Aircraft Carriers in Peace and War

)

ioO^OU

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN PEACE AND WAR 00 en

Few

chapters in United States naval history fill more dramatic pages than those devoted to carrier aviation. From

CVJ

en rvj

o o

yesteryear's weird-looking experimen-

have developed today's super-

tal craft

carriers — pride of our modern nuclear ro

fleet.

Here

—

riers

is

the story of the pioneer car-

and

the Langley, Lexington,

Saratoga; the evolution of the catathe

pult;

first

heroic attack on the

Japanese mainland by planes launched from the Hornet; the saga of carrier

Midway, the

feats in the battles of

Coral Sea, and the Atlantic; the ordeal of the Franklin; the tale of the

most

famous carrier of all — the Big "E"; the story of

how Captain

Thach's "phan-

reans;

North Koand the dramatic use of carriers

in the

1962 Cuban

tom

carrier" harrassed the

crisis.

These and many more — the very "cream of carrier aviation writing — have been selected by Joseph A. Skiera for this new volume in the Watts Aero"

space Library.

(

See back flap

Jacket photos Official U.S.

Navy

Photos.

FRANKLIN WATTS, INC. • New York 22,

575 Lexington Ave.

N.Y.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN PEACE AND WAR

THE WATTS SEAPOWER LIBRARY

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN

PEACE AND

WAR

Edited by Joseph A. Skiera

FRANKLIN WATTS, INC. New York

575 Lexington Avenue,

Marin County Free Library Civic Center Administration

Building

Son Rafael. California

22

FIRST PRINTING

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-7803

Copyright

©

1965 by Franklin Watts, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America

iJJi

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The selections in this book are used by permission and special arrangements with the proprietors of their respective copyrights who are listed below. The editor's and pubhsher's thanks to all who helped make this collection possible.

The

editor

ership of

all

and the publisher have made every

material contained herein. It

is

eflFort

to trace the

own-

their belief that the necessary

permissions from publishers, authors, and authorized agents have been obtained in all cases. In the event of any questions arising as to the use of any material, the editor

made,

error unconsciously

and publisher, while expressing regret for any will be pleased to make the necessary cor-

rection in future editions of this book.

Sperry

Ralph A.

Rand Corporation for "The Past is Prologue" by Vice Adm. Ofstie, USN. From the Fourth Quarter 1953 issue of Sperry-

scope, Vol. 13, No.

Reprinted by permission.

3.

"The Langley—A Floating Airdrome" by Cdr. Kenselection is from the January issue of 1961, Vol. 4, No. 6. Reprinted by permission. only the BuNo Approach, The Naval Aviation Safety Review for ". ." from the September 1959 issue, Vol. 5, No. 3. Rehas changed printed by permission. Introduction to Naval Aviation by the Aviation Training Division, Chief of Naval Operations, January 1946, for "The Lexington and Saratoga" and "Evolution of the Carrier." Reprinted by permission. THE STEAM CATAPULT, ITS HISTORY AND OPERATION, NAVAER-00." U.S. Navy, 1957. Reprinted by per80T-69, for "Little David U.S. Air Services for

neth Whiting,

USN. This

.

.

.

.

.

.

mission.

Eugene E. Wilson the book, air

for "Tactics

and Strategy." This

power for peace, by Eugene

selection

is

E. Wilson, published

from

by the

McGraw-Hill Book Company. Copyright 1945. Reprinted by permission of the author.

Yale University Press for "Aviation in the Fleet Exercises" by Lt. Cdr. Archibald D. TurnbuU, USNR, and Lt. Cdr. ChflFord L. Lord, USNR. This selection is from the book history of united states naval aviation. Copyright 1949. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. Naval Aviation News for "Last of the Fleet Problems" by Scot Mac-

Donald, JOC, USN. This selection

is

from the September 1962

issue.

Reprinted by permission.

The

Fairchild Engine and Airplane

cept" by Lt. Cdr. H.

M.

Dater,

USNR.

Company

for "Small Carrier

This selection

is

from

Con-

Airfields at

Sea, the Development of Carrier Warfare, A Supplement to the pegasus. Reprinted by permission. Landmark Books, Random House, Inc. for "Hornet and the Tokyo

Raid" by Capt. Ted W. Lawson, USAAF, edited by Bob Considine. This selection is from the book thirty seconds over tokyo. Copyright 1943. Reprinted by permission of the pubhshers. E. P. Button and Company, Inc. for "The Battle of the Coral Sea." is from the book combat command, the American aircraft CARRIERS in THE PACIFIC WAR by Adm. Frederick C. Sherman, USN (Ret.). Copyright 1950 by Frederick C. Sherman. Reprinted by permission of E. P. Button and Company, Inc. Time Magazine for "The Battle of Midway." Courtesy Time, The Weekly Newsmagazine; copyright Time Inc., 1957. The OflBce of the Chief of Naval Operations for "Capture of Guadalcanal—The Solomons Campaign." This selection is from the book u.s. NAVAL AVIATION IN THE PACIFIC, 1947. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "The Coal-Burning Carriers." This selection is from the April 1954 issue. Reprinted by permission. Information Bulletin, Bureau of Naval Personnel, for " 'Sunken' Carrier Carries On." This selection is from the March 1944 issue. Reprinted by

This selection

permission.

Grumman

Aircraft Engineering Corporation for

Atlantic." This selection

is

from the book

"The Battle

of the

grumman at war, Grumman

Aircraft Engineering Corporation, 1945.

The by

Fairchild Engine

Lt. Cdr.

and Airplane Company

H. M. Bater,

USNR.

"The Grand Besign" from Airfields at Sea, Supplement to the pegasus.

This selection

the Development of Carrier Warfare,

A

for is

Reprinted by permission.

Harper and Brothers for "The Task Force Shows Its Strength, The Campaign," edited by Lt. A. R. Buchanan, USNR. This selection is from the book the navy's air war, a mission completed. Theodore Taylor for "First Battle of the Phihppine Sea." This selection is from the book the magnificent mitscher by Theodore Taylor. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. Copyright 1954 by Theodore Taylor. Reprinted by permission of the author's agents. Information Bulletin, Bureau of Naval Personnel for "They Ran But Won." This selection is from the January 1945 issue, No. 334, ReGilberts

.

printed

is

.

.

by permission.

Shipyard Bulletin for "U.S.S. Fran/cZfn—Trial by Fire." This selection from the April 1962 issue. Vol. XXI, No. 12, Newport News Ship-

building and

Bry Bock Company. Reprinted by

permission.

Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, for "We Make Her Go." This selection is from the November 1945 issue. Reprinted by permission. CoUins Radio Company for "The Big E." This selection is from Collins Signal, Summer 1962, Vol. X, No. 2. Reprinted by permission. Bryan, III for "Setting the Rising Sun" by Fit. Adm. WiUiam F. J. Halsey, USN, and Lt. Cdr. J. Bryan, III, USNR. This selection is from All Hands,

Bureau

of

vi

the book admiral halsey's story, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947. All

Hands Magazine

This selection

is

for "Flattop in the Arctic: Expedition Frostbite."

from the

May 1946

issue,

No. 350. Reprinted by per-

mission. for "Carrier Crewmen Have Rugged, Vital Jobs." This selecfrom the November 1951 issue, No. 417. Reprinted by permission. Bee-Hive for "Close Support from the Carriers" by Wayne Thomis. This selection is from the Fall 1950 issue. Vol. XXV, No. 4, United Air-

All

tion

Hands

is

craft Corporation. Reprinted

by permission.

Honeywell Flight Lines for "Com Car Div 3— Navy Jets at Korea" by R. Adm. John M. Hoskins, USN. This selection is from Flight Lines, November 1950, Vol. I, No. 2, Minneapolis-Honeywell Company. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "The Air Navy Below the Waterline." This selection is from the June 1954 issue. Reprinted by permission. John Denson for "Captain Thach's Phantom Carrier." This selection is from Colliers Magazine, October 14, 1950. Reprinted by permission of Mr. Denson. Flying Magazine and Publisher Edward D. Muhlfeld for "Canted Deck" by Cdr. W. G. Winslow, USN. This selection is from the September 1954 issue of Flying. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "Summing Up: The Turbulent Postwar Years" by Scot MacDonald, JOC, USN. This selection is from the October 1963 issue. Reprinted by permission. Marine Corps Gazette, Journal of the Marine Corps Association, for "U.S.S. Thetis Bay (CVHA-1)." This selection is from the March 1957 issue. Reprinted by permission of the copyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, pubhshers of the Marine Corps Gazette, professional journal for Marine officers. Copyright © 1957 by the Marine Corps Association.

Army-Navy- Air Force Journal and Register for "Navy Saves Pilots* Lives— It's Done With Mirrors!" This selection is from the July 27, 1957 issue. Vol. 94, No. 7. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "Aviation in the Sixth Fleet." This selection is from the April 1963 issue. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "Show-How System Leads to Roger Passes" by Lt. B. G. Homan. This selection is from the July 1955 issue. Reprinted

by permission.

Approach, The Naval Aviation Safety Review for "Barricades ." by Lt. Cdr. R. W. Kennedy, USN. This The Other Way to Stop selection is from the issue of February 1961, Vol. 6, No. 8. Reprinted .

.

.

.

.

by permission, Sperryscope for "Enterprise" by Capt. Vincent P. de Poix, USN. This is from Sperryscope, Sperry Rand Corporation, Second Quarter

selection

1962, Vol. 16, No.

1.

Reprinted by permission. vii

Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company for "Facts about the Enterprise." This information is from the September 1960 issue of Shipyard Bulletin, Vol. XX, No. 5. Reprinted by permission. Naval Aviation News for "Learn or Bum— Realistic Drills On CarThis selection is from the September 1962 issue. Reprinted by

riers."

permission.

Launch Magazine tion

for "Attack!

from the Fall 1962

is

The Ranger

issue.

in the Pacific." This selecReprinted by permission of The

Martin Company, Orlando, Florida.

The Image for "Tactical Navigational Display System Iconorama Ahoy" by Sandy McCullar. This selection from from the May 1963 issue. Vol. 2, No. 5, of Ling-Temco-Vought, Dallas, Texas. Reprinted by per.

.

.

mission.

Navy, the Magazine of Sea Power for "The Navy and Cuba" by Jack is from the January 1963 issue, Vol. 6, No. 1. Reprinted by permission. United States Naval Institute Proceedings for "U.S.S. Itvo Jima (LPH-2)" by Cdr. L. W. Garrison, USN. This selection is from the November 1963 issue. Copyright © 1963 by U.S. Naval Institute. Reprinted from Proceedings by permission. Grumman Horizons for "AEW— Airborne Early Warning" by Harold Andrews. This selection is from the Spring 1962 issue, Vol. I, No. 3, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation. Reprinted by permission. Launch Magazine for "They Stalk the Big Fish." This selection is from the Fall 1962 issue. The Martin Company, Orlando, Florida. Kestner. This selection

Reprinted by permission.

Our Navy for "Sea Power's Growing Force— Naval Aviation" by Richard D. Bach. Reprinted by permission of Our Navy Magazine, Vol. 57, No. 10, November 1962. United States Naval Institute Proceedings for "The SubmarineAircraft Carrier" by C. C. Abt. This selection is from the October 1963 issue. Vol. 89, No. 10. Copyright 1963 by U.S. Naval Institute. Re-

©

printed

by permission.

United States Naval Institute Proceedings for "Naval Aviation in the Adm. Fitzhugh Lee, USN. This selection is from the October 1963 issue. Vol. 89, No. 10. Copyright 1963 by U.S. Naval Institute. Reprinted by permission. Years Ahead" by Vice

©

The

and publisher's grateful thanks are due

to the United photographs in this book. The editor's very deep, personal thanks go to: Lt. Col. Gene Guerny, USAF, whose fertile mind and confidence provided more than the impetus; To Lt. Cdr. Dave Cooney, Head, Magazine and Book Branch, chinfo, and his associates, Lt. Frank Steele, Anthony J. Metro, YN2, and Virgil L. Swing, J02;

States

editor's

Navy

for the

viii

Lt. Cdr.

Dan

K. Dagle,

Commander Cooney's

able

and cooperative

replacement; Mrs. Velma L. Mitchell, Naval Photographic Center; Cdr. Paul Jayson and Scot MacDonald, JOC, of Naval Aviation News; Cdr. Arnold Lott, USN (Ret.) and Denis Clift and Frank Uhlig of the U.S. Naval Institute; A. Barrie Young, Approach;

and to the many librarians of Washington, D.C.; Providence, R.I.; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and the state of Hawaii, Hickam AFB, Pearl Harbor NAS, and Honolulu; and to the many fine men of industry: Gordey Williams, Boeing; Bob Sorensen, Collins Radio; Maynard Crosby, Douglas; Vernon Davis, H. E. Bockrath, Grumman; A. L. Schoeni, LingCottrell and B. R. Brinley of The Martin Company; Forler Massnick, Minneapolis-Honeywell; R. B. Hopkins, Newport News; Ken Brigham and Philip Biddison, Sperry Rand; Frank Giusti, United

Fairchild Stratos;

Temco-Vought; Ed

and the many others who provided the answers or made a to do so. Thanks also to Licia Thiesen for research, editing, and typing of the highest cahber, and to Adaline Crocker for typing the final manuscript under adverse conditions. Aircraft;

valiant

eflFort

IX

% ^>^

DEDICATED TO THE NAVY MEN IN THE FAMILY (There

is

only one other kind—mel)

My brother George The O'Briens (Uncles

all)

Michael, Martin, and James

Merrill (Jake) DeCoster; especially for the wonderful

Newport summers

of youth

The

Nightingales, Carl (Tiger) and Steve

George Barbary Ed McLaughlin Maurice Lavoie Ivan Deighan Regis Massey Herbert (Roundcomers) Kelly

and

EUGENE AND MILTON O'BRIEN AND EDWIN M. (TED) LENNON Their memories are not as strong as were their personalities during but they are with us yet. They have remained so; they always shall.

life,

Preface Over two-thirds of the earth's surface is covered by water, which means that any nation seeking a major role in world affairs has been obhged to build and maintain a navy capable of defending its rights. Ever since aviation became more than a fanciful dream, visionaries of the world's navies have been quick to see, and to attempt to use, its potentialities. Today naval aviation occupies a major position in air-power planning and strategy. The beginnings of carrier aviation history, it has been argued, started in one of three places.

According to one school of thought 17, 1922,

the

first

when

it

Lt. Cdr. V. C. Griffin

aircraft carrier

commissioned

did not begin until October

made

the

in the

first

takeoff

United

from

States,

the

U.S.S. Langley.

Another group prefers crediting Eugene Ely, a civilian pilot, with the honor. On January 18, 1911, he flew his baling- wire-andcanvas Curtiss pusher to the U.S.S. Pennsylvania, which was anchored in San Francisco Bay, and made the first shipboard airplane landing on a wooden platform specially-built over the ship's stern. To prove the feasibility of his venture, he turned the flimsy craft around and took off, after the ropes and sandbags used as an arresting gear were removed from the deck. Behind Ely's dramatic ffight was the vision of Capt. Washington I. Chambers, USN, who had been placed in charge of monitoring correspondence pertaining to aviation by the Navy Department the year before. It was after Capt. Chambers and aviation pioneer Glenn Curtiss became acquainted that the latter's plane made the successful experimental flight from the deck of the cruiser Birmingham in 1910. The results of this flight convinced Capt. Chambers and others that an airplane would be of tremendous advantage to the fleet if it could both take off from and land on the same ship. The Pennsylvania was made ready and naval aviation was bom with Ely's flight. To call it the birth of carrier aviation, too, would xiii

find opponents at widely divergent poles, however, since there are historians, naval bu£Fs,

and the

like,

who uphold

a third point with

considerable enthusiasm and logic.

These eager students of naval lore contend that carrier aviation, nee naval aviation, was bom in the early days of the Civil War when the George Washington Parke Custis and the Fanny were used as springboards of water-based aerial reconnaissance. They were used as platforms for balloons, which were able to provide hmited, but valuable, information to their comrades who were restricted to a ground-level reconnaissance of the enemy.

An

is that naval aviation because of the limited foresight afforded the "ship

unfortunate sidelight of this viewpoint

suflFered greatly

admirals" vehicles,

who many

could

only

envision

the

employment

of

aerial

years later, as multipowered binoculars, restricted

"Eyes of the Fleet." This extremely limiting approach can be partially attributed to

to the role of

the balloon ascensions of John in behalf of the Federal

La Mountain and Thaddeus Lowe,

government, during the

War between

the

States.

Rising from the deck of the Union transport 1861, John

La Mountain

sought,

by

Fanny

in

August

aerial reconnaissance, to de-

termine the disposition of the Confederate forces. Pleased with the success of these operations, the Federal forces constructed a "balloon boat" from which ascents.

One

of these,

Lowe made on

May

number

of particularly valuable

24, 1862, with

Gen. Stoneman, Union

a

commander, along, Lowe ascended and controlled the artillery fire from his position high above the scene of conflict. While these operations were extremely limited in scope and mobihty, they can be considered as early, though "poor relations" of the far-reaching, mobile flattops of World War II which coursed throughout the waters of the world wreaking havoc and destruction on enemy forces. Three viewpoints. Three possible birthdates for carrier aviation. However, the birth of naval interest in aviation has little doubt connected with it for, in 1898, a man destined for higher acclaim, Theodore Roosevelt, was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy when he became interested in tlie flying-machine experiments of Professor Samuel Langley. Applauding the success of these efforts, Roosevelt

recommended

to his superior the establishment of a board,

XIV

composed

of

Army and Naval

officers, to

study the military value

board concluded that favorable conexperiments in the developgiven additional should to sideration be of such a machine. This joint

ment

of the airplane as a future addition to the military/naval

arsenal.

The twin

specters of

La Mountain and Lowe continued

to

guide

the majority of thinking in the formative years of land- and sea-

based air-power potential by emphasizing the reconnaissance, and not the tactical, role to be played by airplanes in future conflicts. But other men, just as able and dedicated, but gifted with an ability to foresee the future, were on hand to pursue the development of the airplane as more than just an auxiliary to sea power. One of these, the previously mentioned Capt. Chambers, wasted no time in learning as much as he could about flying from the moment he received his assignment in 1910 as the Navy's aviation "expert." He plunged into the task and was soon so knowledgeable that he was seeking broader dimensions in order to bring aviation to the

Navy.

Shortly after receiving the assignment,

Glenn H.

Curtiss, pioneer aviation genius

Capt. Chambers met whose name must be

accorded the highest honors in all of aviation, but especially naval These two greats of aviation met at one of those inevitable crossroads of history where men of vision complement each other and

flying.

new

idea is given birth and impetus. Soon after this meeting, on November 14, 1910, came the first Ely flight from the Birmingham, while the cruiser was anchored in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Key naval officers were witness to the first of a series of world "fii'sts" that led, eventually, to the integration of air and sea power. Even the most hidebound of these traditionalists seemed to be impressed by the practicality of these tests, a

because the Secretary of the Navy soon recommended the purchase of aircraft for naval use. Progress in the years leading

World War I was steady as its wings and set course for new means for waging war and

up

to

Seair shook the salt spray from

the ultimate in the use of this

peace. Talk and plans for a mobile airfield capable of taking to the sea lanes as a self-sufficient entity capable of protecting our shipping, as well as

being equipped to take the fight to the enemy, were

limited to a handful of visionaries.

XV

These years were

filled

with

"firsts,"

but they were solely con-

cerned with testing the capabilities of airplanes. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels announced, in 1914, that the point had been reached "where aircraft must form a large part of our naval forces

and offensive operations." But there was still no word, amongst all the talking and planning, of the need for an "airplane carrier"; even as this country entered

for defensive

World War

I.

Limited experiments, such as those conducted by Britain's Royal the line of developing an "airplane carrier," were not helped in this country by experts from various specialized aviation activities who devoted themselves to pursuing special considerations for changing their activities from one of relatively minor importance

Navy along

one of becoming the major means for taking air power to sea. Flying boats received much emphasis from one group. Lighterthan-air types, pointing to the World War I achievements of air-

to

urged concentration in their specialty. Still others suggested that aircraft should fly from "in-being" ships of the line without

ships,

resorting to another type vessel.

With

aviation only a short step from

its

cradle, all claims

were

duly considered and development was continued in each of these areas.

Finally, in 1919, authorization

was given

to convert the collier

Jupiter to the role of "airplane carrier"— despite

the vociferous

who felt the fleet was in greater need modest beginning, to a program that would bring the utmost attention from a host of shipbuilders, aircraft designers, component manufacturers, and naval tacticians objections of senior flag officers of the collier. This quite

for

many

years, resulted in a role

undreamed

of for a naval air arm,

even by the most visionary and ardent of naval airmen.

XVI

Contents PART ONE: AIRFIELDS BECOME MOBILE Introduction— The Past Is Prologue

1

VICE ADM. RALPH A. OFSTIE

The Langley— A Floating Airdrome CDR. KENNETH WHITING, USN The Langley as a Test Bed CAPT. JOSEPH A. SKIERA, USAF "Only the BuNo Has Changed The Lexington and Saratoga Public Relations-1929 Style .

3 10 "

.

15

.

18 21

Evolution of the Carrier— Characteristics of Design Little

28 33

David ...

Fleet Exercises— Tactics

EUGENE

E.

22

and Strategy

WILSON 38

Aviation in the Fleet Exercises CAPT. ARCHIBALD

CLIFFORD

L.

D.

TURNBULL, USNR, AND

LT. CDR.

LORD, USNR

42

Last of the Fleet Problems

SCOT MACDONALD

PART TWO: THE CARRIER GOES TO

WAR

Introduction

49

Small Carrier Concept LT. CDR. H. M. DATER, USNR

51

The

54

Battle Christening of Carriers

CAPT. JOSEPH A. SKIERA, USAF

58

Aboard the Hornet CAPT. TED W. LAWSON,

EDITED BY BOB CONSIDINE

Wasp

Stings

69

Twice xvii

The

ADM. FREDERICK

The

71

Battle of the Coral Sea

Battle of

C.

SHERMAN, USN

Midway

84

FROM "time" magazine Capture of Guadalcanal— The Solomons Campaign FROM NAVAL AVIATION FILES While in the Atlantic

FROM

88

92

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

The Coal-Burning

93

Carriers

FROM "naval aviation NEWS" 96

Carriers in the Atlantic

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS "Sunken" Carrier Carries

On

98

FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS The Battle of the Atlantic The Grand Design LT. CDR. H. M. DATER,

100 103

USNR

The Task Force Shows Its Strength: The Gilberts Campaign EDITED BY LT. A. R. BUCHANAN, USNR

106

Occupation of the Marshall Islands

111

FROM

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

113

Landings at Hollandia

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Atlantic Prize of

War

114

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS First Battle of the Philippine Sea

THEODORE TAYLOR But Won They Ran FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS Against Such Teamwork the Enemy Could Not Prevail Mindoro, Luzon, Iwo Jima, Okinawa: The Rising Sun Grows Dim FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS U.S.S. Franklin-Tm/ By Fire Medal of Honor Chaplain FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS .

.

.

xviii

115 121 128 129

136

139

We

140 144

Make Her Go

The Big "E" Sun WILLIAM ADM. FLEET

14V

Setting the Rising

LT. CDR.

J.

BRYAN,

F.

IH,

HALSEY, USN, AND

USNR

PART THREE: AFTERMATH OF WORLD

WAR H

Introduction

1^'

Flattop in the Arctic: Expedition Frostbite

160 163

Carrier

Crewmen Have

a Rugged, Vital Job

ARTHUR P. MILLER, JR., USNR Close Support from the Carriers WAYNE THOMIS Com Car Div 3— Navy Jets at Korea REAR ADM. JOHN M. HOSKINS The Air Navy Below the Waterline Captain Thach's Phantom Carrier JOHN DENSON Canted Deck CDR. W. G. WINSLOW, USN Summing Up: The Turbulent Postwar Years SCOT MACDONALD LT. (jg)

172 178

182 187

197

201

PART FOUR: FROM KOREA TO THE PRESENT DAY ^07

Introduction

209

Bay (CVHA-l) CORPS GAZETTE MARINE FROM Done With Mirrors!

U.S.S. Thetis

It's

210

FROM ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE JOURNAL Aviation in the Sixth Fleet

Show-How System Leads LT. B. G. HOMAN

to

"Roger" Passes

Barricades— The Other Way to Stop LT. CDR. R. W. KENNEDY XIX

.

.

.

212 218 220

A

224

U.S.S. Enterprise

CAPT. VINCENT

P.

DE POIX, USN, COMMANDING OFFICER

Facts About the Enterprise

Learn or Burn— Realistic

229 232

on Carriers FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS Attack! The Ranger in the Pacific Drills

240 244

The Best Duty Tactical Navigational Display System

.

.

.

Ahoy

Iconorama 245

SANDY MCCULLAR The Navy and Cuba— Operational Report

248

JACK KESTNER U.S.S.

Iwo Jima {LPH-2)

CDR. L. W. GARRISON,

254

USN

AEW—Airborne

Early Warning HAROLD ANDREWS Aircraft Carriers and Astronauts They Stalk the Big Fish Sea Powers Growing Force— Naval Aviation RICHARD D. BACH

258 261 262 266

PART FIVE: THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Introduction

Can Do Both Jobs ADM. ARLEIGH A. BURKE, USN The Submarine- Aircraft Carrier C. C. ABT Naval Aviation in the Years Ahead VICE ADM. FITZHUGH LEE, USN Carrier Air

Appendix

21

279

Aviation Ships

284 286

Carriers

EscoH

271 272

Carriers

289

Index XX

PART ONE

AIRFIELDS BECOME MOBILE

Introduction-The Past If

the past

steps that

is

to

be prologue

have led to

to the future,

Is

it is

Prologue well to review the

this carrier-weapons system, for

the growth of carrier weapons

is

woven

into

the revolution that naval aviation

has caused in sea warfare.

Ever since 1911 when the Navy purchased its first plane, the have been concerned with

Curtiss amphibian Triad, naval flyers

one problem— the best way of taking

power to sea. Even in day were convinced that

air

1911, flyers of the frail aircaft of that

power would prove the key to sea power. The principle of sea power rests upon the ability to mount the weapons of the day aboard ship. This was true for the ramming prow, the smoothbore cannon, and the high-powered naval rifle, in their turn. It is also true for the airplane today and perhaps will be naval

air

so for the guided missile tomorrow.

In 1919, even as the seaplane and flying boat were in the ascendancy as the Navy's basic aircraft, the feeling was growing that neither type could achieve air power's potential role in naval warfare. As early as 1913, Lt. Cdr. Mustin was urging those in charge of aviation to get away from the all-purpose plane. Planes of various types— the low-flying torpedo plane, the scout,

and the

heavily armed fighter— were needed. Mustin and others argued that, iJF a true fleet aviation were to emerge, the Navy would have to take high-performance aircraft to sea.

To make

this possible,

these

men

concluded, a speciahzed plane-carrying ship must be

built.

The

insistence of their argument, coupled with the British

1

Royal Navy's successful experiments with carrier prototypes during the latter part of

World War

I,

forced the decision to start conversion

of the collier Jupiter into the airplane carrier Langley in 1919.

Vice Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, USN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)

1953

Experiencing the same overwhelming backslide services

and organizations

felt

by

World War Navy, what there was of after

the

all military

I

Armistice,

succeeded in hanging on by a slender thread—saved by the efforts of a few rugged individual pilots dedicated to its retention and expansion. Plans and suggestions were submitted to the Navy Department. First, and most important, the aircraft carrier question began to be favorably resolved for the first time. Capt. E. J. King stated, "there never seemed any doubt that carriers were essential." Adm. Mayo included fighter-aircraft on his list of proposed types for use on carriers by the postwar Navy. And Capt. Twining said, "every aviation in the United States

fleet

must carry a large number of

it,

fighting planes or lose

command

was certainly being viewed from a different angle for the first time, and by ranking officers. In spite of these glowing opinions, there were still influential officers who saw no place for carriers in our Navy. Their greatest concession was still mixed up with the outdated theory that "Naval aircraft must be able to land on water and be fitted for hoisting of the air above

it."

The

carriers role

aboard." This concept remained substantially the majority opinion

Naval

of

flag officers for the next several years.

"Justice prevails" is a peculiarly

American axiom and

it

was not

long before plans for the collier Jupiter were modified in November 1919, calling for an unobstructed "flying-on and flying-off deck," storage space for airplanes,

an

old,

and

facilities for

airplane repair, plus

but considerably renovated innovation, the catapult.

The Lang ley— A Floating Airdrome CDR.

An

KENNETH WHITING, USN

is a vessel fitted to carry aircraft and able them into the air immediately upon the request of the commanders in chief of the fleet or the senior naval ofiicer present. The "carrier" must also furnish a platform upon which the aircraft can alight upon the completion of their mission. It must furnish, in addition to its own crew, living quarters for

AIRCRA.FT "carrier"

to put

3

the aviators and the aircraft crews, hangar space for the planes, repair shops, storerooms for plane parts, storage for gasoHne

and

oil, photographic and meteorological offices, magazines bombs, torpedoes, machine-gun ammunition, aircraft cannon ammunition, parachute flares, and other munitions. It must provide facihties for the rapid handUng of the partlyassembled planes from the storage holds to the assembly deck and from there to the flying deck, and the reverse of this operation must receive due consideration, for planes may only ahght on the flying deck one at a time. The flying deck must be cleared before another plane may alight. Speed in this operation is an important consideration when one thinks of two planes returning to the ship at the same time with only a few minutes' gasoline supply left in

lubricating for

their tanks.

The

must have every facihty that

"carrier"

equipped airdrome and, stand

off destroyers,

and speed

in addition,

guns of

exists

at

a well-

sufficient caliber to

submarines, and light cruisers, plus mobility

keep up with the fastest units of the fleet. In is a floating airdrome which supplies tlie admiral of the fleet with aircraft of the following types: pursuit, spotting, scouting, attack, torpedo, and bombing; and supplies these immediately when needed— night or day, rain or shine, sea rough or smooth, from a harbor, off the coast, in the middle of the ocean, or wherever the field may be. One can see at once that a "carrier" cannot be a very small ship, especially when one considers that a hangar 120 feet by 60 feet will house at one time sufficient to

other words, a carrier

only five or

six of

The question

the

Army DH-4-B

type planes.

naturally arises: If planes of the types mentioned

above can be carried on a ship and be present with the fleet at all and these planes can fly from such a ship and operate against a possible enemy— ff these statements are true— are our fleets equipped with them? And, if not, why not? The answer is, "Not yet!" And the reasons are about as follows: Before we entered the war, as every aviator knows, aviation received little or no consideration at the hands of Congress. And this was due in part, with about two exceptions, to the timid recommendations of the officers who were then in charge of the Army and Navy. The exceptions were the Army and Navy officers in immediate charge of what aviation we possessed and the General times,

4

Board of the Navy. The General Board had consistently advocated the development of naval aviation, and has specifically recommended, in years gone by, the procurement of "carriers." The officers of the Navy who became naval aviators also advocated "carriers" before we entered the war in 1917. Then came the war, and with it further recommendations from Adm. Sims that carriers be procured, but it was then too late, as the Hun submarine was sinking ships at the rate of 450,000 tons a month. Every ship available was used to carry troops, food, and munitions to our overseas forces and our allies, and no vessels of the size and speed required could be diverted for the purpose of

Adm. Sims's recommendations. Loud demands for the protection of shipping came from all the Allies, and it was decided that a carrier, despite

aviation could furnish at the time could All of our energies

went

were bent toward

against submarines

the best help naval

combat the submarine. and "fleet aviation"

this end,

into the discard for the "duration."

Now

the Langley (ex-Jupiter) does not possess

all

of the charac-

She lacks the high speed required, and is objectionable for other reasons, but she has much to recommend her, and at the time she was selected her advantages outweighed her disadvantages. The advantages were as follows: She had the necessary length to permit planes to fly off, and, with her 14-knot speed, the necessary length to permit planes to fly on a specially prepared deck. She had very large hold spaces, with high head room in them, a diflBcult thing to find in any ship. She had larger hatches leading into these holds than most ships, a factor permitting the stowing of the largest type planes that it is possible to use from a carrier; and, in addition, these large holds permitting the stowage of a teristics of

an ideal

"carrier."

comparatively large number of planes.

She was electrically driven, permitting flexibility in maneuvering and in speed, two desirable qualities. She needed only a small crew to operate her— a most necessary quality at the time of her selection when the hue and cry of the wartime sailorman was "back to the farm; no more seagoing in my young life." Yes, a small crew was an important consideration. The Jupiter's firerooms were well aft and consequently the gases from her boilers could be so handled as to guarantee a

5

minimum

interference with

for the planes when ahghting on her decks. She had ample space machine, carpenter, metal and wing repair shops; for gasoHne and aircraft lubricating oil storage; spare parts, spare engines, and but crowded, bit ammunition. Her living quarters appeared to be a

be undertaken. We thought she could be converted cheaply. That was a mistake, however. In any event, she will have cost less when completely converted than any other ship we might have selected. We thought war she could be converted quickly-that was another mistake. The breatha taking are men material is over and labor, contractors, and ing spell. The recommendation for her conversion was made by appropriated the General Board of the Navy early in 1919; Congress 1921; she for January promised the money in June 1919; she was suflBcient for the

work

to

may be ready by July 1921. The Langley when commissioned

will provide our

Navy with

an experimental carrier which, while not ideal, will be sufficiently of serviceable to conduct any experiment required for the design

and future carriers and for the development of naval aerial tactics, mentioned aircraft of types various the for the development of above, for these last are also lacking in our Navy, due to concentrating on antisubmarine

The Langley

will

be

fitted

work during the war. with every device

nautical world to assist in flying

ofiF,

the facihties for handling aircraft, While the British were the first

must be given

to the civihan Ely,

known

to the aero-

flying on, rapid assembly,

and

for stowage, repairs, and upkeep. to show us the way, much credit

who

first

flew from a ship; to the

naval aviators Ellyson, Richardson, and Mustin, who developed the catapult which permits the launching of aircraft from a ship with no relative speed through the water for assistance; to Curtiss, who developed planes which could ahght on the water; and, finally, the to Cdr. Simmers, Construction Corps, USN, who redesigned planes the lift which elevators Langley as a carrier; designed the

from the assembly deck to the flying deck; the traveling cranes which lift the planes from the holds to the assembly deck; the cranes which lift the planes from the water (some are seaplanes) to the assembly deck, arranged for the smoke pipes to fold down and the gases from the firerooms to be discharged from either side or from both sides, as the situation requires; provided wind brakes

)

)

)

:

(an idea borrowed from our British cousins) so that planes might be safely handled in a 30-knot wind; installed catapults which do not interfere with "flying on" any more than the slot in a trolley track interferes with the passage of an automobile; arranged to take a "Waterberry" gear from this old battleship, a motor from that old cruiser, a part from some other old ship, in order that the cost of conversion might be kept down and time saved. The British Navy is about five years ahead of us, for they have

had

carriers of various kinds in service since 1915,

new

and many of

them. Yet, in a way, we start about even, for the war also retarded their development, because of the large demand for aircraft to combat the Hun on the the problems that are

to us are old to

and on other land

front in France

fronts;

because of the same

conservatism on the part of their ranking naval

which

officers

and because of the large number of vessels sunk by the Hun submarines, which forced the development of their antisubmarine aircraft to the exclusion of their fleet aircraft. That carriers will be successful, and an absolute necessity to any well-equipped navy in the future, there is not the slightest doubt in my mind. Some of the reasons for this belief are as follows existed in our service;

(a) Planes carrying and launching torpedoes have sunk ships. (British

and German planes.)

(b) Planes have flov^m from ships and destroyed Zeppelin hangars which could not have been destroyed in any other way. (British planes.

(c) Planes flying from

down Zeppelins.

(

towed hghters have destroyed and shot

British planes.

(d) Planes have been conveyed on aircraft tenders, flown from the water and bombed towns, dock yards, and navy yards which could not have been

bombed

in

any other way. (British planes.)

(e) Planes have flown from carriers and investigated other

on the high seas to determine ( In the case cited they were friendly. )

craft flying in the vicinity

if

were friendly or

(

not.

air-

they

Amer-

ican and British planes.) (f)

A

plane has flown from an aircraft tender in battle and

enemy ships. ( British plane. German seaplanes have bombed

reported (g)

7

British submarines in the

)

mouth

)

)

of the

the British of Fourth,

)

)

)

)

)

Thames. By using carriers they might have bombed and our own battleships at Scapa Flow, the Firth

fleet

and

in the

Humber River.

(h) Planes have scouted in the Pacific Ocean and reported the position of enemy vessels, resulting in the destruction of those ships. (i)

(German

planes.)

bomb

Planes have attempted to

cessfully,

due principally had to

the distances they

battleships,

but not suc-

to the inferior type of planes used, fly to

make

and

the attack. (Turkish ship in

Dardanelles, British planes. (j)

screen

Planes have successfully controlled gunfire through a smoke when the control could be done in no other way. (American.

(k) Planes have controlled gunfire at an invisible target (battle-

and destroyed her. ( British planes off Africa. In war games planes have conducted submarines and de-

cruiser ) (1)

stroyers to a position permitting a successful attack

on

capital ships.

(American.)

on

(m) Planes have attacked destoyers and killed ojBBcers and men their bridges; at night. (German planes.) (n) Planes have sunk destroyers by bomb attack. (French and

British.

(o) Planes have attacked destroyers at night with cannon (

fire.

French.

(p) Planes have sunk submarines by dropping bombs on them. (French, British, and American planes, and, I suspect, German planes or aircraft.)

(q) Planes in practice have obtained ten per cent of hits on a small obsolete battleship, the equal of thirty constructive hits on a

modern

battleship. (American.)

bombs have so damaged an obsolete type battleship throw her main propeller shaft out of line (same effect may be expected on the most modern ship) and caused her to sink. (r) Aircraft

as to

(

American. (s)

Large

aircraft

bomb

exploded on obsolete type battleship

gutted the ship. (American.) (t) Planes have been used to spot for guns firing at 30,000 yards' range in wartime. (British planes. ( u ) Planes flying from carriers have been used for reconnaissance

of sea in enemy's control.

(

British.

8

)

(v) Planes in practice have laid

down

a smoke screen permitting

other planes to simulate torpedo attack. (American and British.) (w) Planes have conducted actual torpedo attack and obtained hits in practice.

(

British.

(x) Planes have scouted at sea and located fleet in war game and reported position accurately. (American.) (y) Planes have taken innumerable reconnaissance photographs

during war.

been done by planes belonging to the naval The Army planes have conducted many other more valuable missions of bombing, reconnaissance photography, attack on enemy All of the above has

branch.

and so on, which can be done equally well from planes from carriers, provided the carriers are available. Do you wonder after reviewing the above facts, from ( a ) to ( y ) that I am positive that "carriers" are an absolute necessity to a well-equipped navy? We are asking this Congress for the first properly designed carrier. It will take from three to four years to build it. Will they give positions,

flying

,

it

to us?

"Such remarks as I may have to make as to the nature and extent of the air force required by the Navy will be based upon the assumption that the airplane is now a major force, and is

becoming daily more that therefore even a

efficient

and

its

weapons more deadly

or disable a battleship alone, that a fleet

command

.

.

.

small, high-speed carrier alone can destroy

enemy

whose

carriers give

it

can defeat the latter, that the fast carrier is the capital ship of the future. Based upon these assumptions, it is evident that our policy in regard to the Navy air force should be command of the air over the fleet of any possible of the air over the

fleet

enemy."

Adm. William October

9

14,

S.

1925

Sims,

USN,

The Langley—A Floating Airdrome— was finally a reality. Years of devotion to a principle and years of crusading, by dedicated naval aviators, for a means by ivhich airplanes could be taken to sea to augment naval power, were rewarded with a vehicle that could combine the elements of sea and

air into

a new, powerful

striking

force.

Yet, the commissioning of the Langley was not actually a fait accompli—mission accomplished. It was only the beginning. A beginning to many problems to be solved. Problem-solving is not a relatively easy matter even when eventual difficulties are recognized in the early stages of development. It becomes even more difficult when one starts with a completely new concept and improvisation and testing becomes a daily way of life. And so it was with the

Langley. Fortunately, for the

Navy and

men

the United States, the

re-

and Air were an unusual lot, men hard work and self-sacrifice could achieve the

sponsible for the wedding of Sea

who

believed that

theoretical goals established in the infancy of the airplane. This re-

some of these achievements is set forth here not so as a chronological listing of accomplishments, but as a sincere

capitulation of

much

salute to those

who pioneered the development of the aircraft carrier.

The Langley CAPT. JOSEPH

The

first of

its

kind, whether

as a Test

SKIERA, USAF

A.

it

Bed

be an automobile, an airplane, or

any one of a thousand items used around the home,

is

subject to

exhaustive testing, modification, additional testing, further modification,

so

it

and was

still

more

for our

of the

first

same

until

it

meets certain standards.

And

airplane carrier, the Langley.

In the case of the Langley, however, there was no estabhshed

standard for comparison purposes. devised as to

how

best to

make

Many

theories,

many

the carrier perform

its

plans,

were

mission. But,

even here there was httle guidance, since the tacticians were still engrossed with how best to "cross the T," with battleships, or lesser 10

vessels, in line,

and had given

little

thought to the employment

of the carrier.

Even before the Langley was commissioned under command

March

at Norfolk, Virginia,

Kenneth Whiting, on were being conducted as to what type

of her executive ofiBcer, Cdr.

20, 1922, certain tests

equipment would be needed aboard to conduct fast, relatively safe operations. One of these was the testing of arresting gear at Hampton Roads. Lt. A. M. Pride taxied onto a runway deck in an Aeromarine and successfully engaged arresting wires arranged athwartship, which were attached to weights, and fore and aft wires designed to guide the aircraft in a nearly straight line. From these early beginnings came the specifications for arresting gear later installed aboard the Lexington and Saratoga. "The arresting gear will consist of two or more transverse wires stretched across the fore and aft wires wires,

is

guided

brought to rest

.

.

.

The

plane, after engaging the transverse

and is by the action of the transverse wire working with

down

the deck

by the

fore

and

aft wires

hydraulic brakes."

Even before the first takeoflF from the Langley on October 17, had authorized conversion of the unfinished battle cruisers Lexington and Saratoga to aircraft carriers. 1922, Congress

Prior to the Langley Lt. Cdr.

Godfrey

De

s

appearance on the naval scene,

pilots

under

C. Chevaher practiced flight-deck landings on

a coal barge at the Washington

Navy Yard— a barge upon which was

constructed a 100-foot flight deck.

When

the Langley stood out to sea, one of those aboard her was

Lt. V. C. Grifiin,

one of the

assiduously on the barge.

To

fifteen pilots

who had

practiced so

GriflBn fell the first carrier launching,

and he had less trouble taking off from the Langley s flight deck than Ely had experienced in getting off the Birmingham's makeshfft platform eleven years before.

The

becoming the first naval aviator to land aboard a U.S. Navy carrier was won by Chevalier. The historic day was October 26, nine days after the first takeoff by GriflBn. Chevalier, however, was flying an Aeromarine and made his landing while the Langley was underway off Cape Henry. His slow-flying plane came to rest on its nose in a welter of arresting gear— but landing safely nonetheless. It was more than unfortunate that this skillful pioneer of carrier aviation was to die less than three weeks singular honor of

11

Portsmouth Naval Hospital, from plane crash at Lochaven, near Norfolk. later in the

On November made

the

first

18,

Commander

injuries suffered in a

PT

Whiting, piloting a

seaplane,

catapult launching from the Langley. This flight was

rather unusual since the original conversion plans of the Jupiter-

Langley called only for the installation of arresting gear, but no catapult of any type. Later, however, catapults of the Seattle and Huntington type were installed. Aircraft recovery techniques were also studied and practiced to a great extent during the early 1920's aboard the Langley. One of the first, in 1923, was made with Aeromarines operating in flights of three. It required two minutes to prepare the deck after each landing and, in the best time, the three planes were taken aboard in seven minutes. In

May 1924, the first plane, a DT, to dummy torpedo, was launched by

be flown

off

the Langley

The importance of this event can best be appreciated by jumping forward to World War II and studying the damage dealt to enemy fleets by torpedowith a

catapult.

carrying aircraft.

The end of her employment as an experimental carrier, and the beginning of Langley operations as a unit of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, were signalled by the reception of VF Squadron 2 aboard on February 4, 1925. This was the first unit trained as a squadron to operate from a carrier and they joined the Langley, off San Diego, in another first for carrier aviation. A high point in the history of carrier aviation was bom with Fleet Problem V, the first to incorporate carrier operations, in March 1925, off the coast of Lower Calffomia. Even though the Langley air activity was limited to scouting in advance of the black fleet movement to the Guadalupe Islands, the performance so impressed the commander in chief, Adm. R. E. Coontz, that he recommended to his superiors that the Lexington and Saratoga be completed as soon as possible. He also recommended that development of planes of greater durability, dependability, and radius receive the highest priority and that steps be taken to insure continued emphasis on this matter, as well as in the improvement of catapult and recovery gear. Two events of major significance in the development of the aircraft carrier occurred during April 1925. Lt. Cdr. C. R.

catapulted in a

DT-2 from

die Langley at

12

its

dock

in

Mason was

San Diego on

April

2.

The launch demonstrated the

feasibility of using flush-deck

catapults for land planes.

John D. Price made a night landing on the Langand he was followed on board by Lts. D. L. Conley, A. W. Gorton, and R. D. Lyon. Except for an accidental landing on the night of February 5, when Lt. H. J. Brow stalled aboard while practicing night approaches, these were the first night landings made on board a U.S. carrier. An emergency barricade, designed to prevent landing aircraft from crashing into planes parked on the flight deck, if they missed all arresting wires, was successfully tested in June 1926. In a day of tests, August 9, 1926, to determine the speed with which aircraft could be operated at sea, pilots of VF Squadron 1 completed 127 landings aboard the Langley. As a result of the experience gained, the same squadron later landed 12 planes in 21 minutes when the ship ran into a heavy mist, creating an emergency

On the eighth, Lt.

ley, at sea,

situation.

"Covered Wagon," as she was performed her mission as a research laboratory of carrier operations well. Lessons learned aboard her, even with the primitive gear of the 1920's, provided her oflBcers and men with the "know-how" that was to be put to such good use during World War II. But the Langley was not relegated to the scrap heap upon completion of her training chores. With a part of her deck chopped away, she became less than an aircraft carrier, but still served the country well. Early in World War II, while en route to Tjilatjap, Java— as a seaplane tender— ferrying thirty-two Army Air Force P-40's, she was attacked and sunk, just seventy-four miles from her

The

httle 11,500-ton Langley, or the

affectionately called,

by Japanese aircraft. end for the gallant First Lady of United States carrier aviation than was accorded many of her larger, more powerful followers who were consigned as scrap, placed in mothballs, or tethdestination,

A more

fitting

ered as targets during the "Operation Crossroads" atomic testing at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific during 1946.

13

bomb

Only the BuNo and the date, and the group of letters and numbers what kind of an airplane it is. Everything else reads right up to date in this "old but new" true narrative of events aboard he hauled hack on the stick the Navy's first real flattop. ". and floated" ". he was coming in too slow and was being " ". just as he got to the stern he got given a 'come-on ."—Doesn't read like history, does it? Reads like cocked a little that tell

.

.

.

.

.

.

last

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

week's Aircraft Accident Report.

vividly descriptive letters

And

from aboard the

back when your leading chief going out on thirty.

first

yet the events in these U.S.S.

joined the

Langley occurred

Navy—and now

he's

from them, and we pass our and they and they nod knowingly and condescendingly. And then they go right out to learn the hard way from the only teacher who doesn't overlook or forgive mistakes— experience. So they still "haul back on the stick," come in too slow, and get cocked a little, more or less, and someone writes a letter to a friend about the day's events. Thirty years or so from now it'll make interesting historical reading— someone who's joining the Navy today will be getting out then, and he might observe, "Doggone, they're still doing it— only the BuNo has ." changed Yes,

we make

mistakes and

we

learn

learning on to the youngsters fresh out of flight training listen to our wise words as they filter through our beard,

.

.

Flying from the backyard-sized deck of the Langley was, in itself, a hazardous occupation for all concerned. This was due, in part, to the newness of the operation, the host of unknown elements involved, but most of

concerned. Aviation

all,

is

to the "inexperience-level" of the pilots

a dynamic profession where change

rule rather than the exception,

and

is

the

this article firmly establishes that

change is ever present, even though similarities abound in mistakes made, and that experience is valuable only to those who will listen to its voice.

14

"Only the

BuNo Has Changed

." .

.

UNITED STATES FLEET AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS, BATTLE FLEET U.S.S.

LANGLEY 9 August 1929

Dear S

,

We

have had four major casualties in 738 landings since we first oflF fore and aft wires. The first egg was laid by a Chief A.P. in one of our FU's. He hauled back on the stick when he got the "cut gun" and floated over the entire gear, finally crashing into the barrier. The principal damage was done by the prop cutting the top barrier wire so that a taut whip end of it came back and broke the spars of the right tip and lower wings, broke the left V-strut, broke two engine cylinders and ripped the fuselage. Also he blew his right tire and broke the tail skag. Fore and aft wires could never have took

saved him.

The second egg was laid by Ens. J. in an 02U2. He came over OK. Then he started to haul back and float. He floated to

the stern

the starboard side of the deck and landed somewhere between

number 3 and number 4 wire, almost at the outboard Hmit of the Even then he would have been OK except for a peculiar accident which, it was discovered later, must have happened as he passed over number 4 wire. The aluminum fairing piece which the

gear.

02U2's carry underneath the fuselage right at the tail skid, and on which the leather tail skid boot is mounted, had apparently come loose at the forward edge. It was caught by some obstruction and pulled back slightly and simultaneously the hook bounced up against the fuselage. As this happened the plate snapped forward and caught the hook against the fuselage, preventing it from engaging number 4 or number 5 wire. The plane therefore rolled into the barrier, binding the prop, crashing the landing gear, and ripping the fabric in various places.

which hardly damaged the plane at all was the S. He came aboard with his tafl hook not released, first because he forgot it and second because no one on deck saw it. He ran normally down the centerline and into the barrier. Little damage was done to the plane because the top barrier wire hit the extremely heavy oleo cylinders of the landing gear merely

The

T4M

third crash

flown by Ens.

tearing the light streamline plate.

15

o

-1

The lower wire

of the barrier

apparently was rolled over by the large wheels just as they

roll

over

Except for a damaged lower right aileron which couldn't clear the starboard barrier standard he could have continued flying. To avoid recurrence of this we have had large cards printed with HOOK on them with a string attached, which we hand to any pilot who is slow about lowering his hook and tell him to hang it around his neck. It is large enough so that it is inconvenient and he is constantly reminded. Also we have placed an extra man behind Billings with a pair of flags to give the OK when the hook is lowered or to notify Bill in case it isn't. This man has no other crosswires.

duties.

The

latest crash, also a

He was coming

T4M, was flown by an AP

just

out of

slow and was consistently being given a "come-on" by Bill. At the last come-on he went haywire and completely cut his gun, just barely connecting with the deck. The mark of his tail skid was left on the ramp. He landed about 10 feet inboard from the port edge of the deck, plane heading for the stacks. His hook mark on the deck shows that it passed about a foot outboard of the sheave of number 1 wire so that it couldn't Pensacola.

engage anything.

in too

He continued his course, passed over

port operating platform with right wheel

still

passing the stacks, his right wheel rolled off

the stacks and on the deck. Just after the deck and he went

into the net with his landing gear. This obstruction caused

make

him

to

a half outside loop so that he landed on his back in the water,

nose toward the ship. After what seemed five minutes he came up from

underneath and found a ring buoy which had been tossed there for him and almost immediately thereafter the plane sank. He was picked up by the Aroostook unhurt. The next day he came out again in a T4M, made fine landings and was qualified. What can be done to avoid stage fright and failure to follow signals on first landing, I don't know, especially when a man shows up excellent in field training and gives no cause for suspicion. As you can see, not a single one of these crashes would have been averted by fore and aft wires. On the other hand, several of the successful landings which have been made would have been certain crashes with the old gear because of the jazzy way in which some of them have landed. Of minor crashes we have had twenty-nine. Thirteen of these have been merely broken tail skid or tail skid shoe casting. Seven have been blown tire or broken wheel. Five have been breakage of a landing gear strut, some involving bending or pulhng out spreader tube, one caught aileron horn in wire, one tore wing fabric on a pie,

16

one bent axle on a pie, one pulled spreader out after a bounce. Worst of these have happened in FU's, with weak landing gear and tendency to bounce due to rubber shock absorber. None of these would have been avoided with fore and aft wires. Get rid of wooden tail skids and brittle tail skid shoe castings and most of the minor crashes will be avoided. There is no question in anybody's mind but that the simplified gear is a great improvement and is here to stay. Regarding 's crash all I know is what I have heard, viz., that he is inexperienced in carrier landings even though an old-timer and every landing of his was a potential crash. Yet he goes to work and

makes landings at night right after cracking up at day. I have just completed a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the Langley gear, which I will forward to you as soon as blueprinted. I think similar studies should be made of each type of gear we now have and I was surprised to find nothing about ours in our

files.

Will write you soon again about some experimental work.

17

The stage teas set by the Langley for the debut of the Lexington and Saratoga as our first almost-from-the-keel-up carriers. Designed as battle cruisers, with the inherent speed of such ships, the "Lex" and "Sara" were invaluable additions to the striking power of our

and Pacific. The two opened an era of phenomenal growth in offensive capabilities and technical progress never before achieved by any of the world's sea powers— and not equalled since. The Lex and Sara marked the transition from theory and testing to establishing the tactical and strategic concepts that contributed so much to Allied victory in World War II. economically shrunk

fleets in the Atlantic

The Lexington and Saratoga The formation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in the summer of 1921 brought into naval aviation an officer with unhmited enthusiasm for the future of naval flying. Adm. Moffett, as chief of bureau, looked beyond the immediate scouting function of the airplane and foresaw it as a true offensive weapon. Under his administration of the

far

Bureau, dive-bombing experiments were carried out, aerial gunnery

made enormous

strides,

and new and

larger patrol

bombers were de-

signed as forerunners of the modern "flying battleship." Naval avi-

but also in the special techniques applicable to aviation in the fleet. The Langley was soon operating in naval maneuvers as a ship of the line. Then came the U.S.S. Lexington and U.S.S. Saratoga. These two great aircraft carriers, converted from battle cruiser hulls, gave naval aviation a striking power which carried it vigorously through the doldrums of the '30's and safely past the critical days immediatelyators

were trained not only

in basic flight principles

following the Japanese attack on Hawaii. It is paradoxical that the "Sara" and the "Lex" should be the progeny of peace, though born out of worldwide revulsion against war. That, however, was the case. When the signatories to the Washington Conference of 1921-22 agreed to limit world naval power and scrap warship tonnage within fixed ratios, the United States had two large battle cruisers building.

18

These two great ships were assigned to the yet unfilled treaty category for aircraft carrier tonnage, and were converted on the ways to the Saratoga and the Lexington. With battle cruiser hulls and power, the Sara and the Lex were to reign as the most formidable ships of their class for 15 years after their commissioning in 1927. Each displacing some 33,000 tons and carrying a complement of 80 aircraft, they were among the few carriers responsible for stemming the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific in 1942.

This decade of the development of the carrier stands out in the history of naval aviation as a period of

phenomenal growth. At the

beginning, a small detachment in each ocean fleet to a decision to give aviation the

practical conditions of operating at sea. It

appropriations, yet the

Hence

owed

chance to prove

Navy devoted a

its

itself

was a period

existence

under the

of declining

steadily growing larger share

were in full operation, patrol squadrons and seaplane tenders were performing essential scouting functions, aircraft were regularly assigned to battleships and cruisers, and together these elements were playing an important role in the offensive and defensive maneuvers of the annual fleet war games. The period was also characterized by impressive technical progress. The radial air-cooled engine was developed into an efficient and reliable power plant. The full impact of this development was realized by the U.S. air industry some years later as this type of engine was used almost exclusively as the power plant for all types of aircraft. Better instruments and more satisfactory radios were put into use; an accurate bomb sight was developed. Bought by the Army Air Corps, this sight played an immense role in the strategic bombing concept of World War II. Aircraft were equipped with oleo struts and folding wings to enhance operations from the aircraft carriers. Aircraft flew higher, faster, and farther each year, and of the many world records placed on the books, a fair share of them were put there by naval aircraft. Tactics were developed. Accurate dive bombing became an accepted tactic that was to prove decisive in naval battles still two to aviation.

at the end, three aircraft carriers

decades in the future. Marines learned the value of air support. Techniques of torpedo attack, scouting, spotting of gunfire, and operating from advanced bases were developed and refined into doctrine.

Everywhere

it

was evident that the Navy was solving 19

its

unique problems of taking aviation to sea; by solving them w^as gaining new strength from this revolution (that some claimed would do away with navies ) and was thereby carrying out its duty to the destiny of the United States. ;

Douglas T2D-l's went to sea aboard the newly commissioned Lexington in 1928. This year marked the last use of liquid-cooled inline aircraft engines by torpedo planes of the U.S. Navy. A total of 285 aircraft were operated from carriers during 1928-29, out of a Navy total of 829 planes of all types in commission during this period.

20

It is a well-established tradition in the Armed Forces of the United States that they stand ready to assist their fellow Americans in overcoming the effects of natural and man-made disasters, in time of peace or war. This short article outlines how the Lexington reacted to a problem in our Pacific Northwest and, by so doing, added another illustrious

chapter to the history of this tradition.

Public Relations -1929 Style The

U.S.S. Lexington cast off her lines

and made preparations for on the dock and bid the

sea as hundreds of grateful citizens stood

vessel bon voyage. The date was January 17, 1930, and the port was Tacoma, Washington. The "Lex" and her crew had just completed a special mission without which the Yule trees of Tacoma would have been dark at Christmas. She had been furnishing— free— electrical power to that city for the past thirty days and had delivered a total of over four

huge

and a quarter million kilowatt hours. The dry summer of 1929 had affected many parts of the nation, but the great Northwest was the hardest hit for there had been no water to produce hydroelectric power to meet Tacoma's needs. The Lexington had begun generating electric power for Tacoma at 2206 on December 17. Prior to that time she had been standing by after overhaul at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard awaiting orders to Tacoma. She went a little further in cementing good relations with Tacoma citizens by throwing a Christmas party for about 125 children. The crew pitched in and donated $500 to help defray the cost, and each child received clothing, toys, candy, nuts, and fruit. Santa arrived via an

02U down

the forward elevator with Lt. H. C. Carlson at the

controls.

The Tacoma Chamber of Commerce gave a was a "ball" long remembered. 21

ball for the

crew that

Combining the elements of sea and air into an efficient fighting was not just a simple matter of placing a landing deck on a sleek, fast hull. Many problems arose. Some had not been anticipated when the Langley conversion was on the drawing boards. Decks were not long enough to permit aircraft to come to a stop only after they had run out of forward momentum. Turbulence on the landing approach, caused by hot gases rising from the stacks, made this most difficult phase of flight even more vehicle

precarious.

The awesome amounts of highly volatile aviation gasoline stowed aboard a carrier demanded extensive, efficient fire-control systems. Here we learn how many of these problems were anticipated and solved on the drawing boards. How others were discovered only after the vessel had put to sea. And how the ingenuity of all hands was equal

to the task of

making

their vessel efficient

and

safe.

Evolution of the Carrier Characteristics of Design was apparent from

It

rested solely in

aboard.

The

its

the start that the eflPectiveness of the carrier

ability to

latter function,

launch planes and receive them back however, posed the biggest problem.

Since naval carrier aircraft paradoxically were land planes equipped

with wheels rather than pontoons, some method had to be devised them within the extremely limited dimensions of the

for stopping flight deck.

This was solved by the ingenious device of deck arrest-

ing gear.

Modern hydraulic

self -compensating

to the devices which endangered

life

gear bears

and

Hmb

little

resemblance

of the early carrier

pilots.

The

British

worked out the

first

system.

It

consisted of longitudi-

nal wires to guide the landing plane safely along the deck, a

ramp hang

check momentum, and a hardy crew of plane handlers to as the plane rolled to a stop. It is a matter of passing interest that the Royal Navy retained longitudinal gear until about 1935. to

on

22

made its debut with the Langley U.S. Navy and the system universally

Cross-deck arresting gear 1922, an innovation of the

use today.

Initially,

in in

the Langley utilized both longitudinal and cross-

deck gear, which gridironed the deck like tenement wash lines. To say these early devices were mortal enemies of a long life would be an understatement. Supporting the ends of the longitudinals were metal "fiddle bridges" which raised the wires to the necessary height above deck level. These devices frequently punctured the tires of incoming planes to the unhappiness of the pilots. An even greater hazard, which made existence on the flight deck something of a sporting proposition, were similar supports under the cross-deck wires. These wood devices were called Ely Elements, or "pies" after their general contours. When the plane's landing hook caught the arresting wire, the resultant sudden tension caused the "pies" to be hurled violently down-deck in a sort of scatter fire liable to be lethal to anyone so unfortunate as to be in the way. Finally, due to confusion engendered in the wire grid, the U.S.

Navy

abolished longitudinals in favor of cross-deck gear alone.

And

hand for the general security. the Navy was faced with the further

eventually the "pies" were also taken in

In retaining cross-deck gear,

necessity of providing tensions adequate to bring planes to a quick

but

still

safe stop.

Drag was

counter weights, which

slid

first supplied by a system of brakes and up and down metal tubes. This was only

brought the plane to a quick if ungentle But the weights were so heavy that, after being stopped, the pilot was forced to gun his engine desperately to avoid being dragged backward at a brisk pace before his tail hook could be disengaged. Nor was the tension on the wires self-compensating in the event the pilot landed off-center or out of the fore-and-aft axis of the carrier. Unless he was "in the groove," the drag of the uncompensated gear was just as likely to haul him over the side as it was to stop him on deck. The modem hydraulic system subsequently was perfected, permitting tension to be controlled and thereby compensating for the unequal drag caused by off-center partially satisfactory. It halt, all right.

landings.

Modem

gear

now

number of arresting wires rigged Three— and several collapsible wire case of emergencies or bad landings.

consists of a

across the flight deck aft— Fly

midway of the deck in Tension on the individual arresting wires also increases in the direc-

barriers

23

tion of the landing, so that a plane catching the last wire short of

and much more vioA normal landing, however, assures a relatively long run and gentle stop. Stacks and superstructure posed another basic problem to beset designers. What to do with them? Hot gases and smoke from the stacks, and the turbulent air currents set in motion across the fl\"ing platforms by the ship's superstructure, made shipboard flying an uncertain business at best. Designers finally hit upon the "island"— the barrier will be brought

lently than

if

the

first

two

up much

shorter

or three wires are caught.

the characteristic superstructure at the starboard side of the flight deck. Not only did air

it

provide for an unimpeded

turbulence at a minimum, but

it

flight

deck and keep problem

satisfactorily solved the

deck control as well as the visibihty necessary for navigating and conning the ship itself. Experiments were made with folding stacks at the ship's side, but this departure (other than in escort conversions) was incorporated in only one major U.S. carrier, the Ranger. Side stacks, however, have been a characteristic of of affording

fliight

Japanese carrier design.

The

was another feature of carrier construcfrom practical considerations and the exigencies of tion that evolved the moment. It was hit upon as the most sensible solution to the problem of getting aircraft above-decks to fly. In fitting out H.M.S. Campania, an old Cunarder, as a seaplane tender in 1915, the British tried out the idea and found it so successful that it was thereafter retained. It was not improved upon until 1941 when the U.S. Navy installed the folding deck-edge elevator.

Two

flight-deck elevator

design principles are inherent in the carrier for obvious rea-

sons—the need for as large a flight deck as possible, and the necessity for building it high enough above water to insure dryness from ordinary seas; and it must also be high enough to permit easy flying operations. Despite the resultant high freeboard, the carrier must still be stable enough and fast enough to operate with the fastest ships of the hne. The ease and certainty with which a carrier can launch aircraft

is

also in direct proportion to

its

speed, because

it

must compensate for its shortened flight deck (the runway) with an increased flying wind over the deck. A plane taking off into a 15-knot wind might have difficulty becoming airborne in the allotted deck space; but when that deck is steaming into the wind at 30 knots, the resultant 45-knot wind offsets the handicap of a shortened runway. 24

Speed and

stability, therefore, are essential to

required of a carrier

bility

if it is

to

come

the high maneuvera-

into the

wind and handle

group with a minimum loss of time. Sluggish response to the undue weather-cocking in high winds, or extreme deck mo-

its air

rudder, tion

would

A

seriously limit the practicability of carrier operations.

carrier

is

a self-contained military air establishment. Conse-

becomes an additional problem. Room must be found not only for the ship's oflBcers and men but also for the additional aviation personnel, pilots, planes, and equipment. quently, space

A

stowage capacity of a large tanker. Where other ships are concerned only with their own fuel needs, carriers must provide for the fueling of their squadrons as well. This means they must be able to carry 200,000 to 300,000 gallons of high octane gasoline as well as their own bunker fuel. The dangers which exist in this amount of volatile fuel have, in carrier also possesses the gasoline

turn, required installation of ingenious

The

and extensive

fire

damage

is apparent in the have become increasingly impervious to ordinary fire dangers from battle damage. The first Lexington, a prePearl Harbor carrier, was lost in the Coral Sea not from relatively minor battle damage, but from fires which developed afterward. Many of our later carriers have suffered comparable damage, but have still retained their battle-worthiness as a result of improved fire

control systems.

fact that

damage

newer

effectiveness of these systems

carriers

control systems.

on a carrier likewise becomes extremely comdue to operation of three high-speed elevators, complex deck and recognition lighting systems, radar controls, and

Electrical wiring

plicated flight

ship-to-plane communications.

own engines must develop power sufficient to through the water at more than 30 knots, and turn up a power output sufficient to meet the total needs of an average-sized city. The engineering plant of an Essex develops 150,000 horsepower Finally, the ship's

drive

it

from

its

four main turbines, which are powered

by high-pressure

superheated steam.

The

carrier for the

most part

is

very hghtly armored, sacrificing

the protection of heavy armor plate for greater speed. Only in the

Midway

is armor an important feature. For its protection the upon its speed and aircraft, and upon those tactics long-range action. Light armor, however, is apphed to

class

carrier relies

inherent in

25

the sides and to the hangar deck, and sphnter protection to the ex-

posed gunnery and control stations. The carrier is not designed to engage in close-action combat but to strike at 100-mile range through its aircraft, deriving whatever direct combat protection may be necessary from its own antiaircraft batteries and its heavily-gunned task force escort.

must be prepared

to

armament is therefoffe designed with this The main battery of an Essex-class carrier will consist more dual-purpose 5-inch 38-caliber guns fore and aft

of

It is principally

defend

from the

air that a carrier

purpose

itself. Its

in view.

eight or

of

the island, and a secondary battery of 40-mm. and 20-mm. automatic antiaircraft guns mounted in the island and about the flight deck in twin and quadruple mounts. A Midway carrier will mount more than double the 5-inch armament of an Essex, as well as greater firepower in the 40-mm. and 20-mm. categories. Antiaircraft fire thus provided, while not comparable in weight or volume to a cruiser or battleship, nevertheless affords formidable and effective protection against attacking aircraft.

In their underwater form, carriers do not differ greatly from other combatant ships. Differences are created, however, in problems of stability and ballasting due to the great height of the flight deck ( over 50 feet above the waterline ) and the off-center island superstructure. The importance of stability is again apparent in a carrier's ability to take on and fly off aircraft in all but the most severe weather and sea conditions. Finally, one of the most effective plane-handling improvements was the deck-edge elevator, which overhangs the port side and can be swung up flush with the ship's side when not in use. This portside elevator materially speeded up all flight-deck operations. It provided additional elevator capacity and, even more important, reduced the need of the fore and aft deck elevators during periods of landing and launching, when their use might close the flight deck and delay the schedule of an entire task force. It was an innovation first applied to the first Wasp and later developed into its present form on the Essex class. Aboard a carrier, as at any shore station, the control and the regulation of air traffic is an important factor of operations. This control, as distinct from the ship's operations, centers in the island, the flight deck, and the hangar deck.

26

The island, on the starboard side, is the nerve center of the carrier. Here are located the captain's navigating bridge and the primary fly control. It also houses air plot,

communications, the aerological

oflBce,

the ship's conning stations and pilot house. If the carrier is a flagship—and most large carriers are— the island also includes the flag ofiicer's plotting room and bridge. In ships of the Essex and Midway class the island is larger than that on a CVL or CVE. In the former, it is some five decks (platform) from flight-deck level to sky lookouts. In smaller carriers, the island

is

The

of cantilever-type construction, built out over the ship's

CV's and CVB's, are located in the small carriers at the side of the ship nearly flush with the side.

stacks, a part of the island in

flight deck.

Immediately under the flight deck, and approximately on the level of the catwalk and gun galleries surrounding it, is the gallery deck. This deck is "hung" up close under the flight deck. It houses pilots' ready rooms, air intelligence ofiBces, the CIC, armorer's compartments, and other air department functions. Many of the functions ordinarily housed in the island of a large carrier will be located on the gallery deck of a CVL or CVE. The hangar deck is what its name denotes— the ship's aircraft hangar where all ordinary hangar functions are carried on, such as stowage, repairs, and maintenance. On a carrier, the hangar deck is usually the main deck. It extends fore and aft of the ship except for relatively small areas at either end devoted to quarters and stowage compartments. Beneath the hangar deck, which is usually armored, are carried on the normal functions of any combatant ship.

27

.

known today

other than for its role aboard a role of tremendous importance. Without the catapult, or a similar device, carriers would not he able to launch the heavy, jet-powered aircraft of today. The jet engine is

The

an

catapult

is little

aircraft carrier.

And

it is

slow in providing the thrust necessary to get an airplane airborne. It

took

many people— aviators,

designers, engineers,

and the like-

to work out the application of the catapult principle to getting an airplane into its element, the air. Each was trying to modify a

method from

Biblical days, the slingshot victory of

little

David

over Goliath.

Little The catapult

is

not a

David

new weapon

.

.

of warfare.

The Bible

tells

the

story of David's using the catapult technique in his slingshot battle

with Goliath. The Greeks and the Romans also used crude variations of the catapult principle to hurl stones, spears, fireballs, projectiles against their adversaries.

employed huge catapults called

and other

During the Crusades, the armies which were particularly

baUistas,

useful as siege weapons.

As the twentieth century began, the catapult showed signs of becoming a fixture in aviation. Horsepower was low and undercarriages shaky. Catapults were needed to get aircraft aloft and flying. The early aircraft built and tested by Orville and Wilbur Wright and by the Smithsonian Institution's Dr. Samuel P. Langley in the period between 1903 and 1911 were aU launched by use of a simple form of catapult. Where Professor Langley employed coiled springs, the Wright brothers utilized cables and a falhng weight to attain catapulting force.

The Ely

in

first

made by Eugene Birmingham, stimulated many of

successful flight from a naval vessel,

1910 from the deck of the

ponder the development of a device which could launch aircraft from a ship's deck. The techniques of operating airplanes from ships were being given fairly close scrutiny. On January 18, 1911, Ely landed aboard his contemporaries to

28

the battleship Pennsylvania, proving out the basic principle of the arresting gear.

A number

of sandbags

were

laid

down

to

add progressive

resist-

landed on a form on the ance to the movement of Ely's plane as ship's stern. Twenty-two pairs of 50-pound sandbags were attached at each end of hues spaced three feet apart. The lines were stretched across the deck and suspended 12 inches above it. As Ely's plane touched down on the deck, the sandbags were pulled along. For every 3 feet of forward motion, 100 pounds of resistance were added. As the forward momentum dropped, the plane decelerated, coming to a full stop when it reached the twentyit

second

line.

At the time Ely was making his shipboard landing, another aviaGlenn Curtiss, was attempting to devise some method of launching aircraft from a ship's deck. From Hammondsport, New York, he wrote to Capt. W. I. Chambers, an ojfficer appointed by the tion pioneer,

Navy

to take special interest in aviation

now

developments, "I

am

de-

means of launching our regular machine from the deck of a ship and hope to put this in practice shortly, first at our training ground here, and later, off the deck of a ship, if arrangements can be made to do so." Curtiss was developing a wire launching device, not a catapult. In September 1911, he wrote Chambers: "This scheme of sliding down a wire seems simple, but when you come to it, there are so many obstacles and problems to work out. Still looks feasible, however." Later, that year, voting myself just

to devising

hydroplane from Curtiss' wire device over the shores of Lake Keuka, near Hammondsport. From a platform, a 250-foot length of steel cable ran out and was secured to a subLt. T. G. Ellyson flew a

merged

piling.

pontoon

fitted

A

metal-lined slot cut into the keel of the aircraft's

on the cable. Lateral equihbrium was maintained by main cable on which the wingtip pontoons rode. The wire inclined down toward the lake shore. As the plane began to move, a man on either side balanced the plane until its speed was greater than the men could run. Several successful, although hazardous, launchings were made, and a test aboard ship was considered. However, development of a true catapult and initial tests with it, also made by Ellyson, showed that the inclined-wire method was not the most practical. Capt. Chambers wrote Curtiss, "In regard to the launching device,

means

of 2-foot wires parallel to the

29

I

don't think I

cliflF.

Ellyson's

(

would

lose

any more time with the cable from the

catapult ) flights seem enough to assure the practica-

bility of a catapult.

30 feet before the

On

the drafting board

full

impulse of the catapult

think this would be

more than ample.

I

we can

get a run of about

and I should propose having a prelimis felt

inary test with a dead load."

Chambers described was developed at the Washington, D. C, Navy Yard in 1912 under his direction, with the Bureau of Ordnance and the Naval Gun Factory cooperating. Compressed air was the power source. An air hoist, with cable and sheave blocks, was rigged to a channel track structure, the free end of the cable being attached to a

The

catapult

launching car on

rollers.

The first attempt to utilize the Chambers compressed-air catapult was made on July 30, 1912, from the deck of the Santee at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, with Lt. Ellyson piloting a Curtiss AH-3 aircraft. The initial efforts were unsuccessful because of the fact that the airplane was not secured to the launching car to prevent the plane's nose from hfting when the accelerating force was applied. The catapult was returned to the Washington Navy Yard for modifications.

On November launch was

12, 1912, at the

made from

Washington Navy Yard, a successful

a barge arranged so that the launching tracks

were only 2 feet from the water. These tests indicated that a greater power capacity was necessary, and construction of a new design was started. The structural work for the new catapult was done by the construction and repair shops at the Navy Yard, and the engine details completed at the Naval Gun Factory. This new catapult was transferred to Pensacola, Florida, where the Naval Air Station had recently been established. There in 1914, it was installed on a coal barge. Lt. P. N. L. Bellinger was successfully catapulted from this more powerful model in an AB-2 seaplane, and for a brief period the catapult was used in the training course for early naval aviators.

The commander

at Pensacola, Lt. Cdr.

H. C. Mustin, obtained

permission to install a catapult on the quarterdeck of the U.S.S. North Carolina. A hoist was rigged on one of the battleship's guns to lift

a hydroplane from the deck to the catapult track.

this track that

Mustin made the

first

30

It

was from

catapult launching from a naval

under way. The date was November 5, 1915; the aircraft a 1700-pound AB02 flying at 43 knots. Mustin also conceived the idea of elevated tracks on the quarterdeck, utihzing the after turret as a turntable to transfer planes from storage to the catapult. As Mustin's work went ahead, a more powerful catapult engine was developed and manufactured at the Washington Navy Yard. In 1916, catapults were installed on the Seattle and Huntington with elevated tracks, and R-G seaplanes were frequently launched from both these ships at sea. At this stage, however, a successful method for stopping the catapult cars had not yet been worked out satisfactorily. It was the practice to let the car go overboard with the airplane. The cars were vessel

then recovered in a more or

less

damaged condition by means

towline stowed on the car with one end attached to the ship. possible to get the elevated tracks out of the

way by

It

of a

was

folding them,

procedure proved to be something of a major operation. Because of these operating diflBculties, the catapults and aircraft were removed, when the Seattle and Huntington were put on con-

but

this

voy duty at the outbreak of World War I. Although Mustin's flight and the catapult operations which followed it proved the feasibiHty of catapult launching from carriers, they did not immediately result in such a development. When the old collier Jupiter was converted into the first U.S. Navy carrier and renamed Langley, an arresting gear was installed, but no catapult of any type. Later, however, catapults of the Seattle and Huntington type were installed aboard, and in 1922 Cdr. Kenneth Whiting, at the controls of a FT, was the first to be catapulted from the Langleys deck. The problem of a catapult brake for stopping the launching car from going overboard had by then been solved. In order to facihtate the operation of catapult aircraft from battleships and cruisers, the idea of a turntable catapult was suggested by Cdr. Whiting in 1919. Work on this project was begun at the Naval Aircraft Factory [now called the Naval Air Engineering Facility (Ships Installations)] at Philadelphia, the

conducted

in 1921.

The

first

first tests

shipboard installation was

being

made on

the

quarterdeck of the U.S.S. Maryland. The catapult was powered by

and was housed within a bridge-like structure mechanism. Friction brakes on the structure decelerated the launching car at the end of the run. compressed

air

mounted on

a turntable ring equipped with suitable training

31

In 1922, an experimental catapult employing powder as the propulsion source instead of compressed air was developed and tested.

and cable arrangement was similar to that of the compressed-air type, but here the power medium consisted of rapidly expanding gases obtained by firing a charge of powder into an expansion chamber. Catapults of this type were installed on the tops of gun turrets on battleships and were trained by training the turrets. The powder catapult was first installed on turret No. 3 of the U.S.S. Mississippi, late in 1924. Turntable powder catapults ap-

The

cylinder, sheaves,

peared in 1926.

Work begun later when this

on a flywheel catapult culminated ten years type was installed on the aircraft carriers Lexington

in 1918

and Saratoga. The propulsive unit consisted chiefly of a flywheel in which launching energy was stored, an electric motor, gears, and cables. A cone-type friction clutch engaged a cable drum with the flywheel at the instant the cable drum was brought up to the speed of the flywheel. Capacity of this type of catapult was for launching a 10,000-pound airplane at 48 knots. Being fitted only for the launching of twin-float seaplanes which were seldom flown, however, the

and were removed. By 1934 the advantages that would accrue from the use of flushdeck-type catapults to launch landplanes were becoming more and more apparent. The deck catapult permitted the stowage and landing of airplanes on the after part of the flight deck while the forward part of the ship was used for launching. Without use of a catapult, it required practically the entire length of the flight deck for an airflywheel catapults

fell

into disuse

plane to attain takeoff speed.

The

first

flush-deck catapult

catapult consisted of a

was tested

wooden platform

table seaplane catapult.

A

towing

finger,

in 1935.

The experimental

built over a standard turn-

attached to the launching

extended up through a slot in the platform. Successful launches were made of an F4B airplane weighing 5,500 pounds flying at 39 knots. Required takeoff run was 34 feet. car,

32

The

military

weapon

is

not truly a "weapon," in the accepted

sense of the word, until it has completed a carefully planned processing. The vehicle which rolls from the production line or down the

ways of a shipyard is an unknown. This is, of course, very true of an entirely new concept. Similar models, which follow, have been modified to correct discrepancies found in the original. When the exhaustive testing is completed the vehicle is either found to be suitable for military operations or

it is

discarded.

The next step in the operational suitability of the aircraft carrier came with the annual Fleet Exercises. The next three stories of development in the United States chronicle the achievements and the problems of the flattops during these yearly "war games." To those who think Fleet Exercises were little more than games

aircraft-carrier

played for the benefit of tacticians and

strategists,

we

invite the

reader to study these stories closely and then apply his new-found

knowledge to the following article. In "The Carrier Goes to War," one can readily see that the men of the carriers learned their lessons well in the peacetime exercises. The final step in the evolution of the carrier— of any weapon system—is in the most trying test of all; the crucible of war.

Fleet Exercises— Tactics and Strategy EUGENE

E.

WILSON

Fleet exercises contributed to the accumulation of experience. Under the leadership of Rear Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, the air squadrons were based on shore and exercised in gunnery and air tactics under a progressive schedule. This served to develop tactical doctrine and gunnery procedure that later stood the fleet in good stead. The U.S. Navy conceived and developed the dive bomber and its tactics.

But as an example of the state of mind of the period, some "seagoing" units anchored in California harbors resented the basing of aircraft units

on

shore,

and even some of the 33

carriers took the atti-

tilde that the aircraft

were an integral part of

their interior organiza-

tion, rather than a concentrated force to be serviced

Adm. Reeves was old school, he

had the

a great air

was steeped

commander,

in the

A

Navy blue water

vision to foresee the airplane in

its

by the

carriers.

naval officer of the tradition, yet

ultimate role.

He

he

had,

energy and driving force to accelerate its practical employwhen the Langley was to participate in the annual "Fleet Problem" involving an "attack" on Hawaii, the admiral insisted, against the advice of his air leaders, that the Langley carry 42 fighter and scouting aircraft against the 12 of her normal complement. He personally devised the means of accomalso, the

ment

in the fleet. Thus, in 1928,

plishing this

and

of raising the speed of landings

and

takeoffs to the

point where, in his words, "the air striking force justified the tonnage

required to give

it

mobility of base."

It is interesting to

remember

that during the flight training

and

other preparations for this Hawaiian cruise, a Japanese tanker

ways managed

al-

San Pedro or cruising in the vicinity of the fleet. Scores of Japanese fishing vessels based in Los Angeles Harbor in full sight of the fieet anchorages and maneuvering grounds. During the Langley s 1928 "attack" on Pearl Harbor, under circumstances similar to those of December 7, 1941, Japanese citizens read the details in the Honolulu morning papers. Meanwhile, the fleet looked at the Langley principally as a "battle Hne" auxiliary. She might scout for "enemy" vessels or defend the fleet with her fighters, but her striking force was largely discounted. She was therefore assigned a precise position "6,000 yards astern of the battleship divisions" and expected to maneuver with the fleet. Adm. Reeves had to fight for freedom to maneuver independently and get sea room to turn into the wind to launch and receive planes. When the Lexington and Saratoga joined the fleet, Adm. Reeves used them in the monthly exercises to develop air tactics in support of the battle line. General naval opinion, however, anticipated that future fleet actions would follow the tactical precedents of the Nelsonian era, and that a final decision would be reached by two fleets drawn up in battle array, slugging it out with their guns. The battleships were willing to accept aircraft as distant spotters for their guns. Their captains saw, month after month, the brilliant joint operations of aircraft and destroyers, for Adm. Senn, the destroyer squadron commander, and his chief of staff, Capt. Harold to

be loading

oil at

34

Stark, were alive to the implications of naval air force. The aircraft and destroyer squadrons collaborated in exquisitely timed aerial and destroyer torpedo attacks through aerial smoke screens, while dive bombers strafed nonexistent battleship antiaircraft batteries and real torpedo defense guns. Meanwhile, bombers timed their approach to hit just after the strafers and in conjunction with the torpedoplanes. Incredible as it may seem, the monthly repetitions of this finale to tactical exercises still did not fully impress the fleet. It was a spectacular show, but meant little because the effectiveness of the attack was discounted. It was to need Pearl Harbor really to prove it more

than a show. Thus, "fleet

when

plans for 1928 winter maneuvers were sent out, the

problem" contemplated the usual "attack" on the Panama

Canal, rather than an effort to develop the air force. However,

Adm.

Reeves saw in the problem an opportunity to show his wares. Like other unit commanders, Reeves submitted his own "Estimate of the Situation," but proposed something new. He suggested that the Saratoga be detached from the attacking fleet, sent on a wide southerly detour to the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands, then run the gauntlet of the defending fleet by night for a dawn attack on the canal from a distance of 150 miles at sea. This assault was to pave the

way

for later fleet action.

When Adm.

Pratt,

commander

in chief, published his orders for

Adm. Reeves Adm. Pratt's flagship, the Calithe commander in chief in person.

the exercises, the Reeves plan was no part of them.

then flew to San Pedro, where lay

and put

fornia;

Adm.

his plan before

had prepared the original plan and would have to leave it in effect. However, he agreed that after the fleet had sailed, he would stop it at sea, change the orders, and send the Saratoga on her way. This he did. By curious circumstance, the only vessel in the fleet capable of escorting the Saratoga, Adm. Reeves's flagship, was the Pratt stated that his staff

that he

cruiser

Omaha,

rier task force

with the Fleet.

the

flagship of

Adm. Senn. Thus, the first effective carby Adm. Pratt comprised two flagships

created at sea

full staffs of

the aircraft and destroyer squadrons. Battle

Though Adm. Senn was

Omaha

senior to

over to Reeves and traveled

Adm. Reeves, he turned more or less as an "inter-

ested and enthusiastic observer."

The

forces defending

Panama included 35

the Saratogas sister Lex-

Wright and her squadrons, strong naval combined naval and army shore-based air defenses and the

ington, the seaplane tender forces,

Panama Canal. The Saratoga proceeded, with the Omaha in company, to the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands and at dawn, twenty-four hours beof the

fore the scheduled attack, started her run at 30 knots

nearly 1,000 nautical miles from Panama.

made

The

from a distance

was

daylight run

such squally weather that no scouts were launched until late afternoon. Then, when a section of single-seaters took off, they ran plump into the "enemy" destroyer Breck on the outer scouting in

hue. Before the scouts could drop their messages on deck (fighter

planes carried no radio then ) the Breck was in sight of the Saratoga. ,

Then ensued one

of those

minor incidents that sometimes play

vital

parts in war.

The

admiral, finding that the Omaha's fuel

was

insufficient to

permit her keeping station with the Saratoga through the night, had instructed her to slow down, and now faced the need of launching aircraft before dawn with no "plane guard" to pick up any aircraft that might land in the water. With this on his mind,

he heard the

we are the What shall

who was watching the "She acts as though she thinks

signal chief quartermaster,

Breck through his

glasses, remark,

friendly Lexington. She I tell

is

coming

in close for signals.

her?" Instantly, the admiral replied, "Tell her to

take a plane guard station astern." The Breck promptly obliged and was promptly "disabled" by the umpire before she could radio her discovery. The Saratoga's presence was not revealed. Just at dark, however, the cruiser Detroit commanded by Capt. R. Drace White appeared on the horizon astern. Knowing Adm. Reeves well, White had concluded the yet undiscovered Saratoga must be somewhere in the area and left his assigned station to reconnoiter it. The Omaha engaged her at once, but not before she reported the Saratoga to the defending fleet. Then, though officially "disabled," the Detroit trailed the Saratoga position

and movements

all

in plain English. In

Reeves's squadron leaders urged

him

to

night, reporting her

view of

this,

Adm.

launch aircraft at midnight,

four hours ahead of schedule, but he held to the original plan, fearing that any change might upset the dehcate timing. at 0400 he gave the signal, "Man your planes," and pilots streamed from the ready room onto the starht deck. The tropical

Then

36

night gave a

moved up

to

accustomed to it. The Detroit watch the show and gave a play-by-play account by little

light to eyes

radio, in plain English, to the defenders. Plane after plane took off into

the night with rings of blue flames from engine exhausts.

With running

rendezvoused with their squadron were assembled "wing and tail" in close formahghts were doused and the formation streamed toward the

leaders. tion,

lights on, they

When

all

distant Canal.

The plan of attack called for three separate groups approaching from different directions and arriving over enemy observation posts nearly simultaneously. The bombers were escorted by fighterbombers. If engaged by enemy fighters, they could drop their bombs and defend the heavy bombers. If not intercepted, they would dive-bomb and strafe the objectives and then protect the bombers as fighters. The carrier fighter-bombers were technically superior to the shore-based fighters in speed, climb, ceiling, and maneuverability, so that they could engage

The

attack

on favorable terms. went according to plan. The enemy was caught on

The formations returned to the carrier without incident when "waved off" because the deck was not ready, ran out of gas just before reaching the Saratogas stern, and landed in the water alongside, where the pilot was promptly the ground.

save that one fighter,

rescued.

The only

maneuver was that one of Adm. Pratt's supporting battleship divisions, whose task it was to interpose itself between the Saratoga and a division of defending battleships, arrived too late, and the Saratoga, standing on to recover aircraft, was officially "sunk." It was rumored that the navigator of the battleship division had misjudged the current off Cape Mala, hence the delay. At the critique held on shore later, Adm. Pratt characterized this exercise as the "most brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed" of his career, and did the Saratoga the honor of flying his flag on her on the return north. hitch in the whole

37

Aviation in the Fleet Exercises CAPT. ARCHIBALD D. TURNBULL, USNR LT. CDR. CLIFFORD L. LORD, USNR

AND

Adm. Pratt's bold gamble had given

carrier aircraft their first real

opportunity, and good advantage of this had been taken. fast carrier for

now

The

which Mustin, Whiting, and others had pleaded

occupied so definite a place that

all

existing plans for future

at sea must be revised to provide for it. Even those who regarded the battleship as the chief factor of fleet actions could not but admit the striking power of a properly handled air force, both offensively and defensively; and the report of Adm.

war still

Henry Wiley, commander

in chief,

of beating off air attacks, either

upon

emphasized the impossibiHty ships or

upon the

coastlines,

with anything but stronger aircraft. The admiral also stressed the fleet's need for numerous small carriers to replace the cruisers as scouts, a need made apparent by the diflBculty with which the cruisers, during the exercises, recovered their returning planes. If any further argument was neces-

was furnished by the exercises of 1930 in which the this time numbered with the "attackers," scored heavily against the defending battleships to show how suddenly command of the air might be seized and how much this command must affect the outcome of an action. These 1930 exercises brought up for particular study the "carrier sary, this

Lexingtons planes,

group," then for the

first

time defined as a complete tactical unit

one carrier, four cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons. Vice Adm. Carey Cole, commanding the defending ships in the game, raised several questions. Even with its great mobility, he asked, could such a group avoid attack by surface ships? Could it, especially at night, escape its enemy's torpedoes? What were its full possibilities as a means of reducing enemy strength before a major engagement, or as a means of holding control of the air long enough for its support to arrive and make that control complete? To all these questions Rear Adm. Frank Brumby, commander of the attacking aircraft, gave answers whoUy consisting, for example, of

38

in favor of the air arm, carrier groups, to

attacks

ahead of

and he urged the formation of numerous

be trained for independent but simultaneous

their supporting Battle Fleet.

In 1931 the games began with the assumption that "a Pacific power" was attacking both the Panama Canal and a hypothetical

Nicaragua Canal at a moment when the United States was doubtful about the neutrality of "a European power." This made it necessary to keep part of the United States Fleet off New England, but it left the two big carriers with the defenders in the south. The conditions and the course of the game were such that both carriers almost exhausted their fuel and thus became only 50 per cent effective against attackers who were able to land in two places and

Rear Adm. Reeves, commanding the striking force, was moved to comment that "the air force cannot stop the landing," but advance of battleships and prevent them from he did add that ships and planes were "mutually dependent," and establish air fields.

.

.

.

he admitted that the planes would "directly affect battleship design in the matter of maximum gun-range ... by means of airplane spotting." tions,

Adm.

found

it

Pratt,

by

this

"the consensus

defense against approaching

time ashore as chief of naval opera.

.

.

that air attack as a

fleets is of less

means

of

value than had been

commenting strongly upon the lack of effective methods of refueling carriers at sea, was also inclined to doubt the effectiveness of planes. The latter, however, when assignment as chief umpire of a later exercise gave him the opportunity to witness what he described as a "beautffuUy coordinated attack" upon the Saratoga by planes from the Lexington, modified his earlier views and called air operations "a demonstration of eflBcient training and of excellent material." An important feature of this efficient training had been demonstrated by the dive bombers in attacks against the radio-controlled Stoddert and the destroyers Marcus and Sloat. The vulnerability of such small craft became particularly plain when they were raked from close overhead with 50-caliber machine guns, whose shots penetrated decks and bulkheads; when 30-pound demolition bombs smashed searchlights, boats, and torpedo tubes. The conclusion was that bomber attacks, delivered with the viciousness of which the Navy's pilots were now capable, could be stopped only by much better shooting from many more antiaircraft guns than expected," while

Adm.

F. H. Schofield,

39

were then mounted by small or even by larger ships. Along similar the effect of aircraft upon the operations of submarines was

lines,

also

made apparent when

the subs, necessarily surfacing

when

they had scouting information to report by radio, found themselves promptly set upon by planes diving as falcons stoop to sparrows.

Here were more problems on the relation of planes to ships. Rear Adm. Yarnell, whose opinion gained weight as advancing rank broadened his responsibilities and emphasized his professional standing, took an active part in the study of the use of aircraft. After he had commanded the "Blue" aircraft in the 1932 games, he urged the importance to the fleet of more carriers. He estimated that any

plan to operate across the Pacific would necessitate the

having

fleet's

not eight carriers of the large type, in order to launch, from far out at sea, air attacks upon an enemy's shore at least six, if

bases of such severity as would force his ships out into a decisive

view was that of others who favored building many small carriers because the loss of one or two would have less effect upon command of the air, and these differing opinions action. Against his

led to further discussions

of

the best

way

to

protect

carriers,

large or small.

The

cruisers built at this time

under the Washington Treaty

requirements were certainly stronger guards than any destroyers could be but they were not at all satisfactory in their means for handling their own planes. In 1930, when Moffett had arrived in

London

one of the delegates to the conference called at the first ten years of "disarmament," he had found great interest displayed in the flight-deck cruiser, and the agreement finally reached had permitted the United States to build eight of these, at 10,000 tons each, provided none was adapted "exclusively as an aircraft carrier." It was the consensus that carriers were fully provided for in the 135,000 tons which the United States, after some argument no doubt based largely upon the ground that it as

end of the

had

utterly failed to build

mitted to keep as

was

its

up

to the old treaty strength,

was per-

allowance. This restriction on cruiser-carriers

particularly disappointing to the

Bureau

of Aeronautics

because

moment had in his desk the plans for a 30-knot armed with half a dozen 6-inch guns and eight 5-inch antiaircraft guns, and fitted to carry from 30 to 50 planes. Even if there were some delicacy about describing such ships as "cruisers" Moffett at that very

cruiser,

40

rather than as "carriers," MoJBFett wanted seven of them included in the building program; but the General Board would agree to no more than one flight-deck cruiser, recommending that the rest be

under the treaty of 1922 and demanding, Since even this

as originally designed

instead,

the building of another small carrier.

recommendation came to nothing, the Ranger, as finally laid down in 1931 and commissioned three years later, remained the only carrier of her size in the fleet.

Few

though they were, the

siderable experience,

some

of

it

carriers

afforded the pilots con-

of the

most practical kind. For

example, in 1931 the Lexington had been on hand for the Nicaragua

earthquake to fly doctors, nurses, medical supplies, and food into the devastated areas. This was very necessary support for the effort

Marine Corps, whose experience during four years of operations, from a dozen fields in Nicaragua built by themselves, ranged from the battle of Ocotal, July 17, 1927, said to be the first occasion when dive bombers were used against troops, to the carrying of mails, money, and the wounded. This cooperation between the marines and the carriers led, within the year, to the regular assignment of Marine Squadrons VS-14M and VS-15M to the Lexington of the

and Saratoga,

flying the

02U-1

plane,

41

first

of the Corsair series.

:

"The culmination carriers with their fleets.

On

the

of

year's

operations

squadrons participate

in the

arrives

when

the

annual cruise of the

these cruises, the year's efforts to perfect the detail of

major campaigns have been crowned

aircraft operations are given the test of simulated

Our

against possible enemies.

efforts in the past

with a certain amount of success, but every success has only indicated new possibilities of the employment of aircraft in fleet operations and has emphasized the vital importance of continuously operating with the fleet the maximum number of aircraft that can be carried on our surface vessels."— Rear Adm. J. M. Reeves, USN,

Commander,

Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, 1929.

Last of the Fleet Problems SCOT MACDONALD Rear Adm. Reeves described the year-long naval aviators as the twenties came to an end

training schedule of

gunnery exercises, the squadrons are emConcurrently with barked on the aircraft carriers and they participate in the monthly exercises with the fleet. These fleet exercises are arranged to present new and increasingly diflBcult problems to all arms of the fleet and to insure the effective coordination of these arms in major fleet operations and engagements. It is not suflBcient for one officer, commander. Aircraft Squadrons, to be proficient in effectively employing aircraft. This knowledge must be possessed by all flag officers. To this end, aircraft on the various carriers, and the carriers themselves, are assigned from .

time to time in fleet.

.

.

fleet exercises to

the various subdivisions of the

In part of a problem, the aircraft will cooperate with de-

stroyers; in another part, they operate offensively against destroyers;

in another part, they operate with

and against submarines; they

operate continually with battleships and these battleship planes

must continue their activities during the attack of "hostile" aircraft. This employment of aircraft on widely differing missions reacts

42

not only to the vast improvement of the air arm, but also and equally

with the

important,

it

possibilities

further the

acquaints

and

main mission

the

of the

officers

means

eflFective

fleet,

During Fleet Problem XIII, held

of

command rank

of employing aircraft to

the destruction of the enemy. in the Pacific-West Coast area

and attack, Four out of five submarines of one force, assigned scouting missions, were detected by land and carrier-based planes and "sunk." CO's of these submarines in 1932, the vulnerability of submarines to air detection at that time,

was

reported their

clearly demonstrated.

own

vulnerability

when

operating in an aircraft-

screened area.

problem were forced to exercise Rear Adm. H. E. Yarnell, who commanded the "U.S." aircraft during the exercise, noted Aircraft carriers assigned to the

in widely separated areas of the Pacific.

war in the Pacific, the number of aircraft on hand would be totally inadequate to meet the needs. Also, the admiral pointed out, this problem was not greatly dissimilar from all other problems conducted in the past, in that when one aircraft carrier was assigned to each of the forces in the war games, each of the forces invariably made the destruction of the other's carrier the prime tactic. This resulted in both forces losing their carriers early in the game. It was therefore obvious, he repeated, that the side with the greater number of carriers had a tremendous advantage. In time of war, this would be critical. He suggested that at least six or eight more aircraft carriers be added to the Navy's inventory. The next problem, XIV, was conducted in the same area the next year, 1933. Its conditions were that "during preparation for escorting an expeditionary force overseas in a campaign, an outlying possession was in danger of a raid, and important industrial, military, and mobilization centers of a long coast line were threatened by that in event of actual

carriers

carrier raids."

The Blue force was to protect the West Coast while Black was ordered to make at least one raid in the San Diego-San Pedro, San Francisco,

and Puget Sound

areas. Black divided its force into Northern Carrier Group was to raid San Francisco and then proceed to Puget Sound to the north. The Southern Carrier Group was to raid San Pedro and then San Francisco, rendezvousing later with Black's Support Group.

three groups.

Its

43

The first four days were uneventful. On the fifth day, a Lexingtonbased plane of the Northern Group spotted an enemy submarine, causing the carrier to change formation for the approach to the launching point of the raid. Weather worsened, forcing the suspension of flight operations. Early the next morning, as Lexington

warmed up

her planes, a Blue battleship was sighted at a 4,500-yard As the carrier tried to escape, a second enemy battleship

range.

came

into

view and the Northern Carrier Group was declared out between two enemy battleships at

of action, caught unexpectedly

close range.

The Southern

Carrier Group had better luck. On the seventh of the problem, Saratoga-hsLsed planes successfully launched the attack. Black reported that 12 scouts had attacked the oil refinery at Venice with 24 100-pound bombs, 5 scouts

day

attacked a powerhouse at Long Beach with 10 equally powerful bombs, encountering no enemy force and sustaining no losses. The force

3 bombers to the enemy, 2 fighters during an 18-bomber attack on an enemy transport, an oil field at El Segundo, and docks at Long lost

Beach. Saratoga sustained slight damage. The force moved north San Francisco raid. When she arrived in the San Francisco area, the Saratoga launched her planes. Before she completed, aircraft from the cruiser Richfor the

mond and

the carrier Langley

bombed her flight deck. After Saras planes returned from the raid, 37 per cent of her flight deck was assessed damaged, 36 planes lost, and her flight deck out of commission for 38 hours. The CV-2 aircraft had succeeded in making

dive-bombing attack on the Langley, temporarily disabling her flight deck, and attacked Crissy Field, San Francisco docks, San Andreas reservoir, and the dry-dock at Hunter's Point. This exercise underscored the urgent requirement for the development of better planes, particularly carrier bomber and torpedo a

planes.

Adm.

Yarnell again pleaded for three additional 18,000-ton

which were permitted under existing treaties. In the period 1933-34, the fleet conducted a series of 20 tactical exercises. The last three of these comprised Fleet Problem XV, which also proved the last of the war games of the three-carrier carriers

period.

In his

oflBcial

monograph Aviation 44

in the Fleet Exercises,

1911-

Eugene

Ely, flying a Curtiss biplane, takes off on his historic flight

deck of the

USS Birmingham, November

from the

14, 1910.

Ely landing on the improvised deck of the battleship Pennsylvania, January San Francisco bay.

18, 1911,

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Ely and his flying machine on the USS Pennsylvania.

Close-up view of Ely's landing on the deck of the Pennsylvania.

Two

views of the USS Langley. Called the "Covered Wagon," she was commissioned March 20, 1922, having been converted from the old navy collier Jupiter.

^So,

A Corsair landing

I

on the

jiight

deck of the Langley.

A« >.L.»
ytwf y*»P«»«»^ ^

•

J-W*

.Va-

on the deck of the USS Saratoga, January 11, 1928. Pilot is Lt. Cdr. Marc Mitscher, later famous as the admiral in command of fast carrier First landing

task forces in

World War

II.

Aerial view of

USS Lexington and USS Saratoga

at

anchor

off

Honolulu

in

1933.

Launching of the USS Ranger

at

'Newport News, Va. She was the

ship designed as an aircraft carrier from the keel up.

first

U.S.

Samuel P. Langleys aerodrome poised on houseboat launching platform in Octo-

its

ber of 1903, just before it crashed on take-off.

First aircraft ever cat-

apulted from a moving ship

is

shown

in

1915 photo. Pilot was Lt. Cdr. H. Musthis

who flew this AB-2 seaplane from the USS North Carolina. tin

^int^

First cruiser modification,

showing planes on catapult

built

on stern of a

cruiser. r

\

A

Curtiss pusher-type airplane on

its

catapult at Annapolis,

Md.

The USS Saratoga making

the icoihl

s

'speed reeeid fer bii^

34.99 knots.

The USS Lexington

at

Tacoma, Wash,

in

1929.

.v/;//;.v

in

1928

:

1939, historian Lt. Cdr. James

M. Grimes, USNR, described the

war games "The primary eflFort of the commander them up had been to introduce reahsm into late as nearly as possible actual

in chief

when drawing

and to simuwartime operations. For this reason, fleet tactics

the opposing fleets represented actual navies of the period. Carrier operations were extensive throughout the problem.

.

.

.

"There were several important results of Fleet Problem XV as regards the development of Naval Aviation. The most important, perhaps, was the realization brought out by air operations during the problem, that if the carrier was to be the offensive weapon it was considered to be, carrier-based planes would have to be so

armed that they could carry the offensive to the enemy. "It was seen that planes carrying 100-pound bombs were obsolete and of little use against an enemy force equipped with planes capable of carrying 500- and 1000-pound bombs. The commander in chief, in his remarks at the critique held on Fleet Problem XV, stated that at least three-fourths of the carrier-based planes should

be so equipped." U.S.S. Ranger joined the fleet for the next war game. Fleet Problem XVI, conducted in 1935. Actually, this game consisted of five separate exercises, none of them related, spread over the Pacific from the Aleutians to Midway, to Hawaii. Both the Army and Coast Guard participated. The major air operations took place during the third phase of the problem. Unfortunately, these were marred by a series of plane and personnel casualties that, unfortunate in themselves, also seriously affected later air and sea operation. Although valuable experience was obtained in mass flight of patrol squadrons, nothing of significance developed in the operation of aircraft carriers. Fleet Problem XVII was conducted in the Panama-Pacific area in 1936. The exercises (again five) saw extensive use of patrol planes and the effective use of automatic pilot, but there was no major

contribution

design or

to,

or effect on, the evolution of carriers, either in

tactics.

The question of proper employment of aircraft carriers was brought up again in Fleet Problem XVII of 1937: Should they 45

operate with the main body of a

fleet or

should they operate at a

distance? Black's aircraft commander held that a carrier tied down to a slow main body formation was certain to be destroyed. "Once an enemy carrier is within striking distance of our fleet," he said, "no

security remains until

it, its

squadrons, or both, are destroyed, and

our carriers, if with the main body, are at a tremendous initial disadvantage in conducting necessary operations." But his force commander took a different view. He felt that carriers should his

decision to

He

problem.

be an integral part of the main body and defended employ them in such a way, as he did in this

suggested that Ranger, because of her small size

could provide scouting and spotting with

He hoped

detected.

that

less

when Yorktown and

chance of being

Enterprise joined the

such an employment of Ranger might be possible. Fleet Problem XIX was the last on the Ranger phase of the war games. It was conducted in 1938 and consisted of Parts II, V, and

fleet,

XI

Annual Fleet Exercises.

of the

In the

first

phase, the outstanding performance was a long-range

San Diego-based patrol plane bomber attack which successfully eliminated Lexington as a carrier unit in the game.

The notable development

of the second phase of the

war game.

Part V, was the attack on Pearl Harbor, launched from Saratoga

some 1,000 miles over Lahaina

off

area,

the coast of Oahu. Sara's recon. group flew

photographing beaches

and reporting the

enemy's strength there.

At the same time, Sara sent an attack group which bombed Fleet Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Wailupe Radio Station, and returned to the carrier. This tactic was to be employed by the Japanese some three years later, in December 1941. In phase three (Part XI), the outstanding air operation was an unopposed air attack by Lexington- and Saratoga-based planes launched against Mare Island and Alameda. "Excellent experience was provided in planning and executing a fast carrier task force against shore objective," says Grimes. "The problem of defending a coast line, or even an isolated portion thereof, against fast enemy raiding forces equipped with large carriers and protected by powerful surface ships was seen to be one difficult of solution." Air Base,

46

Yorktown and Enterprise entered into the 1939 exercises of Fleet Problem XX, which were conducted in the Caribbean area and oflF the northeast coast of South America. The war games entered their final phase. Neither Langley nor Saratoga participated. As a result of this game, reports indicated that carrier operations reached a new peak of efficiency; particular credit was given the two new carriers which, despite inexperience, contributed significantly to the success of the problem. These exercises studied employment of planes and carriers in connection with convoy escort, development of coordinating measures between aircraft and destroyers for antisubmarine defense, attack on mobile patrol plane bases, scouting and attack by patrol planes, defense of surface ships against aircraft attack, and trial of various forms of evasion tactics against attacking aircraft and submarines. The last war game, XXI, was played in 1940 in the HawaiianPacific area. It consisted of two separate exercises. Historian Grimes describes them:

The

first

exercise

was designed

to

afford training in

making

estimates and plans; in scouting and screening; in the coordination of various types of fighting units; in employing standard dispositions;

and

finally to train the

and

fleet

opposing forces in decisive

engagement. The second major exercise of the problem was designed to afford training in scouting, screening, communications, coordination of types, protection of a convoy, seizure of advanced bases and finally, decisive engagement.

Between the two major parts of the problem were two minor which air operations played a major part: Fleet Joint Air Exercise 114A and Fleet Exercise 114. Exercise 114A underscored the need for greater cooperation between the Army and Navy in organizing the defense of the Hawaiian area. Exercise 114 compared patrol plane attacks on surface units with use of planes in high altitude tracking. The former proved the planes vulnerable, while the latter met with great success. Few new difficulties emerged from this war game. Reiterated was the question of latitude given carrier commanders by force commanders. Yorktown' s commanding officer stated his belief that success could best be achieved when aircraft personnel in carriers exercises in

47

operated under a broad directive. The exercise proved again— as it did in Fleet Exercise 114— that low-level horizontal bombing attacks had little chance of success— especially against a ship that was not otherwise engaged. By 1940, the war games were halted. Although one was planned

worsening of world tensions caused their cessation. Various tactical exercises were held instead. Naval aviation grew with the war games. The first phase— the pre-aircraft carrier years— employed "constructive" carriers and merely indicated to the Navy the potentials of this new weapon. The Langley phase was an informative one, but this was more an experimental ship than an aircraft carrier. The games reached fruition with the addition of the Lexington and Saratoga in Fleet Problem IX. It saw the employment of an aircraft carrier as a for the next year,

separate striking force and introduced a

new

tactic in the

book of

naval strategy. The Ranger phase showed the potentials of small aircraft carriers,

And

employed with

telling effect in

World War

II.

the final phase, the addition of the Yorktown and EnterprisSy

increased and refined carrier operations in the critical years prior to

World War

11.

48

PART

TWO

THE CARRIER GOES TO WAR Introduction United States carrier aviation faced the moment of truth, all-out Navy had acquired its first aircraft carrier. It met the test squarely by taking immediate global war, only nineteen years after the oflFensive action and, eflForts,

continued

fleet striking

its

while neutralizing further Japanese expansion rapid buildup to become the spearhead of

power.

The spearhead that led the way, after Coral Sea and Midway to Guadalcanal, up the ladder to Tarawa and Kwajalein, to Saipan and the Phihppines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and finally to Japan itself. The United States found itself squarely between two wars which, pohtically and geographically, had httle in common other than an enemy combine, the Axis. Naval carrier operations in the Atlantic were primarily concerned with the protection of convoys carrying war munitions, reinforcements, and other suppHes to Europe and North Africa, with participation in amphibious operations hmited to three engagements. The war in the Pacific was a matter of stopping an enemy advance that had pushed southward from the home islands of Japan and which threatened to enslave the peoples and territories all the way to Austraha. Carrier air then had the bitterly-contested task of loosening the enemy's grip so that surface

and land forces could begin the long

The country was hardly ready

The Navy and 1 small

air arms could muster only 7 large 5 patrol wings and 2 Marine aircraft wings, 5,900

and Marine Corps aircraft carriers,

trek northward.

for either campaign.

and 21,678 enlisted men, 5,233 aircraft of all types including trainers, and a few advanced air bases. But aided by its distance from the enemy and fortunate in its industrial power, the United States built the ships, planes, and equipment, and trained the pilots

49

and air forces that ultimately beat down the enemy, drove him from strategically located bases, cut oflF his raw materials, and placed the Allied forces in position to launch final air and amphibious offensive against his homeland— offensives that were made unnecessary as the awesome destructive power of the atom was released over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For the first time in history, naval engagements were fought entirely in the air without opposing surface forces sighting each other. Advances in technology, particularly in electronics, improved the defense and added power to the offense. The scientist contributed directly to the war effort in both the development of specialized equipment and in the application of scientific principles to operational tactics. Logistics took on new importance. Refueling and replenishment at sea were developed to a high art and increased the mobility and staying power of fleet forces. In the course of the war. Navy and Marine aircraft alone destroyed over 15,000 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground, and without any assistance from other agents sank 161 Japanese warships totaling over 725,000 tons, 447 Japanese merchant ships of better than 1,500,000 tons, and in the Atlantic destroyed 63 German submarines. It was a creditable record, but the Navy's air arm did not play an entirely independent role. It operated as it had deland, sea,

veloped, as an integral part of naval forces, contributing

share to the power of the fleet and to the achievement of in controlling the sea.

50

its

its

full

mission

World War

II, like the harbingers of spring, were Europe every day as the 1930's reached mid-decade. In the United States the new breed of Naval officersline and aviation qualified— were busily engaged in trying to convince their superiors that more hulls were needed to support flight decks if we were to effectively meet the threat of a two-ocean war. Time, as usual, was a determining factor. It was argued, therefore, that several smaller carriers could be constructed from

The heralds

of

becoming more apparent

in

scratch or that ships already afloat could be converted, in the time that one large carrier could be

made

ready.

Cdr. Dater discusses the issue from firsthand experience during active wartime duty and as Head, Naval Aviation History and Research Section, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1946 to 1952.

Small Carrier Concept LT. CDR. H. M. DATER,

USNR

As EARLY AS 1925 the Navy's General Board considered

briefly

rejected the conversion of 10,000-ton cruisers to hght carriers.

years later Lt.

but

Two

Cdr. Bruce G. Leighton, aide to the Assistant

Secretary of the

Navy

for Aeronautics, prepared a study of the

possible uses of smaller carriers. In addition to protection of the

he suggested their suitabihty for antisubmarine warfare, reconnaissance, and reduction of enemy shore bases. Nothing came directly from these speculations, except as they influenced the design of Ranger authorized in 1928 and the first ship of the United States Navy built as a carrier from the keel up. From the time it joined the fleet in 1934, Rangers usefulness was limited by its comparatively slow speed. Other carriers built prior to World War II were all smaller than the Lexington and Saratoga but possessed comparable top speeds. They were the Yorktown and Enterprise, sister ships commissioned in 1937 and 1938 respectively, and the Wasp, commissioned in 1940, and the Hornet, which was still on its battle line,

shakedown

cruise

when the hostiHties began. 51

Although the concept of the small the reports and recommendations

throughout the after the

thirties,

war broke out

carrier continued to

of

various

fleet

appear in

commanders

nothing was done along these lines until in Europe in 1939. Early the following

Adm.) W. F. Halsey, Jr., commanding became alarmed over the possibility that at the very time carriers might be needed for operations, there would also develop a requirement for decks on which to train replacement pilots and to transport Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft year,

Rear Adm.

(later Fit.

the carriers in the Pacific,

He urged that merchant vessels be converted for and expressed the view that the conversion should not "proceed with a view to producing a first-class military vessel." This suggestion was favorably received in Washington, where the authorities from the President down were already worried about the submarine problem. The British had shown that shore-based aircraft could be effective in curbing submarine activity in the sea approaches but that there existed wide stretches in the mid-Atlantic where German U-boats could operate without aerial interference. Since there would be httle danger of enemy air attack and because the carriers would operate in conjunction with slow moving convoys, there was no need for the ships to have the military characteristics and speed of combat carriers. At a White House meeting on January 17, 1941 at which representatives of the Maritime Commission as well as the Navy were present, it was agreed to go ahead with the conversion of small (6,000-8,000 ton) merchant vessels. Beginning on March 4, the Navy in less than three months equipped the C-3 cargo ship Mormacmail with flight deck and minimum facilities for handling aircraft. It emerged from the yard on June 2 as the U.S.S. Long Island, the first of more than 100 escort carriers turned out by American shipyards for the United States and British to distant bases.

these purposes

navies.

The years between wars had taught the Navy much about carriers. Aboard the Langley the techniques of carrier flying had been worked out. After Lexington and Saratoga had joined the fleet, commanders had experimented widely with tactics and investigated the possibilities of the single large carrier as the center of a striking force or as an element in the support of surface vessels, but httle

experience had been gained in operating two or more carriers together. Sufficient ships

had not been 52

available. In

June 1941, the

commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, drew up emergency war plans which showed the existing concepts of the proper use of carriers. Of the three assigned to his fleet, one was to operate with the battle force to protect

the cruisers for

and support the heavy ships, another was to join scouting purposes, and the third was to be the

center of a striking force with the primary mission of raiding bases. In retrospect, this dispersion appears to

enemy

have been highly

dangerous. Actually, the situation as

On

it

developed made

the morning of

December

it

necessary to dis-

1941 a skillfully executed carrier attack on Pearl Harbor temporarily put the great card these plans.

number

of battleships out of action.

7,

Fortunately,

none

of

the

time and so upon them fell the burden of checking the enemy advance in the months that followed. During the crucial period from Pearl Harbor through the Battle of Midway, carriers

was

in

Hawaii

at the

the three carriers assigned the Pacific Fleet, plus two others hastily

more than 180,000 miles, and fought two decisive battles that

transferred from the Atlantic, steamed carried out

numerous

raids,

turned the course of war.

53

The

of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941 by Japanese Empire has etched a permanent record on man's emotional history as a dastardly deed. As a military attack, devoid of political and sociological aspects, it must be cast

attack

on Oahu, Territory

aerial elements of the

in

a completely different role. success, while temporary, was almost overwhelming. IF our

It's

carriers

had been

in Pearl

Harbor and IF their fate had been war in the Pacific might have .

similar to that of our battleships, the

lasted years longer.

Actually, the Japanese could be thankful to

many Americans

and the plan of attack. Gen. Billy Mitchell, martyred proponent of air power, had predicted just such a course of action

for the idea

many

years before.

And

for several fleet exercises of the late 20's

and early 30's similar attacks were either attempted or executed. To some, December 7, 1941, will remain a mystery forever. For our purposes,

it

And

is sufficient

to explain briefly

how

the operation

be thankful that the Japanese were not capable of follow-up action. And that our carriers were at sea.

took place.

The

to

Battle Christening of Carriers CAPT. JOSEPH

A.

SKIERA, USAF

The PLANES came from

the northwest of the island of Oahu, the major bastion of our mihtary and naval forces in the Hawaiian Islands. Boldly emblazoned on wings and fuselage were circular red insignia; the aircraft insignia of Japan, which would later be referred to as "meatballs."

With wing guns beating out

a staccato of death and destruction, opening the way for the greater destructive power of bombs and torpedoes, they flashed across the airfields of Ewa, Hickam, Kaneohe, Wheeler, and other island runway complexes. But their major attack was against the might of the U.S. Navy, Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor. Weaving an intricate pattern, with the precision attained through lengthy practice sessions and aided,

54

by espionage reports blueprinting ship anchorages, devastation of unprecedented proportions was dehvered upon the hulls of our ships lying calmly at anchor on what had been a peaceful, beautiful Sunday morning. The date, of course, was December 7, 1941. However, as successful as the attack was generally regarded, one flaw in its planning and execution proved to be a turning point in the war. The aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet were not in Pearl superbly,

Harbor.

(CV-3), just out of overhaul, was moored at San Diego; Lexington (CV-2) was at sea, about 400 miles southeast of Midway Islands, westernmost islands in the Hawaiian chain, preparing to deliver a Marine scout bombing squadron to this vital outpost. However, when the message announcing the attack on Saratoga

was received the task force reversed course and steamed for Pearl Harbor. The launch of the Marine aircraft was disregarded in the wake of the changed circumstances. Air searches were immediately launched from the Lexington but in a southerly direction, due to conflicting reports, and no contact with the enemy ships was made. Enterprise (CV-6) was also at sea, about 200 miles west of Oahu, returning from Wake Island after dehvering the men and planes of a Marine fighter squadron. Scouting Squadron 6, was launched early Sunday morning to land at Ewa, a short distance west of Pearl Harbor. As they approached Oahu, they sighted bursts of antiaircraft fire and, much to their surprise, met Japanese planes. Without hesitation, although flying slower, less maneuverable aircraft, they engaged the newly declared enemy in aerial combat. Five of the eight planes sent into the air by the "Big E" were shot down by the Japanese or our own ground fire. The Enterprise remained at sea and conducted an exhaustive

Oahu

installations

search for the

enemy

fleet,

but without success.

The loss of one or more of these ships on December 7 would have allowed the Japanese to proceed v^th impunity in their drive to the south and east, and would have undoubtedly prolonged the Pacific War for many months, if not years. It would have permitted consolidation of enemy forces through uninhibited reinforcement of garrisons, while, at the same time, would have permitted the buildup of aircrews and planes throughout the growing area of conquest, 55

many of both elements, made by the carriers.

rather than losing so strikes

soon to be

The

effect of not neutralizing

Saratoga, in retrospect, rolled

down

was

in the retaliatory

the Enterprise, Lexington, and

similar to that of a snowball being

a mountainside, growing

its

way

to the bottom.

and damage

The

on island installations, by carriers, so soon after the attack on Oahu, was not in the planning the Japanese had done to expand the empire in Southeast Asia and points en route. Retaliation, on a limited scale to be sure, began almost immediately. On December 10, aircraft from the Enterprise attacked and sank the Japanese submarine 1-170 in waters north of the Hawaiian Islands. The 1-170 was one of the submarines used to scout the Hawaiian area prior to the December 7 attack. It was the first Japanese combatant ship sunk by United States forces in loss

of trained aircrews, planes, ships,

World War

inflicted

II.

Three weeks

after the Saratoga

was forced

to retire for repairs

from a submarine, 500 miles southwest of Oahu on January 11, Adm. William F. "Bull" Halsey, aboard Enterprise, and Rear Adm. F. J. Fletcher, with his flag on Yorktown, led their respective Task Forces 8 and 17 in the aerial bombing and ship bombardment of enemy installations in the Marshall and Gilbert after a torpedo hit,

Islands.

These surprising attacks upon the enemy's newly gained "front terrific blow to the morale of Japan's leaders, since assumed United States striking power was crippled into they taking defensive actions only. Casualties, loss of materials, and damage to bases, while not of major significance, were sufiicient enough to result in precipitous changes of plans by the Japanese. Once again, on February 24, the Enterprise, flying Halsey's flag, and escorted by a cruiser and destroyer screen, lashed back at the Japanese forces. The target this time was Wake Island. Like a football team engaged in practice scrimmages, but with a much greater sense of urgency and seriousness, Halsey's task force continued its quick-strikes against enemy-occupied territory. On March 4, he moved the Enterprise within 1,000 miles of Japan to launch air strikes against tiny, tiiangular-shaped Marcus door" were a

Island.

Another carrier attack, launched from Lexington and Yorktown

56

in the Gulf of Papua, flew over the

15,000-foot

Owen

Stanley

Mountains on the tip of New Guinea to bomb, torpedo, and strafe Japanese shipping engaged in landing men and materials at Lae and Salamaua. Sunk, in the rapier-like thrust, were a light cruiser, a minesweeper, and a cargo ship. Other large vessels suffered damage to varying degrees and many light ships were beached by their captains in an effort to avoid off-shore destruction.

57

April 1942

men

fighting

was witness

to

one of the

in action as the

finest

Navy and

the

examples of American Army Air Force com-

bined their talents— men and equipment—for the first attack on the Japanese homeland. ". their flight was one of the most courageous deeds in all military history. For those crews to make that dangerous takeoff, fly 650 miles over stormy water in land planes, fight their way across .

.

an aleHed and viciously defended area, and fly 1,400 miles more to an inadequate landing airfield in strange country— all that took guts ." a lot of 'em and Adm. William F. Halsey, USN Commander, Tokyo Raid Task Force .

.

.

.

.

Aboard the Hornet CAPT. TED W. LAWSON, EDITED BY BOB CONSIDINE

An American

aircraft carrier

was underneath

us.

Three of our

were already on its deck. landed and taxied over to the side where Doolittle and York were beckoning to us. I rolled back my window and looked B-25's

We

down

at them.

"Is everything

okay?" Doolittle asked.

I said everything was.

"Taxi

off

the field and park at the edge of the Hornet's wharf.

you

They'll take care of

As soon out

all

our gas,

after our

there," Doolittle said.

Navy boys jumped all over us. They drained except a few gallons. One of the boys got in,

as I did, the

crew got

out.

An Army "donkey" hooked

the Ruptured

Duck's main gear and towed it down the pier. We walked down after it and then watched the claws of a big crane reach down and pick up our ship as if it weighed ten pounds. The crane swung it

slowly up on the deck of the Hornet.

We

were standing

there,

watching 58

this,

when Lieutenant

Miller

came up

to

me and

know where

don't

said,

"Don't

nodded and kept looking

I

I can't

sides.

that

describe the feeling

Maybe

it

the thing

was a

tell

the

anything.

They

She was a great

sight.

Navy boys

you're going." at the Hornet.

standing there, looking up at her

I got,

was

I felt

fine feeling to

just plain patriotism. All I

know

that she

know

is

was there and ready

to help us.

Sixteen planes all

had been

lucky.

The Navy had spaced them out

over the deck of the Hornet, placed blocks under the wheels

and now were tying the planes to the flight deck. We all stood up on deck, not knowing quite what to do. After a while a couple of tugs nuzzled up to the Hornet and pulled us away from the pier. I looked around the bewildering ship and finally found my quarters. I shared a compact little room with two ensigns, one of them a big, hearty fellow named "Nig" White. We began moving the next morning at 9 o'clock. That first day I wandered through the ship with the rest of the Army fellows, figuring out

how

not to get

to get us to tell

We just looked The Navy

The Navy boys kidded

them where we were

wise, as

flyers

over the deck.

lost.

We

if

going. But

us a

lot,

trying

we were mum.

we knew.

were very interested took them

all

in the B-25's

sprawled

all

over our planes, bragging like

how fast and how far they could go. We were awful proud of our planes. The Navy boys returned the favor by taking us below decks and showing us their dive bombers, torpedo planes, and fighters. Their wings were folded and, naturally, they were cooped up because our ships took up all the space on the flight deck. I wondered a httle how the Hornet would protect itself. It was late that afternoon that I realized we weren't alone. Looking around, I began to see more and more warships until finally I could see cruisers and destroyers. The word Japan was mentioned oflBcially for the first time the next morning. Doolittle called us together in the empty mess hall and all of us sensed that now we'd know. He cleared his throat and said, "For the benefit of those of you who don't already know, or who have been guessing, we are going straight to Japan. We're going to bomb Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya. The Navy is going to take us in as close as is advisable, and, of course, we're going to take off from the deck." kids about

59

when planes. off

the meeting broke up,

Some

of the boys

all

of us drifted instinctively to our

walked along the

flight deck,

measuring

the alarmingly short distance between the island— the ship's

superstructure rising from starboard amidship— and the bow.

we

You

be told that we'd be able to use only about there wouldn't be any place to put the sixteen parked planes, except to squeeze them in together on the stern. Even then we figured that they'd take up nearly half the deck. So the boys who were pacing off the probable distance we'd have for a takeoff were measuring from the middle of the island to the bow. And scratching their heads at the end of their pacing. We began to reahze just how incredibly well planned the mission was the following day. At the meeting, Doolittle introduced us to two naval oflBcers— Lt. Cdr. Stephen Jurika and Cdr. Apollo Soucek, executive ofiBcers of the Hornet. Jurika had been naval attache at the U.S. Embassy at Tokyo and now he gave us the first of a series' of lectures. It seemed curious at first, but soon I could see how much we needed it. He spoke on the history of Japan and China. He went into detail about the political setups of the countries, told us of the differences between Chinese and Japanese, described the various modes of dress and uniforms we might encounter and physiological see,

didn't

half the deck.

have

We

to

knew

differences.

We worked hard on the Hornet, day and night. something

to

do

or test around the plane.

At

There was always

night,

when our bunch

would work inside the ship, we'd put up cardboard over the windows of the Ruptured Duck in deference to the blackout on the ship. In addition, there was a lot of studying. Doolittle placed Davey Jones in charge of our map room. Davey put us to work early on the job of memorizing cities and geographical landmarks along the course we planned to use on the raid. He also had dozens of aerial photographs of the five Japanese cities marked out to be bombed, and told us to get an indelible picture of them in our minds. All of us got a scare, the third day out, that we'd miss the raid. The Navy boys came out with buckets of white paint and drew a line along the port side, two or three yards in from the edge. We heard that Doolittle had decided to send one of the planes back to the Mainland with a message. The message couldn't be sent any other way because the Hornet was observing radio silence. I tried 60

much as possible, and so did the the guide of the plane ordered be others. The to take off. It was easy to figure out that the left wheel of the unlucky B-25 selected would have to keep on that line. In order to to

keep out of

Doolittle's sight as

hne, of course,

was

to

clear the island with the tip of the right wing, the fuselage of the

plane had to be quite far over to the left, and the left wing would extend out over the edge of the ship. Our fears subsided after the line was drawn. A Navy blimp came us, hovered over the deck, dropped us some stuff, and presumably took back the necessary messages that had to be transmitted to the Mainland. It was a relief to know that I hadn't gone through all that training just to become a messenger boy. We went over heavily detailed maps of the city of Tokyo with Jurika. "I know that town hke a book," he'd say, and give us the

over to

location of this or that factory or plant. Finally,

we

selected three

on a reasonably straight line and close together, and we began the long job of memorizing their characteristics. We were going to be able to take a few maps along with us, but no pictures, and there were to be no lines or erasures of ours showing on the maps, for fear that if they were captured it might in some way lead the Japs back to the Navy. At the next meeting, in answer to a question, Doolittle said that there would be no bombing of the palace. He said it wasn't worth targets

a plane factory or a steel smelter or a tank farm.

We

our ships, guns, instruments, charts, maps, pictures, and lectures only to eat and sleep. The Navy fattened us up like conleft

demned men. Most

of us gained weight and very few of us were There was too much to think about. We swung readily into the Navy routine. Twice a day over the loudspeakers would come the command, "General quarters! Man your battle stations!" It usually came just before dawn and at dusk. Wherever we were and whatever we were doing, we'd scramble up the ladders and passageways and take our posts. We were more than spectators at these drills. Doolittle had told us in one of the meetings that if we were attacked from the air we would have to get our planes off the deck in a hurry, and, with that in mind, we always knew just where we were and the direction and distance of the closest friendly land. If we were attacked by a surface seasick.

61

a

vessel, particularly at

long range,

we were

to leave the planes

where

they were and depend on the Hornet's guns and the heavier guns of the

accompanying warships.

Early in April, north of Hawaii, our force was joined by other de-

and cruisers. We were now a sizable task force. proceeded slowly west. The weather turned very bad

stroyers

We

just

One of our own shijps became partially cripmake better than six knots. The Navy worked

after the rendezvous.

pled and could not

on

for three days

it

and added keenly

to our ever-increasing respect

Navy. Once, while in motion, a heavy wave swept over one and washed a man overboard. Our loud-speaker system immediately and dispassionately bawled at the ship, "You've lost a for the

of our ships

Man overboard!" "Okay, Hornet" the voice of the ship answered, and a destroyer fished him out well behind us as we kept going. The weather was so rough at this time that once, in checking over the instrument board of the Ruptured Duck, I noticed that the rise man!

and dip

of the

Hornet would

affect

our altimeter as

much

as

200

feet.

The days were crowded with briefings, tinkering and practice for the gunners. The Hornet let out kites behind the ship to give our men practice shooting at them. The Hornet had no way of using its which may

planes,

or

may not have

accounted for the frequent

firing

its guns. Its "Chicago pianos," those multi-barreled pom poms, gave out with the darnedest musical scale you ever heard— grim broken chord of three or four sharp notes. Hornet gunners would pour a perfect curtain of fire into the sky. Other ships frequently tried their guns, too, to add to the growing tension. Cruisers cata-

practice of

pulted scout planes for long trips to

all

sides of our force, while

we

worked. Working on the plane one day with all this going on, I suddenly realized how much it was all costing. It made me want to carry out

Our

my

end.

task force

Hornet.

We

was

in the

command

got a good look at

of

him on the

Adm.

Halsey, aboard the

fifteenth.

He came

out to

pose for Navy newsreel men, along with Doolittle and a row of the bombs we were going to use. All of us crowded around to watch the

show.

Naval oflBcers who had been decorated by the Japanese during the peace years had turned in their medals after Pearl Harbor. Someone, I don't know who, thought it would be a It

was very

interesting.

62

good idea to tie the medals to the bombs we were going to drop. So they were brought along on the Hornet. Halsey tied one on to one of the fat 500-pounders, for the benefit of the newsreels, and then he turned that good, tough face to us and said, "Boys, return these medals with interest. Good hunting." I went to Doolittle one day toward the end and told him that I had been figuring our probable gas consumption and asked him if I

could carry twenty-five five-gallon cans in the plane instead of the had allotted us. I told him I realized that the extra gas would

ten he

pounds a gallon but that I was sure my ship could take it. "No," he said. "Your tail might get sluggish with that extra 450 pounds in there. It might start whipping around, and there's not going to be a lot of room to do that. The first important thing you've got to do is get off this deck. If you can't do that, well, we will have wasted a lot of time and money." We had our orders about discarding the five-gallon cans. "I don't want you to throw them out as they're used," Doolittle told us in a meeting when that question came up. "If you do, it will leave a perfect trail for the Japanese to foUow back to the carrier. Use up the stuff in the cans first, of course, but save them and dump them all together. The Navy has been great to us. Let's show our appreciation in whatever way we can. "Another thing: If any of you men are foolish enough to carry anything that might lead the enemy back to the Navy, in case you're forced down and captured, get rid of it now." That was the day I gave back the ash tray one of the Navy boys had made for me, with the word Hornet on it. Incidentally, that was the only spelling out of the name I saw on the entire ship, except on the dried-up hornet's nest that hung in the wardroom. The time was getting near. We were going to take off during the evening of Sunday, April 19, come in over our cities in the dark and fly the rest of the way during the remainder of the night, landing after dawn in China. Our carrier would turn back and escape during the night. And, with the time drawing near, Doolittle was as restless for action as any of us. He inspected all of our planes. Lt. Don Smith, of Belle Fourche, South Dakota, had additional headaches. Smitty's right engine cracked a high blower on the sixteenth while he was testing it. The Navy was ready for that, among many other things. Navy carpenters built a platform up to the engine, mechanics

weigh

six

63

took the big power plant shops, fixed

On

it

and put

it

off in a hurry, sent it

down

to the

machine

back on Smitty's wing.

April 17, which turned out to be our last full day on the

Hornet, our rear gun turret went bad.

We

on the turret, appreciating more than ever how much we'd have to depend on it. Japanese planes would certainly attack us, we felt, and our rear guns were our main protection. As we worked, the tension mounted on the ship. The Hornet was pulhng away from the force, accompanied by spray-spouting cruisers and knifing destroyers. The carrier shuddered with new power and we plunged deeper and deeper into Japanese-controlled waters. We were a little more than 1,000 miles off Japan now. We were coming into the homestretch, and everybody knew it. We worked on and cursed the turret. I slept from about 10 o'clock until battle stations the next dawn— which regrettably and unexpectedly turned out to be the day of the raid. That was April 18. After battle stations early that morning I went back to the room to wait for breakfast. That's when it happened. First there was a muflBed, vibrating roar, followed immediately by the husky cry of battle stations. "Nig" jumped for the door and I went right after him. We were three decks down. Scrambling after "Nig" as fast as I could, I found other Army boys racing for the top. We flung questions at one another, but got no answers. And twice before I could get up on top, the Hornet vibrated and echoed with the sound of heavy gunfire nearby. I got out on the flight deck and ran around a B-25 just in time to see the cruiser off to our left let go another broadside of flame in the direction away from us. And presently, down near the horizon, a low-slung ship began to give off an ugly plume of black smoke. Dive bombers were wheeling over it. I must have asked two dozen questions in one minute. One of the Navy boys, hurrying past, said it was a Japanese patrol boat and that our gunnery had accounted for it within three minutes after en-

worked

like fools

gaging.

me above the bellow of the sound of the wind and the cries of excited, jubilant men. I turned and saw it was "Nig." He was racing back over the route we had covered just a few minutes before. I was on his heels, saying nothing. This was it, and before we "Let's

go!"

somebody yelled

at

cruiser's guns, the crashing sea, the

64

a

We'd have

now. Not Sunday evening. Now, Saturday morning. We were forced to assume that the Japanese ship had had time to flash the warning about us. All hope of surprising the Japanese had now fled, I thought. Surprise was our main safety factor, Doolittle had often drummed into our heads. We had no way of knowing that no warning was sent. Apparently the ship either did not see the B-25's spread all over the deck of the Hornet, or just couldn't beHeve that it was possible, or maybe

wanted

it.

to take

oJBF

Navy sank it too soon. The Hornet leaped forward, boring a hole in the head wind. I could feel its turbines take up a faster beat and felt that it was the

straining forward as fast as

it

could, to get us a minute closer—

gallon nearer. I felt this, too: that our Navy had done all that it could— and it had done it in a way that made a fellow proud of belonging to the same country. I thought of Halsey with that tough jaw jutting out, standing high up in the island of the Hornet, and I wondered, as I began stufiing something in my bag, how long it would take the long-range Japanese bombers to come out after our carrier. Now we were going to take off about 800 miles off the coast. It took some figuring— quick figuring. And the sums I arrived at, in my buzzing head, gave me a sudden emptiness in the stomach. I thought of the preparations the Japanese must be making for us, and I thought of that turret that just wouldn't work. But most of

thought of our gas. "Army pilots, man your planes! Army pilots, man your planes 1" the loud speakers brayed. But I already knew the time had come. The flight deck of the Hornet was alive with activity, while the big voice of the looming island barked commands. all I

The Navy was now taking charge, and doing it with an efficiency which made our popped eyes pop some more. Blocks were whipped out from under wheels. The whirring little "donkey"— the same one that was supposed to have broken loose and smashed my planewas pushing and pulling the B-25's into position. In about half an hour the Navy had us crisscrossed along the back end of the flight deck, two abreast, the big double-rudder

assembhes of the 16 planes sticking out of the edges of the From the air, the Hornet, with its slim, clean foredeck, and its neatly cluttered rear deck, must have looked tail

rear of the ship at an angle.

65

like

an arrow with pinfeathers bounding along the surface of the

water. It was good enough flying weather, but the sea was tremendous. The Hornet bit into the rough-house waves, dipping and rising until the flight deck was a crazy seesaw. Some of the waves actually were breaking over the deck. The deck seemed to grow smaller by the minute, and I had a brief fear of being hit by a wave on

the takeoff and of crashing at the end of the deck and falling off into the path of the careening carrier.

The Hornet's speed

rose until

it

was making

its

top speed, that

The bombs now came up from deck on their low-slung lorries to our planes. It was our first look at the 500-pound incendiary, but we didn't waste much time on it except to see that it was placed in the bomb bay so that it could be released fourth and last. The Navy had fueled our planes previously, but now they topped the tanks. That was to take care of any evaporation that might have set in. When the gauges read full, groups of the Navy boys rocked our planes in the hope of breaking whatever bubbles had formed in the big wing tanks, for that might mean that we could take a few more quarts. The Hornefs control tower was now beginning to display large square cards, giving us compass readings, and the wind, which was of gale proportions. hectic, hurried

below and

I

of April 18.

rolled along the

saw our

plane and

morning

takeoff instructor, Lt. Miller, trot

chmb

up

to Doolittle's

bottom opening. For a time I thought that he was going along, but after a bit he came out and began visiting each of the other B-25's. We were in the Ruptured Duck now, all of us, and when Miller came up to the pilot's compartment he must have stood there a half minute with his hand stuck out at me before I came back to life and shook hands with him. I had so much on my mind. Miller wished all of us good luck, and he said, "I wish I could go with you." It was something of a relief when five additional five-gallon tins of gas were handed in to us. We lined them up in the fuselage beside the ten cans Doolittle had aheady allotted us. It was a sobering thought to realize that we were going to have to fly at least 400 miles farther than we had planned. But my concern over that, as I sat there in the plane waiting to taxi and edge up to the starting line, was erased by a sudden reHef that now we wouldn't in the

have

to

worry about running into barrage balloons at night. This, was going to be a daylight raid. It was only a few minutes

of course,

after eight in the morning.

Cdr. Jurika and "Nig" also came up to say good-bye and to When they had gone, I suddenly remembered that none of my crew had had breakfast and that all of us had lost

shake hands.

could have taken coffee and water and sandwiches along. I was tempted to send Clever below to get some food, but I was afraid that there would not be time. Besides, sight of the fact that

we

was being pulled up to the starting line and his and other props were beginning to turn. The Hornet's deck wasn't a safe place. I found out later that one of the Navy boys had an arm clipped off by a propeller blade that morning. Doolittle warmed and idled his engines, and now we got a vivid demonstration of one of our classroom lectures on how to get a 25,000-pound bomber off half the deck of a carrier. A Navy man stood at the bow of the ship, and off to the left, with a checkered flag in his hand. He gave Doolittle, who was at Doolittle's ship

the controls, the signal to begin racing his engines again.

He

did

it

and making it go faster and faster. Doolittle gave his engines more and more throttle until I was afraid that he'd burn tliem up. A wave crashed heavily at the bow and sprayed the deck. Then I saw that the man with the flag was waiting, timing the dipping of the ship so that Doolittle's plane would get the

by swinging the

flag in a circle

benefit of a rising deck for signal.

Navy boys pulled

its

takeoff.

Another signal and Doolittle released

moved With

Then

the

man

gave a

new

the blocks from under Doolittle's wheels. his brakes

and the bomber

forward. full flaps,

engines at

full throttle,

and

over the port side of the Hornet, Doolittle's

wing far out plane waddled and

his left

then lunged slowly into the teeth of the gale that swept

down

were a

track.

the deck. His left wheel stuck on the white line as

if it

His right wing, which had barely cleared the wall of the island he taxied and was guided up to the starting line, extended

as

nearly to the edge of the starboard side.

We

watched him like hawks, wondering what the wind would and whether we could get off in that little run toward the bow. If he couldn't, we couldn't. do

to him,

67

up more speed and held to his line, and, just up on the top of a wave and cut through it at full speed, Doolittle's plane took oflF. He had yards to spare. He hung his ship almost straight up on its props, until we could see the whole top of his B-25. Then he leveled oflF and I watched him come around in a tight circle and shoot low over our headsstraight down the line painted on the deck. The Hornet was giving him his bearings. Adm. Halsey had headed Doolittle picked

as the

it

Hornet

lifted itself

for the heart of Tokyo.

The engines of three other ships were warming up, and the thump and hiss of the turbulent sea made additional noise. But loud and clear above those sounds

I

could hear the hoarse cheers of

Navy man on the ship. They made the Hornet fairly shudder with their yells— and I've never heard anything like it, before or since. every

68

vast amounts of Allied real estate under some state time the United States was striving to recover the control by of Hawaii. One of the smaller parcels of land against the blow from Sea, Malta. The island was not Mediterranean in the was an island

The Axis had

occupied by Germans or Italians but its destiny, a day-to-day affair, was controlled by Axis air power. It was subjected to merciless aerial bombardment at all hours of the day and night. The defenders were left with little with which to strike back except, at one point, three hopelessly outdated Gloster Gladiator

Hope, and Charity. Though outmaneuvered and outnumbered they were never outfought. However, even the most gallant of pilots needs an airplane and it wasn't long before the sturdy little Gladiators were no more. The salvation of Malta had to be in the air since therein preyed the force that was daily reducing her to uninhabitable rubble. But these were times of short-range fighters, and friendly refueling bases did not lie between the aircraft source and the destination. Another facet of the carriers versatility is revealed in this episode of aerial resupply of aerial vehicles by the U.S.S. Wasp, {CV-7). biplanes. Faith,

Wasp Stings Twice operating in the North Sea in April 1942, the U.S.S. Wasp (CV-7) was assigned the hazardous mission of reinforcing the aircraft complement of the greatly fought-over island of Malta in the Mediterranean. After off-loading some of her own aircraft, the carrier embarked 47 Spitfires, and set sail on its mercy mission. Wasp entered the Mediterranean during the hours of darkness, in order to frustrate Axis spies who monitored every ship entering the sea through its narrow Atlantic opening, and commenced launching aircraft before dawn. By 5 a.m. on April 20, all Spitfires had been launched and flew the short distance to Malta. In less than three weeks, Wasp delivered another 47 Spits to the

While

beleaguered defenders of strategically valuable Malta, thereby earning additional accolades from the British. Typical of these plaudits was a message from Prime Minister Churchill. In typical

69

read "Congratulations! Your splendid disprove the apiarian theory that wasps never sting twice.

Churchillian prose,

luck and

many

it

efforts

Good

thanks."

Wasp was sunk by

Japanese torpedoes while escorting a troop convoy to Guadalcanal.

Four months

later the

70

To thwart an attempt by the Japanese on the south coast of

New

to capture Port

Moresby

Guinea, an Allied task force, including

the Yorktown and Lexington, was sent to the Coral Sea.

On May

7,

day of action, the Japanese Shoho became the first carrier to be lost by either side. The second day's action found two carriers on each side locked in a duel. Both enemy carriers were damaged and the Yorktown was struck but continued to launch and recover planes. Lexington, however, was struck by two torpedoes and a half dozen bombs, but remained navigable. Several hours later she was a flaming hulk. Volatile vapors, released by enemy missiles, had accumulated in the vast spaces below the flight deck and exploded with ravaging force hours after the battle had ended. Here is an eyewitness account of the Coral Sea action and the demise of the Lexington by the skipper of the Lex, Adm. Frederick 1942, the

first

C. Sherman.

The

Battle of the Coral Sea

ADM. FREDERICK The combined 1942, after

C.

SHERMAN, USN

task force fueled from the

Neosho on

May

5 and

6,

which the tanker and the destroyer Sims were sent to 300 miles to the southeast. The task force headed

cruise about

west into the Coral Sea.

By

the afternoon of

May

6,

meager reports from the scouting

of enemy ships in the New Guinea— New Britain— Solomons area. Their direction of movement seemed to be toward Port Moresby, although what channel they would take to enter the Coral Sea was not apparent. Our task force headed northwest into this critical area without any real informa-

planes indicated a large

number

tion as to the enemy's position, course, strength or destination.

Our carriers alternated in carrying out daily air searches, the remaining planes of both carriers standing by to attack any targets located. Thus one carrier was always left with a depleted attack 71

group, the other with a

full

complement. The fighter squadrons

were divided equally, so that the attack groups had fighter escort while the task force retained the remainder for

its

own

defense.

These early actions were to show the need for a higher percentage of fighters on our carriers. The Yorktown had the scouting duty on May 7. At daylight her scout bombers were launched to search the northern semicircle to a distance of 275 miles. At the same time Fletcher sent Grace's cruiser group, plus the destroyer Farragut, to take station at the

southern end of Jomard Passage to intercept any come through it.

enemy

ships

trying to

hands were eagerly waiting when one of the search planes enemy carrier just north of Misima Island near the northern entrance to Jomard Passage, and heading southeast. Other reports from the land-based planes at Townsville came in, indicating many ships in the Solomons Sea, all moving in the general direction of Port Moresby. The time to strike had come. Our remaining scouts returned, reporting no contacts. In one sector to the eastward, they had turned back when they ran into a All

flashed a report of an

rain squall 150 miles out instead of continuing to the designated

was unfortunate, as after events proved that the Zuikaku and Shokaku were in this sector. They were

distance. This

large carriers

not located until the next morning.

Fortune favored the attack groups winging their way toward the reported position of the enemy carrier near Misima Island. The Lexington group, leading the way and anxiously scanning the water below, suddenly spotted a vessel. It was the small carrier

Shoho, escorted by several cruisers and destroyers. With clocklike precision, the Lexington bombers went into their dives, closely followed

by the torpedo planes

at

low

altitude.

The

in almost simultaneously. Our fighter escorts encountered a number of defending Nakajima 97 fighters, an efficient plane but not as effective as the better-known Zero. When the 97's attempted to break up the dive-bomber formation, our fighters shot down seven of them. Within a few minutes, the Shoho had received thirteen bomb hits and seven torpedo hits. Burning

Yorktown planes went

from stem to stem and with black smoke pouring out, she blew up and sank fifteen minutes later. Our pilots watched her go down. They reported that her casualties must have been enormous. 72

Returning from the attack, Lt. Cdr. Bob Dixon, commander of Scouting Squadron Two, coined a new word which has since become a standard designation for a carrier. His radio message was simply, "Scratch one flattop." They were the most thriUing words we had heard since Pearl Harbor. While our planes were attacking the Shoho, the Japanese carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, to the eastward, had been unable to locate our task form amidst the rain squalls. About 300 miles southeast of us, however, they found our tanker, the Neosho, which one of their scouts reported as a carrier. Their air groups attacked this helpless

and her escort destroyer, the Sims. The Neosho was soon down after being hit by several bombs. Although waterlogged, the oiler's tanks kept her afloat until May 11, when she was sunk by torpedoes from the Henley, one of our destroyers which had come out from Noumea to rescue auxiliary

a mass of flames and the Sims went

survivors.

The Lexington had a search in

the scouting duty. At daybreak

all directions. It

we

sent out

was possible that the Japanese might

have headed south and passed us during the night. Our planes covered 360 degrees of the compass, 150 miles to the south and 300 miles to the north. All hands were tense as we waited for the decisive action we were sure the day would bring. At 8:22 came the expected contact report. Lt. (j.g. ) Joseph Smith of Scouting Two had sighted the enemy formation 190 miles northeast of us. It was thrilling news— the first sighting of the large Japanese carriers

by

either land-based or carrier planes. In

addition to the Shokaku and Zuikaku, their disposition contained three heavy cruisers

and a number

About two minutes

of destroyers.

after receiving this report,

radio transmission from a Japanese plane

a contact report of our position.

The

first

we

intercepted a

which we deduced was carrier duel in history

was about to begin. I remarked on the bridge of the Lexington that from their distance at the time of contact the attack would probably come in on us at 11 a.m., and that it was possible for the carriers on both sides to be sunk by the simultaneous onslaught of the opposing

air groups.

The weather tropical front

We

prepared for a fight to the

in the vicinity of the

we had

enemy was

finish.

typical of the

experienced the previous day, flyable but

full of rain squalls offering

good hiding places 73

for siuface ships

trying to avoid an air attack.

Bob Dixon,

of "scratch one flattop"

fame, upon intercepting the contact report, proceeded to the position of the

He

enemy

location to assist in tracking their

movements.

stayed in their vicinity for over two hours, dodging in and out

of clouds to avoid

enemy

fighters

bent on shooting him down,

and gave us excellent information

until

fuel

shortage

forced

his return.

Both our carriers promptly launched their air-attack groups, the Yorktown being designated to lead, reversing the order of the previous day. This group consisted of 24 dive bombers, 9 torpedo planes, and 6 fighters; the Lexington sent out 22 dive bombers, 12 torpedo planes, and 9 fighters, for a total from the two groups of 82 planes. By the time the planes were launched, the distance to the enemy had been reduced to about 165 miles, which was still a little long for the torpedo bombers to cover, out and back. We had planned to shorten the return trip still further by heading in their direction while they were in the air. Circumstances beyond our control were to render this impossible.

During

their flight to the targets, the

To keep together

two

air

groups became hope-

weather was impossible. The dive bombers climbed to 17,000 feet to be in position for their attack; the torpedo planes had to make their runs at low altitude and in any case could do little climbing with their heavy loads. In addition, the Lexington dive bombers got separated from the rest of their own group. Three of their escorting fighters also went astray in the poor visibihty. Thus the Lexington group, under Cdr. Bill Ault, when it finally found the enemy, consisted of only 4 dive bombers, 12 toi^pedo planes, and 6 fighters. The Yorktown attack group was first to sight the Japanese force, at 10:32, and waited for the slower torpedo planes to get into lessly separated.

position.

in the

existing

The two enemy carriers, they reported, had separated so were now some 6 or 8 miles apart, with one group

that they

making for a rain squall and the other heading into the easterly wind and launching its planes. The Yorktown group at 10:58 a.m.

down in a coordinated attack on tlie Enemy fighters attacked the bombers

dived

latter carrier.

during their dives, and

our pilots were hampered by fogging of bomb sights and windshields. Nevertheless, they claimed six sure hits which started fires

74

Unmolested, the torpedo craft loosed their "tin fish" and, upon their return, claimed three sure hits. In the engagement with the enemy fighters, the two bomber squadrons reported 11 Zeros shot down, while their fighter cover claimed kills on 3 Zeros, 1 scout, and a torpedo plane. Making use of the cloud cover for rendezvousing and retiring, all the Yorktown planes returned aboard the

carrier.

safely.

When

the Lexington group, minus the dive-bombing squadron,

enemy, nothing squadron of his bombers dive with the 4 to "fly a square" while he went on section to look for the Japanese caniers. He found one of them 20 miles away, partly hidden by a squall. Unable to contact the rest of the dive bombers by radio, he ordered a coordinated attack by the torpedo group and his own section of 4 dive bombers. Zeros engaged in hot combat the six fighters accompanying the torpedo arrived at the spot

was

where they expected

to find the

in sight but rain squalls. Ault directed the torpedo

group.

bombers same time flying in just off the water. The pilots subsequently reported two 1,000-pound bomb hits and five torpedo hits. There were vicious dogfights between our own and the enemy fighters, from which 2 of our flyers failed to return. How many Japanese planes were shot Roaring

down

in their

power

dives to 2,500 feet, the

released their missiles, with the torpedo planes at the

down

could not be determined in the poor

Only

visibility.

bombers returned to the carrier. Pulling out of their dives, they were unable to reassemble in the mist and rain. One plane. Ens. Haschke, fell in wdth one of oiu- fighters, Lt. Noel Gaylor, and the two came back together. Cdr. Ault was in touch with the Lexington by radio and reported both his radio man and himself wounded. Unable to fix his position after the melee, he requested directions back to the ship. In spite of every effort to distinguish his plane from the dozens of others on the radar screen, the attempts to coach him back were unsuccessful. "Remember we got a 1,000-pound hit on the flattop," his voice said, "and one other plane got one too." Probably he became unconscious from his

wounds

1 of the 4

shortly thereafter, and. crashed.

Coral Sea was the end of the

An unknown

trail for this gallant

spot in the

and courageous

oflBcer.

Lt. Cdr.

Jimmie

Brett's

torpedo squadron rendezvoused after

75

its

and took a defensive formation, knowing enemy fighters would soon be after them. They had a long road back home to the carrier. Every ounce of gasoline had to be conserved. In ensuing attacks, they shot down 2 Japanese fighters and fought off many others. One plane went down into the water, out of gas, just attack

as

it

got within sight of the Lexington. Diligent search later failed

to locate its men. When we sighted this group returning about 2 P.M., we had about given them up for lost. They had been out an hour longer than the time when our figures said their gas should have been exhausted. Short of fuel and unable to maneuver for recognition purposes, their one thought was to get into the

landing circle as quickly as possible. They came straight

Yorktown opened

in.

The

on them, not realizing they were Lexington planes, before we could stop her. Luckily none were hit and we soon had them on board, some of their gasless engines conking out as they hit the deck. They were landed while the Lexington was fighting tremendous fires below decks from an internal gasoline-vapor fire

explosion.

Aboard the Lexington, after our attack planes had departed, we had made full preparations for the onslaught we expected from the Japanese. Our returning scouts were landed, serviced, and launched again for defense against low-flying torpedo bombers. Although the

SBD's were not intended for use as fighters, their two fixed 50caliber machine guns in the nose and swivel 30-caliber rear guns might prove useful against the equally slow enemy torpedo planes. Nine of the Lexingtons 18 fighters were escorting the attack group, leaving 9 others for defense around the carriers. We landed and serviced our combat patrols. At 11 a.m., all our planes were in the air vdth full tanks of gas. Then we went to battle stations and "buttoned up" the ship— closed all watertight doors and hatches, stowed aU unnecessary gear, had all fire hoses ready, drained our gasoline filHng lines, and distributed first-aid equipment throughout the vessel. At 11 o'clock we were as ready as humanly possible to give the enemy planes a hot reception and to withstand whatever damage we might suffer. At 10:14 a Yorktown fighter on combat patrol spotted a Kawanishi four-engine flying boat and promptly shot it down. At 10:55 the radar showed a large group of enemy planes approaching from the northeast. At 11:13 the Lexingtons lookouts sighted the first of the attackers. The battle was on. 76

The weather was bright and sunny, with hardly a cloud in the sky. The Japanese had no difficulty in finding us. On the sparkling, tropical sea, we were visible from miles away. Our move to the south the night before had given the enemy this advantage, but it also meant that they had no cloud cover to mask their approach. The clear visibility gave our antiaircraft guns full play. in its early stage of development. Lexington for all the fighters in the air. Control was on board the There were 17 in all, 8 from the Yorktown plus the Lexingtons 9,

Fighter direction was

still

with Lt. "Red" Gill as fighter-direction officer. The single, early model radar we had on board picked up the enemy aircraft at a distance of 68 miles, but gave no indication of their altitude.

those old radars

enemy

planes.

it

We

was

On

from out on

also difficult to distinguish friendly

felt that if

our fighters were sent far

might miss the contact, owing to differences in and thus be wasted. We were also influenced by the belief that the torpedo planes represented the greater hazard and that they would come in low. Accordingly, we kept our fighters close in overinterception, they altitude,

head, at 10,000 feet, ready to attack

when

the

enemy groups

ar-

rived at their "push-over" point. The Dauntless dive bombers on antitorpedo-plane patrol were stationed at 2,000 feet, 6,000 yards

We

it was carriers. from the necessary to intercept it at a much greater distance It must be remembered that this was the first carrier duel in history, and we were learning our tactics by experience. Nevertheless, our defending planes did a magnificent job. Five Lexington fighters were vectored out at 11:02 to intercept the oncoming craft. They made contact 20 miles away and reported one group of 50 to 60 planes stacked in layers from 10,000 to 13,000 feet, with torpedo planes in the lowest level, then fighters, then dive bombers, then more fighters. There were approximately 18 torpedo planes, 18 dive bombers, and 24 fighters in this group. Two of our 5 fighters had been sent low to look for torpedo planes. The other 3 fighters in the intercepting unit climbed madly for altitude and dashed in to attack. Engaged by the Zeros, they shot down several but were unable to stop the bombers before they started their dives. The 2 low fighters attacked the torpedo planes as they dropped down for their part in the battle, but were unsuc-

out.

learned in this battle that to break up an air attack

cessful in stopping them.

The

air fighting

now became

a melee.

77

Our own planes were mixed

in with the

enemy and

the sky was black with flak bursts.

The

Japanese spent no time in maneuvering, but dived straight in for the kill. The huge Lexington dwarfed the other ships in the forma-

and bore the brunt of the attack. It was beautifully coordinated. From my bridge I saw bombers roaring down in steep dives from many points in the sky, and torpedo planes coming in on both bows almost simultaneously. There was nothing I could do about the bombers, but I could do something to tion

avoid the torpedoes.

The ideal way to drop torpedoes was for groups of planes to let go simultaneously on both bows. In this method, if the target ship turned toward one group to parallel its torpedoes, it presented its broadside to the other. The timing was vital. The enormous Lexington was very slow in turning. It took 30 to 40 seconds just to put the rudder hard over. When she did start to turn, she moved majestically and ponderously in a large circle. Maneuverability was greatly improved in later carriers. As I saw the enemy torpedo planes coming in on both bows, it seemed to me that those to port were closer than those to starboard. They were approaching in steep glides, faster than we considered The air was full of antiaircraft and the din was terrific. When the planes to port were about 1,000 yards away I motioned to the helmsman, Chief Qm. McKenzie, for hard left rudder. It seemed an eternity before the bow started to

practicable for torpedo dropping. bursts

turn, just as the

enemy

planes started disgorging their

fish.

seemed full of torpedo wakes. Bombs were also dropping all around us. Great geysers of water from near misses were going up higher than our masts, and occasionally the ship shuddered from the explosions of the ones that hit. In less than a minute, the first torpedoes had passed astern. We quickly shifted rudder to head for the second group of planes. These split up to fire on both bows, the hardest maneuver for us to counter. Then it became a matter of wriggling and twisting as best we could to avoid the deadly weapons heading our way. I remember seeing two wakes coming straight for our port beam, and there was nothing I could do about them. The wakes approached the ship's side, and I braced myself for the explosion. Nothing happened. I rushed to the starboard bridge, and there were the wakes emerging from that side. The torpedoes were running too deep and had passed completely under the ship.

The water

in all directions

78

My

on the bridge was Cdr. H. S. Duckworth. "Don't change course, Captain!" he exclaimed. "There's a torpedo on each side of us running parallel!" We held oiu- course with a torpedo 50 yards on either beam and both finally disappeared without air officer

hitting.

Enemy

planes were being shot

down

right

and

left,

and the

water around us was dotted with the towering flames of their burning carcasses. One plane turned upside down as it hit the water, its torpedo still slung on its belly. Before it sank, we noticed a peculiar wooden framework around the missile's nose and propeller

mechanism. This explained why the Japanese were able to drop their torpedoes at such high speeds and altitudes. The cushioning devices permitted them to enter the water without excessive shock to the delicate machinery. It was a scheme still undeveloped by our ordnance experts, and gave the Japanese at least a temporary superiority in torpedo warfare.

Five bombs had landed on the Lexington. Two torpedoes exploded against our port side. The water spouts of three near misses which splashed water on the deck were also thought at first to be from torpedoes, but subsequent examination showed only two actual hits by this weapon. Suddenly all was quiet again. It was as though some hidden director had signaled for silence. The Japanese planes were no longer in sight, the guns had stopped shooting for lack of targets. The sea was still dotted with burning planes; our own aircraft were seen in the distance, assembling to be ready for further action. But the enemy was through. I looked at my watch. The entire attack had lasted just nine minutes. It seemed hours since we had first sighted the enemy planes.

Off in the distance to the southeastward, we could see the Yorktown, a column of black smoke rising from her flight deck. Evidently she too had been damaged. She had been attacked by both torpedo planes and dive bombers, but with her greater maneuverability had managed to evade all torpedoes and was hit only by one large bomb, which had penetrated the flight deck and exploded in a storeroom down below. It had killed 37 men outright and wounded many others. Near misses had caused several fragment holes in the hull along the water line. Otherwise the Yorktown

was undamaged. 79

Taking stock on the Lexington, we found things not so bad as they might have been. The small fires down below were being fought by the damage-control parties, who reported that they

would soon have them under control. No smoke from the flames was showing above decks. The ship had taken only a seven-degree hst from torpedo hits, and this was rapidly being corrected by shifting water ballast. The engine room reported full power and speed available if I wanted it. Our flight deck was intact. We felt like throwing out our chests at our condition after the attack. But our satisfaction was soon changed to apprehension. We proceeded to land our planes which were in the vicinity, and out of ammunition or gas after their air battles. We replenished the ammunition of our guns and refilled the ammunition hoists to be ready for another attack should one come. Lt. Cdr. H. R. ("Pop") Healy, our damage control officer, was down in central station, below the armored deck, where directions for all damage control were issued and reports received. He had just phoned the bridge to inform me that all damage was under control. "If we have another attack," he said, "I'd like to take it on the starboard side, since both torpedo hits were to port." At 12:47, the Lexington was suddenly shaken by a terrific internal explosion which seemed to come from the bottom of the ship. It rocked the huge structure more violently than had anything we had received during the battle. Smoke began emerging from around the edges of the elevator on the ffight deck. We called central station on the telephone but found the connection was broken. The rudder indicator on the bridge was also out. All telephones were dead except a sound-powered one to the engine room. However, reports of huge fires breaking out in the vicinity of central station were soon received. The station itself was an inferno. A few men had escaped from it; others were rescued by volunteers who risked their lives in the flames, but the majority, including Healy, had been killed outright by the terrific explosion. Its cause was later established as the insidious accumulation of gasohne vapor, leaking unsuspected from our gasoline storage tanks, which had been weakened by the torpedo hits. It was an unexpected blow, but as yet we had no idea that it was to cost us the ship. Raging fires, fed by gasoline, broke out from ruptured vents and risers. The water main was broken in the area of the explosion,

80

making the work of combating the flames extremely diflBcult. Long hoses had to be led from the far after part of the ship, and only very low water pressure could be maintained. It was a losing battle from the beginning, but

we

did not

know

it

then.

We fully

expected

to save the carrier.

remained on the bridge to direct the handhng of the ship and Mort Seligman, the executive ofiicer, was everywhere, advising and encouraging the fire fighters. Small explosions of ammunition were occurring frequently in the vicinity of the fires, and Seligman was more than once blown like a cork out of a bottle from watertight doors through which he was passing. He brought to the bridge frequent reports of conditions below. All lights were out and the damage-control men toiled in complete darkness except for hand flashlights. The decks where they were working would grow hot from fires on the decks beneath. Despite the loss of our rudder indicator on the bridge, we were able to steer from there for a while. It was during this period that we landed the torpedo squadron which returned so late and which we had feared was lost. Then the electric steering gear went completely out and we had to steer by maneuvering the engines, giving orders to the engine room over the one telephone still working. We were unable to use the hand steering in the station below for lack of communications to give the steersman there his course. The fire continued to spread. More frequent explosions were occurring, and the surface of the elevator in the flight deck was beginning to glow a dull red. A report came from the engine control room that the forward engine-room bulkhead was getting white hot, and I

to receive reports. Cdr.

that the temperature in that vicinity

asked permission, which

I

had

risen to 160 degrees.

They

promptly granted, to abandon the forward

engine room and use only the after engine-room space. Then the one telephone began to get weaker. It was apparent that it would go out completely. When would be no way of getting the men out of the engine rooms. Unless I ordered them to leave, they would stay there, trapped by fire all around them, and hemmed in by red-hot bulkheads, until they perished. Over the weakening phone, I ordered these men to secure the engineering plant and get up on deck. Although we were unable to hear any reply, presently the sound of steam escaping from the safety valves assured me they had received it

was only a matter

it

did, I realized, there

of time until

81

the message. Eventually

all

of

them found

their

way through

the

encircling fires to safety on the topside.

We now had

no power and the ship lay dead in the water. Withwe were helpless even to fight the fire. I called a destroyer alongside to send over its hoses, but the fire pumps on the small vessels in those early days were of such low capacity that only a trickle of water could be obtained from this source. It seemed outrageous that we could do nothing to put out the fire and save our ship. At this time, about 5:00 p.m., Adm. Fitch, unperturbed and efficient, leaned over the flag bridge and told me I had better "get the boys oflF the ship." It was heartbreaking, but it seemed to be the only thing left to do. Reluctantly I gave the order to abandon ship. It was the hardest thing I have ever done. Nevertheless, if we could not prevent the loss of the Lexington, saving the lives of her crew was of utmost importance. The officers and men were as reluctant to leave as I was. We had to order them to go. Most of the wounded were lowered to a destroyer alongside, the remainder going directly into small boats from out pressure on the main,

the other ships.

below

Some

of the crew, while waiting to disembark,

went

which was not in the fire area. They filled cream and stood around on the flight deck Knotted ropes were dropped over the side for the men to

to the service store,

their helmets with ice

eating

shde

it.

down

into the water.

Some

of

them

orderly fashion on the deck before they return.

There was not the

lined

left, as if

up

their shoes in

they expected to

slightest panic or disorder. I

was proud

of

them.

crew were off. The water around was black with the bobbing heads of swimmers. Small boats from our escorts, cruisers and destroyers were busy picking men out of the water and transferring them to the other ships. After making a last inspection to insure that there were no stragglers, I stood with Cdr. Seligman at the stern. I directed him to leave, as it was my duty and privilege to be the last one to go. He went down into the Finally, just after sunset, all the

the ship

water. I stood on the great ship alone.

While

was pausing tliere, a tremendous explosion took place amidships by the elevator. Planes and debris of all kinds went high into the air. Ducking under the edge of the ffight deck to avoid the falling pieces, I decided it was time to go, and slid down the rope I

82

to

do

my

stint of

swimming

until

my

turn

came

to

be picked up by

the rescue boats.

was dark when I arrived on the cruiser Minneapolis. The burning Lexington was an awe-inspiring sight. All the survivors had by then been taken out of the water and were safe on board our cruisers and destroyers. Fletcher directed the Phelps to sink the Lexington by torpedoes. The great ship was lit up by her flames in the gathering darkness. The Phelps stood off and fired four torpedoes. They hit and exploded with dull booms. The stricken vessel started getting deeper in the water, slowly going down, as if she too was reluctant to give up the battle. With her colors proudly flying and the last signal flags, reading "I am abandoning ship," still waving at the yardarm, she went under on an even keel, like the lady she always was. As she disappeared from sight, there was a tremendous underwater explosion from her magazines. It was the end of the Lexington. During the afternoon the task force had remained in our vicinity and the Yorktown had repaired the damage caused by her bomb hit. When we had lost propulsive power, our planes remaining in the air had landed on her deck. She had her own air group practically intact, plus the Lexington planes she had recover The Battle of the Coral Sea was a tacticarand strategic victory, despite the loss of the Lexington. It was the first decisive naval battle in history in which surface ships did not exchange a shot. It was fought entirely by aircraft. As a result of this battle, the Japanese withdrew from their attempt to expand their southern conquests by amphibious attacks from the sea, and retreated with their forces It

badly punished.

The

Battle of the Coral Sea

was a turning point

in the

war and

a

proved the dominance of the aircraft carrier. As significant as the battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac in 1862, it ushered in a new era in fighting at sea, and ended the period of Japanese advance. We learned a lot from this battle. We learned that it was necessary greatly to improve the fire-fighting equipment on our combat milestone in history.

vessels.

more

We

learned that our carrier complement should include

fighter aircraft.

direction

It

We learned that we must improve

methods and intercept attacking

our fighter-

aircraft at greater dis-

tances from our ships. All these lessons were to prove invaluable in

the actions to come.

83

Although the Battle of the Coral Sea was a draw from the

tactical

viewpoint, it was a strategic victory for the Allied cause since the Japanese expedition was turned hack. It also provided a lift to the

morale of our fighting forces and the civilian populace hack home. A month later, the Japanese were ready to try again. This time they were moving to the east with Midway Island as their goal. Midway, made up of small coral and sand atolls, would he an ideal jumping-off spot from which Japanese aircraft could carry out bombing attacks against Hawaii. However, our Intelligence forces had been able to decipher coded Japanese messages and, from them, had determined enemy intentions.

Midway The

defenses were multiplied.

victory that followed

Magazine

article written to

is faithfully

recounted in this Time

commemorate the

fifteenth anniversary

of the battle that turned the tide of war. At Coral Sea the surface forces had not sighted one another.

The same was true at Midway. But this time there was no doubt as to who was the victor, tactically or strategically. Naval aviators had gained control of the sky and with it control of the seas below.

The

Battle of

FROM

TIME

Midway

MAGAZINE

4, 1942, and World War II in the Pacific was almost months six old. The U.S. Fleet, though it had won a strategic edge, had been mauled, and the carrier Lexington sunk, in the Battle of

It

was June

the Coral Sea

Now

(May

4r-8).

the Japanese carriers were on their

oflFensive of all. "Spirits

way toward

the biggest

were high— and why not?" exulted a Japanese man was

naval aviator aboard the carrier flagship Akagi. "Every

convinced that he was about to participate in yet another

brilliant

victory."

The

fateful

meeting was the Battle of Midway. It was one of the no less monumental than Salamis,

decisive battles of history, a fight

84

Yamamoto, archiarmada of 200 ships Wake Island and to the Aleu-

or Lepanto, or Trafalgar. Japan's Admiral Isoroku tect of victory at Pearl Harbor,

and 700 planes across the

had

flung a vast

Pacific to

with the spearhead pointing toward a remote, strategic atoll called Midway. His plan was to seize Midway, "sentry for Hawaii," tians,

draw out what was

left of

the U.S. Fleet, and

win the war quickly

might could be brought to bear. "In the last analysis," he argued, "the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether or not we succeed in before U.S. industrial

destroying the U.S.

fleet,

more

particularly

its

carrier forces."

U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, though heavily outnumbered,

was

not without hidden assets. Not long before, in perhaps the greatest intelligence victory of the war, the U.S. had managed to break the

Japanese navy's principal code. Adm. Nimitz, thus forewarned of the Japanese grand strategy, now planned to throw his whole air strength against one part of the Japanese armada— the carrier strike forcebefore Adm. Yamamoto could concentrate overwhelmingly. Specifically, Nimitz swung his three canieis— Enterprise, Hornet, Yor^^oii;n— around to the northeast of

Midway

to take the Japanese

be governed by the principle commanders, Rear Fletcher, Frank who well Adms. Raymond A. Spruance and Jack knew that the three carriers were about all that stood between the Japanese and California. Not far away, gliding serenely through a fog bank amid their great escort, the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu prepared for their strike to win the war. "Ambush!" At 0430 the eastern sky was tinged with a faint glow as the battle began. A southeasterly breeze and calm seas provided ideal launching conditions for the Japanese airmen as they roared off, 108 dive bombers and covering fighters, to blast the defense and land-based aircraft on Midway. "There is no evidence of an enemy task force in our vicinity," said Yamamoto's strike force commander, Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo. "It is therefore possible for us to attack Midway We can then turn around, meet an approaching enemy task force and destroy it." But almost at once. Airman Nagumo, task force commander in the attack on Pearl Harbor, began to come unstuck. His scouting planes were late in taking off and clumsy in their search for U.S. ships. His attack planes battered at Midway, beat down a Marine fighter

by

from the

surprise

flank.

"You

will

of calculated risk," Nimitz told his task force

.

.

.

85

squadron, but found that forewarned U.S. land-based bombers were not at home. Between 0700 and 0830, ineffectively but heavily

tacked by Midway's land-based bombers, cision: instead of

Nagumo

at-

took a fatal de-

keeping his second-wave carrier planes ready for

any U.S. ships that might turn up, he would launch them on a second attack on the island. This decision meant reamiing torpedo planes with bombs, a good hour's backbreaking work, and Nagumo was right in the middle of it when he got chilling word from his search planes: "Ten ships— apparently enemy— sighted." Soon reports chattered in from his screening ships and search planes that U.S. planes (100-plus aircraft launched at precisely the right time by Adms. Spruance and Fletcher from about 200 miles to the northeast) were bearing in hard for the Japanese carriers. "A bolt from the blue!" cried an aviator aboard Akagi. "Ambush! The entire picture is changed." Desperately Nagumo's Zero fighter patrols roared off to

provide

air cover.

battle, it seemed that it was fouled up. Waves of low-level Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers lumbered in through flailing antiaircraft screens and deadly Zeros toward the wildly veering and evasive carriers. There was almost no U.S. coordination, onlv spotty fighter escort. From Hornet, 35 scout bombers witli fighter cover missed the Japanese fleet and the whole battle; the 41 Devastators that did find it lost an appalhng 35 of their strength, rang up not a single torpedo hit. But the low-flying, vulnerable torpedo bombers had made a sacrifice more vahant than they knew. In tlie clutch of the battle they drew the deadly Zeros down to the deck, leaving the carriers wide open to attack from higher altitudes. In the apparent victory of the Zeros, Nagumo now saw a chance to save his carriers and to save Yamamoto's master campaign. During the U.S. torpedo runs, he put his men to work frantically rearming the planes for a counterstrike against tlie U.S. carriers. The flight decks were packed with armed, fueled planes as the big ships began turning into the wind. At 1024 tlie order to start launching came down from Akagi's bridge by voice tube, and the air officer flapped a white flag. At tliat instant, slanting and howling

S5 out of 41. For the next hour of the

was the U.S. attack

tliat

70 degrees out of hght clouds, the SBD Dauntless dive bombers of Enterprise and Yorktown bore down undetected and unopposed. "HeUdivers!" screamed a lookout on Akagi. Within minutes

down

at

86

the dive bombers scored a fabulous nine hits and mortally three of the Japanese carriers. Within hours, Akagi,

wounded

Kaga and Soryu

were on the bottom. Go Get Hiryu! With only 18 dive bombers and 6 Zeros, Rear Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi of the sole surviving carrier, Hiryu, put in a sudden, sharp attack against Yorktown, losing almost all of his aircraft but scoring three hits and starting fires. At 1245 Yamaguchi threw in his last 10 torpedo bombers and 6 fighters, remnant of Nagumo's force of 250 plus, led by a lieutenant who knew he had only enough fuel for a one-way trip. The result: slaughter for the Japanese planes by U.S. fighters and antiaircraft, but two torpedo hits on Yorktown, enough to cripple her and leave her a mark, two days later, for a Japanese submarine. At 1530 Adm. Spruance on Enterprise sent off 24 dive bombers to get Hiryu. "Enemy dive bombers directly overhead" was about all

Hiryu s lookout had time to report before Hiryu, swerving in an attempted evasion, was smothered by 4 direct hits. And when word of the disaster dinned back into the ears of Commander in Chief Isoroku Yamamoto, as he sat amid his battleships several hundred useless miles to the northwest, the master planner could only groan. "The game was up," a Japanese yeoman recalled. "The members of the staff looked at one another, their mouths tight shut. Indescribable emptiness, cheerlessness, and chagrin." Thus ended the decisive phase of the decisive Battle of Midway. For two more days Yamamoto planned samurai slashes with his battleships against the U.S. carriers, but he had lost his air power and he could not connect. Raymond Spruance, vdth Enterprise and Hornet, badgered Japanese surface vessels, sank a cruiser, but he dared not get too close to the outsize guns of the Japanese battle force or the land-based Japanese bombers on Wake Island (a trap Yamamoto hoped to the end that Spruance would fall into). The

was that without naval air power Yamamoto had lost the battle, and as early as 0255 on June 5 he put out the famous order— "The Midway Operation is canceled"— that reversed a tide of war that would now roll back through Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, to Tokyo Bay. central fact

87

The United

States did not possess the

vehicles in mid-1942 with

which

weapons or the delivery

to launch

a counter ofensive of

any great impoH against the Japanese, hut a limited offensive was needed in the Solomons area in order to halt the enemy advance to the south. Supply lines to Australia had to be made secure, and the defenses of that country had to he strengthened in order to keep it

in Allied hands.

Limited carrier support was available and provided during the early days of the campaign, but as the Solomons fighting continued throughout the year our carrier forces were diminished further and land-based aircraft were substituted. The lessons to be learned and applied in the future were the mark of the Solomons' "laboratory," as is explained in this official summation.

Capture of Guadalcanal-

The Solomons Campaign FROM NAVAL AVIATION

FILES

With the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, United States and Japanese carrier strength became nearly equal. At the same time the news that the Japanese advance was creeping down the Solomons and commencing the construction of an airfield on Guadalcanal made it advisable to undertake a limited oflFensive in the South Pacific.

In view of the danger to supply Hues to Australia and with

the reassurance that the United States had 12 fast and 15 escort

on the ways, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined to accept and orders were issued directing operations against the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. The first test of the Japanese carriers

the

risk,

perimeter came a year before the

On August

canal, quickly

constructed

enemy expected

it.

7, 1942, the United States Marines landed

on Guadal-

overcame minor opposition, and captured a halfAir support for the U.S. Marines' first amphib-

airfield.

World War II was provided by three carriers of Air Support Force (Rear Adm. L. Noyes), and by Navy, Marine, and Army units of Aircraft, South Pacific (Rear Adm. J. S. McCain) operating from bases on New Caledonia and in the New Hebrides. Carrier forces withdrew from direct support (August 9) but remained in the area to give overall support to the campaign during which they participated in several of the naval engagements fought ious landing of

over the island. Although the Japanese were taken by surprise, their reaction was immediate and from August 8 through November 15

they attempted, by every means available, to retake the Guadalcanal airfield. United States forces remained on the defensive attempting to keep open the sea approaches and to hold and keep in operation the airstrip which had been so easily taken on August 7. During a series of duels between weakened carrier forces, numerous pitched

between land-based aircraft and several night surface actions, the issue remained in doubt until the Battle of Guadalcanal, November 12-15. A Japanese attempt at hmited reinforcement precipitated a final night action on November 30. The way was then clear for a land offensive which pushed back the poorly supplied Jap troops. In February 1943, some 10,000 survivors of the 30,000 troops which the Japanese had invested piecemeal in the campaign were evacuated. Saratoga and Enterprise sank the Japanese light carrier Ryujo in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (August 23-25); Saratoga was damaged by a submarine torpedo (August 31) and forced to retire; and Wasp was sunk by a submarine ( September 15 ) while escorting a troop convoy to Guadalcanal. Hornet, in Task Group 17 (Rear Adm. G. D. Murray), hit targets in the Buin-Tonolei-Faisi area (October 5); attacked beached Japanese transports and supply dumps on Guadalcanal; destroyed a concentration of seaplanes at Rekata Bay ( October 16 ) and, with Enterprise, fought in the Battle of Santa Cruz ( October 26-27 ) in which she was sunk by air attack. air battles

;

campaign. Enterprise took part in the last stages of the naval battle for Guadalcanal (November 12-15), assisting in sinking 89,000 tons of war and cargo ships, and in the Battle of Rennell Island (January 29-30) in which two escort carIn

final carrier actions of the

riers also participated.

Ashore,

air forces in great variety

provided direct support. Navy

patrol squadrons flew search, rescue,

89

and

offensive missions

from

and harbors. Marine Fighter Squadron 223 and Scout Bombing Squadron 232, dehvered by the escort carrier Long Island, initiated operations from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal (August 20) and were joined within a week by AAF fighter elesheltered coves

ments and dive bombers from Enterprise, and by other elements as the campaign progressed. Until the island was secure (February 9), these forces flew interceptor patrols, offensive missions against shipping,

and close air support for the Marines and for Army troops them (October 13). Marine air units, carrying the major

relieving

air support burden, accounted for 427 enemy aircraft during the campaign.

United States forces began a slow advance up the Solomons chain leading toward Rabaul. As the Navy lost two carriers in the early part of the campaign, its first-line strength in the Pacific was reduced to two carriers, and this was a primary factor in explaining the slow progress of succeeding months. Guadalcanal air bases were expanded; the Russells were taken for an advanced fighter base; an amphibious campaign covered by planes from those bases took Munda and other points on New Georgia. From those airfields short amphibious advances took Vella Lavella and an island in the Treasury group on which further bases were built. A foothold at Torokina on Bougainville was obtained in November 1943. Only from here and from bases secured in similar short Southwest Pacific advances from New Guinea could land-based fighters finally reach the main Japanese base at Rabaul. Sixteen months elapsed from the date of the landing at Guadalcanal until the first South Pacific fighter planes flew over Rabaul less than 700 miles distant. Even then it was deemed desirable to take and develop further bases at Green Island and Emirau before the Rabaul area could be considered adequately covered; this consumed three months more. The lessons and consequences of this long drawn-out campaign were numerous. It afforded an opportunity to perfect tactics by which the heavily armored United States fighter planes could master the brilliantly maneuverable but unarmored Japanese. It confirmed the need for close support of troops by aircraft and provided in numerous landings a school for the development of suitable techniques.

The air war was conducted principally by Marine and Navy shorebased planes of carrier types. Using largely dive- and glide-bombing 90

tactics, small planes proved most suited to this type of sea and island warfare in a theater where the supply problem was critical. Whether in terms of hits per gallon of gasoline, hits per pound of

plane weight reflected in turn in time and effort of tion, hits

per dollar invested or

flight

crewmen

airfield construc-

risked, hits per

hour

and in hits per ton dropped, the small, single-engine, lowbomber with its crew of two or three and its ability to fly from short and narrow fields was the most effective weapon. Whatever the lessons from the first sustained experience with United States power, the Japanese failed to profit from them. In the face of rapid progress in radar search and fire control, night surface action once favorable to the inferior force and for which they had long trained was no better than action by day. But more important was what the Japanese lost: 2 carriers, 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 39 destroyers, and some 3,000 aircraft and crews. The losses in heavy ships were overshadowed by the attrition suffered in destroyers and other escort types which plagued them to the end of the war. Most serious of all was the loss of experienced air personnel, a loss which was never overcome. The Solomons campaign was a valuable laboratory to the side which could profit from experience. flown,

altitude

91

While in the Atlantic FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Two

important naval actions had been fought without the forces

themselves engaging in opposing surface gunfire. Aviation had demonstrated ofiFensive

element of the

its

latent

power

as

new American Navy. The

the principal loss of four of

weakened the powerful striking force with which the Japanese had achieved their conquests. They withdrew battleships and seaplane tenders from the fleet for hasty their finest aircraft carriers

conversion to carriers, but the Japanese navy never regained the it lost at Midway. The initiative had shifted to the United

position States.

But men had

to

be

trained, the

weapons of war produced

in

quantity before a fuU-scale ofiFensive could be initiated against the

Japanese Empire. Civilian authorities had placed a higher priority on the European Theater of Operations, however, which meant

and equipment from the Pacific. Naval aviation did not mark time while the industrial might of the United States was mobilized. Training programs of unprecedented scope were established throughout the country, for every specialty that would be needed in the heavy fighting to be found on the waterways to Japan. Qualifying pilots to fight from carrier decks was a need of such urgency that only ingenuity and planning on the highest order would provide the required methods. Naval leaders were more than equal to the task and a program founded on classic American diversion of personnel

commonsense was begun.

92

The Coal-Burning FROM

Carriers

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the Navy's pilot training program was well underway, but there was a definite need for actual carrier landing experience for fleet.

all

new

All the existing carriers

they reported to the

pilots before

were

in constant use in the battle zones

and couldn't be spared. However, the necessity of training carriers, operating without interruption, was of equal paramount importance. Neither the west nor east coast was a safe place for such training ships because of the submarine menace. It was too costly in both men and ships to provide complete armament plus escort vessels to cope with the enemy. Capt. R. F, Whitehead conceived the idea of operating in inland waters. Capt. D. C. Ramsey, assistant chief of BuAer, saw at once the merits of such an idea and both did their utmost to further negotiations.

Their efforts and planning eventually

made

possible actual carrier

landings in the protected waters of the Great Lakes where neither

submarine nor escort and gun emplacement protection were needed. Lake Michigan was the ideal operating area. Already Naval Air Station Glenview was functioning and Chicago had harbor facilities

and access

The next

to all necessary supplies.

step

was finding some

existing ships that could

be con-

verted into training carriers. Every shipyard was loaded to capacity

with

new

construction and every

oil and freight was needed had to be found.

for that purpose.

Early in January 1942, the C. and B. Transit

Company

new bottom

Navy began

A

survey

Some

other solution

negotiations vdth the

for the sale of the Seeandbee,

largest, coal-burning, side-wheeling excursion

the Great Lakes.

that could carry ore,

made by

the

War

one of the

steamers ever to ply

Shipping Administra-

tion disclosed that a refitting period of approximately three

would be adequate

months

to convert the ship into a training carrier.

93

On August

12,

1942, she

was christened the Wolverine and

proudly assumed her place in the line of commissioned ships of the Navy. With Cdr. G. R. Fairlamb as her first skipper, she steamed into Chicago, coal soot announcing her arrival.

was a satisfactory suban ocean-going carrier. Her flight deck was 550 feet, somewhat shorter than a large carrier, but longer than some of the newly converted merchantmen. Her speed was 16 knots, much slower than a regular carrier and, under certain v^nd conditions, takeoff and landing operations were impractical. Since she had no hangar deck, there were just 26 feet from flight deck to waterline. With a heavy sea rolling, it was imperative that pilots hold their altitude when taking off. In the first four months, more than 400 pilots had been qualified and some 3,000 takeoffs and landings recorded. Then she ran into winter weather. Operations became difficult because of heavy icing on her flight deck and bad weather on Lake Michigan. At about this time, a naval aviator said, "Give us another trainer like this one and we can qualify all new pilots in the whole aviation program for carrier duty." The Navy had already begun work on his wish. The largest passenger ship on the Great Lakes, the Greater Buffalo, was converted and commissioned the Sable on May 8, 1943. For

all

practical training purposes, she

stitute for

Her first skipper was Capt. Warren K. Berner. The Sable, similar to the Wolverine but with a slightly longer flight deck, was a coal-burning carrier too. Both ships consumed an average of 150 tons of bunker coal in 14 hours at

full

speed.

Operations were conducted on a year-round basis despite

all

weather

hazards. In 1945, their operating area experienced the most severe

winter in 39 years of Chicago Weather Bureau recorded history, but

both ships conducted operations with most gratifying results. Coast Guard craft from Chicago and nearby ports were pressed into service at various times to help break the massive ice fields of vdndrow ice encompassing the area. Because of operating risks, the ponderous ice fields were necessarily circumvented each day. Foul-weather gear issued by the Navy was given a most severe test aboard the carriers. Flight deck crews remained topside throughout operations and, even on the coldest days, were warm and dry. Reports from the ship's doctor on the Wolverine added good words to the overall picture. The daily binnacle lists throughout that period were the smallest in the ship's thirty-three-month history.

94

The

day's

work began

at sunrise

and ended only when sunset or

fog made operations too hazardous. Planes were dispatched from Glenview, rendezvousing over Point Oboe in Wilmette, Illinois. From there, they took their departure from the carriers. Sometimes, the planes were kept aboard and a number of pilots stayed over-

was usual possible and be on

night for the following day's operations. However, the pilot to complete his landing as fast as

way back to Glenview. The majority of the pilots who were

it

for his

qualified aboard the training

had already completed operational training and were ready who had just been commissioned at NAS Pensacola and NAS Corpus Christi, received additional operational training after finishing carrier qualifications. All pilots were given "bounce" drill at Glenview before coming aboard, then received a minimum of eight takeoffs and landings aboard the carriers. While the Navy wanted its pilots to get qualification training in carriers

for active fleet duty. Some,

service-type aircraft, plane shortages generally prevented the experience. F4F-3's

bomber

were used

for fighter groups

and SNJ's

for scout

and

pilots.

A

normal day's operations resulted in 30 pilots qualified, but on May 28, 1944 the Sable broke her record, qualifying 59 pilots in a normal operating day with 488 landings made in 531 minutes. In addition to training pilots, the carriers trained many hundreds of men and oflBcers for combat carriers. Arresting-gear crews from the Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia were given several months of training before transfer to CVE's then under construction. Every two weeks 15 men were received for four weeks training in flight deck procedure and further transfer to east or west coast carriers for combat duty. A number of aviators were trained in air department duties for new construction and student LSO's completed their instructions and training period aboard. The ships also served to give practical training for radar technicians, instructors from the radar school at

Navy

Pier.

During the war years, the Wolverine and Sable managed to compile some pretty impressive records too with the Wolverine chalking up over 65,000 landings and the Sable over 51,000. The "freshwater" carriers and those that ply the salt waters have more than absorbed their share of the training with raihoad timetable reUability.

95

Carriers in the Atlantic

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS The

naval war in the Atlantic was more remote from

its

Pacific

counterpart than the simple matter of geographic distances and other circumstances

made

it.

was responsible Europe so that the

Seair in the Atlantic

for opening, then protecting, the sea lanes to

major elements of war, men, and supplies, could be positioned to strike at Hitler-held Europe. The Germans, having learned well from World War I lessons they had taught, had concentrated their seapower efforts in the production of submarines. They eventually had a peak war strength of close to 400 submersibles, despite continuing losses.

Again, as in World

War

I,

their successes placed the Allies in

underwater vessels roamed the seas from the Americas to Europe-Africa practically at will. Operating singly or in packs they sunk 700,000 tons of shipping in June 1942, alone, and during the entire course of World War II their total toll was 2,753 ships amounting to 14,557,000 tons. It was a situation calling for immediate and drastic action. Sir Winston Churchill classed German submarines as the greatest single threat to the survival and ultimate victory of the Allies. And well they were, for the Germans sank an average of sixteen merchant ships for every submarine they lost, initially. The very lifeline of the fighting forces in Europe was in danger of being severed by the wily, torpedo-firing submarine. Allied antisubmarine warfare tactics were evolved and placed serious peril since the

into operation as quickly as possible. Prodigious efforts, involving

950 ASW ships and 2,200 ASW aircraft, had turned the tide by July 1943 and the Axis was losing two submarines, complete with crews, for each merchantman sunk. In all, 781 German and 85 Italian submarines were sent to the bottom during the war. 96

Antisubmarine aviation was one of the most effective Allied developments of World War II, and aircraft sank or took part in half of all

submarine

"kills."

than the effective employment of carrier-based aircraft against the submarine threat, however, was the use of the aircraft carrier in the Atlantic as a ferry for Army Air Force and British Fighters, as well as providing aircraft for Operation Torch,

Even

earlier

the invasion of North Africa. Carrier aircraft from the Ranger

and the

escort carriers Sanga-

mon, Suwanee, and Santee of Rear Adm. E. E. McWhorter's Task Group 34.2, covered the landings of Army troops near Casablanca and supported their operation until opposing French forces capitulated. The escort carrier Chenango accompanied assault forces and launched her load of 78 P-40's of the AAF 33rd Fighter Group, in additional support of the invasion.

97

"Sunken" Carrier Carries

On

FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS In April 1943 Adolf Hitler announced triumphantly that a German U-boat had sunk the U.S.S. Ranger, and he conferred the Oak Leaves to the Knight's insignia of the Iron Cross upon Lt. Otto von Bulow, the submarine commander credited with the feat. Unfortunately for the Nazis, the report of the Rangers sinking was grossly exaggerated. Instead of being at the bottom of the North Atlantic, the Ranger was busily engaged in ferrying U.S. Army

From

fighter planes across the Atlantic.

British bases, these fighter

planes were knocking Nazi airmen out of Em-opean skies and shep-

herding the bombers engaged in softening

German

defenses prepar-

atory to the invasion of the continent. Six

months

locker, she

after the

made

bombed and

Ranger was supposedly in Davey Jones' Norwegian waters as her planes

a daring foray into

German shipping to the bottom. bombastic announcement of her

blasted 40,000 tons of

That was her answer

to Hitler's

demise.

The

14,500-ton Ranger,

first

vessel of the

Navy

ever designed and

constructed as a carrier, was built by the Newport

News

Shipbuild-

& Drydock Company and commissioned on June 4, 1934. She has a 770-foot flight deck and can carry more than 80 planes. Eighteen days after she was put into commission the first regular plane landing aboard the new carrier was made by Adm. Ernest King, USN, now Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of J. Naval Operations, as the ship maneuvered off Lynnhaven Roads, Virginia. Adm. King then was Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, ing

with the rank of rear admiral. After the

war

started the

lantic, ti'ansporting

war.

her

Time

flight

Army

Ranger made many trips across the AtEuropean theater of

fighter planes to the

through submarine-infested waters, and hangar decks packed with planes. after time she slipped

98

was made on May 10, 1942, when the Ranger transported sorely needed Army Warhawks to within 40 miles of Africa and then sent them winging to friendly fields.

The

first

such

trip

In October 1943, the Ranger, while operating with a British task force, carried out a daring raid

on German shipping

in

Norwegian

waters well within reach of heavy concentrations of Nazi land-based

bombers. Planes from the carrier destroyed four merchantmen, a tanker and an oil barge; damaged other ships, and shot down a Junkers 88 and a Messerschmitt 110. The cost to the Ranger was three planes.

The raid was carried out in two phases with 16,000 pounds of bombs being dropped in the first attack, and 15,000 pounds in the second assault. It was the first combat action for 60 per cent of the airmen. Nevertheless, they carried out their assignments

carrier's

like veterans.

The Rangers most crushing blow

against the Axis probably

during the North African occupation,

Commander,

when

was

she served as the flag-

was one of five carriers which gave the invasion force air superiority. The Rangers aviators dropped more than 48 tons of bombs and fired more than 20,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition during the 60 missions to which they were assigned. Backbone of resistance was broken on the first day of the invasion —November 8— and the 200 flights made that day by Ranger airmen contributed greatly to neutralizing hostile naval units and shore batteries in the Casablanca area. On November 10, final day of fighting, two Ranger raids were credited with speeding the capitulation of ship of

enemy

Carriers Atlantic. She

forces.

In the

first

of these a

bombing

raid

was made on the Jean

Rart,

the French battleship which was persistently shelling United Na-

from her berth in Casablanca harbor. Nine planes armed with 1,000-pound bombs attacked the battlewagon, and she ceased firing after the fierce bombing. In the second raid nine Ranger planes, also armed with 1,000pound bombs, attacked and neutralized coastal defense guns and antiaircraft batteries located on Point El Hank and protecting Casations warships

blanca harbor. In every action the Ranger upheld the traditions of her namesake, the flagship of

Commodore John Paul 99

Jones.

Grumman Avengers of VC-9 squadron, based on the CVE, U.S.S. Bogue, attacked and sank the German submarine U-569 in the middle North Atlantic scoring the first sinking of the war by escort carriers while on hunter-killer patrol. The day was May 18, 1943, and it signaled a new era in the battle to keep the sea lanes open for our convoys to Europe.

The

Battle of the Atlantic

"The convoy reached port Almost forgotten a victory that

made

in the all

without

safely,

sweep

of

loss."

more spectacular successes

is

other victories possible: the winning of the

Battle of the Atlantic called "U-boat Alley," where, out of reach of air patrols, the Nazi submarines hunted Allied shipping. That they were gruesomely successful was hinted in brief newspaper stories of ships sent to the bottom and crews lost, but few

land-based

civilians

knew

the extent of the casualties in Allied shipping until

the figures for 1942 were released: 8 million gross tons lost to Nazi

U-boats in that year alone. Obviously, such a rate of loss had to be stopped or the Allied

cause would be defeated on the doorstep. The Navy's answer to the

U-boat was the escort carrier with cats as its hunting team.

The

Grumman

Avengers and Wild-

were affecwere either oilers or C-3 cargo hulls converted by the Navy, or carriers of the Casablanca class, built by Kaiser. Their decks were not more than 480 feet long and storage space was cramped. To these the Navy assigned fighters and torpedo bombers for maintaining patrol and hunting down the U-boats. The planes were well suited to baby carrier operation, being sturdy enough to withstand the shock of catapulting and full-stall landings, and being maneuverable at relatively low speeds. Further, their unique type first

escort carriers, or "baby flattops" as they

tionately called,

of wing-folding

made

possible the storing of five in the space that

100

two would occupy with wings outstretched.

All this,

and death

to

U-boats too. In 1940, U-boats had begun to operate in wolf packs. An individual submarine patroUing the sea lanes might spot an Allied convoy, say in the North Atlantic. Immediately, while continuing to

would call other subthere were enough of them to-

shadow the slow-moving

marines from distant points until

ships,

it

gether to attack the convoy in strength.

One

of the

pack might then seek

to feint the convoy's escorting

destroyers out of position while the rest attacked from another direction.

By

sheer numbers they usually

managed

to break through

the destroyer screen, loose their torpedoes and get away. Many ships were sunk; hence the Navy's decision to provide every considerable convoy with an air escort.

and Avengers was not so much to sink the submarines as to keep them under water. Submerged, U-boats are helpless. Only when they are surfaced do they have enough speed (about 20 knots) to overtake convoys. By keeping a constant patrol of the waters surrounding convoy operations, the airplanes from escorting flattops made it unsafe for a submarine to show its periscope within a radius of 50 miles. Flying the long stretches of routine patrol day after day, whether in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, Wildcat pilots and Avenger crews have had one of the Navy's most tedious and diflBcult assignments. While they must be constantly alert for their prey, they have also to be mindful of their bearings; the task of getting back to a dimesized carrier deck in any weather without landmarks is one for

The

chief job of the Wildcats

experts only. If in

the course of a long run a pilot can spot a surfaced sub-

marine on which to unload brighter.

which

is

his

bombs

or depth charges, his

day

is

The excitement of "bringing home the skipper's pants," Navy parlance for a sure kill, compensates for many hours'

uneventful patrol. trail-blazer in flying-techniques against U-boats was ComSquadron One of the U.S.S. Card. The first air squadron to operate from an escort carrier against submarines, this unit in 1943

The

posite

received the Presidential Unit Citation for sinking more submarines

than

all

other such teams combined.

Some convoy runs have been packed with more 101

action than others,

as illustrated

by a vivid

story of Allied operations cabled

New

Currivan from London to The

Through Arctic

gales,

York Times,

May

by Gene

19, 1944:

heavy murderous seas and pitch-black, sub-

zero nights, one of the largest convoys ever sent to Russia ran the gantlet of submarine attacks

and

aerial dogfights

without the

merchant ship. The action took place Cape, Norway, about 900 miles from the North Pole.

of a single

.

.

.

The naval

.

loss

North

off

.

.

escort included the aircraft carrier Chaser,

whose

Wildcat fighters damaged a Focke-Wulf 200 and a Junkers 88. These were among the swarms of German planes that harried the convoy from land bases. The convoy route to Russia at this point is so narrow, with North Cape on the one side and Arctic weather as a barrier on the other, that no great masses of ships can slip through unnoticed and all are prepared to fight every mile of the way. This, literally, was just what they had to do. In addition to battling their attacks

on the way back

way

to Russia they

to Britain.

had

to face

more

U-boats appeared in packs of

unusual size for recent months, and every crew member of the carrier planes reported having sighted at least one. .

.

.

Throughout all these engagements land-based German planes shadowed the convoy, but, whenever spotted, they were driven off by Wildcat fighters from the carrier. Dogfights in Arctic gales, with the weather 11 degrees below zero, were common each day. It was the first time that American-built planes had operated so far above the Arctic Circle.

So successful were escort carriers in the Atlantic in 1943 that that were 60 per cent less than in 1942. By the beginning

year's losses

one merchant ship in 1,000 was not getting through, and by May 1944, war-risk insurance for cargo on ship runs between the North and South American coasts and the British Isles had dropped to the low wartime figure of 3 per cent. Commented the New York Sun's correspondent W. C. Heinz after a seven weeks' assignment aboard a flattop in the Atlantic, "The lane that used to be known as U-boat Alley is now U-boat Graveof 1944 only

yard."

Thus German Admiral Karl Doenitz, guiding genius of the submarine woKpack technique, did not foresee the menace of planes when he boasted, "An aircraft can no more kill a submarine than a crow can kiU a mole." 102

Back

in the Pacific,

Adm. Nimitz was gathering

the ships for a

crushing counteroffensive which would be spearheaded by the new 33,000-ton Essex-class carriers. To aid and abet the master plan, con-

ceived years before in mock Naval War College battles and seminars, Nimitz also had the smaller Independence-cZa^s carriers to work with.

These vessels, as Cdr. Dater pointed out earlier in this section, were based on proposals made, but rejected, in 1925 by the Navy's General Board. The Independence-c^s carriers were built on 10,000-ton Cleveland-cZa55 cruiser hulls.

The concept of the American counteroffensive was to force the Japanese fleet into action by slashing across the Central Pacific, thereby cutting the enemy's routes to the newly conquered areas of Southern Asia and the East Indies. This would deny the Japanese the oil and food sources they had so desperately sought and which had provided the impetus

for their aggressive actions.

The Grand Design LT. CDR. H. M. DATER,

The plan in

USNR

general was no great secret. Japanese strategists twisted

their hats around, and, thinking

what they would do

in

Nimitz' place, fairly accurately predicted the grand outline.

took their precautions accordingly, relying heavily upon

air

Adm. They power

based upon the coral atolls and volcanic islands that dotted the ocean west of Hawaii. These were their unsinkable aircraft carriers, each defended by a garrison of tough, fanatical troops who would have to be overcome before the next stronghold could be taken. As they filled in the outline, the planners of the Pacific Fleet discovered the fatal weakness in the Japanese strategy. The enemy had spread his resources thin. If superior force could be brought to bear from the sea, any particular point could be overcome and occupied; and if the aircraft within range of that same point were once destroyed, and their fields knocked out, a small number of United 103

States land-based planes

would

the fleet maintained

sufiBce to

keep them neutralized.

the forward area, the Japanese could not relieve or recover their garrisons except by a fleet Finally,

if

itself in

action of their own. If the Japanese failed to act,

it ceased to matter tough the garrisons were. They could be by-passed and left to wither on the vine. Could it be done? A tremendous amount of careful preparation

how

was required, not only by the Navy but by the Army and Marine Corps as well, for all services had their place in the grand design. Basically it was necessary to send not only a conventional surface fleet to sea, but also an air force and an army. Furthermore, if the momentum of the campaign was to be sustained, the base itself had to be put afloat and dragged along. So to the war vessels and amphibious craft were added tankers and tenders, reefers and supply ships, floating dry docks and storage barges. Finally there were the Navy Construction Battalions (Seabees) and the Army Engineers who were to dredge safe harbors and roll out the airfields from which the land-based aircraft, those policemen of the skies, would operate to keep the by-passed enemy garrisons in a properly humble

A

noted British military historian has called the design, construction, and assemblage of these mighty forces "perhaps the greatest organizational feat in all naval history." attitude.

The success of the campaign depended upon the ability of Essexand Independence-class carriers to neutralize Japanese land-based aircraft and to maintain the air superiority once established. This clearly entailed the further responsibility of intercepting and destroying any attempt at reenforcement whether by air or surface. To the carriers were joined the new battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to create the greatest concentration of naval striking power in the history of the world. All the ships had greatly increased antiaircraft armament, and the new carriers possessed more effective damage control equipment and safer fuel systems. Aircraft complements had been changed to provide more fighters, and the new improved models of aircraft had better flight characteristics and armament. The fresh, young pilots had been thoroughly trained to exploit the advantages of their own equipment and take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses. But most important of all was the revolution in tactics to which those changes contributed. During 1942, when carriers had operated in pairs, they dispersed under attack, 104

each taking part of the protecting screen of surface vessels with it. Henceforward, they were to operate in a task group usually of three or four and to maintain formation within the screen at all times.

The

results

would be

volume of antiaircraft fire, more and the use of fewer fighters were defended individually. Two or more such a greater

positive protection against submarines,

each carrier groups in close supporting distance of one another constituted a than

if

fast carrier task force.

The called

situation

upon

could be foreseen in which the fast

to fight a fleet

engagement or

to interdict

carriers,

enemy air at The escort

a distance, would be unable to support landing forces.

however, had shovni their ability to fly close air support in North Africa, and it was decided to use them for a similar carriers,

Even though they lacked the combat carriers, the risk did not appear unduly great, because it was expected the Japanese aircraft in the objective area would have been knocked out before the amphibious role in the Central Pacific offensive.

protective features of the

forces arrived.

105

After the victory of Midway, as we have seen, the air war shifted South Pacific theater where the bloody battles of the Solomon

to the

Islands were fought and won. In the meantime, new carriers were commissioned and readied for combat— Essex, Yorktown, Lexington, Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, and Cowpens, These ships assembled at Pearl Harbor during the summer and autumn of 1943 and began the training exercises which were the necessary preliminaries to an offensive sweep across the Central Pacific. On August 31 the first of the dress rehearsals took place at Marcus Island where a task force built around the Essex, Yorktown, and Independence struck that Japanese outpost for the second time during the war. On September 1, in a concurrent operation, the Princeton and Belleau Wood covered the unopposed landing on Baker Island; and eighteen days later, with the new Lexington, they raided Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. Finally, on October 5-6, the largest carrier task force yet assembled, carriers then available, attacked air

and surface

the

first

tactics.

The

Wake

curtain

was

composed

of the seven

new

Island in a test of revised now ready to be raised on

amphibious operation of the Central

Pacific offensive.

The Task Force Shows Its Strength: The Gilberts Campaign EDITED BY LT.

Our the

A. R.

BUCHANAN, USNR

seizure of the Gilbert Islands was a logical development in

war

against Japan. This group of coral atolls

and most

in the shortest

invasion force the

ominous

would shorten our supply Hues

enemy threat,

was the

direct route to the empire.

transfer the action to

fiist

step

successful

southwest

to the

to divide his strength in order to

and

A

Pacific,

meet a new and

an area ideally suited for

the operation of our new, fast carrier task force.

Task Force

50,

Pownall, was the

commanded by Rear Adm. first

edition of the

106

famed

(later Vice

air-surface

Adm.) striking

Task Force 58 and Task Force 38, which swept the sea from the Gilberts to the Sea of Japan. All the experience of the South Pacific campaign, the early raids across the Central Pacific, and the recent rehearsal strikes had gone into force, later

its

known

alternately as

development.

The combined

carrier force, comprising 6 large carriers, 5 light 8 escort carriers, and about 900 planes, had an ambitious program: In addition to establishing and maintaining air superiority carriers,

in the area, this force

the assault, conduct

was

to neutralize

medium

enemy

defenses, support

searches ahead of the assault forces,

provide fighter protection, maintain antisubmarine patrol, provide gunfire spotting, and maintain continuous observations and reports over the objectives, Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama. These tasks not only reflect the importance of naval aircraft in amphibious operations; they suggest that air units were the principal factor in the control of sea areas.

was November 20, 1943. During the week before, the four groups of Task Force 50 began converging on the islands, two groups on a track from Pearl Harbor and two from Espiritu Santo. The interceptor group (Task Group 50.1), which was built around the Yorktown, Lexington, and Cowpens and commanded by Rear Adm. Pownall, operated in an area between the Marshalls and Gilberts in order to intercept

D-Day

for the initial landings in the Gilberts

attacks launched from the northern atolls against our assault troops.

November 19 and 26 this group inflicted damage on the enemy, principally at Mili and Jaluit. For

In the period between severe

a loss of 5 pilots and 2 crew members, aircraft of the 3 carriers shot

up Japanese

airfields,

sank a small cargo ship, and burned 50

enemy planes on the ground and in the air. Their efforts reduced enemy plane availability in the Marshalls and prepared the way for amphibious forces to enter the Gilberts area

unmolested by

air attack.

Task Group 50.2, the northern group, was commanded by Rear A. W. Radford and included the Enterprise, Belleau Wood, and Monterey. This group was assigned the mission of gaining and maintaining control of the air at Makin and providing direct support to the Northern Assault Force, whose task was the conquering of that atoll. Operations were unspectacular until the night of November 25 when the task group came under a deter-

Adm.

107

mined the

which was repulsed by gunfire. The next night Japanese snooped the group and Adm. Radford ordered air

attack

night fighters launched against approaching torpedo bombers. Betty's

were shot

the Navy's

first

Two

but Lt. Cdr. E. H. "Butch" O'Hare, one of heroes and an experimenter in night tactics,

do\\Ti

air

failed to return to the Enterprise.

Both the Interceptor Group and the Northern Group had sortied from Pearl Harbor; the carriers of the Southern Group (Task Group 50.3) and the Relief Group (Task Group 50.4) had recently participated in the early November raids on Rabaul and consequently approached from the south. The Southern Group was commanded by Rear Adm. A. E. Montgomery and included the carriers Essex, Bunker Hill, and Independence. Formed on November 15 near the Ellice Islands, it proceeded north to Tarawa where it supported the Marines in their epic struggle on Betio Island. Under sporadic attack throughout its operating period, the task group met a flight of sixteen to eighteen Bett)^'s at dusk on D-Day which succeeded in putting one torpedo in the Independence. The planes had come in low over the water and were not picked up by radar after they had been seen by an alert spotter. Excellent damage control enabled the Independence to steam, under its own power, to Funafuti for temporary repairs. The Relief Group (Task Group 50.4) left Espiritu Santo on November 15 under the command of Rear Adm. F. C. Sherman. On November 19 the Saratoga and Princeton launched strikes against

Nauru (Pleasant) Island and, with air opposition negligible, removed any threat of its planes to the

neutralized the airfield and

success of the Gilberts operation. Following this action the group

escorted the

Makin and Tarawa

garrison forces to the

thereafter operating to the southeast of relief carrier

Tarawa

in

its

combat

area,

capacity as a

group, subject to caU in support of ground troops.

By November 26 islands storined

the air battles had been won, the strategic and taken, and the success of the operation assured.

The Commander

in Chief, Pacific Fleet, therefore, effected a re-

organization of the fast carrier task force in anticipation of interim operations before the invasion of the Marshall Islands.

A

striking

composed of the Yorktown, Lexington, Essex, Enterprise, Cowpens, Belleau Wood, and screening ships under the command of Rear Adm. PownaU, hit Wotje and Kwajalein on December 4,

force

108

Bulwark

of naval air

power

in

the Pacific at the time of Pearl Harbor were

the carriers Lexington (above), Enterprise, and Saratoga. The Japanese erred greatly in not accompUshin
tchich gave

them

their

first

It

was the

''Lex'

and

"Big,

£"

defeat in the Coral Sea six months after Pearl

Harbor.

Japanese photo taken at start of attack on December 7, 1941. Battleship row in foreground. Pearl Harbor Naval Base in background. ALL PHOTOS COURTESY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

I

USS Hornet with B-25s on deck on

SBDs on deck

of

the

way

to

mid Tokyo.

en Enterprise, part of the Task Force escorting Hornet April 18, 1942. Hornet appears in distance. raid

USS

route to Tokyo for

of

I

An Army famous

B-25 takes

off

from the Hornet and

is

soon on

its

nay

for the

raid.

Japanese planes attaek the Hornet during the Battle of Santa Cruz, October 26, 1942. Bomber in upper left center crashed into the signal bridge of the carrier.

Ahoic: Battle Sea,

of the Coral

May, 1942. Japanese Shoho im-

aircraft carrier

mediately after a torpedo hit. U.S. Kaiy planes scored repeated hits on Japanese ship.

Aircraft

ington

the

big

carrier

USS Lex-

burning

following

the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Above: The "Lex" during initial stages of abandoning ship. Attempt is being made to pump water from destroyer along starboard side into carrier s fires.

Another

destroyer at the port quarter

is

trying to take off crew.

When

all

personnel were

off

the "Lex," U.S. destroy-

ers

put an end to the gal-

lant carrier

to sink

bombs.

which refused

from Japanese

.iSSgf:

This happy group of carrier pilots tangled icith 21 Japanese planes, shot 17 with no U.S. losses. Morale in naval air units aboard carriers in the

down

Pacific

was

high.

fxercehj after being struck by three Japanese torpedoes near the Solomon Islands on September 15, 1942. duty while on escort

USS Wasp burns

Bombing

of the

USS Yorktown during

the Battle of

Sioan song of the Yorktown nears. Listing heavily, she by all but a salvage party.

Midway, June 1942.

is

already abandoned

Japanese attack on the

USS

Enterprise,

gust 1942. This

!^^-

hit

and

on the

Au-

bomb

jli^ht

deck

killed the Photog-

rapher's

Mate

icho

took the picture.

14

Below: Aerial view of USS Saratoga en-

.':..,

the

route to Rabaul Island.

^""-y.

^

^^

\

„ji^^

"*'*V

.-

.;-"

^-^,

'^iiI^m^^^m^'^^MhMI^^^I

'

^^^^^i^E^^^^^^afe*

IP ^^

^^P|i«MS

^

y^ m^k

^^>>X"-"

•^^'^=•v

N 1.

.2lhr»

1\^

A

P-40 takes

off

from the USS Chenango, an escort

carrier.

V-mfi

Baby

flattops, icith a portion of their

Pacific.

destroyer screen, steaming through the

December

1944.

An SB2C comes

carrier operating in the South

in for a landing on board an Essex-class

China

Sea.

A

Japanese suicide plane missed and crashed

that

alongside the

USS Sanga-

mon. Marshall

Islands.

Japanese torpedo plana being, shot fleet carrier.

Personnel in a carrier radar room.

down by

antiaircraft fire

from a

Pacific

Landing

officer

USS Essex off

to

a

aboard the

gives the wave-

returning

plane.

Planes from the Essex have just

bombed enemy

installa-

tions in the Philippines.

Kwajalein,

1944.

War

tcasnt always grim. These

Saratoga

sailors

enjoy

swim, beside their ship.

a

Crewmen

(above) loading

on small carts aboard the Essex. On flight deck (below) they are installed on an F6F in preparation for a raid on Okinawa. January 1945. 5-in. rockets

F

n

?WH-HtHiiHii-HH.y

i.f

so

-^

s

4^

»=isliiSs,i

3

Ci:

-

*

1

o to

S\5 Ait Japanese dive—bvmffer diving into the deck of the

Essex.

The Enterprise is attacked by Japanese Kamikaze (suicide) planes during operations

1945.

off

Okinawa.

May

1

A

^re-rescue

man

in

bestos suit on board

as-

USS

Saratoga. September 1945.

Funeral services aboard the Saratoga for two men killed

during raid on Rabaul. Shipmates bearing, litter stand by flight deck after

body

is

consigned to the

sea.

destroying an estimated 78 planes and sinking and damaging several ships. After recovery of the air groups the task force com-

menced

retirement.

The Japanese made two

small, sneak torpedo

and sent continuous but hesitant attacks from dusk until after midnight. During the night the Lexington was discovered by flares and struck by one torpedo, but withdrew successfully without further injury. The story of the escort carriers during the Gilbert Islands campaign is one of experiment mixed with tragedy. On D-Day, Rear Adm. H. M. MuUinix and his group of three carriers, the Liscome Bay, Coral Sea, and Corregidor, began operations in support of the Makin landings as part of Rear Adm. R. M. GriflBns Air and Surface Support Group (Task Group 52.13). The success of the landings can be attributed, in part, to the bombing and strafing missions of the CVE planes and to the air coverage which they provided for the amphibious units in the Makin area; but aircraft losses were high and the experimental nature of the operation was evident. On the morning of November 24, while 16 miles off Makin attacks in the early afternoon

Liscome Bay was struck by a submarine torpedo. The ship exploded amidships, burst into flames, and showered a destroyer, 5,000 yards away, with sparks and burning debris. An Island, the

observer reported that "a few seconds after the

first

explosion, a

second explosion which seemed to come from inside the Liscome Bay burst upwards, hurling fragments and clearly discernible planes 200 feet or more in the air. The entire ship seemed to explode and glowed with almost at the same instant the interior of the ship .

.

.

flame like a furnace." At 0535, twenty minutes after being carrier sank

700

oflBcers

by the stern with the and men.

loss of

hit,

the

Rear Adm. MuUinix and

the south, Rear Adm. V. H. Ragsdale led his division of three carriers, the Sangamon, Sutvanee, and Chenango, plus the

To

Barnes and Nassau, in support operations against Tarawa. This group (Task Group 53.6) maintained combat, intermediate and antisubmarine patrols, made searches, conducted hunter-killer operations, and provided bombing strafing support for forces ashore. Upon the annihilation of the Japanese garrison at Tarawa, the group moved eastward and provided routine air coverage for our

Apamama. The work of the escort

units at

carriers at

109

Makin, Tarawa, and

Apamama

can best be judged by what was learned and later applied in support operations across the Pacific to Okinawa. The Gilberts campaign

was the medium

of their formative experience. In

it

they learned

the technique of support for ground troops and of tactical maneuver-

ing with amphibious forces. sized the vulnerability

The

loss of the

and hmitations

Liscome Bay empha-

of the type but did not

change the previous concept of its use. After their experience in the Gilbert Islands the CVE's became efficient and necessary components of each succeeding invasion. The campaign was more than a proving ground for the escort carriers. The four-group fast carrier task force appeared for the first time and learned the lessons of amphibious support. Experiments with night fighters uncovered their defects but established their future in combat operations. And new planes, the Hellcat and the Helldiver, revealed a superiority over Japanese types. Here, then, was a rehearsal on a grand scale for the events of the future. The role of naval air power in the Gilbert Islands campaign demonstrated the ancient but fundamental principle of warfare that overwhehning force is the key to victory. From the beginning the carrier planes of Task Force 50 were able to deny the adjacent seas to the enemy fleet; in a matter of hours they reduced Japanese air opposition to scattered nuisance raids from the MarshaUs. The defenders of Tarawa, fighting grimly from their battered forts, called in vain for help which might have changed the fortunes of war. In a real sense, therefore, our carrier planes insured the victory.

For the fate of the enemy was sealed even before the Marines struggled ashore to go about the bloody work of conquest.

110

Twelve carriers, six large and six light of the Independence class, participated in the second amphibious operation of the offensive against Japan. The landings in the Marshall Islands were much like those of the Gilberts campaign except for better execution, due to lessons learned in the latter.

Control of the air proved, once again, to be the key to successfully landing an invasion force on enemy -occupied territory.

Occupation of the Marshall Islands FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Six heavy and six light carriers, in four groups of Task Force 58

(Rear Adm. M. A. Mitscher), opened the campaign to capture the Marshalls on January 29, 1944, with heavy air attacks on Maloelap, Kvi^ajalein, and Wotje. On the first day the defending enemy air forces were ehminated and complete control of the air was maintained by carrier aircraft during the entire operation. Eight escort carriers, attached to the Attack Forces of the Joint Expeditionary Force, arrived in the area early the morning of D-Day. Aircraft from the carriers flew cover and antisubmarine patrols for attack shipping

and

assisted

two

fast-carrier

groups,

providing air support for landing on Kwajalein and Majuro

atolls,

Roi and Namur, and for operations ashore. Two fast-carrier groups west kept Eniwetok Atoll neutralized until these initial objectives were achieved. Their early achievement permitted the second phase of the campaign, seizure of Eniwetok, earlier than the planned date of May 10. The landings on February 17 and the to the

ground action were supported by aircraft from one fast-carrier group and one escort carrier group. Covering operations were provided by the First Strike on Truk, carried out by the Truk Striking Force (Vice Adm. R. A. Spruance), built around three fast-carrier groups. In a two-day attack, the carriers launched 1,250 combat sorties against this key naval base and exploded the myth 111

of

its

impregnability with 400 tons of

bombs and

torpedoes, sinking

37 war and merchant ships aggregating 200,000 tons and doing heavy damage to base installations. In this action, the first night-

bombing attack in the history of U.S. carrier aviation, carried out by VT-10 from Enterprise with 12 radar-equipped TBF-lC's, heavy damage resulted. In a brief enemy air attack on the same night, the U.S.S. Intrepid was hit by an aerial torpedo.

112

Landings

at

HoUandia

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Task Force 58 supported the landings

of Southwest Pacific Forces

New Guinea coast. and seven Hght carriers, organized in three groups, launched preliminary strikes on airfields around Hollandia and at Wakde and Sawar, covered the landings at Aitape, Tanahmerah Bay, and Humboldt Bay, and supported troop movements ashore. Eight escort carriers of Task Force 78 (Rear Adm. R. E. Davison) flew cover and antisubmarine patrols over ships of the Attack Group during the approach and provided support for the amphibious assault at Aitape. Carrier aircraft accounted for the destruction of 30 enemy aircraft in the air and 103 on the ground. in the Hollandia-Aitape section of the north

The

force of five heavy

113

Atlantic Prize of

War

FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Off Cape

Blanco, Africa, a hunter-killer group,

commanded by

Capt. D. V. Gallery, composed of the escort carrier Guadalcanal,

with VC-8's aboard, and five destroyer escorts, carried out a determined attack on the German submarine U-505, forcing it to surface. Boats from the destroyer escort Pillsbury and the carrier reached the submarine before scuttling charges could accomphsh their

purpose and the U.S. Navy found

114

itself

v^th a prize of war.

The powerful striking forces gathered in the Central Pacific were ready to meet the biggest test of their capabilities, the Marianas. These large volcanic islands were unlike the Gilberts and Marshalls, scattered coral atolls, in other than their physical makeup. The Marianas, capable of defense in depth, were an important link in the inner defense line of the Japanese, whereas the coral atolls were little more than outposts on the perimeter. Enemy reaction to the threat posed by the eight large and eight light carriers at the heart of the invading force, while not

due

to the hesitancy of

enemy command, was

strong.

immediate,

But

it

was not

capable of coping with the rapid advances in tactics and technology made by carrier task forces, especially in the use of radar. Ample

warning of enemy attacks was gained by superb radar technique, and the debacle which resulted has become known as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot." Large enemy formations were broken up far from our carriers by radar-warned and vectored fighters, and those that managed to get through were picked out of the sky by defending antiaircraft fire. Nearly four hundred Japanese aircraft were destroyed: 366 in aerial combat, 15 to ships' guns, and 17 on the ground. This story not only gives an inside look at the methods used to create such widespread havoc amongst enemy forces, but it gives an insight into the type of man we had leading our fighting forces. When Adm. Marc Mitscher lit up the Pacific skies so that his overdue flyers could find home, he wrote a page in the annals of world military history that will live as long as

special place for the veteran

Naval

as well as in the hearts of those

man.

And

it

reserved a very

pilot in the aviators Valhalla,

still flying.

First Battle of the Philippine Sea THEODORE TAYLOR Just after breakfast the next morning, Cdr. Ernest Snowden went up to the flag bridge and offered to lead a group of Hellcats in a search for the enemy.

115

"They're a long "I'll

way

off,"

use volunteers,"

Mitscher said.

Snowden

replied.

Then he

briefly outlined

a plan to load the Hellcats with 500-pound bombs, with delayed-

action fuses.

Mitscher seemed receptive. He said, "You'd better take a bomber with you." Some of the bombers had radar sets in them. Mitscher was concerned about navigation on the long flight. Finally, he said, "I've got a search out that should be back about I'll send you out." Snowden, who was Gen. "Hap" Arnold's son-in-law, went down to the fighter ready room and chalked twelve numbers on the bulletin board, with his own name beside the first. Then he turned to the pilots: "Gentlemen, this is strictly volunteer. Chances are less than fifty-fifty you'll get back. I need eleven people. My name is on the top of the list." Snowden left the ready room, and when he came back about a half hour later, all the numbers had names

1100. If I don't get anything,

beside them.

The early-morning search group was recovered shortly after Snowden ran up to the bridge, and the admiral nodded his okay. Then, as Snowden walked toward the ladder, Mitscher called after him: "I want you to go back and tell those boys that if you make contact and anybody gets shot down, I'll come and pick them up even if I have to steam the whole damn fleet up after them." Snowden's long-range search group was launched at 1200. They went out 475 nautical miles— on the longest search of the war up to that time— and then Snowden turned them back toward the task force. There was not a sign of the Japanese fleet. At 1512, during the three-hour return leg, Snowden heard an Enterprise plane radio a 1100, having found nothing.

contact to the task force.

down from

his chair and Burke was on the TBS: "Indications are our birds have sighted something big." Mitscher waited for verification, along with information about distance, course, and speed. It came finally. The enemy was about 275 miles away. At the same time— 1548— Burke was back on the TBS: "Have received following. Enemy fleet sighted 15-02 N, 135-25 E, speed 20 knots. Course, 270. Reception was poor. Anybody heard

Back on the Lexington, Mitscher

slid

followed Burke into flag plot. Seconds

116

later,

check position, course, and speed. Anybody transmission contact the commander, Task Force

di£Ferent transmission

heard

dijfferent

58."

would be late afternoon before the planes could reach the enemy and completely dark by the time they could get home. He could count on heavy losses. Operating at such extreme range, many planes would run out of gas as they searched in the dark for their carriers, and would be forced into the sea. Each second of indecision, however, brought nightfall closer and reduced the chances of success. Mitscher conferred with Burke and the other senior staflF members, but Burke felt the admiral had already made up his mind. Then Mitscher gave the order to launch planes. The ticker tapes in the ready rooms recorded the range and bearing— all the information the pilots needed— and the squawk box ordered: "Pilots, man your Mitscher launched a strike now,

If

it

planes." At 1553, Mitscher informed Spruance he intended to launch everything he had. His Action Report said later:

The

decision to launch strikes

was based on

so

damaging and

slowing enemy carriers and her ships that our battle line could close

during the night and at daylight sink all the ships that our battle was believed that tliis was the last time that

line could reach. It

the Japanese could be brought to grips and their

enemy

fleet

Taking advantage of this opportunity was going to cost us a great deal in planes and pilots because we were launching at maximum range of our aircraft at such time as it would be necessary to recover them after dark. It was realized also that this single-shot venture for planes which were sent out in the afternoon would probably be not all operational for a morning strike. Consequently, the 5th Fleet was informed that the carriers were firing their bolt. destroyed once and for

By

1630, the

first

all.

deckloads were

away— 85

fighters,

77 dive

bombers, and 54 torpedo planes. As they dropped out of sight, a second message came in from searchers, locating the enemy fleet 60 miles further away. It was a stunning blow. At best, the original position gave the pilots an even chance in returning to the task force.

make

The new

position

would

night landings inevitable.

the casualty

list

was sure

to

strain the last If

ounce of

fuel,

and

Mitscher didn't recall the planes,

be heavy. 117

After rechecking the charts, Mitscher decided not to recall them.

However, he did tell Burke to cancel the second deckload and Adm. Spruance that the rest of the planes would be held

inform

until morning.

A few minutes before sunset, Task Force 58 pilots found small Japanese units and then jBnally reached the wildly maneuvering enemy

Ozawa had

most of his fighters in the previous what he had as the American dive bombers and torpedo planes attacked. Although the attacks were not coordinated, there was little interference. In the shadows, it was difficult to see how much damage was being done, although carriers.

lost

day's shooting, but launched

the inter-plane radios

chattered enthusiastically.

Actually,

only

was sunk. Two had been previously downed by submarines, and in addition, two oilers had been sunk. Then the planes started home, but not in usual formation. They flew independently, or flocked together in any order for company. Mitscher had been out on the bridge wing since he launched them and ate his dinner from a tray. Every minute or so, he'd look at the sun's position, and check the big, luminous-dialed watch on his left wrist. At the turn of dusk, the loudspeaker in flag plot announced: "Attacks completed. Two CV sunk." Ralph Weymouth, a bit optimistic, had sent the message as the planes flew toward the force, now shadowy in the twilight. Mitscher changed the axis of the fleet and spread the task groups to a distance of 15 miles apart. By then, the pilots were within 70 miles. They had picked up homing signals and were visible on the task-force radar screens. But it was very late. Fuel tanks were one

carrier, the Hitaka,

almost dry. Mitscher informed Spruance of several course changes

he planned to make

after recovering the pilots

reach the task-force disposition.

He

who managed

to

told Spruance he intended to

steam the task force in a direction that would enable recovery of the who had gone down in the ocean, and he also urgently requested Dumbo planes to join the search for pilots. Mitscher was facing the worst disaster in naval aviation history. He added speed until the carriers were surging along at 22 knots. By 2030, planes were sighted, scattered without pattern in the western sky. To the south were rays of lightning, and some pilots headed toward the false beacon. At 2045, a few aircraft began to orbit in confusion, their red and green lights flashing. pilots

118

knew

was almost exhausted. They had to be brought in. Now the sky was filling up over the task groups. The pilots knew the task force was down there— they could even see the wakes of the ships— but there was no way to distinguish Mitscher

their fuel supply

the carriers.

Adm. Mitscher

slipped

into flag plot, sitting

down from

down

at the very

and walked end of the transom. He lit a

his swivel chair

and looked up at Capt. Burke. "Turn on the lights," he said. Task Force 58 suddenly leaped from darkness, temptingly visible to any nearby submarines. Searchlight beams climbed straight into the sky; others pointed toward the carrier decks. Glow lights outlined the decks; truck lights flashed on mastheads in the outer screen. Cruisers threw up a procession of star shells, flooding the ocean with light. Said one carrier pilot, Lt. Cdr. Robert A. Winston, USNR: "The efi^ect on the pilots left behind was magnetic. They stood openmouthed for the sheer audacity of asking the Japs to come and get us. Then a spontaneous cheer went up. To hell with the Japs around us. Our pilots were not to be expendable." Then the planes started coming in. They were trying to locate their home ships. Mitscher said, "Tell 'em to land on any carrier." Some made landing approaches on cruisers and battleships. More ran out of gas and made controlled water landings. Some cigarette

The heard din could be Through the destroyers were working overtime. the mournful beeping of the whistles on pilots' life jackets. Men glided right into the paths of destroyer searchlight beams.

adrift!

on the Lexington but the seventh refused a wave-off. He was high, but cut his engines and landed, bouncing over the barrier and plowing into a row of parked planes on the bow, sparks and flame Ughting up the deck. In ten minutes, an incredibly short time to clear up the strewn wreckage. Flight Deck Chief Prather had the Lexington ready to operate again, and the planes began landing. On Cabot, Yorktown, and Bunker Hill, and all the other carriers, the tumultuous drama was being repeated. Several carriers had so many planes on the flight deck that airborne craft couldn't be landed. Their captains ordered planes pushed over the side. Six planes settled safely

119

Although he had

set a

precedent for these rescue procedures in

the Battle of Midway, Mitscher's decision to light up the fleet in the Marianas stands in naval aviation history with the surface

Navy's "Damn the torpedoes! Go ahead!" That night, Mitscher endeared himself to every man who wore gold wings, and won the admiration of all sailors. When the account of what had happened reached the press, Mitscher acquired new and greater stature. In stories about the admiral words like "compassion" and 'Tiumanitarian"

began

to

accompany

Two hundred and when

appraisals of his fighting ability.

sixteen planes

had been launched. By 2230,

the last of the surviving aircraft landed and Mitscher once

again turned the task force after the enemy, only a hundred of the planes that had taken part in the strike were

left. It

was impossible

rapidly to count the survivors and tally the missing.

By

early

was estimated that 80 planes had gone down in the sea or been destroyed in landing accidents. Twenty were estimated to be combat losses. Rescues continued throughout the night and into the next day. By dusk of June 21, all but 16 pilots and 22 crewmen had been rescued. Meanwhile, at 0450, on June 21, Mitscher informed Spruance he did not think it would be possible to close the enemy at a speed greater than 15 knots. Fuel shortage would not permit them to move faster, and the recovery of tlie pilots had taken the force a good 60 miles farther away from Ozawa's battered remnants. During the morning, Mitscher reorganized Task Force 58, sending a carrier group with the battle-line forces chasing the fleeing enemy. As the day wore on and other searches were futilely launched, it became increasingly evident that the Japanese would probably get morning,

it

away. Adm. Spruance canceled the search at 1920 that night. But there was gloom on the flag bridge of the Lexington. Mitscher had gambled at the last moment. He had won, but his winnings

what they might have been. A considerable had escaped. He summed up the battle in his Action Report: "The enemy had escaped. He had been badly hurt by one aggressive carrier strike at the one time he was within range. His fleet was not sunk." So ended the Battle of the Philippine Sea in flag country of the were small compared

to

portion of the Japanese fleet

U.S.S. Lexington, June 21, 1944.

120

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was easily the most complex naval engagement of World War 11. It may rank as such in the recorded world history of sea war. Leyte Gulf was also a confusing affair. Two complete volumes of the official Naval History of World War II have been devoted to the subject in an effort to reduce the multitude of events, actions, and counteractions, and the like, to an easily understood explanation of what really happened off the Philippines in October 1944.

Our

selection concerns itself with the action off Samar, of the

escort carriers—the

baby

flattops, jeep carriers, or

what have you.

It is an inspiring story. The dependence and interdependence of each element of Task Force 77 on each other element is readily

seen.

Also readily apparent vessel present

and how

is

the complete team effort by every type was to the successful outcome.

vital this

They Ran ... But

Won

FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS It

was not planned

that way: the job of our CVE's, standing

Samar Island on the morning air

of October 24, 1944,

was

oflF

to provide

support for the five-day-old invasion of the Philippines. They

were not there to fight a fleet engagement. But they did— and they won. How they won, whipping and turning back a powerful unit of the Japanese fleet, makes one of the strangest stories ever told of war at sea: The losers had heavy odds in their favor. The wdnners, even as they won, thought they had lost. They were running all the time they were winning. Gallant United States DD's and DE's, at the height of the chase, whirled about from get-out-of -formation, raced to within 4,500 yards of Japanese battleships and carriers, launched crippling torpedo attacks and peppered their big opponents with gunfire at pointblank range. ,

121

Our

had spent their ammunition and and sped his rout by making dummy some dropping their extra gas tanks as make-

carrier planes, after they

torpedoes, divided

runs on his ships,

enemy

fire

beheve bombs. It all started

enough— if even

quietly

the routine launching of

can be called quiet— vdth the planes, setting about normal day's work over Leyte, taking off before dawn that morning from the three escort carrier groups. On the south, closest to the mouth of Leyte Gulf, was the group commanded by Rear Adm. Thomas L. Sprague, USN, who also was in overall command of the three groups. In this group were the CVE's Petrof Bay, Capt. J. L. Kane, USN; Sangamon, Capt. M. E. Browder, USN; Santee, Capt. R. E. Blick, USN; Savo Island, Capt. C. E. Ekstrom, USN; and Suwanee, Capt. W. D. Johnson, Jr., USN. In the center group, under Rear Adm. Felix B. Stump, were the Kadashan Bay, Capt. R. N. Hunter, USN; Manila Bay, Capt. Fitzcarrier aircraft

their

hugh Lee, USN; Marcus

USN; Natoma USN; and Ommaney Bay, Capt. H. L.

Island, Capt. C. F. Greber,

Bay, Capt. A. K. Morehouse,

Young, USN.

To

the north, closest to the approaching but undetected Japanese

was the group commanded by Rear Adm. C. A. F. Sprague, the Fanshaw Bay, Capt. D. P. Johnson, USN; Gambler Bay, Capt. W. V. R. Vieweg, USN; Kalinin Bay, Capt. T. B. WilHamson,

force,

USN;

USN; Kitkun Bay, Midway), Capt. D.

J.

Sulhvan,

Capt. F.

J.

P. Whitney, USN; Saint Lo (formerly the J. McKenna, USN; and White Plains, Capt.

USN.

This northern group was the only one whose carriers came within range of the Japanese warship's guns in the action, one of the three major engagements in the three-day Battle of the Philippines.

Two

Gambier Bay (lacerated by a score of hits from Jap CA's 8-inch guns ) and the Saint Lo ( victim of an enemy dive bomber after his surface forces had broken off the engagement), were the only carriers lost from the CVE force. Its escort of 3 DD's and 4 DE's, under the tactical command of Comdr. U. D. Thomas, USN, included the other U.S. vessels lost in the action, the destroyer lohnston, commanded by Comdr. L. S. Kintberger, USN, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, Lt. Comdr. Robert W. of

Copeland,

its

ships, the

USNR. 122

At 0500, an hour and a half before sunrise, this group launched its combat air patrol for Leyte and at 0545, its local combat air patrol, antisubmarine patrol, and its first strike on Japanese beach positions on Leyte. Exactly an hour later one of the pilots of the local antisub patrol reported sighting

an approaching enemy force

and destroyers. These were the Japs, or most of them which had been attacked in the Sibuyan Sea the day before by aircraft of the Third Fleetnow battering another enemy force, including battleships and carof battleships, cruisers,

Luzon. Despite damage, the Japanese force had come through San Bernardino Strait during the night and now was swinging around Samar toward our transports, landing craft and supply ships in Leyte Gulf and the still narrow beachheads riers,

well to the north

oflF

there.

Expecting to meet no such enemy fleet, the commander of the northern CVE group, Rear Adm. C. A. F. Sprague, ordered that the contact reported be checked and verified.

He tells the story from there: "The report came back: 4 battleships, 7 heavy and light cruisers, and about 9 destroyers— with pagoda masts. Simultaneous with the pilot's verifying report, we sighted antiaircraft fije. The whole Japanese force had opened up on him. I knew we were in a tough spot. I didn't think anything could save me, since the Japs were reportedly making 30 knots my way. "The only thing to do was to think of something to do. I ordered my screen to drop back astern of the carriers and make smoke. We made smoke, too, and immediately launched all our planes. Fortunately, the wind was right. My course was 90 degrees and the wind was from 70 degrees, so I could run and launch at the same time.

"To the north of us there was a rain squall which extended out of sight. It wasn't thick, but the squall, combined with our course change, gave us a few minutes' breather. "I didn't like our 90-degree course, for the Japs could have stayed on it forever. I asked for all possible aid and assistance from our forces to the south and also ordered the Leyte strike to return immediately. Then I ordered a course change to the south. "I figured we'd be blown out of the water the instant we came out of the rain squall. But, for some reason, the Japanese fleet failed to 123

cut across the triangle to cut us

long ships

way around were no

and,

off.

Instead, they followed us the

when we came

closer to us than they

we might seemed certain we were "I figured

out of the rain squall, their

had been when we entered do some damage, since

as well try to

in for

it;

it.

it

so I ordered the escorts to launch

a torpedo attack. "It

was a very gallant

One

attack.

of the destroyers got a direct

torpedo hit on a battleship."

[The destroyer Hoel made two torpedo runs under effective, closerange enemy fire, launching half a salvo each time, in attempts to stop both the enemy's battleship and cruiser columns. The first is believed to have damaged the lead BB. The second, made on one engine and by hand steering after the ship had been seriously damaged by Japanese shells, struck home on the lead enemy CA so effectively that she was scuttled and abandoned. The HoeVs guns scored numerous hits on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers before she went down after taking some 40 large-caliber projectiles through her thin skin.

[The second U.S. destroyer lost in the action, the Johnston, also attacked successfully with both torpedoes and gunfire, at one time challenging an enemy cruiser at pointblank range to draw her fire away from the damaged CVE Gambler Bay. After more than two hours of almost continuous firing, during which her guns were knocked out one by one, the Johnston went down in the midst of the Japanese fleet. [The story of the third escort sunk off Samar that morning, the DE Samuel B. Roberts, is similar: a successful torpedo attack under suicidal conditions, followed

by gun duels

at 4,000 to 5,000 yards

with vastly superior enemy ships until— dead in the water and sinkCameramen on Japanese warships

ing fast— she was abandoned.

only a few hundred yards

away took moving

pictures of her sur-

life rafts. They, with those of the two destroyers and the Gambler Bay, drffted two days and two nights before being picked up.] "The Japs (Admiral Sprague's narrative continues) then sent a

vivors as they struggled to their

number

of their cruisers up on our port hand, and the destroyers on our starboard hand. The battleships stayed at the rear, and all the guns that could reach us were firing. "During the two and a half hours of the attack, I estimate that

124

which only one scored a vital hit on any of the carriers— a shell caught the Gambler Bay below the waterline, flooded an engine room, and knocked the engine out. Her reduced speed made her fall behind, and the Japanese forces passed her by, scored more hits and sank her. At the same time 3 of the escorts (2 destroyers and a destroyer escort) took hits which sank 300 salvos were

fired, of

them.

emerged from the surface engagement with 5 of my 6 escort although some of them had been hit. The Kalinin Bay had taken several hits, including one from a major-caliber shell. My flagship, the Fanshaw Bay, had also taken hits. A near miss had raised the White Plains' stern out of the water and damaged her, but she was still operating her flight schedule. "I

carriers intact,

"During the surface engagement, we made frequent course changes throw the Japs off in their gunnery problem. Each individual ship captain chased the splashes from the Japanese salvos. It was to

miraculous that

"When

we emerged

as

we

did.

down

where the there was one on the stern of each escort carrier), we opened up and got hits, observable from both our ships and the air. While our 5-inch gun was firing from the flagship, one of the battery officers said: 'Just hold on a little longer, boys, we're gettin' 'em into 40-mm. range.' "Meanwhile, all our own planes, and planes from Adm, Thomas Sprague's force (70 miles to the south) and Adm. Felix Stump's force (30 miles to the southeast), were working the Jap ships over and doing considerable damage. "Some of the Wildcat and Avenger pilots from Adm. Ofstie's carriers—he [Rear Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie, USN] was my second in command—were making dummy runs on the Japs after their ammunition and torpedoes had been expended. "When the Japs finally turned away, a signalman on my bridge said: 'Dammit, they're getting away.' At the time I didn't know why the Japs had turned tail. But upon analysis, I concluded that it was because they had suffered too much damage to continue the the range between the two forces got

Japs came within reach

to

of our escort carrier 5-inch guns

(

attack.

"One cruiser had been sunk, a destroyer had gone down and a badly damaged cruiser was sunk later by planes from Adms. Thomas Sprague's and Felix Stump's carriers. Our planes scored many bomb 125

and torpedo hits and I learned that every single one of the Jap ships had either been hit or sunk." [Another destroyer from this Japanese force was caught and sunk that night by returning units of the Third Fleet before she could get back through San Bernardino Strait, and a heavy cruiser and a light cruiser were probably sunk in the Sibuyan Sea next day by U.S. carrier aircraft harrying the retreating enemy.]

may have heard that Adm. Oldendorf's force and destroyers under Rear Adm. Jesse B. Ol-

"Then, too, the Japs [battleships, cruisers,

dendorf,

USN, which blocked

had wiped out the southernmost Japanese had been polished off. They that a heavier surface action awaited them if they tried

through Surigao force

knew,

and that too,

to force

the Japanese entry into Leyte Gulf

Strait]

their northern carriers

an entrance to Leyte Gulf.

I

am

of the opinion that the

Japs just couldn't continue on, they had to retire. "They turned around at 0925. Thirty minutes later,

we began

Twenty minutes after that, 8 Japanese dive bombappeared at 5,000 feet, without previous warning. Each of them picked out a carrier but only one of them made a decent attack. His bomb went through the flight deck of the Saint Lo, exploded while bombs and torpedoes were being loaded onto our returned planes. Fire broke out, then two explosions, the second of such trelanding our planes. ers

mendous

force that I

knew

the Saint

Lo was

gone.

"I immediately ordered our 4 remaining escort vessels to stand by and pick up survivors. We had been through so much by then that it didn't seem to make any difference whether we had escorts with us or not. I'm glad I made that decision. The losses on the Saint Lo were low— we picked up about 750 men. Losses on the Gambier Bay were low too, considering that she dropped back into the middle of the Japanese fleet. Approximately 730 of her crew were saved." [Of the Saint Los 750 survivors, some 400 were wounded and 75 were stretcher cases. In orderly fashion, all were removed over the side and into the water in 24 minutes despite continuing explosions which prevented the escorts from approaching until the ship had gone down. Her skipper, Capt. F. J. McKenna, USN, particularly praised the work of the escorts, themselves damaged, in returning to pick up his survivors despite the danger from Japanese land-

based dive bombers. [Survivors of the

Gambier Bay had 126

to

abandon

their ship right

under the guns of the enemy heavy warships, making immediate rescue impossible. They were in the water 40 to 48 hours before being picked up.]

"The Kalinin Bay and Kitkun Bay were hit during the dive-bombing attack, but neither was seriously damaged. Three of the eight dive bombers were shot down before they could make an attack and two other attacks were avoided by the maneuvering of the carriers. "We continued on south after the air attack, because I wanted to join forces with Adm. Thomas Sprague's outfit and get an escort. During this period, we were landing and rearming our planes and sending them ofi^ to attack the fleeing Japanese fleet, which was heading toward the San Bernardino Strait. We kept this up until nightfall.

"When

darkness came,

we were 20

miles north of

Adm. Thomas

by a Japanese submarine. I asked Three destroyers promptly arrived, and we weren't

Sprague's force, and being trailed for an escort.

bothered by the submarine thereafter.

"The combined attack was a

full-scale effort

by the

Japs.

They

even launched a torpedo attack just before retiring. From 12 to 24 torpedoes were fired at our formation by enemy DD's on our starboard quarter but from so far out— 7,000 yards on a following shotthat the torpedoes were practically played out when they reached us. A stray pilot from the Saint Lo, who was still in the air, exploded two of the Japanese torpedoes by strafing them in the water long before they ever reached our formation. "An air attack looked imminent that night but it never developed. About 30 planes trailed us for a full hour but failed to press an attack. I had told Admiral Kinkaid [Vice Adm. Thomas C. USN, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, of which the CVE groups were a part] that we had suffered considerable battle damage and recommended that our force proceed to the port of our last

"Meanwhile,

Kinkaid,

anchorage. Permission was granted.

"Everyone performed in excellent fashion throughout the engagement. The pilots of our escort carriers, in my opinion, are tops. The escorts made a most gallant attack. No one was particularly excited and the work of rearming and getting our planes ready was carried out without excitement."

127

Teamwork the Enemy Could Not Prevail

Against Such

The following message was sent by Rear Adm. Thomas L. Sprague, USN, commander of escort carrriers, to all ships and units that participated in the

To the those

offiicers

who were

CVE

action off Leyte Gulf on October 24.

and men These

lost:

decisive battles of this war.

of the escort carriers carriers

The

and

to the kin of

have participated in one of the

aircraft of these carriers not only

have met and defeated enemy attacks in the air but they have turned back a large enemy fleet composed of his most modern ships.

The intrepid courage, skill, and fighting spirit of the pilots and crewmen were superb. Never have fighting men had a greater task and never have fighting men performed their duty with greater determination and distinction. The seamanlike handling of the vessels, the brilliant offensive and defensive work of the screen, the cool accuracy of the gunnery, the sustained and imperturbable air

handling of planes on deck, the calm singleness of purpose of the rearming and gasoline details, the prompt and efficient action of the damage-control parties and the engineers—all contributed to turning the tide of battle to victory. Against such teamwork the

enemy could not prevail. I am proud have been privileged to be present and observe your achievements. May God bless every one of you and may the citizens of your country forever remember and be thankful for your courage. To the mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers, wives and sons and daughters of those who were lost I say: Do not be sad. Be comforted and inspired in the thought that the victory for which these men so freely and courageously gave their lives has contributed immeasurably to the final defeat of the enemy. to

128

Mindoro, Luzon, Iwo Jima, Okinawa:

The Rising Sun Grows Dim FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Although bad weather

severely

hampered

airfield construction,

by

December, Army and Marine shore-based squadrons had taken over control of the air around Leyte. With the ground campaign progressing satisfactorily. Southwest Pacific forces prepared to resume their advance by landing on Mindoro Island. Since the invasion fleet would have to move through confined waters within the Philippine Archipelago, where it would be peculiarly vulnerable to enemy air attack, direct coverage was furnished from escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, which beat off suicide attacks and restricted losses to two LST's sunk and a cruiser and destroyer damaged. To prevent early

enemy

air operations at

the source three fast-carrier task groups

maintained continuous air patrols over Japanese fields on Luzon. Often referred to as the Navy's rolhng blanket, this new technique accounted for 298 enemy planes in three days, three-fourths of them on the ground. A further 45 Japanese aircraft were shot down by the combat patrols of the escort carriers and another 55 were either

destroyed by ships' gunfire or expended themselves in suicide dives.

With Mindoro in the hands of United States troops and with the end of organized resistance at Leyte on December 20, the way was open to commence operations against the important Luzon area, the center of Japanese power in the islands. Army aircraft began a series of strikes on the great complex of airfields around Manila and completed the disorganization of Japanese air forces which had been well advanced by over three months of carrier-plane attacks. Aheady 1,500 enemy planes had been destroyed on the ground in the Philippines and during the three-month period carrier aircraft had accounted for 3,800 Japanese planes in the air and on the ground in the Philippines-Foiinosa-Ryukyus area.

129

The climax

of the Philippine

campaign was the invasion of Lin-

Luzon. The reinforced 7th Fleet was to transport, protect, and land the invasion forces by a route passing west of Luzon through the inland waters of the Philippines. Direct air support was to be provided by escort carriers while the Army Air Forces neutralized Japanese air bases to the south and the fast carriers took care of those in Formosa, the Ryukyus, and northern Luzon.

gayen Gulf

in western

Army heavy bombers began 22.

Luzon airfields on December Navy search planes from Leyte and Mindoro, coordinated with raiding

long-range aircraft from China, extended their patrols of the sea

approaches to cover all the Philippines and the South China Sea. On January 3, as mine-sweeping, bombardment, and escort-carrier units started their northward advance through the Sulu Sea, the fast car-

Formosa and the Ryukyus. Despite Japanese efforts at dispersal and camouflage, over 100 aircraft were destroyed, the majority on the ground. Designed to prevent reinforcement of Japanese air power on Luzon, this effort also reduced the number of planes on Formosa which were available for direct attacks on United States forces in Lingayen Gulf. On January 4, 1945, the hoarded remnants of the Philippine air garrison began suicide attacks on the advancing ships, sinking an escort carrier. On the following day Kamikazes caused damage to another escort carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer. To relieve the escort riers initiated

two days

carriers already fully

of strikes against

occupied with defense of the amphibious

the Southwest Pacific

command

fleet,

requested that the fast carriers

operate south of their originally designated area so as to cover the

chain of bases centered around Clark Field near Manila. Repeated

on January 6 and 7 destroyed over 110 enemy planes and combined with the sweep of land-based planes and the activities of

strikes

enemy sorties from about 130 on number on the 7th.

the escort carriers, reduced to less

than half that

Some

the 6th

however, escaped the vigilance of the attacking Japanese plane, except a handful reserved for the evacuation of staff ofiBcers, was designated for a suicide mission, the invasion forces were exposed to serious danger. Although Japanese orders directed that Kamikazes concentrate on the transports, actually the combatant ships in Lingayen Gulf received tlie heaviest aircraft,

forces. Since every

damage. The situation appeared so serious that the 130

fast carriers,

which had planned

Formosa on January 7, were retained on Luzon. Kamikazes continued to appear a week or more but they were merely the

to attack

to continue their raids

twos and threes for remnants of the enemy air forces in the Philippines. On January 8, the Japanese naval air commander had left for Singapore and his staff for Formosa, while the commanding general of the 4th Air Army retired, without his army, to the hills of Luzon. The troops went ashore on January 9. The conquest of the Luzon plain turned out to be easier than expected, and without air support in

mountain areas. When on January 17 the Army Air Forces with which Marine squadrons were operating assumed responsibihty for air support, the escort carriers withdrew. Although the Japanese continued to hold out in parts of the Philippines until the end of the war, the principal naval advantages of the reconquest were gained by mid-January. United States forces not only controlled the sea but had severed the last route to the Southern Resources Area. Between January 10 and 19 the fast carriers were in the South China Sea, and American the

enemy could put up

effective resistance only in

planes destroyed 57 ships along the coast of Asia, ranging as far south as Camranh Bay in Indochina. Such small vessels as the Japa-

nese tried to

slip

through after January were effectively checked by

the collaboration of submarines and naval land-based patrol planes.

The

Philippines campaign revealed the poor state of the Japanese

Although production of planes had been increased in 1943 and 1944 so that more aircraft were available than ever before and even though the quality of the planes improved, the ratio of losses in combat mounted higher and higher. All United States aviators agreed on the cause. The Japanese had failed to replace the superb air force.

rode so high in the first year of the war. The enemy's training program had broken down. With adequate numbers of air-

pilots

craft

who

and poorly trained

pilots,

the Japanese resorted in desperation

they turned their aircraft into guided of United States ships. It was maneuver. The percentage decisive, but not effective, dangerous, an of hits did not exceed that achieved by American carrier flyers using to

Kamikaze, suicide

missiles

tactics;

and flew them onto the decks

bombing methods. conquest of the Marianas in June 1944, Central Pacific After the forces had turned south to meet Southwest Pacific forces in the Philippines. In February 1945, they were ready again to move north conventional

131

and west in operations preliminary to the invasion of Japan itself. Iwo Jima was selected as the next objective in order to secure a base from which Army fighters could escort B-29 strikes on the empire and also to stop damaging raids from Iwo against the crowded airfields on Saipan. Prehminary bombings of Iwo and the minor air base at Chichi Jima were conducted by shore-based aircraft from the Marianas. Reinforced by B-29 reconnaissance fhghts, naval shorebased and tender-based patrol planes extended the air search to the coast of Japan itself. Covering operations for the invasion were begun by the fast carriers on February 16 and 17 when the first carrier raids were made on the Tokyo area. On those two days and again on the 25th, strong air opposition was encountered despite bad weather. During these raids, 420 Japanese planes were shot down, 228 were destroyed on the ground, and a limited number of sorties were directed against strategic targets such as aircraft-engine plants and airplane factories. The pattern of attack at Iwo followed that of other amphibious operations. Direct air support and defense were furnished by escort carriers with the fast carriers preventing the enemy from bringing up reinforcements. The Marines on shore, however, encountered the most vicious and determined defense of the Pacific war. The Japanese had taken advantage of the natural terrain to build a complete underground defense system, much of which defied the most intense air and surface bombardment. In many parts of the island the Marines had to dig out and kill the enemy individually. From February 19 to

was

March

16, bitter fighting

continued until the Japanese garrison

viitually eliminated.

If the price for

On March

8,

Iwo Jima was

high, the results were also great.

naval patrol planes began to use the island for searches

that covered the coast of Japan as far as Tokyo. Army fighter planes from Iwo escorted the B-29's of the 20th Air Force on their devastating raids against Japanese industries, and the big bombers used the island as an emergency-landing field. Between March 1945 and the close of the war over 2,400 B-29's put in at Iwo with an incalculable saving in planes and lives. The existence of an emergency field

made

of safety

it

and

possible to reduce the to increase the

bomb

amount

of gas carried for reasons

load. Finally,

from Iwo Jima

air-

sea rescue planes could cover most of the B-29 route from the Mari-

anas to Japan. The reconquest of the Philippines had permitted the United States

132

with the Southern Resources Area. The Japanese could obtain only a trickle of supplies from the Mainland by way of the East China Sea and the Straits of Tsushima. Before an assault on the home islands could be launched, more fleet anchorto sever the connection

and staging areas

ages, airfields,

these objectives could be satisfied

were required. All by the occupation of Okinawa

for troops

of in

the Ryukyus. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that

Central Pacific forces undertake the operation.

The

assault

on Okinawa was the

The

the Pacific war.

largest

amphibious operation of

joint expeditionary force

included 1,213 ships,

564 support aircraft based on escort carriers, and 451,866 Army and Marine ground troops. Also available for air support as well as to prevent enemy interference and reinforcement were a fast-carrier force with 82 ships and 919 planes and a British carrier force with 22 ships and 244 planes. For interdiction and neutralization raids against enemy air bases there were the Army's Twentieth and Far East Air Forces. Preassault operations were initiated by fast-carrier attacks on Kyushu, Shikoku, and western Honshu on March 18 and 19. Beginning on March 23, the fast carriers operated continuously for 2^2 months in the Okinawa area, providing direct air support and cover for the amphibious forces. These were the longest sustained carrier

operations of the war. Islands in the Kerama Retto, 15 miles to the west of Okinawa, were seized on March 26 in order to provide a protected anchorage and a base for logistic support. From tenders seaplane searches extended far into the Yellow Sea and to the Straits of Tsushima between Korea and Japan. Day and night antisubmarine patrols were flown by patrol and carrier planes completely around the southern Ryukyus where the surface ships were operating. Search aircraft, acting in coordination with submarines, watched the exits from the

Inland Sea.

At 0830 on April 1, 1945, the amphibious assault on Okinawa itself began. Landings were made over the western beaches against unexpectedly light opposition, and by noon the two airfields at Yontan

and Kadena had been captured. As operations ashore progressed, Japanese resistance increased. On April 9, heavily defended positions to the south were encountered and a long drawn-out battle began.

The expected

air reaction

was slow 133

to materialize

and

for the

first

few days were

relatively light. Starting

on April

6,

the Japanese air

forces struck with a fury never before encountered.

The

scale of

was the outstanding and most spectacular aspect of the Okinawa operation. During the period from April 6 to June 22, ten major, organized Kamikaze attacks were carried out. The relatively short distance from Japanese air bases in Kyushu and Formosa permitted employment by the enemy of planes of all types and pilots of every degree of proficiency. In 896 enemy air raids approximately 4,000 planes were destroyed in combat, of which 1,900 were Kamikazes. Damage to United States forces amounted to 28 ships sunk by air attack of which 26 were by Kamikaze planes, and another 225 damaged, of which 164 were by Kamikazes. The Japanese navy made a last, despairing effort. At 1520, April 6, eflFort

in suicide missions

a force consisting of the battleship Yamato, the hght cruiser Yahagi,

Tokuyama on the Inland Sea with Okinawa at daylight on the morning of April 8. This force was sighted by United States submarines while proceeding south through Bungo Channel during the and eight destroyers

sortied from

the object of attacking the invasion fleet off

evening of April

6.

Contact was regained the next morning by naval

patrol planes

and by

Commencing

at

fighters,

air

search groups from the fast-carrier force.

about 1240, a

series of

coordinated attacks by carrier

dive bombers, and torpedo planes resulted in the sinking of

the Yamato, the Yahagi, and four destroyers. Suffering varying degrees of

Heavy

damage the remaining

destroyers retired to Sasebo.

on the amphibious and covering forces continued during April and May, after which they declined rapidly. During this period valuable support was rendered by the 21st Bomber Command and the Far East Air Forces in attacks on airfields in Kyushu and Formosa. In April approximately 40 per cent of the effective sorties of the 21st Bomber Command were on such missions. On April 7 the first of the land-based Marine aircraft attached to the Tactical Air Force arrived on Okinawa. Consisting originally of Marine aircraft to which were later added Army fighters, this force operated jointly for over two months with the escort-carrier planes and ultimately relieved the carriers of responsibility for air defense and direct support of ground troops. Ashore the operations proceeded slowly. By April 20 all organized air attacks

Japanese opposition in the northern two-thirds of the island had ceased. On April 19 the ground forces launched a large-scale offen134

sive in the south,

but slow progress was

made

against stubborn

were well planned. The rugged terrain with many natural caves and elaborate underground was installations presented difficult obstacles. Direct air support Marine land-based by and carriers furnished by both fast and escort

resistance. Japanese defense positions

Naval gunfire was provided throughout the campaign. the June 21 all organized resistance on Okinawa ceased and area. the in days of 88 stay a escort carriers departed after planes.

135

On last

U.S.S. Franklin— Trial The large-carrier

building program in

the most remarkable feats in

tlie

by Fire

World War

was one

II

history of shipbuilding.

of

The con-

on the Essex-type Franklin set a record for the fastest building time of any of the big carriers anywhere. The 878-foot vessel was completed in less than 14 months. In spite of the building speed, the Franklin was destined to go down in naval history as one struction time

of the best constructed vessels of the fleet.

The Independence Day 1944 strikes against the three Jimas marked entry into action of the Franklin, which had been floated the October before. Sponsor for the craft was Lt. Cdr. Mildred H. McAfee, director of the Waves.

Of

all

the

Newport News

ships participating at Leyte, the Frank-

undoubtedly had the most harrowing experience. Destined within a few weeks to undergo one of the greatest trials in maritime history, on October 13, 1944, she had a foretaste of disaster when she "sustained negligible damage from a strafing suicide plane," while participating in the great air battle off Formosa in which the enemy sent approximately 1,000 aircraft against the Third Fleet. An enemy plane, badly damaged by ship's gunners, crashed just abaft the island structure, shd across the flight deck and burst into flames upon striking the water. Two days later, when the task group returned to strike the Philippines again, there was more action for the carrier's damage control parties. The brief naval release said: "Three west of Japanese bombs caused minor damage to the Franklin Luzon Island. One small bomb penetrated the corner of the deck edge elevator and detonated just below the flight deck level, causing minor fragment damage and a small gasohne fire. The second bomb detonated upon striking water close aboard to port. The third bomb detonated on water impact close to starboard." Except for a few isolated surface actions and some mopping-up of cripples by U.S. submarines, the Battle of Leyte Gulf had ended. It was not, however, the end of tlie Philippine campaign. That campaign was to keep the carriers in action with httle respite for anlin

.

136

.

.

other three months in support of the ground forces, and was to witness inauguration of the desperate Kamikaze tactics conjured up

by the Japanese as the only remaining substitute fleet which by now was but an unhappy memory.

On

October

of being the

30, 1944, the Franklin

first

won

for the

proud

air

the unenvied distinction

damaged by a Samar Island the Japanese plane crashed

large U.S. carrier to be extensively

suicide plane. East of

through her

flight

bombs from

the

deck, igniting planes parked at the after end;

enemy plane

carried forward, detonating

among

were extinguished in little more than two hours, but structural damage was extensive to the flight and galley decks as well as to structures within the hangar. As a result the big vessel was forced to retire to Ulithi, thence to the United States for extensive repairs before returning to the gassed aircraft in the hangar. All

fires

Pacific.

Less than 16 months after she was commissioned, the Franklin

was subjected

to an excruciating ordeal which few warships could have survived. The fact that she did survive is, in the words of an ofiBcial naval news release, "a ghastly but unforgettable memorial to the heroism of those who man the Navy's ships and the skill of those who build them." The Franklins agony began on March 19, 1945 when she was participating in air strikes against the Japanese fleet in the Inland Sea. Operating less than 60 miles from the Japanese coast, with many of her planes fully armed and fueled, the carrier was suddenly attacked by a Japanese dive bomber, which scored hits with two 500-pound armor-piercing bombs. The ship was soon an inferno— a cauldron of flame exploding bombs and rockets, racked by explosions and reverberating with a bedlam of detonations and voices raised in pain or command. An eye-witness said, "To horrified onlookers she was a blur of fire and smoke but when the veil .

.

.

was still there." The first bomb had penetrated to the hangar deck, and in exploding killed all personnel in the forward area, knocked out the combat intelligence center and air plot; and sucked down and wrecked the forward elevator, and started fires in the hangar which enveloped the forward starboard side of the ship and flight deck. The second bomb, exploding above the hangar deck forced the after elevator upward to starboard, and started uncontrollable fires on the planes turning upon deck in the process of taking off. lifted,

the Franklin

137

from more than 1,000 casualties, the carrier painfully limped the thousands of miles back to New York. This last attack had marked the end of the Franklins war career. V-J Day was a reality before repairs could be completed

Gutted by flame,

listing badly,

and

to her ravaged hull.

138

suffering

Medal of Honor Chaplain FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Chaplain on board the U.S.S. Franklin when that vessel was fiercely attacked by enemy Japanese aircraft during oflFensive operations near Kobe, Japan, on March 19, 1945. A valiant and forceful leader, calmly braving the perilous barriers of flame and twisted metal to aid his his ship, Lt. Cdr, O'Callahan groped his way through

men and

and into the midst of and other armament. With the ship rocked by incessant explosions, with debris and fragments raining down and fires raging in ever increasing fury, he ministered to the wounded and dying, comforting and encouraging men of all faiths; he organized and led fire-fighting crews into the blazing inferno on the flight deck; he directed the jettisoning of live ammunition and the flooding of the magazine; he manned a hose to cool hot, armed bombs rolling dangerously on the listing deck, continuing his efforts despite searing, suffocating smoke which forced men to fall back gasping and imperiled others who replaced them. Serving with courage, fortitude, and deep spiritual strength, Lt. Cdr. O'Callahan inspired the gallant oflBcers and men of the Franklin to fight heroically and with profound faith in the face of almost certain death and to return their stricken ship to smoke-filled corridors to the open flight deck

violently exploding

bombs,

shells,

port."

139

rockets

The following article, picturing a phase of naval service that helped to win battles hut seldom made the communiques or headlines, is an excerpt from a letter written by an officer in the engineering department of a CV in the Pacific. This is a side of war too often neglected by the journalist, historian, storyteller, who are usually concerned more with the glamorous, the apparently heroic. Nothing is more heroic than doing a job that is only a small cog in the massive machinery of war. There are no promotions, medals, combat leaves, headlines,

or the

like.

Keeping a drop

of oil

on a moving part may not seem

vital.

That

until the engine stops running.

is,

The men assigned these duties would have preferred manning a gun on deck or in a TBF, but they didn't get the chance. Instead, they got dirty, thankless jobs at which they worked for long hours; in combat or not. They did their jobs well and are deserving of very special appreciation.

There would have been no

victories without them.

We Make

Her

Go

Here we are, an integral part of a battle task force. You look around —over there another carrier, here a cruiser, that way a battleship, in this direction a destroyer, racing back and forth looking for enemy submarines, Hke a dog on a crisscross scent. The whole group looks pretty ominous as it steams swiftly and silently along through waters that might hold anything. Quiet prevails, as radios are mute. Signaling is done by means of hghts and flags.

The

other carrier, there— she looks very big, very capable, very

know that from a distance you look the same. It good— important. You're ready, you're fit. stand around, though. You tour the hangar deck, then

dangerous. You

makes you

No

feel

time to

up and around the

flight deck.

Your directions are purposeful, for 140

you're inspecting equipment for sible.

Deck lights, landing

whose functioning you are responand much more. Then through bridge; further up to the navigation

signal gear,

the island structure to the signal

bridge, into the pilot house: the navigator's electrical gadgets, the steering gear, the telephones, compasses, searchlights, engine-order

telegraph, literally dozens of signaling devices.

Out

again, you swing aloft, looking over certain things at the top smoke stack. Maybe you climb higher, up the mast, crawl out on the yardann to inspect the newly installed circuit, then further up still to peer closely at the truck hght. You look down—far below, the hull of your ship. Planes on deck, little people hurrying about.

of the

Now

look out across the blue (or green, or black) water that

stretches for thousands of miles around. reflection of sunlight

The below

on a wave

ship's bell clangs

A

periscope? No, just the

tip.

seven times. You are to take over the watch

Down, down, down. Into your room, a quick You reach the door, then stop for just one minute,

in 15 minutes.

dungarees.

shift to

perhaps only 40 seconds.

Why?

Well, you're alone, so

let's

say a

prayer.

Once more, down. Through the little scuttles, securely locking them over your head as you descend the iron ladders. Finally you're there, in the engine room. That familiar odor of hot oil, the heavy throb of the powerful turbines driving the big ship along at high

A

speed. at his

dozen or so sweaty

light perspiration here)

each

appointed task.

Now

you— or, you step up you everything that has happened— the speed, what pumps and other auxiliaries are on the line; about the ofiicer of the watch comes over to

to his log desk. ship's

men (no

the engines.

You

He

tells

listen intently,

nod, ask a question or two. Satisfied

you understand the situation, you say: "You are relieved." Oh, fateful words. You didn't have to say them. No one can make you do so. Any dissatisfaction with developments, anything left undone, anything being improperly handled, and you not only may, but should, refuse to take over until all has been cleared. You don't have to accept any other person's responsibilities. But in turn, you must stand four-square on your own. Once you have relieved the watch, it's all in your hands. Your baby now. Four hours to go. You stand behind each throttleman in turn, watching as he feeds the that

141

steam— 600 pounds per square ture, flashing

inch, 850 degrees superheat temperathrough those valves and pipes.

The boast of the engineers is now yours to protect: "We answer bell." The engineers' motto cannot be scorned this watch: "We make her go." Don't know what is happening topside now. Enemy planes, with a every

deadly load to drop? Straddle fire from a pagoda-masted battleship? Choose your maneuvers. Captain— fast turn, flank speed, stop, back, full speed

ahead— just

ring that engine order— she'll be going

where you want while the note

Now

is still

sounding.

hour of close inspection. You gaze at the throttle board with its hundred instruments— gauges, thermometers, mercury tubes, clocks. Flashlight in hand, you visit every spot, look at every thermometer, every oil sight, feel every bearing. Others come and go, taking over posts. You are notified of every move. "I've been properly relieved in number 3 pump, sir." "Very well." "I've been properly reheved on number 7 booster, sir." "Very well." You post the log from time to time. No mistakes here, either, for it's a permanent record. You'll sign it when you leave. QUICK! for an

.

.

.

WHAT'S THAT?

A no

hum! Like a shot you're down the laddergrab the handrail and slide. Hit the deck and jump—

strange noise in this

steps, just

you're shutting off live steam in the broken line almost before the others reach

it,

but not quite. They were

closer,

and they move

fast,

these men.

Fast now!

Open

the auxiliary line, there. We'll pull this valve and

Why?

Say, don't you remember? "We answer every No shut-downs here. No sissy calls to the bridge. "We have to secure number 4 engine." And leave the captain handicapped if he suddenly needs every ounce we've got? Do it hot, use the emergency, keep her in full

repair

it

hot.

bell."

blast.

"Hey, you! Put those gloves on. Wanna lose both hands?" me that socket wrench, sailor." "I'll do it, sir."

"Give

You bet he will— and do

it

well.

142

Twenty minutes later you step back. You're hoarse, dripping from to foot. You look at one another and grin. Hold up your casualties—a burned wrist, a sprained finger, a cut thumb. Not even worth a trip to sick bay— our first-aid kit will do. Who's that coming down the ladder? Your relief. Another four hours of night steaming under your belt. You tell him everything that has happened— the ship's speed, what pumps and other auxhead

about the engines. He listens intently, nods, asks a question or two. Satisfied that he understands the situation, he says: iharies are

"You are

on the

line;

relieved."

143

"

In every arena of sc

"

life

certain inanimate objects achieve a status

closely identified with a flesh-and-blood, living character that

they are spoken of in a manner one usually reserves for a near and dear relative.

War

has a tendency to intensify and magnify this

trait in man. from one ship would gladly take on the entire crew of a larger ship in defense of the honor of their ship. Men in foxholes protected their rifles as they would a loved one. Airmen held their particular aircraft in high regard and made disparaging remarks about others. In every instance the object of endearment was referred to as

Sailors

being of the female gender. One such mighty behemoth of war, the U.S.S. Enterprise {CV-6), was such an object.

While not a sonnet

in the tradition of Shakespeare, this story of

the Big "E" could have been written by the Bard of Avon.

The Big "E" Most famous

of all the world's aircraft carriers

and America's most

decorated jBghting ship was the U.S.S. Enterprise (CV-6), as "The Big 'E.'

Launched on October

3,

1936, the vessel

known

was christened by Mrs.

Claude Swanson, wife of the Secretary of the Navy, with the appro"May she also say with just pride: 1 have done the state some service.' Built at an approximate cost of 19 million dollars, she displaced 20,000 tons, was 825 feet long, 109 feet wide, and carried 170 officers, 1,900 enlisted men, and 4 squadrons of airplanes. After a shakedown cruise to Rio de Janeiro, she was ordered to join the Pacific Fleet and proceeded to Pearl Harbor in September 1939. As dawn broke over the Pacific on December 7, 1941, 200 miles out of the island of Oahu, she learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From the day America declared war on Japan until the war ceased priate prognostic:

144

more than four years

the Enterprise was active in

but one The only ship in naval history to receive both the Presidential and Navy Unit Citations, The Big "E" never became inoperative throughout her four-plus later,

all

of the major naval battles of the Pacific.

years of battle action in the Pacific.

The

ship's swift

was the only

movements during a period

when she enemy intelH-

in 1942

active carrier in the South Pacific misled

gence into reporting her as three different ships. Enterprise was flagship for Vice Adm. Halsey and later for Vice Adm. Spruance. She accompanied the U.S.S. Hornet on the Doolittle raid against Tokyo, carried Adm. Spruance into the Battle of Midway, and with Rear Adm. T. C. Kinkaid aboard, supported the landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, and took part in the battle of Santa Cruz. Although heavily damaged in these actions, she kept operating. Her air strikes helped amphibious forces occupy islands in both the Marshall and Gilbert groups.

The Enterprise pioneered night air operations, her torpedo bombers made the first night radar bombing strike by U.S. carrier planes when they attacked the island of Truk on February 17, 1944. Her planes participated in the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. She

was

in action against all three

forces in the battle for Leyte Gulf

Japanese

and maintained supporting

air-

Two Jima continuously for 174 hours, to set a record. The final record of The Big "E" in the Pacific war was 911 Japanese planes shot down by the ship's guns and planes, 71 enemy ships sunk by her pilots, another 192 ships damaged or probably sunk. The enemy had damaged the ship 16 times with hits and near misses and had claimed her sunk on six different occasions. While accumulating 20 of a possible 22 combat stars for carriers in the Pacific area, the Enterprise had steamed more than 275,000 miles in pursuit of the enemy and had recorded some 54,000 deck landings. Finally, time accomplished what the enemy could not. Outmoded by bigger and faster airplanes which could not operate from her flight deck, she was decommissioned on February 17, 1947. "The men who have fought with her love this ship," wrote Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in a letter to President Truman dated November 1, 1945. "It would grieve me to put my name to the document which would consign her to be broken up for scrap." Unfortunately, the attempts of Secretary Forrestal, Adm. Halsey, craft over

145

ofiBcials and devoted former crew members to save the permanent memorial were doomed to failure. The proud ship was stricken from the Navy hst on October 2, 1956, and scrapped in 1958.

other

Navy

ship as a

146

It is

in

extremely doubtful that any commander of Allied forces II received the exposure to, or the adulation of, the

World War

American people as much as Fleet Adm. William F. "Bull" Halsey. He was the epitome of what Americans had come to expect of their great battle commanders. Blunt-spoken, hard-as-nails, "BulV Halsey had a streak of sentimentality a yard wide. He was a patriot who, far from being ashamed to make known his deep and abiding love for his country, would climb to the highest crow's nest to shout it

to the world.

We

have saved Adm. Halsey s story until this time, because it is the last selection in the section devoted to World War II. It is last because Adm. Halsey had dedicated every fiber of his being to the complete destruction of his country's enemy.

Setting the Rising

Sun

FLEET ADM. WILLIAM F, HALSEY, USN AND LT. CDR. J. BRYAN, III, USNR

We the

from Leyte under a broad directive: we would attack enemy's home islands, destroy the remnants of his navy, mersortied

chant marine, and

power, and cripple his factories and communistrike inland; our big guns would bombard coastal targets; together they would literally bring the war home to the average Japanese citizen. With our campaign thus focused on Japan proper, we did not

cations.

air

Our planes would

expect to see Leyte again, and ent from

we were

we

didn't— but for a reason far

what we thought. For the sake

diflfer-

of a shorter supply line,

planning to base in the future at Eniwetok, which

is

about

the same distance as Leyte from Tokyo, but some 2,200 miles nearer our main base at Pearl Harbor. We did not see Eniwetok either.

Our next port

of call

was Tokyo

itself.

147

Our preparations for the attack on the empire were extremely had made a thorough reconnaissance of Hokkaido and northern Honshu. Navy B-24's, covered by Army P-Sl's, had photographed Tokyo, our first objective. Submarines had probed for minefields oflFshore from our bombardment areas. As we closed careful. B-29's

land-based planes flew barrier patrols ahead of us, to screen our approach from enemy scouts; and seven submarines advanced on

in,

a 100-mile front to destroy

enemy

and

pickets

to act as lifeguards

for our pilots. Strike

day was July

Our luck and rode

10.

held. It even improved.

We

picked up a weather front when our strike

almost to our launching point, and

it

Tokyo at daybreak, not a single interceptor was in the air, and only two snoopers came near the force. Both were shot down. Tokyo was a poor target. The few planes our pilots managed to find were degassed, revetted, and widely dispersed. The Japanese had been slow to learn the obvious economy of degassing their planes, and we were sorry they ever learned it; a plane with empty tanks does not always bum under strafing, so damage appraisal becomes difiBcult. Still, we could count 109 definitely destroyed and 231 damaged. We also damaged hangars and other arrived over

installations.

Previous attacks on Tokyo by B-29's and led us to believe that opposition

reported

it

would be

fighter planes

light,

had

but our pilots

AA

was meager— the AA the Empire, the home of the Son of Heaven.

almost nonexistent. Even the

protecting the heart of

Army

We

began to reestimate the probable duration. Every turn of our screws now took us further north than any ships of the fleet, except submarines, had ever ventured before. Our schedule called for strikes against Hokkaido and northern Honshu on the 13th, but the fog belt that hangs down from the Kuriles blanketed our targets, and we had to postpone for a day, much as I would have enjoyed staging the first surface bombardment of the Japanese homeland on a Friday the thirteenth. We fueled on July 16, and everyone was able to relax except me. The flag log for that morning tells why: "At 0645, CTF-37 reported for duty and took station astern of TG-38.4. At 0845, H.M.S. Quadrant came alongside with CTF-37 and staff for conference. At 0907, H.M.S. Terpsichore came alongside with CTG-37.1 and staff." .

148

.

.

)

TF-37 was the

fast-carrier task force of the British Pacific

Fleet—

and 18 destroyers, under Vice Adm. Sir Bernard Rawhngs; CTG-37.1 was Vice Adm. Sir Phihp Vian. I knew both these gentlemen by their splendid reputations, but we had never met, and I am afraid that my appearance did little to recommend me. They were wearing smart blues; I was wearing a Marine woolen jacket, a blue flannel shirt, green flying trousers, and a long-billed cap like a sword fisherman's. I explained that I found these motleys more comfortable for fighting, and reluctantly I opened the conference. I say "reluctantly" because I dreaded it. When I was informed at Pearl Harbor that the British Pacific Fleet would report to me, I naturally assumed that I would have full operational control, but when I reread the plan at Leyte, I discovered that tactical control had been reserved. This would force me to present Adm. Rawlings with three alternatives, and I did so now: ( 1 ) TF-37 would operate close aboard us, as another task group in TF-38; it would not receive direct orders from me, but it would be privy to the orders that I gave TF-38; these it would consider as "suggestions" to be followed to our mutual advantage, thereby 1 battleship,

4 large carriers, 6 hght cruisers,

assuring us a concentrated force with concentrated weapons.

(2) TF-37 would operate semi-independently, some 60 or 70 miles away, thereby preserving its technical identity at the cost of a divided force.

only

if

(

I

stipulated that I

would consent

to this choice

the request were put in writing.

TF-37 would operate completely independently, against soft which we would recommend if so desired. Bert Rawlings did not hesitate. He said, "Of course Til accept number 1." My admiration for him began at that moment. I saw him constantly thereafter, and a finer ofiicer and firmer friend I have never known. Whereas TF-38 could strike on three successive days, we were counting on the British to strike on only two, because of their ships' lower fuel capacity and slower rate of fueling; however, by fueling them from our own tankers when the need arose, they were able to match us strike for strike. One of my most vivid war recollections is of a day when Bert's flagship, the battleship King George V, fueled from the tanker Sabine at the same time as the Missouri. I went across to "the Cagey Five," as we called her, on an aerial (3)

spots in Japan

149

trolley, just to

drink a toast to this unique episode in the histories

of the American and Royal Navies. (I would have invited Bert back for a return toast if it had not been for Secretary Daniels' Order 99.) Our strike against Tokyo on the 10th had been chiefly exploratory; our photographers had obtained good coverage of the area, so we returned on the 17th to develop the targets they had pinpointed. Top priority was assigned to the battleship Nagato, which photo intelligence had discovered badly damaged but still afloat at the Yokosuka Naval Base. Again foul weather required a day's postponement, but we improved our wait with a midnight bombardment of an engineering works and arms factory at Hitachi, about 50 miles north of Tokyo. The afternoon of the 18th was clear, and our flyers went in. The AA was the heaviest they had ever encountered; it cost us and the British together 18 men and 14 planes. We destroyed 43 enemy planes and damaged 77, sank several ships, and wrecked a number of locomotives, dumps, and barracks, but although the Nagato's superstructure was battered further, she still

floated.

we v^thdrew

rendezvous with our supply force, brilliantly organized and led by Rear Adm. Donald Before our next

strikes,

to a

what TF-38 took aboard; 6,369 tons of ammuniand provisions, 379,157 barrels of fuel oil, 99 replacement planes, and 421 replacement personnel. I give the figures because I believe that this was the largest replenishment ever achieved by a fleet at sea. We might have been able to mount fifteen attacks in the short time left us, but the weather allowed only seven. The first three were concentrated on the Inland Sea area. The series began on July 24 with a fighter sweep against airfields between northern Kyushu and Nagoya, and a strike on the Kure Naval Base with bombs, rockets, and torpedoes. Kure is the port where Japanese warships went to die. We hit them hard that day but did not finish them off; next day's strike was partly weather-bound, and we could not resume the action until the 28th. By sunset that evening, the Japanese navy had ceased to exist. Photographs showed the battleship Ise down by the bow and resting on the bottom; her sister ship, the Hyuga, was awash amidships; the Haruna was beached and burning, with a large hole in her stem. The Katsuragis flight B. Beary. This

is

tion, 1,635 tons of stores

150

deck was torn and buckled; the Amagi's could have been used as The heavy cruisers Tone and Aoba were beached. The commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet could reach his cabin in his flagship, the hght cruiser Oyodo, only in a a ski slide.

diving

suit.

was now afloat— the 5 were still afloat but damaged. Of 18 heavy cruisers, the only 2 afloat were at Singapore, both damaged. Of 22 light cruisers, 2 were afloat. And of 177 destroyers, 42 were afloat, but only 5 were fully operational. Slew McCain strongly opposed our strikes against Kure. He and his staff considered the Japanese fleet only a minor threat; they wanted us to use our air strength against other, more profitable targets. But there were three good reasons why this fleet had to be Japan had 12 battleships

in the war; only 1

crippled Nagato, at Yokosuka.

Of her 25

aircraft carriers,

destroyed: (1) For the sake of our national morale. This propriate retaliation for Pearl Harbor. (2) For the sake of the Russians.

was the only ap-

Our high command knew

of

impending declaration of war and knew that if we had to establish a supply line to them, it would run between Kamchatka and Hokkaido— a route so exposed that even a few enemy cruisers and destroyers could dominate it. (3) For the sake of the peace terms. We could not afford to establish a supply line to them, it would run between Kamchatka as a bargaining point, as Germany had after World War I. There was also a fourth reason: CINCPAC had ordered the fleet destroyed. If the other reasons had been invalid, that one alone would have been enough for me. Around the middle of July, CINCPAC had forbidden us to attack certain cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No explanation was given, and I was puzzled until Rear Adm. William R. Purnell came aboard on the twenty-second, under CINCPAC's instructions, and gave me my first word of the bomb. He said that the drop was planned for August 2, on a Kyushu target, and that I was to keep all my planes at least 50 miles from the area. (This is why we set our own Kyushu strike for the 3rd.) The typhoon that delayed us also delayed the drop— it was eventually made, of course, on the 6th, and although we could have struck on the 5th and hauled clear, we were needed elsewhere in a hurry. their

151

Our shift to Honshu-Hokkaido was at the request of Gen. MacArthur, who suspected that the Japanese had massed several hundred planes at these northern fields for an attack on Okinawa, which had recently been placed under his command. We were weathered out on the 8th, and fog screened Hokkaido on the 9th, but our heavy ships bombarded Kamaishi again for two hours that after-

combed the Honshu fields, destroying or damaging 392 planes. By now our contempt for Japan's defenses was so thorough that our prime consideration in scheduling this bombard-

noon, while our pilots

ment, which was broadcast from the Iowa, was for the convenience of the radio audience at home. My war diary remarks with satisfaction, "an excellent day."

was

day that Russia entered the Pacific War. Since the fields in the area which we were hitting were the only ones in the Japanese home islands from which Russian territory could be attacked, we hit them again on the 10th. We were hoping to fatten our score at the same time, but our pilots had slim pickings It

also the

until late in the afternoon,

my war

centrations"— as

when they discovered "lucrative conthem— at Mamurogawa and

diary calls

Obanazawa, and happily chalked up another 175 destroyed and 153 damaged. I was sitting in the flag wardroom that night when a communications watch officer brought Mick Carney a transcription of a radio intercept. Mick read it aloud: "Through the Swiss government, Japan stated that she is willing to accept the Allied surrender ultimatum issued at Potsdam, provided they can keep their Em."

peror.

.

None

.

of us

was wildly

surprised.

Ever since the

first

of the month,

radio and press reports, decoded Japanese dispatches, and the rapid

decay of our opposition had been clear signposts to the event that us. We were ready to meet it. Our long-range

now approached plans,

drawn

in August, logistic

in the late spring,

but

I

had

called for a retirement early

had recently canceled tliem and had ordered the full for just such an emergency as this, which

pipe line kept

would require the

indefinite extension of our operations in

empire

waters.

We

were the only military unit

at

hand with

sufficient

power

to

take Japan in custody at short notice and enforce the Allies' vdll until occupation troops arrived. Accordingly,

152

we had

organized a

landing force of a regiment of Marines, three naval battalions from

TF-38, and a fom-th from TF-37. These men, plus a reserve force

were fully equipped and had been briefed on had assembled groups of specialists and artificers to operate captured Japanese facilities and equipment, and to estabhsh temporary shore facilities of our own. We were prepared even to occupy and develop the naval base and air station at

of five battalions, their jobs.

We

Yokosuka, to

man enemy

vessels with nucleus crews, to demilitarize

installations, to drop supplies at POW camps, and to rescue and evacuate the prisoners. Such tasks as these are not normally expected of a striking force at sea, but they represented— as we learned next morning— only a fraction of the extraneous duties that we would have to assume. Our dispatch boards had doubled in thickness overnight. The queries and instructions pouring in on us concerned subjects as diverse as these: military government units, whole blood, amphibious landing craft, post-oflBce ships, staff cars, interpreters, ammuni-

enemy

tion for small arms, national anthems, sanitation ashore, refrigerator ships, protocol of official visits, wire recorders,

and

had the

my

this

full-time job of operating the fleet, but

new

so on. staff

We

still

shouldered

load as well.

Although the avalanche of dispatches indicated oflBcial confidence that surrender was probable, there was no suggestion that we delay or even slacken our attacks. We fueled on the 11th as planned, intending to strike Tokyo early next morning. However, it takes time to set up a strike, and as the deadline approached, a typhoon to the southward was still heading toward us, so I notified Slew McCain to hold his planes until the 13th, in case we had to run for fair

weather.

A few hours my room with

midnight, Mick Carney came to an intercept from the Army News Service: "The

later, shortly after

American Secretary

of State, speaking for the Allied Powers, has

accepted the surrender of Japan, provided that the Supreme Allied Commander rule Japan through the authority of the Emperor."

but I was reluctant to attack an enemy whose surrender was actual though not yet ratified; and certainly I was more than reluctant to risk my airmen's lives under such circumstances. But had Japan surrendered? That "provided" puzzled me. I called a meeting of my staff to discuss it, I

realized that this report

was

unofficial,

153

and a majority of us to cease

fire.

My

finally

agreed that the honorable course was its way to Slew when

decision was hardly on

Mick, stubborn as always, came to my room with a fresh set of arguments. My armistice was not only premature, he said, but might easily prove to be one-sided; we had never trusted the

Japanese before, and this was a hell of a critical time to start. I was persuaded. I signaled Slew, ATTACK TOKYO AREA

TO-

MORROW UNLESS THE THROWING

IN

NIPS BEAT US TO THE PUNCH BY THE SPONGE.

Slew was worried that they would throw in something deadher than a sponge. He warned his task force, KEEP ALERT FOR

AND BANZAI ATTACKS X THE WAR IS NOT OVER YET X THE NIPS MAY BE PLAYING THEIR NATIONAL GAME OF JUDO, WAITING UNTIL WE ARE CLOSE AND UNWARY. TRICKS

The typhoon curved away harmlessly during the 12th, and we By now I was convinced that it would be folly to spare an enemy who considered himself in a started our run-in to the launching point.

he maintained his belhgerent remarked that we were becoming

position to quibble over terms while status.

(Somebody on

my

staff

Japanese de-liberation ribbon.) Moreover, the prolonged negotiations were raising another dilemma. We were now in our forty-third consecutive day at sea; our stores were running eligible for a

short; our galleys

were reduced

to serving

dehydrated carrot salad.

war was over, we could repro vision on the spot; if it was not, we would have to retire, reprovision, and return. Until the diplomats made up their minds, we were restricted to short-range plans. Even these took a manhandling. At 0100 on the 13th, I received a dispatch from CINCPAC ordering me to cancel the strike and proceed to the Tokyo area "with caution." I passed the word to the task force at once, adding, SITUATION If the

NOT CLEAR BUT MAY DEVELOP RAPIDLY X MEANWHILE MAINTAIN STRONG DEFENSIVE CAP; and later, I WILL ORDER IMMEDIATE ATTACK IF ENEMY SEARCHES OR SNOOPS. Almost as this message went out, I received a second dispatch from CINCPAC, voiding the first. I signaled the task force, FOLORIGINAL SCHEDULE OF STRIKES. Within an hour, the strike was taking off for Tokyo. Within a few hours more TF-38 had weakened Japan's air power by 422 planes— 254 destroyed on

LOW

154

down near

by our CAP. Ten of these 19 were probably snoopers; the others were unquestionably Kamikazes. Japan might have surrendered, but a good many Japanese had not been given the word. Our first strike next morning, designated "Able 1" and consisting of 103 planes, was launched at 0415. Exactly at 0614— when Able 1 had struck and was returning, when Able 2 had been launched and was within five minutes of the target, and when our flight decks were being respotted for Able 3—1 was handed a top the ground, 149 damaged, and 19 shot

secret, highest priority dispatch

from

the force

CINCPAC: AIR ATTACK

WILL BE SUSPENDED X ACKNOWLEDGE. and recall Able 2. Some of Able 2's pilots suspected that the order was a Japanese trick. We had to authenticate it twice before they would obey. A curious coincidence now happened. I have described how, on the morning of December 7, 1941, I was having breakfast on the I

sent a message at once to hold Able 3

Enterprise

when my

flag secretary,

Doug Moulton, gave me

the

had opened the war. On the morning of August 15, 1945, I was having breakfast on the Missouri when Doug, now my air operations officer, gave me the news that Japan had ended the war. He burst in, waving a message blank, and shouted, "Ad-

news

that Japan

miral, here she is!"

My was,

first

thought at the great news was, "Victory!" My second I'll never have to order another man out to my next was, "I am grateful for the honor of being in

"God be thanked,

die!" And command

of the Third Fleet on this day."

and pounded the shoulders of everybody within reach. Suddenly Armistice Day, 1918, came back to me. When the news was announced, Adm. Beatty, the commander in chief of the British Grand Fleet, sent

Then

plain joy took over. I yelled, "Yippee!"

out this general signal:

ALL HANDS SPLICE THE MAIN BRACE

X NEGAT SQUADRON

5. To "splice the main brace" is to take a and "negat"— short for "negative"—here means "except"; Squadron 5, being the American squadron, was dry. I now sent a

drink,

ALL HANDS SPLICE THE MAIN BRACE X NEGAT TASK GROUPS 38.1, 38.3, 38.4-which left only 38.5, the

signal to TF-38:

British group. I

on

ordered the carriers to stow their bombers and torpedo planes hangar decks, to spot their flight decks only with fighters,

their

155

an augmented and extra-vigilant CAP. My trust in still less than wholehearted, and I was taking no chance that a Kamikaze would seize a last-minute opportunity to win honor for his ancestors. In fact, I had our fighter directors call our CAP pilots by radio and instruct them, "Investigate and shoot down all snoopers— not vindictively, but in a friendly sort of way." I was told later that one pilot had been overheard to ask, "What do you mean, not vindictively'?" And another answered, "I guess they mean for us to use only three guns instead of six." Thank God, the fleet took my warning to heart and did not let down! Even as I was speaking, a battle royal raged overhead— 1303. CAP splashed one Zeke and one Judy. 1316. CAP splashed one Judy.

and

to maintain

the Japanese was

1325.

One Judy splashed by picket

Before the day was done, our planes trying to

bomb

CAP

destroyer's gunfire.

and

AA

us or dive into us.

had shot down eight I was certain at the

time that these Japanese were irreconcilables, fighting a private war; but when I went ashore and saw the utter ruin of Japan's com-

munications system,

I

became convinced

that they simply

had never

received the word.

The

last of

these planes was splashed at 1445. After that minute,

the Third Fleet never fired another shot in wrrath. score for

its

two campaigns. Here

Planes destroyed or

damaged

added up

its

10,335

Warships sunk Warships probably sunk Warships damaged Merchant vessels sunk I

We

it is:

130

90 150 1,000

hope that no nation ever dares challenge this record. But hope that the Third Fleet is there to defend it.

does, I

156

if it

PART THREE

AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR

II

Introduction In the

wake of World War

II the

Navy and her

sister services

became the

victims, once again, of rapid demobihzation. Accompanying this phenomena, attributed to individual rights in a democracy, were the problems of internal reorganization, an uneasy peace, and a nationwide desire to forget the war and any talk of being better prepared for the next. Ships and aircraft were "mothballed"— placed in storage. Manpower strength dropped to one-fourth of the World War II high. Only skeleton crews were available to man our decimated fleets. All of this at a time when the task of supporting United States policies on a global scale required trained, full-strength crews aboard large fleets in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and other areas where tangible proof of this country's might was necessary to assert our determination to support the free peoples of the world. In addition to these demands on the time of the men and equipment of the Navy, was the urgent requirement to review the lessons of the greatest war in history in order to determine the requirements for future aircraft carriers and their best method of employment. This period was made more remarkable by rapid technological and scientific advances which made change the watchword of the day. The fluid status of almost continual change in plans, tactical strategy, and forces was accepted as normal.

and projects became the order of the day. was Expedition Frostbite in March of which the U.S.S. Midway conducted cold weather tests

Tests, operations,

One of the 1946, in

first

of these

in Davis Strait.

In July, tests to determine the effects of atomic

157

bombs on naval

were conducted at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific as part of Operation Crossroads. Although tlie tests provided valuable, detailed data on the effects of nuclear blasts, one of its victims was targets

the venerable Saratoga. After nineteen years of service the Sara,

despite strong efforts to enshrine the vessel at an appropriate location,

was sunk

in shallow water.

Also in July, Lt. Cdr. James Davidson made successful landings and takeoffs on board the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt, flying an

FD-1 Phantom,

in the first U.S. test of

adapting

jet aircraft to carrier

operation.

From

a position 660 miles off the Antarctic Continent, the U.S.S.

Philippine Sea launched to Little America the

first

of six

R4D

which she had ferried from Norfolk as a part of Operation Highjump. The first plane off, which was also the first carrier takeoff for an R4D, was piloted by Cdr. William M. Hawkes and carried Rear Adm. Richard E. Byrd as a passenger. Highjump was completed in March 1947. The intervening years, until Korea, were marked by the same frenetic pace to keep abreast of changes in equipment, declining personnel strength, ever-decreasing budgets, and a steady increase transport aircraft

in responsibilities.

Communist aggression burst through the Parallel in

Korea with flames of open

curtain of the 38th

conflict in the

summer

of 1950,

catching U.S. military services in the midst of transition.

The Department

of

Defense had been established in 1947 and

reorganized in 1949. Reduction in forces had followed successive arbitrary slashes of the military budget.

War

A

mix

of

outmoded World

weapons with newer equipment presented problems in and operating techniques due to the wide differences in performance characteristics, maintenance and support requirements, and tactical application. However, forces already in the Western Pacific went into action immediately. The first Naval Air combat action came on July 3 when Air Group Five from the carrier Valley Forge blasted railroad yards and bridges in the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. By the end of the month, two fast carriers and two escort carriers, the latter with Marine fighter squadrons aboard, were actively enII

tactical doctrine

gaged.

Other elements of naval aviation were on the way and before 158

the year was over, naval air strength

was equal

to

any reached dur-

ing the entire war.

The force employed in Korea was small, in comparison with World War II experiences, but in some respects surpassed the ejQForts of the longer, world-encompassing conflict. The sortie rate was higher, combat employment of carriers was on a more continuous basis, and the amount of ordnance expended on enemy from June 1950 until expend 176,929 tons rounds of ammunition of bombs, 271,890 rockets, and 73,888,000 while making over 850,000 runs on targets. This was within 7,000 sorties of the World War II naval air totals in all theaters and bettered the bomb tonnage by 74,000 tons, and the number of rockets by 60,000. In terms of the United States air efi^ort, the sorties flown by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft rose from less than 10 per cent in World War II to better than 30 targets per flight delivery

was

greater. In

all,

July 1953, naval aviators flew 275,912 sorties to

per cent in Korea.

159

"Expedition Frostbite"—the U.S.S. Midway's fact-finding trip to the Labrador Sea— demonstrated that the Navy can effectively

extend

its carrier-air

operations to subarctic regions in defiance of

and snow and frigid winds. That was the gist of repoHs after Midway had spent 16 days testing special cold-weather equipment off the northeastern coast

ice

of Canada.

The colder regions of the earth had been neglected in military long-range plans and operations until the latter stages of World

War II,

despite scholarly emphasis on the subject many years before, hut problems arising from the Casablanca and Yalta Conferences reawakened our strategic interest in these foreboding areas. Russian demands at both meetings far exceeded their contribu-

and several of our farsighted political sciboth in and out of uniform, realized that "Over-the-Pole" attack on the North American continent would be the most logical move for a future enemy to make. The Midway test, as it contributed to our general fund of knowledge concerning the subarctic, also answered many questions about tions to Allied victories entists,

carrier operations not previously considered or experienced.

Flattop in the Arctic:

Expedition Frostbite Commanded by Capt. Herbert S. Duckworth, USN, the Midway, with three escorting destroyers and a fuehng tanker, experimented with aircraft and gear from March 6 to 22, 1946 in a sector bounded roughly by Labrador, Baffin Island, Greenland, and the North Atlantic.

The northernmost

point reached during the cruise was at

63 degrees north latitude and 53 degrees west longitude. The late winter season having been selected deliberately because it is marked by the most unfavorable weather of the year. Expedition Frostbite was frostbitten and harassed by heavy wdnds, but it was possible to operate some of the Midways 58 planes during approximately 10 days. oil diluted by gasoline to keep it from freezing, the planes were started with special apparatus and warmed up on hangar

Their

160

flight decks for takeoflF. There any of the aircraft, including the new FR-1 jet propelled plane and the new fighter F8F-1 Bearcat. The report said that weather hazards in this zone, in conditions prevailing at the time of the test, can be overcome by "high deck" operations, as 90 per cent of the bad weather is shallow, that is, below 15,000 feet. It was believed that a maximum of 115 planes could be operated under the weather conditions encountered. The normal plane complement of the Midway is 137. The basket method of air-sea rescue proved eflfective after three planes were forced to make water landings. One pilot was lost but five other men were picked up in metal baskets lowered from booms on the destroyers. In the first forced landing, the pilot was unable to escape from

decks before they were hoisted to the

was

httle difficulty in starting

the plane, but the

came

crewmen managed

to inflate a raft.

A

rescue ship

and he was on board within six and a half minutes after the plane had hit the water. Another pilot and crewman were picked up within 25 minutes. alongside, lowered a basket,

The

third rescue required 17 minutes. In this operation a

from the destroyer was lowered

in the basket,

man

which was then

"paravaned" as the ship circled to bring the raft inside the radius of the basket.

The

raft

was intercepted and the three men hoisted

aboard.

The rubberized nylon exposure

suits

so cold that in ordinary clothing they

protected these

men

in

water

would have survived only a

few minutes.

The

report suggested that in general the present articles of cold

weather clothing are too bulky and require too long a time to don. Pilots, for instance, needed 15 minutes to get fully accoutered. A "multiple layer" system of clothing was recommended to allow the wearing of several other articles under the outer gear. Snow and ice were among the main problems of the trip. Snow sometimes covered the flight deck up to a depth of three inches

and there was a constant battle against ice. It was found that by use of powered rotary sweepers the flight deck can be cleared of snow three inches deep in 30 to 60 minutes. Rock salt was satisfactory in removing ice, but this method had drawbacks. The draft created by planes' propellers scattered the salt into the faces of men on deck, and swept it into parts of the aircraft, causing increased corrosion. Heating of the hangar deck helped 161

removing ice because of the heat-transferring quahties of the deck plates. Covers to protect wings and tails of the planes were of little use. In removing light coatings of ice, the aircraft parts were sprayed with a special Uquid and wiped with rags. Snow was not only prevalent in the area— it was peculiar. Literally, it snows upward in the Labrador Sea. As cold winds from the

in

north hit the comparatively

warm

water,

snow

results,

the flakes

From the air it appeared as though so many bales of cotton were scattered over the water. The temperature range between 25 and 35 degrees Fahrenheit was considered to be the most critical for aircraft armament. In that range, with the fluctuation above and below the freezing point, condensation was troublesome. The temperature change occurring as a plane was shifted from the hangar to the flight deck caused the guns to "sweat." A system for overall heating of the guns was recommended. The temperatures were not extremely cold, ranging from 14 to 50 degrees above zero, but northern winds cutting across the flight deck at 60 to 70 knots made the effect less than temperate. Practically all the navigation in the operational area was done by Loran, the system by which positions are plotted according to radio signals from shore stations. There was so much overcast that no star sights of any kind were obtained, and navigators were lucky to get one sun line a day. High-frequency radar was reliable in contacting large icebergs at a safe distance, but the "growlers"— smaller ice formationswere treacherous. Navigators did not have confidence in either radar or sonar— the underwater sound device— in locating the "growlers," and depended on lookouts. The "Northern Lights" were not observed long enough to determine their effect on radar. The weather affected men of the expedition in two principal ways: 1. They were hungrier than usual. 2. Their actions were slowed by the heavy clothing they wore. It was reported that men of the Midway drank 75 per cent more coffee than normally and consumed 85 per cent more chocolate bars than were eaten on the Midways shakedown cruise in the Caribbeing carried aloft from the surface.

bean.

162

Teamwork, in any enterprise or group, is an important factor an aircraft carrier it is vital.

more than one individual everday life. Aboard

to consider in

without a doubt. Even more importantly,

It is vital to the mission,

without teamwork, a

affecting

life,

or several

or the entire ship's

lives,

complement, could be lost by an unthinking individual acting independently of the team. Here is an interesting commentary on the work of the flight-deck crews who get the planes safely off and then return them to the nest until next they are needed.

Carrier

Crewmen Have

a Rugged,

Vital Job LT.

The

(jg)

ARTHUR

P.

MILLER,

JR.,

big aircraft carrier, trembling slightly as her

over, turns slowly into the wind.

From one

USNR helm

is

thrown

of her halyards streams

a white flag with a red diamond superimposed on it, the Fox flag. This flag indicates to the screening destroyers that the big ship

about to launch her aircraft. on the flight deck, ready and waiting, are her planes. In front stand the jets; farther back the conventional. A brilliant is

Down

pattern of silver and blue

glancing

In

off

among

the

maze

is

created

by the morning

of folded wings.

the planes, swarming about like a busy

are the flight deck

sunlight

crewmen. Each crewman

is

band

of locusts,

distinct in a brightly

colored shirt with helmet to match. Yellows, blues, red, browns,

and whites mingle in a symphony of color. These flight deck crewmen— as well as their counterparts on the hangar deck, the hangar deck crewmen— are Very Important People. Indeed, without them there would be no operation today. Without the yellow-shirt and blue-shirt men, no planes would greens,

163

reach the

flight

out the red

deck from the

shirts,

carrier's great

would get no

the planes

"garage" below; withgas,

no bombs and no

without the browns, the aircraft would be in no shape to fly; without the greens, they could not be launched or recovered; and without the whites, no help would be on hand if a plane bullets;

crashed.

Now

wind and the helmsman up the deck, a hehcopter

the giant carrier has nosed into tKe

has steadied up on his

new

pulls itself into the air

and sheers

course. Far off to

one side where

it

will act

as plane-guard during the operation.

man

your planes." The order, barked out over the bullhorn, shatters the morning stillness. Red shirts, green shirts, and white shirts hurriedly melt into the catwalks. Brov\ni-shirted plane "Pilots,

captains

who have been

busily giving their plane

its

pre-flight

check-out climb out of the cockpit to greet the pilot as he trots

toward the plane.

"Now

clear the decks. Remove all chocks and tie-downs." word, squads of blue-shirted "plane pushers" gathered near the island structure break ranks and run down the deck

At

this

to their assigned planes.

Each

pilot,

by now

dition of his aircraft, slips into the cockpit.

with the con-

satisfied

The

brov^oi shirts dis-

appear into the catwalks. "Stand clear of propellers check all chocks and loose gear about the deck Start engines!" booms the bullhorn. A few minutes later comes the word "Start jets." An F4U Corsair emits a loud belch, catches, and roars to life. Soon another and another .

.

.

.

.

.

join the throaty chorus.

A

whines

jet

as

it

takes hold

starts,

and

bursts into a sustained, high-pitched howl. Soon the flight deck

throbs with the din and

it

is

next to impossible to

make

yourself

heard. Several blue-shirted plane handlers scurry to the to

be launched, an

first

of the jets

F9F Panther. Two men yank the chocks from man flips off the last tie-dowm gripping the

the wheels. Another

plane to the deck and gives the plane director (he wears a yellow shirt)

a

thumbs-up signal signifying that the plane

is

free

from

the deck.

The plane

director takes his station in front of

of the aircraft

where the

pilot

and

can easily see him.

to the right

He

the pilot to taxi his plane forward and spread wings.

164

motions to

Two

blue

run beneath the wings and check the wing locks and flaps. director points up the deck and the Panther rolls forward to be catapulted. Slowing down, the pilot turns his plane shirts

The plane

toward another yellow

shirt

who

stands near the port catapult.

This plane director coaxes him into position. The catapult crew springs to action— one green shirt lines up the plane's nose wheel;

under the roaring Panther to attach the catapult "bridle," a noose-like length of strong wire rope which will throw the plane into the air; two more crawl beneath the howling tailpipe to bend on the "holdback" which prevents the plane from moving forward until the maximum power has been built up by the catapult

two others

slither

engine.

Each officer

"cat"

when

man

his job

is

control panel operator,

done.

who

The

The whine of The

to a thundering roar.

catapult ofiicer glances at his

stands at the firing station in the

catwalk, gets an okay and nods. his engine.

a "thumbs-up" to the catapult

in turn gives

He

signals to the pilot to rev

up

the Panther turns to a shriek and then pilot salutes indicating

braces his head against the headrest for the

he

is

ready and

jolt.

Seeing everything ready, the catapult oflBcer throws his arm forward and ducks to the deck. The catapult control man pushes the red button marked "Fire" and the plane leaps forward, a blue streak hurtling down the deck and taking to the air. No sooner is the plane airborne than another green-shirted catapult man jumps from his place in the catwalk far up the deck, runs to inspect the bridle for damage, and, seeing none, gives a thumbs-up and jumps

back into the catwalk as the bridle is retracted for the next launch. As one catapult is being readied to launch, its twin on the opposite side

is

in the act of hurling

its

eight tons of metal into

all the jets have been launched and the conventionals— F4U Corsairs and AD-2 Skyraiders this morning— have the deck to themselves. They need it. They will do "deck run" takeoff s, each making a run down the deck from abreast

the morning haze. Within minutes,

the island.

Off they go, each pilot aiming his plane for the corner of the

maximum run. Scarcely fifteen minutes and mere specks in the sky. Abruptly, silence once more settles back on the flight deck. A few planes were found not able to fly this morning, and the

flight

deck to get the

they're gone,

165

deck boys now push these planes toward the nearest deck elevator where they will be struck below for repairs. This done, all yellow shirts and blue shirts converge on a small "shack" tucked away unobtrusively in the island structure at flight deck level. This is flight deck control and it serves as a sort of plane handlers' ready room. Here the crewmen hear praise or criticism of the morning operation— "Get those disabled planes spotted to one side"— and grab a cup of coffee. The coffee is well deserved. Chances are that these men have been up and about since 0530 getting ready for today's launching. Planes have been brought up from the hangar deck and "spotted" in their proper place for takeoff. Replaced planes have been taken below. Catapult men have inspected the catapults. Barrier men have checked the barriers. Arresting gear men have tested the arresting wires. All hands have received last-minute instructionsthen the launch. Now it's 0830 and the only time off the crew has flight

had was a quick half -hour for breakfast. Fhght deck crews and hangar deck crews long hours.

are accustomed to hard

One bunch, kept on deck almost

day and night

continuously during a

went 63 hours with only an occasional catnap. Crewmen in carriers off Korea are used to numerous, often day-long flight quarters. Even in an ordinary day aboard a rear area carrier, a plane pusher spends an average of 12 hours on deck. Hangar deck crews, not so busy when the battle

problem

in the Mediterranean,

air, often put in overtime at night (they miss a movies) readying the planes for the next day's missions. "Honestly, it's one of the most rugged jobs in the Navy," says a flight deck chief, referring to his plane handlers. "On deck, you're

planes are in the lot of

on the move all the time— and you gotta move fast and carefully. You work long hours and catch up on sleep when you can. You freeze when it's cold, boil when it's hot, slip when it's wet, and don't get any extra pay. But most of these fellows wouldn't trade their job for a yeoman's billet at a recruiting station."

As

"Now

if

to underscore the chief's remarks, the bullhorn blares out

stand by to recover aircraft."

"Here we go again," he grins. Half -drunk cups of coffee clink down on the glass-top table as crewmen scramble to get out on deck to bring in the returning aircraft.

The landing

signal officer,

whose job 166

it is

to direct a plane to a

)

safe landing

by means

of special

hand

signals to the pilot,

can be

seen at his post far aft on the portside. Green helmets of the arresting gear and barrier

men poke up from both

catwalks.

landing signal oflBcer has a plane "in the groove," that is

the

the plane

turning onto the last leg in his landing pattern.

From It

is,

Now

the catwalks, heads crane to watch the plane's approach.

smoothly eases around the

last turn,

70 to 80 feet above the water.

In response to a series of signals from the LSO, the pilot straightens her out, maintains altitude and air speed, lines himself up with the center line of the flight deck, and finally gets a "cut" signal, mean-

ing "land." As the pilot cuts the throttle the plane bounces to the

deck for a three-point landing with the momentum of a fast express train. The tail hook snags one of the heavy arresting wires and pulls it up the deck like a great rubber band. The plane jerks to a halt. As sometimes happens, the tail hook has failed to free itself from the wire. To free it, two green shirts jump from their spots in the catwalk, sprint to the plane, yank the hook free and dive back into the catwalk again as the pilot throttles his craft up the deck to make room for the next plane to land a scant 25 to 30 seconds later. The arresting gear control panel operator, also in the catwalk, throws a lever and the wire which was run out by the plane retracts to

its

original position.

The

barrier operator lowers his barriers to

the deck so the landed plane can taxi forward then throws another lever

which

flips

the barriers

up

again, all set for the next landing.

(Barriers are simply fence-like structures of

heavy wire which stop

snag an arresting wire. such as the one described is a tricky business. Safety precautions here are much more than slogans— they can mean life or death. If you don't think so, shoot the breeze for a few minutes with the flight deck crew of U.S.S. Midway (CVB-41), one of the biggest of Uncle Sam's flattops. "Yeah, these jets keep you on your toes all right," says Pat Casey, AB3, USN. Casey has had plenty of close calls himself but today he's speaking of a friend of his, Johnny Seebold, AN. "Seeb was running this chock from under an F9F to the catwalk a plane that

A

fails to

carrier operation

[to remove or run' a chock, a chockman bends down and pushes the chock before him to one side of the deck]. This jet starts taxiing up to the catapult and just as Seeb gets this chock to the catwalk the plane swings its tail around and—wingo!— the blast picks Seeb

167

up by the seat of his pants and drapes him across the rail. A couple more and he would have been over the side. As it was, he

of feet

got only a couple of bruises I"

"These conventional can be nasty too," another green shirt chimes in. "Remember when Haney (Marion Haney, AN, USN) was chocking an F4U so it could be taken down the forward elevator? "He was putting the chocks to the wheels when another F4U comes barreling in, makes a crazy landing, bounces clean over the barriers and heads straight for Haney. He saw it coming and started to crawl like mad for the side but the plane was going too fast for him. As

it

hit his

F4U, Haney

hit the deck.

And

I

mean

the stuff

But he was lucky— the prop ripped through his shirt but never touched Haney. You know, when he left the ship he still had really flew!

that shirt as a souvenir!"

Despite this

flirting

with danger, relatively few crewmen become

casualties.

To is

deal with injuries on the flight deck

the job of several other

members

doctor and one or two corpsmen

if

they do occur, however,

of the flight deck team.

who wear

One

a white shirt and a white

it stand ready for any emergency. Two other emergency personnel are the hot suitmen or "hot poppas" who stand

hat with a red cross on

waiting in their asbestos gasoline or oil

suits.

They

will

wade

into

even the worst

fire.

Other members of the team are the repair party

men who

clear

the flight deck of wreckage in case of a mishap, the alert photog-

raphers

who

take pictures of takeoffs and landings that will

show

pilots what they are doing wrong, and a chaplain (sometimes dubbed the "Sky Pilot") who stays close at hand for moral support.

Beneath all this flight desk hustle and bustle, in the relative quiet of the hangar deck, another close-knit crew of men works at a different job. Whereas the flight deck crew topside is concerned mainly with getting planes off the deck and bringing them back aboard again, the hangar deck gang is responsible for insuring that the planes stay in the air as long as they are needed.

Two

two parts spare parts, and six parts hard labor— that's a hangar deck operation. What's more, the scene here is not as dramatic nor as colorful as that topside. As if to underline this fact, the hangar deckers wear the familiar faded blue dungarees instead of a brightly colored shirt and helmet. parts grease,

168

But if it is less dramatic, the job of a meclianic on the hangar deck no less important than that of the plane pusher. For here in the dim light of the barnlike hangar deck many minor miracles of aircraft repair ( and a few major ones ) are performed. For example, a plane with a smashed propeller and a wing badly dented from a barrier crack-up or one riddled with shrapnel, will be wheeled in late one afternoon, repaired and wheeled out again the next morning, ready to take its place in the line once more. "Miracles" like this are not the result of luck. Rather it's the end product of many skills blended together into a smoothly working repair organization. This organization is part of an aircraft squadron, a difference from the flight deck crew. The flight deck personnel are for the most part ship's company. Squadron personnel follow the squadron wherever it may gois

afloat or ashore. In this

inside

when

way

they come to

know

and out and thus are better prepared it

When

their

own

aircraft

to diagnose trouble

occurs.

gang like this goes aboard ship, its two key enlisted men are the hne chief petty officer and the maina squadron maintenance

tenance chief petty oflBcer. The "hne chief," as he is called, has his post in flight deck control on the flight deck. From this operational nerve center he is in a position to answer all queries regarding which planes are capable of flying

and which must undergo

repairs.

When

a plane needs a

repair job, the line chief so reports to his squadron commander or squadron duty ofiBcer. The "skipper" or his representative makes his decision, then notifies the line chief who puts the job order on his

repair schedule.

The

line chief's right-hand

man on

the flight deck

is

the plane

he lands and gets from him any complaints about his plane. These complaints or "gripes" are jotted down immediately and turned over to the hne inspector. This petty officer meets each pilot as

chief.

he may have, then passes the on the hangar deck, the maintenance chief. The maintenance chief might be called the straw boss of the hangar deck. He is the fellow who gets the complaints, picks the right men, assigns them, follows up the work and makes sure the "miracles" are performed on schedule.

The

gripes

chief adds any information

on

to his counterpart

169

Engine trouble? He assigns his jet engine or conventional engine team to the job. Brake failure? He calls a structural mechanic. Radio trouble? A radio-radar speciahst. Wiring snafu? An electrician from the electrical shop.

When

on and a plane is needed for the next day's may be forced to work a good part of the night. Whatever the case, however, the maintenance chief notifies the line chief as soon as a plane has been repaired. The line chief in turn tells the CO. or squadron duty ofiicer who orders the plane "back on the line." To stop here in our story would be to leave out one very important man— the plane captain. A plane captain has a unique job. He is personally responsible for the condition of one airplane—his airplane. Roughly speaking, he is the pilot's representative on the the pressure

is

the maintenance gang

flight,

ground.

who gives his aircraft its important prewarm-up. For an F9F Panther, for example, a plane captain

It is

flight

the plane captain

must go through 20

items. Here are a few: "Inspect safety belt. Clean instrument panel. Check oxygen supply— 1800 pounds per

square inch. Check hydraulic fluid cracks or bums. after pilot enters

After each

Check

starter.

level.

Connect

Look up

tail

pipe for cuts,

battery. Close nose section

." .

flight,

.

the plane captain gives his craft a post-flight

inspection. He accompanies the plane inspector on his tour and makes mental notes of the pilot's complaints. He lubricates his plane and fills the fuel tanks. Like a good filling station attendant, he also cleans the windshield and sides before a flight. And hke as

not while mechanics are laboring over his plane, he will be watching from the shadows— or helping.

"Each of these boys practically eats and sleeps in his plane," says Kurt Schilling, ADC, USN, the experienced line chief of experimental squadron three (VX-3). "Some of them are young and many aren't yet rated, but they learn fast. And they know that the plane is their pigeon and that it's up to them to see that it comes home to roost."

In a nutshell, Schilhng's last sentence accurately sums up the job of the entire flight deck

and hangar deck crews

their skill

and courage they help

to

as well.

Both

exist

come home to roost. Through make flying a plane onto a rolling

in order to see that the Navy's pigeons

170

flight

their

deck just as safe and feet on the deck and

reliable as

their

it is

humanly

possible.

With

heads in the clouds, these carrier

crewmen share the credit for making ing weapon of sea power today.

171

the aircraft the greatest strik-

It was June 25, 1950 and the world was beginning to prosper again after the devastation of war. An uneasy peace lay like a briar mantle on the free world. For many neighbors were being imprisoned behind an Iron Curtain rung down by the Soviets.

The

threat of

wolf" so

many

war was always

in the air,

but so

many had

"cried

times since August 1945 that Mr. Man-In-The-Street

rarely got excited

enough

to

up on emergency rations. The terrible wait ended

run to the Corner supermarket to stock as North Korean

Communists poured

across the 38th parallel in an unprovoked attack on their relatives in

South Korea.

Two days later the carriers U.S.S. Valley Forge and H.M.S. Triumph were steaming for Korea. Aircraft from the two were launched Red capital of Pyongyang on July 3 and 4. Correspondents rushed to Korea to record the action. One of the first comprehensive reports to see public print is this one. in strikes against the

Close Support from the Carriers WAYNE THOMIS The bent-wing

birds have done the job in Korea as they did more ago in the Pacific war against Japan. Corsairs manned by Navy and Marine regulars became extensions of the doughfoot's Ml, his carbine, bazooka, or BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle). Tactics first tried from carrier decks or coral flight strips of the Palaus proved adaptable to a new kind of warfare amid the arid rolling hills of this theater. And it is no exaggeration to say that tlie most sincere and thorough aviation enthusiasts in the world were the infantrymen of the outnumbered and often outmaneuvered bits and

than

five years

pieces of divisions

first

tossed into battle.

"While those bent-wing babies are nosing around overhead, the North Koreans never come out of their holes. We never get ambushed in daylight when the planes are in action. We never drive 172

around a mountain shoulder and find ourselves face to face with an unexpected T-34 Russian tank," said the ground troops. "And when we get in a hot spot they come down, take aim over our shoulders, and hit'em where we can't. They used to work a quarter-mile ahead of us. But nowadays they're in there so close they're splashing dust and sand on us from the rocket and machine-

cannon bursts. That's real support." As usual the boys closest to the point of impact are right. The generals say that the use of ground support from fighter-bombers is

the great tactical lesson taught

by the

fighting.

They agree

that

and plentifully supplied, can offset numerical odds against American troops. They assert that continuous, close, and hot air cover has turned the tide in major battles and has provided the absolute rail and highway interdiction that was the greatest hurdle for the North Korean hordes. The copters— now serving in their second war—have won for themselves a special niche in the hearts of all within the American zone. They have been in the front lines with the Marines, and they have been out to sea to provide air-sea rescue and courier service from carriers to the beach. The Marine fighter pilots are using F4U's, and operating from jeep carriers that have maximum speeds of 20 knots. There are two such carriers in operation here, affectionately known as the Bing Bong and the Sicilian. For all normal operations both carriers are at sea working as a single team. Unless special assistance is required, or an emergency such as checking a full-scale offensive arises, pilots of one carrier fly from 0630 until 1430 (6:30 a.m. until 2:30 p.m.) on strikes ashore, while those from the second carrier fly the tedious but never omitted combat air patrols. During the afternoon hours the jobs are reversed. While the writer was with this force the carriers were staying at sea for ten days at a stretch and the pilots were flying daily on hops that averaged four hours each. There were always a few pilots— the jobs were rotated— who flew two hops daily. When an emergency such as the first Naktong River fight of August 16 through August 19 was raging, air cover, intelligently

every pilot flew eight hours daily. Exactly what this meant in strain on men and planes will best be understood by veteran pilots. Every takeoff was a catapult shot. Every landing, a test of flying skill and plane ruggedness. For in

173

the sheltered waters close in toward the shore where these carriers habitually rendezvoused,

and three days

in a

the winds

were extremely

light.

Two

row we have seen the anemometer on the Bing

Bongs bridge registering only 22-23 knots over the deck when the was at flank speed heading into the only breeze.

ship

Despite these extremely unfavorable conditions, the Corsairs were going o£F canying one external fuel tank, a 500-pound bomb or a

napalm tank weighing an equivalent amount, plus eight 5-inch rockets, and a good supply of 20-mm. ammunition. Several times, with wind dropping to zero during catapulting, four rockets would be removed from planes on the catapult bridle. But this didn't happen often. ( Most of the Corsairs are the F4U-4 model, which accounted for 2,140 enemy aircraft during World War II. Also in action is the latest model Corsair, the F4U-5 powered by Pratt & Whitney Aircraft's Double Wasp engine. Among the armament carried by the F4U-5's are two "Tiny Tim" armor-piercing missiles, each weighing more than 1,150 pounds. The rockets are almost a foot wide.) "Only the Corsair could do this," said Maj. "Stiney" Steinhouse, fighter-bomber operations oflBcer. "It's a real load-carrying baby, and it's still a first-class fighter once we shed the bomb and rockets. We can stay out four hours and come back and orbit another hour, if

we

must, without worrying about lack of fuel.

"A

we

lot of us

first

Marines were pretty rusty in our carrier work when

got out here, too. Half a dozen in this squadron hadn't been

on a carrier in five years. We did bounce on the beach at San Diego, and came aboard like veterans. Then surprisingly enough we had a couple of weeks of ragged work, particularly when we got into these light winds out here. But that's behind us, too. The secret was to expect the landing signal officer to give us a cut well out and pretty high. In stronger airs, you get the cut close in and almost on the deck. It took a while to get adjusted to this. "Over the target none of us want a better airplane, and we all would kick if they wanted to take our bent-wing away. Almost everyone in the squadron flew Corsairs for two years or more during the Japanese war. Then we flew F7F's, and checked out in the twoseater F-80's in preparation for Navy jets. And we still beheve that no other airplane now available at home could do the job these F4U-4's are doing." 174

By early September, this squadron had flown more than 1,000 hours total time and each pilot had averaged just over 63 hours of combat time in less than three full weeks of flying days. In that period only one case of mechanical failure Corsair, following a successful catapult shot,

had occurred. One was ditched when

power before the flight deck could be respotted and a landing made. There had been several other airplanes lost but these were the result of flak damage which caused ditchings or crash landings ashore. One plane was stalled after the catapult shot and flopped, in the commencement of a spin, into the sea just ahead of the ship. Fortunately the pilot clawed himself clear and managed, despite a fouled parachute that persisted in floating him chin low and butt high, to get gulps of air until the plane-guard destroyer fished him out. "We simply never worry about that R-2800 engine," these Marines asserted. "It's been good to us all. We beat the planes and engines daily in 400-knot dives and five- and six-G pull-outs. The mechanics change plugs or clean oil-screens and that's about all. The props give even less trouble. We think they are completely trouble-free and ideal equipment for us— who have such abbreviated facilities the engine lost

for maintenance,

The same

anyway."

and scorn of newer, faster turbinepowered craft pervades ready rooms of Corsair pilots on the two Essex-class carriers that made up the power of Task Force 77 during the month of August and early September. "The prop planes are the workhorses and the load-carriers," says Cdr. John T. "Tex" O'Neill, commanding one of two such units on the Philippine Sea. "None of the jets carry enough weight of armament to make their use in ground support work justified, although there's no question that carriers must carry jets to fight enemy jets. faith in their planes

"Real load-carrying planes of the carriers

bomb and rocket load War II. But our Corsairs

Skyraiders whose

now

are the Douglas

equal to that of a B-17 can give an excellent account of themselves against even the Russian jets if it came to that

during World

is

out here."

One

stunt that

breath away

is

now

when he

regarded as routine took

saw

this observer's

That is the practice of climbing right into the engine intake ducts— while the engine is running at idling settings— to make fuel pump adjustments. It was done for a first

it.

175

was forbidden by directive. Now at sea, precautions being used by the mechanic at the throttle,

time on the beach, then

with special it is

it

again standard operational procedure.

While

was aboard

by Cdr. Ralph Weymouth of Key West, Florida, flew to an airfield deep in enemy territory. The strike was intended to ferret out any enemy aircraft that might be filtering into Korea. They expected to find camouflaged aircraft somewhere round the airfield's perimeter. But let I

this

carrier the jets,

led

Weymouth tell it. "We went in at 20,000 feet over solid 10/ 10th cloud. Luckily there was a hole where we needed to let down and we came in over that Window-peeking is definitely approved these went down to 50 feet to look into the several hangars and windows of buildings round the edge of the field. I couldn't see a plane, but I did see that the buildings were roofless or were airport at 360 knots.

days, so I

gutted.

"Some character with a light machine gun opened up on me I came across, and some of the boys went down to give him a dose of cannon fire. 1 looked round the edges of the field for paths that led out to nowhere or to haystacks or possible revetments. I saw some planes that had been freshly camouflaged, but going over them at 50 feet I could see that even these planes were wrecks with broken wings and holes torn in fuselages. I decided they had freshly camouflaged them in order to get us to waste our ammunition there. We gave everything a squirt or two for good measure anyhow, and came back home, climbing again to 20,000 feet for good speed and economy." Busiest and hardest to pin down of all squadrons on a big carrier are the copter boys. Aboard the Philippine Sea the HU-1 detachment had no ready-room and normally its members lounged on the flight deck and its pilots in the combat intelligence center plot room. "The only difficulty we've had has been caused on the hangar deck by jamming folded wings of fighters against our rotor blades. We carry extra rotor heads and change them every 80 hours. We can do an engine change on the carrier but have no spare right now." the second time

Duties of the unit include taking the

force as

air as

plane-guard for every

was launching and recovering ten at thi5 time— plus being used in the task courier mail carrier and as transfer taxi for doctors or

and landing— our times a day on schedule takeoff

carrier

176

who might

go from a cruiser to a carrier and return. General rules called for no longer than 50-mile flights over water, but hehcopter pilots of Marine VMO-6 frequently fly 80 to 100 miles out from land bringing rescued pilots back to carriers or bringing staff officers

courier mail. as taxis

and

The Marine hehcopters— also H03S-l's—have been used wounded and any other mission that

for evacuation of

uninhibited leaders can think up. Several times the Marines have landed behind

enemy

lines to

pick up pilots, and recently the same kind of job was done by an Air Force helicopter pilot from a squadron based at

Masan

air strip.

On

August 19, I was on a high hill overlooking the Naktong River after a combination of Corsair strafing and great valor by Marine infantry had driven out the largest concentration of North Koreans to penetrate American lines up to that time. Medics were working swiftly over a Marine shot through the belly. They said: "He can't be carried off here or the jolting will kill him for sure, and yet if we don't move him he'll die anyway." The word was relayed by pack radio and within twenty minutes one of VMO-6's copters was settling near us. In the excitement of getting the

man

carried to the copter, kicking out a glass panel be-

side the rear seat

and

resting the victim

on the

seat so his feet pro-

jected into the wind-stream, I forgot to get the pilot's name. But that

helicopter pilot thought nothing of using the bare 1,200-foot hilltop as a landing point

wounded

and he told the medics he'd been carrying da vs.

in another copter for the last three

177

On

July 3

and

4,

1950, carrier-based jet-powered aircraft went

time in history. Watching with anxious eyes and a hopeful heart as his "babies" struck out for Korea was Rear Adm. John M. ("Uncle John") Hoskins, Naval air boss of the Seventh Fleet. Here is the story from into action for the

first

.

Com

Car Div

3

.

- Navy

.

Jets at

Korea

REAR ADM. JOHN M. HOSKINS

A JET "panther"

leaves the flight deck of the Seventh Fleet aircraft

carrier U.S.S. Valley Forge. As part of a six-plane sweep over Communist North Korea, he speeds in over the target at 20,000 feet, drops his brakes and heads down. Before the enemy realizes what has happened and can fight back, his planes have been liit on the ground, locomotives, troops, and gun emplacements have been shot

up.

The

jet

comes home. He lands aboard.

For Seventh Fleet raid on

enemy

aircraft carriers this

summarizes a typical

jet

by the Panther, but behind the small raid are the thousands of problems the new and deadly weapon imposes. These problems are felt in the training commands, logistic support groups, maintenance, planning, and strategy. The jet Panther has a short history. It came to the fleet aboard the Valley Forge when she departed from San Diego, California, on May 1, 1950. The Valley Forge was assigned routine duty with the territory

Seventh Fleet operating out of the Philippine Islands. The period between the joining of the Valley Forge wdth the Seventh Fleet and the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula had been one of constant training. It was a test and experimental period for the jet Panther. Throughout the early stages of our Far East duty, the jet flew on peacetime operations only when land was within fuel range of the Panther. The fuel problem of the jet was and still is the most out-

standing of

all

the problems.

178

.

.

were Hfted aboard the Valley Forge, have been ironed out. One of the outstanding problems was handling or moving the jets on deck. At first, they had to be towed from a fitting on the nose wheel. This meant, of course, that to move the plane from the forward to the after end of the flight or hangar deck, the following steps had to be Since the

many

day the

first

jets

of the shipboard problems

taken: (

1

)

A

plane handling crew of ten

of

its

men had

to pull the plane out

spot.

2 The plane had to be turned around ( headed aft ) The tractor tow bar had to be connected to the nose wheel. ( 3 ) (4) Plane then towed to the approximate location desired. )

(

(5) Tractor bar then disconnected. (6) Plane handling crew then

(

had

to turn the plane

( headed forward ) The plane then had to be pushed into

7)

its final

around

spot.

was a very awkward and time-consuming maneuver. the V-shaped tow bar used to pull conventional aircraft, the task was simplified. This modification consisted of lengthening one leg of the tow bar and attaching it to the main landing gear. The other leg of the tow bar was shortened so that it could be connected to the tail skag assembly. The jet plane would then be towed tail first with the resultant effect that jet aircraft handling operations on the flight and hangar deck were immediately speeded up at least fifty per cent. This problem was solved by one of the Valley Forge crewmen, R. A. Hudson, aviation chief boatswain's All in

all,

this

By modifying

mate.

On

July 3 and

4,

1950, jet Panthers from the Valley Forge hit the

enemy hard and fast. For aircraft saw action from a the

maximum

the

first

carrier.

time in naval aviation history, In order that the

time over the targets,

On

we moved

jets

jet

could realize

the carrier in close

combat mission, they shot down two on the ground and damaged many others, resulting in a sudden and marked decrease in the enemy's air potential. Hitting the enemy alternately from the Yellow Sea and Japan Sea, the jets have run up quite a scoreboard, while time, training, and operations continue to see their problems solved and performance improved. to the shore.

enemy

their

first

planes, destroyed others

179

At

first,

the jet Panther appeared to present a greater maintenance

compared with conventional aircraft upkeep, but hangar deck crews now boast they can change a jet engine in a matter of hours where days are still required for the prop planes. Earlier this year, when jets were first introduced aboard the Valley Forge, skepticism about the Panther's real worth ran high. "Too fast," said some. "Too little firepower," others contended. I believe, however, that most of tliese skeptics failed to realize the particular purpose of an aircraft determines its entire design. Most of the qualities in an airplane, such as high speed, maneuverabihty, long range, weight-carrying capacity, rapid climb, quick takeofi^, and high ceiltask as

ing are inherently incompatible in the same design.

High speed, for example, is attained by designing a plane wdth high wing load— that is, with small wing surface relative to the weight carried.

Though almost any

military plane can shoot, drop bombs,

carry out other such tasks and though conditions vdll

and

demand

at

times the use of multipurpose planes, the best aircraft for any job is

the one designed specifically for that job.

We

have found this particularly so of the jet Panther. The jet's terrific speed, combined with high ceiling, relative long range and rapid climb, make it a superior fighter-interceptor. As a strafing weapon, the effects of its 20mm. cannons is felt throughout all of enemy Korea and the results speak favorably for the Panther. Her close support and supply line strikes during the past months up and dowTi the peninsula have left tanks, troops, trains, and locomotives, artillery pieces and numerous other targets chopped up, burned, and in most cases, destroyed. Though the Panther has not flown off the Valley Forge in all types of weather, we can be sure of one thing. The jet stands up well in the tropics and semi- tropics. The varying weather conditions from the Philippine Islands to the upper portions of the Japan Sea has had httle effect on the Panther. In the single loss of a jet Panther off the Valley Forge, another feature of the jet is brought to light. After being hit by gunfire, a jet pilot made a perfect water landing and because he had time to empty the fuel from his tip tanks, the jet remained afloat till the rescue helicopter picked him up. The pilot didn't even get wet and the plane had to be sunk by gun fire. 180

It is clear that

the airplane

essentially the

is

weapon

of surprise.

tremendous speed often enables the Panther to appear deep into territory and drive home its blows before the enemy can muster effective opposition. It is in this fact that the jet finds its Its

enemy

place disregarding all other contingencies. Its rapid climb ability can get the Panther to 10,000 and 20,000 feet in a matter of minutes to ward off any attacking planes. Though this has not been necessary for the Seventh Fleet Panthers, it has earned them another title, "Our unused insurance poHcy." Over the target, the jet has shown itself more than capable of the great bursts of speed so often necessary at times, while on the other hand, it has proven itself a deadly weapon in the hands of pilots

slow speed characteristics. Panther is a hard plane to hit with

familiar with

The

jet

cause of

its

its

speed, but

its

ability to

AA

fire,

not only be-

change speed during climbs,

and level flight by employment of the brakes. During the month of August, additional carriers joined the Seventh Fleet and on their decks were a newer model jet Panther. Though similar in most respects, these new jets carry a greater destruction to the enemy in the form of rockets. Added to their 20-mm. cannons, they have been packing a punch to every comer of the dives

peninsula.

After the strikes are over and the

return home, they

jets

into the landing pattern with their brakes

with a

minimum

of wave-off s.

The

move

down and come aboard

excellent visibility of the cockpit

enables the pilot to see well ahead and to the side of him.

Though

he comes in faster than the prop driven craft, the jet comes in for near perfect landings each time. Contrary to the misconception that the jet blast will burn a man on the flight deck, the rush of air from the jet pipes merely pushes him aside. Compared to the idling propeller, the jet blast is comparable to a kitten.

As each day of

carrier strikes

by the Seventh Fleet comes and by the men that handle the

goes, jet problems are finding solutions jet

around the

The

jet is

clock.

The

jet

has found

here to stay.

181

its

place in the carrier brood.

a fascinating glimpse at the multitude of tasks that m.ust be performed "below the waterline" to keep a floating city, such as an aircraft carrier, operational. Each task must be performed with skill and promptness. Anything less would detract from the ability of the carrier to perform its misThis

is

sion smoothly, efficiently,

and

safely.

The Air Navy Below

the

WaterUne

As THE Oriskany steamed into Sasebo Harbor recently, flight deck crews were bent on an all-hands task. They were busy respotting the carrier's planes for "operation pin wheel" using CVG-19's prop and jet planes to provide the carrier with her maneuvering power. Steaming out to join TF-77, these same crewonen provided the teamwork necessary for CVG-19 to garner an "outstanding" in three fields and an "excellent" in ten during their Operational Readiness Inspection by COMFAIR HAWAII. These marks were attained despite the fact that the air group was the first group to be deployed Far East with each of its four squadrons flying difi^erent aircraft. Furthermore, the flying was done in near "no wind" conditions. The teamwork on the flight deck is always apparent. Hundreds of men are bent on performing one task— getting planes into position for an operation, fast. But the greatest teamwork of all, probably the most coordinated effort made during carrier operations, isn't visible on the flight deck. That is why it often goes unrecognized. This action takes place many decks below, hidden from the documenting lens of the camera. Far removed from the rapid tempo of flight deck operations, the casual observer is unaware of the men in the engine rooms and boiler rooms below. Yet without them, not one single plane would leave the deck. The big muscle of the Navy's air arm would be nothing but a helpless mass of steel drifting aimlessly on the ocean. To most persons, flight operations begin when the air officer, overlooking the flight deck from "primary flight control," gives the green to the

182

light

Actually,

signal.

deck receives the order

operations begin to increase the

when

the oflBcer-of-the-

speed of the ship to compen-

sate for the existing wind.

Before the

first

plane can be safely launched, at least 30 to 35

down the flight deck. If sufficient men below decks becomes more important than ever. The difi^erence has to be made up by the ship's engines. The skill and precision with which the men in the engine knots of wind must be blowing

wind

is

not present, the work of the

rooms and boiler rooms answer the engine orders issued by the OOD on the bridge means the success or failure of the mission, whether in combat or in peacetime training. Speed of a 33,000-ton, 150,000-hp. ship isn't regulated by pressing an accelerator or turning a switch. It still takes hard manual labor. When the OOD sends an order below to increase speed, 32 men manning the four engines and 28 others in the boiler rooms spring into action.

The

valves are turned,

pumps speeded

up, throttles are opened,

and scores of gauges are watched anxiously. There cannot be any departure from the highly critical readings; they must remain nearly constant at all times. A few wrong moves or gauge readings missed and not compensated for may result in loss of steam pressure which could lead to loss of power. This is a dreaded event for any commanding officer and a true nightmare to the chief engineer. Engines would stop, turbo-generators would no longer produce electricity, the galleys would be unable to prepare food, and shipboard activity would additional burners are "lighted

come

off,"

to a standstill.

Obviously, everything and everyone aboard a carrier relies on the steam produced by the boilers. Vital needs may be met temporarily

from the boilers through main arteries by emergency diesel generators and motors, but steam is the lifea foot in diameter, branches into hundreds of miles of capillaries which reach throughout the ship, then circulates back to the engine rooms to be condensed into water again and is refed to the boilers. Every drop of fresh water must be used and reused carefully. The evaporators manufacturing it are capable of producing only a fraction of the 2,500,000 gallons which must be converted into steam blood of the

carrier. It flows

during a day of standard operation. The water must be chemically pure before 183

it

enters the boilers.

The

one-third of a

pound

of salts present in each gallon of seawater

has to be extracted by the evaporators which also operate on steam.

Two sets of three run day and night

to

quench the

thirst of

crew and

turbines.

The water they produce automobile battery.

It

is

purer than distilled water placed in an

has to be because^ as steam,

it is

heated and

reheated to 850 degrees, then forced into the engines under a pressure of 600 pounds per square inch. pressure, even the slightest

amount

At

this great

temperature and

and damage to

of impurity eventually clogs

corrodes steam lines and boiler tubes, causing serious

complex propulsion machinery.

Some

of this heat

is

bound

to "rub

oflF"

in the air that

fills

the

engine rooms and boiler rooms. Although these spaces would seem

warm

amazingly cool under the circumstances. Elaborate exhaust and ventilating systems keep thermometers at 100 degrees or less, depending on the temperature of the outside air and seawater. A visitor soon forgets the heat as his interest turns to the array of machinery of all types and sizes. Anyone who shows enough interest to make the trip "south" of the third deck aboard a carrier such as the Essex will encounter real hospitality. The men in the engineering gang, all 500 of them, are eager to explain the operation of even the smallest motor or pump. There he can see Dean B. Sharp, FN, carefully testing the salt water content of the fresh water passing from the Essex's evaporators into extremely

to the unacclimated, they are

the storage tanks.

The

first

impression an outsider receives in either the

or machinery rooms

is

fire

the presence of tremendous power.

rooms

Each

of

the four whining engines, larger than the living room of an average home, produces 37,500 hp, enough to push 33,000 tons of steel through the water at 33 knots. The boilers, comparable in size to two-story houses, continually produce a constant supply of super-heated steam. Evidence of great power is everywhere— steam pressure gauges with the needles quivering at 600 pounds, temperature gauges indicating 850 degrees, huge steam lines, giant generators, electrical switchboards, and pumps. All of these add to the crescendo of sound which leaves the outsider's ears ringing long after the climb topside.

Despite the enormous size of these pieces of machinery, the machinist's

mates

still

speak in terms of thousandths of an inch. To

184

breakdown owing to the great demands placed on machinery by fast-carrier task force operation, carriers have a program of continuous preventive maintenance similar to the one carried on by the Essex's chief engineer, Cdr. C. R. insure against

the

propulsion

Brandt.

Under the direction of his main propulsion assistant, Lt. H. A. May, men check critical points, measure clearance and replace worn Everyone from chief petty officer to fireman apprentice has his job to keep the ship running efficiently. Whether it's William C. Giles cleaning the firesides of the boiler furnaces or another man cahbrating a temperature gauge, each task is done with equal skill. The men are keenly aware of the fact that individual performance of their duties often decides the delicate balance between full power or loss of power. If serious trouble develops, the engineering machine shop turns out any part necessary for emergency repairs. Well-trained machinists manufacture a bearing, part or gear from blueprint or sample. Phihp C. Duncan, MM2, and John T. Page, MMl, and other machinist's mates can complete an important repair job while underway without affecting the ship's speed or operating schedule. The urgency of repairs while the carrier is underway was aptly demonstrated during the Korean War. It happened to the Philippine Sea while she was pounding Communist frontline positions in all-out parts.

carrier operations.

Damaged four shafts.

couplings forced her to operate on only two out of her

Working day and

Cdr. N. Sonenshein

made

night, engineering personnel

under

the repairs at sea, allowing the ship to

keep Skyraiders, Panthers and Corsairs striking over North Korea

Communist Reds. The engineering team made

at the

it

possible for the Phil Sea to stay in

the fight despite her serious handicap in carrier speed.

Five separate divisions compose the engineering team aboard a carrier.

The

auxiliary division

is

responsible for the refrigeration

machine shop, heating, and emergency diesel generators. and repairs the boilers and their auxmachinery as well as manufacturing the fresh water and main-

plants,

The

boiler division operates

iliary

taining the evaporators.

The electrical The machinery

and power systems. and keeps the main propulsion

division maintains the lighting division operates

185

machinery

in top condition.

ship's welders, ship fitters,

The

repair division

Immediate and proper response the

first

MM2,

is

composed

of the

and damage contiolmen. to the engine order telegraph

is

objective of the ship's engineering force. Fred H. Davis,

stands the throttle watch at one time or another.

He

answers

the engine order telegraph at main engine control and begins the

chainwork of coordinated action necessary

to

change the speed of

the ship.

Responding to the order to increase speed, Lloyd C. Torgerson, BT3, lights off additional burners as Darrell L. Holladay, FN, regulates the flow of fuel oil to the boiler furnace.

carrier

depends on the

skillful

The mobility

of the

execution of engine orders by these

men.

Many

instruments are installed in the crowded

machinery rooms issued

by the

fire

rooms and

understand orders on the bridge. These include compass repeaters,

to help personnel to better

OOD

rudder angle indicator repeaters, wind direction, and force indicators.

There

is

a fascination to these jobs below the waterline and most

men

wouldn't trade their jobs for any other aboard a carrier. The best example of this devotion is Jerry D. Freckleton, a fireman of the

aboard the Yorktown.

He went below

the waterline to visit a ship-

mate and liked the work so well that he changed his job to fireman. As Freckleton says, "Of course it's hot down here, but there's something about

it

that gets in your blood."

and destroyers of a task force tura into the wind and prepare to launch aircraft, the team below the waterline swings into coordinated action. As flight deck activity increases when the pilots man their planes and plane handlers direct the aircraft into launching position, the engine rooms and boiler rooms increase their tempo too. As

aircraft carriers, cruisers,

The

men

actions of these

"topside."

men

Although

are every bit as important as those of

their rates don't

to recognition as part of today's "Air

186

show

Navy."

it,

they're entitled

The North Korean Communists never knew where his planes would strike them next as Capt. Thach sailed his tiny task force from launch area to launch area in the seas around the peninsula of Korea. These hit and run tactics thoroughly confused the Reds. It confused them not only as to the direction the next attack might come from, but as to how many carriers we had operating in the Korean area. Capt. Thach, one of the Navy's outstanding fighting airmen of II, was also a brilliant tactician whose combat innova-

World War

much to turning back the Japanese shortly Harbor and throughout the long Pacific Campaign. Admiral Thach, three-star rank, is now hard at work on the sta§ of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pentagon, as of this writing. tions contributed so after Pearl

Captain Thach's Phantom Carrier JOHN DENSON Here were

three of us.

The

U.S.S. Sicily, one of the Navy's

CVE's

(escort carrier) with a capacity of 24 fighter planes; the destroyer U.S.S.

James E. Kyes, and the cocky

the U.S.S. Doyle. That's

Uttle destroyer-minesweeper,

The big

brass, short of ships to

seemed

far too big for

hold the United Nations hne on the vast Eastern seas, must have smiled grimly when they designated our threesome a task group. But there were no more warcraft available and the hour was critical on that fading afternoon when the Sicily sailed from Japan's rusty port of Kobe to join the destroyers and take on the Marine-piloted planes all.

at sea.

The tions

task group's mission

were

its size.

Instruc-

enemy wherever and whenever he

to harass the slippery

could be found; to provide close

air

support for ground forces; to

give fighter cover to British warships bombarding seaports, and to raise general

down upon

havoc with the Communists who were

still

pressing

our positions in the southeast corner of crimson-stained

Korea.

187

was a ghostly kind of mission, too, but greatly to the hking of the group commander, Capt. John Smith (Jimmy) Thach, the Navy's most celebrated fighter-plane tactician and a lean, savvy veteran of the Pacific war against the Japanese. To Jimmy Thach, the Mission meant striking short jabs and body blows at the North Koreans, roaming and punching with his fightei: planes— always, dawn to dark, roaming and punching. The skipper's aim was never to let the enemy know where the air strikes came from, nor whether there were 20 planes or 200, nor whether there was one aircraft carrier or a dozen of them plying the heavily-mined waters off the southern and western coasts of Korea. What he did was to turn the Sicily into a phantom with a terrific wallop, searching out targets and hitting them low with Corsair planes, carrying every ounce of destruction he could squeeze It

aboard. First night out of Kobe was long, black, and memorable, for this voyage was to be the Sicily's baptism of war. (The ship's keel was laid toward the end of World War II but she was not commissioned until it was over.) There was not much more than fitful sleeping among the Sicily's 950 sweating crevraien. Portholes closed tightly in a complete blackout and diesels throbbing, the carrier set a lonely course straight for Tsushima Strait where the Russians and the Japa-

nese fought a massive, historic naval battle just short of a half-

century ago.

Captain Thach stuck out the night hours on the Sicily's bridge, warning of sonar that submarines were nearby. There were numerous warnings. Fortunately, they faded and the Sicily sailed unmolested into a morning of sun and shower. By noon, the dim outhnes of the island of Iki, with a startling resemblance to Gibraltar, appeared far off. The rain came harder and a soupy mist rolled over the ship. It was the prearranged time ears strained for the ping-ping

The Sicily circled and waited. Suddenly, as though they had come up out of the sea, the Kyes and the Doyle were at our side. They gave brisk reports by blinker light

for rendezvous with the destroyers.

and took

The

positions to screen the carrier

from underwater

attack.

formation, ranging between 15 and 18 knots and constantly

on the chance that the Russians might start open submarine moved toward another rendezvous, this time with the Marine fighter squadron— famous VMF-214.

alert

warfare,

188

The weather cleared in the late afternoon and the waters of Tsushima became glassy smooth. There was to be another long, hot night with many warnings from sonar, before the task group was complete and ready to strike. Midafternoon of the next day the Marine Corsairs came. In groups of 8— three flights of them and a full load of 24 fighters for the Sicily —they flew in over the horizon from bases in southern Japan. The Sicily was to be home to the Marine flyers for a long time to come and, though few of them had much carrier training, they circled and landed smoothly as Capt. Thach swung his ship downwind. Five of the pilots reported serious mechanical trouble so there would be only 19 of the planes available for quick use. Capt. Thach's order for an immediate strike was waiting for the Marines. Darkness was not many hours away, and the skipper was determined to give our troops much-needed support on the western front then under intensive attack by the North Koreans. Marine and Sicily crewmen, resplendent in brilliant yellow, red, and green shirts and helmets to denote their assignment on the flight deck, were set to gas the planes and load on ammunition, 5-inch rockets and 500pound bombs. The

Corsairs

(F4U's) are rugged, heavily armed, double-duty

planes.

They operate both

good

have around in any war, even in the age of

to

as fighters

and dive bombers, and are jets.

Yellow-shirted flight directors drove the crews to utmost speed in

maiden strike. Crewmen worked in steaming heat and this correspondent had never seen men so eager to do the dirty jobs that have to be done in war. There's not much glory in getting off the Sicily's

handling a gas hose. In less than three hours after the Marines had landed, the crippled planes stored on the hangar deck and a flight of 8 Corsairs made ready with their powerful loads. Capt. Thach had the word

He

from the advanced U.N. military headquarters in Korea. They were to hit where they were needed most. The task group was cruising 65 miles southeast of Pusan, the vital and hard-pressed port on the southern tip of Korea, when the first plane wheeled onto the catapult. The flight leader (in number 8 with MARINES painted on the underside of the wings) was Maj. Robert Prescott Keller from Oakland, California. to go.

told the pilots to get their directions to targets

intelligence center at

189

:

Maj. Keller gunned his Corsair and, in just another half-hour or

The Sicily's catapults shot off the more than 40 seconds, and they flew northwestward into the sun. What of this maiden strike of the Sicily? Gen. Douglas MacArthur's communique from Tokyo the next day said tersely that "carrier-based Marine planes had gone into action for the first time in the Korean war in close ground support of the so,

he would be

in another war.

planes at intervals of

little

Army's 25th Infantry."

MacArthur didn't say what carrier or where the carrier-based planes came from, but it would not have made much difference if he had given the Sicily's name and exact location. We were beginning our swing around the Korean coast on Capt. Thach's phantom voyage. The enemy would never find us twice in the same place because the skipper never launched two straight strikes from any one spot

The

in all the

first

day

days to come. was to be the easiest the Marine

of action

flyers

had

aboard the Sicily. Capt. Thach wanted the Communists to feel the Navy and its brother service, the Marines, down to their marrow. The skipper's brown eyes were intent when he told me. The task group sailed west in the night. On the second day, three pounding strikes went out from the Sicily while the ship's mechanics strained their backs to put more planes into commission. Capt. Thach began feeding the North Koreans napalm bombs, a flaming concoction so hot that it sucks in oxygen and kills men untouched by the fire 30 feet away. These bombs, the skipper reasoned, could eat away the clever concealment of Communist tanks, vehicles, gun emplacements, and troops, and they could burn their targets to shapeless steel and human cinder in a matter of seconds. Napalms, whose main ingredient is jellied gasoline, are dangerous business for those who mix them, too. Crewmen worked all night to get them ready for the second day's strikes, and a deep voice boomed through the Sicily's loud-speakers at intervals of just a few minutes "The smoking lamp is out." This maritime command meant no cigarettes, and if anybody aboard took an extra puff or two after the warning, he was taking a chance with the lives of nearly 1,000 men. Aircraft carriers are floating explosives: gasoline by the thousands of gallons, fuel oil by the tens of thousands of gallons, scores of 500-pound bombs (any 190

one of which could blow the ship into debris ) 5-inch rockets by the hundreds and 20-mm. machine-gun ammunition packed in deck-high ,

stacks of boxes.

The Sicily and her chesty destroyers turned toward the Yellow Sea and the west coast of Korea. These are narrow waters with great mine fields left over from World War II. To the west lies Communist

China, to the north the Red-controlled port of Dairen,

Man-

hidden in the coves and harbors. Four British warships, two of them cruisers, were waiting for the Sicily when we arrived deep in enemy waters on a sunny Saturday morning. The objective was to bombard the port of Inchon which was being used extensively in Communist operations. Big Navy Neptune bombers had flown in from southern Japan to observe for the bombardment, and Capt. Thach was to provide fighter cover. But the skipper would not be satisfied with mere patrol. Under the captain's shrewd guidance, VFM-214 pilots gave one of the really brilliant low-level performances of the Korean war, and they were well-rewarded. First flight of seven Corsairs (many of 214's planes were still out of commission) was led by a chunky, quiet young man who knew what to do when he applied the seat of his pants to the seat of his plane. Maj. Kenneth L. Reusser, a preacher's son from Oregon, is his name, and he won a Navy Cross in the last war along with a Distinguished Flying Cross— and he had fought from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. Maj. Reusser went hunting after he had carried out a rocketmachine-gun strafing mission. His suspicions were aroused by what looked hke an assembly plant— two big buildings with a courtyard in the middle. There seemed to be activity there, so the major got down to about 30 feet and looked in the windows. He got a quick glance, and there seemed to be the outlines of vehicles and tanks inside the buildings. A burst of ack-ack assured the major that he had run onto something hot. Capt. Thach ordered Reusser's flight reloaded with napalm, and the Corsairs were off again to hit the plant. By now, the Communists knew they had been spotted and the Marines found them hurrying tanks and vehicles out of the buildings. The flight hit with everything it had— napalms, rockets, and 20mm., and the pilots were flying so low that they could almost see the expressions on the faces of the enemy. Napalm crashed through the roof of one building and it billowed into flame. Two more nachuria. Russian submarine pens are

191

palm bombs dropped on the second building, but

The

didn't explode.

Corsairs followed through with a barrage of rockets

the bombs.

The second building turned

and ignited There

into a blazing torch.

The Marines with rockets and they were left burning. The people in the courtyard tumbled in their tracks. Maj. Reusser was convinced now that the only way to get good targets was to fly low— "on the deck," as airmen say. Returning to were

six

tanks hidden in the shadows of the courtyard.

hit these

the Sicily, he got down to look around a bit. Over Inchon Harbor, he saw a big square of planking extending from the docks. It didn't seem natural. He made another run and looked under the planking. There was an 8,000-ton tanker hidden there. He let go with 20-mm. incendiary machine-gun fire because that was all he had left. The ship must have been loaded with oil. It exploded. More flights of VMF-214 went out over the Yellow Sea to strafe airport hangars, bum freight cars, wreck oil refineries and power plants and, generally, to drive everybody in the Inchon area to whatever cover they could find. Only a few refugees straggled along the rural roads nearby. By midday, Inchon, under bombing by air and bombardment by sea, seemed a smoking ghost city. One mission found a train hiding in a raihoad tunnel, a favorite trick of the Communists. Capt. William Oliver (Curt) Curtis, a tall, big-boned pilot from Oklahoma, flew his squadron right up to the mouth of the tunnel and the Marines lobbed napalm inside. He saw a gush of flames and smoke as he and his following Corsairs swung homeward to sea. This was that big weekend Capt. Thach had planned. The weary but successful pilots of VMP-214 gathered in Ready Room No. 1 to report.

On

the flight deck,

crewmen

fell

exhausted and slept despite the

roar of planes being tuned up. Capt. pilots a

warm "Well

Thach gave them and the

done," and the Sicily circled to the south on

The next day the planes would be striking far Korean coast. The skipper had ordered a mission to Mokpo,

her phantom course.

down the

an important enemy-held port on the southwest

coast, well-pro-

and shallow waters. Mokpo had been getting a pasting from the east and south, but this was to be a destructive surprise. Capt. Thach planned to hit the city from the west. Over Mokpo in the morning haze, the Corsairs sighted some juicy targets, especially for napalm treatment. The fiery bombs exploded

tected

by

islands

192

warehouses and oil-storage facilities along the waterfront, while other flights ranged farther inland to blast an electric plant, railroad bridges, camouflaged trucks, and staging areas for enemy reinforcements. There was considerable strafing during the day because of large movements of Communists toward the southern coast in an effort to break through to Pusan, last port in the hands of the

United Nations. The task group moved farther south and then east again in the Korean Strait to the general area of our first strike. Another CVE carrier with Marine flyers aboard, the Bandoeng Strait, affectionately known as the Bing-Ding, and two more destroyers were to join the Sicily. Under command of Rear Adm. Richard W. (Bud) Ruble, we were going to look more Hke an American task group should look— in size and striking power.

On this for

first

cruise, the captain

more than an hour

at a time.

never

He

left

the open bridge to sleep

spent 20 out of every 24 hours

unending tasks and he had his anxious moments. There was the time that a Corsair came bounding onto the flight deck with a 500-pound bomb hung to its wing. The skipper held his breath for at his

bomb would come

had exploded, the Sicily might have been put out of action. At best, it would have torn a hole in the vital flight deck. But the bomb hung on and the Sicily went about its business. VMF-214, once based on Guadalcanal and commanded by that fabulous Marine flyer Lt. Col. Gregory (Pappy) Boyington, was lucky— and the Sicily, too. Not a man was lost in the fiist days of operation and every mission had been carried out to pinpoint accuracy. Capt. Thach was not only a pilot himself (seven Japanese planes to his oflBcial credit and probably others uncounted in the mass air batttles of World War II ) but one of the Navy's most careful planners. He left nothing undone to insure the safety of his ship, planes and personnel. As operations oflBcer for Vice Adm. John Sidney McCain, commander of Task Force 58 of Adm. William (Bull) Halsey's Third Fleet in the last war, Jimmy Thach played an important part in one of the most daring and effective naval sorties in history. This was when the U.S. Navy broke into the Japanese-dominated South China Sea, cut the Japanese life hne to the conquered countries of southeast Asia, and virtually destroyed what was left of the Nippon air fear that the

loose. If

,

193

it

twenty days, roaming these inner enemy waters, Task Force 58 had amazing success. It was credited with shooting down, destroying on the ground, and damaging more than 1,200 Japanese aircraft, force. In

much

of

oflBcial

it

massed on Formosa en route

to the fighting hues.

The

estimate was 600,000 tons of Japanese shipping— then very

dear to the miUtarists— sunk and put out of commission from the

air.

Such accomphshment did not come quickly. There was a long, painful buildup, and Capt. Thach saw many grim days. When the war broke in 1941, Thach, then probably the youngest flight squadron leader in the Navy, couldn't get a full complement of planes. He was due to have 27, but when his carrier, the Saratoga, puUed out of San Diego he had only 14, some without gunsights because of strikes in Eastern plants. He wangled two more out of overhaul, promising to condition them at sea. At P.earl, where the battleship Arizona was still burning in the harbor, he finally got 18 planes and 18 pilots.

The Saratoga was rines

on Wake

told to proceed to the relief of the heroic

Island, holding out against a

heavy force

Ma-

of Japanese

warships. Just before Christmas, the Saratoga turned eastward from

Wake. It was too late to do anything about the siege of Wake— it was too late, Thach said, and we had far too httle to confront the Japanese. The carrier was hit by Japanese subs while on patrol out of Pearl a

little later.

Thach and Squadron Three saw plenty more Ordered

to the Lexington, the flyers left

of the Japanese.

on a mission

to the Coral

They were to attempt to intercept the Japanese trying to expand beyond Truk and Rabaul, endangering AustraHa. That's when Thach got his first Japanese plane. Later in the Battle of Midway, Squadron Three got 52 Japanese planes. This was the result of the famous Thach weave, a maneuver developed by the young leader to overcome advantages of the Jap Zero. (The Thach weave involves the use of four-plane combat Sea.

teams in formations which kept the Zeroes in a constant crossfire.) The weave proved so effective in combat that the Navy— and Army,

too— wanted training

in the

Thach

tactics.

He

trained flyers at

Pearl and, later on, in the United States, but he was back in action at sea when the war ended. Jimmy Thach, who turned forty-five

and

the Korean war broke out,

just

about a month before

had been a long time 194

in seeing his

dream

of naval air power come true. In 1929, just two years after he had graduated from the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Vice Adm. George Murray, now commander of the Western Sea Frontier, gave the

young ensign the advice that led to a naval air career. "Get on a carrier," the admiral told Thach. "That's the future." It didn't seem to be much of a future then. The Navy had a carrier, an old coal-hauling ship with a flight deck. It was the Langley and Capt. Thach made his first landing on her precarious platform. In all the years to come, nothing was to divert him from studying air tactics and flying. Capt. Thach believes that carriers of the future will be able to make effective use of jets but that methods will change. For example, jets are not practicable as air

cover for surface craft because of

Thach said, "we can have detect enemy craft and send the jets off the

their fuel consumption. "But,"

longer-

range radar to

carriers

when

We will need four

the warning comes.

fighting combination of four jets at one time.

have

be warmed up.

to

can meet any aerial opposition with as we can with propeller craft already in

We will need modern carriers to do

air.

a jet doesn't

We

carrier-launched jets as fast the

catapults to shoot off a

Remember,

it,

though."

snugly into the Navy's conception of

its wartime mission. As Capt. Thach told congressional committees: "Mobile air power is the main striking force of the Navy today, and it uses this force in accomplishing many of its missions. The

Jets

Navy

fit

is

not a single-purpose force.

"It has the job of operating

anywhere on more than seven-tenths

of the earth's surface. "It "It

must neutralize enemy submarine warfare. makes possible the transport of supplies and troops overseas.

"It protects the

import of

during war. withdrawal from or landing

critical materials

"It provides control of the air for

upon beachheads. "It

can furnish close

air

support for invasions (or ground forces)

before local fields are established or captured. "It is

an absolute essential to the successful performance of the

missions of the other military services.

can overwhelm enemy advanced air bases and destroy enemy long-range bombers before they take off for an attack on the United "It

States."

195

The Korean war has put a big bold exclamation point at the end what Capt. Thach said months and even years ago. What he said will become urgently important if Soviet Russia's threatening gestures toward the Western world explode into World War III. In the Korean war, many of the missions of the Navy have been carried out with eflficiency and dispatch despite economies which largely demobihzed the fleet that dominated the world at the end of the last of

war.

Capt. Thach

when such

little

is

not discouraged by our position of the moment been given such large jobs to

task forces as his have

do in the Korean war. He is certain that the Navy will get the weapons to do its job now but, like most military men in the Orient, he feels that no time should be wasted. Even if large-scale war does not come, the skipper thinks an effective carrier

fleet

can serve the

cause of peace.

The captain was watch the

He turned to now riding the

reluctant to indulge in hindsight.

last flight of

planes

come

in as the sun,

horizon toward China, splashed pink over the wide blue sky. Maj.

Wilham Martin (Bill) Lundin of Chicago, one of VMF-214's hero came up to the bridge to report on a strike near the

flight leaders,

front lines.

A crewman to

from the Sicily s communications center interrupted hand the skipper a message from the big brass. Vice Adm. C.

Turner Joy, commander of naval forces in the Far East, said: "The excellent results of your first strikes indicate that your Marine fighter group will soon have the situation well in hand." The skipper started below for a much needed catnap. Tomorrow his planes would again be in the front lines in Korea. They were hitting the enemy from the deck at 150 yards.

196

Improving an airplane, an automobile, or an

aircraft carrier is

not always just a matter of making the vehicle larger or more powerful. In many instances, it is simply a case of adding a feature

not previously considered.

Such was the modification of carriers, so that an angle to the conventional fore and aft axis.

The angled deck, now

flight

called the canted deck, gave

decks added

new

life

and

versatility to our older carriers thereby prolonging their period of

active service at a time

when funds

for

new

carriers could not

be

obtained.

Canted Deck CDR. W.

G.

WINSLOW, USN

Because she was first of the carriers to have her fighting face lifted, the U.S.S. Antietam recently leaped to sudden prominence as the hottest thing in the fleet, potentially the most powerful flattop afloat. The alteration, known as the "canted deck," is so simple and has added so much mobihty to her striking power that old Navy pilots are wondering why no one thought of it before. In fact, the canted deck appears to be one of the most momentous strides in naval aviation. It may even be the beginning of a new era in naval air war.

A very few years ago many contended that jets ated from aircraft carriers. They believed that

could not be operjets,

heavier and

larger than conventional planes with their high landing speeds tail

and

pipe blasts, would present impossible problems to limited carrier jet's poor rate of acceleration from taking a wave-off in the event of a bad

decks. Additionally, they held that the

would prevent

it

approach.

Whether or not jets could operate successfully from carrier decks had to be deteraiined. One grim faction was obvious. If naval aviation was to remain a major weapon, then aircraft flown by Navy 197

must match or surpass the best that could fight against them. The Navy had no alternative jet aircraft must operate from carriers or else. Months of grueling trial and error ensued. Each problem was met methodically by airmen grimly determined to succeed. By the time of Korea, Navy and Marine jets were able to fly pilots

.

.

.

night and day from carriers against the Reds.

But the young jet age shoots relentlessly ahead. New aircraft with fantastic speeds and capabilities evolve from drawing board to

reality

so

rapidly that, as fast as

another sprouts up to replace

it.

Navy

one problem

is

resolved,

planners striving desperately

meet the problems inherent in new aircraft hit upon the canted deck. The idea seemed logical. If it worked, the Navy would have a platform for launching and retrieving the most powerful jets. The U.S.S. Antietam, a veteran of Korean operations, was chosen for the experiment. A new addition was made to the port side of her flight deck. This allowed the landing area to be offset ten degrees from the ship's fore and aft centerline. The usual arresting wires remain on the after portion of her flight deck, but the barriers to

are missing.

have been standard equipment on fhght decks since the aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Langley. Located about amidship, they prevent a plane which fails to engage an arresting wire from crashing into aircraft parked forward on the flight deck. With Barriers

Navy's

first

jet aircraft, barriers its

weren't enough. Occasionally a

jet,

because of

great weight and high landing speed, knifed through the barriers

and smashed

To prevent

into

this,

parked

aircraft

forward with resulting

loss of lives.

a barricade designed to stop anything capable of

plowing through the barriers was erected beyond them. All this is different on the canted deck. Here, because of the

offset

landing platform, barriers are not necessary. Landing aircraft dis-

engage their tail hooks from the arresting wires and taxi up to the forward third of the flight deck completely clear of the landing area. In an emergency, when a landing aircraft is unable to engage its

hook in the arresting wires, a barricade can be erected to stop it. To be sure, that is a rough way but it is better than losing both plane and pilot to the sea. The technique of landing on the canted deck differs considerably from that on a standard one. On the standard carrier when the LSO (landing signal officer) orders the pilot to cut, he immediately retail

198

duces all power and settles heavily to the deck where the tail hook engages an arresting wire. On the canted deck, the pilot flies his plane at 85 per cent power while in the landing pattern and after the LSO gives him the cut. He literally flies it into the arresting gear

and he does not reduce power

To last

until the tail

hook catches a wire.

put yourself in the pilot's seat for those

better understand it, exacting seconds of the landing approach. Your eyes are fixed

on the LSO. Your every thought, every move must be precise. You can't be too high, too low, too much to the left or right, too fast, or too slow. Your jet is moving at 120 knots toward that little landing area bobbing in the sea. Everything must be just right. The LSO signals, "Cut!"

Immediately, you nose your jet over, skim inches above the deck, and wait for the tail hook to engage a wire But for some reason the hook fails to make contact. Do you sit there frozen with fear as the barriers and vague outlines of parked aircraft loom in your face? No, you merely fly on off the ship, join the landing circle and come on in for another try!

The unobstructed landing area

of the canted deck, with the haz-

ards of barrier crashes eliminated,

They

is

a real

boom

to carrier pilots.

find themselves landing with a feehng of relaxation

and con-

fidence hitherto impossible.

Canted-deck landings permit a low rate of descent and easy contact with the deck. This

means

a great reduction in the landing

loads imposed on the aircraft contrasted with those encountered

during a normal carrier landing or "precision crash," as it is jokingly called. This is extremely important to the future of naval aviation. It means that aircraft operating from carriers like the Antietam can

shed the handicapping extra weight required to "beef up" the plane structure in order to withstand the tremendous landing shock. The

dead weight will see a proportionate increase in carrier plane performance and efficiency. During evaluation tests hundreds of landings and takeoffs have been made by different types of Navy planes, both jets and conventional. As operations progressed without serious mishap, even the most skeptical pilots enthusiastically agreed that canted-deck landings were the finest they ever experienced aboard ship. But what would happen ff, after engaging an arresting wire, the tail hook or wire broke? Without the barriers, it appeared that the plane would resulting reduction in

199

continue on over the side and into the sea. Such contingencies

seemed the worst

that could possibly befall a pilot during a canted-

deck landing. And they did happen. On one jet the tail hook broke, but the pilot flew the plane off the deck without further incident. Fortunately, the ship was not far out to sea and the pilot landed at a Navy airfield instead of having to crash land into the barricade. Another jet settled on the deck with its hook in the wire, but the arresting wire broke. When the tensed cable parted, it shipped back down the deck with a force capable of cutting a man in half. Fortunately, it expended its rampant fury harmlessly. The jet, in the meantime, continued on off the ship, joined the landing pattern and landed on the next attempt.

One

of the closest calls

came when a pilot, feeling his plane settle hook had engaged a wdre, and reduced

to the deck, thought that his

power. As his plane continued to race towards the end of the flight deck, he suddenly realized what had happened. Immediately, he

slammed the throttle wide open and the jet shot off the end of the deck and settled out of sight. Onlookers believed he had

flight

crashed into the sea. But, during the

split instant that

the plane

ship's side, the pilot reached down and retracted That saved him. As the wheels came up, the jet staggered just over the tops of the waves and then rapidly gained altitude. On the U.S.S. Antietams canted deck Navy pilots have tried about everything conceivable to prove its value and utility. Jets and propeller driven aircraft demonstrated "touch and go" landings and arrested landings during daylight and at night. They even landed while jets were turning up on the forward catapults. For the

dropped over the

his landing gear.

time in naval aviation history, simultaneous takeoff operations were conducted with jets being launched from the catapults while

first

propeller jobs took off from the canted deck. All of this

was done

with winds varying from 26 to 42 knots over the flight deck and varying in direction from 10 degrees to starboard to 20 degrees port. The lack of a major accident to mar these operations, in spite of the inexperience of the personnel concerned, is a high tribute to the increased safety inherent in the canted deck.

In proving the tremendous advantages of canted-deck carriers over conventional types, the U.S.S. Antietam thus emerges as a milestone in naval aviation history.

200

There has been a spectacular advance in aircraft design techThe transition from propeller-driven aircraft to jet power has been fast. We are now undergoing another evolution from By modernizsubsonic to supersonic speeds at higher altitudes. ation we have utilized our assets of World War 11 Essex-class carriers to the maximum. This has been a military necessity in order to maintain an acceptable degree of combat readiness econology.

.

.

.

nomically in about half the time required for new construction. Carrier modernization has been pushed vigorously. Adm. Arleigh Burke, USN Chief, Naval Operations, 1957

Summing Up: The Turbulent Postwar Years SCOT MACDONALD The postwar era was one

of dynamic change. The aircraft carriers change with many modifications designed to equip them to operate the most modern aircraft capable of dehvering nuclear weapons and launching guided missiles. Technological developments were making the Essex class obsolescent. On June 4, 1947, the chief of naval operations approved new aircraft carrier characteristics to be incorporated in an improvement program titled Project 27A. This was the first of a series of modernization efforts to modify the Essex carriers to meet changing operatreflected that

ing requirements.

(CV-34) was the first of the Essex-class carriers modernized under Project 27A. She entered New York Naval Shipyard in October 1947. At spaced intervals, she was followed by Essex (CV-9), Wasp (CV-18), Kearsarge (CV-33), Lake Champlain (CV-39), Bennington (CV-20), Yorktown (CV-10), Randolph (CV15), and Hornet (CV-12). The Hornet, last to be modernized under 27A, left the New York yard in October 1955. U.S.S. Oriskany

201

The

27A

were directed toward a capability of operating aircraft of up to 40,000 pounds gross weight. The H4-1 catapults were removed and H-8's installed, principal changes involved in the

project

permitting the launching of considerably heavier aircraft than the

had been capable of during the war years. The flight decks were strengthened and the 5-inch guns on the flight deck were removed to decrease topside weight, to provide more deck space for parking planes, and to increase safety aspects of the landing area. A special weapon capability was given the last six of the nine carriers modernized under this project. Elevator capacities and dimensions were increased to accommodate heavier planes. And special provisions for jet aircraft were installed— such as jet blast deflectors, increased fuel capacity, as well as some modern jet fuel mixers. Three of the ready rooms for pilots in these carriers were moved down below the hangar deck, relocating them from spaces directly under the flight deck. This increased pilot comfort and provided better protection. To get the equipment-laden pilots up to the flight deck, an escalator was installed abreast of the island. This provided a single route for pilots manning their planes; it prevented confusion from ship's company rushing up the normal access routes to man carrier

battle stations.

In April 1947, Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the yards on Ship

Improvement Program No. 1, which provided her with a special weapon capability. Her sister ships, the battle carriers Midway and Coral Sea, followed. This program was also extended to the Oriskany, Essex, and Wasp, which had not received tlie capability under 27A.

The Navy continued

to

ings from carrier decks. In

Fury

experiment with heavier aircraft launch-

March

1948, carrier suitability of the FJ-1

was tested on board the Boxer (CV-21) off San of takeoffs and landings were made by Cdr. Evan Aurand and Lt. Cdr. R. M. Elder of Fighter Squadron 5A. The following month, Cdr. T. D. Davis and Lt. Cdr. J. P. Wheatley made JATO takeoffs in P2V Neptunes from the deck of the Coral Sea off Norfolk. This was the first carrier launching of planes of this size and weight It was inevitable, then, that the Navy would introduce all-jet squadrons to carrier operations. On May 5, 1948, Fighter Squadron 17- A, equipped with 16 FH-1 Phantoms, became the first carrierjet fighters

Diego.

A number

202

qualified jet squadron in the U.S. Navy, It took three days of opera-

squadron pilots, in addition to Commander Air Group 17, qualified on the U.S.S. Saipan (CVL-48), with a minimum of eight landings and takeoffs each. Project 27A was originally intended for more than nine carriers, but development of the steam catapult and the prospective employment of more advanced types of aircraft made it apparent that this tions to

do

it,

but

all

had to be modified to meet future needs. Accordingly, Project 27C was initiated. Hancock, Intrepid, and Ticonderoga were slated for this programlater identified as Project 27C (axial deck). Most important of the changes was the introduction of the steam catapult installed in the

project

Royal Navy carrier H.M.S. Perseus, conducted at the Naval Shipyard, NOB, Norfolk, and at sea during the first quarter

Philadelphia, at of the year.

"The new catapult fared so well during the

tests that the

has already begun an investigation into the adaptabihty of

new

flush

deck carrier U.S.S. Forrestal, which

is

it

Navy

to their

now under

con-

struction.

"The new catapult, invented by a Royal Navy volunteer reserve officer,

Cdr. C. C. Mitchell, O.B.E., of Messrs.

Brown Brothers &

Co., Ltd., Edinburgh, uses the principle of the slotted cylinder,

A

hook on the aircraft to be launched is connected directly to a piston which is driven along the cylinder by high pressure steam from the ship's boilers. A novel sealing device is used to keep the slotted cylinder steam

and has no rams or purchase

cables.

tight.

"While the amount of steam required for sustained operation is have shown that the boilers can meet the demand withinterfering out with the ship operations." The Hancock was the first U.S. carrier to receive the new "steam slingshot," designated C-11 by the U.S. Navy. On June 1, 1954, Cdr. H. J. Jackson, in an S2F-1, was catapulted from the Hancock in the initial U.S. operational tests. Throughout the month, testing continued. A total of 254 launchings were made with the S2F, AD-5, F2H-3, F2H-4, FJ-2, F7U-3, and F3D-2 aircraft. In addition to the C-11 steamcat. Project 27C (axial deck) also provided for a strengthening of the flight deck. The number three centerline elevator was replaced with a deck edge type of greater

large, tests

203

capacity. Other improvements

proved

eflBcient in

were made,

in addition to

those

27A.

Even as these changes were being built in the Hancock, Intrepid, and Ticonderoga, the Bureau of Aeronautics proposed, in mid-June 1952, that a new design flight deck be installed in the Antietam. The previous May, both jet and propeller type aircraft were tested on a simulated angled deck aboard the U.S.S. Midway. The idea was originated by the British and proved very effective for them. Antietam's deck was to extend outboard on the port side from the normal flight deck, thus allowing aircraft landings to be angled 10 degrees

off

the ship's center

line.

Pushed through the guidance design stage by the Hull Design Branch of BuShips in early July, Antietam s new deck was completed in mid-December at the New York Naval Shipyard. At first called a canted deck, this term officially gave way to the more familiar angled deck by OpNav Notice 9020 on February 24, 1955. It also outlawed the use of "slanted" and "slewed" in describing the deck design. Project 27C (angled deck), which resulted from the Antietam tests and modified the original 27A, significantly changed the silhouette of the aircraft carriers. The canted or angled deck was installed and the hurricane bow of the original Saratoga and Lexington carriers reintroduced.

ment

Mark 7

The

project also allowed for the improve-

by reducing the number of deck pendants by one-half and thereby cutting the ratio of arresting gear sheaves to two to one. The forward center-hne elevator was enlarged. Air conditioning and sound proofing made the island spaces more comfortable and efficient. The latest advancements in deck lighting were also installed in these attack carriers. Lexington, Shangri La, and Bon Homme Richard all received the improvements of this project and they were so successful that Hancock, Intrepid, and Ticonderoga returned to the yards for this

new

of the

arresting gear

conversion.

The trend extended, inevitably, to the Midway class. In September 1953, the Navy announced new modernization plans for these carriers

under a

new program

called Project 110. In

May

1954,

the Franklin D. Roosevelt entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for the conversion.

Midway

followed in September 1955. These

carriers received the best features of the

204

27C (angled deck)

con-

September 1950, flight deck of USS Sicily, Capt. Thach's "phantom carrier." F4U-4 Corsairs armed with high-velocity rockets and 500 lb. bombs preparing for a sunrise serenade over Korea.

An F9F-5 canted

aircraft

is

prepared for catapulting as an AD-4n takes

off

from

flight deck.

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

A

Marine helicopter squad-

ron demonstrating^ personnel reseiie at sea icith the

USS

Thetis Bay.

Korea, 1951. The Hicachon

Dam

is

demolished by US

Navy Sky raiders ial

using aer-

torpedoes for the

time

during

the

first

Korean

War.

An F9F

Jet Panther

pulted from the

USS

is

cata-

Prince-

ton for a strike on Korean

Communist

targets.

An

air-to-air

shees

flying,

photo of Ban-

over Task Force

77.

Aboard the USS Hancock, June 1954. This S2F-1 was the

first

aircraft to

pulted by steam.

Banshees flying tion

Sea.

over the

in

forma-

USS Coral

be cata-

3^

eye vieic of the deck on the neic super carrier USS

Pilot's

anfiled

Independence.

The

carrier Saratoga refueling, in the Mediterranean Sea.

Cdr. George T alley in his F8U-1 as he becomes the first to pilot an airplane aboard the USS Enterprise, the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Two F8U-1 Crusaders poised on catapults of the Navy's new 86,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier. Enterprise.

Above: The VSS Saratoga undencay and cnroute to the Sixth Fleet.

The attack carrier USS Kitty

Hawk

off

Oahii, Haicaii.

the coast of

'^^^2^1

Above: Frogmen and boat crew from the USS Kearsarge attach line to Astro-

naut L.

Gordon Coopers

spacecraft Faith 7 after his successfid 22 orbit mission into space.

May

1963.

Vigilantes being catapulted off

the

USS

Enterprise.

A symbol

of

United

the

mobile forces, the carrier USS Essex returns home after playin^i an imStates

portant role in the

and Formosa

Lebanon

crises.

Pride of the nuclear Navy, USS Enterprise. "Plane disposition normal fair

weather."

.

.

.

cruising

version which were incorporated in Project 110. Additionally, they

had

a modified steam catapult installed in the angled deck area;

were added for maximum protection, liquid stowage, and the after starboard elevator was relocated to the starboard deck edge. With the changes in carrier configuration ran a parallel change

full blisters

and

stability,

in missions

and these changes were

reflected in the redesignation of

certain carriers as they appeared in the Navy Vessels Register. On October 1, 1952, the very familiar CV and CVB designations went by the board. The ships were assigned the designation CVA, reflecting their reclassification as attack carriers. Prior to this, only

the CV's were

known

as attack carriers, in the fleet, to distinguish

them from the CVB's. Antisubmarine support aircraft carriers became a new classification in July 1953 and was applied to those attack carriers assgned to ASW; the following August 8, five CVA's were redesignated CVS's, ASW support carriers. The modernization of individual carriers reflected Navy thinking. Navy accomplishment, and Navy planning. The programs were successive steps in what somebody once called "a schedule of orderly retirement." As the carriers aged (some aged "faster" because of battle damage in World War II), they were transferred from the CVA designation to the CVS, then to LPH and retirement, and it all was tied to new construction programs which made it possible to keep the number of operating CVA's up to the prescribed limits. As each new ship was acquired, it took the top position among the CVA's while the one in the bottom position moved to the top of the next lower

class.

(CV-43) was the last aircraft carrier of World War II design to be extensively reworked during the postwar modernization program. She entered the Puget Sound Shipyard on April 15, 1957, and was recommissioned January 25, 1960. In the interim, changes made in her configuration were contained in Project llOA, a modification of the 110 of her sister ships, F.D.R. and Midway. The basic changes were the same as those in Project 110, but llOA added new features. Of the three deck-edge elevators installed, for instance, one was placed on the port side near the LSO platform. This eliminated the hazardous arrangement of having an U.S.S. Coral Sea

elevator contiguous to the landing area. It also simplified mainte-

205

),

.

nance problems and provided the capability of operating

all

three

elevators during jBight operations.

Existing arresting gear v^as replaced with five

Mk

7-2 pendant

and barricade engines with the new sheave and anchor dampers. Coral Sea was the first to have installed, in the fantail area, a complete jet engine test facility; they are carriers.

She had twice

as

much stowage

now

installed in

all

new

for JP-5 fuel as her sister

ships, over a million gallons, in addition to a 62,000 gallon capacity

for avgas.

And

although Ranger was the

purifiers installed, she did not rely

first to have fuel centrifugal on them exclusively. When Coral

Sea deployed to WestPac, she had four of them installed and did use exclusively. During the first eight and one-half months of operation, she burned approximately 7 million gallons of JP-5, according to Air Ofiicer Cdr. D. W. Houck, and did not experience one case of contaminated jet fuel. The modernization program extended the lifetime usefulness of the Essex-clsLSS carriers built during World War II and permitted them and other class carriers to operate jet-powered aircraft of increasing designed power without compromising combat readiness of the fleet. The important limiting characteristics of the planes operating from carriers are landing speed, landing weight, and required end speed, and— in wooden-deck ships— the wheel loading. Many new developments have had a profound effect on carrier aviation. In August 1955, for instance, the constant run-out method of controlling arrestment was used in the Mk 5 arresting gear installed in U.S.S. Bennington. Its primary advantage was the ability to arrest a plane with a minimum amount of hook loads.

them

With the

earlier pressure types of controls

it

was necessary

to stop

the aircraft in shorter run-out in order to take care of inadvertent

overspeed of the planes.

aircraft.

The new system

is

This put a considerable strain on the set for the

so that a 60,000-pound plane

would

weight of the landing aircraft, pull out no more wire than

a 10,000 pounder.

Other pilot aids include TACAN ( tactical air navigation system which gives pilots bearing and distance from a carrier, the Britishdeveloped landing system ( improved by the use of Fresnel lenses ) and PLAT ( pilot/LSO landing-aid television )

206

PART FOUR

FROM KOREA TO THE PRESENT DAY Introduction The truce it

in

Korea did

had been seeking

little

to provide the

world with the peace

World War II. International and the traditional practice of the world's troubled spots took on a new

so earnestly since

relations continued to deteriorate

"showing the

flag" in

importance.

Tense situations in the Far East and the Mediterranean focused world attention on these hotbeds of international strife, and strong naval forces built around the aircraft carrier were deployed to keep the peace.

During these years, weapons and tactics were constantly reappraised due to technological and scientific advances of such magnitude that naval aviation underwent changes greater than any in its history— changes that enhanced speed, firepower, versatility, and mobility of naval sea and air forces. The steam catapult and the angled deck, major modifications in the conversion of

World War

II Essex-class carriers,

provided these

and ever faster airneeded for modern war. Emphasis on the antisubmarine warfare mission mounted as the operating capability and the destructive potential of the underwater adversary increased. Electronic detection and location devices were developed, as were more efi^ective underwater explosives and weapons delivery equipment, to enhance the defense against submarines at sea. New task groups of special air and surface units appeared in the fleet, providing a means of developing and learning improved antisubmarine tactics and establishing in being forces capable of going into immediate action. ships with the ability to handle the ever heavier craft

207

Missiles, such as the air defense Terrier, the air-to-air Sparrow and Sidewinder, and the air-to-ground Petrel, along with Bullpup, Talos, and Tartar, joined the operational inventory. The use of the aircraft carrier, during this period, was not

restricted to preparations for war, nuclear or conventional, nor to

acting as a stabilizing influence in cold war hot spots.

Humanitarian missions, a proud tradition of

aircraft

almost from their inception, continued to receive the

acknowledgment

carriers

grateful

of major segments of the world's population. In

one of the larger efforts of this type, the carrier Saipan spent a week off Tampico, Mexico, in OctolDer 1955 performing disaster reHef operations. During these operations, Saipan helicopters rescued 5,439 persons marooned on rooftops, trees, and other similar refuges, and also delivered over 180,000 pounds of food and medical suppHes to area inhabitants.

Two

Lake Champlain arrived at Valencia, Spain, thousands made homeless by a flood.

years later,

give aid to

to

Princeton contributed seven days of similar assistance to flood victims in Ceylon in January 1958.

A

Marine Helicopter Squadron, operating from Thetis Bay, comweek of relief operations in flood-stricken Taiwan in which airlifted 1,600,540 pounds of cargo and 833 passengers in 898

pleted a it

missions.

September 1959 found the Kearsarge in Nagoya, Japan, performing relief operations in the

In

all respects, carrier

wake

of a typhoon.

activities— war readiness training,

"showing

the flag," humanitarian efforts— have been pursued with equal vigor

and

at a

pace worthy of a

since Korea.

New

much

larger force during the uneasy days

concepts in tactics and strategy, operational

evaluation of recently-acquired aircraft, and even specialized roles, after modification,

keep

its

carriers

for

the

older carriers,

enables the

Navy

prepared to meet the ever-changing world

tion.

208

to

situa-

The

versatility of the helicopter in carrying out missions of

a

widely diversified nature in the course of the war in Korea prompted planners in the Amphibious Warfare Section of the Navy to seek a way in which rotor aircraft and the carrier could become partners

added mobility to naval forces. The theory of vertical envelopment— capture

in providing

by

assault troops transported to the target

of an enemy area by helicopters— was

a modification of the mission of paratroops and glider-delivered ground fighters used in World War 11. Months of field testing resulted in a request for modification of an outmoded carrier to a Helicopter-Assault configuration.

The

first

vessel of this type

was the Thetis Bay.

U.S.S. Thetis

Bay (CVHA-1)

FROM MARINE CORPS GAZETTE Sea duty has taken on an additional connotation with the operation of a new type vessel in the Navy's amphibious fleet. Marines embarked aboard the Thetis Bay are combat-ready, prepared to lead the assault ashore by means of a vertical envelopment. The members of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines who boarded at North Island, San Diego, had the unique experience of being on an aircraft carrier designed especially to carry assault troops.

The

ship's interior

compartments were modified to provide adequate troop berthing and messing facilities as well as other refinements like internal elevators to eliminate the back-breaking toil

by troops

of bringing

ammo and

water cans topside prior to H-Hour. commanders embarked, helicopter control communications equipment and troop radio facilities have been installed in the separate command and operations compartsuch items as mortar

To

aid the troop

and

ments. Consequently, their helicopters,

it

aircraft

when

the

word

is

passed for Marines to

will find the landing force

of the success of his mission with ships like

transport group.

209

man

commander confident the Thetis Bay in the

The

War

final

II

approach speed of

aircraft

and a system was needed

Signal Officer

with the rapid

if

this

had

risen sharply after

World

Landing keep pace

to assist or replace the

phase of carrier operations was to

scientific progress in other areas.

And, the accident rate had risen in proportion with landing speeds.

Flying safety and technical progress demanded a more sophisticated system of handling aircraft in this crucial phase of flight. The "Meatball" was born. ( The spot of light which a pilot keeps centered in the landing system mirror

It's

when making

Done With

a landing. )

Mirrors!

FROM ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE JOURNAL

A NEWLY

PERFECTED mirror landing system (MLS) for use on airand shore installations has already been credited with reducing carrier landing accidents by more than one-third, and saving taxpayers twenty thousand dollars a year. Coupled with the angled-deck carrier design, MLS has reduced the accident rate for carrier based aircraft, the Navy says, from 3 craft carriers

per 1,000 landings to

.9

per 1,000 over equivalent two-year periods.

4x4

MLS

Main

component is a curved mirror (about feet square ) mounted in an automatic stabilizing frame on the portside of the ship. Four bright source lights are beamed into the mirror from an aft position, forming a "meatball" which is reflected to the pilot of

an approaching

aircraft.

If the pilot is in the optical glide

beam provided by

meatball, the spot will be centered in a lights. If

the plane

is

row

the reflected

of stationary green

move up; "On target"

too high, the meatball will

too low the spot will drop correspondingly.

if it is is

the

mirror's center.

The principal advantage of the new system is that landing pattern around the carrier from 100 to 500 210

it

raises the

feet,

adding

an invaluable margin of safety for the pilot. In addition MLS allows for a straight-in approach at night and reduces the necessary pilot training time.

Developed by the Liberty Mirror Division of the Libbey-Owens— Ford Glass Co., the special optically-ground mirror used in the system is coated with chromium film by a vacuum diffusion process. It would take 500 of these films, each about 6 millionths of an inch thick, to equal the thickness of one sheet of newspaper.

211

The Mediterranean Sea has become one of the forivard areas of democracy. The Sixth Fleet is stationed there to help maintain the peace by deterring any threat the Communist bloc may try to impose on countries which believe in the freedom of man. This great expanse of water touches the shores of more than a dozen countries of different languages, customs, and cultural backgrounds. It has been and still is the lifeline of countries which produced our Western civilization. The history of the area shows that the balance of

power and the

rulers wielding

it

passed from

shore to shore, spreading the ideas, traditions, religions, and knowl-

edge that are now the foundation of most Western nations. The geography of the Mediterranean area has, throughout history, presented many advantages and disadvantages from a strategic point of view. From the days of the Phoenicians to the end of World War 11, military commanders have been concerned with the many great challenges posed by its strategic location between three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa. Today, it challenges naval aviators with the Sixth Fleet.

Aviation in the Sixth Fleet The advantages

of stationing a carrier striking force virtually in the

backyard of friends and potential enemies are obvious. Vice Adm. David L, McDonald, commander of the Sixth Fleet, recently made the following statement: "We are, by being in the Mediterranean, more favorably disposed toward an area of likely conflict. This means that we have gained the extremely important element of access to possible target areas in the region of

NATO's southern

flank."

The

greatest strategic area of interest to the Sixth Fleet

is

the

southeastern part of Europe, western Asia and the northern areas of the

Middle East. The Mediterranean Sea gives the

necessary mobility and

flexibility

while shifting

in tactical operations incident to carrying out responsibilities.

The two elements 212

its

of access

its

NATO and

fleet

the

striking forces

and national

mobility, then,

are the strong points in the projection of sea

power

into this vital

area.

But just being there is not enough. The fleet, its oflBcers, men, and equipment have to be ready for any emergency. It must be able to respond quickly to orders that may come from London, Paris, Naples, or Washington. Exercises and maneuvers, bilateral and NATO-oriented, conducted continually throughout the year, are the key to a successfully trained and versatile fleet. Although the Sixth Fleet has taken advantage of some of the characteristics of Mediterranean geography, there are some major disadvantages placed upon naval aviators who fly aircraft from the two attack carriers of the fleet. The disadvantages imposed on pilots ofi^er

many unusual

requirements that

make

today's air opera-

Mediterranean unique. There is very little sea room, for instance, in the Mediterranean in comparison with the Pacific or Atlantic. There is even less air room. Unlike his fellow aviators who operate with the Seventh Fleet and are able to fly almost unlimited distances in several directions, the Sixth Fleet aviator is prone to be affected by a slight feeling of claustrophobia when he first reports to the Mediterranean. He must constantly be aware of other countries, other air forces and an increasingly heavy commercial air trafiic. In the organization of the fleet, carriers and embarked air groups are assigned to Task Force 60 whose commander is the currently embarked carrier division commander. Normally two attack carriers, including at least one of the Forrestal class, are assigned to the fleet. Two cruisers and about 20 destroyers are assigned in support of the CVA's. Task Force 60 is, in turn, organized into two operating task groups, which become Task Group 60.1 and 60.2, often referred to as the "Blue" and "Gold" groups. A carrier is assigned to each group. To afford incoming air groups a smooth transition into the Sixth Fleet team and make them familiar with their operating environment, a cycle of indoctrination exercises is scheduled for about a six-week period. These give pilots a "feeling" for flying conditions associated with the crowded air space and tightrope flying conditions of the Mediterranean area. First on the slate is type training involving an individual carrier and its embarked air group. Warm-up operations include bombing tions in the

213

with practice ordnance on targets such as Pachino on the east coast Avgo Nisi to the north of Crete. New pilots get a

of Sicily or

thorough introduction to communication procedures, Sixth Fleet operation orders, and the fast pace of operations. Newly reporting units are exercised at task force and task group levels, the former combining Task Groups 60.1 and 60.2. Most deployments afford personnel an opportunity to participate in not only bilateral exercises but also in at least one major NATO exercise, so that familiarity is gained in working with NATO operation orders and procedures. Although the Sixth Fleet remains national in character,

war

of

it is

NATO

earmarked for assignment

to

NATO

in event of a

scope.

Frequently the Sixth Fleet conducts exercise "strikes" into friendly countries to test U.S. strike capability and give alHed countries an

opportmiity to improve their defensive forces. In a recent bilateral exercise with the French, for instance, the Sixth Fleet conducted

both a conventional and nuclear nature against inland targets and the French opposed with fighters. Valuable benefits were derived from this exercise in which Sixth Fleet pilots tested their skills against French aircraft, flown by Frenchmen, and not against just another fighter from a U.S. carrier. The effectiveness of these exercises stems from the mental processes generated by the fact that neither pilot knows just what to expect from the other. Through much work at conference tables, both on board the fleet strikes of

flagship,

U.S.S.

Springfield,

and ashore

in host countries,

many

have been established. These are of considerable value in rounding out the training of low-level, dead-reckoning navigation routes

attack pilots for low-level flying. tice,

commented upon by

An

pilots

interesting aspect of this prac-

assigned to the Sixth Fleet,

is

the benefits they derive from learning the characteristics of these routes. Air

Groups which come from the Jacksonville or Norfolk

soon become familiar with the terrain in those Mediterranean, it is a different story. Pilots must fly completely new, unfamiliar routes. Many report that such flights have resulted in additional navigation and communications areas, for instance, areas.

However,

experience

in the

and famiharization

training.

The

short

deployment

period plus the increasing number of available routes and targets serve to keep pilots especially alert since they generally

course only a few times during any one cruise.

214

fly

the

same

Often the fleet is operating in an area where target facihties are not available or practical and towed spars are used for practice

bombing and rocket firing. Scoring of hits is usually accompHshed best by the towing ship. Recently ships, other than carriers, have provided towed spars, thus allowing more flexibihty in scheduling and more opportunities for practice. Task force protection is another type of exercise. Although the Sixth Fleet will probably never be called upon to strike an enemy force containing aircraft carriers, there

is

a continuing threat to our

from land-based aircraft. As a result, it has become necessary to do a certain amount of day-to-day repetitious training to maintain skills, such as air-to-air intercepts, bombing, rocket and missile launching and strafing, all of which have to be done on a carriers

regular,

continuing basis in order to maintain proficiency and

readiness,

A

might see Task Group 60,1 deby aircraft from Task fending its Group 60,2 and shore-based air opposition. When the defending task group has been located by the attackers, the defensive measures used include combat air patrol aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and typical exercise of this type

own

carrier against attacks flown

weapons, with backup provided by the close-in firepower envelope of surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft guns. Rotation of attackers' and defenders' roles further develops skill and teamantiaircraft

work among

pilots, air controllers

and

missile crews.

Quite often, prior to a strike or exercise, and apart from readying the aircraft for launch, a practice loading of conventional weapons takes place. The overall time consumed in such an exercise is tabulated and computed in the final tally of the time required for

launch after the initial operation order has been received. Recently the need to improve the speed of handling conventional weapons has required some new planning to schedule such exercises. It has required study and reevaluation of techniques not often used in the past few years while emphasis was placed on nuclear weapons.

The deck crews gain invaluable experience during these weaponhandling exercises and continually try to improve speed. The primary ASW force of Task Force 60 is composed of destroyers which provide screening support, although at infrequent intervals a hunter/killer antisubmarine group deploys to the Mediterranean for special training. Last summer the U.S.S. Randolph, with

215

Commander

Carrier Division 20 embarked,

task group ofiFensive

The

fleet

was integrated

into

and defensive operations.

continually drills in antisubmarine warfare, employing

the several U.S. submarines assigned to the Sixth Fleet. Submarine-

opposed replenishments and

sorties

from Mediterranean ports are

routine exercises designed to test participating units in simulated

wartime operations. Of tlie 50-some ships normally assigned to the Sixth Fleet, only the fleet flagship and two or three auxiliaries are permanently homeported in the Mediterranean. The deployed units rotate from the East Coast, exchanging places two or three times each year with ships already in the Mediterranean.

The

fleet replenishes, refuels,

and rearms

way Replenishment Group, Task Force Sixth Fleet.

at sea

from the Under-

63, the service force of the

Without the important capability of underway replenishthis powerful fleet would need to rely on

ment, day or night, outside sources for

its

support. This

is

not feasible for a force

deployed thousands of miles from the continental United States. Major replenishments, which occur about once a month, involve the transfer of stores and food which are used at the rate of about 50 tons a day. Fuel for ships and aircraft, received more frequently, is used at the rate of hundreds of thousands of gallons a day. A Mediterranean deployment means hard, intensive training balanced by recreation and liberty opportunities ashore. Normally a carrier spends about half of its deployment in the liberty ports located around the Mediterranean. During the time at sea, ComSixthFlt tries to provide about 12 flying days each month. Since a great deal of time is devoted to night flying, most of these flying days go into the night.

tempo of fleet operations in recent years is the who became "centurions" on a deployment. As

Indicative of the

number

of pilots

recently as four or five years ago, a pilot

who made 60

to

70

landings was considered to have had a busy deployment. This past

year nearly every squadron had reported a high percentage of

100 mark in takeoffs and landings. In a Marine squadron recently embarked in Independence, nearly every reached the centurion mark during the six-month deployment

pilots reaching the

fighter pilot

period.

Creating impressive

statistical records,

216

however,

is

not the primary

goal of the Sixth Fleet staff planners, but high quality performance is.

Through the process

results,

new

criteria are

of constant analysis

and review

of exercise

incorporated into each subsequent exercise.

Thus there is a constant improvement in fleet aviation. The steadily increasing quality of pilot performance is helping to meet the challenge posed by the Mediterranean Sea's geography, its international environment of unique flying conditions, and the Sixth Fleet's high tempo of operations. Navy personnel and the American public alike can take pride in the continual improvement of carrier operations in the Mediterranean as the result of the pro-

gram being conducted by the Sixth Fleet. The worth of continuous training was well expressed by a Sixth Fleet pilot when he described the end of a long flight: "Finally the tail hook grabs the number four wire, and the healthy tug of the harness straps against your shoulders tells you you're home. Visions of a lengthy sleep fill your mind, but you take a moment to face into the wind and enjoy a deep sense of satisfaction. You did pretty well today. It was only practice, of course. But your confidence is up and, although it's an unhappy .

.

.

forethought, you're certain that to get there

and do the

if

the real bell rings, you'll be able

job."

217

Thus

far in our look at the

in the United States

development of the

aircraft carrier

we have

covered the evolution of the carrier itself, the work of crews on deck and below, tactics and strategy, combat actions, and so forth, but, other than "Coal-Burning Carriers," little mention has been made of how a naval aviator is trained until he becomes carrier-qualified.

And, since the carriers only reason for being aircraft against

enemy

targets,

it is

period in the development of the

to launch piloted

is

we took a men who make time

look at a critical

a carrier opera-

tional.

Naval

flight training is

a long and arduous task even before reach-

ing the carrier-qualification phase. Only the best get this it is

far.

And

here that the students meet the professionals of carrier flying, Car(

the flight instructor pilots designated as Demonstration Pilots rier Qualification).

Show-How System Leads to "Roger" Passes HOMAN

LT. B. G.

A

LITTLE

KNOWN

but Certainly unique group of

flight instructors is

saving lives and planes at Naval Auxiliary Air Station Barin Field.

These pilots fly high and slow. They fly low and slow. Some of them have even been accused of flying more slowly than they drive to work.

These expert instructors are the "Demonstration of

BTU-3

(carrier

quahfication )

trainers while students

The DP's mission

is

make

.

They

ride

Pilots" or "DP's"

the

back

seats

of

their first field carrier landings.

to get across to students the

The

FCLP-1,

knowledge

of

devoted to slow air work familiarization and stall review. It is done at high altitudes for safety with a specific altitude used as an imaginary carrier deck. Climbing turn stalls (left and right) with wheels and flaps down are practiced. Flying carrier patterns at approach speeds, the instructor shows the student how to recognize an incipient stall getting aboard a carrier.

and how

first

period,

is

to recover. Proper wave-off techniques are introduced.

218

Then,

if

the student

is

ready for

it,

comes FCLP-2 during which

the student repeats the previous period sans instructor. If

all

goes

mans the rear cockpit for FCLP-3. This time the altitude averages between 75 and 150 feet of actual height above ground obstructions in the FCLP pattern. Some of the toughwell, the instructor again

est critics in the world, the landing signal officers, are observers.

two of eight carrier approaches and landings are demonstrated by the "Demo Pilot." Then a minimum of six landings is made by the student. Now the student has the general idea. Any minor corrections to the acquired technique are transmitted via intercom by the in-

The

first

structor.

Many

known

go out on their next hop, FCLP-4 (solo), and fly several "Roger" passes. A "Roger" pass is an approach and landing during which the LSO can figuratively "lie down on the job." The pattern, banks, altitude, and air speed are within safe hmits from start to finish, with no "coaching" necessary. The present demonstration program began in October 1952. Prior to that time, the demonstration hop consisted merely of having an LSO demonstrate two or three passes to the student from the front seat of the trainer with the student doing none of the flying. It was soon realized that it would be better to allow the student to fly the field carrier approaches with the instructor in the rear seat to correct his errors on the spot and indoctrinate him in the proper students have been

to

carrier technique.

In

May

1954, the

program was further altered

to

include a

high-work demonstration hop. This showed the student how to utilize his slow flight procedures, and in this way he was prepared to make the most of his next period, a solo repeat of the dual hop. It also inculcated the proper methods of recovery from stalls likely to be encountered in the FCLP pattern. This additional period of instruction helped to reduce the number of stall/spin accidents. Now it is the job of the 12 to 14 "Demo Pilots" on board to fly twice with each student in the training command. It is a tough and exacting job. They jokingly say, "Every one of those kids is out to kill me." But this attitude in itself is a life saver. By guarding against dangerous, inadvertent errors, making the proper instructional corrections, DP's are reducing the accident rate and saving lives and dollars in a hazardous phase of flight training.

219

.

With today's increased tempo of more important that every means

carrier operations

it is all

the

of preventing carrier aircraft

accidents be pursued.

The problem

of stopping

an

aircraft

on a carrier

flight

deck

receives comprehensive treatment in this article by a veteran naval aviator.

A

brief

resume of past eforts

is

included in this study of

the methods in use today.

Barricades-The Other LT. CDR. R. W.

There are two ways is

Way

to Stop

.

.

KENNEDY

to stop an airplane aboard ship.

The other way

the barricade.

had several tail hooks engaging cables The plane picked up these cables and dragged sandbags tied to the cables. This got to be too much work and the plane quit trying. We aren't very far removed from that stage now, just more refined. Which shows that we were very smart at the beginning or else we've been slow ever since. Take your pick.

The

first

arrested landings

across the deck.

Now

even with real rehable type sandbags the

Pennsylvania, just before the

first

landing,

air

boss of the

was concerned. Suppose

some clown came in hot at 50 knots and missed all the wires. Where would that leave the Pennsys smokestacks? The air boss talked it over with his flight deck oflBcer and first lieutenant. The latter didn't know much about airplanes but he was an old hand with awnings. So they rigged a big one forward of the landing platform

and the stacks were safe. Eugene Ely, whose name was number 1 on the flight schedule, didn't go for this too hot. After all, he sat out in front. He decided not to take any chances. He came aboard with ten inches hook-to-ramp and didn't even come close to the barricade. When our first carrier, the Langley, went to sea in 1922 she was equipped with the first barrier, not barricade. This arrangement was enough to make strong men weak. It was nothing more than a cable 220

stretched across the deck high enough to engage wings, wheels, props, or anything else out front.

cured to the deck on either

The

were was the

barrier cables

side; the only "give"

firmly sestretch in

the cable. Eventually, out of regard for the pilots' necks, the barrier cables

were connected to a regular arresting engine. This allowed the cable to pay out just as the cross-deck wire did when engaged by the hook. The number of stiff necks treated by the flight surgeon went down. This barrier arrangement served well until the F7F made the scene. With two engines and a nosewheel the Tigercat posed new problems to the designers of arresting gear. Like, the nosewheel wasn't built to take the strain of a barrier cable. And the two engines were in a good position to sever the cable and fling it in the cockpit. Finally there was no longer a big hunk of steel out front to run interference for the

pilot.

A

quick walk-around inspection indicated that the best place to latch onto a misplaced F7F was by the main gear. This was strong

enough and was behind the

pilot.

Somehow

or other

it

would be

necessary to have the barrier cable on the deck so the nosewheel

could pass over. Then the wire had to be raised to catch the main gear. Divide wheelbase by speed and you can see that this minor miracle also had to be performed in a short time.

The

first

attempt to solve

this

problem included an extra wire,

The small The nosewheel was invited to engage the small wire and pass over the main barrier cable at the same time. Then, by dragging out the small wire, the main cable would be hauled up in front of the main landsmaller than the barrier cable, raised across the deck.

wire was attached to the barrier cable by vertical wires.

ing gear. It

worked

one thing made it hard to sell: the wound up in the cockpit. The F7F had a No room for uninvited guests. Back to the

as advertised, but

small wire frequently single-place version.

drawing board.

The engineers thought the

principle

was good

so they looked

for other ways to use the basic idea. A suspended cable made out of nylon parachute webbing was tried in place of the small wire.

around

worked, and the Davis barrier was born. Technically the Davis barrier is referred to as a barrier adapter since it adapts a cable barrier for use with nosewheel airplanes, but It

221

that needn't slow

you down. Neither should the

changed the top strap

When

fact that they

to cotton.

properly engaged, the Davis barrier stopped airplanes re-

and with very minor damage. During Korea, AD's and F4U's which hit the cable barrier suffered in the prop, cowling, and occasionally had sudden stoppage of the 3350 or 2800. Panthers and Banjos, on the other hand, managed to taxi away from the Davis liably

barrier.

On

board the carriers a rash of disastrous accidents occurred went through or over the barriers. While the flight-deck crew cleaned up the mess forward, a high-priority search was under-

when

jets

way

for some means to insure a positive stop. Even chain Hnk fence was considered, but, fortunately, rejected. The final choice was an

all-nylon net.

This new device was taller than the biggest plane it had to stop (which naturally means it has grown considerably since then). Across the top and bottom and on both ends were load-carrying straps. Connecting the top and bottom together were nylon risers. The net was connected to an arresting engine. To differentiate between the net and the barrier, the net was christened "barricade." The air boss on the Pennsylvania wouldn't have been impressed. Several emergency arrests occurred aboard ship in which the barricade, installed forward of the barriers, assisted the barriers. Then, on June 28, 1952 the first barricade-only arrest: an F9F-2 dove for the deck, bounced, and cleared all the barriers. Then and there the barricade paid for itself many times over. The Panther was snatched out of the sky like a butterfly in a butterfly net. Although the barricade is nylon it can impose heavy local loads on the airframe. Damage to slats, flaps, gear doors, wing and fin leading edges, and intakes frequently occurs. At this stage of the game we needed barriers for the AD's, barriers wdth adapters ( OK, the Davis barrier ) for the S2F family. The barricade handled the rest. Since the barriers meant extra weight and storage space, and since the barrier adapter had limitations, the possibility of using the barricade for props was investigated. It worked, so now angled deck ships need only the barricade. The one exception

is

the Antietam.

Though she

led the

way

she

still

has to

keep barriers aboard since she isn't fitted with the stanchions needed to handle the latest barricades. The Valley Forge and the Lake 222

Champlain are

also excepted, naturally, as they are the last axial

decks operating, and must do without the luxury of bolters. Which finally brings us up to date, with barricades only, and

with even them out of sight. What do they look Hke? This gets us back to the original question

up in vulture's roost. They look like a Monday morning clothesHne. Hanging from the top load-carrying strap are the verticals which latch onto the airframe. The bottom load-carrying strap is out of sight for a very good reason. It is hidden behind a small ramp or in a slot in the deck. This protects the bottom strap if you engage the barricade on the morning you left your nosewheel at home. On either side are the stanchions which hold the barricade up. After the net is engaged the stanchions have nothing further to contribute so the net is detached by means of shear pins, and is then free to drape itself all over.

The barricade is stowed where it can be yanked out in a hurry. The Forrestal and later carriers have a storage compartment right under the flight deck. By opening the hatch, the barricade is started out; muscle and tractors do the rest. Prior to CVA-59 the barricades are stowed in the gallery deck adjacent to the catwalk. Deck-edge rollers are provided so the net can be dragged up on deck quickly.

How

long does

it

take to rig a barricade?

A

lot of statistics are

deck reports furnished by each ship. The maximum time reported recently is 5 minutes and 2 seconds; the minimum is 1 minute and 10 seconds. In an actual emergency 5 minutes is good time. Add 40 knots WOD, turn off the sun, and sprinkle in a little rain, 10 minutes is available from the

monthly

flight

good. Steps to keep rigging time low start with

time for pilots to see the barricade

first

drills.

This

hand. The

is

AG

also a fine

crew

will

appreciate your interest, too, and you'll have a better appreciation of the

work they

do.

223

Although her nuclear propulsion plant sets the U.S.S. Enterprise, apart from oil other carriers, she is nevertheless a part of the pattern which has continued since the first vessel was designed and built as a seagoing mobile airfield. The proud name of Enterprise is inherited from seven naval predecessors dating from the Revolutionary War, including the most decorated ship in U.S. naval history, the World War 11 Big "E," which was featured in a previous part of this book.

CVA(N)65,

By

virtue of both her displacement of

more than 85,000 tons and

her length of 1,101 feet, the nuclear-powered Enterprise is the largest ship ever built. The nuclear power plant will not only enable

her to operate for years without refueling, but creases the space available for aircraft fuel.

it

also greatly in-

With her greater mobility and flexibility, sustained high speeds, and reduced support requirements, the Enterprise more than adequately meets the needs of this day and age.

U.S.S. Enterprise CAPT. VINCENT

P.

DE POIX, USN,

COMMANDING OFFICER In the EARLY

1950's, the

power

of the

atom was

still

thought of

marily in terms of explosive energy. But United States engineers, alert to the possibilities of nuclear

power

pri-

Navy design at sea,

were

already working in close-knit coordination with the Naval Reactors

Branch of the Atomic Energy Commission. Dealing with the projected requirements of the Defense Department as to what demands could reasonably be placed on naval aviation and on the floating airfields that

support

it,

these groups spent over three years in prepar-

ing the design for the world's

first

nuclear-powered attack aircraft

thousands of manhours were spent by aviation, electronic, ordnance, and propulsion planners who drew upon carrier. Literally tens of

past experience, present knowledge, and,

224

I

suspect, an occasional

peek into the proverbial crystal ball, to put onto some 10,000 miles of blueprint paper the working plans that would eventually become the greatest achievement of modern maritime design and construction.

Known

#546 to the artisans of the Newport News Dry Dock Company who contracted to build her, she became Enterprise when Mrs. Bertha M. Franke, wife of the only as Hull

Shipbuilding and

then Secretary of the Navy, with an enthusiastic swing, broke the traditional red, white, and blue beribboned bottle of champagne on the towering bow. On a typical Indian summer Saturday in Sep-

tember 1960, the submarine Robert E. Lee fired a huge slug of water from one of her Polaris ballistic missile tubes in the first salute to Enterprise.

Adm.

Arleigh A. Burke, chief of naval operations, set the

future mission saying, "This

new

Enterprise

our determination to preserve liberty and

is

a mighty symbol of

justice,

and a

clear indica-

do so." moment, although she is the eighth naval vessel to bear the same illustrious name. Enterprise can best be described as a

tion of our ability to

From

series of

The

that

important

first

"firsts."

attack aircraft carrier to be nuclear propelled, her eight

reactors provide

a comparatively unlimited high-speed

cruising

Her upper decks and superwhich conventional boilers obtain tremendous volumes of air for combustion and out of which pass exhaust gases. The lack of dependence upon outside air for operation of the nonexistent firerooms makes it possible, for the first time, to enclose the ship completely within a "gas-tight envelope" in case of atomic, biological, or chemical attack. The absence of stack gases, corrosive fumes, and soot helps to alleviate constant cleaning and protective maintenance range, in addition to other advantages.

structure are not cluttered with large uptake spaces through

duties.

Safety of flight for the carrier's aircraft is another bonus resulting from the use of nuclear energy. The violent effects of turbulence during final landing approach that result from the unpredictable air currents which stream downwind from the carrier's stacks have been ehminated for the first time. Another joy for the squadron maintenance personnel is the ease with which they can keep their highspeed aircraft in a clean and highly polished condition. Other super carriers are limited in the number of days they can

225

operate without replenishment and refuehng. Here, again, other

first.

Use

is

an-

of nuclear energy enables Enterprise to sustain, not

only herself, but also her escort and her aircraft for longer periods

advantage creates a smaller demand on the replenishment forces and results in savings to the Navy. In the future, when fully nuclear-powered task forces become a reality, Enterprise's tanks, now carrying black oil with which to refuel escort destroyers, will be converted to aviation jet fuel and will exceed by an even wider margin the aviation fuel capacity of any other aircraft carrier at sea. This

afloat.

Enterprise

the

Navy

the

is

ship in the Atlantic Fleet to have installed

first

system (NTDS). With

tactical data

its

functions of auto-

matic processing, display, and exchange of tactical information, this system vastly improves the operational capabilities of both ship and task force. Evolved to meet the demands of modem warfare in

which

aircraft

and

may approach

missiles

thousands of miles per hour, threats

NTDS

is

a task force at speeds of

capable of evaluating multiple

and recommending countermeasures to shipboard command-

ers in millionths of a second.

A

saving of some 120 tons of gross weight resulted from the use

of structural

aluminum construction on the heavy jet bombers and

deck-edge from hangar 15 seconds. Another 8 tons were saved by

elevators for lifting

deck to

flight

deck

in

ship's four

fighters

using aluminum in the construction of the island structure.

The

first

installation of jet air starting units

in the flight

deck

will

speed the

and cooling

vital function of

facilities

launching the

ship's air strike group.

The

size of Enterprise's island structure

the two radar screens that flank each of

developed radar system

is

is

dictated

its

by the

size of

four sides. This newly

the most powerful to be installed on a

floating platform. Its far-reaching three-dimensional capabiHty

enhanced by

its

height above the water

move

is

line.

men, supplies, and bombs up and down the 23 levels between keel and the top of the mast. With all of these innovations and the normal equipment generally found aboard super carriers, there must be space for equipment, maintenance, and the habitability of support manpower. Fully manned, Enterprise will have in excess of 4,600 officers and men. Long deployment possibilities require comfortable and convenient Thirty-six elevators

planes,

226

and shoe repair cream and soda fountains. A closed-cir-

living spaces, air conditioning, recreation, laundry facilities, ship's stores, ice

cuit television station pipes training lectures, live entertainment,

and filmed shows

and berthing areas. Administrative of men, planes, and ship. The health of all hands is efficiently guarded by a staff of doctors, some belonging to ship's company, others to the embarked air oflBces

into the living

maintain the records of

all activities

provided for their important task are as modern and complete as could be desired: a 92-bed hospital that includes two wards, each with pantry; a fully equipped primary operating room for major surgery and a secondary operating room for minor groups.

The

facilities

treatment. There are also complete X-ray facilities; a diagnostic laboratory; an ear, eye, nose,

and throat examining room; and a

specially

constructed audiometer room for conducting hearing protective tests for all

personnel coming in contact with the loud scream of

Two quiet rooms for postoperative cases and two wards for communicable disease patients, dry and wet physiotherapy, and a complete pharmacy are additional medical the jet engines. isolation

facilities.

The dental

clinic

contains six well-equipped dental operating

rooms, a prosthetic laboratory, and a dental X-ray room. Both medical

and dental the normal

facilities are situated so as to traffic of

be separate and apart from

the passageways.

movand by

Enterprise has been referred to in such terms as "the largest

ing thing ever built by man," "the behemoth of the seas,"

many

other Hollywood-type phrases.

that cannot be denied; indeed,

it is

Her huge

size is

one thing and

a source of great comfort

safety to the pilots who will operate from her flight deck. It also shows every evidence of minimizing damage which may occur occasionally to aircraft in the landing process. This one feature not only saves the great sums necessary to repair damage to today's high-priced airplanes, but also it helps insure that the carrier has the maximum percentage of her air group operational and ready to go at all times. The increase in landing safety results from the ability to reduce the glide slope angle that an airplane follows in flying in to the arresting gear. The longer the angled deck and the greater the distance from the stern of the ship to the arresting wires, the gentler the descent the pilot can make in his final landing approach while, at the same time, insuring adequate clearance between his hook

227

and the

end of the flight deck, or "round down." Again, increased distance from the wires to the forward end of the angled deck aft

helps insure safe flying speed for a pilot or "bolters"

and must

fly off for

who

another

try.

misses

The

all

four wires

arresting wires

on the ship— of the constant run-out type— provide the

pilot

with the

longest stopping distance of any carrier, and this minimizes wear

on the planes. Size also gives greatly improved ability to launch and land planes under unfavorable wind and sea conditions. Propulsion and control characteristics of the ship offer great tactical flexibility. There are four rudders, one almost directly astern of each propeller. This provides excellent maneuverability at all speeds as well as tactical diameters in turns which compare with much

and

tear

smaller ships.

The

characteristics of the reactors in providing heat

on quick demand for production of steam are such as to give her acceleration characteristics an order of magnitude greater than that of any heavy combatant driven by conventional power. Her great speed, and endurance at high speed, reduces her vulnerability to submarine or surface attack, since the attacking force will have less chance of gaining a favorable position. Her ability to launch a strike on the enemy from one position, recover, and launch another 24 hours later from an unpredictable position more than 800 miles away from her previous strike position will constantly be a factor in causing the enemy to utilize protective forces that could be deployed elsewhere. If a show of force is required, Enterprise can be on distant station in a shorter period of time than any other ship in the fleet. In limited war, she offers means of applying tactical air power quickly and effectually in widely dispersed and moving attacks, attacks that are not vulnerable to enemy ballistic missiles and that require great enemy effort to counter. She is not bound by treaty to any definable land mass, and her presence on the high seas does not invite threats of aggression or retahation on friendly nations.

/ 228

)

Facts About the Enterprise CVA(N)65

Navy designation Type of vessel Propulsion

Nuclear attack aircraft carrier Nuclear

Number

8

of reactors

Horsepower, over

200,000

Speed, over

30 knots

Length overall Length between perpendiculars Breadth at main deck Extreme breadth at flight deck

1,101 feet

Depth Depth

at

C/L

flight

1,040 feet

133 feet

252 feet 229 feet 6 inches 99 feet 4 inches November 15, 1957 February 4, 1958 September 24, 1960

deck

Contract date Keel laid Christening

Delivery

Fall 1961

Height, keel to mast top, equal to

23-story building

Area of flight deck Displacement Number of crew (including air group) Meals served aboard daily Number of compartments and

4.47 acres

85,350 tons 4,600 13,800 3,200

spaces, over

Weight

of rudders, about

Number Weight Weight

of anchors of anchors of links in anchor chain

Number

of propellers

(all

five

35 tons each 2 30 tons each 360 pounds each

4

blades

Height of propellers

21 feet each

Weight

64,500 pounds each

of propellers

229

)

Number Number Number

)

of telephones, over

1,800

of designers required

915

of drawings

made

16,100

Miles of blueprints issued

Number

of plane elevators

2,400

4

(all

deck edge) Size of plane elevators, about

4,000 square feet

Number

4

of catapults

Capacity of air-conditioning plants

1,225 tons (enough to serve

over 400 homes)

Daily capacity of

280,000 gallons (enough to sup-

distilling plants

ply daily needs of over 1,400

homes

Facts About the Materials Used Structural steel required

60,923 tons

Weld metal used in construction Aluminum used in construction

3,400,000 pounds

Length of ventilation and heating

37 miles

3,014,266

ducts aboard, about

Length of electrical cable, about Length of )4-inch welding Length of pipe and tubing (from )4-inch to two feet in diameter Material received at Newport News, equal to more than

The Enterprise—A

625 miles 4,000 miles

230 miles 3,000

rail

carloads

Floating City Has

Air-conditioning plants

Laundry

Armory

Library

Bakery Barber shop Blacksmith shop Butcher shop Carpenter shop

Machine shop Movie theater Operating rooms Oxygen plant Paint shop

230

Copper shop Dental

Pharmacy Photographic laboratories

oflBce

Distillation plant (waterworks)

Post

Electric shop

Printing plant

Electrical generating stations

Radio and TV repair shop Sheet metal shop Soda fountain Tailor shop

Fire stations

Garbage disposal plant Hospital Ice cream plant

TV

and bars (3)

lounges

Volleyball courts

Jail (brig)

Ladies'

ofifice

Weather bureau

powder rooms (4)

Facts About the Electrical and Electronic

Total output of

all

Equipment

electronic equip-

ment

to output of about 300 powerful radio stations, op-

Equal

erating simultaneously

Estimated number of tubes, transistors and diodes, about

1,000,000

Total power of auxiliary motors,

30,000 horsepower

nearly

Area taken up by switchboards,

7,000 square feet

nearly Potential electrical generating ca-

Enough

to supply the

needs of

a city of over 2,000,000 per-

pacity

sons

Total

number

Length

of lighting fixtures

of all cable

and wiring used

25,500

Equal

to 3,000 times the

length of the ship

231

)

From

our days in grammar school

evacuate the building in a

fast, orderly,

when we had and

to learn to

safe manner,

whenever

marshal signaled a "Fire Drill," to the presentday Civil Defense alerts, we have learned to respond to alarms and the principal or

fire

drills.

Aboard a carrier at sea there are no "fire escapes" to safe ground. The emergency must be met quickly and efficiently so that "safe ground" continues to be the carrier. This detailed account of realistic drills is yet another facet of carrier life without which our brief review would be incomplete.

Learn or BurnRealistic Drills

on Carriers

FROM OFFICIAL NAVAL RECORDS is a dbill, this is a drill! "General quarters, general quarters,

"This

all

hands

man

your battle

stations.

"Condition Zebra will be set in three minutes."

With these sounds ringing in their ears, some 3,900 men aboard (CVA-61) make the mad dash to their GQ stations. For some it may be a short run. Others make their way in the U.S.S. Ranger

well-organized dashes to distant stations.

Whether the

is sounded on the Ranger ( CVA-61 (CVAN-65), the Constellation (CVA-64) or the

signal for drill

or the Enterprise

Lexington (CVA-16), the Essex (CVS-9) or the Bennington (CVS-20), comes with the same urgency. Aircraft carriers use drills, so that in the event of real trouble, every man can cope efficiently with the

it

emergency.

The largest aircraft carrier in the world, equipped with the most modern aircraft and weapon system, is impotent if it is incapacitated before reaching the scene of battle. Excluding the action of a poten-

232

tial

enemy force,

there are

many ways

in

which such a tragedy could

occur. Fire, with resultant internal explosions can render a ship helpless.

can produce deck rolls and angles of list that preoperations. Combined with heavy seas, this same instability

Instability

clude air

can cause progressive internal flooding and result in capsizing. In war, a nuclear explosion delivered by a far-reaching

enemy

missile

could disable a ship by either radioactive deposits or blast damage. Panic by undisciplined personnel could result from any of the pre-

ceding conditions and render a ship defenseless. In an emergency, the response of each man must be automatic. The fact that he knows what to do in case of attack or fire is not sufficient.

He must be

able to perform his particular role without

pausing to question his actions.

mous

On

a large carrier, loaded with enor-

quantities of aviation gasoline

and ammunition, any pause

could spell catastrophe.

Not only do the drills keep the crew alert and ready, but they are method of training new men to fit into new jobs. The Forrestal, which in 1961 captured all five readiness awards, points up the importance of drills as follows: "Upon our return from a Mediterranean deployment in late Aualso the best

gust 1961, ginia, for

we

entered the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Vir-

an extensive

haul period.

.

.

.

alteration, modernization,

Many

and general over-

of our old stalwarts were transferred to

meant that we

left

the shipyard with a newer ship, but a less experienced crew.

To

other

commands

or paid off from the Navy. This

again mold a ship,

team,

its

we began an

aircraft

and 4,000 men

into an efficient fighting

intensive training period.

Under the

careful

guidance and experienced eyes of the fleet training group in Guantanamo Bay, we developed the standards of efficiency that brought the coveted E awards to the Forrestal in 1961." Another vital purpose of shipboard drills, as important as that of training, is that of checking the equipment. "The best means," according to Essex officers, "of finding out whether the fire mains are operational, whether there is sufficient protective clothing for monitors in case of atomic attack, or whether the thousands of fittings to be closed in setting material condition 'Zebra' are in proper order, is to hold a drill in which all these items come into use. Nothing can be left to chance. The safety of the ship is only as certain as the condition of her least watertight fitting."

233

In order to maintain constant combat eflBciency and

maximum

under several emergency bills, which are flexible enough in their design to handle any foreseeable situation. These emergency bills come under four categories: (1) general emergency, (2) fire, (3) man overboard, and (4) ABC defense. The U.S.S. Bennington describes the first drill as follows: "The general emergency bill contains procedures and responsibilities for three general emergency situations. First, the organization and control of personnel during a major emergency or disaster suffered by the ship, such as collision, grounding, and internal or external explosion. Second, it provides for the orderly and controlled egress of safety, the ship operates

personnel

if

abandonment

of the ship

provides for salvage of the ship,

In order for

drills to

be

if

effective,

is

required.

And

finally, it

feasible,"

they must be authentic. Every

made

to give them verisimiHtude. Whether it is a water line smoke filled compartments, or electrical failures where emergency power must be rigged, reahsm is the keynote. The exereffort

is

rupture,

cises are so close to "the real thing" that

during one of them,

it

should an accident occur

could be taken care of with no additions to

the personnel and equipment already on hand.

The

true complexities of these shipboard drills appear during the

yearly competitive operation readiness inspection.

On

the Essex, for

example, personnel undergo a series of exercises which enable the trained observers to determine the ship's capabilities under battle

and emergency conditions. The air group holds flight operations for 48 continuous hours. During this time, every item of equipment is rigorously examined. Every step in launching, recovering, refuehng, etc., is

carefully observed.

Meanwhile the ship's company deals with a battle problem. The words, "Torpedo on the port beam," may be the beginning of an exercise in which repair parties fight flames and attempt to repair damage. The exercise may end with the orderly evacuation of personnel from all spaces in an "abandon ship" drill. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the four emergency bills under which carriers operate, according to the U.S.S. Bennington, is

the atomic, biological, chemical

up procedures

(ABC)

defense

for coping with attack either

The first achieve severe material damage

or chemical agents.

234

This

by atomic,

of these— atomic

or injuries

bill.

and

bill sets

biological,

attack— seeks to

casualties to person-

)

thermal radiation and radioactive eflFects characteristic of these weapons. Biological warfare involves the use of hving agents or their toxic products, to incapacitate personnel by disease nel

by the

blast,

The

agent— chemical— is designed to produce casualties or harassment by inhalation and contact with the skin. Although biological and chemical methods of warfare are military capabilities, it is the defense against atomic attack which is the more important because of its severe damage and casualty potential. Further, a good atomic defense is equally ejBFective against biological and chemical agents; therefore, it is the drilhng in atomic defense that has the highest priority aboard aircraft carriers. ABC defense drills are required to be practiced once each quarter aboard aircraft or death.

third

carriers.

Bennington describes the procedure thus: "During an atomic attack drill there are two phases in the preparation stage: when the attack is immi( 1 ) when an attack is probable, and ( 2 ) nent. Most atomic attack drills are held while the ship is at general quarters, and the 'attack probable' command is the signal for all personnel not required in exposed areas topside to take cover. "All inflammable and loose materials are removed from the weather U.S.S.

and other protective clothing are disand radiac instruments are checked throughout all repair

decks; dosimeters, gas masks, tributed;

parties. If flight operations will permit, the If this is impractical,

assist in

the ship

is

wet down

water curtain as

much

is

rigged.

as possible to

the rapid run-off of radioactive material.

"The second preparatory phase begins with the announcement, 'Atomic attack imminent.' all

If possible,

the water curtain

personnel take shelter and the gas-tight envelope

out the ship. (All

X ray.

is

is

activated,

set through-

Yoke, Zebra, and Circle William

fittings are

closed.

"A 15-second

blast of the chemical signals the actual attack, fol-

lowed by a description of the type of burst and its range and bearing from the ship. If it was an underwater burst, the ship is maneuvered into the best position in relation to the approaching base

have been established in case of necessity. The executive officer is standing by in secondary conn while the operations oflBcer is prepared to assist in conning the ship from CIC ff primary and secondary conn are destroyed or unsurge. Alternate metliods of steering the ship

tenable.

235

"Once the

shock of the blast has been absorbed, the repair which they have been trained. Investigators are sent out on pre-determined routes with radiac instruments to determine the location and amount of radioactivity, as well as initial

parties begin the tasks for

any material damage sustained by the ship. Repair party personnel are ordered to stand by until the advisability of movement about the ship has been established. As an added precaution, the word is passed that until further notice, there shall be no eating, drinking, or smoking.

"When

appropriate, repair parties follow standard procedures in

and control of structural damage, fire, and flooding. "As the final stage of recovery from atomic attack, personnel decontamination stations are manned, and all personnel who were exposed during the attack proceed to these stations. Here, their contaminated clothing is discarded; freshwater showers are taken; and clean clothing is issued in an orderly and controlled manner. "The closure condition of the ship will be modified as soon as possible but on a selective basis, to insure that ventilation systems do not carry contamination from topside areas into the interior of the ship. Finally, when the condition of the ship is known, the radioactive hazard acceptably reduced or eliminated, and the safety of repair

all

personnel assured, the

One

element,

common and

damage-conti'ol exercises,

abandon-ship

drill is

drills, is

secured."

necessary to

ABC

all drills

whether they be

man

overboard, or communications. These include general anfire drills,

warfare,

nouncement systems, squawk boxes, ship's service telephone, and messengers. In addition, numerous circuits, sound-powered so that an electrical failure will not aflFect their proper functioning, are kept open at all times and manned by trained phonetalkers. These men have a vocabulary all their own which enables them to comprehend the "word" as it is passed and to send it on to those concerned. Aboard U.S.S. Ranger, there are eight repair parties operating out of ten lockers. Each repair party is broken down into units which operate throughout the ship, a total of 1,000 men. In addition to the drills each week, work load permitting, there is a one-hour class held each day and attended by approximately 25 men each session. One of the points stressed is the definition of

damage

control: the action taken to maintain or restore the offensive

236

and defensive power of the preventive and action.

The preventive phase

ship.

These involve two principal phases:

relates primarily to the responsibility of the

various divisions for the proper setting of material conditions-

keeping spaces in good shape and making sure that damage-control equipment and fittings are properly maintained and stowed.

The

action phase

is

the responsibility of the ship's repair parties.

Here damage-control central enters the

picture. This control station

receives reports, evaluates them, then issues orders for action. Fire-fighting drills

scheme. At sea,

when

fit

hand

in

fire drill is

hand with the damage-control

sounded,

all

hands

man

their

GQ

stations.

Each man

is

for fire drills.

thoroughly familiar with the equipment and methods For instance, to fight class "B" fires (oil or gasoline

Ranger has 17 high-velocity fog foam stations. These staon the hangar deck and hoses on the hangar deck and flight deck. Each hangar deck monitor can be turned on at the monitor station or from a conflagration station. Ranger has three conflagration stations which are located on the 02 level with a direct view of hangar bay areas. Foam to each hangar deck or flight deck hose can be turned on near the hose station blazes),

tions serve swivel monitors

serving

it.

Class "A"

fires in

the hangar bays can be fought with the hangar

bay sprinkling and water curtain systems. These systems can be actuated from the conflagration pushbutton station on the main deck, and from pushbutton stations on the second deck. To prevent fire from spreading from one hangar bay to another, a set of sliding doors has been built. These doors, which can be closed by an electric motor in about 20 seconds, are controlled from the conflagration stations or two local control stations on the main deck. Flight deck crash crews and

fire fighters

are also standing

by

for

any emergency. Again and again they run through the drills made to seem as nearly as possible "the real thing." U.S.S. Essex, in reporting its drills, regards the man-overboard routine as the one most constantly applied in Navy life. Essex reports, "The boat crews and others involved are given frequent opportunities to practice their skill. Also, since a rapid muster of all 237

personnel on board must be taken so as to determine the identity of the

man who

is

overboard, this too

the ORI, one or two

crewmen

is

on the drilhng agenda. During by the inspectors

are usually hidden

to determine the length of time necessary for estabhshing their identity."

Ranger concurs with the Essex An the importance of the man-overboard drill. Ranger has a lifeboat manned and ready 24 hours a day. The eight-man crew is a well-trained, smoothly running team. Each man is a specialist in his own field. The team has worked hours upon hours to maintain a high standard of eflBciency. It was not a drill when D. Terry, AN, aircraft pusher in Carrier J. Air Group 13, fell over the side of the U.S.S. Constellation (CVA-64) on March 16 during a shakedown cruise at Guantanamo Bay. U.S.S.

How

with the ship traveling at a an experience he will never forget. It took only six minutes from the time "man-overboard" word was passed until Terry was lifted from the water. HU-2 Detachment's helicopter crew was on the ball. Terry was standing near number 3 elevator swabbing up water and foam left over from a fire drill. "I decided to ring out my swab the lazy way by stepping on it and squeezing it," he said. "All of a sudden I lost my balance and over the side I went, into the water." Terry is a good swimmer and he swam as fast as possible away from the ship to avoid being caught in the screws. Another thing in his favor was the calm sea. "The ship was about one-quarter-mile away when I saw it turning," Terry said. "I was glad to see that." Lt. Cdr. R. B. Moran, hehcopter pilot and OinC of the HU-2 Detachment said, "I was seated in a helo when I heard a series of blasts on the ship's horn indicating a man overboard. I had on my helmet because an A4D was turning up near me, and I was unable to hear any announcement. I thought it might be a drill. "I started the engine while the crew removed the blade boost, and does

it

feel to fall over the side

good speed? Terry says

it is

then a crewman yelled, 'Man overboard!' Sharretts, my rescue crewman, checked the hatch and hoist as we cleared the area for en-

gagement.

and were advised the man was in the ship's wake smoke flare. As we came abreast the flare, we saw the man about 250 yards away. He was splashing around and was diflB-

"We

lifted off

just aft of a

238

cult to see

because his dungaree trousers and blue jersey blended

with the water." R. Sharretts, AN, goes on with the story. "The pilot made his J. approach and gave me the signal to open the hatch. After I had done so, I lowered the seat and gave the pilot directions as to where the man was. When we were over him, I saw he was in good shape. He sat down on the seat, and I raised him into the helo without diflBculty. Terry was one of the happiest men I've ever seen." Drills pay off. The Constellation got the "man-overboard" word at 1340, the helo was launched at 1343, and Terry was picked up at 1346.

The

air

department has

its

share of

of rigging the nylon barricade for

drills.

The continuing

practice

emergency landings may make

the difference between a successful or disastrous barricade landing, depending on the speed in which the gigantic nylon device is ready for use. Ranger personnel have rigged the barricade in less than two minutes and are trying to beat that record. In the event that a ship must be abandoned, all hands must be trained in water survival. Survival instruction is usually given to large groups. In smaller groups, demonstrations on how to don a life jacket, launch a life raft or net, and the proper way to enter the water give each man the confidence necessary to assure an orderly ship abandonment. Shipboard drills can be grim and difficult, and those who participate in them derive little enjoyment from them. But these drills can save not only the ship, but thousands of men aboard her in an emergency. The drills spell readiness. New flight deck and hangar deck teams are trained to work at peak efficiency. Air groups are requalified and honed to a keen edge. Gun crew, director crews, CIC teams, communications watches, boat crews, at-sea replenishment teams, and others are in training continually. The never-ending cycle of training and drills continues. It must. It is not being continued just to upset scheduled activities of a day.

The

cycle continues because the strength of the

the efficiency and speed which

drills

239

provide.

Navy depends on

Crises are

common

along the 9,000 miles of Asian coast guarded

by the 125 ships, 650 aircraft, and 60,000 personnel of the Seventh Fleet based in the Orient. Since 1949, Formosa has been in the headlines. In 1950, Korea. In 1958, there were Quemoy and Matsu. Throughout the Fifties South Asia broiled with one conflict after another— Dien Bien Phu,

and Vietnam. Today, Vietnam hangs in the balance. The Formosa Straits could become the next point of conflict between the peoples of the free world and the captors of the oppressed. With 30 million square miles to defend, the area assigned to the Seventh Fleet, the role of the carrier has never been more impor-

Laos,

tant.

Attack!

The Ranger

The Rangers deck crewmen scrambled forward

A

cats, their

in the Pacific to safety

between the two

ghosthke features silhouetted against the night

from the catapult officer and the heavy F3H-2 Demon belched fire at the blast shield and strained against its bridle, vibrating the 4-acre flight deck and the wardrooms below. Another signal, and the fighter was off, down the length of the cat and out over the water, climbing fast and clear of the carrier and disappearing on the dim horizon. Another plane rolled into position. The forward cats sky.

signal

alternated as the night operations began,

first

the port, then star-

board, and the aircraft rolled quickly into the lineup for their turn.

Then

silence fell over the

the wind and on tal

port of

its

Somewhere

its

deck as the Ranger turned back out of

course toward Yokosuka, Japan, the final Orien-

tour.

China Sea, 80 or 90 miles away, the Coral were flying that night. Near the Philippines, the Lexingtons air group repeated the routine. With the attack carriers, the routine becomes a ritual that never ends. Day in, day out, they train and practice, then go through it all again until it's second nature. Then they do it again. The carrier air groups rack up hundreds of flying hours a month in the East

Sea's aircraft also

240

while at sea. During one month, for example, the Rangers air

group 9 flew 4,149.6 hours, using 1,500,000 gallons of jet fuel and 140,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The Ranger sailed 8,115 miles during its 23 days at sea that month. "You're really a schoolboy your whole career," a chief commented as he directed his men through an engine repair job. "You no more than learn everything there is to know about the job, than they improve the stuff or send you something new. You have to learn it all over again."

The Ranger was going home, having completed its tour with the fleet, but back home more training awaited the crew of the 1,046an integral part of carrier life, this training, and it blends in and becomes synonymous with their defense missions. They're rehearsing for tomorrow's war, if it comes, and they have foot carrier.

It's

work under the assumption

to

By

that

it

will.

their very nature, the attack carrier forces are offensive, able

and demolish the enemy's vitals should the need arise. They hold jobs as varied as the threats facing this part of the world where 3/2 million Communists are under arms. Their aircraft can bomb distant cities far inland from continental coasts or blast open a beachhead for landing amphibious forces. Other potential targets include to strike

enemy shipping or enemy bulldog their way through

invasion forces that

may

try to slip or

Oriental waters. Carrier fighters provide

And, meanwhile, the carriers show the flag in the ports they visit, reminding anyone who cares to look that they can back up American foreign policy. This is the job handed to them cover for

by

all

the

fleet.

their boss, Vice

Adm. WiUiam

A. Schoech,

commander

of the

Seventh Fleet. "They can strike any assigned target," said the admiral who demands constant readiness and pushes his staff to make certain the goal is realized. "I spend most of my time in what I call the wholesale business,

practice

is

We must be any focal point of trouble." And

planning future operations and training.

able to concentrate

making

armed might

at

this possible.

In the previous seven months, the Rangers 3,500 officers and men drilled under pressure akin to war as the carrier fulfilled its mission.

On

the angled flight deck, four catapults

fire off

a steady stream of

headed for training with the weapons from the ship's magazines. Below are mechanics, ordnance men, engineers, gunners, stewards,

jets

241

and the

scores of other speciahsts,

sible, all

common

all

the

men who make

the job pos-

running through their specific assignments to achieve a objective. Each man aboard helps put the w^eapons on tar-

get.

There's a vi^eatherman plotting a cold

wave moving down

across

a funny thing, but

you can count on the Red Chinese for accurate forecasts." Cooks and bakers are busy with the 10,500 meals served daily, one of them noting that "fresh pork goes over best with the crew." The navigator advises Ranger Capt. W. N. Leonard that a heading of 104 will take the ship around a storm. Gun crews on the port side are pounding away at a drone that buzzed them, while other men sweat in 125-degree engine room Asia, observing that

"it's

heat as they check pressure gauges. Lt. F. A. Neth, guided missile oflBcer declares,

and

"We can pull

the sections of a Bullpup missile off the

completely assembled to the flight deck in seven and a half minutes." All are putting the Ranger through her paces. Carrier planes boast a wide variety of weapons, including the air-to-

racks

air

deliver

it

Sidewinder and Sparrow

sile,

rockets,

Bullpup mishave a nuclear

missiles, the air-to-surface

bombs, mines and torpedoes. They

also

capability.

"We're battle ready in

all

the weapons

we have

aboard," said Cdr.

Jack Endacott, commander of Attack Squadron 94, which versatile A4D-2N Skyhawk jet. "You can count on that."

flies

the

Endacott was to fly that morning on another practice mission, and he moved slowly around the plane during his preflight check, pausing at one of the three Bullpup missiles attached to the underside, then climbed to his cockpit. In minutes he would fly from the ship to destroy a target in the ocean. "Bullpup is out of this world against shipping," he said. "It's an outstanding weapon." For the sake of economy, meanwhile increasing their skill, pilots throughout the fleet practice on special electronic trainers that simulate the flight of a Bullpup, giving the men much the same control they would have with genuine guided missiles. "We have a number of runs on the trainer before we fire the missile," said Cdr. Billy May of the Coral Seas VA-153, another squadron of Skyhawk

jets.

The commander

said the practice has paid off

in better missile launches. "We're getting very high accuracy

on moving targets." Pilots on the Lexington

even

also receive intensive training in fleet air*

242

weapons. Lt. Cdr. W. H. Searfus, training oflBcer of Squadron VA-146, runs his pilots through a special sequence before they ever launch a missile. "We have three or four hours of classes on the beach," Searfus said, "where we use films and other material to cover the missile's capability. Then there are eight sessions with the trainer before they get their hands on the missile. We follow this with a dry run, and craft

finally a live launch."

And all

so

it is

with the other weapons and equipment. The pilot and

the others in the ship's

oughly and

how

those jobs relate to the others.

or the whole system

men

company must know

of the ship,

fails; it is

by the

their

The

own jobs

jobs thor-

must mesh

a matter of coordinated effort by the

ships that

make up the task group, and fleet. The teamwork is the final

by all the elements of the exam, short of actual combat, that proves the fleet's effectiveness. The system appears to be working. Though widely dispersed throughout the Orient, the attack carrier forces can assert their weight wherever necessary, combining their striking power with the Marines, and other fleet elements, and with the Army and Air ultimately

Force.

"Oh,

we have

om* nuts and bolts problems integrating the various

elements, but we're in good shape," said Admiral Schoech,

now on

his fourth tour

with the

who

is

fleet.

Training for the attack carriers continues. With such exercises as the giant Operation Tulungan in the Philippines this past spring,

Navy and forces of allied nations, the carriers test The photo pilots survey the battle areas, bringing back photo intelligence upon which to base the critical command

involving the their their

skill.

decisions; the fighter pilots are out with their Sidewinders, searching

"enemy" planes; and the attack pilots are lobbing their Bullpups, bombs, and special weapons into beachheads and shore installations, setting the stage for the Marines to land. Other training will follow. The Ranger had been the full cycle in the Orient and would enter a new phase back in the States. But training is still the order of the for

day.

"You at

it,"

117 enlisted

We

and expect to be any good whose 21 oflBcers and it." "You have to keep at it.

can't leave off practice very long

said the

VA-94

men

skipper, Cdr. Endacott,

are "very good at

do."

243

The Best Duty "You SEEM TO spend

and out of your Squadron 94 aboard the carrier Ranger. He stood in his ready room with his arms folded, an air hose hooked to his suit to keep him cool. He was waiting for a clearance to fly and the minutes seemed to crawl by before he would take the escalator to the deck. But for the commander and the other pilots aboard, all the preparation is worth it. Said Endacott, "It's the best duty in tlie Navy." half your time climbing in

gear," said Cdr. Jack Endacott,

commander

244

of Attack

.

Decision-making has always been dependent upon complete, and up-to-the-minute intelligence whether the situation

factual,

he in combat or

in training exercises.

A commanders

estimate of

the situation cannot be any better than his intelligence, unless he

is

gifted with a crystal ball.

Today's dynamic war potentials, with

its

accelerated speeds, re-

quires decisions, as a matter of course, literally in seconds. The fantastic pace of present-day war situations could result in an attack

being mounted and completed before the defense could evaluate the operation,

if it

was

restricted to conventional,

outmoded

charts

and

maps, blackboards, and the like for situation display. Automation, the computer, and other electronic gear joined the

commanders staff to aid him in the difficult decision-making One such "staff member" is presented here.

process.

Tactical Navigational Display System.

Iconorama Ahoy SANDY MCCULLAR Automation has come

to the warship's

combat information center

with sophisticated sHde projectors replacing

sailors

using grease

pencils.

The purpose

of the

CIC

is

to give the battle

command

staflF

a

visual picture of the complete situation in the arena of conflict and, until

now, the grease pencils have been necessary for plotting posiand other information about the ships, planes, and sub-

tion, course,

marines in combat.

Now

the plotting job is done faster and more eflBciently by elecequipment called the tactical navigational display system— TNDS for short— and produced for the Navy by the Temco Electronics Display Systems unit of Ling-Temco-Vought. TNDS is the latest development of the Iconorama concept originated by the LTV unit. tronic

245

The

TNDS

prototype was installed in 1961 on the aircraft carrier,

U.S.S. Randolph, stalled

on another

TNDS

and a

later,

more advanced system has been

in-

carrier, the U.S.S. Essex.

brings to the high seas the

same

sort of current situation

displays that other Iconorama systems provide for officers

who must

decisions concerning the nation's defense at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) headquarters, Colorado Springs,

make

Colorado;

SAC

(Strategic Air

Command)

headquarters near Omaha,

Nebraska, and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Some 25 other Iconorama systems, including the Mercury Orbital Plotter in

Greenbelt, Maryland, for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

have

also

been

installed.

Focal point of TNDS is the screen and projector assembly. All the information a commander needs to direct his ship or task force in sea combat

projected on the screen. This includes the direction and speed at which he is traveling as well as the same information on all other vessels and craft in the area and as far away as radar and sonar can detect them. The ship with the TNDS may be shown in the center of this display or anywhere else on the screen. Wherever this ship is shown the other craft and vessels will be depicted is

in accurate relationships, with all tracks continually

changing ac-

cording to the real location and other information of the current time.

accomplished by 10 Iconorama slide projectors, six of which are equipped with highly accurate miniature plotting systems made of clear materials so the information may be displayed while it is being plotted. The projectors are Projection of

controlled

all

by two

of this information

tall

is

cabinets of electronic equipment which

make

up, in effect, a speedy, specialized analog computer.

The computer and

projectors are controlled from an evaluator's

console where information from radar and sonar

data on the ship's geographic location,

weapon

is

integrated with

systems, ranges, nav-

igational factors, etc.

Behind the console is a manual plotting board where such information may be drawn and fed to the computer so that it also may be displayed.

246

An late

increasingly popular sport amongst Sovdet

bomber

pilots of

has been the risky business of seeking out at-sea U.S. aircraft

carriers

and dropping down from

altitude for a closer look.

These

encounters have mainly been connected with the arrival or departure of one of our carriers from a port which has widely announced the event and have not been as a result of Russian

reconnaissance capabilities.

The Soviet "Bears" and "Badgers" have been escorted to the by its F-4 Phantoms and F-8 Crusaders, after the ship's radar has picked up unidentified targets hundreds of miles from its location and has then scrambled the carrier interceptors. Unlike the Communist pilots, who have destroyed numerous United States aircraft and crews without provocation, naval flyers simply join the bomber formation and escort it to, over, and away from the carriers vicinity

surface force.

Of course, the Navy fighters are armed with air-to-air missiles and fly a position that would result in the immediate destruction of any aircraft that proved itself hostile. The effort of the Soviets to arm Cuba with missiles, capable of placing the majority of our population and industry under the threat of short-range attack, occurred recently enough in our history to still be a part of our everyday concerns. The situation helped to expose our lack of defenses on the vulnerable southeastern flank. For many years we have concentrated our defensive capabilities The Fine Tree Line, Dew Line, BMEWS, and arctic subarctic and bases have typified our defensive arrangements, when one excepts our offensive capabilities as the best line of defense. The quarantine, or selective blockade, of Cuba almost brought our to the north.

country to the brink of World that could be

made

War

III,

but

it

was the only choice

in light of the best interests of the free world.

The threat to our safety, on which the well-being of our depends, was grave. This account of the

Cuban

action

is

allies

edited so that the role of the

can be more readily discerned. It is not meant to cast adverse reflection on the numerous other elements of our Armed Forces which played key roles in all phases of the operation. carrier

247

The Navy and Cuba— Operational Report JACK KESTNER For Adm. Robert

L. Dennison,

commander

days before on Tuesday, October

16.

and had occm-red four

in chief, Atlantic

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, his introduction to the crisis

He had

just finished breakfast

with his wife at stately Missouri House on "Admirals' Row" when a telephone rang in his upstairs study. In the pleasant, book-lined room overlooking a garden in the rear, there were three telephones. One was local, another a "hot" Hne to the Chief of Naval Operations, the third a "hot" line to the Joint

was the third phone that was ringing. The conversation was brief. There was urgent business in Washington. Could he come? Yes. At approximately the same time, in a bedroom in the White House, President Kennedy was handed a thick stack of photos. He, too, was being introduced to one of the deadliest threats the country had ever known. Adm. Dennison returned from his Washington trip to mull over Chiefs of

Staff. It

contingency plans.

On

Thursday, October

18,

he again flew to a

Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting in Washington.

On

same day the nuclear-powered attack carrier, U.S.S. Enterprise, back only six days from a fomr-month deployment in the Mediterranean, left Norfolk in such a rush that she was still taking her air group aboard as she "turned the corner" at Cape Henry. that

When ters

why

that she

a reporter asked Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force headquar-

Enterprise

had put

had taken

off in

a cloud of spray, he was told

to sea to (1) practice engineering exercises,

and

(2) evade Hurricane EUa.

"Engineering exercises 1" the reporter snorted. "A week after she

248

)

gets

back from the Med?

really

want me

And

Ella turned east at

noon today. You

to believe that?"

"Absolutely," was the cordial reply.

This was the pattern for

were no leaks

all

queries in the days to come. There

eve of the President's speech simply because there were only a few at the very highest level who were aware of what was going on. As a result, the Cuban operation (

at least not until the

became the best kept military secret of modern times. In Norfolk, only Adm. Dennison had the complete picture. And he had a ready-made cover story going for him in the Caribbean. For on the same fateful Tuesday that proof of Russian perfidy had been handed President Kennedy, 10 amphibious force ships steamed out of Norfolk for Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, where they picked up a Marine brigade and headed for Vieques Island ofi^ the eastern tip of

Puerto Rico.

Weeks

before, an amphibious exercise entitled "Phibriglex 62"

had been scheduled

for 8 a.m.,

October 23— only 12 hours,

as

it

turned out, after the President delivered his "quarantine" speech. Also scheduled for the exercise were the attack carrier, U.S.S. Independence, the ASW carrier, U.S.S. Randolph, destroyers, submarines, and replenishment ships. Had it not been for the fortuitous timing of Phibriglex, the sudden departure of so many ships would quite likely have resulted in published speculation of a seriously handicapping nature. It was a big break for Adm. Dennison. Saturday, October 20th. At 6:10 p.m., Adm. Dennison left Norfolk for Washington. With him in his plane were Adm. Ward and Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman, Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, who had been serving on the Atlantic Command staflF as a planner and who would now form the nucleus of a Joint StaflF.

Attending the meeting in Washington that night were the Joint (Adm. George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Opera-

Chiefs of Staff tions,

who

served as executive agent for the JCS in the upcoming Dennison party, Gen. Walter C. Sweeney,

military operation), the

commander, Tactical Air Force, and

half a

dozen

joint staff

mem-

bers of two-star rank or above.

Using the chart, Adm. Dennison outlined the proposed mechanics

249

The ground rules of engagement were discussed, were the availability and disposition of forces. While there, a preliminary draft of the President's speech was passed around. It was indicated that the speech would be delivered of the blockade. as

Monday

night, with implementation of the blockade occurring at

10 A.M. Wednesday.

En route back to Norfolk shortly before 11 p.m., the mood of Adm. Dennison and his commanders was serious but calm. They knew what they had

to do.

Sunday, October 21. Early in the day, Rear Adm. John W. commander of Charleston-based cruiser-destroyer Flotilla 6, flew into Norfolk and spent the day at CINCLANT headquarters. He was to be designated surface group commander of the quarantine forces. By that evening, a draft of the operational order

Ailes, III,

had been prepared. At 9 A.M. Adm. Ward met with Rear Adm. H. G. Bowen Jr., commander of the Norfolk-based cruiser-destroyer Flotilla 4, and told him to "get your boys ready to go as unobtrusively as possible." Other forces were moving in the same manner. Submarines at the destroyer-submarine piers began slipping out one by one. Overseas in Holy Loch, Scotland, the tender U.S.S. Proteus was preparing to steal quietly out to sea.

Predetermined targets in Russia were already

zeroed in by Polaris missiles. Vice Adm. E. G. Grenfell, commander, Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force, said later: "I would think that Mr. Khrushchev was aware that our Polarises were ready, and that this had something to do with his decision to walk the cat back in Cuba." At mid-afternoon, 25 miles southeast of San Salvador in the Bahama Island chain, the tropical blue water below was broken by a broad white wake. At the head of the wake rode the nuclear-powered Enterprise, her two plane guard destroyers striving to keep astern. She was ready to fight. Both of her red "angel" helicopters were airborne and in position. The tempo of activity at Atlantic Command headquarters mounted throughout the day. On a wartime footing for the first time since Korea, the joint staff was shifting into high gear. Monday, October 22. Vice Adm. Horacio Rivero, commander, Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force, had a problem. Five days before

250

he had picked up a Marine brigade from Camp Lejeune and headed south for the Phibriglex landing on Vieques. A rendezvous had been scheduled with Amphibious Squadron 8 (the six ships on "ready" duty in the Caribbean), but on Sunday he had received orders to send them to Guantanamo. Moreover, the attack carrier U.S.S. Independence had been cut from the exercise, and a dress rehearsal— scheduled for Monday-

had been canceled. Even a less experienced naval

could have read these as Cuba. And the normal thing

officer

clear indications of the rising tension in

would have been to move in that direction. However, if he committed his forces toward GTMO— in the opposite direction from Vieques— it would mean that the exercise would be missed if it remained on the books. It was a thorny problem for an admiral who had worn his third star only

one week— the

first

native-born Puerto Rican to achieve

this rank.

The manner in which Adm. Rivero resolved it is representative manner in which command judgment was exercised throughout those early days. Many commanders were not to know precisely what had precipitated the crisis, or the President's response to it, until the speech Monday night. Yet no one was caught napping. In the Rivero force were two LPH's, carrier-type ships whose design was based on the concept of "vertical envelopment"— sending Marines behind enemy lines, via helicopter. They had one quality of the

not generally associated with amphibious-type vessels— speed.

So Adm. Rivero detached the U.S.S. Thetis Bay and U.S.S. Okinawa and sent them steaming down Mona Passage between the western end of Puerto Rico and the eastern end of the Dominican Republic. At the bottom of the passage they turned right and moved to a point beneath the island. There they remained— ready to dash for either

GTMO or Vieques.

The admiral himself steamed down the

passage.

He

listened to the

Mount McKinley's loud Bay and the Okinawa already on

President's speech piped over the U.S.S.

speaker system. With the Thetis

the way, they were able to arrive off

GTMO

in short order to take

and await any call for help. When the call didn't come, Adm. Rivero summoned them to join his force now cruising between the quarantine line and the Bahama Islands.

up

stations

251

Throughout the

crisis,

side of a double-headed

an

It was one smash down on Cuba at

the force remained poised there.

hammer, ready

to

instant's notice.

The other

side of the

hammer was

to

be known as Task Force

135.

The Enterprise had

left

Norfolk after the Naval Supply Center,

sweating blood, had loaded 10 hours of provisions and supplies in 120 minutes.

Embarked on Enterprise was Rear Adm. John

T.

Hayward, com-

mander, Carrier Division 2. On Monday morning he rendezvoused with the Independence north of the Bahamas, above Windward Passage. Independence carried Rear Adm. Robert J. Stroh, commander. Carrier Division 6. The Independence and her destroyers had already been joined by Capt. Otis R. Cole, Jr., commander, Service Squadron 4, embarked in the fleet oiler U.S.S. Truckee, The next day Task Force 135, under command of Adm. Stroh, steamed toward Windward Passage lying between the eastern tip of Cuba and the western tip of Haiti. The Independence had 85 planes aboard, the Enterprise, more than 100. It is significant that Enterprise, on her way to the rende2rvous, had picked up an extra Marine squadron of A4D attack bombers from Cherry Point— the type of aircraft that would be called on if a decision was made to knock out the Russian missile bases. The Task Force passed ships carrying the 2,800 evacuees from GTMO. The ships identified themselves but would say only that they were travehng under secret orders. Near Jamaica, they took up ready stations, sometimes cruising above the island, sometimes below, depending on unidentified submarine contacts. Adm. Hayward, senior to Adm. Stroh, relieved him of command of the Task Force, and on November 9, Adm. Stroh flew back to the States. The two flattops remained within easy striking range of Cuba throughout the operation. Wednesday, October 24. At 10 a.m., the hour of implementation, the Newport News was moving east past the blockade line. Days before, photographs taken of the Russian freighter Poltava indicated that she was of such size and configuration as to permit concealment of missiles in her holds. She was kept under almost continual

252

Washington picked her as the first ship to board, and the Newport News was headed for an intercept. But at 10 A.M., according to aircraft reports, a strange thing happened. The Poltava went dead in the water. For the next 12 hours she sat there. Then slowly she turned and headed back east. There can be little doubt that this was the turning point in the entire Cuban operation. As Adm. Ward later put it: "I think Mr. K. made up his mind pretty early." This did not mean that the operation was over. Far from it. A total of 435 sightings of inbound ships were made, 33 were intercepted and 1 boarded. Then there were the follow-up operations of intercepting and photographing outbound missiles and IL-28 bombers. Somehow, though, there then was the feeling of anticlimax. As President Kennedy was to put it later: "It was the first time that the military forces of the Soviet Union and the United States had faced each other with the possibiHty of air surveillance.

conflict."

And

the Reds

had backed away.

253

The Iwo Jima

is

a logical follow-on to the prototype Thetis Bay

was the case with the Langley, Thetis Bay provided a working laboratory for the theories and concepts that led to her design. In turn, the more sophisticated Iwo Jima gained refinements that could not have been determined without thorough operational evaluation aboard CVHA-1. discussed earlier. As

U.S.S. CDR.

The

U.S.S.

Iwo Jima (LPH-2) L.

W. GARRISON, USN

Iwo Jima (LPH-2)

is

the

first

ship built from the keel

up

to implement the Navy-Marine Corps concept of vertical envelopment. Her design is a logical step forward in the development of surface ships to support modern amphibious doctrine and her construction recertifies the military worth of amphibious assault operations.

The Iwo Jimas mission and 500 the

stafi^,

enlisted

requires accommodations for 50 ofiBcers

men, plus 230 o£Bcers and 1,900 enlisted men

in

squadron, and landing force. Provision of these extensive

personnel accommodations necessarily limits machinery space, hence

Iwo Jima is a single screw ship— with maximum habitability. The absence of catapult and arresting gear machinery also contributes to the unusually commodious working and living spaces. In fact, the Iwo Jima provides more hving space per man than any other ship in the

Each Marine

is

provided an upright locker,

additional stowage for field pack and

hand weapons, and a comTroop living compartments

the amphibious force. fortable

bunk complete with

are equipped for

mattress.

maximum comfort— each

has a recreation space,

ironing boards, and ship's service telephone, and every troop berth

equipped with a reading lamp. All living spaces are air conditioned. The four troop debark and assembly stations located adjacent to living compartments are well protected from weather and

is

helicopter rotor blast.

254

The Iwo Jima has two cargo charge of combat stores to the

which provide rapid disdeck, and incidentally assist

elevators flight

the ship's force in stowing replenishment stores. Assault force vehicles are

stowed

aft

on the main deck readily accessible

to

deck-edge

elevators.

The hangar deck admits 9 HR2S's,

or 20

HRS's and

is

fully en-

closed except for the 2 deck-edge openings and 8 cargo doors which

can be secured when not in use. The 20-foot clearance from main deck to overhead provides ample clearance for helicopter maintenance. Conventional fueling stations and electrical and air outlets provide immediate service for aircraft or vehicles. Two conflagration stations, a sprinkler system, and fire mains provide conventional damage-control facilities. Aircraft mantenance shops are located on the main deck forward of the hangar bay.

Deck-edge elevators are capable of lifting more than 17 tons and can be folded to pass the Iwo Jima through narrow channels. The flight deck provides 8 landing/ takeoff spots, and there is ample stowage for 24 HUS's ( with rotors folded ) The Iwo Jimas design helicopter complement is 20 HUS's and 2 HR2S's, and she is capable of launching or recovering waves of 4 aircraft simultaneously with her full complement of aircraft on board. The Iwo Jimas medical facilities support her crew and assault force during amphibious operations and are equipped to serve equally well the peacetime function of casualty evacuation during civil disasters. The Iwo Jima can accommodate more than 300 cas.

from a battle or disaster area are delivered via deck-edge elevator to the hangar deck and via litter hoist to the casualty station from which they are rapidly proc-

ualties at once. Casualties air-lifted

essed to dressing station, operating room. X-ray room, ward, or the

compartment. The medical spaces include a well appointed laboratory, pharmacy, isolation ward, and diet pantry. Two dental operating rooms, associated X-ray rooms, and storerooms aft troop living

are available to attend dental needs.

The

operations department

and plan

assault operations.

helicopter direction center tion center lery

(SACC)

is

especially well equipped to control

The combat (HDC), and

information center (CIC),

supporting arms coordina-

are located adjacent to each other

deck forward, centrally located with respect

radio central, and troop and staff

offices.

255

The

on the

gal-

to bridge, flag plot,

ship

is

equipped with

a surface-search radar and air-search radar, with repeaters located in

HDC,

conn, flag plot, CIC, and secondary conn. This ship

programmed

to receive a closed circuit

information plotted in

CIC

TV

to the bridge

and

equipped with

ECM/ELINT

equipment.

The HDC ment during

manned by a

tactical air control

assault operations.

are facilitated

by remote

teletypewriter

(RATT)

UHF

The and

Homing The CIC is also

flag plot.

devices are installed for air navigation and control.

is

is

system to transmit the

squadron detach-

functions of helicopter control

FM

voice radio stations, radio

terminals, navigation aids, radar repeaters,

and status boards, and a dead reckoning (DRT). Internal communications including the 22 and 24 mc. pneumatic tubes, and sound power telephones link the HDC to the combat cargo control station, the SACC, the bridge, and other lighted display panels tracer

vital control stations.

HDC

The SACC is located adjacent (aft) of the and provides 14 remote voice radio and continuous wave communications stations to serve

an amphibious squadron commander and

Current battle information

is

displayed in a lighted

6'

his staff.

x 12' cabinet

Lighted status boards provide current references to the forces engaged, intelligence data, communications, containing

six sliding panels.

and the status of control and communications equipment. Internal communications link the SACC to radio central, flag bridge, troop operations oflBce, staff logistic and intelligence office, and primary flight control.

Communications equipment aboard the Iwo Jima includes GRC-10 This equipment provides FM, UHF/VHF, and HF capabilities for multichannel high command, tactical control, and aircraft communications. In addition the ship's communication facility provides high-frequency RATT, facsimile map and picture-recording equipment, and the newest cryptographic devices. The meteorological offices are uniquely located on the gallery deck aft. Balloon observations are made from a platform extension to the gallery deck astern of the ship just under the flight deck. The balloon inflation room is protected from weather by a large sliding hatch which provides direct access to the balloon launching platform. A recent ship alteration provided the Iwo Jima with a complete radiosonde installation making her a class RS weather ship. Propulsion machinery is similar to the famihar Mariner, some-

UHF.

256

The single shaft Iwo Jima ahead at over

times installed in attack cargo and transport hulls. transmits 22,000 horsepower and drives the

20 knots. There are two

interior

communications rooms. One forward

contains the gyro, an electromagnetic log, ship's service telephone

switchboard, dead reckoning analyzer, a closed-circuit television

and the gunfire control target designation equipment. The IC room encloses the auxiliary gyro compass, fire alarm and magazine sprinkling controls, and the security alarm control and control,

after

transmitter system.

The Iwo Jimas

"limited" self-defense capability

is

vested in her

twinmounted, 3-inch, 50-caliber guns. Two mounts are located, in tandem, forward of the island structure on the flight deck, and one mount is located on each stern quarter at the 02 level. Each mount is served by an ammunition hoist and handling room. The ship has ample stowage for more than 35,000 line items in the allowance for her class— there are more than 90 storerooms, issue rooms, and lockers. The hotel-sized galley has already proven its worth to crew morale and efficiency. The Iwo Jima was recently selected to represent the amphibious force of the Pacific Fleet in the annual Ney award competition. The Iwo Jimas galleys feed more than 330 enhsted men, 40 chief petty officers, 126 officers, and 24 staff officers in one sitting. The bake shop and ice cream plant have already demonstrated a remarkable capacity for serving the "gedunks" so essential to crew well-being. Fueling at sea is accomplished from four stations (two port and four,

two starboard) using span-wire or close-in rigs. The ship is fitted with seven replenishment-at-sea stations, four port and three starboard. However, transfers are normally

made from

the starboard

side.

The Iwo Jimas hull dimensions are: Length, overall 592 feet; beam, extreme 105 feet; displacement (full load), 18,000 tons; draft, 26 feet 6 inches.

257

"Air superiority for the fleet is an absolute necessity. As the seagoing portion of our nations striking force, a fleet with air superiority is an extremely powerful deterrent to all-out war and a highly efficient instrument to employ in limited wars." Although made only recently, the above statement has been an .

.

axiom ever since the airplane introduced a new dimension

.

to naval

warfare.

AEW

Because of its truth, the mission has assumed an increasingly important role in the pei'formance of the overall mission of U.S.

Navy fleet units

"to maintain control of the seas

force on watch at

home and

and serve as a ready

overseas, capable of strong action to

preserve the peace, or of instant offensive action to win in war."

AEW— Airborne Early Warning HAROLD ANDREWS The

beginnings of

AEW

can be traced back to seeds planted in

the Thirties which took root in

World War

II.

Naval warfare developed around completely new concepts during World War II, largely because of developments in electronics and aviation. Prior to this time, fleet units operated largely on visual contact. In fact, the longest view in the U.S. Navy came from the crow's nest, and the fastest communications were through the use of visual aids such as the blinker light or semaphore flag. These two systems, as well as radio communications, were cumbersome and placed a limit on the tactical effectiveness of the fleet in combat. The advent of radar and improved tactical communications in World War II made possible naval battles in which opposing fleet surface forces never even saw each other except by means of radar. U.S. Navy interest in radar began with efforts of the Naval Research Laboratory to develop radar for fleet use in the midThirties. When the U.S. entered World War II, radar had been installed on the Navy's capital ships. The major hmitation of this 258

radar— one that

still

low-flying aircraft

today— was

exists

inability to "see" ships or

its

beyond the horizon. Microwave energy emitted is Hmited to "line of sight" in the detection

from radar antennas of targets.

Airborne radar, with a limited capability by today's standards, also employed by patrol aircraft when the Navy entered the

was

war. In addition to the "state of the art," there were limitations inherent in the weight restrictions imposed upon the new radar

equipment. Radar was another piece of hardware on already heavily laden aircraft. Its weight was traded off with an equal number of pounds of fuel or weapons. Tactically but not technically, the "best" radar was very often the lightest. Aerodynamic problems and technical facts of

life

gave airborne radar a somewhat limited

effectiveness.

As the war progressed, operational uses of radar were developed and the capabilities of the radar itself were greatly improved. From experience with shipboard radar and improved communications came the Navy's combat information center, where the collection and display of the total tactical picture gave the commanding officer control over a tactical situation which had not been possible during the early stages of the war. for use in the great Pacific naval battle The push to develop

AEW

was completed by V-J Day— too late toward victory, but significant enough

substantially contribute

to to

become

a factor in naval

tactics for all time.

Technological improvement of attack aircraft, particularly in

terms of speed and altitude, and the possibility of attack of

by long-range

units

missiles,

demanded a

better

cope with the excellent altitude capabilities of the finding radar was needed in this system.

A

fleet

AEW capability. jet,

To

a height-

carrier-based aircraft

that could carry an antenna equal in size to the large land-based

AEW aircraft was also required. With the improvements

in radar, a carrier-based, airborne

CIC

appeared feasible— provided that a new aircraft capable of carrying this equipment, ample fuel, and the CIC crew could be

finally

built.

The modification the

first

of the

Grumman S2F Tracker for

AEW produced

carrier-based aircraft with accommodations

radome on top

of the fuselage rather than

259

to

carry a

under the fuselage,

as

The new

had been the case with previous

aircraft.

a huge, teardrop-shaped radome,

and was called the WF-2 Tracer.

became the Navy's

It

first

aircraft carried

carrier task force aircraft

with airborne

CIC. Operational experience and continued development of the units

which received the

AEW information

had highlighted

CIC

certain

basic limitations. Reporting ships and aircraft flooded the radio

networks with verbal reports exceeding the network's capabilities. Status keeping of displays was entirely manual and reported attacking elements were sometimes misplaced or forgotten in the rush of

Manual tracking and voice control of interceptor aircraft number of situations one operator or CIC officer could control. The result was that in many instances the task force commander received information too late, or too infrequently, to

battle.

severely limited the

maintain an up-to-the-minute presentation of the tactical situation.

To

increase tactical effectiveness, the concept of the naval tactical

(NTDS) was developed. With the requirement established for an

data system

aircraft to provide the

airborne inputs to the tactical data system, the

Navy held an inW2F-1

dustry-wide competition to select a design. Designated the

Hawkeye, the new aircraft and its airborne tactical data system (ATDS) became part of a total information system designed to present an entire tactical situation to the commander. The W2F- 1/1 ATDS plays a key role in this complex. As an Airborne Early Warning Picket it can extend the radar coverage of the task force many miles. Radar signals are processed by digital computers which perform a number of important functions. Targets are automatically detected, thus decreasing the possibility of

human

error. Height information is obtained and presented to the operator on demand. If the target is transmitting proper identification signals, it is automatically displayed as a friend. The use of symbols for

raw video "blip" enables the operator to what the various targets are. By means of a highfrequency data link, information on all targets and interceptor targets instead of just the tell at

a glance

position

is

constantly relayed to the task force

command

ship as

In return, reports from other and displayed in the W2F-1. All air targets are continuously tracked by the computer. If a target is not identified as a friend, the computer examines the status of all available well as other participating units. stations are received

260

which is best suited to make an intercept (by virtue of fuel and armament status) and sends appropriate command signals by a separate data link to place the interceptor aircraft, selects the one

selected interceptor in position for an attack.

Aircraft Carriers

and Astronauts

Gordon Cooper, a NASA astronaut, and his Mercury space capsule Faith 7, were hoisted aboard the carrier Air Force Maj. L.

Kearsarge after completing 22 earth orbits on

May

16, 1963.

70 miles southeast of Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean, was part of a force of 28 ships, 172 aircraft, and 19,000 people assigned in direct operational support of the

The Kearsarge, on

station

MA-9 mission by the Department The Kearsarge six orbits in

of Defense.

also recovered Cdr.

Walter Schirra,

Jr.,

after his

the Mercury space capsule Sigma 7 in October 1962.

While spaceborne

around the earth, Cdr. Schirra executed all missions assigned by the Mercury program. When it was over, his capsule lifted to an elevator on the Kearsarge, the astronaut calmly asked "permission to come aboard"— as if he were completing a normal carrier flight recovery mission. Schirra's vehicle landed in the ocean some 275 miles northeast of Midway Island. He was taken aboard the U.S.S. Kearsarge 46 minutes later. for

the six flights

261

The Soviet Union, since World War 11, has constructed a strong, modern navy with an emphasis on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Of grave concern to the free world is the Soviet strength in modern submarines, a fact which they acclaim almost as loudly as their missile successes.

would be surprising to many students of naval strategy if the do not have a missile-submarine combination, such as our Polaris, with which they could tailor their strategy to include the use of this weapon against the North American continent. For this reason alone, the Navy has had to devise a strategy to It

Soviets

defeat the submarine. Basically, this strategy

the it

enemy submarine

in

it

puts to sea until

returns home.

They a hard fact doesn't want to be It's

a necessary,

is

designed to keep

is

danger from the moment

if

Stalk the Big Fish

you want to identify a submarine that identified, you must force it to the surface. This

that

if

touchy, business

in

the

international

Pacific

where some 100 Soviet and 20 Red Chinese subs operate freely. To keep the sea lanes open, you have to know where the undersea craft are and where they're going. You've got to be sure. And you've got to be sharp, "You have to project your thinking like a submariner to beat him," said Rear Adm. Henry "Hank" Miller, waters,

commander

of Carrier Division 15, a hunter-killer, or

assigned to this antisubmarine job.

From

Bennington, Miller directs a fantastic complex of

embodying

virtually every kind of

HUK,

group

his flagship, the U.S.S.

men and

machines,

equipment and weapon available he

to the service. "You're dealing in three dimensions all the time,"

added, "planes, surface ships, and submarines against submarines. It's

the most complicated type of warfare in the Navy."

To sharpen

HUK groups, the

Navy

pits its

own

in exercises that simulate the actual combat.

except the

final

subs against them

Nothing

is

spared

destruction of one or the other.

The Bennington group was geared 262

for just such

an exercise early

this

year as

it

approached Japan, bound for duty with the Seventh crew had been on the go for

Fleet. Alert for submarines, the

days, 12 hours on, 12

as they searched for their big fish.

off,

The

wing S2F Trackers and AD-5W Guppies fanned out, radomes combing the rough seas for a clue to a target, while HSS-1 helicopters covered other areas. Radar, sonar, and other special instruments aboard the carrier listened intently for the telltale signs of an approaching vessel, either on or beneath the carrier's fixed

their

surface— their operators

numbed by

the constant grind.

On

the eight

accompanying destroyers, other operators waited and watched. "Every time we leave port it's round the clock duty," Adm. Miller said, obsessed with the mission for which he was charged. As a member of his staff commented, "The admiral wants a sub so bad he can taste it." And then it came. A terse radio message advised the ships that one of the S2F Trackers had made a contact. "Mother Hen," the pilot called the ship, "this is Alpha One. Spook bearing three four zero, 14 miles from me. Investigating." 'This is Mother Hen," Bennington's combat information center (CIC) replied, suddenly alive with the expectancy of a chase that had been so long in coming. "Continue to investigate your contact." Cdr. Donald Fledderjohn plotted the position on the chart in front of him and checked his instruments. It was too early yet to tell whether the contact was a sub; the CIC officer knew that a brief radar contact can mean anything— weather disturbances, electronic signals, or even whales. You get a whale going along at 5 or 10 knots and it's hard to tell the difference. The commander recalled that a carrier and its planes once tracked a whale in the Atlantic for two days before realizing what it was. "Before we developed ASCAC," Fledderjohn said, "we spent millions on whales." ASCAC stands for antisubmarine classification analysis center, whose advanced techniques and instruments are themselves highly

The S2F

classified.

pilot called again.

miles,"

he reported, having

aircraft

had picked up

"My

spook became a sinker at eight with the object. No other

lost contact

signals.

The commander faced a problem. Should he stand by and await developments, or should other search aircraft be sent into the area?

He

informed the admiral's

staff.

263

A tact.

helicopter

was now over the point of an S2F's

"Stand by to mark on top,"

pilot instructed

its

last

radar con-

CIC. "Mark on

top."

The

dropped a smoke

on the water and began a felt would localize the sub, if it turned out to be a sub. "Investigating with Maypole," he advised the ship. The Maypole, or Sonobuoy, floats on the surface and radiates sound waves down into the ocean. If the waves strike something hard such as a submarine, they bounce back to the buoy. The direction and time of response are translated into an underwater fix, and a moving submarine thus can be tracked in three dimensions beneath the surface. Cdr. Fledderjohn plotted the smoke light position on his chart, the first known position and reference point from which to search. Another call from the copter. "Contact one zero and one two. pilot

light

meticulous search of the area, flying a pattern he

Classified as possible submarine."

Adm.

Miller

was

to the contact area.

alerted,

and Fledderjohn vectored another S2F miles away from

The Bennington was now 15

the quarry. It

was time

away from

and Miller veered

to shoot the works,

group

his task

the contact so that the ships wouldn't run into the U-boat

waters. Then, sending another helicopter to join in localizing the sub, the admiral also ordered the

two destroyers nearest the con-

break formation and join the chase. It was a case of the hunter and the hunted, each with his own tricks and maneuvers, each playing by his own rules. tact area to

The new S2F two

arrived at the contact area, followed soon

destroyers, their

bows

by the

rising high in the water, pausing, then

down into the heaving seas The senior commander of the

waves gushed over

splashing

until

decks.

destroyers assumed

of the circular contact area, the size of

distance a submarine can travel from

which its

is

last

their

command

determined by the

known

point, this

distance forming the radius of the circle.

The

destroyers circled at the

maximum

holding range and

the aircraft press the attack. It was a time such as

this, as

let

Adm.

Miller said, when "you've got to project your thinking like a submariner to beat him. You have to think in this business. They're a smart bunch of kids in our submarine service." Your ships can feint as another

moves

in for the kill or they

264

can stop cold in the

water the way a sub does— just play dead and let your opponent worry. "You're either ready or you're not worth a damn," according to Miller.

His boys were ready. Pressing in for the kill, one of the planes dropped a practice depth charge close to the sub. The resulting explosion, heard by the undersea commander, signaled the end of the game, and the sub rose to the surface. The HUK group had won the game— this time. But there would be other days and other submarines, both friendly and not so friendly, which would continue to test their skill. In either event, the Bennington hunter-killers would be after another trophy, a photo of a sub it brought to the surface. That's all it can have in a cold war.

265

Block

some 85,000,000 square miles

off

tain that the 2,000 ships likely to in essence,

is

commander

of ocean, then make cerit are safe. That,

be traveling across

the assignment handed to Vice

Adm. John

S.

Thach,

of all antisubmarine forces in the Pacific.

"ASW is the common denominator for all wars," said Thach, whose commander covers the activities of 100 combat ships, more than 40 submarines, and 100,000 personnel. America and its allies must keep their supply lines open, he added, if the land, sea, and air forces are to operate. "We act as agents in coordinating with other nations in control of shipping, which we look upon as a part of ASW." All facets of the Navy are necessary for ASW, he said. "We look at ASW as a tri-dimensional team because no one vehicle can do the job alone. Each of their weaknesses and strengths is different." He cited the submarine as an example of knowing only what it can hear, while aircraft and surface vessels can see but have other shortrole as a type

500

aircraft,

comings.

two men in a dark room with gravel on the floor," he said, an analogy of the undersea craft, whose engines give them away. "They're waiting with guns to kill each other. But who's going to take "Picture

in

the

first

step?"

Despite the team

effort,

Thach maintains the

U.S.

still

has a long

go in ASW, particularly since "the Russians have the largest submarine fleet in world history, including nuclear subs in the Pacific. Noting that "we are fighting today's targets with yesterday's equipment," he called on science and industry to come forth with improvements in the field.

way

to

Sea Power's Growing Force-

Naval Aviation RICHARD

D.

BACH

On a steel

flight deck, 70 feet above the waves of the China Sea, a lever is pressed, a wisp of steam flares along a catapult track,

and an

A4D Skyhawk

lifts

on

its

a sulking sky.

266

miniature delta wing to patrol

A hundred

miles south of Havana, another lever, another flare

and a twin-engine S2F Tracker, packed with electronic is suddenly airborne. North of Tripoli, in the Mediterranean Sea, the lever, the steam, and a single A3J Vigilante is a dwindling speck low on the horizon, oflF for nuclear weapons delivery practice. From the hard white runways of NAS Olathe, Kansas, a pair of FJ-4 Furys, retired from active duty, lift under the gloves of Naval of steam

antisubmarine warfare equipment

Air Reserve pilots.

Nine hundred miles west of Hawaii, a pair of F8U-2N Crusaders hook up to refuel at a GV-1 Hercules tanker. All these go to make naval aviation, and together they make one of the most powerful forces in the world today. And the force is growing. The launching of the Enterprise, the newest carrier of the fleet, has been followed by the reconditioning of the Essex, the oldest one, and the announcement of still more aircraft carriers to come. The changes that have gone to make naval aviation today are well reflected in its airplanes. Once weapons only for fleet air superiority and close air support missions, today nearly every aircraft that flies from a carrier deck can deliver nuclear weapons.

Even the venerable propeller-driven AD Skyraider is fitted to toss an atomic bomb. This square-cut workhorse is still an active airplane on carrier decks, and her importance has even increased with the emphasis today on combating limited wars over diflicult terrain.

The

AD

can hold aloft for hours, working the target over at low

speeds between missions of the fuel-hungry hunter-killer teams

roam

far

from

jet

fighters.

AD-5

their carriers, the lead airplane

wingman standing by with enough armament to sink them. The S2F Tracker and WF-2 Tracer are both antisubmarine patrol airplanes, and illustrate the emphasis that is being put on searching electronically for submarines, the

eliminating the enemy submarine from the scene. Both operate from carrier decks as well as from shore bases, both carry sonobuoys and depth charges to mark and dispatch their quarry. The F8U Ci-usader is primarily an air superiority weapon, mount-

Once the fastest airplane in now paced by the A3J Vigilante and the

ing four Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

the Navy, the Crusader

Mach

2.5

is

F4H Phantom

interceptor for the

H, but

fleet.

267

still

remains as the front-line

The record-holding Phantom

II

is

one of the most

planes in the Navy's air arm. As an interceptor,

versatile air-

Sparrow III and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, can climb to 98,500 feet in 6.2 minutes. As a strategic weapons system, the awkward-looking airplane can carry several different types of nuclear weapons and the speed to walk away from enemy interceptors. It holds the world's speed record for jet aircraft at 1,606 miles per hour. As a convenit

carries

tional fighter-bomber, the Phantom II can carry an incredible load and variety of external stores; nearly any type of bomb conceivable, napalm tanks, a wide variety of rockets, and the Bullpup missile.

The A3J from

Vigilante

is

an all-weather attack bomber that operates

carrier decks. It holds the world's altitude record for a 1,000

kilogram load: 91,450 feet. Equipped with an inertial guidance navigation system, the airplane is capable of knowing its position

on the earth even better than the ship that carries it, and has made necessary to modify its carriers to take an equally good inertial

it

navigation system.

The A3D Skywarrior on

carrier decks as

A

is

the forerunner of the Vigilante,

an attack bomber and

contemporary of the

A3D

is

the

still

active

as a photo-recon airplane.

A4D Skyhawk

fighter,

an

moment the increasing complexity of The Skyhawk is a "pilot's airplane"; light, maneuverable, unencumbered by electronic equipment or even an engine afterburner. The Bullpup-toting little "hot rod" is still very active airplane that reversed for a

Navy

aircraft.

on the scene, filling the gap between the F9F Cougarjets and the high-Mach giants that followed it.

The Navy's

mission, today as

To

much

strategic as tactical, calls for

end most combat airplanes are fitted for inflight refueling, either from buddy-tankers, fighter airplanes fitted with a refueling supply system, or from the GV-1 long legs for

its

airplanes.

this

Hercules shore-based aerial tanker. The GV-1 has the capability of

one time, and supported the recent Operation Pine Needle, when 18 F8U's crossed 7,000 miles of Pacific

refueling

two airplanes

at

Ocean in 17 flying hours. The new A2F Intruder is another versatile

A2F

airplane.

With

variable-

can carry a selection of external stores as wide as the F4H's, and though not so fast an airplane as the Phantom II, it can make attacks at speed down to 80 knots, allowing it to work in very limited airspace. deflection jet exhaust, the

268

The P3V is a military version of the turboprop Electra airHne transport, and is replacing the P2V Neptune on antisubmarine patrol. The Navy HSS-2 holds the world's helicopter speed record 210 miles per hour, and is one of several new turbine-powered coming on to active duty on shore and with the fleet. The hst can go on, tlirough trainers and transports and patrol airplanes and fighters more. But the fact that the list is a long one

at

helicopters

only serves the more to show the versatility of today's Navy air arm. Once a weapon to defend the fleet and to support the amphibious

Naval aviation

troops.

well into the heart of aircraft carrier,

and

is

now

enemy

that, too,

a strategic force, one that can stiike territory. Its base, of course,

many

has undergone

is

the

changes since

Korea.

been the adoption of the canted deck, allowing the launch of aircraft at the same time as the recovery of others. Gone is the need for barriers and "Tilley" to stand between landing airplanes and the crowd of aircraft

Most noticeable change

secured forward; it

merely

flies

if

in the carrier has

a landing airplane misses

its

arresting cables,

around to try again.

The mirror landing system, or "meatball," on today's carriers. The meatball gives the

another newcomer

is

pilot a simple visual

reference as to his position on the glide path, and has reduced the

LSO

to

become an

The atomic

interested spectator of landings.

carrier Enterprise, currently the largest ship in the

another reflection of modern naval aviation. The Big E carries seven squadrons of tactical aircraft, yet was built without a fleet,

is

gun or

seeming oversight is accounted for by the very fact of the Enterprise's airplanes which serve as one line of defense against enemy air. Another line is the armada of ships that sail with the Enterprise. Since they need single

missile for self-protection. This

not use every available cubic inch for airplane and fuel storage, they carry the surface-to-air missiles for cover from attacking air-

weapons of their own. ready to handle a bigger mission than it has had in the past; it can deal with nuclear and conventional warfare from its fast-moving airfields. In limited war threats, the the time has passed when, in the words of President Kennedy, ". craft as well as antisubmarine

This modern

Navy

is

.

.

choice was abject retreat or devastating reprisal."

Able

to

be recalled or diverted in 269

flight to

an alternate

target,

able to bring back information of attack, the

man and

enemy

capability

his airplane will play

and

results of

an important part

in

strategic naval aviation through the foreseeable future.

But though the best reflection of today's Navy is seen in its aircraft and its carriers, the power behind them lies with the men who fly the airplanes and maintain them. A fully-loaded F4H standing full throttle and ready at the catapult would merely roll over and splash into the sea vdthout a pilot, and it would never get as far as the catapult were it not for mechanics on the hangar decks. In this respect naval aviation today is the same as it has always been. It is men who know their job and who strive to do it well. Air Force pilots admit admiration for the man who will ride a catapult into the last rays of the sun, fly out and navigate back to a postagestamp carrier, then make a low-speed, high-power approach to four arresting wires in the dark. Night carrier landings in

are

work

for professional pilots only. It

is

about these

modem men

aircraft

that

R. B. Pirie, former deputy chief, Naval Air Operations, spoke

he

said, "In this mission,

man— not

unflinchingly at the breech.

science and missiles— must stand must be careful that we don't kill in important areas due to our over-

We

and initiative concentration on missiles." The Skyhawk over the China

personnel

spirit

Adm. when

Sea.

The Tracker over the Caribbean. The Vigilante over the Mediterranean. The Fury. The Hercules. The radar pickets and the recordbreakers. The pilots in the cockpits, the mechanics and deck handlers on the carriers. This equipment, these men, are naval aviation today.

270

PART FIVE

THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Introduction The aircraft carrier

has, once again, reached a point

fluential critics are locked in

where

in-

debate with flattop advocates as to

the merits of seaborne air power. Although the current situation

seems to lack the emotionalism that marked and marred previous debates, it also appears to be devoid of historical appreciation of carrier capabilities

Since

man

first

by opponents. took up a club against

his neighbor, to settle a

disagreement, succeeding generations of military and naval leaders

have studied, learned, and practiced the maxims of conflict. They have applied the battles and wars of history to their own immediate situation, actual combat or war games, while theorizing about future conflicts.

They have learned

lessons

from the world's history of innumer-

able, frequent conflicts in order to prepare their nation for the

that

war

may or will come.

In the past, the ranks of those attempting to peer into the crystal have been filled by two species of man: the ob-

ball of the future

jective, analytic, well-trained

person

who

has been gifted with the

while glancing back; and his antagonist. The throughout history, has been one of two major types: the well-meaning but unknowing man or the man whose vision is made fuzzy by a subjective approach to the future. ability to look ahead, latter,

The

future must be prepared for in

all

facets of

life,

including

war. Knowledge and dedication are necessary to preparation.

271

Does the politics?

aircraft carrier

Can

the case, will

it

have a role in future international power if such be

contribute to maintaining world peace or,

its

high cost be

justified in the

event of

war— nuclear

holocaust or brush-fire variety?

The answer to each must be "yes." Here, from the prolific pen of a dedicated American, a professional student of world affairs, and, formerly, the nations Number

One

Sailor, are the

words that back up that

Carrier Air

"yes."

Can Do Both Jobs

ADM, ARLEIGH A. BURKE, USN, FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Naval carrier aircraft

will be a major factor in the defense of the United States for the foreseeable future. Events of the last few years have demonstrated the soundness of thesis on which the United States has built up its naval air power.

Perhaps the picture would come clearer if we remember that the purpose of war is to control people and territory rather than to make devastation and ruin. As a result weapons, tactics, and

equipment are used

to obtain the

needed

control.

Under some

weapons is do the job. Carrier air can handle both the big and the small job. In meeting day-to-day situations such as those in Jordan, Lebanon and, earlier, in Thailand, Suez, and Vietnam, it was possible to produce terrific power with but a couple of carriers. Aircraft could be put where they were needed and held there under the control of the United States. It was not necessary to ask permission of any foreign power nor to accept the conditions which might have been imposed on the use of aircraft from land bases. These situations estabhshed, in my opinion, the absolute need for manned aircraft equipped with conventional weapons and with a essential, while in other cases,

conditions, use of big lesser

weapons

will

272

nuclear capability.

The knowledge

of the pilot

is

also essential to

handle the day-to-day situations which are becoming almost a way of life. While sometime in the future there may be a substitute for

manned aircraft, that day any event, information that can be called back or crew puts commanders in a position to deal with

the reconnaissance capability of the hasn't arrived. In

by a pilot emergency situations quickly. Not even a Polaris-equipped submarine can be a

substitute for

carrier air. Its value exists solely in the event of a

major war.

constitutes

no cure

It

for uncertain situations nor for the protection

of merchant ships at sea.

by its versatility provides one kind of balance. It gives us, at the same time, the power needed to handle limited war and it will pack a tremendous wallop in the event of a big war. Carrier air

273

The concept of using a submarine as a base for airplanes is not wholly new. However, in the past this combination has been limited in scope to the use of one miniaturized aircraft that was outmoded years before

it

was designed.

In this interesting approach to the subject, the author envisions a submersible carrier capable of carrying at least twenty strike craft of the STOL {short takeof and landing) type.

air-

It is yet another approach to the wedding of Air to Sea, and is included here as a concept of logical imagination that could be one answer to carrier critics who claim the mobile airfield afloat is

a sitting-duck target.

The Submarine -Aircraft C.

C.

Carrier

ABT

A SUBSTANTIAL delivery capability for both

conventional and nuclear

war operations will require manned aircraft and drones show no prospect of having the necessary target detection and identification capabilities. Where are the free world's limited war forces, and in particular explosives in limited

for the foreseeable future. Missiles

its

tactical air forces to

be based? There

is

a definite trend of inAmerican air bases

creasing pohtical agitation against maintaining

on foreign soil. The west is fortunate, however, in its possession of a substantial number of mobile air bases of massive military capability. These are the aircraft carriers, together with their protective screening forces. Unfortunately, the aircraft carrier is becoming increasingly vulnerable to submarine-launched, air-launched, and even landlaunched ballistic missile attack, while its vulnerability to con-

ventional submarine-launched torpedo attack has been

by no means

ehminated by improvements in the antisubmarine art. One has only to consider the problems of successfully defending a carrier task force operating in the eastern Mediterranean giving air support 274

to limited

war operations

in the

Middle East

to obtain

an ap-

Under some alternate means of supplying the necessary air surveillance and discriminating firepower must be found. The submarine appears to o£Fer the only hope of substantially decreasing the vulnerability of limited war strike forces. Unfortupreciation of the magnitude of the carrier's vulnerability.

these circumstances,

nately, missile-firing submarines of the Polaris type, although pos-

sessing great firepower,

do not possess the right kind

for limited

A

submarine capable of launching smaller, shorter-range tactiweapons is no solution, since most limited engagements will probably have to be fought with high-explosive ammunition. Although the submarine could store and launch small high-explosive rockets, it would not, by itself, have the target detecwar.

cal nuclear

and identification capability required for the eflficient use of ammunition of such limited lethality. On the other hand, a submarine-aircraft team would appear to offer a nearly ideal military symbiosis. The submarine would supply the heavy firepower (both conventional and nuclear), while the aircraft would detect and identify tactical targets for the submarine, do artillery spotting, and bombardment and ground support missions requiring such rapid reaction time and target discrimination as to be beyond the capation

bility of the

submarine's relatively long-range tactical rockets.

The obvious question

to

base the reconnaissance and

tactical support aircraft part of the

submarine-aircraft team? If

is:

where

land bases are becoming increasing political carrier bases will

inevitable answer

own

liabilities,

and

aircraft

be increasingly vulnerable to enemy strikes, the is that the submarine must be the base for her

aircraft.

Let us

now

consider some of the interesting technical problems

of design involved in a submarine capable of launching her

own

and bombardment aircraft. We want a submarine that can rapidly launch not just one reconnaissance aircraft, tactical reconnaissance

as did the Japanese submarines of World War II, but a significant number of tactical aircraft having appreciable offensive bombardment capability. The type of aircraft that would probably be ideal

for this application

would be a

of the short-takeoff-and-landing

(

single-engine, turbo-prop aircraft

STOL

)

type, having high subsonic

speed at very low altitudes, a combat radius of about 1,000 miles with a full load of high-explosive bombs, and a combat radius of

275

perhaps 1,500 miles with two tactical nuclear weapons. The gross weight of such a combat tactical strike aircraft would be comparable to that of the current Polaris missile— some 30,000 pounds.

The

basic design requirements of the proposed submarine air-

craft carrier are that

it

be capable of rapidly launching and

covering some 20 tactical strike aircraft of the 30,000-pound type.

Although the

aircraft

may be

re-

STOL

rapidly launched in restricted

space by means of catapults, deck space must be

made

available

wheel landing recovery of the STOL aircraft. Some 200 to 400 feet of deck space in length should be sufiBcient for this, provided the submarine can maintain a speed of at least 20 knots on the surface. This speed appears quite feasible with the employment of a for

nuclear power plant.

In order to provide a short unobstructed runway for

STOL

re-

covery, the conning tower or "sail" of the submarine should be

eliminated or be retractable. Since a conning tower serves

many

probably be worthwhile to incur the complexity and expense of designing a small and retractable conning tower, somewhat along the hues of a very large periscope. During STOL aircraft recovery operations, this conning tower would be retracted flush with tlie landing deck. useful purposes,

A

it

problem basic

will

to all

submarine hull design

is

the maintenance

of the integrity of the hull against sea pressure at depth. This be-

comes a diflBcult problem if aircraft elevators, comparable to those employed in aircraft carriers, are used to place aircraft on deck for launching or to remove them from the deck in preparation for submerging.

It is

therefore desirable to

make

the aircraft elevator

only large enough to transfer aircraft with folded wings to the deck. Such an elevator could have small 12-foot

and

it

by 25-foot hatches,

should be possible to secure hatches of this size even at

substantial depths.

Both the storage of the STOL aircraft and the takeoff and landing platform on the submarine deck impose new requirements on the submarine hull's shape. While the ideal shape of a pressure vessel is hemispherical or cigar-shaped, such a shape would not present sufiBcient deck width for landing STOLS without the addition of cumbersome and high-drag superstructure. A plausible hull crosssection for the submarine aircraft carrier would be a flattened cigar shape with an 80-foot beam and a depth of approximately 40 feet. 276

maximum beam and depth

This compares with a

for the current class of Polaris submarines.

lined shape for eflBcient underwater cruising, a factor of safety for

STOL

of

some 30

To maintain a and

landing recovery,

feet

stream-

also to provide

it

is

desirable to

lengthen the hull from that of the current FBM boats of about 300 feet to approximately 500 feet. With its increased length, beam, and draft, the

submarine

aircraft carrier

would displace about 10,000

tons.

A

secondary, and perhaps eventually primary, mission for the

submarine aircraft carrier would be that of cargo carrier. The aircraft hangar space of the submarine would be about the size of the cargo space of a C-2 World War II Liberty ship, or a comparable tanker. Thus the submarine aircraft carrier could be utilized in peacetime for eJBBcient logistic support operations. Clandestine, relatively high-speed,

and

relatively invulnerable logistic support

with supplies, troops, or tanks could be undertaken in time of war. The current class of FBM nuclear submarines has been estimated

some 200 million dollars each, missiles. As nuclear power plants

in publicly available sources to cost

with its complement of 16 Polaris become more common, it seems

proposed submarine aircraft the current generation of strike aircraft. It does

while somewhat larger than nuclear submarines, would present

carrier,

FBM

a comparable cost even with

plausible to estimate that the

its

complement

of

some 20

tactical

not appear unreasonable to estimate that for

a cost of some 10 billion dollars amortized over a ten-year period, the United States could build up a fleet of about 100 submarine aircraft carriers.

Assuming an operational deployment

cent, such a force could supply a tactical air force of

of 50 per

some 1,000

95 per cent of the area of the world within less than a week. Furthermore, in its secondary function as logistic carrier, the submarine aircraft carrier fleet could, in an emegency, provide a substantial fraction of the logistic support requirements for our overseas deployment. Before such a major military development program is embarked upon, studies would have to be made of the probable vulnerability of such a submarine aircraft carrier to enemy countermeasures likely to be operational at the same time as the underwater submarine aircraft carrier is likely to be operational. If we assume a conservative initial operational capabihty of 1968 for the submarine aircraft strike aircraft in

277

carrier

and attached

STOL

aircraft,

we must

reckon

\vitli

global

reconnaissance and substantial advances in antisubmarine warfare. Even if certain vulnerabilities are discovered, however, the proposed submarine aircraft carrier may yield economics of peace-

satellite

time logistic operations justifying the concept by

278

itself.

Naval Aviation in the Years Ahead VICE ADM. FITZHUGH LEE, USN

Human nature has not changed much

We must

assume that we

may

throughout recorded history. not be able to wage peace with com-

and that power-hungry men and sysbe abroad on earth in 1973. As prudent men, we must make plans to deal with whatever may come. In short, in 1973 we must still be ready for war. To gain an idea of what form such a war might take, let us look at the situation today and then try to forecast probable changes during the coming decade. Let us try to predict what these changes portend for naval plete success in this decade

tems will

still

aviation.

The extraordinary development of naval aviation in our time makes us realize how difficult it was at the beginning of each decade to foretell what even the next few years might bring. Who, in 1943, would have dreamed that by the war's end 110 U.S. and Allied aircraft carriers would have taken part, and that, despite the gloomy views of those who called them "sitting ducks," only one would have been lost through land-based air attack? Who, in 1943, could have predicted that carriers would sustain lower loss rates in war than battleships, cruisers, destroyers, or submarines; that in the war in the Pacific several times more enemy aircraft would be destroyed per carrier-based aircraft than per shorebased plane, and that at war's end the Navy would have 40,000 aircraft and almost 50,000 naval aviators to man them? Now, who can tell what the next 10 years will add to world history: what kind of peace? What kind of war? What kind of aviation? The only thing we can be sure of is change— change, and the realization that some things change faster than others. We live in an uneasy world which is changing rapidly. It is a world divided in which two power galaxies are locked in struggle— 279

.

one trying aggressively

to enslave the w^orld, the other trying de-

fensively to preserve freedom

and

to extend

it

to all

mankind. Each

galaxy possesses the military power with which to destroy the other.

The

free world does not

want

to use this power.

The Communist

world fears to use it, lest at the same time it destroy itself. We call the Communist answer to this dilemma the "cold war." It is a total war, involving every technique of propaganda and action vdth each move designed to win control over both minds and bodies. In such a setting of world struggle, freedom's mihtary forces have a difficult role. Unquestionably, we must maintain an eflPective deterrent to a nuclear exchange; this costs a tremendous amount of money. At the same time, to cope with continuing cold and warm

war be

short of the nuclear exchange, freedom's military

flexible

and mobile.

It

must be able

to

power must

adapt to each situation the

aggressor poses with precise gradations of power, precisely applied at the right time. It

must be able

to

muster power quickly at any one

location or simultaneously at several scenes the

must be able to sustain tic cost be enormous.

The

this

power

indefinitely

enemy

selects. It

even though the

logis-

maintained by the threat of a counter-bHtz delivered by almost unbelievably powerful striking forces. These deterrent forces include a growing, atomic missile power, both landand sub-sea-based. These forces are supplemented by U.S. and British strategic bombers, by carrier-based strike planes, and by landbased fighter bombers of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marines and our allies.

We

deterrent

is

hope that this massive and costly deterrent is sucEven if it is, the free world also must be able to cope with Communist military actions short of the atomic blitz. These actions we call "hmited war"—hmited in objectives, fimited by such considfervently

cessful.

and its location, and weapons used (no first use of atomic weapons ) The forces for such limited wars are, in current Pentagon vernacular, known as general purpose forces. Based on the open sea, naval forces can apply graduated power with the least friction in the oddest variety of situations. The landing in Lebanon and the quarantine of Cuba are good examples of such power application. erations as the size of the theater of conflict

limited

by the type

of

Our naval general purpose gories:

forces fall into five principal cate-

carrier striking forces, Polaris striking forces,

280

amphibious

forces,

antisubmarine forces, and logistic forces. Two characteristics all of these forces can contribute to our success

are significant. First, in

an atomic bhtz and/or

them except the

Polaris forces, the

tant role ranging is

little

changed

ahead

to its decisive aftermath. Second, in all of

manned

from the dominant

to the

to indicate that these

airplane plays an impor-

merely

two

significant.

There be

characteristics will

in the 1970's.

Manned

naval aircraft will be busier than ever in the 70's. There be large numbers of earth satellites in orbit, some belonging to the free world and some to the Communists, which will be able to perform reconnaissance missions over all the ocean areas of the will

war at sea has been marked by prodigious search efforts to find out what was where on the surface of the sea, and it has been marked also by countless hours of worry because one side did not know what the other side was doing in vast areas of blue waters. The reconnaissance satellite may reduce this knowledge radically, world. This

is

of signal import, for the long history of

whether its discoveries are friends, foes, or neutrals. Hence, it will be necessary to identify the targets announced by satellites and destroy them promptly if required. Obviously, the airplane— the manned 1970's airplane— is going to have a much busier but

it

will not tell

job than heretofore in the investigation of contacts reported lites

by

satel-

over the important ocean areas of the world.

In the decade ahead the Russians will develop a substantial

own. Freedom's side will have to make enorsuch a force, to ascertain its presence and movement, and to be able to counteract this part of any Russian bhtz. The need for an improved ASW capability is apparent. Naval aircraft clearly will continue to provide a vital contribution to such Polaris force of their

mous

efforts to contain

a capability.

The need dent also as

for increased attention to

we

include a large

ASW

will

become more

evi-

exchange

may

realize that the survivors of a nuclear

number

mencement. They

of Russian submarines, at sea before

will survive the counter-blitz

and

strangle our operations at sea in the decisive phases of the follow. Again, naval aircraft

would be important

its

com-

will seek to

war which

to the blocking of

this sort of strangle hold.

The growing pains

of a multitude of new, underdeveloped nations

will cause local conflicts in

many

areas of the world,

281

and provide

advantageous locales for Communist attempts to increase the area Communist control. Freedom's job will be to thwart such ven-

of

tures.

The skyrocketing

costs of military forces will dictate that increased

emphasis be placed on those forces which are most economical because they are versatile. The economical forces will be those which can contribute to the deterrent, which can survive the first blitz in order to contribute to the counter-blitz and which can also serve with distinction in the various forms of limited war. Certainly the impor-

tance of naval air forces will loom large in any such assessment.

In the 1970's our weapons systems, including our naval aviation systems, will be even

unhappy thought, the

man on the if it

is

of today. This

is

an

today's millstone. Significantly

ground, under the sea, and in

obsolete; he will be

warfare,

more complex than those

for complexity

tlie air will

more important than ever

not become

before. Push-button

comes, will place tremendous responsibilities on

men

to make the machines work when the buttons are pushed and great emphasis on the training of the minds of those men whose fingers must push the right buttons at the right time.

Command warfare. In

manned

of the air will continue to be a requisite for successful

some

situations, this

aircraft, so that

command

can be attained only by common sense can

thought, judgment and

be brought to bear on the problem. The nation that fails to appreciate the unique advantages and potential of manned aircraft, particularly in ASW, and that neglects them in favor of missiles will deny herself a highly versatile capability. Mindful of all these things, American naval strategists have been going forward with plans for the Navy of the 1970's. Approved plans of our government, projected ahead as far as 1968, contemplate construction of new carriers with a life-span of at least 20 years. Barring major breakthroughs now unforeseeable, it seems probable that the aircraft carrier will with manned aircraft be plying the seas in the 21st century. All of our

aging Essex

class.

We

ASW hunter-killer (HUK) must

start

soon to lay

carriers are of the

down new

carriers de-

signed and built for hunter-killer operations.

Current emphasis on the rapid development of the short-takeoff( STOL ) airplane will undoubtedly lead to deployment of this type of plane aboard all types of carriers, including the amphibious assault ships, and many other ships as well. The STOL air.and-landing

282

plane, however, probably will not supplant the marvelous helicopter,

which can play a variety of roles in the ASW and amphibious operations of any future war. Emphasis on the use of helicopters will continue.

In 1973 the United States will continue to be a key

member

of a

world oceanic confederation. Communism will not have been vanquished, nor will it have been killed by its own debilities. The members of the free world confederation will be dependent more than ever on the seas and upon surface shipping for economic prosperity in peace and for mutual security in war. Control of the sea will remain dependent on controlling its surface as well as its depths and the skies above it. Control of the sea after a nuclear exchange will be particularly important; manned aircraft will play a major role in exerting such control. Our military capability for exerting free

control at sea aircraft,

own

must include sea-based weapons systems, including

not only to protect our

own

shipping, but also to defend

and friendly shores on both sides of the oceans, and power to other continents. Naval aviation has a growing potential, and the aircraft and the ships it uses surely will change in the decade ahead. All this will be true unless, as we all hope, man himself can change and build a our

coast

to allow us to project our military

lasting peace.

283

APPENDIX

AVIATION SHIPS

CARRIERS

/

(of past or present designations

CV, CVA, CVB, CVL, CVS)

Hull

Number Name 1

2 3

Date of Commissioning

March 20, 1922 December 14, 1927 November 16, 1927

Langley Lexington Saratoga

4 5

Ranger Yorktown

6

Enterprise

7 8 9

Wasp

June 4, 1934 September 30, 1937 May 12, 1938 April 25, 1940 October 20, 1941 December 31, 1942 April 15, 1943 August 16, 1943 November 29, 1943 January 31, 1944 May 8, 1944 October 9, 1944 February 17, 1943 May 25, 1943 November 24, 1943 April 15, 1944 August 6, 1944 April 16, 1945 January 14, 1943 January 25, 1943 March 31, 1943

Hornet Essex

10

Yorktown

11

Intrepid

12

Hornet

13

Franklin

14

Ticonderoga

15

Randolph

16

Lexington

17

Bunker

18

Wasp

19

Hancock

20 21 22 23 24

Bennington Boxer Independence

Hill

Princeton Belleau

Wood 284

Hull

Number Name

^

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 45

^47

/^^

48 49 59 60 61 62 65 66

Date of Commissioning

Cowpens

May 28,

Monterey Langley Cabot Bataan San Jacinto

June 17, 1943 August 31, 1943 July 24, 1943 November 17, 1943 December 15, 1943 November 26, 1944 April 11, 1946 March 2, 1946 March 25, 1950 January 28, 1945 November 26, 1945 September 15, 1944 June 3, 1945 December 8, 1945 September 10, 1945 October 27, 1945 October 1, 1947 November 3, 1946 May 11, 1946 July 14, 1946 February 9, 1947 October 1, 1955 April 14, 1956 August 10, 1957 January 10, 1959 September 24, 1960 Christened February

Bon Homme Richard Lei/^e

Kearsarge Oriskany Antietam Princeton

Shangri

La

Champlain Tarawa

La/ce

Midway Franklin D. Roosevelt

Cora? Sea Valley Forge Philippine Sea

Saipan Wfig/i# Forrestal

Saratoga

Ranger Independence Enterprise

America

1964

285

1943

1,

.

ESCORT CARRIERS (Former Designation

CVE)

Hull

Number Name 1

9 11

12

Date of Commissioning

Long Island Bogue Card Copahee

20

Core Nassau Altamaha Barnes

21

Block Island

23 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Breton Croatan

13 16 18

June 2, 1941 September 26, 1942 November 8, 1942 June 15, 1942 December 10, 1942 August 20, 1942 September 15, 1942 February 20, 1943 March 8, 1943 April 12, 1943 April 28, 1943 August 25, 1942 September 24, 1942 September 19, 1942 August 24, 1942 March 3, 1942 April 9, 1943 July 8, 1943 August 7, 1943 August 27, 1943 August 31, 1943 September 13, 1943 September 25, 1943 October 5, 1943 October 14, 1943 October 23, 1943 October 31, 1943

Sangamon Suwannee Chenango

* * *

*

Santee

Charger Prince William

Casablanca Liscome Bay Anzio {ex-Coral Sea) Corregidor Mission Bay

Guadalcanal Manila Bay

Natoma Bay St. Lo (ex-Midway) Tripoli

Wake

November November

Island

White Plains

7,

1943

15,

1943

Date commissioned as escort carriers after conversion from fleet oilers ( AO ) Hull nmnbers omitted may be accounted for as follows: 2-5 not used, 6-8, 10, 14-15, 17, 19, 22, 24, 32-54 transferred to United Kingdom; 121, 123 not commissioned, 124-139 construction canceled. *

286

Hull

Number Name 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Date of Commissioning

November November December December December December December

Solomons

Bay Kasaan Bay Fanshaw Bay Kitkun Bay Kalinin

Tulagi

Gambier Bay Nehenta Bay Hoggatt Bay Kadashan Bay Marcus Island

4, 9,

1943 1943

15,

Fefro^ Bat/

Budyerd Bay Saginaw Bay Sargent Bay Shamrock Bay

Bay

Bat/

Steamer Bay Cape Esperance Takanis Bay

April 15, 1944

T/ie^is Bat/

April 21, 1944

Makassar

April 27, 1944

Strait

May May May May May

Windham Bay Makin Island Lunga Point Bismarck Sea Salamaua Hollandia Kwajalein Admiralty Island

June June June June June June

Bougainville

101

Matanikau

102

A«w

1943

21, 1943

,

Ommaney Bay

Si^fco/i

27, 1943

28, 1943 January 3, 1944 January 11, 1944 January 18, 1944 January 26, 1944 February 3, 1944 February 11, 1944 February 18, 1944 February 25, 1944 March 2, 1944 March 9, 1944 March 15, 1944 March 21, 1944 March 28, 1944 April 4, 1944 April 9, 1944

Sat>o Island

Shipley

21, 1943

287

1944 1944 14, 1944 20, 1944 26, 1944 1, 1944 7, 1944 13, 1944 18, 1944 24, 1944 30, 1944 3,

9,

Hull

Number Name

Date of Commissioning

103

Roi

July

6,

104

Munda

July

8,

105

Commencement Bay

106

Block Island

November December

107

Gilbert Islands

February

108

Kula Gulf

May

109

March

May

19,

111

Cape Gloucester Salerno Bay Velh Gulf

April

9,

112

Siboney

May

14,

113

Puget Sound

110

114

Rendova

115 116

Bairoko

117

Saidor

118 119 120

Sicily

Point Cruz

122

Palau

Badoeng

1944 1944

12, 3,

27, 1944

1944 1945

30,

5,

1945

1945 1945 1945

1945 June 18, 1945 October 22, 1945 July 16, 1945 November 14, 1945 September 4, 1945 February 27, 1946 October 16, 1945 December 4, 1945 January 15, 1946

Strait

Mindoro

288

Index Twenty-fifth Infantry, 190

AB-2's, 30 ABC warfare, 234-36 AD-2 Skyraiders, 165

World War

Arnold, Gen. Henry H. ("Hap"), 116 Aroostook (transport), 16

AD-5's, 203

AEW,

258-61 AH-3's, 30, 31 Ailes, Rear Adm. John W., Ill, 250 Airborne Early Warning. See AEW.

Atlantic, Battle of the, 100-02 Atlantic Fleet, 226, 248

Atomic Energy Commission, 224 Ault, Cdr. Bill, 74, 75 Aurand, Cdr. Evan, 202 Australia, 49, 88

Aircraft carriers:

accomplishments

of,

II participation, 89, 90, 96,

97, 103, 129, 132, 133

7-9

Arctic expeditions, 160-62 astronauts and, 261 coal-burning, 93-95

Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, 19111939, 44-45

of, 140-43, 163-71 defense of Southeast Asia, 240-43

crew

B-24's,

148

3-4 fire drills on, 232-39 future of, 271, 279-83 large — use of, 136-38

B-29's, 132,

mirror landing system, 210-11 small — use of, 51-53 submarine, 274-78

Bandoeng

148 160 Bahama Islands, 251 Baker Island, 106

definition of,

Baffin Island,

,

training on,

193

Battleship Row, Pearl Harbor, 54 Beary, Rear Adm. Donald B., 150

42-48

warfare use of, 71-83, 84-87, 88-91, 92, 96-97, 98-99, 100-02, 103-05, 106-10, 111-12, 113, 114, 115-20, 121-27, 128, 129-35, 136-38, 14446, 147-56, 172-77, 178-86, 187-96 Aitape, 113 Akagi ( Japanese carrier ) 84, 85, 86, 87 Aleutian Islands, 45, 85 Amagi (Japanese carrier), 151 Anderson, Adm. George W., 249 Antietam (carrier), 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 222 Antisubmarine aviation, 97, 207, 266 Aoba (Japanese cruiser), 151 Apamama, 107, 109 Arizona (battleship), 194 ,

Army, U.S.:

Belleau

Wood

(carrier), 106, 107, 108

30 Bennington (carrier), 201, 206, 232, 234, 235, 262, 263, 264, 265 Bemer, Capt. Warren K., 94 Bikini Atoll, 13, 158 Birmingham (transport), 11, 28 Blick, Capt. R. E., 122 BMEWS, 247 Bogue (carrier), 100 Bon Homme Richard ( carrier ) 204 Bougainville, 90 Bowen, Rear Adm. H. G., Jr., 250 Boxer ( carrier ) 202 Boyington, Lt. Col. Gregory, 193 Brandt, Cdr. C. R., 185 Breck ( destroyer ) 36 Brett, Lt. Cdr. Jimmie, 75-76 Brown, Lt. H. J., 13 Brumby, Rear Adm. Frank, 38-39 Bullpup (missile), 208, 242, 243 Bulow, Lt. Otto von, 98 Bellinger, Lt. P. N. L.,

,

,

,

Air Force, 19, 97, 131 Far East Air Force, 133, 134 33rd Fighter Group, 97 cooperation with carrier operations, 52,

89

Strait (carrier),

Barnes (carrier), 109

,

289

Bungo Channel, 134 Bunker

Dater, Lt. Cdr. H. M., 51, 103 Dauntless ( dive bombers ) 77 Davidson, Lt. Cdr. James, 158 Davis, Fred H., 186 Davis, Cdr. T. D., 202 Davison, Rear Adm. R. E., 113 Davis Strait, 157 DD's, 121, 122, 127 DE's, 121, 122 Dennison, Adm. Robert L., 248, 249

119 Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 225 Byrd, Rear Adm. Richard E., 158

Cabot

Hill (carrier), 108,

(carrier),

119

California

(

destroyer ) 35

Campania

(

British

Camp

,

,

)

,

24

Lejeune, 251

Camranh Bay, 131 Canted deck, development 200

197-

Cape Henry, 11

Detroit ( cruiser ) 36, 37 Dew Line, 247 DH4-B (Army plane), 4

Card

Dien Bien Phu, 240

of the,

(carrier), 101

Carlson, Lt. H. C, 21 Carrier Division 15 (hunter-killer group),

262

,

Dixon, Lt. Cdr. Bob, 73, 74 Doenitz, Adm. Karl, 102 Doolittle,

Casablanca, 99

Casablanca (carrier), 100 Casablanca Conference, 160 Catapult, development of the, 28-32 Chambers, Capt. W. I., 29, 30 Charity ( biplane ) 69 Chaser (carrier), 102 Chenango (carrier), 97, 109 Chevalier, Lt. Cdr. Godfrey De C. Chev,

alier, 11 Chichi Jima, 132 Churchill, Winston, 69-70, 96

Adm. James

H., 58, 59, 60-62,

63, 65, 66, 67-68, 145 Doyle (destroyer), 187, 188

Duckworth, Cdr. H. S., 79, 160 Duncan, PhiHp C, 185 Eastern Solomons, Battle of the, 89 Ekstrom, Capt. C. E., 122 Elder, Lt. Cdr. R. M., 202 EUyson, Lt. T. G., 29, 30 Ellice Islands, 108 El Segundo, California, 44 Ely, Eugene, 28-29, 220

CINCLANT, 250 CINCPAC, 151, 154, 155

Emirau, 90

Clark Field, Manila, 130 Cleveland (carrier), 103, 104, 106, 107 Cole, Vice Adm. Carey, 38 COMFAIR HAWAII, 182 Congress, U.S., 4, 6, 9, 11 Conley, Lt. D. L., 13 Constellation (carrier), 232, 238, 239 Coontz, Adm. R. E., 12 Cooper, Maj. L. Gordon, 261 Copeland, Lt. Cdr. Robert W., 122 Coral Sea, 49, 71, 75, 84, 194 Battle of the, 71-83, 84 Coral Sea (carrier), 109, 202, 205, 206,

Eniwetok Atoll, 111, 147 Enterprise (carrier), 46, 47, 48, 51, 55, 56, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 112, 116,

240, 242

Corregidor (carrier), 109

Cowpens (carrier), 106, 107, 108 Cuban crisis ( 1962), 247-53 Currivan, Gene, 102 Curtis, Capt. William Oliver, 192 Curtiss, Glerm, 29 CV-2. See Lexington. CV-3. See Saratoga.

CV-6. See Enterprise. CV-7. See Wasp. CVB-41. See Midway.

Endacott, Cdr. Jack, 242, 243, 244

144-46 record of the, 145 Enterprise (CVA-65,

carrier),

224-28,

232 facts about, 229-31, 267, 269 Espiritu Santo, 107, 108

Essex (carrier), 25, 26, 27, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 184, 201, 202, 207, 237,

246 Eiuropean Theatre of Operations, 92 Ewa Air Force Base, 54, 55 Expedition Frostbite, 157, 160-62 F2H-3's, 203 F2H-4's, 203 F3D-2's, 203

F-4 Phantoms, 247

F4U

Corsairs,

222 F4U-4's, 174 F4U-5's, 174 F7F's, 174, 221

290

164, 165, 168, 173, 189,

:

Greater Buffalo ( passenger ship ) 94 See also Sable. Greber, Capt. C. F., 122

F7U-3's, 203 F-8 Crusaders, 247

,

F8F-1 Bearcats, 160 F9F's, 167, 222 F-80's,

Green

Fairlamb, Cdr. G. R., 94 Faith ( biplane ) 69 Faith 7 (space capsule), 261 ,

Fanshaw Bay

125

(carrier), 122,

Farragut ( destroyer ) 72 FD-1 Phantoms, 158 FH-1 Phantoms, 202 ,

Adm., 82 jets, 202 FJ-2's, 203 Fledderjohn, Cdr. Donald, 263, 264 Fleet Problems XIII, 43 XIV, 43 XV, 44, 45 XVI, 45 XVII, 45, 46 XIX, 46 » XX, 47 XXI, 47 See also Navy, U.S., and Aircraft FJ-1 Fury

H4-1 (catapult), 202 H-8 (catapult), 202 Halsey, Rear 56,

F.

J.,

58,

Adm. William 62-63,

car-

Virginia, 11

,

,

Hayward, Rear Adm. John Healy, Lt. Cdr. H. R., 80

,

Heinz,

Formosa, 129, 130, 131, 134, 194 Forrestal (carrier), 203, 213, 223, 233 Forrestal, Navy Secretary James, 145-46

110 Henderson Field, 90 Henley ( destroyer ) 73

FR-1

Hickam

122,

124,

,

158,

125,

Gaylor, Lt. Noel, 75 Gilbert Islands, 56, 106, 115, 145

Campaign, 106-10, 111 William C, 185 Gill, Lt. "Red," 77 Gorton, Lt. A. W., 13 Giles,

22

Hiryu (Japanese Hitachi, 150

carrier), 85, 86,

87

Hitler, Adolf, 96, 98 Hoel (destroyer), 124 Hokkaido, 148, 151, 152 Holladay, DarreU L., 186 HoUandia, 113 Honshu, 133, 148 Hope ( biplane ) 69 Hornet (carrier), 51, 58-68, 85, 86, 87, 89, 145, 201 Hoskins, Rear Adm. John M., 178 Houck, Cdr. D. W., 206 Hudson, R. A., 179 HUK groups, 262-65 ,

Humboldt Bay, 113

Great Britain:

development,

102

Air Force Base, 54 Hiroshima, 50, 151

126-27

aircraft carrier

252

Helldivers,

Galapagos Islands, 35, 36 Gallery, Capt. D. V., 114 (carrier),

W. C,

T.,

Hellcats, 110, 115

jets,

Gambier Bay

52,

Hawaii, 18, 45, 47, 55, 56, 85, 103 Hawkes, Cdr. WilUam M., 158

56, 72, 83, 85,

160 Franke, Mrs. Bertha M., 225 Franklin (carrier), 136-38, 139 Franklin D. Roosevelt (carrier), 202, 204, 205 Freckleton, Jerry D., 186 FU's, 15, 17

Jr.,

147-59,

Hancock (carrier), 203, 204 Haruna ( Japanese battleship ) 150

86,87 Flotilla 4 ( cruiser-destroyer ) 250 Flotilla 6 ( cruiser-destroyer 250 Focke-Wulf 200's, 102 )

F.,

145-46,

193

Hampton Roads,

riers.

Adm.

90

Battle of, 89 Guadalcanal (carrier), 114 Guadalupe Islands, 12 Giiantanamo Bay, 238, 251, 252 Gulf of Papua, 57

Fitch,

Fletcher, Rear

Island,

Greenland, 160 Grenfell, Vice Adm. E. G., 250 Griffin, Rear Adm. R. M., 109 Griffin, Lt. V. C, 11 Grimes, Lt. Cdr. James M., 45, 46, 47 Grumman Avengers, 100, 101, 125 Guadalcanal, 49, 70, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 145, 191

174

6, 7, 8, 9,

Hunter, Capt. R. N., 122 Huntington (convoy), 12, 31 Hyuga ( Japanese battleship ) 150 ,

291

1-170 (Japanese submarine), 56

Independence

103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 111, 216, 249, 251, 252 Intrepid (carrier), 112, 203, 204 Ise ( Japanese battleship ) 150 (carrier),

,

Lexington (carrier), 11, 18-20, 21, 25, 34, 35-36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56-57, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 204 (CV-16, carrier), 106, 107,

Lexington

108, 109, 116, 119, 120,

Iwo Jima, 48, 87, 129, 132, 145 Iwo Jima (carrier), 254-57

232

Leyte Gulf, 127, 128, 129, 130, 136, 147, 149 BattlQ of, 121, 123, 126, 136, 145 Lingayen Gulf, 130, 131 Liscome Bay (carrier), 109, 110 Long Island ( carrier ) 52, 90 Lower California, 12 Luzon, 129, 130, 131, 136 Lundin, Maj. WilHam M., 196 Lyon, Lt. R. D., 13

Jackson, Cdr. H. J., 203 James E. Kyes (destroyer), 187, 188 Japan, 49, 55, 56, 57, 111, 132 Jean Bart ( French battleship), 99 Johnson, Capt. D. P., 122 Johnson, Capt. W. D., Jr., 122 Johnston (destroyer), 122, 124 Jomard Passage, 72

,

Junkers 88's, 102

McAfee, Lt. Cdr. Mildred H., 136 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 190 McCain, Rear Adm. John S., 89, 151,

Jupiter (collier), 2, 3, 31

See also Langley. Jurika, Lt. Cdr. Stephen, 60, 61, 67

154, 193

Kadashan Bay

(carrier),

122

Kadena, 133

Kaga (Japanese carrier), 85, 87 Kalinin Bay (carrier), 122, 125, 127 Kamikazes, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137 Kane, Capt. J. L., 122 Kaneohe, 54 Katsuragi ( Japanese carrier ) 150-51 Kearsarge (carrier), 201, 208, 261 Kennedy, President John F., 248, 249, ,

250, 253, 269

Khrushchev, Nikita, 250, 252 King, Adm. Ernest J., 398 King George V (British battleship), 149 Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C, 127, 145 Kintberger, Cdr. L. S., 122 Kitkun Bay (carrier), 122, 127 Kobe, 59 Korea, 133, 172, 178, 187, 191 Korean conflict, 172-77, 178-86, 187-96 Kure Naval Base, 150, 151 Kwajalein, 49, 108, 111 Kyushu, 133, 134, 150, 151

McDonald, Vice Adm. David L., 212 McKenna, Capt. F. J., 122, 126 McKenzie, Chief Qm., 78 McWhorter, Rear Adm. E. E., 97 Majuro Atoll, 111 Makin, 107, 108, 109 Maloelap, 111 Malta, 69 Manila, 129 Manila Bay ( carrier ) 122 Marcus (destroyer), 39 ,

Marcus Island, 56 Marcus Island (carrier), 122 Mariana Islands, 115, 131, 132 "Marianas Turkey Shoot," 145 Marine Corps, U.S.: cooperation with carrier operations, 41, 49, 50, 52,

Cuban Korean

55

crisis participation,

249

conflict participation, 172, 175,

177, 187-90, 191, 192

World War 90,

103,

II

108,

participation,

110,

129,

88,

131,

89, 132,

134-35 Labrador, 160, 162

Lake Champlain 23

(carrier), 201, 208,

Langley (carrier),

2, 3-9,

222-

10-14, 17, 22,

23, 31, 34, 44, 48, 52, 195, 198,

Langley, Samuel P., 28 Laos, 240 Lee, Capt. Fitzhugh, 122 Leighton, Lt. Cdr. Bruce G., 51 Leonard, Capt. W. N., 242 Lepanto, Battle of, 85

220

Fighter Squadron 223, 90 Scout Bombing Squadron, 90 Marshall Islands, 56, 107, 108, 110, 115,

145 occupation of the, 111-12 Maryland ( transport ) 31 Mason, Lt. Cdr. C. R., 12 Matsu, 240 May, Lt. H. A., 185 May, Cdr. William, 242 "Meatball." See Mirror landing system. ,

292

Mediterranean Sea, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217

Mercury program, 261 Merrimac ( ironclad ) 83 ,

Midway

(carrier), 25, 26, 27, 157, 160,

161, 167, 202, 204, 205 Island, 45, 49, 55, 84, 92 Battle of, 84-87, 88, 194

Midway

Rear Adm. Henry, 262, 263, 264 Mindoro Island, 129, 130 Minneapolis (cruiser), 83 Mirror landing system, 210-11 Misima Island, 72 Mississippi ( transport ) 32 Missouri (carrier), 149 Mitchell, Gen. BiUy, 54 Mitchell, Cdr, C. C, 203 Mitscher, Rear Adm. Marc A., Ill, 115, 116-20 Miller,

,

MofiFett,

Adm. William

A., 18, 40,

41

Mokpo, Korea,

192, 193 Monitor ( ironclad ) , 83

Monterey (carrier), 107 Montgomery, Rear Adm. A. E., 108 Moran, Lt. Cdr. R. B., 238 Morehouse, Capt. A. K., 122 Mormacmail ( cargo ship ) 52 Mullinix, Rear Adm. H. M., 109 Murray, Vice Adm. George, 195 Mustin, Lt. Gdr., H. C., 1, 6, 31, 32, 38

New Caledonia, 89 New Georgia, 90 New Guinea, 57, 71, 90 New Hebrides, 89 New York Sun, The, 102 New York Times, The, 102 Nimitz,

Adm. Chester W., 85

NORAD,

246 North American Air Defense Command. See NORAD North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See

NATO. North Carolina (battleship), 30 Norway, 102 Noyes, Rear Adm. L., 89 NTDS, 226

Ofstie, Rear Adm. Ralph A., 125 O'Hare, Lt. Cdr. E. H. ("Butch"), 108

Okinawa, 49, 87,

Nagasaki, 50, 151

(

,

96-97,

129,

133,

191 Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse

Omaha ( cruiser Ommaney Bay

93-95,

111-12,

106-10,

Oahu, 54, 55, 144

Nagato ( Japanese battleship ) 150, 151 Nagoya, 59, 150, 208 Nagumo, Vice Adm. Chuichi, 85, 86, 87 Naktong River, 177 Namur, Atoll, 111 Nassau (carrier), 109 NATO, 212, 213, 214 Natoma Bay (carrier), 122 Nauru Island, 108 Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, 95 Naval Air Station Glenview, 93, 95 Naval Air Station Pensacola, 95 Naval Gun Factory, 30 Naval History of World War II, 121 Navy, U.S.: Bureau of Aeronautics, 18, 40 carrier development, 4-5, 22-27 Cuban crisis action, 248-53 fleet exercises, 33-41, 42-48 Korean conflict action, 172-77, 187-90 naval aviation development, 18-20 small carrier development, 51-53 World War II participation, 71-83, 8488-91,

103-05,

O'Callahan, Lt. Cdr. Joseph T., 139

,

87,

100-02,

113, 114, 115-20, 121-27, 128, 12935, 136-38, 139, 144-46, 147-56 Navy Tactical Data System. See NTDS. Neosho (tanker), 71, 73 Neth, Lt. F. A., 242

98-99,

O'Neill, Cdr.

134, B.,

135,

126

35, 36 carrier ) , 122

)

,

T., 175 Operation Crossroads, 13, 158 Operation Highjump, 158 Operation Torch, 97 Operation Tulungan, 243 Oriskany (carrier), 182, 201, 202 Osaka, 59 Owen Stanley Mountains, 57 Oyodo (Japanese cruiser), 151 Ozawa, Jisaburo, 118, 120

P2V

John

Neptunes, 202

P-40's, 13,

P-51's,

97

148

Pacific Fleet, 52, 53, 55, 84, 85, 103, 108,

144 Page, John T., 185 Panama Canal, 35, 36, 37, 39 Panther jet, 179, 180, 181 Pearl Harbor, 34, 35, 46, 53, 54-^5, 62, 73, 85, 107, 144, 147 Pennsylvania ( battleship ) 29 Pennsylvania (carrier), 220, 222 Perseus (British carrier), 203

293

,

Petrel (missile),

Bay

208

S2F's, 203,

(carrier),

,

Philippine Islands, 49, 121, 129, 130, 132-33, 136, 178 Philippine Sea (carrier), 158, 175, 176,

185 Philippine Sea, First Battle of the, 11520, 145 Pillsbury ( destroyer escort ) 114 Pine Tree Line, 247 Point El Hank, 99 ,

Polaris

(missile),

225,

277 Port Moresby, 71, 72 Pownall, Rear Adm. C.

273,

275,

A., 106-07,

276,

Deck Chief, 119 Adm. William, 35, 37, 38, 39

Price, Lt.

John D., 13

Pride, Lt. A. M., 11

Saipan, 49, 87, 132 Saipan (carrier), 203, 208 Salamis, Battle of, 84

Samar Island, 113, 121, 123, 124, 137 Samuel B. Roberts (destroyer escort), 122, 124 San Bemadino Strait, 123, 126, 127 San Diego, CaHfomia, 43 San Francisco, California, 43, 44

,

Princeton (carrier), 106, 108, 208 Project 27 A, 201, 202, 203 Project 27C, 203 Project 110, 20S Proteus (tender),

SAC, 246 Saint Lo (carrier), 122, 126, 127 See also Midway.

Sangamon (carrier), 97, 109, 122 San Pedro, California, 34, 35, 43 San Salvador, 250 Santa Cruz, Battle of, 89, 145 Santee (carrier), 97, 122 Santee ( cruiser ) 30

108

Prather, Flight Pratt,

Saratoga (carrier), 11, 18-20, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 89, 108, 158, 194, ( carrier ) 122

250

Schirra, Cdr. Walter, Jr., 261 Schoech, Vice Adm. William A., 241

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 21 Pumell, Rear Adm. Wifiiam R., 151

Schofield,

carrier),

148

(

carrier ) ,

Seeandbee

Sharretts,

Ranger, CVA-61, carrier), 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240^3, 244 Rawlings, Vice Adm. Sir Bernard, 149 Reeves, Rear Adm. Joseph M., 33, 34, 35,

Rennell Island, Battle of, 89 Reusser, Maj. Kenneth L., 191, 192 Rivero, Vice Adm. Horacio, 250-51 Robert E. Lee (submarine), 225 RoiAtoU, 111 Ruble, Rear Adm. Richard W., 193 Russell Islands, 90

96

W.

H.,

(

243

,

213, 240, 241 Shangri La (carrier), 204 Sharp, Dean B., 184

98-99

36,42

39

steamer ) 93 See also Wolverine. Seligman, Cdr. Mort, 81, 82 Senn, Adm., 34, 35 Seventh Fleet, 127, 129, 130, 178, 181,

(carrier), 24, 41, 45, 46, 48, 51,

Rekata Bay, 89

F. H.,

Searfus, Lt. Cdr.

R4D's, 158 Rabaul, 90, 194 Radford, Rear Adm. A. W., 107, 108 Ragsdale, Rear Adm. V. H., 109 Ramsey, Capt. D. C, 93 Randolph (carrier), 201, 215, 246 97,

Adm.

Seattle (convoy), 12, 31

Seair

Ranger

204

Savo Island

Puerto Rico, 251

Quadrant (British Quemoy, 240

222

Sabine (tanker), 149 Sable ( carrier ) 94, 95

122 Phelps (destroyer), 83 Phibriglex, 62, 249, 250 Petrof

J.

R., 238,

239

Sherman, Adm. Frederick C, 71, 108 Shikoku, 133 Shoho (Japanese carrier), 71, 72, 73 Shokaku ( Japanese carrier ) 72, 73 ,

Sicily (carrier), 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,

192, 193 Sidewinder (missile), 208, 243 Sigma 7 (space capsule), 261 Simmers, Cdr., 6 Sims (destroyer), 71, 73 Sims, Adm. William S., 9 Singapore, 131 Sixth Fleet aviation,

212-17

Skyhawk, 265-70

Ryujo ( Japanese carrier ) 89 Ryukyus, the, 129, 130, 132, 133 ,

Sloat (destroyer),

39

Smith, Lt. (j.g.) Joseph, 73

294

Task Group Task Group

Smithsonian Institution, 28 Snowden, Cdr. Ernest, 115, 116, 117 Solomon Islands, 71 —Campaign, 88-91 Solomons Sea, 72

,

missile ) 208 69 Sprague, Rear Adm. C. A. F., 122, 123, 124 Sprague, Rear Adm. Thomas L., 122, 125, 127, 128 Springfield (carrier), 214 Spruance, Adm. Raymond A., 85, 86, 87, 111, 117, 118, 119, 145 Stark, Capt. Harold, 34-35 Steinhouse, Maj. "Stiney," 174 Stoddert, 39 Strategic Air Command. See SAC. Stroh, Rear Adm. Robert J., 252 Stump, Rear Adm. Fehx B., 122, 125 Sullivan, Capt. D. J., 122 Sulu Sea, 130 Suwanee (carrier), 97, 109, 122 Swanson, Mrs. Claude, 144 Sweeney, Gen. Walter C, 249 ,

Navigational

Display

,

TNDS

(Tactical Navigational Display System), 245-46 Tokyo, 59, 60, 61, 87, 132, 147, 150 Tone (Japanese cruiser), 151 Torgerson, Lloyd C, 186

Tracker, 265, 267, 269, 270 Trafalgar, Battle of, 85

Treasury Islands, 90 Triad, 1

Triumph

172 252 Truk, 111-12, 145, 194 Truman, Lt. Gen. Louis W., 249 Truckee

17-505

U-569

(

British carrier ) ,

(oiler),

(German submarine), 114 German submarine ) 100 (

,

System.

TNDS.

VC-8's, 114 Valley Forge (carrier), 180, 222 Vella Lavella, 90

Talos (missile), 208 Tanahmerah Bay, 113

Tarawa, 49, 87, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110 ( missile ), 208 Task Force 8, 56 Tasw Force 17, 56, 89 Task Force 37, 149 Task Force 38, 107, 149, 150 Task Force 50, 106-07, 110 Task Force 58, 107, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 193, 194 Task Force 60, 213, 215 Task Force 63, 216 Task Force 77, 121, 175, 182 Task Force 78, 113 Task Group 34.2, 97 Task Group 50.1, 107 Task Group 50.2, 107 Task Group 50.3 (Southern Group), 108 Task Group 50.4 (Relief Group), 108 Task Group 52.13 (Air and Surface Support Group), 109

Tartar

Thach, Adm. John S., 187-96, 266 The Big "E." See Enterprise. Thetis Bay (carrier), 208, 209, 251 Third Fleet, 123, 126, 136, 193 Thomas, Cdr. U. D., 122 Ticonderoga ( carrier ) 203, 204 Tjilatjap, Java, 13

U-boats, 100, 101, 102 United Nations, 187, 193

T4M's, 15, 16 See

86

Terpsichore (British carrier), 148 Terrier ( missile ) 208 Terry, J. D., 238

Spitfires,

Tactical

215 215

TBF-lC's, 112

,

(

60.2, 213, 214,

TBD torpedo bombers,

Sonenshein, Cdr. N., 185 Soryu ( Japanese carrier ) 85, 87 Soucek, Cdr. Apollo, 60 South China Sea, 130, 131 Soviet Union, 247, 262

Sparrow

60.1, 213, 214,

VF VF

Squadron Squadron

1,

2,

172,

178,

179,

13 12

Adm. Sir Philip, 149 Vieques Island, 249, 251 Vietnam, 240 Vieweg, Capt. W. V. R., 122 Vian, Vice

Vigilante, 267, 268,

270

VMF-214,

VMO-6

191, 192, 193 helicopters, 177

Wakde, 113

Wake

Island, 55, 85, 106

Washington Conference (1921-22), 18 Washington Navy Yard, 30

Wasp

(carrier), 26, 51, 69-70, 89, 201,

202

Weymouth, Cdr. Ralph, 176 Wheatley, Lt. Cdr. J. P., 202 Wheeler Air Force Base, 54

295

White, Capt. R. Drace, 36 Whitehead, Capt. R. F., 93

White

Plains (carrier), 122, 125 Whiting, Cdr. Kenneth, 11, 12, 31, 38 Whitney, Capt. J. P., 122 Wildcats, 100, 101, 125 Wiley, Adm. Henry, 38 Williamson, Capt. T. B., 122 Winston, Lt. Cdr. Robert A., 119 Wolverine (carrier), 94, 95 Wotje, 108, 111 Wright ( seaplane tender ) 36 ,

Wright Brothers, 28 Yahagi

(

Japanese cruiser )

Yalta Conference, 160

,

134

Yamaguchi, Rear Adm. Tamon, 87 Yamamoto, Adm. Isoroku, 85, 86, 87 Yamato (Japanese battleship), 134 Yamell, Rear Adm. H. E., 40, 43, 44 Yokohama, 59 Yokosuka Naval Base, 150, 151, 240 Yontan, 133

Yorktown

(carrier), 46, 47, 48, 51,

5&-

57, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 83, 85,

86,87 Yorktown (CV-10, carrier), 108, 119, 186, 201 Young, Capt. H. L., 122

106,

107,

Zeroes (Japanese planes), 75, 77, 86, 194

Zuikaku (Japanese

296

carrier), 72,

73

/

^

X

You will also enjoy

SUBMARINES

IN

COMBAT "Submarine warfare is enthusiastically endorsed by many, loudly damned by many, and abhorred by all," says Rear Admiral Joseph B. Icenhower. "It is an ungallant means of war, but there is no gallant warfare in modern times." But they are gallant men who man the submarines, as these true accounts of submarine commanders will prove.

Here are stories of both Allied and enemy submarine commanders

who

displayed almost unbelievable

courage in World

War

II.

Jacket photos: (top) Eugene Ely landing on deck Pennsylvania; (bottom) USS Saratoga catatwo fighters simultaneously, off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

of

USS

pults

THE WATTS SEAPOWER LIBRARY The overall purpose and scope of the Seapower Library is to depict to readers both in

and out

of the naval service the aims,

and operating techniques of the United States Navy, as well as the high calibre of the officers and men who man its ships, aircraft, and shore installations. Authors of the volumes comprising the objectives, history,

Library are either active duty or reserve officers, retired officers, or highly qual-

naval

ified civilians

who

are experts in their par-

ticular subjects.

X PRINTfJ.^ iN U.S.A. PRESS. INC. BY MOt I

1

i v>v;:-