Theories of \PO Dr "One of the most creative books about international relations you will ever read-and one of the smartest." -PETER BEINART, author o...
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T heories of
\ PO
Dr
"One of the most creative books about international relations you will ever read-and one of the smartest."
-PETER BEINART, author of The Icarus Syndrome "Bless Dan Drezner for this book which punches huge holes in the hokum of American foreign policy thinking. Our theories in this business have been thin and often very costly, and if it takes Drezner's 'zombie attack' to puncture their bloat, so be it. Besides, the book is fun." -LESLIE H. GELB, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former New York Times columnist "Drezner is to the z01nbie attack what Thucydides is to the Peloponnesian War-he is its great chronicler. As witty as he is insightful, Drezner has taken old ideas and traditions in international relations ai1d brought them back to life."
-G. JOHN IKENBERRY, Princeton University "'This book fills a gnawing gap in the international relations literature and adds flesh to those bones by con1municating key international relations theories in a fresh, fun, and effective way."
-DANIEL NEXON, George1own University \ '
'This interesting, thoughtful, and engaging book nicely integrates the . chssics of zombie work with theories of international politics to make s n e of human- and nonhuman-behavior. This is the only international relation textbook tl1at will n1ake students frequently laugh and thil1k at the san1e time. Indeed, this textbook is food for brains, which
. " ma , of course, onJy attract n1ore zorn btes. -STEPHEN SA/DEMAN, McGill University
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scenarios for the political stage in tJ t fa c.: • ,f a zombie threat and considers ho , \'a]id how rotten-such scenarios night b ·.
Dr zner boldly lurches into the breach and "stre s tests" the ways that differ nt approaches to world poUtics ' auld xpla · policy responses to the living dead. lie examines the most prominent intern ional relations theories-jncJuding reali n , liberalism, con ructivism, neocon crvati m, and bureaucratic politic -and decomp scs th ir p edictions. I e digs into prominent zombie films and novels, such as Nigbt ofthe Liviug D,end and T!Vorld War Z, to see where esset tial theories hold up and where they w uld s m ble and fall. Drezner argues that by hin ing about outside-of- he-b x threat w get a c gnitivc grip on what former . . (tolllim~d on bt~rlt
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THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ZOMBIES
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ZOMBIES DANIEL W. DREZNER
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD
pyng ' t © 201 r by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey os 540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OXzo 1TW press. princeton. edu All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Drezner, Daniel W Theories of international politics and zombies I Daniel W. Drezner. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-o-691-14783-3 (pbk: alk. paper) relations-Philosophy.
2.
International Zombie films-History and criticism. 1.
I. Title. }Z1305.D74
2011
32 7. IOI-dC2 2
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available fhjs book has been composed in Janson Text Printed on acid-free paper. 00 Printed in the United States of America [Q
9 8 7 6 5
For my son Sam, who thought this was "way cooler" than my other books; and my daughter Lauren, for reasS,uring me that "there are no zombies in this land."
CONTENTS Preface
IX
Introduction ... to the Undead
1
The Zombie Literature
11
Defining a Zombie
21
Distracting Debates about Flesh-eating Ghouls
23
The Realpolitik of the Living Dead
33
Regulating the Undead in a Liberal World Order
47
Neoconservatism and the Axis of Evil Dead
61
The Social Construction of Zombies
67
Domestic PoJitics: Are All Zombie Politics Local?
77
Bureaucratic Politics: The "Pulling and Hauling" of Zombies
87
We're Only Human: Psychological Responses to the Undead
99
Conclusion ... or So You Think
109
Acknowledgments Notes References Index
115 119 129 149
PREFACE
Fifteen years ago, on a cross-country drive, I stopped to visit Graceland. By the time my tour hit the Jungle Room, it was obvious that the thirty-odd people walking throu gh Elvis Presley's mansion fell into two groups. The first contingent was thoroughly, utterly sincere in their devotion to all things Elvis. They were hardcore fans, and Graceland was their Mecca, their Jerusalem, and their Rome. Many of thetn sounded convinced that the King was still walking the earth. They gasped when they saw the jumpsuit collection, bedazzled by its grandeur. The second group of tourists was equally delighted to be at Graceland, but for a different reason. Thes e people took great pleasure in the kitschy nature of all things Elvis. To thetn, a mansion that preserved the aesthetics of green shag carpeting and both funny and tacky. They 1nirro red walls was gasped when they saw the jumpsuit collection, bedazzled by how ridiculous they thoug ht it was. As we atnbled along, the sheer professionalistn of our tour guide struck me. Her task was not an easy one. She had to provide a veritable font of Elvis knowledge to all of the intense devotees. At the same time,
PREFACE
she a] o ha l to acknowledge the absurdist nan1re of the experience for of the rest of the tour group. With subtle changes in her facial expre sions and slight adjustments in her tone of oice, our guide accon1plished her task brilliantJy. At no point it time did he dimini h Elvis in the eyes of hi d lowers. Still , I believe everyone left
out fol-
rae land that
day thoroughly satisfied with their visit. Think of this book as n1y tour of a different kind of Graceland, only with a lot 1nore footnotes. Oh, and zon1bies.
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ZOMBIES
Thus said the Lord God unto these bones: Behold, I will cause breath to enter into you, and ye shall live. And I will lay sinews upon you, and bring up flesh upon you, and cover you with skin, and put breath in you, and ye shall live; and ye shall know that I am the Lord. So I prophesized as I was commanded; and as I prophesized, there was a noise, and behold a commotion, and the bones came together, bone to its bone. And I beheld, and, lo, there were sinews upon them, and flesh came up, and skin covered them above; but there was no breath in them. -EZEKIEL 37:5-8
-
• •
INTRODUCTION • TO THE UNDEAD
Ther e are many natural sources of fear in world politics- terro rist attacks, lethal pandemics, natural disas ters, climate change, financial panic, nuclear proliferati on, ethni c conflict, global cyberwarfare, and so forth. Surveying the cultural zeitgeist, however, it is strik ing how an unna tural prob lem has become one of the fastest-growing conc erns in inter natio nal relations. I speak, of course, of zombies. Whe ther they are called ghouls, deadites, posthuma ns, stenches, deadheads, the mobile deceased, or the differently animated, the specter of the living dead repre sents an impo rtant puzzle to scholars of international relations and the theories we use to understand the world. Wha t would different theories of inter natio nal politics pred ict would happ en if the dead bega n to rise from the grave and feast upon the living? How vali d-or how rotte n-ar e these predictions? Serio us readers migh t dismiss these questions as fanciful, but conc erns abou t flesh-eating ghouls are mani festl y evide nt in popu lar culture. Whe ther one looks at films, songs, games, or books, the genr e is
INTRODUCTION
POPUlAR AND SCHOlARlY INTEREST IN ZOMBIES 3SO ············································ ······························································
300 ........................................................................................... .......... . 2SO ....................................................................................................... ~
~
..: 200 ................................................................................... .................... E ........ .............. . .:;; 1so
Movie releases
.......... ............................. . ..... . ..............................
Scholarlv publications 1960s
1970s
1980!
1990s
2000s
Figure I. Popular and scholarly interest in zombies. Sources: Wikipedia, Web of Science.
clearly on the rise. As figure r shows, the release of zombie films has spiked since the dawn of the new millennium; according to conservative estimates, more than one-third of all zombie fihns were released in the past decade. 1 Figure 2 suggests that these estimates might be understated. According to one recent analysis, zombies became the most important source of postapocalyptic cinema during the last decade.* Nor is this interest li1nited to celluloid. A series of zombie video garnes, including the Resident Evil and *Phelan 2009. Zombies are clearly a global cjnematic phenomcn n. Beyond the United States, there have been Austra1Jan, British, Chinese, Czech, German, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mexkan, and Norwegian zombie flicks. See Russell 2005 for an exhau rive filmography.
INTRODU CTION
3
INTEREST IN ZOMBIES SINCE 2000 200 ....................................................... ............................................................................... .
Books wi th ~lz o m b i es " in tit le ISO ··· ................................................... ......................... ~.......................................... .. 100 ................................ ........................................................ .
Movie releases
so . . .... .... ................. ....... . . .~ ........ ...... . . ... .... . 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 fjgure z. Interest in zombies since 2000 . Sources: Amazon.com, \Vikipedia.
Left 4 Dead franchises, was the precursor for the renaissance of zombie cine1na. The undead are now on television shows, such as Con1edy Central's Ugly Amer-
icans and AMC's Tbe Wa1leing Dead. Over the past decade, zombies have also seeped onto the written page. The popular literature ranges fron1 how-to survival 3 2 1nanuals, to children's books, to revisionist early Victorian fiction.4 Cmnic book series such as The Walking
Dead and Marvel Zombies have spread rapidly over the past five years. One book editor gleefully told USA
Today that '"in the world of traditional horror, nothing .is more popular right now than zombies. The living dead are here to stay.,,-' A cursory scan o f newspaper databases shows a steady increase in post-human lnentions over the past decade (see figure 3). Clearly, the living dead have lurched from 1narginal to n1ainstrearn. Q•
!',
INTRODUCTION
MEDIA MENTIONS OF ZOMBIES 2,500 ...................................................................................................................................... ....... 2,000 ........................................................ ................................................. ... ......... ......... .. ... ....... .
1,000 ........... .................. ..... ...... ........_.............. ,................................................ . ~~
soo . ............. . ............ ..... . ........................................... . .............. . ........... ............................... .... .
o---------------------------- -----2ooo 2001 2002 2oo3 2004 2oos 2006 2001 2oos 2009
Figure 3· Media mentions of zombies. Source: Lexis-Nexis.
One could distniss the zombie trend as merely feeding a mass public that craves the strange and bizarre. Such an explanation would be only skin-deep. Popular culture often provides a window into the subliminal or unstated fears of citizens, and zon1bies are no exception. Sotne cultural cotnmentators argue that the September rr,
terrorist attacks are a priInary cause for renewed interest in the living dead, 2001,
and the numbers appear to back up this assertion (see figure 2). 6 Certainly the subsequent anthrax attacks in the autumn of 2 oo r raised fears about bioterrorism and biosecurity. 7 As Peter Dendle notes, "It is clear that the zotnbie holocausts vividly painted in n1ovies and video games have tapped into a deep-seated anxiety about society." 8 Zombies have been an obvious
INTRODUCTION
metap hor for Inedical rnaladies, mob rule, and Marxist dialectics.* Sotne international relations scholars would posit that intere st in zombies is an indirect attem pt to get a cognitive grip on what former U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld fan1ously referred to as the 9 "unknown unknowns" in international security. Perhaps, howe ver, there also exists a genuine but publicly unacknowledged fear of the dead rising fron1 the grave and feasting upon the entrails of the living.
Majo r universities and police departn1ents have developed "mock" contingency plans for a zombie outbreak. 10 An increasing numb er of college students are playing Hum ans versus Zotnbies on their campuses to relieve stres s-or perhaps to prepare for the 11 inevitable army of the undead. Outdom~ Life magazine has run a "Zom bie Guns" feature, stressing that 12 "the only way to take 'em out is with a head shot." Biosecurity is a new imperative among national governm ents. n The gove.rnn1ent of Haiti has laws on the 14 books to preve nt the zombification of individuals.
*In one of the more interesting interpretations, Grady Hendr ix (zoo8) concludes that Juan Carlos Fresnadillo's 28 Weeks Later (zoo7) is "an effective metaph or for the unstoppable, global spread of Starbucks." For more genera] discussi.ons of how zombies are used as metaphors, see Aquilina and Hughe s zoo6; Comar off and Comar off 2002; Cooke 2009, chap. 7; Fay zooS; Harpe r 1002; Kay and Embry 20o8; Newitz 2oo6; Paffenroth 2oo6; 200 8; Lauro Russel1 zoos; and Webb and Byrnard 2oo8 .
S
INTRODUCTION
No great power has done the same in public-but one can only speculate what these governments are doing in private. One must be wary of overstating the case- after all, flesh-eating ghouls are not the only paranonnal phenomenon to spark popular interest. Over the past decade, aliens, ghosts, varnpires, wizards, witches, and hobbits were also on the tip of everyone's tongue. For some, the specter of zmnbies pales in comparison to other paranonnal creatures. The disdain of cultural elites has abetted this perspective by placing zombies in the derivative, low rent part of the paranormal spectrum-a shuffling, stutnbling creature that desires only braaaaiiiiiinnnnm1ns. Twenty-five years ago,Jmnes Twitchell concluded, "the zornbie is an utter cretin, a vampire with a lobotomy." 15 De pite the zombie renaissance in popular culture, they are stdl considered disreputable. Paul Waldn1ann observed in 2009 that "in truth, zombies should be boring ... what's remarkable is that a villain with such bttle complexity has thrived for so long." 16 In 2010, he Acadetny Awards presented a three-rninute hon1age to horror cinen1a, and only a 1nillisecond was devoted t any zombie fihn- far less than that Chucky doll. o zombie has the appeal of ]. l(. Rawling's I-Iarry Potter or the Twilight series' Edward Cullen. From a public policy perspective, however, zornie m.erit greater interest than other paranonnal
INTRODUCTION
Zombies, in contrast to va mpires, do not thrive in hjgh chools.
phenomenon. In contrast to van1pires or demons, scientists and doctors acknowledge that s01ne variation of a zo1nbie could exist in our physical world.* Zmnbies *Berlinski 2009; Davis 1985, 1988; Efthimiou and andhi ; Koch and Cr.ick 2001; Littlewood an d Douyon 1997· In the 2007 main, these possibilities adhere closely to the traditional 1-Iaitian notion of the zombie as a human revived via voodoo and devoid of free will, rath er than tl1e fl esh-eating ghouls that started wi h George Romero's Night of the I iving Dead (1968).
7
INTRODUCTION
possess a patina of plausibility that vampires, ghosts, witches, demons, or wizards lack; the creation of a zombie does not necessarily require a supernatural act. Indeed, this plausibility of zombies can be seen in expert surveys. A recent poll of professional philosophers showed that more than s8 percent of philosophers believed that zombies could exist on some level. In contrast, fewer than I 5 percent of the same respondents were prepared to believe in God.* Given the raft of religion and theology departments in the academy, it seems churlish for scholars toneglect the question of reanimated corpses snacking on human flesh. The traditional narrative of the zombie canon also looks different from stories about other paranormal beings. Zombie stories end in one of two ways-the elimination/subjugation of all zombies, or the eradi17 cation of humanity from the face of the earth. If popular culture is to be believed, the peaceful coexistence of ghouls and humans is a remote possibility. Such extreme ali-or-nothing outcomes are less corn*Data from the PhllPapers Survey of 3,226 professional philosophers and others carried out in November 2009 (http://phil papers.org/surveysl). The philosophical definition of zombie (a being identical to humans in every way except lacking in consciousness) is somewhat different from the vernacular meaning (a reanimated corpse intent on eating human flesh). There is some conceptual overlap between the two meanings, however. As David Chalmers ( 1996, 96) puts it, "all is dark inside" for both categories of zombies.
INTRODUCTION
mon in the vampire or wizard literatures. Ther e are far fewer narratives of vampires trying to take over the world. 18 Instead, creatures of the night are frequently co-opted into existing power structures. Indeed, recen t literary tropes suggest that vampires or wizards can peacefully coexist with ordinary teens in many of the world's high schools, provided they are sufficiently hunky. 19 Zombies, not so much. If it is true that "popular culture nzakes world politics what it curre ntly is," then the international relations communi ty needs to digest the problem posed by flesheatin g ghouls in a more urgen t manner.
20
9
THE ZOMBIE LITERATURE It would be reckless to proceed with any discussion of the zombie problem without first reviewing the literat ure on the subject. Thankfully, the living dead are now the focus of rigorous scholarship, as figure 1 demonstrates. The humanities are replete with cultural de1 compositions of flesh-eating ghouls. Philosophers have chewed over the conceivability and metaphysi2 cal possibility of zombies at some length. The natural sciences have started attacking the zombie question. Zoologists have looked at the presence of zombielike creatures elsewhere in the animal kingdom. 3 Biologists have researched the disease4 ans. hum ng biti ans hum of ies pert pro n transmissio Forensic anthropologists have considered how long 5 zombies can persist while their body decomposes. Physicists have explored the best place to hide from 6 the "ran dom walk" pattern of zombielike bodies. Com put er scientists are working frantically to ward
7 off online zombies, or botnets. Mathematicians re, cen tly modeled the theoretical spread of zombies and offered some sobering conclusions: "An outbreak of zombies infecting humans is likely to be disastrous,
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
unless extremely aggressive tactics are en1ployed against the undead .... A zombie outbreak is likely to lead to the collapse of civilization, unless it is dealt with quickly." 8 This study has provoked some critical feedback, however. 9 This brief survey of the zombie literature reveals an immediate and daunting problem. The hmnanities and the hard sciences have devoted attention to the proble1n posed by reanimated corpses feasting upon human flesh. The social sciences, however, are curiously absent from this line of inquiry. As of July zoro, the advisory board for the Zombie Research 10
Society does not contain a single social scienrist. When social scientists mention zombies, they do so
only for metaphorical reasons. 11 While economists have rigorously modeled the optitnaltnacroeconon1ic policies for a world of vampires, 12 they have yet to flesh out a zotnbie consumption function. Despite their mob tendencies, sociologists have not analyzed the asocial sociability of zombies. Political science has abjectly failed to address the policy responses and governance issues associated with the living dead. When compared to work in cognate disciplines, the social sciences in general-and international relations in particular-suffer from a zombie gap. This dearth of scholarly inquiry should gnaw at international relations scholars and policyinakers alike. Classical authors were clearly aware of threats posed by
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
the living dead, as the opening passage from Ezekiel suggests. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu stressed the importance of fighting when on "death grotmd," clearly anticipating the imminent threat posed by the undead. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounted how a "plague that showed itself to be something quite different fron1 ordinaty diseases" would lead to general lawlessness and chaos. 'When Thom as Hobb es described the state of nature as one of "continuall feare, and danger of violent death, and the life of tnan solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short," 13 zombies were either on his mind or outside his door. In contrast, recen t scholarship has been either inarticulate or brain-dead on the subject. Mod ern international relations theorists have eagerly delved
into othe r paranormal phen otne na-in clud ing UFO s, 14 wizards, hobbits, and vam pires -but not zorn bies. It is genuinely surprising that 1nore scholarship in world politics has not been devoted to the living dead. From a policymaking perspective, further research into flesh-devouring ghouls is also warranted. As powerful decision makers have demonstrated in recent years, low-probability events can elicit hyperbolic 15 policy responses if the predicted effects are severe. Form er vice president Richard Chen ey believed that extre me measures were warranted if there was even a 16 perc ent chance of a severe terro rist attack. If a 1
polic y analyst applies this logic to the undead, then
13
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
preventive measures are clearly necessary. Even if the probability of a zon1bie uprising is n1uch stnaller, the dead rising from the grave and feasting on the living represent a greater existential threat to hun1anity than nuclear terrorism. Indeed, the living dead literally embodywhat]essica Stern calls a "dreaded risk."
17
Because the postulated effects of zotnbies appear to be so dire in film and fiction, more strategic planning should be devoted to this scenario.lt is certainly possible that any counter-zombie contingency plans will disintegrate at first contact with the undead enemy. 18 Nevertheless, the planning process itself can itnprove future policy responses. 19 If the past decade of military incursions teaches us anything, it is the dangers of conducting foreign policy with only a facile or superficial knowledge about possible enemies. Traditional tools of statecraft like nuclear deterrence, economic sanctions, or diplon1atic demarches would be of little use against the living dead.* Zombies crave
hun1an flesh, not carrots or sticks. A deep knowledge *The use of nudear weapons in particular would be a catastrophic mistake in a zombie-infested world. Ghouls caru1ot be deterred, stripping the one useful trait such weapons possess. Nuclear weapons would no doubt :incinerate massive nwnbers of zombies. UnJike human beings, however, the undead would survive any radioactive falJout from the nuclear blast. Indeed, zombies carrying lethal doses of radiation would pose a double threat to humans as they stumbled around: death by radiation, or reanimation by zombie bite. If any government was so fooll1ardy as to launch a first strike, it would create the only thing worse than an army of the living dead: a mutant, radioactive army of the living dead.
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
of zon1 bies- and the possible policy response to zornbies- is required in order to avoid both overreactions and underreactions. The rising popularity of zotnbies is in and of itself anoth er reason for further investigation. Research suggests that exposure to paranormal narratives increases the likelihood of individuals to believe in their existence. 20 Such beliefs have a viral quali ty-th at is, exposure to other people's beliefs will increase the likelihood of accepting that san1e belief, regardless of 21 its logical plausibility. As zombies bleed into popular culture, more people will co1ne to believe, fear, and dread their existence. Fear is a powerful emot ion that can profo undly affect policyrnaking across several dimensions. 22 A phobia of the living dead could lead to self-defeating policy responses in the same way that the fears of terror ist attacks led the post- 9/r r U.S. military to tortu re prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Clearly, publi c fears of bejng devoured by flesh-eating ghouls can only be allayed by rigorous scholarship. In many ways, international relations is the missing link in most discussions of how to cope with a zomb ie uprising. The undead menace usually goes global in the zon1bie canon. Thes e stories lack a basic groun ding in worJd politics, however. Narratives abou t the living dead use stnall con11nunities or families as their unit of social analysis. The effect of natio nal governtnents or international relations is
1S
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
barely discussed- even though logic suggests that the living dead would provoke some kind of policy response. As Jonathan Maberry observes, "most of the major entries in the genre have tnilitary, police, or civilian defense as part of the backstory." 23 The problem is that these responses are either dismissed or glossed over quickly to get to the apocalyptic portion of the story. 24 Even if official policy responses are suboptimal, they should be factored into our expectations about how the world would respond when the dead walk the earth-and how international relations would look afterward. What follows is an attempt to satiate the evergrowing hunger for knowledge about the interaction of zombies and world politics. Alas, sotne lines of academic inquiry are simply not feasible. Human subjects committees would impose a formidable barrier to experimental methods. The rare nature of zombie outbreaks make statistical approaches unsuitable. Nevertheless, there are many possible ways to proceeddevelop a new theoretical model, interview experienced policyrnakers about their experiences with zombielike scenarios, create powerful computer simulations, or search for other modalities. Looking at the state of international relations theory, however, one quickly realizes the absence of consensus about the best way to model world politics. 'There are multiple existing paradigms that attempt
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
to explain intern ationa l relations. Each of thetn has a differe nt take on how zon1bies affect world politics and how political actors would respond to the living dead. I have theref ore decided to flesh out how existing intern ationa l relations theories would predic t what would happe n in response to an outbre ak of zombies.* What would these theories predic t would happe n? \\That policy rec01nn1endations follow frotn these theories? When will hiding and hoard ing be the right idea? This analysis is useful not n1erely because of a possible zombje threat but as a way to stress test our existing theories of international politics. Scholars, commentators, and policy analysts rely on deductive theories as a cognitive guide in a complex world. The more observat ional implications that flow fro1n these theories, the greate r their explanatory leverage over known 25 unkno wns and unkno wn unknowns. One measure of their explanatory leverage is their ability to offer useful and counte rintuit ive predictions in the wake of *Space constraints prevent a fu.ller discussion of how some theorie s-such as Marxism or feminism- would cope with flesheating ghouls; they wou~~ appear ~~ have more explanatory leverage in analyzing the tradJttonal Ha~?an or voodoo zombies . I wo~ld ordinad ly encoura ge these paradigms to focus on tlesh-eatmg ·houls, but in this instance I am wa1y. To be blunt, this project is :xplicit ly prohuma~, whereas M~rxists and f~minists would likely syrnpat hjze more wrth the z01~1bres. To Marust s, tl~e undead symbolize the oppressed p,r~letanat. U~less the zombres were all undead white males, fermmsts would likely welcome the posthuman of existing patriarchal structures.
smaShing
17
8
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
exogenous shocks to the system. Surely an anny of the ravenous living dead would qualify as such a shock. Zombie denialists might argue that since there is minimal chance of the dead rising frorn the grave and feasting upon the living this exercise will yield little in the way of enlightenment. This ignores the ways in which world politics is changing, and the need for international relations scholarship to change with it. Traditionally, international relations has been concerned with the interactions among nation-states. Many current security concerns, however, center on nontraditional threats. A growing concern in world politics is the draining of power from purposive actors to the forces of entropy. 26 In the most important ways, flesh-eating ghouls are an exemplar for salient concerns about the global body politic. Zombies are the perfect twenty-first-century threat: they are not well understood by serious analysts, they possess protean capabilities, and the challenge they pose to states
.
very, very grave. I will rely on two sources of evidence to buttress the theoretical paradigms. The first data source is the social science literature on events akin to an attack of IS
the undead: pandemics, disasters, bioterrorism, and so forth. Past responses to calamitous events can inform our expectations of how states and nonstate actors would respond to the presence of reanimated and ravenous corpses.
ZOMBIE LITERATURE
The second data source is the fictional narratives abou t zombies that exist in popular culture. In recent years, policymakers have relied on the creators of fictional narratives for insights into "out of the box" 27 threa t scenarios and outcomes. Similarly, international relations scholars have branched out beyond stand ard statistical analyses and comparative case studies for their empirical analysis. Thes e scholars have used simulations and agent-based modeling to test their theories. 28 The use of fictional narratives as a data source for theory build ing-p artic ularl y horror and science ficti on-h as become more common 29
in rece nt yearS. To be sure, there are some dangers with this approa ch that should be acknowledged at the outset. First, the narratives of film and fiction might be skewed 30 in ways that could bias our analysis. Perhaps people would respond to a real night of the living dead in a different mann er than George Romero or Max Brooks posit. This possibility will be cons idere d-bu t as we shall see, there is a hidden heterogeneity to the zombie cano n. Ther e are a sufficient number of variations to the traditional ghoul narrative to illuminate each of the majo r international relations paradigms.* *To sidestep the myriad controversies that plague the comrnu. of zomb ie enthusiasts, my primary empirical focus will be on major works in the zombie canon: George Romero's films, Max Brooks's novels, and the most popular works released over the
:7
past decad e.
19
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ZOMBIE LITERATURE
Second, pursuing a paradigmatic approach to explain the field of international relations has some drawbacks. Some might argue that paradigmatic debates have yielded much more heat than light. The predictive power of these approaches has been underwhelming.31 Other scholars posit that calling these different theoretical approaches "paradigms" gives 32
them a coherence and completeness that they lack. As will be seen, some of the concepts in one paradigm bleed over into others, as they rely on similar actors and processes. Nevertheless, these paradigms do help to clarify what different international relations theorists believe is important in world politics. \Vhether researchers admit it or not, all coherent international relations work proceeds from some paradigmatic assumptions. A theoretical attack of the undead can further reveal how these different approaches diverge in their predictions. In eliding some internal theoretical disputes, however, I fully acknowledge that I am committing some conceptual violence to these paradigms. In fairness, however, the undead would likely do far worse. Before proceeding with the variegated predictions of different international relations theories, a few definitions and distractions must be addressed.
DEFINING A ZOMBIE Definitions of zombies range from the philosophical one of a huma n being witho ut consciousness to the anthropological one of a person buried and then resurrec ted by a conjurer. Cons istent with the Zombie Research Society, I choose to treat the zombie as a biologically definable, animated being occupying a huma n 1 host, with a desire to eat huma n flesh. This definition is at variance with the etymology of the word zombie in West African and Haiti an voodoo rituals. Thos e reanim ated corpses, however, do not represent a transnatio nal security threa t-ind eed, these "traditional" zomb ies are usually described as the most obedient of labor ers. All mode rn works in the zombie canon are roote d in the kind of ghoul that first appeared in Geor ge Romero's Night of the Living Dead (r968). Because they can spread across borders and threaten states and civilizations, it is flesh-eating ghouls that shoul d anima te the concern of international politics schol ars and policymakers. From a national security perspective, the three relev ant assumptions about zombie behavior are as
follows:
Z
DEFINING A ZOMBIE
1. Zombies desire human flesh; they will not eat other zombies.
2. Zombies cannot be killed unless their brain is destroyed.
3. Any human being bitten by a zombie will inevitably become a zombie.
Every modem zombie narrative adheres to these rules. These criteria do eliminate some of the urnarratives that laid the foundation for the zombie canon, such as Richard Matheson's 1954 novel I Am Legend or Don Siegel's 1956 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers. 2 Nevertheless, any zombies that satisfy these rules would have a pronounced impact upon international relations. In turn, however, the nature of international relations would affect the global response to an attack of flesh-eating ghouls.
DISTRACTING DEBATES ABOUT FLESH-EATING GHOULS There is significant variation in zombie capabilities across the canon -and vigorous debate within the 1 zombie studies community over these differences. In most of the literature, zombies cannot talk, and do not retain any attributes of their human identities. There are distinguished exceptions, however, in both film (Dan O'Bannon's Return of the Living Dead, uez's Planet Terror, 2007) and fic19 85; Robert Rodrig tion. 2 In most of the narratives, only humans can turn into zombies; in the Resident Evil franchise, however, dogs and birds are affected as well. It is usually assumed that there are no gender differences among the walking undead, but recent films provide some unusual exceptions.* Wheth er zombies have desires beyond the consumption of human flesh is unclear. Most narratives do not discuss this question, but the *In Jake West's Doghouse (2009), the toxin that creates zombies only affects wo~en. Jay ~ee's Zombie Stripper: (2oo8) offers the intriguin g prenuse of a VIrus ~at turns m~n mto garden-variety ghouls but empowers women mto developmg a better appreciation of both the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and the complexities of pole dancing.
24
DISTRACTING DEBATES
Italian zon1bie films of the I 98os, as well as Peter Jackson's Dead Alive (1992), suggest that ghouls lust after other ghouls. There is no consensus about how long a zombie can exist before decomposing. Obviously, most works assurne that a human being needs to die before becorning a zo1nbie -but most scholarship also counts Danny Boyle's z8 Days Later (zooz) and Juan Carlos Fresnadillo's 28 Weeks Later (2007) to be part of the canon. In those fihns, the "rage virus" does not exactly kill the infected; they merely transform into bloodshot, bloodthirsty maniacs in less than thirty seconds. Surveying the state of the zombie literature, the two sharpest disagreements are about their origins and their capabilities. This provides us, as social scientists, with an excellent n1eans to detern1ine whether zombie-specific variable s-their origins and their speed-h ave a dramatic effect on international relations. If the same outcomes persist regardless of variation in these variables, then they are unimpor tant as causal factors. The greatest variation in zombie narratives is their origin story: what caused the dead to reanimate and prey upon the living? The reasons provided range from the extraterrestrial to the technological to the microbiological to the supernatural. In George Romero's Night ofthe Living Dead ( r 968), jr is suggested that a returnin g space probe contaminated Earth with a
DISTRACTING DEBATES
hereto fore unkno wn form of radiation. Technology can contribute to the creation of the living dead. Ste3 phen King used a computerized "pulse" in Cell. In the Resident Evil franchise, the Utnbrella Corpo ration biologically engineered the "T-virus." Max Brooks attributed the source of zombies to the Solanu1n virus, which in his zoo6 novel Wodd "War Z has its origins at the bottom of China's Three Gorges Dam reservoir. 4 In Z. A. Recht's novel Plague of the Dead (zoo6), the 5 virus originates in central Africa. In Jackson's Dead Alive, the bite of a Sumatran "rat monkey" creates the first batch of undead. The narrat or in Ruben Fleischer's Zombie/and (zoo9) offers a simple explanation: "Mad cow became mad person became mad zombie." Supernatural explanations have also been provided in the literat ure. In Brian Keene's zotnbie novels, demonic possession is responsible; Ron1ero's Dawn of the Dead (r978) provides the most iconic explanation in the canon: "Whe n there's no more roon1 in hell, the dead will walk the earth."* For Michael Jackson, *It is interest ing to note that Romero's explanations have trended in the opposit e directio n from the rest of the zombie literature . In general, the genre has moved toward scientific and pseudos cientifi c exp lanation s involving viruses, prions, and toxins. In his film.s, however, Romero has drifted from the radiation backstory of Night of tbe Living Dead (1968) to a more superna tural explana tion. In the later D_ay of the Dead (r?85), the cha~acter John scoffs at the idea of a sc1ennfic explananon, conclud mg simply, "We've been punishe d by the Creator . He visited a curse on us, so we might get a look at what Hell was like."
25
26
DISTRACTING DEBATES
the dead start to walk in their 1nasquerade for the rnurkiest of reasons: the evil of the "ThriJler." Clearly, there is no consensus on what causes the reanimation of corpses into flesh-eating autom.atons. For our concerns, this discord is diverting but irrelevant. From a foreign policy/national security perspective, the primary reason to be concerned about the cause of zombies is to adopt preventive 1neasures and policies with which to handle zon1bie-infested jurisdictions. As antiterrorism and hon1eland security policies suggest, however, massive invesonents in prevention canno t be 100 perce nt foolproof. It only takes one zotnbie to create an anny of the undead. Unfortunately, the very multiplicity of causal n1echanisms makes prevention both highly unlikely and prohibitively expensive. 6 A u~uly preemnptive doctrine would require a co1nprehensive and draconian list of policy measures. It is unlikely that any government would be both willing and able to block all relevant research efforts into biological, nuclear, and computer technology, moni tor and preve nt any religious interference that could stir up the undead, and ward off the evil of the Thriller. Even powerful g·overnments will lack both the foresight and the capabilities to block all of the possible causal mechanisms though which the dead can be resurrected. This is especially true given that, in most of the origin stories, the emergence of zombies is accidental
DISTRACTING DEBATES
rather than intentional. The complexity of precautionary tneasures could increase the likelihood of the living dead stalking hutnankind by increasing the probability of a "normal acc1dent." 7 U.S. efforts to develop countermeasures to bioterrorisn1, for exanlple, have actually increased the supply of deadly toxins, thus concon1itantly increasing the probability of an accident triggering the unintended release of a biotoxin to the outside world. In the case of bioterroristn, however, at least the federal government could point to the existence of prior attacks to validate preventive measures. Without a prior history of zombie attacks for justification, no governn1ent could produce a cost-benefit analysis to warrant extensive precautionary policies. International relations scholarship is less concerned with the cause of zmnbies than their effect on world politics. To use the language of social science, flesh-eating ghouls are the independent variable. As it turns out, the creators of zombie narratives largely share this position. It is telling that these stories usually provide only perfunctory explanations for how "Zombie Zero" was born. In Night of the Living Dead, for exan1ple, Romero only provided a causal explana9 tion when pressured by the filrr1's disu·ibutors. Multiple comtnentators have correctly observed the reason for this lack of concern; these stories are always set after the outbreak, as civilization itself is threatened.
10
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DISTRACTING DEBATES
Like interna tional relation s scholars, the creators of zombie narratives are more interested in how the living dead affect human institut ions. The absence of consensus about what causes zo1nbies tnight be vexing but, for our purpose s, it is not problen1atic. An even fiercer doctrin al dispute involves how fast zotnbie s can move.u From Romero 's Night of the Living Dead throug h Brooks's World War Z, the living dead walked, shuffled, lurched , crawled, or stutnb ledbut they did not run. Recent zombie survival manuals stress this point. 12 Brooks is particu larly emphat ic, asserting , "Zomb ies appear to be incapab le of running . The fastest have been observe d to n1ove at the rate of barely one step per r. 5 second s .... The average living human possesses a dexteri ty level 90 percen t 13 greater than the stronge st ghoul." Beginn ing with 28 Days Later, however, the idea of"fast zombie s" has n1ade serious inroads into the canon. In Zack Snyder's
2004 remake of Dawn of the Dead, zombies sprinte d at high speeds. In Zombie/and, the undead spread because they were faster than the aerobically challenged Americans. Frozen Nazi zombies were able to traverse difficult, snowy terrain at high speed in Tommy Wtrkola's Dead Snow (2009). This need for speed pron1pted George Romer o to rebut the idea of fast zon1bies in Diary of the Dead (zoo8). His protago nist explained early on that "dead things don't tnove fast .... If you run that fast, your ankles are gonna snap off."
DISTRACTING DEBATES
This debate has clearly anin1ated the zombie studies con1 mun ity-b ut, again, it is largely irrelevant to questions about international relations. The reason is that, regardless of whether flesh-devouring ghouls move slowly or quickly, the plague of the undead is extren1ely likely to cross borders. If zombies were able to move and infect hurnans at high speeds, it would be virtually in1possible to contain their spread 14 to a single coun try or region. However, even if zombies are slow, they are unlikely to stay confined to a single country. A slow-moving zombie outbreak would translate into an equally slow-n1oving policy resp onse and, as we shall see in the chapter "Bureaucratic Politics: The 'Pulling and Hauling' of Zombies," the initial responses are likely to be riddled with error. Furt henn ore, if the zombie canon is any guide, slow zon1bies are positively correlated with a slower incub ation period. The infected in 28 Days Late1" are fast zombies; when they are exposed to the rage virus, they "turn " in less than thirty seconds. The zombies in Ron1ero's movies or Brooks's World War Z are slow moving; if they are bitten, it takes them hours or days to become part of the living dead. The effect of zombiism corresponds with the speed of transmission. Fastactin g viruses lead to fast zotnbies, and slow-acting viruses lead to "old school" zombies. If it takes a longer tirne for hun1an beings to die and turn into flesh-eating ghouls, then it is also possible
29
30
DISTRACTING DEBATES
for them to travel a farther distance fr01n the original point of infection while still human. With a modern transport infrastructure, an infected individual can get from one major population center to another within twenty-four hours. Even a single outbreak of corpse reanimation can go global. In addition, although the zombie plague is only spread through biting or other fluidic transfers, the infection rate is roo percent. Even powerful disease vectors like smallpox or influenza have infection rates that are considerably lower. 15 Because the zombie contagion is so powerful, its cross-border spread is a near certainty. It should be stressed that the fast-versus -slow debate is of significant importance for other policy dimensions. The military tactics, evacuation logistics, refugee policies, and homeland security measures needed to cope with a fast zotnbie outbreak would look dramatically different from a slow one. We are concerned with global responses in this book, however. As figure 4 demonstrates, both the fast and slow zmnbie possibilities lead to the same outcom e-the globalization of ghouldom. Because either variety of zotnbie leads to an international relations problem, we can dismiss the causal import ance of speed as a detenn ining factor in global policy responses. Indeed, as the two-by-two diagram in table r detnonstrates, neither the origins nor the speed of zon1bies is of 1nuch causal significance.
DISTRACTING DEBATES
Zombies spread across land borders
Rapid spread pro11okes rapid go11ernment
recognize crossborder nature of problem
Globa lization of ghouldom ; globalization of policv response F igur e 4· W hy speed does not causally affect the spread of zombies.
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DISTRACTING DEBATES
TABLE 1 A 2X2 Table, as Required in aU Political Science Research
Fast Zombies
Slow Zombies
Supernatuml O-rigins
Cross-border security problem
Cross-border security problem
Scientific Origins
Cross-border Securjty problem
Cross-border Security problem
The starting point of our analysis is that the Jiving dead are a transnational phenon1enon. Either corpses reanimate across the globe, or they spread outward from a single source. Either way, they are a threat that all COWltries must consider in crafting their foreign and national security policies. And so we arrive at our central question: \Vhat would different theories of international relations predict would happen if the zombies started to roam the earth?
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD 1 The re are many varieties of realism, but all realists start with a con11non assu mpt ion- that anarchy is the overarching constraint of world politics. Anarchy does not mean chaos or disorder but instead the ab-
sence of a centralized, legitin1ate authority. No matter wha t arde nt costnopolitans or conspiracy theo rists believe, there is no world government. With no mon opol y on the use of force in world politics, every acto r mus t adopt "self-help" 1neasures to ensure continu ed existence. For realists, the primary actors are thos e that can guarantee their own surv ival- nam ely, states. Because force is the ne plus ultra of power, the acto rs that coun t are those with the greatest ability to use forc e-st ates with sizable armed forces. Mos t realists argue that the combination of anarchy and the need for self-help creates recu rren t and pers isten t patterns in international affairs. In a world of anarchy, the only currency that matters is pow erthe material capability to ward off pressure or coercion while being able to influence others. If one state amasses mor e and more power, othe r states will have
l4
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
an incentive to balance against that state, so as to prevent it fr01n dominating everyone.2 The anarchic global structure makes it itnpossible for governn1ents to fully trust each other, forcing all states to be guided solely by their own national interests. Since all states can only count on their own resources and capabilities, realists are very skeptical about the ability of international institutions to regulate world politics. States will consider the distribution of gains when thinking about cooperating with another actor. The question, for realists like Kenneth Waltz, is not "will both of us gain?" but "who will gain more? "3 Cooperation in the fonn of balancing coalitions will always be transient and unstable. Just as zombies will always crave human flesh, realpolitik states will always crave a 1nore favorable distribution of capabilities. 'Vhen relative gains concerns are paramount, cooperation is always ephemeral 4 Because anarchy is such a powerful constraint on state actions, realists are not particularly interested in the domestic politics of other countries. Whether a country has a democratic, autocratic, or revolutionary fonn of goven1n1ent has only a marginal effect on that country's foreign policy trajectory. The structure of anarchy is so powerful that it evenmally forces all states into roughly sitnilar policy preferences-n1aximizing security. This does not necessarily translate into power maximization. States that becon1e too powerful risk
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
at is, triggering what is called a security dile 1nm a-th ose acquiring so much power tha t oth er colmtries cho er. 5 fon n a balancing coalition against the rising pow on Even scholars who believe in power maxi1nizati ly allow that the "stopping power of water" will like 6 acdet er any state from global overreach. Realists e knowledge that, on occasion, states deviate from thes en , predictions because of d01nestic interests _? "\/Vh the this happens, however, the competitive rigors of their systeru will force these actors to either change rotbeh avi or- or they will wither away faster than a 8
ting corpse. Realists focus like a laser beam on the interna ing tional distribution of power. Th e waxing and wan outof states corresponds to their influence over balcomes in world politics. Mo st realists posit tha t ting ance of power politics acts as a natural regula care mechanisnL Power transition theorists, however, erful abo ut the relationship between the most pow to its sta te- the heg em on- and potential challengers ted prim acy in world politics. If a hegemon is supplan war by a rising power, the likelihood of a great power stspikes. 9 Wh en this situation occurred in the pa at from Sparta and Athens in ancient Greece to Gre he Britain and Germany prio r to World Wa r I-t past, wo rld becomes fraught with uncertainty. In the trigthe prospect of such a power transition has often als ger ed gre at power wars. If the rising power sign
3S
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THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
that it has revisionist aims-in other words, it wants to rewrite the rules of world order- then such a conflict will be inexorable. As this summary might suggest, realisn1 has a rather dystopic and jaundiced view of the world. In other words, realism is perfectly comfortable in the zo1nbie universe-particularly tl1e world of George Romero's films. In the original Night of the Living Dead ( r 968), seven people are trapped in a farmhouse surrounded by flesh-eating ghouls. Despite the common external threat posed by zombies, the individuals inside the house are barely able to cooperate. Ties of kinship mean little. Two separate sovereign entities (the baselnent and the first floor) are quickly created and ruled by separate individuals (Harry and Ben).* Resourcesfood, access to inforn1ation, firearms-are the object of fierce distributional conflict. Temporary accords designed to create a public good-escape and rescuequickly break down when there are shifts in the distribution of power. A similar dynamic plays itself out in Romero's
Dawn of the Dead (1978). This tin1e a band of survivors fortifies itself inside a shopping mall. Despite possessing an abundance of resources, the main characters do their utlnost to prevent another cluster of *Indeed, Ben tells Harry, "If you stay up here, you take orders from rne!"
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
er gan g hum ans fron1 ent erin g the mall.* Wh en a bik nin g the bre ach es the ir defenses, the y res pon d by ope upy the doc kin g bays to let in mo re zom bie s-t o occ dow n in atte ntio n of the bikers. Co ope rati on breaks ed, the Ro me ro's Day of tbe Dead (I9 85) as we ll-i nde tha t film cha rac ter of Sar ah complains early on in ns." Th e tha t "we 're all pul ling in diff ere nt directio ce of refailure of hu1nans to coo per ate in the pre sen per me ate s ani ma ted corpses is a com mo n the ine tha t rna tion al the zot nbi e can on- jus t as the futility of inte rpr eta coo per atio n rec urs thr oug hou t the rea list inte tion of history. ghouls Ho w would the intr odu ctio n of flesh-eating simple if affe ct wor1d politics? Th e realist answer is be largely sur pri sin g-i nte rna tio nal rela tion s wo uld mp res sed una ffec ted . Th is par adi gm would be uni eat to the wit h the claim tha t a new existential thr cha nge in hum an con diti on leads to any radical und ead hum an behavior. To the m, a pla gue of the sters. Dis wo uld me rely ech o old er plagues and disa ck De ath eas e has affected wo rld politics fro m the Bla influenza of the fou rtee nth cen tur y to the I 9 I 8- I 9 s simply pan dem ic. In the past, mo st of the se plague ause n1ore reif ied exi stin g pow er relationships. Bec stro nge r dyn am ic and pow erfu l societies developed mutters, "It's *As the biker gang rampages the mall, Stephen ting the bikers. ours . We took it. It's ours." He then starts shoo
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THE REALPOLITIK Of THE LIVING DEAD
i1nmunities to plague, they gained a greater share of relative power during pandemics. 10 Similarly, modern research shows that wealthier and more powerful societies can weather natural disasters better than weaker, poorer states. 11 Realists would see no reason to expect an epidemic of zotnbies to be any different in its effects. To paraphrase Thucydides, the realpolitik of zombies is that the strong will do what they can, and the weak n1ust suffer devouring by reanimated, ravenous corpses. To be sure, even realists would acknowledge some shifts in the global distribution of power frotn the reanitnation of the dead. Some governments will be better p1aced to repulse the zombies than others. Those with greater security and communications infrastructures should be able to put down any internal zombie insurrections and reestablish domestic order, or block cross-border zotnbie incursions. States with low population densities would have more time to adapt to the presence of the undead. Geographic isolation would be no guarantee of zombie prevention.
As Romero demonstrated in Land of the Dead (zoos) and Max Brooks showed in his novel World War Z (2oo6), there is no stopping power of water for the undead because they have no need to breathe. Nevertheless, geography still matters. Some geographic features alter the offense-defense balance vis-a-vis an exten1al attack-in other words, defense is easier than
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
coastlines offense on certain kinds of terrain, such as 12 countries or mountain ranges. Realists would expect to thwart with mountainous borders to be more likely e states hordes of foreign flesh-eating ghouls. Som by the livwould undoubtedly be completely overrun ing dead. , howWould the character of world politics change strategies ever? No t necessarily. Th e best tactics and y throughfor defeating zombies would spread quickl the ethical ou t the international system, regardless of rld War Z, or tnoral implications of such plans. In Wo y tha t diffor exan1ple, the national security strateg an apartfuses thr oug hou t the globe has its origins in scenario hei d So uth African government's doomsday tionY Th is of an all-out uprising by the black popula of some str ate gy calls for the intentional sacrifice the situapop ula tio n centers. Given the exigencies of e. tio n, however, it is quickly adopted worldwid itics, so Realists also predict balance of power pol a balancing wo uld n't the specter of the undead create ility cannot coa liti on against all ghouls? Th is possib on theobe rul ed out, particularly for power transiti rasia, for rists. If zombies emerged from central Eu could trigexample, the ir capacity to spread quickly to prevent ger a nat ura l balancing coalition designed continent. zom bie hordes from spreading across the states and If gho uls overran a significant cluster of , a power cre ate d a sufficient num ber of fresh ghouls
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THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
transition dynamic could present itself. The zombies would be seen as the rapidly rising power- and no one would deny that their preference for human flesh would represent radically revisionist war airns. A conta inme nt strategy would no doubt be proposed as a means of litniting the territorial expansion of the undead. 14 Most realists would be vety skeptical about the robustness of a universal "anti-zombie alliance," however. First, buckpassing would be an equally likely outcome. 15 In a buckpassing situation, states would refrain from taking an active stance against the zornbie hordes in the hopes that other countries would do the dirty work of balancing in their stead. So even if a powerful state tried to amass an anti-zombie coalition, other governments tnight con1mit to such an alliance in name only. Second, s1nall suppo rter states would fear that powerful countries would use a global quest against zombies as a subterfuge to augm ent their own capabilities and interests. Past history offers sotne support for this prediction. The Soviet Unio n installed puppet governments in its military theat er of operations at the end of Worl d War II to develop a buffer zone between itself and the West ern alliance. Even during the peak perio d of the Cold War, NAT O men1bers repeatedly clashed over the scope and natur e of the strategic emba rgo placed on the comm unist bloc, be-
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE liVING DUD
ance benecause son1e members of the Western alli h the Soviet fited disproportionately from trade wit itself out du rUnion. 16 A sin1ilar dynamic has played terror." Th e ing the American-led "global war on efforts against United States tried to coordinate global tactic. Ot her all nonstate actors that en1ployed this t were concountries responded by adding groups tha te fit the defisidered national threats bur did no t qui 17
nit ion of terrorist. ic at work Realists would predict a similar dynam ept on an even in any kind of anti-zotnbie crusade, exc disasters have gra nd er scope. In the past, natural 1ans. 18 hun g on am ts flic con g s6n exi pre ed exacerbat from the livStates could therefore exploit the thr eat h irredentist ing dead to acquire new territory, squelc enduring rimo vem ent s, settle old scores, or subdue could use the vals. Th e People's Republic of China n of Taiwan. zom bie thr eat to justify an occupatio tify intervenRussia could use the san1e excuse to jus Z, the conflict tio n int o its nea r abroad; in World War ia and Pakiallows Mo sco w to reabsorb Belarus. Ind failing to consta n would likely accuse each oth er of Th e Un ite d tro l the zombie pro ble m in Kashmir.* temptation to Sta tes would no t be in1mune from the opportunity. exp loi t the zombie thr eat as a strategic ban undead Ho w ]arge would the army of the Cu its zom bie infes*In World Wtn· Z, Pakistan's fai1me to con trol Iran. tati on leads to a mil itar ized dispute with
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THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
need to be to justify the deploy ment of the Eightysecond Airborne? In the end, realists -partic ularly American realists -would no doubt evoke the cautionary words of former preside ntJolm Quincy Adams and warn against going abroad "in search of monsters to destroy." Some realists would go further, arguing that, in the end, hurnan-zo1nbie alliances of convenience would be just as likely to emerge as human -human alliances.
As previously noted, Inany zo1nbies in the canon start out possessing strateg ic intelligence, making then1 more than capable of recogn izing the virtues of tactical agreem ents with some human s. Son1e zombie studies scholars might object at this point, arguing that flesh-eating ghouls can neither talk nor develop strateg ic though t. Even if they did not, though , realists would point to Romer o's zombies for empirical suppor t. Even in Night of the Living Dead, Ro1nero's ghouls demon strated the capacity for using tools.* In each of his subseq uent films, the undead grew more cognitively complex. The zombie charact ers of Bub in Day of the Dead and Big Daddy in Land of the Dead were painted with a tnore sympat hetic brush than most of the human characters. Both Bub and Big Daddy learned how to use firearms. Bub was able to speak, perform simple tasks, and engage in in1pulse *The very first zombie we see in Night of the Living Dead uses a rock to break into Barbara's car.
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
con trol -tha t is, to refrain from eating a hum an he hked. Big Daddy and his undead coho rt developed a hierarchical authority structure with the ability to engage in tactical and strategic learning. In doing so they overran a well-fortified hUJnan redoubt and killed its mos t powerful leader. It would take only the n1ildest of cognitive leaps to envision a zonlbiearticulated defense of these actions at the United Nati ons. By the end of Land of the Dead the lead zombie char acte r and the lead hutuan character acknowledge a tacit bargain to leave each othe r alone. This is perfectly consistent with the realist paradign1. For zonlbies to survive and thrive, they n1ust avoid losing thei r brains; and, like hu1nans, they also n1ust adapt to the rigors of anarchy in world politics. Whi le son1e eme rgin g zon1bie governments tnigh t pursue radical antih uma n policies at first, the anarchical system would 19 eventually discipline a mod erati on of views. In a world of sophisticated zombies, alliances betwee n hum an states and zornbie states are possible. Inde ed, any governtnent that tried to develop a grand coal ition targe ting the undead would imn1ediately trigg er the security dilemma. Realpolitik states could expl oit any move toward an idealistic global war on zom bies by creating temp orar y alliances of convenien ce with etnerging ghoul governments. A tnore passive strategy would be to encourage what Jolm
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THE REALPOLITIK OF THE liVING DEAD
Zombies could defend their actions at rl1e United Nations.
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE LIVING DEAD
Mearsh i1ner labels "bait and bleed" and "bloodletting" strategies.20 In these instances, realist states would try to fon1ent conflict between anti-zon1bi tate and the ghouls then1selves, profiting at the rela i loss incurred by both sides. Realists would advocate noninterfe rence in how zombie states treated the ir own living and undead populations.* In the end, realists would conclude that there would be little intrinsic difference between hmnan states and zombie states. Hlnnan beings have an innate lust for power in the realist paradigrn; zmnbies have an innate lust for hun1an flesh. Both are scarce resources . Regardless of individual traits, doInestic institutions, or variations in the desire for living flesh, hurnan and zombie actors alik are subject to the satne powerful constraint of anarchy. Both sets of actors wou ld engag in u·ategic oppornu1isn1 to advance their interests in anarchy~ The fundament al character of world politics would therefore re1nain unchanged . In the end, realists would caution hu1nan governme nts against expending significant a1nounts of blood and treasure to engage in far-i~ung antizombie adventure s-particul arly blood. ou ld no doubt warn again t the power of a *Some rea1i t "human lobby" to blind government from their national inter ts .
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REGULATING THE UNDEAD IN A LIBERAL WORLD ORDER
Like the realist paradigm, there are many varieties of liberalism. 1 All liberals nevertheless share a common belief: cooperation is still possible in a world of anarchy. Liberals look at world politics as a non-zero-sum game. Mutual cooperation on issues ranging from international trade to nuclear nonproliferation to disease prevention can yield global public goods on a massive scale. These gains are not always distributed evenly, but they do rnake all actors better off than they would be in the absence of policy coordination. Major actors in world politics therefore have an incentive to realize the benefits that come from longterm mutual cooperation and avoid the costs that come with mutual defection. Liberals do not believe that cooperative outcomes always happen in world politics. In some cases, preferences might be so divergent that no compromise or bargain can be struck among the actors. Even if a nonzero-sum bargain is possible, this incentive to realize
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
these gains does not guarantee that collaboration takes place. The benefits generated by cooperation are often nonexcl udable- in other words, anyone will benefit from broad-based cooperation even if they themselves do not cooperate. For exa1nple, if a plucky band of survivors were to devise a way to eli1ninate the plague of the undead, all hun1ans would benefit regardless of whether they helped or not. This creates a free-rider problem, as the payoff structure in table 2 demonstrates. The conundr um for liberals is that while an outcome of n1utual cooperation is better than one of n1urual defection, everyone is best off in a situation in which they can unilaterally defect. Since every actor has these san1e incentives, the outcome can be a "tragedy of the co1nmons"--everyone defecting, 2 even though everyone is better off cooperating. This situation is not hopeless, however. The liberal paradigm. offers multip]e strategies to overcome the tragedy of the commons. 3 Conditions that lengthen the shadow of the future increase the likelihood of cooperation. The longer one's time horizon, the greater the rewards from mutu.al cooperat ion are in comparison to the fleeting benefits fron1 free riding. If an actor expects to be around for a while, then response strategies that punish noncoop eration but play well with "nice" actors- such as tit-for-t at-can sustain multilateral coopera tion over the long run.
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
TABLE 2 Tr·agedy of the Commo ns Game
Player B
Pl.ayerA
Cooperate
Defect
CoopeTate
(3,3)
(0,5)
Defect
(5,0)
(1,1)
Other gambits can increase the rewards fro1n cooperat ion and reduce the benefits fro1n defection. Econornic interdependence reduces the incentive to defect by magnifying the gap in gains between a world 4 of collective action and a world of mutual distrust. Governments will be less likely to cheat in the short term if they know it n1eans they will lose the benefits from trade in the long tern1. Multilateral institutions that 1nonitor and disseminate information can ensure 5 that cheating will be detected and punished. Institutions reassure all participating actors that they are on the satne page in terms of the rules of the gan1e -and they clarify how and when those rules will be broken. Finally, democracies are more likely to cooperate with each other. Libera]s posit that democracies are more likely to have sitnilar preferences, n1aking cooperat ion easier. More significantly, d01nestic laws and institu tions provides democracies with the 1neans to 6 credibly comnut to inten1ational agreernents. Liberals
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REGULATING THE UNDEAD
allow that the Hobbesian war of all against all predicted by realism could happen, but only under very extreme conditions.? A world of economic interdependence, democratic govenunents, and international institutions should foster extensive arn.ounts of multilateral cooperation. At first glance, the liberal paradign1 appears to be a bad fit for a genre that specializes in zmnbie apocalypses. Indeed, the tragedy of liberalism in a universe with zon1bies is that some of its central tenets would accelerate the spread of flesh-eating ghouls. Liberals advocate an open global economy in order to foster complex interdependence and lock in incentives for governments to cooperate. Just as open borders foster greater migration of peoples and pandemics, they would also facilitate the cross-border spread of both the undead and infected human carriers. 8 In sharp contrast to realism, liberal policy prescriptions would appear to exacerbate the first stages of the zombie tnenace. It is little wonder, therefore, that so many critical theorists equate the unchecked spread of zombies
with the unchecked spread of capitalism itself. 9 Similarly, liberals acknowledge that cooperation with rombies would be next to impossible. One would be hard-pressed to devise sanctions that would compel zombies into cooperating. The divergence of preferences is also too great. The refrain in Jonathan Coulton's song "Re: Your Brains," written frotn a zornbie's
REGULATING THEUNDEAD
point of view, best encapsulates the itnplacable nature of the zmnbie bargaining position: All we want to do is eat your brains We're not unreasonable; I mean, no one's gonna eat your eyes
All we want to do is eat your brains We're at an impasse here; maybe we should comprom1se:
If you open up the doors We'll all come inside and eat your brains
If this represents the zombie bargaining position, then the liberal assun1ption of a non-zero-sum bargain does not hold. As table 3 shows, in the Tragedy of the Zon1bies game, the dotninant strategy for zombies is to eat humans. Tit-for-tat strategies do not work. Neither cooperation nor coordination is possible with the Jiving dead. A second glance reveals that the liberal paradigm still offers significant analytical bite. Romantic zombie comedies-rom-zorn-corns for short~ontain both implicit and explicit elements of liberalism. Ruben Fleischer's Zombie/and (2009) is about the articulation and adherence to well-defined rules for surviving in a zombie-infested landscape. Its central nlessagebeyond the need for cardia workouts-.is the need for disparate individuals to credibly commit to each other. The characters in Edgar Wright's Shaun of the Dead
S1
REGULATING THE UNDUD
TABLE 3 Tragedy of the Zom bies Game
HumiJns Don't kill
Zombies
zombies
Kill zombies
Don't eat humans
(1,4)
(0,5)
Eat humans
(5 ,0)
(4,1)
(2004) cooperate with each other far n1ore than in any of George Romero's films. Indeed, just before the climax of that film, the character Shaun rallies his
friends and relations with a stirring paean to liberalism: "As Bertrand Russell once said, 'the only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.' I think we can all appreciate the relevance of that now." The liberal paradigm offers some intriguing predictions and explanations for how a global zombie outbrea k could affect world politics. Perhaps the most import ant liberal insight is an answer to one of the biggest mysteries in zombie studie s-the failure of ghouls to ever attack each other. In Romero's Dawn of the Dead ( r 978), a scientist observes that ''there are no divisions" among the undead. Even those infected with the "rage virus" in Danny Boyle's 28 Days Later (2002) focus their rage only on other humans- not their fellow zombies. We assume that zombies have no wish to eat each other, but it is surprising that they do not turn on each other when try-
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
ing to divvy up a human carcass-especially as human flesh grows scarce. From Romero's Night ofthe Living Dead (I 968) onward, however, zombies have either tolerated each other's company or actively cooperated to defeat humans. Why? The liberal paradigm provides a simple, rational answer: the living dead have the longest possible shadow of the future. John Maynard Keynes famously commented that "in the long run, we are all dead." In the long run, the undead still have to interact with each othe r-and therefore they have the 10 stron gest of incentives to cooperate. If zombies hang together, then humans face the danger of hanging separately. Despite the daunting degree of zon1bie solidarity, liberals would predict that the incentive for multilateral cooperation among humans would be powerful as well. The proliferation of the differently animated represents a classic negative externality probletn of economic globalization. Countries that profit from tradin g with each other would nevertheless reward a third party -flesh -eatin g ghouls- by unwittingly facilitating their spread. States would therefore view zombies the satne way they viewed other public bads that emerged from the open global economy, such as mone y laundering or food-borne diseases. Powerful governments would create and reinforce international institutions designed to control their spread.
53
i4
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
Indeed, the zombie menace would touch so many different spheres of life that liberals would predict a "regime complex" to en1erge. 11 A welter of international governmental organizations- including the United Nations Security Council, the World Health Organization, and the International Organization for Migration-would promulgate a series of policies and protocols designed to cotnbat existing zombie hordes and prevent further outbreaks.* A coordinating body, perhaps even a World Zombie Organization (WZO), would need to be formed in order to handle all of the overlapping health, trade, and security issues. In the end, sotne organization would announce a "comprehensive and integrated dezombiefication strategy," with sufficient buy-in from stakeholders across global civil society, as their plan of action.** The liberal expectation would be that a counterzombie regime complex could make significant inroads into the zombie problem. The public benefits of wiping the undead from the face of the earth are *Given that zombies would be covered under genetically modified organisms, the European Union would immediately invoke the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as the key regulatory mechanism for the cross-border movement of reanimated dead tissue. **This libera.l prediction hinges crucially on whether the initial policy responses could mitigate the spread of ghouls. If decision makers concluded that no action could halt the spread of the undead, then the shadow of the future would disappear; liberals would predict actors to pursue endgame strategies of noncooperation. Hiding and hoarding would be the appropriate responses at this juncture.
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
quite significant, boosting the likelihood of signifi12 cant policy coordination. The undead would fall into the category of systemic threats- such as terrorism and global pande mics- where states have engaged in meaningful cross-border cooperation. This prediction is also consistent with key portions of the zombie literature. In Max Brooks's novel World War (2oo6), the decision to go on the offensive comes after a Unite d Nations meeting.U Consistent with liberal internationalism, the United States provided the necessary leadership and a strong sense of social
z
14 purpose in order to rally support. How effective would these global governance structures be in combating the undead? The question of regitne effectiveness has haunted international re15 lations scholarship for decades. To be sure, liberal security regimes such as NATO or the Chemical Weapons Convention have a credible track record of
success. 16 The ability of both security and health regimes to monit or and spread information quickly in the era of instant messaging would facilitate rapid reactions to the zombie problem at an early stage. Globalization has certainly fostered the technical and regulatory coordination necessary for enhancing biosecurityY At a minimum, one would expect a significant rollback and stringent regulation of the living dead, roughly consistent with the outcome in Brooks's 18 World War Z or Mira Grant's Feed (2oro).
SS
6
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
Althoug h the macrosit uation might appear stable, it would also be imperfect. At present, the regime for cross-bo rder moveme nt of the dead already has significant loopholes. 19 Even if current international law is fixed, zombies represen t a tough test for global governan ce structure s. They are most difficult kind 20 of governan ce problem -a prohibiti on regime. Unless every single ghoul is hunted down and destroyed
beyond recognit ion, a recurren t spread of the undead remains a possibility. The internati onal regimes designed to eliminat e disease de1nonstrate the difficulties inherent in this task. The scourge of smallpox has been erased, but few other diseases have been completely and totally eradicated. 21 The persistence of AIDS, polio, malaria, tuberculosis, and the myriad strains of influenza de1nonstrate the challenges that would face an internati onal counter- zombie regime. The liberal paradigm would predict two significant loophole s that could form within the confines of a global counter- zombie regime. First, some countries might fail to provide timely informat ion about zombie outbreaks until the problem had escalated beyond local control. Authorit arian countries are often reluctan t to admit health crises because of the threat such an admissio n could have on state control over society. Non-dem ocratic regimes are less likely to invest in the public goods necessar y to prevent or contain disasters. 22 This is one reason why the loss of life
REGULATING THE UNDEAD 23 from disasters is greater in authoritarian countries. Local officials could delay reporting a zombie outbreak up the chain of command for fear of being the bearer of bad news. Developing countries might lack the infrastructure to detect the reemergence of the
living dead. They would certainly fear the economic impact of any policy response by large market jurisdiction to an announced outbreak of flesh-eating ghouls.* China's initial refusal to notify the rest of the
world of its SARS cases in a timely, transparent, and verifiable manne r is the exemplar case of this kind of policy conundrum. 24 China behaves in a similar manner in World U'ar Z-go ing so far as to trigger a crisis with Taiwan to disguise the extent of their zombie problem. 25 Second, it would not be surprising if nongovernmenta l organizations (NGO s) devoted to the defense of the living dead acted as an impediment to their eradication. The ability of NGO s to alter global governance structures is a matter of some debate within 26 intern ationa l relations scholarship. At a minimum, however, global civil society can raise the transaction costs of implementing the rules of global governance. At least one nonprofit organization in favor of zorn"This problem is not limited to developing countries. If flesheating ghouls were detected, two immedjate and obvious predictions would follow : the European Union would impose a complete ban on British beef, and Japan and South Korea would impose a similar ban on U.S. beef.
S7
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REGULATING THE UNDEAD
ProtestS against counter-zombie policies would be unsurprising.
hie equality already exists-Gr eat Britain's Citizens for Undead Rights and Equality. 27 The formation of 1nore powerful activist groups- Zombie Rights Watch, Zo1nbies without Borders, ZombAid, or People for
the Ethical Treatment of Zombies- would undoubt-
REGULATING THE UNDEAD
edly make it difficult for the WZO to achiev perfect eradication. \i\Thile thes pitfalls could prove problematic, they should not be o erstated. China has m.oved down the learning curve as a result of the SARS episode; authorities in Beijing were much more tran parent dur2 ing the 2009 I-II N r epiden1ic, for examp le. As countries have adapted to the problem of panden1ics, few r of then1 would be expected to cone al a growing proble m with the undead. Even if multilateral solutio ns proved to be inadequate, liberal would n-
vision the e1n.ergence of "n1inilateral" or regional organizations to act as a backstop. The u ·n ited tates would likely respond to any failure of a WZO by creating a North AI11erican Count er-Zom bie Agreement to handle the problem regionally. imilarly, one would expect the Europ ean Comn1ission to i s e the 1nother of all directives to cope with the issue.* he Association of Southeast Asian Nation s, Mercosur, the Arab Leagu e, and the African Union would not be far behind. The bulk of global civil soci ty would also be unlikely to raise too much of an objection to the eradication of the undead. Zombie right would likely be one of those issues that n1ore powerful GOs *lt is beyond the scope of this te 't to eli cuss h w z mbie comirology within the · ~ uropean nion w uld be handl.ed. T h r js 11rtle doubt, however, th
59
60
UGULATING THE UNDEAD
would resist pushing on their advocacy agenda for 29 fear triggering donor fatigue or political backlash. The liberal paradigm would predict an outcome that would be in1perfect and vulnerable to political criticism over time- much like the European Union in its curren t form. That said, the system would also be expected to function well enough to ward off the specter of a total zombie apocalypse. Zmnbie flareups would no doubt take place. Quasi-permanent humanitarian counter-zornbie missions, under United Nation s auspices, would likely be necessary in failed states. Liberals would acknowledge the permanent eradication of flesh-eating ghouls as unlikely. Thereduction of the zombie problem to one of n1any manag-eable threats, however, would be a foreseeable outcome. To use the lexicon ofliberals, most govern1nents would kill most zombies most of the time.
NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE AXIS OF EVI L DEAD In the American foreign policy community, neoconservatives, or "neocons," are treated as analytically distinct fron1 either realists or liberals. Most international relations scholars view neoconservative foreign policies as possessing a melange of liberal and realist tenets, but some believe that this approach 1 represents an altogether different paradigm. On the one hand, neocons agree with liberals about the inlportanc e of the democratic peace. Like liberals, neoconservatives believe that a world of de1nocracies 2 would be a more secure global order. They accept the notion that democracies will not fight each othertherefore, the world is a safer place when there are democracies. Neocons also agree with liberal internationalists that An1erican hegen1ony contributes to a more just world order. On the other hand, neoconservatives share the
1nore
3 realist skepticis1n about international institutions. Neoco ns disdain multilateral institutions as a Nietz4 schian weapon of the weak and the devious. International institutions and international law only constrain
62
THE AXIS OF EVIL DEAD
democracies because of their adherence to the rule of law. Despotic states benefit from cynically embracing multilateralism in theory but not in practice. N eoconservatives do not trust the foreign policy intentions of authoritarian countries. They are also wary of the ability of democratic states to 1naintain their vigilance in such a dangerous world. Like classical realists, neocons fret about the enervating effects of 5 democracy on the practice of foreign policy. American neoconservatives are very quick to spot threats and conflicts. Over the past decade, they have articulated many such threats to the American way of life-inc luding those emanating from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Al Qaeda, Islatn, the European Union, and the United Nations. 6 Provided that the morass of other possible existential threats did not distract them, one would expect neoconservatives to detect the zombie menace at an early stage.* The neoconservative policy response to an uprising of undead flesh-eaters would be simple and direct. Zombies are an existential threat more serious than any clash of civilizations. To paraphrase Robert Kagan, humans are from Earth and zombies are frotn Hell. 7 Neither accomn1odation nor recognition would be sustainable options. The zombies hate us for *Indeed, one concern would be that the initial neoconservative response to a zombie outbreak wouJd be to invade Iraq again out of force of habit.
THE AXIS OF EVIL DEAD
to abstain our freedorns-specifically, ow· freedom bies exfrom eating hum an flesh. As one of the zom ing Dead plains in Da n O'Bannon's Return of the Liv only thing (r985), ghouls eat brains because it is the tha t eases the pain of being dead. conNeoconservatives would scoff at the realist or in world ten tio n tha t zombies are like any oth er act global govpolitics, and at the liberal contention tha t 1bie menernance strucrures could cope with the zon ommend ace. Th is school of thought would instead rec ensure the an aggressive and militarized response to ther than con tin ued hegemony of the human race. Ra conservawait for the ghouls to come to thern, neo ions tha t tives would recomrnend proactive policy opt preference take the fight to the undead. Th eir policy tral region would be for an arn1ed invasion of the cen ed forces in the zombie-affected area. Deploying arm purposes. in ghoul-infested territory would serve two ng zombies Fir st, it would act as "flypaper," diverti this use of fro m expanding the ir dominion. Second, of the unforce would eventually drain the swan1p dea d menace. on zom Th e neoconservative policy preference itary affairs bies is predicated on the revolution in mil 8 itary docper mi ttin g swift victory. Based on this mil relying on trin e, neoconservatives would recommend us on air hig h-t ech com bat tactics with a heavy foc the living po we r and special forces to shock and awe
63
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THE AXIS OF EVIL DEAD
dead into submission. The hardcore neoconservative position would assert that the use of American power would create a new reality, in which the zombies themselves would yearn to break free of their undead state and rejoin the human-based community. 9 Moderate neoconservatives would adopt a more nuanced position; they would posit that, after creating a human outpost in the center of zombie-infested territory, humans in neighboring zombie-afflicted nations would be inspired to rise up and liberate themselves from their undead oppressors. All neoconservatives would welcome a crusade against the undead as worthy of the martial spirit and national greatness that embody the best virtues America has to offer. 10 It is to neoconservatism's credit that its doctrine is consistent with extant work on how best to respond to the zombie menace. 11 A war against zombies would, surely, be a war against evil itselfY However, other elements of neoconservatism might undercut the long-term viability of their initial plans. For example, neoconservatives frequently assume that all adversaries are part of a single axis or alliance of evil enemies. To be sure, that assumption works when confined to zombies, but it is unlikely that neoconservatives would stop there. Because of neoconservative hostility to authoritarianism, they would be inclined to see zombies and despots as part of the same overarching threat. They would inevitably identify reanimated
THE AXIS OF EVIL DUD
d War IV against a corpses as pa rt of a bigger Worl could include Iran ' so-called Axis of Evil Dead that a, China, and RusSyria, Hezbollah, Barnas, AI Qaed the undead. 13 of ies arm d ine mb co the as ll we sia, as uld sabotage any atExpanding the list of enemies wo warfare, hindering tem pt at broad-based coalition r on zombies. military effectiveness in a global wa of shock and Fu rth erm or e, the military doctrine rint of forces on awe combined with the light footp s in a military camth e gr ou nd would prove disastrou ks noted explicitly pa ign against the undead. As Broo uld likely have zero in World War Z, this doctrine wo enemy can't be effect on zombies: "[W]hat if the n't, but biologically shocked and awed? No t just wo ly trigger a 4 In de ed , such a strategy would on "~ ? n't ca to rise up. If history fresh wave of flesh-eating ghouls ing force would be is an y guide, the initial occupy long run, military dr aw n down too quickly. Over the a protracted, bloody forces would likely be enmeshed in nous human popuinsurgency from the undead. Indige the U.S. military's lat ion s would quickly lose faith in s. ab ili ty to quell the zombie horde d materiel to Wtth a massive surge in troops an ie-free territory, the cle ar an d hold pockets of zomb -eating ghouls might neoconservative approach to flesh g run. Th e costs, yie ld mo de st successes in the lon e failure of a surge however, would be appalling. Th le and catastrophic str ate gy would lead to an inevitab
6S
THE AXIS OF EVIL DEAD
policy response, as demonstrated in 28 Weeks Later. When a zombie outbreak occurs in the latter half of that film, military forces are quickly given orders to shoot on sight, regardless of whether the person is or isn't infected. Scarlet, a sympathetic Army doctor, explains the military mind-set in case of an outbreak of infection: "It all makes sense. They'r e executing Code Red. Step I: kill the infected. Step 2: containment. If contain ment fails, then step 3: extermination." Alas, by the end of that film, despite extreme measures that include the firebombing of London, the zombie infection escapes quarantine and spreads to contine ntal Eurasia.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES ConstrUctivism is the most recent international relations paradigm to achieve widespread scholarly recognition. Just as with the realist and liberal paradigms, 1 there exists a plethora of constructivist approaches. Constructivist approaches do share a set of core assumptio ns about world politics, however. These assumptio ns and causal mechanisms revolve around two central tenets: the social construction of reality, and the importan ce of identity in explaining and interpretin g behavior on the world stage. For constructivists, material factors such as economic wealth and military power are importa nt-but even more importa nt are how social structures filter and interpre t the meaning of those material capabilities. For example, zombies are hardly the only actors in the social world to crave human flesh. Cannibals, sharks, and very hungry bears will also target Homo sapiens if there is sufficient opportu nity and willingness. Nevertheless, zombies are perceived to be a much greater threat to humankind. Why? There are material factors to conside r-to our knowledge, bears can't
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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
turn human beings into more bears by biting them. Constructivists would argue that this is an incomplete explanation, however. Zombies threaten the powerful human norm of not devouring each other for sustenance or pleas ure-a nd therefore arouse greater security concerns as a result. Constructivists argue that transnational norms are a powerful constraint on action in world politics. Nuclear weapons, for example, are the most powerful destructive force in human histo ry-bu t they have not been used in combat since 1945. Social constructivists argue that, over time, a taboo has developed regarding their use. 2 With in societies, actors will usually refrain from violating powerful social norms because they do not want to be ostracized by their peers. Constructivist scholars argue that this effect also exists in global society; by and large, governments want to avoid being ostracized by other actors 3 in the international community. Just as impo rtant to the constructivist paradigm is the role that identity plays in defining actors and their preferences. Identities are developed or constituted throu gh mutual recog nition -auth oritat ive actors are considered legitimate in the international community not only because of self-recognition but because others recognize them as legitimate. Acto rsincluding but not limited to state s-def ine themselves 4 in part by distinguishing themselves from the "other."
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
ological Th is provides all actors a gre ate r sense of ont in world security tha t guides the ir actions and beliefs reaniaffairs. 5 Because zombies used to be hum an, make humated, ravenous flesh-eating corpses could and how ma ns mo re unc erta in abo ut the ir ide nti tyit differs frotn the viably challenged. have a Significant elements of the zombie can on observed, con stru ctiv ist bent. As cultural critics have a single the hor ror in zon1bie films comes not from of them. 6 ghoul but from an ever-expanding community a large It oth er words, the terr or increases wh en ways of swa th of individuals are socialized into the ly raise the und ead . Similarly, zombie films persistent bet we en que stio ns abo ut the ide ntit y distinctions e con gho uls and humans. Th ese questions provok s-f rom sid era ble anx iet y-a nd occasional nig htm are lysis of hum an pro tag oni sts. On e rec ent cultural ana arkable the zom bie gen re observes, "W hat is rem vivors of abo ut so ma ny zombie movies is tha t the sur the inthe pla gue /ac cid ent /ali en invasion tha t caused lves from fec tion do so little to distinguish themse so too am zombies; it's ver y mu ch a case of as you are, esIn Ge org e Ro me ro's films, characters can not
/."7
en the livcap e com me ntin g on the similarities bet we bies and ing and the und ead . Th e actions of the zom ing Dead the zom bie -hu ntin g posse in Night of the Liv fro m each other. In ( 1 68) are bar ely dis ting uis hab le 9 the Dead bot h Dawn of the Dead (1978) and Day of
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SOCIAl CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
(r985) a huma n character, discussing the zombies, sin1ply declares, "The y're us." One could argue that social constructivism is better prepared than other paradigms to deal with a paranormal pheno meno n like the dead rising fron1 the grave. As previously noted, constructivists have engaged with other paranormal actors, such as UFOs. The applicability of these preexisting d1eoretical arguments to zombies is open to question, however. For example, Alexander Wend t and Raytnond Duvall's constructivist explanation of official denials of extraterrestrial aliens is premised on the notion that 8 these aliens possess superior technology to humans. The technological superiority of aliens undercuts the anthropocentric nature of human worldviews. UFO s therefore go unacknowledged because any official recognition would endanger the sovereignty of Honzo sapiens on Plane t Earth. \Vhile zotnbies possess some cotnparative advantage over humans in already being dead, their technological capabilities are far lower. Indeed, Wend t and Duvall's arguments cannot be extended to vampires, ghosts, Elvis Presley, or the Loch Ness mons ter-m uch less zotnbies. Unfortunately, attem pting to advance this UFO-specific variant of constructivism further would repre sent a theoretical dead end. The constructivist paradigm nevertheless offers some useful predictions and policy recommendations.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
If confronted with the exogenous shock of the undead, constructivists would undoubtedly argue that 9 zon1bies are what hun1ans tnake of them. That is to say, there are a numbe r of possible en1ergent nonns in response to zo1nbies. One possible effect could be the Hobbesian "kill or be killed" scenario in which hutnan beings turn on each other as well as the living dead. Some research, 10 as well as most of the zon1bie canon, concludes that the natural response to the rise of the living dead would be sheer panic, leading to genuine anarchy. Most constructivists would instead posit that a Kantian "pluralistic counter-zotnbie security comrnunity" in which governments share sovereignty and resources to comba t the undead menace is more likely. 11 Empirical work on how individuals respon d to Jnanufactured and natural disasters suggests that this is the n1ore likely outcome than that predicted in 12 George Rotnero's oeuvre. Rebecca Solnit observes that, "in the wake of an earthquake, a bon1bing, or a major storm, most people are altruistic, urgently engaged in caring for themselves and those around
them, strangers and neighbors as well as friends and loved ones. The image of the selfish, panicky, or regressively savage human being in times of disaster has little truth to it." 13 Anthropological research further suggests that only with extretne resource scar14 city will communities of people turn on each other.
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SOCIAl CONSTRUCTI ON Of lOM81£S
T h is could h o ld w 'f fl it h even g re at er fo rce 1 es.heating ghouls are th e so u rc e o f th e disa ster. T h e ext~te n ce o f zombies m . ig h t foster some 11 · · 1 ntologl11t1a o cal security, b u t ov er ti m e th e implaca ble n at u re of th e zombie th re at sh o u ld create a st ro n g er feeling of collective id en ti ty am o n g hun1.ansbecause th~Y . . . h ave no 1ntr1ns1c co m l . p u s1on to consun1. th e entrails e · o f th e living. 15 T h is sh ar ed sense o f id en ti ty should, in tu rn , foster a g re at er sense o f ontolo gical securi~· In d ee d , for so1ne co nstructivists, th e ex istential p en l posed b y zo1nbies could be th e exo genous shock n ee d ed to b re ak d o w n n at io n al is t divi des an d advance th e cr ea ti o n o f a w orld state. 16 To n u d g e key acto rs to w ar d th e cr ea ti o n o f a pluralistic security co m m u n it y in respo nse to zombies, constructivists w o u ld offer two co ntroversial b u t co n cr et e policy re co m m en d at io n s. T h e first p re em p tive move would b e to destroy every co p y o f nearly every zombie film ever n1ade. In te n ti o n al ly o r u n w tentionally, constru ctivists ar g u e th at th e consistency o f th e zotnbie nar rative socially co n st ru ct s "apocalypse myths." As F ra n k F u re d i observes , "T h e experience o f d is as te rs -m aj o r and m in o r- is a social p h en o m en o n which is tnediated th ro u g h th e public's cultural imaginatio 17 n." C u lt u ra l narra tives th at suggest panic, disaster, and m ay h em ca n ha ve real-world effects. 18 If everyon e expects th e rise o f living dead to tr ig g er panic an d dystopia, th en tho se m is p er ce p -
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
tions could very well reify that outcome. The zornbie canon stresses the dog-eat-d og (or person-ea tperson) nature of zombie apocalypses. Those images could become cetnented in both elite and n1ass public perception s. At the very least, security institution s should subsidize counterva iling narratives about resilience in the face of flesh -eating ghouls- something that, not coincidentally, occurs in Max Brooks's novel World War Z (2oo6). The second policy suggestion would be to socialize zotnbies into human culture. ]en Webb and Sa1n Byrnard observe that "zotnbies aren't social isolatesthey seem to prefer to live in groups, within built social environme nts." 19 In Romero's Day of the Dead, Dr. Logan suggested that zombies were demonstra ting the "bare beginning s of social behavior," allowing for the possibility of hun1an society socializing them. This was certainly the aim in their efforts to "train" Bub. Similarly, at the end of Edgar Wright's Shaun of the Dead (2004), a n1ontage demonstra tes the ways in which English society reintegrate s the remaining zombies- as game show contestant s, daytime talk show guests, supennark et workers, and video gan1e players. This would be consistent with the socialization efforts advocated by constructivist scholars. If the undead learn to act as if they are hutnan again, then constructivists would posit that they have abandoned their identity as flesh-eatin g ghouls.
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These pobcy recomm endations as un1e that once zon1bies walk the arth, hun1ans Wi 11 be abJe tO SOCialize thetn before they proliferate beyond hun1an control. If a critical mass of fl e h-eatin g ghouls were to etnerge, however, then the constructivist paradigm offers a very different prediction. Constructivists would predict an emerge nt "norn1 cascad " fron1 the proliferation of the living dead. 20 A norm cascade functions like peer pressure- as people witnes others adhering to a particular tandard of behavio r, they are more likely to confon n to that standard of behavior as well. A a larger fraction of individuals are converted to the undead persua ion, the ren1aining humans would feel significant n1aterial and social pressure to conforn1 to zon1bie practices. he conforn1ity meme appears frequently in the zon1bie canon. In U!Orld War Z, Brooks noted the existence of "quislings," hun1an s who acted like they were zotn ies. As one character described then1, "These people were zombies, tnaybe not physically, 21 but 111ental1y you could not tell the di fference." In haun of the Dead, the principal charact rs practiced shuffling and moanin g in order to blend in. In Ruben Fleischer's Zombieland (2009), Bill Murray put on z m bie makeup in order to go out for an evening. Even if hu1nans adopt zotnbie norms sitnply to survive, over time these actions will begin to constit ute their identity.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ZOMBIES
T he lifes tyles of th e college student and zomhie are eerily similar.
Norm s acquire general acceptance through a con1binati on of greater nun1bers and the intrinsic attractiveness of the practice then1sel es. While one could casually distniss the idea that eating live human flesh would be attractive, other c01nponents of the zombi e lifestyle n1ight be allm·jng t many humans. Th li ing dead do not feel the ne d to bathe, shave, or chang·e their clothes- nor do they judge thejr own kind based on appearance. Zo1nbi do not d1scrim1 nate ba ed on race, color, creed, ethnid ty, or exual
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orientation. They always hang out in large packs. They are extremely ecofriendly-zon1bies walk everywhere and only eat organic foods. This description accurately captures many of the lifestyle traits of the typical college student, the change agent of 1nany societies. Zombies Inight have hidden reserves of soft power, leading humans to want what zon1bies want. 22 If this cultural vanguard were to embrace the zo1nbie way of life, remaining survivors would eventually internalize all zombie norms. These would include guttural Inoaning, shuffling, and smelling like death warmed over. In the end, both socialized humans and zombies would crave the flesh of unrepentant humans. At this point, the conceptual category of zombies would not be restricted to reanimated corpsesit would be a social construct as well.
DOMESTIC POLITICS: ARE ALL ZOMBIE POLITICS LOCAL?
The international relations paradigms discussed to date have been pri1narily systen1ic in their orientation.* Thei r sources of change and explanation in world politics corne from interaction among states and other global actors. Whil e elegant, a systemic approach might miss the more fine-grained power struggles that take place within the confines of domestic politics. The structure of domestic institutions, the state of public opinion, or the constellation of interest group pressures can affect a wide array of foreign policy and national security initiatives. At a minimum, domestic pressures can exert powerful constraints on the foreign policy leader's bargaining po1 sitions when negotiating with other actors. The conceptual difficulty with "second image" approaches, however, is their lack of parsimony. *The key word here is p1·imarily. As much as the liberal, realist, and constructivist paradigms might claim to be exclusively systemic in their provenance, all of them dip into both second image (dome stic po.litics) and first image (individuals) at certain points.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
Dom.estic institutions, cultures, and attitudes vary from country to country, making it difficult to boil down differences across borders. Compare and contrast, for example, the reaction to zombies in Atnerican movies with the British response in Edgar Wright's Shaun of
the Dead (2004). Americans tend to display far more visceral reactions, use profanity at a far higher rate, and react quickly and aggressively when a compatriot is bitten. The English tend toward n1ore low-key behavior. Those who are bitten by zombies choose not to inform their compatriots about this fact for fear of being a bother. If England and America are this different in their response to the living dead, imagine how different the variegated national responses of India, Russia, or China might be. It is difficult to fashion a coherent and parsimonious theory that captures the heterogeneities of each country's domestic politics. 2 To alleviate this problem, this section will therefore focus primarily on American domestic politics. The United States is perceived to be a "weak" policymaking state, in that the federal government is open to influence from societal interests. 3 The effect of dotnestic attitudes, interests, and institutions should therefore be at their most pronounced in the United States, 1naking their observation easier. Would any dimension of domestic politics play a significant role in affecting the global policy response
DOMESTIC POLITICS
to the e1nergence of zombies? At first glance, dotnestic institutions beyond the executive branch would see1n to matter little for the zombie issue. The emergence of the living dead poses an in1mediate threat to hotnelan d security. When faced with such an imminent threat, the executive branch of the governm ent possesses all of the policy levers. The presiden t cOinmands the anned forces, calls up the Nationa l Guard, negotiates with other countries, and so forth. For good or ill, countervailing institutions such as legislatures and courts play a minimal role during real-time policy formulation and crisis 1nanagen1ent in times of catastrophe. 4 If there is divided government, and the opposjti on party holds a clear n1ajority in the Congress, then legislatures can constrain the policy autonomy of the executive branch over time. Even scholars who stress the role of congressional influence ackno~ledge, however, that a truly global crisis tein5 porarily enhances executive autonon1y. Flesh-eating zon1bies would surely count as such an exigency. In theory, public opinion would also not impose an immediate constrai nt on executive action. At a , one would expect an initial "rally round 1ninin1um the flag" phenon1enon in response to a zotnbie emergency. 6 During times of national crisis, populations will strongly support their national leaders in a display of patriotism. The effect n1ight be long-lasting. Public opinion research shows that Americans would
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be willing to suffer casualties and costs if they believed in the severity of the nationa l security threat and the likeliho od of victory. 7 Provide d the initial counter -zombi e respons e was sufficiently vigorous, voters would be expected to reward incun1bent lead8 ers with greater political support . Over time, however, public sentime nt might impose signific ant constra ints on counter -zotnbi e poli-
cies. Scholars from Adam S1nith onward have observed that n1ass publics will conside r local issues to be far more import ant than the trouble s of foreigners. 9 Indeed , to update a critical passage from book 3, chapter 3 of Smith's Tbeory of Moral Sentiments for our purpose s: Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up
by a plague of the undead, and let us consider how a man of hmnani ty in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, as well as the unholy nature of undead existence after the end of life. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concern ing d1e effects which this disaster
DOMESTIC POLITICS
might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentimen ts had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger tomorrow he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of hundreds of millions of Chinese zombies, and the undead existence of that imtnense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own. If his finger was bitten off by a flesh-eating ghoul, however, then all bets would be off.
Any effort to combat the zombie problem globally would therefore have to be Inarried to a strong counter-zombie effort at home. Even if this was done, one could envision "zombie fatigue" n1aking inroads
into public support for overseas operations.* Over time, public sentiment would likely turn against ongoing, far-flung operations that entailed high costs in blood and treasure. This would be true regardless of *Public hostility to nationals from zombie-infested countries would be another predicted effect.
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the foreign policy benefits of such operations. As recent public opinion data suggests, prou·acted military conflict, combined with a severe econ01nic recession, will lead to .increased isolationisn1 from the American masses. 10 Even the tnost charistnatic commander in chief will encounter the limits of a "press the flesh" strategy when coping with a surly American public. Interest groups could affect a state's domestic and foreign counter-zombie policies in multiple ways. There are groups with a vested interest in constraining the eradication of the living dead. The actors with the most immediate stake in sabotaging any attack on zombies are those who have been bitten by zombies, and their human relatives. By definition, the mo1nent humans are bitten, they will inevitably become zombies. This fact can dramatically alter their preferences. This change of mind occurs in many zombie filn1s. In George Ron1ero's Land of the Dead (2005), the character of Cholo has the most militant antizombie attitude at the outset of the film. After he is bitten, however, he decides that he wants to "see how the other half lives." In Peter Jackson's Dead Alive
(2002), as well as Romero's Dawn of the Dead (r978) and Survival of the Dead (2oro), family members keep their undead relatives hidden frotn security and paramilitary forces. Clearly, soon-to-be-ghouls and their relatives can hamper policy implen1entation. Paradoxically, a fail-
DOMESTIC POLITICS
ure to implem ent early measures will force governments to pursue more extreme tneasu res-wh ich, in mrn, will be likely to trigger a greater public backlash. The openin g sequences of Rmnero's Dawn of the
Dead sugges t that one reason the zmnbie problem spins out of control is public hostility to harsh governmen t n1easures and recornm endatio ns-n1a rtial law, the abando ning of private residences, and the extennina tion of undead relatives chewing the flesh away fron1 the bones of loved ones. The soon-to -be-und ead and their relatives n1ight hinder policy implen1entation, but they are too fragn1ented and ephen1eral a groupin g to in1n1ediately influen ce the directio n of policymaking. Defens e contrac tors are anothe r matter entirely. These actors have a significant stake in the allocation of resources devote d to con1bating zombies. "While the idea of a singular, cohesive zombie-industrial complex stretches credulity, sotne corpora tions in the security sector would undoub tedly be intrigu ed by the 1nilitary applicatio ns of zombies. In many cases- the fihns Return of the Living Dead (Dan O'Bann on, 1985), Planet
Terror (Rober t Rodriguez, zoo7), Zombie StrippeH (Jay Lee, zoo8), and the Reside nt Evil franch ise-· these firms are the very progen itors of the zombie problem . Even if private firms were not the cause of the undead menace, they would no doubt be interested in exploit ing the researc h and develop ment
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opportUnities po se d by ussue.
.' .' I
I
. fd d burnan th e re an il na oo n o ea
. _t T he st ru ct ur al de pe nd en ce of th e state on captta~ . su gg e ts th at if th e zo tn bi e pr ob le m were to Perstst, . th es e firn1s co ul d in1p . ns tr at nt ose a m or e se no us co on ad ap ta ti on an d n1iti . u Corporate gation strategieS . . pressures on go ve rn m en ts to ou ts ou rc e securtt:)' . fu nc uo ns to private co nt ra ct or s- Wl'th 1uc r acive con~ tracts, of co ur se -w ou ld . gainst be intenseY Rests ta nc e a . - . t h e e1Imin . at:J.on of co nv en uo na 1 b-1g-o·c ket 1nilitaf.Y co nt ra ct s w ou ld be fie rce . Ph ar m ac eu ti ca l co mpanteS would lo bb y for 1nassi deve subsidies in an effo rt to velop cu re s an d vaccin es for th e un de ad pr ob le m -£ even I su ch tr ea tm en . ts w er e m ed ic al1y nn pr obable . Defense co nt ra ct or s wou ld resist eradication stra tegies in favor of approaches th at pe rm it th e wareh ousillg and testing of ca pt ur ed ghouls. If firms headquar tere~ in di ff er en t co un tr ie s pu rs ue d a similar appr oach, lt co ul d provoke a br ea kd ow n in tr us t m uo ng na tions. Do · 1 nl es uc P uralist pressure s could sabotage tn u10'later al efforts to st op gh ouls fr om sn ac ki ng on human flesh.u T h e po 1·tc y re co m m en da ti on s th at co m e fr om a domestic politics or ie nt at io n are relatively stra ightforward. Clearly, th e initial po lic y response s to a zombie attack are cruc ial. T hi s is th e pe ri od when domestic co n · ts on stratn co un te rm ea su re s are at th 1. r weakest. If g e · ov er nm en ts can fash. ion clear, co he re n t '
DOMESTIC POLITICS
and cotnpetent policy actions fro1n the outset, then don1estic pressures on policy autonomy should be modest. As a secondary rec01nmendation, governments would be urged to use propaganda and other political tactics to maintain the rally-round-th e-flag phenotnenon for as long as possible. If the zombie problem persists, however-thr ough initial policy errors, resistance from zombie relatives, or the logistical difficulties of destroying the undeadthen domestic politics will play an increasingly itnponant role in global policy articulation. Legislatures will slowly exercise n1ore voice, interest groups will constrain policy options, and the public will grow restive toward far-flung operations to eliminate the scourge of the living dead. If this effect takes place across a broad swath of countries, the bargaining core for meaningful international cooperation to co1nbat
the undead would slowly rot away.
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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: THE ''PULLING AND HAULING" OF ZOMBIES . d parad'tgms sh are one tm. r AU. of . the· arorementione · · · 1 organtzanons · th at tnternanona · phcit assumptton: and national security agencies will act with alacrity · when the dead start to roam the earth · and de Xtenty · Th·IS Is· a far from obvious assertion. International organizations often fail to live up to their original ~ounding ideas. Politicized staffing decisions and polIcy drift can cause these organizations to quickly deV~lve into dysfunction. 1 Domestic agencies suffer from sunilar problems. 2 Classic works on bureaucratic politics have modeled foreign and security policies as the outcome of "pulling and hauling" among multiple organizations with different agendas. 3 Other organiZation theorists argue that political institutions are · like" organtzed anarchies" in wh'tch burea ucratic entrepreneurs hawking their solutions are searching f~r li · }setproblems rather than the converse. 4 Many po nca · argue that political actors-from the Iemslarive enttsts • tY · reaucrauc b . or executive branches-will compromtse u
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.
. )' . 1 on l. 5 rh e nee In or d r to r tain po tnca c rro · . . re su lttn . f f 111 ideaL g po hc ou tp ut are o ften ar · ro · · . . , . W ith in a 1n gl l ureaucracy, organ1·za ·anal cu 1 o . to neW tu re ca n co ns tra in flexjbi lity an d adaptatJOD . ·atc1r un1stanc es . All ag en ci e deve 1op st an dard ope ! . . 1ng pr oc ed ur s (S O P ) t effic ie nt ly process r~~e pr ob le ins.6 T he e SO P , ho w ever, can constr ain the d a b 1.l.1ty o f b ur ea uc ra ci es to ad ap t to ne w threats an .. . challenges. he failure d · re llt 111 f U.S. se cu nt y an f J:h ge ne e agenci.es to reio rnl. . e1 .l e1 es 1·n th e wake o . th e 9/1 I attacks hi gh lig ht s d.1ffi culnes d th e pr of ou n · th at bu re au cr at ic politics an d or ga ni za tio na l cultllres . can Impose on policymal · concing. 7 If bureaucratiC . fl.lC t an d or. ganizational path ologies ha1nper effecnve co un te rte rr or is Jn poli ie , im ag in e th e effect theY w ou ld have n co un te r- zo m bi e policies. T he bureau . cratlc tu rf wars w ou ld b . fth e bl oo dy 1n every sense 0 word. Q uelli ng th e rise of th e un de ad would re qu ire significant interagency coordi nation. In th e U ni te d State s, on e co ul d easily envisage n1ajor roles for th e D ep ar tm en ts of State, D fense, Ju st ic , H om el an d Securit y, Tr an sp or ta tio n, and H ea lth and H um an Services. This d e no t include au to no m ou s or sen1iautonon1 us agencies like th e Fe de ra l Em.er ge nc y M an ag em en t Agency, th e En vi ro nm en tal Pr ot ec tio n Agency, th e F od an · ls . d D ru g dm tn · tra tio · n, th e C en te rs .ctO f Disease ontro] an d p · re ve nu·on , and th e tn yn·a d · 111·u1te ca m p
t
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
Bureaucrau· c tu.rf. wars would be bloody in every . ense of the word ·
gence agencies. A decade ago Anthony Cordesman estirnated that forty-four federal bureaucracie had a hand inc n1bating bioterrorism; it w uld be afe to 8 assuJne a similar nun1ber would be invol · ed today. Cooperation among the uniforn1 d rnilitary, National Guard units, and local police and emerg ncy s . . ervices would also be nece sary. Other countrieS With m dern bureaucracies would face sinular coordination problems.
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Whe ther bureaucracies can adapt to an army of the nndead is an open question. The z01nbie canon is deeply keptical about the ability of brainless bureaucrats to hand le a problem as deadly as the undead. In Brian Keene's novel Tbe Rising (200J), for exatnple, the U.S . gove rnm ent falls apart almost itnmediately. One trigg er was the Secret Service's difficulties altering standard oper ating procedures. After the president turn ed into a zombie, he started devouring the secretary of state. As a result, "one Secret Service agent drew his weapon on the undead Commander-in9 Chief, and a second agent immediately shot the first." In divining bureaucratic preferences, where you stand
depends on who you eat. Inde ed, the one trait com mon to every zombie narrative in existence is the inep titud e and fecklessness of bureaucracies. In Geo rge Romero's Night of the Living Dead (r968), the authorities provide contradi ctory info rmat ion to the public. At first, they suggest that people stay in their own homes; later, they reverse themselves and reco mme nd going to emergency centers. Mili tary officials and scientists are seen bickering on camera abou t why rean imat ed corpses are tryin g to eat people. In Romero's Dawn of the Dead ( r 978), a SWA T raid on a tene men t building is executed ineptly, and both civilians and police officers needlessly lose their lives. Mass desertions within the securjty services and the disintegration of unit
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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
cohesion are recurren t themes in Romero 's films. In Day of the Dead (r985), the featured team of soldiers and scientists provide a model of organizational dysfunction. The n1ilitary leader is a near-psychotic, and the leading civilian scientist is little better. A unit goes rogue to blackn1ail political leaders in Land of
the Dead (zoos). In Diary of the Dead (zooS), the only rime the military makes an appearance is to raid the supplies of civilians. Even researchers on the sociology of panic acknowledge that "the problen1 with bureaucrats during crises may be the only thing that . h "10 . disaster movies get ng t. Max Brooks's work also suggests that both military and civilian agencies would blunder in the wake of zombies. In his novel World War Z (zoo6), one obvious cause of the initial spread of ghouls is the refusal of national security and intelligence bureaucracies in powerfu l places to acknowledge an "out of the box" problem . When the U.S. Army has its first large-scale engagem ent with zombies in the Battle ofYonkers, its tactics prove to be completely ill-suited to the sihiacion. Brooks offers a soldier's narrative that encapsulates the organizational pathologies on display: We wasted so much time, so much energy preparing these elaborate firing positions. Good "cover and concealment " they told us. Cover and concealment? "Cover" rneans physical protection, conventional protection, from
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d dnance. That small arms and artillery or air-droppe or . ~ agamst. ound like the enemy we were about to go up
. b d And what genius though t to put us m o Y armor any. , r not ba'Vlllg way? Because the press reatned em 10r ou need 3 enoug h in the la t war? Why the hel1 d0 Y helme t when you're fighting a living corpse? No one though t about how many roun d5 the artillery would need for sustained operations .. · ·
th
You think that after being "traine d" to airn for e center mass your whole n1ilitary career you can suddenlY make an expert head shot every time? 11
Each of these statem ents reveals the 1'nh· eren t difficulties political organ izatio ns would have with s~ch a radically new threat . Politics, standa rd operaong proce dures, and ingrained n1odes of thinking wo uld no doubt predo minat e until such strateg ies failed to pre~ vent zornbies from achiev ing their goal: feasting upon the flesh of the living. In earlie r work, Brook s identi fied additi onal problems that affect the organ izatio nal compe tency and cultur e of the rnilitary: the inevit able logistics and nloral e gap. "Unli ke its hurna n count erpart s, an arrnY of zombies is cornp letely indep enden t of support,'' we r ea d 1n · h.IS Zombie Surviv al Guide (2 oo 3) · ''It will not requ1're .croo d , an1munit1on · · , or me d'1ca1 attentio n. It will not suffer from low moral e, battle fa-
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
tigue, or po or leadership. It will no t succun1b to panic, de sertion, or ou t-a nd -o ut rnutiny."t 2 H ur na nrun security institutions wou ld un do ub te dl y co nf ro nt th ese problen1s.
At this point, libertarians no do ub t feel se cu re in thei
r convictions about the ra nk inefficiency and in competence of governn1en t bureaucracies. It should be noted, however, th at pr iv at e- se ct or or ga ni za tio ns perform just as badly in th ese narratives. As previous]y mentioned, for-profit co rp or at io ns are of te n responsible for tri gg er in g th e initial zombie ou tbreak. In Da wn of the Dead, a news st at io n broadcasts ~Ut-of-date en1ergency in fo rm at io n to keep up ra tIng · L1 World 1¥ar Z, en tre pr en eu rs develop quack renledies for the zo1nbie infe ction as a w ay to make a quick profit. Th e Resident Evil franchise 's U m br el la C or po ra tion is rl1e apotheosis of co rp or at e in ep tit ud e in th e zo.mbie canon. W hi le th e po litical power of this multinational co rp or at io n is ob vious, its organizational competence is highly suspec t. In th e film series, U m brella outsources in te rn al se curity in its research labs to balky and unstable artif icial intelligences. Lo w ranking employees display In in iin al lo ya lty to co rp orate goal s. I-Iigh-ranking co rp or at e officers tnake decisions th at accotnplish lit tle bu t accelerating th e pread of the T- vi ru s fa rth er th an intended. Th is occnrs even th ou gh th e co rp or at io n- un iq ue anl.ong
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zombie narr ativ es-a lrea dy possesses a cure for the undead infection. As a corporate actor, Umbrella's only tangible success appears to be covering its tracks in the mainstream media. It would seetn that flesh-eating ghouls would lead to organizational decision making ranging from the rote to the catastrophic. However, an organizational perspective cannot stop with that observation. "While bureaucracies will inevitably make initial missteps, it would be foolhardy to predict persistent mistakes. Whe n put unde r extreme duress, or threatened with extinction, gove rnm ent bureaucracies can adapt and overcome. Indeed, the failure to recognize this possibility is the biggest blind spot in the zombie canon. If humans can thin k faster than zombies, then their greatest comparative advantage in a future conflict
f
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will be their ability to develop innovative tactics and strategies. Man y long -run ning zombie stories presume the evolution of zombies. Curiously, however, very few of them discuss how human individuals and organizations would adapt. World war provides the best example of human adaptation. After the disaster at the Battle of Yonkers, the military begins to alter its doctrine. Mos t major
z
governments quickly adop t a gran d strategy of securing a geographically well-defined safe rone; U.S. forces retre at to the west side of the Rocky Mountains. The new chairman of the ] oint Chiefs of Staff develops
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to maxithe "re sou rce -to- kill ratio" (RKR) in ord er e mize military efficiency. In the process, there are som 13 scarcity dea r bureaucratic losers, but the stress of character forces a rationalization of resources. As one amazing rec oun ts in Brooks's narrative, "W hat was so to take to see was how the culture of RKR began r soldiers hol d am ong the ran k and file. You'd hea hy have talk ing on the stre et, in bars, on the train; 'W e ten Ys, X, wh en for the same price you could hav Zs.' Solwh ich could kill a hun dre d times as ma ny ir own, die rs eve n beg an com ing up wit h ideas on the we could inv ent ing mo re cost-effective tools tha n 14
hav e envisioned." re An org ani zat ion al perspective would therefo step and pre dic t tha t gov ern me nt agencies would mis is same err at the init ial stages of a zombie attack. Th pressure per spe ctiv e would also argue tha t ecological ve would on the se org ani zat ion s to survive and thri prediction lea d to ada pta tion and improvisation. Th is snadillo's is pro bab ilis tic, however. In Jua n Carlos Fre Later (2007), for example, a NA TO expedi2
8 Weeks
r the rage tio nar y for ce reoccupies Gre at Britain afte n tho ugh vir us has ext erm ina ted the pop ula tion . Eve gers of inthe com ma nde rs are fully aware of the dan rgence. fec tion , the y abjectly fail to pre ven t its reeme Th e pol icy rec om me nda tion s tha t such a perspeclargely of tive off ers are straightforward, and consist es ways to avoid the wo rst organizational pathologi
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and tur f wars. No dou bt the bat tle ove r wh . h genC)' tc a "l d" ver hoW to or bure auc rac y wo uld have the ea o def eat the und ead wo uld be fierce. Na tio nal governcy beme nts sho uld con sid er des ign atin g a lea d agen hompfore rat her tha n after flesh-eating ghouls start c ing on citizens. In Mi ra Grant's Feed (zoro), for example, the Ce nte rs for Disease Co ntr 1 d Preo an · b · onsiderven aon eco me s the lead agency, amass mg c . . abi lioe s able am oun ts of ope rat ion al and security cap in the process. Per hap s the org ani zat ion al perspective's srrong~st rec om me nda tio n wo uld be to exploit technolo~es tha t flatten org ani zat ion al hie rar chi es and make tn .. for ma tio n mo re rea dil y available. Ne two rke d srruc· ate tur es have the capacity to col lec t and . dtsserntn inf orm atio n mo re quickly. If bo th nat ion al and inter.. nat ion al org ani zat ion s relied on mo re net worked arran gem ent s, inf orm atio n fro m ope rat ors abo ut the resilience of the und ead can mo ve up the hierarchy as soon as possible. Th is would accelerate rap id responses to zornb'Ie em erg enc ies , and allow the bes t cou nterzombie t aca·cs an d strategies to diffuse across the globe.1s Th ere is a tragt·c · Iro ny to the se pre d'ten·ons and rec om me nda tio ns. Recall the discussion of hoW domestic politi cs . ld wo u affect cou nte r-z om bie po l'tete . s·· go ver nm ent . . Ins titu tio ns wo uld be abl e to act tn . an unc ons tra ine d ma nne r at first, bu t politics would
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
impose a stronger constraint over time. The organizational perspective offers the reverse narrativebureaucratic competency will improve over time. If both domestic political pressures and bureaucratic politics play a role in affecting government policies, their combined effect could be doubly disastrous. Government agencies would have the most autonomy when they are most likely to make bad decisions. By the time these bureaucracies adapt to new zombie exigencies, they would face political hurdles that could hamper their performance.
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WE'RE ONLY HUMAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO THE UNDEAD
Zombies are often assumed to lack intelligence, but it should be noted that humans frequently respond to new undead situations with confusion and ignorance. Indeed, even a cursory glance at human behavior in zombie films highlights puzzling or seemingly irrational actions by the human characters. In Edgar Wright's Shaun of the Dead (2004), the protagonists insist that safety can be found in the local pub even though it is located in a densely populated urban area. In Ruben Fleischer's Zombie/and (2009), some of the characters are oddly certain that a Disney-style theme park will be zombie-free. In George Romero's Dawn of the Dead (1 978), marauding bikers pelt zorn.. hies with cream pies, acting as if that will incapacitate them. In Dan O'Bannon's Return of the Living Dead
s5), the zombies are smarter than most of the 9 human characters. There is no shortage of stupid or (1
self-defeating behavior in zombie films.
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Th is sho uld no t be surprising. A zo b . 0 utbreak m te . sis perfectly designed to pre y on powe rfu l em oo on . . th n fear, dtsgust, revulsion , and dr ea d- . at ca cause . . d eVIauon fro m pru de nti a 1 b e h avt.or. t Zonlbies oc11 " of cupy the lowest de pth s of the "un can ny va ey . . .hum an likenesses wh ich me an s tha t they r esernble ' . d revulhum an s en ou gh to tri gg er ins tan t dts gu st an . . sion.- T he spr ead of zombte s encapsu 1ates the eleme nts of an ep ide mi c tha t should aro use the greatest am ou nt of dread and anxiety fro m individuals. Fear . . . an d suspicion are mu ch mo re severe . th I.r effects 111 e wh en the source of da ng er is ne w as any revieW of ' 3 first reactions to AIDS, SARS, or Hr N I will reveal. Th e canonical responses to the zotnb ie thr eat suggest tha t hu ma n beings can no t be red uc ed to bloodless calculating machines, despite the assumptions of rational choice theorists. All indivi duals have fears, foibles, and failings tha t cause beh avior to deviate from ho w a dispassionate, rational decision maker would behave. Fir st- im ag e theorists look at these ten de ncies in hu ma n behavior and see wh eth er they 4 translate int o rec urr en t pa tte rns in wo rld politicsTh ere are a cluster of cognitive att rib ute s hardwired int o aU hu ma ns tha t mi gh t affect policy responses to an uprising of the living dea d. Perhaps the mo st powerful · ts the ten de nc y for confirmation bra · s ln · proces sin g ne . n ab ou t . . wI·n £on.na no a ph en om en on . 5 All IndiVidua ls h · ave I·d eo logies, cognitive heunst· lCS · ,
WE'RE ONLY HUMAN
or rules of thumb they use to explain how the world works. \Vhen confro nted with an unusual or anoma lous event, n1ost people will focus on the bits of infonnati on that corresp ond to their preconceived worldviews. They will use historical analogies to guide their action s-even if these analogies are in16 perfect. At the satne time, they will ignore or suppress infonn ation that contradicts their beliefs. Only if their preconceived ideas lead to radical policy failures willtno st individuals be willing to rethink their worldviews.
Indeed, confinn ation bias helps to explain why first responders would likely fail to ha1t an initial zombie outbreak. Preventive action would require these people to logically conclude d1at the dead are walking the earth- a fact that contradicts most logocentric worldviews. As Jonad1an Maben y observes, "the zon1bie has to be seen and identified as a diseasecarrying hostile vector. That's not gojng to happen quickly or easily, and probably not at all during dlis [early] phase." 7 Max Brooks is even tnore en1phatic on this point: "Governn1ents of any type are no more than a collection of hutnan beings -huma n beings as fearful, short-s ighted, arrogant, closed-minded, and generally incomp etent as the rest of us. Why would they be willing to recognize and deal with an attack of walking, bloodth irsty corpses when most of humanity isn't?" 8
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A promin ent form of confirmation bias in interna tional relations is fundamental attribution error. When interpr eting the behavior of other actors, individuals 9
will often treat allies and adversaries in different ways. If an ally does smnething positive, individuals will attribute this behavior to his internal character. If an ad-
versary acts in a constructive manner, however, that is attributed to pressures by the external enviro nment that is, he was forced into being good . Conversely, if an ally acts in an unproductive manner, that is explained away as a situation in which external circumstances forced a good actor to behave badly. If an adversary acts in the satne tnanner, however, then it is because he is inheren tly wicked . Anothe r type of behavioral trait commo n to individual decision makers is their tenden cy to act differently when confron ted with gains or losses relative to the status quo. 10 Rational choice theory assun1es that individuals have constan t attin1des toward risk. According to prospect theory, however, people tend to be 1nore risk averse when operati ng in a world of gains, and more risk loving when operati ng in a world of losses. To use some numeri cal examples, imagine you face the following choice:
Option A: The certain destruction of soo zombies Option 8: A so percent chance of destroying 1 ,ooo zombies and a zombies
so percent chance of destroying 100
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In a July 2010 online survey that yielded 1,2 38 respondents, I found that rnore than 61% chose option A, even though option B offered the greater expected value of destroyed ghouls. Indeed, nutnerous experiments demonstrate that when individuals have to choose between a guaranteed prize and a l.o ttery offering a prize with a slightly higher expected value, they will take the sure thing. Now, consider a different choice: Option A: A certain increase of soo zombies Option 8: A 50 percent chance of creating only 100 new zombies and a 50 percent chance of creating r ,ooo new zombies
In this case, more than 57% of respondents chose option B, even though the expected value of option A is better. If people must choose between a sure loss or a lottery in which the expected value is worse but the possibility exists of returnin g to the status quo, they will gamble for resurrection. The policy in1plications of prospect theory are clear. Compared to the status quo, individuals will act in a more cautious, risk-averse .tnanner when they believe that they are gaining ground. \Vhen they perceive themselves to be losing ground, individuals will be 1nore willing to take risky gambits in an effort to 11 . J: resuscitate th etr 10rtunes. First-image theorists argue that this cluster of psy-
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chological attributes leads to a "hawk bias" in foreign affairs .12 \Nhen confronted with a possible adversary, the psychological response by individual policymakers will lead to more confrontational policies. Aggressive actions will be interpreted as intentional. When threatened with a possible loss, poliC)llnakers will be more willing to take risky actions to presenre the status quo. Other psychological traits-such as optimisin bias and the illusion of control-will reinforce aggressive poJicies. 13 Leaders will be supremely confident that proactive measures can address whatever threat emerges fron1 beyond the grave. Oddly enough, while the hawk bias Inight be a bad fit for human international relations, it would provide
the right frame of nund for how to respond to flesh eating ghouls. The revulsion caused by zombies would make it easy for individuals to label then1 as the enen1y. Confirmation bias would ensure that any new data about zon1bies would simply reinforce their enen1y status. Prospect theory would guarantee that leaders, when faced with initial losses from undead attacks, would double down with risky strategies designed to reclaim the status quo. The hawk bias might exaggerate conflict with humans-but it would appear to promote just the right attitude toward the living dead. The zombie canon suggests two important caveats to this generally positive assessment, however. First, confirmation bias and fundamental attribution error
•.
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will also lead individuals to treat their zombified relatives differently than others. As previously noted, a staple of the canon is for people to refrain from killing relatives who turn into flesh-eating ghouls. In Survival of the Dead, for example, one family patriarch refuses to kill any zombie in his clan, arguing that it would be tantamount to "killing our own kind." The living dead would exploit this misperception, allowing the army of zombies to increase throug·h an undead form of social networking. Family members would infect other family members, friends would infect friends, and so forth. Second, it is unclear whether the perceptual response to zmnbies would be limited just to the undead. It is entirely possible that the hawk bias would cause individuals to distrust and fear other humans as well. In situations of flux, it would be easy to envisage hun1ans accusing other hun1ans of being bitten by a zon1bie. This internecine conflict atnong human sand among human govern ments- could paralyze efforts to tnaintain a comtnon anti-zombie front.* *It is interesting to note that a feminist perspective might provide some policy leverage at this juncture. In Zack Snyder's remake of Dawn of the Dead (zoo4), for example, the contrast between the governance structure of the mall when the security guards are in charge and when the female lead (a nurse) and her compatriots are in charge is quite stark. Decision making is both more consensual and yields superior results under the latter regime. It is possible that a gendered perspective would counteract cognitive biases against cooperation.
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.d th Fi rs t-i m ag e m od el s would prov1 e re e concrete policy re co m m en da tio ns to co m ba t th e sc ourge of th e living dead. Fi rs t, it wi ll be crucial for governrnents an d in te rn at io na l orga . . · kl and n1zauons to qulC Y. effectively pr of fe r ne w rules and m et ho ds for coping . . w1th th e un de ad . Individual d · kly to new s ca n a ap t qu1c · circumstances, provided th at those c1· rcums tances pro"d VI e for so m e sta bi · d. ·d ls knoW lity over tim e. 14 I f 1n IV l ua wh at th e "n ew no rm al " look s like du rin g a zombie ou tb re ak , panic will be m uc h less likely. Second, policies sh ou ld be im pl et ne nt ed that "nu dge '' In · d'1v1"d ua 1s In · to pu rs ui·ng th · ht kind of e ng co un te r-z om bi e tactics. 15 Th es e policies should have default op tio ns th at lead to pr ud en tia l counterzombie be ha vi or ra th er th an assuming th at individuals will ad op t th ei r ow n activ e co un te r-z om bi e measures. Fo r example, after a zo m bi e attack, a neW co m po ne nt of an y driver's license exam m ig ht be a de m on str at io n of evasion ta ct ic s- or ho w to pe rfo rm a hi t-a nd -ru n on a flesh-eat ing gh ou l wi th minimal damage to th e m ot or vehicle . Th er e is on e final, risky ga m bi t- bu t it ju st m ig ht work. Th is se ct io n has focu sed on th e psychological at tri bu te s of hu m an s- bu t wh at ab ou t th e psychology of zombies? O ne of th e bi gg es t puzzles in th e zombie studies lit er at ur e is why th e living dead are compelled to devour hu m an s even th ou gh th er e appears to be no biological re as on for flesh-eating ac-
WE'RE ONLY HUMA N 16 tivi ty. Given the tendency of zombies to travel in packs and mobs, first-image theorists would hyp othesize that this decision to eat humans is a classic case of grouptbink, the tend enc y for individuals to prioritize group consensus over a tho rou gh vetting of alternative ideas and proposalsY Thi s phenornenon has been observed in humans - but perhaps it ex-
plains zotn hie behavior as well. Based on thei r gro uping behavior, it could be argued that the living dead care the mos t abo ut reaching a consensus atnong then1selves abo ut thei r social purpose. Thi s could lead individual zombies not to question the assutnptions behind the decision to eat humans. A risky but intriguing policy option would be for hum an governments to use psychological operatives to engage in "cognitive infiltration" of the undead community. Such efforts have already been proposed 18 for extremist and terrorist groups. Thr oug h suggestive gru ntin g and moaning, perhaps these operatives could end the epistemic closure among zo1nbies and If get them to question their ontological assumptions. zombies threw off their cognitive shackles and recognized that they did not need to eat hun1an beings, then the crisis of the undead would be much less severe. Of course, it is also possibJe that the living dead Would devour the agents before they could perform their tasks. As prospect theory suggests, however, desperate times lead to desperate n1easures.
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• • •
CONCLUSION OR SO YOU THINK
A specter is haunting world politi cs-the specter of reanimated corpses coming to feast on people's brains. To date, the scholarly response by international relations theory to the zombie menace has been only skin deep. I have tried to take a much deeper cut at this looming problem. As the preceding pages should make clear, international relations theory offers some interesting and varied predictions and recommendations about how governments, international institutions, domestic interests, bureaucracies, and individuals would respond to the transnational threat posed by the living dead. A quick review reveals some interesting continuities across the different theoretical paradigms. For example, most of these approaches would predict that the living dead would have an unequal effect on different national governments. Powerful states would be more likely to withstand an army of flesh-eating ghouls. Weaker and developing countries would be more vulnerable to a zombie infestation. Whet her
10
CONCLUSION
due to realist disinterest, waning public support, bureaucratic wrangling, or the fallibility of individual decision makers, international interventions would likely be ephe1neral or imperfect. Complete eradication of the zombie rnenace would be extremely unlikely. The plague of the undead would join the roster of threats that disproportionately affect the poorest and weakest countries. The different theories also provide a greater variety of possible outcon1es than the bulk of the zmnbie canon. Traditional zornbie narratives in filn1 and fiction are quick to get to the apocalypse. Most of the theoretical approaches presented here, however, suggest that there would be a vigorous policy response to the menace of the living dead. Realistn posits an eventual live-and-let-live arrangement between the undead and everyone else. Liberals predict an imperfect but useful counter-zombie regime. Neoconservatives believe that an aggressive and thorough military deployment would keep the undead menace at bay. Some constructivists would predict a robust pluralistic security community dedicated to preventing new zombie outbreaks and socializing existing zombies into hutnan society. Organizations might err in their initial response, but they could also adapt and overcome. Individuals would be hardwired toward an aggressive policy response against the living dead.
CONCLUSION
These kinds of predictions suggest that maybe, just maybe, the zombie canon's don1inant narrative of human extinction is overstated. While encouraging, this survey also reveals son1e cautionary warnings lurking on the horizon. First, catastrophic outcomes are still quite possible. Bureaucratic dysfunction could trigger a total collapse in state authority. Public opinion and interest group pressure could make multilateral cooperation tnore difficult. A nonn cascade could trigger a world in which the biological distinctions between hun1ans and zombies would be imma terial- every one would act like zornbies. Policytnakers or individuals could overreact against the zombie menace, killing tnany humans in the process. Still, these are possible outcomes; whether they are the likely outcomes is another question altogether. Second, fron1 a human security perspective, even the "optimistic" outcmnes discussed above would be untnitigated disasters. Huma n security approaches focus on risks to individuals, whereas national security approaches focus on risks to states.' From this perspective, anything that threatens an individual's bodily integrity qualifies as a threat. In a world in which zombies were concentrated in the poorest and weakest countries, billions of hutnan beings would have an additional threat to contend with on top of
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CONClUSION
disea e, poverty, and the erosion of the rule of law. A Inajority of the world's population would not achieve freedom from fear in a world where the undead roam. his sobering assessn1ent highlights a flaw in the standard international relations paradigms-their eroding analytical leverage over the security problems of the twenty-first century. Most international relations theories are state-centric, but interstate conflict is not all that significant a threat anymore. Consider the list of dangers that opened this book; aln1ost none of thern emanated fron1 states. Neither terrorists nor hackers possess large swaths of territory, making retaliation difficult. Natural disasters like earthquakes or volcanoes do not possess "agency" as we understand the concept; neither do disease vectors or tnelting glaciers. The international relations profession has always started with the state-and governments will continue to be an important part of the world poLitics equation. Unless these theories can adapt to the plethora of asymmetric threats to the human race, however, they will be hard-pressed to offer cogent policy responses to the living dead. Clearly, further research is needed. This leads to sotne final but crucial questions: How can we assess the explanatory power of each paradign1's predictions? Is only one of them true? Some of them? All of thetn? In the social sciences, the best way to adjudicate be-
CONCLUSION
tween different theories is to devise empirical tests that buttress or falsify the different approaches. For the zombie question at hand, however, that is neither desirable nor plausible. The international relations scholar must concede that analytical rigor alone is an insufficient basis for political judg ment on how to respond to the living dead. A paradigmatic approach to explaining political outcon1es provides some useful analytical tools, but the tool kit remains incomplete. Even international relations theorists themselves are aware of this fact. Perh aps individual realists would treat zombies as different from humans; perhaps advocates of legislative constraints would allow that an attack from the living dead migh t overwhehn Congress's ability to respond. It is possible that, when confronted with a conc rete policy problem like flesh-eating ghouls, specific tnicr othe ories -con tinge nt hypotheses that apply to a very narrow set of circu tnsta nces -mig ht 2 be In ore useful than the grand paradigms. Havi ng the judgtnent to know which models apply in world polit ics-a nd whe n-is n1ore art than science. 3 As Albert Hirschman observed soon after Geor ge Romero's Night of the Living Dead (I968) was released, "[O]rdinarily social scientists are happy enou gh when they have gotten hold of one paradigm or line of causation. As a result, their guesses are
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CONCLUSION
often further off the n1ark than those of the experienced politician whose intuition is more likely to take a variety of forces into account."+ This volun1e serves as a caution against the fallacious but prevalent view of zombie studies: that the world will end once the dead walk the earth. It is up to readers to exercise their own judgment in determining what to do with that information. International relations theory clearly retains son1e practical utility. Perhaps, however, the ability of these theories to explain current global threats and challenges is Inore circumscribed than international relations theorists proclaim in their scholarship. Informed by these paradigms, the interested and intelligent students of world politics should use their own brains to cogitate on this question- before the zombies decide to use them instead.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Growin g up, I was not a fan of the horror n1ovie genre. My earliest memory of a horror film was watchi ng ten tninutes of Poltergeist as a kid and then not sleeping that night. It wasn't until I stumbled across 2 8 Days Later one night on television that I developed any enjoytnent for the zombie genre. I an1 therefo re grateful to Danny Boyle and Alex Garland, the directo r and writer of that underrated filn1, for getting me interested in zombie flicks in the first place. The genesis of this monograph was a Foreign Policy blog entry that I posted in August 2009.* The post garnere d a fair amoun t of attention within both the blogos phere and the international relations conlmunity. A numbe r of international relations professors contacted me to say that they had directed their students to this post because it provided an accessible entry point into the more abstruse areas of international relations theory. This inspired me to see if the premise could be expanded into what you are now reading. *See http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/postshoo9/o8/ I 8/theory _of_international_politics_and_zombies (accessed July 15, 2010).
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
. . . . interest aboat I tha nk Alex Ma ste for p1qutng my the topic. the zom bie qu est ion wi th his blo g po st on Glasser, At Foreign Policy, Re bec ca Fra nk el, Su san . Britt Blake Ho un hell, Jos hu a Keating, M 0 ises Nann, nder.. Pe t rson, and Ton1 Stec have proVI'de drn ea wo f ....., ar.. ....-.rl"hl ful ho me at wh ich to blo g abo ut evetyu .• .~ng [QlJrtr to theo~, cane disputes wi thi n int ern ati on al rel . auo ns A or.. th e global . apo alypses. P go ver nan ce of tnovte c . J lytio n of this ma nu scr ipt was exc erp te d 111 · the 1.1 Au gu st 20 10 issue of Fo1·eign Policy.* .d e Ch and a Ph ela n was kin d eno ug h to 111 proVl e wi th he r data on po sta po cal yp tic fictio n. . ds I foisted the dra ft rna nu scr ipt on to tno re fnen ' '/ colleagues, and com ple te str ang ers tha n 1 do rn mo re con ven tio nal work. I tha nk Be tha Al bertson, ny . Kyle Brownlie, Charli Carpenter, Steph · Carvt 11' ante EsJon ath an Caverley Sa m Cr an e Eri ka Drezn er, ' h Ha rri s, Ch' arl the r Dr ezn er, Sh ore ie Ho nla ns, J0 hn H organ, · k Th add eus Jackson, Jac bT~~ Pat rrc o · . Ka M te cN am ara , Blake Messer, Mi cah Mt. ntz , Jennl. .. £er Mi tzen, Da n Ne xo n, Ne ge en Pe ga h'l, Gabrtel Rossman, Steve Saideman, Anna Seleny ,Joanne Spetz, Laun·e Wi1l · kie, ] ason Wi lso n, and Atny Ze gart for th eu · t eed back, advice, and sup po rt. \V he the r theY knew it or no t, Alan Beattie Eli zab eth Econoiil'/' Brad Ge nd ell , Yfat Reiss Gend~ll,Jenn ifer M. Harris, ' h t 0 f th L' . R r "Da niel W Dre zne.r, "N Ig e Ivm g o zry r8o Only-August zor o): 3438.
lx r.
vvO
nks " Fm-eigll I
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
G. John Iken berr y, Dav id Lake , and Mic hael Mas tand uno prov ided usef ul sugg estio ns. The tean1 at the Prin ceto n Univ ersit y Pres s has dratnatically imp roved this book with their meti culousness, energy, and prof essio nalis tn. I am grate ful to Julia Livi ngst on, Nata lie Baan, The resa Liu, and Jenn ifer Roth for thei r assistance in conv ertin g this book fro1n pixels to prin t. Bria n Ben dlin saved me from tnan y abst ruse erro rs with his copy editi ng. Each of Ann e Kare tniko v's draw ings are wor th a thou sand Wor ds-w hich mea ns she's resp onsi ble for an awful lot of the intel lectu al value of this book . Poli tical science edito r Chu ck Mye rs and edit or in chie f Pete r Dou gher ty will have my etern al, undy ing grat itud e for bein g brav e enou gh to think , "Wh y yes, now that We thin k abou t it, what's really miss ing from our cata log is a book on inter natio nal relat ions and zombies." My wife Erik a reac ted to this book idea in the sa1ne way she reacts to all of my ideas- with an appr opri ate mixture of reas sura nce and bem usem ent. My appr eciation for her unst intin g, level-hea ded supp ort in these ende avor s wiJl last well beyo nd the grave. Finally, to Ken neth Wal tz, auth or of Theory of International Politics, an icon in tny field of srudy, and som eone who m I've neve r prop erly met: I'm very sorry.
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NOTES Introduction · .. to the Undead
~·Bishop 2oo8; Den~le 2007. ·Brooks 2003; Loutson 2009; Ma 2010. 3. Bolger 2oro. 4· Austen and Grahame-Smith 2009; the success of Pride · · · d'zce and Zombies has spawned a number o f slmiand l p re.;u arly reinterpreted classics ranging from children's stories (lhum and Thomas 2009· Carroll and Cook 2009), to touchstones in American liter~ture (Twain and Czolgosz 20°9), to th e h'Istory of the Beatles (Goldsher 2010). w· 5· Katy I-Iarshberger of St. Martin's Press, quoted in Ilson 2009 . 6 · Bishop 2oo8· Newitz 2oo8· VanDusky 2oo8.
' ' Stern' 2002-3. 7· Koblentz 2oro; 8. Dendle 2007, 54 . 9
· Buus 2009; Grayson, Davies, and Philpott 2009 ..
lO. See, for example, the University of Florida's adVIsory manual at http://www.astro.ufl.edu/-jybarralzombieplan.pdf I (accessedJuly rs, 2oro). Ab 11. Wexler 2oo8. See also http://humansvszombies.org , out (accessed July r 5, 2oro). 12 · John B. Snow, "Surviving the Undead: Zombi~ Guns, Outdoor Life, March 3' 2oro; http://www.outdoorlif e.com/
b~otos/gallery/survival12oro/o3/surviving-undead-zom d Ie-guns (accessed July r 5, 2010). 13. Carlson 2003; Chyba and Greniger 2004; Klotz an Sylvester 2009; Koblentz 2010; Stem 200 2-3· 14. Berlinski 2009; Davis 1988. 15. Twitchell 1985, 273. 16. Waldmann 2009.
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NOTES TO PAGES 8-13
17. Significant exceptions include Brooks 2oo6 and Grant zoro. 18. Cooke 2009, chap. 7· Obvious and important exception are Joss Whedon's TV series Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003) and Angel (1999- 2004). 19. On teen vampires in books, see L.J. Smith's Vampire Diaries series (1991-); Charlaine Harris's Southern Vampire Mysteries (aka the True Blood series, 2001-); Stephenie Meyer's Twilight series (zoos-); Richelle Mead's Vampire Academy series (zoo6-); D. C. Cast and Kristin Cast's House of Night series (2007-); and Melissa De La Cruz's Blue Bloods series (2007-); and that's just for starters. 20. Grayson, Davies, and Philpott 2009, I 57·
The Zombie Uterature 1. Bishop 2009; Harper 2002; Loudermilk 2003. 2. Chalmers 1996; Dennett 1995; Moody 1994· 3. Foster, Ratneiks, and Raybould zooo; Hughes et al. 2009; Hughes, Wappier, and Labandeira 2010. 4. Rudolf and Antonov1cs 2 007. 5. Vass zooi. 6. Cassi 2009. 7. Cooke,Jahanian, and McPherson 2005. 8. Smith? et al. 2009, 146. 9. See Gelman 2oro; Messer zoro; Rossman 2010. 10. The full list is available at http://zombieresearch.org/ advisoryboard.html (accessed July r 5, 2010). 11. See, for example, Quiggin zoro. 12. On the economic research into vampires, see Hartl and Mehlrnann 1982; Hartl, Mehlmann, and Novak 1992; and Snower 1982. 13. Sun Tzu, Art of War, chap. r r, line 14; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, book 2, par. so; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, part r, chap. 13, par. 9· 14. On UFOs, see Wendt and Duvall zooS. See Nexon and Neumann 2oo6 on wizards and international relations,
I
NOTES TO PAGES 13-22
and Ruan e and Jame s 2oo8 on hobbits and international relat ions. Buus 2009, Davies 2010, and Molloy 2003, discuss vamp ires and international studies. 15. Gold smit h 2007; Hoyt and Brooks 2003-4; Klotz and Sylv ester 2009. 16. Susk ind 2oo6. 17. Stern 2002 -3. 18. Clar ke I999i Cord esma n 2001. 19. Drez ner 2009. 20. Sparks, Nels on, and Campbell 1997. 21. Mark ovsk y and Thye 2001. 22. Craw ford zooo ; Gray and Ropeik 2002; Molsi 2007; Stro ng 1990. 23. Mab erry 2008, 267. 24. Ibid. See also Bishop 2009. 25. King , Keoh ane, and Verba 1994, 29-30. 26. Ferg uson 2004; Haass 2oo8; Schweller 2010. 27. SeeD er Deri an 2002. More recently, Max Brooks address ed cadets at the U.S. Naval War College at the behest of the school comm anda nt. See http: //maxbrooks.com/news/ e/ (accessed July I 5, 20IO). 2 oiolo~I 2/the-us-naval-war-colleg 28. On simulations, see Van Belle I998; on agent-based mod eling , see Cede rman 2003. 29. See Buus 2009; Cord esma n 2ooi ; Huls man and Mitc hell 2009; Mull er zooS; Van Belle, Mash , and Brannwart h zoro ; Web er 2oo6; Weldes 2003. 30. Soln it 2009, I 20-3 4. 31. Tetlo ck 2005. 32.Ja ckso n and Nexo n 2009 .
Defining a Zombie 1. See also Brooks 2003, r. 2. This definition also excludes some more recen t char-
acter s with quasi-zombie properties, like the Reavers in Joss Whe don' s TV series Firefly (2002) or the Vrrals in Cronin 2010.
121
22
NOTES TO PAGES 23- 35
Distracting Debates about Flesh-eating Ghouls 1. For recent examples of the variegated approaches to the undead, ee Golden zoro; and Adams 2oo8. 2. See Keene 2004 and zoos, as well as Wellington zoo6a, zoo6b,zoo7. 3. King zoo6. 4. Brooks 2003, zoo6. 5. Recht zoo6. 6. Cordesman zoor; Koblentz zoro. 7. Perrow 1984. 8. Klotz and Sylvester 2009. 9. DendJe 2001, 121; Twohy 2008, r6. 10. Bishop 2009, 2 r; Mabeny zoo8, 22 - 23. 11. For a recent and concise summary of this debate, see Levin zoo+ l2. Ma zoro, 2-3. 13. Brooks 2003 , 13-14. 14. Maberry zoo8, chap. 3· 15. Cordesman 2001, r 1; Maberry zoo8, 172.
The Re~~lpolitik of the Uving Dead 1. Space constraints prevent a further exploration of the myriad intraparadigmatic divisions of realism. For classical realism, see Morgenthau 1948. For neoclassical realism, see Rose 1998 and Zakaria 1998. On postclassical realism, see Brooks 1997. Mearsheimer 2001 provides the exemplar of offensive realism. For a good example of defensive realism, see Snyder 1991. For a critique, see Legro and Moravcsik 1999· 2. Walt 1987. 3. Waltz 1979, 105. 4. Grieco 1988; see also Powell 1991 and Snidal 1991. 5. Herz 195o;jervis 1978. 6. Mearsheimer 2oor. 7. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Walt zoos.
NOTES TO PAGES 3S-S3
8. Waltz r 979, 76-7 7· 9. Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Kim 1992; Organski 1958. 10. Diamond 1999; McNeill 1976; Price-Sm ith 2002. 11. Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register zoos; Brancati zoo7; Cohen and Werker zoo8; Kalm zoos; Nel and Richarts 2oo8. 12. Glaser and Kaufman n 1998. 13. Brooks zoo6, ros- r r. 14. On containm ent, see Gaddis 1982 and Kennan 1984. IS. Christens en and Snyder 1990; Mearshei mer 2oor. 16. Mastand uno 1992. 17. Hughes 2007. 18. Brancati zoo7; Nel and Righarts 2oo8. 19. Walt 1996. 20. Mearshei mer 2001, 152-55·
Regulating the Undead in a Liberal World Order 1. Space constrain ts prevent an extended discussion of the different varieties of the liberal paradigm . On Kantian liberalism , see Doyle 1983; on commerc ial liberalism, see Russett and Oneal 1997. Keohane 1984 provides the best developm ent of neolibera l institution alism, and Moravcsi k ideationa l liberalism. On democrat ic liberal199 7 develops ism, see Doyle r 986, and on liberal internatio nalism, see Ikenberr y zooo. 2. Hardin 1982; Olson 1971. 3. Axelrod r 984; Axelrod and Keohane r 98 5. 4. Keohane and Nye 1978; Lipson 1984. 5. Drezner zooo; Keohane 1984; Martin 1992. 6. Marcin zooo; Simmons 2009. 7. Powell 1991; Snidal 1991. 8. K.imbal1 2oo6; Knobler, Mahmou d, and Lemon 2oo6; Koblentz 2010, 102-3 . 9. Harper 2002; Lauro and Embry zoo8; Webb and Byrnard zoo8. 10. Axelrod 1984; Fudenber g and Maskin 1986.
123
124
NOTES TO PAGES S4-62
11. Raustiala and Victor 2004. 12. Drezner 2007. 13. Brooks zoo6, 264-69. 14. Ikenberry 2000, 2010. 15. Chayes and Chayes r 99 3; Downs, Rocke, and Barscorn .1994. 16. Haftendo m, Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Lake 2001. 17. Hoyt and Brooks 2003-4. 18. Brooks 2006, Grant 2010. 19. Marlin-B ennett, Wt]son, and Walton 2010. 20. Barrett 2007b; Nadelma nn 1990. 21. Barrett 2007a. 22. Flores and Smith 20IO; Kahn 2005. 23. Kahn 2005; 6 Gnida 2009; Sen I983. 24. Fidler 2004. 25. Brooks zoo6, 47· 26. Drezner zoo7; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sell 2003. 2 7. Their manifest o-which calls for equal rights and a raising of the mandator y retiremen t age to be higher than "dead," can be found at http://ww w.votecu re.com/vo te/ ?p= I 3 (accessed July I 5, 2o 1 o). 28. Fidler 2009. 29. Carpente r 2007.
Neoconservatism and the Axis of Evil Dead 1. See Caverley 2oio; Fukuyam a zoo6; Rapport 2oo8; and Williams 2005 for scholarly assessments of neoconse rvatism as a theoretica l paradigm . 2. Fukuyam a I992. 3. Bolton 2007; Krautham mer 2004. 4. Bolton 2007; Kagan zoo8. 5. Caverley 2010, 602-7; Kagan and Kagan 2ooo; Kristol and Kagan I 996. On classical realist skepticism about the ability of democrac ies to practice foreign policy, see Kennan 1984-
r
NOTES TO PAGES 62-72
6. Bolton 2007; Frum and Perle 2004; Kagan 2oo8; K.ristol and Kagan 2ooo; Podhore tz 2007. 7. Kagan 2003. 8. Boot 2oo6; Fukuyama zoo6; Kagan 2003. 9. On the neoconservative faith in the ability of the United States to create its own reality, see Suskind 2004. 10. Kagan and Kagan 2ooo; Kristol 1983; Kristol and Brooks 1997; .Kristol and Kagan 1996. 11. Smith? et al. 2009. 12. Frum and Perle 200413. Podhor etz 2007. 14. Brooks zoo6, 104.
The Social (onstrudion of Zombies 1. For a state-ce ntric approach, see Wendt 1999; for a te-centr ic take, see Holzsch eiter 2005. Der 1nore non-sta Derian and Shapiro 1989 provide a more interpretivist approach. 2. Tannen wald 1999, 2005. 3. Johnsto n 2 oo I. 4. Mercer 1995· 5. Mitzen 2006. 6. Cooke 2009, chap. 7; Russell 2005. 7. Webb and Byrnard 2oo8, 86. 8. Wendt and Duvall 2oo8. 9. Wendt 1992. 10. Price-S mith 2003; Strong 1990. 11. Adler and Barnett 1998. 12. Durodi e and Wessely 2002; Furedi 2007; Glass and Schoch -Spana zoor; Quarant elli 2004; Tierney 2004. 13. Solnit 2009, 2. 14. Snyder 2002. Even under circumstances of famine, however, 6 Gnida (2009) finds minimal evidence of cannibalism , for example. 15. Mercer 1995·
125
126
NOTE S TO PAGES 72- 87
16. \M ndt 2003. 17. Furedj 2007,4 l8. Iarke zooz; ·ray. n, Davi es, and Phi lpott 2oo8; Mitchell et ai. zooo· Tierne , Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006. 19. \Vebb and Byrnard 2008, 8+ 20. Finnemo re and iiOOnk 199 21. Brooks 2oo6, I 57-58. 22 . N'ye 2004.
Domestic Politics: Are All Zombie Politits Local? 1. See Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Milner I997i Putnam I988; Weeks 2oo8. 2. Ris e-Kappen 1991. 3. Krasner 1 978. 4. Kaufman n 2004; Ornstein and Mann zoo6. 5. Howell and Pevehous e 2007. 6. Baun1 2002. 7. Eichenbe rg zoos; Feaver and Gelpi 2004 . 8. Voters reward politician s more for post-disas ter performance more than preventiv e measures. See Healy and Malhorta 2009. 9. Burbach I 994; Kohut and Stokes zoo6. 10. Pew Research Center 2009. 11. Przewors ki and Wallerstei n I 988. 12. Stanger 2009. 13. T his result is consisten t with M ilner I 997 ·
Bureaucratic Politics: The 11 Pulling and Hauling" of Zombies I. Barnett and Finnen1o re 2 0042. Wilson 1989. 3. Allison 1971; Halperin I97+ 4. Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972 .
NOTES TO PAGES 88-107
5. On legislative constraints, see Wei ngas t and Mor an
e bran ch constraints, see Moe 1990; for 19 83; for executiv 1996. an inte grat ive appr oach , see Ham mon d and Kno tt 6. Sim on 1976. 7. Zeg art 2007 . 8. Cor desm an 2001 . 9. l{ee ne zoos , r 2 3· 10. Soln it 2009, 125. 11. Broo ks zoo6, 94-1 00. 12. Bro oks 2003 , 155· 13. The Air Forc e loses mos t of its com bat capabilities in favo r of tran spor t and logistics. 14. Broo ks 2006 , 145. gh15. Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009; Slau ter
2004 .
We're Only Human: Psychological Responses to the Undead 1. Ster n 200 2-3. 2. Mor i 1970. 3. Pric e-Sm ith 2002 ; Stro ng 1990, 2 52-5 44. Byn am and Poll ack 2001; Wal tz 1959. 5.Je rvis 1976. 1986. 6. 1-Ioughton 1996; Kho ng 1992; Neu stad t and May 7. Mab erry zoo8, 39· 8. Broo ks 2003 , 154· 9. Mer cer 1996. 10. Kah nem an and Tve rsky 1979; Levy 1997·
11.] ervi s 1992. 12. Kah nem an and Ren shon 2007 . 13. Wei nste in 1980. 14. Glass and Sch och- Spa na 2001 . 15. Tha ler and Sun stein zoo8. 16. Broo ks 2003 . 17 .Jan is 1972. 18. Sun stein and Verm eule 2008.
127
28
NOTES TO PAGES 111-114
l f
Conclusion ... or So You Think I. Pari 2 oo r. 2 . i\1 t and ta rr r 9 4. 3. B rlin 1996; Katze n tein and Okawara and Katz n tein zoio. 4. Hir hman 1970, 34r.
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INDEX
academic puffery. See another
book Adams, John Quincy, 42 AIDS, s6, IOO . See also pandemics Al Qaeda, 62, 65 aliens, 6, r 3, 70 alliances, 40-43,64. See also NATO anarchy, 33-34, 47· See also postapocalypse anthrax attacks, 4 anthropology, I I, 71 apocalypse. See post-apocalypse authoritarianism, 34· s6-s7· 64-65 Axis of Evil Dead, 65 bad zombie puns, r- 128 balancing, 34• 39-40 bears, 67-68 Belarus, 4I biology, I I bioterrorism, 4-5, 18, 27,89 Black Death, 37-38 braaaaiiiiinnnnnnns, 6 Brr;indead. See DeadAlive Brooks,~ax, rg,2s,J8,6s,74• 9I-92, 95, IOI, I2lll27 buckpassing, 40 bureaucratic politics, 87-97, r I I Byrnard, Sam, 73 cannibals, 11, 67, I 25m4 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 54n
causal mechanisms, 24, 26 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S., 88, 96 Chemical Weapons Convention,
55 Cheney, Richard, I 3 China, 25, 4I, 57, 59, 6z, 65, 78, 8o Chucky doll, lameness of, 6 Citizens for Undead Rights and Equality, s8, I 24ll2 7 college srudents, 5; similarity between zombies and, 7s-76 confirmati.o n bias, roo-roi, 104 Congress, United States, 79, I r 3 constructivism, 67-76, I 1 o-I I containment, 40 contingency planning, 5, 14 cooperation, 34, 36-7, 39-40, 47- 60,71-2,84. See also international regimes Cordesman, Anthony, 89 Coulton, Jonathan, so-51 Cuba, 41 cyberwarfare, 1, 11
Dawn of the Dead, 25, 28, 36, p, 69-70,82,8J,90,93·99· 105 Day of tbe Dead, 2 5n, 37, 42, 69- 7°.73.91
DeadAlive, 24, 25,82 Dead Sno1v, 2 8 deadheads. See zombies deadites. See zombies den1ocracy, 34,49-so,6I-62
\ ISO
I
INDEX Dendle, Peter, 4 developing countries, 57, 109 Diary of the Dead, 2 8, 9 r differently animated. See zombies disasters, r, r8, 38, 57,71 - 72, ru disease. See pandemics
Doghouse, z8n domestic politics, n-86, 96-97, r ro-r I
dreaded risk, I 4, I oo DuvaU, Raymond, 70 economics, I 2 Elvis. See Presley, Elvis entropy, .18 European Union, 54fl, 57n, 59n, 62 fear, I 5, 7 I, roo
Feed, 55· 95 feedback loop. See paradox feminism, I 7n, I05ll flesh-eaters. See zombies free-rider problem, 48 fundamental attribution error, 102, 104 Furedi, Frank, 72 game theory, 48-49· sr-sz Germany, 35 ghouls. See zombies global civil society. See nongovernmental organization global governance. See international regimes globalization, so, 53, 55 Grant, Mira, 55, 9 5 Great Britain, 35, 58, 78,95 group think, I o6-7 hackwork, r-128 Haiti,;, 17n, 21 Hamas, 6;
hawk bias, 103-4 hegemony, 35, 6r Hezbollah, 65 Hirschman, Albert, r r 3-14 Hobbes, Thomas, r 3 hobbits, 6; silliness of, I 3 H rN r. See influenza; pandemics human lobby, realist warnings about, 45n human security, III-12 Humans Versus Zombies, 5 India, 41, 78 influenza, 56, 59, wo. See also pandemics interest groups, 82, 85, I I r international law, ;6, 6I-62 International Organization for Migration, 54 international regimes, 54• 59• 6r-6z, 87; effectiveness of, 55 , 6r-62 international relations theories; r6-zo, 33-114; gnawing gap with respect to zombies and, 12; paradigmatic nature of, r6- zo, r 1 2-14; state-centric focus of, r 12; utility of, I 7, 1 1 2- r 4· See also constructivism; liberalism; realism Iran, 4m, 62, 65 Islam, 62 isolationism, 82 Jackson, Michael, 2 5 ]apan,57n Kagan, Robert, 62 Kashmir, 41 Keene, Brian, 25, 90 Keynes, John Maynard, 53 King, Stephen, 2 5
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INDEX Korea . See North Korea, South Korea
Land of the Dead, 38,42-43, 82, 9I Left 4 Dead, 3 liberalism, 47-60 , I ro; in contrast to neoconservatism, 61-62 libert arians , 93 living dead. See zombies Loch Ness monster, 70 Lord of the Rings. See hobbits Mabe rry,Jo natha n, r6, ror malar ia, 56. See also pandemics Marv el Zomb ies, 3 Marx ism, 5, I 7n mathe matic s, I I - I 2 Mear sheim er,Joh n, 44-45 milita ry force, 14, 63-66 mobil e deceased. See zombies mode ls. See intern ationa l relations theori es multi latera l coope ration . See coope ration ; intern ationa l regim es Murra y, Bill, 74 ~A1L0,40-4I,55,95
natur al disasters. See disasters netwo rks, 96, 105 neoco nserv atism , 6r-66 , I 10 ~GO. See non-g overn menta l organ izatio n ~ietzsche, Friedrich, z 3n, 61 Night of the Living Dead, 2 I, 2 7, z8,36 ,42,6 9,90, I13 non -gove rnmen tal organization,
57-6° norm cascade, 74 norm al accident, z 7. See also burea ucrati c politics
1Sl
norms, 68, 74-76 North American Coun terZombie Agreement, 59 North Korea, 6z nuclear weapons, 14, 68 offense-defense balance, 38-39 outsourcing, 84 Pakistan, 41 pandemics, I, I8, 37-38 , so, ss-56, 59 , Ioo paradigms. See international relations theories paradox. See feedback loop paranormal creatures. See hobbits; international relations theories; vampires; and zombies. Mostl y zombies People for the Ethical Treat ment of Zombies, 58 philosophy, 8, I I physics, I I plague. See pandemics Planet Terror, 24, 83 policy planning, 14. See also contingency planning polio, 56. See also pandemics post-apocalypse, 2, 16, 27-2 8, so, 60,72 -73• IIO post-humans. See zombies Potter , Harry, 6 powe r transition, 35-36 , 39-40 Presley, Elvis, ix-x, 70 prohi bition regime, s6 prosp ect theory, 102-4 public opinio n, I 51 77-82 , I I I rally-roWld-the-flag, 79, 85 rational choice theory, 102 realism, 33-45 , no; in contra st to neoconservatism, 61-62
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152
INDEX
regime complex. See internationa! regimes relative gains concern, 34 Resident Evil, z, 23, 25, 83, 93· ee also Umbrella Corporation Return of the Living Dead, 2J, 24, 63 , 83.99 revolution in military affairs, 6J- 64 Rising, The, 90 Romero, George, 19, 24, 2 7, 36, 38, 69,71,82,90 RowHng,]. K., 6 Rumsfeld, Donald, 5 Russell, Bertrand, 52 Russian Federation, 41, 62, 65,78
SARS,s6,59,
Tragedy of the Zombies, 5I -52 ruberculosis, 56. See aJso pandemics z8 Days Later, 24, 28- 29, 52 z8 Weeks La.teT, 5n, 24, 66,95 Twilight series, 6, I 20nr9 Twitchell,James, 6 UFOs. See aliens Ugly Americans, 3 Umbrella Corporation, 25,93--94 undead. See zombies United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Nations, 43-44, 54-55, 6o,62,78-89 United States,4r, 55,62-64,78-82
roo
Vampires, 6-9, q, IlOni9; suckiness of, 9 viably challenged. See zombies
sharks, 67 Shaun of the Dead, 51-p, 73, 74• 78,99 Smith, Adam, So-8 1 social sciences, r 2, 1 r 2 sociology, r 2 soft power, 76 Solnit, Rebecca, 7 r South Mrica, 39 South Korea, 57n standard operating procedures (SOP), 88, 92 stenches. See zombies Stern, Jessica, 14 Sun Tzu, 13 Survival of the Dead, 82, 105 Syria, 65
II7 Webb,Jen, 73 Wendt, Alexander, 70 Whedon, Joss, 1201119, 12 rn2 wizards, 6, I 3 World Health Organization, 54 World U'llr Z, 25, 28, 29, 38, 39, 41·55·57.65, 73.9 1--95 World Zombie Organization (WZO), 54• 59
Taiwan, 41 terrorist attacks, I, 4, IJ-IS, 88 Thriller, evil of, 2 5-26 Thucydides, I 3, 38 Tragedy of the Commons, 48-49
ZombAid, 58 zombie canon, 8, I5, I8, 23-25, 28,J7,69 1 7I,7J-74 1 90;hidden heterogeneity of, 19; biases of; 19,94,104-5,110
Waldmann, Paul, 6 Walking Dead, The, 3 Waltz, Kenneth, 34; apologia to,
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INDEX
zombie-industrial complex,
83-84 Zombie Research Society, n, Zombie Rights Watch, 58
2I
Zombie Strippers, 2 3n, 83 Zombie/and, 25, 28, 51, 74• 99 zombies, r-128: alliances with humans, 42-43; capabilities of, 2 3-32; cooperation among, sz-53; contingency plans for, 5i definitions of, 21-22; elite disdain of, 6; family responses to, 8z-83, 103; geographk barriers to, 38-39; groupthink tendencies of, 107; Haitian type of, 8n, qn, 21; infection
rate, spread of, 29-30, 50; international cooperation in face of, 40-41; intelligence of, 2 3; lifestyle of, 7s-76; metaphorical use of, 4-5, 12; nicknames for, 1; origins of, 24-28; as perfect twenty-first-century threat, 18; preferences of, 22, 24; popular culture and, 2-4, 15; popularity of, 2-5; possibility of, 7-8, I 3; scholarly literature on, I I-n; speed of, 28-32.; superiority to vampires, 6--9 Zombies without Borders, 58 zoology, 1 I
153
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