Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class (Warships of the Kriegsmarine)

Gneisenau in the winter of 1939/40



The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau: The Backbone of the German Surface Forces at the Outbreak of War GERHARD KOOP and KLAUS-PETER SCHMOLKE

Copyright © Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn, 1991 This edition first published in Great Britain in 2014 by Seaforth Publishing, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley S70 2AS www.seaforthpublishing.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 84832 192 2 First published in the German language under the title Die Schlachtschiffe der Scharnhorst-Klasse by Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn, 1993 First published in the English language by Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Ltd, 1999 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of both the copyright owner and the above publisher. Translated from the German by Geoffrey Brooks Printed and bound in China through Printworks International Ltd

Contents Foreword Development and Construction Scharnhorst Class: Technical Specifications Scale Plans: Scharnhorst Camouflage Schemes The Battleship Gneisenau Origin of the Name: August Wilhelm Anton Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau The Battleship Scharnhorst Origin of the Name: Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst Conclusions Appendices Bibliography Index of Ships About the Authors

Foreword Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class presents detailed information in the same manner as its companion volume Battleships of the Bismarck Class. The book opens with a short history of the development stage which led to the construction of the two ships of the class. This is followed by an in-depth career history of each vessel, concluding with a critical epilogue. Also provided are detailed tables of design, construction and technical/tactical data regarding weapons and weapons systems, machinery, equipment and crew strength. A comprehensive selection of photographs, accompanied by a full narrative, technical drawings and battle charts, complete the book. In naming the two ships, the Kriegsmarine followed an old tradition of the Imperial Navy which bestowed upon vessels of certain classes the names of important German historical figures. The battleship Scharnhorst was the second warship to bear the name, Gneisenau the third. The postwar German Federal Navy initially continued the custom with two training frigates but subsequently abandoned the practice without explanation. The two battleships were ‘children of their time’, and their construction was completed against the backdrop of portentous political change in Germany and Europe which had so influenced it: even the experts disagreed upon an exact definition of what type the ships were. Some spoke of battlecruisers, others of battleships. Both were correct within limits; the description ‘fast battleship’ probably comes closest. I owe thanks to Klaus-Peter Schmolke, who prepared the sketches and plans with tireless application. I must also thank F. Bavendamm, who assisted me in selecting the photographs, A. Didrichs for valuable help, and my friend of long-standing S. Breyer, who has given me support over the years and unselfishly provided solutions in many problem areas. Not least my thanks go to Bernard & Graefe Verlag, who published the original German edition, and to Greenhill Books for the new English edition. All plans and sketches were prepared by Klaus-Peter Schmolke unless otherwise stated. Sources for photographs were Kriegsmarine Werft, Wilhelmshaven; the Koop Collection/PK/Deutsche Werke Kiel; Renard; Urbahns; Scherl; Nauticus; the Raabe Collection; Klein, Kiel; Klein; Klinger, Zürich; the Royal Air Force; the United States Air Forces; and the Royal Navy. Gerhard Koop

Development and Construction From inception the design, planning and building of the Scharnhorst class battleships were subject to a number of limitations. First and foremost among these were the provisions and restrictions of the Versailles Treaty as it related to Germany. This agreement permitted the building of new ships up to a displacement of 10,000 tonnes, but only to replace existing ships and no more than six (plus two in reserve). The same restriction also applied to smaller warships. U-boats and aircraft were completely forbidden. Even manpower levels were precisely laid down. The mass scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919 was punished by the surrender of further parts of the Fleet to the victorious powers. This left the Reichsmarine with only the remnants of what had once been: a fleet reduced to six obsolete pre-dreadnought battleships (plus two in reserve), six dilapidated light cruisers (plus two in reserve) and a number of old torpedo-boats amounted to no more than a coastal force of questionable strength. It was only natural that Germany’s new naval leaders should wish to have this situation improved at the earliest opportunity, and in the early 1920s the first thoughts were given to replacing the predreadnoughts and old cruisers with new construction. However, proposals were not so easily put into practice. The Weimar Republic was politically unstable and its continual changes of government— between the end of 1918 and 30 January 1933 there were twenty Cabinets with twelve different Reich Chancellors—allowed for little continuity of purpose. Germany was in desperate straits financially, for the reparations to the victorious Powers had virtually ruined the economy of the Reich. Then came hyperinflation. Not until the late 1920s, when the position began to stabilise, did the government begin to look kindly upon the requirements of the Navy. The first new replacement for a pre-dreadnought was armoured cruiser ‘A’, launched as Deutschland. This revolutionary type of ship was a hybrid within the specifications of the 1922 Washington Agreement because Deutschland was a capital ship in terms of the calibre of her main armament but a Type A cruiser according to her relatively light displacement.1 Five ships of the armoured cruiser type were planned. Whereas the German Navy adhered strictly to the permitted displacement of 10,000 tonnes for Deutschland, the later sister ships Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee were heavier. As is now known, this was because of an increase in armour and thus the purpose was exclusively to improve their defensive capabilities. The preliminary designs for the capital ships were dated 1928. By then the Navy—with the knowledge, connivance and approval of the Reich Government—had made its case for a increase in size to 17,500 tons standard displacement, 19,192 tons ‘construction displacement’ and 21,000 tons ‘battle displacement’. The ships’ dimensions would be 206 × 25 × 7.8m (676 × 82 × 25ft approx.) and their armament 30.5cm (12in), 15cm (5.9in) and 8.8cm (3.5in) guns. In 1930 the Reich Government agreed to the introduction of the so-called ‘Ship Replacement Building Plan’, due to complete in 1938, and from this there emerged in 1933 the ‘Rebuilding Plan’, which embodied the policy of having in commission six pre-dreadnoughts or armoured cruisers, one aircraft carrier, six cruisers, six destroyer or torpedo-boat half-flotillas, three minesweeping halfflotillas, three E-boat half-flotillas, three U-boat half-flotillas, one sail training ship and one minelaying group. In addition, the creation of a naval air arm was predicted, consisting of nine small squadrons and more besides. This plan came into effect in November 1932 under the overall control of the Reich Defence Minister von Schleicher and in response to the doomed Geneva Disarmament

Conference, from which Germany took her leave on 14 October 1933. France, from time immemorial Germany’s principal potential enemy, reacted promptly to the appearance of Deutschland and the proposed construction of her two sisters by placing orders for two larger battleships, Dunkerque and Strasbourg. These displaced 26,000 tons, were armed with 33cm (12in) guns in quadruple turrets and could make 30kt. Dunkerque was launched on 2 October 1935 and Strasbourg on 12 December 1936. Other naval powers had undoubtedly noted what was going on in German shipyards but looked on with less alarm. The building of the two French battleships had been closely watched by the Germans and prompted a review of their naval planning. On 30 January 1933 Reich President Hindenburg entrusted Hitler with the formation of a new government, and with the support of his large party organisation the latter soon succeeded in eliminating opposition, so clearing the way for his objectives. Although initially hesitant, by March 1935 Hitler had declared Germany’s sovereignty in defence matters and stepped up rearmament. It is fairly certain that the foundations for this were laid in April 1934 during Deutschland’s Norwegian cruise, when Hitler was aboard her in the company of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Raeder, Reich War Minister Generaloberst von Blomberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General von Fritsch. The building contracts approved for the two armoured ships ‘D’ and ‘E’ had meanwhile been placed. As a response to the French Dunkerque class they were larger than their three forerunners (of which only Deutschland was as yet in commission), displacing some 20 ,000 tonnes with dimensions of 230 × 25.5 8.5m (approximately 754 × 84 × 28ft). Emphasis had been laid on an improved protection scheme, with belt armour of 220mm, citadel 50mm, upper deck 80mm and the control tower 300mm. The main armament had been set at 28cm (11in). Some thought had been given to having eight rather than six main barrels, arranged in two quadruple turrets as aboard the French ships, but this would have required a completely new design. The traditional 15cm calibre was retained for the medium guns, together with 10.5cm, 3.7cm and 2cm flak. The installation of torpedo tubes was envisaged. Lengthy discussions were subsequently held concerning the desirability of matching the 33cm main armament of the French ships. Consideration was given to 33cm, 35cm and 38cm guns, but, as had been the case with the quadruple turret idea, a completely new design would have been required in order to carry them. Furthermore, Hitler would not have given his approval, since for some time he had been making overtures to Great Britain. It is reasonably certain that Hitler—at least at that time— was anxious for a reconciliation with the world’s leading naval power, and opting for a calibre greater than 28cm would have jeopardised the negotiations. The two keels ‘D’ and ‘E’ were scrapped on the stocks in the summer of 1934 and the naval architects started work on new plans based on the principles of the former design. The following year the keels of the two battleships ‘D’ and ‘E’, to be named Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were laid again.1 The size of these two ships was now officially 26,000 tonnes and the armament had been increased from six to nine 28cm barrels disposed in three triple turrets. Thicker armour afforded resistance to 33cm shells, and an effort was made to provide the best possible protection against bombs and torpedoes. Owing to a shortage of space amidships only single-barrel 15cm gunhouses were sited there, although elsewhere the medium-calibre armament was paired in twin turrets. Difficulties existed in the choice of main plant, and the controversy gave rise to lively discussions between the architects and the naval engineers’ branch. Once the various departments concerned in naval shipbuilding were brought together under a single controlling authority, steam turbine drive was decreed. This did not resolve the argument, but any further delay was unjustifiable. That the final decision favoured the steam turbine was due principally to the fact that the equivalent diesel plant was not available because the remaining problems had not been addressed at the proper time.

Furthermore, a euphoric atmosphere surrounded the newly introduced high-pressure hot steam plant being used by merchant vessels and in shore installations, and many believed it to be the last word in marine drive. All types of marine engines have their pros and cons. The diesel motor is instantly ready to provide drive, that is, it can be put at once to maximum output from zero: all that is required is the push of a button. With steam drive, much more time is required. A steam plant has to work up to maximum output because time is needed before the boilers can supply the steam requirement. From cold—that is, when all boilers are shut down and no turbines are pre-heated—the process takes about two hours. The diesel is more economical with fuel. For this reason the armoured cruisers Admiral Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer could operate against enemy shipping as far afield as the Indian Ocean while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—with steam drive—were confined to the North Atlantic. As regards floor space, the steam plant is more advantageous. The high output required of the diesel system demands several motors which take up a large floor area whereas the turbines of the high-pressure/hot steam installation require less space. Aboard Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the boilers, linked to economisers, were larger and stood higher. Another reason behind the decision to install steam drive had been the Ship Testing Committee’s criticism of the construction method of the diesel installation in the Deutschland class vessels. This was only partially justified, as lightness of the unit had been a basic contractual specification laid down by the Navy. In order to comply with the condition, the foundations were built lightly and, as was discovered later, weakly. But this was mainly an architectural flaw. Subsequently Deutschland had to ship extra ballast to increase her stability, and if some of this extra weight had been allowed to the diesel manufacturer the problem with the foundations would not have arisen. From a political perspective the building of battleships ‘D’ and ‘E’ was a clear breach of the Versailles Treaty, as was the declaration of military sovereignty on 16 March 1935. The tonnage of the armoured cruisers ‘B’ and ‘C (Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee) also amounted to an infringement of the Treaty. The decision to build the latter pair was approved by the pre-Hitler Reich Government and the Reichstag, and the culpability for the decision lies with these institutions. The building of the much larger Scharnhorst class was sanctioned retroactively by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. It was planned to refit both ships with 38cm (15in) guns, but subsequent events precluded this. Taken as a whole, the two units of the Scharnhorst class represented a compromise in which political considerations had played the major role. From a purely military/technical point of view, the design had not been thought through with due maturity.

Scharnhorst class: Technical Specifications GENERAL DETAILS (Information per Witte; minor variations per Gröner, Evers, Hadeler and Anglo-American sources)

WEIGHT GROUPING Note: Individual construction groups have an identification letter used initially for calculation purposes in the design stages but ultimately retained throughout the period of the ship’s useful life. S = Weight of compartmented hull, comprising S I (building materials, e.g. steel ST 52, excluding waterline armour), S II (metal workers), S III (carpenters) and S IV (painters); A (armament and armour with equipment); T (torpedoes with equipment); F (aircraft installation with equipment); Spr (mines with equipment); I (general equipment); Ta (masts and spars); N (nautical gear) MI = main machinery and connections, condensers, gears, couplings, shaft connections, propellers, auxiliary machinery, conduits and piping used in connection with the operation of the main machinery, exhaust/funnel cap, equipment etc., boilers with armatures, oil and water in the main engine plant MII = auxiliary boiler plant, ship’s heating system, washing and drinking water desalination plant, laundry, ablutions, kitchen gear etc., ship’s pumps, primary electrical plant, lighting, cables, steering assembly, capstans, boats’ windlasses, room fans, weapon systems, refrigerating plant, searchlights, signalling lamps, command elements, gyro compass, mileage logs, sirens and workshops.

Gneisenau after conversion, 1940

Gneisenau: proposed conversion , 1942

WEIGHT GROUPING BY PROPORTION (TONNES): SCHARNHORST

PLANNED CONVERSION OF GNEISENAU (AS OF 1942) Standard (tonnes) Operational (tonnes)

displacement displacement

33,510 40,720

Length cwl (m) Maximum draught (m) Armament:

236 9.75 6 × 38cm/L47, 12 × 15cm/L55, 14 × 10.5cm/L65, 16 × 3.7cm/L83, 28 × 2cm in single and quadruple mountings



ARMOUR The armour plate was principally KC (Krupp Cemented, containing 34% carbon, 3.78% nickel, 0.31% manganese and 2.06% chrome) steel, classified Ww (= Wotan soft) or Wh (= Wotan hard). Wh had an ultimate tensile strength of 85-95 kg/mm2,20% expansion and a yield point of 50-55 kg/mm2. Ww had an ultimate tensile strength of 65-70 kg/mm2, 25% expansion and a yield point of 38–40 kg/mm2. Belt armour Armoured bulkheads Funnel mantle base Deck above engine room Citadel armour Splinter bulkhead in citadel area Upper deck Armoured deck Armoured deck slopes Torpedo bulkhead Forward command position 350mm Aft command position Command position rangefinder rotating cupolas Fire control position in foretop Flak fire control position

350mm KC reducing to 170mm (below); forward from amidships, 150mm Wh reducing to 70mm; aft from midships, 200mm Wh reducing to 170mm 150mm to 200mm KC 20mm Wh 20mm Wh 40mm Wh, aft 35mm Wh, forward 20mm 20mm Wh 50mm Wh 80mm–95mmWh 105mm–110mm Wh 45mm Wh Sides 350mm KC, roof 200mm KC, companionway 220mm KC, face KC, rear 350mm KC Sides 100mm KC, roof 50mm KC, companionway 100mm KC 100mm KC 60mm KC, roof 20mm KC, rotating cupola 20mm KC

14mm KC Central forward 200mm KC, sides 350mm KC, central rear 200mm Barbettes, main turrets KC 28cm main turrets Face 360mm KC, sides 180mm KC, rear 350mm KC, roof 180mm KC 15 cm turrets Face 140mm KC, sides 50mm KC, rear 50mm KC, roof 50mm KC 15cm singles, central pivoting 25mm shield 10.5cm flak 20mm splinter protection

Arrangement and distribution of armour



ARMOUR STRENGTHS, WEIGHTS AND DISTRIBUTION (TONNES)

WEAPONS Note: In German naval practice the main turrets are identified alphabetically, i.e. ‘A’ (‘Anton)’, ‘B’ (‘Bruno’), ‘C (‘Caesar ’) etc., from forward to aft. 9 x 28cm/L54.5-C34 in three triple turrets (turret roller track chassis C34) Length of gun barrel in calibre multiples: 51.25 Length of gun barrel, inc. chassis and breech block, in calibre multiples: 54.47 Muzzle velocity: 890m/sec. Rate of fire: 3.5 rounds per barrel per minute Shell weight: 315kg and 336kg

Main armament

Life of barrel: 300 rounds Barrel weight, inc. breech: 53.5 tonnes Maximum range at 40° elevation: 42.5km Weight of broadside: 2,970kg Barrel elevation speed: 8°/sec. Turning speed of turret: 7.2°/sec. Turret weight: 750 tonnes Maximum elevation of barrel: +40° Maximum depression of barrel: −8° (‘B’ turret−9°) Thickness of armour penetrated by 28cm shell striking at 70° angle: 10,000m = 348mm 15,000m = 280mm 20,000m = 225mm 25,000m = 194mm Ammunition supply: 450 armour-piercing shells L/4.4, weight 336kg, length 1.245m with 6.6kg explosive charge, tail fuse 38 450 armour-piercing shells L/4.4, weight 316kg, length 1.245m with 16kg explosive charge, tail fuse 38 450 armour-piercing shells L/4.5, weight 315kg, length 1.273m with 21.8kg explosive charge, nose fuse 27 1,350 shell cases, weight 189.5kg, each filled with 71kg RPC/38* 1,350 powder bags, weight 36kg, each filled with 36kg RPC/38* (*RP = gun powder, C/38 year of development) The 28cm barrels of a turret could be elevated individually or together. A barrel could fire singly, or two or three barrels could combine for a salvo. Where a full salvo of three barrels was fired, the discharge from the centre gun was delayed for a split second to prevent variation caused by the pressure of the departing shells. The 28cm C/34 gun was a further development of the 28cm C/28 fitted aboard the Deutschland class. The shells contained less explosive and were of greater length. The differences were as follows:

The triple 28cm (11in) L/54.5 SK 28 gun on C34 turntable chassis.

The penetrative power of the 28cm shell at selected range s was: Range (m) 7,900 15,100 18,288

Side armour (mm) 460 335 291

Deck armour (mm) 19 41 48

8 × 15cm/L55-C28 in twin turret (roller track chassis C34) 4 × 15cm/L55-C28 in single-shielded centre-pivot mounting MPL35 Barrel length in calibres: 55 Muzzle energy: 1,770 megatonnes Muzzle velocity (V0): 875m/sec. Barrel life: 1,100 rounds Barrel weight, inc. breech: 9,080kg Shell weight: 45.3kg Maximum range: 23km (22km from single-mounted barrel)

Secondary armament

Maximum barrel depression: −10° Maximum barrel elevation: +40° (+35° from single mounted barrel) Rate of fire: 8 rounds per barrel per minute Ammunition supply: 1,600 explosive shells (800 with nose fuse, 800 with tail fuse), weight 45.3kg, length 65.5 or 67.9cm with 3,058 or 3,892kg explosive charge 1,600 shell cases, weight 23.5kg, length 86.5cm with RPC/32 filling. 240 starshells with casing Weight of gun: 120 tonnes

Flak



Note: The German term ‘flak’—a contraction of Fliegerabwehrkanone—is used throughout this book to describe anti-aircraft (AA) weapons and installations both aboard ship and ashore. 14 × 10.5cm/L65-C33 in seven twin turrets C33 (these were converted 8.8cm flak twin turrets C31). Barrel length in calibres: 65 Muzzle energy: 625 megatonnes Muzzle velocity (V0): 900m/sec Barrel life: 2,950 rounds Weight of barrel, inc. breech: 4,560kg Shell weight: 15.1kg Maximum range: 17.7km horizontal, 12.5km at 80° elevation Maximum depression of barrel: −8° Maximum elevation of barrel: +80° Weight of gun: 27.35 tonnes Rate of fire: 18 rounds per barrel per minute. Ammunition supply: 6,020 explosive cartridges, weight 15.1kg, length 1.28m (shell and casing as one unit), 5.2kg charge 420 tracer shells 16 x 3.7cm/L83 in eight twin housings, chassis C30 Barrel length in calibres: 83 Muzzle energy: 38 megatonnes Muzzle velocity (V0): l,000m/sec Barrel life: 7500 rounds Weight of gun, inc. breech: 243kg Maximum range: 8.5km horizontal, 6.8km at 80° elevation (tracer

4.8km) Maximum elevation: +80° Ammunition supply: 32,000 explosive shells, weight 0.745kg, length 54.3cm (shell and casing as unit), charge 0.365kg Rate of fire: 80 rounds (in theory), 40 rounds (in practice) per barrel per minute 2cm/L65-C30 single mounting, chassis C30 2cm/L65-C38 single mounting, chassis C30 2cm/L65-C38 quadruple mounting, chassis C38

Gneisenau:

Scharnhorst:

2cm Flak C30:

10 × 2cm/L65-C30 single C30; from 1941 refitted with 2cm/L65-C38 and in addition received 2cm quadruple C38. These were removed during that year and replaced by 3 × 2cm quadruple C38. At the end of 1941 Gneisenau had 22 × 2cm flak barrels. 10 × 2cm/L65-C30 singles C30; from 1941 a 2cm quadruple C38 was added and the single C30 guns were replaced by model C38. In 1942 Scharnhorst’s flak was twice augmented by two further 2cm quadruple C38. For the ‘Channel Dash’ in early 1942 another 2cm quadruple was installed atop ‘B’ turret. At the beginning of 1942 the ship had 38 × 2cm flak barrels. Barrel length in calibres: 65 Muzzle velocity (V0): 835m/sec. Barrel life: 22,000 rounds Barrel weight, inc. breech: 64 kg Maximum range: 4.9km horizontal, 3.7km elevated Maximum elevation of barrel: +85° Weight of shell: 0.132kg Weight of gun: 420kg

2cm Flak C38 single-mounted C30—differences: barrel weight, inc. breech: 57.5kg; weight of gun: 416kg 2cm Flak C38 quadruple-mounted C38—differences: weight of gun: 2,150kg Ammunition supply: 20,000 explosive tracer rounds, weight 0.132kg, length 7.85cm, charge

39.5g. Obviously a greater stock of ammunition would have been shipped as the number of flak guns aboard increased. Rate of fire: 280 rounds (in theory), 120 rounds (in practice) per barrel per minute single-mounted; 480 rounds (in theory), 220 rounds (in practice) per barrel per minute quadruple-mounted.

Torpedo installation

In 1941 Gneisenau received two triple sets each of 53.3cm torpedo tubes from the light cruiser Leipzig, as did Scharnhorst from the light cruiser Nürnberg. These were installed either side of the upper deck superstructure at the level of the aircraft hangar. They were never used operationally, although during her refit in Brest Gneisenau conducted trials with them. For safety reasons, no torpedoes were carried by either ship during the ‘Channel Dash’.



The penetrative power of a 28cm explosive shell (L/37-300kg) against normal armour. The shell will remain intact. (Note: A hectometre, one tenth of a kilometre, is the standard range measurement factor in German gunnery. However, to avoid confusion, ranges are generally expressed as kilometres and parts of a kilometre elsewhere in this book.)

The penetrative power of a 28cm armour-piercing shell (L/37-300kg) against an armoured surface. The shell will remain intact.

Characteristics of a 28cm SK-C/34 shell of 330kg at 890m/sec V0 .

Source: OKM: Tables and Guidelines for the Determination of Principal Ranges for Engagements and Choice of Shell, 1940

FIRE CONTROL AND RANGEFINDING EQUIPMENT

All rangefinder reports, together with lateral and/or altitude data calculated in the individual fire control centres from target indicator sights (ZAGs), were relayed to the gunnery TS and action command centre grouped on three platform decks in compartment XIV within the citadel area (a similarly equipped reserve group was located in compartment V). The entire fire control installation was equipped with the Model 30 gear, which was the most modern available. If the primary system in the foretop controlling the main armament went out of commission, the reserve system aft would then take over. Even if all central fire control systems were lost, a turret could operate individually. The main armament could therefore be directed centrally, or a turret could operate in combination with others or singly. There was no central fire control for the 3.7cm and 2cm flak guns: these had their own rangefinders, which were operated manually.

Details of the 10.5m rangefinder

MACHINERY Drive machinery Designed efficiency

Scharnhorst 125,000shp

Gneisenau 125,000shp

109,000shp maximum over measured mile on engine trials after entering commission; 154,000shp on later trials 31kt 30.7kt at 160,050shp and 265 shaft rpm 28kt at 151,983shp and 280 shaft rpm 8,200nm at 19kt 6,200nm at 19kt

Actual efficiency

160,050shp= 128%

Designed speed

31kt

Actual speed

31.65kt on trials

Range (designed) Range (actual)

8,200nm at 19kt 7,100nm at 19kt

Boiler Installation

12 Wagner high-pressure steam-heated boilers with natural water circulation, in three boiler rooms, four in each. Three boiler drums, each with two Saacke burners at one end, air and feedwater pre-heat surfaces. Measurements of boiler room: length 33m, heating surface area 707m2, cubic area 5,300m3, weight 1,100 tonnes (43.8% of MI weight). Manufacturer: Deschimag, Bremen. Total heating surface of boilers: 4,660m2. Details of single boiler: evaporation heating surface 425m2; superheater heating surface 130m2; air pre-heat surface 800m2; output 54 tonnes steam/ hr; operating pressure 50 atmospheres forced; turbine start-up steam pressure 44 atmospheres forced; operating temperatures 263°C (saturated steam) 480°C (superheated steam); turbine start-up steam temperature 470°C; feedwater pre-heating temperature 200°C; intervention pressure, safety valves, working pressure: 58 atmospheres forced (maximum 63); authorised pressure 68 atmospheres forced; super heat intervention pressure 73–74 atmospheres forced (wet steam), 66.5–68.0 atmospheres forced (superheat) production processes; heat production 588kcal/kg; boiler efficiency 81%; flue gas temperature 330°C, evaporation figure 14 at 9,300kcal/ kg; steam production 127kg per m2 heating surface; gas resistance approx. 300mm; capacity = 132.4m3; weight of boiler (with warm water) 55 tonnes; weight of (warm) water content 4.5 tonnes; pre-heating temperature (air) 290°C; furnace load (106) 2.12kcal/m3/hr. Note: ‘Wet steam’ is steam which has reached boiling temperature but still retains elements of moisture. In practice ‘saturated steam’ is a transitional stage at which steam is 100% dry, saturated with ‘heat’ since additional heat would raise the temperature above boiling point. ‘Superheated steam’ contains more heat than does saturated steam at the same pressure.

Arrangement of ship’s machinery, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Key: 1. Central turbine room. 2. Port turbine room. 3. Starboard turbine room. 4. No 1 boiler room. 5. No 2 boiler room. 6. No 3 boiler room. 7. No 1 electrical plant. 8. No 2 electrical plant. 9. No 3 electrical plant. 10. No 4 electrical plant. 11. No 5 electrical plant. 12. Auxiliary boiler room. 13. Port shaft. 14. Centre shaft. 15. Starboard shaft. 16. Port shaft tunnel. 17. Starboard shaft tunnel. 18. Centre shaft tunnel

Output/speed curve for Scharnhorst at 38,950 tons operational displacement. The diagrams on this spread of various parts of a Wagner marine boiler are taken from Maschinenkunde (Science of Machinery), the engineering branch petty officer’s course textbook published by the Marine Engine Inspectorate, Wilhelmshaven, in 1940, and used in training schools under their jurisdiction.

A boiler of similar design to those installed in Scharnhorst and Gneisehau, although the battleships’ boilers had two Saacke burners instead of the one depicted. These were three-drum boilers with centre and mud drums, superheater, economiser and upper drum. The air was preheated by the flue gas, the feedwater by exhaust steam run off from one of the turbines and also by a direct charge of fresh steam. A boiler height of 6.685m meant that the steam collector was above the deckhead at the level of the armour deck, and for this reason the latter was not flush but raised in the area above the boiler room spaces. Originally five-drum boilers were planned, each with two superheaters and two economisers, but these proved too large and complicated. Boilers of this construction and output cannot be hand-regulated since in the event of faulty handling they will boil dry within a few minutes on account of the low water content. They were therefore equipped with a hydraulically operated Askania automatic regulator, a steel tube which would cut in to regulate the flow of heating oil, combustion air and feed water independently of the boiler pressure when the situation required.

Diagrammatic front view of Saacke burner. The Saacke was a rotary oil burner turning at between 5,000 and 7,000rpm. Heating oil was reduced to a fine spray by centrifugal force, mixed with a high-velocity current of air which acted as the atomizing agent, the mixture then being driven into the combustion chamber of the boiler.

Deschimag Wagner turbine set. The structure and arrangement of the turbine set illustrated roughly corresponds to that installed in

Gneisenau. Individual turbines were connected by a system of steam pipes. Steam was led first into the HP turbine, then, under reduction, into the IP turbine, and from there, under further reduction, into the LP turbine. The steam then passed directly into the condenser for return to feedwater. The individual turbines were linked to the drive shafts by toothed couplings, pinions and an intermediate wheel. Key: a. atomizing air intake vent. b. air passage to burner. c. burner door. d. air ring valve. e. air supply route. f. inner casing. g. primary air fan. h. oil pump and cup drive shaft, f. atomizing cup. k. atomizing compartment. 1. ball-bearing. m. fan oil container, n. direction blades. o. regulator and burner trip valve. p. swivel pipe. q. fuel oil tube. r. oil distribution head. s. secondary-air valves. t. air jet I. u. air jet II. v. baffle. w. control lever for secondary air valves.

EQUIPMENT It was finally decided in 1939 to equip the units with three Arado 196 floatplanes. Previously He 114 aircraft had been tried, as had the Fw 62 and Arado 96 aboard Gneisenau. Originally four aircraft had been planned, two to be accommodated in the hangar and one on each of two catapults. However, it was found that the weight of the catapult atop ‘C’ turret adversely affected the training of the turret, there was a serious danger of aviation spirit spilling over the turret roof by accident or as a result of battle damage, and the aircraft was highly vulnerable to damage not only from enemy shelling but also from blast from the turret’s guns when they were fired. Eventually this catapult was unshipped. During the ‘Channel Dash’ in 1942 Gneisenau had no aircraft aboard. The ship’s equipment included five searchlights each 1.6m in diameter. These were triaxially stabilised and could be directed centrally. One was located on a platform on the forward face of the tower mast, two were fitted one each side of the funnel platform and another pair were located on an extensible platform abreast the base of the catapult. This latter pair of searchlights were removed in 1942. A crane abaft the tower was used for lowering the ship’s boats. Two other cranes were located one either side of the hangar for setting down or retrieving the ship’s boats and aircraft. A collapsible derrick abaft the superstructure deck served the same purpose for the aircraft perched on ‘C’ turret catapult but was dispensed with when the catapult was unshipped. Ship’s boats consisted of three picket boats, two motor yawls, five cutters, one motor pinnace and one motor launch. Prior to the pre-war rebuilding, three bow anchors had been stowed in side hawsepipes, one to starboard and two to port. A stern anchor was lodged in a hawsepipe on the port quarter. After conversion the two bow anchors were repositioned on deck in a cluse on either bow well forward and the former hawsepipes were welded closed. A third bow anchor at the forepeak (visible in some photographs) was removed after sea trials showed that it set up strong vibrations when the bow plunged and worsened the effects of seas shipped over the bow. In 1940 both ships were fitted with an anti-mine system. The degaussing loop for this ran along the upper edge of the belt armour. Under the heading of ‘Equipment’ is included systems and installations such as the gyrocompass, navigation, radio, teleprinter, signals, hydrophones, command and report centres, the ship’s hospital and workshops.

COMPLEMENT At the outbreak of war Gneisenau had a complement of over 1,669 men (56 officers and 1,613 other ranks), augmented from time to time by personnel of the Fleet Staff (10 officers and 61 other ranks). Her permanent company was distributed into 13 divisions of personnel: Divisions 1 and 2 Divisions 3 and 4 Divisions 5 and 6

Seaman branch, including personnel for the main armament Seaman branch, including personnel for the secondary armament Seaman branch, including flak personnel

Divisions 7–9 Division 10 Division 11 Division 12 Division 13

Engine room personnel (turbines, boilers and auxiliary machinery) Engine room personnel (electrical plant) Signals personnel (telegraphists, signallers, rangefinder, hydrophone and teleprinter operators etc.) Functionaries, e.g. writers, storemen, cooks, shoemakers, tailors Armourers and magazine workers

In 1943 Scharnhorst had a crew strength of 60 officers and 1,908 other ranks. At commissioning, the personnel had been split into Divisions as follows: Divisions 1–4 Division 5 Division 6 Divisions 7–10 Division 11

Seaman branch and armament Functionaries (clerks, cooks, craftsmen etc.) Armourers and ammunition workers Engine room personnel Signals staff (telegraphists, teleprinter operators etc.)

Up to the outbreak of war, the distribution of armament personnel had been: Divisions 1–4 Division 2 Division 3

Half secondary armament complement, plus ‘C’ turret ‘B’ turret ‘A’ turret

The remaining secondary armament complement was distributed between Divisions 2 and 3. At the outbreak of war, all these weapons personnel were removed from Divisions 1-4 and reallocated to form the 12th and 13th Divisions (armament personnel) exclusively.

Scale Plans: Scharnhorst

Inboard profile and plan (prior to reconstruction).

Upperworks, superstructure deck and upper deck.

‘Tween deck and upper platform deck.

Intermediate platform deck, lower platform deck and plant room.

Details of antennae (based on general plan).

Bulkheads I–XXI.

General plan and inboard profile (after reconstruction).

Camouflage Schemes

Gneisenau, Baltic, autumn 1940 (port and starboard similar).

Scharnhorst, Norway (port and starboard similar).

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Atlantic, January 1941 (yellow turret roofs to main and secondary armament).

Scharnhorst, ‘Channel Dash’, February 1942 (port and starboard similar).

1 Capital ship: gun calibre over 20.3cm (8in); Type A cruiser: gun calibre between 15.5 and 20.3cm

(6.1–8in); Type B cruiser: gun calibre below 15.5cm (6.1in).

1 ‘D’ and ‘E’ above are identification letters of German usage for unnamed new warships under

construction. The capital letter indicates a capital ship, a lower case letter a cruiser. Standing alone, the letter indicates a new addition to the fleet; the letter plus the word ‘Ersatz’ denotes a new ship as the replacement for an existing unit.

The Battleship Gneisenau The building contract for Panzerschiff ‘E’ (Ersatz Hessen) was placed with the Deutsche Werke Yard, Kiel, on 25 January 1934, although this was premature as the design had not received final approval. The keel was laid on 14 February, but the material was scrapped on the stocks on 5 July 1934 following a fresh directive from the highest level. After the original plans had been modified to accommodate the new specifications (the contract had not been cancelled), a fresh keel was laid down on 6 May 1935. The hull was launched on 8 December 1936. The pre-launch speech was delivered by the C-in-C of the German Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch, and the christening performed by the widow of the commander of the First World War armoured cruiser Gneisenau, Kapitan zur See Julius Maerker, lost with his ship at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914. On entering the water the progress of the hull was not fully arrested and a collision ensued between the stern and the quay of the Kiel Seegarten Bridge on the opposite side of the launching basin. Gneisenau entered service on 21 May 1938 under Kapitan zur See Förste. Part of her complement had been shipped in from the light cruiser Karlsruhe, which paid off on 25 May at Wilhelmshaven for a refit. The first weeks of working-up between 30 June and 8 July 1938 took the form of a maiden voyage in northern waters which also served as an extended trials period. On the occasion of the launching of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen on 22 August 1938, Gneisenau took part at Kieler Förde in the last great German Naval Review, in the presence of Hitler and the Hungarian Regent Admiral Horthy. Gneisenau was based at Wilhelmshaven but when entering the port for the first time on 20 September 1938 she touched Entrance III lock wall and went directly into drydock. As a result the ship was based at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven became home instead to the ‘pocket battleship’ Admiral Graf Spee.

1939 Her maiden trials having demonstrated a tendency for the ship to plunge forward—water shipped over the bow penetrated below decks, causing technical malfunctions and breakdowns in the two forward main turrets, particularly ‘A’ turret, through flooding and for other reasons—Gneisenau returned to the builders in January 1939 and was fitted with a new bow. The ship was lengthened overall and the straight stem was replaced by the ‘Atlantic bow’, a graceful curved prow. The side hawsepipes (two on the port side, one to starboard) were sealed and the two remaining forward anchors repositioned one each to a deck cluse either side of the bow well forward. Between 12 June and 26 July 1939 the ship exercised with the Fleet in Atlantic waters. During gunnery practice and manoeuvres it was observed that the bows were continuing to ship heavy seas, and ultimately this problem was never resolved. At the outbreak of war the ship’s boats were put ashore (a normal measure designed to reduce the presence of inflammable objects directly exposed to enemy fire), although some were later reshipped. The so-called Kriegszuschlag (‘War Supplement’) came aboard: these were reservists or personnel from other units who brought the ship’s complement to full war muster. Practice ammunition was exchanged for live shells, the ship’s coat of arms and name plaques were taken off, and later even the eagle and swastika decoration at the stern was removed.

The first air raid warnings were broadcast on 4 September 1939, when British aircraft approached the German coast and attacked fleet units at Wilhelmshaven. However, at the time Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in the anchorage at Brunsbüttel. On 8 September Gneisenau passed through the Kiel Canal and after a short period laid up in the yards carried out exercises in the eastern Baltic. Between 7 and 9 October a force consisting of Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, the light cruiser Köln and the destroyers Wilhelm Heidkamp, Friedrich Ihn, Erich Steinbrinck, Diether von Roeder, Karl Galster, Theodor Riedel, Max Schultz, Bernd von Arnim and Friedrich Eckholdt sortied through the Skagerrak without achieving anything and the two heavy units put into Wilhelmshaven Roads. On 21 November they weighed anchor and headed northwards with orders to attack British vessels patrolling the Iceland-Faroes gap as a feint towards the Atlantic. This tactic was intended to relieve pressure on the ‘pocket battleship’ Admiral Graf Spee operating in the South Atlantic. The force comprised Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and the destroyers Bernd von Arnim, Erich Giese and Karl Galster, later joined by the light cruisers Leipzig and Köln. These latter five were released later. Heavy seas soon put Gneisenau’s ‘A’ turret out of action, but on 23 November the two battleships met up with the armed merchant cruiser HMS Rawalpindi guarding the Iceland-Faroes passage and soon disposed of her with the concentrated fire of their far superior armament. Gneisenau expended 53 × 28cm shells (52 nose-fused, one tail-fused), 106 × 15cm shells (66 nose-fused, 40 tail-fused) and 15 × 2cm rounds.1 The German units headed for the Arctic to await bad weather for the return to Germany through the North Sea. The entire Home Fleet put to sea in the search, but the pair eventually broke through without incident, anchoring off Wilhelmshaven on 27 November. Both ships had sustained sea damage, and while Scharnhorst went into the local shipyard Gneisenau steamed to Kiel for the same purpose and docked there, under repair from 15 to 29 December 1940.

1940 From 3 January a few minor modifications were made at the Scheerhafen, and from the 15th of the month Gneisenau exercised in Kiel Bay. She was joined by Scharnhorst on the 27th, when the gun crews were exercised and speed trials were run over a measured mile at Neukrug in the Bay of Danzig. The severe winter curtailed any further activities, and when the sea froze Gneisenau was trapped in thick ice at Kieler Forde. Normal traffic between ships was maintained on foot over the ice. Eventually several powerful icebreakers found a way through and after 2½ hours of effort succeeded in opening a channel between the mooring and the lock chamber, enabling Gneisenau to reach the Kiel Canal, from where she made her way to the Jade at Wilhelmshaven on 6 February. On the 10th of the month she drydocked for five days to repair ice-damaged screws and on the 16th hauled alongside Entrance III, where the main gun turret roofs received a coat of yellow paint. The following day Gneisenau cleared the lock and dropped anchor in the Jade estuary in company with Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and the destroyers Karl Galster, Wilhelm Heidkamp, Wolfgang Zenker and four others. On 18 February the entire squadron weighed anchor and steamed up to the Shetlands. Nothing was achieved, and by the 20th the force was back at its moorings.2 Gneisenau hen revisited the yards for the removal of the catapult atop ‘C’ turret and its derrick, and for some time subsequently she rotated between the roads, the harbour and the shipyard. On 7 April steam was ordered for 0030hrs, and, in company with Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and fourteen destroyers, Gneisenau set out to the north at the commencement of Operation ‘Weserübung’.3 In the Skagerrak, Hipper fought off a high-altitude bomber attack, but a larger attack which had been promised failed to show. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were detailed to

provide distant escort on the western flank for fleet units carrying occupation troops to the main Norwegian ports—Admiral Hipper for Trondheim, ten destroyers for Narvik and the German light cruisers making for Bergen. The weather conditions, storm force winds, blizzards and rough seas favoured the German plan, although it proved heavy going, particularly for the destroyers. On the morning of 9 April Scharnhorst and Gneisenau briefly exchanged fire with the British battlecruiser HMS Renown. An extract from entries made in Gneisenau’s, War Diary (Kriegstagebuch) by her commander shows the unfolding of events: 9 April 1940: 0125hrs:

0200hrs:

0459hrs:

0500hrs: 0505hrs: 0506hrs: 0507hrs: 0508hrs: 0511hrs: 0513hrs: 0514hrs:

0516hrs:

5/10ths overcast. NNW 6–7, sea state 6, −1.5°C. Radar 1 reported a contact at 25km range on port quarter. I was on the bridge at the time and with the Senior Gunnery Officer I attempted to verify the radar report by means of a rangefinder. Visibility to the west was extremely variable because of intermittent localised snow and hail showers. Visibility to the north and east with a clear and predominantly cloudless horizon was 20km, west and south variable. I was sceptical about the contact because of our experiences with the radar in the last few days, but I put in force all procedures on the assumption that the report was genuine and informed the Fleet.2 Information from foretop that a shadow was visible from the direction reported by radar. Senior Gunnery Officer summoned to control centre and reported to Admiral’s bridge. About same time from the bridge made out in that direction a large vessel resembling a tanker which was then identified as a battleship of the Nelson class. Very long bow section, bridge structure well astern. Alarm. Alarm given by Fleet at same time. Muzzle flashes seen from opponent before latter concealed in a snowsquall: shells falling 300–500m distant abeam of Gneisenau’s bridge. Ships’ command staff vacated forward command position. 25kt ordered to get ship clear of fall of shells. From Fleet: Go 40° to starboard to steer 350°. Guns have opened fire. Own speed 15.5kt. The new course (350°) caused problems for the forward main turrets. I suggested to Fleet a course more to port. From Fleet: Go 20° to port to steer 330°. Engine room clear for action. Ship clear for action. Own speed 24kt. I observed a hit on the enemy ship forward approximately half-way between her bridge and bow. There was a longish oval tongue of flame which rose quite distinctly, black and obliquely upwards, from round, yellow points of gunfire seen through mist or spray. The points of gunfire were like locomotive lights seen in a yellow mist. Next, To Senior Gunnery Officer: You are shooting well, keep it up. There was no answer; this was unusual. This must have been when the foretop

0517hrs:

0519hrs:

was hit. Range 14.6km. As the main guns now had the range, the secondary armament prepared to engage. However, the hit in the foretop had destroyed the No 2 Gunnery Officer ’s targeting sight in the forward fire control centre. Transferred to lateral targeting sight port side, but meanwhile ship had turned +60° to starboard and the secondary armament was no longer in shooting range. From Fleet: Turn 60° to starboard on course 30°. Main armament fire control transferred to aft control position, limiting gunnery to ‘C’ main turret together with port side 15 cm turret IV linked in to salvobell installation. During the course alteration Scharnhorst’s smoke obscured

Operation ‘Weserübung’, 7–9 April 1940

1 7 April: British 2nd Cruiser Squadron sails 2 8 April: British 1st Cruiser Squadron sails

3 7 April: Home Fleet leaves Scapa Flow 4 8 April: Course of British 18th Cruiser Squadron 5 9 April: HMS Repulse detached 6 8 April: Admiral Hipper sinks HMS Glowworm 7 9 April: Course of Home Fleet and cruiser squadrons 8 8 June: HMS Glorious sunk by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 9 9 April: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau engage HMS Renown 10 9 April: German 2nd Destroyer Flotilla heads for Narvik 11 Courses of the German invasion fleet 12 9 April: Blücher sunk 13 9 April: Karlsruhe sunk at Kristiansand 14 10 April: Königsberg sunk at Bergen 15 10–13 April: 10 German destroyers sunk at Narvik 16 11 April: Lützow (ex Deutschland) torpedoed 0526hrs: 0527hrs: 0529hrs: 0530hrs: 0534hrs: 0535hrs: 0536hrs: 0537hrs: 0538hrs: 0539hrs: 0540hrs: 0541hrs: 0544hrs: 0546hrs: 0547hrs: 0548hrs: 0549hrs:

0550hrs:

Gneisenau’s sight of enemy. Enemy ship on bearing 170° has ceased fire for the moment. From engine room: Have steam up in all boilers.1 From aft gunnery station: Target out of sight at 184°. To engine room: All engines 27kt. From Gunnery: ‘A’ turret flooding due to heavy seas. Large pumps requested. Heavy quantities seawater coming in through left optic of range-finder cupola after hit knocked away cover. Question to aft control station: Is enemy still firing? From aft control station: Scharnhorst has opened fire. From Fleet: Turn 10° to starboard on course 40°. From Fleet: Do not go to full speed; stay at 27kt. Range 18.4km. From Gunnery: ‘A’ turret and two leading 15cm port side out of action (due to seas). To commander: Bridge is on fire. Lifebelt and wooden deck set ablaze by shell fragment from hit on foretop. Burning parts thrown overboard. From aft control station: Enemy ship has turned away. Aft control has fired seven salvos. No hits observed. From aft control station: Enemy at 22.5km no longer in sight. From aft control station: Enemy coming up. Lies 70° by the stern. From Gunnery: ‘A’ turret out of action. Shipboard repair not possible. From aft control station: Enemy no longer in sight; rangefinder 24.2km. Reduced speed to 25kt as Scharnhorst unable to keep up. Question to aft control station: Where is enemy fire falling? Answer: Enemy firing at Scharnhorst. Speed reduced to 20kt until 0618hrs to close up to Scharnhorst.

0622hrs: 0625hrs: 0635hrs: 0638hrs: 0644hrs: 0647hrs:

0649hrs:

0700hrs: 0708hrs: 0709hrs:

0711hrs:

0712hrs: 0716hrs: 0720hrs: 0728hrs: 0746hrs: 0800hrs 0812hrs:

Cannot measure range because of smoke. Enemy not visible. Scharnhorst has closed up and is abeam to port at 220°. From Fleet: Increase speed to 25 knots. Steer 0°. Enemy in sight at 202°. Enemy has opened fire at Scharnhorst. Enemy no longer in sight. Speed 26kt. Pause in fighting. Removal of wounded. The observation of the enemy was only possible occasionally because of seas breaking aboard. For the ship’s command staff standing port and starboard there was only one periscope forward at their disposal, of which the optic was not very good and soon got worse through interior misting. Observation of Scharnhorst from the command centre was not possible. It was therefore necessary for the ship’s command to occupy the aft control station. A similar problem with the periscopes was experienced by the Fleet Command. Observation through the viewing slits was out of the question as the seas coming aboard would have put all the command relay equipment out of commission. Our frequent battle drills have proved their worth. From when the alarm was first given to the state of battle readiness, throughout the battle itself and the repairs to damage caused by flooding (e.g. the breakage of porthole glass in the crew heads in forecastle) and hits on the ship, all went off smoothly and the transmission of commands between command structure and weapons continued without interruption. There was not the least panic or undue haste at any station, and it was noticeable that this air of calm pervaded the ship … Report to ship’s command from aft control station: We can see shells falling astern of Scharnhorst. No further shelling observed. Question to First Officer: What is the situation regarding water in the ship? From First Officer: We are trying to stop the flooding. Water is coming in through the tower structure. It is doubtful if we can stop it if the ship continues at this speed. Compartment XX can keep up with it. There is some coming in through the anchor cluses. Battery deck XIII will be able to hold it. There is not a tremendous amount there. Question to engine room: What is the fuel situation? Answer: 4,800m3. From aft station: Scharnhorst is in a squall. Our speed down to 25kt. Scharnhorst in sight again on bearing 188°. Scharnhorst is 9km distant. Reduce speed again to 22kt. Scharnhorst coming up. Scharnhorst 6km distant. Scharnhorst 4.6km distant. Scharnhorst now closed up, normal war cruising stations.

The War Diary of the Fleet Commander aboard Gneisenau contains the following entries (in

extracts): 9 April 1940:

0400hrs:

0440hrs: 0447hrs: 0449hrs: 0457hrs: 0507hrs:

0508hrs:

0511hrs: 0514hrs: 0522hrs:

0525hrs:

Grid square 34401 rt centre, NNW 6–7, heavy swell, sea state 6,1012.6mb, −0.5°C, clear visibility, FT 2 0227/22—Norwegian Admiralty has ordered immediate shut-down of all radio beacons and coastal lights from Lister to Feiestein, from Marstenen to Narvik. Group.3 Speed 9kt. Order by Ultra SW: each shaft second boiler ready (24kt). Speed 12kt. Radar report: contact at 295°, 20.2km, a little later 280°, 18.5km. Afterwards foretop reported a shadow at 280° which disappeared immediately and was also not visible from other stations. Large ship sighted, apparently a warship, at 260°; alarm ordered for group. Go 40° to starboard to steer 350°. Enemy ship opened fire. This was only ascertained from his muzzle flashes. Therefore at first no certainty as to how many opponents and warship types. From first fall of shells, evident that he has large calibre. Enemy also firing from secondary armament. First indication of range 14.8km. Our battleships laboured as they worked up speed into the heavy seas; enormous breakers were coming along the forecastle and making observation very difficult at the command centre as the optics were misting up and the motors for the rotary clear screens short-circuited as soon as turned on. The visibility to the SW improved gradually and the enemy was identified definitely as a battlecruiser of the Renown class (probably Repulse). We were uncertain as to whether there was a second or third enemy ship. Muzzle flashes coming from different positions suggested a second opponent (from individual observations perhaps of the Nelson class). The objective of the operation and the great distance from home bases precluded me from continuing to offer battle to an enemy against whose main armament our armour is not resistant. In order to reduce the effectiveness of his batteries, I decided to steer NE, bearing in mind that I could now only bring my after turrets to bear. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst opened fire simultaneously. Very difficult to maintain observations despite range of less than 16km. Very favourable for enemy as our ships outlined against a clear horizon. Turn 20° to port (to relieve situation of forward turrets). Priority signal (Kr.FT): ‘Am in battle with heavy forces grid square 3440 AF Fleet Commander.’ Direct hit on foretop, rangefinder and radar out of action. Senior Gunnery Officer and Lt (Admin) F., who was observing enemy vessel, one petty officer and two men dead, one man seriously wounded (died later of wounds), some lightly wounded. Gunnery control transferred first to forward control position, then after change of course to

0528hrs:

0535hrs: 0544hrs: 0559hrs: 0607hrs: 0623hrs: 0624hrs: 0638hrs: 0641hrs:

0642hrs:

0645hrs:

0653hrs:

position aft. Speed 27kt. Course 30°. It became clearly evident after our change of course that the enemy’s gunnery was encountering technical difficulties. As he made the corresponding turn, he could only train his two forward turrets at us and his shooting became erratic and inaccurate. The smoke we were making on account of the forced working-up of the remaining boilers made it difficult for him to observe. The range was increasing fairly rapidly. Occasional rain showers made continuity in gunnery impossible for both sides. Later the quality of our observation to windward improved although with only one main turret bearing and a narrow target to aim at our chance of success was slim. Course 40°. Enemy lost to view in a squall. Report from Gneisenau: Enemy has turned away. Speed 22kt as Scharnhorst trailing. Scharnhorst has meanwhile crossed Gneisenau’s wake and taken position on port quarter spotting our fall of shot. Order given to Scharnhorst: Dwarslinie Steuerbord.1 To Scharnhorst, question: How many opponents seen? Battle signal V. Battle signal 25kt. From Scharnhorst: So far only one. To Scharnhorst, question: Do you have enemy in sight? From Scharnhorst: ‘A’ turret out of action due to severe flooding. Similar report received from Gneisenau plus also forward 15cm turrets. Priority signal 0654 (not transmitted as aerials shot to pieces and earthed), ‘To Group West: Enemy two units, probably Renown and Nelson. Renown is keeping contact; we are breaking off to N. Both ships “A” turret unserviceable due flooding.’ Reduced speed to 20kt (due to flooding of forward turrets). Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: Have ceased fire to conserve ammunition. Enemy not in sight. Even though we may conclude that enemy may be falling behind because of battle damage, I have decided to disengage for the following reasons: 1. The loss of ‘A’ turret on both ships has reduced their effective armament by a third; 2. Scharnhorst cannot maintain full speed because of engine trouble; 3. The loss of the foretop as a gunnery control station aboard Gneisenau has severely impaired the ability to conduct an engagement at long range; 4. In the prevailing weather conditions the optics at the command station and the gunnery targeting apparatus on Gneisenau are unserviceable for combat purposes, as all electrical motors for the rotary clear-screens are short-circuiting; 5. Scharnhorst’s ‘C’ turret has expended all AP shells and the effectiveness of her guns would be reduced during the long period when replacement ammunition was being transported from ‘A’to ‘C’

turrets. Therefore I have decided not to renew contact with enemy ship but if possible to stand off to the N in order to effect repairs beyond the range of enemy naval and air reconnaissance. This would gain me time, and on the basis of ships’ reports I hope to remedy at least some of the breakdowns if time can be found for it. Resumption of high speed and restoration of a state of battle readiness of the ships is of decisive importance for me, bearing in mind the further tasks which have been set. 0655hrs: 0715hrs: 0728hrs: 0743hrs: 0745hrs: 0800hrs

0835hrs: 0837hrs: 0905hrs: 0917hrs: 0925hrs: 0929hrs: 0934hrs:

0956hrs:

1133hrs: 1200hrs:

26kt. 25kt. Ultra short wave to Scharnhorst, question: Engine problem? 22kt. Priority signal 0708/14 from Group West to Fleet: Commander Home Fleet is in position grid-square 8400 AF, apparently two heavy groups. Scharnhorst reported port engine will only be able to make 24kt for some time. Grid square AF 31 500 centre left. NNW 8– 10, sea state 7, 1012 millibars, 2, −2°C, visibility 14nm. Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: 1. Highest maintainable speed 25kt. 2. Breakdown T2 main feed pump, probably seized coupling. Boiler 1.1 probably split tube; Boiler 3.3 fire in economiser. 24kt. Ultra short-wave to Scharnhorst, question: Are you sure there was only one enemy ship? From here two were seen. Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: Have established there were two at the beginning. Ultra short-wave to Scharnhorst, question: Will it be possible to increase highest maintainable speed after repairs at sea, and how much time is needed? Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: All shipboard aircraft unserviceable. 38cm [15in] shell fragment found on quarterdeck. Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: We saw a third enemy ship astern at the beginning of the battle (not observed by Gneisenau). Ultra short-wave from Scharnhorst: Repairs in hand. Boiler with burnt-out economiser not serviceable for at least five hours. Boiler with split tube cannot be examined until sufficiently cooled in about five hours. Main feedwater pump now started up. Maximum speeds not yet predictable. Lamp signal to Scharnhorst: Intend continue course N at 24kt until 1200, then course W 18kt. For time being War Sailing State 1, War Sailing Speed Stage 25kt. Grid square 8480 M.1., NNW 7–8, sea state 5, 1014.9mb, −2.5°C, course 270°.

HMS Renown made a great effort to keep in touch as the German units forged ahead but was forced to cut back her speed to 20kt as the continual plunging of her bows into the heavy seas caused flooding of the forecastle deck and forward main turret. The German group obtained three observed hits on Renown, all of which failed to explode. One shell struck the central leg of the forward tripod mast, destroying cables for the radio direction finder and tearing adrift some lanterns. The second came to rest astern between the upper and main decks and the third caused a large dent and splits in the mantle of the forefunnel. Gneisenau had taken rather more punishment. A 15in shell exploded in the foretop, having entered the structure on the port side aft, detonating on its exit against the starboard forward bulkhead. The main armament fire control station was destroyed and the Senior Gunnery Officer, Fregattenkapitän von Buchka, Leutnant (Admin.) Fritsche and four ratings were killed, two others (some sources state nine) being wounded. Gunnery control was switched aft at once under the command of No 3 Gunnery Officer, Korvettenkapitän Bredenbreuker. The other two hits were by 4.5in shells. The first of these struck ‘A’ turret and damaged the flap covering a rangefinder optic; the second hit in the area of the flak weapon to port aft, adjacent to the superstructure deck. In the foretop complex, the following equipment was rendered unserviceable or destroyed: the central target indicator sight, the director stabiliser, the central firing trigger unit, the target indicator receivers, foretop port and starboard, the target attitude computer, and all control and gun telephones. In the forward station the optic of the central target indicator sight was destroyed by a shell splinter, as were the searchlight training apparatus, the FuMO radar, a transmission aerial, half of the receiver aerials and the aircraft signals centre, while one short-wave and one longwave receiver and an ultra short-wave set were all put out of action. On the left arm of ‘A’ turret rangefinder, the protective flap for the optic, which had been closed prior to the battle to prevent the admission of seawater in the high swell, was blown off by the second hit, and seas continually being shipped over the bows caused repeated flooding to ‘A’ turret. All electrical equipment in the turret was unusable for 36 hours. The rangefinder itself remained undamaged. The expenditure of ammunition aboard Gneisenau amounted to 44 × 28cm shells with nose fuse, 10 × 28cm AP and 10 × 15cm with nose fuse. Gneisenau arrived at Wilhelmshaven on 13 April 1940. The burial of her dead took place on 21 April. Two days later she went into dock at Bremerhaven, returning to Wilhelmshaven on the 29th of the month. She set off for the Baltic at 0900hrs on 5 May. As was customary for the passage of the Kiel Canal, she had reduced her displacement by discharging unnecessary fuel. Extracts from the entries made in the War Diaries kept by the ship’s commander and chief engineer graphically portray the next series of events: 5 May 1940: Wilhelmshaven Roads War sailing closed-up state. Weighed anchor, sailed to Brunsbüttel with 0930hrs: flak crews closed up, anti-submarine watch, damage control brigade at stations. 1030hrs: Shipboard aircraft flown off as anti-submarine protection. Speed 22kt. Mine exploded port aft compartment IV. Effect: all engines immobilised as most steam valve trip gears operated due to shock. As three electrical plants out no current for guns or rudders. Ship turning to starboard. As switch-over to rudder motor room unsuccessful,

1145hrs:

steered manually for five minutes. Although the explosion seemed slight, all electric current supply and with it all lighting for the two aft 15cm turrets and ‘C’ turret failed. From immediate enquiry to battle control E-station, established that E-plants 1, 2 and 4 had been shut down. These plants supplied AC current to the switching and report centres so that central control of all guns would have been impossible. Electrical power was restored after 15 minutes.

According to the Engine Room War Diary:

1148hrs:

Powerful shock. Following valves tripped: ‘T1’ main HP turbine forward, LP turbine, vacuum release; main trip valve. Auxiliary engine: lubricating oil back-up pump, cruise feed pump, auxiliary engine cooling pump. Ventilation screw lubricating oil for gearbox casing IP turbine sprung. ‘T2’ main HP turbine forward, IP turbine; main trip valve. Auxiliary machinery: main lubricating oil pump, main condenser pump block, cruise feed pump. ‘T3’ main HP turbine forward, IP and LP turbines; main trip valve. Auxiliary machinery: main lubricating oil pump. ‘B1’ steam bridging auxiliary blocks 1.1 and 1.4, boiler superchargers 1.2 and 1.3; water gauges 1.1 and 1.4 out (liquid flow blocked); water gauges all protective glasses dislodged, 1.3 shattered.

Commander ’s War Diary:

1205hrs:

6 May 1940 0208hrs: 0216hrs: 0500hrs: 1450– 1641hrs:

1713hrs:

Machinery restarted in order, port, central, starboard. 12th Auxiliary Minesweeping Flotilla and minesweeper M 98 closed in for our protection. Will proceed to lightvessel Elbe I on port and central engines as availability and endurance of starboard engine not yet ascertained. It will therefore be held in reserve for emergencies. (This evening anchor off Brunsbüttel.) Weighed anchor. Entered Brunsbüttel lock. Cleared outer lock Kiel Canal astern of Nautilus-equipped remote minesweeping gear; into Kiel with flak crews closed up. Kiel. Into Kiel lock; flak crews stood down. Docking manoeuvre Kiel drydock B. Hull report: upper arm port shaft box distorted. From compartments I to III gashes to empty tanks and shaft tunnel. Area of compartment III forced inwards with a gash 2m in length and several tears crosswise. Along stabilising keel at frames 74/76 and 95, gashes 0.5 to 1.5m long at each. Starboard stabilising keel, an old welded gash has reopened.

Compartments in German warships were numbered in Roman characters from astern forward. Therefore damage to compartment IV was well aft: Gneisenau’s forepeak was in compartment XXI. Not mentioned in the commander ’s notes was a light grounding during the Wilhelmshaven-

Brunsbüttel move. This occurred during an extremely low tide. No damage was caused. During the laying-up period the main turret roofs were painted yellow. On 23 May 1940, in the eastern Baltic, the ship carried out trials with anti-mine degaussing gear newly installed by the yard and the gun and flak crews were exercised. Gotenhafen was used as a port of call. From there Gneisenau returned to Kiel, from where, at the beginning of June, a fresh operation codenamed ‘Juno’ was begun. The commander ’s War Diary once more provides an exhaustive account (reproduced here in extracts): 3rd June 1940: Kiel, Kriegsmarine Yard, anchorage 2 1715hrs: Shipboard aircraft shipped. 1930hrs: Fleet Commander and Staff boarded. 4 June 1940 0600hrs: Cast off. War sailing closed-up state introduced down to ‘tween deck. Left Kiel per Operational Order No. 7 (Commander, Sea Area West, General Orders 245 A1 of 30.5.40). Eastern Baltic, scattered cloud, sunny. Speed 10kt. In line astern Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Admiral Hipper, 0800hrs: followed by destroyers Hans Lody, Hermann Schoemann, Erich Steinbrinck and Karl Galster and the torpedo-boats Jaguar and Falke. Giving anti-mine protection ahead were Sperrbrecher IV with remote forward mine detection gear and Hai (F 3) with C-in-C Minesweepers Baltic aboard. 0930hrs: Gun crews exercised. Ship’s company mustered astern, where I announced purpose of the 1110hrs: mission.1 1445– 1600hrs: Great Belt. Gun cleaning. Lightvessel Halskow-Rev abeam. Three R-boats joined Hai. Hai and the Sperrbrecher turned too soon. Passing Hatter-Borne Narrows. The 1634hrs: plotted course passed through Hatter-Borne Ground. Gneisenau took station to port of the Sperrbrecher. After clearing the Narrows, Hai and the Sperrbrecher resumed ahead of the formation. 2000hrs: Kattegat, Hatter-Rev abeam. 2030hrs: War sailing closed-up state ordered. 5 June 1940: Report from R-35, grid square 4875 central (S of Anholt), two objects suspended from parachutes dropped by aircraft on N course. 0003hrs: Formation steered 65° to avoid suspected grid square and returned to line of original plotted course bearing N later. Sperrbrecher IV released. Three He 115s arrived to provide close anti0115hrs: submarine escort. 0323hrs: Wind NE; submarine alarm, attack made by Erich Steinbrinck. 0500hrs: Air calm. Following R-Flotilla with sweeping gear deployed. 0555hrs: Wind W to S. Mine alarm given by Hai, later retracted.

0630hrs: 0640hrs: 0730hrs: 0918hrs: 0920hrs: 0929hrs: 0931hrs: 1230hrs: 1520– 1545hrs: 1600hrs: 1610– 1750hrs: 2025hrs: 2033– 2044hrs: 2120hrs: 2130hrs: 2230hrs: 6 June 1940: 0008hrs: 0030hrs: 0200hrs: 0315hrs: 0400hrs: 1435hrs: 1630hrs: 1655hrs: 1925hrs: 2000hrs: 2023hrs: 2030hrs: 7 June 1940: 0045hrs:

Skagen abeam on port hand. Passed mine barrier. Wind Force 1; 1st R-Flotilla and Hai released. Skagerrak, 5/l0ths cloud, increased speed to 24kt, open daylight sailing formation with aircraft escort. Sunny, wind 3-4. Submarine alarm from Scharnhorst. Submarine alarm cancelled. Submarine alarm from Scharnhorst. Submarine alarm cancelled. In both cases a false alarm. Jaguar and Falke released to Wilhelmshaven. Central North Sea, clear skies, sea state 1, four drifting mines sighted, grid square 3466 rt upper. Northern North Sea, 42nm off Lindesnes. Five drifting mines sighted. 29nm off Utsire, speed 24kt, wind NW 2, sea state 1, scattered cloud. Three drifting mines grid square 2867 rt lower. Misty, entering thick fog. Changed to night sailing formation. Fog clearing, visibility improved. By events so far we have no idea if the enemy knows that the fleet is out. Probably the easterly drifting fog interfered with British air reconnaissance throughout the day. One drifting mine grid square 2328 upper. Horizons clear. Light swell. Daylight sailing formation. 40 sea miles off Stadlandet. Wind NW 1–2, overcast, sea state 1. Two He 111s passed by. 350nm off Bodö, wind NW 6, freshening at times to Force 8. Two He 111s returned. Naval oiler Dithmarschen hove in sight on port bow. Order from Fleet: Transfer oil. Hawser and hose connected up. Refuelled Steinbrinck at 7kt, war sailing state II, war sailing speed 22kt. Wind slackening W 3–4, overcast, temperature +3°C, sea state 4. As to result of air reconnaissance, unfortunately no reports received so far. Wind NW 5, overcast. Refuelling Steinbrinck completed, 450m3 transferred. Group on general course 45°, 7kt, voyage resumed but remaining units still refuelling.

0440hrs: 0530hrs: 0750hrs: 0830hrs: 0900– 2030hrs:

2225hrs:

2245hrs: 2255hrs: 8 June 1940: 0200hrs: 0400hrs: 0500hrs: 0605hrs: 0623hrs: 0638hrs: 0643hrs: 0646hrs:

Hawsers and hoses inboard. Refuelling all destroyers completed. Hipper taking on fuel from Dithmarschen. For time being down to 5kt so that Hipper and Dithmarschen can get closer. Refuelling of Hipper completed. Daylight sailing formation resumed. Dithmarschen attached. Course E. Conference Fleet Commander and commanders on flagship Gneisenau. For an attack on Harstad and Vagsfjord we still had no information on mine/net barriers, underwater obstructions and shore torpedo and gun batteries. And that was not the only precondition for initiating the attack. Second precondition was satisfactory information based on air reconnaissance as to types, extent and situation of enemy naval forces in the fjord. Both preconditions had to be met in order not to run the risk of incurring the most serious losses. The destruction of loading wharves and land installations seems to me very questionable. Where are they? Will we be able to recognise them from the ship and can we get at them? Finally, an attack of this kind ought to be mounted jointly with the Luftwaffe, and for this we require liaison and cooperation. It would appear from current reports that all ship movements at the present time are westwards. Could that signify an evacuation? According to the subsequent situation report supplied by Admiral Norway on 8 June 1940, there were in fact no naval forces in the fjord. We might therefore be making just a stab in the dark. Fleet therefore proposed to attack the nearest escorted convoy within range. That was very much preferable to an unprepared blind thrust which would have deprived us of the element of surprise in the event of a later raid on Harstad. Speed 22kt, southerly courses. Dithmarschen released. War sailing state II, war sailing speed 28kt. War sailing state I, war sailing speed 28kt. Speed 15kt. Spread out to form scouting line (10nm between each ship). Masts of steamer sighted to S. Made towards it. Alarm! Speed 25kt. Heading for steamer. Steamer identified as tanker (bow right 60°, another object to right of it). Ship clear for battle. Range of tanker 16.1km. To her right a second small craft making lamp signals, identified as destroyer.

0648hrs:

0657hrs: 0659hrs: 0701hrs: 0703hrs: 0704hrs: 0705hrs: 0706hrs: 0708hrs: 0709hrs: 0710hrs: 0711hrs: 0713hrs: 0717hrs: 0810hrs: 0825hrs: 1000hrs: 1002hrs: 1017hrs: 1019hrs: 1020hrs: 1024hrs: 1028hrs: 1029hrs: 1030hrs:

Tanker and destroyer turning to port on opposite course (bow left 50°). Range 14km. Destroyer has taken up station between tanker and Gneisenau at 11.3km. Order to destroyer: Observer, keep a watch out for torpedo tracks. Speed 28kt. Seems a very small destroyer. Some doubt about the type. Estimated speed of tanker 12kt. To Fleet: Request permission to open fire. Range 8km. From Fleet: Not yet. From Fleet: Destroyer is Jupiter. Doubtful to me as too small. It was the armed ‘Tree’ class trawler Jun iper. Alteration in allocation of targets from Fleet: Gneisenau take tanker, Hipper the destroyer. Range 6,600m. Secondary armament open fire, main armament no permission to fire. To destroyer: Observer, keep a very good lookout for torpedoes. Hit after hit on tanker after first salvo struck astern. Big explosion in forward section. From Fleet: Cease fire. From Fleet: Resume fire at tanker. Secondary armament opened fire again at tanker. From Fleet: Cease fire. Gneisenau turned away. From Fleet, to all ships: Cease fire. Both enemy vessels sinking. Tanker on fire abaft bridge. Tanker sank by stern apparently after being torpedoed by one of Hipper’s destroyers. Tanker was Oil Pioneer. Expenditure ammunition Gneisenau 113 rounds 15cm.1 Shipboard aircraft from Scharnhorst and Hipper sent up for reconnaissance. Scouting line resumed steering 65°. Ship clear for battle. Alarm! Basis is report by reconnaissance aircraft; convoy consisting of one cruiser, two destroyers and three steamers standing N of our group. From Fleet: Steer 10°. From foretop: Bearing 135° one mast and smoke trail. From Fleet: 25kt. To Senior Gunnery Officer: Observe at 0°. From Hipper. Bearing 8° right smudge of smoke. From Senior Gunnery Officer: Bearing 358°, fighting top clearly recognisable. Reported to Fleet. From aft control centre: Bearing 140° definitely smoke. In my opinion this will be from our own destroyers. From Fleet: Speed 27kt. From Fleet: Hipper to go on ahead. From Senior Gunnery Officer: On bearing 350° a large ship with two funnels and two masts. Range 46km. From ship’s aircraft: Steamer is

1033hrs:

steering northerly course.

1034hrs:

From Senior Gunnery Officer: Steamer is fine on port bow. From Senior Gunnery Officer: On bearing 308° a steamer with single funnel and two masts. Relayed to Fleet. From Fleet: Convoy in two groups. Steamer and ahead of it hospital ship (Atlantis). From Senior Gunnery Officer: Latest information steamer 349° at 34km. Fleet searching to starboard with foretop cupola. From Senior Gunnery Officer: One steamer on bearing 141°, another on bearing 114°. From Fleet: Steer 30°. From foretop cupola: Object at 141° looks like a cruiser. From Fleet: Steer 130°. From foretop cupola: On bearing 22°, range 30km. To Senior Gunnery Officer: Can you see a cruiser? Answer: No. Question to Fleet: What is bearing of cruiser? From Fleet: Cannot make it out any longer. From Flak Senior Gunnery Officer: Hipper has opened fire. From Fleet: Steer 0°. Neither Senior Gunnery Officer nor I ever saw the cruiser reported at 1045hrs. From Fleet: Speed 25kt. On bearing 305°, heavy explosion from steamer being shelled by Hipper. From Fleet: Speed 18kt. From Fleet: Steer 260°. Steamer sunk (this was the empty troop transporter Orama). In my estimation the reported convoy must have resulted from position fixing or reporting error on the part of the reconnaissance aircraft. Attack was not on a convoy but on transport ship sailing in vicinity of hospital ship. The convoy was erroneous. Reasons still unknown. It appears that transport and hospital ship were proceeding independently of each other. War sailing state. Speed 18kt. Group closing up. Wind NE 4, sea state 3. About 10–12 empty lifeboats in area where transport sank. [Hipper had picked up 112 survivors.—GB] Hipper and destroyers sent in to Trondheim to refuel. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sailing N to complete oiling. Smoke sighted briefly on port bow. Foretop reported fighting top on starboard beam. Alarm!

1035hrs: 1037hrs: 1040hrs: 1043hrs: 1044hrs: 1045hrs: 1048hrs: 1050hrs: 1052hrs: 1057hrs: 1058hrs: 1101hrs: 1112hrs: 1117hrs: 1143hrs: 1150hrs:

1206hrs:

1207hrs: 1240hrs: 1330hrs: 1344hrs: 1656hrs: 1700hrs:

(For an account of subsequent events, see extract from Scharnhorst War Diary, p. 103ff.) On 9 June 1940 the two battleships dropped anchor at Trondheim. On the following day Gneisenau, Hipper and four destroyers set out for an anti-convoy operation in the Norwegian Sea but, deterred

by adverse air reconnaissance reports, were back at their moorings on the 11th. The next operation began on 20 June under the new Fleet Commander, Vizeadmiral Lütjens. It was terminated prematurely1 when the German squadron crossed the path of the British submarine HMS Clyde, Gneisenau receiving a torpedo hit forward at 2336hrs. The report of the incident is described by Gneisenau’s commander in his War Diary (in extracts) in the following terms: 2230hrs:

2335hrs:

2336hrs:

2338hrs: 2347hrs: 2348hrs:

2354hrs:

Wind NW 4 and heavy seaway. Proceeding as Fleet Group. Speed 18kt. Intended speed 25kt could not be maintained because of heavy swell. Group in daylight sailing formation, vanguard providing antisubmarine escort, Karl Galster plus one seaplane. From bridge a torpedo track seen on starboard beam approaching from astern at about 300m distance; two other tracks passed ahead of bows. Submarine alarm: hard to port! Torpedo hit forward on starboard bow slightly abaft bow anchor. Column of water of moderate height. Light shock. The rudder manoeuvre had not yet taken effect. Turned away 90° and proceeded from scene. Ship answering rudder, and speed reduced by only about 2kt. No exterior damage visible on forecastle but on port side a large sheet of plating torn back, so presumably effect of explosion through the bow one side to the other. Karl Galster taking on submarine. Question to command centre about extent of flooding. Report from Senior Gunnery Officer: Guns clear, magazines ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets clear. This confirmed that the effect of the torpedo hit was limited to forecastle area. From command centre: Ship is battleworthy. Torpedo damage probably in compartments XX and XIX. From command centre,: Compartment XIX and rooms forward no entry through battery deck. Outer plating is torn away. To reduce force of swell entering damaged area almost diagonally, turned further 30° to port. Ship’s aircraft made ready to fly anti-submarine cover.

21 June 1940: 0002hrs: 0005hrs: 0020hrs: 0037hrs: 0200hrs:

From First Officer: Report about extent of flooding, all compartments tight to XVIII, same applied at level central platform deck, but compartment XIX destroyed. Last intact bulkhead forward 185.7 is being shored up. From Fleet: Steer 180° approach course for harbour. After shoring up bulkhead speed increased to 19kt, to minimise pressure forward pumping out all tanks compartment XIX and fuel oil bunker XVIII. Ship’s aircraft flown off to provide anti-submarine cover. Entered Trondheim skerries.

At this time in the Kriegsmarine the shipboard pump brigade (Leckwehr) and fire brigade (Brandabwehr) came under the jurisdiction of the First Officer. Not until later in the war (e.g. on board Tirpitz) was a form of Ship’s Damage Control Branch introduced in the Navy, when the command of the pump and fire brigades was transferred to the Chief Engineer and a Ship’s Damage Control Officer.

The report on the flooding submitted by Gneisenau’s, First Officer shows the sequence of events following the torpedo hit and its effects on compartments XX to XIX: The pump brigade was at War Watch Sleeping Station, the No 1 pump emergency officer on watch at the pump brigade centre. 1. Course of events: explosion. At 2335hrs an explosion was heard in the ship. The tremor was not very strong and at first it was not known at the LW [Leckwehr] centre whether it had come from forward or aft. When the alarm was raised I made my way across the bridge (from where I noticed a thick spillage of oil on the starboard side forward), through the command corridor to the control room. 2. Measures. At 2335hrs the order ‘Close all bulkhead doors’ was passed by telephone to all LW stations and put into effect. At 2338hrs, in reply to his enquiry as to the extent of the flooding, I informed the Commander that the situation had not yet been assessed. At 2340hrs a coxswain’s mate who had come to the control room from the port battery deck in compartment XIX reported the presence of smoke and gas there. At 2342hrs LW group leader Station 5 reported gas and smoke developing in compartments XVIII to XXI. I reported to Commander and Chief Engineer: hit forward, extent of flooding not yet ascertained. At 2348hrs ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets and magazine rooms were reported clear. At 2350hrs WOI Pump Master [Oberpumpmeister] informed me that LW group leader 5 and an NCO of the pump master ’s staff had entered the battery deck of compartment XIX by a cautious then rapid opening of the bulkhead door at frame 185.7 in order to access pump XIII and so control the room. The water here was about 20cm deep. Pump XIII would not function because the switch was damaged, although the operating connections seemed to be in place. They then left the room. The Pump Master instructed the NCO stationed in the anteroom to turn on the pump from below. The NCO reported that pump XIII had already been working for some minutes. On the order of the Pump Master to turn it off, the NCO found that the pump would not respond to the switch. It was assumed that the pump had started up of its own accord as a result of a shortcircuit in the safety switch. Further access to compartment XIX battery deck was not possible on account of the rising water level: it was found to be 40–50cm deep at the next attempt and it quickly flowed into adjacent compartment XVIII battery deck whenever the bulkhead door was opened. Pump XIII was switched off from the E-plant battle station. At 2357hrs the Pump Master reported that the battery deck of compartments XIX to XXI was under a metre of water and could not be accessed. LW command ordered Master group 3 to shore up bulkhead 185.7 at battery deck level. At 2358hrs I reported to the Commander and Chief Engineer that compartment XIX battery deck and anteroom were half under water with no access to deck. Speed could be maintained. At 2358hrs LW group leader 5 reported the presence of personnel in compartment XIX anteroom 7a 9 cut off by flooding. Middle platform deck compartment XIX was dry, above that fully flooded. Companionway hatch XIX 8.9 to XIX 7a.9 was cut off. Compartments XV to XVIII and all other rooms were unaffected. At 0002hrs I made a provisional report in person to the Commander regarding the extent of the damage and flooding, and the LW officer telephoned the Chief Engineer to suggest that he should pump out all fuel tanks in compartment XIX in order to improve the ship’s trim and attempt an increase in speed once the outer bulkhead had been shored up and placed under constant watch. At 0025hrs speed was increased to 19kt and the bulkhead held. At 0032hrs I reported to the Commander and Chief Engineer that there was about 1,000 tonnes of water in the bow and that the ship was down by the head by about one metre. At 0056hrs the Chief Engineer notified the control room and pump control that in order to improve the trim he had begun discharging fuel oil from compartments XVIII–XIX. He had

decided not to flood the outer wall fuel and trim tanks astern because of the existing submarine alert. At 0332hrs the Pump Master reported to LW centre that pump XIII was clear. At 0430hrs the Chief Engineer informed the First Officer that 630m3 of fuel oil had been pumped out of compartments XVII–XVIII. At 0600hrs LW control ordered Pump Master group to flood trim tanks compartment I and II and outer wall tanks compartments III–VIII and at 0635hrs the Pump Master reported that this had been completed. At 0730hrs I suggested to the Commander that as the submarine alert had been cancelled, the ship should slacken speed or stop so that we could free the two crew (one NCO, one man) who had sought refuge from pump room XIII in the sail locker. After No 2 LW officer took over the LW centre, the following measures were taken in hand. Two hydraulic bilge pumps were prepared to clear battery deck compartment XVIII starboard. The bulkhead door at frame 185.7 was ventilated so that water in compartment XVIII could be tackled by the hydraulic bilge pumps. It was observed that the water level in compartment XIX was slowly falling. After 30 minutes it had fallen sufficiently for the compartment to be accessed without much danger, and compartment XIX bulkhead door could be opened briefly. Behind the secured bulkhead door Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) H. in company with the Pump Master and an NCO of his staff opened the drainage valves from the battery deck to pump room XIII and pump XIII was turned on. Water now ran through the open hatch, frame 197, to the ‘tween deck. After a short time compartment XIX companionway was reopened. It was half flooded and pumped out with a hydraulic bilge pump. After opening the hatch cover to the upper platform deck it was found that this companionway was also half flooded and the same method was used to clear it. The hatch to the middle platform deck was opened and the trapped personnel freed. At the same time compartment XIX rooms were examined. By cautious opening of the doors it was established that the ‘tween deck and upper platform deck were half flooded. The rooms were drained into pump room XIII and completely pumped out. In compartment XX companionway frame 197 the slightly distorted doors in the ‘tween deck giving to crew room compartments XX–XIX were shut with block and tackle. The companionway was pumped out. The adjacent chain lockers were in order. Remaining rooms in compartments XX and XXI could not be pumped as the decks and outer plating port and starboard had been destroyed. Subsequent calculations have shown that there was 1,350 tonnes of water aboard when pumping started if we assume that the main and reserve fuel oil bunkers in compartments XIX–XXI were full at the time. 3. Damage ascertained: a) Battery deck: frames 207–217.5 torn away, outer plating port and starboard partially torn and substantially distorted. From frames 185.7 to 200 all installations destroyed by flooding. Bulkhead 207 bent. Communication doors in bulkhead torn off. b) ‘Tween deck: from frames 207 to 216.5 outer plating missing, port frames 204–215.5 and starboard frames 207–216.5 destroyed. Crewrooms from frames 196.5 to 207 deck to deck: installations completely destroyed. c) Upper platform deck: frames 207 to 216.5 including outer plating port and starboard destroyed. From frames 196.5 to 207 assumed destroyed (inaccessible). d) Bulkhead 207 from battery deck downwards forced back. e) Bulkhead 217.5 from ‘tween deck to waterline seriously damaged and bent. Further damage survey necessary by divers or in dry dock.

The hole in the bow was large enough to allow a 100-man picket boat to sail through Gneisenau from one side to the other. After the ship had docked at Trondheim, makeshift repairs were carried out and the external damage screened over. Neither Scharnhorst nor Gneisenau were now battleworthy. Under the prevailing conditions, and with the materials available, a restoration to full readiness was not possible, and repairs in a German yard were indicated. Accordingly, on 25 July a squadron assembled off Agdenes for the voyage south. Gneisenau had an escort consisting of the light cruiser Nürnberg, the destroyers Hans Lody, Karl Galster, Paul Jacobi and Friedrich Ihn and four minesweepers of the 4th Minesweeping Flotilla. The heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper had also been attached but was released for a polar mission. After five torpedo-boats of the 2nd and 5th Flotillas had joined the group as further protection on 26 July, the formation set off, but they had got no further than Stavanger at about 1600hrs that afternoon when HM submarine Thames fired a spread of torpedoes at either Gneisenau or Nürnberg and hit an escort protecting Gneisenau, the torpedo-boat Luchs, which immediately sank. However, Gneisenau made fast at buoy A12, Kiel, at 0103hrs on 30 July, entering dry dock ‘B’ at the Kriegsmarine Yard the next morning.’ She remained at the shipyard until December and sailed from Kiel on the 28th of that month. By then she had a complement of 1,901, augmented not only by the Fleet Commander and his staff but also by prize officers and war reporters of the Propaganda Ministry. It was intended that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau should break out into the Atlantic and operate as a battle group against enemy shipping. An extension to this plan envisaged the addition of Bismarck and Tirpitz later, making up a very powerful squadron. However, Bismarck’s loss and the basing of Tirpitz in Norway frustrated this idea. The sortie was abandoned when Gneisenau received sea damage forward with subsequent flooding. By 30 December both units were back in German waters and moored at Gotenhafen on 2 January 1941.

1941 By virtue of the need to return her to full battle-readiness urgently, Gneisenau shifted to Kiel to drydock for the completion of her refit. After 14 January the remaining work was done alongside the quay: the strengthening of the bows and the installation of a 2cm quadruple flak mounting on a retractable lattice platform located where the new aircraft hangar was planned for later. The 2cm flak singles were each replaced by a newer model. On 22 January 1941 the two battleships embarked upon Operation ‘Berlin’ for the second time. For refuelling at sea a chain of tankers had been set up in the Atlantic off the beaten track waiting for the summons: the Altmark class naval oilers Uckermark (Altmark herself renamed) and Ermland and the tankers Schlettstadt, Adria, Esso Hamburg and Friedrich Breme.1 The Royal Navy was aware from early on that the force had sailed and made its preparations accordingly. On 28 January Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sighted HMS Naiad in the Iceland-Faroes gap, but the British cruiser was unable to keep contact and Admiral Lütjens diverted into the Arctic Circle in order to refuel from Adria. The two German battleships broke out into the Atlantic by way of the Denmark Strait on the night of 3/ 4 February. A hurricane put Gneisenau’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets out of action on the 10th, but repairs were effected with shipboard equipment. In accordance with his orders to avoid battle against superior enemy units, Admiral Lütjens used his high speed to disengage when he ran across the battleships HMS Ramillies and HMS Malaya acting as convoy escorts. In terms of tonnage, the tally of ships sunk was 22, totalling 115,622brt. Gneisenau claimed 14, of

66,300brt, and in addition she sent three captured tankers off to France with prize crews, although only one arrived. On 22 March 1941 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau dropped anchor in Brest at the conclusion of the operation. An overhaul of the latter ’s engine room was scheduled to be carried out here during a layup, for which Gneisenau entered drydock on 4 April. During the pumping out of the basin an unexploded bomb was discovered between the stocks. This required the basin to be refilled for the ship’s judicious removal, after which the dock was drained and the bomb defused. Finally Gneisenau did enter drydock, but in a worse condition than that in which she left it, for in the meantime she had been put on an exposed mooring in the roadstead, where on 6 April a British aircraft had torpedoed her on the starboard side at the level of compartment IV, causing serious damage to the reserve command centre. Once in drydock on 10 April she was again attacked by bombers and took four direct hits. The first struck the upper side of ‘B’ turret’s floor, exploding on the starboard side of the barbette and forcing the upper deck armour downwards. The second followed the same path and exploded against the armour deck to starboard of ‘B’ turret. The third bomb penetrated the superstructure deck, the upper deck operational centre and the battery deck starboard at frame 148 directly on the armoured hatch of compartment XIV, eventually exploding in the ‘tween deck starboard of ‘B’ turret. The fourth hit was a dud, the bomb being discovered on 15 April in the battery deck. The attack claimed 78 dead and 84 wounded. Ten of the latter subsequently succumbed to their injuries. The damage inflicted was as follows. ‘B’ turret jammed and the flak switching and report centre, the forward compass E-gear and part of the command-relay system in the command centre were all put out of action. The armour deck was distorted at the site of the blast. The kitchens and bakehouse were destroyed. All accommodation decks forward of compartment XII were uninhabitable owing to the effects of the explosion and fire, depriving a third of the crew of their quarters. Except for indispensable personnel, the normal harbour watches and flak crews, the ship’s company was now quartered ashore at nearby Douarenez. On 17 April the Commander-in-Chief, Grossadmiral Raeder, inspected the ship. During the period in the yards at Brest two sets of torpedo tubes were installed since until late May 1941 it was intended to send out both units on a fresh anti-convoy operation in combination with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. The hangar was rebuilt with collapsible sides and an internal catapult installed on a turntable so that the ship’s aircraft could be flown off from the hangar directly. Time in the yards was usefully employed for numerous tests, trials and gunnery exercises. Training was carried out energetically as Gneisenau was required to be at full battle-readiness forthwith. The British looked down on these activities with growing concern: in addition to a constant aerial watch, for safety’s sake they posted a submarine in the coastal waters nearby.

1942 The permanent threat from the air forced the German planning staff to consider ways and means of extricating their heavy units from Brest. The urgency of the matter was underscored on 6 January by a near-miss during a bombing raid. Hitler was finally convinced that the units at Brest must return to Germany, and preparations for the operation were quickly taken in hand under the code-name ‘Cerberus’. Steam was ordered for 2030hrs on 11 February. An air raid warning which delayed the sailing contributed substantially to the success of the enterprise since the departure of Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and five escorting destroyers at 2300hrs passed unobserved. The British submarine was off station recharging her batteries at the time. Against

practically all rules in the art of warfare, the large squadron was steering on a course which the enemy had not anticipated—a high-speed dash through the English Channel and the Strait of Dover. Fortune favoured the German squadron, which remained unreported until it had reached the Dover Strait at about midday on 12 February, by which time the possibility of mounting an effective attack was past. (For a fuller account see pp. 111–12.) Towards evening Gneisenau was mined, but she was able continue to Brunsbüttel, where she anchored a few hours later in company with Prinz Eugen. Scharnhorst entered the locks at Wilhelmshaven. The destroyer escorts put into Bremerhaven and the torpedo-boats and E-boats berthed at Heligoland. On 13 February Gneisenau passed through the Kiel Canal and went immediately into drydock at the Deutsche Werke. Kriegsmarine standing orders prescribed that prior to a shipyard lay-up or entering drydock, a warship must discharge her stock of ammunition, but for reasons that have never been explained Gneisenau went into drydock with her shell-rooms and powder magazines full. Less than two weeks later this error would prove fatal. Presumably the original purpose of the drydocking was merely to allow a survey of the mine damage before the ship was transferred to Gotenhafen for full repairs, but Gneisenau was still in the dock during an air raid on the night of 26/27 February. She suffered only a single hit. The bomb struck the forecastle, and, having penetrated the upper and battery decks, detonated against the armour deck. The hot explosive gases were sucked through the ventilators into the magazine below ‘A’ turret and ignited the powder in the shell cases for the ready ammunition. There followed a chain reaction: the powder went up in a great jet of flame and the excess pressure lifted up ‘A’ turret and tossed it askew. All members of the turret crew were killed. The ship’s final death toll was 112. A catastrophic explosion was only averted by immediately flooding the shell rooms and magazines. On 23 April Grossadmiral Raeder visited the ship. This bomb abruptly ended Gneisenau’s career. The circumstances of the war dictated that repairs at Kiel would not be possible, and the Navy decided to move the ship to Gotenhafen, where she arrived under her own steam on 4 April in company with the old pre-dreadnought Schlesien, serving as a cadet training vessel, and the ice-breaker Castor (the Baltic being partially frozen at the time). Following the ship’s decommissioning at Gotenhafen on 1 July, rebuilding work was started with a view to replacing the existing armament with six 38cm (15in) guns in three twin turrets, but this project was shelved at an early stage.

1943 In January Hitler ordered the cessation of all repairs and conversion work and subsequently the guns were removed piecemeal for inclusion in coastal batteries. The two surviving 28cm triple turrets were re-sited at Bergen and Trondheim, the 15 cm twin turrets at Fanö, Denmark, and in Holland. It was proposed to place four of the six 38cm guns north of Esbjerg in 1945, but nothing came of this scheme. In subsequent months the hulk was used as a storeship, frequently as an air raid bunker (on account of the armour) and for other purposes.

1944 Hulk laid up at Gotenhafen.

1945 On 27 March the hulk was towed out to the harbour entrance and scuttled as a blockship. After the war the wreck was broken up by the Polish authorities. What remained of the hull was raised on 12 September 1951 and scrapped.

GNEISENAU AS FLEET FLAGSHIP Gneisenau was planned as Fleet Flagship from the outset and the additional accommodation for the Fleet Staff (about 100 personnel, including 15 officers) had been allowed for in her construction. Gneisenau assumed this particular role for the first time in August 1938 during her trials when the Fleet was reviewed by the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy. After completion of trials—but only between May 1939 and March 1941—she sailed with the following Fleet commanders: 1.11.38–20.10.39 21.10.39–7.7.40 13.3.40–13.4.40 19.6.40–7.7.40 8.7.40–22.3.41

Adm Hermann Boehm Adm Wilhelm Marschall (acting) VAdm Günther Lütjens (acting) VAdm Günther Lütjens Adm Günther Lütjens

See also photographs and captions on p. 130.

SHIP’S COMMAND STRUCTURE Commanders 5.38–11.39 11.39–8.40 8.40–4.42 2.42–5.42 5.42–7.42 First Officers 5.38–5.40 5.40–12.40 12.40–5.42 Navigation Officers 5.38–12.39 12.39–8.41 8.41–11.41 11.41–3.42 3.42–1.42 Senior Gunnery Officers 5.38–1.40 4.40–7.42 Chief Engineers 5.38–.39 4.39–6.40 6.40–8.40 8.40–2.42

KptzS Erich Förste KptzS Harald Netzbandt KptzS Otto Fein KptzS Rudolf Peters (ship’s business only) FKpt Wolfgang Kähler (ship’s business only) KptzS Werner Schönermark KptzS Erich Heymann KptzS Rudolf Peters FKpt Siegfried Sorge FKpt Hans-Eberhard Busch (acting) FKpt Franz Frerichs FKpt Hans-Eberhard Busch KKpt Edgar Lanz FKpt Hans-Georg von Buchka FKpt Wolfgang Kähler KKpt (Ing) Jensen KKpt (Ing) Fritz Nötzold KKpt (Ing) Hellmut Göller KKpt (Ing) Eugen Kannegiesser

2.42–5.42 5.42–7.42

KKpt (Ing) Stephan Zehme (ship’s machinery business only) KKpt (Ing) Rudolph Kuppe (ship’s machinery business only)

MODIFICATIONS AND REFITS August 1938 January 1939 May 1939 October 1939 January 1940 February/ March 1940 January 1941

Brest 1941/42

Aircraft hangar reduced in size Straight stem replaced by Atlantic bow. Large raked funnel cap added. Bow anchors reduced from three to two and repositioned in cluses on forecastle. Former hawsepipes sealed. Minor modifications to funnel cap. Radio mast on foretop replaced by pole mast stepped abaft tower mast. Hangar discarded. FuMO mattress aerial fitted on cupola of foretop rangefinder. Admiral’s bridge closed in. Degaussing gear and loop fitted. Aircraft catapult atop “C” turret and attendant derrick removed. 2cm quadruple flak fitted on movable platform. End caps of ‘A’ turret rangefinder removed. 2cm single-mounted C30 flak guns replaced by model C38. Exchange of FuMO radar. FuMO radar installed aft. 2cm quadruple flak removed and replaced by 3 × 2cm quadruple C38s mounted (i) atop ‘B’ turret (ii) on funnel platform and (iii) on roof of new hangar. New hangar with drop-sides and internal catapult installed. Banks of torpedo tubes fitted. Tripod mast similar to that on Scharnhorst available but not fitted

Origin of the Name: August Wilhelm Anton Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau Gneisenau was born of impoverished noble parentage on 27 October 1760 at Schildau, near Torgau, and died on 23 August 1831 at Posen (in modern Poland). After a short period of military service in Austria, in Ansbach and with an Ansbach contingent in 1782-83 in the American War of Independence, he entered Prussian military service in 1786. He took part in the 1794 campaign in Poland, but otherwise spent the period from 1786 until the outbreak of war between Prussia and Napoleon in 1806 on garrison duty. He was still a company commander at the time of the Battle of Jena, but in 1807—together with the ‘Citizen’s Adjutant’ Joachim Nettelbeck of Kolberg—he mounted a successful defence of the fortress of Kolberg (Pomerania, in modern Poland) until the Peace of Tilsit that same year, and the joint command of ‘Citizen and Soldier ’ brought him public acclaim. Appointed by the king to several reform commissions—in 1809 he was Inspector of Fortifications and Commanding Officer of the Engineer Corps— he stepped down (provisionally) in 1809 on the grounds of Prussia’s neutrality in the war between Austria and France. This was one manifestation of the serious differences of opinion existing between the decisive Gneisenau and the indecisive King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia. Gneisenau travelled at the instigation of the Prussian statesman Hardenberg to Britain, Austria, Sweden and Russia for the purpose of secretly negotiating an anti-Napoleonic coalition.

By 1813 Gneisenau had returned to Prussian Army service as Quartermaster-General in Blücher ’s Silesian Army. After the death of Scharnhorst in Prague on 2 8 June 1813, Lieutenant-General Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau became Blücher ’s Chief of Staff. He was responsible for planning strategy and played an influential role in unifying the Allied militia at the Battle of Leipzig. In 1814 as Governor of Silesia he mobilised the Landwehr and Landsturm (front-line and secondline reserves, respectively), and in 1815 with Marshal Blue her he was the driving force behind the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. In 1816 the king relieved him of his office as Commanding General at Koblenz: Gneisenau’s liberal and national opinions were a constant source of annoyance to the hesitant and reactionary Friedrich Wilhelm III. Nevertheless, he was appointed Field Marshal in 1825, and was Supreme Commander of Prussia’s ‘Army of Observation’ during the Polish uprising of 1831 at the time of his death from cholera in August of that year.

Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau was one of the great Prussian military reformers. Together with Scharnhorst, in the war against Napoleon he resolutely advocated a conscripted citizen’s army instead of a mercenary force and argued for a strategy of decisive battle and subsequent relentless pursuit to destroy the enemy. He had advocated the abolition of corporal punishment, which came about in 1808, the social equality of soldier and officer (‘the citizen in uniform’), promotion on merit, military academies, and the abolition of special privileges for the higher classes. Gneisenau was sharply critical of archaic disciplinary measures and of an education system more biased towards form than content. With Scharnhorst, he was one of the most significant military reformers of the period 1807– 1815. His spiritual charisma has, together with that of Scharnhorst, continued to find its expression up to the present day, particularly in the modern German Bundeswehr.

The first bearer of the name: the flush-decked corvette Gneisenau was built at the Imperial Yard, Danzig, launched on 4 September 1879 and entered commission on 3 October 1880. After foreign service until 1886 she was used as a training ship for ships’ boys and sea cadets. On 16 December 1900, whilst at anchor at Malaga , the ship was surprised and overwhelmed by hurricane force winds, hurled against the harbour wall and sunk. There were 41 dead. The corvette displaced 2,994 tonnes, measured 82m overall and 13.7m in the beam and had a 6.3m draught. She was a fully-rigged, three-masted sailing ship of 2,218m2 sail area and fitted with a three-cylinder, single-expansion auxiliary engine of 2,866hp which gave her a top speed of 13.8kt. Steam was supplied by four cased boilers. The funnel and propeller were both retractable. The ship’s armament consisted of 14 × 15cm L/22 revolver guns, 2 × 8.8cm L/30 quick-firing guns and 6 revolver-guns of smaller calibre. The complement numbered 17 officers and 443 men (including 20 cadets and 230 ships’ boys). The photograph shows the corvette Gneisenau at the Kieler Forde mooring buoy.

The second bearer of the name: the armoured cruiser Gneisenau. Built by AG Weser, Bremen, she was launched on 14 June 1906 and was commissioned on 6 March 1908. From 1910 she was attached to the East Asia Cruiser Squadron, based at the German enclave of Tsingtau on the coast of mainland China. At the outbreak of war the squadron set off for home eastwards across the Pacific, and, after defeating a weaker British naval force at the Battle of Coronel on 1 November 1914, rounded Cape Horn with orders to occupy the Falkland Islands (see also p. 118). On 8 December 1914, while preparing to invade, four of the five cruisers of the squadron were overwhelmed by a superior British force which included two battlecruisers; 598 of the crew were lost. The cruiser Gneisenau displaced 12,985 tonnes. She was 144.6m overall, 21.6m in the beam and had an 8.37m draught. Her machinery developed 30,396hp, providing a top speed of 23.6kt. The armament was in all respects similar to that of her sister-ship Scharnhorst. Her complement was 38 officers and 726 men. The photograph shows Gneisenau outward bound for East Asia from Kiel on 9 November 1910.

Deutsche Werke, Kiel, on 8 December 1936: New Construction ‘E’ on Slipway 1 prior to launching. The armorial shield at the forepeak is draped over; the official entourage is assembled on the ‘baptismal pulpit’. Notice the bulge at the forefoot of the hull, and the dark rectangular area amidships at the waterline where the belt armour will be fitted later. The two hawseholes for the port bow anchors can be seen. The other hull (left) is that of the heavy cruiser Blücher, launched on 8 June 1937.

Gneisenau leaving the stocks. The Field Marshal’s coat-of-arms has been undraped and a board bearing the ship’s name hangs over the top edge of the forecastle. Notice the huge staging against the Blücher’s hull.

To the strains of ‘Deutschland über Alles’, the ship trundles down to her element. Notice the single hawsepipe for the starboard bow anchor.

Gneisenau, stern immersed and practically afloat, collides stern-first with the quay on the opposite side of the launching basin after the failure of the designed braking measures.

Gneisenau during fitting out in 1937. Suspended from a crane is a barbette for one of the 28cm main turrets, providing a good illustration of the individual deck levels with equipment.

The rotating base of ‘C’ turret about to be lowered into position on the roller track inside the barbette. The three 28cm guns of the turret will be bedded between the tenons of the three cradles.

Gneisenau fitting out during the winter of 1937/38. This view, looking forward from the port beam, shows her decks and bridge superstructure strewn with cables and shipyard equipment. The upper edge of the belt armour is clearly visible. The two main forward turrets, ‘A’ and ‘B’, are complete to the projecting armoured hoods for the rangefinder optics.

Gneisenau from the stern alongside the fitting-out pier. The ship is close to completion, and the white plume of smoke from her funnel indicates the first cautious boiler tests. The sail training ship in the background is Gorch Fock.

Gneisenau’s forecastle. The ship is nearing completion, staging indicating that some work remains to be done. The shelter on the port side of ‘A’ turret is probably a weatherproof area for worktools. The starboard anchor is connected to its chain and drawn up to the hawsehole.

Gneisenau in the builder’s floating dock, January 1938. There is staging around the tower mast, and the foretop range-finder and rotary cupola have yet to be installed.

Gneisenau, still incomplete, running one of her early engine and drive-shaft trials in April 1938.

Gneisenau on a later trial, with mainmast fitted abaft the funnel mantle and both aircraft catapults in position.

Gneisenau at speed following her commissioning. Even here, in an almost glassy sea, a huge bow wave foreshadows later difficulties. In any kind of seaway Gneisenau was very wet forward. The low freeboard can be appreciated in this photograph, which shows rangefinders and rotating cupolas fitted at the fore-top, the aft control station and the bridge ‘porch’.

Kiel, 21 May 1938: the commissioning ceremony for Gneisenau. The ship’s company is paraded on the quarterdeck facing aft as the battle ensign is hoisted at the ensign staff, a band plays the Flaggenmarsch and the honour guard presents arms. Directly astern is the pre-dreadnought Hessen, a gunnery target shin.

The ship’s armorial shields are now located high on either side of the forepeak.

Gneisenau seen from forward, with the guns of ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets elevated to port. The equipment at the level of the scuttles is a mooring boom for the ship’s boats.

Gneisenau passing through Möltenort, outward bound from Kiel, in May 1938.

A photograph of Gneisenau, port side forward from the aft control centre, taken in May 1938 after commissioning. Ship’s boats can be seen lying at a mooring boom at the bow, and there is a jack ladder over the side aft. The upper edge of the extensive belt armour can easily be seen. Because of the low freeboard, the belt was often far too deeply immersed.

Leaving Kieler Förde in June 1938. Notice the disturbance made by the bow wave as far aft as ‘A’ turret despite the ‘millpond’ conditions, and note also the pronounced forward trim. The boilers are probably being forced as indicated by the black smoke (the result of insufficient air for combustion). ‘Smoke-free sailing’ was the ambition of every Chief Engineer, i.e. a boiler situation in which exhaust gases were virtually invisible.

A view of Gneisenau off the starboard beam in June 1938 during shipboard training—suggested by the position of a number of the guns. ‘B’ turret is trained starboard aft with two barrels elevated and the third depressed, a 15cm single is traversed to starboard, and diagonally forward of this a twin 10.5cm flak is elevated skywards. A Heinkel 114 with folded wings is perched on the forward catapult and facing seawards.

Gneisenau seen from the starboard quarter in June 1938. The naval flag at the ensign staff indicated a Revierfahrt, i.e. a passage through territorial or narrow waters such as Kieler Förde or the ship canal. On the high seas the flag was flown from the pole mast abaft the forward catapult and in battle at the truck of the mainmast (immediately abaft the funnel).

Gneisenau made fast to a mooring buoy at Kieler Förde in June 1938. The large floating cranes alongside are presumably engaged on some minor refitting task. Both mooring booms have been extended. The duty of the rating posted at the ensign staff (Posten Flagge) was to dip the colours in reply to the salute of passing traffic on the orders of the Officer of the Watch. In the background is the ‘pocket battleship’ Admiral Graf Spee.

Gneisenau from the port beam, with two jack ladders down and a floating crane on her starboard side. Admiral Graf Spee can be glimpsed ahead of her stem.

The ship seen from a point off the port quarter, summer 1938. A Heinkel 114 sits on the forward catapult and an Arado 95 atop the C turret catapult; both aircraft have wings folded.

Numerous types were evaluated before the Kriegsmarine finally opted for the Arado 196 as its standard shipboard aircraft. This photograph, taken in the summer of 1938, shows Gneisenau conducting aircraft trials: a Heinkel He 114 V-l is suspended from the port derrick and the biplane on the ‘C’ turret catapult, facing to starboard, is a Focke-Wulf Fw 62 V-1.

Normal shipboard routine: a weapons area is given a cleaning—here the 15cm twin turret Port I. On the upper deck numerous items of equipment from inside the turret are being worked on by the ‘Lords’ (the popular term for all ratings below the rank of Warrant Officer). The parade uniform—commonly known as the ‘Kiel sailor-boy suit’—was navy blue trousers and blouse, a fly-scarf with knot and a soft-crown peakless cap with black tally, the ribbon often being of considerable length, with the bearer’s unit such as ‘Gneisenau’ or ‘Unterseebootsschulflotille’ picked out in gold Fraktur lettering. In wartime, however, the tally bore only the inscription ‘Kriegsmarine’ Under the Exerzier collar a fly-scarf was tied in such a way that a thin diagonal blue thread was visible across the knot. The direction of the diagonal indicated whether the wearer was attached to the North Sea or Baltic station. Warrant officers and above wore white shirt, collar and tie and a peaked cap and were known as Wasche vorn (‘laundry ahead’) as opposed to the other ranks who were Wäsche achtern (‘laundry astern’).

A view from the quarterdeck looking forward: Gneisenau in foreign climes during her maiden voyage in July 1938.

Gneisenau leaving Kiel in August 1938. Even before completion of shipboard training and trials, the vessel had already assumed the mantle of the future Fleet flagship. The occasion here was the impending launch of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, the State visit of the Hungarian regent, Admiral Horthy, and other associated Fleet activities. The naval ensign is set on the foretop radio mast and the Führerstandarte flies at the top of the mainmast, indicating that Hitler is aboard.

Gneisenau at anchor in the roads at Kieler Förde. At the mainmast is the national flag of Hungary, at the foretop an admiral’s pennant. In the foreground is Nixe, the yacht of the Baltic Naval Station, while in the background the state yacht Grille.

Gneisenau dressed overall for the launch of Prinz Eugen and firing a salute, 22 August 1938. At the mainmast flies the Hungarian flag, at the foretop the pennant of the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

Heavy ships of the Fleet, dressed with flags from stem to stern, at moorings in Kieler Forde. From left to right are Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee and Gneisenau.

Gneisenau at the 1938 Naval Review, with the ship’s company paraded along the starboard rail and superstructure decks.

A stern view of Gneisenau during the Review.

The first sea trials having demonstrated that the ship shipped a great deal of water over the bow, this causing continual breakdowns not only to ‘A’ turret particularly but to the forward structure in general, Gneisenau underwent a major refit in which the fore end was modified and the ‘Atlantic bow’ fitted in an effort to alleviate the spray problem. At the same time the length of the hull was increased and a large raked funnel cap added for improved discharge of the boiler gases. The photograph shows Gneisenau offshore at anchor or lying to moorings after completion of the refit. The starboard mooring boom has been extended and a number of her ship’s boats have made fast. The accommodation ladder has been let down. Access to the ship is by boat only.

Gneisenau modified, spring 1939. This photograph shows the new hull form with its graceful prow. The starboard anchor is still stowed at a side hawsepipe.

Gneisenau at Kiel mooring buoy All. Both bow anchors to port are drawn up at side hawseholes. Mooring booms have been extended on either side of the bow and accommodation ladders let down. This photograph affords another view of the ‘Atlantic bow’ and new funnel cap.

Gneisenau at moorings in Kiel, showing the starboard anchor deck cluse.

The full refit involved an adjustment to the anchor arrangement. One bow anchor was removed and the other repositioned in a cluse on deck. Notice the substantial thickness of the hull amidships on account of the armour belt.

Gneisenau’s forward 28cm turrets. Scharnhorst is in the background. Kiel, 7 September 1939.

The first winter of the war brought many problems. Battle readiness was limited and virtually no sea training was possible in the icy sea conditions. The photograph shows Gneisenau frozen in at Kiel. Most of the seaman branch spent their working hours chipping away at the layers of ice on the upper deck, superstructure and, most importantly, the weapons. Communication to and from ship was maintained by icebreakers and tugs, but as the ice thickened a beaten track soon came into existence between ship and shore.

Gneisenau in January 1940 at moorings in Kiel. A U-boat can be seen (left), which had far worse problems forcing a way through the ice. At the peak of the bow is the anchor watch. At the foretop on the cupola a radar aerial has been installed.

Gun cleaning under way while the ship is frozen to her moorings. For protection against the bitter cold, bobble caps pulled down over the ears, layers of pullovers under the fatigues and thick scarves all help.

A 1939/40 winter view of Gneisenau from the starboard bow anchor, the upper deck, superstructure and weapons all wearing a mantle of ice.

Because of the prevailing weather, frost and particularly ice, little sea training could be done. This 1939/40 winter photograph captures Gneisenau leaving for a brief sortie. On the catapult sits the new Arado Ar 196 shipboard aircraft. The catapult atop ‘C’ turret had by this time been removed.

January 1940 at Kiel: a view over the fore end from the port side of the tower mast. Alongside lie a number of supply vessels, while tugs and icebreakers work at creating a navigable channel. Sister-ship Scharnhorst is ahead.

The foreship and icefield from a slightly different position on the tower mast.

A tug/ice-breaker alongside Gneisenau in the winter of 1939/40.

Any chance to get out to sea was taken. Here the 10.5cm flak gun-crews are exercised. There is still ice on the side rail.

Gneisenau with two destroyers seen from Scharnhorst off the Friesian island of Wangerooge, 18 February 1940. Because of the more favourable weather situation in the North Sea both units had moved down to the Jade estuary off Wilhelmshaven and set off northwards that day on a operation in connection with the Altmark incident. However, they achieved nothing and were back by the 20th.

February 1940: a view looking aft down an icy foredeck. Important items of tackle such as the anchor chains are kept ice-free. Notice the way in which the foretop radar mattress bears to port for security reasons.

Once clear of the icefield, the ship’s company is mustered on the quarterdeck aft and the purpose of the mission announced. Astern are two destroyers.

Two exposures showing the damage inflicted by two hits in the action with the British battlecruiser Renown: (right) the foretop, including the unserviceable radar set visible just in front of the officer; and (below) the hole previously protected by an armoured cover to shield the port optic of ‘A’ turret rangefinder (later removed altogether).

Gneisenau photographed in drydock at the Deutsche Werke, Kiel, on 20 May 1940, a hull survey being necessary following mine damage at the level of compartment IV received on the 5th whilst the ship was en route to the Baltic. The damaged plating is on the left of the picture.

Looking down Gneisenau’s forecastle from aloft. Forward of the anchor windlasses is the aircraft recognition device in the general format used by all heavier Kriegsmarine battle units. Shown in the diagram below are the differences between the designs on the forecastles of Gneisenau (left) and Scharnhorst (rig ht).

In June 1940 Operation ‘Juno’ was more successful than some of its predecessors. Here one of Gneisenau’s 28cm turrets has just fired.

On 7 June the squadron closed in around the fleet flagship and individual commanders were ferried by ship’s boat to a conference with the Fleet Commander aboard Gneisenau. This procedure was very risky but still possible to carry off at the time. The various units remained on full battle alert (notice here how the railings have been dismantled accordingly) and more or less drifted in the relatively calm conditions. This is a view of the fleet flagship Gneisenau and, behind her, Scharnhorst, taken from the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. Communications boats can be seen to the left of the picture.

All units anchored in Trondheim on 9 June. Gneisenau is to the left and Admiral Hipper, with boats’ mooring booms extended, to the right.

Trondheim roads, with Gneisenau (centre) and the light cruiser Nürnberg (right). Both units are apparently wearing camouflage colours.

Trondheim roads from another perspective. Nearest the camera are two Heinkel He 115 floatplanes and a white-painted older-type Heinkel (probably an air-sea rescue He 59); in the foreground, at anchor, is Gneisenau, and on her starboard beam is Scharnhorst, with a rather misty view of some destroyers off her bow; to the right is Admiral Hipper. The camouflaged ship in the centre of the photograph

is probably a flak/minesweeping Sperrbrecher.

The next operation, on 20 June, was abruptly terminated when one torpedo from a spread of several fired by the submarine HMS Clyde exploded in Gneisenau’s bows. The hole was so large that a 100-man picket boat could comfortably pass through.

The torpedo damage seen from the port side. To the right, the outer hull plates have been torn back by the blast.

After essential shoring-up work in Trondheim, Gneisenau made for home with a strong escort, and, despite attention from enemy aircraft and submarines, reached Kiel without further damage. The photograph shows the ship proceeding through Kieler Forde on 31 July 1940 to the Deutsche Werke shipyard drydock.

The following five photographs taken in drydock show Gneisenau’s hull from various angles: on this page are a view of the starboard bow, one from directly ahead and one from the port side aft; on page 80 photographs portray the hull from forward of the starboard beam and at keel level forward of the bow on the port side. Notice the size of the hole made by the torpedo explosion. The emergency repair to the plating above the waterline carried out at Trondheim is clearly visible, as is the bulged forefoot.

Gneisenau in the shipyard’s 40,000-tonne floating dock.

At the second attempt Scharnhorst and Gneisenau broke out into the North Atlantic in February 1941 to form a commerce raiding group. This photograph shows the heavier winter sea conditions with which they had to contend after the gentler Baltic and North Sea experience.

Gneisenau taking on fuel during the Atlantic operation. A short period careened was unavoidable while the lateral bunkers were filled. Here the effect of a slight inclination to port combined with the Atlantic swell gives the illusion of a heavy list.

The Arado Ar 196 shipboard reconnaissance floatplane proved very useful during the Atlantic operation by hugely extending the radius of search.

Gneisenau hidden to the level of her bridge superstructure and tower mast behind an Atlantic crest.

Inside the ship: 28cm shell cases on a conveyor belt to the main turret ammunition hoists.

Inside one of the main turrets. A shell case is about to be rolled into a loading tray. The cage-like sections to the left support the shells during conveyance.

A boiler room. The leatherwear here was essential: in the event of superheated steam escaping at high pressure, this form of clothing provided protection against scalding.

The two battleships retired to Brest on 22 March 1941 for an overhaul before embarking on a fresh Atlantic sortie. However, the British had other ideas. As soon as the two units had arrived (later joined by the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Prinz Eugen), the Royal Air Force began a programme of constant air attack to prevent any further adventures. The photograph shows Gneisenau arriving under the attentive gaze of a delegation of Japanese naval officers visiting the French port at the time as part of a project to select a suitable Biscay base for their own submarines.

Japanese naval officers visiting the battleship. Above the second officer is the aircraft catapult; aft is the after main rangefinder with battle ensign hoisted at the pole mast.

The naval harbour at Brest from the air, spring 1941. In the centre is the tidal breakwater protecting the inner roadstead; at the right end of this is the huge U-boat bunker. Jutting out from the quayside beyond the breakwater is a mooring pier. Along the main quay, protected on the seaward side by a bow-shaped barrier of anti-torpedo netting, is Scharnhorst, and in the first drydock ahead of her is Gneisenau. Out of the picture to the left are further naval installations and dry docks.

Gneisenau in drydock on a day grey with mist. Her fore-deck is covered over with camouflage netting and ‘A’ turret’s barrels are elevated towards their maximum. At the foot of the picture is one of the buses used to transport the crew to and from their shore barracks.

A clearer view of Gneisenau in drydock at Brest.

The tower mast and funnel of the ship. This photograph, taken from the starboard side astern, gives a good view of a 15cm singlemounted gun, diagonally above it a twin 10.5cm flak, two starboard flak control centres (‘waggle-heads’) and the additional open observation position in the foretop (upper right).

The continual RAF bombing raids and torpedo attacks occasionally bore fruit, and on 6 April 1941, during one of the latter, Gneisenau was hit at the level of compartment IV. The damage is seen here.

In January 1942 preparations were made for the return to Germany. Both units and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen had been repaired to a state of battle-readiness. Here Gneisenau is seen in the protected anchorage at Brest.

Operation ‘Cerberus’, the so-called ‘Channel Dash’: leading the squadron is Scharnhorst and in her wake is Gneisenau, photographed from Prinz Eugen.

A 10.5cm flak gun in action. The chassis was triaxially stabilised. Notice the number of gun crew needed.

Looking forward along the starboard side, the secondary armament aiming on exercises (in action the side rail would have been dropped). All rangefinders and radar aerials bear to starboard.

While Scharnhorst put into Wilhelmshaven, Gneisenau continued to Kiel and the Deutsche Werke shipyard. Probably the original intention was merely to have the mine damage to the hull surveyed, but the ship remained in drydock for repairs and, as these would have been fairly minor, her stocks of ammunition and powder were not discharged—contrary to custom and standing orders. This was a fatal error. The Royal Air Force was in a position as regards aircraft and personnel to attack any chosen target in the western half of Germany, and on the night of 26 February 1942 Gneisenau was knocked out when a direct hit on the foredeck set off a devastating chain reaction. The photograph shows the ship in floating dry-dock, and the destruction forward clearly visible.

The extensive destruction. Next morning work began to clear the damage. This view is looking forward to the bow over the remains of the barbette of ‘A’ turret, this latter having been hurled through the air by the force of the explosion.

A port side view of the damaged bow.

Shortly afterwards Gneisenau proceeded to Gotenhafen, where a somewhat hesitant start was made to the planned refit and installation of 38cm guns. In this 1942 high-altitude Allied reconnaissance photograph, Gneisenau is seen in floating drydock at Gotenhafen.

Another aerial reconnaissance photograph showing Gneisenau at Gotenhafen. Her barbettes can be clearly seen following the removal of her three main turrets to the wharf alongside.

A later reconnaissance photograph of Gneisenau moored to the same wharf with her barbettes covered over, the bows and probably the stern masked for camouflage purposes by wooden screens.

A reconnaissance photograph taken on 1 August 1942. The arrows indicate the empty barbettes; the letter ‘A’ indicates other equipment that has been unshipped.

Another Allied reconnaissance photograph, showing a partial plan view of the ship. ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ indicate the missing 28cm turrets. The gun cradles are still fitted, but ‘D’ and ‘E’ point to the storage area for the 28cm guns.

Gneisenau being hors de combat for the foreseeable future, a determined attempt was at first made to start the long-planned refit to install 38cm guns, but ultimately the changing war situation dictated the abandonment of this undertaking, and it was also decided to convert the ship’s 28cm triple turrets lying on the quay at Gotenhafen to coastal batteries. The damaged ‘A’ turret was little better than scrap, but ‘B’ and ‘C’ turrets were intact and these were shipped to Norway, where it was intended to place one on the Örland Peninsula commanding the entrance to Trondheim Fjord and the other on the island of Sorra near Bergen. The work was extensive, requiring new emplacements, and by 1945 only the unit at Trondheim was ready. Two 15cm twin turrets and one single 15cm mounting were positioned at the northern end of the Danish island of Fanö, and the remainder probably finished up in the Netherlands. The 38cm guns were shipped to Denmark for installation on the coast of Jutland, but nothing more came of the idea. These four photographs show (top left) a rear view of one of the 28cm turrets on its new emplacement at Trondheim; (above left) an interior view of the turret with its shell loading facility; (top right) details of the loading tray and breech of the centre 28cm gun; and (above right) a section of the turret commander’s periscope.

This photograph, taken on 30 July 1973 at the Armoury Museum, Copenhagen, shows one of the 38cm gun barrels intended for Gneisenau on display during an exhibition.

As the Soviet Army advanced westwards, Gneisenau was towed out to the Gotenhafen port approaches on 27 March 1945 and scuttled at an angle across the main channel. This photograph was taken in 1945.

In 1946 the wreck was still recognisable by the upperworks. The lighthouse (left) stands at the end of a mole on one side of the harbour entrance (its position can be more clearly seen in the second photograph overleaf).

The wreck of Gneisenau in 1948 and 1949. Not until some time afterwards were serious efforts made to dispose of the obstruction. 1 The commander of HMS Rawalpindi rejected an instruction from Gneisenau to scuttle and fought to

the end. Whilst attempting to rescue surviving crew members, the German force was disturbed by the cruiser HMS Newcastle and left the scene.— GB 2 This operation, code-named ‘Nordmark’, was intended as an attack on British iron-ore traffic from Narvik as a reprisal for the Altmark incident and thereafter to provide homeward escort for the Fleet oiler Altmark aground in Jössingfjord. However, the latter was not sufficiently seaworthy to make the homeward voyage until March.—GB 3 The Altmark incident in Norwegian waters in February 1940 precipitated the invasion of Norway in April. Though being of the explicit opinion that the British attack on the Altmark was a serious breach of its country’s neutrality, the Norwegian government had instructed its warships observing the incident not to interfere. The Germans interpreted this to mean that the Norwegian government was not prepared to guarantee the safety of German shipping in Norwegian waters under international law. This was significant, because most of Germany’s iron ore was brought from Narvik in freighters which legitimately hugged the Norwegian coast in order to give immunity from attack. Therefore invasion was unavoidable. The British were actually in the act of mining Norwegian inshore waters as

the German invasion force arrived. See Hubatsch et al.—GB 1 Radar = Dezimeter-Telegraphie-Gerät (Dete), the FuMO equipment. In the illustrations its mattresslike aerials can be seen atop the revolving cupola of the rangefinger in the foretop. 2 ‘Fleet’ here means the Fleet Commander aboard Gneisenau as his flagship. 1 Fourteen minutes passed between the alarm being given for clearing the ship for action at 0500hrs and reporting the engine room cleared for battle. By 0530hrs the boiler plant had been forced up to the maximum output level, i.e. the boilers had reached their inertia level and were now in a position to supply any steam demand. 1 For an explanation of the German naval grid-square charts, see Appendix I. 2 FT = Funk(en)-Telegraphie, a wireless signal. ‘FT 0227/22’ = received at 0227hrs, signal log no 22. 3 Group = Naval Group, here Group West, set up in August 1939 with Headquarters at Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden. 1 Dwarslinie Steuerbord = line abeam to starboard, a steaming formation in which station is taken on the port quarter of the senior ship. 1 Admiral Marschall’s objective was to penetrate to the end of Andfjord and attack the town of Harstad, which British forces had invested as a naval base with a view eventually to retaking Narvik. Captain Roskill stated in his work The War at Sea (Vol. I, HMSO) that ‘… it was a bold plan and, in view of the great reduction in Lord Cork’s naval strength which had taken place at this time, might well have succeeded in causing us serious losses.’—GB 1 No torpedoes were fired. The corvette HMS Juniper was burning fiercely and as she went down her depth charges exploded. Hipper found only one survivor. Oil Pioneer, 5,666brt, sunk by Gneisenau, was a tanker in ballast. Both ships were bound for England. The destroyer Hermann Schoemann picked up 11 crew members from the tanker. See Eismeer Atlantik Ostsee: die Einsätze des schweren Kreuzers Admiral Hipper, Brennecke, HeyneVerlag, 1968.—GB 1 Partly intended to divert attention from the homeward voyage of the damaged Scharnhorst, which sailed from Trondheim for Kiel an hour later, this operation to ‘roll up’ the Northern Patrol was to have been a repeat of the Rawalpindi exercise of the previous winter, but far more dangerous on this occasion for being attempted in a month without darkness.—GB 1 The Kriegsmarine Yard at Kiel functioned from 1 April 1939 until 30 June 1943. It was formed by a merger of the Howaldtswerke and Naval Arsenal, Kiel, and used the site of the former Kaiserlichen Werft (which was known as the Reichswerft from 30 April 1919 to 17 June 1920 and then Deutsche Werke, Kiel). Part of the Kaiserlichen Werft became the Naval Arsenal in 1919. 1 Gneisenau received from Schlettstadt about 1,515m3 of fuel on 5/6 February 1941 and another 2,550m3 on 14/15 February. Admiral Lütjens used the two naval oilers, which were both armed with three 6in guns, as scout ships on either flank of his patrol line with some success. At the conclusion of the operation they were used to transport prisoners to France.—GB

The Battleship Scharnhorst The contract for Panzerschiff ‘D’ (Ersatz Elsass) was placed with the Marinewerft Wilhelmshaven (from 1935 the Kriegsmarine Werft) on 25 January 1934. The keel was laid on 14 February 1934 on Slip 2 but work was stopped on 5 July 1935 and the material scrapped. The original plans were modified to accommodate new specifications and the keel was laid afresh on 15 June 1936. The hull was launched on 3 October 1936 in the presence of Hitler, who, as usual on such occasions, was accompanied by a large retinue. The Reich War Minister, Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg, delivered the pre-launch speech, and the widow of Kapitän zur See Felix Schultz, commander of the armoured cruiser Scharnhorst, lost with his ship at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914, performed the ‘christening’. Scharnhorst was commissioned on 7 January 1939. Completion took an inordinately long time and 27 months elapsed between the ship’s launching and her entering service—an indication of the pressure on yard capacity caused by the pace of German naval rearmament. The ship’s permanent company was gradually drafted in and were quartered in the Jachmann barracks during the construction period.

1939 Following commissioning in January, the ship conducted intensive trials and worked up in the Baltic. Short calls were made at Pillau, at Memel, at Sassnitz and on several occasions at Kiel. On 1 April Scharnhorst was at Wilhelmshaven for the launching that day of the new battleship Tirpitz, and as the largest unit present acted as flagship. After the launch the guests assembled on Scharnhorst’s quarterdeck to witness the promotion of Generaladmiral Raeder to Grossadmiral by Hitler. Scharnhorst was laid up at Wilhelmshaven in the Kriegsmarine Werft for the usual contractual completion work and replacement of the straight stem with an ‘Atlantic’ clipper bow, the fore end being lengthened at the same time. The aircraft hangar was rebuilt with a catapult on the roof. A raked funnel cap was fitted and the mainmast was relocated aft from its original position immediately abaft the funnel mantle. The ship was not ready for yard trials until the outbreak of war. As an initial measure her complement was brought up to war strength and the War Supplement was shipped in. When British bombers raided the German Bight for the first time on 4 September on an antishipping sortie both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were at Brunsbüttel. Weeks of intensive battle training were conducted in the Baltic before Scharnhorst returned to Wilhelmshaven in November 1939. On 21 November the two sister-ships sortied from the Jade estuary, initially with a destroyer escort, and claimed their first victim, in the Iceland-Faroes area, when they overwhelmed the armed merchant cruiser HMS Rawalpindi. The return was undertaken in deteriorating weather conditions, the ships plunging head-on into seas piled high by strong southerly winds. Breakers shipped over the bow caused a disruption of the electrical current to ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets and the secondary armament forward. On the 28th of the month the ships moored in the Wilhelmshaven roads. In December a FuMO 22 radar set was fitted on the forward face of the foretop rangefinder cupola. Improved models followed later.

1940 In Operation ‘Nordmark’, which took place between 18 and 20 February, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and two destroyers made an unsuccessful foray as far as the Shetlands in connection with the Altmark incident. On 7 April a large part of the German Fleet assembled in the German Bight for Operation ‘Weserübung’, the occupation of Denmark and Norway. The invasion force consisted of Admiral Hipper, 12 destroyers plus two more later, and other battle groups made up of light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, E-boats and numerous auxiliaries. Almost anything capable of raising steam was commandeered. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau offered protection to the flank as distant escorts. Proceeding northwards, the group encountered worsening weather and a strong north-westerly gale forced a reduction in speed to 9kt. Scharnhorst sustained weather damage: a longitudinal bulkhead to starboard was distorted, evidence of metal fatigue and cracks were discovered in the bows, and more structural faults became evident in the upperworks. It was in these conditions that a battle ensued on 9 April as reported in Scharnhorst’s War Diary (presented here in extracts): 0500hrs: 0505hrs: 0507hrs: 0508hrs: 0510hrs: 0511hrs: 0513hrs: 0515hrs: 0517hrs: 0520hrs: 0528hrs: 0534hrs: 0551hrs: 0555hrs: 0600hrs: 0605hrs: 0615hrs: 0617hrs: 0618hrs:

Speed 12kt. Grid square 3476 rt centre. Showery, especially to west where low rain cloud causing occasional poor visibility. Breaks in cloud. Wind NW force 8, sea state 5, steering 350°. Ultra short-wave order from Fleet: Alarm! Reason at first not evident. Against dark western sky the silhouette of a large ship. Enemy opened fire. Turned to steer 350°. Heavy guns opened fire. Enemy identified as battlecruiser Renown class. Behind enemy ship one or two other targets.1 Turned to steer 330°. Signal: Speed 24kt, steer 330°. Secondary armament also opened fire. Switched to HFS [= elevation remote-control], main armament. Short pause in shooting. Turned to steer 30°. Enemy being engaged to rear by ‘C’ turret. Meanwhile manoeuvring to get clear of fall of enemy shells. Report to Fleet: Steam up in all boilers. ‘A’ turret both swivel motors unserviceable due to flooding. Speed 26kt. Enemy shells falling very close port side. Gneisenau hidden in squall. Enemy ship has ceased fire. To all: Enemy ship no longer in sight. Speed 15kt. Visibility improving. According to report from Gunnery, enemy in sight fine on starboard quarter. Scharnhorst took up position on Gneisenau’s port quarter to allow her clear field of fire. Centre engine stopped, steam valve tripped. Enemy opened fire. Permission to fire given ‘C’ turret. Report to Fleet: ‘A’ turret

0625hrs:

unserviceable due to severe flooding.

0629hrs: 0630hrs: 0634hrs: 0637hrs: 0641hrs: 0650hrs:

Steering 30°. Battle signal: Form line ahead on Fleet Commander. Speed 25kt. Edging into formation in wake of Gneisenau. New course, steer 0°. Ceased fire. Speed 26kt. Enemy briefly out of sight, then seen at 192° on bearing supplied by D/F equipment. Enemy opened fire. Senior Gunnery Officer reports: Enemy flying admiral’s pennant.2 Target out of sight. New course, steering 350°. Centre turbine returned to service. Signal: Line abeam to port, speed 28kt. Port engine slowing. Main feed pump out. Port engine can only make 24kt. Speed 25kt. Battle signal: Form line abeam to starboard. Enemy has probably turned away as can no longer be seen despite clear visibility. Boiler 3.3 out, fire in economiser. Speed 22kt. Pause in battle. Gunnery has instruction: Transport AP shells from ‘A’ to ‘C’ turret. Grid square 3158 and KM, wind WNW, sea state 4, snow showers, good visibility. Broken cloud, variable. Funnel continuing to make black smoke. Not possible to estimate for how long as another boiler is out. Probably split tube. Reported to Fleet: (1) maximum maintainable speed 25kt; (2) breakdown T2 main feed pump, probably seized coupling. Boiler 1.1 probably split tube. Boiler 3.3 fire in economizer. Speed 24kt. Reported to Fleet: No shipboard aircraft serviceable. 38cm shell fragment found on deck. Visibility aft control centre 20km, foretop 25km. Repeat order from Fleet: Reduce your smoke. This is not possible because of the loss of an economizer. In response to Fleet enquiry, reported probable duration of engine repairs. Alarm ended, normal war watches resumed. Expenditure of ammunition: 182 rounds 28cm AP, 13 rounds 28cm nose-fused HE, 91 rounds 15cm nose fused HE. No hits, no casualties. In response to Fleet enquiry, reported that transfer of AP shells for most part completed. Equal distribution dependent condition turret

0651hrs: 0654hrs: 0659hrs: 0703hrs: 0706hrs: 0708hrs: 0720hrs: 0722hrs: 0725hrs: 0742hrs: 0755hrs:

0809hrs:

0825hrs: 0830hrs: 0918hrs: 0920hrs: 0958hrs: 1000hrs:

1300hrs:

1313hrs: 1331hrs: 1333hrs: 1336hrs: 1340hrs: 1423hrs: 1600hrs: 1700hrs: 1800hrs: 1842hrs:

2215hrs: 2316hrs: 2330hrs:

‘Anton’. From Fleet: Ultra short radio silence. Speed 24kt. To Fleet: Bearing 0°, smoke trail in sight. From Fleet: Make no smoke while steaming. To Fleet: Apparently not smoke trail but a cloud formation. Speed 18kt. Grid square 7589 centre upper, wind NNW 5, sea moderate. Reported to Fleet: One ship’s aircraft ready by tomorrow morning. In response to Fleet enquiry, reported present state of engine repairs. Boiler 1.1 back in service. In response to enquiry, Scharnhorst informed Fleet initially will be able keep up war sailing state 1. Reported to Fleet at same time: One damaged boiler now returned to service and linked in. Steering 270°, speed 15kt. Reported to Fleet: ‘A’ turret clear. The speed at which ‘A’ turret has been restored is an outstanding achievement by the gunnery mechanics under Kapitänleutnant (Weapons Branch) St. Fleet ordered: War sailing state 2. From Fleet: War sailing state 2, war sailing speed 18kt. Speed 15kt.

Thus the accounts contained in the War Diaries. A much wider picture of events is obtained when these extracts are read in conjunction with individual battle reports, for example those submitted by the various gunnery positions: Gunnery Report, ‘C’ turret, 9.4.40: I. General. 1. Work in the turret proceeded calmly and safely despite the heavy gyrations of the platform. The turret mechanics merit especial recognition for the way in which they set to their tasks with great enthusiasm. Thanks to their excellent standards of knowledge and ability, their involvement in the rapid repair of breakdowns was outstanding. In my opinion the high number of mechanical problems is attributable to the great demands made on the materials (battle loading) and the gyration of the gun platform caused by the heavy sea conditions. None of the breakdowns was due to crew error. A number of the turret crew (including some important Numbers’) were sea sick. Most of these forgot their seasickness after the first enemy salvo arrived. The remainder fought against the malady with great determination and all worked faultlessly. Here the success of basic individual training made itself especially noticeable. 2. I was not able to keep the enemy under constant observation, as I often had to attend to mechanical breakdowns. From my position I could not see the target clearly, but when I compare the typical identifying feature (fighting top) of Repulse with that of Renown, I conclude that Renown must have been the enemy ship. I found astonishing the high rate and continuity of the enemy’s fire, which was not impaired by the heavy movements of his ship. When the enemy turned away to port for the first time, he was pounding so strongly that his keel was visible at the stem. Conditions of visibility were mostly very poor as it was still fairly

dark. The target stood against a black horizon and was often hidden in passing squalls of rain and snow. In my opinion my turret fired on one occasion when the gun barrels were flooded. Shortly before firing the gunhouse had been deluged by the collapsing column of water from a salvo falling very close to the ship’s side. I had the impression that the barrels recoiled further back than previously after firing that salvo. I did not observe any hits on the enemy vessel, but on the other hand I saw four straddling salvos. Observation of the enemy was very difficult as from my low vantage point the target was often obscured by the high swell. 3. I did not keep the record of salvos and timings required by standing orders as I had to reappoint Aircraft NCO Kroll to another duty (removal of dented shell cases etc.). 4. In the event of battle, the orders were that gunlaying and firing was by HFS and SVZW, which would override at Alarm.1 The switch-over ordered by gunnery control to change from gunlaying on bearing/elevation gauges and centralised firing, and the checking back by the command-relay officer, led to a delay in reporting the turret clear for action. II. Mechanical faults, breakdowns and changeovers a) Gun Platform 1. The right barrel failed at the second salvo. Reason: loading container did not drop down. Action: loading container raised with hand lever and then disengaged. Fault did not recur. 2. The left barrel was reported to have failed at the fourth salvo. It was reset but misfired (fifth salvo). Barrel out of action for two minutes. On examination it was found that the firing cable had become unplugged during recoil. Subsequently left barrel was fired by use of lanyard. The cable was removed during the first pause in the shooting and the plug was soldered in by the turret mechanics later in the battle. The reserve cable was useless. This fact was known before the operation. The shipyard would not supply cabling with plugs that fitted because they had no contract for it. There was insufficient time available to obtain the necessary contract before sailing. 3. During loading, the barrels (when under HFS) came out of the loading position. The rammers were not bent at that time as these had just been drawn back. The right rammer had been raised a little. 4. Because of faults 2 and 3, reverted to laying by bearing gauge, turret-elevated, turret-fired. 5. Right barrel loading problem. A shell case jammed because cover was torn off. One cartridge was extracted with emergency bar. During this fault right barrel fired singly. Interruption lasted three salvos. Later fired singly during another two salvos. 6. While right barrel was firing single rounds, centre barrel No 1 reported ‘bearing gauge out of action’. Transferred to bearing/elevation by direct laying, turret-fired. Right barrel coupled up with centre barrel. Examination revealed only a mechanical fault. Turret mechanics replaced the defective item. During the repair direct elevation and turret-fired. Subsequently reverted to elevation gauge, transferred to salvos from left. 7. During the pause in the battle, an attempt was made to couple up to HFS again (more accurate training). The turret mechanic had overhauled this during the first stage and believed it was now clear for action. However, the attempts made during the pause proved negative. Motor drive was therefore reverted to at once, all three barrels training from right. SVZW could not be used as left barrel was being fired by lanyard (see 2) 8. Towards end of action the centre barrel would not return to firing position. Reason: probably barrel sticking to cradle due to overheating to both because of high number of rounds fired. Measure: fired two outer barrels, from right. Centre barrel did not participate in the latter salvos while turret mechanic raised air pressure of return mechanism to 98 atmospheres.

Result of this not established as battle finished meanwhile. 9. Right barrel loading difficulty. Shell casing dented. Turned and rammed manually. Measures while being cleared: left and right barrels firing singly. Right barrel omitted one salvo. b) Machinery platform: no defects. c) Cartridge platform: no defects. d) Shell platform 1. Locking lever on forward loading table failed to return on one occasion. Reason: probably due to severe gyration of ship. Action: repositioned manually. Defect did not recur. 2. Shell not flush in hoist tray. Defect occurred twice to right and once to centre hoist. Reason: movement of ship. Right barrel out of action once when defect occurred for first time. Later these problems were recognised immediately and corrected, therefore no further interruptions. 3. About 15 minutes after battle began, the motor of lifting winch C VII seized. Cause: coil overheating (not the first time!). Action taken: mechanic removed brake. Winch ran later without brake and gave no further trouble. Winch out of action about ten minutes. Ammunition supply not interrupted during repair as being brought from ready ammunition room at the time. Recommendation: that brakes be removed from all winches. Winch C V has been running without a brake since last operation and since then has operated perfectly satisfactorily despite violent gyrations of the ship. III. State of Turret at End of Battle. 1. Gunlaying method: 2. Equipment out of service: 3. Expenditure ammunition: 4. Loss of personnel:

Bearing on bearing gauge, turret-fired. HFS (permanent) Centre barrel (would probably have been clear after firing pause). Electrical firing left barrel (clear again after few minutes). 139 AP, 6 nose-fused HE. Nil.

Signed: Bredemeyer, Kapitänleutnant, Cdr ‘C’ turret. Battle Report ‘A’Turret, 9.4.40: When the Alarm was given the turret was bearing 70° with 10° elevation. During the traverse to the target the turret began to experience serious flooding through the shell-case ejection ports. This became more severe on account of the unfavourable bearing (rear of turret facing into oncoming seas). When the ejection ports were opened seawater gushed through, sometimes to level of deckhead, drenching gun crew. The flooding made an orderly shooting tempo impossible and breakdowns ensued in the following sequence: 1. Block magnets for elevation machinery: gun breeches and rammers jamming. 2. SVZW. 3. Smoke extractor. 4. HFS. 5. Main swivel motor. 6. Reserve swivel motor. 7 and 8. Reserve hoists. 9. Current from No 3 E-plant (cable fire). After breakdown (6) ceased fire as laying the turret with emergency motor was hopeless. For the remainder of proceedings under increasingly difficult circumstances transferred over to alternative means of fire control. In all took part in eight salvos and fired 6 HE nose-fused and 9 AP rounds. Salvos 1 and 2:

Left barrel, single rounds, turret-elevated, bearing by SVZW.

Salvo 3: Salvos 4, 5 and 6: Salvo 7: Salvo 8:

Left and centre barrels, single rounds, turret-elevated, bearing by SVZW. Left and centre barrels coupled, turret-elevated, turret-fired. Left and centre barrels coupled, HFS, turret-fired. All three barrels HFS, turret-fired.

After turret dropped out, about 100 AP shells were transferred to “C” turret. Getting the slings and crabs brought up took a long time. These ought to be laid out ready when clearing ship for action. Loss of personnel: Nil Signed: Kapitänleutnant and Turret Cdr. Battle Report ‘B’turret, 9.4.40: When the alarm was given, the turret was occupied in exchanging ready ammunition. As target information was supplied at once, I ordered the right and centre barrels which were already clear to be loaded with AP and the left barrel with nose-fused HE. The first order for laying the gun was ‘by bearing gauge’. For this procedure turret firing was ordered immediately. Before permission to fire was given, the order came down, ‘HFS and SVZW’. This was carried out immediately. At the first attempt to fire the SVZW failed and the salvo did not go. The next salvo was discharged by turret firing. After this salvo the electrical plant shorted. It was switched at once and the mechanic reported at the same time that the SVZW was now clear with a new safety catch fitted. On the order to fire the salvo did not go. Turret commander ordered transfer to SVZW left. This next salvo also did not go. Therefore without making any further investigations, the turret was individually fired from then until end of phase. During the intervening period the electricity supply failed very briefly. The left and centre hoists came up; the right one stuck halfway. As pressure was again available almost at once this was not too bad, but when the right hoist arrived, the unloading gear failed to extend and so no shell was delivered. The turret commander ordered the right barrel to be fired unloaded. Salvo fired with two barrels. Manual operation of right hoist was then ordered. The turret fired three-barrel salvos until the conclusion. Over the three phases of battle ‘B’ turret fired 38 rounds. In the first and second phases shooting was interrupted when the problem stages were encountered. Turret not involved in third phase (purely rear engagement.) The heavy flooding through the shell case ejection ports, crew access hatches and the opened rangefinder cupola caused severe disruption. Observation of own fire only occasionally possible because of seas breaking on deck. I believe I saw a column of smoke from a hit rising from the enemy vessel shortly before his salvo fell. Signed: Kapitänleutnant, ‘B’ turret commander. Thus the battle reports of the three turret commanders, which all specifically draw attention to malfunctions of the 28cm turrets caused by heavy seas being shipped over the decks. Put bluntly, this was a dangerous weakness— and not only for these large units. The views of the gunnery controller (Senior Gunnery Officer) are made known in his battle report and summary of observations submitted on 26 April 1940: Supplement to Battle Report Renown 9.4.40 (Gunnery): A. As regards gunnery, the battle was fought in three phases. I. Running battle to port, guns trained aft but within the field of fire of all guns. Duration about 11 minutes (051 l–0522hrs). Turned away for stern engagement following Gneisenau, which

had just received a heavy shell hit in the foretop. The battle developed immediately from the Alarm being introduced. As the first orders were being given the enemy opened fire. Controller heavy armament, Senior Gunnery Officer in foretop, controller secondary armament, No 3 Gunnery Officer in forward fire control position. Target could be clearly made out and was identified as Renown. No difficulties in observation. Temporary interruption when Gneisenau was hit as own reports not yet synchronised. Ranges between 13 and 15km, enemy bearing from 230° to 255°. 21 heavy, 12 medium salvos. Heavy armament obtained the range with the 5th salvo (2½ mins). Battle phase was terminated by turning away 60 to 70° for stern engagement with change of target data equipment. At that moment the heavy armament straddled the enemy with a full salvo. From the beginning ‘A’ turret had been flooding through the shell case ejection ports which made full participation in the battery impossible. The crew on the after gun platform was occasionally being washed around the turret. In view of the loss of installations due to water damage the turret fired only from time to time over a variety of ranges. According to reports made by the controller, the secondary armament was firing ‘medium short’, and then ‘high short’, and took no effective part in the action up to the time when control was transferred to the after fire control centre. The 15cm MPL [centre-pivot single-mounted] guns were mostly washed out by the sea. II. Rear engagement port quarter, almost exclusively only ‘C’ turret and sections of the secondary armament. Duration about 36 minutes (0523–0559hrs). Controller main armament: Senior Gunnery Officer in foretop, controller secondary armament, No 4 Gunnery Officer in rear fire control centre. Ranges from 14.5 to 21km, increasing steadily. Enemy bearing from 185° to 220° with on one occasion a short turn towards at 250°. 36 heavy salvos. Secondary armament not recorded. Heavy guns (‘C’ turret) straddling at first but soon lost the range through lack of continuity. Because of squalls the target was occasionally obscured and on various occasions was only detected by muzzle flashes. Therefore a large proportion of our rounds were wide or not observed. Finally firing became ragged and was attended by no prospect of success. This phase of the battle terminated when sight of the enemy ship was lost. When target vanished from sight, search was taken up by radar. When the enemy turned towards us for a short period ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets engaged with one and four salvos respectively. Subsequently ‘A’ turret reported permanently out of action with all swivel motors unserviceable due to flooding. Secondary armament continued to fire for a period without getting close to the target and ceased fire when clearly beyond maximum range. III. Straightforward pursuit by the enemy, stern firing on starboard quarter by ‘C’ turret to force enemy ship to keep distance. Duration 21 minutes (0619– 0640hrs). After a break in fighting for 20 minutes the target reappeared astern; observation was often made difficult, parts of own superstructure in the line of sight, very narrow

target and occasional squalls. Controller heavy armament, Senior Gunnery Officer in fore-top, 18 heavy salvos. Range 24.5km decreasing constantly down to 21 km. Enemy bearing 175° to 210°. Holding-off gunnery battle, sequence of own salvos very slow. Lateral accuracy satisfactory; length of aim, target straddled; own shelling ineffective because of low volume of fire. Ceased fire to conserve ammunition. B. Expenditure of ammunition: 182 × 28cmAP, 13 × 28cm HE nose-fused and 9l × l5cm HE nosefused. Prospects for hits existed at phase I and at the beginning of phase II of the battle. A hit in the area of the enemy bridge was observed by several officers. C. At the beginning Renown was shooting with both main and secondary armament. The enemy’s heavy guns were firing impressively fast and regularly by battery divisions (one forward and one stern turret was involved at almost every salvo). Until given the task of pursuit, the enemy maintained an intense fire and must have expended a large amount of ammunition. His intention seemed to be to cause damage to the German units at all costs. Renown was shipping seas very heavily over the forecastle but that did not appear to hamper fire control and firing momentum. Contrast this with the great ponderousness of our own main battery which, allied to complicated and hypersensitive fire control equipment, found its expression once more in the abysmal rate of fire. The secondary armament operated below its best rate but that was because of the use of the stabiliser VZW for gunlaying. The great wetness of the turrets—caused principally by the shellcase ejection ports—has proved again to be a serious disadvantage for us in comparison with the enemy. It is little short of catastrophic that as soon as we become embroiled in a shooting match in a rough sea and at high speed (the normal state of affairs!) we must expect that a section of the heavy armament will soon have to drop out. Alternatively, we can decide on which turret is most affected by flooding through the shell casing ejection flaps and keep it on standby in case we need it later. The danger threatens all three main turrets depending on the direction from where the sea happens to be coming aboard. The experience of the recent battle on this point has been to highlight the superiority of British naval gunnery on most corresponding courses. Observations regarding gunnery against the British battle-cruiser Renown on 9.4.1940: The defects caused by flooding in ‘B’ turret (loss of SVZW), and especially in ‘A’ turret (from the beginning only temporarily available for salvos fired independently; dropped out altogether after eighth salvo), and enemy bearings mainly abaft the beam and so beyond the field of fire of the forward guns, inhibited the rate and volume of fire and the armament was never able to properly zero-in. Accordingly, an energetic and effective fire was never possible in any phase of the battle. The 2-minute lull in firing arose for the following reasons: ‘A’ turret was attempting, with only brief success, to re-link to HFS which had been put out of action by flooding. ‘B’ turret was attempting the same with the SVZW but the safety catch was faulty and although the guns were often reported clear, they could not actually be fired. ‘C’ turret at this time changed over to ‘direct elevation’ and there was a delay caused by a difficulty in opening the viewing shutter. (‘Direct elevation’ was unnecessary and incorrect. The turret commander had ordered it on the basis of an incorrect defect report from the Elevation Number, later retracted, who reported, ‘Elevation gauge out of action’ to describe a purely mechanical fault in which the indicator needle was immobile because of a broken pin. The report had misled the turret

commander into believing that the entire elevation electrical system was out of action.) The following gun-training and firing systems were used during the battle:1

‘B’ Turret

Salvos 1–3 Salvos 4–6 Salvos 7–8

‘C’ turret



‘A’ Turret

= (l)and(3) = (3), (4) and (5) = (2), (4) and (5) = (2), (4) and (5) = Salvos 1 and 2 = (3), (4) and (5), then (1) and (2); then (3), (4) and (5); then (4), (5) and (6); then (1) and (3)

Further observations on other points raised in the General Battle Report: C. Length: The range recorded on the photographic plate for the first salvo must be an error. It is clearly remembered by those involved that the opening range was something in excess of 14km, although this cannot be checked since no written record was kept … This is a permissible scatter under the given ratios. The turret sighting equipment must have been hindered by cordite smoke, squalls [and] poor visibility due to a low eye-level as well as lateral diversion soon after opening fire … the radar was manned before the alarm and a sweep of the horizon had just been made. The enemy vessel was not detected. An optical search by the foretop cupola had not found a target. The vibration at the equipment was very powerful … V. Second Phase of Battle (Salvos 23-59): a) Battle scenario: After turning away, the enemy was engaged from the rear in a running battle, with associated target positional changes. From time to time our own course changes gave the forward main turrets a shooting opportunity which ‘A’ turret, because of electrical failures caused by water damage, could only take on one occasion … for the same reason ‘C’ turret was forced to abandon HFS while ‘A’ turret had been deprived of this facility more or less from the outset by water damage. The numerous changes in course ordered by the ship’s officers were actually carried out either only partially or often in a different manner from that planned. As regards lateral variations between the ships involved, the dotted graph on ‘C’ turret bearing gauge shows the advantages of the SVZW. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that this outstanding fire control equipment can only be relied on in a reasonably dry gunhouse. Gunlaying on the reading of the bearing gauge is very imprecise (per dotted graph ‘B’ turret and central part ‘C’ turret.) IX. Lessons: Apart from the unfavourable nature of the external and tactical battle conditions, a full development of theoretical fire power, where it was attempted, was not possible. As I see them, the causes and reasons for this were: 1. The unstoppable flooding, even at low speed (12kt!) and in a moderate seaway, which quickly put a third of the heavy armament out of action and, practically from the outset, a very valuable piece of equipment in ‘B’ turret, the SVZW, and incidentally caused great inconvenience to the crews on all

platforms. 2. The many important pieces of equipment (such as HFS) which by reason of their complicated and hypersensitive nature do not interlock satisfactorily with existing gear under battle conditions, forcing changes and switching back and forth between alternative methods of laying and firing the guns, transferring to standby or replacement systems, resorting to the use of hand appliances and the like. 3. The ponderous battery, which was never able to offer continuity through a useful loading rate. The shell casings played a special part in this. They were not only indirectly the principal originating source of the turret flooding, but because of dents and bulges caused loading ‘log jams’ and were also the cause of a variety of delays after firing. To mention but one, even at the level of superfiring ‘B’ turret, after being thrown out through the ejection flaps shell cases were frequently tossed straight back into the turret by a passing sea. On the other side of the coin, all observers are unanimous that the enemy ship, contending with the same conditions of wind, sea and high speed, and despite shipping seas full over the bows, managed to maintain a regular rhythm of fire from both forward turrets throughout the engagement, and in all phases of the two-hour long battle kept up a commendably rapid rate of salvo fire.1 On board, 26 April 1940. Signed Löwisch, Fregattenkapitän and Senior Gunnery Officer Once again the susceptibility of the two units in heavy seas had been demonstrated, and the criticism related not only to weapons malfunction: the finely tuned high-pressure superheated-steam plant also suffered continual breakdowns. As a result of the outstanding training and the great technical skill of the gunnery and engine-room personnel, repairs were regularly effected in a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, in battle the problems were dangerous: when it mattered, defects of the sort mentioned could be fatal. The three shipboard aircraft were all reduced to scrap by shrapnel, although an airworthy machine was eventually assembled from pieces of wreckage and flew. On 12 April Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Admiral Hipper retired to German ports. After a brief stay at the Kriegsmarine Werft, Wilhelmshaven, Scharnhorst docked at Kiel on 10 May for a short refit, followed by crew training. The next fleet operation, ‘Juno’, lasted from 4 to 10 June 1940. Its purpose was to relieve pressure on General Dietl’s forces involved in the fighting for northern Norway. The German squadron consisted of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers. Unknown to the Germans, British and French ground troops were already evacuating Norway to reinforce the defence of mainland Europe following the opening of the German offensive in the west on 10 May. The German group steamed into this seaborne withdrawal and on the morning of 8 June sank the empty troopship Orama, the corvette [sic] HMS Juniper and a naval tanker, Oil Pioneer. Admiral Hipper and the destroyers then put back to Trondheim prematurely because of a fuel shortage. That same evening Scharnhorst and Gneisenau came across the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious, escorted by the destroyers Acasta and Ardent. All three British vessels were sunk. The War Diary of Scharnhorst’s commander describes the battle with HMS Glorious in the following terms (presented here in extracts): 1646hrs:

Reported to Fleet: On bearing 60° smoke in sight. First reported from

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foretop by Midshipman Goos. To Fleet: Beneath reported smoke trail battle mast and smoke visible. Approximate range 40km. Wind WNW 4, sea state 2, very good visibility. Course 330°, speed 19kt. From Fleet: Steam up for highest speed. From Fleet: Alarm! Sound ‘Clear ship for battle’. Steering 30°. Speed 24kt. Radar switched on as ranging aid for gunnery. Foretop reported: Thick funnel and mast with battle centre made out, probably also flight deck. Turned to steer 70°. Senior Gunnery Officer reported: Left of funnel tall thin derricks projecting outwards. Indicates aircraft carrier Ark Royal. Right of battle mast the island, then the flight deck. To the right of target two more masts seen. We are looking at an aircraft carrier with two destroyers one north and one south. (These ships were HMS Glorious with the destroyers Acasta and Ardent.) Turned to steer 150°. Target now to port. Speed 26kt. Steering 160°. Secondary armament will take destroyer north (Ardent), main armament aircraft carrier. Speed 29kt. Destroyer turning away. Secondary armament permission to fire at destroyer. Opening range 14.5km, bearing for guns 120° by bearing gauge, aircraft carrier laying smoke screen. From Fleet: Open fire at the aircraft carrier. Main armament opened fire at aircraft carrier at range 26km (by rangefinder). Lateral accuracy good, on target with third salvo. Secondary armament stopped, interfering with main armament. Fleet informed. Battle signal ‘P’ turn to steer 170°. Destroyer laying smoke screen. Speed 29kt. Speed 30kt. Gneisenau now engaging destroyer. Hit observed on aircraft carrier. Destroyer south has opened fire. Secondary armament permission again to fire at destroyer north. Destroyer is skilfully avoiding secondary fire and making aim very difficult. Destroyer north turning towards. Destroyer south laying smoke screen in front of aircraft carrier. Destroyer north disappearing occasionally from sight behind own smoke screen but continues firing at us from inside the smoke and is being most skilfully handled. From Fleet: Deploy shipboard aircraft according to commander ’s judgement. Personally I do not see likelihood of this, however. From Fleet: Gneisenau will take station ahead of Scharnhorst. Gneisenau steaming on our starboard side. Hydrophone report: Bearing 330° torpedo. Hard to port. Ship turned

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Ship returned to previous course. Destroyer north has dropped smoke buoy, which has effectively reinforced his intention to disguise his movements. Destroyer south shrouding aircraft carrier with smoke. The black smoke-making apparatus of the British destroyers is exceptionally effective. Destroyer north temporarily disappeared behind his thick smoke screen after apparently having made torpedo attack. Hydrophones report: Torpedo to port. Short turn to port to avoid. Gneisenau arriving to starboard. Destroyer south shooting but his shells falling very short. Aircraft carrier on fire and listing heavily to starboard. Steering 170°, old course. From Fleet: Battle course 130. This course brings the aircraft carrier and destroyer south very fine on the starboard bow. Hydrophones report: Torpedo on bearing 110°. Aircraft carrier temporarily hidden behind smoke screen. Observed thick black clouds of smoke with more smoke developing. Main armament ceased fire as cannot see target. Gneisenau still firing. Chief Engineer reports an engine room out of service. Destroyer north emerging from smoke screen. Secondary guns engaging him. Range reduced, now torpedo danger greater. To foretop: Look out for torpedo tracks to port. From Fleet: Do not waste ammunition. Centre engine 27kt. Report from engine room control position: Boiler 1.1 out, probably split tube. Hit on destroyer north, now proceeding low speed with heavy list. Destroyer has fired three torpedoes. Hydrophone report: Torpedo bearing 330°. Course plotted from ship, turned 20° to port. Radio signal from Fleet to Group West: Enemy aircraft carrier grid square 2160 steering SE at very high speed. Returned to old course. Hydrophone report: Torpedo bearing 320°. Flak gunnery officer requesting permission to open fire at destroyer south, which I give. Another hit on destroyer north. Heavy flak opens fire, shooting with contact fuse. To secondary armament: Heavy flak also firing. To flak gunnery officer: Keep a sharp look-out for torpedo tracks. Aircraft carrier in sight again. Foretop reports: Torpedo track to port. Turned 20° to port. On enquiry foretop reports torpedo passing ahead. Returned to old course. From Fleet: Do not waste ammunition. Order to heavy flak: Cease fire as in my opinion not sufficiently effective. Aircraft carrier burning fiercely astern. Main armament resumed firing at aircraft carrier. List on destroyer

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north increasing markedly. Reported to Fleet: Engine trouble. Cannot maintain speed. Steering 150°. On enquiry reported to Fleet: Scharnhorst capable 28.5kt. Destroyer ’s mast knocked down. List increasing. Destroyer capsizing. Secondary armament cease fire. (This was HMS Ardent.) Hydrophone report: Torpedo bearing 10°, course plotted. Hydrophone report: Torpedo passed ahead. Order to secondary armament: Destroyer bearing 0°. Concentrate on that target. Aircraft carrier burning more fiercely. From Fleet Commander: My congratulations to commander and crew on sinking the destroyer. Secondary armament opened fire on destroyer south without permission, range is too great. Order to secondary armament: Cease firing. From Fleet Commander: I will not tolerate any more waste of ammunition. Destroyer south making smoke and firing. Tactically this one is being handled very skilfully as well. His shells are falling 50m ahead. Aircraft carrier in sight again. Destroyer seems to be making for us. Secondary armament given permission to fire and opens fire. Steering 170°. 20° to starboard; intention is to keep destroyer directly ahead. From foretop: Destroyer has fired four torpedoes. Destroyer crossing bow to port making thick smoke to screen aircraft carrier, zigzagging and making shooting difficult for secondary armament. Steering 150°. Returned to course ordered. Ultra short-wave set unserviceable. Severe tremor astern, apparently torpedo hit. Main guns ceased fire. Radar unserviceable. Speed falling. Veering 90° to starboard on 240°. Intention to close up to Gneisenau. Secondary armament permission to fire at destroyer. By lamp to Fleet: Torpedo hit astern (sent at 1849hrs). Turned to port to steer 190°. Report from Gunnery: Evacuating ‘C’ turret. Heavy explosion and flooding, thick smoke belching out. Report from command centre: Torpedo hit apparently at level ‘C’ turret. Magazines being flooded. Report from engine room: Starboard engine out. Speed indicator still shows 26kt. Steering 260°. ‘C’ turret magazine flooded. List to starboard (increasing steadily). Chief Engineer reports: Checking engine room. Fore-top reports: Torpedo track could not be seen. Engine room reports: Knocking noises in HP bearing starboard

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engine. Control reports: Hit in compartments III and IV. Secondary armament silent. Ultra short-wave link resumed. Destroyer laying smoke screen again. Reported to Fleet: Torpedo hit starboard in compartments III and IV, ‘C’ turret unserviceable. Steering 180°. Control reports: ‘C’ turret magazine being pumped out. Foretop reports: Destroyer out of torpedo range. From Fleet: What speed can you maintain? Destroyer in sight again. Secondary armament given renewed permission to fire and resume firing. From Fleet: Battle signal Z-Nil. Formation in line astern of Gneisenau. Steering 160°. First Officer reported: Torpedo hit will not interfere with running of ship. Steering 150°. From Fleet: Confirm that Scharnhorst can maintain 28kt! Chief Engineer reports: T1 and T2 clear, T3 knocking noises. To Fleet: Top speed 27.5kt. Revolutions centre engine dropping fast. Centre engine stopped. Reported to Fleet: Centre engine out of service. Report from engine room: Apparently major inrush water in T1. One propeller knocking very heavily. Destroyer on fire astern. Secondary armament ordered to cease fire (to save ammunition). Have lost sight of aircraft carrier. Speed indicator shows 25kt. From engine room: Knocking noise from propellers louder. Destroyer still firing his guns. Secondary armament therefore given fresh permission to fire at destroyer. Hit on right barrel ‘B’ turret. Report from engine room: Will have to reduce speed T3 as knocking noise getting worse. Presume starboard screw knocking. T1 fire out. From Fleet: Cease fire. Reported to Fleet: Centre engine out of service due flooding. Starboard engine has to reduce speed due to knocking. To all centres: Pause in battle. Ultra short-wave order: Steer 70°, speed 24kt. First Officer reports: Starboard propeller heavy knocking. Aft platform deck starboard side 1m under water. Pumping under way. Fuel oil being transferred to compensate for list. Speed indicator reading 21.5kt. To all centres: Battle is over. Use all means to effect repairs to damage. Destroyer is astern burning and unable to manoeuvre. No danger from torpedoes. (This was HMS Acasta). Helm put to ‘peacetime helm position’ as result of switching error. Ship temporarily not answering helm and sheering to port. On enquiry reported to Fleet: Scharnhorst not in difficulties as regards steering. Situation still being checked. On enquiry reported to Fleet: Speed 24kt can be maintained for time being.

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‘B’ turret reports: Light hit on right barrel. No effect on gun readiness. Radio Technical Officer reports: No defects. Since commencement of battle poor reception on all frequencies. Gunnery reports: Water coming into shell room Starboard IV 15cm turret. From Fleet: Order war sailing state 1, war sailing speed stage 27kt. Intend speed 24kt. Later intentions dependent on condition Scharnhorst. First Officer reports: Pumping T1 successful. Water level falling. List has been reduced by transfer of oil. On enquiry reported expenditure of ammunition to Fleet: Heavy guns about 210 rounds (28cm), secondary guns about 850 rounds (15cm), heavy flak 136 rounds (10.5cm). Total therefore 1,196 rounds. Steering 160°, speed 24kt. Starboard IV 15cm turret now clear. Magazine still flooded. On enquiry reported to Fleet: Aircraft on catapult is not clear. Am checking condition of aircraft in hangar. Starboard engine stopping, being uncoupled as noise is getting worse. Reported to Fleet. From Fleet: Pay special attention to smoke suppression while steaming. Engine trouble because of breakdown in plant room. On enquiry from Fleet, estimate maximum speed 20kt. Starboard and centre engines out of service. Flag Signal: Speed 20kt. Following submission of provisional pumping calculations the starboard side is open to the sea at compartments IV and V. The following are fully flooded: compartment II two store rooms in lower platform deck; compartment III magazines for 28cm guns, starboard fuel oil bunker and trim tanks, shaft tunnel, ‘tween deck (partially); compartment V bottom, shaft tunnel, one heating oil bunker; in the ‘tween deck battle dressing station; compartment VI desalination room 1.1. Flooding in turbine room 1 has been pumped out. Total water under decks 250m3. Stern draught 11.63m, forward 8.69m. List 1° starboard. Following report made to Fleet: Condition of ship, flooding through shaft tunnel starboard and other damage in compartments III and IV More flooding Tl. Is being stemmed. Engine plant T1 and T3 unserviceable. T2 fully clear. Guns: ‘C’ turret and Starboard IV turret unserviceable. Remaining main and secondary armament at full readiness. Flak clear. Fire control heavy flak limited. Two aircraft in hangar clear. One light shell hit on right barrel ‘B’ turret. No impairment. Personnel losses: 48 dead and 3 wounded. From Fleet: Maintain course and speed. Gneisenau closing up. Gneisenau turned and passed Scharnhorst astern to take up station on starboard side. Fleet ordered: 1. Provide unambiguous report about condition of

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engine room. 2. Report reasons for failure of starboard and centre engines. 3. Question: Is port engine definitely clear? 4. Can we expect improvement in state of engine room by appropriate measures and when?

The sinking of HM Ships Glorious, Acasta and Ardent, 8 June 1940

The commander replied directly to the Chief of Staff by ultra short-wave radio. First, in response to the Fleet enquiry of 1957hrs, that the torpedo hit had occurred at 1838hrs. Amongst other matters the commander explained that attempts were being made to return the centre engine to service. The turbine room and a large part of the auxiliary machinery were still under up to a metre of water. It was assumed that the main turbine was open to the sea as the water in the room was mixed with fuel oil. There was little prospect of getting the engine serviceable. Water was being pumped and the level had fallen below the floor plating. At one stage the centre cruise turbine had been completely submerged and the IP turbine partially submerged. The thrust bearing and main coupling of the starboard turbine were damaged and the shaft was knocking with some force. This was having a severe effect on the bearing and coupling. The port side engine was fully clear and had not suffered seawater or battle damage. 8 June:

Flag signal from Fleet Commander: With reverence and gratitude I salute our fallen comrades of the battleship Scharnhorst. The defeat

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administered to the British in the Polar Sea today has avenged our brave destroyers at Narvik. Ultra short-wave conversation Fleet Engineer with Chief Engineer Scharnhorst: Fleet Commander has ordered Chief Engineer to inform Commander:

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1. The restoration of the engine plant is the priority. 2. Accepting the level of risk attached thereto the starboard shaft will be linked in and make revolutions. An increase in speed of several knots is required for a period of about ten hours. The safety measures reported by the commander will be dispensed with. 3. The centre engine will be got clear with all means available. 4. It is expected that no difficulties should arise when linking up, but, if they do, speed must be reduced. 5. The Fleet Commander reserves the right to avoid putting into port if possible. Reported to Fleet: Torpedo fragment found, torpedo hit proven. Odd that the torpedo hit us on the starboard side when the destroyer stood to port. Question: Perhaps submarine? Provisional pumping estimates reported to Fleet: Water under decks compartments II, III, IV, V and VI about 2,500m3 cannot be pumped out. Midships immersion 51cm, difference in trim, stern-heavy about 3m. List settled at 1° after pumping oil. Received from Group West FT 2220: Assume return both battleships together. Voyage through Kattegat envisaged. Report to be made if draught will not permit passage of Belt. I consider depths in Belt are always sufficient. Reported to Fleet: Starboard turbine started up again. On account of hammer-type blows and strong hull vibrations which set in at 90 revolutions had to be disengaged again. No increase in speed achieved. Steering 160°, speed 20kt. Reported to Fleet: 3,376m3 bunkers. Reported to Fleet: Shortly after de-coupling the starboard shaft the heavy blows stopped. Shaft has seized. Return to service no longer possible. Steering 150°. On enquiry from Fleet, reported stern draught 11.63m. Received FT from Admiral Norway1 that long-range reconnaissance from Trondheim flown from 2100hrs on 8.6.40 and bomber groups ready. Received orders to fly off shipboard aircraft to Trondheim at 0130hrs. Further to follow. Fleet advises: Operational situation at present considered very favourable. Astonishingly, so far shipboard B-Dienst2 reports no activity British radio traffic. Until now no mention own battleships by

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Aircraft in sight on bearing 180°. Reported to Fleet: Aircraft alarm! On enquiry reported that aircraft sighted was a land machine. Probably two engines and retractable undercarriage. Either Bristol Blenheim or Vickers Wellington. As the aircraft was more than 17km away it is possible that the battleships were not noticed against the bright eastern sky. However, we must bear in mind that we may have been reported. Received signals FT 2303 and 2358 from Group West with air reconnaissance report. Fighter cover and security of approach ordered for return of battleships, also rendezvous with escort 5th TorpedoBoat Flotilla off Stavanger planned. Shipboard aircraft given flight order. Navigator will hand Fleet Commander ’s report personally to Admiral Norway in Trondheim. Ordered: Aircraft to fly off soonest possible. Shipboard aircraft T3+BK flown off.3 Order received: Another aircraft to be made ready soonest. To be kept in reserve as fighter. Reported to Fleet: Drifting mine to starboard. On bearing 113° three aircraft in sight, soon identified as own He 115s. Exchanged recognition signals. Received FT 0210hrs from Group West: From this it appears that Norwegian government and king have fled. War Minister negotiating with Group XXI for cessation of hostilities. Therefore Group intends if morning reconnaissance favourable Gneisenau will detach at midday to recommence attacks on British and French withdrawal transports. Reported to Fleet: Aircraft T3+BH on catapult clear for operational use as fighter. Very good visibility, occasional showers, wind NNE 4, sea state 3, steering 150°, speed lOkt. Received FT from Group West: Air reconnaissance flown off from Stavanger at 0300hrs observed the hospital ship reported by the battleships yesterday, one heavy cruiser, one large merchant vessel. All these ships on latitude Orkneys steering SW. Turn to steer 200°. Received FT from Admiral Norway: Destroyers waiting in grid square 5933 as requested as anti-submarine escort for battleships. On enquiry respecting draught reported to Fleet: Draught at the moment forward 9.34m, stern 10.9m, amidships 10.12m. Permanent list now 1° to port. About another 100m3 could be pumped out. Water under decks now 2,400 tonnes, not pumpable. 130m3 trim flooding to port. Other trimming by redistribution oil. Reported to Fleet: Ammunition expended heavy armament (28cm) 160 AP, 45 tail-fused, 7 nose-fused. Gneisenau turned away to port, raised submarine alarm. Subsequently

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reported probably false alarm. Received FT 0436hrs from Admiral Norway: Shipboard aircraft Scharnhorst landed in Trondheim. Report from Fleet Commander handed to Admiral Norway. Signal delayed due to coding error. Received FT from Admiral Norway: From 0800hrs close air cover in position. Reported to Fleet: Bunkers 2,672m3 fuel oil. Standing towards Frohavet. Changed course to 89°, order of Group West that battleships are to put in at Trondheim (FT 0822/95). He 111 sighted, Recognition signals exchanged. Three destroyers in sight on port bow. Received order to fly off shipboard aircraft for close escort and antisubmarine protection. Group in line abeam, destroyers forming antisubmarine escort. Steering 115°. In line abeam, destroyers providing anti-submarine escort. Bow protection gear extended. Speed 20kt. Close escort by He 115 and ship’s aircraft. Order: Ship’s aircraft to engage in anti-submarine patrol. From Gneisenau: Increase distance off to 1.2km. To Fleet: Require change of course 40° starboard to fly off ship’s aircraft. To Fleet: Suggest immediate change of heading 40° to fly off aircraft. Will fly off aircraft next time we change course. Steering 146° running through Frohavet. Order: Fly off aircraft. Shipboard aircraft T3+BH flown off. Halten light tower abeam. Steering 208°. Two Me 109s on starboard beam will remain with Group as fighter escort. Order received from Fleet: Until entering Kraagvaag Fjord war sailing state 1, after that 3. Bearing 90° own He 111 in sight. Exchanged recognition signals. Foretop reports periscope at 120°. To Fleet and Karl Galster: Foretop reports periscope of submarine at 120°; identified shortly afterwards as stake on rock awash. Foretop reports two aircraft at high altitude on port beam. To Fleet: Two twin-engine aircraft approaching from port beam, to their right two more of the same type. Aircraft alarm! Shortly afterwards aircraft fire off recognition signals. Aircraft alarm cancelled. Steering 165°. On enquiry reported to Fleet: We have dead two NCOs and 46 other rates. Lightly wounded 3, seriously wounded nil. Ordered by flags: Form line astern at 1km. Kraagvaak Fjord. Manoeuvred into wake of Gneisenau. War sailing state 3 ordered. Surface target gunnery crews stood down.

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Gneisenau commanding Group during run-in. Entered Trondheim in wake of Gneisenau. FT 1113 from Group West, intend Scharnhorst return Germany escorted by torpedo-boats Greif and Kondor as soon as two engines clear and operational situation permits. CO 5th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla arriving Trondheim morning 10 June. For stay at Trondheim Fleet ordered: 1. Radio silence. Essential signals for homeland to be transmitted by Naval Signals Officer Trondheim. 2. Ammunition re-supply Scharnhorst from remaining stocks ships, then destroyers, then supply ship Alstertor as far as possible. 3. Refuelling Scharnhorst will not be carried out. Ship’s aircraft T3+BH reports emergency landing in Orkedals Fjord through shortage of fuel. Requires assistance. From Fleet: Ships and destroyers at six hours’ notice; from 10 June 0000hrs three hours’ notice. Information from Fleet: Re aircraft emergency landing, Trondheim airfield will deal. Fleet allocates Trondheim anchorages. Anchored at Trondheim. Anchorage east of Munkholmen. At three hours’ notice with port shaft. After anchoring shipboard conference with Naval Commander Trondheim and Base Senior Officer Huascaran about possible assistance to repair centre engine and seal off external damage.

The Group returned to Trondheim on 9 June and divers ascertained the extent of the damage. The gash torn open by the torpedo hit was 12m by 4m. Emergency repairs were carried out by the repair ship Huascaran and the salvage ship Parat, the damage being temporarily patched over. Ammunition was replenished from the supply ship Alstertor. An air raid on 13 June caused no further damage but later an unexploded bomb was discovered in the hull. The Commander-in-Chief visited the ship on 15 June. The starboard shaft was immobilised after knocking during engine trials on 18 June. Scharnhorst left Trondheim Fjord on 20 June and headed for Kiel escorted by boats of the 1st Minesweeping Flotilla, the destroyers Hans Lody, Hermann Schoemann and Erich Steinbrinck and the torpedo-boats Greif and Kondor. At midday on the 21 st the torpedo-boats Falke and Jaguar were also attached. Towards 1600hrs six British torpedo aircraft attacked off Utsyvire, one of these being shot down. Thirty minutes later six aircraft bombed unsuccessfully from high altitude. Scharnhorst expended 900 rounds of 10.5cm, 1,200 rounds of 3.7cm and 2,400 rounds of 2cm ammunition. On the evening of 21 June the group put into Skudenes Fjord near Stavanger, moving round to an anchorage in Dusavik Bay at 0400hrs the next morning. They weighed anchor ninety minutes later and all units reached the Baltic safely on the 23rd. At 1730hrs the group arrived at the German end of the Great Belt and Scharnhorst made fast to Kiel buoy A12 at 2226hrs. The battleship entered drydock ‘C’on the afternoon of 24 June. That night the bodies of the dead crewmen were removed from the flooded stern rooms. The funerals were held on the 27th. The work to restore the ship to battleworthiness lasted into the late autumn and was followed by trials and crew training. On 28 December 1940, in company with Gneisenau, an attempt was made to break out into the Atlantic for commerce-raiding but storm damage forced the postponement of the enterprise and a return to Germany. The two units retired to the eastern Baltic and Scharnhorst

remained at Gotenhafen until 19th January 1941.

1941 On 22 January Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailed from Kiel on a second attempt to embark on the Atlantic anti-convoy operation codenamed ‘Berlin’. They headed north and hugged the limits of the ice-fields, refuelling from the tanker Adria before availing themselves of favourable poor weather for the break-out through the Denmark Strait on 4 February. Immediately after arriving in the Atlantic, both battleships took aboard a total of 3,300m3 of fuel from Adria. On 5 February Scharnhorst shipped about 1,380m3 more from Schlettstadt, on 14/15 February about 2,315m3 from Esso Hamburg and on 27t February another 3,582m3 from Friedrich Breme. The weather was typical for a North Atlantic winter and the ships experienced their usual wetness in heavy seas. The main armament was regularly out of commission, and the secondary armament, less well protected against the elements, fared especially poorly. Several convoys were sighted, escorted by heavy units such as the battleships HMS Ramillies and Malaya, and in accordance with orders battle was refused by the use of superior speed. Meetings were effected twice with U 124 and U 105. After a final replenishment from Friedrich Breme, the ships put into Brest on 22 March, Scharnhorst having sunk eight merchant vessels totalling 49,300brt. Brest was favourably located for air attack from Britain and the battleships were now exposed to a continual onslaught from bombers and torpedo aircraft. The first two raids, on the nights of 30 March and 3 April, passed off without mishap, but Gneisenau was torpedoed from the air on 6 April. Offensive mining operations were mounted with a view to blockading the seaward approaches to Brest. Over the succeeding weeks Scharnhorst’s machinery was overhauled, engine trials being run in July. Because of the continual air raids, it was found prudent to quarter ashore such watches as could be spared, initially by division in a hotel at Roscoff and later in barracks at Landerau, La Roche. In order to reduce the concentration of heavy units in one port—the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen had arrived there on 1 June—Scharnhorst moved down the coast to La Pallice on 23 July, but this did not pass unnoticed and an attack was pressed home the following day by twelve Halifax bombers. Two machines fell victim to flak or fighters and the other ten all returned home damaged. The bombs were dropped in two runs. Several near-misses fell in the sea between the ship’s side and the anti-torpedo nets. Five hits were obtained, all on the starboard side. The first and fourth bombs penetrated the armoured upper deck, battery and ’tween deck and exploded against the armour deck. The second, third and fifth bombs pierced all decks and passed through the plating of the double bottom without exploding. There was some flooding as a result. The ship listed 8°, but this was reduced to 2° by compensatory flooding. The attack proved that La Pallice was no safer than Brest, and as in any case there was no suitable dockyard facility there Scharnhorst returned to Brest for drydocking in August and remained at the port until early 1942. Whilst the bomb damage was being repaired, the opportunity was taken during the next few months to give the ship a refit. Banks of torpedo tubes were installed and 2cm flak quadruples set up on the 15cm turret roofs. The constant danger of air attack coupled with the abandonment of plans for a new Atlantic sortie following the sinking of Bismarck convinced the Naval Staff that the heavy units had to be evacuated from Brest for deployment elsewhere. Although numerous plans were drawn up, there were really only two possibilities: a break-out back to German waters by the north-about route, or one through the Strait of Dover. Both were fraught with danger: the former was likely to entail a meeting with a superior naval force, the Home Fleet, somewhere along the way, while the latter would mean running

the gauntlet of heavy coastal batteries, air attack and massed torpedo strikes by torpedo-boats and MTBs. However, a ‘Channel Dash’ would be made beneath a Luftwaffe ‘umbrella’ which at the time was still relatively strong.

1942 The final discussions for the planned break-out were held in Paris on 1 January and attended by General-admiral Saalwächter as Group Commander, Admiral Schniewind as Fleet Commander, Vizeadmiral Ciliax as C-in-C Battleships and the commanders of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen. The conclusions reached were then drafted as an operational order. The final decision was taken by Hitler on 12 January at Führer HQ Rastenburg when he gave the green light for Operation ‘Cerberus’, the break-out of the three heavy units from Brest. The first stretch to be covered was the 460nm (770km) from Brest to the Scheldt, the operational area of the BSW (Commander Minesweeping West, Kapitän zur See/Kommodore Friedrich Ruge). His command consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 12th Minesweeping Flotillas and had the responsibility of keeping the intended route swept. The initial work was taken in hand at once. During this continuous activity—the British were always laying fresh mine barriers—the destroyer Bruno Heinemann was mined and sunk off Calais on 25 January. In the weeks before ‘X’-day, fourteen newly laid barrages were found and swept west of Calais. The British undoubtedly suspected that something was afoot. They had considered the possibility of one or more of the German heavy units making a run for it up-Channel, but on the whole had discounted the idea. Their spies in France had been unable to assist them. There was little else to be done but shut down the Brest approaches and presumed outward channels by mining. The remaining 240nm from the Scheldt to the Elbe came under the BSN (Commander Minesweeping North, Konteradmiral Wolfram) who had at his disposal the 1st and 5th Minesweeping Flotillas (which alternated between BSW and BSN), and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th R-Boat Flotillas. Two Luftflotten were involved and were responsible for providing air cover—Luftflotte 3 (Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle) and Luftflotte Reich (General der Flieger Weise). Fighter groups came under the command of Oberst Galland. The heavy units would be directly escorted by six destroyers (originally seven including Bruno Heinemann), namely Richard Beitzen, Paul Jacobi, Hermann Schoemann, Friedrich Ihn, Z 25 and Z 29. Nine torpedo-boats of the 2nd and 3rd Flotillas (T 2,T 4,T 5,T 11, T 12, T 13, T 15, T 16 and T 17) would be joined later by Kondor, Falke, Seeadler, Iltis and Jaguar of the 5th Flotilla plus ten E-boats of the 2nd, 4th and 6th Flotillas. Notice for steam was given for 2030hrs on 11 February. In command of the squadron was Vizeadmiral Ciliax embarked aboard Scharnhorst. Sailing was delayed by a providential air raid warning. When the ships eventually weighed anchor at 2245hrs their departure was unnoticed. As luck would have it, the Royal Navy submarine stationed off the harbour entrance had chosen that hour to retire offshore to recharge her batteries. The British showed no awareness of the passing of the German armada until it was beyond Calais, when they launched attacks using destroyers, MTBs, bombers and torpedo aircraft. By then the German units had already reached the North Sea and had the benefit of an outstanding air defence. Towards 1530hrs, off Flushing, Scharnhorst was mined in compartment XVI. Fires were extinguished in a number of boilers. The gunnery control instrumentation of the aft control centre was knocked out, as was the gunlaying equipment for all three main turrets, although all weapons were again operational within a few minutes. As a precaution Vizeadmiral Ciliax transferred to the destroyer Z 29, but Scharnhorst was soon under way and gradually built up speed sufficiently to enable her to re-join the squadron. At 2235hrs she was again mined and lay adrift for 45 minutes: she

resumed on her two remaining serviceable shafts, the centre providing 16kt, the port shaft 14kt. The foretop rangefinder was also now unserviceable. During the action the British carried out 110 attacks using 600 aircraft, of which 42 were shot down; 500 tonnes of bombs were aimed at the squadron. Scharnhorst expended 400 × 10.5cm, 900 × 3.7cm and 6,000 × 2cm shells. At 1230hrs on 13 February Scharnhorst entered the Wilhelmshaven locks by way of No III entrance and made fast alongside the Fliegerdeich (Seydlitz Bridge), proceeding to the 40,000-tonne floating drydock the following day. A survey of the hull revealed that the damage inflicted by the two mines was more extensive than first thought. The outer and double bottom required re-plating over two areas 90m and 35m in length. A number of gun turrets had been dislodged from their roller beds. The foundations of the main engines and some of the auxiliary plant was in a sufficiently serious condition to warrant unshipping for a complete overhaul, but most of these recommendations were brushed aside for future consideration. For repairs and a restoration to battleworthiness Scharnhorst transferred to Kiel on 14 February after the C-in-C, Grossadmiral Raeder, and the Fleet Commander, Admiral Schniewind, had visited the ship at Wilhelmshaven. She escaped damage during the air raid on Kiel on 26 February which put paid to Gneisenau drydocked nearby. Unsatisfactory steaming trials were run in July 1942 and Scharnhorst then moved eastwards to Gotenhafen for working up. In November she drydocked once more, this being followed by more trials combined with intensive crew training. At the same time an emergency rudder system was experimented with in light of the experience of Prinz Eugen, which had been torpedoed by HMS Trident on 23 February 1942 with the loss of her stern. She had managed to make Trondheim, unaided where the emergency rudder had been fitted for the return to Kiel. On 22 December 1942 there occurred aboard Scharnhorst a breakdown in the machinery, which, it had been decided, should be left to run unrepaired. This had been long feared by the technical personnel, and thus the failure to comply with the recommendations of the engineering specialists bore bitter fruit. Meanwhile, together with other heavy units of the Fleet, Scharnhorst was ordered to Norway, and the crippled ship prepared for the voyage on her two serviceable shafts.

1943 A squadron consisting of Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and the destroyers Friedrich Ihn, Paul Jacobi and Z 24 sailed for Norway on 10 January under the command of Admiral Schniewind but returned to Gotenhafen on the 11th following warnings of air attack. On 23 January Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen and the destroyers Z 39 and Erich Steinbrinck attempted this voyage again under an operation code-named ‘Domino’ but this was also abandoned, the group returning to Gotenhafen on the 27th. During a refuelling of the destroyers by Scharnhorst at sea, the oil hose burst following an attempt to pump into a full bunker and the precious fuel oil poured out over Scharnhorst’s, upper deck. As a result of the débâcle in the Barents Sea on New Year ’s Eve 1942, when the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and ‘pocket battleship’ Lützow had been driven off from a convoy by the escorts, Hitler had ordered the decommissioning of all heavy ships. On 31 January Admiral Dönitz was promoted to Grossadmiral and C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine, and he was eventually successful in having the order partially rescinded so as to either cancel or delay the decommissioning. Scharnhorst was therefore spared this ignominious end to her career. On 6 March Operation ‘Paderborn’ bore fruit when Scharnhorst and the destroyers Z 28, Erich Steinbrinck and Friedrich Ihn set out for Norway and dropped anchor in Bogen Bay near Narvik on

the 9th, being joined there two days later by Lützow and the light cruiser Nürnberg. Once Tirpitz had also put into Bogen Bay from Trondheim, Nürnberg was released back to Germany. In the days and weeks that followed the ships exercised jointly, fuel permitting. On 22 March they anchored in Altafjord and in an inlet, Kaafjord. Scharnhorst was directed to an anchorage in Langfjord, another inlet. The units lay protected within anti-torpedo nets. On 8 April there was a serious internal explosion aboard Scharnhorst amongst a store of inflammable materials in compartment III above the armour deck on the starboard side. The accommodation deck where IX Division was quartered was situated immediately above it and seventeen crewmen were killed and 20 injured. The cause was never established, although sabotage during the dockyard lay-up at Gotenhafen was suspected. Following repairs, further joint exercises were held with Tirpitz and Lützow but these were sporadic affairs and fuel shortages limited the distances sailed. Meanwhile the floating flak battery Thetis had anchored in Kaafjord to provide additional anti-aircraft protection. Between 6 and 9 September Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and the destroyers Z 27, Z 29, Z 30, Z 31, Z 33, Erich Steinbrinck, Karl Galster, Hans Lody and Theodor Riedel mounted Operation ‘Eisberg’ against Allied bases on the island of Spitzbergen. Installations were destroyed or set ablaze by the fire of the German weapons and storm troops disembarked from the destroyers blew up the remainder. The units then returned to Altafjord. After British midget submarines (‘X-craft’) had succeeded in virtually immobilising Tirpitz at the end of September, Scharnhorst was the only German capital ship remaining in northern waters. However her time was fast approaching. A Murmansk-bound convoy of nineteen merchantmen reported by German air reconnaissance was confirmed on 22 December and the decision was made for a seaborne attack. On Christmas Eve notice was given for steam on Operation ‘Ostfront 1700’. The German battle group consisted of Scharnhorst as flagship and the destroyers Z 28, Z 29, Z 30, Z 33 and Z 34 of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla under the command of the C-in-C Destroyers, Konteradmiral Bey (representing the Battle Group Commander, Admiral Kummetz). Aboard Scharnhorst were 45 officers plus Tirpitz’s No 2 gunnery officer (plus five battle group Staff officers), 379 NCOs (plus fourteen NCOs of Staff) being 73 warrant officers and 320 petty officers in all, 1,438 other rates (plus fourteen other rates from Staff), five senior midshipmen, 34 officers in training and 33 reserve officers in training—a total of 1,968 officers and men. The German units put out at 1700hrs on Christmas Day 1943 and by midnight were well clear of the coast on a northerly bearing. The British wireless monitoring service had swiftly decrypted German ‘Enigma’ signals from the outset, enabling the Royal Navy to prepare immediate countermeasures. The British naval forces functioning as convoy escorts consisted of two battle groups, Force I and Force II, made up of the battleship Duke of York, the heavy cruiser Norfolk, the light cruisers Jamaica, Belfast and Sheffield and eight destroyers. Weather conditions were poor, with winds southerly gale force 8–9, sea state 6–7. The forecast for 26 December was for winds SW 6-8 with a heavy swell from the SW, overcast with rain, visibility 3–4 but occasionally 10nm. Blizzards were expected for the Barents Sea. In view of the weather forecast, Admiral Bey decided to release his destroyers at the earliest opportunity.

Scharnhorst’s final cruise, 25–26 December 1943

The objective of the German force was convoy JW 55A,1 but, unknown to the Germans, another convoy, RA 55A, was sailing an opposite course and this was the reason why the British naval force at sea was so strong. At 0339hrs on 26 December, the British C-in-C was notified that Scharnhorst had sailed. At this time the German group was approximately 115nm south-east of Bear Island; Force I was 137nm eastsouth-east of Bear Island and Force II approximately 270nm west of North Cape. Scharnhorst was sighted on two occasions by cruisers of Force I and engaged briefly. She was hit twice: an 8in shell penetrated the battery deck at compartment IX but failed to explode, the other destroyed the foretop radar equipment.

Towards 1300hrs Scharnhorst came round to the south and set course for the Norwegian coast. Force I remained in contact with Scharnhorst while Force II steered to intercept. At 1617hrs Duke of York obtained a radar contact with her Type 284 gunnery control radar at 42km and again at 1632hrs when the range had shortened to 28 km. At 1640hrs the British battleship ordered the cruiser Belfast to fire starshell to illuminate the target and four minutes later turned to starboard to bring her broadside to bear. After firing her own starshell at 1648hrs, Duke of York opened fire with her main armament (10 ×l4in) at a range of 11km, straddling her opponent with the first salvo, a hit putting ‘A’ turret out of action. At 1652hrs the cruiser Jamaica opened fire at 12km, straddling Scharnhorst with her third salvo, one hit being observed. The German ship was taken completely by surprise, for without her radar she was blind. She turned away to the north, where at about 1657hrs she ran into Force I and the combined fire of Norfolk and Belfast, then altered course again at 1708hrs and headed east at her fastest speed. The British units now sought to cripple the enemy since on that bearing she could outrun them to safety. At 1713hrs the British destroyers were ordered to make a torpedo attack but found it difficult to manoeuvre in the heavy seas. By 1742hrs Scharnhorst had increased the distance to her pursuers to 16.5km, at which range only the heavy guns of Duke of York could reach her. She was still being hit: ‘B’ turret had to be evacuated permanently when a hit on the ventilation system meant that poisonous fumes could no longer be extracted, and a fatal hit which penetrated No 1 boiler room reduced her speed for a period to 10kt, although this was soon increased to 20kt. On account of the long ranges involved, Scharnhorst ceased fire at 1820hrs and Duke of York did likewise four minutes later. The loss of speed caused by the hit in the boiler room enabled the destroyers to overtake the German ship and place themselves off her bow for the torpedo attack. Between 1840hrs and 1900hrs two attacks ensued and 28 torpedoes were fired, of which four hit, one on either bow, the others astern to port and amidships on the starboard side. The lion was cornered. The British units closed in and at 1905hrs Duke of York and Jamaica resumed fire at 9.5km. Scharnhorst now had only ‘C’ turret intact and could make at best 10kt. At 1916hrs ‘C’ turret dropped out, leaving a few of the secondary guns to offer the final resistance. Duke of York ceased fire at 1930hrs to allow the coup de grâce to be administered by torpedo: Jamaica obtained two hits, the destroyers Musketeer and Virago three each. At 1945hrs the magazines exploded and, having fought to the last shell, Scharnhorst sank beneath the icy waters of the Polar Sea. Of the 1,968 officers and men aboard, only 36, all ratings, could be saved.

SHIP’S COMMAND STRUCTURE Commanders 1.39–9.39 9.39–3.42 3.42–10.42 10.42–12.43 First Officers 1.39–9.41 9.41–3.42 3.42–1.43 4.43–12.43

KptzS Otto Ciliax KptzS Kurt Caesar Hoffmann KptzS Friedrich Hüffmeier KptzS Fritz Hintze KptzS Günther Schubert FKpt Hilmar Schroeter KptzS Helmuth Giessler FKpt Ernst Dominik

Navigation Officers 1.39–3.42 3.42–2.43 2.43–12.43 Senior Artillery Officers 1.39–4.41 4.41–1.43 4.43–12.43 Chief Engineers 1.39-7.40 7.40-3.42 4.42-10.43 10.43-12.43

FKpt Helmuth Giessler FKpt Achim Teubner KKpt Edgar Lanz FKpt Wolf Löwisch KKpt Ernst Dominik KKpt Walter Bredenbreuker FKpt (Ing) Erwin Liebhard KKpt (Ing) Walther Kretzschmar FKpt (Ing) Walter Kaupert KKpt (Ing) Otto König

MODIFICATIONS AND REFITS June 1939 December 1939 1940 1941

1942

Straight stem replaced by ‘Atlantic bow’, length overall increased. Anchor stowage modified (as per Gneisenau). Aircraft hangar enlarged and catapult fitted on roof. Mainmast abaft funnel replaced by new tripod mainmast 27m further aft. Raked funnel cap fitted. FuMO 22 installed on foretop. Degaussing gear installed, loop fitted along upper edge of belt armour. Aircraft catapult atop ‘C’ turret and attendant derrick discarded. Both bridge wings shortened by half. 2 × 53.3cm torpedo tube sets (2 × 3) shipped on upper deck one either side of hangar (tubes taken from light cruiser Nürnberg). FuMO 22 radar in foretop exchanged for FuMO 27. Second FuMO 27 installed in aft control centre. Admiral’s bridge closed in. Funnel platform enlarged to accommodate one 2cm quadruple flak. Platforms erected both sides of catapult foundation to take 2 × 2cm flak quadruples. Rangefinder removed from ‘A’ turret and openings welded over. Platforms erected atop 15cm turrets Port I and Starboard I for additional bi-axial Army-pattern 2cm quadruple flaks plus 2cm quadruple flak installed atop ‘B’ turret (all for ‘Channel Dash’).

Origin of the Name: Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst Scharnhorst was born on 12 November 1755 at Bordenau, Hanover, and died on 28 June 1813 in

Prague. Educated in the noted War College of Wilhelmstein, Steinhuder Meer, Scharnhorst was commissioned into the Hanoverian Army in 1776 and in 1801 applied for the rank of LieutenantColonel in the Prussian Army. By 1806 he was Chief of the Duke of Brunswick’s General Staff at the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt, and the following year held the same office under General L’Estocq at the battle of Preussisch-Eylau (then in East Prussia, now in Russia). In 1807 he was Minister at the War Department and Chairman of the Military Organisation. Here, in close collaboration with Gneisenau, he introduced many military reforms—abolition of the recruitment of foreign mercenaries, restrictions on exemptions from military service and limitations to the preferential appointment of the nobility in the army. In military training he introduced the concept of loose-order warfare in place of the battle square. Despite the pressures exerted by such reformers as Gneisenau, Götzen, Boyen, and Freiherr vom Stein, resistance by the king was such that Scharnhorst did not succeed in implementing general conscription until 1813. Scharnhorst’s major achievement was the ‘shrinkage system’ designed to circumvent the limit of 42,000 men for the standing army imposed by Napoleon on Prussia in the Paris Treaty of 1808. Recruits were conscripted for short periods for training purposes and then sent into reserve. This system increased the actual number of trained soldiers and officers without exceeding the 42,000 limit. In 1809 and 1811 he pressed for the entry of Prussia on the side of Austria and Russia in the struggle against Napoleon, but, as did Gneisenau, encountered the resistance of King Friedrich Wilhelm III. It was not until 1813 that he had a (clandestine) meeting with the Czar at Kalisch in Poland in order to discuss the principles of a common war aim.

While serving as Chief of Blücher ’s General Staff at the Battle of Grossgörschen on 2 May 1813, Scharnhorst received a wound to which he eventually succumbed in June 1813 at Prague, although whilst there—and despite his injuries—he negotiated with Schwarzenberg and Radetzky the admission of Austria to the Russo-Prussian Alliance. He was a great military and social reformer, yet the strategist Scharnhorst never had an army command. Instead he built up a new army for the purpose of freeing Prussia from Napoleon’s yoke. His visionary ideals—frustrated often enough by the king and reactionary generals—set the politically strategic course which his friend and pupil Gneisenau brought to fruition. In appreciation of this collaboration the Navy adopted the two names for the two battleships of the Scharnhorst class.

The earlier warship to bear the name: the armoured cruiser Scharnhorst. Built by Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, she was launched on 22 March 1906 and entered service on 24 October 1907. From 1909 she was the flagship of the East Asia Cruiser Squadron based at the German enclave of Tsingtau on the coast of mainland China. At the outbreak of war the squadron set off for home eastwards across the Pacific and in the Battle of Coronel on 1 November 1914 defeated a weaker British naval force sent to intercept. On 8 December 1914, near the Falkland Islands, four of the five cruisers of the squadron were sunk by a superior British force which included two battlecruisers. From Scharnhorst’s crew of 860 officers and men there were no survivors. [Professor Fritz Haber (Journal of Chemical Education, 11/1945, p. 528), states that ‘… in the fall of 1914 every expert [on the German side] recognised the necessity of ending the war in the spring of 1915’ on account of Germany’s nitrate shortage. Von Spee’s squadron was ordered by the German General Staff to capture the Falkland Islands as a coaling and reinforced naval base from where elements of the High Seas Fleet would operate to protect the proposed German nitrate convoy route from northern Chile. Before the battle, heavily armed storm troops were seen on the decks of the German ships. Describing this in his World in Crisis, Churchill admitted that he did not understand the reason for the invasion and a glance at the length of the convoy route on the map will show what a truly desperate idea it was. In May 1915 the German chemist Bosch announced the discovery of the synthetic nitrate process. See also Borkin, Crime and Punishment of IG Farben, 1978.—GB] The cruiser Scharnhorst displaced 12,985 tonnes. She was 144.6m overall and 21.6m in the beam and had a 8.37m draught. Her thickest armour plate was 150mm and the armament consisted of 8 × 21cm (8.2in) and 6 × 15cm quick-firing guns, both calibres L/40, 18 x 8.8cm L/35 quick-firing guns and 4 × 45cm torpedo tubes. As flagship her crew numbered 52 officers and 788 men. She was driven by three 3-cylinder triple-expansion engines developing 28,783hp. Steam was provided by eighteen marine water-tube boilers. The ship had three screws and could make 23.5kt. The great blanket of black smoke was the hallmark of the coal-fired boiler: Scharnhorst’s eighteen boilers were fired by 36 furnaces in five boiler rooms. The uptakes of two of these were trunked together so as to share one funnel.

3 October 1936: Hitler arrives with his entourage at the Kriegsmarine Yard, Wilhelmshaven, for the launch of the battleship Scharnhorst. Leading (left) is the senior shipyard manager, Vizeadmiral von Nordeck; on Hitler’s right is Generaladmiral Raeder, C-in-C of the Navy, to his left is Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg, Reich War Minister, and between Hitler and Blomberg, to the rear, is Generaloberst von Fritsch, C-in-C of the Army. The tower in the background is part of a factory producing precision optics, chronometers and ships’ compasses.

In the shadow of the awesome hull, the launching party and guests inspect a guard of honour. Notice the bilge keel and the two waterbrakes.

Hitler meets surviving members of Von Spee’s East Asia Cruiser Squadron.

The ‘baptismal pulpit’. One of the numerous stopping anchors hangs at the end of a long chain. Once the ship is afloat these will be dropped to arrest the progress of the hull. Notice the onlookers on the rooftops of the residential building (which is still standing today).

The launching ceremony completed, the ship’s name board has been swung into view and the armorial device unveiled. Note the huge waterbrake at the bow and, along the ship’s side, the long rectangular area where the belt armour will be fitted.

A view of the gigantic hull on the slip.

The ship begins to slide, her stern already touching the water.

The whole process of launching will take no more than a few minutes. Here the ship is almost afloat.

The launch is completed. The progress of the hull having been retarded by the stopping anchors, tugs are on hand to bring it under control. The stern tug has already taken Scharnhorst’s hawser, while at the bow the ship’s head is being turned. The hull will be towed out of the fitting-out basin into the main harbour by way of the access channel, turned, and then brought back stern-first and manoeuvred alongside the south quay starboard-to.

Scharnhorst fitting out in 1937. ‘A’ turret is in place, ‘B’ turret barbette is still covered over, and immediately to the rear of the latter is the shaft for the tower mast. Also visible, minus weapons, are ‘C’ turret and 15cm turrets Port I and Star board I. The wooden decking of the forecastle has been laid. The ship is moored at the south quay of the fitting-out basin. In the top right-hand corner are the torpedo-boat Jaguar (left) and two fleet escorts of the F 1–F 10 series.

Scharnhorst fitting out, seen from astern. Staging surrounds the funnel mantle and tower mast for further work. Slightly forward of two completed 15cm turrets are the foundations of the after command centre. Otherwise the upper deck is a confusion of cables, tooling and miscellaneous shipyard equipment. In the background, against the east quay, are the U-boat tender Saar (left) and the gunnery target ship Zähringen (right).

Having been completed to the preliminary trials stage, Scharnhorst is towed to the 40,000-tonne floating dock in the Zwischenhafen (Intermediate Harbour) and is seen here passing between the towers of the Kaiser Wilhelm road bridge, one of the landmarks of Wilhelmshaven. This 1938 photograph was taken from a destroyer; to the right is a Raubtier class torpedo-boat.

Scharnhorst’s commissioning took place on 7 January 1939. Here Kapitän zur See Ciliax inspects the ship’s company by divisions, accompanied by his First Officer (partially obscured) and ADC (wearing aiguilette). The Divisional Officer is nearest the front rank.

The forward turrets as seen from the forepeak.

To the strains of the Flaggenmarsch, the naval ensign is hoisted (the commander’s pennant will be set on the foretop mast) and Scharnhorst enters commission. Notice the anchor at the stern hawsehole and the national eagle and swastika emblem which adorned the counter of all heavy units. In the background is the artificial island with catering office and to the left, through the winter haze the outline of the Kaiser Wilhelm Bridge is visible.

Scharnhorst after commissioning alongside the quay of the fitting-out basin.

The new battleship Tirpitz was launched at the Kriegsmarine Yard, Wilhelmshaven, on 1 April 1939. Hitler attended with the usual large entourage and Scharnhorst, as largest battleship present, served as his flagship for the occasion, dressed overall and moored with numerous other ships and smaller craft at the Seydlitz Bridge in the main harbour. Later that day, aboard Scharnhorst, he promoted the C-in-C, Generaladmiral Raeder to Grossadmiral. A Naval Review had been arranged for the German leader in connection with the Tirpitz ceremony, and from the base yacht Ariadne (a large launch) he made his inspection of the units assembled in the harbour area. At the Seydlitz Bridge were Scharnhorst and the Panzerschiffe Admiral Graf Spee (Fleet Commander, Admiral Boehm) and Admiral Scheer, At the Gazelle Bridge (later Bonte Quay) were Deutschland (C-in-C Panzerschiffe, Admiral Marschall) and the light cruiser Nürnberg (C-in-C Scouting Forces, Vizeadmiral Densch). Also present were the destroyer Z1/ Leberecht Maass (Commander TorpedoBoats, Konteradmiral Lütjens); the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, comprising Z 3/Max Schultz, Z 2/Georg Thiele and Z 4/Richard Beitzen; the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of Z 5/Paul Jacobi, Z 6/Theodor Riedel, Z 7/Hermann Schoemann and the new Z 20/Karl Galster; the 5th and 6th Torpedo-Boat Flotillas; the 2nd R-Boat Flotilla; and a number of submarines of the 2nd and 3rd U-Boat Flotillas. In addition, the survey ship Meteor, the gunnery training ships Brummer and Delphin (ex M 108), the sail training ship Albert Leo Schlageter, the remote control ships Blitz (ex T 185, ex V 185) and Komet (ex T123, ex S 23), the target ship Hessen, the base tender Frauenlob (ex M 134), four auxiliary minesweepers and two D/F vessels were in attendance.

The hull of Tirpitz after launching, under tow to the Grosser Hafen (main harbour) for turning, passes between Scharnhorst (right) and Nürnberg (on opposite bank), both dressed overall. In the background is the chimney of the shipyard’s southern HQ; astern of Tirpitz is the Kaiser Wilhelm Bridge and, far right, a building of the old torpedo-boat yard.

This broadside view shows clearly the lines of the new battleship but also the low freeboard and the low-lying upper edge of the belt armour. On completion Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were virtually identical. At the time of the major bow refit other structural alterations were taken in hand and Scharnhorst was then identifiable by having her mainmast and hangar set much further aft: Gneisenau’s mainmast was immediately abaft the funnel and the hangar was of different design.

Scharnhorst in the Baltic measuring speed and fuel consumption. These were a part of the usual programme of trials, the resulting data being documented by the Chief Engineer. Notice the amount of water being shipped over the bow in relatively calm seas.

Scharnhorst at her moorings at Kiel.

At Kiel in April 1939: Scharnhorst from ahead, her anchors still lodged in the old side hawseholes. Gneisenau, with the new ‘Atlantic bow’, is abeam.

Close under the stem of Scharnhorst, lying to drum buoy A12. In Kieler Förde buoys carried an identification letter and running number. There were no mooring buoys at Wilhelmshaven, where ships made fast against the quays in positions allocated by letters and number (B = builder’s basin, H = harbour, etc.).

Scharnhorst leaving Kiel.

In the summer of 1939 Scharnhorst went into the 40,000-tonne floating drydock of the Westwerft for a refit, which included the replacement of the straight stem by an ‘Atlantic bow’. Here the fore-end is surrounded by scaffolding: the old bow has been removed.

A view of the port anchor cluse on the new bow. The refit is still proceeding, and the awnings suggest that parts of the upper deck are still open.

Scharnhorst in the late summer of 1939, following her refit. The view shows the extent of the modifications: ‘Atlantic bow’, mainmast stepped further aft, raked funnel cap and aircraft hangar. Two Arado 196 shipboard aircraft are perched on each of the catapults aft.

August 1939: in the foreground is Scharnhorst and behind her Gneisenau (left) and Admiral Graf Spee, only a few days before the latter embarked upon the South Atlantic commerce raiding sortie from which she would not return. Behind the three larger units are two Königsberg class light cruisers and a destroyer.

Kieler Förde anchorage, 23 October 1939: Scharnhorst’s company parades along the starboard rail in salute to U 47 (Kapitänleutnant Prien), returning after her success at Scapa Flow.

Admiral Boehm held the post of Fleet Commander from 1 November 1938 to 21 October 1939, when he was relieved by Admiral Marschall, shown here (left) boarding the superstructure deck of the fleet tender Gazelle that day. The photograph to the right shows the ceremonial departure of Admiral Boehm, who is passing between two lines of Fleet Staff officers formed as an honour guard. The Chief of Staff, Kapitän zur See Kummetz, hands him the Fleet Commander’s standard. Marschall remained in office only until the following June, when he resigned, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health but actually on account of irreconcilable differences over tactics and strategy with the C-in-C, Grossadmiral Raeder.

The fleet tender Gazelle, referred to as the ‘Stabsarche’ (‘Staff Ark’) in naval slang. This former Imperial Navy minesweeper performed the function until January 1939 under her original name M 135 Hela. She was renamed Gazelle when a new fleet tender was launched as Hela. Normally a section of the Fleet Staff, including the Fleet Commander, had its work rooms on board this tender; the other section worked ashore. When a fleet operation or activities such as large manoeuvres, a naval review or other high-level functions were in the offing, the Fleet Commander would transfer to the fleet flagship, as was the case with the first operational sorties undertaken by the battleships—the occupation of Norway and the Atlantic raiding operation.

Scharnhorst from another perspective in the salute to U 47 (right): aboard the battleship the ship’s company is paraded along the starboard rail, and the mooring booms for the ship’s boats have been extended. There is a propeller watch. A rope ladder hangs over the counter for crew access to the ship’s boats, while to starboard, aft, an accommodation ladder has been lowered.

A view of a Scharnhorst class battleship’s interior. This is the command centre located below the armour deck and inside the citadel. In action this is the battle station from where the First Officer (left) directs and coordinates damage control. At his side is the pump brigade officer, and behind them command-relay personnel for individual sections. The command centre also functions as an independent navigation centre: nearest the camera a coxswain (Obersteuermann = Warrant Officer Class II) plots the ship’s course and position.

The command centre in the engine room. Seated with the Engine Room War Diary before him is the engineering watch officer. Standing at the desk, an engineering warrant officer listens in at one of several telephone earpieces. The additional earpiece in his right hand is for use in the event of excessive engine room noise; the two command-relay ratings have both to the ears. The armband (rating in white fatigues) indicates that the wearer is the watch engineer’s runner. Notice (right) the array of telephones.

The steam plant with its arrangement of piping, valves and other appliances so incomprehensible to the layman. This is a turbine room. The steam pipes are thickly insulated against heat loss between boiler and turbine. This insulation also protects personnel against scalds and excessive heat radiation.

One of the three shaft tunnels. Depending on a ship’s size it was possible in some places to walk upright through them. The individual shafts and thrust bearings required constant monitoring and control, especially the quality of the lubricant. Here a test sample is drawn off for analysis.

One of the ship’s diesel-electric plants: seen here are two diesel motors with their array of levers, camshafts and control valves. In the background are the control panels. The exhaust piping overhead is also thickly clad with insulating material.

An electrical switching centre. Each handwheel directs supply to individual shipboard consumers.

In front of a boiler. Here one of the Saacke burners is being drawn. Notice the numerous handwheels and instruments for servicing and monitoring.

Cleaning ship: crewmen on board Scharnhorst at Wilhelmshaven. Notice the ropes laid out for scrubbing: this was done each time after they had been used, primarily to check for kinking.

One of the searchlights in use at sea as a signal lamp. The lever operates the shutters for Morse signals.

Scharnhorst alongside at Wilhelmshaven. In the background are the airfield buildings erected in 1937, since which time the Seydlitz Bridge quay had been known locally as Fliegerdeich (Airmen’s Dyke). In front of the camera on the quarterdeck is the ship’s band, the microphone suggesting an important musical occasion.

Scharnhorst alongside the quay at Wilhelmshaven. Aboard ship the normal routine of maintenance and general upkeep takes place. On the quayside a new intake receives preliminary instruction as to future duties. These depended on a rating’s career branch, which also decided his division, employment, watch allocation and accommodation. On a ship of the size of Scharnhorst virtually all career branches of the Kriegsmarine were represented. Until 1938 these were: I = Warrant Officer (Senior Boatswain)/Seaman Branch: Ia aboard ships (i.e. destroyers to battleships) Ib(T) aboard torpedo-boats and MTBs Ib(M) aboard minelayers and minesweepers Ic Senior Gunnery Id Company Sergeant Ie Senior Provost IfSenior Provisioning lg Sailmaker Ih District Sergeant II = Yeoman of Signals: IIa Chief Yeoman of Signals IIa (V) Survey IIb Teleprinter III = Senior Coxswain: IIIa aboard battleships to destroyers IIIb Survey IIIc aboard torpedo-boats and minesweepers V = Senior Carpenter VI = Senior Armourer (ammunition, not torpedoes or mines) VII = Senior Mechanic: VIIa = Senior Gunnery Mechanic

VIIb = Senior Torpedo Mechanic VIII = Senior Materials Administrator IX = Administration X = Writer XI = Sick Berth Attendant XII = Senior Music Master XIIIa = Senior Engineer XIIIb = Senior Radio Operator XIVa = Naval Gunnery XIVb = Vehicle Driver With effect from 31 January 1938 the career system was reorganised as follows: I II III IV V VI VII VII Sp X VP X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVIIA XVIISp

Boatswain Engineering Coxswain Signals (Yeoman, Radio and Teleprinter) Carpenter Armourer Gunnery Mechanic Mine Mechanic Administration (VS = writer, SV = trustee) Maintenance Writer Sick Berth Attendant Music Company Sergeant Naval Gunner Vehicle Driver Naval Replacements Administration Weapons (Gunnery) Weapons (Mines)

As the war progressed the career branches were further amplified in a manner appropriate to the degree of specialisation.

Scharnhorst at Kiel in November 1939: a view from the forepeak looking towards the two forward 28cm turrets and bridge. Note the modifications, including the addition of radar to the cupola of the 10.5m rangefinder at the foretop. As usual, the mattress aerial faces to starboard for security reasons.

Scharnhorst in a field of ice at Kieler Förde, January 1940.

The iced-over breakwater and forward main turrets, and a deck of ice to stand on. Clearly the manoeuvrability and battle-readiness of the units was severely impaired under conditions such as these. As a priority the flak had to be kept free of ice for immediate use: immobilised heavy units could be found in Kieler Förde and the inner harbour, sitting ducks for air attack. At the time the danger from the air was not as acute as it would become and the defences were strong, but the ships were still horribly exposed. It was decided not to lay up in a safer harbour further east because the ice was even worse there.

Finally the two battleships were transferred back to the North Sea base, from where they had made a feint against the Northern Patrol towards the end of 1939, sinking the armed merchant cruiser HMS Rawalpindi. Here Scharnhorst is led through the Kiel Canal by an ice-breaker. Crewmen throng the upper deck and superstructure, some as ‘spectators’ and others as flak gunners on watch near their stations.

A view forward along the starboard side from 15cm turret S I. Watching out astern from the extended bridge wing are the commander and two officers.

In the North Sea—and the usual drama of seas crashing over the bow in little more than a Force 4. Here the deck is already icing over with freezing spray. Just visible is Scharnhorst’s air recognition swastika.

Icing on the after decks: at high speed the stern tended to be sucked down, allowing seas to curl aboard.

Sea and spray frozen on shipboard equipment: the starboard rail, the forward single 15cm gunhouse and a twin 10.5cm flak mounting cloaked in a thick layer of ice.

With assistance from tugs, Scharnhorst moves away from quay H2 in Wilhelmshaven’s main harbour, 14 February 1940. Moored at an angle to the Wiesbaden Bridge (upper right) is the accommodation ship Tanganjika, to her left the channel leading to the Intermediate Harbour. It is just possible to make out a large ship in the 40,000-tonne floating drydock—probably Gneisenau.

Closest to the camera, the mysterious object cloaked in ice is a twin 3.7cm flak mounting; above that a rope or cable drum and parts of the bridge deck can be seen.

Scharnhorst at the mole at No III entrance, Wilhelmshaven, February or March 1940.

On 18 February 1940 German heavy units made a foray from Wilhelmshaven as far as the Shetlands in the light of the Altmark incident but returned on the 20th having achieved nothing. Here Scharnhorst enters the No III entrance lock. To the right of the ship construction work proceeds on the harbour gate for the new No IV entrance (the Raeder Lock), officially opened in mid-1942.

Assisted by tugs, Scharnhorst is towed to her berth. This photograph well illustrates three of the twin 10.5cm flak mountings.

The battleship moves slowly through the opened Kaiser Wilhelm road bridge, with tug alongside.

Scharnhorst about to make fast at the Fliegerdeich (Seydlitz Bridge) in the main harbour. Her two tugs are forcing away ice from the quayside. The building is part of the naval air station. The crane serves to hoist seaplanes in and out of the water. Aboard Scharnhorst, looking aft, can be seen three twin 10.5cm mountings and the rear single 15cm gun of the port side pair fore and aft amidships. In the background is the Kaiser Wilhelm Bridge.

Scharnhorst and a supply ship at the quayside, Wilhelmshaven, taken from the bridge of U 50 (Kapitänleutnant Max Bauer; boat lost north-west of Shetlands on 10.4.1940.—GB)

Scharnhorst in thick ice at Wilhelmshaven. To the left is the naval air station crane.

An eloquent illustration of the seakeeping qualities of the class: Scharnhorst in rough conditions with breakers crashing over the forecastle, the ‘Atlantic bow’ proving little better than the original straight stem.

A photograph taken at the forward breakwater and showing the foredeck awash.

Seen from higher up, the bows are swamped as the bow digs in, allowing the seas to comb the foredeck. Gneisenau is in the distance.

A stern view of Scharnhorst shows the other extreme: at high speed the stern is sucked down and now the sea washes over the quarterdeck. This photograph was taken during the battle with the aircraft carrier Glorious. The forward main turrets have just fired; the barrels of ‘C’ turret are trained ahead.

‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets having just fired: a photograph taken from Scharnhorst’s bridge.

A distant view of Gneisenau engaging HMS Glorious.

8 June 1940: the aircraft carrier Glorious burning and shrouded in smoke. The drifting curtains of smoke in the lower photograph are the result of an attempt by one of the escort destroyers to screen the carrier from the German battleships.

The destroyer HMS Acasta lays a smoke screen. To the right, Glorious is wreathed in smoke.

HMS Acasta on fire and sinking.

At the conclusion of the battle, the upper deck is cluttered with 28cm shell casings. After firing, these were ejected from the gun breech and then manually tossed out of the gun turret through flaps at the rear.

The heavy work of cleaning the gun barrels. Whereas this was a reasonably straightforward procedure for ‘A’ turret crew with their gunhouse sited at deck level, for the crew of the superfiring ‘B’ turret the task was more arduous as it was done at a gradient.

Scharnhorst did not escape unscathed from her encounter with Glorious and her two escorting destroyers Acasta and Ardent. Although all three British vessels were sunk, before she went down Acasta succeeded in loosing off a spread of torpedoes in a daring manoeuvre and was rewarded with a hit on the battleship on her starboard side aft. Following emergency repairs at Trondheim, Scharnhorst returned to Kiel on 20 June and drydocked at the Deutsche Werke, where this photograph was taken. In the foreground is a U-boat fitting out.

The extent of the torpedo damage: (left) the point of impact directly forward of the starboard shaft tunnel, and (right) from a position further astern the starboard propeller shaft is slightly unseated. Notice, directly below the lower row of scuttles, the protective covering for the degaussing loop.

Scharnhorst’s clipper bow.

Scharnhorst in Norwegian waters on 30 December 1940 after abandoning the first attempt at a break-out into the Atlantic with Gneisenau and shortly before setting off for the Baltic that day. In the foreground is one of the numerous harbour defence craft used by the Germans in Norwegian ports.

An Arado Ar 196 floatplane on the catapult. The photograph was taken in Norwegian waters.

The ship’s aircraft in flight after release from the catapult by a charge of compressed air. Notice, aboard ship, the manned flak guns, all with barrels well elevated. At bottom right is a quadruple 2cm flak mounting.

Shipping the aircraft after a flight was accomplished by shipboard derrick, and here a floatplane is suspended from a hook as the pilot is apparently in the act of leaving the cockpit. The Ar 196 was a two-seater crewed by a Luftwaffe pilot and, usually, a Kriegsmarine navigator/gunner.

In this photograph all gun crews are closed up. The left rangefinder optic of ‘C’ turret is exposed: Starboard II 15cm turret is trained abeam and the radar fitted to the 10.5cm rangefinder cupola at the foretop faces ahead on the port side. On the superstructure are flak and ammunition teams.

A photograph of Scharnhorst taken from Prinz Eugen during Operation ‘Berlin’, released for publication after the deletion of the rangefinder cupola and radar mattress from the foretop by the censor.

In February 1941 the two battleships broke out into the Atlantic after two failed attempts. Here Scharnhorst is seen in misty weather off Newfoundland. Leaning against the side of a 10.5cm flak gun, one of Gneisenau’s look-outs watches the sky.

The entire foredeck submerged as far back as ‘A’ turret in an Atlantic swell.

A ship’s aircraft is hoisted inboard by crane. This photograph was taken in the autumn of 1940 before the catapult atop ‘C’ turret was unshipped.

Great activity with the shipboard aircraft: one is suspended from a derrick, a second is being hauled up by another crane and the third is perched ready on the catapult. Below the aircraft, the hangar has its roof drawn back.

Shipboard routine was the same in the Atlantic as anywhere else. Here at ‘Reise, reise, aufstehen!’ (Reveille) the boatswain’s mate of the watch ensures a seamanlike turn-out and supervises the lashing of hammocks. This latter was important since in an emergency a correctly lashed hammock could be used as a life preserver in the water.

Cruising the Atlantic convoy routes where the enemy was capable of springing a nasty surprise without warning called for the crew to be sharp. Here off-duty men engage in a tug-of-war on a deck aft.

‘Backen und Banken’ (mealtime) on a crew deck. The individual Backen (tables) and Banken (benches) were collapsible and when not required were stowed in supports slung from the deckhead.

Whilst sporting activities were organised for the off-watches, the ship was always at battle-readiness. In this photograph the 3.7cm flak guns are seen with their crews. Other crewmen do necessary work at their war stations.

North Atlantic weather in March is changeable. Here the look-outs man their posts with spray cascading over the decks in a rising sea. Apparently something of interest has been sighted to starboard as all optics are trained in that direction.

Two twin 10.5cm flak guns and a single 15cm with gun crews at readiness.

Scharnhorst in the Atlantic, forecastle and weather decks heavily awash as she ships seawater over the starboard bow.

22 March 1941: running into Brest. The sea salts have taken a toll of the ship’s paintwork, and Scharnhorst is now an unprepossessing sight.

Scharnhorst in drydock at the Brest naval base and draped in camouflage netting. However, British air reconnaissance was not deceived.

Following refit Scharnhorst’s initial trials along the Breton coast were quickly called off because of the increasing threat of air attack. Further damage was later inflicted in air raids. Here the battleship follows Sperrbrecher 19/Rostock off Brest in the summer of 1941.

Scharnhorst under camouflage netting, probably at La Pallice, from where as a result of serious bomb damage she was forced to return to Brest for repairs.

After the completion of repairs the ship worked up in the Bay of Biscay with intensive crew training, including gunnery exercises.

The repaired Scharnhorst berthing at Brest with her ship’s company paraded aft. A radar room with an open observation station on its roof has been added to the foretop superstructure.

Scharnhorst at Brest. Notice, alongside, the strings of anti-torpedo nets. In the background the Brest harbour breakwater can be seen. For the planned ‘Channel Dash’, but also for other reasons, the number of flak barrels aboard was increased: quadruple 2cm flak guns were mounted on a roof platform on 15cm gunhouses Starboard I and Port I, the latter being shown in this photograph, taken during flak crew training. The three stripes on the upper arm of the uniforms indicate the watch to which the wearer was assigned. Basically there were single-watch boats (E-boats and other craft of this size, for which there would normally be no watch relief); two-watch vessels (minesweepers and inshore U-boats); and three-watch ships (ocean-going U-boats and destroyers upwards). The stripes were worn mainly on three-watch ships and indicated the following: Right upper arm:1 stripe, Div. 1 ; 2 stripes Div. 3; 3 stripes Div. 5. Left upper arm: 1 stripe Div. 2; 2 stripes Div. 4; 3 stripes Div. 6. At a surprisingly late stage it was realised that where a ship had more than six divisions, some crewmen would have stripes running the length of their arm. This was further complicated by individual career branches and functions within the individual divisions and so eventually it was decided that stripes on the right upper arm would be starboard watch and those on the left upper arm would be port watch (another variation had green stripes for starboard and red for port), and one, two or three stripes indicated No 1, No 2 or No 3 watch respectively. Finally, notice the number of men manning the weapon. The guns were in the open without any form of shielding and casualties caused by low-flying fighters shooting up the flak crews were high.

An overhead view of a practice torpedo about to be loaded into one of the torpedo sets fitted at Brest. The thinking behind the installation was proposed future Atlantic operations. In the foreground is a quadruple 2cm flak mounting.

Scharnhorst within the protected anchorage at Brest. The line of small buoys is supporting an anti-torpedo net. This photograph was taken shortly before the ship put to sea for Operation ‘Cerberus’.

Operation ‘Cerberus’, 11/12 February 1942: Scharnhorst bound for Germany with all gun crews closed up.

Scharnhorst, with Gneisenau astern, leads the German squadron during the Channel Dash: a view from the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen.

A stern view of the squadron from an escort: a destroyer is followed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with torpedo-boats on the flanks.

A panoramic view taken from one of the leading destroyers showing four torpedo-boats, Scharnhorst astern, then more escort vessels before Gneisenau. The close formation suggests a fairly restricted channel.

Immediately after the successful break-through Scharnhorst called at Wilhelmshaven for a hull survey and then continued to the Deutsche Werke shipyard at Kiel, where this Allied reconnaissance photograph was taken. Alongside the quay (right) is another large warship, the light cruiser Nürnberg. In the harbour basin nearby are several smaller units grouped in small packs—E-boats, minesweepers etc.

A bow view of Scharnhorst under camouflage netting in drydock. The photograph was taken from a public jetty on 3 June 1942.

This photograph, taken on the same day as the previous picture, shows the ship amidships between the mainmast and ‘B’ turret. The upper section of the mainmast appears to have been struck and the upper foretop structure with rangefinder cupola and radar equipment has been

unshipped (although possibly the censor was responsible for these omissions).

After completion of her lay-up at Kiel, Scharnhorst remained in Baltic waters for working-up. This shows the ship in the early autumn of 1942 wearing the camouflage scheme of the time. The purpose of painting the forward hull light grey was to deceive enemy rangefinder operators into underestimating the ship’s length. If the deception were successful it would lead to initial measurements being based on a target the length of the darker section.

Scharnhorst seen from Prinz Eugen. This appears to be an uncensored photograph taken on the same occasion as that on page 147.

This Allied air reconnaissance photograph shows Scharnhorst at the quayside at Gotenhafen. Note that by now anti-torpedo nets are necessary even this far east: after the United States entered the war, Germany was confronted by a long-range bomber force which could strike at previously safe harbours in the eastern Baltic.

The battleship also needed to drydock at Gotenhafen. Seen here are the twin rudders, with their designed slight convergence forwards (not found to be as advantageous as first thought), and the three-bladed propellers.

The starboard shaft and screw. Visible under the hull is the trunking for the centre shaft, which projected further aft than the two outer screws.

Scharnhorst alongside at Gotenhafen during machinery trials.

Scharnhorst broadside: a 1942 photograph.

A close look at the foretop reveals the delicate brushwork of the censor. The radar mattresses both there and at the forward command position, together with the quadruple 2cm flak positions atop the two forward 15cm gunhouses, have all been deleted from this photograph taken in Norway. The censor even went so far as to paint in some gun barrels on the 15cm gunhouse on the port side, but they were never as wide apart as this.

Scharnhorst in a Norwegian fjord. The camouflage paintwork is intended to blend in the ship’s contours with the snow-covered mountains above the shoreline.

Scharnhorst on one of her sporadic outings, Norway 1943.

Scharnhorst and two destroyers during naval exercises. These were conducted with much economy owing to the acute shortages of fuel.

Scharnhorst (left) and Tirpitz (right) under way.

A broadside view of Scharnhorst taken from Tirpitz during joint exercises in March 1943.

A close-up photograph of Scharnhorst taken from Tirpitz in March 1943 and showing ‘A’ and ‘B’ main turrets with numerous crew members on deck. Weather conditions for flying must be poor since the flak gun beside the bridge is covered with canvas. E-boats can be seen in the background.

Amidships aspect of Scharnhorst showing (from right to left) the rear of the tower mast, the funnel and hangar with a shipboard aircraft on the roof catapult, the mainmast and the after command centre. On the aft command centre, the starboard-facing rangefinder cupola with its radar equipment and FuMO 23 (or 27) carries an additional aerial which by its shape is an FuMB 6 aerial (a loop with 45° polarisation), a component of the FuMB 31 ‘Palau’ radar-emission detection system. Its frequency lay between 120 and 333MHz, the receiver (amplifier) belonging to the FuMB 4 (or 9). It must have been installed only a short while before this photograph was taken.

An interesting beam view of Scharnhorst showing how disruptive camouflage broke up the ship’s outline.

Scharnhorst met her end on 26 December 1943. Battered beyond recognition by a superior enemy force, she went to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. Only 36 members of her crew were saved. Some of them are seen here on board a British warship. On arrival at a British naval base, the survivors were led off blindfold. This was not intended as an insult but was a curiously British measure designed to prevent the prisoners from obtaining a clue as to their whereabouts.

In May 1980 at the Naval Memorial Laboe near Kiel, the society of surviving Scharnhorst crewmen unveiled and dedicated this plaque to the memory of the battleship’s dead. The inscription reads: ‘Battleship Scharnhorst. Sunk on 26 December 1943 in the Polar Sea in battle with superior British naval forces. To the memory of more than 2,000 fallen comrades and the proud ship. Scharnhorst Kamaradschaft, May 1980.’

The highest-ranking survivor from Scharnhorst was Senior Boatswain’s Mate Willi Gödde. He had served aboard the ship since her commissioning. 1 In fact, HMS Renown was accompanied by nine ‘H’ class destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla.

On 9t April the group was about 80 miles west of the Lofotens, bearing SE at 12kt. At 0337hrs (British time) the German ships were sighted to the east, and Renown turned to engage at 20kt. According to her logs, she opened fire at 0405hrs. 2 HMS Renown was the flagship of Vice-Admiral W. J. Whitworth. 1 In German naval practice, men of the gun crews are referred to as ‘Numbers’—the Loading Number, the Gunlaying Number, etc.) 1 HFS = Höhenfeuersteuerung, a remote control instrument maintaining the guns of a battery at the correct angle of elevation for a particular range. In the event of failure of the HFS, a turret commander would elevate the guns himself, relying on an elevation gauge showing data from the fire control centre. SVZW = Seitenvorziindewerk, a centrally controlled gunlaying and firing device which made minute adjustments to the general turret bearing to allow for wind, sea, spin of the shell, period in passage through barrel, etc. Indirect laying = laying the turret by a gauge showing data from the fire control centre. Direct laying = laying the turret by viewing the target through a telescopic sight. The latter two methods were vastly inferior to the SVZW.—GB 1 (1) SVZW = centralised gunlaying and firing device; (2) HFS = centralised gun elevation by remote control; (3) guns elevated by turret commander using elevation gauge; (4) guns laid using bearing gauge; (5) guns fired by turret commander; (6) guns’ direct elevation by turret commander. 1 The explanation for the oft-discussed difference in the sea-keeping qualities of HMS Renown in comparison with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau lies in the differing methods of construction. After a rethink, German naval architects decided to rebuild both these battleships, the subsequent Bismarck class, the Hipper lass heavy cruisers and the ‘Narvik’ class destroyers on the basis of a heavy framework with the so-called ‘Atlantic bow’. The British traditionally preferred a mostly unchanged, slim form of stem, and clearly this proved its worth. Although this bow tended to plunge deeply at speed, it recovered and rose equally quickly. The lower stem and clipper bow of the German ships was supposed to minimise the plunging tendency, but experience—especially in the Atlantic—proved otherwise. The only concession which the British designers made was for bent frames in the fore-end which had a certain deflecting effect. The low freeboard of the German units was another negative factor. 1 Admiral Norway = Commanding Admiral Norway/Naval High Command Norway. The headquarters for this centre was set up in Oslo following the occupation of Norway in April 1940. 2 B-Dienst = Beobachtungsdienst, the signal decryption service which monitored all enemy radio transmissions. A garbled signal from HMS Glorious was received by HMS Devonshire standing to the north but was not relayed because the cruiser was maintaining radio silence. She had on board King Haakon VII and the Norwegian government, plus the Norwegian gold reserves. The proximity of this cruiser may explain why Glorious had no aircraft up. As the B-Dienst evidence suggests, the British strategy was evidently to keep a low profile at all costs and hope. The only British survivors of the battle, six men from HMS Acasta, were saved when a German seaplane spotted their liferaft a few days later.—GB 3 All civil and military aircraft were identified by markings which also served as the individual callsign. 1 JW was the designation for convoys running from Loch Ewe (Scotland) to Kola Bay (USSR) after December 1942. Previously they had been known as ‘PQ’ convoys. Twenty JW convoys involving 505 ships made the run. Only five vessels were lost. ‘RA’ convoys made the return run; 22 such convoys were made, involving 492 ships of which 27 fell victim to enemy action.

Conclusions An objective opinion of the capital ships described in this volume was not possible until the files seized by the victors in May 1945 had been returned to the German Federal Republic. The view taken in this survey is not intended to diminish the value of the ships nor the courageous commitment of their crews in the best German naval tradition—even when the situation was hopeless. A memorandum1 published after the war by a noted authority on the German Navy made the point: When war broke out in 1939 it was clear that the majority of warships either in commission or building, and especially the larger surface units, were not suitable for the war at sea against enemy commerce irrespective of whether the enemy was Poland, France or Britain. This had been a lesson of the First World War which should logically have been taken to heart when rebuilding the Fleet. In fact it had been one of the decisive lessons of the First World War that the German High Seas Fleet, though outstanding technically, was so limited in its range as to present no effective threat to Britain’s lines of supply. When rebuilding the Fleet, the dictum to have been borne in mind when planning any German surface warship was ‘great range’. This had been realised in 1928 when the Deutschland class Panzerschiffe were designed with diesel drive. All the more incomprehensible, then, was the reversion in 1934 to steam-driven battleships such as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and later Bismarck and Tirpitz. This cut the 20,000nm radius of action of the armoured ships to less than half that for the battleships. It was in that fact that the German surface navy ceased to be an effective opposition to any sea power.

Hull and Armour Protection As with all German heavy ships, the guiding principle behind the design of the Scharnhorst class was ‘steadfastness’. This was actually favoured in this case by the relatively small calibre of the main armament (28cm, or 11 in), because the weight saved in that area could be transferred to strengthening the armour system. Nevertheless, there were still weaknesses, owing to the size of the ships. In comparison with the Bismarck class which followed, the internal division of the watertight rooms was not so extensive (for example, there were only three boiler rooms whereas Bismarck had six), and the distance between the outer plating and torpedo bulkhead was not as great, since engine room space could not be compromised. On the other hand, the vertical protection in the Scharnhorst class was stronger. A new armour plate was used for the first time in the building of the Scharnhorsts, classified as ‘Wotan hard’ (Wh) and ‘Wotan soft’ (Ww). These two new alloys could be welded and their specifications were: ultimate tensile strength 85–95 kg/mm2 (Wh) and 65–70 kg/mm2 (Ww), expansion 20% (Wh) and 25% (Ww), and yield point 50–55 kg/mm2 (Wh) and 38–40 kg/mm2 (Ww). These materials replaced the former uncemented armour (Krupp KNC). KC (Krupp Cemented) steel was a hardened carbon steel, 34% carbon, 3.78% nickel, 0.31% manganese and 2.06% chrome. The belt armour was so arranged as to be theoretically resistant to a 33cm (13in) shell. It was important that the so-called ‘immunity zone’ remained intact, this being the area between the maximum and minimum battle ranges in which a shell could not penetrate the armour protection.

Such underwater protection experiments as were possible were carried out. From 1928 tests were conducted on a 60m midships section of the old battleship Preussen, spared by the breakers. The target was prepared in conformity with the specifications of the proposed Scharnhorst class. For the first test all seams were welded, for the second all but the torpedo bulkhead. Installed before the 40mm torpedo bulkhead was a fuel oil bunker filled with water. An explosive charge of 250kg of TNT was used for the first experiment (for the Deutschland class Panzerschiffe) and 300kg for the second. In both tests the torpedo bulkhead held, distortion being limited to the impact point. These results seemed to show that the underwater protection proposed would be sufficient, but in practice, as real torpedo hits proved later when they struck in places not tested in the experiments, the torpedo bulkhead was torn away at the seams, causing flooding. The belt armour extended down to 4.5m, the longitudinal bulkhead to 5.3m.

As regards armour, its arrangement and distribution, the German Navy preferred its well-tried system. In the case of the Scharnhorst class battleships, the narrow 30m beam forced the architects to design the longitudinal torpedo bulkhead at an incline instead of vertically. This was the only way in which it was possible to build in the necessary safety zone between the bulkhead and outer plating. The Bismarck class battleships were 6m beamier, affording a much more favourable anti-torpedo structure. Nevertheless the arrangement proved to be the weak point in the overall armour system.

In general, after the First World War the German Navy had little opportunity to carry through an intensive programme of experiments. Apart from the Preussen midships section they had at their disposal a stricken merchant vessel, the SS Falk, plus two remote-control vessels, the old predreadnoughts Zähringen and Hessen and, for a while, Hannover. This last was listed for conversion to a bombing target ship, but the plan was abandoned at the outbreak of war. It was proved in action that the horizontal armour in the Scharnhorst class was inadequate, as shown in their career summaries,

Scharnhorst at La Pallice and Gneisenau at Kiel. The modification of the building plans amplified a design fault: the lengthening of the hull and the upgrading of components resulted in a freeboard that was much too low. As a result, the fore ends shipped the sea aboard in almost all sea states—which the fitting of a replacement bow did little to alleviate—with the effect that the weapons systems were vulnerable to repeated breakdown. In truth, the class were not very seaworthy. The fact that the two battleships saw service operationally on the North Atlantic convoy routes bears testimony to Germany’s lack of powerful, seaworthy ships: the surface Navy was eventually reduced to calling out everything regardless of its real suitability.

Machinery The reason for the return to steam drive from diesel remains a mystery. It can probably only be explained on the basis that the reconstruction of the Kriegsmarine was forced through on fully political and only partly naval grounds, so as to produce results. The German Navy preferred for its heavy units the three-shaft drive which had proved itself in Imperial Navy practice but which was ultimately to doom the Bismarck. Other navies opted for fourshaft drive, and in these the US Navy led the field. With their designs the ship’s after end was designed in tunnel-form and the two outer shafts had long timber baulks which served as additional protection for the inner shafts. Although the steam plant of the Scharnhorst class vessels provided high speed, cruising range was limited, and it is interesting to note that the Bismarcks, with identical engine plant, were slower in comparison.

Weapons and Fire Control Systems With a heavy armament of 28cm calibre, the units were too lightly armed to be rated as pure battleships, and accordingly they are often styled battlecruisers. The choice of calibre was a political decision and not a military one: it was essentially a form of interim solution intended to be remedied later with a much larger calibre. The same also applies to some extent to the secondary armament. The ships’ size, particularly at the beam, did not allow a uniform arrangement of 15cm guns in turrets: thus there were twin turrets forward and aft of the midships superstructure and single gunhouses amidships. The shipboard flak battery was seriously inadequate. By September 1939 at the latest its shortcomings had been realised, but the fitting of numerous light anti-aircraft weapons aboard Scharnhorst at a later stage did little to rectify the situation. Fire control equipment was another area sadly lacking. One of the leading experts in the field of gunnery, Ludwig Cordes,1 later a ministerial adviser, composed a memorandum on this subject in March 1943: The German Wehrmacht has failed to value its engineers. Lay amateurism rules: the management of national engineering is vested in non-engineers or semi-professionals and therefore in the hands of laymen! Leadership has been denied to the engineer, to the detriment of Volk and State! 1. Preliminary Observations: I will confine my remarks principally to occurrences and failures which have come to light over the years in memoranda, development projects and official reports and as regards which no decisions have been taken. The work of OKM [Oberkommando der Marine, or Naval High Command] bears the hallmark of the half-measure and dilettantism. Goethe described it thus: ‘It is the nature of the dilettant not to recognise the difficulties inherent in a matter, and to want to undertake something beyond his capabilities.’

At many places half-measures have been practised, with which, nevertheless, quite a number of things have been achieved. But mere involvement in technical matters cannot transform a nonengineer (officer) into an engineer, not even if he has been to Technical College and can produce a diploma. He is still in a technical sense only half-qualified and a dilettant, and in the long run will not be of full value even in his own special military sphere since he is a stranger to aspects of it. The predominant OKM type active in the technical sphere is the officer who has had no technical training at all. He holds a key position, from where he attempts to direct the development of complicated technical planning such as shipboard weapons systems. He will have working beneath him many gifted engineers, but these too will have had neither a technical naval training nor shipboard experience. No matter how talented they may be, they will never be in a position to find the right path through the numerous interdependent technical problems. Direction from above, and advice and guidance on a clear and correct mental approach to a clear and simple principle, can obviously not be supplied by superior officers who themselves lack the technical basics. The result is an irrational mis-employment of engineers and correspondingly an inefficient use of manpower. Furthermore, the structure inclines these specialists to exaggerate the importance of their narrow field, so that, albeit with the best intentions, they find technical solutions which produce overcomplicated, unbalanced and— dare one say—toy-like weapons systems of inferior quality. There are numerous examples to substantiate this assertion, as I will show in more detail shortly. In the field of engineering a false Führer principle holds sway. In the same way that the officer at the battle front must exercise a tight rein in order to exact more from his troops in fighting terms than the purely algebraic sum of their parts, on the technical battlefield, where engineers struggle to find the best solutions in weapons technology, this can only be successfully achieved by engineers under tight professional control, i.e. where their leaders are creative, talented and experienced not only as engineers but also as naval engineers. On this subject the following was expressed in a report circulated on 31 December 1942 by the Bureau Head of A Wa B [Artilleriewaffenamt, or Office of Naval Weapons]: In the current war situation, the absolute necessity to concentrate on work essential for victory demands that fields of research of like kind and their work forces must be grouped together under a tight professional leadership for the maximum achievement in return for the minimum investment in personnel. In this respect the A Wa feels compelled to point out that in the Office of Naval Gunnery engineers can only be used rationally, i.e. with the greatest effectiveness, if all engineers in A Wa Bureau are brought together as the Bureau Group. Only in this way will achievement be greater in real terms than the sum of all the parts, contrary to the experience of several military departments where the engineers are split up in smaller groups. It is simpler to place a gifted, qualified engineer aboard a warship for a while to enable him to familiarise himself with the vessel and its procedures than immediately employ an engineer who knows a warship only from photographs. It is completely erroneous to believe that anything useful can be achieved by engineers having no naval knowledge and who are under the direction of a non-engineer. On the contrary, each of these engineers individually will be self-taught in the field and come to overestimate the importance of his work and the field of research. Such narrow specialisation leads to poorly designed weapons systems, of which many examples can be cited.

The military side pointed out in discussions that creative minds are necessary for successful development projects. That is basically correct, and it only remains to be determined from which professional group they should come—officers or engineers. There can be no doubt that even the most creatively gifted mind is unable to put good ideas into practice without the necessary technical ability. The creatively gifted engineer can be equated with the creative artist who for the production of a work of art must be endowed with the necessary ability: both artist and engineer must be gifted simultaneously with creative thought and the technical wherewithal to carry it through. Ultimately the profession of engineer is not just any old calling which one can just pick up from a course of technical study. A good and efficient engineer is born and bred. Of course, that does not mean that an officer cannot have the intellectual qualities to be a good engineer, but he can only be an engineer by professional training and appropriate experience. From the foregoing it must be clear that a so-called Gentleman’s Course for Officers with the objective of getting them an engineering diploma is still a far cry from turning them into engineers. They are still at the stage of officers who have passed the main examination but have no useful front practice. 2. Closing Observations: The far-seeing engineer of proven ability who would long ago have been elevated to leadership in a properly run organisation with a proper system of selection finds that this is not possible in the existing organisation, where dilettant non-engineers have aspirations to play the leading role. This amateurism has been fostered by a false system and then held aloft as correct. One hears very frequently the expression ‘total responsibility’, but in this case those responsible to Volk and Reich for what goes on appear to be absolved from responsibility. An unqualified person may not enter medical practice. There are laws against it. In the German Navy, however, it is permissible for quacks to be at work designing shipboard weapons systems. In judgement of them we must use the dictum ‘A man is measured by his deeds’. Evidence is available to show the difference between the low level of achievement aimed for by a group of engineers directed by a non-technical leader and what the same group actually achieved when placed under the control of a gifted engineer (for an example, see Scharnhorst and Gneisenau). Amateurism in the OKM is at its most blatant when designs with an obvious weapons application and which have been worked on day and night by competent engineers can be dismissed with a stroke of the pen so as to smile favourably instead, despite warnings, on such monkey business as the northsouth orientation system, flak control centres, the inclusion of flak remote control Type 4 and so on. It is a blatant misuse of Bureau power to allow incompetents free rein to indulge their folly where only a clear system and engineering know-how can ever be in a position to solve difficult problems. 3. Examples: In the spring of 1937 the writer pointed out that the Krag sights fitted in the centre-pivot 15cm gun-houses aboard Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were unnecessarily complicated and not viable. Furthermore, an attempt was made when Prinz Eugen was launched to make clear to the directors of the two firms involved that the Krag was a useless piece of technology. A year later it transpired that this gun sight could not even be manufactured satisfactorily, despite the fact that a factory employing 40,000 people had been scoured to find workers able to carry out the task. The proud announcement that the equipment was so complicated that only twelve people in 40,000 could be found who were sufficiently skilled to make it ought to have raised eyebrows at OKM as to the enormity of the nonsense being peddled in the military-economic sphere. The practical result was that, at the time of the Poland crisis, the [15cm] guns on the two battleships mentioned had no gunsights fitted and in an emergency would have had to have been trained and fired by direct observation from the gunhouse. And this was only one act in the great Krag drama. Not until

1943, the fourth year of the war, did we succeed in having the Krag replaced by independent gunsights. It was decided to use the surface rangefinders in the dual role for flak—as in Scharnhorst and Gneisenau— and to have the data fed into an automatic range calculator. The whole idea was absurd and could only have been conceived by a creatively gifted amateur because, as is well known, the range is never given automatically but is plotted graphically from all rangefinders bearing on the same target. This was only the beginning, and it was never possible to unravel the mess subsequently. Whereas previously the range indicator supplied measurements immediately from rangefinder to the user centre, there were now two indicators, one for surface, one for flak, driven by a special amplifier control (situated on the gun between the indicators). However, because of the disastrous crossswitching arrangement in the amplifier, readings for both surface and flak were produced at the same time. Moreover, the amplifiers themselves were of faulty construction. Major errors were made in fixing the rotational measurements. Each firm had worked out its own solution and none of them had been correctly advised by OKM. Result: one rotation in the intermediate indicator was sufficient to throw the transmission circuit into chaos. Shipboard personnel were surprised to find that overnight the whole range-transmission system was giving false readings: it was found that this was due to dissimilar rotational measurements in the checking field. A circuit diagram the size of a small piece of notepaper, prepared and checked by an expert, would have detected the defect at the design stage. The shut-down of the range-indicator had the consequence that the build-up of range measurements in the flak calculator was incomplete. When transferring from direct firing to firing by rangefinder, as is the case at night and in MTB skirmishes, the necessary range comparisons were not possible because the distances were not available on the equipment until after the feeding in of the range-finder data, by which time the target had moved. All in all, monkey business in the task-setting centre plus basic flawed reasoning in design and manufacture resulted in a weapon that did not work. As far as possible at the outbreak of war, superfluous equipment was shut down and a ‘half-way house’ of solutions created from what was left. This would have been done better and more cheaply had it been handled from the beginning by engineers. At the request of the ships’ officers, the writer ’s attempts to make head or tail of their radar installations encountered the most bitter opposition from OKM military circles, who, not being engineers, could not rectify the matter themselves. Even at the conference they wanted to argue about jurisdiction. What a picture for the ships’ officers! They saw the man who could really do something to help them at the front obstructed by the military side of the OKM. With such goings-on as this is it any surprise that the whole battle-front questions the OKM and its decisions? As for the useless flak direction equipment, once war broke out the writer collaborated with the senior ships’ officers aboard Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and also Admiral Hipper and Blücher, in a sort of self-help activity to try to remedy the worse defects. This resulted in pulling out 20km of cabling from each ship (that alone is proof of the senseless expenditure involved). Initially the conversion work was done on the quiet and without the knowledge of OKM, who were informed upon conclusion. It was accepted without comment. This report came from the pen of Ludwig Cordes, one of the most competent technical experts. The author can only agree with what he says, although it is a pity that—especially in his memorandum of March 1943— he could not have restrained his anger and indignation and written more circumspectly. If he had done so, he might have had a response from OKM. On the other hand, today’s reader might well wonder what standards of puerility were accepted as

normal at OKM to reduce Cordes, a man at the peak of his professional powers and steeped in the art of rational thinking, to a state of such exasperation. Certainly the friction which between civilians and naval staff must also have found their expression here. A sentence in Cordes’s later observations (1948–50) shows that even then he was still deeply rooted in Tirpitz’s sentiment that the German Navy can and must be an effective weapon against any seapower. But this memorandum also shows that a courageous man had the freedom to make a powerful criticism even at that time—and the OKM could accept it. This speaks volumes for both. A word in conclusion concerning cooperation between German air and naval forces. The opinion developed after the war on the German side that naval forces frequently lacked air cover (which is correct) and that this was the failure of the Luftwaffe leadership. The latter must be contradicted. Operation ‘Cerberus’, the ‘Channel Dash’ described in this book, was an outstanding example of cooperation between Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, and the determination shown and success achieved by both arms of service is highly praiseworthy. At the time in question all parts of the forces involved were in a position to carry out everything the task demanded of them (as regards operational distances, availability of aircraft and fuel, level of crew competence and the battle-readiness of the various Staffeln, Gruppen and Geschwader). The attempt to assist Bismarck in her final battle failed despite everything the leadership tried. It failed because of the ship’s distance from land, because of still inadequate long-range air reconnaissance and because of the difficulty of providing the bomber groups with fighter protection. In contrast, the British were able to bring their reconnaissance, fighter and bomber units into the action immediately. In the far north, the weather played the decisive role—general visibility, sudden mists, snow, icing and changes in sea state. When German aircraft were not flying, it was generally the case that the British were also unable to operate. Flying off shipboard aircraft was even more dependent on weather and sea state. If the weather changed for the worse while aircraft were aloft, they could finish up as total write-offs. The Luftwaffe also afforded the U-boat arm such support as it was able to provide at the time. At the outbreak of war (and even until Pearl Harbor) the navies of all sea powers underestimated the effectiveness of aerial attack, and had to bear the consequences for their failure. Justice requires the point to be made, however, that of all the air forces, it was the Luftwaffe which had the unique problem of fighting a war on many different fronts. The German Reichskanzler was responsible for the European war of 1939, which expanded into the Second World War in December 1941. Amongst many millions of others, its victims were also the dead, wounded and missing of the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—to whom this book is reverently dedicated. 1 Cordes, Ludwig, Principles of Design of Naval Gun Mountings Used in German Practice, 1948-50

(written for the Historical Division). 1 Ludwig Cordes, Dip-Ing, b. 25.10.1896, d. 30.3.1958. Kriegsmarine Dockyard, Kiel, June 1937– January 1940; with Special Commission for Damage Investigation January 1940–1942; at OKM, Head of Bureau Group for Gun Construction 1942 to war ’s end. The author has custody of Cordes’s correspondence files.

Appendices

APPENDIX I: EXTRACT FROM NAVAL GRID CHART

The Kriegsmarine’s secret naval charts were divided minutely into a system of reference squares with some slight variations in size due to the Mercator Projection. The ships’ position within a 6-mile square anywhere in the world could be reduced to a 6-digit reference coordinate. The method was always used in signals and ships’ war diary entries. As an example, a vessel off the most easterly point of the Isle of Wight would have been in position BF3139 (Block BF, Grid Square 31, sub-square 3; sub-sub-square 9). In practice, the position was often specified even more precisely in the war diaries by further subdividing the sub-sub-square.

Source: Rohwer and Jürgen, Die U-Boot-Erfolge der Achsenmächte 1939–1945, Munich, 1968.

APPENDIX II: DETAILS FOR SELECTED ROYAL NAVY SHIPS Glorious Launched 20.4.16, Harland & Wolff, as light battle-cruiser; 1924–30: converted to aircraft carrier. Data (as aircraft carrier): 22,500 tons; length (oa) 239.75m, 224.02m (pp); beam 27.58m; draught 8.53m. Four-shaft turbines, 90,000shp = 30.5kt. Armour: 76mm belt. Armament: 16× 4.7in AA guns. 48 aircraft, complement 1,216. Renown Battlecruiser, launched 4.3.16, Fairfield. Data (1939): 36,080 tons; length (oa) 242.21m; beam 27.45m; draught 9.30m. Four-shaft turbines, 120,000shp = 30.75kt. Armour: 152mm belt. Armament: 6 × 15in, 20 × 4.5in DP; 24 × 2pdr; 16 × 0.5in MG. Complement 1,200. Duke of York (ex Anson) Battleship, launched 28.2.40, John Brown. Details: 44,794 tons; length overall 227.27m; beam 31.42m; draught 9.91m. Four-shaft turbines, 110,000shp = 28kt. Armour: 356−381mm belt Armament: 10 × 14in, 16 × 5.25in, 88 × 2pdr, 8 × 40mm, 55 × 20mm. Complement: 1,422 Juniper Naval trawler, ‘Tree’ class (T123), launched 15.12.39, Fergusons. Data: 530 tons; length (oa) 49.98m; beam 8.37m; draught 3.2m. Single-shaft steam piston machinery, 850hp = 11.5kt. Armament: 1 × 12pdr (equivalent to 3in), 2 × 4in, 4 MG. Complement: 35. Rawalpindi Armed merchant cruiser (ex passenger liner), launched 26.3.25, Harland & Wolff. Data: 16,697grt; length (oa) 173.74m; beam 27.17m; draught 8.61m. Two shafts, two 4-cylinder steam piston engines, 15,000hp = 17kt. Armament: 8 × 6in, 2 × 0.303in MG.

Bibliography BOOKS Assmann, Kurt, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen, Heidelberg, 1957 Bekker, Cajus, Augen durch Nacht und Nebel, Oldenburg, 1978 Bennett, Geoffrey, Naval Battles of World War Two, London/New York, 1976 Bensel, Rolf, Die deutsche Flottenpolitik von 1933–1939, Berlin, 1958 Bidlingmaier, Gerhard, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten im ozeanischen Zufuhrkrieg, Neckargemünd, 1969 Bräckow, Werner, Die Geschichte des deutschen Marine-Ingenieur-Offizierskorps, Oldenburg, 1974 Bredemeier, Heinrich, Schlachtschiff Scharnhorst, Herford, 1978 Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers, 1905–1970, London/New York, 1973 ——, Battleships of the World, 1905–1970, Greenwich/New York, 1980 ——, Schlachtschiff Gneisenau, Friedberg, 1987 (Marinearsenal) ——, Schlachtschiff Scharnhorst, Friedberg, 1987 (Marinearsenal) Breyer, Siegfried, and Koop, Gerhard, Von der Emden zur Tirpitz, Vol. 1, Munich, 1982 ——, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine 1935–1945, Vols 4/5, Friedberg, 1988/1989 Busch, Fritz Otto, The Drama of the Scharnhorst: A Factual Account from the German Viewpoint, London, 1956 Chesneau, Roger, (ed.), Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946, London, 1980 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, 6 vols, London/Boston, 1948–53 Diwald, Helmut, Der Kampf um die Weltmeere, Munich/Zürich, 1980 Dönitz, Karl, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage: Erinnerungen 1939–945, Koblenz, 1985. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, with a new Introduction by Jürgen Rohwer, London/Annapolis, 1990 Dülffer, Jost, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, Düsseldorf, 1972 Dulin, Robert O., and Garzke, William H., Battleships (Vol. 3): Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II, London, 1986 Ewers, H., Kriegsschiffbau, Berlin, 1943 Friedman, Norman, Battleship Design and Development 1905–945, London, 1978 Giessler, Helmuth, Der Marine-Nachrichten- und -Ortungsdienst, Munich, 1971 Gröner, Erich, German Warships, 1815–945 (Vol. 2): U-Boats and Mine Warfare Vessels, London/Annapolis, 1991 Hadeler, Wilhelm, Kriegsschiffbau, Darmstadt, 1968 Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648–939. Hrsg. vom Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. Bd. 4/ Abschnitt VIII: Deutsche Marinegeschichte der Neuzeit, Munich, 1979 Hildebrand, Hans H.; Stöhr, Albert; and Steinmetz, Hans-Otto, Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe: Biographien, Vols 2/5, Herford 1980/1982 Hubatsch, Walther, (ed.), Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945, 2. Aufl. Koblenz, 1983 Hubatsch, Walther, ‘Weserübung’: Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940, 2. Aufl. Göttingen, 1960 Johannesson, Rolf, Offizier in kritischer Zeit, Herford, 1989 Jung, Dieter; Abendroth, Amo; and Kelling, Norbert, Anstriche und Tarnanstriche der Kriegsmarine, Munich, 1977

Kähfler, Wolfgang, Schlachtschiff Gneisenau, Herford, 1979 Koop, Gerhard; Galle, Kurt; and Klein, Fritz, Von der Kaiserlichen Werft zum Marinearsenal: Wilhelmshaven als Zentrum der Marinetechnik seit 1870, Munich, 1982 Koop, Gerhard, and Mulitze, Erich, Die Marine in Wilhelmshaven, Koblenz, 1987 Lewin, Ronald, ULTRA Goes to War: The Secret Story, London/New York, 1978 Lochner, R. K., Als das Eis brack, Munich, 1983 Lohmann, Walter, and Hildebrand, Hans H., Die deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939–1945: Gliederung, Organisation, Stellenbesetzung, 3 vols., Bad Nauheim, 1956–1964 Pemsel, Helmut, Seeherrschaft: Eine maritime Weltgeschichte von den Anfängen der Seefahrt bis zur Gegenwart, 2 vols, Koblenz, 1985 ——, Biographisches Lexikon zur Seekriegsgeschichte, Koblenz, 1985 Peter, K. H., Schlachtschiff Scharnhorst: Kampf und Untergang, 2. Aufl. Frankfurt/Main, 1959 Potter, Elmer B., (ed.), Sea Power: A Naval History, Annapolis, 1981 Potter, John Deane, Fiasco: Breakout of the German Battleships, London/New York, 1970 Raeder, Erich, My Life, Annapolis, 1960 Raven, Alan, and Roberts, John, British Battleships of World War II: The Development and Technical History of RN Battleships and Battlecruisers, 1911–1946, London/Annapolis, 1976 Robertson, Terence, Channel Dash: The Drama of Twenty-Four Hours of War, London/New York, 1970 Rohwer, Jürgen and Hümmelchen, Gerhard, Chronology of the War at Sea, London/Annapolis, 1992 Salewski, Michael: Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, 3 vols, Frankfurt a.M./Munich, 1970– 1975 Schmalenbach, Paul, Die Geschichte der deutschen Schiffsartillerie, Herford, 1968 Wagner, Gerhard, (ed.), Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939– 1945, Munich, 1972 Whitley, M., German Capital Ships of World War II, London, 1989 PERIODICALS Jahrbuch der Schiffbautechnischen Gesellschaft Leinen los/Atlantische Welt/Flotte/Marine Marineforum Marine-Rundschau Schiffbau Truppenpraxis Warship OTHER SOURCES AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS Author ’s archive Dipl.-Ing. Többicke (Marineoberbaurat z.Wv), ‘Die Panzerung der deutschen Kriegsschiffe’ Burkhardt, Hermann (Marineoberbaudirektor a.D.): ‘Die Entwicklung des Schiffbaumaterials der Deutschen Kriegsmarine’ ——, ‘Die Entwicklung des Unterwasserschutzes in der Deutschen Kriegsmarine’ ——, ‘Der Einfluss des Kriegsschiffbaues auf die Entwicklung der Technik’ Pfitzmann, ‘Schiffsansprengungen und Kriegserfahrungen’ Cordes, Ludwig (Ministerialdirigent a.D.), ‘Diverser Schriftverkehr ’ ——, ‘Principles of Design of Naval Gun Mountings used in German Practice’ (written 1948/50 for the ‘Historical Division’)

Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br.: III M 300/5 KTB Flotte III M 309/1 KTB Gneisenau III M 310/2 KTB Scharnhorst III M 300/7 KTB Flotte OKM: Unterlagen und Richtlinien zur Bestimmung der Hauptkampfentfernungen und der Geschosswahl, 1940

Index of Ships Acasta (destroyer), 103, 106, 143, 144 Admiral Graf Spee (Panzerschiff), 9, 11, 36, 37, 65, 68, 125, 129 Admiral Hipper (heavy cruiser), 37–38, 44, 46, 47, 50, 76, 77, 83, 95, 96, 102n, 103, 113, 167 Admiral Scheer (Panzerschiff), 9, 11, 68, 125 Adria (supply ship), 51, 110 Albert Leo Schlageter (sail training ship), 125 Alstertor (supply ship), 109, 110 Altmark (oiler), 37n, 51, 74, 95, 138 Ardent (destroyer), 103, 144 Ariadne (state yacht), 125 Atlantis (hospital ship), 47 Belfast (cruiser), 113, 115 Bernd von Arnim/Z 11 (destroyer), 37 Bismarck (battleship), 50, 51, 102n, 111, 162, 164, 167 Blitz (ex T 185, ex V 185; remote control gunnery vessel), 125 Blücher (heavy cruiser), 56, 167 Brummer (gunnery training ship), 125 Bruno Heinemann/Z 8 (destroyer), 111 Clyde (submarine), 48, 78 Delphin (ex M108; gunnery training vessel), 125 Deutschland (Panzerschiff), 9, 10, 11, 18–20, 68, 125, 162, 164 Diether von Roeder/Z 17 (destroyer), 37 Dithmarschen (naval oiler), 45, 46 Duke of York (battleship), 113, 115, 170 Dunkerque (battleship), 10, Erich Giese/Z 12 (destroyer), 37 Erich Steinbrinck/Z 15 (destroyer), 37, 44, 45, 110, 112, 113 Ermland (naval oiler), 51 Esso Hamburg (tanker), 51, 110 F 1–F 10 (fleet escorts), 122 Falk (explosives trials ship), 164 Falke (torpedo-boat), 44, 45, 110, 111 Frauenlob (ex M 134; tender), 125 Friedrich Breme (tanker), 51, 110 Friedrich Eckholdt/Z 16 (destroyer), 37 Friedrich Ihn/Z 14 (destroyer), 37, 50, 111, 112, 113

Gazelle (ex Hela, ex M 135; fleet tender), 130 Georg Thiele/Z 2 (destroyer), 125 Glorious (aircraft carrier), 103, 141, 142, 143, 144, 170 Gneisenau (corvette), 55 Gneisenau (armoured cruiser), 55 Gorch Fock (sail training ship), 58 Greif (torpedo-boat), 109, 110 Grille (state yacht), 67 Hai (ex-F 3; tender), 45 Hannover (battleship), 164 Hans Lody/Z 10 (destroyer), 44, 50, 110, 113 Hermann Schoemann/Z 7 (destroyer), 44, 110, 111, 125 Hessen (battleship/target ship), 61, 125, 164 Huascaran (repair ship), 110 Iltis (torpedo-boat), 112 Jaguar (torpedo-boat), 44, 45, 110, 112, 122 Jamaica (cruiser), 113, 115 Juniper (armed trawler), 46, 103, 170 Karl Galster/Z 20 (destroyer), 37, 44, 48, 50, 109, 113, 125 Karlsruhe (light cruiser), 36 Köln (light cruiser), 37 Komet (ex T 123, ex S 23; remote control gunnery vessel), 125 Kondor (torpedo-boat), 109, 110, 111 Leberecht Maass/Z 1 (destroyer), 125 Leipzig (light cruiser), 22, 37 Luchs (torpedo-boat), 50 Lützow ((Panzerschiff), 113 Malaya (battleship), 51, 110 Max Schultz/Z 3 (destroyer), 37, 125 Meteor (survey ship), 125 Musketeer (destroyer), 115 Naiad (cruiser), 51 Nelson (battleship), 41, 42 Nixe (yacht), 67 Norfolk (cruiser), 113, 115 Nürnberg (light cruiser), 22, 50, 77, 113, 116, 125, 155 Oakland/Sperrbrecher IV (mine destructor ship), 44–5 Oil Pioneer (tanker), 46, 103

Orama (troop transport), 47, 103 Parat (tug), 110 Paul Jacobi/Z 5 (destroyer), 50, 111, 112, 125 Preussen (battleship), 162 Prinz Eugen (heavy cruiser), 36, 51, 52, 67, 83, 86, 111, 112, 154, 156, 166 Ramillies (battleship), 51, 110 Raubtier/Raubvogel class (torpedo-boats), 123 Rawalpindi (armed merchant cruiser), 37, 95, 135, 170 Renown (battlecruiser), 41, 42, 43, 75, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102n, 170 Repulse (battlecruiser), 41, 97 Richard Beitzen/Z 4 (destroyer), 111, 125 Rostock/Sperrbrecher 19 (mine destructor ship), 151 Saar (U-boat depot ship), 122 Scharnhorst (armoured cruiser), 55, 118 Schlesien (battleship), 52 Schlettstadt (supply ship), 51, 110 Seeadler (torpedo-boat), 112 Sheffield (cruiser), 113 Sperrbrecher IV, see Oakland Sperrbrecher 19, see Rostock Strasbourg (battleship), 10, T 2 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 4 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 5 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 11 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 12 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 13 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 15 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 16 (torpedo-boat), 111 T 17 (torpedo-boat), 111 Tanganjika (accommodation ship), 137 Thames (submarine), 50 Theodor Riedel/Z 6 (destroyer), 37, 113, 125 Thetis (floating flak battery), 113 Tirpitz (battleship), 48, 50, 113, 125, 159, 160, 162 ‘Tree’ class (trawlers), 46 Trident (submarine), 112 U 47 (U-boat), 129, 131 U 50 (U-boat), 140 U 105 (U-boat), 110 U 124 (U-boat), 110 Uckermark (ex Altmark; naval oiler), 51

Virago (destroyer), 115 Wilhelm Heidkamp/Z 21 (destroyer), 37 Wolfgang Zenker/Z 9 (destroyer), 37 Z 24 (destroyer), 112 Z 25 (destroyer), 111 Z 27 (destroyer), 113 Z 28 (destroyer), 113 Z 29 (destroyer), 111, 112, 113 Z 30 (destroyer), 113 Z 31 (destroyer), 113 Z 33 (destroyer), 113 Z 34 (destroyer), 113 Z 39 (destroyer), 112 Zähringen (battleship/gunnery target ship), 122, 164

About the Authors

GERHARD KOOP Gerhard Koop was born in 1926 and entered the Kriegsmarine in 1941 for pre-NCO training, followed by service in the U-boat arm. He was a member of the Federal Frontier Protection Force from 1951 but transferred to the Federal German Navy in 1956. From then until 1975 he served aboard motor torpedo boats, submarinechasers, minesweepers, frigates and supply ships as ship’s technical officer. During the period 1960– 62 he lectured at a Naval Technical School. In 1975 he was appointed as a specialist in ships’ motors at Naval Support Command. He retired in 1981. His journalistic activities have involved him as author, technical translator and collaborator in naval/historical and naval/technical works.

KLAUS-PETER SCHMOLKE Klaus Peter-Schmolke is one of the finest draughtsmen of ships and scale drawings in Germany and has collaborated on a series of specialist publications, including Die Deutschen Segelschulschiffe.