After The Battle 149 - The Guns of Godley Head

after the

battle

THE GUNS OF GODLEY HEAD HITLER’S HQ AT MARGIVAL Number 149 49

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770306 154097

£4.25

NUMBER 149

LONDON STOCKIST for the After the Battle range: Motorbooks, 13/15 Cecil Court, London WC2N 4AN Telephone: 020 7836 5376. Fax: 020 7497 2539 United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution: Warners Group Publications PLC, Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH Australian Subscriptions and Back Issues: Renniks Publications Pty Limited Unit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019 Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355 E-mail: [email protected]. Website: www.renniks.com Canadian Distribution and Subscriptions: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 622 Welland Avenue, St. Catharines, Ontario Telephone: (905) 937 3100. Fax: (905) 937 1760 Toll Free: 1-800-661-6136 E-mail: [email protected] New Zealand Distribution: Dal McGuirk’s “MILITARY ARCHIVE”, PO Box 24486, Royal Oak, Auckland 1345, New Zealand Telephone: 021 627 870. Fax: 9-6252817 E-mail: [email protected] United States Distribution and Subscriptions: RZM Imports Inc, 880 Canal St., Stamford, CT 06902 Telephone: 1-203-324-5100. Fax: 1-203-324-5106 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.rzm.com Italian Distribution: Tuttostoria, PO Box 395, 1-43100 Parma Telephone: ++390521 29 27 33. Fax: ++390521 29 03 87 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.tuttostoria.it Dutch Language Edition: SI Publicaties/Quo Vadis, Postbus 188, 6860 AD Oosterbeek Telephone: 026-4462834. E-mail: [email protected]

CONTENTS THE GUNS OF GODLEY HEAD WAR FILM The True Glory FRANCE Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ IT HAPPENED HERE The Potters Bar Incident — April 26, 1941 WRECK DISCOVERY No Longer Missing — The Search for LW337

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Front Cover: The two emplacements for the 6-inch guns of the Godley Head Battery which protected Lyttelton Harbour on the east coast of New Zealand’s South Island. (David Green) Centre Pages: This aerial photo was taken in April 1949 when Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ was still more or less in the condition it was left when the Germans vacated it in September 1944. The annotations accord with the French numbering of the 1950s. (IGN) Back Cover: This rustic cross marks the spot where Halifax LW337 crashed in Berlin on the night of January 20/21, 1944. (Ralf Drescher) Acknowledgements: For his invaluable help with the Godley Head story, the Editor would like to thank Peter Wilkins. He also extends his appreciation to Peter Cooke. For their help with the ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ story, he thanks Didier Ledé of the ASW 2 Association; Dieter Zeigert, author in conjunction with Franz Seidler of Die Führerhauptquartiere 1939-1945; Pierre Rhode and Werner Sünkel, authors of Wolfsschlucht 2, Autopsie eines Führerhauptquartiers, and Bruno Renoult. Photo Credits: ATL — Alexander Turnbull Library; BA — Bundesarchiv; IGN — Institut Géographique National; MOD — Ministry of Defence; USNA — US National Archives.

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© Copyright After the Battle 2010 Editor: Karel Margry Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey Published by Battle of Britain International Ltd., The Mews, Hobbs Cross House, Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow, Essex CM17 0NN, England Telephone: 01279 41 8833 Fax: 01279 41 9386 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.afterthebattle.com Printed in Great Britain by Warners Group Publications PLC, Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH. After the Battle is published on the 15th of February, May, August and November.

During the Second World War, Lyttelton Harbour, on the east coast of New Zealand’s South Island, was protected against enemy attacks by a heavy coastal battery at Godley Head. Located at the northern mainland entrance to the natural harbour, this headland was an ideal look-out and a perfect battery position. The decision to build a battery there was already taken in December 1938 but construction of the gun casemates did not begin until after war had broken out in September 1939 and the first 6-inch guns were not operational until July 1941.

THE GUNS OF GODLEY HEAD Long considered, the fortification of New Zealand’s Godley Head was finally undertaken on the brink of the Second World War. Work on the largest defensive works on the South Island since Victorian times began in 1939 and continued throughout the war and beyond. New Zealand is comprised of two primary landmasses — the North and South Island — plus numerous smaller islands. Situated in the south-western Pacific Ocean, New Zealand’s closest neighbours are Australia, 1,300 miles to the west, and Fiji, 1,300 miles to the north. In the late 19th century, the isolated British colony faced the threat of an external aggressor — first France, then Russia. During the ‘Russian scares’ of 1870-85, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley, Royal Engineers, judged that the most likely form of attack against New Zealand would be from enemy cruisers. While it was assumed that any approaching enemy vessels would be intercepted by the Royal Navy, Scratchley nevertheless recommended coastal batteries, mines and torpedoes to protect the country’s primary ports. In line with Scratchley’s suggestions, by 1885 there were four coastal guns — 64-pounder guns at Spur Point Battery and Erskine Point and two 7-inch muzzle loaders at Battery Point — guarding Lyttelton Harbour. A joint Defence Secret Committee of August 1900 advocating the transfer of the Fort Jervois guns to Godley Head was not acted upon. Although the Russian menace had receded by 1903, Major-General James Babington, New Zealand Army, proposed a battery of 6-inch guns for Godley and Adderley Heads, at the entrance to Lyttelton Harbour, though he later reversed his decision to concentrate on the defence of Wellington and Auckland (on the North Island): ‘This colony cannot maintain more [sites] in an efficient state: it is a waste of money to continue inefficient defences’. Meanwhile in London, the Colonial Defence Committee independently championed the development of coastal artillery at Godley Head, an area set aside as a military reserve since 1851.

By David Mitchelhill-Green This scheme was supported by a Royal Engineers’ report and later reaffirmed by Lord Kitchener, who toured the area in 1910. But instead of ploughing money into additional fixed defences, Major-General Sir Alexander Godley, who became General Officer Commanding New Zealand Forces in 1910, turned instead to developing a national Territorial Force (TF). In Godley’s opinion, since it was impossible to install permanent defences at ‘all the innumerable ports and harbours’, the best way of repelling ‘an invader’ would be to ‘go meet him while he is landing and/or after he has landed’. Advances in artillery, however, rendered the original batteries at Lyttelton obsolete and the harbour was protected by two 6-inch and two 8-inch Armstrong ‘disappearing’ guns (‘disappearing’ because, as it fired, the recoil pushed the gun back underground where it could be reloaded under cover) at Fort Jervois, on Ripapa Island, at the outbreak of war in July 1914. One of these guns was later recommissioned in 1941 and served until 1943. In a situation similar to Australia’s first shot from Fort Nepean (see After the Battle No. 90), the small coaster Whakatu entered Lyttelton Harbour a month after the declaration of war on August 4 in brazen non-compliance of wartime regulations. The ship’s captain, ‘such a belligerent type that he ignored completely the examination vessel at the Heads’, continued to sail ‘on up the Harbour’ until a ‘6-inch shell across his bows brought him to very smartly’. Such was the only shot fired in anger at Lyttelton during the course of the First World War. New Zealand’s coastal batteries were stood down from 24-hour readiness in April 1915 and perhaps the main highlight at Lyttelton for the remainder of the war was the incarceration of the audacious Count Felix von Luckner, captain of the three-masted German raider SMS Seeadler, on Ripapa Island following his capture at Fiji and subsequent escape from a POW camp on Motuihe Island, near Auckland and recapture near the Kermadee Islands north of New Zealand.

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GODLEY HEAD

LYTTELTON

GOOGLE EARTH

GODLEY HEAD

Budgetary cutbacks in the immediate postwar period scuttled a proposal by Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Jellicoe (New Zealand’s Governor-General from 1920 to 1924) to reinforce the country’s harbour defences; indeed New Zealand’s fiscal deficit forced the closure of coastal defences including the mothballing of Lyttelton’s coastal artillery. At the same time the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which pre-empted the three largest naval powers — Great Britain, the United States and Japan — from entering into a new arms race, alarmed the New Zealand government because of the size limitations placed on the Royal Navy. Offsetting this concern, however, was Britain’s 1921 decision to construct a large naval base at Singapore. Added economic woes in subsequent years amid the Great Depression forced New Zealand’s Labour government to suspend compulsory military training, the fight against poverty a more pressing need. But as anti-militaristic sentiment swelled and the ranks in the Army’s Permanent Force continued to ebb, events abroad prompted a rethink. With the ending of Britain’s ‘Ten Year Rule’ — namely that no major conflict would arise in the next decade — as a consequence of Japanese intervention in China and Germany’s re-armament programme, a review of New Zealand’s defence requirements was tabled in October 1933. It encouraged Cabinet to upgrade the nation’s coastal defences with a priority second only to the development of a capable air force. Sites for several new coastal forts were identified, though for the moment, all were located on the North Island. As part of a 1937 reorganisation of the New Zealand Army, a Territorial Force Special Reserve was formed that would provide the ‘necessary personnel for the heavy [coastal batteries] and . . . the specialists required’ for the fortress infantry battalions. These reservists, unlike regular territorials, would train for an initial three months and afterwards attend a yearly ten-day camp during the term of their three-year enlistment. In the event of war breaking out, these fortress troops would be mobilised immediately. A fresh examination of the coastal defences by the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee regarded an attack on home soil by the Japanese as ‘highly improbable’. Moreover, Fortress Singapore was deemed ‘secure’. Reiterating earlier assessments, the commit-

in New Zealand and the largest urban area on South Island. The Godley Head battery formed part of the Lyttelton Fortress area.

DES SMITH COLLECTION

Lyttelton Harbour is a natural feature serving the port town of that name and lies south of Christchurch, the second largest city

When war broke out in September 1939, construction of the main gun position was still waiting to get started. As an emergency stop-gap, two carriage-mounted Mark III 60-pounder First World War field guns were quickly moved to the site on September 9 and set up on simple concrete pads several hundred yards north of the intended main battery position. The 30 gunners manning them initially cooked and ate in trenches, the wind at times being so strong that it literally blew the food from their plates! As the area was then still devoid of buildings except for the lighthouse and keeper’s cottage, they lived in tents until proper barracks became available in mid1940. Godley Battery, the main gun site built later, was in front of the trees visible on the ridge line in the distance.

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The guns have gone but their emplacements remain following restoration by the Godley Head Heritage Trust in 2009. 3

FORTIFYING GODLEY HEAD The outbreak of war added importance to the fortification of Godley Head, though work on the gun pits was further interrupted by the unavailability of the two 6-inch Mark XXIV guns originally assigned to the clifftop fortress. For a short time the ‘defended port’ of Lyttelton was protected by the single 4-inch examination battery inside the harbour at Battery Point. A dummy battery comprising two telegraph poles under a tarpaulin was briefly ‘operational’ until blustery weather exposed the deception. To compensate for the lack of available artillery, two Mark III 60-pounder field guns, accompanied by 30 gunners of the Territorial Force Special Reserve, 23rd Heavy Battery, New Zealand Artillery (NZA), were rushed from Trentham Camp near Wellington on North Island on September 9. The First World War vintage guns were immediately set up on concrete pads as an interim measure ‘for use seawards by day to prevent hostile vessels bombarding from anchor in the vicinity of the harbour’. The 60-pounder battery was known as the 17th Heavy Battery (Godley Head), 11th Heavy (Coast) Regiment, until June 1941 when the first 6-inch guns were brought into service. Godley Head’s two battery observations posts (BOPs) — No. 1 at 784 feet above sea level, No. 2 adjacent to the guns on top of the 300-foot cliff –, a miniature range, plotting room and engine room were completed by the end of 1940. A decision by the Royal New Zealand Navy not to reconfigure a second armed merchant cruiser released two 6inch Mark VII naval guns for use as coastal

DOC CHRISTCHURCH

In January 1941, work was begun on a temporary 6-inch gun battery on the headlands south-east of Taylor’s Mistake, directly behind and to the sides of the existing 60-pounder sites, as an interim measure till the main 6-inch battery was completed on the lighthouse site. Named Taylor Battery, it comprised two ex-naval breach-loading 6-inch Mark VII guns on PIII pivot mountings in reinforced-concrete barbette (literally, over the edge) positions. To transport the heavy gun barrels from Lyttelton Port to the battery site, the Army had to call in the help of nearby RNZAF Station Wigram which provided their specialised aircraft-moving vehicle to do the job. Being only a temporary facility, the battery had neither engine room nor magazine. Ready-use lockers were built into the rear of each gun platform, reserve ammunition and cartridges being stored under canvas nearby. A basic battery observation post was set up between and to the rear of the two guns. The guns were later provided with three-quarter (i.e. open to the rear) steel-plate turrets. The battery was operational for only six months — from July until December 1941 — being closed down when the first of the Mark XXIV guns came into service.

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tee found that the main danger to New Zealand was either an attack by enemy cruisers, submarines and motor torpedo boats; limited strikes by carrier-based aircraft, or an amphibious raid by small landing parties. A subsequent warning by Wing Commander the Hon. Ralph Cochrane, RAF, that any enemy attack would most likely be seaborne was followed by Cabinet consensus in December 1938 to establish a 6-inch counterbombardment battery at Godley Head. With Europe edging toward hostilities, a new assessment of the strategic importance of the Pacific was held in Wellington in April 1939. In recognising the possibility of a local conflict in concert with war in Europe, which would naturally obstruct any assistance from Britain, the review recommended the bolstering of New Zealand’s home defences. In the meantime a public tender for the construction of defensive works on Godley Head — two 6-inch gun emplacements, two battery observation posts, a plotting room and ancillary facilities — had closed. Construction of the gun pits, originally intended to begin in July 1939, was delayed, however, by a combination of bad weather and the priority given to other military projects following New Zealand’s declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939.

Today only the emplacements remain. When the site was closed down, the Mark VII guns were dismounted (they reportedly went to the Bay of Islands). Some time later the Army made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the northernmost gun platform. The last of the site’s buildings were removed in 1984. artillery in late 1940. Authorisation was granted the following January for their installation in a temporary battery, known as Taylor Battery due to its proximity to neighbouring Taylor’s Mistake. In the interim, construction had begun on two more emplacements several hundred yards to the south-east for the long-anticipated Mark XXIV guns. The two long-serving 60pounders were finally relieved in July 1941 when Taylor Battery’s 6-inch guns became operational. A month earlier battery regimental headquarters had moved to Godley Head, the battery redesignated as the 87th Heavy Battery. Later, in August 1941, it became the 80th Heavy Battery.

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Left: The army also built a number of pillboxes on the slope overlooking Taylor’s Mistake. Each one mounted a Lewis machine gun. 4

DOC CHRISTCHURCH PETER WILKINS

DOC CHRISTCHURCH

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Above: A camp to house the personnel was established 450 yards behind the headland. Construction began in July 1939. Three permanent buildings — the Officers’ Mess, Sergeants/Other Ranks Mess and the regimental office/quartermaster’s store — were completed in permanent materials but war shortages forced the construction of the remaining barracks and facilities in wood. Later on, the influx of WAAC personnel and fortress troops required many additional buildings. The water supply for the camp posed a major problem for in spite of sinking several bore holes, no natural source could be found on the Head. A supply was eventually obtained from the reservoir at Taylor’s Mistake, an additional 455,000-litre reservoir being established at Black Rock and one of 136,500 litres at Lyons Main. This is the view of the camp looking out towards the sea. Right: The three permanent buildings and the Medical Inspection Room (the only wartime wooden building to survive) and the parking lot are all that remain.

Left: The camp, which could accommodate 400 persons, comprised 91 buildings, including barracks, quartermaster’s store, kitchen, laundry, ablution block, messes and medical post. This is

the view looking towards the hill. Right: The Godley Head Heritage Trust is working to turn the former regimental headquarters/quartermaster’s store (left) into a museum. 5

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with ‘Colchester-style’ overhead protection. These concrete covers restricted the arc of fire to the seaward approaches to the harbour. New Zealand official photographer John Dobrée Pascoe (a renowned mountaineer/writer/photographer before the war) pictured E1 gun firing a test-shot on January 12, 1943.

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The two Mark XXIV 6-inch guns for the Godley Battery finally arrived in June 1941 and were ready for operations by the following December. They had a firing range of 14 miles with shells weighing 100lbs. The 30-ton weapons were protected by open-end steel-plate turrets and mounted in barbette positions

The guns have gone but the casemates for E1 and E2 remain. 6

Right: E2 gun pictured during the war. Each gun was equipped with a personnel shelter and ready-use lockers, with an underground magazine having a capacity of 800 shells. Projectiles were brought up by hoist.

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DOC CHRISTCHURCH

Barely five months passed before Taylor Battery’s tenure concluded with the completion of Godley Battery. Its two long-range Mark XXIV guns — the only ones installed in New Zealand during the war — were mated with their Mark V mountings on December 20 and 24, 1941. The two guns — dubbed E1 and E2 — were first fired, respectively, on January 12 and 15, 1942. Originally open, overhead protection was completed by April 1942 following a howl of protest from the commanding officer of the 11th Heavy Regiment. Additional work was carried out building a new battery observation post, No. 3, directly behind the camp as the uppermost one — No. 1 — was not infrequently shrouded in mist. However, by this point in the war the enemy threat to Lyttelton Harbour had long since passed.

The concrete cover has stood the test of time well.

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The casemate’s interior showing the access to the shelter.

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Above: Godley Battery’s third gun emplacement — E3 — completed in 1944 (but with its gun not installed until 1946), had no overhead cover which theoretically allowed a 360-degree field of fire. Below: E3 still offers a spectacular vista.

ENEMY OPERATIONS An appreciation issued on November 23, 1939, by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence (in London) downplayed the likelihood of a New Zealand invasion. Japan, it was reckoned, needed to ‘dispatch and subsequently maintain a large army more than 3,000 miles from home, with the possibility that at any time a British fleet would arrive to cut the communications; in which case all would be lost’. As it eventuated, neither the Japanese Army nor Navy entertained plans for occupying New Zealand and, for a short period, it was the German Kriegsmarine that posed the biggest hazard to shipping at Lyttelton Harbour. New Zealanders had every right to be wary of German raiders. During the First World War the German raider Wolf laid mines off New Zealand’s North Cape and Farewell Spit. The first intruder of the next war was the auxiliary cruiser HSK Orion, which laid a total of 228 EMC (Einheitsmine Type C) moored contact mines across the Hauraki Gulf and east of the Colville Channel off the North Island on the night of June 13/14, 1940. The minefield’s first victim was the liner Niagara, which sank after hitting two mines near Mokohinau Island, off Auckland, on June 18. Earlier in the year, on January 14, the German auxiliary cruiser HSK Pinguin had captured the Norwegian whaling factory ships Ole Wegger and Pelagos, the whale-oil tanker Solglimt plus 11 whale catchers. The newly-acquired prize fleet was sailed to France with the exception of one of the small 354-ton whalers, Pol IX, which was renamed Adjutant and retained as a scouting vessel. Following the loss of Pinguin in the Arabian Sea to HMS Cornwell on May 8, 7

PETER WILKINS

PETER WILKINS

Battery Observation Post 2, located right on the cliff edge south of Godley Battery, was the Short Range and Night Observation Post. Its purpose was to take over from BOP3 when there was limited visibility due to weather or nightfall. The searchlights at the harbour’s edge were directly controlled from this post.

Battery Observation Post 3 was situated half way up the slope towards the camp, and served as the Long Range BOP where the Battery Commander or Duty Officer was based. From here

the range and direction of targets was established and transmitted directly to the Battery Plotting Room. Corrections to fall-of-shot were also made from here.

Left: The interior of BOP 2 with the Depression Position Finder on the left and the stools for the Battery Commander and his

assistant on the right. Right: All the fittings have gone but this is the same view today.

PETER WILKINS

DOC CHRISTCHURCH

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Battery Observation Post 1 (BOP1), just below the crest of the hill, south-west of the camp, housed the Seaward Defence Headquarters. Here the regimental commander, supported by Navy and Air Force representatives, acted as the Fire Commander for the Lyttelton Fire Command. Orders to engage the battery were issued by him to the Battery Commander at BOP3.

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Left: A WAAC operating the Depression Position Finder (DPF) in BOP2, pictured by John Dobrée Pascoe in January 1943. This telescope-like instrument was used because the observation post was at both a different height and bearing to the target than were the guns. The downwards angle and the true bearing between the telescope and the target was relayed to the Plotting Table at the Battery Plotting Room and then recalculated by it to give the down-angle and bearing from the guns’

own perspective. This was then used in calculating both the bearing of the guns and its elevation in order for the rounds to reach the target. The down-angle from the guns and the known height between the guns and the tide were used in a trigonometric calculation which resulted in establishing the correct distance to the target. Right: The Inclination Officer, a 2nd lieutenant, at work with his stereoscopic sight, photographed by Dobrée Pascoe in the same BOP.

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PETER WILKINS

DOC AUCKLAND RUFFLE COLLECTION

Right: Two Projector Fortress 90cm Mark V 1939 searchlights were installed at sea level on the southern (harbour) side of Godley Head, just below BOP2. These supported the Godley Battery and covered the harbour mouth at night. The buildings housing the lights were constructed of reinforced concrete with a semicircular ‘bay window’ front, fitted with sliding steel shutters to close off the opening and protect the lights when not in use (our picture shows a similar emplacement at North Head). Access to the searchlights was via a steep track down the cliff and a 120-metre-long access tunnel. Each light was manned from dusk to dawn. When a friendly vessel entered the harbour, both lights were dipped so as not to illuminate it as a target for an enemy submarine. The ship was then trailed into the harbour by the sweep light to ensure no enemy vessel used it as a cover to enter the harbour. The 18-inch carbon rods for the searchlights burned quickly and they required replacing every 45 minutes.

The inner searchlight (left) was called the ‘sentry light’. It was aligned on a white marker, low on Adderley Head, and remained stationary throughout the night, the intention being to form a barrier of light through which any unknown vessel

entering the harbour had to pass. The outer light, known as the ‘sweep’, was ranged back and forth across the harbour entrance by a remote operator at BOP2. Right: The emplacement’s steel shutters have become somewhat unhinged. 9

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Left: Also part of the Godley Head installations were two radar stations. The first unit, a CWS (Coast Watching Set) Mk1, was located in a building called Station S1 (South 1), immediately adjacent to BOP1, and had its own generator. Its mast, aerial and gearbox were attached to the BOP’s rear (see page 8). Installed by the Post and Telegraph Department, the system became operational on January 4, 1941. A long-range set, it acted primarily in an EW (Electronic Warfare) role but occasionally performed unofficially as a GS (Gunnery Set), providing early warning of approaching shipping up at ranges between 30 to 50,000 yards. It was crewed by a team of 8 to 12 specially trained gunners, from December 1942 progressively relieved by WAACs. (Coast-watching sets were normally manned by the RNZN but those at Godley Head were manned by Army personnel.) In late 1942, the CWS Mk1 set was replaced with an improved NZ 105 system, seen in this photo, which had a reach of between 40 and 60,000 yards. It was sited between BOP1 and BOP3 — though nearer to BOP3 — but regarded as part of S1.

PETER WILKINS

DOC CHRISTCHURCH

In late 1943 the NZ 105 was dismantled and returned to stores. Today all that remains is a small level area on the hillside. Our author David Green, together with local expert Peter Wilkins, discovered it when scouting the terrain during their research for this article.

1941, Adjutant joined the auxiliary cruiser HSK Komet, a veteran of in the audacious attack on Nauru (see After the Battle No. 94), in the Indian Ocean later that month. From here the two vessels sailed south of Australia to the Pacific Ocean from where Adjutant would mine New Zealand waters. Komet’s war diary recounted the operation, ‘At 1130 hours on June 11 [1941] Ship 45 sent Adjutant, as planned, to lay ten TMB [magnetic] mines [originally intended for the waters off Rabaul six months earlier (see After the Battle No. 98)] in the approaches to the New Zealand harbours of Port Lyttelton and Port Nicholson (Wellington) during the next new moon period’. Under Leutnant zur See Hans-Karl Hemmer, the voyage to New Zealand was uneventful apart from engine trouble. The diary continues: ‘The Auckland Islands appear to starboard at 1320 on June 20. At 1600 on June 24 Adjutant sets course 267° for Lyttelton: wind is force 7 to force 8 with corresponding sea. The mines are clear for laying and the ship ready

Left: The second radar installation, Station S4 (South 4), was located immediately behind the Godley Battery gun positions. Construction was begun on August 4, 1942 and it became operational on October 26 that year. The short-range set was an Australian-made CA (Coastal Artillery) No. 1 Mk I ShD (Shore Defence) unit which acted primarily in the Gunnery Set role and could detect ships up to 35 miles from Godley Head. During the time that Station S1 was being upgraded to an NZ 105 set, Station S4 temporarily took over the former’s coastwatching role. Still later, in August 1943, a new CD (Coastal Defence) CA No. 1 Mark II set was mounted at or near the 10

ShD’s location. This was in turn replaced by a No. 1 Mark V equipment (which had a mobile cabin and power units). Once this was giving good results, the NZ 105 at S1 was taken out of service. Right: The S4 site was abandoned on October 29, 1943, the Mark V set being moved to alongside the small Port War Signal Station, located between the 60-pounder and Godley Battery emplacements. ‘Mothballed’ since 1943, the ShD equipment was dismantled and dispatched to Burnham Stores in May 1945. Post-war, during the Compulsory Military Training period, an Observation Position (just visible behind the tree) was erected on top of the ShD radar building.

‘The Adjutant then withdraws on a course 50°. After 0200 this is altered to 70° and speed increased to ten knots. Shortly afterwards, the lights of a steamer coming in from the south-east are seen. At daybreak the Adjutant is about 60 miles off the coast. The high snow-covered mountains can be seen clearly; and as the sun rises, it might as well be the Bodensee’. For his part in the operation, Hemmer was later awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, ‘in recognition of his former service as a mem-

ber of the crew of the Pinguin and latterly of his command of the Adjutant’. Mine expert Oberleutnant zur See W. Karsten was also decorated ‘in recognition of the mine-laying operation’. Adjutant’s sortie, however, was a failure, the mines apparently defective. As an entry in Komet’s war diary later recorded: ‘No news of any sort was ever obtained about losses of shipping brought about by the Adjutant minefields’. Post-war, several explanations have been put forward why this was so, none, however, conclusive.

GODLEY HEAD HERITAGE TRUST (PETER WILKINS)

to scuttle herself. It is a dark night. Godley Head light comes into sight at 2130; later, also the Christchurch aircraft homing beacons. They are all burning peacefully. A searchlight at Godley Head directed towards Baleine Point bars the main approach to the harbour. At 2400, when Adjutant is three miles off Godley Head, the light is kept dead ahead. On June 25, between 0007 and 0122, the ten mines are laid according to plan at a depth of 16.5 to 22 metres, the ship steaming at seven knots. There is no enemy opposition.

KARL AUGUST BALSER

The German scouting vessel Adjutant which laid ten magnetic mines outside the entrance to Lyttelton Harbour on the night of June 24/25, 1941. It was not detected, probably because the CWS radar, which in any case was not able to pick up smaller ships, was out of action (which it frequently was). The mines never caused any damage to any shipping and various theories have been put forward to explain their ineffectiveness, one being that the batteries powering them had been allowed to go flat while they were still on the vessel, another that the mines were released in water too deep to allow the mechanism to function properly. A recent theory proposed that perhaps the mines were never laid at all, since the only record was the Komet’s logbook. However, the Naval and Coastal Defences of Wellington did hunt for a vessel acting suspiciously off the Wellington Harbour entrance, which presumably would have been the Adjutant.

Sketch map showing the various gun sites, observation posts, searchlights, service buildings and other installations on Godley Head. 11

PETER WILKINS

DOC CHRISTCHURCH

Left: An integral part of the Lyttelton Fortress area was a permanent heavy anti-aircraft battery located on the hilltop east of Mount Pleasant in Christchurch. Begun in August 1942 and completed in early 1943, it comprised four 3.7-inch guns in open mountings and a command post excavated into the rock.

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lar recreational destination — the fort ranked among New Zealand’s top-ten coastal defence heritage sites.

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guns of Godley Head removed and scrapped. Occasional Army exercises were held until the early 1990s and today the area is a popu-

Having become obsolete in the nuclear era, Godley Battery’s three 6-inch guns were dismantled and scrapped in 1958. This is E2 gun — then (above) and now (below).

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JAPAN, WAACs AND MOTHBALLS Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor led to the further expansion of New Zealand’s coastal and anti-aircraft defences as well as a social revolution. A shortage of men prompted the large-scale employment of women to operate artillery fire-control instruments and radiolocation, or radar, equipment. Some 2,200 women enlisted in the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) by November 1942, many of whom served at Godley Head and the 3.7-inch anti-aircraft battery on nearby Mount Pleasant. But with little likelihood of an enemy attack, the decision was made in June 1943 to curb the expansion of New Zealand’s coastal defences and to curtail the enlistment of WAACs. Godley Battery ceased its operational role at 1200 hours on November 2, 1943. Relegated to ‘care and maintenance’ status, only the observation posts were continuously manned. Plans for a second, larger 9.2-inch counter-bombardment battery on Mount Northcroft at ‘Site L’ were also shelved. The regimental headquarters shifted to Christchurch and only the radar remained fully operational, primarily as a navigational aid for the inter-island ferry and early warning for the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Port War Signal Station at Godley Head. In 1944 the 80th Heavy Battery became the 80th Coast Battery, although all coast and anti-aircraft defences were effectively mothballed by this time. All WAAC personnel were transferred to Burnham Military Camp by April 1945 though, curiously, work continued on the building of the third gun emplacement at Godley Battery — E3. Construction of the open gun pit, allowing a 360degree radius of fire, had started in March 1943 and was eventually completed in 1944. The actual gun, which had been delivered during the war, was not installed until March 1946. The gun’s large underground magazine was also not completed until several years after the war. Although the golden age of coastal artillery had long since passed, the guns of Godley Head again saw service during the Cold War with the introduction of Compulsory Military Training. In this new role E3 was fired for the first time in June 1950. A mobile Mark I twin 6-pounder quick-firing gun, originally requested and delivered in 1943 for use against torpedo boats or submarines in the shallow waters of the harbour entrance, was also brought into service. While Britain decided to abandon coastal defences in 1956 as ineffective in the event of a nuclear war, New Zealand’s Chiefs-of-Staff retained the coastal artillery for another year as a ‘comparatively cheap deterrent’ against Russian aggression. The following year Territorial Force coastal defence training was abandoned and the

The guns were operated by approximately 50 men of the 83rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, assisted by a dozen WAACs crewing the command post. The battery was manned from January 1943 to September 1944 but never went into action. Right: The deserted concrete echoes the memories of the past.

THE TRUE GLORY Division and the US War Department, US Navy, the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Canadian Military Headquarters. In a memorandum dated December 15, 1944, to the Assistant Chief-of-Staff, G-l SHAEF, the Director of SHAEF’s Public Relations Division, Brigadier General Frank A. Allen, Jr., proposed that the Joint AngloAmerican Film Project, created months earlier as the production instrument for the Committee, be officially formalised.

By Trevor Popple The Project Group was composed of technical staff, covering all professions and trades, drawn from the British and American film industries. The American element was all military while the British, though predominately military, included some civilians, and was based at the British Film and Photo Centre at Pinewood Studios in Buckinghamshire.

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The Joint Anglo-American Film Planning Committee was created on March 8, 1944 for the purpose of producing official films for world distribution showing the Allied operations from a truly integrated viewpoint. Previous experience had shown that the making of official war films portraying major operations on a unilateral basis, i.e. separate American and British films, was giving the world an entirely false impression, which stood in urgent need of correction. The Committee sat under joint chairmen in the persons of Robert Patterson of the American Office of War Information (OWI), and Jack Beddington of the British Ministry of Information. It consisted of representatives of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Public Relations

The office for the Joint Anglo-American Film Project for The True Glory was located at 20 Grosvenor Square, London.

The building, minus the bricked-up windows and fortified entrance, is now the HQ of US Naval Forces in Europe. 13

The reason for Allen’s request for the absorption of the Project Group into SHAEF was to prevent the transfer of military personnel who hitherto had been working on temporary duty status from other areas of the armed forces. The recent failure to retain a captain from the US Psychological Warfare Division plus the pending similar fate of two British officers had brought matters to a head. The film, as yet untitled, was in the advance stages of production, and changes of creative staff in uniform had become an intolerable and disruptive irritation. The British civilians involved with the film were not under threat and Allen nominated the US military team within the group as: a Lieutenant General, one Major, two Captains, one Staff Sergeant and one Technician, 4th Grade. The British consisted of two GSO2s with the proviso that one officer might be from the ATS. Prior to the formation of the Committee, the American approach to filming the forthcoming invasion and subsequent campaign was laid down by Major George C. Stevens, Chief of the Signal Corps Motion Picture Department, as a series of films of two reels (20 minutes) each, or longer, plus a fulllength production tentatively titled Assault on the Continent. This feature would be compiled from material lifted from the anticipated eight two-reelers ‘and/or other topics as the campaign develops’. In January 1944 a draft script plan ‘for practical discussion’ with the working title A Single Instrument (a reference to Allied solidarity) was in existence. This was to be a two-reel production for civilian distribution in the USA covering preparations for the landings to be released on D-Day. At this point a directive from SHAEF was required to proceed singly or ‘in any form of joint Anglo-American collaboration as may be directed . . .’ Discussions in March between the Committee, Major David McDonald of the British Army Film and Photo Unit (AFPU), and Major Stevens’s Special Coverage Unit agreed upon joint collaboration, and script writers were engaged forthwith. The duration of the feature was undecided, or at what stage of events it should conclude, or even when it should be released. The British fully supported the featurelength production, and the Americans concurred that it was the best idea, but they still held on to the additional two-reel pre-invasion film for the American public. The Committee endorsed this decision. By May, areas of the American War Department were having misgivings, or perhaps getting a little paranoid, over the joint film policy and the departure from previous practice. Distortions of the truth were being

On March 28, 1945, General Eisenhower appeared at a press conference held in the Scribe Hotel in Paris. His theme that ‘teamwork wins wars’ is repeated in the filmed introduction to The True Glory: ‘I have been asked to be the spokesman for this Allied Expeditionary Force in saying a word of introduction to what you are about to see. It is the story of the Nazi defeat, on the Western Front. So far as possible, the editors have made it an account of the really important men in this campaign. I mean the enlisted soldiers, sailors and airmen, that fought through every obstacle, to victory. Of course to tell the whole story would take years, but the theme would be the same: teamwork wins wars. I mean teamwork among nations, services, and men, all the way down the line from the GI and the Tommy to us brass hats. Our enemy in this campaign was strong, resourceful and cunning, but he made a few mistakes. His greatest blunder was this: he thought he could break up our partnership but we were welded together by fighting for one great cause; in one great team; a team in which you were an indespensible and working member. That spirit of free people, working, fighting and living together in one great cause has served us well on the Western Front. It will likewise defeat that other great enemy of human freedom, even now in the far off Pacific reeling under the blows delivered by our gallant comrades in arms. We in the field pray that that spirit of comradeship will persist for ever, among the free peoples of the United Nations.’ aired in Washington: the Committee was predominately British; any joint productions would be released in Britain before the United States; there were even questions as to why Pinewood was the base for film operations. Clearly the War Department was not cognizant of the realities. The Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was moved to cable the Chief of the General Staff, General George C. Marshall, to disperse these concerns. Eisenhower apologised for any fears that may have arisen in Washington, blaming unclear communicaTwo directors were appointed to represent Anglo-American interests: Carol Reed (left) for Great Britain and Garson Kanin (right) for the United States. Directing since 1935, Reed’s first major film was The Stars Look Down in 1939 which was followed by Night Train to Munich in 1940, followed by a thriller, The Girl in the News, in 1941. Reed’s next assignment was a dramatised documentary made for the Army to show civilians what they could expect on joining up (The New Lot in 1943), which was later expanded into a full-length feature for public exhibition — The Way Ahead released in 1944. Garson Kanin had worked as both an actor and director on Broadway but some of his best known work was as a writer. He even worked as a musician and comedian! In 1939 he directed The Great Man Votes and Tom Dick and Harry in 1941 before being drafted to produce films for the War Information and Emergency Manpower offices. Carol Reed died in 1976 and Garson Kanin in 1999.

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tion, and proceeded to give a concise report laying out the facts. That he had to explain the Pinewood situation is probably indicative of the depth of Washington’s worry and feelings of isolation. The reasons he cited were (i) the studios’ proximity to the forthcoming operations; (ii) sufficient British and almost enough American production personnel (this would be later corrected) were already available; (iii) ‘actual combatant participants are locally available for any necessary re-enacted scenes’; and, (iv) Pinewood had been already made available.

The Supreme Commander went on to stress the absolute importance of a joint film policy. On the one hand the British and Canadians would be denied the ability to make a biased independent film, but would have total access to American newsreel material. On the other hand the Americans would be in a reciprocal position with access to British and Canadian footage. Eisenhower concluded his cable: ‘Since it has always been my foremost desire to establish a spirit of teamwork and unity of all elements under my command, I foresee great danger in the possibility of not having a balanced coverage in both newsreels and special films of the forthcoming operations. I am also fearful that any evidence of disunity at this point might go much further than the subject of film.’ [author’s italics] In an exchange of signals within SHAEF the appointment of producers and directors was discussed. It was proposed that the Joint Committee would request the US War Department and the British Government to provide a producer or producers for each specific joint picture. It also recommended that a sub-committee be formed to lend every assistance and advice to producers. This first signal (sent on June 5, which should have been D-Day) was answered on June 8 and agreed with, but with the comment: ‘In theory co-producer idea OK but in practice it may work out better if production entrusted to one single producer either American or British. Committee can decide on this.’ On June 14, a trans-Atlantic telephone conference principally between Colonel Justus B. Lawrence, GSC Public Relations Section US European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), and Major General Alexander D. Surles, Director of the Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, embraced a number of topics. On the subject of a billings policy, it was generally agreed that joint films should have two sets of main titles. British copies would have first billing: something to the effect, ‘presented by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States’, and American copies would be headed by a switched billing. It was also agreed that both versions would have their own commentators. The advisory sub-committee was appointed during this trans-Atlantic conference. General Lord Burnham, Director of Public Relations, War Office, and Colonel Lawrence himself, based in England but acting under orders from the War Department in Washington, were both selected. In addition there would be a representative from

The score was by William Alwyn, an English composer and music teacher from Northampton. He was a virtuoso flautist and was Professor of Composition at the Royal Academy of Music from 1926 to 1955. Between 1941 to 1962 he wrote over 70 film scores. He died in 1985.

Robert Harris is the commentator, linking the various ‘chapters’ together. He studied for the stage at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art and won the Reandean Scholarship at the Critics Circle Schools of Acting competition. He made his first professional appearance in 1923 and died in 1995.

SHAEF’s Public Relations Office, and in September Brigadier William Turner was appointed. During this conference (on D + 8) co-producers were offered. The Americans proposed Lieutenant Colonel Anatole Litvak (one of Frank Capra’s contemporaries), whilst the British offered Major David McDonald, a Scot with a pre-war Hollywood background who had supervised Desert Victory. Surles agreed. The format of The True Glory was still untitled and far, far from its final form. During these discussions the film was expected to be a six-reeler (60 minutes) covering the inception, preparation and implementation of Operation ‘Overlord’, the thrust inland, and a yet to be determined climax (a month and a half later this would still be a question). Assuming that the campaign in France would go according to plan it was hoped to set a general target date for completion at four to six weeks from June 6 with two weeks post-production. The thinking behind these talks seemed to be that after D-Day plus eight weeks the first flush of battle would be over. This was to prove to be a woefully naive piece of wishful thinking. On

D-Day plus six weeks the ‘first flush’ was far from over. The American First Army was bogged down in the hedgerows and swamps north-west of Saint-Lô so the break-out from the bridgehead had yet to be accomplished, whilst the British and Canadians were locked in a bloody struggle for Caen — a target planned to be captured on D-Day. In no way was this the fitting climax to The True Glory that had been hoped for. The fact that the campaign in France had not developed in the way the film-makers had optimistically assumed naturally influenced the shape of the joint feature film format. October 1944 appeared to be the key month that indicated changes afoot. The earliest reference to Carol Reed as the film’s producer appears in some orders, dated the 26th, authorising film music composer Sergeant Marc Blitzstein to travel to Paris with the purpose of touring France and collecting partisan songs. From the tone of the document Reed had been working on the film for some time. The first reference to the film’s American director, Captain Garson Kanin, does not appear until December 14.

Millions of feet of combat film were viewed to select the 7,500 feet needed, a hugely difficult task when there were so many aspects to cover. SHAEF had to make specific requests for material, for example on February 6, 1945 for ‘a few scenes of Negro combat troops’; March 23 for ‘high-level bombing effectiveness’ . . . trying to avoid sequences that have been willingly used’, and as late as

May 30 for ‘coverage of General Patton with three stars and pearlhandle pistols with background similar to St Lo’. At the same time well-known footage had to be included like the photo-call of the D-Day commanders at Norfolk House (left) on February 1, 1944, and Admiral Bertram Ramsay and Ike emerging from Southwick House at Portsmouth on June 6 (see After the Battle No. 84). 15

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Left: Captured film was included, this particular shot portraying the might of the German military parading on the Unter den However it is extremely probable that the two men were appointed simultaneously by the Joint Committee — but when? And why were Litvak and McDonald removed? In employing British film-maker Carol Reed, the Joint Committee had secured the basis of a strong foundation upon which to build The True Glory. His classic story The Way Ahead starring David Niven, which dealt with the transformation of raw civilians into cool, professional infantrymen, had been released that year. Reed had entered the film industry at Ealing in 1932, directing his first full-length feature in 1935, thereafter consistently using his ability to tell a good story with an inner excitement to good effect. Captain Garson Kanin, aged 32 and Reed’s junior by six years, had begun as a director in Hollywood in 1938. Known for his prowess as a raconteur, he was equally adept at writing screenplays, especially in collaboration with his wife Ruth Gordon. Script production and preparation were now moving ahead. On October 14 a copy of the ‘Overlord’ plan dated July 1943, with subsequent revisions and inclusive of operations during August, was supplied by SHAEF to Lieutenant Colonel Harlan Miller and Wing Commander Louis Nickolls, RAF, of the Public Relations Division. As reconnaissance and narrative officers and advisers to Reed and Kanin they were authorised access to Top Secret data. By late November General Surles, in a letter to General Allen, agreed that the producers and the British members of the Joint Committee were correct in wanting to make a film embracing the period from pre-invasion to German capitulation. He added that the American public had not seen a film (as opposed to newsreels) portraying the US Forces since D-Day, whereas it had seen several covering the activities in preparation for the invasion. At this time Surles believed that one-third of the picture (20 minutes) would largely report this theme and laid down a personal preference for a detailed explanation of the military achievement, namely the beach fighting; supply build-up; hedgerow combat techniques; break-out; the armoured thrust across Brittany; and the sweep beyond Paris. ‘These things’, said Surles, ‘happened so rapidly that even the splendid coverage provided by the American press did not fully tell the story.’ He added: ‘The production of this picture is in expert hands. Captain Garson Kanin knows his business and so do the other American officers now associated with the project. The War Department is protected by its right to script and picture-review.’ The General then ‘passed the buck’ to Allen over the matter of ‘general supervision’ and the correct representation of the ‘American point of view’. 16

Linden in Berlin. Right: The saluting base was in front of the Royal Guard House with the Arsenal (Zeughaus) beyond.

It was now abundantly clear that this film was a potential time-bomb, as each of the British and American services endeavoured to ensure that they would be shown in a favourable light. For Reed and Kanin it must have been an awesome responsibility. An example of this is shown in a memo to General Allen dated December 7. Reed and Kanin had provided an interim report on the film’s content. The response was that more footage of the French Resistance and the Free French units in Europe be included; also there was ‘the necessity for including enough [American] air force material to satisfy General Arnold, otherwise there is a danger that he will stop the release of the picture’. The General was not concerned with the balance between the Allies, but rather a fair showing of the ‘actual line-up, land, sea and air, to give an idea of the relative number of troops’. This same memo also now indicated a fresh degree of indecision creeping in regarding where the film should end. Jack Beddington, General Lord Burnham and Robert Patterson of the OWI were being swayed by the ‘changed military situation’. At this point Carol Reed had not been consulted as he was in Brussels and not contactable. However, for the moment, General Surles’s original agreement over the capitulation option still stood.

A month later, on January 6, 1945, Surles’s office in Washington sent a signal requesting a viewing print of the rough cut and commentary for submission as soon as possible. ‘Decision will then be made as to whether film should be completed immediately without awaiting termination of hostilities. We now lean toward early completion and do not anticipate continuing joint producing activities.’ Reed and Kanin pressed on. On January 5 they had contacted the France Libre Actualité in Paris for material from Journal Allemand No. 21. On February 7 a SHAEF signal went to US 12th Army Group requesting scenes of Negro combat troops: ‘Scenes showing Negro Artillery, Tank or Anti-Tank in action with proper cut-ins. Close-ups of face, etc.’ On February 14 Allen contacted Surles by signal and reported that the Joint Committee, having viewed the rough cut, were recommending changes because of ‘factual errors and minor omissions’. Otherwise the film was considered to be excellent. A Committee viewing of the final cut covering operations up to March 1 was to be arranged in London for Monday, March 19. The Committee and the Public Relations Directors of the British Ministries were very anxious that General Surles or a suitable delegate be pre-

As well as material taken by combat cameramen from the USA and Britain, footage came from Canada, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Holland, Norway and Poland.

Naturally D-Day forms the central theme of the film. This American footage shows Eisenhower visiting the 101st Airborne Division at Greenham Common on the evening of June 5 (see After the Battle No. 85). Surles be there, and Newman was asking that it be pointed out to the General that not only were the Committee extending the invitation but so were General Lord Burnham of the War Office and Lord Willoughby de Broke of the Air Ministry. Most of the British involved had never met Surles and were anxious to do so, for there were other Allied public relations problems that required discussion apart from the jointly produced film. Newman then appraised Mitchell of the picture’s current content. There was still a shortage of footage devoted to Negro troops, also, only one or two generals’ names were mentioned; the feeling held was that all ‘Army and higher commanders should be mentioned or none of them’. It was felt that women’s service activities were understated as was the subsequent invasion of France from the south (the latter is only referred to verbally in the released film). The Mulberry harbours and ‘pre-D-Day disaster’ were thought to be overstated, and should be balanced by reference to operations ‘such as North Africa, Italy, Dieppe, etc.’ These were the areas that would be corrected for the viewing on March 19. According to Newman’s memo the Joint Committee and the War Department were in accord with regard to the film’s content ending with operations on March 1. Following the viewing, Mitchell signalled Surles on March 23 because the air force material was not of sufficient quality: ‘Immediately select 2,000 feet fine grain of . . . effective shots of ground strafing on roads, railroads, canals, etc, avoiding shot of automobile in which Rommel was supposed to

ride, also avoiding stuff overworked by newsreel or industrial incentive film. . . . Include shots of high-level bombing effectiveness, using best half-dozen examples of pin-pointing target areas with clearest possible result, also trying to avoid sequences that have been widely used. Please include several sequences of cut-in shots of American pilots, gunners, bombardiers, in bombers shown close up to indicate facial expression.’ General Eisenhower viewed the film on March 28 and his visual prologue and sections of commentary were shot and recorded on the 29th. With regard to the content, he made the following observations: (i) General Bradley should appear in at least one shot; (ii) the commentary describing the Omaha landing was not good, ‘in that it indicated something went wrong due to mistakes, etc, whereas resistance experienced at Omaha was expected everywhere’; (iii) ‘that the Mortain fighting should not be presented as a “retreat” [sic]’; (iv) ‘the commentary should indicate that the brass hats gave to the Leclerc Division the opportunity to enter Paris first’; (v) ‘more space should be given to the landings in Southern France and the advance of General Devers’ 6th Army Group up the Rhone Valley.’ In conclusion, Eisenhower stated that he and senior members of his staff wanted a preview before the film’s public release. A month later, to the day, Mitchell enthusiastically signalled Surles in Washington: ‘Reviewed and gave tentative approval to first five reels of film on Friday. Final review of full eight reels is now set for May 18. Picture at this point is remarkable and potential box office success.’

And on the beaches. Left: This is Canadian film of the touch-down on Juno Beach — a location we just had to track down for D-Day Then and Now (right).

WYBO BOERSMA

sent. Surles’s reply, six days later, suggested that as he could not be in London on the appointed date, a rough cut be sent to Washington, accompanied by a competent officer to answer any questions, so that the War Department, OWI and War Activities Committee could view it and comment. Surles’s signal did little to further the Supreme Commander’s desire for ‘teamwork and unity’ between the Allies. The British and Canadian view was that the film was of ‘inestimable value’ for releasing in all three countries as an ‘outward and visible manifestation of the integrated effort which alone has enabled the Allied Expeditionary Force to reach present positions’. Allen was also told that British opinion was that the keynote of victory ‘will be the completeness of unity . . . among the victorious armies of all three nationalities’. This was a crisis point for Allen, and then the British added: ‘if the subject of film emphasises integration, work on production cannot be less than 100 per cent integrated’. Then they indirectly pointed towards the War Department: ‘Integration during production is already . . . achieved by efforts of the joint staff . . . but higher-level integration is now essential if post-production high-level criticism is to be avoided.’ Allen wisely passed the British and Canadian views in depth to Surles on February 25, and recommended the Committee’s view that personal contact in one room between senior representatives of all the public relations authorities be upheld. Allen urged that Colonel Curtis Mitchell of the War Department’s Pictorial Branch attend the London viewing and then return to Washington with a British officer and a copy of the film. Mitchell had already been made aware of this situation in a memo dated February 15 from Lieutenant Colonel Irving Newman, Chief, Photo Section, clearly stressing the importance of General Surles’s presence at the viewing. It had been Mitchell’s idea that

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The liberation of Paris by French forces (featured in issue 14) . . . official admitted that he could not imagine a soldier in a slit trench saying ‘there’s a lot of dashed shells about’. American release was set for September. The only real criticism levelled at the British version by some areas of the Press was the style of the linking commentary. The Spectator described it as ‘impersonal . . . which makes the astonishing mistake of trying to give events importance by describing them in the archaic phrases of bad, Shakespearian blank verse.’ It also made brief mention of the omission of the extremely poor weather at the time of the invasion and of ‘General Eisenhower’s momentous decision to proceed in spite of the unfavourable conditions’. Just over a year later, on October 8, 1946, a sad and desperate story appeared in the Daily Graphic and a couple of other newspapers. Mrs Joyce Quinton had seen the film in London’s West End and had thought she recognised her father, Driver Ernest Page, RASC. The family had been informed that he had been reported missing following an amphibious operation on the River Scheldt in 1944. Unfortunately the sequence in which Driver Page was supposed to have appeared was describing action in Holland in 1945. Grasping this, Mrs Quinton and her sister Miss Eva Page viewed the film together at the War Office cinema in London’s Curzon Street and both agreed that they had seen their father. The family, particularly his widow, had never accepted his death, preferring instead to believe he was still alive somewhere but suffering from a loss of memory. Subsequent War Office enquiries proved inconclusive but it stands as an example — and a warning — of the possible dangers of film producers using footage merely

to illustrate a theme and not in a strict geographical or chronological context. Among the 700 cameramen who supplied material for the film 32 were killed, 16 were reported missing and 101 were wounded. It is estimated that six and a half million feet of film were exposed, whereas the finished article consists of about 7,500 feet. Bearing in mind that an acceptable film production ratio today would be in the order of 20:1, The True Glory equates to a shooting ratio of 812:1! An interesting aspect of the film coverage of the invasion assault was the use of remote automatic cameras. A hundred Eyemo 35mm Bomb Spotter Cameras were borrowed from the RAF by the Americans for use aboard landing craft, tanks and other vehicles. What proportion of the total number of cameras employed these represented is not known, but the results were reported as highly satisfactory. Unfortunately these particular ones were lost or destroyed in action and the Americans had to repay the loan. In addition, only 300 feet of remotely shot footage survived the assault. The other Allies also employed remote fixed cameras, an example being of Canadians preparing to disembark onto Juno Beach from their LCA — with four sections being extracted from the original roll and cut separately into the invasion sequence. Whatever opinion one holds about the linking commentary, the individual pieces of dialogue that represent diverse participants of the campaign are the film’s highlights and strength. These pieces and the master commentary had occupied five writers plus the input of Reed and Kanin. With a professional script, the producers (credited as directors) turned to professional actors to

. . . and the gamble at Arnhem which failed to pay off (see issue 2) . . .

ROBERT VOSKUIL

However, a communication from an excited Brigadier Turner dated May 9 to Reed and Kanin finally endorsed the ending for the film that had been first agreed upon the previous November. He had just returned from Berlin and wrote: ‘ . . . am convinced ending of your film should be shot of that city in present state. Utter destruction and devastation is fantastic and symbalish [sic] of the utter pulverisation and extinction of the spiritual and actual heart of Nazism by the sheer weight of Allied might. . . . The play-out shot of Berlin could be preceded by shot of signing of surrender instrument. Recommend this suggestion to your urgent consideration.’ The final post-production schedule was laid out during a telephone conference on July 12 between Brigadier Turner and Lieutenant Colonel Newman at the SHAEF headquarters in Paris and Colonel Mitchell in Washington. Embarrassingly the two prints and trailers of The True Glory destined for the USA for exploitation had been despatched and lost! The picture was 12 days behind the current schedule and the Supreme Commander and the Chief-of-Staff had yet to approve its final form, which would further delay its release. Turner assured Mitchell that Eisenhower, then in Frankfurt, would see the film ‘any day now’. Mitchell’s response was that Eisenhower’s approval would make the task of getting the Chief-of-Staff to approve it that much easier. The entire British Press acclaimed the film following its UK premiere in London at the Warner Theatre and the Odeon, Leicester Square, on Friday, August 4. National release followed on August 27, but Washington’s passionate desire for simultaneous exhibition was thwarted by their own country’s censors! The Hays Committee objected to the inclusion of the words ‘hell’ and ‘damn’, and alternative sections of commentary were recorded, though one Hays Office

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. . . the link up with the Red Army at Torgau (recounted in issue 88) . . . record these sequences. Whilst the American contribution remains anonymous, five of the British contributors have been identified. One is the late Jimmy Hanley, who speaks as a photo-reconnaissance pilot, and later as a fighter pilot with a Typhoon Wing. He was embarking on a cinema career at this time, having appeared in Reed’s The Way Ahead, later moving into television in the late ’fifties. He is probably best known for his role as the ‘rookie’ police constable supporting Jack Warner in The Blue Lamp. Another is Leslie Dwyer who speaks twice: once during embarkation, and later as the British columns endeavour to reach Arnhem. Like Hanley, he had been one of the green recruits transformed in The Way Ahead, but later, having recently retired after a long career, he was nationally known to the British public as ‘Mr Partridge’, the bad-tempered, child-hating, drunken Punch and Judy man in television’s Hi-de-hi. The third is Richard Attenborough, who was then serving in the RAF as a gunner/cameraman, but comments as a paratrooper en route for Arnhem. Alexander Knox speaks briefly about dropping agents over France. He appears in a number of war films from the 1950s and 1960s but is probably most well known in the UK as Douglas Bader’s surgeon in Reach for the Sky (see After the Battle No. 35). Lastly there is Geoffrey Keen representing RAF Bomber Command, referring to the Ruhr and the Battle of Berlin. A familiar face from the ’forties to the ’eighties (appearing in five of the Bond films as Sir Frederick Gray), he appears as a corporal in The New Lot, an army training film made by Carol Reed, which was subsequently developed into the feature The Way Ahead. The surviving records of the making of the film refer to ‘reconstruction’ shooting, the shots covered by this being the close-ups of truck drivers of the various nations and services. The True Glory had marked the climax in combined film operations between the British and the Americans. It had been the most lavishly equipped and planned photographic campaign in history, and censorship of the material was centralised by SHAEF in a viewing centre in Davies Street, London. From the beginning the scene had been dominated by vast numbers of American service cameramen, whilst the British teams, small in numbers and unaccountably short of film and equipment, had covered the war by

the use of small combat teams attached to formations as necessary, very mobile, and able to tie on to any formation that looked as if it were doing something interesting and record what was going on. The RAF material was superb, whilst that from the navies excelled only when their work was most in evidence. To this must be added the work of the European crews covering the Netherlands, that of the Norwegians covering the Walcheren landings, and of the units filming civilian life — particularly the coverage by the Madru brothers of the liberation of Paris. Since 1945 the whole vast collection of shots has formed an archive to be forever drawn upon in visual surveys of the war — primarily now for television — but only The True Glory had used much of it at the time for a primary documentary. When, or at what point, the definitive title was chosen, or by which individual or group of individuals is not known. The Spectator in its review of the film on August 10, 1945, quoted the source historically as attributed to Sir Francis Drake, but it is referred to in the commentary as an ancient prayer: ‘O Lord, when Thou givest thy servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us also to know that it is not the beginning but the continuing of the same until it be thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory’.

. . . to the surrender at Reims (the subject of issue 48).

‘We were going towards the Danish frontier, Bremen fell, then Hamburg, the rot was setting in. A million and a half surrendered in the north, the fighting was nearly over and our job was beginning. We had been training a long time for the administration of Germany and we were prepared for plenty of trouble, sabotage, passive resistance, or perhaps something more violent, you know werewolves in sheep’s clothing. But as it turned out most of them were docile and did what they were told. They seemed healthy, well fed. Their disease was in their minds. The German woman, looking at what was left of her town, said to me: “If only you’d given up in 1940, none of this would have happened”.’ 19

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Of the many Führerhauptquartiere built during the war, the one at Margival, eight kilometres north-east of Soissons in France, was used by Hitler only once. It was known under the code-name ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ (or ‘W 2’ for short). By the time this picture was taken of Hitler chatting with Admiral Karl Dönitz, C-in-C of the

Kriegsmarine, Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the OKW, and foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in front of a heavy bunker at Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschanze’ in East Prussia in September 1944, the Organisation Todt had completed 16 Führer headquarters and three more were under construction.

FÜHRERHAUPTQUARTIER ‘WOLFSSCHLUCHT 2’ Recent events have prompted us to revisit the Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ at Margival, eight kilometres north-east of Soissons in France, which the late Dr Richard Raiber described in After the Battle No. 19. Firstly, a document of major importance titled Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Daten über die von der OT gebauten Quartiere des Führers und der Wehrmachtteile (Résumé of the most important data with respect to the HQs built by the OT for the Führer and the Wehrmacht arms of service) has recently become available at the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz. In November 1944, Siegfried Schmelcher, the Senior Construction Engineer of the Führerhauptquartier Projects at Organisation Todt (Chefbaumeister der Führerhauptquartieranlagen), filed a detailed report on the 16 Führer Headquarters which had by then been built, and of the three still under construction. Schmelcher retained a copy of this report which only came to light when, before his death in 1991, he passed his papers to Professor Franz Seidler requesting that they be published. This came to fruition in 2000 when the professor, in conjunction with Dieter Zeigert, authored Die Führerhauptquartiere 1939-1945. Although Dr Raiber searched all available sources for illustrations to include in his account in issue 19 published in 1977, none could be found but historian Bruno Renoult has recently unearthed a series of photos taken at Margival just a few days after the departure of the last Germans that shows the headquarters in a remarkable state of preservation. 20

Finally, the base, which has been off limits for decades because it was located in a restricted military area, can now be visited by appointment, thanks to the efforts of the ASW 2 Association (Association de Sauvegarde du ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’) which campaigned long and hard to have the headquarters preserved. After the outstanding success of the Wehrmacht offensive in the West in 1940, when the Netherlands and Belgium were conquered and three French armies and one British wiped out in three weeks, on May 31 the German command issued operational orders for the second phase of the campaign. As set out in Führer Directive No. 13 issued a few days earlier, the object was ‘to destroy in the shortest possible time the remaining enemy forces in France’. It was about this time that it was decided to establish a new field headquarters for Hitler, closer to the battlefront than the present Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht’ at Brûly-de-Pesche. The first mention of a replacement HQ appears in the Führerhauptquartier war diary on June 11. The site chosen was at Rilly, just south of Reims, where a railway tunnel appeared to offer suitable shelter for the Führersonderzug, Hitler’s personal railway train. On June 12 Hauptmann Erich Bertram was sent ahead with a motorcycle detachment to reconnoitre the tunnel and the following day Reichsminister Dr Fritz Todt arrived to inspect the site with Generalmajor Rudolf Schmundt, Hitler’s senior Wehrmacht adjutant, and Oberstleutnant Kurt Thomas, the commander of the Führerhauptquartier. (After having founded

By Jean Paul Pallud the civil engineering body, Organisation Todt, Dr Todt had been appointed Minister for Armaments and Munitions in March 1940; by then, Xaver Dorsch had taken over as head of the OT.) On the 14th another motorcycle unit was sent to occupy the southern end of the tunnel at Germaine but, when three days later France requested terms for an armistice, there appeared no need for a new headquarters. Consequently, the troops occupying the tunnel were recalled this same day to Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht’. Since the war there has been confusion over the location of this proposed HQ as some accounts mix up the tunnel at Rilly with a similar one at Margival, north-east of Soissons. However, the Führerhauptquartier war diary makes it clear that it was at Rilly. Also the Margival tunnel would not have been available for use for the French Army had blown the entrances about June 6 as the Germans crossed the Aisne river just to the north. Although the northern charge failed to explode, the southern one collapsed the hillside, completely blocking the tunnel, so if this had been the location visited by Schmundt and Thomas, they would have immediately rejected it. Work to clear the tunnel started only in November 1940 and it took several hundred workers, most of them French prisoners of war, over a month to complete the task. By mid-December railway traffic had been restored though only on a single track.

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Left: Hitler delegated responsibility for the construction of his field headquarters to an informal committee consisting of his senior Wehrmacht adjutant, Generalmajor Rudolf Schmundt (right), his three military adjutants and the commandant of the FHQu, Oberst Kurt Thomas. Construction of the Führerhauptquartiere was entrusted to the Organisation Todt, the Nazi civil engineering body, and in September 1939 architect Siegfried Schmelcher was appointed Chefbaumeister der Führerhauptquartieranlagen (Senior Construction Engineer of the Führerhauptquartier Projects) and tasked to plan all the new FHQu ordered by Hitler. Above: This sketch from Schmelcher’s report filed in November 1944 describes the workforce engaged in the construction of the Führerhauptquartier at Margival from September 1942 through August 1944, a peak of 13,000 workers being reached in April 1944. The table also shows that the construction of ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ involved a total of 2.7 million working days. able for landing, sectors threatened by smallscale attacks to be defended by a series of strong points and less threatened sectors to be patrolled. At the same time it was decided to establish a battle headquarters in France from where Hitler could conduct operations personally when the expected invasion by the Western Allies took place. Although it is not clear when the decision to establish this advanced HQ was precisely reached, the first mention of ‘Anlage W 2’ appears in the war diary of the Führerhauptquartier in June 1942. In May, Oberstleutnant Thomas and Major Walter Spengemann flew from FHQu ‘Wolfsschanze’ at Rastenburg in East Prussia, where Hitler and his entourage were then in residence, to Brussels and Paris to discuss the setting up of the new Führerhauptquartier and to reconnoitre possible sites. In the end they settled on Margival as, just north of the village, the tunnel that was necessary to provide shelter for the Führersonderzug had

now been repaired. Although Hitler had seen action in this sector in May 1918 when he was a soldier with the Bayerische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 16, it is doubtful that he chose the Margival site himself. Possibly he agreed with the recommendation because of his personal experiences in the area. In September 1942 the director of the OT, Xaver Dorsch, gave the ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ project to Siegfried Schmelcher. As the Chefbaumeister der Führerhauptquartieranlagen (Senior Construction Engineer of the Führerhauptquartier Projects) he had the responsibility of planning and building all of Hitler’s headquarters. With a staff of about 30, he delegated engineers to plan the various technical areas involved, such as heating, sanitation, water supply and camouflage. When specialised services were required, he turned to private companies such as Drägerwerk at Lübeck for ventilation and air conditioning. From August 1940, the Schmelcher

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It has also been written that plans were made in the summer of 1940 to use Margival for Hitler’s headquarters for Operation ‘Seelöwe’, the invasion of Britain. However, in his Directive No. 16 covering ‘preparations for a landing operation against England’ issued on July 16, Hitler designated ‘Adlerhorst’ as his headquarters. Codenamed ‘Mühle’ by the Organisation Todt, construction of ‘Adlerhorst’ near Bad Nauheim in the Taunus mountains had already begun back in September 1939. As an invasion attempt by the Allies was expected at some stage, in the spring of 1942 the building of the ‘Atlantic Wall’ began after Hitler issued his Directive No. 40 for the conduct of the defence of the West. He decreed that the defences along the coast should be organised in such a way that any invasion attempt could be smashed before the actual landing or certainly immediately after. Strong defences were to be built in the places suit-

Left: Taken late in 1942 by Oberbauleiter Leo Müller, Schmelcher’s deputy, this is the only photograph showing ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ during German tenure that we could trace. It shows that the Teehaus (tea house), the wooden chalet visible high on the hillside, was one of the first buildings to be erected in the compound and that construction of the large bunkers

had apparently not yet begun. Right: The long wooden platform, built by the Germans for the benefit of the Führersonderzüge (Hitler’s special trains), disappeared many years ago. The Teehaus on the hillside has also vanished, but two of the buildings constructed later — Bau 1 and Bau 5 — still stand and are just visible between the trees. 21

These photos taken a few days after the last Germans had left show ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ as it appeared under German occupancy. Above: The American engineers captioned this picture of Bau 1 simply as an ‘entrance to the headquarters building’, which indicates that they had no idea that this was actually the Führerbunker. The picture illustrates well the words of Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Kearney in his report to the US First Army: ‘The camouflage measures taken throughout this area were excellent’. Right: The whole compound has been off limits for decades but the French ASW 2 Association has now obtained permission to organise group visits and also offers guided tours. These start at the southern entrance of the camp located at the village of Margival, and visitors are first taken along a series of large bunkers, Bau 18 through to Bau 9. Then, having reached the former FHQu railway station, one is taken to the northern sector, with stops at Bau 5 and Bau 8, and then at Bau 1 (the Führerbunker) and Bau 2 (the OKW bunker). The guides then proceed to point out the nicely refurbished Type 105A bunker (No. 81) and the former site (now-overgrown) of the Teehaus. 22

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In September 1944, an investigation team from the US 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion surveyed the ‘W 2’ compound and took this picture of the camouflaged Bau 1 which blended remarkably well with the tree-lined slope behind.

team established its offices in the Organisation Todt offices at No. 3 Pariser Platz, Berlin. To manage the construction of the new Führerhauptquartier at Margival, a local command of the OT — Oberbauleitung ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ — was set up at Soissons under Oberbauleiter Friedrich Classen. Construction work began in September 1942 and from then on the railway tunnel was closed to normal traffic. Ventilation shafts were installed with smoke extractors providing a fresh air supply even when locomotives under steam were parked inside. Two sets of armoured doors were fitted, one 80 metres from the exit at Margival while the other was 120 metres inside the Vauxaillon entrance. Each door was made of two sections which slid into recesses cut into the sides of the tunnel. The small railway station at the southern end, which had been established in 1921 to serve the villages of Laffaux and Neuvillesur-Margival, was enlarged and the existing platform lengthened. On October 25, 1942, Hitler’s Heeresadjutant, Oberst Gerhard Engel, with Schmelcher and his deputy, Oberbauleiter Leo Müller, visited Classen to discuss the expansion of ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’, abbreviated ‘W 2’. On December 17 Engel returned a second time to give Müller further instructions. The construction of ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ was a masterpiece of logistics. Because local material was unsuitable for making concrete, sand, ballast and cement had to be imported, mainly by barge from Belgium, being unloaded at Missy-sur-Aisne, about eight kilometres away. Other materials like iron and timber arrived by rail at Crouy station, between Margival and Soissons. As ‘W 2’ lay in a remote rural area, the telephone network had to be extended from Paris to reach it using some 115 kilometres of cabling. From the French capital there were two trunk lines to Germany, one to Aachen via Brussels, the other to Saarbrücken through Reims and Metz. A further trunk line via Charleville was also extended through Belgium to Prüm in Germany so the HQ would have a third point of access to the Reich network. Electricity was provided from the French civilian grid by underground cables. To avoid the possibility of power cuts, emergency diesel generators housed in three separate concrete shelters were installed. Water was pumped in from springs in the surrounding hills and piped from there into a 500-cubicmetre reservoir. Three sewage farms were provided for dealing with waste water. In December 1942 the work-force comprised 7,000 men but this was progressively increased to 10,000 by February 1943, 12,000 by March, reaching a peak of 13,000 in April. It then decreased to 4,000 in July to reach 3,000 for the remainder of the year. Much of the labour was provided by French building firms contracted to the Organisation Todt

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Left: Another bunker camouflaged to merge in with the hillside behind. The Teehaus appears in the top left corner. Right: Without the Teehaus, it would have been difficult to identify this

Nicolaus von Below, was announced, Müller called on his supervisors to urge them to step up the pace. Then, before returning to Munich, Müller called at the Paris office to confer with Oberbaudirektor Weiss, the head of OT Einsatzgruppe West (Assignment Group West), which was the OT operational command covering France, Belgium, Holland and the Channel Islands. Müller made his last visit to Margival on January 10, 1944, to inspect the air conditioning system. By then, the construction of Führerhauptquartier ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ was nearly complete. Numerous Flak batteries and a belt of ground defences protected the headquarters out as far as Vauxaillon in the north to Chivres-Val to the south, a distance of some ten kilometres, and about four kilometres from Tergny-Sorny in the west to Laffaux in the east. The defence of the inner compound was the responsibility of the Führer-BegleitBataillon, which manned the control posts and sentry points on the perimeter.

In March 1944, the entire population of seven local villages — Laffaux, Margival, Neuville-sur-Margival, Vauxaillon, TergnySorny, Vregny and Vuillery — were evacuated, the German Wirtschaftsoberleitung (or WOL for short) taking over to run the farms in the area. Some minor defence work took place in the early summer when it was planned to incorporate the HQ into a defensive line across France. It ought to be explained that the construction of a second Führerhauptquartier in France was also started in 1942 at Montoiresur-le-Loir, 15 kilometres west of Vendôme. There, too, the heart of the headquarters complex was a railway tunnel. The work on this ‘Wolfsschlucht 3’ ran for almost a year in parallel with that for ‘W 2’ until all work was suspended in August 1943. By then, only a few bunkers had been built at ‘W 3’, plus a number of Flak positions. Also, from November 1943, a third FHQu, code-named ‘Zigeuner’ in OT files, was being worked on at Thionville (Diedenhofen) in Lorraine.

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but in addition French, Belgian, Dutch, and later Italian, prisoners of war and forced labour were also employed. While the OT employees were quartered either in the Charpentier Barracks in Soissons, commuting by train to Margival, or in huts, the impressed workers were housed in camps set up close to the building site. Oberbauleiter Classen and his engineers had established their offices and quarters in Le Moulin, just west of the village. On March 20, 1943, Müller and Classen met with Oberst Engel and Oberstleutnant Gustav Streve, the new Führerhauptquartier Commander, in Berlin to consider progress, Müller seeing Engel again on April 4, this time at the Obersalzberg, to discuss outstanding matters. On the 22nd, Müller and Classen had a site meeting to discuss electrification and camouflage and on May 27 Müller flew over the site in a Fieseler Storch to check the latter from the air. In November, when an impending inspection by Hitler’s Luftwaffenadjutant, Oberstleutnant

particular bunker for they were all built along the same general lines. It is in fact the western end of Bau 5, the bunker housing the complex’s telephone exchange.

With a length of over 100 metres, Bau 5 is the largest of the constructions at ‘W 2’. The ‘Vorbau’ (annex) along its front masks

the ‘Baustärke A’ (build-strength A) heavy bunker lying behind. In the right background is Bau 6 of lighter construction. 23

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On the evening on June 16, 1944, an unexpected telephone call ordered Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, commander of Heeresgruppe B, and his Chief-of-Staff Generalleutnant Hans Speidel (both pictured here in April 1944) to report to ‘Battle Headquarters Wolfsschlucht 2’ at Margival at 9 a.m. on June 17 to give a report in person to Hitler. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander-in-Chief in the West, received the same instruction. shals stood. His hypnotic powers seemed to have waned.’ Following a curt and frosty greeting, Hitler expressed his dissatisfaction with the attempt to counter the Allied landings, finding fault with the local commanders. He ordered that fortress Cherbourg be held at any cost. For their part, the field-marshals sought to obtain freedom of action, including permission to

draw reserves at will from coastal areas not immediately threatened by invasion. They also recommended certain withdrawals in order to shorten their lines and concentrate their forces. To this Hitler made no direct reply but instead changed the subject to claim that the tide would soon be turned by the V-weapons. Introducing General Erich Heinemann, the

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A FÜHRERHAUPTQUARTIER FOR ONE DAY On June 15, 1944, having received yet another unrealistic order from Berlin to free seven panzer divisions for offensive action without weakening any part of the front, the Commander-in-Chief West, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, requested that either the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, or his deputy, General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, come to France to discuss the future conduct of operations in more realistic terms. Instead, Hitler decided to come in person to meet with von Rundstedt and Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, the commander of Heeresgruppe B. Hitler flew from Berchtesgaden to France on the evening of June 16 together with Jodl, Generalleutnant Rudolf Schmundt, his Senior Wehrmacht Adjutant, and a few staff officers. Landing at Frescaty, near Metz, Hitler was driven to Margival early next morning. The party was greeted at the Teehaus, the wooden chalet on the hillside that served as the Officers’ Mess. Von Rundstedt and Rommel then arrived with their Chiefsof-Staff, General Günther Blumentritt and Generalleutnant Hans Speidel. The meeting then began at 9.30 a.m. in the large conference room of Bunker No. 1. Unfortunately no photographs appear to have been taken that day and the only surviving minutes are those noted by Major i. G. Arthur von Ekesparre of the staff of Heeresgruppe B. However both Blumentritt and Speidel later wrote down their recollections of the day. Speidel described how ‘Hitler looked pale and sleepless, playing nervously with his glasses and an array of coloured pencils which he held between his fingers. He sat hunched upon a stool while the field mar-

very same roads south-west of Laon in June 1940 when he toured the locations where he had fought during the First World War (see After the Battle No. 117).

Left: A crowd of German soldiers cheer Hitler at Laon in June 1940 as he leaves the city after a brief visit to its cathedral. However, his passage in the early hours of June 17, four years

later, was no doubt much less noticed. Right: The house on the corner of the Place du Parvis is now a café but the inclement weather in our comparison has left the city almost deserted.

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Having flown to Metz on the evening of June 16, Hitler was driven to Margival early next morning. No photos appear to have been taken during the journey but Hitler had driven these

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The meeting began at 9.30 a.m. in the conference room in the ‘Vorbau’ of Bau 1 [A] and lasted till 12.30 p.m. when lunch was served in the nearby Teehaus. The talks resumed in the afternoon, but were interrupted by an air raid warning, which sent Hitler and the two field-marshals to the shelter in the heavy bunker [B]. They remained there for about an hour, finally emerging about 3 p.m., and von Rundstedt and Rommel left soon thereafter. Above: The US engineers photographed the conference room, simply captioning it as ‘interior of one of the headquarters buildings’. But for the horseman sculpture on the chimney breast, the room was quite sparsely furnished, with a nondescript table, chairs, bookshelves and a lamp standard that might be found in any house. Obviously, the soldiers of the US 1st Infantry Division who visited the compound at about the same date, allowed their imaginations to run free when they reported: ‘luxuriously furnished’ offices and quarters! In 2007 vandals lit a fire in this bunker and the conflagration which raged for hours completely gutted the interior. Because of the presence of toxic materials, particularly asbestos, the bunker is now completely closed off and all entry forbidden. Right: Pierre Rhode and Werner Sünkel were lucky to be able to visit the bunker in the 1980s when the conference room was still in fairly good shape, though the equestrian statue had by then already been broken by vandals.

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commander of the LXV. Armeekorps that had been formed specifically to command the V-weapon offensive, Hitler warmly thanked him for the successful opening of the campaign against England. ‘The impression arose’, wrote Blumentritt later, ‘that Hitler diverted himself by this means from the bitter knowledge of the real situation’. The meeting broke up about half past midday without any decisions having been made. Lunch was served in the Teehaus. Speidel: ‘A one-dish meal at which Hitler bolted a heaped plate of rice and vegetables after it had been previously tasted for him. Pills ranged around his place and he took them in turn. Two SS men stood guard behind his chair.’ After the meal, a presentation was given to publicise the introduction of the V1 campaign that had begun on June 13. The conference was resumed after lunch when Rommel dared to suggest that it was time to come to terms with the Western Allies. Jodl later recalled how Hitler heard him out in silence before sharply retorting: ‘That is a question which is not your responsibility. You will have to leave that to me.’ An air raid warning was then sounded and Hitler and the rest of the delegates entered the shelter at the side of the bunker where they remained for an hour, hardly a word

In 1993 Rhode and Sünkel published Wolfsschlucht 2, Autopsie eines Führerhauptquartiers, their remarkably detailed study of the Margival headquarters (see www.wehrtechnikmuseum.de). 25

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being spoken. They emerged some time before 3 p.m. Speidel wrote that ‘before the conference ended, Hitler’s chief adjutant, Generalleutnant Schmundt, apparently impressed by Rommel’s repeated warnings that the High Command had to have firsthand knowledge of the front, asked the Chief-of-Staff of Heeresgruppe B to prepare for a visit on June 19 by Hitler to La RocheGuyon or some other suitable headquarters’. Once the two field-marshals had departed, Hitler and his party carried out a short inspection tour of the headquarters before leaving for Germany later that evening having suddenly cancelled the meeting planned for the 19th. There is some doubt as to the precise route they took to return to Germany. Nicolaus von Below said that the party returned by car to Metz, arriving in the early morning, from where they flew to Salzburg, but local unsubstantiated accounts claim that the party took off from a local airfield, Juvincourt or Laon-Couvron. In his book Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign published in 1950, Speidel stated that it was the crash of a rogue V1 nearby that alarmed the Führer and his staff and precipitated their departure. However this is incorrect for the V1 incident occurred during the early hours of June 17 before the Hitler party arrived. The proof is given in a telex from Jodl to the LXV. Armeekorps later that day: ‘On June 17, about 0430 hours, what was probably a FZG 76 crashed about two kilometres from Camp W 2. The remains found at the site of the impact have been impounded by CriminalInspector Schmidt, RSD W 2. The LXV. Armeekorps will immediately start an investigation and report the result to the chief of the WFSt.’ This V1 is believed to have been launched from a ramp at Vignacourt, near Abbeville, but instead of flying north, went off course and flew 120 kilometres south-east before crashing about four kilometres east of the Führerhauptquartier. FZG 76 was a codename for the V1; RSD W 2 stands for Reichssicherheitsdienst at W 2, the Reichssicherheitsdienst being the security service which 26

to the Saint-Guislain farm, was marshy and the impact crater had soon disappeared. Absolutely no trace of it is visible at the position circled on this aerial photograph taken by the French Institut Géographique National in 1949.

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Left: This is the telex sent on the evening of June 17 by Generaloberst Alfred Jodl: ‘On June 17, about 0430 hours, what was probably a FZG 76 crashed about two kilometres from Camp W 2’. Right: The terrain where the V1 crashed, close

Mrs Louise Cyri, the niece of André Leleu, the owner of the Saint-Guislain farm in 1944, clearly remembers where the V1 crashed. Then 19 years old, she visited the farm a few days afterwards and saw the crater a few dozen metres west of the field which was at the time planted with potatoes. However, nothing remained to be seen of it when Jean Paul visited the farm in 2009 in the company of Didier and Rémy Ledé of the ASW 2 Association and Marc Henneveux, the mayor of Allemant. provided protection for high Nazi officials; and the chief of the WFSt (Wehrmachtführungsstab) was Jodl himself. All the times are in Central European Summer Time which in June 1944 was GMT + 2. The time of the crash is also supported by witnesses recently found by the ASW 2 Association. Bernard Adam, a farmer living in the nearby village of Vaudesson, heard and saw the pulse of the missile’s engine in the sky, then the silence before the huge explosion at Allemant, less than two kilometres from where he stood. Then André Leleu, who ran the Saint-Guislain farm at Allemant, remembers the tremendous shock of the V1 exploding just a few hundred metres from the farm, leaving an eightmetre-wide crater in the marshy ground. He was checking for damage to the farm build-

ings when German troops arrived within ten minutes or so after the crash, asking where the ‘aircraft’ had crashed. M. Leleu gave them the few pieces of twisted metal that he had found and they started to systematically collect what else remained of the missile. Although Hitler’s reason for cancelling the meeting at La Roche-Guyon has not been recorded, possibly he was not in a mood to continue the argument with the two fieldmarshals, and Rommel’s suggestion for a political solution was the last straw. Talking about this meeting to Albert Speer, his Armaments Minister, on his return to the Obersalzberg, Hitler told him how Rommel had lost his nerve and become pessimistic. He also commented that ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ was not safe, ‘lying as it was in the middle of France infested by Partisans’.

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On August 25, the US XX Corps attacked north-eastwards from the bridgehead across the Seine at Melun. The leading troops crossed the Marne river on the 28th, wheeled eastwards, and by noon on the 31st were at Verdun and across the Meuse. Having taken over the Melun bridgehead from XX Corps, the US VII Corps attacked in turn on the 26th with the 3rd Armored Division leading. The leading elements reached the River Marne on the 27th and two days later the division’s Combat

Westphalia hams and noodles, and tinned asparagus and some of the best canned cherries that ever dazzled a soldier who had seen nothing like that for months, and would not see anything like that for still longer’. North-west of Soissons, off the main route of advance, infantrymen then came upon ‘the almost unbelievable creation at Margival, the newly completed and never occupied headquarters for the German Commander in the West’. The divisional historian wrote that: ‘It was such a triumph of camouflage that even from a moderate distance at the ground level one would fail to see it, and such a triumph of secrecy in building (by the Organisation Todt) that even the occupants of a nearby village had never seen it and knew only vaguely that some kind of building had been going on with imported workmen. Yet beneath the forest of painted camouflage strips and netting lay broad concrete streets with lamp-posts for night illumination. Beside the road lay the well-designed buildings of reinforced concrete walls reaching far below ground-level, roofed with armour comfortably and even luxuriously furnished for the great number of staff officers who were to have offices and quarters in this model headquarters. The council room designed for von Rundstedt with its mapcases and huge table, perfectly lighted, almost made one wish that the war would halt around here long enough to permit its use by the Division. Fire extinguishers were in their places, engravings on the neat walls

(labels on the backs were invariably those of looted art-shops in Paris), comfortable work chairs and easy chairs in each officer’s room and (model of German thoroughness) in each wardrobe a bootjack. About the edge of Margival were defence-post pillboxes but for precaution’s sake no large anti-aircraft installations: those we later saw on the surrounding hills. It was all like a stage set, save for its decidedly permanent character, a truly perfect headquarters completed, by a jocular Fate, just too late to be of any use to its builders.’ In 2007 historian Bruno Renoult was researching the history of the XIX Corps in the US National Archives for his series of books dealing with the battles on the River Seine (see www.vexinhistoirevivante.com). ‘I came across a file with reports by a camouflage unit operating with the 30th Infantry Division. The study of this file was somewhat boring, with details like the covering of artillery guns with foliage, until I came across a study of the camouflage of the German headquarters at Margival. A few days after the end of the bitter fighting in the Seine bridgehead and the general German withdrawal, the camouflage unit of the 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion was moving eastwards in the Soissons sector. At Margival they came across the Führerhauptquartier intact. It was a golden prize, the first headquarters of Hitler to fall into Allied hands! An engineer team was detailed to carefully inspect and photograph the various types

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THE CAPTURE OF ‘WOLFSSCHLUCHT 2’ The ‘W 2’ installations were finally used as a command post for Heeresgruppe B that reestablished itself at Margival on August 19 after having pulled out from La RocheGuyon under American artillery fire earlier that morning. When the US VII Corps launched their attack from the Melun bridgehead on the River Seine on August 26, it quickly unhinged the LVIII. Panzerkorps, and by the 28th, the 3rd Armored Division was speeding through Château-Thierry and Soissons (see After the Battle No. 119). As a result, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model (Commander-in-Chief West and commander of Heeresgruppe B since mid-August) and the staff of the Heeresgruppe B headquarters quit Margival late that evening having been operational there for just ten days. There was no time to destroy the installations and they were all left intact save for the radio station on the top of the hill. Although the garrison withdrew in good time, taking with them the 20mm and 37mm guns, the heavier 105mm weapons had to be spiked and abandoned where they were. Elements of the 3rd Armored Division reached and passed through Margival on the afternoon of August 29, en route to Laon. Following the leading armour, the 1st Infantry Division cleared Soissons, finding two trains standing in the station, one of them loaded with food. ‘First Division messes for several days were enlivened by

Command B crossed the Aisne at Soissons. They were now just eight kilometres from ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ which had been abandoned by the Germans just a short time before. Left: Here, an M5 light tank of CCB crosses the Place de la République in Melun, with a Sherman and Jeep in the background. The tanks were heading for the Aisne bridge which lies about 500 metres off to the right. Right: Looking north-west across the square from the Avenue de Reims today.

An M7 105mm howitzer motor carriage photographed crossing the Aisne on August 30 using a ramp over the small breach made by the Germans in their attempt to destroy the bridge.

Our comparison is taken looking south-west from the end of Boulevard Gambetta with the Abbey of Saint Jean des Vignes in the background. 27

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Nos. 3 – 4

No. 18 No. 26 No. 19 No. 20

No. 10b

No. 11b

No. 16 No. 17

No. 27

Nos. 21 – 22

No. 99

ATB

USNA

Trees now hide most of the ‘W 2’ bunkers from aerial observation but the pair of bunkers at Vauxaillon show up clearly. Type 108A ammunition bunkers measured 16.8 by 18 metres, with walls and ceiling three metres thick, and featured two storage rooms, each six by three metres. The road from the bunkers to the tunnel (seen on the left alongside the railway line) is the original German concrete road.

USNA

ATB

and techniques of camouflage used by the Germans. Bunkers covered with nets made of ropes and wire mesh, plastic materials, natural plants and bushes, etc. The report included a sketch plan which included the railway tunnel, positions of the Flak guns, and field defence positions.’ On October 30, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Kearney sent his report to the First Army: ‘The area was observed from the air at altitude of 1,500 and 3,000 feet. It was easy to locate because of the proximity to the railroad tunnel. From these heights the artificial grass, trees and rock were easily discernible. This was due to the colours used. Generally, the materials were darker than the surrounding foliage. Texturing however was good, and the camouflage blended well on photographs. The material used for the dummy roofs gave an excellent imitation of tile. It was also noted that although a great deal of excavating had been done, no spoil was in evidence. It must have been hauled away, or added to a hillside and covered with sod. No signs of construction work were visible. ‘In general, the camouflage measures taken throughout this area were excellent. Although in many cases the artificial materials were evident, neither photography nor direct observation revealed the nature nor the exact location of the structures being camouflaged, and accurate observation of the installations would have been difficult.’ The report also noted how each end of the tunnel was hidden under camouflage covering over the tracks to a distance of about 150 metres.

Type 108A ammunition storage bunker. Right: There were actually two bunkers of this type close to one another and both still stand in an open field in front of the Vauxaillon railway station.

GOOGLE EARTH

Left: Men of the 602nd Engineer Battalion soon came across the abandoned German headquarters and at Vauxaillon, near the northern entrance of the railway tunnel, they took this shot of a

Another picture from the US engineers report, showing a ventilation shaft from one of the underground installations. 30

In many places near the ‘W 2’ compound — such as at Laffaux, Neuville and Vauxaillon — the Germans used ancient underground quarries to store equipment, supplies and food. They concreted the entrance for some distance, and sometimes installed Decauville narrow railway tracks to service the interior. Above: This is one of the three ventilation and escape exits built by the Germans for the quarry at Vauxaillon.

SHAT

UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT American forces occupied the HQ for some months but when war ended it was used to house displaced persons, Italians, Czechs and Yugoslavs, and finally elements of Polish troops who had served with the British Army. Some time later, Margival was used as a base to assemble and train IndoChinese troops as France was then becoming involved in the war in Indo-China. Later female units of the French Army were trained there. Following NATO’s North Atlantic Council decision in September 1950 to create an integrated European defence force, the establishment of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) proceeded quickly and in April 1951 General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe, with Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery as Deputy. In July, a brand new headquarters was inaugurated for SHAPE at Rocquencourt, near Versailles, south-west of Paris. Subordinated commands for Northern and Southern Europe were established in Oslo and Naples respectively and the Central Europe command was established at Fontainebleau, south of Paris. Ensuring the survivability of senior command staffs in a nuclear environment was an immediate concern and Margival’s extensive infrastructure was soon chosen to serve as a primary static war headquarters for the Central Europe command. A considerable amount of work was undertaken to renovate and modernise the old bunkers of the former ‘W 2’ HQ, but few new buildings were constructed. Extensive communication links were established, including in the late 1950s the tropospheric network then being built across Western Europe to link SHAPE with its subordinate commands. By a queer twist of fate, General Hans Speidel then returned at Margival. After the war, he had served for some time as Professor of Modern History at Tübingen University, his book referred to above being published in October 1950. One month earlier, the three Western occupation powers — Britain, France and the United States — had accepted in principle that West Germany could contribute military forces to the security of Europe and Speidel became involved in the development and creation of the Bundeswehr. West Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1955 and in April 1957 Speidel was appointed Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe. In June, he was promoted to fourstar rank just as the first three German divisions joined NATO forces. He immediately brought new perspectives, challenging the Allies to think innovatively about the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces in the conduct of land operations. Speidel remained at this post until September 1963, an impressive achievement considering he had been a general under Hitler only 15 years before! However, the Margival complex soon proved to be a heavy burden on the NATO budget. In spite of costly efforts to make the HQ adequate in an NBC environment, being above ground it never proved to be fully satisfactory. Also the extensive site required a large guard force to secure the perimeter, and the demands for electricity, water and maintenance proved to be difficult to satisfy. In 1966 Président Charles de Gaulle decided to withdraw from the integrated military command of NATO as he wanted France to be able to act independently (although the country was to remain a member of the organisation and of the North Atlantic Pact). Consequently, NATO vacated its former headquarters in Rocquencourt and Fontainebleau in April 1967 to relocate in Belgium, the personnel at Margival following in June. (It would not be until

This plan, which is the earliest one of ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ that we have been able to trace, was drawn up in June 1952 by French Army engineers when it was planned to use the former German headquarters for the French National Air Defence Command Centre. The plan indexes each construction from north to south with a twodigit reference number that was apparently based on the original German numbering. The yellow sector outlines the inner compound of ‘W 2’ and the table on page 33 lists the function of most of the buildings. This can be augmented with others such as No. 24, a Type L410 Flak bunker; No. 81, a Type 105A machine gun bunker (refurbished by the ASW 2 association); and No. 99, a Type 108A ammunition bunker. The buildings in the green areas were predominantly new French constructions except for those at Neuville-sur-Margival where there were several original buildings from a German heavy Flak battery that had been located there. No. 229 was a large L408A bunker (a command post for a Flak-Abteilung); Nos. 228, 231 and 232 were Type 502 personnel shelters; but Nos. 225, 226 and 227 were new French constructions built on the site where there had formerly been three Type L2 positions for 37mm Flak guns. None of the wooden huts that were distributed throughout the area to serve as barracks for the Flak gun crews appear on this plan. These buildings were in poor shape by the early 1950s and by 1952 most of them had been demolished. However, two large timber buildings were still indexed on the plan in the centre of the complex: the L-shaped building No. 10ter that was to be destroyed later in the 1950s, and the large hut No. 10bis which was to survive right up to the mid-1970s. The words ‘Entrée de la Carrière’ at Neuville-sur-Margival and at Laffaux indicate the entrances to underground quarries (see the photographs at the bottom of the facing page). 31

ASW2

ASW2

Another shot taken at the time of the CEC in 1982, this one showing a well-maintained Bau 4, which was a heavy bunker of the ‘Baustärke A’ type, that during the war had housed the FHQu teleprinter exchange. Note that its ‘Vorbau’ (annex) was built on one side only. In the background, across the railway line, stands Bau 1. The original German concrete road was still in perfect condition.

ASW2

THIERRY GILBERT

1977, ten years after having evacuated Margival, that NATO Central Europe command possessed an adequate headquarters for war operations, this being the underground facility code-named ‘Erwin’ at Boerfink, near Kaiserslautern, in Germany.) From 1968 the Margival facilities were used as a training centre for French commandos, an obvious reminder of this period being the ‘village’ of Saint-Raoul built in the 1980s at the junction at the bottom of Bau (Building) 1 for practising street-fighting. The commandos left in 1985 and from then on the camp served occasionally for manoeuvres by the 67ème Régiment d’Infanterie which was based at Soissons. In 1987 there were talks of constructing a hospital there for the German army and, although money was spent in the early 1990s to sanitise and update the facilities, the former Hitler headquarters finally closed down in July 1993. From then on, although the area remained off-limits for individual access, much looting, theft and mindless vandalism took place. In 2005 the whole site was offered back to the communities of Laffaux, Margival and Neuville whose land had been taken in 1939, each village taking back its former territory. However it was specified that the French Army retained the right to requisition the camp. However it would appear that Neuville’s plot, which includes three of the largest bunkers, was sold in 2008 to a Dutch developer.

From 1968 to 1985 the Margival facilities hosted the Centre d’Entrainement Commando (CEC), a training centre for French commandos. This photo from 1975 shows the CEC emblem on the façade of Bau 18, the facility’s command post during this period. Both Bau 14 and 18 were light bunkers, the former measuring 45 by 14 metres, the latter 35 by 14 metres. The armoured doors and shutters were original German fittings.

MICHEL TRUTTMAN

With no photos of ‘W 2’ under German management having survived to our knowledge, those taken during the French tenure in the 1970s provide a good illustration of what the place must have looked like as a military headquarters. In March 1971 Général Georges Richter, commanding the 8ème Division d’Infanterie, and Général Maurice Henry, commanding the 4ème Brigade, reviewed troops in front of Bau 14.

Left: Climbing training in 1984 on the exercise tower built by the French on the roof of Bau 21. This was a ‘Baustärke A’ heavy bunker, 44.5 by 18.5 metres, with a garage extension on the side. Its four doors are visible. Right: Colonel Henri Tirat during a parade 32

in July 1977 marking the completion of the commando course. Bau 9 seen in the background was another ‘Baustärke A’ bunker, this particular one measuring 79.5 by 26 metres with annexes built along the front and sides.

DESIGN AND LAYOUT Unfortunately the 1944 report by Siegfried Schmelcher does not include a plan, and no original plan of Führerhauptquartier ‘W 2’ appears to have survived. Also no photos of the headquarters during the war have been discovered. Although one can understand that the Germans would have banned all photography for security reasons, one might have hoped that the Americans or British would have photographed the base, assuming of course that they were aware of its importance as Hitler’s headquarters in the West. However, but for the survey conducted by the 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion in September 1944, no further investigation appears to have been carried out. No. 542 Squadron of the RAF photographed Margival on July 6, 1944, and in April 1949 the French Institut Géographique

National (IGN) surveyed the area, taking sharp aerial photos. These are of particular interest as they show ‘W 2’ more or less as it was at the war’s end. Photos taken by IGN in 1957 and 1975 also enable us to follow the later French and NATO alterations and new constructions. Another major source of information are the early post-war French studies. In order to assess the value of the various works built in France by the Germans during the war, in the interests of national defence the French set up a commission to carry out a complete survey covering the whole country. Army engineers were responsible for surveying and preparing reports, the commission then deciding whether to take into official ownership those facilities that were of interest or to hand them over to the owner of the land on which they were built.

The earliest set of plans that we have traced was drawn up in June 1952 by the Engineers Direction of Soissons and are part of a file dealing with the French National Air Defence Command Centre, code-named ‘Olive’, planned to be installed at Margival. The study lists the constructions — some 135 ‘blocks’ in all — and includes a sketch plan of every one with the function of each building. These early French plans index each construction from north to south with a two-digit reference number that may be based on the original German numbering, hence the description ‘Bau 1’ and ‘Bau 2’ that remained in use for the larger bunkers. More plans were drawn up in the 1970s and 1980s when the camp was occupied by the French Army but these changed the indexing to three figures. We have used the numbering system of 1952 throughout this article.

FÜHRERHAUPTQUARTIER ‘WOLFSSCHLUCHT 2’ INNER COMPOUND Indexing 1950s

Indexing 1980s

Description

Overall measurements

FHQu function when known

Comments and later French names

1

027

Haut-le-Wastia

002

OKW

Zucarello

4

028

5

024

9

036

21

056

23

Vx 971

3 6 7 8 10 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 22 26 27 25 17 11 12 19b 72 50 23b 10b 11b 32 22t 37

029 023 022 019 037 046 047 048 049 051 052 054 057 030 060 Vx 970 050 039 044 053 004 016 Vx 467b 040 043 026 058 032

23 50 60 72.5 44 31 11 93 108.5 69 79.5 44.5 16 45 60 27.4 29.4 34 29.4 32 23 45 32 44 35 40 32 40 28.8 13.6 13.6 16.7 14.8 12.5 12.5 9.8 9.8 9.8 30.5 13 26.5

Führerbunker

2

heavy bunker Vorbau heavy bunker Vorbau annex heavy bunker Vorbau heavy bunker Vorbau heavy bunker Vorbau heavy bunker annex heavy bunker Vorbau light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker light bunker power station power station power station shelter shelter shelter shelter shelter shelter shelter wooden building wooden chalet wooden chalet brick building brick building

17 23 18.5 25.5 12 18.5 20 18.5 25.5 18.5 26 18.5 12 18.5 26 13 11.4 12 11.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 12.4 14 12.4 11 10.4 10.4 15.5 9.5 11.6 11.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 12.5 11 6.4

This table only lists the larger bunkers and specific constructions in the inner compound of ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’. It does not include Flak or ground-defence bunkers. The first column for the heavy bunkers refers to the ‘Baustärke A’ part and the second to the annex or ‘Vorbau’. These extensions were generally built along the front and sides of the central bunker and the measurements given include the annex, hence the latter line

teleprinter exchange telephone exchange

Constance

guests' bunker

Taschet des Combes

shelter garage

Loano

cinema

Krasnoe Derly A/C Bahl Berezina Sergent Coty Verdun Fockedey Colonel Marescot du Tilleul La Marne Général Weiller Caen Sous-Lieutenant Busin Le Matz

four 150 KVA generators two 150 KVA generators two 150 KVA generators Type 608 Type 502 Type 622 Type 622 Type 621 Type 621 Type 621

officers club ('Teehaus') entrance post railway station

demolished 1970s demolished 1980s demolished 1986 pre WWII construction pre WWII construction

should be read as ‘overall measurements’ (except for Bau 4 and 21 where the annex was simply built alongside). The functions of each construction in the FHQu organisation remain largely unknown though in a very few cases some indications can be found in early reports. In the case of Bau 3 for example, the American engineers visiting the camp in September 1944 noted that it was a ‘motion picture auditorium’. 33

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ATB ATB

ATB

There were seven heavy bunkers of ‘Baustärke A’ in the inner compound. Depending on their size, they comprised either one or several separate shelters, with a gas-lock at each entrance. Bau 1 and 4 comprised only one shelter, Bau 2, 21 and 23 (above) two, Bau 9 three and Bau 5 four. Bau 23, shown here, had the ‘Vorbau’ annexes added along the front and sides. Bau 5 and 9 had the same configuration. Bau 4 and 21 had the annex built as a separate building alongside, while Bau 1 and 2 featured a combination of the two. Bau 1 had the extension added along the front by a building at an angle (see page 25), and Bau 2 had an annex along its front and sides plus an independent building located at the front right-hand corner. These three views show Bau 5, the former telephone exchange. The long central corridor (below left) has doors on the left to the rooms in the annex (right) while those on the right lead to the corridor inside the main ‘Baustärke A’ shelter (below right).

34

ATB

There were 13 light bunkers in the inner compound. Bau 15, shown here, illustrates the general plan of these bunkers, which had a central corridor with entrances at each end and offices on either side. Depending on its size, each bunker featured between ten and 20 rooms plus a toilet.

ATB

From the report of Siegfried Schmelcher issued in November 1944 we know that the construction of ‘W 2’ involved 2.7 million working days and needed about 250,000 cubic metres of concrete. This was more than any of the other Hitler headquarters, including ‘Wolfsschanze’ at Rastenburg, as that took 1.75 million days to construct and used 173,000 cubic metres of concrete. Only the huge, uncompleted ‘Riese’ complex southeast of Bad Charlottenbrunn (now JedlinaZdró in Poland) in Lower Silesia involved more working days: 3.5 million and 360,000 cubic metres of cement by the end of 1944. Führerhauptquartier ‘W 2’ covered an area two kilometres long by one wide and was split into two parts. The headquarters, with the Hitler and OKW bunkers and the communication centres, lay to the north while the support, supply and services were in the south. Surprisingly, there was no road inside the compound linking the two parts until one was built in the 1950s along the eastern side of the railway line. According to Schmelcher’s report, the constructions at Führerhauptquartier ‘W 2’ provided 43,050 square metres of useful space. Over ten per cent — 5,045 square metres — were built to what was called ‘Baustärke A’ standard,

ATB

During the mid-1970s, the French Army gave the large bunkers girl’s names which were painted on the concrete. Bau 1 became ‘Marie-Aude’, Bau 2 ‘Marie-Jeanne’, Bau 5 ‘Patricia’, and so on. In the early 1980s, they were renamed along more-martial lines, Bau 1 becoming ‘Haut-le-Wastia’ after the battle with the Germans in Belgium in May 1940. Others commemorated First World War battles — ‘La Marne’ and ‘Verdun’ — and even a river crossing during Napoléon’s Russian campaign was remembered with the name ‘Berezina’. Above: Bau 15 today although some of the armoured doors and shutters that once protected its openings have been removed.

i.e. with walls and ceilings of 3.5 metres of reinforced concrete, capable of withstanding the heaviest artillery of the day and direct hits from bombs of up to one tonne. These bunkers had their own air supply and could be sealed off from the outside, the entrances being protected by a pair of gas-proof armoured doors. These bunkers were not just air raid shelters but served to provide secure accommodation for command and communications (one of them housed the telephone exchange and another the teleprinter unit). The headquarters compound contained seven bunkers of ‘Baustärke A’, some shaped to make the best use of the hillside on which they were built, hence the angled Bau 1 and the curved Bau 5. Most of these bunkers had an annex, or ‘Vorbau’, comprising overflow offices with walls and ceilings only 50 to 75cm thick. Two more of these ‘Baustärke A’ bunkers lay outside the perimeter, one being located in the grounds of a château at Vregny that was developed to house the services of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, and another near a property at Mailly for Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In addition, there were 13 light bunkers in the inner compound to provide additional office space. The design was a protective shell of concrete walls and roof over a standard brick-built hut that Organisation Todt referred to as ‘Ummantelte Baracken’ — concreteencased huts. The entrances and windows Left: This corner of Bau 10 is a good example as it still shows the successive designations of the bunker. The first series of numbers, here number ‘10’, were painted directly on the concrete in white on a black background. Though they probably followed the original German numbering system, they only appeared on the exterior walls after the war, as is proven by the photo of Bau 5 taken by the US engineers in September 1944 (see page 23 top) which does not show the number. The second name, ‘Sergent Coty’, was applied in the 1980s and was painted mostly in red on blue metal panels which were secured to the concrete. This panel was placed over the earlier female name, the blue outline of the former identity can just be seen in this picture slightly portruding from the new nameplate. As the same method of adding metal panels was used for the new three-digit numbers, (here ‘037’) these were most likely to have been introduced at the same time. 35

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Two ‘Baustärke A’ bunkers were built outside the FHQu compound, one at Vregny, five kilometres to the south, where Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had planned to set up camp, and one at Mailly (above), 15 kilometres to the north-east, for Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his staff.

Three large bunkers had been built to house generators for the ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ headquarters. No. 25 was located near the northern end of the railway tunnel, close to Bau 23; No. 26 situated at the tunnel’s southern end near Bau 3 and 4; and No. 27, pictured (above), was located near the village of Margival, opposite Bau 19, 20 and 21 on the far side of the railway track (see the map on page 31).

were fitted with armoured doors and shutters but were not gas-proof, and with walls and roof between 50-75cm thick, these bunkers offered limited protection, the Organisation Todt considering them only ‘Splittersicher’ — shrapnel proof. The size of these light bunkers varied from 23 to 45 metres, by either 11.4 or 14 metres, and each provided 10 to 20 rooms with a central corridor. In the inner compound there were also three large bunkers housing generators, eight standard command or shelter bunkers, about ten large wooden huts, and odd buildings like garages and workshops. The bunkers housing generators were built to ‘Baustärke B’ specification having the roof and walls two metres thick. A French report drawn up in the early 1950s explains that poor-quality timber had been used in the construction of the wooden buildings and that these were already in poor condition. It stated that repair was impossible and that they should be demolished yet the large hut, No. 10b, still survived till the mid-1970s. One notable timber construction was the ‘Teehaus’ or ‘Kasino’ on the hillside about 200 metres from the Führerbunker. It had two dining rooms and a bar and served as the Officers’ Mess. Known as the ‘Green Chalet’ during the post-war era, it ended up in poor shape and was finally demolished in 1986. Another wooden chalet stood near the railway line by the southern entrance. Its purpose is not known although it might have been the office of the security services. In the 1970s it was known as the ‘White Chalet’ or the ‘Finnish Chalet’ and was used by the French Army to house high-ranking guests. It, too, was removed in the 1980s. There were also about 70 wooden huts distributed throughout the area to serve as barracks for the Flak gun crews. Generally they were provided with earth banks for blast protection. Most of these were also demolished in the 1950s, the remainders in the 1970s or 1980s, but in many places the protecting walls still survive today. The headquarters compound was defended by an outer belt of defences comprising around 60 bunkers with machine guns, most in open ‘Tobruk’-type positions, but some with either a steel plate embrasure or armoured cupola. There were also personnel shelters and numerous ammunition stores. ‘W 2’ was defended against air attack by seven heavy Flak batteries and around five light/medium batteries. The heavies each had six 105mm guns plus two or three 20mm guns and a 60cm searchlight, and the light and medium batteries were mostly armed with 37mm guns, 12 guns each, and some with 20mm guns.

ATB

The FHQu compound was defended by an outer belt of defences comprising a total of about 155 bunkers of various type and function in a radius of a few kilometres around the headquarters. Around 80 of these were personnel quarters for the troops and 60 were bunkers armed with machine guns. Most were in open ‘Tobruk’ positions (a concrete foxhole occupied by a two-man team) but 14 posessed armoured embrasures; another four armoured cupolas with firing slits, and two armoured embrasures plus a cupola. Left: This armoured cupola on top of a Type 99A bunker can still be seen at Margival, off the right-hand side of the road, about 100 metres beyond the turning which climbs past the entrance to the FHQu compound. For the technically minded, the cupola is a Type 407P9 with three firing slits. There were four of them in the FHQu belt of defences. These defence bunkers were mostly left untouched by the later French and NATO troops occupying the compound and original German markings can still be seen in many of them today. 36

Seven heavy Flak batteries defended FHQu ‘W 2’ against air attack, each having six 105mm guns plus two or three 20mm guns and one 60cm searchlight. The weapons were installed in concrete emplacements, with associated bunkers being provided for personnel and ammunition as well as shelters for generators. In addition, each position comprised about ten wooden huts that served as barracks for the gun crews. Right: The heavy Flak battery just south of the village of Laffaux featured six 105mm gun positions of Type 103A — at [1] and [2] — and three 20mm gun positions of Type L1 (two at [3] and one at [4]). It also had one Type 426 communication post [5] and one Type 407 ammunition depot [6]. A Type 621 personnel shelter lies north of the battery [7] and another at the right end of the zig-zagging trench in the centre of the 105mm gun positions. The wooden huts had already been demolished by the time this aerial photo was taken in 1949 although the excavations in which they were sited to give protection still showed up. Three of them stood side by side below and left of the battery, with a third slightly above; four were in line just under the fork of the inverted Y-shaped tracks; one was at the left end of the zig-zag trench within the circle of gun positions; and one was situated just above the circle, by the side of the incoming track.

6

2 1

5

3

IGN

4

ATB

MARGIVAL TODAY All in all, the Margival site comprised some 800 buildings, including 155 forming the ground defences and 230 the anti-aircraft batteries, plus another 80 miscellaneous structures serving as barracks, fuel stores, garages, etc. ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ is the only one of Hitler’s headquarters where the concrete bunkers are more or less in the same condition as when abandoned over 60 years ago, even though many are overgrown and with internal fittings missing. Also many of the Flak positions and defence bunkers still remain to be seen. The condition of the surviving bunkers, including many very rare types, and the beautiful surroundings, makes ‘W 2’ a very attractive place to visit. There is a mix of Atlantikwall and Westwall designs and some of the late Luftwaffe Regelbau bunkers like L425, L426 and L427. The ASW 2 Association devotes much effort in trying to preserve what is left although the task is a huge one. One recent project was to refurbish a Type 105A defence bunker back to its original condition having first to clear it of electrical equipment installed by the French Army (see their website at www.asw2.new.fr). However, unlike the sites of FHQu ‘Wolfsschanze’ in East Prussia and FHQu ‘Riese’ in Lower Silesia which have now become successful tourist venues, local authorities have as yet failed to seize the opportunities offered by the remarkably preserved FHQu ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’, and the area is still closed to individual access. However, the ASW 2 Association has obtained permission to organise group visits with a minimum of four persons, and they can also offer guided tours. For further details and appointments, E-mail [email protected]. The railway tunnel, which was once an important part of the headquarters, is now fenced off and strictly out of bounds as the line is in constant use. However this is no great loss for the wartime double-track was reduced to single working when the tunnel was totally rebuilt in 1975. During this conversion work, the mountings for the German armoured doors were covered up behind the new tunnel wall.

7

The five light and medium batteries were mostly armed with three 37mm guns, although some were fitted with 20mm weapons. The gun crews and associated searchlight units of the Flak batteries defending the Führerhauptquartier amounted to about 1,800 men. Above: This is one of the Type 103A gun positions of the heavy Flak battery located near the village of Moisy. It is as large as the one at Laffaux, and remarkably well preserved, though now totally enveloped by farmland. 37

FÜHRERHAUPTQUARTIERE: THE HEADQUARTERS OT OT number designations

Other designations

Location

Services due to be there, as filed by the OT

1

Mühle

Adlerhorst Amt 600

Wiesental, just west of Bad Nauheim, Germany

FHQu, RAM in castle Ziegenberg RFSS in castle Kransberg

2

Felsennest

Anlage ‘WO’

Rodert, just east of Bad Münstereifel, Germany

FHQu and OKH, parts of, in Forsthaus Hülloch, 5 km to the east

3

Waldwiese

Glan Münchweiler, 20 km west of Kaiserslautern, Germany

FHQu, small part only

4

Tannenberg

Kniebis, 65 km south-west of Stuttgart, Germany

FHQu, parts only

5

Wolfsschlucht

Brûly-de-Pesche, 6 km south of Couvin, Belgium

FHQu, parts only OKH, parts of, in Chimay

6

Askania Nord

Wolfsschanze

Rastenburg, East Prussia, now Ketrzyn, province Warminsko-Mazurskie, Poland

FHQu in Görlitz wood, Rastenburg OKH in Mauerwald (Mamerki), Angerburg (Wegorzewo) and Lötzen (Gizycko) OKL in Niedersee (Ruciane-Nida) and Goldap RFSS in Grossgarten (Pozezdrze) RAM in Steinart (Sztynort)

7

Askania Mitte

Anlage Mitte

Tomaszow Mazowiecki, 40 km east of Lodz, Poland

FHQu and small parts of OKH

8

Askania Süd

Anlage Süd

Strzyzow, 15 km north-east of Krosno, Poland

FHQu only

9

Eichenhain

Wehrwolf

Vinnitsa (German spelling Winniza), 200 km south-west of Kiev, Ukraine

FHQu in Anlage Wald, 8 km north of Winniza OKH in Anlage Winniza, OKL in Anlage Steinbruch, 30 km north of Winniza RFSS and RAM in Anlage Hegewald on outskirts of Shitomir

10

Bärenhöhle

Gniesdoba, 9 km north of Smolensk, Russia

FHQu only

11

Wasserburg

4 km north-west of Pskov (German spelling Pleskau), 250 km south-west of Saint Petersburg, Russia

FHQu, parts only

12

Hagen

Pullach, 13 km south of München, Germany

FHQu, parts only

13

Olga

Orsha (German spelling Orscha), 80 km south of Vitebsk, Belarus

FHQu, parts only

14

W2

Margival, 10 km north-east of Soissons, France

FHQu and small part of OKH RFSS in Vregny and RAM in Mailly

15

W3

Saint-Rimay, 12 km south-west of Vendôme, France

FHQu only

16

Zigeuner

Brunhilde

north-west of Thionville, 25 km north of Metz, France

FHQu, parts of OKH, RFSS and RAM

17

Riese

Rudiger

Bad Charlottenbrunn, now Jedlina-Zdro, 65 km south-east of Wroclaw, Poland

FHQu, OKH, OKM, OKL, RFSS and RAM

18

Berchtesgaden

Lothar

Berchtesgaden, Winkl, and Bad Reichenhall, southern Germany

FHQu and OKH, parts only, in Franken-Strubb barracks in Berchtesgaden OKH in barracks at Winkl and Bad Reichenhall

19

Zeppelin

Amt 500 Maybach II

Zossen, 25 km south of Berlin

OKH

Siegfried

At the beginning of the Second World War no permanent headquarters had been constructed for Hitler so instead he visited the front lines in Poland either by air or on his personal train, the Führersonderzug, which can possibly be considered as the first of Hitler’s field headquarters. (Stationed at Mönichkirchen, Austria, it served as Führerhauptquartier ‘Frühlingssturm’ during the Balkans campaign in the spring of 1941 when Hitler stayed there from April 12-25.) The building of the first fixed headquarters, FHQu ‘Mühle’ and FHQu ‘Felsennest’, was begun back in September and October 1939 for Hitler’s use during the campaign in the West in May 1940. This list of the Führerhauptquartiere is based on data compiled by Siegfried Schmelcher, 38

the Senior Construction Engineer of the Führerhauptquartier Projects at Organisation Todt, in his report of November 1944. It covers the 16 Führerhauptquartiere which had then been completed and the three under construction with the planned date for completion and the number of working days required. The latter figures appear between brackets in this table. Although it was not mentioned in Schmelcher’s report, the Führerbunker at the Reichskanzlei in Berlin should appear as it became a de facto headquarters for the Führer during the Battle of Berlin. The designation given in the second column has been taken from Schmelcher’s report, but the names in the third column are from various secondary sources and should be viewed with

S BUILT FOR HITLER’S USE Construction periods

Days worked

Concrete used (cubic metres)

Surfaces provided (square metres)

Periods when used as FHQu

584,000

48,100

900 - 3,969 7,740 - 0

December 10, 1944 to January 15, 1945

October 1939 May 1940

85,500

8,500

0 - 130 1,050 - 8,300

May 10 to June 5, 1940

October 1939 May 1940

38,750

4,250

0-0285 - 96

Not used as FHQu

October 1939 June 1940

43,750

2,340

0-0275 - 85

June 26 to July 6, 1940

7,200

630

0 - 2,800 25 - 1,500

June 6 to 25, 1940

1,748,500

173,260

0 - 9,830 5,394 - 141,987

June 24 to August 27, 1941 August 28, 1941 to June 11, 1942 June 20 to July 15, 1942 November 1 to 5, 1942 November 23, 1942 to February 18, 1943 March 13 to 21, 1943 June 29 to August 26, 1943 August 27 to November 7, 1943 November 16, 1943 to February 23, 1944 July 9 July 16 to November 20, 1944

812,500

75,100

0 - 130 6,849 - 4,900

Not used as FHQu

1,200,000

61,500

4,520 - 0 3,900 - 8,010

Hitler’s and Mussolini’s respective trains stopped for the night on August 27/28, 1941

November 1941 September 1942 and January July 1943

332,100

11,400

0 - 21,500 184 - 140,595

July 16 to October 31, 1942 February 18 to March 13, 1943 August 27, 1943

October 1941 September 1942

475,000

900

0-043 - 9,416

Not used as FHQu

November 1942 June 1943

475,000

900

0 - 4,300 43 - 2,540

Not used as FHQu

March 1943 November 1944

173,750

25,000

0-01,642 - 5,626

Not used as FHQu

July September 1943

35,750

400

0 - 200 0 - 3,599

Not used as FHQu

2,700,000

249,350

0 - 15,330 5,045 - 22,675

June 17, 1944

June 1942 August 1943

400,000

9,000

0-0190 - 7,000

Not used as FHQu

March September 1944

322,500

2,300

15,300 - 1,080 0 - 1,350

Not used as FHQu

3,457,950 (6,307,950)

359,100

40,160 - 44,802 10,240 - 99,030

Not used as FHQu

October 1944 March 1945

56,000 (528,000)

43,000

2,800 - 0 2,090 - 18,000

Not used as FHQu

September 1944 May 1945

68,750 (108,000)

18,000

0-01,180 - 0

Not used as FHQu

September 1939 August 1940

May 25 June 6, 1940 September 1940 August 1941 and July 1942 beginning 1945

October 1940 September 1941 October 1940 October 1941

September 1942 September 1944

November 1943 August 1945

caution as some of the headquarters are well documented like ‘Adlerhorst’ or ‘Wolfsschanze’ but others less so. Also for sake of clarity sub-designations of parts of the complex have been omitted. As for the square metreage of the buildings, the figures include both newly-built and existing buildings and tunnels fitted out by the OT. The two figures on the first line are for the areas in tunnels and heavy bunkers. The two on the second line are for light bunkers (first figure) and for wooden huts, blockhouses, and other concrete constructions (second figure). The most extensive one completed was that of FHQu ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ at Margival where 2.7 million working days and about 250,000 cubic metres of concrete were involved, more

than in any other headquarters, including FHQu ‘Wolfsschanze’ at Rastenburg. Only the massive ‘Riese’ complex involved more working days and employed more concrete but this was still uncompleted in 1945. Regarding the periods of occupation by Hitler, please note that some dates are still unclear and are even disputed by historians. For example, Hitler’s first arrival at ‘Wolfsschanze’ is stated in the FHQu war diary as June 24, but other sources give either the 22nd or the 23rd. One thing that is clearly apparent is that Hitler spent very little time in Berlin during the war, and was most frequently at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg at Berchtesgaden and the ‘Wolfsschanze’ headquarters in East Prussia. 39

Adversaries in battle. Left: Hauptmann Wilhelm Schramm had the dubious honour to be the captain of the first German airship shot down over England. Right: Lieutenant William Leefe Robinson

piloting a B.E.2c biplane fighter attacked the Schütte-Lanz airship SL11 over Hertfordshire on the night of September 2/3, 1916, causing it to crash in flames at Cuffley. The 16-man crew were all killed.

THE POTTERS BAR INCIDENT – APRIL 26, 1941 Undoubtedly, the Blitz produced numerous ironies, but few quite so remarkable as that which occurred when the town of Potters Bar in Hertfordshire, or more to the point its cemetery, containing the graves of airship crews shot down over the district in the First World War, was bombed by a German raider in the Second.

40

The story begins in 1916, at the time of the first air raids on Britain, when the German Army and Navy deployed airships in a similar attempt to defeat the country by means of a campaign of terror. On the night of September 2/3, 1916, Hauptmann Wilhelm Schramm, in command of his Schütte-Lanz SL11, was part of a 16-strong force of airships assem-

By Andrew P. Hyde bled for an attack on London. It was to be the largest effort of the war to date but, unfortunately for Schramm and his colleagues, early that evening British Naval Intelligence was forewarned of the impending raid.

The chapel, although rebuilt, still serves as a point of reference.

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The first Zeppelin, L14, crossed the East Anglian coast at 9.50 p.m., the remainder following on during the next two hours. However, because of the adverse weather conditions — icy winds and heavy rain — six airships became widely dispersed and attempted to bomb alternative targets. The German Army’s SL11 reached Britain near Foulness at 10.40 p.m. before taking a roundabout route to begin its bombing run on the capital from the north-west. At the time only three British B.E.2cs from No. 39 Squadron were airborne covering the North Weald — Joyce Green patrol line. Lieutenant William Leefe Robinson was about to descend from his defensive patrol at 12,000ft when he spotted a glow several miles to the north which he decided to investigate. Fifteen minutes later he identified it as an airship caught in searchlights. Fortunately he was at a higher altitude so, diving to make a head-on attack from below the airship, he fired off a complete 50-round drum of mixed Brock and Pomeroy explosive and incendiary bullets from his Lewis gun without effect. Reloading, he closed to within 500 feet

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SL11 crashed on Castle Farm, its descent being visible all over north London. As a result, thousands of sightseers flocked to Cuffley, hoping to see the wreckage or perhaps pick up a souvenir. That evening an inquest into the deaths of the crewmen was held at the nearby Plough Inn when the Coroner announced that the War Office had decided to give the Germans a military funeral.

before firing off another full drum, this time aiming constantly at one spot. A red glow soon developed into a raging fire as the airship plunged earthwards cloaked in flames. Schramm and his 15 crewmen perished in the ball of fire that finally crashed at the Hertfordshire village of Cuffley in a beet field of Castle Farm. Writing to his parents later, Lieutenant Robinson said that ‘when the colossal thing actually burst into flames it was a glorious sight — wonderful! It literally lit up all the sky around me and me as well of course — I saw my machine as in the firelight. As I watched the huge mass gradually turn on end and — as it seemed to me — slowly sink, one glowing, blazing mass, I gradually realised what I had done and grew wild with excitement. When I had cooled down a bit, I did what I don’t think many people think I would do, and that was I thanked God with all my heart.’ Leefe Robinson was awarded the Victoria Cross for his heroic action and the remains of the ill-fated German crew were laid to rest in Mutton Lane cemetery, Potters Bar, on September 6. In spite of the fact that there were a great many people vehemently opposed to the idea of giving ‘baby killers’ a Christian burial with full military honours, the authorities considered it right and proper to conduct the service according to military etiquette.

Left: Back in 1916, the introduction of the bombing of civilians from the air by the dreaded ‘Zeps’ filled the public with fear so there was an outcry when it became known that Captain Schramm and his crew were to be buried in an English cemetery. So the graves in Potters Bar cemetery on Mutton Lane

were dug in a remote corner, well away from the other burials. In the background can be seen the headstone marking the grave of William James Le Neve Dove who had been buried there in October 1905. Right: One hundred years later the graveyard has expanded right across the open ground. 41

He arrived back in the UK on December 14, 1918, very sickly and walking with the aid of a stick. That winter the country was in the clutches of the world’s worst influenza epidemic and Captain Robinson succumbed to the infection on December 31. He was laid to rest in Harrow Weald Cemetery, his coffin being carried by fellow officers including Major Fred Sowrey who downed the third German airship. Above: On June 9, 1921, the Daily Express Memorial was unveiled on East Ridgeway at Cuffley, close to the spot where SL11 was brought down.

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Lieutenant Robinson was feted as a national hero and on September 5 the King awarded him the Victoria Cross. On April 5, 1917 Robinson was brought down over the Western Front (by Vizefeldwebel Sebastian Festner of Jagd-Staffel 11), news which stunned the nation as it was not clear whether he had been killed or captured. He spent the next 20 months in captivity, making several attempts to escape. Although he survived the war, his health had suffered from the lack of food and the mistreatment meted out by one particular camp commandant.

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Lieutenant Wulstan Tempest and Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Mathy fought a duel to the death over the same piece of airspace. Mathy was determined to press home the attack even after the Kelvedon Hatch searchlight exposed the Zeppelin at 9.45 p.m. Taking avoiding action, the airship veered off north-west to Hertfordshire to begin its bomb run from the north. However, very heavy anti-aircraft fire dogged the airship’s progress and Mathy decided to release some of his load to aid his escape. A number of bombs fell in and around Cheshunt, where more than 300 houses were damaged, with five landing on Walnut Nursery, destroying over six acres of glasshouses. Fortunately there were only two casualties, a 16-year-old girl who received a slight cut, and a pony which was later destroyed. L31 now rocked

under increased ground fire, and faced the added and far more sinister threat from the three pilots airborne from North Weald. The aircraft that brought about the airship’s demise was a B.E.2c piloted by 2nd Lieutenant Wulstan Joseph Tempest of No. 39 Squadron. He made straight for the searchlights that held the Zeppelin in their grip, braving the shell-bursts and ack-ack and closed in on his prey. Five miles from L31, Tempest’s fuel pump failed and he had to operate it by hand as well as pilot the aircraft and fire his Lewis gun. Tempest fired two bursts and then manoeuvred himself underneath the target, firing a long-sustained burst. At last, L31

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The following month another German airship, Navy Zeppelin, L31, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Mathy, was one of 11 Zeppelins assigned to attack England, though only seven of these, L31 among them, succeeded in making the British coast. On the night of October 1/2, L31 crossed the shoreline just north of Lowestoft at 8 p.m. and followed a course of 245 degrees until reaching the tracks of the Great Eastern Railway at Chelmsford. Here Mathy checked his position. His orders were to ‘attack London if possible according to weather conditions’ and he could have turned round at any time had he believed his ship and crew to be unnecessarily threatened. Nevertheless,

Just a month after the Cuffley victory, Mathy’s Zeppelin came down barely half a mile from where Schramm lay buried. Left: L31 hit an oak tree in Oakmere Park, Potters Bar, which immediately became a focus for more sightseers. The ‘Zeppelin Oak’, although split in half, continued to grow leaves each year and services were held there on the anniversary of the crash. When the area was developed for housing, the lower section of the park became Tempest Avenue although the oak still survived

in the garden of No. 9. Shortly before the Second World War it was cut down by Bill Crawley as his neighbour at No. 7 was concerned lest the tree, which was by then quite rotten, might fall. Bill had a real job as he said the trunk was full of metal! Right: When a new entrance to Oakmere Park was required, Nos. 9 and 11 Tempest Avenue were demolished. The street sign ‘Wulstan Park’ on the right is believed to mark the exact spot where the Zeppelin Oak once stood. 43

The bodies of Mathy and his crew were buried in the same plot as Schramm. Mathy’s wife visited the grave in 1926 and was dismayed to find it very neglected. The wooden crosses had decayed and a fence had been erected to hide the graves from the rest of the cemetery. She complained to the German Embassy which quickly took steps to rectify matters. In 1930 the Potters Bar branch of Toc-H took it on their own initiative to look after the German plot and an annual remembrance service started to be held there on Armistice Day in the hope of better Anglo-German relations. However, when Hitler came to power in 1933, the annual ceremony began to incorporate a Nazi presence until by 1935 it was a wholly German affair with Nazi salutes and conducted in German. The German Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop attended the last ceremony before the Second World War brought a halt to proceedings. In 1960, the German War Graves Commission exhumed the remains to be reinterred in a centralised war cemetery then being established by them in Britain. 44

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caught fire and, as Tempest afterwards described, the airship went ‘red inside like an enormous Chinese lantern’. Then ‘a flame shot out of the front part of her and I realised she was on fire’. He followed the enormous structure after it passed him, ‘roaring like a furnace’. L31 broke into two as it crashed to earth in Oakmere Park, Potters Bar, the front half wrapping itself round an old oak tree. All the crew perished, either in the burning hulk or in trying to leap clear to the ground, Mathy among them. Tempest was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his victory. The 19 dead crewmen of L31 were buried in Mutton Lane cemetery alongside their comrades from SL11 on Thursday, October 5, in a ceremony kept as secret as possible to avoid the demonstrations that had attended the previous service. The Last Post was played over the graves and an Army chaplain officiated. After the war a fitting but modest memorial was erected, and the widow of Heinrich Mathy visited the cemetery and viewed a cross in the parish church made from metal from the wreckage of his Zeppelin. For many years thereafter, annual remembrance ser-

On October 16, 1959, an agreement had been concluded between the British Government and that of the Federal Republic of Germany covering the future care of graves of German nationals who lost their lives in the United Kingdom during two world wars. The agreement provided for the transfer to a central cemetery for all those graves which were not situated in cemeteries or plots maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. The Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge chose a site on heather-covered heathland, reminiscent of the German homeland, at Cannock Chase in Staffordshire. Over the following eight years more than 4,900 vices were held at the cemetery, attended by a German pastor, dignitaries, and many Germans living in England. These yearly ceremonies proceeded quite amicably until 1932 when the service was interrupted by a Nazi Party supporter in the congregation. The

dead were exhumed from churchyards and cemeteries all over Great Britain including the crews of the four Zeppelins shot down in the First World War. (The other two were L32 commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Werner Peterson, shot down by 2nd Lieutenant Frederick Sowrey near Billericay, Essex, killing the entire 21-man crew, and Kapitänleutnant Franz Eichler’s L48 which was brought down by the combined efforts of several pilots. The Zeppelin came down at Theberton, Suffolk. Of the 19 men on board, only three survived the crash.) The airship crews were buried in four communal graves on the elevated last terrace.

vicar, the Reverend Robinson, was so outraged that he insisted that unless he was assured that such disgraceful politicising of the proceedings would not accompany them in the future, he would refuse to conduct the service.

The 1933 service did take place but it was to be the last. With the emergence of the Nazi Party in Germany, Reverend Robinson found the attitude of the Hitler regime towards religion distasteful and declined to hold the service in future.

45

Above: On April 16, 1941, a parachute mine floated down over the Mutton Lane cemetery. Below: Because the burial ground has been greatly expanded, it took us some considerable time to match the shot . . . and to discover that the remnants of the crater can still be seen on the eastern extremity, complete with broken grave stones. On April 26, 1941 came the day when a parachute mine drifted slowly earthwards towards the resting place of commanders Schramm, Mathy and their crews. ‘I was walking down High View Gardens’, recalls Eileen Field, ‘and I believe the siren had sounded. There was a public shelter on the right-hand side of High View Gardens but as I lived further down the road it seemed sensible to me to run home. All of a sudden there was a noise, a cross between a thud and a bang. I ran down the side of one of the houses straight into someone’s kitchen. I can remember a lady sitting at a table eating. We both looked at each other, neither of us said anything. I turned tail and raced home.’ Terry Goulding, a schoolboy at the time, remembers ‘a resounding bang and blast

effects’ as the mine blasted a huge crater in the western end of the cemetery in Mutton Lane, about a hundred yards from the German war graves. He also remembers the sound of the aircraft as it made off. In Mutton Lane itself houses were damaged by blast, and also a number in Darkes Lane where the windows were blown out of every other shop front in the road. Mrs R. Clarke remembers that, ‘it was almost as if a ball had been bounced first on one side and then on the other, leaving the intermediate windows undamaged’. Meanwhile, a second mine exploded in nearby Sunnybank Road, just south of the cemetery across the railway track and beyond the embankment. Extensive damage was caused in the road, especially to Nos. 47

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SECOND WORLD WAR The Blitz arrived early at Potters Bar. On September 2, 1940, a German bomber, either flying to a target in the north, or possibly heading for one of the RAF airfields in the area, jettisoned part of his load over the town. A month later more stray bombs fell, it is believed by a single enemy aircraft. However, there is a strong consensus of opinion locally that the enemy made several concerted efforts to destroy the LNER railway line through Potters Bar and Hadley Wood which consisted of only two tracks. It was something of a bottleneck as the rest of the line north and south of this section was four tracks that might explain the amount of attention the town received in relation to its lack of importance in any other respect. This theory, advanced by the Potters Bar and District Historical Society and others, is substantiated in part by the fact that one bomb landed on the Hadley Wood tunnel itself.

46

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to 51 and 38 to 40, between which it is believed the mine landed. A third came to earth at Home Farm, Wrotham Park, about one and a half miles south of the town. Miraculously, none of the mines caused any fatalities. At first it was not appreciated just where the first mine had landed but Terry Goulding was informed by a local part-time warden and fire-watcher who lived next door that it had exploded in the cemetery. He and a couple of mates raced to the scene next morning hoping to collect souvenirs only to find their entry into the cemetery blocked by police and wardens. Debris lay scattered everywhere, along with fragments and scraps of parachute from the mine. Where the fire station now faces the cemetery, the boys discovered what they were after: parts of the mine’s aluminium casing. The German graves survived unscathed. The oak tree into which Mathy’s airship had crashed became something of a local attraction and was visited from miles around by sightseers. However as time passed it gradually deteriorated and was finally chopped down a few years prior to the outbreak of war.

Above: These two headstones were the clues and under a magnifying glass we could just recognise them. Below: We have arrowed them on both wartime pictures.

CUFFLEY

M25

ORDNANCE SURVEY SHEET 166

POTTERS BAR

TRENT PARK

And just to show just how much this part of the country has changed, compare these two maps. The first (above) dates from just after the First World War and the second one is from

the present day Ordnance Survey. (The stately home in Trent Park, Cockfosters, was used to interrogate Luftwaffe aircrews in the Second World War — see After the Battle issue 70.) 47

Of the 116,000 men and women of the air forces of the British Commonwealth who lost their lives during the Second World War, 55,500 were members of Bomber Command which flew over a third of a million sorties and lost nearly 9,000 aircraft. Many thousands of airmen were reported ‘missing in action’ until the Missing Research and Enquiry Service traced and identified over 22,000 graves on the Continent. Nevertheless

more than 20,000 still have no known grave and their names are commemorated at the Runneymede Memorial (above) unveiled by HM Queen Elizabeth II in October 1953 before an audience of over 25,000. Below: One such name engraved on Panel 225 is that of Sergeant John Bremner, a flight engineer with No. 102 Squadron, who was reported missing on a raid to Berlin in January 1944.

In May 1918, the last bombs of the First World War fell on London. Just over 22 years later, on the night of August 24/25, 1940, German raiders again appeared over the capital, releasing bombs over a wide area, including the City of London. This led the British War Cabinet to order a retaliatory raid the following night on Berlin, which in turn provoked Hitler to respond with the massed attack on London on September 7. Although the German capital was the designated target for a number of raids over the next year, it was not until November 7/8, 1941 that a major attack was attempted. However, of the 169 aircraft taking part, 21 failed to return, a loss rate that led Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, the C-in-C of Bomber Command, to be replaced by Sir Arthur Harris. Harris ignored the German capital for the next 14 months until the Battle of Berlin began in earnest in 1943 using a force of several hundred aircraft. The most effective raid during this period was on November 22/23 with a follow-up the next night. Nineteen major attacks followed before attention had to be turned in March 1944 to attack targets in support of the forthcoming landings in Normandy. 48

In January 1944, No. 102 (Ceylon) Squadron, based at RAF Pocklington in Yorkshire, lost seven Halifaxes out of the 15 they despatched to Berlin on the night of January 20/21, a loss rate which led the squadron diary to record that ’this was an exceptional night of misfortune and unlikely to be repeated’. One of the aircraft missing on that operation — which was a major attack comprising over 750 aircraft — was Halifax LW337, coded DY-F but known to her crew as Old Flo. Normally a Halifax flew with seven crewmen but on this occasion Sergeant Kenneth Stanbridge, an Australian, was on board acting as second pilot. (All pilots were required to do two operational flights to gain experience before joining an operational squadron.) At the controls was Flying Officer George Griffiths with Pilot Officer Reginald Wilson (who had recently been promoted from Flight Sergeant) navigating. Pilot Officer Eric Church was the wireless operator; Flying Officer Laurence Underwood the bombaimer; Sergeant John Bremner the flight engineer, and Warrant Officer Charles Dupueis and Sergeant John Bushell the air gunners.

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NO LONGER MISSING – THE SEARCH FOR LW337

Old Flo took off from Pocklington at 1630 hours but they found northern Germany covered in cloud so navigation had to be conducted by H2S radar images and dead reckoning. Their target was Hitler’s Reich Chancellery and no sooner had the bombs been released from 18,000 feet than LW337 was hit by a Messerschmitt Bf 110 night fighter which had homed in on the radar transmissions. It is almost certain that the pilot was Hauptmann Leopold ‘Poldi’ Fellerer, the commander of II./NJG5 who accounted for four Halifaxes and one Lancaster that night. Flying unseen below the Halifax, he opened fire with his upward-firing cannon, known to the Luftwaffe as ‘schräge Musik’, aiming at the starboard wing as the tanks would still have contained over 1,000 gallons of fuel. The Halifax immediately caught fire and commenced a spiral descent from 17,000 feet.

Equipped with the Handley Page Halifax, after being based at several Yorkshire aerodromes, the squadron was stationed at Pocklington from August 1942 until May 1945.

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One of the RAF’s oldest squadrons, No. 102 (Ceylon) was formed in 1917 as a night bomber unit, a role that was continued when it was reformed as a heavy bomber squadron in 1936.

The runways still remain although hidden by the crop, the steeple of Barmby Moor church being the reference point.

A raid on the German capital in the so-called Second Phase of the Battle of Berlin was scheduled for the night of January 15/16, 1944 but this attempt had to be cancelled due to bad weather. When conditions improved on the 20th, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris decided to mount a heavy attack that night. Upwards of 750 bombers — Lancasters and Halifaxes — took off late on Monday afternoon, flying on a dog-leg route over the North Sea to cross the German coast south of Kiel.

Diversionary raids by Mosquitos to Düsseldorf, Cologne and Hannover were intended to fool the defences as to the real target but these measures were not sufficient to deceive the Germans. In the event, the majority of the bombing fell on the eastern part of the city with a spread of over eight miles, although over 45 communities up to 70 miles away reported damage, possibly as a result of crews under fighter attack jettisoning bombs or releasing them too early. 49

GOOGLE

Left: The target for Halifax LW337 was Hitler’s Reich Chancellery in the centre of Berlin but as the city was blanketed with cloud, Reg Wilson, the navigator, had to conduct a blind-bombing run using his 10cm H2S radar and a stop-watch. Based on his last

Aloft that night over Berlin was Hauptmann Leopold Fellerer, the commander of II. Gruppe of Nachtjagdgeschwader 5 (pictured with his radar operator) who already had an impressive tally of victories using the upward-firing cannon installed in his Bf110. Right: This device was reputed to have been developed by an earlier CO of II./NJG 5, the then-Oberleutnant Rudolf Schönert, and by 1944 a third of all Luftwaffe night fighters were equipped with ‘schräge Musik’ enabling them to fire at the bombers from their blind spot below. 50

computed wind speed, with a course plotted from a point north of the target, Reg gave the bomb-aimer, Laurie Underwood, the signal to release the bombs. Right: Today the target has long gone to be replaced by blocks of flats.

REG WILSON

REG WILSON

capital. Gathering up his parachute, he promptly fell asleep! The following morning he was found crouching behind a bush by a posse of police. Although Laurie Underwood, John Bushell and Reg Wilson also all landed safely, they were all soon apprehended by the police or military which was in itself fortunate as they were saved from the possibility of being lynched by the local population — as so many crews were — and they spent the next 16 months as prisoners of war. Of the remaining four crewmen, the body of the wireless operator Eric Church, who had helped to kick out the escape hatch but was unable to save himself, was buried in Fürstenwalde New Cemetery in the borough of Friedrichshagen, south-east of the city centre. However, for some unexplained reason, the Germans transported the body of

the second pilot Ken Stanbridge to the cemetery at Döberitz which lies nearly 20 kilometres west of Berlin. Soon after hostilities were over, the British Military Government and the Imperial War Graves Commission (as it was then called), established the Berlin 1939-45 War Cemetery on the Heerstrasse for the concentration of graves from around Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany. The Missing Research and Enquiry Service (MRES) was already searching for RAF airmen lost over the Continent, and when the grave of Sergeant Stanbridge was opened in 1948, the remains were identified by the discovery of a leather tag with his name and number. He was buried in Grave 8 in Row C of Plot 7, and Pilot Officer Church, whose identity had been confirmed by his ID disc, was interred in Plot 5, Row D, Grave 7.

MICHAEL FOEDROWITZ

MICHAEL FOEDROWITZ

Seconds before the fatal dive, Reg Wilson and Laurie Underwood managed to kick out the escape hatch beneath the navigator’s position against the slipstream and centrifugal force, and jump out into the upcoming flak. A minute or so later George Griffiths and John Bushell were blown free when the aircraft’s fuel exploded. George later recalled watching the altimeter unwind as he plummeted trapped in his seat by the gravitational force of the steep dive. He remembered watching the needle sweep past 14,000 feet to 7,000 feet at which point he made a swift mental calculation of how soon his end would come. Suddenly, without being aware of any explosion, he found himself tumbling through space with pieces of the aircraft falling around him. He pulled the ripcord with some urgency and landed on a piece of waste ground, still within the

commissioned in December 1943, he had not had time to purchase a new uniform; thus he gave the Germans his NCO’s identity number.

MICHAEL FOEDROWITZ

The telegram that every mother and father dreaded receiving but fortunately, in the case of Reg Wilson, he was alive and being held in a prisoner of war camp. Although he had been

Four of the crew survived and four were missing. After the war Pilot Officer Church was found buried in a cemetery in south-east Berlin — which in the event turned out to be a significant clue to the location of the crash site. However, Sergeant Stanbridge had been buried in Döberitz where the Germans interred the majority of RAF aircrews found in the Berlin area. These two graves

(left and right) were moved to the Berlin War Cemetery which was established by the Imperial War Graves Commission in 1948. Centre: Next to Kenneth Stanbridge in Row C of Plot 7 is the grave of an unidentified airman and one can speculate that this might well contain one of the two missing crewmen, found with no means of identification. 51

RALF DRESCHER

Although the four survivors kept in touch, and of course wondered what had become of Warrant Officer Dupueis and Sergeant Bremner, it was not until 2005 that Reg decided to try to find out where their aircraft had come down. The only clue they had was that George Griffiths remembered being marched past a railway station called Oberspree.

In July 2005, Reg Wilson took up the challenge. Pinpointing Oberspree station in the borough of Köpenick in the former Soviet sector of Berlin, he made contact with the local museum to ask if they had any information about a Halifax crash in the area. He gave them all the details that he had on file, including information already uncovered by George that they believed that Hauptmann Fellerer had shot them down. Reg also said that he intended to visit Berlin again that October. Claus-Dieter Sprink replied that they would make enquiries and that they also proposed to have an appeal for information published in the Berliner Kurier and Berliner Woche. Meanwhile Reg inquired of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to see if they had any information on where their aircraft had come down and the reply was very encouraging: ‘According to information taken from captured German records, your aircraft crashed at Hirschgarten, Friedrichs hagen (an outer suburb of Berlin). Two crew were recovered from the wreckage.’ The newspaper article by Ralf Drescher in the Berliner Woche produced a remarkable amount of interest and over 60 replies. When Reg arrived with his wife Barbara

CRASH SITE

RV REISE-UND VERKEHRSVERLAG

HIRSCHGARTEN

The mid-upper gunner Charles Dupueis and flight engineer John Bremner were never found so both were later commemorated on the Memorial to the Missing (Panels 254 and 225 respectivly) which was unveiled by Queen Elizabeth II in October 1953 on Cooper’s Hill at Runnymede. This memorial overlooking the Thames records the names of over 20,000 airmen who failed to return from operations over north-west Europe, the MRES having successfully traced another 30,000. And there the story rested for over 60 years. The four survivors kept in regular contact; always telephoning each other at 8 p.m. on January 20 each year to congratulate each other on their survival, yet always wondering what had become of the two missing crew. In 2001 and again in 2005 Reg went back to Germany on a reunion for the prisoners of his camp, Stalag IVb, taking the opportunity to visit the Berlin War Cemetery to pay his respects to his two former crewmen. In 1944 George, John, Laurie and Reg had all decided to meet together in Peterborough on the 50th anniversary of the loss of LW337, although the only clue they had at that time to where their plane had crashed was that George Griffiths, after he had been captured, remembered being led through a tunnel under the railway and seeing the name Oberspree. 52

REG WILSON

OBERSPREE

Pinpointing the station in the borough of Köpenick in the former Soviet sector of Berlin, Reg contacted the local museum asking for any information. During the era of the German Democratic Republic help would not have been forthcoming but now his request was received with great interest. A meeting was arranged in the town hall to which had been invited various eyewitnesses who had come forward in answer to articles placed in the Press by Ralf Drescher. L-R: Michael Pincus; Barbara Wilson; Reg; Mayor Klaus Ulbricht; unknown; Klaus Dieter Sprink (since deceased).

MICHAEL PINCUS

Right: Dr Pincus proved to have remarkable evidence of the crash of a Halifax just 200 yards from where he lived in Hirsch garten. He produced the diary that he had kept as a 16-year-old in which he had even sketched the crash site. He told Reg that ‘The Halifax ended up with its underside flat on the ground in an area of the wood where there were few trees, just to the north of the railway station, and had then skidded a further 30 or 40 metres into the wood, before burrowing about 1.2-1.5 metres into the ground with its shot-up side to the right. The badly damaged nose was pointing in a north-easterly direction and the rear portion (minus its turret) was facing south-west. Neither numbers, letters nor other identifying marks could be seen on the bomber, and the remains of fuselage and wings were heavily blackened and scorched from the underside upwards. On the upper side of the Halifax, the camouflage paint and national emblem were still clearly recognisable. The left-hand side of the fuselage had been badly damaged in the flames.’ ‘Thursday 20.01.1944 from 1900 hrs until 2100 hrs full alert. Heavy attacks on Köpenick and the Elsengrund district as well as the capital itself. We were shaken about in our air raid shelter. Streams of bombers whistled overhead. The heavy explosions made the ground shake beneath us. It was time once again to write our Wills! ‘A four-engined bomber of the Halifax type crashed 200 metres from the Waldburgweg in the wood, about 100 metres from Hirschgarten railway station. The left wing was broken off about two-thirds of the way along and the right-hand one about half way along. The fuselage lay flat on the ground. The rear gun turret and lots of ammunition, together with a dead Englishman lay in the Heidekrugstrasse where they had crashed. Three further young Englishmen lay in the fuselage of the plane. ‘From the instrument panel of the bomber, I broke off a metal plate which bore the inscription “SPECIAL TROOP SIGNALLING”. The wreck of the Bomber was not guarded and the corpses (in the wreck) were not removed until five days later.’ He also explained that a woman came up and began kicking and swearing at the body lying in the street shouting ‘Geh zur Hölle!’ (Go to Hell!), and she had to be forcibly restrained until the body was removed. (Reg believes that this was most probably Eric Church because some time later, when George was at Dulag Luft (see After the Battle No. 106), after his formal interrogation, he

Above: Dr Pincus had re-drawn his sketch to indicate the positions in relation to the present-day street layout. ‘The three dead crew members could be clearly seen through openings in the burst fuselage. It was obvious that they had been trapped, unable to escape. They were badly disfigured — a sad and gruesome sight. The bodies in the wreck were neither examined nor disturbed by us. Only the gunner was clearly recognisable. He had been thrown out next to his turret, with his machine guns, ammunition and shattered rear structures in the Heidekrugstrasse, on the corner where this street meets the Waldburgweg. That’s where he was trampled on by a furious woman from the neighbourhood, who chastised him repeatedly with the words “Go to Hell!” until she was stopped. The street was cleaned up by the fire service on the morning of the 21st but the wreck of the plane, which lay in the woods, was left unguarded and unattended.’

Ralf Drescher shows Reg and Barbara where the body lay in the Heidekrugstrasse. The cross street in the foreground was originally named Apelstrasse but in 1933 the Nazis descended on Köpenick which was a stronghold of the Social Democratic Party. Many residents were beaten up and some died of their injuries including Anton Schmaus, an SDP member who lived in the street. After the war, the East Germans renamed the road Schmausstrasse in his honour (see map page 52).

REG WILSON

nearly five kilometres north-east of Oberspree, it corresponded with the CWGC report, and his testimony was confirmed when he produced his boyhood diary in which he had sketched the crash position. He had even recovered a cockpit label at the time for his collection. His diary entry read as follows:

MICHAEL PINCUS

and daughter Janet, who was fluent in German, Ralf had arranged with Mayor Klaus Ulbricht of Köpenick for a reception to be held at the town hall. One of those invited was Dr Michael Pincus who was 16 years old in 1944 and lived just 200 yards from where a Halifax had crashed on January 20. Although this was at Hirsch garten,

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REG WILSON

REG WILSON

In May 2006, Reg returned to Berlin to search the woodland to try to find any evidence of the crash. Dr Pincus had not been back to the spot since 1944 yet his memory was so accurate

To answer this Reg realised that he had to find the families of John Bremner and Charles Dupueis to have DNA tests carried out. He also found out that because the remains only consisted of bones, DNA from a relative in the maternal line would be necessary to confirm the identity. Reg knew that John Bremner had lived in Elswich in Newcastle upon Tyne and an appeal in the local press successfully traced John’s 88-year-old sister, Marjorie Acon. However, in the interim, the remains had been sent to Canada by the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency at RAF Innsworth as Charles Dupueis came from Regina in Saskatchewan. Once these had been returned, the results of the British DNA test in March 2008 established that the remains were definitely those of Sergeant John Bremner

RALF DRESCHER

said he would organise things and ask Rüdiger Kaddatz, an aviation researcher, to come with his metal detector. In May 2006, with Dr Pincus leading the way, pieces of wreckage were found in the undergrowth including one component part stamped with ‘EEP’ (standing for English Electric Preston) confirming that this was the spot where a Halifax had come down. The matter was then put in the hands of the police who carried out a detailed search in November when the undergrowth had died back. Human remains were found and, after the police were satisfied that they were not from a suspicious death, they were passed to the British Embassy. However, the question now was: to which of the two missing crewmen did they belong?

RALF DRESCHER

was asked for the name of his wireless operator ‘so we can bury him with a name’.) Also Fürstenwalde, where Eric was first buried, is not far from the crash, whereas Döberitz is on the other side of Berlin.) Another witness, Siegfried Gall, then eight years old, was still living just 150 yards from the crash site. He said that about a week after the crash foreign workers, probably Russian, broke up the wreck with axes and removed one or two bodies in boxes. (Dr Pincus did not see any of this as he had meanwhile been called up for preliminary training in the Hitler Youth.) After returning to the UK, Reg knew in his heart that he had to return to Berlin to visit the crash site which lay in woodland quite close to Hirschgarten railway station. Ralf

that he actually fell into the depression, still there hidden in the undergrowth, which had been carved in the ground by the crashing Halifax!

Of the two remaining, the other Halifax lost five aircrew whereas LW337 lost four. The RAF Air Historical Branch established that the other aircraft had crashed at Erkner which would indicate that this particular component came from LW337.

RALF DRESCHER

The discovery of this piece of aircraft wreckage was very signifcant. On the night of January 20/21, 27 Halifaxes were shot down but only seven had been built by English Electric at Preston and of these, five had their crash positions identified.

RALF DRESCHER

The matter was then handed over to the German police who found not only fragments of aircraft wreckage, including this parachute release buckle, but also human remains. In earlier days, without discovering any personal identification, it would not have been possible to name the crewman but now, with the advent of DNA testing, that has all changed. 54

MOD

MOD

Berlin War Cemetery, Thursday, October 16, 2008. An airman is no longer missing and a sister can see her brother laid to rest. for the interment, the grave having been prepared in the same row as that of Ken Stanbridge. A trumpeter from a German Panzer regiment sounded the Last Post and Reveille with a small band from the same unit playing the British and German National Anthems. After the burial, the Union flag which had covered the coffin was carefully folded and presented to Marjorie Acon by the officer commanding the Queen’s RAF Colour Squadron. Upon leaving the cemetery the party were taken by coach right across Berlin to the crash site, the spot now having been marked by a wooden cross (see back cover).

MICHAEL FOEDROWITZ

sented by his widow Hazel and daughter Karen. Reg Wilson attended of course with his wife Barbara and their three children, Robert, Janet and Helen, while Sergeant John Bushell was accompanied by friends. Unfortunately the fourth survivor, Flying Officer Laurie Underwood, was unable to make the journey to Germany. The Chief of the Air Staff was represented by Air Vice-Marshal Peter Dye with Group Captain F. M. Simpson, the Air and Naval Attaché from the British Embassy. Tom Wingham represented No. 102 Squadron. After the service the cortège, escorted by police outriders, proceeded to the cemetery

MOD

As a result of all these efforts, on Thursday, October l6, 2008, after a service held in St George’s Anglican Church in Berlin conducted by the Reverend Dr Irene Ahrens and the Reverend (Flight Lieutenant) David Richardson from RAF Lyneham, John was laid to rest in the Berlin War Cemetery. In attendance were Marjorie Acon with her daughter and son-in-law, Lesley and Paul Fallon, who also gave a eulogy at the service; Michael Church, the son of Pilot Officer Eric Church, with his friend Judith Button, and Bernice du Heaume, daughter of Sergeant Ken Stanbridge. Sadly Flying Officer George Griffiths had died in 1998 but he was repre-

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