Aircraft of the Second World War The Development of the Warplane 1939-45 by E. R. Hooton,P

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

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PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

Aircraft of the Second World War The Development of the Warplane 1939-45 Series Editor: Philip Jarrett

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Contents

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Introduction I>r Alfred Price Dr Alfred P.-icc .......-ai

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7

Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak of\X'ar

II

2

Allied Aircraft Development in the Early \Var Years

33

3

Fightcr Developmcnt) l\'tid-1941 to A-tid-1945

59

4

The Bomber Revolution

91

5

Airmobility: Aircraft in Support of Ground Forccs

127

6

Naval Aircraft in the Second \'(forld \'(far

149

7

The Helicopter's First \X'ar

177

8

Armament Diversifies

193

9

The Well-equipped Warplane

221

10

Propulsion

251

11

Testing and Ferrying

267

12

Training: a Vital Command

285

Index

299

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5

Introduction Philip Jarrett The years 1939~S saw rapid and unprecedenled de\'c!· opmcnt in all spheres of aviation, as the warring nations vied to gain a tcchnological edge O\W their opponents and win mastery of che skies, and thereby secure ultimate \'ictory. Designers, engineers and scientists in industry and in research institutions laboured to impro\"(~ lhe acroplane and enhance ilS capabilities and equipment. By the end of the Second \'l;'orld War enormous strides had been made, not only in weaponry and destructive power, but in all of the cssential technologies that would re\"Olutionise air transport in the years ahead. For all its grim horror, che war accelerated the aeroplane's de\
mechanical or operational shortcomings to be pinpointed :Jnd resolved. Japan's pro\·ing ground was the conflict with Russia in 1939, where the inadequacies of its aircraft became disastrously evident. The problems in this case were that technologically modern aircraft were being built to outmoded requirements, and the consen·atism of military traditionalists inhibited the development of modern tactical philosophies. Derek \\700d's sun'CY of the dewlopment of Allied aircraft in the early war years spotlights the manner in which Germany's neighbours left the modernisation of their air arms too late, some adhering to the nai\'e beljef chat chcir neutrality would be respected, and ochers trusting in static defences or outmoded tactical conceplS. The failure of the European aviation industry to meet the sudden and o\'erwhelming demand for modern combat aircraft resultt'd in the USA's manufacturers receiving orders for a \'ariety of types. This had the fortuitous effects of bringing about an expansion of che American companies' production facilities and of enabling them to assess their products' performance in operational service :Jnd introduce impro\'ements before the USA actually entered the war. In some instances, however, this had unfortunate results for che customer nations. Those who ordered the Bell Airaeobra, Brewster Buffalo and Curtiss Hawk 75A, for example, found to their dismay that cheir investments had been wasted, and that their brand new fighters were no mutch for the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s. Tragically, the need was so desperate that some of these aircraft were then put to work in India and the Far East, where they proved equally \'ulnerable to their Japanese counterparts. Howe\'er, there were great success stories, Outstanding examples were che Norch American Mustang and Mitchell, Lockheed Hudson, Douglas Boston, Boeing B-17 and Consolidated Liberator, all of which saw widespread use after initial teetlling troubles were resolved. Britain's industry, too, had its share of failures and successes. The Fairey Battle and \'\Icstland Whirlwind did nO! come up to expectations, but others, such as the AHO Manchester and Hawker Typhoon, were transformed from problem children into mature and potent warriors. De\'e!opment potential is the hallmark of great design, and the aircraft lacking in this attribute, such as the Hurricane and Stirling, flew briefly into the spotlight and then receded. Those ha\ing it in abundance were

7

AlkCkAI'!" Ol'l HE SECOSI) WORl.D WAR

I:-
the Spitfire and Mosquito, the lauer also being endowed With eXtraOrdinary \'crsaulity; a gre"l assct in war. One thing many of the successful machines had in common was the Rolls-Royce ,\teIlin engine, another product which had gltlt de...elopmem potential Kussla's greal strength at the war's OUtsel lay in its ability to take thc aggressor's first mighty and unexpcct· t..d blow and then. afler a maSSI\OC IogISUes exercise in which its threatened factories were withdrawn 10 the depths of this \"3st country, to rail), recoup its Iosscs and hit back ....1th a ...engeance_ It was formnate for both Britain and the USSR thai Germany had failed to dc\-c!op a Succl..'!isfullong-range bomber. I-Iad Ilitlcr been able to cripple the centreS of manufacrure of either nation, the outcome would ha\'c been \'ery different. The story of fighter dC\'c!opmcnt from 1941 onwards is taken up by Dr Alfred Price, who begins by survcying the continuing and parallel development of Britain's Spitfire and Germany's Bf 109, and the dlsad\-antagcs of such prolonged continuation of a line. He then rums his attention on new fighter types introduced into service dunng the war by Britain, Germany, the USA, Japan and Ihe USSR, underlining the essential requirements of en· gme and armament and how these wcre affected by the specific role or operanonal sUmluon_ Comparative performance data highlight the: relau\'e: ments and dcments of the principal t}'PCSNighlfighting placed the emphasis on qUite: diff~nt fighter attributes, and the ~oon dealing ....ith this aspect opens \\1th an outline of Britain's night air defence sys· tern, at the time the onl)' really effeco\oc s)"5tem of its type in the world. and the way in which the fighlers operated .....ithin it. The LuftwalTe sySlem e\'Olved on similar lines bUI look longer to de\-e1op, and the incessant 'batlie of the boffins' 10 de\ise increasingly bener radars and, in responsc, more cffccth'e radar countermeasures, is a ~..c ntral theme. The usc of the fighter-bomber was pioneered by the Lurtwaffe, bUi once its advantages wcre pcrcei\-ed by their opponents the type became an important componenl of all of the combatant forces. Unlike a bomber, the fighler.bomber could re\-ert to Its pure fighter role and dcfcnd itself once it had released its bombs. ]., 10TeO\ocr, it was cheaper, required fewer crc:....., and had far beller spttd and altitude performance. Disad\'anlages .....ere the smaU bomb load and limited radius of action. Such aircraft demanded new operational techniques and specially developed weapons, particularly for use against difficult targets such as tanks. Dr Price exposes the fallaC)' ofthc much-vaumed air-launched unguided rockl:t pro)Cetl.lc, which lacked accuracy and was quile ineffecti\OC agamst armoured \-ehicles_ He concludes ....ith a SUI\ocy of the development and use of rocket· and ;ct.propelled fighters_ Interestingly, both Luftv.-affe and RAF semor officers initially

regarded their respecU\'e types, the Me 262 and Meteor, .....ith almost casual mlerest, 5ttIng them as outside of their requirtments_ Ho.....e...er. once the .\ Ie 262 had pro'oro Its orth against US hca\1 bombers and the onush got ,ord of German dC'\1."lopments. both sides pursued the sub)CCt 'lith \igour_ Dr Price dismisscs the postwar myths thai the ,\te 262 was nol PUI mto largescale production early enough. I1nd thai Hitler's edict thai the aircrafl should imtially be used as a fighlerbomber caused any appreciable delay in its operational II1troduction as a fighter. The great .....caknl..'!iSCS of the ,'vie 262 were liS unreliable engmes and poor ser...iceability, and a comparison of \ictories claimed ag-Jimt losses rc· n ..als poor results. The spectacular nature of the diminutive '\·Ie 163 rocket-propelled interceptor belied its disapl>ointing and dangerous Service usc, and again we arc presented wim figures which show it to ha\'e been far from successful in combat_ Speculation can be a pointless pursuit, but the re\-ela· oon of the outstanding superiorily' of the Vampire I whcn compared ....1th the Spitfire XIV, in aU :lISPCCUi of combat pe:rformance, m.:lIkes one .....o nder how the ;CI fighter might ha\'c affected air combal had the .....ar continued. In truth, ho.....e ...er, the jet fighters had a negligible mfluence on the war_ In his chapter 'The Bomber Ke...oIuOCn·. Mike Bo.....y·er Stres5CS the diffenng tactical phi105ophies thai determined the approaches taken by the various warring nations_ While Germany had concenlratro on the small· cr, hort.range Iwin engined ~dlUm bombers and single engined Slukas, belie...ing dive·bombing to be an essenual capabililY if accuracy .....a s to be achic\'Cd, Brilaln'S bomber force ....'as Initially formed 'lith the aim of waging a slnncgic campaign to destroy the enemy's industril..'!i and navy, and Iherefore comprised long.range Iwin enginc bombers, with a new generation of four engine heavy bombers under dcvelopmcnI. In both eases the resulting machines initially proved inadequate and vulnerable in the face of determined opposition, and both sides learned their respective lessons the hard way, sulTering little success and heavy losscs. While Britain upgraded only tile \'('e1hngton, prefernng to Introduce complelely new t)'PCS, Germany follo.....e d a path of continual updating of the original designs. A SIgnificant contribution 10 the Allied CilUse ca~ from thc USA, .....here sc\ocl'llol excellent bombers of \"arious classes were de\'clopocd, as menuoned earlicr. In Russia the I:rTIphasis 'l'aS again on t'lin-<:ngincd medium bombers, though one four engined slnucgic Ilea\')bomber, the Pe-8. was de\ocloped. Germany's only true bomber m thiS class. the I-Ie 177, .....as dogged throUghoul its operational life by inlerminable poy,ocrplant problems. and ne\,..r realised its potential. Japan PUI range befort defence in bomber design,

8

and its min engme bombers were suited to both army and na\1- usc. Again \"UlnerabiIiIY ...."3S a major problem. An a1temati\oc solution .....as the: high-speed unarmed bomber. ThiS concept was embodied ....ith great success in the Mosquito.. origtnally dismissed b)' Bomber Command's Commander-In-Chicf as being of no usc, bul soon to pr
Although reconnaissance and fleel prolection 'l1."re the roles initiaUy pe:rformro by na\"'9.l aircraft, the camers also sen'ed as ftoaung bases from ....hlch strikes could be launched. uSing 10rpedO and di\-e bombers_ Na\-al air· craft also pr
9

AIRCRAFT or Till

Sl'co:.:n WORI.D \i'AR

by Dr Price, but while one author is considering the airo-aft from the pomt of \'iCYI of the tcchnology it embodied, the other is concerned with its effecth'eness as a combat aircraft. 11'11s ser\'es to remmd us that there arc at least two SIdes to e\'ery question, and that conclusions depend to a large dcgr« on the approaches on which thcy arc based The second part of this chaptcr. contributed by l»atnck HasseU, looks at the extrnordinary business of aircraft ferry1ng, ooth ....;thin the British Isles from factory to nice umt, and across \-aSt oceans and continent!. It is no usc hanng new aeroplanes pounng from the production lines if you cannot get them to the plaen whCTt' they are d perately needed, and the accomplishments of the Air Transport Auxiliary. the Atlanuc Ferry OrganlS3uon and the Return Ferry Senice WeTe tmpressi\'e, to sa}' the leasL The impact of the experience gamed m mtc:rconunental operations on the postwar deveLopment of commercial air trnnsport was surely profound, Tlus \"olume concludes ~ith John GoUey's account of the tralMlng systems adopted by Germany and lhe A1bes. The title 'Vital Command', chosen by him. streSSeS the importance of t.r.lining to all air arms, and the essenlial and basic need for a system that ensures a continual fiow of \\-eU-trained aircrcw. Closely allied to this, of course, ....-as the pr0l1Slon of SUItable airo-aft on which to t.r.lln them. TlIe author ShOll'S that the Lufl\\-affe had ample faclillies and rttrults. but that its training system was inadequate and began to fragment owing to the urgcnt nced to replace combat losses, whereas the Empire FJ};ng Training Scheme tapped rt."'SOurces around the world. Moroo\'er, the significant contribution of the USA ensured Ihal there was an ample supply of wcll-trained aircre\\' to operate the machines. Last, but b~' no means least, mention must be made of artist rrunk Munger's splendid cutaway drawing of the Hawker Typhoon, undoubtedly the first such drawing of this aircraft e\'er produced. The aim in this series is to feature a cutaway in each \'Olume, the aircraft selccted being typical of the period covered rauler than exceptional. 111c Typhoon suits this criterion admirably, being vcry much a product of the Second World \X'ar ef3 \\;th regard to its design, structure and powerplant.

\X'hik Britain and the USA concent.r.lted on output. reliability and commonalily of ilmmunition, Germany upgraded Its weapons eonstanuy and produced a \\ide range of ne\\ typc5 of gun. Nor was commonality a priority of the J~panesc, the nav)' using different weapons to the army, and ooth Ser\'ices mixing tyj)CS and calibres. The SlghU used \\1m the guns, and the tUlTets in which the guns we~ moumed. were as rich in their \-ariety as the guns lhemsch'es, and ooth were sub}eCt to constant development and imprO\'Cment, UnguIded rockets we~ fairly basic de\'ices, but Germany pioneered the guided missile \\1th IU \\1~-guidcd X~ and radio-guided Hs 293, E\-ery aeroplane embodies a number of sy'5tcms and an assorunent of eqUIpment, some \1tal to the machine itself or its Cf'C\\, and some to enable the lllrcraft to perform Its appointed task In Chapter 9 Le5 Coombs \;\'Idly iUusmtes the great ad\-ances made in the war yean;, and the rapIdly Incre:tsmg complexitY of the machine that was the aeroplane. '\X'eU-cqulpped' is. of course, a rclath-e term that changes in accordance With the standards of each particular period, Although the 31rcrart of the early ....-ar period mIght ha\-e been regarded as teprcsenung the latest in technological accomplishment. they we~ not total 'weapons systems' as we now understand the term. Indeed, compared \\1th the machines of the late ......a r period they seem rdati\'e1y SImple In some respectS. The in~sant bailie to increase safN)' and $3\'e \-aluable pilots' lives, impro\'t: the performance and capabilities of the machine and countcr or outsmaf( the opponent meant thai significant progress ....-as milde in the five years of ....-ar. Andrew Nahum's short chapter on ilero engines establishes the state of engine development at the war's outbreak and looks at the problems engine designers faced as they sought to improve efficiency ilnd reliability'. The allied and insepilrable subjects of high-octilne fuels and supercharging are also co\'ered, as are problematic engines, Finallr, the hurdles confronting the designers of the first jet engines ilrc ouUined. Chapter I I compriSt.'S contributions from two authors. Capt Eric Brown, an accomplished test pilot, describes the role of fhght testing in \\-artime and highlights some specific aspects and aircraft. His assessment of thc Me 163 as a 'landmark in a\'iation technologr· might ~m to be at \-ariance with the opinion expressed

1 Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak ofWar E R Hooton Germany At the outbre:tk of war In September 1939 Germany' Reichsluftwaffe ....lIS the .....orld's most pcmnful air force_ This status ....lIS achie\'ed not m('rely numerically, for liS fll"St-Jine strength of 4,093 aircraft ....-as nearly half that of the Sol;e1 Air Force (.....hich had 7,321 on New Year's DilY 1939), but on the fact that the vast maJOril)' of Its :un:raft (92 per cent) were of modem design and conSlrucuon, Germany's success in completing aerial re-cquipment bcfo~ its enemies gave the Luftwaffe an edge .....hlch II used to dC\-astaang effect 0\'Cf the ~xt three years. Tbc: edge \\-as made keener by the slrucrure and philosophy of the Luft\\lIffe, .....hich was far more than lhe purcly tactical force \\ hich most post-....-ar a\iation hislorians claim. Indeed, had it been a tactic-.ll force it would ne\~r ha\~ spearhcaded NUl Germany's success, but to understand its philosophy requires a slight di\~rsion Into German nuLnary thought, In the aftermath of the Napoleonic ....-ars the German Gencral Staff fC'COgniscd that the appearance of mass armies meant that the old di\;sion of military operatlons into Tactics ilnd Strategy .....as inildequate. They therefore confined Tactics to operations by army corps and their component units (although these could be extended to armies III certain circumstances), and the acti\'itics of armies ilnd army groups now came under the new

concept of the Operational (Operrlll't-'eT) Art, \\;th Strateg)· confined to acti\;ty abo\-e army group le\d. This philosophy ubsequently helped define military alrCT3ft reqUl~ments. Tacucal operanons were largely lhe responsibility of the Nahaufklarungsstaffeln on land and the Sttnahaufk1arungsstafTein as well as the Bordfliegerstaffeln at sea. 'flll;: former were attached to Armee Korps and Panzer Dh;sionc-n and .....c re essentially .....hat the: Royal Flymg Corps in the First \X·orld War had called CofJl'S Aeroplanes, smgle-t:ngmed two-seaters with thc: roles of taCbcal reconnaiss:mce (\·isual and photographic), artillery' obscn-ation and di~on, ground attack. and resupply, Their f100tplane equh-alents in the Royal Na\-aJ Air Sen1ce had sundar tacucal Tttonnaissance llInd artillery support duties, but re:sponsibilil)' for coastal anti-submafine operauons replaced ground-attack./rnuppl)' duties, In most of Europe's air forces, Corps Aeroplanes comprised 20 to ~O per celli of the lOtal first-line strength, but In the Luftwaffe they were only 7,5 per cent, The maiorit}' of the Nahautklarungsstaffeln were equipped WIth the Henschel Hs 126. a stressed-skin monocoque, braced-wing monoplane .....ith a radial enginc and fixed undercarriage. It was typical of the last genef3tion of such airCT3ft, being designed for operation from smaU, roughly prepared fields to a requirement which emphilsised \·isibilil)' from the semi-enclosed

Philip Jarrell

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10

II

Alf.lCf.lAI'T OF

1'1I1~

AXI~

SECOND \!:'Of.lLIl \1;'AR

naissance and higher performance. B)' 1939 protOlypes of the new alrerafl, the Focke-Wulf F..... 189, .....ere flying. rollowing a trend common in the late 19305, it was a t\\1n-boom design, like the Fokker G.I and Lockheed P-38, Like the contemporary Pota 637 army co--<:Iperation alrcrafl, the F\\ 189 (which entered sen;ce lale in 1940) had t\\;n engincs, a retractable undercarriage and a full)' enclosed cockpit, which made it seem a world away from the 1-15 126, although Ihl-ir performance and combal capabilily were similar, One protOI)"pc Fw 189 was modified to meet the c1~-support or 'Schlachl' reqUirement. 11m mission was de\'e1oped by the German Army during the Firsl \XOrkl \X'ar, .....hen Schlacht aircraft .....e re cssentially firing storm rroops designed to assist an ad\'ance on the ground by anad"ng enemy uoops .....ith aUiomanc weapons and small bombs. Its .....3rume success meanl thaI III 1934 an updated reqw.rement ....'as issued as the Light Di\"Cbomber. for which the Henschel Hs 123 U'aS selected. This was a curious mixture ofold and new, with sesquiplane configuration, fixed undercarriage and open cockpit bul all·metll1 monocoque construction and mixed-construcuon wmgs. The 'Em-Zwel-Dref, as it .....as popularly called, formed the basis of the Stuka (SIUr.tkampfflugzeug) Gruppen, and despite the support of the LuflwafTe's head of de\"Ctopmcnt, Oberst \'i:'olfram von Richthofen, II was gl1ldually withdrawn from scn;ce, In 1937. hO\\e\'er, Rlchthofen (a cousin of the famous 'Red Baron' and minor 'ace' in his 0\\'11 right) became chief of slafT 10 the Condor Legion, me German cxpeditionary force fighting in Spain for Franco's Nationalists. The Legion had copied the Spanish and used its obsolete Heinkel He 51 fightcrs for the Schlacht role \\;th great success, and had nx:ommended the development of dedicated ground-anack aircrafl with armoured proIcction for the Thctical role, 1t is interesting to nOle that the Russians camc to a similar conclusion, leading to the de\'elopmem of the Ilyushin 11-2 'Ilyusha·. At the outbreak of war only olle Schlachtgruppe cxisted, and this was equipped with the ageing Hs 123, which \\HdS essentially a nying machinc-gun nest, with two ,\\G 175 which could be supplemented by up to 200kg (4-101b) of bombs or two 20mm (0,78in) MG FF cannon. hs potcntial replacements, the Fw 189 Vlb and thc Hs 129, both twin.engined aircraft, .....ere ft);ng in protolYpe form by the outbreak of war. The former was a two-seat armOl.lrcd version of the Fw 189 (the Schlachl model of which ....'as to be dcsignated Floi' 189C), ....'ith four MG 17s and tWO MG FF forn'ard and IWO 7.9mm MG 815 aft, while the laner was a dedicated single-seat design \\;th armour plate 6-12mm thick, 7Smm thick armoured glass and an armament of two MG 175 and two ""IG FF The Hs 129', protection ....'3S its only advantage, for the aircraft proved sc\ocrely underpo.....ttt'd as

1M FocJu.. tl'u(f Fw 189 V3 was lhe drird prolot~ of the ncm--mgmtd CorpJ Clffmtft daignro to rrplaa the Hs 126. TN O'Pt btgan to ~1lI" strt"i« from lhe autumn of I 9-10,

cockpit. Tlle radio and the topographic camera m the rear ba)' (5upplemcntcd b). a hand-opcraled camera on the port side) were the most imporlaIlt items of equipment, wtule ~ armament, I)"plcall)', was derisory, composing a smgle fixed 7.9mm (O.30in) MG 17 ma~ chine-gun for the pilot and a slmJl,ar-calibre MG 15 on a lTIO\'3ble mounting for the observer, The maximum bomb load ....'as only lookg (2201b), Against the latest ~neration of high-performance fighten, such aircraft were dead meat with only their manoeuvrability to protect them. Many of the NahaufkHirungsstaffeln retained some of me older Heinkel He 45 biplanes and He 46 braced monoplanes with wooden wings and fuselages of welded steel tube covered by doped fabric and metal panels. This form of construction had appeared in the First World War and .....as extensiwly employed until the early 19305, when it was supplanted by all·metal, Stressed-skin monocoquc construction lechniques which produced lighter bUI stronger airframes. Yel mc Corps Aeroplanc itself was becoming an anachronism, able neither to fight nor flee, and the Luftwaffe had begun developing a more modern conccpt from 1937 based upon tactical recon-

Em",,,, svviufrom July 1939, IheArudoAr 196 rrplaad tlu Hein~l He 60, Da~ m a spolln aircraft, it was uwi for a WrIe'ty of dutin including esccm fighttr, and could soffUtinln maldt the 8«lujighln, Trw of these aircraft ht/ptd UJ capture the British submoriM HMS ScaJ..

12

Alf.lCf.lAf'T AT THE OUTBREAK 01' WAf.l

bu.k(/llute Ikknsit:~ anllOmClt I£J 10 reJnign of1M Domin Do 171 jortlXlrd /uMlilg.r, alld rhis t.WSioll tmtrtd str1.'IC"t III Ihe

IU1llltln of 1938 US the Do I-Z, sun hnr.Allhough lhe aircraft haJ 0,,1y a small bomb bay, Ir rros!rrqllently ustdjor Iou:-ltt.-el Jl/rpriM atliJdu b«uu~ irs sholllJn "wl/mtd rrlllKJ ma~ II taJtn fer pilots 10 JIl.Jgt Ihnr aill/IIIM,

well as CI1I.mpcd, but It .....as cheaper 10 build and in 1941 .....a s selected for production. The oa\'31 equi\'alcnl of the lis 126 \\'as me Arado Ar 196 floatplanc. an elegant all-metall\\in-ftoat design of modcm construction wtuch was 10 prow surpnsmgly agde, At the oUlbreak of ....'ar the Arado .....as bemg intrOduced mto the BordfilegerstiltreIn, but these stilI had many He 60 biplanes .... hich also equipped the SccnahaufklarungsstafTcln and mar be rcgard~"(\ as the flootplanc cquh'alenl of the He 45. Curiously, the Luft.....affc·s first ck j(uIO chief of staff, Oberst (later Gencralleutnant) \,\'alther \'\'e\ocr, brought \\'nh him when he transferred from the arm)' the laner's behef in the supremacy ofTactJcal air power, but extellsh'c reading led him to change his mind. \X'ithin a year \'('e\'cr h:Jd nOt only accepted thai the Luftwaffe should ha\'c an opcratit'Cr role with the emph:Jsis upon bombers interdicting the enemy rear al arm)'/armr group or fleet level and destroying enemy air po.....er, but he had also 'sold' the concept to thc Army's high command. '111(: concept .....as also acceptable to his political masters be· cause the bombers could also be used to cow Germany's ncighbours in peacetime b)' threatening to annihilate their cilies and factories. Luftwaffe bombers .....ere therefore designed to strike at Germany's immedialc neighbours, and four designs emerged during the mid 19305, The Lufl\\'3fTe requirements had assigned priori!)' to bomb load, followed by speed, defcnsive armamenl and range, but the general requirement .....as for an aircraft .....ith a I,OOOkm (600mile) range, a maximum spcc
jumo 20Se diesels proved extremdy unreliable, although they pfO\;ded exceptional operuting economy, IIO\\'C\'('(, radial engmed \,(,(SIOns PfO\"N popular abroad and thC)o' scn-ed U1th fi\·e air forces. The other IWO were designed to follow another t)"J)leal 19305 fashion, the concept of a bomber fast enough to outpace cnemy fighters, The concepi refte<:ted the tcchnological rt\'o.Iution crealed by combinmg lightweight monocoque, streSSed-skin airframes \\;th po.....erful engmes at a ume .....hen fighler d~ign emphasised manOCu\T3bIILI)' al the expense of speed and firepower. Agalllsi bIplane or bracl:d-wing monoplane fighters the fashion prO\·cd sound, as the Hc 111 and Do 17 .....ere to demonslr,ltc during the next IWO years. Both were elegant, streamlincd dcslgns, but experience in the Spanish Ci\'il \'\'ar. and natural caution, dictated a strengthening of defensive armament to supplement self-scaling tanks, The He 1111'-1 had only mree I\IG 15

TIlt Htl1lktl He 111113 ifonltnly He Illb)of 1935 feW llu S«OtW bombn prolotypt and 'M poI/ern for Ihe lit/tinpoo.oemJ He I I IA snia rcilh 8,\11171 J 6.02 engines. Only rche" Iht DO/min-Be":: 600 alld ]Ilrtkns Jume U'tn' Imrodllud did the He III b«ome tM jormidabk aircraft rrhldt trw the 'tl/lrd kg' of the Kompfgruppm.

J3

AXIS AII(CI(AI''l' A I

AIRCRAFT 01' TilE SI::COl"1) 'X' 0 11.1. I) WAR

tilL

Ol.:TIlREAK 01' 'X'AR

".

A !kill" u;huh f.'W" III t/~ nghl PWa at t/~ riglll "II/~. LJII~ Jn~ral ~,,~r OIrrru!t of III~ "'''~, t/~ JWllIm Ju 51 could ~ aJiJPI.-J to a bombn,lJ"J Srtvra/ Jt:spaulud fO Spain In 1936 pntomuJ bolh roles. LJrg.- ml'tINrs fl.Yl't bflliI as bombers orring W lhi! failure of tire '>Omur 1>0 11 13/23 family, anJ t-irtualiy lJ/11wJ Nf'l IrUIISjrrr.-J 10 mmsport ll/IIU l!Y Yptembcr 1939. Al tlult ti"re II rws also llMJ for trami", ami ..l«tro"U: imeUigcu:.., n:ltik dunng lire ftllT 11 fMS filteJ n:I111 a la~ m.og'relit: coil for m.op~tit: ""'leSU'«f'mg.

n:ceh-w the appropriate difC'Ct.ion-finding (OF) loop aenal. 111e RAF by contrast was slow not only creating a beacon networl!; and equippmg llS aircraft but also providing sufficient nangators. 'llIe Lufthansa practice of all-weather operation extended into the nighl, and !.his. 100. was copied by the LuftwalTe. all of whose major bases had Lorenl: instrument-landing systems and all of whose bombers had the approprillte receivers. The sys~ tern was modified IOtO an instrument bombing system, 'X-Verfahren', one of three in sen'ice or at advanl;ed stages of de\'(~lopment at the outbreak of war.

machine-guns in nose. dorsal and \'entrn! positions, but later \~rslOns such illS the I~~ had armour protection for the pilot. a second MG IS In the nose and (wo finng from the side wIth III fifth crew member to operate them. Similar improvements were made in the He 111 H-2, while the Do 17Z expanded its defensiw armament from thrce: to four MG 15s but \'entral co\'Cr was impro\'cd through a redesigned nose. The Do 1- was exponed 10 Yugosla\'llll and an improved export \'ersion with DB 60 1A in-line engines was under de\'elopment at the outbreak of war as the Do 215, and was destined to join the specialised AufkhirungssLalTein of the LuftwalTc I hgh Command (ObdL). B)' the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe had 1,171 medium bombers or 28.5 per cent of its first-line stlength, but their indi\'idual bomb load was limited.·lne horil:ontlll bomb bays of the Do 17 I;ould nOt accommodate anything larger than 250kg (SSOlb) bombs, and with a full bomb load the tactical radius was reduced 10 about 320km (200 miles). The He III had three urnes this runge, but the \'ertical cells of its bomb bay could accommodate nothing larger than 500kg (1,1201b) bombs, hea\'ier loads. induding a I,OOm:g bomb, ha\'ing to be carried externally, with the resulting drag limiting range. One feature of Luftwaffe bombers not generally noted WIiS their abillly to optrule III all weathers. This requirement came from Milch, whose direction had Ctlsun:d that Lufthansa possessed such a capabilit)· befon: the Nazis came to power. This was emulated by the Luftwaffe. which established a network of rudio beacons throughout the Reich, and C'\~ry multi-engined aircraft

The JIIIlIt.-rs JII 87 1'3 prololy".. first flew i" 1935, mid a )'('.or /.ater a prt-prodllctlOfl aIrcraft seN:td briefly II' Spam mukr Ill' SIl/WP'tUlon of Obnsllfbifr.all/ {.vn Ruilihofen. It rt:tft,,~d 10 G..rmally if! 1937, bfll/.ala in year.o mltnbeT ofproduction ditv:-bo",bvs ftv1' Utl110 Spai" and began tlu I)~'s j.amolts COr«J". By Ilu o/ltbT«lil of tNT tliJill SwkaKllIppen ttt'rt: I" seN:ice, rilT« IWIkr Ri<.hthofen as F/~IIrtr :obi' IkJl.-r Fllqn-Rorps I'ill!.

*

14

---~

"l71l! ~rfoml
A major weakness of the first generation of German bombers (Do 11/13{23 andJu 52) had been poor bomb sights. which led 10 intense interest in dive-bombing for greater accuracy. From its earliest days the Luftwaffe had Sturt.kampftlug-J.eug units. and the Ught Dh'ebomber requirement which led to the Hs 123 was accompanied by II Heavy Dh'e-bomber requirement drafted around the Ju 87, the emphasis of this latter requirement being on bomb load. Dcspite the acquisition of the Lolfe 7D Lachometric bomb sight by September 1939, the Luftwaffe was the only land-based air arm w1lh a large dh'e-bomber force, which comprised 24 per cent of all German bombers. The Ju 8- could I;arry a 500kg (1.102Ib) bomb some 600km (370 miles), and could be used for either taetic'dl or optroliu~r missions. but defensive armament (two fixed j\ lG 17s forward and one movllble j\ lG 15 aft) WliS bmiled and it required I;ondltions of aenal supenomy to operate effeclJ\·ely. A longerranged version was completing development for anti-shipping operations 35 the Ju S-R, and a study was also under way of a carrier-borne version of the Ju 8-B, the Ju 87C. Di\~-bombing fascinated the Lufl:\\'3ffe de\'Clopmem orgamsauon not only under Gcncralleumam Emst Udet,

who assumed the position of GeneralluflZeugmcister in 1938. but also under his prcdl'o:ssor, Rkhthofen. \\ho initially went to Spain to test new types including prototype Ju 87s. Another enthuSiast was Oberst Hans Jeschonnck. the Luftwaffe chief of slaff in 1939, whose earher staff appointment ga\'c him I;onsiderablc innuence in aircraft development. The combination of innuences WlIS 10 han' a pernicious effl'Ct upon Luflwaffc bomber development, as \\'as becoming clear lit the outbreak of war. A demand for a dh'c-bombing capability was included in lhe requirement for the LuflwalTe's nextgener.ltion medium and hea\'y bombers. the Ju 88, Do 217 and lie 177. 'Ine first, em;saged as a high.speed three-scal lllrCfaft \\;th a speed of 5ookm/h (310 mph), a range of 3.000km (1.850 miles) and a maximum bomb load of2lOnnes (4.4 IO1b), had added 10 il a l'('quiremem 10 conduct 30"-angle dh'e-bombing anacks, and Spanish expcrien~ indicating the need for bener dcfensh'e armamenlled to a fourth ere\\ member being added. As a rcsuh of numerous design changes. the weight of the Ju 88 doubled and performance dropped, so thai the initilll production aircraft. which was cmcring scn;ce at the outbn:ak of Wat, had a maximum speed of 460km'h

15

AIRCRAFT OF THE

SECO~O

AXI.:s AIRCRAFT AT TilE Ol;TBREt\K OF \\:'AI{

\'i'OR!.D \X'AI{

\ .L ,""'"~,~

i

.J

C.O

Unlike {he RAT; tile Llif/waffe developed a 10llg-rullge cuorl fighler!illlerceplOr ill Ille AJesserschmill Hf 110, ProJlIClioll (LIas slow dllrillg lhe slimmer of 1939, alld ollly a fer/) Zcrs/orergmppell J/lld received Ihe Iype whe" Pola"d u:a.s illvudlod. The Silllmiol/ grud/wlly improved, Qlld (('illli" a J'tar the Hf 110 was bcillg /lsed for other roles inell/dillg rffQllllaissallCi',for rdllth lhis Hf 110C-5 tOO! dctx/oped,

outbreak of war. Fortunately Focke-\X'ulf had been designing a long-range maritime reconnaissance \'ersion of the Fw 200B four-engined airliner for the Japanese Na\'y as the Fw 200C, and in September the Luftwaffe placed an order for a small number. Interestingly Dipllng Heinrich Hertel, who had conducted initial design work on the He 177, joined the Junkers organisation in the summer of 1939 and took charge of the Homber B design. This was a Ju 88 rt'placement, the requirement for which was issued in July 1939 and the development of which proved as accident prone as that of Bomber A. In this programme also the Luftwaffe was to prO\'e too ambitious and Udet's organisation inadequate. 'Ille di\'C-bombing requirement also plagued the Do 217, a genuinely twin-engined hea\'y bomber which may be regarded 3S the equi\'alem of lile Avro ",Ianchester. The maiden flight was in August 1938 and de\"elopmem was under way in 1939, but the umbrellalike dive brake in the tail pro\'ed a major headache and e\'entually, in 1939, Udet authorised the temporary suspension of the di\'C-bomhcr requirement, As the handling characteristics of the aircraft pro\'Cd uns.1tisfactory, a major redesign was authorised, leading to the Do 217E the following ye3r. -1l1e Luftwaffe's bombers (and those of Italy's Regia Aeronautica) were also its 'eyes', both in their normal configuration and in dedicated long-range reconnaissance versions. 'Ibe latter were assigned to separate Arm~' and Luftwaffe Fernauf1:.liirungsstatfeln, although the Kampfgeschwader themselves conducted a great deal of reconnaissance for their own missions and German bombers were noted for their extensive

(286mph) and a range of 1,770km (1,100 miles). -Ille maximum imernal bomb load was 1,800kg (3,960Ib) or 2,OOOkg externally, the internal bomb load being confined to 50kg bombs. 'Ille dive-bombing requiremem was also extended to Germany's four.engined bomber, the He 177, which was scheduled to be in widespread sen'ice by 19~2. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe this extremely sophisticated aircT'Jft, designed to the Bomber A requirement, was to be plagued by de\'elopmcnt problems. The prototypc's four Daimler-Benz DB 601 engines were paired in two nacelles as the DB 606, and were prone to overheating, "Illis exacerbated the aircraft's wcight problem caused by the need for strengthening to meet a 60 0 diveangle requirement. It had been anticipatcd that the loaded weight of the operational He 177 would be approximately 27 tonnes (59,sOOlb), but successive prototypes increased in weight until the first production \'ersion (I-Ie 177A-I) had a loaded weight of 30 tonnes (66, IOOlb). The idea of a four-engined bomber didng at 6if has been much derided by aviation histOrians, but it should be noted thtlt R.A.F Specification P. I 3136, which led directly to the Halifax and indirectly to the [Jlncaster, included an unspecified dive angle requirement, 7rY' at one time being seriously considered. In the e\'ent Goring personally authorised removal of the di\'e-bomber re· quiremem enrly in Ihe He I 77's development, but Udet's compartmentalised organisation with its blinkered engineers was unable to rt'soh'e the bombers problems until 19~3. 'Ibe absence of the He 177, which was to ha\'e been the backbone of the long-range anti-shipping force, created a major problem for the Luftwaffe :It the 16

I-Ie 59 twin-cngincd multi-role floatplane which was used also for anti-ship operations and minelaring. Experience quickly confirmed that both were at the end of their opcratioml! lives, but the replacement for the Do 18, the three-engined Blohm und Voss Ih 138 with Jumo 20S diesel engines, required considerable redesign and was not a\'ailable until the follo\\ing summer. Fortunately there were no such problems with the He I 15 multi-role f10atpJane which was to replace the He 59. '1l1e new aircraft was the antithesis of its predecessor, an all-metal monoplane with enclosed crcw positions and a bomb bar which could hold mines or torpcdoes. The floatplane configuration was to impose increasingly severe performance restrictions, bUI (ht' He 115 was (Q prO\'e a robust and reliable design. Unlike its rh-als, Ihe Luftwaffe had only one modern single-engine fighler design at the outbreak of war, and \'irrually all the Jagdgruppen had the Bf 109, wilil a strength of I, I5 I aircraft. "Ille selection of the Bf 109 was a political and operational triumph for its designer, Professor \X'illi Messcrschmitt, who had had to overcome personal prejudice (from the Luftwaffe's second-incommand, Gencraloberst Eberhard Milch) and conser· \'atism which might h3\'e been epitomised in Udet (whose 62 victories were won in traditional fighters). Far from being a stick-in-the-mud, howe\'er, Udet quickly recognised the \"alue of the Bf 109 and his demonstra· tions undoubtedly helped 10 extinguish any opposition from traditionalists. The Bf 10912 was the prime first-line aircraft, with a maximum speed of 550kmjh (3~2mph) and a formidable armament of two 20mm MG FF cannon and two ,\IG 17 machinc.guns, but a substantial number of the older Bf 109Ds were in service with the

fenestration. The majority of reconnaissance aircraft were Do 17F{p \'ersions of the Do I 7E/" I bombers, with cameras in the bomb bay, supplemented by small numbers ofJu 88As and He III Hs. The philosophy of using bombers for long-range reconnaissance was part of the First World War philosophical baggage, when dual use was the norm, such aircraft being capable either of Outpacing or outfighting the few fighters which might intercept them. As the Luftwaffe Quickly disco\·ered. this philosophy depended upon the enemy having old-fashioned fighters, and the introduction of high-performance interceptors placed aircraft such as the Do 17 in the inddious position where they could neither out-fight nor out-run th<'ir opponents, especially wht'n the lauer had radar to provide early warning of thcir \"ietim's approach. The solution was based upon adapting fighter designs for re<:onnaissance using their high speed at lower altitudes or, e\'en more effcco\'ely, flying at \'ery high altitudes which even forewarned interceptors had difliculty in reaching. "ro meet the former requirement the Messerschmitt Bf IIOC-5 was already being de\'CIoped at lile outbreak of war, while for the latter requirement, for which the British swiftly used modified Spitfires, the Luftwaffe again used bombers. A proposal was rec<'i\'ed from Junkers to com'ert Ju 86 airframes with pressurised eabins and impro\"ed engines as the Ju 86H (later Ju 86P), and this appeared in the summer of 19~0 together with lile Bf 1IOC-5. "I be only Luftwaffe reconnaissance units wilil dedicatt-d reconnaissance aircraft were the Sedernaufklarungsstaffcln and the Ktislenmehrlweckstaffcln, the former with the Do 18 flying boat and the lalter with the 17

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND '«'ORLD WAR

AXIS AIRCN.ArT AT TltE OUTBREAK OF '«'AN. 'Ikm~ngmcd aircraft WIth twO- or three-man crews, such as the Bf 110, wcre greatly influenced by experi. ence in the First \X'orld \X'ar, notably with the Bristol Fighter and !he Caudron C.II. In the face of the highpcrformance fighters such as the Bf 109 which emerged III the late 19305, all of the long.range fighters were 10 pro\~ a disappointment, lacking the speed or manoeu\Tability to dogfight with the single...engined aircraftMost were to be reduced in status lO ground-attack duues m daytime, although some, like lhe Bf 110, were to earn a new I~ of hfe as nlghtfighlers, Cenaml}' the outbreak of the W:;lr 5a\\ the Luft\\'lItfe acti\'Cly considering IWO designs as successors to the Bf 110 in !he Zcrstorcrgruppen, 'Ine Messcrschrruu Me 210, of which the prototype flew on 5 September 1939, was the fa\'OUTite, gh·en Messenchmiu's cxperience. presuge and mfiuence, wlule the Arado Ar 240, which first flew In May 19.1(), W:;lS the back.up programme, Both were extremely sophisticated designs with defensi\'C armament including remotely controlled barbeues, Unfortunately both designs displayed appallmg handhng characteristics, esp«ially \\1th regard 10 stablliry.,ne ,\le 210 programme m parucular pro\'ed prolonged lind so disastrously unsuccessful that it pro\'ided Milch with an opponunity for re\'enge upon the designer, ....· hom hc humiliated in 1942. In one respect at least the Lufl\\'3ffe was Streets ahead of Its m"als. "Inat \\'3S In the pro\ision of air transpon, although th,s was by' accident rather than design. In its ellrly days tJle Luftwaffe Intended supplementing its Do II bombers wilh a small number ofJu 52/301 transports which would be operated by LufthanS3 and be capable of conversion into bombers With !he appropriate kit. AI!hough it \\'lIS an all·metal monoplane with a cantile\'er wing, the '-nulle ju' (Auntic junkers), as the aircraft was nicknamed, was techniC'.tll)' an oldcr-gcncration design with a structure of corrugated aluminium O\'er a tubular stcel fr.tmework, a strong fixed undercarriage and three UM \XI 132 radial engines. The fllilure of the Do II series, despile radical redesign, led to the decision to usc the Ju 5213m as a StOpgap pcnding the arrh'QI of the second-generatiol bombers (Do 17, He III, ju 86), "111e air bridge which allowed General Franco to mo\'e thousands of troops from Morocco 10 Spain in the early days of the Spanish Cinl War, mostl)' relymg upon com'Crted ju 52/301 bombers, alerted the Luftwaffe to the llId\'anlages of air tr.msport. At the outbreak of war some 550 were in ser\ice, and apart from a dozen aircraft in an X-Verfahren bombmg urnt, all "~re transporu. Iialf of them were assigned to general transport duties (inclUding those requislljoned from Lufthansa), ready to ft}· m replacements and supplies to forward units, \\ hile the remainder \\~re assigned to '-liegerdi\'ision 7 with crews trained either to drop troops b)' parachute or to fly them into

10 Sffppkmtm Iht Bf 109, dt'f.1tlopmtl/t had beglm of I~ FocJu..lnlif Ftc 190, tlu protol>1't dtp~ttJ Iurr fi>,''Z for I~ fir'll lmu ,1/ Jwu 1939. As fl:'1lh tM Hoo:ker 1j-phoon, 1M tksign m:u pwglltJ by trlgint probbu, althollgh in 1M ~ of 1M Gin/lUll Ulrcraft '''~' m'n' r.w«rl!aud by btirtallarJCY /II 1M RL\f

"I

7..erstorergruppen pending the delivery of adequate numbers of Bf II Os, and also In !he Nachtjagdgruppen, Development of the replacement Sf 100F "i!h Iughcr pcrfomun~. including a maximum s~ of 6OObn,Ih (373mph) but weaker armament, was already under wa)'. and mention should also be made of a carrier·bome \-crsion With Improved range, the Hf 109'1', under development at the outbreak of war The success of !he Hf 109 made the higher echelons in the LurtW'atre reluctant to oonsider another fighter, but !he \'3lue of hea\ier llfTllament and a more robust undercarflage led Udet's orgamsalJon reluctantJy to consider just such a requirement. By the outbreak of war, therefore, work ....'lIS well ad\'3ncc:d on !he Fw 190 with a radial, air.cooled engine, and in]une 1939 the prototype made its maiden flight. The lack of integration \\ithin Udet's organisution mean! that [WO years were to elapse before tJle n~w figiller entered scn'ice, and it required a jagdgcschwadcr technical officer to provide the direction which was to make the Fw 190
18

airfields behmd enemy lines. Not e\'cn the So\'iet A,r Force, which had pioneered airborne operations, had such a force. Ital)' Serond only to the Luftw~dffe in prestige at the outbreak. of the Second \'('orld War was haly's Regia Aeronautica. Europc's second autonomous air force, It had some 2.800 first-line aircraft in September 1939,'Ine prestige had been gamed through the inheritance of the mantle of the greal prorhet of air power, Gen Guilio Douhet, through IU operational experience in Ethiopia and Spain 35 \\~II as numerous record-breaking flights. Consequently many air forces ordered Itnlian aircraft before lhe Second \'('orld \'\'ar, and as late as the summer of 1940 C\'Cn the RAF \\'35 seeking Caproni light bombers. "ne reallly was that the Regia Acronautica \\'lIS a turkey rather than an eagle, due largel)· to luly's w~ak mdustrial base, \\ith both a.trcrart comparues and component manufa.cturers under-capnaliscd. leading to low rates of production. Nevertheless_ industry was seeking to meet the Regia Acronautica:s expansion plan, Programme R, and all the modem bombers such as !he CRDA Cant Z.I OO"7bis Alcione (Kingfisher), Fiat OR 20 Cicogna (Stork) and Sa\'Oia-Marcheni S.-9-1 Spaniero (Sparrow HaWk), were low.wing cantile\'er monopl.ancs "1th retractable undercarriages, while the other compo-nent of the GruPPI Bombardamento TeTTCSte. the S.81 I'ipcstrello (Bat) bomber-transport had a fixed under· carriage. Howcvcr, as \\i!h most of !he Regia. t\eronautiea's combat aircraft, their fuselages were all of

l..ike lhe Jil 52, Ik Soooia-.\lo1'CMui 5.81 PJplStrtl/Q (Bat) a bombn mil/sport frhich saw almm.1t Mn'1a ", Spain, fr1urt it prot1td obwInctm,ytl tt'tll In 1939 llfornud Iht backbolle of 1M Gnippi BT. aluu)f(glr incrMsingly il m:u U'CU

ratricted to mghl bombiflg.

traditional construction, with steel tube or wooden air· frames CO\'cred "i!h wood or doped fabric, and most of the bombers had sunilar cO\'CTings on their \\lngs. Compared \\1th the all-metal monocoque, these weaker structures look a higher proportion of the take-off weighl, imposing penalties upon both range and pay· load, \\ hile !he m31crials were more vulnerable to eO\ironmental conditions which reduced aircraft life. The problem \\'3S compounded by the inabilily' of Italian aero-engme manufacturers 10 pro\'ide high. power, waler-cooled, in-line motors, which forad them 10 rei)' upon radials oftcn dcveloped from foreign

IUJJy~

tkgom eaminj Rillnit; deU'Adriati£o (Cam) Z.I007bis Akiolle (Killgjis!ur) trlltrtd seTt--Ke in 1939 alld htlptd form Ihe badtbont of 1M tmrll/'U Grupp'- BoII/bardommtt TtrrtSu, ytl If aJso SIlmmllristd the fl.1ta)mnsn of the Ira/ian airaufl indllstr;)~ Millg of all-fJ:OOdtn collSmielion btcallSe there m:u insufficinu im;n/mtlll for all·,nelal aircrafl, and hunng tlrru tIIgl/lel btcause t~ i"dustry m:u i"wpablt of producing high-powend engillo.

19

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND \\:"ORLD \\:'AR

,'XIS AIRCRAFT AT Till; OUTBREAK OF WAR

nle prQ/Q/ype Sociela AI/onimu Piuggio PI 08 jour-tllgilled bomber jlf?1:v ill /939, und was Ihe ol/Iy Axis dedicalCd heavy bomber design fdlh sepamw e'lgines to see opermiollalseN,,'ice. Although the lYx:ke-lntif Fw 200 flew bomber missions cnvr Britain, II "'Os ,I,'signl!d as al/ airlilll'r, wI/iiI! lite engines of lite cot/Wllpornry f1eillkl!! He 177 f!'ere paired ill tn'O I/oulles.

All imporUJII/ !eSSO'1 of Ihe Spallish Civil Ifill' f''OS Iht req/liremem for a dedicated dive-bomber, alld all Ilalil/ll rtlSPOIISt UYI.! Ihe Sm:(}ia-Marchelti S.85, '/I.'hich fl.-as ill service with 960 Gruppo ill 1939. The design proved a fail/lre alld Iht S.85s «'ere r<,placed by JI/ 87s UI Ihe eurlieSI opporllmity.

designs."nle Piaggio I~XI RC 40 in lhe Z.IOO7bis de\'eloped I,OOOhp at take-off, and the Alfa Romeo 126 RC 34 in the 5,79-[ developed only 780hp at a time when the latest version of the contemporJ.ry junkers jumo 21 1 in lhe ju 88 developed 1,200hp, To compensale for increased structural weighl lhe designers of bolh lhe Alcione and 5pan'iero adopted a lhree-engine solution which increased drag, e\'en with long-chord engine cowlings. "nle Cicogna had twO Fiat A.gO RC 41 I gcylinder engines rated at I,OOOhp but pro\'ed deddr.:dly underpowered, partly because the heavy struelure also included a nose gun turret. In this respeCi the Cicogna was unique in lhe Regia Aeronautica, whose leadership piously (and somewhat optimistically) hoped their bombers would outrun mOSI interceptors. The defensive armam{'nt of all halian bombers was based upon sing"', riRe-calibre (7.7mm) machin{'-guns, allhough lhes{' were often suppl{'mented by one or two heavy-calibre (12.7nun) weapons, lhe Z.IOO7bis having two. Curiously for an air force allegedly shaped in Douhet's image, the Regia Aeronautica .had no war-winning airpower doetrine like Ihe RAF and, increasingly, the US Army Air Corps, When created in 1925 the Regia Aeronautica was based upon a strike force (Aerial Army) of bomber and fighter squadrons, of which a fixed number were assigned to co-opcnlte with the army and na\'y, supplementing their dedicated reconnaissance squadrons, In 1931 the then Air ,'vlinister, Marshal [talo Balbo (who was killed br his own AA gunners in 1940), introduced a more flexible arrangement. As a result the Gruppi Bombardamelllo were assigned ad hoc missions dependent upon the situation, and might be called upon 10 allack targets on land or al sea. However, there was no practical co-ordination belween th{' three services and Ut{'

1939 but had a totally inadequate performance and ne\'er saw active sen'ice, being replaced by the 1u 87B laic in 19~O. A major problem for me Regia Aeronautica (and the Armel.' de l'Air) was U1C fragmentation of the de\'e1opment and procurement organisation under Balbo's influence. Aircrnft selection and orders were primarily (but nm exclusively) the responsibility of the Direzione Genera1c Costruzioni e Approvigionamenti (DGCA), from which lechnicians were excluded, while technical development and e\"aluation were the responsibility of the Direzione Superiore Studi Esperienze (DSSE), U1C spedfications being drawn up by the Air Staff. This arrangement compartmentalised de\'elopment, with little exchange of ideas, and its mosl pernicious etreels were seen in fight{'r d{'vdopment. By lhe mid-1930s it was clear thaI the traditional fighter, designed largely {O destroy enemy Corps Aeroplanes, with its light armament and emphasis upon manO<.'u\"rability and pilm visibility, could nm meet the new generation of high-speed bombers. High performance and heavy armament were required for this lask, and reluctantly air staffs ordered fighlers with thcse characteristics - except in the Regia Aeronautica. In September 1939 more lh:m 70 per cent of the Italian fighler force consisted of biplanes built in lhe traditional manner, and the Regia Aeronautica was still 1'1.'. equipping Gruppi Caccia 'Icrrcstc with biplanes! "'ne backbone of lhese Gruppi were equipped wilh the Fiat CR.32, powered by a FiatA,30 RA liquid-cooled vee engine, the aircraft being a development of the CR,30 wilh lhe same powerplant, "'ne only concession to technical ad\'ance was the pro\'ision of {wO 12. 7mm machine-guns rather than lhe Ir.lditional rifle-calibre weapons, while

Regia Aeronautica therefore shaped air missions to its own whim. Ne\'ertheless, during 1939 experiments were well advanced with torpcdo bombing by Gruppi Bombardam{,IllO, and during that year the S,79-IIlx:gan to enter service. This had lhe same engin{'s as lhe Z.1007bis but could carry two torpedoes externally, and the squadrons which received Ulese aircraft pUI Italy in the forefront of ami-shipping operations. Indeed, me Germans paid the Italians the complimenl later in the war of emulating their tactics and acquiring their torpedoes. At the outbreak of the Second \'\'orld War a successor 10 the S,79 was being de\'elopcd, originally as the S,79bis and later as the S.84 (a designation shared wilh an unsuccessful DC-3 lookalike). The new bomber featured an impro\'cd a{'rodynamic shape wilh twin fins and rudders, but while it had a heavkr armament (six 12.7mm machine-guns) than thc S.79, its performance prO\'ed inferior, although it was to see operational service from 1941 onwards. The Regia Aeronautica was also nm blind 10 me advantages of modern four-engim:d bombers, The I~iaggio company had been working on various experimental designs since the mid-1930s, beginning wilh lhe P,23 (sometimes referred to as the 1~123) and the 1'.50, and the expertise gained led to the all-metal, monocoque construction I~ 108, which first flew in 1939. It featured a strong def<.'nsive armament including twO remOielycontrolled wing turrets and six 12,7mm machine.guns, bUI while this flying fortress was quickly ordered into production, it did not enter service until 1942. Like the Germans, the Italians were also interested in the concept of di\'e-bombing, although il was never embraced with such fen'our in Rome. The Sa\'oia S.8S, with two 500hp Piaggio I~VII RC 35 radials, was issued to Squadrigl.ie in

20

the later CR.32bis had two such weapons added ill the lower wings, By lhe end of 1939 ulis was being replaced by the CR.42 Falco (Falcon) with the Fiat t\.74 RC 38 radial and one hea\1" and one rifle-calibre machine-gun in the cowling. Relatively fast IH 430kmlh (267mph), lhe Falco was an anachronism, although il was purchased by scwral air forces, including that of Hungary" While the Regia f\cronautica appeared rdUl.:lantly 10 accepl the low-wing monoplane fighter, a specification not being issued until 1936, in practice it sought to mould the new generation of aircraft in the shape of the traditional virtues, "Inc successful designs, lhe Fiat G.SO

The Regia Aerol/alltica's comertxui.!m fOas expres.red in lht seleclioll of the fixcd-wuurcarriagc SodetiJ AI/onima ;lerol/olllica d'lwliu (Pial) eRA2 scsqlliplalllJ as its stUIIdardfigll/er i" 1939, whell the world'.! major air forces "'ere sekcling all-mewl camikver monoplancs for Ihis role. Nevertheless, Ihis aircraft 1/01 only maimoil/ed the First Irilrld IfiJr fighter traditio/!, bl/I also prO'tlf?d 01/ export SIIeClm, being .rekClcd, like iu Fial predecessors, by several air forces, inell/dillg Ihose of Belgirml, HUllgary a'ld SU'edcn.

21

AIRCRAFT OF THE ShCO:-;D WORLD WAR

AXIS AIM-CM-AFT AT Till'. OUTBREAK OF \\'AII.

,

I

lire "lht dmctwn fur lire Grupp; CoaUJ T~re FiiJt G.50 Frtaia (Arrotr), rrhiJ:h. mtn'rd SC'f,ia from 19J8.\tllhednign stin OW(J RWrr 10 trnditwn IWI to tuhnok>gy, INIng slow o.nd ladtlng firrpor«r.

finl jlmm in 1939, the Fio.J CR.25 uw o.1sD an o.tlonpt ti) prodllU i) limg-nmge eseurtfightC' /iJu the Bf 110, and om prodIKtw,. mac.h.i'le WS luaJ o.J' 0. 'hadt' by the ItaliiJn A,r AI/o.dre in &r/in. lu i,UJikqllQ,cles as a fig/rtC' fCtT't: quidlJy ua/istd o.IId It uw produced Orlly /or lire wutegic rtronnaissanu rolf, o./ulOugh It uw a/so uud to DCOTl transport o.Ircraft·

17Je SA /nd.m~ ,\frcduUlidle e AmmamidJe ,\faw.ono./I Ro 'Rolllm) 37 nltnrd snt-ia in the mid 1930swafighltTrt'COlmo.lSuma o.irnuft. So o.t/cmpt UW ll1ade 10 n!forc~ lhe fcrnJn rtqlllrt"I~m, amJ Ir m:u r/" baJu Corps alfnuft of II" Rtgla Ammallllal. A roJlQ/ mgwtd f.:vnitm, tM RrJ J ihrs, slIppILnu:meJ tIle Ro J'; ", the SqlladnglU! O.uenUZIOIU! AtTta,

Orlt of Eu~'s leaJ",g UlrnuJt exporters t:W tht Sot:ittd lIa/lima Cupro".~ v:hidt prodllUJ a sru:auion of OmStTf.'(/· "t~ dn,gllS. ltrdMJ, as £lu as 1940 Brilo.in's Air ,\llnl$lry U'clJ '" the wu s/o.~ ofordtT",g SO"le Ca 310s. 17Je Ca 133, ofv:/ridl o.n o.lr o.mblllana f.'fi'SWn is sen!~, uw Q typica.l bo",btT-trurlsport dntg'l, o.nd /omwd tile badtbo,U! of lhe coIomala"rforulnA~ by 1939,

Freccia (Arrow) and the Macchi MC200 Saena (lnunderbolt) bolh embodied modem constrUction techniques. but lhe emphasIs was upon manocu\Tabibl)' and me)' had only 1\\'0 12.-mm machine-guns, while transparent canoPl" m each design were replaced by open cockpitS at pilotS' request to prm;dc better visibilil)'. Bolh aircraft were handicapped br ha\;ng to usc lhe 8~Ohp Fiat A.7-1 RC 38 at a time when the Bf 100EI had a I,050hp liquid
the reqUll'cment for ground-attack lI1tCraft, largely through the effortS of Col Amedee Mecozzi in the late 19205. 8y 1939 ltaban dl\'istOns could caD upon the Squadrigl~ Assalto, \\ hich had three purpose-built designs. The Breda Sa 64 was an an-metal, camile\'er monoplane design \\;th open cockpll and retractable undercarriage, while the Caproni Bcrgamaschi AP.I was sundar but of tradmonal construction and with fixed undercarnage. The Bredll design had four rifle-calibre machine-guns In Ihe wings. while lhc AP.I had three machine-guns. one each in the wheel fairings and one in the fuselage, but there was a considemble degree of commonalit)', both aireraft carrying a total bomb load of 400kg (8801b) and being a\llilable in single-seal fighler/auack and two-scat reconnaissanl;'e \'crsions, and both being at the end of their scn'ke lives. The Ra 65, which formed the backbone of the Squadriglie Assalto, WIIS powered by a GnOme-RhOne 14 radial built under licence as the Isoua-Fraschini K.I-I, and was also produced in single-seat auack (Ra 65) and two-seat reconnaissance-bomber (Ba 6Sbis) versions. It fearUTed substantial improvcmenls in armament, with two rifle-calibre and twO heav)' machinc-guns and up to 1 tonne (2,200lb) of bombs, but its obsolescence was demonSlrllted during lhe Spanish Ci\'i1 \'rar, by which time a potential replacement was under de\'c1opment by Breda. 'rhis was a twin-cngined attack bomber of ultramodern CQnSlrucrion with thn:'C heav)' machine-guns in lhe nose and a single 7.7mm weapon in the open rear rod:.pit. l:>roduction bt:gan in 1939 as the Ba 88 lince a..rnx), The Unce could carry up to 500kg (I,OIOlb) of bombs, but II was underpowered and the massh'e naceUes for the l:>iaggio 1~X1 RC 40 radials created tremendous drag in an otherv.ise dean airframe. An unusual feature of Regia Acronautica policy was a series of requirements for aircraft dedicated to the

colonIal policmg role. The original design was Caproni"s Ca 133 bomber-transport, a hlgh-braced-wmg monoplane with three: radial engines capable of carr),ng 500kg (I,IOOlb) of bombs extemaUy or eighteen soldiers IOternally. A new gencration of multi-role aircraft was in production by 1939 from Caproni Bergamaschi, bascd upon the Borea (North \'('ind) light airliner. All were t\\in-engmed, canule\"er-wlng monoplanes of tmdmonal l.:onStrul;'uon. The Ca 309 Ghibli (Desert \'('lnd) ha\'lng II fixed undercarriage, but the Ca 310 Liberccio (Southwest \'.;Iind) and the Ca 311 had retractable undercarriages. Although lightly armed (three 7,7mm m:lchine-guns) and carrying a bomb load of only -IOOkg (880Ib) these alrerafl and e\"Olutionary dC\'elopmentS were to be used extensh'cJy during the Second World War and many were exported. The Ca 309 was manufal;'tured undcr licence in Bulgaria wilh 240hp Argus As IOC engines as the Papagal (Parrot). Given Mussolini's determination to ensure that the Mediterranean was IH(;Ire Noslmm (Our Sea) the Italian nel.'l was well served with seaplanes which could patrol the waters around the navy's eXlcnsive nelwork of bases. "Ine twin-huUed Savoia S.55, used for many recordbreaking flightS, was being \\;thdrawn and had been largely replaced by the single-engined Cant Z.501 Gabbiano (Seagull) flying boat. In the offensh'e role the elegant trimotOr Cant Z.s06 Airone (Heron) floatplane had entered scn;cr with the Gruppi Bombardamento ~ larittimo in 1938, and could carry a torpedo or a 800kg (1,76-1lb) bomb IOtemally. To direct the na\1"S guns the battk'Shlps and crulscrs carried the ,\1eridionali Ro 43 noalplane, although its performance both in the air and in waters other than flal calm were poor. 10 provide air protecuon for the flcct al 5Ca, a fighter \'ersion of the Ro ~3 was produced as the Ro 4-1. Itaban aIrcraft \\"Cre extensh-ely exported to Europe,

the :\ liddle East and Latin America. In addition to aircraft sclected for the Regia Aeronauuca, a number of deSigns were buIlt Specifically for expo" or buill under hl;'ence. One of the most successful was a IWIn-engmed \'ersion of the S -9, the S.-913, which was tined with a \llriety of engines depending upon the customer's choice. Romarua's first batch had I,OOOhp GnomeRhOne KI4 II C32s, while the 5ecOnd batch, JRS.798, had the 1,220hp Junkers Jumo 211 Da liquid-cooled vee engine and was manufactured under licence from 19~0 with a rcdesigned tail. The Caproni Ikrgamaschi Ca 135 had been an unsuccessful competitor \\ith the Cam Z.1007 and S.79, but It had some export success, customers including Hungary, which selected the version with I'iaggio I~XI RC -10 radials (Ca 135bis), this version featuring a manually operated dorsal turret. Hungary also selected the

A

lief'

III

UW IIrL

22

TI,e Offitme M«umidlt 'Rcggialle' SA (Cap rom), rom· mOll/y ca/i£J Rl'fgwlIe, prodllr;£d tlw Re 2000 Imnretlore (/lIttTUp'orl to mL!tt a Rqia Anv'lOlI/iro requiremmt for a IIlOnopwllt' fighler. Aillumgh. Ii ttUS not seltt:ttd for domtSI~ use,fro'" 1939 It uw txpor,ed to olld abo miJmifa
23

AIRCRAfT OF THl:: SECOND ,"'ORl.!)

\~'AR

AXtS AIRCRAFT AT TilE OUTBREAK 01' WAR

to the extent that it used the wil of me PZL 1>.24E fighter. 11 was scheduled to recci\'e four rifle-ealibre (7.92mm) machine-guns, but the difficulties of acquiring these and other components in a Europe now al war, as well as the lack of machinc tools, prevcnted the fighter entering sen'ice until eariy 1941. Japan Italian aircraft sold tojapan participated without distinction in a conflict which ended immediately before the outbreak of the Second World W·ar. In May 1939 a dispme on me Manchurian-Mongolian border betw{'{'n the Khalkin Gol rh'er and me dllage of Nomonhan flared into a full-scale war in which the Fiat Type [ (DR.20) was used. The battle ended in ignominious defeat for the japanese, who lost 158 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair_ This conflict actuallr saw the third clash betw{'{'n Russian and japanese pilots, who had met on the Korean border in 1938 and in China from 1937_ On paper japan had more than 2,000 fifSl·line aircraft, bm janus-like organisation fragmented its strength into the Army Air Force OAAF) and Nav)' Air Force ONAF), and it was the fonner Sen'ice's air arm which was humiliated. The role of the japanese Army was to secure national interests on the cast Asian mainland, Ihe prime threat being pereei\'ed from the Soviet Union, while in the absence of any Japanese entllUsiasts of Douhet, its air arm existed to support that rolc. Its early leaders had been officers 'ticket punChing' before transferring to omer commands, one of the most distinguished being Lt Gen 'Ibjo Hideki, who was Inspector General of the jAAF between December 1938 and july 1940, then became \X'ar l\-linister, and in 1941 the Prime Minister. In 1939 a new plan to expand me jAAF by a third 10 142 squadrons (Chutai) was accepted_ By this time the jAAF was developing its own career structure, yet the definition of aircraft requirements still tended towards the conservati\'C while benefiting from a substantial capital in\'estment into the aviation industry made during the early 1930s. This ill\'estment meant that by 1939 most japanese combat aircraft were cantilever monoplanes with mOllocoque airframes, almough the failure to dc\'elop modern liquid-.coolcd in-line motors meant that most aireraft had radial engines, MostjAAF aircraft represented First World War requirements in the shape of late 1930s te<:hnology, although mere were signs of philosophical development. This conset\'lltism is especially striking in the bomber force, which continued to follow the First World War division into single·engined, two-scat light bombers and multi-engined heavy bombers. The majority of bombers were in the former category, and bom they and the multi-engined aircraft suffered from notably small bomb loads. The May 1936 requirement for a new generation

HIt Industria Aerommtiw ROlllalla (IAR), /xu:;kbolle of Rumania's aircraft illdllstry, prodllced the sesqlliplalle IAR 37 Corps aircraft. II prutJ<':d I/usatisfactory Oicillg to ilS IAR 14K mgi"e, a deriooriw of the GI/ome-RMI/e 14K, a/l(/ alternative pcn'Cr U'OS sOl/gill. n"illl rhe 13tH II" 132A the aircraft becollle the IAR 38, iI'hieh firsl jlen' in JUllllary 1939, allli fhefollOicillg J'Cur, pOflJtrei/ by the IAR 14K /I e32, ir tms designatcd IAR 39, SCCII herc, (md became Ille prime jrom·/i'lc vcrsioll.

Reggiane Rc 2000 Scric [ fighter which had competed unsuccessfully against thc G.50 and MC 200. An allmctal fighter powered by a Piaggio PXI RC 40. it later proved more manoeuvrable than the Bf 109E, but its unprote<:ted wing fuel tanks were a weakness. The fighter was sold to Hungary, where it was dubbed Hcja (Hawk), and produced under licence from 1942 with GnomeRhone 14K as the Hi-ja II. A design which flew only in prototype form was the Caproni Bergamaschi Ca 335 Maestra1c (,...tistral). This was a two-scat fighter reconnaissance design wim Hispano.Suiza 12 Ycrs liquid-cooled \'ee engine, and a licence was acquired by Belgium'g SABCA. which was producing the aircraft as me SA7 at the time of thc German ill\,tlsion in 1940, The Balkan allies of Germany and Italy had small aircraft industries whose limited facilities were largely cmployed to produce aircraft of traditional construction, usually of obsolete German, Italian, Czechoslo\~.l.k. French and I>olish design. By 1939 only Hungary and Romania had produccd indigenous combat aircraft, the former's Corps Aeroplane squadrons including the Manfred \'{Ieiss WM 16 Budapesl. A deri\'ative of me Fokker VD biplane with a Gnl'Jme·Rh6ne radial engine, this was produced in two versions. with the 9K !\'Iistral (Budapest I) and the 14K Mistral-Major (Budapest II). Romania produced a similar aircrafl with the same powerplant as the Budapest II, me IAR 37 sesquiplane wim enclosed cockpi!. The unreliability of early liceneebuilt Mislnll·Majors led 10 the stop-gap installation of me BMW 132A as Ihc IAR 38, but by 1939 improvements in Mistral-Major rcliablity led to renewed installations in the JAR 39. The same engine was also selected for the country's firsl modern fighter, the IAR 80, which made its maiden flight in April 1939. This all-metal monocoque fighter capitalised upon existing production

24

Afiwlbishi's !lrmy U-pe 97 heatly bember (Ki-2/) 'Uus desig>led 10 mlX/ a 1936 specifiwrion, bllr pM/lleliim oj lite Ki·21·' depicted here was sWw, Qlld some heavy-bomber Chllwis Iw.d the misforl/mt 10 reeeitV! Ihe Fiat BR.20. In the Secol/d Il'arld Ifbr lite Ki-21 was codcllamed 'SafJy' by Ille Allies.

of light bombers specified a maximum speed of 400kmlh and a normal bomb load of 300kg (661Ib) to replace the Army Type 93 (Kawasaki Ki-3). This requirement led to two low.wing aircraft with enclosed cockpits and fixed undercarriages. The Mitsubishi Army Type 97 Singleengined Light Bomber (Ki-30) differed from me Kawasaki Army Type 98, also a Single-engined Light Bomber (Ki-32), in that the laner, uniquely for japanese combat aircraft of this period, had a liquid-eooled vec engine (Kawasaki Ha-9), The bombs, up to a maximum of 450kg (993Ib), were carried internall~', and their defensive armament consisted of a single rifle·calibre (7,7mm) machine-gun facing forward and one in me rear cockpit. At the suggestion of a Capt Fujita YulO. a ground-auaek aircrAft specification based upon the Ki30 was issued in December 1939, and prolotypes made their appearance in the summer of 1939. Although lightly armed (two fixed and one movable rifle-ealibre maChine-guns) and with a small, externally carried bomb lo.1d of 180kg (400lb), the aircraft was armoured. It cntcred service from 1940 as the Mitsubishi Army Type 99 Assault Aeroplane (Ki-51). l11e Inlditionallight bomber concept was challenged when the japanese encountered the Tupole\' SB-2-,\ II 00 in China in No\'ember 1937. 'Illis led almost irmnediately to a requirement for a twin-engined light bomber with a maximum speed of 480km/h (298mph), a 400kg (882Ib) internal bomb load and a defensi\'e armament of up to four rifle-calibre maChine-guns, The Kawasaki ArmyType 99Twin-engined Light Bomber (Ki-48) was a four-man aircraft and de\'(~lopment was well advanced in 1939, the aircraft entcring scrvice the following year. By 1939 the heavy bomber Chutais had recci\'Cd the Mitsubishi Army Type 97 Heavy Domber (Ki-21), which was designed to meet a 1936 specification to replace the Mitsubishi Arm)' Type 92 (Ki-20) and Mitsubishi Army Type 93 (Ki-I), The specification induded a five-hour endurance, a maximum speed of

400kmjh (248mph) and a normal bomb load of 750kg (1,653Ib) which might be extended for short-range missions to I tonne (2,2051b). Initial production models of the Ki-21 had a long, enclosed. dorsal machine-gun position. Later production models had impron:d protection including a fifth machine-gun in a remotclr-operated tail position and laminated rubber sheets added to me fuel tanks, Delays in production of this aircraft led to tlle purchase of the Fiat BR.20 as a stop·gap, but tllis was an experiment the japanese did not repeat. The limitations of the Ki-21 were evidently acknowledged by the Army, which issued in 1938 a replacement hea\1' bomber specification. This ea1led for a maximum speed of 500km/h (311 mph), a 3.000km (1,864-mi1c) range, a I tonne bomb load and improved acti\'e/passi\'C protection including self-scaling tanks. The prototype of what became the Nakajima Army -IYpe 100 Heavy Bomber (Ki-49) made its maiden flight in August 1939 and entered sen'icc two years later, bUI the type never supplanted its predecessor. In fighter design, too, the japanese Army pro\'ed as eonsermti\'e as the Regia Aeronaurica. The last biplane fighter. the Kawasaki ArmyType 95 (Ki-l0), had almost disappeared by 1939 and had been replaced by the Nakajima Army Type 97 (Ki·27), combining modern construction techniques wim a fixed undercarriage, open cockpit and a pair of rifle-calibre machine-guns. The Ki·27, which emh'ed from a pri\'llte-\'enture design, the 'IYpe PE, was clearly designed to traditional fighter concepts, although later production \'crsions had enclosed cockpits and could carry cither four 25kg (55Ib) bombs for ground-attack missions or twO 130 litrc (28.6 Imp gal) drop tanks to extend range, The rc· placement. the Nabjima Army Type I (Ki-H), was already flying in prototype form in September 1939. and while it fearured a retractable undercarriage and higher speed (the specifICation of 1937 called for 500km/h

25

AXIS AIRCRAFT AT THE OUTHREAI-: OF \\:'AR

AIRCRAFT OF THE SliCOKD \\:'ORLD \\:'AR

-. The prOiOlyt>e Nakajima Army 7)'pe / (Ki-43) Hayabl/so (Peregrine FulcoII) flew as Ihe Et'ar begall and t~'l'lS a repiaalIIent for II/e Ki·27, allhol/gh bl/ilt acwrtling 10 Ihe same philosophy. IVidely ellcountered dwi"g Ihe tt'Qr, il tt'QS codcnamed 'Oscar'.

In 1939 most of the Japallese Army Air Force's Corps sql/adrons had the 1Uchikm~'(1. Army '1yPe 98 direct w.oper· allO" lUroplalle (Ki-36), tL'lllchJ like Ki-27 alld Ki-43, um a lradillo"al desigll exploitillg IIetv tcdmology, /1 was extreme, Iy popular wilh irs crewS,olle reasoll fvhya lroi'ler version appeared in /939 as Ihe Army 7j>pe 99 adva"ced lrailler (Ki.55), codellamed 'Ida'.

(311 mph)), it was srill a traditional design. Indeed, the specification demandcd manocuvrabmt~' at least equal to lhat of the Ki-27, The new fighter, dubbed Havabusa (Peregrine Falcon), entered senice in 19-1 I. ' Like its contemporaries in Europe, lhe japanese Army was interested in the twin-engined, long.range fighter concept, allhough the specification issw.:d in March 1937 was essentially a blank sheet of paper. The responses from Kawasaki, Mitsubishi and Nakajima

then led to a more detailed specification nine months later which included a maximum speed of 540kmjh (335mph) and a five-hour endurance with an armament of two forward-firing and one mm'able rear-facing machine-gun. Only Kawasaki n:spondl'd, with the Army Experimental Ki-45, which first flew in january 1939. Engine problems delayed its introduction into sen·iee, howe\·er, and lhese were nOt overcome for tWO years. Inevitably lhe majority of jAAF aircrafl were Corps

--

Virwally all of Ihe Japanese Army fighler GIll/luis in 1939 u·ere eqllipped wilh Ihe Nakajima Army 1jope 97 (Ki-27), u'hieh U'l'lS mlllton dressed as lamb, Ihe lraditional fighler tOllUPI elJlbodie(1 in lIew techl/ology. II was slilI Ihe backbo'lC of these Clmlais ill /941, receiving Ihe codellame 'Nale'.

26

AeroplaneS. Small numbers of lhe Nakajima Army T)'pe 9-1 Reconnaissance Aeroplane (Ki.4) sesquiplane re· mained in first·line service, but they had largely been supplantcd by lhe Tachikawa Army Type 98 Direct Cooperation Aeroplane (Ki-J6). This had a modern airframe with an enclosed cockpit, yet essentially reproduced lhe earlier aircraft with such features as its fixed undercarriage, light armamenl (two 7.7mm machineguns and 150kg (3301b) bomb load), but despite (or because of) lhem it proved very popular. Captain Fujita Yuzo, who influenced the Kj-51 attack bomber specification, also drafted one in july 1935 for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft 10 support armies and army groups. The specification for what became the Mitsubishi Type 97 Command Reconnaissance Aeroplane (Ki.15) ineluded a requirement for a maximum speed of 450km/h (280mph) and a combat radius of 400km (250 miles). With its fixed undercarriage and long, enclosed cockpit it resembled contemporary mailplanes, but it proved successful, and in September 1939 production of an up,engine
Caplaill (laler Major) Flljila 111::0 U'OS one ofthe few visiollaries iI/ l/se Japanese Army Air Force, alld his demand for a high-performal/ce. rccomU1issallu aircrafr led /0 lite appearalice ill November /939 of Ihe prOlOl)'/'e Atiuubishi Army Type 100 commalld recomUJiSSilnu aerop/alle (Ki-46). The second version, pic/IIrtd herr, tvas Ihe Ki-46-1l fvilh MilSllbishi Ha /OZ t"gines, which fJ,'OJS fasrer rlU1/l rhe Ki-4] and ell/ered 5eroice ill 1940.

torpedo attacks until the battleships could fight lhe decisi\·e action, their guns being directed by observation aircraft. ",. 'Ine japanese Nav)' was no exception, and e\'en until the end of lhe Sccond \'('orld War il was dominated by traditionalists who belicvcd in thc suprcmacy of lhe battleship. This orlhodoxy was ehallenglxi by two men, lhe most notable of whom was Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, newl)' appointed commander·in.chief (officially commander of the Combined Fleet) in September \939, and lhe charismatic Commodore (Rear Admiral in November) Onishi Takajiro_ A brilliant staff officer who had exploited every opportunity to broaden his horizons, Yamamoto had lectured on the importance of air power, and especially torpedo bombers, as an instructor in the Naval Academy in lhe 1920s. He had headed lhe JNAF in lhe mid-I 930s, and as a Navy Minister encour· aged lhe construction of aircraft carriers to take the baltic to the enemy. He was complemented by Onishi, a founder of lhe Nakajima Aircraft Company and by 1941 chief of Slaff of lhe land-based II th Air "'leet. who sought also to exploit lhe numcrous islands on lhe cast· em edge of japan's Pacific empire for land-based air power. The majority of the aircraft in sen·ice in 1939 came from programmes initiated between the 8th and \1 th rears of the Showa reign (8-Shi to II-Shi), i.e, 1933 to 1937. The long-range, land-based strike force largely had the M.ilSubishi Na\'y Type 96 Attack Bomber (G3M), dewloped al the instigation ofYamamoto when he headed the Na\·al Bureau of Aeronautics' Technical Division. 'Inc specification he issued in 1933 wcnt only to Mitsubishi and produced a twin-engined torpedo bomhcr whose operational debut in August 1937 involved a 2,OOOkm (1,250-mile) transoceanic bombing 27

AXIS AIl{CRAFT AT T1I1' Ol;TIjREAK 01' WAR

i\ll{Cl{i\i'T 01' TilE SECOND ""OKLO WAK

simplified designation G5N. but it pro\'ed unsuccessful. Like the JAAF, the jNAF suike force consisled mainly of smgle-engmed aircraft, although 10 this case because they were dcsigned primarily to operate from aircraft carriers. By 1939 a \\holt"sale change in the di\"C:bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons was well ad\lIllCC'd.....;!h uaditional-COn5tructlon biplanes of the 8-Shi and 9-Shi programmes bemg replaced by monocoque-construCllon, cantile\"Cr monoplanes. Re-cqulpmenl of the torpedo bomber units had been gi\"Cn priOrtl). for thc Yokosuka Na\')' T)"e 96 Carrier An3ck Bomber (B4Y) \\11 oc\"Cr more than a stop.-gap design follo.....ing !he failure of the Yokosuka Type 92 (D3\). The IO-Shl (1935) specificatlon laid greal emphasis upon endurance, which ....-as 10 be up 10 se-.-en hours. and an external payload of SOOkg (I.-60lb). The ....inner of the competition \\115 the Nakajima Na\')·Typc: 9- Carrier AIt3ck Bomber CBS!'.'), which entered senice in 1938 and was the first japanese carrier-borne aircraft ....1th a rttraetable undercarnsge. The aircrafl possc:sscd a formidable range of bet.....een I, II Okm (normal) and 2.260km (maXimum) (590nm and 1,220001), .....hich was unmalched by American torpedo bombers e\'en in 1944. So radical was the design that a consernlJ\-e fall-back design \lith a fixed undercamage ....-as produced by Musublshi as the B5M. but saw linle actiw St'T\;cc. In 1939 a 14·5hl specification for a replacement aircraft ....-as iSSUed. calling for a range of between 1,850km (\\ith SOOkg load) to 3.300km (withoUl bombs) (1,000 10 1,800nm), which led 10 19.\ I to the Nakajima Na\'}' Carrier Attack llomberTeuzan (Heawnly Mountain), or B6N. In re-cquipping di\'e-bomber units the Na\'y pro\·ed mOTe conservative, and during 1939 the Aichi Na\'}' ·I)·pc 96 Carrier Bomber (DIAl), strongly influenced by thc I'kinkel lie 66. was due for replacement by the Aichi NIl\')' Type 99 Carrier Bomber (D3A), which relaine
Dt:t~IoPI/JOIl of 1M /\fiullbishi Sat')' O'~ 96 allock bolllMr (GJ.H) was brglln at 1M insligation of Gapt (loUT Ad,,,,raJ, Hmw",oto fsoro/tll, a"d 8'X~ tlu Japa"~R .\'Cl't')' all """. oolkd Jong-rallgr strJu an" ,,, 19J9. 7i:."O yean 1auT, trh£ll tI,~u bombvJ rrcnv£d tI~ codcw,,~ ·stir. w,,~ MIj1«1 to sink tM BTitish wpital ships HAtS Prince of \X·aks and Repulse:.

nusslOn agamst Chinese targets m bad w~ther. The biggest drawbacks to thiS fanuly were that !heir SOOkg (1.746Ib) bomb load had to be carried externally, and !heir th~ riflc-calibre machlnc·gun dcfcnSI\·c armamcnt (in ~ retractable t~ts. two dorsal and one \"Cntra1) was Inadequate. In $cptcmber 1939 a prototy~ replacement aircrafl devdoped 10 a 12·Shl TCqUiremcnt madc its first flight. and ....-as 10 pro\'ide the Japanese: Navy \\i!h an aircraft capable of carrying an 800kg torpedo internally 3,700km (2,OOOnm). The cigar-like Mitsublshi Na\')' 1)"e I Attack Bomber (G4M) was to ha\'e a hClnicr armamcnt. With a 20mm cannon 10 a lad position and four 7.-mm rnachlne.guns. bUI there was no pto\'ision for armour or self-sealing fuel lanks. The previous year saw work begin on an e\-en more ambitious project for an allack bomber ....'i!h a range of up to 6.500km (3,500nm). Based upon the Douglas DC.4E fourengined alrhner. Ihe firSI prototype of the Nakajima Experimenral 13·Shi Altack Bomber Shinzan (1\lountain Recess) flew at the end of the year and had the

By 1939 tM Japonm NQtVlI Air Foret had kJrgdy corrin grollps fI:lth modem stnke aIrcraft SlIch as this IVaRaJllfla !\'lNJI 7~ 97 tarrin Qttack bomhu ,B5.\'1). Dlmng till toor tJ/.l$l alrt:rufr. coJowmld 'Katl'. ~ usal for both kve/ olld torptJo bombing os t«// os r«onnal$$QIJu. rt-tqlllp~d Its

28

Yokosuka Naq' Carrier Bomber 5usei (Comet).or D.\Y. first flew at the end of 19.\0. nearly thrcc years elapsed before it Joined di\·e-bomblllg Units. owmg to de\oclopment problems. The Na\')··s fighter in 1939 was l)'Plcal of Its contemporaries. belllg produced to a 9-$hl (193.\) n-qUlrement. -Ine l\lItsubishi Na\"y TnJe 96 Carrier Fighter (/\5M) \\lIS an all-metal gull.wing design \\ith an open cockpit and fixed undercarriage. The usual pair of nfle-eahbre machlllc-guns \\TIC fined. although later models augmented this \\ith a 20mm cannon. I:x..,,·dopment of a replacement \\-as well ad\-anced, ha\,· 109 begun in 19r in the light of combat cxpenencc o\"cr China. and "' hile manocu\Tabilil)· was stressed. the spttd and armamall requirements (500km/h or 311mph and twO 20nun cannon ....ith two -.-nun rnachlOe-guns) clearly demonstrated that the jNAF was seeking a radical design. The ,\htsublShl Na\1·1)-pe 0 Carrier Fighler (A6,") enleted SCT\;CC in 19.\0 and ....lIS to prO\-e one of the great fighttTS of the Second "'·orld \'\'ar. \\lth a phenomenal range (for thc period) of 1.8-0km (I.otOnm). Tnc bmlted range of Its predecessor forced the jNAF to send attack bombers unescorted deep imo Chinese territory. where many fell \ictim to cnemy fighters. Reeogmsmg the problem, and influcnced by the French PotC".l 631. a long-range. t\\in-engine fighler specificalJon \\-as ISSUed III 1938.11\15 called for an aircraft wi!h a maximum speed of 520 km/h (322mph), good manocu\'rablllty 10 mcct smglc-scat fighters and a nor· mal range of 2,~OOkm which could be extended 10

- I}

711(' otlur lkltum of tlu (lJrTW" stnk:(' foret (OO.J IO be till Aid" Xut!Y O'Pl 99 (<1"in" bo"',," fDJA I!. u:hich altered sen.·ice /1/ 1940. CoJ£,w11Icd 'lUI', this dit:~ boll/ber f."'W grtdl/y InflllOU:cJ by '/~ Hrinul He 70. HrinJu/ wid AicJri ha1.'lllK hod a Strong bminns rrlotionship sina tM lotI 1910s.

3.-00km (1.300 to 2.000 nm). The prolOl)"e of the Nakajima N:l\')" E.xpcrimcntal 13·$hi thrcc·scal escort fighter did not fly until 1941 .. and pto\·ed a failure. but redesigned it be'came the Na\')· T~"e 2 Reconnaissance Aeroplane aIN). Tne Na\1"s desire for a bomber destroyer was underhned 10 a 1.\·Shi requirement ISSUed in September 1939. ....hich had aClually been drafled the pre\;ous year. This called for a land-based aircrdft \\ith 6OOkm/h (3"73mph) maximum speed and the abilil)' to reach 6,00001 (19,-OOft) 10 5.5 mmutes. Three years were to elapse before the prototype ,\ lilSUbishi Na\'y Interceptor Fighler Raiden (lllUnderboll). or j2,\I. firsl flew, and

I

- .....'y-

"_-3

I

29

,.

~ 8

..

I\IRCII.AI'T OF TilE SECOND ",,'ORLD WAR

AXIS ... III.CII. ... FT AT TilE OUTBREAK OF \'('AII.

For /ong-ronp rccomwuumu Ik J(lpan~ Sovy rt/~d In /939 upon I~ fOllr mginM Kmronishi Sary I'}'~ 97 Ji)ing boot (H6Kl, frilh 0 no",101 ro~ of ,nort lhon Z,ZOOnm (4,OOOkm,.lt awfmlllfflll)' OKOfml~1l'ddllnll8 rh~ tror, fl:hm 1/ f.-W codaw,,~
rogme- probkms we-re- to ha\oco a de-ln~lal e-ffect upon de\·e1opment. Tbe smgle-engined altack bombers all had a secondary reconnaissance rok. Indttd, the Yokosuka D.J\' actually entered $Cnitt in 1941 with a reconnaissance unit, but the C)ocos of the- fleet we-re- its se-aplanes. Longrange- reconnaissance- re-quirements were mct by tWO 9-Shl designs ....1th bnace-d Wings, lhe four-cngincd Kawanishi Navy 'I)'pe 97 "'ying Boat (I16K) and the t....in-cngincd Yokosuk.a Navy Type 99 Hying Boat (H5'f). The laller was supposed to complement the former bUl proved underp<,"ocored, but the H6K pro,·cd a gre-at success, ha\'mg a normal range of more than 4,OOOkm (2,200nm), By 1939 a replacement Large Flying Ileal was undcr de'·c1opment to meet a 13-Shi

rcquircmcnl for an aircraft with a range of 8,300km (4,500nm). The protOtype of whal be-came theKawanishi Navy Type 1 A~ing Boat (H8K) did not appear unul the follo.....mg year, and when it enlered scnice 11 was to pro\'e a valuable tool, with armour prolC~ction and a defenSIve armament of fke 20mm cannon and three 7.-mm machine-guns. Seaplanes wcre embarked in man}' Japanese ships to pro,ide tactical reconnaIssance and fire control, but seaplane carriers as well as seaplane lenders were also a'11ilable to stre-ngthen r(>C()nnalssance- and anli-submarine forces, One oflhe mOSl widely used flootplanes in 1939 was the Nakajima Navy Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplane (E8N), a single-float open-wckpit biplane of traditional construcuon, and its successor adoplcd a similar design philosophy, entering service as the Mitsubishi Navy Type 0 ObsemHion Seaplane (FIA1), For longer-range reconnaissance in cruisers and seaplane carriers the Navy used the Kawanishi Na\l' Type 94 Reconnaissance Seaplane (E7K), a twin-float design otherwise similllr to the ERN, Developmcnt of a replacement had b«n under way since 1937, and was to be won in 1940 by the Aichi Nav}· Type 0 Reconnaissance Seaplane (E 13A), a lwin-flolll, lln-metal monoplane with an enclosed cockpit, A potcntial replacement for which a 14-Shi (1939) re-quirement \\115 issued called for a high-speed reconnaissance seaplane which could e\llde fighters. -1\\'0 years were to elapse before the first flight of what became the Kaw11nishi Navy Type 2 High-speed Reconnaissance Seaplane Shiun'(Violet Cloud). or EI5K, and the aircraft \\11S not Ii sucre-ss, The- japanese- Na\l' place-d much e-mphasis upon mght operations in which the enem}' would be: struck first by \"Cr~' long-range torpedoes and then by gunfire,

Et:
30

For the Rcgia Aeronautica see;

and in this field the Japanese wcre to \dn seveml \ictorics, C\'en against enemy forccs who had the advantage of TUdar. To suppon this role small numbers of the single-e-ngmed AIChl Na'l'Type 96 Night Reconnaissance Seaplane (EIOAI) biplane flying boat wcre in SCr\ice, e-mbarkcd in the light cruisers which led the dcstroyer floulla ,but from 1938 lhese w"Cre- being replaced b). the Similar Aichi Type 98 Night Reconnaissance Seaplane ElIAI), designed to an II-Shi requirement. The submanne arm. whose tasks were to pro\ide ad\'3nttd warmng of e-nemy fleet mO\ocomenlS to the Combined "'CC't and lO erode enemy fleet ~ngth. naturally had a seaplane requirement. In 1939 this was met by \'\'atanabe Na\l' Type- 96 SmaD ReconnaissanceSeaplanes (£9\'\'1), which were kept dismanl1ed In smaD hangars and re-assemble-d when required. A l2-Shl requirement for a replacement saw the appearance in 1939 of the prolOlypc of what became the t"in-f1oal Yokosuka Na\l' Type 0 Small Reconnaissance Seaplane EI4Y1). ThiS hnle-known aircraft entered service In 19.J I and had the unique distinction of bombing the American mainland the follo\\ing year,

Ce-\ll. L & Curami, A, 'Air Army and Aircraft Industry in haly' in Boog, Horst (e-d), I'M Coru/uct of I~ Air Ifar ill lIlt Secolld Ifor/d Ifin (Berg Pubhshe-rs, Oxford. 1991). and

n,t

Green, \'\' FriekCT, J, All Forces of tile Ifol/d (MacDonald, London, 1958), For an exhausti,·c study on Japanese aircraft see: Francillon, R j, Japa,~ Aircroft of the Paajk Ifil,. (Putnam, London, 19-0). 11lere is Imle m English about the de\'ClopffiCnt of the japanese lIIr forces apart from; Fjichlro SckigaW'a, l"'U::toriaJ History ofJapannt MIlllary At'wlum, cd.Lte-d b)' 'Iaylor, J \'(I R and Monday, 0 (Ian Allan, Shepperton, 1975)

as well as Grttn & Fricker (op cit). For the JAAF. see a series of US Army post-war monogl1lphs pubhshe-d In microfilm fonn by !.hc US GO\'CTnment I'rlnung Offi~:

Bibliography

No 76, 'China Are-a air opel1ltions record July 1937 to August 1945';

There is a we-alth of hterature on German aircraft, of which the author has rebe-d upon:

No 77, 'japanese preparalions for operations in Manchuria 1931-1941';

Green, \'(1, IfilrplalltS ofdlt Third Rridl (Galahead Books, New York, 1990);

japane~ Studies

on Manchuria series No 4, 'Air operations 1931-1945', is also of interest. Also see pass;n!:

Homze, E L. Arming lIlt ulftwafJe (Unh'CfSity of Ncbraska Prcss, Lincoln, 1976);

Saburo HayashI & Coox, A D, Koglin (Inc Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia, 1959).

Smith,j R & Kay, A, Otrmall Aircrafl ofthe Second Iforld I\'ar (Putnam, London, 1972).

For thc jNAF, there is:

For the Luftwaffe at this time see:

Masalake Okumi)'a & jiro Horikoshi with Caidin, M., Zero (Cassell & Company, London, 1957), and

Hooton, E R, Plioellix Tritlll/pluml (Arms & Armour Press, London, 1994).

MilsuO Fuehida & Masatake Okumi)'a, Midway: The baIlie /110/ doomed Japan (Hutchinson & Co, London, 1957),

l.ittle has been writtcn in English about Irnlian aircT'Jft or the Regia Aeronautica. Thc only comprehensiw work on aircrafl is: Thompson, jonathan \V, Ilalian Civil and .~hlilary Airemfl 193~/945 (Aero Publishers, USA, 1963).

Note: 11 should be- nOled that the family name comes first in japan.

31

2

Allied Aircraft Development in the Early War Years

I

Derek Wood I

The first real mo\'CS towards (II, rearmamem among lhe

before the war, but all this was 10 no lwail. The Belgian Air Force also possessed Fiat CR..J2 biplane fighters and sixteen Fairey Baltic Iighl bombers. A modern monoplane fighter designed by Renard had been under lcst in 1939, but It crashed during trials. In its last ntriant it was the Renard 38 \lith a Merlin engine. It had a spttd of O\'er 300mph (480kmih) and a mixed cannon and machine-gun amument, but although It showed great potential it did nol go mlo production. In Holland the key aircraft manufacturer was Fokker, which supplied the Dutch armed $Cnices. The standard fighter was the Fokker D.XXI, first flown in 1936. Powered by an 830hp Bristol Mercury radial engme, the D.X-'Xj had a fixed ull(krcarriage lind a maximum speed of 270mph (434kmjh). It waS highly manoeuvrable. but not faSI or \\<(>U-cnough armed to match the Bf 109. The Fokkcr G.Ia was a twin-cngined, twin-boom fighter ground-attack aircrafl of high performance but was

European nations mut would eventually face Germany 10 "'3T came in 1935. In that year. Adolf Hitler re-

.

&::.

~

~.>':-

~

~"-

"-

-

Polish PZL R37 I..os /lg/II bombers. A 11SE/t11 aircraft. fhe lAS was (1l'ffu:lre/",tJ ill tile SIIdde" ulfw:affi aud ill

Stp(~",b
1939. SOlllt aalpuJ /0 Romania O/ld f!'('I"C etvmlllol/y lI$i'd agllirm Russia.

nounced the terms of lhe Treaty of Versaillc ,introduced conscnption and unveiled the new Luftwaffe. On Germany's borders wen: potenual enemies - Poland, Belgium, France, Ilotland, Denmark and S"itzerland. Beyond Poland lay the great emgma, Russi.a. In the dislance wnJi Great Britam, while aCfOJiS the Atlantic lay the VOited SllItes ofAmeria. The attitude of these countries 10 a forthcoming conflict varied, as did their abiill)' 10 rroduce modem aircraft and build them rapidl)' in quantit}'. Poland had a well-de\'Clopcd aircraft industr)' "ith some basically sound designs, induding a modem [winengined light bomber. the PZL P.37 Los. A highperformance modern fighter was, howe\'er. lacking. A dozen squadrons equipped with Bristol Mercurycngmed PZL P.llc fighters went to war, 001 pro\'ed no malch for the Messcrschmitt Bf 109. The P.llc was an aU-mellll, high gull-wing machine with a fixed undercarriage.and a top spttd of 242mph (39Omph). Belgium had expected thai its neutrality would be re~pcctcd; a forlorn hope. It had a small aircraft Industry, the products of which Included several foreign types butlt under licence. Arrangements had been made for the lIa\\ker I-Iurrialle 10 be assembled under bcence in Belgium, but the in\'asion pUl a StOp 10 thai after just a few had been completed; a squadron of purchased l-IurriC:lOeS was wiped out on the ground. T\wnty-two Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters had becn purchased

j

Be/gia" Air Force Glosler GkulwlOrs. III SIIrprise Qlladu /1I!!.'I' rem: ('i,wally triped 0111 ill /9-10. The Gladiator ll'aS ";glll)' monoeuvrobk, bill, as a biplane, was ollft/Mud by modefll mOlloplom: [ig/utl's. Ollt' II/Iil operated with Ihe RAP ill the Bailie of Britain. olld the type waj for a PI',iod rhe 011/.'1' lit/ella of l\1oltd. Tile GfmliolOr also sat'tl "ClIO" i" No"~YJY alld III

rhe lI'tSlall Deseri.

32

Tilt Rolls-Roy(t-Mer/ill-powered Re'lOrd 38 prototype. A prolllisillg modem disigll, brll deu:laplIIl!lIt ceased after tile i1ltW'llm of &Igillm m J 940.

The s/{Jlldard si,lgU:-stat fighler '" Hollal/d ill 1940, Ihe Ivkker lJ..\"SI uW' OlWlIl/llbered alld olllperforllltd by tht Hf 109.

33

ALLIEI) AIRCRAFT nEVEI.OP.\II;:-:T 1:-: THE EARLY \X','R "liARS

AIRCRAFT OF THI, SECO:-:I) WORLD WAR

delivered in Jalluary 1940, but when the German offensh'e opened on 10 May only thirty-six were operational. Further units were re-equipped with the type before the armistice, and they all performed \\'el1. In tOlal, 905 D520s were built, and a number subsequemly operated with air forces of the Axis powers. Limited further de\'elopment of this promising design took place during the war. The Bloch 152 radial-cngined fighter also had a reasonable performance, with a top speed of 316mph (27-1kmjh)and a sen'ice ceiling of 38,oooft (1I,600m). SC\'eral hundred were in usc in 1940, but nOI enough to affect lhe outcome of the batUe in lhc air. The most widely used French fighter was the ;\\orane ,"lS406, powered by the 860hp Hispano-Suiza 12Y 31 in-line cngine. With a maximum speed of 303mph (488kmjh), the ,\1S 406 was sturdily built and manoeuvrable; it could nOt, however, match the performance of the Bf 109 and suffered accordingly. Before the war the French bomber fleet was declared obsolete or obsolescent and replacement programmes were hastily initiated. The most promising of the new tyIX~ was the Liorc et Olivier LeO 451 medium bomber, powered by two Gnome-Rhone radials. Sll'eamlined, and with a maximum speed of 285mph (485kmjh), the LeO 451 had a service ceiling of 26,500ft (8,000m) and carried up to 2,800lb (1,270kg) of bombs. However, its defensive armamelll was poor, with single 7.5mm machine-guns in the nose and ventral positions and one 20mm cannon in a poorly engineered dorsal mounting. Despite problems over the non-availability of certain \,ilal items of equipment, and other delays, Ulere were iust O\'('r 470 LeO -I5s in service by May 1940 and eight groups were fully equipped. Afler the armistice the aircraft were used operationally by the Vich)' French and later by the Free French. Another streamlined modern bomber was the Amiot

available only in small numbers. Holland, like Belgium, was neull1l1 and it did not consider that it would be direcuy threatened in any war. POlentially, the two most powerful foes lhat Germany faced were France and Great Britain. France had had a succession of go\'ernments \\ith \'arious aircraft policies - most of them bad. The disorganisation was such that many different types were ordered in small quantities. The great disaster came in 1936, when the Popular From wok office. h proceeded [0 nationalise a grealer part of the industry and split it inlo six companies which, in turn, acquired factories from the remaining private sector. The result was chaos. Guy La Chambre bccnme Air 1\1inister in 1938 and tried to pick up the pieces with \'ery little time to spare. He made great efforts, bUI the overall situation was hopeless. A new production programme was initiated in 1938 requiring the eonslruction of 2,500 up-to-date military aircraft, but the bulk of the defence budget went to the army and funds were therefore inadequatc, c\'cn if the induslrY could ha\'e coped with the expansion.'l·here were at least two promising fighters under dC\'clopmenl and two or three bombers bUI, in the main, front-line equipmenl was obsolescelll or obsolete. Far and away the best fighter produced in France was the single-scat Dewoitine 1)520. Powered by a supercharged 910hp I-lispano 12Y 45 in-line engine, it had a maximum speed of 326mph (524kmjh) and a service ceiling of 36,OOOft (II ,OOOm), and its range was 615 miles (990km). Its 28ft 9in (8m) span and 33ft 6in (10m) length made for a fast and highly manoeuvrable combat aircraft. Armament consisted of one 20mm cannon Hring ulrough the airscrew hub and four 7.5mm machine-guns in the wings. Originally a private \'enturc, the D520 flew in OCtober 1938.1be first order for 200 was placed in 1939, although this was later increased to 2,200, plus 120 for the Aeronavale. The Hrst balch was

....

-~"" ~

~

17/l //lost

-""..=

mmlCTOllS imerceptor i'l the French Air r-orce ill /940 rtas the ktoTQne J\tSA06, 'II.'Ju"ch Ilad a 20"ml cannoll firil/g Ihrough tile propeller shaft a"d two rcil1g-mowlIed IIIlJChinc-gulls. Despite a lOp specd of JUSt otoer 300mph it ~('(JS "0 lIIatch for Ihc German Bf 109.

UIldOllbud/y Ihc Frellch fighter Wilh the beSt performance ill 1940 was tIre DCfJ.'Oitine 11520; 1l0fJ:cvcr. llrere wcre IIO! ellougll of tllem.

34

The liorC

it

Oliver Leo 451, shown ill lite foregroulld i" this picl/Ire, uw the but medillm bomber ill Ihe Armee de {'Air in

1940, bllt too few «'Cre available. 11 fwd lIigll performance, bill poor armamem.

351/354, which was also used for reconnaissance. Powered by two Gnome-RhOne radials. the 351/354 had a crew of four and could altain a top speed of 265mph (426kmjh). lis range was 1,500 miles (2,400km) and its armament consisted of one 20mm cannon and two 7.5mm machine-guns. A bomb load of 2,500lb (I, 130kg) could be carried. The 351 had Iwin fins, while the 354 had a single fin and rudder. The first production aircraft left the factory in late 1939 and about fifty had been ddi\'ered by ule time of the invasion; the factory ncar Paris was subscquenuy O\'errun by the Germans. Out of the motley assortment of machines that went to war with the French Services, one olher stands out, the Bloch 174/175 twin-engincd reconnaissance bomber (see photograph overleaf). \'
(450kg) of bombs. Marcel Bloch (better known after the war as ,\-tareel DasStlult) was a good designer, yet his efforts were to havc linle practical effect, as only fortynine 174/175s were used operationally and production was very slow. O\'erall, France had too little time available and too chaotic an industry to re-equip the Arm~e de l'Air and the Aeron::tvale with sufficielll numbers of the right aircraft. A shortage of parts, and e\'en sabotage, contributed to the gloomy picture. After the armistice, development al French factories aU but ceased, and this seriously affected the industry after the war. 11 had to catch up with five years of losl lechnology and design know-how, not to mention missing the beginning of thc jel agc. The USA, although not in ule conflict until December 1941, was indirtttly a major participant in the air war from 1939 onwards. In the late 1930s France, Belgium, Norway, Greece and Brilain ordered military aircraft from the USA to fill gaps in their inventories. This had tWO effects. Firsl, it enabled US factories to expand at a time of acute contr.tct shortage, and second, il ga\'e firms im'aluable operational experience with their products before the country entered the war.

35

ALLIED AIRCRAFT DE\,t::LOP.\IEST IS TilE "ARl.Y 1,X'AR Yl:.ARS

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOSO WORLl) WAR

...--

Ordered lor lire L'S Nuvy as the BmlJsler FM, Ihis figh/er ftm also Ihe subject 01 a misguided RAP order ill 1939, rdleft! il um k"OfIlIl as Ihs BII/fa/o. UtlSllitabk lor Ellropeal/ operatiollS, RAP D/lffa/ots f{-eft! stili 10 MalaJ~ Wid Singapore, td,elt Ihey feU viclim to lrigll-peiforma"ce Jap
Some of these types were \~r}' successful either in the shon or long term. while others pro'oed quile unsuited to operations in the European thc:nn: when pined against the Luftwaffe. A typical example of the latter was the Ben P-39 Airacobra. One of the first interceptors to have a ITIcycie undercarriage, the Alracobra WlllS unique 1M ha\'iog its 1.ISOhp Allison V-171Q-FA cngme mounted behind the pilot, the propdler bemg dri\"Cn na a long extension shaft. A 20mm cannon fired through the

The main list of ain:raft is as foUows: BcU P-39 Alracobra, Boeing Jl...17 FortreSs, Brewster F2A Buffalo, Consolidated PRY Catalina, Consolidated B-24 Lib-erator, Curtiss Hawk. 75, CurUss P-W Warhawk,l Tomahawk, Chana....Voughl V-IS6F Chesapt:ake. Douglas DB--7NB Ha\1)C'Boston, Grumman F4F \'('lIdcat/Maruet, ~ Hudson, Martin 16Maryland. North Amencan lIan-ard, North American P-S1 Mustang and Vulttt Vengeance.

7· ...

r

-----_JL

~--"

.......

-

A tony modern-lookmg. st~a",/med fighrer. rM &/1 P-19 Alrucobra did rWI have a fKiformona 10 maldJ, particularly 01 a/Wilde, alld tro1 rherrfort mlSul/ed 10 Ihe Ellropeatl air U'Qr. .\fany trerr s/lpp/ieJ to tJ~ CSAAF arid 10 RussUJ, (dIm lhey ( r c r llsed lor Krmmd alld. 71~ 1'-19 rro.s umqu~ i" hot"" Ihe nlg"~ bdlllld rile pllol, drrn"g 1M propt/kr lhrough 0" «trow" sJUJ/r.

36

--

....

The firSI American fighler 10 see (lelioll ill I}W. Secolld Il'orld IIt1r, lire Curtis Hatvk 75A (/'-16) sow sertJice ft·i,II Ihe F,.md, Air lim;e al/d, later, Ihe RAT: Tire laller stl/l Iht"', as the MvlrQft'k, 10 India and 13/lfma. SetI'I!ra/ USIIAC squadrons tt-ere I:qlllpped tnth the 1'-16.

airscrew boss. while there ....-ere t...."O nose-mounted and four wing-mounted a.30in machine-guns. Airacobras ....~re InJUa.lly ordered by Fnmce. but aftcr the armistice the contract was taken over by Britain Following Arr Fighung [)cl~lorment Unit lrials. one squadron. No 601. was re-cquippcd ith the t)lK'.1t was found that pcrl'orman« at altitude as very poor and mechanical unrebabdny led to ~rious ~n'ic~bIlI(Y problems. The Alracobra .....as briefly used for ground strafing, bul was ....,thdrawn from operations after four months.The bulk of the 6"0 ordered were can«lIed and, Instead......ent to the US Army Air Corps. while many were supplied to RUSSia, .....here they proved suuable for low-Ie\'el attacks. 1\\'0 other interceptors were ordered which also pro\'ed unsuitable for the European conflict, namelr the Brewster Buffalo and the Curtiss Hawk 7SA. The Buffalo, an ugly barrel-shaped fighter, .....a s first ordered by the US Navy as the F2A. In 1939 the British I'urchasing Commission decided 10 order a land-based \'ersion, as did Belgium. After Belgium collapsed. its order for 28 was laken up 10 add to the 170 for the RAF, .....here the)' were named Buffalo. Firsl deli\'eries were made in july 1940, but flight trials showed conclusl\'el}' that the Buffalo would be no match for the Bf \09. Its speed of 292mph (470km/h) and general performance wen: 10\\, and the armament of four 0.5in machine-guns was madequate. The Buffaloes ....-ere. therefore. shiplXd 10 thl: Far East......here they lalet suffered ~\'CTely at the hands of japanese fighters. Britain ordered another radial-n1gined lightcr, thl: Curtiss Ha.... k 75A hleh in RAF servlct' .....as named .\\oha\\ It. Again. this as an aircraft ordered and opt:rat· I:d in quantit}' ~' the French air force, thl: remaimng orders being SWlIehed 10 Britain after thl: armlsuce. The

P-36A Hawk was a standard fighter with the USMC. Th(' French Ha\\ were pow~rcd by the l'mn & \Xllitney T ....in Wasp engine. and these were designated Mohawk III ~. the RAE The majont)· of the 1000pius .\10hawks deh\~red 10 the RAF in 1940 wen:. hO\\·C\~r. powered by the 1,200hp \'fright Cyclone GR·I 20 radial. and in this form wen: designaled Mohawk IV. With a top speed of 302mph (48SkmIh), a senice ceding of 32.000ft (9,75001) and six O,3Oin machme-guns, the .\10hawk W3S a good deal bener than the Buffalo. although u W3S soil unSUItable for Europe. Later the Mohawks wen: opct2ted in India and Burma against thl: japanese air forces. "\\"0 further fighters had useful caTttrs \\ith the RAF, neithet in its original intended role. These were the 1'-40 Tomahawk and the P-SI Mustang. "Ill(' Curtiss Toma· hawk was drtually a liquid-eoolcd·cngine de\'e1opment

A dnx/opmem 01 1M CurtISS P-36 trllh 011 AI/ISO" Irquldcooled engirre in place of 0 radUJ/, tM P-40 rro.s IlIli/t in large' numbmjortM L:sAIIC lJlldjorU:/KJn.1rith lhe RARas Ihe Tvr,UJhau:k.IM aIrcraft ttW usedjoT Jorr.-lnJt/ taetit:a/ n'tOflIIaissallt:e m tlw. LX ondjigJlftr ground alld it/ tM .\fiddle Eas/.As all inu:raplor irs 1adt 01 a/lilutU perforrna'la r/lled II ow i" 1M European Ilw.atrt.

37

AI.I.IEI> AIRCRAFT DE\'EI OI'.\lEST tS THE EARLY WAR YEAR::'

AIRCRAl"t' 01''1111; SECOSD WORLD WAR

j

lJeSlgn~d al/d bmll '" I I 7 do)"$ to 1/1«1 a Brllish f(x,nin~ sP«IficazWn, ,~ j"ur,h Il,,~, Musrang had a I.Jmlnar-ftorr trine rrhidr g.at~ il wry gooJ ~/lIl/l{k per!onrwna. II aw IlKd by Ih~ RIlP fqr IOCllcu/ ret:Qmw/ssalla, WId later, ~hen fi,,~d mlh the IW//s.Royu Mer/", '" plaa of lire Alltscn mgm~. II b«a"'~ ,h~ olllsra"ding Io,tg.rurrgr, high-.a/lituck figl"t"( (If t/~ toor.

of th~ Mohawk. Francc ordered \40 c"porl P-4Os, bul these wen~ not deh\~d; they were taken up by lhe RAF along With an addluonal 606 machmes, Vanants covered Tomahawks Mk I, IlA and liB. The'lbmahawk scn'Cd as a low-lc\'C1 lactical reconnaissance aircraft with anny co--operation squadrons in Britain, as poor altiludc perrormance did not allow fighter opcTlltJons In the European lhcatrc. Tomahawks

did, howc\'er, work as Interceptors In the \X'estern Desert in addition 10 pcrrormmg effective ground-altack opera· tions. \X'ith a I,040hp Allison V·l 71 0-33 engine, the aircrart had a lOp speed of 345mph (555knv'h) at 15,OOOft (~,570m) and carried six O.JOJin machine-guns_ In 19~0 the RAF took lhe unprecedented step or commissioning the deSIgn or a fighter m the USA to incorporale thc lessons learned in the firSI eighl months or the war. A prototype of lhe NA-J7, destined to become the Mustang, was designed and built in the remarkable urne or 117 days. It had a laminar-flow wing, a 10w-tor when re-engined with the Rolls-Royce: ,\ lerlin, This development is dealt \\ith in anolher chapler. The Royal Na\1' also took an Interest in US fighter designs, and on the faU of France look O\'tt a French order ror single.scal Grumman G·36A aircraft.

XalllcJ lIre n"i1dC
38

DurgnauJ A-20 by I~ CSAAC and talJcJ Boston by I~ RAF, this Douglas lMSlgn fmS a lyry tffmlty bomba/alld aIrcraft "nd ttW also 'lsN as afighttr-. 17le aircraft shorrll htr-t is all RAF <Ol/ I, 8DIII. BostOIl Is teen' (om:erlld in Briwill II/tO flm:oa as nighl figlrttr-iintrutkrs, and wur BDIII tn:u filltJ trull a 1i"'bl/l/1l~ alrbortU! uurcJr/lght.

deslgnaung lhem Manlel I. 'Inis was foUO\\'ed by an order rOf 100 G-36Bs, 90 of them \\;th folding wing1. Initially the 1.200hp Wrighl Cyclone was fined, bUllhe second balch had lhc Pratt & \XbitneyTwin \"'asp radial or lhe same power, lhese being known as Martlet Mk. II. Deliveries were made in 19-W, the second balch fol1000'ing in 1941-2. A Greek order was also taken O\'cr in 1941. 'lough, reliable and armed with four or si" 0.5in machinc-guns, lhc ,\ lartlet was a godsend to the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), It was used in evcry theatre or war, op· crating from fleet and escon carriers. Undcr l..end· Lease, enaCled in the USA in 1941, lhe FAA received a sleady st.!eam of "hrtlcts and Wildcats, the latter being the name ror the type uscd by lhe US Na\1' and US .\1arines and then standardised on by Britain in 1944. The Martlet had a span or 38rt (11m), a ma"imum speed of 328mph (527km/h) al 21,OOOfl (6,400m), a sen'ice ceiling or 37,500ft (11,435m) and a normal range of 845 miles (1,3ookm). Its loaded weight was 7.002Ib (3.175kg). In the fields or light and medium bombing, reconnaissance and tT:IlOing, lhe USA was able to pro\;de first-class aIrcraft, sc\'cral of which were conunuously de\'clopcd through the war. One of the mosl successrul rrom the outset was lhe mqcle·undcrcarriage Douglas DB- ~ light bomber. Originally the sub¢ct o( a large prcwar French order and one (or Lhe R.>\E the DU-7 first flew In AuguSI 1939 and, after the German im'llsion. lhe oUtslllndlOg French orders were taken O\-cr by Lhc RAE

'Iltcrcaftcr, lhe US Army Air Forces adopled lhe type as the A·20, lhe .A' prefi" standing ror attack. llte RAF used its first DB- ~s as tT:Iiners, Ihe name Boston being adopled. A quantil)' ofOll- ~s and DB-7As were convened Into night intruders and nightfighlers in Urnaln and called Havocs, 'Inc I\lk I had two 1,200hp Twin Wasp radials, while later delivcries wcre fitted \\;lh 1,6oohp Wright Doubk-Row Cyclones. As a nighlfighter the Havoc had a 'solid' nose housing eight 0.303 machme.guns and airborne radar, while the intruder version had a glazcd nose with guns in Lhc lower nose, a Vickers K gun in Ihe dorsal position and 2.400lb (I,OOOkg) or bombs. 'Inc II:I\'OC II nighlflghtcr had an unglazed nose accommodating no rewer lhan tweh'e 0.303in machineguns. 'Ine light bomber version of lhc aircraft, thc BOSlon Ill, was lhe mOSt widdr used variam with lhe RAF, dcliveries beginning in spring 1941. It pro\'e-d lhe ideal replacement ror lhe obsolescent Blenheim, which had borne the brunt of the daylight bombing since the war began and had suffered hC2v)' casualties. 'Inc Boslon 111 was rast, wllh a ma"imum speed of over 300mph (~82km/h), manocu\'rable and well liked by its crews. The Mark III had a span or 6 HI ~in (18m) and a range of jusl over 1.000 miles (1,600km) when fully loaded. \,\'llh a Cl'C\\ of rour it had a rtU"imum bomb load or 2,0001b (907kg), Gun annament consisted or four fixed 0.30310 machine-guns in lhc nose. and I\\;n 0.303s in the dorsal and \'CntT:Il gun posLUons. An inuuder \'ersion of the Boston III carried four 20mm cannon in an

39

ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF\'l'1 Ot'o\Il'XT I" THE EARLY WAR YEARS

-"amtJ lhe .\larykmd by tile IJrIIlsh, III,S .\farrin bomber uw IWI orJtreJ by t}~ L'SIIAG. Mos, of/~ supplioJ to 1M RAFnYn KIlt 10 tM MidJle Eas,. V:Mre till!)! ~ ugdjor boll/bmg anJ rea",nolswna. Tk .\lary·land uw also fI~d by Somll AftUan A,r T"Oru sqUadrollS. From lilt Jlary'wnd uw dn:e/opeJ I/~ wl'l" IJolwlIOre bomber for tilL RAT; tt:hKh had bm" ptTjormallU anJ Ins t:rrlmped cm:r QaOnJlIfod.mon _ und~rfu~lag~

p:ilck.. 'Illc .\larks IV and V which huer In the war had a power-opcruted min-gun dONial turrel. A light attack bomber which failed to gam a US conlt3Ct but \\ hich W3S supplied to Europe was lhe ,\ lartin 167, named l\laryland by the RAE A lhrce-scater. the ,\ laryland was powered by tv.o I,200hp Twin \X·asp radi· als mltially, wllh single and laler two·s13ge supcrcharg. ers. II earned up to 2.000lb (9Irkg) of bombs :md six machine-guns. four of which wer~ in the wing. Some sc\'enty-five Marylands were taken O\'er from French orders, and alwgelher the RAF acquired 225. the majorit}' being shipped to the j\ liddle EaSt for bombing and ap~rcd

171L AJartin Balti/tlon den:lepmclIf of rilL .\Ia,,"n Mory'kllld uhi€h uw origll/olly dnlgl/td to Frel/ch reqllirtIIImrs olld lalCr lI$td by the RAT: Classifitd as a liglrt bo",~r, rlrt Ball/more uw I.Jrgcr and fi,urer tholl Irs forebear and carr~d Niter dtkmittt a"'WtlWll. Tilt &JIll/lOre sert'td III tilL JhJJk East and Iwly.

photogrnphic reconnaissance work. It had \'ery cramped crew poslUons ~parated by bulkheads, and was only moder-ucl)' suc sfu!. A more capacious, higher powered development 10 British reqUIrements was the Martin Baltimore. which fiNit fle\\ m June 19~ 1 and entefC'd RAF scn;cc early in 19~2. Ukc the Maryland, the Baltimore was employed in the ,\ leditcrrancan area. A tala.! of 1,"73 was produced for the RAE T\\'O imponant and ",;dely produced American medium bombers began flight tests In 1940, th~ North American S-25 Mitchell and the Martin S-26 Marauder. The original protOt},pc for the 13-25, the NA-IO, was desuo)'ed dunng IOlUal flight tCSlS in 1939. but the USMC was so Impressed th3t it called for major design changes to be Ulcorporated and had enough falth to place an order for IS~ of the new NA-62. the first of which fk"\\ in August 1940. A mid·",;ng 6~ft -in (2Om)-span aircraft ",;th two 1,700hp R-2600 radials, the 3-25, had a fivc·man crew, a five-gun armameO! and earned 3,l)(M)lb (1,360kg) of bombs.The range was 1.350 miles (2.1 OOkm), and it had a maximum speed of O\tr 3DOmph (482km/h). To soh'e stability problems. dihedral on the outer wing panels was deleted. O\'Cr 9,700 MuchcUs of all marb were built, of which SOO-plus were delivered to the RAE 111e ch3nges 1ft the Mitchell, parucularly concerning annamem (a prime consideration in the Second World War), arc considcred e1sewherc 1ft thiS work. When the US Arm)' Air Corps issued a requirement for a high-performance medium bomber in Januarr 1939, the ~mphaSIS was laid on speed. The Glenn Martin company's submission was ba~d on an aircraft with a \'ery high wing loading (i.e. a small wing area) and a high degree of strc::tmlining. Uke the 13-25, the resulting aircrnft by M::trtin, the 13-26 Marauder, had a tricycle undercarriage. The high wing lo::tding ine\'itably led 10 high landmg speeds and training problems. With a ShOulder-wing, the 1:\-26 had plenty of fuselage capacity, allowing a bomb load of 4,800lb (2,I77kg). Armament consisted of nose and tail 0.30in machine-guns plus twO 0.50s mounted in a dorsal turret. Powered by two 1,850hp R·2800 Double Wasp radials, the ,\ larauder could achieve 315mph (SOOkm/h) at 15,OOOft (4,57001) and crUIsed at 265mph (-426kmjh). Range was 1,000 mill'S (I,600km) and ser\'ice ceiling 25,OOOft (7,600m). 'IlIe US Army Air Corps became the US Army Air Force in June 1942, and its fiNiI Marauders were delivered that year, while aircraft supplied to the RAF did not become operauonal unul mid 1942. On subsequent \"3riants the wmgspan was increased from 65ft to 71 ft (19m to 21m) and armament was steadil}' increased. Production continued through 10 April 19-45. Two American four-engmcd bombers were to ha\'C a m310r effect on the outcome of the Second \X'orid \X'ar, namely the DoelOg 13-17 Hymg Fortress and the

A 1~'lly armed hl8h perfi)rnlallU nu:dlllm bomber, tlu: .\Iort", H-Z6 Murou
o,rt of 1M most sucussl/ll Ammean fro",-Imt atrrnJ/t oftltt SUOIIJ Iri)rJJ Il'ar, the Sonh AIII"iaJn Jllldltll t:W prrr JI,ecJ to u total of ,,~arlj' 11,000 a"d scn:rd m ttTr)' t/walTe of tto:1r. Jr uw 'lamed aft" tilL ut:ialion piopu:er Gmerol '81lJ);.\llldleU.A medIum bomber m'I" a cmr offit~, j,had a lop spud of (ltV 280 ",ph o"d u ra1/~ 011,350 nnlts. nIL examplt shOtt'" is a Jlllchell I rB--Z5B" tile first deln.Yrtd to Ihe lX. f«
Consolidated 13-24 liberatOI'. Both benefitcd from carl) SoCf\;ce experience ",;th the RAE The 13-1- daled back to a far-sighted Anny Air Corps design compcuuon of 1934 for a bomber to carry 2.000lb of bombs for al leasl 1.020 miles at a speed of (l\Cr 200mph. 'llIe prototype was flown m 1935. and 'teady development continued thereafter. Bc<:ausc of lack of money and political opposition. the first fully operational \"eNiion, the B·17B, \\'3S nOl

ordered until I938.·llIercafter the B-I-C was procured, of which thlrt)'-C'lght were supp1lcd to the USMC and, In 1941. n\'en[y to the R.<\F as the Fortress I. The B-I-C had II 6if[ IOm.long fuselage of circular cross-scctlon, four\X'right Cyclone R·1820 engines of 1.1OOhp each with turbosuperchargers. and a CTC\I. of ten. \X'ingspan was 103fl 9in (31m) and all-up \\"eight 45;:"SOlb (20.750kg). "Ille lessons learned by the RAF were incorpornted

~I

8«llIg B-17C Fb'mg TYJ,tress / of tilL RAT: TrMlry of rllest aircraft "'"t' supplleJ 10 JJomber CoIIIII/O'uJ in 1941. Ow'lg to m«holliall o"d other problems, logetlter Wllh poor armalllNlr.lhey tren' IIOt a SllUW. 171t reJalgntd 8·17E corrttud tllLU Jtfi~"cJn, liS ""prot'CI,wms lIullIJmg a 'leU' jiPI olld a toll turret. III rhlS form It upcm:J I/~ OffCtlSlttt by UIt! l"S 8th Air Force from Brttam and, fl;llh Ioter ",arks. beaJnlt! fimlbUS as or~ of tite most i"'PDf/alll Iwut!y bomlNn of tM trOr.

ALLlIOD AIRCkAFI DI::\'FI

AlkCKAI'T Of> 1111:: SI::COSl) WORLD \l'AR

A ubt'ro/(w / of RAF Cou$til/ Commond. 11Iis /)~ D'u} io $IIUnwn moth a major ""'tribwia" /0 /M tror against 1M L". boot by ,loslll~ the A/wmu aIr gap. as tht Libera/Dr had D rQngt of 2.400 ",iks. T/~ tarl)' air-l&-f/lr/tJa-t,.'tSH/ (ASI ') rudar aerialt aliI Ix scm 0" Ihe fL"lIlgr, /IOU anJ OMit lilt rmr fuui4gt. 11lt ubt'rotor mmt 011 to b«omt 1M $tabk",au of Iht 8-17 in I/~ L"S cJaylighl bo",bI"g ojJDoi1.1t In Europe, and $trt.ltd III a// tror tlltalrrt. In the next major \'3riant of the Fortress. the B-I-E. Mechanical rdiabilil)' \\'3S improved. the bomb sight modified and gun flffZlng dealt \\1!.h. Most Important. though, was an Increase In the defenSI\'e armament. The rear fuselage was redesigned to Incorporate a tail gun turret, and an enlarged tail unit was filtcd. Armamem was increased to twelve 0.5in guns and one 0.30in (including two power-opcrated twin-gun turrets) and the bomb load rose from IO,5OOib 10 17,600lb (4,760 to 7,980kg). The B-17E had a scn'ice ceiling of 36,6OOft (11.155m), a maximum speed of 317mph (510km/h) Rnd cruised al 210mph (337km1h). hs allup weight WlIS 53.ooolb (24,oookg). The B-17E came into service in thc I>acific and European war theatres in 1942. '111e second hea\'y da)' bomber to achie\'e fame, the B·24, was a later and very diffcrcnt-looking aireraft. It also had the distinction of being produced in larger quantitics than any other single Allied type during the Second 'X'orld War (a total of owr 18,000). When, m 1939, the Army Air Corps formulated a spccificalJon for a heavy bomber, it demanded better range and cap.aclly than the B-17, together with high s~d. Consolidated Aircraft set out to meet these using the Davis patented long.span, narrow-chord \\ing. This hlgh.aspect-ralJo \\1ng had a low angle of :mack, and ilS design thus gave high bft and low drag, which meant in· creased range. On the Consolidatt.'d ,\lodel 32 bomber. whieh became the 8·24. the shoulder-mounted ",ing allowed for

a la~ bomb bay with the bombs Stowed \'crtically, and a catwalk between the front and rear sections of the fuselage. h also had roIlcr·shuuCl bomb doors which rt'~ duced airflow disturbance associaled with conventional bomb-bay doors. Finally, lhe Model 32 was the first hea\1' bomber wnh a nosewheel undercarriage, the main legs retracting outwards into the winp. While the USAAC ordered a small number of early Liberators, the RAF ordered 285, of which 120 had originally been ordered by France. The first of these were used as transports. As a result of operational experience, the RAF Liberator Is were fitted with O.Sin maehineguns, Olle each in the nose and tail, one either side of the fuselage and one in a tunnel gun position underneath. In addition, self-scaling fucl !links and imernal armour were fitted. The Liberator wcnt imo RAF squadron service with Coastal Command in June 1941. With its range of 2,200 mill'S (3.530km) it ....-as known 9S a VLR (very long l".mge) aircraft, and for the first time Britain could begin 10 close the gap in mid-Atlantic where German U·boots had been operating unhindered by land-based aircrnfl sun'elilance and anack. The 8-24 Uberator ....'3S steadily de\'eloped and had a distinguished career in bomber, maritime and transport roles. The early marks had four 1,2oohp Pratt & 'X'himey R·1830-33 engmcs wlUI mechanical superchargers. Span \\'35 110ft (33m) and length 63ft 9in (19m). Gross weight was 53,6OOlb (24.3ookg), maximum speed 292mph (460km,Ih), cruising speed 228mph (366kmlh)

OPMI'~T

1:-0 THI:: I::ARLY \\:'AR YEAkS

First flov:" in 1939, 1M Lodth«d P-J8 ughming remomed 11/ prodllcria" mllll tM tnd of rllt mlr. Jim, and poutmd of lo1lg ro~, tM U'glllllinz carmd a heavy nose armamenl, and mrl1oSllptrcharga-s for 1M AJI/sim mglnes fNf't (Orr~d", die booms. (fl,t famolu n.ltm m tht Lx/wll"g's IIluory uw /ht $hoo/mg Jou-n (If a bomfJr:r cor')1llg the Japolll:U Arhmru/ Hit/Willow. 500 ,,,,ksjro,,,, wfightm'bast.

and scn'ice ceiling 30.5ooft (9,300m). Bomb load was 4.000lb (I,800kg). Britain pionccrro the use of air·surface,\·essel (AS\') radar for airborne maritime sur\"eiUance. This became a ma)Or factor In the U·boat war. The equipmenl was steadily de\"elo~d for longer range and clearer prescota· Lion for the operator. With its exceptional range the LiberalOr made full usc of ASV in both British and American service, the former from June 1941 on.....ards. The first Coastal Command aircraft 10 be fined with ASV was also American, the ubiquitous Lockheed Hudson. 'Ibis type was the first American aircraft to be used operationally by !.he RAF in !.he Second World War. The Hudson was a military conversion of the Lockheed 14 civil tr,msport, and was purchased in quantity by the Briush in 1938. II was a classic example of a good basic airframe being adapted to undertake numerous tasks in a wide \-ariety of climates. 'Ine Hudson .....a s used for maritime reconnaissancc/anack, general reconnaissance, bombing, training and as a transport. Powered b)' tWO I, loohp Wright Cyclone radial en· gincs, the Hudson had a maximum speed of 246mph (395km,1h), cruised at 170mph (273km1h), and had an endurance of 6hr, "Inc weapon load (of bombs or depth charges) "''3S 750!b (340kg), and armament consisted of two 0.303 machine-guns in the nose, 1\\'0 in a dorsal Boulton l:>aul turret and one in the belly. A crew of five .....a s carried. TlIe successor 10 the Hudson \\-as another aclapl:iltion of a Lockheed transport, this time the Model 18, Bearing

a close resemblance 10 the Hudson, the type was known as the B-34!B~37 Lexington in the USAA.F. the PV·I With the US Na\1', and the Venrura in the R."o.E With IWO 2.ooohp I~ratt & Whitney Double 'X'asp engines, the Vemura had a maximum speed of 300mph (480kmih), cruised at 260mph (420kmlh), had a range of 1,000 miles (I,600km) and a service ceiling of 25,OOOfI (7,26001). Armament was tWO 0.50 and six or eighl 0.303in guns plus 2.5OOlb (I,135kg) of bombs. 'Ibe Vcntura saw limited service with Bomber Command in 1943 and then served with Coastal Command and the air forces of AustrJlia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. A radical American fighter design was ordered in quantity by Britain in 1940 but later cancelled, which caused arguments and recriminations. The aircraft, the Lockheed »·38 Lightning, was designed to meet a 1937 USMC requirement for an inlerceptor to auain 360mph at 20,OOOft (6,OOOm) and reach that height in six minulcs - \'cry ambitious for that prc....-ar period. Lockhttd chose a Iwin·boom, Iwin-enginc layout with radiators and IUrbosuperchargcrs mounted in the booms behind the Allison in-line engines. The pilot sat in a centnll nacelle .....hich also housed the single cannon plus four machme.gun armamenl. The RAF had ordered 143 Lightnings in March 1940, and there \\'3S also a French contract, These were aU 10 be powered by the same unsuperchargro 1,040hp Allison V-1710-33 engine as the Curtiss Tomahawk, also orderro by both nations. The orders .....e re placed before

ALLIED AIRCRAFT DE\"ELOP.\\ENT

AIKCKAFT 01-' THE SECOSI) \'('OKI..O ,"'AR

the long~drawn-oul Battle of Britain had been fought and many lessons about air fighting had been learned, particularly me need for climb and altitude performance. Wimout superchargers Ihe Lightning clearly did not meet European conditions, and tile RAF cancelled me order following trials \\im three aircraft al A&AEE Boseombe Down in late December 1941 and early 1942. Lockheed wanted the contract adhered to on the original terms, but this was nOi found possible. At the time mere was also a shortage of superchargers in the USA. As a result, the USt\AF took O\'er the British order and placed a larger one following America's entry into the conflici. The USAAF subsequently used the Light· ning in all war meatres as a long-range fighter, fighler~ bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. Production continued until 1945. The final version, the P·38L, had a top speed of 414mph (666kmJh), could climb to 20,OOOft (6,OOOm) in se\"en minutes and had a service ceiling of 44,000ft (13AOOm). In addition to the aircraft detailed abo\'e, a varicty of other types were purchased by Britain, usually in smaller quantities" One exception was the North American NA~16 I-Ian"ard two-seat adv:lllced trainer, which remained in RAF service until the late 1950s. First ordered by me RAF in 1938, the Harmrd was entering service by the end of that year. Contracted and paid for up to early 1941, Harvards for the RAF lotalled 1,100. Under Lend-Lease a further 4,000 were delivered. "Ille USA employed the type in large numbers as the T-6 Texan.

"Ille Harvard was used under the air training scheme in Canada and Southern Rhodesia and the commonality with the Texan was a major asset after December 1941. The Harvard was of metal construction and powered by a single 550hp Pratt & \\;'hitncy \\;Iasp radial. Maximum speed was 205mph (330km/h) and endurance 3.9hr. "I11e arrangements between the USA and Britain were quite remarkable. A non-combatant up to Decem· ber 1941, America was supplying large quantities of war material, including hundreds of aircraft, to a friendly nation at war. By 1941 Britain was quite literally running out of dollars, and faced a situation where she would be unable to pay for the aircraft she so desperatcl~' needed. On 11 March 1941 President Roose\"elt signed a Congressional 'Lend-Lease' Bill which completely ahered the sirumion right through until the defeat of Japan in 1945, Under 'Lend-Lease' the USA could sell, transfer, exchange, lease Or lend any defence article, providing the receiving country's defence was deemed to be vital to the defence of the USA. Continued deli\'erics \0 Britain were thus assured. It had not, howe\"er, been a one·way street. In the 1938-9 period British contracts with American ftrms were worth morc than those placed by the USAAC. These sen"ed to 'prime the pump' of US industry at a time when American rearmament had hardly begun and, as mentioned earlier, allowed for much needed factor~' and workforce expansion. In addition, as noted

•

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nil: Norlh American A1:6, /lalllcd 1exan ill Ihe USA and Harvard by Ihe RAl; was Imdo/lbudly Ihe key advtmced ,rainer of Ihe Secolld Ir0rld I\'ilr. Thousallds ofairerew flew Ihe Iype ill Ihe USA alld Ihrol/ghollt Ihe British Commol/wealth cOl/filries" It had a top sj)€ed of 205 mph. After Ihe war il was also /lsed for cOlI/lIeriflSllrgeucy work.

44

[~

TilE EARLY WAR YEARS

All early prodllCliOlI Hllrriame i\lk I right-gllll fighter, U 621 of No 87 Sqlladroll, wilh lu-o-b/ade,fixed-pilch propeller. The Hllrricalle fMS wry 1IU1"OCIwrablc ami a swble glill plmform, alld bore the brullt of Ihe air fig/Ili/IE ill France and in the IJutlle of Brilailt.

American Ainvays began fcrrying American aircraft to the RAF in the 1\1iddle EaSI \ia West Africa.

previously, both industry and the USAAC/USAAJ' re· ceived a steady flow of combat information which indicated where improvements on aircraft needed to be made" These includcd the fitling of self-scaling fuel lanks, aircrew armour protection, heavier armament for both fighters and bombers and, for fighters, thc neccssi· ry for higher altirude performance and better rates of climb. The requirement for greater range/endurance meant larger internal fuel capacity and reliable drol) tanks. Operational experience also showed up mechanical defects and maintenance problems which could be remedied on types which would ultimately be flown on a war basis by both air forces. A fur tiler British contribution in 1941 was to open the door on British technical secrets to the Americans" This included providing the cavity magnetron, a highpower valve developed at Birmingham Universiry which made possible the production of cemimetre wa\'clength radar. "l11is was to revolutionise air-to-surface, air-to-air and ground-based radars. Finally, the ferrying of American-built aircraft across the Atlantic had been organised. -Ille ferry service was inauguraled on 10-11 NO\'ember 1940 with seven Lockheed Hudsons led by Capt (later AirVice-l\larshal) D C T Bennett of British Overseas Airways Corporation. It took them ten and a half hours 10 ny from Gandcr, Newfoundland, 10 Northern I.reland" 111is trailblazer was to lead in later years to vast numbers of multiengined aircraft traversing what was to be me longesl o\'crsea main air supply route in the world. 'Ib get ferry crews back to North America an east-west service was begun in September 1941 by BOAC, initially using six com'erted Liberator bombers, In August 1941 Pan

Britain "Ille period September 1939 to April 1940, known as the 'Phoney\X'ar', hardly prepared Oritain for the disasters to come" 111e air fighting O\"er the Western Front was sporadic and, apan from giving RAF pilolS some combat in Hurricanes, it did not give me overall experience neccs$.1ry to counter later massivc German air attacks. Certain lcssons were learned, the most important of whieh was that the then-current generation of twin-engine bombers, such as the Blenheim and Wellington, could not survh"e in daylight without escort when confronted with modern enemy fighters. During the Battle of France the single-engine standard light bomber, the Fairey Banle, proved to be a disaster and suffered severe casUlllties. After the evacuation from Dunkirk and the FrancoGerman armistice, Britain's situation as an island fortress oIT an enemy·hcld European land mass was perilous in the extreme. During May and June 1940,959 aircrafl were lost, of which 477 were fighters. The aircraft raw material siruation had radically allered. Deli\'ery of aluminium-comaining bauxite from France ceased with the armistice, and supplies had to be shipped all the way from British Guiana, in the face of a growing V-boat campaign. Canada was a key aluminium supplier. In the last quarter of 1939 some 12,000 tons (12,200 tonncs) of ingots of aluminium arri\'ed in Britain; in 1940 this rose to 48,000 tons (48,770 tonnes). Canada also supplied quantities of high-purity magnes· ium and cryolite, essential for top·grade aluminium

45

AIRCRAFT OF Til 10

SECO~O

"'-ORLO WAR

ALLII;O AIRCRAFT OIO\,f.LOP;\\I;:s"T I:s" Till: I'. ... RLY 'J:'AR YfARS

Probably tI~ mcst filltlOIlS of all fighter aIrcraft, lire .\lI!r/i".por~J Fidlers·Sllperm
production. Refinmg and crushing cryolite ore had becn a Danish speciality, but this sourcc was nit ofT with thc German invasion. Specialised timber, texules, paper and rare malerials like platinum and radium had to be purchased and impOrtl."d from all O\"er the ...."(Irld. l:>roducuon of :urcraft in Britain exeeeded thai of Germany In 19-W, and continued 10 gro..... despite the bombing of faclOries up and dOVin the country in

system of subcontracting parts and comPQncnts was widcl)' extended, By mcluding small engineering works, garages, and ewn such companies as 10)' makers, a country-"ide net.....ork of around 15,000 subcontractors was created. 'l1Ie only m:J.jor failure in the shadOY. scheme .....as lit Clistle Brom"ich. Swinton had wanted il to be parented by Vickers, as it WIiS for Spitfire m:mufaCiure. \'\:1lcn Swinlon was replaced b)' Sir Kingsle)' Wood In 1938, C:t5tle Brom\\ich was placed in the hands of the Nuffield Orgarusation. As 1I result, instead of a massive OUlput of Spitfires, by May 1940 nothing had come off the line, Lord Bca\"crbrook, the Minisler of Aircraft Production, immedialely placed the factory in the hands of Vickers, and b)' the end of September 1940 125 Spitfires had been produced there. The key to fighter production was the suppl)' of Rolls-Royce Merlin engmes. Any disruption of Merlin production during the Bank of Britain would have left Hurricane and Spitfire auframes Sltung uS<'less at the end of th~ line. \l'hi1c Bristol chose 10 ha''I: a mOlor car company ~Ie ilS shadOY.' faCiory, RoIIs-RO)'ce decided 10 run a shadOY.' Itself at Crewt:. The new factory finished its first Merlin In May 1939. During the swn· mer of 1940 Rol1s.Ror« ""(Irked up 10 30 ralc of delivCfY of 400 engines per month. A further Rolls-Royce factory, at Hillington ncar Glasgow, .....as completed in October 1940, In the USA Ford turned down a licence contract to build the Merlin, but it was laken up by the Packard Motor Company, which laler buill thousands of Merlins, including those

194~1.

The bam for the aircraft industry and its uansition lO a rearmament sUlle .....as established in the period 1935lO 1938 b)' a vcr)' far-sighted politician, Lord Swinton, .....ho became Secretary of Stale for Air in mid-1935, Firsl, he cut the existing lengthy time between fully tested prolotype and in·service date by ordering 'off the dra\\ing boord' and incorporating modifications on the line. He also ordered common engine mountings which allowed for easy fitmem of alternative powerplants. Swinton's greatest achievement, hOY.'I:'"er, was 10 pro,ide for Il13ssi,'e production expansion when the emergency came. He launched an Air Mlruste)· scheme whereby s13te~wned factorie5 would be SCI up by non· aviation companies such as car manufacturers, Thcy would eqUiP and manage the ""(Irks and tum out aircraft 30nd aero engines from a 'parent' company in the aircraft mdustry. This .....as knoy"n as the shadOY.' factory scheme, and was announced b)' the Prime Minister in March 1936. The parent company had to provide specifications for plant, jigs, tools, etc, full drawings and training for key people. In addition 10 the shadow scheme, the

46

All Nrl)' prodlll:tioll Hou:ker 1j'pluxJI/ IA u:ith all Un/lUlllmt of Itt'f'k-e II/
for the later marks of ,\ lustang fighter. 1ne l\ \crlin· cngmed ,\tuslang became one of the best inlen:<:plors of the Second \Xorld \X'ar Despite the many S<'tbacks of war, the industry .....as able to pJ'O\ide the fighting machines lO defend Bntam and 10 strike back, 'Inc IIlr battles owr France and the subsequcol Battle of Hmam laught man)' lessons" hlch afTe<:tl"d then current production and future developments. Both the Hurricane and Spitfire had been Improved with higher-rated Mertins and constam·spced propellers. 10 provide more firePQwer an unproved 20mm cannon installation was (0 be available for both airer-Jft by 1941. 'Illere was, however, clearly an upper limit to Ilurricane performance improvements.

In 193- the Air ,\finistr)' issued specification FIS'37 for a high-speed fighter intended lO utilise nC'\\ 2.ooohp engincs. One example wa to be fined "ith the Napier Sabre, which had cylinders arranged III an '1-1' configuration. The other was 10 ha"e the ROUs-RO)'cc Vulture engine with an 'X' cyhnder arrangement, the Vul1ure also bemg scheduled as the powcrplant for thc Ano Manchester hea,')" bomber, Both engines had 24 cylinders. Ilawker subnuut'd a common airframe design for both the engines specified, the Vulture-engined machine becommg known as the Tornado and Ihe Sabreengined one as the ·')'phoon. 'Ine 'Iornado IIcw flrsl, but was later abandoned because of technical problems with the Vulture and

The Splljire II !nlS a majvr updale vf the Spilfire I alld II, Willi more /K'ft'(!r and ooried armall/em. It uus lhefirst t'OrlaTllIQ be llscd as afighler-bomber, 11,e Spitfire I{ in early 1941, ttus in time tv meel tlte improtN!d Gertlum IJf 1091: This phoUlgrtlph shOtt's Spilfire l"bs of Nv 340 lie de Frana Sqlladro", tdlh f
ALLtED AIRCRAFT DeVELOI';\!eNT tN THE I,ARLY \\:',\1{ YEAHS

AIHCHAFT OF THE SECOl\1) WOHl.!) \'(':\H

A promising desipl, Ihe Ireslumdl\'1,jrhci"d tl.'aS thefirst twi"-e"gi"ed smgle-seat fighter to serve with the RAT: Ulljorllmauly il rtqrlirtd IOllg r/lnways for lal/dillG, and had problems flJilll liS Rolls-Royu Paegdlle ellgilles, wllil:h were '101 used 0" olher types. It U'aS fast al low altilUde alld was IIsed for bomber escorl. Lmer il was filled fdlll tft'O 500 Ib bombs. SIIpplemcmillG i,s fOllr 20111111 Ca1/1I01l, and tl.'aS /lsed jor groulld al/(uk.

The Iwill-Hercules BriSlol Beallfigllier was the RAP's first effective IIightfighter when eqllipped wilh alrborlw.jmerceplion (AJ) radar. II replaced Ille slow Blenheim and, with jOllr eallllon alld six mad,ille-glills, had devastating firepoo.'€r, BUll/fighters «'ere wed ill Europe and IIII' Middle and Far Easf, being adapled to carry rO
48

subsequent cancellation due to Rolls-Royce's concentration on the "krlin. The T}'phoon was first airborne in February 1940, bUI unfortunately the specification was drawn up in the era when it was anticipated that most air fighling would be at low and medium altitudes. Consequently the Typhoon did not ha\'e the necessary climb and high altitude performance, and it suffered from rear-fuselage structural problems. The engine also continued to give trouble owing to its usc of sleeve vah'es, which eventually had to be manufactured in a differelll material using imported American machine tools. At one point thc Typhoon programme was nearly cancelled, Fortunately this did nOI happen, and the machine e\'olved imo one of the best fighter/ground-anack aircraft of the war, with four 20mm cannon and either cighl 601b-warhead rocket projectiles (27kg) or two 500lb (227kg) or I,OOOlb (454kg) bombs. The Typhoon in its final in-service form had a maximum speed of 412mph (660km/h) at 19,OOOfl (5,79Om), Other details on the Typhoon 3re co\'cred in a later chapter. The main development in RAF single-seat fighters devolwd on the Spitfire, which pro\'ed itself capable of remarkable improvements in performance and, in man}' versions, remained in large-scale production through to the war's end. llte Spitfire II, with a 1,175hp RollsRoyce Merlin XJI, went into service in August 1940 and was succeeded, in February 1941, by the Spitfire V with a Mcrlin 45 of 1,440hp. Carrying either eight machineguns (J..'lk VA) or two 20mm cannon and four machineguns (Mk VB), it had a maximum speed of 374mph (600km/h), could climb 10 20.ooofl (6,ooom) in 7Y>min and had a normal range of 470 miles (76Om), Its ceiling was 37,000ft (11,2oom). The Spitfire VC had a 'unh'crsal' wing which could accommodate the armament of the VA or VB or four 20mm cannon.1lte Mk V became available as the Luftwaffe \\'as putting lhe improvedperformance Bf I09F into sen'ice. In the meantime, camera~equipped unarmed Spitfires had been doing exceptional work as high-altitude pholographic reconnaissance aircraft. The I'R Spilfire was later pUI into production as the Mark IV, and 229 were built. Another fighter for which there were high hopes but which suffered from lack of altitude performance was the Westland Whirlwind, Like the Lockheed Lighming il was a twin-engined, single-scaler with hea\'y armament concentrated in tile nose. Designed 10 meet specification F:37/35. the Whirlwind was powered by 885hp RollsRoyce Peregrine I in-line engines, developed from the famous Kestrel. The aircraft went into squadron service in july 1940 but was 1101 operational until December owing 10 lack of engines, Rolls-Royce being totally involved in Merlin production. llte Whirlwind was fast and effecti\'e at low altitude, particularly as a bomber es~

cort and laler as a fighler-bomber, but it required long runways 10 cope with its high landing speed. With no Peregrine development in view, the \'(fhirlwind's operationallife and production were limited. Armed with four 20mm cannon in the nose, the \'\'hirlwind had a maximum speed of 360mph (580krn/h) at 15,000ft (4,570m) and a service ceiling of 30,000n (9,IOOm), Climb was 5.8min to 15.000n (4,570m), and range was 800 miles (1,280km). One \'ery successful twin-engined fighter emerged from the Munich Crisis of 1938. Cannon armament was being introduced in Germany, and France, and the RAF had no long-range fighter for use as a nightlighter and for escorting bombers. BriS101 evolvcd a dt-sign which would usc the wings, rear fuselage, lail unit and undercarriage of the Beaufort torpedo bomber, already under development. These were married 10 a new from fuselage. Called the Beaufightcr, and powered by Hercuk-s radials, this air· craft first flcw in july 1939. Four prototypes were or· dercd, followed by Specification E17/39 covering the production of 300 aircraft. A number of modifications were inlt'oduced before the first Beaufighlers were delivered to the RAF in August 1940, in the middle of the Bartle of Britain. The RAP's Blenheim fighters were pro\'ing \'ery disappointing againsl modern opposition as they wcre too slow and poorly armed; they could even be outpaced by the junkers ju 88 bomber! With night defence bc<:oming of paramount importance. the Beaufighter was the obvious answer, It could carry the new air interception (AI) radar previously installed in the Blenheim, and its armamcnt of four nosemoumed 20mm cannon plus six machine-guns in the wings was the heaviest of any fighter of the pt"riod. During the night blitz against Britain in 1940/41 the number of Beaufighters in service rose and so did the lally of night 'kills'.'llte first Luflwaffe aircraft destroyed at night by a Beaufighter with AJ radar was a ju 88 on 19 November 1940, 'Ilte aircraft was also fitted with Rolls·Royce Merlins (the Mk II) as an alternati\'e 10 the Hercules, but the majority of production machines had the Hercules engine. The Beaufighler pro\'ed itself to be extremely versatile. It became Coaslal Command's standard long.range fighter and was equipped with bombs, rockel proicctik-s or a torpedo. It scn'cd in the Middle East and Far Easl theatres. in the latter being known by the japanese as 'whispering death '. The Beaufighler I had a span of 57ft lOin (17m), a loaded weight of 21,OOOlb (9,500kg), a maximum speed of 330mph (530km/h) and a rangc of 1,500 miles (2,400km). Its Hercules III engines delivered 1,365hp each. This was a classic example of the adaptation of a sound basic airframe to perform a variety of tasks. After the campaign in France it was realised that a

49

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND \X'OR!.D WAR

ALLIED AIRCRAFT DEVELOl'MENT IN TIlE EARL" WAR "liARS

Fir$I//oo.m ill 1936, tile Armstrong Irllim'Orth l\"'hillcy "ight bomber fOOS a stalldard RAF 'hemry' ill Ihe early uoar )'('ars. A" Ihe early varUJms, as shoom here, the ellgilll?s fure Tiger mdials, bill /rolll the Mark IV OIlUurds the puwerplillll dla/lged 10 Rolls-Royce Merli,lS. 1/1 w./ditiOlI 10 &mber COlI/lIland, II,., (rllitley was //Sed ill Coasral CO/llJllalld GIld CIS a pormroop tmillcr alld glider /IIg.

20mm cannon plus four machine-guns in the nose. The logical follow-up was the fighter-bomber Mosquito, with bombs in addition to guns. The M.osquito was steadily developed through the war, achieving faster speeds, greater range and higher altitude. For two-and-a-htllf years from ils entry into service, the Mosquito was faster than any other type in service with the Allies or the Axis. In Bomber Command it was the fastest aircraft throughout the war. When the war began, Britain's long-range medium bomber forc(' relied on three I"ypes, me Whitley, (see photograph, page 52), Wellington and Hampden. Of thl'Se the best all-round operational aircraft was the Vickers Wellington. It was, however, clear to the Air Ministry thaI larger, hea\~er machines with increased de(ensh'e armament would ultimately be needed. In 1940/41 operations highlighted the usual crop of deficiencies: lack of self-scaling fuel tanks, low performance, defecti\'e armour plate and, abo\'e all, poor dcfensi\'e armament. Lack of suitable navigational aids was an added factor, bUI hardly the fault of the airframe manufacturers. By the end of 1940 medium bombers were used only at night, as daylight raids w('r(' tOO costly. Of the three aircraft, the Wellington (affectionatclr known as the Wimpy) pro\'ed to be the best and most reliable, and il therefore had the longest Sen'ice life, ultimately in a variet)' of roles. It used geodetic, lattice, construction whidl was \'ery strong, and the aircraft could take a lot of punishment. Originally fitted with IWO Bristol Pegasus engines, the \'(/ellington was also produced with Rolls-Royce J\'lerlins and then Bristol Hercull'S. \,(lith 1,145hp Merlins, Ihe Mk 11 carried a

strike/ground-attack aircrnfl had to have the ability to deli\'er weapons directJy and then fight if necessary with a reasonable chance of sun~val. The Fairey Battle light bomber concept was truly dead. Vcrsatility along these lines went further with another design which was to become one of the really great military aircrnfl of the Second \\70rld \'o;/ar, the de Havilland Mosquito. When, in 1938, the Hatfield-based company proposed a bomber design without armament bUi with faster speed than proposed fighlers, the idea was greeted by the RAJ~ with littJe enthusiasm; what they wanted was a bomber \\ith heavy armament. Largely due to the e!forts of Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the Air j\'\ember for Research, Development and Production, the project was kept alh'e. An order was placed for fifly aircraft in ,\-larch 1940 to meet specification 1l1/40_ The prototype was completed in eleven months and ftew in November 1940. \X'hat emerged was a streamlined two-scat aircraft with two 1,2S0hp Merlin engines, a speed of O\'er 380mph (600kmlh) at 17,oooft (5,180m) which, as a bomber, carried a load of 2,OOOlb (900kg) for 1,370 miles (2,200km). Even more fCvolutionary was that it was of all-wooden construction. It was clear thut the Mosquito was admirably suited to fulfil other roles. Accordingly, prototypes for photogrnphic reconnaissance and interception followed. The long-r.:mge PR Mosquito was urgently needed by the RAF and was the first into service, in September 1941. -Inc fighler MosquilO with Al radar was not in ser\'ice until January 1942, but thereafter it replaced the Beaufighter and the Havoc. Its armament was four

50

Nickllamed ,he '1\I'impy', the Vickers I\'Hlillgton bomber tI.>as a cOlI/emperory of the I\I'1Iitley and Hall/pde" ill the RAF, bill 5erwd ill Imlch larger /lumbers.lnilially wilh PtgtlSm tIIgilles alld also produud with J\Jer/im (iHk /I), the It'Nlillgloll from the Mk 1/1 OllUVJrdJ ft'llS pmrered by Heralles. Geodetu: lallia stmclllre uus exlremely lOugh alld cOllid wi,hsrand a lor 0/ damage. The (t'el/il/glOll played a major role fvilh Coastal COlllmand and also operoled as a bomber ill Ihe Midille and Par Easl. These are I\~llil/gtol/s Is of No 9 Squadron.

All IIS/la/layollt wilh a lollg rai/boom characterised Ihe Handley Page Hampdlm, lhe third Bomber CommlJlld main lytle 10 ePl/er the war. It suffered, however;frolJ/ poor accolJ/lI/odatio,1 for the crew alld illeffective deft:llsit'l': aromame,lI. It fIJllj /asl alld had lollg rallge; modifieatiom were made alld it tI.'('1I/ OIl 10 perform weN, later workil/g as a Coasw/ Commalld UJrpedo-bomber. Basic potJ..>er uw two Pegaslls radials, bill 100 were built as Herefords fvi,h Napier Dagger el/gilles.

51

ALLIED AIRCRAFT I)I'VEI OI',\\ENT IN TilE EARLY WAR YEARS

AIRCIl.AI'T OF THIl SECO}lO WORLD WAR

~~-----~-

"ws,

1M t>ersault Ingh.pnfOrmana UlQrpla~ of 1M &rond Iforlcllfar, 1M ck Hat.'i/kmJ l\fosqWIO trW a hriJJwnt tksign. 0/ frember /940. l"Yd for for fnngrrJlIgt prtdsitm bomlnng,fXlIJrfindmg, doy wuJ nightfighrin" low-kt~/ otttJdl, rteOlmaUkllfa, manllltU arttJdl arJJ sP«io' Jutin, 1/ mtllJ!1ud In RAF sn1.1« umi/ rM adt~m of 1M Qmbtnu ~t bomber. /lJustraud is the third (PRJ pro/Or~, If'405I.

four Bristol Hercules rndlals. The Vulture COnsisted of m"O RoUg..Royce l~eregnn~ one abo\·e the other, driving a single cl1lJ\kshaft. This resulted in an X,configuration engine rated at I,sOOhp, but With considerably higher power potenual. The A\TO bomber design, the Trpc 679, subsequentlr named the Manchester, retained the Vulture, while the Handley Page pro~t, which became the Halifax, was switched to a four·Merlin layOut in 1937. The Manchester soldiered on with the Vulture. It flew in protOlyPC form in Jul)' 1939 and first entered sen·ice with Bomber Command in November 1941. The airframe was excellent, but the Vulture wa!! a constant source of trouble. It did not reach its designed power

pilot and four CK'o\'. Bomb load was 4,OOOIb (l,ISOkg) and range 2,200 mil~ (3,540km) at ISOrnph (290km,/h) at 15,OOOn (4,Y'Om). Armament comprised a min-gun nose mrret, a four-gun tail mrret and m·o beam gum. Span was 86ft 2in (26m), and length 64ft 7in (19m). \'('ellington production totalled 11,461. The medIUm bombers had emerged as a resull of RAF spedficaoons ISSUed in 1932 and 1934. By 1936 the Air Slaff, watching the growing power and size of the Luftwaffe, issued far.slghted specifications for new and larger bombers carrying increased bomb loads. Tko wcre to be twin-engined and one four-engined. Avro and Handley Pagc had the Rolls·Royce Vuhure engine specified, while the Shorts design was to have

TM mostfonwu.s Brilish heotry bombn of the &amdlri1rldlrar. rhl Avro wnaurer, nus tM rmill of Ik marriage of rhlfintclass /\t",ldrmtr aIrframe, trhidl htJd lfro unreliable Iidrure mgma, rrrth four Ro//s-Ru)'u Alerlim. In the S«Qnd half of rhl UlQr w wnaurer jcntKd the badfbu~ of Bomfxr Command, albn,g U'lm tht Halifax, wuJ aJrrUd tM kJrgal bumbs, indtlding 1M Kianr 11,OOO/b 'Grand Slom'.1//uslraud is 1M prototype lAnauln- I,a COIffXTltd Afanchtsur.

52

If'rm tM I~,u:asrer,d~ HOIl(JJ.e)' Page Ho/ifox froS the mainsw)' of rM RAr""'s bomber oflmsit:e against Germany. Earl)' mtJrIu haJ /\'mill mginn unriJ. rrilh 1M .\fk 1/1, t~ oircraft sra'ldiJrd,stJ on rhe /Itrcuks raJIO/. The HalIfax fMS also rrlckly Ij~d

for man"time from rrilh CoasraJ Co",nlOnd wuJ as a glickr mg.

OUtpUt and engme failures were frequent. If ROlls-Ro)'ce had not had alllls efforts concentrated on the Aledin, the compan)' .....ould certainly ha\·e developed the Vulture 10 an acceptable standard. As it .....as. time and effort were at a premium and the Vulture was an also-ran. There then occurred one of the most remarkable aircraft transformauons in wartime. A\'ro fitted a Manchester aIrframe \\ith four Merlins and flew it in Januar}· 1941. 'lbe result, as the Lancaster, became the best·known and most successful RAF hea\'y bomber of the war; it was also the largest load
ceilmg 22,800ft (6.9SOm). Its span was 98ft lOin (29m) and loaded \\"eight 58.ooolb (26.300kg). Armamem was t\\"O 0.303in guns in a nose turret and four in the tall, while some airtT'J.ft had ~am guns. The maximum bomb load was 13,OOOlb (5,900kg). Mllny detail modifiamons were carried OUt on sub-marks until the Hercules-engmed Mark III became a definith'e produc· tion variam. "Ibe hislOry of the Short Stirling ""liS a somewhat djlT~rent matter. Air ,\ linistf)' policy changed with the increasing perceh·ed threat and, as a result, apart from the Manchester and Halifax, which were initially classified as medium bombers to 1'.13/36, a further requirement, Il I2/36, was issued for a fast four*Cngine, long-range heav}' bomber. lbe word 'fas!' has to be taken in terms of the aircraft in sen'ice in 1936. For example, thc Faircy Hendon and [he Handley I~age Heyford bombers had top SIX.'Cds of I55mph and 142mph respccti\·e1y. Short·s submission for B. I 2136 was for a large fourHercules aircraft with a crew of sc\·en or eight, using tcchnolog)' bascd on the company's prm·en firing boats. -Ibe Air ,\ linistfy, howe\"~r, placed sc\'eral restrictions on Ihe specification including, ridiculous as it may seem, a limit on the "ingspan to fit a standard RAF hangar. This meant thal the wing was oflow aspect ratio, thus limiting the opernuonal ceiling - a definne draw·back when in ser\'lce. 'fbe Stirling had a wing span of 99ft lin (30m) and a length of 87ft 3in (26m). As it had a shoulder-wing it possessed a \"CJ"}' tall main undercarriage. Production of the Stirling ""liS held up by Lufm"liffe bombmg raids, but It went mto senice "1th No 7 Squadron in August 1940,

53

AIRCR"'FT OF THE SECOND WORLD \l;> ... R

ALLIED ... IRCRAFT DEVELOl'MENT IN THE E ... RLY "'· ... R YIiARS

"',

- --'

,

a,.. ;-"- '-:4: : , . , . ,

...... '::-'-

,

'

/;Z

71re first fOllr-lmgined bomber lQ be /lsed opera/iollally ill lhe u:ur, the Shorl SU·rti,lg Wilh fOllr Hercules rudials illilially OL'e1i/ ill/o sqUadroll servia ill Augmf 1940. Beca/lse of ils 1or1J-ClSp€ll-TUlio willg itJ servia ailillg was limiud. As a bomber the Slirling was !twllsed ill 1944, bw it was fllidely employed as a glider /IIg and lrolls/xm.

during !.he Battle of Britain. The Stirling !.hus 3chieved t.....o 'firsts', !.he first four-engined monoplane bomber to go into service wi!.h !.he RAP and !.he first to go on operations in !.he Second World War, The Hercules delivered 1,4oohp, and wi!.h these !.he Stirling h3d a maximum speed of 260mph (420km/h) and a maximum cruising range of 2,330 miles (3,750km) with 3,500lb (l,590kg) of bombs, or 590 miles (9S0km) with 14,0001b (6,350kg) of bombs. Its aU-up weight was 59,400lb (26,940kg). Its armament comprised a two-gun nose turret, a four-gun tail Nrret and, initially, a ventrnltwo-gun 'dustbin'. Later !.he ventral turret was removed and a two-gun dorsal turret fined.The turrets had hydraulic reeuperators, but unfortunately !.he location of m'o of them coincided wi!.h the RAF roundel on !.he fuselage. By using the roundcl as a target, enemy fighters were able to PUI the turrets out of action, As a result, the recuperators had to be mo\'Cd. Through 1940 and 1941 Britain was developing and gaining operational experience on the types of large long-range bomber which would fonn the backbone of Bomber Command's operations at night. At the same time, the USAAF was modifying and perfecting its own key four-engined day bombers, the B-17 Fortress and the 8-24 Liberator, described earlier. In 1943-45 !.he two great air fleets would conduct a round-the-clock campaign, a form of air warfarc ne\'er before seen. Two events of Ma}' 1941 ....'tre ultimately 10 change military and civil aviation completely on the one hand, and bring untold destructive power from !.he air on the o!.her. On ISMay 1941 a 29ft-span (8m) single-seat monoplane, the E.28/39, took off from Cranwell,

Lincolnshire, flown by P E Sarer. In one \·ital respect it differed from all other aircraft in Britain, for it had no propeller. It was in fact jel-propellcd, and the onl)' machine of its kind, apart from twO in Germany, the Heinkel He 178 and He 280, which had also flown in protot)'pe form, Neither side was aware of the other's gas turbine work. Flight Lieutenant (later Air Commodore Sir) Frank Whittle had pioneered gas turbine design development, and his firm Power jets Ltd was given a contract in 1939 to build a flight engine. Design and development of the airframe was entrusted to !.he Gloster Aircraft Company under !.he terms of specification E.28/39, the 'E' slanding for experimemal.

Ouuide GenoollY the first jet aircraft to fly uw the Gloster £.28139, fllhlCh took tf) the air fvith a Whittle WI tlIrbojet ellgine 011 15 M'ay 1941, From this design grew the two great jet /!/Igi"e industries of lhe USA and Bri/ain, and it led the way to the civil alld military jet fleets of loday.

54

• TIre /3oei"g 8-29 Supeiforlress represellled a quall/IIIII leap in aircraft design.I\"ilh i,s high speed of350mph, presmrised cabin, reII/O/ely coll/rolkd gUll /IIrreu alld range of ()(.ltr 3,000 miks, il was remarkable ill Ihat the original official requiremell/ was issued ill February 1940. The 8-29 uw Ihe Iype wltidl dropped thejiNI 1'/.1.'0 atomi' bombs orl Hiroshima and ,""agaroki ill 1945.

Powered by an 860lb-thrust Power jets \Xl. I gas turbine, the E.28/39 had a maximum speed of 466mph (750km/h), well in excess of any piston-engined aircraft of the period. It could climb to 30,000ft (9,OOOkm/h) in 22min, and had a service ceiling of 32,OOOf( (9,750m) and a loaded weight of3,7481b (1,7ookg). A second protot)'pe was built, but later crashed when !.he ailerons became jammed during a high-altitude flight. The first prototype continued flying at intervals !.hrough to 1944 with higher powered engines and other refinements. In 1946 it was put on permanent display in the Science Museum in London, In November 1940 the RAF issued a specification for a min-engined jet fighter based on designs submitted by Gloster Aircraft. In February 1941 an order was placed for m'el\"e 'Gloster-\'\'hittle' aircraft, a type which was to become the Gloster Meteor. As related earlier, Britain shared its technical secrets wi!.h USA and !.his included Whittle's aero gas turbine work, It was to ha\'e far-reaching consequences QS companies in both countries turned tOwards the gas turbine first for fighters, then for bombers and latcr transports. 'fbe technology b-.aP became ever wider between the victorious Western Allies and those nations defealed or left to mark time during the Second World \X'ar, It can all be traced back to Whittle and the E.28/39. 'Inc second key e\'ent of May 1941 was !.he issue of a

lettcr by tllC USAAC to Boeing, stating that an ordcr would be placed for 250 aircraft of a 'supcrbomber' type, Boeing h3d received an official requirement for such an aircnl.ft in February 1940. It was to carry 2,0001b (900kg) of bombs at a speed of 400mph (640km/h) Qnd have a range of S,333 miles (8,S80km). A tricycle undercarriage, pressurisation and hem'}' defensive armament were specified. Boeing had been working on designs of such a bomber since 1938, and three prototypes had been ordered in 1940.The project was known as !.he modcl345, the army designation was XB-29, and it later became famous as the 8-29 Superfortress which was to lay waste the cities of Japan by dropping the first (wo atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even to consider such an incredibly ad\'anced project in 1940-41, wi!.h littlc money a\'3ilable, represcllled one of the most farsighted acts in !.he history of military aviation, Russia In the early hours of 22 june 1941 Hitler im'aded !.he Soviet Union in Operation 8arbarossa. Surprise was complete, and by noon on the same day 1,200 Russian aircraft had been destroyed on the ground and in !.he air. Losses of bases and equipment continued as tile German army advanced, In !.he early stages the main opposition came from Polikarpov 1-152/1-153 biplane and

55

AIRCRAFT OF

T~II:

SECONU \l:'ORI.U \l:'AR

Al.I.[ED AIRCRAFT DEYELO[',\IENT [N THE EARLY WAR YEARS

Uibliography

jackson, A j, Avro Aircraft siflte 1908 (Putnam, London 1965) Jackson, R. Air Irar over Fralla! 1939-40 (Ian Allan. London 1974)

Andrews, C F, Vickers Aircraft since 1908 (Putnam. London 1969)

James, D N, GIOSler Aircraft sillce 1917 (Putnam, London 1971)

Angle, G D, (ed), Aerospltcrc 1939 (Aircraft Publications, New York 1939)

111t! 11-1 Shmrmooik armOllred groutld-allack aircraft played a major part iPl the ultimate Soviet victory uver the German i'lvasion roll/lI1llS_ Heat/ily armed, rhe 11-2 tllas prodlla!d at the rate of 1,200 per JIIomh, and productioll for OlllStripped mOSI otlter SWJlld tl'-brld Hur types. Illustrated is all Il-2A·13.

1-16 monoplane fighters, both of which had been combat-tcsted in Spain. Mosl of the bombers in Soviel operational service were also obsolescent and suffered accordingly at the hands of the Luftwaffe. Howevcr, a number of modern designs .....c re already well inlO the development/production phase. As the Germans approached !\,Ioscow a remarkable operation was undertaken. Threatened factori,.:s were mo\'ed by r'Jilway to cast of the Ural mountains and to Siberia. It was a mammoth undenaking, but it was successfully concluded. The Luftwaffe had failed to dewlop a suitable tong-range bomber and, therefore, the new factory sitcs were safe from allack. In these faclOries Yak-I, MiG-I, MiG-3 and LaGG·3 fighters were steadi1r produced and developed, incorporating the lessons learned from combat experience. Designer Ilyushin built the 1l~2 single-engine close support/anti-tank aircraft which became famous as the 'Shturmo\·ik'. This was flown in October 1940 and pUt into large-scale production in March 1941. Its armament was twO cannon and two machine-guns, and it had a top speed of 292mph (470km/h). Ultimately the Russialls built 36,000 11-2s. Like the Luftwaffe, the Soviet Air Force concentrated on light and medium twin-engine shon-range aircraft. A lypical example was the l'etlyako... I'c-2 with a three-man crew, two M-I05R in-line engines of 1,IOOhp and carrying a bomb load of up 10 2,200lb (I,OOOkg),

Balchin, N, The Aircraft Builders (HAlSO, London 19.n)

Lumsden, A, British PistonAero-Ellgilles O/Id Iheir Aircraft (Airlife, Shrewsbury 1994)

Barnes, C H,SllOrtJAircraft silla! 1900 (putnam, London 1967)

Mason, F K, Hawker Aircraft since 1920 (Putnam, London 1961)

Barnes, C H, Bristol Aircraft since 1910 (Putnam, London 1964)

Nowarra, N j & DU\'al, G R, Russiwl Civil and l\lilitary Aircraft, 1884-1969 (Fountain Press, London 1971)

Bowers, P M, Boeing Aircraft sma! 1916 (Putnam, London 1966)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, P M, United StaleS Military Aircraft sillce 1909 (putnam, London 1989)

Bridgman, L (cd), Jalle's All the Iforld's Aircrafl 1941 (Sampson Low, London, 1941)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, I' M, Uniled Stares Navy Aircraft since 1911 (pumam, London 1968)

Brown, D, Shores, C & Macksey, K, The Gllincss History of Air lfbifare (Guiness Superlatives, Enfield 1976)

lapper, 0, ArmstrollK lrIhi,u'Orlh Airr:raft sina! 1913 (Pumam, London 1973)

Franeillon, R j, Grllmmall Aircraft sillce 1929 (Putnam, London 1989)

Taylor, M. J H (ed), Jane's Encyc/Qpedia of Aviatioll (Bracken Books, London 1989)

Francillon, R j, McDolI/lcll DOllg/as Aircraft since 1920, lobi 1 (I"utnam, London 1988)

Thetford, 0, Aircraft of the Royal Air Fora si,lU 1918 (Putnam. London 1971)

Armament consisted of four machine-guns. The Pe-2 had a span of just o\'er 51fl (15m) and a maximum speed of 335mph (540km/h). The \'ery heavy aircraft losses incurred br tllC So\'iet Air Force in 1941 led to urgent requests to Britain and America for warplanes. There then began a steady flow of fighters and bombers including "Iomahawks, KillYhawks, Hurricanes, Airacobras and BOSIOIlS. As the war progressed more ad\'anced types were supplied. In total, the USA ultimately sent 14,833 aircraft to Russia, while Britain's direct contribution included no fewer than 2,952 Hurricanes.

Capable of over 330 mph, Ihe Petlyakoo Pe-2 «'
56

57

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECONI) WORLI) WAR

3 Fighter Development, Mid-1941 to Mid-1945 Dr Alfred Price

The Spitfire XII; fIO'lwrrd by Iht 2,03Shp Rolls-Royce Griffon 61 engille with a IUYJ-Slage supercharger, was olle of the IIIOSt effecrivt air s/lpen"ority fighteN ill service at Ille Cl/d of the Stto'id It'brld J\'ar. (Vickm) (See pages 60-61.)

airframe to meet his requiremenl. '1l1e Bf 109 was a smaller machine all round, and its wing area of 16.17m l (174 sq ft) was one quaner less man me Spitfire's 242 sq ft (22.48m l ). The engine fitted to lhe Bf 109F-2 was me 1,200hp Daimler Benz DB 60 IN engine, while me Spitfire V had me 1,470hp Rolls-Royce Merlin 45. Bom fighters had a maximum speed of just o\"er 595km/h (370mph), however. At this time drop tanks were little used, and without them bom fighters were limited to an effecti\"e combat radius of about 100 miles (l60km). The Bf 109 'Friedrich' was me lighter of the twO fighter.>, its loaded weight of 2800kg (6,173Ib) being about l60kg (3501b) less than mat of the Spitfire VB. On me orner hand, the larger wing of the Spitfire gave it a wing loading at 271b/sq ft (I.13kg/m J ), compared with 35.51b/sq ft (1.49kg/m l ) for the German fighter. Thal meant me Bf 109 was inferior to the British fighter in a turning fight. Thc Spitfire VB was me more heavily armed, carrying two 20mm Hispano cannon and four 0.303in machineguns spaced out across the wings. The 'Fricdrich-2', in contrast, was armed principall)' for fighter-to-fighter combat and had a single 15mm cannon and two 7.9mm machine-guns grouped close together in the nose of the aircraft. -I'nroughout the remainder of lIle war me de\"elopment of fighter aircraft in Great Britain and Germany

The air superiority fighter in mid·1941 In rnc middle of 1941, nearly tv.o years into lIle Second \\?orld \,\Iar, twO aircraft stood out as representing the state of the art among the air superioriry fighters then in service: the Supermarine Spitfire l\brk VB and the Mcsserschmin Bf I09F-2. Both fighters were de\'c!oped \'crsions of designs that made their initial flights more than half a decade earlier, and both were in large-scale production. When, in !:he mid-l 930s, me)' had designed me two fighters, both Reginald Mitchell and Willi Messcrschmin had the same goals in mind. Each sought to producc a short-range interceptor fighter with the highest possible speed and climbing performance, mating the smallest possible airframe to the most powerful engine then available. Gi\"en lhe similarity of lhe requirements, it is hardly surprising that me resultant aircraft should ha\'e sc\"eral points in common. Both were low-wing monoplanes with all-metal stressed-skin construction, faired cockpits and retractable undercarriages. When considcring the rclath'e merits of these fighters, howe\"cr, one mUSI bear in mind that airCr'.l.ft design is largely a matter of compromise. If the designer concentrates on improving one aspect of performance or combat capability, almost ine\'itably this will be at the expense of something clse. Arguably, Willi Messerschmill did slightly better tllan Reginald Mitchell in designing the smallest possible

Tile limglll F4U CONair was tlu! fastest and 1Il0st effectiw carrier-home fighterlfigluer-bomber type 10 see /a.rge-scale seruice during the Suond lri.lr/d Irar. (Sec pages 64 and 74-5)

1u:u broadly comparable machines u:hidl rallked as the mosl effeclive air SlIpen"on'ly fighters ill $(!rvU:e ill mid- / 94 /. Left: A SIIf'Cr",arine Spitfire I '8 of No 92 SqlliulrrJll. Right: A i\1esserschmill Hf 109 'Friedricll' ofJagdgeuhwader 2,oll/side its camouflaged hallgar ill lIorther'l France. (Spitfire: Vickers; J\fesse"ichmilt: 'Via Schliephake)

58

59

FIGHTER DEVELOPMENT, ,\IID-1941 TO MID-1945

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOSD \l'ORJ.D \l:'AR

\

nu: Spiifire XII tooS optimiu:d for operatiO'1S at low allitude, and had irs willgs dipped 10 give a" i"crellled rote of roll. followed one of Iwo separate paths. On one of these paths, the well-proven Spitfire and Bf 109 designs were developed to squeeze the laSl drop of performance out of them. On the other path, new fighter types were built and introduced into service. In the next twO sections we shall obsen'e the aircraft that emerged from each path of development, and see how they fared in service.

the structure was liable (Q suITer a catastrophic failure and break up. To cope with each major increase in weight, therefore, a fighter's airframe had to be strengthened to restore its safe loading factor. And, naturally, each such increase in strength brought with it a further twist to the weight spiral. During the Second World \X'ar Supermarine pushed the process of incremental developmem of the Spitfire further than anybody else. After the Mark VB, the next major impro\"emem to the performance came in the spring of 1942 with the imroduction into service of the Spitfire ,\.\ark IX. 'll1is was powered by the new !\'lerlin 61 engine filled with two supercharger blowers in series, one feeding into the other. AI sea level the new engine developed a maximum of 1,565hp, JUSt under loohp more than the Merlin 45. AI high altitude the effect of the two-stage supercharger was more profound. At 30,OOOft (9, 150m) the ,"1<'rlin 45, with the single-stage supercharger, developed about nOhp. At the same altirude the Merlin 61, the same basic engine but with the two-stage supercharger, developed about I,020hp, or nearly one-third more. With its additional blowcr and casing, the Merlin 61 was 9in (23cm) longer and about 200lb (about 90kg) heavier than the Mark 45. After the Mark IX, the next major impro\'emem to the performance came early in 1944 with the introduction into service of the Spitfire Mark XlV. The new fighter was powered by the 2,035hp GriITon 61 engine, a 36.75·lirrc 'banger' with a cubic capacity one-third greater than the Merlin. By inspired juggling with the ancillary components Rolls-Royce designers kept the frontal area of the new engine to within six per cem, its length to \\ithin 3in (7,5cm) and its weight to \\;thin

Pushing the Well·proven Designs The Spitfire VB and the Bf I09F-2 werc wcll into their respccli\'c de\'clopment processes in mid-1941. 'Inese had followed, and would continue to follow, more or less common lines. Successi\'e variants of these fighters employed more powerfUl (and therefore heavier) engines to boost lheir maximum speed and climbing performance. They carried more powerful (and therefore heavier) armamcnts. They carried larger (and therefore heavier) fucl loads 10 pro\'ide the increases in range that operational pilots demanded. And ther carried more (and therefore heavier) armour and other items of operational equipment. Each impro\'ement in performancc or combat capability brought wilh it a weight increase, which in turn led (Q other problems. The late-war Spitfire J\'lk XIV, for example, weighed more than a tonne more than the Mark I when it entered sen;ee before the war. When the fighter was on the ground or in normal Aight the increased weight was not important, but in combat it was a quite different matter. In a 6g turn every part of the fighter and those items attached to it weighed six times as much. If the airframe was not strong enough to support the additional weight, multiplied by the 'g' factors,

60

A CIoU-IIP of the Griff011 engine fitted 10 a Spitfire XlV. A/though il had a albic capacity olle-third greater than the Merlin, by inspired juggling witlt tlte ancillary compolI/!I1lS its desigm!N kept tilt jroma/ area ofllle nefO tl/gine 10 witltill 6 per celli, its kl/gth to Wilhill 3i,/ (7.5cIII) and ilS weight 10 wlthi" 600/b (272kg) of the eq/llvakmjigures for the A'fer/i". (Costai,,)

will be seen thai the Spitfire Mk XlV had a wing loading more than tOlb/sq ft (O.4kg/m ' ) greater than the Mk J. The 'bottom line' of these changes was that during ilS long development life the handling characteristics of the Spilftre delerionned steadily. lest pilOt Alex Henshaw described their eITect:

600lb (270kg) of the Merlin. It speaks equally highly for the design staff at Supcrmarine that they were able to redesign the Spitfire to take the new engine. The box below summarises Spitfire development. It puts some figures to the imprm'emem in performance t.hat resulled from lhat extra power. It also shows lhe increases in weight and their progressive effect on the fighter's wing loading (for each mark for which figures are gi\'en, the fighter'S wing area remained the same). It

I loved the Spitfire, in all of her man)' versions. But I ha\'C to admit Illat the later Marks, although they were faster Figllres for llll'tial production wn10'1 of each variattt

Dcvclopmcnt of the Spitfire Entered service

Engine power

Sep 1938

I,030hp

362mph 583km/h

5.8191b 2,639kg

241b/sq ft I.Olkg/m l

V

Feb 1941

1,470hp

371mph 597km1h

6,525lb 2,9591::g

271b/sq ft 1. 131::g/m2

IX

June 1942

1,560hp

409mph 658km/h

7,400 lb 3,356 kg

30.61b/sq ft 1.29 kg/m 2

Jan 1944

2,035hp

446mph 718km/h

8,4oolb 3,809kg

34.71b/sq ft 1.46kg/m l

Mark

XIV

Maximum speed

61

Weight (normal loaded)

Wing loading

A1N.CN.AFT OF THE SECOND WORLD WiAR

FIGHTER DE\·EI.Ol',\tENT. MID-19011 TO MtD-l'il4S

performance en\'elope is I1m:I)' achie\'ed without a deterioration some" here elsc, That deterioration in the Spitfire's handling characteristics came at the s.-lme time as major and sought-after impro"ements in performance, That alone made them acceptable in time of war. Other fighter designs proved much less able to accommodate the development process, however. A prime example of fighter design that suffered problems from o,w-de"elopment was the J\"-csserschmitt Bf 109. \'\Ihen the Bf 109 'Berta' entered sen'ice in February 1937 its wing loading was an acccptable 1.14kg/m' (27.2Ib/sq fl), and it handled beautifully. The Bf 109 'Friedrich' provided the beSt compromise in terms of performance, fighting ability and handling characteristics. From then on, however, each increase in performance or combat capability was bought al a high cost in terms of the aeroplane's handling characteristics. Ideally, the Bf 109 should ha,·e been superseded in production by a new design in the spring of 1942. !lUi the f\'Ic 209 and Me 309 fighters intended to replacc it wcre not yet ready to go into production (they never would be), There was no allemative but to continue de\'Cloping the older tighter, As has been said, Willi Messerschmitt did rather better than Reginald Mitchell when it came 10 designing lhe: smallest possible airframe to meet the original requirement for an interceptor. But when the German fighter was subjloctcd to the rigours of the development process, that advantage became a major handicap. The next major production variant of the Bf 109, the 'Gustav-6·, entered service in September 1942 and had

Spifjire [Xs of No 313 $qll, &Jeh fighler carries a 90gal (408-lilre) drop-tal/k I/Ilder Ihefusefage.

than lhc earlier ones, were also much heavier and so did not handle so well, You did not havc such positive oontrol ovcr lhcm. One ICSt of manoeu\'l""JbililY was to throw the Spitfire into a flick roll and sec how many times she rolled, With the "·lark 11 ,., one got two and a half f1io;k roDs, but the Mark IX was heavier and you got only one and a half. With the later and still heavier versions one gal even less. The esscnce of aircraft design is oompromise:, and an impro\'emenl alone end of the

I •

.11re J\fesserschmitt Bf 109 'KlIr/lIrsl', the filltJl version of the fighler a wing loading of 1.68kg/m' (40Ib/sq ft). ·1l1at was bad enough, but sub-\·ariants of the 'Gustav' optimised to engage Allied hea"1' bombers carried even heavier weapon loads which pushed their wing loading up to 1.81 kg/m' (431b/sq ft), Box 2 below summarises the development, The combination of the small wing, overloaded airframe, narrow-track undercarriage and big 1,800hp engine drh'ing a broad bladed propeller, produced some really vicious handling traits in the Bf 109G-6. If an inexperienced pilot opened the throttle too quickly during take-off, or if he tried to lift the fighter imo the air before it had reached flying speed, the aireraft was liable to roU on its back and smash into the ground. Nobody did that twice.

A late productiem Spiljire XIV fi/t(:d with a bubble callopy. The latter gave greatly improved tJ,-sibility ill Ihe rear hemisphere, all imporlam advamage ill COII/bal,

62

Entered service

Engine power

imo large-scale productioll. (via Sch/iephake)

lne ultimate production ,'ariam of the Bf 109, the K-4, was even more of a handful than the 'Gustav', Both sub-IYpes of the Bf 109 remained in large scale production in Germany until the last days of the war, though as combat aircraft they were much inferior LO the Spitfire Mk XlV. The Spitfire and the Bf 109 equipped the bulk of the fighter uniLS in the RAF and the Luftwaffe, respecti\·ely, throughout the whole of the period under review. clnese two fighters illustrated the extent to which the development process could be pushed in time of war, but they also highlighted its shortcomings. In the next section we shall examine some of the new-generation piston-engine fighter designs that entered senice after the middle of 1941 and pro\'ed successful in combat.

Dcvelopment of the Messersehmitt Bf t 09 Variam

10 go

Figures for i"illal prodllCliOf/ tlersioll ofecu;h varlam

Maximum speed

Weight (normal loaded)

Wing loading

Ikno

Feb 1937

680hp

465km/h 289mph

2,150kg 4,7411b

1.14kg/m1 27.2Ib/sq ft

Emil

Feb 1939

1,100hp

550kmJh 342mph

2,504kg 5,5231b

• 1.31kg/m1 31.31b/sq ft

Friedrich

l"lar 1941

1,200hp

600kmih 373mph

2,800kg 6,1731b

1.49kg/m 1 35.51b/sq ft

Gusta\'-6

Sep 19-12

1,475hp

621kmJh 386mph

3,147kg 6,940lb

1.68kg/m l 401b/sq ft

63

AIRCRAFT OF

TI~r:

SECOND WORI.D WAR

FIGIITER DI,\'l:l OI'MEST, ,\110·/9-11 TO MID-1945

The Hawker Typhoon and Tempest Type ·I)·phoon I

-

...

.

Tempest V

.~~~~

-II'

fl.

~

A Maurschmm Bf 100G toxin m aft" a sonk, past a bomb craur bemgjiUtd /II, m sumltJer of 1944. By the (inman jighter uw fkrxJuped past iu best and It had acquirtd some "oiciot,S handli"g troilS.

me

mil

How they Compared:

Spilfire

~taTk

XIV

&pllbli€ 1'-47 71/11nderboll of dte 3761h Fighur Squadron, 36111 FIJ:hler Orcnlp.. thln"g dl~ spring of 1944. The ThllndnbDlt trW tM jirst rtally ~Jftrtit..,. Jing~ined lo'IJ:-nmgt t$COn jighter to go "'to snt-iu in qU01!lilY. This uamplt carrln a 9Oga1 (408-lurtj pmsurised drop-tanJr under thejwL~. (L"SAi-) A

. r:;:-' "'''''''-~

Sep

~f\ice

19~1

Engine power 2,180hp

~ laximum

speed

~OSmph

6S2k.m,1h

.' .-;-;.1J-?...• .. •

Enteu-d

Figum jor i"itUJI production venion of tad! type

~ ~1esserschmitt

Bf I09G

Ma:omrtm sPfflJ The Spitfi~ XIV is 40mph (64km,/l1) faster at all hcighlS except near 16,OOOfl (4,9OOm), \IIh~ It IS only IOmph (16UnJh) fasler. Maximum dlmb The samC' result: at 16,OOOft lhe tWO aircraft a~ identical, Olherwi~ the Spidiu- XIV out-elimbs the Me 1000.lnC' zoom climb is practical. Iy Ktentical when lhC' climb is made without opening lhc throttle, Climbing at full throttle, the Spitfi~ XIV draws a....'3y from lhC' Me 109G quite easily. Dwt During the initial part of the dive, the Me I09G pulls awa)' slightly, but when a speed of 380mph (612km1h) is rcached, the Spitfire XIV begins to gain on the Me 109G. 7imUlIg circk The Spitfirt" XlV easily out-turns the Me I09G in either direction, Rale of roll ·Ine Spirfirc: XIV rolls much more quickly. COIU;;ltlsio" The Spitfire XIV is superior to the Me I09G in every respect.

inlrOduced the Grumman F6F Hellcat and later the Vought F~U Corsair. The Japanese Na\'y introduced the Musublshl A6M3 (Allied cOOmamc 'Hamp'), followed much Ialer by the .\btsublshi J2M3 'lad;' and the Kawanishi N IK I-J 'George·. 'Ine Japanese Army began its .....a r with the Nakajima Ki-O '()scar' and in the dosIRg Stages oft.hc conflict ilS bcsl fighler was the Nakajima Ki-84 'Frank', The So\"iel Air Force inuoduced a long

Nolfl;·n,is box und the following 'compariso" boxes'ill fillS dropter comai" wrbotim uarpu from officUJI reporu of COl/lbut trials carrkd Ollt during the Second lrilr/d ifilr luing capwrtd ajrcmft.

The new generation of fighters E3C'twcen the middle of 19~1 and the spring of 1944 each of the major air forces in\"oh·cd in the conflict fielded one or more new air superiority fighters. The Luftwaffe brought iRio action lhe Focke-Wulf Fw 190. The RAF mlrOduced lhe Ha.... k.erT)'phoon and later the Tempest, and lhe US Arm)' Air Force brought in the P...H 'Inunderboh and the P-SIA Mustang, followcd later- by Mcrlin.engincd \'3riants of the P-SI. The US Navy

A c/OU-IIP of the Pratt & IV/m,te)' R-28OD-59 Dollble It'asp tnglnefltud to a 17twukrbolt. Nou du largt dlla un.dn W mgme, 10 carry Cdrbr,rrttor air to tM turbosllpncharger jitttd in the m:rr fUM~. (USAF)

Apr

19~~

2.~20hp

~3Smph

-OOkmilt line of Mtko)"an and Gurnich, YakO\·Ie\· and Lavochlun fighter designs. Each of lhcsc fighter t}'PC'S employed lhe same basie layout lIS a low·....inged monoplane ....ith single fin and ruddtt, fixed forward-finng annamcnt, the cngine mounted U1 the nose dri\ing a tractor aif'scre......, and a t:lIilwhccl undercarriage. It goes ....ithoul sa~ing that fighter perforrna.nce depends on engine power. In this fCSpect British and US dcslgners wcrt" U1d~d fonulUlte in ha\ing support from hIghly effecD\·c engme manufacturers such as Rolls· Royce, Napier and Pratt & \Vhimey. During 1942 each of these companies began production of engines m the 2.000hp class suitable for usc in fighters. In Germany the first such cngmes did not become available until 19~4. The SO\iet Union and Japan bolh failed to bring uuo ~n,ce any smglc-engincd fighter type poweu-d by an engine in that class. The armament carried by a fighter depended on the type of opponenl it was intended 10 engage. The American ThunderbollS and ,\ lustangs were intended to fight mainly against enemy fighters or fighter-bombers, and for that purpose their armament of eight and six O.5in (12.7mm) maChine-guns respecti\'e1y was sufficient. For much the same reason, many Russian fighters carried one 20mm cannon and twO O.Sin weapons, Japanese fighlers at lhe beginning of the period carried two 20mm cannon lind two rifle·calibre machine-guns. The RAF Spitfires lind 'rYphoons were armed to engage encmy bombers and fighters, the former carrying a combination of rine-ealibre machinc-guns, 0.5in weapons, and twO 20mm cannon and the latter tweh'e O.303in machineguns which were soon rcplaced by four 20mm cannon. The Luftwaffe also armed its fighters to engage enemy bombers and fighters, and the initial production \"Crsion of the Fw 190 carried four 20mm cannon and tWo riflc-calibre machine-guns. In action against US hea\·)· bombers e\·en this armament PfO\'ed insufficient, hOY."C\·cr. '10 pro\·ide additional firepower, some Fw I 90s Qrried a launcher under each \\1ng for a Wgr 2 I. a 2 IOmm-eli.libre (8' ,in) spin~stabi1.ised air-to-air rockeL Among the new generation of singlc-engined fightCT'5 lhe largest and the hea\icsi. by a "ide margin, was the ThunderbolL -Inc mitial production \'(,'rsion, lhe p-rc,

\'('eight (normal loaded)

\X'ing loading

11,400lb S,170kg

-W,8Ib/sq ft 1.72kg/m2

11,-WOlb S,I-Okg

37.71b sq ft I.S8kg/m 2

Armouren prime the flXtrhead of a (17Kr 21 rockel before loadi'lJ: il illlo Iltt Imlllellillg wbe. nilS spill-stabilised 1lI1guided rocket uv:ighed 110kg (242Ib) at latmell, il/dlldi'lg Ille higlt--txplosiVt u'Qrlltad t::eighing 36kg (79/b).

Clau-IIP ofthelfir 2/ Ia,muter fmtd to an Fw 190.

65

r1GUTEH

AIRCRAFT Ot' TilE SECO:-':O WORLD \t"AI(

w~lghed 13.S00lb (6,125kg) in th~ normal loaded condition. That ...."35 more than doobk thai of the Messcrschmm Bf 109G. and n~arly t\\ic~ that of th~ Spitfire Mk IX. The American fighlCf ......a s powered by the Pratt & \Vhlm~y R-2800-S9 Double \"('asp turbosupercharged radIal, which de\-c!opcd 2,300hp at 3\ ,000ft (9,500m). 'Ine weight and size of the turbo· supercharger unit dictated that it be fit~cd in the. rear fuselage. Locating it so far from th~ engme gavc rISe 10 sC\'eral problems. Air for thc cngm~ carbure~tor was ~ol. lected by a larg~ mlet at the base of Ihe engme cowhng. and from there it was ducted some 20ft (6m) rearwards to the turbosupcrcharger Aftcr compression, the air was

Tn"

At Iht md of fhe U'(.Ir t/~ KatroIJiJhi N I KZ 'George'u'C'U one of tJ~ beJt JupoMU Nin;y figllim m urt.'iu, bUI /.00 ftw fUre at'OIWblt for then to inflllDJU l't't,m. Flgllm for m/fial produt:liDrl vtnum of tach type

Entered scnicc

Englnc po.....er-

Maximum speed 390mph 628km1h

8,600lb

3,900"

36.91b sq ft 1.55kg1m2

2,3OOhp

433mph 697km/h

13,500lb 6,122kg

451b sq ft 1.89kg/m 2

1,620hp

440mph 708km/h

9,200lb 4,I72kg

39.51b sq fl 1.66kgfm2

P·5If\ Mustang

Apr 1942

1,2oohp

P-47C Thunderbolt

Apr 1943

1'-518 Mustang

Dec \943

Figl/m for initial production f.'tT1U," of tach Iype

Japanese Navy FightcNi 1)-pe

EnterN scr\ice

\'('ing loading

\'('eight (normallo3ded)

Engine power

Maximum speN

\X'eight (normal loaded)

Wing loading

MitsublShl A6M3 'Hamp

Apr 1942

1,130hp

554km,/h 338mph

2,5431:.& 5,609lb

I.02kg/m 2 24.21b1sq ft

'\'l.itsubishi j2M3 'Jack'

jan 1944

1,820hp

597km/h 371mph

3,434kg 7.5731b

1.47kg/m 2 351b/sq ft

Kawanishi Nt K2-j 'George'

LaiC 1944

1,990hp

596km/h 370mph

4,099kg 9,0391b

1.39kg/m 2 331b/sq ft

Fig/lm for initial produt:IU'"

De\'elopment of the Focke-WulfFw 190 Variant

Entered Stt\;ce

Engine power

MaJ(lJTlum speed

l'l'1lwn

Weight (nonnalloadcd)

F6F·3 Hellcat

jan 1943

F4U·1 D Corsair

May 1944

Engine power

l\laXlmum sptt
2,OOOhp

376mph

605kmJh 2,250hp

425mph

684kmJh

\'('eight (nonnalloaded)

Wing loading

II.3811b 5,I61kg

34lbfsq ft 1.43kgfm2

12.0391b 5.460kg

38,3lb/sq ft I ,6 Ikg!m 2

ducled forwards some 20ft (6m) and inlO the mlel of a mechanically dri\'t'n second·slage sUpttCharger at the rear of the engine. The hot ~xhaust gases had to be dueted 20ft (6m) to the rear to dm-e the turbine before they emerged from the rear fuselage. This arrangement meant there was about 60ft (18m) of ducting running up and do.....n the fusclage, under the clXkpit. The duet carr~ing the compressed air had to be of the high-pressure type, while that carr~;n8 the hot exhausl gases rt'arwards had to ha\"C sliding joints to allow for the expansion of the metal. With all thai ducting and a 256 Imp gal (1,162 litre) fuel tank insidc the fuselage, thc Double Wasp engine in the front and the turbosupercharger in Ihe rear, it is hardly surprising thai Ihe Thunderbolt was so big. Once its pilots learned to explOit the fighler's high s~d and its excellenl dl\;ng performance, howl:\-cr, the P47 PfO\'ed succcssful as a long-range escon fighler e\"Cn agamSI smaller and more nimble opponents, The 166 Imp gal (753-litre) ferr}'lank fined initially 10 the p... a s unpressuri~, and so .....o uld not deIi\tt fuel at a1mudes abo..-e 20,OOOft (6,100m). Thunderbolts ftew 10 the enemy coast below that altitude, using the fucl from the ferry lank. When they reached the coast they dropped the tanks. oflcn before the}" .....ere emply, and commenced a climb 10 be in posi. lion to engage enemy fighters when thcy mel u1Cm. The next major ad\'ance to the Thundcrbolt's escort rangc came with introduction of the 90 Imp gal (408· h~) pressuriscd drop tank. It became a\11ilablc in

Scplembcr 1943 and, smce It worked at an)' altitude, it permitted a more ftexible mode of operation. Using the new lank the fighter had a radius of action of about 400 miles (645km). Later, small numbers of Thunderbolts ....-ere mochfied to carry tWO 90gaI drop tanks, thus in· creasing their operational radius of action 104-5 miles (765km). The hghicsi fighter Iypc of this period .....25 the japanese Mitsubishi A6.\13 Model 32 'Hamp·. This carrier-borne fighter appeared in April 1942 and had a loaded weight of only 5,609lb (2,544kg), '10 achic\'e a performance comparable With that of contemporary fighters in other countries, using a less po.....erful engine, designer liro Horikoshi had to produce a very 'tight' design. But thai meant the fighter had wry btue potenual for de\"Clopmcm. During the first ),ear of the war in the Pacific the 'Hamp' and ItS pred~sor, the 'Zcro', had struCk fear in the hearts of il$ opponents. Yet the real rca· son for thiS success 25 nOl so much the fighter but the highly tramed pilol$ ho ftew il. During the first elghl. ttn months of the amOict, that band of pre"..nr·tramed japanese Na\1' fighter pilots .....as ....,pcd 001 almost 10 a man. Their hastily tramed replacements were far less elTccti\-e. Another fighter type that became the bane of its opponents when it first appeared .....a s the Focke·Wulf Fw 190. A more sturdy machine than the Bf 109, the Fw 190 was pou'ered by the 1,600hp 8M \VI 80 I rddial. 'Inc Fw 190 had a clear performance margin O\'er the Spitfire

Tlte 1\ tiuubiJhi A6M5, Allied rode-"alll~ 'Zeke 52', whose Navy's per/armona uw owc1aJud by tlwu of tile He/lair mId Corsair fighters.

Tlte Fw 1900, whidl ementl seNJiu ill rite OII//f/I/II af I 944, had (l jHr/orPllalla! com/XIroble witlt tltal of the 1'-51 B, tlte Spitfire XIV tmd lite Tempal.

nc . . .

of NdI l'(.lna",

Wing loading

Fw 190A·3

Apr 1942

1,700hp

673kmJh 418mph

3,977kg 8,:701b

1.8"'1>g/m2 44.51blsq fl

Fw I90A·8

Apr 1944

1,700hp

657km/h 408mph

4,381kg 9,660lb

2,06kg!m 2 491b/sq ft

Fw 19OD-9

SCI' 1944

2,240hp

686km/h 426mph

4,299kg 9,4801b

2,02kg/m 2 48.llb/sq f(

66

Enlered sen;ce

MIO·19..\~

Figum /or imllal pf'OdlltlUm l'tT1Um of ~odr 1)'/1'

DC\'elopmcnt of L;S Na\')' FighteNi

US Army Air Force FightcNi

Tn"

t>E\'E1.0P.\IEST ••\110-19'..\1 TO

us

67

l'lGllTI,R OEVELOI',\lli'':-'' . .\IID· 1 I).: 1 TO .\110-1945

AIRCRAFT OF TUE SECOSD IX'ORLD \TAR

Th~ GrumlJ/Q/1 F6F Nellcal carrier fighur haJ a cQ/lJit!erable perforlll(Jllle adtxlIIlage over Ihe Japanese A6:\15 'Zcke 52', and played a II/~jor pari i" Ihe CS Naval victories itt flte Paalic Ihcatrt dl/ring 1943 and 1944

I

_ "";:10

/

T

r'lXM-n'illf Fm 1905 ofJo.g~ 51 Opmlling linda harsh tt'lnrerronduwns al ajorL'YJrd alrfltld In RussitJ. Xote lhal t1It aircraft in flu bat:Jr6round is N.n.'l1Ig Its mgmt cJwnged in the opnl. (Romm)

VB which soldi~d on untillhe Spitfire IX e:nterro S/:r\;cc. From Ihen on Ihe paformantt of Ihe Spitfire ad~ \-anced the faster, and Ihe Mk XIV had a clear margin of superiority even O\'er Ihe Fw 1900. For the Japanese Navy Ihe moment of trulh came in Ihe summer of 1943, when the US Na\]' introduced Ihe Grumman F6F Hellcat. This was powered by a 2,OOOhp Pratt & Whitney R-2800-IOW, an engine similar 10 !.hat fitted to the Thunderbolt. The new American fighter had a maximum speed of 376mph (605km) at 22,8ooft (6,900m), gh;ng it a comfortable performance margin over !.he 'Hamp'. With the next generation of JapaneS/: fighters stiU more than a year from sef';ce, the outclassed 'Hamp' had to continue to bear the brunt of the

-

-~''

1M Nakajima Ki-84 'Frank 'v:as Ollt of Iht btJl fighun in trllh fht ]apa"m Army AIr Foret,

Enterro scn-i«

F1gllrn Pr inlfial prodl'Clion tltJ'Sion of tJU1r

jul

Nakajima

K.i

~3-IIB

19~3

Engine power

Nakajima Ki 8~ 'FrMlk'

Aug

19.J~

,\\aximum speed

\X'eight (normal loaded)

f)'Pt

\X'ing loading

1,130hp

515km1h 320mph

2.412kg 5,3201b

0.96kgim 2 n.9lbjsq ft

1,900hp

624kmJh 388mph

3,612kg 7,9651b

1.26kg..m2 29.91b/sq fl

'Oscar'

...

urt.'let

Japanese Ann}' Air Force Fighters 1)..,.,

air fighting over the Pacific. Now the 'tightness' of its original design was a liability, because Ihe airframe could not accept an engine developing more than 1,3OOhp, Mitsubishi did its best to squeeze more performantt from the existing auframe, but 1,l,;th little success. The cleanest airframe design of any fighter of thiS pt:riod wu that of Ihe North American P-51 1\\uStang. The IJ·51A.lhe initial production \"Cf$ion, was powered b}' Ihe Allison V·171 a engine and was quite an effectl\"e low-altitude fighter, \",'hen the fighter was re-cnglned ,,;th the ,\\ertin 61 built under licence by the liS Packard company as !.he \'-165()"J, the Mustang reaUy came into Its own. The Spitfire IX used the Rolis-Royce-bwit \·er· sion of the same engine. \'Ct, when the twO fighters flew at similar Ihrottle settings, the Mustang was between 20

and 30mph (32 and 48km.'h) faster, depending on altitude, \Xtith a maximum speed of +-IOmph C08klll/h), the ,\ lusrang was faster than an~- piston-n1glned fighter opposing iL .\10f'COl'er, cafT~1ng two 75 Imp gal (3010 htre) tanks. its operational radius of action of 650 miles (1.().45km) took It to Ikrlln and beyond. The appearance of large numbers of Thunderbolts and Mustangs o\'er Germany in the spring of 19~~ cauS/:d a cflSis in the Luft\\-affe. Home defence umtS flying the Bf 109 and Fw 109 found themsel\'CS In a sort of 'Catdl 22 situation', If a fighter carried enough firepower to destroy the American hea\'}' bombers, it was 100 hea\1' and uO\\;eldy to engage with the American escorts. If Ihe armament was reduced so that the fighter could dogfight with Ihe American escons, it could not engage Ihe bombers with much chance of success. As a makeshift solution, the Luft\\'affe introduced separate Gruppen equipped with 'heavy' and 'light' fighters. The: 'heavy' fighter type was the Specillll)' modified Focke·\X·ulf Fw I90A-8 'Sturmbock' ('bauer· Ing ram') fitted with tWO 20mm and two 30mm l\tK 108 cannon. This \-er$ion earned extrll. steel armour to prote
Sorr.h AlPIff"ic~n 1'·51 "Jusumgs of the 503rJ FIg/ita Squadron, J39fh Flghla Grr:JIIp, in 1M SUllm~r of 1944. 17u Ihrtt alrcrafl "wrtt, 1M camero Q" Ihe 'D'twslon trlth Iht

bubble ronopy. The fimhtsf aircraft is a 'C'tY'rsum v:uh Ihe ongiTI(JI fairtJ COllOPY.

Additu)II(J! armour fitted to Iht

row 190A-B SmrmbodJ.

FIGHll;R DE\·I,I.OI'.\l., .... T. \110-1941 TO .\IID-194, AIRCRAFT OF Till'. SECO"'O '\t'ORI.D WAR

How they Compared; Spitfire Mark VB

r'Odu

If.ijlf Fw 190A-8 'Sllm"bock'fighIM of II. (Swrlll) Grttppt of JagJgesdm:ader 300. 77ICK hcau:'1y arll/otlredfightm carrkJ tWO flJi"g-IIlOllllttd 30ll/tIl call1lon, mId wen: modijitd to engage ill sllort-n;mgc fire-fights ft,ltll US Iltlltry bomber formariorls. (Ro""")

Left: l-akoc'lt:v )'uJr-9 figlturs of tht $O't,;tr Air Foru. This wrcruft emerW

verSIIS

Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-3

Gmerol The Fw 190 was compared with a Spitfire VB from an operational squadron for specd and all-round manocuvrnbililY al heights up to 25,OOOfl. The Fw 190 is superior in speed at all heights, and the approximate differences are as follows: At 2,OOOft (6OOm) the Fw 190 is 25-3Omph (4Q-..18k,mJh) fasler than Ihe SPltfi~ VB At 3,OOOft (9OOm) the Fw 190 is 30-35mph (48-S6kmJ1l) faster than the Spilf'i~VB At 5,OOOf! (1,5OOm) the Fw 190 is 25mph faSler than the SPltfi~ VB At 9,000fi (2,700m) the Fw 190 is 25-3Omph faslerthan the Spid'ireVB At 15,OOOft (4,6OOm) the Fw 190 is 20mph (32km/h) faster than the Spitfire VB At 18,OOOft (5,5OOm) the Fw 190 is 20mph faster than the Spitfire VB At 21,OOOft (6,400m) the Fw 190 is 2Q-25mph faslcr than the Spitfire VB Climb 'lne climb of the Fw 190 is superior 10 thaI of the Spitfire VB at all heights. 'Ille best s~ds for climbing are approximately the same, but the angle of lhe Fw 190 is considerably Sll~epcr. Under maximum continuous climbing conditions the climb oflhe Fw 190 is about 450ft/min (2.28m/sec) better up to 25.oooft (7.600m). Dit'C Compnrath'C: di\'CS belwttn Ihe twO aircraft ha\"~ shown thaI the Fw 190 can lea\'C: the Spitfire with ease, particularly during the initial S12ges. .\fWJOmlTrJin"lily Thl: m3nonJ\"tabilil}' of the Fw 190 is better than that of the Spitfrre VB exccpl in lUTl1Jl18 circles, when the Spit.f'in can quite easily OU(.lum it. The Fw 190 has bener accelcTation under aU conditions of flight and this must ob\iously be most useful during combaL W'hen the Fw 190 ....1IS in a tum and ....115 altaeked by the Spllfirc, the superior rate of roU enabled it 10 flick into a di\;ng tum in the opposition direction. The pilot of the Spilfire could experience g~al difliculty in following this rnanoeU\TC, and I:\'cn when prepared for it, was seldom able to allow the COrre<:1 deflection. A di\"e from this manoeuvre enabled lhe I· w 190 to draw lIWllY from the Spitfire, which \\~..s then forced to break off the attack. The abovc lTials havc shown mat me Spitfire VB must cruise at high speed when in an lIrca where enemy fighters can be cxpected. It wiU then, in addition to lcssening the chances of being successfully 'bounced', have a better chance of catching the Fw 190, particularly if it has the ad\1Inlage of surprise.

Augllst J9~Z onJ ImS buIlt ilf large nWllbtn. Ir huJ 0 moximum spud of 584Jrm 1h (J6JtIlph) and t..righm J,199kg (7,0551bJ. Jt71-1U III

How they Compared: Spitfirc Mllrk XIV versus Focke-Wulf Fw t90A-3

Figures for wI/wi prodlj(lum lovsiMI of tm:h t)'Pt

SQ\'iet Air Force Fighters

Tn"

Entered Stt\'icc

Engine pOWeT

Max. sp«d

\,('eight (normalloadt'd)

\'I':'1ng loading

AUlUmn 1941

l,J50hp

655km/h 40-mph

3,284kg 7,242lb

1.61kgfm1 38.31blsq ft

Yako\'le\' Yak-9

Aug 1942

1,26Ohp

584km/h 363 mph

3,199kg 7,055lb

1.60kglm2 38. Ilbfsq ft

La\'OChkin

Spring 1943

1,640hp

647km/h

3,358kg 7,406lb

1.66kg1m2 39.4lb sq ft

f, \lkoynn-Gu~\1Ch

MiGJ

402mph

LA-51~

70

Maximum speeds From 0-5,OOOfi (Q-I,500m) and 15,000-20,OOOft (4,600-6,loom) the Spitfire XIV is only 20mph (32km1h) fasler; at all other heights it is up to 60mph (97kmJh) faster than the Fw 19OA. .\farimum climb The Spitfi~ XlV has a considerably greater nue of climb tluln the Fw 190A at aU altitudes. Ditv Aner the initial part of the dIve, during which the F..... 190 gams slightly, the Spitfire XlV has a slight ad\1lnuge. Trlrnittlf rirck The SPId'i~ XIV can easily rum insid~ the 17..... 190, though in the case ofa nght-hand rum !hi difference is 001 quite so pronounced. &reofrolJ The Fw 190 i very much belter. Coru/unO'" In defence, the Spilfire XIV should use itS remarkable maximum climb and turning circle against an)' encmy aireraft. In the anack it cnn afford to 'mix iI' but should beware of the quick roll and dh·c. If this manoeuvre is used by an Fw 190 and the Spitfire XJV follows, il will probably not be able to close me range until the Fw 190 has pulled OUt of its di\·c.

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AIRCRAI·T 01

lilt:. SECO:-"D WORI D WAR

l'IGIITER DEV"1.0J'.\lli:-;"'1, ,\111) 1941 TO ,\\ID 19 ..13

How the)' Compared:

contlrmed

North Americ:an P·5IB Mustang ver.ro.s Fockc·Wulf Fw 190A·3

Grumman F6F·5 Hellcat and Vought F4U~lD Corsair tIff.s11.s Mitsubishi A6,\15 'Zeke 52'

I\faximum spud 'Ille Fw 190 is nearl)' 50mph (80kmJh) slower at all heights, increasmg to 70rnph (112km1h) above 28,oooft (8,500m). Climb There appears 10 be little to choose in the maximum rate of climb. It is amieipated that the M.ustang will ha\·e a better climb than the new Fw 190D. The Mustang is considerobl)' faster at all heights in a zoom climb, Dive The !\'\ustung can always out-di\'e the Fw 190. Turtling arclt Again, there is not much to choose. The Mustang is slightly bener, When evading an enemy aircraft v.ith a Sleep turn, a piloc \\ill always out-tum the atlacking aircrnft initially becau~ of the difference in spttds. It is therefore still a worthwhile maoocu\n \\1th the A'lustang when attacked. RiJl~ of roll Not even a M.ustang approaches the Fw 190, Cmu:blsions In the attack, a high speed should be mamtamed or rqaincd in order to regain the height mitiao\-c. A Fw 190 could not C'"3de by dhing alone. In defentt a Steql tum foUov."C'd. by a fun throttle dhoe should increase the range before regaining height and course. Dog-fighting is nol a1togethtt rt'Commmded. Do not attempt to elimb away without at leaSt 250mph (-WOkm,Ih) shO\\ing initially.

F4U·ID Corsair The F4U ranged from 48mph (77km/h) faster at sea Icvcllo 80mph (129kmjh) faster at 25,oooft (7,600m),ln the climb it .was equal to the Model 52 below IO,OOOft (3,OOOm), at all altitudes above that the F4U was superior, up to 750ft/mm (3.81m/scc) bener at 18,OOOn (5,500m). Below 230mph (370km/h) the rate ofroll of the twO fighters was similar, above that speed thc F4U was much the better. Below 200mph (322km/h) the Model 52 was far more manocU\T3blc than the F4U, while abO\'e nOmph the F4U was the more manoeuvrnble.

How the)' Compared: North American P-51 B Mustang versus Messerschmitt Bf 109G Maximum spud Thc !\tuslang is faster al all heights. Its best heights, by comparison, arc below 16,OOOft (4,900m) where it is 30rnph (50km/h) faster, approximately, and abO\-c 25,oooft (7.6OOm) where it is 30mph fastcr, incTC3Sing to 50rnph at 30,OOOft (SOkm/h at 9,100m). Maximum climb This is rather smular. The Mustang i \1::1')' slightly bener abO\'c 25.oo0ft but inclined to be .....o ne bdow 2O,oooft (6.loom), Zoom climb The Me: 1090 appean to ta\-C a \"C'r)' good lugh-speed climb, making the twO airttllft similar in a zoom climb, Dir.:'t On the other hand, in defence thc Mustang can stili increa~ the range: m a prolonged di\·e:. Ti,rning circk 1M Mustang is greatly superior. Role ofroll Not much to choose, In defence (in a tight spOt) a rnpid change of direction will throw the Me 1090's sight off. This is because the 1Q9G's maximum rate of roll is embaITII.ssing (the 51015 k~p opening), COllclllSiollS In attack, the Muslang can always catch the t\'ie I09G, except in any sort of climb (unless mere is a high overtaking speed). In defcnce:, a steep lurn should be the first manocU\'fe, followed, ifnecesslIry, by a dive (below 20,OOOft), A high-spcc:d climb will unfortunately not increase the range. If above 25,oooft keep abo\'e by climbing or all-out 1c\"C1 flight.

Gtt/NUI Do rIOt dogfight with the Zeu 52. Do not try to foUow a loop or half·roll "1th puU·through, When attacking, usc your superior power and Iugh·speed performance to engage at the most fa\'OUI'abk JllOmC"nL 1b C'1Ide a Zen 52 on your tail, roll and dh-c a"1Iy into a high-speed tum.

To fight by nighl In this section we shall examine the evolution of a quite different genre of fighter that emerged during the Second "(forld War: me nightfighler, In May 1941 the German night blitz on Brilain ended as the bulk of the Luftwaffe moved east for thc attack on the Sovict Union. The damaging raids on the cities had forced the R.AF to gh-c the highest priomy to developing means to counter the night rnider. As a result, when the blitz ended, Britain possessed the only re~dly effective night air defence srstem anywhere. Borne of tria1 and error, foresight and much hard work, the elements of that 5}'5t~ remained in place: for the rest of the war, Before describing the rughtfighters themser.-es, It is ImpOnam to understand how the\' fitted inlO the s\·stem. For, compared with day fighti~g, night lighting was more of a team effort. As during a daylight interception proc~'5s, the long-range, low-precision Chain Home rodar provided early warning of the approach of roiders. This enabled nightfighters to lake off in good time and head for the general area under thrcat. When tile raiders

neared the coast the)' came \\1thm range of one or more of the medIUm-range, medium precision Ground Controlled Interception (GCI) radars. GCI opernlOrs 'talked' tile nightfightcr pilot to a point in the sky about two miles behind tile bomber and at the same altitude. That pUI thc bomber in thc field of \'iew of the night.fighter's short-range, high precision Airborne Interception (AI) rndar. When the fighter's rndar operntor had the bomber on his screen, he 'Ialked' the pilol into a position where the latter had \1sual contact \\1th the prc:)'. From there on the pliot carried OUt a \1Sua! attack, usually closing to shan rnnge - about fifty )"3I"ds _ before operung fire. '10 operate \\ithin this system, the nightfighler reqUired altributes different from those of the day fighter. It ideally needed a room)' fuselage to accommodate the AI rndar and Its operntor, armament poY.ocrful enough to destroy or cripple a bomber \\1th a few short bursts, and, since its patrols often laSled sc\·cral hours, il needed a much longer endurance. Ikcause of thesc requirements a nighrnghter needed to be a fairly large aircraft, which meant it required the power from tWO engines. In mid·1941 the mosl effccti\'e nightfighter Iype in ser\'ice anywhere \\1IS the RAFs Bristol Bcaufightcr. This Iw~~ter carried an armamenl offour 20mm can. non and six O.30Jin machine-guns, On the pO\\-cr of twO 1.400hp Bristol Hercules englOes It had a maximum speed of about 300mph (about 480km/h), '11lc AI Mark IV rndar fined to the Beaufighter was a first·generntion equipment, working on frequencies in the 150 MHz band. ·rlle rndar's maximum rnnge v.1IS JUSt under thrtt miles (4.8km) or the fighter's height above the ground, whiche\-cr \\1IS less. The Beaufighter was not the only nightfighter Iype thcn in usc by thc RAI~ as single·cngined Hurricanes and Boulton Paul Defiants flew 'catseye' patrols,

How the)' Compared: Grumman F6F-5 Hellcat and Vought F4U·ID Conair venus M..itsubishi A6M5 'Zeke 52' F6F-5 F6F rnnged from 25mph (40km,lh) faster at sea 1C'1::1 to 75mph (120kmlll) faster at 25,OOOft (7,600m), In me climb the Model 52 was superior below 14,oooft (4,250m), at altirudcs abO\oc that the: F6F was superior. Below 230mph (370km/h) the rnte of roll of the two fighters \\'3S similar, abO\-c that speed the F6F was much the better. Below 200mph (322kmjh) the Model 52 was far more manoeuvrable than the F61~ while ab<)\"e 230mph (370bn,lh) the F6F was the more manoeu\'rnblc. ~

ronlinllcd

7.1

The Bris/OI &aufigll/cr, ft·lumfitted witltAII\fark IV radar, the 1II0St tfJec/ive niglufigJuer ofall in the lale spring of 1941.

rt'UJ"

75

I

I'IGIITER OEVELOI'MENT,

AIRCRAFT 01' THE SECOND WORLD \lIAR

TO MIO"194S

Figures for inilial prodllction version of each Iype

RAF Kighlfightcrs Type

MIO"19~1

Entered service

Bristol Bellufightcr I

Sep 1940

De Havilland r.·\osquito II

Mar 1942

Mosquito 30

Apr 1944

Engine power

Max. specd

, x

\'\!eight (normal loaded)

Radar range

300mph 480km/h

20,SOOlb 9,4331:.g

3 miles 4.Skm

1,480hp

370mph 596kmJh

IS5·mb S,411kg

3 miles 4.8km

, x 1,690hp

424mph 682km/h

21,7151b 9,S48kg

10 miles 16km

1,400hp

, x

In building up the nightfighter defences of Germany the Luftwaffe trod a generally similar path to that taken by the RAE Because initiall)' the pressures were less, hO\\'e\'er, the process took a bit longer, After much trial and error the Luftwaffe developed its own technique for an 'all-radar' interception, having also found the catseye nightfighting methods to be relati\'ely ineffecth·e. In 1942 the main German nightfighler type was the Messerschmitt Bf I IOF, wim a performance generally similar to that of the Beaufighter I, This three-seater carried an armament of twO 20mm cannon and four 7.9mm machine-guns. On the power of tWO 1,350hp Daimler Benz DB 601 engines the German fighter had a maximum speed of about 500kmJh (310mph). Its 'Lichtenstein' AI r:ldar worked in the frequencies in thc 440 MHz band and it had a similar performance to thc British AI Mark IV.

attempting to engage enemy bombers illuminated for them by searchlights or found visually. A two-seater, the Defiant carried its armament of four 0.303-in machineguns in a power operated turret mounted behind the pilot's cockpit. Since it lacked Al radar, the Hurricane could not achieve much at night, although Al sets were fined in Defiants which sern~d in this role until mid1942. The next significant nightfighter type to enter service in the RAF, at the beginning of 1942, was the Mosquito. II had its share of teething troubles, but within a few months these were sorted out. The Mark 11 version carried the same type of radar and a similar armament to the Beaufighter. Its maximum speed was 370mph (596km/h). As the war progressed the ,"Iosquito, later fined with more ad\'anced types of radar, equipped the entire RAF nightfighter force.

The Boulton Paul Dejiam, pressed imo lISe as Q "ighl jighler, carrii:d its fOllr-gllll armament in a wrret mOllmed behi,ld lhe cockpit. The IYI't was far less effective lhal/ Ihe &atljighter, hOU'£fJer.

76

.-

-,

rI de Havilland Mosquilo 30 of No 85 Squadroll, ol/e of Ihe 'mits assigl/ed take-oJj in Ihe f1.'imer of I 94415.

10

No 100 Group, UYlrmillg its engines before

'Giant \'(/iir.lburg' ground radars and the Lichtenstein airborne equipment. At the end of July 1943 RAF bombers began dropping large quantities of Window to fill the German radar screens with hundreds of false targclS. \'\/ith the Himmelbett system of close ground control neutralised, the Luftwaffe was forced to make a radical change in tactics. As a temporary expedient it employed single-engined fighters at night, flying catseye p:lttols. For twin-engined nightfighlers the Luftwaffe introduced a new system of control. As the incoming raiding force was detected on early-warning radar (thc longwa\'c!ength sets were not affected by this type of Window), scores of nightfighters look off and assembled over designated radio beacons. lnen, operating under radio broadcast control, the packs of nightfighters were directed to fly from beacon to beacon to bring them progressively closer to the bombers. From there they 'stepped off to join the stream, the crews searching for the bombers visuall~' and with radar. 'Inroughout this time the fighter controllcrs broadcast a running commentary on the progress of the bomber stream. The aim was to set up long-running battles lasting throughout the time the bombers were o\'er Germany or occupied territory. In the autumn of 1943 the Luftwaffe introduced a new AI radar, the 'SN-2', with a range of four miles. This operated on frequencies in the 90 MHz band, and its longer wa\'elength rendered it almost immune to thc types of\'\Iindow then in use. Also, to assist in locating bomber streams at long range, German nightfighters carried 'Naxos' and 'Flensburg' eqUipment to home, respecti\'elY, on emissions from the 'H,S' bombing radar and the '!...1onica' tail warning radar. A further innovation al this time was the fitting of the so-called 'schrage Musik' inslallation in some nightfighters: one or tv.·o 20mm cannon in the cockpit or rear fuselage firing upwards at an angle of 60". This enabled

By the time the Bf 11017 was in large-scale service, several RAF nightfighter squadrons hud re-equipped with the faster and more effecti\'e Mosquito II. Initially these types operated only in the home defence role, how. e\"cr, so thc lower performanec of the Messcrschmitt was not an important factor. The so-called 'Himmelbeu' system of close control for Luftwaffe nightfighters was more rigid than that used in Brilain. It employed a line of ground radar stations in France, Belgium, Holland, northern Germany and Denmark. "Inese formed a barrier through which the raiding forces had to pass, to reach their targets in Germany. Indiddual Luftwaffe nightfighter units operated with the same few ground control stations, each time they went into action. Aircraft rarely ventured more than 100km (60 miles) from their base airfields, and the Bf 110 was quite adequatc for this rclativcly undemanding task. Opcrating in this way, the German nightfighler caused hea\')' attrition among R.AF raiding forces. Had maners been allowed to continue, the Himmelben system might havc remained in usc for the rCSt of the "'ar, but thc RAF produced a countermeasure in the form of 'Window' (now called 'Chaff), aluminium foil strips measuring 30Cm long and JUSt owr 1.5cm wide. -Inesc strips were designed to jam the predsion radars on which Himmclbett depended, the 'Wiir;:burg' and

II Alessersd'mill Hf I lOG /liglujigluer, jilled willt a LiclttellSuin radar aerial army 011 the /lose.

77

t'lGHTliR I)E\'liI.OPMI'.ST. M[I)-1941 TO

AIRCRAFT 01' TilE SECOND \I:'ORLD \I:'AI{

Figl/rel/or

Luftwaffc Nightfightcrs

Tn"

Entered service

fo,\esserschmiu Bf IIOF4

Aug

)unkeNi )u 88G-6

Oct

19~2

19~~

Engine power

,'lax. speed

l/ll/lai

proJm:IIO" vnsioll 0/ M4h Iypt

Weight (normal loaded)

Radar range

2 x 1,350hp

SOOkm,lh 310mph

20,·n~lb

4.8km 3 miles

2 x 1,608hp

626km/h 389mph

13,I06kg 28,900lb

3 miles

9,285kg

~.8km

Spllfire 1.""·J o/.\'o 71 Squadron, «Xh

A JllnJurs JII SSG mghtfigJuer wm So\' 1 radar aniah on du rnne and Fleruburg 110/1/£1' O£nuh mOllnUJ on 1M ltading tdga O/l~ u:ingl.

fighter versIOns of the junkers ju 88. Larger and more powerful lhan the Bf 110, the ju 88G had a loaded weight of 13,OOOkg (28,900lb) and a maximum speed of 622km/h (389mph). The thrUSt, parry and counterthrust battle of the night \\"3.r ovcr Germany did nm end there, however. In mid+ 19~4 No 100 Group of RAF Bomber Command began o~rations in support of the night bombing raids. As well as using specialised jamming aircraft 10 disrupt the German r'ddar network, the Group employed six squadrons of l\'losquilO nighl fighters to harass thcir German counterparts in thc air and on the ground. During the final months of the war the Mosquito Mark 30 was, by a wide margin, the most effective nighlfighter type in service anywhere. Its maximum speed was ~24mph (678km/h) and it carried the latest AI Mark 10 centimctric-wavc1cngth radar, with a range of up to ten miles (I6km). The Mosquitoes of No 100 Group had to search for the German nightfightcrs in a sky full of friendly bombt'rs, but homing on radar emis+ sions from enemy aircraft was a game that could play. Thc RAF fighten carried the 'Serrate' and 'Perfectos' equipmenu 10 enable them to home, respectively, on emissions from the SN-2 radar and the IFF sets carried br their prey. The nightfighten' ....-ar lacked the panache and spectacle of thaI fought by day. Single nightfighters stalked mdl\idual bombers and, later, individual memy nightfightcrs. Success in this type of action often went to

Drawi"g Illuwlllg jhe IoYOld o/tht Il'hriige MilSik upwardjirin, ca,lI/on insiaJlolionjitltd 10 lile B/IIO Ilightfighttr, wilh ItI.'O 10",,,, camlon.

"',,0

the fighter to eng1lge the bomber from below, from outside the field of fire of i~ rear gunner. The new nightfighting tactics ....-ere challenging for the Bf II OJ when fitled with all of the extra new equipIll<'nt, plus extema1 tanks to give it the necessar)' extr.l endurance, it suffered a major drop in pcrformantt. It was not fast enough for the long punuit operations tim ....-ere now ~ order of the dar - but it remained in service. Some units began to re-equip ....;th the latest nighl-

78

.\IID~1945

UlrT)'ing tr.."'O

150

A 150lb (J J3kg) bomb mOlin/I'd on IN remg rack 0/ a Spitfire.

pomJdn's, 1a.'Q' 0111 fur a dn:e-bombing sonie Of 'heir bau at 1'rltt» III )Ugmlat.'ia.

the sldc \\1th the ~tter el«tronic equipment and the crews b(st able to usc II effeeth-ely. Throughout the war the RAF and the Luftv.lIffe remained the main players 10 the nighl air defenet' baltic. Although the other contestants also dabbled in this art, nonc of them \\lIS able to achle\1:: any great success at it.

chosen targcts proved 10 be difficult under operational conditions. If a fighter-bomber delivered a low-altitude horizontal attack from around 60ft (18m), i~ bombs n~ed a fusmg dday of at least ten seconds after impact. Othef'\\'Ise the aircraft was liable 10 suffer splmter damage - or worse - when they detonaled. Such an alLack could be effective only against a target bulky enough to stop a bomb ramming into it at speeds up to 300mph (480kmJh), and th~ ....-ere rare, especially in a battle area. If the bomb failed to StOP at the target, the rest of its lravel was fraught ....;th unpredictabilities. During one RAF trial, fighter-bombers flying at 300mph (~80km/h) released 250lb (lIOkg) bombs from 60ft (18m). aiming at vchide LargCts on flat ground. Cine photography re\'ealed cases where, after striking the ground, bombs bounced 10 twice Ihe heighl of the releasing aircraft and onen maintained disconcertingly close formation on it. During the tcn seconds following the initial impact these bombs continued on, often tumbling end over end across the ground, as they exhausted their huge momcntum. '111e diS13nce they covered varied greatly, depending on the type of surface. In some cases the bombs finall}' came 10 rest more than half a ntile (800m) from their initial point of impact (foTlunatcly for the prop!c invoked in the trial, the bombs were nOllh·e!). I hgh-alllrude horizontal auacks by single.engmed fighter-bombers were even less accurate. Such aircraft usually had the cockpit ovcr the \\;ng. which meant that the pilot's view downwards \-aried between poor and non-exlstent. Since he could not see the target at the lime of release, II was impossible 10 aim the weapons using a bombslghl. This type of attack could ha\-e only a nuisance value. The only reasonably effective method of attack 3\"3.i!able to the fighter-bomber, when It carried normal t)"J'CS

The rise of the fighter-bomber The Luftwaffe pioneered the use offighter-bomhers, 10tcreeplor fighters fined with bomb racks, during the Battle of Britain in 19~0, when it sent ,\ Icsscrschmin Bf 1095 and Bf II Os to carry OUt small-scale attacks on 13rgets 10 southern England. There wcre ob\ious ad\"3.ntages 10 using fighters in this way. They arc much cheaper Ihan bombers and they required a smaller crew. In engineering terms the installation of bomb racks \\"3.S a relativel)' simple matter. Once thc aircraft had relcased its bombs it could re\'ert to the fighter role and il was wcll able to take care of itself in combal. In speed and altitude performance the fighter-bomber was far superior to mOSl of the specialised bomber Iypes. Indeed. if it was not possible to establish Icmporary air superioril)' O\'er a target area, the fighler.bomber offered the only chance of deh\·ering attacks withoUi incurring prohibItive losses. These clear ad\'3nt3ges tended to blind people to Ihe shortcomings of the fightcr-bomber, ho....-e\·er. These alrcran carried a relatively small weight of bombs. and if the latter were to ha\'e any useful effect they nceded to be deli\'ercd ,,;th gl1::al accuracy. ,\ 10T«l\-er, since the carriage of bombs usually pr-ecluded the usc of drop tllInks, the radius of action of fighler-bomben was usually rather shon. Inmally the fighter-bombt'rs carried normal types of bombs ....-elghmg around 250 or 5001b (around 110 or 250kg). Getllng these weapons to explode close to the

-9

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND \'('QRLD

FIGHTER DEVEl.OI'.\tENT, MID,t941 TO .\Itn-1945

\'('.'~R

To increase the effectiveness of the low-flying fighterbomber, specialised weapons were needed. In June 1941 the Luftwaffe introduced the first of these, the SD 2 antipersonnel bomb, weighing only 2kg (4Alb). Although thc weapon proved extremely successful against battlefield targets and aircraft on the ground, the Luftwaffe soon discovered that it had a serious shortcoming. Occasionally a bomblet failed to leave its con· tainer and remained lodged in place, and the crew of the aeroplane had no way of knowing it. When the aircraft landed, the jolt freed the \\'capOn, which then dropped to the ground and detonated on the runway. After several German aircraft were destroycd or damaged in this way, the SD 2 was withdrawn from scn;ce until a solution was found. The answer was to fit the SO 2s into a streamlined container that could be aimed and dropped in the Slime way as a normal bomb. Once it was safely clear of the aircraft, the container split open along its length to dis· gorge its load of bomblets. Thus was born the first cluster-bomb, a weapOn designed to produce an IIrea of destruction on the ground rather like the blast of a shot·

of bomb, was 10 release the weapons in a dive, hut the accuracy of such anacks compared poorly with those by purposc-built di\'c-bombcrs, Almost all the interceptor fighters com'erted to this role lacked dh'c brakes, so in their diws they gained speed rapidly, Even in a relatively shallow di\'e of 60" they built up speed rapidly and often exceeded 450mph (725kmjh). B~ause of their high diving speed, and becausc their airframes were not stressed for a tight pull-out manocu\'re, fighter-bombers usually released their bombs from altitudes above 4,000ft (t,200m), Even when flown by wcll·uained pilots, the accuracy of attack of a com'erted fighter was considerably less than that by a sp~ialised di\'e-bombcr type, 'Ine lalter delivered its bombs flying steeper and slower, and bomb release was at about 2,oooft (about 6OOm). This is not to say that fighter-bombers did not carry out many effecti\'e attacks using normal bombs, but it required more aircraft and many more bombs than if a spccialis('d dive bomber had done the job, Of course the specialised dh'e·bomber was far more vulnerable to fighter attack than a fighter-bomber, but in this business one cllnnot have everything.

The SO 2 Fragmentation Bomb The SD 2 fragmentation bomb \\"Cighed only 2kg (4.4Ib), and was much smaller than any air.dropped weapOn previously in general use in the Second World War. In the stowed condition the weapOn was a cylinder 7.5cm (3in) in diameter llnd 9cm (3~in) long - about the size ofa small beerean. Aftcr release, the bomb's casing opened to form 'wings' which caused it to d~elerate rapidly. It then descended to the ground rc1atiwly slowly. -Ille SO 2 bomblets were carried in sp~ial containers which fitted on the aeroplane's normal bomb racks.lne type of container carried by the Bf 109 held 96 of these bomblets, while that fitted to the Bf 110 held 360. Designed for release during low-altitude lmacks, the SO·2 was highly efTectiw against 'soft skinned' \'ehic1es, trOOPS and aircraft on the ground, From the attacker's point of view there were sc\'eral ad\'antages to releasing a large number of small bombs rather thlln one or two large ones, The rapid deceleration of the SD-2 after releasc, and its small explosive charge, meant that when the weapon detonated the fighter-bomber was safely clear of any flying splinters. Also, since it could be dclivcred in low·altitude attacks, the SD 2s could be Illid very accurately across small targets.

17M SD 2 fmgmema· lioll bomb, weiglll'"g 2kg (4.4lh), was lhefirstfreefall uv:apon specially de· signed for release from /ow.fiyillg aircraft. After release the bomh's casing opened to fonll 'tIIings', cal/si"g it to duelerQ/e rapidly alld tUsund lO the grou"d relatively slowly.

gun, From the summer of 1942 the Luftwaffe made large.scale use of SD 2s as cluster munitions. 'lanks were among the most difficult targets for air attack, being small and oftcn well armoured. II required a direct hit, or else :I very ncar miss with quite :I large warhead, 10 pUt them out of action. Generally speaking any weapon carried by a fighter that was accurate enough to havc a good chance of hitting a tank, for example a 20mm cannon, was insufficiently po\\"Crful to destroy it, and any weapon powerful enough 10 destroy a tank, for example a bomb of 50kg (llOlb) or larger, was insufficiently IIccurate to stand much chance of hitting it. 1ne first serious attempt to break out of that circle, using a converted fighter type, came with the introduction of the Hurricane Mark lID. This aircraft carried a Vickers'S' 4Qmm cannon under each wing and tWO 0.303in machine-guns loaded \\ith tracer ammunition 10 assist aiming. The pilot approached the tank flying horizontally at a height of about 50ft at 240mph (about 15m at 385km/h), and commenced firing at 600 yards (540m). The Cilnnon were single-shot weapons, and each loosed offa round with each press of the firing button. A well-practised pilot could get off len pairs of aimed rounds during the firing pass. The Hurricane lID was at its most effective against tanks that had broken through a defensi\'c line and had outrun their AA gun protection. In North Africa, where the Hurricllne liD first saw action, such conditions oc· curred rarely after the summer of 1942. Certainly it was reassuring for the army commander to know that he had this capability on call, however, in case such an emergency should arise. If they went against tanks in a defen· sive position with AA protection, the low-flying Hurricanes oftcn suffered heavy losscs. At thc end of 1942 the German Army introduced its pOwerful new Panzer VI (Tiger) tank, much of whose thick armour was impervious 10 rounds from the Vickers S gun.lnereafler the RAF lost interest in the hea\'y cannon as an anti-tank weapon, in favour of the rocket projectile.

During the war the air-launched rocket was touted as a highlr etTecti\'e wcapon for use against tanks. The Hawker Typhoon, the main RAF fighter-bomber type to employ this weapon in the ground-attack role, carried eight of them on launching rails under the wings. 'X'hen emplOyt,:d against ground targcts, the British 3in rocket carried a 60lh (27kg) warhead containing I7lb (7.7kg) of high explosive. After launch the rocket accelerated rapidly. It reached its maximum speed of about 1,000 mph (l,600km/h) in 1.5 seconds, having covered about 550 yards (5OOm). At that point the motor burned out and from thcn on the missile lost speed rapidly owing to air resistance. During a typiCill rocket attack the Typhoon established itself in a 30" di\'e and fired the projectiles from a range of 1,000 Yilrds (900m). The aeroplane's di\"e angle and firing range were critical, and required vcry fine judgement at the time when the pilot might himself be under fire. E\"en slight deviations from the ideal would cause fairly large miss distilnces at the target. If the refl~tor sight was set up for the abo\'e figures and rockets werc fired in a 27 0 dive from 1,150 yards (I,035m), the errors amounted to only 3" in angle and 15 per cent in range, yet ther would cause the rock· ets to impact 17 yards (15m) short of the target, far enough to allow an armoured vehicle to escape without serious damage. Despite the enthusiastic claims madc for it at the time (and later), there is clear e\'idence that during the Second World War the air-launched rocket projectile WllS not vcr)' effecti\'e against tanks or armoured \·ehicles. The weapon was just not accufllte enough. According to RAF records on operational rocket strikes during 1945, the chancc of scoring at least one hit on a tank from eight rockets was a derisor)' two per cent. The M.I0 rockets carried by USAAF fighter-bombers performed no better against tanks. lnat said, the rockets were very effective against unarmollred vehicles. artillery pOsitions and other soft targets where a near·miss could CilUse serious damage. And against large targets such as U·boats or ships, salvoes of rockets were often lethal.

All AB 250 cltmer·homb bei"g loaded on llle bomb rw;k of a Fw 190, This eolltai"er could hold up to Ili"ety-six SD 2 hombkts. Hawker HlIrritanc liD delivers a troillil/g utfatk 011 a lunk u,ith its 401/1111 catll/O/I. n,e need to make a slraight-aml-lroel firillg run Q/ very low allilllde //lade tile aircraft IJXlreme/y VillI/crable to M fire.

80

81

AIRCRA!'T 01 ·IIH. SI:.CO:-.D WORI.I) WAR

f'IGlITI-1I; tll,VIiI.OP,\lEST. ,\110-1941 TO ,\110-1945

Althollgh IU exumal ap/JI'arona f.."W sinll10r to fhe jigh," tV'SUm, tM He 190F UW o;u"sit:dy mooijitJ for ,M grrJImJ-auadt rok. This drrncmg shoccs 'he adJmo/JaI ar1Il0llrjilted along ,he IIntkrsidt WId silks of fJet fide~ and on hlCh side of ,Ite rodlpll.

A Hafj,;ker 'lyPllocm of No 198 Sq/l(ldroll,fitu,/ rt"itIJ right 60/b rocRelS, taxies ow

Althol/gh the rockets fj,;crt tf/«rhv: agaimt soft wrgelS, they UV!rt hit 011 a tallk.

lIot

UlIJ1/

eucllrote mOllgll

airsmp '" 'lorlhem Pnmu III 1944. a good chalice ofscoring a dlrtCt

'11re Ftxkt-Il'i'if He 190F troS 1M /asttsf armOllnd gwulld aUlUk aeroplane of fhl' Sccol/t/lfQrldlfar. This IXal/lp~ from SchlllchtgeullUvu!er 2, based at Sopoc,lllIlIgary, in Jalluary 19-15, carries U1I A11 250 cluster-bomb COllla",er lI1/der the fimlage.

82

rurboJets, both aircraft emplO)'ed twO engines. Of the two fighters. thc Me 262 was lhe more ad\"anced, II had an excellem pcrform:mce when the engines developed their full thrust, but they did nOI do 50 for long (sec box o\'Crleaf'German I'roblcms with theTurbo;et Engine'), In a nl'W condition each of the two Jumo 004 turbotclS delivered 900kg (1,980lb) of thrust. giving the fighter a maximum speed of 870km/h (540mph). Its nearest Allied rival, the Metcor I, ""as powered by two 1,700lb (770kg) thrust Rolls-Royce W2B '23 engines and had a ffi3ximum speed of ~ IOmph (660krn/h). In the spring of 19~3 Luftwuffe senior officers regarded the Me 262 as an mteresung nO\-elly, bul one lhal met no Immediale need. The main battlefronts w~rc in North Africa and the So\'iet Union, and from time to time mere: were daylight attacks on peripheral targets in Germany. PTO\ided there were enough of them In-ailable, the latesl versions of the Fw 190 and the Bf 109 were well able to deal with the enemy air opposition.

10 hdt'e

low altitude, making it lhe fastest armoured attack aircrtIfl of the Second World \'<'ar. Such was thc Importance of thiS alrcrafl that, despilc the competing requiremenl for fighters, during 1944 more than a third of all Fw 1905 were: buill as ground-attack \1Hianl In the closing stages of thc war the Fw 190F wenl imo action C3TT}ing lwelw Scm 'Panzerblllz- 3Ir·t().ground rockelJ. There is no e\idencc that these rr01:ed any more dfectiw againsl armoured \-chicles Ihan their Bntlsh or Amencan counlerparts. In thc next section we shall examme thc dc\"elopmenl and service careers of lhe final generation of fightcr de· signs in me Second World War, those powcred by turbo-Jet engines and rockets.

One problem common to all cOlwerled lnlereeptor fighters operahng In the fighter-bomber role was that most of their protccm·e annour was in the wrong place. Air supcriorit)· fighters did 001 carry much armour, and most of it was positioned behind Ihe pdot to gi\'e protcc· non against rounds from enemy fighters attackmg from behind. Also, m front of his head, there was a loughened glass "'indscrttn to gi\'~ protection from rounds from a bomber's rear guns. Dunng a low-Iewl attack on a ground targel, howe\"(~r. the enemy rounds usually came from below and from ahcad or the sides. The normal ar· mour fitted to a fighter afforded Iinle protection against thl-ose. The Focke-\'(/ulf Fw 190F, me main ground-altack version of the famous Gennan fighter, was one of the finest ground-attack aircraft of the Second \'(lorld \'<'ar, Almough in its external appearance It was little diffcrenl from the fighler \ttSion, internally il had Important changes. To sun II for the low-Je\'cl, ground-attack role It C3rried about 360kg (aboul 800lb) of annour along the underside and lower sides of the fusc:lage, and each side of the cockpil. Thus the pilot and the Internal fuel lanklli were "-ell protected against rounds coming from ahead and below. At the front of the acroplane the rugged aircooled BM\'(' 801 engine ga\'C added protection to the pilot, and it could take heavy battle damagc and continue to run. The Fw I90F carried tWO 20mm cannon and twO 13mm machine-guns, plus an ordnance load of up to 550kg (1,IOOlb) of bombs. Its maximum speed Cllrrying full ordnance load was about 520kmlh (325mph) al

Flame bekhts from lhe nar 0/ a Jllmo 004 tlIrbojtl chlrirrg start-lip. 77/fS tmlptrQmnllal mgml, tmJ of r::hldt ~d tlte .lle 262, fV/uirrJ alrrful hotJdling ill flighl or if ta:lS Ii_ abk toJlu"~jl or allcllfi".

77te MesseTKhmm .\11' 262 teaS tM mosl tjJ«In'e kt fighler type to nl/n stn.'ICe In 1M S«onJ IrOrlJlrar, lim dill' to lIre short nmlllng Ii~ of lIS tIIgines il teaS ahk /0 euhietY little. Enter the jet fighter By the spring of 1943 IWO fighter types powered by turbojet engines were undergoing tests, Ihe Gennan Mcsserschmin Me 262 and me British Gloster Meteor I. Owing to the low power Ic\-cls generated by me early

/1 Gloster Meteor I fit/cd wilh a belly lank to i",:rcast its fallge.

83

FIGHTER DEVELOI'.\IENT. MID·t94t TO "1[1)-]945

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECO:-lO \\:'011.1.1) \'\'AR

crews? Ne"ertheless, to keep abreast of the latest technological de\'elopments, the Luftwaffe placed an order for thirty pre-production Me 262s. Interestingly, RAF scnior officers fclt the same way about the l\'leteor when it was first considered for production. "l11e early British jet engines were more reliable and had longer running li\"es than their German counterparts, but as yet the Service had no requiremenl for an aircraft with the l\ ICleor's unique capabilities. Early in 1943 the Ministry of Aircraft Production produced cornparati,"e performance curves for ,"crsions of the Meteor planned to appear in 1944. and the Mk 21 Spitfire scheduled to appear at the same time. 'l11ese

l"lorco\"er these rugged and well-pro,"en machines could operate from primitivc forward airfields and were easy to maintain in action. Any diversion of indusll'ial resources to build jet fighters would be at the expense of the conventional fighter types the Luftwaffe really needed. In the type of war thcn being fought, what use was a temperamental, if fast, short-range iel fighter that required long runways and constant nursing from its mainten:lnce

Rationale for the Turbojet Engine in Fighters The concept of the turbojet engine had been known as an engineering possibility since the early part of the twentieth century, but nOt until the late 19305 did work begin to produce a practical unit of this type to power aircraft. The main factor dri,;ng the work in this field was the dawning realisation, in several countries, that there was a finite limil 10 the mllximum speed that an aircraft could attain on the power from a piSIOn engine driving a propeller. That limit, imposed by the immutable laws of physics, lay somewhere \'ery close 10 500mph (805km/h)" The problem centred on the use of the propeller to com"ert the engine's rotational power into thrust. As the aircraft's forward speed neared 500mph, me efficiency of the propeller fell av..ay drastically" A few figures will serve to illustrate the point. In round terms, the Spitfire Mark I attained a maximum speed of about 300mph (about 480km/h) at sea le,"el on the 1,000 or so horsepower from its Merlin engine. At that speed the propeller was about 80 per cent efficient, and the I,Ooolb (450kg) of thrust thus produced equalled the drag from the fighter's airframe" Now consider the engine power thai would be needed to propel the Spitfire at twice that speed, 600mph (960krn/h). Drag rises ,\~th the square of speed, so if the speed is doubled the drJg is quadrupled. Thus the 1,0001b of drag lit 300mph becomes 4,OOOlb (1,814kg) of drag at 6OOmph. To overcome thai amount of drag the aircraft would need 4,OOOlb of thrust. But at 600mph the efficiency of the propeller was reduced 10 about 50 per cent, so to drive the aircraft at that speed would ha,"e required a piston engine developing aboul 12,OOOhp. During the Second World War the best piston engines produced a fraction over one horsepower for each pound of weight. Thus the piston engine need· ed to propel our notional fighter at 600mph would have weighed about II,OOOlb (4,990kg), about double the aU-up weight of the early production Spitfire. For high. speed ftight the turboiet was a far more efficient power unit than the piston engine. The former produced its output in thc form of thrust, withoul the conversion losses caused by the propeUer.

German Problems with the Turbojet Engine The problem facing the designers of the early turbojet engines was that these ran at far higher temperatures, and at much grealer rotational speeds, than previous aircraft engines. In Gennany these difficulties were exacerbated by shortages of nickel, chromium and other steel-hardening ores needed in the production of high. temperature-resistant alloys. Because of this, junkers engineers had to develop substitute materials for use in the critical parts of the jumo 004. The honest part of the mrbojet is inside the f1Qme tubes. An ideal material for these would have been a nickel-<:hrome-steel alloy with small amounts of silicon, manganese and titanium as hardening elements. In the jumo 004, however, the flames tubes were fashioned from mild steel sheet and had a spray coating of aluminium baked in an o'"en to prevent oxidation. This inelegant material did not sUI"\'i,"e long al extreme temperatures. As a result, throughout the time the 004 "'as running, its flame tubes were slowly buckling out of shape. Another critical area was the turbine blades. These worked in temperatures often exceeding 7WC, and the centrifugal forces imposed tremendous Sll'esses on the blades. 111e turbine blades on the jumo 004 were manufactured from a steel-based alloy conuining 30 per cent nickel and 15 per cent chromium, which was not up to the task. During running the blades de\'eloped 'creep'. that is to say the metal deformed and slowly the blades increased in length. When blade 'creep' reached a laid-down limit the engine had to be changed. Curtailed by flame tube buckling and blade 'creep', the running life of pre-production jumo 004 engines rarely exceeded ten hours. The Me 262 then had to be grounded for an engine change. Production engines were a little better in this respect, with a notional running life of 25 hours - still a \'ery low figure.

84

showed that although the M.eteor had a higher maximum speed at the extremes of low and high altitude, this was offset by its inferior rate of climb and its rrlati\'ely short endurance and radius of action. 111e only role in which the Meteor I was superior to the best piston-engined fighter types was that of short-range daylight home defence interceptor, operating against targets at \"ery high or very low altitude.lnc RAF had no requirement for an aircraft with those capabilities. Nobody doubted that the jel fighter had enormous potential, however. It was decided to continue de\'Clopment of the Meleor and get il ready for production, in case thc war took an unexpected turn. Both in Germany and Britain, the war took that 'unexpected turn' much sooner than expected. In the summer of 1943 US hea,')· bombers began mounting deep-penetration daylight attacks on targets in Germany itself, and escort fighters accompanied them progressi"ely deeper into Germany. For the ,\1e 262 this change in the war situation brought about a reversal of its fortunes. \,
Me 262 into largc-scale production, confidem that junkers would soon solve the jumo 004 turbojet's reliability problems. The schedule called for initial produc· tion aircraft to be appear in january 1944, with output rising to sixty aircraft per month by the end of May. From now on the 1\"1e 262 was the white hope for the future of the Luftwaffe fighter force. In Great Britain the mood changed jusl as abruptly, and at almost the same time. Disturbing intelligence reports from Germany told of no,"cl types of air weapon under development there, including high-speed fighters powered by turbojet engines and rockets. Following a directh"e from I>rime Ministcr Winston Churchill, the Meteor was ordered into production with an order for 120 aircraft. Laler this was increased to 300. -111us, by the beginning of 1944, the RAF and the Luftwaffc each had a turbojet-powered fighter type in production. Both were ordered for usc as home air defence fighters, hO\"e"er, so the chance of their meeting in action was small (in fact, they newr did). In the e,'ent, however, neither the Me 262 nor the Meteor was the firsl jet-propelled fighter 10 go into action. "Inat honour went to the Messerschmitt Me 163, a small rocket-propelled target defence fighter. "[be development of the rocket

-Ifl'arittg a special s/lil to give proreClloII from colltaet witll tile wlatile l:StolT fllel, a pilm boards a i\lesseruhmill tHe 163. The small dimellsiolls of Ille rocket-powered fighter are readily apparetll ill this photo.

85

AIII.CRAFT OF TilE

SECO~O

\\:'011.1.0 \\:',,11.

FIGHTER rocket motor at full power for only four minutes. Once the fighter had rcached its operational altitude and accelerated to fighting speed, the pilot would shut down the motor and deli\-er his attack coasting along at high speed. As the fighter slowed, the pilol fired the rockel in short bursts to restore his fighting speed. In tllis way he could extend the l'vle 163's endurance at high altitude to about eight minutes, gidng the fighter an cffecth'e combat radius of action of about 4Qkm (25 miles) from base. Because of the explosive nature of the T-Stoff, it was important to exhaust the fuel before landing, and the rocket fighter returned to base as a glider. However, as some Me 163 pilots discovered to their cost, gliding could be an unhealthy activity in areas where American escort fighters were on the prowl. The M.e 163 had a sparkJing speed and climbing performance, yel it operated too dose to the limits of what was possible for it to achieve much in action. Moreover, the "FSloff was rather too exciting for general service use, and the fighter's formidable rate of fuel consumption gave it a very restricted radius of action. At the peak of its deployment there were JUSt under a hundred Me 163s in sen'ice with IWO front-line Gruppen, yet there were ne\'cr more than thirty or them serviceable, and on no dar did more than ten of the rocket fighters go into action. On its most successful day the Me 163 shot down only four enemy aircraft. In its sen'ice career lasting almost a year, it is doubtful whether the rocket fighter accounted for more Ih:m sixteen enemy aircraft in tOlal. It will be remembered that the Meleor I had been placed in production to coumer lhe threat from the no\'cl

fighter outpaced that of the two turbojet powered types, and the Me 163 began flying practice interceptions against Allied aircraft in May 1944. Power for the Me 163 came from a Walter 509A bifuel rocket motor. This ran on two liquid chemical fuels, code-named '"!:Stoff and 'C-StofT' by the Germans. 'I: Stoff was highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, an unstable and highly corrosive compound liable to decompose on contact with copper, lead or almost anything combustible. When it decomposed, the chemical produced heat at a rate similar to that of gunpowder. Not least of its unendearing qualities was that it would decompose violently if it came imo contact with human flesh. At take-off the Me 163 carried more than 1.5 tonnes of the vile liquid, which must have done little for Ihe pilofs peace of mind. The other fuel carried by the fighter, C-Stoff, was a relatin'ly Slable combination of methyl n.kohol, hydrazine hydrate and a little waler. The IWO fuels came IOgether in the rocket's combustion chamber in the ratio of about three parts ofT-Stoff to one part of C-Sloff. This caused a violem chemical reaction that produced a jet of superheated sleam and nitrogen with a velocity of 1,980m/see (6,5OOfl/sec) and a temperature of 1,800"C. That gave a thrust of 1,7ookg (3,750Ib). When an Me 163 look off, just over half of its weight was fuel. At full thrust the \'<'alter 509A consumed about Skg (18Ib) of fuel per seamd. That wasfiflun limes more than :l pair of contemporary turbojet engines developing the same le\'el of thrust. Because of this \'oracious appetite, the Me 163 carried sufficienl fuel to run the

During Ihe fi,/(I/ SIX IIIOII/}15 of fhe f{J(Ir the ul/w:affe had tlO shortage traillillg and mpportillg tllc Iype ;n sCftJiu gave severc problems.

0/ Me

'\\10-1941 TO ,\tI0"1945

262 fighlCN, bill providillg pi/Ois with adcquatc

lYpeS of anack weapon being de\'eloped in Germany. On 13 June 1944 the first of these, the VI flying bomb, went into action. Between then and the end of the month more than 2,400 of these missik'S were launched against London. About a Ihird of tlle tIying bombs smashed into Ihe City, where they caused widespread destruction. Distinctly underpowered, the Meteor I was certainly no great performer, yet it had a significant ad\~dntage over the available piston-engined fighters. Between sea b'd and 4,oooft (I ,220m), the band of sky inhabited by flying bombs, its maximum speed of 385mph (620kmlh) was about 30mph (48km1h) faster than anything else. That was sufficienl to spell the difference between the success and failure in the interception of a VI. A single squadron of Meteors was hastily formed and sent into action against the robot weapons. During August 1944 tllC Meteors accounted for thirteen flying bombs, most of which fell to cannon fire. However, on one famous occasion a Meteor with jammed guns manoeuvred into formation alongside a V I and the pilol nudged up the flying bomb's wing 10 flip il OUI of control. Towards the end of AugUSt Allied ground forces overran the V I launching sites in northern France, and the main bombardment ended. Meanwhile, what of the Me 262? In May 1944, as a means of countering the expecled Allied seaborne in\'3sion of north-west Europe, Adolf Hitler ordeTl-d that all new Me 262s coming off the production line be modified to sen'e as fighter-bombers rather than fighters. Some writers ha\'e made [00 much of this edict, asserting

l>roblems Common to all Early Turbojet-powered Aircraft All of Ihe early turbojet engines were temperamental and required very careful handling. Moreover, as speed was reduced the ram efTect of the air lessened and the engine's power dropped away. Once speed had fallen beyond a certain point, for example on the landing ap· proach, the turbojet responded very slowly to any mo\-ement of the Ihroltle. In that event the pilol was commincd to continuing the landing even if he had misjudged his approach. If he ad\'3nced tlle tluottlcs and tried to overshoot, the aircraft was likely to strike the ground before it gained sufficient speed lO commence a climb away, This limitation became particularly important for the Luftwaffe during the final months of the .....ar. Marauding Allied fighters often caught German jet fighters on the landing approach, where they were unable to take any evasive action and fell as easy prey. Another problem with the early jet fighters \\'3S that they had a short endurance, of the order of 45 minutes. Since they cruised much fasler than the pislon-engined machines the pilots had flown previously, navigation was far more difficult. Several of the early jets were wrecked because their pilotS became 10SI, ran short of fuel and were forced to bale out. Clearly, those carly jet fighters were not suitable mounts for inexperienced pilots.

Trailing smlJlu from iu exhaust, an A1e /63 begins iu lake-off rtm.

86

OEVELOPME~T,

87

FIGI/TER OE\'ELOP.\II'l'T

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO:"I) WORl.D WAR

Figum for inilia/ prodllCtum t'n'Sion of eadt '>1Je

Earl)' Jet Fighters Type

,\110-1941 TO .\110-1945

Emered senicc

Engme thrust

,\ lessc:rschrnm Me 1638

Mar

19~~

Rocket )( 1,-OOkg )( 3,-50Ib

l\l.esserschrniu Me 262A

Apr

19~~

Turbojel 2 x 900kg 2 x 1,9841b

Gloster Melcor I

jul

19~~

2 x 2 x

.\ lax. speed 953kmll 592rnph

~IOrnph

Turbojet 1,700lb 770kg

660kmIh

\'\eight (normal loaded)

Armament

4,308kg 9,500lb

2)( 30mm

4.~ I-kg 9,- ~Olb

~)(

30mrn

II,Soolb 5,35 I kg

~)(

20mm

TJ~ de HUlJi/kmd Ibmpire / jel fighter omclassed /I~ Spitfire XII~ olle of tlie best air SllperiorllY fighters at the end of tlie Second Irorld Irar, ill a/mosl et.'ery aspeCl of combat perjormll/lce.

262's combal career. In mid-October the Kommando WIthdrew from operations so that lIS pi.10ts could receiw further training and its jet fighters could be modified. Nowolny had been given an ImposSIble task; to introduce a revolutionary new fighter into combat in an area where the enemy held almost lotal air superiority. The urnt's generalle\'t~1 of training was 10....·, and scr\1ccability of the .\I.e 262 was so poor that rarely could It put up more than fi"e aircraft lilt the same ume. Br the beginning of 1945 Me 262s were coming off the assembly lines at a rate of about thirty-six per week. f"OUo\\1ng the earlier debacle it ....-as decided that when the jet fighter next went into action it would do so in strength, as a fully working system and ftO\\"I1 by fully trained pilOts. OWing to poor w~ther and me: allpervading Allied air superiority, hQ\\~\'er, pilot conversion lI'aining in the winler of 19-4-4/5 took much longer than expecled. Only in Februar)' 19-45 were the ,"Ie 262 fighter units ready to re-enter the fray, and not until the follO\\'ing month did they start to launch large-scale attacks on American bomber formations. During the fmal twO monlhs of the war the jel fightcr units waged a losing battle against enemy air forces with vast numerical superiority. The cold SllltiSriCS highlight the Me 262's lack of effc:cIJ"eness under such condlllons:

that it played a serious part in dela)ing the 1\ 1c: 262's entry into action as a fighter. In fact. the jumo ~ engme was still not reliable enough for the design 10 be 'frozen' for large-scale production. Although it caused consternation in me Luftwaffe al the urne, Hitlers order made remarkably link dIfference. In September 19~-4 Hitler ~mded his edict and, coincidentally, the nominal running life of the jumo ~ engine finally reached twenly-five hours. lis 'life' ....-as still pamfully short, hut at last the turbojel could enter mass producnon. At the end of September the Me 262 underwent Its first o~rational deploymem as a fighter, when Kommando Non-omy deplo)'ed With twemy-threc: or lhe jets to airfields in northwest Gennany. The venture ended In railure. Poor seniceabllilY dogged the jel fighter, imposing severe constrainls on its effecth-eness. Allhough the new production jumo 00-4 engines had longer nominal running lives than their predecessors, lhey still ga\'c a lot of trouble. Also, lhc airframe of thc Me 262 had ilS share or 'bugs' that nceded 10 be ironcd out. For their part, the Allied fighter pilots soon disco\'ered the Achilles' heel or the ;ct fighter. If it could be caughl flying allow speed, immc..dlalcly after take:-off or on the landing approach, it ....-a extn:mcly ndnerable. To counler the )e'(3, Allied fighters began mounting standing patrols O\~r the arrficlds they uS<.'d. Dunng lust over a month of Oper:IUOns on the wC'Stern front, Kornmando Nowotny elaJmed the dC'Struction of foul' American hca\'y bombers, twel\'e fighters and thl"C't reconnaissance aircraft. In achie,ing this meagre total, the unil lost SC\~n Me 262s in combat, while se\-en more ....~re destrOyed and mne darT12ged in accidents 01' foIkrning technical failures. \'("Orsl of all, fighler ace Ma)or\'\'aher Nowotny, the umt's commander, was killed in action. It had nOI bc(on an auspicious starl to the Me

Total {\ Ie 262s delh'cred 10 the Luft\\"3ffe by May 19~5: more than 1,200 Gl"C3tcsl number of Me 262 fighters in senice (ApnlI9~5): about 110 Greatest number of Me 262 fighter sorties in a day (7 April 1945): 59 GI"C3IC'St number of Me 262 victories in a day (31 March 19.a5): 16 Se\'eral postwar writers ha,~ derided Lufl\\-affe leaders for failing to gel the Me 262 into large-scale

88

production early enough. Yet, as \\~ ha\'e scen, If any· thing the production of the aircraft ...."3S initialed tOO early, and Me 262 airframes Started coming off the assembly lines before the engine to j>O\\-er them was ready

for mass production. Nor did Adolf Hitlers order regarding the initial use of the Me 262 as a fighter-bomber cause any appreciable delay in the t}"~'s operational introduction as a fighter. First and al\\"3)'$;, the main factor

How they Compared: De Havilland Vampire I versus Spitfire XIV During the Second \'("orid \X'ar the jet fighter types that .....e nt into action produced uniformly disappointing results in terms of the number of e~)' aircraft they shot down. HO\\~\'ff, there can be no doubt that, had the war continued a fe..... months longer, this picture would ha\'e changed radically. In 1946 the RAF flew a comparath~ trial in .....tuch it pined a de Ha\'iIland Vampire I ....ith a Gobltn II engine against a Spitfire XlV. As has ~n seen elsewhere, the Spitfire XlV was one of the mosl effeeth~ pislon-engined fighlers at lhe end of the ....'31'. Yet as these excerpts from the official report show, the Vampire oUlclassed the Spitfire in e\-ery aspect of combat performance that really malteredo Maximum leve/ speed The Vampire is greatly superior in speed to the Spitfire XIV at all heights. Its speed ad\'3ntage is shown below: Alli/ude ground level 140mph (225km/h) 5,OOOft (1,500m) 120mph (193km1h) IO,OOOft (3,OOOm) II0mph (I77km/h) l5,OOOft (-4,600m) IIOmph (I 77km1h) 20,OOOfI (6, 100m) IOSmph (169km/h) 85mph (I 36km1h) 2S,000f1 (7,600m) 30,OOOft (9, 100m) 70mph (112km/h) -40.000ft (i2,200m) 90mph (145km/h) Aeultrtuion and d«ekrotion \'('ith both :un:ntft In line-abreasl formation al a speed of 200mph (322km/h) lOchcated, on the word 'Go' both engines ....-ere opened up 10 a maximum power simultaneously.The Spi~ initially drew ahead, bul after a penod of approximately 25 M.'COnds the \"amplt'C gradually caught up and quickly accderated past the Spitfire. Tbe rate of deceleration for the Spitfire is faster than the Vampire e\"Cfl when the Vampire uses Its dl\~ brakes. This shows that the Vampire's di\~ brakes are not as efreeth'e as they should be. Dit:<£' The 1\\'0 aircraft ....-ere PUI into a 40 0 di,'e in hne-abreast formation ....ith sct throttles al a speed 250mph (indicated, 4OOkm/h). The Vampire rapidly dl't"Yl ahead and kept gaining on the Spitfire. romilffled

89

AIRCRAFT OF TUI' SECO-':D '«'ORLO '«'AR

Zoom chmb The Vampire and Spitfire XIV in line-abreast fornution w~ put inlo a 45° dl\oc. \'<'hen a speed of 400mph (indicated, 644km!h) ~d been reached, a zoom climb at fixed throttle settings was carried out at approximatel)' 50°. The Vampire showed nsdf \'astly sUlXrior and ~ched a ~Igtll l,()OOft (300m) in exctsS of the altirude of the Spitfire in a few seconds, and qUickly increased its kad as the zoom climb continued. The same proced~ was earned Out at full throttle settings and the Vampire's a
limiting the Me 262'5 capablliues In combat was the short runrung life and general unreliability of its jumo ()().4 engines.. Despite imaginati\oc efforts by the junkers engmeers. C\'Cn in the spring of 1945 the ()().4 "-as not a fully reliabk unit. As a result, the Me 262 never came dose to living up to its ongmal proml~. At the beginning of 1944 II had seemed that the side .....hlch as first to bnng into scr\'icc large numbers of;cr aircraft ould gain a huge: ad\-antage in the battle for air supremacy. Certainly t.he jets had the potenual to \\1n that supremacy for, particularly In the ca~ of the German aircraft, their performance was far in ad\'ance of anything previously achicvl..-d. Yct duc to poor serviceability these aeroplanes wcnt into action only in rclati\'cly small numbers. In a large-scale conflict a few aeroplanes, no matter how brilliant their flying performance, cannot and did not secure decisi\'e resultS. In the ewnt the German and British jet fighters achieved remarkably little in action. Had thc)' not secn combat, t.he outcome of the war would not ha\'e been different in any material respc<1.

Francillon, R j, Japonm Atmaft of /he Patlfit irar (Putnam, London, 19-0). Standard referen~ .....o rk on jaranese military aircraft during me Sc-oond World War.

Green, \'
4 The Bomber Revolution M J F Bowyer massi\'C raids upon Warsaw's worthwhile targets ....1th little regard for collateral damage. Domier Do 1-s assisted others attackmg enCircled Polish forces and carried out Interdiction raids. \'\'ith German air superiority quickly cstablished, armoured forces with air support raced forward in the first blitzkrieg; slowly t.he world came to lerms with the fact that Germany had caused a major war, Could it muster me resources and supplies needed to \\in? How could Britain be hit hard from Ihe Fatherland withoullong.range bombcrs?What ;Ibout the RAF - was it rcally able to bomb Germany effecti\'ely from bases in Britain?

\'\ben hostilities commenced in September 1939, it took hundreds of bombc:rs and t.housands of bombs to wreck a ma}or city. \'\'hen hostilities cea~d, one bomber uSing one bomb could cripple, indeed almost destroy, an entire nation. Such was the bomber re\·olution. Ele\'cn minutcs before Germany declared \\'3r on Poland, three junkers ju 878s of 3./StG I screamed down to put\'crise t.he :approachcs to me rh'cr VislUla's Dirshau bridge. The brutish, spine chitling SlUka terror had been unleashed 10 start what meir crews tcrmed 'the casy war', only thc wcather prc\'enting their friends in Heinkcls from smashing Warsaw. Howe\'cr, they had miscalculated; in a ye:ar's time they would be fighting a \'ery tough war With \ocry inadequate bombers. 'Ine spatted-undercarriage 4,350kg (I O.OOOlb) ju 878 carried a 500kg (l.Ioolb) bomb on a ccntreline cradle, supplemented by four 50kg (1IOIb) bombs beneath each ....ing, in .....hich a 7.9mm (0.3in) MG 17 machine-gun was installed, AU was finely tuned in the most effecu\'e, Iightcst mamstream bomber......hich had a lop speed of about rOkm/h (23Omph) at 4,I15m (l3.5ooft). and a cruising speed of 18-km.ih at ..l,5-2m (175mph at 15,OOOft). A weakntsS the ju 87 shared ....ith many Gcrman bombc:n "'3S Its limited fuel capaClty, gl\;ng a m~ 595km (370 miles) normal range. That manered little until the casy war turned hard and the distances increased. In Septcmbc:r 1939 nine Stuka Gruppen nominally fielded 335 aircroft - mostly Ju 87B-15 - which ruthlessly dh'e-bombed Polish communications, pTCventing reinforcements from rcaching thc front. Heinkel He t lIs. of which 800 wcre operational, soon carried out

The British experience Britain's bomber foree, quite differenl from mat of Germany. had bc:cn assembled to carry OUt a strategic campaign intended to destroy the German capaclty to "-age war and to help sink its navy. For those purposes It was using long-range, twm-engine bombers, and a sec· ond generation was emerging, bigger and necessarily four-engined bcc3usc pairs of a\-ailable engines no longer pTO\ided sufficienl power. All would spend much time over hostile terrilory, and bccau~ long-durotion fighters were not a\-ailablc, defensi\'e guns m hea\'}' po.....er-operatcd turrets would, hopefUlly, fully protcct them. These turrets added nothing 10 offensh'e n.-sults, which \\'35 one reason why German bombers were generally defended by a few single or paired guns in light mountings, usually manually trained. At the outbrcak of war Bomber Command's six Vickcrs-Armstrongs \'\'cIlington squadrons were rearming with the Mk la, fined wit.h Frazer-Nash two-gun

jJrice, A, Bl,u 011 Britain (Ian Allan, Sheppcrton, 1977). Account of me air attacks on Great Britain during the period 1939 to 1945, and the de"c1opment of the British air defence system.

....

Price, A, FIg/lin' Alrmtft (Arms & Annour Press, London, 1989). Account of the de\oclopment of the day fighter aircraft before and during the Second \'<'orld War.

Bibliography Ethell,j, and J'"rice, A, Irorldll'ar II F'Ihw'l Jets (Airlife, Shrewsbury, J994), Account of the de\'cSopment and ~r\itt careers of the nine jet-propelled aircraft that entered scnice before the end of the Second \'\'orld \,\'ar.

Price, A, The SpItfire SlOry (Arms & Armour Press, London, 2nd Edition 1995). Detailed and compre· hensi\'t' account of the de\'e1opment of the Spitfire.

90

1M JlInkers JI/ 878·2 of /940, a /radititmal forn. of 'Swka'droe bomber.

&IW«1I 1939 "TId /94/ tM IItinkel He 111 H ffOS lilt: uf/tT.Mffe's principal mediI/III bomber.

91

TilE BOMBER REVOLr.:TION

AlIl.CIl.AI'T 01' TUIl SECOSP WORLD WAR

TheVickton-Armstnmgs (l'(Jlingron Its nose and lail turreu t«r't rJ'piall ofrlwufituJ 10 1940s Bn"lish bo",baJ. This machint, RJ175, UYars lilt codts of No 149 Sqlladron. n~ and lail turrets, On the firsl dar of war \'\:'ellingtons searched in vain for Gcnnan na\1\1 ships until storms and darkness dosed in. Ncxt day. fouru~cn aircrafl of Nos 9 and 149 Squadrons, operating off Brunsbilnel, met

fierce AA firc which claimed rwo \,\:'dlingtons. Such operauons werc mounted up to the end of 1939. On 3 December twent)·.four \'('ellingtons were sent in daylight to attack naval ships ncar Hcligoland, Gennan radar. its

Slim linn anJ a sklllkr boo", alrTJ'mg the tail SlIrjaaJ rr:JIIUJ tM Handlry Page Hampck" 's smfaa arm and drug. These arr:

.vo 408 Sq/ladron OIrrrufl.

92

A I'idlers 11'(Jlingto" Ie of So 9 Squadron m:ar HOlli,lglon in J 940, tl'lIn lIS drag-mdllemg 'd/lSlbin'vemrallllrret lowtred.

presence unknown, rracked them, intense accurate AA fire greeted them and cloud covcr helped to protect them. Two badly damaged Wellingtons Cl1lsh-landed on rerum. With only nose and tail turrets defending many \,\'dlingtons, the Air Staff on 6 December 1939 decided that se\,enty-se\'en muSt be fiued with retractable belly turrets. A dozen Wellingtons of No 99 Squadron so cquipped sct off in darlight on 13 Dccember for thc Schillig Roads. An 800ft (244m) cloudbase did not stop AA guns firing and German fighters being vectored on to the bombers, which, despite holding lheir formations, fought a disastrous battlc. Fh'e were shot down, another later crashed, and only one fighter was destroyed. In Bomber Command's opinion it was the cloudy ....-eather that mad~ th~ o~rat:ion difficult. Stubborn belief remained that bombers could hold theIr own In daybght, and nOt until 18 December 1939, when twenty-four WeUington las of Nos 9, 37 and 149 Squadrons h~ad~d for warships report~d off Wilhdmsha\'Cn, was rcality acc~pted. A~;ng in four formallons at about 1-1,oooft (-I,26-m), th~y skirt~d 'flak-ships' and then German fighters pounced. Easily evading turret firc by bearing down upon the Wellington, blind beams. they shot down ten bombcn,

and two more latcr ditched. Gennan pilots ofJG I rttkoned that by keeping formation, giving in~ffective crossfire, thc bombers actually made interception casier. Between 3 September and 18 December 1939 RAF Bomber Command's Handley Page Hampdens, Wellingtons and Bristol Hlenheims flew 861 daylight sorties and dropped 61 tons of bombs for a loss of forty-onc bombers and highly trained Regular air force crews. ThaI amounted to ten per ccnt of Command a\'Cf'.I.gc daily strcngth. "len German fighters had been shot down and thrce warships damaged. Protection of bombers could only come with concealment, something which darkness could prO\;de. That gcneratcd many problems, not the least of which would be target acquisition at nighl. The Germans had been worlung on that problem, making use of radio beams, and soon the British would need to do likC\\;sc. Bomber Command, with no choice, s\\;lched to mainly night openllions in February 19-10. O~rational fl);ng in darkness emphaSIsed needs for much technical dc\'e1opment mcluding nC\\' C"quipment, improvcd signals and homing srstems and airfield lighting. General agreement was reached on 1 January 19-10 that four-gun tail turrclS, first suggested br Vicker.; in October 1936, must be finC"d to \'\cllingtons, although it ....1\5 mid-19-11 before

°

93

TilE 80.\18EK Kl::\'OLUTIO'" AIRCII.AliT Of THE Sf-CO="'!) \t'ORLI) \X'AII.

Hod 1M Juiuy SqllOdrvn.

Balt~

bun smalln amJ Griffon mgitld, it Il/Igl1/

lhat cam~ about. On 7 Fcbruary orders .....cre ghocn to fit addiuonal armour and sdf-scaling fuel tanks, A Iov.ocrcd belly turret CUt the \'.;'ellington's speed by 15mph (24kmJh>, so on 15 ,\lay 1940 the derision was taken to rcplatt it ";th beam guns, S3\;ng 500lb (225kg), and the idea .....315 extended 10 new bombers. Ikam guns "ocre a transient feature, all Bnush 'hea\'lcs' by 1942 ha\'ing t.....o-gun dorsal turrets. Whereas Gennany updated ill; bomber designs throughoul the war, Brilain introduttd eompletely ne..... types, upgrading only the \'\'elhngton. A potentially fasler A1erlin-cngined Mk II for rropical use made its first flight on 3 March 1939, bUI lailplane troubles caused de\'elopment to continue mainl~' with thc Pegasus-po.....ered \'ariant, A stronger undercarriage allowed increased weight, and a 24V elcctrical system impro\'ed equipment perform..nce. When, in Augusl 1940, supplies of Pegasus engines were in doubt, pick-up pomts on \'(lellington naedks, designcd to cope with a \'ariel)' of engines, led to an order 10 fill the gap with ,\1c:rlin Xs in 200 airframes. The Air ,\1inisLr}' insisled mal a fuu & Whitney T,"in \'('asp 1,830hp \'ersion should go ahcad as thc Mk IV, although the Mles Ie and III (Bristolilerculcs) .....o uld remain tandard vcrsions, On 31 March 1941 twO \'('elhngton lis became the first bombers 10 drop a 4.000lb (I,81Okg) bomb ~ch, Emden being the targct. The need for ~ting, ampk oxygen and extra ~' comfort "ocre e\ident during kmg nighl fllghls. as was the need for nangation aids o\'Cr b1acked-out areas, All aircraft nttded ready escape eXits for usc afler ditching, along with dinghies; crews required ampk training and an airisea rescue sen;tt.

ftot...

prot'ed t1.'ry /lufl//. Tileu Illret btlong 10 No 116

Dropping largely ineffecli\'C bombs and a\'oiding ci\"ilian argcl!. Bomber Command was gomg 10 find it difficult to jX'netrate heanly defended areas. especially in poor "'Camer. But some hard lessons had been administered 10 good ume. for- 10 have launched large bombers 10 daylight during the German w~tem OffenSl\'C would have been catastrophic. Inst~d, me planned Strategic night bombing offensive against the Ruhr and Rhmeland bq;:in whcn nincty-six bombers sct out on 15/16 May 1940. Only twenty-four crews e\'cn claimed to haw found their targets. The task ahead, 10 wagc an effccli\'c stralcgic bombing offensh'c, was daunting; how bad thinb'S mighl havc becn was shown b)' the RAPs light bomber squadrons. To support the British Anny Britain's two other bomber type were regarded by Bomber Command as irrelevant, as thcy werc dcveloped for army support to a I,OOOlb (454kg) bomb load, I,OOO-milc (1,609km) range requirement. Larger man a Ju 87, thc IO,900lb (4,940kg). 54ft·span (16.4m) singlcengine FalfC)' Battle carried the prescribed bomb load for 1.000 miles (1.610km) but failed on other counts. The intention had been to po'-'ocr It With a 1,500hp RoUs-Roytt Griffon cnginc based upon me 'R' engine used by the 1931 SchneiderTroph}' ";nncrs. Non·a\'3ilabihty forced Fairey 10 tum to itS 1,700hp 24...qlinder Prince double engine dri\;ng contrarolanng propellers. but II! complexity caused me company to fil a 1.000hp Rolls-Royce Merlin. The Battle was thus seriously underpowered, its cruising speed falling 10 a mere U8mph (238km/h) al 15,OOOft (4.S~Om). French·based Battles

94

T'Our 2501b G~raJ l'urptJK bombs formed 1M imernalloud of the Bristol Bkn/Iei", ,\,. J,

95

THe 80.\lBER RE\'OL",TIOS

AIRCRAfT OF THE SECOXn 'CORLD 'CAR

All F.24 annna iJ /aitm aboard a Blmhtlm / oj .vo 2// Squadron in /940. Ma,!)' B~m wrtin tL'Uf' for nxo,,,lOusaJIU pUrpoMS. pro\'ed useless for stemming the German in\
vies on the flanks, pfO\'ided maximum protective crossfire. The need for well-concei\"ed bomber formations and finely executed fighter protection was a lesson all air forces bought dearly. Like the Battles, 2 Group Bienhcims were hurled into action in .\lay 1940, usually fatally, without fighter cover. Gunfire broke apart their formations, atlo,\ing Bf 109 fighters to pick off the bombers. No longer 'faster than a fighter', the Blenheim IV (IWO 920hp Bristol Mercury radials) had a top speed of 227mph (365km/h) at sea level and 266mph (365km1h) at 1 I ,870ft (3,618m). At 15,OOOft (4,572m) It cruised at 180mph (290kmJh),carrying a I,OOOlb (454kg) bomb load for a creditable 1,460 miles (2,349km). Until 1943 the Blenheim IV remained an army upport aiTCJ'2ft. although It was much u~d as a mamslrC3m bombeT for daylight 'nuisantt' raids. At night Bknhcims bombed Channel pons and heal)' guns. then during the 1940--41 wimer they took part in Bomber Command's main night offensi"e before imensivcly operating against shipping; tasks for which the I)'PC was nC"er intended. Another easy war? On I April 1940, 1,726 of the Luftwaffe's 5,178 operational aircraft were bombers and 419 wcre dh'e-bombers, many shortly to be committed 10 the invasion of Norway, an operation undertaken to secure IrOn ore supplies from Sweden and pTO\ide bomber bases from which Britain could be attacked. By captur109 the Benelux countries and nonhern France, mo~ suitable ba~ were obtained. junkers ju 87s had supponed rapid trOOp adnmces, particularly at the ."euse

, The wllISllaJ geomelry oj the Blenheim /I"s /lose improtocd lire uavigurorfbo",b uimer's accommodutio1l. fkm~ulh it is a rcor(/,'t(J.rd-jirillg, pcriscopi,ally sightcd gllfl. This IS a No 40 Sqlladro/l airr:rajr.

96

ri\'eT crossing. The Lufl\\
In 1938 modified \'t;t:lleslcys set a world long-dIstance record by flying non-stop from Ismailia (Egypt) to Darwin - a ~urnC'r of7,162 miles (11,525knt) completed in JUSt O\'er forty-eight hours. Such exceptional range came not by chance, Bnush bombers having bef:n concei\'ed '\ith needs to reinforce garrisons in O\'crscas terntones where distances were enormous. \'(Iellcslc)'s proved ideal for East African operutions, No 14 Squadron on the first doy of war mounting a long-dislance raid on ,\ 1assa\\
Italian interlude \\"'hen Italy declared \\
A lesson for Britain Such African acti,i~' was utterly different and remote from the ferocious fight about to break out o'-er England for, at the start of July 1940, the Luftu'atre \\'as to unleash its Stubs again. So powerful would be the blows that full-bloodied invasion would be unnccessary. Shipping, ports. industry and the rcmnants of the RAF would be obliterated, and the civilion population blasted into submission. Brazenly the ju 8-s sallied forth across the English Channel and immediately encountered something unexpected. Their short range, ewn with an external longrange tank beneath each wine producing the ju 8-R (R for 'Rcic:hwcit', or range) W1lS insufficient, but a far greater shock came when the Srukas encountered, for the first ume, radar controlled, skilfully assembled and hIghly effccrivC' fighter defences against which their almost non-existant self-defence rendered them easy prey. All Gennan bomber crews disco\'ered during the Battle of Britain that only plentiful fighter protection could ensure suni\'al, and it was not always to hand.

Lo"g-Spall, high-
A hard war On 4 july thirty-thret' Ju 87Bs of IIlJStG 51 attempted the first dive-bombing of Portland, where they encountered strong defences. By 20 july 1940 battle casualties had cut the ju 87 force by a third, to 248 aircraft out of its mtended holding of 316, and by the rime the Luftv;stre launched its main Battle of Britain offensi\-c the SlUka'S supcrioril)' was ousted by re\'oJuuonary change. At about 0830 on 12 August a group of Messerschmitt Bf 1105 roared along the English Channel, sections peeling a\\
97

ritE RO.\IRER

AllteR!d'T OF TilE 51'(:0:") ~-ORLD WAR

Changing tM .\feuendrnllIt HI 1 10 jig/un- ;"'0 0 jighu:r-bombn- fn1S a PIO{·d idea rJ:;dJ nxrIas/l1ll COII~lj('rlUj.

-~-

-

Gum,mys mOSI IlbiqlllfOl1S warplane. lhe Jmlken JII 88, carrIed Its offtrls;t~ load trXtnl/.Q!/y,

98

RE\'OLl·T[O~

lR1.v:/oped from Ihe .\llJrywIIJ. IJ", /es.s crumpcJ Baltimore III Sorth Africa. Tllis alreraft, Baltimore 1 AG688. troS tt'tJllw/(:J at Ihe A&AEE m luu 1941.

umg ru/l~ made the ,\ lartlll :\faryland t'tJI/labkfor photographic ruotltlOUsal/a. This Afary/alld I teas ul/der USI III 81'1/0;11 ill NOfXlllbn 1941.

stf'TJCd wllh the RAP

Srrike and suppon aircraft would never be the same again, a point re-emphasised when, at midday. Bf 110 tighter-bombers hit RAF ,\o'o\'ding well beyond reach of the raiding forces.

Atlantic, France for bombers and Britain for advanced trainers. One purchase WIIS the Lockheed 14 airliner. Displaying modern features and the comfort typical of US combat aircraft. it was easily modified mto the 11udson reconnaissance bomber. In july 1940 more American-built combat aircraft began arriving In Britam. mainly fugith·C$ from the conmlets of "mquished nations. Although they had modern items such as \-:lriablc-pitch propcll~, Raps, good air-cooled engines. nosewhecl undercarriages and high standards of personnel comfon, most were iU-equipped for the European conRIC"t.TheIr duration and speed were acceptable. but not their poor annament and small bomb loads. They had bct:n designed either to dm·e off America's $OUthem neighbours or defend the USA b} anaclting the japanese na'1', Rated htghly "-:IS the three-seat Glenn .\ \artin ,\ lodel 167F .'\aryland bomber, -5 of the French order for 215 ultimately reachmg U1C British. -me 61ft -tin (l8.6m) span aircraft. ,\ith a loaded weight of 17.890lb (8, I 15kg), had a resp«'table top speed of 294mph at 13,OOOft (473km/h at 3,962m) and a maximum range of 1,870 miles at 179mph (3.009km at 288km1h), Unforrunately its maximum bomb load was only 1,800lb (816kg), and that for shorHange operations. For defence the Maryland relied upon twO 0.30in (7.62mm) guns, making it quite useless, As with many other US air· craft, the British used them for purposes other than intended. the Maryland undertaking long-range photographic reconnaissance. Among other coups, it $C. cured the photographs upon which the Royal :"-:3.'1"5 Taramo raid of 11 No,'ember 19~O was based. Thc British ordered 150 Maryland ,\1k lis which. with spcr-cl boosted by more powerful engin • \\~ used for fonn3rion lC'\ocl bombing raids over North Africa, \\here 0pposing tightCTS included IUlIian biplanes, Thc Maryland's 19.40 successor, the .\todd 18i Baltimore. drew upon combat fttdback.. The '1("\" through the additional nose glazing \\-:lS improved. a deeper fuselage allowcd crew contact. and self-scaling fud tanks. buJlelproof glass, additional annour and

The American input Before the war, Europeans had shopped across the

99

THE BOMBER RE\,OLl,;TIOS

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOSO WORLD WAR

A sound daign, 8«jng's Moth/ 299, 1M prtd«mor of alI B-17 Flying TYJrJrtSSeS,fintjkw on 28 July 1935.

As the Iighlly tkfrmhd Baltimora proUtd «UY PITJ' 10 fighlM, 1/~,uk JIl fcowrtd" dorwllUl"'rtl,

400hp more power from TWO 1,600hp Wright Double Cyclone GR-2600-A5B engines '\'ere: all useful changes, Increasing the bomb load even to 2,OOOlb (910kg) was not easy, but armament was much impro\'ed, at one Slage totalling de\'en guns. Four, ventrally mounted, were to administer a parting gesture after low-Ie\'el bombing. Willi-mounted fixed guns, of little value in a bomber ,,"'ere replaew. in other US aircrafl such as lhe Dougl~ A-20, North American B-25 .and Martin B-26 by gun p.acks on the sides of the nose, or by guns in a 'solid' 005C' for ground strafing. When the Balumore went intO action on 23 May 1942, its poor manually tra.\"~ gun defence WliS only tOO ob\iously inadequate, for fighters Shol dO\\" three

bombcn. A four 0.303m (7.69mm) lurrel "ersion, the Baltimore Ill, had an aU-up weight of 23,OOOlb (I0,430kg), attained 302mph (486k.m/h) al II,OOOfi (3,350m) and had a range of950 miles (1,530km) when carrying a 2,OOOlb (9078kg) bomb load. The first American bomber to sec combat in Europe was the shapely all-metal, stressed-skin Douglas 08-7 with nosewheel undercarriage and radial air-cooled Pratt & \Xfhitney \l;"asp engines. The protol)'PC, flown in De«mber 1938, was by early 1939 showmg a credilable tOP speed of 314mph (505kmJh) .and .a climb rate of half-a-mile a mlnUle. Only thirty reached France txfore it coUapsed, the residue beginning to arri\'e in England during July 1940. Although fast, the 105 ex-French

D8-7s, supplemented by sixteen from a Belgian order, were poorl)' anned and tOO shorl of range 10 reach German)'. Special mining was needed because of the nosewheel gear, so the first nineteen examples were aner modification set aside as Boston I trainers. l\-\ajor impro,'emems soon followed, The Pratt & Whimc)' Wasps were replaced b)'Wright double-row Cyclones and more aerodynamically satisfactory naCt'lIes were fined to the OB-7A. Stability was impro,'ed by increased-.area vertical tail surfaces, but the typc's short duration remained a drawback. The US Army had ordered the DB-- as the A-20, the engme change from Pnm & \1;1J.itne)' to Wrighl R-2600-3 being a feature of 143 A-20As, each able 10 carr)' a 1,IOOlb (SOOkg) bomb load. The A-20BIDB-7A, thc first effective "crsion for the USAAC, had two 1,690hp R-2600-ll engines and 5e\'cn guns, all of 0.50in (12,7mm) calibre. NOl until late 194 I did the longer-ranged 08-7B/BOSlon III emerge, powered by twO 1,600hp R-2600-23 engines. Here at last was a lOp performer whose shoulder wing sat upon a slender fuselage, whose pilol had an excellent forward view and in which me navigator or bomb .aimcr sat in an ideal glazed nose. Amidships the gunner had IWO guns and the palOI could operate four O.3Oin (7,62mm) machine-guns fined on either side of the nosc. The bomb load was 2,600lb 1,I80kg). In RAF Boston IlIssix 8th USAAF crews on 4 July 1942 mounted the AAFs firsl bombing opcration o\"er western Europe, B)' 1944 lhe A-2OG version was in scr\'1ee, sporting a dorsalrurret and a c1ear-\'lsion or sold

engines, lhe four-engined B-17C was one of t\\'ent)' purchased by Britain. The 8-17 originated in a 1934 competition for a four-engined bomber, Boeing cop)'righting the tradc name 'Aying Fortress' for the aircraft. Of all-mctal conStruction, it initially had four 750hp Prau & Whime)' Hornet R-1690-E nine-q'lindcr radial engines, a retractable undercarriage, a shapd)' 103ft 9in-span wing and a crew of eighL ~fence comprised four single-gun posilions and a solitary nose gun. Full)' loaded it weighed 43,0001b (J 9,500kg) and carried up 10 right 600lb (rOkg) bombs. It first flew on 28 July 1935, lis lOP speed was .around 250mph (400k.m;Ilt), crutSlng speed 200mph (320kmJh), and sen'1ee ceiling about 24,OOOft (7.300m), but un~rtamues arose because the proIOl)'PC crashed on 30 Octotxr 1935. Thirteen YB-17s with more suitable 930hp Wright Cyclone GR-I 820-39 (G2) cngines followed, and one imponant slatic airframe. Arguments arose because lhc US Na\'y ,'iewed the 'flying battleship' as a lhreal (Q its building programme, and funding methods caused lhe new examples to be redesignated YIB-l7s, lhe first flying on 2 December 1936, AlIlhineen wenlto lhe 2nd Bombardment Group (BG) whose lengthy flights tested an aircraft which fonned the nucleus of US sO'ategic air power By the 1938 MUnich crisis they had flown 1,800,000 miles (2,897,OOOkm) without serious aCC'idenL Turbosuperchargers in the static test machine imprm-ed all-round performance so much that, as the onl)' )lB-17A (37-369), it began flight tests in April 1938 and fCvealed a ceiling exceeding 30,OOOft (9,150m) and lJ top speed of 311 mph (500km/h), way ahead of the 256mph (412k.m/h) shown by lhe olhers. A\'eroging 238mph (383km/h), it could carry an II,OOOlb (4,990ka) load for 620 miles (I,OOOkm), or more realistically 2,400lb (I,090kg) for 1,500 miles (2,415km). Not

"""'.As the nighl blitz was ending, a ncw shape emcred The 1Il0$l effectit'e US lighl bomber m:u the short-rollgt but speedy Dol/glas A-20G Boston IV, u'/ti,1t as «'til as formotion ooy/igltt raids. Sun hat is BZ403 tinder ust.

QtlacJu

100

tt'
ideol for low-m/

European skies whcn a Boeing B-17C Flying Fortress landed at Prestwick, Scotland, after a direct 8hr 20min flight from the USA. U1timalely this bomber would ha,·c a profound effeci upon the war. With rurbosuperchargcd

101

AIRCRAI'T 01' Till

SECO'Ol '«'ORLO '«'AR

TilE KO.\IRER RE\,Ol.l:TIOS

Allliough il fMS kJJ 'Iimb~ Illall file 1'1-20, North America" i H-25C :\lucl1ef/ carried (J lieut:ier bomb loaJ. roTtI't.lrdfiri,,& glil/ padu "WJe faur wrsiof/J uwfili for lou'-kn:1 JlrikeJ.

(370km/h), \X'ith four 1,1 10Ib (SOOkg) t.;S bombs the operntional radius WIiS ..l50 rrnks (725km), To opcr:ne at around 28,OOOft (8.63Om). the lie\~n men aboard the bomber drew for hoon upon oxygen supplies during long, cold and exhausting sorties. 'Iney wore c1«trically heated elothing, layen being added as the aircraft climbed 10 a rcgimc where the temperature could fall to -50·C. From 10,ooon (3,050m) a bombing error of onl)' -150ft (140m) was claimed when using the Sperry sight, but only on cleo.!r days, of which there wcrc fcw. Such a day was 8 july I 9..l I , when o..l-Cs opernted for the first time. No formation fl};ng was undertaken b)' the trio runnmg up on \X'ilhdmsha\'en to bomb from 27,OOOft (8,HOm). One, \\lth an inch of frozen oil covering its tailplane. had to unload near Nordeney. lne most disastrous opcrntion occurred on 8 September. when four FortreSs Is sel out for Oslo. 1\ lesscrschmitt Of 109s Illterceplcd one at 27.000ft (8,23010), and another, badly shot up, had wounded aboard, A mird found cloud covering the target, and the fourth never returned. The hlst sortie took place on 25 September, and was the twenty-fourth abortivc sortic OUI of fifty-two flown, 'Inc Fortresses showed how difficult II was to mounl high-le\'e1 raids n~mg clear wcamer mat was rnrely prescnt. Poor gun defencn confirmed that e\"Cn Iugh

surpri ingly, an order for thirty-nine 8-I-Bs (I,OOOhp R-I 820-65) folkJ\\-cd. 'InCK had an enlarged rudder. a nat nose panel for use "ith the Sperry bomb sight. and more flap ll~a. AU u~re delivered by March 1940. Then came thirty~ight B-I-Cs. somewhat different in appearance because the gun positions had been replaced by a \'Cntral bath and large side panels whIch the gunner removed before using his guns. Power was provided by' 1,2oohp GR·\820-65 (G-205A) engines.·llie B-17C's \\~Ight had riscn to 49,6501b (22,521kg), and the first example flew on 21 july 19..l0. Further rcl'inefTl(:nts were incorporated in fony-two liubst-qUC'nt B·I-Os. A belief that high ftying afforded safely from mtercepoon (something the Germans also believed) aroused a Bntlsh desire to acquire turbosupcreharged B-I"s to see whether they were suitable for high.le\'el opcraoon . "l'l,e reluctance of the USA to release them was tempered by American interest in what could be aehie\'ed under combat, so it was agreed to sell Britain twenty B-17Cs. Known as Fortress Is, the RAF aircraft had twO waist, twO dorsal and a single \'entral 0.50in guns and one or tWO O.3Oin fr« guns in the 1lOSC'. British tesong shov'ed the B-1 ie's top s~ 10 be 325mph (523km/h) at 29,OOOfi (8.~Om), and its cruising s~ 230mph

102

ftyeT'S unprotected by fighlers were ready prey. and easily secn contrails re\'caJed the precise posllion at alti. tudes wherc a pressure cabm was dl.-"liirablc. Back 10 the USA reworking of the 8·17 was under war in the belief mal sufficient defensiw guns would make it impregnable. In the B·17E a forward dorsal m"o-gun turret was added and twin ventral guns were TCplaced b)' a 'baU nlrttt' for manning b}' me shon of '>Iature. A m'm--gun rear turret CO\'E:ring a major blind pol was falred into an enlarged tail unit lilted to Un+ pro\"C the .aIrcraft's stability lne weight ~ 10 5-1,000Ib. se\~n tons abo\'C the original. me first example flying on j September I 9..l I. The B-I7E reached a top speed of 31-mph (510kmlh), and production lotalled 512. japan's Pearl Harbor assault immediately p~eded the operational introduclion of me B-17E and a new generation of US bombers, the Consolidated B-2-1 Liberator, North American B-25 "tuchell and Martin 8-26 Marauder, All, dUring de\'elopment, benefited from the fightlng 10 Europe. !'\amed after Billy ,\lltchcU. the 8-25 became America's most ";dely used bomber, provmg adaptable and \'cry stable Twenty-four Wcft ordered off the drawing board in 1939, the first flymg on 19 August 19..l0 and serving as the prototype. Production dclh'erics began in February 19-11, and to Improve handling the wing centre section from me lenlh example rcillined dihedral whereas outer mainplancs were horizontal, as on all sub~equent B-25s, The forty 1l·25As, also lightly defended by four 0.50in (l2,7nun) guns, had self·scaling tanks and extra armour. \X'eighmg 17,8-0Ib (8,I06kg) cmpt)' and 25.J22lb (II ,..l86kg) loaded. the 8-25/\ could carry 3,OOOIb (1,36Okg) of bombs for 1.350 miles (2,I-Okm), more than many aircraft in its class, and attained 315mph at 15,OOOft (507kmJh at -I,5':"0m), Impro\'ed defence ClIme "ith the B-258's dorsal and bell\" lurrets in lieu of waist and tail guns, As a penalty the weight rose to 26,2081b (11,887kg). and speed fell to 300mph at 15,oooft (483km/h at -1,57010). By December 19..l1 130 13-25Bs had been deli\'cred. The 1\ lilchelJ's good endurance was first exploited during anti-submarine pauo.ls off the L:S coast. Early in 19-12 the 3rd BG rTl()\'ed 10 Australia, from where the first opeTlIlJOn mvolw:d ten 8-25s island hopping to the Philippines and then allacking japanese stuppmg. In April 19-12 operations against targets in New Guinea began, and 8·25s \\~re subsequently actl\"C m the Pacific region throughout hostilities. One highlight of the ,\ !Itchell's career followed succcssful trial launching of the 67ft 6in (20.5m)-span bomber from the aircraft carrier t.;SS Hor",'" no mean feat. The I.,th BG then pro\'ided t\\~nty-four 8-25Bs for a carrier-launched attack on japan. Their lower turrets and Norden bombsights were rerTl()\"cd, and additional fUcltankage aUou"Cd 1.I..llgal (5,18- Iitn"li) to be carried,

103

Aboard each aircraft were ten 5gal (19-btre) fuel drums to 'top up' if nel:ded, Each 1l-25B earned four 500lb (228kg) bombs. and tWO had wooden 'scare guns' protruding from the tail. Sixtl.-'Cn prepared B·25Bs were aboard the Homet II hen it sailed for the launch -I-JO miles off japan. Unfortunately small enemy ships were encountered. so to sa\'e the operatlon it began at 0800 on 18 April 1942. 7l..l miles from japan, Leadmg was Lt Col James Doolittle aboard -10-23-1-1, t}l'ically he:l\ily' laden lit 31,0001b (l..l,06Okg), but aU Sixteen .\Inchells were launched \\;thin an hour and bombed from 1.500ft (-160m) wlthOUIIoss, other tllrgets being Kobe, Yokohama and Nagoya, Finding designated landing airfields m China 10 \'er}' bad weather was so difficult that four crews crash-landed, ele\'en baled out and ..lO-22-12 landed at Vladivostok, only 10 be promptly interned. 'Ille B·25C - loaded weight 33,5OO\b (15,200kg) _ could \\ith additional fuel deh\'er 3,200lb (I,-I50kg) of bombs during a 1,525-mJle (2,..l50km) sortie, It had a tOp speed of 26-lmph (..l2-1kmJh) at sea ~~I, and 28-1mph at 15.000ft (-I5KmJh at -I,570m). On shon missions external racks m~3Sed the load to 5.200lb (2.360kg). Production ended m May 19..l3 with the 1,619th example. A new plllnt to build 8-25s opened in Kansas City, where between February 19-12 and March 19..l-l 2,290 B.25Ds, similar to the B-25C, were completed. The 8-25'5 stability renderl'-d it ideal for mediumlevel. strongly esconed formation bombing 10 Europe, where most losses \\"Cre catlsed b}' AA fire. In the Pacific theatre 'solid-nose' adaptations included packages of machme-guns and a hefty 75mm cannon, malang the B-25G and If modds good for low·le\'el stnke. ,\lore Con\'Cntionai bomber 8-25s of the 28th Composite Group operating from the Aleutians raided targets in Japan's Kurile island chain fOr a second time on 10 July 19..l3. At the time of thelokyo raid the other Iwin~ngined US medium bomber, the controversial B-26 Marauder, was available for operations, Oflgmating in a plan for a 2.000-miIe (3,2 19km) range bomber "ith a 20,OOOft (6,IOOm) ceiling and able to fly at 350mph (563kmJh), it had a 56ft (I-m) long fuselage mated to uings of only 65ft (20m) span, gh;ng a 501b ft' (24-1kg,m 1) ",ng loading. "Inat helped to produce a hazardous landmg speed of 130mph (209km/h). The Clrcular-eross_scction fuselage reduced bomb bay' Size, the load being only 2,OOOlb (910kg), Initial defensi\'e armament was again poor, comprising only one O.3Oin (7.62mm) nose gun, a 0.30in tail gun and two 0.50in guns (l2,7mm) in the dorsal ,\ lartin turret. Two 1,850hp Pratt & Whllrle)' R-Z800 Double \':'asp cightccn-erlindcr, two-stage supercharged engmes fined uith eJC(;tor exhausts dro'.e four-bladed propellers.

AIRCRAFT 01' Tilt; Sl':CO:-:O \rORI.D \rAR

THE UO~IIH::R RF.VOLl,;TION

.Hartm's shapd)! 8-26 J\furtlllder provtJ too l'Ullluabk fur Iow-levt/ utlOCk. romlUliom of l:S 9th AIr T'Ora B·16s attodud aIrfields and bridgts in 1M In'tks before Jhe ;",:asl-on ofnorthnn Europt.

The first of 1,100 MllI"auders ordered in September I 939 flew on 25 No\-ember 19-10, rapid production re-

sulting in 200 by mid· I941. Afler taking off loaded at 26,6251b (12,0--kg) the 1)·26 reached 3 I 5mph (507kmJh), bul landing accidents during crew training ....ith the 'very fast ship' r.aiscd calls for cancellation. Production was halted in early 19-12 and resumed in ,\hy, the 8-268-10 introdUCing a larger \\ing, of 71ft (21.6m) span. The 22nd Bombardment Group al Muroc in Cali· fornia introduced the bomber 10 operations with B-26 ami-submnrine palrols. In February 1942 the Group moved to Australia, joining thc 5th AF and resuming operations in April wim ami-shipping sorties and raids on New Guinea. Torpl,:do-bomber Marauders operated during the Battle of "'·lid"'aY but no sinkings were achieved. Although 8-26s were aeti\'e O\'er the south-west Pacific in 1942·19-13. they rcalIy needed Europe's firm. long run"'a)'S. There, the Maraudcr was highly effect:n·e. It operated III large formations at medium altitudes, oflen ca~t-bombing :l.lmclds, well protected b)' shoals of fightCT'S. Argunbly America's best wartime bomber W2S the B-2-1 Libe:rator. Had it nO( been f~ Europc:2n interest it might n~u have procttded, as the USMC "'as firmly c:ommilled to the B-17. Designed III 1939, the four-cn· glned ailU1lft was planned to fly faster and further than the B-17 and carry an 8,OOOlb (3,620kg) l02d. Its highaspect-ratio Da,is wing conferred cxceptionally long

range on 20 aeroplane uith transpon potential. Exhaust turbosupcTChargers boosted its spc:cd and rate of climb. \X11en the XB-N (four 1,200hp Prall & \'(rulner R1830-H) flew on 29 lkcember 1939 it was dca.riy a good pcrfonncr, but was defended by only by six O.30in (7.62mm) guns. Britain ordered the LB-30 \-ariant ....ith a 2,OOO-mile (3,219km) range and 3,OOOlb (1,360kg) bomb load for its maritime reconnaissance potential. In 1940 the British expressed. reseT\'atlOns about the \"Cry poor defences, and the Americans responded with the LB-30A (first flown in January 1941) with tWO tail defence guns, but this was sull unacceptable for European operations. Brilain's first LibcrJIOrs were convcrtcd into transatlantic transports. Thcre was no doubt of the design's potential. lbe XB-24B tested oval cowlings whIch Improved cooling, and the B-24A had twin 0.30in (7.62mm) lail guns and six O.SOin (l2.7mm) guns. 'l11e RAF acquired twent}' LB-30B Liberator Is and fitted them "ith a four 20rnm gun pack. Cruising at ISOkt carrying a 2,OOOIb load, the Liberator I could patrol for 20 amazing sixteen hours. Using the forward firing cannon 2 Liberator shot down a Focke-\X'uIf Fw 200 on 4 October 1941 In an unusual bomber-\"tt'$us-bomber combat. Additional tankage: allowed com'O)'S to be mc:t by Condors 800 miles (1,290km) OUt in the Allanuc. Curiously, the USMC ordered only seven YB-2~s, nine B-24As and only ninc B-24Cs, whereas the British continued to back the Liberator b)' ordering 16S .\ik II

A ,0ml1",ullon ofh,gll-asp«l-rulio rrings and wrbosupndwrgt:J mgin~ gaw umso/ldtJtNs 8-14 lJberator ltmger rrlnze and Nltn all-round pnJormalia than III~ 8-17. TJu- 8-14.\1 tkpicud, /ilu the H and SIl~llDIll..ibnalon,had 'lOse, tatl, dorsal and ventral "'rrtlS,

bomber.> ....ith l\\"O-gun rotating tail tulTCts, a\'atlable from October 19-11. Soon 2ftcr thc Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the US acquil'e'd some of the Bnush order. their \1Ilue over the Pacific being only too ob\ious. The B-2-1 had phenomenal range, ample: speed. fast dimb and fairly good load potential. Vital increased defence came Ulth the B-2-10 (Libc:mtor III), which had tail and forward upper turrets along with waist positions from which O.SOin (12.7mm) guns could be: fired, as in the 8-17. For an II.6-hour ocean parrol the B-240 (of which 2,696 were built) could carry a 3,OOOlb (l,360kg) bomb or depth-charge load, so the US Na\1' as well as the RAF ordered it. The USAAF began operating B-24Ds from Britain in October 1942, but their Stay \\'as ~hortlived. for they moved to North Africa and in 1943 made the famous 10w-Ie\'c1 raid on the Ploesti oilficlds in Romania. Not until summer 19-13 were B-24s again a going concern in the 8th Air Force. In autumn 19-12 a newer Flying Fortress, the B-17F ....ith framelcss PIc:.aglas nose. 400 modifications and additional guns, replaced the B-I-E. h entered producuon In April 1942 and 3,40S were buill. 1111,' l02ded w~ight ",:is 56,OOOIb (25,402kg), and e\1~nlUally the maximum permissible takc:..off weight W:ilS -2.()OOlb (32,659kg). The B-I-Fuith a possible 9,600lb (~,I86kg) bomb load partly carried on external racks bc:ca.me the standard L"SAAF bomber in Europe until the B-17G, featuring a prominent chin turrt't to discourage frontal attaeks (8.680 built), was introduced In 1943. B-I-Fs made the

lOS

first raid on Germany on 27 January 1943. On 17 August their \"Ulnel'llobtlity b«'llome \"err e\idcnt when 60 out of r6 raiding Rc:gensburg and Schweinfurl were shot down. On 2 second Schwemfurt raid enemy fighters shot down 60 OUt of 305 operating. The lesson the RAF had learned In 1939 was being taught to the Americans, who clea.r1y did not heed any warrung. During I'lloids on Germany B-17s c2rned bomb loads of 4,OOO-5,OOOlb (l,SI4-2,268kg),compared "ith the JO,OOOlb (4,S36kg) a\'erage load of the RAFs AHo Lancaster.

Eorly B-/7 Flymg Fortrnses tom' dtfentkd /rom open gml ports, /Ising hand-held r«upons. Th~ B-17G,shOfl:n lint, /uJd IlIIprottd tkfau~ iIK/llding mtclldttica/Iy dritvm mrrrlS.

TilE 1l0~18ER RI:.\'OLt:TIO='" A1RCRAl'T Ot' TUI' SFCOSn ""ORI.O \t'AR

Soon after the B-2-40s returned to Britain in summer 19-43 they were replaced by the B-24H (3.100 built) and B-2-4j (6,778 built). born of which had new. poweroperated m1n O.50in (12.-mm) n~ gun turrets. and better walSI positions. The slab- ided B-2'" ....115 easicr 10 mass produee man me B-17, and a huge r-ord compkx al \X·ilio.... Run churned out B-2-4s al an amazing ronc. 1\\in 0.50in (12.-mm) guns were in the tail turrets of the I 667 B-24Ls and 2.593 of the bghler B-2....\ 1. The B-2-4'was usually faster !.han the B-17. but the 'Hying FonTeSs' was long established and mort' charismatie. l\\"O-!.hirds of !.he US 8m Air Force went 10 war in 8-175; the rest had 8-2"'5. Russia's Bombers Al dawn on 22 Junc 1941 German trOOPS stormed the USSR from the Baltic to !.he Blllck Sea. Junkers ju 885, He I II s and Do 2175 raced in high (0 pul\'erise airfields c1andesnnely reconnoitred by Domiers. and by noon !.he USSR had lost 528 aircran on !.he ground and 210 in !.he air in the Western Districl. German records claim that by mid-afternoon 1,200 Russian :llTcran had succumtx-d. 1lI-lnlined and poorly orgamsed, the So\;el Air Force undoubledl~' suffered a reehng blow and is thought to ha\"t' lost 3.808 aircran \\1thm th'e days.

Sll:QJy iktvlcpment of t/~ A.\'1:42 kd to

for 2,61rkm (1,620 nules). Normally loaded. thc DB-3 weighed -.938kg (I-,SOOlb) (lO,025kg122.IOOlb maximum). and It was defended by three -.3mm (O.3Oin) guns. Early DB-3s h3d a nose lurret, bul by 19-W the DB-3fhad a mon: pomted nose \\ith additioruJl glaz.mg \X'ith a 101' speed of -418km,fh (26Omph) and a range of -4,Onkln (2.500 miles), Its normal bomb load ....1IS 998kg (2.200lb). although it had room for 2....954; (5,500lb). II was used as a lactical or strategic bomber, and Capt Alexandr .\tolodchr of the long-range bomber force. flying a DB-3f, claimed on 7 Augusl 19-41 to be !.hc first So\;el bomber pllol to attack Berlin. 'Inat flight im-ol\'ed 3 round trip of somc 2.000 miles (3,220km). The USSR's great strall-gie advantage was the dep!.h of ils tcrritory, and the Pe-8 (or TO-7). Russia's only four-cngined stralegic bomber, was built well inside the USSR_ With primitive nose, tail and dorsalrurrels. it carried a crew of six, Ihe pilots sitting in tandem. Machine-guns poked from lhe rear of the inner engine nacelles, undcrnea!.h each of which was one r.ldiator for IWO 1.350hp At\t·35A engines. A large aeroplane, It spanned 40m (131 ft 3in), was H.5m long (80ft 6in) and weighed O\"t'T 22 tons when loaded. With a top speed of ·n-kmJh (265mph) II had a range of ....-OOkrn (2.920 miles) when carrymg a 2.000kg (",,",OOlb) load. AI the other cXlTCmc \\1IS a Russian eqw\"3Ient 10 the Stuka. nOI ready when the Gamans im1lded. lIyushlO had dc\ised a tough, slngle-engine ground-attack aIrcrafL It began as the BSh-2. a m"O-SC31 armoured assault aU'CTllft, and effectJ\'eness Increased ....; th modific:ltion mto the famous 11-2. \X'i!.h II \\ingspan of 14.6m (,rft II in) and length of 11.6m (38ft 3in). it weighed S.S56kg (12,2501b) loaded and could carry a 599kg (1,320Ib) bomb load. Much \\"t'ighl \\1IS ascribed to eXlcnsh'e armour protecting thc crew and the engine from ground fire.l\\"O 7.62mm ShKAS machine-guns and tWO 20mm ShVAK cannon were fitted in the ....ings, below which wcre racks for four 25.4kg (56Ib) RS-132 rockcts, Ahemati\·c1y it could ha\'e two 37mm (lAin) or two 57mm (2.24in) wing cannon for tank busting. In the rear cockpil was a 12.7mm (O.Sin) machine-gun or 20mm (0,78in) cannon for ground slnlfing. The top speed \\1IS 426km/h (265mph) and cruising speed around 322km/h (2oomph), achJe\"Cd uSlllg an AM·38F inline engine glv· ing 1,7oohp for take-offand 1,550hp for cruise. Uke thc Stuka, me 11-2 had a range of some 612krn (380 miles). which meant basing il vulnerably close 10 the front Line. Typical of So\ia aiTCTllft of the period \\1IS Vladinur M PetlyakO\"s Pe-l t\loin-cngme light bomber for ground support, medium-level dl\'e bombing and tactical reconnaissance. With a span of 17.1 m (56ft 4in) and thw similar in size to the Douglas DB-7, it appeared to 0V0't some of its origin to the French rotez 63, Of the Cf("\\' of thrtt, the rear gunner was dangerously separaled from the others by a large fucl lank. As well as a dorsal 7.62mm

-:::......

BllIlt 11/ Io~ III/mbcn, Ihe 7iIPOtn.' S8·2 'juSI boil/beT' of lhe

wle 1930s summcd from II" A,\''/:40.

So\'iet military policy recognised twO threats; one from the cast and one from the west, '!1,erefore ils forces were organised to fight independently and simultaneously, the WeSlern and EaSlern Air Forces each e\'en having !.heir own sources of production. HOlh Air Forces comprised four main elements: Air Forces of the Air Armies or 1\ lilimry Districts. Fighter Defence Force defcnding special rear areas, !.hc Long Range Bomber Force or Independenl Strike Force under the Supreme Command, and the Air Force: of the Red Fleets or Na\'ll1 Commands. Prewar control was cntuely mrough •\lilitary Dlsmet5. then dunng the WlIIT each Army

,ire PCllyaklJlV IN, lilt Sot'l~r L'mO/t's O'lly rrortinlc llalt')' bolllM. 106

(.o,u:~w('J befoft lilt tror, but ItOIIll sert.-ice uI/t,1 1941, II~ lfyflS/ulI 11-2 u:as a !JtQt.'lly-armtd and uxl/ an/lOured fight alla£k bomber. PnxillClio" bq:QlI Wilh lltt sillgk-staltr ('('TSIOll ill 194/, Iltt two-stater follOK'illg ill mid-194Z.

Group had its own Air Army, !.here being three main Groups, North, Central and Southern, which much impro\'ed the air forces, Wi!.hin each Air Army were Air Dh'isions comprising three Air Regiments, whose lask was to support the Red Army, The Long Range Bomber Force raised during the war auacked targets well behind the banle hne and Its bombers, with no sophlStlcaled llIght bombmg aids, carried out operations deep inlO hostile lermorl including Poland. Germany and Hungary. As the Gffmans ad\1Inccd eaSlwards the)' o\"erran many of the \l'est~ District factories. Rapid establishment of new producnon sources well 10 the caSI allo-.\'t'd a turnaround In Russia's air force: Strength, and by the end of 19-43 the $o\iet Air Forces were fighting back strongly, Br !.hen aircraft were being known by melr designcr or factor)- name, whereas pm;ously ther merely had classification utks: BB for cl~-range bomber, DB for long-range bomber, SB for fasl bomber and TB for hea\1' bomber; II for lIIyushm, Pc for Petlyako\". Tu for Tupole\' and so forth, preceding bomber dcsign numbers. TIle three-man, Tupolcv designed S8-2 was in usc for much of !.he war. Two 830hp M-loo inline enginl'S were set far forward and its huge wings, spanning lO.33m (66ft 8in), were supplemented by a giant triangular tailplane. It had a 101' speed of aboul 393km/h '244mph) and a limiting range of 1,250km (777 miles). Defended by two nose guns and single dorsal and ventral guns (replaced by turrels) later \'ersions were pow_ ered by m'o 960hp M-103 engines. Owing 10 their vulnerability, SB-2s usually operdled al night. Some were fitted with skis, a special \1Iriam being the Arkhangelskii Ar-2, powered by 1,100hp M-105Rs and Intended for close support and di\"t' bombing. The backbone of the Russian bomber squadrons \\1IS the 19r Ilyushm DB-3 with Iwin I,OOOhp '\\·88 radial engi~, in production by I CJ.W as thc OB·3f or 114. Used also in the Russo-Finnish war, thc DB-3 had a 21.35m (70ft 3in) span, and, \\;th a tOP s~ of about 370km/h (23Omph), could carry a 9O-kg (2,OOOlb) load

107

THE 1l0MIlEIl. REVOLUTION

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECO:-1D \1:·ORI.D WAK

Germally'j OliO' dedicated 10llg-rallge heavy bomber, rhe troublesome Heinkel He 177A, had double aJllpled v'GiI,es drivinG hllge jour-bladed propellers. This caplllred example was 'ested at RIlE Famborougll in 1944.

TIle Jrlpolev 7i1-2 100mph boll/ber ell/ered service il/ lale 1942_

(0.30in) gun, replaced on liner versions by a dorsal turrel, the rear gunner also controlled a \'cntral gun aimed through a periscope. Bombs were carried in small cclls within the fuselage and the rellr nacelles of the I, IOOhp ,"1-105R inline engines. The usual load totalled 598kg (1 ,320lb), but could be increased to 998kg (2,200lb), for there was provision for additional weapons below the \\;ng centre section. Two 7.62mm (0.30in) forward firing guns were usually fittcd in thc nose. The Pe-2 wcighed 5,851kg (I2,900lb) empty and 7,679kg (16,930Ib) loaded. Its low-level top speed was 460km/h (286mph), and me maximum attainable was 537km/h at 4,998m (334mph at 16,400ft). It had a normal range of about 1,126km (700 miles). A longer-range \'ersion carried an additional navigator. Mid-war dcvelopment to" maintain me effectiveness

of the 11-2 resultcd in the 6.350kg (l4,OOOlb) all-up weight 11-10 of 194~. The wing and tail unit were modified, micker armour was installed and engine power rose to 2,000hp with me fitting of an AM-42, boosting the top speed 10 ~55km/h at 2,133m (283mph at 7,OOOft). Range was much enhanced, to about 1,239 (770 miles), for which a I,002kg (2,2 IOlb) wcapon load could be carried. Soviet fascination with rocket weapons was e\'ident under the wings, where me aircraft carried a hefty load. There were twO 23mm cannon in itS mainplanes and a 12.7mm or 20mm free gun in me rear cockpit The pilol had tWO fonvard firing 7.62mm machine-guns. Although its design began in 1938, meTupolevTu-2, of which o\'cr 3,000 were e\'entually built, did not fly until June 19~ 1 and came into use in late 19~3 as a Pe-2 replacement. \'<'im two 1,750hp Ash-82/S3, ils loaded weight was 12,S02kg (28,22~lb) and late examples attained 557km,1h al 5,791 m (348mph at 19,OOOft), Defended by four O.50in guns and a 20mm cannon, it had a span of 2.3m (69ft lOin), reached a ceiling of 1O,972m (36,OOOft) and had a range of 2,49~km carrying 1,497kg (1,550ml carrying 3,300lb), which made it the best Russian bomber of me war. Germany and the heavy bomber Germany's strategic heavy bomber programme originated in May 1933. when the air force supported a study suggesting mat il should acquire sufficient

Tile Petlyakov Pe-l was lhe USSR's pri"cipal wartime /actiw./ bomber.

108

deterrent force to pre\'ent France and I'oland from stopping Gcrmany re-cstablishing itSelf as a greal powcr. A fleet of 400 four-cngined bombers was proposed, to destroy enemy means of production and break civilian morale. The army, opposing this concept, belie\'ed mat it invited retaliation, and pointed out that German industry lackcd thc capacity to build such aircraft. The Lufm'affe's first chief of staff, Oberst \,\Ialter Wever, fa\'oured a broader based strategy in which the air force complemented the army and na\1' and did not operate independently. Although Wever expressed the \;ew that 'me decisive weapon of air warfare is the bomber', he pointed out that a strategic bomber fleet could not destroy an enemy air force. He contended mat Germany needed ample fighters and AA guns for defence and the prO\;sion of air superiority for the army and navy. While the destruction of cnemy industry might be sound policy, it could take a very long time. Ne\'ertheless, he agreed mat it made sense to ha\'e a fleet of long-range bombers. The four-engine Domier Do 19 and Junkers Ju S9 were sleadily going ahead when, in June 1936, the farsighted Wever was killed in an accidcnt. His successor was Gen Albert Kesselring, a military leader rdther man a strategist, who questioned me hea\1' bomber plan. Cancellation of bom large bombers came about because design and production of engines to provide me required performance was beyond achie\'cment wimin me necessary timescale. The Luftwaffe then pursued me 1936 short-rangc medium bomber programme because its aircraft were suitable for the likely restricted sphere of operations cO\'ering Czechoslovakia, France and Poland. Ernst Udet began parading his belief that, because di\'e bombing gave me most accurate results, all bombers should have that capability. NC\'ertheless, a firm decision was taken in 1937 10

build a long-range bomber able to reach as far as all parts of the UK from Germany. The Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLI"l) drafted a specification that was sent only to Heinkel. Naval backing was gh'en on me understanding that the aircraft would be used to co-operate wim V-boat activity. It needed to carry 907kg (2,000Ib) for 6,600km (4,100 miles) at a speed of 539km/h (335mph). Aided by Daimler-Benz, Hcinkcl offered a no\'el four-engine bomber made possible by coupling tWO twel\'c-cylinder liquid-cooled DB 60 I engines to make a duplex DB 606 driving one propeller mrough elaborate gearing. Having only two nacelles would CUI drag and sa\'e developmenl cost and time. Large radiators would ob\'iously be needed. Fuel consumption could be high, and there was no doubting the overall complexity. Guns in barbcttes would have reduced drag, but turrets proved easier to develop. The undercarriage geometry was unusual, bom pairs of legs parting, one to retract inwards and one outwards before being covered by doors, Heinkel's He 177 bomber seemed likely to ha\'e an all-up weight of 26,998kg (59,520Ib) and to be able to reach 550km/h at 5,486m (342mph at 18,000ft). Design work was well under way when Heinkel was lold to apply Udet's dh'e-bomber policy 10 the Hc 177. The 31.39m (103ft) span bomber would need to dive at up to 60°, which meant restressing, adding much useless weight and delaying the project by more mat a year. The first flight took place on 19 November 1939. Future war, it was reckoned, would be toral, thereby making me destruction of industry, cities and the morale of their people legitimate objectives. If new bombers became unstoppable and werc the hearl of air power, then the means to retaliate were essential. l\'lany Luftwaffe officers wrongly belie\'ed mat the Do 17 and He III were quite suitablc for strategic operations, but neither had sufficient range to rcach any part of Britain from

109

AIRCRAt'T 01: 'IIII'

SF.CO~")

\\'ORI_D I.t'AR

TIII- 1l0:\IBFR RI-\"OLL·TIO:-':

engmes \ibraled badly, ron at \try high temperatures, O\'tthcated quiCkly and readily caughl fire, Connecting rods \\"CfC breakmg, learing open 011 tanks. Tightly pack· aged engine partS reech·ed insufticient lubricauon, and \\"Ith no fire.....alls betw«n the powerplant bays and the mainplane. fires spread easily. Tail surfaces had insuftidcnt area, and the second prototype disintegrated O\\ing to control flutter. Early u-ials showed th:1I a loaded lie 177, carrying a mere lhree guns, wcighed 2J,920kg (52,7Hlb), had a tOP speed of only 460kmIh (286mph) and a 4,855km (3,017-milc) range. By comparison, the 1940 Fw 200c-{) bomber now had three 7.9mm guns, and the Fw 200c-l also featured a forward-firing MG FF 20mm cannon 10 a gondola. A 250kg (5501b) bomb ....--as carried beneath each outer engine nacelle and another on an outboard rack; four m aU. Before 1940 was out Winston Churchill ....'3S calhng the Condor ·the scourge of the Atlantic', yet only twenty-six Fw 200cs had been built, and on a\"Crage only eight were sernce:able, Between August 1940 and February 1941 they were credited with sinking eighty-five ships totalling 363,000 tons (368.800 tonnes), making them an exceptionally successful invcstment. "Inc same could not be said of the I-Ie 177 Greif (Gnffon). Each troubk'SOme example became hea\ier, and the sixth prototype reached 28,070kg (61,8831b), gmng it a \·ery high \\ing loading of 280kglm ' (57A91b ft'). For take-off the D8 606A-l could prO\·lde 2,-OOhp. but the engines g3\"C ron tant trouble. Atrf'rame, equipment, combamng fires In the air, aerodynamic problems, worries about structural su-ength and rt:~led modtficaDons - not to mention roping ....ith all the ingcnuit}· - resulted in a disasU'OUs programme. T .....o prototypes planted among the Condors for trials in late 1941 were immedialely' pronounced useless. NOl until November 19~ I did the firSI He 177A-{) pre-production airct"Jft fly. With a crew of fj\"C~ and an all-up weight of 30,OOOkg (66,139Ib), it relied for defence upon fi\'e machine-guns and a cannon. its offensive load was a mere 2,340kg (5.290lb). Had the Germans kno.....n. the)' might have deri\·ed shghl comfort from problems bcsetung RAF 'big bombers'. The A\TQ Manchester's RolIs.RO)·cc Vulture engines suffered overheating and crankshaft troubles, ....hile the Short SUrhng's engines peaked so low thai itS cetlmg .....as around 13,OOOfI (3.962m), But .....hereas the Germans had no hca\1' bomber m prospect, the RAF was looking for.....ard to rccei\ing the superb A\TO LanClisler, which inherIted the spacIous bomb hay of the Manchester, the .....orld·s firSl bomber conceived as a weapons system. 'Inis newcomer, with room for 12,OOOlb (5,440kg) of bombs, could convey much of that weight deep into Germany, and regularl}' deliver to Berlin's factories and offices around 9,0001b at 20,oooft

Germany. In the e\·enl of war, basn In Fronce and Ihc Low Counu-ies would need to be SC"ize..t to achie\"C thai, unless II long-range bomber ....-as a\-ailable Chief of SI:df Kesselring was replaced by Hans jeschonnek, who, drh·en by me behef th:u Hitler could do no wrong, staunchly followed hiS leader's ideas, proposing aIr force policies that were economically impossible and whIch ga\'c little support to a 10ng-l1lnge OOmbcr. By 1939We\"Cr's carefully conceived plans had become submerged in daily reaction to tlle existing situ" ation, making a coherent slTIltegic bombing policy impossible to implement. Tbe Luftwaffe was \irtually sidelined into supporting a ground .....ar, and be-came increasingly ued 10 the army. Experience in Spain had sho.....n ho\\ h3.rd it was to flOd a target, let aIo~ hit iL At mghl that .....o uld be exceedingly difficult. so research was Instigated to develop radio bombing aids 10 support the '-Ie 177 force .....hen it became effcctl\"C. In August 1939 Hermann GOnng claimed 10 place great importance on the I-Ie 1-- and the new high-speed Mcsscrschmitt Me 210 multi-purpose types. Then he ordered thai concentration be directed upon producing existing types, not on entirely new designs and experimentation, a policy linle changed until 1942. Future bombers became steady imprO\'emems of the Do 17 (the Do 217) and the ju 88 au 188). Only Heinkel would de\·e1op a major new type: while it kept the He III in production until 1944. A low-powered, limited-performance: four-engme Fock.e-\'\'ulf Fw 200 Condor I'e'COnrullssance bomber adapted from a transatlantic airlim.:r design and ordered by the japanese was neanng completion. Could II strengthened, BMW 132H-po.....ered \'e"ion be adapted to become an interim long-range bomber, at least to satisfy the na\'y? From a prcw:u balch of ten Fw 200c-Os (modified Fw 200Bs) ix .....ere compleled with defensh'e guns early in 1940, and soon the Fw 2005 of I./KG 40 commenced bombing shipping during the Norwegian campaign, By july 1940 thc Condors wcre based at Bordeaux/h\erignac, from where they carried OUt anti-shipping operotions o\'er Biscay', and off Ireland and Norway. They' also made a few bombing sorties o\'er the UK in late August 19~0, becoming the first fourengine Lufm"lltre bombers 10 roid Britain, but .....ere quite unsuitable for emplO)·mcnt as strategiC bombers. Againsl undefended merchant ships, though, Condors had success far beyond that Implied by therr smaU numbn's, and during Augusl and September 1940 sank O\"Cr 90,000 tons (91,500 tonncs) of Allied shIpping. On 26 October a Condor scion fire the 42,378-lOn (43,000-lonne) Canadian Pacific Empress of Bnwm northwest of Ireland, lhe burning liner being subsequently torpedoed by the U-32, Could lhe He 177 soon playa similar part? 'Inc answer .....as a resounding 'no', for its complex

110

Bnldi,,'s s€Co"d-golnOwm bomhnJ, EM HaJif;Jx, Sor/ltlK and .Hat/chat", r..~ tk.Jign~J to tJuonlmodau 1,(}()()Jb bombs rrhu:h tile Hampdnr mu/J also cuny. H~ a Mand~st" is aholll 10 rt'Ult"t' its 1,OOO-potmJa.

TlI~ AI~I/chcs/l!r's huge bomb bay, abk to colltam bombs /o.rger Ihall l,OOO-pmmders,jormeJ Ihe IIUCleUS of ils jour-mgil/ed derft'allw, the umcosur, all aircraft of No 6/9 SqIUu/ro'l tNillg sec" here.

111

TilE HO.\llllcR REVOI.t;TIOX

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND \l:'ORLD WAR

Bremen lmder RAP lIight auack, photographed 011 213 JIIly J 942 from a IJJ"caster of No 97 Sqllallr011. Aircrafl moveme1l/, drijtillg flares a"d markers, alld Ille seats offires all comribme /0 tile Iwrrijic beauly of rhis picture.

011 16/17 SepumM 1942 369 (Tnos claimed 10 have made a highly effeClive raid on Esse". Among them wert tlwse aboard Ihe 1\'0 97 Sqlladroll LlUu:mler, Olle of 93 involved, from which Ihis Ilighl photograph was sewred. More tllall /00 large fires tt'\'re started.

at 200mph (3,630kg at 6,IOOm at 320kmJh). No other mid-war bomber could equal that. As Britain's champion bomber prepared for its 1942 operational debut, the first production He- I 77A-I s also appeared, with a lOp speed of 510km/h at 5,800m (317mph at 19,030ft) and the ability 10 cruise at 430km/h (270mph), provided there was no engine fire. Some improvement was expected from mating rwo DB 605s 10 produce the DB 610, forecasl to provide 2,950hp for take-off and O\'er 3,loohp above 7,000ft. That was largcly hypothetical, the He I77A-3 settling for the DB 606, a successiol1 of modifications, differing guns and various weapon loads, with linle prospect of successful bomber or maritime operations. Meanwhile, the Condors of I.IKG -10 mm'ed to Norway, benl on moniroring and attacking Russian-bound COI1\·oys. 'X/hen the full extent of the Stalingrad debacle became apparent, the Germans began ferrying trOOPS OUt of their encirclement. So desperate did they become that He 177s participated, fi\'e being variously lost during such activity between November 1942 and 2 February 19-13, along with nine Fw 2oos, 169 Hc Ills and a Ju 290 transport derh'ed from the ill-fated 1u 89. February 1943 saw deli\'ery of the first He 177A-5, the most effective of its breed. Whereas Germany still had no stTategic force, RAF Bomber Command could, on I March 1943, call upon 330 LancasteT5, 237 Wellinglons, 214 Halifaxes, 147 Stirlings and 74 r-,'\osquilocs in its squadrons. Of the lauer, rwenty-two

The best-kllown RAP special auack of the war breached the JHoime Dalll.lrilter (;all be seer, poI/ring rhrollgh the wall in rhis piclllre, Iakerlfrom a Spitfire PR.Xl. w~re

Oboe pathfinders which, within a week, were to mark the Krupp works at Essen so accurately in darkness that il was de\'aslated. Even by the end of 1943 only 261

112

He I 77A-5s had been built, primarily for anti-shipping operations. That left the Ju 88, Ju 188 and updates of the Do 217 to continue sparse bombing of the British Is[es while awaiting New Year's Eve, when Operation Capricorn, a combined VI flying bomb, V2 rocket and bomber onslaught, would burst upon London with teutonic ferocilY. InSlead, the V-weapons were, like the bombers, not ready. ,[l1e DB 610A-I-engined He 177A-5 had a sen1ce ceiling of 8,ooOm (26,250ft) and a tOP speed of -I88km/h at 6,IOOm (303mph at 20,OOOft), where it cruised at 415km/h (258mph), Its range was 5,-1S0km (3,-100 miles) at a starting all-up weight of 25,8-10kg (59,970Ib), the maximum overload permitted being 3 t ,OOOkg (68,340Ib). Its 31.39m (I 03fl) wingspan was close to the Lancaster's 102ft (31.08m), and its length a similar 19.-1m (67ft). In November 1943 twenty He 177s of II./KG -10 carrying Hs 293 glider bombs attacked a Biscay con\'OY in daylight, sinking a ship and losing three of their number. Of another fourteen attacking shipping five days later, four were shot down and three crash-landed. On 21 January 19-1-1 some thirty A-3s and A-5s drawn from l.IKG -10 and I.IKG 100 based al Chaleaudun and Rheine took part in the postponed 'Baby Blitz' on London. This was hardly successful, KG 100 alone losing six aircraft between 21 January and 2 ,'larch, four of them to nightfighters. 'll1e He 177A-3s fielded were hardly gHuering performers. Operating at 30,84-1kg (68,OOOlb), 32,SS6kg (72,500lb) o\'erloaded, they proportionately carried \'ery small loads, some bringing to London only tweh'e 250kg (550Ib) bombs. Tbe average load for a S85km (550mile) flight could 100ai 7,690kg (16,950Ib), which could comprise two I,SOOkg (3,968Ib) and two I,OOOkg (2,200Ib) bombs internally and twO external I,OOOkg bombs. The first He 177A-3 shot down in Brilain had carried an II,OOOlb load, and sel OUt for a 6-15km (-100mile) flight carrying -I,2-15kg (9,360Ib) of fuel. The average top speed for the aircraft being employed was around 450km/h at 3,960m (2S0mph at 13,000fl). For defence there were fi\'c ,\IG I3ls, an MG SI and a 20mm lvlG lSI in the tail, where lack of power traverse limited its usefulness, The DB 610 in the He 177 A-5 was now gh'ing 2,580hp for take-off, 2,-I68hp al 5,791 m (l9,000ft). [t was possible to shut down one of its DB 605s, which usually led 10 trouble, as the remaining power unit tended to overheal. The He 177s continued operating into March, suffering from auacks by Mosquito nightfighters, day strafers and more from mechanical malaise. Tht')' withdrew from operations that month, as the Allies massed in southern England for the D-Day assaull. How useful 400 effective 'heades' would ha\'e then been, for they could ha\'e incinerated the gliders, knocked OUt loading

ports, battered troop concentnltions and might ha\'e preventt'd the im'asion. InSlead, a few He 177s played a minimal part during the nights following the Normandy landings by att:lcking Allied shipping in Caen Bay with advanced weapons. But the He I 77's engine problems were never completcly cured, merely adjusted, Four conventional engines were later fitted to the He 277, the wings of which weTC extended to 39.9501 (131fl 3in) 10 imprO\'e the range, A high.altirude version, the lie 27-1 (four DB 603A), wingspan -I4.19m (145ft), carried an ~,OO6kg (8,832Ib) bomb load. Its all-up weight was 36,010kg (79,388Ib), ils range -I,2-18krn at 11,000m (2,640 miles at 36,100ft) and the top speed was 579km/h at 10,990m (360mph at 36,060ft). Howe\"Cr, these were only experimenlal \'ersions flown too late to be of any value. On 3 July 19-1-1 Germany's com'cnlional bomber programme was largely halted in order to concentrate resources on fighler production and a handful of advanced types, particularly jets. But that same month the ill-fated He 177 found some 'elcventh hour' success. With about ninety aircraft on hand, three Gruppell of KG 1 lIew the Grief againsl Russian tactical targets while dwindling fuel slocks lasted. This single unil's strength was by a significant margin the most powerful Luftwaffe striking force on the Eastern Front. Operations were mainly successful. with little sign of the engine fires that had so plagued the type pre\·iously. They culminated in a series of daylighl formation bombing raids by eighty-plus He 177s to demonstrate what might have been. Japan's bombers [n common with other types, Japanese Air Force bombers had a chronological 'Ki' number, and when orders were placed the aircraft were gi\'en a manufacrurer's name, a type number indicating the year in the Japanese calendar in \\'hich production began, a function and model or mark number. Up to 1939 th~ Iype numb<'r used the laSI two digits of the year, Le. '99' came from 2599 and 19-10 was denoted by 100, after which 1941 and 19-12 used Type I and Type 2. Na\1' systems were more complex, and three sryles \\'ere used. An experiment:ll number was replaced by a type number followed by year, function and model identity figures. After mid-19-13 the type number was replaced b)' a name. The Navy model number had tWO figures, one for the airframc and onc for the engine. An ageing Army design frequently updated was the Kawasaki Ki--I8 (Army Type 99), codenamed 'Lily' by the Allies. Carrying a crew of four, it had IWO 1,000hp Ha 25 engines. Close in size 10 a Blenheim, it weighed -I,050kg (g,930Ib) empty and 6,085kg (13,417Ib) loaded and was quile agile. Its bomb load was only 299kg (6601b), and the lOp speed of -I79km/h (298mph) was hnked with a 2.398km (1,-I90-mile) maximum range for

113

I\tKCKI\!"1

OF THe SECOND WORLD \1:'I\R

TilE 1l0MIll:R REVOLUTION

"Inc Ki-21-11 had 1,400hp engines, more armament, and in llb form a 12.7mm (0.50in) gun in a dorsal lurret. Extra power gave a top speed of 478km,1h (297mph) at 3,999m (13,120ft) and carrying a maximum load the aircraft had a range of 2.t72km (1,350 miles) when cruising at 283krn/h (I 76mph). Production ended in September 1944, nearly 2,000 Ki-2is having been built within eight years. On 2~ May 1945 ninc Ki· 21 s wcre dispatched in a speclacular ancmpl 10 disrupt 8-29 activities on Okinawa. Sevcn reached the island but six were shol down. I('a\'ing one to land trOOps who destroy("d seven 8-29s and much ammunition and fucl in a courageous but futile suicide attack. japan's heaviest land attack bomber, based on operational experience gained in China, was the navy's Mitsubishi G41\ II Type I R ikko, known 10 the Allies as 'Betty' and possessing exceptional rangc of trans-Pacific proportions. As with other japanese bombers, this was gained Ilt the expense of defensi\'e armament, which made it highly vulnerable if unescorted, especially so because the 5,OOO-liU"e (1, lOOgal) wing tanks were unprotected. Design work started in 1937. the japanese by then relying upon their indigenous aircraft industry. "Ine navy required a bomber with a 3,701km (2,300-mile) range when carrying a torpedo or a 798kg (1,760Ib) bomb load. "Inat meant a light airframe. and the G4t.'11 had two Mitsubishi Kasei 1,530hp 14-cylinder radial engines. With a tOP speed of 428km/h at 4,200m (266mph at 13,780ft), and cruising at 315km/h at 2,999m (196mph at 9,840ft), the se\'en-man G4M1, defended by four hand-held 7.7mm guns and a 20mm roil cannon, became operational in May 1941. Carrying a 998kg (2,200lb) bomb load or an 8071:g (1,760Ib) torpedo, it weighed 6,758kg (i4,900lb) emply and 9,5OOkg (20,94~lb) loaded. Of the 180 dellwred by December 1941, the navy held 120 rcady to bomb Malaya, the Philippines and Dutch East Indies. From Formosa on 8 December lile)' very effectively struck at Clark Field. When the battleships HMS Prince of \lyles and Rep'lise were disco\"Cred, twenty-seven 'Bcnys' based in Indochina were ordered to make the fateful torpedo attack.

Ktrl.I'CJSaki produced lhe Ki-48 'Lily' recollllaiuallet bomba. MandlUrian border operations. \'(fidely employed as a light bomber, (he Ki-48 readily fell to fighlers if unescorted, its only protection being four 7.7mm (0.30in) or 12.7mm (0.50in) free guns. Like the Hampden and the Bf 110, the Ki-48 had a slender, cut-away, drag reducing fuselage to impro\"e the gunner's \'iew. Between july 1940 and 1942 550 Ki-48s were built. -Inc Modcl 20. followed, with 1,130hp I-Ia 115 radial engines increasing the top speed to 315mph while the bomb load remained only 453kg (t,OOOlb). Another 1,450 examples were buill before production ceased in late 1944. \Xlhen war began the Army made much use of the Mitsubishi Ki-21 Type 97 'Sally' although it was obsolescent. Schemed in 1936 and operated between 1937 and 1945, this long-range four-seat bomber was also intended for use o\"er the Russo-Manchurian border region. Carrying a 748kg (1,650lb) load and cruising IH 306km/h (19Omph), it had a top speed of 402km/h (250mph) at 3,048m (IO,OOOft) and was powered by two 14-qlinder two-row engines. The armament of three 7.7mm (0.30in) guns,one each in the nose, \'entral and dorsal positions, was later increased when a remote tail-eone gun was installed. Production of the Ki-21-1 began in 1938. Spanning 22m (72ft lOin) and 116m (52ft 6in) long, it had a top speed of 433km,1h (269mph). In December 1941 Ki-2ls bombed Hong Kong, Burma and Ihe Philippines.

Mitsllbishi's Ki·21 'Sally' was rapidly olltcUuSCli during Ihe

The Mitsubishi G4M, codcnamed 'Belly' by the Allies, served throughout the coll/liet.

Far BasI uoar. 114

lis speed and range allowed the Ki-67 to anack US bases on the ,\ larianas :md Okinawa, carrying a 798kg (I,760lb) bomb load. \,(Iith a top speed of 537.5kmjh at 5,815m (334mph at 19.080ft) it stood a reasonable chance of e\'ading fighters. Cruising at 399km/h (2~8mph), it possessed a normal range of 2,8ookm (1.740 miles) and a sen'ice ceiling of9,470m (31,070ft), and was clearly the type of bomber japan should have developed sooner. 1/ late elltry i/1/o hallie alias 'Peggy'.

r~'as

The Unarmed Bomber lne concept was simple. A bomber would fly much faster if shorn of defcnsive guns, gunners and the structure and fuel conveying them. Ovcrall it would be safer, and operationally far more efficient. \'(fhether it was multi-pislon or even jel-engined, the hypothesis still made sense. Expenditure would be less and tactical flexibility greater, but getting such ideas accepted was very difficult, especially in 1938, for the RAFs Blenheim was faster than opposing fighters, though they were only biplanes. De Havilland, which in the First World War had produced the D.H.9 bomber, faster than existing fighters, was planning anotller, to reach 4oomph. Within three weeks of its D.H.88 Comet racer winning the speed prize in thc 1934 Mildenhall to l"lclbourne McRobcnson Air Race, de Havilland had applied its clean aerodynamics !O the four-engine D.H.91 Albatross airliner. \'\lith war clouds gatllering. the company pointed out that the Albatross could convey a 6.000lb (2,721 kg) load !O Berlin in a non-stop return flight. \'I;fhen Specification P: 13/36, outlining a twin-engined bomber, arrh·ed at Hatfield in August 1936 It aroused interesl. Could the woodcn D.H.91 be adapled? Turrets, bombs and torpedoes were all required for this 275mph (443km1h) bomber able 10 tnlnsport 4,500lb for 3,000 miles (2,040kg for 4,830km). De Ha\'illand proposed a twin-Merlin wooden bomber in which speed was paramount, but this idea from a compan}' inexperienced in bomber design was dismissed by the Air Ministry. In the first week of war de Havilland again approached the ministry, presenting ideas for a small, two-man, unarmed bomber. Sceptical oflkials requested morc details, so the company reminded tllem that Berlin was two hours away! Estimatcs were carefully studied and different engine installations considered, with the Merlin always best. A turret and gunner added 9151b (415kg), clipping a dial 20mph (32km,1h) off the speed. Keeping the aircraft small was likely to give a tOP speed of 409mph (654km/h), and by NO\'ember 1939 work was concentrated on a 54ft-span twin Merlin-engined bomber to carry a l,ooOlb (453.6kg) load for 1,500 miles (2,414km) at a speed approaching 400mph (644km1h). Although its surface area was twice that of the Spitfire, it would ha\'e twice the power. A very

Ihe J\1iullbisJti Ki-67 H,ryu,

Subsequently G~M Is operated O\'er lile Marianas, the M:ushall Islands, New Guinea and the Solomons, and sank the USS umgley during a very successful but costly phase of the war. "Inc G4M2, \\ith laminar-flow wing and Kasei 21 engines with methanol injection, carried 330gal more in a protected tank in the fuselage. It first new in November 1942. "1l1e prominent flank obscn'3tion blisters had been replaced, and additional nose glazing and a dorsal turrel with a 20mm cannon were added, along with two morc 7.7mm (0.30in) guns. The weight of the 24.9m (81ft 8in) span, 19.5m (64ft Sin) long aircraft rose considerably to 7.994kg (17,624Ib) empty and 12,500kg (27,557Ib) loaded. In 1943,660 were built. An improved version, the G4M3, appeared in May 19~4, powered by 1,850hp Kasei 25s which gaw It a tOP speed of 438km/h at 4,599m (272mph at 15,09Oft) and an enhanced range of 3,640km (2,260 miles) when cruising at 315km/h (196mph). A revised wing layout, along with crew and fuel-tank protection, turned the 'Betty' into a short-range maritime patrol bomber. In all 2,479 were built. The finest japanese bomber was the late-war M.itsubishi Ki-67 Hiryu. 'Peggy', a 1941 army design introduced to operations in October 1944 as a torpedo bomber and Ki-21 replacement. Here at last was a japanese bomber with good defence 10 revitalise, potentiall}', an oUlclassed force to tack.1e US Navy units. "Ine slim, clean form, carrying a crew of six or eight and defended by four 12.7mm (0.50in) and one 20mm guns, incorporated Western ideas mixing combat needs and Cfl'W safety. The prototype Ki-67 flew in December 1942, with tWO 18-c}'linder, two-row, two-speed supercharged, fan-cooled Mitsubishi Ha-I04 radials deliver· mg 2,OOOhp for take-off. Easy to build and maintain, the Ki-67, with a wing span of 22.5m (73ft 9r.in) and a length of 19m (621fl4in), was progressing well. Then the Services asked for more and more modifications, to such an extent that production was seriously retarded. Only 251 were delivered in 1944, yet the Ki-67 was then one of the few bombers japan could depend upon. B)' this time B-29 raids wcre badly damaging japan's aircrdft factories. 115

AIRCRAPT 01' TilE

SECO~j)

TilE 1l0MllER REVOLL:TION

\\:'ORI.D \'('AR

,

C'l(Jrm
smoOlh, aerodynamically refined wooden structure and dueted radiators would further compensate for size, making il :It least 20mph faster than the Spitfire. The Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, said on 12 December 1939 that he had 'no usc' for the unarmed oombcr, bUI thai the newcomer showed promise for high-altitude reconnaissance. E\'enrually, after strong arguments put forward by Sir \,\Iilfrid Freeman, the Air Member for Research, De\'clopment and Production, an order for fift)' such aircraft was agreed, giving dc I-Ill\'ilIand a fOOl in the door, Design wem ahead on II wooden photographic-reconnaissance (PR) machine weighing about 17,OOOlb (7,7IOkg) and ha\;ng a top speed of 397mph 11.1 23,700ft (639km,1h at 7,220m), On I March 1940 II conrraci for fift}' D.H.98 reconnaissance aircraft for the RAF was confirmed. On 25 NO\'ember 1940 the prototype (W4050) made its maiden flight, almost immediately confirming performance estimates. By February 1941 It had flown at 386mph (620kmih) - 20mph (32km,1h) faster than the currenl mark of Spi[fi~. Official trials at Bascombe Down confirmed the high performance, luckily before the tailwhcel jammed on a rough surface and the Mosquito's fuselage fraetu~d. De Ha\illand brought along a rt'placement unit from the PR prototype,

W4051, and carpentcrs armed with saws, glue and skill demonstrated the ease of repair. By Ma)' 1941 the 16.000Ib (7,257kg) prototype had reached 392mph at 22.oooft (631kmjh at 6,706m). making It faster than any existing fighter. An order for bombers followed, and a contraci amendment now called for ten PR/Bomber COO\"Ctsion T)'Pe equinl[ent to !.he later ,\Ik IV. On 15 No\'embcr \'\'4064 became !.he first Mosquilo bomber to join the RAE The true bomber prototype was \'\14057, the 1\·10squito B Mk V. Bomb-bay measurements showed that double the load could be carried if telescopic fins could be filled 10 bombs. Instead, their tails were shortened so that the bomber could carry four 500lb (227kg) high-cxplosive (liE) bombs. With emphasis on high ft}ing for prolection, the next stage in Mosquito development came when \'\'4050 was grounded in October 1941 for finnent of l\\'o-stage supercharged Merlin 61 S. Not until 31 ,\ lay 1942 did the bomber coO\~ion go into action, as a PR aircraft fl);ng high to assess the effecll\'cncss of the prevIous mght's "f1lousand Bomber' raid on Cologne. The sixth flight that day was undertaken by Sqn Ldr Channcr, who, for safety and 10 try for bener photographS, decided to ftyW'4069 \"C'ry low to escape radar and fighlCfS, He thereby initiated a tactic now

116

standard in the RAE In September 1942 came a headline-grabbing 100v-lc\'e! atlack on the Gestapo HQ in Oslo. Four bomhcri. in Channer style. ftew low across the North Sea to a\'oid radar detection, So 10\\' did they attack that some bombs went through the front \\indows of the buildmg and OUI through the back. One bounced on a table at which a clerk was working, Further proof of the Mosquilo's bite came on 30 January 1943, whcn NazI leaders broadcastmg spe«hes 10 Berlm were t\\ice rudely interrupted. Bet\\~n February and M.IlY 1943 Nos 105 and 139 Squ.lldrons, holding up to thirty-t\\·o aircraft bet\\-cen them, dclh-ered highly spectacular and accur.illte combined low-level and shallow-dh"C' anacks culminating in calls on Zeiss Optics at Jena and the nearby Schou glassworks dttp in German}'. A Bomber Command sun'C}' showed that losses dur109 day raIds Inched 3bout aght per cent. Dog-legged tracks w"C're oflen flown, confusing defenders 3S to the wgeL Crew'S reckoned they had a th'e mph ad\-anrage O\'er the Fw I90A fighter. Bm\~n 31 May 1942 and 31 ,\\ay 1943 726 day sorties were flown for a loss of fony. eight aircraft. A third squadron, No 109. was using Mk IYs fined with special blind bombing radio equiprrn::nt codenamed 'Oboe' which entailed a 'cat' station measur109 an a.ircraft's range and directing its track. A 'mouse' stallon sIgnalled 10 the crew the precise moment for bomb relea~. On 20 December 1942 No 109 Squadron conducted an Oboe trial operation, relying upon the operawrs to give instructions as to when to release bombs on Luuerade power station in the Netherlands. Alongside was a cemelery, and when German radiO announced thai bombs had fallen upon it, the RAF knew that Oboe was accurate enough to revolutionise night bombing accuracy. From March 1943. Oboe '\,Iosquitoes led Bomber Command in raids up to a radius of 278 miles (447km), bcyond which it was impracticable - so far. Summer 1942 brought a new high.f1ying Mosquito with a 2 psi (0.14kg/cm') prcssurised cabin, Spcciall)' modified, the oombcr prototype was first flown on 8 AugUSt 1942. A week laler it was carrying guns and rt'ady to tackle hlgh-ftying Junkers Ju 86R nUisance raiders. Weighing 22,350lb loaded, this was the hea\'iest Mosquito yet. The two-stage supercharged Merlin Mosquito was produced as the Mk IX, the firsl oomber fiying in March 1943. Within \\"C'eks a Mk IX carr~ing a 500lb (227kg) oomb below each wing was tested. The 23,OOOlb (10.433kg) \\"C'ight at which il was flying confirmed that a Mosquito could lift a 4,OOOlb (l.815k.g) oomb load; a single 'cookie' if then: was room in the bomb bay. Mosquito copacity was explored, and a 4,OOOIb 'cookie' was fined 10 the swollen bomb bay of Mk IV DZ59~, which first ftew in July 1943, A lot of'refining' followed,

Specially SlIptrcllargrd Rolls-Royce Merlim and a pres· SlImed (ablll tmllallud Ihl' J\losquito XVI's 11Igh-altlllldl' ptrformollu.

and on 9 October 1943 the decision was taken to modify more Mk. I\'s rather than interfere with Mk IX production. The first operational 4,DOD-pounders \\"C're dropped on Dusseldorfby ,\tk IVs on 23 February 1944. 'Ine first production B Mk XVI prcssure-
""

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND \'('ORI.D

\'(',0.1{

THE 1l0.\I11ER RE\'OJ.UTIO:-O

which compared favourably With that for the :\ lerlin 66-powered North American )'·51 Muslang, which, on lests al Bascombe Down, reaehed 430mph at 22,OOOft (688km/h al 6,600m), afler which ilS performance fell awa)'. Even German Jets had a tough task 10 calch 'Massies'. Dc Ha\,nand had the polential answer; a .iel~ngined MosqUllo. Did !he MosquilO Ih'e up 10 the fortt3sts? Many factors influence comparisons \\;th other Bomber Command aircraft, but total soruelo\-erall loss relauonships sho\\': Surlmg 18,440.3.81 per cent. Blenheim 12,2IJ 3.62 per cent, LancaSler 156,19212.13 per cent. and Mosquito (all versions including 100 Group fighlers) 39,-95;0.63 per Cl:Ilt, suggesting that de Ha\iIland was righl to push its idea. Amazingly, this small aeroplane dropped 8,386 huge 4,OOOlb (1,815kg) bombs. On 20121 February 1945, and on the folloo;ng thirty-five consecuti\~ nighlS, MosquilQC:S bombed Bertin, uffering a 0.58 per cent loss rate. During 1945 3,988 night sorties were dispalched 10 the capital for a loss of fourteen aircraft, a rale of 0.99 per cenL The largest number auadang in one flight was 139 on 21/22 March. Of those, t\\,enty made two calls in the one night. Yes, the 1\ losquitO was unique.

The kamikazes Volunteering for any wartime mission might result m death; becoming a japanc.-se kamikaze, lcikusui or suicide pilot made II virtuall)' certain. On 26july 19~ twO Aiehi D3AI 'Val' di\·e·bombers approached the British EaSI Indies Fleet al 8.000ft (2,400m), their purpose uncc:r· lain. Although HMS Amur deslroyed one, the other, hit b}' fire from }-IMS S,UWC, bounced on to the ship, caus· ing little damage. A third 'Val' then crashed on to, and se· riously damaged, the mmeswttper- H,\ IS I bla1, which had to be sunk b}' gunfire. It is bclie\'ed that these were the first kamibze attacks. following a suggestion in May 19.J..1 to pack obsolc$cent aircraft ";th bombs, explosi\"es and specially fused additional fuel, and to ask for \"Olunteer palOts of the Speci.:lI All" Corps to ram them inlo AllJed wanhlps. During a special <:eremony celebrating their flight 10 final glory. the first kamikaze pilots WOtt white robes. l...atcr, many settled for a white scarf, the' traditional srm· bol. Their chosen ctle of kamikaze, or 'di\ine ";nd·, re· called a typhoon" hleh frustrated a Mongohan mvasion of japan in 1280, the hope being that it might again come to the rescue. I'i\ots were drawn from \'aried backgrounds, some being deferred uni\'ersity students m

/

Most kD,mJta::t auaults, incblding this atladr on t~ carriu HAtS Formidable 0,. 4 May 1945, im-ohNd tM lIY ofobJolesum 1M efJ«twenm 0/ a kDm~ hit urxm a highly w",bustible airmifr corrin is obt.'ious lint. a/lht",glr a surprising mlmbtr of atladlns misYd IhDr /a~ts.

OIfCT(J/I.

118

very stiff al high speeds, making any manOCU\"TC by a ship worthwhile. If the aircraft was badly damaged by gunfire and lIS controls destroyed. cngine damaged or pilot killed. lIlertia and the aircraft's characteristics tended 10 keep il on COUfsc unless a "ing or other essential control surface was shol a\\'aY. In some instances the aircmft connnued 10 dl\'e after both wings came a"--ay, changing II 1010 a bomb. Nothing except hea\1" accurate gunfire could stop a suicide aircraft once the dive had begun. Murnal support "'as needed, with no ship being left on its own. Starting from outSIde automatic weapons range, a swcide arrcraft reached Its target m about twenty seconds. In a di\~ it "'as constantl) acceleralmg, making il difficult 10 track. -10 counter massivc suicide attacks. dcsuoyer1i and escorts were positioned as outlying early warning radar pickets which made them highly nJlncrable. The full·scale kamikaze campaign began during October 1944. The dubious disnnction of being the first shIp 10 be hit fell 10 H,\\AS Alutrolla. a distlllcti\~ threc·funnel cruiser lying off Le}1e. when. at dawn on 21 Oclober, a loo-flyer approaching from land and hit by AA fire turned and then crashed into the ship's fottmast, serung fire 10 Ihe bndge. Thirty officers and men lost theIr h\'es Ifl the ensumg explosion and fire. On 9 January Ihc battleship Minissippi wa.s hit and AfutroJia suffcred for the fifth time, fort)·.four of the crcw dying and the injured totalling sixly-fivc. Belween 21 November and 13january 1945 kamikazes sank 22 ships and damaged 126. Next, the operations 10 lakc Iwo Jima initiatcd intensive kamikaze actl\·ity. The nighlfighter carrier SorolOga soon came under allack, IwO bombs or torpedoes being followed by four suicide aircraft. Nevertheless, fires were under control within an hour, the ship maintaining 25kt. FOrly-fi\·e minutes laler another kamikaze attack was launchcd, IWO raiders being destroycd hcfore a third placed its bomb on Ihe flight dcck, clouted t.he carrier then tumbled o\·crboard. Saratoga had by now lost forty-nine aircraft and suffered 350 casualties, llnd had 10 WIthdraw. Action Icading to the seizure of Okinawa saw kamik3zes reach their zenith, the first mass suicide altack dC\'c\oping during mid-aflcrnoon on 6 April, whcn nearly 700 aircraft, 355 of them kamikazes, lefl Krushu to smk shlppmg off Okinawa.. About .wo penetrated outer defences, although aga.in many wnted their wrath upon the pickel screen. Another huge force of attackers followed twO hours later, quickly mauling two ~ning destroyers. Six ships were sunk and eighteen damaged, nearly all by suicide bombers, and 300 enemy aircraft "ef"e claimed destroyed. Although it was spectacular. the small one-man Yokosuka MXY- Ohka (Cherry Blossom). "-hich began operatmg m April 19J5, "'as a simply constructed

An ~fficttt~ hit on a corrin dNA usually m"om duposmg of many Olrrrajl. IJke tl~ CorUllrs aboard Formldabif:. TJu shIp rolllJ /hus b«ol'lL "SLIas for man)' 'limn., anJ Slmu· rima jar longu.

their early t\\'entles, prepared to repay a cultural debt by calmly sacnficmg their Ih-es. Performing for honour (bushido). not hatred, and cagcr to fly an obsolescem fightcr or bomber to mutual destruction. a pilot's final spartan days would bring a pUf"e, noble end to life. Some waited for months, e\~n sleeping soundly in the hours pr«edmg the final call. ,\ losl of thc aIrcraft used were ageing and singleengined. including the t\ichi D3A 'Val', Mitsubishi AM I '7..ckc' (or 'Zero') and Nakajima Ki 43 'Oscar' fightcl'S, and the Nakajima B5N2 'Katc' and B6N2 'Jill' and Yokosuka D4Y2 'judy' divc bombers. Fully Illden for a one·way fhght Ihey often carried a 250kg (550Ib) bomb. 'I\vin-engined aircrafl also used included the Kawasaki Ki-48 'Lily', Mitsubishi Ki-21 'Sally', Nakajima jlNI 'Irving', the 30,5001b (13,835kg) ""Iitsubishi Ki·67 'Peggy' and Yokosukn PIYI 'Frances', but these were morc \'ulnerable to interception. Suicide bombers had 10 elude extensiw US fighler defences. Once thai was achic\'ed il was difficult to Ihwarl their inlenl. The first attacks in\·ol\"ed groups of aircraft" hich sep:ualcd about thirty miles from the targel llrea and then attacked singly to make themselves dlfficuh 10 delect and distinguish. Some wll\'e-skimmcd to e\--ade radar detection. Off uytc on 7 December 1944 kamikazes displayed a ncw laroc. A dozen or more grouped over one larget and deli\-ered a co-ordinated attack.. No armoured ship "--as ever sunk by suicide bomben. Against \~ry steep dl\·cs. quick reaetion b}' a ship and a positi\'e course ch:mge were sometimes effecti\~. Although the pilot usually aimed his machine 10 its demise, contro15 bttame 119

rill: KO.\1BER RE\'OI.t;TIOS

AIRCRAFT Of TUE SECO:-;O \t'ORLO '«'AR

..

./ -\

. .., -1_ . ~"

. . j"

-

•J

-

.

"

...

.• ,"

-;-

.

"' '" : .. ~ Japall's dedic:alt:d kamika::t manned roc:Jut bomb, the \okomka .\ IX\'7 Ollku fehu,-y 8IoJJolII), uw IIstd III rtlalin:ly small /IwnfNn.

rocket-propelled pilot~d bomb. \'('!th a 5m (16ft Sin) \\ingspan, 11 w~ighed 1,895kg (4,~18Ib) loaded. and usually had a 816kg (1.800lb) lTi-nitro-aminol uotrhead fined to ilS 6m (19ft lOin) cylindrical fU5('lage. Flnt used against shippmg off Okinawa, it posed less of a uncal than mlghl N supposed becau5(' ilS slow launch aircraft ""'as easy to mtercc:pt. Designed by na\'al ensign Mitsuo Ohta, the MXY7 was known to Ihe Allies as the Baka (Idiot). it fim flew in summer 1944, production of 755 examples of the Model II (the only operational version) starting in September. Carried in the belly of a ,\litsubishi G-lM2~ land attack bomber. Ohka was launched from about 8,2-Wm (27.000ft) at 28~320kmJh (1-S-200mph) and could glide at 5° on a run of83km (52 miles) at 368km,'h (23Omph). The e1ectricaUy fim! 5881b s.t. Type 4 Model 20 solid-fuel rocket motors would then start acccknung the bomb to 856kmJh (535mph) before the terrmnal dh'c on to the target at 990kmIh (620mph). During April 1945 1,400 kamikaze sorties were diSpatched from Kyushu alone in operation 'len-Go', th~ defence of the homdand. Th~ first nighl kil..'Usui attack took place on 28/29 April, o\'er half of the attackers being destroyed. A serious error was the decision to make suicide operations compulsory, a crusade orr the Philippines degenernting inlO an e\'ent devoid of all humanity.

Owr 5,000 pilots died In suicide anaclcs. Long after the campaign fatkd, pilots "~re still bemg herded to death in the knowl~dge thai the Emperor. regarded as a Supreme Ikmg, along With their country, had not !.he slightcsi consideration for them as human bemgs. Superfortress, scourge ofJapan Boeing's 8·29 Supcrfortrcss will always be remembered liS the aeroplane which dropped Ihc first tWO atomic bombs, which rnpidly ended !.he war with jllpnn. From Pacific islands, 'Superfofts' of the US XXIh Air Force had already \\ipcd OUi many japllnese industrial cities, upon which they ramed fearsome incendiary loads. ,\ ltllions of close-paCked. earthquake-frail japanese buJldmgs succumbed completely 10 the 8-29$. In 1938 Boeing had produced a study for a pres· surised 8·1- in which a large--diameter circular-section fuselage was mated "1th normal "1ng and tall componenlS. Ov.ing 10 problems regarding sealing the pressurised sections whIle retaining gun positions, no order was placed. Boeing. anticipating thaI such an aircraft might laler be required, worked on the armament problem. e\'entually producing a layout having two pres· surised sections link~d by a small tunnel, and this was n fellture of subsequent proje<:lS. Con\'inced it was on [0 a winner, Boeing built a mock-up as a priv3le venture.

120

Boti",'s 8·29 Supnfor/raJ could deliVC" hnn:y /ooJs /0 distam ta~lJ. L'mll mai'l/y IIIcmdlOritJ. 8-29J "''''Itrattd 1I101/y ofJapa1l 's large$l paPllla/io" all/ra - a"d /lIcll ddil~red the atomic: bombJ.

mainly responsible, ha\ing risen from six manually operaled 0.50in (12.-nun) guns 10 ten of lhe same calibre in Spcrr)· pcriscopically conlTOllc:d re:tractabl~ power.o()penlted turTetS abo\'~ and below the fuselage. T"1n lail guns were supplemented by a 20mm cannon. As the most favoured submission. the Boeing XB-29 received a go-ahead in june 1940, funding for twO prototypt."S and a Static test airfrnme follO\\ing in August. Mar 1941 brought production authorisation and an order for 250, doubled the following january. By the time th~ XB-29 (four 2,200hp Wright R-3350-13s) flew, on 21 September 1942, 1,664 B-29s were on order. Major changes had pre\iously been incorporated. The fuselage was shghtiy lengthened, engln~ cooling and turbosupc:rchargers were improved, a large fin fiUet was added, the turrets were no longer retrllclable and the bomb bay was modified 10 carry 20,0001b (9.0;0kg). That new estimaled all-up weight "'as 114.500lb (51 ,9-l0kg), and the pre· dieted maximum range was about 5,330 nulc:s (8,5 Okm) wh~n carrying only a ton of bombs. The narrO\\··chord mainplanes raised concern, but the)' ga\·e the aircraft lIS long range. Large FO\vlcr flaps would take care of take.o()ff and landing. The second protOlYpe, first flown on 28 December 1942, de\'eloped an engine fire during II landing approach on 18 February 1943 and crashed into a factory,

adding th~ir n~w high-11ft lIerofoil section 10 a hlghaSp«1-raoo "1Og. A top speed of -WSmph al 25,OOOft (652km,1h at - ,62Om) "'as estimated for the 'superbomber', which was fined with lhe smaller, lighter Pran & Whimey R-2800 ~ngines of 2,000 hp. AI an all-up w~ight of 85,672lb (38,86Ikg) a rang~ of 7,000 miles (11,265km) was estimated when carrying a ton of bombs. The maximum feasible load was 10,OOOlb (4,540kg). [n january 1940 a specification for such II 'superbomber' was issued to the Boeing, Lockheed, Doug[as and Consolidaled companies, outlining a 400mph (6-l0km,fh) bomber wllh a range of 5.333 miles (8.530km) when carrying 2,0001b (900kg). When news u'as received of the RAFs day bombing losS6, the specification W"llS a!TJ('I'Kkd to caU for mcrc::ilsed def~nsiw armament, self-sealing fud tanks and extn armour. cope ",m the addluonal loading, Bot-mg Increased the .\todd )41'5 O\"CraU slZ~ and fC\'erted 10 more: powerful \'('rlght R-3350s. Delails of this design, the Model 3~5, submitted in May 1940 showed a 141fl 3in (43.05m) wmg and a double-whetled nosewhed und~rcarriag~. While lhe rnnge was unchllnged, Ihe maximum bomb load had risen to 16,OOOlb (7,26Okg), but the estimated speed had fallen to 382mph at 25,OOOrt (6lSkmih at 7,26Om). Greau)' increased defensive armament was

-'0

12\

AIRCRAFT Of TilE SECOND WORLD \\:'AR

THE BOMBER REVOLUTION

August 19~~ allowed the construction of five extensi\'e airfields, each holding a Wing of 180 Superfortresses and 12,000 men. 13-29 groups began arriving in the Marianas during October, On 24 November III B-29s set Out in daylight on a high-altirude mission led by Gen O'Donnell aboard /)alllllkss /)olly. This was the firSl operation by ,\ larianas-based B-29s, eighty-five of which bombed targets in Tokyo. The first mass release of incendiaries took place on 18 December, when Hankow docks suffered under cighty-four B-29s while another sixl)-~three raided Mitsubishi at Nagoya on 3 january 19~5. Fighters were acti\'e, 400 attacks being made on B-29s raiding the lalter target, and five bombers subsequently being reported missing, Major-Geneml Curtis E Ld..lay took command of the Marianas-based B-29s in January 19~5. Keen to launch incendiary attacks on Japanese cities, he decided to s\\iteh B-29s to low-altitude night bombing, which increased the bomb load without increasing vulnerability, and daylight attacks ended with the lokyo raid of 4 March. The first night fire raid, Rown on 9 March, in· vol\-ed 33~ "'larianas~based B~29s. Marker le:ld ships each released 180 70tb (31.8kg) MA7 napalm bombs before the main force auacked, each bomber dropping twenty-four 500lb (227kg) clusters of "'1,69 oil incendiaries intended to total 8,333 per square mile. The force, strung out in three ~oo-mile-long streams (6~Okm), carried Out a three-hour raid and incinerated 15,8 square miles of the heart of'lok)'o, killing 83,793 people and injuring ~O,918_ A million lost their homes and 267,171 buildings were destroyed. O\'er the next eight days similar inn'ndiary attacks were launched, twice upon Nagoya and on Osaka and Kobe_ Supcrfortresscs were soon partly stripped of defensh'c armament to altow maximum bomb loads to be carried. Massive raids were launched throughout May, and the terrifying onslaught mged into June. On the 17th each of the four Wings visited a city; Omuta, Amam:ltsu, Yokkaichi or Kagoshima. Operations were mounted at a rate of two a week, LeMay wrgeting thrce or four towns each time following leaflet warnings. Eventually sixty urban centres were laid waste, -Ioyama being almost completely destroyed, Almost untouched were Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigati and Nagasaki. When B-29~~5-"'10 44-86292, Enola Gay, released the atomic bomb o\-er Hiroshima on 6 August 19~5, it surely marked the climax of the Superfortress's fame. There was never any doubt that the weapon would be \-ery large, and fifteen B-29s were modified to carry it. In mid-19~~ the 393rd Bombardment Squadron (VH), part of the 509th Composite Group, was taken o\'er by Col Paul WTibbets to plan for the drop, and after much training it mO\'ed in May to North Field, Tinian. Two operational bombs arrh'ed on Tinian and Hiroshima was chosen as primary target. The 9,7901b (4, 170kg) 'Little

killing eleven lOp 13-29 people and many in the building, Attention was at once concentrated on the fire problem, modifications being made to the third XB-29, which was also lost in a crash, but not before it had shown a need for different propellers and a revised General Electric system of rurrelS controlled from astrodomes. These changes delayed the fourteenYB-29s. On I June 19~3 the first Superfortrcss unit, the 58th Bombardment Wing (VH), was activated at Marietta, near Bell's Superfortress plant_ With 150 Superfortresses promised for early 19~~, the first operational Wing comprised fh'e bombardment groups, the 40th, ~~4Ih, 462nd, 468th and 472nd, the last of which acted as a lraining unit at Smoky Hill Field, Salina, where, 011 27 November 1943, the XXth l30mber Command was formed to control B-29 units. A second Very Heavy Wing, the 73rd, comprised four more groups to absorb the next batch of 150 Superfortresscs. By the end of 19~3 thc Bell-M.ari('tta and Boeing-Renton plants also began turning out Superforttesses, which now had a maximum permissible weight of 138,0001b (62,597kg) and a normal gross weight of 133,5OOlb (6O,556kg), figures that indicated the huge size of the 13-29. -111e SupcrfortIess was the first production aircraft to make extensi\-e use of remotely-controlled armament. Four barbelles, e3ch housing twO O.5in (12_7mm) guns with 1,000 rounds per gun, were installed, tWO on top and tWO underncath the fusclage, controlled remotely through a complex fire control system operated from stations in the pressurised sections of the fuselage. Additionally, the tail turret gunner controlled two 0.50in machine-guns and a 100-round 20mm M-2Typc Beannon. Fourteen outer-wing, eight inner-wing and four bomb-bay tanks provided a maximum fuel capacity of 6,80 Igal (30,9171it) until four more were added to the wing centre-section, giving a total of 7,896gal (35,892Iit)_ That g3ve the B-29 a normal range of about 3,700 miles (5,95~km) when carrying 12,000lb (5,443kg) of bombs. On 2 April 19~~ the first 13-29 for Far East opemtions landed at Chakulia, and on 2~ April, only eighteen months after the X£-29 first flew, a Supcrfortress arrived at Kwanghan to start an opcmtional China-based force. About 100 Wichita-built B·29s of the 58th BW set out from India to attack Bangkok on 5 june 19~4, many equipped with 'bombing through overcast' (BTO), HlX and Loran, along with electronic countermeasures (EClv\). The force bombed through the clouds using radar. On 15 June forty-se\'en B-29s operating from Chengtu bombed the steel mills at Yawata by night in the first raid upon japan proper since 19~2.111e build-up of Superfortress missions was slow until the capture of the ~'t:ariana Islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian in July and

122

10 exrmd Iht flying-bomb campaign agai,1SI Briwil/, Htinktl Ht 111 bombeN tt'trt adapted 10 carry a Jl1 'crl/ist missilt'jor rtltase otocr lilt NOr/it Sta, /lSI/ally lOfJ.'ords London. The campaign c-Y/ended from SIWlllltr 1944 10 early 1945. Boy' cylindrical atomic bomb, 129in (3.27m) long and 31.5in (0.8m) in diaml'ter, contained 137.31b of uranium-235. Ellola Gay left Tinian at 0245hrs on August 6 1945, and :It 0915hrs the nuclear weapon was released from 31,600ft (9,630m). At 800ft (245m) above Hiroshima an explosion equivalem 10 20,000 IOns (20.3Mkg) of TNT de\-astated 4.7 square mik-s of the city, killing more than 70,000 people. Three days later a second atomic bomb was released over Nag::tsaki from Capt F Bock's 13-29-35 MO, 4~-27297 Bockstar, In all, 3,970 Superfortresses were built. Although the nuclear weapons heralded a revolution in warfare, mercifUlly they did not necessarily gi\'e a glimpse of the future_ That was displayed by the ad· \-anced aircraft and weapons available to Germany by 1945, which would form the basis of aerial bombardment during the rest of tile 20th c('ntury.

bombs came in at a few hundred feet, ending tlleir flights by di\'ing upon the target area and exploding to produce maximum blast effect. The onlr way 10 halt the atlacks was to destroy the launch sites, weapon dumps and factories, or force the launchers OUt of range, which was ultimately achieved, The Germans then started air-launching Vis from Heinkel He 1111-1-22s, a risky alTair im-olving hazardous low fiying and dangerous launching. They were, howe\'er, introducing the idea of stand-off air launched cruise missiles. Perhaps because VIs could be seen and heard until the fuel ran out, lhey were considered more disturbing than the V2 or A4 ballistic missile, forerunner of the ICBMs and moon rockets of later decades. The first V2 fell without any warning at Chiswick in September 19~~. No warning of a V2's approach was possible, although launch trails from sites around tile Hague were often \'isible_ l>ostwar estimates stated that 26 million AA shells bursting in close proximity were needed to destroy a V2 in flight. More general concern might ha,-e arisen had it been realised that jet-propelled bombers were a\'ailable for raids on Britain, Germany expected a short war until the Luftwaffe's failed assault in 1940, and then to obtain \-ictory German scientists, aerodynamicists and engineers made a great effort to de\ise war-winning weapons, but lacked sensible direction from the top. The Arado Ar 23413, the world's first operational jet bomber, was a typical ad\'3nce which came too late to affect the war's outcome_ In 19~0 a fast, medium-range Ie<:onnaissance aircraft operating at altirude to e\-ade interception was called for,

A Glimpse of the Future As the war drew towards its conclusion, weapons for future decades were emerging. One was the Fieseler Fi 103 FZG-76, or V I flying bomb, intended for a massive New Year 19~4 onslaught on London. Henschel's self-propt'lled glider bombs were launched against shipping in 19~3, and in 19044 radio controlled PC 1400 bombs were aimed at warships off Plymoulh. The VI was quite different, being a ground launched 'cruise missile' which made its O\vn way to the target. It relied on a simple pulse jet, its mnge being determined by tile mte of fuel consumption_ A small aeroplane with wings and a tail, its guidance was mainly governed by the orientation of its launch ramp, Fired from France in large sah'os, flying

123

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND ""'OR!.I) WAR

TilE 80.\\IIEk kEVOLUTION

came fa\'oured. A second Ar 234 flew on 27 July. The third, first flown on 25 August, had a pressure cabin and an ejector seat for the pilot. flight trials showed the third aircraft to ha\'e a t'1p speed of 750km{h (466mph), a ceiling of 12,500m (41,OOOft) and a range of 1,200km (750 miles), Early prototypes exceeded the specification in several respects. The airframe was able to accept more power, and the aircraft flew much faster befor~ encountering serious compreSSibility effects. Another 'first' followed when two Ar 234 prototypes were fitted with four lighter 1,76Okg (7981b S,l.) BMW oo3A jet engines, these becoming the world's first four--cngined jet bombers. One had four turbojets in individual underwing nacelles, while the other had them paired in two nacelles. The first, ready to begin flight trials on I February 1944, was beset by cowling contour problems and airflow through the narrow space between fuselage and nacelles caused se\'ere shock waves. Both aircrafl flew reconnaissance sorties during early summer 1944, Allied fighter pilots often finding themselves incapable of intercepting the Ar 234s, Trolley and landing skids were proposed for some postwar jets, but those fined to the Ar 234 showcd their impracticability, After landing, aircraft had to be lifted on to a rrolley before remo\'al to a dispersal bay for turnaround. Landing areas would become cluttered with aircraft, so thc Ar 234B had a narrow-track retractable nosewhecl undercarriage, Powered by two lurno 0048 turbojets, it had a pressurised cabin and a braking parachule (a common postwar item) to reduce an emergency landing run. j>roduction of the Ar 2348 was well under way by aurumn 1944, about 150 being dcli\'ercd before 1945, by which time it had become one of four highest-

Thc uI/reliability ofjCl cllgines curbed Iheir lise ill bombers dllring rhc war, Arada Ar 234s jlew some opera/iOllal sorties, al/d thefOllr engined Ar 234C version shown herr was IInder extensive developmellt, with a top speed of 700km/h (435mph) and a range of 2,OOOkm (1,242 miles). Arado's submission was a shoulder-wing monoplane powered by two gas rurbines under the wings, Originally the Ar 234 was to ha\'e a jettisonable three-wheel trolley for take-off and retractable skids for landing, sa\~ng the weight of an undercarriage, The extensi\'ely glazed pilot's cockpit was in the fuselage no><.

The first machine was completed before 1942, but development of the Junkers Jumo 109-004 rurbojet did not keep pace with airframe consrruction, the engines needing a ycar to reach a reasonably reliable state. Not until J\·{arch 1943 did a pair of pre-production Jumo oo4As reach Arado. After troublesome rrials with the take-off trolley, the pr
'Inc Ar 234C four-engined BMW oo3A-1 powered reconnaissance \'ersion of the Ar 2348 was in produclion when hostilities ceased. It had maximum speeds of 829kmJh (515mph) at sea ]c\'el and 872km/h (542mph) at 6,OO4m (19,7ooft), a range of 1,480km (920 miles) and could climb (0 9,997m (32,8ooft) in II min 54sec. 'Ine Ar 234C-I and -2 were abandoned in favour of the multi-role C-3. Other versions were 10 carry a Fieseler Fi 103 flying bomb on a cradle, the weapon being lifted by hydraulically-opcrated arms to clear the tOP of the aircrafl for firing. Nineteen production Ar 234C-3s were completed before the war's end, but Ar 2348s, of which 210 were completcd by VE Day, wcre the only jet bombers to undertake operational missions, \'('hen the -hot war' ceased in August 1945 the main ingredients for the Cold War were available; the jet bomber, the cruise missile and 'the bomb'. The bomber revolution was complete.

Bibliography Air Ministry, Weekly Intelligence Summaries (unpublished) Craven, W E, and Cate, J L, (cds) The Army Air Forus ill Il'orld Ifitr II, 1-01 5, Thc Pacific: Mat/CrhOr/l to NagaUlki (Chicago Unh'ersity Press, USA, 1948)

III /939 a u'ell~«'rapped \il-'hilley crefl; member in darkllcss pllShes a load of propaganda IcajlclS down a chllte - lIopefully Of)Cr tile righl place aftcr map rcading and dead reckom'/lg had played their parts. By 1945 sophislicated radar. radio aids mid assorted electronic devius were beginllillg to lakc COli/rei ofoperatiollS,

Glines, Lt Col C V, The Doolittle Raid (Orion Books, USA,1988)

Jaue's All thell'-orld's Airemft 1945-1946 (Sampson Low, London, 1946)

priorit)'types. Delin:ries were made to KG 76, but many training accidents relarded operJ.tional activity until late summer 1944, when Ar 234s flew a number of reconnaissance f1ighls O\'er battle areas and, from Norway, over the northern British Isles. Arado planned many far morc advanced \'ersions, one for high-speed research ha\'ing twO B,\ {W oo3A-1 turbojelS and a Br.,\W 718 bi-fucl rocket motor to augment thrust briefly by 2.700Ib. Various wings and tail surfaces, some swept back. were planned, but none wcre completed,

PRO Air 22/203 Statistics

Operations

Richards, Denis, He Royal/lir Force 1939-1945, Vol (HMSO, London 1953) Sharp, M C & Bowyer, M 1 F, Mosquito (Cree)' Books, 1996) ll'i1r with Japan, Vol VI (HMSO, London 1995)

Williamson, ,"{urtar_ London 1988)

111 less tllal/ four yean amazi>lg progress had bem made. Tile differellces bel«-eCII Ihis amblillg ArmS/rollg lI'lhit«'Orllllf1hitky 1/ al/d Ihe Arodo jel bomber, fdudl fiefl; almosl four lillles as fast and twice as lIigh, provide ample etlidel/u of spectaclllar advam:es.

124

Bomber Command

125

Lufluxlffe

(Grafton/Collins,

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND ,",'ORLD W ..\ R

5 Airmobility

"

Peter Hearn

H"i,h 110 aircrafl designed specifically for tral/sporl, at the oll/break of Ihe u'Or Ihe RAF relied on wmJerled bomben or requisitioned airliners, $//ch as this Halldley Page H,R42,for aena/movement of troops and stlpplies,

nle Douglas C-47, knoum as Dakola to lite Bri/l51t forces alld SkYlrai'l 10 Ille American, u'Qs derived from 111i! DC-3 air/iller (JIld become the lraflspor/ rrorkhorn of Ihe Allied foren,

126

Fallschirm;ager Olney had expected di\·e bombers. 'Illey had expected artillery fire, They hnd expected the dis tam rumble of armour, But the few lookouts in their emplacements on Belgium's fori Eben Emacl had not expcclcd these grey, bat-like figures swooping grncefully and silently from a dawn sky, Mesmerised, they \\'alched in the half-liglll as the flring vehicles ploughed into the grass amongsl them; vehicles thai borc on their flanks - thcy realised tOO late - the black cross of Germany. From cach glider poured nine close-helmeted figures, firing as they came. The few defenders on the surface of thc fort were overwhelmed by smallarms fire, grenade and flame. Others fled 10 join the main body of the fort's garrison in the supposed safeI)' of tile underground maze of tunnels, sheltcrs and gun emplacements, there to be tr.lpped and further stunned as specially prepared hollow charges tore through the six-foot-thick reinforced concrete of the emplacements to destroy the great guns inlendcd to dominate this \·ital slretch of the bordcr between Belgium and Germany. Within minutes, a fort manned by 1,200 men and considered impregn::able had been neutr.lliscd by se\'enry-eight troops who had swooped upon it from dawn skies, at the cost of only six of their number, Thus began the German assault on the Low Counrries on 10 '''lay 1940. Further west, other glider-borne troops were taking the bridges of Vroenhofen and Velchrezelt. Paratroops were spilling from their Junkers Ju 52s from heights as low as 100m (300ft) to seize other river crossings at ,"I.oerdijk and Dordrccht. In Rotterdam itself, 50 paratroops jumped into a spons stadium, and 120 men were landed on the river Maas in 12 Heinkel He 59 seaplanes. A larger force of paratroops seized Ihe airfield at Waalha\'en, while further north others were dropping on to Ihree airfields around The Hague, baltling to sccure them for the airlanding of reinforcements and supplies. Although the assault on The Hague was fiercely resisted and losses of aircraft were hea\1', Rotterdam was held by German airborne trOOps until the 9th Panzer Division entered the city on 14 Mar, having rolled along the carpet of intact bridges and neUlralised stTongpoints laid for it by the 'Fallschirm;ager' - Germany's young 'hunters from the sky', Holland surrendered to tile invaders that evening, Belgium followed suit twO weeks later. 'lltis assault on the Low Countries was the largest

and most dramatic airborne operation of the Second \,(Iorld War so far, but nOl the first. In Fcbruary 1939, and again in Novcmber, small groups of Russian paratroops jumped near Summa and Petsamo 10 cut communications in support of the im'asion of Finland. On a much larger scale, in September 1939,4,000 paralroops and 12,000 airborne infantrymen had stood in readiness on Silesian airfields for operations against Poland at the outbrcak of the war, but so dcvastatingly swift had been the ad\'ance of Germany's Panzer divisions that there had been no call for airborne assault - although the 16th Regimem of the 7th Air Division had been airlirted to forward baule positions north of Lod;,: 10 fight as ordinary infantry. In April 1940 O\'er 500 tr.lllsport ::aircraft, mostly Ju 52s, with smaller numbers of heavy Ju 90s and FockeWulf Fw 200s, had spearheaded and then supported Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway, Initial assault from the sky had achieved immcdiate results, largely tluough audacity and surprise rather than by weight of arms. During the brief and victorious campaign that followed, the Germans airlifted 29,280 men, 2,376 IOns (2,414 IOnnes) of supplies and 259,300 gal (980,000 Htres) of a\'iation fuel into the combat zone. This combination in 1940 of assault by parachute and glider, airlanding by tr.lnsport aircraft and subscquem resupply and reinforcement from the air, was the first major demonstr.ltion of the concepts of airmobility and airborne operations conceivcd and developed by haly, Russia, and abo\·e all by Germany during the years between the twO world wars. The support of ground forces from the air had become an integral pan of the German doctrine of'B1ir.drrieg': surprise assault by fastmo\'ing columns of tanks, artillery and motorised infantry to break through or bypass the linear defence still favoured by tr.lditional military thinking, The role of air support in this novel method of warfare was: 1 To gain air superiority 2 ·10 provide reconnaissance 3 ·10 bomb and str.lfe in close support of the advance 4 '10 deli\·cr troops from tllC air ahead of or on lhe nanks of the ad\'8ncing mechanised columns 5 >[0 resupply and reinforce the ground assault. This doctrine had a \'igorous and far-sighted proponent in Generalleutnant Kun Student, commander of Germany's fledgling airborne forces. It also had the personal backing of Hitler, and of Goering as commander of the Luftwaffe.

127

AIRCRAFT OF Till' SECO:"O

\\~ORLO

\t'AR

AIR.\I0B1LITY

..

GUI1lQllY'S starlltllg IIU of paratroops III 1940 relied llpoll 11U! Jlmkers JII 52, td,id! remail/ed (he badtbo"e of Germa" airlllobtl,ly (Immg/10111 the ttur" Jllmps tt:ere I/!
Student enjoyed the benefits of single command of the men and of the aircraft m:n were to carry them; me whole force was part of the Luftwaffe, This cemralised command was an advantage that would not be enjoyed by Student's Ikitish and American emulators, NO! only did Student so aptl)' match his own ideas on airborne suppOrt to the overall dOClrine of Blitzkrieg; encouraged by Hitler, he purposely fostered the aura of Hitism that has e\'er since been the stamp of the paratrooper of all nauons, It is a creed that represents the supreme confidence and audacity of men who arc prepared and eXpl."Ct to fight againsl gre:n odds and win. II \\'as a mystique reinforced by the assaults on Scandina\;a and the Low Countries, whe~ the purely physical blows dealt b)' the airborne 1O\"lIsion had been augmented by the de\"lIStaung psychological impact on the enemy. The confusion and disruption caused b)' the FaUschirmjager had SlruCK at the heart of civilian, political and military \\;Upower. To back a well-defined policy, integraled command. and hlgh
specifically built for It. and a reliable parachute. 'llIe lrimOlor.low-wingJu 5213m with its distinctive corrugated metal skin had been developed by Ernst Zindel from the single-engme Ju 52 of 1930. The Ju 52/3m first tlew in 1932, intended as n ch'ilian airliner but with irs potential as a bomber and troop carrier barely disguised. 'Ille military \'ersion produced in 1934 found employment in bo!.h roles with Germany's Condor Legion during the Spanish Cil'il \'\':Ir Readily cOO\'erted to the parachuting role in 1936, the Ju 52 could delh'er eighteen fuUy equipped men to a range of 620 miles. It was an excellent gilder tug. and ltS ruggedness, reliability and shorttake-
...

~,,,~~~~~~:===:~ ~. By far tIre mosl u'ldely lIud Gerl/lQn assaul1 glider ttus lIre DFS 230, u:hiclr could carry eight heavily-armed lroopS. It ttUS lIsed to capture lhe &lgianfort of Eben ElllOeloll 10 1\lay 1940, and look parI in lhe i'ffJaSioll ofCrelc ill ,\lay 1941.

111eJu 5213m would remain the mainstay of Gennan air transport throughout the war, but the four-engined types, the 1u 90 and structUrally less reliable Focke-\XIulf

~

_.....--

--""'~ "

--

Fw 200B Condor, would provide heavier lift. A smnll number of Dornier Do 24 and Do 26 flying boats would provide a transport and communication facility, as the)' had done effectively during the Norwegian campaign. DC\'c1opment and production of the promising 1u 252 Herkules, a !.hiny-fi\'e-seater equipped with a rear loading ramp, would be cancelled in 1944 as Germany's priorit)· for dwindling resources concentnned mninly on fighters. The gliders that swooped with such devastating effect on 10 Eben Emael \\'e~ DFS 2305, each carrying eight trOOps in the fabric
-

The Meuenchmm Me 321 Gigam glider could lklit.~ a massitoe load of 130 troops or 26,OOOIb offreighl; prm:';lkd II could ~ mcoll~d illto the air, This could be adl~d by tt."O or thru tIIgs or by /ISIng" Hnnhl He III Z, a (omposiu of ttro HI' II Is U:ltl, a fifth mgillL added.

129

AIRCRAFT 01

THI,. SECO:-:D \\-ORI.D

AIRMOlllllTY

~'AR

If'/th tht add/IlOI/ of SIX ttlgines tht Ale 321 (top left) became rht Me 323. lIS hllge nose doors al/ouY'd rapid IInloading for its cargo of troops, freight or f-Y'hides. were 10 be carried on two decks.lllc main problcm was hauling this 24-ton l
years of the war thc effective exercise of airpower to achic\'e a ground force objecti\·e. It was a Icsson waiting to be copied. Thc British reliction The first to copy it were !.he British. Winston Churchill, e\'er an admirer of the audacious and thc uncom'cntion01 in warfare, e"cn whcn at the rcceidng cnd of it, was much impmsed by Germany's use of airborne assault, and on 6 june 19~0 had the foresight to ask me joint Chiefs of Slaff to form 'a corps of at least 5,000 para· chute lroops'. At II time when mer were desperately prepllrmg to repel a likely m\-asion, not launch on~, the Chiefs cast a sour eyc upon mis directiw. British military thinking had in any case: reicc1ed the concept of parachute assault when demonstrated to observers by me Russians in 1936, It had neither the knowledge nor me \\111 to ~t about It nO"o'. Nor did II ha\~ any suitable

130

alrcrafl for such a task. Although Britain had pioneered air mobIlity through Its use of aircraft to transport freight and troops, particularly In the Middle Easl, the nation had enlered the war in 1939 \\ith only a few outdated remnanlS of that force in the fonn of small numbers of Handley Page Harrows, Bristol Bombays and e\'en older \'ickers \'alenua bIplanes, still operaong mostly O\'crseas. The RAF had no mod~rn, custom-buill transport air· craft. The cmphasis during the rearmament phase of me 19305 had bec:n on air dcfcnce, in which air trnnsport h.:lId bttle part to play. To fill the transport g3p in 1939, and also to pro\ide aIrcraft for \-arIOUS tralrung roles, Britain's airlmes ....-ere l:Irought undcr gO\'cmmcm contract. These airlines and "harter companies tned to persuadc the Air Ministry mat they should be allO\\~ to maintain their idcnooes, meir aircr.lft and their personnel to pro\ide an 'Air .\ierehant SenlCe' sunilar to that giwn by their scafanng L.:olleagues, Inslead, the pm1)te compania; and their 35~etl> .... ere: requisitioned and their penonncl conscnpted, Somc of the ·assets· found their \\1)' to RAF Hendon to ~ operated by the RAFs only transpon squadron at the orne, No 24. To the squadron·s A\TO Ansons and de Ha\1l1and Tiger Moths ....-~re added impressed D.H. Rapldes and Dragons, Armstrong \\;llitworth Ensigns, Perci\1)1 Proctors. Airspeed En\'OY's, Lockheed Lodetars. and e\'en three Italian Sa\"Qia-Marehcm S.73s. An equally di\'Crse array of airline pilots \\1)S welcomed LIltO the RAF Volunteer Resen'e to fly these aircraft on communication flIghts throughout Britain and Allied Europe. In 19~0, as the British Expeditionary Force (Ctreatcd in confusion lowards the Channel ports, this motle)' collection of unarmed airliners and freighters flew ammunition and olher essential supplies into forward airfields and strips. onen under the guns of the enemy. The support of militar)' operations by British airlines and their machines would reach further afield when Imperial Air'Nays airliners and flying boats wcre em· ployed to ferr)' personnel and small-bulk freight, pri. maril)' to the Middlc EaSt, India and Ihe Far EaSt, followmg where possible the established roUICS !.hrough central Africa. An alternalive 10 the usc of civilian air transport lay in the conversion of bombers to a passenger or freighl role. II was (0 this resource thaI the RAF turned when, as II result of Churchill's directin". it was tasked WIth me training of Britain's first paratroopers. To establish a Cennal Landing School al 1\ lanchesler's Rmgway Airport in June 19-«>, came a renowned flyer from the First \\;orld War and ci\ilian a\iation, now retum~ to umform in the RA.FVR, Sqn Ldr Louis Suange, and a 1\tajor of me Ro)-al Engineers,john Rock. They had one thmg 10 common - neither knew anything about parachuting. Yet within a ffiOnm of their arrival, md With no great encouragement from their superiors In

131

either Servicc, they began Ihe training of Britain's first paratroops. Instruction was given by a hastily gathcr~ band of RAF parachute techmClans and Army phYSIcal lJ'aImng IOstructors, with an element of parachuting know-how being pro\'ided by I\\"Q fonner exhibItion jumpers from me tr.l\·clling flring circuses of the 19305, Bruce W'illiams and HalTr W'ard, soon to ~ joined by a mird. Bill Hire. The par:achute first used for Bntish airborne training was a manu:tllr operated airerew training type cOO\'ertcd for 'stalic line' operation. \\;ncn, on the fourth dar of training, one failed to open and a man fell to his death, the canopy-first deployment was changed to riggmg-hnc fir..t, and the pack modified accordmgly, to create the 8.5m (28ft) 'X'Type paraehutc that v.-as to ghoe Britain' paratroops good sen-ice mroughout me ....-ar and for almost tw~nty years beyond. 'Ibe bomber that the Air MinislrY reluctantly made a\1lilable for col1\"ttSion to parachute training ...."as thc Annstrong \\;'hlt"""Qrth Whitley; SIX of them. 'Tlle all· metal Whitley Mk V firsl flew in 1936 but was obsolete as a bomber by 1940, Paratrooping g3\'C it a new lease of life, e\'en though it \\"as unsulled to and desperately uncomfort.able for the job. A narrow fuselage dcscnbed by Harry Ward as 'a ~wer-like passageway connecting the tail to the nose' could accommodate ten jumpers, who .....ould shume on their bouoms to drop through an aperture whcrc thc \'cnnal gun-turret had once been, hoping not to smash !.heir faces on Ihe far side of the 'hole', an injury known a the 'Whitlcy KIss'. The main drawback (0 British dc\'c1opment of an airborne force was, and \\"Quld long remain.. this lack of an air tTllnspon fleet and mc rcluctance of the Air Ministry to provide one. Louis Strange made strenuous but

Bnto", S PIOl/«r porolroorxTJ cmpJam in 11'711lwonh 1r711f~ .\lk I; co1Tl..v ud to car')' CTJ to drop through all opcnllre '" tl~ floor.

WI

Armstro",

lni porolroo~

AIRCRAFT 01' Till:: SECOND

\\~ORLD

WAR

J For Bnluh alrilormfitrus, W DaJw,a rrilh iu sidt-door ail prut-lJed a t.:'€1co",~ rrpJocel,wnt m 1942 /or lilt cramrxd and agtdn"hilk:>~ PJMrtSl, unsuccessful bids for Douglas DC·3s. NO! until America enlered Ihe war would this eminently suitable aircraft hi: made a\'3itable to Britain's airborne forces (sec pholo ab
AIR.\I0HII.ITY

For tnllnlng pUrpo5CS an unusual 'flying machine' would supplemem Ihe \'\'hitleys from mid 1941, a tethered barrage balloon. FMm a 'cage' suspended beneath the balloon, lJ1linecs would make their first two jumps undtr weU
Brilain 's first mililary g/idn, IN ~ Aircraft Houpllr, s/wfrs its tkgam ImD. It "mid carry nlQmly for tM lrammg of P,u,u and ntt'« wtnt to tmr. 132

SAm

troops.. but

=

IlHd

were used sokly for training. Other gliders, larger and mort functional. would fill the operational role. \'.;'ho was to fl}' the g1id~r into battle? The RAF dId not \\'3nl to; gilding was a one·way ticket. 'rne Army, on the other hand .....'3S keen to do SQ. Nor would it confine Its pilots simply to flying othtrs into the combat area. On landing, they [00 would join tht battlt as infanl:l'}mtn. So was born tht Parachult Glider Rtglmtnt, formally ('<;Iablished In Ftbruary 1942 as pan of the recently formed Army Air Corps, which was also responsible for Air Obser\'3tion Posts. Despite tht lack of kno.....ledge, inadequacy of tquipment, hlgh·le\~1 indifference and mwes, not to mtn~ rion a disturbing casually rate, Britain's embryo airborne force was created, and went 10 war in a small way In February 1941. "'}ing OUt of .\ lalla in six \\'''hitleys, forty men of II Special Air s.,'nice Battalion parachuted at mght mto Southern Italy to attack the Tragmo aqueduct. .\1atenal cbmage was slighl and all the men were cap-. turtd wh~n an~mpts to reco\'er them by submarine failed, but Operation Co&ossus demonstrated Britain·s abilily 10 strikt deep into enemy tcmtory, and Italy ....-:lS frightmed intO di\"Crting large numbers of troops 10 homt dtftn~. This '(yll1g up' of forcts in a def~nsi\~ rolt against surprise anack has betn an often under~umated function of airborne forc . In March 19~1 Winston Churchill visited Ringway to sec: how his brainchild was faring. Instead of the 5,000 paratroops ht had asktd for, ht found ftv.·tr than ~OO drawn up on the parade ground for hIS inspection, .... atched a mere fOrty-four others parachute on to the airfield from their ancient \'\1l.itleys, and saw one lonely Hotspur looking \'cry unwarlike as it swooped elegantly to earth. Disappointed by the numbers, he was, howe\'er, much imprtsstd by tht enthusiasm and spirit of the airborne pioneers. In a testy note to the Chiefs of Siaff he subsequently asked for an immcdiate expansion of the force. In Ihis he was also influenced by another awesome demonstration of airmobility and airborne potential b)' Germany's Fallschirmjager.

tactical error by the defenders of ,\ laleme airfield let the Invaders through, and, dtspite hea\1' losses of aircraft from artillery and mortar fire, into this base Student poured his airlanded reinforcements. The ude of baltle turned, and even the dtstruction of their seaborne force by the Royal Na\'}' could not now Stop the Germans. On the \~ry dar that Churchill again urged the expansion of hiS airborne force upon his Chiefs of Staff, Gen FI'C}'burg, commanding tht Allied forces on Crtte, hcpn to e\1icuate his men from tht lost island. It \\'3S the first - and only - maJOr banlt 10 tit' won entirelr by air· bome forces. ""'hile Churchill - and other distant observers - were again impressed, Hitler '3S not. Although ht \\-:lS pleased I'll the \ietor), he ~ighed it against the COSI; 56 per cent of his 8, I00 paratroops ....~rt killtd or wounded, the airlanded .\lountain Dhision suffered 34 per cent casualucs, and 258 of the 500 Ju 52s wert destroyed. Tht pnce had been too high. Hitler derided.•~d he needed his Ju 525 to haul supplits to his ntv.' and grtattr bank area, his Eastern Front. Furthermore, he believed thaI all'bomc assault was lOSing tht tl~ment of surpnse. He person31l}' cancelled a .....ell.planned airborne in\'35ion of .\1aha bC'Caust he fcared a repeat of the heavy losSC'S sus~ tained in Crtte Thtre would be no more mass assaults by his belo\'ed FaUschirmjager. But he dId nOI dIsband thtm. E.xpansion and training of tht airborne units continued, and their technical ca· pablllt)· .....as Improved. Night jumping techniques were e\'aluated and practised; parachutes were impro\'ed; new melhods of carrying weapons into war were developed; and glider lcchnology was ad\'anced "ith the mtroduc· tion of 'Piggy-back' gliders carried aloft br com'crted fighter-bombers, and 'dive gliders' that would spend less time in the air providing targets for ground fire. Few of these innovations went into battle, howe\l:r, for ne\'cr again would German paratrOOps descend ell masse upon a startled foc. Thus an operation that spurred the dc\'c!opment of Allied airborne forces spelt the end for the \'iclon themselves,

Crete On 20 "'lay 1941, ha\'ing battered his enemy with almost unopposed bombing and strafing, Kurt Siudent launched tht first wave of 8,000 airbornt solditrs from a force of 500 Ju 52s and 7~ DFS 230 gliders agamst thc Allied-held island of Crete. The immediate aim of O~rauon Mercury \\'35 10 capture and hold airfitlds and docks for subsequent rcinforctment by airlandtd and Stabome forces. Onct the dtftndtrs had rtco\~rcd from the immedi· ate shock of Stting their slties suddenly filled with para· ehutts and gilders, ther fought back SO \iciously that by mghtfall of lhe first day, "ith none of their objccti\-n taken. tht Germans seemed 10 be pinned down. But a

The Americans Winston Churchill was not the only one imprtssed by the capture of Crtte by airborne forces alone. So were the Amencans. Dunng the 19305. the USA had shared Britain's indifference to the airborne concept. However, in 1939 the US Army undertook an appraisal of 'air infantry' which eoncludtd that certain tasks could tit' undtrtaken by infantrymen landed by aircraft or para~ chule. But as America girded for likely \\'3r, tht project was temporaril)' sheh'ed in fa\"Our of more pressing rtquircmtntS, untillhe combat usc of paratroops by Russia and more emphatically br Germany, spurred the USA tow:trds the formation of Its o.....n airborne force. In tarly 19~0 the lask was gi\'tn 10 Maj \~'illiam Ltt,

133

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND \X'ORLD \X'AR ,\IIC\tOIlILI"fY

_. All Americall lHoIco CG-4A if; ttlft'ed aloft by a C·47. It COlt/d accommodate thirteen troops.

In Britain, Ille Waco "'<1$ klloom as the Hadria".

formation of the 50lst I'arachute Infantry Unit and plans to form three more airborne battalions. These plans were accelerated and extended following the German victory in Crele, and within a year of the USA entering the war in December 1941 it had twO airborne di\'isions, me 82nd and the 10 ISl. These divisions included a glider regimem and twO parachute regiments. The USA did not have a glider policy until early in 1941, and when it did decide that it had a need for such a force, procurement of an appropriate aircraft did not run smoothly. It was gi\'cn a low priority, to the extent that major aircraft manufacturers were not allowed (0 bid for glider design and construction contmcts lest they interfere with their morc important task of aeroplane production. The small companies who gained the orde~ then subcontracted to a total of 150 other businesses to provide components. The result was administrative chaos and flawed workmanship - sometimes fatally flawed. However, out of this chaos came the \'ilot Regimen! as he watched W'aeo machines being uncrated and assembled.Tne CG-4A could carry thirteen troops or light \'ehicles and guns, and had a nose door. It was small enough for twO at a time to be towed by a C+47, usually in tandem. Of a further 2,000 gliders built in America, the largest was the \'
destined to become revcred as 'father of thc US Airborne'. Like his British counterparts, he had to learn from scratch. He had a new parachute made - the 1:4, whose canopy-first opening delh'ered a se\'erc shock. His jumpers, hO\\'e\'er, had the comfort of a rl'"Sen'e parachute carried on the ehest. He gathered instructors from me test-jumpers of me Air Corps, and had no lack of \'olunteers from the Army for a Parachute 'lest Platoon. And he had a highly suitable aircraft. Early jumps were made from a C-33 (the military designation for the DC-2), but it was the Douglas C-47 that was to become the mainstay of air support for the Americans and their allies. In 1932 the Douglas DC-2 had introduced 3 new breed of sleek, low-wing transport craft to the world's airlines, and its de\'elopment culminated in the DC-3. \,(Iith a reinforced metal floor, a strengthened undercarriage and a large loading door, the military \'ersion of the DC-3 entered service wim the US Army Air Corps in 1941 as the C-47 Skytrain, offering a capacir)' to carry 6,OOOlb (2,722kg) of freight or twent)'-seven troops over a range of 6,000 miles. Like the Ju 52, its side door provided a far safer, more conwnient and quicker mode of exit than the 'holes' through which British pioneer paratroops went to war. Rugged, durable, and \\ith a capacity to well exceed th3t 6.oo01b of freight, as long as the maxim 'shO\'e e\'erything as far forward as it will go' was obeyed, the C-47 became a remarkable workhorse. O\'er 10,000 would emerge from America's vast manufacturing capacity during the war, of which 1,900 would go to the RAF under Lend-Lease arrangements. To the thirty-three RAF squadrons equipped with the C-47 it became the Dakota. As an indication of the extent to which Britain had fallen behind in the production of transport aircraft, when the Dakota was issued to No 31 Squadron in India it replaced the Vickers V3lentia. The e\"3.luation of methods and equipment b}' \'(o'illiam Lee's l'arachuteTcst Platoon culminated in the

standing of the potential of the new arm, lind interService differences of opinion and prioritY. E\'en those dedicated to the airborne concept in principle differed on the implementation of that concept in detail. -Inere was, for example, much argument about the rel:llive merits of glider and parachute. Each had its particular ad\"{)(ates. Germany had pioneered a concept that favoured glider assault backed up by pamchute troops. as Student had employed at Crete, and before that in the assault on the Corinth Canal. America's doctrine, enshrined in its 1942 Tw:tics und "lecJmiqllcs of Airbomc Troops, put the paras in first, reinforced by glider landings. British planners tended to 3dapt the 'bafting order' to specific circumstances. It was with the exact role of its airborne force undecided and its potential poorly understood at higher levels of command that America first sent its paratroops into battle.

results decided Stirling to go overland in future, but the parachute would later take a much-expanded SAS into Europe on numerous clandestine missions. Later in t.he North African campaign, groups of Italian paratroopers of the 'X' Regimenti Arditi would be dropped on simil3r small-sc3le sabotage raids against Allied positions. with "arying success. Also in this theatre of great distances and poor surface communications, air freighting in both a strategic and a tactical mode played an increasingly important role. Suffering losses of almost 40 per cent of seaborne supplies destined for Rommel's Afrika Korps, Germany was forced in late 1942 to cstablish a Mediterranean 'air bridge'.lnis, too, was costly, se\'entY Ju 52s being lost to Allied fighle~ in November alone. This battered fleet \\"3.S reinforced with Ju 90s, Focke-\'
The Middle East Elements of America's airborne forces were parachuted into North Africa in late 1942 in a combined operation with troops of the British I st Parachute Battalion, to support the Operation 1brch seaborne inv3sion. 1ne airborne operation was poorly concei\'ed and planned, was largely unopposed, and through no fault of the paratroops, contributed little to the success of the im'asiOIl. In a pure infantry role the airborne soldie" subsequently fought with immense distinction, justifying the elitism they had inherited from their German coumerpans and from their distinctive method of going to war. This was nOl the first use of paratroops in North Africa, for its deserts had been the birthplace of David Stirling's Special Air Service. Self-trained with 'acquired' parachutes and anciem Vickers Valentia 3nd Bristol Bombay aircraft, six£}' of Stirling's men had bccn launched ag3inst targets in the lobruk area, at night, on to rocky ground, in a 45mph sandstorm. 'Ine painful

The Far East Air transport both strategic and tactical played an important role in the Far EaSt and Pacific, although

134 135

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AIRCRAFT 01''1111'. SECOl"D \\:'ORLD \'t"r\R

direct assault by paratroops was carried out on a relatively smaU scale; audacious raids rather than the massin: airborne op<:nmons of the Europe:ln theatre were the norm. Japan entered the war with a \"ariel)' of modern rranspon aircr.lft, some of indigenous design (such as the licence-buut Mltsubishi Ki·S7 Ty~ 100), othen buill under licence such as the DC·3 deri\"'3.u\"C ShaWl! LlDI and the Nakajima K1-3~ T)'~ 97. msplr«I by the Douglas OC-2. \X'lth these alluan,Japanese paratroops. lI"amcd by German instructors. captured airfields in the Celeb« and Timor and oilfields in Sumatrll in 19~2. But Japan failt'd to develop the sU't'ngth of airlift for largerscale operations, and loss of air superiority in the later stlges of the conflict deterred any wrbome assaults at all, apart from tWO despe:ratc raids launched in the Philippines in latc 19~. In India, Britain tstablished a Parachutc Training School m3n~ by insttueton from Ringway to U3in an Indian Parachute Bngade, but the only large-Kale operation by ekmen15 of this force came in 1945, \\ith a largely unopposed drop ou15lde Rangoon as pari of the rroccupation of Burma. American panmoops mounted imaginati\·c and largely succcssful assaults In the Pacific theatre, notably to capture aIrfields along the northern coast of New Guinea, and most sjXCtacularly against the island fortress of Corregidor, where they complelely surprised the japanese defenders by parachuting from low-flying C-47s on to the parade ground and a narrow strip of cratered land on the very nov..n of the island, instead of on to the more obvious bUI \'ery \-ulnerable lower ground. Shortly afterwards, a classic amp tk "Jaln by 125 paratroops rescued, withoul 1055, 2,000 ci\'ilian capti\'cs under threat of execution in the Los Banos prison camp in the I>hilippines. These and similar operations may tlll\"C~ been low in numbers but were high in the basic ingredient of successful airborne assault, audacity and sur· prise. The only glider-borne assault in the Pacific came in 1945, towards thc cnd of the war, when se\'en US gliders landed troops in northern Luzon to hasten the capture of the island. It was through resuppl)' and reinforcement that the transport aeroplane best ser\'ed the ground forces in the Far ..::aSt and Pacific, In retrospect it can be argued thaI not enough use was made of airmobility in a militllry theatre of \':ISI distances, most of them scattered o\'Cr the sc:a or rugged lerram, Howe\'er, limited resourcts and in some caSts an uncertainty of \itlll air superiority undoubtedly influenced air rransport operations in these areas. With few hospilable airfieldS, the sc:aplane came into its own as a means of communication in this zone. Across the PaCIfic (and across the Atlantic) Pan-Am's giant Boeing 314 Clippers pTO\ided a 10ng-l1mge miil-

AIR,\I08ILITY

drop and glider, and at the end of the operation were mostly alrhfted OUt of the banle zone, An increasingly \1Ilued aspecl of air support, the recovery of the wounded, \\':IS demonstrated in the Burma campaign. Mostly they wert flown out of the forward areas by light aU'CTafl. Some wert actually rttumed by glider, for among the ingeruous mno\':Iuons In concepl and technique born of this campaign "':IS a sySlem whereby Waco gliders that had dell\'ered their load could subsequently be The 'snalched' from the ground by a kn\'-fl~ing helieopler also made an appeara.nce in support of the Chmdlts, the Sikorsky R-4 and later the R-5 being used for communicauons and casualt}' C\':Icuation, Orde Wingate died III an air crash before thc end of his campaign, but not before his \;sion, wdl supported by colleagues and by sc:nior commanders, had inspired a maJOr ad\':Ince 10 the concept of aumobllIt}',

c-r.

Japan devtlqped an ajrbo,,~ capability basnJ on GeTman IIKthods, btU madt onry hmiud 14M of g1idvJ, mainry clrring 10 a Jadl oft/xr:ing airr:roft. Tht Kolmsai Ku-7.S«n here, mu Iht largat lUSQult gljder bUIlt In Japan and could hold lhnIy-rtro lroops or an Dghl-Um tank, By tht ttmt of III first flighl, mAugust 1944,Japan fWS las",g tht tror, and It did IIot progrtss «yo"d the exptrimcJIlul Stage.

tar)' passenger senice for th~ Allies similar to thai provided by Imperial A1rways ft)1ng boats \130 the African routes. \'('ithin the war zone, US Arm)' Air Force and GS Na\1' flying boats such as thc Martin 1>B2'\\-1 Mars and the smaller Catalina and Mariner v..ert used for supply and communications. Brilllin's Short Sunderland flying boa15 pro\'lded both stnteglC and in-theatre support. The China·Burma-Indla theatre saw tWO outstanding examples of air transport support. From 1942 to 1945 US and Chinese forces operating out of southern China were sustained by massi\'e airlift from bases in India and Burma. l>Ushed westwards by thrtal ofjapanesc fighlers, this route had to surmount the Himalayas; 'Crossing the Hump' il was cal1ed. 'l1"Ie operation began with C-47s ,each carrying three Ions of supplies. As the C-47s were progrcssi\'cly replaced by Curtiss C-46 Commandos and smaller numbers of Douglas C-54s and Consolidated C-109s, the monthly airlift rose from 2,800 Ions (2,840 tonnes) in February 1943 to 7,000 tons (7,110 tonnes) by December of that year, then to 12,000 tons (12,200 tonnes) in early 1944. A morc direct use of air support was provided in Burma for Orde Wingate's 'Chindits' in their long-range penetrations of Japanese-held terrilory east of the Chindwin river. Wingate had pre\'iously employed Ri\F transport support in a successful campaign againsl the Italians in Ethiopia. Now, this 'genius for unorthodox and no\'C1 warfart' as his commander, Gen ''''a\'dl, called him, inspired an operation that prtsaged modem concepts of air mobililY with its total integration of air and ground forces employing an ingenious \'lIriet}· of techniques and airborne operation. Hi firsl infiltration of j3pan~ territor)' in 19",,2 in\"Ol\'ed 3,000 men in eight sc:parale 'columns' m0\1ng by fOOl through hazardous lerram whert their success and \'ery sun1val depended

136

The 'ChlnJ,,' Ulmpaiglls III Burma sat: lhe Second U'arld Ir;'r~ bur txampk of al' tra,1SfKJ71 in SlIppt1Tt of a ground wmpalgll. mdudillg the torly lISt of hdicopttrs for a"''''I1/ml
='=.

Special operations Britam's second airborne operation had been more successful than i15 ill-fated anack on the Tragmo aqueduct, On 27 February 19~2 120 men of the 2nd Parachule Danahon made a danng nighl drop from their W'hltlers on 10 the French coaSt at Brune\-aJ, near Le Ha\'re, to overcome the defencC5 of a German radar installation, not 10 dcstroy il bul to enable a radar expert Specially trained for the mission to examine, dismantle, and take parts from II. The for~ \\1IS reeo\'Cred from a nearby beach by a na\1I1 flotilla, It "1IS a classic amp ck "Jai,,; a c1andesune raid rather than a full aIrborne assault, Throughout the war and in most of its theatres the support of co\'ert operations v.WdS an important but underslandably less appartnt function of air transport, rangmg from the droppmg or air landing of single 'agents' 10 Ihe delivery of'speeial forces' in groups of \'arious strengths. A total of 420 men and women of Special Operations Executive (SOE) alone entered France during the war, mostly by parachute or airlanding. For the lauer, the \'\'estland Lysander was well suited. E\'olved as 11 two-scat army co-operation aeroplane, it found wider usc during the \\'lIr for air-sea rescue and for the transport of agents into and out of hostile territOry. Four such passengers could be crammed into its fuselage, and its short-take-off-and-Ianding capabilit}, made it ideal for the small fields, roads and rough moorland that It used for missions in occupied Europe. An aircraft offered the ob\'ious ad\1Intage of lifting people OUt of as well as into hostile territory. A fine example of a 'Iift-out' \\':IS Germany's rescue in 19",,3 of Ihe deposed lkmto ,\lussollm from imprisonment in what "':IS thought 10 be an impregnable hOlel 9,000(( up in the Abruzz.i mounlliins. served only by a funicular raih\':IY, Led by sc:lf-styled 'air commando' Otto Skorzen)', eight}· men wcre landed in Iwelve DFS gliders on a narrow OUIcrop of rock alongside the hotel, while others dropped by

upon supply from the air by RAF C-47 Dakotas and Lockheed Hudsons. \"'ingate's more ambitious operation In 19·U W2S more generously supported by an IntegratUSAAF force of bombers and fighters, gliders, Sunson L-I and L-5 hght aircraft, and SC:\'en squadrons of C-",,7s, all under the command of the equally inspirational LI Col Phillip Cochran, USAAF. His force of support alrcrafl became the lSI Air Commando Group, whose SUCCtsSOTS ha\'e continued to give dedicated air support to clandtstine operations to this day. Of the 12,000 ChindilS commincd to Operation Thursday in 19""4, 10,000 were airlifted (with 1,300 mules) into rough airstrips and jungle clearings that had b«n seized by glider.borne assault troops then prepared by glider-borne engineers. -Inc troopS who struck out from thtse forward bases were further supplied by air-

--

t..,J" I

~'. ._

Ofslpled for army w-cpvalicn, tJ~ Ifb:tlwui L)'$Ondn pro('4kd an air-drop Ulpability for ground loren and air-sea 1'QaI~, und a clamkstillt dtlit.vry a"d rtlr1et'01 S)'jfnn for .-I{[ltd agmts, Ilsualry ImtkT CDt~ of darlm.w.

137

AIRCRAFT OF THE

SECO~D

\l'ORLD \l'AR AIRMOBILITY

for example, 700 men of the French SAS dropped in fifty separate parties to disrupt German communications in norm-east Holland. The dropping of Allied agents and 'special force' groups was largely \'ested in RAF Special Duty Flights or US Air Commando units, using the full rangc of available aircraft.

parachute into me \
Allied expansion Churchill's hectoring of his Chiefs of Staff in 1941 led to immediatc plans to expand the airborne force to a full brigadc of four battalions, and to put the training of paratroops cntircly in RAF hands, instead of it continuing as a joint task. To the overall command of British airborne forces Churchill personally appointed General 'Bo~" Browning, Under his elegant and forceful leadership and against considerable opposition, particularly from the Air Ministry, the force was to expand into two divisions. -10 operate the British transport support for these divisions, RAF Transport Command was formed in htarch 19..0 . Operational control of its fleet of converted bombcrs, C-47 Dakotas and gliders was \'estcd in 38 and (later) 46 Groups. The British glider force now had a less attractive but more workmanlike vehicle than the Hotspur; the Airspeed Horsa, of which 700 were buill during the war. lnis al1·wooden machine could carry rwenty-cight troops or a gun crew with howitzer and light truck. '1'0 unload the latter, man)' Honas were equipped with cordite charges known as 'surcingles' to blow off their tailplanes, or with a system of quick-release nuts and wirc cutters 10 achieve thc same resUlt. A larger \'ersion and a powered \'ersion of the Horsa were protected but not produced. 1ne heavier lift was provided by the

1\7111m BritiJh g/iderbormJ troops did go 10 rear, it was primarily ill Ihe Airspeed Horsa, whieh amid carry Iwemy.el"llt lroops or a hOfdl:::er wilh a ligllltrl/ck. 138

Heavy Ilftfor Brilish airbomeforces U'aS provided by Ihe Gellera/ Aircraft Ha",ilcar, capable ofcarrying sUly IroopS or a wllk iI, which nus l/nloaded Ihrough IIle hinged nose door_

s~cia/ly designed for

Gencral Aircraft Hamilcar, which could carry sixty trOOps or a light tank (specially built for it) into battle. It had clamshell doors in the nose for ease of loading and unloading. Over 400 were built. A handful of fifteen-scat SJingsby Hengisl paratroop-carrying gliders had been produced, but changing Service requirements rendered them obsolete. This forcc of powered aircmft and gliders would ne\'er be enough to lift the whole of British airborne forces into banle, and reliance would have to be placed on additional American airlift rl'SOurces, which were vast. The advance of the starus and strength of air trans· port during thc Second \X'orld War was most apparcm in the USA, where it was supported by a manufacturing capacity well beyond that of its Allies - and its enemics. By 1943 the USA had o\"Cr 1,900 transport aircraft, more than all the rest of the world's transport aeroplanes combined. Furthermore, these aircraft were designed as transports, not converted from bombcrs, and were operated by an appropriate command structure. In july 1942 Air Transport Command was formed as part of the USAAf; with the US Navy and Marine Corps retaining their own independent transport forces, and their own airborne units. In March 1943 USAAF Troop Carrier Command was also formed, to gi\'c specialist support for airborne operations and for airlift of troops between major theatres and battle zones. -me first large.scale airborne operation mounted by the Allies, combining assault by glider and parachUlc, came close to total disaster. 'Inc planning of the invasion of Sieil}' by sea and air had been notable for disagreements between most of the commanders, poor communications at all levels, and inadequate training of the American aircrews who were to deli\'er the airborne forces. J\·1ost wcre former airlinc pilOts, accustomed to flying fixed routes with beacons to guide thcm, not to delivering trOOps across seas at night into unknown terrain against enemy guns.

On the night of 9 july 1943 British and Amcrican airborne troops were lifted from bases in Tunisia to spearhead the invasion. Of 147 Waco and Horsa gliders carrying Britain's 1st Airlanding Brigade, only tweh'e reached their landing zones. Sixty-nine were released early and landed in the sea, drowning 600 men. One landed in Malta, one in Sardinia. The remainder were littered about southern Sicily. The first wave of paratroops fared no better. Of 3,400 American troops dclh'ered into southcrn Sicily that night, only some 200 were dropped on target; some landed as far as sixty miles from their drop zones. -Ine follOWing night an attempt to reinforce the Americans with a further 2,000 men came under intense fire from 'friendly' naval guns which killed 20 per cent of the paratroops. On 13 july the British 1st Parachute Brigade joined the battle and suffered the same treatment. Of their 116 aircraft, twenty-nine failed to drop at all, and only thirty-nine dropped their men on or within half a mile of their drop zones. Determined fighting and plenty of'airborne initiative' helped to retrieve the situation, but the immense shortcomings in planning and delivery threw the whole furure of airborne forces into question. Gen Eisenhower order<'d an inquiry which only narrowly conduded that airborne forccs did ha\'c a part to play, pro\'ided they were gi\'en realistic tasks, adequate support, and proper training, particularly of airerews. The Allied iO\'3sion of Europe Doubts and differences of opinion about the cffecti\'e· ness and the purpose of airborne operations still lingered at high leve[s of command as the Allies prepared for the im'asion of mainland Europe in June 1944. Tne enthusi· asts favoured a deep penetration by four airborne divisions to establish an airhead midway between the Normandy beaches and Paris. At the other extreme, Air Chief Marshal Lcigh.j"lallory, as Gen Eisenhower's Air Commander, forecast 80 per cent casualties and advised

139

AIRMOIlILITY

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Supply of the beach-head by air became crucial. As soon as a toehold on the coast had been achieved, Airfield Construction Companies hacked out rough airstrips known as'lcmporary Staging Posts (TSPs) into which poured essential supplies, and out of which poured the wounded - over 50,000 of them from British strips alone during the first three months of the battle for Europe. -Inc great force of Allied C-47 Dakotas was the mainslay of mis might~· airlifl. Afler the breakout from me beach-head, supply lines became critically stretched by me rapid Allied advance through France and into Belgium. Before me Channel ports could be taken and repaired, the aeroplane was a vital link between supply bases in Normandy and the forward positions, particularl)' when the road supply of the British armies suffered from the withdrawal of 1,400 lorries to which \\Tong gearbox components had been fined. The TSPs and the Dakotas kept hard on the heels of the ad\'ancing armies. Louis Strange, now commanding a \X'ing of TSI~s in Europe, remembered watching 435 DakOias land at Evere, offload, then take off again in the space of six hours,

against an airborne assault at all. Eisenhower chose the middle path, wim plans to prOleCt the flanks of the seaborne invasion with airborne landings in strengm. The US 82nd and IOlst Di\1sions were to create a defensh·e block on me right flank; me British 6th Airborne Division to seize vital bridges and destroy selected strong points on me left. The drops took place in darkness on 5 June. The Americans were again poorly dropped, being spread over an area twemy miles \\ide instead of being concentrlued on their intended drop zones. But, fighting numerous isolated battles in small groups, they created even more confusion amongst a surprised enemy than they experienced themselves, and by dawn were on their way to achieving meir objectivcs. Wim some exceptions, the British were dropped with greater accuracy by their more experienced crews. Glider-borne trOOpS caprured vital bridges over me Caen Canal and me River Orne and held them until reinforced by ground trOOps ad\·ancing from the beaches. ParatrOOps destroyed other bridges then fought a holding action against German forces trying to launch a counterattack against the beach landings. A elassic coup de mail1 by only 150 men out of a very scattered 750 dropped by glider and parachute silenced the heav~' guns of the Merville bauery. Despite the scattered dropping of the Americans, the airborne assault was fully justified, and the trOOPS then remained in position and fought on the flanks through much of the battle to consolidate the beach-head.

Arnhem 'Inc epic struggle for the bridge at Arnhem is perhaps the best-known of all airborne battles, purely through the heroic nature of the fight against great odds that is the hallmark of the paratroopcr. Operation ,\1arket Garden, of which Amhem was but a part, was a bold concept, tragically flawed in its de-

Halifax /lIg aircraft O/Id their Hamilcar gliders are marshalled at 1arram RIISluOII in prepratiol/ for tire airbome imXlSiol/ of Normalldy 011 D-Day

140

o\·er the \'(·'aal at Nijmegen, but only after some delay. AI Arnhem, although well delivcred outside the town, the Ist British Airborne Division soon met unexpected and fully alerted opposition, and only one battalion was able 10 fight its way 10 the bridge. Its northern end was held by 750 men of John Frosl's 2nd Battalion for o\·cr three days, a day longer than ordered; a da)' longer man it should have taken the British 2nd Army to reach and relieve them. The rest of the division were pressed back against the Rhine by far hea\ier enemy forces. Bad weather delayed resupply and reinforcement by the 1st Polish Parachule Brigade, and the British 2nd Army failed to appear until after the battle was o\·er. Of the 10,095 men who had landed at Arnhem, only 3,000 came back o\·er the Rhine. It was not the airborne soldiers nor the aircrews who tlew them into battle who failed at Arnhem. It was the planncrs. "Inc solution? \'\lith not too much hindsight, a direct assault on the bridge by gliders backed by paratrOOps, preferably at night, reinforced when local dcfences had been wiped out, might ha\·e becn costly in immediate terms, but it would not have COSt 7,000 men.

Heavily-lade" troops of Britain's 1st Airborlle Division on board a Dakota heading for the drop zones oll/Sitk Amhem, and the brave bw poorly pial/lied 'Baule for the Bridge'.

tailed planning. Just as Kurt Student had laid a 'carpet' to Rotterdam for Hitler's Panzers in 1941, the Allies sought to lay a se\·enty-mile carpet of neutralised defences and captured bridges across the Low Countries, along which would roll me British 2nd Army to gain a foothold beyond the lower Rhine at Arnhem, then wheel right and strike into the heart of Germany, But if it had Student's vision, ""arket Garden scorned the basic ingredients of succcssful airborne operation as pioneered by him: boldness, surprise and concenU'ation of force upon the target. 'Ille Americans, after their painful experiences of night dropping, insisted on a daylight assault e\'en though it would lessen surprise. Surprise IH Arnhem disappeared altogether in tactical terms when the RAF then decided that if the assault was to be in daylight, it would not fly against the flak barrage that \\"Ould surely protect me bridge; instead it would deliver the trOOpS [0 suitable dropping zones seven miles to the west of thc town, Conccntration of strength evcn in the wrong place might hl1ve compensated for the lack of surprise, bUI such concentration was denied by spreading the delivery of the total force o\'er three days. To these major faults were added differences of opinion at high level, an inadequate plan for dose air support, poor communications, underestimation of the time that it would take the ground forces to reach Arnhem, and an intelligence report that completely failed to acknowledge the presence in Arnhem of headl)' armed Panzer units. All stemmed from a gross underestimation of the enemy, \\Tinen off by some as already defeated. The outcome was the military disaster known to the world. The airborne deli\·ery on 17 September 1944 went wcll. "Ille US 10 ISt Airborne Division took the southernmOSt river and canal crossings in the Eindho\'en area_ The 82nd Airborne Division captured the bridge

The unforeseen Towards the end of 1944 an operation was forced upon Allied airborne forces that was to presage one of their more modern roles: rapid reaction to the unforeseen. 1ne unforeseen in this case was an unexpected attack by eight Panzer divisions on weakly held positions in the Ardennes, in an attempt to break through Allied lines and strike in 'Blitzkrieg' style for Antwerp. As part of this bid, Hitler ordered his Fallschirmjager into battle once morc. Fewer than 700 paratroops could be mUSlered in sixty-se\'cn Ju 525, flown by inexperienced pilOts in poor visibility and 30kt winds. The drop was widely scattered and the airborne operation a complctc failure. Howevcr, in what was to be called 'The Battle of the Bulge', the Panzcrs broke through me American lines and slammed mc defenders back upon me town of BaslOgne, there to be reinforced by the US 82nd and 10 ISt Airborne Dhisions, trucked into battle only two weeks out of the fighting in Holland. AI Bastogne they were immediately surrounded by the Germans and CUt off from ground supply. A group of I~athfinders parachuted into the battleground to guide in an airdrop by C-47 Dakotas from British bases. Essential fuel and artillery ammunition could onl)' be carried by glider, so in a series of flights, fifty Waco gliders manned by US crcws wcre launched into the area. Thirty-five of them landed within mc perimeter; fifteen were destroyed by ground fire, as were thirteen of the tow aircraft. 'Inc losses were heavy, but the supplies, and me voluntecr surgical teams, that they brought to beleaguered Bastogne played an important part in the e\"Cnrual Allied defeat of Hitler's last bold attempt 10 rurn the tide of the battle for Europe.

141

.... IR.\IORILITY AIRCRA"T OF TilE SECO:'l:O

~'ORLO ~'AR

essential supplil'S of food weTC dropped to starving civilIan popuilluons, as a prc:ce:dent for a modem function of aIr supply.•\Iost notable was Operation Manna. in \\ hich Allied aircraft lIew to the relief of the popula. tion of northern Holland, stan·ed by German denial of food and the flooding of their polder-lands. During ten days in April 19-15 the: RA.F alone mounted 3,156 sorties by 145 de Ha\'illand .\losquilo light oombers and 300 A\,.o Lancasters to drop 6,685 Ions of food. mostly by free drop. \'('ith the ending of the: war in Europe. attention turned to the mO\'ement of aircraft and men to reinforce Allied operauons 10 the: Far East and the anticipate:d 10\"'3~ion of japan. 10 which airborne forces werc expected 10 fealure. The atomIc bombs dropped on I hroshulla and Nagasaki cancelled such mO\"CS.

Fro", /941 IImi/ / 945 lhe Clmiss C-46 Commando prot-1acd m/lloblt airlift of/tId onJ olhn slIpplin across lhe Hinwlayan rrJtlgts /rom /nJIa to $olllltr,." ChI/la, II provtd nl1nrrabk U'ltm IIS~J dllnng Opt'rotIO', lImit)', tltr crrmmg of the Rh'nl:.

of the: aIrborne troops bc:mg lulled or wounde:d, and 240 lfOOp-carrying aircrafl shot down. Particularly \l.llner· able was the C-46 Commando, used for thc first timc in combat, It pro\'cd to be: a fire· trap. \'('ith fucl running down the fuselage from rupturcd tanks, the machine \\'Ould explode In flame If hit by trace:r. Twe:nty.four of the scventy-Iwo that flew across the Rhine that day crashed in flames. The Horsa and Hamilear gliders suffered heavily, tOO, Released as high as 2,500ft (750m), they hngered far too long in the sky as choice targets for German gunners. The Waco gliders, released as low as 500ft (150m) for their more shallow approach, fared slightly beller. 11lCTC were those who said that the costs were too high, and the achievements of the airborne aSS3ult 100 small to justify such massive application of effort and material. Even at this late stage of the war the arguments over the: effectiveness of massive airborne assault went on. But if Varsity lacked OOldm..'Ss, other operations planned for the closing months of the war certainly did not, Operation Arena envisaged the dc1ive:ry of six airborne: dIvisions (the: USA now had four) and four airlanded infantry dl\;sions to create an 'island' srronghold and airhead midway between the Rhine and Berlin. and it was no coincidence that this concepl echoed Orde \'('mgate's long.range massive:-peneuation theories, for his Air Commande:r, Col Pht! Cochran, was now on the planOlng staff for airborne operations in Europe. Operation Eclipse was a planned llIssauh on Berlin itself.

The Rhine - lhe last great airborne assault Still reeling from the defeat at Arnhem. the planners got it righl to the point of over-caution for the last great airbornl: opel'3tion of thl: war, Operation Varsi~·. Thl: intl:nuoo was to uS/: airborne lfOOpS to suppon thl: crossmg of thl: Rhml: by seizing high ground beyond the ri\'er and blocking possible counterattacks. On 25 March 1945 21,680 airborne troops of the British 6th and the American 17th Airborne Divisions were carried over the Rhine ncar \X'essell in 1,696 transpon aircrafl and 1,348 gliders, flying in threl: columns each of nine aircraft across, with escorting fighters above and fighterbombers on the flanks to suppress anti-aircraft fire. There rna}' ha\'e been some in that aerial armada who recollected the six ancient Whitleys and the single IlolSpur glider thaI demonstrated the full might of Briush airoorne forces to Churchill in 1941. The paratrOOps went first, S3rurating the target area in less than tWl:nl1' minutes. Then came the gliders, taking longer to land reI still concentrating the whole onelift assault into less than tv.'O hours. "me main ingredients for SUCCI:SS were thert:: conct:ntrauon of force III the shortl:St possiblt: time, on top of the targets, \\;th air superiori~' and close air support. Success it was, with all objecti\'cs achieved, and a link-up with ground forccs \\;thin IWe-mr-four houn. But the cost of Vanit), was high. Most losses werc from anu·3.l.rcnft fino on the approach and ground fino from German troOps on the: landing zones, 25 per ccm 142

(h,e of Ille final air-sllpply operations of Ille fror m:u Operul101l ,\lamia, tile droppmg of food 10 start:lIIg DII/dl <'1t'1/4111S by a variety of BrrliJlI aeropklllt'S, lIIdlldmg I
Nt:ither plan was implemented; Varsity remains the laSI of the gre:at aIrborne battles in Europe. Some of the final alrmobibty operations of the wllr in Europe were of a more humane nature. SAS parties were parJchuted in to protect prisoners of war and some of the inmates were airlifted from their camps. And

~

,lIt/wllglI Russia plo"urrd the co'lUP' 0/ assallil gliders dllr1Il.f I/~ 1930s, II "JaJe lillk optralio'la/ 11M 0/ the AmO,Wl: dllrllllllle tNT.

"'-7

Condusions The Second World \'('ar promptM immense am"'3nces in the uSC' of air tran<;port in support of ground forces. notably in the de:h\ocr)· of trOOps 1010 battle from the air, and in the: reinforcc:ment and supply of combat areas. Mistakes Wl"fC: made, particularly among the Allies. who suffered throughout the war from ha\IDg begun It \\lthOUI a clear air mlOsport poI.iq, and then continued It WlthOUI rc:sol\lng differences of opinion 0\"C'f the: role: of air transport in general and airborne forces in particular. Of the major combatants, only Germany entered the war \\lth a wdl-prepared transport force and an agreed dOCtrlOe for ItS use.The USA was able I:\·entually to provide the matenal resource:s, but suffe:red from lack of an agreed policy as to how those resources might best be employed. Britain, too, failed 10 imegratc adequately Its command and conlrOl of the air and ground forces, ']h:hOlcal Improvements to the transport fleets continued throughout the war, though not as fast as development of Ihe fighter and bomber, and gcnerJ.lly with a lower priority in construction. The tendency was 10 rely upon Ihe junkers ju 52 and the C-47 Dakota as well· tried workhorses, and to supplement them with newer aircraft wilh increased payload. Throughout the wllr Brilain relied on ci"ihan air transport, com'erted bombers. and American aircraft. What of Russia, that great pioneer of airborne assault? Small groups of paratroops jumped into Finland 10 1939. and later parnchule:d behind the ad\·ancing German armu:s to act III a partisan role. Gliders were uSC'd on a few occasions in similar small-scale actions. The only Russian aIrborne operation of any size mounted during the \\"'3r failed dismally when 5,000 men were dropped on the western side of the Ri\'Cr Dnelper to hamper the rctrc:aung Germans, but were so v.idely scat~ tered that they fought only in defl:nsi\-e pockl:ts and w-ere \'irtually wiped OUI The 'Locust Warriors' who had once prorruSC'd so much. nO\\ suffered from lack of leadership, 143

A1R.\IOHILITY

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO:-:D WORLD WAR

Appendix:

Maximllm speed Range

Principal Transport Aircraft and Gliders

Spa" lLngth

'-.,,-

•

- .._. ". - -

LoaJ

Junkers Ju S2/3m

DFS 230 (glider) Germany's maIO tactical assaull glider, Later "ersions used a braking parachute to shorten the landing run, and had a forward-firing machine·gun to keep defenders' heads down

-.

E1Igm~s

,\faxlmllm sp<~d

Ra""

,

• ~

. .' '

".

.

'

.'

..

••

"

'.'..' .- '.

o

":'. -.' ::: ..

.. .. - .:.' - . ".. '

'.

Span

1-L1Iglh

-- -

U>aJ

.-;. " '" .. - . .'

~"-

~~

.~

." ':'J.:"'~.

.. ·-:r·,-. _ .. .- . .- , . '. -

...

'

.

:

'.

Jlaximum spud Ra,1lC

Span I..ength

lack of a doctrine, lack of an adequate transport fleet and, for much of the war against Germany, lack of air superiority. It is also likely that, in a totalitarian society that encouraged II belief that all are equal and no man better than another, the Russian paratroops themsel\"es lacked that spark of elitism without which a paralrOOper IS not full)' armed. From the dc\-elopmenlS, from the mistakes and from the successes, deri\"ed sc\"eral pointers lOwards the potential for airmobiht)' in support of the ground forces: 1 The aeroplane now had the 'reach' and the reliability for slr.ltegic deployment of men and material, as shown by the airlift o\"er the Himalayas into China and the establishment of an 'Atlantic bridge' for the ferrying of aircraft to Britain. 2 The eon'-enuonallr.lnsport aircraft had established a tactical role "ithln the battle area. and the newly introduced helicopter promlscd to extend and ultimate· I)' alter this role immensdy.

ii',,,.

3 The massi\"e airborne assaults against a prepared enemy hud become increasingly costly. Would further advances in ground-to-air defences sweep them from the sky altogether? On the other hand, smaller-scale operations making full use of boldness and surprise had generally been morc successful and less cxpensi\"e in men and material. 4 Transport aIrcraft deSigned for the job, with good load/range ratio, rugged performance and preferably wide-door load 109, now had a definite place in the air force iO\'emory, 5 'Inc optimum usc of air trnnsport in support of ground forces reqUlK'd mtegrated command and control of alt and ground elements and an agreed doctrine of usage; rarely "-ere either achieved by the Allies dunng the Second \'('arld \'('ar, \'{"hether these pointers would be followed K'mained to be Ken.

144

LoadeJ wnghl .\fanmum U1UI spud

])( 830hp R\1\X' 132A·] radials 276km/h (J -2mph) 998km (620 miles) 29.26m (95ft Ilin) 18,9Om (62ft) 18 paratroops or 4,536kg (10,OOOlb) offre!&ht.

Span iLngth

U>aJ

/~d

l..oatkJ weighl ,\fax.",,,m U1UIsp«d

3 x I,OOOhp Bramo 323R-2 radials H7kmjh (r2mph) (2,~ 73 miles) 3,970km (111ft lOin) 3~.05m 25,llm (82ft 4in) 35 trOOpS or 5,670kg (J 2,500lb) of freight.

Span &"glh /.-1

,HaxWIIlIll speed

RfJ'lgt

Span I~ngrh

Load

Loadtd «Ieighl ,\!aximllllll(ltv speed

Span

6 x 990hp Gn6me·Rh6ne 14N ~8/49 radials 214km/h (I 37mph) 1,121km (696 miles) 55.15m (181ft) 28.35m (93ft 4in) 130 troops or 9,752kg (21,500lb) offrcight.

Ullglh

LoaJ

2~Ohp

7.296kg 209kmjh 24.36m IS.76m 22 troops 2,721kg

(16,094Ib) (130mph) (80ft ~in) (51ft lOin) or (6,OOOlb) of freight.

ITALY Savoia-.\tarchcui SM.81 and S.\1.82 f.'lihtary de,'e!opmem of the m-motor S~1,73 ci\illr.lns· port, and Italy's predomJOant paratrooptng. troop lr.lns· port and freighting aircraft.

Fie eler Fi 156 Storch A communications and liaison aircraft with outstanding STOL performance, ideal for clandestine support. Ix

39.-IO-4kg (86,860lb) 218krnJb (Irmph) \\ith He IIIZ tow 55m (180ft 5in) 28.15m (92ft 4in) 130 trOOpS or up to 12,196kg (26,8~6Ib) offrcight,

Gotha Go 242 (glider) A twin-boom freight glider well suited to the carriage of guns, small "ehicles or light tanks. Introduced in carl)' 19~2 and used mainly for supply missions on the Russian From. Twin engines were added to create the unsuccessful Gotha Go 244.

,\lesserschmin Me 323 High-wmged. six-engine monoplane. Germany's main heavy.1ift aircraft, valuable on the Eastern Front but an easy prey to fighters elsewhere. Laler \'ersions mounted defensi\"e 20mm cannon in four power-operated turrets,

Engmes

2,09Okg (~,6301b) 209km/h (130mph) 21.98m e2ft lin) 11.201m (36ft lOin) 9 troops or 1,236kg (2,-S01b) offK'lghl.

Messer-schmitt ,\le 321 (glider) Hea\)' tnilnsport glider. one of the largest aircraft of the Second \X'orid \'rar. Used rocket·assisted take-off and sperial rug aircraft.

junkc-n ju 352 An all-wooden \-enion of the cancelled ju 252 proiect, produced only in small numbers as a freighler with rear loadmg doors, Not usually employed In an assault role. but used for reinforcement and supply.

Engmc

A fl-uvt of C-47s drops Allied troops beyond the Rhine dllring the Wsl of the grcat alrbome assall/u of lire Second I\,&,/d ,\ tore than 20,000 lIIen fl-'crelallMd by pamchlllt alld glider in Ins tha" two hOlln.

(l09mph) (2.ul miles) (46ft 9in) (32ft 6in)

GER.:\lANY

The mamstay of ~nnan}"s air uanspon fleet, derived from early junkers tinl airliners. Rugged performance rrnlde It an Ideal front-hne support aircraft for freighting, paratrooping, and 1rOOp-landing roles.

•

17Skmjh 38Skm 14.2Sm 9.9m 2 passengers.

3)( 750hp Nfa-Romeo RC35 radials

Argus ASIOC-3 in·line

145

AIRCRAI"T 01" TilE 51,CO".;'I> WORI I> WAR

l\laxlmlllll SpaJ

Rallge Spall UlIgI"

(-oaJ

326km/h (I 96mph) 1,311 km (932 miles) 22.96m (78ft 9in) IS.33m (60ft 1m) 16 paratrOOps or ~,761kg (IO.500lb) offrelghl.

AIR,\IOBILITY

-l x 1,600hp Bristol Hercules xn radials 280mph (449km/h) 3,000 miles (4,823km) (30.I-m) 99ft S-ft 3in (23.92m) 40 troops as passengers, or 24 paratroopers.

EngllltS Maximum

speed

Rangt SPOil Lmglll Lc
GREAT BRITAIN Armstrong Whilworth Whitley "'k V Com·erled from Its original bombing role for paraehute training and operations by replacing me \'enlral gun turret with an aperlure for trOOPS to drop mrough. Tug for Ilotspur glider only. Englllfl ,\faxl1Plllni sp«J

Rung< Span [.Lllgt" l~d

2 x 1,1.J5hp RoDs-RO)·ce .\lerllO X in-hnes 230mph (370krn.lh) 2,400 miles (3,863km) 8Mt (25.58m) 69ft 3in (21.l7m) 10 paratrOOps.

Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle Conceived as a fast bomber, It SCT\"Cd almost exclusj\-ely as a glider tug and special I111I\sporl, fined \\ith under\\lng panmers for droppmg supplies. l"aratrOOPS ex.ued through a floor aperrure.

Westland Lysander The Mark lilA was used for c1andestme landing of agems in cncmy lerritory. Engllli .\faxwlllm sp«d

Ru"l' Spall Leng/II

Loud

1 x 870hp Bristol Mercury 30 radial 212mph (H2km/h) (805km) 500 miles (15.24m) 50fl (10.69m) 30ft 6in 4 passengers.

General Aircraft l-Iotspur (glider) Thc first Brilish glider built 10 a military specificalion, but used only as a Ininer. Alwin-fuselage \'crsion """"s produced but difficull to tty and did nOI emer scfliC('.

Maxllllllm

sp«J

Ruu" Spau

Lmg,.

Lc
I-Iandley Page Halifax A convcrted bomber used extensively as a glider rug as well as for dropping paratrOOps, agents and supplil.'S. Specification for Mk II.

I\laximlllll lOW spud Lenglh

Lc
General Aircraft Hamilear (glider) Designed to carry a \-ariC'ty of loads including Ihe light 'Teu-arch' l3Ilk or twO Bren CarricB; loaded and unloaded through hinged nose door. LoadtJ «'tig/II 1\10:1"1·"'1111I lOW

spud

Span Lmglh

Lc
Maxmlllm spad

Rallge Spa'i ILllgfll

Lc
x 1,390hp RoUs-Royce Merlin in-lines 285mph (458km/h) 3,000 miles (4,823km) 98ft lOin (30.09m) 71 ft 7in (21.83m) 16 paratrOOps

36,OOOlb (16,326kg) ISOmph (241km/h) (35.52m) II0fl (20.72m) 68" 25,OOOlb (10,3rkg) freighl or \-ehldes.

Airspeed Horsa (glider) Brilain's main battle glider, carrying troops or freight. Loaded fveighl .\faxi",ultI lOW

SPOIl

lLnglh Lc
Short Stirling I-,rst of RAF new generation of four-engine bombers, con\"Cned to U'OOP carrying, parachuting and supply dropping from ILS retained bomb ceDs.

146

ElIgllles

Douglas C-47 Skytrain (Dakota) 'Skytrain· to me Americans, ·Dakota' to the British, Ihe most \\ldely produced transport aircrafl of the war, deri\-ed from the DC-) airliner

l\faxilllllm

speed

Rcmgt SPOil

Lmg,.

Loud Engllla

,\faxiltllllll SptlJ RUlIgt Spall Ullgl},

Loud

2 x I,lOOhp l'rau & \X1J.itney R~ 1830'l"\\'in \'(·asp radials 230mph (433km/h) 1,600 miles (2,575km) (J9.65m) 64ft Sin 95ft (28.96m) 27 trOOps, or 6,OOOlb (2.-21 kg) of freight.

2 x 2,OOOhp Pratt & \Vhitney R-2S00-S I Double Wasp radials 269mph (433kmlh) 1,200 miles (1,93Ikm) 108ft (32.9m) -6ft -lin (23.3m) 30 paratroopers, .w passengers, or 10,OOOlb (4,536kg) of freight.

Waeo CG·4A (glider) Only glider used In any number by US airborne forces, for trOOPS and freight, induding light guns and vehicles, loaded through hinged nose door. Also used by British as the Hadrian. Other \·ersions produced in small numbers, such as me CG-13A, capable of lifling 30 trOOps.

Curtiss C.....6 Commando .\\ihtary \·ersion of the commercial airliner, used pnmar· ily for freighting in the Far East and I),.lcific, and occasionally for paratrooping, for which it pro\;dcd me first instance of simultaneous jumping from doors on both sides.

Loockd wnghl J\faxillllllll lOW spud

Bibliography

Hart, L, His/ory oj 1M SuO/.d Iforld Ifbr (Cassell, London, 1970). I'uts airborne operations inlO a \\ ider perspective.

Span 1.LlIglh

Lc
9.1501b 125mph 83ft 8m ~8ft 4in 13 troops 4,OOOlb

(4,151kg) (201km/h) (25A8m) (14.7~m)

or (1,814kg) offreighl.

~,300lb

l...oadcJ Wl:lIhl Spa"

2 x 1,590hp Bristol Ilercuics radials 2SOmph (403kmJh) 1,300 mIles (2,092km) --fl (23ASm) 60ft (I8.29m) 10 paratroops.

(J ,948kg) 120mph (193km/h) (l8.90m) 62ft 36ft Jin (11.08m) S troOps.

UNITED STATES

spted

IS,500lb 150mph 88ft 6-f, 25 trOOPS 7,200lb

(7,028kg) (241km/h (26.8m) (20Am)

or (3,259kg) offrcight.

Arthur, M, Me" oj the Red lkm (Hutchinson, London, 1990). A chronicle of personal experiences narr.lted by men of Britain·s airborne forces. Low in technol-

Hearn, P. Flying Rtbel (I-L\lSO, London, 1994). Biography of Louis Srnmge, who in the Second World War was h~\iJy in\Xlh·ed in the Irllining of British airborne forces, air resupply and the planrung of airborne operauons.

01)•.

Cole, C and Grant R. Bllt SOl In A~ (Ian Allan, London, 19-9). Subtilled 'The RAF in the Transport Role', this IS a sel~tion of illuslrllU\"C episodes ramer than a comprehensi\·e histor}' of the subject.

Heydte, Von Der, ~Jelus Rtll/med (HutChinson, London, 1958). Personal account of experiences with Germany's FaDschirmjagcr, including an evocaU\"C account of the battle for Crete.

Dedin, G M. Paralrooper (Robson Books, London, 1979). The Story of American parachute and glider eombat troops during the Second World War. farrar-HOCkley, A, TM Army ill ~ AIr (Alan SUllon Publishing, StrOUd, 1994). The hislory of the Bnlish Army Air Corps, includmg the Glider Pilot Regimem.

Hic~)·,

M, Oul oj l~ Sky (~hDs & Boon, London, 19-9). Comprchensi\"t history of air transpon In support of ground forces, ""lth emphasis on de\"CIopment of airborne forces.

Ga\·m, J ,'vl, Airborne I\urfa", (Infantry Journal Press, New York, 1947). Rcview of airborne operalions and policies dunng the S~ond World \'(:ar by commander of the US 82nd Division.

Kuhn, V, Germall 1~(Jralrooper$ ill I\'orld nur 'Iroo (Ian Allan, London, 1978). Concise and authoritati\·e treaunem of the history of the Fallschirm;ager until the end of the war.

Grqory, B and Balchelor,J.Airbornt'lfilljart 1918-1941 and Airborll~ Il'aljan 1941-1945 (Phoebus Publishmg, London, 19~8). lIJustr.ued treatment, \\;th selective technical details of alrcraft and \\-eapons.

Middlebrook..\t, Arnhtm 1944 (Voong, London, 1994). A re«nt examination of the Amhem battle, adding noming new but concisely gathering In the pre\;ous material.

147

AIRCRAFT OF TilE Sl:CO:-OD lll:'ORLD \l"AR

,\lrazek, J E, The Glider If,,r (Robert Hale, London, 1975), \X'riuen by one who was there; expres," the Spirit of the glider men as \\ell as the hlStol'"Y.

\X'igan, R, Operatum Freshman (\X'illiam Kimber. London, 1986), An account of Britain's ill-fated glider raid into Norway In 19..&2.

Tugwell, M, AirborM to &uk (\X'illiam KimbeT, London, 19-1). \'{'ell.presented history of airborne warfare from 1918 to 1971.

Wragg, D, Airlift (Aulife, Shrewsbury, 1986), A comp~hensive histor}' of mllital')' all' mnsport. \X'right, L, The IfOOden Srrord (E1ek. London, 1967). Personal account of author's Invol\'ement \\ith glider dC\'t~pment and oaining dunng the Second World War.

\Xbiting, C, SlDughur Ot'CT Sic:Jy (Uo Cooper, London, 1992). No-punches-pulled exarrunation of the Sicily operation.

6 aval Aircraft in the Second World War Norman Friedman As in aU other sphern. om:raft enormously affected the course of the mond World War at sea. 'lllrcc countries, Bfltain,Japan and the United State of America. operated large aircraft carner forces; Germany and Ital}' began work on carriers but did nOt complete them dunng the war. All the maior comballlnts operated land-based aircraft and seaplanes aSSigned to maritime operations, and mOSt battleships and cruisers operaled floatplanes or seaplanes, "Ine roles of these aircraft reflected some important differences between land and sea warfare, Surely the single greatest fact of nllval worfare is mobility. A ship, howe\-er large, is a \-ery small speck even on a rel:U.l\'c1y small sea such as the Mediterranean. Except for the important case of an attack on a fixed base (such asTaranto or Pearl Harbor). naval warfare begins with, indeed IS almost dominated by, reconnaissance.

Aircraft originaU}' entered into na\-aI warfare because thq offered far better ('O\'eI"3ge of the sea around a mO\'· ing Reet than any comblOaDon of surface sh.lps. Indeed, initially the only real Issue WllS the e)"ent to which air scouting could be made available in bad weather, Thc advent of true carriers launching wheeled aircraft soh'cd that problem. Howc\'er, the carriers soon became strike platforms, supporting torpedo and then [e\'el and dJ\'l: bombers, Strike warfare, particularly against ships but also against shore targets, was the main Second World \,(Iar carrier role. although the fighter defence of a fleet or convoy was also clurcmel)' important. Scouting did not disappear, hO\\'e\'er, and radar made scouts much more effecU\·c. That was particularly the case in the British and US navies. For example, from 19..&3 on Grumman TM,\ I Avengers were norm:llly equipped with simple anti.ship radars. Beginning in

."onu am:rajr tkslp! ""m ahroys be adapuJ to li",its i"'poMd by carri8J. &ofirt XF617 on t/~ lift of flJ'S Ravagcr has Its v;ings tioubll:-foIikJ to fit v;lthm a li",iud hangar d«Jt Might. L'S-built flelkat Jfk I JVlI5, f:islbk orr d«Jt, uw tksigned for carrlc opcutlo"s, v;ith v;ings folding bodrrrords speqfically to I"mt folded hnght, 148

149

SA\'AL AIItCItAI'T IN IIlE SECOSD \l'ORLD WAR AIRCRA"T OF TilE SECOND WORLD WAR

1942, the US Navy worked on an extension of this theme, Projecl Cadillac, in which a high-powered nucrowave radar on board a modified bomber could transmit a good-resolution radar pIctUre down to a ship from well beyond the horizon. In 1944 Proicct Cadillac was reoriented IO....1\rdS detecting and tracking low-flying enemy aircraft. It resuhed in both currier- and landbased forms of airborne early 'A1\rmng, a wry important pos[\'\"Ilr theme. Many nanes placed their scouting aircraft on txtard battleships and cruisers, By the Second \'(arld War such aircraft were Iypically launched by C3lapults de\"Cloping an end sp«-d of about 6Ok1. Catapult-launched aircraft were also important (or spotting the (aU o( shot from 1arge-cahbrc guns. Naval guns only rarely scor'W hits With the first sah'O. .\Iore usuall)' the)' missed, and the second and later sal\"OC$ were COrtn:led by 'spotting"!he position o( the splashes (the misses) rclati\'C to the rna\'IRg target. A1rcraft c1earl}' offer'W ad\1Ultages in spomng, SIRce obseT\"CTS on board could see well beyond a ship's horizon, and clearly s« by how much shells had miSsed. This role faded as radar came inlO scn;ce during the war, Radar could measure range quile accuralely, and its beams e\'Cn penetrated beyond a shtp's homon, That ....1\5 a relid, since C3U1pult-launched aircraft could be dtfficuh and cumbersome to re'cover, and catapults were often sublCCt 10 damage by the blast from a ship's guns. In the Royal Navy, space originally provided for catapults was often filled \o,;th light anti-aircraft weapons. Carrier (and land based) anti-submarine warfare was also an important theme throughoul the war. Second \'('orld War submarines were esscntially surface ships capable of dl\'mg 10 hide, A submerged submarine could remain down for up 10 about 4g hours, but only by moving extremely slowly; endurance 01 high speed was limited to aboul an hour. Merely by appearing, then, an aeroplane could in effect immobilise a submarine by forcing it down. If the aeroplane eaughl the submarine on the surface, il could drop a deplh bomb as the boat dhocd, with a vcry fair chance of causing serious or e\"Cn fatal damage. For example, only a surfaced submarin~ could close with a convoy or a naval formation. Air patrols around thai formation could keep submarines dQ\\'n and thus prevent them from auacking. Inilially, submarine commanders were relatively safe at nighl, and had to lie low only during daytime, or beyond the ship's or formation's horizon. The effect of wartime aircroft radar in Britain and in the USA was 10 keep submarines down during the nighl, limiting thcm 10 lying in wait ahead of Illeir targets. One Gc.rman counler was the snorkel, which allowed a submarine to run diesels wrule submerged and thus largel)' TC$IOr'W mobility. Th~ .-\lli~d counter was higher-frequenc)' radar capable of detecting a snorkel. Thus the mere presence of aircraft near a con\V)'

could drJsticaUy reduce Ille effectiveness of submarines. Hence the mlense Interest iR adapung long-range bombers to the com'Oy escort (mariume patrol) role, and also the com'ersion of many merchant ships to escorl carriers, AirC1'3fl were not aI\\1I)'s the anS\Oo'Cr. Land-based bombers enjoyed enormous endurance and considerable capaclt)', bul once on stauon they could nOI easily be rcmforced or rc\le\'ed before the scheduled time. For ex· ample, a Consolidated B-24 Liberator assigned to a ,\1arch 1943 Al1antic con\'O)' spotted a group of V-boats closing in. UnfoTlunately a series of attacks on the V· boats falled. The bomber ran OUI of depth bombs long before 11 was orne for another bomber 10 appear, so it be'gan 10 make dummy altacks, to fon.:e down the VboalS, For a time the dummies \o''Orked. Then the V-boat conunanders realised that the bomber had run OUI of bombs. They closed 10, and the bomber crew could only watch 10 horror as the altad progres~. In COntraSl, an escort carrier \\'Ould ha\'C bttn able to rearm aiTCl"3ft for repeated altacks. Clearly she, tOO, would ha\'C suffer'W from limiled magazine capaCIty, but that would not ha\'e bttn nearly so limned as the bomb load of the hapless Liberator. Submarmcs could g~ncrall)' expect 10 be safe once undern1\tcr. H()'\O,'C\'er, in !he \'cry clear ....1Ilers of the Mediterranean submerged submarines were sometimes so \'isible as to be quite \1Jlnerable 10 air attack. After scverallosses of boal$ to Italian seaplanes, the Royal Navy had to repainl Mediterranean submarines for bener concealment. Until 1943 the aircraft could attack the submarines only when they .....ere surfacL-d or when Illey .....ere diving. Then the Allies inltOduced a homing torpedo, the Mk 24 (Fido), which could be dropped as the submarine dh"Cd and could follow it down. About this time Ihey also introduced the firsl sonobuoys, which permitted an aeroplane to estimate a submarine's course once underwater (the search began at the point at which the submarine dh'ed). There was also magnetic anomaly detection (MAD). It prO\'cd useful in the Strait of Gibrallar, where flows between the Atlantic and lhe Mediterranean rendered conventional sonar nearly uscless. Consolid:J1ed PBY Catalinas ft);ng over the Smits could, hO\\~\"Cr, detect the metal mass of a submarine, and they could drop bombs (actu.ally relTo-bombs, whose rockclS cancelled OUt the aeroplane's forn1\rd motion) as the}' pas~. The other side of mobility is the n~d to shift forces to meel unexpec1ed demands. The O3\;es of the Second World War fa\'Oured fl}lng boats for long-range palrOl bec.ause lhose aircraft requir'W so little in the way of preparatJon for their bases; oflen no more than shel[ered CQ\'C3. The US and Japanese na\;rs built specialised seaplane tcoden specifically to SUppor1 \"CT)' mobile

150

"/'0"

171~ Sta is t.wt; tvm the ltJ~1 shIp is 0 s",ol1 spedt it. Almon oil natttJ/ optmllumS begIn t.....th fiNiing the many, aNi fro", W Ofltsl:t aircroft o.fJn?d an i",portam "'tatlS of r«DlmaUSOIICl!. TY)r tll~ L'S ,\'~, kJ1lg-roll~ sta-based aircro.fl likt Ihis Calalllla u't'n' a key 10 io
The tmy in frhich manli,fU air pouv:r di:t.v:/ofNd in difkrrm COfmtnn dllrmg the perIod /eaJmg up to W nur ckpoukJ politics. /II Bmalll. lhe RAF SOflght to rrplace lhe otOO .xrtw almast compkuly. ~ «JnSl!t/IU1IU ttw lhat il lhought oj liS big flying boats as man·tinu auadt alrrraft rolher tha" SCOflU, The Short SIIIIJerltJnd slwtrn Mrr aw a lau expression of this canupt.

Oil

151

"AVAL AIMCMA!'T IN THE SECOND \'\:'ORLD \1;'AR

AlltCRArT 01-' Tllh SECOND \1;'OItLO \1;"AR

ThT'Oflghom tilt S«ond IrilrJd Irar, sJun-t.bajed anli·ship a,rcraft /wJ a consJderabk tff«t on nm..'tJ1 operaticns «llhIn t1ItI, rrmge limiu, The ltaluVI air jora adliA-ed som~ c:emslderabk JJjtaS.Se$ v:ith 5 .•\1.79-11 torpedo bombers like Ihis 0,1t

Aerial ",,,,lIIg could dm)' all enemy k~ tooters. Dunng Ihe Sectmd Irorld Irar a iJrmsh prtSSUrt-IIIl11t (ampmp' dtsrroytd many L'·boou on training "illS ,n Ihe Baltie. kl/hng off n/lIlln-OIlS ~s btfon tky could b«ome lfPtratUmal. nit L"S aerial ",ining ~",palJ:n of /945, prosulI/ed largely by heavy bombers. wmnbllled ngnijicamly to the Strlmglllatwll ofJapan. Here Q Brilish Halllpdm. opera"·"g as a folld-hosed lorpedo bo"'bn, IS loaded wilh WI crenol "'ine (oj u'hith Ihe parodI/de fl!tarM is I."isibleJ, i" / 94 /.

In the USA, an imporumt agreement with the army limited the na\')' to carrier aircraft and \\1IIer·based aircraft (f1oatplanes and seaplanes), to the point that in 1941 th~ na\'y planned to buy small seaplanes (to be based in coastal co\'es and bays) to provide antisubmarine patrols off the US coast. '(ben the navy was permitted to buy a few twin-engined maritime patrol aircraft (Lockheed Hudsons), of a type already being bought for the RAE For a time it competed \\~th army anti-submarine unils, then, in 1942, the decision was laken to lransfer all maritime patrol aircraft, whether land- or water·based, to Ihe na\')·, l3y that time the ,"brine Corps. an arm of the navy, \\1IS already operating land·based bombers in lhc Pacific. japan was \'Cry different. In most wartime spheres the almost absolute 5<'par,ltion of arm~' and na\')' had disastrous con~quences. Howe\,er, in this one case the na\')' was able to operate what~\'er Iypes of aircraft it liked. indudmg land-ba~d bomb(rs and e\'en the land-based fighters which defended itS ba~. That made for considerable duplication of effon, which slrained the weak japanese Industrial baS(:. In Germany and Italy the land-based air arms were

operations. On~ of th~ surpri~s of the Pacific: war was the ~as~ with which airfields could be built on islands as they werc seized. 'Ibat surprise largely explains the adoption of large numbers of land-based patrol aircraft, such as Consolidated PD4Y Pri\·ateers. by the US Navy. Every country except japan was much affected b~' the politics of air control. In Britain, the Royal Air Force was eSlablished in 1918 as the single air service, In practice, the Royal Na\')' continued to control carri~r-based aircraft (although the RAF tried [0 limit their numbers), The RAF controUcd all land-based aircraft, induding those assigned 10 maritime missions, One consequenc~ was a rivalry b(tween the two Sen'ices for the role of def~nding imporlant bases such as Singapore, the RAF exaggerating the PI'O\\·l'SS of its land-based torpedo bombers as altemati\'es to coastal fortifications and ships, Another was that, instead of pro\'iding a fttonnaissance senice to the ft~t, RAF ftying boats .....ere concei\'Cd 35 an a/tvnatlt.-e to the f1cct, with parallel anti-ship responsibilitit'$. A third ....'as thaI the Royal Ka\'y ......a s not allowed to de\'elop itS na\'al aircraft for land anack, except In the exceptional circumstances of raids on enemy na'lll ba~,

152

but the techniquc sen"rely limited bomb weighl, as the aeroplane had to be able to manoeuvre violenliy while carrying itS load. Thus a w\'e bomb(r could .....rttk the upper works of a capital stup, but probably could not expect 10 inflict fatal daouge. The sort of bomb which could do the JOb could not be dropped in a di\'e, and mosl 1Ikely would nol hit. Of course, di\'e bombers could and did sink anything short of a battleship. Part of the problem was the bomb had 10 b( dropped from a great heighl to gain sufficienl momenlUm 10 penell'l1te armour. yet In thaI case hits were quit~ unlikely. Bombs dropped from hllting altilUdes lended not to arrh'C at sufficient speed. Thus, for example, il seems unlikely that any of the con\'ened batlieship sheUs dropped by Japanese aircraft at Pearl Harbor aCtually penetrated deck armour. -nus problem was only soh"ed in 19-B. with the Ild\'ent of guided bombs, one of which \\'3S used by the Germans to sink the Italian batlieship Roma that September. In the Pacific, the japancse kamikazes achie\'ed similar accuraC)', but not deck penelration; the combination of bomb and aeroplane could not attain anything lik~ th~ t~rminal \'elocity required. On the other hand, dh'e bombers prowd extremely difficult to shoot down because they moved so fast, Com'enrional anri-aircraft fire control techniqucs, in wtuch the motion of the air targel \\1IS measured and projected ahead, could not deal with th~m. The only solution seemed (Q be light automatic weapons (typically 20mm and ~Omm in Allied na\~es, 25mm m the Japanese Na\'y) which could, in effect, fill \\ith fire the area through whIch the bomber had to di\·e. Wartime de\'e!opmenls induded the adoption of glide bombing (in effect. shallow dive bombing) by aircraft not stressed for full, near-vertical di\'es, and also the in\'ention of skip-bombmg, in which a wry low.flying aIrcraft dropped a bomb to skip along the surface of the \\'3ler and hll a stup a1mOSI horizontaUy. In Bntain a

Di1.>t bombmg, dt"fleJoped by JefJCrul ,un.'leJ bm..' >tVI lIre U'Qn, dramatiaJ/ly ,mpl"UUd a carrUr's ability /i;I attadt tPlemy u'Qnh,ps btcause lIre dive bomber could in tjJUI bt aimtd at a /IIm:ill, ship. CS Navy Dalllllksses /iilt this O'lt, sllO«'II wilh dit.-.e brakts extmdtd, u:o" tIlt Raith of I/re Coral Sta alld Afldu'Q)" Ihe firsl 111 history i1l which llie ships mt:olved >/l.'Vtr tame U'ilhm visllal rx}flUU:I. dominant, The Luftwaffe controlled all land-based aircraft and seaplanes, and only grudgingly helped the navy with such essemial sen'iccs as reconnaissance in support of U~boats. The halian navy did operate aircraft based on board its battleships and cruisers, but it could nOl control thc much more important land-based reconnaissance and strike aircraft, Nor could it force the Italian air force to pro\~de strike aircraft (thc land-based Aeronillro"tt) in sufficient numbers. The So\'i~t Na\]' did control its own land-based aircraft, whose assigned roles induded auacks on enemy naval bases as well as on enemy ships. Thus the na\'31 air arm induded com'entional land-based bombers which we~ expected to carry mines and torpedoes; they were organised In mine-torpedo regiments.lbe later missilecarrying regiments were their direct descendantS. Somc important faclS of life Iimiled the effecth'eness of aircraft at 5<'a, Bombmg was of limiled \-alue against a manocu\Ting ShiP, The dewlopmem of dive bombing from the 19205 onwards made I( possible to hit manocu\Tlng shIps (essentially by pointing lhe aircraft at them),

153

NAVAL AIRCRAfT IS TilE SECOND \t'ORI 0 \t'AR AIRCRAFT OF THE

SECO~I)

WORLD WAR

agamst surface ships, and the US Na\1' had adopted an II. -510 weapon alongside Its more com'emional Sin rockets. These unguided missiles were effect.i\"C, but they also added to the amount of explosi\"e on a carrier's hangar deck, as the US Nav)' found to lIS COSt when earners \\o"Cre hit by kamikazes 10 19-15, Carner operation Imposed suff hmltauous on aircrafl. Although deck catapults exisled well before 1939, aircraft were gcncral.ly expectcd 10 make rolling take-offs. Thus the)' had 10 be able to take off \\o1thin a few hundred feet into, say, a 20kl wind generated by the ship's mouon. Landing imo arrestmg gear limited allowable stalling speed and thus wing loading. Aircraft also had 10 be ablc to CO\'cr diSlanccs greater than those common on land. The Royal Navy believed that tcally long range required specialist navigators, so it generally used two-seat aircraft. -Inetc were other limits. The carrier deck has a finite strength; it can accommodale only so much weight. hluch the same goes for the lift, which also limits overall airframe dimensions, at least when the \\o1ngs are folded, Arresting gear is rated for a gi\'en maximum aIrcraft speed and weighL On the other hand, existing aircraft could operate from relatively small decks. Catapults could make up for hmited deck length and low ship speed, Arresting gear could be installed on snu1I decks. It e\"Cn turned out that standard land-based fighters could be launched by catapult, for deli\'CTy directly into combaL Merchant ships could therefore be com'erted into simple 10\\'-

vanety of bouncing anti-shIp bombs were developed during 1943--44, but they were nOi used operationally. Capital ships certainl)' could be stopped and sunk b~ torpedo attack.. HO\\l:\'CT, to de!i\'CT torpedoes seemed to require a low, relam-el}' slO\\' approach which was Itself quite hazardous. Any \iolem pre-launch manoeU\Te would throw off the debcate m«harusm of the torpedo, 'Inere were various anempts to sol\'e thc problem, the ~I probabl)' being the British 'monoplane air tail' (MAn, in dTect a gYT'O-ConlrOlled glider which carri~ the 10rpedO through the air, and thus allowed launch at a greater range, The US Na\'Y Iried spoilers which slowed the torpedo both in the air and once it hit !.he walcr, in theory allowing launching at higher speed. 'Inc Russians dc\'e\opcd a gcncrally unsuccessful technique of high-altitude launches of pallcrns of torpedoes. Throughout the war, batlleships sunk by aircraft generally fell victim 10 torpedoes, even though in many cases thc)' also suffered serious bomb damage. The exccptions were thc lI.alian Romo (sec abo\'e), USS Arno,w (which seems to ha\'e exploded after a fire touched offb)' a bomb penernued a hatch in the armour deck and set off black powder mside a magazme), and the German Tirpltz (sunk by several \"Cr)' !lea\1' bombs while al anchor), The main addition to Allied air-launched anti-ship wcapone}' \\o"3S the rocket, initiall}' adopted 10 attack surfaced submarines (it could penetrate the submanne's pressure huD from a distance, thus pr«:luding div1Og). By about 1944 rockets were commonly being used

&/
seemed ob\ious that observers on surface ships could spot approaching enemy aircraft early enough to warn a carritt to launch IOterttptors, Then the slnJauon changed dramatically as bomber speed mcreased. \'('ithin about fi\"t' years, intercepLion seemed hopeless, Not only would \\o-aming time be too short, but bombers could spend much of their time aOO\"C cloud. It could not, of course, be assumed that an enem), would fail to launch fighters. That seemed to lea\"C bomber escort as the mam valid na\"31 fighter role; the fighlers might also strafe enem), air defence ...."Capons to help the bombers. The fleel would have 10 rely on its anti-aircraft guns and its armour for protection in the face of enemy aIr attack. Hcnce, for example, the British choice in 1936 10 build carriers with armoured hangars, whose aircraft would be slruck below (and thus protectcd) at the approach of enemy bombers. Ironically, JUSt as it seemed that the naval fighter was more or less finished, radar was im'emed simultaneously in Britain and in the USA. Suddenly there was a real prospect of gaining sufficient warning time to react effectively, and indeed of \'ectoring fighters out to attack incoming bombers. It is not dear 10 what extent the Impenal japanese Na\1' ('\'er accepted these Ideu. Certainly it Lacked radar 111 1941, but equally cet'tainly the radar-less japanese carriers put up :lI fighter defentt at batllcs such as Midway in 1942. It appears that by concentrating muluple ships together the japanese were able to mainlain a standll1g patrol of fighters O\"Cr their force, \\oithout ha\'ing 10 rei)' on warning. US and Brmsh thinking \\o"3S much more wedded to single-carricr operations, in which limited numbers would ha\"C prohibiled standing patrols, The japanCSt' may also ha\"C belie\'ed that their unden\'aler sound equipment would pro\ide sufficient early \\o-aming of the approach of large groups of aircraft (sound from aeroplanes tra\'els inlO and through the water). In an)' case, it was generally agreed th:1I a carrier loaded with aviation fuel and bombs was an accident wailing to happen. Thus, at least at the outset of war, it wa.s assumed that whiche\'er carrier force located the other fim would en;o)' a decisi\'e advantage,!.he ability to gam air superiority by wiping OUt the opposing carrier force. Thai made the situation in narrow European SC3S radically different from that 111 the central Pacific, where the USA and japan expected to fight. British carrier forces operatmg either in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean faced land-based rather than carrierbased aircrafL It \\o"3S \ikely that no strike they could make would suffice to \\o1PC OUI the opposing air arm. Prewar Irtaues limned the size and number of earriers. jusl how those limits affecled aircraft numbers \"3ried from na\1' to na\1'. British operating practice was apparenlly formcd after 1918, when the land-onemed

performance escOrt earriers (in two importanl cases, the US Casab/anaJ and Co",,,,ttlament Bay classes, ships were built intennonally as carriers, but they \\O"Cre based on standard merchant hulls). Numcrica.U}', escon earriers formed the bulk. of wartime fleets. They did nOl, hO\\"C\"t'r, carry the bulk of wu~ carner aircraft, S1l1tt (on a lon-for-ton baSIS) they \\"t're quile inefficient (most of their huns wtte filled uith ballast), \'\'ithin the limits sct by carriers, aircraft performance depended on engine performance, A typical fighter engine of the late 19305, such as the Bnosh Rolls-Royce Merlin or the US Pratt & Whitney R-1830, generaled about 1,000 10 I ,200hp. The designer had to choose beTween speed and range, which was why the sparkling Supermarine Spitfire (na\'alised as the Seafhe) had vcr}' short legs, whereas the US Grumman F4FWildcat had relatively poor speed, The jlapanese choice was to cut structural weight to achie\'e both speed and range, in Ihe famous Mitsubishi A6M 'Zero'. At this time, engines \\o"Cre de\"Cloping extremely fas!. Thus a typical fighter engine of aboul 1942, such as the later Merlins or the Gnffon, or the US R-2800, developed something closer to 2,OOOhp. Although pistonengine fighter speed WllS ultimalely limiled (by aerodynamics) 10 aboul 400 or 45Omph, the extra power allowed a much hea\ier aeroplane 10 attain that speed, and thus allowed na\-aI arrcraft the combinaoon of high speed and long range. U1nmaTely they were quite the equals of land-based plSlon fighters which did not need anything like their ran~. Not all ruJ\ies could enjoy that combination, Much depended on industrial capacity, Bntam mobilised In the late 19305, That froze many designs. Although new deSIgnS were de\ocloped contmuously during the war, it was difficult 10 place them in production, and some aircraft, such as the Fairey FireRy, conceived as early as 1939, did nO( see sef\ice uno11943. Blessed uith much greater industrial capacity, the USA did not mobilise until about 1941, and such new aircraft as the Grumman F6F Hellcat could progress vcr)' quickly from design to service (in this case, betwcen 194\ and \943). The Royal Nav}' was fortunate in being able to exploil this US capabibty. As for japan, bmiled induslrial capacit)' made a shift from pre....-ar designs extremely difficult, Thc A6,\1 W3S stiD in production al the end of the war, although by thai Lime it was clearly outclassed. New carrier bombers had been introduced, but not new carrier fighle", To some extent, the fighter-makll1g capacity which might ha\"C been impor-tant during the decisi\"C 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea seems 10 ha\"t' gone instead imo Iandbased naval fighlers, a type II1splred by the SUCtt5S of US carrier raids conducted from 1942 onwards. A fourth factor \\o-as the pcrcei\'ed ability of na\"31 aircraft to protect carriers and other ships. Aboul 1930 il

1SS I S4

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND \'i'ORLD \l:'AR

NAVAL AIRCRAFT IN THE SECOND WOR!.t) WAR

RAF imagined a carrier as hterally a floating airfield. An aeroplane had to be struck below into the hangar before the nC:l:t onc was allowed to land. Carrier aircraft capacity was therefore equated to hangar capacity. Moreover, the standard British operating practice made for a lengthy interval between landings. japanese carrier operating practice seems generally to have followed British pl'llctice, probably because of the cnormous influence of a 1921 British official mission. British practice had an interesting indirect effect. \X/hen the British naval staff calculated the number of aircraft the fleet needed, it far e:l:ceeded the capacity of the carriers. Interwar economies precluded large-scale carrier replacement. One alternative was to place combat aircraft on board battJeships and eruisers_ They would be launched with full combat loads (e,g., torpedoes), and would crash-land on their rerum. Ibe requirement that all aircraft be suitable for catapuh launching (at an end speed of 60kt) further constl'llined aircraft design. Limited carrier capacity also encouraged the Royal Navy to demand multi-purpose designs, in hopes that a carrier's aircraft could swing from role to role in the course of a banle. That in rurn limited performance, as will be seen below. Thc Imperial Japanese Navy made similar assumptions but was less limited, largely because it had larger carriers. That was partIy a maller of luck. The key 1922 Naval Arms Limitation Treaty allowed each signatory 10 com'ert two existing capital ships to carriers. Largely because Britain had laid down almost no such ships during the First W'orld \'('ar, thc ships she chosc werc two relati\'ely small battIccruisers, HM,S CQI/rageous and GloriOI/S. The other British carriers of the interwar period were ships conceived during the First World War, when the key importance of large hangars was not yet undcrstood, 'Ibus they carried few aircraft per ton compared with postwar designs. Because japan started later. in 1921 she h3d only a single sm311 carrier under construction. However. she 3lso had a very large capital ship construction programme. The IWO ships selected for carrier con\'ersion, A1uJgi and Kaga, wert' much larger than the two British ships. Successors had large hangars. The US Navy benefited from a very differem carrier operating practice. Early studies at the US Naval \'.;Iar College showed that \'ery large numbers of aircraft would be needed to secure vital tactical advantages. To accommodate large numbers on board e\'en small carriers, a barrier was installed. Inste3d of striking an aeroplane below after it landed, it was pushed forward beyond the barrier. The next aircraft, landing into arresting gear, SLOpped well short of the barrier (which protected the parked aircraft stowed forward). Once the whole air group had landed, all the aircraft were mO\'ed aft, into position to f1)'-off again. This practice

was clearly dangerous (a pilot might well be killed while hitting the barrier). but on the olher hand it allowed a relatively small carrier to accommodate a \'ery large air group. One peculiarity of US practice was that it was difficult to fly small numbers of aircraft, e.g, for patrols, since one or the other end of the night deck was generally full of aeroplanes. To sol\'e that problem, just before tIle Second World War US carriers were pro\'ided with arresting gear at the forward end of the flight deck. Their machinery was designed for high astern speed. In theory. then, a single aeroplane on patrol could take off over the forward end of the flight deck and then, at the end of its patrol, land back over the same part of the deck. Alternati\·cly, if all the aircraft were parked forward, the same aircraft could be launched using an athwartships catapult, then land O\'er the usual arresting gear. These rather exotic capabilities were little-used during the war, and the hangar catapults were removed about 1943. Unlike the Royal Na\'y and the Japanese Navy, the US Navy did not build its hangars integral with its carrier hulls. The)" were open-sided, often with rolling doors to close them in rough weather. One consequence was that aircraft engines could be run up while airCr',l.ft were still in the hangar. Aircraft could then be brought up to deck warmed up, ready for take-off. The alternative, as in British practice, was not to warm up any aircraft befort' they had been 'ranged' at !.he after end of the flight deck; the area of that after end, leaving enough length for a rolling take-off, in effect decided how many airCl'llft a carrier could launch at one time. Large US carriers of the standard wartime Essex class had one other peculiarity; the deck-edge elevator JUSt fom"ard of amidships. 'l'hey also had the usual centreline lifts at the ends of the hangar. For much of the lime these lifts wert' co\'ered, by aircraft parked aft ready for take off, or by aircraft parked forward having landed, Using the deck-edge lift, a damaged aeroplane could be struck below after landing without disturbing the parked aircraft in the bow. Alternati\'ely, an aeroplane could be brought up from below and fed to the take-off zone forward without disrurbing parked aircraft aft. Germany Germany entered lhe Second World \'X'ar with a Luftwaffe high command firmly convinced that all naval opel'lltions were peripheral. On the other hand, the large tactical bomber force pro\'ed quite adaptable. The major theatres of maritime air operations were the Norwegian Sea (the com'oy routes to Russia), the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Atlantic. Except for tile Focke-Wulf Fw 200, a four-t:ngine converted airliner, the Germans mainly used conventional level bombers Ounkers Ju 88s, Dornier Do 217s and Heinkel He Ills) and dive bombers au 87s) against

156

-~.

riIo:.

r.

'~~~- ..~,,- i--~

Allhollgh Ihe prewar Lufro>affc showed liuk imercsl ill marilime tJ..>arfare, warlime Allied co'rvoys i./ bolh Ihe Arelit; and (he Medilerrallean tJ..'ere badly damaged by Gcmwn airemfl, bolh lorpedo- and ditJe-bolllbers. They tJ..'tYt 011 imporlOll/ reason for Ihe developlllem of Brilish esrxm wrriers. This Heinkel He III wrries a pair of aerial /QrpcdQCS. surface ships. Their main contribution to anti-ship weaponry was a series of guided bombs (Fx-1400) and missiles (mainly Henschel Hs 293).The former was used in the Mediterranean in 1943-44, the latter initially in the Bay of Biscay. Although Allied jamming is sometimes credited with ending the Fx·1400 problem, apparently the destruction (by bombing) of the specialist squadron ill\'o!\'ed was more important (the Luftwaffe high command was ull\\illing to replace it). Both in the Nom'egian Sea (against eOll\'oys to Russia) and in the Meditcrranean German dive and lc\'cVtorpedo bombers sank numerous Allied merehant ships and some warships, Ironically, this contribution to Allied losses was relath'ely little appreciated, to the point where, after 1945. shipping protection seemed often LO mean protection against submarines but not against air attack. At the outbreak of war the German navy had a small force of floatplanes and nying boats, some of which were equipped with aerial torpedoes. They came under the authority of Fuhrer der Luftstreilkriifte (FdL) within the Luftwaffe. During 1940...43 FdL units gradually changed o\'er 10 conventional land-based bombers. The main anti-shipping force of Aiegerkorps X com-

prised KG 26 and KG 30 (the first unit to be equipped with the ju 88 bomber). These units specialised, respectively, in le\'el and dh'c bombing. As the Germans conqucrcd Europe, Aiegerkorps X was moved to Norway for anti-shipping work (although it was acth·e on a wider scale during the Battle of Britain). In January 1941 it was moved to the Mediterranean specifically to auack warships such as aircraft carriers. For example, Fliegerkorps X aircl'llft hit and disabled HJ\"\$ lllllS/riOI/S. In Nonvay, Luftftoue 5 retained a residual anti-ship role. When Germany invaded Russia, Aiegerkorps X moved to the Eastern Mediterl'llnean and changed into a more com'enlional air unit. However, its sutrcommand continued to specialise to some extent. Thus KG 26 (He Ills) converted partly to a torpedo-bomber unit, ultimately using torpedoes dewloped with Italian help (the FdL IOrpedoes, which were of Nonvegian origin, had to be dropped at low speed and low altitude). KG 26 also contributed pathfinders using sophisticated radio na\'igational aids, presumably as an outgrowth of its experience navigating O\'er the sea. Parts of KG 30 specialised in anti-ship bombing. Meanwhile, in March 1941 a new command, F1iegerruhrer Atlantik, was formed to help fight the

157

AIRCRAI'T OF TilE SECOSl) WORLD WAR

:"'A\',o,1. AIRCRAFT

1M Fw 200 Condor, a com.wud alrlllUl> ftW UMd joT both m;onnaissana aM onti-Jhlp auadt at low lef.:t:J. Battle of the Atlanuc. lis Fw 200s prm1ded sorm: reconnaissance in support of U-boats; for that maner, U-boats somctimes PfO\;ded targeting suppon for the aircraft, which dropped their bombs at low altitude. Elements of KG 26 and KG 30 mo\'ed back to NOf"\\'lIY to altack convoys 10 Russia. Others opcTated in the Meditcrranean. KG 100, the pathfinder unit in the Baltle of Britain, became a specialist anti-ship missile unit; IIl./KG 100 ....'lIS responsible for attacks uSing me Fx-1400 guided armour-piercing bomb; and II.!KG 100 used the Hs 293 missile. 1ne first succCSSC'S WIth these weapons were, respectively, against the Italian battleship ROlna on 9 September 19-13 and against lhe British sloop Egm (in thc Bay of BIscay) on 28 August 1943. Together these two weapons claimed 68 \1ctims up 10 15 August 1944. 'Inc Germans launched a carrier, Gmf Zepptlin, and dc\'eloped plans for numerous com'ersions of cruisers and mcrcham ships. They also dc\'e1oped carrier \,crsions of lhe Mcsserschmiu Of 109 fighter and the Junkers Ju 87 di\'l: bomber. Howe\,er, no carricr c\'cr entered scn1ce; afler mc war the Soviets seized the incomplete Gmf Zeppelin, expending the hull in wcapons leSI$.

Italy Under a 1923 law, Italian military a\'l3uon was ceolnlh~ under an arr foru. ~ other air forces, Ihe prewar halian ser\'lcc: had liltk mlerest 10 naval operations, and It rC!iisted Ihe formation of land-ba~ anack unilS (Anosllurantt), Atlhe outbreak of war the standard lorpedo bomber was Ihe Ihrtt~ngine Sa\l;lia-.\ \archetti S, -9 Spaniero. It was successfully tcsted "1th torpedoes in 1938, and Ihe firsl torpedo-bomber. the S.79-II, carT)1ng twO 45cm torpt"docs, \\'lIS delivered in September 1939. At the Italian dcclannion of war in 1940 the~ were 200 Acrosiluranti aircraft. By Ihe Italian capItulation 10 September 1943 they had been reduced to 61, in 5 Aerosdurante Gruppi (2 squadrons each) \\1th a Strength of 9 fO 14 aircraft each. Na\'lI1 units were equipped with Cant Z.501s (reconnaissance ft)1ng boats), Z.506s (tri-motor reconnaissance-bomber f1oatplanl'S), and Fiat RS,14s (bomber ftoatplancs, including AS\'('), Like Germany. Italy flirted with aircraft carrier constTuetion, but the twO ships, Agllifo and Sparviero, were ne\'er completed.

Japan 'Inc Imperial Japanese Na\'}' designated its aircraft by mission, sequence number, and manufacturer number. Thus lhe Zero was A6M; A for fighter, 6 for the slxlh fighter, and'" for MllSub,sru, Ihe maker.1ne malO miSSIon letters were: A for carricr fighlcr. B for torpedo bomber, C for carner reconnaissance, 0 for dh'c bomber, E for f100lplane reconnaissance, F for ftootplane OOscT\"3.tion (spotting), G for land-based bomber, II for fl),ng boat, and J for land·ba~ fighter. Carrier air group composition emphasised altack, on thc theor)' that numcncal inferiorily could be overturned only by agglU5i\'eness at the outbreak of \\'lIr. Thus in 1936 the large Kaga accommodated -2 aircraft: 24 dh'C bombcn, 36 lorpcdO bombers, and only 12 fighters. At about the same time the new ShoJuJku wus designed to carr)' 27 di\"C bombers, 27 10rpedO bombers. and 18 fighlen. At thiS orne Ihe Japanese Na\)' also operated light carricn such as Sor)'fl (18 of each ~1>C of bomber plus 9 tighten). Like the US Kavy, by 1944 Ihe Japanese Na\)' nttded many more fighters, and il Died 10 malO· uun its strikmg J)O\\'Cr by usmg fighter-bombers, in Ihis case modified A6.\ls. Typical (,\\ay 1944) large-<:arricr

n:

THe SECOSD \l'ORI.D \l'AR

air groups consisted of 27 A6;\1s, 27Yok05W D4Y dive bomllcr , 18 Nakajima B6N torpedo bombers, and 3 D~Y scouts. ughl carriers had on board the samc r A6Ms (9 of them fighter bomben) and 6 B6Ns. 'Ine prewar treaties left Japan with only 60 ~r cent of me carrier tonnage of thc USA or Botam, Although Japan renounced Ihe tl'Caties in 19H (effccth'c at me end of 1936), Ihe Japa~ Na\')' "'liS .....ell a.....are that It could not "1n an arms race ";th ilS mosl likely enemy. Ihe USA, II thCf(fol'C SOUghl equalisers, One \\'lIS the long-range land-based bomber. In the0ry such an aircraft could atLack the approaching US fleel long before It came \\1thm anacking range of Japanese flttt unllS, and long before It eXpttled any son of auack. 'Inese bombers .....ere firsl used to attack Chinese cities dUTlng the "'lIr \\hich began in 1937 - indeed, their need for long-range fighter escorlS inspired some of lhe requirements for the Zero fighler, 'Inc firsl operauonal aIrcraft of this ~1>C was the ,\btsubishi G3.\'l, .....hlch helped smk HMS Prina ofn'~ and H,\lS &plllu ofT Mala)'lI 10 Decemllcr 1941 in company wilh its successor, the Mitsubishi G~.\t. The latter \\'lIS used throughout the war against US ships,oftcn in kme night anacks. In 1945

1 , KP::' The ltoluln Nm:y optrattd all uo-ba.ud Ito/ion aircraft. In 1940 lhe uml Z.506B AIWllt' (Heron) uw I-U 101lg-mll~ bombn, t:Opabk oft:OrT)ing 0 unpedo or IU'O I, l001b bombJ. Inilially tM Seniu's AirollU opnrmtd mamly as bomben, btll aft" 'md-I 94 I all Alrona ~ su:iuMd 10 m;onnausana, mdud",g com.'O;)' morf and ASIt'.'

TM trortln/~ ltolum ,\lavy uwi th~ four- or fitv-1m1 Cam Z,501 Gohbiono (Gull) joT patrol, ln€wdl''8 ASlf!

158

.....

•..,.. I

Like the prm"Or {,oS Navy, flu prewar Imperial Japanm Navy II«n tM mojor l.:S ba.u 01 Pearl Horbor. The JlItJllbiJhl GlM U'W llu first Jllcass/ul aeroplo1le of thu type. Tha1l}u to IU Iollg rungt il U'W /Iud co bomb dulOn! Chintu Cltia during tM too'r btgmllmg in 1917, It turned out to 1Iud eKoru ofsmllior mllgt; MIU JIu tkCJelopmtnl ofitJ Jtubkmale. tM A6.\l Zno.Agaill, thanJu (0 Iollg range. G3,\1I f.t't'1t obk 10 Iocau, aud.mld Jink 1M BritiJh t:Opital $IIipJ Prince ofWaics Wid Repul~ rrlu'l tM commotl.un of tlut loiter Imghl qUIl~ rto.umabiy holY: thought tMmuh"t:S Ofltside air attadt rullgt.

'59

AIRCRAFT 01' TilE SECOND \1I:'ORLD WAR

:>;A\'AI

TM ttummt Impnjal Japantst Xat-y also WId/bing boau, 11$ Korranuhl H8K u usually considtrrd rJw lInl oj all S«ortd Ifi7rldlfor ft)11f1 boals.

1M MiullbUhi G4A1 SUpn-udbJ W G3M dun'ng tM S«ondU'i7rldlfor, and m:u usuJ throoghoul ~ conflict. LiJu ", rhe «ur rhue aircraft ~ IlyJ 10 laundl rodut.propdkd suia
form) and less-trained pilots PTO\"Cd fatal at tht' Battle of the l"hilJppme $t'.a m june 1944, \X'ithout trained pilots, the carrien which suni\'ed that battle could function only as decoys at the Battl~ of 1...(')1e Gulf that October. By that tim~ il was clear 10 the japanese high com· mand thai con\'entional air tactics "~re largely pointless. The solution adopt~d at the time w:as suicide warfare, the ultimate ~xploitation of the supposed superiority of japanese fighung SpIrit, As it happened, the kamikazes fared better than their com'entional counterparts partly because they did not Ar tight formations, and hence could not be tracked and intercepted as easily by the A~t't's radars and fighters. Allied countermeasures included adding fighters to air groups and anacking japanese aircraft on the ground, before th~y could be launched.The latter tactic explains the intense US interest in fighter-bombers at the end of the war, At the outbreak of war in 1941 the standard japanese strike aircraft wer~ the Nakajima B5N and Aic:hi 03A, the laHer having won a 1936 competition. They were roughly parallel to, but somewhal laler than, the US TBO and SBD, Thc corresponding fightcr was the Mitsubishi A5M, which was no longer in large-scale service by 1941, A 1937 competition for a nCY,' trio of carrier aircraft produced the Zero, the Yokosuka D4Y Suisei dive bomber, which appeared in small numbers at Midway, and the Nakajima B6N lorpedo bomber, which did not enter service until 1943. The new di\'e bomber was intended to equal th~ n~ fighter in speed, exceed its range, and carr)' the standard japanese 250kg (5501b) bomb. By 1941 thc Imperial Na\')' had decided 10 unitC the dh'e and torpedo bomber categories; the winncr of thiS last pre·war eompention was the Aichi B7A, which did nOI enter production until 1944 and had little effttt upon th~ war,

G4h'\s Cllrried rock~t-powered Iwnik.az~ bombs ('Baku'). As in the CllSC of the Zero fighter, these aircraft achkved their ~xtrtmely long ranges largely through thc usc of \"tty lIghtwaght structure, i.~., by a\'Oiding annour of any kind, Anoth~r equahscr WIIS th~ long-rang~ l'i)ing-boat bomber, In 1942 japan had the best in th~ world, the four-cngincd Kawanishi H8K. That Y~lIr H8Ks raided P~arl Harbor, using ubmarines to refuel them DI r"OflU. To som~ ~xtent the Zero fighter was also an equaliscr, 11 was the firSt japan~.se na"al fight~r to have an enclosed cockpit and retractable landing g~ar, In most equh-alent fightcrs high speed was achieved partly by shrinking th~ "ing5, and hence accepting high wing loadings and sharply r~duced manocu\Tability. japanese pilots apparentlr demand~d manocuvf'lIbility, which the Zero's designer, jiro Horikoshi, supplied using special combat flaps, The result waS II unique combination of speed, range, and manoeuvrability - at a cost in structural strength, particularly armour. Apparcntly the Zero also could not dive with contcmporary US fighters (which it could outrun in level flight), Perhaps the most important ~qualiser "-as the \'ery high level of training accord~d na\'lll pilots and other aircrew. Whencver confronted by the ob\'iou$ disparity in shcer weight of numbers and matcrial between japan and the \'('estern powers, the japanese answer \\'lIS that human diff~rences, both in training and in sheer fighting spIrit, would O\~rcome them. Unfortunately for japan, once large numbers of pilots had been losl al Midway and in the Solomons campaign which follouul., it was impossible to If'lIin their successors 10 anything like the pre·war standard, The combination of obsolescent ;urcraft (which a limited japan~ mdustrial base could nOI replace: WIth more modem types anwable in protOty~

160

hI 1941 rlre standard JapwIEU wrrier-baRJ tor/KJo oombrr ttW rile XakaJI11UJ 85X1,

•

AIRCRAFT IS THE SECOXIJ WORE D W'AN.

The stani.'ilrJ Japanese carril:r..lJa.ftd dit~ bomber ttW lJ~ A1Chi

-

--~.~--

III 1937 lire Japalleu Xaty inrrodllud lhe t:.'orJJ's firsr modtm mo"oplalle carrier fig/lIer, .\hlSllbisllls ASJI, al

In

J 941

DM,

-'

77/t fast D41' SlIiul ··Cometj uw olle oftff..'O tItW alUU.'k air· crafr Immdtd la replace r/re pair u:illr U'llidi Japall bqan rite PaCific lI'itr, 17,ere u'€re oorh radial· alld in-lille-e"gillcd vet· siol/s,11/4Jecllhe D41' uw eqlliwltm to (and probably //lore SllClXSsflllllton) Iht CS SB2C Helldi'l,'tr.A feu' D41's fOllgllr

aoollllire same tllI/e Ilral ir issueJ a specifiWlionfor lire aerq. plalle's muclr /IIore modern S/lcussor, trlriell became Ihe A6,\I. Like irs predecessors, lire AS,\J (nu lig/l/ly-/OCJded for eXITtmt malloer/t'raOlllry III dogfigJllillg. The faSler A6.\t cOl/ld 1101 be as handy, bill il mu actepted 011 Ihe Ilreory Illal u:ry-//lghfY-lramed Japanese pilots could make liP for the differenu il/ performallU. Tile slallghter of mall)' of l!toSt pilou ul/\Iidft,")' ulld ill lite Solo/llolls elimillated allY SIIdl udmll/ogt at jllsllIle time Ihe Allies «'ere jieldmg IIIl1cll more poo:erflll aircrafl, sl/ch as Ihe HeliaJl.

at ,\lidrfay III 1942.

japan also developed a superb specialised carrier scout, the Nakajima C6N Saiun, but it ::appe::ared 100 laiC for the major carrier battles of 1944. As in the US Na\'y. the standard wartime scout w::as::a dh'e bomber. the D4Y. Xakajima S B6.\'1 ltl/zan UUf inlellded as the standard u'QrtI/IIe IOrpedo bo",ber, replacing lite tarlier B5.\'2. It enItN'J sm.iu iI' 1943.

Soviet Union The pr~-1941 Soviet linion flirted with the ideo of building one or mort' aircraft carriers, but none was evcr laid down, Both durmg and after the war, So\iet na\"3I aviation was almost entircly shore-based. the only exccp. tion being a f~\ floatplanes ft~ing from battleships and CruIsers. They saw very little action. All So\'iet aircraft were united in a Single aIr force in 1920, bUI on 5 .\lay 1935 na\"3I aircraft \\~re placed

under nantl contrOl as an arm of the na\'y (they w~re briefly returned to a unitary air force between 23 july 19r and 1 january 1938). It appears that initially only ftoalplanes and seaplanes of various types \\~re taken O\'er by the navy, but certainly by 1941 th~re \\~re also substantial numbers of land-based bombers, including

161

AIKeItAI'! 01

lIyruhin's DB-J

JIll·, SECO:"l} \\"OItLD \X'AR

r.tW lJ

swnJ.Jrd trom",t

SA\'AI

Sot'~l L:l1IJ~~Jlur~do bomba. mo~

\-crsions of the Ilyushin DB-3 (0-1) and the Tupo!t'· SlJ..2 medium bomber, and the I»ctlyako\" Pc-2 light bomber "ighters dcfendlng ports and na\"1l1 base5 were also under n:I.\~.. 1 eonlrol. Ofthc bombers, thc DB·3T was a specialised torpedo bomber producl:d in 19r-38 spccifkally for the na\1', and thus probably thc first froit of the return to n:l.\l1l conrrol. II could carry a single ~5cm lOrpedO (\\hich could be drop~d by parachute from a consider· able altilUde) or a com'entional bomb or mine, and it could also be used for long-range reconnaissance. As the first mass-produced SO\iel torpt'do bomber, it formed the initial strength of the nt'\ mine-lOrpedo formations ralscd In 1939-10. One ""ml&-/Orptdn)'t m'lapolki (MTAP) was assigned to each of thc Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets. A ftoatplane version, the DB·3I"T, was dc\'Cloped for the North('rn and Pacific "leets, which had limHed airfield facilities, but it was ne\"er pro· duced in quantilY. Instead, additional airfields were built. Baltic Fket DB·3Ts were the first So\'iel aircraft lO bomb Rerlin, 011 thc night of 7-8 August 19~1. In june 19-11 a IOtal of 2,581 aircraft were reponed in naval service, of which 1,445 wcre in the three \'(festern fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea) facing the German anack. Of these aIrcraft, about half (763) were fighlers.• '111e Northern Fleet air component was particularly imponant because it helped defend the convoy terminus. Thus in july 19~ I it received a regiment of Tupolc\' SB-2 bombers from the Baltic Fleel, at the end of thc year a regiment of Hurricanes, and in january 19~2 a regiment of Petlyako\' l'e·2 light bombers. Baltic and Black Sea air components scem to han: concentrated "Ac:~"\W'Ihn.&

10 • MOOf} pubh-Jxd

bornbtot1 w

l~ ptt

eml. n

In

198-1.

lJ\

lhn

~ ~

on the land bank. Modernisation began In 1943, \\1th Ilyushin 11-4 and Douglas A-2OG (Boston) torpedo bombers, Pe·2 di\'t bombers, Ilyushin 11·2 and YakO'o·le\· and La\'()Chkinscnes fighters coming to predominate. In 19~3 the Baltic Fleet air componenl began to anack Gennan sea lanes of commumcallon. At the tx:ginmng of !9~~ slJ'tngths w~ 298 aircraft in thc Northcrn Flcct, 313 in the Baltic, and ~29 in the Black Sea. As the general offensh'c against Gennan)' accelerated, the Balllc Flcct air component grew: by !he cnd of the war 11 alone of !he three \X'estern fleet air componentS was hea\'i1} engaged In land operations, and il had -87 aircraft. In August 19~5 !he Pacific 1--leel \\lIS part of the force which crushed japanese forces in Manchuria. At that time its air component amounted 10 SIX air dhisions (torpedo, bomber, two mixed, two fighter), ten separate air regiments and fourteen separate squadrons; aboul 1,500 aircraft in all. By way of comparison, in 1941 there were no air di\'isions at ull. The Norlhern Fleet had two rei'llments and a separate squadron; the Baltic Fleet had three brigades, three separote air regiments and se\'en separJte squadrons; and the Black Sea Fleet had twO brigades, two separale air regiments, thirteen separate squadrons and two air detachments. No ntw speciallscd na\"lI1 aircraft wcre de\'e!opcd during the war, although it ap~ars that the SO\'iet na\'y was the sole user of the hybrid plston.jet fighters made in 1945. AI that time a new torpedo bomber, theTupole\' Tu.21~ \\lIS being tested. Production began In 1947, and this aeroplane \\lIS standard until jets replaced it in the 19505.

1JJlX ~ (KnuU) .moumed ptt em' 0( df«U\~ C'<'II>bM

10 9.)

10 2S

1i,,"cr1

of l«at .utflIth. '0 ~5.) ptt <;ml, SW»hnJ 1)"P"'t "'ftl' tto. 1I)"U$hin DB-J .orpedo

ptt tt>U

tlrOflC\h.

bombcT; lIvThpokv 58-2 ~ Ar_2 andTupar.·T8-l ~ 1M I'oIIbrpoo 1-ISbos. 1·16 and 1·153. Yako\1f;, Yak·1 mJ ~~-an and Gur)"l:'U .\loG-J li&hl MIlR_2 and ,\11'8-2, NnilWl GST 'Caaluia and Ol)'ttl~ 0l)~-2 II).,.. tx.l$.

162

United Kingdom The: Royal Na\1' of 1939 had becn designed mainly 10 fight japan. From about 1919, the Bf1\Jsh fcared thai their Far Easlern ally might tum on them to seize the riches of the Eastern part of the: Empire. There was initially some hope thai the alliance could be maintained (the British actually sent a IJUssion to japan In 1921 10 help the japanese estabbsh their na\1I1 air arm), but most Bnnsh na\-a1 strategiC thinking seems to ha\'c gone into soI\1ng thc problcm of a major fleet aerion In the Far EaSt, Thc concept was that the base at Singapore would be held until the fleet arrived. Resources on hand would include submarines and land-based RAF torpedo bombers. To deal \\1th the arri\ing British fleet, the japanese would ha\"t~ to steam so far south as to be out of the CO\'tt of their own shorc·based aircTafL A decish't f1et"t engagemenl would lea\"C japan open to a fatal blockade. From an aVlatlon point of \'je-.\. this outJook meant thal Brlllsh nll\-a1 aircraft procurement concentr.lled on thc problems of lhc decisi\"C f1cct battle. For example, the British flttt would ha\'e to locate and to shadO'o\· the opposing fleet. For thai purpose, specia.llow-speed carrier aircraft \\'tre designed 10 the latc 19305 (thcy ne:\'Cf entered sen'ice, hO\\'t\"Cr). Give:n the limitations of di\'e and Icn~l bombing, the British assumed through the IntCf\\11r period that their aircraft could not sink the enemy' capital ships; that would ha\'e to be left to bat· t1eship i,'Unfire, HO\\"C\'Cr, the enemy's flttt would prob.ably be a good deal faster, partly because the RO)lIl Navy had ne\'cr had enough money to rebuild ils elderly battleships. Aircrnft would, therefore, be essential to slow down the enemy's fleel. They would achie\'e that With torpedoes. The British fleet could nOI be based at Singapore for se\'eral ~asons. One was fear of uncO\'ering home walers; anomer was the sheer COSI of keeping so large a forcc so far from home. The compromise adopted betwcen wars was to ket"p a large fleet in the Mediterranean, from where it could swing either north or cast, through thc Suez Canal. -111e latc 19305 broughl a series of unpleasanl surprises. Without all)' reduction in the japanese threat, two European threats emerged, Gcrmany and Italy. It soon became ob\ious that Germany \\11S rebuilding a U·boat arm, and both countries werc building battleships. They were outnumbered by the Royal Na\1· (particularly since Francc was a British ally), but to face them dO\\Tl the RO)lIl Na\1' would ha\'c to abandon its plan to fight thc decisl\'t battle 10 the East. In particular, many British officers recalled that the Germans had tied down the British flet"t during the First World War simply by refUSing to gi\'t battle. Aircraft offered a solution, since thcy alone could penetrate an cnemy's harbour to attack the ships Inside.1nc culmina-

163

AIRCKAI'T IS '1'111; SECO:"D WORl.D WAR

tion of this thinkmg was the dramatic arrack which cripplcd the Italian flect at 1aranto in NO\'ember 1940. By that time the balance had worsened because France had been knocked out of the war. Thus, despite considerable success In the MeditCrranean, there could be 00 question of sending the ftt"t't east the foU0\\1ng year; all that could be spared \\"lIS a pair of capital ships (the accompanying carrier grounded 10 the \X'CSt Indies, and could not be sent), 'Ine Icsson drawn from the loss of Prinu ofl\'ak$ and Repulu \\11S that hcnceforth battleships could not opttalc freel) \\ithoul aCC'Ompan)ing carriers. L'nfortunately the Royal Navy carner force suffered badly during the first three years of\\"lIr, and thc large carrier construction programme begun prcv.11r (si;\: ships, thc largest of an)' contemporary na\')') took some considcrable orne to complelc.

Ullwed in Iht /Owlll/lmber of aircraft ilS carriCN could ac· Ihe Ro)'al Navy soughl to colI/bille mu/iiple ftmctiO/IS ill eacll of its aeroplalle lypeS. Tile Fairey Suoortifisll, olle oftchich is SI1(XlIlI lal/dillg aboard Ihe 'MIlC' carrier Empire McAlpine i" JlIlIe J 943, typified thc com· promises adopted. n,t relaljvely slow biplane design tau tu· cepu:d becallse II oJ!ere,llhc slot" /Glldi,lg al/d take-off spuds reqllircd of aireraft fI:hic" //light haw /0 be calaplf/ud from lxm/nhips alld CTliiSeN u'ltll filII combal loads, alld u·1Iich u'()uld land 0" hoard carriEN 'a:ilJlOlI/ arrester gear, Lou, s~ed tras also Ihe pria of long saJllli"g rallge, u:hich froJ f.'/lallo a lleel a:luch rould 1/01 0e11efit from sea-~d scoms. I..ong £fIJllrana fOOS t';tal in Ihe gUlifire spoiling role u,hich t/~ Hoyal A'at'Y ho~d uymid hElp assure II ~ic/Ory 11/ lite de-cis,toe ballie II sollght. The 10~Jo role mu also f.'iroJ, sjm:e only tor~Jo II/IS could slow a pi mellt)'lke, erwllghfor the British bailie ft«1 to catch it. Indud, Ihe compromises IlIOde III ,he Su:orJfish tksig" shOf,~ jusl how many dijferNIl air rr-qmm'U"nu the Royal.\'at,. had, ralher Ihan (as is often Slll~U:J) hott;' lillie il umkrstood aircraft. COII/II/()(wu:,

AIRCRAI'T

or

Till' SI.CO'd) WORLD WAR

SIo\'101

Uke OIlier Ilm'ies of Ihe illfe/utlr period, Ihe Royal Navy f/.'(JJ fasci"ated by Ihe potell/ial ofdit:e bombing. j\fal/Y il/itially rolkd Ihis foml ofal/ack sirajillg, w il is ,,01 a/wgether Sltrprismg Illat Ihe Royul -"(¥L·y's jirst dltle' bomber, Ihe BlockburII Sklla, U'tU also COIISidl:rtJ a fig/tier. Tlte l...'S Saty flIrted u·illl IIl//c1I lite J(JlIIlJ COI/UPI Of aboutlhe same time. orJermg prO/OI)'~ /fl'O-Sfat fighttrf rchieh soo" became scouts alld Illell scout-bombers.

AIrcraft also promised to hclp soh'c the t;-boat problem, As long as th~ r\l.lJes controllcd the cxits from the North Sea (thc English Channcl llnd the route around Scol1and). V-boats had to tra''el ca~fully to th~lr patrol areas west of thc British Isles. submerging dunng thc day. Since a L:-boat could spend onl)' so many d:irs at sea, any such limitation (imposed mainly by air patrOls) would drastically reduce the cxtcnt of its operating area, and hence the area through which the Royal :"a\1' wQuld ha\'e to convoy ships. '!lms the Royal Na\1' could economise on escortS, building ships Inlended to ope-ratc ",thm about 500 miles of their bases. This logic collapsed With the loss of thc Frtnch and Norwcgian coaSIS, which placed the U-boats much closer to the centr.ll Atlantic, Once there. they could operalc out of rangc of

short-based alfCraft, ~maln1Og surfaced and mobile until they sighted their targets. The extension of air CO\'erage to the central At1anue becamc an Imponant themc of wartime Allied air policy. Thc Royal :"a\'y needed se\·er.11 diff"C'ft'nt carrier or catapull arrcraft capabiliues: dl\'e bomber (8), fighter (!"1, reconnaissance (R). 5potung (S), and torpWo bomber (I). Gi,'en limited carncr capacity, it had to combine them in multi-purpose aircraft. Oi\'e bombmg first beeame important about 193~. At that ume the planned combmation w~s a fighter dh"C bomber (FB). the Blackburn Skua, and a torpedo spotter reconnaissance aeroplane (fSR), the Fairey Swordfish. ;-;'either had a particularly sparkling performance, and the Skua could nOI carry a hea\")' enough bomb. Nor was il

IotRCRIoFT I:" TilE SECOSD WORLD '«'loR

If"irh rhe dive-bombing rok shi/lcdfromfighrer 10 torptdo bomber, tire Royal Navy amid buy afighter whose structure U'OS not stressed for diw bombmg, Ihe '-"flirey FlIlmar. altOgether clear that spolting was worth the load It placed on the Swordfish. The Royal Na\1' began the Second \'\:'orld War \\ith the combmation of Skua and Swordfish. and in 19~O S"'-uas sank the German cruiser Konigsbtrg In Norway. In 1936 me armourN-deck carriers were designed. It was no longer SO clear thal fighlers were worthwhilc: the "hole point of lhe deck was lO help the ship absorb the inC'itablc bomb hits when the cnemy bombers arrh'ed. .o\lthough nothmg m lhc records 5uggC$ts as much, it <;ttms reasonable to associate this shift \\ith lhe crisis "Ith Italy 10 1935-36. \\hen il beeame ob\ious thai thc fleet might well ha\'e to fighl 10 the .\1ednerrancan, The

t~

aeroplane associated with this shift was the Fairey Albaco~, concch'cd as a TBR, a lOrpedo- and di\'cbomber, By 1938, howe\'cr, lhe Royal Na\'y was again imerested in carner-based fighters. Although no sUf\i\ing records suggest as much, it seems likely that by this timc radar and radar fighter control \\'ere clearly In Sight. Radar would also C"emually make it \"CT}' difficult for low-perfonnancc reconn3Jssance aircrafllo approach an enemy fleet. In addition, a new engine, lhe Rolls-Royce .\lerlin, was 1\0\\ 1\"3ilable, A new pair of carrier aircraft, the lwo-seal Fairey Fulmar fighter and the F~y Barr:ilcuda bomber, wert dl"Signed. As it turned out, only

tJ~ t:tlrtln~

The Fairey AlbacQrt: U'OS milch mort: than a deal/ed-up alld ",otkrnis£J Su'OTdjish; 1/ m:u a httA)' dlt'e-Oomber, too, and IJ~ ckmamfs tmailed III dlt~bo",blng badly rtfarded its det:dopme",.

Fcurry Barracuda had to satisfy Sft'Va1 ronflicIjng dcnands, inciliding borh /he dit~braJu flaPSI, The demand for obserttltJon capalnllty Jed to th~ adoptu", ofa hIgh U:lng U:ltlt U:I/fdou:s bmeath II. Tlte wmev:ltaz (lfr:kuoard rrSltll is reprrsellltd by Ihis aircraft of 814 Sqlladro,/ on board H.\fS Venerable m 1945.

164

165

LiJu

Su:ordfish and Alboam,

UJrp
:-;-.>,,\

AIRCRAI'T 01' THE SI":COSU WORLD WAR

As in I~ CSA, lhe aJt~1l 0/ Vlflna In lhe Z,OOOhp diJss wk.'cd mllny probln,u. Hocft:cr, II f..'UJ n,."h mort difficulr for tll~ Bnruh alrmJft mduJlry to ~Itch tO'1ro) 1)'fJn in rr;arti",~.AJ a rrJult, oircra/t trhich JJwllld 1Im.y: trll~J JCN.'1Gt Ohm., 19-11, Ilk tlliJ l:aut)' Flrtfly I, did 1I0t op~ar m m/lllbrrs IImil tlu: md o/Iht U't1r.

the Fulmar soon entered service. Its performance was 10deed limiled, but when guided by radar it could beat off bomber anacks quite effectively. IJendmg the (,,"ailabilitr of the Fulmar, the na\'y placed a few ex-RAF GIOSler Gladiators on board ,\ Icditerranean Fleet carriers. The ships carrying them lacked radar, 50 they cannot ha\'e been of vcrr great use in combat. Br this orne se\'C'ral new engines In the 2.000hp cia \\'C'rc In prospect, notably the Rolls-Royce Griffon and the Napier Sabre. A follow-on Gnffon FR spectficauon, which produced the Fairey FireRy, was issued. E\'C'ntually a Griffon-engincd version of the Barracuda would also be built. For the moment. the Barr.lcuda was condemned 10 low performance because other types of aircraft claimed much higher priorities for the new cngines, There was much grumbling in British aeronautical circles at the low performance of existing aircraft. ,\ Ian)' felt thaI the second-scat requirement was to blame. As a consequence, a specification was issuro for a Sabrcenginro smgle-seat fighler. As eXpe<:lro, it could not offer a realJ)' imprcssi\'C' performance because. like the other na\"31 aircraft, it still had to land and take off at limited speeds. Ultimately it became a single-scat torpedo bomber (officiaUy a 10rpedO fighter), Ihe Blackburn Firebrand, Then the war began, and radar made its Immense Impact on carner operations. Suddenly carner-based Irllcreeptars were dearly worthwhile. E.",perience in Norway showed Ihat lIurricanes could be accommodated on board carriers, and somewhat later Seafires also operAted from British carriers. II may be objected that these fighters had eX3ctl}· the sort of performance the RO}"31 Navy thoughl, in 1939. it could not ha\·e. with

\'ery high wIOg loadings. Howe\'er, they both lacked range, and the Seafire was clearly quite fragile. None of the Griffon- or S3bre-engllled aircraft was available in 1942--44. Fortunalely for lhe Royal Na\·y. US aircraft powered by equl\"3knt engines were provided in large numbers: Ilelicats, Corsairs, and A\'enger torpedo bombers. Because so much power \\"3S a\"3ilable, they could be quite sturdy Without sacnficing performance (fortunately the Royal Na\")' neWT got the large number of Curtiss HeJldh'ers it wllnted), By the latter part of the war. Bntain had largt' aircooled radl3l engmes quite equal to the big t.:S engines. and a \"Cry new generation of na\-al lIII"craft was on lIS

Cmll I/~ aJt~1t 0/ radar, Iht RDJal Sat,. haJ lIt1k use for soorl-rcmge Ji"gk-stlll im-nuplo/3, JO ,wile U'OJ adopl~d. Thm Ihl! JIII/aIlOll ellollgcd dramatlrolly. CII/ort/malel)', Iht high-ptrformallu British Iype adopted i" UlQrti",e. Iltl! SlIptrmarille Se~firc, had bet/l dUlg/ll!d at a time {I'hen range alld ruggcdlltjs had 10 be lraded 01/ 10 gaill ptrfor"/oIIce, Herl!. a J\lark /II is ShDfl!II III Ptu:ific marki"gs.

166

tlRCR

'T .S TilE 5 I:.(;OS I> WOIl.! D '«'AR

Sot alll/~ aircraft bought i" Ihe pmr:ar Bmull mobdualum prr:n.y:J Juuessful. The Sau".krs-R~ lLru:idlfalitd w haJly /hal t
It U'OJ

way. In the Hawker Sea Fury the Royal Na\1' finally had a high-performance na\'lI1 interceptor with adequate endurance. The new Firebrand and Fairey Spearfish ~eemed to offer adequate strike performance. However, nonc of these aircrart was available in time for the war. For its pan, the RAF had specialist torpedo bombers, albeit obsolete Vickers Vildebel'S!S, at the outbreak of war. Thcy were soon superse-ded by torpedo-armed Bristol Bcauforts and Beaufighlers. both of which enjoyed much higher performance and were used exten~

commodate fi\"C elghtcen-aircraft squadrons: one of SCOUlS, to find the enemy before being found; one ofdh'e bombers; one of torpedo bombers; and twO of fighters. The number of fighters had only recently been doubled, probably with radar fighler control in mind, Earlier foursquadron carriers had their fighlcr squadrons enlarged to twemY·$C\'en aircraft. Ih 1943 it \\"3S clear that fighters would be nceded in much larger numbers, and the new IlldepmJOIuran & Whuney R-1535 were more common in singleengine aircraft. They powered the bombers of the 1934 competitions and the fighters of the 1936 competition. By 1938 the R-1820 and R-1830 were approaching I,OOOhp output, and they were used in a new generation

~i\·dy.

On the OIhCT hand. the RAF seems to ha\'e had 1mJe r'fC\\'lIr mterest in maritime patrol It plannro 10 usc a (ombtnauon of small landplanes (Ano Ansons) 3nd flying boots (big Short Sunderlands as well as the new bUI unsuccessful twin-engineH, thc bombing role ha\'ing been addcd o\dng to the percei\'cd high pi:rform;Jnce of the pre-war Catalina (PBY). There were also utility aircraft (Vj), generally f1oatplanes. [n 1941 the new carrie~ werc being designed to ac-

167

AIRCRAFT 01' THE SECOSD WORLD WAR

SA\·AJ. AIRCRAFT IS'I HI: SI:COSD WORLD WAR

Like lhe Royal Xov,)~ lhe CS Sat" of 1941 paid a perfornla/let penalty for rurner operatum. Thest early Grlllm"all F4F tr"iidalts thoro a" Important l.:S Sai-')' fealUrti lighl bomb ~ bought w lhal aircraft COI,Id tupport landi"g op. nalWm. ~ CTOUD IIPlW the rri"gs i,tdiaJu participatIon III preu:ar an~. The red circks in the stan of W 'lalwnoJ mSlgnia t.'Tn' elJ",maud dllnng 1941 for fear of being misUJkOl for wJapanLSe rismg sun 'nttalball'. For lhe same muon. many Bntuh and Co",momrcalth aIrcraft opnr1tlllg In tlre Pacific Thealrt! hod the rtd willa of their roundels tliminaud. and laU7 had l;S-styw horizontal frhlle ban added.AIIJumgh qmu otudasud by Ihe Zaos.lriidalts m'rt' retaltted lhrollgh the frar MCallY lhcy amid OfJffOle from small arort carnen. (Oddlj~ the RiJ)'Cl1 XQt.')' managed 10 operate Hellcau an.! CorwIn fro", milch Ill/! some decks at this lime.)

of fighle~ and bombe:~ (Grumman F4F \X'ildcal, Douglas SOD Dauntless, and Douglas TOO De\-aslator), Howe\"er, a further new generntion was in prospect. the \X'righl R-2600 and the Pran & \Xlurney 2800. offering aboul mice Ihc output of the earlier engines, They powered the aeroplanes whIch entered ser\1Ce from 19.a2 on. By that time a further new geneMltion W3S represented by the \\;'right R-3350 and Pratt & \Xllllney R...B60. They were Incorporated In warume designs, including the Douglas BT2D, which became the postwar AD Skyraider. Thc main prewar fighter competition (1935) produced the Grununan \'Cildcat and the unsuccessful Brewster F2A Buffalo. Although outperformed by the Japanese Zero, and hence replaced in first-line units by the next-generation Grumman Helical and Vought Corsair, Ihe Wildcat sur\'i\'cd in production for use on board escort carriers. A hea\'ily redesigned \"ersion, the F2l\ \, was de\'e!oped for this imporulnt duty__ A 1938 competitlOn for a hIgher-performance fighter powered by the new R-2800 engine produced the Vought F41j Corsair, Grumman fallmg to com;nce the na\1' to bur its ahemati\'e. How('\~r. after the fall of France In June 19-10 the company managed to comince the na\'y to buy a redesigned, uprated \"('[sion of the F4F, powered by the new R-2600 engine. Shifled to the R2800. it beciime the \-ery successful F6F Hellcat. 11$ appearance was forrunatc, because b)' 1942 the Corsair was nOt ret considered entirely acceptable for carrier 0jXl'200ns. Br 1944 both the Hellcat and Corsair w~ in senice in \'ery large numbers, and bolh pro\"ed quill.' successful. Both were modified In \\"3rome as single-seat nightfighters. at a time when all other Allied nightfighle~ had a separate .radar operntor. A further fighter competition was held in 1940. It was

Through Iht inltf'f&Qr pmod, liM olher air arms, the CS wmpemlO'U 10 cJwou the aIrcraft it fl.ymld hr,y. TIte B~Sler Buffalo (shou:n In British nlarklngs as a BlljfakJ Ii btal a Gmm'lI4n biplane daign /If 1935. Tvrtllnarely Gnlr""wn m:u pt'r''''tted to offrr a ralher diffrrem monoplane, u:hich h«a,,~ the U"i/dcat; lhe Bl,jJaJo m:u kss Iha" SIIcussfill III Yrt.'fa.

As ", the ca.u of titC 1935 ",,,,petllion, Gnunman aw al1k to rrcoup ItS 1938 /ou.lri.lrlr Oil a Corsair alurnalitv began in 1940, and lhe result, the Helkot,enter'td combal in 1943. Tllis example is", BrIluh "wrk",,,. Dapile iu fm"i~ success lhe HdJau did nOf offrr perfcrlllallU m<'llching tho, of Ihe CorsaIr, amJ It t."'W n:ithdrarrll from L"S combal snt'-fa after 1945. II did. hotrft.'n, fight m Indo-Gluna In French Urt.'fa, ProI1ab/y its last CS combal roil was as a dralle, al/adll"g targets in Korea ill 1952.

S~')' rtUl

168

T1u Ii.lllghl F4L' Ccrsair tron lhe 'laf L'S Sat')' fighter l'Onlat, ill 1938, bill illitially s«med poorly sUllcd to camm. Forwnattly tM RO)'Cl/Sat')' folllld it extrem~/y eJf«litv. By 19-15 il t.."'W clearly the bw CS Sar.')'fighter, and II fl.'c1S rttall~d '" ProdIlCll/:m pomMr. This is a .\Iarllle Ccrps AL'-I, 0.11 altadt tvmOll of the final fighler t-mtOll.

not. as many wnten ha\'e suggested. connected \nth the .HUh."U,)'-Class carriers. which had nOi yel been designed. This time Grumman won with a radical twin-engine de~ign. the PF Tigercat Grumman's argument was that careful streamlimng of the fuselage would reduce drag drnmatically, allowing the aeroplane [0 make full use of 11$ doubled horsepower (IWO R-2800s). As it happened. the F7F was only rarely used aboard carriers. It missed the war.

The L:SA mobilised in 1941. frttzing designs for production (the Helical nearly missed i1$ chance). Production of Ihe existing F4F was S\\;tched to General Motors (Eastern AIrcraft), the fighler bemg redesignated F.\I. The Co~alr \\-as licence-produced by Goodyear as the FG. Late in the war, when the kamikazes became a major uueat, Goodyear produced a mueh more powerful redesigned Corsair, the F2G, using the new R-·B60 engine. It was ne\"er produced in numbers. Grumman's other wartime design, the 1-"'SF Bearcat, seems 10 ha\'e originated as a pri\"ate proposal to build a fighter particularly suited to small carriers, which were limited 10 ad\"anced \"ersions of the \'fildcat. II WliS also an Imerceptor, with much better climb than a Hellcat or Corsair. The FSF JUSt miSsed \\"3r senice. Small-arrier reqUlremen1$ probably also led to the design of the R)-an Fireball (FR). which combined a small piston engme with a jet in the tail. This also just missed war senice, and unlike the FSF It \\"35 nol produced In any numbers POSIW'ar. CurtlSS also produced a mixed-power fighter. the FI-IC. nll'Tl: were also a \'ariety of experimental proje<:u, perhaps most nOlably the \'OUghl F5U 'Pancake', whIch \\'as shaped almost like a ft)ing saucer and whIch \\"3S expected 10 have a \"ery low stalling speed. It ne\"er ft('\\·.

D/lrlllg the $«OllJ \I'orld Ifur the L'S Sat')' commissioncd "umtrOlIS Slllall aeort mrricrJ. I" 19-H l...coy Gnmmum propoYd a srnppeJ-Jorrn int~~plor speOally SllilCd to Ihem.1I b«ame lhe F8F &arcat, ShOfC'll herr.

169

AIK<.:KAFT 01' Till' SIiCO:-11)

~'ORLl>

WAR

1M C"rrw SB1C HtllJi1.vr ftW t/~ pkJt",~d nlCussor to prnror Dawllins. AnM from 11Ighn pnfomwllu, 1/ amid C' to ~ 'ramkr"d. t~

although a 10\\ -powered, piloted scale model, the \'oughl \·-173,did. The bu~3U held its firsl posl-19~O fighler competilion In 19~~, For the flrsl time. aircrafl could be designed pnmanly 10 be calapulted, so their stalling speeds could exeeed 9Omph. All were to be mterceptors. Out of Ihis competJIion came Ihe first postwar US na\-al jet fighlers, the Grumman I-""9F Panther and Cougar. North American F] Fury (which e\ul\'Cd into Ihe Sabre), Ihe McDonnell Phantom (HI), and the \'ought Pirate

:-1A\'AI. AIRCRAI'T 1:-1 TilE SECO:-1D WORLD WAR

I" t~ Nrly 1930s t/~ CS Sat:,· almml aball.Jo,.ed torpedo bombmf altDf'ttltn". 0" the t"ror)' t/rat onuplann capable of I,ft"l$ 'orpcdOC's t«rr far too hl.'at'J' 10 U(hit't~ stifficWll ~. fomwI/u to stU'UtV mem\'filithtm. The torptdo bomhi", rok f.."W UJt.vJ oy t/~ adtnll of ,J~ ,wt'J'~ first "UNUm monopJ.m~, tM IJougl.Js TUO-I J)etWWlOr. shot~" herr on tite L'SS Saraloga in $JIII/(J')' 1938, 1":m~(Jl/)', litis $lillie hlgitpcrfortlWI/U turopJ.me f..'US II/
longitudinal st3bililY. It also turned out to be o\·erwClghl. In senice, the Ilclldiver also pron'd to be too weak structurally. many losing !.heir tails \\hen strt.'Ssed. After a weak debul III NO\'ember 19·13, the fleet asked 10 keep the reliable SHD. Howc\'er, by thai time only the Hclldiver wa in production, and it endcd the war as the slandard US di\'e bomber. A furthcr competition in 1941 resultcd in two morc designs. the Curtiss SB3C and the Douglas S02D. but the former was never built and the lauer was soon dropped as tOO large and too eompli'x. '111e failure of the S1320 led Douglas to dc\'e1op the \"ery sUl;l;cssful POSIwar Skyraider. The Olher major bomber at the outbreak of W3r was the DevaSlator (rUD). which was also the result of a 1934 design competition. It had been the first US Na\'y monoplane, and by 19~ 1 was considered daled. However, Denstaton performed wcll as le\'el bombers durmg the carncr raids conduclcd early in 19~2. At .\hdway. \\urkmg as lorpedo bombers, they were massacred. It is only fair to say that plans had called for a ;oint attack by dl\'e and lorpedo bombers screened by fighters. bUI that the diffcrent c1emenlS of the attack failed 10 arrt\'e Simultaneously. The appearance of the TBDs pulled defending Japanese fighters down to the surface. leavlllg the higher-altitude approach of the SBOs unchallengi'd_ One might ascribe the disaster to a

(F6U).

In 1934 Ihe Bureau of Aeronautics held competitions for new scout bombers (5,OOOlb aeroplancs to carry 500lb bombs) and heavy dh'e bombers (6.000lb aeroplanes to carry I,OOOlb bombs). Norlhrop proposed a single aircraft to do both jobs, Ihe OT, and it de\'c1opcd into the SBI) Dauntless. The following year the other twO competitors. the CUrliss SBe and the Vought SB2U, were also modified for Ihe" dual-purpose role. and the heavy dive bomber diS3ppearcd, Both lhe SB2U and SBC were used III small numbers at the outbreak of war. BrewSler's SBA WliS produced in small numbers but did nOI sec aCllon. By thai time the dominant scout bomber was the Douglas SBD Daunllcss. ,\ lore than any olher aeroplane, II was responsible for the decisi\'e \;ctory at ,\ IIdw:.l.}'. By 1941, howcver. the Dauntless seemed dated. A 1938 competition had produced a successor. the Curtiss SB2C Helldl\'er (as well as Ihc aborl.ln: BrewSler SR2A). One Imporlant rt'quircmenl had been thai twO Helldi\'en fit a standard carner ele\-alor. That PfO\W unfortunale, the llelldJ\ocr bemg too shon for sufficient

\70

11,~ GflImman TBF At"("lgtT t.'US ,he liigltn"-pct/o"",.mu SIlCUfsor to lilt THD; tlreu aircraft art probably Ge,u:ral Motorsbllll, TB.\ls, J..lJu lilt TlJ/), ,hey tt~ level bomlxrs, 1101 straW for dil~ bombi"g, bru tilt), ro/lld make shallow glide auad/s.

lack ofJapanese radar, as a radar-equipped force would h:u'c been aware of Ihe threal represented by Ihe approaching SBOs. Grumman had already won a 1939 competition for a replacement \rrB, producing the \'ery successful Avenger (I'BF), '111e same competition produced Vought's Seawolf (rBU). Although technically superior to the TBF, the Seawolf was dropped so that Vought could coneentrlue on the more \'ital Corsair fighter, allhough a few were produced by Consolidaled as TBYs. Produclion oflhe TBF shifted to Eastern Aircraft so that Grumman could concentratc on Hellcats (the aircraft \\ere designated TaM). A \"3riet)' of follow-on auack aircraft were de\'eloped durmg the \\-ar. It rurned Out that multi-seaters had unin· splrlllg performance, and many of them seemed 100 hea\')' for easy carrier operations. About 19~4 the US Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics became interesled in single-scaters With ncar-fighter performance. capable of attacking and then fighl.lng their way home. By Ihis time, too, il seemed less and less attractin° 10 separate attack aircraft mto dh-e and torpedo bombers. The new. \-ery powerful engines allowt'd both roles to be combmed. Then: "-as also pressure 10 do so, as carners nceded mon: fighten on board to cope "ith kamikazes.

The ncw class of aircraft was designated VB'[ E"cntually It produced the Douglas Skyraider, initially dcslgmlteacific, they were needed to prodde Ihe fleet with early knowledge of enemy movements, Quite aside from the agreement \\ith the llmlY, such SCOUtS had to be seaplanes because so few airfields existed. The main type in service in 1941, the Consolidated POV Catalina, arose OUt of a 1932 dcsign competluon, which the company' won with an aeroplane designated XP3 Y, i.e" a pure patrol aircraft- The Oureau of Aeronautics was 5uflicienlly impressed wilh ilS performance 10 add a bomber role, redesignating a modified version of the XP3Y the PRY. This sen'ed \'ery successfully through the S~ond \'('orld War, and was also gi\'en to US Allies, including Hritain and the So\;el Union. The I'BY servcd III the Second World \'('ar at least parll)' because altemplS to develop a new generauon of scoutS took much longer than eX~led, In 1935 the Bureau of Aeronautics lei 11 conrract which it hoped would produce 3n aeroplane carrying t\\ice the bombload of the PBY owr t\\;ce its combal range. 'Inc result "-as an unsuccessful Sikorsky four-c:ngine

17\

AIRCRAFT 01' TilE

SECO~IJ

\\'ORLD \VAR

SAVAL AIRCRAFT IS THE

SECO~D

'X'ORLD \1:'AR

expected, but by 1941 the Martin Mariner was in service, along with the Catalina. The new four.engine flying boat became the huge f\'!artin PBn I ,\tars; il was soon redesigned as a long. mnge transport. Like most Coronados, the Mars was also used as transport rather than a patrol bomber. The most striking wartime parrol bomber development was the shin towards land-based aircran. 'Ille US Na\'y flew i:s first Second \Xrorld War ASW patrols out of Iceland in the summer of 1940, using PBYs.111at autumn and \\;nter it became ob\;ous that such aircran could not operate reliably, and in October 1941 the navy received 20 Lockheed Hudsons, essentially small airliners conn'rted to maritime patrOl aircran for the RAE One of them sank the first U·boat credited to a US air· craft. In US service the pao Hudson dC\'c\oped into the PV-l Venrura (first delivered December 1942) and, late

flying boat, the XPBS; the bureau almost immediately let a contr3ct to Consolidated for an alternath'e, the PB2Y, which became the wartime Coronado, It ftew in 1938. These aeroplanes used de\'c\opmcnts of the R-1830 engine; the PBY was powered by earlier \"ersions. As in the single-engine aircran, the next step was due to the appearance of new engines, in this case the R2600. The bureau announced competitions for four- and n\;n-engine seaplanes in the autumn of 1936. J'ooiartin won the 4,OOO-mile nvin.engine competition with its PBM Mariner, which served alongside the Catalina throughout the war. By 1937 the bureau had three aeroplanes under de\"C!opment, the PBS, PB2Y, and PB,"t It immediately ordered the PBM, on the basis that it would be easiest 10 maintain and offered the best performance. Development proved more difficult than had been

The ~('tlrtime L"S Navy lleeded high-endllrance air
Experie,u;e rcith jlyi,rg beau ill roug" Norlhem waters cOlwinced the US t\'avy to rel/egotiate iu agrume'l/ not 10 operate IQ/ldbased aircraft. It began /Q bllY Locklu:ed bombers, IIltimately Lockheed PJI.J Jill/uras (showlI here) alld PJI-2 Harpoolls. Quite successful during Ihe f~r, rhey iI/spired the poSltlXlr det'tlopmem of the P2 V Nepllllle (later P-2) (,md then of the Orioll (P31{ changed to 1'·3).

172

1938, when Boeing B-17s intercepled the Italian liner Rex ,,"ell out 10 sea. One consequence was that the standard US medium bombers, the North American B-25 and ,\taron 8-26, could carry torpedoes. \,(lartime army airemft in the South Pacific conducted numerous antishipping attacks, generally skip-bombing rather than using torpedoes. When the na\'y took ovcr the Liberators al the end of 1942, the)" were redesignated PB4Ys (a PH3 nying boat flew in 1943, but \\'as unsuccessfUl), A hea\'ily modified version with a single tail appeared late in the war as t.he I>B4Y·2 I>rivaleer, and continued in US service postwar. Although the RAF used Boeing B-17s for coastal operations, the US Na\'y did not. The PBs taken O\'er late in the war were used for initial experiments with airborne early warning, under I>ro;ect Cadillac. The PVs were clearly interim aircraft. In December 1941 Lockheed begal\ \\'ork on a follow-on, which

in the war, into the PV·2 Harpoon (first delh'ered in August 1944). Although theSe aircraft were bought for AS\'\'. they were soon valued for general ami-shipping patrol work. and the Pacific forces demanded them. The firsl squadron arrh'ed in the summer of 1943. At sea level the \cnrum was faster than many contemporary fighters, so it could be used aggressively in daylight sweeps into enemy terrilOry. Many Venturas were used in the Aleutians Where, as in Iceland and elsewhere in the North Atlantic, seaplane operations were hazardous al best. At this time the US Army Air Force oper3ted heavy bombers, mainly B-24 Liberators, on anti-submarine patrol. The pre-war Army Air Corps had claimed a coast defence responsibility, hence a need for anti·ship capabili!)'. This was actually an RAF-style attempt to supersede the na\·y. It was most spectacularly manifested in

173

....

I~CR

NAVAL AJRCR ..\ FT Il" THE

.... FT OF THE SECOND WORLD W .... R

Brown, J D, Carrier Op€ratiolls in 1\''Orld I\'ilr 1/ (2 vols., London, 1974),

Poolman, K, The CarafigJllcrs alld l\Jercltam Aircraft Carriefl (London, 1970). Describes twO wartime British expedients to bring aircraft to sea, catapults for one-way fighter missions and semi-com·ersions of merchant ships which remined their freighter or tanker capabilities.

Brown, J D, Alrt'"rafl Carriers ofll"or/d lI'ur 11 (London, 1977), Chesneau, R, Aircraft Carriers of Ihe Il"orld (London and Annapolis, 1984), Creed, R R, PBl': 11le Catalilla Plying Boot (Annapolis, 1985).

Poolman, K, Allied Escorl Carriers (London and Annapolis, 1988).

Friedman, N, Carrier Air Poo'!!r (London, 1981),

Price, A, Aircraft vs. Submarine (London and Annapolis, 1973).

Friedman, N, L:S Aircraft Carriers:An IIllislraled Design History (Annapolis, 1983).

Reynolds, G, The Hm Carriers (New York, 1968; second edition: Annapolis, 1992),

Friedman, N, Brilish Carrier Airpoft'er (London and Annapolis, 1988), Treats the aircraft as well as the ships, gh'ing design and operational rationales.

became the P2V Neptune, me principal postwar patrol bomber mrough me mid-I 960s. ·£bere were also banIcship and cruiser flo::nplanes. In 1941 me standard was the Curtiss SOC biplane, the protOtype of which h:ld been ordered in 1932. It was primarily an obsen'ation aircraft, its original designation having been 03C. "[be combination designation reflected :I decision to combine the scouting role (for cruiser aircraft) lind the gunnery obsen·ation role (for battleship aircraft). Vought designed the monoplane OS2U Kingfisher as a replaccmcnt, and it pro\'ed quite successful. Its intended successor, me Curtiss S03C Sellmew, was, however, a failure, and some were replaced by SOCs reinstated into service. In 1942,:lS the S03C was entering sen'ice, the na\'y circulated a specification for a much faster catapult-launched scout. Curtiss won this competition with its single-scat SC Seahawk, whidl emered sen'ice in 1944. Finally, the US Navy seems to have been unique in using airships for anti-submarine pattol. Prewar interest in \'cry-long-nmge rigid airship scouts lapsed after a disastrous crash, but the non-rigid 'blimps' survived, and indeed were retained In sen'ice for more than a decade after the war. Compared with conventional aircraft, they were very atttacti\·c because they could slow down to something likc coO\'oy speed, and they enjoyed something approllching surface ship endurance.

Stuni\'am, R Fkel Air Arm atll'ur (London, 1982). Sturtivant, R, The Suwdfislz SlOry (London, 1993). Till, G, Air Pml'!!r U/ld Ihe Royal Navy 1914-1945 (London, 1979).

Hanson, N, Carrier Pilot (Cambridge, 1979).

Tillman, B, I\"iltlco.l: Ihe F4F ill lrbrld H'br (Annapolis, 1983; second edition 1990).

Harrison, W, Tuirty Pirtj/y (Shrewsbury, 1992). Hendry, A, Plying Cats: 11le Catalina i1l lI'orld irar 1/ (Annapolis, 1988).

(St:lndard books on :lircraft of this period lire not listed here.) There arc no full-length accounts of several imporlant Allied aircraft: the Barracuda, Helldiver, and the Ventura/Harpoon series. Apan from the Zero fighter, there are also no book-length English-langu:lge accounts of the major Japanese aircraft. "hny of these aircraft were, howc\'er, covered by Profiles and/or by bookJelS in the Squadron/Signal 'In Action' series.

!!e"llct, VAD'\,\ Sir Arthur, Aircraft mId Sta PQfcer (London and New York, 1970), One ofa trilogy on major influences on modern sea power; the other \'olumes concern submarines and electronics. Ikuhiko, H, Japlwcsc Nat'al Aces and Figltltr linilS lfbr/d 1I'&r 11 (Annapolis, 1989).

Tillman, 13, Tile Dalltlfless Dive Bombet ill ItIQrfd Irar (Annapolis, 1976), Tillman, 13, AlJellger York, 1980),

Belote, J Hand \v,! M., Titalls of Ille Seas (New York, 1975).

I.undstrom, J, The Fir$( 1tam alld Ille G/ladalcallal Campaign (Annapolis, 1994). US naval fighters in combat, August through November, 1942.

Irar (London, 1979 and New

Vaem, J G, Blimps alld L:-Bools (Annapolis, 1992). \'\:!arner, D and I~ Tile Sacrtdll"arriors (New York, 1982). "111e kamika"le story, including a score card of ships hit and sunk in 1944-45. ·Ibis book also includes other Japanese suicide weapons. Y'Blood, W 'I~ Red SUIl Selling (Annapolis, 1981). The Battle of the Philippine Sea, in \\·hich the Japanese na\'al air arm was destroyed.

Mikesh, R C, Zero (Osceola, 1992),

Y'Blood, W T, Hllll/er-KiNer (Annapolis, 1983). The story of US escoTt C'arriers in the Battle of the Atlantic.

,\li1ler, N, The Naval Air I\"&r, 1939-45 (Annapolis, 1991).

y'Blood, \XI l~ The lillie Giall/s (Annapolis, 1987), Escott carriers againsl Japan,

Brown, E, DllelJ in lhe Sky: Irbr/dlt'ilr 1/ Natul Aircrafl ill Combot (London and Annapolis, 1988). An aHempt to compare aircraft in each major category. Brown, J D, Allied Carrier Fighters of Ir'Orld I\'ilr II (London, 1975),

174

0.1

nt'O

Tillman, B, Corsair (Annapolis, 1979).

Inoguchi, R and Pineau, R, The Diville lI"ind (Annapolis, 1958). ·£be first full account of the kamikazes. I.undstrom, J, The FirSI Team (Annapolis, 1984), US naval fighlers from Pearl Harbor to GUlldalcanaL

Trt'O

Tillman, 13, Helical (Annapolis, 1979).

III

Abrllms, R, P4U Corsair mll"i/r (London and New York, 1981).

Brown, E, Wings of Ihe Navy (London and Annapolis, 1987). E\·aluations of sixteen wartime carrier aircraft; includes large keyed cut-away drawings.

Smith, PC, Ditli! Bombn/ (Ashbourne and Annapolis, 1982).

Fuchida, M and Okumiya, M, Milluu)'. The Baufe Ihm Doomed Japan (Annapolis, 1955, re\'ised edition 1992). The story of the key I'acific na\'al air battle, told from the Japanese point of view.

Select Bibliography

BO\\1·er, C, Coastal COlllllland at iri:zr (London, 1979).

WORl.D IX'AR

Nesbit, R C, The Strike lI"illgs: Special AllIi-5hipping Squadrons 1942-45 (London, 1984). RAF landbased anti-Ship units formed from NO\·ember 1942 onwards, using Bcaufightcrs and MosquilOs.

Brown, J D, The Seafire: The Spitfire Ihm Ire'll {O Sea (London and Annapolis, 1989 (second edition]).

lri'" before carrier aircraft could eXp€ct to do IIlllch dallUlge to //Iajor ellemy 'V.'Oflhips, spouer aircraft offered a polell/ially decisive degree of improvement i'l hClJV)'.grmjire cOlltrol. Carrier fig//lers soollfo//mud,as il f(.'(lS essemiallO proleet frielldly SpoIlers and drit'e off those ofem enemy. By 1939 mOSI of Ihe fI.'Orld's b
SECO~D

175

AIRCRAFT OF TilE

SECO~D

\X'ORLD \X'AI(

7

The Helicopter's First War Elfan ap Rees

7im Ci(!T1)Q C.30A Rota I AI/togiros 'were delii:ered 10 the RAF i/l lhe mid- / 930s for et;(ll"atiol/ by Ille army co·operatioll squadrOllS, The S/lrtlitlOrs !toe" imegrated imo No 5 Radio SertJicil/g Sectioll ill /940 for radar calibratioll UYJrk, n,is example, K4235, is scen coded as ;::"'\-8 of .Yo 529 Squadroll,

Almost rejfeled by the RAF ill its imended role as (til aerial ObSCrtlmiol/ POSt, Ihe C,30A prQl,'Cd illdispell5able durillE Ihe !tar as Ihe Ollly accurate meallS of calibratillg tlte then-sec"t dt/ellee rallar chain.

176

At the outbreak of the Second \X'orld \X'ar only three counlries, France, Germany and Great Britain. could claim to ha\'e successfully flown a controllable helicopter, and even these machines were still very much experimental. Consequently it was the helicopter's predecessor, the autogyro, to which the warring nations first looked for military potential. This slow moving, short take·ofT I vertical landing machine seemed ideal for reconnaissance and artillery-spotting, replacing the existing fixed.wing aerial obsen"ation posts (AOPs) supporting the army, and inlroducing a similar role aboard larger ships where space for a flight deck might be possible. Beyond that the autogyro seemed limited in its capabilities, In the 1930s the Cierva C"30A Autogiro and its variants were dominant. The Spanish Na\'y was acrually the first sen'ice (0 use a rotary.wing aircraft on military operations, using a C,30A in Asrurias during a rebellion in OCtober 1934. Over the next five years a small number of C.30As were supplied to !he French Air Force and :'-Ja\,', Britain's Royal Air Force and the Soviet go\'ernment, whilst in the USA deri\"ati\'es built by Kellen were deli\"ered to the US Army Air Corps and to the Japanese Army. A second US licensee, Pitcairn. worked with the US Na\'y, In Germany the local licensee, Focke-Wulf, built about thirty C.30As OUI of a planned production run of forty. Single C.30As were also deli\"ered for military e\"aluation to se\'eral other go\'ernments. which did not progress lheir use further, Despite this apparent wide interest, September 1939 saw only the British, French and German sen"ices using the aUlogyro operationally, although the Sodet Army and Japanese military were to usc them later in the war. In France, the delivery of twenty·fh·e military Cierva C.30A Autogiros, mosliy built under licence by Lion: ct Oli\'ier (LeO), began in October 1935 wi!h !he hando\'Cr of the first of four aircraft to the Aeronanle. Delh'erics (0 ['Armee de l'Air (AdA) followed between January and July 1936, The AdA laler recei\'ed a further thirty-four lcD-built C.30As. The primary role em"isaged by the French generals for the Autogiro was artillery obsen'ation along the expected front of the .\ laginot and Siegfried lines. The plan was to equip up to thirty AdA Flights, each with three C.30As, to work in conjunction with front-line army artillery units, The Acrona\"alc was less ambitious, seeing the AUlogiro mainly of \"3lue in tTacking torpedoes during peacetime training exercises.

By the beginning of September 1939, immediately before the outbreak of war, cight AdA units were equipped with a total of twen(y-eight C.30As, with a fur!her twenty-one in storage or under repair and three operating at Sommesous in a training role. The Aerona\"ale was operating six aircraft, di\'ided between 3S-2 t-lotille at Cuers-Pierrefeu and the training school al Hyeres, Two more AUlogiros were in storage. O\'er the neXI nine months, as the 'phoney' war period gradually deteriorated, the French Autogiro force changed relatively little, with fony-seven C.30As still on AdA charge at the beginning of ,\ lay 1940 and thirteen in ser\'ice with the Aerona\"a1c" More than thiny artillery obsen