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THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST i

A

94i-i945

Military History

By

the

same author:

Military History

The Defence of the United Kingdom The Battle of Britain The Battle of the V-weapons, 1944-45 The Second World War A Military :

(British title

Biography

Leader of the Few

Heavenly Adventurer Brasshat

:

A

History

Short History of the Second

World War)

THE WAR FAR EAST I

A

94

I " I

IN

945

Military History

by Basil Collier

WILLIAM New York

MORROW 1969

& COMPANY,

INC.

THE

Copyright

All rights reserved.

No

©

1968 by Basil Collier

part of this book

may

be reproduced or utilized in any

form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to William Morrow & Company, Inc.,

425 Park Avenue South,

New

York, N.Y. 100 16.

Printed in Great Britain

Library of Congress Catalog Card

Number 69-12551

CONTENTS

Author's Note

xi

Book I

:

Prelude

4

2.

Seeds of Conflict Decline of the West

16

3.

The Undeclared War

3O

4.

Book II Japan Confronts the West Japan, the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Western Democracies

1.

:

5.

Breakdown Book III

6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 1 1

.

The Japanese

:

Offensive,

1941-1942

War

Plans Pearl Harbor, the Philippines,

58 74

Guam

and Wake Borneo

Malaya, Hong Kong and British Northern and Central Malaya Arcadia to Singapore Japan Completes Her Programme

14.

Book IV The Allied Offensive, 1942-1945 Kwajalein to Midway The Solomons and New Guinea The Unforgotten Front

15.

Symbol

16.

New

17.

and the Pacific Islands Burma Changes Hands

94 114 136 160 178 202

:

12. 13.

to Sextant

246 272 314 334

Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago

372 398

v

vi 18. 19.

Destination Tokyo The Last Phase

438 458 Appendices

3.

The Tripartite Pact December 7-8, 1941 The Japanese Armed

4.

The Sextant Programme

1.

2.

:

the Japanese Time-Table Forces on the

Outbreak of War

Short Bibliography Source Notes

Index

480 482 485 492 495 499 518

MAPS

General:

The Far East and

the Western

Pacific

18-19

The Malay Peninsula

110

2.

Oahu and

121

3.

The

4.

Bataan and Corregidor Hong Kong the Mainland

and Central 1.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

Pearl

Harbor

Philippine Islands and Northern Borneo

:

Hong Kong the Island The Jitra Position The Gurun Position :

The Trolak-Slim River Position The Muar-Batu Anam Position The Loss of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade The Assault on Singapore Indonesia and Borneo of Java

14.

The Invasion

15.

West Java

16.

21.

Burma Moulmein The Salween The Bilin River The Sittang Bridge The Allied Retreat from Burma

22.

New Guinea

23.

The Antipodes The Pacific Theatre

17.

18. 19.

20.

24.

to the

Solomons

126 129 150 153 163 167 172 183 187 194 203 212

217 220 224 227 231 233

237 241 247 249

vii

viii

25.

The Attempt on

Port Moresby:

the Japanese Plan 26. The Battle of the Coral Sea: Events of May 5-8 27. The Battle of Midway 28.

Guadalcanal

29.

The

Battle of

30. Port

Moresby

Savo Island to

Buna

Guadalcanal: the October Battle Guadalcanal Western 32. 31.

33. 34. 35.

The Assam-Burma Frontier The Arakan Offensive, 1942-43 The First Chindit Operation

41.

New Guinea and the Northern and Central Solomons Salamaua and the Huon Peninsula The Central Solomons Sattelberg: the Japanese Counter-Offensive, October 1943 Palau to the Ellice Islands The Encirclement of Rabaul

42.

Dumpu

254 257 265 279 283 292 298 309 315 322 328

36. Eastern

37. 38. 39.

340 348 350

48.

364 374 379 385 389 409 416 419 428 432

49.

441

40.

to

Madang

Western New Guinea 44. Operation Ha-Go 45. Imphal and Kohima 43.

46.

47.

Indaw Burma and the Salween Ledo

to

Mandalay-Meiktila Saipan and the Marianas 50. The Battle of Leyte Gulf

452

TABLES

1

.

Organization of British Malaya

December

Command,

1941 2. Organization of British Malaya Command, February 8, 1942 3. Organization of Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army, February 8, 1942 4. The Battle of the Java Sea Japanese and Allied Naval Forces 5. The Battle of the Coral Sea: Organization of Japanese Naval Forces 6. The Battle of the Coral Sea: Organization of Allied Naval Forces 7. The Battle of Midway Island: Organization of Japanese Naval Forces 8. The Battle of Midway Island Organization of Allied Naval Forces 9. The Invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi: Organization of Allied Forces 10. Organization of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade ~ (the Chindits), February 1943 8,

144 191

193

:

214 253

256 263

:

11. 12.

13.

266

274 326 369

The Japanese Merchant Fleet, 1941-1943 Organization of Allied Land Forces in SouthEast Asia, December 1943

400

Organization of Allied Air Forces in SouthEast Asia, December 1943

402

w.f.e.

—

i*

ix

X 14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Organization of Japanese Land Forces in Burma, January 31, 1944 Disposition of Northern Area Combat Command and Attached Forces, May 31, 1944 Organization of Japanese Land Forces in Burma, January 31, 1945 The Battle of the Philippine Sea: American and Japanese Strengths, June 18, ~ 1944 The Japanese Merchant Fleet, 1944-1945

408 425

434

445 461

AUTHOR'S NOTE

THE PURPOSE

of this book is to present, in a single volume, a concise account of the war which convulsed the Far East from 1941 to 1945. Earlier events have been touched upon only insofar as some reference to Japan's embroilment in China, to the yearnings and antagonisms which shaped and marred relations between East and West throughout the ages, is clearly needed to explain the circumstances in which the belligerents found themselves when hostilities began. The campaigns in South-East Asia and the Pacific were fought over vast expanses of land and sea. Burma, which looks so small on maps of Asia, is considerably larger than France and Belgium put together; a ship transferred at the height of the war from the main base of the British Eastern fleet at Kilindini to the American fleet base at Pearl Harbor would have had to steam about 11,000 miles. The men who fought on the Allied side came from places as far apart as the Continental United States, the United Kingdom, Australasia and British India; and they fought under leaders divided by differences of nationality, outlook, background and political allegiance. Hence it is not

MacArthur

the South-West Pacific, Nimitz in the Central Pacific, and Mountbatten in SouthEast Asia seemed at times to be fighting separate wars. I have tried to show that, while attempts by the AngloAmerican Combined Chiefs of Staff to frame a compresurprising that

in

hensive strategy and impose their will not only on the

enemy but

on

own

were by no means uniformly successful, the Japan was none the less one war. Events in Burma and Assam were profoundly influenced by events in the Central Pacific and New also

their

war

side

against

xi

xii

Guinea, even though they may have been still more profoundly influenced by events in Europe and North Africa. It has often been said that victory in war goes to the side which makes the fewer mistakes. The Japanese would scarcely have found it possible to make more mistakes than were made by their opponents; but their errors were fundamental. They mistook the Anglo-Saxon temperament when they supposed that the Western Allies would consent to be despoiled in order to prove that Japan must have a bigger share of the world's markets and raw materials. Many citizens of the United Kingdom and the United States believed that Japan had something of a case; but all Englishmen and all Americans objected very strongly to the methods by which she sought to uphold it. The Allies were willing to be generous, but they wished first to be victorious.

In dealing with the various campaigns, I have made no attempt to apportion space on the basis of the contribution made by each of the Allied nations to a particular campaign or to the war as a whole, but have been guided by a personal assessment of the military interest and significance of the events described. The loss of the Philippines in 1942 has been briefly treated because, notwithstanding a valiant bid by the United States Marine Corps and other American forces to postpone defeat, a successful outcome from the Allied point of view was not to be expected. Conversely, the fighting in Malaya in the same year has been dealt with at some length, because the Allies did expect to hold Singapore, and their failure to do so raises points of

which demand attention. principle, as much space has been devoted to On crucial operations by relatively small American and British Commonwealth forces in the Solomons and New Guinea

and the same

tactical

strategic interest

during the early stages of the Allied offensive as to later operations of greater magnitude in which the issue was never seriously in doubt. The sources I have used include material accumulated over a period of twenty years and more. For the benefit of students of war I have aimed at giving a reference to an

xiii

authoritative

and generally

accessible published source for

every material statement of fact whose provenance is not but this does not mean that only such sources have been consulted. Published reminiscences apart, I am indebted to eye-witnesses at various levels who have given me the benefit of their observations and experience. The bibliography is far from comprehensive. It includes those books which I have found most useful, and a number to which readers may refer for a different interpretation of the facts or additional detail. Some of these contain useful bibliographies and lists of documents. self-evident;

The maps have been drawn from my rough

Mr

N.

S.

equally rough draft by

Mrs

F.

M. Brown.

I

by

sketches

Hyslop; the manuscript was typed from

am

my

grateful to

them, and to all who have placed me in their debt by reading the manuscript or proofs, compiling the index, or helping to prepare material for the printer. B.C.

BOOK

I

PRELUDE

I

SEEDS OF CONFLICT

f\

fm

LMOST FROM the beginning of recorded

time, the West has hankered after contact with lands of reputed wealth and splendour east of Suez. Whether, in a broad sense, the East has gained more than it has lost by the exchanges thus inspired will always be debatable. It remains true that for many centuries trade between East and West, although profitable to both Eastern and Western merchants, brought only doubtful benefits to the economies of Western societies. For example, as early as the third century of the Christian era Oriental silks and spices found eager buyers throughout the Roman Empire, where they soon came to be regarded as indispensable accompaniments of gracious living. As the r est had little or nothing to offer in exchange that was acceptable in Eastern markets, these goods had to be paid for almost entirely by the export of gold or silver. 1 Thus the Roman Treasury, often hard put to find the means of rewarding officials and legionaries for their services, was exposed to a constant drain, while the coffers of the Chinese Empire were correspondingly enriched. Even after the secrets of silk manufacture had been smuggled to Europe by way of Syria, the West was far from achieving a favourable trade balance with the East. When intercourse between East and West was resumed after the Dark Ages, the commodities most in demand in Western markets were pepper, nutmegs, cinnamon and cloves. So far as seaborne supplies were concerned, the Venetian Republic obtained a virtual monopoly of these by concluding a treaty with the Mamelukes of Egypt, who controlled traffic through the Red Sea. A limited quantity of goods reached Europe, however, by arduous overland

W

4

THE MIDDLE AGES

5

and in 1336 the Genoese gained a foothold in the Far East by establishing a settlement in southern China. Whether Venice can be said, in any but a poetic sense, to have held the gorgeous East in fee seems doubtful. Certainly Venetian merchants made large profits, but only by charging even more exorbitant prices than they had to routes,

pay.

At the end of the fifteenth century the Portugese Vasco da Gama broke the Venetian monopoly by sailing round the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean. This exploit opened a new chapter in international relations, and was the indirect cause of

many

reproaches afterwards levelled

Europeans by Eastern peoples. But, ruthless though many of the merchant venturers who followed Vasco da Gama's example proved to be, it would be wrong to picture at

them

as mere pillagers, intent on depriving guileless Orientals of their possessions. Trade, not conquest or colonization, was their aim. They soon found, however,

that they could trade securely with the Far East only

by

establishing quasi-permanent settlements which served both as markets and as ports of refuge for their ships. One reason was that the routes to the China Seas swarmed with Moslem predators whose activities ranged from outright

piracy to attempts to levy tribute. At the same time, Oriental potentates unwittingly laid the foundations of a system of extraterritorial privileges for Europeans by insisting that foreign merchants should transact their business entirely at specified places where their activities could be controlled

and customs duties levied. However, even in the age of the merchant venturers the West's concern with the East was not prompted solely by hopes of material gain. In the Middle Ages and later, Western

strategists

regarded trade with the Far East as a

means of driving a wedge through the Moslem world for the benefit of Christendom. Popes and kings encouraged commerce with Cathay and the Indies not only as a source of wealth, but also as a contribution to the ideological struggle between Cross and Crescent. But again, the wealth derived from these transactions

6

SEEDS OF CONFLICT

was not always such a clear gain to the West as it was thought to be at a time when the distinction between private profit and the public interest had been little studied. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Portugese were able to finance their Far Eastern trade only by acting as carriers and middlemen for Oriental customers. The Dutch, unable to gain a commanding share of the China trade in face of Portugese rivalry, were driven to various expedients which led them to acquire, almost by accident, a vast empire in Indonesia. The English, as latecomers, met even greater difficulties in China, and in consequence soon sought a more promising field in India. It was not, however, until the end of the eighteenth century or later that, largely as a result of the phenomenal expansion of their textile industry which followed attempts by Parliament to ban the importation of printed calicoes and muslins, the English were able to sell more goods east of Suez than they bought. This reversal of the familiar pattern of East- West trade had far-reaching consequences. For the first time large tracts of Asia, and especially British India, became for the West not merely sources of raw materials and finished or partly finished goods, but profitable export markets. The lead gained by British manufacturers and exporters at the dawn of the Industrial Age gave them exceptional opportunities of meeting demands created by new methods of production and distribution which put the luxuries of yesterday within reach of the toiling masses. At the same time the Chinese Empire, hitherto the dominant power in the Far East, lost her pre-eminence: not only was she outstripped on the technical side but her administrative system no longer sufficed to maintain the authority of the central government and check abuses. The rivalry between the old Chinese Empire and a new British Empire came to a head in the so-called Opium Wars of the nineteenth century. But the Opium Wars, although precipitated by the determination of Western merchants to engage in a profitable traffic frowned upon by the Chinese Imperial government for economic as well as moral reasons,

1839-1869

7

really wars about opium. As a former American Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, pointed out of the first of them, they were wars about prestige. 2 They asserted the imperative claim of British, French, American and other Western merchants to be allowed to live and trade in China without interference from the agents of a government which had persistently refused to enter into diplomatic relations with the West on terms of equality. When the second Chinese War ended in 1860 with the defeat of Chinese Imperial forces by British and French troops, the Chinese government was constrained to agree that foreign

were not

envoys should be allowed to reside at Peking and should not be required to kow-tow to the Emperor. The government also confirmed the right, already granted to foreign merchants, to be tried in their own courts, and increased the number of ports at which foreigners were allowed to trade from five to seventeen. The British received a few square miles of the Chinese mainland opposite the island of Hong Kong, which had been ceded to the British Crown at the end of the first Chinese War in 1842. Half a century later, Chinese who held strong views about foreign imperialists bitterly criticized the government of the day for making these concessions. At the time, however, large numbers of Chinese regarded the presence of foreign merchants as anything but a disadvantage. Throughout the war of 1856-1860 the British remained on excellent terms with the Chinese business community. They continued to trade with Chinese merchants, and were even able to negotiate a lease of Chinese territory as a base for military operations against the Imperial government. Furthermore, the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British resulted in its transformation from a barren island into a thriving settlement inhabited by a million British subjects of Chinese origin.

During a great part of the four centuries or so which divided the Convention of Peking from the beginning of Western economic penetration of East Asia, the Japanese remained aloof from Western influences, When the Portu-

SEEDS OF CONFLICT

8

first established themselves in the Far East, Japan was generally regarded in China as a land of pirates. The

gese

Mongol Emperor Khubilai Khan had made two attempts to invade Japan in the thirteenth century, but failed on both occasions to overcome the difficulty of launching an expedi-

an uncommanded sea.* Among educated Japanese there was none the less a traditional respect for China as the source from which Japan had drawn her tion

across

culture.

In 1542 some Portugese sailors were cast ashore in Japan and were well treated there. Missionaries and traders followed. At first these, too, were well received. They found the Japanese a polite, gay, friendly and artistic people, given to hospitality and receptive to new ideas. 3 Japanese merchants were quick to see that they had much to gain by entrusting their cargoes to well-armed Portugese ships.

Moreover, as Japan was in the midst of a protracted civil war, Europeans were welcomed by both sides as potential allies whose knowledge of firearms might prove extremely valuable.

The civil war ended

early in the seventeenth century with

Tokugawa family. Once Tokugawa made up their minds

a clear victory for the powerful firmly in the saddle, the

no challenge must be offered to the authority of the Shogun, or hereditary Commander-in-Chief, who ruled the country in the name of an Emperor all-powerful in theory, that

but in practice relegated to the status of a quasi-divine In order to rid the country of disturbing influences, they banished Portugese missionaries and traders, forbade the building of large ocean-going ships, and decreed the death penalty for any Japanese who tried to go abroad. From 1641 no Europeans were allowed in Japan except a few Dutch merchants, who were confined to the island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay. For more than two centuries these, with a few Chinese merchants, provided the only recognized means of contact between Japan and the father-figure.

outside world. Whether the outside world * See p. 461.

would consent

to

be kept at

JAPAN bay

for

an

indefinite period

9

was another matter. As early

1649 the Russians established a base at Okhotsk, in Kamchatka, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin they went on to show an embarrassing interest in the approaches to Japan. In 1739 a Russian ship was seen off the coast of Honshu. 4 A generation later, in 1771, a Polish exile made a daring escape from Siberia in a captured government vessel. On his way to freedom in Madagascar he landed briefly in Japan, was kindly treated, and made remarks which were taken to mean that the Russians had designs on the country. 5 Subsequent attempts by Russian envoys to establish commercial and diplomatic ties with Japan were treated with reserve. Moreover the Russians, although genuinely eager to trade with the Japanese, did not improve their chances by raiding Japanese settlements in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands in 1806 and claiming to take possession of the Kuriles in the name of the Tsar. 6 In 1825 the Bakufu, as the Shogun's government was called, ordered the armed forces to fire without hesitation on any ship which approached the coast anywhere except at Nagasaki. 7 It happened that fears of Russian aggression reached their peak at a time when the minds of educated Japanese were attuned to change. In the second half of the eighteenth century a series of floods, storms, earthquakes and other natural disasters in Japan aroused feelings akin to the wave of enlightened scepticism which swept through western Europe after the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. At the same time it became widely known that the coast defences were extremely weak. The result was that doubt was cast on a system of government which relegated the divine Emperor to a minor role and exalted the all-too-fallible Shogun. Believing that the country was in danger, Japanese thinkers asked themselves whether it could be right that the supreme political power should be exercised by a Commander-inChief who might be better employed in attending to his as

eastern Siberia. After exploring

military duties.

Faith in the collective

wisdom of

the Bakufu suffered a

further decline when, in 1837, a ship chartered by

American

10

SEEDS OF CONFLICT

was twice fired upon, although she was known to be unarmed. In response to something akin to popular demand, the 'fire without hesitation rule" was then relaxed, although the Russians were still feared. Such was the state of affairs when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Shogun and his critics learned that the American naval squadron in Chinese waters was about to pay a visit to Japan. Opinion as to the proper response to this gesture was divided. There were, however, many Japanese who held that friendship with the well-armed Americans would, at worst, be better than acquiescence in the designs of the equally well-armed Russians. Moreover, as the coast defences were incapable of repelling modern warships, it was difficult to see that the authorities could do anything but arrange an appropriate diplomatic welcome. A squadron of four American warships, commanded by Commodore Matthew G. Perry, duly appeared on July 8, 1853, and cast anchor in Yedo Bay (now Tokyo Bay). missionaries to repatriate Japanese castaways

4

Commodore

Perry carried, in addition to his credentials, a letter from President Millard Fillmore to the Shogun, and also a letter from himself in which he made it clear that he was determined to secure good treatment for distressed American seamen and some facilities for navigation and trade. He added that he would return with a larger force in the following spring and would expect then to recieve a favourable reply. Perry's confidence was justified. The Japanese authorities, well aware that their guns and forts were useless against European or American ships and that a single modern warship could starve out the city of Yedo by interrupting its food supplies, had no choice but to comply with his politely phrased demands. When Perry returned in 1854, he was received not merely with courtesy but with intense interest, almost with enthusiasm. Towards the end of the negotiations gifts were exchanged. The Japanese proffered such Oriental products as silks and porcelain; the Americans gave rifles, pistols, a miniature locomotive, liqueurs and a hundred gallons of

,

1854-1894

11

They also treated the Japanese to a minstrel show. 8 Finally, on March 31a treaty was signed which gave the

whisky.

Americans access to two ports, limited facilities for trade, and the right of consular representation in Japan. Treaties with Britain, Russia and the Netherlands followed in October 1854, February 1855 and November 1855 respectively. Thus the Russians, who had made up their minds to court Japan in order to offset British and American influence in the Far East, had to go almost to the end of the queue.

The

conclusion of the treaties was followed by a period of turmoil in Japan. At the end of it the Japanese transformed their way of life with a speed and thoroughness doubly astonishing in a deeply conservative people to whom tradition was dear. The Shogunate was abolished in favour of a constitutional monarchy which did not decrease but, on the contrary, enhanced the Emperor's powers; quasifeudal institutions were swept away; the right and obligation to bear arms ceased to be a prerogative of the hereditary military caste. With startling rapidity Japan provided herself with a conscript army modelled partly on the French but largely on the German pattern, and a navy organized

on British lines. Thus Japan, emerging from more than two centuries of equipped herself within a generation to take the place of China as the dominant power in the Far East. The question was whether the Western powers and Russia would allow her to do so.

isolation,

The

first test

came

in 1894,

when an

insurrection broke

out in Korea. The Japanese claimed that the Chinese, by sending a small force to help the government to restore order, had violated an agreement of 1885 which forbade either country to intervene without prior consultation. They declared war on China and soundly defeated her on land and sea. Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war, China ceded Formosa and the Pescadores and agreed to pay a large indemnity. She also agreed to cede a tract of territory in Manchuria. But the Russians

12

SEEDS OF CONFLICT

objected to the transfer of any part of the Asiatic mainland to Japan France and Germany supported Russia and in face of diplomatic pressure the Japanese were forced to withdraw their claim. The Russians then obtained from China a lease of part of the territory denied to Japan, while the British, the French and the Germans also gained concessions at the expense of the moribund Chinese Empire. The Japanese, fearing that Russia's next step might be to annex Korea, then cast about for a means of averting such a calamity. In 1902 the British, also distrustful of Russian intentions, abandoned their policy of splendid isolation and concluded with Japan a treaty which provided for mutual support should either country become involved in a war to protect Chinese or Korean interests and be attacked by a power not originally a party to the dispute. Meanwhile the Japanese pressed the Russians for an undertaking not to exclude them from Manchurian markets which they regarded as a natural outlet for their products. They obtained no satisfaction. In 1904 they broke off the negotiations with startling abruptness; launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far Eastern Fleet; invested Port Arthur; and drove the Russians from Mukden with heavy losses. The Russians hoped to retrieve the situation by sending their Baltic Fleet half-way round the world to Vladivostok, but the Japanese under Admiral Togo intercepted it near Tsushima Island and won a resounding victory at a trifling cost. Largely on American advice, but with some additional prompting from the British, the Japanese then concluded, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a treaty by which the Russians renounced their interest in Port Arthur and their claims to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin. Japan and Russia agreed that Manchuria was to be regarded as an integral part of China. These terms, although highly detrimental to Russia, were generally regarded in Japan as too lenient. Once again, it was felt, a combination of non- Asiatic powers had deprived Japan of the full rewards of victory. Nevertheless Japan remained on excellent terms with ;

;

1905-1911

13

Russo-Japanese War the British, sensitive danger of a Russian invasion of India across the North- West Frontier, agreed to replace the limited alliance of 1902 by a full-blooded mutual assistance pact. This was to take effect in the event of an unprovoked threat to British or Japanese interests either in East Asia or Britain. After the

to the long-term

in India.

Meanwhile the age-old Chinese Empire was crumbling death of the Dowager-Empress in 1908 China was left without a ruler until, some three years later, the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen succeeded in establishing a loose ascendancy over the provincial war lords who struggled for power. How long he would be able to hold out against the forces of disruption was uncertain. There was, however, general agreement among the great powers that the integrity of China must, if possible, be preserved in order to prevent the country from becoming a bone of contention among nations. At the same time relations between Japan and the United States became less cordial, partly in consequence of a decision by the American authorities to segregate the to decay. After the

children ofJapanese settlers in California in special schools.

When

the British renewed their treaty with

Japan

in 1911

they tried, therefore, to set American misgivings at rest by on a clause to the effect that Britain should not, in any circumstances, be called upon to declare war on a country with which she had concluded an arbitration treaty. This did not satisfy the Americans, who refused to conclude an arbitration treaty with the British. Thus it insisting

remained possible that one day Britain might have to choose between making war on her former American colonies and giving up her alliance with Japan.

2

DECLINE OF THE WEST

N THE OUTBREAK War

of the First World

1914, the Japanese hastened to throw in their lot with the Franco-British alliance and to occupy a number of German possessions in the Pacific in

and the Far East. Soon afterwards they confronted the weak Chinese government with demands which, had they been fully met, would have made China virtually the vassal of Japan. Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China evoked a storm of protest from the great powers. The Japanese then agreed to cast some of their demands in a form less obnoxious to the outside world, but offered an exposition of their aims and motives which left the Western powers still uneasy and dissatisfied. In return for Japanese naval help in the Mediterranean the British agreed, however, to support Japan's claim to the former German concession in Shantung. Japan's action was particularly alarming to the Americans. The United States had become a Far Eastern power by acquiring the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century, and her policy was to preserve the integrity of China. Moreover, the threat of Japanese expansion came at a time when relations between the United States and Britain had become uneasy as a result of British insistence that American exports to Europe should be confined to customers of whom the British approved. President Woodrow Wilson was uncomfortably aware that, in the last analysis, the United States depended on the sufferance of the Royal Navy to give safe passage to her cargoes. He was also uncomfortably aw are of the growing naval strength of Japan. Disregarding the opinion of his confidential r

16

Sea of Okhotsk.

SAKHALIN

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MARIANA

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS Pearl Harbor

Mr**/.

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Satpan.

Guam MARSHALL]

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Kwajalein \

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Equator

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DECLINE OF THE WEST

20

Conference, President Wilson was bitterly attacked for allowing the Shantung concession to go to Japan. Despite efforts which left him broken in health, he was unable to persuade the Senate to ratify the treaty. The United States then withdrew into isolation, and soon afterwards adopted legislation which severely restricted immigration from European countries and closed the door to settlers of

Asiatic origin.

In the winter of 1920-2 1 the British government grappled with the problem of American naval expansion, described by Lloyd George as the most important and most difficult the Committee of Imperial Defence had ever had to face. Lloyd George and his colleagues came to the conclusion that the United Kingdom, with half the population of the United States, could not afford to build ship-for-ship with the Americans. They decided, therefore, to seek agreement with the United States on naval disarmament, if necessary at the cost of sacrificing the Japanese alliance. In the summer of 1921 they also decided, in principle, to establish a first-class naval base at Singapore as an insurance against trouble with Japan. 2 The Washington Conference, held in the winter of 1921-22, was intended by its American sponsors to deal with all aspects of disarmament. But the French made it clear that, as the refusal of the United States to ratify the Versailles Treaty had deprived them of British and American guarantees which were to have come into effect on ratification, they were not prepared to consider any reduction of their land forces. Accordingly, only naval

disarmament was discussed.

Under

the terms of the Naval Treaty of Washington,

signed on February 6, 1922, the leading naval powers agreed that no battleship or battlecruiser built by any of them to replace existing ships within the next ten years should displace more than 35,000 tons, and that the tonnages of their battlefleets should not exceed the following totals

THE WASHINGTON TREATIES Great Britain United States

525,000 525,000 315,000 175,000 175,000

Japan France Italy

They

also agreed to build

no new

21

tons tons tons tons tons

aircraft carriers dis-

placing more than 27,000 tons, and to limit the tonnages of their carrier fleets in

much

the

same proportions

capital ships. Partly in deference to

as for

French objections, no

were placed on cruisers, destroyers, or submarines, except that no ship which did not rank as a battleship or battlecruiser was to displace more than 10,000 tons or carry guns of a greater calibre than eight inches. The naval treaty also dealt with fortifications and bases insofar as these affected relations with Japan. Broadly, its restrictions

terms left the British free to carry out their intentions at Singapore but not to extend their existing naval base at Hong Kong or found new bases in the Pacific islands; forbade the Japanese to establish new bases or add to existing facilities in Formosa, the Pescadores and the

and Ryukyu Islands and gave the Americans a free hand in the Hawaiian Islands but not in their other insular possessions in the Pacific. No restrictions were placed on the establishment or extension of bases and fortifications in Australia, New Zealand, the Japanese homeland, Alaska, Canada, the Continental United States, or the Panama Canal Zone. Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not mentioned in the documents signed at Washington, the Japanese understood very well before the conference opened that nothing but embarrassment could come of any proposal to renew it. As a solace which could not take the place of the alliance but might help to save their faces, they were offered, and accepted, a Four-Power Treaty in which the British Commonwealth, France, Japan and the United Kurile, Bonin

;

States affirmed each country's existing rights in the Pacific;

agreed to refer to a joint conference any dispute between them arising from those rights; and undertook to concert counter-measures in the event of a threat from an outside

22

DECLINE OF THE WEST

power. Finally, Belgium, China, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal joined the parties to the Four-Power Treaty in concluding a Nine-Power Treaty which pledged signatories to respect the sovereignty, rights, interests and integrity of a China.

Thereupon Japan relinquished the Shantung concession to the Chinese, who had always maintained that China alone had the right to decide who should hold the concession when the Germans were forced to part with it. Rights and privileges arising from treaties and conventions to which China was an assenting party, on the other hand, were not affected by the Nine-Power Treaty. Accordingly, the Japanese were not called upon to give up their interest in Manchuria, where they controlled the Southern Manchurian Railway and foreigners whose countries had come to terms with the Chinese Imperial government during the era of gunboat diplomacy continued to enjoy extraterritorial privileges at the treaty ports. Japan, whose forces had played a major part in relieving the besieged ;

legation quarter at Peking during the Boxer risings of 1900, qualified for such

was among the powers whose nationals privileges.

Japan also retained her hold on the mandated islands north of the equator. Thus she remained astride American communications with the Far East. As Britain had, in effect, agreed to share command of the sea with the United States and could not be expected to maintain her role as guardian of the world's maritime trade unless the Americans made a substantial contribution, this was a disadvantage from both the British and the American points of view. However, Japan depended so much on imported raw materials that she was thought unlikely to adopt a menacing attitude at the cost of falling out with two or more of her chief suppliers. When the British Committee of Imperial Defence discussed the future of Singapore in 1925 the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, was asked, in effect, what would happen if Japan's eagerness to gain a dominant position in China led her to contemplate a breach of the Nine-Power Treaty. In substance his answer

1922-1932

23

was that a major clash in the Far East at some future date was not inconceivable, but that meanwhile any action by Japan which threatened British interests in China would also threaten American interests. By acting together, Britain and the United States should, he thought, be able to ensure that nothing done by Japan in China was offensive to them. However, when it came to the point Britain and the United States did not find it easy to act together. One reason was that a traditional distrust of entangling alliances made American statesmen reluctant to act in concert with the British, even where they saw that action was needed. Another reason was that before long both countries lacked the physical means of acting resolutely in defence of their Far Eastern interests. For many years after 1922 neither the Americans nor the British maintained their navies at the maximum level permitted by treaty, and the naval base at Singapore and its defences received only intermittent attention. Largely on financial and economic grounds, from 1919 to 1932 successive British governments accepted, and from 1928 they annually affirmed, the assumption that there would be no great war involving the British Empire for at least ten years.

For nearly a decade after the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty Japan, too, was ruled by governments reluctant to embark on programmes of military expansion. Many Japanese, distressed by the breakdown of the AngloJapanese alliance, believed that the government had acted too hastily in pressing its claims on China during the First World War. Moreover, for some years Japanese governments were no more willing than British governments to spend large sums on armaments. During the nineteentwenties schemes for the modernization of the army were held up for lack of funds. Retrenchment programmes adopted in 1922 and 1925 reduced the army's peacetime strength by four divisions. 3 Officers complained that their troops were ill clothed and badly fed, that they themselves could barely live on their pay, that modern machine-guns, aircraft, tanks and wireless equipment were lacking. 4 Some also complained that the interests of the army, and of the

24

DECLINE OF THE WEST

landowning and peasant classes from which the army was were being sacrificed to those of the urban and its employers. As both of the two leading proletariat political parties were known to be closely linked with the four or five great business houses which dominated Japanese industry, one effect of these misgivings was that a number of officers were attracted by movements which condemned the tie-up between politics and Big Business. Among these movements was the Aikyojuku, or School of Lovers of the Native Land. Founded in 1931, but foreshadowed earlier in the writings of its founder, Kosaburo Tachibana, the Aikyojuku stood for a more equitable distribution of incomes, a better balance between town and country, and pressure on the West to share out the world's raw materials on terms which Britain and the United States would scarcely have conceded except under compulsion. largely drawn,

In 1929 the Socialist leader

Ramsay MacDonald became

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for the second time. Believing that fleets and armies were a source of danger rather than of safety, MacDonald convened an international disarmament conference in London, suspended work on the Singapore base as a gesture of goodwill, and offered to lead the

way towards

a general scaling

down

of

armaments by accepting a limit of fifty cruisers in place of the seventy which his expert advisers considered the essential minimum. As a government which favoured accommodation with the West still held office in Tokyo, Japan, agreed to manage with fewer cruisers. Such was the state of affairs when the effects of the disastrous Wall Street crash of October 1929 began to be felt in Japan. Against a background of dwindling fortunes and declining trade, the world's leading naval powers agreed under the London Naval Treaty of April 1930 to build no capital ship replacements before 193 7. 5 In too,

addition, the British

Commonwealth, the United

States

and

Japan undertook not to outbuild each other in destroyers and submarines, and accepted limitations which gave the British Commonwealth and the United States each about one and a half times the permitted cruiser tonnage of

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY

25

It was also agreed that a further naval conference should be held in 1935. When that year came the Japanese refused, however, to take part in the proceedings unless they were granted at the outset a naval parity which the other powers were not willing to concede. A glaring defect of the agreement reached in 1930 was that it was clearly illogical that the cruiser strengths of countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan, which lived by foreign trade, should be determined by reference to the number of cruisers needed by a country such as the United States, whose economy was self-supporting. In England the treaty, although unpalatable to the wellinformed, was accepted with customary British phlegm. In Japan, however, the Chief of the Naval Staff resigned his post as a protest against its acceptance by the government and its ratification by the Privy Council. The outcome was a controversy in which the right of civilian ministers to disregard opinions tendered by the service chiefs was called in question. The constitution laid down the principle that the size of the armed forces should be determined by the Emperor, who always acted on advice. The consensus of opinion in naval and military circles was that, where issues affecting the national security were at stake, such advice should be tendered not by the Cabinet but by the Chiefs of Staff, who had direct access to the Emperor and were intended by the framers of the constitution to be his advisers on naval and military ques-

Japan.

tions. 6

Opinion in Tokyo was

disturbed by the shock of this controversy when mysterious happenings occurred in Manchuria, where the Japanese were allowed by international agreement to maintain a force known as the Kwantung Army for the purpose of guarding the South Manchurian Railway and protecting other Japanese still

interests.

On

September

18, 1931,

stretch of the railway.

an explosion wrecked a short

The Kwantung Army promptly

exchanged shots with Chinese troops, whose officers afterwards alleged that the Japanese had staged the explosion

26

DECLINE OF THE WEST

in order to provoke a clash.

went on

to

The Kwantung Army then

occupy Mukden and other

strategic points.

Irrespective of the truth of the Chinese allegations,

it

lost control over the Kwantung Army. In these circumstances the obvious remedy for the Western powers was to exhort the Japanese government, through diplomatic channels, to reassert its authority and offer amends if the Kwantung Army proved to be at fault. The Chinese government, however, acted so swiftly that the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty were given little time to concert their policies. On September 21, only three days after the explosion, China appealed to the League of Nations, and on September 30 the Council of the League called upon Japan to withdraw her troops from Manchuria. This public rebuke played into the hands of extremists in Tokyo by affronting opinion in Japan. Sustained by a large measure of popular approval, the Kwantung Army proceeded to occupy the whole of Manchuria and set up a puppet government to administer the occupied territories under the name of Manchukuo. In theory, the Western powers could still have upheld the Nine-Power Treaty by exerting economic pressure on Japan. In practice, an embargo on trade with Japan would have been extremely unpopular on both sides of the Atlantic at a time when millions of people were out of work and thousands of employers struggling to make ends meet. The American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, did tentatively propose economic sanctions, but in terms which the British government seems to have thought too vague to be worthy of serious consideration. 7 Moreover British statesmen and officials, aware that British interests in the Far East and the Antipodes could not be adequately defended until the Singapore base was ready, were in any case reluctant to see anything done that might lead to war. 8 The Chinese followed up their appeal to the League of Nations by instituting a boycott of Japanese goods. On January 18, 1932, this led to a riot at Shanghai. The Japanese demanded the withdrawal of the boycott and the

seemed clear that Tokyo had

SHANGHAI AND MANCHUKUO

27

suppression of anti-Japanese associations. As the Chinese did not reply, they reinforced the small naval party assigned to the protection of Japanese interests in the International Settlement, and presented an ultimatum. The Chinese

accepted the ultimatum, but shots were exchanged a few hours later between their troops and Japanese sailors moving to positions just outside the International Settlement. Thereupon the Japanese, declaring that lives and property were at stake, despatched from Japan an expeditionary force of one division and one independent brigade, afterwards reinforced by another two divisions. The expeditionary force began to land near Shanghai on February 7, 1932. It rapidly advanced about twelve miles inland, driving the Chinese before it. Eventually British, American, French and Italian mediators persuaded both sides to stop fighting and conclude an armistice. About the end of May the Japanese withdrew their troops from the neighbourhood of Shanghai, though not

from Manchuria.

Meanwhile the Japanese government became increashome. In January two prominent industrialists were murdered by members of the Aikyojuku. 9 Thereafter ministers hesitated to take action for fear of stirring up more trouble. On May 15 civilian demonstrators, joined by members of the armed forces, roamed through the streets of Tokyo. The Prime Minister, K. Inukai, was assassinated. A group of army officers then brought party government to an end by persuading Prince K. Saionji, the sole survivor of a college of elders responsible for advising the Emperor about such matters, that any attempt by party politicians to assert their authority was bound to lead to fresh disingly incapable of controlling the situation at

Emperor, who commanded the was the prisoner of a constitution which precluded hirn from acting without advice, appointed a non-party government with an admiral and a general as its leading members. Four months later the new government formally recognized Manchukuo. In March 1933, after a commission

orders. 10 Accordingly the

fanatical loyalty of all Japanese but

W.F.E.

— 2*

28

DECLINE OF THE WEST

appointed by the League of Nations had reported that

Manchukuo was an

artificial

existence solely to the

creation which

Kwantung Army,

owed

its

the Assembly

of the League passed a resolution condemning Japanese aggression against China. Thereupon Japan gave notice of her impending withdrawal from the League. Her forces then pressed southwards, occupied the Chinese province ofJehol, and encroached upon the Chinese homeland south of the Great Wall. In the same year the modernization of the Japanese Army, for which its leaders had long

been pressing, was at

last

put in hand. 11

As a result of these events the British government, warned by the Chiefs of Staff that the crisis at Shanghai was "the writing on the wall", discarded the assumption that there would be no great war for ten years and agreed that work on the Singapore base and its defences should be resumed. Finally, in November 1933 the government appointed a committee to advise it how to remedy the worst deficiencies in the national and imperial defences. But the committee did not report until February 1934, and it was not until 1935 or later that the British rearmament drive can really be said to have got under way. In the United States, too, practically no attempt to meet the danger of an armed conflict with Japan was made until at least two or three years after the Japanese had begun to strengthen and reorganize their army.

3

THE UNDECLARED WAR

I 1

jlJRING THE

^ Japanese

"lost years" when the Kwantung Army was over-

running Manchuria and the Western powers were marking time, the Chinese Nationalist government was intermittently in conflict with Communist rebels and had only a loose hold over the outlying provinces of the old Chinese Empire on either side of the Great Wall. At the same time, protests from the League of Nations and the United States did nothing to halt the Japanese. In the early summer of 1933 Chiang Kai-shek decided, therefore, to buy a respite by making a truce with the invaders. The Japanese were not unwilling. With a peacetime army of seventeen divisions and four independent brigades, 1 they could not hope to occupy the whole of China. Moreover, not even the extremists favoured a prolonged war with Chiang Kai-shek. Their aim was to bring about a situation which would force the Western powers to abandon the principle of the "open door" and compel them and Chiang Kai-shek to concede Japan's claim to a special position as the dominant power in the Far East. 2 From 1933 to 1936 the Japanese aimed at consolidating their hold on Manchuria, and at the same time countering Communist influences in the northern provinces by setting up anti-Communist buffer states between Manchukuo and Nationalist China and along the south-east frontier of the Soviet-controlled Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia. As a result of these efforts, secessionist trends in Inner Mongolia and North Chahar crystallized in a separatist movement led by Mongol chieftains and backed by the Kwantung Army. In addition a Japanese puppet administration came into being in East Hopei, on the borders of 30

1933-1936

31

Manchukuo. Elsewhere in the provinces of Chahar and Hopei, the Japanese had to be content with persuading the Nanking government to acquiesce in the creation of a Political Council whose attitude towards Japan was conciliatory rather than submissive. 3 This was headed by General Sung Cheh-yuan, commander of the Chinese Twenty-Ninth Army and responsible to Chiang Kai-shek for the defence of Peking and Tientsin. From 1935 the Japanese pressed Chiang Kai-shek to come to terms with them on the basis of a three-point programme which would pledge the Nanking government Manchukuo, and make common cause with Japan against Communism. Even if the Japanese were right in thinking that these proposals were not unattractive to Chiang Kai-shek, 4 such a bargain was not likely to appeal to the large number of his disciples who had already protested vigorously against his truce with the Kwantung Army. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek had some reason to hope that he might soon be strong enough to insist on terms more acceptable to the to repress anti-Japanese activities, recognize

great mass of his supporters. In 1934 the British government granted him substantial credits for railways and exports; in 1935 a British financial expert, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, travelled to China to reform the Chinese currency. Additional funds for railway construction came from Belgian, French and German sources, and both the

Germans and the Italians were willing war materials and military advisers. 5

to help

by providing

In these circumstances Chiang Kai-shek was in no hurry programme. He had not yet done so when, towards the end of 1936, Japanese influence in the northern provinces suffered a sharp decline. In November ©f that year an Inner Mongolian secessionist force, led by to accept the three-point

the

the

Mongol chieftain Prince Teh and covertly assisted by Kwantung Army, marched into the province of Suiyuan

and was soundly defeated by the Chinese forces there. This lowered the standing of the Kwantung Army, strengthened anti-Japanese elements in the Nanking government, and encouraged Chinese Communists to hope that Nanking

32

THE UNDECLARED WAR

might yet be converted to their policy of a China united against the Japanese invaders. When Chiang Kai-shek was mysteriously kidnapped a few weeks later by Communist freebooters under a Chinese war-lord, the Communist leaders insisted that he should be released, but took the opportunity of impressing their views on him. According to the Japanese Consul-General at Hankow, the kidnapping was arranged by the Communist International, or Comintern, precisely for that purpose, and led to a fruitful interview between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist spokesman Chou En-lai. 6 This episode was followed by a significant improvement in relations between the Nationalist government and their Communist rivals. The Japanese, already disconcerted by the visit of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross and the Suiyuan affair, were thus confronted with the danger of a Nationalistic Communist link-up and perhaps even an eventual accord between Nationalist China and the Soviet Union. In the meantime spokesmen of the German National Socialist government had approached the Japanese with proposals for a pact to be directed ostensibly against the Communist International, but in reality against Soviet Russia. At first unwilling to enter into such an agreement unless it were supported by other powers with Far Eastern interests, the Japanese sounded the British and the Dutch. 7 But the British were unresponsive. As for the Dutch, although at first they were attracted by the prospect of

Communist activities in south-east Asia and Indonesia, they refused to have anything more to do with the pact when they saw that adherence to it might involve them in a clash between Germany and Russia. 8

restricting

Although none of this was encouraging, the Japanese overcame their misgivings. On November 25, 1936, they concluded an Anti- Comintern Pact with Germany alone. The published articles of the pact dealt with methods of countering the subversive activities of the Communist International, for which Moscow officially disclaimed

But secret articles bound Germany and give no help to the Russians should either country

responsibility.

Japan

to

THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT become the

33

an unprovoked attack or an unprovoked threat by the Soviet Union, and not to conclude, except by mutual consent, any treaty with the Soviet Union which contravened the spirit of that undertaking. Both the published and the secret articles were to remain in force for object of

five years.

As things turned out, this arrangement did nothing to advance Japanese interests. The Russians, almost certainly aware of the secret articles and in any case well able to divine the anti-Soviet implications of the pact, retaliated

by suspending negotiations for the renewal of a fisheries agreement much prized in Japan. Thus the effect of the Anti- Comintern Pact on Japan was to complete the isolation which her action in Manchuria and her withdrawal from the League of Nations and the London Naval Conference had begun. Nor did she receive the doubtful compensation of a military alliance with Germany. The pact did not pledge the Germans to withold military supplies or withdraw German military advisers from Nanking in the event of a further clash between Japan and Nationalist China. Nor did it place them under any obligation to give active support to Japan in the event of a clash between Japan and Russia. In these circumstances the Japanese government and General Staff came to the conclusion that Japan's policy in China must be to avoid any action that might increase the risk of joint action against her by the Soviet Union and a unified China. In June 1937 an emissary of the General Staff was despatched to China to impress upon the North China Garrison Army the importance of staying out of trouble. 9

Under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, Japan was entitled to maintain in North China a force capable of providing a legation guard at Peking and protecting communications between Peking and the sea. This force, the North China Garrison Army, was distinct from the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, and was based on

Tientsin.

34

THE UNDECLARED WAR

In the summer of 1937 the Garrison Army comprised about 7,000 of all ranks, organized in one infantry brigade of two regiments, with supporting arms. With the consent of the Chinese Twenty-Ninth Army, one battalion had taken up a position at Fengtai, on the Peking-Tientsin railway a few miles south of Peking. The Japanese wished to establish themselves in permanent quarters between the Peking-Tientsin and Peking-Hankow railways, presumably so that they could dominate both routes to Peking in case of trouble. Local landowners refused, however, to sell or lease them land on which to build barracks and an airfield. According to a Chinese source, the Garrison Army asked in vain for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the neighbourhood of the Peking-Hankow railway and the Marco Polo bridge across the Yungting River near

Wanping. 10 Although the Garrison Army was

entitled to seek facilities

its troops within the terms of the protocol, its attempts put pressure on reluctant landowners, especially by holding frequent manoeuvres in the neighbourhood, caused some resentment. Conversely, the Japanese were inclined to attribute their lack of success to obstruction by Chinese

for to

officials.

At the same

time, the attitude of the junior officers

and rank-and-file of the Twenty-Ninth Army towards the Japanese was bound to be affected to some extent by the hopes engendered by the failure of the Suiyuan expedition and the lessening of tension between the Nanking government and the Communists. On the Japanese side some officers, at any rate in the Kwantung Army and possibly in the Garrison Army also, were attracted by the theory that, as an eventual link-up between China and the Soviet Union seemed inevitable, Japan would do well to launch a fresh blow at Chiang Kai-shek without loss of time. 11 Even so, relations between senior officers of the Garrison Army and the Twenty-Ninth Army were outwardly good. 12 General Sung Cheh-yuan, the Chinese commander, seems indeed to have regarded the Japanese commander, General Tashiro, as a valued friend. 13 Nothing in the disposition of the two forces suggested that either was

THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE

1937:

35

contemplating an attack upon the other. Moreover, the Garrison Army was so heavily outnumbered that it could not hope to launch a successful offensive unless substantially reinforced. Finally, the General Staff in Tokyo had not only taken special pains to ensure that General Tashiro and his staff were aware of their policy of avoiding provocation, but had expressly warned the commander of the infantry brigade against embroiling himself with the Chinese. 14 At the end of the first week in July General Tashiro was mortally ill, and his successor had not yet arrived. The commander of the infantry brigade was away from his headquarters on a visit of inspection. On the Chinese side, General Sung Cheh-yuan had gone on leave with the declared intention of "sweeping the tombs of his ances55 tors 15 Command of the Twenty-Ninth Army devolved on .

second-in-command, General Chin Teh-chun, who was not only a soldier but also Mayor of Peking. On the night of July 7 a Japanese officer complained to

his

Chin Teh-chun

5

s

staff that a

company on night man-

oeuvres near the Marco Polo bridge had been fired upon. He asked that Japanese troops should be allowed to enter Wanping in search of a soldier who was missing. General Chin refused the request and ordered his men to resist any attack on Wanping, but not to fire first. 16 He and the local magistrate then interviewed the Japanese complainant, with the result that eventually both sides agreed to a joint investigation.

Meanwhile the Chinese

raised

troops in the neighbourhood of the

the strength of their

Marco Polo bridge

to

and the main body of the Japanese battalion hitherto at Fengtai joined the detachment already on the spot. A lively skirmish began on July 8, after the Japanese had unsuccessfully renewed their request to be allowed to enter Wanping; but the Japanese investigator forbade the troops from Fengtai to advance beyond the positions already occupied by the Garrison Army. However, on the following day he allowed them, in the light of complaints of persistent fire from the Chinese lines, to launch an attack two

battalions,

36

THE UNDECLARED WAR

which the Chinese seem difficulty.

to

have repelled without much

17

In the meantime the General Staff in Tokyo had inArmy not to widen the scope of the conflict and to negotiate a local settlement. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff of the Garrison Army carried to Peking a request that the Chinese should apologize for the incident on the night of July 7 and promise to punish those responsible. In addition, the Chinese were to agree to the replacement of their troops near the Marco Polo bridge by lightly armed militia, and to give an assurance that henceforth anti-Japanese elements would not be allowed to get out of hand. 18 The Chinese, although at first reluctant to accept these demands, seem to have agreed as early as July 9 that both sides should withdraw to the positions occupied on July 7. But negotiations were still in progress when, on July 1 1, the Japanese government took a disastrous step. On the previous evening the General Staff in Tokyo had decided, in the light of a report that four Chinese divisions were moving towards the scene of the dispute, that the Garrison Army must be reinforced by two brigades from Manchuria, a division from Korea, and three divisions from Japan.* The Minister of War, General G. Sugiyama, asked the Cabinet to endorse this decision in order to avert a possible disaster to Japanese troops and civilians in North China. The Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, was not heart and soul with the extremists, and indeed would probably not have been asked to form a government if the militarist faction had been able to find a suitable candidate in their own ranks. 19 He opposed the sending of such powerful reinforcements, and was supported by at least two of his colleagues. But he gave way when he saw that the Cabinet was divided and that persistent refusal might put Sugiyama in a position to force a crisis by resigning. 20 Later in the day the Chinese accepted the Japanese * On that date the major formations of the Japanese Army comprised eleven structed the Garrison

divisions in

Japan, two in Korea, and four in Manchukuo. The establishment

home was 10,000 of all ranks; that of the divisions in 18,000 of all ranks.

of a Japanese division at

Manchukuo was

CHIANG'S ACCUSATION

37

proposals, apparently after learning that the Garrison Army

be reinforced. 21 The military authorities in Tokyo then agreed to countermand the despatch of the three divisions from Japan, but did not halt the formations already on their way from Manchuria and Korea. These began to arrive on July 12. By that date it was becoming doubtful whether the Nationalist government intended to abide by the Peking settlement, even though they had announced on the previous day that agreement had been reached. 22 As early as July 10 they had spoken of claiming compensation for the Marco Polo bridge affair. On July 16 they demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese reinforcements; on the same day they appealed to powers with Far Eastern interests to take note of an alleged violation by Japan of her

was

to

obligations

under the Nine-Power Treaty, and referred

significantly to their right to "control closely" the basis of a

settlement negotiated by the provincial authorities. Three days later Chiang Kai-shek publicly accused the Japanese of 'engineering" the Marco Polo bridge incident in order '

to provide themselves with a pretext for

Hopei and Chahar the

tactics

employing in

adopted by the Kwantung

Army in Manchuria. 23 The

wrongs was easily foreseeable. Remembering the unseemly haste with which the Japanese had occupied Mukden after the railway incident in 1931, foreigners who were in no position to cross-examine witnesses or compel governments to open their archives were ready to listen sympathetically to allegations that the Japanese account of the dispute was disingenuous and that the Garrison Army had tried to seize the Marco Polo bridge by force of arms. 24 Even so, for a few more days the prospects of a peaceful settlement seemed quite good. On July 18 General Sung Cheh-yuan, who had returned from leave to attend the funeral of General Tashiro on July 16, apologized to Tashiro's successor for the bridge incident and promised, in effect, that the terms of the Peking settlement would be carried out. 25 Almost simultaneously a friend and confidant effect of this invocation of past

38

THE UNDECLARED WAR

of Chiang Kai-shek gave the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking to understand that the Nationalist government would, after all, accept the settlement. 26 But on July 25, after a visit to Peking by the Vice- Chief of the Chinese General Staff, Chinese and Japanese troops came into conflict at Langfang, about half-way between Tientsin and Peking. This episode was followed by a clash between Chinese troops in the outskirts of Peking and troops sent to reinforce the Japanese legation guard. There was also fresh at Wanping. The Japanese government then authorized Tashiro's successor, Lieutenant-General Kiyoshi Katsuki, to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the Marco Polo bridge and Wanping by noon on July 27, and of the whole of the Chinese 37th Division from the Peking area by noon on July 28. At the same time they told Katsuki not to advance beyond the Yungting River. The government also decided to send to North China the three divisions from Japan whose previous orders to move there had been countermanded a fortnight earlier. 27 Accordingly, Katsuki presented an ultimatum on July 26. At midnight on July 27 one of his staff officers, Colonel Takuro Matsui, warned General Sung that, as the TwentyNinth Army had not only failed to carry out the terms of the Peking settlement but was, according to the Japanese, to blame for the recent affray in the outskirts of the city, the Garrison Army intended to advance. 28 On the following day Katsuki attacked and defeated the Chinese forces in the Peking area, including a reinforcing division from the southern part of the province, Generals Sung and Chin then left the city, apparently on orders from Nanking, and Katsuki went on to make himself master of the whole of the Peking-Tientsin region after overcoming stiff resistance at Tientsin and Tungchow. According to Konoye, this outcome was contrary not only to his wishes but also to Sugiyama's. 29 He concluded that not only he and his colleagues but also the military authorities in Tokyo had lost the power to control the whole of the armed forces. The government, taking only a few senior members of the General Staff into their confidence,

fighting

AUGUST

1937

39

then instructed their Ambassador in Nanking to settle with Chiang Kai-shek before August 20, when the three divisions arriving from Japan were expected to complete their concentration.

The terms which

Ambassador was to propose were that the province of Hopei as far west as the Yungting River should become a demilitarized zone, and that Chiang Kai-shek should withdraw his troops from the whole province and replace those in the demilitarized zone by militia. In return the Japanese would restore the sovereignty of the Nanking government in North China by abolishing such bodies as the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and would reduce their Garrison Army to the strength permitted by the Boxer Protocol. At the same time or later, at his discretion, the Ambassador was to suggest that Chiang Kai-shek should accept the three-point programme of 1935 in return for an undertaking by the Japanese to withhold support from Mongolian secessionist movements. The Japanese would then co-operate with the Nanking government in suppressing the traffic in smuggled goods which the puppet regime in East Hopei had fostered. Four months later Chiang Kai-shek would gladly have accepted such an offer. 30 In the summer, however, he was conscious of strong opposition to any negotiations with Japan from elements both inside and outside the government. At a series of conferences at the Nanking Military Academy, the provincial military leaders on whom his power rested insisted that the time had come to make a stand. 31 His senior German military adviser, General von the

Falkenhausen, expressed the opinion that the Japanese their entire army to defeat China, and that even then they might not be successful. 32 According to his newly appointed American air adviser, Colonel C. L. Chennault, Chiang Kai-shek made up his mind by the first week of August to fight Japan. 33 Within the next few days substantial Chinese forces moved to positions outside the International Settlement at Shanghai. Work on field fortifications in that area had begun some months

would need

earlier,

and had drawn protests from the Japanese under the

40

THE UNDECLARED WAR

terms of the Sino-Japanese armistice agreement of 1932. 34 Almost simultaneously the Japanese Inner Cabinet recorded the opinion that the best place for the employment of land forces in the event of war with China would be the Hopei-Chahar area and Shanghai. 35 At that time the Japanese had, in fact, no land forces at or near Shanghai, apart from a small body of disembarked naval officers and ratings in the International Settlement. This force, known as the Naval Landing Party and normally about 2,000 strong, was similar in function to forces maintained by other treaty powers with rights and interests in the International Settlement. But on July 27 the General Staff had decided to earmark two divisions in Japan for the protection of Japanese subjects at Shanghai and Tsingtao, 36 and in August the naval authorities reinforced the Naval Landing Party in the light of reports that the Chinese had reinforced their militia in the demilitarized zone and that newly arrived troops of the Chinese Army were encroaching on the zone. 37 According to a Japanese source, a first batch of three hundred sailors from warships already in the Yangtze River was followed by a final instalment of about a thousand officers and ratings carried in a squadron of fifteen ships

which arrived from Japan on August 1 1 38 By August 8 members of the diplomatic corps in Nanking were aware that trouble was brewing at Shanghai and that any incautious move by the Japanese might precipitate a crisis. 39 Notwithstanding rumours spread by highly placed Chinese to the effect that the Japanese were about to open an attack, it was to be expected that the Japanese would go carefully, as they had only a small force in the neighbourhood.

On the following day a Japanese naval lieutenant named Oyama and

a seaman named Saito were shot and killed by Chinese soldiers in Monument Road, on the outskirts of the city. According to the Japanese version of the affair they were unarmed, except that Saito carried a revolver, and

were engaged in routine duties under the International Defence Scheme. The Chinese asserted that they had tried to enter a neighbouring airfield and had killed a Chinese

CHIANG AND THE

U.S.S.R.

41

An

autopsy conducted in the presence of Chinese officers showed, again according to the Japanese, that the sentry had been killed by a rifle bullet. 40 Was the man killed by his own side in an attempt to cover up the murder of the two sailors? Or did Oyama and Saito kill him? And, if so, with what weapon? These are questions that have never been satisfactorily answered to the present day. On August 12 the Chinese 87th and 88th Divisions, trained by German officers, arrived at Shanghai and took up positions adjacent to those occupied by the Naval Landing Party. 41 Even with the reinforcements said to have arrived on the previous day, the Landing Party must therefore have been outnumbered during the next few days by something like seven to one or more. sentry.

and Japanese medical

Who fired the first shot when the inevitable happened on August 13 has never been established. According to the Japanese, whose lack of numbers and supporting arms gave them every reason to lie low, the Chinese began with rifle fire in the morning, and followed at 4 p.m. with an artillery bombardment. At the outset the fighting went strongly in favour of the Chinese, who were only prevented by lack of elbow room from overwhelming their opponents. On August 14 Chinese airmen tried to bomb a Japanese cruiser in the Yangtze River, but missed the target and caused heavy civilian casualties in the International Settlement. A week later Chiang Kai-shek, who had been flirting with Moscow since the early summer but had hitherto gone carefully for fear of alienating the Western powers, concluded with the Soviet Union a Non-Aggression Pact which brought him early delivery of arms and ammunition to the value of a hundred million Chinese dollars. 42 In the course of the next two years he obtained from the Soviet government loans and credits to the value of two hundred and fifty million United States dollars, bearing interest at only 3 per cent and repayable over a long period in raw materials. 43 Meanwhile fighting continued at Shanghai. The Japanese were still heavily outnumbered on land, but com-

42

THE UNDECLARED WAR

manded

the approaches to the port and had a powerful naval force at the mouth of the Yangtze River. Recognizing that their small Naval Landing Party could not hold out indefinitely, they decided to land an expeditionary force commanded by the veteran General Iwane Matsui, who was called out of retirement for the purpose. 44 Matsui asked for five divisions, but was given two, less one brigade. These were followed by piecemeal reinforcements which brought his strength to the equivalent of five divisions by October. At the same time the authorities in Tokyo did not despair of a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek on terms similar to those discussed in the first half of August. On October 1 the Inner Cabinet decided to offer through an intermediary to restore the authority of the Nanking goverment in the northern province by abolishing the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the East Hopei puppet regime, and to suggest that demilitarized zones should be established both in the Hopei-Chahar region and round Shanghai. 5 The Nationalist government would not be expected to join an anti-Communist crusade, but would be asked to acquiesce in the creation of a buffer state between China and Sovietcontrolled territory by recognizing the independence of Inner Mongolia under Prince Teh. These proposals were duly conveyed to the Nanking government through the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie. The Ambassador did his best to tone down the Japanese demands and especially to persuade Tokyo to give earnest of its peaceful intentions by withdrawing the North China Garrison Army to the positions held before the Marco Polo bridge affair. 46 Doubtless for that reason, the Japanese decided after a few weeks to see

whether Craigie's German colleague, Dr Trautmann, could do better for them. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, then communicated the government's proposals to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, adding that he and his colleagues had made up their minds to step up the fighting in China if the Chinese refused to come to terms. 47 As it happened, the German government was by no

CHIANG APPEALS TO THE LEAGUE

43

means whole-heartedly behind Japan. Even so, the Germans were just as eager as the British to see the dispute brought to a close. Accordingly, Dr Trautmann not only conveyed the Japanese terms to Chiang Kai-shek on November 5, but added a rider to the effect that his government considered them a suitable basis for negotiations. 48 Chiang Kai-shek, buoyed up by the hope that Britain and the United States would come to his aid by putting economic pressure on Japan, refused even to take official cognizance of the proposals. On the same day Japanese troops began landing in Hangchow Bay with the obvious intention of pressing northwards to threaten the rear of his

Shanghai if he persisted in showing fight. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had made the task of the mediators more difficult than it need have been by once again appealing to the League of Nations. On October 6 the Assembly of the League adopted a report which described Japanese military operations in China as "out of all proforces at

portion to

Inasmuch

the incident that occasioned

as the Garrison

the

Army had gone much

conflict

55 .

further in

July than the government intended, Prince Konoye and General Sugiyama might have agreed that there was a grain of truth in this. But they would not have agreed that they were wrong to reinforce the Garrison Army in view of the strength of the Chinese Twenty-Ninth Army and the failure of the Chinese to carry out the terms of the Peking settlement. Nor would they have agreed that there was anything wrong in sending an expeditionary force to Shanghai after powerful Chinese forces had, as they believed, attacked the Naval Landing Party at a time when Japan was trying to reach a settlement with China on terms regarded in Tokyo as extremely generous. *

Not

surprisingly,

Japan

refused to attend the conference

of powers with Far Eastern interests which assembled at Brussels in the first week of November. Moreover, she per* In a telegram to the Japanese

Ambassador in Nanking, Hirota described the terms proposed in August as so favourable that not only the Chinese but the whole world would be impressed by the fair-mindedness and disinterestedness that inspired them.

44

THE UNDECLARED WAR

her refusal even when the powers assured her that they had no intention of calling her to account but were genuinely concerned to adjust the dispute between her and China. The Japanese saw in the Brussels Conference yet another attempt by rich and powerful nations to keep markets and sources of raw materials in their own hands by marshalling world opinion against Japan. If the Japanese were wrong in this, Chiang Kai-shek was equally wrong in supposing that joint action by the powers would do anything to help him. Of the Western nations with Far Eastern interests, the British had by far the largest financial stake in China. But their rearmament programmes were only just getting under way, they might find themselves at war with the European dictatorships while they were still unready, and they were not willing, unless assured of American support, to take any action against Japan which might embroil them in a Far Eastern war as well. Similarly, the French were not prepared to put any pressure on Japan unless assured that both the British and the Americans would support them in the event of a threat to Indo-China. But joint action with European powers would have been contrary to the American tradition of noninvolvement with the affairs of the Old World. Suggestions that the United States might take the lead in imposing economic sanctions on Japan found no favour with the State Department, and were indeed resented by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, as attempts to cast the United States for an uncongenial role. 49 On October 5 President Roosevelt inserted in a speech prepared for him by the State Department a clause to the effect that the world was suffering from an outbreak of lawlessness akin to an "epidemic of physical disease", and that the community of nations might have to impose "a quarantine of the patients". But the hint of collective sanctions in these phrases caused such an outcry from supporters as well as critics that he found it necessary to explain a few days later that he had not really meant what he seemed to mean. Thus, by the time the delegates assembled at Brussels it was already clear that the Americans were not prepared to sisted in

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE put any kind of pressure on Japan

;

45

that the British were

no further; and that the Japanese disapproved of the whole business. All the conference achieved was to hamper attempts at mediation by exciting alarm and resentment in Japan; raise false hopes in Chiang Kai-shek; advertise the determination of the United States not to coerce Japan either alone or in partnership with the European democracies and show that collective security was a myth. With this hurdle behind them, the Japanese went on to drive the Chinese in headlong retreat from Shanghai. They then advanced with such alarming rapidity towards Nanking that early in December Chiang Kai-shek decided, after all, to accept the Japanese terms as a basis of discussion. 50 By that time the fighting in China was becoming a burden on the Japanese economy. It also threatened to cut across the long-term plans of the General Staff, which did not provide for a heavy commitment in China but envisaged readiness for war with the Soviet Union by 1942. 51 Many influential Japanese were, therefore, still in favour of a prompt settlement which would leave the Chinese reasonably content. But they were unable to stand up to extremists inside and outside the army. The result was that Chiang Kai-shek was confronted with much stiffer terms than those offered in November, and decided to go on fighting even when the fall of Nanking forced him to take his government to Hankow. Finally, on January 16, 1938, the Japanese government announced that it would no longer negotiate with the Nationalist government. Both sides then withdrew their ambassadors, although neither willing to go as far as the Americans, but

;

declared war. From the start of the affair there were many signs that the Japanese government had only an uncertain control over its armed forces. In August 1937 the British Ambassador in Nanking, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, was seriously wounded when Japanese airmen attacked two cars carrying him and his party to Shanghai. On December 12 Japanese shore batteries and aircraft attacked American and British warships and merchant vessels in the Yangtze

46

THE UNDECLARED WAR

River, with the result that the United States gunboat Panay was sunk and the British gunboat Ladybird damaged. Worse still, the Japanese troops who entered Nanking in the same month indulged in a terrifying orgy of massacre and rape. 52 They also plundered and set fire to many buildings, including houses owned by Europeans. 53 As a result of these excesses the Japanese military authorities made some changes. Matsui was recalled, and in the spring of 1938 was succeeded by General Shunroka Hata. But until late in 1939 no high command was established on the mainland to co-ordinate the actions of the three armies in China and Manchuria. The North China Army, now led by General H. Terauchi, was allowed to set up in Peking a "Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic" under a prominent Chinese banker and financier, Wang Keh-min. Not to be outdone, General Hata's Central China Army then established at Nanking a "Reformed Government of the Republic of China", which in theory was to amalgamate with Wang's government at some future date, but in practice never did so. In the far north the Kwantung Army added a touch of Ruritanian comedy by sponsoring a "Federated Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia" which harked back to the glorious days of Genghis Khan by dating its pronouncements from that era. Recovering from their setback at Nanking, the Chinese armies attacked troops of the North China Army in Shantung with some success in April, but afterwards narrowly escaped encirclement near Suchow and withdrew westwards, blowing a huge gap in the Yellow River dyke to cover their retreat. The Central China Army then began a slow advance on Hankow by way of the Yangtze valley. Early in September, after secret negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek had led to disagreement in Tokyo, the Japanese government decided to send an expeditionary force to South China, where hitherto they had landed only a few troops at Amoy. This force went ashore in Bias Bay, some thirty to forty miles north-east of Hong Kong, advanced overland with little opposition, and on October

1938

47

21 took Canton. Four days later Hata's forces entered

Hankow. Within the space of a week the Nationalists thus lost both their capital and the port through which they had hitherto drawn most of their foreign supplies, including those shipped by the Russians from Odessa. But Chiang Kai-shek had fled in good time from Hankow to Chungking, deep in the Yangtze gorges. Moreover, he could still receive supplies from abroad by a number of routes. So far as supplies from the West were concerned, the most important of these, until it was closed to him in the summer of 1940, was that from Haiphong, in Indo-China, through Tonking to Kunming, in the province of Yunnan. All railways serving this route were French-owned or French-controlled In addition the Chinese had begun, before Canton fell, to build a road from Kunming across the foothills of the Himalayas to Lashio, at the head of the easterly branch of the British-owned Burma Railway. This was the famous "Burma Road". It ran through some of the worst country in the world from the climatic point of view, and its carrying capacity was never very high. But it became of some importance when the Haiphong-Kunming route ceased to

be available.

With eager support from Moscow, the Chinese also took steps to provide themselves with an overland route from Soviet territory through Russian and Chinese Turkestan. For some years after the fall of Canton the bulk of the supplies sent from Russia to both the Nationalist and the Communist armies in China were carried in lorries from Alma Ata, on the Turksib Railway, along a route through Sinkiang developed by Chinese labour and served by camel which delivered

fuel to staging posts. 54

Later the completion of a road fit for wheeled traffic from Ulan Ude, on the Trans-Siberian Railway, to Ulan Bator, in Outer Mongolia, provided an alternative means of supply, though the goods had still to be carried by camel from Ulan Bator across the Gobi Desert into China. 55 To speed communication between the Soviet Union and Nationalist trains

48

THE UNDECLARED WAR

China the Russians also established, with Chinese cooperation, a jointly controlled air service linked at Alma

Ata and Hami with Russian and Chinese services to Moscow and Chungking. 56 These developments gave the Russians ample opportunities of indoctrinating the

predominantly non-Chinese

inhabitants of Sinkiang with Communist ideas, infiltrating the local administration, and giving the external trade of

the province a Muscovite slant. Outside Sinkiang, on the other hand, they generally abstained, at any rate during the early years of the Sino-Japanese dispute, from sub-

propaganda which might weaken Chiang Kai-shek's capacity to resist Japan. Their policy was to keep him in the fight, and thus pin substantial Japanese forces to China. Hence they had no interest in destroying his hope that sooner or later the Western powers would intervene decisively in his favour, or alternatively that the Japanese would have to withdraw their armies in order to fight the Soviet Union. Doubtless with all this in view, they encouraged him to buy large quantities of Russian arms and ammunition on credit without, it would seem, enquiring too closely into the use he made of them. 57 "You may have a loan of any amount you require without putting forward any reasons," Stalin is said to have told an emissary from Chungking in the spring of 1939. 58 After the fall of Canton and Hankow the Japanese believed that Chiang Kai-shek had lost the power to hit back. Even when he refused to sue for peace on terms which would have compelled him not only to recognize Manchukuo and conclude an An ti- Comintern Pact with Japan but also to grant far-reaching economic concessions to Japanese firms and submit to a partial occupation of China by Japanese troops, they felt that his regime might well collapse within the next twelve months or so. 59 They versive

decided, therefore, not to follow to content themselves with

him

hampering

into the interior but his

communications,

bombing Chungking and other Chinese cities, mopping up guerilla forces in occupied China, and making occasional forays against troop concentrations or for special purposes.

1938-1939

49

In November 1938 they went on to announce that, as the Nationalist government had been reduced to a local regime, the time had come for Japan to inaugurate in East Asia a New Order based on true justice. 60 In plain terms, this meant that henceforth Japan would monopolize as much of China's foreign trade as suited her, and that the Western powers, if not squeezed out by Japanese competition, would be free to apply the principle of the "open door" to

what was left. Each of the leading Western democracies responded this threat in its

own way. The United

to

government by unilateral

States

denied the right of Japan to abrogate treaties action and granted Chiang Kai-shek a credit of twentyfive million United States dollars, to be spent mostly on

and vehicles for the Burma Road. 61 The British government set up an exchange-stabilization fund of ten million pounds sterling to support the Chinese currency. 62 The French government announced that it intended to uphold the Nine-Power Treaty but, like the American and British governments, promised to consider any future

fuel

Japanese proposals

for modification of the treaty. 63

The outcome was a cold war between Japan and the Western democracies. On the Japanese side this took the form of anti-British demonstrations, attempts to gain a substantial measure of control over the administration of foreign settlements and concessions in China, and other measures designed to make life so difficult for European residents that the British would be driven to withdraw their support from Chiang Kai-shek rather than suffer an endless series of setbacks to their China trade. In February 1939 the Japanese threatened communications between Hong Kong and Singapore by occupying Hainan Island; in March they claimed

sovereignty over the Spratley Islands, to which the French also laid claim; in June Japanese troops built a live-wire fence round the British and French

and instituted a strict blockade. demanding and enforcing the right to search British and French subjects entering and leaving the concessions,

concessions in Tientsin Besides

they asked for the surrender of the Chinese government's

50

THE UNDECLARED WAR

reserves of silver, which (with the exception of a portion stored in the legation area of Peking) had been deposited in the Tientsin concessions for safe keeping.

This put the British government in a most embarrassing Since 1922 the assumption that a strong fleet would be sent to Singapore in the event of serious trouble in the Far East had been the cornerstone of British imperial strategy. But in 1939 the Admiralty's calculations showed position.

Mediterranean and home waters would be prejudiced if a fleet containing more than two capital ships were sent. 64 Although the government maintained that its intention was still to send, in the event of war, a fleet strong enough to keep sea communications open, avert any major threat to Australia, New Zealand or India, and prevent Singapore itself from falling, this effectively ruled out any immediate action against Japan. At the same time the government had reason to believe that the Japanese General Staff was ready with plans for war with Britain and that extremists hoped that the Tientsin affair might provide a sufficient pretext. 65 Accordingly, Chamberlain and his colleagues decided to play for time by offering to discuss the Tientsin question in Tokyo. The Japanese agreed to this course, on condition that the British meanwhile assented to a declaration to the effect that Japanese forces in China were entitled to take measures designed to safeguard their security and maintain order in regions under their control. 66 The Americans, with a much smaller stake in Japaneseoccupied China and no intention of engaging in a European war, could afford to take a tougher line. On July 26, two that British interests in

the

days after the publication of the British declaration, they served formal notice of their denunciation of the Commercial Treaty of 1911 between Japan and the United States. Under the terms of the treaty, this became effective

on January 26, 1940.

At the Tokyo conference the British, although embarby demands from their own side for gestures of defiance which they were in no position to make, succeeded by well-considered tactics in conceding no point of major rassed

TOKYO, importance.

1939:

The Chinese

LAKE HASSAN,

1938

were

silver reserves

still

51 safely

and French control when the conference adjourned on August 20, ostensibly to allow the British to consult other interested governments before reaching a decision. 67 Any immediate danger of war between Japan and the European democracies passed away a few days later, when the news that Germany was concluding a pact with the Soviet Union caused consternation in Tokyo and brought a change of government. stored in vaults under British

This news was all the more alarming to the Japanese it coincided with the second of two discouraging encounters between Japanese and Soviet troops. The first of these occurred in the summer of 1938 near Lake Khassan (or Hassan), on the Manchukuo-Soviet frontier in the Hunchun area. In July troops of the Kwantung Army, alarmed according to their own account by the sudden appearance of supposedly hostile patrols on what they believed to be their side of the frontier, clashed with Soviet frontier guards.* Both sides brought up reinforcements, and an action involving tanks, artillery and aircraft as well as infantry went decidedly in favour of the Russians. A Soviet spokesman claimed afterwards that Russian guns and aircraft had " turned the Japanese guns 55 into litter and their pillboxes into dust 68 Although this was the language of exaggeration, it was true that the Japanese were constrained to accept a truce which since

.

*

The

Russians, on the other hand,

a

map

blamed the Kwantung Army

for the

They

afterwards produced, allegedly from their diplomatic archives, showing that the frontier ran along the crest of the hill on which the

incident.

The Japanese, although unable to refute this evidence, did not accept it. They said that Korean villagers were in the habit of holding festivals on the crest without interference from Soviet frontier guards, and that hence their troops were entitled to assume that the frontier was on the reverse slope, and were bound to defend themselves when the Russians appeared on the crest without warning. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East appears to have been deprived of his command in consequence of the affair, although his troops were outstandingly successful, it seems likely that the Soviet leaders were not so sure that there had been no provocation on their side fighting began.

as they claimed to be.

W.F.E.

—

THE UNDECLARED WAR

52

allowed the Russians to retain their positions and required the

Kwantung Army

to fall back. 69

An encounter in the following summer near the borders of Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, south-east of Lake Buir and close to the Khalka River, was a much more serious affair.

According

to the

Outer Mongolians and

their

Soviet supporters, the frontier in this sector did not run along the Khalka, as might have been expected, but fol-

lowed a

line of inscribed posts

further east. 70

some twelve

On the other hand

the

to fifteen miles

Kwantung Army,

for

whom the question was of some importance since they were rail extension which would pass uncomfortably Outer Mongolian territory if the Outer Mongolians were right, maintained that the frontier did run along the

planning a close to river. 71

In

May Japanese and Outer Mongolian troops came into Both

then tried to seize a group of low hills near the east bank of the Khalka. The highest of these rose only about 150 feet above the level of the surrounding plateau, but the hills had some value as points of vantage. After some weeks of inconclusive skirmishing the Japanese, nominally acting as allies of the independent state of Manchukuo, pushed their opponents back to the river with the aid of reinforcements brought from their railhead at Halunarshan. The Russians, who claimed to be discharging their obligations towards the Mongolian People's Republic, then brought up more powerful reinforcements, including units equipped with flame-throwers. At the Battle of Khalkan (or Halkin) Gol on August 20 they drove the Japanese from the disputed territory with heavy conflict in the disputed area.

sides

losses. 72

Japan and the Soviet Union now seemed on the brink of war. General Ueda, commanding the Kwantung Army, ordered emergency measures (including air-raid precautions) throughout Manchukuo. His subordinate on the Khalka River front issued an Order of the Day proclaiming his intention of avenging his defeat. But the Japanese government, in no mood for such adventures, recalled

1939:

HALKIN GOL

53

Ueda, made changes in the staff of the Kwantung Army, and instructed their Ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, to open negotiations for a settlement. 73 The Russians, preoccupied with the imminent partition of Poland, were willing. Togo and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, had little difficulty in agreeing on an armistice which left the Russians in possession of the disputed In the following summer the Japanese government, anxious to settle outstanding differences with the Soviet Union before beginning a southward advance into Indo-China, formally accepted the Red Army's definition of the frontier in the Khalka River sector, although in the meantime a mixed border commission had been unable to reach agreement on the matter after sixteen meetings. 75 This defeat, which cost the Kwantung Army about 18,000 casualties, made a profound impression in Japan. Members of the government, in particular, seem to have taken it as proof that the Red Army was far better equipped than the Japanese Army. At the same time the Russians, notwithstanding their propagandist boasts, formed a far from unfavourable opinion of their opponents. When Marshal Zhukov, whose impressions of the Japanese Army appear to have been derived entirely from his experience on the Khalka River front in 1939, spoke to the foreign press in Berlin at the end of the war in Europe, he said that the Germans were much better equipped than the Japanese and were very good soldiers, but that
Marshal G. K. Zhukov (born 1896) was the most consistently successful highcommander of troops in the field on the Soviet side during the Second World War. He was largely responsible for the successful defence of Moscow in the early winter of 1941, made what some commentators believe to have been a decisive contribution to the halting of the German advance on Leningrad a few months earlier, and played an important part in the Soviet winter offensive of 1941-42. With Marshal Vassilevsky he planned the crucial Stalingrad offensive of November 1942 January 1943. Early in 1945 he led the First Belorussian Army Group (or "Front") from the Vistula almost to the Oder in *

level

—

three weeks.

54

THE UNDECLARED WAR

"China incident". As Chiang Kai-shek could not hope to drive the Japanese from China without armed support from either his Western or his Soviet backers, his policy was to hold on in the hope that eventually such support might be forthcoming. The Japanese, on the other hand, had a chance of ending the war quickly if they could persuade the Western powers to put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to make peace with them. heartily tired of the

BOOK

II

JAPAN CONFRONTS

THE WEST

4

JAPAN, THE ROME-

BERLIN AXIS AND THE

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

HE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT of 1936 left the Japanese uncomfortably aware had publicly aligned themselves with Germany against Communism, but had gained no assurance that Germany would give them active support in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union.* Between 1936 and 1939

that they

made

repeated attempts to transform the pact into a defensive alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis, but scored no success. In principle, the Germans were willing to conclude a defensive alliance with Japan. Moreover, they were able to persuade the Italians, with some difficulty, that such an alliance was desirable. But they wanted an alliance which, while it pledged the dictatorships to come to the aid of Japan in the event of a clash with Russia, would also pledge Japan to come to the aid of Germany and Italy in the event of a clash with France and Britain. The Japanese, on the other hand, were not prepared for a bargain which might involve them in a serious dispute with the European democracies and perhaps with the United States. Consequently the negotiations broke down after a Japanese mission had visited Rome and Berlin in the late winter and early spring of 1939. At a reception in Berlin on April 20, 1939, the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, warned

they

Japanese spokesmen that Japan's persistent refusal to accept an alliance on his terms might drive Germany to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. 1 But this warning was not taken seriously in Tokyo. 2 Meanwhile the Italians had agreed to join the An ti- Comintern Pact. But they were not told of its secret terms, and hence * See pp. 32-33.

58

1939

59

were not bound

to give Japan even the limited degree of help against Russia which the Germans had promised. Japan then turned to the United States. On April 19 the Japanese Minister of the Navy, Admiral M. Yonai, assured the American Ambassador in Tokyo, J. C. Grew, that Japan would not "go fascist". 3 When Grew went on leave a few weeks later he carried to Washington a letter in which the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, proposed that Japan and the United States should combine to avert a catastrophe in Europe by advising Germany and

indirect

Italy to

make

become

less bellicose

concessions. 4

entertaining

Dooman,

the

and France and Britain

Hiranuma followed up American Charge d

5

this

to

move by

Affaires,

E.

H.

at his private house. In the course of a long con-

versation he urged that the Americans should join trying to persuade the Axis powers

him

in

and the European at an international

democracies to adjust their differences conference. 5 When Dooman pointed out that a joint effort would be difficult to arrange as long as the Japanese contined to pursue in China a policy which most Americans regarded as aggressive, Hiranuma replied, in effect, that Japan would not need to make exorbitant demands on China if only the Western powers would help her to gain secure access to markets and sources of raw materials elsewhere. 6 These overtures were coolly received in Washington. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, thought that the Japanese stood to gain more than they could expect to lose by a European war. 7 He concluded that Hiranuma must have some ulterior motive for his proposal. Moreover, as he believed that all Japanese statesmen were much the same at bottom, he was not moved by the argument that it might be worth his while to make some concessions in order to keep Hiranuma in office and more extremist leaders out. His reply to both the letter brought by Grew and the message conveyed through Dooman was to the effect that the best contribution Japan could make to world peace would be to call a halt in China, and that he failed to see how the

w.f.e.

—3*

JAPAN,

60

THE

AXIS,

THE DEMOCRACIES

United States could do more to stave off a European war than she was already doing. 8 In face of this rebuff the Japanese Minister of War, General Itagaki, urged his colleagues to make a fresh attempt to reach agreement with Germany and Italy. Hiranuma, supported by the rest of the Cabinet, refused to do so, but was soon forced out of office by the news that Ribbentrop had not been bluffing when he spoke of a nonaggression pact with Russia. To make matters worse, Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow to sign the Russo-German pact came at a moment when Japanese troops had just been soundly beaten by the Red Army on the Manchurian frontier. *

A

stopgap government under General Noboyuki Abe then took office with the avowed intention of holding aloof from the war in Europe, patching up relations with Moscow by accepting defeat on the Khalka River front, and putting an end to the "China incident" by making peace either with Chiang Kai-shek or with a rival government established under Japanese auspices at Nanking. General Abe kept the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in his own hands until September 23, when he made a bid for friendship with the United States by transferring it to Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, a one-time naval attache much liked and respected in Washington.

As Abe had publicly condemned the

"illiberal

and

stingy" behaviour of his fellow-countrymen in China before

taking office, it did seem possible that he and Nomura might succeed in convincing the Americans that not all Japanese statesmen were tarred with the same brush. Nomura declared on October 2 that it was not the government's policy to ride roughshod over the rights and interests of the treaty powers in China, and that he was aware that Japan must give concrete proof of her sincerity. He went on to settle a number of outstanding claims arising from losses and injuries suffered by American residents in China. Nevertheless Hull refused to negotiate a new commercial agreement with Japan in place of the Commercial Treaty * See pp. 52-53.

1939-1940

61

which he had denounced.* His

refusal was backed by the President although neither Hull nor Roosevelt had any immediate intention of imposing punitive sanctions on

Japan. 9 Their uncompromising attitude seemed unwise to Grew, who urged them to consider at least a temporary agreement pending the negotiation of a new commercial

when better times returned. 10 As Grew foresaw, the outcome of Nomura's

treaty

failure to

wring any concession from Hull was that he and Abe were fiercely assailed in their

own country

for truckling to the

Americans and getting nothing in return. Under pressure from militarist critics, the Abe government resigned in January 1940, and was succeeded by another short-lived government under Admiral Yonai. Six months later, when the German armies had swept through France and seemed on the point of invading England, the Yonai administration gave place to a group of ministers whose undisguised aim was to hitch their wagon to Hitler's star.

Not for the first time, it fell to the too-pliant Prince Konoye to serve as a respectable figurehead for a government of extremists. Prominent among these was Lieutenant General Kideki Tojo, the army's choice for the important post of Minister of War. A sincere patriot but notoriously indiscreet, Tojo had urged the General Staff in 1937, when he was serving as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to launch a blow at Chiang Kai-shek before he could join forces with the Communists or strike a bargain with Russia. 11 As Vice- Minister of War in 1938 he had caused a flutter in high circles by telling the armaments industry that Japan must be ready for simultaneous war with China and the Soviet Union. 12 For the moment, however, the most influential member of the government was neither Konoye nor Tojo but Yosuke Matsuoka, the untried Foreign Minister. Matsuoka had studied law in the United States and had spent some years in the Japanese foreign service, but was more at home on the borders of business and politics than as a diplomat. He claimed to have little use for orthodox methods of diplo* See p. 50.

62

JAPAN, THE AXIS, THE DEMOCRACIES

macy and was openly structure,

critical

which he hoped

of the existing political by a totalitarian

to see replaced

regime. Garrulous, unprincipled and conceited, he proved a fitting counterpart to the egregious Ribbentrop and the erratic Ciano. Matsuoka believed in the summer of 1940 that Britain was on the verge of collapse and that Italy was bound to become subservient to Germany. He also believed that Japan, by virtue of her geographical position, would be able to ally herself with the Axis powers without forfeiting her independence. It followed that, in his view, little more than a show of readiness to fall in with Hitler's schemes was needed to put the Japanese in a position to claim their share of the spoils. He persuaded the Inner Cabinet to agree on September 4 that he should negotiate with the Axis powers on the understanding that he would claim as Japan's sphere of influence the whole of Greater East Asia as far west as Burma and as far south as New Caledonia. It was also agreed that the region under Japanese control or tutelage should ultimately be extended to include India, Australia and New Zealand, but that India might, if necessary, be offered to the Soviet Union as the price of her acquiescence in these designs. 13 At the same time Matsuoka was authorized to promise that Japan would take all measures, short of war, that might be needed to complete the overthrow of the British Empire and prevent the Americans from intervening. In exceptionally favourable circumstances Japan might even go to war. 14 As Hitler had failed to persuade the British to sue for peace and was already contemplating an attack on Russia, the prospect of keeping the Americans out of the war by enlisting Japanese support was not unattractive to him. Consequently he was not only willing to reopen negotiations with Japan, but this time was ready to concede that the Japanese should not be required to take an active part against the British unless some new factor came into play. On September 23 the German, Italian and Japanese negotiators agreed on the terms of a Tripartite Pact between their respective countries. On September 26 an

1940:

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

63

investigating committee of the Japanese Privy Council

accepted the pact with the proviso that the government should not take advantage of its promulgation to stir up popular feeling against the Western democracies. 15 Even so, there was a good deal of high-level opposition to the pact in Tokyo. While many responsible Japanese favoured an alliance with Germany in the belief that it would reduce the risk of war with Russia and might help Japan to establish a commanding position in East Asia, few could contemplate without dismay the prospect of an open conflict with the British and the Americans. Both the Emperor and Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, Commanderin-Chief of the Combined Fleet, thought that, if Japan did come to grips with the United States, she would have cause to regret it. Yamamoto described Matsuoka's policy as 'outrageous". He added prophetically that, even if the Tripartite Pact were followed by a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, the Russians could not be trusted to abstain from stabbing the Japanese in the back while they were fighting the Americans. 16 The Emperor pointed out that Japan seemed always to come out on the losing side in naval exercises involving an imaginary conflict with the '

American

fleet. 17

Nevertheless the pact was signed in Berlin on September provided for mutual recognition of the leadership to be exercised by Germany and Italy in Europe and by Japan in Greater East Asia and it bound the contracting powers to give each other full political, economic and military 27. It

;

support in the event of an attack on any of them by a power not already involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese dispute. In addition, secret understandings pledged Germany to help the Japanese to increase the state of readiness of their armed forces, and to do her best to promote a friendly understanding between Japan and the Soviet Union.*

Japanese hopes that the pact would be followed by a in relations with Russia were not ful-

prompt improvement *

For a summary of the Tripartite Pact and

see

Appendix

1.

its

accompanying understandings

JAPAN,

64

THE

AXIS,

THE DEMOCRACIES

When

Molotov was officially informed of the pact on the evening before it was signed, he claimed that the Russo-German Non- Aggression Pact of 1939 gave the Soviet Union the right to study the text of any agreement between Germany and Japan before the formalities were concluded, and to express views upon it. 18 None the less the Russians, who were becoming increasingly suspicious of Germany's intentions in the light of Hitler's evident interest in the Balkans and Finland, were not unwilling to draw closer to Japan, and expressed some interest in transforming the Moscow Pact into a Four- Power Non-Aggression Pact. But they insisted that, as part of any bargain, the Japanese should relinquish coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin which they had held for many years. Matsuoka hoped that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union might consider selling North Sakhalin to Japan. This proposal made so little appeal to Molotov that when he first heard of it he asked whether it was intended as a

filled.

joke. 19

In March

1941

Matsuoka travelled by the TransMoscow, where he assured Molotov

Siberian Railway to and Stalin that he regarded the Anglo-Saxons as the common enemies of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. He then went on to Berlin for conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Ribbentrop told him that there

was no longer any hope of concluding a four-power nonaggression pact and that relations between Germany and Russia were not friendly. 20 Hitler stressed his intention of striking at the Soviet Union if she showed any sign of intervening in the European war on behalf of Britain, but did not add that preparations for an attack on Russia had reached an advanced stage and would be completed by the middle of May. He did, however, express the opinion that the Russians, with 150 German divisions to the west of them, would not dare to strike at Japan if the Japanese attacked Singapore, as he wanted them to do. Finally, Ribbentrop warned Matsuoka on March 29 that a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union was always possible,

and advised him

to confine his negotiations in

MATSUOKA, STALIN, HITLER Moscow on and

the return journey to questions of

65

commerce

fisheries. 21

broad hint that war between Matsuoka reopened negotiations for a non-aggression pact at his next meeting with Molotov on April 7. The best he could obtain, after an interview with Stalin on April 12, was a five-year Neutrality Pact to which the Russians agreed only in return for a promise that Matsuoka would do his best to persuade the Japanese government to relinquish the concessions in North Sakhalin within the next few months. The pact, signed on April 13, 1941, pledged Japan and the Soviet Union to remain neutral should either of them become the object of hostilities on the part of an outside power or combination of powers, and to respect the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo. Much to the disappointment of the Japanese, the signing of the pact had no appreciable effect on Chiang Kai-shek's attitude to peace offers. At the same time, tension between Germany and Russia ruled out any hope that the pact might be swiftly followed by a general agreement between Notwithstanding

this

Germany and Russia was

in the offing,

the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and the Soviet Union to co-operate in the dismemberment of the British Empire. On June 6 the Japanese Ambassador reported, after a visit to Berchtesgaden, that Hitler had made up his mind to attack the Soviet Union. However, even in face of this report Matsuoka managed to persuade himself that the odds were against war. 22 He was therefore as much astonished, as any member of the government when the Ambassador telephoned on June 22 to say that Hitler's invasion of Russia had begun. Swiftly adjusting his policy, Matsuoka then recommended to the Emperor behind Konoye's back that Japan should herself attack the Soviet Union. The sequel was that on July 16, after Matsuoka had fallen foul of his colleagues over the wording of a cable to Washington, the entire

Cabinet resigned for the express purpose of getting Two days later the government was recon-

rid of him.

66

JAPAN, THE AXIS, THE DEMOCRACIES

stituted

with the more amenable Admiral Teijiro Toyoda

as Foreign Minister.

In the meantime successive Japanese governments had continued, since the outbreak of the European war, to put varying degrees of pressure on the Western democracies in the hope that constant goading might induce some or all of them to withdraw their support from Chiang Kai-shek. These attempts achieved little before the summer of 1940, when the fall of France put the French forces in IndoChina in a perilous position. At the same time the loss of French co-operation at sea compelled the British to station a strong fleet in the Mediterranean in order to contain the powerful Italian fleet. This made it impossible for them to think of sending a substantial naval force to Singapore except in such a dire emergency as an imminent threat to Australia or New Zealand. One consequence of the changed strategic situation was that the French authorities in Indo-China were obliged to close the railways to supplies of

war material

for

Chiang

Kai-shek, for fear that the Japanese might invade IndoChina from South China if they refused to do so. The French also agreed to admit a Japanese military mission for the purpose of scrutinizing traffic across the frontier into China and satisfying themselves that it contained no articles of contraband. In addition the Japanese, who hoped to use the northern part of Indo-China as a base for operations against Chiang Kai-shek and to gain a share of the country's rice, anthracite and rubber, pressed for access to three airfields and for transit rights along two routes. The French managed for a time to stave off these demands by skilful delaying tactics, but towards the middle of September were obliged to resume negotiations which could have only one outcome unless they succeeded in finding supporters outside their own country. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, then proposed, on instructions from London, that Britain and the United States should give joint military aid to the French forces in Indo-China for the purpose of opposing Japanese aggression. Hull not only turned down the pro-

THE BURMA ROAD posal, but

warned Lothian that American involvement

a Far Eastern war would

American

mean a

67 in

serious curtailment of

supplies to Britain. 23

Despairing of help from abroad, the French thereupon yielded to Japanese demands. An agreement signed on September 22, 1940, gave Japan the right to establish three airfields in

northern Indo-China and to

move up

Tongking Yunnan.

troops through the province of

to 25,000

for use against

Chiang Kai-shek's forces in The French suffered a further loss of face in the earlypart of 1941, when they were obliged to accept Japanese mediation in a border dispute with Siam. The Siamese had signed non-aggression treaties with France, Britain and Japan, but in consequence of the dispute, for which the chauvinistic Siamese leader Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram was largely responsible, the treaty with France had never been ratified. The outcome of Japanese intervention was that the French were obliged to cede parts of Laos and

Cambodia

to their militarily

weak but

aggressive neigh-

bour.

demanded in the summer of 1940 that Burma Road and the Hong Kong frontier to war materials and certain other classes of supplies for Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time they

The Japanese

also

the British should close the

massed about five thousand troops along the borders of the Kowloon Leased Territory, on the mainland opposite Hong Kong. The British in Hong Kong thereupon took steps to destroy road and rail bridges on the Kowloon frontier and send away their women and children, while in Washington the British Ambassador, accompanied by the Australian Minister to the United States, sought an interview with the Secretary of State. When the three men met on June 27, Lord Lothian told Cordell Hull that Britain, standing alone, was not in a position to oppose aggression both in Europe and in the

Far East. Yet to yield to Japan would not merely be distasteful, but would encourage her to make further demands on the treaty powers. Accordingly he proposed that the United States, whose Far Eastern interests would be deeply

JAPAN,

68

THE

AXIS,

compromised by surrender

to

THE DEMOCRACIES such demands, should help

make a

firm stand, either by banning exports to to Singapore, which the British were willing to make available as a base for part of the United States Fleet. If neither course was acceptable then the best solution, he suggested, would be for the Americans to join the British in bringing about a settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute on terms which would leave China independent, preserve Western rights and interests in the Far East, and provide for Japanese neutrality in the European war. 24 Britain to

Japan or by sending warships

In

effect,

Hull rejected

all

these proposals.

The United

had moved recently from the West Coast of North America to Pearl Harbor for an exercise in Hawaiian waters, and the Americans contemplated leaving it there for the time being as a warning to Japan. But they were not prepared to uncover the approaches to their homeland by moving it further westwards, and in any case there were political objections to their stationing any major part of it at States Fleet

a British base. Nor were they willing in 1940 to put a general embargo on exports to Japan, or to mediate between Japan and China. When Lothian asked whether the United States government would agree to attempts at mediation on the part of the United Kingdom and Australia, Hull replied that there would be no objection to British and Australian approaches to the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek. But he insisted that the principles of the Japanese New Order should be challenged, and that the mediators should not take it upon themselves to offer concessions at Chiang Kai-shek's expense. 25 The British, although somewhat cast down by the refusal of the Americans to join them either in making a firm stand or in finding a way out of the Sino-Japanese dilemma, were still unwilling to yield to the Japanese demands. But the Japanese press became so hostile that towards the middle of July they came to the conclusion that persistent refusal might expose their Far Eastern possessions to attacks which their forces on the spot could not hope to counter before reinforcements reached them, They decided, there-

1940-1941

69

buy time for themselves, and also for the Americans, by closing the Burma Road for three months during the monsoon season, when the volume of traffic would in any case be small. This would make little practical difference to Chiang Kai-shek, and it might help the Japanese government to withstand pressure from extremists by

fore, to

claiming a diplomatic success.

Always reluctant to believe that there was anything to be gained by playing off one set of Japanese statesmen against another, Cordell Hull could not be expected to think well of this move. At the same time, the refusal of the United States government to act in open concert with the British, or to put a complete embargo on trade with Japan, was not due to any failure to understand the importance of curbing aggression. Roosevelt and Hull were unwilling to do anything that might alienate large sections of American opinion, especially on the eve of a Presidential election. But they were ready to move as far in the direction of imposing economic sanctions on Japan as they judged that they could go without inviting the criticism that they were supporting British imperialism at the expense of American interests. On July 26, 1940, the United States government forbade the export of high-grade aviation fuel, lubricants, and certain classes of scrap iron and scrap steel except under licence ; September brought a virtual embargo on the sale of scrap iron and scrap steel of all kinds to Japanese importers; and after the Presidential election in November iron ore, pig iron, steel, copper, brass, zinc, and finally oildrilling equipment and oil storage tanks were added to the list of raw materials and manufactured goods whose export

was controlled. Meanwhile British success in the Battle of Britain paved the way for Lend-Lease and for staff talks which foreshadowed a military alliance between Britain and the United States. British and American service chiefs agreed in the early part of 1941 that, in the event of simultaneous

war with Germany and Japan, a

defensive strategy should

be adopted in the Far East, but that this should not preclude the use of American naval forces in an offensive role

70

JAPAN, THE AXIS,

THE DEMOCRACIES

designed to weaken the Japanese economy and draw Japanese strength away from the South-West Pacific. 26 In April American, British and Dutch commanders and staff officers went on to evolve a joint plan for the conduct of military operations in the Far East in the event of war between their respective countries on the one hand and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other. Their plan, which gave priority to the defence of American naval and air bases in Luzon and of sea communications with Singapore and the South- West Pacific, was rejected by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the ground that "the whole thing pivoted on Singapore". 27 But the approval given in the meantime by the British and United States governments to the "Germany first" strategy meant that at any rate the principle of Anglo-American co-operation was accepted on both sides of the Atlantic.

None

now

of this prevented the Japanese from obtaining a

amount of aviation fuel by importing lower-grade fuels and treating them in their own refineries. 28 But their stocks of fuel oil of all categories, which had risen markedly between 1934 and 1939, began to fall off in the following year, 29 and in general the state of their reserves of raw limited

materials was far from satisfactory.

In the hope of remedying some of these deficiencies without binding themselves hand and foot to the United States, the Japanese tried hard from the spring of 1940 until the summer of 1941 to wring from the Dutch an agreement

which would ensure an ample flow of oil, rubber, tin and bauxite from the Netherlands East Indies. At the same time they were reluctant to risk a crisis in their relations with the Anglo-Saxon powers by exerting too much pressure, or to commit themselves to a conflict which might drive the Dutch to demolish their oil installations rather than see them fall into the wrong hands. This put them at a disadvantage in dealing with skilled negotiators who had everything to gain by postponing a decision. Even after Holland had been overrun, the Dutch government kept a close control of events in Indonesia from their headquarters in London and were able to prevent the Japanese

1941

71

from eroding their sovereignty by overawing local officials. At the end of long-drawn negotiations, cunningly protracted by the Dutch, the Japanese were constrained to sign contracts for less than half the oil they had demanded, accept meagre increases in their supplies of other commodities, and say no more of concessions on which they had counted to give them an economic and political stranglehold on the Indonesian archipelago. 30 However, the Dutch gained only a brief respite from their successful stand. Unfortunately for them, fear of American

embargoes drove the Japanese to conclude in the summer of 1941 that an attack on the Netherlands East Indies might, after all, be the only answer to their problem. On June 10, at a time when the Americans were contemplating a comprehensive ban on the sale of oil to Japan and had already tightened their control of certain classes of exports, the Japanese government learned that their attempt to wrest far-reaching concessions from the Dutch had failed. 31 Within the next few days they decided to send troops into the southern part of Indo-China in order to seize bases for a possible invasion of Indonesia. 32 At an Imperial Conference on July 2 they agreed that this move should be carried out even at the risk of war with the Anglo-Saxon powers. 33 Later discussions, culminating in Matsuoka's removal from office on July 1 6, led to the conclusion that, none the less, a further attempt should be made to reach agreement with the United States and Britain. Moreover, no one could yet say how the situation created by Hitler's attack on Russia would develop. If only for that reason many influential Japanese, although willing that the occupation of southern Indo-China should be carried out, were still of the opinion that the national policy ought to be guided by an earlier decision to have recourse to arms against the Western powers only if the existence of the nation were threatened by embargoes or encirclement. 34

But

their scruples

had

little

practical effect since, as

ment made

it

virtually certain

we

by the Japanese governthat such an embargo would

shall see, decisions already taken

be imposed within the next few weeks.

5

BREAKDOWN

IN 1941 the Admiralty EARLY received from Washington the of a British

first

of communications embodying material derived from Japanese signals traffic which had been intercepted by the Americans and deciphered by experts working for the United States Department of the Navy. This source, known to initiates by the code-name Magic, became a mine of information for American and British statesmen, officials, commanders and staff officers. However, like other mines it contained dross as well as gold. To ensure that nothing important was overlooked, the experts were obliged to decipher a mass of signals dealing largely with routine matters of little or no political or operational significance. The sheer bulk of the material made evaluation difficult, and much of it contained technicalities which could be understood only by specialists who did not understand Japanese and who therefore depended on translations. Moreover, messages which purported to give the views of the Japanese government on important issues could not always be relied upon to tell the whole story. Early in July the Japanese Foreign Ministry transmitted to its emissaries abroad a summary of the conclusions reached at the Imperial Conference ofJuly 2. This was duly intercepted, deciphered, translated, and studied by officials of the Department of State. It revealed that Konoye and his colleagues had made up their minds to send troops into southern Indo-China regardless of consequences, but not that they had sanctioned active preparations for war, or that the Naval Staff had been working since January on the problem of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. 1 In the light of this evidence, President Roosevelt and his series

74

JULY

1941

75

advisers concluded that the time had come for the firm stand which the British had urged them to make some twelve months earlier. On July 10 the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, told the British Ambassador that the United States would impose economic and financial embargoes on Japan unless Konoye thought better of his decision. 2 Only a few days later a signal sent by the South China Army to the authorities in Tokyo gave details of impending moves in Indo-China, and at the same time made it clear that the intention behind them was to secure bases for attacks on the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore. 3 Thereupon American experts agreed on a scheme for the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, and on July 24 the President decided after consultation with the British to give effect to it. Rear-Admiral Richmond K. Turner of the Naval War Plans Division raised the objection that an embargo on trade with Japan might saddle the navy with a Far Eastern war which it could not fight without prejudice to existing commitments in the Atlantic theatre. 4 But he was forced to give way when the Japanese responded to diplomatic overtures by declaring that events in Indo-China must take their course. Accordingly, on July 26 the British and the Americans froze Japanese funds throughout the British Empire and the United States. In addition, Britain denounced her commercial agreements with Japan. The Dutch, not sure of American support in the event of war and unable to discover whether a complete embargo or only a severe restriction of export licences was in view, were at first reluctant to follow suit. 5 But they could not afford to fall out with the United States, and were awkwardly placed since their trade with Japan was based on the dollar. On July 28 they prohibited commercial and financial transactions with Japanese subjects except under licence. The effect of these measures was that roughly three-quarters of Japan's foreign trade came to a standstill and that nearly nine-tenths of her supplies of oil were cut off at the source.

Meanwhile the Japanese had never

entirely relinquished

76

BREAKDOWN

the hope of persuading the Americans that they sincerely wished to re-establish good relations with the West and arrive at an acceptable settlement of the China affair. Even the pro- Axis Matsuoka found it expedient to make a bid for American friendship by sending to Washington an ambassador who would be relied upon to stress these aims. His choice fell on Admiral Nomura, whose strongest recommendation was not that he had served briefly as Foreign Minister in the short-lived Abe government, but that he had made a good impression in the United States during a tour of duty as naval attache in Washington. Matsuoka's courtship of Hitler was, however, so repugnant to most Americans that no envoy could be expected to achieve much as long as he remained in office. Having rid himself of Matsuoka largely for that reason, Konoye made a determined attempt in the late summer and early autumn of 1941 to put his country's relations with the United States on a better footing. But he was not strong enough to prevent the army from carrying out their plans in Indo-China, and the consequent freezing of Japanese assets by the British and United States governments made him powerless to refute the army's argument that Japan might find herself at the mercy of the Americans if negotiations were allowed to drag on while stocks of oil dwindled. On September 6 he was forced to agree that preparations for war with Britain, the Netherlands and the United States should be completed by the end of October, and that the crucial decision for peace or war should be taken about the middle of that month. 6 Later the deadline was put back until the last week in November. Meanwhile Nomura made little progress. His good standing in the United States did not atone for his inexperience, and indeed proved something of a handicap since it gave rise to a suspicion that he had been sent to Washington to create a false impression of Japanese intentions. On July 23 he reported to Tokyo that there was a growing feeling in Washington that the Japanese government was using his negotiations with the United States government as a cloak to hide preparations for attacks on British and

JULY-AUGUST

1941

Dutch possessions in the Far East. Only a few days 7

77

later the

freezing order brought the negotiations to a standstill.

Although dismayed by the freezing order, Konoye did not despair of persuading the Americans to countermand it. On August 6 he offered, through Nomura, to enter into an undertaking to advance no further than Indo- China, and to withdraw from Indo- China on the termination of the 6 c

China incident", if the Americans would lift their embargo and suspend military preparations in the Philippines. When this offer was rejected, he suggested that he and Roosevelt should meet, presumably for the purpose of concluding a bargain whereby Japan would renounce the Tripartite Pact and withdraw from the whole or part of Indo-China in return for the removal of the embargo and a relaxation of the American attitude to the China question. At that stage Roosevelt and Churchill held their famous meeting at Argentia, in Newfoundland, where they discussed matters of high policy and drew up the declaration

known

as the Atlantic Charter.

Churchill believed that

Japan "would probably recoil before the ultimately overwhelming might of the United States". 8 This made it all the more desirable, in his view, that she should be told precisely how far she would be allowed to go. Roosevelt wished to gain time for the strengthening of American forces in the Philippines, and was therefore less inclined to bring matters to a head. 9 However, after a lengthy discussion he agreed with Churchill that Britain, the Netherlands and the United States should each warn Japan that, in the event of any further aggressive move on her part, they would be obliged to protect their interests even at the risk of war. In accordance with protocol, the word "war" was replaced in the draft warning accepted at Argentia by "conflict".

When toned

it

the draft was

down by

shown

to

Hull on August

deleting "conflict"

15, he and making other

changes. 10 Roosevelt accepted these modifications in the light of reminders from his service advisers that the country was not ready for war, but the British were deeply disappointed. As they and the Dutch were not willing to depart from the agreed text, they decided to withhold their

78

BREAKDOWN

warnings rather than communicate them in a form which would reveal that they were not completely in step with the Americans.

On August 1 7 the President and Hull gave Nomura their watered-down version of the warning. At the same time they offered to resume the negotiations broken off earlier in the month. Roosevelt also agreed in principle to the proposed meeting with Konoye; suggested that it might be held at Juneau, in Alaska, about the middle of October; and stipulated only that the Japanese should first make a clear statement of their attitude and intentions. 11 But Hull afterwards convinced the President that a summit conference would be dangerous unless the ground were first prepared by far-reaching diplomatic discussions. On September 3 he made it clear to Nomura that, in his view, the settlement of outstanding issues must precede, not follow, a meeting between the heads of government. 12 Against this background Konoye yielded on September 6 to the insistence of the army leaders that a time limit should be set for the negotiations, but told Ambassador Grew on the same day that there was no reason why he should not come to terms with Roosevelt if only Roosevelt would consent to meet him. 13 He also assured Grew that he wholeheartedly concurred in Hull's opinion that any lasting settlement between Japan and the United States must be based on equality of commercial opportunity and respect for the rights of all nations, including the right of every nation to manage its internal affairs in its own way. But Konoye was no nearer to a solution of his problems, and was unable to conceal from his critics his and Nomura's failure to obtain anything from the Americans but a series of rebuffs. Meanwhile the embargo continued, and the

Tokyo grew daily more exacting. On September 29 Grew cautioned the Department of State, in a long and carefully worded cable, against the facile assumption that Japan would not dare to fight if she were cornered. 14 He warned Hull that only the Konoye government barred the way to a military dictatorship which would be bound to collide head-on with the United States. militarist leaders in

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER

1941

79

Therefore, he argued, a meeting between Konoye and the President was worth trying, if only as a means of keeping

Konoye

in office until the crisis

was over.

Hull rejected this argument, believing that Konoye's protestations were insincere and that his aim was to ensnare the President in a vaguely worded agreement which Japan would then turn to her advantage. 15 He did not close the door to further conversations with Nomura, but held out no hope of an early meeting between Konoye and the President. Konoye was thus forced into a position from which he could escape only by surrendering to the demands of the extremists or by laying down his office. Pressed by his colleagues to choose by the middle of October between peace and war, he forfeited the support of a powerful section of the government by refusing to opt for war. A desperate attempt to persuade General Tojo, the Minister of War, to conciliate the Americans by sanctioning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the whole of China was foredoomed to failure, and on October 16 Konoye resigned with his entire cabinet. On Konoye's advice, Tojo was then invited to form a government in order to "put the responsibility squarely on 55 the army 16 Still not convinced that an understanding with the United States was out of the question, Konoye believed that he had failed to achieve one partly because some Americans feared that promises made by the civil government might be repudiated by the army. Tojo's leadership would at least have the advantage of making it clear that government and army spoke with the same voice. On becoming Prime Minister, Tojo retained his old post of Minister of War. In addition he assumed the portfolio of Home Affairs. As he was still on the active list and was generally regarded as the army's spokesman, the military dictatorship foretold by Grew seemed to have arrived. However, Tojo was no Hitler. A Right Wing Conservative rather than a revolutionary, he neither received nor asked for dictatorial powers. Moreover, while he differed from Konoye in being willing to take the responsibility of declaring war if the need arose, there is reason to believe .

BREAKDOWN

80

would also have been willing to disappoint his extremist supporters by choosing peace if the chance of a favourable settlement had come his way. He claimed afterthat he

wards that he had added the post of Minister of Affairs to his other functions because he believed that

Home it

was

duty to make himself immediately responsible for coping with the internal disorders that might follow a decision not to go to war. 17 Subsequent events lent some substance to that claim. At an Imperial Conference on November 5 the Cabinet and the service chiefs agreed that further attempts should be made to reach a settlement with the United States through his

that Japan should make war on the Empire and the United States only if no success were achieved by November 25; and that in any case no attack should be made on Soviet Russia, even if the Germans pressed for one. 18 Meanwhile an experienced professional diplomat, Saburo Kurusu, was on his way to Washington to help Nomura, who had asked to be relieved on the ground that he did not want to be responsible for giving the

diplomatic channels

;

British

Japanese people a

false

notion of the chances of success.

Instructions in this sense were cabled to

Nomura and

deciphered by the Americans. By the end of the first week in the President and Hull knew, therefore, that Nomura had been warned of the importance of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 25. They also knew that the penalty of diplomatic failure might be war. 19 But they could not know that a Japanese carrier force would leave the Kurile Islands on November 26 with orders to proceed to a point within striking distance of Pearl Harbor. In accordance with his instructions, Nomura opened a new phase of the negotiations on November 7 by submitting proposals for a comprehensive settlement of outstanding issues. The gist of these proposals was that Japan would concede the principle of the "open door" throughout the Pacific Region, including China, in return for an American undertaking not to discriminate against Japanese trade in any part of the world. On the conclusion of peace with

November

NOVEMBER

1941

81

China she would retain the right to station troops in the northern provinces and in Inner Mongolia and Hainan, but would remove her troops from all other parts of China within two years. In addition, she would affirm her intention of preventing the European war from spreading to the Far East, and would give an informal undertaking to remove her troops from Indo- China on the termination of the " China incident". Shigenori Togo, the new Foreign Minister, believed that this offer would meet American wishes in all respects except that Hull would doubtless object to the retention of Japanese garrisons anywhere in China. 20 But Togo was obliged to insist on retaining a foothold in the northern provinces and elsewhere, since Tojo was not likely to sanction a complete withdrawal after breaking with Konoye precisely on that issue. Togo did, however, authorize Nomura to say that the government contemplated the removal of the garrisons at the end of twenty-five years or so. In the meantime it was not inconceivable that Chiang Kai-shek, if he did make peace with Japan, might regard the presence of some Japanese troops in the northern provinces as a useful barrier against Communism. Togo hoped, too, that the British, with their large stake in the Far East and their notorious love of compromise, would help to impress upon the Americans the strength of the case for coming to terms with Japan rather than risking a Far Eastern war which would jeopardize supplies of Malayan tin and rubber urgently needed for the war in Europe. But that was a role which Churchill and his colleagues were not prepared to fill. They knew that the great mass of the American people, although united in their determination to make no dishonourable surrender to Japan, were by no means equally sure that they wished to help the British and the Dutch to hold on to their Far Eastern possessions. Recognizing that this made Roosevelt's position as a popularly elected leader exceptionally difficult, the British decided to leave negotiations with Tokyo to the Americans rather than risk giving the impression that they were trying to drag the United States into war or enlist

BREAKDOWN

82

support for British and Dutch colonialism. This decision did not prevent Churchill from publicly announcing on November 10 that Britain would declare war " within the hour" in the event of a conflict between Japan and the

United States. But it forced the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, to deal a blow to Japanese hopes by telling Togo that his instructions precluded him from taking an active part in the negotiations then in progress. 21

Meanwhile time was running

out.

Nomura's proposals

for a

comprehensive settlement found

Hull,

who

little

insisted that the prerequisite of

favour with

any settlement

was that Japan should abjure Hitler and all his works. Kurusu then did his best to explain that, although Tojo and his colleagues were not in a position to make an open breach with Germany, they had every intention of allowing the Tripartite Pact to fall quietly into the background if only they could reach agreement with United States on other points. But Hull, who regarded Kurusu as one of the architects of the Tripartite Pact because, as Ambassador in Berlin in 1940, he had signed it on Matsuoka's orders, was not convinced. On November 18 he told Nomura and Kurusu in uncompromising terms that public opinion in the United States would not tolerate an agreement with

Japan Hitler.

as long as she

maintained her partnership with

22

Nomura and Kurusu

with only one more card Hull on November 18 they suggested that he might like to consider a working arrangement which would help both governments to keep the negotiations alive without committing either to undertakings which public opinion in their respective countries was not prepared to sanction. The terms of such an interim agreement might, they thought, include the lifting of the embargo and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern Indo-China. When this move was reported to Togo, he rebuked Nomura for making it without prior reference to the Foreign Ministry, but none the less instructed him to This

left

to play. Before taking leave of

NOVEMBER

1941

83

present detailed proposals for a stop-gap agreement on lines already discussed in Tokyo. Accordingly, Nomura and

Kurusu proposed to Hull on November 20 that both Japan and the United States should call a halt to military movements in South-East Asia and the South- West Pacific, and that the United States should lift the embargo, meet Japanese demands for oil, and help Japan to bargain for supplies of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies. In return for these concessions and an undertaking by the Americans to "refrain from such measures and actions as would prejudice endeavours for the restoration of peace between Japan and China", Japan would withdraw her troops from southern Indo-China. She would also bind herself to remove her troops from the whole of Indo-China on the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese peace or other equitable settlement of the China problem. The least satisfactory feature of these proposals from the American point of view was that the reference to "measures and actions" was clearly meant as an invitation to the United States to withold supplies from Chiang Kai-shek while negotiations between Japan and China were in progress. Togo sought to meet this objection by pointing out that Chiang would not need American supplies if he made peace. At the same time he obtained authority to extend the deadline for the negotiations until November 29. Hull afterwards described the Japanese proposals as quite unacceptable. 23 Nevertheless he did not reject them out of hand. On November 22 he showed them to the British and Chinese Ambassadors and the Australian and Netherlands Ministers in Washington. He also invited the four envoys to comment on the draft of a reply which embodied American counter-proposals. These differed from the Japanese proposals in setting an initial term of three months for the interim agreement. In addition, the American proposals stipulated that Japan, besides withdrawing her forces from southern Indo-China on signing the interim agreement, should reduce her forces in the whole of Indo-China to 25,000 of all ranks, and that her purchases of American oil should not exceed the quantities

w.f.e.

—

BREAKDOWN

84

needed

American draft an between Japan the implied promise to do

for civilian use. Finally, in the

offer to provide facilities for negotiations

and China was

substituted for

nothing that might encourage the Chinese to stand out for favourable terms. Hull did not explain to the envoys that he intended to link these proposals with renewed proposals for a permanent settlement on terms favourable to Nationalist China. Nevertheless all the envoys, except the Chinese Ambassador, expressed their approval of the American draft, although all four added that they must consult their respective governments. Hull was therefore disappointed to find, when he summoned the envoys again on November 24, that only the Netherlands Minister was in a position to say that his government would support the American proposals. Believing that the others were holding back because they failed to recognize the importance of the proposals in the context of Japanese readiness for war, he persuaded the President to send Churchill a cabled summary of the proposals, accompanied by a warning that "real trouble" might be expected should the Japanese reject them. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters at home and abroad launched a campaign of recrimination against the United States government for venturing to suggest that the embargo on trade with Japan might be suspended even for a brief period. This put the British in an awkward predicament. They did not themselves attach much weight to Chiang's dia-

which

British commentators afterwards described as and "shrill". On the other hand, they knew that the Americans set great store by their association with Nationalist China. They were not aware that Hull intended, when he handed the interim proposals to Nomura and Kurusu, to accompany them with long-term proposals designed to safeguard Chiang's position. At the same time, they were inclined to overestimate Japanese reluctance to go to war with the British Empire and the United States. Although anxious to avoid a confrontation in the Far East at a time when they were fully occupied with the war in the tribes,

"hysterical"

NOVEMBER

1941

Atlantic theatre and the Middle East, they were therefore unwilling to say anything which might seem to imply to throw Chiang overboard an accommodation with Japan. In hi official reply to the United States government the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, questioned the wisdom of allowing the Japanese to buy oil which they might use for

that they were prepared for the sake of

military purposes. Similarly Churchill, in his reply to the President's cable, stressed the importance of keeping faith

with China. Both men made it clear, however, that they were content to leave the negotiations to Hull and Roosevelt and would support any action which the United States thought fit to take. 24 Churchill also made it clear that a war in the Far East at the present juncture was the last thing the British wanted. 25 Thus the position early on November 26 was that the Chinese had expressed emphatic disapproval of the American proposals; that the Dutch had accepted them; and that the British, too, had given their assent, albeit in terms which indicated that they doubted whether Japan would go to war in any case and were determined to protect themselves against a charge of undue readiness to placate the Japanese at Chiang Kai-shek's expense. But Hull, upset by his failure to gain unqualified support for the proposals, was in no mood to read between the lines of Eden's and Churchill's telegrams. He seems, too, to have forgotten that the Dutch had accepted the American draft almost as soon as they were asked to do so. Convinced, according to his subsequent account of his motives and actions, that all the governments whose opinions he had sought were either against the proposals or lukewarm about them, and acutely sensitive to accusations that he was contemplating a "Far Eastern Munich", he decided in the course of the morning to drop the whole plan of an interim agreement. 26 The President concurred in this astonishing change of front, although he must have known that the result might be to commit the United States and the British Empire to a war for which their forces would not be ready before the spring.

86

BREAKDOWN

Accordingly, Hull confronted the Japanese later in the day with stringent proposals for a final settlement, but withheld the interim proposals which he had taken such pains to prepare. Nomura and Kurusu, who were prepared for the rejection of their own interim proposals but expected American counter-proposals, were aghast. 27 The terms presented by Hull were not intended as an ultimatum, and indeed were not one inasmuch as they contained no threat of an armed attack should they not be accepted within a stated period. But they called upon Japan to withdraw her forces from the whole of China and Indo-China, relinquish her extraterritorial rights, and recognize the sovereignty of the Nationalist government throughout China. Moreover, as the result of an oversight Nomura and Kurusu were not told that Manchuria was excluded from the territories which the Japanese were expected to restore to Chiang Kai-shek. 28 In return for these concessions, Hull offered to negotiate a new commercial treaty on liberal terms, release Japanese assets in the United States, and help the Japanese government to support the yen in the international money market. Hull and Roosevelt did not expect the Japanese to accept this offer. 29 They believed, however, that it was essential to unite American opinion behind the government by making it clear that they did not intend to appease Japan at Chiang Kai-shek's expense. They seem, too, to have cherished a hope that the Japanese might be willing to discuss almost any proposals rather than lose their last chance of keeping the negotiations alive. 30 At a Liaison Conference on November 27, the Japanese government and service chiefs agreed that the American offer was unacceptable. 31 Although this seemed to leave them no choice but to fight, they also agreed that the question should be remitted to an assembly of former Prime Ministers before a decision for war was formally ratified at an Imperial Conference to be held on December 1. The advice tendered by the former Prime Ministers was neatly summed up by one of them when he said that Japan would be wrong to go to war for the sake of a Co-Prosperity Sphere

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

1941

87

must fight if her national existence was at stake. 32 Meanwhile Togo told Nomura and Kurusu that negotiations with the United States would be broken off within the next few days. None the less he instructed them on November 29 to make a final attempt to persuade the Americans to think again. 33 However, a bellicose speech by Tojo and reports of further troop movements in Indo-China did not encourage Hull and Roosevelt to change their minds. By December 6 war was so clearly imminent that Roosevelt, more for the sake of appearances than with any hope of success, appealed to the Emperor to strike a blow for humanity by withdrawing his forces from southern IndoChina. On the same day the Japanese Foreign Ministry began to transmit to Washington, and the Americans to decipher, a fourteen-part message which Nomura and Kurusu were to deliver to the Secretary of State at a time to be communicated later. By 10.30 p.m. the American experts had completed a translation of the first thirteen parts, which consisted of a recital ofJapanese grievances and a denunciation of American policy in the Far East. The transcript was duly placed before the President, who 55 remarked: "This means war. As the result of an oversight it was not, however, shown that evening either to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, or to Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval

in Greater East Asia, but

Operations. 34 The naval authorities in Washington knew that evening that Tokyo had instructed a Japanese agent in Honolulu to report all movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and to say where each American warship was berthed. But they attached no special importance to this information, as the Japanese were known to have given similar orders to their agents at other ports. 35 All American naval Commanders-in-Chief had been warned on November 27 to expect an aggressive move by Japan within the next few days, but this was thought likely to take the form of an attack on the Philippines, Siam, the Kra isthmus or possibly Borneo. 36

88

BREAKDOWN

The next day, December 7, was a Sunday. Admiral Stark was conferring in his office with Rear-Admiral Turner of the War Plans Division when, at 9.15 a.m., Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson and Commander A. H. McCollum, respectively Director of Naval Intelligence and head of the Far Eastern section, brought in a translation of Part 14 of the Japanese message. This indicated that the Japanese considered the negotiations at an end, but it did not contain an ultimatum or directly threaten war. About an hour later Commander McCollum brought the transcript of a further message from Tokyo. This did suggest that war was imminent, for it ordered Nomura and Kurusu to destroy the last of their code and cipher machines and to deliver the fourteen-part message to Hull at 1 p.m. Studying this message, McCollum and his colleagues wondered why the Japanese should choose to deliver a diplomatic note at 1 p.m. on a Sunday. A possible answer

occurred to them when they found, on consulting a time chart, that the only important American base west of the Continental United States which would not be shrouded in darkness at that hour was Pearl Harbor. The sun was due to rise in the Central Pacific at 6.26 a.m. by local time, or in other words about half an hour before noon by Washington time. This suggested that the Japanese might be planning to open hostilities with an attack on Pearl Harbor rather than the Philippines, where the sun would not yet have risen when Nomura and Kurusu were due to present their message. Primed with this knowledge, Wilkinson urged Stark to put through an immediate telephone call to Oahu and warn the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that he might be attacked within the next few hours. Stark pointed out, however, that the army, not the navy, was responsible for the defence of Oahu. Action had therefore to be postponed until General Marshall returned from his Sunday morning ride and could be called into consultation. He reached Stark's office about 11.15 a.m., read all fourteen parts of the Japanese message for the first time, and at once agreed that the naval and military authorities in the Central Pacific

DECEMBER

7,

1941

89

ought to be warned that the Japanese were expected to break off negotiations with the United States not long after sunrise at Oahu. 37 Refusing an offer from the Director of Naval Communications to send a warning through naval channels, and relying as an assurance from his own experts that a signal sent by army radio could be delivered within twenty minutes, he drew up an appropriate message and its prompt despatch. Through no fault of Marshall's, the signal was not sent by army radio but entrusted to a commercial cable company. It reached Honolulu at 7.33 a.m. by local time. A few minutes later it was picked up, with other cables awaiting delivery, by a messenger whose district included the

authorized

administrative headquarters of the United States Army at Fort Shafter. 38 The messenger, a Japanese, had not gone far

when he became aware

that epoch-making events were

He none the less decided that he must keep faith with his employers by completing his round. But he was held up by traffic jams and made slow progress. After negotiating a roadblock manned by taking place around him.

members of the National Guard who told him that his uniform made him look like a parachutist and advised him to go home, he was stopped by policemen who refused to let him pass until he showed them that he was carrying a cable addressed to the Commanding General. By 11.45 a.m., when at last he chugged up to Fort Shafter on his motorcycle and was waved past the barrier by an accommodating sentry, neither the

Commanding General nor

the naval

Commander-in-Chief needed to be told that something extraordinary might be expected to happen soon after daybreak.

Meanwhile the

staff of the

Japanese Embassy in Wash-

ington were preparing their own translation of the fourteenpart message. But Nomura had been warned that he was not to present the message until he received express orders to do so. He had also been told that he was first to "put it in nicely 55 drafted form 39 Not surprisingly, either he nor Kurusu seems to have understood, until they received the "time of delivery" signal on Sunday morning, that the matter was .

90

BREAKDOWN

urgent and that they ought to have moved heaven and earth on the previous evening to ensure that the translation was ready in good time. As it was, progress was so slow that they were unable to give the message to Hull (who had already seen the American transcript) until 2.30 p.m. 40 By that time Pearl Harbor and Oahu had been under air attack for more than an hour; Japanese troops had been ashore in Malaya for about an hour and a half; and much larger Japanese forces assigned to the conquest of Malaya were preparing, if not beginning, to disembark at Singora and Patani, on the Siamese side of the frontier between Malaya and Siam.* See Appendix

2.

BOOK

III

THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE,

w.f.e.

—4*

1941-1

6

WAR PLANS

WHEN THE

United States government banned trade with Japan in the summer of 1941, the Japanese Naval and General Staffs had been working since January on tentative plans for war with the Western powers. They had already committed themselves to the occupation of southern Indo-China, and had begun to requisition shipping under the navy's Emergency War Programme. 1 They now set to work to complete their preparations by December. War, they argued, was not yet inevitable but might soon become so. Therefore Japan must be ready to strike not only before serious inroads were made on her strategic reserves, but also before the northeast monsoon in the South China Sea and winter gales in the North Pacific reached their full force. 2 The service chiefs believed, too, that the Russians would be less likely to catch them at a disadvantage in Manchuria if they began their southward drive about the beginning of the Russian winter. 3

When

framing their strategy, the Japanese had to bear in was in no position to maintain a prolonged offensive. Her merchant fleet barely sufficed for peacetime needs her industrial capacity was much smaller than that of the British Empire or the United States and only quick results could help her to overcome the handicap of scanty raw materials. To go to war at all might be disastrous unless the oil, rubber, tin and bauxite of SouthEast Asia and the South- West Pacific could be captured at

mind

that their country

;

;

an early stage.* * On the eve of the war

South-East Asia and the South- West Pacific region

were producing about 91 per cent of the world's natural rubber, about 58 per cent of the world's tin, and roughly 5 per cent of the world's bauxite. Borneo, Java and Sumatra produced annually about 1.8 times Japan's estimated requirement of oil in an average year of war.

94

JAPAN'S MASTER-PLAN

95

As oil was likely to be the bottleneck, the obvious course was to go straight for the oilfields and refineries ofJava and Sumatra. To do so would, however, expose the Japanese forces to counter-attacks from hostile garrisons on either flank. After considering various proposals the staffs agreed

must be to defeat the British and Malaya and the Philippines, eliminate the British outpost at Hong Kong, and seize British Borneo. After completing the conquest of Malaya and occupying flanking positions in the Bismarck Archipelago and south Burma, their armies would converge on the Netherlands East Indies by way of the South China Sea, the Makassar Strait and the Molucca Passage. Finally, by occupying the whole of Burma and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands they would place their forces within a perimeter extending that their

American

first

step

forces in

roughly south-eastwards from the Kurile Islands to the Gilbert Islands, thence westwards through the Solomons and New Guinea to the neighbourhood of Christmas Island, and across the Indian Ocean to the frontier between India and Burma. If such a line could be reached and occupied in strength, then the Western powers would, it was hoped, concede Japan's claim to a dominant position in the Far East rather than go to the trouble and expense of reconquering distant territories inhabited predominantly by Asiatic peoples.

For the execution of this far-reaching and ambitious plan the Japanese Army could spare only eleven divisions and some seven hundred first-line aircraft after allotting forty divisions and eight hundred aircraft to the defence ofJapan,

Korea, Manchuria and occupied China. * The timetable had assigned to

drawn up on

which would allow forces the capture of Hong Kong and the Philippines

therefore to be

lines

be used later against the Netherlands East Indies. navy, with a large fleet in commission and more than a thousand first-line aircraft at its disposal after purely defensive commitments had been met, was in a stronger position, and indeed was able to devote about half its available aircraft to the direct support of operations by land

to

The

* See

Appendix

3.

WAR

96

PLANS

Even so, the planners came to the conclusion that they could neither afford to gamble on the outcome of a straight fight with the United States Pacific Fleet, nor risk the threat which an undefeated American fleet would preforces.

sent to their communications.

Admiral Yamamoto's decision to use his powerful carrier a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet followed logically from that conclusion. Whether high-level bombers could sink battleships in any but the most favourable conditions was a question hotly debated by naval and air strategists. But torpedo-bombers were certainly capable of doing so, and a British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto in 1940 had shown that they could be used effectively against ships in harbour.* However, as a few fleet for

squadrons of torpedo-bombers could not be expected to tackle the

whole of the American

fleet,

Yamamoto

insisted

that his experts should think in terms of concerted attacks

by

torpedo-bombers, high-level bombers and dive-bombers. Moreover, not only warships but also air bases would have to be knocked out in order to forestall counter-attacks on the striking force.

and practical trials, followed early in September by a war game at the Naval Academy in Tokyo, led to the conclusion that the project was risky and might cost Japan two carriers, but did not convince Yamamoto that it ought to be abandoned. In the same month airmen of the First Air Fleet began rehearsing their roles at a secluded base with the aid of a miniature mock-up of Pearl Harbor and its surroundings. As the outcome of further experiments, armour-piercing bombs were fitted with special fins, torpedoes with wooden stabilizers designed to Staff studies

improve their performance in shallow water. The project was formally adopted on November 5. Two days later ViceAdmiral Chuichi Nagumo, who had already been called into consultation, was officially designated commander of the Striking Force. *

The

British used twenty-one

torpedo-bombers from the carriers Illustrious These flew 180 miles from the Illustrious to Taranto, where they sank three battleships at their moorings. All but two aircraft returned safely.

and

Eagle.

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

97

The plan

allotted to the venture Japan's six fastest carwith a complement of 432 aircraft. 4 These would be screened by nine destroyers and a light cruiser, supported riers,

by two fast battleships and two heavy cruisers, and accompanied by three submarines moving ahead and on the flanks. In order to escape detection by American reconnaissance aircraft the whole force, accompanied by eight tankers, would steam almost due east from the Kurile Islands to the meridian of Midway Island before turning on a south-easterly course towards the Hawaiian Islands. On reaching the meridian of Oahu at a point about 490 miles north of the island the carriers and their attendant warships would make a further turn to starboard in order to approach their objective from the north. Should the negotiations in Washington come to a successful conclusion after the force had set out on its 3,000-mile voyage, Nagumo would be recalled by a pre-arranged signal from Tokyo. In any case he was to turn back if he had reason to believe by December 5 that the Americans had sighted him.* If sighted later, he was to act at his discretion. A place was found in the scheme for a substantial submarine force. Some twenty to thirty long-range submarines, moving independently of the Striking Force, were to approach Oahu from the south-west and take up positions between eight-and-a-half and a hundred miles off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Their task would be to report movements of shipping into and out of the harbour immediately before the attacks, and to sink any warships that might try to escape when the attacks were over. Five of them were to carry two-men midget submarines. These tiny craft, powered by storage batteries and each armed with two torpedoes, were to be released soon after midnight and would try to enter the harbour under cover of darkness or during the twilight hour immediately before Nagumo's bombers swept in for the kill. Such, in *

its

broadest outline, was the Japanese plan of

West Longitude Date. As Tokyo time was kept aboard Japanese warships would be December 6 by Nagumo's reckoning.

at sea, this

WAR

98

PLANS

conquest. How far were the Western powers ready with plans to counter it? The short answer is that no comprehensive plan for war with Japan had been concerted between the American,

and Netherlands governments when war broke out. and possessions in South-East Asia and the South- West Pacific were concerned exchanges between commanders and staff officers of all three countries had, however, resulted in working arrangements which might have achieved some success if attempts to postpone a showdown until the spring of 1942 had not come to a standstill in November. On the other hand, no specific plan was made to guard against a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, although the possibility of such an attack was considered many months before the blow was launched. However, if the Western powers were less than ready, their unreadiness was not due to any failure on their part

British

So

far as the defence of Western interests

to grasp the implications of the long-standing rivalry be-

tween East and West. American strategists, in particular, had recognized, from the moment when the United States ranged herself among the Far Eastern powers by acquiring the Philippines, that the South- West Pacific was a danger area in which the conflict between Western and Japanese plans for China's future might erupt in open violence. Concluding that in that event the Philippines would be indefensible without the help of a strong fleet, the distinguished American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested in 1903 that the United States Navy should concentrate in the Pacific. 5 Two years later the United States Joint Army-Navy Board proposed in the light of Japan's naval victories in the Russo-Japanese War that the battlefleet should be stationed in the Philippines and that a suitable base should be established there. Despite these warnings, it was not until 1916, when the Japanese had followed their seizure of the German colonies in the Caroline and Marshall Islands by confronting China with

their

notorious

Twenty-One Demands,

United States made a serious attempt

that

the

to counter Japan's

AMERICAN NAVAL STRATEGY

99

growing naval power. But President Wilson's naval programme, adopted in that year, was not destined to be fulfilled either in the letter or in the spirit. To gain Japanese adherence to the Washington Naval Treaty, the Americans found it necessary to renounce the right to build new bases at Guam or in the Philippines. As Pearl Harbor was far away and the existing naval base at Manila Bay unsuitable for a large force of heavy ships, this meant that the United States was still powerless to defend her Far Eastern possessions by stationing a strong fleet in the neighbourhood where it was most likely to be needed. In theory, these restrictions were removed when Japan's denunciation of the Naval Treaty took effect in 1936. Accordingly, American naval experts recommended in 1937 that a well-equipped naval and air base should be developed at Guam as an advanced base for the main fleet. Denounced by critics of the Roosevelt administration as provocative, this proposal was turned down by Congress, which sanctioned only minor additions to existing defence works at Manila Bay and the establishment of seaplane bases at

Wake and Midway

Islands

and

at

Kodiak

in

Alaska and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians. In these circumstances it had to be accepted that no large fleet could be permanently stationed within striking 6

distance of the Philippines in the foreseeable future. Such defence of the islands as might be possible in the early stages of a war would have to be carried out by local garrisons supported by naval forces already present. As these garrisons could not be made strong enough before the outbreak of war to hold the whole of Luzon, the troops would be expected to fall back gradually to naturally strong and well-prepared positions covering the entrance to Manila Bay. There they would await the arrival of a relieving force supported by the main fleet. Originally the time that must be expected to elapse before such a force could reach the Philippines was estimated at 90 to 120 days. This was soon seen to be an unrealistic figure. Naval experts pointed out that Luzon was nearly 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, and that it would be quite

100

WAR

PLANS

impossible to maintain and supply an expeditionary force at such a vast distance from its base without the use of intermediate staging posts secure against interference from the enemy. Hence the navy, assisted by the marine corps or the army, would have to begin by seizing key points 4n the Marshall and Caroline Islands, asserting some degree of control over the intervening waters, ajra establishing advanced bases. This threatened to increase the period before relief to 270 days. 7 But whether the garrison of Luzon, cooped up in a small part of the island and with their spirits lowered by withdrawal from the rest of the Philippines, would be able to withstand so long a siege began to seem extremely doubtful. Such was the position in the summer of 1941. At that stage Lieutenant-General Douglas MacArthur, a former Chief of Staff of the United States Army and a recognized authority on the Philippines, was recalled to the active list to assume command of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. MacArthur, who already held the post of Field-Marshal of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, soon came to the conclusion that, if war could be postponed until the spring of 1942, and if his land and air forces were

would stand a good chance of holding the whole of Luzon until reinforcements reached him by way of the Central Pacific or perhaps Australia. 8 Influenced by favourable reports of the new American heavy bomber, the B 17 or Flying Fortress, he believed that the troops which he hoped to have under his command by the time he was called upon to fight would be able to give a good account of themselves if he also had the means of making concentrated air attacks on Japanese bases and communications as soon as hostilities began. These opinions, buttressed by MacArthur's unrivalled knowledge of local conditions, made a profound impression in Washington. General Marshall agreed that MacArthur should draw up a plan on the lines proposed and that his strength should, if possible, be raised by the following March or April to roughly 200,000 United States and Filipino troops and about a hundred heavy bombers. In suitably strengthened in the meantime, he

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

1941

101

meantime official spokesmen encouraged the press to publish hopeful accounts of MacArthur's prospects, presumably in the belief that these would cause the Japanese to think twice before attacking him. Admitting on November 1 5 that the United States was on the brink of war with Japan, Marshall described the position in the Philippines as 55 "highly favourable 9 Yet the truth was that Mac Arthur was still well short of the resources needed to carry out his programme. Far from possessing "the greatest concentra55 tion of heavy bomber strength anywhere in the world 10 as well-meaning journalists asserted on Marshall's authority, he had only about thirty-five modern heavy bombers. This was roughly one-fifteenth of the number used by the Germans to attack Coventry on the night of November the

.

,

14.*

The crux of the problem in

the Philippines, as in Malaya, be defended was almost indefensible in the absence of a strong fleet at a convenient base. The British had the base but not the fleet, while the Americans had the fleet but not the base. Both governments hoped that air forces might fill the gap, but both failed to send an adequate number of aircraft in good time. For such naval support as could be provided locally, MacArthur depended on the United States Asiatic Fleet under Admiral Thomas C. Hart. At one time based on Shanghai, this had moved in 1940 to Manila Bay, leaving only a few gunboats in Chinese waters. The main units of the Asiatic Fleet consisted in 1941 of one heavy and two light cruisers, thirteen destroyers, twenty-nine submarines, six gunboats, five minesweepers, and some thirty-two flying

was that the

territory to

boats served by four seaplane tenders.

The

role allotted to

Hart

5

s

fleet in

the original plan for

the defence of the Philippines was to support the land forces for as long as they continued to resist the enemy. After the 5

adoption of MacArthur s plan this conception was modified on the assumption that MacArthur s bombers would make a substantial contribution to seaward defence and that he 5

*

German

records

show that 509

aircraft

were despatched

to Coventry,

that 449 crews claimed after the raid to have reached the target area.

and

WAR

102

PLANS

would be able

to hold at least part of the Philippines largely with his own resources. On November 20 the Department of the Navy made it clear to Hart that his obligation to support MacArthur did not mean that he was to sacrifice his fleet by engaging superior forces on terms which offered him no prospect of survival. 11 Thereupon Hart, recognizing that MacArthur would be in danger of succumbing to a prolonged blockade even if he did succeed in maintaining his grip on Luzon, began moving his surface forces to Balikpapan and Tarakan, in Borneo, with the intention of using them to prevent the enemy from dominating MacArthur's sea communications. Should an invasion force approach

would use his flying boats to locate it, and his submarines to supplement attempts by MacArthur's bombers to destroy it. In accordance with this policy, Hart responded to the "war warning" of November 27 by stepping up seaward reconnaissance by his flying boats. At the same time MacArthur ruled that the heavy bombers hitherto based in Luzon should move to Davao to reduce the risk of destruction by a surprise attack. But lack of space at Davao,where new arrivals from the mainland were expected, made it impossible to move more than about half the B 1 7s before the the Philippines, Hart

outbreak of war. In the first week of December Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Eastern Fleet, flew to Manila to confer with the American commanders. 12 Hart disclosed his preoccupation with the sea communications of the Philippines, while Phillips stressed the importance of preventing the enemy from breaking into the Indian Ocean. On the assumption that four British capital ships would be available within the next few weeks or months and that a number of Dutch cruisers and destroyers would be at their disposal, the two naval commanders agreed that their ultimate aim must be to station a battlefleet at Singapore or perhaps Manila, and a cruiser

—

Darwin their

—

Sourabaya Port Borneo. In the meantime they would have to do best with their existing resources, supplemented by

strong

force

in

the

triangle

DECEMBER

1941

103

such ships as the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand governments could be persuaded to contribute in the immediate future. As Phillips already had two capital ships but lacked most of the other ingredients of a balanced fleet, Hart agreed that on the outbreak of war an American destroyer flotilla at Balikpapan should move to Singapore. 13 Hart and Phillips also agreed that the role of the main fleet would be to act as a striking force against Japanese movements in the South China Sea, in the neighbourhood of the Netherlands East Indies or through the "Malay barrier", and that the cruiser force should be used to provide escort and cover for convoys within reach of Japanese naval and air bases. The effect of these arrangements on the disposition of Hart's fleet was that the first day of hostilities found him with two of his cruisers, four of his destroyers and all his submarines at Manila Bay.* The third cruiser was at Tarakan. Of his remaining destroyers, five were at Tarakan and four on passage from Balikpapan to Singapore. 14 A paradoxical consequence of the strategic outlook which

stemmed from the Washington treaties was that the American naval and land forces in the Central Pacific, where no attack seemed likely, were collectively much stronger than those in the Western Pacific, where invasion was expected almost hourly. Lieutenant-General Walter C. Short, com-

Army Forces in the Territory of

manding the United Hawaii, had at his

States

Divisions, supported

by a small

and 25th Infantry with an effective 15 fighting strength of about 140 aircraft. Nominally his primary responsibility was the defence of the whole of the territory except the Navy Yard, for which the navy was responsible. But in practice he and his staff and subordinate commanders were obliged to give priority to the manifold task of training the infantry divisions for an active role and disposal the 24th

air force

preparing for despatch to the Philippines the bulk of the heavy bombers which reached them from the mainland. The defences of the crucial island of Oahu included a radar network, but this was organized only on a training basis. *

Two

of the destroyers and four of the submarines were

refitting.

104

WAR

PLANS

The radar stations were not continuously on the air, and the centre to which they reported was not fully manned even during the comparatively brief periods when the system was in operation. 16 Moreover, although experience in Europe had shown that air forces caught on the ground by air attacks were liable to destruction unless their aircraft were systematically dispersed, little or nothing had been done to apply the lesson at American bases in Oahu or elsewhere.

On

the naval side, the fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor since the spring of 1940 had become the United States Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941, when a new Atlantic Fleet came into being. On the same day Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who was chosen in preference to more than thirty officers of greater seniority, 17

assumed command of

the fleet in succession to Admiral James O. Richardson, an unrepentant critic of the move from the West Coast. Soon

afterwards Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, sanctioned the transfer of three battleships and the carrier Yorktown to the Atlantic Fleet, but did so with great reluctance since he had not intended to weaken the Pacific Fleet until the British were ready to send a strong fleet to Singapore. 18

This

move

left

with the Pacific Fleet the nine battle-

ships Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, Okla-

homa, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and West

the carriers Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga', twelve heavy and nine light cruisers; sixty-seven destroyers; and twenty-seven submarines. 19 All the battleships were at least twenty years old and, although modernized, were considerably slower Virginia',

than the carriers. Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel was short of the tankers and other auxiliaries which he would need if he were to thrust westwards to the Marshall and Caroline Islands and relieve the Philippines. 20 At the same time he was bound to assume that the move would take place eventually, and hence to devote to exercises and special training resources which could otherwise have been used for defensive reconnaissance and precautionary patrols. These shortcomings were well known to the American

PEARL HARBOR,

1941

105

naval authorities. A weakness of which they were not aware was that their torpedoes were inferior to Japanese torpedoes in range, speed and hitting power.* During the spring and summer of 1941 the chances of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and Oahu received a good deal of attention both locally and in Washington. On March 31 Brigadier- General F. L. Martin, commanding the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific, and RearAdmiral P. N. L. Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Arm, presented a joint report in which they stated that "the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack launched from carriers". 21 They added that such an attack might well achieve complete surprise. On the following day Admiral Stark warned all naval districts to be particularly watchful at week-ends. 22

Admiral Kimmel himself, when he promulgated his war plan on July 21, expressed the opinion that hostilities might begin with 'raids or straight attacks" on Wake, Midway, or "other outlying United States possessions". 23 However, the general opinion in Western military circles was that the Japanese were incapable of undertaking more than one major operation at a time. 24 Consequently the threat to Oahu was thought to have receded when it became known that the Japanese Army was thinking in terms of a southward drive from Indo- China. When the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington lost track of four Japanese carries in November, the missing carriers were suspected not of steaming towards Pearl Harbor but of preparing, with two carriers reported to have reached the Marshall Islands, to support an expedition to South-East '

Asia or the South- West Pacific. The war warning of November 27, with its emphasis on the danger to the Philippines and Siam, did nothing to dispel the illusion that an attack

had become *

The

unlikely.

When

on Pearl Harbor and Oahu passing the warning to the

relevant figures for the torpedoes in service in 1941 were as follows: Japanese

Range

in miles

Speed in knots Weight of warhead in pounds

American

1 1

7.5

49

26.5

1,120

780

WAR

106

PLANS

Kimmel to carry out a "defendeployment", but made it clear that this was to be

Pacific Fleet, Stark ordered sive

merely the plan.

On

first step towards the unfolding of the offensive the following day Stark added that hostile action

any moment but that Kimmel was not to take the offensive until Japan "committed an overt act". 25 Not surprisingly, Kimmel interpreted these orders not as a warning that the Japanese were about to attack his base,

was

possible at

but as confirmation of his existing instructions to thrust westwards as soon as they attacked the Philippines. Believing that in any case the army was maintaining a continuous radar watch 26 and that therefore the defences were unlikely to be taken by surprise, he did not suspend training in order to make more flying boats available for seaward reconnaissance. 27 Nor did he order his fleet to sea, or cancel week-end leaves and liberties. Between November 28 and December 5 he did, however, order the Enterprise and the Lexington to carry aircraft to Wake and Midway as a precaution against the raids mentioned in his war plan of July 21. As the Saratoga and the Colorado were already on the West Coast of the United States, the result was that all three of his carriers and one of his battleships, in addition to ten heavy and three light cruisers, twenty-five destroyers and thirteen submarines, were away from Pearl Harbor at the crucial time.

General Short's assessment of the situation was no luckier then Kimmel's. Although relations between the two commanders were friendly, 28 Short was as ill informed of what the navy was doing as the navy was of what he was doing. Just as Kimmel believed that the army's radar watch could be relied upon to give warning of approaching aircraft, so Short believed that naval aircraft and patrol craft were maintaining an effective guard over the seaward approaches. 29 Like Kimmel, Short did not suspend the normal activities of his command, for he reasoned that an imminent threat to the Philippines made the training of troops for active service and the preparation of bombers for despatch to Luzon a more vital task than ever. 30 Believing, too, that sabotage by Japanese residents of Oahu

MALAYA,

1940-1941

107

was much more probable than air attack, he arranged that aircraft on military airfields should be parked close together so that they could be more easily guarded. 31 Without disclosing the precise terms of the war warning to General Martin he did, however, take steps which he hoped would reduce the risk of a surprise air attack in the early hours of the morning. Hitherto the army's radar units had maintained daily training watches from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. and had then gone off duty. After the receipt of the war warning it was arranged that henceforth they should keep watch from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., which Short regarded as the period of greatest danger. On weekdays, but not on Sundays, they would then train for another four hours before knocking off for the day. 32

Malaya had always on the assumption that the only sure defence was to station at Singapore a fleet strong enough to dominate the South China Sea. This would make it virtually impossible for the Japanese to disembark and supply a landing force on the Malay peninsula or the isthmus of Kra. When France collapsed and Italy declared war, it became apparent that urgent commitments in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would prevent the Admiralty from sending a strong fleet to the Far East in the near future. At the same time it was accepted that, in view of promises made to the Commonwealth governments, a fleet of some kind would have to be sent should the security of Australia or New Zealand be imminently threatened. Thereafter the Admiralty's policy was to build up in the Indian Ocean a new Eastern Fleet which would be sent to British plans for the defence of

rested

Singapore only when its strength reached a minimum of seven capital ships, one aircraft carrier, ten cruisers and about twenty-four destroyers. 33 These figures might, it was thought, be attained in the spring of 1942. To send a smaller force would be strategically unsound, since only a fleet strong enough to fight the Japanese Navy with a fair prospect of survival could be expected to gain control of the

South China Sea.

WAR

108

PLANS

However, some members of the government, led by the Prime Minister, thought that the presence of even one or two capital ships at Singapore might cause the Japanese to hesitate before embarking on a costly war. 34 Hence the political argument for sending a small naval force to the Far East before the end of 1941 could be held to outweigh the strategic argument against doing so. The sequel was that, in spite of the Admiralty's misgivings, the new battleship Prince of Wales and the modernized battlecruiser Repulse reached Singapore about the beginning of December. Their arrival gave Admiral Phillips a weak and unbalanced fleet of two capital ships, three light cruisers, two armed merchant cruisers and six destroyers. To these Phillips could expect to add the four American destroyers which Admiral Hart promised to send

when hostilities began. The situation in the air was equally unsatisfactory. At one time the Air Ministry had argued that torpedo-bombers, protected by fighters and supplemented by medium and light coast-defence batteries, could prevent hostile warships from approaching Singapore, and that therefore heavy coast-defence batteries were unnecessary. 35 The Chiefs of Staff did not accept that view, but believed that aircraft would play an essential part in the defence of Malaya as a whole, especially if the Japanese should prove so disobliging as to send an invasion force before the fleet was ready. In 1940 they calculated that a minimum of 335 modern aircraft would be needed to guard against a seaborne expedition or an attack across the northern frontier, deny British bases in Borneo to the enemy, and protect trade in the Indian Ocean. 36 Subsequent calculations by the authorities on the spot raised the target figure to 566 and later to

The

582

aircraft. 37

Chiefs of Staff agreed early in 1941 that 582 aircraft

was not an unreasonable figure, but held out no hope of finding more than 336 before the end of the year. 38 In the outcome not even that figure was attained. The first-line strength in Malaya on the outbreak of war amounted to a total of 158

aircraft,

consisting of twenty-four obsolete

1940-1941

109

torpedo-bombers, thirty-five light bombers, seventy-two and twenty-seven reconnaissance aircraft, including

fighters

flying boats. 39

This shortcoming made havoc of the British plan. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who was appointed in 1940 to control all British land and air forces in Malaya, British Borneo, Burma and Hong Kong, was told that the defence of the Far East would be based on air power until a fleet could be made available. 40 In practice he had so few aircraft that almost the entire burden of defending Malaya fell on the land forces. These in turn came far short of the strength needed in the absence of enough warships or aircraft to prevent the enemy from disembarking and supplying a strong expeditionary force. Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival, commanding the land forces in Malaya and British Borneo, assessed his needs at forty-eight battalions organized in five divisions, one independent brigade and two detached battalions. 41 On the eve of the war he had only one battalion instead of one brigade in Borneo; in Malaya he had thirty-one battalions organized in three divisions, two reserve brigade groups, two fortress brigades and one detached battalion. 42 After providing a garrison for Singapore Island, assigning one division to the defence of southern Malaya and setting up a small reserve, he was left with one corps of two divisions, under LieutenantGeneral Sir Lewis Heath, to meet an attack across the northern frontier of Malaya. To make matters worse, the Royal Air Force had built a large number of airfields and landing grounds to accommodate the powerful striking force which they once hoped to have at their disposal. Provision had to be made to deny these to the enemy, although some of them were in unfrequented places which could otherwise have been left undefended. As this commitment compelled Heath to disperse about half his force in isolated positions remote from any through road, only one of his two divisions would be available to bar the main route to the south. Heath's difficulties were further increased by the exist-

MAP

1

The Malay Peninsula ill- Railways Roads

Jerantutr

Raub

A

7

Kuala Lumpur]

Port

'K.uant:an

Segamat

D/cksoirv

"Labis

>

%Mer5itig

f

emaluang

'Muar BatuPahaP

'Kluang' ^Ayer Hi'tam*

HONG-KONG,

1941

111

ence of alternative plans for the employment of his one division. The nature of the country was such that the Japanese would almost certainly be obliged to disembark the greater part of their troops on the isthmus of Kra or immediately south of it in order to gain access to the road leading southwards near the west coast of the Malay peninsula. In favourable circumstances Heath would, on receiving the signal Matador, advance into Siam in order to block the neck of the isthmus at and near Singora, and would also send a small force into Siamese territory to block a road leading southwards from Patani at a position known to the British as 'The Ledge'. The advance to Singora would, however, be feasible only if the troops were given thirty-six hours to prepare for the move and were able to start at least twenty-four hours

uncommitted

before the

enemy came

ashore. 43 Should those conditions

not be present, or should the advance to Singora be ruled out by political factors, then Heath would have to stand at Jitra, about eighteen miles on the Malayan side of the frontier, but would still need to send a small force to The Ledge in order to prevent the enemy from outflanking him

by advancing from Patani. 44 Brooke-Popham would decide, if necessary in consultation with London, whether Matador or the Jitra alternative was to be put into effect, and his decision would be conveyed to Heath through Percival. For the defence of Hong Kong the British had only a small garrison consisting originally of four battalions with no aircraft. Until shortly before the war the authorities in London took the view that no more could be expected of such a force than a brief resistance followed by an honourable surrender. Brooke-Popham believed, however, that it might be possible to hold Hong Kong until the arrival of a relieving force if the garrison could be increased to six battalions. 45 Major-General A. E. Grasett, a Canadian who commanded the troops at Hong Kong until the summer of 1941, expressed a similar view when he visited Canada after relinquishing the command to MajorGeneral C. M. Maltby. 46 The Canadian government thereupon offered to find the additional two battalions, practically

112

WAR

and the

authorities in

PLANS London accepted

the offer although

still thought that Hong Kong could be defended only an outpost. There remained the problem of defending the Netherlands East Indies. As the Dutch had too few troops to throw an invader back into the sea, this was not likely to be solved unless their naval and air forces, consisting of

they as

three light cruisers, seven destroyers, thirteen submarines

and about 140 aircraft, could co-operate with the British and perhaps also the Americans, to prevent the enemy from putting a substantial force ashore. The British, predicting that the Japanese would not try to conquer the Indonesian archipelago without first landing in Malaya, concluded that the best course both for themselves and for the Dutch was to concentrate on holding the Malay peninsula until they were in a position to dominate the South China Sea. 47 However, as no British fleet strong enough to dominate the South China Sea was likely to arrive before the spring of 1942, and as Malaya could not be held indefinitely by inadequate land forces with meagre air support, in effect this meant that the fate of the Netherlands East Indies, as of Malaya and the Philippines, would depend largely on the date when hostilities began. For the British, Dutch and United States authorities charged with the defence of Allied possessions in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific, the breakdown of negotiations between the United States government and the Japanese in the early winter of 1941 was therefore an unmitigated disaster.

7

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES,

WAKE

GUAM AND

IN

the second

battleships,

week of November 1941 the carriers,

cruisers,

destroyers,

submarines, tankers and supply ships of Admiral Nagumo's Striking Force began to move by twos and threes from the Inland Sea to Hitokkapu Wan, a lonely bay on a desolate stretch of coast in the largest of the Kurile Islands. By November 22 all had reached the rendezvous. Four days later the force set out on its long voyage to the Central Pacific.

Nagumo, who had no great faith in his mission, was unable to repress a hope that he might be either recalled, or forced to turn back by the knowledge that his force had been detected. But his route lay far from areas reconnoitred by American submarines or aircraft, and only one ship, a Japanese freighter, was seen throughout the voyage. On December 2 the code-message 'Climb Mount Niitaka warned him that there would be no recall and that he would be expected to launch his attack at the appointed time unless his approach became known to the Americans within the next few days. Sunday, December 7 (West Longitude Date) had been chosen for the attack because Japanese agents reported that the American battleships always stayed in harbour on Sundays. On Thursday, December 4 (East Longitude Date) the force crossed the International Date Line after refuelling in difficult conditions on the previous day. So by international reckoning the next day was again Thursday, December 4. Nagumo and his staff continued, however, to use Japanese time and therefore reckoned the date as December 5. On December 6 Nagumo learned from Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo that there were at least seven 5

114

DECEMBER

6-7, 1941

115

Harbor. 1 That evening he took leave of his tankers, hoisted to the masthead of his flagship the Agaki the flag flown by Admiral Togo on the battleships,

but no

carriers, at Pearl

eve of the great victory of Tsushima Island, and set a southerly course towards Oahu in gathering darkness and a

mounting sea. At first light

on

the

following

morning

Nagumo

reached his launching area about 275 miles north of Oahu. After despatching four seaplanes from his heavy cruisers with orders to make a final reconnaissance of the target area and do their best to locate the American battlefleet if 2 it had put to sea, he decided to use thirty-nine of his aircraft for a defensive patrol in the neighbourhood of his own ships and send 353 to Pearl Harbor and Oahu in two waves. Forty aircraft not fully serviceable remained in reserve.

The weather had improved

considerably during the southward run, but a fresh wind was blowing from the north-east. Even in a moderate sea the flight decks of the carriers dipped awkwardly as the first wave of forty torpedo-bombers, fifty-one dive-bombers and forty-nine high-level bombers,

accompanied by forty-three

fighters,

took off and disappeared in a belt of overcast at 6,000 feet. Meanwhile the submarines of the so-called Advanced Expeditionary Force had reached their allotted sectors south-west of Pearl Harbor after refuelling at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. In the early hours of December 7 the five which carried midget submarines cast off their charges within a few miles of the inlet leading to Pearl

Harbor.

At 3.42 a.m. on December 7 the small minesweeper Condor was making a routine sweep less than two miles off the entrance to Pearl Harbor when the Officer of the Watch, Ensign R. C. McCloy, saw in the darkness a patch of white which appeared to be approaching from seaward and

closing with his ship. After consulting the Quarter-

master he came to the conclusion that it was the wake made by the periscope of a submerged submarine. The destroyer

w.f.e.

—

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

116

Ward, warned by blinker light from the Condor at 3.58 a.m., began forthwith to search the area. At 4.47 a.m. the crew responsible for opening and closing the gate in the anti- torpedo net at the mouth of the harbour began the laborious task of opening the gate to admit the Condor and another minesweeper which had been working with her. By 5.32 a.m. both minesweepers had passed through the gate. However, instead of closing the gate behind the minesweepers the crew decided to leave it open. The tug Keosanqua was due to leave harbour within the next three-quarters of an hour, on her way to pick up a steel barge which was being towed towards the entrance by the supply ship Antares. Closing and reopening the gate would have occupied at least a third of that time, so the effort scarcely seemed worth while. By half-past six the Keosanqua was past the gate, which remained open so that she could re-enter the harbour in due course. The sun had risen, but had not yet cleared the northern heights. The harbour and roadstead were bathed a grey light flecked with early-morning mist. The was already in sight, with the barge about a hundred yards behind her at the end of a long steel hawser. The Ward was still searching about a mile off-shore, and a Catalina flying boat was patrolling overhead. At that moment the Ward's helmsman saw a strange black object apparently fastened to the towline between the Antares and the barge. He spoke to the Quartermaster, who saw through his glasses that the object was not fastened to the towline and that it looked like the conning- tower of a submarine. The Officer of the Watch thought at first that it looked more like a buoy, but decided to rouse his comin

Antares

manding too,

was

The

officer

when he saw

that evidently the Catalina,

interested.

had no doubt that he was looking at a submarine, but supposed it to be an American submarine in distress. He went into a tight circle and dropped two smoke-bombs to guide rescuers to the spot. Lieutenant William W. Outerbridge, who had assumed command of the Ward only a day or two earlier but had pilot of the Catalina

DECEMBER

7,

1941

117

fourteen years' experience of the peacetime navy, was under no such illusion. The strange craft was not only in an area which American submarines were not allowed to enter, but

from any American submarine he had ever seen. Outerbridge closed with it at the best speed his twenty-three-year-old ship could make, opened fire at a hundred yards closing to fifty yards or less, and released four depth charges. Taking his cue from the Ward, the pilot of the Catalina then dropped depth charges of his own. At 6.51 a.m. Outerbridge signalled to his shore command, the Fourteenth Naval District, that he had attacked a submarine in the prohibited area with depth charges. Feeling on reflection that something more was needed to show that he had not merely dropped depth charges but had come close enough to the submarine to shoot at it, he followed a few minutes later with a further message to the effect that he had also used his guns. For some reason these signals took so long to decode that

was quite

different

neither of

them reached the Duty

Officer at headquarters

Although claims by destroyer com7.12 a.m. manders to have attacked submarines which turned out to be mythical were not unknown, the Duty Officer, Lieutenant-Commander H. Kaminsky, was sufficiently impressed to feel that some action was required. He roused the 3

before

Chief of Staff, speak to the

who asked for confirmation but promised to Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval

Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Kaminsky also managed, with some difficulty, to convey a message to Commander R. V. Murphy, the Duty Officer at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters; but it reached Murphy in a form which failed to convince him that the submarine alleged to have sunk had actually been seen and fired upon at close quarters. Consequently he attached no great importance District,

to the message from the naval

until, at 7.35 a.m.,

confirmation arrived

pilot who witnessed the Ward's attack had reported. Murphy then put through a call to Admiral Kimmel's house, about five minutes' drive from his headquarters. The Admiral listened with interest and said that he would "be right down". 4 air station to

which the

118

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES who was responsible to Kimmel Navy Yard, had been duly warned and

In the meantime Bloch, for the safety of the

was taking steps to send a second destroyer to help the Ward and bring a third to readiness. Meanwhile even more startling news had reached the army's radar information centre at Fort Shafter, but had fallen on stony ground. That morning five radar stations dotted round the coast of Oahu were on watch. The station at Opana, near the northernmost extremity of the island, was manned by Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott, who had been guarding the station since noon on the previous day and were due to return to camp as soon as their watch ended. As both men were eager to improve their knowledge of radar and its workings, they were not sorry when the moment came to turn on the equipment and tune it in. As a rule the morning watch gave the men on duty at Opana ample opportunities of observing echoes from American aircraft patrolling or exercising off the north coast. But on this Sunday morning no exercises had been arranged, and the few Catalina aircraft on duty were reconnoitring further to the south. 5 Lockard and Elliott had nothing to observe until 6.45 a.m., when they picked up the echo from an aircraft approaching at a fairly high speed from a point almost due north of the centre of the island. Although they could not know that this was one of the seaplanes sent ahead of Nagumo's first wave, they duly tracked it for fifteen minutes and reported their observations to the information centre. 6 Had an experienced officer, forewarned of the movements of all friendly aircraft, been on duty at the centre, he would thus have known before 7 a.m. that an aircraft was at large in an area where no friendly aircraft should have been. But no such officer was present. The authorities immediately responsible for the manning of the centre had no reason to suppose that an air attack was likely, and had not even been told when ordered to modify their watchkeeping system about a fortnight earlier that the reason for the change was that highly placed officers in Washington

DECEMBER

7,

1941

119

war was imminent. 7 Lieutenant Kermit

Tyler, the only officer on duty at the centre that morning, was a novice who had been sent to learn as much as he could about the radar network before returning to other duties. He had some experience of passing to fighter squadrons orders given by the Controller who took charge of the centre

believed

during exercises. But he was not accustomed to issue such orders on his

own

responsibility,

and no

fighters

had been

purpose of intercepting hostile was not foreseen that he would be called upon to do anything more than supervise an uneventful training watch. Not at all alarmed by the appearance of a single unidentified aircraft in an area where American aircraft were often at work, he saw no reason to prolong the watch beyond the

put at

his disposal for the

aircraft or investigating doubtful plots, since it

usual hour. Accordingly, at 7 a.m. the plotters at the information centre took off their headphones, put away their rakes and counters, and went to breakfast, leaving Tyler to kill time until his own tour of duty ended an hour later. Nominally the radar stations then closed down for the day. But Lockard and Elliott, marooned at Opana until the breakfast

which was often late, arrived to take them to their nine miles away, decided on their own initiative to remain on watch until the truck appeared. Two minutes later their equipment responded to an echo far larger than any in their previous experience. After making sure that the equipment was in order, they estimated that at least fifty aircraft were approaching from the north at 180 miles an hour. As there was no plotter at the far end of their direct line to the plotting table, they were unable to report this conclusion to the information centre until they succeeded in putting through a call to the switchboard operator on another line. The operator, impressed by truck,

camp

and finding to his surprise that there was on duty in a plotting room bereft of plotters,

their earnestness still

an

officer

agreed after a parley to summon Tyler to the telephone. But Tyler was not shaken by Lockard's attempt to convince him that something altogether exceptional was happening.

120

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

He knew that two American carriers were at sea, and had heard that about a dozen bombers on a delivery flight were expected from the mainland. Satisfied that the aircraft detected by Lockard and Elliott would turn out to be friendly, he refused to recall the plotters and told Lockard not to worry.

So no alarm was raised, although Lockard and Elliott continued to track the approaching formation until it was so close to them that its echo was lost in the permanent echo from the neighbouring hills. 8 When the formation, later identified as Nagumo's first wave, crossed the coast some forty minutes after it was first detected, the defenders not only had no fighters ready to meet it but were caught with most of their aircraft closely bunched together in unprotected positions in the open. Few anti-aircraft guns ashore or afloat were fully manned, and even those which were could not be fired until ammunition had been fetched from depots or extracted from locked boxes. 9 Of seventy warships and twenty-four auxiliaries in harbour only one was under way, and of thirty-three serviceable flying boats at the navy's disposal only three were on patrol. 10 On reaching the coast Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the leader of the first wave, sent part of his force overland to deal with the principal air stations, and led the rest in a wide sweep which brought them towards Pearl Harbor and Ford Island from the south-west and the west. With the exception of the Pennsylvania, in dry dock with two destroyers, Admiral Kimmel's battleships were berthed close together south-east of Ford Island. They were not fitted with anti-torpedo aprons or baffles, which Kimmel had declined to use on the ground that they were cumbersome and took up too much room. 11 All except the Maryland and the Tennessee, which were moored inboard of the Oklahoma and the West Virginia and could not be easily reached by torpedoes, made tempting targets for torpedo-bombers. Reaching Pearl Harbor about 7.55 a.m., the first of Fuchida's torpedo-bombers opened fire on the battleships at almost exactly the same moment as some of his dive-

bombers and

fighters

began

to

bomb and

harass neigh-

MAP Oahu and

2

Pearl

harbor Principal air bases

122

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

bouring air stations. The Arizona, the Oklahoma and the West Virginia were all hit by torpedoes in the first few minutes, and most of the battleships were also hit by bombs. After a brief interval the Arizona blew up with a low-pitched roar, showering other vessels with flaming debris. Within half an hour all that was left of the Arizona was a blazing wreck, the Oklahoma had capsized, the West Virginia had been saved from a similar fate by prompt counter-flooding but had settled on the bottom, and the California was sinking. The Maryland and the Tennessee were still afloat although both were damaged, and the Nevada had a huge rent in her side but was casting off as a prelude to a gallant attempt to put to sea. Afterwards ordered not to leave harbour because of the danger that she might sink and block the channel, the Nevada was later beached by tugs. In the midst of these calamities, which cost the navy more than fifteen hundred lives in the space of a few minutes, seamen made haste to man anti-aircraft guns and break the locks of ammunition boxes, while airmen took stock of airfields littered with wrecked aircraft. Survivors bore witness to countless acts of heroism and to extraordinary feats performed by men under the influence of strong emotions. A sailor was seen to cut clean through a steel hawser with a single stroke of a hatchet at least one man who had never swum before saved his life by swimming. Another non-swimmer saved more lives than his own by escaping through a submerged hatch in a capsized vessel, bobbing up like a cork beside a neighbouring quay, and telling rescuers where to look for his trapped shipmates. A brief lull between 8.25 and 8.40 a.m. was followed by the arrival of Nagumo's second wave. Its eighty divebombers, fifty-four high-level bombers and thirty-six fighters were met by a substantial volume of fire from ships' guns, and a number of low-level attacks on air bases were broken up by machine-gune fire. In addition American fighters made about a dozen sorties, mostly from one small airfield which had escaped damage. 12 Hampered by these efforts and by smoke from burning ships and shore installations, the second wave achieved nothing comparable with ;

DECEMBER

7,

123

1941

the crippling of the American battlefleet by the first wave, but destroyed or damaged many aircraft on the ground and gave the Nevada's crew some anxious moments. The Pennsylvania was hit soon after 9 a.m. by a bomb which went through her boat deck and exploded in the casemate of a 5-inch gun, but she suffered no great damage and was able to leave the dry dock less than a week later. By 10 a.m. the attacks were over. In two hours the Japanese had sunk or damaged eighteen American warships and auxiliaries, destroyed or damaged 349 American

and killed or wounded 3,581 American sailors, soldiers and marines for the loss of twenty-nine of their own aircraft, all five of their midget submarines and one oceangoing submarine. 13 In addition 103 civilians, most of them employed at naval or military installations, were killed or injured. About forty explosions in the built-up area of Honolulu did half a million dollars' worth of damage, but all except one of these mishaps were caused by incorrectly aircraft,

fused or defective anti-aircraft shells. 14

Notwithstanding

American

the

immense

harm

battlefleet, this astonishing feat

done

to

the

did not give the

Japanese the sweeping ascendancy they might have won if Nagumo had pushed his advantage a little further. When the last aircraft of the second wave turned away, Admiral KimmePs repair shops were still in good shape and his power plant and reserves of fuel untouched. Fuchida pleaded for a chance of inflicting further damage, arguing that this might tempt the missing American carriers to join the fight and give Nagumo an opportunity of destroying them. 15 But Nagumo ruled against a renewal of the air attacks and gave the order to withdraw. His departure left Kimmel with all three of his carriers and one battleship intact, six of his eight sunk or damaged battleships not so far gone that they could not be restored to service before the war was over,* and all but a few of his cruisers and destroyers *

Of

the eight battleships at Pearl

became a Virginia

total loss.

The

were refloated, and

eventually rejoined the

5*

all

fleet.

were repaired without great

W.F.E.

Harbor on December

California, the Nevada, the

7, only the Arizona Oklahoma and the West

except the Oklahoma, which was sold for scrap, Maryland, the Pennsylvania and the Tennessee

The

difficulty.

PEARL HARBOUR, THE PHILIPPINES

124

undamaged or only lightly damaged. 16 Thus the outcome of Yamamoto's decision to attack Pearl Harbor either

was that the Americans were temporarily or permanently deprived of a number of battleships past their prime, but retained a first-class naval base in the Central Pacific and the nucleus of a new and improved Pacific Fleet. At a heavy cost in human lives, they also received a valuable lesson in the importance of air power in naval warfare.

When Japanese

aircraft began to attack Pearl Harbor at on Sunday, December 7, the time at Manila was a.m. on Monday, December 8. News of the attack was

7.55 a.m. 1.55

received in the Philippines almost immediately, reached

Admiral Hart soon after 3 a.m., and was passed to General Mac Arthur about an hour later. 17 Official confirmation arrived from Washington at 5.30 a.m. 18 Further evidence that Japan was at war with the United States was provided by twenty-two Japanese aircraft which left the carrier Ryujo at first light to attack a seaplane tender anchored off Davao. Despite this unmistakable call to action, the prompt attack on Japanese airfields in Formosa which MacArthur expected to launch at the outset of hostilities was not delivered, apparently because neither MacArthur's Chief of Staff nor his air commander, Major-General L. H. Brereton, was willing to sanction such an attack without a preliminary air reconnaissance. 19 American aircraft in Luzon went into the air in response to a general alert at 8.30 a.m., but they saw nothing of the enemy and were back at their bases by the middle of the forenoon. 20 General

made

preliminary arrangements to reconnoitre Formosa later in the day and attack the Japanese airfields in the afternoon. In the meantime the Japanese were threatened with a serious dislocation of their programme. As the army support bombers of the 5th Air Division could not reach Manila from bases in Formosa, the High Command planned to attack the crucial American airfields in that neighbourhood with land-based naval aircraft of the Eleventh

Brereton then

MANILA: DECEMBER

8,

1941

125

Air Fleet, which had a longer range; use army bombers against objectives further north; and land about five hundred men on Batan Island, off the north coast of Luzon, with orders to prepare a forward landing ground for use at a later stage. 21 The force consigned to Batan Island duly went ashore at dawn, and thirty- two bombers of the 5th Air Division which took off shortly afterwards attacked objectives in northern Luzon about 9.30 a.m. 22 But earlymorning fog over the Eleventh Air Fleet's bases prevented the naval aircraft from starting their long flight to the neighbourhood of Manila until well after ten o'clock. 23 Recognizing that the Americans must have known since the early hours of the morning that an assault on the Philippines was imminent, the Japanese concluded that the Eleventh Air Fleet had lost its chance of catching MacArthur's aircraft

on the ground and was

likely to

meet heavy opposi-

tion.

However, these fears proved unfounded. Although the American radar network ought, in theory, to have given the air defences ample warning that a large hostile formation was approaching, in practice they received so little notice that only one American fighter squadron was airborne when nearly two hundred aircraft of the Eleventh Air Fleet arrived soon after midday. 24 Heavily outnumbered, this squadron lost all but two of its aircraft when a large Japanese formation came up with it as it was about to land at the end of its patrol. 25 On reaching their objectives, the Japanese bomber crews were astonished to see large numbers of American aircraft parked in the open with little or no attempt at dispersal or concealment. Not seriously hampered by antiaircraft guns using old-fashioned ammunition, the Eleventh Air Fleet played havoc with MacArthur's principal air bases, and withdrew with the loss of only seven aircraft after destroying nearly a hundred American aircraft in the air or on the ground. 26 These losses reduced the United States Army Air Forces in the Far East to some seventeen heavy bombers and fewer than forty fighters, not

all

of them

undamaged

or

fit

MAP

3 PEC.8I

The Philippine Islands

BATAN

I.

and Northern Borneo IPEC.10I

V hi Li p pine

Sea,

PHILIPPINE PECjiTI

Soutfv

China,

Sea ISLANDS

Japanese landings, with dates

Miles' 200

100

jSalikpapan

300

DECEMBER

10-12, 1941

127

action. 27

MacArthur, whose plan rested on the assumption that he would be able to strike hard with his aircraft before the enemy could disembark a landing force, was thus forced on to the defensive almost from the for

immediate

start.

After a lull caused by another spell of indifferent weather, the Eleventh Air Fleet returned on December 10 to deal with the naval base and other objectives in the neighbourhood of Manila Bay. This time the air defences received about three-quarters of an hour's warning and put up some thirty-five fighters. 28

These were overwhelmed by roughly a hundred naval fighters escorting some fifty to sixty naval bombers. 29 Attacking from heights well out of reach of the anti-aircraft guns, the bombers started uncontrollable fires in the Navy Yard, destroyed the entire reserve stock of torpedoes for Hart's submarines, and wrecked a large part of the city of Cavite. 30 Two days later a wing of Catalina flying boats lost all its aircraft to naval fighters which shadowed them as they returned from a fruitless search for Japanese carriers and attacked them at their moorings. Their loss compelled Hart to withdraw his surviving aircraft to Java in the knowledge that they could not live without fighter protection which Brereton's thirty-three remaining fighters could not provide. 31 By the evening of December 1 2 the Japanese had thus won complete control of the approaches to the Philippines both on the sea and in the air. Henceforth no supplies could reach MacArthur's beleaguered army, and Hart was powerless to prevent the enemy from disembarking troops and stores whenever he chose to do so. Landings in Luzon had in fact begun on December 10, the Japanese Fourteenth Army sent ashore the first of five distinct formations which converged on Manila from north and south. On the same day Guan, which might have served as a valuable outpost for the defence of the Philippines if Congress had not refused to fortify it, succumbed to a greatly superior Japanese force after a brief but spirited resistance by its tiny garrison of 365 marines, 308 native militia and a few naval officers and seamen. 32

when

128

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

and Hart's submarines scored a few bound for Luzon, but they were too heavily outnumbered to make much impression. Without command of the air, MacArthur was obliged to fall back on the old plan of a retreat to the neighbourhood of Manila Bay, but with the important difference that the Pacific Fleet was no longer in a position to come to his relief even after a delay of nine months.* On December 27, after his fourteen surviving heavy bombers had withdrawn to the relative safety of an airfield near Port Darwin in Australia, he declared Manila an open city and ordered his corps commanders, Major-General Jonathan M. Wainwright and Major-General George M. Parker, to take up positions covering the Bataan peninsula. Hart left on December 26 for Java, bequeathing a miscellaneous force of gunboats, minesweepers and other light naval craft to Rear-Admiral Francis W. Rockwell, Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. In the meantime Rockwell had moved from Cavite to the island fortress of Corregidor, where he set up his headquarters in a tunnel. Between January and April relentless pressure from Brereton's aircraft

successes against Japanese forces

superior forces with strong air support drove the defenders of Bataan slowly towards the southern extremity of the pen-

was too weak

smother all attempts by the Japanese to land troops behind the American lines, and a bid to run supplies to Bataan from

insula. Rockwell's miniature fleet

to

the southern part of the Philippine archipelago was unsuc-

On March 11, after the submarine Swordfish had taken President Manuel Quezon and other dignitaries to a place of safety, MacArthur handed over his command to General Wainwright and left, on orders from Washington, for Australia. Before going he promised the Filipinos that one day he would return to redeem the promise of complete independence by 1946 which the United States government had given in 1934. Redoubling their efforts, the Japanese succeeded in the course of the next few weeks in breaching Wainwright's front and sowing confusion in his rear. On April 8 he came cessful. 33

* See p. 100.

MAP

4

Bataan and Corregidor Miles 5

10

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

130

to the conclusion that further attempts to hold Bataan without hope of relief and with dwindling reserves of food could serve no useful purpose. 34 That night he withdrew to Gorregidor with the small part of his force which could be

carried to the island before daylight, leaving the rest to lay

down

their arms.

Gorregidor, stoutly defended by the United States 4th Marine Regiment and the remnant of the army continued to hold out until May 6. On that day General Wainwright surrendered the fortress and all surviving forces in the Philippines to Lieutenant-General T. Yamashita, who had been brought from Malaya to succeed Lieutenant-General M. Homma in command of the Japanese Fourteenth Army.

In the meantime the Japanese South Seas Force, under Vice- Admiral S. Inouye, had met an unexpected setback at

Wake

Island.

This lonely, treeless atoll, annexed by the United States in 1899, had been developed since the nineteen- thirties as a staging post for aircraft crossing the Pacific by way of the Hawaiian Islands and Guam. Its occupants on the outbreak of war comprised seventy civilian employees of Pan American Airways, 1,146 civilians employed by a firm of contractors working on government account, and a garrison of 449 marines, 68 sailors and 5 soldiers. 35 Major J. P. S. Devereux of the United States Marine Corps commanded the marines and was, for practical purposes, the garrison commander, but the senior officer present was a naval commander who had been sent with a small staff to take charge of a projected naval air station. Devereux had at his disposal six 5-inch coast-defence guns; twelve 3-inch antiaircraft guns; a number of machine-guns for use against low-flying aircraft and for beach defence and twelve obsolete aircraft brought by the Enterprise on December 4. 36 He had no radar and no fighter control centre. ;

With Makin and Tarawa

in the Gilbert Islands,

Wake

belonged to a group of objectives needed by the Japanese to establish the eastern boundary of the area in which they proposed to make themselves supreme. Its capture was en-

WAKE ISLAND

supported by landAir Flotilla. 24th The nearest Japanese based aircraft of the airfields were at Kwajalein, more than six hundred miles away. The Japanese began with a rather leisurely air bombardment extending over three days. This destroyed seven fighters on the ground and set fire to a dump containing 125 tons of dynamite used for blasting, but cost the Japanese at least two bombers. 37 On the fourth day a naval landing party and attached troops approached at 5 a.m. in transports and converted warships escorted and supported by three light cruisers and six destroyers. Devereux held his fire until 6.15 a.m., when he opened with his 5-inch guns at 4,500 yards. 38 Damaging the force commander's flagship with their second salvo, his batteries went on to sink a destroyer and damage several other ships within the first few minutes. Four of the garrison's five surviving aircraft then joined the fight, dropping small bombs with the aid of improvised equipment. After they, too, had sunk a destroyer, the Japanese withdrew without accomplishing trusted

by Inouye

131

to a small task force

their mission.

Besides covering the garrison with glory, this feat

made

almost certain that sooner or later the enemy would return with a larger force. Admiral Kimmel, who had pointed out nearly nine months earlier that, if Wake were strongly held, an attempt by the Japanese to take it would give him an opportunity of matching his warships against theirs, 39 was thus encouraged to go ahead with a plan designed for the dual purpose of strengthening the defences of Wake and bringing on a naval battle. His intention was to use three fast carrier forces in mutually supporting roles. The first, commanded by Rear- Admiral Frank J. Fletcher and built round the Saratoga, was to carry aircraft and supplies to Wake while the second, commanded by ViceAdmiral Wilson Brown and built round the Lexington, made a diversionary attack on Jaluit, in the Marshall Islands.

it

The

third,

commanded by Vice-Admiral William

F.

Halsey and built round the Enterprise, was to cover the approaches to Oahu unless ordered to give direct support

132

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

As Jaluit was admittedly an objective of doubtreceived authority from Kimmel to vary his course of action in the light of any information that might reach him after he had sailed. 40 Had Kimmel remained in command, these arrangements would have given him at least a sporting chance of engaging the enemy on favourable terms, even if Fletcher reached Wake too late to help Devereux. But on December to Fletcher.

ful value,

Brown

than twenty-four hours after the Saratoga left Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was relieved of his post on the ground that he had allowed himself to be caught at a disadvantage when hostilities began. As his successor, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, could not arrive from Washington much before the end of the year, command of the Pacific Fleet devolved tem17, less

W. S. Pye, hitherto in command of the battle force. Thus the onus of giving effect to Kimmel's plan fell on a stopgap commander who might find himself in trouble if he committed himself too wholeheartedly to an enterprise which Kimmel's critics might represent as no more than a vain attempt to postpone the loss of a doomed outpost. Three days later Admiral Stark was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Ernest J. King, formerly in command of the Atlantic Fleet. Almost his last act was to inform Pye that he regarded Wake as a liability and that King agreed with him. 41 Meanwhile the Japanese were preparing for a fresh assault on Wake. Recognizing that they had asked for trouble at their first attempt by exposing their lightly armed invasion force to accurate fire from the coast defences, they decided that this time their final approach should be made under cover of darkness and in conditions which offered some chance of tactical surprise. To provide more aircraft for preliminary air attacks the Soryu and Hiryu, detached from Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force, took up positions about two hundred miles north-west of Wake. The force commander also took the precaution of interposing a support force of four heavy cruisers between the invasion porarily on Vice- Admiral

WAKE: DECEMBER

23,

1941

133

and any American naval force that might approach from the east. In the early hours of December 23, after a series of air force

bombardments extending over eleven days, troops of the Naval Landing Force and the 55th Division began to stream ashore at points on which the American 5-inch guns could not be brought to bear. 42 Although vigorously opposed as soon as they set foot on land, they made rapid progress. At 5 a.m. the senior American officer on the island, Commander W. S. Cunningham, reported to Pearl Harbor that the enemy was ashore and the issue in doubt. 43 At that moment Admiral Fletcher, who had lost his chance of reaching Wake before the landings began by unfavourable conditions, was rather more than four hundred miles north-east of the island. Admiral Brown, who had decided not to attack pausing to refuel

his destroyers in

and was under orders to join Fletcher, was fast closing with him, but was still some eight hundred miles to the south. Admiral Halsey was roughly six hundred miles to the east, but was in a good position to go to Fletcher's help

Jaluit

or cover his retreat. Thus Fletcher was too late to interfere with the landings or carry equipment and supplies to Wake in time for the garrison to use them. On the other hand, he was not too late to press on and catch the warships and transports of the invasion force at a disadvantage, although (as we now know) he had only a slender chance of bringing the Japanese carriers and support force to action before they turned for home. 44 However, Fletcher was still refuelling when the need to settle his course of action became imperative, and in any case the decision was not left in his hands. Admiral Pye believed, incorrectly, that the ships detached from Nagumo's Striking Force to support the landings at Wake included two battleships. 45 Although the Saratoga could out-distance any battleship, he concluded that any further attempt by Fletcher's force to carry out its mission would involve the risk of a setback which might tempt the Japanese to launch a fresh attack on Oahu. 46 After consulting his

134

PEARL HARBOR, THE PHILIPPINES

Chief of Staff and his Operations Officer, he ordered Fletcher and Brown to return to base. The Americans thus lost their only chance of scoring a naval success in 1941. They also lost Wake Island, which they might conceivably have saved at the eleventh hour had Fletcher's carrier-borne aircraft intervened while the invasion force was still disembarking equipment and supplies.

8

MALAYA, HONG KONG

AND BRITISH BORNEO

ON NOVEMBER

1,

1941,

the

British

government decided to replace Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham as Commander-inChief of the land and air forces in the Far East by a younger officer with recent experience of war. 1 Their choice fell on Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, who had distinguished himself as Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France.

Confirmation of

PownalPs appointment was, however, delayed by a controversy about the system of command, and also by lastminute doubts as to the wisdom of swapping horses in midstream. 2 The result was that the change had yet to be made when war broke out. Thus the unfortunate Brooke-Popham, an air officer who had taken up his post in the belief that he would be given enough aircraft to enable the Royal Air Force to stand guard over Far Eastern waters pending the arrival of a strong fleet at Singapore, just failed to escape

the thankless task of defending Malaya with about twothirds of the troops considered by his experts necessary in the absence of the powerful air support which he was unable to provide.*

To make matters worse, on the eve of the war BrookePopham found himself in a quandary. He knew that, if the Japanese presented an evident threat to Malaya by preparing to disembark troops on or near the isthmus of Kra, his best chance of stopping them would lie in giving effect to Operation Matador, or in other words sending troops into Siam for the purpose of denying to the enemy the port of Singora and the road and railway leading from Singora to the Malayan frontier. But he also knew that the author* See pp. 107-111.

136

MALAYA: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER,

1941

137

at home would not lightly sanction a move which might cause the United States government to refuse its support on the ground that the British had affronted American opinion by invading Siam. Asked by BrookePopham on November 21 to define the circumstances in which Matador would be permitted, the Chiefs of Staff replied on November 25 that the government could not commit itself in advance, but that he could count on receivities

ing a decision within thirty-six hours of a firm report that the enemy was on the move. 3 Four days later they rejected his plea for authority to order Matador should reconnaissance aircraft report the approach of Japanese convoys to the Siamese coast, although he had warned them in the meantime that an expeditionary force could start disembarking at Singora within thirty-three hours of leaving Saigon. 4 However, this did not mean that the Chiefs of Staff were not prepared to allow Brooke-Popham to give effect to Matador if he could do so without forfeiting American support. On November 30 the British disclosed to the United States government the existence of a plan to occupy the Singora area before the Japanese could reach it, and asked what the American response would be. 5 But the President had left for a brief vacation at Warm Springs, Virginia, and Hull was unwilling to deal with the matter in his absence. Hence it was not until December 5 that the Chiefs of Staff were able to tell Brooke-Popham that he could order Matador without reference to Whitehall if he had good reason to believe that the Japanese had entered Siam or were about to disembark troops on the isthmus of Kra. 6 In the meantime Brooke-Popham had learned from a secret source that pro-Japanese members of the Siamese Cabinet were said to have proposed to Tokyo that an expedition apparently bound for the isthmus of Kra, but in fact bound for Kota Bharu in Malaya, should be despatched from Indo- China in order to tempt him to cross the frontier and thus provide them with a pretext for inviting Japanese forces to enter Siam for the purpose of defending the country against British aggression. 7 This news, following

138

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

closely on a reminder from the Chiefs of Staff that the government's policy was to avoid war with Japan "if possible", 8 made him particularly anxious not to put his country in the wrong or fall into a trap. The result was that his perplexities were not resolved by the cautiously worded message which reached him from the Chiefs of Staff on December 5. On the following day he learned that Japanese convoys were known to have left Saigon and Camranh Bay, that Japanese transports and warships were approaching the Gulf of Siam, and that Siamese frontier guards were erecting obstacles on the roads leading southwards from Singora and Patani. 9 After consulting the naval authorities he decided that he could safely order all forces in Malaya to assume the highest degree of readiness, but would not be justified in ordering Matador without knowing whether the Japanese were bound for Kota Bharu, the isthmus of Kra, or perhaps Bangkok. 10 As there was only a remote chance of his obtaining this information before the Japanese transports reached positions from which they would be able to arrive off the isthmus of Kra before British troops despatched from Malaya could reach Singora, in effect this decision meant that BrookePopham was abandoning all but a slender hope of putting Matador into effect with any prospect of success. Hence a logical corollary would have been to warn the troops in northern Malaya that the odds against Matador were lengthening, and that they might be called upon to carry out the Jitra alternative at short notice.* The importance of a prompt start should Matador be ordered was, however, so clearly apparent to all concerned that readiness for Matador remained the chief preoccupation. General Percival, on learning that afternoon that Japanese transports were at sea, at once took steps to ensure that an advance to Singora could be carried out without delay should Brooke-Popham give the word. 11

Meanwhile the transports had rounded Cape Cambodia and were making in thick weather for a rendezvous approximately 180 miles north-east of Singora. At 9.5 a.m. on * See pp. 109-111.

DECEMBER December

7 the

first

7,

1941

wave of the Japanese 5th

139

Division,

in sixteen transports, left the rendezvous with orders to

thrust southwards into

Malaya

after landing at

Singora

and Patani. One regiment of the 18th Division, in three was despatched to make a subsidiary landing capture airfields in that neighbourhood, Bharu, Kota at and advance on Kuantan. One regiment of the 55th Division, carried in seven transports, was to land at points well transports,

north of Singora for the purpose of seizing Siamese airfields and covering the 5th Division's rear. The 3rd Air Division, with roughly 170 bombers, nearly 150 fighters and some 36 reconnaissance aircraft concentrated in southern IndoChina, and with assistance from detachments of the Eleventh Air Fleet, was to cover these movements, occupy captured airfields in southern Siam and northern Malaya, and attack a variety of objectives throughout the Malay peninsula and as far south as Singapore Island. The British, knowing nothing of these plans but suspecting that the ships seen on December 6 might assemble in an area not usually visited by their reconnaissance aircraft, despatched a flying boat early on December 7 with orders to extend its flight to the eastern part of the Gulf of Siam. As it failed to return, they gained no further knowledge of Japanese naval movements until the afternoon. A few warships and merchant vessels were then seen in positions which suggested that the Japanese meant to come ashore within the next few hours. In the meantime Brooke-Popham received from the British Minister in Bangkok, Sir Josiah Crosby, a telegram urging him in the strongest terms not to send troops into Siam until the outlook became clearer. 12 Crosby, who had seen the Siamese Foreign Minister that day, added that opinion in Siam was favourable to Britain, but might swing in the opposite direction if the British entered Siamese territory before the Japanese.

Reviewing the situation late that evening, Brooke-Popham recognized that he had lost his chance of giving effect to Matador if the ships seen in the afternoon were bound for Singora or Patani, and might put himself in the wrong by

140

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

they were not. 13 On the other hand, Matador might yet become the right course if events showed that the Japanese intended to land in the Singora-Patani area after trying to keep him guessing for another twenty-four hours or more. He decided, therefore, not to commit himself to either Matador or the Jitra alternative until a dawn reconnaissance of Singora told him whether the enemy had begun to land there. 14 By that time, too, he might have received the answer to a signal in which he had proposed that the Chiefs of Staff should give him discretion to order Matador if the Japanese began to land at Kota Bharu without immediately landing in Siam. Thus the position at midnight was that BrookePopham had yet to decide on his course of action, and was still thought likely to choose Matador. General Heath, commanding the corps in northern Malaya, had indeed been told as recently as 11.20 p.m. that Matador might be ordered at dawn. 15 A few minutes later, Heath's troops on the beaches north-east of Kota Bharu reported that three transports were anchoring off the coast. 16 Soon afterwards the Japanese 56th Infantry Regiment, supported by covering fire from a light cruiser and a destroyer flotilla, began to move ashore in landing craft. By that time the skies were clearing after heavy rain, and the moon had risen. Air Vice-Marshal G. W. H. Pulford, the British air commander, ordered all available aircraft at Kota Bharu to attack the transports, landing craft and troops, and arranged for further attacks by torpedobombers and other aircraft from first light. 17 Some hours later, after consulting General Percival, he decided that a full-scale attack on the transports should be launched soon

doing so

after

if

dawn. 18

The Japanese,

advantage of the tropical moonlight to use some of their aircraft during the night. About 4 a.m. some seventeen land-based bombers of the Eleventh Air Fleet from southern Indo- China attacked Singapore Island. The two airfields which were their main objectives suffered little damage, but bombs which fell in built-up too, took

DECEMBER

8,

1941

141

caused about two hundred civilian casualties. 19 Fighter squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries received good warning and were brought to instant readiness, but in order to give the guns a clear field of fire no fighters were put up. 20 The raid came as a complete surprise to the civil population, who could not be alerted as the headquarters of the Air Raid Precautions organization was not manned. 21 Meanwhile the first wave of the Japanese 5th Division, favoured by the preoccupation of the British with events in north-east Malaya, had reached the isthmus of Kra with time to spare. By 7.30 a.m., when aircraft of the 3rd Air Division based in southern Indo-China began a series of damaging attacks on British airfields in northern Malaya, large numbers of troops had landed at Singora and Patani with little opposition from the Siamese. 22 At 8 a.m. Brooke-Popham received the long-awaited signal which authorized him to violate Siamese neutrality at his discretion if the Japanese came ashore at Kota Bharu. 23 Although this did not help him to decide between areas

Matador and the

Jitra alternative,

it

removed any

poss-

an advance towards Patani for the purpose of occupying the position called The Ledge. BrookePopham, apparently not understanding that prompt seizure of The Ledge was vital to the success of either operation, none the less forbade the troops to move while he was still hesitating between the two. 24 The outcome was a delay which not only served no useful purpose but proved dis-

ible objection to

astrous.

At 9.15 a.m. a badly damaged reconnaissance aircraft landed at Kota Bharu with the news that troops were landing on the isthmus of Kra from a large concentration of ships off Singora and Patani. This information, which gave Brooke-Popham no choice but to renounce Matador and adopt the Jitra alternative, reached Singapore about half an hour later. 25 As General Percival had left by that time to attend a routine meeting of the Legislative Assembly, he did not hear of Brooke-Popham's decision until he returned to his headquarters about 1 1 a.m. 26 For reasons never made clear, another two hours then elapsed before General

142

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

Heath, two hundred miles away at Kuala Lumpur, received orders to occupy the Jitra position, send a delaying column along the trunk road towards Singora, and despatch a force along the Patani road to seize

was not

The Ledge. 27 Thus

it

Heath was able to tell MajorGeneral D. M. Murray-Lyon, commanding the 1 1th Indian Division, to carry out these moves. At the same time he gave orders that a reconnoitred position at Gurun, about until 1.30 p.m. that

thirty miles south of Jitra, should

be prepared for defence

as a precaution against the loss of the

main

position.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Moorhead, whose orders were to occupy The Ledge, had at his disposal one infantry battalion already standing by at Kroh, a second infantry battalion (less one company) and a battery of mountain artillery some fifty miles away at Penang, and one troop of an anti-tank battery which joined from Jitra. His leading battalion reached the Siamese frontier about 3 p.m., but was then held up by road-blocks manned by Siamese armed constabulary who had received no orders to admit British forces to Siam. Although opposition by the Siamese ceased about twenty-four hours later, the cumulative effect of the delays that had occurred since the morning of December 8 was such that on December 10 the battalion was met five miles short of its objective by elements of three Japanese battalions, supported by light tanks. An encounter battle, followed by repeated attacks by the enemy along the road, cost Moorhead such substantial losses that he was obliged to fall back to a succession of less favourable positions. As his chances of preventing the Japanese from breaking through to the trunk road south of Jitra were correspondingly reduced, the result was that General Murray-Lyon was hampered almost from the start by anxiety for his

communications This was not the only difficulty to which Murray-Lyon was exposed by Brooke-Popham's reluctance to make a timely choice between Matador and the Jitra alternative. The 1 1th Indian Division had been formed at a time when the Indian Army was expanding rapidly under the pressure of events in the Middle East. Its units and formations had

DECEMBER

8-11, 1941

143

arrived piecemeal in Malaya, were short of experienced officers

and non-commissioned

officers,

and had had

few-

opportunities of training together as a team. Commanders and staff officers had, however, given much thought to the 28

problem of an advance to Singora. In theory they ought to have been equally ready for the Jitra alternative; in practice they were not. 29 The switch from a tactically offensive to a tactically defensive role, coming at a moment when the troops had been standing by for Matador in pouring rain since the afternoon of December 6, caught them at a disadvantage. It involved not only new tactical dispositions and new arrangements for supply and transport, but also changes in organization which had to be made while units were on the move. These adjustments could have been made more smoothly if all concerned had been warned in good time that the chances of their being called upon to advance to Singora were receding. As it was, the main body of Murray-Lyon's two brigades, joined by the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade from Corps Reserve, moved with creditable speed to its allotted positions athwart the trunk road and railway at Jitra, but found them incompletely prepared and partly waterlogged. 30 To buy time for last-minute preparations, Murray-Lyon committed his outpost troops to expensive attempts to delay the enemy at forward positions which were quickly overrun. These not only cost him substantial losses in men, guns and vehicles, 31 but led him to split up his newly arrived reserve brigade almost as soon as it came under his command. Thus he had no divisional reserve when the enemy made contact with his main position late

on December 1 1 32 Meanwhile in north-east Malaya the Japanese 56th Infantry Regiment, although hampered by a heavy swell and opposed by troops of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade under the 9th Indian Division and by Air Vice-Marshal Pulford's aircraft, had quickly established a beach-head less than two miles from the airfield at Kota Bharu. In the light of a false report that Japanese troops had reached the perimeter of the

airfield,

but also bearing in mind the

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

144

TABLE

1

Organization of British Malaya Command,

December

8,

1941

Malaya Command (Lt-Gen. A. E. Percival) Singapore Fortress (Maj.-Gen. F. K. Simmons) 1 Malaya Inf. Bde. (Brig. G. G. R. Williams) 2 Malaya Inf. Bde. (Brig. F. H. Fraser)

Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore

Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defences

12 Indian Infantry Bde. (Brig. A. G.

M.

Port Dickson

Paris)

8 Australian Div. (Maj.-Gen. H. G. Bennett) 22 Australian 27 Australian

3

Inf. Inf.

Jemaluang

Endau

Bde. (Brig. H. B. Taylor) Bde. (Brig. D. S. Maxwell)

Indian Corps (Lt-Gen. Sir Lewis

Kluang Kuala Lumpur

Heath)

Kuala Lumpur

9 Indian Div. (Maj.-Gen. A. E. Barstow) 8 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. B. W. Key) 22 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. G. W. A. Painter) 1 1

Indian Div. (Maj.-Gen. D.

Kota Bharu Kuantan

M. Murray-Lyon) Sungei

6 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. W. O. Lay) 15 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. K. A. Garrett)

Krohcol (Lt-Col. H. D. Moorhead)

Patani

N.W. Malaya N.W. Malaya Kroh, Penang and

N.W. Malaya 28 Indian

Penang

Inf.

Bde. (Brig.

W.

Fortress (Brig. C. A.

St. J.

Carpendale)

Ipoh

Penang

Lyon)

Lines of Communication Troops (Brig. R. G. Moir) Airfield Defence

British Troops,

Troops

Sarawak and Brunei (Lt-Col. C.

M. Lane) Kuching and Miri

British Troops, Christmas Island

(one 6-inch gun)

Christmas Island

Note

28 Indian Inf. Bde. was transferred from 3 Indian Corps Reserve to 1 1 Indian Div. with effect from 1.30 p.m. on December 8. It entrained at 5 p.m. for the area immediately in rear of the Jitra position.

DECEMBER

8-11, 1941

145

danger of crippling air attacks, Pulford decided soon after 4 p.m. on December 8 to withdraw all serviceable aircraft then at Kota Bharu to Kuantan, about two hundred miles to the south. 33 Almost simultaneously the ground staff abandoned the airfield after setting fire to buildings, but without destroying stocks of bombs and fuel or making the runways unfit for use. 34 Brigadier B. W. Key, commanding the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, then fell back to positions covering the town. This mishap left Pulford with two airfields within thirty to forty miles of Kota Bharu still fit for use. However, after losing more than half his available strength in northern Malaya on the first day, 35 he was unwilling to hazard the remnant at bases so far forward. Moreover, as the outcome of further losses on December 9, even Kuantan was fast relegated to the status of a forward landing ground and afterwards abandoned. 36 A gallant attempt to hit back at Japanese-held airfields near Singora on December 9 was only partially successful, and it left the Japanese with almost overwhelming air superiority. Thus the position on the ground at the end of the second

day was that all three of Pulford's airfields in north-east Malaya, whose defence was the primary task of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, had become useless to him. In the meantime the Sultan of Kelantan had, in effect, absolved Brigadier Key of the need to cover the town of Kota Bharu by departing with his household. Accordingly Key had fallen back about thirty miles in order to spare his force. In these circumstances Major-General A. E. Barstow,

commanding

the 9th Indian Division, proposed that, as Key's communications were still precarious, he should take his brigade the whole way back to a central position at Kuala Lipis. Heath agreed, but Percival pointed out that the proposal raised political issues which would have to be discussed at a higher level. 37 Heath left by train on the night of December 1 1 to put the case to the authorities in Singapore. Meanwhile Admiral Phillips had returned from his visit to the American commanders at Manila. At a conference

146

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

aboard the

announced

Prince of Wales at 12.30 p.m. on December 8 he his intention of smashing the Japanese naval

forces off Singora

and Kota Bharu

at

dawn on December

but added that success would be possible only if he had good fighter support and achieved surprise. 38 At 5.35 p.m. he put to sea with the Prince of Wales, the Repulse and four destroyers, leaving Rear- Admiral A. F. E. Palliser, his Chief of Staff, to act as his representative at Singapore and his link with the army and the air force. In the early hours of December 9 Admiral Palliser signalled to the Prince of Wales that fighter protection off Singora at dawn on December 10 could not be provided, and that strong Japanese bomber forces were believed to be stationed in southern Xndo-China. 39 Nevertheless Phillips decided to carry on unless he were spotted by Japanese air10,

craft before nightfall.

Accordingly, Phillips was still holding to the north when, at 1.40 p.m. on the same day, his force was sighted by one of twelve Japanese submarines patrolling off the coast between Singapore and Kota Bharu. Ordering aircraft from the Japanese 7th Cruiser Squadron to shadow Phillips, Vice-Admiral N. Kondo of the Japanese Southern Force thereupon arranged to intercept him off Singora on December 10 with the four heavy cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron and the two battleships and two heavy cruisers of his battle squadron. Torpedo-bombers of the 22nd Air Flotilla left Saigon at dusk for a night attack on the British ships, but failed to find them. Although not aware that he had been sighted by a submarine, Phillips recognized that surprise had been lost when three Japanese aircraft were seen that evening from the Prince of Wales. At 8.15 p.m. he therefore reluctantly turned back for Singapore. Almost simultaneously, persistent reports to the effect that enemy craft were approaching Kuantan led Brigadier G. W. A. Painter, commanding the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, to believe that a landing there might be imminent, and to warn his superior formation, the 9th Indian Division, that he expected an attack at dawn. 40 The information

DECEMBER

9-10, 1941

147

which reached Singapore about 10 p.m. was not, however, that Painter expected the Japanese to land within the next few hours, but that they were believed to be already landing. 41 The result was that shortly before midnight Admiral

who

know

that only three small boats beaches when British aircraft arrived at 4 a.m. to attack the supposed landing force, despatched a signal to that effect to the Prince of Wales.* In the light of this message, Phillips altered course for Kuantan. According to a member of his staff, he reasoned that Palliser, having sent him the message, would expect him to go straight to Kuantan and would arrange for fighters to meet him there. 43 This was not done, as Palliser could not tell how Phillips would respond to the message, or precisely when would he arrive at Kuantan if he did decide to go there. Eleven Buffalo fighters of No. 453 Squadron were, however, ordered to stand by at Sembawang, about an hour's flight from Kuantan at cruising speed, in readiness to go to the Admiral's help if called upon. 44 Phillips found nothing of interest at Kuantan. He had just turned away after investigating some junks and barges further north when, at 10.20 a.m., a shadowing aircraft was seen from the Prince of Wales. For reasons which will never be known, Phillips did not report to Palliser that he was being shadowed, or ask for fighter cover, although he could no longer hope to conceal his position from the enemy by not doing so. The first attack on his ships was made about 11.24 a.m. by high-level bombers which hit and straddled the Repulse without seriously damaging her. These were followed twenty minutes later by torpedoPalliser,

could not

would be found

off the

2,

bombers which scored two hits on the Prince of Wales. After repeated attacks by both torpedo-bombers and high-level bombers, the Repulse sank at 12.33 p.m. and the Prince of Wales at 1.20 p.m. Out of 2,921 officers and ratings serving in the two ships, 2,081 were rescued by British destroyers without interference from the enemy but Admiral Phillips was not among them. The fighters of No. 453 Squadron, taking off at 12.26 p.m. in response to a message from ;

w.f.e.

—

148

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

Captain W. G. Tennant of the Repulse which reached the Air Operations Room seven minutes earlier, arrived to find the enemy withdrawing and the Prince of Wales sinking. 45

Meanwhile Japanese at

British garrisons

Hong Kong and

were in contact with the

in British Borneo.

The territories under British administration at Hong Kong on the outbreak of war consisted of the island of that name, with a few small islands in the neighbourhood; the Kowloon peninsula and some hundreds of square miles of the mainland stretching about seventeen miles inland from Kowloon to the Sham Chun River. Except near Kowloon the mainland south of the Sham Chun River is largely mountainous, and has few roads. The island of Hong Kong is also mountainous, but is encircled by a coast road and traversed by a road which runs from north to south through the Wong Nei Chong gap, near the centre of the island. Major- General Maltby, the garrison commander, had at his disposal six infantry battalions of the British Indian and Canadian Armies and six companies of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. These were supported by two mountain and three medium batteries of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery, with an establishment of twenty-eight guns. There were also twenty-nine coast defence guns and a number of 18-pounders in fixed positions for beach defence. For naval support Maltby could call on one destroyer, eight motor torpedo boats, four gunboats and some armed patrol vessels, all under the command of Commodore A. C. Collinson, R.N. Three obsolete torpedo-bombers and two Walrus amphibians were based on an airfield and a seaplane base near Kowloon, and were used chiefly for target towing. There was enough food on the island to last for about four months, but strict economy and a modicum of luck would be needed if the inhabitants were to stand a siege without running out ofwater. Normally the island depended on the mainland for half its water, and the system of storage and distribution was vulnerable to artillery and air bombardment. 46 The task assigned to General Maltby was to hold Hong ;

CM.

HONG-KONG: DECEMBER Kong

as

an outpost

8-9, 1941

149

He

divided

for "as long as possible". 47

mobile force into a Mainland Brigade of three battalions under Brigadier C. Wallis, and an Island Brigade, also of three battalions, under Brigadier J. K. Lawson. As the Sham Chun River line was far too long to be defended by three battalions supported by only sixteen mobile guns, Wallis was instructed to hold a shorter line across the neck of the Kowloon peninsula, where he would receive additional support from five coast defence guns on Stonecutters Island, about three-quarters of a mile from the coast. This line, known as the Gindrinkers Line from the name of a local feature, was about eleven miles long. It had been prepared for defence in former years, but work had stopped in 1938 because General Maltby's predecessor did not expect to have enough troops to hold it. It was too close to the southern extremity of the peninsula to give room for a second line behind it, and was marred by a gap which Wallis was soon obliged to fill by committing his only his

reserve

company.

The Japanese opened

at 8 a.m.

on December 8 with an

air attack which cost the garrison all five of their aircraft. At the same time six infantry battalions of the Japanese 38th Division, supported by mountain and field artillery and with three additional infantry battalions in reserve, began to cross the Sham Chun on a broad front. Well served by their engineers, they were not much hampered by blown bridges. A British covering force, equipped with Bren-gun carriers and armoured cars, delayed their progress for the first two days, but withdrew at dusk on December 9 to the main position. The Japanese divisional commander's plan was to attack the main position in strength within the first week, using the four forward battalions of the 228th and 230th Infantry Regiments on his right and the two forward battalions of the 229th Infantry Regiment on his left. 48 However, the

commander

of the 228th Regiment, surveying the situation late on December 9, came to the conclusion that he would not be able to take a ridge that barred his path until a feature known as the Shing Mun redoubt was in Japanese

MAP 5 Hong Kong The Mainland :

M British positions

January $

DECEMBER

9-13, 1941

151

hands. Although the redoubt lay outside his sector, he decided to launch a surprise attack without divisional sanction. His forward troops, wearing rubbersoled shoes, made a stealthy advance under cover of darkness, cleared gaps in the British wire, and dropped grenades down the ventilating shafts of some tunnels at the northern end of the redoubt. The defenders, although greatly outnumbered, fought desperately at close quarters to hold their own, but by the early hours of December 10 were cut off and over-

whelmed. Brigadier Wallis was left with no troops within the best part of a mile of the redoubt. 49 He urged the local battalion commander to counter-attack at first light, but did not press the matter when the battalion commander point-

ed out that

his reserve

ness to less than half

pulled back his

awkward As the

left

company had been reduced by its

normal

sick-

strength. 50 Wallis then

about a mile in order to lop off an

salient.

original line

was already uncomfortably

close to

the points of embarkation for an eventual withdrawal to the island, this did not improve the chances of a prolonged stand on the mainland. As late as 8 a.m. on December 1 General Maltby still hoped to hold the Kowloon peninsula for at least another week, 51 although he had already begun to accelerate preparations for withdrawal. 52 But persistent shelling convinced him soon afterwards that the situation had become precarious, and at noon he decided to start pulling out without delay. Embarkation began that evening and was completed, with few casualties, by the morning of December 13. All guns were successfully withdrawn, but more than a hundred mules, which would have been extremely useful on the island, had to be left behind because the craft which

have carried them had been sunk by enemy action. The troops on the island were then redistributed between an East Brigade (Brigadier Wallis), a West Brigade (Brigadier Lawson), and a Fortress Reserve of one infantry battalion and four companies of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. All coastal sectors were manned, but the

were

to

152

wheeled

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO artillery

was

allotted to the East Brigade since the

eastern half of the north coast

was

clearly the

most

likely

landing place.

Heavy air and artillery bombardments during the next few days knocked out a number of pillboxes and searchlight posts, cut telephone communications at many points, and reduced Commodore Collinson's force to two gunboats and a handful of motor torpedo boats. Uncontrollable fires broke out in built-up areas, and at least one water-main was damaged beyond repair. Japanese troops, using rubber boats and improvised rafts, tried to cross the quarter-milewide Lei U Mun channel in daylight on December 15, but were repulsed. By December 1 7 the enemy was seen to be preparing for a systematic assault on the north-eastern sector. General Maltby decided, however, not to thin out his southern sectors for the benefit of the northern sectors or the Fortress Reserve, as he could not be sure, in the absence of air reconnaissance, that simultaneous landings would not be made in the south. 53

Late on December 18, under cover of darkness and the smoke from a blazing paint factory and burning oil tanks, the forward troops of all three Japanese infantry regiments crossed the harbour west of the Lei Mun channel and

U

lodgment areas in the northenemy had six battalions ashore, and was preparing to swing his left and centre southwards and westwards to threaten the built-up area in established themselves in three

eastern sector.

By midnight

the

the north-west corner of the island.

Both Lawson and Maltby recognized the importance of holding the Wong Nei Chong gap and its eastern approaches, but the troops available after all coastal sectors had been manned were very few. Lawson's only reserve company was overwhelmed by greatly superior numbers after fighting a gallant delaying action in which Company Sergeant-Major J. R. Osborn, of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, won a posthumous Victoria Cross; Lawson himself was killed when he "went outside to fight it out" with Japanese troops who were firing at his headquarters beside the gap

MAP

6

hong Kong-, the Island

§$<^

Built-up areas

Main axes of Japanese thrusts: 229 th. Regiment 22$ th. Regiment

230 th. Regiment Lines held by British immediately

before surrender

\

Miles

154

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

Maltby ordered a general counterattack from the west after attempts to push reinforcements to the gap from north and south had failed, but did not at point-blank range.

learn until too late that the West Brigade was without a brigadier to co-ordinate the moves of its battalions. 54 He

urged the East Brigade to gain control of the area due east of the gap. But Wallis proposed, and Maltby agreed, that the East Brigade should first disengage and fall back to the south. This, it was hoped, would give Wallis time to rest and reorganize his troops as the prelude to a concerted thrust by his whole force. 55 The withdrawal of the East Brigade proved disastrous. An Indian officer, misunderstanding an order to "get out also

of action", destroyed his howitzers instead of taking them off the field of battle, and some anti-aircraft guns had also to be abandoned. 56 By the time the southward move was completed, Wallis had lost his chance of counter-attacking before nightfall. When he did attack at 8 a.m. on December

he was unable to make much progress against an enemy who had been steadily reinforced throughout the previous day. Ultimately his troops were cut off in the extreme south of the island, while further north the West Brigade was forced back from the Wong Nei Chong gap and driven 20,

slowly westwards. Meanwhile small bodies of troops were holding out in isolated positions on the northern flank of the Japanese

The power station on the north shore was defended by a garrison consisting partly of members of the Hong Kong Volunteers Defence Corps, recruited almost entirely from the business community and all well past middle age, and partly of wounded men of the Middlesex Regiment who had taken refuge there. Afret all the volunadvance.

for many hours

teers

had been

killed or

captured while attempting a

sortie,

the wounded infantrymen continued to hold out for another twenty-four hours until they, too, were overwhelmed. The Japanese, with complete command of the air and

with nine battalions ashore by the evening of December 23, were delayed and harassed by many spirited local actions, but were too strong to be held up for long by anything short

HONG-KONG: DECEMBER

24-26, 1941

155

of a general offensive which Maltby lacked the means of launching after his setbacks on the first two days. By the morning of December 24 the strength of one battalion west of the gap was down to 1 75 of all ranks out of an initial complement of about 800, while east of the gap the survivors of the East Brigade had their backs to the sea and were running out of water. Incessant artillery and mortar fire on that day, accompanied by low-level air attacks and followed by heavy fighting during the night, reduced the defenders to such straits that at 3.15 p.m. on December 25 Maltby advised the Governor, Sir Mark Young, that further effective resistance had, in his opinion, become impossible. 57 On that day the Governor, after consulting two civilian members of the Defence Council as well as Maltby and Collinson, authorized a cease-fire. That evening he formally surrendered the Crown Colony, without conditions, to Lieutenant-General T. Sakai of the Japanese Twenty-Third Army. Brigadier Wallis, cut off in the extreme south with no artillery or mortars fit for action, received oral orders to surrender from two British officers sent by Maltby from the Japanese lines, but refused to give up without written orders which reached him after midnight. The final surrender of the East Brigade was made, therefore, in the early hours of December 26. proposal by Chiang Kai-shek to take the Japanese in the rear with three Chinese armies about the beginning of January came to nothing.

A

In British Borneo, which consisted in 1941 of the States of British North Borneo and Sarawak, the Brunei Protectorate and the Crown Colony of Labuan Island, the British had one infantry battalion of the Indian Army, a small Coastal Marine Service, and a few native troops and armed police, all under the command of LieutenantColonel C. M. Lane. As the whole of British Borneo could not be held by such a force, it was agreed before the war that no attempt should be made to defend any part of British North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan. An oil refinery at Lutong, in north-east Sarawak, would be demolished as soon as hostilities began, and oilfields at Miri and Seria, on

w.f.e.

—6*

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

156

between Sarawak and Brunei and connected by pipelines with Lutong, would be made useless to the enemy. * The neighbourhood of Kuching in western Sarawak would, however, be defended for the sake of its airfield and because its occupation would give the enemy access to an important Dutch airfield, only 350 miles from Singapore. This airfield, known as Singkawang II, was roughly sixty miles south-west of Kuching and about the same distance east of the port of Singkawang in Dutch Borneo. Until shortly before the outbreak of war the British proposed to defend Kuching by meeting the enemy north of the town and using mobile forces to oppose a southward advance. At an Anglo-Dutch conference in September 1941 this plan was reluctantly abandoned in favour of a static either side of the frontier

defence of the airfield seven miles to the south. 58 The demolition and denial schemes at Lutong, Miri and Seria were duly put into effect on the first day of the war, and on December 1 3 the troops and officials concerned left by sea for Kuching after making a landing ground at Miri unfit for use. On the same day three infantry battalions and attached troops of the Japanese 124th Infantry Regiment, accompanied by a naval landing force, left Camranh Bay for Miri and Seria in ten transports with a strong naval escort.

The Japanese landed unopposed at both places in the December 1 6, but were afterwards attacked

early hours of

by Dutch

from Singkawang II, which sank a destroyer. Leaving one battalion to occupy Brunei, British North Borneo and Labuan, the main body re-embarked on December 22 for Kuching. Meanwhile an air attack on Kuching, delivered by fifteen Japanese bombers on December 19, did little damage aircraft

but caused a large part of the native population to leave the town. Thereafter labour needed to complete the defences of the airfield was unobtainable. Early on December 23 the Japanese convoy, then about 150 miles from Kuching, was sighted by Dutch airmen on * See

Maps

3

and

13,

pp. 126 and 203.

KUCHING: DECEMBER Dutch

23-25, 1941

157

were about to leave Singwhen, at 11.40 a.m., a raid by twenty-four Japanese bombers did so much damage that they were unable to take off with a bomb load. With British assent, the Dutch authorities then withdrew their aircraft from Singkawang II to Palembang, in Sumatra. 59 At least three ships which formed part of the convoy or its escort were, however, sunk on that day and the next by submarines of the Royal Netherlands Navy from Sourabaya. The Japanese ships were also attacked, without much success, by British bombers working near the limit of their radius of action from Singapore Island. At 6 p.m. on December 23 the convoy was seen approaching the mouth of one of two rivers leading to Kuching. Two hours later, Colonel Lane received orders from Singapore to destroy the airfield. 60 As it was too late for him to reconnaissance.

kawang

II

to attack

aircraft

it

revert to the original defence scheme, the effect of these

him with nothing to do but defend an which he had already been told to destroy. Regarding this as pointless, he asked permission to withdraw across the frontier to Dutch Borneo, but took steps to orders was to leave

objective

defend the now useless airfield while awaiting a reply. Vigorously opposed by Lane's gun and mortar detachments, the Japanese came ashore next day, and by the late afternoon were in possession of the town. In the meantime Lane received orders from Percival to hold the Japanese for as long as possible and then act in the best interests of west Borneo as a whole. 61 Accordingly, he postponed a general withdrawal until, in the early afternoon of Christmas Day, the sound of gunfire on his left warned him that his line of retreat might be cut unless he acted promptly. 62 To the accompaniment of bitter fighting which cost him all but one platoon of his two rearguard companies, he then fell back to the terminus of the road at Krokong, about twelve miles short of the frontier between Sarawak and Dutch Borneo. After releasing his native troops, who were under no obligation to serve outside Sarawak, he continued with the main body, but without heavy equipment or vehicles, along a jungle track to Singkawang II. There he

158

MALAYA, HONG KONG, BORNEO

placed his battalion under Dutch command for the defence of Singkawang II. His covering troops were forced to make a long detour to escape encirclement, but succeeded in joining the main body on December 31 after a march of about sixty miles through dense jungle with little food or water.

9

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

N THE

fourth day of hostilities the broad situation on the front defended by the 11th Indian Division in northern Malaya was that the Japanese 5th Division, less one regiment of three battalions due later, had landed at Singora and Patani with attached troops. These included a tank regiment with an establishment of thirty-seven medium and twenty light tanks. On the Japanese left, three infantry battalions with a few light tanks were advancing from Patani towards Kroh, and were in contact with Colonel Moorhead's column near The Ledge. On the Japanese right, the main

body of the 5th

Division, comprising the six battalions of

the 9th Infantry Brigade with the rest of the tanks,

had

move down

the trunk road from Singora and destroy the British forces known to be at Jitra. LieutenantGeneral T. Matsui, commanding the 5th Division, was not responsible for the three battalions ashore at Kota Bharu, which belonged to the 18th Division under Lieutorders to

enant-General R. Mutaguchi. By the evening of December 1 1 General Matsui's advanced guard on the trunk road had overrun or driven off the whole of General Murray-Lyon's outpost troops, and was ready to make contact with the main position. The Jitra position had been chosen before the war in preference to a river line on the Sungei Kedah, some fifteen miles to the rear, because at that time it was deemed essential that the front should be well forward of two important airfields at Alor Star and Sungei Patani. 1 By December 11 both airfields had, however, been abandoned by the Royal Air Force, although neither was within range of the enemy's artillery. This was scarcely an encouragement to the troops at Jitra.

160

JITRA,

)

DECEMBER

11,

1941

161

Murray-Lyon's intention when the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was added to his command on December 8 was to hold the Jitra position with the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier K. A. Garrett) on the right, the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier W. O. Lay) on the left, and the 28th Brigade (Brigadier W. St. J. Carpendale) in reserve. 2 However, by the evening of the 11th he had given two battalions of the 28th Brigade to the 15th Brigade to compensate for the loss of the greater part of two battalions in outpost actions,

and had

sent the third battalion

to guard his rear. The 1 5th Brigade, commanded by Carpendale instead of Garrett, who was missing, held a front of about three and a half miles. One of its battalions held the sector between a range of low hills on the right and a point east of the trunk road, and one was athwart the trunk road and a road from Kangar which joins it near the centre of the village. The third battalion was in reserve. The 6th Brigade had one battalion between the roadjunction and the railway to the left of it; one battalion in reserve and one battalion with its right on the railway and its left on the coast about six miles to the west. The whole front was nearly fifteen miles long, but it ran for much of its length across low-lying, swampy country which promised to confine the enemy to the right-hand sector and perhaps the extreme right of the left-hand sector. In view of the nature of the country and the absence of good lateral communications, these dispositions were open to the criticism that Murray-Lyon might, with advantage, have disposed his six battalions in greater depth near the road-junction and have countermanded the detachment of half Lay's left-hand battalion to the coast. A mechanized Japanese division with tank support was not likely to forfeit its advantages by attempting a major thrust across a roadless expanse of marsh and swamp. In the early evening the Japanese advanced guard made contact with Carpendale's right-hand battalion and began to feel for his flank amidst the jungle-clad hills on the extreme right. Soon afterwards Japanese tanks with headlights blazing drove down the trunk road towards his 3

away

;

162

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

were halted by anti-tank fire in front of the main position. 4 The Japanese then opened desultory fire on the right-hand battalion. Misled by inaccurate reports that the enemy had occupied two hills on his right, Carpendale came to the conclusion that his flank was in danger of envelopment. Without consulting his divisional commander he borrowed four companies from Lay, sent two of them to strengthen the rear of his right-hand battalion, and used his own reserve battalion and one of Lay's companies to set up a second line of defence about two miles to the rear of his main position east of the road. During the night and early on December 12 the enemy launched two frontal attacks along the road and just east centre, but

of it, but made only a shallow penetration. Garpendale then borrowed two more companies from Lay for a counterattack which might have succeeded if its timing had not been upset as a result of a misunderstanding which led one of his battalions to open fire on friendly troops. Murray-Lyon learned early in the morning that during the night Carpendale had committed the whole of his own and Lay's reserves without authority. On visiting Carpendale's headquarters about 9 a.m. he formed the impression that an enveloping movement round the right of the Jitra position was in progress. 5 Worried by this, by the threat to his communications from the three Japanese battalions advancing from Patani, and by his lack of a divisional reserve, he asked for permission to fall back to Gurun. 6 Heath, who was still at Singapore discussing the future of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, replied after consulting Percival and the Far East War Council that the order to fight at Jitra still held good. 7

About midday on December 12 Major-General S. Kawamura, commanding the Japanese 9th Infantry Brigade, decided to relieve the advanced guard and ordered his two infantry regiments, each of three battalions, to attack during the coming night on either side of the trunk road.

Before the advanced guard could be relieved, however, it launched a fresh attack immediately east of the road, drove a wedge about three-quarters of a mile into Carpendale's

MAP

7

The Jitm Position

Mi Us

164 centre,

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA and swung westwards with the obvious intention of

enveloping

his

left-hand

battalion.

Carpendale,

again

borrowing from Lay, delivered a counter-attack which checked the enemy's advance but did not close the halfmile-wide gap that had opened between his eastern and western sectors. Visiting the headquarters of the

5th Brigade again that full of con8 fidence. He agreed that Carpendale should withdraw to his second line east of the trunk road as the prelude to a counter-attack from the west. 9 Carpendale afterwards countermanded the attack and insisted that his left-hand brigade, which had suffered only thirty casualties, should conform with the withdrawal of his right. The move took three-and-a-half hours and cost him the loss of a company which did not receive the order to withdraw. On the return journey, Murray- Lyon found that rumours of disaster were circulating among the non-combatant troops in Carpendale's rear. 10 On reaching his headquarters he was handed groundless reports to the effect that Carpendale's forward battalions had been attacked as they were withdrawing to their new positions, that one of them had been overrun, and that the enemy had reached the extreme right of the new line. He also received a somewhat alarming account of Moorhead's adventures on the KrohPatani road. Murray-Lyon was in a difficult position. He had been warned that he must not risk the loss of his division, as it was the only one that could be used to defend northern Malaya. 11 Moorhead seemed unlikely to be able to hold the enemy on the Kroh road for more than a few days, 12 and it was no consolation to Murray-Lyon that he had always thought it wrong that he and his staff should be saddled with responsibility for that sector. To withdraw from the Jitra position without waiting for the enemy's main body to attack it might seem inglorious. Yet he feared that, if he did not withdraw, the Japanese might break through Carpendale's centre, with disastrous consequences, at a moment when neither he nor Carpendale had any afternoon,

1

Murray-Lyon found Carpendale

DECEMBER

12-13, 1941

165

which to plug a gap. At 7.30 p.m. he thererenewed his request to be allowed to fall back to Gurun. Heath was still at Singapore. After once more consulting Percival, he replied that Murray-Lyon's task was to fight for the security of north Kedah, that he was believed to be opposed by only one Japanese division, and that his best course might be to dispose his forces in depth. 13 When passing the message to Murray-Lyon's headquarters by telephone, Heath's staff added that he was free to retreat from the Jitra position at his discretion. 14 They also gave him the welcome news that Corps Headquarters would assume reserves with

fore

direct responsibility for the

Kroh

sector at midnight.

At 10 p.m. Murray-Lyon ordered his force to disengage and start withdrawing at midnight to the south bank of the Sungei

Kedah

at Alor Star. 15

had they been further and suitably disposed to cover the relatively narrow sector astride the trunk road, could have held an attack by six Japanese battalions that night will never be known. The major attack ordered earlier in the day by General Kawamura was not delivered, and an attempt to rush a small force down the road and through Carpendale's new positions south of the village just after midnight was unsuccessful. 16 What we do know is that Murray-Lyon's attempt to withdraw his whole force along a single route, in exceedingly bad

Whether Carpendale's

troops,

reinforced at the expense of the 6th Brigade

weather, proved disastrous. 17 Some units never received the order to withdraw, and were still in position next morning. 18 To avoid congestion on the trunk road, some took to the country, where guns and vehicles became bogged and had to be abandoned. Some made their way along the railway to Alor Star. Some struck out for the coast in the hope of finding ships to carry them to the Sungei Kedah, with the result that they became irretrievably separated from the main body and eventually reached distant destinations, or were shipwrecked. 19 The 15th Brigade, on reaching the south bank of the Sungei Kedah about 9 a.m. on December 13, was down to about a quarter of its strength and was withdrawn into

166

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

Murray-Lyon placed the 6th Brigade astride the road and railway about six miles south of Alor Star, ordered elements of the 28th Brigade to provide rearguards, and prepared for a further withdrawal to Gurun. The Japanese, arriving soon afterwards, made a determined attempt to cross the river and succeeded in gaining a foothold at one point, but were driven back and prevented from making reserve.

by the battalion which had acted as rearguard during the previous night's withdrawal. During the

further crossings

succeeding night the division continued its retreat, in pouring rain, to the selected position at Gurun. As the outcome of Heath's order of December 8 that the Gurun position should be prepared for defence, a civilian labour force had been assembled for the purpose.* The 1 1th Division had, however fallen back so swiftly that most of the work of preparation had to be done by the tired troops when they arrived between dawn and midday on December 14. The troops were scarcely in position, with the 6th Brigade covering the trunk road and the railway, the 28th on its right and the 15th in reserve, when the Japanese arrived. They were held that afternoon after making a shallow penetration, but in the early hours of December 15 drove so deeply into the 6th Brigade's area that the commander of its left-hand battalion, believing that the battalion on his right had been overwhelmed, retreated westwards in the hope of rejoining the division by a roundabout route. This uncovered the whole of the trunk road and its immediate neighbourhood as far back as the village of Gurun. There Brigadier Carpendale, once more commanding the 28th Brigade since Garrett had returned to take charge of the 1 5th, succeeded in holding the enemy with troops drawn from his own brigade and Garrett's. In the meantime both Murray-Lyon and Heath had come to the conclusion that their attempt to halt the enemy at Gurun was not likely to prove rewarding. 20 The proper course, Heath felt by evening of December 14, was to take the 1 1th Division right back to the Perak River, some eighty to a hundred miles to the rear, and rely on demolitions * See p. 142.

MAP The

Ml.

Ml/

S

(furun, Position

iJJ

British battalions Dec. 14

Position held by battalion H.Q

—

•

—

and one company Boundary between 6 and 28 Brigades Line held Dec. 15

—

Withdrawal of left-hand battalion of

6 Bde.

Japanese thrusts: /tec.

/4

~Miles

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

168

and a temporary stand at an intermediate position to buy time for a safe withdrawal of the British garrison of Penang. 21 Until the evening of December 17 he was, however,

unable to obtain permission from Percival to retreat

so far.

This was not because Percival was unaware of the strength of Heath's case, but because the case for holding the enemy as far north as possible seemed even stronger. Percival's primary task was to defend the naval base at Singapore. He knew that the fate of the naval base, and of Malaya itself, might turn on the safe arrival of convoys bringing troops and equipment from the United Kingdom, the Middle East and India. His view, which was endorsed at a conference of American, Australian, Dutch, New

Zealand and United Kingdom representatives on December 18, was that, until these reinforcements reached him, the Japanese must at all costs be prevented from seizing airfields whose occupation would enable them to attack the convoys with the benefit of fighter cover. 22 This meant that central and southern Malaya must, if possible, be barred to the enemy for at least another month.

The

11th Division had therefore to

make a number of

brief stands at intermediate positions during

its

retreat to

the Perak River. At the same time the Japanese troops advancing from Patani, which reached Kroh in the middle

of December and then turned southwards along a bad road through the Perak Valley at the cost of leaving their tanks behind, had to be prevented from reaching the division's line of retreat on the trunk road.* These delaying actions were exhausting for Murray-Lyon's troops and especially for the newly arrived 12th Brigade, which bore the brunt of the fighting on both fronts during the second half of the month. Meanwhile the Japanese troops which had landed at Kota Bharu were pressing south. Accordingly the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, whose future Heath had gone to Singapore to discuss on the eve of the action at Jitra, withdrew with Percival's consent to the neighbourhood of Kuala Lipis and Jerantut. The 9th Indian Division's other * See

Map

1,

p. 110.

DECEMBER 1941-JANUARY

1942

169

22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, remained at week of January, Heath ordered and the airfield at Kuantan to be it to fall back to the west abandoned. The 22nd Brigade reached Jerantut during the night of January 6 after a stiff rearguard action which left it with roughly two-thirds of its original strength, and thence moved to Raub, some twenty-five miles north-east of the junction of the Kuala Lipis road with the trunk road. The British garrison duly withdrew from Penang by the night of December 16, but steps taken to deny important brigade, the

Kuantan

until, in the first

installations to the

enemy did not include

the demolition of

the broadcasting station or the scuttling of ships in harbour.

The Japanese, when they arrived, took possession of twentyfour self-propelled craft and other vessels which afterwards

helped to outflank the 11th Division's troops beyond the Perak River. They also found a use for the broadcasting station as an instrument of anti-British propaganda. Meanwhile reinforcements were arriving for both sides. On December 23 one regiment of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division from Siam joined the main body of the 5th Division in western Malaya ; a week later the Japanese 55th Infantry Regiment, which belonged like the 56th Infantry Regiment to the 23rd Infantry Brigade of the 18th Division, landed at Kota Bharu and was ordered to follow the 56th Regiment to Kuantan. On the British side, the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade disembarked safely at Singapore on January 3.

General Pownall reached Singapore on December 23, later succeeded Air Chief Marshal BrookePopham as Commander-in-Chief, Far East.* His brief was, however, cast in a broader mould than that given to his

and four days

predecessor.f * t

Seep. 136. Brooke-Popham's original

him

directive,

dated October 22, 1940, called upon

to exercise "operational control" of all British land

and

air forces in

Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong. This was changed in a new directive, dated December 2, 1941, to "strategic control". Pownall was directed to assume joint responsibility with the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, for "the conduct of British strategy in the Far East".

170

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

On the day after Pownall's arrival, Murray-Lyon was succeeded in command of the 11th Indian Division by Brigadier A. C. M. Paris, hitherto commanding the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. As Carpendale, Garrett and Lay were all in hospital, new brigadiers were appointed to command the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade, and a new 15th Indian Infantry Brigade formed from elements of the old 15th and 6th Brigades. Heath chose for defence two positions east of the Perak River and south of Ipoh. The first of these was at Kampar, where the trunk road, joined immediately south of the village by the railway, runs between high ground on the east and a belt of low-lying, swampy country extending to the coast on the west. The road and railway at Kampar were defended at the end of December by the reconstituted 15th Brigade, with the 28th Brigade guarding a defile on the far side of a four-thousand-foot mountain on its right, and the 12th Brigade some twenty miles to the south-west near the mouth of the Perak River. The Japanese attacked straight down the road on January 1 and 2. The 15th Brigade held the enemy well north of the village on both days but its left and rear were threatened by a force which had landed south of the river and was joined by troops of the Imperial Guards Division who came down the river in small boats. Fearing that the 1 2th Brigade, whose troops were very tired, might not be able to check the advance from that direction for more than a day or two, General Paris decided on January 3 to disengage. 23 On Heath's instructions, he withdrew the 15th Brigade to the second position at Tanjong Malim, some fifty miles south of Kampar, and placed the 12th and 28th Brigades at an intermediate position near the village of Trolak. In the neighbourhood of Trolak the trunk road and the railway, surrounded by dense jungle except where they adjoin rubber plantations themselves flanked by jungle, run close together as far as the village of Kampong Slim, four and a half miles to the south-east. There the road diverges from the railway, swings eastwards, and runs for about seven miles along the north bank of the Slim River to the ;

JANUARY

1942

171

Slim River bridge. West of Trolak, on the far side of a jungle-clad hill, a huge swamp extends almost to the coast. As the jungle near Trolak is exceptionally thick, General Paris could safely assume that any attack in strength would be confined to the road and railway. He decided to defend the Slim River bridge in depth by placing the 28th Brigade along the stretch of road and river between the bridge and the railway, with the 12th Brigade forward of it along the road and railway between Kampong Slim and a point well north of Trolak. The whole position had a depth of about fourteen miles, measured along the trunk road. As the 12th Brigade would bear the brunt of the expected it by an additional infantry batand a squadron of mechanized cavalry. Each brigade was supported by a regiment of field artillery and one troop of an anti-tank battery. The rest of the divisional anti-tank guns, which would have been far more valuable

attack, Paris reinforced talion

than field guns to forward battalions of the 12th Brigade defending a narrow front hemmed in by trees and undergrowth, Paris kept back at Tanjong Malim. The 12th Brigade had only twenty-four mines out of a divisional reserve of some fourteen hundred, and its road-blocks, hastily constructed from portable concrete obstacles, were not very formidable in the absence of an adequate number of weapons capable of stopping tanks. 24 During the advance of the main body of the Japanese 5th Division from Singora to the Perak River, the Japanese 3rd Air Division had given most of its attention to attacks on the opposing air force and the preparation of bases in Siam. From the beginning of January more aircraft were available for the close support of troops. Repeated air attacks on the Trolak position between January 4 and January 6 had a depressing effect on the defenders, although they did little material damage since the Japanese airmen could not see their objectives amidst the trees and bombed more or less at random. The British and Indian troops, tired by constant fighting and frequent moves, were

made

uneasy, too, by the uncanny stillness of the jungle. 25 In the early hours of January 7 three of the four infantry

MAP

0123 n

>

i

„

i

Mites

*

J

9

To TanJjong v

Malim

THE SLIM RIVER DISASTER

173

1 2th Brigade were in position north-west fourth battalion was resting at Kampong

battalions of the

of Trolak.

The

Slim, but was to go forward

when

upon to a check The three battalions

called

position about a mile south of Trolak.

of the 28th Brigade were in bivouac at Kampong Slim, but were ready to move at short notice to their reconnoitred positions near the railway station and astride the road. At 3.30 a.m. on January 7 a column of Japanese tanks, interspersed with infantry in lorries, advanced along the road in bright moonlight. The infantry, covered by artillery fire and fire from the tanks, succeeded in clearing the first road-block and forced the forward battalion of the 12th Brigade, less one company overrun at the outset and killed or captured, to retreat down the railway. The column then continued down the road and into the sector held by the 5th Battalion of the 2nd Punjab Regiment, but came to a standstill about 4.30 a.m., when the leading tank struck a mine at the first minefield. The forward company of the Punjabis astride the road put up a desperate fight, but was surrounded and overwhelmed when the Japanese discovered a way through the jungle along an overgrown loop road created by the straightening of the trunk road before the war. Overrunning the next company of the Punjabis, who had no road-block or mine-field, the Japanese column resumed its advance along the trunk road until, at 5.30 a.m., it reached the second minefield and was again halted, this time for about an hour. Meanwhile all landline communications in the forward area had been cut. Brigadier I. McA. Stewart, who had set up the headquarters of the 1 2th Brigade on an estate road more than a mile from the trunk road, knew that the

Japanese had broken through his forward battalion and were being held by the Punjabis, but believed as late as 7.20 a.m. that the situation, although serious, was not critical. 26 He told the Punjabis to hold on, even though tanks should break right through their position; the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, in rear of the Punjabis, to build road-blocks covering Trolak;

resting at

Kampong

Slim to move to

and the battalion its

check position.

174

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL MALAYA

General Paris, many miles to the rear at Tanjong Malim, received no information from Stewart until 6.30 a.m., when he learned that there had been "some sort of break-

through" and ordered the 28th Brigade to occupy

its

reconnoitred positions. 27

Almost at that moment the Japanese armoured column reached the first of the road-blocks in the sector manned by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and swept the defenders aside with little difficulty. Half an hour later the column reached the second road-block, where it was only briefly checked by troops with armoured cars and anti-tank rifles but no anti-tank guns. Continuing southwards without infantry support, the tanks drove right through the battalion moving towards the check position. Almost immediately afterwards the 28th Brigade's only anti-tank troop,

going forward to help the 1 2th Brigade, was overrun before could get into action. Entering the Slim River sector, the tank column then by-passed one battalion of the 28th Brigade at the railway station, ran through the next as it was about to deploy beside the road, and overtook the third while it was moving eastwards to its battle position three miles west of the Slim River bridge. The leading tanks reached the bridge about 8.40 a.m.

it

There an enterprising

light anti-aircraft troop,

warned by

approach, set its sights at minimum range and opened fire, but was unable to stop armoured vehicles designed to stand much heavier punishment than light anti-aircraft guns were capable of inflicting. Finally, the column was met two miles beyond the bridge by the 155th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, which was moving up to support the 28th Brigade. Although astonished by the sudden appearance of enemy armour nineteen miles behind the supposed front, the gunners showed such presence of mind that at 9.30 a.m. the column was brought to a halt by one round from a 4.5-inch howitzer. Fired at the unusual range of thirty yards, this hit the leading tank and convinced the enemy that his armour had gone as far as it could venture without support. As it was, the forward troops of the Japanese Twenty-

signallers of their

JANUARY Army

7,

1942

175

had, in six hours, destroyed one brigade of the 1 1th Indian Division and crippled a second. The combined strength of the seven infantry battalions of the 12th and 28th Brigades on the following day was approximately 1,200 of all ranks, or little more than one-fifth of their

Fifth

establishment. 28

IO

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

A few days of the outbreak of WITHIN war Far Prime

in the East, the British Minister and his service advisers crossed the Atlantic to confer at Washington with President Roosevelt and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the so-called Arcadia Conference in December and early January the Americans and the British reaffirmed their policy of defeating Germany before Japan, supporting Chiang Kai-shek, and maintaining in the Far East and the Pacific only sufficient forces to hold vital areas from which an Anglo-American offensive would eventually be launched. 1 As it was clear by the end of 1941 that the Philippines could not be saved, this meant that the Western Allies must aim at holding a line through Malaya, southern Sumatra, Java and the Indonesian archipelago to New Guinea in order to safeguard naval and air bases in that neighbourhood and their communications with India, the Middle East and the United Kingdom. It also meant that they must aim at holding Burma so that supplies could continue to reach Chiang Kai-shek through Rangoon and along the Burma Road. Australia, too, must be held as a base for the recapture of territories in the South- West Pacific already lost or imminently threatened, and the Japanese must somehow be prevented from cutting communications between the Antipodes and the United States. With these aims in view, the British counted on finding reinforcements amounting to two divisions and an armoured brigade for Malaya, two divisions for the Netherlands East Indies and two for Burma. 2 Command of the China Seas and the Western Pacific had been temporarily lost, but a reconstituted Eastern Fleet was being built up in the

Indian Ocean and would, 178

it

was hoped, assume substantial

DECEMBER 1941-JANUARY

1942

179

proportions by the spring of 1942. 3 In the South- West Pacific the Americans, the British and the Dutch could muster between them nine cruisers, twenty-six destroyers and some forty submarines. 4 There were also six cruisers and some light naval forces in Australian and New Zealand waters. Finally, the United States Pacific Fleet, despite its heavy losses, was still a fleet in being. At a meeting at the White House on Christmas Day,

General Marshall pleaded for unified command of the whole area from Burma to the Moluccas and as far north and south as Luzon and the Cocos Islands. The British doubted whether one man could control so vast an area, but eventually succumbed to Marshall's arguments. At Roosevelt's request, the post of Supreme Commander was offered to the British General Sir Archibald Wavell, who

accepted it with the comment: "I have heard of men having to hold the baby, but this is twins". 5 After prolonged discussion, the Western Allies agreed with reservations on the extent of Wavell's command. The Americans insisted that Burma should be included because Rangoon was the port of entry for Chiang Kai-shek's supplies; that China should be excluded because Chiang might interpret its inclusion as a threat to his sovereignty; and that Siam and Indo-China should also be excluded because they had already proposed to him that both should be included in the China theatre. 6 The Americans wished, too, to exercise direct control of the route from Rangoon to Chungking and to command any American or Chinese forces that might operate in Burma. The British agreed that Chiang Kai-shek's susceptibilities must not be ruffled, but were reluctant to lump Burma with the South- West Pacific area, since recent study had convinced them that effective control of any forces there could be exercised only from India. American control of communications used by British troops was bound, they thought, to lead to difficulties. Eventually it was agreed that Allied forces in Burma should be controlled by the Supreme Commander but administered from India. An American officer accredited to Chiang Kai-shek would command all United States forces

W.F.E.

—

180

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

in China and any Chinese forces that might be assigned to him, but all such forces would go under WavelPs command if they were called upon to operate in Burma. LieutenantGeneral Joseph W. Stilwell, an energetic but truculent authority on Chinese problems, was chosen for this difficult appointment. WavelPs appointment as Supreme Commander of the American-British-Dutch Area (or Abda) was announced

on January 4, 1942. On the same date the Western Allies announced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had accepted the Supreme Command of Allied land and air forces in the China theatre. Eleven days later Wavell formally assumed his duties, the British Far East Command was abolished, and General Pownall became Chief of Staff to Wavell. The American Admiral Hart became Chief of the Naval Staff, the British Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse was appointed Chief of the Air Staff with the American Major-General L. H. Brereton as his deputy, and the Dutch Lieu tenant-General H. ter Poorten took charge of the branch of the staff responsible for land forces. Port Darwin and its neighbourhood were included in Wavell's area, but Allied naval forces based on New Zealand and the east coast of Australia formed a separate command controlled by the American Vice- Admiral H. F. Leary under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet.

These arrangements were attractive in principle, but in practice they saddled Wavell with the impossible task of directing the operations of British, American, British

Com-

from widely separated bases, some of them not in direct touch with his headquarters in Java. Wavell could not, for example communicate with the Burma Command, even by wireless telegraphy, except through Delhi, and in consequence could never be sure that his knowledge of the situation in Burma was up to date. In retrospect the chief interest of the Abda Command, which was not destined to last long, is that it monwealth, Dutch and mixed

forces controlled

set the pattern for later systems

of integrated

which worked reasonably well in more compact

command areas.

JANUARY

7-14, 1942

181

On

the day of the Slim River disaster, Wavell reached Singapore on his way to his new headquarters. After visit-

ing the forward area on the following day, he expressed the opinion that Heath's corps would fall to pieces if the policy of gradual withdrawal were continued when the 11th Division reached the relatively open country south of Kuala Lumpur. 7 He announced his intention of fighting a defensive battle in the neighbourhood of the trunk road at Segamat and the mouth of the Sungei Muar. To provide a suitable force the 8th Australian Division, already in Johore, would be augmented by the two brigades of the 9th Indian Division and the newly arrived 45th Indian Infantry Brigade, but would leave the 22nd Australian Brigade at

Endau, on the

east coast, until the arrival of the 53rd Infantry Brigade from the United Kingdom gave Percival a chance of replacing it by troops from Singapore Island. Heath's corps was to withdraw under cover of demolitions through the augmented 8th Australian Division. It was then to reorganize the 1 1th Indian Division, form a general reserve by taking up reinforcements as they arrived, and assume responsibility for the defence of the mainland south of a line drawn from Endau to the lateral road and along it to Batu Pahat in the west. For the time being the 22nd Australian Brigade would be placed under Heath's command. The conduct of the crucial battle in north-west Johore thus devolved upon Major-General H. G. Bennett of the 8th Australian Division. His force in its expanded form was known as Westforce. Bennett had served with distinction in the First World War and was an energetic and resourceful officer, keenly critical of mistakes which he attributed to

Heath and

subordinate commanders. 8 But he had no first-hand knowledge of Japanese methods, and no staff suitable for the control of more than a division. Moreover, only one of the two brigades of his own division remained at his

his disposal.

In accordance with WavelPs plan the 1 1th Division, conof the 15th Brigade and all that remained of the 12th and 28th Brigades, broke contact with the enemy during the second week in January. By the morning of January 14

sisting

182

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

had passed through Westforce and was on and behind the lateral road in the neighbourhood of Kluang and Rengam. On January 1 1 the Japanese 5th Division entered Kuala Lumpur, capturing large quantities of equipment and supplies whose removal to Singapore Island had been cut short by the retreat. Meanwhile Bennett was preparing for the battle which it

would, in effect, decide the fate of Singapore. He placed the 8th Indian Brigade astride the trunk road at Batu Anam, with the 27th Australian Brigade in front of it and the 22nd Indian Brigade on its left to guard against an outflanking movement through Jementah. The 45th Indian Brigade, which might with advantage have been concentrated near Yong Peng to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the trunk road at that point by moving from Bakri or Batu Pahat through Bukit Pelandok, was dispersed on Bennett's instructions 9 along both banks of the Sungei Muar from Muar to Lenga. Instead of guarding a single road from Bukit Pelandok to Yong Peng, its inexperienced troops had therefore to watch a front of some twenty-four miles. About 10 a.m. on January 15 an advanced guard of the Japanese 5th Division, relieved later in the day by the 9th Infantry Brigade, attacked the 27th Australian Brigade on the trunk road. On the same evening the 21st Infantry Brigade, now at its full strength of six battalions, began to move along the loop road north and west of Mount Ophir towards Jementah. On the Japanese right the Imperial Guards Division ordered the 4th Guards Regiment, less one battalion, to contain the enemy at Muar while the 5th Guards Regiment forced a crossing of the Sungei Muar further upstream under cover of darkness. The remaining battalion of the 4th Guards Regiment was to land in rear of the enemy near Batu Pahat, lie hidden until Batu Pahat fell to the main body, and then block the escape route along the coast.

The 27th Australian Brigade stood up well to the Japanese advanced guard, and in face of attacks by the 9th Infantry Brigade withdrew in good order to the main

High ground

& Road block

184

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

position covering Batu Anam.

On the extreme left, however,

Bennett was soon in dire trouble. Downstream from Jorak the 45th Brigade had one battalion divided between the north and south banks of the Sungei Muar on a front of about nine miles, with one company of the reserve battalion in its rear at Simpang Jeram and a detachment watching the coast

still

further back. Before

noon on January 15 the

two companies of the forward battalion north of the river were overrun so swiftly and so completely that no news of the disaster reached battalion headquarters on the south bank. As this left the 45th Brigade with no troops north of the Sungei Muar below Jorak, the Japanese were able to collect a few small boats from neighbouring ricefields, paddle them across the river when darkness fell, and return with larger craft which the defenders had moored under the south bank in the belief that this would prevent the enemy from using them. Leading elements of the 5th Guards Regiment then crossed the river in considerable strength, routed one of the two surviving companies of the 45th Brigade's left-hand battalion, and set up a road-block to hold off the right-hand battalion. They went on to enter Muar from the east after repulsing counter-attacks by part of the reserve battalion. By the evening of January 16 the main body of the Guards was across the river and the 45th Brigade had been driven to Bakri with the loss of nearly half its strength.

Meanwhile Bennett had learned that Muar was threatened, but was far from understanding the full extent of the disaster to the 45th Brigade. He sent the reserve battalion of the 27th Australian Brigade, less one company, to Bakri with orders to restore the situation by a counter-attack and then return to Gemas. 10 Percival, recognizing that Bennett would have to pull back his right if his left collapsed and that this was undesirable on psychological grounds, arranged to add a battalion drawn from the 22nd Australian Brigade on the east coast. 11 He also ordered Heath to protect Bennett's communications and gave him the 53rd Brigade, which had reached Singapore only three days earlier after a long

voyage in crowded troopships.

BATU PAH AT

185

However, after learning on January 18 that Bennett was facing two Japanese divisions, Percival agreed that the 27th Australian Brigade and the 9th Indian Division must, after all, withdraw behind Segamat as the prelude to a

He

then transferred responsibility for the so that Bennett should be free to take care of the situation on the trunk road. During the next few days the British tried hard to prop up their forces on the left and especially to hold Batu Pahat. These efforts did not prevent the Japanese from exploiting their opportunities in that sector. The survivors of the 45th Brigade, cut off at Bakri with the two battalions sent to help them, made a desperate attempt to fight their way through to the 53rd Brigade at Bukit Pelandok, but were unable to force the crossing of a bridge at Parit Sulong. They took to the jungle after destroying their heavy equipment and leaving their wounded in the care of volunteers. Eventually about four hundred Indians and some five hundred Australians made their way on foot to safety. The 1 5th Brigade, still serving with the 11th Indian Division and ordered by Heath to accept the risk of encirclement by holding Batu Pahat after the Japanese had cut the roads to Yong Peng and Ayer Hitam, was likewise forced to abandon its guns and vehicles when the enemy was found to have blocked the coast road. Leaving the wounded in the care of the Red Cross, about half the brigade escaped by taking to the country inland of the road. The remainder, moving seaward of the road, came up against an unfordable river, turned downstream to a shore fringed by mangrove swamps, and after many adventures were rescued by two gunboats and a few small craft which put in to the coast further retreat.

Muar

front to

Heath

on four successive nights. Meanwhile Wavell had ordered Percival to fight out the battle in Johore but prepare in secret for a withdrawal to Singapore Island. 12 On January 21, after Wavell had paid a flying visit to Singapore, Percival told his commanders that his intention was to fight the enemy north of a line from Jemaluang through Kluang and Ayer Hitam to Batu Pahat. He went on to reorganize his troops on the

186

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

mainland in three formations consisting of Eastforce in the Jemaluang area and covering the line of retreat from the east coast; Westforce covering the trunk road and railway; and the 11th Indian Division on the west coast. Westforce resumed command of the doomed 45th Brigade, while the 11th Division received the 53rd Brigade in addition to the 15th Brigade and the remnants of the 12th and 28th Brigades. Secret instructions already given to Heath and Bennett warned them that, should a withdrawal from the mainland become necessary, each force was to retreat along its own lines of communication and that Heath would concert their movements. However, it was not until January 23 that Percival ordered Westforce to fall back to the Kluang-Ayer Hitam line, 13 and not until the afternoon of January 25 that he decided to pull out of Batu Pahat. 14 These decisions came too late to save the 45th Brigade and the heavy equipment of the 53rd Brigade. Their loss was so keenly felt that Percival warned Wavell on January 27 that "a very critical situation" had developed. 15 On the following day he ordered Heath to complete the withdrawal to Singapore Island by the morning of January 31. 16 The withdrawal of Eastforce from Jemaluang began on January 30 without interference from the Japanese, who had suffered heavily when following up the withdrawal of the 22nd Australian Brigade from its forward positions a

few days

On

earlier.

the west coast the survivors of the 11th Indian Divi-

sion, less the troops of the 15th

Brigade withdrawn by

sea,

an by the 53rd Brigade to break through position held by the 15th Brigade before it took

retreated without disaster along the coast road after

unsuccessful attempt to the last

to the country.

In the central sector the intention was that the 27th Australian Brigade should retreat along the trunk road and the 9th Indian Division, comprising the 8th and 22nd Indian Brigades, along the axis of the railway. As there was no road beside the railway for some distance beyond Layang Layang (about twenty miles south of Kluang), this

MAT

11

The Loss of the 22nd. Indian Infantry Brigade

21 INF.

SOB.

JUNGLE

To

Kluang

^

Line held by West Force, p.m. Jan. 27 Line of retreat of

21 Australian Bde.

Kulai »

To

Singapore

»

»

»

«

for

9 Indian B

Div.

guns and vehicles

British brigades, night Jan.

27 Australian Bde.

CL; •••••••

i

^Miles

W.F.E.

—

7*

22 lncl,an Bcle

-

8 Indian Bde.

> Japanese thrusts

Div.

27/26 :

188

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

meant that the 8th and 22nd Indian Brigades, when they reached a point north of Layang Layang at which a track through a rubber estate gave access to the trunk road, must send away their guns and vehicles and continue their retreat with only the weapons they could carry. If the enemy followed up promptly a great deal might depend on scrupulous adherence to the time-table or prompt notification of any change that the tactical situation might enforce. During the afternoon of January 27 all the guns and vehicles of the 8th and 22nd Indian Brigades, including wireless trucks,

its

were duly despatched along the track

to

About ten o'clock that evening Brigadier Painter, commanding the 22nd Indian Brigade, reached his allotted position astride the railway between Rengam and Layang Layang. Foreseeing that the enemy might outflank him by using a network of estate roads east of the railway, he had asked when the scheme was explained to him earlier in the day to be allowed to fall back to Layang Layang, but had been told that any departure from his orders might have the trunk road.

disastrous consequences.

About two hours

was demolAlthough the gap could be crossed by men on foot, this meant that no more rations or ammunition could reach him by rail. Moreover, the explosion cut later a bridge in his rear

ished without authority.

only signals link with the 8th Indian Brigade to the south of him. The last communication he received from the 8th Brigade was a telephone call to the effect that the brigade had passed through Layang Layang and that further information would follow. To make matters worse, the 8th Brigade did not take up the position selected by the divisional commander but moved further down the railway. 17 This left a gap of some his

three to four miles between the two brigades.

Painter passed an anxious night. He longed to take his brigade to safety down the railway. Yet he dared not disobey his orders for fear of jeopardizing the withdrawal of the guns and vehicles and endangering troops of the 27 th Australian Brigade who were holding the junction of the trunk road with the track by which the guns and vehicles

JANUARY

28-31, 1942

189

had withdrawn. His state of mind was not improved by the sound of vehicles, which could only be Japanese, to the east of his position.

In the morning he found that the enemy had, as he reached the railway between him and the 8th Brigade. After losing about fifty of his advanced guard in an attempt to break through to Layang Layang, he decided to take to the jungle rather than risk a full-scale assault without supporting arms and without means of transport for the wounded. The outcome was an exhausting march which took his dwindling brigade through trackless forest to a point about fifteen miles from the causeway leading to Singapore Island. With his way blocked by the enemy and with practically no ammunition left, he was forced to surrender some thirty-six hours after the failure of a final attempt by the 9th Division to locate his force and guide it

feared,

to safety.

During the last stage of the withdrawal from the mainland the 22nd Australian Brigade, reinforced by a battalion of the Gordon Highlanders, covered the approaches to the causeway. The 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, reduced to a third of its strength by losses in northern and central Malaya, guarded an inner bridgehead. Early on January 31 the Australians, followed by the Gordons, withdrew through the inner bridgehead and were played out of Johore by the only two surviving pipers of the Argylls. After the pipers had played out the remnant of their own battalion, the order was given to explode demolition charges which wrecked a lock system at the northern end of the causeway and cut the road and rail links

between Johore and the

island.

Wavell believed after the loss of Johore that Percival, strengthened by the diversion of the 18th Division from the Middle East, ought to be able to hold the island for some months. 18 As large numbers of American aircraft and other reinforcements were due to reach the Far East in the near future, even a respite of six or eight weeks would, the Western Allies hoped, enable them to launch a powerful

190

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

counter-offensive from the Netherlands East Indies in the early spring.

At the end of the

week

February Percival had under his command in Singapore about 70,000 combatant and some 15,000 non-combatant troops. 19 His infantry was organized in thirteen brigades. These comprised four airfield defence battalions, three volunteer battalions, two Malay battalions, and thirty-six regular battalions of which thirteen were British, six Australian, and seventeen drawn from the British Indian Army. All the British battalions, except those which had just arrived, were very much under strength; the Australian battalions would also have been considerably under strength but for the recent arrival of first

in

reinforcements consisting almost entirely of raw recruits and most of the Indian battalions were not only deficient in rifle strength but had absorbed so high a proportion of incompletely trained newcomers that their fighting value was seriously impaired.

The Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army, with infantry battalions in

its

thirty-one

three active divisions in Malaya,

had no advantage in numbers or theoretical rifle strength. But it had suffered no disastrous defeats or crippling losses, all ranks were elated by success, and General Yamashita could count on receiving about ten times as much air support as his opponent. By early February the Japanese had captured nearly all the posts on which the defenders of Singapore depended for early warning of air attacks, and could bring observed artillery fire to bear on three of the four airfields on the island. Singapore Island is a small island, about thirteen miles

long and seven miles wide, and is cut up by a number of rivers flowing to broad inlets. The Japanese, Percival felt, might land anywhere on the coast and might also drop paratroops elsewhere. Once established, they would be almost impossible to dislodge, as the country did not lend itself to a battle of manoeuvre. This meant that they must be either prevented from landing, or driven back by local counter-attacks soon after they came ashore. To prevent them from landing would, however, scarcely be possible,

MALAYA COMMAND

191

TABLE 2 Organization of British Malaya Command^ February 8, 1942

Malaya Command (Lt-Gen. A. E. Percival) Singapore Fortress (Maj.-Gen. F.

Malaya Malaya

K. Simmons)

Southern Area

Bde. (Brig. G. G. R. Williams) Bde. (Brig. F. H. Fraser) Straits Settlements Volunteer Force Bde. (Col. Grimwood) 1

2

Inf.

Inf.

Command Reserve

Reserve Area

12 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. A. C.

M.

-

Paris)

Western Area

8 Australian Div. (Maj.-Gen. H. G. Bennett) 22 Australian Inf. Bde. (Brig. H. B. Taylor) 27 Australian Inf. Bde. (Brig. D. S. Maxwell) 44 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. G. C. Ballentine)

3 Indian 11

Corps (Lt-Gen. Sir Lewis Heath)

Indian Div. (Maj.-Gen. B.

W. Key)

28 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. W. R. Selby) 53 (British) Inf. Bde. (Brig. C. L. B. Duke) 8 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. W. A. Trott) 18 (British) Div. (Maj.-Gen.

54 55

(British) Inf.

(British) Inf.

Northern Area

M.

(Div. Reserve)

B. Beckwith Smith)

Bde. (Brig. E. K. W. Backhouse) Bde. (Brig. J. B. Coates)

15 Indian Inf. Bde. (Brig. J. B. Coates)

(Corps Reserve)

Notes: 1

.

2.

9 Indian Div. was abolished after the loss of 22 Indian Inf. Bde. during the withdrawal from the mainland. Its remaining brigade (8 Indian) then joined 1 1 Indian Div. Troops in the Reserve Area included 12 Indian Inf. Bde., 15 Indian Inf. Bde., and a reserve battalion of 27 Australian Inf. Bde.

192

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

had only to cross a narrow channel fringed by mangrove swamps which made observation of the surface since they

of the water difficult. Percival concluded that he must so dispose his troops as to give him a good chance of preventing the enemy from pushing inland. 20 He divided the island into three area commands covering the coastline, and a reserve area in the interior. He allotted the Northern Area, in the north-east, to Heath's corps, with two divisions and six infantry brigades, of which one brigade was placed in the Reserve Area as Corps Reserve the Western Area, in the west and northwest, to the 8th Australian Division, with three infantry brigades ; and the Southern Area to his two untried Malaya Brigades and a brigade formed by the Straits Settlement Volunteer Force. This left him one brigade as Command Reserve. General Yamashita, with three divisions in hand and a fourth standing by in Japan, decided to attack the northwest corner of the island with all three of his forward divisions. The 5th and 18th Divisions, with sixteen battalions forward and five in reserve, were to deliver the main assault on a front of four and a half miles. The Imperial Guards Division, with four battalions forward and three in reserve, was to follow up on their left after doing its best to give the impression that the main attack was coming east of the causeway. About 10.30 p.m. on February 8, after artillery and air bombardments extending over several days, assault troops of the 5th and 18th Divisions began to land in the sector held by the 22nd Australian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier H. B. Taylor. The Australian troops had been warned that searchlights covering the beaches must not be exposed without specific orders from unit commanders, since otherwise their positions might be prematurely disclosed to the enemy. However, when the time came no specific orders could be given, as the bombardment had cut all telephone lines in the forward area. The troops had also been told that, if surrounded in forward positions and unable to rally at company headquarters, they were to fight ;

FEBRUARY TABLE

8,

1942

193

3

Organization of Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army, February 8, 1942

Twenty-Fifth

Army (Lt-Gen. T. Yamashita) Matsui)

5th Division (Lt-Gen. T.

9 Inf. Bde. (Maj.-Gen. S.

1 1

Inf.

Kawamura)

Regt.

41 Inf. Regt. 21 Inf. Bde. (Maj.-Gen. E. Sugiura) 21 Inf. Regt.

42

Inf.

Regt.

18 Division (Lt-Gen. R. Mutaguchi) 23

Inf.

55 56 35

Bde. (Maj.-Gen. H.

Inf.

Regt.

Inf.

Regt.

Inf.

Takuma)

Bde. (Maj.-Gen. K. Kawaguchi)

Inf. Regt. (less one coy.) (124 Inf. Regt.)

114

Imperial Guards Division (Lt-Gen. T. Nishimura) 3 Guards 4 Guards 5 Guards

56

Inf.

Inf. Inf.

Regt. Regt. Regt.

Division (in reserve in

(less

2 battns.)

Japan) Notes

1.

2.

Regt. did not take part in the assault on Singapore Island. Each infantry regiment contained 3 infantry battalions.

124

their

An

Inf.

way back to previously selected battalion

attempt to carry out

this

manoeuvre

the early hours of February 9 sent

perimeters. 21

in darkness during

many

units astray.

Brigadier Taylor was forced to cancel a counter-attack

FEBRUARY

9,

1942

195

which he had hoped to deliver with the aid of a battalion drawn from the 27th Australian Brigade on his right, and by 3 p.m. was occupying a defensive position near Bulim, some three to four miles west of the road from the causeway to the south. This position coincided

previously reconnoitred position

Meanwhile

with the outposts of a

known

as the Jurong Line.

all was quiet in Northern Area, had given Western Area his only reserve formation, the weak 12th Indian Brigade, and had set up a new Command Reserve by taking the 15th Indian Brigade from Heath. During the afternoon he decided after hearing Bennett's views that the 22nd Australian and 44th Indian Brigades, joined by the 12th Brigade, should occupy the Jurong Line and its outposts; that the two remaining battalions of the 27th Australian Brigade should continue to hold the causeway sector astride the road and railway;

Percival,

satisfied

that

and that the 15th Brigade should move to the rear of the Jurong Line and go under Bennett's command. As the Jurong Line was less than three miles long and had both flanks on water, these dispositions seemed to offer a good chance of holding the enemy west of the main road and barring his advance to the naval base and the built-up area in the south.

However, as things turned out a series of misunderstandand errors of judgment on the part of Percival's subordinate commanders undid all his plans. After leaving Bennett's headquarters towards evening on February 9, Percival decided that, if the worst came to the worst and he were driven from the Jurong Line, he would not retreat to the east of the island but would hold a perimeter round the built-up area of Singapore Town, with its airfield, supply dumps, reservoirs and hospitals. He therefore issued a "secret and personal" instruction on those lines for the information of Area Commanders and members of his staff, adding that administrative adjustments which fitted in with the scheme and could be made at once should be put in hand. 22 On receiving this instruction, Western Area issued an operation order based upon it. When this reached Brigadier Taylor and his staff about 9,30 a,m. on ings

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

196

February

up the

10,

they took

it

position allotted to

ordered

all

units

under

as it

his

an order

to the brigade to take

in the scheme. Taylor therefore

command, except

the reinforce-

ments which had reached him on the previous day, to abandon the positions west of the Jurong Line and fall back to a line immediately west of the Singapore perimeter. On his way to reconnoitre the new position he reported to Bennett, who expressed "extreme displeasure" but did not countermand the order. 23 In the meantime Brigadier D. S. Maxwell, commanding the 27th Australian Brigade in the causeway sector, had come to the conclusion that the Japanese might cross the river to the west of him. As early as 11 a.m. on February 9 he asked permission to swing back his left to face northwest. Although this was refused, he arranged later in the day to withdraw south of the Mandai Road if the need arose. About midnight he gave the commander of his lefthand battalion authority to pull back both his own battalion and the battalion on his right if he saw fit to do so. 24 The result was that about 4 a.m. on February 10 both battalions withdrew to the angle of the Mandai and Woodlands Roads, uncovering the stretch of road and railway south-west of the causeway and opening a gap of some 4,000 yards between the right of the 27th Australian Brigade and the left of the 1 1th Division. This proved a boon to the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, whose troops had begun to come ashore about seven hours earlier and had hitherto been so stoutly opposed that the divisional commander had asked permission to abandon his attempt on the causeway sector and make a fresh landing in rear of the ^th Division.

A further consequence of the withdrawal of the 27th Brigade was that the commander of the 12th Brigade, finding no Australians to the north of him and recognizing that there was nothing to stop the Japanese from driving straight down the main road in his rear, decided on his own initiative to withdraw his brigade from the northern end of the Jurong Line in order to block the main road at its junction with the road leading westwards to Bulim and beyond.

FEBRUARY

10-13, 1942

197

it came about that, at various times on February causeway position, the northern end of the Jurong Line, and the outpost positions of the Jurong Line were all abandoned, although none of them had been subjected to attacks that could not be met. By dusk Western Area's brigades were widely dispersed; leading elements of the Japanese 5th Division, with tanks in support, were well past the Jurong Line on the road through Bulim, and were about to wheel southwards along the main road the Japanese 18th Division was poised to attack eastwards along the Jurong Road; and forward troops of the Imperial Guards Division were across the trunk road and railway immediately south of the causeway. A counter-attack towards the causeway sector, begun that morning by the 8th Indian Brigade, had made some progress but had not ended an imminent threat to the 11th Division's left. Meanwhile Wavell had reached Singapore on what proved to be his last visit, and had come to the conclusion that steps must be taken to recapture and hold the Jurong Line. 25 Accordingly, Percival ordered Bennett to launch a

Thus

10, the

;

counter-attack in that direction. During the night an attempt to carry out this order with tired and scattered troops led to further heavy losses and worse confusion. Thereafter Percival had no choice but to

back as best he could to his last line of defence. There the defenders resisted stoutly. A line close to the outskirts of a town whose population was swollen by refugees to about a million was, however, very unsuitable for prolonged defence in face of odds. As a result of the concentration of large quantities of military equipment and vehicles within the municipal boundary, practically the whole of the built-up area became a legitimate target for Japanese artillery and aircraft. Constant bombing and shelling not only caused heavy civilian casualties and pull

blocked streets with rubble, but made the water supply precarious by fracturing the mains at many points. Moreover, before long soldiers as well as civilians began to feel that their plight was hopeless. By February 13 armed deserters, chiefly

men

recently drafted to

Malaya

as re-

198

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

inforcements, or absentees from administrative units, were hiding in the town, seizing small boats in which to escape

from the

island,

ships leaving for

and sometimes forcing Java and Sumatra. 26

their

way aboard

At a conference at Percival's headquarters on that day, all information commanders agreed that a major counterattack was unlikely to succeed. Both Heath and Bennett advocated capitulation. 27 On the following morning the municipal authorities reported that more than half the water drawn from the reservoirs, which were in Japanese hands but had not been interfered with, was running to waste through breaks in the mains, and that supplies might last

another forty-eight hours at the most.

None

the

less

Percival decided to fight on.

The outlook on February

was still worse. There were fairly large reserves of small-arms ammunition and of food for the civil population, but stocks of food for the troops and of ammunition for field guns and light anti-aircraft guns were running low, and there was practically no fuel for motor vehicles except that already in their tanks. The water supply was not expected to last more than another twentyfour hours, and its total failure might bring not mere discomfort but disease and pestilence. Percival, fearing that the Japanese might break into the crowded town with disastrous consequences for the inhabitants if he remained on the defensive, concluded that the choice lay between surrender and an immediate attempt to regain control of the water supply and recapture the army's food dumps. 28 As his formation commanders were unanimously of the opinion that a counter-attack could not 15

became his only course. After a long and General Yamashita agreed at 6.10 p.m. that hostilities should cease at 8.30 p.m. and that Percival's troops, with the exception of a thousand men who would be allowed to retain their arms until further notice as guardians of law and order, should disarm themselves where they stood. General Yamashita, who undertook on succeed, surrender

parley, he

behalf of the Japanese Imperial forces to protect British and both sexes, thus brought his cam-

civilians of all ages

FALL OF SINGAPORE

199

paign to a successful conclusion a month ahead of the Supreme Command's time-table. In doing so he inflicted

on the British the greatest military disaster in their history, and raised the number of British, Indian, Australian and local volunteer troops captured in Malaya to more than 130,000 of all ranks. According to Japanese records, Yamashita's own losses throughout the campaign were fewer than 10,000. 29 What were the causes of this astonishing success? According to the rather hasty verdict delivered by Wavell at the time, the root of the trouble from the British point of view was that the whole of Malaya had been asleep for the past two centuries. But in retrospect it seems clear that the loss of the Jitra position, the Slim River disaster and the decisive setback inflicted on Percival's forces at the Muar River cannot be attributed solely, or even mainly, to the alleged backwardness of the Malay States and the Straits Settlements.

The

labour from the production of dollar-earning tin and rubber played some part in delaying the completion of defence works but this was no more than a contributory factor. Nor was Yamashita's progress attributable to the aptitude for jungle warfare shown by the Japanese in Burma, New Guinea and the Solomons. In Malaya the jungle was an obstacle generally avoided by both sides. The Japanese made good use of estate roads and half-forgotten tracks, and of captured boats and small craft where these came to hand. But the measure of their success was the speed of their advance along the trunk road. Here Yamashita was well served by his subordinate commanders and especially by his regimental officers, who were not afraid of making swift decisions and were perhaps too unsophisticated to change their minds, as their opponents sometimes did, in the light of troublesome afterthoughts. But probably the biggest single ingredient of Yamashita's success was that his troops were more suitably organized and equipped than the enemy's for the purpose in view. They were not tied, for example, to the disproreluctance of local

officials to divert

;

ARCADIA TO SINGAPORE

200

ammunition and explohad accumulated in forward areas

portionately large reserves of fuel, sives

which the

British

and feared to leave behind them, or to the defence of useless airfields and landing grounds. The Twenty-Fifth Army, forced to bring everything with it from Japan or IndoChina, made a virtue of necessity by travelling light. Moreover, the British relied largely on formations designed primarily for service in the Western Desert of Egypt, where the tides of battle ebbed and flowed over vast distances and a high degree of mechanization seemed essential. Quite apart from the inexperience of many of the fighting troops, these formations proved too cumbrous for a campaign fought along a single road. During the retreat from Jitra many of the massive British lorries and other mechanically-propelled vehicles broke down or went astray in the hands of unskilled Indian drivers, became jammed in bottlenecks, or were even halted by obstacles intended to stop the enemy. In Malaya the Japanese drew heavily on their few fully mechanized formations, but in general the Japanese infantryman did not depend to anything like the same extent as his British, Indian or Australian counterpart on motor transport either for his own mobility or for that of his supplies. Provided with a bicycle where there was no lorry to take him forward, carrying a dole of rice which would suffice, with an occasional requisitioned duck or chicken, to keep hunger at bay for several days, he was seldom acutely troubled by the fear of losing touch with his transport columns. Thus Yamashita's troops enjoyed, by virtue of the very shortcomings which caused British intelligence officers to underrate the fighting capacity of

the Japanese Army before the war, a degree of tactical mobility which went far to justify the opinion of Colonel

Masanobu staff,

Tsuji,

of the Twenty-Fifth Army's planning Malaya was made easy by expen-

that the conquest of

sive British roads

and cheap Japanese

bicycles. 30

1

JAPAN COMPLETES HER

PROGRAMME

HE

JAPANESE PLAN for the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies and Dutch Borneo provided for a three-pronged advance. In the west, a force based on Camranh Bay was to invade southern Sumatra; in the east and centre, forces using forward bases in the southern Philippines were to push southward by way of Celebes and eastern Borneo, while the eastern force was also to cut the air route between Australia and Java by seizing Amboina and Timor. Finally, the three forces were to combine for the invasion of Java. By the end of 1941 Davao, Jolo and British Borneo were all in Japanese hands, and the campaign in Malaya was going well. Imperial General Headquarters decided, therefore, that the eastern and central forces should start their southward drive without delay, leaving the western force to follow as soon as the capture of Singapore was certain. Accordingly, the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas, each about 150 aircraft strong, moved to Davao and Jolo respectively in the first week of 1942. On January 7 troops and naval ratings of the central force, bound for the oil-producing island of Tarakan in eastern Borneo, left Davao in sixteen transports escorted and covered by light naval forces and by aircraft of the 23rd Flotilla. The Western Allies responded by sending seven American heavy bombers and three American submarines from Java to intercept the convoy, but the submarines arried too late. Visibility was so bad that only three of the bombers reached the target area, where they dropped bombs from a great height without effect.

The Japanese that the local

202

arrived off Tarakan on January 10 to find Dutch commander, warned by coastguards

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

204

of their approach, had already set fire to the oil installations. Opposed by a coast-defence battery which sank two minesweepers, they landed in the early hours of January 1 1 at two points on the island, and soon overcame the garrison of roughly 1,300 men. By the morning of January 12 the island was in their hands and they were able to start preparing the airfield as a base for their supporting air flotilla. On the day of the landings at Tarakan, a naval landing party of the eastern force, also despatched from Davao, went ashore at Menado and Kema in the northern extremity of the large island of Celebes. At Menado the Japanese also used about five hundred paratroops. These were inaccurately dropped in a strong wind, but their arrival helped to confuse the Dutch garrison of about 1,500 men. By January 1 2 the eastern force had captured the whole of the northern tip of Celebes and was in possession of an airfield which soon became a valuable base for the 21st Air Flotilla.

Thus the situation in the middle of January, when Wavell took up the post of Supreme Commander, was that

enemy had already gained control of the northern approaches to the Makassar Strait and the Molucca the

good position to strike at the Dutch Balikpapan and at strategic points at whose capture would put him well on the road to the conquest of the whole of Indonesia. None of the objectives which Wavell expected to have to defend within the next few weeks was strongly held; yet to reinforce their meagre Passage,

oil

and was

in a

installations

would mean exposing his forces to defeat in detail by dispersing them. Indeed, it had long been obvious that garrisons

East Indies could not be adequately defended by a network of isolated garrisons, but only by concentrated naval and air power. Here Wavell was at a disadvantage. His naval forces comprised nine American, British and Dutch cruisers, some twenty-five American, British and Dutch destroyers, and about forty American and Dutch submarines. The greater part of his surface fleet had to be used for the protection of convoys bringing reinforcements and supplies. the Netherlands

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1942

205

only the submarines and a striking force of three cruisers and up to twelve destroyers under Rear-Admiral W. A. Glassford, U.S.N., for the seaward defence of objectives scattered over many thousands of square miles of the South-West Pacific. 1 In the air the immediate outlook was even less promising. Losses in Malaya had been so calamitous that, notwithstanding the recent arrival of Hurricanes from the United Kingdom, Wavell could usually reckon on being heavily outnumbered at any point. 2 Up to a thousand aircraft were, however, due from the United States within the next two months. Wavell, still hoping that the battle on the Segamat-Muar front in Malaya would not go against him, concluded that his best course was to concentrate on holding a line of bases from Singapore to Darwin while building up his strength in the air. 3 In Borneo and Celebes he could not hope to do more than delay the enemy's advance and perhaps inflict some naval losses. To prevent the enemy from getting astride his air communications with Australia he urged the Australian authorities on January 27, and again on January 31 and February 4, to send reinforcements from Darwin to Timor, but it was not until February 7 that they agreed to

This

do

left

so. 4

On

January 20 the main body of the Japanese force which had landed at Tarakan nine days earlier left for Balikpapan after emissaries had been sent to demand that be surrendered intact. Warned on the same day that an enemy convoy was southward bound in the Makassar Strait, WavelPs headquarters ordered Admiral Glassford, who was refuelling at Timor, to attack it under cover of darkness. Glassford left with two cruisers and four destroyers as soon as his refuelling was completed, but had to send his destroyers ahead of the cruisers because one cruiser struck an uncharted rock and the other was suffering from engine trouble which reduced its speed to fifteen knots. Late on January 23 some sixteen Japanese transports, less one sunk by Dutch aircraft, cast anchor in Balikpapan Bay and further south. Opposed only by one weak battalion the

oil

installations there should

206

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

which withdrew westwards

after carrying out a prearranged demolition scheme, the Japanese landed promptly and were soon in possession of the town. In the early hours of January 24 Glassford's four destroyers, led by Commander P. H. Talbot, U.S.N., approached Balikpapan Bay and found about a dozen Japanese transports silhouetted against the glare from burning oil installations but intermittently obscured by drifting smoke. Although hampered by the unnecessarily high speed at which they manoeuvred and by unsatisfactory torpedoes, the destroyers accounted for at least three transports and one patrol boat before withdrawing without interference from Japanese destroyers which moved to seaward with the intention of cutting them off. 5 Yet another transport was sunk by one of two Dutch submarines which, with six American submarines, had been ordered to the Makassar Strait when the enemy's southward move was first

reported. 6

On same

the

same day the Japanese eastern force, using the and men as had captured Menado nearly a

ships

fortnight earlier, seized a valuable airfield at Kendari, in

southern Celebes, against weak opposition. In Borneo a small force carried by sea from Kuching followed on January 27 with a landing at Pemangkat, due west of the airfield at Singkawang II. Moving inland, this force joined hands with Japanese troops who had marched overland from Kuching in face of stout opposition from Dutch troops and the remnant of Lane's battalion from Sarawak.* Eventually the survivors of Lane's force escaped southwards, but they were obliged to surrender when the whole of Dutch Borneo fell to the Japanese in March. Amboina, defended by about 2,600 Dutch troops and an Australian infantry battalion, was the next objective for the eastern force. A Japanese infantry regiment and a naval landing party, with a strong naval escort, arrived off the island on the night of January 30, and before dawn on January 3 1 began to disembark at points on the north and south coasts. A Dutch force in the south, attacked from two * See p. 158.

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1942

207

than twenty-four hours after the an Australian and a mixed Australian and Dutch force held out until February 2 and 3 respectively. By February 4 the Japanese had undisputed directions, surrendered less

first

landings;

elsewhere

and its airfield. With Kendari already had access to two air bases within hands, they thus in their striking distance of Timor, whose loss would deprive Wavell of a vital staging post for reinforcing fighters flown from Australia to Java and Sumatra. Wavell feared that the enemy's next step might be to use his forces at Balikpapan to capture air bases in southern Borneo, within easy reach ofJava. 7 He ordered repeated air attacks on the Japanese shipping there, but these achieved only a limited success, chiefly because the weather was unfavourable. Admiral Hart, WavelPs naval commander, managed on February 2 to form a reconstituted striking force of American and Dutch ships, placed it under RearAdmiral K. W. F. M. Doorman of the Royal Netherlands Navy, and told Doorman to make a fresh attack on the Japanese convoy under cover of darkness. Doorman left Java on the night of February 3 with two Dutch and two American cruisers and three Dutch and four American destroyers, but turned back on February 4 in face of attacks by bombers from Kendari, which damaged both American cruisers and also did some damage to his flagship. The cruiser Marblehead, although able to reach port, was so hard hit that she had to be sent to the United States for control of the island

repairs.

Without waiting to capture bases in southern Celebes, the Japanese launched heavy air attacks on naval and air bases in Java on February 3 and 5, using naval bombers from Kendari and long-range naval fighters from Balikpapan. Troops from the neighbourhood of Balikpapan then moved partly by sea and partly overland to southern Borneo, where they captured the town and airfield of Bandjermasin. On February 9 the Japanese eastern force made a further landing in southern Celebes at Makassar. Admiral Doorman, who had withdrawn after his mishap of February 4 to the south coast of Java, was ordered to attack the convoy

208

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

bound for Makassar, but it reached its destination before he could put to sea. 8 On the day of the landing at Makassar part of the Japanese 229th Infantry Regiment, followed two days later by the rest, left Camranh Bay as vanguard of the western force. Vice-Admiral J. Ozawa, in command of the force, sailed on February 10 with six cruisers, a light aircraft carrier and three destroyers to cover the convoys. Chancing to fall in with a large number of ships and small craft which were carrying troops and refugees from Singapore, he sank many of them before continuing on his way. On the night of February 13 all available Allied bombers attacked the leading Japanese convoy near Banka Island, but the weather was stormy and few hits were scored. One ship was sunk, and a number of others were set on fire, in the course of further attacks in daylight on the following morning. While these attacks were in progress, Japanese transport aircraft from southern Malaya carried about 360 paratroops to two points near Palembang. Although warned of their approach, the air defences were unable to intercept them, as all available Allied fighters were committed to the action off the coast. At least one transport aircraft was, however, brought down by anti-aircraft fire. The paratroops quickly gained possession of oil installations about four miles east of the town, and early on February 15 were reinforced by a further drop.

Meanwhile Wavell, satisfied by February 11 that the Japanese were making active preparations to invade Sumatra, had ordered Doorman to assemble a striking force at the western extremity of Java in readiness to intercept their transports and escort force. As Doorman's ships were far away, it was not until the evening of February 14 that he was able to bring them to the prescribed position. Passing east of Banka Island so as not to expose his force to air attack in the narrow channel between the island and the mainland of Sumatra, he found on the following morning that the leading Japanese convoy had already cast anchor off the inlet leading towards Palembang, and that the second and larger convoy was still well to the north of him.

FEBRUARY

1942

209

After running the gauntlet of successive waves of bombers, he turned back in the belief that he would not be justified in risking a further

advance without fighter cover.

He

after-

wards remarked disarmingly that history would doubtless censure

him

for this retreat. 9

Both Japanese convoys were therefore able to reach Sumatra without interference from Allied surface ships. On February 15 and 16 Dutch and British forces withdrew in haste from Palembang to Java, and within a few days all points of strategic importance throughout southern Sumatra were in Japanese hands. These included a useful anchorage at Muntok, on the coast of Banka Island. Landings in Bali and Timor followed on February 19 and 20. An Allied convoy bound for Timor with the reinforcements promised on February 7 had left Darwin late on February 15, but Wavell reluctantly ordered it to turn back in face of attacks by some thirty to forty bombers from Kendari. Doorman engaged Japanese shipping off Bali on February 19, but without much success. Meanwhile four fleet carriers of Admiral Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force, escorted from a point south of Kendari by two heavy cruisers, had crossed the Banda Sea and reached the Timor Sea without detection. About 10 a.m. on February 19 nearly two hundred bombers, torpedo-bombers and fighters from the carriers, followed some two hours later by bombers from Kendari, attacked Port Darwin. In the space of a few hours the Japanese destroyed eleven ships and twenty-three aircraft and killed or wounded more than five hundred people for the loss of only five of their own aircraft. This was an alarming experience for the Australians, who concluded that their turn for invasion was close at hand. The Japanese did, in fact, give some thought to the invasion of Australia, but came to the conclusion that they had no hope of finding either the ten divisions or the

many

for the purpose.

10

thousands of tons of shipping needed

As Java was now imminently threatened, the AngloAmerican Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed Wavell on

210

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

February 21

withdraw

to

his

headquarters at his disMalaya, Sumatra, Bali,

cretion. 11 Wavell, observing that

Borneo, Celebes,

Amboina and Timor had

all fallen to

the

been told that Burma was to revert to the India Command, suggested that his headquarters should be dissolved rather than withdrawn. The defence of Java could, he thought, be better conducted by the Dutch, with help from Allied forces and their commanders, than by a large integrated staff assembled for a

enemy and

that he

had

just

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed, and on February 25 Jonkheer Dr. van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the Dutch Governor-General, assumed com-

different purpose.

mand

of all Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies. For the defence of Java, an island about six hundred miles long and up to a hundred miles across, WavelPs successor had twelve Dutch and two Australian infantry battalions; one British cavalry squadron with twenty-five light tanks; some Dutch artillery supplemented by one

American

field artillery regiment; five British anti-aircraft regiments which had lost most of their equipment; and a Home Guard of some 40,000 partly trained and inexperienced volunteers. His naval and air forces consisted of eight cruisers, twelve destroyers, thirty-two submarines still fit for sea, and some eighty to ninety serviceable aircraft. Lieu tenant-General H. ter Poorten, commanding the land forces, put his best troops near the extremities of the island, where he rightly expected the enemy to come ashore. Vice- Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich, R.N.N. who had succeeded Hart as naval commander on February 14, divided his surface ships between two striking forces based on Sourabaya and Batavia respectively. Finally, Air ViceMarshal P. C. Maltby, who had reached Batavia from Singapore about the middle of the month, set to work to reorganize the depleted air squadrons and establish an effective early-warning and interception system staffed largely by local volunteers. The general intention was that submarines should cover the most probable landing-places, that all available bombers should attack the enemy's transports as far out to sea as possible, and that one or both of the ,

FEBRUARY

1942

211

naval striking forces should engage the main invasion convoy when it appeared.

By February 20

Java knew that there was a large Japanese force at Jolo and that other Japanese forces were believed to be assembling at Muntok. It was not, however, until February 24 that a large fleet of enemy transports, strongly escorted, was known to be heading south in the Makassar Strait and was likely to reach Java about dawn on February 2 7. 12 On February 25 Japanese destroyers disembarked a small landing party on Bawean Island, within a hundred miles of Sourabaya. On the same day Admiral Helfrich, apparently concluding that the fleet in the Makassar Strait was the main invasion convoy, ordered "all available cruisers and destroyers" to join Admiral Doorman at Sourabaya. Commodore J. A. Collins, R.A.N. commandAllied Headquarters in

,

ing the British naval forces in Java, thereupon sent the cruisers Exeter and Perth, with three British destroyers, from Batavia to Sourabaya. Doorman's force was known thereafter as the Combined Striking Force. These moves reduced the Western Striking Force at Batavia to a token force of one Australian and two British cruisers and two

Dutch destroyers. During the night of February 26 and the morning of February 27 the Western Striking Force made a fruitless search for the Japanese convoy believed to be based on Muntok. Some twelve hours later the three cruisers, accompanied by one Dutch destroyer, put to sea with orders to sweep north of Batavia and make for Ceylon if they failed to find the Muntok convoy by 4.30 a.m. on February 28. No contact was made, and the force duly arrived at Colombo on March 5. About 2.30 p.m. on February 27, just as the Combined Striking Force was entering harbour at Sourabaya to refuel after an equally vain search for the convoy from the Makassar Strait, Doorman learned that two groups of Japanese transports escorted by warships had been seen less than an hour earlier, and that one of them was near W.F.E.

—

tetravia

Bandoeng

S our

abayT^^^^~

JAVA Indian, lMakag$ar|

Ocean,

Japanese Forward bases

Main approach routes o t

100 i

200 i

Mies

300 i

400 i

MAP U The Invasion of Java

BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA Bawean

213

Island. 13

Concluding that the hour of decision was he turned his ships about and put to sea again. Meanwhile reconnaissance aircraft had kept the Japanese informed of Doorman's movements. About noon the transports, with a close escort of two destroyers, received orders to keep out of harm's way. The main body of the escort and covering force, comprising two heavy and two light cruisers with fourteen destroyers, maintained its course under the command of Rear- Admiral T. Takagi. On paper there was little to choose between this force and Doorman's two heavy and three light cruisers and nine destroyers. Although Takagi had more destroyers, Doorman would, in theory, have the upper hand if he could bring his three 6-inch cruisers to bear against his opponent's two 5.5-inch cruisers. But Doorman's was a scratch force, hastily assembled from ships of three different nationalities. He had no spotter aircraft to keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and he did not know the precise position of the convoy which it was his business to destroy. His officers had had no time to evolve a common tactical at hand,

doctrine,

they lacked the corporate

would have helped them not merely

experience which to

understand

his

and and procedure hampered communications between ship and ship and between ship and shore. In practice, therefore, Doorman was handicapped from the start. The battle began at 4.16 p.m., when the heavy cruisers on both sides opened fire at a range of nearly sixteen miles. At that moment Doorman was on a course which, had he maintained it, would have enabled Takagi to "cross his T", or in other words to bring all his guns to bear on Doorman's ships while only Doorman's leading ships could reply. Unless Takagi made some unexpected move, it was therefore only by a change of heading that Doorman could avoid putting himself into a notoriously unsound position. Nevertheless he was reluctant to turn away, since it was only by closing the range that he could bring his light cruisers into play and thus reap the advantage of their orders but to divine their underlying significance, differences of language

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

214

TABLE 4 The

JAPANESE

Battle of the

Java Sea : Japanese and Allied Naval Forces

(Rear-Adm. T. Takagi)

8-INCH CRUISERS Nachi Haguro 5.5-INCH CRUISERS Jintsu

JVaka

DESTROYERS

ALLIED

(Rear-Adm. K. W. F. M. Doorman)

8-INCH CRUISERS Exeter (British)

Houston (U.S.) 6-INCH CRUISERS Perth (Australian)

De Ruyter (Dutch) (flagship) Java (Dutch) DESTROYERS Electra, Encounter; Jupiter (British)

;

Witte de With, Kortenaer (Dutch)

John D. Edwards, Alden, Ford, Paul Jones (U.S.)

(9 destroyers)

At 4.29 p.m. he compromised by making a slight turn to port. The result was that for the next half-hour both fleets steamed almost due west on superior fire-power.

unable to engage Takagi's cruiser force, the Allied 6-inch cruisers opened fire about 4.30 p.m. on a number of Japanese destroyers which ventured close enough to open a torpedo attack at long range. About half an hour later the rest of the Japanese destroyers, led by the light cruiser Jintsu, delivered a further attack with torpedoes, also at long range. The Japanese heavy cruisers also launched a number of torpedoes. With the exception of one which hit and sank the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer, none of the torpedoes found its mark. The Exeter, immediately astern of the flagship De Ruyter and followed by the American heavy cruiser Houston and the rest of the Allied cruiser force, was, however, hit soon after 5 p.m. by an 8-inch shell which severely damaged her. parallel courses. Still

BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA With her speed reduced

215

to fifteen knots, she turned to port

in order to give unobstructed passage to the Houston.

The

was that the captain of the Houston, assuming that the Exeter had responded to an order which had not reached result

him, altered course in order to keep his station astern of her, and was himself followed by the Perth and the Java. Doorman succeeded in re-forming his cruiser line by 5.25 p.m. But he now had only one heavy cruiser to Takagi's two, had lost one of his two Dutch destroyers, and was forced to part with the other in order to help the crippled Exeter back to base. Moreover, he had less than an hour of daylight left in which to defeat or circumvent Takagi and

convoy which was his true objective. At 7.45 p.m., after losing the British destroyer Electra in an encounter with three Japanese destroyers, Doorman abandoned an attempt to work round Takagi's force and

find the

turned southwards, presumably in the belief that his only remaining hope of catching the transports before disembarkation began lay in interposing himself between the

enemy and

He had

American destroyers to Sourabaya to refuel and replenish, and was steaming westwards about four miles from the coast, when the British destroyer Jupiter suddenly blew up, possibly as the result of contact with a stray mine. As his only remaining destroyer, the British Encounter, was soon engaged in rescuing survivors from the Kortenaer who were found still the coast.

sent his four

clinging to their rafts, the fighting strength of the Striking Force

and three

was reduced by the

late

Combined

evening to one heavy

light cruisers.

In the meantime Doorman, apparently deciding that he must make one more attempt to find the convoy before resigning himself to a waiting role,

had

altered course again.

For more than an hour he held almost due north, possibly in the belief that Takagi's cruiser force, unseen since the late

away and

would be able to slip past it while its aircraft were immobilized by darkness. In point of fact, the heavy cruisers Nach i and Haguro were fast closing with him in bright moonlight. At 10.30 p.m. they came in sight about eight miles away on his port beam, and afternoon, was far

that he

216

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

on both sides opened fire. The two Dutch cruisers by torpedoes within the first few minutes. By 10.50 p.m. both had sunk, the gallant but consistently unlucky Admiral Doorman had gone down with his flagship, and the Battle of the Java Sea was over. The Houston and the Perth escaped, but both were sunk twelve hours later in a desperate fight with cruisers and destroyers coverall

ships

were

hit

ing landings west of Batavia. In the early hours of March

man had failed to

1

the convoy which Door-

find cast anchor off the north coast about

a hundred miles north-west of Sourabaya. Disembarkation began almost at once. The Dutch offered no opposition on the beaches, but Allied aircraft attacked the transports and damaged two of them. Only lightly opposed by the Dutch forces in East Java, the Japanese pressed rapidly inland and along the coast road towards Sourabaya. Late on March 7 forward troops of the Japanese 48th Division reached the outskirts of the town, while the 56th Regimental Group, striking diagonally across the island, made its way to Tjilatap, the chief port on the south coast. On the Japanese right, the large convoy carrying troops to West Java split in two on reaching the Java Sea. Early on March 1 the Japanese 230th Infantry Regiment began to disembark at Eretenwetan, about ninety miles east of Batavia, and the Japanese 2nd Division at Bantam Bay and Merak in the north-west corner of the island. At Eretenwetan the Dutch again offered no opposition on the beaches, but Hurricane fighters damaged at least six landing craft. The 230th Infantry Regiment then sent a column along the road towards Batavia, and a second column southwards in the direction of Soebang and Bandoeng. The first column was delayed by Hurricanes of No. 232 Squadron and broken bridges the second reached Soebang within the first few hours, and a counter-attack by the Dutch on the following day was unsuccessful. On March 7 forward troops of the 230th Infantry Regiment entered Lembang, only seven miles from the seat of government at Bandoeng. In the extreme west the 2nd Division met some opposition from Dutch troops on the beaches and in prepared ;

MAP

15

West Java

Java S £ & Bantam,

Indian, ce

aw

Japanese thrusts: -

2nd

Division

230 th.

Inf.

Reg t. 20

W/a Bandoeng

'Black force'

Main

1

Miles objective

40 I

I

bO I

218

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

but soon captured the road junction at Serang, about twelve miles south of Bantam Bay. One column then made for Batavia by the shortest route. A second column, afterwards reinforced at the expense of the first, pushed southwards with the intention of reaching Bandoeng by way of Buitenzorg, but on March 2 was halted at Leuwiliang, about ten miles west of Buitenzorg, by a mobile striking force under an Australian officer, Brigadier A. S. Blackburn, V.C. This force, known as Blackforce from the name of its commander, consisted of two Australian infantry battalions, an improvised Australian composite battalion, a British cavalry squadron, an American field artillery regiment and positions,

some Australian and

British engineer

and

signal units.

On March

4 General ter Poorten decided to withdraw his forces from Batavia and Buitenzorg and concentrate them at Bandoeng under cover of a rearguard action by Blackforce. Blackburn's hastily assembled force, although strongly attacked, succeeded in keeping the enemy from the crucial road junction at Buitenzorg until the withdrawal was completed, and on March 6 fell back to Bandoeng after delaying the advance of the main body of the Japanese 2nd Division for four days at the cost of 150 casualties. 14 At a conference on March 5 General ter Poorten told Major-General H. D. W. Sitwell, commanding the British forces in Java, that Bandoeng could not hold out for long, but that his troops would continue to fight under the direction of local commanders who had been warned that orders to surrender should be disregarded. 15 At 9 a.m. on March 8, however, he issued a proclamation to the effect that organized resistance by Dutch forces in Java was about to cease. That afternoon he and the Governor-General met the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Sixteenth Army and agreed to the capitulation of all forces in the Netherlands East Indies. When the text of the proclamation was communicated to the British about an hour after it was made, General ter Poorten's staff added that the Commander-in-Chief expected all Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies to lay down their arms. 16 General Sitwell discussed with Air Vice-

FALL OF JAVA,

MARCH

Marshal Maltby and others the case

8,

1942

219

on

in spite

for fighting

of the Dutch surrender, but came to the conclusion that, in view of the proclamation and General ter Poorten's message, the effect of doing so might be to put the troops under his command outside the provisions of the international conventions governing the treatment of prisoners of war. 17 As this might mean that any Allied soldier captured by the

Japanese thereafter would be liable to summary execution, orders were issued at 2.30 p.m. to all British, Australian and American units in Java to cease fire. A formal instrument of surrender was signed at Bandoeng on March 12, and on the same day troops of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division landed without opposition in northern Sumatra.

With the capture of the Netherlands East Indies, rich in oil and other raw materials, the Japanese attained their main strategic aim. In order to establish their defensive perimeter they had, however, to set up a chain of advanced bases between the eastern extremity of the Netherlands

East Indies and the Gilbert Islands.

conquer Burma, a country about the Belgium put together.

The conquest of Burma

as far west

They had size

also to

of France and

and north

as

Rangoon

was assigned to the Japanese Fifteenth Army, comprising the 33rd and 55th Divisions less one infantry regiment. On

Army, temporarily by the Imperial Guards Division, was to occupy far south as Nakhorn, on the isthmus of Kra, and

the outbreak of assisted

Siam

as

war the

Fifteenth

seize British airfields in southern

Burma

as bases for air

on Rangoon. With the aid of the Siamese rail and 55th Divisions were then to concentrate at Raheng, between the Bangkok-Chiengmai railway and the Burmese frontier, and prepare to advance on Rangoon by way of Moulmein as soon as the campaign in Malaya was known to be going well. As there was no road from Raheng to Moulmein, the initial advance would be made along jungle tracks improved as far as the frontier by Japanese engineers and Siamese labour. On the outbreak of war Burma was almost defenceless. attacks

system, the 33rd

W.F.E.

—8*

•LhasaV Chungking

TIBET

^r'^

V

Bay of

Bengal

Japanese thrusts,

E=*> Dec 1941 to

O

19 Jan 1942

Concentration area for

33 and 55

Divs.,

Jan 1942

mm^ _

Japanese thrusts, ^Jan 20- March 8, 1942

—

h

i-

Siamese rail system

Burmese road system and 'Burma Road

MAP

)6

Burma Miles

BURMA: DECEMBER

1941

221

Lieutenant-General D. K. McLeod, commanding the land had at his disposal only the 1st Burma Division (Major-General J. Bruce Scott), supplemented by the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. K.Jones), which was

forces,

just arriving.

The

1st

Burma

Division consisted of the 1st

and 2nd Burma Brigades and the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade. None of these three brigades had had any collective training, and the division was short of artillery, engineers and transport as well as medical and signal units. 18

Burma was also extremely short of aircraft. operational squadron of the Royal Air Force in

The only Burma on

war was No. 67 Squadron, with sixteen The country was, however, well provided and Rangoon was covered by a good earlywith airfields, warning system based on radar. Moreover, three fighter squadrons of the American Volunteer Group, formed to the outbreak of

Buffalo fighters. 19

Chiang Kai-shek at a time when the United neutral, had been assigned to the defence of the Burma Road. Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing that the Burma Road would become useless to him if Rangoon and its communications with the terminus of the Burma Road at Lashio were lost, agreed that one of these squadrons should serve in Burma. It was sent to an airfield near Rangoon, where it proved extremely valuable. The other two American fighter squadrons were based in the early stages of the war at Kunming, in the Chinese province of Yunnan. Chiang Kai-shek also agreed that the Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies (each equivalent to about one British division) should serve in Burma, but only on condition that Chinese troops were given a definite area or line of communications to guard and were not mixed with Burmese troops or put in reserve behind such troops. 20 The British did not give aid to States

was

still

understand this proviso to mean that all formations of both Chinese armies must be allowed to enter Burma simultaneously. Nevertheless, their proposal that formations should come forward as and when they were needed was regarded by the Chinese as tantamount to a refusal of Chiang's offer. This misunderstanding took some time to

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

222

clear up, and thereafter relations between the Chunking government and the Western Allies were never very satisfactory.

McLeod

General

recognized that limitations of supply

would prevent the Japanese from maintaining more than about two divisions in Burma unless and until they took Rangoon. 21 He thought that a thrust from Raheng towards Moulmein and Rangoon was highly probable, but that an invasion of the Shan States would be even more dangerous, as access to lateral roads leading to Toungoo and Meiktila could be gained from the Bangkok-Chiengmai railway along tracks on which the Japanese would probably be able to use wheeled vehicles. With Brooke-Popham's approval, he therefore deployed his meagre forces on a wide front, primarily for the purpose of preventing the enemy from entering central Burma by crossing the Salween. 22 Four days after the outbreak of war the Chiefs of Staff transferred control of the forces in Burma from the Far East

Command

to the India Command. General Wavell, as Commander-in-Chief, India, then became responsible for the defence of Burma, and was promised substantial reinforcements. As far-reaching administrative changes would be needed to maintain an expanded force, Wavell replaced

McLeod

as

commander

of the land forces by Lieutenant-

General T. J. Hutton, who had shown his ability as an administrator while serving as Chief of Staff in India. Air Vice-Marshal D. F. Stevenson, formerly Director of Home Operations at the Air Ministry, was appointed on January 1,

1942,

to

command

amounted on that date

the air force in Burma, which to

some

thirty aircraft. 23

The only

naval forces available consisted of five motor launches and a few auxiliary vessels under Commander K. S. Lyle, R.N. Meanwhile the Japanese Fifteenth Army had gained complete control of Siam, with its airfields and railways, and on December 11 had seized the British airfield at Victoria Point, in the extreme south of Burma. Rangoon was repeatedly attacked by Japanese aircraft from December 23, but the one American and one British fighter squadron in the neighbourhood put up such an effective

JANUARY

1942

223

defence that towards the end of January LieutenantGeneral H. Obata, commanding the Japanese 5th Air Division, decided to use his bombers only at night. The American volunteer pilots, flying Tomahawk (P 40) fighters, were particularly successful. The attacks had, however, the effect of making labour hard to find and at the same time saddling the civil and military authorities with the care of hordes of refugees. Many Burmese inhabitants of the city sought refuge in the jungle, where they had no means of subsistence, and large numbers of Indian dock workers took to the roads and tracks in the hope of finding their

way back

to India.

Early in January Major-General J. G. Smyth, V.G., commanding the 1 7th Indian Division, arrived at Rangoon with his headquarters staff. Hutton, knowing that the Japanese were concentrating at Raheng and were likely to cross the frontier in the near future, ordered Smyth to defend a front of some four hundred miles from Mergui to Papun with a force made up of one of his own brigades which arrived from India on January 16 without its transport, and two brigades already in Burma. About the same time, Hutton decided to move large quantities of military stores from Rangoon to depots in the neighbourhood of Meiktila, Mandalay and Myingyan. Besides making his stocks less vulnerable to air attacks, this precaution would, he hoped, enable him to fight a battle for Central Burma even if Rangoon were lost. Moreover, if the track running north-westwards from the Mandalay area through Kalewa could be made suitable for heavy traffic as far north as the Kabaw Valley and be linked with a road through Imphal which the Indian authorities were building, a day would come when the depots could be steadily replenished from India. On January 19, while Smyth was still assembling his forces, a battalion of the Japanese 55th Division which had crossed the frontier on January 15 reached Tavoy and overwhelmed the inexperienced troops assigned to the defence of the town and airfield. As this made the airfield further south at Mergui untenable, the garrison was withdrawn by

MAP 17 British position,

dawn Jan. 3o

Japanese attacks Final perimeter

High ground

Moulmeirv

MOULMEIN: JANUARY sea.

With Victoria Point and Tavoy already

1942

225

in their hands,

the Japanese thus gained possession of all three of the airfields developed by the British in the extreme south of

Burma. In the meantime Smyth had come to the conclusion that he could best defend Rangoon and prepare for a counterstroke by concentrating his division near the estuary of the Sittang. 24 Of his three brigades, the 46th Indian Infantry Brigade was already in that neighbourhood, and the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade had withdrawn, with Hutton's approval, from the frontier area, but had lost its transport as the result of an accident to a ferry. Smyth asked permission to pull back the inexperienced 2nd Burma Brigade from an intermediate position at Moulmein, but was overruled. Hutton, aware of the need to buy time for the arrival of reinforcements, insisted that Moulmein should be held for as long as possible. 25 Wavell, who had left India to take up his new post in Java but flew to Burma on the night of January 24, agreed with Hutton. 26 Moulmein stands on a narrow tongue of land in the estuary of the Salween. The garrison would therefore have been in a strong position had their side controlled the seaward approaches to the estuary. Without command of the sea and air, they were in a weak one. Early on January 30 the Japanese 55th Division launched attacks from the south and east. The 2nd Burma Brigade successfully defended their positions in the south, but in the east were gradually pushed back to a line about a mile and a quarter from the waterfront. During the afternoon Smyth reported to Hutton that the outlook was unpromising, that the choice lay between reinforcement and withdrawal, and that reinforcement at the eleventh hour seemed unlikely to succeed. 27 Hutton agreed. About midnight, after parties ofJapanese had begun to land in and near the builtup area in the north, Smyth told Brigadier R. G. Ekin of the 46th Brigade, who had arrived to take charge of the situation at Moulmein in co-operation with Brigadier S. J. H. Bourke of the 2nd Burma Brigade, that he could withdraw at his discretion, Ekin then ordered about fifteen river-

226

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

steamers earmarked for the purpose to put in to the jetties on the western waterfront. The withdrawal in daylight on January 3 1 was outstandingly successful, although only the failure of the Japanese to make the best use of their air superiority averted a disaster. The loss of Moulmein did not mean that Smyth was free to fall back to the area in which he had proposed a week earlier that he should concentrate his force. Hutton, still anxious to gain time, was determined that the enemy should not be allowed to cross the Salween without opposition and that an attempt should be made to hold Martaban, on the estuary opposite Moulmein. Wavell, who paid another flying visit to Burma in the first week of February, again agreed with Hutton. 28 He urged Smyth to keep a tight hold on key positions within an area of some three thousand square miles between the Salween and the Sittang, and spoke hopefully of an attempt to recapture the lost territories in the south. Noticing that the dry ricefields near Rangoon promised to make good tank country, he decided to ask the Chiefs of Staff to divert to Burma the 7th Armoured Brigade, then on its way to Malaya from the

Middle

The

East.

decision to delay the

enemy on

the line of the

Salween meant that nearly a hundred miles of the river, from Martaban to the Siamese frontier, must be watched. At the same time, Smyth could not afford to guard all points at which the enemy might cross, since this would involve a dangerous dispersal of his forces and might well lead to defeat in detail. Accordingly, he disposed his troops in great depth, posted battalions or small detachments at or near a few of the most vulnerable crossings, and relied on patrols to give him timely warning of the enemy's arrival in the rear or on the flanks of his forward troops. He ordered the 2nd Burma Brigade to guard the approaches to the railway bridge at Sittang which was his sole link with Rangoon, and placed strong elements of the 16th and 46th Indian Infantry Brigades well in rear of the Salween line near Bilin and at Thaton. The forward troops on the Salween and at Papun, in the north, were also drawn from

MAP

IS

The Salweerv

Q

British rear positions

and reserve formations Japanese thrusts

±— Mitts

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

228

16th and 46th Brigades. The newly-arrived 48th Indian Infantry Brigade, allotted to Smyth in order to provide him with a divisional reserve, was ordered by Hutton to a position at Kyaikto, roughly half-way between the

Bilin

and

Sittang.

On

February 9 the Japanese Fifteenth Army, acting on from its superior formation, the Southern Area Army, ordered the 33rd and 55th Divisions to drive the enemy from the Salween and the Sittang. After crossing the Sittang the 55th Division was to move on Toungoo, destroying any Chinese forces it might meet, and the 33rd Division to capture Rangoon and then expand northwards in order to pave the way for the capture of Mandalay and the oilproducing regions in the valley of the Irrawaddy. * On the same day the British found that Japanese troops had landed west of Martaban and blocked the road to the north-west. The road was cleared by a counter-attack in the afternoon, but that evening the garrison commander, whose orders to withdraw had failed to get through, decided on his own initiative to pull out. Two days later three battalions of the Japanese 33rd Division crossed the Salween near Pa-an. An Indian battalion west of the river fought fiercely but was heavily outnumbered, and a battalion sent to help it made slow progress and eventually returned to its starting point on the strength of a false report that the enemy had been pushed back. By February 14 the Japanese 214th and 215th Infantry Regiments were across the river and ready to move on Thaton and Ahonwa. Towards nightfall on February 13 Hutton gave Smyth authority to withdraw at his discretion, adding that he still wished to fight as far forward as possible. 29 Twenty-four hours later Smyth, suspecting that the enemy was by-passing his forward positions, exercised his option. On February 15 the 46th Brigade pulled in its scattered units and detachments and completed a difficult retreat without mishap. By the following morning practically the whole of the 1 7th Division, less one battalion in an outpost position covering instructions

* See

Map

16, p. 220,

FEBRUARY

1942

229

Thaton to Bilin, was concentrated between the rivers Bilin and Sittang. In its rear the 2nd Burma Brigade, removed from Smyth's command on February 13, had the task of patrolling the lower reaches of the Sittang and guarding the Sittang bridge. The 17th Division was responsible for preparing the bridge for demolition and the road from

destroying

it if

the need arose.

For the tasks assigned to him by Southern Area Army on February 9 Lieu tenant-General S. Iida, commanding the Japanese Fifteenth Army, had four infantry regiments, each of three battalions, supported by some two to three hundred aircraft of the 5th Air Division based on airfields in southern Burma and Siam. His forward troops were a long way from their railhead, and from the moment when they crossed the frontier until the middle of February, when their line of supply through Raheng became usable by motor transport as far forward as Moulmein, they depended on such supplies as they could carry or obtain locally. For an army of roughly 35,000 men (non-combatants included), Iida had rather fewer than six hundred lorries, about seven hundred troop-carrying vehicles. 30 On February 16 the three brigades of the 17th Indian Division had ten infantry or rifle battalions, mostly under strength and composed largely of men whose training had horses,

and some

fifty

been cut short in consequence of the demands made on the Indian Army by the campaigns in the Middle East. Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson had no more than sixty to seventy aircraft, and these had not only to support the 17th Division but also to defend Rangoon. Dependence on motor transport tied most of Smyth's formations to the roads, but

fit

newly arrived 48th Indian Infantry Brigade was equipped with mixed animal and motor transport and would therefore, it was hoped, be able to move more easily the

across country.

Smyth's task was to delay the enemy's advance in order to gain time for the arrival of the 7th Armoured Brigade, and for the Chinese formations promised by Chiang Kai-shek to complete their concentration in central Burma. Hutton

230

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

knew by February

10 that the 7th Armoured Brigade was expected to reach Rangoon by February 21 and might be ready for action on the Sittang front by February 24. He and Smyth had therefore to weigh carefully the advantages of delaying the enemy against the risk of losing the 1 7th Division by failing to withdraw it before the enemy cut its line of retreat by reaching the crucial Sittang bridge. This

was a railway bridge, but had been decked so that a single line of motor vehicles could pass across it. On Hutton's orders, it was supplemented by a ferry provided with ramps and served by three powered craft. About three hundred local craft bought by the British to prevent the Japanese from using them were assembled at Sittang. The Bilin river is fordable at many points, and any positions held by the British on either bank could be turned by movements along jungle tracks or by landings from the sea. Concluding that a deep defensive system was essential, Smyth disposed the 16th Brigade on the line of the river, with the 48th Brigade in divisional reserve six miles in its rear and the 46th Brigade astride the road and railway about half-way between Bilin and Sittang. On reaching the west bank early on February 16 the left-hand battalion of the 16th Brigade found, however, that leading elements of the Japanese 33rd Division had already crossed the river.

On

same day Hutton visited the 17th Division, reminded Smyth that the Bilin river position was to be held for as long as possible, and added that there must be no the

withdrawal without his permission. 31 During the next three days the Japanese 33rd Division crossed the river in strength, the 55th Division landed from the sea in rear of the 16th Brigade, and Smyth committed practically the whole of the 48th Brigade in the forward area. On February 19 Hutton, satisfied that he had gained the time he needed, told Smyth to draw up a plan of withdrawal and put it into effect when he thought fit to do so. Smyth, whose troops were fighting well, waited until late on February 20 before giving the order to withdraw, and his intention was then unwittingly disclosed to the enemy by at least one unit or formation which repeated the order in

MAP

19

The Bilin River British forward positions, 16 Feb. 1942:

O

#

.V.* :

Battalion

Detachment

Japanese thrusts:

Z$>33rd. Division 5$ th. Division

Yinoti'

Ahonwa

Miles

232

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

clear. Thereupon the commander of the 33rd Division, who had two battalions ready for an enveloping movement on

ordered his forward troops to strike across country to the Sittang bridge and the rest of the division to the British

left,

follow as rapidly as possible.

On February 20 Smyth succeeded in uniting the whole of and divisional troops at Kyaikto after delaying the advance of two Japanese divisions for four days. He then faced the awkward task of moving his force along the fifteen miles of unmetalled road which still separated it from the Sittang bridge, and passing all his vehicles across the bridge in a single line. Smyth understood the importance of getting his division behind the Sittang without delay, and was aware of the risk that his enemy might by-pass Kyaikto and try to cut him off. 32 But he was not prepared to uncover Kyaikto by moving his rearguard to the bridge without knowing whether the enemy was following him along the road, and he felt, too, that an attempt to pass troops and vehicles across the river before he was satisfied that the bridge was adequately guarded and that proper arrangements had been made for traffic control might lead to chaos. 33 He decided to take his divisional troops and the 48th Brigade part of the way to Sittang on February 21, and leave the 16th and 46th Brigades where they were until the head of the column began to cross the bridge on February 22. February 21 was a day of sweltering heat. Vehicles raised dense clouds of dust as they lurched from pothole to pothole and from bomb-crater to bomb-crater. The 1 7th Division was bombed and machine-gunned not only by his three brigades

Japanese aircraft, but also by Allied airmen who were ordered to attack a non-existent column on the KyaiktoKinmun road and were not told that nothing west of that road must be attacked. 34 Vehicles were ditched, troops awaiting their turn to move were killed or wounded, and the state of the road became worse than ever. Soon after the column began to cross the bridge on the following morning, it was held up for more than an hour by a vehicle which ran off the decking. Only divisional

MAP

20

The Sittang Bridge Sittang

Mokpalin

\V/

To Bitin

^

British line of retreat

Approximate line ofJapanese advance British positions late p.m., Feb.

22

48 Bde. (less H. Q. and one Bttn.) and bridgehead troops

CZ> °

-

IS Bde.

+46 Bde. "

Japanese attacks, to noon, Feb. 22

8.

30 a.m.

234

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

headquarters and the headquarters and one battalion of the 48th Brigade were across when, at 8.30 a.m., Japanese troops burst out of the jungle close to the bridgehead. The rest of the 48th Brigade, instead of crossing the river, had to turn and fight. Further east, the enemy reached the road between the 16th and 46th Brigades and attacked the rear of the 46th Brigade while its forward battalion was trying to clear the road.

The

situation late that evening

was that

less

than a third

of the 17th Division had reached the west bank of the Sittang and that heavy fighting was in progress near the bridge on the east bank. The ferry had become unusable. Brigadier N. Hugh-Jones of the 48th Brigade, who had moved to the west bank with his headquarters in the morning, was responsible for destroying the bridge when the division was across. On consulting the engineers who were laying explosive charges he learned that shortage of cable had forced them to put the firing point for the demolition in a position which made it impossible for them to guarantee that the bridge could be blown under observed fire. He knew that the greater part of the division, including two of his own battalions, would be cut off if he destroyed the bridge that night. Yet he feared that, if he failed to destroy it, the enemy might capture it and reach Rangoon almost unopposed. He gathered from stragglers who found their way across the river after sunset that in any case most units on the east

bank had practically no chance of survival. About 4.30 a.m. on February 23 one of his staff officers managed to speak to divisional headquarters on a very bad telephone line. The officer was asked whether "Jonah" (meaning Brigadier J. K. Jones of the 16th Brigade) was on the west bank. Perhaps confusing Jones with HughJones, he said that Jonah was. Thinking when the conversation was reported to him that this meant that two-thirds of the division had crossed, Smyth authorized Hugh-Jones to destroy the bridge at his discretion. 35

Hugh-Jones gave the order about an hour later. The bridge went up with a sound so awe-inspiring that for some minutes both sides stopped firing.

THE SITTANG BRIDGE DISASTER The

troops cut off on the east

bank

235

successfully defended

when a general withdrawal to edge was ordered. The Japanese made little

their positions until 2 p.m.,

the water's

attempt to follow up. Large numbers of men crossed the on improvised rafts or by swimming, some making repeated crossings to help weak swimmers. Others crossed by a lifeline slung across the gap in the bridge or took to the jungle and found crossings higher up the river. But the combined strength of the three infantry brigades of the 17th Division on February 24 was only 3,484 of all ranks out of an authorized establishment of about 8,500. 36 With most of its transport and some of its guns lost, the division had ceased, for the time being, to be an effective fighting river

formation.

Meanwhile uninformed criticism from the rear had led the British government to contemplate a change of command in Burma. WavelPs confidence, too, was shaken when Hutton warned him on February 20 that Rangoon might have to be abandoned if resistance on the Sittang should collapse. 37 The result was that on March 5 General the Hon. Sir Harold Alexander arrived from the United Kingdom to relieve Hutton, who became Alexander's Chief of Staff. As the outcome of repeated requests from Hutton for a corps headquarters to take charge of his formations in the Lieutenant-General W.J. Slim arrived on March 19 to command Burcorps. This comprised the 1st Burma Division, the reorganized 17th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Brigade. In northern and central Burma as far south as Toungoo there were two Chinese armies, each equivalent to a British division in rifle strength, but with practically no supporting arms or ancillary units and no means of maintaining themselves except by drawing supplies from the British or living on the country. third Chinese army arrived in April. The Japanese, extended by their advance to the Sittang, waited until March 3 before crossing the river in strength. Meanwhile the Australian government refused, on the day of the Sittang disaster, to divert to Rangoon the 7th Australian Division, whose arrival would in any case have field,

A

236

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

awkward problems of supply. On day in Burma Alexander disclaimed any intention of abandoning Rangoon without a struggle, but late on March 6 he came to the conclusion that the right course was to complete the programme of evacuation and demolition begun by Hutton and withdraw his forces to the Irrawaddy

confronted Hutton with his first

valley. 38

By that date more than half the native population of Rangoon had left the city, and many members of the civil administration and other Europeans had withdrawn in accordance with Hutton's scheme. Late on March 7 and early on March 8, after the last train had left for the north, launches carried the remaining officials and demolition parties to ships waiting to take them to Calcutta. Meanwhile the Japanese 33rd Division, under Lieutenant-General S. Sakurai, was sweeping round the northern outskirts of Rangoon so as to make its final approach from the north-west. At the suggestion of one of his regimental commanders, Sakurai cleared his troops from the road to Prome in the hope of concealing his intention from the British. This enabled Alexander to retreat northwards without disaster, and at midday on February 8 the 215th Infantry Regiment of the 33rd Division entered the city to find that the British had gone. With Rangoon in their hands, the Japanese were no longer prevented by difficulties of supply from maintaining in Burma enough troops to occupy the whole country. In March and April the 18th and 56th Divisions joined the Fifteenth Army, the 33rd Division was reinforced by the 213th Infantry Regiment from Siam, and the arrival of two additional air brigades brought the strength of the 5th Air Division to well over four hundred aircraft. Pushed back by greatly superior forces, Alexander had soon to decide whether to retreat to China by the Burma Road, or make for India along the tracks and waterways leading northwestwards from Mandalay. Wavell, who had returned to his old post of Commander-in-Chief in India on the dissolution of the Abda Command, stressed the importance of not losing touch with the Chinese, However, on April 21

MAP

21

The Allied Retreat from

.>

Chinese 22nd, 3$ th.

Burma

and 9 6 th. Divisions

Other Chinese formations

=

Roads

-

Tracks

-

238

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

Chiang Kai-shek's chief liaison officer in Burma agreed with Alexander that Burcorps could do more for the Allied cause by going to India than by locking itself up in China, where it could not be re-equipped or even adequately fed. 39 Alexander then gave orders for a general withdrawal northwestwards across the Irrawaddy, but told Slim not to uncover the line of retreat of the Chinese formations still in Burma until their rearguard reached a point on the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway some thirty miles north of Mandalay. 40 Alexander's British, Indian and Burmese forces, accompanied by thousands of refugees whom he was determined not to abandon, went on to complete the longest retreat in British military history. Closely followed by the Japanese, who reached Shwegyin on May 10 and attacked troops of the 16th Indian Brigade waiting to embark on river steamers for Kalewa, the main body crossed the frontier into India just before the first heavy rains of the monsoon season threatened to make the tracks impassable. The rearguard reached Tamu on May 19. Of three Chinese divisions which were unable to escape before the Japanese cut them off by seizing Myitkyina, two made their way by difficult routes to India. The third succeeded in by-passing the enemy and marched to China from Fort Hertz across the foothills of the Himalayas. The fifty-eight-year-old General Stilwell, also cut off by the Japanese advance to Myitkyina, escaped to India by walking through wild country from Pinbon to Maingkaing, where he and his companions embarked on a raft which carried them to Homalin. On May 20 Alexander, his task completed, relinquished his command. The forces withdrawn from Burma then came under the India Command. Since December the Burma Army had suffered about 13,000 casualties to British, Indian and Burmese troops. Of these men about 4,000 were known to have been killed or wounded and about 9,000 were missing. The Japanese Fifteenth Army's losses were roughly 5,000 killed or wounded. The Allies lost 116 aircraft, of which 65 were destroyed in combat, theJapanese 117 aircraft of which 60 were destroyed in combat. 41

THE INDIAN OCEAN

239

During the last stage of the withdrawal the British were abandon all their vehicles except fifty lorries and thirty jeeps, but they succeeded in saving more than half

forced to

their guns.

Meanwhile the Japanese had decided to send powerful naval forces into the Indian Ocean for the dual purpose of securing their supply routes to Rangoon and convincing the inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent that Japan was invincible.

On March

28 Admiral Nagumo's Striking Force

left

Celebes with orders to attack the known bases of the British Eastern Fleet at Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon. Admiral Sir James Somerville had just arrived to take command of the Eastern Fleet, and had at his disposal the battleship Warspite, two large fleet carriers, the old, slow battleships Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign and Revenge, the small carrier Hermes, seven cruisers and some sixteen destroyers. He received good warning of Nagumo's intention, but was led to expect that the enemy would arrive on or about April 1. The result was that, when Nagumo approached Colombo on April 4, Somerville had broken off the search for him and was 600 miles away at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands, where a new base for the Eastern Fleet was being developed without the knowledge of the Japanese. Somerville then made repeated attempts to place himself in a position which would enable him to attack Nagumo at night and keep out of his way by day. No contact was made between the main body of his fleet and the Striking Force, and at dusk on April 9 Nagumo withdrew after damaging shore installations at Colombo and Trincomalee, sinking one small aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers, vessels,

two destroyers, one corvette and six merchant and destroying thirty-nine British aircraft for the

of only a few of his own aircraft. Somerville, concluding after Nagumo's attack on Colombo that his slower ships were more of a liability than an asset, sent them to Kilindini in Kenya, but kept his faster ships in Indian waters. 42 loss

As an accompaniment

to

Nagumo's

expedition, Vice-

240

JAPAN COMPLETES HER PROGRAMME

Admiral Ozawa, now commanding the Western Division of Vice-Admiral N. Kondo's Southern Force, swept into the Indian Ocean with one light carrier, six cruisers and about ten destroyers. Before turning back for Singapore on April 7 he sank about 90,000 tons of merchant shipping off the coast of Madras and dropped bombs at two points on land. Japanese submarines sank a further 32,000 tons off the west coast. The British, who had long feared that the Japanese might establish a naval base at Diego Suarez in Madagascar, seized the port from the French in early May, and later in the year took control of the whole island. After the fall of Rangoon they attempted no defence of the Andaman or Nicobar Islands, which were duly occupied by the Japanese.

On

the ocean flank in the Pacific, the Japanese followed their drive to the Gilbert Islands at the outset of the war by sending aircraft from Truk, in the Caroline Islands, to

bomb

objectives in the Bismarck Archipelago.

On January

23 a detachment of Vice- Admiral S. Inouye's South Seas Force, supported by carriers of Nagumo's Striking Force, seized Rabaul in New Britain from the small Australian garrison. Kavieng in New Ireland fell to Inouye's forces on the following day, Gasmata on the south coast of New Britain just over a fortnight later. All three places were then developed as advanced bases for the invasion of New Guinea. A month later forces from Gasmata began the assault on New Guinea by seizing Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen. While preparing for an attack on Port Moresby in southern Papua, which Imperial General Headquarters had decided in January to include in their defensive perimeter, Inouye turned eastwards to the Solomons. During the second half of March naval landing parties went ashore near the northern extremity of the large island of Bougainville and on the smaller islands of Buka and Shortland, primarily for the purpose of occupying sites for airstrips which would serve as forward bases for a further advance. The Japanese service chiefs were debating their next move when they received the disconcerting news that American bombs had fallen

on Tokyo.

BOOK

IV

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE,

W.F.E.

9

1

942- 1 945

12

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

THE early months INwar, while the

of the Far Eastern

British Chiefs of Staff

were

scraping the bottom of the barrel to find reinforcements for Malaya, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies, their American and Commonwealth colleagues were taking steps to prevent the Japanese from severing communications between the United States and the Antipodes. In January the Australians raised the garrison of Port Moresby to a brigade, the New Zealanders that of Fiji to two brigades. In the same month the Americans found garrisons for a number of islands chosen as staging posts on the air route to Australia, provided a fighter squadron for Fiji, and sent the 7th Marine Regiment to Samoa. They also despatched a force of about 17,000 men by way of Australia to New Caledonia, where an Allied base was established at Noumea with the consent of the Free French authorities who had assumed control. In the course of the next few months work was begun on an Allied naval and air base at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, and the United States 37th Division joined the New Zealanders in Fiji. Meanwhile an American advanced base was established at Darwin, and American units were added to the Australian garrison there. On February 22 General Mac Arthur assumed command of all United States forces in Australia. He was told that the United States 41st Division would start leaving San Francisco for Brisbane about the middle of March and that the 32nd Division would follow later in the year.

At a time when the Western Allies were extremely short of shipping, the movement of large numbers of American troops over such vast distances not only put a tremendous 246

MAP

23

The Antipodes

•

Tarawa

Makin

•

e/LBERT

Equator

Nauru ~

tort/7

Kavten g

^

'

t

/.

y

BOUGAINVILLE

V_

Gasmsta*

wmm mmm Japanese perimeter

SOLOMON

'Shortland I.

(as originally planned)

ISLANDS

Rabaul

Japanese bases

SAN CRISTOBAL

Coral ESPIRlTU At

Sea,

#l

SANTO

HEBRIDES

F/y/

H

CALEDONIA,

Pacific Brisbane

Ocean-

Sydney

Ta s maw S 500 ^Hiles

Auckland

NEW eo,

ZEALAND Wellington

/5.

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

248 strain

on their resources but ruled out any hope of a major on Continental Europe in 1942. These disadvantages

assault

had, however, to be accepted. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognized that the despatch of many more American troops to the Antipodes than to the United Kingdom during the early part of 1942 seemed hard to reconcile with the Anglo-American decision to give priority to the defeat of Germany. But the situation in the Far East must, they felt, be stabilized before a new front could be opened in Continental Europe or north-west Africa. 1 The dissolution of the Abda Command and Mac Arthur's appointment to a new post led to a reorganization of the chain of command. At the beginning of April the Western Allies agreed that the British should remain responsible for the defence of India and for operations in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, and that the United States should assume responsibility for the whole of the Pacific. The Pacific was then divided into a South-East Pacific Area, covering the approaches to the Panama Canal and the west coast of South America; a South- West Pacific Area which included the Philippines, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Australia and most of Indonesia and a Pacific Ocean Area extending from the Aleutians in the north to New Zealand in the south. General MacArthur assumed command of all land and army air forces, and control of such naval forces as might be assigned to him, in the South- West Pacific Area; Admiral Nimitz command of all Allied forces in the Pacific Ocean Area except those engaged in the land defence of New Zealand. The Pacific Ocean Area was in turn divided into three sub-areas covering respectively its northern, southern and central portions. Nimitz retained direct control of his forces in the Central Pacific; in the South Pacific control was delegated to Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, U.S.N. For the time being no separate commander was appointed for the North Pacific Sub-Area. native of Texas and grandson of a master mariner, Nimitz had once specialized in submarines but in recent years had served in a variety of surface ships and had also ;

A

1000

MAP 24

2000

Miles

The Pacific Theatre

6C°N

ussn MONGOL) A

\\

CH INA %

TIBET 7

20°S

BRITISH

AREA 40°S

WO°E 160°B

Area

—

boundaries, August

and April,

Sub -area boundaries (names

1942

in brackets)

250

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

held a number of staff appointments. He combined a good all-round experience with a rather exceptional freedom from the tendency of many of his contemporaries to think of naval power almost exclusively in terms of battleships.

Ghormley was an able, hard-working officer who had made mark as the navy's representative at highly secret

his

59

"exploratory conversations with the British in 1940. Nimitz knew when he took up his appointment that, until a new battlefleet could be assembled, he would have to depend on the carrier force for most of his striking power. In addition to the three carriers which had escaped the holocaust at Pearl Harbor he was given the Torktown from the Atlantic Fleet, but he lost the Saratoga on January 11, when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine and had to go to the United States for repairs. Nimitz opened a limited offensive on February 1, when a force built round the Enterprise bombed and bombarded Japanese bases at Kwajalein and elsewhere in the Marshall Islands. On the same day a force centred on the Torktown tackled bases in the Gilbert Islands. A projected attack on Rabaul some three weeks later was called off after a stiff fight between the Lexington's fighters and Japanese landbased bombers, but aircraft from the Enterprise attacked Wake on February 25 and Marcus Island on March 4. On March 10 more than a hundred aircraft, carried by the Lexington and the Torktown to a launching point south of New Guinea, flew over the Stanley Owen Mountains to attack Japanese shipping at Lae and Salamaua. All but one of them returned safely after sinking a large minesweeper, a 6,000-ton merchant vessel and a converted cruiser. 2 Rear- Admiral J. G. Crace, R.N., commanding a predominantly Australian cruiser squadron, made a supporting sweep with four cruisers and four destroyers. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that something more than these outpost raids was needed to bring the war home to the enemy. With active encouragement from the President, they planned a surprise attack on Tokyo. As their carrier-borne aircraft had too short a range to be launched from a point outside the area constantly

THE TOKYO RAID: APRIL

1942

251

by the enemy's light naval craft and within easy reach of his land-based aircraft, sixteen B 25 bombers of the United States Army Air Corps under LieutenantColonel James H. Doolittle were embarked on April 1 in the newly commissioned Hornet. Since this meant that the Hornefs own aircraft had to be stowed below and could not protect her, she and her escort of two cruisers and four destroyers, which left San Francisco on April 2, were joined between Midway Island and the western Aleutians by the Enterprise and a number of additional cruisers and destroyers. The plan was that the whole force, under the command of Vice- Admiral W. F. Halsey, should move by April 17 to a point about a thousand miles from Tokyo, where the destroyers were to be left behind. The carriers and cruisers, after refuelling at sea, were then to steam at high speed to a launching point within five hundred miles of the Japanese coast. The bombers were to take off during the afternoon of April 18, attack Tokyo and drop a few incendiary bombs elsewhere in Japan under cover of darkness, and land in daylight on the following morning at Chuchow in the Chinese province of Chekiang. Colonel Doolittle was to fly well ahead of the rest of the squadron and mark the main target with incendiaries. Chiang Kaishek was not told that a raid on Tokyo was in prospect, but merely that he could expect a number of army bombers to arrive in China. 3 As things turned out, Halsey was still about 650 miles from the coast of Japan when, early on the appointed day, the approach of Japanese picket boats warned him that patrolled

surprise

had been

lost.

After

consulting

Doolittle,

he

decided to launch the bombers without delay at the cost of switching from a night attack to a daylight one. All sixteen aircraft took off in a strong wind between 7.25 and 8.25 a.m. on April 18 and reached their objectives soon after midday. In accordance with their orders, thirteen crews bombed Tokyo while the remaining three sought targets at Osaka, Kobe and Nagoya. Bad weather had prevented the Chinese from completing their preparations at Chuchow, and in any case the alteration of the time-table gave the

w.f.e.

—9*

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

252

American airmen

One

there.

chance of making safe landings landed at Vladivostok, where the

little

aircraft

Russians promptly seized it and interned its crew. Four made crash landings, and the crews of the remaining eleven baled out in rain and darkness after they had used up all their fuel. Nevertheless only eight of the eighty men who took part in the raid lost their lives. Five of these were killed when baling out, two were executed by the Japanese and one died in a Japanese prison. Most of the survivors owed their escape to Chinese peasants who befriended them with a touching disregard for their own safety.

The Tokyo

raid caught the Japanese service chiefs in

two

minds. Elated by success, they wished to extend their conquests in the South Seas for the dual purpose of adding to their sources of raw materials and cutting communications

between the United States and Australia and

New

Zealand. But they were not sure that they could afford to do so without first destroying the remnant of the United States Pacific Fleet. 4 As preparations were already being made for landings at Port Moresby in Papua and on the small island of Tulagi in the central Solomons, they decided to carry on with this part of their programme, but not to go further until they had done their best to bring about a decisive naval action. An expedition to Midway Island would, they thought, compel Nimitz to commit his fleet in order to avert a potential threat to Oahu, and this would give them a good chance of destroying it. If all went well, landings on Nauru and Ocean Island, and eventually in New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, would follow in due course.

For the capture of Tulagi and Port Moresby the Japanese proposed to use a substantial body of troops and a naval landing party, carried in twelve transports screened by eight destroyers, all under the command of Rear- Admiral Aritomo Goto. One transport was to disembark a small force at Tulagi for the purpose of establishing a seaplane base for immediate use. The remaining eleven, with six of the destroyers, would constitute the Port Moresby Invasion Force under Rear-Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka. Support

APRIL-MAY

1942

253

would be provided by two light cruisers, a seaplane carrier and three gunboats under Rear-Admiral Kuninori Marushige; cover by three heavy cruisers, the light carrier Shoho and a destroyer under Goto's direct command. The whole force was to approach Port Moresby from Rabaul and the northern Solomons by way of the Jomard Passage, off the south-eastern extremity of New Guinea. The Western Allies would, it was thought, send a cruiser force augmented by one carrier into the Coral Sea to intercept the Port Moresby Invasion Force, and would also make use of some two hundred bombers based on airfields in Australia. Accordingly, the High Command detached the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku from Nagumo's Striking Force and placed them, with two heavy cruisers and six destroyers,

TABLE

5

The Battle of the Coral Sea Organization of Japanese Naval Forces

TASK FORCE

MO

(Vice-Adm. S. Inouye) carrier striking forge (Vice-Adm. T. Takagi) Zuikaku Shokaku

Two

heavy cruisers

Six destroyers

One

oiler

invasion forces (Rear-Adm. A. Goto) tulagi invasion force (Rear-Adm. K. Shima)

One

transport

Two

destroyers

Nine miscellaneous vessels port Moresby invasion force (Rear-Adm. Eleven transports Six destroyers

Nine miscellaneous vessels support force (Rear-Adm. K. Marushige)

Two

light cruisers

One

seaplane carrier Three gunboats

covering force (Rear-Adm. A. Goto) Shoho

Four heavy

One

cruisers

destroyer

S.

Kajioka)

MAY

1942

255

command of Vice- Admiral Takagi for the purpose of countering this double threat. Takagi was to skirt the Solomon Islands on the east, come up with the Allied cruiser and carrier force after it had passed into the Coral under the

and go on to strike at Allied airfields in Australia. As things turned out, a fortnight's warning from his intelligence sources that a large Japanese convoy was Sea,

Coral Sea in the first few days of May enabled Admiral Nimitz to assemble a larger carrier and cruiser force than the Japanese expected. Nimitz arranged that Rear- Admiral F. J. Fletcher, commanding a force built round the Torktown and based on Noumea, should be joined on May 1 at a point west of the New Hebrides by Rear- Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch with the Lexington and four destroyers from Pearl Harbor. In addition, General MacArthur contributed Admiral Leary's Australian cruiser squadron under Admiral Crace. Fletcher, who was ordered to assume command of the whole force, thus began with two large carriers and eight cruisers against Takagi's two large carriers and two cruisers, though he had also to deal with the one light carrier and six cruisers of the Japanese support and covering forces. Each side started with about a likely to enter the

hundred and

forty carrier-borne aircraft. *

On the other hand, Fletcher received less help from landbased aircraft than the Japanese expected. The Allies had about fifty fighters at Port Moresby, another fifty fighters and nearly two hundred bombers at bases in Queensland, and about a hundred and ninety fighters at Darwin and Sydney. 5 But only a small proportion were free to co-operate with Fletcher, since most of them were needed for tasks of more immediate concern to General MacArthur and his air commander, who controlled them. The Japanese, with roughly a hundred and sixty land-based aircraft at forward bases or ready to move from Truk, were better off in this respect, since all their naval and air forces were under one commander. This was Vice-Admiral Inouye, who took The Torktown carried 71 aircraft, the Lexington 70, the Shokaku 62 and the Zuikaku 63. The Shoho carried 21.

*

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

256

TABLE 6 The Battle of the Coral Sea Organization of Allied Naval Forces

TASK FORCE

(Rear-Adm.

17

F. J. Fletcher)

carrier group tg 17.5 (Rear-Adm. A.

W.

Fitch)

Torktown Lexington

Four destroyers attack group tg

17.2

(Rear-Adm. T. C. Kinkaid)

Five cruisers Five destroyers

support group tg 17.3 (Rear-Adm. Three cruisers

Two

G. Crace, R.N.)

destroyers

fuelling group tg 17.6 (Capt.

Two Two

J.

J. S. Phillips)

oilers

destroyers

search group tg 17.9 (Cmdr. G. H. DeBaun)

One

seaplane tender

charge of the whole operation as Commander-in-Chief of the South Seas Force. Almost immediately after making rendezvous with

May

Fletcher began to refuel and told Fitch to do likewise. He was steaming slowly into the Coral Sea,

Fitch on

1,

having completed

his refuelling earlier

than Fitch, when he

learned at nightfall on May 3 that earlier in the day airmen on reconnaissance from Australian bases had seen Japanese forces disembarking at Tulagi. He hastened towards Tulagi during the night, and next morning launched a series of rather ineffective air attacks on shipping there. The result was that, by the time he had again made rendezvous with Fitch on May 5 and was ready to move westwards with his whole force for the purpose of intercepting Japanese

presumed to be coming from Rabaul, Takagi had rounded the Solomon Islands and was heading for the passage between San Cristobal and Rennell Island. Meanwhile the Port Moresby Invasion Force, accompanied by Marushige's Support Force, was steaming on a southerly forces

258

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

course towards the Jomard Passage. Goto's Covering Force was also heading there after refuelling at Shortland Island in the northern Solomons. Fletcher spent much of May 6 refuelling and searching

enemy. As his searches were unhe remained unaware that Takagi had entered the Coral Sea and had then turned southwards on a course which brought the two carrier forces within striking distance of each other during the succeeding night. Suspecting none the less that a carrier battle was imminent, and fearing that it might prevent him from intercepting the Invasion Force before it reached its destination, he told Crace early on May 7 to make for Port Moresby with his Australian cruiser force and one additional destroyer, while he himself turned north. Crace thereupon made north-westwards at high speed, evaded repeated attacks by land-based aircraft, and eventually reached a point about a hundred and twenty miles south of the eastern extremity of New Guinea. Meanwhile Takagi's carrier force, mistaking an oiler and a destroyer left behind by Fletcher for a carrier and a cruiser, spent an unprofitable morning disposing of these relatively harmless ships at the cost of six Japanese aircraft lost. Almost simultaneously, the pilot of a reconnaissance aircraft from the Torktown mistook the light cruisers and gunboats of Marushige's Support Force for two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. Accordingly Fletcher, deceived by a ciphering error which made it appear that two carriers and four heavy cruisers had been seen, despatched some ninety bombers and fighters to attack what he supposed to be Takagi's carrier force. Only after they had left did he discover that he had sent two-thirds of his aircraft on a wild goose chase at a moment when Takagi was all too likely to attack him. By good fortune Fletcher's aircraft, while on their way to attack Marushige's inconsiderable force, found and sank the Shoho, which went down with all but three of her aircraft. This incident had a considerable effect on the subsequent course of the battle, for it compelled Goto to rely on Takagi for the air cover which the Shoho would have given.

with

his aircraft for the

successful,

BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA

259

Takagi was therefore obliged to stay closer to Goto's force than he might otherwise have done. In the meantime Japanese airmen had located Fletcher's carriers and reported their position to Rabaul. Inouye, alarmed by Fletcher's proximity to the area through which the transports were to pass, and perhaps also by the approach of Grace's squadron, thereupon ruled that for the time being the Port Moresby Invasion Force should stay out of harm's way on the northern side of the Jomard Passage.

Some hours later Fletcher, who expected the Invasion Force to come through the Jomard Passage within the next twenty-four hours and was still without news of Takagi' whereabouts, decided to steam towards Port Moresby during the night and rely on land-based aircraft to locate the Japanese carriers for him when daylight returned. However, soon after sunset about half a dozen stragglers from a formation of Japanese bombers and torpedo-bombers, sent in the late afternoon to look for Fletcher's carriers and chased away by his fighters, approached the Torktown displaying recognition signals, or circled about her as if awaiting permission to land. This told Fletcher that, unless the Japanese airmen were hopelessly astray, Takagi's carriers must be close at hand and would have to be dealt with before the Invasion Force could be tackled. He considered using his cruisers and destroyers for a night attack, but came to the conclusion that his best course was to keep his force concentrated and prepare for action in the morning. 6 Inouye also contemplated a night attack, but he too decided that there was more to be gained by waiting until sunrise. Accordingly he ordered Goto to send two cruisers to reinforce Takagi and use the rest of his ships to protect the transports. As these were now heading away from the

Jomard

Passage, in effect this decision

meant

that

all

hope

of sending the Port Moresby Invasion Force to its destination before action was joined with Fletcher's carrier force

had been abandoned. Meanwhile Grace, escaping the fate of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse by what seemed a miracle, had become

260

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

irrevocably separated from the main fleet, whose location he did not know. He had reached the area in which he was to look for the enemy's transports, but had not found them. On learning during the night that the reason was that they

had stayed north of the Jomard Passage, where he could not follow them, he turned south on a course which eventually took him back to base. Fletcher, who had chosen to part with Crace's squadron before he knew Takagi's whereabouts, was thus left with five cruisers and seven destroyers to support and screen his two large carriers. Takagi, also with two large carriers, had four cruisers and six destroyers. Fletcher had lost a number of bombers and fighters at Tulagi, in his encounter with the Shoho, and during his brush with the enemy on May 7, but still had 122 aircraft fit for immediate use. Takagi had one fewer, but was stronger than Fletcher in fighters and torpedobombers. Air reconnaissance by both sides began at first light on May 8. A belt of cloud to the north gave Fletcher's airmen a difficult task, but at 8.15 a.m. a pilot from the Lexington caught a glimpse of Takagi's force about 1 75 miles to the north-east. In the light of a more detailed report which arrived about twenty minutes later, Fletcher ordered both his carriers to launch striking forces and placed Fitch in tactical command. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Tadaichi Hara, who was responsible to Takagi for the handling of the Japanese carriers and their destroyer screen, was also preparing for a strike. The Shokaku and £uikaku, each accompanied by two cruisers and two or three destroyers, were steaming southwestwards about ten miles apart when thirty-nine torpedobombers, dive-bombers and fighters from the Torktown arrived to deliver the first attack. While the dive-bombers were waiting for the torpedo-bombers to get into position, the Shokaku turned into the wind to launch defensive fighters and the guikaku disappeared in a rain-squall. All but two of the aircraft despatched from the Torktown then attacked the Shokaku. The torpedo-bombers, either because they opened fire at too great a range or because their

MAY

8,

1942

261

were unsuccessful. The divebombers scored two hits, one of which buckled the Shokaku's flight deck so that she could no longer launch aircraft, although she could still recover them. Forty- three aircraft from the Lexington were to have made a follow-up attack, but roughly half of them ran into cloud and failed to find the target, while the rest scored only one hit between them. The Shokaku, burning furiously but not irreparably damaged, then made off after arrangements had been made for some of her aircraft to be transferred to the £uikaku. Almost at that moment the two American carriers, both clearly visible in bright sunshine, were attacked by aircraft launched from the Shokaku and the Zuikaku while their own aircraft were forming up and taking off. Fitch, with too few fighters left to protect both carriers, was forced to rely chiefly on evasive action and on fire from his anti-aircraft guns. The Lexington was struck by two torpedoes and suffered two bomb-hits and a number of damaging nearmisses in less than twenty minutes the more manoeuvrable Torktown escaped with one bomb-hit which killed or seriously injured sixty-three of her crew and started fires soon brought under control. Neither carrier was disabled, but internal explosions, caused by a leakage of petrol vapour, missiles

were

defective,

;

damaged the Lexington so severely that she had to be abandoned. At eight o'clock that evening, after her captain had made a final tour of inspection to ensure that no wounded were left behind, a torpedo from an American afterwards

and a half miles bottom of the Coral Sea. So ended the first naval battle in which all the losses on both sides were inflicted by aircraft despatched from ships which never used their main armament or came within sight of the enemy. At 6 p.m. Inouye, believing that both American carriers had been sunk, ordered Takagi to return to Truk. As Goto's transports and warships could not be risked without carrier support where Allied land-based aircraft could reach them, it followed that these, too, had to be recalled and the invasion of Port Moresby to be postdestroyer sent her on her last voyage of two

to the

poned.

262

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

Meanwhile

Fletcher, too,

had received orders

to with-

draw. In one sense he had suffered a defeat, since the loss of the Lexington was a heavier blow to the Allies than that of the Shoho to the Japanese. From every other point of view he was rightly judged to have won an important victory by preventing Inouye from reaching his objective. Moreover, Fletcher had given a good account of himself by not only sinking the Shoho but also putting the Shokaku temporarily put of action and inflicting minor damage on the £uikaku. Before action was joined in the Coral Sea, the American naval authorities received warning from their intelligence sources of an impending Japanese offensive in the Central Pacific. 7 In the light of detailed accounts of Japanese plans and preparations which began to arrive in the second week of May, Admiral King predicted on May 15 that a force bound for Midway Island would leave Guam about May 24. 8

Admiral Yamamoto's intention was to create a diversion by sending small forces to occupy the islands of Attu, Kiska and Adak, in the western Aleutians, under cover of air attacks on the eastern Aleutians by a light carrier force under Rear-Admiral K. Kakuta. A strong battleship force under Vice- Admiral S. Takusu, detached from the main body of the Combined Fleet, would then take up a position on the direct line from Pearl Harbor to the western Aleutians and engage any enemy warships moving in either direction. While the Americans were thus preoccupied, about five thousand men conveyed in twelve transports covered by a force under Vice-Admiral N. Kondo were to seize Midway Island after a preliminary air assault by Vice-Admiral Nagumo's Striking Force, renamed the First Mobile Force. Finally, any ships of the United States Pacific Fleet which escaped destruction at Takusu's hands would be brought to action and destroyed, presumably as they were returning from the vain dash to the north which Yamamoto seems to have expected them to make, by the First Mobile Force and a powerful battleship force under Yamamoto's direct command. in the north

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES TABLE

263

7

The Battle of Midway Island: Organization of Japanese Naval Forces

NORTHERN AREA FORGE

(Vice-Adm. B. Hosogaya)

kiska occupation force (Capt. T. Ono) Two transports (about 1,200 men); two light cruisers; one auxiliary cruiser; three destroyers; miscellaneous light naval craft

adak-attu occupation force (Rear-Adm. S. Omori) Two transports (about 1,200 men); one seaplane carrier planes)

;

five destroyers ; miscellaneous light

(6 sea-

naval craft

second mobile force (Rear-Adm. K. Kakuta) Light carriers Ryujo, Junyo (90 aircraft) two heavy cruisers three destroyers; one oiler MISCELLANEOUS FORCES Under direct command of Adm. Hosogaya One heavy cruiser; two destroyers; two oilers; three supply ships ;

;

Under Rear-Adm. S. Tamasaki Six submarines

COMBINED FLEET

(Adm.

I.

Yamamoto)

Aleutian support force (Vice-Adm. S. Takusu) Four battleships two light cruisers four oilers first mobile force (Vice-Adm. G. Nagumo) ;

;

Fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu (272 aircraft) ; two battleships; two heavy cruisers; twelve destroyers; five oilers

main body {under direct command of Adm. Tamamoto) Three battleships; light carrier Hosho (8 aircraft); two seaplane carriers (carrying motor torpedo boats and midget submarines) ;

thirteen destroyers

midway occupation force (Vice-Adm. N. Kondo) covering force

Two

{under direct

command of Adm. Kondo)

battleships; light carrier

Zu ^°

cruisers; eight destroyers; four oilers;

(23 aircraft); four one repair ship

heavy

invasion force (Rear-Adm. R. Tanaka) Twelve transports and supply ships (about 5,000 men); one light cruiser; ten destroyers; three converted destroyers; one oiler

close support force (Rear- Adm. T. Kurita) Four heavy cruisers; two destroyers; one oiler miscellaneous forces seaplane force (Rear-Adm. R. Fujita) Two seaplane carriers (28 seaplanes); one destroyer; one converted destroyer MINES WEE PING FORCE Four converted minesweepers; three submarine chasers; three cargo and supply ships

264

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

This might have been a sound plan if Admiral Nimitz could have been relied upon to fall into the trap prepared for him. Unfortunately for the Japanese, he had no mind to do so. Recognizing that his main task must be to prevent the enemy from seizing Midway Island and thus gaining an outpost within twelve hundred miles of Pearl Harbor, he contemplated leaving the defence of the Aleutians to light naval forces and shore-based aircraft, but ultimately decided to form a small North Pacific Force under RearAdmiral Robert A. Theobald. In addition to his naval resources, which comprised two heavy and three light cruisers, thirteen destroyers, six submarines, some fifteen to twenty light naval craft and about twenty shore-based naval aircraft, Theobald could call upon about a hundred and fifty aircraft of the United States Army Air Corps under Brigadier-General William O. Butler. To deal with the threat to Midway, Nimitz formed two task forces which, when united, would constitute a single Carrier Striking Force under Admiral Fletcher. Task Force 17, under Fletcher's direct command, consisted of the Torktown (repaired in two days), with two cruisers and six destroyers. Task Force 16, commanded by Rear- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in place of Admiral Hasley, who was ill, consisted of the Enterprise and the Hornet, with six cruisers and nine destroyers. Also included in the Carrier Striking Force were two oilers screened by two destroyers. Forces based on Midway included a reinforced battalion of marines, about a dozen light naval craft for local defence, and about a hundred and twenty bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Of the remaining American carriers in commission in the early summer of 1942, the Wasp was on her way back to the United States after helping the British Mediterranean Fleet to carry aircraft to Malta, while the Saratoga had just completed repairs and was working up at San Diego. Assuming that the Japanese would use at least four of their large fleet carriers in the forthcoming battle and might use all six if the Shokaku and the £uikaku were repaired in time, Admiral King suggested that the British should help by

£

40'N

3o'n

Pear]

Harbor 20°N

HAWAII '

130'£

Guam

140°£

\150°E

160"£

170°

180'

Approximate courses of Japanese naval forces (as planned) :

>

—

•

Occupation forces and immediate support

1000

Miles

->» Diversion

——

Main body

Wamamoto] \naoumo\

Striking force

Aleutian support force \takusu\

X, United States Naval forces

MAP 27 The Battle of Midway

266

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY TABLE The

8

Battle of Midway Island:

Organization of Allied Naval Forces

U.S.

PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC

OCEAN AREAS

(Adm. C. W. Nimitz) carrier striking forge (Rear-Adm. F. J. Fletcher) task forge 1 7 (Rear-Adm. F. J. Fletcher) Torktown

Two

cruisers

Six destroyers

task force 16 (Rear-Adm. R. A. Spruance) Enterprise

Hornet

Six cruisers

Nine destroyers oiler group

Two Two

oilers

destroyers

sending a carrier from the Indian Ocean to the South- West Pacific. Alternatively, they might attack either Rangoon

and the Andaman Islands or Japanese communications between Rangoon and Singapore. However, it was not until May 19 that King signalled his request to London, and not until May 22 that he gave the Admiralty's representative in Washington a full account of the evidence on which he and Nimitz based their prediction of impending attacks on Midway and the Aleutians. 9 As two of the three carriers serving in Admiral Somerville's Eastern Fleet were undergoing repairs at Kilindini and could not conceivably reach the Pacific in time to be of use, the Admiralty responded to King's appeal by asking Somerville whether he could move a strong force to Colombo and perhaps attack Sumatra or the Andaman Islands. Somerville agreed to make a diversionary movement towards Ceylon. As the Shokaku and the £uikaku were not, in fact, repaired until the danger had passed, in the outcome Nimitz began the battle for Midway Island with three large carriers to Nagumo's four. At the same time he possessed, in the island itself, an unsinkable aircraft carrier which could accom-

MAY modate many more

30-JUNE

3,

1942

267

than the largest ship afloat. He decided to make the most of this advantage by placing the Carrier Striking Force well to the north-east, where Japanese aircraft were unlikely to spot it, and by relying on shore-based aircraft, supplemented by submarines, to warn him of the enemy's approach. Thus he would not only escape Yamamoto's trap, but himself set a trap for

Nagumo's

On

aircraft

carriers.

by Nimitz from

headquarters well over a thousand miles away, intensive air searches of the approaches to Midway Island began on May 30. Everyone was keyed up to expect the enemy, and competition among the crews of the big Catalina flying boats became so keen that pilots assigned to the dawn reconnaissance drew lots for the privilege of covering the line due west of the island. About 9 a.m. on June 3 Ensign Jack Reid reached the limit of his patrol, 700 miles west of base, but decided to go a little further before turning back. A few minutes later he and his co-pilot saw, thirty miles ahead of them, about a dozen vessels "looking like miniature ships in a backyard pond". These were mostly transports of Admiral Tanaka's Invasion Force, but were thought at the time to be part of the main fleet. Bombers from Midway Island attacked them later in the day but scored no hits, though an oiler was struck early on the following day by one of three torpedoes launched by a Catalina. Admiral Fletcher, with all three American carriers, was roughly 300 miles east-north-east of Midway Island when, late that afternoon, he received news of these events. Judging in the light of the intelligence picture that only the Japanese transport force had been sighted and that Nagumo would approach from the north-west, he set a course designed to put him within striking distance of the Japanese carrier force by the morning of June 4. Fletcher was right. Nagumo, still undetected, steamed on during the night. About twenty minutes before sunrise he reached his launching position 240 miles north-west of Midway Island. Knowing nothing of Fletcher's whereorders issued

his

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

268

abouts or the strength of his force, yet vaguely appre-

bombers and thirtysix fighters to deliver a pre-invasion attack on the island, but kept back ninety-three bombers armed with torpedoes and armour-piercing bombs to deal with any American warships that might be spotted by seaplanes sent on reconnaissance from his cruisers. About an hour later the pilot of a Catalina gave the first news of Nagumo's arrival, and the same pilot also saw Japanese aircraft on their way to their objectives. Twenty-seven Buffalo and Wildcat fighters were sent from Midway to intercept them, but were hopelessly outmatched by Nagumo's Zero fighters. The bombers went on to do heavy damage to shore installations, but were unable to prevent large numbers of shorebased aircraft from taking off to attack the Japanese hensive, he despatched seventy-two

carriers.

scored no hits and suffered crippling they made an important contribution to the battle, for their intervention helped to convince Nagumo that he had failed to knock out the defences of the island and that a second wave of bombers must be sent. Although he was still without news of Fletcher's force, the very fact that hitherto his seaplanes had sent only negative reports suggested that no American carriers were about. At 7.15 a.m. he made the fatal mistake of ordering that the bombers which he was reserving for attacks on American warships should stand down and be rearmed for

These

losses.

aircraft

None

attacks

on

the

less

objectives ashore.

Less than a quarter of an hour later Nagumo learned from one of his seaplanes that ten enemy ships were

approaching from a point north of Midway Island. After pondering this disquieting news for some time he cancelled the order he had just given and directed that aircraft still armed with torpedoes should retain them. 10 But it was not until another half-hour had passed that he knew that the ten enemy ships included at least one carrier. And by that time he also knew that he would soon need all his deckspace to recover the aircraft despatched at dawn. Meanwhile Fletcher, having learnt soon after 6 a.m. that

BATTLE OF MIDWAY

269

Nagumo was almost exactly where he expected him to be, had ordered Spruance to "proceed south-westerly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located". Spruance intended to launch his aircraft about 9 a.m., when he would be less than a hundred miles from the enemy, but was persuaded by his Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, that he would stand a better chance of catching Nagumo at a disadvantage if he attacked earlier at the cost of giving his pilots a longer route to cover. Between 7 and 8 a.m. he despatched sixty-seven dive-bombers, twentynine torpedo-bombers and twenty fighters from the Enterprise and the Hornet, keeping back only eight dive-

bombers and thirty-six fighters to protect his fleet. Fletcher, following with the Yorktown, contributed about half her aircraft and reserved the rest for use against any Japanese carriers

which might turn up unannounced.

The result was three

American

that the bulk of the striking forces from carriers arrived just after

all

Nagumo had

completed the recovery of his aircraft and had turned to port with the intention of closing with the one American carrier of whose approach he was aware. He was thus caught in the midst of a desperate attempt to refuel and rearm his bombers before action was joined. Even though the Hornefs dive-bombers went astray and the torpedobombers scored no hits and were nearly all shot down by Nagumo's fighters and anti-aircraft guns, the sequel was a resounding triumph for the Americans. By midday the Akagi, the Kaga and the Soryu had all succumbed to accurate attacks by dive-bombers from the Lexington and the Yorktown, which met little opposition since the torpedo-bombers had drawn most of the enemy's fire. Aircraft from the Hiryu then attacked and disabled the Yorktown, but the Hiryu was herself afterwards put out of action by dive-bombers from the Enterprise, supplemented by a few aircraft transferred from the Yorktown. In the early hours of the following morning Yamamoto, confronted with the loss of all four of Nagumo's

and their entire complement of aircraft, reluctantly abandoned all hope of successful intervention by his battleships and ordered a general retirement. carriers

270

KWAJALEIN TO MIDWAY

fared better. Admiral Theobald was warned by Nimitz that landings in the western Aleutians were probable, but suspected that the

In

the

north

the Japanese

information on which Nimitz relied had been concocted by the enemy to hide a plan to seize more valuable objectives in the eastern Aleutians or Alaska. Determined not to be caught napping, he disposed the main body of his fleet so far to the east that he was never in a position to bring it to bear against Hosogaya's forces. In theory a system of patrols by shore-based aircraft and light naval craft ought to have given him adequate warning of the enemy's approach, but in practice thick weather helped Kakuta to take his light carrier force within striking distance of its diversionary objective at Dutch Harbor without detection. After launching three air attacks on two successive days, Kakuta retired with the loss of a few aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft guns and shore-based fighters. At that stage Yamamoto, dismayed by the unfavourable turn of events in the central Pacific, contemplated calling off the Aleutian enterprise and using Kakuta's light carriers to reinforce Nagumo. Eventually he decided that landings at Attu and Kiska (but not at Adak) should be carried out as planned. These inhospitable islands, inhabited only by a few settlers who gained a precarious livelihood from fishing and trapping, were duly occupied by the end of the first week in June. They proved of little strategic or economic value, though some attempt was made by the invaders to develop Kiska as an air base. Their capture did, however, go some way to console the Japanese for the disastrous failure of Yamamoto's attempt to engage and destroy the United States Pacific Fleet near Midway Island.

J

3

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

MAY

1942 the Japanese decided, as a Coral Sea, to postpone the invasion of Port Moresby until July 3. 1 In the following month the crippling of their carrier fleet in the Battle of Midway Island convinced them that a seaborne expedition to Port Moresby had become impractical, but not that the rest of their plans for a southward drive must be abandoned. They decided to aim at taking Port Moresby by an overland advance from the north coast of New Guinea, hasten the completion of their bases in the northern Solomons, and supplement their seaplane base at Tulagi in the southern Solomons by constructing an airfield for landbased bombers and fighters on the large island of Guadalcanal. 2 The Seventeenth Army, composed partly of troops serving with the South Seas Force and partly of units drawn from the Philippines and Java, would be responsible for operations on land, and a new Eighth Fleet under ViceAdmiral Gunichi Mikawa would take care of the naval side. While these decisions were being made in Tokyo, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were feeling their way towards an offensive strategy. Large numbers of American troops had been carried to Australasia and the South Seas for the purpose envisaged by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when they ruled that the agreed policy of defeating Germany first need not preclude the Allies from securing bases for an eventual offensive against Japan. But the use that could be made of these troops after their arrival was restricted by the volume of shipping and assault craft available at a time when the Allies were committed to a landing in French North Africa. General MacArthur claimed immediately after the Battle of Midway Island that,

IN

result of their setback in the

272

JULY

1942

273

given two carriers, a division trained in amphibious warand a suitable bomber force, he could take Rabaul. 3 But he had to be told that the means of carrying a division to the Bismarck Archipelago and disembarking it under fire could not be found, and that the naval authorities were not prepared to risk their carriers, without support from land-based aircraft, where substantial numbers of Japanese land-based bombers and fighters could be brought to bear against them. However, on July 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prompted by Admiral King, directed that preparations should be made for step-by-step advances towards New Britain and New Ireland by way of the Santa Cruz Islands and the Solomon Islands on the right, and New Guinea on the left. 4 They proposed that Nimitz should begin by seizing the Santa Cruz Islands, driving the enemy from Tulagi, and establishing a firm foothold in the southern Solomons. Forces controlled by MacArthur were then to recapture the northern Solomons and eastern New Guinea before going on to restore Allied control of the Bismarck Archipelago. few days later the Joint Chiefs learned that Japanese troops and engineers from Tulagi had crossed to Guadalcanal and were building an airfield near the north coast. This meant that a good deal more than the capture of Tulagi and the adjacent islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo would be needed to give Nimitz a secure hold on the southern Solomons. It also meant that he would be well advised to start before the Japanese completed the airfield and were able to oppose him with land-based bombers escorted by land-based fighters. The ensuing expedition to Guadalcanal and Tulagi was the first seaborne expedition to enemy-held territory undertaken by United States forces since 1898. 5 As the troops assigned to it belonged to the United States Marine Corps it was, however, a naval rather than a joint-service enterprise, except insofar as army bombers and reconnaissance aircraft provided some of the air support. Responsibility for the execution of the plan was entrusted to Admiral Ghormley, and the boundary between the Southfare

A

274

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

West Pacific Area and the South Pacific Sub-Area was redrawn so as to put the whole of the southern Solomons in

TABLE 9 The Invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi Organization of Allied Forces

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE,

U.S.

PACIFIC FLEET

(Vice-Adm. R. L. Ghormley) expeditionary forge tf 61 (Vice-Adm. F. J. Fletcher) air support forge tg 61.1 (Vice-Adm. F. J. Fletcher) Saratoga Enterprise

Wasp North Carolina (battleship) Five heavy cruisers

One

light cruiser

Sixteen destroyers south pacific amphibious force tf 62 (Rear-Adm. R. K. Turner) Twenty-three transports and supply ships carrying 959

and 18,146 enlisted men of the U.S. Marine Corps under Maj.-Gen. A. A. Vandegrift escort force tg 62.2 (Rear-Adm. V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., R.N.) Four cruisers Nine destroyers fire support group l (Capt. F. L. Riefkohl) Three heavy cruisers Four destroyers fire support group m (Rear-Adm. N. Scott) officers

One

light cruiser

Two

destroyers

minesweeping group (Cmdr. W. H. Hartt, Jnr.) Five minesweepers land-based air task force tf 63 (Rear-Adm. J. S. McCain) Two hundred and ninety-eight aircraft based in

New

New

Hebrides, Fiji, Samoa and Tongatabu SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC (Gen. Douglas MacArthur) allied air forces, s.w. pacific (Lt-Gen. G. C. Kenney) Bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft based in Australia and New Guinea, as available

Caledonia, the

AREA

Ghormley's area. Rear-Admiral Richmond K. Turner, formerly of the War Plans Divisions of the Department of the Navy, was chosen to command the transport, escort and

OPERATION WATCH TOWER bombardment

275

and become responsible for the detailed planning of the landings. Admiral Fletcher, fresh from his success at Midway, commanded the carrier force which was to provide air cover during the assault phase, and in theory was in tactical command of the whole expedition. forces,

Rear-Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., who in command of the predominantly Australian cruiser squadron based on Brisbane, acted as second-in-command to Turner. The landing force comprised roughly 19,000 officers and enlisted men of the 1st United States Marine Division less one regiment replaced by a regiment of the 2nd Marine Division. The divisional commander, Major-General A. A. Vandegrift, was to conform with orders from Turner until his troops were

The

British

had succeeded Crace

firmly established ashore.

Admiral Ghormley believed that the "basic problem" was "the protection of ships against land-based aircraft during the approach, the landing and the unloading". 6 He also believed that there were about 5,000 Japanese on Guadalcanal, although in fact there were fewer than 2,500, of whom not more than about 600 were combatant troops. His plan was to carry the whole of the landing force to Guadalcanal and Tulagi in one lift, using nineteen large and four smaller transports and supply ships escorted and supported by eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Air support was to be provided by nearly 300 aircraft based in New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoa; by such aircraft as MacArthur could spare from his forces in south-eastern New Guinea and Australia; and, for a limited period, by 240 aircraft carried in the Saratoga, the Enterprise and the Wasp, which in turn were to be supported by one battleship, six cruisers and sixteen destroyers. An obvious weakness of this plan was that, as all the troops assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the operation were to be committed at the outset, no follow-up forma tions or reinforcements would be forthcoming unless they could be found from units assigned to the defence of Ghormley's bases. Another shortcoming was that Ghormley, although he knew and said that the expedition would need w.f.e.

— 10

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

276

protection against air attack not only during the approach and while the troops were disembarking but also while the transports and freighters were discharging equipment and supplies, did not insist that Fletcher's carriers should remain within striking distance until unloading was completed. As the plan stood when the expedition sailed, the

was

withdraw within forty-eight hours, although unloading was expected to take twice as long. carrier force

The

to

target date for the assault,

originally fixed for

August 1, had to be postponed until August 7 because the were not ready. Thus the landings were still more than a fortnight away when, on July 21, troops of the Japanese Seventeenth Army began to land at and near Buna, on the north coast of New Guinea, as the prelude to a thrust across the Stanley Owen Mountains towards Port Moresby. The result was that MacArthur, who had proposed on the previous day to carry out an elaborate programme of air reconnaissance on Ghormley's behalf, was obliged to recast his plans in order to free some of his aircraft for a defensive campaign. As the crucial Japanese base at Rabaul could be reached by only a small proportion of Ghormley's aircraft from his forward airfields in the South Pacific, it was, however, still necessary that MacArthur's forces

aircraft should

On body

make a

substantial contribution.

the following day the transports carrying the main of the 1st Marine Division set out from Wellington,

New

Zealand, and on July 26 the various components of made rendezvous south of Fiji. On July 31, after the landing force had spent four days rehearsing its role in friendly territory, the whole fleet set course for the southern Solomons. During the night of the expeditionary force

August 6 the transports, escorts and bombardment force, led by Admiral Crutchley in the cruiser Australia^ passed south-west of Guadalcanal and rounded Gape Esperance, leaving the carrier force to take south.

These moves came ese. Early on August

up covering positions

to the

complete surprise to the Japan7 the garrison of Tulagi reported by as a

V

AUGUST many

7,

1942

277

were approaching from the northwest and added plaintively: "What can these ships be?" 7 Even so, the prospect before the landing force was far from reassuring. The islands of the southern Solomons, mostly mountainous and clothed with virgin jungle interspersed with patches of knife-like kunai grass, outcrops of bare volcanic rock and occasional coconut plantations, offer few attractions to visitors even in time of peace. The climate is hot and humid, the atmosphere oppressive. Malaria-carrying mosquitoes abound. Frequent rainstorms, often presaged by slowly drifting clouds which wreathe the radio that

ships

treetops in swirling mist, foster a luxuriant tropical vegeta-

which spreads a dense canopy of dripping foliage far above the ever-saturated, almost sunless floor of the primeval forest. A dim, greenish light, an inescapable, allpervading scent of vegetable decay, a stillness so profound that the occasional harsh cry of a startled bird seems an act of sacrilege, invest the jungle with an air at once sinister and awe-inspiring. Even where the jungle has been cleared in the interests of cultivation, or where tracks have been cut through it, progress from point to point is made difficult by unbridged streams and rivers, slime-covered pools of unknown depth, and patches of mud in which men sink to tion

their thighs.

Against these disadvantages the invaders could set the prospect of willing co-operation from the native population. The fuzzy-headed Melanesian inhabitants of Guadalcanal and the adjacent islands, more robust in temperament as well as physique than the Polynesians and Micronesians of the Central Pacific, had not taken kindly to the arrival of Japanese overlords who spread the gospel of co-prosperity but paid for goods and services in dubious paper money. Eager to resume their peacetime status as citizens of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, most of them were more than ready to welcome the Americans as liberators. The expeditionary force could also look forward to valuable help from a coast-watching organization established by the Australian government in the Australian Mandated Territory of New Guinea, which included the northern islands of

278

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

Buka and

Bougainville. This organization,

manned

by-

had continued to function in secret after the and on many occasions was to give useful warning of the approach of enemy ships or aircraft. However, the first step was to get ashore. Landings on both sides of the Sound began about 8 a.m. on August 7. About 1,500 Japanese defended Tulagi and the twin islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo with fanatical obstinacy, but were gradually worn down by weight of numbers. By nightfall on August 8 nearly all of them, with the exception of three captured by the Americans and about forty who escaped to Florida Island by swimming, had either died in volunteers,

arrival of the Japanese,

own

rather than surrender. The marines lost 108 killed and 140 wounded. 8 On the other side of the Sound the Japanese garrison of Guadalcanal astonished the landing force by offering no battle or taken their

lives

resistance to the landings, and were afterwards found to have retreated westwards. By the end of the first day about 1 1,000 marines were ashore, but were in a far from enviable position since most of their heavy equipment and supplies were still aboard the transports and supply ships. Moreover, as no provision had been made for an unopposed landing, such equipment and supplies as had been unloaded were piled on congested beaches from which they could not be removed and distributed to units until a plan was im-

provised. 9

On the following day the marines pushed westwards, meeting only token opposition. By nightfall the partially completed airfield, afterwards called Henderson Field in honour of a marine who had distinguished himself in the Central Pacific, was in their hands. The supply position remained precarious, but was slightly eased by the capture of large quantities of rice.

Meanwhile the Japanese authorities at Rabaul had responded swiftly to the landings. Aircraft of the 25th Air Flotilla arrived within the first few hours to attack Allied shipping off Guadalcanal and Tulagi, but were intercepted by fighters from the Enterprise and the Saratoga, suffered fairly heavy losses, and scored only one hit on a destroyer.

MAP 2$ Guadalcanal

—>

American landings, 7 August 1942

^=>> Japanese 10 1

I

20 I

Jiilesr

landings, 1$ August 1942

3C s=J

40 i

280

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

On the second day a larger formation, arriving about eighty minutes after a coast watcher on Bougainville had given the alarm, damaged a second destroyer and set fire to a transport which burned furiously for

many

hours. Anti-

from warships and fighters from the Enterprise destroyed nineteen Japanese aircraft out of forty-three. In the meantime Admiral Mikawa had hastily assembled a naval striking force. Late on August 7 he set course for the Solomons with seven cruisers and the only destroyer he could find at such short notice. At noon on the following day seaplanes despatched from his cruisers to reconnoitre the neighbourhood of Guadalcanal and Tulagi returned with the news that eighteen transports, nineteen destroyers, six cruisers and a battleship had been sighted. In the light of this and other information, Mikawa continued towards the southern Solomons and arranged to deliver a night attack in the early hours of August 9. At 10.26 a.m. on August 8 Mikawa's force was sighted east of Bougainville by an aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force from Milne Bay. The pilot, kept at a distance by anti-aircraft fire, mistook Mikawa's seven cruisers and one destroyer for three cruisers, three destroyers and two seaplane tenders or gunboats. As he went on to complete an aircraft fire

reconnaissance before returning to base, the substance of his report did not reach the Allied naval commanders off Guadalcanal until the late afternoon. 10 In the meantime Admiral Turner, who had asked Admiral Ghormley's air commander to make a special search of part of the area covered by MacArthur's aircraft, was not told that his request could not be fully met. When the report from Milne Bay did arrive, the chance of making a confirmatory search had gone. The result was that both Turner and Crutchley were led by the reference to seaplane tenders or gunboats to expect a daylight attack by seaplanes rather than a night attack by surface ships, for which many more than three cruisers would be needed. 11 Even so, precautions against a night attack were not neglected. Admiral Crutchley, with eight cruisers and eight destroyers at his disposal, ordered a Southern Force extensive

GUADALCANAL: AUGUST

8,

1942

281

of one American and two Australian cruisers, with two destroyers, to patrol throughout the hours of darkness between Cape Esperance and Savo Island; a Northern Force of three American cruisers, also with two destroyers, to patrol between Savo Island and Florida Island; and an Eastern Force of one American and one Australian cruiser, again with two destroyers, to patrol off Tulagi. In addition the destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot, equipped with radar capable of detecting surface vessels up to ten miles away in optimum conditions, were to patrol west and north of Savo Island for the purpose of giving early warning of the enemy's approach. When these arrangements were made, Admiral Fletcher with his three carriers and accompanying warships was about a hundred miles from the main transport anchorage near Lunga Point. At 6.7 p.m., without consulting Turner, he recommended in a signal to Nimitz that he should withdraw immediately on the ground that twentyone of his ninety-nine fighters had been lost in his successful encounters with Japanese aircraft, that his force might be attacked by large numbers of bombers and torpedobombers, and that fuel was running low. 12 Without waiting for a reply, he then made off to the south-east. Turner had known since July 26, when he urged in vain that the carriers should remain within striking distance until the unloading of the transports and supply ships was completed, that Fletcher's determination to withdraw the carrier force about forty-eight hours after the initial landings was unshakeable. He was none the less dismayed when he learned, by intercepting his signal to Nimitz, that Fletcher now proposed to retire after only thirty-six hours. At 8.32 p.m. he called Crutchley and Vandegrift to his flagship to discuss his future course of action. By that time Crutchley, flying his flag in the Australia, was patrolling with the rest of the Southern Force between Cape Esperance and Savo Island. As the summons was urgent and the voyage to Lunga Point by barge would have taken several hours, he left in his flagship after ordering Captain H. D. Bode of the Chicago to assume command.

282

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

At the conference both Crutchley and Vandegrift agreed with Turner that, in view of the departure of the carriers, he would be well advised to withdraw his transports and warships next morning, but that meanwhile a supreme effort should be made to discharge essential equipment and stores. 13 Crutchley took the opportunity of discussing the reconnaissance report from Milne Bay. He found that Turner was strongly of the opinion that the reference to seaplane tenders or gunboats pointed to a coming attack by seaplanes, and had asked Ghormley's air commander to do and attack Mikawa's force on the following day. Turner recognized that a night attack by surface ships was not out of the question, but was satisfied that due prehis best to locate

cautions

had been

taken. 14

The conference ended a few minutes before midnight. The night was hot, oppressive and very dark. To the northeast, the transport set

on

fire earlier

with a lurid glow. Elsewhere,

little

in the

day

still

burned

could be seen except

when

occasional flashes of distant lightning flickered across the sky. Vandegrift wished to make for Tulagi, and Crutch-

him on his way. By the time this was of the night remained that Crutchley decided to patrol immediately west of the main group of transports rather than spend time rejoining the Southern Force. Meanwhile Captain Bode, expecting the Australia to return before midnight and resume her station at the head of the Southern Force, saw no reason to depart from Crutchley's arrangements for the night's patrol by placing his own ship in the lead. Accordingly the Southern Force, led by the Australian cruiser Canberra but commanded by Bode from his station 600 yards astern of her, continued to shuttle to and fro along a line roughly parallel with the coast of Guadalcanal. To the north-east the Northern Force, led by Captain F. L. Riefkohl in the Vincennes, was patrolling each side in turn of a box about five miles square, while further east the Eastern Force covered a line to seaward of the transports off Tulagi. To the west of the cruiser forces the Blue and the Ralph Talbot steamed backwards and forwards along lines approximately at right angles to Bode's ley promised to put

done, so

little

MAP

29

The Battle of Save Island

,

Lenqo Channel

— ;

Point,

•

© Airfield

GUADALCANAL. Boundaries between patrol areas

Allied patrols

A

Blue

8

Ralph Talbot

C

Southern Force

D

Northern Force

B

Eastern Force

F

Australia

Transports '

-—

Mikawa Yunagi

Burning transport

w Et=

Miles

W.F.E.

— IO*

j?0

=1

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

284

course. Mikawa, steaming south-eastwards at high speed, was due to reach the neighbourhood about an hour after

midnight. after 1 1 p.m. Mikawa despatched two seaplanes to a final reconnaissance of the transport anchorage. One of them was sighted from the Ralph Talbot and recognized as an aircraft of a type commonly launched from cruisers, but the Talbot was unable to pass a warning to Turner's flagship as her transmissions were masked by atmospherics. Her signals were, however, received aboard a number of patrolling cruisers and destroyers, some of which also received reports of unidentified aircraft from their own lookouts or radar operators. But most commanding officers concluded that, as no warning had come from Turner or his staff, the aircraft must be friendly. 15 Mikawa again narrowly escaped detection nearly two hours later. He was approaching Savo Island with the intention of passing south of it and attacking first the transports off Guadalcanal and then those off Tulagi, when lookouts aboard his flagship sighted the Blue on his starboard bow. But the Blue had turned away after reaching the north-east limit of her patrol, and Mikawa was able to slip past her without being seen by her lookouts or picked up by her radar. He then changed course with the intention of passing north of Savo Island, but afterwards reverted to his original plan and made for the southern passage. The result was that his ships were barely discernible against a background of dark clouds which had gathered in the lee of the island when, at 1.36 a.m., the Southern Force came in sight at a range of seven miles. Mikawa promptly gave the order to attack. His torpedoes were already streaking towards the Allied ships, his gunners were on the point of firing their first salvo, when the destroyer Patterson sighted his flagship and raised the alarm. Almost simultaneously his seaplanes dropped flares which threw a lurid glare over the Allied transports in the

Soon

make

background.

The

Canberra, sharply silhouetted against the light

the flares, was disabled within five minutes.

from

Aboard the

BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND

285

Chicago Captain Bode, roused from a deep sleep, changed course abruptly to avoid a torpedo from starboard, swung back again when more torpedoes were seen approaching his port bow, and suffered only minor damage from one shellhit and one torpedo which he failed to dodge. Without telling the Northern Force what had happened, or what action he was taking, he then made off in pursuit of Mikawa's sole destroyer, the Tunagi, which Mikawa had ordered to turn back and block the passage between Cape Esperance

and Savo Island. 16 Mikawa, having disposed of the Southern Force by putting the Canberra out of action and unwittingly leading the Chicago on a wild goose chase, then swung towards the Northern Force, which his lookouts had already sighted about six miles away on the port beam.

The Northern Force comprised, Vincennes, the cruisers Quincy

and

in

Astoria

addition

to

the

and the destroyers

Wilson and Helm. The general situation aboard these ships when Mikawa made his turn to port was that the Patterson's warning had been received, but that many officers were

puzzled by the flares. Captain Riefkohl and his executive officer heard gunfire to the south, but assumed that the Southern Force was firing at aircraft. 17 Moreover, as no

word had come from Captain Bode and the course and position of the Southern Force were not precisely known, one or two commanding officers were reluctant to fire for of engaging friendly ships. The Northern Force, although not altogether unprepared, was thus caught at a disadvantage when all three of its cruisers were suddenly illuminated by Mikawa' s searchlights. The force put up a good fight once its officers became fully alive to the situation, but could not prevent Mikawa from making the most of his superior fire-power and the excellent information provided by his lookouts and seaplanes. Within an hour of fear

the firing of the

first

salvo the Quincy

had

capsized, the

was dead in the water and about to sink, and the was a blazing wreck. As the Canberra was no longer capable of fighting and the Chicago still searching in vain for the Tunagi, only the Australia and the small and unsuspecting Vincennes

Astoria

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

286

Mikawa and the transports which it was his business to destroy. However, in the course of his encounter with the Northern Force Mikawa's force had become split up and had lost cohesion. Many of his ships, including his flagship, had suffered minor damage, and he had begun to run short of torpedoes. Concluding that he would not be able to get his ships back into formation much before daybreak and might be attacked by carrier-borne aircraft if he lingered, he abandoned his intention of attacking the transports and gave the order to withdraw. 18 Thus the Allied cruiser Eastern Force stood between

although tactically defeated, fulfilled their purpose by preventing the enemy from attaining his strategic aim.

forces,

Fletcher, far away to the south, had a.m. to steam away from the scene of action. As no reply to his signal to Nimitz had arrived by that time, he then turned back towards Guadalcanal. No news of the fighting north of the island reached him until 3 a.m., when he received a vague and belated report of "some type of surface action" in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. 19 This was followed about half an hour later by permission to withdraw. Thereupon Fletcher turned southeast again without waiting to hear more. 20 Mikawa, expecting to be attacked by Allied aircraft as soon as daylight came, continued to make off in the opposite direction. He was not much troubled by an Australian reconnaissance aircraft which shadowed part of his force for nearly an hour during the afternoon of August 9, but early on the following

Meanwhile Admiral

continued until

day

lost

east of

On

1

one cruiser

New

to

an American submarine patrolling

Ireland.

the morning after the Battle of Savo Island Admiral

Turner, accepting the risk of air attack, postponed for some hours the withdrawal on which he had decided at his conference with Vandegrift and Crutchley. Unloading was resumed at daybreak and continued until the afternoon. The transports, accompanied by Turner's surviving warships, then steamed away. Their departure left Vandegrift s troops with roughly 5

AUGUST

1942

287

half their allotment of ammunition and with rations for about a month, but with no radar or coast defence guns, and with none of the heavy equipment which they had

hoped to use for the construction of permanent buildings and the completion of the airfield. No aircraft had arrived, but on August 15 four converted destroyers brought bombs, fuel and ammunition. On August 17, after much backbreaking toil by the marines and a trial landing by one aircraft, Vandegrift pronounced the airfield fit for use in dry weather. Three days later the escort carrier Long Island, a converted merchant vessel, brought a first instalment of nineteen fighters and twelve dive-bombers. Meanwhile the Japanese Supreme Command had decided that the Seventeenth Army's most important task was the capture of Port Moresby, but that none the less an attempt must be made to regain control of the southern Solomons. Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, the army commander, estimated that there were no more than 2,000 American troops on Guadalcanal, and that 6,000 Japanese would suffice to deal with them. Two detachments of Hyakutake's troops, known after the names of their commanders as the Kawaguchi and Ichiki detachments, were assigned to the venture. These were supplemented by a naval landing force about a thousand strong. On the night of August 18, 916 men of the first wave of the Ichiki detachment, preceded by 500 men of the naval landing force who disembarked in the western part of the past the American beachhead in six and landed unopposed near Taivu Point. The presence of Japanese troops to the east of the beachhead soon became known to native troops of the British Solomon Islands Defence Force, and on August 19 a party of marines led by Captain Charles Brush of the United States Marine Corps gained valuable knowledge of Colonel Ichiki's intentions by setting a trap for one of his patrols. The Americans then strengthened their perimeter on the left bank of a stream wrongly believed to be the Tenaru River. On August 21 the 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel C. B. Cates, repulsed a pre-dawn attack near the island,

slipped

destroyers

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

288

mouth of the stream by 200 screaming Japanese armed with and hand grenades. At the cost of only 35 killed and

rifles

75 wounded, the marines then went on to annihilate the first wave of the Ichiki detachment by making a skilful turning movement through the jungle.

Meanwhile

transports carrying the second

wave of

the

detachment and the rest of the naval landing force Rabaul with an escort of one cruiser and four destroyers, supported by the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo in addition to two battleships, five cruisers and seventeen destroyers. Admiral Ghormley, warned by coast-watchers, assembled three task forces built round the Saratoga, the Enterprise and the Wasp and the battleship North Carolina, and ordered them Ichiki

had

left

to take

up

positions south-east of Guadalcanal.

The

trans-

on August 23 by the crew of an American on reconnaissance about 250 miles north of the island, but Vice-Admiral N. Kondo, commanding the Japanese naval force, eluded aircraft from the Saratoga by steaming northwards throughout the rest of the day and the succeeding night. Early on August 24 he turned south again and sent the Ryujo ahead in the hope that she would distract attention from his larger carriers and enable him to sink the American carriers while their aircraft were away. The outcome was an indecisive engagement known to ports were sighted aircraft

naval historians as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

Admiral Fletcher had sent the Wasp away to refuel, and had therefore to match the enemy's effort with aircraft from the Saratoga and the Enterprise. He duly despatched a force which sank the Ryujo, but steered clear of Kondo's trap by reserving powerful fighter forces to defend his carriers against strikes from the Shokaku and the Zjiikaku, of whose presence he was warned by aircraft from the Enterprise. The result was that, when aircraft from the Shokaku and the Zuikaku came in for the kill, they were strongly opposed and

heavy losses. The Enterprise, hit by three bombs and damaged, survived the battle, and the Japanese transports were so fiercely assailed by aircraft from Henderson Field and the New Hebrides that they had to be

suffered

severely

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER recalled.

The Japanese

destroyers

this

289

troops were then transferred to

which landed them

a few nights later. In the light of

1942

safely

near Cape Esperance

experience the American naval

adopted a policy of using their carriers to support a limited flow of reinforcements and supplies from New Caledonia and elsewhere in the South Seas to the southern Solomons. 21 At the same time possession of Henderson Field, gradually transformed into a well-equipped all-weather airfield by engineers of the 6th Naval Construction Battalion who arrived on September 1, enabled the Americans to dominate the approaches to Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the daylight hours, though not at authorities

Command

of the sea, which in daylight had come to depend on command of the air, thus changed hands twice in every twenty-four hours. From dawn to dusk the Americans were supreme from dusk to dawn the Japanese held sway by virtue of their superiority in surface ships and their special aptitude for night attacks. The result was that neither side was able to prevent the other from supplying and reinforcing its garrisons as occasion served, but that both sides had to pay careful attention to the timetable in order to avoid disaster. By this means the Japanese were able to land the whole of the Kawaguchi detachment by the middle of September, while the Americans added some 4,000 fresh troops to their strength by bringing the 7th night. *

;

Marine Regiment from Samoa. However, the outlook for the Americans remained far from promising. Malaria, dysentery and other ills took heavy toll of the marines, whose resistance was lowered by inadequate rations and the hardships of life under canvas in one of the worst climates in the world.

To make

matters worse, the Saratoga was torpedoed by a submarine on August 3 1 and had to be sent to Pearl Harbor for repairs

on September 15 the Wasp was sunk,

also

by a submarine,

The Naval Construction Battalions, or Seabees, were special units consisting mainly of skilled artisans drawn chiefly from the building and engineering trades. The officers were mostly naval constructors or engineering graduates. All officers and men were trained to fight as well as build. *

290

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

while covering the passage of the 7th Marine Regiment. At the Battle of Bloody Ridge in the middle of September •General Vandegrift successfully withstood an attempt by the Kawaguchi detachment to recapture the airfield and drive him into the sea, but was left with an uncomfortable impression that before long his force might be outnumbered or starved out. Only a few days later the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters decided that, for the first time, the recapture of Guadalcanal must take precedence over operations in New Guinea. 22

When Japanese

troops began to stream ashore at

Buna

Western Allies had only meagre land forces in Guinea. There were two Australian militia battalions at Port Moresby, and a third militia battalion was assembling at Milne Bay. One independent Australian company, supplemented by a few troops raised locally, was stationed at the centre of the gold-mining district inland from Salamaua, and one native battalion and an incomplete Australian battalion were between Kokoda and Buna. MacArthur was on the point of sending a small force overland to Buna for the purpose of establishing an air base which would be needed for an eventual advance to the northern Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago, but found himself forestalled. 23 Allied naval forces in the South- West Pacific Area consisted in the summer of 1942 of only five cruisers, eight destroyers, twenty submarines and a few light patrol craft. On the other hand, MacArthur had substantial air forces in Australia, in addition to two fighter squadrons at Port Moresby and an Australian reconnaissance squadron and some Catalina flying boats at Milne Bay. In 1942 there were two tracks by which the neighbourhood of Port Moresby could be reached across the Owen Stanley Mountains from the Buna area. That used by the Japanese led by comparatively easy stages to Kokoda, climbed across steep ridges and through deep gorges to a 7,000-foot-high pass at Templeton's Crossing, and continued through equally difficult country to the narrow

in July, the

New

PAPUA: JULY-SEPTEMBER coastal plain

Coral Sea. trail,

1942

291

which looks on the Gulf of Papua and the

The

alternative route,

known

as the

Kapa Kapa

crossed the watershed at a point dominated

ains rising to 10,000 feet or so,

steeper than those of the

and

its

by mount-

gradients were even

Kokoda trail. Both tracks

traversed

country whose climate resembles that of the Solomon Islands, North- West Borneo, and parts of Burma and West Africa in being among the wettest in the world. The Japanese advanced quickly to Kokoda, which they occupied on July 29, only eight days after their advanced party of some 2,000 men had landed more than fifty miles away at Buna. Taking advantage of their unchallenged control of the Bismarck Sea, they went on to raise their strength in New Guinea to a total of roughly 13,500 of all ranks, but soon found themselves facing insuperable difficulties of supply. Under the impact of repeated attacks by Allied bombers, their line of communication along a single track broke down so catastrophically that many of their troops died of starvation, or were so weakened by privations that they succumbed easily to one or other or a variety of tropical diseases. Meanwhile MacArthur ordered the 18th Australian Brigade to Milne Bay and the 21st Australian Brigade to Port Moresby. On August 12 Lieutenant-General F. F. Rowell, commanding the 1st Australian Corps, arrived at Port Moresby to take command and sent the 21st Brigade towards Kokoda. In spite of their difficulties the Japanese continued to push southwards until, in the middle of September, the arrival of the 25th Australian Brigade to reinforce the 21st turned the scale. They were then brought to a halt only thirty- two miles from their destination. In the meantime a small Japanese force landed under cover of darkness at Milne Bay, but was driven out by the 18th Brigade after a desperate struggle for the airfield. By the end of the third week in September MacArthur was thus ready to turn to the offensive with forces which already included the whole of the 7th Australian Division and would soon include the greater part of the 6th Australian Division and elements of the 32nd United States

MAP

30

Port Moresby to

10

20

Bismarck. Sen

Buna

30

Miles

Kokoda

K^

f

Templeton's

J

y

Crossing

Pongani

8407

Roads Tracks

November 1942 January 1943

Allied advances to

Australian

American Spot heights in feet

CAPTURE OF KOKODA On

293

September 23 the Australian General John Blarney, who was responsible to MacArthur for Division.

Sir all

land forces in the South- West Pacific Area, arrived at Port Moresby to take direct control of operations in New Guinea. His plan was to use the 7th Australian Division to drive the Japanese back along the Kokoda trail, and at the same time to threaten their flank by sending an American column towards Buna by the Kapa Kapa route. In addition troops of the 32nd United States Infantry Division flown to Wanigela, about a hundred miles north-east of Milne Bay, were to make their way along the coast and eventually join hands with the forces advancing overland. 24 On the day of Blarney's arrival the 25th Australian Brigade began their advance along the Kokoda trail. Supplied

by husky Papuan porters, and later by "biscuit bombers" which dropped rations and ammunition as close as the crews could

manage

made good

progress to Templeton's Crossing,

to selected clearings in the jungle, they

where they

found the Japanese installed in prepared positions near the summit of the ridge. After capturing the enemy's forward positions on October 16 they were relieved by fresh troops of the 16th Brigade. Forcing their way through dense jungle and thick mud, the newcomers succeeded on October 28 in driving the Japanese from the rest of their positions after bitter fighting in conditions of appalling difficulty.

November

2

opposition,

and by November 4

the Australians

entered its

On

Kokoda without

airstrip

was ready

to

support a further advance.

The Japanese retreated from Templeton's Crossing to the west bank of the Kumusi river, some thirty to forty miles south-west of Buna, but were soon driven to the east bank by attacks delivered with powerful air support. Much reduced in numbers, they then fell back to strong positions covering about ten miles of the coast from Cape Endaiadere Gona. The Australians, after crossing the river with the aid of bridging equipment delivered by air, were brought to a standstill in front of Gona and Sanananda while their to

engineers built

new

airfields

artillery as well as supplies to

which made

it

possible for

be flown to the forward area.

294

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

Meanwhile the 128th United States Infantry Regiment, preceded by an Australian battalion which secured the airstrip, had reached the starting point of its advance at Wanigela. Thence it moved in native craft to Pongani, where a new airfield was constructed within twenty-five miles of Buna. In the first half of November the headquarters of the 32nd Division and the 126th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, joined the 128th Regiment at

Pongani. Soon after the middle of the month the remaining battalion of the 126th Regiment, arriving by the Kapa Kapa trail, also joined the 32nd Division after sending a detachment to make contact with the 7th Australian Division on its left. In the meantime the division had begun to move on Buna, but on November 20 it was brought to a halt on reaching the Japanese perimeter. Thereupon General Blarney replaced the two tired brigades of the 7th Australian Division by fresh brigades from the 6th Australian Division, brought the 32nd United States Division to its full strength by flying in the 127th Regiment, and put Lieutenant-General E. F. Herring, who had succeeded General Rowell as commander of the 1st Australian Corps, in command of all troops in northern New Guinea. Lieutenant-General R. L. Eichelberger, who arrived with orders from Mac Arthur to "take Buna or not come back alive" and was accompanied by most of the staff of the 1st United States Corps, took charge of the

American component. On December 9 the newly arrived 21st Australian Brigade duly captured Gona, but elsewhere progress was very slow. The weather was almost unbelievably bad, and both sides suffered heavy wastage not only from battle casualties but also from disease. By concentrating his one part of the Japanese perimeter at a time Rowell succeeded, however, in occupying the whole of the coastline from Cape Endaiadere to Buna by the first few

forces against

days of 1943. The arrival of a fresh American infantry regiment on January 1 then enabled him to turn with two American regiments and one Australian brigade against the narrow bridgehead still held by the remnant of the

CAPTURE OF BUNA

295

Japanese Eighteenth Army under Lieutenant-General Hatazo Adachi. By January 21 Sanananda as well as Buna and Gona were in Allied hands and all pockets of resistance had been mopped up. Since July the Australians had lost nearly 5,700 of all ranks and the Americans about 2, 800. 25 Japanese losses are not precisely known, but are believed to have been about 12,000.

While the

Allies

New Guinea,

were pushing the enemy back in eastern

the struggle for Guadalcanal continued with-

out intermission. The Japanese, convinced by their failure to capture Henderson Field in September that they had underestimated the strength of the Americans, sent a steady flow of reinforcements from Rabaul in preparation for a renewed thrust in October. As these moves did not go unnoticed, the result was that the Americans also decided to strengthen their garrison. Accordingly, two transports and eight destroyers carrying the 164th United States Infantry Regiment left Noumea on October 9 with orders to skirt San Cristobal on the north and anchor off Lunga Point in daylight on October 13. Distant cover was to be provided by task forces built

A

round the

carrier Hornet

and the

battleship Washington.

third covering force, consisting of four cruisers

destroyers under Rear-Admiral

was

Norman

Scott,

and

five

U.S.N.,

convoy by taking offensive action against and landing craft". As these were seldom to be found in the immediate neighbourhood of Guadalcanal in daylight, Admiral Scott concluded that he must be ready to reverse the verdict of the Battle of Savo Island by accepting a night action from which he was determined to emerge on the winning side. On October 9 and 10 Scott made tentative advances towards Guadalcanal, but on each occasion turned back when air reconnaissance showed that no enemy ships or landing craft were present. On the third day he learned by 4 p.m. that a Japanese naval force was approaching at high speed from the north-west and would probably reach the to protect the

"enemy

ships

island about midnight.

He

therefore increased speed to 29

296

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

knots and set a course designed to put him in the neighbourhood of Savo Island before the enemy arrived.

According to reports which reached Scott that afternoon, the Japanese naval force consisted of two cruisers and six destroyers. In fact it comprised a bombardment force of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers under RearAdmiral Aritomo Goto and a transport force of two seaplane carriers and six destroyers under Rear-Admiral Takaji Joshima. Joshima's orders were to disembark about seven hundred troops and their equipment near Kokumbona while Goto, who was in tactical command of both forces, shelled

About ten

American

positions further east.

o'clock that evening, while

still

some distance

and west of Savo Island, Scott ordered all four of his cruisers to launch reconnaissance aircraft. Two were successfully launched and sighted Joshima's ships near Cape Esperance, but they missed the bombardment force, which was then some thirty miles to the north-west. As a result Scott, who suspected that the enemy's main force was still to the west of him and was determined not to miss it, was in the midst of an elaborate change of course when his lookouts confirmed that Goto's cruisers and destroyers, already detected by radar, were close at hand. He was none the less in a far better position to cope with the unexpected than the unfortunate Goto, who knew nothing of his presence. In the course of a brief and confused action, called by naval historians the Battle of Cape Esperance, he unwittingly brought off the manoeuvre known as "crossing the enemy's T", and at 12.28 a.m. he retired after sinking two cruisers and a destroyer for the loss of one destroyer. Joshima was able to land his troops and their equipment to the south

without interference, but their arrival was more than offset by the punctual disembarkation of roughly four times as many officers and men of the 1 64th Infantry Regiment. None the less the balance of advantage during the next few days lay with the Japanese. An accurate high-level attack on Henderson Field at noon on October 13 was followed by a series of air attacks and naval bombardments which knocked out more than half the aircraft on the

GUADALCANAL: OCTOBER

1942

297

accumulated since August 7, and made flying impossible except from a grass strip intended only for fighters. For the time being, therefore, the Americans had to depend largely on bombers from distant bases not only to deal with Japanese shipping off the coast, but also to fly in fuel needed to keep their fighters in the air. As a result the Japanese were able to bring the strength of their garrison to roughly 20,000 of all ranks by disembarking some 3,000 to 4,000 men in daylight on October 15 before air attacks forced them to beach half their transports and withdraw the rest. On the same day Admiral Nimitz observed that control of the sea in the neighbourhood of the southern Solomons appeared to have been lost, that henceforth the American garrison of Guadalcanal could be supplied only at great cost, and that the situation was critical though not hope26 less. On the next day Admiral King accepted his proposal that Admiral Halsey should relieve Admiral Ghormley as Allied Supreme Commander, South Pacific Area, and Commander-in-Chief, South Pacific Force. With the conisland, destroyed nearly all the reserves of fuel

currence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ultimately of the President, arrangements were made during the next few days to divert to the South Pacific Area one battleship, six cruisers, twenty-four submarines and about a hundred and thirty naval aircraft, and at the same time to restore the damaged Enterprise to service. No additional troops could be found for the Pacific at the expense of the European or North African theatres, but it was agreed that the 25th United States Infantry Division and some seventy-five aircraft of the Army Air Corps should move to the South Seas from the Hawaiian Islands. Meanwhile the Japanese were preparing to launch their October offensive about the end of the third week in the month. Their plan was that the main body of the 2nd Division, under Lieutenant-General M. Maruyama, should march through the jungle from Kokumbona to the east bank of the Lunga river, deploy south of Bloody Ridge, and deliver a two-pronged attack northwards under cover of diversionary attacks near the western confines of the American

MAP

31

Guadalcanal: the October Battle

- American

positions

Japanese thrusts: Main body Diversion

oaa Japanese approach routes

4000

2000

g

g***

,

,

,

"Yards

OCTOBER

1942

299

bridgehead by a smaller force under Major-General T. Sumiyoshi. As soon as Henderson Field was in Japanese hands, a strong fleet under Vice- Admiral N. Kondo was to venture within striking distance in order to " apprehend and annihilate any powerful forces in the Solomons area as well as any reinforcements". For this purpose Kondo's "advanced force" of two battleships, one light carrier, six

and twelve cruisers was augmented by the three large carriers, two battleships, five cruisers and fifteen destroyers of Nagumo's Striking Force. As most of the artillery intended to support both Maruyama's and Sumiyoshi's troops was to stay with Sumiyoshi, the Seventeenth Army's plan called for careful synchronizacruisers

tion of attacks to be delivered at points about five miles

apart. As things turned out, Maruyama's approach by a roundabout route through inadequately reconnoitred country took longer than the planners expected, and part of his force was still further delayed by a combination of exceptionally dense jungle and torrential rain. As a result Sumiyoshi's thrust near the mouth of the Matanikau river had spent its force by the time the main body of the 2nd Division was ready for action, and even then the movements of Maruyama's eastern and western spearheads were

not well co-ordinated. When Maruyama did come forward on the night of October 24, two battalions of the 164th Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment, well posted in prepared positions, inflicted such fearful slaughter on his troops that, after a further attempt on the following night, he was obliged to withdraw the remnant of his force. Further west the two remaining battalions of the 7th Marine Regiment, though hard pressed, held firm against repeated attacks by part of Sumiyoshi's force which had crossed the Matanikau river about a mile from its mouth and then swung northwards. Meanwhile Admiral Kondo was at sea awaiting news of the capture of the airfield. He was roughly 300 miles northeast of the southern Solomons when, early on October 25, he learned that the battle on land was going badly but that the outcome was still uncertain. Some six hours later in strength

300

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

the approach of a Catalina flying boat from Espiritu Santo, in the New Hebrides, caused him to sheer off to the north, although he was still unaware that there was an

American

carrier force about 360 miles to the south of him. This consisted of three task forces built round the Enterprise the Hornet, and the battleships Washington and South Dakota, but for practical purposes formed one fleet under the tactical command of Rear- Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid. ,

Halsey's orders to the three task forces were to

make

rendezvous at a point 273 miles north-east by east of Espiritu Santo, sweep north of the Santa Cruz Islands, and then head south-west "in order to be in a position to intercept enemy forces approaching Guadalcanal". Kinkaid's sweep north of the Santa Cruz Islands was, however, still uncompleted when he learned as a result of the sighting by the Catalina from Espiritu Santo that he did not need to turn to the south-west in order to place himself between the enemy and his objective. He therefore set a north-westerly course, and by dawn on October 26 was less than 200 miles

from Kondo's force. Meanwhile Kondo had despatched reconnaissance aircraft which soon sighted the Hornet, and Kinkaid had also ordered an early-morning search by reconnaissance aircraft each armed with one bomb. Kinkaid scored an early success when two of these disabled the light carrier £uiho, but was twenty minutes later than Kondo in getting his main strike under way. Already outnumbered, he was further handicapped by the loss of nearly half the aircraft despatched from the Enterprise in an encounter with Japanese fighters which stayed to attack them instead of accompanying Kondo's bombers to their objectives. The outcome was a tactical success for Kondo, who sank the Hornet and a destroyer, damaged the Enterprise, the South Dakota and a cruiser, and lost none of his own ships. The Shokaku was, however, so badly knocked about that she remained out of action for nine months, and the £uiho and a Japanese destroyer were also damaged. The Americans lost seventy aircraft and the Japanese about a hundred. Within a few hours of the sinking of the Hornet in this

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER

1942

301

action (known as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands), an urgent request for the loan of a carrier was received in London. 27 The British, although hard pressed to meet demands arising from the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, were willing to help, but had received so little

information about events in the Pacific that they took the opportunity of asking how Halsey's forces were disposed and how the Hornet had been lost. This angered Admiral King, who complained that he was being 'catechized". After an exchange of views which may have enlightened the British but did nothing to make King more amenable, the Admiralty agreed to send the Victorious to the South Pacific at the cost of leaving the Home Fleet without a single carrier. However, by the time she reached her destination and was ready to go into action with American airmen c

aboard her, the struggle for Guadalcanal was over. In the meantime both the Americans and the Japanese continued to reinforce their garrisons, while the Japanese also renewed their attempt to put Henderson Field out of action by naval bombardment. Between November 2 and November 10 Japanese cruisers and destroyers made repeated runs to Kokumbona under cover of darkness, and on November 4 two regiments of the 2nd United States Marine Division landed unopposed at Lunga Point. Two convoys carrying 6,000 officers and men of the socalled Americal Division from New Caledonia followed in the second week of November. The transports were still unloading off Lunga Point when, on the afternoon of November 12, a strong Japanese naval force was seen approaching from the direction of Rabaul. This consisted of two battleships, one light cruiser and fourteen destroyers under Vice-Admiral Kiroake Abe, whose orders were to bombard Henderson Field and then withdraw. As most of his gunners had exchanged their armour-piercing ammunition for lightly fused projectiles unsuitable for use against

Abe was not likely to go out of his way to engage the enemy's surface ships, but would defend himself with torpedoes if attacked.

warships,

Admiral Turner, who was again in charge of the landing

302

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

operation, responded to the news of Abe's approach by ordering that unloading should continue. When it was

completed he withdrew

with a close escort of and support forces under Rear-Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan to cover his withdrawal by fighting a delaying action. In the early hours of Friday, November 13, Callaghan's five cruisers and eight destroyers met Abe's force almost head on at a point about midway between Lunga Point and Savo Island. In the course of a brief but furious battle all Callaghan's ships were hit, he himself was killed, and two of his cruisers and four of his destroyers were either sunk or so badly damaged that they had to be abandoned. The Japanese lost two destroyers, the battleship Hiei was left helpless in the water and succumbed to air attacks next day, and Abe withdrew without accomplishing his mission. On the following night Vice-Admiral G. Mikawa renewed the attack with four heavy and two light cruisers and six destroyers. Meeting nothing more formidable than a few light naval craft from Tulagi, he carried out a bombardment which destroyed seventeen American aircraft on the ground and damaged another thirty-two, but failed to put the airfield out of action. After losing the heavy cruiser Kinugasa to air attacks on the homeward voyage, he returned to his base at Shortland Island with three of his cruisers and one destroyer damaged, also by Allied aircraft. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Raizo Tanaka, with eleven transports and the same number of destroyers under command, was awaiting a chance of disembarking reinforcements which he had intended to put ashore on the night of Abe's rebuff. Accordingly Admiral Kondo, who was in charge of the whole expedition, assumed direct command of the remnant of Abe's force and arranged to support an attempt to run the transports to Guadalcanal on the night of November 14. Tanaka duly left Shortland Island early on that day, but was heavily attacked by American aircraft and reached the neighbourhood of Savo Island with only four of his transports still afloat. In the meantime Kondo, intent on punishing Henderson Field so severely that he and his transports

three destroyers, leaving the rest of his escort

NOVEMBER

14-15, 1942

303

Tanaka would be able to withdraw on the following morning without interference from land-based bombers, had set course through the passage between Santa Ysabel and Florida Island at a speed designed to take him to his destination as the moon was setting about an hour after midnight. As Halsey was determined not to risk the Enterprise north of Guadalcanal, the task of dealing with Kondo's one battleship, four cruisers and nine destroyers fell to the two battleships and four destroyers of Task Force 64, under Rear-Admiral Willis A. Lee. Admiral Lee, flying his flag in the Washington, was less than a hundred miles south of the western extremity of the island when he learned, at 4 p.m. on November 14, that a strong force was approaching from the north. Concluding that other forces were likely to follow from the west but that the force already seen must be dealt with first, he timed his entry into Iron Bottom Sound so as to arrive before the enemy. About an hour before midnight, when he was heading west off the north coast of the island with his destroyers in the van, his radar detected a ship or ships to starboard. The first shots were fired about half an hour later, after Kondo's leading cruiser had come in sight as the moon was disappearing behind the mountains to the south. The American destroyers fared badly, perhaps because their officers were confused by Kondo's disposition of his ships in three separate forces, and were soon out of the battle. The South Dakota also became temporarily incapable of fighting and retired. The Washington then saved the situation by scoring some fifty hits on Kondo's only battleship and damaging her so severely that she was afterwards scuttled by her crew. By 12.33 a.m. Lee, although out of touch with South Dakota and uncertain of her fate, felt justified in concluding that the Japanese had failed to achieve their object and that he could safely withdraw the Washington on a course designed to distract attention from his damaged ships. He was right so far as Kondo was concerned, but underestimated Tanaka's courage and tenacity. Boldly continuing on his eastward course when the battle was over, Tanaka succeeded in beaching his surviving transports,

304

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

from which some thousands of Japanese troops scrambled ashore at Tassafaronga as dawn was breaking. But all their stores were lost, and the beached transports were soon destroyed by Allied aircraft. This action, regarded by naval historians as the last phase of the battle begun by Callaghan in the early hours of the previous day, was expensive for both sides. The Japanese lost the battleship Kirishima and a destroyer, while the Americans lost three destroyers and suffered heavy damage to the South Dakota. Lee's defeat of Kondo's elaborately screened bombardment force was none the less not only averted a potent threat to Henderson Field but convinced the Japanese that they could not afford to send their heavy ships into the narrow waters between the Solomon Islands while Halsey had a decisive,

since

it

fleet in being.

Even so, in dealing with the destroyers from which the enemy continued to unload reinforcements and supplies under cover of darkness, the Americans were still handicapped by Japanese superiority in night fighting. This arose partly from technical factors such as the better design of the Japanese torpedoes, but was largely due to the inability of the Americans to assemble task forces composed of ships which had worked and fought together in the past. The weakness of a system which sent Lee into action on November 14 with four destroyers drawn from four different divisions must have been apparent to Halsey and his staff; but a tendency to improvise proved ineradicable as long as the press of events put a premium on swift decisions and left time for careful rehearsals or patient staff work. It follows that, while in retrospect the surface action fought in the middle of November can be seen to have marked a turning point in the struggle for Guadalcanal, the Americans were not conscious at the time of much reduction in the pressure on their forces. The Japanese continued to cling tenaciously to their positions in the western part of the island, were pushed back only a short distance by an offensive launched by Vandegrift in the second half of the month, and towards the end of it were suspected of planning little

NOVEMBER

29-30, 1942

305

a substantial reinforcement of their garrison. In fact their was to send not reinforcements but supplies.

intention

These were packed in drums which were to be jettisoned on the nights of November 30 and December 4, 8 and 12 off Tassafaronga, where they would be picked up by small craft and carried to the shore. Accordingly Halsey (promoted from Vice-Admiral to Admiral on November 26) assembled a task force of five cruisers and four destroyers to counter any such attempt. Admiral Kinkaid was to have commanded it, but on November 28 was posted away from the South Pacific Area. His place was taken at the last moment by Rear- Admiral Carleton H. Wright, an experienced task force commander who was no stranger to the Pacific theatre but lacked Kinkaid' s intimate knowledge of the waters in which he was about to fight. Late on November 29 Admiral Tanaka left Bougainville with eight destroyers to make the first of the four runs envisaged in his plan. Almost at the same moment Admiral Wright left Espiritu Santo to intercept him. He carried with him a tactical plan drawn up by Kinkaid, but knew nothing of the strength or composition of Tanaka's force except that it was said to consist of eight destroyers accompanied by six transports which might or might not turn out to be warships. After he had sailed this information was supplemented by a report to the effect that "nearly a dozen 55 destroyers were believed to have left Bougainville since nightfall on November 29.

By

taking the shortest route while Tanaka followed a devious course in order to escape observation, Wright reached Guadalcanal in time to add to his force two destroyers detached on Halsey s orders from a convoy homeward bound from Lunga Roads. On the other hand, he had no time to confer with their commanders or disclose his plans to them. The seaplanes from his cruisers, which he had sent to the anchorage at Tulagi so that they would be ready to drop flares when the enemy appeared, had duly reached their destination. But these aircraft, designed for launching by catapult, proved of little value since their pilots were 5

306

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

unable, except after repeated attempts and long delays, to get them off the water in the flat calm prevailing at the time. The night was pitch dark, and would remain so until the moon rose about midnight. Soon after 11 p.m., when Wright was steaming westwards off the north coast of the island, his radar detected Tanaka's force approaching on his port bow. Tanaka had no radar. Although he had been warned earlier in the day that American cruisers were making for Iron Bottom Sound, he had no means of knowing that the enemy was close at hand. All but two of his ships were encumbered with the supplies which they were about to throw overboard, and he had already reduced speed for that purpose. Thus Wright combined the advantage of surprise with that of superior fire-power. On the other hand, he was troubled by the absence of his seaplanes, and had had less than forty-eight hours in which to size up the capabilities fatal indecision led of his ships and their commanders. him to hesitate for four minutes before authorizing the destroyers in his van to open fire with torpedoes, although the range had closed to little more than four miles by the time he was asked to do so. 28 The result was that, when he did give the word, Tanaka's leading ships were already abaft of his best-equipped destroyers and were becoming more difficult to hit at every moment. Barely a minute later, when only a score of American torpedoes had been launched, Wright threw caution to the winds by ordering his cruisers to open fire with their guns on targets detected by their radar. 29 As the resultant gunflashes at once disclosed the position of his cruisers to the enemy, he thus forfeited through undue eagerness to exploit his fire-power the surprise which his initial hesitation had already prevented his destroyers from using to the best advantage. Superb marksmanship by an enemy well versed in the technique of night fighting did the rest. In little more than half an hour the redoubtable Tanaka inflicted a crushing defeat on Wright's superior force by sinking one and severely damaging three of his five cruisers for the loss of only one Japanese destroyer.

A

DECEMBER

1942

307

In spite of this success, the Japanese naval authorities soon came to the conclusion that the burden of maintaining and reinforcing the garrison of Guadalcanal was more than they could shoulder. Their colleagues on the army side were eager to continue the struggle, had formed a new Eighth Army to co-ordinate operations in New Guinea and the Solomons, and were assembling large forces at Rabaul. But the means of carrying substantial reinforcements to Guadalcanal and supplying both them and the 25,000 troops already present could not be found except at a price which the navy was not prepared to pay. Accordingly, Imperial General Headquarters ruled on December 3 1 that Guadalcanal should eventually be abandoned. 30 A new line would be established in New Georgia, where an airfield had already been constructed at Munda, near the north-west corner of the island. As it happened, this airfield had been detected early in December on air photographs taken by Allied reconnaissance aircraft, but its existence was thought by Allied intelligence to point not to withdrawal from Guadalcanal but to a forthcoming attempt by Japanese air forces to

make Henderson

Field untenable. 31

Meanwhile the Americans, although they still held no more of Guadalcanal than a bridgehead about seven miles wide and up to two and a half miles deep, had built up such substantial air forces at Henderson Field and adjacent fighter strips that they

were able not only

to supply their

garrison almost at will but to carry out reliefs

and

reinforce-

ments with comparative ease. On December 9 General Vandegrift was relieved by Major-General (afterwards Lieutenant-General) A. M. Patch, hitherto commanding the Americal Division. Between that date and the first week of January all four regiments of the 1st Marine Division were withdrawn to Australia for rest and reorganization. The arrival at the end of 1942 of 7,737 officers and enlisted men of the 25th United States Infantry Division, followed by the remaining regiments of the 2nd Marine Division and further elements of the Americal Division, brought the strength of the American garrison to roughly 50,000 of all ranks. With these troops General Patch, who knew nothing w.f.e.

—

1

308

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

of Japanese plans for withdrawal, intended to round up or annihilate the enemy and secure the whole island. Patch's plan was to open a major offensive in the new year, but first to secure his flank by capturing Mount Austen, which his predecessor had meant to take on the day of the initial landings but had never reached. After a preliminary reconnaissance on December 14, the 132nd Infantry Regiment began to advance towards the foothills of the mountains on December 17, and on Christmas Eve its leading battalion captured a Japanese observation post on the summit. But the Japanese clung tenaciously to prepared positions on a ridge about a mile to the west, and were not finally dislodged until January 22, after the equivalent of more than five infantry battalions supported by artillery and naval gunfire had been brought to bear against them.

The main

launched on January 10, began slowly but gained momentum as the Japanese prepared for their final withdrawal in the first week of February. The 6th Marine Regiment, moving along the coast with the 147th Infantry Regiment on its flank and the 182nd Infantry Regiment on the extreme left, reached Kokumbona on January 23. Six hundred Japanese troops brought specially to the island to cover the withdrawal then fought offensive,

a stiff rear-guard action in front of Tassafaronga, which the Americans entered early in February and found unoccupied. The arrival of large numbers of Japanese destroyers in late January and early February did not escape the notice of the Americans, but was thought to herald renewed attempts to hold the north-western corner of the island.

Meanwhile a reconnaissance party of the 132nd Infantry Regiment had marched through the jungle from Kokumbona and reached Beaufort Bay, where troops of the 147th Infantry Regiment despatched by sea had already made contact with the occupants of a Dutch mission station and had set up a road-block to prevent the Japanese from retreating by the Kokumbona trail. From Beaufort Bay the reconnaissance party travelled by schooner to Verahue, on

MAP

32

Western Guadalcanal

10 I

15 I

20 =1

Miles

SAVO A

>

^

CapeEsperance

,^

° Henderson Field

Mt Au$tetv Beaufort

Say ^

_ ^^American

advances and approach routes, January -February 1943 Preliminary thrusts,

December 1942- January 1943

Mt Popomatvast^

310

THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

the north-west coast. There they were joined on February 1 by troops carried from the American bridgehead in a

seaplane tender and five landing craft which also brought transport, artillery and supplies. Screened by four destroyers, these craft had made the seven-hour voyage from Lunga Roads, mostly in daylight, without interference from the enemy, although Japanese aircraft were active at the time. General Patch, still hoping to round up large numbers of Japanese troops by a double enveloping movement from east and west, then sent the 161st Infantry Regiment, supported by artillery of the 10th Marine Regiment, along the coast from Tassafaronga, while elements of the 132nd Infantry Regiment came forward in a wide sweep from Verahue. At 4.25 p.m. on February 9, some thirty-six hours after eighteen destroyers had borne away the last survivors of the Japanese garrison, the leading battalions of the two infantry regiments sprung an empty trap by meeting on the banks of a river about three miles south-east of Cape Esperance. The seven-months-long struggle for Guadalcanal thus ended with an anti-climax which each side interpreted in its own way. The Japanese, who had lost about two-thirds of their troops but had brought off a remarkable feat by withdrawing nearly 12,000 survivors under the noses of the Americans and without arousing their suspicions, claimed that their garrison, after pinning the Americans to a corner of the island, had accomplished their mission and departed to fight elsewhere. Although highly misleading, this statement was not without a grain of truth, inasmuch as the Americans did little to enlarge their bridgehead until after the Japanese had decided to withdraw. Similarly, there was an element of exaggeration in the claim made by General Patch on February 9 that the Japanese had been "totally and completely defeated". The fact remains that the Americans attained their strategic aim by gaining possession of the whole island, and that their combat losses were much lighter than the enemy's. Strategically the most interesting feature of the campaign

FEBRUARY

311

1943

was the part played in the struggle for command of the sea by land-based aircraft. Without possession of Henderson Field, the Americans would have been hard put to maintain their troops and prevent the Japanese from bringing up reinforcements and supplies in daylight as well as at night. In that case they could have averted a disaster to their land forces only by risking the destruction of their carrier force by the enemy's land-based aircraft and superior carrier and battleship fleet. As it was, a cautious use of their most valuable ships cost them the loss of the Wasp, the Hornet and eight American or British Commonwealth cruisers, while the Japanese lost only one light carrier and four cruisers but also lost two of their older battleships.* Taking destroyers and submarines into account, each side lost the same number of warships, but Japanese losses in transports and supply ships were much heavier than those of the Allies. Thus in one sense the Americans paid the higher price, since their fleet was the smaller. From another point of view they paid the lower price, for their capacity to make good their losses by hastening the repair of damaged ships and the completion of new ships was by far the greater. Within four months of the close of the Guadalcanal campaign American naval strength in the Pacific was, indeed, to equal or exceed that of the Japanese Navy in all classes of fighting ships except cruisers.

*

The

losses

on both

sides

were as follows Allied

Battleships

Large

fleet carriers

Light carriers

Heavy

cruisers

Light cruisers Destroyers

Submarines

— 2 — 6

Japanese 2

— 1

3

2

1

14

11

— 24

6

24

i4

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

FOR

MANY

generations before the out-

break of the Second World War, British plans for the defence of India were founded on the assumption that any attempt to invade the Indian sub-continent would be made across the North- West Frontier. To the north, the Himalayas were an impassable barrier; to the north-east there was no potential enemy within striking distance. Moreover, the frontier between Assam and Burma ran through wild, mountainous country where torrential rain from the middle of May to the end of October made campaigning almost impossible for roughly half the year. The Japanese invasion of Burma forced the India Command to grapple with the problem of defending the NorthEast Frontier. It also threw a glaring light on the difficulty of maintaining more than one or two divisions in Assam. There were no bridges across the broad, fast-flowing Brahmaputra, and no roads of any importance in eastern Bengal. Access to some of the river ports on the right bank of the Brahmaputra was by metre-gauge railway, to others by spurs from the broad-gauge system the ports on the left bank were served by a metre-gauge railway, a second-class trunk road, or in some cases by both road and railway. Equipment and stores, as well as men and animals, consigned to the frontier area had therefore to be carried by routes which involved a succession of changes from one form of transport to another. The size of the force that could be maintained east and south of the Brahmaputra was thus severely restricted by considerations of supply. Early in 1942 the military authorities took steps to improve matters by establishing at Dimapur an advanced base depot which, when fully stocked and equipped, would ;

314

316

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

hold thirty days' supplies for three divisions and be capable of handling a thousand tons of stores a day. 1 They intended that this should be linked with the frontier at Tamu, and eventually with the west bank of the Irrawaddy at Kalewa, by at least one all-weather road capable of carrying two hundred lorries a day in each direction. Plans were also made in the first few months of 1942 to run a road through the Hukawng Valley from Ledo to Myitkyina so that war material could still be sent along an existing road across the Chinese frontier to Chiang Kai-shek should control of the Burma Road between Wanting and Lashio be lost. In addition, the Allies were determined to build upwards of two hundred new airfields in various parts of the country so that sixty-six bomber, fighter and reconnaissance squadrons could be accommodated in place of the eleven squadrons already present. Before long the situation was further complicated by the loss of Upper Burma, the withdrawal of Burcorps to Assam, and Japanese naval operations in the Bay of Bengal. At a time when it still seemed possible that Japanese troops might cross the frontier before or even during the rainy season, practically the whole of the available labour force in the frontier area had to be withdrawn from urgent work on roads and airfields to build and stock camps for the hundreds of thousands of refugees who poured into the country.* Accommodation and supplies had also to be found for roughly 20,000 officers and other ranks of Burcorps and some 8,000 survivors of the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions. These demands threw a heavy burden on an administrative system already hard put to maintain the existing forces east and south of the Brahmaputra. The These numbered about 400,000. Roughly a quarter of them were carried to Calcutta by sea after they had made their way across the Arakan Hills to Akyab, but the great majority preceded, accompanied, or followed the retreating British, Indian and Chinese forces along the northern routes. About 190,000 reached Imphal by way of Tamu; others followed more difficult routes through the Hukawng Valley or made for Fort Hertz along the mountain track from Myitkyina. Many who were overtaken by the monsoon in the wild foothills of the Himalayas were brought in by rescue parties after aircraft had spotted *

them and dropped food and medical

supplies.

MARCH-MAY

1942

317

railways lacked sufficient rolling stock in any case, and were barely able to cope with the increased volume of through traffic created by the diversion of merchant shipping from east coast to west coast ports after Nagumo's and Kondo's raids in April. * However, the Japanese Fifteenth Army made no attempt to follow Burcorps across the frontier, and the weather would soon have ruled out any serious threat to Assam in the immediate future, even if such a move had been intended. Wavell and his subordinate commanders, although still hampered by inadequate communications, were thus free to devote the rainy season largely to the thousand and one administrative problems which would have to be settled before they could hope to drive the enemy out of Burma. Difficulties of supply, aggravated by a shortage of skilled drivers and mechanics and such natural hazards as landslides and washed-out bridges, continued to make the maintenance of large numbers of troops further forward than Dimapur extremely troublesome, but became less menacing as more and more units not needed in the forward area were sent away to rest, reorganize and re-equip. Work on the Ledo-Myitkyina road had to be suspended in the first half of May because the 15,000 labourers assigned to the job were needed for more urgent tasks, and in any

much of its point when the Japanese entered Myitkyina later in the month. But good progress was made with the construction of new airfields and the development of facilities for an expanding air force.f Meanwhile land communication with China had been lost. On the other hand, in March a small number of transport aircraft and their American crews had arrived at Dinjan, near Ledo, for the twofold purpose of ferrying to case the project lost

* See pp. 239-240. t Under the scheme adopted in

By

the end of 1942 86 of these

May, 215 new airfields were to be constructed. had at least one all-weather runway not less

than 1,600 yards long, and five were complete in all respects. In addition sixty fair-weather airstrips were completed. At the same time the system of command and control was greatly improved and the existing repair and maintenance depot at Karachi was supplemented by six base repair depots in various parts of India and Ceylon and a central supply unit at Allahabad.

318

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

Myitkyina supplies to be taken on to China by surface transport,

and reconnoitring a

direct air route to

Kunming The

across the 15,000-foot-high foothills of the Himalayas.

was found to involve a hazardous exposure to turbulent air currents which could break up an aircraft in the air, and in bad weather much blind flying through vast banks of cloud. However, when Myitkyina fell it became the only link with Nationalist China. Undeterred by losses, the pioneers of the air lift to China persisted to such good effect that eventually they and their successors were carrying to Kunming a bigger flow of war material than had passed along the Burma Road. direct route

Many of the Allied troops who served in Assam or Burma during the Second World War received the impression that theirs

was a

£

'forgotten front".

The

authorities in

London,

they believed, took only an intermittent and perfunctory interest in their affairs once Burcorps had retreated to India.

This was not so. There was never a time between 1942 and 1945 when the British government and Chiefs of Staff failed to concern themselves deeply, even passionately, with events in South-East Asia. If their interventions often ended in disappointment and frustration, the reason was not that their efforts were half-hearted, but that they were seldom in a position to know whether the means of giving effect to their proposals would be forthcoming. So far as the men on the spot were concerned, plans for the recapture of Burma, with India as the base, were first considered within a few weeks of the withdrawal to Assam. From the standpoint of Delhi, Wavell came to the conclusion that, until he had enough aircraft to ensure command of the air, he would have to content himself with a limited offensive designed to secure part of upper Burma north of Mandalay. 2 About the end of October he would, if circumstances permitted, advance on a broad though discontinuous front from the Imphal-Chin Hills area, with the line of the Chindwin from Kalewa to Homalin as his

immediate objective. If successful, he would push on by the

1942

319

to a line from Kalewa through Katha to Myitkyina. He would then be in a position to join hands with the Chinese armies in Yunnan for an eventual advance on Mandalay, Rangoon and southern

end of the 1942-43 dry season

Burma. Viewed from London, the obstacles which seemed to Wavell to bar his way to the early recapture of the whole of

Burma appeared

less

after the Battle of

Midway

formidable. Churchill, concluding Island that the Japanese were unlikely to offer a further challenge to British control of the Indian Ocean, described the operations proposed by Wavell as "very nice and useful nibbling", but added that

what he was really after was the recapture of Rangoon and Moulmein and a thrust towards Bangkok. 3 He suggested an advance along the Arakan coast from Chittagong to Akyab, to be followed by a seaborne expedition across the northern part of the Bay of Bengal. As the seaborne expedition would call for some 40,000 to 50,000 specially trained troops with a suitable armoured component, Churchill wisely added that it would be feasible only if all went well in the Middle East and on the Russian Front. Within the next few weeks Tobruk fell, the Eighth Army retreated in haste to the Egyptian frontier, and the Russians suffered a series of sharp reverses in the Crimea and the Ukraine.

The

Chiefs of Staff diverted substantial forces

from India to the Middle East for fear that the Germans might attempt a double enveloping movement across the Nile Delta and through the Caucasus, but none the less proposed that Wavell should carry on with plans and preparations for an advance to Rangoon in the early part of 1943. 4

Almost simultaneously the All-India Congress Committee, incensed by the refusal of the British to agree that Britain could best serve the cause of world peace by abandoning the four hundred million inhabitants of British India to their fate, invited Mahatma Gandhi to lead a mass struggle "on non-violent lines". The outbreak of organized arson, murder, sabotage and intimidation which followed Gandhi's arrest on August 9 received little popular support

320

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

and was soon suppressed, but the troop movements needed to restore order increased the strain on the railways and had adverse effects on arms production and training programmes. 5 Furthermore, at the end of July Wavell was ordered by the Chiefs of Staff to return to Madagascar a quantity of assault shipping and landing craft which had been sent to him after the capture of Diego Suarez. 6 Finally, on August 1 1 the War Cabinet in London accepted proposals which made it certain that troops which were to have been put at WavelPs disposal for a thrust across the Bay of Bengal would remain in Madagascar for some time to

come. 7

Meanwhile the Americans had committed themselves to a long-drawn struggle for Guadalcanal, and the target date for the Allied invasion of French North Africa was less than three months away. As President Roosevelt and his advisers attached far more importance to these undertakings than to any attempt by the British to regain control of Burma, there was little likelihood that the means of launching a seaborne expedition across the Bay of Bengal would be forthcoming unless the Combined Chiefs of Staff addressed themselves resolutely to the whole question of priorities for the Far Eastern war. However, Wavell

still

believed that the troops and

landing craft detained in Madagascar would reach him by the end of the third week in October. 8 In the middle of September he decided to restrict his operations on the Chindwin front, and ordered the Eastern Army in Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to make preparations for the early capture of Akyab and the reoccupation of northern Arakan. Meanwhile there were signs that the enemy was very thin on the ground in northern Burma. During the rainy season an Allied reconnaissance party dropped by parachute near Myitkyina succeeded in making its way to Fort Hertz, where it was joined in the middle of August by two officers and nine men also dropped by parachute. A disused landing ground in the neighbourhood was then made ready, and on September 10 a company of Indian infantry, thereafter supplied by air from Dinjan, was flown in. In the

1942

321

following months Wavell accepted a proposal from Stilwell that the survivors of the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions, re-equipping and training in India under Stil-

who were

welPs direction, should be reinforced by Chinese troops from Yunnan and eventually used in an offensive role. Stilwell had in mind a thrust from Imphal towards the Chinese frontier and the Burma Road, but Imphal could not be used as a base since its communications were already fully stretched. Accordingly he agreed with Wavell that his advance should be made from Ledo through the Hukawng Valley to Myitkyina, that the plan to construct a road along that route should be revived, and that the Americans should assume responsibility for building the road and accumulating supplies at Ledo. 9 During the summer of 1942 Wavell also sanctioned the formation of a special long-range penetration force under Lieutenant- Colonel (afterwards Brigadier) O. C. Wingate, who had attracted favourable notice in organizing guerilla activities in Palestine and Abyssinia. This force, officially designated the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade but generally known as the Chindits, consisted of a headquarters, one British and one Gurkha infantry battalion, a signals section, a special sabotage unit and a reconnaissance unit. Supplied entirely by air and depending on horses and mules for its mobility, it was to operate behind the Japanese lines for the threefold purpose of disrupting the enemy's communications, supplying target data for air attacks, and "exploiting any opportunities created by its presence within enemy territory". The name "Chindit" came from the Chin the, a mythical winged beast which figures prominently in Burmese iconography.

On

September

21, 1942, Lieutenant-General

N. M.

S.

commanding the Eastern Army, ordered the 14th Indian Division (Major-General W. L. Lloyd) to move forward in Arakan and seize a line from Maungdaw to Buthidaung as the prelude to a seaborne assault on Akyab to be delivered when the necessary troops, assault craft, landing craft and naval escorts became available. Irwin,

MAP

34

The Arakan Offensive

ARAKAN, The weather in Arakan is of May until early

1942

323

bad from the middle the end of October, but from November until

May is usually good.

invariably

In 1942, however, exceptionally

heavy rain fell early in November and again in the week of December. Nevertheless the 14th Division

made

first

a creditable ad-

vance across almost entirely roadless country between Chittagong and the base of the Mayu Peninsula, constructing its line of communication as it went and making use of a few river steamers, launches and local craft to carry some of its troops and supplies by sea or along inland waterways. On December 17, only a fortnight behind schedule,

on the MaungdawButhidaung line, from which the Japanese had withdrawn after occupying it as an outpost position since October. In the meantime Wavell had at last become aware that the resources needed for a full-scale seaborne expedition were not likely to reach him in time to be of use. 10 Moreover, it was doubtful whether such an operation could succeed without a degree of air superiority which had not yet been won. His plan was now to capture Akyab by an overland advance combined with a short-range seaborne assault from the Mayu Peninsula, for which small craft could be used. 11 Hence it was important that the southern end of the peninsula should be captured in time for the troops which were already preparing for the seaborne assault to go into action about the end of January. the division established itself in strength

To

defend the approaches to Akyab Island the Japanese December only the 213th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion in central Burma. But Lieutenant-General

had

in

S. Iida,

commanding

the Fifteenth

Army, was

fully alive to

the importance of retaining an objective whose loss would put the Allied air forces within easy striking distance of

Rangoon. Early in January he ordered the 55th Division, then roughly 180 miles to the south, to move to Akyab and the 33rd Division to send the remaining battalion of the 213th Infantry Regiment to Paletwa, on the inner flank of the British advance. Meanwhile Major-General Takishi Koka, commanding the 55th Division, was to assume

324

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

command

of the troops already in the area and to defend

existing positions at all costs. 12

On

reaching Akyab towards the end of the month, confronted by an apparently desperate situation. No substantial reinforcements were likely to arrive for some weeks, and the chances of holding the existing front without them seemed so slender that for a time he contemplated withdrawing his whole force to Akyab itself. 13 Eventually he decided that his orders to hold on at all costs must be obeyed. This proved the right decision. Numerically the attackers were the stronger side, but their forces were split up by the grain of the country, and their thrusts were not well co-ordinated. Attacks by two Indian infantry brigades

Koka was

on Koka's main

positions at

Donbaik and Rathedaung

at

the beginning of February failed to dislodge his troops, and further attacks during the next few weeks were equally unsuccessful. A skilful counter-offensive by the 55th Division then drove the British back to the positions from which they had started in October. In the north the Allies suffered no such ignominious defeat, but met other obstacles which prevented them from making much progress towards the reconquest of upper Burma and the reopening of land communications with China. The most important of these was the ill-disguised reluctance of the Chinese to take the offensive from Yunnan. Chiang Kai-shek protested that only the failure of the British to assemble large naval forces in the Bay of Bengal prevented him from launching an all-out effort, but failed to convince Wavell that he was making a genuine attempt to build up his forces near the frontier. 14 By Christmas it was also clear that the Americans would not be ready to start work on the projected Ledo-Myitkyina road until the dry season was almost over. 15 This meant that, even if Stilwell succeeded in pushing his American-trained Chinese divisions towards the Hukawng Valley before the monsoon broke, he would almost certainly be unable to maintain them in the forward area and would have to withdraw them in order to escape defeat.

THE GHINDITS

325

Wavell, promoted Field- Marshal at the beginning of 1943, concluded that in these circumstances the troops of

the Eastern

Army which were to have supported Stilwell by

pushing towards Katha and Myitkyina would be better employed during the remaining weeks of the 1942-43 dry season in completing and improving the road from Imphal to Tamu. 16 He had then to decide whether Wingate's Chindits, which were also to have supported Stilwell, should be allowed to carry out their project before the monsoon broke, at the cost of disclosing their purpose to the enemy without attaining any definite strategic aim. After consulting Wingate he came to the conclusion that, although in theory it was wrong to launch the Chindits on a venture which could not be followed up by his main forces, they ought to be given their chance of gaining valuable information and experience while their enthusiasm was at its

peak. 17

Meanwhile the Chindits had moved from their training area in central India to Imphal, where they joined the 4th Indian Corps (Lieutenant-General G. A. P. Scoones) as part of General Irwin's Eastern Army. On February 8 Wavell ordered them to move to the frontier area at Tamu. At the same time he sanctioned the formation of a second long-range penetration brigade, to be called the 111th Indian Infantry Brigade. 18 On reaching Tamu, Wingate divided his force into a Northern and a Southern Group and issued a stirring Order of the Day. He then departed for Tonhe on the Chindwin with the Northern Group, leaving the Southern Group to cross the river further downstream. When taking leave of the Southern Group he told its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Alexander, that he would meet him in the hills between the Irrawaddy and the Shweli River. 19

Alexander duly crossed the Chindwin at Auktaung in the middle of February, skirmished with Japanese patrols about ten miles beyond the river on February 18, and on March 2 approached the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway near Kyaikthin after making a long detour to avoid further

326

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT TABLE

10

Organization of jyth Indian Infantry Brigade {The Chindits), February 1943

NORTHERN

(No. 2)

GROUP

Brigade Headquarters (Brig. O. C. Wingate) Group Headquarters (Lt-Col. S. A. Cooke) No. 3 Column (Maj. J. M. Calvert) No. 4 Column (Maj. R. B. G. Bromhead) No. 5 Column (Maj. B. E. Fergusson) No. 7 Column (Maj. K. D. Gilkes) No. 8 Column (Maj. W. P. Scott) 2nd Burma Rifles (Lt-Col. L. G. Wheeler) Independent Mission (Capt. D. C. Herring)

SOUTHERN

(No.

1)

GROUP

Group Headquarters (Lt-Col. L. A. Alexander) No. 1 Column (Maj. G. Dunlop) No. 2 Column (Maj. A. Emmett) 142nd

Commando Company

(Maj. J. B. Jeffries)

Motes 1

.

Each column was a self-contained unit with its own fighting troops, medical, signals and air liaison sections, sabotage group, and platoon of scouts, guides and interpreters chosen for their local knowledge.

Column

establishments were as follows: British

Column 17

Officers

Other ranks

Horses

289

18 351

306

369

15

15

100

100

rifles

4

4

Mortars Heavy machine-guns Light machine-guns Light A.A. machine-guns

2

2

2

2

9

9

2

2

Mules Anti-tank

2.

Gurkha Column

Captain Herring's mission was to move into the Kachin Hills with a platoon of the Burma Rifles and find out how far the local tribesmen were willing to support the British and whether the time was ripe for an open revolt against the Japanese.

MARCH

1943

327

contact with the enemy. At that stage a series of mishaps led part of his force to disperse and make for home. He then continued with the rest of his troops to the Irrawaddy after destroying a railway bridge between Kyaikthin and Wuntho. Crossing the Irrawaddy without opposition on March 9 and 10, he arrived a few days later at his rendezvous with Wingate, but was unable to find Wingate or get in touch with him. After searching in vain for brigade headquarters he made by a roundabout route for the upper reaches of the Shweli River. There he expected to meet Captain D. C. Herring, who had crossed the Chindwin with the Northern Group and set out for the Kachin Hills with orders to make contact with friendly tribesmen and then report to Alexander or his representative in that neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Northern Group, with brigade headquarters, had reached the hilly country between Pinbon and Pinlebu after making a useful addition to its transport by acquiring an elephant and its oozie. Wingate, intent on damaging the railway between Wuntho and Indaw and attracted by the idea of establishing a permanent stronghold near Wuntho from which to make repeated attacks on the enemy's communications, made a long stay in that neighbourhood before deciding to cross the Irrawaddy in accordance with the plan foreshadowed in his parting remark to Alexander. He then sent two of his columns across the river before following with the rest of his force, less one column which had turned for home after using up most of its ammunition in an encounter with Japanese forces near Pinlebu. The delay enabled him to do a good deal of damage to the railway, but it left the Southern Group in the air and gave the enemy time to recover from his surprise and bring up substantial reinforcements. The result was that, on reaching the east bank of the Irrawaddy on March 18, Wingate found himself trapped in a belt of hot, dry, inhospitable country ringed with roads and rivers bristling with Japanese patrols. His troops were adept at eluding the enemy as long as they moved in small bodies and had the advantage of surprise. But they had no supporting arms apart from a few mortars and machine

SHWELI RIVER: MARCH

1943

329

guns, they were not organized or equipped to storm defended positions or cross rivers in face of systematic opposition, and neither men nor animals could thrive without supplies of water which were hard to find between the Irrawaddy and the Shweli in the dry season. Moreover, even if Wingate did succeed in crossing the Shweli and reaching the Kachin Hills, he could not hope to escape in that direction without passing out of reach of supplydropping aircraft with fighter escort. When ordered on March 24 to give up the attempt and return to India, he had no choice but to part with most of his heavy equipment and mules and disperse his force in columns or small detachments which were told to make their way to safety as best they could. As Wingate had always known that he might have to extricate his brigade from awkward situations at the cost of sacrificing its cohesion, and had trained all ranks in survival methods of which he was a pioneer, this was not such a desperate expedient as it appeared to be. Of roughly three thousand men who had crossed the Chindwin in February, well over two thousand were back in India by the first week in June, some of them after marching up to fifteen hundred miles and going as far afield as Paoshan in China. 20 But many sick and wounded had to be left behind in the hope that the local population would care for them, and many months elapsed before the brigade could be reconstituted with fresh units. So ended an expedition which fired the imaginations of statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic and made its leader a national hero almost overnight. Wingate had shown that his force could range far behind the enemy's lines with relative impunity and could be supplied by air, although his experiences also showed that rations would have to be improved and provision be made to return the sick and wounded to Allied territory if the experiment were to be repeated. 21 On the other hand, his exploit did nothing to controvert the orthodox view that lightly armed guerilla troops could be a useful adjunct to conventional forces with supporting arms but were not capable of replacing them.

330

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

This was clear to Wingate, who afterwards pointed out in a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff that any success he might gain in future operations would be short-lived unless it were promptly followed up by the main body of the Allied forces. 22 It was not always so clear to his admirers, some of whom formed exaggerated notions of the part that could be played by long-range penetration groups. The result was that the impressionable Churchill summoned Wingate to London, proposed even before he arrived that he should "command the army to fight in Burma", and took him across the Atlantic to attend the AngloAmerican high-level conference at Quebec in August. This was awkward for Wingate's immediate superiors, who knew that he had made a great success of the training of the Chindits and as a propagator of ideas, but had yet to prove his fitness for high command. General Sir Claude Auchinleck, who succeeded Wavell on June 20, 1943, when Wavell was designated to succeed Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy later in the year, did his best to put Churchill straight by pointing out tactfully that "the further Wingate was removed from the troops employed the less valuable he was likely to be". But Wingate made such a powerful impression on the Chiefs of Staff that Auchinleck was obliged to form six long-range penetration groups instead of the two already contemplated, and to meet Wingate's demand for predominantly British troops by breaking up a British division. The American Chiefs of Staff, also favourably impressed, decided to set up the force which ultimately became known as Merrill's Marauders. These were not the only important consequences of the first Chindit operation. Wingate's expedition, although undertaken purely as an experiment and with no strategic aim in view, had a powerful effect on Japanese strategy. This arose from its impact on an energetic Japanese commander, Lieutenant-General R. Mutaguchi. Originally the Japanese planned to stand firm when they reached the Assam-Burma frontier, making no attempt to press on into India. In the summer of 1942 the ease with which they had gained their objectives in Burma led them to consider

JAPANESE PLANS:

1942-1943

331

the possibility of advancing into Assam at the end of the rainy season and seizing the Eastern Army's railheads at Dimapur and Silchar. Plan 21, drawn up by the Fifteenth Army with these aims in view, was shelved towards the end of the year as a result of developments in the South Seas and the South- West Pacific, but the project was not forgotten by the Fifteenth Army's planners. In March 1943 the higher authorities came to the conclusion that a new area command, subordinate to Field- Marshal H. Terauchi's Southern Area Command, was needed to co-ordinate the defence of Burma. They then set up Burma Area Army

Headquarters, under Lieutenant-General M. Kawabe, for that purpose. Mutaguchi, hitherto commanding the 18th Division, thereupon assumed command of the Fifteenth Army. Close study of Wingate's exploit convinced him that

on the Salween and the Irrawaddy did not provide an adequate defence for Upper Burma, and that he must advance his line at least as far as the Chindwin and preferably beyond the frontier. After a long tussle he succeeded in convincing his superiors that, in order to forestall a possible British thrust from Assam, he should aim at seizing the Eastern Army's base at Imphal during the 1943-44 dry season. This meant that the Japanese troops in Burma would have to be reinforced by the equivalent of some three divisions and given at least a thousand additional motor vehicles. 23 In the meantime the Japanese High Command, recognizing that the sea route from Singapore to Rangoon was much exposed to attacks by Allied submarines and aircraft, had grappled with the problem of supply by starting work on a single-line metre-gauge railway linking the Siamese rail system with the Burmese railway south of Moulmein. Originally the target date for completion was November 1943, but in February of that year Imperial General Headquarters directed that the line should be ready by August so that reinforcements for the Fifteenth Army could pass along it. 24 The Southern Area Army tried to meet this demand by grossly overworking the 61,000 Allied prisoners of war and the Burmese and Malayan conscripts at their his existing positions

THE UNFORGOTTEN FRONT

332

it was claimed on their behalf that they did also try to recruit additional labourers. 25 The unfortunate prisoners of war, lashed on by their impatient captors, more than half starved and afflicted by malaria, dysentery and jungle sores, suffered such appalling hardships that roughly a fifth of them died before the job was finished and the health of many others was permanently undermined.* About 32,000 prisoners of war continued to work as maintenance crews after the line went into

disposal, although

service.

For

political reasons the

45,000 Indian troops captured

Malaya were not employed on such work but were carefully segregated from other prisoners and subjected to a powerful campaign of propaganda and intimidation. By a mixture of threats and blandishments some 40,000 were induced to declare their sympathy with the Free India Movement sponsored by the former Congress Party leader Subhas Chandra Bose, who moved from Berlin to Tokyo for

in

the purpose; but only about a sixth of these afterwards

came forward

to fight

on the Assam-Burma

front. 26

The

thousand, with the rest of the two and a quarter million Indians who volunteered for service in the Indian Army, remained faithful in word as well as in deed

remaining

five

to their allegiance to the British

Crown.

About half the 61,000 were British, rather fewer than a quarter Australian and most of the rest Dutch. But the total included about 700 Americans. *

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

1943 American and statesmen and INservice made repeated attempts British

chiefs

to

war which would and acceptable to

arrive at a strategy for the Far Eastern

be,

one and the same time, feasible all But their efforts were repeatedly frustrated by difficulties of one kind and another. Some of these difficulties arose from an inevitable clash between British and American political aims and aspirations. The leading Anglo-Saxon powers had a common interest in defeating Japan, but not in restoring the status quo in the Far East. In south-east Asia the British aimed at ending the threat to India and regaining their possessions at

parties.

and protectorates in Burma, Malaya and elsewhere. At the same time they regarded themselves as pledged to help their Dutch allies to win back their Indonesian empire. Politically-minded Americans, on the other hand, had been brought up to believe that the interests of the United States required that the world-wide naval and mercantile supremacy long exercised by the British should be curtailed. Many Americans believed, too, that British and Dutch hegemony over Asiatic peoples was not only undesirable on political and economic grounds, but morally wrong. There was also a tendency in the United States to assume that tariffs imposed by the government of India after the First World

War,

ostensibly to protect Indian manufacturers against a

flood of imports from the United

Kingdom, were

really

intended not so much for that purpose as to close the door to competitors outside the British Empire. Few people who had not studied India's problems at first hand knew how intractable these were how ill-equipped were the majority of her inhabitants to adapt themselves to the vast social and ;

334

ALLIED

WAR AIMS

335

economic changes which Western thinking equated with how irreconcilable were the racial and religious rivalries which obstructed India's path to Dominion status within the British Commonwealth. Thus it was natural that progress;

the small

band of rather conservatively-minded

officials

who strove with selfless obstinacy to preserve British India from domestic strife and foreign exploitation should be widely regarded as agents of an aggressive imperialism which ninety-nine Englishmen out of a hundred had renounced. For these and other reasons the safeguarding of British rule in India and the restoration of British and Dutch control over Burma, Malaya and the East Indies did not strike either the United States government or most thinking Americans as important or even particularly desirable war-aims. On the Asiatic mainland the Americans aimed chiefly at supporting Chiang Kai-shek, preserving the traditional cultural link between the United States and China, and making the best possible use of China's position as a barrier to Japanese domination of the Asiatic mainland. Where the British thought in terms of a drive to the south-east, the Americans were much more inclined to believe that the primary task of the Allied forces in India should be the restoration of secure communications with China. 1 The British agreed that Chiang Kai-shek must be supported, if only because otherwise the twenty-six divisions of the Japanese Army locked up in China might be used elsewhere. But neither they nor the Americans found it easy to say how the alliance with Nationalist China could be best exploited. General Chennault, whose China Air Task Force blossomed on March 11, 1943, into the Fourteenth United States Army Air Force, believed that American aircraft stationed in China could make a major contribution to victory by attacking Japanese communications. He concluded that the air lift from India ought to be expanded primarily, or even solely, for the purpose of ensuring him an adequate flow of bombs, fuel and spares. 2 On the other hand General Stilwell, who was both Chennault's com-

336

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

manding

officer and Chiang Kai-shek's titular Chief of thought that the bulk of the supplies brought by air ought to be reserved for the new and improved armies which he was trying to persuade Chiang to put into the field. At the same time he believed that the air lift would never suffice to equip and maintain such a force as he had in mind, and that hence his main task as watchdog of American and Chinese interests in India must be to ensure that land communications with China were reopened as soon as possible. 3 However, in spite of Stilwell's special knowledge of China his enthusiasm led him to overrate Chiang's ability to make a useful contribution to the war on land. By 1943 Nationalist China was in the grip of a severe economic and financial crisis. Heavy government spending, an inadequate revenue, widespread corruption, poor harvests and natural calamities had combined to bring about a massive rise in prices and a progressive weakening of the government's capacity to check consequent abuses. 4 In a troubled State, save something for yourself was a maxim which the Chinese had long known how to apply. Hoarding and tax evasion were common. The central authorities could exercise little effective control over local administrators even in districts where their rule was not openly flouted by Communist leaders or other political rivals. They were almost powerless to regulate production and consumption; taxes levied on their behalf were subject to heavy deductions by dishonest officials or diverted to unauthorized channels. Foreign observers of the ill-clad, half-starved, poorly equipped troops who formed the bulk of the Nationalist armies could only speculate as to what had happened to the huge quantities of equipment and stores despatched from Western countries in the course of the past six years or so. Another obstacle which hampered the search for a Far Eastern strategy was the frequent inability of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to judge whether the resources needed for a given plan would become available in time to give effect Staff,

to

it.

Many of the projects that competed for their attention

called for assault shipping

and landing

craft,

of which the

THE OUTLOOK Allies

IN

1943

337

never seemed to have enough although their output

was prodigious; many for transports to reinforce the troops assigned to an enterprise, or to carry them to a new destinacargo ships to bring equipment and supplies. It was therefore important that the Allies should be able to foresee what proportion of their merchant shipping would be at their disposal in a given part of the world at a given moment. A Ministry of War Transport, established long before 1943 and recruited partly from the shipping industry, enabled the British to keep a close watch on the allocation of their ships to military and civil purposes and to budget with fair accuracy so far as their own ships were concerned. By 1943 the Americans had, for the first time, a larger merchant fleet than the British, but neither their shipowners nor their officials had the same experience as their British counterparts of cooperation between government and industry in peace and war. At the same time, American commitments in the Pacific created problems which, although in some ways simpler than those arising from the complexities of British foreign trade, proved even more intractable. The United States War Shipping Administration was not as well equipped as the Ministry of War Transport to scrutinize demands from service departments, and had less control over shipping once it had been allocated. 5 The increased dependence of the Allies on American shipping after 1942 meant, therefore, that the framing of realistic programmes for theatres in which the American service departments were only mildly interested became more difficult. This situation, although it reflected political divergences and was aggravated by inter-service rivalries, was due primarily to a system which made the Combined Chiefs of Staff responsible for framing Anglo-American strategy but gave them no effective means of ensuring that the resources of both tion. All, or nearly all, called for

countries were allocated accordingly.

The

first

attempt in 1943 to sketch the outline of a Far

Eastern strategy was made by the Combined Chiefs at the Symbol Conference at Casablanca in January. This meeting, notable for President Roosevelt's gratuitous disclosure

338

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

to the world's press that

Germany,

Italy

and Japan would

be expected to surrender unconditionally, was held in circumstances which tempted the Western Allies to overcall their hand. The British Eighth Army had won an important victory at El Alamein in October and November; the Allies hoped soon to open the Mediterranean to convoys bound for the Far East by driving the Axis forces from the whole of North Africa; the Russians had trapped a quarter of a million German troops at Stalingrad. In the Far East, General MacArthur's Australian and American troops completed the capture of the Buna area while the conference was sitting; the struggle for Guadalcanal was expected to end within the next few days with the annihilation of the Japanese garrison; and the dismal failure of the British offensive in Arakan was not yet apparent. In these circumstances the Combined Chiefs recommended that operations in New Guinea and the Solomons should continue on the lines laid down in the previous July; that the Allies should aim in the Pacific at reaching a line from Truk to Guam; and that a major attempt to take Rangoon should, in principle, be launched about the middle of November. The chances of keeping to this date were, however, to be reviewed later in the year. The

Combined Chiefs also recommended that the offensive in Arakan should be followed by a limited advance across the Chindwin, and that additional transport aircraft should be sent to Assam for the twofold purpose of increasing the flow of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek's armies and putting Chennault in a position to launch sustained attacks on Japanese shipping off the coasts of China and Siam. The President and the Prime Minister accepted these proposals on the understanding that the primary aim of the Allies was still to defeat Germany before undertaking a large-scale offensive against Japan. 6

In the context of these decisions, the Allied forces in New Guinea prepared to drive the Japanese from Lae and Salamaua and clear the whole of the Huon peninsula as the prelude to an advance to New Britain and the eventual capture of Rabaul. In January the small Australian garrison

NEW of

Wau

GUINEA: JANUARY-MARCH

1943

339

had stood firm against repeated attempts by the

airfield. Reinforced in February by the 1 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, the Wau garrison went on to push the enemy northwards to the coast. Lieutenant-General Hitoshi Imamura, commanding the Eighth Area Army, thereupon decided in consultation with his naval colleagues to reinforce the garrison of Lae by despatching the headquarters of the Eighteenth Army and the main body of the 51st Division from Rabaul in eight transports escorted by eight destroyers. Allied reconnaissance aircraft sighted the convoy within twenty-four hours of its departure, and between March 2 and March 5 American and Australian bombers from Papuan bases, making low-level attacks and using bombs with delayedaction fuses, sank all the transports and half the destroyers and destroyed some twenty to thirty Japanese aircraft for the loss of five of their own. 7 Thereafter the Japanese were able to reinforce and supply the garrisons of Lae and Salamaua only by sending small numbers of troops and relatively small quantities of stores in barges and submarines. Moreover, Japanese survivors who landed on a neighbouring island were found by Australian troops there to be carrying sealed tins containing documents which listed all units of the Japanese Army and their commanders. 8 In the Solomons Admiral Halsey prepared for an assault on Munda by seizing the Russell Islands, to which the Japanese were known to have moved some of the troops withdrawn from Guadalcanal. During the voyage the American convoy was attacked at night by torpedobombers, but these were beaten off by anti-aircraft gunners using proximity-fused shells. * About 9,000 American troops

Japanese to capture the

*

The proximity

a British invention developed in the United States, enough to be incorporated in a shell. The shell exploded automatically on approaching a solid object such as an aircraft, or was blown up by a self-destroying device if it failed to find a target. Shells so fused were more effective than those fitted with clockwork fuses which had to be preset, but could not be used over friendly territory as long as there was a risk that rounds which failed to score might not blow up before they reached the ground. Hence they were particularly suitable for use at sea. In 1944 the British Anti-Aircraft Command used them with great success against V.l flying bombs approaching the South Coast and aimed at London. fuse,

consisted essentially of a radar set small

W.F.E.

— 12

MAP

36

THE SOLOMONS AND THE ALEUTIANS

341

reached the Russell Islands on February 21 to find that the enemy had gone. A fortnight later, on the night of March 6, a naval task force commanded by Rear- Admiral A. S. Merrill, U.S.N., sank two Japanese destroyers carrying supplies to Vila, in

bard the

Kolombangara, and went on

to

bom-

airfield there.

The only

other notable encounter between American and Japanese warships in March occurred in the neighbourhood of the Aleutian Islands, where American forces had occupied Adak in September, and Amchitka in January,

purpose of establishing airfields within fighter range of Attu and Kiska. On March 26 two American cruisers and four destroyers, comprising a task force under RearAdmiral Charles H. McMorris, made contact about halfway between Attu and Kamchatka with Vice-Admiral Hosogaya's Northern Area Force of four cruisers and four destroyers, with accompanying transports bound for Kiska. The outcome, known as the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, was a long-range slogging match between surface vessels without benefit of air support. The American heavy cruiser Salt Lake City, damaged in the course of a bold attempt by McMorris to reach the transports, was temporarily disabled by a further hit after he had turned away to avoid taking his force within reach of land-based aircraft. But a smoke-screen hid her plight from Hosogaya, who conceded the match by ordering the transports to for the

return to base. 9 During the retirement the Americans launched five torpedoes and the Japanese forty-three, but all missed.

When

and Tulagi was planned in 1942, the intention of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff was that Halsey's forces should establish bases for an advance to the Bismarck Archipelago by forces to be commanded by MacArthur. By March 1943 the Japanese were, however, so firmly entrenched at Rabaul that the Allies could no longer hope to turn them out with the resources likely to be available in the near future. At the end of the month the Joint Chiefs agreed, therefore, to the Allied expedition to Guadalcanal

342

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

give Halsey

now

and MacArthur a new directive. They were Solomon Islands as far north

to gain possession of the

as the southern part of Bougainville, clear the Huon peninsula, advance westwards along the north coast of New Guinea, and gain a foothold at the western end of New Britain without trying to take Rabaul. 10 In deference to the

American naval

authorities it was also agreed that Halsey should retain tactical control of the forces under his command, although the strategic direction of the enterprise would rest with MacArthur. The launching of MacArthur's offensive, at first fixed for the middle of May, was afterwards postponed until the end of June to give time for the assembly of his naval forces. Thus the opening of the offensive was still six weeks away when, on May 12, the Allied statesmen and their service advisers met at Washington for their second highlevel conference of the year. Shortages which kept MacArthur waiting did not, however, prevent the Americans from undertaking operations designed to wrest their lost islands in the Aleutians from the Japanese, since these were deemed essential on political rather than purely strategic grounds. On May 1 1 assault troops of the 7th United States Infantry Division, carried with the rest of the division from Alaska in transports escorted and supported by powerful naval forces, landed successfully on Attu. There the division met determined opposition during the next fortnight, but gained possession of the island after withstanding a desperate charge by a thousand Japanese on May 29. About 35,000 Allied troops, of whom roughly 5,000 were Canadian, were assigned to the capture of Kiska, where even heavier opposition was expected. But the Japanese succeeded in withdrawing their garrison without detection, leaving only three yellow dogs to bark defiance at the assault troops who groped their way ashore in fog and rain on a dismal night in mid-July. In the meantime a calculation by the staff of the India

Command had shown

that, if the tasks assigned

by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Allied forces in SouthEast Asia were to be tackled in November, an average of

OPERATION ANAKIM

343

183,000 tons of stores a month must reach India from the United Kingdom and the United States between February and June, and roughly 160,000 tons a month thereafter. These figures did not seem unattainable in the light of experience up to the end of November 1942. But towards the end of the year deliveries fell sharply in consequence of demands from other theatres and losses inflicted on the Allied merchant fleets in the Atlantic and elsewhere. By April 1943 it was clear that the build-up needed for a fullscale offensive across the Assam frontier and the Bay of Bengal could not be completed in time for the assault to be launched in November, and that the whole enterprise might have to be postponed until after the 1944 monsoon. In order that the 1943-44 dry season should not be wasted, Wavell then decided to give priority over all other engineering projects in Assam to the completion of airfields needed to raise the capacity of the air-lift to China to the 10,000 tons a month which Chiang Kai-shek had repeatedly asked the Allies to provide. When Wavell and his naval and air colleagues visited London in the second half of the month, the British Chiefs of Staff endorsed this decision. They also pointed out that Operation Anakim, as the projected offensive in SouthEast Asia was called, was open to the objection that, even if not ruled out by administrative difficulties, its launching in 1943 would absorb naval forces, assault shipping, and other resources which might be more profitably used in the Mediterranean to follow up a successful invasion of Sicily. 11 They concluded that, although preparations for Anakim should continue, the forces in South-East Asia might do well to content themselves during the 1943-44 dry season with increasing the capacity of the air-lift, undertaking only such operations across the Assam frontier as conduced to that end, and capturing Akyab and Ramree Island further south as bases for attacks on Japanese communications and further advances along the coast. 12 In the meantime Wavell had been turning over in his mind the chances of finding a suitable substitute for Anakim. The programme approved by the Combined

344

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca seemed to

him not only

to

pose formidable administrative problems, but also to invite the criticism that separate advances from India and the Pacific along the flanks of the Japanese line threatened to bring only slow progress at a considerable cost. 13 As early as February he suggested to his planning staff that the forces intended for Anakim might combine with Mac Arthur's to deliver a shattering blow at the Japaneseheld Netherlands East Indies. 14 By striking such a blow under cover of preparations to recapture Burma and the Bismarck Archipelago the Allies might hope to secure surprise, regain control of the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and threaten the whole Japanese position in Malaya and Indonesia. Moreover, the Americans and the Australians would, in WavelPs estimation, be far readier to co-operate with the British in the South-West Pacific than to give them effective help in Burma. Wavell and his colleagues followed their visit to London by accompanying the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff to Washington for the Trident Conference in May. During the voyage Churchill remarked that going into the jungle to fight the Japanese was like going into the water to fight a shark. 15 He also observed, when endorsing the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff, that the programme offered to the forces in South-East Asia was a "bleak and skinny" one. 16 At the Trident Conference he proposed an attack on the northern tip of Sumatra (Operation Culverin), but was persuaded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to leave the matter for later consideration. 17 Thus neither Wavell nor Churchill succeeded during the first half of 1943 in focussing attention on the case for a unified rather than a dispersed effort against Japan. This was not surprising at a time when the end of the war with Germany was not in sight and the extent of the resources that would ultimately become available for the Far Eastern war could not be assessed. Where much was uncertain, where the possibilities of disagreement were almost limitless, it was understandable that the Allies should be content to strike here and there at the Japanese line in the hope that

THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE

345

eventually the right course to pursue would be revealed to

them. In substance, the decisions reached at the Trident Conference were that operations in the South and South- West Pacific should go forward on the lines already sketched, and that Admiral Nimitz should, when he had the necessary strength and could overcome the problems inherent in an advance across thousands of miles of blue water, do his best to open a route across the Central Pacific by way of the Gilbert, Caroline and Marshall Islands.* The proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for a limited offensive in SouthEast Asia were accepted, but with the important proviso that the forces in Assam should make a "vigorous and aggressive" thrust to join hands with Chinese troops advancing from Yunnan. 18 The British were also to continue administrative preparations for "the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of Anakim". 19 Before the conference broke up, Churchill mentioned privately that he had in mind a new system of command in South-East Asia. 20

On the eve of Mac Arthur's

1943 offensive, the land forces in the South- West Pacific consisted of the two armoured and ten infantry divisions of the Australian Army; two

American infantry divisions; one American marine division; and elements of one American cavalry division whose main body was due to arrive within the next few weeks. MacArthur's naval forces, renamed the Seventh Fleet on March 1 5 and commanded from that date by the American Rear- Admiral Charles S. Carpender, were still weak, but his land-based air force had a strength of roughly 1,400 aircraft, about half of them provided by the Royal Australian Air Force. In the South Pacific, Admiral Halsey had one New Zealand and six American divisions; about 500 land-based aircraft of the Thirteenth United States Army Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force; and powerful naval forces which included one American and

one British * See

Chapter

fleet carrier, 16.

three escort carriers, six battleships,

346

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

and some 350 numbers of miscellaneous naval craft and submarines. These ships formed the Third Fleet, under Halsey's direct command. During the months that divided the fall of Buna from the launching of the main offensive, MacArthur decided to reorganize his land forces on national lines by setting up an all-American task force, called the Alamo Force, under Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger of the United States Sixth Army. His plan was that the Alamo Force should begin by occupying Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, northeast of Milne Bay, while the Australian formations in New Guinea, joined by one American infantry regiment which was to land south of Salamaua at Nassau Bay, drove the Japanese from the neighbourhood of Lae and Salamaua so cruisers, about fifty destroyers carrier-borne aircraft, in addition to large

thirteen

that airfields could be established there to support the next stage of the advance.

The Alamo Force was then

to cross to

western New Britain, leaving the Australian New Guinea Force to continue along the north coast of New Guinea to

Madang. Meanwhile

Halsey's forces in the Solomons were to capture the islands of the New Georgia group, occupy airfields constructed by the Japanese at Munda and Vila,

and push north-westwards

Kieta in Bougainville. In effect, the creation of the Alamo Force removed MacArthur' s American formations from the control of the Australian General Blarney, although nominally Blarney was still in command of all Allied land forces in the Southto

West Pacific. As MacArthur neither consulted the Australian government before making the change, nor offered any subsequent explanation of his motives, it is not surprising that his action caused some resentment in Australia. 21 The Japanese expected the Allies to push northwards after capturing Guadalcanal and Buna, but failed to make the best use of the respite given them by the slow Allied build-up. As Yamamoto's policy was to reserve his diminished carrier-force

and

battlefleet until

tunity of striking a decisive blow, he

he saw an oppor-

and

his colleagues

decided to rely largely on land-based aircraft both to defend the central Solomons and to interfere with Allied prepara-

MARCH-SEPTEMBER

1943

347

Accordingly, towards the end of March more than a hundred aircraft from Nagumo's Striking Force, manned by the pick of his pilots, were disembarked and sent to airfields in New Britain and the northern Solomons. 23 During the next four weeks the Eleventh Air Fleet, thus augmented, delivered a series of attacks on Allied shipping at Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Oro Bay, Port Moresby and Milne Bay. These not only failed to achieve their purpose, but cost the Japanese such heavy losses that their carrier force was crippled for months to come. The Japanese Navy suffered another heavy blow on April 18, when Allied aircraft intercepted and shot down two bombers known to be carrying Yamamoto and members of his staff on a projected tions.

22

visit to

Bougainville.

Yamamoto, with

the bombers, was killed,

all

other occupants of

and Admiral Mineichi Koga

succeeded him.

The offensive in the South-West Pacific duly began at the end of June with unopposed landings by American infantry and cavalry units on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, where there were no Japanese, and at Nassau Bay. Here the Americans were guided ashore by Australian troops of Lieutenant-General E. F. Herring's New Guinea Force. During the next six weeks the Australians, with the Americans on their right, fought their way to the outskirts of Salamaua across steep ridges strongly held by troops of the Japanese Eighteenth Army in prepared positions. They then delayed their final assault on Salamaua for a fortnight in order to attract as many Japanese as possible to their front while the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions completed preparations for converging attacks on Lae from land and sea. 24

In the meantime Halsey had opened his offensive in the central Solomons with a minor readjustment of his programme. About ten days before D-day Major D. G.

Kennedy, an

officer of the British

Solomon

Islands Pro-

who was acting as coast-watcher near the southern extremity of New Georgia, reported that the Japanese were active in the neighbourhood and were closing in on him. To help Kennedy, and to gain a foothold tectorate Defence Corps

W.F.E.

12*

MA?

Allied thrusts,

>

June -Nov. 1943

37

Salamauci and the HuonVeninsulfr

Nov. 1943 -Jan. 1944

To

WewakK BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

THE CENTRAL SOLOMONS

349

on the island while there was still a chance of landing without opposition, four companies of American marines and infantry went ashore at Segi Point between June 20 and 22. In accordance with their original plan, the Americans proceeded at the end of June to occupy Rendova Island, where they soon overcame the garrison of 200 to 300 Japanese seamen with the help of native troops organized by Major M. Clemens, also of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force. Landings at Viru Harbour, again in the southern part of New Georgia, followed on July 1, and next day troops from Rendova Island began to cross to Munda Point, only a short distance from the airfield which was Halsey's immediate objective. To counter any attempt by the Japanese to reinforce New Georgia by passing troops across the Kula Gulf from Kolombangara, about 2,600 infantrymen and marines then landed at Rice Anchorage, on the north-west coast. They were met by a party of two hundred native porters mustered by Flight- Lieutenant J. A. Corrigan of the Royal Australian Air Force, who was acting as coast-watcher in that part of the island.

The Japanese

offered

little

resistance

on the beaches, but

fought fiercely for Munda airfield. They also made strenuous attempts to reinforce and supply the 11,000 soldiers and seamen stationed in New Georgia and the neighbouring islands

by running troops and

stores

from

New Britain and

the northern Solomons to Vila. Four destroyers carrying the first wave of four battalions ordered to Vila on July 4

reached their destination safely and sank an American destroyer which was making the return voyage from Rice Anchorage. Ten destroyers, forming part of a larger force also bound for Vila, were intercepted in the early hours of July 6 by a task force of three cruisers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral W. L. Ainsworth, U.S.N., but the remaining three destroyers succeeded in disembarking about 1,200 troops under cover of a confused action which cost the Americans one light cruiser and the Japanese two destroyers.

This action, called by naval historians the Battle of Kula

MAP 3S The Central Solomons

®

Airfields

20

10 1

,

\

-I

Miles

Sea,

30 1

40 I

JULY-AUGUST

1943

351

was followed in the early hours of July 13 by an equally confused engagement fought in the same waters and known as the Battle of Kolombangara. Admiral Ainsworth, this time with three cruisers and ten destroyers, sank Gulf,

the Japanese cruiser Jintsu, lost one destroyer, and suffered heavy damage to the New Zealand cruiser Leander, in addition to minor damage to his two American cruisers. But again the Japanese, warned by a device which detected Ains worth's radar transmissions, were able to disembark troops by detaching some of their destroyer- transports from their main body before going into action. The Americans were also handicapped, as on many earlier occasions, by their imperfect knowledge of the speed, range and hittingpower of the enemy's torpedoes. 25 In the light of these unsatisfactory encounters, American destroyer commanders renewed long-standing pleas to be allowed to show what destroyers could do in a night action if they were not tied to cruiser forces. Their chance came in the first week of August, when no Allied cruisers were available to intercept a Japanese force reported to be about to make a dash for Vila with a further instalment of troops and supplies. On the night of August 6 Commander Frederick Moosbrugger, U.S.N., leading four destroyers of his own division and two commanded by Commander Rodger Simpson, U.S.N., surprised a Japanese destroyer flotilla in Vella Gulf, opened fire with torpedoes at 4,000 yards, and in forty-five minutes sank three of the enemy's four destroyers at no cost to his own side. Meanwhile the American troops ashore in New Georgia had met unexpected setbacks/Command of the sea and air by day enabled Halsey to send supplies to the island with little interference from the enemy, but did not overcome the difficulty of delivering them safely to forward units whose communications were under constant threat from Japanese patrols. By the second week in July the two regiments of the 43rd United States Infantry Division advancing on Munda were in danger of losing touch with their back areas and of being forced apart by a wedge driven in their front.

352

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

The American commanders,

recognizing that nothing could deprive them of the power to move troops to the island as long as they continued to dominate the sea approaches, then took a fresh grip on the situation. In the middle of the month they disembarked two regiments of the 37th United States Infantry Division east of Munda Point, relieved the most hard-pressed of their troops already ashore, and appointed a new commander to take charge of the main body of their land forces. On July 25 LieutenantGeneral Oscar W. Griswold of the 14th United States Corps opened a new offensive. The Japanese garrison continued to fight bravely, but were heavily outnumbered. On August 3 their commander, faced with a progressive crumbling of his front and a threat to his rear from troops of the 37th Division who were across his main route to the north-west coast, ordered a withdrawal. The bulk of his surviving troops then fell back with some difficulty to Bairoko, where the last of them embarked on August 13 for

Kolombangara. The Americans occupied Munda airfield on August 5, made an unopposed landing on Vella Lavella ten days later, and prepared to bring Vila within range of their artillery by seizing Arundel Island as soon as they were ready. When the Allied leaders met at Quebec on August 17 for the so-called Quadrant Conference, they could thus look back on a year of mingled success and frustration in the Far East. In New Guinea their forces had averted an imminent threat to Port Moresby, captured Buna, pushed forward from Wau to the shores of the Huon Gulf, and were now investing Salamaua as the prelude to a powerful assault on Lae. In the southern and central Solomons they had established themselves in great strength on Guadalcanal and at Tulagi, driven the enemy from his second line of defence in New Georgia, and gained bases for land-based bombers within easy striking distance of Rabaul. On the other hand, their attempt to seize Akyab Island without powerful naval and air support, and with troops whose communications were stretched to the limit and beyond, had ended in total failure, and their successes in the Solomons

THE QUADRANT CONFERENCE

353

had been won only after setbacks due largely to faulty planning. Moreover, even when allowances were made for difficulties of supply, it was doubtful whether any Allied troops, except the Chindits and some of the more experienced Australian units in

New Guinea, had yet shown them-

selves consistently the equals of the Japanese in junglecraft.

At the Quadrant Conference Churchill renewed his plea an attack on northern Sumatra. This came to be regarded as his pet project, but he was by no means its sole advocate. Both Wavell and his successor as Commander-

for

in-Chief in India, General Auchinleck, thought that a seaborne expedition to some part of the Indonesian archipelago would be more profitable than an attempt to recapture the whole of Burma from Assam. 26 So, at least for a time, did Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (afterwards Earl Mountbatten of Burma), whom the Allies chose at the Quadrant Conference to command their forces in South-East Asia. 27

But Wavell had been thinking, when he first broached the matter to his staff, not of a mere substitute for an advance across the Assam frontier, or of a thrust by British or British Commonwealth forces alone, but of a resolute attempt by the Western Allies to sink their differences and combine to loosen the enemy's hold on vital objectives for whose sake Japan had gone to war. Operation Culverin, as propounded by Churchill at Quebec and elsewhere, was a far less ambitious project. The British Chiefs of Staff complained that an attack on northern Sumatra would give them, at best, no more than a base from which they might be able to bomb Singapore, and would tie up large resources which could be used to better effect elsewhere. 28 The President was even less enthusiastic. He likened the area held by the Japanese to a slice of pie with Tokyo as its apex and the Netherlands East Indies as its rim or crust. Culverin amounted, in his view, to no more than an attempt to nibble at the crust. 29 The Allies, he thought, would do better to move along the edges of the slice by advancing on the right across the Pacific to Formosa and the Chinese coast, on the left through Burma into China. 30

354

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

The Combined Chiefs of Staff could scarcely fail to know that a substantial Allied force advancing through Burma into China would stand little chance of getting far before outrunning its supplies. They confessed their inability to draw up a comprehensive programme for the 1943-44 dry season in South-East Asia, but agreed that the Allies should aim first at capturing northern Burma in order to reopen land communications with China and make the air route more secure. At the same time the capacity of the air lift must be increased. Preparations for the recapture of Akyab and Ramree Islands were to continue on the lines discussed at the Trident Conference, and the implications of various alternative or complementary operations, including Culverin, were to be further considered by the staffs concerned. In the Pacific, the Allies would aim in 1943-44 at capturing the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Ponape, the eastern Carolines, Palau and the Marianas; in New Guinea and the neighbouring islands at seizing or 'neutralizing" eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak, the Admiralty Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago. Rabaul was no longer to be captured but should be "neutralized". 31 Thus the Quadrant Conference added little to the conclusions reached at Trident, except that the difficulty of framing an acceptable strategy was more openly recog6

nized.

However, some two months later the Russians gave a new twist to Allied thinking. At the close of a conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in October, Stalin remarked "suddenly and in passing" to Cordell Hull that Russia would join Britain and the United States in defeating Japan when the war with Germany was over. 32 Thereafter the Western Allies, turning a blind eye to the political implications of

Russian participation,

made

it

their business to

to

would be allowed use the Russian Maritime Provinces as a base from which

to

bomb Japan. 33

extract from Stalin a promise that they

In September the Japanese, too, reviewed their strategy. In the light of their setbacks since 1942 they came to the

AUGUST-OCTOBER

1943

355

conclusion that they could not hope to hold their existing could expect no help from Europe in view of events in Italy and Russia. At the same time, they could not afford to weaken their capacity to fight a defensive war by relinquishing their newly won sources of rice and raw materials in South-East Asia and the Netherlands East Indies. They decided that, in the west, they must continue to hold Burma, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Indonesian archipelago as far east as Timor, but that further east they must be prepared to withdraw to a new line through western New Guinea and the Caroline Islands to the Kurile Islands. 34 As a result of heavy losses to their merchant fleet, the Japanese also decided late in 1943 that henceforth their ships must move in convoy wherever they were likely to be attacked by Allied submarines or front, especially as they

aircraft. 35

week of August Halsey continued his offensive in the central Solomons by putting troops of the 172nd United States Infantry Regiment ashore on Arundel Island. In the

last

The Japanese, recognizing that their communications with Kolombangara were already threatened by Halsey's earlier landing on Vella Lavella, responded by moving part of the garrison of Kolombangara to Arundel Island in order to gain time for the rest to escape northwards. The 172nd Regiment had a stiff fight, but on September 20 completed the capture of the island at the cost of 44 dead and 256

wounded.

On

the following day a brigade of the 3rd

New

Zealand Division, which had relieved the 35th United States Infantry Regiment on Vella Lavella three days earlier, began a two-pronged advance which pushed the remnant of the Japanese garrison into a small pocket at the extreme north-west corner of the island by the end of the month. Three Japanese destroyers escorting a number of small craft sent to rescue the survivors were intercepted on the night of October 6 by the same number of American destroyers, but the surviving troops were successfully embarked under cover of a brisk engagement. This cost the Americans the loss of one of their destroyers and heavy damage to the two

356

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

which remained

afloat.

In

this

engagement, known

to naval

historians as the Battle of Vella Lavella, the Japanese lost one destroyer.

In the light of the high-level decisions reached in Tokyo Imamura gave orders on October 7 for a series of delaying actions in the northern Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago. Admiral Koga decided to help him by disembarking aircraft and pilots from his carriers, as Yamamoto had done with disastrous consequences six months earlier, but first moved with the Combined Fleet from Truk to Eniwetok in the hope of intercepting an American carrier force moving towards Wake. Consequently the disembarked aircraft did not reach the Eleventh Air Fleet at Rabaul until the beginning in September, General

of November. 36 Bougainville, division,

garrisoned

by

one Japanese

four independent battalions and

infantry

some 20,000

seamen, was Halsey's next and last important objective in the Solomons. As the enemy's forces were believed to be strongest in the southern part of the island and weakest in the west, Halsey decided in consultation with his planners to make a diversionary landing on the island of Choiseul in order to give the impression that his assault was coming from the east, and then put the 3rd United States Marine Division ashore at Empress Augusta Bay, on the west coast. Under cover of the diversionary landing the 8th New Zealand Brigade, with attached troops, was to seize the Treasury Islands, south-west of Bougainville, so that a fighter strip could be established there to support the main assault.

As things turned

out, the expedition to Choiseul

scarcely needed, for the arrival of the

New

was

Zealanders in

the Treasury Islands on October 27 proved enough to convince the Japanese that their airfields and other military installations in the southern part of Bougainville were in

danger. 37 The marines, landing at Empress Augusta Bay from twelve transports five days later, were opposed on the beaches by fewer than 300 infantrymen supported by a single field gun of antique pattern. In spite of air attacks

BOUGAINVILLE

357

by nightfall some 14,000 marines and large equipment and stores were ashore, and eight of the transports were on their way to safety after completand rough

seas,

quantities of

ing their unloading. That night four Japanese cruisers and six destroyers approached Bougainville for the twofold purpose of landing reinforcements and attacking any Allied transports they could find. The Americans thus found themselves in much the same position as before the Battle of Savo Island, except that this time they received accurate and timely warning from their reconnaissance aircraft. Rear- Admiral A. S. Merrill, U.S.N., commanding a task force of four light cruisers and eight destroyers, ordered the four transports which had not yet completed their unloading to take up a safe position to the south. In the early hours of November 2 he intercepted the Japanese force about fifty miles northwest of the beach-head. Engaging the enemy's cruisers with his own while his destroyers fought two separate actions with their Japanese counterparts, he sank the Japanese light cruiser Sendai and had the satisfaction of seeing the

enemy withdraw without accomplishing

his mission. About had given the order to break off the pursuit his force was attacked by more than a hundred naval aircraft from Rabaul, but escaped with two hits which did no lethal damage. 38

three hours after Merrill

Some

forty-eight hours later, Allied reconnaissance air-

heavy cruisers accompanied by Rabaul from the direction of Truk. Halsey, rightly concluding that Koga was contemplating a heavier blow than Merrill's light cruisers and destroyers could parry, decided that his only remedy was craft reported that seven

destroyers were approaching

to strike first at the cost of risking his carrier force within

reach of land-based

and the new

aircraft. 39

On November 5

the Saratoga

up launching positions 230 miles from Rabaul, despatched 107 aircraft which scored hits on six Japanese cruisers and two destroyers, and light carrier Princeton took

withdrew unscathed. Six days later, aircraft from three new carriers contributed by the Fifth Fleet in the Central Pacific found that most of the ships damaged in the earlier raid

358

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

had gone, but sank a light cruiser and a destroyer and inflicted heavy damage on a second destroyer. The Japanese, discomfited by the failure of their land-based aircraft to protect ships in harbour and by the loss of nearly threequarters of the aircraft disembarked from their carrier force, never again used Rabaul as a base for heavy cruisers. 40

In the middle of November the arrival of the 37th United States Infantry Division brought the strength of the American garrison in the Bougainville beach-head to nearly 40,000 of all ranks. By that time the Americans, although still outnumbered, held a well-defended perimeter which the Japanese could attack only by passing troops along difficult routes across the island. Within it, their engineers were working hard to complete airstrips, an all-weather airfield, and a naval base.

New

Guinea, the broad situation towards the end of August 1943 was that the Japanese Eighteenth Army, with one division based on Wewak, a second on Madang and a third divided between Lae and Salamaua, still controlled the Huon Peninsula and the coastal belt roughly as far south as the line of the Markham River and the Ramu River. The Allied New Guinea Force, with four divisions and two independent brigades based on Milne Bay, Port Moresby and the Buna area and one division in contact with the enemy north-east of Wau, was threatening

In eastern

Salamaua and had cleared the coast from Buna to Tambu Bay. Close to the headwaters of the Ramu River, in the neighbourhood of Bena Bena and Garoka, a small Allied detachment known as Bena Force controlled a tract of high-lying, temperate country, inhabited by skilled cultivators who grew excellent crops and had no use for coined money. Here the Allies had built a number of airstrips at a rate determined partly by the supply of cowrie shells and salt with which to reward the inhabitants for their services. 41

By the last week in August the struggle for the southern approaches to Salamaua had been won by the 3rd Australian

NEW GUINEA Division,

commanded by Major-General G.

S.

359 Savige

and consisting of the 15th and 17th Australian InfantryBrigades and the 162nd United States Infantry Regiment. The 5th Australian Division (Major-General E. J. Milford) then assumed command of the troops in front of Salamaua, and the 29th Australian Infantry Brigade relieved the battle-weary 17th. The task of New Guinea Force was to capture Lae and establish itself in the Markham Valley. Support would come from aircraft hitherto needed to carry supplies to the troops advancing on Salamaua, since these troops could

henceforth be maintained by sea. Salamaua would be taken only when the fall of Lae was certain. Finally, the Huon Peninsula would be cleared by simultaneous advances across the Finisterres to Bogadjim and along the coast from Finschhafen through Sio and Saidor. To free General Herring for this crucial assignment, General Blarney relieved him of responsibility for New Guinea Force and appointed a temporary commander. Herring's command was thus reduced to the 1st Australian Corps, which included most of the fighting formations in New Guinea Force but not the 3rd Australian Division, Bena Force, or forces assigned to the defence of certain airfields

and

bases.

Blarney's plan, as finally approved

some

dissension

between

by

Mac Arthur

their respective staffs,

after

was that the

9th Australian Division should land about seventeen miles east of Lae and advance on the town while the 7th Australian Division seized strategic points in the Markham Valley. 42 The 7th Division would then join hands with the 9th Division at Lae, and also move towards the watershed between the Markham and Ramu Rivers as the prelude to a thrust across the mountains towards Bogadjim. The 7th Amphibious Force of Admiral Carpender's Seventh Fleet, under Rear- Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, would be responsible for putting the 9th Division ashore, and American paratroops would play a crucial part in the Markham Valley by seizing a disused pre-war airfield at Nadzab. Fighter cover over Lae would be provided by aircraft from

360

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

the neighbourhood of Marilinan, where ers

had worked day and night

An

American engine-

to build a suitable airfield

about five miles away, used before the war by gold-miners, was surveyed but found unsuitable. On September 1 the 9th Division embarked at Milne Bay for the first seaborne expedition to enemy-occupied territory undertaken by Australian troops since the Gallipoli landings twenty-eight years earlier. After staging at Buna the assault troops landed early on September 4 on two jungle-fringed beaches swept by fire from five American destroyers. The only opposition came from small numbers of Japanese aircraft which attacked shipping, landing craft, and an ammunition dump. By 10.30 a.m. 7,800 troops and 1,500 tons of stores were ashore, and by nightfall the advance on Lae from the beaches had begun. On the following morning about 1,700 paratroops of the 503rd United States Parachute Regiment from Port Moresby, supplemented by an Australian artillery detachat Tsili Tsili.

existing airstrip

ment which staged at Tsili Tsili, seized the airfield at Nadzab without interference from the Japanese, whose aircraft were hampered by fog at Rabaul. In the late afternoon the paratroops were joined by Australian pioneers and engineers who had marched from Tsili Tsili and crossed the Markham River in small boats, and on the following day by American and Australian engineers who came by air. By September 7 the airfield was ready to receive transport aircraft carrying the 7th Division's infantry. During the next few days the 9th Division's advance from the east was checked by swollen rivers and tardy opposition from the Japanese 51st Division. The heavy rains which made the rivers almost impassable also held up the advance of the 7th Division in the Markham Valley by putting Nadzab airfield out of use for three days on end. But by September 14 the 9th Division had overcome the worst of its difficulties, and on that day there were indications that the Japanese were retreating northwards. 43 On September 16 the leading troops of both Australian divisions entered Lae from opposite directions to find that

SEPTEMBER the enemy had gone, leaving behind of stores and discarded weapons.

The

him

1943

361

large quantities

on Salamaua began on September 10. of the 42nd Australian Infantry Company "B" A patrol of Battalion, led by Captain A. G. Ganter, reached the builtup area of the town at 2.30 p.m. on September 11 after swimming a river in flood, and was followed on September 44 12 by the 162nd United States Infantry Regiment. On September 16 an Australian chaplain, the Reverend V. H. G. Sherwin, hoisted over the rat-ridden ruins of the town the flag which the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles had taken with them when they left Salamaua in 1942. Two days after the fall of Lae MacArthur and Blarney agreed that on September 22 a brigade group of the 9th final assault

of three infantry battalions with supporting arms, should land north of Finschhafen in order to hasten the clearance of the Huon Peninsula and thus pave the way for an expedition to New Britain. Blarney asked for a follow-up by an additional brigade group, and understood that this was approved, but found when the follow-up was needed that Admiral Barbey had no authority to lift a second brigade group without prior reference to MacArthur's headquarters in Australia. 45 The 20th Australian Infantry Brigade, which had taken part in the landings east of Lae but was relatively fresh, was chosen for the Finschhafen landing. Its commanding officer, Brigadier W. J. V. Windeyer, asked that his troops should be put ashore at first light, which on September 22 would be at 5.15 a.m. The American naval authorities wished, however, to begin disembarkation as soon as possible after moonrise, due at 12.25 a.m., so that the unloading of stores could be completed before daylight. They were confident that the distinctive shape of the cliffs would enable them to find the right beaches at that hour, even if clouds obscured the moon. 46 Eventually Admiral Barbey agreed to postpone the landing until 4.45 a.m., and Windeyer' s divisional commander accepted that arrangement. His impression that a happy compromise had been Division,

consisting

reached was not, however, justified by events. In the dark-

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

362

dawn many

of the landing craft and barges their intended headings, with the result that units reached the shore in the wrong order and in some cases up to half a mile from the places at which they should have landed. 47 While training for the landings east of Lae all ranks of the 20th Brigade, in common with the rest of the 9th Division, had been told what to do if they found themselves on the wrong beaches, as had happened to their forefathers at Gallipoli. The Japanese were expecting a landing and had reinforced their garrison, but had only about 300 to 400 troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the landing-area. In spite of some confusion at the outset, the Australians were able to organize their beachhead without serious ness before

edged

slightly

away from

and by

reached all their objectives for the first day. Thereafter they met systematic opposition from infantry and seamen in prepared positions but, notwithstanding the reputation of the Japanese for fighting to the last man, succeeded on more than one occasion in driving the enemy back in wild disorder. By the evening of September 26 the defenders were losing their grip on the northern approaches to Finschhafen, and on October 1 they withdrew from the town in face of co-ordinated attacks interference,

nightfall

by infantry, artillery and aircraft. However, the capture of Finschhafen did not mean that the 20th Brigade, reinforced early in October by the greater part of the 24th Brigade, was free to move on Sio. From the moment when Finschhafen was first threatened, the Japanese had seen the importance of holding a tract of high ground at Sattelberg, * about six miles west of the Australian beachhead. By October 5, when Lieutenant-General Shigeru Katagiri of the Japanese 20th Division arrived from

Madang to take command, the troops in the area consisted of the newly arrived 79th Infantry Regiment; the 80th Infantry Regiment, which had taken part in the defence of Finschhafen; and the equivalent of one weak regiment made up of troops who had retreated from Lae and Salamaua.

On *

October 10 Major-General G. F. Wootten, com-

Wrongly

called "Satelberg"

on some contemporary maps.

OCTOBER

1943

363

manding

the 9th Australian Division, established his headquarters at Finschhafen with the intention of pushing northwards. In the light of indications that the Japanese

were preparing for a counter-attack, he soon saw that he must first fight a defensive battle. 48 This was confirmed on October 15, when a document taken from a satchel found after a brush between patrols proved to be a copy of an order from Katagiri, calling on his troops to carry out a series of offensive movements when the kindling of a bon49 fire on the Sattelberg heights gave the signal. Katagiri' s plan was that, under cover of diversionary attacks, the 79th Infantry Regiment should infiltrate positions held by an Australian pioneer battalion west of the beach on which the 20th Australian Brigade had landed in September. When all was ready the regimental commander, Colonel Kaneki Hayashida, would thrust with the main body of the regiment towards the sea, make contact with a party of infantry and engineers who were to come ashore from self-propelled barges, and assume command of the whole force. Hayashida would then turn southwards and take the Allied positions at Finschhafen from the rear. In daylight on October 16 the Australians repulsed a number of probing attacks which suggested that the offensive was imminent. These ceased during the afternoon, and by nightfall such heavy rain was falling that it seemed doubtful whether the bonfire mentioned in the captured order could be kindled. At least one unit claimed that none the less a fire was visible, but their report seems not to have reached divisional headquarters. 50 The pioneers were, however, warned that they must "patrol vigorously to prevent the enemy from getting in close in force", and a keen lookout was kept for barges. American light naval craft, which usually patrolled the coast at night, were ordered to keep out of the way so that no confusion could arise

between friendly and hostile craft. Meanwhile one incomplete company of the Japanese 79th Infantry Regiment and picked platoons from two engineer units had left the neighbourhood of Sio in seven barges, of which only three reached their destination.

MAP 39 Sattelberg: the

Japanese

Counter-Offensive, October 1943

Gusika £ Wareo

ONE COS. 79 P.E&T AND ENGINEERS

Allied positions, Oct. 16

Japanese thrusts, Oct. 16-17

SATTELBERG

365

These arrived off the beach selected for the landing in the early hours of October 17. There they were engaged in darkness and pouring rain with a variety of weapons which ranged from small arms to 2 -pounder anti-tank guns. One barge turned away, but the others reached the shore, where they were afterwards wrecked by fire from an antitank platoon. About seventy Japanese tumbled out of them and, led by a bugler and two flame-throwers, charged across the beach towards a .50 Browning machine-gun manned by Private Nathan Van Noy, Junior, of the 532nd United States Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Van Noy, with one leg shattered by a grenade, held his fire until the Japanese were almost upon him, when he stopped the charge by pressing the trigger with devastating effect. He then reloaded and, although again severely wounded by a grenade, continued to fire until a third grenade silenced him. His loader, Corporal Stephen Popa, was wounded by the first grenade, but managed to grab a rifle and shoot an approaching Japanese through the head before losing consciousness. After the action Van Noy was found dead with his finger still on the trigger. Popa was alive, but pinned to the ground by the body of the man he had killed. About thirty Japanese succeeded in getting past the gunpost, but most of them were afterwards hunted down and killed by an Australian infantry company. In the meantime the main body of the 79th Regiment, aided by the darkness of the night, was making such good progress that their attempt to reach the coast early on October 17 might well have succeeded if Van Noy's gallant feat

By

had not averted the threat

to the Australians' rear.

Hayashida's leading troops had passed all three companies of the pioneers and were threatening battalion headquarters, only about a mile from the shore. After driving off a number of weak patrols they were halted first

light

by elements of a single platoon of the pioneers, but a temporary shortage of ammunition then caused the Australians to fall back, with the result that battalion headquarters had to be withdrawn that evening to the sector held by a neighbouring infantry battalion.

366

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

On

the following day Hayashida's forward troops succeeded in reaching the shore at Siri Cove. Thereupon the

commander

of the 24th Australian Brigade took the heroic

withdraw from a strong position at Katika in order to be sure of holding the beach immediately to the north, which he had been told to defend at all costs. 51 Wootten then redisposed his troops near Finschhafen to guard against a thrust in that direction, recaptured the high ground west of Katika by counter-attacking from the north, and within a few days was once more master of the situation. In the last week of October the Japanese withdrew with heavy losses from almost the whole of the territory they had occupied since the middle of the month, leaving about one company of the 80th Regiment to bar decision to

the road to Sattelberg at Jivevaneng. The 9th Australian Division, brought

up

to strength

by

the arrival of the 26th Brigade from Lae and reinforced by the greater part of the 4th Brigade and a tank battalion,

wiped out the Jivevaneng pocket in the first few days of November, paused briefly to regroup, and on November 1 launched an offensive which ended Katagiri's chances of restoring the situation at Finschhafen.

By November 25

Sattelberg was in Allied hands, a renewed attempt

by the

79th Regiment to drive a wedge through the 9th Division failed disastrously, and a depleted and disorganized 80th Regiment was falling back to new positions which it could have little hope of holding. On the western flank the 7th Australian Division, under Major-General G. A. Vasey, won a race against the Japanese Eighteenth Army for control of the Markham Valley above Nadzab by seizing Kaiapit within a few days of the fall of Lae. The 21st Australian Brigade, flown to Kaiapit in American transport aircraft between September 21 and 25, pushed rapidly across the imperceptible watershed between the Markham and Ramu Rivers, drove the numerically strong but hungry and dispirited Japanese 78th Regiment to the foothills of the Finisterres, and captured Dumpu in the first week of October. Vasey, warned that he must not risk outrunning his supplies, had then to be

had

THE SEXTANT CONFERENCE

367

content with a programme of vigorous patrolling while preparations were made for an eventual advance to

Bogadjim. 52

When

the Western Allies met in Cairo on November 22 to discuss their strategy for the coming year, they could thus look with some satisfaction on the progress made by their

Solomons and

New

Guinea since their last meeting. In the Central Pacific, too, Admiral Nimitz had just opened an offensive to which American naval strategists attached great importance. In South-East Asia, on the other hand, the outlook was unpromising. In recent months disastrous floods in India had hampered the development of airfields and communications; poor harvests meant that in 1944 some of the shipping needed by the Western Allies for military purposes would have to be used to carry grain for civilian use. Above all, Chiang Kai-shek remained forces in the

obstinately reluctant to take the offensive with his troops in

Yunnan

committed themselves to a major operation with naval and seaborne forces in the Bay of unless the Allies

Bengal.

Two

such projects received attention from the British Chiefs of Staff on the eve of the Cairo Conference. The first

was Culverin, discussed

at

Quebec and

earlier.

Culverin was, however, ruled out at Cairo since the British could not undertake it without drawing on American resources which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not willing to release for a venture of which they had never approved. The second project, called Buccaneer, was an expedition to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In October the British Chiefs of Staff considered this the most promising operation they could undertake in the Bay of Bengal with the means then thought likely to be available. 53 But in the context of the Cairo Conference, with the forthcoming assault on Hitler's Fortress Europe in the forefront of their minds, they were not satisfied that Buccaneer, or for that matter Culverin, would make the best use of resources which might, they thought, be more profitably employed in Europe. 64 Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek's attitude was such

368

SYMBOL TO SEXTANT

that they doubted whether any inducement the Allies could offer would extract from him a firm and unequivocal

promise to contribute to an offensive on land. At one stage he insisted, for example, that the air lift to China must in no circumstances by curtailed, although it was obvious that no offensive on the lines discussed with him could be launched unless some aircraft were diverted from the air lift to the support of Allied troops. 55 The upshot was that, after discussions interrupted by a visit to Teheran, where Stalin again expressed his intention of taking part in the Far Eastern war when Germany was defeated, the Western Allies agreed that their main effort against Japan in 1944 should be made in the Pacific, and should take the form of simultaneous advances by Nimitz in the Central Pacific and MacArthur in the South- West Pacific* They also agreed that operations in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, China and South-East Asia should be "conducted in support" of the main effort, and that landing craft which were to have been used in SouthEast Asia in 1944 should be diverted to Europe. 56

Thus the

outcome of four high-level conferences in which the Western Allies affirmed their 1943, at all of intention of defeating Germany before launching a major offensive against Japan, was that they agreed, at a time when they were by no means sure of finding enough warships and assault craft to ensure successful landings in North- West Europe, to devote a big share of their naval resources, and no small share of their land and air forces, to island-hopping ventures in the Pacific. As it had taken them six months to turn the Japanese out of Guadalcanal and had just cost them the lives of more than a thousand American marines and sailors to capture the tiny island of Betio in the Gilbert Islands,-)* the defeat of Japan by such means seemed likely to prove a protracted and expensive business. On the other hand, success in the Pacific would put the Japanese homeland within reach of American very-longrange bombers, and when Germany was defeated both final

* See Chapter 16 and Appendix t See Chapter 16.

4.

JAPANESE SHIPPING

369

American and British bombers might be able to attack Japan from Russian bases. Moreover, by the end of 1943 attacks by submarines, and to a lesser extent by aircraft, had made big inroads on the Japanese merchant fleet, although the Allies were not yet aware of the full extent of their success. In just over two years the Japanese had lost nearly three million tons of shipping. In spite of a big effort by their shipyards their carrying capacity had fallen since the beginning of the war by a nett figure of more than a million tons.

TABLE

11

The Japanese Merchant Fleet, 1941-1943 (Ships of less than 500 tons excluded)

TONS Carrying capacity, December

7,

1941

Additions from new production and captured or requisr tioned ships, December 7, 1941 -December 31, 1943

5,996,607

1,823,487

7,820,094

Gross

losses,

December

7,

1941 -December 31, 1943

Carrying capacity, December 31, 1943 Nett

loss since

outbreak of war

2,994,075

4,826,019 1,170,588

NEW GUINEA, THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

w.f.e.

— 13

ON MARCH

15, 1943, when Admiral Halsey's naval force became the Third Fleet and General Mac Arthur's the Seventh Fleet, the component of the United States Pacific Fleet which remained in the Central Pacific was renamed the Fifth

Fleet. But a mere change of designation did not prevent the American naval authorities from continuing to regard the fleet based on Pearl Harbor as their most important asset. Their policy was to commit to support of the South and South- West Pacific commands only such ships as might from time to time be needed for the tasks assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Halsey and MacArthur, and to build up in the Central Pacific a fleet strong enough to

defeat the largest force that the Japanese

could bring to bear against

Combined

Fleet

it.

However, the Americans had no intention of relegating their strongest fleet to a purely defensive role. Early in 1943

Admiral King suggested that Nimitz should consider how his ships could be used to support a thrust to the Gilbert Islands. 1 Undeterred by the argument that any warships, transports, troops and assault craft that could be spared for an offensive in the Central Pacific might be better employed in direct support of operations elsewhere, King went on to propose an advance by way of the Gilberts to the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the principle of simultaneous thrusts in the Central Pacific and further south, and at the Trident Conference in May the Combined Chiefs agreed that Nimitz, after seizing the

Gilbert Islands, should launch an offensive against the Marshalls and Carolines in order to protect the northern flank of Halsey's and MacArthur's forces, and at the same

372

THE CENTRAL

PACIFIC: 1943

373

time keep the enemy guessing and compel him to fight on more than one front. 2 At the Quadrant Conference in August the Combined Chiefs rejected a tentative proposal that they should curtail MacArthur's offensive in favour of operations in the Central Pacific, but agreed that Nimitz

should aim in 1943-44 at pushing as far west as the Marianas or perhaps Palau. Meanwhile Mac Arthur was to continue his step-by-step advance along the north coast of New Guinea and "seize or neutralize" eastern New Guinea, "including the Admiralty Islands and the 55 Bismarck Archipelago 3 By July 20 the fleet based on Pearl Harbor included two new fleet carriers, three light carriers, twenty new destroyers and the new fast battleship Alabama. Nimitz was told that he could count on having by October not only much larger numbers of heavy ships but also nearly thirty transports and a substantial number of new escort carriers. In the outcome, the warships at his disposal when he began his westward advance in November included six modern and seven older battleships, six fleet carriers, five light .

carriers, eight escort carriers

The

tasks assigned to

and

fifteen cruisers.

Nimitz would involve a

of advances from island to island across vast stretches of blue water. As most of the objectives he was to take would furnish nothing but a few palm trees and such stores and buildings as the Japanese might leave behind them, he and his backers faced the problem of supplying and maintaining an expeditionary force whose communications he could not hope to safeguard unless his ships were able to keep to the sea for months on end without returning to far-off bases for replenishment or repairs. The answer was found in the provision of a large fleet train of specially designed supply and repair ships. The principle of a fleet train equipped to serve as a floating base was not new, but the Americans applied it on a scale which endowed a powerful modern fleet with a staying-power unknown since the days of sail. In August Vice-Admiral Spruance, the victor of Midway, assumed command of the Fifth Fleet. In preparation for the offensive he set up a number of task forces. The most series

MAP 40 Patau

j 500

to the Ellice Island?

Miles Truk: Japanese bases, 20 November, 1943

140°£

160°£

150'£

^

£

• '

Jf

180*

170'B

Saipan Tfnian

Rota

'Guam Eniwetok

.Bikini

Poi-Namur Ya£ Palau

t

,

Mabelap

CAROLINE

Majuro Truk

ls

-

Peleliu

.Wotje

'Ulithi

*V

Jaluit

.Mili

*

Ala kin

.

Tarawa «

.

.

BISMARCK

'

Abemama

Nauru Ocean I.

Nanumea iae

ELLICE

-

IS.

XL

Funafuti

NOVEMBER

1943

375

important of these were a fast carrier force, an assault force, and a force which controlled both the fleet train and any land-based aircraft within reach. The fast carrier force

and light carriers, the new fast and a number of cruisers and destroyers. The assault force was built round the transports, freighters, assault ships and landing craft of the 5th Amphibious Force. It included escort, covering and bombardment forces composed of cruisers, destroyers and older battleships, and consisted of the fleet carriers battleships,

Land more than a hundred thousand strong, were furnished by the 5th Amphibious Corps, under LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith of the United States Marine escort carriers to provide air cover for troops ashore.

forces,

Corps.

The

on the Gilbert Islands involved the assembly of troops, ships and aircraft at places as far apart as Alaska, California, the Hawaiian Islands, New Zealand and the South Seas. It also involved the despatch, from bases separated by three thousand miles of water, of two distinct landing forces bound respectively for Makin and Tarawa. The two convoys, despatched from Pearl Harbor on November 10 and from the New Hebrides on November 12, sighted each other at sea on November 19 as they approached their destinations. The Japanese had based their plans for the defence of the Gilbert Islands on the assumption that ships and carrierborne aircraft from Truk would be available to repel an invasion force. 4 But when the time came, Admiral Koga, having disembarked most of the aircraft from his carriers at the beginning of the month to meet Halsey's offensive in the Solomons, was unable to put to sea for lack of air support. The only localities in the Gilberts which were at all strongly defended were Buritari at the south-western extremity of Makin, where the Japanese had a few guns and 300 combatant troops to defend their seaplane base, and assault

the tiny

islet

of Betio at the south-western extremity of

Tarawa. Betio, although only about two miles long and nowhere more than six hundred yards wide, was the site of an airfield and had a garrison of roughly 4,500 of all ranks

376

NEW

armed with a

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS variety of weapons. These included heavy

machine-guns, field guns, and coast defence guns brought from Singapore. The beaches were barricaded and thickly sown with mines, and a neighbouring reef presented a natural obstacle to landing craft at most states of an unpredictable tide. On November 20 some 6,000 troops of the 27th United States Infantry Division landed without much difficulty on Buritari after a concentrated attack by carrier-borne aircraft and a two-hour naval bombardment. Once ashore, the troops advanced at a pace described by their corps commander as "infuriatingly slow". None the less by November 24 they succeeded in capturing the island, and with it the whole of Makin, at a cost of 214 soldiers killed or wounded. In addition 644 sailors were drowned when the escort carrier Liscombe Bay was torpedoed by a submarine. 5 Betio, assaulted on the same day by the reinforced 2nd Marine Division under Major-General Julian C. Smith, proved a much harder nut to crack. A two-and-a-half-hour naval bombardment, preceded and followed by air attacks, silenced the coast defence guns and killed nearly half the garrison, but had little effect on field guns and beach defences. Amphibious vehicles called amphtracs, capable of climbing over coral reefs and of making about four knots in still water, then carried the first waves of the assault force towards the shore. But they were delayed by a choppy sea and an unfavourable current, with the result that the first of them did not reach dry land until about twenty minutes after the bombardment had ceased. This gave surviving members of the garrison time to man strongpoints commanding the landing areas and to bring field guns to bear on the amphtracs while they were still battling against wind and water. Troops in the succeeding waves, carried in landing craft which could not clear the reef, had to wade up to a quarter of a mile through waist-deep water before they reached the shore. Even so, some 5,000 marines landed on the first day, and by nightfall were clinging precariously to a shallow beachhead. At noon on the second day, after a battalion of the

NOVEMBER 1943-JANUARY had fought

1944

377

way

ashore with the loss of roughly a third of its strength, the tide unexpectedly rose so far that landing craft were able to go the whole way to the beach. The Japanese then retreated into two or three small pockets which were pinched out by the evening of November 23 at the cost of 1,009 marines and sailors killed and 2,101 wounded since the morning of November 20. 6 Landings on the remaining islands of the group, which cost the marines a further ninety killed or wounded, put the whole of the Gilberts into Allied hands by nightfall on divisional reserve

November

its

26. 7

On that day the 9th Australian Division, fifteen hundred away in New Guinea, began a northward advance on

miles

week the Japanese 20th and were retreating under cover of rearguard actions. About the end of the year it became clear to Lieutenant-General Hatazo Adachi, commanding the Eighteenth Army, that he had no hope of holding Sio, and on January 4 he ordered both divisions to fall back on Madang. An American task force under Brigadier-General Clarence A. Martin cut the direct route to Madang by landing at Saidor on January 2, but some thousands of Japanese succeeded in escaping by passing south of the American lodgement area. The 9th Australian Division entered Sio on January 15, and was then relieved by the 5th Australian Division. By January 21, when the Australians completed their mopping-up in the Sio area, the Huon Peninsula and the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Sio had been cleared of the enemy at a cost to the Japanese of some 7,000 to 8,000 casualties since September. 8 The 9th Division's losses in killed and wounded since October were about one-seventh of that figure. 9 MacArthur was thus free by the end of 1943 to carry out the landings in western New Britain which had long figured in his plans. As a prelude to the main landing at Gape the Sattelberg front. Within a

51st Divisions

Gloucester, in the north-west corner of the island, a combat team of the 112th United States Cavalry Regiment landed

on December 15 at Arawe, on the south coast, where it established a beachhead with little difficulty. Cover was

378

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

provided by an Australian naval task force under Admiral Crutchley, and by land-based aircraft from New Guinea. The landing at Cape Gloucester, carried out by regimental combat teams of the 1st United States Marine Division under Major-General William H. Rupertus, followed on December 26. By the end of the first day 12,500 marines and more than seven thousand tons of stores were ashore. On December 30 the marines captured a neighbouring airfield after a stiff fight with two Japanese battalions, and by the middle ofJanuary western New Britain was securely in Allied hands. To extend the American bridgehead to the east, a further landing was made in the first week of March at Talasea, on the east coast of the finger-like promontory which points towards the western extremity of New Ireland. As the greater part of New Britain is mountainous, and in 1944 was roadless, these moves were intended not as the prelude to an overland advance to Rabaul, which in any case was ruled out by the terms of MacArthur's directive, but as the first stage of an encircling movement which would confront the Japanese with the choice between trying to

withdraw

their forces

from Rabaul and leaving them

to

waste away. MacArthur's intention in the early part of 1944 was that this movement should take the form of an assault on Kavieng by Halsey's forces in the Solomons, and a simultaneous advance to the Admiralty Islands by his own forces in the South- West Pacific. 10 As a step towards Kavieng, and also to tighten his grip on the enemy's communications, Halsey decided to begin by seizing Green Island, a group of coral reefs and islets about half-way between Bougainville and New Ireland. In the third week of February troops of the 3rd New Zealand Division, accompanied by a few American observers and technicians and opposed by a Japanese garrison of 120 officers and men, duly occupied Green Island at the cost of ten New Zealanders and three Americans killed. 11 Almost simultaneously the Japanese, alarmed by the growing weight of the Allied air offensive, decided to strengthen the air defences of Truk by recalling their fighters from Rabaul. 12 As bombers without fighter escort could not

MAP 41 The Encirclement of Rabaul

landings.

Pec 1943 -Mar 1944 St.

Math/as Is. 50 ;

Emiraul.

^*^MM 20

y

^>FEg

29

Jliles 1

\

Woodtark

W.F.E.

13*

100

150

380

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

be risked in daylight within reach of Allied fighters, this meant that no air support would be available for a longdelayed attempt by the garrison of Bougainville to drive the Americans from their lodgement area at Empress Augusta Bay. So desperate was the garrison's plight that General Imamura of the Eighth Area Army, knowing that he had no chance of sending more than a trickle of reinforcements and supplies to Bougainville as long as the Allies maintained their stranglehold of his communications, none the less allowed the attack to go forward. 13 At dawn on March 8 the Japanese 6th Division, augmented by two additional infantry battalions and supported by a large number of field guns dragged laboriously along jungle tracks, attacked the American perimeter. The Japanese, using about 15,000 first-line troops backed by a generous allotment of administrative and ancillary units,

made some

progress at the outset, but were heavily out-

numbered by the two American divisions in the beachhead. After a week of desperate fighting they were driven back with fearful slaughter. Thereafter they fared so badly that on March 25 the Seventeenth Army called off the offensive

on Imamura's orders. Meanwhile Mac Arthur's American and Australian Air Forces were reconnoitring and bombing the Admiralty Islands in preparation for an assault due on April 1. The Japanese garrison was believed to be about 4,600 strong, but the crew of a reconnaissance aircraft which flew low over the islands on February 23 reported no signs of Japanese occupation. 14 MacArthur, hoping to take the small island of Los Negros by a coup de main and thence advance to the main island of Manus, promptly ordered a reconnaissance in force by not more than a thousand men. The report was found to be inaccurate when, on February 27, a six-man reconnaissance party which landed surreptitiously signalled that Los Negros was "lousy with Japs". 15 However, the reconnaissance in force was not cancelled. Before dawn on February 29 a thousand troops of the 1st United States Cavalry Division, accompanied by twenty-five Australian officers and men and twelve native

FEBRUARY-MARCH

1944

381

Royal Papuan Constabulary, began to stream ashore near the south-east corner of Los Negros. 16 The garrison, expecting that any attack would come from the opposite direction, were caught unprepared and could not prevent the cavalrymen from establishing a beachhead covering an airstrip near the coast. On March 1 Mac Arthur ordered his troops to hold on and arranged to reinforce them. Counter-attacks cost the Japanese heavy losses, and by March 9 an Australian fighter squadron was operating from the airstrip. At the cost of 330 killed and 1,189 wounded, 17 the Allies soon gained possession of the whole of the Admiralty Islands, and with them of one of the finest police of the

natural harbours in the South- West Pacific. To complete the encirclement of Rabaul, Halsey proposed that, instead of assaulting Kavieng, he should seize Emirau Island in the St Mathias group. This proposal, with others made by Halsey and MacArthur, was accepted in Washington on March 12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then

gave MacArthur a new directive which called on him to speed up the development of a first-class base in the Admiralty Islands, complete the "neutralization" of Rabaul and Kavieng "with minimum forces", and seize Hollandia, in Dutch New Guinea, with the object of developing there an "air centre" from which heavy bombers could strike at Japanese bases in western New Guinea, the islands west of New Guinea, and the Palaus. 18 As Nimitz was doing well in the Central Pacific, he too was directed, at his own request, to speed up his advance. The tasks now set for him were to "neutralize" rather than capture Truk, occupy the southern Marianas about the middle of June and the Palaus about the middle of September, and provide support for MacArthur's leap to Hollandia. Mindanao was to be occupied about the middle of November as the prelude to an advance in the early part of 1945 to Formosa, either directly from Mindanao or by way of Luzon. These proposals had obvious disadvantages from MacArthur's point of view. Regarding himself as pledged to liberate the whole of the Philippines as soon as possible, he could scarcely be content to see Luzon reduced to the

382

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

status of a possible staging post

on the route

to

Formosa.

The American programme was also unsatisfactory who saw no place in it for the

to the strong British fleet which they were trying to persuade the War Cabinet to agree to send to the Pacific within the next British Chiefs of Staff,

twelve months. 19 But on March 13 and 21 communications from the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear to the British that the Americans foresaw no need of a British fleet in the Pacific before the summer of 1945, and thought that operations in the Indian Ocean would provide more suitable employment for British warships in the meantime. 20 The difficulty was that such operations could not be made effective without assault shipping which the Americans were not willing to divert from the Pacific or to see withheld from the Mediterranean or north-west Europe. In accordance with the new directive, on March 20 four American battleships bombarded Kavieng in order to give the impression that a landing there was imminent, while the 4th United States Marine Regiment landed unopposed on Emirau Island. The combined effect of this move and the occupation of the Admiralty Islands was that by May about 140,000 Japanese soldiers and seamen, including some 30,000 survivors of the garrison of Bougainville, were irretrievably cut off from the main body of the Japanese forces. 21

In the meantime Nimitz had followed his capture of the by advancing in overwhelming strength to the Marshall Islands. These consist of hundreds of coral atolls and islets scattered over many thousands of square miles of sea. The American plan, which involved the movement of more than fifty thousand troops and nearly three hundred warships, transports and auxiliaries, was to begin by seizing the undefended island of Majuro in order to secure an anchorage for tankers and supply ships. Landings would then be made on the twin islands of Roi and Namur, at the northern end of the vast Kwajalein Atoll, and on Kwajalein Island at its southern end. Wotje, Maloelap, Mili and Jaluit, all of which were defended, would be by-passed, but Gilberts

THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

383

about a score of other islands, including Eniwetok, would have to be occupied before Nimitz could claim to have attained his aim. On the Japanese side, the decision reached

by Imperial General Headquarters in September 1943 was that the Marshall Islands should be defended as outposts of the new line from the Kurile Islands through the Caroline Islands to Timor. Accordingly, troops had been sent from Japan, Manchuria and the Philippines to reinforce the disembarked seamen already present. 22 But these garrisons were not expected to do more than gain time for the completion of the new line, or for a naval counter-stroke. The defence of the Marshall Islands remained the responsibility of the navy. The Japanese knew that only a decisive naval victory could enable them to halt Nimitz before he swept with irresistible might through the Marshalls and reached the Carolines or the Marianas. Their carrier force had, however, been so weakened by Yamamoto's and Koga's successive attempts to prop up the defences of Bougainville and Rabaul that they were in no position to risk a major fleet action except in the most favourable conditions. In December and January attacks by land-based aircraft from the Gilberts severely damaged Japanese airfields in the Marshall Islands, but left about 150 aircraft still intact at Eniwetok and elsewhere. Most of these were destroyed or made unserviceable by carrier raids at the end ofJanuary. 23 On February 1, after a battalion of the 16th United States Infantry Regiment had occupied Majuro without loss, the 4th Marine Regiment assaulted Roi and Namur while the 7th Infantry Division tackled Kwajalein Island. The assaults were preceded by a long-drawn naval bombardment. A tricky approach through gaps in coral reefs made the landings at Roi and Namur rather difficult, but both islands were captured by nightfall on February 2. At Kwajalein Island about 3,000 Japanese who had survived the preliminary bombardment made a desperate attempt to push the invaders back into the sea after the first wave had landed without a single casualty, but soon found themselves hopelessly outnumbered. On February 7 the Americans

384

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

completed the capture of the whole of Kwajalein Atoll at the cost of 372 soldiers and marines killed out of 41,000 committed. The Japanese lost 7,870 killed out of a garrison of8,675. 24 Three days later Koga, recognizing that he was in danger of being cornered at Truk by carrier forces which he was in no position to seek out and destroy, withdrew practically the whole of the Combined Fleet to the Palaus as the prelude to a further withdrawal to Singapore and Japan. The Fifth Fleet, striking with carrier-borne aircraft at Truk on February 17 and 18 and also during the intervening night, was thus too late to catch Koga's heavy ships, but sank 137,091 tons of merchant shipping and destroyed about 270 aircraft. In addition the Japanese lost two light cruisers, two auxiliary cruisers, a training ship and four destroyers, some of them sunk by aircraft and others by surface ships and submarines. 25 Their land-based aircraft made desperate attempts to hit back, but succeeded only in damaging one American carrier and destroying twenty-five aircraft. Under cover of these raids, and of attacks on Ponape by aircraft of the Seventh United States Army Air Force

from Tarawa, about 8,000 marines and infantrymen from Kwajalein captured the three defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll between February 18 and 22 at the cost of 339 of their number killed or missing. The Japanese lost 2,677 killed and 64 captured. 26 In

New

Guinea, the survivors of the Japanese 20th and

51st Divisions continued after their hasty departure

from

Sio to fall back to the west. Notwithstanding the presence of American troops at Saidor, many thousands of Adachi's troops managed to escape by taking to the jungle. By the last week in February at least 3,469 Japanese were known to have passed along a route south of the American bridgehead, and in March the Australians estimated that altogether about 8,000 had escaped. 27 In the meantime Australian and Papuan troops advancing from Sio to make contact with the Americans had killed 734 Japanese, found 1,793 dead, and taken 48 prisoners. Their own losses during

MA? Vumpti

to

42

Modang

Roads Japanese positions, Oct 1943

Akxishafen

B

i SttlCLTCk

Madang Sea,

\Astrola,be

' Kamusi

Bay

386

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

the pursuit from Sio to the Saidor beachhead were three killed

and

five

wounded. 28

Further west, the rapid advance of the 7th Australian Dumpu in October 1943 forced the Japanese to bar the southern approaches to Bogadjim by improvising defensive positions in the Finis terres. By the end of the month a mixed force under Major-General Masutaro Nakai, composed of troops left behind when the main body of the 20th Division moved forward to Finschhafen and Sattelberg in September, held Madang, Bogadjim, and the high country to the south. As a road intended to link Madang with Lae had been completed as far south as Yokopi, the Japanese could supply their forward troops without great difficulty, while the Australians depended on airborne Division to

Dumpu and were therefrom the unhealthy Ramu Valley. This did not prevent the 7th Division from patrolling far more energetically than Nakai's troops, but for the time being it ruled out any big advance. Towards the end of 1943 the Allies believed that the American landing at Saidor, due early in the new year, might cause General Nakai to thin out his troops in the Finisterres. In December General Vasey sanctioned a local offensive designed to weaken the enemy's hold on his forward positions near Kankiryo. 29 On December 26 a supplies to replenish their stocks at

fore unable to

move

far

battalion of the 21st Australian Infantry Brigade, fortified

by a Christmas dinner of £C giblet soup, roast turkey and seasoning, green peas, mashed potatoes, shredded carrots, gravy, plum-pudding and sauce, tea and buns", prepared to begin the assault as soon as the skies were clear enough for supporting aircraft to play their part.

A

thick mist lifted before 8 a.m. on December 27. Fighters and dive-bombers then attacked the Japanese positions, and at 9 a.m. the Australians began to scale the rock-face in front of them, scrambling over shale and loose stones and in some places using bamboo ladders. By December 31 Vasey's troops

had gained a foothold on a

steep ridge leading to the

Kankiryo position. Meanwhile Vasey had returned from a brief visit

to Port

NEW GUINEA: JANUARY-MARCH

1944

387

Moresby, where he conferred with his immediate superiors also saw MacArthur. In the first week of January the veteran 18th Australian Infantry Brigade and the wellseasoned 1 5th Brigade relieved the two brigades which had flown to Dumpu three months earlier. The 18th Brigade, with orders to demonstrate towards the Bogadjim-Yokopi road and capture the intervening heights "as soon as the

and

administrative situation permits", attacked the strongly held Kankiryo position on January 20, and in the first week of February completed its capture for the loss of 46 killed

and 147 wounded. 30 The 15th Brigade then took over the task of patrolling forward from Kankiryo, and by March 14 reached Yokopi in battalion strength. 31 Meanwhile two battalions of the 32nd United States Infantry Division from Saidor had landed almost unopposed at a point about midway between Saidor and Bogadjim, and Australian patrols were reaching far to the rear of Nakai's positions on the road north of Yokopi. In the third week of March Adachi responded to instructions from his superior formation to withdraw westwards and concentrate his force at Hollandia by ordering a slow retreat under cover of a rearguard action by the 41st Division at Madang. 32 On April 13 a patrol from the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade entered Bogadjim to find that the enemy had gone but had 33 Eleven days later left much heavy equipment behind him. Australian troops moved into Madang just after the last of the Japanese rearguard had withdrawn. 34 Hitherto most of the fighting in New Guinea had been done by the Australians, advancing through territory administered before and after the Japanese occupation by Australian officials. For his advance into Dutch New

Guinea and beyond, MacArthur

on American Army. His aim was to

relied chiefly

troops of General Krueger's Sixth

begin by seizing Hollandia and its neighbourhood as a base for Allied naval, air and land forces. Hollandia itself was a small settlement of no great importance, but the adjacent Humboldt Bay was the only first-class anchorage on the 400-mile stretch of coast from Wewak to Geelvink Bay. Moreover, the Japanese had developed three airfields about

388

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

ten miles west of Hollandia, near Lake Sentani, and were building a fourth. They also had airfields less than 150 miles to the west, in the neighbourhood of Sarmi and Wakde Island. As MacArthur's nearest big air bases were some 400 to 500 miles away in the Markham Valley, he decided that he must try to gain possession at the outset of a Japanese airfield in an intermediate position at Aitape. MacArthur's plan was that a regimental combat team from the 41st United States Infantry Division (to be joined twenty-four hours later by a team from the 32nd Division) should land at Aitape and seize the airfield. Simultaneously, two teams from the 41st Division were to land at Humboldt Bay and two from the 24th Division some twenty to thirty miles further west at Tanahmera Bay. Hollandia and the area between the coast and Lake Sentani would then be captured by converging movements from east and west. The troops would be carried from Finschhafen and Goodenough Island in more than two hundred ships and small craft of the 7th Amphibious Force, escorted by American and Australian cruiser forces under RearAdmiral R. S. Berkey, U.S.N., and Rear-Admiral Crutchley. Eight escort carriers from the Fifth Fleet would provide air cover during the landings. The Fast Carrier Force, also from the Fifth Fleet, would give distant cover and provide such additional air support as might be needed. When planning the assault on Hollandia, the Allied

were handicapped by inadequate local knowledge. or Americans were acquainted with the topography of Dutch New Guinea, which had only about two hundred white inhabitants before the war and was described by Dutch officials as "a colony of a colony". 35 Six Australian scouts, accompanied by four natives and an Indonesian interpreter, landed from an American submarine at Tanahmera Bay on the night of March 23 for a preliminary reconnaissance, but they were attacked by Japanese troops and only five of the party escaped with staffs

Few Europeans

their lives.

In late March and early April American and Australian land-based bombers made heavy attacks on Japanese

MAP Western

43

New Guinea,

American landings, April -September, 1944 10

100

1*

200

20

Miles

Miles

Oceatv

Pacific

Cycle J rps Mts. Holland*. Mcrotail.

SEP

15

Lake j

Seninni

HALMAHBRA [J

ULY 30,

Batjan

r9r

to*

Bay

^-?&IMAY27|

IMAY171

Vogelkop Teninfula

DUTCH

NEW GUINEA

r

u

r

a

Sea

390

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

from Wewak to the Indonesianarchipelago. These were so successful that the 6th Air Division, caught unprepared by the first attack on the Lake Sentani airfields, was unable to offer any effective opposition to the American landings on April 22. 36 The Japanese land forces were also far from ready. In the middle of March Imperial General Headquarters transferred the Eighteenth Army to the Second Area Army, leaving the Eighth Area Army with only the doomed Seventeenth Army in the Bismarck Archipelago and the northern Solomons. Lieutenant-General Korechika Anami, commanding the Second Area Army, thereupon instructed General Adachi to continue his retreat from the MadangBogadjim area and concentrate his three divisions at Hollandia. 37 But the 41st Division was still in contact with airfields

the Australians in the Finisterres, the disorganized 20th

and

and the greater part of

51st Divisions

were withdrawing

slowly and painfully along difficult routes after by-passing

With the exception of one regiment which was trying to reach Aitape, none of Adachi's troops was further west than Wewak when the Hollandia the Americans at Saidor.

landings began. Pending the arrival of two reinforcing divisions due from China at the end of April, Anami had only the 36th Division and some indifferent garrison troops with which to oppose the landings. The senior army officer at Hollandia was a newcomer who had had no time to draw up a co-ordinated plan and concert it with the naval and air authorities, or to weld his troops into an effective fighting force.

MacArthur, with almost undisputed command of the sea and air, and with nearly 50,000 troops at his immediate disposal and another 30,000 in reserve, was thus in a position to bring overwhelming strength to bear against Anami's forces. At Aitape the 163rd Regimental Combat Team, opposed by fewer than a thousand Japanese of whom not more than a quarter were fighting troops, secured the airfield for the loss of two Americans killed and thirteen wounded; at Humboldt Bay the defenders were so shaken by the preliminary bombardment that few stayed to

APRIL-MAY

1944

391

oppose the landings. The only serious hitch, apart from the by fires started by a single Japanese bomber on the night of April 23, occurred at Tanahmera Bay, where one of the beaches chosen for the landings was found to be fringed by an impassable swamp, while the other had no means of egress except a track too steep and narrow for vehicles. Moreover, it was skirted by a coral reef which prevented landing craft from reaching it except at high tide. destruction of large quantities of stores

However, as there was no opposition the leading troops were able to move inland without disaster. Follow-up formations and supplies were then diverted to Humboldt Bay. By April 26 all the Lake Sentani airfields were in Allied hands, and the Aitape airfield was in regular use by Australian fighters flown in two days earlier. While troops of General Eichelberger's 1st United States Corps completed their rounding up of the scattered Japanese garrison, American engineers went on to transform Hollandia into a highly efficient modern base, complete with docks, roads, accommodation for 140,000 men, and pipelines to carry fuel from Humboldt Bay to the Lake Sentani airfields on the far side of the Cyclops Mountains. 38 The loss of Hollandia was more than a tactical defeat for the Japanese. In 1943 Imperial General Headquarters had agreed that the new defensive line from the Caroline Islands to Timor should meet the New Guinea coast in the neighbourhood of Sarmi and Wakde Island. On May 2 they

came

to

the conclusion that the

Sarmi-Wakde

Island

sector could not be held indefinitely without the protection

of outpost positions at Hollandia, and that consequently the main position must be pulled back to a line through Biak Island and Manokwari. 39 Only a few days later they were forced to reconsider their decision in the light of heavy losses inflicted by American submarines on convoys carrying the 32nd and 35th Divisions to Halmahera and western New Guinea. Recognizing that bases even as far west as Biak Island were dangerously exposed to attacks by Allied aircraft from the Lake Sentani airfields, they ordered the Second Area Army on May 9 to pull the main position still

NEW

392

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

further back to a line through Sorong to

and Halmahera, and

hold Biak Island and Manokwari only as outpost

positions. 40

Even so, the heaviest righting had yet to come. MacArthur had decided before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape to seize Wakde Island when his troops were ready. 41 On May 17 the combat team which had landed at Aitape on April 22 secured a beachhead on the mainland opposite the island without difficulty. Next day American troops crossed the two-mile stretch of water to Wakde under cover of a naval and air bombardment, and on May 20 the island changed hands after a bitter struggle in which forty Americans and more than seven hundred Japanese lost their lives. A westward advance on the mainland met still stronger opposition from the main body of the Japanese 36th Division, which held out in front of Sarmi until the second week in June. In the meantime MacArthur received the disquieting news that the Lake Sentani airfields were unsuitable for the

heavy bombers which he had hoped the

Markham

Valley. 42

He

to

move

there from

therefore decided that Biak

Island, where there were airfields believed to be fit for his purpose, must be seized without delay. On May 27 assault troops of the 41st United States Infantry Division landed on the island and established a beachhead with deceptive ease. few hours later the garrison, which was very much stronger than the Americans supposed, began a fight to the death by counter-attacking so effectively that one of the two American regiments ashore was threatened with encirclement and had to be re-embarked and brought back to the beachhead for a fresh landing. Within the next few days the Japanese repented of their decision to hold Biak only as an outpost. Recognizing that the loss of the island and its airfield would reduce their chances of halting the American offensive by fighting a fleet action without interference from land-based bombers, they came to the conclusion that the existing garrison of roughly 11,000 men ought, after all, to be reinforced. 43 convoy carrying about 2,500 troops left Davao on the

A

A

JUNE-JULY

1944

393

night of June 2 with an escort which included two heavy and a battleship, but turned back on the following day in the light of a false report that there was an American carrier at Biak. second attempt was made a few days later, when the same troops were embarked with others in three destroyers and three towed barges, escorted by three more destroyers. But Allied bombers sank one of the destroyers, and the rest were chased away on the night of cruisers

A

June 8 by three cruisers and fourteen destroyers under Admiral Crutchley. Toyoda then decided to send a transport group so strongly escorted that Crutchley would be powerless to touch it. But the two giant battleships and two heavy cruisers assembled for the purpose had yet to leave for Biak when signs of an impending assault on the Marianas led Toyoda to send them post-haste to a rendezvous in the Philippine Sea.

Even so, the garrison put up a tremendous fight. Making good use of caves linked by underground passages and ringed with pillboxes and natural or artificial obstacles, they held out for so long that in June MacArthur began to look for an airfield whose capture would help him to give cover to his troops on Biak and at the same time contribute to the next stage of his advance.

On July

2,

ten days after

had completed the occupation of Biak at the cost of 2,738 battle casualties and 3,500 cases of typhus since May 27, the 158th Regimental Combat Team, followed on July 3 by 1,500 paratroops of the 503rd United States Parachute Regiment, landed on the small island of Noemfor in Geelvink Bay. By July 6 the island and its three airfields were in Allied hands. Just over three weeks later a task force carried from Wakde Island in destroyers and landing craft captured the last of MacArthur' s objectives in New Guinea by landing at Sansapor without opposition from the Japanese 35th Division, which had withdrawn from Manokwari to Sorong in accordance with orders from the his forces

Second Army.

Meanwhile General Adachi, far away to the east and with scores of thousands of well-fed American troops between the hungry survivors of his three divisions and the

394

NEW

GUINEA, AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

of the Japanese forces in New Guinea, had come to the conclusion that a long, roundabout march through the jungle would be even more hazardous than a do-or-die attempt to carve a way through the Aitape perimeter to the west of him. The Americans, learning from intercepted wireless traffic that he was likely to take the offensive early rest

in July with some 20,000 to 30,000 troops, brought in substantial reinforcements. 44 Adachi attacked on July 10, and in the first twenty-four hours broke through the

American forward

positions

miles east of Aitape.

The

on a

about twenty back about four

river line

defenders

fell

miles before launching a series of counter-attacks which

them more or

soon after the middle of July. Adachi's forces, weakened by a further attempt to break through to Aitape in the second half of the month, were then driven back with heavy losses to a line some fifteen miles further east. Almost simultaneously Australian and Papuan patrols, ranging forward from Madang, reached the Sepik River in Adachi's rear. MacArthur's spectacular advance along the north coast of New Guinea thus ended with every important base except Wewak in Allied hands. In August one division of Lieutenant-General Fusataro Teshima's Second Army was clinging to its remaining outposts in New Guinea at Sorong, while further east the battered remnant of Adachi's Eighteenth Army was immobilized between the Sepik River and the American perimeter at Aitape. Before the Philippines could be recaptured, MacArthur still needed to gain a foothold in the islands of the Halmahera group for the benefit of his land-based aircraft. The main island of Halmahera was believed to be held by some 30,000 Japanese, and in fact was garrisoned by a substantial part of Teshima's army. The smaller island of Morotai was rightly thought to be only lightly defended, but might be reinforced from the main island. MacArthur decided, therefore, to prepare for the worst by assigning to the capture of Morotai the whole of the reinforced 31st United States Infantry Division, backed by a regimental combat team of the 32nd Division in reserve. Preliminary air carried

less to their original line

*

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER attacks

from

1944

395

on Halmahera were made by land-based

aircraft

New Guinea,

while carrier-borne aircraft of the Third Fleet struck at airfields in Celebes. Some of the 28,000 troops involved were embarked at points more than nine

hundred miles from their destination. Landings were duly begun on September 15, under cover of a naval bombardment by American and Australian cruisers and destroyers of the Seventh Fleet and with fighter support from six escort carriers. The assault troops, scrambling over coral boulders and through deep mud to reach the shore, found the going difficult, but there was no opposition on the beaches. An airfield left unfinished by the Japanese was captured on the second day, but proved so boggy that MacArthur's engineers set to work to build a new one. Within three weeks of the initial assault the new airfield was ready to take fighters, and soon after the middle of October it was being used by heavy bombers. Meanwhile Nimitz had made such progress further north that the loss of the Philippines could be only a matter of time for the Japanese unless their surface fleet redeemed their failure to stop him by winning the decisive naval battle for

which Toyoda was preparing. *

* See Chapter 18.

i

i7

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

JULY INWestern

AND AUGUST,

Allies agreed that the

1943,

the

new SouthIndia Com-

East Asia Command, which was to relieve the of responsibility for operations against the Japanese in Burma, Siam, Malaya and Sumatra and to defend Ceylon and the North-East Frontier of India, should be under a British Supreme Allied Commander assisted by an American deputy and an Anglo-American integrated staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for the allocation of British and American resources to the SouthEast Asia Command and the China theatre, and would retain their responsibility for the broad strategy of the war against Japan, but orders and instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander would be issued by the British Chiefs of Staff. The India Command would remain responsible for the development of India as a base, for internal security and for the defence of the North- West Frontier. Acting Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (who held the substantive rank of Captain) was appointed Supreme Allied Commander at the end of the Quadrant Conference in August, but his command did not come formally into existence until midnight on November 15. Lieutenant-General J. W. Stilwell became Deputy Supreme Commander; Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall the Supreme Commander's Chief of Staff. LieutenantGeneral R. A. Wheeler of the United States Army was appointed Principal Administrative Officer, with a British deputy. Mountbatten and his staff were troubled from the start by weaknesses in the chain of command. Mountbatten had hoped to be able to give much of his attention to long-

mand

398

NOVEMBER 1943-AUGUST

1944

399

term plans, and to take care of current operations by issuing orders to three Commanders-in-Chief responsible for naval, land and air forces. In practice he found that he had often to smooth over difficulties arising from an imperfect and anomalous organization. Some of these weaknesses were inescapable. Admiral Sir James Somerville, who became Naval Commander-in-

command

of the Eastern Fleet, for it would not have been possible to give Mountbatten a usefully strong naval force distinct from the fleet already in the Indian Ocean. The result was that Somerville, with only one battleship, one escort carrier, seven cruisers, two armed merchant cruisers, eleven destroyers, thirteen escort Chief, necessarily retained

submarines available in November, became responsible to Mountbatten "in all matters concerning the security and support of land campaigns and amphibious operations in South-East Asia". At the same time he remained directly responsible to the Admiralty for the security of sea communications in an area extending as far west as the east coast of Africa and the Persian Gulf. 1 This arrangement led to disagreements between Somerville, who expected to find himself in the position of a deputy and an expert adviser rather than a subordinate, and Mountbatten, whose interpretation of his directive from the Prime

vessels

and

six

Minister was that Somerville was "under his command at 55 2 all times and for all purposes The Admiralty did their best to put matters right by explaining that no such interpretation was accepted by the authorities at home. But Somerville was still vexed by Mountbatten s creation of a "war staff 55 whose advice on naval matters might conflict with his. 3 The arrival of substantial naval reinforcements early in 1944 did not end the conflict, which persisted until Somerville was transferred in August 1944 to an important post in Washington and succeeded by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who succeeded in getting on good terms with .

5

Mountbatten. Further troubles arose from the multiplicity of appointments held by Stilwell and from his unhappy temperament. Stilwell was not only Deputy Supreme Commander but

400

BURMA CHANGES HANDS TABLE

12

Organization of Allied Land Forces in South-East Asia, December, 1943

South-East Asia

Command

(Vice-Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten)

Eleventh Army Group (Gen. Sir George Giffard) Fourteenth Army (Lt-Gen. W. J. Slim)

Delhi Delhi Calcutta (later Comilla)

Arakan

15th Corps (Lt-Gen. A. F. P. Christison) 5th Indian Division 7th Indian Division 81st West African Division (less 3rd W.A. Bde.) 4th Corps (Lt-Gen. G. A. P. Scoones) 17th Indian Division

Imphal

20th Indian Division 23rd Indian Division

Northern Combat Area Command. 1 (Lt-Gen.J.W.Stilwell) Ledo 22nd Chinese Division 30th Chinese Division 38th Chinese Division Reserve 26th Indian Division 254th Indian Tank Brigade Colombo Ceylon Army (Lt-Gen. H. E. de R. Wetherall) 11th East African Division 99th Indian Infantry Brigade Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization, Royal Marines India 33rd Corps* (Lt-Gen. M. G. N. Stopford)

Army

2nd

(British) Division

36th Indian Division 1 19th Indian Division c Attached for a., T j. > 25th Indian Division and tralnmg 50th Indian Tank Brigade) J 50th Indian Parachute Brigade 2 Special Force 2 (Maj.-Gen. O. C. Wingate) 77th Indian Brigade 1 1 1th Indian Brigade 14th (British) Brigade 16th (British) Brigade 23rd (British) Brigade 3rd West African Brigade 3rd Special Service Brigade 2 (Commandos) .

.

•

•

•

I

.

,

.

:

.

.

administration

.

India India

S.E.A.C.:

CHAIN OF

COMMAND

401

Notes 1.

2. 3.

Temporarily under operational control of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fourteenth Army. To revert eventually to operational control of Supreme Allied Commander. Under administrative control of Commanding General, China-Burma-India Theatre, United States Army. Assigned but not yet allotted. The land forces of the Japanese Burma Area Army consisted at the end of 1943 of seven divisions and one independent brigade, disposed as follows: Salween front 56th Division 1

8th Division

31st Division

33rd Division 15th Division

Myitkyina-Hukawng Valley area Assam front Assam front In transit from Siam to Assam front Arakan front

55th Division 54th Division Deploying in Ramree I.-Irrawaddy delta area Tenasserim 24th Independent Mixed Brigade

Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek; Commanding General of the China-Burma-India Theatre, United States Army; and Commanding General of the Northern Combat Area Command at the northern extremity of the Allied line. Chiang Kai-shek was willing that the Americantrained Chinese divisions of the Northern Combat Area Command should form part of Mountbatten's force as long as Stilwell exercised direct control of them; but Stilwell also

Commanding Northern Combat Area Command, under

refused to place himself, in his capacity as

General of the

the strategic direction of General Sir George Giffard,

whose Eleventh

Army Group

issued directives to the rest of

forces. 4

Mountbatten was able to give effect to Chiang Kai-shek's wishes only by persuading Stilwell to place the Northern Combat Area Command temporarily under the operational control of Giffard's Mountbatten's land

subordinate, Lieutenant-General teenth Army. 5

W. J.

Slim of the Four-

As the Tenth United States Army Air Force, which provided nearly a third of the combat aircraft in the SouthEast Asia Command, came under Stilwell as Commanding General of the China-Burma-India Theatre, Mount-

402

BURMA CHANGES HANDS TABLE

13

Organization of Allied Air Forces in South-East Asia,

December 1943

Command

(Vice-Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten) Delhi Air Command South-East Asia (A. CM. Sir R. Peirse) Delhi Eastern Air Command (Maj.-Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer) Delhi

South-East Asia

(later Calcutta)

Third Tactical Air Force (A.M. No. 221 Group, R.A.F. 9 squadrons R.A.F. No. 224 Group, R.A.F.

Sir J. Baldwin)

Comilla

Imphal Chittagong

12 squadrons R.A.F.

2 squadrons Royal Indian Air Force Northern Air Sector Force Dinjan 7 squadrons Tenth U.S. Army Air Force 3 squadrons R.A.F. Strategic Air Force (Brig-Gen. H. C. Davidson) Calcutta 7 squadrons Tenth U.S. Army Air Force 3 squadrons R.A.F. (under No. 231 Group, R.A.F.) Calcutta Troop Carrier Command (Brig.-Gen. W. D. Old) (later

2 squadrons

4 squadrons R.A.F. Photographic Reconnaissance Force (Gp-Capt. 3 squadrons

Comilla)

Tenth U.S. Army Air Force S.

G. Wise) Comilla

Tenth U.S. Army Air Force

2 squadrons R.A.F.

No. 222 Group R.A.F. 1 Colombo 8 squadrons R.A.F. 1 squadron Royal Canadian Air Force 1 squadron Royal Netherlands Air Force Bangalore No. 225 Group, R.A.F. 1 3 squadrons R.A.F. Tenth U.S. Army Air Force 2 (Maj.-Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer) Delhi Air Transport Command Dinjan Fourteenth U.S. Army Air Force 3 (Maj.-Gen. C. L. Chennault) China Washington Twentieth U.S. Army Air Force 4 20th Bomber Command, U.S. Army Air Corps 5 58th Bomber Wing, U.S. Army Air Corps 6 73rd Bomber Wing, U.S. Army Air Corps 7

DECEMBER

403

1943

Notes 1.

Strategic control of aircraft operating over the sea vested in

Com-

4.

mander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet. Under Commanding General, China-Burma-India Theatre, U.S. Army. Operational control of active units, other than those of Air Transport Command, exercised by Eastern Air Command. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved the right to re-assign units to the Fourteenth U.S. Army Air Force should they be needed in China. Under Commanding General, China-Burma-India Theatre, U.S. Army. Operations co-ordinated with those of Eastern Air Command through Air Command, South-East Asia. Under strategic control of United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.

Forming.

2.

3.

6. 7.

Due Kharagpur area (65 miles west of Calcutta) about May 1944. Due Kharagpur area about May 1944. Assignment to 20th Bomber

Command countermanded before arrival.

On December 12, 1943, the effective strength of the 67 squadrons under Command South-East Asia was roughly 850 aircraft. Of these, 264

Air

were contributed by the Tenth Army Air Force. These fighters do not include six American, twelve R.A.F., and two Royal Indian Air Force squadrons training or re-equipping. The effective strength of the Japanese December 1943 was approximately 200

Army

Air Force in

aircraft.

Burma

in

These were organized

as follows

HQ, 5th

Air Division (2 regiments) 4th Air Brigade (3 regiments) 7th Air Brigade (5 regiments)

about 40 about 75 about 85

batten's Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief

aircraft aircraft aircraft

Marshal Sir seemed likely to meet similar difficulties if StilwelPs powers were not curbed. Against StilwelPs wishes, but with the concurrence of the American army and air staffs, Mountbatten gave orders on December 12 for the integration of his British and American air forces. 6 MajorGeneral G. E. Stratemeyer, the commander of the Tenth Air Force, thereupon assumed command of the air forces which were to be used against the Japanese in Burma, and Peirse became Allied Air Commander-in-Chief. Aircraft in Ceylon and southern India were excluded from Stratemeyer's command, and aircraft of the American Air Transport Command used for the air lift to China continued

Richard

Peirse,

w.f.e.

— 14

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

404

be controlled by the Tenth Air Force. The Fourteenth United States Army Air Force in China remained under the control of the Commanding General of the ChinaBurma-India Theatre, but Stilwell agreed that he and to

should co-ordinate Stratemeyer's force. Peirse

its

operations with

those of

When Mountbatten took up his post, seven offensive operations in South-East Asia were in prospect.* These were: 1

.

A seaborne assault on the Andaman

Islands (Buccan-

eer). 2.

3.

4.

An

advance by the 15th Corps in Arakan towards Akyab. An advance by the 4th Corps in Assam to the Chindwin. An advance by StilwelPs Chinese troops of the Northern Combat Area Command towards Myitkyina.

5.

6.

7.

An

advance by Chiang Kai-shek's

forces in

Yunnan

towards Bhamo and Lashio. The capture of Indaw by paratroops which would afterwards link up with StilwelPs force. The cutting by Wingate's Special Force of Japanese communications with Indaw for the benefit of StilwelPs force and the Chinese troops advancing from

Yunnan. Administrative preparations already in hand included work on the road to be driven from Ledo through the Hukawng Valley. Mountbatten hoped also to lay a pipeline from Calcutta to Ledo and thence to Fort Hertz and eventually to Myitkyina. During the first part of the Sextant Conference at Cairo in November, the American Chiefs of Staff asked that four or five airfields near Calcutta should be made ready for B.29 very-long-range bombers which were to attack objectives in Japan from forward airfields in China. Mountbatten reported that the airfields could be ready by May 1944 only * See

Map

33, p.

315 and General Map,

p. 18.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

405

if preparatory work were begun without delay and if American engineers and materials arrived by the middle of January. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that an immediate start should be made, and that equipment should be diverted from the Ledo road at the cost of delaying its progress by six to eight weeks. 7 Five airfields, connected by a pipeline with the port of Calcutta, sixty-five miles away, were ready by the end of April; roughly a hundred aircraft of the 58th Wing, 20th Bomber Command, were based on them by the end of May. The 73rd Wing, which was to have accompanied the 58th, was kept in reserve for eventual deployment in the Marianas.

Mountbatten's programme did not go so smoothly. When Mussolini fell from power and the Italian navy dropped out of the war in the summer of 1943, the British were at last able to plan a substantial reinforcement of the Eastern Fleet. In these circumstances President Roosevelt assured Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo in November that the South-East Asia Command would carry out a substantial amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal within the next few months. 8 Almost immediately afterwards an exchange of views with Stalin at Teheran convinced the Western Allies that they could not afford to

The

rest of

delay their projected invasion of north-west Europe beyond summer of 1944 if they were to keep on good terms with the Russians. The Americans wished also to put a force ashore in the south of France. The Allies found, however, that they would not be able to assemble enough assault shipping and landing craft to mount these offensives, and also to give effect to Buccaneer, without jeopardizing their plans for the Pacific theatre. The President had therefore to confess during the second phase of the Sextant Conference that Buccaneer had become impractical, and early in December Mountbatten was obliged to part with nearly half his assault shipping for the benefit of the the early

European theatre. 9 Cheaper substitutes for Buccaneer were considered, but these too were found to be impractical without greater resources than the Chiefs of Staffs were willing to devote to them. Chiang Kai-shek, whose troops

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

406 in

Yunnan were

future,

in

no

state to take the offensive in the

near

was thus presented with an excellent pretext

for

inaction.

Within six weeks of taking up his appointment, Mountbatten was thus confronted with the indefinite postponement not only of Buccaneer but also of Chiang Kai-shek's offensive from Yunnan. Recognizing that this made it impossible for him to carry out his existing directive, he proposed that he should be given the task of encouraging Chinese resistance by means of limited advances designed to make the air lift more secure, and of undertaking seaborne assaults as occasion served. This programme did not appeal to Stilwell, who continued to hanker after an overland advance through Burma. 10 On February 5 Mountbatten therefore despatched a mission, headed by MajorGeneral A. C. Wedemeyer of the United States Army, to London and Washington with orders to put his views and StilwelPs before the British and American Chiefs of Staff. T hile awaiting the result, he carried on with preparations for an overland advance in Arakan, a limited advance across the Assam-Burma frontier by the 4th Corps, and operations by the Northern Combat Area Command and

W

Wingate's Special Force. Stilwell, without informing Mountbatten, also sent a mission to Washington, but afterwards apologized to Mountbatten for this breach of loyalty. 11

Meanwhile the Japanese Burma Army (LieutenantM. Kawabe) was preparing for the offensive which Kawabe had proposed in the previous summer after hearing the views of General Mutaguchi of the Fifteenth Army. * On January 7 Imperial General Headquarters sanctioned General

the launching of Mutaguchi's offensive "at the opportune time' 12 week later the leading regiment of the 15th Division reached the Fifteenth Army's area after a march of 700 miles from Siam, where the division had been kept 5

.

A

back until October as an insurance against an Allied landing from the sea. Kawabe's plan was that the 56th Division, on the * See p. 331.

JAPANESE PLANS IN

1944

407

Burma-China front, should hold Chiang Kai-shek's Yunnan armies on the line of the Salween or immediately west of it, and that the 18th Division in the Hukawng Valley area should stand firm against any Allied thrust from Ledo. The Fifteenth Army, consisting of the 15th, 31st and 33rd Divisions, was to advance on Imphal and Kohima from the Kalemyo-Fort White area (33rd Division and 1st Division Indian National Army) and the crossings of the Chindwin between Tamanthi and Thaungdut (31st and 15th Divisions).* Two to three weeks earlier, the 55th Division was to launch a diversionary offensive in Arakan (Operation Ha-Go). A fundamental weakness of this plan was that roughly half the Fifteenth Army's troops would be unable to receive supplies from the rear for a period estimated by Mutaguchi at three weeks. 13 Mutaguchi hoped to be able to supply the 33rd Division and the Indian National Army from Kalewa along roads which he wrongly believed to have been brought to all-weather standards. In addition, a track from Tamu to Ukhrul (which the British were improving) might be used to carry supplies to part of the 15th Division. But the rest of the 15th Division, and the whole of the 31st Division, advancing along tracks unfit for wheeled vehicles even in dry weather, would depend entirely on the rations and ammunitions they carried with them. A further weakness arose from the late arrival of the 15th Division. The 55th Division was ready to begin its diversionary offensive by the first week in February, and its commander could wait no longer for fear that the enemy might seize his starting positions before he could move off. But it soon became clear that the 15th Division could not be ready to take part in the main offensive before the middle of March, and that even then only two-thirds of its troops would be in position. The start of the main offensive could not, however, be postponed until the whole of the 15th Division was ready, for it was vital to Kawabe's plan that the Fifteenth Army should have time to consolidate its gains before the monsoon. Mutaguchi had therefore to * See Map 45, p. 416.

408

BURMA CHANGES HANDS TABLE Organization of Japanese

14

Land Forces

in

Burma,

January 31, 1944

Southern Area

Army

(F.

M. Count H.

Terauchi)

Burma Army

(Lt-Gen. M. Kawabe) Hukawng Valley area 18th Division Salween front 56 Division Tenasserim 24th Independent Mixed Brigade Fifteenth Army (Lt-Gen. R. Mutaguchi) Arriving Chindwin front 15th Division Chindwin front 31st Division 33rd Division Chindwin front Chindwin front 1st Division, Indian National Army Twenty-Eighth Army (Lt-Gen. S. Sakurai) Arriving southern Arakan 2nd Division Northern Arakan 54th Division 55th Division Northern Arakan

accept the twofold disadvantage of opening his attack with and too late to receive the full benefit of the diversion in Arakan. insufficient troops,

On

the Allied side, the situation on the

Arakan

front at

beginning of February was that the 15th Corps (Lieutenant-General A. F. P. Christison) was in the early stages of an offensive movement and had just regrouped for an advance on Buthidaung. The 5th and 7th Indian Divisions were standing approximately on the line of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road, with the 5th Division athwart the road between Maungdaw and Htindaw. The 7th Division, on the 5th Division's left, was disposed on both banks of the Kalapanzin River, with its right immediately north of the road and its left in hilly country almost due east of Buthidaung. The 81st West African Division, also under the 15th Corps, was in the Kaladan Valley, on the 7th Division's left, and was being supplied by air. Lieutenant-General T. Hanaya, commanding the Japanese 55th Division, concluded that he was about to be attacked in strength and must act at once. 14 His plan was the

MAP

44

Operation Jia-Cjo

=

All- weather

road

Fair weather roads

o C*^±

Sinzweya British positions,

3 Feb 1944

Japanese advances

Miles

410

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

column of infantry and engineers about 5,000 strong, under Major- General T. Sakurai, should pass under cover of darkness and morning mist through the 7th Indian Division's positions east of the Kalapanzin, cross the river at Taung Bazar, and block the 7th Division's communicathat a

Ngakyedauk Pass, in the 5th Division's area. column Sakurai's was then to attack the enemy from the rear while two battalions of the 143rd Infantry Regiment came forward from the south. Hanaya's ultimate intention was to occupy what he believed to be the operational base tions at the

of the 15th Corps at Bawli Bazar. 15 Generals Giffard and Slim, the British

army commanders, had no

army group and

detailed knowledge of this plan,

but suspected that a Japanese offensive was imminent and that probably an attempt would be made to outflank the 15th Corps. 16 Slim had made a close study of Japanese tactics during the past twelve months, and had come to the conclusion that they could not be countered by attempts to form continuous fronts, since these could always be turned

by stealthy infiltration. Forward units or formations whose communications were cut ought, he told his subordinate commanders, to stand fast unless they were ordered to withdraw, and administrative staffs must be ready at all times to supply such units or formations by air. The forward troops would then form "an anvil against which reserves could destroy the

enemy

forces in their rear". 17

After discussing the situation on the Arakan front with Giffard on February 2, he took steps to put this theory into practice by ordering his principal administrative staff officer to start packing day and night so that supplies would be ready for delivery to the 5th and 7th Divisions by air when they were needed.

Less than forty-eight hours later, in the early hours of February 4, Sakurai's column began its hazardous march through the British lines. The main body, helped by a thick mist which persisted until well after dawn, succeeded in passing through the 7th Division's widely separated posts east of the Kalapanzin River before the alarm was raised. It reached Taung Bazar without serious interference, and

BATTLE OF THE NGAKYEDAUK PASS on February 5 completed

its

411

crossing of the river in captured

pushed west and south towards the Maungdaw-Bawli Bazar road and the lateral road connecting it with Kwazon. At the same time two columns of the 143rd Infantry Regiment advanced from the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road along the boundary between the 5th and 7th Divisions and towards the bend of the Kalapanzin River north of Buthidaung. As a result of these moves Hanaya succeeded in cutting the 7th Division's communications at the Ngakyedauk Pass, investing its headquarters and administrative area at Sinzweya, and making the road from Bawli Bazar as far south as its junction with the lateral road so hazardous for the British that traffic passing along it had to be escorted. Nevertheless the outcome was a triumphant vindication of boats. Sakurai then

Slim's doctrine.

On

February 6 Slim told Christison that

it

was

essential

that the 5th and 7th Divisions should stand fast, that they would be supplied by air and also to some extent by sea, and that he was bringing up reinforcements from two divisions in reserve. 18

was done, though not without some difficulty. accurate dropping of supplies in small areas close to high hills and surrounded by Japanese troops raised formidable problems, for at some points aircraft had to fly so low that they came within range of small arms fire. Moreover the Japanese 5th Air Division, although hampered by small numbers and conflicting demands, made strenuous attempts to interfere. On February 8 a first instalment of aircraft of No. 31 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, led by the American Brigadier-General W. D. Old of Troop Carrier Command in person, had a rough passage, and on February 9 seven transport aircraft out of sixteen had to abandon their mission. But eventually the answer was found in a combination of night drops, where these were possible, with carefully chosen approach routes and strong fighter patrols where drops had to be so accurate that they could only be made by day. From February 9 troops cut off and surrounded received daily deliveries All this

The

w.f.e,— 14*

412

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

not only of food and ammunition but also of cigarettes, rum, mail, razor blades and newspapers. The Japanese, on the other hand, had so much difficulty in supplying Sakurai that within ten days it was not the besieged but the besiegers who were going hungry and running short of ammunition. 19 On February 23 Sakurai's hard-pressed troops were driven from the Ngakyedauk Pass by a counter-attack, and on the following day the Japanese offensive was called off. 20 Meanwhile Mountbatten, who had been authorized at the Sextant Conference to divert a limited volume of traffic from the China air lift should he need to do so u in order to

meet any unforeseen emergency

arising in battle",

had

decided to ask for specific authority to divert up to thirtyeight Dakotas or their equivalent to the Arakan front. After trying for three days to get in touch with Stilwell, who had gone to Ledo to take charge of the Northern Combat Area Command, he asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 18 to give their approval. Their answer reached him on February 24. 21 As the crisis was over by that time, it seemed that an appeal to the Combined Chiefs was not a very promising way of dealing with an emergency. The Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass proved the turning point of the war in South-East Asia. It showed that the tactics of deep infiltration, hitherto practised with unbroken success by the Japanese, could be countered by well-trained troops under a resolute commander. It also showed that such a commander must have at his disposal not only adequate reserves but also an adequate number of transport aircraft. Brigadier-General Old's Troop Carrier Command had, before the middle of April, only about 150 transport aircraft with which to supply isolated detachments in the Chin Hills and at Fort Hertz, look after Wingate's Special Force, meet all the needs of the 81st West African Division in the Kaladan Valley and provide for such emergencies as the encirclement of the 7th Indian Division. This suggested

any future battle might well depend on freedom to draw on the all- American Air Transport Command without waiting to consult authorities who could not be relied upon for a swift answer. that success in

Mountbatten

5

s

MARCH On

1944

413

February 22, before the Battle of the Ngakyedauk

Pass was over, Christison told his divisional commanders to resume their interrupted offensive at the first oppor-

They completed their redeployment on March 5, and on March 9 entered Buthidaung. Later the 15th Corps withdrew for the monsoon season to a line facing

tunity. 22

through Taung Bazar. In the 4th Corps area, 250 miles to the north-east, the

east

on that day was that an offensive by the Japanese Army had long been expected and seemed to be beginning. General Scoones, the corps commander, proposed to meet it by withdrawing his troops from forward positions to which they had moved in readiness for a limited advance across the Chindwin, holding fast to his main positions in the Imphal area, and assembling the largest

situation

Fifteenth

possible force for a counter-attack. Slim agreed with these

proposals, but stipulated that orders to divisional

com-

manders to withdraw from forward positions should be given by the corps commander in person, and only when he was satisfied that a major offensive had begun. 23 In the second week of March, Scoones received reports of enemy troop movements in the Fort White-Tiddim area. On March 12 Japanese patrols appeared west of the Tiddim road, in rear of forward positions held by the 1 7th Indian Division. Satisfied by the following morning that Slim's second proviso had been met, Scoones gave the 1 7th Division permission to withdraw to the Imphal area and told Major-General D. D. Gracey, commanding the 20th Indian Division in the Tamu-Sittaung-Htinzin area, to speed up the withdrawal of engineer and labour units from the

Kabaw

Valley. 24

Elaborate administrative preparations, including the had been made for the withdrawal of the 17th Division along the Tiddim road. Nevertheless the decision to fall back came as a great surprise to most of the division. 25 The divisional commander, MajorGeneral D. T. Cowan, did not issue the withdrawal order until 1 p.m. on March 14, and units were given until 5 p.m. to start moving. 26 As a result of this late start and of

stocking of supply dumps,

414

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

mistakes made by subordinate commanders who did not grasp the urgency of the situation, the division was soon in difficulties. The outcome was that Scoones had to use two brigades from his corps reserve at Imphal to help clear the road and extricate the 17th Division's forward units. Slim foresaw as early as March 14 that this might happen and that, if it did, the 4th Corps would be left with no uncommitted infantry reserve. In order to put himself in a position to provide Scoones with a new reserve, he asked Mountbatten on that day for aircraft to expedite the arrival of the 5th Indian Division, which he had decided to move to the Imphal area as soon as it could be relieved in Arakan. 27 On March 18 Mountbatten responded to a more urgent request from Slim by placing the equivalent of thirty Dakotas of the Air Transport Command at Slim's disposal with effect from the following day. When reporting his action to the Chiefs of Staff and asking for covering approval, Mountbatten added that the Japanese had presented his forces with an opportunity of repeating, on a much larger scale, the tactics they had used so successfully in the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass. 28 The sequel was a telegram from Washington to the effect that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to Mountbatten's diverting thirty Dakotas or their equivalent from the air lift for a limited period, but did not agree that he had the right to make such diversions without consulting them. 29 From Mountbatten's point of view this was a thoroughly unsatisfactory reply, for it did not answer his argument that the security of the air lift might come to depend on his being free to make his own decisions in the light of a tactical situation which could not be judged from the standpoint of Washington. Between March 19 and 29 about twenty-five Dakotas of No. 194 (Transport) Squadron of the Royal Air Force, supplemented by twenty Commando aircraft of the Air Transport Command, flew the whole of the 5th Indian Division, with its guns, mules and jeeps, from Arakan to the Imphal plain to join the three divisions of the 4th Corps already present or moving in from outlying sectors. By

APRIL-JUNE

1944

415

early April the four divisions were disposed within or on the circumference of an arc of about ninety miles from Kanglatongbi in the north to Torbung in the south. Troops at Dimapur, Kohima and elsewhere outside the Imphal perimeter were placed on April 2 under LieutenantGeneral M. G. N. Stopford of the 33rd Corps, who had come forward with his tactical headquarters to take charge of them. Three days later Scoones began to regroup his forces in readiness to counter-attack as soon as the opportunity arose. Meanwhile the Japanese 33rd Division continued to push forward from the south. By the last week in March it had, however, so clearly failed to encircle the 17th Indian Division that the Japanese divisional commander, LieutenantGeneral G. Yanagida, urged in vain that the offensive should be called off. 30 The 15th and 31st Divisions, intentionally starting later, met stubborn resistance at Ukhrul and Jessami, but succeeded at the end of March and early in April in reaching the Imphal-Kohima-Dimapur road north of Imphal and on both sides of Kohima. The effect of these moves was that the small but resolute garrison of Kohima was threatened with destruction until troops of the 33rd Corps broke through on April 18 to relieve it, and that roughly 155,000 British and Indian troops in the Imphal area became cut off from their bases in Bengal. All this was, however, foreseen in Slim's plan. The troops in the Imphal plain had large stocks of ammunition and rations for five weeks; from April 18 these were supplemented by more than 18,000 tons of supplies delivered by transport aircraft between that date and the end of June. Transport aircraft also brought 12,550 troops as reinforcements for the 4th Corps, and carried away approximately the same number of sick or wounded and about 43,000 non-combatants. During the same period the 33rd Corps, based on Dimapur, was built up by the arrival of the 2nd (British) Division and other formations assigned to it. Conversely, the three divisions of the Japanese Fifteenth Army besieging Imphal and Kohima were left almost entirely to their own devices from the moment when they

MAP

45

Imphal and Kohima,

AW -weather roads Fair-weather roads British 15

main positions,

March 1944

British forward positions

Japanese thrusts: 15 Div.

31 Div.

33 Div.

Miles

Yamamoto

Det.

FAILURE OF JAPANESE OFFENSIVE crossed the frontier.

417

The 33rd

Division received some the 15th supplies and reinforcements, April 25 Lieu tenant-General

supplies along roads suitable for light traffic;

Division also received some the 31st Division none. On K. Sato of the 31st Division, strongly attacked in the Kohima area by the 2nd (British) Division under MajorGeneral J. M. L. Grover, declined to part with an infantry

regiment which he had been ordered to send to the 15th Division on his left. 31 Thereafter his situation became so precarious that he was obliged to order the battered remnant of his troops to withdraw across country under cover of a rearguard action and to tell Mutaguchi that the Fifteenth Army's failure to supply him made it impossible for him to carry out his orders. 32 Without his help LieutenantGeneral M. Yamauchi of the 15th Division was unable to force a way to Imphal from the north, and in the second half of April Yamauchi, too, was obliged to go on to the defensive. 33

Not

surprisingly, a staff officer

from Imperial General

who returned to Tokyo in the middle of May the Burma front began his report by saying:

Headquarters after visiting (

'The Imphal operations stand little chance of success". 34 This, however, was not Mutaguchi's view. Even after British and Indian troops of the 4th and 33rd Corps had reopened the Imphal road by meeting near Kanglatongbi on June 22, Mutaguchi still believed that the 33rd Division could bludgeon a way to Imphal from the south. While famished survivors of the 15th and 31st Divisions, many of them without arms, were struggling rearwards along jungle tracks which the monsoon had turned to rivers of mud, the 33rd Division continued, therefore, to fight fiercely in the neighbourhood of Palel and Bishenpur. But a time came when even the indomitable Mutaguchi was forced to recognize that he had failed. On June 26 he proposed a general withdrawal, and early in July Imperial General Headquarters agreed that he had no choice but to fall back on his whole front. At the end of the month there remained of his

men

army of 84,280 of all ranks only 30,775

still

able to march. 35

officers

and

418

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

Meanwhile two of StilwelPs Chinese divisions from Assam, joined in February by a Chinese tank unit and by Brigadier-General F. D. Merrill's American counterpart of Wingate's Chindits, had begun to move towards the Hukawng Valley, with Kamaing, Mogaung and Myitkyina as their objectives.

In the first half of February the 16th (Long Range Penetration) Brigade of Wingate's enlarged Special Force, under Brigadier B. E. Fergusson, left the Ledo area with orders to help Stilwell by marching well over 300 miles

through wild and unfrequented country to the neighbourhood of the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway near Indaw. Leading troops of the 77th and 111th Brigades were to follow early in March in gliders which would put them down on rough landing places between the railway and the Irrawaddy. There they were to prepare airstrips suitable for transport aircraft which would bring the rest of both brigades.

On March 5, was due

to

about half an hour before the 77th Brigade

start,

Wingate was handed reconnaissance

photographs which showed that one of the two landing places allotted to the brigade was obstructed by tree trunks, afterwards found to have been laid out to dry by foresters who knew nothing of his plan. 36 After a brief discussion he and his subordinates agreed that the venture should go forward. By March 13 about 9,000 men of the two brigades, with 1,300 animals and 250 tons of stores, had landed east of the railway at points north and south of Indaw. Their activities, with those of the 16th Brigade and of the 14th and 3rd West African Brigades, which followed them, held up supplies to the Japanese 1 8th Division and pinned down the equivalent of the infantry of one Japanese division. 37 However, Wingate was not content with his allotted role of easing StilwelPs task by harassing Japanese communications between Mandalay and Myitkyina. He believed that he could also contribute to the defence of Imphal and Kohima by cutting the communications of the Japanese Fifteenth Army, and that both roles would be open to him if he could establish a strong force more or less

MAP 46 Ledo

to

lndaw

Ledo ©e

:=== ledo

Road

Airfields >

©

Special Force

Kachin Levies and

Burma

Regt.

Northern Combat Area

25

Command

Miles

50

420

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

permanently ,in the neighbourhood of Indaw. On March 12, after the 16th Brigade had sent two columns to attack Lonkin, on the flank of StilwelPs route, Wingate ordered Fergusson to hasten to Indaw with the rest of his force. 38 When repeating this order on March 20, he allowed Fergusson to believe that the 16th Brigade would be supported at Indaw by leading elements of the 14th Brigade, which was not yet at Wingate's disposal and which he was planning to use, if he did gain control of it, for a different purpose. 39 Moreover, he insisted that Fergusson, in order to gain surprise, should attack the Japanese garrison of Indaw without pausing to rest and concentrate his troops after their long and exhausting march. As the Japanese, forewarned by the arrival of the 77th and 111th Brigades, had ample time to strengthen the defences of Indaw while Fergusson was approaching, the result was that the 16th Brigade was unable to gain possession of the airfields and supply dumps which Wingate expected it to capture, and had some difficulty in retaining its coherence.

Wingate was killed on March 24, when an American in which he was travelling crashed in mountainous country near Imphal. He was succeeded by Brigadier Lentaigne, an (afterwards Major-General) W. D. A. experienced campaigner. At a conference attended by Lentaigne and Stilwell on April 3 it was agreed that two brigades of Special Force should move northwards to meet StilwelPs troops as they approached Mogaung. 40 Two brigades would, if possible, operate towards the Chindwin in order to disrupt the communications of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. In the course of the next week it became clear that troops of the Fifteenth Army were not receiving supplies along the routes in question, and that a hazardous move of part of Special Force towards the Chindwin could serve no useful

bomber

purpose. In consultation with Slim, Lentaigne then decided that the 16th Brigade should be flown back to India and that the rest of Special Force should move

towards

Mogaung

for StilwelPs benefit. 41

Stilwell disliked this plan. Believing that the effect of

MARCH-MAY

1944

421

moving the greater part of Special Force towards Mogaung would be to draw the Japanese against his flank, he urged Lentaigne to "keep the front door at Indaw open" while his own troops "forced the garden gate at Myitkyina and Mogaung". 42 He also asked that the 19th Indian Division, which was Mountbatten's only reserve, should be flown to Indaw to make his flank still more secure. However, at a meeting with Slim and Lentaigne on May 1 he agreed to the northward move of Special Force, and it was explained to him that he could not count upon the arrival of a fresh division from India. 43 It was also agreed that Special Force, less the 16th Brigade, should be placed under his opera-

when it reached the Mogaung area about the middle of May, but that probably it would have to be withdrawn to India during the monsoon. Two flying-boat anchorages were prepared on Indawgyi Lake, about fifty miles north of Indaw, so that Lentaigne's sick and wounded could be flown out pending the junction of his troops with StilwelPs. As the approaches to the lake would have to be guarded by Lentaigne's troops, this arrangement would go some way to meet StilwelPs objection to the removal of the whole of Special Force from the Indaw area. Almost simultaneously the Japanese set up the ThirtyThird Army, under Lieutenant-General M. Honda, to tional control

co-ordinate operations against StilwelPs and Lentaigne's forces by the 18th and 56th Divisions and the newly arrived

53rd Division. In the meantime Stilwell was having a rough passage. His advance was delayed not only by the enemy, but also by Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to see Chinese troops used in an offensive role until he was sure of winning. For many weeks Chiang not only refused to take the offensive with his forces in Yunnan, but insisted that the Chinese divisions serving under Stilwell should drag their feet. 44 The result

was that Stilwell was able to establish himself in the Shadazup-Warazup-Auche area at the end of March only at the cost of driving the lightly equipped American component of his force almost to the limit of endurance. 45 Under pressure from the Americans, Chiang agreed in March

422

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

that two divisions from Yunnan should be added to StilwelPs force, but it was not until he was threatened in April with an embargo on American supplies that he gave permission for the main body of the Yunnan armies to cross the Salween and engage the Japanese 56th Division in the frontier area. 46

On

April 17, only three days after Chiang Kai-shek's Minister had issued a formal order to that effect, the Japanese forces in China gave point to Chiang's hesitations by launching an offensive of their own. On that day the China Expeditionary Force, consisting on paper of the whole of the Japanese First and Twelfth Armies supported by about 200 aircraft, began a southward drive designed to open an overland supply route to Siam and Malaya through Indo-China and to capture Allied airfields in southern China. Chungking, deep in the Yangtze gorges, was not seriously threatened, but the loss of airfields used by American aircraft would be no small matter. Thus the situation at the end of April was that the Chinese armies in Yunnan, some 72,000 strong, were pledged to take the offensive against 11,000 officers and men of the Japanese 56th Division; that Chiang Kai-shek also had a defensive campaign on his hands; and that Stilwell had yet to capture any of his three main objectives, although the onset of the monsoon was only a few weeks away. Stilwell hoped, however, that with his right protected by Special Force and his left secured by Kachin Levies and a battalion of the Burma Regiment which had advanced from Fort Hertz to Sumprabum and beyond, he would be able to reach Myitkyina by a swift dash through mountainous country between the Ledo-Mogaung road and the Irrawaddy. 47 This move, duly carried out by Merrill's Marauders between April 28 and May 1 7, gave Stilwell possession of a valuable airfield four miles from Myitkyina. But the Chinese troops which were then to have captured the town moved so slowly and uncertainly that the Japanese were able to rush in reinforcements and bring StilwelPs forces to a halt.

War

Thus, by a double misfortune, Special Force passed under

MAY-JUNE

1944

StilwelPs operational control almost at the very

when he

suffered a crushing disappointment

423

moment

which he was

not temperamentally equipped to bear with fortitude. On May 20, still hoping that his American and Chinese troops could capture Myitkyina, he declined an offer from Lentaigne to bring up a detachment called Morrisforce, about a battalion strong, from a position some twenty miles away. 48 About the same time he brought forward two engineer battalions from the Ledo road, summoned reinforcements for the Marauders from India, and pressed the hospital authorities to return to their units all men fit to press a trigger. 49 By May 25 it was, however, clear that these measures would not suffice. Stilwell then told Lentaigne to order Morrisforce to capture Waingmaw, on the east bank of the Irrawaddy opposite Myitkyina. Morrisforce, although hampered by swollen rivers and broken bridges, succeeded in concentrating east of Waingmaw by May 29, broke into the Japanese positions on May 30 and again on June 2, but was unable to consolidate 50 StilwelPs deputy, its gains for lack of artillery support. Brigadier-General H. L. Boatner, then ordered Morrisforce to seize Maingna, also on the east bank of the Irra-

waddy, and when its

it

failed to clear the village asserted that

inability to turn the

Japanese out of Maingna was

responsible for his failure to capture Myitkyina. 51 Although

Boatner fell sick and was replaced soon afterwards, Stilwell complained more than once thereafter that Special Force had failed to carry out his orders promptly. To Lentaigne, however, and also to Slim and other British officers, it

seemed quite clear that the root of the trouble was that Special Force was repeatedly given tasks which could have been tackled with confidence only by fresh troops with adequate supporting arms. Merrill's Marauders had been similarly misemployed by Stilwell. At the end of May and early in June StilwelPs Chinese troops, no longer held back by go-slow orders from Chiang Kai-shek, at last succeeded in isolating the main body of the Japanese 18th Division at Kamaing by cutting the LedoMogaung road on both sides of the town. As Honda ruled

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

424

that the defence of Myitkyina must take precedence of any attempt to restore the situation at Kamaing, the Japanese

then withdrew into the

leaving StilwelPs Chinese troops to enter the town without organised opposition on

June

hills,

16.

was that the Chinese 38th Division should attack Mogaung from the north and west while the 77th Brigade of Special Force attacked from the east and south. The 77th Brigade, under Brigadier J. M. Calvert, duly fought its way to the eastern and southern outskirts of Mogaung by June 12. By that date the brigade had been behind the Japanese lines for fourteen weeks, sickness and battle casualties had reduced its fighting strength to 550 men out of an initial complement of about 4,000, and it was in no state to stage a deliberate assault on a defended town. 52 In any case an assault on Mogaung was not a task which even a fresh formation would normally have been expected to undertake without artillery support. However, the Chinese did not begin to arrive until June 18, when they took up positions on Calvert's left instead of attacking Mogaung from the north and west as they had been told to do. As Calvert's strength was wasting away daily from sickness, he concluded on June 23 that he could afford to wait no longer. 53 Late on June 25 the Japanese withdrew to the south-west in face of repeated attacks delivered by Calvert's troops with only leisurely support from the Chinese, and on the following day the 300 fit men still under Calvert's orders took possession of the StilwelPs plan for the next step

second of StilwelPs main objectives. By that date the 77th Brigade had suffered nearly a thousand battle casualties since it first came under StilwelPs orders in the middle of

May. 54

A

few days later Mountbatten,

after

discussing

the

and Lentaigne, ruled that the 77th and 111th Brigades should be withdrawn to India as soon as possible. Stilwell agreed that both brigades must be relieved, but continued to dispute Lentaigne's competence

situation with Stilwell

withdrawal without further headquarters. A medical investigation to

to arrange the details of the

reference to his

JUNE-AUGUST TABLE Disposition of Northern

1944

425

15

Combat Area Command and Attached Forces, May 31, 1944

Myitkyina area

5307th Composite Unit (Merrill's Marauders) 14th Chinese Division (part of one regiment) 30th Chinese Division (two regiments) 50th Chinese Division (one regiment) Morrisforce (strength about one battalion)

Mogaung

area

77th (Long

Range

Penetration) Brigade

Indawgyi Lake to Mogaung area 14th (Long Range Penetration) Brigade 1 1 1 th (Long Range Penetration) Brigade 3rd West African (Long Range Penetration) Brigade

Kamaing

area

22nd Chinese Division 38th Chinese Division 50th Chinese Division (one regiment) 1st Chinese Provisional Tank Unit Reserves

14th Chinese Division 50th Chinese Division

(less

part of one regiment)

(less

two regiments)

had agreed showed, however, that most men in both brigades had had malaria at least three times in the last sixteen weeks, that all ranks were "physically and mentally worn out", and that only a few hundred, at most, were still capable of fighting after making approach marches with a sixty-pound load. 55 Eventually it was arranged that the whole of both brigades, except one which

Stilwell

company of the

1 1 1 th Brigade retained for garrison duties, should be relieved by troops of the 36th Indian Division from Slim's reserve. The 14th Brigade and the 3rd West African Brigade, which had arrived later, remained in the forward area until August and were then replaced by Chinese troops. With Kamaing and Mogaung in his hands, Stilwell was

426

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

able to reinforce his troops in front of Myitkyina.

The

hold out until August 1, when the garrison commander committed suicide after arranging for the withdrawal of his eight or nine hundred remaining troops. Two days later the Allies entered Myitkyina without opposition. Since January the advance to Myitkyina had cost them roughly 18,500 battle casualties, or nearly two thousand more than the Fourteenth Army had suffered in repelling Mutaguchi's full-scale offensive on the Assam front.* Nearly a third of these had been incurred since May 1 7 in the siege of Myitkyina, whose garrison had never numbered more than 3,000 men, non-combatants

Japanese continued

to

included. 56

While the Fourteenth Army was driving the Japanese from the Assam frontier with catastrophic losses and Stilwell advancing at a heavy cost on Myitkyina, American aircraft bombed the Japanese homeland for the first time since the famous carrier raid of 1942. On June 15 sixtyeight B29s of the 58th Bomber Wing, based near Calcutta but using forward airfields at Chengtu in China, aimed about 1 20 tons of bombs at a Japanese steelworks and did a good deal of damage to the neighbouring industrial area. 57 Further attacks on industrial targets in Japan, and a number of raids on objectives in north China and Manchuria, followed in July and August. Later, aircraft of the 58th Wing supported operations in the Pacific by attacking air bases in Formosa and the naval base at Singapore. The transport of fuel, bombs and spare parts to Chengtu was found, however, to make such heavy demands on the Air Transport Command that in January 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the B29s should be concentrated in *

The

figure

was made up

as follows

Chinese

13,618

Special Force

3,628

Americans

1,327

18,573

The Fourteenth Army's battle were 16,667.

casualties in the fighting at

Kohima and Imphal

JAPANESE PLANS FOR the Calcutta area

1944-45

and the Ghengtu bases

427

down. 58 the Marianas in close

Pending the transfer of the 58th Wing to its aircraft were used from time to time to support the South-East Asia Command by attacking objectives at or near Singapore, Saigon and Bangkok and laying mines in waters frequented by the Japanese Combined Fleet. On the whole, operations by the 58th Wing from Chengtu and Calcutta were not particularly successful, but American losses were fairly light. April,

The

collapse of the Japanese Fifteenth

Army's offensive

long-delayed success on the northern front left Mountbatten's land forces standing in the first week of August 1944 along an arc of about 500 miles from Maungdaw to Myitkyina. With ample manpower and almost overwhelming air superiority at his disposal, Mountbatten could be expected to continue his advance on a wide front as soon as the monsoon lifted, link up with the Chinese from Yunnan, and drive with irresistible momentum through Mandalay towards Rangoon. Alternatively, he might seize Rangoon by seaborne and airborne assault and reconquer central and upper Burma from the south. In face of this unpleasing prospect, the Japanese considered withdrawing from the whole of Burma, but came to the conclusion that they could not afford to do so. 59 Imperial General Headquarters ruled in September that the rice-growing regions of southern Burma, and the oilproducing area in the neighbourhood of Yenangyaung, must be held at all costs, but that only a low priority need be given to attempts to prevent the Allies from restoring land communications with China. 60 Thereupon Burma Area Army ordered Honda to stand on the defensive in the Lashio-Mandalay area with the 18th and 56th Divisions and one regiment of the 49th Division, and to be prepared to take the offensive in the Mongmit area in order to prevent the Allies from outflanking the Fifteenth Army on his left. In the south Lieutenant-General S. Sakurai's Twenty-Eighth Army, with the 54th and 55th Divisions and the equivalent of about half one additional division

and

Stilwell's

MAP

47

Burma and theSalween

3&y

of Senjjal

Allied front

Aug -Sep 1944 ^^Disposition of Burma ^ Area Army, by armies, Oct 1944

Miles

THE OCTAGON CONFERENCE under command, was

429

from Yenangyaung to the Arakan coast and along it to the Irrawaddy delta. The vulnerable central sector, covering Mandalay, Pakokku and Meiktila, was allotted to the Fifteenth Army, commanded since the end of August by Lieutenant-General S. Katamura and consisting of the 53rd Division and the depleted 15th, 31st and 33rd Divisions. These dispositions left Lieutenant-General H. Kimura, the new commander of Burma Area Army, with the 2nd Division and the headquarters and one regiment of the 49th Division as counter-attack formations to be used in support of either the Twenty-Eighth or the Fifteenth Army. The Thirty-Third Army, threatened not only by the left wing of Mountbatten's forces but also by the whole of the Chinese armies from Yunnan, would have to manage as best it to hold a line

could without reinforcement. In the last few months of 1944 the China Expeditionary Force, reorganized in August and September, continued its southward drive through provinces already picked to the bone by Chiang Kai-shek's retreating armies, not all of w hich fell back without a struggle. But its pace slowed as 7

communications grew more stretched, and its achievements were disappointing. By the end of the year little could be hoped of the offensive in China except that it might do something to open an escape route for surviving Japanese forces in Burma, Malaya, Siam and Indo-China. its

On at the

Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed Octagon Conference at Quebec in September that

the Allied side, the

try to recapture the whole of Burma soon as possible, but that operations undertaken for that purpose must not prejudice the security of his existing communications with China. With the approval of the Allied governments, they directed him on September 16 to aim at launching seaborne and airborne assaults on Rangoon in the middle of March 1945, and meanwhile to push forward on land with the twofold object of making the air route safer and reopening land communications. 61 Soon afterwards Stilwell fell foul of Chiang Kai-shek and was recalled to the United States. The opportunity was

Mountbatten should

as

430

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

taken to

make some much-needed changes

command

in South-East Asia. General

succeeded Stilwell as Chief of Staff to

in the chain of

Wedemeyer, who Chiang Kai-shek,

assumed responsibility for units and formations of the China-Burma-India Theatre in China, but not for those in India or Burma. These went under Lieutenant-General D. I. Sultan, henceforth responsible for the Northern Area Combat Command, and became an integral part of Mountbatten's forces. The post of Deputy Supreme Commander went to General Wheeler, who retained his responsibilities as Principal Administrative Officer but had no duties outside Supreme Headquarters. Mountbatten was thus assured, for the first time, of the services of a deputy whose allegiance was undivided, and who could be relied upon to be present when he was needed. The removal of the anomalies created by StilwelPs multiple responsibilities also made it possible to appoint a Commander-in-Chief responsible for all Allied land forces in South-East Asia. On the creation of this post, which went to the British General Sir Oliver Leese, the appointment held by General Giffard became redundant and Headquarters, Eleventh

Slim continued to

Army Group, was abolished. General command the Fourteenth Army and

remained the dominant figure in South-East Asia so far as operations on land were concerned. On October 16 the Northern Combat Area Command, then still under Stilwell, launched a southward drive with the 36th Indian Division on its right directed on Indaw, the 22nd Chinese Division in the centre on the crossings of the Irrawaddy below Bhamo, and the 38th Chinese Division on its left on Bhamo and the frontier area. About a fortnight later the Chinese Yunnan armies, which had reached the neighbourhood of Lameng, resumed their advance along the axis of the Burma Road. The unfortunate General Honda, who was still well forward of the positions assigned to him in Kimura's final plan, thus faced converging attacks by greatly superior forces. However, the Chinese armies from Yunnan came forward so slowly, showed so little regard for security, and made such heavy demands on the

REOPENING OF BURMA ROAD

431

Northern Combat Area Command that the Japanese 56th Division was able, with Honda's approval, to make a leisurely retreat from the frontier area under cover of extensive demolitions. 62 The result was that, although Indaw, Katha and Bhamo were all in Allied hands by the second week in December, it was not until January 20 that the Chinese First enemy had gone.

Army

entered

Wanting

to find that the

Just over a week later the first "official" convoy to pass along the Burma Road since the fall of Burma left Wanting for Kunming in the presence of a large number of journalists and press photographers specially summoned for the purpose. The reopening of land communications with Chungking proved, however, of little practical benefit to the Western Allies. By 1945 those parts of north China which were not occupied by the Japanese were dominated

by Communist bands who owed no allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek, and even in the south his influence was fast declining.

Meanwhile Slim was preparing to deliver the decisive blow described afterwards by Kimura as his master-stroke. Until December Slim's intention was to pursue the Japanese Fifteenth Army eastwards across the Chindwin and destroy it between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. About the middle of that month, however, he came to the conclusion that the Fifteenth Army would not stay to fight west of the Irrawaddy. 63 Thereafter the problem for Slim was not merely to bring the Fifteenth Army to action but to prevent Kimura from falling back to southern Burma with the whole of his surviving armies. In order to force Kimura to give battle in central Burma he decided to send the 4th Corps more than two hundred miles southwards from Kalemyo along a difficult, winding route, hurl it across the Irrawaddy near Pakokku, and cut the line of retreat of the whole of the Japanese Fifteenth and Thirty-Third Armies by capturing Meiktila under cover of an assault by the 33rd Corps on Mandalay. 64 At the same time the Northern

Combat Area Command would resume

its

southward

MAP 48 Mandalay-Meiktilci 4 Corps

25

33 Corps

50 1

Miles N.C.A.C.

Myitkyina

Burma Road

Ka]emyo

Gangaw

Lashio

»

Loilem # Meiktila • Pyawbwe

To Rangoon

SLIM'S PLAN drive, with

Mongmit, Kyaukme and Lashio

as

its

433 object-

ives.

One of the great merits of this plan was that practically nothing had to be changed in Slim's arrangements except the destination of the 4th Corps. Mandalay was not only an obvious but a genuine objective for the 33rd Corps, whose preparations for a series of thrusts in that direction were already well advanced when the new plan was made. Deceived by the evident threat to Mandalay from three divisions of the 33rd Corps which crossed the Irrawaddy at four points north and west of the town in January and February, Kimura and his subordinate commanders and staff officers remained oblivious of their danger at Meiktila until practically the whole of the 17th Indian Division, supported by a tank brigade, was advancing on the town from a bridgehead seized by the 7th Indian Division. 65 Even then the Japanese believed that the threat to Meiktila came only from lightly armed troops of the Chindit variety, who could be overcome by the existing garrison. The result was that the 4th Corps captured Meiktila with ease in the first week of March. Kimura, facing the loss of two-thirds of his entire strength, had no choice but to do his best to recapture the town in order to reopen the line of retreat of the Fifteenth and Thirty-Third Armies. With six or seven weak divisions at hand to oppose six strong British and Indian divisions, supported by a tank brigade and greatly superior air forces, he was, however, in no position to do more than postpone inevitable defeat. Mandalay fell to the 19th Indian Division on March 20, and in the course of the next week attempts to drive the British from Meiktila spent their force. On March 25 Honda, to whom Kimura had given the task of counterattacking towards Meiktila, estimated that two of the three divisions at his disposal had only twenty guns between On or about February 23 Japanese officers who were conferring at Meiktila about the threat to Mandalay received a report to the effect that a force accompanied by 200 vehicles was advancing on Meiktila. According to the Japanese record this report was wrongly transmitted; it should have read *

"2,000 vehicles".

BURMA CHANGES HANDS

434

them. 66 Three days later Burma Area Army agreed that the counter-attack should be abandoned, but stipulated that Honda should do his best to cover the withdrawal of the

remnant of the Fifteenth Army. Honda replied that the Thirty-Third Army would fight to the last man. With Mandalay and Meiktila in his hands, Slim was ready to undertake the recapture of Rangoon. He decided to send the 4th

Corps straight towards

TABLE Organization of Japanese

its

objective along

16

Land Forces

in

Burma,

January 31, 1945

Army (F. M. Count H. Terauchi) Burma Area Army (Lt-Gen. H. Kimura) Thirty-Third Army (Lt-Gen. M. Honda)

Southern Area

Northern Sector

18th Division 56th Division Fifteenth Army (Lt-Gen. S. Katamura) 15 th Division 31st Division

Central Sector

33rd Division 53rd Division 1st Division Indian National Army Twenty-Eighth Aimy (Lt-Gen. S. Sakurai) 54th Division 55th Division 24th Independent Mixed Brigade Area Army Reserve

Southern Sector

2nd Division 49th Division

The

disposition of the Fifteenth

5th Division 31st Division 33rd Division 53rd Division 1

1st Division,

I.N. A.

Army was

approximately as follows

North of Mandalay

Mandalay area Mandalay

to

Pakokku area

In reserve, Kyaukse area Pakokku area

the axis of the road and railway, with its right covered by the 33rd Corps in the Irrawaddy Valley. As an insurance against failure to reach Rangoon before the monsoon he asked, however, that preparations should be made for a

RANGOON RECAPTURED

435

seaborne assault. Accordingly Mountbatten ordered the 26th Indian Division, supported by armour and a parachute battalion, to stand by at Ramree Island, which the 15th Corps had reoccupied at a trifling cost at the end of January and early in February. In April the 4th Corps pushed rapidly down the Sittang Valley, driving the remnant of Honda's army before it and overrunning his headquarters twice in ten days. By the last in the month the Japanese Twenty-Eighth Army was reported to be withdrawing from Rangoon, and prisoners of war in transit from Rangoon to Moulmein were known to have been turned loose. 67 On May 1, just over three years and two months after the disaster to the 17th Indian Infantry Division at the Sittang bridge, the same division reached Pegu, about 30 miles from the scene of its mis-

week

and some 45 miles from Rangoon. There it was obliged to halt while a bridge across the Pegu River was

fortunes

repaired.

had been launched. On May 2, after preliminary landings by paratroops on the previous day, troops of the 36th and 71st Indian Infantry Brigades landed unopposed at the mouth of the Irrawaddy. Next morning elements of the 36th Brigade entered Rangoon and were welcomed with enthusiasm by the inhabitants. 68 With the opening of the headquarters of the 26th Division at Government House two days later, the campaign in Burma was over except for the final pursuit and some weeks of mopping up. Meanwhile the seaborne

w.f.e.

— 15

assault

i8

DESTINATION TOKYO

VV/aR

HAS BEEN

defined as the imple-

mentation of a nation's foreign policy by means other than diplomacy As all sovereign states maintain ministries whose function is to formulate their foreign policies, the statesmen of warring nations might be expected therefore, always to be ready to expound their war aims. In practice they often shrink from doing so, not so much lest they should tell their enemies more than it is good for .

them to know as for fear of disconcerting supporters at home and abroad by an excess of candour. Between 1940 and 1945, for example, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom prided himself on the frankness of his relations with the President of the United States. Even so, Churchill and Roosevelt could not, without embarrassment, have openly acknowledged to each other that, while the British looked forward to the restoration of the status quo in the Far East, the Americans had in view a sharp curtailment of British influence in Asiatic countries and the emergence of a strong, democratic China linked by cultural and emotional ties with the United States. For the President it was enough that the British, by signing the Atlantic Charter, had committed themselves, no matter with what tacit reservations, to the principle that subject peoples throughout the world should become self-governing when the war was over. 1 Conversely, the failure of Nationalist China to qualify for the role of a first-class power appeared so obvious to British statesmen that any attempt to drag the President's illusions into the light of day would have seemed not merely impolitic, but impolite. No doubt partly in the hope of avoiding awkward issues, but also because it was assumed that the United States would provide most of the supplies for any Allied strategic

438

ROOSEVELT AND STALIN

439

might be established on Russian soil, the minor part in negotiations which followed Stalin's disclosure in 1943 that he was willing to fight Japan when the European war was over. 2 Stalin knew, however, when he made that declaration that the President and Hull were so unorthodox as to look on Chiang Kai-shek air force that

British played only a

He also knew that in 1943 they were more than willing to fall in with Russian ideas as to the treatment to be meted out in due course to a defeated Germany. 4 Furthermore, it was doubtless within his knowledge that in September Hull had thanked the Russian Charge d Affaires in Washington "profusely" for telling the State Department that the Japanese had proposed in vain to Moscow that they should act as mediators between Germany and the Soviet Union. 5 For some months the President's courtship of Stalin made slow progress. At the Teheran Conference in November Roosevelt suggested that for stabbing Japan in the back the Russians might be rewarded with access to Dairen, of which the Treaty of Portsmouth had deprived them nearly forty years earlier. 6 He then asked Stalin whether the Soviet Union would help the Americans to establish bases in the Russian Maritime Provinces for up to a thousand bombers. It was not until February 2, 1944, that Stalin replied that the Americans would be allowed to base a thousand bombers in Siberia after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. 7 The Russians then built six or seven new airfields near Vladivostock. In the course of the next few months they proposed that the Americans, besides sending a strategic air force of their own to Russia, should provide the Red Air Force with 540 heavy bombers, and that these should be handled by Soviet airmen to be trained by as the leader of a great

power. 3

5

American specialists. 8 Such was the state of affairs when, on June 6, the Western Allies made a profound impression on the Soviet government by disembarking in Normandy, within the space of a single day, some 83,000 British and 73,000 American troops* escorted, covered and supported by nearly a *

The

total of 156,000 included

about 23,500 airborne troops.

440

DESTINATION TOKYO

thousand British and about two hundred American fighting ships. In view of the boasted strength of Hitler's Fortress Europe, Stalin described the disembarkation of these troops and of those which followed within the next few days as a feat without precedent in military history. 9 Almost simultaneously, more than 127,000 American marines and soldiers and well over five hundred combatant ships and auxiliaries assigned to the capture of the principal islands of the Mariana group completed their assembly in the Marshall Islands, about a thousand miles from their objective. The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, from Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States, were allotted to the Northern Attack Force (Vice- Admiral R. K. Turner), whose task was the capture of Saipan; the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, from Guadalcanal, to the Southern Attack Force (Rear-Admiral R. L. Conolly), which was to seize Guam. The 27th United States Infantry Division provided a floating reserve which was to move with the attack forces; the 77th United States Infantry Division was in general reserve. Immensely powerful naval forces at the disposal of Admiral Spruance of the Fifth Fleet, who was in command of the whole expedition while it was afloat, included the Fast Carrier Force under Vice-Admiral Marc A. Mitscher.* Mitscher, a pioneer of naval aviation, was a picturesque figure whose deeply lined, gnome-like face, habitually topped by a lobsterman's cap, contrasted strangely with his air of studied courtesy and quiet, unassuming manner. On the eve of the American landings the Japanese had some 32,000 troops and disembarked seamen in Saipan, about 9,000 in Tinian and roughly twice as many in Guam. Lieutenant-General H. Obata of the Thirty-First Army was in command of all land forces in the Marianas, but was subject to strategic guidance from Vice- Admiral Nagumo, *

During the conquest of the Marianas and the approach to the Philippines, at sea was exercised in turn by Spruance (Fifth Fleet) and Halsey (Third Fleet). The intention was that while one commander and his staff were carrying out an operation, the other commander and his staff would prepare for the next operation. The ships assigned to the two fleets were substantially

command

the same.

MAP

49

Saipati

12

3

4

5

442

DESTINATION TOKYO

who

held the nominal post of Commander, Central Pacific Fleet. This was a shore command which did not give Nagumo control of any ships except a few miscellaneous small craft. Nagumo was in turn responsible to Admiral Toyoda as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. During the early part of 1944 large numbers of naval aircraft had been sent to the Marianas from Japan. Many of these succumbed by the end of May to attacks on their bases, or on neighbouring objectives, by American carrierborne aircraft. More than a third of the remainder were then sent south to bolster the Second Area Army's attempt to hold Biak Island.* In the second week of June Mitscher delivered a series of devastating attacks on Saipan, Tinian, Guam and Rota. On June 13 seven fast battleships detached from his force bombarded Saipan, but achieved less than the older battleships whose more experienced gunners took over the job on the following day. At dawn on June 15, attacks by both warships and aircraft were switched to eight beaches near the southern end of the west coast of Saipan, on which the marines were about to land. Once ashore, the 2nd Marine Division was to push inland to the 1,500-foot-high Mount Tapotchau while the 4th Marine Division, on its right, advanced across the island to the east coast, capturing an airfield at Aslito on the way. Just before 8.45 a.m. assault forces from the two marine divisions, carried in hundreds of amphtracs, began to stream ashore on a four- mile front under cover of low-level attacks by 72 aircraft from escort carriers. In the first twenty minutes about 8,000 marines reached the shore in face of heavy artillery and mortar fire which prevented most of the amphtracs from carrying them further than the

Area

By

about 18,000 had established themselves in a shallow beachhead at the cost of some 2,000 casualties, but had captured only about half the area which they were to have occupied on the first day. In the absence of General Obata, who was visiting Guam, command of the garrison devolved upon Lieutenant-

water's edge. 10

* See p. 392.

nightfall

JUNE

1944

443

General Y. Saito of the 43rd Division. His 25,000 troops

and 7,000 seamen, holding strong positions to which they had withdrawn in face of the preliminary bombardment and air attacks, gave a good account of themselves throughout the daylight hours. At 3 a.m. on June 16, with nearly three hours of darkness still before them, they launched a counter-attack intended to drive the Americans into the sea. But the marines were not defeated, and at dawn the Japanese withdrew, leaving about 700 dead behind them. Meanwhile Toyoda was preparing for the great naval battle which alone could give his side a favourable decision. By June 13 the weight and intensity of Mitscher's attacks convinced him that the Marianas rather then the Halmaheras were the enemy's main objective. 11 He therefore recalled the aircraft sent southwards a fortnight earlier, ordered the two giant battleships and two heavy cruisers which were waiting at Batjan Bay* to cover the running of supplies to Biak to move northwards, and sent the First Mobile Fleet eastwards from Tawitawi (between the Philippines and North Borneo) to make rendezvous with this force in the Philippine Sea. As few, if any, of the aircraft recalled by Toyoda returned safely, the only land-based aircraft available for the defence of the Marianas on June 15 were some ninety to a hundred which survived Mitscher's preliminary attacks. The rest of Toyoda's programme was, however, duly put into effect. Vice- Admiral M. Ugaki, commanding the force at Batjan Bay, weighed anchor on June 13. At 5 p.m. on June 16 he made rendezvous at the appointed place with Vice- Admiral

Ozawa of the First Mobile Fleet, whose main body had steamed through the San Bernardino Strait, between Samar and Luzon. The junction of the two forces gave

Jisaburo

Ozawa large

a powerful

aircraft;

fleet consisting

of five battleships; five

with a complement of 473 eleven heavy and two light cruisers; and twenty-

and four

light fleet carriers

eight destroyers.

As a result of sightings by American submarines, Spruance received on June 15 two reports which told him * See Map 43, p. 389. W.F.E.

— 15*

444

DESTINATION TOKYO

that Japanese naval forces, including carriers, were approaching. 12 Thereupon he postponed the 3rd Marine Division's assault on Guam, due on June 18. After consulting his subordinate commanders he ruled that the 27th Division should be disembarked in Saipan without delay, that a number of ships should be detached from the bombardment forces to strengthen the Fast Carrier Force, and that the unloading of transports and supply ships should continue until nightfall on June 17. 13 All such ships would then be sent out of harm's way until the expected naval

was over. June 1 7 Spruance explained his plan to Mitscher. It was that Mitscher's aircraft should first knock out Ozawa's carriers and next disable or delay his battleships and cruisers. A battlefleet detached from Mitscher's covering forces would then destroy the remnant of Ozawa's battle

On

After adding that the western approaches to Saipan must not be left uncovered, Spruance arranged to bring almost the entire Fifth Fleet together on the following day

fleet.

at a point 160 miles west of Tinian.

The effect of these moves was that, from the late afternoon of June 18, Ozawa's fleet was outnumbered in warships of every category except heavy cruisers. Ozawa was also outnumbered by roughly two to one in carrier-borne aircraft. Moreover, even the best of his airmen had received far less training than Mitscher's. On the other hand, the Japanese carrier-borne aircraft had a considerably greater radius of action, chiefly because they were not encumbered by armour or self-sealing tanks. Ozawa, approaching from the west in the teeth of the prevailing wind, would also have the advantage of being able to fly-off and recover his aircraft without changing course, while Mitscher would have to turn away to do so. Ozawa hoped, too, to eke out his carrier-borne aircraft by making use of the ninety to a hundred land-based aircraft still at Guam and Rota, and to use airfields there as refuelling and rearming bases for aircraft

from

his carriers.

At twenty minutes to nine that evening, when Ozawa was roughly 450 miles west of Guam, he betrayed the

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA TABLE

445

17

The Battle of the Philippine Sea : American and Japanese June 18, 1944 American

Strengths

fn.fofl.np<;p

Battleships

7

Fleet Carriers

7

5

Light

8 8

4

fleet carriers

Heavy

cruisers

Light cruisers Destroyers Carrier-borne aircraft

Land-based

11

13

2

67-69 956

28 473 90-100

aircraft

approximate position of

5

his flagship to the

Americans by

sending a signal to the commander of the land-based air Mitscher then proposed that the Fast Carrier Force should close with him during the night and attack at daybreak. Spruance insisted, however, that the fleet should not risk uncovering Saipan by venturing too far west before he was sure of the location of the whole of Ozawa's force. 14 forces.

The

was that at first light on June 19 Ozawa's were still out of reach of Mitscher's aircraft, yet not so far away as to put the American carriers out of reach of his own aircraft. In spite of this handicap Mitscher succeeded not only in launching a series of crippling attacks on air bases in Guam, but also in repelling, at a heavy cost to the Japanese, four separate attacks by a total of well over three hundred aircraft from Ozawa's carriers. By nightfall Ozawa had lost more than two-thirds of the aircraft desresult

carriers

patched, or roughly half his entire carrier-borne force; the land-based air forces on which he was relying had been crippled; and two of his large carriers, the newly commissioned Taiho and the veteran Shokaku, had been sunk by American submarines. A big part in Mitscher's success was played by his radar, which gave him ample warning of Ozawa's long-range attacks. However, Ozawa was not aware of the full extent of his losses. 15 Supposing that many of the aircraft that failed to return to his carriers had landed safely at Guam, he made

446

DESTINATION TOKYO

off to the north with the intention of refuelling and renewing the engagement as soon as he was ready. Mitscher followed him, but was unable to gain news of his whereabouts until 3.42 p.m. on June 20. He then learned from a reconnaissance aircraft that Ozawa's nearest ships were about three

hundred miles away, heading

west. This

meant

even Mitscher despatched his striking forces with the least possible delay, they would be unable to come up with the enemy until the light was failing. Moreover, they would have to return in the dark and would doubtless suffer heavy losses, since Mitscher's pilots were not trained to make night landings. Nevertheless Mitscher decided that he must make the attempt rather than risk losing his last chance of engaging the enemy. He turned into the wind at 4.20 p.m., and within a quarter of an hour put more than two hundred aircraft into the air. Mitscher's dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers sighted Ozawa's fleet just as the sun was touching the horizon. In a twenty-minute engagement they sank the fleet carrier Hiyo, damaged four other carriers, a heavy cruiser and a battleship, and reduced Ozawa's air strength to thirty-five aircraft fit to fly. Leaving Ozawa to withdraw on Toyoda's orders to Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands, all but twenty of the 216 American aircraft despatched then set course in the gathering darkness for their parent carriers. Eighty failed to make safe landings, but all except sixteen pilots that,

if

and

airmen were saved. So ended a two-day battle which almost annihilated the Japanese naval air arm and sealed the fate of the Marianas. The Americans, with three divisions ashore in Saipan, captured Mount Tapotchau on June 25, and in the last week of the month drove the Japanese garrison to the extreme north of the island. On July 7, after Nagumo and Saito had committed suicide "in order to encourage the troops in thirty- three other

their final attack", 3,000 survivors

made

a desperate charge

which carried most of them to their deaths. Hundreds of civilians who had fallen back with the troops then jumped over the cliffs at the northern extremity of the island, apparently in the belief that the Americans meant to

TOJO RESIGNS

447

torture them. Some hurled their children over the cliffs before themselves committing suicide; others jumped with children in their arms.

The capture of Saipan on July 9 gave the Americans a secure base for very-long-range bombers within twelve hundred miles of Tokyo. The significance of this event, coming only a few weeks after the first raid on Japan by B29s from Chengtu, was not lost on the Japanese. On July 17, without waiting for Tinian and Guam to fall in August, the Jushin, or committee of former Prime Ministers, agreed with one dissentient that the government must go. 16 Tojo resigned on the following day after a brief struggle; but Admiral M. Yonai, who was urged by his colleagues in the Jushin to form a government favourable to the Peace Party, declined to make himself responsible for further defeats by accepting so prominent a position. Eventually it was agreed that a military man, General Kuniaki Koiso, should become Prime Minister in order to placate the army; that Yonai should serve as Minister of the Navy; and that both should receive the Emperor's mandate. Thus Yonai became, in effect, Vice-Premier. This was done at the instance of the influential Marquis Kido, who did not trust Koiso. 17 The new government's task was to carry on as best it could while seeking the way to a compromise peace. An attempt to reconcile the aims of the army, which wanted to continue the war, with those of the Peace Party, which wanted to end it, was, however, bound to lead to difficulties. Nevertheless the government did achieve one useful reform. In August Koiso set up a Supreme War Council to coordinate policy and strategy. This consisted of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy and the Chiefs of the General and Naval Staffs. During the lifetime of the Koiso government the effectiveness of this body was, however, limited by the inclusion in

its

secretariat of the Director of the Military

Bureau of the War Office and on the naval side. As long as these two Affairs

his opposite officers

number

were allowed

448

DESTINATION TOKYO

no opinions could be expressed without their immediately becoming known to a much wider circle of naval and army officers than the service chiefs might wish to take into their confidence. In the summer of 1944, Japan thus faced an uncertain future. To the Western Allies, too, the shape of things to come seemed far from clear. Despite a visit paid by the President to Pearl Harbor in July, when he discussed the outlook with Nimitz and MacArthur, there was much doubt, in particular, as to whether the Allies would or would not have to invade Japan. 18 In the early stages of the Octagon Conference, held at Quebec from September 12 to 16, it was, however, understood and accepted that in the course of the next few days, while MacArthur was capturing Morotai, Nimitz would seize Peleliu as a first step towards the occupation of the Palaus. In November, after Nimitz had secured Yap and Ulithi and MacArthur the Talaud Islands (between Morotai and the Philippines), MacArthur to attend meetings,

to assault Mindanao. Finally, in December Nimitz and MacArthur would, in concert, invade Leyte.* The next step, to be undertaken during the first two or three months of 1945, might be either an expedition to Formosa or the

was

recapture of Luzon.

However, this programme was soon overtaken by events. Early in September Halsey made a number of carrier strikes on Yap, the Palaus and Mindanao. Meeting little opposition, he shifted his attacks to the central Philippines, and again was only lightly opposed. On September 13 he suggested to Nimitz that, as the Japanese seemed weak in the Philippines, MacArthur might consider by-passing Mindanao and going straight to Leyte. Nimitz and MacArthur agreed to submit proposals on these lines to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who placed them on September 15 before the Combined Chiefs, then in conference at Quebec. Within an hour and a half the Combined Chiefs agreed that MacArthur should be directed to bypass the Talaud Islands and attack Leyte instead of Mindanao in the third week of October. 19 * See

Map

50, p. 452.

ALLIED PLANS FOR It

was

also agreed at the

1944-45

449

Octagon Conference that the

British should send to the Central Pacific a fleet expected

to consist

by the summer of 1945 of four new fast battleships,

six fleet

carriers,

four light fleet carriers, fifteen escort

twenty cruisers, up to fifty destroyers and a large fleet train. This decision was pushed through by the President and the Prime Minister in the teeth of opposition from Admiral King, whose reluctance to see a substantial carriers,

number of British

an American theatre was undisguised. It entailed the expenditure of more than £20,000,000 by the Australian government on naval bases. Moreover, the provision of a suitable fleet train made heavy demands on British shipping resources at a time when the economy of the United Kingdom was strained almost to the ships serving in

20

limit. 21

On September 15 assault forces of the 1st Marine Division duly landed in Peleliu and secured a beachhead against

stiff

opposition.

The Japanese, who had

reinforced

March and April, fought fiercely to retain on the islands, but were gradually pushed back. They finally succumbed after a long and bitter struggle which cost the Americans about 2,000 lives. Meanwhile a combat team from the 81st United States Infantry Division seized Ulithi in the western Carolines, which in October replaced Eniwetok as the principal forward base for the Palaus in their hold

Halsey's

fleet.

At the beginning of October the Joint Chiefs of Staff at agreed that Luzon, not Formosa, should be the next Accordingly they directed MacArthur on October 3 to invade Luzon about the end of the third week in December. 22 Nimitz, supported by MacArthur where such help was appropriate, was then to capture Iwojima and Okinawa. Plans were also to be made for an eventual landing on the coast of China north of Formosa, and for an invasion of the Japanese homeland during the winter of 1945-46. Meanwhile the Russians had made it clear that they were last

objective after the capture of Leyte.

450

DESTINATION TOKYO

no longer interested

American help with the At the Moscow Conference

in receiving

training of their airmen. 23

which followed in October they stated that their intention was to raise the strength of their land forces in the Far East from thirty to sixty divisions, and that this would take from two and a half to three months and would call for the accumulation of more than a million tons of equipment and supplies which they expected the Americans to ship them, chiefly through Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. On October 1 7 Stalin told the Americans, at a meeting not attended by the British, that the Red Army would take the offensive against the Japanese about three months after the end of the war in Europe. Pressure would be exerted on Japanese forces along the northern and eastern borders of Manchuria, but the main effort would consist of a sweep from the Lake Baikal area through Outer and Inner Mongolia to Kalgan, Peking and Tientsin. 24 This would drive a wedge between the Japanese forces in Manchuria and those in China. While Russian, American and British statesmen and strategists were conferring in Moscow, Admiral Halsey was preparing for the assault on Leyte by striking with (and in partnership with the 58th Bomber Wing at Calcutta and Chengtu) at Japanese bases in Formosa. The Japanese seized what seemed to them a good chance of crippling the American carrier fleet, but lost most of their remaining naval aircraft and succeeded only in sinking the Australian cruiser Canberra and damaging the American cruiser Houston and three carriers.* At the time, however, the naval section of Imperial General Headquarters announced, in the light of unconfirmed reports from surviving airmen, that two American battleships and eleven carriers had been sunk. On the strength of this announcement the army section of Imperial Headquarters ruled that, so far as the land forces were concerned, the main battle for the Philippines should be fought in Leyte, not in Luzon. To this manifestly unsound decision the leaders of the army clung in the teeth of contrary advice from the redoubtable General Yamashita, who had Mitscher's

*

carriers

The Japanese admitted

the loss of 320 aircraft.

TOYODA'S PLAN arrived in the Philippines on October 6 to take

451

command

of the land forces there. 25 For the Japanese everything seemed likely to turn, therefore, on the naval battle which Toyoda was preparing to fight. Toyoda recognized that, with few carrier-borne aircraft left, he would have to lean heavily on his battle fleet. His plan was that a Northern Force under Ozawa, consisting of four carriers with 106 aircraft manned by halftrained crews, two converted carrier-battleships with no aircraft, and a screen of three light cruisers and eight destroyers, should lure the American carrier fleet to the north by approaching the Philippines from that direction. Meanwhile the First Striking Force from Singapore would approach from the west and would split into a Centre Force and a Southern Force after refuelling in North Borneo. The Centre Force, consisting of five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers under Vice-Admiral T. Kurita, was to pass through the San Bernardino Strait about dawn on October 25 and set course for Leyte Gulf. At the same time the Southern Force, consisting of two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers under Vice- Admiral S. Nishimura, was to enter Leyte Gulf from the south after passing through the Surigao Strait, immediately north of Mindanao. Finally a weak Second Striking Force, consisting of three cruisers and four destroyers under Vice- Admiral K. Shima, was to follow Nishimura through the Surigao Strait and take advantage of the confusion that might be expected to follow the simultaneous arrival of the Central and Southern Forces. On October 17 the American invasion fleet, carrying troops drawn from two corps of General Krueger's Sixth Army which embarked at Manus and Hollandia, was seen approaching Leyte. Thereupon Toyoda ordered that effect should be given to his plan. 26 The consequences were that on October 20, when the Americans began to stream ashore at three points on the shores of Leyte Gulf, the First Striking Force reached Brunei Bay in North Borneo and the Northern Force set out on its southward voyage from Japan. Toyoda also ordered that on October 24 surviving

MAP

50

The Battle of Leyte Cjulf

OCTOBER

24,

1944

453

aircraft of the First Air Fleet in Luzon, reinforced by aircraft of the Second Air Fleet from Formosa, should co-operate with the Fourth Air Army by launching a general offensive against Allied shipping. Attacks delivered on that day cost the Americans the light carrier Princeton, but the Japanese lost sixty-seven naval aircraft out of about two hundred

employed. 27

On

the

same day Ozawa, eager

to advertise his presence

enemy, sent seventy-six aircraft to attack the American Fast Carrier Force. As some of these were shot down and the rest went on to Luzon, Ozawa was left with only thirty aircraft. Moreover, his gesture failed to achieve its purpose. Until the afternoon Admiral Halsey, whose command included 106 ships of the Fast Carrier Force but not the 734 warships, auxiliaries and landing craft of MacArthur's Attack Forces and their escort, was still eagerly awaiting news of the ships which Ozawa was determined

to the

to thrust

upon

his notice. 28

Kurita's Centre Force, on the other hand, did not escape attention. Repeated attacks by American carrierborne aircraft sank the battleship Musashi, damaged three other battleships and one heavy cruiser, and led Kurita to take evasive action which obliged him to warn Nishimura in the evening that he expected to reach his destination about seven hours late. Meanwhile Halsey, recognizing that Leyte Gulf was Kurita's probable destination, announced soon after 3 p.m. that he proposed to form a task force of battleships and heavy cruisers for the purpose of engaging him decisively at long range. 29 Between 3.40 and 4.40 p.m., however, Halsey at last learned from his reconnaissance aircraft that Japanese carriers were approaching from the north. Deceived by reports which led him to believe that Kurita's force had been so severely damaged that it need no longer be taken seriously, he then set off in search of Ozawa's carriers, leaving the San Bernardino

unguarded. 30 Meanwhile Nishimura, followed by Shima, was making for the Surigao Strait in accordance with his orders. ViceAdmiral T. C. Kinkaid, whose Seventh Fleet included all Strait entirely

DESTINATION TOKYO

454

the ships and small craft of the Attack Forces and supporting naval forces other than the Fast Carrier Force, was warned by aircraft of their approach and had no difficulty in divining their intention. 31 He threw a screen of destroyers and light craft round his transports in Leyte Gulf, stationed thirty-nine motor torpedo-boats in the Surigao Strait and south-west of it, and ordered six old battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and twenty-eight destroyers under Rear-Admiral J. B. Oldendorf to patrol the northern exit from the Strait throughout the night. The result was that Oldendorf alerted by a steady stream of reports from the motor torpedo-boats, was able to give Nishimura such a warm reception that by 10.18 a.m. on October 25 only one ship of the Southern Force remained afloat. Shima, wisely turning back to escape the certain destruction of his force, was able to save all his ships except

one

light cruiser.

The threat to his northern flank, on the other hand, found Kinkaid quite unprepared. He had learnt, by intercepting a signal from Halsey to his fleet, that the Fast Carrier Force was moving north to engage Ozawa's force, but supposed that, before leaving, Halsey had formed the task force of battleships and cruisers mentioned in his earlier signal. 32 The result was that, when Kurita emerged from the San Bernardino Strait early on October 25 with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eleven destroyers still intact, there was nothing between him and Kinkaid's transports in Leyte Gulf except sixteen escort carriers and

some eighteen destroyers and escort vessels disposed in three groups some thirty to fifty miles apart. Two of these groups, commanded by Rear-Admirals C. F. Sprague and F. B. Stump, were occupied with routine tasks; the third, under Rear-Admiral T. L. Sprague, had sent some aircraft to speed the destruction of Nishimura's crippled fleet in the

Surigao

The

Strait.

was one of the most remarkable In terms of an orthodox engagement between surface ships the tiny escort carriers, with their light armament and maximum speed of seventeen and a battle that followed

in naval history.

BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF

455

half knots, were hopelessly outmatched by Kurita's battleand cruisers. But they carried a total of 143 torpedobombers, each capable of sinking the largest ship afloat in

ships

the right conditions, as well as 235 fighters. Moreover, they and their attendant destroyers and escort vessels were superbly handled by men convinced that in so monstrously, so almost laughably unequal an encounter they had nothing to lose save honour. Clifton Sprague, who commanded the most northerly group and was therefore the first to be attacked, formed his six carriers into a rough circle and ordered his screen to patrol outside the rim of its exposed sector. Taking advantage of a brief but providential rainsquall, he then edged south and south-west in order to close the other groups and Oldendorf 's force. Kurita, who seems to have been puzzled by these tactics and to have mistaken Sprague's escort carriers for fleet carriers and his destroyers for cruisers, did not pause to form his heavy ships into line of battle, but threw his fleet into confusion by ordering a general attack, in which each ship selected its own target. At 9.25 a.m., after sinking one escort carrier and a number of American destroyers, but with four of his cruisers dis-

abled by aircraft and destroyers from Stump's and Clifton Sprague's groups, he turned away and made off to the north. 33

Kurita then re-formed his scattered fleet, and shortly noon he resumed his course towards Leyte Gulf. But two of his disabled cruisers were so badly damaged that he had to sink them; intercepted messages gave him the impression that strong American naval forces were preparing to engage him and he also intercepted messages which led him to believe that large numbers of land-based aircraft from a captured airfield in Leyte were waiting to attack him if he moved southwards. Finally, for more than before

;

half an hour after midday his force was shadowed by American aircraft which he had no means of driving off.

Deciding, after

all,

that he could not afford to

make

into the gulf and tackle the thirty to forty transports

way known

his

be lying there, he reported to his shore headquarters at 12.36 p.m. that he intended to move northwards, engage an

to

456

DESTINATION TOKYO

enemy task force which he believed to be approaching him, and then retire through the San Bernardino Strait. 34 Meanwhile Halsey, pursued by anxious enquiries from Kinkaid and Nimitz, had come up with Ozawa, and by the early afternoon had sunk all four of his virtually defenceless carriers. Kurita's entry into the San Bernardino Strait that evening therefore ended the series of actions which made up the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In these engagements the Japanese lost three battleships, one

fleet carrier,

three light

heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and seven destroyers the Americans one light fleet carrier, two escort carriers, three destroyers or escort vessels, one submarine and one motor torpedo-boat. With six battleships left but without a carrier force, the Japanese surface fleet was never again able to offer a serious challenge to the fleet carriers,

six ;

Allied navies.

l

THE LAST PHASE

9

GENERAL YAMASHITA disapproved so strongly of the decision of his superiors

that the main battle for the Philippines should be fought in Leyte rather than Luzon that he refused to give effect to it until after the

enemy had begun

come

Helped which prevented the Americans from

by torrential rains making the best use of captured

to

ashore. 1

he then succeeded from some 15,000 of all ranks to roughly four times that number. As the Americans were able to land more than 180,000 men under the protection of their carrier force by the beginning of November he was, however, still outnumbered by three to airfields,

in raising the strength of the garrison

On December 10, after making a fresh landing without opposition on the west coast of the island, General Krueger captured the garrison's chief port of supply at Ormoc. By the end of the year he had little left to do in Leyte beyond mopping up the remnant of a defeated army. For Yamashita this meant that the equivalent of four strong divisions were sacrificed to the determination of the army section of Imperial General Headquarters to back their judgement against his. Weakened by the loss of practically the whole of the Japanese Thirty-Fifth Army, he could not afford to bolster the defences of Mindoro, which MacArthur captured with ease by disembarking some 18,000 men on December 15 after aircraft of the Fast Carrier Force had battered Japanese airfields in Luzon on the three preceding days. Toyoda did his best to restore the situation by despatching two cruisers and five destroyers from Camranh Bay without air cover to bombard the American beachhead but he succeeded only in destroying one transport and some thirty aircraft for the loss of one destroyer. Japanese one. 2

;

458

LUZON

459

land-based aircraft scored some success against American supply ships at the end of December, but early in January had to turn their attention to vain attempts to stem the invasion of Luzon. On January 9 assault troops of three corps of the Sixth Army began to stream ashore in Luzon at points close to those at which the Japanese had landed almost exactly four years earlier. On January 1 3 Generals Krueger and MacArthur followed their troops ashore; early in February leading elements of the 1st United States Cavalry Division, closely followed by the 37th Infantry Division, reached the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile the Japanese were facing a potent threat to their homeland from very-long-range bombers. Warned as early as 1943 that the Americans were producing a highperformance long-range bomber and that airfields with extended runways were being built near Calcutta and in China, 3 they raised the strength of their air defences at home to some 750 fighters and 600 anti-aircraft guns by the summer of 1944. 4 At the end of October the 73rd Bomber Wing of the Twentieth United States Army Air Force reached Saipan, and early on November 24 1 1 1 B29s took off to attack an aircraft factory and docks at Tokyo. During the next two to three months two more wings of very-longrange bombers arrived in the Marianas and were posted to Tinian and Guam. Up to the end of January attempts by bombers from the Marianas to reduce the enemy's war potential were little more successful than those made by aircraft from Chengtu. 5 Indeed, they caused severe damage to only one of nine important aircraft factories listed by the American Chiefs of Staff. The Japanese authorities feared, however, that the Americans might turn to indiscriminate attacks and that the effect of these on crowded, highly inflammable cities might be insupportable. Early in 1945 Imperial General Headquarters decided, therefore, that the air defences of the homeland must be further strengthened at the expense of outlying regions such as the Philippines, Celebes and Sumatra. 6 At the same time, priority must be given to attempts to increase the output of the aircraft

460

THE LAST PHASE it was hoped, enable the by the end of March, a total of 5,000 with which to defend the homeland and

industry. These measures would, authorities to muster,

or more aircraft oppose the two-pronged drive through the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonin Islands which the Americans were expected to launch within the next few weeks. 7 At the same time the depletion of their merchant fleet confronted the Japanese with a problem to which no solution could be found. By the end of 1944 the fleet's carrying capacity had fallen from just under six million tons at the beginning of the war to well under three million. Prodigious efforts had raised the output of new or refurbished ships to nearly a million and three quarter tons in the past twelve months. But there was no prospect that production could be increased substantially beyond that figure, and current losses were running at well over 300,000 tons a month. For lack of shipping, imports of food and raw materials from the occupied territories in the south had fallen to a trickle. 8 Henceforth these territories must be regarded as liabilities rather than assets. In these circumstances a successful outcome of the war was not to be expected. The most that could be hoped for was that a resolute defence of the homeland and its approaches might induce the Allies to accept a compromise peace rather than invite crippling losses. The risk of a breach with the Soviet Union could not be ruled out, but all possible steps would be taken to maintain good relations with Moscow by diplomatic means. 9 The Japanese could, indeed, claim that they had faithfully discharged their obligations under the Neutrality Pact of 1941, even to the extent of displeasing the Germans by allowing cargoes consigned by the Western Allies to Russia to pass unmolested through waters dominated by the Japanese Navy. 10 new method of inflicting on the enemy losses which might prove disastrous had already been tried with some success. After the Battle of the Philippine Sea Vice- Admiral T. Onishi, commander of the naval land-based aircraft in the Philippines, organized a corps of young airmen willing to give their lives for a good chance of scoring a hit on an

A

KAMIKAZE ATTACKS

461

The name Kamikaze Corps was bestowed on Onishi's creation, presumably in memory of an incident in 1281, when a fleet sent by the Mongol Emperor Khubilai

Allied ship. 11

Khan

invade Japan was dispersed by a typhoon or "divine wind" (kami kaze).* The corps first came to the notice of the Allies on October 25, when escort carriers in Leyte Gulf were attacked by suicide pilots who flew from Luzon before and after Kurita's withdrawal to the north. Further kamikaze attacks were made later in the month on carriers in Leyte Gulf, in December on convoys plying between Leyte Gulf and Mindoro, and early in 1945 on to

TABLE

18

The Japanese Merchant Fleet, 1944-1945 (Ships of less than 500 tons excluded)

TONS Carrying capacity, January Additions from

1,

1944

new production and captured

4,876,019 or

1,734,847

requisitioned ships, 1944

6,610,866

Gross

losses,

1944

3,891,019

Carrying capacity, January

1945

2,719,847

Additions, January to August, 1945

565,443

1,

3,285,290

Gross

losses,

January

to August,

Carrying capacity at end of war

1

945

1,782,140 1,503,150

warships and transports off Luzon. Such attacks were difficult to counter, for the chances were that an aircraft which came within reach of the target would hit it even if the pilot Kubla Khan of Coleridge. Founder of the Yuan of the Mongol Emperors who, from 1279 to 1368, held sway over an empire extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Black Sea and from the Arctic Circle to the Himalayas.

* Khubilai

Khan was

dynasty, he was the

the

first

462

THE LAST PHASE

killed by anti-aircraft fire as he approached. Other advantages from the Japanese point of view were that obsolete aircraft could be used and that pilots needed very

were

little

training.

In view of this unpleasant innovation, and also of the ferocity with which the Japanese had defended islands which they could scarcely regard as more than outposts, the Western Allies expected in the early part of 1945 that the cost of invading Japan would be extremely heavy. Moreover, it was now clear that the war in Europe was not likely to end before the spring. This meant that, notwithstanding the British effort in South-East Asia and the imminent arrival of a British fleet in the Central Pacific, a big share of the casualties incurred in the war against Japan during the next few months would continue to be borne by the Americans. The capture of Saipan, defended by a garrison never more than 32,000 strong and soon heavily outnumbered, had cost the United States Army and Marine Corps about 17,000 casualties. What would be the cost of capturing Iwojima, Okinawa, and the islands of Japan? In the light of these considerations, Roosevelt and Churchill did not need to be persuaded, when they met the Russians at Yalta early in February, that Soviet help at the climax of the Far Eastern war would be well worth having. Early in the conference Stalin informed the President that, in place of the airfields near Vladivostok which the Americans had been promised earlier, they would be allowed to base heavy bombers in the neighbourhood of Komsomolsk and Nikolaevsk, on the Amur River. 12 General A. Antonov, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, confirmed that the strategic plan outlined in the previous October still held good. It then remained for the Western Allies to discover on what terms the Russians were willing to enter the war, and in particular how these squared with the declaration,

made by

Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang

Kai-shek at Cairo in 1943, that the Allies aimed at restoring Manchuria to China and establishing a free and independent Korea. On February 8 the President and Stalin exchanged views

THE YALTA CONFERENCE by the

463

British. 13

Three days later and Churchill agreed that, in return for entering the war against Japan "two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated", the Soviet Union should receive the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin, the use of Port Arthur as a at a meeting not attended Stalin, Roosevelt

naval base, recognition of her "pre-eminent interests" in Dairen, and joint control with China of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway. Roosevelt pledged himself to take steps to secure the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek. 14 As the existence of the RussoJapanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 made secrecy imperative, Chiang Kai-shek was not, however, informed until the following June of the terms of the agreement. The British Foreign Office, with its elephantine memory, could scarcely be expected to approve of a bargain which promised to restore to Russia the access to warm-water ports in the Far East of which Japan, to the unfeigned delight of Britain and the United States, had forcibly deprived her some forty years earlier. On the eve of the conference Churchill had, however, made it clear to his colleagues that, in view of the military advantages of Russian intervention, he would not be able to stand out against such demands as Stalin might be expected to make. 15 Roosevelt, who thought that Stalin was "not an Imperialist", would seem to have seen little in the agreement that was objectionable on political or moral grounds. In any case he was, like Churchill, in no position to refute the argument that an offer which might save innumerable lives

could not lightly be rejected.

The Yalta Conference broke up on February

1 1

.

Eleven

on February 22, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, asked the Soviet Foreign Minister whether Far Eastern questions had been touched upon at Yalta. Molotov replied that they had been "entirely excluded". 16 It was not until April 5 that Molotov told Sato that the Soviet Union did not propose to renew the Neutdays

later,

expired in April 1946. He added, in reply to Sato's enquiries, that meanwhile Russia's attitude rality

Pact

when

it

464 to

THE LAST PHASE

Japan would be governed by the knowledge

pact was

still

that the

in force. 17

While the statesmen were reaching agreement at Yalta, American land-based aircraft from the Marianas were making day and night attacks on Iwojima in preparation for the capture of the island by the 5th United States Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The assault, originally scheduled for January 20, had been postponed until February 19 in consequence of the prolonged resistance offered by the Japanese in Leyte and Luzon. The air attacks lasted from January 31 to February 15. A three-day naval bombardment was to begin on February 1 6 under cover of diversionary attacks by aircraft of Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force on airfields and other objectives near Tokyo. The carrier force, helped by thick weather, duly reached its flying-off position sixty miles from the Japanese coast on the appointed day. But overcast skies made bombing so difficult that on February 1 7 Mitscher withdrew after losing nearly ninety aircraft. 18 He then took up a supporting position west of Iwojima.

Iwojima, about four and a half miles long by two and a quarter miles wide, is fairly flat except at its south-western extremity, where an extinct volcano, Mount Suribachi, rises to 556 feet. After the fall of the Marianas the Japanese had come to the conclusion that a resolute attempt must be made to hold the island in order to prevent the Americans from using it as a staging post on the air route to Japan. By the early part of 1945 about 21,000 troops and disembarked seamen under Lieutenant-General T. Kuribayashi of the 109th Division were installed in prepared positions connected by tunnels and disposed in depth. The beaches were mined, and were covered by artillery, mortar and machinegun fire, but Kuribayashi had decided not to defend them by hand-to-hand fighting at the risk of heavy losses. His plan was to keep an invading force from the built-up area near the centre of the island, and if possible from the island's three airfields, by holding his prepared positions

IWOJIMA

465

be defended to the death". 19 The defences included tanks in dug-in positions; caves, subterranean works and concrete emplacements provided a high degree of cover against bombing and bombardment for practias fortresses "to

cally the entire garrison.

On

February 16 an "amphibious support force" of

cruisers, destroyers and miscellaneous naval under Rear-Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, arrived off Iwojima to sweep mines and deliver the three-day bombardment envisaged in the plan approved by Admiral Spruance. By February 18, when Blandy's heavy ships

battleships, craft,

closed to 2,500 yards or less, naval gunfire had stripped the camouflage from a large number of emplacements, many of their positions by offering return fire. The bombardment wrecked many of these emplacements, but had little effect on the garrison.

which disclosed third day's

Early on February 19 Admiral Turner arrived, in perfect weather, with the main body of the expeditionary force. Soon after dawn Admiral Blandy began a final bombardment, interspersed with attacks by carrier-borne aircraft armed with rockets, high-explosive bombs, and napalm bombs filled with jellied petroleum. About three hours later the marines, assured by well-wishers that after such a prelude the landings would be easy, began to go ashore on a two-mile front. They were met by a growing volume of fire from Kuribayashi's troops, who waited until the last moment to emerge from their hiding places and man their weapons. Soon afterwards a swift change in the weather brought heavy seas which made the landing of men, equipment and stores extremely difficult. At the cost of roughly 2,500 casualties, the marines nevertheless succeeded by nightfall in gaining a beachhead about 1,000 yards deep, reaching a corner of the nearest airfield, and pushing across a narrow tongue of land to the west coast of the island. During the next ten to twelve days the marines secured two of the three airfields and gained possession of roughly two-thirds of the island. Thereafter they pushed the remnant of the garrison into two pockets of resistance in the north.

By March

26,

when

all

resistance ceased, at least

466

THE LAST PHASE

20,000 Japanese were believed to have been killed, and the marines had suffered about 26,000 casualties. 20 In addition, the United States Navy had lost nearly nine hundred killed or missing and about two thousand

wounded. 21

The conquest of Okinawa, defended by up to 100,000 Japanese under Lieutenant-General Mitsuru Ushijama, proved even more expensive. The Americans, expecting heavy opposition, assigned to the expedition about 172,000 combatant and 115,000 non-combatant troops drawn from three marine divisions and five infantry divisions of the United States Tenth Army, under Lieutenant-General S. B. Buckner. Ushijama, applying more drastically and on a vaster scale the tactics of deep defence adopted by Kuribayashi at Iwojima, allowed some 50,000 Americans to stream ashore without opposition on April l. 22 He then defended the island with a desperate resolution which cost the Americans more than 49,000 casualties by the time its capture was completed early in July. 23 Meanwhile the Americans, recognizing that their attempt to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by precise bombing from 30,000 feet had failed, had confirmed the worst fears of Imperial General Headquarters by launching a series of attacks with incendiary bombs on Japanese cities. In one night's bombing in early March, according to Japanese authorities consulted by the Americans after the war, more than a quarter of a million houses were destroyed, more than a million people left homeless, and some 80,000 people killed. 24 This, if the Japanese were right, was considerably more than were to be killed when the first atomic bomb was dropped in August. On April 4 Koiso, discredited by a succession of military disasters, laid

down

his office.

The

seventy-nine-year-old

Admiral Baron K. Suzuki, President of the Privy Council and representative of a generation of naval officers who looked back to the era of friendship with Britain and the United States, then formed a government at the instance of the Jushin and in face of protests from Tojo, who called in vain for a Cabinet dominated by the army. 25 Yonai retained

JAPANESE PEACE MOVES

467

of the Navy; Shigenori Togo, a firm advocate of friendship with the Soviet Union, became Foreign Minister. Significantly, the influential posts of Chief Secretary to the Cabinet and Private Secretary to the Prime Minister were both filled by men associated with the peace movement. 26 Soon afterwards it was agreed that henceforward meetings of the Supreme War Council should be attended only by the six regular members and that the directors of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaux should be excluded. Suzuki, at first inclined to speak of fighting for another two or three years, soon understood that he had been appointed for a very different purpose. He found that, while some leading members of his Cabinet believed that the armed forces could stem an invasion of the homeland and others that the war must be brought to a close before invasion came, all agreed that no chance of obtaining a negotiated peace should be lost. 27 Shortly before the fall of the Koiso government Shigenori Togo's predecessor had suggested to the Swedish Minister in Tokyo, Widor Bagge, that he should co-operate with the Japanese Minister to Sweden in ascertaining the chances of a negotiated peace. 28 Togo, fortified by the false assurances given by Molotov to Sato in February and April,* put more faith in approaches to Moscow. On May 15 he denounced the An ti- Comintern Pact of 1936 and declared that the unconditional surrender of Germany had made the Tripartite Pact of 1940 ineffective. Repeated attempts in June to persuade the Soviet government to renew the Neutrality Pact or, better still, replace it by a treaty of non-aggression, were unsuccessful. 29 Nevertheless Togo clung to his conviction that the Russians could be induced to act as mediators between Japan and the his post as Minister

Western Allies. When the Supreme War Council, facing imminent defeat in Okinawa, agreed on June 18 to seek peace on terms which would at least preserve the monarchy it was expressly resolved that the approach should be made through Moscow. 30 * See pp. 463-464.

W.F.E.

— 16

468

THE LAST PHASE

Four days Supreme

Emperor, on Kido's advice, ordered Council to disregard a recent decision to continue the war, and to make peace without delay. 31 On July 7, at Kido's prompting, he sent for Suzuki and urged him to ask the Russians, without further loss of time, to receive a special envoy who would bring an Imperial message. 32 The outcome was that on July 13 Sato reported from Moscow that he had been unable to arrange an interview with Molotov before Molotov departed for the Allied conference due to open at Potsdam on July 17. He had, however, told Molotov's deputy, S. Lozovsky, that the Emperor wished to make peace but not to surrender unconditionally, and that the government proposed to send to Moscow a mission headed by Prince Konoye. Lozovsky had promised to pass the message to Molotov and arrange for him to be consulted while he was in Germany. 33 At Potsdam Stalin made a number of references to the Japanese message in the course of separate conversations with the Americans and the British. He added that, as the message contained no concrete proposals, the Soviet government had taken no action. But Churchill was not convinced that the message should be brushed aside. In the light of it he reminded President Harry S. Truman, who had taken office on Roosevelt's death in April, that the cost of forcing unconditional surrender on the Japanese might be very heavy. At the end of his talk with Truman he was left with the impression that the Americans did not mean to insist on a rigid application of the unconditional surrender formula. 34 But Stalin's disclosure was not needed to tell the Western Allies that the Japanese government was ready to make peace on almost any terms which did not threaten the the

later the

War

nation's existence or the monarchy. They knew that Japan was extremely short of shipping. 35 They believed that air attacks had reduced her output of aircraft by nearly half, that her stocks of aviation fuel were dwindling rapidly, that her electronics industry was unable to provide the armed forces with adequate supplies of radio and radar. 36 Finally, the Americans had intercepted and deciphered the

RUSSIA AND THE WEST telegraphic instructions from

Togo

to Sato

469

on which the

37

message mentioned by Stalin was based. Moreover, the Western Allies themselves were scarcely less eager than the Japanese to bring the war to a speedy end. On June 29 President Truman had accepted the United States Army's plan for the invasion of Kyushu on November l. 38 As the Allied governments were extremely anxious to avoid the heavy casualties which invasion would entail, the effect of this decision was to give them a powerful incentive to bring matters to a head before that date. For at least four reasons, the attitude of the Western Allies to the problem of defeating Japan had, however, changed considerably since Yalta. In the first place, as a result of rapid progress in the Pacific the Americans no longer needed to station bombers in Russia. 39 Secondly, expert examination of the administrative aspect of Stalin's projected advance from Lake Baikal suggested that he would not need the supplies which he had asked the Americans to provide. 40 Thirdly, since February the Russians had not only angered the Western Allies by their behaviour in Rumania and Poland, but as recently as the end of June had alarmed Chiang Kai-shek by making it clear that they proposed to put an interpretation on certain clauses of the Yalta Agreement which the other parties could not accept. 41 Finally, by April the Western Allies knew that by the late summer they might be in a position to drop at least one atomic bomb on Japan if they wished

do

to

so. 42

history of the atomic bomb can be traced at least as back as the early experiments of the English-domiciled New Zealander Ernest Rutherford and the experimental splitting of the atom by two of his disciples, J. D. Cockcroft and E. T. S. Walton, in 1932. Even before 1932 Rutherford warned the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, of the strategic implications of atomic power. 43 Towards the end of 1938 Otto Hahn of Berlin split the

The

far

470

THE LAST PHASE

nucleus of the uranium atom. His former collaborator, Lise Meitner, whose Jewish ancestry had forced her to leave Germany, then formulated with her nephew, Otto Frisch, a theory of nuclear fission which stimulated interest in the production of a chain reaction by which a useful amount of energy might be released. Much thought was given, especially by Frederic Joliot- Curie in France, to a line of enquiry which might lead to the application of nuclear energy to industrial uses. Other physicists, determined that National Socialist Germany should not be first in the field, studied the problem of producing a fast reaction which could be used for military purposes. But the mass of crude uranium needed for a nuclear explosion was shown by Rudolf Peierls, a German-born physicist long domiciled in England, to be so great that the problem of producing an atomic bomb which could be carried in an aircraft seemed insoluble. 44

Uranium

however, of three chemically identical constituents, or isotopes, distinguished by their atomic weights. Early in the Second World War a calculation made by Peierls in association with Frisch, who had also moved to England, showed that, if uranium 235 alone were used, the critical mass might turn out to be quite small. 45 The question was whether uranium 235 could be isolated on a consists,

sufficient scale.

summer of 1939 Frisch had tried, without method of separation which used two concentric

In the late success, a

tubes maintained at different temperatures. Early in 1940 Franz Simon, a German-born Jewish physicist who had

England in 1933, proposed a method which relied on the filtering effect of a series of sieves, or membranes. This seemed much more promising, especially as the membranes could be produced without insuperable difficulty on a fairly large scale. On July 15, 1941, a government committee set up in April 1940 reported that there was a reasonable chance that an atomic bomb could be produced before the end of the war, and made detailed proposals for settled in

the establishment of a pilot plant for the production of

uranium 235. 46 These were accompanied by estimates of

THE ATOMIC BOMB

471

up plant on an

industrial scale and of a week. In the light of this report the British government decided in principle that a pilot plant should be set up in the United Kingdom and that the establishment of full-scale plant in Canada should follow. An organization called Tube Alloys was established for the production of nuclear explosives, and a pilot plant was set up at Rhydymwyn in North Wales. In the United States refugee sc ientists had, in l939, sought to interest the authorities^through Albert Einstein, in the production of nuclear weapons as a means of forestalling Hitler. While some support was forthcoming, in the early stages of the Second World War the United States government was chiefly interested in industrial rather than military applications of nuclear energy. Moreover, it was still believed in the United States that a uranium bomb would have to be extremely big and heavy. 47 Valuable research was, however, done in American universities by expatriate scientists such as the Italian Enrico Fermi and

the cost of setting

producing one atomic

the Hungarian

Leo

bomb

Szilard.

In the late summer of 1940, at a time when the exhaustion of Britain's dollar resources and the fall of France made it imperative that the British should enlist American support, a British scientific mission headed by Sir Henry Tizard left for a long stay in the United States. When urgent work called Tizard home, his place was taken by Rutherford's old disciple Cockcroft. As a result of this visit and of visits to London by American scientists, the British imparted to the Americans the secrets of radar, the cavity magnetron valve, the proximity fuse, and a new predictor for the Bofors gun. The Americans, aware of the immense military value of these inventions, also learned with interest that calculations made in England showed that an atomic bomb could be made with much smaller amounts of uranium than had previously been thought necessary. 48 Great progress,

it

was

clear,

had been made

in

England

since

1939, although the British had devoted only small sums of money and a tiny proportion of their scientific manpower to the project.

The Americans concluded

that

much more

472

THE LAST PHASE

could be done with the financial and technical resources

The outcome was that the President and the Prime Minister agreed on June 20, 1942, that the development of nuclear weapons should be carried

available in the United States.

\

\

out as a joint Anglo-American enterprise, chiefly in the United States and Canada, and that neither country should A use such a weapon against a third party without the consent J] of the other. 49 During the next twelve months or so the British found that scientists and officials assigned by the United States government to the enterprise did not seem to know that it was a joint one, and that information which they expected to be pooled was being withheld from them. The Prime

Minister raised the matter with the President at the Quadrant Conference at Quebec in August 1943, and the agreement reached in the previous year was then formally recorded. 50 Some of the Americans concerned continued, however, to show a marked reluctance to consult the British except when they needed British help. Notwithstanding the expenditure of prodigious sums of money by the United States government, progress was not conspicuously rapid. In September Brigadier-General Leslie R. Groves, who was responsible for all work done on the project in the United States, chose a site at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the production of uranium 235 on an industrial scale. During the next eighteen months Oak Ridge produced no uranium 235, although a number of methods of isotope separation were tried. 51 General Groves then decided to try the thermal diffusion method, rejected by Frisch in 1939 but developed in the United States by the distinguished American physicist Philip H. Abelson. 52 This yielded only a slightly enriched form of uranium which needed further treatment before a product usefully rich in uranium 235 was obtained. 53 Eventually, by a combination of methods, enough fissile material was produced to make one uranium bomb by the summer of 1945. Meanwhile, as an insurance against failure, arrangements were made to construct a bomb which used the artificial element plutonium, whose fissile properties had

MARCH-JULY

1945

473

been studied from 1939 or earlier by physicists in France, and the United States. 54 In addition a version of the plutonium bomb was prepared for testing. Britain

On March

23, 1945, the British technical adviser to the

Anglo-American Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Affairs in Washington, Professor James Chadwick, informed the British government that "a weapon" would almost certainly be ready in the late summer. 55 Just over a month later Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and also a member of the Policy Committee, announced that the Americans proposed to "drop a bomb some time in August", and asked for guidance as to how British consent should be given. 56 Many weeks elapsed before Wilson received an answer. But the delay seems to have been due to pressure of work arising from the German surrender rather than to any doubt on the part of the British government that the Americans should be allowed to drop an atomic bomb on Japan if they wished to do so. 57 The British did, however, suggest that the President and the Prime Minister should discuss the matter at Potsdam. Meanwhile, on June 1, an all- American Interim Policy Committee, headed by the veteran Secretary of War L. Stimson, recommended that "the bomb" should be used against Japan as soon as possible, and that it should be dropped, without prior warning of the nature of the weapon, on a military objective surrounded by or adjacent to houses or other buildings. 58 But in a memorandum written on July 2, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Secretary of State, Stimson made it clear that he thought that the Japanese ought to be given a chance to surrender before extreme measures were taken against them. They should, he wrote, be told that the

Henry

had no intention of depriving them of the means of existence or of permanently occupying their country, and perhaps even that there would be no objection to their retaining a constitutional monarchy under the existing dynasty. At the same time they should be warned that

Allies

THE LAST PHASE

474

failure to surrender

would bring "inevitable and complete

destruction". 59

Between March and June some of the scientists associated with the project expressed doubts about the morality and political wisdom of using nuclear weapons against Japan. JSzilard_wrote a letter to the President not long before Roosevelt's death, and on May 28 saw James F. Byrnes, a lawyer and politician who was a member of the Policy Committee and later Secretary of State. 60 Szilard also worked

with the German-born NobelJMze-wifiQftr James Franck and a Russian-born chemist; Eugene Rabinowitch, on a letter (afterwards called the F ranck Rerjort/sent to Stimson. This letter, although it may have influenced Stimson's memorandum of July 2, seemTlToTto have reached him until some time in June, after the Interim Policy Committee

had

reported. 61

On July 16, after the Americans and the British had reached Potsdam but before the formal opening of the conference, the test version of the plutonium bomb was successfully exploded in New Mexico. Both Truman and Churchill seem to have regarded this as an epoch-making event, although in fact it threw only an uncertain light on the probable behaviour of the uranium bomb which the Americans intended to use first. On July 24, after consulting Churchill, Truman told Stalin that the Western Allies had a new weapon of extraordinary power, but gave no details. 62

The

armed with formal consent from the use the bomb, had yet to make the crucial

President,

British to

decision to use

it.

Although there

is little

to suggest that

either he or Churchill gave serious consideration to the

argument that the Western Allies might gain bigger an d diplomatic advant ages by witholding the weapon than by using it, this was a difficult decision in view of the known desire of the Japanese government to en d the war on the one hand, and the imminen ce__of "^Russian intervention on the other For the President's advisers no longer positively wished the Russians to enter strategic

.

the war, although that did not necessarily

mean

that the

THE POTSDAM DECLARATION Western

Allies could or

would do anything

475

to prevent

them. 63

The outcome was

that, while final preparations for the

nuclear bombing of Japan by aircraft from the Marianas were sanctioned on July 24 or 25, the final decision was postponed pending the issue of a warning on the lines proposed by Stimson. On or about July 18 the Americans decided, in consultation with the British and subject to

Chinese consent, to issue a declaration to the effect that the Allies did not intend to enslave the Japanese, destroy their nationhood or permanently occupy their country, and that a defeated Japan would be allowed access to raw materials and eventually to world markets. 64 No assurance about the monarchy was included in the declaration, although Stimson had told the President that, in his opinion, such an assurance would add substantially to the chances of acceptance. 65 The Chinese agreed to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on July 26. Thal,evming_the Western Allies^jwithout waitingJLo_senLd_the declaratio^ijtojthe Ja panese_t.h rough a neut ral intermediary in acco rdance wit h estahlishecLdlBlgL mati c procedure, broadcast it by radio, but sent a copyJto Moscgw. The result was that the Japanese received it only ^£1^12^ through their monitoring service and were not sure what /vMshap to make of it. The peace group welcomed it as an indication that Japan, would not be treated with complete ruthlessness. The Emperor thought its terms acceptable in principle. o^fAjr n The Supreme War Council, after hearing the views of the service chiefs, decided to await the result of their appeal to

^/

,

5

"

'

Moscow, and

in the

meantime

make no reply. 66 The an era when diplomatic

to

aged Suzuki, who belonged to communications were ceremoniously passed through the recognized channels, was understood to tell a press conference on July 28 that the government proposed to take no notice of the declaration. * * It has been suggested that Suzuki meant merely to say that the government proposed to make no comment to the press. Suzuki's colleagues afterwards denied that it was their policy to disregard the declaration. Their intention, they said, was to "keep silence for a while pending developments".

W.F.E.

16*

476

THE LAST PHASE

Thus no word came from the Japanese before the Potsdam Conference broke up on August 2. On his way home President Truman sanctioned the dropping of the two nuclear bombs delivered to the Marianas. 67 For some days the weather over Honshu was unsuitable for visual bombing. On August 5, however, favourable forecasts were received. During the succeeding night a B29 carrying the uranium bomb left Tinian to make rendezvous south of Kyushu with similar aircraft carrying recording instruments and cameras. Continuing its long flight, the bomb-carrying aircraft reached the crowded city of Hiroshima early on August 6 and dropped the bomb from a height of more than 30,000 feet. A gigantic explosion, which filled the sky with light, killed about 70,000 people. The bomb was fused to explode well above the ground in the belief that this would not only give the maximum blast effect but also reduce radiation effects which might be held to contravene the international ban on chemical warfare. 68 Nevertheless many victims of such effects died lingering deaths. On August 7 a broadcast from San Francisco revealed the nature of the weapon. The Emperor told Togo on that day that the government ought to make peace at once without arguing about terms. 69 Meanwhile Sato had been eagerly awaiting Molotov's return from Potsdam, but was told that Molotov could not see him before 8 p.m. on August 8 70 Later the time was put forward to 5 p.m. When Sato arrived, Molotov cut short his greetings and declared war on Japan with effect from the morning of August 9. 71 As it was already nearly midnight by Far Eastern time, only a few hours elapsed before the depleted Kwantung Army in Manchuria found itself battling against greatly superior Soviet forces. By that time another B29 from Tinian, carrying the plutonium bomb, was on its way to Kokura. After three unsuccessful runs over the target it went on to Nagasaki, missed its aiming-point, and dropped the bomb on an jindustrial area about four miles away. 72 An aircraft carrying cameras and two British observers, Dr. W. G. Penney and Group-Captain G. L. Cheshire, V.C., arrived about ten minutes later. i

THE EMPEROR INTERVENES

477

In Tokyo all six members of the Supreme War Council, meeting at 10 a.m., agreed in principle that the time had

Potsdam Declaration on condition that the Allies consented to preserve the monarchy. 73 As the War Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff wished also to insist that there should be no Allied occupation of the Japanese homeland and to make other stipulations, the question was then remitted to an emergency meeting of the Cabinet, again without result. Finally, at the close of an Imperial Conference which lasted from 11.30 p.m. on August 9 to 3 a.m. on the following morning, the Emperor broke the deadlock by ruling that no stipulations should be made except that relating to the monarchy, on which all were agreed. 74 The time had come to "bear the unbear-

come

to accept the

able".

A Japanese Note to that effect reached Washington through Switzerland about 10 a.m. on August 10. Its outcome was a further broadcast in which the Americans again insisted

on unconditional surrender. The

effect

on the

Japanese was to precipitate another crisis, again cut short by the Emperor, who ruled at a second Imperial Conference on August 14 that the war must end. 75 The Emperor then pronounced an edict to the nation, which was recorded for transmission on the following day. During the night a number of army officers tried to break into the palace and destroy the record, but were repulsed. On the morning of August 15 Togo despatched through Switzerland a note accepting the Allied demand, and at midday the Emperor's edict was heard in silence or with tears throughout Japan. On September 2 MacArthur, acting with the reluctant

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, accepted the Japanese surrender at a formal assent of the Russians 76 as

ceremony aboard the United States battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. MacArthur, flanked by Generals Percival and Wainwright, signed the instrument of surrender on behalf of the Allies as a whole; representatives of each Allied country (including Admiral Nimitz for the United States) signed after him. As MacArthur insisted that British troops should

not occupy Singapore or the mainland of Malaya until the

478'

THE LAST PHASE

ceremony was

over, the formal surrender of the Japanese

forces in South-East Asia

had

when Mountbatten accepted

to wait until

September

12,

their submission.

Meanwhile Soviet troops had thrust forward from southern Siberia and the Maritime Provinces in accordance with the plan outlined by Stalin in 1944. By the third week in August Harbin, Changchun and Mukden, the keys to Manchuria, were all in their hands. Vast areas of China were dominated by Communist bands; the future of Korea was, to say the least, uncertain. So far as Chiang Kai-shek's claims and Korean interests were concerned, the Western Allies could scarcely be said to have attained their declared war aims, except insofar as the Chinese Communists might be persuaded to come to terms with Nationalist China and Stalin to honour his pledges. Moreover, at best the Yalta Agreement would leave Stalin with strategic gains which the British and the Americans had been willing to concede to him when his help seemed indispensable, but whose implications were far from reassuring in the light of recent developments in Europe. To the British the Far Eastern war had brought a massive reduction of their influence in Asiatic countries; to the Americans its outcome could not fail to bring huge responsibilities which they had scarcely begun to measure. To the Japanese it had brought disaster redeemed by a well-founded hope that they would not be left to starve. Only, it seemed, to a Russia bruised and bleeding after four years of war in Europe, but triumphant, had war in the Far East yielded clear gains and calculable profits.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX

i

THE TRIPARTITE PACT The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. The definitive text was in English. The gist of the terms was as follows: Article

Japan recognizes the leadership of Germany

1

new order in Europe. Germany and Italy recognize the leadership of Japan in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia. Article 3 The contracting powers agree to co-operate on the foregoing lines. They also agree to give each other and

Italy in establishing a

Article 2

economic and military support in the event of an attack on any of them by a power not already involved

full political,

in the

European war or the Sino-Japanese

Article

4

experts to

dispute.

Implementation of the pact to be discussed by be appointed without delay by the governments

of the contracting powers. Article 5 Nothing in the pact to affect existing relations between the contracting powers and the Soviet Union. Article 6 The pact to remain in force for ten years unless renewed. The pact was accompanied by the following secret understandings between the Japanese Foreign Minister (Yosuke

Matsuoka)

and

(General E.

Ott) :—

1.

(a)

has

the

German Ambassador

in

Tokyo

Whether an attack within the meaning of Article 3 been delivered to be decided by consultation

between all three of the contracting powers. (b) In the event of such an attack on Japan, Germany to give Japan full economic and military assistance. (c) In the meantime, Germany to help Japan to pre480

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

481

pare for such an emergency by giving her "all possible

and material aid". (d) Germany to do everything in her power to promote a friendly understanding between Japan and the Soviet

technical

2.

3.

Union. In the event of war between Japan and Britain, Germany to give all possible assistance to Japan.

mandated islands already in her possession, but to make some return for their final relinquishment by Germany. (b) Germany's other former possessions in the Far East and the Pacific to to revert to Germany at the end of the European war, but Germany then to open negotiations (a)

Japan

to retain the

for their sale to

Japan.

APPENDIX

2

DECEMBER

7-8,

1941

:

THE JAPANESE

TIME-TABLE / The Attacks

The planned

times of the initial attacks were as follows Local Time

Washington

Greenwich

Mean Time Landings in Malaya (Kota Bharu) Air attacks on Pearl

Harbor and Oahu Landings in Siam (Singora and Patani) First air attacks

Initial assault

Kong

on Luzon

on Hong

(about)

Time

5.15 p.m.

12.15 p.m.

(Dec. 8)

(Dec. 7)

7.55 a.m.

5.55 p.m.

(Dec. 7) 12.55 p.m.

12.45 a.m.

(Dec. 7)

(Dec. 7)

(Dec. 7)

2.30 a.m.

7.30 p.m.

2.30 p.m.

(Dec. 8)

(Dec. 7) 10.30 p.m.

5.30 p.m.

6.30

ai.m.

(Dec. 8) 8 a.m (Dec. 8)

(Dec. 7)

(Dec. 7)

(Dec. 7)

midni ght

7

(Dec. 7)

(Dec. 7)

p.m

a conflict of evidence as to the time when the first landings at Kota Bharu were actually made. However, there is reason to believe that Japanese troops were ashore by 1.30 a.m. (local time) at the latest.

There

The

is

air attacks

on Pearl Harbor and Oahu were made

punctually.

At Singora and Patani the

transports were in position

about ten minutes before the time appointed for the initial By 4 a.m. (local time) substantial bodies of troops were ashore. The bombing of the Philippines was delayed by earlymorning fog in Formosa. The first air attacks on Luzon were made about 9.30 a.m. (local time), and were followed landings.

by heavier

attacks

482

some three

to four hours later.

DECEMBER The

7-8, 1941

483

attacks on Hong Kong were made at 8 a.m. At the same time Japanese troops began to

first air

(local time).

cross the frontier.

II The Severance of Diplomatic Relations

Many

of the senior officers of the Japanese Navy were war with the Western powers. Nevertheless they were determined, ifJapan did go to war, to achieve complete surprise at Pearl Harbor. Shigenori Togo, the Foreign Minister, insisted, however, that a reply to the American Note of November 26 must be delivered in Washington before any attack was made. The Japanese Naval Staff did not tell him when the attack was due. At first they suggested that the message should be delivered at 12.30 p.m. on Sunday, December 7 (Washington time). Later, they assured him that 1 p.m. would be quite soon enough. After the event they confessed to Togo that they had "cut it too fine". Thus it was bad luck for Togo that the envoys in Washington were unable to deliver the Japanese Note until 2.30 p.m., more than an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun. Even so, it would seem that he himself was partly to blame, inasmuch as he failed to warn the Embassy well beforehand that the note was to be delivered at the unusual hour of 1 p.m. on a Sunday. With his experience of the work of embassies, he might have been expected to foresee that the staff would have difficulty in translating his long message in good time unless they were told at an early stage that the work was urgent. The British received no intimation from the Japanese that Japan had broken off diplomatic relations with the Western powers until 8 a.m. on December 8 (Tokyo time), reluctant to go to

when

their

Ambassador

in Tokyo,

Sir

Robert Craigie,

received from Togo a copy of the Note delivered in Washington some three and a half hours earlier. This was five hours or more after the initial landings in Malaya. The

American Ambassador, Joseph G. Grew, received a copy

484

APPENDIX

2

of the Note about half an hour earlier. Formal notification that a state of war existed between Japan and their respective countries was given to both ambassadors about 11 a.m. on December 8 by Tokyo time, or approximately 2 a.m. on December 8 by Greenwich Mean Time.

APPENDIX

3

THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR Naval Forces The following were the principal units of the Japanese Combined Fleet in service during the opening stages of the Far Eastern war: BATTLESHIPS * 63,720 tons, 18.1-inch armament, 27 knots Yamato (commissioned December 16, 1941) 38,980 tons, 16-inch armament, 25 knots Nagato

Mutsu 35,400 tons, 14-inch armament, 25 knots

he Hyuga 33,000 tons, 14-inch armament, 23 knots Fuso Yamashiro

32,500 tons, 14-inch armament, 30.5 knots Hiyei

Kirishima

Kongo Haruna

FLEET CARRIERS 36,000-36,600 tons, 63-72 aircraft, 30 knots Akagi Kaga 25,675 tons, 63-72 aircraft, 34 knots Shokaku

485

APPENDIX

486

3

Zuikaku " 18,000-18,500 tons, 63-72 aircraft, 33 knots Soryu

Hiryu

LIGHT FLEET CARRIERS 13,000 tons, 31 aircraft, 26 knots Zuiho Shoho (completed January 1942) 8,500 tons, 31 aircraft, 31 knots Ryujo 7,470 tons, 21 aircraft, 25 knots Hosho heavy cruisers (8-inch armament): 18 light cruisers (5.5-inch armament): 18 destroyers: 113 submarines: 63 seaplane carriers (up to 30 seaplanes) 6 :

For administrative purposes the ships and aircraft of the Combined Fleet were organized in seven formations known 55 For operational purposes they were organized as "fleets in task forces whose number and composition varied from time to time. The following table shows the composition of the principal task forces formed in December 1941 MAIN BODY .

1st Battle

Squadron

Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu 2nd Battle Squadron Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Tamashiro 9th Cruiser Squadron

Two

light cruisers, eight destroyers

One seaplane carrier (30 seaplanes) striking force (Vice- Admiral C. Nagumo) 3rd Battle Squadron (1st Division) Hiyei, Kirishima

Carrier Squadron Kaga (about 140 aircraft) 2nd Carrier Squadron Soryu, Hiryu (about 140 aircraft) 1st

Akagi,

JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

487

5th Carrier Squadron Skokaku, £uikaku (about 140 aircraft) 8th Cruiser Squadron

Two 1st

heavy

cruisers

Destroyer Flotilla

One

light cruiser, sixteen destroyers

southern forge (Vice-Admiral N. Kondo) 3rd Battle Squadron (2nd Division) Kongo, Haruna

4th Carrier Squadron Ryujo, Shoho (when completed) (62 aircraft) 4th, 5th, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons Eleven heavy cruisers 16th Cruiser Squadron

One heavy

cruiser,

two

light cruisers

2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Destroyer Flotillas

Four

light cruisers, fifty-four destroyers

'4th, 5th

Two

and 6th Submarine

Flotillas

light cruisers, eighteen submarines,

one depot

ship

Two

seaplane carriers (about 55 seaplanes)

Three seaplane tenders (about 45 seaplanes) south seas forge (Vice- Admiral S. Inouye) 6th Cruiser Squadron Four heavy cruisers 18th Cruiser Squadron

Two

light cruisers

6th Destroyer Flotilla One light cruiser, twelve destroyers 7th Submarine Flotilla Sixteen submarines

One

light cruiser

northern forge (Vice-Admiral 21st Cruiser

Two

B.

Hosogaya)

Squadron

light cruisers

submarine fleet (Vice- Admiral Shimizu) 1st, 2nd and 3rd Submarine Flotillas Twenty-nine submarines

One

light cruiser

488

APPENDIX

3

ATTACHED TO COMBINED FLEET FOR TRAINING 3rd Carrier Squadron

The

Hosko, £uiho (52 aircraft) aircraft of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th

and 5th Carrier

Squadrons constituted the First Air Fleet. The only other major air formations at the navy's disposal were the Eleventh Air Fleet (21st, 22nd and 23rd Air Flotillas)

and the 24th Air

The Eleventh Air

Flotilla.

was based in Formosa and southern Indo-China. Its five hundred aircraft were all land-based in the sense that they were not carrier-borne, Fleet

but they included a small number of flying boats. The 24th Air Flotilla, based in the mandated islands, numbered about sixty aircraft. Naval air units not organized in major formations included about two hundred shipborne aircraft carried in warships, seaplane carriers, seaplane tenders, and other

which did not form part of the main carrier force; roughly the same number of shore-based seaplanes and flying boats for seaward reconnaissance; and units serving

vessels

with the

home

defence forces in Japan. The duties assigned to the naval task forces and major naval air formations were

main body:

To

give general naval cover.

To

deliver surprise attack on the United and its base; to forestall counter-attacks by attacking airfields on Oahu. southern forge To provide transport, cover and support for southward drive by land forces under Southern Area Army. south seas forge: To capture Guam, Wake, and objectives in the Gilbert Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea by disembarking naval landing parties supplemented by one augmented regiment from 55th Division. northern forge To guard the Japanese homeland and

striking forge:

States Pacific Fleet

:

:

adjacent waters.

submarine fleet: To reconnoitre the approaches to Pearl Harbor, send midget submarines into the harbour, and

JAPANESE

ARMED FORCES

engage any American warships attempting to leave the air attacks. first air fleet

:

To

Combined

serve with the

489 after

Fleet,

as

detailed above.

eleventh air fleet To support operations by Southern Force and land forces under Southern Area Army. 24th air flotilla: To serve with South Seas Force. :

Land Forces and Army Air Force The major

formations of the Japanese land forces (other than training or holding formations) on the eve of the Far Eastern war comprised fifty-one divisions disposed as follows

Japan Korea Manchuria North China Central China South China

5 2 13

10 11

4

Indo-China

2

Formosa and Okinawa Hainan Island

3 1

51

As

it

was not considered

safe to

make any

substantial

reduction in the strength of the land forces in Japan, Korea, Manchuria or the greater part of China, only eleven divisions were available for the offensive plan. The following table shows how these were allotted to commands responsible for carrying out the plan: Twenty-Third Army (South China) 38th Division southern area army (HQ Saigon) Fourteenth Army (Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, Palau) 16th Division 48th Division

APPENDIX

490

Fifteenth

Army

3

(Indo- China)

33rd Division 55th Division

(less one regiment to South Seas) Sixteenth Army (Formosa and Palau) 2nd Division Twenty-Fifth Army (Indo-China, Hainan, Canton) Imperial Guards Division 5 th Division 18th Division 56th Division

Area Army Reserve 21st Division

In principle, each division consisted of some 18,000 officers and other ranks organized, as a rule, in three infantry regiments, each of three battalions; one field artillery regiment; one engineer regiment; and one transport regiment, with the addition of medical and signals units.

The air forces at the direct disposal of the Japanese Army were organized in air squadrons, air regiments, air brigades, and air divisions. First-line establishments were as follows

Bomber

or reconnaissance

squadron

9 to 12 aircraft

Fighter squadron

Air regiment (three squadrons) Air brigade (three or four regiments)

16 aircraft

27 to 48 aircraft

90 to 120 aircraft

Air division (two or three brigades)

275 to 350 aircraft

Of the five air divisions formed by 1941, two were assigned to the offensive plan, leaving three to carry out defensive tasks in Japan, Manchuria and elsewhere. These two divisions were allotted to the Fourteenth Army (5th Air Division) and the Twenty-Fifth Army (3rd Air Division). The

tasks assigned to the various armies

ations were:

and

air

form-

JAPANESE

ARMED FORCES

491

twenty-third army: To capture Hong Kong with 38th Division and attached troops, supported by some eightyaircraft comprising one light bomber regiment, one reconnaissance squadron, one fighter squadron, and eighteen heavy bombers detached from 5th Air Division.

southern area army To co-ordinate and supervise operations by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Twenty-Fifth Armies, and to be responsible for internal :

security in Indo-China.

fourteenth army: To capture the Philippines with 16th and 48th Divisions, augmented by one independent brigade and one infantry regiment (not brigaded) with supporting troops. Naval support and cover to be provided by elements of Southern Force; air support and preliminary air attacks by Eleventh Air Fleet (less 22nd Air Flotilla) and 5th Air Division.

fifteenth army To occupy Siam, seize airfields on isthmus of Kra, and invade southern Burma with 33rd Division and 55th Division less one regiment. Air support to be provided by 5th Air Division after capture of Manila by Fourteenth Army. sixteenth army: To occupy Dutch Borneo, Celebes, Amboina, Timor, Java and southern Sumatra with 38th Division (to move from Twenty-Third Army after capture of Hong Kong); 48th Division (to move from Fourteenth Army after capture of Manila); and one infantry regiment with supporting troops (to move from Fourteenth Army after capture of Davao and Jolo). These troops to be supplemented by naval landing parties. Naval and air support to be provided by elements of Southern Force and Eleventh Air Fleet, reinforced by elements of Striking Force (including elements of First Air Fleet) twenty-fifth army: To invade Malaya and capture Singapore, British Borneo and northern Sumatra with Imperial Guards Division and 5th, 18th and 56th Divisions. Naval support to be provided by elements of Southern Force; air support by 3rd Air Division and 22nd Air :

Flotilla.

APPENDIX

4

THE SEXTANT PROGRAMME The Sextant

Conference, attended not only by representand the United States but also by a Chinese delegation headed by Chiang Kai-shek, opened in Cairo on November 22, 1943. Meetings were held daily from that date until November 26. The British and American representatives then left to meet the Russians at Teheran, where Stalin followed up an earlier disclosure to Cordell Hull by announcing at a plenary session that Russia would join the Western Allies against Japan when the war with Germany was over. Formal discussions in Cairo were resumed on December 3, and on December 7 the Sextant Conference broke up. At the last plenary meeting in Cairo on December 6, the President and the Prime Minister accepted and initialled a "final report" prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This was founded on the axiom that the overriding purpose of the Western Allies was still to bring about the unconditional surrender of Germany at the earliest possible date, but that meanwhile unremitting pressure on Japan should be "maintained and extended". As no one knew when the war with Germany would end or just what form Russian participation in the Far Eastern war might take, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to frame a comprehensive programme for the defeat of Japan. But they put forward, as a basis for further investigation, the following outline plan: 1. The main effort in 1944 to consist of an advance by way of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to the Japanese mandated islands, and a simultaneous advance by way of New atives of Britain

492

THE SEXTANT PROGRAMME

493

Guinea and the Netherlands East Indies towards the Philippines. These to be completed in time for the launching of "a major assault in the Formosa-Luzon-China area" in the spring of 1945.

Operations in the Northern Pacific, the South Pacific, China and south-east Asia to subserve operations in the Central and South- West Pacific. 3. The British to retain in the Indian Ocean naval forces sufficient only to deter the Japanese. All other available units of the Royal Navy, "as far as they could be supported and profitably employed", to be concentrated in the 2.

Pacific. 4.

As soon

as possible after the defeat of

British divisions to

move

Germany, four

to Australia for service in the

Pacific. 5.

The (a)

following specific measures to be taken in 1944:

In the North Pacific, preparations to be made for bombing of northern Japan and the

the very-long-range -Kurile Islands.

(b) in the Central Pacific, the mandated islands to be captured and very-long-range bombing of the Japanese homeland to be undertaken from Guam, Tinian and Saipan in the Marianas. (c) In the South and South- West Pacific, the advance along the New Guinea-Netherlands East Indies-Philippines axis to be continued, the bombing of objectives in the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines to be intensified, and Rabaul to be "neutralized". (d) In China, Chinese land and air forces and Amercan air forces to be built up with a view to land and air operations in and from China; advanced airfields to be established in the Chengtu area (200 miles north-west of Chungking) so as to permit attacks by very-long-range bombers on objectives in the Japanese homeland, Manchuria, Japanese Sakhalin and Formosa. (e) In south-east Asia, upper Burma to be captured in the spring of 1944 with a view to the improvement of the air route to China and the reopening of land communications; bases for the very-long-range-bombers

494

APPENDIX

4

operating from the Chengtu area to be established near Calcutta.

The Combined

recommended, and the President and the Prime Minister agreed, that "major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal" should be delayed until after the 1944 monsoon, and that landing craft which were to have been used in south-east Asia should be diverted to the European theatre. "Naval carrier and Chiefs

also

amphibious raiding operations" were, however, to be carried out in conjunction with operations in upper Burma, and air attacks were to be made on the Bankgok-Burma railway and the harbour at Bangkok. Alternatively, the capture of upper Burma and accompanying operations in the Bay of Bengal might be postponed in favour of a bigger air lift to China and accelerated preparations for the reception of very-long-range bombers.

SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY Amrine, Michael, The Great Decision, London, 1960. Avon, The Earl of, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators, London, 1962. Beamish, John, Burma Drop, London, 1958. Behrens, (Miss) G. B. A., Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, London, 1955. Beloff,

Max, The

Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, 2 vols.,

London, 1947-1949. Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951, London, 1953. Bundy, Mc. G., See Stimson, H. L. Butler, (Sir) J. R. M., Grand Strategy Volume II, London, 1957. Grand Strategy Volume III, Part II, London, 1964. Butow, R.J. C, Japan'\s Decision to Surrender, Stanford, California, 1954. Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, London, 1947.

Chennault, C. L., The Churchill,

Winston

of a Fighter, New York, 1949. The Second World War, 6 vols., London, 1948-

Way

S.,

1954.

Clark, R. W., The Birth of the Bomb, London, 1961. Coakley, R. W., See Leighton, R. M. Craigie, Sir R., Behind the Japanese Mask, London, 1946. Crosby, Sir J., Siam : the Crossroads, London, 1945. Crowl, Philip A., The Campaign in the Marianas, Washington, 1960. (with Edmund G. Love) Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls,

Washington, 1955. Dallin, D. J., Soviet Russia' s Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, The Rise of Russia in Asia, London, 1950.

New Haven,

J. R., The Strange Alliance, London, 1947. Dexter, David, The New Guinea Offensives, Canberra, 1961. Dirksen, H. von, Moscow, Tokyo, London, London, 1951. Ehrman, John, Grand Strategy Volume V, London, 1956. Grand Strategy Volume VI, London, 1956.

Deane,

Eichelberger,. R. L., Our Jungle

Road

to

Tokyo,

New York,

1950.

Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, 1947. Feis, H., The Road to Pearl Harbor, Princeton, 1950.

The China Tangle, Princeton, 1953. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Princeton, 1957.

Japan Subdued

:

the

Atomic Bomb, Princeton, 1961.

495

1942.

SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

496

Fergusson, Bernard, Beyond

Grew,

C, Ten

the

Chindwin, London, 1945.

London, 1944. J. Groueff, Stephane, Manhattan Project, London, 1967. Tears in Japan,

Now

Can Be Told, London, 1963. I, London, 1964. Hassell, Ulrich von. The Von Hassell Diaries, London, 1948. Holt, Edgar, The Opium Wars in China, London, 1964. Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols., London, 1948. Jones, F. C, Shanghai and Tientsin, London, 1940. Manchuria since 1931, London, 1949. Japan's New Order in East Asia, London, 1954. Jungk, Robert, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, London, 1958. Kase, T., Eclipse of the Rising Sun, London, 1951. Kato, M., The Lost War, New York, 1946. Kennedy, M. D., The Problem of Japan, London, 1935. Kenney, George C, General Kenney Reports, New York, 1949. Kirby, Major-General S. W., The War against Japan, Vols, i to iv, London, 1957-1965. Leahy, Fleet Admiral W. D., / Was There, New York, 1950. Leighton, R. M., and Coakley, R. W., Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, Washington, 1955. Lord, Walter, Day of Infamy, London, 1957. Love, Edmund G., See Crowl, Philip A. McCarthy, Dudley, South- West Pacific Area, First Tear, Canberra, 1 959. Mackenzie, Compton, Eastern Epic, Volume I, London, 1951. MatlofF, Maurice, and Snell, E. M., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, Washington, 1953. Millis, Walter (Editor), The Forrestal Diaries, London, 1952. Milner, Samuel, Victory in Papua, Washington, 1957. Mook, H. J. van., The Netherlands Indies and Japan : Their Relations, 1940-1941, London, 1944. Moore, F., With Japan's Leaders, London, 1943. Morison, Samuel Eliot, The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 vols., Boston, 1947-1962. The following volumes refer: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (iii) Groves, Lt-Gen. Leslie R.,

Gwyer,

J.

M.

Coral

It

A., Grand Strategy Volume III, Part

Sea,

1942

Midway and Submarine

Actions,

May

1942-August

{iv)

The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 (v) the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (vi) Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 (vii) New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944 (viii)

Breaking

June 1944-January 1945 (xii) The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao,

Leyte,

1944-1945

(xiii)

Victory in the Pacific,

1945

(xiv)

the

Visayas,

SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

497

Supplement and General Index, (xv) The Two-Ocean War, Boston, 1963. Morton, Louis, The Fall of the Philippines, Washington, 1953. Percival, Lt-Gen. A. E., The War in Malaya, London, 1949. Postan, M. M., British War Production, London, 1952. Pratt, Sir. J. T., War and Politics in China, London, 1943. Reel, F., The Case of General Tamashita, Chicago, 1949. Rentz, John N., Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, Washington, 1948. Marines in the Central Solomons, Washington, 1952. Roosevelt, Elliott, As He Saw It, New York, 1946. Roskill, Captain S. W., The War at Sea, 3 vols., 4 parts, London, 1956-

1961.

The Navy at War, 1939-1945, London, 1960. Sansom, (Sir) G. B., The Western World and Japan, London, 1950. Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 4 vols., London, 1926-1928.

Sherwood, R. E., The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 2 vols., London, 1949. Slim, Field-Marshal Sir William, Defeat into Victory, London, 1956. Smith, R. R., The Approach to the Philippines, Washington, 1953. Snell, E. M., See Matloff, Maurice. Stettinius, Edward R., Roosevelt and the Russians, New York, 1950. Stimson, H. L., and Bundy, McG., On Active Service in Peace and War,

London, 1948.

Truman, Harry

S.,

Tsuji, (Colonel)

Tear of Decisions, 1945,

Masanobu,

Singapore

:

New

the

York, 1955.

Japanese Version, London,

1962.

Weizsacker, E. von, The Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker, London, 1951. Welles, Sumner, Seven Major Decisions, London, 1951.

Werth, Alexander, Russia

Wigmore,

Willoughby, C. A.,

Woodward,

Wu,

at

War, 1941-1945, London, 1964.

Lionel, The Japanese Thrust, Canberra, 1957. (Sir)

Sorge, Soviet

Master Spy, London, 1952.

E. L., British Foreign Policy during

War, London, 1962. A. K., China and the

Soviet Union, London, 1950. Yanaga, C, Japan Since Perry, New York, 1949. Young, G. M., Stanley Baldwin, London, 1952.

the

Second World

SOURCE NOTES Seeds of Conflict

1. 1.

Sansom,

2.

and Japan, 21, 138. Holt, The Opium Wars

The

Western

World in

China, 102.

6.

Jones, 23.

7.

ibid.,

22.

8.

ibid.,

24-25.

9.

ibid.,

25.

10.

Evidence of General Chin Teh-chun, cited by Jones, 32 and fn. 2.

3.

Sansom,

4.

ibid.,

5.

ibid., loc. cit.

6.

ibid.,

244.

13. ibid., 31 (fn. 2).

7.

ibid.,

246.

14. ibid., 31 (fn. 3).

8.

ibid.,

280.

15.

105-106, cit., op. 115-116, 124, 174. 213.

11. Jones, 28. 12. ibid., 31.

ibid.,

30.

16. ibid., 32.

1.

Decline of the West Seymour, The Intimate Papers

2.

of Colonel House, ii, 3 1 6-3 1 7. Kir by, The War against Japan,

2.

17. ibid., 33. 18.

ibid., loc. cit

19. ibid., 17-18, 34, 64,

65-70

20. ibid., 34. 21. #x7/., 33 (fn. 6).

i,3.

New

Order in

3.

Jones, Japan's East Asia, 5.

4.

ibid., loc. cit.

International Affairs, 1937,

5.

Kir by,

187-8).

6.

Jones,

7.

Avon,

523-524. Kirby, i, 11.

the

8. 9.

Jones, 15.

the Twenty-Ninth was forced to open

10.

22. ibid., 35.

23. ibid.,

op. cit., 9. op. cit.,

10-11.

Facing

the

24. Dictators,

ibid., loc. cit.

Jones,

9.

26-27. 20-21. 21-22.

ibid., 4,

3.

ibid.,

4. 5.

Avon,

op. cit.,

W.F.E.

— 17

of i,

For example, Lord Avon, who was Foreign Secretary at

had 1.

Survey

time,

the

describes

Army fire

on

the Japanese because they

The Undeclared War

2.

(citing

Chinese as explaining that

11. ibid., 15-16.

3.

36

524; Jones, 23.

launched

"a

full-

scale assault with artillery

adjacent to the Marco Polo bridge". (Avon, 531.) This seems to have struck him as a more credible account of the Marco Polo

499

NOTES

500

to pp.

37-58

bridge affair than the one given by the Japanese. But the only episode near the bridge which could be described as a "full-scale assault" was the attack made by a Japanese batallegedly

talion,

in

self-

on July 9. If the Chinese were referring

41. Jones, 47-48; Chennault,

42. Jones, 49, 173; Wu, China and the Soviet Union, 268.

Wu,

43. Jones, 174;

45.

ibid.,

56.

Behind

46. Graigie,

48.

ibid., loc. cit.

49.

ibid.,

Ninth Army fired at a Japanese company on the

52. ibid., 74, 89 (fn. 2).

night of July 7. Whether the Japanese manoeuvres

54. ibid., 175.

52.

50. ibid., 62. 51. ibid., 64, 83-84.

53. ibid.,

89 (and

fn. 4).

55. ibid., 209. 56. ibid., 176. 57. ibid., 58.

Wu,

loc. cit.;

Wu,

59. Jones, 80, 84-85. 60. ibid., 75-79. 61. ibid., 138, 139.

28. ibid.,

62. ibid., 138, 147.

29. ibid., 38 (fn. 4).

63. ibid., 139.

30. ibid., 62-63.

64. Kirby,

31. Chennault, Fighter,

The 41-42.

Way

of a

20.

i,

65. Jones, 149. 66.

Text of declaration in Jones, 150

32. Jones, 41 (fn. 2).

(fn. 3).

Chennault, loc. cit. 34. Jones, 45-46, 47.

67. Jones, 152.

35. ibid., 46.

69. Jones,

33.

68.

36. ibid., 47. 37. Jones,

Shanghai and Tientsin, Order in

47

War,

at

9.

Werth,

181. Cf.

Mew

Order in East

7,

9,

New

(and

fn. 2).

71. ibid., 184, 185 (fn. 2).

Werth, 46, 94,

135, 990, 998. 73.

Jones 185 (and

fn. 2).

74. ibid., 185.

75. ibid., 185-186, 189 (andfn. 1).

(fn. 2).

39. Jones, Japan's

70. Jones, 184

72. ibid., 184. Cf.

Evidence of Admiral Isamu Takeda, cited by Jones, Asia,

Werth, Russia 135.

59; Japan's New East Asia, 47.

Japan's

270.

269.

27. ibid., 38. loc. cit.

Japanese

47. Jones, 60.

contradicted the Japanese account nor refuted the charge that the Twenty-

another question. 25. Jones, 30 (fn. 2), 31 (fn. 2), 36. 26. ibid., 36-37.

Order in

East Asia, 46. 40.

the

Mask, 50-51.

to that, their story neither

fire is

38.

269.

44. Jones, 49.

defence,

on July 7 were intended to goad the Chinese to open

41-

42.

Evidence of Admiral Isamu Takeda, cited by Jones, op. cit., 47 (fn. 3).

4.

Japan,

the

Rome-Berlin Axis and

Western Democracies. Jones, Japan's New Order in the

1.

East Asia,

1

15.

NOTES 2.

ibid., loc. cit.

3.

Grew,

Ten 245-6.

Tears

Japan,

in

to pp.

58-94

501

4.

ibid.,

264.

5.

ibid.,

6.

ibid.,

265 (and fn. 3). 286-287; Kirby,

i,

74.

4.

Jones, 122.

7.

5.

ibid., loc. cit.

8.

Jones, 279. Churchill, The Second World

6.

ibid.,

7.

Hull, Memoirs,

9.

Jones, 282, 287

8.

Jones, 123.

9.

ibid.,

10.

War,

123. i,

631.

op. cit,

269.

11.

182.

ibid.,

13. ibid.,

loc. cit.

15. Hull,

15.

199

16. Jones, 292.

(fn. 1). cit.

17. ibid.,

17. ibid.,

loc. cit.

18. ibid.,

18.

Memoirs,

202.

19. ibid., 300.

20. ibid., 299.

20. ibid., 211.

21. ibid., 301.

21. #uf., 212.

22. ibid., 304.

23. Hull, Memoirs,

22. ibid., 215.

228

23.

ember

i, 58 ; Jones, 247 (and fn. 4). 27. Kirby, i, 61-63; Jones, loc. cit; Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, iii ( The Rising Sun

26. Kirby,

28. Jones, 258.

Jones, 309. 27. ibid., 313. 28. ibid., 312. 29. ibid., 314. 30. Hull, Memoirs,

481. i,

43,

259

2. 3.

1073. i,

88.

34.

Morison, The Two-Ocean War,

35. ibid., 51.

(fn. 2).

36. ibid., 49.

loc. cit.

Kirby,

i,

i,

66-67.

63-64.

Breakdown Jones, 263 (and i,

ii,

33. ibid., 319.

238-246; Kirby,

37. ibid., 53. 38. Lord,

Day of Infamy,

39. Jones,

1.

NovText in

32. Jones, 318.

33. ibid., 260; Kirby,

5.

1941.

52.

31. Jones,

34.

25,

26. Jones, 310.

60.

32. ibid.,

1070.

31. Jones, 317; Kirby,

in the Pacific), 55.

i,

ii,

25. Churchill to Roosevelt,

25. ibid., 167.

30. Jones,

1033.

24. Jones, 309-310, 312.

(fn. 2).

24. ibid., 165-166.

29. Kirby,

ii,

293 (fn. 1). 297-298.

19. ibid., 205.

ibid.,

283

285-286.

14. ibid.,

16. ibid., loc.

4);

14. ibid., 289.

13. ibid., 195.

ibid.,

fn.

12. ibid., 284.

11. Jones, 28. 12.

(fn. 3).

282 (and (and fn. 1). ibid., 283-284.

10. ibid.,

156.

Grew,

522.

ii,

320

(fn. 3).

40. ibid., 323. fn. 2)

;

Kirby,

64, 66.

Jones, 264; Kirby, Jones, 263.

i,

70.

6. 1.

War

Plans

Kirby,

i,

64.

1

74.

NOTES

502

to pp.

94-125

2.

Kirby,

3.

ibid., loc. cit.

4.

Figure

5.

Morison, The Two- Ocean War,

6.

ibid.,

7.

ibid., 18.

90.

i,

from Lord, Day of

Infamy, 219. 17.

8.

ibid.,

78.

ibid.,

79.

ibid.,

77.

42.

ibid.,

163.

43. ibid., 78, 181.

44.

ibid.,

170.

45.

ibid.,

56-57.

46.

ibid.,

81.

34, 35 (fn. 55-56, 61-63.

22.

9.

41.

47. ibid.,

loc. cit.

11.

ibid.,

79.

12.

Roskill, The

52-53,

Philippines,

the

Guam and Wake 1

War at Sea,

561 Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 156-157.

.

Morison, The Rising Sun

2.

ibid.,

were

Roskill,

Morison, Rising Sun, 158-160. 124.

According

93.

to

some

accounts only two seaplanes

562.

13.

in the

92-93.

Pacific,

i,

14.

i,

Harbor,

Pearl

7.

10. ibid.,

1),

sent.

97.

3.

ibid.,

4.

ibid., loc. cit.

15.

ibid.,

16.

Lord, 44-45.

5.

ibid.,

122, 136.

17.

ibid., 7.

6.

ibid.,

138.

18.

Morison, Rising Sun, 57. i, 560; Morison,

7.

Morison, The Two-Ocean War,

8.

Morison,

19. Roskill,

Rising Sun, 58. 20. Morison, The

50.

27. 28. 29. 30.

11. ibid., 139.

The Two-Ocean War, 49 (fn. 3). ibid., 73; Lord, 8. Morison, Rising Sun, 132-133. Lord, 8. Morison, Rising Sun, 133. The Two-Ocean War, 50; Rising Sun, 133.

12. ibid., 124.

13. ibid., 98, 126,

14.

15. 16.

31. Rising Sun, 123-124. 18.

War at Sea,

34. ibid., 555-557. 35. Kirby,

i,

7.

36. ibid., 35. 37. ibid., 48-49.

i,

555.

209-214; Lord,

220.

17.

32. Lord, 44. 33. Roskill, The

Morison, Rising Sun, 100, 125.

10. ibid., 100, 122.

loc. cit.

24. Morison, Rising Sun, 129, 130. 26.

19.

Lord, 220; Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 67. Lord, 181. Morison, Rising Sun, 210-213. 168-169; ibid., The TwoOcean War, 80. The Two-Ocean War, 80. ibid., 80-81.

20. Rising Sun, 170. 21. ibid., 166; Kirby, 22. Rising Sun, i,

i,

101.

23. Rising Sun, 169-170.

39. ibid., 162-163, 511.

24. ibid.,

ibid.,

51.

101.

169-170; Kirby,

38. ibid., 54.

40.

137

125. 9.

23. ibid., 128-129.

25.

Sun,

;

38.

21. Morison, Rising Sun, 128. 22. ibid.,

Rising

(map) Lord, Day of Infamy,

Two-Ocean War,

170 (and fn. 11); The Two-Ocean War, 81.

NOTES 25.

The Two-Ocean War, 82.

26. ibid.,

27. Rising Sun, 171.

ibid.,

183.

20. ibid.,

loc. cit.

28. ibid.,

loc. cit.

21. ibid.,

loc. cit.

29. ibid.,

loc. cit.

22.

183. 203.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34. 35.

36. 37.

War, 82; Rising Sun, 171-172. Rising Sun, 173; The TwoOcean War, 82. Rising Sun, 184-186. ibid., 200-203. ibid., 203-204. ibid., 228-229. ibid., 227-228. ibid., 230-231.

The

Two-Ocean

ibid.,

23. ibid., 184. 24. ibid., 184, 186. 25. ibid., 184-185. 26. ibid., 185. 27. ibid.,

loc. cit.

28. ibid., 47, 57, 163-167, 211.

29. ibid., 185, 211. 30. ibid., 203, 204. 31. ibid., 204-206. 32. ibid., 206.

38. ibid., 232.

33. ibid., 189.

39. ibid., 227.

34. ibid.,

loc. cit.

40.

ibid.,

237-240.

35. ibid., 192.

41.

ibid.,

251.

36.

42.

ibid.,

247.

37. ibid., 190-191.

43.

ibid.,

248.

38. ibid.,

44.

ibid.,

253.

45.

ibid.,

251.

46.

ibid., loc. cit.

8.

192, 201.

39. Kirby,

i, i,

195; Roskill, i, 565.

ibid., loc. cit.

3.

ibid.,

173.

47.

ibid.,

4.

ibid.,

173, 174.

48.

ibid.,

5.

Jones, Japan's Mew Order in East Asia, 322.

6. 7.

Kirby, i, 175. ibid., 174-175;

8.

ibid.,

9.

ibid., loc. cit.

180.

11.

ibid.,

cit.

108-181.

12. ibid., 181. 13. ibid.,

181-182.

14.

182.

ibid.,

15. ibid., loc. 16.

cit.

ibid., loc. cit.

17. ibid., loc.

cit.

i,

564.

193.

i,

564.

43. Roskill,

2.

80.

194; Roskill,

loc. cit.

ibid.,

The

564.

41. ibid.,

Kirby,

i,

i,

42.

44. Kirby,

Borneo

at Sea,

40. Kirby,

1.

10. ibid., loc.

193-194; Roskill,

War

Malaya, Hong Kong and British

503

18. ibid., 184. 19.

loc. cit.

125-157

to pp.

45.

i,

198.

ibid., loc. cit.

46. ibid., 108-109, 111, 127, 143.

81-82, 109-113. 119, 499-500.

49. ibid., 121. 50. ibid., 122. 51. ibid., 123.

cf.

Jones, 322.

52. ibid., 122-123. 53. ibid., 149

(and

fn. 2).

54. ibid., 134-135, 149. 55. ibid., 132. 56. ibid.,

loc. cit.

57. ibid., 144.

58. ibid., 222. 59. ibid., 224. 60. ibid.,

loc. cit.

61. ibid., 224.

62. ibid., 225.

NOTES

504 9.

to pp. 160-221

Northern and Central Malaya

11.

Kirby,

306.

i,

1.

Kirby,

2.

ibid.,

204.

13. ibid.,

3.

ibid.,

204-206.

14. ibid.,

4.

ibid.,

206.

15. ibid., 339.

5.

ibid.,

207.

16. ibid., 340.

6.

ibid., loc. cit.

17. ibid., 337.

7.

ibid., loc. cit.

18.

8.

ibid.,

9.

ibid., loc. cit.

203.

i,

12. ibid., 316.

208.

ibid.,

320-321. 328-329.

350.

19. ibid., 362.

20. #m/., 363.

10. ibid., 209.

21. ibid., 371.

207, 212. 12. tft£, 209.

22.

13. ibid., loc.

cit.

24. ibid., 382.

ibid., loc. cit.

25. #uf., 388.

11.

14.

ibid.,

15. ibid., loc.

ifo'rf.,

549-550.

23. ibid., 384.

26. ibid., 401.

cit.

409-410.

16.

210.

27.

17. ibid.,

209-210.

28. ibid., 413-414.

18.

210.

29. ibid., 473.

ibid.,

19. ibid., loc.

z'2>zW.,

30. Tsuji, op. cit, 185.

cit.

20. ibid., 215-216. 21. ibid., 216.

11.

22. ibid., 231-233.

1

.

23. ibid., 248.

281.

24.

Japan Completes Her Programme Morison, The Rising Sun in the 271-273; Roskill, Pacific, ii,

6; Kirby,

2.

Kirby,

26. ibid., 278.

3.

ibid.,

27. ibid.,

4. ibid., 348.

276 Deakin)

25. ibid.,

(citing

Colonel

loc. cit.

i,

350.

350, 354, 356, 357, 428, 430, 431, 432, 433. i,

296.

285-290;

28. ibid., 281 (fn. 1).

5.

10. Arcadia to Singapore

6.

Morison, op. cit, Kirby, i, 298. Kirby, i, 297.

7.

ibid.,

8.

10.

352 Morison, op. cit., 307. Morison, 310. Butler, Grand Strategy Volume

11.

Kirby,

1.

Butler, Grand Strategy III, i,

Part II,

Volume 669-672 Kirby, ;

263.

9.

259-260.

2.

Kirby,

3.

ibid.,

4.

6.

Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 272-273 ; Roskill,ii,6. Kirby, i, 265 (fn. 1). ibid., 256-267.

5.

i,

350.

ibid.,

;

III, Part II,

252.

i,

12. ibid., 435.

14.

438; Roskill, Kirby, i, 447. ibid., loc. cit.

13. ibid.,

7.

ibid.,

284.

15.

8.

ibid.,

283.

16. ibid., 448.

9.

ibid.,

304.

17. ibid., 449.

10.

z'foW.,

305; Tsuji, Singapore: Japanese Version, 271.

18.

the

469.

429.

Kirby,

ii,

19. ibid., 10.

12.

ii,

13.

NOTES 20. ibid., 17.

4.

21. ibid., 13-14.

5.

22. ibid.,

221-323

to pp.

Morison, 260; Kirby, Morison, 282.

6.

ibid.,

264.

23. ibid., 25.

7.

ibid.,

281-282.

24. ibid., 30.

8.

ibid.,

292.

25. ibid.,

loc. cit.

9.

Morison,

26. ibid.,

loc. cit.

loc. cit.

28. ibid., 38.

10.

29. ibid., 41-42.

Morison,

442.

11. ibid., 26.

32. ibid., 66.

13. ibid.,

33.

14. ibid., 32.

zfci/., /oc. cit.

16. ibid., 39.

73, 445.

17. ibid., 47.

37. ibid., 80-82.

18. ibid., 50, 53. 19. ibid., 58.

38. ibid., 89, 94. 178.

20. ibid.,

40. ibid., 180, 206-207.

41.

ibid.,

1.

2.

22. Kirby,

ii,

12. Kwajalein

to

24. ibid., 286-287.

Midway

25. ibid., 289. 26. Morison, op. in the

389.

393.

3.

ibid.,

4.

Kirby, ii, 226. Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War

5.

II,

iv

{Coral Sea,

Midway

ibid.,

44.

7.

ibid.,

69.

30. Kirby,

31

.

Roskill, The

10.

War at Sea, ii, 37. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine

13. 1.

2. 3.

ii,

270.

235.

2.

ibid.,

3.

ibid., loc. cit.

237.

4.

ibid.,

5.

ibid.,

247.

6.

ibid.,

248.

7.

ibid.,

Actions, 107.

The Solomons and New Guinea Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, 61. Kirby, ii, 271, 278. Morison, op. cit., 258; Kirby

ii,

284. op. cit.,

322, 334, 340,

The Unforgotten Front Kirby, ii, 53.

80.

ibid.,

ii,

Morison, 351.

1.

8.

178.

29. ibid., 300.

14.

9.

cit.,

The War at Sea, 229-231; Kirby, ii, 282. 28. Morison, op. cit., 299. 27. Roskill,

and Submarine Actions), 20. 6.

279.

ii,

23. ibid., 278.

29.

Kirby, ii, 223. Morison, The Rising Sun Pacific,

loc. cit.

21. iWrf., 108.

210.

42. Roskill,

31-32.

15. ibid., 34.

67.

35. ibid., 72.

39.

Chaps.

Struggle for

The Struggle for

12. ibid., 27, 28.

36.

270.

Guadalcanal, 19-27.

31. ibid, 60.

34.

iv,

v {The

ii,

Guadalcanal), 16.

27. ibid., 32.

30.

History,

xii-xiv;

505

143.

250.

8. 9.

ibid.,

245.

10.

ibid.,

256.

11.

Oft, 257.

NOTES

506 12.

Kirby,

to pp.

324-367

265.

ii,

13. ibid., 266.

18.

Kirby,

19.

ibid.,

Ehrman,

381-382.

ii,

381.

14. ibid.,

291-299.

20.

15.

295.

21. Dexter,

v, 139.

18. ibid., 310.

The Mew Guinea 221-222; private communication. 22. Kirby, ii, 374-375, 377.

19. ibid., 312.

23. ibid., 377.

20. ibid., 324, 501.

24. ibid.,

ibid.,

16. ibid., 306. 17.

ibid.,

Offensives,

309-310.

21. ibid., 501.

412; Dexter, 289 and

passim.

22. ibid., 399, 400.

25. Morison, The Two-Ocean War,

23. ibid., 428-434.

279.

24. ibid., 428.

26. Kirby,

25. ibid.,

27.

26.

loc. cit.

Mackenzie, Eastern Epic, i, 403 -404; Kirby, ii, 432; iii, 78.

15. Symbol 1

.

V,

2.

to

Sextant

Ehrman, Grand Strategy Volume 128-129; Sherwood, The

White House Papers ofHarry L. Hopkins, ii, 776 and passim. Ehrman, op. cit., 127-128.

General Chennault has told his own story in The Way of 3.

Ehrman, ibid.,

125.

5.

ibid.,

30.

6.

Kirby,

7.

ibid.,

8.

9.

128.

297.

ii,

376; Morison, The TwoOcean War, 272-273. Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, 10-11.

Morison, The Two-Ocean War,

271; History, vii {Aleutians, Gilbert and Marshalls), 23ff. 10. Dexter, op. cit., 7-9; Kirby, ii,

Kirby, ii, 420; Ehrman, v, 151-152. 29. Kirby, ii, 422. 30. ibid.,

loc. cit.

31. ibid.,

423-424.

32.

Kirby,

368-369.

ii,

12. ibid., 369. 13. ibid.,

Ehrman,

v, 161.

33. ibid., 428-429. 34. Kirby,

Sea,

ii,

36. Kirby,

235 iii,

(Part I

),

;

iii

85; 234.

The War

at

(Part I) ,342. Roskill,

iii

37. Kirby,

iii, 86; Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 286. 38. Morison, op. cit, 289. 39. Kirby, iii, 87; Roskill, iii

(Part 40. Kirby,

234.

I),

iii,

87.

41. Dexter, 234, 240, 243, 244. 23, 166, 266-269, 273, 281-283. 43. ibid., 377-379. 44. ibid., 318-320, 321 (fn. 7). 45. ibid., 445, 480-481.

42.

ibid.,

47. ibid., 453.

48.

363-364.

14. ibid., 363.

ibid.,

522, 525.

49. ibid., 523, 525. 50. ibid., 529.

15. ibid., 369.

51. ibid., 540.

16. ibid., loc.

52. Kirby,

17.

72-73.

iii,

35. ibid., 98; Roskill,

46. ibid., 447.

377. 11.

v, 151.

28.

a Fighter.

4.

404

ii,

Ehrman,

Ehrman,

cit.

v, 151.

ii, 90-91; Dexter, 438-439, 561, 566.

NOTES 53.

Ehrman,

36. Kirby,

v, 153.

54. ibid., 158-159, 167, 181, 185-

186; Kirby, iii, 58. iii, 55-56.

60-61; Ehrman,

iii,

507

421.

37. ibid., 422.

Our Jungle Tokyo, 113-114.

38. Eichelberger,

55. Kirby, 56. ibid.,

367-417

to pp.

to

v, 192.

39. Kirby,

iii,

Road

422.

40. ibid., 423. 16.

New

Guinea, the Bismark Archi-

pelago and the Pacific Islands 1.

Morison, The Two-Ocean War,

2.

Kirby,

3.

Ehrman, v, 13-1 5; Dexter, 790.

4.

8.

Kirby, iii, 93. Morison, op. cit., 298. Dexter, 655. Kirby, iii, 96. Dexter, 736.

9.

ibid.,

6. 7.

42. Morison, The

iii,

425-426.

44. ibid., 423; Dexter, 806.

381, 409.

ii,

Two-Ocean War,

320. 43. Kirby,

295.

5.

41. Dexter, 805.

17.

Burma Changes Hands

1.

Kirby,

2.

Roskill,

iii,

46.

The War

(Part

I),

at Sea,

3.

ibid., loc. cit.

737.

4.

Kirby,

10. ibid., 792.

5.

ibid., loc. cit.

11. ibid.,

6.

ibid, 48.

12.

7.

ibid.,

8.

Ehrman, Grand Strategy, v,

9.

ibid.,

13. 14.

794-795. Kirby, iii, 105. ibid., 104-105. Dexter, 795.

iii,

47.

58.

192; Kirby,

69-70.

15. ibid., loc.

cit.

10.

Kirby,

16. ibid., loc.

cit.

11.

ibid.,

161, 257.

12.

ibid.,

13.

ibid.,

75-76. 74-75.

17. ibid., 797. 18.

Ehrman,

19. ibid.,

421

450-451.

v,

iii,

14. ibid., 136.

ff.

20. ibid., 451-452.

15.

21. Kirby,

16. ibid., 127.

106.

iii,

22. ibid., 106-107. 23. Roskill,

iii

(Part

24. Morison, The

I),

333.

Two-Ocean War,

312. 25. Roskill,

ibid.,

79.

17.

ibid., loc. cit.

18.

ibid.,

140-141.

19.

ibid.,

149

iii

(Part

I),

335.

The Two-Ocean War,

21. ibid., 145.

22. ibid., 149. 23. ibid., 191-192.

316; Dexter, 801. 27. Dexter, 771.

24. ibid., 194.

28. ibid., 770.

25. ibid., 195.

29.

ibid.,

(fn. 2).

20. ibid., 150.

26. Morison,

689, 696, 704-705.

30. ibid., 738-756.

loc. cit.

27. ibid., 197-198.

28. ibid., 198-199.

31. ibid., 774. 32. ibid., 789; Kirby,

26. ibid.,

iii,

418, 422.

iii

216.

29. ibid., 200.

33. Dexter, 784.

30. ibid., 240.

34. ibid., 787.

31. ibid., 329, 331.

35. ibid., 802.

32. ibid., 362.

iii,

1

65.

59-66.

NOTES

508

33. Kirby,

to pp.

417-458

332.

6.

Jones, 417.

34. ibid., 354.

7.

35. ibid., 372.

8.

Ehrman, Ehrman,

36. ibid., 179.

9.

Werth, Russia

iii,

(and

37. ibid., 186

v, 430.

212.

vi,

38. ibid., 207.

855

10.

Morison, The Two- Ocean War,

11.

Kirby,

39. ibid., 208.

329.

40. ibid., 247. 41. ibid., 280-282.

iii

iii, 427, 432; Roskill, (Part II), 193-194.

42. ibid., 282.

12.

Kirby,

43.

ibid., loc. cit.

13.

ibid., loc. cit.;

44.

ibid.,

45. ibid.,

226, 292. 229.

46.

231.

ibid.,

War,

at

(citing Pravda).

fn. 2).

432.

iii,

Morison,

op. cit.,

330. 14.

Kirby,

434;

iii,

Roskill,

iii

(Part II), 195.

Kirby,

47. ibid., 226.

15.

48. ibid., 295.

Jones, 424. 17. ibid., 425.

435.

iii,

16.

49. tftt, 295 (and fn. 2). 50. ibid., 402.

18.

Ehrman,

51.

19.

Kirby,

20.

Ehrman, v, 514-51 7; Morison

21.

Ehrman,

loc. cit.

52. ibid., 408-409. 53. ibid., 409. 54. ibid.,

op. cit.,

loc. cit.

55. ibid., 412-413. 57. ibid., 393.

58. Kirby, iv, 133. 59. ibid., 58.

423-424. vi, 221-222, 237-

Strange Alliance, 235.

loc. cit

Ehrman,

61. iWrf., 13;

205-206.

64.

245; Roskill, iii (Part II), 329-332, 426-430. 22. Kirby, iv, 66-69; Ehrman, vi, 208-211. 23. Ehrman, vi, 212; Deane, The

56. ibid., 415.

60. zfoW.,

vi,

iv,

v, 517.

24.

Deane,

op. cit.,

248-249.

62. Kirby, iv, 147-148, 193.

25. Kirby, iv, 67-68, 70-71.

63. ibid., 163.

26. ibid., 73.

64. ibid., 164, 169.

27. ibid.,74.

65. ibid., 272.

28. ibid., 75.

66. ibid., 312.

29. ibid.,

67. ibid., 390.

30. ibid., 76;

68. ibid., 397.

Ocean War, 454. 31. Kirby, iv, 76.

Destination Tokyo 1.

Roosevelt

2.

Saw It, passim. Ehrman, v, 429;

32. ibid.,

(Elliott),

Ay

/&

212, 218. Jones, Japan s New Order in East Asia, 416.

4. ibid., loc. 5.

ii,

78;

Morison,

op.

79; Roskill, (Part II), 223.

34. Roskill,

loc. cit.;

1.

The Last Phase Kirby, iv, 71.

2.

ibid.,

19.

cit.

415; Hull, Memoirs, 1263-1284.

ibid.,

Morison, The Two-

454-455. 33. Kirby, iv,

vi,

1

3.

loc. cit.

85.

Kirby,

cit.,

iii

iv, 80.

NOTES 3.

ibid.,

231.

4.

ibid.,

231

5.

ibid.,

6.

39. ibid., 261, 262. ibid.,

261.

91.

41.

ibid.,

262.

ibid.,

231-233.

42. ibid., 275.

43. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb,

7.

ibid.,

233.

ibid.,

225.

9.

ibid.,

225, 226.

xiii.

10. Jones, Japan's

44. ibid., 43.

New

Order in

East Asia, 426. .

12.

13.

14.

Kirby, iv, 80. But see Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 479. Ehrman, vi, 215-216. 218; Leahy, /W^j There, 316-362.

Ehrman,

vi, 219; Jones, 478-479.

tit.,

15.

Ehrman,

16.

ibid.,

125-136.

47.

ibid.,

166.

48. ibid. , loc. cit. , quoting Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago. 49. Butler, Grand Strategy

III Part

op.

218.

vi,

45. ibid., 49-51.

46.

vi,

276.

51

Groueff, Manhattan Project, 338.

.

52. ibid., 339. 53. ibid., 343.

18.

433-434. Kirby, iv, 237

54. Clark,

19. ibid., 235.

loc. cit.

op.

cit.,

17-18,

122-

125.

238; Morison,

op.

ciL,

55.

Ehrman,

vi,

275.

56. ibid., 276, 296.

524. 21. Morison,

Volume 625; Ehrman,

Ehrman,

Jones, 433.

ibid.,

II,

50.

17. ibid.,

20.

509

40.

(fn. 1).

8.

1 1

459-477

to pp.

57. ibid., 296-299.

loc. cit.

58. ibid., 277-278.

22. ibid., 536.

59. ibid., 285-288.

23. ibid., 556. 24. ibid., 528.

of the

For detailed studies effects

of the

60.

offensive see

Butow, Japan's

Decision

Surrender,

and

Amrine,

The Great Decision,

97-98.

air

61. ibid., 99, 229-231.

Kase, Eclipse of the Rising Sun. 25. Jones, 430-431. 26. ibid., 431-432.

187 (quoting Byrnes). 63. Ehrman, vi, 292-293. 64. ibid., 305-306.

27. ibid, 433.

65. ibid., 288.

28. ibid., 429.

66. Jones, 441.

29. ibid., 435.

67.

Amrine,

68.

Truman). Ehrman, vi, 296.

to

62. ibid.,

30. ibid., 436. 31. ibid.,

loc. cit.

32. ibid., 437. 33. ibid.,

34.

cit.,

op. cit.,

69. Jones, 442.

loc. cit.

Ehrman,

op.

Truman and

vi,

303.

70. ibid.,

loc. cit.

71. ibid.,

loc. cit.

Ehrman,

35. ibid., 280.

72.

36. ibid.,

73. Jones, 444.

loc. cit.

37. ibid., 304; Millis, Diaries, 86-88.

38.

Ehrman,

vi,

259.

The Forrestal

vi,

311.

74. ibid., 445. 75. ibid., 447-448. 76. ibid., 449.

198 (quoting

INDEX Abda Command,

180, 236, 248 Abe, (J) Vice-Adm. K., 301, 302 Abe, (J) Gen. N. 60, 76 Abelson, P. H., 472

Abyssinia, 321 Adachi, (J) Lt-Gen. H., 295, 377, 384, 387, 390, 393, 394 Adak Island, 262, 270, 341 Adams, John Quincey, 7 Addu Atoll, 239 Admiralty (British), 50, 74, 266, 301, 399; policy in Far East 1941-2, 107, 108 Admiralty Island, 354, 373, 378, 380, 381, 382 Africa, 248, 272, 291, 320, 338, 399; Allied landings in, 301 Ahonwa, 228 Aikyojuku, 24, 27 Ainsworth, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. W. L., 349, 351 Air Ministry (British), and defence of Singapore, 108 Air services via Alma Ata, 48 Chinese, 48; Pan American, 130; Russian, :

;

48 Aitape, 388, 390, 392, 394; airfield, 391 Island, 316, 319, 320, 321, 323, 324, 343, 352, 354, 404

Akyab

Alamein,

El,

'Anakim' Operation, 343, 344, 345

Anami, (J) Lt-Gen. K., 390

Andaman

Islands,

Argentia, 77

Arundel Island, 352, 355 442 Assam, 314, 316, 317, 318, 320, 330, 331, Aslito,

338, 343, 345, 353, 404, 406, 418,

426 Atlantic Ocean, 107, 178, 329, 330, 343 Atomic bomb, 466, 469, 470-7 Attu Island, 262, 270, 341, 342 Auchinleck, (Br) Gen. Sir C, 330, 353 Auktaung, 325 Australian Air Force, see Royal Australian Air Force Australian airfields, 253, 256

Army, 206, 207, 218, 246, 290, 295, 338, 339, 345, 346, 347, 349, 353, 359, 360, 362, 363, 365, 380, 386, 387, 390, 394 Royal Papuan Constabulary, 380-1,

Australian

235, 236, 238 Alexander, (Br) Lt-Col. L. A., 325, 326,

Corps:

327 Allahabad, 317n Alma Ata, 47, 48 Alor Star, 160, 165, 166

510

355,

Antonov, (R) Gen. A., 462 Arakan, 319, 320, 321, 322, 338, 404, 406, 407, 408, 410 412, 414, 429 Arakan Hills, 316 Arawe, 377

Special Forces:

Amchitka, 341 Amoy, 46 Amur River, 462

266,

384

338

Island, 202, 206,

240,

Antipodes, 178, 246

Alaska, 21, 78, 270, 342, 375 Aleutian Islands, 99, 248, 251, 262, 264, 266, 270, 341, 342 Alexander, (Br) Gen. the Hon. Sir H.,

Amboina

95,

367,404

Bena Force, 358, 359 Blackforce, 218

New

Guinea Force, 358, 359 1,

Divisions:

291, 294, 359 3,

358-9

5,

359, 377

6,

291, 294

7,

235-6, 291,293,294, 347,

&

144, 181, 188, 189, 191,

9,

347, 359, 360, 362, 363, 366, 377

359, 360, 366, 384

210

192

INDEX

302, 303, 304; Midway Island, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 319; Ngakyedauk Pass, 412, 413,

Australian Army continued Brigades: 4, 366 15, 359, 16,

Point,

387

293

359 18, 291, 397 17, 339,

20, 361, 362,

363

21, 291, 294, 366, 22, 144, 181,

386

184, 185, 186,

188, 191, 195, 196 24, 362,

25, 291, 26,

366 293

366

27, 144,

182, 184, 185, 186,

359

Australian Government, 17, 235, 346, 449 Australian Navy, see Royal Australian

Navy Axis, Rome-Berlin, 58, 59, 62;

Rome-

Berlin-Tokyo, 62, 63, 65, 70, 76, 338 Ayer Hitam, 185, 186

Ballentine, (Br) Brig. G. C., 191

Banda

Sea, 209 Bandoeng, 216, 218, 219 Bandjermasin, 207 Bangkok, 138, 319, 427 Banka Island, 208, 209 Bantam Bay, 216, 218

L.,

405 Bennett, (Aust) Maj.-Gen. H. G., 144, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 191, 195,

S.,

388

430, 431 Biak Island, 391, 392, 393, 442, 443 Bias, 46 Bihar, 320 Bilin, 226, 228, 229; River, 229, 230 Bishenpur, 417 Bismarck Archipelago, 17, 95, 240, 248, 273, 290, 341, 344, 356, 372, 390; Sea, 291 Black Sea, 46 In Blackburn V.C., {Aust) Brig. A. S., 218 Blackforce, see under Australian

Blarney,

Barbey, {U.S.) Rear-Adm. D. E., 359, 361 Barstow, {Br) Maj.-Gen. A. E., 144, 145 Bataan Peninsula, 128, 130 Batan Island, 125 Batavia, 210, 211, 216, 218

Batjan Bay, 443

Bloody Ridge, 290; Sea,

256, 258, 259, 260, 261; Eastern Solomons, 288; Java Sea. 213,

Khalkan, 215-16; 52; Kolombangara, 351; Kula Gulf,

214,

349-51 Leyte Gulf, 450-6; Lunga ;

N.

Bhamo, 404,

204, 207; Bay,

Cape Esperance, 296; Coral

P.

469 Betio Island, 368, 375, 376

205, 206 Balkans, 64

Battles: of Britain, 59;

Rear-Adm.

Berlin, 53, 58, 82, 332,

Bali Island, 209, 210 103,

(U.S.)

105 Bena Bena, 358 Bena Force, see under Australian Army Bengal, 314, 320, 415 Bengal Bay, 316, 319, 320, 324, 343, 367,

196, 197, 198 Berchtesgaden, 65 Berkey, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. R.

Backhouse, (Br) Brig. E. K. W., 191 Bagge, Widor, 467 Baikal, Lake, 450, 469 Bairoko, 352 Bakri, 182, 184, 185 Bakufu (Shogun's government), 9 102,

191 Bellinger,

42, 361

Balikpapan,

414; Philippine Sea, 445-6, 460; Santa Cruz Islands, 341; Savo Island, 284, 285, 286, 295, 357; Vella Lavella, 355, 356 Batu Anam, 182, 184 Batu Pahat, 181, 182, 185, 186 Bawean Island, 211, 213 Bawli Bazar, 410, 411 Beaufort Bay, 308 Beckwith Smith, (Br) Maj.-Gen. M. B.,

Belgium, 22,31,219

188, 191, 195, 196 29,

511

(Aust)

Gen. Sir

J.,

Army 293, 294,

346, 359, 361 Blandy, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. W. H. P., 465 Bloch, (U.S.) Adm. C. C, 117, 118 Bloody Ridge, 297 (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. H. L., 423 Bode, (U.S.) Capt. H. D., 281, 282, 285 Bogadjim, 359, 367, 384, 387, 390 Bonin Islands, 21, 460 Borneo, 87, 94n, 102, 108, 205, 206, 210; British North, 95, 109, 148, 155, 206; 157, 202; Dutch, 156, Eastern, 202; North, 443, 451; North-West, 291 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 332

Boatman,

INDEX

512

Bougainville Island, 240, 278, 280, 305, 342, 346, 347, 356, 357, 358, 378, 380, 382, 383 Bourke, (Br) Brig. S. J. H., 225 Boxer Risings, 22; Protocol (1901), 33,

39

Brown, (U.S.) Vice-Adm. W., 131, 132, 134 Browning, (U.S.) Capt. M., 269 Brunei Bay, 451 Brunei Protectorate, 155, 156 Brush, (U.S.) Capt. C, 287

Brahmaputra River, 314, 316

'Buccaneer' Operation, 367, 404, 405,

Brereton, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. L. H., 124, 127, 128, 180

406 Buckner, (U.S.) Lt-Gen. S. Buir, Lake, 52 Buitenzorg, 218 Buka Island, 240, 278 Bukit Pelandok, 182, 185 Bulim, 195, 196

Marco

Bridge,

Polo, 34, 35, 38; incident

of, 37, 42; skirmish at, 35, 36 Brisbane, 246, 275 British Air Force, see Royal Air Force

British

Army

British

Solomon

Islands Protectorate

Defence Corps, 347, 349 Hong Kong and Singapore

Royal

Artillery, 148

Hong Kong

Volunteer Defence Corps, 148, 151, 154 Straits Settlement Volunteer Defence Bde, 191, 192 Special Force: Krohcol, 144 Army: Eighth, 319, 338 Divisions 2, 400, 4 1 5, 4 1 15, 407 31, 407 :

Brigades:

1

Malayan

B.,

466

Buna, 276, 290, 291, 293, 294, 295, 338, 346, 352, 358, 360 Buritari, 375, 376

Burma, Central, 223, 229, 235, 323, 431; Northern, 235, 320, 354; Shan States of, 222; Southern, 95, 207, 229, 319, 431; Upper, 316, 324, 331

Burma Road,

47, 49, 67, 69, 178, 221,

236, 316, 318, 321, 430, 431 Burma Units, see under Indian Army

Buthidaung, 321, 323, 408, 411, 413 Butler, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. W. O., 264

Inf.,

144, 191,

Byrnes, J. F., 474

Inf.,

144, 191,

Calcutta, 236, 316n, 404, 405, 426, 427, 450, 459 California, Japanese settlers in, 13

192

2 Malayan 192

7Armd.,

226,

229,

230,

Callaghan, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. D.

235 18 53

Inf., 189,

191

Inf., 181,

184, 185, 186,

191

54

Inf.,

191

55

Inf.,

191

14 L.R.P. (Chindits), 400, 418, 420,

425

16 L.R.P. (Chindits), 221, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234, 238, 400, 418, 420, 421 23 L.R.P. (Chindits), 400, 418 Battalions and Regiments: 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 173, 174, 189

Gordon Highlanders, 189 Middlesex, 154 155th Field, R.A., 174

Government, 50, 235 Navy, see Royal Navy Bromhead, (Br) Maj. R. B. G., 326 Brooke-Popham, (Br) Air Chief Marshal

British

British

Sir R., 109,

111, 136, 137, 138,

139, 140, 141, 142, 169; 222

J.,

301,

304 Calvert, (Br) Maj. J. M., 326, 424 Camranh Bay, 138, 156, 202, 208, 458

Canadian Army Regiment: Winnipeg Grenadiers, 152 Canton, 47, 48

Cape Cambodia, 138 Cape Endaiadere, 293, 294 Cape Esperance, 276, 281, 285,

288, 296,

310

Cape Gloucester, 377, 378 Cape of Good Hope, 5 Caroline Islands, 17, 98, 100, 104, 240, 345, 355, 372, 383, 391; East, 354; West, 449 Carpendale, (Br) Brig. W. St. J., 144, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 170 Carpender, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. C. S., 345,

359 Casablanca, 337 Cates, (U.S.) Col. C. B., 287

Cathay, 5 Cavite, 127, 128

INDEX Celebes, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210,

239 395 459 Ceylon, 211, 239, 266, 317n, 398, 403;

Army, 400 Chadwick, Prof. James, 473 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 22 Chamberlain, Neville, 50 Changchun, 478 Chahar, Northern, 30, 31, 37, 40 Charter, Atlantic, 77, 438 Chekiang, 251 Chengtu, 426, 427, 447, 450, 459 Chennault, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. C. L., 39, 335,338,402 Cheshire V.C., (Br) Gp-Capt. G. L., 476 Chiang Kai-shek, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 81, 83, 84, 85,

86, 155, 178, 179, 180, 221, 229,

238, 251, 316, 324, 335, 336, 338, 343, 367, 368, 400, 404, 405, 406,

407, 421, 422, 423, 429, 430, 431, 439, 462, 463, 469, 478 Chiefs of Staff, American, Joint, 273, 275, 372, 381, 382, 404, 414, 448; British,

108,

137,

138,

140, 222,

226, 246, 318, 319, 320, 330, 343; Combined, 209, 210, 248, 334, 336, 338, 342, 343-4, 354, 373, 398, 405, 406, 412, 414, 429, 448

Chin, (C) Gen. Teh-chun, 35, 38 Chin Hills, 318, 412 China, Air Task Force, see under U.S. Air Forces; Dowager-Empress

of,

13;

Empire of, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 30; Emperor of, 7; Nationalist Govt, of,

30, 31, 32, 38, 39, 42, 45, 48,

60; Nationalists, 30, 32, 47, 84, 86, 318, 335, 336, 438, 478; South, 46 "China incident", 54, 60, 77, 81 China Seas, 5, 178 Chindits, 321, 325, 326, 330, 353, 404,

North Group, 325, 327; South Group, 325, 327; Special Force, 418; Morrisforce, 423, 425 British Army, Indian (see also 418;

Army) Chindwin River, 318, 320, 327, 329, 331, 338, 407, 413, 420, 431

Chinese Army Northern Combat Area

Communist, 47 Nationalist, 47,

48

Chinese Army continued Armies: Yunnan, 422, 429, 430 First, 431 Fifth, 221, 235 Sixth, 221, 235 Twenty-ninth, 31, 34, 43 Divisions: 14, 425 22, 316, 321, 400, 401, 425,

430 425

30, 400,

37, 38 38, 316, 321, 400, 401, 424,

425, 430 50,

Command,

425

87, 41

88,41

C Prov. Tank

Unit, 425 Units under U.S. comd: 319, 321, 404, 1

418, 421, 423, 424, 425, 427, 429

Chinthe, 321 Chittagong, 319, 323 Choiseul Island, 356 Chou En-lai, 32 Christison, (Br) Lt-Gen. A. F.

P., 400,

408, 411,413 Christmas Islands, 95, 144

Chungking, 47, 48, 179, 422, 431

Chuchow, 251 Churchill, Winston S., 77, 81, 84, 85, 108, 178, 319, 330, 338, 344, 345,

352, 353, 438, 449, 462, 463, 468, 472, 473, 474

Ciano, Count, 62 Clemens, (Br) Maj. M., 349 'Climb Mount Niitaka' (codeword), 114 Coates, (Br) Brig. J. B., 191 Cockcroft, Dr. J. D., 469, 471

Cocos Islands, 179 Coleridge,

Samuel Taylor, 46 In

Collins, (Aust)

Collinson, (Br)

Commodore J. A., 211 Commodore A. C, 148,

152, 155

Colombo, 211, 239, 266

Combined

Striking Force (Java), 211,

214,215,216 Communism, Communists,

30, 31, 32, 48, 58, 61, 81, 336, 431, 478 Conferences: Arcadia, 178; Cairo (Sextant),

367, 404, 405, 412, 462,

Casablanca, 337, 344; 354; (1944), (1943), 450; Potsdam, 468, 473, 475-6, 477; Quebec (Quadrant), 330, 352, 353, 354, 372, 398, 472; Quebec (Octagon), 429, 448, 449; Teheran, 368, 405, 439;

492-4;

Moscow

400, 401, 404, 406, 412, 430, 431 Armies: Central, 46

513

INDEX

514

Conferences

Eichelberger,

continued

Washington (1921-2), 20; Washington (Trident), 344, 345, 354 Gonolly, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. R. L., 440 Cooke, (Br) Lt-Col. S. A., 326 Coral Sea, 253, 255, 258, 261, 262, 272, 291 Corregidor, 128, 130 Corrigan, (Aust) Flt-Lt. J. A., 349 Coventry, 101 Cowan, (Br) Maj.-Gen. D. T., 413

(U.S.)

Lt-Gen.

R.

C,

294, 391 Einstein, Albert, 471 Ekin, (Br) Brig. R. G., 225 Elliott, (U.S.) Pte. G., 118, 119,

120

Emirau Island, 381, 382 Emmett, (Br) Maj. A., 326 Empress Augusta Bay, 356, 380 Endau, 144, 181 Eniwetok Island, 356, 382, 383, 384, 449 Eretenwetan, 216

Crace, (Br) Rear-Adm. J. G., 250, 255, 256, 258, 259-60, 275 Craigie, Sir Robert, 42, 82

Espiritu Santo, 246, 300, 305 Europe, Allied landings in, 368, 405

Crimea, 319 Crosby, Sir Josiah, 139 'Crossing the enemy's T', 213, 296 Crutchley V.C., (Br) Rear-Adm. V. A. C,

Falkenhausen, (G) Gen. von, 39 Far East Land Forces (FARELF), 108,

274, 275, 276, 280, 281, 282, 286, 378, 388, 393 'Culverin' Operation, 344, 353, 354, 367

Fengtai, 34, 35 Fergusson, (Br) Brig. B. E., 326, 418, 420 Fermi, Enrico, 471

Cunningham,

Cmdr.

(U.S.)

W.

S.,

(130), 133

Cyclops Mountains, 391

War

Council

(British),

Darwin, 205, 209. 246, 255 Davao, 102, 124, 202, 204, 392 De Baun, (U.S.) Cmdr. G. H., 256 Defence Scheme, International, 40 Delhi, 180, 318 (U.S.), 74, 102

Devereux, (U.S.) Maj. J. P.

S., 130, 131,

132 Diego Suarez, 240, 320

162

246, 252, 274, 275, 276 Fillmore, Millard 10 Fiji Islands,

Finisterres, 359, 366, 386,

Dairen, 439, 463

Department of the Navy Deshima Island, 8

109, 111

Far East

390

Finland, 64 Finschhafen, 240, 359, 361, 362, 366, 386, 388 Fitch, (US.) Rear-Adm. A. W., 255, 256, 260, 261 Fletcher, (U.S.)

Rear-Adm.

F. J.,

260, 262, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 274, 275, 276, 281, 286, 288 Florida Island, 278, 281, 303 Ford Island, 120

Formosa,

11, 21, 124, 353, 382, 426, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453 Fort Hertz, 316n, 320, 404, 412, 422 Fort Shafter, 89, 118

Dimapur, 314, 317, 331,415 Dinjan, 317, 320 Donbaik, 324 Doolittle, (U.S.) Lt-Col. J., 251

Dooman, E. H., 59 Doorman, (D) Rear-Adm. K. W.

F. M.,

Fort White, 407, 413 Franck, J., 474 Franck Report, 474

Adm.

Sir Bruce,

399

207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 214, 215,

Fraser, (Br)

216

Fraser, (Br) Brig. F. H., 144, 191

Duke, (Br)

Brig. C. L. B., 191

Dumpu,

366, 386, 387 Dunlop, (Br) Maj. G., 326

Dutch East

131,

132, 133, 134, 255, 256, 258, 259,

Indies, see Netherlands East

Free India Movement, 332 Frisch, Otto, 470, 472 Fuchida, (J) Cmdr. M., 120, 123 Fujita, (J) Rear-Adm. R., 263

Indies

Dutch Harbor, East

African

99,

270

Units,

Gallipoli, 360, 362

see

under

Indian

Gama, Vasco da, 5 Gandhi, Mahatma, 319

Army (Burma Units) Eastforce (Malaya), 186

Ganter, (Aust) Capt. A. G., 361 Garoka, 358

Eden, Anthony, 85 Egypt, 200, 319

Garrett, (Br) Brig.

170

K.

A., 144, 161, 166,

INDEX Gasmata, 240

Hanaya, (J) Lt-Gen.

Gavutu

Hangchow

Island, 273, 278

Geelvink Bay, 387, 393

Hankey,

Gemas, 184 Genghis Khan, 46 George, David Lloyd, 20 Ghormley, (U.S.) Vice-Adm. R. C, 248,

Hankow,

250, 273, 275, 276, 282, 288, 297 Giffard, (Br) Gen. Sir G., 400, 401, 410,

430 Gilbert Island, 95, 130, 219, 240, 250, 345, 354, 368, 372, 375, 377, 382,

T., 408, 410, 411

Bay, 43

Sir

M., 469

48 Hara, (J) Rear-Adm. T., 260 Harbin, 478 Harbor see under Dutch, Pearl Hart, (US.) Adm. T. C., 101, 102, 103, 108, 124, 127, 128, 180, 207,210 Hassan Lake, see Khassan Hata, (J) Gen. S., 46, 47 32, 45, 46, 47,

Hawaiian

Islands, 21, 97, 103, 130, 297,

375, 440

383 Gilkes, (Br)

515

Maj. K. D., 326

Heath, (Br) Lt-Gen. Sir L., 109, 111,

Gindrinkers Line, 149 Glassford, (U.S.)

140, 142, 144, 145, 162, 165, 166,

Rear-Adm. W.

A., 205,

206

168, 169, 170, 181, 184, 186, 191, 195, 198

Gobi Desert, 47 Gona, 293, 294, 295 Goodenough Island, 388 Goto, (J) Rear-Adm. A., 252, 253, 258, 259, 261, 296

Gracey, (Br) Maj. -Gen. D. D., 413 Grasett, (Can) Maj.-Gen. A. E., Ill

Green Island, 378 Grew, Ambassador J. C, Grimwood, (Br) Col., 191

59, 61, 78, 79

Griswold, (US.) Lt-Gen. O. W., 352 Grover, (Br) Maj.-Gen. J. M. L., 417 Groves, (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. L. R., 472 Guadalcanal Island, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278, 280, 282, 284, 286, 287, 288,

Helfrich, (D)

Vice-Adm. G. E.

L., 210,

211

Henderson, (U.S.) Marine, 278; Air278, 288, 289, 295, 296-7, 299, 301, 302, 304, 307, 311 Herring, (Br) Capt. D. C, 326, 327 Herring, (Aust) Lt-Gen. E. F., 294, 347, field,

359 Himalayas, 47, 314, 316n, 318, 461n Hirunama, Baron, 59, 60 Hiroshima, 476 Hirota, K., 42, 43n Hitler, Adolf, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, 76, 82, 367, 471

Hitokkapu Wan, 114

289, 290, 295, 297, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 310, 311, 320, 338, 339, 341, 346, 347, 352, 368,

Hollandia, 381, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 451

440

Homma,

Guam,

17, 99, 127, 130, 262, 338, 440,

442, 444, 445, 447, 459

(J) Lt-Gen. M., 130 (J) Lt-Gen. M., 421, 423, 427, 43Q, 433, 434, 435

Honda,

Hong Kong,

Gurkhas, 321

Gurun,

Homalin, 238, 318

142, 162, 165, 166

7,

21, 46, 49, 67, 95, 109,

Royal

Artillery,

'Ha-Go' (J. operation), 407

fence

Corps,

Hahn, Otto, 469 Hainan Island, 49, 81

Army

Haiphong, 47 Halkin Gol, 52

Halmahera

;

see also

Khalka River

Island, 391, 392, 394, 395,

443 Halsey, (U.S.) Vice-Adm.

W.

F.,

131,

133, 251, 264, 297, 300, 301, 303,

304; Adm., 305, 339, 342, 346, 347, 349, 351, 356, 357, 372, 375, 378, 381, 440n, 448, 449, 450, 453,

454, 455 Halunarshan, 52 Hami, 48

and Singapore Volunteer De-

111, 112, 148, 149; see

under

British

Honolulu, 87, 89, 123 Honshu, 9, 476 Hopei, East, 30, 31, 42

Hopei-Chahar

Political Council, 31, 39,

42 Hosogaya, (J) Vice-Adm. B., 263, 270, 341 House, (US.) Col. E. M., 17 Htindaw, 408 Htinzin, 413 Hugh-Jones, (Br) Brig. N., 234

Hukawng

Valley, 316, 321, 324, 404,

407, 418

INDEX

516

Hull, Cordell, 44, 59, 60, 66, 69, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 137, 354, 439

Humboldt Bay, Hunchun, 51

Huon

387, 388, 390, 391

Indian

Army

196. 197

352; Peninsula, 338, 342,

Gulf,

continued

Divisions: 11, 142, 144, 160, 166, 168, 169, 170, 175, 181, 185, 186, 191 and n, 14, 321,

358, 359, 361, 377

Hutton, (Br) Lt-Gen. T.

222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 235, 236 Hyakutake, (J) Lt-Gen. H., 287 Hyashida, (J) Col. K., 363, 365, 366

19,

287 Lt-Gen. S., 239, 323 Imamura, (J) Lt-Gen. H., 339, 356, 380 Imphal, 223, 316n, 318, 321, 325, 331, Ichiki, (J) Col.,

23,

Iida, (J)

413,

414, 417, 426n; Plain, 414, 415

420,

418,

25, 26, 36,

Brigades:

13,

426,

171,

and

n,

174,

175,

435

44, 191, 195 45, 169, 181, 182, 184, 185,

186 46, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232,

234

408, 412 7

48, 228, 229, 230, 232,

L.R.P., 400, 418,

425 Regiments: Burma Regt, 422 2 Burma Rifles, 326 Corps: 3, 144, 191, 192 4, 325, 414 Divisions: 5, 400, 408, 410, 41 1, 414 400, 408, 410, 411, 412,

433 9, 143, 144, 146, 168, 169,

189,

234

50 Tank, 400 50 Parachute, 400 71, 435 77 (Chindits), 321,

225,

226, 229 3 Special Service, 400 3 West African

186,

173,

36, 400, 425, 430,

Burma, 221,235

185,

191

186, 191

11 East African, 400 81 West African, 400,

191n

186,

191n

413, 435

181,

221

28, 143, 144, 161, 166, 170,

53,400, 431,433, 434

7,

191

22, 144, 146, 169, 182, 186,

400, 404, 406, 413, 431, 415, 417, 433, 434, 435

Burma, 221 2 Burma, 221,

186,

175,

n, 195, 196

185,

15, 400, 404, 408, 410,

Brigades:

n,

195 19, 400, 421

317, 318

1

and

15, 144, 161, 165, 166, 170,

Burcorps, 235, 238, 316,

Divisions :

166

143, 144, 145, 162, 168,

and

430

4,

433,

12, 144, 168, 170, 171, 173,

Army Gps: Eleventh, 400, 401, 430 Eastern, 321, 325, 331 Armies: 400,

415,

197

under Chindits

Fourteenth,

400,

414,

435 400, 433 400, 413 400 400 400, 435 400

174, see

230,

235,

182, 186, 191

Burma Units Special Force,

229,

234,

6, 144, 161, 165, 8,

Indaw, 404, 418, 420, 421, 430, 431 Indawgyi Lake, 421 Indian Army

Corps:

228-9,

232, 413,

J.,

20,

407,

323

17, 223,

326, 418, 420, 424, 425 111 (L.R.P.), 325, 418, 420, 424, 425

254 Tank, 400 Regiment: 5th Bn. 2nd Punjabis, 173 Indian National Army, 407, 434 Indian Ocean, 5, 95, 102, 107, 108, 178, 239, 240, 248, 266, 319, 399 Indo-China, 94, 137, 179, 200, 422, 429; Japanese threat to, 44, 45, 53, 66, 67, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 94; pro-

jected

withdrawal

of Japanese

INDEX from, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87; Japanese air

forces

in

south,

146 Inouye, (J) Vice-Adm.

140,

141,

517

Japanese Army continued Armies continued Fifteenth, 219, 222, 228, 229, 238,

240,

317, 323, 331, 406, 407, 408, 413, 415, 417, 418, 420, 427, 429, 431, 433, 434; and Plan 21, 331 Sixteenth, 218

Ipoh, 144, 170 Iron Bottom Sound, 278, 303, 306 Irrawaddy River, Valley, 228, 236, 238, 316, 325, 327, 329, 331, 418, 422, 423, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435 Irwin, (Br) Lt-Gen. N. M. S., 321, 325 Isthmus of Kra, see Kra Itagaki, (J) Gen., 60

Seventeenth, 272, 276, 287, 299, 380, 390 Twenty-third, 155 Twenty-fifth, 174-5, 190, 193, 200 Twenty-eighth, 408, 427, 429, 434,

S., 130, 131,

253, 255, 259, 261, 262 Interim Policy Committee, 473, 474

Inukai, K., 27

Iwojima Island, 449, 462, 464, 465, 466

435 Thirty-first,

Japan,

4-28, 30-54, 58-71, 74-90; prepares for war, 94 et seq.; attack on Pearl Harbor, 90, 1 14,

Divisions:

439, 440, 442, 443, 445, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451; Navy now impotent, 456, 459, 460, 461, 462,

431,

433,

458 Guards,

Imperial 170,

182,

196, 197, 2,

115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125,

127-34, 136-43, 145-9, 151-8, 162-75; tally of successes, 174-5; 178-90, 192-200, 202-9; strategic aim achieved, 219, 222-433 passim; driven out of Burma, 435,

429,

421,

434, 435 Thirty-fifth,

Jaluit Island, 131, 132, 382

440

Thirty-third,

192,

141,

171,

182,

193,

219

216, 297, 299, 408, 429, 434

5, 139,

169,

160,

390, 169,

192, 193,

196, 197 6,

380 406, 408, 417, 429, 434

15, 401,

18, 139,

160,

192,

415, 193,

197, 295, 331, 339,

feelers,

464, 465; makes peace 467-9, 473, 474, 475;

347, 358, 366, 377, 390, 393, 394, 401,

first atomic bomb, 476; and second, 476-7; surrenders

407, 408, 418, 421, 423, 427, 434

463,

receives

unconditionally, 477, 478 Japanese Army (see also Appendix 3) Orders of battle, 193, 408, 434, 48991; captured, 339 Special Forces

China Expeditionary Force, 422, 429 North China Garrison, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 46 Armies:

Burma

384,

386,

408, 417, 429, 434 32, 391, 429 55, 228, 230, 232,

415,

20, 362,

55, 391,

393

36, 390, 392 38, 149

Kwantung,

43,

Southern Area, 228, 229, 331, 408, 434; Command, 331 First, 422 Second Area, 390, 391, 393, 394, 442 Eighth Area, 307, 339, 380, 390 Twelfth, 422 Fourteenth, 127, 130

236,

323, 401, 407, 408, 415, 417, 434

Area, 331, 401, 406, 408, 427, 429, 434 Chinese, 75 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 46, 51, 52, 53, 60, 476

377,

390 57,401, 407,

41, 387,

390

51, 339, 360, 377, 384, 390

443

434 55,421,429, 434 54, 408, 427, 434 49, 427, 429,

139, 223, 225, 228. 323, 324, 401, 407, 408, 427, 434

55, 133,

56,

m,

406, 408, 421, 422, 427, 430, 434

INDEX

518 Japanese

Army

Brigades:

Japanese Navy

continued Inf., 160, 162, 182, Inf., 182,

Naval Landing Party (China), 40,

23

Inf.,

41, 42, 43 Northern Area Force, 263 Kiska Occupation, 263 Adak-Attu Occupation, 263 Northern Force (Leyte), 451-6 Task Force MO, 253

193

193 169, 193

24 Ind. Mixed, 401, 408,

Regiments:

continued

9 21

434 3 Guards, 193 4 Guards, 182, 193 5 Guards, 182, 184, 193 11 21 41

42 48 55

56 78 79 80 114 124 143

Inf.,

193 193 193 193

Inf.,

216

Inf., Inf.,

Inf.,

Inf., 169,

Special Forces

continued

Port Moresby Invasion, 252, 253, 256, 258, 259 Tulagi invasion, 252, 253 Fleets:

Mobile Force,

First

Inf., 140, 143, 193,

216

366

Eighth, 272

Inf.,

363, 365

Main Body, 263

Inf.,

362, 366 193

193 410. 411

Inf., 156, Inf.,

and n

Divisions: 3, 138, 141, 171 125, 222, 236, 403, 411

5, 124,

229,

390

Japanese Government: Imperial General Headquarters, 114, 240, 290, 307-31, 383, 390, 391, 406, 417, 427, 450, 458, 459, 466

Supreme Command, 287 Supreme War Council, 467, 468 Japanese Merchant Fleet, 369, 460, 461 Japanese Navy {see also Appendix 3) Combined Fleet, 63, 262, 263, 356,

Advanced Expeditionary Force (Pearl Harbor),

:

Battleships Hiei,

302

Kirishima,

304

Mushashi, 453 Carriers : Akagi, 115, 263, 269 Hiryu, 132, 263, 269 Hiyo, 446

Hosho, 263 Junyo, 263

Kaga, 263, 269

288

Ryujo, 124, 263, Sendai,

357

Shoho, 253, 255n, 258, 260, 262

Shohaku, 253, 255n, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 288, 300, 445 Soryu, 132, 263,

269

Taiho, 445

372, 384, 427, 442 Special Forces:

First Striking

Southern Force, 146, 240 South Seas Force, 130, 240 Striking Force, at Pearl Harbor, 96-7, 114; at Wake, 1 32-3 in Timor area, 209; in Indian Ocean, 239, 240; renamed First Mobile Force, 262 at Midway, 262-9; aircraft disembarked, 347; in Philippines, 443 Squadron: 7 Cruiser, 146 Flotillas 2 Destroyer, 2 1 4 Destroyer, 214 ;

213 Inf., 236, 323 214 Inf., 228 215 Inf., 228, 236 228 Inf., 149 229 Inf., 149, 208 230 Inf., 149,216 Detachments: Ichiki, 287, 288 Kawaguchi, 287, 289, 290 Army Air Formations Fourth, 453 Armies:

6,

below under

Second Mobile Force, 262, 263

Inf.,

Inf.,

see

Striking Force

193

1

15

Force (Leyte Gulf),

451 Centre Force, 451-6 Southern Force, 451-6 Midway Occupation, 263 Naval Landing Force (Wake),

Zuiho, 263, 300 Zuikaku, 253. 255n, 258, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 288 Cruisers

Haguro, 214, 215 Jintsu, 214, 351 Kinugasa, 302 Nachi, 214, 215

Naka, 214

INDEX Japanese Navy

Kampar, 170

continued

Kampong

Destroyer:

Naval Air Formations

Kanglatongbi, 415, 417 Kankiryo, 386, 387

Fleets:

Kapa Kapa

453

Second, 453 Eleventh, 124, 140, 347, 356

125,

127,

139,

Flotillas:

21, 202,

204

22, 146 23,

202

24, 131 25,

278 fighters,

268

Java, 94n, 95, 127, 128, 178, 180, 198, 202, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 219, 225, 272, 344; East, 216; West, 216; Sea, 216 Jeffries, (Br)

Maj.

Jehol, Province

J. B.,

of,

326

28

Jemaluang, 144, 185, 186 Jementah, 182 Jerantut, 168, 169 Jessami, 415 Jitra, 111, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144n,

160, 162, 165, 168, 199,

200

Kelantan, Sultan

294

of,

145

Kema, 204 Kendari, 206, 207, 209 Kennedy, (Br) Maj.-Gen. D. G., 347 Kenney, (U.S.) Lt-Gen. G. C, 274 Key, (Br) Brig. B. W., 144, 145, 191 Khalka River, 52, 53, 60 Khassan, Lake, 51 Khubilai Khan, 8, 461 Kido, Marquis, 447, 468 Kieta, 346 Kilindini, 239, 266

Kimmel,

Jivavaneng, 366 Johore, 181, 185, 189 Joliot-Curic, F., 470 Jolo Island, 202,211

(U.S.)

Adm. H.

E., 104,

105,

106, 117, 118, 120, 123, 131, 132

Kimura, (J) Lt-Gen. H., 429, 430, 431, 433 434

Jomard Passage, 253, 258, 259, 260 Jones, (Br) Brig. J. K., 221, 234 Jorak, 184 Joshima, (J) Rear-Adm. T., 296 Juneau, 78

Jurong Line, 195, 196, 197 Jushin, (J) Committee, 86-7, 447, 466

Kabaw

Valley, 223, 413

Kachin Kachin

Hills, 326, 327,

329

Levies, 422

Kaiapit, 366 Kajioka, (J) Kakuta, (J)

Trail, 291, 293,

Karachi, 317n Katagiri, (J) Lt-Gen. S., 362, 363, 366 Katamura, (J) Lt-Gen. S., 429, 434 Katha, 319, 325, 431 Katika, 366 Katsuki, (J) Lt-Gen. K., 38 Kavieng, 240, 378, 381, 382 Kawabe, (J) Lt-Gen. M., 331, 406, 407,

408 Kawaguchi, (J) Maj.-Gen. K., 193 Kedah, North, 165

Kamikaze Corps, 461 Zero

Slim, 170, 171, 173

Kangar, 161

Tunagi, 285

First, 96,

519

Adm. E. J., 132, 262, 264, 266, 273, 297, 301, 372, 449

King, (U.S.)

Kinkaid, (U.S.) Vice-Adm. T.

C,

256,

300, 305, 453, 454, 455

Kinmun, 232 Kiriwina Island, 346, 347 Kiska Island, 341, 342, 346, 347 Kluang, 144, 182, 185, 186 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe, 45 Kobe, 251 Koga, 347, 356, 357, 375, 383, 384

Kohima, 407, 415, 417, 418, 426n Rear-Adm. S., 252, 253 Rear-Adm. K., 262, 263,

270

Koiso, (J) Gen. K., 447, 466, 467 Koka, (J) Lt-Gen. T., 323, 324 Kokoda, 290, 293; Trail, 291, 293

Kaladan Valley, 408, 412

Kokumbona,

Kalapanzin River, 408, 410, 411 Kalgan, 450 Kalemyo, 407, 431 Kalewa, 223, 238, 316, 318, 319, 407 Kamchatka, 9, 341, 450 Kamaing, 418, 423, 424, 425 Kaminsky, (U.S.) Lt-Cmdr. H., 117

308 Kokura, 476

296, 297, 301, 308; Trail,

Kolombangara

Island,

341, 349, 352,

355

Komsomolsk, 462 Kondo, (J) Vice-Adm. N.,

146, 240, 262, 288, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 317

INDEX

520

Konoye, Prince Fumimaro

36, 38, 43,

61, 65, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81,

468

Korea, 11, 36, 37, 95, 462, 478 Kosaburo, Tachibana, 24

KotaBharu,

144, 145, 146, 160, 168, 169

Territory, 67, 148, 149,

151

Kra

Isthmus, 87, 107, 111, 136, 137, 138,

141, 219 Kroh, 142, 144, 160, 164, 165, 168

Krohcol,

see under British

Army

Krokong, 157 Krueger, {U.S.) Lt-Gen. W., 346, 387, 451, 458, 459 Kuala Lipis, 145, 168, 169

Kuala Lumpur, 142, 144, 181, 182 Kuantan, 139, 144, 145, 146, 147, 169 Kuching, 144, 156, 157, 206 Kula Gulf, 349 Kunming, 47, 221,318,431 Kuribayashi, (J) Lt-Gen. T., 464, 465, 466 Kurile Islands,

U

Mun Channel, 152 Lei Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 31, 32 Lembang, 216

137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143,

Kowloon Leased

Leese, (Br) Gen. Sir Oliver, 430

9, 12, 21, 80, 95, 97, 114,

Lend-Lease, 69 Lenga, 182 Lentaigne, (Br) Maj.-Gen.

Lunga

Point,

295,

301,

302;

127, 128, 179, 381, 443, 448, 449, 450, 453, 458, 459, 461, 464

Gmdr. K. S., 222 Lyon, (Br) Lt-Col. C. A., 144

Kurusu, Saburo 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89 Kwajalein Island, 115, 131, 250, 382, 383, 384

MacArthur,

(J), see under

281,

Roads, 305, 310; River, 297 Lutong, 155, 156 Luzon, 70, 99, 100, 102, 106, 124, 125,

Lyle, (Br)

(U.S.)

Gen. D., 100, 101,

102, 124, 125, 127, 128, 246, 248,

255, 272, 274, 275, 276, 280, 290, 293, 294, 338, 341, 342, 344, 345,

J Armed

Forces Kwazon, 411 Kyaikthin, 325, 327 Kyaikto, 228, 232

D. A.,

Leyte Gulf, 451, 453, 454, 455, 461; Island, 448, 449, 450, 458, 464 Linlithgow, Marquess of, 330 Lloyd, (Br) Maj.-Gen. W. L., 321 Lockard, (US.) Pte. J., 118, 119, 120 Lonkin, 420 Los Negros Island, 380, 381 Lothian, Marquess of, 66, 67, 68 Lozovsky, (R) diplomat, 468

355, 383, 463 Kurita, (J) Vice-Adm. T., 263, 451, 453, 454, 455, 456, 461

Kwantung Army

W.

420, 421,423,424 Leuwiliang, 218

346, 359, 361, 368, 372, 373, 374, 375, 380, 381, 387, 388, 390, 392,

393, 394, 395, 448, 449, 453, 458, 459, 477

Island, 155 Lae, 240, 250, 338, 339, 346, 347, 352, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 386

McCain, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. J. S., 274 McCloy, (US.) Ensign R. C, 115 McCloy, (US.) Cmdr. R. V., 117 McCollum, (US.) Cmdr. A. H., 88 MacDonald, Ramsay, 24 McLeod, (Br) Lt-Gen. D. K., 221, 222 McMorris, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. C. H., 341

Lameng, 430

Madagascar, 240, 320

Lane, (Br) Lt-Col. G. M., 144, 155, 157, 206 Langfang, 38 Lashio, 47, 221, 316, 404, 427, 433

Madang

Lawson,

Maingkaing, 238 Maingna, 423

Kyaukme, 433 Kyushu, 469, 476

Labuan

{Br) Brig. J. K., 148, 151, 152 Lay, (Br) Brig. W. O., 144, 161, 162, 164, 170

Island, 346, 358, 362, 377, 386, 387, 390, 394

Madras, 240 'Magic', 74

Majuro

Island, 382, 383

League of Nations, 17, 26, 28, 30, 33, 43 Leary, (U.S.) Vice-Adm. H. F., 180, 255

Makassar, 207, 208; 206, 211

Ledge, The, 111, 141, 142, 160 Ledo, 316, 317, 321, 324, 404, 405, 407, 412, 418, 422, 423 Lee, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. W. A., 303, 304

Makin Malay Malay Malay

Strait, 95, 204,

Island, 130, 375, 376 Barrier, 103

Peninsula, 107, 111, 112 States, 199

205

c

INDEX Malaya

Meiktila, 222, 223, 429, 431, 433, 434

Central, 141,

168,

145,

189; North, 164,

189;

139,

140,

N.W., 144;

British

Army

Mergui, 223 Merrill,

Merrill, (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. F. D., Ill, 148,

Merrill's

C,

210, 218-19 (see also

(see also

25, 26

Manchukuo),

12, 22,

33, 36, 37, 46, 60, 86, 94,

95, 383, 426, 450, 462, 476, 478 Mandalay, 223, 236, 238, 318, 319, 418, 427, 429, 431, 433, 434

Manila, 102, 124, 125, 127, 128, 145, 459; Bay, 99, 101, 103, 127, 128 Manokwari, 360 Manus Island, 380, 451 Marco Polo Bridge, see under Bridge Marcus Island, 250

Mariana

S.,

341,

under

see

418 United

Army

Mexico, New, 474 Micronesian Islands, 277

Midway

Manchuria), 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 48, 52, 65

Manchuria

Marauders,

States

Air Vice-Marshal P.

Mamelukes of Egypt, 4

Manchukuo

Rear-Adm. A.

(U.S.)

357

151, 152, 154, 155 (Br.)

204, 206

Merak, 216

191

Maldive Islands, 239 Maloelap Island, 382 Malta, 264 Maltby, (Br) Maj.-Gen. C. M.,

Meitner, Lise, 470 Melanesians, 277

Menado,

South, 109, 168, 208

Malaya Command, 144, Malayan forces, see under

Maltby,

521

Island, 97, 99, 105, 106, 251, 252, 262, 264, 266, 275, 373 Mikawa, (J) Vice-Adm. G., 272, 280, 282, 284, 285, 286, 302 Milford, (Aust) Maj.-Gen. E. J., 359

Mili Island, 382

Milne Bay, 280, 282, 290, 291, 293, 346, 347, 358, 360 Island, 381, 448, 451

Mindanao

Mindoro, 458, 461 Miri, 144, 155, 156 Mitscher, (U.S.) Vice-Adm.

M. A., 440, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 450, 464

Mogaung,

393, 405, 422, 440, 442, 443, 446, 459, 464, 475, 476

Marilinan, 360 Markham River, 358, 359, 360, 366; Valley, 359, 366, 388, 392 Marshall, (U.S.) Gen. G. C, 87, 88, 89, 100, 179 Marshall Islands, 17, 98, 100, 104, 105,

418, 420, 421, 422, 424, 425,

427

Islands, 17, 354, 373, 381, 383,

Moir, (Br) Brig. R. G., 144 Molotov, V., 53, 64, 463, 467, 468, 476

Molucca Island, 179; Passage, Mongmit, 427, 433

Moorhead,

(Br) Lt-Col.

H.

Moosbrugger, (U.S.) Cmdr. Morotai Island, 394, 448

Martin, (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. C. A., 377 Martin, (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. F. L., 105, 107 Marushige, (J) Rear-Adm. K., 253, 256 Maruyama, (J) Lt-Gen. M., 297, 299 'Matador' (codeword), 111; Operation,

Morrisforce,

Matanikau River, 299 Matsui, (J) Gen. I., 42, 46 Matsui, (J) Col. then Gen., 38, 160, 193 Matsuoka, Y. 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 76, 82 Maungdaw, 321, 323, 408, 411 Maxwell, (Br) Brig. D. S., 144, 191, 196 Mayu Peninsula, 323 Mediterranean, 16, 50, 66, 107, 338, 343, 382

D., 142, 144,

160, 164

383, 440 Martaban, 226, 228

143

204

Mongolia, 30, 39, 52, 65; Inner, 30, 31, 42, 46, 81, 450; Outer, 30, 47, 52, 450

115, 131, 250, 345, 354, 378, 382,

136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142,

95,

see

F., 351

under Chindits

Moscow Conference

(1943), 354; (1944),

450

Moulmein, 219, 222, 225, 226, 229, 319, 331, 435

Mount Mount

Austen, 308 Ophir, 182

Mountbatten,

(Br)

Vice-Adm.

Lord

Louis, 353, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 412, 414,

421, 424, 427, 429, 430, 435, 478

Muar, 182, 184, Mukden, 12, 26,

185, 199, 37,

Munda

205

478

Airfield, 349, 352; Island, 307, 326, 339, 346, 351; Point, 349,

352

Muntok, 209, 211

INDEX

522 Murphy,

(U.S.)

Murray-Lyon,

Cmdr. R. V., 117 Maj.-Gen. D. M.,

(Br)

142, 143, 144, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170 Mussolini, Benito, 405

Mutaguchi, (J) Lt-Gen. R., 160, 193, 330, 331, 406, 407, 408, 417, 426 Myaitko, 232 Myingyan, 223 Myitkyina, 238, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 324, 325, 404, 418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 427

Nadzab, 359, 360, 366 Nagasaki, 9, 476; Bay, 8 Nagoya, 251

Nagumo,

(J)

Vice-Adm. C,

96, 97, 114,

115, 118, 120, 122, 123, 133, 209,

New

Zealand,

17, 21, 50, 62, 66,

373 Zealand Air Force, see Royal New Zealand Air Force New Zealand Army Divisions: 3, 355, 378 8, 356 New Zealand Navy, see Royal New Zea-

New

land

Navy

Newfoundland, 77

Ngakyedauk

Pass, 410, 411, 412 Nicobar Island, 95, 240, 355, 367 Nikolaevsk, 462 Nimitz, (U.S.) Adm. C. W., 132, 248,

250, 252, 255, 264, 266, 267, 270, 273, 281, 286, 297, 345, 367, 368, 372, 373, 381, 382, 383, 395, 448, 449, 455, 477 Nishimura, (J) Lt-Gen. T., 193

239, 240, 253, 262, 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 299, 317, 347, 440, 442, 446 Nakai, (J) Maj.-Gen. M., 386, 387

Nishimura, (J) Vice-Adm. 454 Noemfor Island, 393

Nakhorn, 219

Nomura,

Namur

39,

43n,

40,

S.,

451, 453,

(J) Adm. K., 60, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89

Island, 382, 383

Nanking,

107,

168, 180, 246, 248, 252, 276,

Military

45;

Academy, 39

Normandy, 439 Noumea, 246, 255, 295

Nassau Bay, 346, 347

Nauru

Island, 17, 252 Netherlands Air Force, see Royal Netherlands Air Force Netherlands East Indies, 70, 71, 75, 83, 95, 103, 112, 178, 190, 202, 204, 218, 219, 246, 335, 344, 353, 355; Army garrisons, 204, 206-7, 216,

218 Netherlands Navy,

see

Royal Netherlands

Navy

New

Britain, 240, 273.

338, 346, 347,

349, 361, 377, 378

New New New

Caledonia, 62, 246, 252, 289, 301 Georgia, 307, 346, 347, 352 Guinea, 17, 95, 178, 199, 250, 253, 258, 272, 273,

274, 275, 349, 351,

Territory

275, 276, 277, 290, 291, 293, 295, 307; Dutch, 381, 387, 388; Force, see under Australian Army; Volunteer of,

New

Rifles, 361 Hebrides, 246, 255, 274, 275, 288,

New

300, 375 Ireland, 240, 273, 286, 378

89, 90, 97, 103, 104

Obata, (J) Lt-Gen. H., 223, 440, 442 Ocean Island, 252 Octagon Conference, 429 Odessa, 47 Okhotsk, 9 Old, (U.S.) Brig.-Gen. W. D., 402, 411, 412 Oldendorf, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. J. B., 454,

455 Omori, (J) Rear-Adm. S., 263 Onishi, (J) Vice-Adm. T., 460, 461 Ono, (J) Capt. T., 263 Opana, 118, 119

Opium, 240, 248, 274, 338,

342, 346, 352, 353, 354, 355, 358, 367, 373, 374, 378, 381, 384, 387, 391, 393, 394, 395; Australian

Mandated

Oahu Island, 88, Oak Ridge, 472

6, 7

The New Japanese,

Order,

48, 68

Ormoc, 458 Orissa, 320

Oro Bay, 347 Osaka, 251 Osborn V.C., (Br) C.S.M. J. R., 152 Outerbridge, (U.S.) Lt W. W., 116, 117 Oyama, (J) naval officer, 40, 41

Ozawa,

(J) Vice-Adm. J., 208, 240, 443, 444, 445, 446, 451, 453, 455

Pa-an, 228

INDEX Pacific

523

Ocean, 240, 266, 301, 311, 337, 338, 344, 353, 354, 368, 382, 426, 46 In, 469; Central, 100, 103, 114,

Pearl Harbor, 68, 74, 80, 87, 88, 90, 96,

124, 262, 270, 277, 278, 345, 357, 367, 368, 372, 373, 381, 449, 462; North, 94, 368; South, 276, 301,

114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,

305, 345, 368, 372; South-West, 70, 83, 94, 105,

1

12, 178, 179, 205,

97, 98, 99, 105, 106,

Peirse, (Br) Air

Ocean Area, 248 South-East Area, 248 South-West Area, 248, 266, 273-4, 290, 293, 372 Sub- Area Central, 248; North, 248; South, 248, 274, 297 Pacts: Anti-Comintern (1936), 32, 48, 58, 467 Sino-Russian Non- Aggression (1937),

104,

102,

Rudolf, 470

Peierls,

Pacific

101,

Japanese attack on,

121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 132, 133,

373, 381, 449, 462; Western, 103, Strategic Areas:

100,

12;

250, 255, 262, 264, 289, 372, 373, 375, 394, 448 Pegu, 435; River, 435

331, 344, 345, 357, 367, 368, 372,

178

1

Marshal Sir Richard, 180; Air Chief Marshal, 402, 403, 404 Peking, 7, 22, 31, 33, 34, 46, 450; Convention of, 7, 37, 38, 43, 50; Mayor of, 35 Peleliu Island, 448, 449 Pemangkat, 206 Penang, 142, 144, 168, 169 Penney, Dr. W. G., 476 Perak River, 166, 168, 169, 171; Valley, 168 Percival, (Br) Lt-Gen. A. E., 109, 111,

41

138, 140, 141, 144, 145, 157, 162,

Tripartite (G,

/,

165, 168, 181, 184, 185, 186, 189,

J) (1940), 62, 63, 77,

Appendix 1 Russo-German Non- Aggression (1939) 51,58,60,64 82, 467,

Russo-Japanese

5-year

Neutrality

(1941), 65, 460, 463, 467 Painter, (Br) Brig. G. W. A., 144, 146,

190, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198,

Perry, (U.S.)

Commodore M.

477

G., 10

Persian Gulf, 399 Pescadores, 1 1, 21 Petropavlovsk, 450 Philippines,

147, 148

77, 87, 88, 95, 98, 99,

16,

100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 112,

Pakokku, 429, 431 Palau Island, 354, 373, 381, 384, 448, 449 Palel, 417 Palembang, 157, 208, 209

395, 440n, 443, 448, 450, 451, 458, 459, 460 Philippine Sea, 393, 443,

Palestine, 321

Phillips, (U.S.)

Paletwa, 323

Phillips, (Br)

Palliser, (Br)

Rear-Adm. A.

147 Canal, 248

Paoshan, 329 Papua, Papuans, 240, 252, 293, 339, 394; Gulf of, 291 Papuan Constabulary, see under Australian

Army Papun, 223, 226 Parachute troops: Allied, 320, 439n; American, 359, 360, 393; British, 320, 435; Japanese, 204, 208 Paris, (Br) Brig. A. C. M., 144; Maj.Gen., 170, 171, 174, 191, (196) Parit Sulong, 185 Parker, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. G. M., 128 Patani, 90, 111, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 160, 162, 164, 168

Patch, (U.S.) Lt-Gen. A. M., 307, 308,

Capt. J.

Adm.

Sir

S.,

256

Tom,

102, 103,

108, 145-6, 147

F. E., 146,

Panama

310

124, 125, 178, 202, 248, 272, 381,

383,

Pinbon, 238, 327 Pinlebu, 327 Poland, 53, 469 Polynesians, 277

Ponape

Island, 354,

384

Pongani, 294 Poorte, (D) Lt-Gen. H.

ter,

180, 210,

218, 219 Popa, (U.S.) Cpl. S., 365

Port Port Port Port

Arthur, 12, 463

Darwin, 102, 128, 180, 209 Dickson, 144

Moresby, 240, 246, 252, 253. 255,

261, 272, 276, 287, 290, 291, 293, 347, 352, 358, 360, 386-7 Pownall, (Br) Lt-Gen. Sir H., 136, 169, 170, 180, 398 Prisoners of war in Japanese hands, 331,

332n

INDEX

524 Prome, 236

Pulford, (Br) Air Vice-Marshal G. 140, 143, 145 Pye, (U.S.) Vice-Adm.

W.

W. H.,

S., 132, 133,

134

Rockwell, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. F. W., 128 Roi Island, 382, 383 Rome, 4, 58 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 44, 61, 69, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 137,

178,

179, 250, 320, 337, 338, 352, 382,

Quadrant Conference, Quebec

see

Conference,

Quebec, 330, 352, 353, 367 Queensland, 255 Quezon, Manuel, 128

405, 438, 439, 448, 449, 462, 463, 468, 472, 474 Rota Island, 442, 444 Rowell, (Aust) Lt-Gen. F. F., 291, 294 Royal Air Force, 136, 160, 222, 232 Estimates (1941), 108-9

Squadrons

:

Rabaul, 240, 250, 253, 256, 259, 273, 276, 278, 288, 295, 301, 307, 338, 339, 341, 342, 352, 354, 356, 357, 358, 360, 378, 381, 383

Rabinowitch, E., 474 Radar, 106, 107, 118, 119, 120, 125, 221, 281, 296, 303, 306, 339n, 351, 445 Raheng, 219, 222, 223, 229 Railways: incident at Mukden, 37; reforms in China, 3 1 BangkokChiengmai, 219, 222, 226; Bengal metre-gauge, 314; Burma, 47; Chinese Eastern, 463; Indian, 317, 320; Indo-Chinese, 47, 66; Manchurian, 22, 25, 463; S. ;

41 57,221 232, 216 31,

453, 147, 148 194 (Transport), 414 Aircraft: Buffalo, 147-8, 221

Catalina, 421 Dakota, 412, 414 Hurricane, 205, 216 Walrus, 148 Royal Australian Air Force, 339, 345, 349, 380, 381, 388, 391

Royal Australian Navy, Cruisers :

HMAS Australia,

276, 282, 285

Mandalay-Myitkyina, 238, 325; Peking-Hankow, Peking34;

HMAS Canberra,

Tientsin, 34; Siamese, 219, 222; Siamese-Burmese link (J), 331, Trans-Siberian, 64; 332; 47,

HMAS Perth,

Turksib, 47; Wuntho-Indaw, 327 Ramree Island, 343, 354, 435 Ramu River, 358, 359, 366; Valley,

386

Rangoon,

178, 179, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 230, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 266, 319, 331, 338, 427, 429, 434, 435

179, 286,

103,

388, 395

282,

211, 214, 215,

216

Royal Navy, in 1914, 16; and Washington Naval Treaty, 21, 23; and London Naval Treaty, 24; attacked in Yangtze River, 45-6; in Mediterranean, 66, 264 Fleets: Eastern,

102,

108,

107,

Home, Battleships

301

and

Battlecruisers

Red Red

HMS Ramillies, 239 HMS Repulse, 108,

146, 147, 148,

Cross, 185

Sea, 4

Reid, (U.S.) Ensign J., 267 Island, 349 182, 188

Rennell Island, 256 Rhydymwyn, 471 Ribbentrop, J. von, 58, 60, 62, 64 Rice Anchorage, 349 Richardson, (U.S.) Adm. J. O., 104 Riefkohl, (U.S.) Capt. F. L., 274, 282, 285 Roberts, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. W. H., 378

178,

399, 405

HMS Prince of Wales,

Rengan,

284,

285

Rathedaung, 324 Raub, 169

Rendova

281,

108,

259 146,

259 Resolution, 239 Revenge, 239 Royal Sovereign, 239 Warspite, 239 Hermes, 239 147, 148,

Carriers:

Cruisers

:

Destroyers:

HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS Victorious, 301 HMS Exeter, 2 2 4, 2 HMS Electra, 214, 215 HMS Encounter, 214, 215 HMS Jupiter, 214, 215 1 1

,

1

1

INDEX Royal Netherlands Air Force,

112, 156,

157 Royal Netherlands Navy, 103, 112, 157, 179,

207

Cruisers :

De

Ruyter, 2

1 1

,

2 1 4, 2 1

Java, 211, 214, 215, 216 Destroyers: Kortenaer, 214, 215 Witte de Witt, 214 Zealand Air Force, 345 Zealand Navy, 103, 179 Cruiser: Leander, 351, 439-40 Royal Papuan Constabulary, see under

Royal Royal

New New

Australian

Army

Russell Island, 339, 341

Russian Air Force, 439; Army, 53, 60, 450 Rutherford, Sir Ernest, 469, 471 Ryukyu Island, 21, 446, 460 Saidor, 359, 377, 384, 386, 387, 390 Saigon, 137, 138, 139, 146 St Mathias Island, 381 Saionji, Prince K., 27

Saipan Island. 440, 442, 444, 445, 446, 447, 459, 462

Seaman,

40, 41

Lt-Gen. Y., 443, 446 Sakai, (J) Lt-Gen. T., 155 Sakhalin, 9, 12, 463; North, 64, 65 Sakurai, (J) Lt-Gen. S., 236, 408, 427,

434 Sakurai, (J) Maj.-Gen. T., 410, 411, 412 Salamaua, 240, 250, 290, 338, 339, 346, 347, 352, 358, 359, 361, 362 Salween River, 222, 225, 226, 228, 331, 407, 422

Samar, 443

Samoan

Islands, 17, 246, 252, 274, 275,

289 San Bernardino 456

Strait,

451, 453, 454,

San Cristobal Island, 256, 295 San Diego, 264 San Francisco, 246, 251, 476 Sanananda, 293, 295 Sansapor, 393 Santa Cruz Islands, 273, 300 Santa Ysabel, 303

Sarawak, 155, 156, 157, 206 Sarmi, 388, 391, 392 Sato, (J) Lt-Gen. K., 417 Sato,

Ambassador N., 463, 467, 468, 469, 476

Sattelberg, 362, 366, 377, 386; Heights,

363

Savige, (Aust) Maj.-Gen. G. S., 359 Savo Island, 281, 284, 285, 296, 302

School of Lovers of the Native Land,

24 Schwegyin, 238 Scoones, (Br) Lt-Gen. G. A. P., 325, 413, 414, 415 Scott, (Br) Maj.-Gen. J. B., 221 Scott,

Rear-Adm. N., 274, 295,

(U.S.)

296 Scott, (Br)

Maj.

W.

'Seabees', see under

P., 326 United States Marine

Corps Segamat, 181, 185, 205 Segi Point, 349

Rumania, 469

Saito, (J) Saito, (J)

525

Selby, (Br) Brig.

W.

R., 191

Sembawang, 147 Sentani, Lake, 388; airfields, 390, 391,

392 Sepik River, 394 Serang, 216 Seria, 155, 156 Sextant Conference, 367, 404, 405, 412,

492-4 Shadazup, 421

Sham Chun Shan

River, 148, 149

States, see under

Burma

Shanghai, 26, 28, 40, 42, 43, 45, 101; International Settlement, 39, 40,

Monument Road, 40 Shantung, 16, 20, 22, 46 Sherwin, Rev. V. H. G., 361 Shima, (J) Vice-Adm. K., 253, 451, 453, 454 Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 1 Shing Mun Redoubt, 149 Shogun, (J) C.-in-C, 8, 9, 10, 11 Short, (US.) Lt-Gen. W. C, 103, 106, 41

;

107 Shortland Island, 240, 258, 302 Shweli River, 325, 327, 329 Siam, Gulf of, 138, 139; Southern, 139 Siberia, 9, 439,

478

343 Siki Cove, 366 Sicily,

Silchar, 331

Simmons, (Br) Maj.-Gen. F. K., Simon, Franz, 470 Simpang Jeram, 184 Simpson, (U.S.) Cmdr. R., 351 Singapore Fortress, 139,

140-1,

191; 157,

Island,

181,

182,

186, 189, 190, 191, 193;

109,

185,

Mandai

196; Woodlands Road, Town, 195

Road, 196;

144, 191

Singkawang, 156

INDEX

526

Singkawang

II (airfield), 156, 157, 158,

206 Singora, 90, 111, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 160, 171 Sinkiang, 47, 48

Stalin, J., 48, 64, 65, 354, 368, 405, 439,

440, 462, 463, 468, 469, 474, 478 Stalingrad, 338

Stanley

Sinzweya, 411 Bridge,

230,

Maj.-Gen. H. D. W., 218

Slim, (Br) Lt-Gen.

W.

J., 235, 238,

400,

401, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415, 421,

423, 425, 430, 431,433, 434 Slim River, 170, 174, 181, 199; Bridge, 171, 174 Smith, (U.S.) Lt-Gen. H. M., 375 Smith, (U.S.) Maj.-Gen. J. C., 376 Smith, (Br) Maj.-Gen. M. B. Beckwith,

191

Smyth V.G.,

R., 87, 88, 104,

Stevenson, (Br) Air Vice-Marshal D. F.,

386

232, 234, 435; River, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235; Valley, 435

Sitwell, (Br)

Mountains, 250, 276, 290

Adm. H.

105, 106, 132

Sio, 359, 362, 363, 377, 384,

Sittang

Owen

Stark, (US.)

222, 229 Stewart, (Br) Brig.

I. McA., 173, 174 (US.) Lt-Gen. J. W., 180, 321,

Stilwell,

324, 325, 335, 336, 398, 399, 400, 401, 403, 404, 406, 412, 418, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429, 430 Stimson, H. L., 26, 473, 474, 475 Stonecutters Island, 149

Stopford, (Br) Lt-Gen.

M. G. N., 400, 415

Settlements,

Straits

Force,

199;

see under British

Volunteer

Army

Stratemeyer, (Br) Maj.-Gen. G. E., 402, 403, 404 Stump, (US.) Rear-Adm. F. B., 454, 455

Maj.-Gen. J. G., 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 232, 234 Soebang, 216

Suchow, 46

Solomon

Sugiura, (J) Maj.-Gen. E., 193

(Br)

Islands, 95, 199, 240, 248, 252,

253, 256, 273, 278, 291, 299, 304, 307, 338, 339, 342, 346, 352-3, 356, 367, 375, 378; Central, 346, 347, 352, 355; North,

17,

253,

258, 272, 273, 290, 347, 349, 356, 390; South, 273, 274, 276, 277, 280, 287, 289, 297, 299, 352; Protectorate Defence Corps, see

Army Adm. Sir

under British

Somerville, (Br)

J., 239, 266,

Suiyuan

affair, 31, 32,

of,

34; (C) province

31

I., 430 Sumatra, 94n, 95, 157, 178, 198, 202,

Sultan, (US.) Lt-Gen. D.

207, 208, 209, 210, 219, 266, 344, 353, 398, 459

Sumiyoshi, (J) Maj.-Gen. T., 299 Sumprabum, 422

Sun Yat-sen, 13 Sunda Strait, 344

399 Sorong, 392, 393, 394 Sound, Iron Bottom, 278, 303, 306 Sourabaya, 102, 157, 210, 211, 216

South China Sea, 94, 95, 103, 107, 112 South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.): formed, 398; organization, 398404, 430; naval resources,

Sugiyama, (J) Gen. G., 36, 38, 43 Suicides, Japanese, 426, 446, 447

399,

405 ff; air forces, 401-4, 411-12, 414-15; plans and operations, 404-35; and Japanese surrender, 478 South Seas, 252, 289, 297, 331, 373 Sprague, (U.S.) Rear- Adm. C. F., 454, 455 Sprague, (U.S.) Rear- Adm. T. L., 454 Spratley Islands, 49 Spruance, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. R. A., 264, 266, 269; Vice-Adm., 373, 440, 443, 444, 445, 465 Stachouwer, Jonkheer Dr. van Starkenborgh, 210

Sung, (C) Gen. Cheh-yuan, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38 Sungei Kedah, 160, 165 Sungei Muar, 181, 182, 184 Sungei Patani, 144, 160 Suribachi,

Mount, 464

Surigao Strait, 451, 453, 454 Suzuki, (J) Adm. Baron K., 466, 467, 468, 475 Sweden, 457 Switzerland, 477 Sydney, 255 Symbol, 337 Syria, 4 Szilard, Leo, 471,

474

Taivu Point, 287 Takagi, (J) Rear-Adm. T., 213, 214, 215; as Vice-Adm., 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261

INDEX Takuma,

(J) Maj.-Gen. H., 193 Takusu, (J) Vice-Adm. S., 262, 263 Talasea, 378 Talaud Island, 448 Talbot, (U.S.) Gmdr. P. H., 206 Tamanthi, 407 Tambu Bay, 358 Tamu, 238, 316, 325, 407, 413

Tanahmera Bay,

388, 391

Tanaka, (J) Rear-Adm. R., 263, 267, 302, 303, 305, 306 Tanambogo, 273, 278 Tanjong Malim, 170, 171, 174 Tapotchau, Mount, 442, 446 Tarakan, 102, 103, 202, 204, 205 Taranto, 96 Tarawa Island, 130, 375, 384 Tashiro, (J) Gen., 34, 35, 37 Tassafaronga, 304, 305, 308, 310 Taung Bazar, 410, 413

Tokyo Bay, 10, 477 Tokugawa family, 8 Tongatabu, 274 Tonhe, 325 Tonking, 47, 67 Tor bun, 415 Toungoo, 222, 228, 235 Toyoda, (J) Adm. T., 66, 393, 395, 442, 443, 446, 451, 458 Trautmann, Dr, 42, 43 Treasury Island, 356 Treaties: Four-Power, 21, 22; London Naval (1930), 24, 33; NinePower, 22, 26, 37, 49; of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 12, 439; of Shimonoseki,

1 1 of Versailles, 20; Washington Naval (1922), 20,21,23,99, 103 ;

17,

Trincomalee, 239 Trolak, 170, 171, 173

Taungdut, 407 Tavoy, 223, 225 Tawitawi, 443

Trott, (Br) Brig.

Taylor, (Br) Brig. H. B., 144, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196 Teh, (Mongol) Prince, 31, 42

Truman, H.

Templeton's Crossing, 290, 293 Tenaru River, 287 Tennant, (Br) Capt. W. G., 148 Tennessee, 472 Terauchi, (J) Gen. H., 46; as F.M., 331, 408, 434 Teshima, (J) Lt-Gen. F., 394 Texas, 248 Thaton, 226, 228, 229 Theobald, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. R. A., 264, 270 Tiddim, 413 Tientsin, 31, 33, 38, 49, 50, 450 Timor, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210, 355, 383,

527

Truk

W.

A., 191

Island, 240, 255, 261, 338, 356, 357,

375, 378, 381, 384

468, 469, 473,

S.,

474,

476 Tsili Tsili,

360

Tsingtao, 40 Tsuji, (J) Col. M., 200 Tsushima Island, 12, 115 Tube Alloys, 471

Tulagi Island, 252, 256, 260, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 286, 289, 302, 305, 341, 347, 352

Tungchow, 38 Turkestan, 47 Turner, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. R. K., 75, 88, 274, 275, 280, 281, 282, 284, 286, 301, 440, 465 Twenty-one Demands, 16 Tyler, (U.S.) K., 119, 120

391

Tinian Island, 440, 442, 444, 447, 459, 476 Tizard, Sir Henry, 471 Tjilatap, 216 Tobruk, 319 Togo, (J) Adm., 12, 115 Togo, Shigenori, 53, 81, 82, 83, 87, 466-7, 469, 476, 477 Tojo, (J) Gen. K., 61, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 447, 466 Tokyo, 24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51, 58, 59, 63, 76, 78, 81, 83, 87, 88, 97, 114, 137, 240, 250, 251, 272, 332, 353, 356, 417, 447,

459, 464, 477

Ueda, (J) Gen., 52, 53 Ugaki, (J) Vice-Adm. M., 443 Ukhrul, 407, 415 Ukraine, 319 Ulan Bator, 47 Ulan Ude, 47 Ulithi Island, 448, 449 United States Air Force

Special Forces:

Air Task Force TF 63, 274 China Air Task Force, 335 U.S. Voluntary Group, 221 Army Air Forces Seventh, 384 Tenth, 401, 402, 403, :

404

528

INDEX

United States Air Force

continued

Army Air Forces:

Fourteenth. 335, 403 Twentieth, 459

Wings:

58

Bomber,

402,

405, 426, 427,

73

Commands:

450 Bomber, 402, 405, 459

Air Transport, 402, 403, 412, 414,

20

426 Bomber, 405

400,

B17, 100, 102 B25 (on Tokyo), 250, 251 B29, 404. 426, 447, 459, 476 Buffalo, 268

Aircraft:

United States Army continued Regiments: 128 Inf., 294 132 Inf., 308, 310 147 Inf., 308 161 Inf., 310 162 Inf., 359, 361 164 Inf., 295, 296, 299 172 Inf., 355 182 Inf., 308 503 Para., 360, 393 532 Eng. Boat and Shore, 365 158 Combat Team, 393 163 Combat Team, 390, 392

United States Marine Corps, 130 Special Force: 'Seabees', 289n Corps 5 Amphibious, 464 :

117,

2,

275, 276, 307, 378, 449 275, 301, 307, 376, 440,

118, 129, 267, 268, 290, 300

3,

356, 440, 444, 464

4,

440, 442, 464

5,

464

Catalina,

116,

Divisions:

1,

442

Commando, 414 Tomahawk {P. 40), 223

United States

Army

Brigade:

1 Provisional,

Regiments:

1,

Special Forces:

4, 130,

Alamo, 346 5307 Composite

Unit (Merrill's Marauders), 330, 418, 422, 423, 425 Armies: Sixth, 346, 387, 451, 459 Tenth, 466 Corps: 1, 294, 391 14, 352 Divisions: Americal, 301, 307 7 Cav., 380, 459 7 Inf., 342, 383 23 Inf., 294 25 Inf., 297, 307 27 Inf., 376, 440, 444 31 Inf., 394 32 Inf., 246, 291,293, 294, 387, 388, 394 37 Inf., 246, 352, 358, 459 41 Inf., 246 43 Inf., 351 77 Inf., 440 81 Inf., 449 Regiments: 16 Inf., 383 24 Inf., 388 35 Inf., 355 41 Inf., 388, 392 112 Cav., 377 126 Inf., 294 127 Inf., 294

382, 383

6,

308

7,

246, 289, 290, 299

10,

Battalion:

440

287

310

6 Naval Construction, 289

United States Navy Divisions:

War

Plans, 75, 88,

274

Intelligence, 105

Operations, 87, 88, 104, 132 Fourteenth, 117 Districts: Sixteenth, 128 Special Forces: 5th Amphibious, 375 7th Amphibious, 359, 388 Northern Attack Force (Saipan),

440 Southern 440

Attack

Force

Carrier Striking Force

(Guam), (Midway),

264, 267 Fast Carrier Force (Fifth Fleet), at

Aitape, 388; in Marianas, 440, 444, 445; in Philippines, 453, 454, 458; at Iwojima, 464 Task Forces: 16 (Midway), 264, 266, 269 17 (Coral Sea), 255-

(Midway), 62; 264, 266, 269

INDEX United States Navy Special Forces

United States Navy

continued

Bottom

(Iron

:

Fleets:

127-8 250

Atlantic, 104, 132,

(formerly

Pacific

U.S.),

88,

68,

96, 104, 106, 114, 117, 128, 132, "

179, 180, 250, 251, 252, 262, 270,

372 Third, 346, 372, 395, 440n Fifth, 357, 372, 373, 384, 388,

215 284 Ford, 214, 215 Helm, 285 John D. Edwards, 214, 215 Patterson, 284, 285 Paul Jones, 214, 215 Ralph Talbot, 281, 284 Alden, 214,

Sound), 303 Expeditionary Force TF 61, 274 Air Support Force TG 61.1, 274 South Pacific Amphibious Force TF 62, 274 Asiatic, 101-3,

continued

Destroyers

continued

Task Forces 64

529

440

Seventh, 345, 359, 372, 395, 453

Blue, 281,

Ward, 116, 117, 118 Wilson, 285 Gunboat: Panay, 46

Minesweeper: Condor, 115, 116 Submarine: Swordfish, 128 Supply Ship: Antares, 116

Tug:

Keosanqua, 116

Ushijama, (J) Lt-Gen. M., 466

Battleships:

V.l flying bombs, 339n

Alabama, 373

Van Noy Jr.,

(U.S.) Pte. N., 365 Vandegrift, {U.S.) Maj.-Gen. A. A., 274, 275, 281, 282, 286, 287, 290, 304,

Arizona, 104, 122, 123n California, 104, 122,

123n

Colorado, 104, 106

307 Vasey, (Aust) Maj.-Gen. G. A., 366, 386 Vella Gulf, 351 Vella Lavella, 352, 355 Venice, Republic of, 4, 5 Verahue, 308, 310 Victoria Point, 222, 225 Vila, 341, 346, 349, 351, 352

Maryland, 104, 120, 122, 123n Missouri,

477

Nevada, 104, 122, 123 North Carolina, 274, 288 Oklahoma, 104, 120, 122, 123n Pennsylvania, 104, 120, 123

South Dakota, 300, 303, 304 Tennessee, 104, 120, 122,

123n

Washington, 295, 300, 303

West

Virginia, 137

Virginia, 104, 120, 122,

123n

Enterprise,

106,

104,

130, 131, 250,

251, 264, 266, 269, 274, 275, 278, 280, 288, 297, 299, 303 Hornet, 251, 264, 266, 269, 295, 299,

104,

106,

287 453

104,

106,

131,

132,

357 Wasp, 264, 274, 275, 288, 311 Astoria,

285

Chicago, 281,

133,

285 Lake City, 341

Quincey, Salt

Vincennes, 282,

285

128,

148, 151, 154, 155

plans

for

British Pacific Fleet, 382

Wars:

Marblehead, 207

C,

Walton, E. T. S., 469 Wang Keh-min, 46 Wanigela, 293, 294 Wanping, 34, 35, 38 Wanting, 316, 431 War Cabinet (British) and Madagascar, 320;

285

Houston, 450

M.,

Island, 99, 105, 106, 130, 131, 132, 133, 250, 356, 388, 391, 392, 393

Wallis, (Br) Brig.

250, 264, 274, 275, 278, 288, 289,

Cruisers

J.

Wales, North, 471 Wall of China, The Great, 28, 30

Princeton, 357,

Saratoga.

Wainwright, (U.S.) Gen. 130, 477

131, 250, 255,

260, 261, 262, 269 Liscombe Bay, 376 Island,

Waingmaw, 423

Wake

300, 301, 311 Lexington,

Long

Viru Harbour, 349 Vladivostok, 12, 252, 439, 462

Carriers

First Chinese, 7; First

World, 61,

23, 181, 334, 470; Japanese-Sino

Russo-Japanese 11; 894) , (1904), 12, 13; Second Chinese, ( 1

7;

Second World, 314, 471; Far

INDEX

530 Wars

Wong

continued

Eastern, 334, 344. 368, 462, 478; European (1939-^45), 438, 450,

462 Wars, Opium, 6

Warazup, 421

Warm

Springs, 137

Washington, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 74,

76,

Nei Chong gap, 148, 152, 154 Island, 346, 347 Wootten, (Aust) Maj.-Gen. G. F., 362, 366 Wotje Island, 382

Woodlark

Wright, (U.S.) Rear-Adm. G. H., 305, 306 Wuntho, 327

80, 89, 97, 100, 105, 118, 124, 128,

132, 178, 266, 342, 344, 381, 399, 406, 414, 473, 477; Naval Treaty of (1922), 20, 21, 23

Wau,

339, 352, 358 Wavell, (Br) Gen. Sir A., 179, 180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 197, 199, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 222, 225, 226, 235, 236, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 324; as F.M., 325, 330, 343,

353

Wedemeyer,

(U.S.)

Maj.-Gen. A.

C,

406, 430 Welles, Sumner, 75

Wellington (N.Z.), 276 Western Striking Force (Java), 211 Westforce (Malaya), 181, 182, 186

Wewak Island, 354, 358, 387, 390, 394 Wheeler, (Br) Lt-Col. L. G., 326 Wheeler, (U.S.) Lt-Gen. R. A., 398, 430 Wilkinson, (U.S.) Capt. T. S., 88 Williams, (Br) Brig. G. G. R., 144, 191 Wilson, (Br) F.M. Sir Henry Maitland, 473 Wilson, Woodrow, 16, 20, 99 Windeyer, (Aust) Brig. W.J. V., 361 Wingate, (Br) Brig. O. G., 321, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 400, 404, 406, 412, 418, 420

Yalta, 462, 463, 464

Yamamoto,

(J)

Adm. &

C.-in-C., 63,

96, 124, 262, 263, 267, 269, 270,

346, 347, 356, 383 Yamasaki, (J) Rear-Adm. S., 263 Yamashita, (J) Lt-Gen. T., 130, 190, 192, 193, 198, 199, 450, 458 Yamauchi, (J) Lt-Gen. M., 417 Yanagida, (J) Lt-Gen. G., 415 Yangtze River, 40, 41, 42, 45-6, 47, 422 Yap Island, 448 Yedo (former name of Tokyo), 10 Yellow River, 46 Yenangyaung, 427, 429 Yokopi, 386, 387 Yonai, (J) Adm. M., 59, 61, 447, 466

Yong Peng, Young,

Sir

182, 185

Mark, 155

Yuan

Dynasty, 46 In Yungting River, 34, 38, 39

Yunnan

Province, 47, 67, 319, 321, 324,

345, 367, 404, 406, 407, 421, 422, 427, 429, 430

Zhukov, (R) Marshal G. K., 53

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