After The Battle 152 - The Liberation of Rome

THE LIBERATION OF ROME

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No. 152

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Number 152

NUMBER 152

LONDON STOCKIST for the After the Battle range: Motorbooks, 13/15 Cecil Court, London WC2N 4AN Telephone: 020 7836 5376. Fax: 020 7497 2539 United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution: Warners Group Publications PLC, Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH Australian Subscriptions and Back Issues: Renniks Publications Pty Limited Unit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019 Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355 E-mail: [email protected]. Website: www.renniks.com Canadian Distribution and Subscriptions: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 622 Welland Avenue, St. Catharines, Ontario Telephone: (905) 937 3100. Fax: (905) 937 1760 Toll Free: 1-800-661-6136 E-mail: [email protected] New Zealand Distribution: Dal McGuirk’s “MILITARY ARCHIVE”, PO Box 24486, Royal Oak, Auckland 1345, New Zealand Telephone: 021 627 870. Fax: 9-6252817 E-mail: [email protected] United States Distribution and Subscriptions: RZM Imports Inc, 184 North Ave., Stamford, CT 06901 Telephone: 1-203-324-5100. Fax: 1-203-324-5106 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.rzm.com Italian Distribution: Tuttostoria, PO Box 395, 1-43100 Parma Telephone: ++390521 29 27 33. Fax: ++390521 29 03 87 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.tuttostoria.it Dutch Language Edition: SI Publicaties/Quo Vadis, Postbus 188, 6860 AD Oosterbeek Telephone: 026-4462834. E-mail: [email protected]

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© Copyright After the Battle 2011 Editor: Karel Margry Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey Published by Battle of Britain International Ltd., The Mews, Hobbs Cross House, Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow, Essex CM17 0NN, England Telephone: 01279 41 8833 Fax: 01279 41 9386 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.afterthebattle.com Printed in Great Britain by Warners Group Publications PLC, Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH. After the Battle is published on the 15th of February, May, August and November.

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THE GERMAN SEIZURE OF ROME 1943 2 THE ALLIED LIBERATION OF ROME 1944 21 FRANCE German Prisoners in Normandy 46 UNITED STATES Guarding the Golden Gate 50 Front Cover: Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army, and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of the US II Corps, posing at the Rome city sign on the Via Casilina (Route 6) on June 4, 1944 — the day Rome was liberated. (USNA) Back Cover: The munition storage bunkers for Townsley Battery, one of the two 16-inch coastal batteries guarding San Francisco's Golden Gate. (David Mitchelhill-Green) Acknowledgements: For their help with the Rome stories, the Editor would like to thank Alessandra Mori who, together with Marco Marzilli, took the comparison photographs; Dwight Walsh and Kevin Metzger of The Citadel Archives & Museum, Charleston, South Carolina; Peter Hendrikx, and Perry Rowe. Photo Credits: BA — Bundesarchiv; IWM — Imperial War Museum, London; NIOD — Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam; USNA — US National Archives.

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CONTENTS

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Map of Italy showing the positions of German and Italian divisions as per September 8, the day of the Italian armistice.

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THE GERMAN SEIZURE OF ROME 1943 September 8-9, 1943 was a remarkable 24 hours in the history of Italy, marked by four outstanding events: the armistice between Italy and the Allies was publicly announced; the Allies landed in force in the Bay of Salerno on the Italian mainland; German forces moved to seize control of Rome; and the Italian King, Vittorio Emanuele III, ignominiously fled the capital, never to return. Within 48 hours of the Italian defection from the war, German forces had brought the Italian divisions defending Rome, superior in force but handicapped by a dismal failure of high command, to their knees and taken control of the Eternal City. Some of the main fighting took place along the Via Ostiense in the south-western suburbs of the town, where this remarkable colour shot was taken by an unknown Propaganda-Kompanie photographer (see page 7). On the night of July 24/25, 1943, during a dramatic session of the Fascist Grand Council, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was voted out of power by dissident members of his party. The coup had been secretly planned with the covert approval of King Vittorio Emanuele III, who wanted Mussolini replaced as head of government by his old trustee, the former chief of the Comando Supremo (Italian Armed Forces High Command), Maresciallo d’Italia Pietro Badoglio. The King himself planned to assume supreme command of the Italian armed forces. The following morning, after visiting the King at the Villa Savoia to hand in his resignation, Mussolini was suddenly arrested and placed under surveillance (see After the Battle No. 77). That evening the usual music programme on Italian radio was interrupted for a special announcement: ‘His Majesty the King and Emperor has accepted the resignation as Head of Government, Prime Minister and State Secretary of His Excellency Benito Mussolini, and Marshal of Italy Pietro Badoglio has been appointed Prime Minister, First Minister and Secretary of State.‘ The proclamation went on with the phrase ‘The war continues’.

The Duce’s ousting from power was the result of a rapidly growing disillusionment of the Italian people with the Fascist regime, which had been in power since 1922. Although Italy had joined the Axis coalition enthusiastically, three years of war had brought austerity and deprivation to its population. The Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10 (see After the Battle No. 77) had carried the war to Italian homeland and the Allied successes on the island, which showed their overwhelming superiority on sea, land and in the air, promised that it would soon reach the Italian mainland. This was emphasised on July 19 when the Allies bombed Rome for the first time, hitting the San Lorenzo neighbourhood and killing some 1,500 and injuring another 6,000. The news of Mussolini’s overthrow and arrest caused Rome to awake from the apathy in which it had languished for some time. Streets and squares filled up with crowds rejoicing the end of a regime that had only brought sorrow and ruin to the nation. The headquarters of the Fascist Party in Palazzo Braschi was attacked and devastated, as was the press centre in Piazza San Silvestro. Fascist symbols were torn down.

By Marco Marzilli GERMAN PLANS TO COUNTER ITALIAN DEFECTION The overthrow of Mussolini took the Germans completely by surprise. Hitler, when he received the news, was furious and at the daily conference at his ‘Wolfsschanze‘ headquarters in Rastenburg openly expressed his mistrust of the new Italian leadership and the King. Hitler had long since begun to entertain misgivings about Italy’s reliability as an ally, fearing fascism might collapse or the country defect from the alliance. These worries increased significantly after the Axis defeat in North Africa in May 1943. Considering political stability in Italy and retention of the country, especially the northern part of it, as vital for the defence of Germany, Hitler had ordered the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, Armed Forces High Command) to make contingency plans for the eventuality of Italy withdrawing from the war or Mussolini being toppled from power, the idea being to have German units in Italy take over the country by force. The initial plan, which was issued on May 22 and code-named ‘Alarich’, provided for a German occupation of northern Italy, coupled with evacuation by German troops of the rest of the Italian boot. The operation was to be carried out by Heeresgruppe B, under Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, initially with six or seven divisions to be withdrawn from the Eastern Front, later revised to eight divisions from the OB West command in France. 3

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The Badoglio government of Italy began secret armistice negotiations with the Allies from early August 1943. The chief protagonists of the talks were pictured at Allied 15th Army Group headquarters at Cassibile outside Syracuse in Sicily on September 3: (L-R) Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, Allied Forces Headquarters G-2 (Chief of Intelligence); Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Castellano, the emissary from the Badoglio government; Major General Walter Bedell Smith, AFHQ Chief-of-Staff, and interpreter Franco Montanari. However, with the defence of Sicily against an expected Allied invasion becoming paramount, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the Oberbefehlshaber Süd (OB Süd, Commander-in-Chief South), an Italophile inclined to trust the Italians, continued to co-operate with Mussolini and the Comando Supremo under its chief, Generale d’Armata Vittorio Ambrosio, and managed to gain their approval of four German divisions being stationed in Italy — one in Sicily, one in Sardinia and two on the mainland. By mid-June, after the fall of the island of Pantelleria (see After the Battle No. 127), the Comando Supremo agreed to the stationing of three more divisions in Italy. One of them was the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division, which moved down into Italy immediately and concentrated in the area between Viterbo and Lake Bolsena, some 75 kilometres north of Rome. To cope with the invasion of Sicily, yet another division was sent to Italy, the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division being flown in to the island on July 12-14. On the 22nd, the Comando Supremo even requested two additional German divisions to reinforce the southern front. With the Germans and Italians thus seemingly co-operating well on the defence of Sicily, Plan ‘Alarich’ receded to the background. However, more and more the Germans began to get irritated over the Italian leadership’s pessimistic outlook, constant bickering and ineptitude. On receiving the news of Mussolini’s fall on July 25, Hitler’s first inclination was to strike back with lightning speed — seize Rome with the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division (from Lake Bolsena) and the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division (to be flown in to the Rome area from France); kidnap the King, Badoglio and his cabinet ministers, and find and liberate Mussolini as a first step to reinstating the Fascist regime. However, Rommel and others recommended a more cautious approach, advising instead to withdraw all German forces from Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, but retain and defend northern Italy. Kesselring, more optimistic by nature, took a different view. Having been assured by Badoglio and Ambrosio, the Comando Supremo chief, that 4

Italy would continue the war on Germany’s side, he advised Hitler to feel out the Italian government on their willingness to receive further German divisions. With these, Kesselring believed he could defend all of Italy and the Balkans. Also, he felt that too drastic measures would antagonise the Italians and jeopardise the supply lines to the Germans troops fighting in southern Italy. The result of all this was that Hitler decided to suspend the immediate seizure of Rome. Instead, he instructed Kesselring to put all his effort in persuading the Comando Supremo to allow the maximum number of German troops into northern Italy. However, this was not because he trusted the Italians. Hitler was still certain that the Badoglio government was planning to betray him, and he ordered the OKW to draw up a new contingency plan to meet that possibility, but now with the intention of seizing control of the whole country. The new German forces entering Italy were ostensibly to reinforce the Axis troops fighting in Sicily and support the Italian forces against a possible AngloAmerican landing on the Italian mainland, all of this under subordination to Comando Supremo. In reality, they also formed part of Hitler’s plan to counter an Italian doublecross. On the night of July 25/26, the OKW sent a personal messenger to Kesselring to brief him on the new plan. Attempts to bring more German troops into northern Italy met with immediate Italian obstruction. On July 27, the 305. Infanterie-Division was stopped from moving into Italy from Nice, supposedly — so the Comando Supremo said — because of a shortage of railway transportation. Four days later, on July 31, the 44. Infanterie-Division was held up at the Brenner Pass frontier post, again for the same reason. After fervent pleas by Kesselring that these two divisions were the ones requested by Ambrosio himself on July 22, and further interventions by the German Military Attaché in Italy, General Enno von Rintelen, Ambrosio gave in. The 44. Infanterie-Division could proceed into Italy, but only as far as Bolzano in the north. In the following days the 305th Infanterie-Division and five more German divisions (three infantry and two armoured)

entered northern Italy, and German forces took secure hold of the Brenner Pass and other frontier passages through the Alps. Meanwhile the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division was already being transported by air to Italy. Between July 28 and August 2, it arrived at Pratica di Mare military aerodrome, in the Pontine Marshes 25 kilometres south of Rome, and concentrated in the same area. Generale di Corpo d’Armata Mario Roatta, the Italian Army Chief-of-Staff, was curious about the sudden arrival of the paratroops but he swallowed Kesselring’s explanation that they were just reinforcements for the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division fighting in Sicily. Generaloberst Kurt Student flew to Rome to set up headquarters of the XI. Flieger-Korps alongside Kesselring’s headquarters at Frascati and take operational control of the paratroop division and the 3. PanzergrenadierDivision. The OKW’s new plan to forcibly seize control of Italy in case of Italian defection was issued on August 1. Code-named ‘Achse’, it went through various revisions, reaching its final form on August 30. On receipt of the code-word, German units in Italy and elsewhere were to disarm Italian soldiers, except those who remained loyal. Italian units who wished to fight on the German side were to be permitted to come over to the Wehrmacht; those who wished to go home were to be allowed to do so. OB Süd was to withdraw German units from southern Italy to the Rome area, then conduct further operations in accordance with instructions from Rommel’s Heeresgruppe B. The latter headquarters was to reinforce the troops at all the passes leading to Italy, occupy the ports of Genoa, La Spezia, Leghorn, Trieste, Fiume and Pola, and pacify northern Italy by means of a restored Fascist organisation. The Kriegsmarine was to take over the tasks of the Italian Fleet, and the Luftwaffe was to do the same for the Italian air force; both were to co-operate to prevent Italian warships from going over to the Allies. By the beginning of September the Germans were ready to cope with the twin dangers of Italian capitulation and Allied invasion of the Italian mainland. However, they had not reckoned with both events occurring at the same time. THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE (September 8) Hitler’s distrust of the Italians was well founded. Almost immediately after the ousting of Mussolini, the new Badoglio government, with the blessing of the King, began to secretly explore the possibilities of an armistice with the Allies, all the while reassuring the Germans of their good faith and willingness to continue the war. The secret negotiations with Allied top diplomatic, political and military officials were protracted, complicated, ambiguous and confusing (and to many Italians up to this day a stain on the country’s history). The Allies would only accept unconditional surrender, whereas the Italians wanted first and foremost a strong Allied invasion close to Rome to prevent a German takeover. Secret talks went on for weeks and finally, on September 3 (the same day the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina and landed at Reggio di Calabria in the toe of Italy), in a tent at 15th Army Group headquarters at Cassibile near Syracuse on Sicily, Generale di Brigata Guiseppe Castellano, as emissary of the Italian government (and himself strongly anti-German), signed the armistice terms that, in theory at least, put Italy out the war. The agreement stipulated that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and Badoglio would simultaneously announce the armistice over the radio at 1830 hours on the evening preceding the Allied main invasion on the Italian mainland by the US Fifth Army. This would ensure that Italian units

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would not oppose these landings. However, for obvious security reasons the place and date of the invasion — at Salerno, 200 kilometres south of Rome, on September 9 — could not be disclosed to the Italians. As part of the armistice settlement, the Allies had agreed to drop an airborne division on Rome to help the Italian army prevent a German capture of the capital and ensure the safety of the King and the Badoglio government. The job was assigned to the US 82nd Airborne Division. Time was very short but Major General Matthew B. Ridgway and his staff had a plan ready by September 4. Code-named Operation ‘Giant II’, it called for the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment to jump into two Italian-held airfields, Cerveteri and Furbara, on the coast 40 kilometres north-west of Rome, on the evening of the 8th and then push down to Rome; on the second night, the 505th Parachute Infantry would jump onto three airfields close to the capital: Guidonia, 20 kilometres north of the city; Littorio in the northern suburbs, and Centocelle in the south-east; and on the third night, the 325th Glider Infantry would land at these fields. A small seaborne force of three LCIs and one LST would touch down at the mouth of the Tiber and bring in an artillery battalion, three anti-aircraft batteries and a dozen tank destroyers. However, Ridgway was very sceptical about the whole undertaking, which he found extremely risky. He needed to be absolutely sure that the Italians would safely hold the airfields; would neutralise Italian and German anti-aircraft batteries along the flight routes, and, after the landings, would provide transportation, fuel, rations and other supplies for his paratroops. Moreover, the Germans would certainly rush several divisions to Rome and, if the Italian divisions proved unwilling to fight alongside them, the American airborne troops ran the grave danger of being trapped far behind Allied lines and overwhelmed by superior German forces with crippling losses. Deeply worried about these factors, Ridgway gained approval for two of his airborne experts — his Divisional Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing intelligence officer, Colonel William T. Gardiner — to be smuggled into Rome to conduct a first-hand assessment of the firmness of the Italian resolve to assist the paratroopers. After a daring trip — departing from Sicily in a PT boat on the 7th, secretly transferring to the Italian corvette Ibis, being landed at Gaeta and secretly driven to Rome in a blacked-out ambulance — Taylor and Gardiner reached the capital at dusk and later that evening met with Generale di Corpo d’Armata Giacomo Carboni, commander of the Italian Motorised Corps (whose divisions were to defend Rome), and several other high-ranking Italian generals. Still later, in the early hours of the 8th, they met with Badoglio himself at his private villa. The two Americans found the Italians unanimously gloomy and pessimistic about the ability of the Italian divisions to withstand the Germans. Also, the Italians did not seem to appreciate the urgency of the matter, namely that the drop on Rome was tied to the Salerno landings, now less than 30 hours away. Hints on the matter shocked Badoglio but did not noticeably spur him to action. What they heard and saw convinced Taylor and Gardiner that they could not rely on any Italian promises of assisting the airborne assault. Even worse, Badoglio now renounced the armistice terms signed by Castellano, saying that it would provoke an immediate seizure of Rome by the Germans, and he therefore refused to broadcast the armistice that night as had been agreed. At 0121 hours on September 8 Taylor radioed the Allied Forces Headquarters

Bedell Smith signs the Armistice for the Allies at 1715 hours on September 3. Standing around are (L-R) Commodore Royer Dick, Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, commander of Allied Naval Forces; Major General Lowell Rooks, AFHQ G-3 (Chief of Operations); Captain Deane, Brigadier Strong’s adjutant, serving as interpreter; Castellano; Strong (behind Castellano) and interpreter Montanari. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, was present at the ceremony but he left the actual signing of what he regarded as ‘a crooked deal’ to his Chief-of-Staff. (AFHQ) in Algiers through a secret wireless link (provided by SOE) that there would be no armistice announcement from Rome and that, since the Italians could not guarantee the airfields, the airborne assault on Rome was impossible. On receipt of the message, Eisenhower was understandably furious about the Italian turnabout. He radioed Badoglio a blistering message, which reached Rome at 1730, stating that he would proceed with the public announcement of the armistice at 1830 that evening as had been agreed and that, if the Italians failed to do likewise, ‘I will publish to the world the full record of this affair’. The message included an order for Taylor and Gardiner to return to Algiers immediately (which they did, secretly flying from Centocelle in an Italian aircraft and reaching North Africa safely at 1900 hours). He also sent a second stern telegram to Badoglio: ‘I see by your behaviour that you do not wish to comply with agreements. I have decided to announce the armistice tonight at 1830 hours. Follow me. Eisenhower.’ In total panic, the King convened a meeting of the Crown Council at the Quirinal Palace at 1815 — a quarter of an hour before the agreed armistice broadcast. Among those present were the King; Badoglio; Ambrosio, the Comando Supremo chief; Carboni, commander of the Motorised Corps; the deputy Army Chief-of-Staff; the Naval and Air Chiefs-of-Staff, and several cabinet ministers. They discussed all the options to escape the trap in which they had put themselves, but they soon realised the impossibility of renouncing the armistice. Any doubt was dispelled at 1830 hours, when Radio Algiers transmitted Eisenhower’s recorded announcement: ‘This is General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. The Italian government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As Allied Commander-inChief I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once.’

The meeting at the Quirinal Palace was still undecided when at 1845 word arrived of Eisenhower’s broadcast. When they heard of it, the mood of those present sank to its lowest point. Meanwhile, news of a separate peace between Italy and the Allies spread quickly through the international news agencies. Within minutes, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was telephoning Rudolf Rahn, the German Ambassador in Rome, asking about the truth of the news picked up from a Reuters dispatch. Rahn called the Italian Foreign Ministry, which categorically refuted the reports. When Ribbentrop called again, Rahn called General Roatta, the Army Chief-of-Staff at his headquarters in the Palazzo Orsini in the town of Monterotondo, 28 kilometres northeast of the capital, but the latter denied categorically (and in good faith), adding that ‘this report from New York is a barefaced lie of British propaganda which I reject with indignation’. Meanwhile, faced with Eisenhower’s fait accompli, the Italian government had no other choice but to comply. With Badoglio still unable to make up his mind, the King took a decision: Italy could not change sides again but was committed to the armistice. At 1945 hours — over one hour late —speaking from the EIAR radio studios in Via Asiago and preceded by a short announcement by Giambattista Arista, Badoglio read out the announcement of the armistice, following exactly the text approved by AFHQ. Badoglio’s broadcast came as a startling surprise to all Italians. The hours following it saw utter confusion in administrative and military circles everywhere. Government officials phoned their ministries, civil servants their head offices, military unit commanders their superior headquarters, always with the same questions: ‘What is happening?’, ‘Is it true?’ — and getting a variety of confusing answers: ‘We don’t know’ or ‘It cannot be possible, this is propaganda!’ or ‘We cannot help you. There is no one here’ Although the secret armistice negotiations had been going on for over a month, none of the top military or political leaders on the Italian side had taken any action to cope with 5

Left: La Battaglia per Roma — The Battle for Rome. With some six and a half Italian divisions, two of them armoured, placed in a protective circle around the capital, it would appear that the two German divisions — the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division, concentrated around Lake Bolsena 75 kilometres to the north, and the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division, bivouacking 20 kilometres to the south — would have a tough job seizing the city. Yet, due to lack of central direction and clear orders on the Italian side, resulting in chaos and confusion at all levels, and the ill-advised decision by the Italian High Command early on the 9th to order all Italian forces defending Rome to withdraw to the eastern outskirts, the city proved to be an easy prey for the Germans.

its consequences. Neither the King, nor Prime Minister Badoglio, nor Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Ambrosio had taken any steps to prepare their troops for the changing of sides. The only one to show any initiative was Army Chief-of-Staff Roatta, who, on his own accord, on September 1 had issued ‘Memoria 44’, an outline order to the commanders of the Italian armies based on the Italian mainland and in Sardinia and Corsica. In case of the Germans initiating hostile action, they were to attack these German divisions, secure the ports and cut the Alpine passes. Ironically, Roatta was one of the few Italian high commanders who was pro-German and generally loyal to them. He had been aware of the secret armistice negotiations since August 16 (when he learned of it from the King and Badoglio) but he was completely surprised by the moment of its public announcement. When it came, he was at his headquarters at Monterotondo. Now, as soon as he heard of the armistice, he issued an order to the forces defending Rome: they were to man road-blocks around the capital; German troops leaving the city were to be allowed through; German columns moving on the capital were to be stopped. The more-offensive ‘Memoria 44’ plan was never put into effect, as neither Roatta nor 6

Ambrosio, the chief of Comando Supremo, dared take responsibility for it and in these decisive hours Badoglio could not be found to endorse it. The only order issued by Ambrosio, at 0220 (September 9) that night, was decidedly ambiguous: ‘The Italian government has requested an armistice of General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. On the basis of the conditions of the armistice, beginning today September 8 at 1945 hours, every act of hostility on our part should cease towards the AngloAmerican forces. The Italian Armed Forces should, however, react with maximum decision to offensives which come from any other quarter whatsoever.’ The declaration was ambiguous because it did not unequivocally state that Germany was the new enemy, leaving many lower unit commanders completely bewildered. The Allied airborne drop on Rome was cancelled at the very last minute, the paratroops on a dozen airfields in Sicily having already boarded their aircraft and some of the planes being literally stopped on the runway seconds before take-off. Thus, by their own vacillation and inertia, the Italian leadership had seen to it that their divisions would have to defend Rome against the Germans all alone.

FIRST GERMAN MOVES The news of the Italian double-cross did not come unexpected to Hitler and the OKW. Three days before, on September 5, the OKW had warned Kesselring to be ready for any emergency. On the 7th, at the suggestion of Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Hitler had begun preparing an ultimatum to Badoglio demanding that the Italians unequivocally rally on the German side or else he would take control of the country and its government. It was to be delivered on September 9, but the armistice announcement precipitated all that. Hitler was told the news as he returned from a visit to the Eastern Front. Very irritated, he immediately instructed the OKW to call Kesselring and implement Plan ‘Achse’. At that moment, the Germans had 17 divisions in Italy. Spread out over central and southern Italy was the 10. Armee under General der Panzertruppe Heinrich von Vietinghoff with eight divisions, six in the south and two in the Rome area. In northern Italy, Heeresgruppe B, commanded by Rommel, had another nine divisions. According to Hitler’s orders, the latter were to remain where they were so, for the moment, the 10. Armee was on its own to fend off the AngloAmerican invasion at Salerno and confront the insurrection of the Badoglio forces. The dispersion and strength of troops in and around Rome showed a significant disparity in favour of the Italians. Ever since Mussolini’s overthrow, the Comando Supremo had been surreptitiously strengthening the forces guarding the capital and the Italians could now muster six divisions under three corps headquarters, with a two more divisions on the way. The Corpo d’Armata Motocorazzato (Motorised Corps) of Generale di Corpo d’Armata Carboni controlled four divisions: the 135th ‘Ariete’ Armoured Division (Generale di Brigata Raffaele Cadorna), located some 40 kilometres north of Rome near Lake Bracciano; the 10th ‘Piave’ Motorised Division (Generale di Divisione Ugo Tabellini), in position just north of the city; the 131st ‘Centauro’ Armoured Division (Generale di Divisione Count Carlo Calvi di Bergolo), concentrated some ten kilometres north-east of Rome; and the 21st ‘Granatieri di Sardegna’ Division (Generale di Brigata Gioacchino Solinas), placed immediately south of the capital. The Corpo d’Armata di Roma (Army Corps of Rome), commanded by Generale di Corpo d’Armata Alberto Barbieri, controlled the 12th ‘Sassari’ Division (Generale di Divisione Francesco Zani), stationed inside Rome itself, plus the carabinieri and service and school troops within the city. The XVII Corps of Generale di Corpo d’Armata Giovanni Zanghieri, responsible for guarding some 180 kilometres of coast south of Rome, had one of its formations, the 103rd ‘Piacenza’ Division (Generale di Divisione Carlo Rossi), between the Alban Hills

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The 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division launched its main penetrations into Rome along the Via Ostiense and the Via Laurentina, the two main thoroughfares leading into the city from the south-west. Here they were confronted by troops of the Italian ‘Granatieri di Sardegna’ Division. The junction of

the two roads in the suburb of Montagnola saw a violent clash between the paratroopers and the 1st Infantry Regiment ‘Granatieri’. In the course of the skirmish, the Fallschirmjäger knocked out two Italian armoured cars, both of which burst out in flames.

and the Tiber, interspersed among units of the German 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division. Two more divisions were en route to the capital and scheduled to arrive that day: the 13th ‘Re’ Division (Generale di Brigata Ottaviano Traniello) from the Balkans, which already had elements in place north of Rome; and the 7th ‘Lupi di Toscana’ Division (Generale di Divisione Ottavio Priore), which was en route by train from southern France and moving southwards along the Tyrrhenian coast. These divisions represented a total strength of some 55,000 men, with 200 tanks

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Right: The junction of the Via Ostiense and Laurentina has seen considerable change since the war but fortunately a few of the original buildings on the far side of the junction remain to pinpoint the photographs. All our present-day comparisons were taken by Alessandra Mori.

While the Italian vehicles burn out, the Fallschirmjäger have set up no less than three of their anti-tank guns to cover the road junction. The Forte Ostiense, another of the strongholds of the ‘Granatieri’ Division during the battle, lies a kilometre or so

further down the Via Ostiense, away to the left. At least two German Propaganda-Kompanie photographers and a cine cameramen were present and were able to record the fighting here. These pictures were taken by PK Reuschler. 7

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the Via Ostiense. Here they unhook another anti-tank gun from its towing vehicle. Right: The Via Ostiense — then and now.

Left: Men of Fallschirm-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 2, the divisional anti-tank unit, have set up a 5cm PaK 38 gun on a corner of the Via Ostiense, close to the Mercati Generali marketplace compound. Right: The old market building on the corner of

Ostiense and Circonvallazione Ostiense survives in a dilapidated state. Since 2005, plans are underway to reinvigorate the whole Mercati Generali complex, which dates from 1912, into a modern civic and entertainment centre.

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Left: With the enemy opposition at Montagnola overcome, the paratroopers continued their push towards the city centre along

cles (the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division had 42 assault guns) and artillery. Having heard the armistice announcement, the Germans expected an immediate Allied invasion of the coast near Rome, including an airborne landing. Although his headquarters had been heavily bombed by the Allied air force that afternoon, and he had only one telephone line working in a

provisory command post, Kesselring acted with dispatch. His first task was to bring the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division from the area to the north of Rome to join with the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division south of the city. His main objective was to seize control of the communications and supply lines to the 10. Armee in the south, thereby securing that army’s withdrawal route to the north.

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and armoured vehicles and strong artillery, backed up by aircraft, but they were generally short on fuel and ammunition. Against this the Germans could only field two divisions — the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division and the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division, plus some elements of the 26. Panzer-Division, with a combined strength of some 26,000 men with much fewer armoured vehi-

Left: An Italian Semovente 75/18 75mm self-propelled gun knocked out by German anti-tank fire on the Via Ostiense. It belonged to the Lancieri di Montebello, the armoured reconnaissance regiment of the ‘Ariete’ Division, which had come to 8

reinforce the ‘Granatieri’ Division on September 9. Right: The same building on the corner of Ostiense and Via dei Conciatori, which is just a few hundred metres south of the Porta San Paolo.

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At the same time, Kesselring sent a battalion of paratroopers to seize General Roatta and the Italian Army General Staff at their headquarters at Monterotondo in a coup de main. In the absence of Generalleutnant Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke, who was on sick leave, the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division was led by Oberstleutnant Wolfgang Meder-Eggebert, acting commander of FallschirmjägerRegiment 6. His first move was to form two Kampfgruppen (combat groups). One was sent to disarm, peacefully if possible, the Italian units located between Rome and the coast, the other to seize the large petrol depot in Mezzocammino, on the Via Ostiense. The paratroopers quickly overran some Italian coastal batteries south of the city. The Piacenza Division in position around the towns of Lanuvio and Ardea fell easily, not putting up even a show of resistance. The garrison of Ostia voluntarily handed in their weapons. At the same time, columns of paratroopers under Major Friedrich-August Freiherr von der Heydte, the division’s Operations Officer, set out towards Rome along four main roads: the Via Portuense and Via della Magliana (north of the Tiber) and the Via Ostiense and Via Laurentina (south of the river). The column on the Via Laurentina, comprising the III. Bataillon of FallschirmjägerRegiment 6 under Major Pelz, advanced to the ‘military citadel’ of Cecchignola, a complex of Italian military headquarters, schools and other facilities on the southern outskirts of Rome and, in the evening, advance patrols of this force reached the EUR, the modern business and residential quarters at the southern edge of the city (built from 1937 in Fascist architectural style for the 1942 world’s fair, which never took place due to the outbreak of war). The column advancing along the Via della Magliana met Italian troops of the Granatieri Division at Magliana. Initial contacts between them were friendly. The Germans twice asked permission to pass through the city, the Italians refused and for the time being it ended there. However, around 2300 hours a second German detachment, using a stratagem, approached Italian mortar positions near the Ponte della Magliana and a brief but bloody battle erupted. At the same time fighting broke out at the Cecchignola military complex.

Lancieri di Montebello regiment. The view is looking south, so the vehicle’s gun was facing away from the German lines when it was knocked out. The other Semovente can be seen in the distance, just before the railway viaduct. Right: The spot is between the Via dei Conciatori and Via Giuseppe Giulietti.

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Left: A second self-propelled gun, this time a 47mm open-top Semovente 47/32, disabled on the Via Ostiense, another 100 metres closer to the Porta San Paolo. It either belonged to the ‘Granatieri’ Division’s own anti-tank gun company (the 121a Compagnie Cannoni Controcarro) or to the ‘Ariete’ Division’s

The most-important clash of the 1943 battle for Rome took place at the Porta San Paolo, where the Via Ostiense enters the old city through one of the ancient gates in the Aurelian Walls. Here troops from all over Rome and civilians willing to take up the fight in defence of their city rallied with soldiers of the ‘Granatieri’ Division in a desperate and bloody fight that lasted throughout September 10. Here a field gun has been set up on the square in front of the gate, its barrel pointing towards the Via delle Cave Ardeatine. The gun is an Obice da 100/17 modello 14 10cm medium howitzer. Originally produced by Skoda for the Habsburg Imperial Army, who knew it as the 10cm Feldhaubitze M14, during the First World War, it served as the standard Italian medium howitzer after 1918.

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Right: The Porta San Paolo Station in the background remains as a link with the past. From here trains run to Ostia-Lido on the coast. 9

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A memorial plaque on the old city walls records the ‘heroic resistance’ of September 10, 1943 — celebrated as the ‘Secondo Risorgimento’ (Second Insurrection) in analogy to the first Risorgimento — the 19th-century struggle for the unification of Italy.

Left: Italian riflemen firing down the Via Ostiense towards the German positions. They have taken cover behind the low wall that lines the Pyramid of Cestius, the tomb of Caius Cestius dating from 12 BC, which stands just outside and to the west of the city gate. Right: Today the only danger comes from the heavy traffic racing down the thoroughfare. the division’s Kampfgruppen advanced rapidly along two highways, the Via Claudia Braccianese and the Via Cassia (Route 2), leading from Lake Bolsena to the capital along either side of Lake Bracciano, meeting little resistance. Another column of the division moved west to the port of Civitavecchia. Along with their combat actions, the Germans skilfully exploited the confusion and lack of clear instructions on the Italian side. Making smart use of this, they arranged local truces and appealed to the honour of Italian soldiers that the war was over and they might go home if they wished. The latter standpoint seemed in accord with Badoglio’s radio announcement, and many of the Italian soldiers simply abandoned their weapons and disappeared in the countryside.

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At 0200, September 9, troops of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 under Oberstleutnant Hans Kroh attacked the military airport of Ciampino, along the Via Appia (Route 7) south-east of Rome. The Italian airmen of the 3a Squadra Aerea offered some resistance, albeit in vain. German pressure increased: at Magliana the Granatieri Division was forced to retreat slightly, although they maintained a solid front, and at around 0300 the news arrived that German forces had reached Tor Sapienza, on the eastern edge of the city, just eight kilometres from the city centre. Meanwhile, the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division (Generalleutnant Fritz-Hubert Gräser) was moving on Rome from the north. Attacking adjacent Italian units immediately,

FLIGHT OF THE KING AND HIGH COMMAND In the early hours of September 9, as various reports of encounters with German units came in, Army Chief-of-Staff Roatta became aware that the Germans were making a concentric approach to Rome from several directions. Appreciating that the city was about to be surrounded, he realised that the only escape route still open to the Royal Family was the Via Tiburtina (Route 5), leading out of the city to the east. From here it was still possible to reach Pescara on the Adriatic coast and embark for the south, towards territory in Anglo-American hands. When he reported this to Ambrosio shortly after 0400, the latter took two far-reaching decisions: firstly, the King and the government would leave Rome immediately; secondly, all military forces in and around Rome were to withdraw from the city and concentrate near Tivoli, along Route 5 some 30 kilometres to the east. Thus, around 0500, eight cars carrying the King, Queen, Crown Prince Umberto, Badoglio and four military aides hastily left Rome, motoring first to Pescara on the Adriatic coast and then to Ortona, boarding an Italian Navy cruiser for Brindisi, in the south and in Allied hands. Before he left, the King had given instructions that Ambrosio, the three service Chiefsof-Staff and the three service ministers leave

Left: An Italian machine-gun team has taken up position on the pavement in Viale Giotto, just inside the old city, while in the background more troops mill around two field guns and a 10

Semovente 75/18 guarding the passage through the Aurelian Walls. Right: The same view today, looking to the Porta San Paolo with the Pyramid of Cestius beyond.

Right: Two officers of the ’Sassari‘ Division and a captain from an Alpini unit are being led into the German lines blindfolded to discuss a possible truce with officers of the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division. The German officer on the right is most likely Oberstleutnant Wolfgang Meder-Eggebert, acting commander of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and, in the absence of Generalleutnant Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke, acting division commander.

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BATTLE FOR ROME (September 9-10) Meanwhile, events followed one another quickly. During the morning of September 9 lead elements of the 3. PanzergrenadierDivision met outposts of the Ariete Division at Manziana on the Via Claudia Braccianese, and at Monterosi on the Via Cassia near Monterosi Lake, and ordered them to give way. The Italians refused. When the Germans tried to rush tank columns through the Italian strong points, which were protected by well-placed mines and well-directed artillery fire, they were rebuffed. At Monterosi, the bridge over which the Germans had to pass was blown by a courageous Italian 2nd lieutenant, Sottotenente Ettore Rosso, who was killed in the act. The Germans halted, regrouped, brought up infantry and threatened an attack. In the south-west, at Magliana, a real battle had meanwhile broken out between the Granatieri Division and the Fallschirmjäger. In stiff fighting the Italian road-blocks fell, were re-taken, fell back in German hands and passed again to the Italians. In the south, at the Cecchignola military complex, some 200 Italian troops, mostly cadets from an officer and NCO training course, still refused to give in, often engaging in bitter close-quarter fighting. This unexpected opposition led the Germans to bypass the position and head directly towards the city. However, it gave many Italian soldiers the time and opportunity to turn up and report at their stations to participate in the defence of the city.

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Rome as well and join him at Pescara. Thus, shortly after 0600, the complete Italian high command — Comando Supremo chief Ambrosio; Army Chief-of-Staff Roatta; Navy Chief-of-Staff Ammiraglio di Squaddra Raffaele de Courten; Air Force Chief-of-Staff Generale di Divisione Aerea Renato Sandalli and several other key officers — all departed from the capital. Before he left, Roatta turned over command of all the forces defending Rome to General Carboni, commander of the Motorised Corps, directing him to withdraw his forces to the Tivoli area according to Ambrosio’s decision and to relocate his own command post to the town of Carsoli, another 35 kilometres further on. The decision that all Italian units move east to Tivoli sealed the fate of Rome. Taken at a time when the city’s defences were still intact and the Germans had not yet broken through, it later became a source of much controversy (and in post-war years would even lead to official investigations and a trial against Generals Roatta and Carboni), the question being whether it had been a sensible tactical move — to spare Rome the ravages of combat and at the same time maintain a strong threat close to the city to await the arrival of the Allies — or an order just designed to protect the escape route of the King and government.

Marco and his friend Alessandra did very well in locating the spot where the truce talks took place. The men are standing on what is today the Circonvallazione Ostiense, the side street of the Via Ostiense that runs alongside the southern end of the Mercati Generali. The warehouse on the right belongs to the latter complex. The industrial buildings in the background are those of the gas works on the far side of the Via Ostiense.

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Right: The talks for a possible cease-fire or Italian surrender continue. The German officer in the dark uniform on the right is Major Friedrich-August Freiherr von der Heydte, the divisional Ia (Operations Officer), who commanded the paratroops’ Kampfgruppe along the Via Ostiense. The pictures were taken by PK Otto from Propaganda-Kompanie 699. 11

The former EIAR building, in the XXII District on the west bank of the Tiber, is still a state radio facility, used today by EIAR’s successor, the RAI broadcasting company.

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The 800 paratroopers of the II. Bataillon of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 (under Major Walter Gericke) sent to Monterotondo north of Rome to capture the Italian Army commander and general staff in the Palazzo Orsini had more trouble. Taking off from Foggia airfield and parachuting from 52 Junkers Ju 52 aircraft around 0700, they ran into tenacious opposition from Italian soldiers, assisted in many cases by civilians. They captured some 2,500 troops, but by the time they seized the Army headquarters, they found that General Roatta and his staff had gone. Meanwhile, at the German command post at Frascati, nerves were tense. Kesselring and his Chief-of-Staff, General Siegfried Westphal, still found it hard to believe that the Italians had signed the armistice without an agreement with the Allies to protect Rome, so they moved cautiously. They still expected at any moment an Anglo-American surprise move on the city, which would put the German troops besieging the Italians into serious difficulties. Their concern over Allied intentions continued until daylight and only dissipated when the news of the Allied invasion at Salerno, far south of Rome (see After the Battle No. 95), came in. Their main concern now was to keep open the roads to and from Rome, and they decided to deal with the Italians and secure the city if at all possible without further fighting. On the morning of September 9, the Italian Army General Staff began setting up a new headquarters at the carabinieri barracks at Tivoli. Carboni, who had been placed in command of all the forces around Rome, arrived there at 0900 but he found no orders waiting for him as he had expected. At 1300 he took command. His first act was to start the withdrawal to the Tivoli area of the two most-reliable motorised divisions, the Ariete and the Piave. The Ariete had just that morning given the 3. PanzergrenadierDivision a bloody nose at Manziana and

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Right: One of the main installations in Rome that the Germans were determined to seize was the studio building of EIAR (Ente Italiano per le Audizioni Radiofoniche), the national radio station at No. 10 Via Asiago. Right from the beginning, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring included German occupation of the facility as one of the terms of an Italian surrender at Rome. Here, members of the Polizia d’Africana Italiana (PAI), the Fascist police force, stand outside the building after the capitulation. Two Germans, one of them with a bandaged head, can be seen in the building’s entrance. Picture by PK Funke of Propaganda-Kompanie 699.

Left: Two Fallschirmjäger stand guard at the entrance to the radio station. The same bandaged officer seen in the previous picture can now be seen on the right. The surrender agreement included a clause stipulating that the Rome police force would 12

be allowed to stay in the city to maintain law and order, hence the PAI policemen were permitted to keep their weapons and equipment. Right: Looking down Via Asiago towards its junction with Via Montello.

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Left: One of the main centres of power to be occupied by the Germans was the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the seat of Interior Minister Umberto Ricci. Before he fled from the capital with the King, Prime Minister Badoglio had charged Ricci with responsibility for continuing the civil administration with the other cabinet ministers, but the surrender the next day made that superfluous. Here the Fallschirmjäger have placed two of

The Ariete Division, the first to depart, moved down the Via Cassia, reached the outskirts of the city, took the Viale Parioli and exited the city along Via Tiburtina, where they marched past German troops on their way to the city without one single shot being exchanged. The Piave Division followed behind and by the morning of September 10,

the two divisions were concentrating in the Tivoli area. In other areas, however, the confusion was still great and fighting continued. In the south-west, at the Ponte della Magliana, a false order issued by the Germans at 1600 hours instructed the Italians to abandon their positions and head towards the city centre.

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Monterosi, forcing the Germans to halt and regroup. During this interval, the Ariete and Piave Divisions withdrew, and were replaced in the line by the Re Division. Unaware of the changeover, the German division commander, Generalleutnant Gräser, maintained his threatening attitude but refrained from launching an attack.

their 37mm PaK 36 anti-tank guns in front of the ministry building on Piazza del Viminale. The gun in the foreground is pointing north-westwards into Via delle Quatro Fontane, the one on the extreme right into Via Palermo. The picture was taken by PK photographer Bayer of Propaganda-Kompanie Luftflotte 2. Right: Central Rome survived the war unscathed and the Palazzo Viminale remains as before.

road in Via del Viminale. Right: Looking up the same street today, which leads north-east to the Central Railway Station.

Left: The Germans put sentries in all the streets surrounding the ministry building. These Fallschirmjäger are guarding the corner of Via Palermo and Via Genova, one block to the north

of the Palazzo Viminale. The MG42 machine gun is trained on the Via Milano. Right: Today just an innocuous corner in the centre of Rome.

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Left: A Fallschirmjäger on guard duty in front of the Interior Ministry watches the crowd of curious spectators across the

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Another building that needed to be secured was the German Embassy on the Piazza di Villa Wolkonsky. The newly appointed ambassador, Rudolf Rahn, and his staff had hastily burned secret diplomatic papers and rapidly evacuated the premises during the night of September 8/9, the Italian authorities having issued them with special passes permitting them to leave the city. However, right from the start of Italo-German surrender talks, Kesselring had presented immediate re-occupation of this premise as part of his terms.

Now, with the Germans back in control and PAI policemen assembled on the street outside, the Germans have placed a 7,5cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun squarely in the embassy’s main gate.

At first it seemed strange, but then the soldiers began to dismantle their road-blocks and move in accordance with the directions received. By the time the deception became clear, the main positions had been irretrievably lost. South of the Tiber, fighting between the Fallschirmjäger and the Granatieri Division intensified. Exerting the strongest pressure against strong points guarding the Via Ostiense and the Via Laurentina, the paratroopers late in the afternoon knocked out several Italian artillery batteries. The Italians pulled back slightly but maintained a solid front. Carboni telephoned the division commander, Generale di Brigata Gioacchino Solinas, and encouraged him to continue the fight. Towards midnight of September 9/10, the Granatieri Division attacked to recapture the Ponte della Magliana. By dawn, despite heavy losses, they had almost succeeded. At this point, however, the fighting was again interrupted to initiate further negotiations, the Germans requesting passage in order to proceed to the south to counter the Allied landings. The Italians accepted, but as soon as they came over the bridge to allow the Germans to move, the latter resumed firing. The situation became critical and the Italians were forced to fall back along the Via della Magliana towards the junction with the Via Ostiense, where they received orders to retreat to the EUR. Here, however, the German paratroopers had in the meantime infiltrated, sniping from the roofs of nearby buildings. Further fighting developed on the Via Laurentina. Here, at the village of Montagnola and at the Forte Ostiense, 500 troops of the Granatieri Division and a number of civilians fought desperately to block the passage of German troops, suffering 45 and nine men killed respectively. When this bastion fell, the German column linked up with the paratroopers coming from the Via Ostiense and they jointly proceeded towards the working-class district of Garbatella, where other Italian soldiers and civilians tried to put up a fight. However, due to the overwhelming German superiority in men, means and organisation, the clash was brief and quickly resolved in German favour. A few grenades fell in the square in front of San Paolo Church (property of the Vatican State), the Germans occupying the square after only a brief clash. Leaving a detachment at the square, the paratroopers continued their advance along the Via Ostiense, opposed by elements of the ‘Lancieri di Montebello’ Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment. However, in the midst of fighting, the latter received orders to retreat.

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Left: Today, the Villa Wolkonsky no longer houses the German Embassy but — in an ironic twist of history — serves as the official residence of the British Ambassador! After the liberation of Rome in 1944, the Italian government sequestrated the property and it was placed under the Allied Control Commission. For a short time the building was occupied by the Swiss Legation, then by the Italian Red Cross. Then, after the clandestine militant Zionist group Irkun blew up the British Embassy at Porte Pia on October 31, 1946, the Italian government made the Villa Wolkonsky available to the United Kingdom as temporary embassy and ambassadorial residence. After the embassy moved back to the newly completed premises at Porte Pia in 1971, the villa remained in use as ambassador’s dwelling. When Germany re-established diplomatic relations with Italy in June 1951, it had to find a new address for its embassy. First it was in Via Don Giovanni Verità, then from 1957 in Via Po, and from 1998 at No. 4 Via San Martino della Battaglia. 14

Above: The Germans immediately deployed anti-aircraft guns at strategic places around the city. This SdKfz 7 2cm Flak wagon has taken up position on the Monte Gianicolo in west-

ern Rome. Below: The second-tallest hill in the Eternal City, the Gianicolo was and still is famous for its breathtaking view of the city and its innumerable domes and churches.

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SURRENDER NEGOTIATIONS (September 9-10) While all this was happening, the Germans continued their appeals to the Italian divisions to cease fighting their former comrades. These petitions had little effect on the Granatieri Division, which fought stubbornly and well. But they did find a receptive audience in the Centauro Division, which had thus far taken no part in the fighting. At 1700 on September 9, a German parliamentary, Hauptmann Hans Schacht, presented himself at the Centauro Division headquarters at Bagni Acque Albule, some 20 kilometres east of Rome, bringing an oral appeal from General Student to the division commander, Calvi di Bergolo. This declared confidence in the division’s friendly attitude towards the German troops and requested that the division treat the German troops as friendly. It was not quite clear whether this represented a demand for surrender, an offer of honourable capitulation, or a request to let the German forces pass unmolested to the north. In reply, Calvi di Bergolo sent his Chiefof-Staff, Tenente Colonello Leandro Giaccone, to Kesselring’s headquarters at Frascati to learn exactly what terms the Germans would offer. Arriving there with a

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Now the last obstacle facing the Germans was the imposing Porta San Paolo, the city gate in the Aurelian walls, with its embattled towers and walls of over four metres thick. This is where the most-decisive and bloody clash of the two-day battle for Rome took place. Here, spontaneously or on orders from young and courageous junior officers, soldiers congregated from the military barracks in Rome, as well as civilians who wished to help out in defence of their city. In the vast square, bounded by the Pyramid of Cestius on the left and the Ostiense Railway Station on the right, the hardest clashes occurred, in which the Germans also made use of mortars. A few light tanks and armoured cars from an Italian motorised cavalry platoon arrived to support the position, but they had no armour to resist the German anti-tank guns, and so one vehicle after another was destroyed by accurate German fire.

Left: Rome was the central hub of the German lines of communications so it was vital to secure the city’s road and rail bridges over the Tiber. Here Fallschirmjäger set up a machine gun on the Ponte Regina Margherita. Right: Built in 1886-91 on designs by Architect Angelo Vescovali, the Ponte Margherita remains timeless. 15

Looking south towards the Piazza Annibaliano today. At the close of the meeting, Kesselring opiniated to Giaccone that the Italian situation was hopeless. If the Italians refused to accept his terms he threatened to blow up the aqueducts and bomb the city. Giaccone said he thought the terms acceptable and proposed a three-hour truce to start at 0700, September 10. At the end of it, he would deliver the Italian reply to which Kesselring agreed.

When Giaccone reported back to his division commander, Calvi di Bergolo, about 0200, the latter was disappointed and annoyed about the German terms but also uncertain about what course to take, so he sent Giaccone on to Carboni. The latter apparently accepted the German terms for at 0530 Giaccone sent his lieutenant interpreter to deliver a message to that effect to Kesselring’s headquarters. He himself followed at 0700.

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lieutenant interpreter at 2100, Giaccone carried out a long-drawn-out discussion with Kesselring, Westphal and Student. He from his side proposed that the Germans continue to respect the ‘open city’ status of Rome (which the Italians had declared on August 14) and evacuate the capital; that one Italian division (the Piave Division) and the police force be allowed to stay in the city; that other Italian troops lay down their arms and be sent home; and that the Italians be permitted to surrender honourably. Against that, Kesselring insisted on having German troops occupy the German Embassy, the telephone exchange and the radio station; that the Italian division remaining in Rome was to have no artillery; that the Italian officer appointed as commander of the city was to give him, Kesselring, a daily report; and that the Italian soldiers, after their discharge, were to have the alternative of taking up military or labour service with the Germans.

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Right: The ‘Piave’ Motorised Infantry Division was in position just north of the city when the armistice was announced on September 8. During the night of the 8th/9th, its commander, Generale di Divisione Ugo Tabellini, had sent units into Rome to reinforce the ‘Granatieri’ Division and in the early morning dispatched the division’s 58th Infantry Battalion to Monterotondo, north of the capital, to help stave off the airborne assault on General Roatta’s Army General Staff headquarters there. However, his plan to move his entire division to Cecchignola in the south to help out the ‘Granatieri’ was blocked by Generale di Divisione Count Carlo Calvi di Bergolo, commander of the ‘Centauro’ Armoured Division but at that moment acting commander of the Motorised Corps, who insisted that they follow the orders to withdraw to east of the city. By the morning of the 10th the ‘Piave’ was concentrating near Tivoli when, at 1045, Generale di Corpo d’Armata Giacomo Carboni, overall commander of forces defending Rome, ordered it back into Rome to prepare for a counter-attack to start at 1600. The Italian surrender at 1630 prevented all that. On the morning of the 11th, as the division entered Rome along the Via Salaria (Route 4), they were met by Fallschirmjäger troops who halted its columns and ordered the men to debuss. Generale Tabellini watched his men being disarmed and was then himself arrested. The group in this picture was rounded up in Via Asmara in the Trieste district, which lies east of the Via Salaria.

More prisoners from the ‘Piave’ Division being rounded up by Fallschirmjäger, this time in the Piazza di Santa Costanza, a few hundred metres further south of the Via Asmara. 16

New development has transformed the piazza but the two apartment blocks in the background survive unchanged. This is Via Bolzano from its junction with Piazza di Santa Costanza.

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Above: An SdKfz 222 armoured car, probably from the 3. PanzergrenadierDivision, approaches the long column of surrendered Italian trucks of the ‘Piave’ Division parked on the Via Tolmino. Picture taken by PK photographer Funke. Right: The modern round building on Via Parenzo seen in the background of the wartime photo is today part of the Guido Carli Free International University for Social Studies (more colloquially known as the Università LUISS).

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However, Carboni was playing a double game. He had no intention of capitulating and played with the idea to continue talks with the Germans to stall for time, hoping the Allies might still intervene with an airborne or seaborne landing near Rome. He also ordered the Ariete and Piave Divisions, which by now were assembling near Tivoli, to attack the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division in order to alleviate pressure on the Granatieri Division. While the two divisions prepared for the move, Carboni at 0700 left for Rome with several of his staff officers to see Antonio Sorice, the Italian Minister of War.

Left: An Italian officer discussing the surrender procedures with a Fallschirmjäger officer at the large traffic circle at the northern end of Via Bressanone, the street that leads north-

wards from Via di Santa Costanza. Right: The open space is today a car-park. This is the view looking north into the Viale Eritrea. 17

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Paratroopers marching past the entrance of the Liceo Giulio Cesare on Via Malta, further south in the Trieste district.

Palazzo Viminale on the morning of the 9th, Sorice broke the news to them. The ministers were completely stunned. When Ricci declined to take responsibility for the civil administration, Marshal Caviglia (who was present at the meeting) stepped into the breach and said he would assume full powers in Rome during the absence of the Head of Government. He tried cabling the King asking for authorisation of his move but the monarch could not be reached, so Caviglia proceeded on the basis of his prestige as a marshal of Italy. Caviglia’s chief priority was to save Rome and its population from the destruction of battle so he immediately began efforts to pacify the Germans. However, the staff at the German Embassy had gone, and Kesselring’s headquarters at Frascati proved hostile to his attempts at negotiation. To tranquillise the population, he directed the Minister of Propaganda, Carlo Galli, to broadcast radio messages and put up posters calling on the people to stay calm and assuring them that negotiations were underway with the Germans. These public announcements, when they appeared early on the 10th, only served to further demoralise the civil population and the troops, thus undermining Carboni’s plan for continued resistance. When Caviglia and Carboni met at the War Ministry on the morning of the 10th, the latter briefed the field-marshal of the military situation. He explained how Roatta had ordered him to withdraw his divisions to Tivoli for no apparent reason. As there was not enough fuel available to move them on into the safety of the Abruzzi Mountains, he

had decided to send the Ariete and Piave Divisions back to Rome to fight the Germans. Caviglia replied with what Carboni construed as an approval of his actions. Carboni then set up his command post in a private apartment at No. 7 Piazza dello Muse (belonging to a staff member of the Intelligence Division), chosen because it had a good observation of strategic streets. From there, equipped with two telephones, he began to issue orders to his military units, and call upon the civil population to join in the fight for the defence of the capital. He instructed Generale di Divisione Tabellini to have his Piave Division reinforce the besieged Granatieri Division in southern Rome; he sent any other separate unit he could find to further bolster up that position; he informed Solinas, the Granatieri commander, to hold on and that help was on the way; and he urged Generale di Brigata Traniello of the Re Division to hold out north of Rome. At the same time, he made contact with members of the Resistance in order to promote popular insurrection against the Germans, even committing to provide weapons and ammunition to the men of the clandestine Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale’ (CLN, Committee of National Liberation). Four days earlier — on September 6 — Carboni had acquired and set aside 500 rifles, 400 pistols and 15,000 hand-grenades for distribution to the people of Rome. Luigi Longo, chief of the Communist Party, had taken charge of the distribution and when he reported to Carboni on the morning of the 10th, the latter encouraged

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The latter had called him to discuss an unexpected new development. The day before, September 9, Maresciallo d’Italia Enrico Caviglia, an elderly officer who had been a rival of Badoglio for years, had on his own accord taken upon himself command of all the civil and military forces in the capital and had assumed what resembled the position of head of a provisional government. The old field-marshal — a trustee of the King, who earlier that year had considered him as possible successor to Mussolini — had come to Rome for an audience with the King. Surprised as everyone by Badoglio’s surrender announcement, early on the 9th he had gone to find out more but had only met the greatest confusion. The King was not at the Quirinal Palace; the War Ministry was near empty; at the Comando Supremo there was not a single general officer to be found; Roatta’s office was empty; Barbieri, the commander of the Army Corps of Rome, was not in his office; and Carboni, commander of the Motorised Corps, had disappeared. Upset and depressed by what he saw, Caviglia was even more shocked when he learned that the King, Badoglio, Roatta and other high-ranking officers had fled the capital and gone east to Pescara. Before leaving, Badoglio had directed Minister of War Sorice to inform the other civil ministers of his cabinet of the new development and tell them to meet the King and his party at Pescara. He was also to inform Umberto Ricci, the Minister of the Interior, that in his (Badoglio’s) absence he was to take over responsibility for the civil government. Convening the ministers at the

Caesar’s lyceum has lost its peculiar stone fence and entrance pillars but the building itself remains unchanged.

Left: A 3.7cm PaK 36 anti-tank gun set up on the corner of the Via delle Isole and the Via Malta. Developed in 1933, the PaK 36 was already obsolete by 1940, being too lightly armed for modern warfare, but it continued to be used as infantry support weapon until the end of the war. Its light weight and easy 18

mobility made it particularly suitable for use by airborne troops. Right: Today only a one-way traffic sign on a crooked pole bars the way into Via delle Isole. When facing down Via Malta the gun would have covered the junction with the Corso Trieste.

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The Germans did not enter the territory of the Vatican State during the fighting of September 8-10 and after the Italian capitulation continued to respect its boundaries. Here five Fallschirmjäger pose on the border line in front of Saint Peter’s Basilica.

The magnificent vista of Piazza San Pietro — then and now.

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him to get civilian fighters to reinforce the Granatieri troops south of Rome. Around noon, Carboni sent Dr. Eduardo Stolfi to the CLN to tell them that the moment had come to arm the population and have it rise against the Germans. However, the committee refused to take action and in the end only few civilians joined and fought with the military. The Romans were disillusioned and tired of the war, and most of them preferred to follow Caviglia’s radio and poster appeals to stay calm rather than Carboni’s call to fight. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Giaccone had arrived at Kesselring’s headquarters at 0700 to confirm that the Italian command had accepted the conditions drafted the night before. However he was confronted with a nasty surprise when Kesselring told him that the Allied landing at Salerno, far to the south, meant that the Italians in Rome were on their own and that he therefore had a new set of terms, much sterner than the one agreed on earlier. He now demanded complete capitulation, and if the Italians did not comply before 1700, he would send the Luftwaffe to bomb Rome. Giaccone had no other option but to carefully discuss the new terms with Westphal. At 1000 he left for Rome with two copies of the capitulation document, one in German and one in Italian, both already signed by Westphal. There he contacted Carboni, then Minister of War Sorice, but both men refused to take on any responsibility of making a decision. Sorice referred him to Marshal Caviglia, the highest military official in the city. Giaccone met with Caviglia and Calvi di Bergolo, his own division commander, in a private house and the three men discussed the German terms. Although he had still not heard from the King, and thus was still unsure whether his authority had been confirmed, Caviglia accepted his responsibility and decided that they had no other option but to capitulate. Shortly after, three members of the CLN and the Minister of Industry, Leopoldo Piccardi, arrived at the house and, after listening to Caviglia’s exposition on the hopeless military situation, endorsed his decision. Giaccone and Calvi di Bergolo thereupon took the surrender papers to the War Ministry to get them signed by either Sorice or Carboni. However, both men refused to sign. Carboni in particular still vehemently argued for a continuation of the fight. Even when Caviglia arrived and declared Carboni’s hope of Allied intervention illusory, the latter remained adamant and refused to sign.

Left: Fallschirmjäger sentries took up a 24-guard along the pavement line delineating the Papal State’s frontier on Saint

Peter’s Square but took care not to cross it. Right: Today the Vatican’s perimeter is marked by a pillar-and-chain fence. 19

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Left: A 2cm Flak gun set up on the Via della Traspontina at its corner with the broad Via della Conciliazione leading to Saint

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cessful raid by German paratroopers had led to the liberation of Mussolini from his detention on the Gran Sasso (see After the Battle No. 22). Thus Rome became a German-occupied city. Generalmajor Reiner Stahel was appointed Stadtkommandant (City Commandant). The German command confiscated large hotels in the Via Veneto and isolated the area with barbed wire and sentries. Curfew was installed, and everyone found out on the street during it was arrested. The long night of Rome had begun.

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everything finally came to an end, the Italian Army had completely disintegrated. Its surrender left the Germans a sizeable booty: in all they captured 1,255,660 rifles, 33,383 machine guns, 9,986 artillery pieces, 970 armoured vehicles, 4,553 aircraft, 15,500 vehicles, 28,600 tons of ammunition and 123,114,000 litres of fuel. A total of 51 Italian divisions were disarmed and 574,000 Italian soldiers, including 24,000 officers, were made prisoners of war. The final blow came on the evening of the 12th, when the radio announced that a suc-

Two more Flak wagons — the one in the foreground a SdKfz 7/2 with a 3.7cm FlaK gun — in position at the Castel Sant’Angelo, pictured by PK Bayer.

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He did not trust the Germans and feared they would exact more than was said in the surrender document. He was especially bitter against Calvi di Bergolo, whose Centauro Division he said had stood by idly while the Granatieri, Ariete and Piave Divisions had fought and resisted the Germans well. He declared that, if Calvi di Bergolo had such good faith in the Germans, he should take over command of the city and take the responsibility of signing the surrender. The others agreed. Taken aback by this sudden turn, Calvi di Bergolo vacillated but in the end he consented. At 1630, half an hour before expiration of the German ultimatum, Giaccone arrived at Kesselring’s headquarters with the surrender papers, signed by him as Calvi di Bergolo’s Chief-of-Staff. Thus, after two days of fighting their former allies, the Italian forces in Rome capitulated. When the news of the surrender reached the Porta San Paolo, Italian resistance weakened and the defenders were pushed back towards Monte Testaccio and the Viale Aventino, where many surrendered to the Germans. Although news of the surrender spread quickly, sporadic fighting continued for a few hours in many areas of the city. Clashes occurred in the Via Appia, in Piazza Vittorio, in Via Merulana, in Via Gioberti, in Via Cavour and at the large military barracks of Castro Pretorio, while the Piazza Esedra, where the wounded were assembled, increasingly resembled an enormous open air field hospital. The last clashes occurred in the Piazza dei Cinquecento, in front of the Stazione Termini (main railway station). Italian soldiers, backed by some railway workers, attempted a desperate final stand around an Army train, which ended at 2030. The Wehrmacht quickly took control of all of Rome. The Fallschirmjäger speedily occupied the ministries and the most-important public buildings; anti-tank guns and machine guns were placed at the major crossroads and many other points all over the city, while the first posters signed by Kesselring and communicating the new rules to the people of Rome appeared on the walls. The gates of the Vatican, which for reasons of safety had been closed during the fighting, were reopened. However, German sentries respected the dividing line between Italy and the neutral Vatican State. The following afternoon, September 11, the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division entered Rome, parading in along the Via Veneto with its armoured columns. Like in Rome, the disarming of the Italian Army in the rest of Italy and the occupied territories proceeded without problems. Isolated groups of Italian soldiers continued sporadic resistance here and there, but they were quickly overwhelmed by the better organised and efficient German forces and subjected to the inevitable retaliation. When

Peter’s Basilica. Right: Looking up the same avenue on a fine summer day seven decades later.

The cylindrical building, overlooking the Tiber and housing the mausoleum of Hadrian, was for centuries used as a fort, then in the 14th century became a Papal fortress, being decommissioned and made into a museum in 1901. The Flak wagons were emplaced on the river bank just west of it, the Ponte Sant’Angelo being just outside the picture off to the right.

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On June 4, 1944 — nine months after the Germans had seized Rome –– forces of the US Fifth Army liberated the Italian capital. It was the culmination of a long drawn-out campaign, begun with the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and continued with the slow and costly advance up the Italian boot from September that year, which for a long time had seen stalemate at Cassino and Anzio. The final advance towards Rome devel-

oped into a race between numerous formations, flying columns of no less than five American divisions penetrating the city from various directions during the course of the day. The population of the Eternal City greeted the Americans with hysterical jubilation, giving rise to scenes that would be repeated later in the year in other capitals of Europe, like Paris on August 25 and Brussels on September 3.

THE ALLIED LIBERATION OF ROME 1944 On May 11, 1944, after two months of preparation, the Allied 15th Army Group of General Sir Harold Alexander launched its two armies — the British Eighth Army and the US Fifth Army — into the biggest Allied offensive yet launched on the Italian front. Code-named Operation ‘Diadem’, the massive attack was designed to finally break the deadlock at Cassino, smash through the German Gustav Line, link up with the Allied beachhead at Anzio, and drive on to capture Rome. Alexander and his staff had designed a strategic plan which, if everything went well, would trap and destroy a large part of the two German armies of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring’s Heeresgruppe C in a giant encirclement south of Rome. With the Eighth and Fifth Armies battering and pushing the German 10. Armee in front of it — so the plan went — the 14. Armee, which was containing the Anzio beach-head, would no doubt be ordered by Kesselring to send reinforcements south. At that moment, the US VI Corps at Anzio would strike out from its shallow perimeter, cut Routes 6 (the Via Casilina of ancient Roman times) and 7 (the old Via Appia) — the two main highways leading from southern Italy to Rome — behind the German main force and thus put the lid on the bucket. ‘Diadem’ went off to a promising start. After heavy fighting, the Eighth Army on the right broke through the Gustav Line at Cassino, captured Monte Cassino, and began advancing up the wide Liri river valley

towards Rome. The Fifth Army on the left was doing even better, its French complement — the Corps Expéditionnaire Français — surprising everyone by its rapid thrust through the seemingly impassable Aurunci Mountains. Less than two weeks into ‘Diadem’, on May 23, the US VI Corps under Major General Lucian K. Truscott launched its breakout attack from the Anzio beach-head, its main effort striking northwards to cut Route 7 at the town of Cisterna and then Route 6 at Valmontone. The US 3rd Infantry Division had a stiff and extremely costly fight to capture Cisterna but by the 25th Route 7 was cut and the corps’ forces were approaching Route 6. It seemed that Alexander’s grand scheme of trapping the German armies south of Rome would be achieved. However, that same morning, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, the commander of the Fifth Army, on his own accord, gave orders that changed the whole course of the operation. Clark, a very ambitious, publicityminded and glory-seeking general, was determined that his Fifth Army should be the first into Rome, that American troops should be the first to enter the capital of Italy. Clark had never accepted Alexander’s view that the liberation of Rome was secondary to the destruction of the German armies in Italy. Moreover, he was not convinced that blocking the two main highways would be sufficient to trap the Germans, given the fact that there were plenty of other minor roads through the Simbruini and Pre-

By Karel Margry nestini Mountains further north, which could be used as alternative escape routes. He also feared that if his army did not capture Rome quickly, the British or French would get in on the job and maybe beat him to it. Now, in clear violation of Alexander’s orders and brushing aside Truscott’s protests, he gave orders for the bulk of the VI Corps to change its direction of attack from north-east to north-west, and launch an all-out drive on the Italian capital via the shortest route — Route 7. Clark’s decision was a strategic blunder of great consequence for it allowed a significant portion of the enemy’s army to escape past Valmontone via Route 6. The change of direction necessitated the wheeling around of four whole divisions in a restricted and congested area. The shift of emphasis from Route 6 to Route 7 also meant that the main attack would have to be made against a stronger section of the Caesar Line, along which the Germans defended the approaches to Rome, and over more-difficult terrain. Some 45 kilometres south of the capital the two converging highways each run past a concentration of low volcanic heights known collectively as the Colli Laziali (Alban Hills), Route 7 passing to the west of it and Route 6 to the east of it. The shift of the VI Corps’ attack meant that its main effort would now be along Route 7 and across the south-western slopes of the Alban Hills. 21

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The VI Corps’ redirected offensive got underway on May 26. The Germans were dug in along the Caesar Line and stubbornly resisted around the towns of Velletri and Campoleone. For five days progress was slow and losses were heavy. The breakthrough came on the night of May 30/31 when the US 36th Infantry Division found a gap in the German lines in the Alban Hills and, in a bold and stealthy night climb, managed to capture Monte Artemisio, in the hills behind Velletri, thereby outflanking this key enemy strongpoint on Route 7 and unhinging the Caesar Line. Meanwhile, on May 25, the main force of Fifth Army had finally linked up with the Anzio forces at a point south of the bridgehead. The US II Corps of Major General Geoffrey Keyes, now pinched out by the VI Corps, was rapidly brought forward to assume responsibility of the sector of Route 6 around Valmontone, taking over the forces left there by the VI Corps and bringing along two of its own divisions. By nightfall on June 2, the Fifth Army stood poised in a wide semi-circle some 40 kilometres to the south and east of Rome. On the left, between the sea and the Alban Hills, was Truscott’s VI Corps, with six divisions: on its left wing, advancing slowly along the coast, were the British 5th and 1st Infantry Divisions; to their right were four American divisions: the 45th Infantry Division labouring up the road from Anzio at Campoleone, the 1st Armored and 34th 22

The operation to capture Rome involved two corps of the Fifth Army, the VI Corps advancing along Route 7 from the direction of the Anzio beachhead, and the II Corps advancing along Route 6 from the south-east. Thus the commander of the Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark achieved his prime ambition of having American troops of his army be the first to enter Rome. However, by directing his VI Corps forces away from Valmontone on Route 6, in clear disobedience of orders, and sending them instead to Rome, Clark had allowed the German 10. Armee to escape certain encirclement. A long and bitter campaign had been won and the capital of Italy had fallen, but a great victory had slipped from Allied hands. Infantry Divisions astride Route 7 at Velletri, and the 36th Infantry Division pressing directly across the Alban Hills. On the army’s right, on the other side of the volcanic heights, was Keyes’ II Corps, with three infantry divisions: the 85th Division on the eastern slopes of the Alban Hills; the 88th Division astride Route 6 at the village of San Cesareo (where the highway cut through the gap between the Alban Hills and the Prenestini Mountains), and the 3rd Division holding the high ground north of the highway near the village of Palestrina. The positions reached by the two American corps put them squarely in front of the Fifth Army’s third corps, the Corps Expéditionnaire Français, and well in advance — over 50 kilometres — of the British Eighth Army coming up at right rear through the Liri and Sacco river valleys further to the south-east. Opposing the Fifth Army and stubbornly defending the approaches to Rome along the Caesar Line was Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen’s 14. Armee with two corps.

On the right, holding a 30-kilometre sector from the sea inland to the Alban Hills and facing the VI Corps, stood the I. FallschirmKorps of Generalleutnant Alfred Schlemm with four divisions: the 4. FallschirmjägerDivision, the 65. Infanterie-Division, the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division and the 362. Infanterie-Division. Holding the army’s left wing — a 15-kilometre zone from the Alban Hills to beyond Valmontone on Route 6 — was the LXXVI. Panzer-Korps of Generalleutnant Traugott Herr. It had only one division-size formation, the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division ‘Hermann Göring’, which since its arrival in this sector on May 25 had fought to keep open Route 6 for the forces of the 10. Armee retreating in front of the Eighth Army. However, with the fall of Valmontone on June 2, this escape route had been cut, leaving Kesselring no other choice but to order the 10. Armee to break off contact and make good its escape through the Simbruini Mountains north of Valmontone to behind the Aniene river, a tributary of the Tiber north of Rome.

Kesselring had already reconciled himself to the loss of Rome but he still hoped to extricate the forces of the 14. Armee defending its approaches. Those units immediately south of the capital could pull out through the city to north of the Tiber. However, the best escape route for those units located south-east of the city was via bridges over the Aniene between Rome and Tivoli, rather than through the city itself, so it was vital to set up blocking positions in order to delay the Allies getting there first. That night, June 2/3, Kesselring authorised the 14. Armee to also break off contact and withdraw to new positions two or three kilometres closer to Rome. On his order, General Mackensen instructed Generalleutnant Schlemm of the I. Fallschirm-Korps to transfer part of the 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division (Generalmajor Heinz Trettner) from the army’s right wing to the left in order to cover the withdrawal to the Aniene. By the morning of the 3rd, one battalion of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 11 (Major Walter Gericke) had taken up a blocking position at a road junction on the Via Tuscolana, five kilometres north-west of Frascati, and another battalion reinforced a position at Due Torri, a locality on Route 6 near the Roman suburb of Centocelle. Thus the scene was set for the Allied final dash into Rome.

From the first days of June, with the Allies pushing north from the Anzio bridgehead ever stronger, German forces began evacuating through Rome. Here a truck towing both a 7.5cm PaK 40 and a 3.7cm PaK 36 anti-tank gun makes its way up the Via dei Fori Imperiali in the centre of the city. The combination has just passed the Colosseum and will shortly pass the large, white-marble Victor Emanuel II Monument seen in the distance. JUNE 3 By daybreak on June 3, both corps of the Fifth Army were on the move. Everywhere masses of infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, guns and all the other fighting arms were driving along dusty roads at the great objective, the city of Rome, now some 40 kilometres away. A sense of impending victory began to pervade the command posts of every American unit involved in the drive. Every commander was attempting to manoeuvre his forces into position to be the first into Rome. Both the II and VI Corps made their main effort along the main highway in its zone, Route 6 and Route 7 respectively, but divisions on either side of these main axes tried to get in on the act as well. The race was on.

II CORPS (June 3) Leading the II Corps’ drive down Route 6 was a unit known as Task Force Howze. A composite force, consisting of tanks, reconnaissance vehicles and infantry, it had been detached from the 1st Armored Division since May 25, initially to close the opening gap between divisions attacking out of the Anzio beach-head and then to give the infantry divisions a stronger punch. Commanded by Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, commander of the 13th Armored Regiment, by this time it comprised that regiment’s 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Bogardus S. Cairn; Company A of the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; the 756th Tank Battalion under Lieutenant

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Right: The broad Via dei Fori Imperiali was built between 1931-33 at the behest of Mussolini, primarily because he wanted a venue for his triumphal marches and parades but also to create a physical and symbolic link between the Fascist Party’s headquarters in Piazza Venezia and the seat of ancient Roman power in the forum. However, creating space for the new avenue entailed wholesale destruction of many Roman structures. The entire old town quarter of Alessandrino was systematically destroyed and its residents forced to move. Parts of four Imperial forums were obliterated, and several churches, monasteries and notable Renaissance houses eliminated to satisfy the Duce’s wishes for a ‘new’ Rome. 23

former headquarters located about 15 kilometres south-east of Rome. Both regiments made steady progress, each capturing a series of hills. The 337th took Monte Compatri without much trouble and Monte Porzio Catone after wiping out some light resistance. The 339th seized two more hills, Monte Salamone and Monte San Sebastiano, and then followed the divisional 85th Reconnaissance Troop into Frascati. The regiment continued to advance until it halted for the night some five kilometres from Rome — at that moment of time the closest point to Rome reached by any Allied unit.

Colonel Glenn F. Rogers; the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry (on attachment from the 3rd Division) under Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Izenour; the 1st Battalion of the 349th Infantry (detached from the 88th Division) under Major James E. Henderson; and a battalion from the 6th Field Artillery Group. On the morning of June 3, Task Force Howze passed through the lines of the 88th Division at San Cesareo and began moving towards Rome on Route 6. The Corps order had laid down phase lines to co-ordinate the attack, but units were not to halt until they reached the last line short of Rome, the north-south road passing through the suburb of Tor Sapienza. Spearheading the advance were the armoured cars of the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion followed by the Sherman tanks of the 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment. Colonel Howze’s tactic was to have a tank platoon simply barrel down the road at a pace of eight to ten kilometres per hour until, inevitably, the lead Sherman tank would run into a German rearguard and get knocked out. Although a crude method, it resulted in quick gains of several kilometres at the cost of just one tank. With the armour advancing at such a pace, the task force’s infantry — the foot soldiers of the 7th and 349th Infantry — had a hard job keeping up and only pulled abreast after well-hidden enemy anti-tank guns and snipers opened up on the tanks just beyond Colonna, a railway station about five kilometres west of San Cesareo. The infantry moved through the tanks and in a co-ordinated attack quickly caused the German rearguards to abandon their guns and withdraw to the suburbs of Rome, a large number of prisoners being taken. By nightfall, having advanced a good 25 kilometres during the day, Task Force Howze held the crossroads at Borgata Finocchio, 15 kilometres southeast of Rome. Meanwhile, at 1700 hours, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, each of its companies mounted on a squadron of Howze’s tanks, had moved out northwards from Route 6 in three columns to set up as many road-blocks on the Via Prenestina, a good thoroughfare running about parallel with that highway between it and Route 5. Shortly before dark, the road-block set up by Company G ambushed a German convoy of nearly 30 vehicles, capturing all of them — including two 88mm guns — and taking 130 prisoners. With Howze taking the lead on Route 6, Right: The Palazzo Venezia (left), Trajan’s Column (centre) and Church of the Most Holy Name of Mary at the Trajan Forum (right) are easy landmarks to identify the comparison. 24

the regiments of the 88th Division (Major General John E. Sloan) had little else to do but follow in their wake. The 351st Infantry moved forward from San Cesareo on a 3,000metre front astride Route 6, cleaning out pockets of bypassed enemy and rounding up stragglers. Brushing aside a small delaying force south of Zagarolo, the division advanced some ten kilometres, to the village of Pallavincini, where the regiment was ordered to halt for the night. Meanwhile, on the II Corps’ rear right wing, the 3rd Division, under Brigadier General Mike O’Daniel, was holding the high ground around Palestrina, north-west of Valmontone. Its task was to stay in place until relieved by units of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français, coming up from the southeast. Once relieved, the division was to advance westwards alongside the 88th Division to screen the corps’ right flank and gain the line of the Aniene river north of Rome. Early on the 3rd the French began to relieve the division’s right-hand regiment, the 15th Infantry, which immediately departed to move westwards along Route 6. Rapidly leapfrogging the 7th and 30th Infantry (of its own division) and the 349th Infantry (of the 88th Division), the 15th reached positions from which it could protect the columns moving on the capital. Its 1st Battalion struck north towards the Aniene river, reaching there at 2200. On the II Corps’ left wing, south of Route 6, the 85th Division (Major General John B. Coulter), with the 337th Infantry on the right and the 339th Infantry on the left, continued its advance across the north-eastern flanks of the Alban Hills toward Frascati, Kesselring’s

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A SdKfz 7 half-track towing an 8.8cm FlaK gun, pictured further up the same avenue.

VI CORPS (June 3) While the II Corps swept towards Rome east of the Alban Hills, the VI Corps began moving to the capital west of and directly through the hills. At first light on June 3, sensing that the Germans had pulled out during the night, the 168th Infantry of the 34th Division (Major General Charles W. Ryder) moved forward and occupied the embattled ruins of Lanuvio at 0900. The rest of the division then advanced on either side of the town another five kilometres to Genzano, a road junction with Route 7, where the latter highway skirts Nemi Lake. This was the opportunity General Truscott had been waiting for: to commit the 1st Armored Division as an exploitation force. He ordered Major Ernest N. General Harmon to move his armour astride the Anzio road to Albano, the next town on Route 7. The 45th Division (Major General William W. Eagles) was to open up the way as far as the railway crossing three kilometres up the road. The 1st Armored was then to pass through and, together with Major General Fred L. Walker’s 36th Division on its right, lead the final drive into Rome. Early in the morning the armour assembled along the Via Anziate behind the 45th Division and prepared to pass through its lines should the infantry reach Albano that evening. The 36th Division, on the corps’ right, moved beyond Velletri and by noon had taken first the village of Nemi and then a road junction just east of Lake Albano. Dusk found both the 1st Armored and the 36th Infantry encamped near Albano, ready to continue their advance towards Rome the following morning — the 1st Armored along Route 7 and the 36th Division along the Via Tuscolana by way of Frascati. Meanwhile the 34th Division had moved along a secondary road south and parallel of Route 7 to a sector south of Albano, where it was to remain until after the fall of Rome. During the day the advancing troops of both corps encountered many clear indications that they were approaching a large

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capital city: increasing signs of urbanisation, a denser road and rail system. From high grounds and through binoculars the troops could at times spot the skyline of what was clearly a large metropolitan area, with many high-rise buildings and churches. All this fuelled a growing feeling of excitement and expectancy. Everybody realised that the fall of Rome was imminent. As darkness fell, some of the troops halted for a short rest, others kept going, probing their way through the night. In front of them, a defeated German army was retreating hastily though the city. The day’s fighting had died down. However, all through the night, German aircraft ventured out to bomb the main roads and strafe the Allied troops. After dark Fifth Army issued orders for the capture of Rome. The chief task was to secure bridging sites over the Tiber river so that the advance could be continued without delay after the fall of the city. Within and close to Rome were at least 17 bridges and these became as many objectives. Instructions were given out to push small mobile columns swiftly through the city to these bridges. The VI Corps was made responsible for the 11 bridges in the southern part of the city and gave the task of seizing the majority of them to the 1st Armored Division. The II Corps was made responsible for the six northern bridges and assigned the capture of them to the 1st Special Service Force and a battalion each of the 338th Infantry (85th Division) and of the 351st and 350th Infantry (both 88th Division). The 1st Special Service Force (1st SSF) was an exceptional formation. An independent, brigade-size unit commanded by American Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick, it was uniquely made up of soldiers from both the United States and Canada. An elite formation trained as commandos, ski troops, mountain troops and paratroopers, it was a very tough fighting unit, perhaps one of the toughest in all of the Allied armies. Raised and commanded since its inception by Frederick, it comprised three regiments, each of two battalions, and a service battalion. Attacking out of the Anzio beach-head on the right wing of the VI Corps, the force had reached Route 6 on June 1, moving eastwards — away from Rome — the following day to contact the French coming up from the south-east. Relieved by French Algerian troops early on the morning of the 3rd, and ordered by II Corps to take over the final drive towards and into Rome and seize the Tiber bridges, Frederick’s force then turned about and moved westwards, its 2nd and 3rd Regiments passing through Howze’s lines on the Via Prenestina at 2000 hours. During the night they advanced cross-country to Tor Sapienza, the final phase line before Rome and less than six kilometres from the city. At 0106 hours (June 4), Frederick received a terse radio message from General Keyes, stipulating his mission for the morrow: ‘Secure bridges over the Tiber river above 68 Northing within the City of Rome’. Fifth Army orders also made sure that the bridges on either side of Rome would not be lost. On the VI Corps’ left flank, the 34th and 45th Divisions were to secure the two bridges over the Tiber south-west of Rome. (The British 1st and 5th Divisions on the far left were only to follow up the enemy withdrawal as far as the Tiber but were not required to cross.) On the II Corps’ right flank, the 88th and 3rd Divisions were tasked with securing crossings over the Aniene river on the 30kilometre stretch between Rome and Tivoli. Each of the divisions charged with securing Tiber bridges formed flying columns for the purpose. Most of these were built around a battalion or less of infantry and a company of tanks, augmented with tank destroyers and engineers. In some cases the infantry were motorised by taking trucks from the

The 17 main bridges over the Tiber in Rome seized by the Americans on June 4. regimental service company or from the divisional quartermaster company; in other cases they rode on the decks of the tanks or tank destroyers until opposition was encountered. Behind these mobile spearheads, columns of foot infantry advanced to the suburbs but did not push deeper into the city until the Tiber bridges had been taken. To cope with the possible destruction of the bridges, each of the mobile columns was advised to take an engineer detachment with river-crossing equipment, such as assault boats and infantry support rafts. Both II and VI Corps brought forward equipment for temporary spans: one footbridge, one Bailey bridge and two floating steel treadway bridges in each corps zone. However, Allied worries over the Tiber bridges were actually groundless for, a few hours before, Adolf Hitler had ordered Kesselring to leave the bridges intact as the Germans pulled out of the city. Small rearguards were to delay the enemy in the southern suburbs, but the Führer had ordained that Rome ‘because of its status as a place of culture must not become the scene of combat operations’. The Germans had no intention of fighting a major action within the city. By this time the bulk of the two armies under Kesselring’s command had already made good their escape from possible Allied entrapment. The divisions of the 10. Armee in the Liri-Sacco valley had mostly withdrawn through the mountains north of Route 6; those facing the

French Corps in the Lepini Mountains had slipped around behind the Fallschirm-PanzerDivision ‘Hermann Göring’ when it still held Valmontone; and that division had itself retired northward to below Tivoli on June 2. As for the 14. Armee, all through June 3 Allied aerial reconnaissance had reported a large volume of enemy traffic streaming out of the Alban Hills in a northerly direction. These were the divisions of the 14. Armee’s eastern flank moving to escape over the Aniene river between Rome and Tivoli. To provide extra cover for this withdrawal, Kesselring during the day had diverted an assault gun battalion northward from Colonna on Route 6 to Zagarolo, a town on the road to the Aniene, and ordered the 10. Armee to turn its reserve 15. Panzergrenadier-Division over to the 14. Armee so that it could help reinforce the shield. As the other divisions of the 14. Armee further west conducted a hasty but orderly withdrawal through Rome on June 3, the 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division moved from the coastal sector to serve as rearguard along the entire front. Meanwhile, Kesselring declared Rome an ‘open city’. To avoid suspicion of immediate withdrawal, he ordered the Stadtkommandant (City Commandant) of Rome, Generalleutnant Kurt Mälzer, and other high officials to attend a gala performance in the Opera House. In reality, many German and Fascist officials and agencies, among them the hated Gestapo, were evacuating the city in haste 25

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Left: Early on the morning of June 4, the column of Task Force Howze and the 1st Special Service Force on the Via Casilina (Route 6) ran into the German strong point at Centocelle, which would hold it up for a full nine hours. Most of the Press and Army photographers with the Fifth Army had gambled that this column would be the first to enter Rome, so it is no wonder that most pictures of June 4 were taken around this point. Carl Mydans pictured both of the leading Shermans that were knocked out by the German self-propelled guns that gave strength to the German road-block. Right: The tank was disabled just in front of No. 857 Via Casilina. II CORPS (June 4) Like on the previous day, the II Corps’ advance on June 4 unrolled with the main effort being made in the 88th Division’s sector. The drive was led by the 1st Special Service Force and Task Force Howze, both operating under the combined command of General Frederick. Unlike the previous day, the advance would not be limited to Route 6 only but, with Frederick dividing his force into two columns, would encompass three converging axes of attack. The northernmost one would come in along the railway line from Tor Sapienza, the central one along the Via Prenestina and the southern one along Route 6. The latter two routes joined about two kilometres inside the Rome city limits. Moving out from Tor Sapienza were the 2nd and 3rd Regiments of Frederick’s 1st Special Service Force, with the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion in support. They planned to secure crossings of the Aniene in the morning and then proceed into Rome along the main railway line. Driving down the Via Prenestina was the 1st Battalion, 351st Infantry, of Sloan’s 88th Division. Leading their column were elements of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop and

the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I & R) Platoon in Jeeps, and Company C and the Canon Company in trucks. The rest of the battalion followed on foot. Spearheading the advance down Route 6 was Task Force Howze with the 1st Regiment of the 1st Special Service Force attached. Following behind this column, attached to it since early that morning, was another battalion of the 88th Division, the 1st Battalion of the 350th Infantry, supported by a company of tanks from the 752nd Tank Battalion, a provisional battery of six 105mm self-propelled guns, a battery of the 338th Field Artillery Battalion, and company of the 313th Engineer Combat Battalion, all under command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Bare, Jr. The two regiments of the 88th Division were involved in their own private inter-regimental race as to which one would be first into Rome. Early that morning, General Sloan had ordered Colonel James C. Fry of the 350th to pass through the 351st and continue the attack. Loath to be overtaken, the 351st’s commander, Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, had pressed on; although not exactly disobeying orders, he nevertheless

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JUNE 4 First light on Sunday, June 4 revealed the unscarred buildings of Rome now just some five to six kilometres away. In the early morning haze, the domes of the churches of Rome could be clearly seen, the first sight of the beautiful prize after weeks of hard fighting. In the warm sunlight the Eternal City seemed to be quietly waiting for the troops to enter it. All through the day the scene south and east of Rome was one of hectic excitement as the small Allied columns of half a dozen different divisions drove towards the city along the walled roads and through the denselybuilt suburbs. Switching from one route to another as the occasion presented itself, some columns crossed each other’s paths. Each force proceeded independently of the others, and many a proud soldier ended the day firmly convinced that his unit was ‘the first into Rome’. Opposition was moderate, the Germans having left only rearguards to delay and hold up the Americans. Occasionally snipers opened up on the columns and had to be flushed out from the houses in which they had concealed themselves in short, violent fire-fights. Here and there an enemy tank or self-propelled gun fired a few rounds from a well-chosen position and then, as soon as American tanks fired back, pulled back to disappear in the maze of roads and streets in the suburbs. Everywhere throngs of excited civilians lined the street, cheering the American troops, throwing flowers and offering bottles or glasses of wine.

The second Sherman was ‘brewed up’ at a point less than 100 metres behind the first. 26

The old station building of the Centocelle railway yards along Route 6 remains to confirm the spot.

Right: On this road the enemy blocking position lay just beyond the large blueand-white sign that marked the city limits of Rome. At this point, a British Army Film and Photo Unit (AFPU) photographer pictured a soldier of the 1st Special Service Force (an officer judging by his M1 carbine) aiming a bazooka towards the enemy lines.

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saw to it that his men hit a pace fast enough to out-distance the other regiment. At 0440 hours, two companies of the 1st SSF Regiment, riding on the tanks of two companies of the 13th Armored Regiment and on eight armoured cars of the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, began moving along Route 6 toward the suburb of Centocelle, some four kilometres east of Rome. Progress was rapid, and the force reached the road junction west of the settlement by 0615 and entered the city limits at 0620 (thereby establishing the claim of being the first Allied troops into Rome). However, just past the big blue-and-white Roma sign, heavy anti-tank and automatic fire from a strong German roadblock brought them to a halt. The blockade, placed just beyond where the road passes the crest of a hill, consisted of machine guns concealed in buildings and behind stone walls and an anti-tank gun manned by paratroops of FallschirmjägerRegiment 11, backed up by one PzKpfw IV from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division ‘Hermann Göring’ and four Sturmpanzer IV Brummbär self-propelled 150mm guns from Panzer-Abteilung 216. (This was the blocking position at Due Torri ordered by Kesselring on the night of June 2/3.) The SP guns, located on a low ridge overlooking Centocelle from the south-west, knocked out the two leading American tanks. The American infantry jumped from their vehicles and deployed under heavy small-arms fire. The advance down this route had been stopped head-on. Meanwhile, the force moving along the Via Prenestina further north had made good progress. It was along this route that a sixman patrol from the 3rd Platoon, 88th Reconnaissance Troop, entered Rome shortly after daybreak. Advancing in front of the 1st Battalion, 351st Infantry, the platoon

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Right: The Roma sign stood at the junction of Via Casilina and the Via Tor de’Schiavi, just beyond the point where a tramline coming from the latter street crossed the main road. Today the line that runs alongside Route 6 is still there but the one coming from the side street has been lifted.

Left: Being a joint American-Canadian unit and mountaintrained, the men of the Special Service Force had different equipment from ordinary US or Canadian infantry, one of the

special items being their British-type mountain rucksack. The man on the left is a British AFPU photographer. Right: A new block of flats now stands to the right of the old railway station. 27

this group reached just north of Centocelle about 0900, it too was brought to a stop by the heavy German fire. Company C quickly dismounted from their trucks, deployed and took up the challenge. In the ensuing action, 1st Lieutenant Trevlyn L. McClure, the I & R Platoon leader, was wounded several times but continued to lead his men until killed by cross-firing enemy machine guns. Meanwhile the rest of the battalion worked its way to the north around the German flank. Three supporting Sherman tanks from Company B of the 752nd Tank Battalion were knocked out by the enemy SP guns, all three erupting in flames and three of the crewmen being killed.

The German strong point at Centocelle managed to hold up the advance of the 1st Special Service Force, Task force Howze and the 88th Division for a good nine hours. It was not until the late afternoon that an American attack finally broke the last resistance. Throughout this fight, General Frederick was up front directing his men. It was during this time that a remarkable scene occurred. Frederick was watching the progress of the attack when a Jeep drew up and General Keyes, the corps commander, alighted. ‘General Frederick’, he asked, ‘what’s holding you up here?’

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had dispatched a patrol of two Jeeps to reconnoitre the road ahead. Bypassing the fight that was developing to their south, the two lone Jeeps — which carried Staff Sergeant John T. Reilly, Sergeant Richard A. Robbins, Corporal Cassie W. Kriemin, Corporal Emidio Mazzetti, Tech/5 Roy T. Cuttler and Pfc Samuel B. Baird — moving forward cautiously, passed the Roma sign shortly before 0730 hours and proceeded for about a kilometre and a half until they got to a small railway station from where a German machine gun opened up on them. Sensing the immediate danger and because their orders called for it, the patrol retraced its route and Sergeant Reilly reported to his platoon leader that he had been in Rome. (This patrol later was officially credited by Fifth Army as being the first Allied troop element to enter the city.) Meanwhile, on Route 6, the 1st Battalion of the 350th with its attached tanks, self-propelled guns and engineers had reached Torre Nova, three kilometres east of Centocelle. Learning of Task Force Howze’s fight up ahead, Lieutenant Colonel Bare had his column switch to the Via Prenestina and bypass Centocelle to the north in order to reach a point overlooking the left flank of the German force holding up Frederick. However, already moving westward ahead of them was the motorised part of the 351st column: the 1st Platoon of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop, the regimental I & R Platoon, and Company C of the 351st in trucks and the regimental anti-tank company. As

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Right: Sometime during the long delay at Centocelle, General Clark, the Fifth Army commander (second from right), and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of the US II Corps (centre), came forward to check on the progress of the advance. Here they are being briefed by Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick, commanding the 1st Special Service Force (right), in the verge of Route 6, surrounded by cameramen and war correspondents. The picture was taken by Clark’s personal photographer, Sergeant Ralph E. Thomas of the 163rd Signal Photo Company.

Seeing the Roma city sign further up the road, Clark could not resist having a publicity picture taken of him standing beside it. Together with Keyes and Frederick, he crawled up the ditch towards it, then crossed the road and stood up beside the sign, while the cameras clicked. As the story goes, right at that moment a German sniper opened up and the first bullet smashed through the sign just above the Army 28

Commander’s head, causing the three generals to duck and crawl on all fours to a safer position. It is a good story except that what makes one suspicious is the fact that the bullethole — in fact three holes (two inside the ‘O’ and one just below it) — are already there in this sign and appear in many pictures taken earlier, albeit clumsily touched up by some unknown photo editor in this one!

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Left: Having his photo taken, Clark comes running back across the street and into safety. Right: Again, the old station building of the Centocelle railway yards along the old Roma Laziali to

clinging to its decks, attacked cross-country south of Route 6 toward the suburb of Tor Pignattara, about three kilometres further to the south-west. Leading the way was the tankers’ Company H, then came Colonels Cairn and Marshall in Cairn’s tank, followed by Frederick’s

command half-track, with Companies G and I bringing up the rear. As they rolled on, the column’s main obstacle was a crowd of Allied war correspondents and an American field artillery battalion moving in convoy (most probably this was Battery B of the 88th Division’s 339th Field Artillery Battalion).

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Frederick replied: ‘The Germans, Sir.’ Keyes then asked: ‘How long will it take you to get across the city limits?’ Frederick answered: ‘The rest of the day. There are a couple of SP guns there.’ ‘That will not do. General Clark must be across the city limits by four o’clock.’ Frederick asked: ‘Why?’ ‘Because he has to have a photograph taken.’ Frederick looked at Keyes steadily for a long moment and said: ‘Tell the General to give me an hour.’ Not much later, Clark and Keyes turned up together in a Jeep and inquired what was holding up the advance. Again Frederick explained the situation. During a lull, the three generals left the cover of a nearby ditch and approached the Roma sign to pose for the many Army and Press photographers present. ‘Golly, Bob’, said Clark to Frederick, ‘I’d like to have that sign in my command post.’ At that moment a German sniper cut loose. The first bullet smashed through the sign, dangerously close to the Army Commander’s head, causing the three generals to scamper back to the cover of the ditch. Frederick told Clark: ‘That’s what’s holding up the 1st Special Service Force.’ Realising there would be no triumphal entry that day, Clark departed. Later, Frederick had the Roma sign taken down and sent to Clark as a souvenir. While a major part of Frederick’s command fought on at Centocelle, the tanks of Cairn’s 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, with the men of the 1st SSF Regiment, under Colonel Alfred C. Marshall, Jr.,

Pantano Borghese line that ran parallel with the Via Casilina helps to pinpoint the spot. Today the track carries Line C of the metropolitan tram network.

As he stood beside the nameplate, Clark had said to Frederick: ‘Golly, Bob’, I’d like to have that sign in my command post.’ Frederick took the hint and shortly after ordered the sign removed to be presented to Clark as a souvenir. Now the three bullet holes are clearly seen.

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Right: As a treasured possession Clark kept hold of the sign all his life. Today it is preserved at The Citadel, the military college of South Carolina at Charleston, of which Clark was president from 1954 to 1965 and where all his papers and memorabilia were deposited after his death. Clark died on April 17, 1984, and is buried on the Citadel campus next to the Mark Clark Hall. The Roma sign is currently in the museum’s storage depot, although there are plans to include it in the upcoming new permanent display. However, there is something odd with the sign: the three bullet holes seen in the 1944 pictures are no longer there but instead there is a single bullet hole midway between the ‘M’ and the ‘A’ so surely this is a different sign from the one removed from the Via Casilina? Possibly Frederick must have secured another sign to present to Clark although the present whereabouts of the three-hole sign is not known. 29

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Left: Having finally overcome the enemy blockade at Centocelle, the American column on the Via Casilina resumed the advance into the city. Here the troops pass one of the self-propelled guns that held them up, a Sturmpanzer IV 15cm assault howitzer from Sturm-Panzer-Abteilung 216. Formed in April 1943, the first of four battalions to be equipped with the new Sturmpanzer IV (which was known to the Allies as Brummbär

— Grumbler), it had fought at Kursk and elsewhere on the Eastern Front from July to December, and then at Anzio from early February 1944. This particular gun was knocked out or abandoned on the Via Casilina near its junction with the Via Francesco Baracca, about two kilometres beyond the Roma sign. Right: The grumbling beast has gone but the facades of the Via Casilina remain unchanged.

At 0715, at a point some one kilometre south-east of Tor Pignattara, the column crossed the city limits of Rome. As soon as it did so, a well-hidden German anti-tank gun opened up, causing the infantrymen to hurriedly jump off the tanks and the news correspondents to melt away to the rear in no time. The artillery convoy just coolly pulled to the side of the road. The enemy gun knocked out two of the leading tanks and then quickly disappeared in the labyrinth of streets. Moving on, the American column met some Italians who warned them of mines and of a German tank and infantry lying in

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Right: Meanwhile, on the Via Prenestina, the next main road north from the Casilina, other troops of Task Force Howze, 1st Special Service Force and the 351st Infantry were moving forward as well. Here men of the 351st pass a burning Tiger from schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508, another armoured unit that had fought at Anzio and withdrawn with the 10. Armee into Rome. Note that it was facing away from the Americans when it was disabled so it was probably hit by surprise when pulling back into the city, otherwise it would have had its gun turned backwards to face the enemy. wait up ahead. Thus alerted, Frederick dispatched Companies G and I to find a way around the ambush. Just then, Generals Clark and Keyes again arrived. Frederick quickly put them in the picture. Clark approved the plan of action but stressed that he wanted the force to seize the Tiber bridges as swiftly as possible. For that reason, Keyes instructed Cairn to immediately send a platoon of tanks into the city without waiting for Companies G and I to complete their outflanking manoeuvre. Cairn sent word to the two companies to continue their probe, then took five tanks down the road directly into the city. Not 100 metres further on, as the leading two tanks (one of them Cairn’s own) rounded a curve, German self-propelled guns opened fire and knocked out both vehicles, which burst out in flames. Escaping from their blazing mounts, Cairn and the other surviving crewmen made their way back to the main force. Cairn asked permission to abandon the frontal attack and continue his plan to outflank the enemy position. Keyes wisely raised no protest. A. MORI

Left: The Tiger was disabled in the middle of the street, close to the junction with Via Erasmo Gattamelata. 30

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of troops dashing past it. On the right is one of the Sherman tanks supporting the advance. Right: The same spot today.

Left: A close-up of the same Sherman, more likely from the 752nd Tank Battalion supporting the 351st Infantry than from Task Force Howze’s 756th Tank Battalion or 3rd Battalion of

the 13th Armored Regiment. Note the shape of another enemy tank some distance further up the street. Right: Looking up the Via Prenestina today.

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Left: The burning Tiger made a spectacular scene, so no wonder Signal Corps photographer Gallagher took more than one shot

Route 6 to the suburb along the Via dell’ Acqua Bullicante, which stretches between Route 6 and the Via Prenestina. As they arrived, the tankers spotted a force of eight German armoured vehicles — apparently part of the force that had earlier defended Centocelle — withdrawing into Rome along the Via Prenestina. The lead American tank platoon swiftly set up an ambush on a high bank overlooking the road, only to discover that their

guns would not depress deep enough to hit the enemy targets moving not 50 metres away. The Germans for their part, because of the high embankment, could not elevate their guns high enough to fire at the Americans. Utterly frustrated, Company G could only sit and watch the enemy vehicles pass right by them and escape into the city. All they could do was fire a few rounds after them as they disappeared around a bend in the road.

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Company G had meanwhile found the enemy position and opened fire on the SP guns that had knocked out Cairn’s tanks. Completely surprised, with all their attention still focussed on the main road, nine of the German armoured vehicles were destroyed before the rest was able to escape deeper into the city. Having disposed of this force, Company G then proceeded northwards and back across

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Left: The tank in the distance was this PzKpfw IV, knocked out in the middle of the tramlines. It most likely belonged to the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division ‘Hermann Göring’ which was the only tank unit left in the area equipped with the Mark IV. Right: Where the panzer stood is now the tram stop at the junction with the Via Alberto da Giussano. 31

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Signal Corps photographer James A. Cuca pictured troops of the 88th Division passing through the gate on June 5.

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Via Prenestina and Via Casilina join at the Porta Maggiore, one of the entry gates through the Aurelian Walls of ancient Rome.

The Porta Maggiore itself dates from before the 3rd-century Aurelian Walls having been built by Emperor Claudius in 52 AD. 32

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Although most of the German rearguards managed to get away in time over the Tiber, the Americans did take a few prisoners. These four Fallschirmjäger are being questioned at the fountain on Piazza Esedra, not far from the Stazione Termini (Main Railway Station). Picture by Signal Corps photographer Fred Bonnard. General Frederick, even though his leg was bound up after being hit by a shell fragment in the afternoon, was up with the forward troops, ranging up and down the banks of the river accompanied by his driver, his aide Captain Newt McCall and two enlisted men, checking the bridges for demolition charges left by the Germans. By 2300 hours all five bridges assigned to the 1st Special Service Force were intact and in American hands. As the 2nd and 3rd SSF Regiments moved off, the 1st Regiment stayed behind on Route 6 at Tor Pignattara. The regimental commander, Colonel Marshall, noting that one of the companies of Major Edward Mueller’s 2nd Battalion’s was still missing, told his Executive Officer, Major McFadden, that he was going to look for it. However, Marshall and the enlisted man that was escorting him had only gone a short distance when they were both cut down and killed by a 20mm shell from a German flak wagon.

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Shortly afterwards, almost on the heels of the fleeing Germans, a column under the command of Colonel Howze arrived comprising the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 351st Infantry plus supporting arms. Having finally overcome the enemy at Centocelle, they had resumed the advance down the two original axes of Route 6 and the Via Prenestina. Also arriving, virtually at the same moment, were the Special Service Force’s 2nd Regiment and a battalion of the 3rd Regiment which had made their way into town along the railway line from the north-west. A little later, Companies H and I of Cairn’s tank battalion and the rest of the 1st SSF Regiment, having made their way back cross-country from Tor Pignattara, rejoined the main force. Thus, all groups now congregated around the road junction of Route 6 and Via Prenestina. By now it was 1500 hours. Colonel Howze decided to leave most of his infantrymen in reserve and dispatch a small tank/infantry column into the city to seize the Tiber bridges in his sector. He set H-Hour at 1530 but decided to postpone it for half an hour to await the arrival of the second battalion of the 3rd SSF Regiment. At 1530 the column moved off, with the 2nd Regiment (under Canadian LieutenantColonel Jack Akehurst) on the left and the 3rd (Colonel Edwin A. Walker) on the right. Led by numerous small tank/infantry patrols, each was furnished with instructions in Italian calling upon civilians to guide the men to the bridges. The 2nd Regiment reached the Porta Maggiore at 1915 hours. By 2000 hours they had arrived at the Stazione Termini (central railway station). One company veered off to the left and entered the Piazza Venezia at 1915 hours, where it had a short fire-fight with enemy mechanised troops. The 3rd Regiment struck north-west on the right of the 2nd Regiment and was at the Piazza del Popolo by 2100 hours. The SSF companies then fanned out to the Ponte Margherita and the four bridges to the north of it. At the Ponte Margherita and Ponte di Littorio to its immediate north, they ran into rearguards manning machine guns, which held up the American progress although the Germans made no attempt to blow up the spans and were soon driven off.

Unaware of this loss, McFadden and Major Mueller led the 6th Company under Lieutenant William G. Sheldon into the city through the Tor Pignattara quarters. They had not gone far when they bumped into a German PzKpfw IV tank. Local partisans guided them around the obstacle passing through a nearby convent but as the company re-emerged on the street behind the panzer they found a second one blocking the way. Leading his men through a store and out the back door, Sheldon got around this second obstacle too. Moving deeper into the city, they were stopped by machine-gun fire coming from a tall building at a crossroads. Sheldon and Mueller led a squad into an apartment building opposite, took the lift to the top floor, rung the bell at one of the accommodations, and eliminated the enemy nest with a burst of fire from a bedroom window. After enjoying cool drinks and sausages proffered by their hosts, they then took the elevator down to rejoin the rest of the company in the street! Continuing their advance, Sheldon’s company reached a point near the San Lorenzo railway yards but there encountered a German infantry detachment with two self-propelled guns. Judging this force too strong to tackle, Major McFadden decided to take Sheldon’s company back to Tor Pignattara, there to await the rest of the battalion. Mueller and his battalion command group, hopeful that one of their other companies had meanwhile entered the city by another route, continued on towards the Tiber. Making their way through the streets after dark they reached one of the bridges to find it guarded by one of the companies of the 3rd Regiment. Coming into the city behind the 1st Special Service Force, the two mobile columns of the 88th Division moved to the northernmost two of the bridges already secured by Frederick’s men, the historic Ponte Milvio and the Ponte Duca d’Aosta respectively. The 1st Battalion of the 351st Infantry, plus several tank destroyers and three tanks, crossed the city limits at 1530 hours (and reported itself as the first infantry, in force, to make it) and veered north-west across the railway tracks at 1820. On the way to its bridge, the battalion met the detachment of the 1st Special Service Force guarding the Ponte Margherita and, each one mistaking the other for a German force, this resulted in a short fire-fight. By the time the error was realised, one man had been killed and several others wounded. Among the injured was General Frederick who had just arrived at the bridge wih his

The Piazza Esedra has since been renamed the Piazza della Repubblica. 33

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small group. He was wounded in the leg and arm — his eighth and ninth wounds of the war. (The one man killed was his driver.) After matters had been cleared up, the battalion resumed its march and shortly after midnight reached the Ponte Milvio. The 1st Battalion of the 350th, with its attached tanks, self-propelled howitzers and engineers crossed the city limits on the Via Prenestina shortly before 1730 hours. Joined by Italian partisans, who aided the men in cleaning out snipers from buildings along the way, the force arrived at its assigned bridge, the Ponte Duca d’Aosta, shortly after midnight. As the various task forces moved into the city, thousands upon thousands of Roman citizens poured out of their homes to greet their liberators. The welcome was tremendous — like nothing the soldiers ever had expected or experienced. The civilians threw their arms around the weary, bearded, marching soldiers, shook their hands, cried, whistled, smiled, shouted, danced, sang, tossed flowers and handed out wine and fresh bread. The crowd was utterly unmindful of the dangers that still lingered in the city. They ignored the sniper and return fire which whizzed about their heads, cheered when a German tank was hit, and groaned when an American vehicle was knocked out. When a German sniper or machine gun opened up from an upper floor, the crowds melted away from the immediate vicinity but congregated a short distance away in each direction to watch the fight and cheer the Americans. 34

driver’s seat of the latter is holding a Bell & Howell Eyemo 35mm cine camera which identifies these men as the combat photo and film team from the 163rd Signal Photo Company assigned to the 85th Division.

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Meanwhile, south of the 88th Division sector, the 85th Division was making its entry into the city along the Via Tuscolana. Here Jeeps of that unit pass through the Porta Furba. The front vehicle is in fact towing the second one, and the man in the co-

The Porta Furba is not one of the city gates of ancient Rome but an archway built during the pontificate of Pope Sixtus V in 1585 as part of the restoration of the Aqueduct of Septimius Severus. It stands just west of Cinecitta, the large film studio complex founded by Mussolini and his head of cinema, Luigi Freddi, in 1937 mostly for propaganda purposes, but today renowned as the capital of Italian cinema. So there seems to be some logic in the 85th Division’s combat film team entering Rome along this road. Later, during the night of June 4/5, the US 36th Division used this same route to begin its passage through the city.

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An M10 tank destroyer on the Via Tuscolana firing a round at a target to the south. The vehicle is more likely to be from the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which supported the 85th Division’s flying columns during June 4, than from the 636th TD Battalion, which formed part of the 36th Division’s force but did not enter the city until after nightfall. Picture taken by Signal Corps photographer Bell. During the night they sent patrols through the north-eastern quarters of the city to seize the railway bridge over the Aniene. Thus by midnight, the entire 3rd Division was deployed across the II Corps’ right flank north of Rome. Meanwhile, on the left in the II Corps zone, the 85th Division had sent a mobile column of the 337th Infantry — comprising a motorised company of the regiment’s 3rd Battalion supported by tanks from the 760th Tank Battalion, tank destroyers from the 776th TD Battalion, engineers and artillery — towards Rome with orders to seize and protect two bridges across the Tiber. As axis of advance Division gave them Route 6, the

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While Frederick’s task forces and those of the 88th Division were fighting their way into the city astride Route 6, the two infantry divisions on either flank of the II Corps had not been idle. On the corps’ right, O’Daniel’s 3rd Division shifted westwards during the day, to protect Frederick’s columns moving into the capital. Only one of its units — the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry — entered Rome itself. Being part of Task Force Howze, the battalion marched to Tor Sapienza on Via Prenestina in the morning. At 1400 hours it was ordered into the city to outflank the enemy blockade at Centocelle. With the enemy driven off, and all forces re-united at Acqua Bullicante, it then followed behind Frederick’s mobile columns as they moved into the city. At 1700 the battalion reached the San Lorenzo railway yards, where they halted to set up a defence in the streets around the station for the night. The rest of the 7th Infantry was relieved at Palestrina by the French at 0800 and entrucked for Rome in the afternoon, the 2nd Battalion taking over the three roadblocks on Via Prenestina vacated by the 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion spending the night at Tor Sapienza on the outskirts. The 15th Infantry, being relieved on the Aniene by the French during the night, started moving westwards for the Tiber at 0400. North of Monte Sacro, on the northeastern outskirts of Rome, the leading 1st Battalion was held up all day by enemy rearguards fighting to keep open an escape route for troops fleeing out of the city. Moving west slowly, the battalion cut Route 4 (the Via Littoria) at Castel Giubileo where it flanks the Tiber about eight kilometres due north of Rome, but enemy troops firmly entrenched on the far bank made it impossible for them to cross the river. However, the battalion ambushed three tanks and six trucks on the highway, taking 80 prisoners, and enemy traffic on Route 3 across the river was interdicted by fire. The 30th Infantry, relieved by the French during the morning, was transported westwards in trucks, debussing a few kilometres outside Rome and ending the day bivouacked on the north-eastern outskirts.

same road which was already in use by Task Force Howze and the 88th Division’s 351st Infantry. The regimental I & R Platoon, preceding the advance, reached the suburbs by 0830 but reported that it had run into elements of Frederick’s force engaged in wiping out the enemy strong point about Centocelle. Before the 337th could be involved in that battle, division turned it south-west to carry out an Army order to cut Route 7 in front of the VI Corps. Cleaning out a pocket of snipers, the 337th reached that highway at 1700 hours, at a point some six kilometres from Rome. However, German opposition in front of the VI Corps at Albano had by this time shrunk so much that the regiment found the 1st Armored Division columns passing across its front. Pressing ahead through the traffic congestion, the regiment nonetheless cut the highway, netting 743 prisoners. However, the resulting traffic jam delayed both units for at least an hour. A new Army instruction ordered the 85th Division to halt its southwesterly drive and the 337th Infantry to hold its advance positions. Another mobile column of the 85th Division, composed of the 2nd Battalion of the 338th Infantry on trucks reinforced by a platoon each of tanks, tank destroyers and engineers, was sent into Rome to secure three bridges across the Tiber. Moving out from Frascati, preceded by the regimental I & R Platoon, the force approached the city by way of Via Tuscolana (the same road assigned to VI Corps’ 36th Division). Moving well in advance of the 36th Division, they proceeded until stopped by enemy anti-tank fire coming from the edge of Rome at about 1500 hours. After several hours delay, during which the infantry outflanked the enemy anti-tank guns, the advance continued and the column crossed the city limits about 1830 hours. They were again held up by a lone German tank but by 2025 the leading light tanks of Company D of the 760th Tank Battalion had reached the Colosseum and by nightfall the infantry had pressed on to its three bridge objectives. They found two of them already guarded by the 1st Special Service Force but secured the third, the Ponte Cavour, the bridge immediately below Ponte Margherita. Thus by 2300 hours all bridges in the II Corps zone had been secured.

The location is just a few hundred metres further into the city from the Porta Furba. The view is looking south, back towards the archway. 35

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Still further south, the 1st Armored Division had the Via Appia Nuova (Route 7) as its main axis into Rome. Here trucks from an anti-aircraft artillery battalion pass through the Porta San Giovanni along that route.

Finally, just after midnight, the combat commands were directed to attack at 0345 hours, passing through the lines of the 45th Division. Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, Truscott’s chief-of-staff, tried to instil some speed and competition in the drive by telephoning General Harmon at 0045 to say that the neighbouring II Corps had already moved to within five kilometres of Rome and were looking ‘to be in there before daylight undoubtedly’. Combat Command A (CCA) was composed of the 1st Armored Regiment (less 3rd Battalion) and the 135th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion), the latter detached from the 34th Division. Its advance guard already moved out at 0130 and, carefully making its way through the German mines, proceeded to the

town of Albano, on the flanks of the Alban Hills, where they turned left onto Route 7, rolling north-west towards Rome. At 0700, General Carleton phoned again to hurry up Harmon: ‘This is an all-out pursuit, the enemy is running away from us — put on all steam!’ The call sent the entire armoured division in a headlong dash towards Rome. Four kilometres beyond Albano, at Castel Gandolfo, Combat Command A was held up just before midday by three Tiger tanks with snipers, who held it up three more times before reaching the outskirts of Rome. As it advanced again in mid-afternoon the column, much to its surprise, bumped into a force of the 36th Division. This was the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry, led by its Company C mounted on tank destroyers of

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VI CORPS (June 4) In contrast with the haphazard and somewhat chaotic entry of the II Corps’ ad hoc task forces into Rome, the VI Corps’ approach and entry was more methodical, less confused but also a little sluggish. This was probably due to the widespread caution and fatigue throughout Truscott’s corps, caused by the two weeks of bitter and unremitting combat since the start of the break-out from Anzio. Leading the corps’ advance were the combat commands of Harmon’s 1st Armored Division, which received road priority on Route 7. During the night of June 3/4, their columns waited along the Albano road near the Lanuvio railway line while their commanders received orders and counter-orders.

Another gate in the Aurelian walls, the Porta San Giovanni was built by Pope Gregory XIII and inaugurated in 1754. The main single grand arch is flanked by seven smaller arches — three on one side, four on the other.

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Left: From Porta San Giovanni, the columns could head right into Via Emanuele Filiberto or left towards Via di San Giovanni in Laterano. These M10 tank destroyers have taken the latter street, which takes them to one of the best-known landmarks of Rome — the Colosseum. Nonetheless, Private Thomas Garcia of the 1st Special Service Force, on seeing the ancient building for the first time, is reputed to have exclaimed: ‘My God, they bombed that too!’ The picture was taken by Signal Corps photographer Bonnard. Right: Small cars and café terraces have taken the place of the armour and crowds of 1944. 36

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Left: Two American soldiers admiring the statue of Julius Caesar on the Via dei Fori Imperiali. The picture was taken by British Press photographer Bela Zola for the American Sunday

of the road and that he could take the left. He did not like this. The head of both columns were abreast and side-by-side as we moved into the outskirts of Rome.’ Hightower, being only a colonel, had no option but to accept Walker’s directive but the result was sheer chaos as the road was not wide enough to accommodate two columns. At this point, General Truscott, the corps commander, arrived on the scene. As he later wrote in his memoirs: ‘At an intersection on the edge of the city, I found the head of the armoured column, as well as one of Walker’s regiments. Walker and a crowd of staff officers were bustling about trying to decide what to do next. He was supposed to have been on another road about a half mile to the east [the Via Tuscolana], so I soon had

him straight, and on his way. Then I turned to Colonel Hightower, who commanded the armoured advance, and asked if he knew what his orders were. He assured me he was to secure the bridges over the Tiber. I asked “Well Colonel, what are you waiting for?” He saluted and without a word turned and signalled “Forward, march”, then ran for his own vehicle. There was a grinding of gears, a roar of motors, and clouds of dust and smoke and the column roared off down the street to the Tiber.’ However, as CCA continued along Route 7 (at this point known as the Via Appia Nuova), it ran into the mobile column of the 85th Division’s 337th Regiment, which was moving south with orders to cut the highway, and another traffic chaos developed, which again caused delay.

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the 636th TD Battalion. Earlier that day the 141st had passed east of Albano Lake and then descended from the hills onto Route 7, thus transgressing into the 1st Armored Division’s zone, in the hope of using it as a quick route into Rome. General Walker of the 36th, who was with the leading elements of the 141st, described what happened: ‘Our road ran into Route 7. When my column arrived at the junction, I met a colonel of the 1st Armored Division who had just arrived there, leading his column of tanks. [This was Colonel Louis V. Hightower, commander of the 1st Armored Regiment]. He told my battalion commander [Major Carthel N. Morgan of the 1st Battalion] that he had the right of way on that highway and that Morgan could follow his column. I told that colonel that we would take the right half

newspaper magazine Parade. Right: The famous bronze statue and the Church of the Most Holy Name of Mary behind are easy landmarks to match up.

Left: An M10 tank destroyer with troops of the 3rd Division making its way through the crowds on the Piazza Venezia on June 5. The Palazzo Venezia, with the famous balcony from which Mussolini used to deliver his speeches, is just out of the

picture to the left. Today it is a museum open to the public. Right: The vehicle was turning into the Via Cesare Battista. The street going off to the right in the background is the Via del Corso. 37

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Left: Private Ben Pollack, perched on the seat of his motorcycle among a sea of happy Romans, holds a bambini for the benefit of the Allied cameras after it was delivered into his hands from

Combat Command B (CCB), the 1st Armored Division’s left-hand prong, was composed of the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, and the 3d Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment, with the 6th Armored Infantry following up closely behind the tanks. Moving out at 0345, the force at first was only delayed by mines on the road curving along the slopes south-west of Albano. However, as it turned west toward the Tiber on a parallel road to the west of CCA it began to meet small-arms resistance. Eight kilometres west of Albano, the main force met an enemy strong point and was forced to deploy for a running battle, which lasted until after noon. However, at 1330 hours, Company A, 13th Armored Regiment, and a platoon of tank destroyers were dispatched to the southern outskirts of Rome, followed later by the 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, in halftracks. Entering Rome from Route 7 in the

late afternoon and moving rapidly through the city, these forces gained control of the Ponte Palatino and the other crossings in the southern part of Rome. The rest of CCB moved out at 1500 hours in three columns, skirting the city, to secure the two main Tiber bridges just south of Rome, the Ponte della Magliana and one other span. Resistance was negligible and the armoured units were at their objectives by 1800 hours, only to find both bridges blown by the Germans. The 36th Division — ordered back to its own assigned route, the Via Tuscolana, by General Truscott — did not enter the city until after dark. At 2215, while all of the division was still halted south of the city near the Claudian Aqueduct, General Walker received a Corps order stipulating that the 1st Armored and 36th Infantry were to cross the Tiber that night and be on the bridgehead line by daylight. Walker quickly made plans to move his division through the city in

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After one last, short skirmish with a German rearguard at the very entrance to the city, CCA finally rolled through the Porta San Giovanni, close to the Papal Archbasilica of Saint John Lateran, and into the city about 1800 hours. Finding their way through the twisting streets lined by cheering civilians, they reached and secured the Ponte Sant’Angelo, Porte Umberto I and Ponte Cavour before midnight. Crossing to the north bank, they then advanced to the city’s western outskirts. As the various Allied columns penetrated Rome from the south and east, the last of the German troops were scurrying north and west out of the city through deserted streets. The bulk of the 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division, whose troops had manned the rearguards, cleared the city in the afternoon, the last unit to withdraw across the Tiber being the I. Bataillon of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 12 under Major Martin Kühne.

the crowd, this particular photo being taken by Fred Bonnard. Right: The comparison proves that he was standing on the Piazza Venezia at the beginning of the long Via del Corso.

A Roman lady welcomes the troops on the Via del Corso. 38

The same spot on the corner with Via del Parlamento.

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A column of Jeeps emerging from Via del Corso and entering the Piazza del Popolo, close to the Ponte Margherita — one of the first Tiber bridges secured by the 1st Special Service Force on the evening of June 4. Picture by Carl Mydans.

As Walker later wrote: ‘None of us knew any of the streets. They were a maze anyway, criss-crossing and leading every which way. We had maps of the city, but a map is not much help at night. There were no Italian policemen, no directional signs, no street lights, and no lights in any of the buildings.’ However, moonlight helped the troops pick their way through the unfamiliar city to the bridges already in the hands of Harmon’s division. Walker: ‘As we moved along the dark streets, we could hear the people clapping their hands at all the windows of the high buildings, but we could not see them. Later, when it became evident that the Germans had left the city, men, women and children, in night dress and slippers, came into

the dark streets to welcome the Americans. Some ran up and down the column offering wine to the soldiers.’ The procession began crossing the Tiber in darkness but it would be well after daylight and into June 5 before the whole division had cleared the city. The 34th and 45th Divisions, to the left of the 1st Armored Division, did not enter Rome but sent task forces to the same two crossing sites south of Rome that were the objective of CCB. The 34th Division formed Task Force A from a company each of the 168th Infantry and the 191st Tank Battalion, reinforced by a battery of the 175th Field Artillery Battalion, a platoon of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a detachment of the 109th Engineer Battalion transporting

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a motorised march with regiments in column, with the 36th Reconnaissance Troop leading the way, followed by armoured vehicles and an infantry battalion in trucks prepared to dismount and fight at a moment’s notice. Each regiment — the 142nd Infantry in the lead, then the 141st, with the 143rd bringing up the rear — was given an assembly area some eight kilometres north-west of the city and was told to get there in the quickest possible time. The convoy moved out at 0230 (June 5) and shortly after began making its way through the darkened labyrinth of Roman streets. Even though the lead regiment had recruited a number of Italian guides, the division had trouble getting through the town.

The square, which constitutes the northern entrance to the old part of the city, is famous for its twin churches, the Santa Maria di Montesano seen on the left and the Santa Maria dei Miracoli on the right.

Another Jeep column drawn up on the same square.

The Egyptian Obelisk of Sety I links past and present. 39

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muzzle of his M1 rifle covered with a contraceptive for protection . . . from filth and dust! Right: The same corner today which is diagonally across the street from the American Embassy.

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Left: GIs of the 88th Division taking a break on the corner of Via Vittorio Veneto and Via Ludovisi, pictured by Signal Corps photographer Katz. Note that the soldier in the foreground has the

Right: This particular gun was positioned in Piazza José de San Martin in the north-western quarter of the park. The building in the background is presently occupied by the British School of Rome. 40

A 105mm M2A1 howitzer of the 88th Division emplaced in the Pincio Gardens, the large park around the Villa Borghese at the northern end of the city centre. All four field artillery battalions of the 88th Division Artillery set up in and around the gardens on June 5, firing missions at the Germans fleeing to the north.

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bridging equipment. This force left Albano at 1230 but was held up by 1st Armored Division traffic until after dark. Moving into Rome and down the north bank of the Tiber, it reached the Ponte della Magliana during the night. Farther south, the 45th Reconnaissance Troop and the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, were at the lower bridge by 1900. Engineers of the two divisions and of the 1st Armored immediately began the construction of pontoon bridges across the river. The British 1st and 5th Divisions advanced to the Tiber during the day but were still short of the river line by nightfall. By midnight of June 4, troops of the Fifth Army stood at the Tiber from near its mouth to the junction with the Aniene river. Every bridge along that stretch had been taken and was under firm guard. The bridges north and south of the city had been blown but all those in the city proper had been captured intact. With tanks guarding the approaches to the bridges, the weary troops slept on sidewalks and in doorways their first night in Rome.

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A plaque on the Embassy building at No. 119 Via Veneto records that this was Brigadier General Frederick’s command post during June 4. It was unveiled on the 40th anniversary of the city’s liberation in June 1984.

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A truck convoy of the 1st Armored Division moving through the historical centre of Rome. They are on the Largo di Torre Argentina and turning left towards the Via Areluna.

To the people of Rome June 5 was the occasion for a delirious holiday. Their joy at being free from Nazi oppression as well as from Italian Fascist domination was unbounded. Everywhere the people milled about in the streets to hug and kiss and shake hands with the American soldiers. They ran beside the Jeeps, trucks, half-tracks and tanks, chattering and laughing unrestrainedly, tossing flowers, waving their hands, handing bottles or glasses of their finest wines and champagne to the passing troops. The solid masses of cheering citizens packing the streets slowed down the convoys to a snail’s pace and at places completely stopped the columns. Many an Allied soldier tried to remember that the Italians had been their enemy until recently, that Italy had been an ally of Nazi Germany for many years, but the spontaneous, happy welcome completely washed away such thoughts. The orgy of celebrations roared on unabatedly well into the evening. Meanwhile, as the American troops passed through the city, the Italians were fighting out their own political vendettas. All over the town, vigilantes were smashing in the plate glass of shops owned by Fascist or German sympathisers. Groups of armed partisans sought to occupy Fascist party and police headquarters, ministries and other important buildings. At the Piazza Venezia, partisans

raided the Police Headquarters and a wild fire-fight erupted. Fascist functionaries were arrested and chased through the streets with blood streaming down their faces. In the 88th Division sector the main force of the 350th and 351st Regiments, following in the wake of their mobile vanguards, passed through the city during the night and early morning hours, exiting along Route 2 towards Viterbo. The 349th Infantry, held in place south of Rome after being pinched out by the French, rode and marched through the city later in the day, de-trucking and deploying across the river. The divisional artillery of the 88th Division set up its guns in the large Pincio Gardens around the Villa Borghese early on the 5th, Artillery Headquarters under Brigadier General Guy O. Kurtz setting up in the villa itself. The 913th Field Artillery Battalion was the first Allied artillery unit to fire from Rome, followed shortly by the 338th, 339th and 337th Field Artillery Battalions. Stripped to the waist, and centre of an admiring circle of signorinas, the gunners fired round after round at German columns across the Tiber fleeing north along Route 2. The 85th Division’s passage through Rome was led by the 339th Infantry, followed by the 338th and 337th, the division leaving the city along Route 2 and deploying to the left of the 88th Division.

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JUNE 5 During the early morning hours, the 1st Armored and 36th, 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions received new orders, instructing them to continue the advance north of Rome in pursuit of the routed enemy. In darkness and near silence, they quickly moved out of the city, the units of VI Corps moving northwestwards up the coastal Route 1 towards the seaport of Civitavecchia and those of II Corps pushing up the parallel inland Route 2 towards Viterbo. The Germans, with all their armoured and mobile formations pushed east of the Tiber, could only put up light and ineffective resistance along these highways and by dusk of June 5 the Allied point elements had rolled far past Rome. That morning large numbers of Romans poured into the streets to give the long columns of American soldiers still passing through Rome a tumultuous welcome. However, most of the troops who had actually liberated the city the day before had by then already moved out. The units and convoys making their passage through the jubilant masses during the daytime hours were those that followed behind the mobile task forces. (Only the 1st Special Service Force remained in Rome and continued to guard the bridges, but they, too, would be ordered out of the city in the afternoon, back to the suburb of Tor Sapienza to await further orders.)

The large square is famous for the remains of the four Roman temples that stand in its central part, which is just off to the left in our comparison.

Left: An American truck squeezing its way through a narrow street close to the Vatican. Right: It was on the Largo del

Colonnato having just come down the Via di Porta Angelica. Saint Peter’s Square is just through the columns on the left. 41

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from Killarney! A resident cleric of the nearby Collegio Teutonicum (German College), he was also the chief organiser of a clandestine network helping Allied escaped prisoners of war and hiding them in Vatican territory. Driving the General’s Jeep is Technical Sergeant R. H. Holden and in the back seat are Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, Clark’s Chief-of-Staff (left), and Major-General Harry H. Johnson, the nominated Military Commander for the City of Rome (right).

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General Clark made his triumphal entry into the city on the morning of June 5. Having got thoroughly lost, he and his Jeep party finally found themselves on Saint Peter’s Square, where the General was pictured talking to a black-frocked priest who had walked up to his Jeep and said in English: ‘Welcome to Rome. Is there any way in which I can help?’ Identified by Clark in his memoirs as an American clergyman ‘from Detroit’, he was is in fact Father Hugh F. O’Flaherty, an Irish monsignor

The magnificent and unchanging vista of Saint Peter’s Square, now as ever filled with tourists and pilgrims. 42

Right: Having found their way to the Capitoline Hill, Clark’s little group of Jeeps halted at the Palazzo Senatorio, Rome’s city hall, on the Piazza della Campidoglio, where a crowd of war correspondents, press reporters, newsreel cameramen and curious Italians awaited the generals.

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General Clark entered the city during the early morning along Route 6 at the head of a small procession of Jeeps, accompanied by his Chief-of-Staff, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, and his entourage of senior staff officers. They wanted to get to the city hall on the Capitoline Hill, where Clark had summoned his corps commanders to a meeting to discuss immediate plans, and where he planned to give a press conference. Winding their way through jubilant throngs, the Jeep party soon became lost but eventually found itself at Saint Peter’s Square, from where an Italian boy on a bicycle, pedalling along in front, guided them to the Capitoline Hill. There Clark was joined by Major Generals Keyes, Truscott (who had got lost on the way too), Willis D. Crittenberger of the US IV Corps and Général Alphonse Juin of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français. They climbed the steps to the city hall overlooking the Piazza del Campidoglio. A mob of

photographers and newsreel cameramen captured the moment as Clark posed with his four generals on the balustrade overlooking the great city spread out below. ‘Well gentlemen’, Clark said to the news reporters, ‘I didn’t really expect to have a press conference here — I just called a little meeting with my corps commanders to discuss the situation. However, I’ll be glad to answer your questions. This is a great day for Fifth Army.’ Thus, in a offending faux pas, Clark painfully failed to mention any of the other Allies — the British and French and all the other nationalities — that were fighting in the long and bloody Italian campaign and who had made the capture of Rome possible. Juin flushed with embarrassment, the other corps commanders felt irritated and ill at ease with their role in this contrived moment of glory, stage-managed by Clark’s public relations officer. Many of the war correspondents were disgusted. After the conference, Clark and his senior staff members went to the Excelsior Hotel where they set up Fifth Army Advance Headquarters and booked in for the night. (A few days later, Clark relocated his headquarters to the woods of the Villa Savoia, near the banks of the Tiber.)

Michelangelo’s great creation remains unchanged although he only lived long enough to see the entrance steps built.

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Clark climbing the steps to the city hall together with Generals Keyes of II Corps and Truscott of VI Corps.

Clark posing on the Campidoglio’s balcony terrace with three of his four corps commanders and his Chief-of-Staff: (L-R): Keyes, Clark, Truscott, Général Alphonse Juin of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français and Major General Gruenther. 43

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Later that day, tens of thousands congregated on Piazza San Pietro to witness Pope Pius XII on the balcony of Saint Peter’s

correspondents in a special audience, the first mass meeting the Pontiff ever held with journalists. He said: ‘Rome yesterday was faced with the dreaded spectre of war and unimaginable destruction. Today she sees salvation with new hope and serene confidence’.

The liberation of Rome made headlines around the world and was greeted by the Allies with great joy. However, news of the Allied invasion of France on June 6, coming one day later, completely overshadowed Fifth Army’s barely-won conquest.

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At 1700 hours that afternoon, tens of thousands congregated on the square in front of Saint Peter’s Basilica to witness Pope Pius XII on the balcony offer thanks to God for the sparing of Rome. Following the public thanksgiving, the Pope received Allied war

Basilica (another of Michelangelo’s creations) offer thanks to God for the salvation of Rome.

Left: With the American 3rd Division assuming the role of main garrison force for Rome, the British and French were allowed small detachments to represent their armies. The 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington’s Regiment (from the British 1st Division) 44

constituted the British complement. Sergeant Menzies pictured their entry into the city on June 8. Right: The troops were marching across the Piazza di Porta Pia from Corso d’Italia, at the northern end of the city centre.

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Built to commemorate the first king of a unified Italy, the Vittorio Emanuele II Monument is also known as the Altare della Patria (Altar of the Fatherland). Headquarters had long since decided not to establish advance base installations within the city. Military installations hence were limited to hospitals, transit camps and a few

military leave hotels. The Excelsior Hotel became a rest centre for officers and the Mussolini Sports Stadium a leave centre for other ranks.

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During June 5, all three regiments of the 3rd Division assembled in Rome. The previous day, an Army order had designated General O’Daniel’s division as garrison force for the city. O’Daniel was appointed the Commanding General of Troops, City of Rome, subordinated to the Commanding General, City Administrative Section, Fifth Army, Major General Harry H. Johnson. He established his Divisional Headquarters in the Rome University. That same day, Brigadier General Edgar E. Hume, Fifth Army’s civil affairs officer, was appointed Military Governor of Rome. To give the British and French due representation in the conquered capital, the 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington’s Regiment (from the British 1st Division), and a Composite Battalion of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français (composed of one rifle company from each of the corps’ four divisions) were to be stationed in the city as well. The units arrived in the city on June 8, being placed under command of the 3rd Division. The garrison’s task was to guard important installations, such as bridges, aqueducts, electricity works and communications centres; to police the streets against riots and unrest; and to prepare contingency plans to deal with Fascist uprisings or acts of sabotage. To organise this the city was divided into three zones, each of which was allotted to a regiment of the 3rd Division. However, the Romans appeared to be just glad to be rid of Fascism and thankful to be liberated from German oppression and occupation, and nothing much untoward happened. The 3rd Division soldiers were able to enjoy the luxury and sights of Rome for just nine days. On June 13 orders came for the division to move to a bivouac area 30 kilometres south of the city. The move began on June 14 and was completed on the 16th. Despite their small representation in the city, the British and the French gave evidence of their presence. On June 12, the band of the Irish Brigade played in front of Saint Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican City. On the 15th, the French had own moment of pride when their 2ème Division d’Infanterie Marocaine paraded through the city. Although Rome would serve as the natural hub of the country’s transportation and communications network for the remainder of the war, it would not see a concentration of rear-area military headquarters or service and supply facilities. Allied Armies in Italy

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Right: June 15 and the French 2ème Division d’Infanterie Marocaine parades through the city. Here they pass through the Piazza Venezia.

There are today three memorials commemorating the Allied liberation of Rome. Affixed to the wall of the Protestant Cemetery near the Porta San Paolo (which played such an important role in the 1943 battle for the city — see pages 9-10) is a plaque to the 1st Special Service Force recording their role in the capture of the city and the seizure of the Tiber bridges. It was dedicated on the 40th anniversary of the liberation in 1984.

Two more memorials lie in the Piazza Venezia. One is a stone plaque dedicated on June 4, 1994 — the 50th anniversary of the liberation — and recording ‘all the fallen of the Italian campaign’. Next to it is a bronze bas-relief sculpture ‘to the liberation of Rome from Nazi-Fascism made possible by the sacrifice and heroism of the Allied forces, partisans and people of Rome’. Designed by Alessio Paternesi, it was dedicated in June 2006. 45

GERMAN PRISONERS IN NORMANDY This series of colour photographs gives a fascinating glimpse of German prisoners of war captured in Normandy. This is especially

so as colour imagery from Canadian sources is rare as at the time the film was expensive and was not as robust as black and white film.

By Edward Storey The first two photographs were taken by Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit photographer Captain Ken Bell on D-Day on Juno Beach (Nan White) at Bernières-surMer. The location is easy to pinpoint as the now famous beach-front house can be seen in the background. Above: In this first photograph (ZK-1083-6), a British military policeman from No. 8 Beach Group attached to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division is searching German POWs. The threat level appears to be low as there is no magazine in the 9mm Sten held by the MP and the two soldiers from the 5th Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, are watching the proceedings with their weapons slung. To top things off, the Canadian from Le Régiment de la Chaudière (8th Infantry Brigade), in the middle of the photograph, has turned his back on the prisoners. Points to note are the red band painted around the rim of the dispatch rider’s helmet; the British Beach Group patch superimposed over the Canadian 3rd Division patch, the MP’s armlet, and dispatch rider boots with socks showing over the top. The Chaudière soldier in the middle is wearing a British Mk III helmet associated with the 3rd Division and has on ankle boots with gaiters but is not wearing any web equipment. The two British Beach Troops watching have white bands painted around their Mk II helmets. Note also their sleeve insignia including formation patch, brigade bars and rank. Left: The second picture (ZK1083-7) shows the ongoing search in which we get a better view of the MP’s insignia on his right sleeve which includes four red service chevrons.

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Left: Once the POWs had been processed in Normandy, several hundred were loaded aboard a Landing Ship Tank (LST 165) for shipment to England. Between June 12 and August 31, LST 165 transported 1,986 German POWs to Gosport. They are seen in this photo (ZK-778) being unloaded at The Hardway ready for onward movement by rail. Note that the British MPs have adopted a more aggressive posture, armed with Mk II Stens, and some are wearing blue covers on their SD caps indicating that they work in a security situation. LST 165 was an American-built LST 1 Class tank landing ship that had been laid down on September 7, 1942 at Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Company at Evansville, Indiana. She was launched on February 2, 1943 and commissioned LST 165 on April

‘They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings except arms, horses and military papers, remain their property. Prisoners may be searched for military papers, but their purses, money, jewellery, etc, must be restored to them; and they must not be subjected to any avoidable indignity.’ Part of the planning for Operation ‘Overlord’ were the measures necessary for the collection and handling of POWs. It was essential that prisoners were searched, separated, interrogated and sent to the rear as soon as possible to release the resources employed to guard, house and feed them. In the 21st Army Group area (Second British and First Canadian Armies), plans were made on the assumption that in the first ten

days, 5,000 prisoners would have to be dealt with and a further 20,000 by the end of the month. Certain vessels were earmarked to transport prisoners back to the United Kingdom until the bridgehead was large enough to enable POW cages to be constructed in France. Of the six camps planned, the first transit cage under the command of the Second Army was ready on D+1 followed by one at Arromanches on D+5. Britain was already overloaded with thousands of prisoners in hutted camps (see After the Battle No. 76) so as many as possible were shipped to Canada and the United States. However the total captured in Normandy was far short of expectations and by the end of July, 21st Army Group had only some 12,000 prisoners in the bag.

RICHARD INGRAM

The Second World War is also considered a black and white war; therefore, period colour photographs are a unique record of that conflict. The collection of colour photographs that was once held by the Canadian Department of National Defence has since been transferred to the Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa so hopefully will be made more accessible to the public. The treatment of captured military personnel was internationally regulated in the July 1929 Geneva Convention of which Britain and the countries of the British Empire were signatories, as well as those nations forming the Western Allies. Article 4 states that prisoners of war are held in the power of the government, not of the individuals or corps who capture them.

3. However three days later she was transferred to the Royal Navy being commissioned HMS LST 165 on April 7. She departed from New York in convoy UGS 8A on May 14. Following service in France and Norway, LST 165 was returned to the US Navy in March 1946 being later scrapped by the Northern Metals Company in Philadelphia. Right: Disembarked in Gosport at The Hardway which faces onto Priory Road, the prisoners were then marched a mile and a half south to the train station on Spring Garden Lane. Before setting off, a few more photos of the assembled prisoners were taken. This image (ZK-781) is a good close-up showing various items of personal kit, one man carrying a blanket and another mess tins and a bread bag.

Having turned off from St Thomas’s Road, the POW column was photographed (ZK-780) marching down Grove Road North. German officers are leading the column. The one nearest the house looks as if he is shielding his face from the photographer although the prisoners seem quite jovial. Article 2 of the Geneva

Convention laid down that POWs were to be protected by the detaining power from violence, insults and public curiosity but inevitably bystanders, like the schoolgirls on the left, were curious to see the enemy at close hand. Note the photographer in one of the upper story windows of No. 54 on the right. 47

RICHARD INGRAM

A real live history lesson for the boys of St John’s Church of England Primary School!

The column had marched less than half a mile down Grove Road South. 48

on red. Beneath is the insignia of Southern Command — a shield divided in three equal horizontal bands of red, white and blue with a white star. Under the command patch is the Vulnerable Point badge — a red ‘VP’ inside a blue diamond.

RICHARD INGRAM

In this photo (ZK-775), the POWs have reached Gosport station. The police constable controls the civilians while the prisoners are marshalled by military police. The shoulder flashes of the British MPSC (Military Provost Staff Corps) are black lettering

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GUARDING THE GOLDEN GATE A STRATEGIC DETERRENT North America’s first permanent coastal fortification, Castillo de San Marcos, was built by the Spanish in 1672 to protect their Florida colony. Nearly a century later, to assert their dominance over the West Coast a Spanish frontier garrison was established at San Francisco. Following an inspection of the Presidio (El Presidio Real de San Francisco, a Spanish fort built in 1776) by British naval officer George Vancouver in 1792, Governor Jose Arrillaga ordered the fortification of San Francisco’s narrow harbour entrance, dubbed the ‘Golden Gate’. Completed in 1794, Castillo de San Joaquin featured 15 embrasures armed with bronze cannon cast in Peru. At this time the United States possessed only independent local forts with no permanent coastal fortifications. In response, Congress provided funds in 1794 for a new system of forts in response to the threat of war with France. A similar appropriation for the upgrading of coastal defences along the eastern seaboard and Gulf Coast was approved in 1807 as the likelihood of war with Britain grew. 50

While these fixed defences proved effective during the ensuing War of 1812, British ships were still able to land troops in undefended areas. Later in 1816, the Board on Fortifications was formed to construct a cohesive defensive network of forts along all three of America’s coasts using standardised armament to protect strategic anchorages, commercial ports and naval bases. Four years after US troops had occu-

By David Mitchelhill-Green pied the Presidio in 1847, the War Department’s Board of Engineers for the Pacific Coast recommended the construction of casemated batteries to defend the Golden Gate; a proposed fort at Fort Point being ‘the key to the entire Pacific Coast in a military point of view’.

DAVID MITCHELHILL-GREEN

Separated from other powerful states by vast tracts of water, for much of its history the United States has been dependent upon coastal defences as a deterrent against enemy invasion. As an army officer noted before the Civil War, America’s coastal batteries acted ‘as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power immense’. This power reached its pinnacle with the construction of Battery Davis at San Francisco: America’s first 16-inch battery and the prototype for all subsequent heavy, casemated US coastal installations during the Second World War.

Top: Battery Commander, Captain John Schonher, the commander of Battery E of the 6th Coast Artillery Regiment, inspects his piece, one of the 16-inch guns of Battery Townsley protecting San Francisco Bay. Above: Never fired in anger, the guns were cut up in 1949. The site now forms part of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area in the Marin Headlands.

Congress subsequently increased funding for fixed defences in 1855 due to threat of a new war with Spain over Cuba, though the new fortifications were only partially complete when the Civil War broke out in 1861. Such was the strategic value of San Francisco and its harbour that George W. Wright, Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific, wrote in 1862 that its loss would deprive the US of a navy yard and military arsenal and destroy ‘all our commerce on the Pacific’. The harbour should therefore ‘be made impregnable’. Lessons gleaned from the Civil War led to major changes in the fortifications protecting San Francisco Bay though the impetus to strengthen harbour defences began to wane after 1875 as America’s focus swung inward with Washington favouring isolationism and the army engaged in the Indian Wars. A decade later President Glover Cleveland convened a special committee, known as the Endicott Board, to assess the future of the country’s seacoast defences. Both the Spanish-American War and America’s sudden emergence as an imperial power sparked renewed interest in coastal defence and new state-of-the-art forts capable of engaging the latest battleships. The subsequent modernisation of these Endicott batteries followed the recommendations of the so-called Taft Board of 1905 (named after William H. Taft, President Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of War), which oversaw the introduction of searchlight batteries, electric hoists, telephone communication and, most importantly, indirect aiming, to assist in artillery fire control. LESSONS FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR The First World War too had a major influence on San Francisco’s coastal defences. While a number of the older batteries were stripped of their guns to provide much-needed artillery for the Western Front and America’s Pacific possessions, the naval arms race was of immediate concern. In particular, the powerful, high-trajectory 15-inch guns of the Royal Navy’s new Queen Elizabeth class of battleships could shell San Francisco’s shorter-range batteries, including the guns mounted on disappearing carriages, with impunity. Apprehensive about German and Japanese warships with comparable weaponry, American planners began buttressing existing forts with additional earth and concrete to provide added protection. Moreover, as early as 1915 a proposal was made by the Chief of Coast Artillery to equip San Francisco with massive, rifled 16inch guns. The first such battery was to be built at Fort Funston, on the Pacific coast south of the Golden Gate.

BTY TOWNSLEY

BTY DAVIS

Above: It was in 1923 that legislation was passed to build a bridge spanning the Golden Gate bay entrance and linking San Francisco with the Marin Peninsula. Final plans were produced in 1930 and work began on what was then the longest singlespan bridge in the world in January 1933. Just under 9,000 feet long, it provided a 220-foot clearance at high water. It was anticipated that 35 workers would lose their lives during its construction but thanks to a safety net only 11 were killed. The bridge opened in May 1937, the same year that the 16-inch guns arrived by sea from the manufacturer, the Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts (below).

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The First World War also underscored the future importance of aircraft in bombing and artillery spotting. To minimise the damage to coastal forts by aerial attack, all new coastal batteries would now have greater separation between the guns with the magazines positioned even further away. Camouflage was essential to evade enemy reconnaissance aircraft, the older open, circular batteries literally seen as bull’s-eyes when viewed from above. To assist in the detection of enemy surface vessels, large hangars were constructed at several San Francisco coastal forts in 1921 to house observation balloons. The same year Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, the future commander of the US Army Air Service, supervised the construction of Crissy Field, the sole US Army Air Service coast defence station on America’s west coast. Situated near the coastal artillery command network, the airfield was home to the 91st Observation Squadron and 15th Photographic Section whose primary role was to detect shipping, both friend and foe, and correct coastal artillery fire by visual or radio communication. An immediate upshot of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty (also known as the Five-Power Treaty) was the availability of the 16-inch guns for San Francisco's coastal defence. Because the treaty halted the fortification of Pacific Islands and limited the size of the navies of America, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy, several shipbuilding projects were either modified or cancelled. With the cancellation of two new classes of American capital ship, whose guns were already manufactured, 20 ex-naval guns were transferred to the Army. Although lighter and less powerful than the Army’s own 16-inch guns, these weapons were fitted to a modified Model 1919 carriage and made available for coastal defence. San Francisco — America's most important harbour in the event of war against Japan — received priority second only to Hawaii and the Panama Canal for a battery of these 16-inch/50 calibre guns. BATTERIES DAVIS AND TOWNSLEY An inspection of America’s Pacific coastal defences in 1935 prompted the Congressional House Appropriations Committee to provide immediate approval for the longplanned 16-inch battery at Fort Funston, temporarily armed with 12-inch guns. This new 16-inch battery would be a revolutionary design in response to the escalating threat to the US from long-range and carrierborne aircraft. Under the Chief of Engineering Design George F. Crowe, planning began for Battery Richmond P. Davis — named after a distinguished Coast Artillery Corps officer — with two immense reinforced-con-

Like most military posts in the US, the new batteries were named after individuals — Battery Davis after Brigadier General Richmond P. Davis, a distinguished Coast Artillery Officer, formerly the Assistant Chief of Coast Artillery, and Battery Townsley was named in honour of Major General Clarence P. Townsley, a First World War general (1855-1926) of the Coastal Artillery Corps. Above: The site for Battery Davis was located within Fort Furston which lay some six miles south of the bridge between Lake Merod and the Pacific. In this case the barrels were mated to their carriages and placed in situ and the casemate built up around them, this picture being taken on February 24, 1938. crete casemates on a sandy ridge separated by 600 feet of galleries, ammunition magazines and power rooms. Work commenced in October 1936. The former naval guns were shipped from the Army’s Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland while the modified gun carriage was manufactured by the Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts. Arriving by sea in March 1937, the gun and carriage were moved by train to the nearest station and from there hauled by flat-bed trailers to Fort Funston. Once the two guns (originally cast for USS Saratoga, which ultimately became an aircraft carrier with a distinguished combat history) were mated to their carriages on a concrete foundation, the Corps of Engineers held a test-firing to settle the foundations into the sandy soil. Concrete was then poured to form the immense eight-and-ahalf-foot thick reinforced-concrete casemates, the actual guns further protected by heavy armour shielding. The complex was then covered by an additional 20 feet of earth with a two-foot-thick concrete ‘burster course’ incorporated below the soil surface to explode shells or bombs before they reached the actual casemate. The structure was designed to withstand battleship projectiles or an aerial bombardment of similar magnitude. Completed in February 1939, the entire complex was camouflaged with trees, ice plants and grasses.

Left: Battery Townsley was situated north of the bridge within Fort Cronkhite, the main difference with Battery Davis being 52

Battery Davis became the prototype for all succeeding US 16-inch coastal forts as well as for the modernisation of existing 12- and 16-inch batteries. To augment the fire-power of Battery Davis, a second battery was constructed north of the Golden Gate at a new 800-acre site designated Fort Cronkhite, adjacent to the Army’s Tennessee Point Military Reserve. Battery Townsley, as it was named, was fundamentally similar to the Fort Funston battery although the two guns were installed after the casemates were completed. Battery Townsley had the honour of testfiring the first 16-inch shell from a casemated battery on July 1, 1940. As 1st Lieutenant Arthur Kramer, HDSF (Harbour Defences San Francisco) Ordnance Officer in charge of the firing, recalled, ‘we were going into unexplored territory’. The tests were designed to gauge the maximum pressure inside the barrel upon firing and measure how far a projectile would travel. From a firing table, Kramer estimated that the guns’ maximum range would be 53,000 yards. Before a round was fired, copper deformation gauges were placed inside the gun chamber and retrieved after firing to ascertain the maximum pressure. A standard 660-pound nitro-cellulose (gun-cotton) powder charge was found to produce 39,000 pounds per square inch.

that in this case the casemates were built before the guns were installed. Right: No. 1 gun being moved into place.

Manning the 16-inch guns was the 6th Coast Artillery Battery E at Fort Cronkhite and Battery C at Fort Funston. It was, recalled George B. Webster, a 2nd lieutenant in charge of Battery C, ‘a hell of a privilege’ to command the 16-inch guns. Battery Davis ‘unofficially’ fired again in the autumn of 1940 with the testing of 12 rounds over several days to evaluate a variety of powder charges including reduced, full and 150 per cent. The formal proofing of Battery Davis finally took place on July 14, 1941 with five rounds fired

'cartridge cloth') that could ignite the next powder charge. During the proof firing on July 1, 1940, the guns were fired with a ten percentage extra powder charge, then at maximum elevation with an additional 15 per cent charge. No splashes were seen as the projectiles had travelled much further than expected. Both Townsley guns successfully fired five rounds with only minor damage sustained to non-vital fittings; the concussion from the firing shattering windows across the harbour in San Francisco. Two weeks later the Army decided to build an additional 27 16-inch casemated batteries.

from each barrel. With both batteries now operational, San Francisco became the most heavily fortified harbour in the world. Battery E held a practice shoot in September 1941. Two ranging rounds were followed by five rounds. The first was 1,000 yards too long, the next 1,000 yards too short but the third round destroyed the target which allowed the gunners to wear the red ‘E’ for gunnery excellence. To assess the effectiveness of the concrete casemates against an enemy strike, the War

Department conducted an experiment using Battery Townsley, the only 16-inch gun in America capable of firing shells onto adjacent land. In November 1941, Army engineers placed four concrete blocks, two of which were 13 feet thick, the other two 26 feet thick, at a distance of 620 feet from the battery. Gun No. 1 would fire at point-blank range to determine which was the stronger option: thicker concrete or thinner concrete with steel reinforcing. The trials were scheduled to begin after the weekend of December 6-7.

DAVID MITCHELHILL-GREEN

Firing the 16-inch guns was a tightly orchestrated task. With camouflage netting carefully rolled back, the guns were fully depressed into their loading position. A hydraulic rammer pushed the projectile into the breech, followed by the propellant. With the breech-block swung shut, the gun was traversed and elevated to match the target co-ordinates. Firing the gun produced a thunderous rumble as the gun recoiled before automatically resuming its firing position. When the breech was opened a gas-purging system extinguished and expelled any gas or burning fragments of the silk powder bags (known as

53

Left: Further trials were planned to test the strength of the actual casemates against direct hits. Right: Reinforced-

disappointed Orita resented leaving ‘without having hurt the enemy at all’. As it happened, San Francisco was never attacked during the war, the closest enemy strike being the shelling of Ellwood Oil Field (near Santa Barbara) by the Japanese submarine I-17 (see After the Battle No. 145). The only American coastal fortification to come under fire during the war was the elderly 10-inch Battery David Russell at Fort Stevens, Oregon, which was shelled by the Japanese submarine I-25 on the night of June 21/22, 1942. The postponed concrete penetration trials using Townsley Battery’s No. 1 gun were eventually completed by the end December 1941. As well as Army and civilian officials, Army Air Force observers were present to monitor the destruction. Technicians from the Lockheed Aircraft Company erected high-speed cameras to capture footage of the shells striking the concrete. Various powder charges were employed to vary the muzzle velocities of the shells, which was measured by means of electrically-charged wire over the muzzle of the gun connected to chicken wire on a wooden frame in front of the target. Captain John Schonher, the battery commander, aimed the massive gun like a rifle with the aid of cross-wires placed over the muzzle at the target 620 feet distant. The first shell penetrated cleanly through the concrete block from which no data could be derived. The second shell, using a lower charge, was embedded in the concrete but

the reduced recoil damaged the gun’s recoil mechanism which further delayed the tests by several weeks. To test the explosive effect of an embedded projectile, a shell was exploded in an existing hole in the concrete, which in the words of the battery’s range observer, ‘was just like a big shotgun in reverse’, forcing all watching to duck for cover! Engineers later broke up and buried the concrete targets, the value of the tests apparently unrecorded. In preparation for target practice on May 9, 1942, Lieutenant Kenneth Cooper, battery commander of Battery C Fort Funston, instigated two hours of daily gun drill. To alleviate wear on the barrels, a reduced powder charge was used. The first shot landed 130 yards short of the target, the second one 120 yards long. Projectile ramming was carefully monitored in order to reduce the inconsistency in the depth of seating inside the breech. Reports from a Hawaiian 16-inch battery had revealed that there could be a variance of projectile seating of up to three inches, dependant upon the skill of the ramming operator. This variation, it was thought, could significantly reduce accuracy. It was also recorded in the report that the crews were ‘gun shy’ since only ten per cent had previously witnessed the firing of a 16-inch gun. Further practice the following day produced more consistent results and a commendation from Colonel James C. Ruddell, regimental commander of the 6th Coast Artillery.

DAVID MITCHELHILL-GREEN

WAR San Francisco’s harbour defences were placed on alert on Friday, December 5, 1941, the gravity of the situation underscored by the issue of live small-arms ammunition. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor two days later, the Western Defense Command became a theatre of operations with San Francisco a major unit. General Edward A. Stockton, HDSF, issued a public bulletin that ‘All Coast Artillery officers and soldiers of the Harbour Defenses of San Francisco are ordered to report to their stations immediately. All leaves and furloughs are cancelled.’ As well as the modern 16- and 12inch guns, the gunners hurried back to the assortment of other guns shielding the harbour including the 40-year-old 12-inch guns of Battery Mendell. A week after hostilities had begun, the long-range Japanese submarine I-15 arrived off San Francisco. According to the boat’s executive officer, Lieutenant Zenji Orita, the I-15 was one of a number of submarines patrolling off the West Coast at this time. Surfacing near the Farallon Islands on the night of December 17/18, the boat’s crew observed the lights of San Francisco, a sight shortly to disappear with the introduction of black-out measures. A planned bombardment of the city’s famous bridge on Christmas Eve using the 14cm deck gun was cancelled by the Naval General Staff amid fears of reprisal. Ordered to return to Kwajalein, a

concrete blocks were set up at a range of 620 feet to measure the penetration of the 16-inch shells.

Left: This was the battery command post at Fort Cronkhite — still to be seen at Wolf Ridge today (right). 54

The final chapter in the development of America’s coastal artillery was the introduction of radar to aid gun-laying. The Signal Corps’ SCR-296 set was ready for introduction in late 1941 with the first sets installed at San Francisco in the spring of 1943. POST WAR America’s ambitious harbour defence program was never fully realised. Many batteries were cancelled while the construction of others, such as a third 16-inch battery at San Francisco, was halted as the threat of

attack subsided. Of the 150 or so planned batteries, some two-thirds were completed, although many of these were never armed. In total, the coastal artillery program between 1940 and 1945 cost approximately $250,000,000. The thunderous report of San Francisco’s 16-inch guns was heard for the last time in March 1948 during tests to asses the accuracy of the latest radar and electronic fire control. A press release afterwards lauded how the batteries still presented a considerable deterrent to a would-be enemy, assisted by the

‘magic eye of radar to find their targets, regardless of weather conditions, and electronic brains to calculate instantly the data for their firing’. The era of the 16-inch battery, however, concluded at the end of the year with the Army’s decision to scrap the guns. In what the San Francisco Chronicle called ‘Operation Blowtorch’, the guns of Battery Davis and Funston were consigned to the smelter, their casemates today relics of a time when coastal artillery was a foremost necessity for America’s defence.

Top and above: The final chapter came in 1949 when all four 16-inch guns ended up as victims of the blowtorch. 55