Essential Histories 040 - The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919

GREGORY

FREMONT-BARNES

holds a doctorate in History from Oxford

Modern University

a n d s e r v e s as a S e n i o r L e c t u r e r i n W a r Studies at t h e R o y a l M i l i t a r y A c a d e m y Sandhurst, d i v i d i n g his w o r k b e t w e e n t e a c h i n g cadets o n site a n d c o m m i s s i o n e d

officers

of the British A r m y posted to garrisons t h r o u g h o u t t h e

UK

a n d a b r o a d . H i s w r i t i n g focuses principally o n the military

and

naval history of the 1 8 t h a n d 1 9 t h centuries.

PROFESSOR ROBERT

O'NEILL,

A O D.Phil. ( O x o n ) , H o n D. Litt. ( A N U ) , F A S S A , is t h e S e r i e s E d i t o r of t h e Essential Histories. His w e a l t h of knowledge

and

e x p e r t i s e s h a p e s t h e series content and provides up-to-them i n u t e research a n d theory.

Born

in 1936 an Australian citizen, h e served i n t h e Australian A r m y , a n d has h e l d a n u m b e r of e m i n e n t p o s i t i o n s i n h i s t o r y circles, including

C h i c h e l e Professor of

t h e H i s t o r y of W a r at A l l Souls College, Oxford, a n d

Chairman

of the Board of the Imperial W a r M u s e u m a n d the C o u n c i l of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for Strategic Studies, L o n d o n . H e is t h e a u t h o r o f m a n y b o o k s including works o n the

German

A r m y a n d t h e N a z i Party, a n d t h e Korean a n d V i e t n a m wars.

Now

based i n Australia o n his r e t i r e m e n t f r o m O x f o r d h e is t h e Director of t h e L o w y Institute for International Policy a n d

Planning

Director of t h e US Studies C e n t r e at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Sydney.

Essential Histories

T h e Anglo-Afghan W a r s 1839-1919

Essential Histories

The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919 Gregory Fremont-Barnes

Readers s h o u l d n o t e t h a t consistent t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n f r o m Pashtun, D a r i and o t h e r A f g h a n languages into English is

Glossary

p r o b l e m a t i c , particularly w i t h respect t o place names and family names, m a n y o f w h i c h b o r e different renderings in t h e

Abattis

D e f e n c e w o r k consisting o f a t r e e w i t h

19th c e n t u r y t h a n t h e y d o today, thus: K a n d a h a r / Q a n d a h a r ;

s h a r p e n e d branches, felled so t h a t its branches

Kabul/Cabool/Cabul/Cabaul/Qabul;Jellalabad/Jalalabad;

point outwards

Jugdulluk/Jagdalak; K h o o r d C a b u l Pass/Khurd-Kabul Pass; Ali Musjid/Ali Masjid; Gilzai/Gilzye, e t c . T h e a u t h o r has t h e r e f o r e

Doolie

C o v e r e d s t r e t c h e r litter o r palanquin f o r t h e evacuation o f t h e w o u n d e d

adopted t h e most c o m m o n l y accepted f o r m o r that which m o s t closely reflects local p r o n u n c i a t i o n .

Feringee

A disparaging t e r m f o r a European

O n an historical n o t e , readers s h o u l d be a w a r e t h a t until 1858

Ghazi

Fighter f o r t h e Faith w h o has killed an infidel

Havildar

Indian infantry sergeant

Infidel

Unbeliever

Indian affairs w e r e m a n a g e d j o i n t l y b e t w e e n C r o w n officials and t h o s e o f t h e East India C o m p a n y (EIC). In L o n d o n , t h e apparatus o f t h e f o r m e r consisted o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r W a r and t h e C o l o n i e s , w h o issued instructions t o t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l in C a l c u t t a and t h e Board o f C o n t r o l , w h o s e

Jezail

L o n g - b a r r e l l e d m a t c h l o c k musket carried by t r i b e s m e n

president, as a cabinet m i n i s t e r was a c c o u n t a b l e t o Parliament. In C a l c u t t a w a s t h e EIC, originally a c h a r t e r e d c o m p a n y w i t h

Jihad

Holy war

Jirga

A s s e m b l y o f tribal elders o r representatives

Kotal

M o u n t a i n pass

purely c o m m e r c i a l c o n c e r n s , b u t w h i c h by t h e 18th c e n t u r y exercised w i d e political and military c o n t r o l o v e r m u c h o f t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t o n behalf o f t h e C r o w n . T h e EIC m a i n t a i n e d its o w n armies, w h i c h s e r v e d in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h o s e o f t h e C r o w n , all c o m m a n d e d by a c a b i n e t - a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f a n s w e r a b l e t o t h e W a r O f f i c e in L o n d o n . In I 858, t h e EIC was disbanded, t h e C r o w n assuming all a u t h o r i t y o v e r India via t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r India, w h o

Lakh

100,000 rupees, t h e equivalent o f £ 10,000 t o d a y

Mullah

Religious teacher, leader o r holy m a n

Nullah

Small valley o r ravine

Poshteen

Sheepskin jacket w i t h a fleece lining

Sangar

Stone b r e a s t w o r k

Sepoy

Indian i n f a n t r y m a n

sat in t h e cabinet, a civilian viceroy, and a c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f o f t h e n e w l y established, British-led Indian A r m y .

Sirdar

Commander

Sowar

Indian cavalry t r o o p e r

Wazir

C h i e f minister o r advisor

First published in G r e a t Britain in 2 0 0 9 by O s p r e y Publishing, M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , Botley, O x f o r d O X 2 0 P H , U K 4 4 3 Park A v e n u e S o u t h , N e w York, N Y 1001 6, U S A E-mail: i n f o @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m

FOR A C A T A L O G U E O F A L L B O O K S PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY A N D A V I A T I O N PLEASE C O N T A C T :

© 2 0 0 9 O s p r e y Publishing Ltd. O s p r e y D i r e c t , do R a n d o m H o u s e D i s t r i b u t i o n C e n t e r A l l rights r e s e r v e d . A p a r t f r o m any fair dealing f o r t h e p u r p o s e

4 0 0 H a h n Road, W e s t m i n s t e r M D 21 157

o f p r i v a t e study, research, criticism o r review, as p e r m i t t e d u n d e r

Email:

[email protected]

t h e C o p y r i g h t , Designs and Patents A c t , 1988, n o p a r t o f this p u b l i c a t i o n may be r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a retrieval system, o r t r a n s m i t t e d in any f o r m o r by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, p h o t o c o p y i n g , r e c o r d i n g o r otherwise, w i t h o u t t h e prior w r i t t e n permission o f t h e copyright o w n e r Enquiries s h o u l d be addressed t o t h e Publishers. A CIP catalogue r e c o r d f o r this b o o k is available f r o m t h e

Page layout by: M y r i a m Bell Design, France Index by Fineline Editorial Services Typeset in GillSans and I T C S t o n e Serif Maps by T h e M a p S t u d i o O r i g i n a t e d by P D Q Media, Bungay, U K P r i n t e d in C h i n a t h r o u g h B o o k b u i l d e r s II

12

7DW

E-mail: c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m O s p r e y Publishing is s u p p o r t i n g t h e W o o d l a n d Trust, t h e UK's leading w o o d l a n d c o n s e r v a t i o n charity, by

www.ospreypublishing.com

ISBN: 9 7 8 I 8 4 6 0 3 4 4 6 6

10

C07

f u n d i n g t h e d e d i c a t i o n o f trees.

British L i b r a r y

09

O s p r e y D i r e c t , T h e B o o k Service Ltd, D i s t r i b u t i o n C e n t r e , C o l c h e s t e r Road, Frating G r e e n , Colchester; Essex,

13

1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

1

Contents Introduction

7

Chronology

10

PART l:THE FIRST A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1839-42 Origins and background o f the war

14

W a r r i n g sides

I8

The fighting

20

H o w the w a r ended

33

Portrait of a civilian: Florentia, Lady Sale (1787-1 853)

37

The w o r l d around war: the playground of the Great Game

43

PART ll:THE S E C O N D A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1878-81 Origins and background of the w a r

50

W a r r i n g sides

54

The fighting

56

H o w the w a r ended

72

Portrait of a soldier: A r t h u r Male, A r m y chaplain, I 3th Hussars

74

PART IILTHETHIRD A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1919 Origins and background of the w a r

80

W a r r i n g sides

82

The fighting

83

H o w the w a r ended

85

Conclusion and consequences

86

Bibliography and further reading

92

Index

94

Introduction

O n 13 J a n u a r y 1 8 4 2 , a British officer,

Afghanistan would become a byword

p e r c h e d o n t h e r o o f t o p of t h e fortress at

savage a n d c u n n i n g e n e m i e s ,

Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan,

climate, bitter winters, scorching

summers

and rugged and beautiful terrain,

including

a lone horseman, h u n c h e d over exhausted, ponderously

spotted and

approaching.

T h e rider was D r W i l l i a m B r y d o n ,

deep ravines a n d precipitous

an

for

inhospitable

mountains,

all ideal for m o u n t i n g defence a n d a m b u s h .

a r m y s u r g e o n a n d t h e sole s u r v i v o r o f a n

Afghanistan appeared a seemingly

A n g l o - I n d i a n a r m y of 1 6 , 0 0 0 soldiers

unconquerable place w h e r e

and

heroism,

c a m p followers t h a t h a d left K a b u l o n l y a

c o w a r d i c e a n d sacrifice a b o u n d e d ,

and

week before - n o w utterly annihilated

where death awaited those foolish

enough

by

exhaustion, frostbite a n d almost

continuous

t o v e n t u r e across t h e f r o n t i e r w i t h o u t

attack by A f g h a n tribesmen. T h e

total

m o s t careful a t t e n t i o n paid to strategy

destruction of the A r m y of the

Indus

exemplified the nature of fighting this forbidding a n d hostile populated by fiercely

in

environment,

independent,

ferocious w a r - m i n d e d peoples, perhaps the most formidable

indeed

proper supply, organization a n d

T h e country's i n f a m o u s reputation for causing suffering o n c a m p a i g n

I n d i a n a n d G u r k h a soldier of this p e r i o d ,

inspired

Rudyard Kipling to produce o n e of the m o s t p o p u l a r p o e m s of t h e age:

T h e British camp at Pezwan, September I 880. (Author's collection)

and

transport.

guerrilla

fighters i n t h e w o r l d . To t h e British,

the

8

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

t o t h e p r o b l e m at t h e h e a r t o f t h e first t w o

W h e n y o u ' r e w o u n d e d a n d left o n

c o n f l i c t s , at least, c o u l d n e v e r lie i n m i l i t a r y

Afghanistan's plains,

intervention alone.

A n ' the w o m e n come out to cut u p

Britain's fear of Russian e x p a n s i o n i n t o

what remains, Jest r o l l t o y o u r r i f l e a n ' b l o w

A f g h a n i s t a n f o r m e d t h e b a c k d r o p o f its f i r s t

out

t w o conflicts; i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , f o u g h t

your brains,

between 1839 and 1842, the

A n ' go t o y o u r G a w d like a soldier.

Governor-

G e n e r a l of I n d i a insisted u p o n a n invasion Yet if A f g h a n i s t a n was to p r o v e t h e graveyard

e v e n after t h e ostensible reason for hostility

of m a n y a soldier, it was o n l y o n e

h a d passed. T h e consequences w e r e

amongst

d e v a s t a t i n g , f o r after t h e i r i n i t i a l l y successful

m a n y of the conflicts waged b y Britain d u r i n g Victoria's reign ( 1 8 3 7 - 1 9 0 1 ) .

Every

c a m p a i g n , i n w h i c h A n g l o - I n d i a n forces

year o f h e r r e i g n saw h e r forces d e p l o y e d

imposed o n the Afghans an unacceptable

o n c a m p a i g n s o m e w h e r e across t h e g l o b e ,

ruler, t h e y p r o c e e d e d d o w n t h e r o a d of

particularly i n Africa a n d Asia, i n a n

folly by attempting to control the country

u n i n t e r r u p t e d series o f c o l o n i a l w a r s a n d

t h r o u g h m e r e o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t is w e l l

m i n o r operations to protect British nationals

k n o w n : unable to hold even Kabul, the army

a n d British interests, shift a frontier i n t h e

w i t h d r e w t o w a r d s I n d i a , o n l y t o m e e t its

Empire's favour, suppress a m u t i n y or revolt,

inevitable demise along the

or r e p e l a n a t t a c k . As t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g

r o a d s a n d passes e n r o u t e t o J a l a l a b a d .

snow-bound

i m p e r i a l power, Britain w a g e d these

Subsequent operations w e n t some w a y

campaigns without hesitation, and

t o w a r d s resurrecting British prestige, b u t

w i t h the full confidence of ultimate

t h e lesson w a s clear: despite a c e n t u r y of m i l i t a r y success i n I n d i a , B r i t i s h a r m s w e r e

v i c t o r y against foes w h o w e r e i n e v i t a b l y n u m e r i c a l l y superior, yet t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y

and

organizationally inferior. Such was the price

not invincible, and Afghanistan could not l o n g be h e l d u n d e r f o r e i g n sway.

of m a i n t a i n i n g a n d e x p a n d i n g the Empire,

Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian rivalry in

o f u p h o l d i n g t h e n a t i o n ' s p r i d e i n its o w n

C e n t r a l Asia led to a second British i n v a s i o n

perceived cultural, economic a n d political

of Afghanistan ( 1 8 7 8 - 8 1 ) , leading to yet

superiority i n t h e w o r l d - a n d usually at

another partial and temporary -

r e l a t i v e l y little cost.

m i l i t a r i l y m o r e successful -

A m o n g s t all these conflicts, however, three Anglo-Afghan Wars ( 1 8 3 9 - 4 2 ,

the

1878-81

a n d 1919) stand out. I n military terms they

though

occupation,

for effective c o n t r o l , especially of t h e vast countryside, again proved impossible. As i n t h e first war, t h e British w o u l d

shared m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h other British

suffer a c r u s h i n g defeat, at M a i w a n d ,

campaigns - initial, sometimes

w i t h t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n o n l y restored after

even

catastrophic failure, but ultimate victory

a c h i e v i n g a decisive victory over t h e

i n t h e field. Yet i n p o l i t i c a l t e r m s t h e wars

A f g h a n s at K a n d a h a r . But t h e w a r

e n d e d u n e a s i l y at best a n d disastrously at

f i n i s h o n t h e basis o f c o m p r o m i s e ,

would with

worst, w i t h a n extension of British influence

Britain controlling the foreign policy of

b u t never extensive a n n e x a t i o n or evidence

Afghanistan, a p o i n t that largely contributed

that the original aims could not have been

t o a t h i r d , b u t m u c h s h o r t e r a n d less c o s t l y

achieved t h r o u g h diplomacy alone. T h e wars

conflict i n 1919, w h e n Afghanistan sought

w e r e m a r k e d b y v a r y i n g degrees of political

t o t h r o w o f f t h e last vestiges o f B r i t i s h

a n d military incompetence a n d brilliance,

c o n t r o l o v e r its i n t e r n a l affairs.

disaster a n d t r i u m p h i n r a p i d succession.

T h e origins of Britain's wars i n

T h e r e w e r e also p l e n t i f u l e x a m p l e s o f

A f g h a n i s t a n m a y b e t r a c e d t o its o b s e s s i o n

supreme folly by politicians, w h o

w i t h the vulnerability of the

failed

Indian

t o i d e n t i f y at t h e outset clear p o l i t i c a l

s u b c o n t i n e n t - its greatest i m p e r i a l

objectives or recognize t h a t t h e

possession - to possible i n v a s i o n b y

solution

Introduction

feringees

9

Afghan tribesmen lie in ambush a m o n g rocks during t h e

the invading

Second Afghan W a r Eastern Afghanistan is ideal ground

for a E u r o p e a n ) . O v e r t h e course of a c e n t u r y

for irregular warfare. (National A r m y Museum)

(a d i s p a r a g i n g t e r m

of British rule, w h i c h c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f I n d i a a n d its p a r t i t i o n

R u s s i a v i a A f g h a n i s t a n . K n o w n as ' t h e G r e a t

i n 1947, m a i n t a i n i n g security along the

G a m e ' , t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for influence i n

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier ( n o w t h e 'tribal areas' of

C e n t r a l Asia f u e l l e d t h e fears o f t w o

western Pakistan) w o u l d require the dispatch

generations of V i c t o r i a n soldiers, politicians,

of dozens of p u n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . I n effect,

colonial administrators and the public.

the Anglo-Afghan Wars m a y more

W h e n s h o r t l y after t h e First A f g h a n W a r

the

accurately

b e d e s c r i b e d as t h r e e c o n f l i c t s c o n d u c t e d

in

border of British India e x p a n d e d to include

A f g h a n i s t a n p r o p e r , a n d a series o f s p o r a d i c ,

w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

low-intensity operations conducted between

North-West

Frontier - a l a n d peopled largely b y Afghans

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a n d A f g h a n

of various tribes - t h e m i l i t a r y

along the North-West

commitment

o f B r i t a i n a n d t h e Raj p e r f o r c e e x p a n d e d , removing any further buffer

with

tribesmen

Frontier.

T h o u g h l i t t l e is r e m e m b e r e d o f t h e s e conflicts - i n d e e d , the t h i r d lasted b u t a f e w

Afghanistan and drawing into the Empire

weeks a n d concluded nearly a century ago

a r e g i o n n o t o r i o u s f o r its v o l a t i l e , w a r l i k e

their relevance to Britain's interests i n t h e

p o p u l a t i o n of disparate tribes. These tribes,

region stands o u t all t h e m o r e

w h i l e largely hostile to o n e another,

s i n c e t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f its a r m e d forces i n

g e n e r a l l y m a d e c o m m o n cause t o o p p o s e

the country in November 2 0 0 1 .

prominently

-

Chronology

First Afghan War, 1839-42

23 November Brigadier-General John S h e l t o n is s o u n d l y d e f e a t e d b y

1836

1837

4 March Lord Auckland

A f g h a n rebels i n t h e B e h m a r u Hills

appointed

Governor-General of India

11 December Anglo-Afghan

2 0 J u n e Princess V i c t o r i a succeeds t o

agreement; British t o w i t h d r a w

t h e British t h r o n e at t h e age o f 18

K a b u l o n t h e 1 5 t h u n d e r safe c o n d u c t

September Captain Alexander

2 3 D e c e m b e r Sir W i l l i a m

Burnes

Mohamed

K h a n d u r i n g negotiations respecting

1 D e c e m b e r P e r s i a n siege o f H e r a t

t h e safe w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e K a b u l garrison

begins 1 9 D e c e m b e r I v a n V i t k e v i c h , Tsar's

William

commander-

1 O c t o b e r A u c k l a n d issues a m a n i f e s t o

in-chief i n Afghanistan, concludes a n agreement w i t h Akbar K h a n for

Shuja t o t h e A f g h a n t h r o n e b y force

t h e safe c o n d u c t o f a l l B r i t i s h t r o o p s

10 December Bengal division marches

to Peshawar

f r o m Ferozepore i n India

6 J a n u a r y A n g l o - I n d i a n garrison

19 February A n g l o - I n d i a n forces r e a c h

of 4 , 5 0 0 troops a n d 1 2 , 0 0 0 civilians

west b a n k of t h e Indus

leaves K a b u l o n m a r c h t o Jalalabad

1 0 M a r c h Sir J o h n K e a n e ' s A r m y

13 J a n u a r y Last s t a n d o f t h e

o f t h e I n d u s e n t e r s t h e B o l a n Pass,

4 4 t h Foot at G a n d a m a k

beginning the invasion of Afghanistan

10 J a n u a r y A k b a r K h a n takes

3 May A r m y of the Indus

Elphinstone a n d Shelton prisoner

concentrated at Kandahar; Shah Shuja

A p r i l S h a h S h u j a is m u r d e r e d

crowned

in Kabul

Amir

2 3 J u l y Keane's forces s t o r m fortress

7 A p r i l Sir R o b e r t Sale, a t J a l a l a b a d ,

of

m a k e s a m a j o r sortie against his

Ghazni

besiegers i n h o p e o f assisting t h e

K a b u l a n d i n s t a l l s S h a h S h u j a as n e w

a d v a n c e of a relief c o l u m n u n d e r

Amir; Dost M o h a m e d , t h e deposed

Major-General George Pollock

A m i r , flees n o r t h t o t h e H i n d u December Dost M o h a m e d

Kush

surrenders

Spring British build outside

16 April Pollock's force relieves t h e garrison at Jalalabad 2 3 April E l p h i n s t o n e dies i n c a p t i v i t y

to t h e British

1841

1 January Major-General

d e c l a r i n g i n t e n t i o n t o restore S h a h

6 August A r m y of t h e Indus enters

1840

1842

Elphinstone, British

special e n v o y , arrives i n K a b u l

1839

Macnaghten

a n d a n aide are m u r d e r e d b y Akbar

arrives i n K a b u l o n m i s s i o n t o Dost

1838

from

cantonment

Kabul

2 N o v e m b e r Start o f a n t i - S h u j a r e v o l t

at Tezeen 2 0 A u g u s t Pollock leaves Jalalabad i n an advance o n Kabul

i n Kabul; Burnes, t h e British resident,

15 S e p t e m b e r Pollock's troops

his brother a n d others m u r d e r e d i n

retake Kabul

Kabul

12 October T h e 'Avenging A r m y '

22 November Akbar Khan, Dost

leaves K a b u l for Peshawar; Dost

M u h a m e d ' s eldest son, arrives i n

M o h a m e d later released f r o m British

Kabul to lead t h e ongoing rebellion

c u s t o d y a n d r e i n s t a t e d as A m i r

Chronology

1843

23 D e c e m b e r British troops reach

21 January Stewart occupies

Ferozepore

Kalat-i-Gilzai

January Dost M o h a m e d returns to his

21 F e b r u a r y Sher A l i dies; his son,

t h r o n e w i t h British approval

Y a k u b K h a n , agrees t o n e g o t i a t e

II

6 April G a n d a m a k occupied by AngloI n d i a n forces

Second Afghan War, I 8 7 8 - 8 I

8 M a y Y a k u b K h a n arrives at t h e British c a m p at

1878

Gandamak

2 N o v e m b e r Lord Lytton, Viceroy of

26 M a y Treaty of G a n d a m a k ,

I n d i a , sends Sher A l i , t h e A f g h a n A m i r ,

a n apparent e n d to the conflict

a n u l t i m a t u m , d e m a n d i n g h e accept a

2 4 J u l y Sir P i e r r e L o u i s N a p o l e o n

British d i p l o m a t i c mission i n K a b u l

C a v a g n a r i enters Kabul

bringing

2 2 N o v e m b e r M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir

3 September Attack o n the British

S a m u e l B r o w n e captures t h e fortress

Residency at K a b u l

at A l i M a s j i d

26 S e p t e m b e r Y a k u b K h a n leaves

24 N o v e m b e r B r o w n e occupies Dacca

Kabul

2 December Major-General

6 O c t o b e r Battle of Charasia

Frederick

Roberts takes Peiwar K o t a l

13 O c t o b e r Roberts enters K a b u l

1 3 D e c e m b e r S h e r A l i a p p o i n t s as

28 O c t o b e r Yakub K h a n abdicates

r e g e n t his s o n , Y a k u b K h a n , a n d flees his capital 20 D e c e m b e r B r o w n e occupies Jalalabad 1879

British cavalry and horse artillery in action outside Kabul, I I D e c e m b e r I 879, w h e n Brigadier-General D u n h a m Massy, w i t h only 2 0 0 officers and t r o o p e r s o f t h e 9th Lancers, a b o u t 4 0 Bengal Lancers and f o u r guns o f

8 J a n u a r y M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir D o n a l d

t h e RHA, blundered into an Afghan force o f thousands

Stewart occupies K a n d a h a r

and was obliged t o retreat t o w a r d s Sherpur.

I2

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

In t h e years b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e A n g l o - A f g h a n wars, sporadic warfare c o n t i n u e d in t h e rugged f r o n t i e r

Third Afghan W a n 1919

t e r r i t o r y H e r e , as t h e G o r d o n Highlanders s t o r m t h e Dargai Heights o n 2 0 O c t o b e r I 897 - p a r t o f t h e T i r a h campaign against an Afghan t r i b e , t h e Afridis - Piper Findlater continues t o play despite his w o u n d s , f o r w h i c h e x t r a o r d i n a r y act he received t h e V i c t o r i a Cross. ( A u t h o r ' s collection)

1919

3 M a y A f g h a n t r o o p s cross i n t o I n d i a a n d occupy village of Bagh 9 M a y British forces a t t a c k t h e Afghans at Bagh 17 M a y A f g h a n s a b a n d o n their defences at Dacca

1880

1 April Stewart leaves K a n d a h a r

27 M a y British troops capture A f g h a n

for Kabul

fortress o f S p i n Baldak; N a d i r

19 April Battle o f A h m a d

Khel

Khan

besieges T h a i

2 M a y Stewart arrives i n K a b u l

3 1 M a y British agree t o g r a n t

22 July Abdur R a h m a n declared A m i r

armistice requested b y Afghans

27 July Battle of M a i w a n d

3 J u n e Armistice signed

6 A u g u s t A y u b K h a n besieges K a n d a h a r 8 A u g u s t Roberts leaves K a b u l f o r Kandahar 11 A u g u s t Stewart leaves K a b u l f o r

Shah Shuja (Shuja-ul-Mulk), w h o s e installation as

31 August Roberts marches i n t o

A m i r o f Afghanistan o n 3 May I 839 f o r m e d t h e

Kandahar

ostensible basis o n which Anglo-Indian forces

1 September Battle of K a n d a h a r 1881

O p p o s i t e page:

India

2 2 April British evacuate

Kandahar

had invaded t h e c o u n t r y t w o months earlier (National A r m y Museum)

Part I

The First Anglo-Afghan W a r I 839-42

Origins and background of the war T h e o r i g i n s o f Britain's r i v a l r y w i t h Russia

w e r e n o t t o a t t a c k A f g h a n i s t a n a t Russia's

i n C e n t r a l Asia m a y be traced t o t h e 1820s,

behest. H e r a t u n d e r Persian c o n t r o l could

w h e n Russia b e g a n t o e x p a n d s o u t h t h r o u g h

l e a d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a base for

t h e C a u c a s u s i n t o n o r t h - w e s t Persia, a

f u r t h e r i n c u r s i o n i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n - at least

process unsuccessfully o p p o s e d b y British

as f a r as K a n d a h a r - w h e n c e t h e R u s s i a n s

d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t for Persia a n d T u r k e y .

could reach India, either via Kabul a n d

B y t h e e a r l y 1 8 3 0 s , Persia h a d b e c o m e a

t h e K h y b e r Pass o r s o u t h - e a s t t h r o u g h t h e

v i r t u a l Russian satellite. To c o m p e n s a t e for

B o l a n Pass. T h u s u n d e r n o

losses i n t h e n o r t h - w e s t , t h e S h a h , w i t h

w a s B r i t a i n p r e p a r e d t o t o l e r a t e Russia or

circumstances

Russian e n c o u r a g e m e n t , seized territory

a R u s s i a n - b a c k e d Persia e s t a b l i s h i n g a

i n western A f g h a n i s t a n , specifically t h e

presence i n Afghanistan. This antagonism

region around Herat, ruled by Kamran,

c o n s t i t u t e d w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

w h o s e g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r h a d t a k e n it f r o m

' G r e a t G a m e ' , w i t h t h e First A f g h a n W a r

Persia. I n 1 8 3 5 , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f

as i t s o p e n i n g m a n i f e s t a t i o n .

India recognized in a m e m o r a n d u m

for

A s f a r as t h e n e w l y a p p o i n t e d

Governor-

his superiors i n L o n d o n t h a t Russia c o u l d

General of India, Lord Auckland, together

e x p a n d i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n v i a its i n f l u e n c e

w i t h t h e East I n d i a C o m p a n y ( E I C ) w e r e

o v e r Persia, t h u s i m p e r i l l i n g B r i t i s h I n d i a :

c o n c e r n e d , t h e best m e a n s of o b v i a t i n g Russian influence i n Afghanistan was to

I t is t h e i n t e r e s t o f R u s s i a t o e x t e n d strengthen t h e Persian Empire,

and

which

ensure that Dost M o h a m e d , the present A m i r i n K a b u l , s u p p o r t e d British interests i n t h e

occupies a central position b e t w e e n

region. T h e question posed before Auckland

t h e d o u b l e lines of o p e r a t i o n of t h e

a n d his advisers i n 1 8 3 7 was w h e t h e r or n o t

Autocrat to eastward and westward, a n d

D o s t M o h a m e d satisfied this n e e d .

as P e r s i a c a n n e v e r b e a r i v a l o f R u s s i a

T h e S h a h o f Persia, despite British

the a u g m e n t a t i o n of her strength can

w a r n i n g , c o n t i n u e d t o m a i n t a i n a close

o n l y increase t h e offensive m e a n s of

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, a n d l a u n c h e d a

Russia... W h a t t h e Russian p o l i c y

r e n e w e d c a m p a i g n against H e r a t i n late July

might

b e a f t e r t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f H e r a t i t is

1 8 3 7 , l a y i n g siege t o t h e c i t y o n 1 D e c e m b e r ,

u n n e c e s s a r y n o w t o c o n s i d e r b u t i t is

w i t h resistance e x p e c t e d to be brief. British

impossible to d e n y t h a t she m i g h t

fears w e r e h e i g h t e n e d w h e n , o n t h e 1 9 t h ,

arrive

at t h a t p o i n t i n l e g i t i m a t e support of her

a Cossack officer b y t h e n a m e of I v a n

a l l y , t h e K i n g o f P e r s i a , a n d i t is e q u a l l y

V i k t o r o v i c h V i t k e v i c h , b e a r i n g a letter

difficult to d e n y that f r o m that point

f r o m Tsar N i c h o l a s I w h o h o p e d t o establish

she m a y p r o c l a i m a crusade against

diplomatic relations w i t h the Amir,

British I n d i a , i n w h i c h she c o u l d be

i n K a b u l . D o s t M o h a m e d w a s less i n t e r e s t e d

arrived

j o i n e d b y a l l t h e w a r - l i k e , restless

i n a c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Russia t h a n i n u s i n g

tribes t h a t f o r m e d t h e

t h e letter to his advantage i n a n o t h e r way.

overwhelming

force of T i m u r .

Since September t h e British already h a d a special e n v o y at t h e A f g h a n capital i n t h e

T h e Persians f a i l e d t o seize H e r a t i n

1834,

f o r m of C a p t a i n A l e x a n d e r Burnes, sent b y

a n d Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign

A u c k l a n d . Burnes h a d m a d e his r e p u t a t i o n

Secretary, h a d issued a w a r n i n g t h a t t h e y

as a r e s u l t o f h i s r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

I5

of his travels t h r o u g h C e n t r a l Asia a n d

Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n , A u c k l a n d ' s

Afghanistan, d u r i n g t h e course of w h i c h

Secretary, o f f e r i n g n o clear n e g o t i a t i n g

Chief

journey he h a d established g o o d relations

powers a n d lacking detail b e y o n d

w i t h Dost M o h a m e d i n 1830. Burnes was

e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e e d to favour t h e interests

in Kabul o n account of a n appeal f r o m the

of R a n jit S i n g h over those of D o s t M o h a m e d ,

A m i r for British aid i n his quarrel w i t h t h e

w h o m Burnes was to a d m o n i s h n o t to begin

powerful Sikh k i n g d o m i n the

negotiations w i t h a n y other power over the

neighbouring

Punjab, u n d e r their f o r m i d a b l e ruler R a n jit

issue o f P e s h a w a r . T h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e d

Singh. Four years earlier t h e Sikhs h a d seized

Burnes i n a difficult p o s i t i o n at K a b u l ; yet

Peshawar, f o r m e r l y t h e richest p r o v i n c e i n

h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e u r g e n c y of affairs, for

Afghanistan. T h e British were n o t entirely

Dost M o h a m e d h a d given h i m a copy of

amenable to interfering between the Afghans

t h e Russian e n v o y ' s letter.

a n d t h e Sikhs, for t h e latter w e r e allies o f t h e E I C b y treaty. T h e r e w a s also n o

obvious

Burnes, i n possession of his n e w instructions but aware that he must

advantage i n m e d d l i n g in a dispute between

give priority to Sikh interests, i n f o r m e d

i n d e p e n d e n t states, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t

Auckland that the A m i r was o n

that British I n d i a a n d the P u n j a b shared a

terms w i t h Britain, but he was chiefly

c o m m o n border. Such sentiments

interested i n t h e recovery of Peshawar.

formed

friendly

t h e basis o f A u c k l a n d ' s m e s s a g e t o D o s t

Barring a change i n British policy i n t h e

M o h a m e d , b u t h e d i d express a strong

f o r m of some a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Dost

desire t o discuss t r a d e b e t w e e n I n d i a

M o h a m e d , t h e y risked alienating the Amir,

and

A f g h a n i s t a n a n d t h e u s e o f t h e I n d u s as

d r i v i n g h i m i n t o t h e a r m s of Russia i n t h e

a w a t e r w a y to facilitate c o m m e r c e . Burnes

pursuit of a n alternative ally against the

had therefore arrived in Kabul to encourage

Sikhs. Burnes characterized D o s t

commercial relations.

as m o r e i n c l i n e d t o B r i t a i n t h a n t o R u s s i a ,

Yet it w a s s o o n a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e A m i r was n o t interested i n discussing trade; his

Mohamed

s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e case b y e n c l o s i n g t h e Tsar's l e t t e r i n h i s d i s p a t c h b a c k t o C a l c u t t a .

troops, u n d e r Akbar K h a n , h a d recently returned following their failure to take the

D o s t M o h a m e d , A m i r o f Afghanistan, w h o s e reign

fort at J a m r u d f r o m t h e Persians. W h a t

stretched f r o m I 834 t o I 863, i n t e r r u p t e d by exile

he

desired, instead, w a s British assistance i n recovering Peshawar f r o m t h e Sikhs, u n d e r R a n jit S i n g h . Burnes h a d n o p o w e r t o negotiate political terms a n d thus h a d to await further instructions. These were i n fact o n their way. Auckland h a d received f r o m t h e Secret C o m m i t t e e o f t h e EIC's C o u r t o f Directors a m e m o r a n d u m requiring

him

t o m o n i t o r e v e n t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n closely, w i t h t h e specific i n t e n t i o n of p r e v e n t i n g t h e progress of Russian i n f l u e n c e t h e r e . T h e m e a n s to a c c o m p l i s h this objective w e r e left t o h i m , b u t if h e saw fit h e w a s a u t h o r i z e d t o interfere i n A f g h a n affairs directly. Auckland was almost certainly the w r o n g person i n w h o m to invest such w i d e powers, o w i n g t o his i n e x p e r i e n c e of A f g h a n affairs, w h i l e Burnes h i m s e l f was o n l y a j u n i o r officer w i t h little k n o w l e d g e of d i p l o m a t i c affairs. Burnes received n e w instructions, drafted b y

during t h e First Afghan W a r (Author's collection)

I6

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

a volte face i n h i s p o l i c y , B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t offer h i m friendship. This h a r d e n i n g of t h e British attitude, a n d Dost M o h a m e d ' s

need

for a n a l l y i n h i s struggle against t h e Sikhs a n d t o k e e p t h e Persians i n check, l e d t h e A m i r t o t u r n t o t h e Russians w h e n , i n A p r i l 1838,

h e m e t w i t h Vitkevich. Burnes h a d

been proved right and, w i t h his mission over after seven m o n t h s , t h e Scotsman returned to India. In turn, Auckland viewed the d e v e l o p m e n t s as j u s t i f y i n g h i s d i s t r u s t o f Dost M o h a m e d , a n d consequently led the Governor-General to consider t h e Amir's replacement w i t h a n e w ruler

favourably

i n c l i n e d b o t h t o t h e British a n d t h e Sikhs for t h e purpose of curbing either direct Russian or Russian-backed Persian influence i n A f g h a n i s t a n , so r e s t o r i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f British i n f l u e n c e i n C e n t r a l Asia. T h e m o s t suitable candidate appeared to be a previous Amir, the Shah Shuja-il-Mulk, w h o m a i n t a i n e d f r i e n d l y t e r m s w i t h R a n jit S i n g h a n d w h o , after h i s last a t t e m p t t o retake h i s throne from Dost M o h a m e d i n 1834, h a d M o h a m e d A k b a r Khan, eldest son o f D o s t M o h a m e d ,

settled i n L u d h i a n a i n western I n d i a u n d e r

w h o led t h e uprising in Kabul in late 1841 and promised

British protection. Both t h e E I C a n d t h e

t o guarantee t h e safe passage o f Elphinstone's army and

Sikh court argued strongly i n favour of

camp followers back t o Jalalabad. His helmet, mail and

his suitability, a n d this insistence, together

shield o n his back are testament t o t h e fact that Afghan w i t h unsubstantiated reports that h e w o u l d

forces proved formidable o p p o n e n t s despite their medieval e q u i p m e n t and lack o f formal training.

be well received i n t h e A f g h a n capital,

(National A r m y Museum)

was sufficient to persuade A u c k l a n d a n d

For t h e n e x t three m o n t h s , Burnes

b e p l a c e d o n t h e t h r o n e . T h e British also

M a c n a g h t e n that Shah Shuja ought to

to advocate support for t h e Amir,

continued unaware

entertained the hope that, w i t h

financial

backing f r o m t h e treasury i n Calcutta,

that i n India Auckland a n d Macnaghten were growing increasingly unsympathetic to

t h e Sikhs w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e troops t o

t h e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t , n o t least w h e n

reinstall Shah Shuja i n Kabul, for they

Dost

M o h a m e d completely rejected a c o m p r o m i s e

h a d m u c h to gain f r o m his restoration:

plan over Peshawar - a rejection that fuelled

specifically, r e c o g n i t i o n o f Ranjit Singh's

Auckland's suspicions t h a t t h e A m i r w a s

r i g h t t o t e r r i t o r y o n t h e w e s t e r n side o f

i n fact hostile t o British views. Evidence

t h e I n d u s River, w h i c h D o s t

appeared to support his contention, for

d i s p u t e d . Still, t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e A f g h a n

Dost M o h a m e d h a d received i n his capital

people m i g h t n o t take kindly to their

Mohamed

a d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m Russia,

Sikh enemies imposing o n t h e m a n e w

w h i c h m a i n t a i n e d a military presence w i t h

m o n a r c h does n o t appear t o h a v e figured

t h e Persian a r m y besieging Herat a n d offered

i n Auckland's calculations.

assistance i n n e g o t i a t i n g t e r m s w i t h Persia.

Ranjit Singh was not, however,

prepared

Furthermore, h e was n o t prepared to reach

t o b a c k t h i s p l a n w i t h h i s o w n forces,

a n a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h R a n jit S i n g h . W i t h o u t

so w h i l e h e i n i t i a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

I7

signatory to the tripartite Treaty of Simla, concluded in June 1838 between

himself,

S h a h Shuja a n d t h e British, w i t h t h e Sikhs receiving i n t u r n a guarantee of possession of the trans-Indus territory. Shah Shuja was to be restored to his t h r o n e w i t h British aid, after w h i c h h e w o u l d agree t o British c o n t r o l of his foreign policy - thus e n a b l i n g a n d Calcutta to ensure n o u n d u e

London

Russian

i n f l u e n c e i n A f g h a n affairs. I n a m a n i f e s t o issued o n 1 October, A u c k l a n d declared his i n t e n t i o n s

respecting

A f g h a n i s t a n , stated t h e reasons w h i c h justified British i n t e r v e n t i o n - n o t least the corrupt malpractices a n d illegitimacy of D o s t M o h a m e d ' s g o v e r n m e n t - a n d stressed above all t h e security of British I n d i a .

The

w e l f a r e o f o u r possessions i n t h e East,' h e a n n o u n c e d , 'requires t h a t w e s h o u l d h a v e Sir Alexander Burnes, assigned as British diplomatic

on

o u r w e s t e r n f r o n t i e r a n a l l y w h o is i n t e r e s t e d

representative at Kabul by Lord Auckland, t h e GovernorGeneral o f India. Burnes was killed by an Afghan m o b o n

i n resisting aggression, a n d

establishing

tranquility, i n t h e place of chiefs r a n g i n g

2 N o v e m b e r I 8 4 1 . (Author's collection)

themselves i n subservience to a hostile enterprise h e negotiated different terms

power a n d seeking to p r o m o t e

w i t h M a c n a g h t e n , w h o agreed to furnish

of conquest a n d aggrandizement.' T h e war,

C o m p a n y troops for t h e u n d e r t a k i n g . T h e

h e w e n t o n , was n o t to be conducted

Sikhs w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o n o t h i n g m o r e

a v i e w t o w a r d o c c u p a t i o n or territorial

than

m a i n t a i n i n g a reserve force at Peshawar for

schemes

with

a g g r a n d i z e m e n t ; as p r o o f o f t h i s p l e d g e ,

eventualities, the circumstances of w h i c h

British troops w o u l d w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e

n e v e r b e c a m e clear. I n t h e e n d , R a n jit S i n g h

c o u n t r y o n c e S h a h Shuja h a d b e e n safely

d i d c o m m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e e n t e r p r i s e as a

a n d rightfully installed.

Warring sides

T h e forces t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d b r i n g t o bear

W h e n t h e First A f g h a n W a r b e g a n i n 1 8 3 9 ,

against t h e A f g h a n tribes w e r e c o m p o s e d

the Bengal A r m y contained 6 9 regiments of

almost exclusively of those of the EIC.

sepoys

For t h e p r e v i o u s c e n t u r y these forces h a d

o f o n e b a t t a l i o n , as w e l l as 1 5 l o c a l

e n j o y e d a l m o s t u n h i n d e r e d success i n t h e

battalions, including three of Gurkhas:

a n d o n e of Europeans, each consisting

field against indigenous I n d i a n armies, some

superb, h i g h l y reliable troops recruited

of whose troops took u p e m p l o y m e n t i n one

f r o m Nepal. T h e Madras presidency mustered

of t h e C o m p a n y ' s three separate s t a n d i n g

5 1 sepoy

armies, representing each presidency: Madras,

2 6 . C a v a l r y s e r v i n g i n t h e C o m p a n y ' s forces

battalions, t h e B o m b a y presidency,

B o m b a y a n d Bengal. T h e r a n k a n d file o f

consisted o f t w o types: regular regiments o f

these forces w a s d r a w n f r o m t h e area i n

light cavalry - three f r o m Bombay, a n d eight

w h i c h they were recruited, a n d they trained,

each f r o m the Bengal a n d Madras armies -

dressed a n d f o u g h t i n t h e style o f t h e British

outfitted, a r m e d a n d trained like their counterparts i n British light dragoon

A r m y , w i t h w h i t e officers i n c o m m a n d . B y t h e t i m e o f t h e First A f g h a n W a r , e a c h

sepoy

(infantry) c o m p a n y served u n d e r t h e

regiments, a n d irregular m o u n t e d units, of w h i c h Bengal supplied four a n d B o m b a y

c o m m a n d o f a British captain or lieutenant,

o n e . T h e C o m p a n y h a d its o w n

together w i t h a British subaltern a n d t w o

of artillery, b o t h o f foot a n d o f horse (the

complement

I n d i a n officers w h o h a d risen f r o m t h e ranks,

d i s t i n c t i o n b e i n g t h a t t h e crews o f t h e f o r m e r

w i t h ten such companies composing a

m a r c h e d o n foot, whereas those o f t h e latter

' N a t i v e ' b a t t a l i o n (or r e g i m e n t , a l l s u c h u n i t s

m o v e d o n horseback), composed entirely

c o m p r i s i n g b u t a single b a t t a l i o n , u n l i k e their

o f E u r o p e a n p e r s o n n e l . T h e C o m p a n y also

counterparts i n t h e British A r m y , w h i c h h a d

m a i n t a i n e d a n engineering capacity i n the

two), under a major or lieutenant-colonel.

f o r m o f sappers a n d m i n e r s o f b o t h E u r o p e a n

A similar system existed for regiments o f

and indigenous composition.

c a v a l r y , w h e r e t r o o p e r s w e r e k n o w n as

sowars.

I n a d d i t i o n t o C o m p a n y forces i n British

A m o n g s t t h e l o c a l ' a n d irregular corps, o f

I n d i a , t h e C r o w n itself sent o u t f r o m h o m e

w h i c h there were m a n y i n India, only the

d e p o t s its o w n t r o o p s - t h a t is, r e g u l a r f o r c e s

c o m m a n d i n g officer,

second-in-command

a n d a d j u t a n t were British, Indians filling all t h e r e m a i n i n g officers' positions, w i t h exclusively I n d i a n troops beneath t h e m . Regular c a m p a i g n i n g , w h e t h e r against fellow I n d i a n forces o r i n t h e First B u r m e s e W a r o f 1 8 2 4 - 2 5 , h a d helped develop a strong b o n d o f m u t u a l respect a n d trust b e t w e e n t h e

sepoys

a n d t h e i r British officers, a n d N a t i v e u n i t s g e n e r a l l y f o u g h t w e l l a n d l o y a l l y - a t least until m u c h of the Bombay A r m y mutinied i n 1 8 5 7 . T h e r e w e r e also ' E u r o p e a n ' u n i t s maintained b ythe EIC, composed entirely of British ( m o r e specifically, m o s t l y Irish) s o l d i e r s , s u c h as t h e B e n g a l H o r s e A r t i l l e r y .

Baluchis in the Bolan Pass, 1842. (National A r m y Museum)

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

h o l d i n g t h e Q u e e n ' s c o m m i s s i o n - t o serve

escorts; s e e k i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o f t h e e n e m y ' s

i n one of the presidency armies, n u m b e r i n g

strength a n d disposition a n d guarding the

20 battalions of infantry a n d four regiments

i n f a n t r y ' s f l a n k s a n d rear.

of light cavalry. Troops posted t o I n d i a

I9

Little c a n said of t h e i r A f g h a n o p p o n e n t s ,

generally spent m o s t of t h e i r a d u l t lives t h e r e ,

for t h e A m i r s m a i n t a i n e d n o s t a n d i n g force of

since t h e m a n y m o n t h s ' t r a v e l t o r e a c h t h e

a n y k i n d , r e l y i n g instead e n t i r e l y o n a large,

subcontinent m i l i t a t e d against regular

s p o n t a n e o u s l y raised force of irregular fighters

rotation to another station. Thus, a regiment

of v a r y i n g reliability a n d effectiveness.

m i g h t r e m a i n i n I n d i a for t w o decades or

T h e y were d r a w n f r o m the countryside

m o r e , w i t h w a s t a g e - f r o m disease, especially

assembled o n the w o r d of a local

sirdar

and

mullah

c h o l e r a , b u t also h e a t , excessive d r i n k ,

(religious teacher or leader),

casualties or discharge - r e p l a c e d b y drafts

c o m m a n d e r ) or t h e A m i r himself, w h o

of recruits sent o u t f r o m B r i t a i n . Troops f r o m

theory could s u m m o n up untold thousands

(tribal in

home, once acclimatized and experienced o n

of tribesmen w h e n required, t h o u g h w i t h

campaign, proved hardy and dependable, and

n o established t e r m s o f service, a n d t h u s

together w i t h their

sepoy

counterparts proved

rendering their long-term

commitment

a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g force; their forebears

u n c e r t a i n at best a n d d u b i o u s at worse.

h a d , after all, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h

They wore no uniform and employed the

Company

forces, c o n q u e r e d B e n g a l u n d e r C l i v e ,

simplest of tactics, s n i p i n g f r o m hillside cover

southern India from the French and the

with the

sultans of M y s o r e , a n d later c o n q u e r e d t h e

w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e c u r v e d stock - or, w h e n

Mahrattas i n t h e west.

jezail

- a long, hand-crafted musket

s e e k i n g t o close w i t h t h e i r e n e m y ,

W h e t h e r belonging to a Queen's regiment

attacking

i n great swarms w i t h o u t consideration of

or a C o m p a n y ' s , all units w e r e o r g a n i z e d a n d

f o r m a t i o n , cutting a n d slashing w i t h their

a r m e d identically, their principal weapons

l o n g , s t r a i g h t s w o r d s a n d k n i v e s . (As m a n y

consisting of the smoothbore,

muzzle-loading

as h a l f a d o z e n k n i v e s a t a t i m e w e r e t u c k e d t i g h t l y i n t o t h e i r w a i s t scarf.)

flintlock m u s k e t a n d b a y o n e t for t h e i n f a n t r y , a n d t h e sabre or l a n c e c a r r i e d b y t h e cavalry. A r t i l l e r y w a s also s m o o t h b o r e ,

Afghan tribesmen a r m e d w i t h t h e famous long-barrelled, hand-made jezail, w h o s e extraordinary range enabled t h e

f i e l d b a t t e r i e s c o n s i s t i n g o f six 6 - p d r s , w i t h

t r i b e s m e n during t h e First Afghan W a r t o pick off enemy

heavier pieces, i n c l u d i n g m o r t a r s , reserved for

t r o o p s f r o m beyond t h e range o f t h e standard-issue

siege o p e r a t i o n s , t h o u g h m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n

British s m o o t h b o r e muskets.

often rendered transportation of heavy artillery all b u t impossible. T h e i n f a n t r y w e r e dressed s m a r t l y y e t i m p r a c t i c a l l y for t h e c l i m a t e i n h e a v y s c a r l e t t u n i c s , w h i t e cross belts, black leather p o u c h e s , haversacks a n d tall black shakos. T h e y m a r c h e d i n closely ordered ranks, deployed

shoulder-to-shoulder

as a t W a t e r l o o a g e n e r a t i o n b e f o r e a n d i n d e e d as u n d e r M a r l b o r o u g h m o r e t h a n a c e n t u r y earlier, a d v a n c i n g i n c o l u m n b u t d e p l o y i n g for a c t i o n i n lines consisting of t w o ranks. T h u s t h e y m a d e best use o f d i s c i p l i n e d volleys to repulse t h e e n e m y or u n n e r v e

him

sufficiently that a b a y o n e t attack could drive h i m off. C a v a l r y m a n o e u v r e d b y s q u a d r o n , either i n line or i n c o l u m n , t h e troopers w i e l d i n g t h e i r sabres i n t h e c h a r g e , b u t m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t s e r v i n g as s c o u t s a n d b a g g a g e

"he fightin

F r o m t h e start, British m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s

A r m y consisted of t w o Queen's regiments

h a d to tackle the p r o b l e m of dispatching

of foot - the 2 n d a n d 17th - four regiments

a m a j o r e x p e d i t i o n f r o m I n d i a across t h e

of B o m b a y Native Infantry, the 4 t h Light

Sutlej a n d m u c h f u r t h e r east. T h e shortest

D r a g o o n s (a Q u e e n ' s r e g i m e n t ) , t w o

route available to the ' A r m y of the Indus'

regiments of n a t i v e cavalry, t w o c o m p a n i e s of

lay f r o m Peshawar t h r o u g h the Punjab. Even

f o o t artillery (all E u r o p e a n ) a n d o n e

this route was 4 0 0 miles a n d w o u l d

o f sappers a n d m i n e r s . I n a d d i t i o n t o these

require

company

m o v i n g t h e a r m y a n d its m a t e r i e l - a b o v e a l l

forces, a separate force o f 6 , 0 0 0 irregulars

its b a g g a g e a n d g u n s - t h r o u g h t h e

w a s raised i n I n d i a for S h a h Shuja's use,

Khyber

a n d o t h e r passes o n a s l o w j o u r n e y t o i t s

consisting of four regiments of infantry,

ultimate destination, Kabul. The

t w o regiments of cavalry a n d a troop of

journey

w o u l d p r o v e a l l t h e m o r e d i f f i c u l t as t h e

horse artillery, e q u i p p e d f r o m British

Sikhs, t h o u g h f r i e n d l y a n d supportive of

m a g a z i n e s a n d l e d b y British officers.

t h e e n t e r p r i s e , w o u l d n o t g o so f a r as t o

L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Sir J o h n K e a n e ,

p e r m i t B r i t i s h forces t o cross t h e i r t e r r i t o r y .

c o m m a n d i n g the B o m b a y division, was

T h e best a l t e r n a t i v e , therefore, was to take a

to m o v e initially by water from

far l e n g t h i e r r o u t e t h r o u g h B a l u c h i s t a n

and

to Sind, there to rendezvous w i t h the

t h e B o l a n Pass, p r o c e e d i n g t o K a n d a h a r

and

thence to Kabul - a journey more t h a n three

Bengal division, led by

Bombay

Major-General

Sir W i l l o u g h b y C o t t o n , w i t h a f u r t h e r

times the distance of the route originally

1,200-mile trek t h r o u g h Baluchistan to

p r o p o s e d , b u t less a r d u o u s i n t e r m s o f

K a n d a h a r . T h e c o n t i n g e n t raised for S h a h

n a t u r a l obstacles at t h e outset, a n d w i t h

S h u j a was t o m o v e d o w n t h e Sutlej a n d

some l i m i t e d transport available for t h e

Indus where, w i t h the entire a r m y unified,

first 4 5 0 m i l e s , i n t h e f o r m o f f l a t - b o t t o m e d

Keane w o u l d assume overall c o m m a n d ,

barges o n t h e Sutlej a n d I n d u s rivers. I n t h e

M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir W i l l i a m N o t t l e a d i n g t h e

with

event, this was the route chosen b y British

B o m b a y d i v i s i o n . Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n ,

military planners.

the n e w l y a p p o i n t e d e n v o y to Shah Shuja,

The expedition would

would accompany the expedition.

comprise

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 , 0 0 0 British a n d I n d i a n

Even before the a r m y could advance, the

t r o o p s i n t w o d i v i s i o n s o f d i f f e r i n g sizes,

casus belli

w i t h t h e force f r o m t h e Bengal presidency

for unexpected news arrived a n n o u n c i n g the

of the war appeared to evaporate,

consisting of n i n e infantry regiments, one

c o n t i n u e d resistance of H e r a t against Persian

being a Queen's regiment a n d the others

forces, n o t least d u e t o t h e l e a d e r s h i p of

C o m p a n y troops: the 1 3 t h Foot, t h e Bengal

L i e u t e n a n t Eldred Pottinger, a n officer i n t h e

Europeans a n d seven regiments Bengal Native

EIC w h o h a d offered to organize the defence

Infantry. Five regiments of cavalry w o u l d

of the place u p o n f i n d i n g himself i n Herat

a c c o m p a n y the expedition, one of w h i c h was

during an unofficial

a Queen's r e g i m e n t - t h e 1 6 t h Lancers -

o p e r a t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e Persians, w o r n

and

four of Bengalis. O t h e r units i n c l u d e d a t r o o p

intelligence-gathering

o u t b y a n u n p r o f i t a b l e n i n e - m o n t h siege,

of horse artillery a n d t w o companies of foot

a n d b o w i n g t o t h e d i p l o m a t i c pressure

artillery, all w i t h E u r o p e a n personnel, plus

a p p l i e d b y t h e Russians, w h o n o longer

t w o c o m p a n i e s of sappers a n d m i n e r s . T h e

w i s h e d t o s u p p o r t this enterprise, raised t h e

smaller contingent provided b y the

siege a n d w i t h d r e w , r e m o v i n g a l l t h r e a t o f

Bombay

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

2I

Russian e x p a n s i o n i n w e s t e r n A f g h a n i s t a n .

consisted n o t m e r e l y of necessities like

N o t o n l y that, t h e Russian ambassador to

a m m u n i t i o n , f o o d a n d fodder, b u t

Tehran, w h o had played an

quantities of officers' kit, m u c h of this m o r e

instrumental

huge

part i n e n c o u r a g i n g t h e Persians t o attack

appropriate to living in camp rather t h a n

H e r a t , w a s r e c a l l e d b y t h e T s a r , as w a s

the field. All armies operating i n a n d out of

in

Vitkevich f r o m the A f g h a n capital. Auckland

I n d i a w e r e f a m o u s for their prodigious t r a i n

received news concerning Herat i n early

of vehicles a n d e q u i p m e n t , b u t this was

N o v e m b e r 1 8 3 8 . This d i d n o t dissuade

him

f r o m proceeding w i t h his g r a n d e x p e d i t i o n ,

exceptional, w i t h knapsacks, blankets t o n s o f o t h e r stores, especially t h a t

and

most

however, for h e was d e t e r m i n e d to oust Dost

essential of all: water. V e r y little t h o u g h t

M o h a m e d f r o m power, a n enterprise

b e e n given to m e t h o d s of re-supply, w i t h the

had

supported b y the Board of C o n t r o l , the b o d y

a r m y foolishly relying substantially o n the

i n L o n d o n w i t h responsibility over t h e affairs

p u r c h a s e o f l o c a l g o o d s a n d services t h r o u g h

of the EIC. T h e e x p e d i t i o n , therefore, w o u l d

the civilian contractors w h o

p r o c e e d as p l a n n e d .

t h e e x p e d i t i o n , as w e l l as b y l i v i n g o f f t h e

O n 10 December, the Bengal division

accompanied

l a n d - a practice w h i c h i n verdant

India

left Ferozepore a n d o n 19 F e b r u a r y 1 8 3 9 all

h a d generally sufficed d u r i n g operations

forces w e r e o n t h e w e s t b a n k o f t h e I n d u s ,

i n t h e past, b u t c o u l d n o t be a p p l i e d t o

w i t h t h e deserts o f B a l u c h i s t a n y e t t o

m u c h of Afghanistan. T h e folly of these

traverse. T h e force was e n o r m o u s , w i t h a

m e t h o d s soon c a m e apparent, for t h e

massive train of c a m p followers a n d baggage

wastes of Baluchistan bore n o r e l a t i o n to

animals. T h e Bengal division comprised

t h e p r o d u c t i v e areas o f t h e P u n j a b or t h e

9,500 troops, b u t a staggering 3 8 , 0 0 0

Ganges Valley, leaving t h e m e n short of

followers a n d 3 0 , 0 0 0 camels, the

camp

numbers

enlarged b y t h e fact t h a t m a n y officers w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d b y several - s o m e t i m e s e v e n d o z e n s - o f s e r v a n t s , as w a s t h e n o r m

in

I n d i a n armies. T h e vast a m o u n t of baggage

T h e great fortress at Ghazni, which blocked Sir John Keane's advance o n t h e Afghan capital in 1839. T h e defenders bricked up all t h e entrances apart f r o m t h e Kabul Gate (centre), against w h i c h a d e m o l i t i o n party placed a large charge o f gunpowder.

22

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Routes of the Anglo-Indian invasion during the First Afghan War O Bokhara T

U

R

K

E

S

T

A C

H

I

N

A

/

I

N

D

I

A

Delhi O

1. 2. 3. 4.

December 1838 February 1839 Armies combine,April 1839 Entry into Kabul, 7 August 1839 Bengal A r m y Shah Shuja's A r m y Bombay A r m y British A r m y o f t h e ' c o m b i n e d forces)

Indus

250 miles ARABIAN

SEA

f o o d a n d w a t e r a n d suffering at t h e h a n d s

sufferings of t h e troops were c o m p o u n d e d b y

o f a h a r s h , u n f o r g i v i n g t e r r a i n . Beasts o f

i n a p p r o p r i a t e c l o t h i n g , for

b u r d e n , transport a n i m a l s a n d horses

the intense heat, they wore the same heavy

suffered especially. N o r was t h e a d v a n c e

l e a t h e r shakos a n d scarlet t u n i c s used i n

unopposed; hostile tribesmen

frequently

notwithstanding

Britain. O w i n g to the weakness of their

h a r a s s e d t h e c o l u m n i n t h e B o l a n Pass,

horses, m a n y troopers h a d to

w h e r e a n y stragglers, especially a m o n g s t

a n d m o v e o n foot, prodding their animals

t h e c a m p f o l l o w e r s , fell easy v i c t i m .

w i t h their lances. Despite these hardships,

O n 3 1 M a r c h 1 8 3 9 , C o t t o n a n d Keane's

dismount

the army reached Kandahar o n 3 M a y

and

divisions, t o g e t h e r w i t h S h a h Shuja's

oversaw the c o r o n a t i o n of Shah Shuja,

c o n t i n g e n t , j o i n e d at Q u e t t a , b u t f u r t h e r

for w h o m his people offered o n l y a cool

delay occurred w h e n headquarters failed to

reception. Supplies p r o v e d m o r e readily

consider the m o s t efficient routes, leading

available here, but the a r m y

t o t h e loss o f t r a n s p o r t a n d m a t e r i e l . T h e

f r o m malaria a n d dysentery.

suffered

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

W h i l e K a b u l still r e m a i n e d 3 2 5

miles

23

O n 2 0 July, skirmishers f r o m Keane's force

away, t h e r o u t e a h e a d at least o f f e r e d m o r e

scattered t h e e n e m y outposts before

f o r a g e a n d , as t h e e l e v a t i o n r o s e , b a l m i e r

a n d r e c o n n o i t r e d t h e fortress, w h o s e walls

temperatures. Moreover, apart f r o m the

t h e y discovered to be exceedingly strong

harassing attacks b y t r i b e s m e n i n t h e Bolan,

a n d y e t t h e a r m y ' s f o u r g r e a t siege g u n s h a d

t h u s far t h e progress of t h e a r m y h a d

b e e n left w i t h N o t t at K a n d a h a r , a n d n e i t h e r

b e e n seriously opposed, for D o s t

not

Mohamed

Ghazni

-

m i n i n g n o r escalade w o u l d suffice against

h a d b l o c k e d t h e K h y b e r Pass w i t h h i s b e s t

walls of such thickness a n d height.

troops to p r e v e n t t h e Sikhs, s h o u l d t h e y

d e s c r i b e d t h e p l a c e i n a l e t t e r t o Sir J a s p e r

Keane

make the attempt, from advancing o n Kabul.

Nicholls, the commander-in-chief in India:

H e believed the British, w i t h Shuja i n Kandahar, w o u l d be focusing o n

operations

O n t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 21st July t h e

around Herat. T h e road to Kabul was n o t

A r m y i n t h r e e c o l u m n s m o v e d close t o

entirely o p e n , however, for h a v i n g left N o t t

the outworks of the place, a n d instead

i n K a n d a h a r at t h e e n d o f J u n e , K e a n e still

o f f i n d i n g i t , as t h e a c c o u n t s h a d s t a t e d ,

faced a gruelling m a r c h i n s u m m e r heat of

v e r y w e a k a n d i n c a p a b l e of resistance,

2 0 0 miles to the north-east to G h a z n i , w h i c h

a second Gibraltar a p p e a r e d before us.

lay i n his p a t h . G h a z n i presented walls

70ft

A h i g h r a m p a r t i n g o o d repair built

high, the whole surrounded by a moat,

with

a scarped m o u n d a b o u t 35 feet h i g h ,

a powerful garrison under 21-year-old

Hyder

flanked by numerous towers, a n d

K h a n , o n e of D o s t M o h a m e d ' s sons. A n o t h e r

surrounded by a well constructed

on

son led 5 , 0 0 0 G h i l z a i cavalry, posted i n t h e

[escalade] a n d a w i d e w e t d i t c h . I n s h o r t

hills o n e i t h e r side o f t h e r o a d .

we were astounded, but there we were.

British t r o o p s storming t h e fortress at Ghazni, 23 July 1839. In t h e absence o f a siege train, no alternative

Intelligence received f r o m A b d u l Rashid,

remained but t o take t h e place by a coup de main.

a disgruntled n e p h e w of Dost M o h a m e d ,

(National A r m y Museum)

r e c o m m e n d e d a surprise s t o r m of t h e

Kabul

24

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

gate, w h i c h rather t h a n b e i n g bricked u p like

M o h a m e d , w h o d u r i n g t h e f i g h t i n g at

the others was merely lightly barred to allow

G h a z n i had 13,000 m e n nearby but declined

t h e passage of t r o o p s . K e a n e chose t h i s

to c o m m i t t h e m to battle, recalled Akbar

o p t i o n , w i t h a diversion or feint directed

K h a n a n d his forces f r o m t h e K h y b e r t o

against t h e s o u t h e r n face of t h e fortress.

defend Kabul, and a combined

A m i d s t a n i g h t - t i m e gale, a c o n t i n g e n t of

contingent, advancing f r o m Peshawar under

sappers u n d e r C a p t a i n Peat a n d

Lieutenant

Anglo-Sikh

General Claude Wade, moved through the

D u r a n d quietly approached the walls b y

pass w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g resistance. T h e

traversing a d i t c h just before d a y l i g h t

A m i r a t t e m p t e d t o gather a d h e r e n t s t o his

on

2 3 July. T h o u g h observed at 1 5 0 yards b y

cause t o o p p o s e Keane's a d v a n c e , b u t n o n e

t h e defenders a n d fired u p o n , t h e sappers

w o u l d materialize, for M a c n a g h t e n h a d p a i d

m a n a g e d t o p l a c e 751b bags o f p o w d e r

o u t generous bribes to t h e chiefs, leaving

against t h e gate a n d l i g h t t h e c o t t o n fuse.

D o s t M o h a m e d n o o p t i o n b u t t o flee

C a p t a i n J a m e s D o u g l a s , a staff officer

n o r t h w a r d s , w i t h Akbar's cavalry i n train.

with

t h e reserve c o l u m n , n o t e d :

T h e A r m y of the Indus entered Kabul o n 6 August 1839, w i t h the 60-year-old Shah

T h e scene at this m o m e n t

Shuja arriving the following day o n a white

was

m a g n i f i c e n t . T h e fire was u n r e m i t t i n g

charger to take u p a t h r o n e he h a d n o t

o n b o t h sides. I t w a s n o t y e t d a y l i g h t ,

o c c u p i e d i n three decades. T h e enterprise

a n d t h e indistinctness of objects, t h e

h a d taken ten m o n t h s , but Auckland's plan

r u d e walls, a n d queer figures f o r m e d

h a d t h u s far succeeded at relatively little

a picture more beautiful, more grand,

cost t o t h e a r m y , t h o u g h sickness h a d t a k e n

t h a n a n y t h i n g I h a v e ever i m a g i n e d .

a toll. W i t h Shah Shuja n o w in power,

Suddenly an explosion, louder

than

Keane returned to India w i t h the

Bombay

thunder, broke t h r o u g h the roar of

division a n d t h e cavalry, leaving C o t t o n

artillery; t h e n a pause; t h e n a cheer;

c o m m a n d i n g at K a b u l a n d N o t t a n d a

the unmistakable English cheer rent the

small garrison to occupy

air; t h e n t h e o l d w a l l s a n d b a t t l e m e n t s i l l u m i n a t e d w i t h the flash of arms, a n d then the busy musketry went

chattering

t h r o u g h t h e streets.

Kandahar.

T h e presence of British troops i n A f g h a n i s t a n was essential, for restoring S h a h Shuja to the t h r o n e was n o t sufficient i n a turbulent country where he enjoyed virtually n o support. Consequently, recognizing the

I n short, t h e gate was b l o w n a w a y a n d a

n e e d for a l o n g - t e r m British garrison i n t h e

s t o r m i n g party, consisting of four

capital, engineers constructed a c a n t o n m e n t

companies

of European infantry, rushed the opening.

o n t h e outskirts of t h e city i n the spring

G r e a t c o n f u s i o n i n i t i a l l y arose a m i d s t t h e

of 1840, w i t h the garrison establishing

s m o k e a n d noise, for conflicting orders

t h e i r lives o n t h e I n d i a n m o d e l , e n j o y i n g

disoriented the troops a n d prevented the

i m p r o m p t u h o r s e races, sports c o m p e t i t i o n s ,

m a i n c o l u m n f r o m advancing until a bugler

a m a t e u r theatricals, cricket matches

f r o m t h e 1 3 t h , refusing to s o u n d t h e 'Retire',

concerts r u n b y t h e r e g i m e n t a l bands, all

and

instead blew the 'Advance', causing the

to the b e m u s e m e n t of the A f g h a n populace.

infantry to rush forward w i t h bayonets fixed.

W i t h garrison life established o n a relatively

There followed bitter h a n d - t o - h a n d

civilized footing, t h e families of some

fighting

i n t h e streets u n t i l B r i t i s h a n d I n d i a n t r o o p s

officers e v e n m a d e t h e h a z a r d o u s

prevailed and triumphantly planted the

to join t h e m .

U n i o n Jack o n t h e r a m p a r t s of t h e fortress, w h o s e e n t i r e g a r r i s o n l a y d e a d at a cost t o K e a n e of 2 0 0 A n g l o - I n d i a n casualties. T h e capture of G h a z n i led to a n u m b e r of military developments elsewhere. Dost

journey

Some of t h e garrison began to insinuate themselves w i t h the female population of Kabul, thus engendering the hatred of Afghan m e n , building up resentment in a society w h e r e vengeance f o r m e d a n integral

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

part of tribal life. Burnes was considered

India. But this expedient could n o t

b y the populace to be the worst offender,

indefinitely, for b o t h Britain's n e w

w i t h A f g h a n sensitivities a b o u t a l c o h o l also

g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r Sir R o b e r t P e e l a n d

continue Tory

largely t r a m p l e d u p o n . Still, t h e city r e m a i n e d

C o m p a n y officials i n C a l c u t t a w e r e

quiet throughout 1840, the m o n o t o n y

a n x i o u s a b o u t t h e r i s i n g costs t o t h e

only

25

growing Indian

r e l i e v e d b y t w o d e v e l o p m e n t s . First, n e w s

revenue. W i t h a n eye for e c o n o m y , therefore,

arrived i n J u l y t h a t t h e Russians h a d r e n e w e d

M a c n a g h t e n b e g a n t o r e d u c e t h e size o f

operations by launching a n expedition

p a y m e n t s - A u c k l a n d slashed b y over half

against t h e K h a n of K h i v a , 7 0 0 miles t o t h e

the £ 8 , 0 0 0 subsidy he paid a n n u a l l y to t h e

north-west beyond the H i n d u Kush, t h o u g h

Ghilzais - and ordered the withdrawal back

this h a d c o m e t o grief i n t h e deserts. S e c o n d ,

t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r t o I n d i a o f Sir R o b e r t

o n 6 N o v e m b e r , after f a i l i n g t o defeat a s m a l l

Sale's b r i g a d e , w h i c h l e f t K a b u l e n r o u t e f o r

force of I n d i a n cavalry, D o s t

Mohamed

surrendered himself to M a c n a g h t e n ,

who

sent h i m i n t o h o n o u r a b l e exile i n I n d i a . Despite the inefficiency a n d

unpopularity

of Shuja's g o v e r n m e n t , t h e c o u n t r y

Quetta o n 10 October. Both measures proved g r a v e m i s t a k e s . T h e G h i l z a i chiefs east o f

appeared unexpectedly i n Kabul a n d

remained

t r a n q u i l t h r o u g h o u t m o s t o f 1 8 4 1 , n o t least o w i n g t o t h e large subsidies f u r n i s h e d b y

Kabul, incensed b y the reduction of the s u b s i d y , c o n f r o n t e d Sale's f o r c e i n t h e

narrow

d e f i l e s o f t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass, o b l i g i n g t h e b r i g a d e t o f i g h t its w a y t h r o u g h a n d f i n d refuge i n t h e fort at Jalalabad. British fortunes n o w t o o k a t u r n for t h e

t h e C o m p a n y t o t r i b a l c h i e f s , s u c h as t h o s e

worse. Officers out s h o o t i n g g a m e

of the Pathan Ghilzais, w h o

themselves stoned b y a n g r y villagers a n d

controlled

the western approach to the Khyber, to keep t h e m pacified a n d to m a i n t a i n

open

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d supply lines back to

found

s o l d i e r s w e r e set u p o n i n t h e s t r e e t s . I n l a t e October a n isolated outpost i n Kohistan, n o r t h of K a b u l , h e l d b y S h a h Shuja's troops u n d e r British officers, was destroyed b y

Encampment o f Major-General W i l l i a m N o t t s army, fresh f r o m Kandahar outside Kabul, late September 1842.The

tribesmen, and o n 2 November, a howling

city lies beyond t h e rows o f tents, w i t h t h e fortress o f

m o b , angered b y his p h i l a n d e r i n g ,

the Bala Hissar on t h e hillside (left) overlooking t h e city.

s u r r o u n d e d B u r n e s ' h o u s e i n K a b u l , set i t

26

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 19

o n fire a n d m u r d e r e d Burnes, his b r o t h e r

m o r n i n g brings a n d t h e n t h i n k w h a t can be

a n d a n o t h e r officer. S t r o n g a c t i o n o n t h e

d o n e . ' I n d u e course M a c n a g h t e n

part of the garrison m i g h t have averted

E l p h i n s t o n e t o o c c u p y t h e Bala Hissar,

further trouble, but C o t t o n had

ordered

a r o y a l palace a n d fortress o v e r l o o k i n g

returned

t h e city, i n a n effort t o i n t i m i d a t e t h e

to I n d i a for reasons of h e a l t h a n u m b e r o f m o n t h s e a r l i e r a n d h i s successor,

p o p u l a t i o n , b u t t h e riots c o n t i n u e d

Major-General W i l l i a m Elphinstone, was not

u n a b a t e d , a n d w i t h greater intensity.

t h e stuff of r e s o l u t i o n a n d s o u n d leadership

T h e crisis d e e p e n e d w h e n , t w o d a y s l a t e r ,

but rather a mere figurehead appointed by

a f o r t c o n t a i n i n g a l l t h e garrison's stores

A u c k l a n d as a c i p h e r l i k e l y t o c a r r y o u t

became isolated f r o m the

M a c n a g h t e n ' s decisions w i t h o u t question.

w h i c h c o n t a i n e d o n l y t w o days' rations.

Old, crippled w i t h rheumatic gout, w i t h n o field experience since W a t e r l o o

T h e s i t u a t i o n g r e w m o r e p e r i l o u s as

and

tribesmen entered the city to join those

possessed o f a c o u r t e o u s m a n n e r i n a situation that d e m a n d e d

cantonment,

of their compatriots w h o chose to snipe

decisiveness

at British a n d I n d i a n troops, isolated a n d

a n d resolution, Elphinstone failed to take

penned up. W i t h Elphinstone

a c t i o n as a r e s u l t o f B u r n e s ' d e a t h , w h i l e h i s

ill, c o m m a n d devolved u p o n Shelton w h o ,

immediate subordinate,

w i t h most of Kabul n o w i n the hands of the

Brigadier-General

increasingly

J o h n Shelton, jealous of his position, a l l o w e d

rebels, r e m a i n e d w i t h a small b o d y of troops

events to deteriorate, if o n l y t o spite his

i n t h e Bala Hissar to d e f e n d S h a h Shuja. H e

superior. I n a letter t h a t b e t r a y e d t h e v e r y

e v a c u a t e d t h e rest, a b o u t 6 , 0 0 0 , i n f a v o u r o f

essence o f E l p h i n s t o n e ' s u n s u i t a b i l i t y for

t h e c a n t o n m e n t , a r e c t a n g u l a r area n o larger

such a n i m p o r t a n t post i n a period of

t h a n 1,000 b y 6 0 0 yards surrounded b y a

p r o f o u n d crisis, h e a d d r e s s e d

Macnaghten

a f t e r B u r n e s ' m u r d e r : ' W e m u s t see w h a t

the

low rampart and a narrow ditch. The whole c a n t o n m e n t was overlooked by high ground, w h i c h the Afghans immediately occupied,

Afghan t r i b e s m e n dragging an artillery piece o n t o t h e

d o m i n a t i n g i t o n a l l sides a n d r e n d e r i n g t h e

crest o f t h e Bemaru ridge overlooking Kabul, w i t h t h e

A n g l o - I n d i a n force e x t r e m e l y vulnerable

Bala Hissar in t h e middle distance, c. N o v e m b e r 1841. T h e vulnerable position o f t h e British cantonment, immediately below, rendered it indefensible against b o m b a r d m e n t .

u n d e r e f f e c t i v e siege. E l p h i n s t o n e

and

himself

h a d c o m p l a i n e d i n A p r i l a b o u t t h e p o o r state o f t h e city's defences i n g e n e r a l a n d of t h e

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

cantonment's i n particular,

notwithstanding

British troops, w h o fled back to the cantonment, the situation

m o r e defensible positions to h a n d :

27

remained

u n c h a n g e d . At the e n d of the m o n t h , T h e C i t y is e x t e n s i v e , v e r y d i r t y

hostilities were replaced w i t h negotiations,

&

for t h e g a r r i s o n w a s close t o s t a r v a t i o n , t h e

c r o w d e d & a great deal of business a p p a r e n t l y g o i n g o n i n t h e B a z a r [sic].

horses r e d u c e d t o g n a w i n g at t e n t pegs a n d

I t is s i t u a t e d i n a h o l l o w ,

t r e e b a r k , a n d m o r a l e w a s c o l l a p s i n g , as

surrounded

b y h i g h m o u n t a i n s ... T h e

L i e u t e n a n t V i n c e n t Eyre observed: ' O u r force

cantonment

is . . . n o t v e r y d e f e n s i b l e w i t h o u t a

resembled a ship i n danger of wrecking, for

n u m b e r o f m e n , as p e o p l e c a n c o m e

w a n t of a n able pilot.' M a c n a g h t e n

i n f r o m w i t h o u t at m a n y points. This,

talks o n 11 D e c e m b e r w i t h t h e A f g h a n s ,

in the event of troops being requested

led by Akbar K h a n , Dost M o h a m e d ' s son,

elsewhere, w o u l d be very

fresh f r o m Turkestan. Their

inconvenient,

& I a m a g o o d d e a l p u z z l e d [as t o ]

what

opened now

unenviable

position d o m i n a t e d British thoughts: r e m a i n i n K a b u l a n d starve - o n l y t w o days'

is n o w t h e b e s t t h i n g t o b e d o n e .

supply of f o o d r e m a i n e d - or a b a n d o n

the

To m a k e matters worse, Elphinstone

c a n t o n m e n t w i t h o u t a promise f r o m their

constantly interfered w i t h

o p p o n e n t s o f safe passage b a c k t o I n d i a .

Shelton's

c o m m a n d a n d m a d e a n u m b e r of poor

I n negotiations conducted o n the banks

tactical decisions, i n c l u d i n g failed a t t e m p t s

of t h e K a b u l River, t h e British agreed n e v e r

to drive off t h e Afghans; e v e n t h e 4 4 t h Foot,

to enter Afghanistan again w i t h o u t

t h e general's o w n r e g i m e n t , refused to

express request of t h e A f g h a n

obey orders.

i n e x c h a n g e for i m m e d i a t e provisions

T h e f u t u r e s o o n b e c a m e still m o r e b l e a k : m o b s carried a w a y t h e garrison's g r a i n a n d

the

government, and

their w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m Kabul o n the 15th. T h e w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d b e u n d e r safe c o n d u c t

m e d i c a l stores, i n e x p l i c a b l y p l a c e d i n a n o l d

as f a r as L u d h i a n a , o n I n d i a n s o i l -

stone fort almost a quarter of a m i l e outside

p a y m e n t s , effectively bribes, m a d e to various

the perimeter of the c a n t o n m e n t , a n d thus

tribes i n e x c h a n g e for t h e i r

impossible to protect adequately. Food a n d

during the w i t h d r a w a l a n d the neutrality of

f o d d e r w e r e r u n n i n g s h o r t , Sale's b r i g a d e w a s

Akbar Khan.

five days' m a r c h f r o m K a b u l at

Gandamak

a n d thousands of Ghilzai fighters h a d

with

non-belligerence

T h e Bala Hissar was d u l y e v a c u a t e d o n t h e day appointed, leaving Shah Shuja to carry

flocked to t h e area, b l o c k i n g a n y prospect

o n as b e s t h e c o u l d , b u t t h e m a i n

of the general returning even t h o u g h he was

garrison i n the c a n t o n m e n t , complete

recalled. M e a n w h i l e , m o r e t h a n 3 0 0 miles t o

its l a r g e c o n t i n g e n t o f d e p e n d e n t

t h e south-west at Kandahar, a n y a t t e m p t

by

British with

women,

c h i l d r e n , s e r v a n t s a n d sick, n o w f a c e d a

N o t t to b r i n g relief w o u l d take five weeks of

difficult a n d dangerous journey, w i t h all

m a r c h i n g - a n d o n l y so l o n g as t h e passes

t h e necessary p r e p a r a t i o n causing delays

were n o t blocked b y s n o w a n d his I n d i a n

to departure. Five inches of s n o w already

contingent, accustomed to the warmer

covered t h e g r o u n d . T h e British stalled for

c l i m a t e s o f I n d i a , c o u l d s u r v i v e as a n

time, while the Afghans added to the terms

effective f i g h t i n g force w h i l e t h e

already agreed. M a c n a g h t e n believed he

thermometer continued to descend

could divide his enemies w i t h promises of

below freezing.

further payments to come, but the Afghans

T h u s , w i t h n o m e a n s o f b r e a k i n g t h e siege

g r e w suspicious of such a ploy, a n d at a

and w i t h circumstances g r o w i n g increasingly

meeting w i t h Akbar o n 23 December

desperate, o n 19 N o v e m b e r M a c n a g h t e n

consider n e w terms for t h e w i t h d r a w a l

and

to

Elphinstone agreed that the a r m y could n o t

of the army, M a c n a g h t e n was killed, a n d

w i n t e r i n K a b u l , a n d after f i g h t i n g a r o u n d

w i t h his d e a t h all trust b e t w e e n t h e

t h e village of B e m a r u , i n w h i c h rebels r o u t e d

sides e v a p o r a t e d .

two

28

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Kabul f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e royal palace and f o r t k n o w n as t h e Bala Hissar (Author's collection)

l i k e l y t o b e a d i s a s t r o u s - as w e l l as a d i s h o n o u r a b l e - journey, especially Macnaghten, w h o emphasized h o w

O n Christmas Day, i n return for t h e British leaving b e h i n d t h e m i l i t a r y treasure,

the

a r m y w o u l d be a b a n d o n i n g massive a m o u n t s o f g o v e r n m e n t p r o p e r t y as w e l l as S h a h

c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m o n l y six f i e l d pieces, a n d

Shuja himself, whose installation had been

t h e surrender of hostages i n t h e f o r m of all

t h e v e r y basis f o r t h e a r m y ' s p r e s e n c e i n

the married m e n a n d their families, Akbar

A f g h a n i s t a n i n t h e first place. A c c o r d i n g t o

p r o m i s e d safe c o n d u c t t o P e s h a w a r .

Captain George Lawrence,

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e s p e r a t e straits i n

secretary, M a c n a g h t e n h a d observed t h a t :

w h i c h he f o u n d himself, Elphinstone

Macnaghten's

could

n o t possibly agree to such terms, a n d t h u s

... e v e n if w e c o u l d m a k e g o o d o u r

t h e a r m y w o u l d h a v e t o f i g h t its w a y

r e t r e a t , w e c o u l d c a r r y w i t h us n o

t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r snows. 'I fear b u t f e w of

shelter for t h e troops, w h o w o u l d i n

us w i l l live t o r e a c h t h e p r o v i n c e s

c o n s e q u e n c e , at this i n c l e m e n t season,

whether

w e g o b y t r e a t y or n o t / L a d y Sale, w i f e

suffer i m m e n s e l y , w h i l e o u r c a m p

of the general, p e n n e d i n her diary; her

followers, a m o u n t i n g to

anxieties worsened b y the widely held view

thousands, must inevitably be utterly

that Elphinstone was utterly incapable of

d e s t r o y e d . As t o a n y h o p e o f successful

h a n d l i n g affairs. N o sooner was a n order

n e g o t i a t i o n s , it appeared to h i m i n v a i n ,

many

issued t h a n it was c o u n t e r m a n d e d ; his

so l o n g as t h e r e w a s n o p a r t y a m o n g t h e

subordinates questioned his

commands

insurgents of sufficient strength a n d

to the extent that they virtually flouted

influence to insure t h e f u l f i l m e n t of

his authority, a n d w i t h enemies all a r o u n d

a n y treaty w e m i g h t enter into.

a n d inadequate leadership w i t h i n , the w h o l e of the a r m y became demoralized amidst a

Against such advice, Elphinstone prevailed.

g r o w i n g l o g i s t i c a l c r i s i s , as s u p p l i e s

After t h e Afghans p o s t p o n e d the date of

dwindled

a n d the t e m p e r a t u r e c o n t i n u e d to fall. M a n y m e m b e r s o f his staff w a r n e d Elphinstone n o t to undertake w h a t was

withdrawal w i t h disingenuous

excuses

that they had yet to accumulate

sufficient

stocks of supplies for t h e j o u r n e y a n d pleas

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

29

t h a t a n escort h a d y e t t o b e a r r a n g e d ,

t r a n s p o r t e d a n d w e r e left t o their fate - t h e

Elphinstone ordered the c o l u m n to

m e r c y , s u c h as i t w a s , o f t h e A f g h a n s .

move o n t h e m o r n i n g of 6 January 1 8 4 2 . T h e advanced guard consisted of t h e 4 4 t h (Queen's) Foot, irregular

T h e garrison duly emerged f r o m

Kabul

i n t o sub-zero temperatures a n d foot-deep

Indian

snow, m a k i n g for t h e m o u n t a i n s b e y o n d ,

cavalry units, t w o 6-pdrs, sappers a n d

w i t h 9 0 miles t o traverse u n t i l assured safety

miners, m o u n t a i n artillery a n d other

in Hindustan.

elements ahead of the m a i n

body.

Once the column wasunderway,

order

T h e m a i n b o d y itself i n c l u d e d t h e 5 t h a n d

b r o k e d o w n r a p i d l y as t h e b i t i n g c o l d

3 7 t h N a t i v e Infantry, t h e army's treasury,

n u m b e d t h e t r u d g i n g figures, t h e c o m m a n d

m o r e irregular cavalry, a r e g i m e n t of loyal

a n d staff s t r u c t u r e ceased t o f u n c t i o n a n d

Afghan infantry a n d t w o 6-pdr guns. T h e

G h i l z a i tribesmen constantly harassed

rearguard was composed of t h e 5 4 t h

Native

Infantry, 5 t h Native Cavalry, a n dt w o

the column, killing a n d plundering w i t h i n c r e a s i n g i m p u n i t y as t h e t r o o p s

6-pdrs. I n total, t h e force consisted of

a n d followers grew ever m o r e w e a r y a n d

690 m e n of t h e 4 4 t h Foot a n d t h e Horse

frost-bitten. W i t h o u t food or fuel, thousands

A r t i l l e r y , 3 , 8 0 0 sepoys

a n d sowars, 3 6

British w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n a n d 1 2 , 0 0 0

died daily, especially a m o n g s t t h e civilians, whose panic drove t h e m into t h e ranks

under-nourished, freezing a n d fear-stricken

of t h e soldiery, d i s t u r b i n g their order a n d

camp followers, nearly all of t h e m

i n c r e a s i n g t h e sense o f despair. E y r e r e c o r d e d

Indians.

T h e sick a n d w o u n d e d c o u l d n o t b e

Afghan tribesmen in w i n t e r dress, c. 1842, wearing poshteens: coats w i t h a leather e x t e r i o r lined o n t h e

t h e ghastly spectacle:

D r e a r y i n d e e d w a s t h e scene over

inside w i t h f u r T h e s e w e r e ideal protection in a land w i t h

w i t h d r o o p i n g spirits a n d d i s m a l

long, forbidding winters.

forebodings w e h a d to bend our

which

30

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

The retreat from Kabul, 6-13 January 1842 Last stand of the 4 4 t h Foot. D r Brydon, sole survivor, reaches safety. t f r o m Kabul j t e t o Jalalabad

Bygram

>

\Pass s

\

*

Khoord Kabul

Gandamak

N

u n w i l l i n g steps. D e e p s n o w c o v e r e d

Still, o n t h e t h i r d d a y of t h e retreat t h e

every i n c h of m o u n t a i n a n d p l a i n w i t h

surviving Europeans w i t h wives and children

o n e u n s p o t t e d sheet of d a z z l i n g w h i t e ,

w h o surrendered themselves to Akbar's

a n d so i n t e n s e l y b i t t e r w a s t h e c o l d , as

p r o t e c t i o n w e r e n o t h a r m e d , as a g r e e d .

to penetrate a n d defy the defences of

T h e ambushes a n d sniping nevertheless

the warmest clothing.

c o n t i n u e d : t h e Afghans drove off w h a t was left of t h e baggage a n i m a l s a n d

continued

C l e a r l y , A k b a r ' s p r o m i s e o f safe c o n d u c t

t o c u t d o w n stragglers. O n 8 J a n u a r y ,

h a d either b e e n a p r o d u c t of subterfuge or

covered o n l y t w o miles the day before, the

having

a p l e d g e m a d e o n t h e basis o f c o o p e r a t i o n

miserable straggling c o l u m n approached the

w i t h tribes w h o later r e n e g e d o n t h e i r offer.

i m p o s i n g f i v e - m i l e l o n g K h u r d - K a b u l Pass.

W h a t e v e r t h e case, t h e a r m y a n d its

T h e d e f i l e w a s o f s u c h d e p t h as t o b l o c k o u t

d e p e n d e n t s w e r e left to r u n a gauntlet

direct sunlight o n the icy stream that flowed

f r o m w h i c h it possessed v i r t u a l l y

t h r o u g h its c e n t r e . O n t h e h e i g h t s t h o u s a n d s

no

p r o t e c t i o n , least of all t h e civilians.

o f fearless G h i l z a i s a s s e m b l e d t o issue a

Captain Charles Mackenzie

destructive fire. T h e y h a d erected small

observed

a little I n d i a n girl:

stone b r e a s t w o r k s b e h i n d w h i c h t h e y lay,' Mackenzie recorded, 'dealing out death w i t h

It was a b e a u t i f u l little girl a b o u t t w o years

perfect i m p u n i t y to themselves.' By the t i m e

o l d , j u s t s t r o n g e n o u g h t o sit u p r i g h t w i t h

t h e t r o o p s , baggage carts, a n i m a l s a n d c a m p

its l i t t l e legs d o u b l e d u n d e r i t , its g r e a t

followers h a d negotiated their w a y

b l a c k e y e s d i l a t e d t o t w i c e t h e i r u s u a l size,

t h e pass, 5 0 0 soldiers a n d m a n y t i m e s t h a t

fixed o n t h e a r m e d m e n , t h e passing

n u m b e r of c a m p followers h a d perished.

c a v a l r y a n d all t h e strange sights t h a t m e t

through

By 10 January, little was left of t h e

its g a z e . . . o n e o f t h e m a n y i n n o c e n t s

original force apart f r o m E l p h i n s t o n e

[later t o be] s l a u g h t e r e d o n t h e r o a d .

h i s staff, 5 0

sowars

of the 5 t h

(Native)

and

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

3I

Cavalry a n d perhaps 2 0 0 m e n of the Horse Artillery a n d 4 4 t h Foot, w h i c h

though

drastically reduced i n n u m b e r , r e m a i n e d a disciplined force. T h i s m o v e d i n single file, or i n pairs at best, t h r o u g h t h e

50-yard

T u n g h i Taraki Gorge, where the Afghans a g a i n lay i n a m b u s h . By t h e t i m e it emerged a n d reached the village of Tezeen o n t h e afternoon of t h e 1 0 t h , Elphinstone's c o m m a n d was d o w n to a mere 2 4 0 Europeans, a h a n d f u l of

sepoys

and

3,000 of the original 1 2 , 0 0 0 c a m p followers. T h e remains of the army, m i n d a n d b o d y frozen, could do n o t h i n g more t h a n simply carry o n , struggling t h r o u g h t h e snows, w h i c h apart f r o m the cold offered a further agony. ' M y eyes', C a p t a i n J o h n s o n c o m p l a i n e d , ' h a d b e c o m e so i n f l a m e d f r o m t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e snow that I was nearly blind, a n d the p a i n intense.' F r o m T e z e e n it was a n o t h e r 2 0 miles t o t h e t w o - m i l e J a g d a l a k Pass w h e r e , as b e f o r e , tribesmen massed o n the heights picked off m e m b e r s of t h e c o l u m n , n o w partially protected b y darkness. O n t h e e v e n i n g of t h e Last stand o f t h e 4 4 t h (East Essex) Regiment at Gandamak, during t h e retreat f r o m Kabul t o Jalalabad, Captain Colin Mackenzie, Madras Army, c. 1842, f o r m e r l y

I 3 January I 842. Captain Soulter concealed t h e

one o f the hostages held in Kabul, wearing native Afghan

regimental colours by w r a p p i n g t h e m around his

dress. (National A r m y Museum)

waist beneath his poshteen. (National A r m y Museum)

\

32

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

'The Remnants o f an A r m y ' , an engraving based on Lady Butler's famous late Victorian oil painting o f D r W i l l i a m Brydon, t h e only m e m b e r o f t h e Kabul garrison t o reach

O n l y a single survivor of this m a r c h of death r e m a i n e d : D r W i l l i a m

Brydon,

a 3 0 - y e a r - o l d Scot, a n assistant s u r g e o n

t h e f o r t at Jalalabad, after t h e destruction o f t h e A r m y w h o w i t h five others h a d left t h e Jagdalak

o f t h e Indus in January I 842.

Pass a t n i g h t a n d t a k e n a r o u t e o v e r t h e 11th, o n accepting a n invitation f r o m Akbar

hills t o w a r d s Jalalabad, i n t h e course

t o discuss t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f e n f o r c i n g t h e

of w h i c h hostile villagers killed his

Ghilzais' agreement to allow the

companions and wounded him. O n

column

the

to proceed unhindered, Elphinstone a n d

1 3 t h , e x h a u s t e d b u t still m o u n t e d a t o p his

Shelton f o u n d themselves prisoners.

bedraggled, dying pony, he approached the

M e a n w h i l e , t h e r e m n a n t s of the

Army

fortress at Jalalabad, w h e r e h e was spotted

of the Indus, n u m b e r i n g b u t 1 5 0 m e n of

f r o m a r o o f t o p b y a staff officer

the 4 4 t h , 16 d i s m o u n t e d artillerymen,

M a j o r H e n r y H a v e l o c k , w h o w o u l d later

and

named

distinguish himself in the Burma

campaign

under Brigadier-General T h o m a s Anquetil,

a n d , above all, d u r i n g the I n d i a n

Mutiny,

c o n t i n u e d their retreat towards Jalalabad,

in w h i c h he w o u l d play a prominent

h e l d b y G e n e r a l Sale, w i t h t h e 4 4 t h r e p u l s i n g

p a r t as a s e n i o r c o m m a n d e r . ' A s h e g o t

t h e G h i l z a i s w i t h t h e i r b a y o n e t s o n at least

nearer/ Havelock recorded of Brydon's

one occasion a n d slowly negotiating their

slow approach:

25 troopers of the 5 t h Light Cavalry,

w a y towards the e n d of the

now

Khurd-Kabul

Pass. T h e r e t h e t r a c k n a r r o w e d t o n o t

much

... it w a s d i s t i n c t l y seen t h a t h e w o r e

m o r e t h a n a goat p a t h , blocked b y a n abbatis

European clothes a n d was m o u n t e d

t h r o u g h w h i c h , after a p a n i c u n d e r fire t h a t

a travel-hacked yaboo [pony], w h i c h

on

left A n q u e t i l a n d m a n y others dead, a f e w

h e was u r g i n g o n w i t h all t h e speed of

d o z e n survivors emerged. A n d thus, o n

w h i c h it y e t r e m a i n e d master. A signal

13

J a n u a r y , t h e last o f t h e s u r v i v o r s - a h u d d l e d

was m a d e to h i m by someone o n the

g r o u p o f 2 0 m e n o f t h e 4 4 t h - m a d e a last

walls, w h i c h he answered by

stand o n a small icy hill near the village of

a p r i v a t e soldier's forage cap over his

G a n d a m a k , t h e officers c a r r y i n g o n l y their

h e a d . T h e C a u b u l gate was t h e n

swords a n d pistols, t h e m e n their muskets

o p e n a n d several officers, r u s h i n g out,

w i t h three or four cartridges apiece.

When

they h a d expended their a m m u n i t i o n

they

waving

thrown

received a n d recognised i n the traveller t h e f i r s t , a n d i t is t o b e f e a r e d t h e l a s t ,

fought w i t h bayonet and clubbed musket

f u g i t i v e of t h e ill-fated force at C a u b u l

before falling before the onslaught.

i n Dr. B r y d o n .

How the war ended

W i t h the total destruction of the A r m y of

lay i n decay. Several A f g h a n attacks f o l l o w e d

the Indus, the A n g l o - I n d i a n garrison under

over t h e course of N o v e m b e r a n d

G e n e r a l Sale at J a l a l a b a d s t o o d p e r i l o u s l y

a n d o n 19 December a n

isolated, w i t h n o i m m e d i a t e prospect of

h a p p e n e d t o h i t t h e area, w r e c k i n g

relief a n d n o h o p e of r e a c h i n g t h e safety of

o f Sale's w o r k o n t h e d e f e n c e s , b u t a l s o

December,

earthquake much

India w i t h o u t reinforcement. Brydon's lone

disrupting his o p p o n e n t s ' plans. T h e n , w i t h

appearance forcefully revealed h o w little

the e l i m i n a t i o n of the A r m y of the Indus,

Sale - w h o n a t u r a l l y a s s u m e d h i s w i f e h a d

Akbar K h a n arrived in February 1842 to

perished w i t h the others - could rely o n the good faith of the Afghans to p e r m i t

s u r r o u n d t h e p l a c e . Sale h a d n o c h o i c e b u t him

to remain

in situ,

for h e h a d received w o r d

a n u n m o l e s t e d w i t h d r a w a l f r o m their soil.

t h a t n o relief w o u l d arrive f r o m

H e h a d b e e n h o l d i n g t h e fortress of J a l a l a b a d

for several m o n t h s .

since N o v e m b e r 1 8 4 1 w i t h a force c o m p o s e d of the 1 3 t h Foot, t h e 3 5 t h Bengal N a t i v e

Peshawar

T h e siege o f J a l a l a b a d h a s e n t e r e d t h e a n n a l s o f V i c t o r i a n l e g e n d . Sale m o u n t e d

Infantry, a squadron of the 5 t h Bengal Light

a spirited d e f e n c e , l a u n c h i n g sorties t o

Cavalry, a troop of loyal A f g h a n irregular

i n t e r f e r e w i t h A f g h a n siege o p e r a t i o n s ,

horse a n d a small c o n t i n g e n t of gunners

r o u n d i n g u p e n e m y cattle a n d

a n d sappers. W i t h these h e dispersed a l o c a l

critically needed forage to sustain t h e

collecting

b o d y of tribesmen i n t h e v i c i n i t y a n d t h e n

garrison u n t i l relief c o u l d arrive. A i d was,

proceeded to repair the fortifications,

i n f a c t , o n its w a y , t h a n k s t o t h e p o l i c y o f

which

L o r d E l l e n b o r o u g h , A u c k l a n d ' s successor Brigadier-General Sir R o b e r t Sale, defender o f Jalalabad.

as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f I n d i a , i n t h e

(Author's collection)

of 8,000 m e n comprising the aptly a n d

form

grandly n a m e d ' A r m y of Retribution' under M a j o r - G e n e r a l George Pollock,

who

o n 5 April attacked the Afghans holding the K h y b e r Pass. I n t h i s , t h e f i r s t B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y experience along this famous route b e t w e e n India a n d Afghanistan, Pollock did n o t c o m m i t the folly of m a r c h i n g straight t h r o u g h t h e Pass. I n s t e a d , h e m a d e a proper study of the place a n d realized that his o n l y c h a n c e of m a k i n g it t h r o u g h was to c o m m a n d and hold the heights by

sending

out strong patrols to drive the Afridis off the heights, thereby enabling the

slower-moving

m a i n body, guns a n d baggage to negotiate t h e pass u n m o l e s t e d . P o l l o c k ' s m e n

took

each p r o m i n e n t p o s i t i o n o n e after another, until the route to Jalalabad was open. D u r i n g Pollock's advance, m a r k e d b y bitter h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting the length of t h e T e z e e n a n d J a g d a l a k passes, L i e u t e n a n t

34

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

J o h n G r e e n w o o d recorded his impressions

force drove off Akbar's m e n , captured

of one of the m o r e barbarous recorded

his guns, b u r n e d his c a m p a n d drove i n

incidents i n a conflict notorious for

a flock of 5 0 0 sheep a n d goats, persuading

its s a v a g e r y :

his o p p o n e n t to m a k e n o further attempts t o harass o r seize J a l a l a b a d . O n t h e 1 6 t h ,

T h e r e is a f e r o c i t y a b o u t t h e A f g h a n s

1 5 5 d a y s a f t e r t h e siege b e g a n , P o l l o c k ' s

w h i c h they seem to imbibe w i t h their

m e n reached t h e t o w n , f i n d i n g instead of

m o t h e r ' s m i l k . A soldier ... s a w a

a s t a r v i n g a n d d e m o r a l i z e d g a r r i s o n , Sale

K y b e r e e b o y a p p a r e n t l y a b o u t six years

a n d his m e n i n h i g h spirits f r o m t h e i r

of age w i t h a large k n i f e , w h i c h his p u n y

r e c e n t success a n d j o c u l a r l y

a r m h a d scarcely sufficient s t r e n g t h t o

i n t h e relief force w i t h t h e 1 3 t h Queen's

welcoming

wield, engaged i n a n a t t e m p t to hack off

p l a y i n g t h e Scottish tune, 'Eh, b u t ye've

t h e h e a d of a d e a d sergeant. T h e

b e e n l a n g a' c o m i n g ' .

young

u r c h i n w a s so c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n his savage task, t h a t h e h e e d e d n o t t h e

Pollock's force h a d arrived s i m p l y to relieve Jalalabad, for L o r d E l l e n b o r o u g h , at

a p p r o a c h of a soldier of t h e d e a d m a n ' s

his post since February, strongly w i s h e d to

regiment - w h o coolly took h i m

w i t h d r a w all British a n d I n d i a n troops f r o m

o n his b a y o n e t a n d t h r e w h i m

up

over

A f g h a n i s t a n o n c e t h e r e m a i n i n g garrisons h a d b e e n rescued. T h e A r m y of the Indus

t h e cliff.

was of course n o m o r e a n d t h e garrison of I n April 1842, u p o n an u n c o n f i r m e d report

G h a z n i h a d f a l l e n p r i s o n e r , b u t Sale h a d

t h a t Pollock's force was b e i n g h e l d back

b e e n saved a n d other troops c o n t i n u e d to

i n t h e K h y b e r , Sale d e c i d e d t o l a u n c h a

h o l d o u t at Kalat-i-Gilzai, b e t w e e n K a b u l

large-scale sortie w i t h a v i e w t o

supporting

t h e relief c o l u m n ' s advance. W h e n broke o n the 7th, he attacked the

dawn Afghan

a n d Kandahar. W i t h d r a w a l n o w h a d to be c o n d u c t e d so as t o r e t a i n as m u c h B r i t i s h Major-General G e o r g e Pollock's column meeting

c a m p , situated t w o m i l e s west of t h e city,

resistance during its advance t o t h e relief o f Jalalabad,

w i t h three c o l u m n s . W i t h i n t w o hours his

5 A p r i l 1842.

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

p r i d e a n d p r e s t i g e as p o s s i b l e . W h i l e

Pollock

35

t h e y e n c o u n t e r e d t h e skeletal r e m a i n s of

was relieving Jalalabad, reinforcements were

m o r e of E l p h i n s t o n e ' s c o l u m n , m a n y still

a r r i v i n g at K a n d a h a r , e n a b l i n g G e n e r a l N o t t

wearing the tattered remnants of their

i n t u r n to relieve Kalat-i-Gilzai i n M a y . T h a t

u n i f o r m s . 'I shall never forget t h e sight

accomplished, Ellenborough ordered both

I saw here,' G r e e n w o o d recorded. ' T h e p o o r

forces o u t o f A f g h a n i s t a n , a task t h a t n e i t h e r

fellows w h o h a d fallen in

c o m m a n d e r could achieve until adequate

retreat, lay together i n heaps. T h e i r bodies

Elphinstone's

baggage a n i m a l s were available. M o r e o v e r ,

a b s o l u t e l y c h o k e d u p t h e n a r r o w pass, a n d

b o t h generals h o p e d to r e m a i n i n t h e

our m e n were m a r c h i n g a m i d a mass of

c o u n t r y u n t i l s u c h t i m e as t h e A f g h a n s

h u m a n corruption.'

could be bested i n battle a n d their capital

N o t t d i v i d e d his force, w i t h

one

once again occupied b y British troops, for

contingent retiring through Baluchistan to

a n u n k n o w n n u m b e r of British prisoners a n d

Sind, a n d the other under himself

various other hostages r e m a i n e d i n A f g h a n

its a d v a n c e f r o m K a n d a h a r o n 1 0 A u g u s t .

custody. E l l e n b o r o u g h c o n s e n t e d to his

His troops sharply defeated t h e A f g h a n s at

beginning

generals' wishes, a n d i n late July ordered

G h a z n i h a v i n g , like Pollock, occupied the

Pollock to m o v e against the capital, w h i l e

heights i n the w a k e of the m a i n b o d y

N o t t was given the o p t i o n of retiring to the

swept a w a y t h e bands of tribesmen o n either

and

Indus via K a b u l or r e t u r n i n g b y a m o r e direct

side o f t h e l i n e o f m a r c h . A g a i n l i k e Pollock's

route. N o t w i s h i n g to forego his part i n

c o l u m n , N o t t ' s force also passed o v e r

wreaking revenge against the Afghans,

o f t h e area still b e a r i n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e

he chose t h e f o r m e r o p t i o n .

much

remains of Elphinstone's ill-fated c o l u m n . T h e y e n c o u n t e r e d t h e i d e n t i c a l spectacles

W i t h Sale's b r i g a d e n o w p a r t o f h i s division, Pollock left Jalalabad o n 2 0 A u g u s t

of horror a n d the folly that can follow poor

a n d o n 8 S e p t e m b e r r e a c h e d t h e site o f t h e

military decision-making: h u m a n

4 4 t h ' s last s t a n d at G a n d a m a k , a scene e e r i l y

t h e r e m a i n s of t h o u s a n d s of bullocks, horses

skeletons;

described i n G r e e n w o o d ' s diary:

a n d camels, their bones l o n g since p i c k e d clean by vultures a n d wolves; b r o k e n - d o w n

T h e top of t h e hill was t h i c k l y strewed

artillery, a b a n d o n e d carts a n d w a g o n s ; a n d

w i t h the bodies of t h e slain. S o m e were

t h e other detritus of war. O n r e a c h i n g K a b u l o n 15

m e r e skeletons, whilst others were i n better p r e s e r v a t i o n . T h e i r h a i r w a s still

September,

P o l l o c k e s t a b l i s h e d h i s c a m p o n t h e site

o n their heads, a n d their features were

of a racecourse originally

perfect, a l t h o u g h d i s c o l o u r e d ... a

b y Elphinstone's m e n before the revolt.

vulture w h i c h had been banqueting

on

t h e m h o p p e d carelessly a w a y t o a little

constructed

N o t t ' s force a r r i v e d t w o days later, a n d

with

t h e U n i o n Jack o n c e a g a i n f l y i n g over t h e

distance, lazily f l a p p i n g his h u g e wings

Bala Hissar it n o w r e m a i n e d t o decide w h a t

... As t h e f o u l b i r d g a z e d listlessly a t m e ,

course to take, t h e A f g h a n chiefs fearing

I almost fancied h i m the genius of

widescale retribution. Pollock ordered the

destruction gloating over his prey.

destruction of the C h a r C h o w k bazaar i n reprisal for M a c n a g h t e n ' s m u r d e r a n d t h e

A k b a r d i s p u t e d his a d v a n c e at t h e Jagdalak

public display of his m u t i l a t e d body, w h i l e

a n d T e z e e n passes, b u t P o l l o c k ' s e x p e r i e n c e

Sale l e d a p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n i n t o K o h i s t a n ,

i n m o u n t a i n f i g h t i n g h e l d his force i n

w h e r e h e b u r n e d d o w n t h e t o w n s of Istalif

g o o d stead, a n d h e a d v a n c e d w i t h

minimal

a n d Charikar. T h e hostages a n d m o s t of t h e

casualties w h i l e e x a c t i n g a h e a v y t o l l o n t h e

h a n d f u l of prisoners t a k e n d u r i n g t h e retreat

Afghans, w h o s e attacks dried u p before t h e y

w e r e m i r a c u l o u s l y still alive - a p a r t

withdrew northwards, abandoning the route

Elphinstone, w h o had died in captivity

t o K a b u l . As A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a d v a n c e d

dysentery - a n d t h e Afghans released t h e m

u n o p p o s e d t h r o u g h t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass,

u n h a r m e d . Shah Shuja had been

from from

murdered

36

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s

1839-1919

General Sir Samuel Browne, c o m m a n d i n g t h e Peshawar Valley Field Force, enters Jalalabad, 20 September I 878. (Author's collection)

T h e British a r m s n o w i n possession of Afghanistan will n o w be w i t h d r a w n t o t h e [River] Sutlej [in t h e P u n j a b ] .

t h e previous April, his son h a v i n g t a k e n

T h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l w i l l leave it

his place, b u t Akbar, c h a s t e n e d t h o u g h still

t o t h e A f g h a n s themselves t o create a

i n t h e field, c o n t i n u e d to pose a m i l i t a r y

government amidst the anarchy which

threat. Shuja was to be left to his

is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e i r c r i m e s .

own

devices, for Pollock h a d orders n o t to interfere i n political matters, a n e w

policy

O n 12 October, h a v i n g laid waste to most

o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n affairs issued

o f t h e c i t y a p a r t f r o m t h e Bala Hissar,

i n the f o r m of Ellenborough's

t h e A r m y of R e t r i b u t i o n left K a b u l e n

of 1 October

proclamation

1842:

r o u t e t o Peshawar. A p a r t f r o m several a t t a c k s c o n d u c t e d i n t h e passes a g a i n s t

Disasters u n p a r a l l e l e d i n t h e i r e x t e n t

the rearguard under Nott,

unless b y t h e errors i n w h i c h

forces e n c o u n t e r e d n o f o r m a l

they

Anglo-Indian opposition

originated, a n d by the treachery by

to their withdrawal f r o m Afghanistan, and

w h i c h they were completed have, in

o n 2 3 D e c e m b e r Pollock's c o m b i n e d

o n e s h o r t c a m p a i g n , b e e n a v e n g e d ...

f i n a l l y reached I n d i a at Ferozepore.

army

Portrait of a civilian

Florentia, Lady Sale (1787-1853)

F l o r e n t i a , L a d y Sale, h e r o i n e o f t h e r e t r e a t

a n d was o n e of the few surviving witnesses

from Kabul in 1842 a n d her subsequent

of a tragedy t h a t left v i r t u a l l y every o t h e r

period of captivity, was the wife of M a j o r -

participant dead along

G e n e r a l R o b e r t Sale, w h o it w i l l b e r e c a l l e d

m o u n t a i n paths, i n t h e d e e p gorges of t h e

h a d b e e n sent back t o I n d i a f r o m K a b u l ,

K h u r d - K a b u l Pass a n d o n t h e b o d y - s t r e w n

o n l y to find himself forced to take refuge

s u m m i t o f t h e h i l l at G a n d a m a k .

i n t h e fort at Jalalabad e n r o u t e .

Having

decided to r e m a i n b e h i n d w i t h the garrison

snow-driven

It w i l l be recalled t h a t

Elphinstone's

d e m o r a l i z e d , e x h a u s t e d a r m y left K a b u l o n

still c o n t r o l l i n g t h e A f g h a n c a p i t a l , L a d y Sale

6 J a n u a r y 1 8 4 2 . I n all, A n g l o - I n d i a n forces

became an u n w i t t i n g participant in one of

n u m b e r e d 4,500 troops a n d 12,000

t h e greatest catastrophes i n British m i l i t a r y

followers, m a n y of t h e latter b e i n g soldiers'

camp

history, d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e she w i t n e s s e d

wives and children, but mostly

the destruction of the A r m y of the Indus

retainers, servants, m e r c h a n t s a n d their

a n d endured a period of harsh captivity.

families. T h e d a y w a s clear a n d frosty, w i t h

Indian

Yet t h r o u g h o u t t h i s o r d e a l she m a i n t a i n e d

nearly a foot of snow already o n the ground.

an invaluable account of her experience,

T e r m s f o r t h e s a f e c o n d u c t o f t h e c o l u m n as

Florentia, Lady Sale, t h e indomitable wife o f Major-

sirdars

General Sir R o b e r t Sale. By choosing t o remain w i t h t h e

e x t o r t i o n a t e cost o f 14 a n d a h a l f

f a r as P e s h a w a r h a d b e e n m a d e w i t h

Kabul garrison after t h e departure o f her husband f o r Jalalabad, she later found herself an unwitting participant in the fateful retreat o f January 1842. H e r m e m o i r s

the

a n d M o h a m e d A k b a r K h a n at t h e

lakhs.

T h e c o l u m n b e g a n t o m o v e at 9 . 3 0 a m

on

6 January w i t h n o molestation of the advance

number amongst many excellent reminiscences o f t h e

g u a r d , as 5 0 - 1 0 0 A f g h a n s m i l l i n g a b o u t t h e

First Afghan W a r

gates o f t h e c a n t o n m e n t w a t c h e d t h e scene. L a d y Sale r o d e n e a r t h e h e a d o f t h e c o l u m n , together w i t h other p r o m i n e n t civilians,

4*.

m o s t l y officers' w i v e s a n d c h i l d r e n . Progress w a s v e r y s l o w a n d t h e first m i l e w a s o n l y covered i n t w o a n d a half hours. T h e bullocks f o u n d great difficulty i n dragging t h e g u n carriages t h r o u g h t h e s n o w a n d m u c h o f t h e c o l u m n lumbered through the bottleneck created b y a narrow, makeshift bridge constructed the n i g h t before over the Kabul River, a l t h o u g h reconnaissance h a d a l r e a d y d e t e r m i n e d it was easily f o r d a b l e nearby, albeit o n l y to those prepared to brave t h e freezing water. A great deal of baggage a n d c o m m i s s a r i a t supplies was left b e h i n d i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o cross t h i s f i r s t o b s t a c l e - j u s t o n e characteristic of t h e travails y e t i n store. T h e troops themselves h a d been o n half r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e w h o l e p e r i o d o f t h e siege, w i t h e v e n less f o r c a m p f o l l o w e r s , w h i l e

the

38

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

cattle - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a recent supply

o n the m o r n i n g of the 7th the rearguard

of b a r l e y - h a d l o n g subsisted o n twigs a n d bark, leaving t h e m fatally w e a k e n e d

o n l y reached t h e m a i n b o d y at 2 . 0 0 a m , in

w i t h s t r a g g l e r s m a k i n g e n q u i r i e s as t o

freezing conditions. I n any event, they were

t h e whereabouts of their units. W i t h the

fated never to reach their destination, for t h e

b r e a k d o w n of unit cohesion came the

poorest a n d hungriest c a m p followers rapidly

d e c l i n e o f m o r a l e , w i t h a sense o f f o r l o r n

devoured those animals that collapsed f r o m

i n e v i t a b i l i t y r e i n f o r c e d as t h e g r o w i n g l i g h t

starvation. Apart f r o m the desperate shortage

r e v e a l e d t h e f r o z e n corpses o f t h o s e w h o

of f o o d , b o t h soldiers a n d civilians suffered

h a d s u c c u m b e d d u r i n g t h e n i g h t . L a d y Sale,

f r o m a total absence of firewood, forcing

still i n t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d , m o v e d off at

t h e m to burn everything combustible:

7 . 3 0 a m w i t h o u t t h e t r o o p s r e c e i v i n g so m u c h

boxes, chests of d r a w e rs a n d all m a n n e r

as a n o r d e r t o p r o c e e d o r a b u g l e s o u n d i n g .

of f u r n i t u r e still i n t h e i r possession, apart

A s d i s c i p l i n e a m o n g t h e sepoys

f r o m the waggons themselves. Indeed, Lady

collapse, some w a n d e r e d a h e a d of t h e

began to

Sale's l a s t d i n n e r a n d b r e a k f a s t a t K a b u l h a d

advance guard. Others could n o t locate their

b e e n cooked w i t h the w o o d of a m a h o g a n y

u n i t s a n d cast a w a y t h e i r w e a p o n s t o l i g h t e n

d i n i n g table.

t h e l o a d , w h i l e some, t o o i n j u r e d or t o o w e a k failed to keep up, resigning themselves to

W h e n t h e rearguard f i n a l l y left t h e cantonment, the Afghans

c e r t a i n d e a t h . N o sooner was baggage left

immediately

b e g a n to o c c u p y t h e b u i l d i n g s a n d fire

b e h i n d t h a n Afghans began to appear a n d

u p o n t h e last p a r t y t o d e p a r t . T h i s caused

p l u n d e r it. T h e e a r l y signs o f t h i s f o r m o f

p a n i c a m o n g s t t h e s e r v a n t s , w h o cast aside

d e p r e d a t i o n w e r e a l r e a d y e v i d e n t i n t h e fact

t h e i r l o a d s a n d r a n o f f , so a b a n d o n i n g

that the c a n t o n m e n t was looted a n d burned

m u c h of the privately carried baggage, the

s h o r t l y a f t e r its e v a c u a t i o n ; t h e f a t e o f t h e

c o m m i s s a r i a t a n d a m m u n i t i o n at t h e v e r y

w o u n d e d left b e h i n d c a n o n l y be surmised.

outset of t h e retreat. Before t h e d a y was even out m e n , w o m e n and children -

an

a p p a l l i n g a s s o r t m e n t o f t h e sick, d e a d a n d d y i n g - b e g a n to litter t h e roads, deprived of t h e w i l l to persevere a n d resigned to their fate. T h e i r b o d i e s e n c u m b e r e d t h e passage of others, all n u m b e d b y the intense cold a n d i g n o r a n t of t h e other foe yet to appear. T h a t night, i n t h e c o m p l e t e absence of tents - m u c h less a n y p r o p e r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e elements - a n officer m a n a g e d to p i t c h a m a k e s h i f t c o v e r i n g o v e r L a d y Sale a n d a f e w of her c o m p a n i o n s , p r o v i d i n g t h e barest of c o m f o r t as t h e w i n d b l e w i n u n d e r t h e s i d e s t o a t t a c k t h e o c c u p a n t s , stiff a n d in their

poshteens

huddled

(a s h e e p s k i n j a c k e t w i t h

a fleece l i n i n g ) . B y t h e e n d o f t h e first day, L a d y Sale h a d o n l y t r a v e l l e d six m i l e s b u t hundreds of civilians a n d some of the troops h a d already fallen by the wayside, the

army

h a d a b a n d o n e d t w o horse artillery pieces o n t h e road, a n d , o m i n o u s l y , all of t h e S h a h Shuja's troops h a d n o w deserted. So p o n d e r o u s p r o v e d t h e j o u r n e y a n d so s t r u n g - o u t h a d t h e c o l u m n b e c o m e , t h a t

Lady Sale on horseback during t h e retreat.

P o r t r a i t o f a civilian

But w o r s e n o w f o l l o w e d , w i t h t h e first serious attacks o n t h e c o l u m n

beginning

39

since t h e horses c o u l d n o longer p u l l t h e m , leaving o n l y t w o serviceable guns

remaining

a n d almost n o a m m u n i t i o n - m u c h of w h i c h

o n the 7th - o n l y the second day of t h e retreat - w h e n a force of s c r e a m i n g

h a d already been abandoned

A f g h a n s sallied o u t of a small fort a n d briefly

i n e p t i t u d e , carelessness a n d l a c k o f a n i m a l

c a p t u r e d t w o pieces of artillery; w h i c h

transport. By t h e e n d of t h e second day,

when

sepoys

through

r e t a k e n after a stiff f i g h t w e r e a b a n d o n e d ,

L a d y Sale o b s e r v e d t h e

t h e guns spiked b y t h e officers t o r e n d e r

w i t h the c a m p followers, w i t h n o h o p e of

mixing

t h e m i n o p e r a b l e . As t h e c o l u m n a d v a n c e d ,

r e f o r m i n g themselves i n t o their respective

t h e A f g h a n s g r e w i n n u m b e r s a l o n g its f l a n k s

units. I n a n y event, t h e y h a d suffered such

a n d i n c r e a s i n g l y h a r a s s e d its c e n t r e a n d r e a r ,

g r i e v o u s losses f r o m d e a t h a n d d e s e r t i o n t h a t

the c a m p followers suffering the most,

their u n i t designations bore little relation to

as L a d y Sale r e c o r d e d : ' N u m b e r s o f

reality. E v e n w i t h s n o w i n a b u n d a n c e , w a t e r

unfortunates have dropped, b e n u m b e d

was n o t easily o b t a i n e d , for t h e r e was n o

w i t h cold, to be massacred b y t h e e n e m y . '

f i r e w o o d w i t h w h i c h t o m e l t it, a n d t h o s e

After m a r c h i n g five miles since m o r n i n g ,

w h o sought to gather water f r o m streams

the c o l u m n halted before the o p e n i n g of the

still u n f r o z e n w e r e fired o n b y t r i b e s m e n .

K h u r d - K a b u l Pass. L a d y S a l e w a s e x c e e d i n g l y disconcerted b y t h e stoppage, for she k n e w

By 8 January a n already dire situation

had

utterly degenerated, w i t h an atmosphere of

t h e t r o o p s possessed o n l y f i v e a n d a h a l f days' rations w i t h w h i c h to reach Jalalabad, a n d the animals could n o t forage o n account of the snow o n the g r o u n d , w h i c h was m o r e t h a n a foot deep. T h e senior officers

T h e t h i r d day o f t h e retreat f r o m Kabul, 8 January I 842. Emboldened by t h e inability o f Anglo-Indian t r o o p s properly t o defend themselves and by t h e helplessness o f t h e camp followers, Afghan tribesmen snipe f r o m elevated positions and make forays directly against t h e

squabbled over w h e t h e r to c a m p or p u s h o n ,

column, seizing Captain and Mrs Anderson's young

before finally agreeing o n t h e latter course,

daughter (left) and fatally w o u n d i n g Lieutenant Sturt

and by the time they reached

Bhoodkhak

(right), son-in-law t o Lady Sale ( m o u n t e d , centre background), w i t h General Elphinstone t o her front.

t h e r e was scarcely a n y baggage r e m a i n i n g of a n y k i n d . T w o m o r e 6-pdrs were a b a n d o n e d ,

A l o n g t h e hillside (right) soldiers o f t h e 4 4 t h fruitlessly a t t e m p t t o disperse t h e harassing Ghilzais.

40

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s

1839-1919

f o r e b o d i n g i n t h e air. ' A t s u n r i s e / L a d y S a l e

t h e m , w o u n d i n g several p e o p l e a n d horses

observed, ' n o order h a d b e e n issued for t h e

i n t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d , i n c l u d i n g Sale, h e r

m a r c h , a n d the confusion was fearful. T h e

a r m struck b y a m u s k e t ball. Three other

force was perfectly disorganized, nearly every

m u s k e t balls passed t h r o u g h her

m a n p a r a l y s e d w i t h c o l d , so as t o b e s c a r c e l y

near the shoulder, but w i t h o u t

able t o h o l d his m u s k e t or m o v e .

injury. T h e principal attack, however,

Many

f r o z e n corpses l a y o n t h e g r o u n d / S o m e of the

sepoys

still w i t h t h e ranks - or i n a n y

poshteen

causing

struck t h e m a i n b o d y of t h e c o l u m n , w h a t r e m a i n e d of the baggage train, a n d

e v e n t still o n t h e i r feet - t o o k t h e futile a n d

t h e rearguard, w i t h a n u m b e r of civilians,

fatal d e c i s i o n t o b u r n t h e i r caps a n d clothes

i n c l u d i n g c h i l d r e n , b e i n g a b d u c t e d or killed.

for t h e m o d i c u m of fleeting w a r m t h this act

Sale d e s c r i b e d t h e h a r r o w i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f

of desperation provided. But the increasing

m a n y of her civilian compatriots,

forays b y t h e A f g h a n s caused t h e greatest

t h e m a c e r t a i n M r s M a i n w a r i n g , a n officer's

distress, a n d w h e n a force o f t r i b e s m e n

wife w i t h the most precious of burdens:

among

a t t a c k e d t h e rear of t h e c o l u m n a p a n i c ensued, the c a m p followers rushing to the

She n o t o n l y h a d to w a l k a considerable

f r o n t for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e troops,

distance w i t h her child i n her arms

a l t h o u g h m a n y soldiers w e r e n o l o n g e r e v e n

t h r o u g h t h e d e e p s n o w , b u t h a d also

under arms. The Afghans continued to

to pick her w a y over the bodies of the

gather i n greater a n d greater n u m b e r s ,

dead, dying, a n d w o u n d e d , both

harassing the c o l u m n f r o m the heights w i t h

a n d c a t t l e , a n d c o n s t a n t l y t o cross t h e

their long, accurate

jezails.

'Bullets kept

men

streams of water, w e t u p to t h e knees,

w h i z z i n g b y u s , as w e s a t o n o u r h o r s e s , f o r

pushed and shoved about by m e n

h o u r s / L a d y Sale r e c o r d e d , t h e 4 4 t h

animals, the e n e m y keeping u p a sharp

and

and

3 7 t h N a t i v e I n f a n t r y r e t u r n i n g f i r e as b e s t

fire, a n d several persons b e i n g killed

t h e y could against a virtually unseen

close t o her.

enemy

p e r c h e d a m o n g s t t h e rocks a n d precipices high above t h e m .

T w o regiments, the 4 4 t h and 3 7 t h Native

Eventually, negotiations began between E l p h i n s t o n e , his officers a n d A k b a r K h a n ,

I n f a n t r y , p r o t e c t e d t h e rear, b u t as t h e y a p p r o a c h e d t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass t h e A f g h a n s

w h o a g r e e d t o g u a r a n t e e t h e c o l u m n ' s safe

increased t h e i r fire f r o m a m o n g s t t h e rocks.

a d v a n c e across t h e b o r d e r , b u t w i t h t h e

T h e n u m b e r o f w r e t c h e d soldiers o p p o s i n g

stakes raised: f u r t h e r p a y m e n t a n d t h e

t h e m c o n t i n u e d to dwindle, a n d those that

surrender of t h r e e senior British officers t o be

survived, t h e i r h a n d s s w a d d l e d i n gloves

d e t a i n e d as h o s t a g e s as t h e p r i c e f o r G e n e r a l

a n d cloth, were barely able to load their

Sale's e v a c u a t i o n o f J a l a l a b a d a n d

withdrawal

w e a p o n s , m u c h less m a n i p u l a t e t h e t r i g g e r .

i n t o I n d i a n territory. These terms were a

To c o m p o u n d the column's predicament,

blatant f o r m of blackmail f r o m those

progress ceased for several h o u r s :

who

h a d already violated the original terms of the agreement, but Elphinstone believed he

had

O w i n g to a halt h a v i n g t a k e n place i n

n o c h o i c e b u t t o accept. A h a n d f u l of officers

f r o n t , t h e pass w a s c o m p l e t e l y

r e m a i n e d b e h i n d as h o s t a g e s a n d t h e

u p ; a n d for a considerable t i m e t h e 4 4 t h

march

choked

r e s u m e d a b o u t m i d d a y , L a d y Sale d e s c r i b i n g

w e r e stationary u n d e r a h e a v y fire, a n d

t h e t r o o p s as ' i n t h e g r e a t e s t s t a t e o f

w e r e fast e x p e n d i n g t h e i r a m m u n i t i o n .

disorganization: the baggage was m i x e d w i t h the advance guard; and the

in

camp

The 3 7 t h continued slowly m o v i n g

on

w i t h o u t firing a shot, being paralysed

followers all p u s h e d ahead i n their

w i t h cold to such a degree t h a t

precipitate flights towards H i n d o s t a n ' .

a m o u n t o f persuasion b y t h e i r officers

N o sooner h a d they advanced half a mile w h e n t h e A f g h a n s o p e n e d a h e a v y fire o n

no

c o u l d i n d u c e t h e m to m a k e a n y effort to dislodge the enemy, w h o took f r o m

P o r t r a i t o f a civilian

some of t h e m n o t o n l y their firelocks,

scenes t h a t a w a i t e d us. T h e r o a d c o v e r e d

but even the clothes f r o m their persons.

w i t h a w f u l l y m a n g l e d bodies, all n a k e d :

4I

f i f t y - e i g h t E u r o p e a n s w e r e c o u n t e d ... the natives innumerable. N u m b e r s of

Eventually, the c o l u m n halted, some o f t h e soldiers still d e t e r m i n e d t o h o l d

t h e c a m p f o l l o w e r s w e r e still alive, frost

o n t o the o n e r e m a i n i n g artillery piece b y

bitten a n d starving, some perfectly out

m a n h a n d l i n g it w i t h o u t t h e a i d of horses,

o f t h e i r senses a n d i d i o t i c ... T h e s i g h t

w h o s e strength c o u l d n o t sustain such a

was dreadful, the smell of blood

laborious enterprise over b r o k e n g r o u n d deep

s i c k e n i n g , a n d t h e c o r p s e s l a y so t h i c k

i n snow. O t h e r m e a n s of defence stood i n a n

it was impossible t o l o o k f r o m t h e m ,

e q u a l l y p a r l o u s state. W h e n t h e a r m y h a d left

as i t r e q u i r e d c a r e t o g u i d e m y

K a b u l , L a d y Sale r e c k o n e d t h a t e a c h

sepoy

horse

so as n o t t o t r e a d u p o n t h e b o d i e s .

carried 4 0 r o u n d s of m u s k e t a m m u n i t i o n i n h i s p o u c h a n d 1 0 0 spares. N o w , o n l y t h e t h i r d

D u r i n g t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e 8 t h , L a d y Sale

d a y i n t o t h e retreat, just t h r e e a m m u n i t i o n -

t o o k stock o f t h e disaster, e s t i m a t i n g t h a t

bearing camels r e m a i n e d i n the c o l u m n , w i t h many

sepoys

possessing n o t a single cartridge

5 0 0 troops a n d about 2,500 c a m p

followers

h a d died f r o m e x h a u s t i o n , cold or

a n d n o system of distribution i n place.

starvation, or fallen at t h e h a n d s of t h e

T h e c o m m i s s a r i a t h a d ceased t o f u n c t i o n ,

Afghans. W i t h the prospect of reaching

r e g i m e n t a l i n t e g r i t y h a d i n m a n y cases b r o k e n

Jalalabad g r o w i n g ever m o r e unlikely, she lay

d o w n , desertion was rife, discipline a n d

d o w n t o s l e e p i n t h e b i t t e r c o l d , w r a p p e d as

m o r a l e s t o o d a t b r e a k i n g p o i n t , a n d t h e scenes

b e f o r e i n h e r poshteen

of suffering c o n t i n u e d i n u n r e m i t t i n g fashion:

c r a m p e d space w i t h t h o s e officers a n d t h e i r

a n d sharing a

w i v e s w h o h a d t h u s far m e r c i f u l l y It w o u l d be impossible for m e t o

survived

a n ordeal of catastrophic proportions.

describe t h e feelings w i t h w h i c h w e pursued our w a y through the dreadful

T h e approach t o Jagdalak, 8 S e p t e m b e r I 842.

42

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Rising o n t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 9 t h , she d i s c o v e r e d t h a t m a n y of t h e soldiers h a d

c o m p a n i o n , w h o s e h u s b a n d h a d just d i e d of his w o u n d s ] n o r I were i n a fit

a l r e a d y m o v e d off, t o g e t h e r w i t h a large

state t o d e c i d e for ourselves w h e t h e r

b o d y of c a m p followers. ' M o r e t h a n one half

w o u l d a c c e p t t h e sirdar's

we

o f t h e f o r c e is n o w f r o s t b i t t e n o r w o u n d e d /

not. There was b u t faint h o p e of our

she r e c o r d e d i n h e r j o u r n a l , ' a n d m o s t of t h e

e v e r g e t t i n g safe t o J e l l a l a b a d ; a n d w e

m e n c a n scarcely p u t a f o o t t o t h e g r o u n d .

followed the stream.

p r o t e c t i o n or

T h i s is t h e f o u r t h d a y t h a t o u r c a t t l e h a v e h a d n o f o o d ; a n d t h e m e n are starved w i t h

T h e w o m e n a n d children, together w i t h

cold a n d h u n g e r / A m i d s t this d e e p e n i n g

their surviving husbands a n d others, were

crisis, a

sirdar

rode o u t to British headquarters

guided b y a circuitous route to the fort

suggesting t h a t t h e t h r e e senior officers,

w h e r e L a d y Sale f o u n d A k b a r K h a n a n d t h e

Pottinger, M a c k e n z i e a n d Lawrence, approach

hostages, together w i t h t h e civilians t a k e n

the A f g h a n garrison of the K h u r d - K a b u l fort

prisoner over t h e preceding days. Here began

a n d request p r o t e c t i o n for t h e wives a n d

a l e n g t h y period of i m p r i s o n m e n t ,

c h i l d r e n , g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e i r safe e s c o r t

w h i c h t i m e m o s t of t h e captives, apart f r o m

during

t o Peshawar at a later date. Barring this

Elphinstone (whose death almost certainly

expedient, there seemed n o possibility

saved h i m f r o m disgrace before a court

of their survival. General Elphinstone,

martial) survived the primitive conditions to

n o w t o o ill to c o n t i n u e i n c o m m a n d ,

b e r e s c u e d l a t e r t h a t y e a r w h e n , as w e h a v e

agreed to this proposal, 'in the t w o f o l d

seen, British m i l i t a r y operations resumed.

h o p e / L a d y Sale s u r m i s e d :

L a d y Sale's h u s b a n d d i e d t h r e e y e a r s l a t e r at t h e battle of M u d k i , d u r i n g t h e w a r i n

... of p l a c i n g t h e ladies a n d

children

Sind, a stretch of w i l d c o u n t r y bordering

b e y o n d the dangers a n d dreadful

south-west A f g h a n i s t a n , l e a v i n g his w i d o w

p r i v a t i o n s o f t h e c a m p , a n d also o f

w i t h a special p e n s i o n f r o m t h e Q u e e n .

showing the

sirdar

t h a t h e was sincere

i n his w i s h to negotiate a truce, a n d

W h e n L a d y Sale h e r s e l f d i e d at C a p e T o w n o n 6 July 1853, the inscription o n the simple

thus w i n f r o m h i m a similar feeling of

granite obelisk over her grave s u m m e d u p

confidence. Overwhelmed w i t h

her character perfectly: ' U n d e r n e a t h this

affliction, n e i t h e r M r s Sturt [her

domestic

s t o n e reposes all t h a t c o u l d d i e of L a d y Sale.'

The world around war

Afghanistan: the playground of the Great Game Dramatic geography dominates Afghanistan

that penetrated this forbidding region were

a n d h e l p s e x p l a i n its r o l e i n B r i t a i n ' s s t r a t e g y

k n o w n , a n d w h e r e t h e eastern H i n d u Kush

f o r t h e d e f e n c e o f I n d i a , its g r e a t e s t c o l o n i a l

c o n n e c t s w i t h t h e c e n t r a l H i n d u K u s h , several

possession. A t t h e n o r t h e r n e n d o f t h e

r o u t e s p r o v i d e d access i n t o A f g h a n T u r k e s t a n ,

subcontinent, t h e H i m a l a y a s r u n for

w h i c h m e a n t t h a t as R u s s i a s l o w l y b u t

1,900 miles, dividing Afghanistan a n d I n d i a

inexorably expanded southwards, the

f r o m T i b e t a n d C h i n a . For t h e w h o l e o f t h e

H i n d u Kush remained the only principal

1 9 t h century, these m o u n t a i n s p r o v i d e d I n d i a

barrier t o A f g h a n i s t a n . A n y foreign force t h a t

w i t h a secure f r o n t a g a i n s t i n v a s i o n . For t h o s e

penetrated b e y o n d this c h a i n of m o u n t a i n s

concerned w i t h the defence of India, the m a i n

w o u l d still face t h e e a s t e r n H i n d u K u s h , w h o s e

issue w a s t h e s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s p o s e d b y t h e

ridges e x t e n d e d s o u t h w a r d i n t o W a z i r i s t a n

north-western frontier w i t h Afghanistan.

a n d B a l u c h i s t a n , n e a r l y as f a r as t h e A r a b i a n

Specifically, s t r e t c h i n g for 6 0 0 m i l e s t o

Sea. T h e y p r o v i d e d a n u n i n t e r r u p t e d n a t u r a l

t h e b o r d e r w i t h Persia sits t h e f o r m i d a b l e

barrier b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d Afghanistan, w i t h

H i n d u Kush, consisting of a massive c h a i n

t h e I n d u s River f l o w i n g r o u g h l y parallel,

of m o u n t a i n s , some rising m o r e t h a n 20,000ft,

t o t h e east, s e r v i n g as a m e t a p h o r i c a l m o a t

r e n d e r i n g access t o a n d f r o m C e n t r a l A s i a n o t

t o t h i s fortress w a l l .

i m p o s s i b l e , b u t c e r t a i n l y n o s i m p l e affair. M o s t of this region was c o m p l e t e l y u n e x p l o r e d b y E u r o p e a n s i n t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y , b u t t h e passes

Afghan chiefs and some o f their sons during t h e Second Afghan W a r

44

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

n e i g h b o u r a n d t h u s , if m o v i n g i n t h e

T o t h e east o f t h e I n d u s l a y areas o f

o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , as o n e o f t h e t w o

considerable settlement. To t h e west, m u c h m o r e sparsely p o p u l a t e d a n d w i t h

an

m a i n a v e n u e s for progress i n t o C e n t r a l Asia.

ill-defined border, lay t h e tribal territories;

A n invasion f r o m the west obviated the need

partly i n British I n d i a a n d partly i n

f o r a n a t t a c k i n g f o r c e t o cross t h e d r e a d e d

Afghanistan, i n reality neither the British

H i n d u Kush, a n d once i n control of the city

authorities nor Kabul h a d more t h a n a very

a n i n v a d e r possessed n o t o n l y shelter for his

limited juristiction over t h e m . V o l u m e s can

troops against a harsh climate, but a fortified

be w r i t t e n a b o u t Afghanistan's vast a n d

city, a m p l e f o o d for his a r m y a n d p l e n t y

varied geography, b u t for t h e purposes

of fodder f r o m t h e s u r r o u n d i n g fertile

of this study it was i n t h e eastern area

-

t h r o u g h w h i c h access t o a n d f r o m I n d i a w a s

c o u n t r y s i d e for his horses a n d beasts of b u r d e n . T h u s f o r c e n t u r i e s H e r a t s e r v e d as

p o s s i b l e - t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c issues c o n n e c t e d

a n i m p o r t a n t strategic objective for all

w i t h the Anglo-Afghan Wars were central.

i n v a d i n g forces a n d a focus of i n t e n s e

For it was this region, stretching f r o m t h e

interest to the British g o v e r n m e n t i n India,

B o l a n Pass i n t h e s o u t h t o t h e K h y b e r Pass

w h o u n d e r n o circumstances w o u l d accept

i n t h e n o r t h - w i t h o t h e r , less s i g n i f i c a n t

its o c c u p a t i o n b y P e r s i a n o r R u s s i a n t r o o p s .

routes i n b e t w e e n - that connected eastern Afghanistan w i t h western India. A f g h a n i s t a n ' s t h r e e c h i e f cities w e r e , a n d c o n t i n u e to be, Kabul, K a n d a h a r

K a b u l ' s i m p o r t a n c e , n o t m e r e l y as t h e c a p i t a l c i t y , l a y w i t h its p o s i t i o n a t t h e

and

crossroads o f t w o i m p o r t a n t a v e n u e s o f communication: a road leading through the

H e r a t . H e r a t sits a t t h e w e s t e r n e n d o f t h e

H i n d u Kush into Turkestan and penetrating

H i n d u K u s h , n e a r t h e f r o n t i e r w i t h Persia,

f u r t h e r i n t o C e n t r a l Asia, a n d a m o u n t a i n o u s

p r e s e n t - d a y I r a n . S i t u a t e d as i t is i n a f e r t i l e

route to Peshawar, i n t h e British Punjab, a n d

r e g i o n , H e r a t s e r v e d as t h e p r i n c i p a l r o u t e

b e y o n d to India's n o r t h e r n plains. A third

o f a d v a n c e i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n f r o m its w e s t e r n

m a j o r m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n across Afghanistan ran f r o m Kabul to Kandahar,

T h e Jagdalak Pass during t h e First Afghan W a r

m o v i n g south-westwards through Ghazni,

(Author's collection)

w h i c h controls the second m a i n avenue

The world around war

i n t o I n d i a - t h r o u g h t h e v i t a l B o l a n Pass. K a n d a h a r , l i k e K a b u l , is s i t u a t e d a t t h e confluence of t w o i m p o r t a n t

45

Entrance t o t h e Bolan Pass f r o m Dadur, I 842. (National A r n r

V

Museum)

communications

routes of strategic significance - t h e H e r a t t o

t o S i n d ( a n n e x e d after c o n q u e s t b y British

Kabul road, a n d that w h i c h connected Herat

I n d i a i n 1 8 4 3 ) v i a t h e B o l a n Pass. S i n c e H e r a t ,

46

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

I

.

V

.

1

ilk

T h e Chunari Pass t h r o u g h t h e Khurd-Kabul Range.

p r i n c i p a l a r t e r i e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n across

Precipitous mountains and n a r r o w defiles such as

t h e c o u n t r y , i t is p e r h a p s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e

these depicted here made Afghanistan an extremely

t h a t British authorities i n I n d i a should have

challenging e n v i r o n m e n t in which t o prosecute military operations, especially in t h e depths o f w i n t e r o r t h e

r e g a r d e d t h e H i n d u K u s h as t h e b e s t b a r r i e r

scorching heat o f s u m m e r (Author's collection)

of defence i n the north-west. T h e further the

Kandahar and Kabul were connected to

f o r m i d a b l e barrier, t h e b e t t e r t h e state o f

o n e a n o t h e r b y roads t h a t constituted t h e

security for I n d i a . Failure to keep Russian

Russians c o u l d b e k e p t at b a y b e y o n d this

The world around war

p e n e t r a t i o n a t b a y , e s p e c i a l l y as f a r as

47

t h e y seized c o n t r o l of t h e c o u n t r y after t h e

Kabul or Kandahar, w o u l d a l l o w t h e m t o

d e a t h o f t h e E m p e r o r o f Persia, N a d i r S h a h .

influence - a n d possibly e v e n encourage to

T h e D u r a n i s w e r e a n d still are best associated

hostility - t h e frontier tribes, against w h i c h

w i t h t h e areas a r o u n d K a b u l , J a l a l a b a d a n d

n o n a t u r a l barrier existed to separate t h e m

Herat, w h e r e a s their p r i n c i p a l rivals, t h e

from the remainder of India.

Ghilzais, w h o h a d ruled m u c h of the south of

Thus Afghan geography a n d the peculiar

the country prior to the D u r a n i ascendancy,

d i s t r i b u t i o n o f its p e o p l e w e l l i n t o B r i t i s h

l i v e m o s t l y t o t h e east o f a l i n e d r a w n

territory played a n i m p o r t a n t role i n

Kabul to Kalat-i-Ghilzai. T h e Ghilzais for t h e

from

encouraging Anglo-Indian intervention.

most part lived nomadically, spending their

I n d e e d , n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e t h r e a t , r e a l

winters o n the plains a n d shifting to the

or perceived, t o t h e I n d i a n

subcontinent

central highlands i n the s u m m e r

months,

could have inspired military operations i n

w i t h large n u m b e r s t r a v e l l i n g i n t o I n d i a v i a

so f o r b i d d i n g a n e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e

t h e v a r i o u s passes f o r p u r p o s e s o f t r a d i n g a n d

featured extremes of temperature,

climate with

w i n t e r s b r i n g i n g s n o w a n d sub-zero blasts of piercing w i n d s , f o l l o w e d b y a rapidly

a l l o w i n g their flocks t o graze. T h e tribes o n t h e N o r t h - W e s t

Frontier,

u n d e r British c o n t r o l after t h e defeat of

approaching spring that i n t u r n quickly gave

t h e Sikhs i n 1 8 4 9 , w e r e also e t h n i c A f g h a n s .

w a y to b u r n i n g s u m m e r temperatures

T h e y consisted of peoples related to b o t h the

-

rising to 110°F a n d above b y June, c o m p l e t e

Duranis and Ghilzais, sharing between

w i t h dust-storms a n d l o n g absences of

a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e i n v a r i a n t f o r m s as

rainfall. A d d to this a seemingly endless

either Pashtu or Paktu ( t h o u g h D a r i a n d

them

series o f r o c k - s t r e w n h i l l s , n a r r o w d e f i l e s ,

a h o s t of o t h e r l a n g u a g e s are also s p o k e n

a bleak a n d waterless terrain, a d e t e r m i n e d

throughout the country), with

e n e m y m a k i n g use o f t o p o g r a p h y i d e a l l y

p l a y i n g some part i n their classification - a

geography

suited to a m b u s h a n d e x t e n d e d defence,

d i s t i n c t i o n is m a d e b e t w e e n t h o s e l i v i n g i n

a n d the British h a d t h e ingredients of a

the plains a n d those m a k i n g their

protracted a n d costly conflict.

i n t h e hills a n d m o u n t a i n s . T h e

I n a c o u n t r y o f severe g e o g r a p h y a n d c l i m a t e , w h e r e l i f e is a r d u o u s , i t is s c a r c e l y

homes

Duranis

a n d Ghilzais b e l o n g i n t h e f o r m e r category, together w i t h various o t h e r tribes w h o

surprising t h a t t h e c o u n t r y bred a t o u g h

inhabit the plain around Peshawar a n d the

p e o p l e , i n f l u e n c e d as m u c h b y I s l a m as b y

valleys further n o r t h . T h o s e tribes situated i n

weather a n d terrain. T h e label 'Afghanistan',

t h e m o r e r u r a l areas a l o n g t h e e a s t e r n b o r d e r

w h i c h literally m e a n s 'Land of the Afghans',

o f A f g h a n i s t a n - s t r a d d l i n g b o t h sides, i n

c a n o n l y b e p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d t o t h a t state

f a c t - o c c u p y w h a t is n o w c a l l e d t h e ' t r i b a l

f r o m 1 7 4 7 , a n d l a r g e l y s t a n d s as a

territory' or 'tribal lands' t h a t e x t e n d

19th-century m e a n s for describing m o r e

Swat i n t h e n o r t h to t h e t o w n s of Sibi a n d

from

of a n ill-defined geographical area t h a n a n

Pishin i n t h e south. T h e area runs a l o n g

actual unified political entity. Nor, to be

m u c h of the length of w h a t was the

strictly accurate, does t h e t e r m ' A f g h a n '

Afghan-British India border, n o w i n

apply o n l y to those peoples living w i t h i n the

Pakistan. T h e s e peoples are e t h n i c a l l y

modern

borders of t h e c o u n t r y called A f g h a n i s t a n , for

diverse, a n d i n c l u d e t h e Orakzais, M a h s u d s ,

t h e y also i n c l u d e t h e P a t h a n s l i v i n g i n w h a t

M o h m a n d s , Afridis, Wazirs a n d others,

was t h e n India i n t h e region stretching f r o m

of w h o m p l a y e d key parts i n t h e

many

numerous

the Swat Valley i n the n o r t h to Waziristan

minor campaigns and punitive

i n the south. I n a d d i t i o n to these, t h e

f o u g h t b y British a n d I n d i a n troops for half

A f g h a n s are d i v i d e d i n t o t w o large t r i b a l

a c e n t u r y after t h e Second A f g h a n War.

c o n f e d e r a t i o n s k n o w n as t h e D u r a n i s a n d

H o w e v e r diverse ethnically

expeditions

and

the Ghilzais, the former of w h o m came to

linguistically, A f g h a n s share m u c h

prominence in the mid-18th century

c o m m o n w i t h one another, placing a high

when

in

48

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Across m u c h of t h e c o u n t r y l i v e d various

v a l u e o n f a m i l y l o y a l t y a n d closeness, p e r s o n a l h o n o u r , hospitality, fierce

n o m a d i c peoples w h o b y definition never

independence a n d physical courage.

coalesced i n t o a n organized, cohesive w h o l e ,

As s u c h , l o y a l t y t o f a m i l y a n d t r i b e or c l a n

as w e l l as v a r i o u s o t h e r n o n - n o m a d i c p e o p l e s

stands a b o v e l o y a l t y t o t h e state. O n

too n u m e r o u s to m e n t i o n . T h e heterogeneous

the

o t h e r h a n d , w i t h t h i s h e i g h t e n e d sense

n a t u r e of t h e c o u n t r y m i l i t a t e d against a n y

of independence comes unreliability

u n i f i e d system of defence against British

fickleness. Similarly, t h e emphasis

and

i n v a s i o n a n d yet, conversely, rendered a n

on

p e r s o n a l h o n o u r , w h i l e a v i r t u e u n t o itself,

invasion of Afghanistan extremely

c a n m a n i f e s t itself i n a d r a w n - o u t

p r o b l e m a t i c a l , w i t h rival groups n o r m a l l y at

c a m p a i g n of vengeance, w i t h

personal

blood-letting

a c o m m o n a n d accepted m e a n s of satisfying t h a t n e e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e obsession -

from

each other's throats t e m p o r a r i l y u n i t e d i n resisting a foreign foe. N o t surprisingly, w h i l e control over the

the Western perspective - w i t h physical

n a t i o n ostensibly lay w i t h the A m i r i n Kabul,

c o u r a g e c a n m a n i f e s t itself i n t h e acts

t h e vast e x t e n t of t h e c o u n t r y a n d the

o f a g g r e s s i o n a n d v i o l e n c e t h a t p l a y so

primitive nature of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,

p r o m i n e n t a part i n A f g h a n life. A n d

c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e stronger, m o r e localized

while

hospitality, w h e t h e r extended to friends,

allegiances, r e s u l t e d i n t h e exercise o f a sort

s t r a n g e r s o r e v e n e n e m i e s , is p i v o t a l t o

o f n o m i n a l , q u a s i - r u l e f r o m t h e c a p i t a l at

A f g h a n c u s t o m s a n d m o r e s , i t possesses

best a n d , at worst, c o m p l e t e

i t s o w n l i m i t a t i o n s ; t h u s , as a c o n s e q u e n c e

e n j o y e d b y the m o r e remote peoples. This

independence

of i n s u l t or o f f e n c e , f o r m e r guests of

a c c o u n t e d for t h e e n d e m i c a n d chronic

a h o u s e h o l d m a y at a stroke b e c o m e

i n s t a b i l i t y so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f A f g h a n

r e - c l a s s i f i e d as f o e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e

politics. Nevertheless, a degree of central

carefully established conventions

laid

d o w n b y generations of tradition. O f the approximately four million Afghans

c o n t r o l c o u l d b e a p p l i e d , a n d state r e v e n u e was raised, n o t o n l y t h r o u g h links w i t h t h e tribal system, b u t t h r o u g h t h e n e t w o r k of

p o p u l a t i n g t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e last q u a r t e r

feudal obligations t h a t e n t i t l e d a chief, or

o f t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y , t h e largest g r o u p after

sirdar

t h e D u r a n i s a n d Ghilzais w e r e t h e Tajiks, a

tribe a n d h o l d i n g his post for life), to

(elected f r o m t h e leading f a m i l y of the

f a r m i n g people, a l t h o u g h a m i n o r i t y sustained

c o m m a n d t h e strict l o y a l t y o f his p e o p l e . I n

t h e m s e l v e s as s h o p k e e p e r s a n d a r t i s a n s .

turn, the

T h e Tajiks l i v e d p r i n c i p a l l y a r o u n d H e r a t a n d

lands g r a n t e d b y t h e A m i r i n e x c h a n g e for

Kabul, a n d further n o r t h i n a b a n d of territory

his service, u s u a l l y t a k i n g t h e f o r m of levies

stretching into Turkestan n o r t h of the central

of a r m e d m e n to be furnished d u r i n g periods

highlands. T h e d o m i n a n t people of the central

of hostility. Thus, even w h e r e n o

highlands a n d i m m e d i a t e l y to t h e west of

a r m y e x i s t e d , as d u r i n g t h e F i r s t A f g h a n W a r ,

K a b u l w e r e t h e H a z a r a s , also P e r s i a n - s p e a k i n g ,

t h e A m i r c o u l d raise s u b s t a n t i a l n u m b e r s o f

b u t of Turkish or M o n g o l descent, a n d again

fighters - unquestionably brave a n d strongly

sirdar

often was t h e recipient of

standing

largely a n agricultural people. I n contrast to

m o t i v a t e d b y religious fervour

m o s t A f g h a n s , w h o are S u n n i M u s l i m s , t h e

xenophobia, but often indisciplined to boot.

Hazaras w e r e Shi'ites, a fact t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r isolation f r o m o t h e r tribes.

and

Such, i n very brief terms, stood this most formidable land and people.

A t t a c k o n t h e Peiwar Kotal by t h e 5th Gurkha Rifles and 7 2 n d Highlanders, 2 D e c e m b e r I 878. T h e Gurkhas advance w i t h yatagan bayonets fixed t o their Sniders while t h e Highlander in t h e foreground carries t h e n e w e r M a r t i n i - H e n r y rifle. (National A r m y Museum)

PART II

The Second Anglo-Afghan War, I 878-8 I

Origins and background of the war B y t h e 1 8 6 0 s , w i t h its d e f e a t a t t h e h a n d s o f

W i t h i n t h r e e years h e h a d i m p o s e d a treaty

Britain, France a n d Turkey i n the

o n the A m i r of Bokhara b y w h i c h

Crimean

Samarkand

W a r ( 1 8 5 3 - 5 6 ) n o w squarely b e h i n d it,

f e l l u n d e r R u s s i a n c o n t r o l a n d free passage

Russia w a s free t o c o n t i n u e e x p a n s i o n i n

w a s o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h a t state. F u r t h e r

C e n t r a l Asia. T h e p o t e n t i a l threat to British

t o t h e west, t h e Russians b u i l t a base at

I n d i a w a s u s e d as a p o s s i b l e b a r g a i n i n g

K r a s n o v o d s k o n t h e eastern shores of t h e

chip i n negotiations over such questions

Caspian, squeezing Khiva between their

as n a v a l access t h r o u g h t h e B o s p h o r u s

possessions o n b o t h sides. P r e d i c t a b l y ,

and

Dardanelles, a point denied t h e m under the

t h e Russians t o o k t h e city, i n 1 8 7 3 , w i t h

T r e a t y o f Paris o f 1 8 5 6 . E v e n if t h e Russians

K h o k a n d f o l l o w i n g t h r e e years later, t o be

never seriously c o n t e m p l a t e d a n i n v a s i o n of

converted into a n e w province by the name

I n d i a - a n d n o s t r o n g e v i d e n c e for t h i s exists

o f F e r g a n a . T h u s , i n less t h a n t w o d e c a d e s

- there r e m a i n e d the possibility of a Russian-

t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n Russia's C e n t r a l A s i a n

inspired revolt along the North-West

possessions a n d British I n d i a h a d decreased

Frontier

a n d w i t h i n I n d i a itself: t h e s a m e spectre t h a t

f r o m 1,000 miles to a mere 4 0 0 miles,

h a d inspired Britain to war in 1839

inspiring the n e w governor of Fergana,

and

w h i c h w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o exercise successive

G e n e r a l M i k h a i l S k o b o l e v , t o g o so f a r as t o

g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e Press a n d t h e p u b l i c a l i k e

p r o p o s e t o h i s s u p e r i o r s i n St P e t e r s b u r g a

for t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e 1 9 t h century.

three-pronged invasion of India

W h e n the Crimean War ended the

originating

f r o m K r a s n o v o d s k , S a m a r k a n d a n d Kashgar.

Russian threat to Afghanistan - a n d , b y

Q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , Russia's g r a d u a l a d v a n c e s

extension - to India, was m i n i m a l . Indeed,

s o u t h t h r o u g h C e n t r a l Asia d i d n o t go

a t h o u s a n d miles separated Peshawar

u n n o t i c e d b y British authorities either i n

from

t h e closest Russian o u t p o s t s i n C e n t r a l Asia,

L o n d o n o r C a l c u t t a . A s e a r l y as t h e 1 8 6 0 s ,

situated at t h e n o r t h e r n ends of t h e

J o h n J a c o b , C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r S i n d (a r e g i o n

Caspian

a n d t h e A r a l Seas. L y i n g b e t w e e n B r i t i s h a n d

a n n e x e d t o British I n d i a b y force i n 1 8 4 3 ) ,

Russian possessions s t o o d b a r r e n p l a i n s ,

h a d suggested a p e r m a n e n t British presence

desert wastes, t h e H i n d u K u s h a n d o t h e r

i n Q u e t t a , b e y o n d t h e B o l a n Pass, e n a b l i n g

f o r m i d a b l e n a t u r a l obstacles, n o t t o

t r o o p s t o t h r e a t e n t h e f l a n k a n d rear of a n

mention

various khanates w h o w o u l d contest a n y

e n e m y s e e k i n g t o e n t e r t h e K h y b e r Pass.

Russian p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o their d o m a i n s .

Yet this advice w e n t i g n o r e d u n t i l 1 8 7 6 .

Nevertheless, f r o m t h e 1 8 6 0 s t h e Russians

Some in the Indian government

began a cautious advance d o w n the line

the establishment of a l i m i t e d protectorate

suggested

o f t h e S i r - D a r y a R i v e r f r o m t h e A r a l Sea,

status for A f g h a n i s t a n , w h i c h since t h e d e a t h

justified i n 1 8 6 4 b y t h e Russian Foreign

of Dost M o h a m e d i n 1863 h a d been ruled b y

M i n i s t e r , P r i n c e G o r c h a k o v , as n e c e s s a r y

his son, Sher A l i K h a n . Such a scheme w o u l d

to subdue hostile tribes o n t h e Empire's

enable British troops to control Kandahar

southern frontiers. This advance led to the

a n d Herat. But this did n o t appeal to

capture of Tashkent i n 1865 a n d the creation

successive g o v e r n m e n t s i n L o n d o n , w h i c h

of a n e w province, Turkestan, w i t h a n e w

p r e f e r r e d t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Russia r a t h e r

governor, General Konstantin

t h a n c o n f r o n t it, for t h e r e w a s m u c h to be

Kauffmann,

w h o was n o t i n c l i n e d to slow his country's

commended in an understanding by which

s e e m i n g l y irresistible a d v a n c e s o u t h w a r d s .

b o t h n a t i o n s ' A s i a n possessions w e r e

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

5I

t h e H i n d u Kush or e v e n t h e line of t h e O x u s River - a fantastic n o t i o n t h a t required m o r e t h a n k e e p i n g a w a t c h f u l eye o v e r Sher Ali's intentions, but controlling h i m

outright.

W h e n the A m i r politely declined Lytton's o v e r t u r e s for t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f close relations w i t h British I n d i a , officials i n C a l c u t t a felt all t h e m o r e strongly persuaded t h a t force of arms m i g h t be required t o p r e v e n t t h e Russians f r o m o b t a i n i n g s o m e sort o f f o o t h o l d i n A f g h a n i s t a n . Anglo-Russian tensions were heightened i n 1 8 7 7 b y the Russo-Turkish War. D u r i n g t h a t c o n f l i c t , t h e Tsar's t r o o p s m a d e progress i n t h e i r m a r c h o n

considerable

Constantinople,

w h o s e capture w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e Russians w i t h u n r e s t r i c t e d access t o t h e e a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n - t h e p r i n c i p a l cause of t h e C r i m e a n W a r , a n d n o w m o r e sensitive still for British interests since t h e o p e n i n g of t h e Suez C a n a l i n 1 8 6 9 . B r i t a i n h a d n o t g o n e t o w a r w i t h Russia 2 0 years b e f o r e t o p r o t e c t The advance guard o f t h e Anglo-Indian army on

T u r k e y o n l y t o see C o n s t a n t i n o p l e f a l l t o t h e

the frontier w i t h Afghanistan, N o v e m b e r 1878.

Tsar's f o r c e s a n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n

(Author's collection)

opened

t o t h e R u s s i a n B l a c k Sea F l e e t . N o r w a s t h e Russian threat pure fantasy: a division of

separated f r o m o n e a n o t h e r b y n e u t r a l buffer

1 5 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s established itself i n t h e area

states. I n a n y e v e n t , a n a g r e e m e n t o f

between the Oxus and the H i n d u Kush.

1873

s e e m e d d e s t i n e d t o satisfy b o t h parties b y

Yet t h e r e w e r e i n fact n o p l a n s t o d r i v e i n t o

r e c o g n i z i n g A f g h a n i s t a n as f a l l i n g w i t h i n

A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d t h e Tsar c o u l d n o t h a v e

Britain's sphere o f i n f l u e n c e , w i t h Russia

deployed substantial n u m b e r s of troops i n

e n j o y i n g t h e s a m e status r e s p e c t i n g B o k h a r a .

the country while simultaneously

A change of ministry i n L o n d o n i n

1874,

engaging

the Turks hundreds of miles to t h e west.

however, altered matters. B e n j a m i n Disraeli,

Nevertheless, w i t h Russian i n t e n t i o n s

leading the n e w Conservative

u n c e r t a i n a n d t h e fall of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e

government,

eyed Russian advances i n C e n t r a l Asia

possible if n o t i m m i n e n t , Disraeli d i s p a t c h e d

w i t h considerably m o r e suspicion t h a n his

a fleet t o t h e Dardanelles a n d troops t o M a l t a .

predecessors. H i s n e w Secretary of State for I n d i a , L o r d Salisbury, w h i l e n o t

anticipating

a Russian i n v a s i o n , also r e m a i n e d

anxious

U n l i k e the Russo-Turkish conflict that began in 1853 and widened to include Britain a n d France, the Russo-Turkish W a r of

about indirect influence, specifically w i t h

1 8 7 7 - 7 8 did n o t draw i n other belligerents.

respect t o A f g h a n i s t a n . Salisbury

H o w e v e r , w h e n Russia, p r o f i t i n g b y its

appointed

L o r d L y t t o n as V i c e r o y o f I n d i a ( t h e n e w

successes i n t h e f i e l d , s o u g h t t o n e g o t i a t e

designation for t h e f o r m e r post of G o v e r n o r -

terms w i t h Turkey f r o m a position of

General, w h i c h was abolished

considerable strength, Britain a n d various

immediately

after t h e M u t i n y a l o n g w i t h t h e E I C ) ,

o t h e r G r e a t P o w e r s t h r e a t e n e d w a r t o redress

i n s t r u c t i n g h i m t o keep Sher A l i clear of

t h e b a l a n c e unless Russia a g r e e d t o n e g o t i a t e

Russian i n f l u e n c e . L y t t o n , p e r c e i v i n g d a n g e r

more lenient terms w i t h the Ottomans.

w h e r e n o n e existed, d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e key

Congress of Berlin, c o n v e n e d i n m i d - 1 8 78,

The

to k e e p i n g t h e Russians at b a y l a y i n h o l d i n g

b r o u g h t a n e n d t o t h e crisis a n d o b l i g e d

52

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier in the 19th century R U S S I A N C E N T R A L ASIA Kyzyl Kum Desert

r

^ - W

K

u/r

Kara Kum

E

S

T

*

ashgar

Gj=okTep?t\ Mazar-iSharif

w

•I-ISH

AFGHTurkestan AN P

E

R

S

A

rat )

/

^

*

AN

*

,

W

O fKhyberPoss °? .OA Jaa la lbad_ Q T OGhazni . Peshawar"*tR \•awalpindi AFGHANISTAN ^ ^

A

CHINA

^

KabUlU

(

KASHMIR

I

0

er Kandahar y> PUNJAB, % Ocharnan S-dey ^ J FerozepoA nd , Quetu Aoera ^ D » T _ — " V - BotonPoss Ghazi \ V* ^^ Kaa ltO X * KHA" DelhiK F

<,

Helrn0

(

^

BALUCHISTAN

V

^>

C NEPAL '" H 1

>

N

ARABIAN

SEA

Russian forces t o w i t h d r a w b o t h f r o m

t h a t Russia w a s s e e k i n g t o m a n i p u l a t e

T u r k e y ' s E u r o p e a n p o s s e s s i o n s as w e l l as

A f g h a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n d e e d , t h e last a n d

f r o m t h e borders of Afghanistan. But British

most important point in w h a t a m o u n t e d to

a p p r e h e n s i o n s w e r e f a r f r o m a l l a y e d . E v e n as

a n u l t i m a t u m clearly, t h o u g h n o t explicitly,

t h e C o n g r e s s w a s b e g i n n i n g its p r o c e e d i n g s

r e f e r r e d t o Russia:

i n G e r m a n y , a Russian d i p l o m a t i c mission under General Nikolai Stolietov appeared,

1. T h e reception of British missions i n

w i t h o u t i n v i t a t i o n , i n K a b u l . Sher A l i , w h o

Kabul whenever the Indian

h a d carefully avoided e n t a n g l e m e n t

d e e m e d it necessary.

with

e i t h e r B r i t a i n o r Russia, w a s p l a c e d i n a n

Government

2. T h e establishment of a p e r m a n e n t

i n v i d i o u s p o s i t i o n , for h e h a d just refused

British m i l i t a r y mission at Herat; a n d

the dispatch of a British mission f r o m India.

p o s s i b l y B a l k h a n d K a n d a h a r as w e l l .

T h e A m i r stalled before b e i n g rescued f r o m

3 . T h e n e e d t o seek B r i t i s h a p p r o v a l

a n u n w a n t e d a g r e e m e n t w i t h Russia

before negotiating w i t h a n y other

b y S t o l i e t o v ' s r e c a l l b y St P e t e r s b u r g ,

country.

a consequence of changing circumstances brought about i n Berlin. Nevertheless, Lytton was furious to

R e f u s i n g t o i g n o r e Sher Ali's failure t o reply, L y t t o n w a r n e d h i m t h a t a refusal t o receive

discover t h e presence of a Russian e n v o y i n

a B r i t i s h m i s s i o n w o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a n

Kabul. H e repeated his d e m a n d , approved

u n f r i e n d l y act, o n e t h a t m i g h t oblige British

b y P a r l i a m e n t o n 14 August - e v e n after

I n d i a t o d i s a v o w its t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s t o

Stolietov's departure - t h a t t h e A f g h a n

Afghanistan. Accordingly, he dispatched

g o v e r n m e n t m u s t receive a British mission,

Sir N e v i l l e C h a m b e r l a i n w h o , o n r e a c h i n g

w h o s e p u r p o s e w a s t o g a i n Sher Ali's

J a m r u d a t t h e h e a d o f t h e K h y b e r Pass o n

agreement to t h e f o l l o w i n g terms, all of

2 1 September w i t h a British mission, was

w h i c h s t e m m e d f r o m a n erroneous belief

b l u n t l y i n f o r m e d that his advance w o u l d

T h e Second A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

53

be opposed b y force. C h a m b e r l a i n ' s m i s s i o n ,

stating t h a t h e m u s t agree b y t h e 2 0 t h t o

a m e r e escort a n d h e a v i l y

receive a British d i p l o m a t i c mission i n Kabul,

outnumbered

b y t h e A f g h a n force sent t o m e e t it, d u l y

barring w h i c h troops w o u l d invade his

declined to proceed, signalling to the Viceroy

d o m a i n s . Such a prospect appeared entirely

t h a t e v e n i n g t h a t t h e d i e h a d b e e n cast:

r e m o t e , f o r S h e r A l i , as C h a m b e r l a i n

T h e first act h a s b e e n p l a y e d o u t ; a n d I d o

a m u s i n g l y p u t it, ' h a d n o m o r e

not think that any impartial looker-on can

of apologizing t h a n of t u r n i n g

consider a n y o t h e r course has b e e n left o p e n

a n d a p p l y i n g for a Bishopric'. I n desperation,

t o us c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d i g n i t y t h a n t o o p e n l y

Sher A l i s o u g h t m i l i t a r y assistance f r o m

intention Christian

break w i t h the Amir.' Lytton concurred: a n y

Kauffmann, but by the time he had

c o n t i n u a t i o n o n Sher Ali's p a r t t o refuse t o

back, the u l t i m a t u m h a d expired a n d

accept a British mission, w h i l e

A n g l o - I n d i a n t r o o p s w e r e a l r e a d y across

welcoming

heard

i n t o t h e capital a Russian envoy, h e

the frontier, leaving the Afghans

with

e x p l a i n e d t o t h e Secretary of State for I n d i a ,

n o prospect of military aid f r o m

General

'has d e p r i v e d t h e A m i r of all c l a i m u p o n

Kauffmann, w h o informed the Amir

our further forbearance' a n d must

n o n e c o u l d b e o f f e r e d w h i l e t h e passes

inevitably

that

require a mission's installation i n Kabul b y

through the H i n d u Kush were blocked

British troops.

w i t h snow. T h e A m i r panicked, fleeing

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g Stolietov's w i t h d r a w a l

n o r t h to o p e n direct contact w i t h the

f r o m Kabul - a n d thus the removal of a n y

Russians a n d a p p o i n t i n g his son,

casus belli

Y a k u b K h a n , as r e g e n t , w h i l e a t d a w n

- a n d divisions of o p i n i o n

his g o v e r n m e n t , t h e Disraeli

within

administration

p e r m i t t e d L y t t o n a strong degree of latitude i n dealing w i t h Sher A l i . Accordingly,

troops

crossed t h e frontier.

on

2 N o v e m b e r t h e V i c e r o y sent t h e A m i r an ultimatum, demanding an apology

on 21 November Anglo-Indian

N C O s o f t h e 8th (The King's) Regiment o f Foot during and

t h e Second Afghan W a r (National A r m y Museum)

Warring sides

Following the Indian M u t i n y (1857-58), the

As c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e p u b l i c ' s suspicious

forces o f t h e E I C w e r e d i s b a n d e d a n d t h e i r

a n d c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s its soldiers at

regiments absorbed i n t o the regular British

t h e b e g i n n i n g of Victoria's reign - b y w h i c h

A r m y or the n e w l y created I n d i a n A r m y .

time their high reputation attained under

T h e latter c o n t i n u e d to m a i n t a i n three

t h e D u k e o f W e l l i n g t o n i n S p a i n a n d at

armies based o n the presidencies of Bengal,

W a t e r l o o h a d largely faded - t h e British

B o m b a y a n d M a d r a s , b u t w i t h critical lessons

A r m y h a d b y the t i m e of the Second A f g h a n

applied: improved pay and conditions

in

W a r a c q u i r e d a n e x a l t e d , h e r o i c status. T h i s

Native regiments and the deployment

of

shift w a s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t i n t h e 4 0 years

a m u c h larger n u m b e r of regiments of t h e

since t h e previous c a m p a i g n i n A f g h a n i s t a n ,

British A r m y to India to keep the

the A r m y h a d established a n u n b r o k e n

proportion

record of a c h i e v e m e n t against t h e Sindis,

of B r i t i s h / N a t i v e forces closer t o parity. T h u s , w h e r e a s just prior t o t h e M u t i n y

the

ratio of British to i n d i g e n o u s troops stood at

Baluchis, Sikhs a n d C h i n e s e i n t h e 1840s, t h e Russians a n d I n d i a n m u t i n e e r s i n t h e

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:7, o n t h e e v e o f t h e S e c o n d

1850s, the Burmese, Maoris, Abyssinians

A f g h a n W a r the ratio h a d changed radically

a n d the Chinese again in the 1860s, and the

t o 1:2, w i t h 6 5 , 0 0 0 Q u e e n ' s t r o o p s a n d

A s h a n t i s i n t h e e a r l y 1 8 7 0 s . A l l s u c h feats

1 3 0 , 0 0 0 regular N a t i v e troops i n India, all

w e r e w e l l k n o w n t o large segments of a n

a r m e d w i t h the single-shot, breech-loading,

i n c r e a s i n g l y literate society, w h o s e insatiable

b o l t - a c t i o n M a r t i n i - H e n r y or Snider rifles,

appetite for i m p e r i a l a d v e n t u r e was fuelled

w e a p o n s m u c h m o r e accurate t h a n their s m o o t h b o r e predecessors carried i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n a g e n e r a t i o n earlier.

British infantry advancing swiftly during t h e Second Afghan War.

T h e Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

55

by n e w generations of war correspondents. T h e t y p i c a l r a n k e r , k n o w n s e n t i m e n t a l l y as T o m m y A t k i n s ' , w a s p o r t r a y e d as s t a l w a r t , i n d o m i t a b l e a n d brave b e y o n d his E u r o p e a n counterparts, the noble defender of Empire a n d propagator of W e s t e r n 'civilization'. If p e r h a p s c r u d e a n d u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , h e stood above all 'savage' o p p o n e n t s , w h o s e superiority lay o n l y i n their n u m b e r ,

though

at t i m e s e v e n m a n y Britons confessed t o a grudging a d m i r a t i o n for their courage.

Many

c o n t e m p o r a r i e s e x t o l l e d their o w n soldiers' virtues i n song, poetry a n d

hagiographic

n o v e l s a n d n e w s p a p e r r e p o r t s . As o n e officer observed:

F r o m close c o n t a c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h soldier, a n d a p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e e x t e n d i n g over m a n y years, I c a n h o n e s t l y say t h a t s o m e o f t h e g r a n d e s t q u a l i t i e s w h i c h go to m a k e a n o b l e character i n m a n , I h a v e seen over a n d over a g a i n e x e m p l i f i e d i n h i m , w h o [is] so u n s h a k e n i n d i s c i p l i n e , so p a t i e n t i n s u f f e r i n g ,

Major-General Sir Charles N a p i e r pursuing tribal forces

so r e a d y f o r a n y s a c r i f i c e o r s e r v i c e i n

in Sind during his conquest o f t h e region in I 843.

t h e cause o f Q u e e n a n d c o u n t r y !

I n t h e i r first c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h , t h e

(Author's collection)

h a u l e d t h e m o u n t a i n g u n s so e s s e n t i a l f o r

Afghans maintained n o standing army,

o p e r a t i o n s i n a r e g i o n w i t h scarcely a n y

relying entirely o n the

roads designed for w h e e l e d transport.

spontaneous

gathering of local militias a n d disparate

T h e artillery, o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of

groups of m o u n t a i n tribesmen. By t h e t i m e

whose guns were rifled a n d breech-loading,

of t h e second war, Sher Ali h a d established

was nevertheless t h o u g h t t h e best a r m of

a regular force e s t i m a t e d at 6 2 r e g i m e n t s

t h e service, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v a r y i n g age

of infantry totalling some 3 7 , 0 0 0 m e n ,

of t h e o r d n a n c e it b r o u g h t i n t o t h e field,

16 regiments of cavalry a n d 4 9 batteries

a n d it p e r f o r m e d w e l l i n t h e course of t h e

of artillery, p r i n c i p a l l y d e p l o y e d i n a n d

c o n f l i c t . W h i l e British a n d I n d i a n forces

a r o u n d t h e m a i n cities o f K a b u l , K a n d a h a r

o n the subcontinent exceeded 200,000,

and Herat. T h e infantry e m p l o y e d a n array

o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of this impressive

o f f i r e a r m s , s o m e as o u t d a t e d as t h e o l d

figure c o u l d be e m p l o y e d o n f o r e i g n service;

B r o w n Bess f r o m t h e N a p o l e o n i c e r a , w h i l e

thus, t h e three c o l u m n s f o r m e d for t h e

others carried t h e latest Sniders a n d Enfields

invasion totalled only 29,000 m e n

supplied, ironically, b y Britain before t h e war.

1 4 0 g u n s - a n d y e t still c o n s t i t u t e d

A r t i l l e r y batteries c o n t a i n e d six h o r s e - d r a w n

t h e largest force t o serve o u t s i d e I n d i a

guns, w h i l e elephants, m u l e s or bullocks

until

1914.

and

The fightin

U n l i k e t h e disastrous i n v a s i o n of n e a r l y

Frederick Roberts, to proceed f r o m K o h a t

4 0 years before, t h e i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n

t h r o u g h the K u r r a m Valley, over the Peiwar

i n N o v e m b e r 1878 was to be conducted via

K o t a l t o t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass, a n d f i n a l l y

three routes, a n d w i t h a different

t h e 5 0 r e m a i n i n g miles to Kabul. Finally,

objective

i n v i e w : t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f r o n t i e r areas

i n t h e s o u t h , t h e K a n d a h a r Field Force

a n d the destruction of the Amir's army,

of 12,800 troops a n d 78 guns under

rather t h a n his r e m o v a l f r o m power.

The

t h r e e r o u t e s o f i n v a s i o n w e r e as f o l l o w s . I n the n o r t h , a c o l u m n of 10,000

men

of t h e Peshawar V a l l e y Field Force u n d e r M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir S a m u e l B r o w n e ,

moving

f r o m Peshawar to Jalalabad via the

Khyber

M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir D o n a l d S t e w a r t , to advance f r o m Quetta to Kandahar. I n total, the three columns

numbered

some 2 9 , 0 0 0 troops a n d 140 guns. W h i l e Stewart reached Kandahar

on

8 J a n u a r y 1 8 7 9 after a n u n o p p o s e d m a r c h ,

Pass. I n t h e c e n t r e , t h e K u r r a m V a l l e y F i e l d

the two other columns met

Force, a s m a l l c o l u m n of 6 , 6 0 0 m e n

f r o m b o t h A f g h a n regulars a n d t r i b e s m e n ,

18 guns under 46-year-old

and

Major-General

opposition

t h e latter of w h o m , consisting m a i n l y of Afridis a n d M o h m a n d s , p l a g u e d t h e lines of

Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts. O n e o f t h e greatest

c o m m u n i c a t i o n as t h e m a i n f o r c e s e x t e n d e d

Victorian c o m m a n d e r s , he w o n t h e Victoria Cross during

i n t o Afghanistan, obliging the British to

t h e Indian Mutiny before taking p a r t in several m i n o r campaigns in Africa. As commander-in-chief during t h e Second Afghan W a n he achieved fame f o r a series o f stunning victories and an epic march f r o m Kabul t o Kandahar

(Author's collection)

d e p l o y a reserve d i v i s i o n to o c c u p y their a t t e n t i o n . Roberts, a V i c t o r i a Cross h o l d e r f r o m t h e M u t i n y d e s c r i b e d as ' a d i m i n u t i v e , red-faced, bandy-legged gamecock

with

t h e b e a r i n g of a l i g h t n i n g rod', f o u n d his progress h e l d u p b y A f g h a n regulars. T h e y were well ensconced i n prepared positions, w i t h artillery i n support, o n the

summit

o f a r i d g e o v e r l o o k i n g a n a r r o w pass at t h e P e i w a r K o t a l , a h i l l 9 , 0 0 0 f t a b o v e sea level covered i n cedar pines. W i t h t h e 5,000 Afghans under Karim

Khan

enjoying b o t h numerical superiority and a c o m m a n d i n g position above the valley in w h i c h Roberts was situated, a frontal attack was out of the question. After

reconnoitring

t h e area, h e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a difficult t h o u g h not impossible route u p a valley to t h e right w o u l d place his troops o n the A f g h a n s ' e x t r e m e left, theoretically

enabling

Roberts to attack t h e e n e m y i n t h e flank. A c c o r d i n g l y , as a r u s e h e l e f t a s m a l l f o r c e of t w o battalions of infantry a n d t w o squadrons of cavalry to his front proceeded by night up the

and

snow-covered

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

track o n 1 December, t a k i n g w i t h

him

57

off their o p p o n e n t s westwards f r o m their

sangar

a force of 2 , 2 5 0 m e n , consisting of

first

Highlanders, Gurkhas, t w o battalions

c o m p a n y o f H i g h l a n d e r s , c a r r i e d o n t o seize

of Punjab Infantry, a pioneer battalion,

a second entrenchment, followed

a m o u n t a i n battery and four guns f r o m the

7.30am by a vital third, w h i c h

Royal Horse Artillery m o u n t e d o n elephants.

t h e h e a d o f t h e pass. H a v i n g t a k e n t h e

and, in conjunction with a

around

commanded

To protect themselves f r o m t h e bitter cold,

Spingwal Kotal, Roberts t h e n

for t h e first t i m e t h e soldiers w o r e p u t t e e s ,

the c a m p 2,500ft below, ordering a frontal

heliographed

o r leg b a n d a g e s , a f e a t u r e o f m i l i t a r y dress

attack w h i l e h e h i m s e l f c o n t i n u e d to force

t h e r e a f t e r so w e l l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

back the Afghan line, notwithstanding

imperial

the

troops. T h e A f g h a n defenders consisted

difficult, precipitous, heavily forested a n d

of eight regiments of regular

broken ground which not only

infantry

hindered

a n d 18 guns m o u n t e d i n carefully

movement, but rendered c o m m a n d

prepared entrenchments.

control difficult to m a i n t a i n .

A m i d s t frosty conditions t h e

column

and

By t h e early a f t e r n o o n , Roberts' force

s t r u g g l e d u p t h e steep h i l l s i d e , m a k i n g its

w a s n e a r l y u p o n t h e A f g h a n rear, w h i l e

w a y gingerly a n d surreptitiously

o n e British a n d one Punjabi battalion were

around

b o u l d e r s a n d across s t r e a m s , w i t h b a g g a g e

advancing u p the Peiwar Kotal f r o m the

mules frequently losing their footing o n

valley, w i t h guns of t h e Royal Horse Artillery

t h e loose shale. D e l a y occurred

when

shelling the A f g h a n camp, causing camels

Roberts altered t h e order of m a r c h , b u t

to stampede, tents to burst into flame

w h e n d a w n broke o n the 2 n d the

drivers a n d c a m p guards to p a n i c a n d flee.

Gurkhas

and

a n d 7 2 n d H i g h l a n d e r s s t o o d at t h e base

W i t h their line of retreat threatened, t h e

of the Spingwal Kotal, w h e r e t h e Afghans

Afghans a b a n d o n e d 18 guns a n d dispersed,

observed t h e m . I m m e d i a t e l y the

w i t h Bengali cavalry i n pursuit.

Gurkhas

began to ascend the m o u n t a i n s i d e ,

driving

Amongst

t h e spoils of war, t h e v i c t o r i o u s t r o o p s

The battle of Peiwar Kotal, 2 December 1878

58

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

British infantry and pioneers advancing against a stockade

d e s c e n t t h r o u g h its r u g g e d f e a t u r e s y e t t o

on t h e ridge n o r t h o f t h e main Afghan position o n t h e

come, but w i t h the route to Kabul n o w open.

Peiwar Kotal, 2 D e c e m b e r 1878. A c o u n t r y blessed w i t h

W i t h n o m e a n s of d e f e n d i n g his capital, Sher

topographical advantages accruing heavily t o its defence, A l i issued a n a p p e a l for m i l i t a r y assistance

Afghanistan consists o f m o r e than merely bleak and sun-baked valleys and precipices, as t h e w o o d e d

f r o m the Russian d i p l o m a t i c delegation,

mountainside depicted here attests.

b u t K a u f f m a n n refused to be d r a w n i n t o hostilities a n d , i n a n y event, observed that s n o w n o w b l o c k e d t h e passes t h r o u g h t h e

discovered a d o c u m e n t , t h o u g h t to be issued b y Sher A l i , calling for

jihad.

'Wage a

H i n d u Kush. T h e Amir, h e therefore advised,

h o l y w a r o n behalf of G o d a n d his Prophet,

o u g h t t o accept w h a t t e r m s h e c o u l d secure.

w i t h y o u r p r o p e r t y a n d y o u r l i v e s / it r a n .

N o t c o n t e n t w i t h K a u f f m a n n ' s refusal to

'Let t h e rich e q u i p t h e poor. Let all die for

h e l p , Sher Ali left K a b u l w i t h t h e Russian

t h e h o l y cause. A f o r e i g n n a t i o n , w i t h o u t

mission o n 13 D e c e m b e r a n d proceeded

cause or t h e slightest p r o v o c a t i o n , has

to Russian-occupied Turkestan w i t h the

m a d e u p its m i n d t o i n v a d e o u r c o u n t r y c o n q u e r it

and

A n d t h u s far, t h e i n v a s i o n w a s

succeeding; Roberts' v i c t o r y at Peiwar

Kotal

i n t e n t i o n o f c o n t i n u i n g o n t o St P e t e r s b u r g , still h o p e f u l h e c o u l d m a i n t a i n his t h r o n e i f t h e T s a r w o u l d p l e a d h i s case b e f o r e t h e

established w h a t was to b e c o m e a brilliant

Congress of Berlin. T h e A m i r duly reached

m i l i t a r y career, for at great risk t o his force

Tashkent, b u t n o further, for he h a d yet to

h e h a d m a n a g e d to drive off a n u m e r i c a l l y

receive a p p r o v a l for t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of his

superior o p p o n e n t f r o m a strongly

j o u r n e y i n t o Russia p r o p e r .

defended

p o s i t i o n , at a cost t o his o w n force of o n l y 2 0 officers a n d m e n killed a n d 7 8 w o u n d e d . Roberts c o n t i n u e d to advance

through

M e a n w h i l e , the second c o l u m n , Browne's P e s h a w a r V a l l e y Field Force, e n t e r e d t h e K h y b e r Pass a n d m a r c h e d as f a r as t h e

e n e m y country, a n d b y 9 December was

formidable fort of Ali Masjid, w h i c h the

r e c o n n o i t r i n g a satisfactory route to t h e t o p

A f g h a n s u n d e r Faiz M o h a m e d h e l d w i t h

o f t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass, w i t h a d a n g e r o u s

3 , 0 0 0 regular infantry, 2 0 0 cavalry a n d

T h e Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

General Sir Samuel Browne, commanding t h e Peshawar Valley Field Force, enters Jalalabad, 20 September I 878. (Author's collection)

59

All three columns were n o w deep inside A f g h a n territory, w i t h the K u r r a m

and

P e s h a w a r f i e l d forces r e g u l a r l y i n c o n t a c t w i t h tribesmen contesting their presence.

artillery m o u n t e d i n smaller

fortifications

Still, t h e w a r a p p e a r e d , e v e n at this early

o n b o t h flanks. T h e w h o l e force was situated

stage, close t o a c o n c l u s i o n , for o n Sher Ali's

o n a hill 500ft above a gorge, a n d

withdrawal f r o m Kabul to Turkestan, Yakub

supported

b y 6 0 0 t r i b e s m e n i n t h e hills o n e i t h e r side

K h a n , h i s s o n , h a d a s s u m e d p o w e r as r e g e n t ,

of t h e m a i n position. B r o w n e , expecting to

a n d shortly thereafter Sher A l i d i e d . I n

be b l o c k e d at this j u n c t u r e , h a d d i s p a t c h e d

February 1879, Yakub K h a n , u n w i l l i n g to

one brigade o n a flanking m a r c h t h r o u g h the

carry o n resistance a n d d i s m a y e d b y British

mountains n o r t h of the Khyber to re-emerge

p e n e t r a t i o n s as f a r as S h u t a g a r d a n

behind the Afghans, while a second brigade

G a n d a m a k w i t h Kabul their ultimate

and

ascended the hills to c o n f r o n t t h e enemy's

o b j e c t i v e , o f f e r e d t o discuss t e r m s . L y t t o n

left a n d a t h i r d m o v e d u p for a f r o n t a l

m a i n t a i n e d a l o w o p i n i o n of Yakub K h a n ,

assault. T h i s last b r i g a d e , c o n s i s t i n g o f

d e s c r i b i n g h i m as ' a v e r y s l i p p e r y c u s t o m e r

t h e 81st, t h e 1 4 t h Sikhs a n d o n e

w h o m w e shall be w e l l r i d o f if h e

Punjabi

regiment, attacked o n 2 1 November,

but

disappears'. M a n y factors, h o w e v e r ,

failed to penetrate the defences, obliging

suggested t h e w i s d o m of peace at this

B r o w n e to halt his offensive b y s u n d o w n .

m o m e n t : the a r m y was suffering badly

The Afghans, meanwhile, o n discovering the

a n outbreak of cholera; the c a m p a i g n was

attempt to turn their position and fearing

p r o v i n g e x t r e m e l y costly; P a r l i a m e n t was

encirclement, quietly withdrew further up

h a u n t e d b y the possibility of a second

t h e pass, w h e r e t h e y c a m e i n t o c o n t a c t

disaster i n A f g h a n i s t a n ; a n d L i b e r a l

with

from

British a n d Sikh troops w h o r o u n d e d u p

opposition MPs under Gladstone were

m a n y o f t h e m as p r i s o n e r s , m a k i n g p o s s i b l e

gaining increasing support against Disraeli.

Browne's progress t o Jalalabad.

L y t t o n felt h i m s e l f constrained t o negotiate.

60

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

T h e f o r t at Ali Masjid during t h e Second Afghan W a r

o f s i x lakhs o f r u p p e e s a n d t h e p r o m i s e o f Anglo-Indian protection from external aggression - a t h i n l y veiled reference to

M a j o r Sir L o u i s C a v a g n a r i , L y t t o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d B r o w n e ' s p o l i t i c a l officer,

Persia, b u t a b o v e a l l t o Russia, t h e p r i m a r y

sent a s t a t e m e n t o n 7 M a r c h detailing t h e

threat i n t h e 'Great G a m e ' . T w o of t h e field

essential p r e l i m i n a r y basis u p o n

forces, t h e Peshawar V a l l e y a n d

which

Kandahar,

b o t h w r a c k e d b y cholera, w o u l d be

t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s m u s t rest:

withdrawn, the former immediately

and

1. T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n b y the A m i r of

t h e l a t t e r as s o o n as c l i m a t i c

authority over the Khyber a n d

p e r m i t t e d . Roberts' c o l u m n w o u l d , however,

Michni

conditions

remain in the Kurram.

Passes a n d t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t r i b e s . 2 . P i s h i n , S i b i , a n d t h e K u r r a m V a l l e y as

T h e circumstances confronting the

f a r as t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass t o r e m a i n

i n v a d i n g forces s t r o n g l y d i c t a t e d t h e British

u n d e r British protection a n d control.

decision for peace. T h e h a r d s h i p suffered b y

3. T h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e

Browne's troops, for instance, was acute,

Afghan

government's external relations i n

w i t h t e m p e r a t u r e s i n J u n e a b o v e 110°F, a n d

c o n f o r m i t y w i t h British advice

dust a n d thirst o n l y a d d i n g t o t h e trials of

and

c h o l e r a . As t h e O f f i c i a l H i s t o r y r e c o r d e d :

wishes. 4. P e r m i s s i o n t o station British officers,

. . . e s p e c i a l l y as t h e y m a d e t h e i r f i n a l

w i t h suitable escorts, i n A f g h a n i s t a n .

m a r c h e s , t h e i r distress w a s v e r y O n 26 May, Cavagnari and Yakub

concluded

a treaty at G a n d a m a k , near t h e place w h e r e t h e 4 4 t h h a d m a d e its last s t a n d i n

1842.

British authorities i n India agreed to

a p p a r e n t . T h e i r clothfes] w e r e stiff a n d dirty f r o m the profuse perspiration a n d dust; t h e i r c o u n t e n a n c e s b e t o k e n e d great nervous exhaustion, combined with a

r e c o g n i z e Y a k u b as A m i r , w h o a c c e p t e d t h e

w i l d expression difficult t o describe;

presence of accredited British diplomats

t h e eyes i n j e c t e d , a n d e v e n s u n k e n ,

in

Kabul. T h e treaty ceded the Kurram Valley

a b u r n i n g s k i n , b l a c k w i t h t h e effects

to British I n d i a a n d h a n d e d control of the

of sun a n d dirt; dry tongue; a weak

K h y b e r Pass a n d o f A f g h a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o

voice; a n d a thirst w h i c h n o a m o u n t of

British a u t h o r i t i e s b a c k i n C a l c u t t a . For his

fluids seemed to relieve. M a n y of these

part, Yakub w o u l d receive a n a n n u a l subsidy

m e n staggered rather t h a n m a r c h e d i n t o

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

their tents a n d t h r e w themselves utterly incapable of further

down

6I

Viceroy's s u m m e r residence at Simla, i n northern India:

exertion

u n t i l r e f r e s h e d b y sleep a n d f o o d ... N o r d i d t h e officers appear t o be i n a n y

E m b a s s y [i.e. t h e d i p l o m a t i c

better plight.

entered the city a n d received most

mission]

brilliant reception. Four miles

from

Cavagnari was fluent i n Pashtun, well versed

c i t y sirdars w i t h s o m e c a v a l r y a n d

i n t h e p o l i t i c a l affairs of t h e N o r t h - W e s t

e l e p h a n t s m e t us.

Frontier a n d a c o m p e t e n t officer. H e

now

W e proceeded o n the elephants

two

with

assumed the position of h e a d of the

a large escort of cavalry. O u t s i d e t h e

d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n K a b u l . I n July h e left

city t w o batteries of artillery a n d n i n e

Roberts' headquarters, k e e n to take u p his

regiments of infantry were d r a w n

p o s t a n d o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t t h e f u t u r e - as

c o l u m n ... t h e i r b a n d s p l a y i n g t h e

in

opposed to Roberts, w h o h a d reservations

British N a t i o n a l A n t h e m . Large c r o w d

about the longevity of peace given t h e

assembled a n d was orderly a n d

restlessness o f t h e c o u n t r y .

respectful. A m i r e n q u i r e d after Viceroy's

Cavagnari

p r o c e e d e d w i t h a s m a l l escort of 75 troopers

health and Q u e e n and Royal Family.

a n d 5 0 sepoys

Amir's d e m e a n o u r was most friendly.

of the Corps of Guides, a n

elite I n d i a n m o u n t e d u n i t f r o m t h e N o r t h West Frontier. T h e A m i r h a d p r o m i s e d

him

But circumstances were n o t w h a t

they

safe p a s s a g e o n t h e 6 0 - m i l e j o u r n e y t o K a b u l , where he arrived o n 24 July a n d established

Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, diplomatic representative o f

his residence i n t h e Bala Hissar. A l l a p p e a r e d

t h e Governor-General o f India, Lord Lytton, negotiating

well i n the city a n d Cavagnari was confident t h a t his stay w o u l d be p e a c e f u l a n d t h a t t h e countryside w o u l d r e m a i n quiet,

sentiments

he expressed i n a telegraph message to t h e

w i t h t h e Shinwaris f o r t h e safe conduct o f Anglo-Indian t r o o p s o n t h e road f r o m Dakka t o Lundi Khana during t h e Second Afghan W a r H e joined t h e ranks o f o t h e r British diplomats w h o m e t a sticky end in Central Asia during t h e 19th century. (Author's collection)

62

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

T h e Afghan AminYakub Khan (far left) and Major Cavagnari (to his right) sign t h e Treaty o f Gandamak, 26 May 1879. By all appearances, this agreement ought

nearby, t h e c r o w d of troops arrived e n masse, startling t h e escort w h o fired a shot, u p o n w h i c h t h e A f g h a n s w i t h d r e w to collect their

t o have concluded t h e Second Afghan W a r ; but peace weapons and ammunition.

was fleeting. (Author's collection)

T h e A n g l o - I n d i a n p o s i t i o n at t h e seemed, for there was deep r e s e n t m e n t of

c o m p o u n d n o w stood i n peril. T h e

C a v a g n a r i ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e i n n a t i v e affairs

R e s i d e n c y itself consisted of a h a n d f u l of

a n d the liberality w i t h w h i c h he distributed

small, flat-roofed buildings surrounded o n

f u n d s left tribal leaders w i t h t h e

impression

s e v e r a l sides b y o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s a n d l a c k i n g

t h a t he, a n d n o t Y a k u b K h a n , steered t h e

a n adequate perimeter wall. T h e troops m a d e

tiller of state. Y a k u b , b i t t e r l y resentful,

t h e best t h e y c o u l d of a p o o r situation b y

provoked trouble. W h e n in August

Afghan

f o r t i f y i n g t h e g r o u n d s , w h i l e C a v a g n a r i sent w o r d t o Y a k u b K h a n , r e q u e s t i n g assistance.

troops returning f r o m Herat took u p residence i n c a n t o n m e n t s at Sherpur,

having

T h e A m i r sent his y o u n g son a n d a

mullah,

themselves n o t participated i n the recent

t o g e t h e r w i t h a n escort of A f g h a n cavalry,

campaign a n d therefore not tarred w i t h the

b u t t h e gathering m o b m e r e l y jeered

brush of defeat, t h e y o p e n l y

demonstrated

their r e s e n t m e n t at Cavagnari's presence a n d v o i c e d d i s g r u n t l e m e n t at t h e

government's

failure to pay t h e m i n a t i m e l y fashion.

a n d p e l t e d t h e m w i t h stones. M a t t e r s t u r n e d uglier w h e n the m o b joined the 2,000 A f g h a n troops o n their return, u p o n w h i c h t h e assault c o m m e n c e d .

A r r i v i n g at t h e Bala Hissar early o n t h e

T h e o p p o s i n g sides c o n s i s t e d o f f o u r

m o r n i n g of 3 September to collect their

British a n d 75 I n d i a n soldiers o n t h e o n e

wages - t h r e e m o n t h s i n arrears -

h a n d , a n d thousands of Afghans o n the

they

r e c e i v e d less t h a n e x p e c t e d a n d a n g e r t u r n e d

o t h e r . C a v a g n a r i w a s k i l l e d a t a n e a r l y stage

to fury. W h e n a r u m o u r spread t h a t

in the fighting, followed by two

money

was to be h a d at t h e British Residency

other

officers, b u t L i e u t e n a n t W a l t e r H a m i l t o n

and

T h e Second A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

his G u i d e s c o n t i n u e d resistance f r o m a t o p

Cavagnari's death. M e a n w h i l e , Yakub K h a n ,

t h e roofs a n d b y s a l l y i n g f o r t h o n sorties,

i n a b i d t o m o l l i f y b o t h sides a n d r e m a i n

b a y o n e t s at t h e ready, against t h e crews of

i n power, called for resistance f r o m his

artillery d e p l o y e d against the Residency. I n

o w n people - specifically t h e frontier

d u e c o u r s e t h e A f g h a n s set t h e b u i l d i n g s

Ghilzais - while simultaneously

alight, the n u m b e r of defenders

to t h e British for help. But Roberts was n o t

dwindled

a n d H a m i l t o n d i e d l e a d i n g a n o t h e r sortie. By nightfall o n l y a h a n d f u l of

sepoys

63

appealing

conciliatory, sending envoys back w i t h a

were

stern reply:

left s t a n d i n g , all of w h o m r e p e a t e d l y

and

officers a n d m e n r e m a i n u n b u r i e d or u n c a r e d

s c o r n f u l l y r e j e c t e d calls f o r s u r r e n d e r

and

quarter, appeals h a v i n g b e e n m a d e to

them

b y their co-religionists. T w e l v e hours i n t o

so l o n g as t h e b o d i e s o f t h o s e

for i n Kabul, I d o n o t believe t h e English p e o p l e w i l l ever be satisfied. T h e y w i l l require t h e advance of a British force, a n d

t h e fight, t h e survivors m a d e a f i n a l sortie

t h e a d e q u a t e p u n i s h m e n t of t h e c r i m e ...'

from w h i c h none returned, adding the

Y e t n o s o o n e r h a d R o b e r t s set o f f f o r t h e

defence of t h e Residency, i n w h i c h perhaps

S h u t a g a r d a n Pass o n 3 0 S e p t e m b e r

6 0 0 attackers fell, to t h e m a n y o t h e r heroic

Y a k u b K h a n arrived at his c a m p , expressing

a c t i o n s o f w h i c h t h e V i c t o r i a n e r a is r e p l e t e .

regret for Cavagnari's d e a t h , c l a i m i n g his

than

helplessness at p r e v e n t i n g t h e u p r i s i n g a n d

N o sooner h a d news of t h e action reached I n d i a ( o n 5 September) t h a n orders

a p p l y i n g for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m his o w n

for t h e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m K a n d a h a r w e r e

m u t i n o u s troops w h o m he claimed h a d

c o u n t e r m a n d e d . R o b e r t s set o f f f r o m t h e

deposed h i m . A b o v e all, h e w i s h e d for

S h u t a g a r d a n Pass e n r o u t e t o K a b u l w i t h a

Roberts to halt his advance. To Roberts'

n e w c o l u m n rapidly gathered at K u r r a m

m i n d , the Amir's words constituted

and

k n o w n as t h e K a b u l F i e l d F o r c e , c o n s i s t i n g

nothing

m o r e t h a n a ruse t o ascertain t h e s t r e n g t h

of t w o i n f a n t r y brigades of seven battalions

a n d i n t e n t i o n s of A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a n d

i n total, one brigade of cavalry composed of

pass t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n o n t o h i s o w n v i a t h e

four regiments, a n d four batteries of artillery - i n all 6 , 5 0 0 m e n ready to m a r c h b y 27 September w i t h the a i m of avenging

Sikh t r o o p s in action against Z a i m m u k h t t r i b e s m e n at Zawa, in t h e Kurram Valley, D e c e m b e r 1879. (Author's collection)

64

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s

1839-1919

Theatre of operations during the Second Afghan War, 1878-81

T h e Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

escort. W i t h o u t a n y c o n c l u s i v e p r o o f ,

Herbert Macpherson. W i t h only 4,000

however, Roberts was obliged to a l l o w Yakub

a n d 18 guns, a n d w i t h A f g h a n

t o r e m a i n , a n d t h e c o l u m n d u l y set o f f ,

c o n t i n u a l l y rising, Roberts h a d to m a k e

t h o u g h the shortage of transport prevented

a d e c i s i o n : i m m e d i a t e assault.

Roberts f r o m m o v i n g m o r e t h a n o n e brigade at a t i m e .

65

men

strength

At d a w n , Roberts h a d sent f o r w a r d a force to reconnoitre the defile, but the Afghans

I n t h e event, Roberts' suspicions p r o v e d

h a d r e s p o n d e d b y p o s i t i o n i n g a large force

well f o u n d e d , for intelligence soon reached

o n e i t h e r side o f it. Roberts

h i m t h a t at least 13 r e g i m e n t s o f A f g h a n

chose to p i n the e n e m y i n that position,

consequently

regulars w e r e c o n c e n t r a t i n g a l o n g a r a n g e

sending the brigade under T h o m a s

of hills at Charasia, 1 2 m i l e s s o u t h of K a b u l .

in an outflanking manoeuvre westwards to

Baker

O u t n u m b e r e d b y four times his o w n

attack the m o r e vulnerable extreme

n u m b e r , Roberts appreciated t h a t h e m u s t

right. W i t h H i g h l a n d e r s at t h e forefront, t h e

c o n f r o n t t h i s f o r c e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e ,

brigade advanced u p the precipitous heights

before reinforcements arrived. W h e n 5 October h e arrived at Charasia,

on

standing

i n t h e t e e t h of serious o p p o s i t i o n

Afghan

from

b o t h A f g h a n regulars a n d t r i b e s m e n . M a j o r

b e f o r e a series o f h i l l s p i e r c e d b y a s i n g l e

Reginald M i t f o r d recorded his impressions

defile, Roberts possessed o n l y his l e a d i n g

of the 9 2 n d o n this occasion:

brigade, w i t h t h e n e x t i n s u p p o r t still a day's m a r c h a w a y . W i t h i n a d e q u a t e

numbers

T h e d a r k g r e e n kilts w e n t u p t h e steep

of troops to take a n d occupy t h e hills before

r o c k y hillside at a f i n e rate t h o u g h

sunset, h e d e c i d e d t o force his w a y

w o u l d occasionally d r o p a n d roll several

through

the defile o n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, t h u s adopting the plan he had employed

one

feet d o w n t h e slope, s h o w i n g t h a t t h e with

r a t t l i n g fire k e p t u p b y t h e e n e m y was

s u c h success a t P e i w a r K o t a l . W h e n t h e s u n

n o t a l l s h o w . B o t h sides t o o k

rose, h o w e v e r , h e f o u n d progress i m p o s s i b l e ,

of e v e r y available a t o m of cover, b u t still

for t h e regular A f g h a n troops o c c u p i e d

t h e kilts pressed o n a n d u p , a n d it was

positions above h i m , w h i l e tribesmen were

a l t o g e t h e r as p r e t t y a p i e c e o f L i g h t

a s s e m b l i n g t o attack his c a m p . W o r s e still,

I n f a n t r y d r i l l as c o u l d w e l l b e s e e n .

advantage

a n A f g h a n f o r c e o f u n k n o w n size h a d manoeuvred between himself and the next brigade b e h i n d , u n d e r

Brigadier-General

Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts and his staff inspecting captured artillery at Sherpun outside Kabul, in O c t o b e r 1879.

66

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

The Highlanders were soon joined by

R o b e r t s set a b o u t r o u n d i n g u p t h o s e

Gurkhas and Punjabi infantry, the

responsible for t h e September uprising a n d

combined

f o r c e d i s l o d g i n g t h e d e f e n d e r s as t h e y

t h e d e a t h s o f C a v a g n a r i , his f e l l o w officers

progressed towards t h e s u m m i t

a n d t h e Guides, a stern w a r n i n g of w h i c h

overlooking

the defile. T h e Afghans, perceiving this,

h a d c o m e t w o days after Roberts' arrival

m o v e d troops to their right, o n l y to find

with the following proclamation:

t h e m s e l v e s w e a k e n i n g a n o t h e r sector a n d p e r m i t t i n g British a n d I n d i a n infantry to

T h e force u n d e r m y c o m m a n d has n o w

reach the heights and make contact w i t h the

r e a c h e d K a b u l a n d o c c u p i e d t h e Bala

m e n o f Baker's b r i g a d e . W i t h t w o

regiments

of Highlanders a n d a m i x of Gurkhas

and

Indians pressing i n e x o r a b l y f o r w a r d b y early

Hissar; b u t its a d v a n c e h a s b e e n pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a

afternoon, the Afghans, leaving 12 guns a n d

conspicuous part i n the opposition

several h u n d r e d d e a d o n t h e field, gave w a y

offered. T h e y have, therefore, become

a n d fled, pursued b y light cavalry. W i t h t h e Afghans routed, Roberts entered

rebels against t h e A m i r , a n d h a v e a d d e d to the guilt already incurred by t h e m

in

Kabul, a city of 5 0 , 0 0 0 residents, w i t h o u t

abetting t h e m u r d e r of the British E n v o y

resistance o n 13 October. Y a k u b

a n d his c o m p a n i o n s .

Khan

abdicated, although Lytton could t h i n k o f n o s u i t a b l e successor. U n t i l o n e c o u l d b e

T h e alleged culprits were h a n g e d i n front of

f o u n d , Roberts was ordered to r e m a i n i n t h e

w h a t r e m a i n e d of the Residency a n d , sharing

c o u n t r y i n w h a t t h e A f g h a n s i n t e r p r e t e d as

t h e fate o f t h e G r e a t Bazaar i n 1 8 4 2 , t h e Bala

an indefinite sojourn, notwithstanding a British pledge to leave once a n acceptable ruler could be f o u n d , based o n

consultations

w i t h t h e p r i n c i p a l chiefs. I n t h e m e a n t i m e ,

Execution o f t h e Kotwal o f Kabul on 26 O c t o b e r 1879 in f r o n t o f t h e remains o f t h e British Residency w h e r e Cavagnari, his staff and escort had been killed t h e previous m o n t h . (Author's collection)

T h e Second A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

H i s s a r w a s d e s t r o y e d as a w a r n i n g a g a i n s t

from the Anglo-Indian and

further violence. W i t h winter approaching,

defenders, w h o b y t h e 1 4 t h w e r e safely

Gurkha

t h e troops gathered supplies, fortified t h e

e n s c o n c e d i n S h e r p u r as t h e A f g h a n s

Sherpur c a n t o n m e n t a m i l e north-east

reoccupied Kabul.

of the city a n d built a c c o m m o d a t i o n .

H e r e R o b e r t s sat i n i s o l a t i o n , h i s t e l e g r a p h

T h e p e r i m e t e r m e a s u r e d 4Vz m i l e s i n l e n g t h ,

l i n e s s e v e r e d , t h e h e l i o g r a p h useless o w i n g t o

w i t h a ridge to t h e n o r t h a n d l o o p - h o l e d

cloudy conditions, and while

w a l l s a r o u n d t h e o t h e r t h r e e sides, r e n d e r i n g

were o n the w a y from

reinforcements

Gandamak,

t h e s o u t h a n d west easily defensible b u t

o v e r w h e l m i n g e n e m y n u m b e r s suggested

t h e east w a l l i n c o m p l e t e . T h e a d d i t i o n o f

t h e brigade w o u l d n o t reach t h e besieged

abattis

67

and wire entanglements and the

cantonment. Meanwhile, amongst the

mullahs

p l a c e m e n t of 2 0 pieces of artillery c o m p l e t e d

A f g h a n populace, the fanatical

Roberts' preparations for w i n t e r quarters,

encouraging the flames of revolt, p l a n n i n g a

but w i t h o n l y 7,000 troops, c o m p o s e d of

g e n e r a l assault o n S h e r p u r for t h e 2 3 r d o f t h e

were

5,500 i n f a n t r y (three British, o n e G u r k h a

m o n t h . Roberts h a d intelligence w a r n i n g

a n d five I n d i a n battalions), it was far

of t h e attack; his troops stood at t h e ready,

from adequate.

lining the walls of the c a n t o n m e n t

A n d so i t p r o v e d . I n D e c e m b e r , h o p i n g t o

him

through

t h e n i g h t u n t i l , as a f l a r e e x p l o d e d i n t h e

recover f r o m t h e i r h u m i l i a t i n g reverses a n d

darkness signalling t h e offensive, great hordes

retake Kabul, Afghans b e g a n to gather

m o v e d r a p i d l y across t h e s n o w a g a i n s t t h e

from

p r o v i n c e s across t h e c o u n t r y , e n c o u r a g e d b y their religious leaders' call for a

jihad

the invaders. T h e y concentrated

against

around

Kabul, t h o u s a n d s of w h o s e i n h a b i t a n t s left the city to join their a r m e d

compatriots

poised to attack Roberts' position.

east a n d s o u t h w a l l s , b e a r i n g s c a l i n g l a d d e r s

a n d u r g e d o n b y ghazis. T h e Special C o r r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e

News,

Daily

assigned t o cover t h e c a m p a i g n ,

reported h o w i n the distance 'came a roar of v o i c e s so l o u d a n d m e n a c i n g t h a t i t s e e m e d as

Yet r a t h e r t h a n a w a i t t h e i n e v i t a b l e assault

if a n a r m y 5 0 , 0 0 0 strong w e r e c h a r g i n g d o w n

b y o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s , Roberts t o o k t h e

u p o n our t h i n line of m e n ' . At the opposite

initiative a n d chose to c o n f r o n t t h e separate

e n d of t h e c a n t o n m e n t , British troops f o u n d

e l e m e n t s of his adversaries' forces b e f o r e

t h e m s e l v e s i n v o l v e d i n fierce f i g h t i n g .

they could c o m b i n e a n d destroy

him

t h r o u g h sheer w e i g h t of n u m b e r s .

' S u d d e n l y . . . a r o s e a d i n as i f e v e r y f i e n d i n h e l l h a d b r o k e n loose,' r e m e m b e r e d M i t f o r d .

D e s p i t e a p o s i t i v e start, his p l a n w a s marred b y the failure to a m b u s h the

T h e u n d e r c u r r e n t or base w a s o n e

A f g h a n s to t h e west of t h e city, w h e n

ceaseless r o l l o f m u s k e t r y b r o k e n a t

Brigadier-General D u n h a m Massy failed to

frequent intervals b y the roar of a h e a v y

a d h e r e t o his orders. M a s s y n e a r l y lost his

g u n . A b o v e t h i s rose British cheers a n d

entire force of 3 0 0 troopers a n d f o u r pieces

Sikh war-cries a n s w e r i n g t h e yells of t h e

of horse artillery to t h e 1 0 , 0 0 0 Afghans

M o o l l a h s a n d Ghazis, screams, shrieks,

under M o h a m e d Jan, into w h o m

he

a n d noises of every h i d e o u s d e s c r i p t i o n .

b l u n d e r e d o n 11 December, b u t i n his hasty

A d d to this that the bullets were

retreat t h e four guns w e r e a b a n d o n e d . For

w h i s t l i n g a b o u t us, k n o c k i n g u p t h e

t h e n e x t t h r e e days, severe f i g h t i n g t o o k

stones, s p l i n t e r i n g t h e abattis, a n d t e a r i n g

place, the Afghans d r i v e n f r o m t h e heights

t h r o u g h the e m p t y tents, a n d y o u

t o t h e s o u t h a n d south-west of t h e city. Still,

f o r m a v e r y i n a d e q u a t e idea of t h e scene

w i t h his o p p o n e n t s ' n u m b e r s r a p i d l y rising,

o n w h i c h t h e p e a c e f u l stars l o o k e d d o w n .

may

Roberts realized t h a t h e h a d n o choice b u t t o w i t h d r a w i n t o t h e relative safety of Sherpur.

T h e British regulars h e l d t h e s o u t h w a l l ,

T h e Afghans reacted immediately,

w h i l e P u n j a b i s a n d G u i d e s h e l d t h e east,

swarming

d o w n o n l y to m e e t d e t e r m i n e d resistance

d i s c h a r g i n g a series o f f u s i l l a d e s w i t h a r t i l l e r y

68

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

i n s u p p o r t . D e s p i t e serious casualties suffered

r e m a i n e d t h e issue o f a s u i t a b l e A m i r

i n t h e face of disciplined fire, t h e A f g h a n s

that Yakub K h a n h a d abdicated a n d was

continued w i t h their determined

receiving a pension in India. Abdur

until approximately ten in the

onslaught

now

Rahman,

a n e p h e w of Sher Ali, d i d n o t initially m e e t

morning

w h e n , after a n hour's respite, t h e y r e s u m e d

a n a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d , as f o r t h e p r e v i o u s

t h e i r assault, t h o u g h w i t h

d o z e n years h e h a d b e e n receiving a p e n s i o n

somewhat

d i m i n i s h e d ardour. By 1 . 0 0 p m o n

Christmas

Eve, t h e A f g h a n s h a d g i v e n u p t h e effort

and

f r o m t h e R u s s i a n s as a r e s u l t o f h i s e f f o r t s i n 1 8 6 3 t o secure t h e A m i r s h i p for his f a t h e r

-

were w i t h d r a w i n g rapidly, leaving hundreds

t h e Russians' preference - instead of Sher A l i .

of their n u m b e r strewn a r o u n d the

Yet despite his a p p a r e n t

c a n t o n m e n t . T h e n , t h e gates s w u n g o p e n

A b d u r R a h m a n w a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e best

unacceptability,

a n d lancers, Guides a n d Punjabi light cavalry

available candidate b y Lytton, w h o was

t h u n d e r e d after t h e fleeing Afghans, w h o s e

anxious to w i t h d r a w British troops f r o m

numbers were reckoned to have been

A f g h a n i s t a n as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e l e s t t h e

100,000, against w h i c h the

Anglo-Indians

h a d lost o n l y t h r e e d e a d a n d 3 0 w o u n d e d . T h e f o l l o w i n g day all was quiet, the

enemy

Russians be p r o v o k e d i n t o a n

intervention

of t h e i r o w n , or t h e c o u n t r y dissolve i n t o a state o f a n a r c h y . I n a n y e v e n t t h e r e was

h a v i n g w i t h d r a w n n o t o n l y f r o m t h e city,

g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e w a r at h o m e

b u t t h e h i l l s a n d v i l l a g e s , as w e l l .

t h e L i b e r a l s u n d e r G l a d s t o n e . F i n a l l y , as t h e

W i t h t h e start of 1 8 8 0 , t h e

countryside

grandson of Dost M o h a m e d -

from

considered

a p p e a r e d p e a c e f u l , b u t t h e r e w a s as y e t

b y m a n y t o be t h e greatest recent leader of

n o provision for replacing Yakub K h a n .

A f g h a n i s t a n - A b d u l R a h m a n w a s less l i k e l y

Yet c o l o n i a l officials b a c k i n I n d i a w e r e

t o a p p e a r t o h i s p e o p l e as a m e r e p u p p e t ,

n o t going to repeat the mistake of

1842

installed by a foreign power, a n d enjoying

withdrawal

n o p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . T h e British also s o o n

f r o m Afghanistan w i t h o u t establishing some

f o u n d a g o v e r n o r f o r K a n d a h a r , w h i c h Sir

a n d order the troops' precipitous

reliable f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t ; u n t i l such t i m e , Lytton wrote in October 1879, the

army

would remain:

Jagdalak Pass, January I 880. (Author's collection)

I t h i n k w e should instantly take possession o f t h e a u t h o r i t y w h i c h falls f r o m the h a n d of the A m i r into our and promptly, though

own

provisionally,

e n f o r c e t h a t a u t h o r i t y , so f a r as o u r practical p o w e r of enforcing extends, i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n ... T h e n e x t step w i l l be either to proclaim our

permanent

r e t e n t i o n of t h a t a u t h o r i t y or to transfer it, w i t h v e r y careful a n d copious restrictions, to some of native

Reinforcements under Brigadier-General Gough, bound f o r Kabul, find their path blocked by Afghan forces at the

form

government.

Success o v e r o p p o s i n g forces s p e l l e d t h e e n d of a British scheme originally proposed to d i v i d e A f g h a n i s t a n i n t o separate provinces, a course of a c t i o n predicated o n t h e

notion

t h a t it w o u l d b e easier t o c o n t r o l t h e country's u n r u l y tribes a n d w o u l d a v o i d t h e necessity for a n a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r e

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

69

70

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 19

D o n a l d Stewart re-occupied before

devolving

c o m m a n d to General James Primrose, a n officer i n t h e B o m b a y

O n reaching Kabul i n late April, Stewart l e a r n e d t h a t h e was t o succeed Roberts a n d that the g o v e r n m e n t i n L o n d o n h a d fallen,

Army.

Stewart proceeded n o r t h where he

w i t h a Liberal ministry under Gladstone i n

e n c o u n t e r e d considerable resistance at

office. L y t t o n , w h o s e support for A b d u r

A h m a d Khel, about 2 0 miles west of G h a z n i ,

R a h m a n h a d w a n e d , h a d resigned, to be

b y a strong force of Ghilzais a n d o t h e r tribes,

r e p l a c e d as v i c e r o y b y L o r d R i p o n , w h o

as o n p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s d r i v e n t o a p i t c h

like Stewart c o u l d s u m m o n u p b u t little

of fanaticism b y a c c o m p a n y i n g

mullahs.

e n t h u s i a s m for t h e candidacy of A b d u r

O n 19 April, 3,000 sword-bearing tribesmen

R a h m a n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as s u p p o r t w a s r i s i n g

launched a furious attack o n the Anglo-

w i t h i n A f g h a n i s t a n itself, B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s

I n d i a n centre at A h m a d K h e l , w i t h cavalry

gradually decided t h a t h e should rule the

s w a r m i n g o n the flanks i n a bid to reach

country and duly proclaimed h i m Amir on

t h e rear of Stewart's line, f o r m e d i n haste.

2 2 J u l y . H a r d l y h a d a w e e k p a s s e d , a n d as

' D o w n they came,'

troops w e r e o n t h e verge of l e a v i n g K a b u l for

Lieutenant-Colonel

E. F. C h a p m a n r e c a l l e d , ' q u i t e r e g a r d l e s s

t h e return m a r c h to India, t h a n news arrived

o f o u r fire ... t h e w h o l e h i l l s e e m e d t o

o f t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n of Primrose's B o m b a y

be m o v i n g . ' T h e 5 9 t h Foot was nearly

d i v i s i o n a n d t h e siege o f K a n d a h a r , 3 2 0 m i l e s

overwhelmed, but managed to hold o n until

south-west of Kabul, b y 7,500 well-equipped

a b a t t a l i o n of G u r k h a s a n d a n o t h e r of Sikhs,

D u r a n i t r i b e s m e n u n d e r t h e fiercely anti-

w i t h strong artillery i n support a n d aided b y

British p r i n c e , A y u b K h a n . H e p l a n n e d , after

a Punjabi cavalry charge, steadied t h e line.

t h e fall o f t h e city, t o eject t h e r e m a i n i n g

After b r i n g i n g i n his reserves, Stewart h e l d

British troops f r o m t h e c o u n t r y b y m e a n s of a

o n , t h e savage f i g h t c o n t i n u i n g for a f u r t h e r

popular revolt a n d assume the t h r o n e himself.

t w o hours before the Afghans retired. Stewart entered G h a z n i w i t h o u t firing a shot o n the

T h e troops i n question were those of Brigadier-General George Burrows, w h o

on

21st, a n d t w o days later left 4 0 0 d e a d a n d w o u n d e d t r i b e s m e n o n t h e field at A r z u ,

Indian cavalry charging at t h e battle o f Maiwand, 27 July

s e v e n m i l e s t o t h e south-east, at a cost t o

1880.

himself of o n l y t w o dead a n d eight

Crimea, British t r o o p s relied heavily on indigenous

- t h e stark result w h e n

wounded

sword-armed

Like all Victorian campaigns apart f r o m t h e

and o t h e r non-European contingents t o s u p p o r t t h e m in Afghanistan, especially Indians f r o m Bengal and o t h e r

assailants m e t w e l l - t r a i n e d , d i s c i p l i n e d , r i f l e d - a r m e d regulars i n o p e n country.

regions, Sikhs f r o m t h e Punjab and Gurkhas f r o m Nepal. (National A r m y Museum)

T h e Second A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

7I

14 July was d i s p a t c h e d f r o m K a n d a h a r t o support t h e W a l i of K a n d a h a r i n t h e area a r o u n d t h e H e l m a n d River i n t h e south of the country. By t h a t t i m e , Ayub's army, w h i c h h a d b e e n able to assemble w i t h o u t interference i n distant Herat, h a d substantial progress t o w a r d s t h e

made Helmand

before Burrows h a d even got underway. Burrows' force consisted of a n i n f a n t r y brigade containing one Queen's regiment ( t h e 6 6 t h ) , t h e 1st a n d 3 0 t h

Bombay

I n f a n t r y , o n e b a t t e r y (six g u n s ) o f R o y a l Horse Artillery, a c o m p a n y of sappers a n d t w o B o m b a y cavalry regiments. W h e n

the

British a r r i v e d at t h e H e l m a n d , i n sight of the Wali's e n c a m p m e n t , the Afghans

simply

decamped, abandoning Burrows w i t h a scratch force of o n l y 2 , 7 0 0 m e n , 8 0 m i l e s f r o m t h e nearest support, w h i l e A y u b was g r o w i n g h o u r l y i n strength t h r o u g h Fighting back-to-back, soldiers o f t h e 66th Foot t r i b e s m e n f l o c k i n g t o his cause, t o g e t h e r w i t h e l e m e n t s of t h e Wali's deserters.

make their last stand at Maiwand, 27 July 1880. (Author's collection)

Burrows, aware that he h a d to defend the approaches to Kandahar,

however

g r o u n d for a w h i l e , b u t his cavalry refused to

sepoy

i n a d e q u a t e his force, w i t h d r e w to

charge. W h e n o n e of his i n e x p e r i e n c e d

Khusk-i-Nakhud, 35 miles back, w h e r e

r e g i m e n t s b e g a n to falter u n d e r t h e pressure,

he was instructed to prevent A y u b

from

another gave w a y altogether, causing a panic

circumventing Kandahar i n a n effort to

t h a t left t h e I n d i a n troops m i n g l i n g a m i d s t

take G h a z n i w h i l e e n route for Kabul.

t h e 6 6 t h , w h i c h w i t h its r a n k s d i s t u r b e d

Despite efforts t h r o u g h reconnaissance t o

c o u l d n o longer offer regular fire against

ascertain t h e location of Ayub's m a i n body,

their attackers. T h e single available British

Burrows r e m a i n e d i g n o r a n t of his enemy's

b a t t e r y f o u g h t as l o n g as i t c o u l d u n t i l i t w a s

dispositions, apart f r o m receiving intelligence

obliged to limber u p to avoid capture, a n d

o n 2 6 July that local tribesmen h e l d the

the 66th managed to withdraw

village of M a i w a n d , 13 miles to t h e n o r t h -

towards t h e buildings for w h a t little cover

gradually

east o f h i s p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n . I n t e n d i n g t o t a k e

t h e y offered. There, together w i t h a h a n d f u l

the village a n d block Ayub's p r e s u m e d line of

of I n d i a n soldiers, t h e r e g i m e n t f o u g h t u n t i l

advance, Burrows discovered o n his a p p r o a c h

a n n i h i l a t e d . B u r r o w s ' losses n u m b e r e d

the following day that Ayub h a d already

1,100 dead, w i t h a few survivors reaching

arrived w i t h t h e w h o l e of his force, consisting

K a n d a h a r after a d r e a d f u l retreat. As i n d i c a t e d

of b e t w e e n 1 5 , 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 , 0 0 0 regulars a n d

earlier, A y u b f o l l o w e d u p his v i c t o r y b y

tribesmen, supported b y 3 0 guns. Burrows

l a y i n g siege t o t h e c i t a d e l o f K a n d a h a r ,

failed t o m a k e best use o f a v a i l a b l e g r o u n d ,

garrisoned b y t h e r e m a i n d e r of Primrose's

d e p l o y i n g his forces i n l i n e i n a n e x p o s e d

force, 5 , 0 0 0 m e n a n d 13 guns -

p o s i t i o n i n s t e a d o f m a k i n g use o f n e a r b y

c e r t a i n l y e n o u g h , w i t h t h e a d e q u a t e stocks

buildings a n d a

nullah

(small ravine). Matters

were desperate f r o m t h e outset, for t h e Afghans had the advantage in b o t h

numbers

almost

of f o o d a n d a m m u n i t i o n at their disposal, t o w i t h s t a n d a s t o r m . S t i l l , as a n a d d e d precaution against the possibility of a n

a n d guns, rendering Burrows' position

A f g h a n rising i n t h e city, P r i m r o s e e x p e l l e d

c o m p l e t e l y hopeless. His m e n h e l d their

the entire p o p u l a t i o n of 15,000 inhabitants.

H o w the war ended

To Roberts - w h o , o w i n g to his popularity,

the day a n d temperatures plunging to

retained senior c o m m a n d of A n g l o - I n d i a n

f r e e z i n g at n i g h t , Roberts' forces carried

forces i n A f g h a n i s t a n - r e s t o r i n g British

o n u n d a u n t e d at a n average rate of

prestige i n I n d i a a n d relieving t h e beleaguered

1 5 m i l e s a d a y , w i t h o u t so m u c h as a l i n e

garrison i n K a n d a h a r required a swift a n d

of c o m m u n i c a t i o n back to Kabul. A n d yet,

decisive b l o w against A y u b K h a n . T h u s , o n

o n 3 1 August, after a forced m a r c h of

11 August, after feverish preparations, Roberts'

3 1 3 miles i n 2 1 days over e x t r e m e l y difficult

field force of 9 , 9 0 0 m e n a n d 18 guns left

terrain - albeit w i t h n o fighting e n route but

Kabul a n d m a d e for K a n d a h a r - a forbidding,

w i t h s e r i o u s losses f r o m s i c k n e s s - h e r e a c h e d

almost impossible m a r c h of m o r e t h a n

K a n d a h a r a n d joined the garrison there.

3 0 0 miles. His force consisted of 12 battalions

A y u b h a d r a i s e d t h e siege a n d t a k e n a

o f i n f a n t r y : t h e 6 0 t h Rifles, t h e 7 2 n d a n d

strong position near Dubba, t w o miles to

9 2 n d Highlanders, plus Sikh, G u r k h a

t h e n o r t h - w e s t o f t h e city. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g

and

Punjab infantry, a cavalry brigade, including

t h e e x h a u s t i o n of his troops a n d his o w n

t h e 9 t h Lancers, m u l e s carrying light

ill-health, Roberts l a u n c h e d a n attack

m o u n t a i n b a t t e r i e s a n d as l i t t l e b a g g a g e

o n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, spearheaded b y a

as p o s s i b l e t o ease t h e s p e e d o f m o v e m e n t .

b a y o n e t assault b y t h e 9 2 n d H i g h l a n d e r s a n d

Roberts' m a r c h w o u l d enter the annals of

2 n d G u r k h a s . T h i s i n f l i c t e d 1 , 2 0 0 casualties

B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y as o n e o f t h e A r m y ' s

a n d d r o v e A y u b ' s forces off i n c o n f u s i o n

g r e a t e s t f e a t s . S t r u g g l i n g across m o u n t a i n s

at a cost t o Roberts o f o n l y 4 0 d e a d a n d

a n d deserts u n d e r a b l i s t e r i n g s u n d u r i n g

228 w o u n d e d - extraordinarily low in return for such a decisive o u t c o m e .

T h e 9 2 n d ( G o r d o n ) Highlanders skirmishing w i t h Afghan t r i b e s m e n during t h e Second Afghan W a r

Indian dollie carriers bearing w o u n d e d t r o o p s through

(Author's collection)

t h e Jagdalak Pass, January I 880. (Author's collection)

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

T h e defeat of A y u b K h a n spelled the e n d of the British proposal for t h e break-up of A f g h a n i s t a n a n d its p a r t i a l o c c u p a t i o n b y A n g l o - I n d i a n forces. I n t h e course of great debate a b o u t t h e possible p e r m a n e n t

73

As a consequence o f a rising o f t h e Afridis o n t h e N o r t h - W e s t Frontier in I 897 which resulted in t h e fall o f t h e Khyber Pass, British authorities in India dispatched General Sir W i l l i a m Lockhart w i t h an expedition t o t h e Tirah Valley, w h e r e 2,000 o f his m e n clashed w i t h t w o - a n d - h a l f times t h e i r n u m b e r o n 20 O c t o b e r at t h e

garrisoning of Kandahar, this scheme was

Dargai Heights, t h e key action o f t h e largest f r o n t i e r

rejected, a n d all British a n d I n d i a n troops

expedition ever m o u n t e d by British forces, involving

evacuated the country. Abdur R a h m a n was

a total o f 35,000 men. W h i l e f o r m i n g up t h e G o r d o n Highlanders f o r attack, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias

left t o rule over his t u r b u l e n t d o m a i n s the treaty concluded w i t h h i m

and

entitled

British I n d i a t o t h e districts of P i s h i n Sibi

declared:'Highlanders! T h e general says t h e position must be taken at all costs.The G o r d o n s will take it!' (Author's collection)

near Quetta, the K u r r a m Valley a n d a p r o t e c t o r s h i p o v e r t h e K h y b e r Pass, h o m e

A f g h a n i n t e r n a l affairs, a n d t h e British

of the t u r b u l e n t Afridis. N o further trouble

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n I n d i a was left to m a n a g e

resulted b e t w e e n A f g h a n i s t a n a n d British

as b e s t i t c o u l d t h e u n r u l y t r i b e s o f t h e

India during Abdur Rahman's period of rule.

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier, w h i c h w h i l e a constant

T h e R u s s i a n s d i d n o t - j u s t as t h e y h a d n o t

r u n n i n g sore p r o v e d a f e r t i l e t r a i n i n g g r o u n d

after t h e First A f g h a n W a r - i n t e r f e r e i n

for British troops well into the 2 0 t h century.

Portrait of a soldier

A r t h u r Male, A r m y chaplain, I 3th Hussars Amongst the m a n y memoirs a n d first-hand

a l a n d r e m o t e f r o m h o m e a n d for a cause o f

accounts o n t h e Second A f g h a n War, that of

w h i c h he was most probably ignorant:

a n obscure A r m y c h a p l a i n n a m e d A r t h u r M a l e provides particularly fine insights i n t o

A n d h o w c o m e s it t h a t I, a m i n i s t e r

t h e c a m p a i g n . A t t a c h e d t o Sir S a m u e l

of religion, should be t h r o w n into

Browne's headquarters, he witnessed various

a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h scenes o f b l o o d a n d

operations f r o m the unusual perspective

c a r n a g e ...? S i m p l y because t h e E n g l i s h n a t i o n , w h e n it sends its g a l l a n t soldiers

of a j u n i o r officer w i t h a n ostensibly n o n c o m b a t a n t role (except

in extremis),

and he

i n t o t h e field, credits t h e m

with

r e m a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r i n close c o n t a c t

something m o r e t h a n mere physical

w i t h the higher echelons of field c o m m a n d .

frames to be kept strong a n d i n good

His e x p l a n a t i o n for his presence w i t h

the

fighting trim. T o m m y Atkins,' while he

A r m y reveals m u c h a b o u t his o p i n i o n of t h e

has a strong a r m t o strike for his c o u n t r y ,

s i m p l e V i c t o r i a n soldier, m a k i n g sacrifices i n

has a h e a r t also t o feel a n d s y m p a t h i s e .

He T h e column under Sir Samuel B r o w n e approaches t h e

is a man,

n o t a m a c h i n e ; a n d has

needs other t h a n those w h i c h can be m e t

seemingly impregnable fortress at Ali Masjid, in t h e

b y the daily m e a t ration, the third of a n

Khyber Pass, 22 N o v e m b e r I 878. (Author's collection)

o u n c e of tea, or e v e n t h e r u m r a t i o n .

Portrait o f a soldier

It w i l l be recalled t h a t w h e n i n late 1 8 7 8 ,

T h e fortress o f Ali Masjid, w h i c h t h e Peshawar Valley

the A m i r failed to answer Lord Lytton's

Field Force, consisting o f t h r e e brigades under Sir Sam

u l t i m a t u m d e m a n d i n g the admission of a

75

Browne, discovered occupied by an enemy force during his advance on Jalalabad in N o v e m b e r 1878. W h i l e a

British d i p l o m a t i c mission to A f g h a n i s t a n , three c o l u m n s of British, I n d i a n a n d

Gurkha

troops crossed t h e frontier, o n e o r i g i n a t i n g

frontal assault failed t o dislodge t h e garrison, Browne's t u r n i n g m o v e m e n t persuaded t h e Afghans t o abandon t h e position w i t h o u t f u r t h e r resistance.

f r o m Peshawar a n d led by M a j o r - G e n e r a l Browne. Browne was a veteran of the Sikh

attack o n Ali M a s j i d . W h e n his c o l u m n ,

Wars a n d h o l d e r of t h e V i c t o r i a Cross, t h e

c o m p o s e d of three brigades of troops,

A r m y ' s greatest d e c o r a t i o n . H e e a r n e d t h e

a p p r o a c h e d t h e fortress, B r o w n e

m e d a l , like Roberts, d u r i n g his service i n t h e

Tytler to m a r c h his brigade over t h e hills

ordered

M u t i n y , w h e r e leading a m o u n t e d irregular

a r o u n d t h e e n e m y ' s r i g h t i n a w i d e arc,

u n i t h e killed i n single c o m b a t a rebel

b r i n g i n g his forces t o t h e rear o f t h e fort.

carrying a standard, i n t h e course of

By this disposition, Tytler w o u l d cut off the

w h i c h h e lost his left a r m - a n d h e n c e his

A f g h a n retreat i n t h e event either t h a t t h e

i n n o v a t i o n , still i n use t o d a y , o f t h e S a m

m a i n attack s h o u l d succeed i n e x p e l l i n g

Browne belt. H e h e l d the a d m i r a t i o n

t h e m or t h a t t h e garrison s h o u l d choose to

and

loyalty of I n d i a n a n d Queen's regiments

a b a n d o n t h e p l a c e as u n t e n a b l e . T y t l e r w a s

alike, a n d troops w e r e prepared to f o l l o w

t o m a r c h as s o o n as d a r k n e s s d e s c e n d e d , so

h i m t o t h e e n d s of t h e E a r t h . B r o w n e ' s first

e n a b l i n g h i m to reach his position b y d a w n .

objective, it w i l l b e recalled, w a s t h e

M e a n w h i l e , M a c p h e r s o n , w i t h his brigade,

mighty

fortress o f A l i M a s j i d i n t h e strategically

was to b e g i n his m a r c h four hours before

i m p o r t a n t rocky gorge w e l l k n o w n i n t h e

d a w n a n d occupy the Shagai Heights,

a n n a l s o f t h e B r i t i s h A r m y : t h e K h y b e r Pass.

o n t h e e n e m y left, t h u s clearing t h e hills

It was i n this peculiar capacity that,

o n Browne's right while Appleyard's brigade

amongst m a n y other reminiscences of his

m a r c h e d a l o n g t h e v a l l e y t o strike t h e

time in Afghanistan, M a l e recorded the

Afghan position.

main

76

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

T h e orders w e r e r a p i d l y c o n v e y e d . Tytler's brigade, consisting of the l / 1 7 t h

;

a regiment

w h i c h h a d s e r v e d i n t h e First A f g h a n W a r , t h e 1st R e g i m e n t o f S i k h s a n d t h e G u i d e s , b e g a n i t s m o v e m e n t as t h e s u n set o v e r t h e h o r i z o n . M a c p h e r s o n ' s b r i g a d e , of Rifles a n d G u r k h a s , m a r c h e d several h o u r s later, w e l l u n d e r the cover of darkness. T h e

following

m o r n i n g , 2 1 N o v e m b e r , just after d a w n , Browne's c o l u m n led b y Appleyard's brigade w i t h its six r e g i m e n t s - f o u r I n d i a n a n d British, together w i t h a m o u n t a i n

two

battery

a n d another of 40-pdrs d r a w n b y elephants

-

entered the Khyber and proceeded towards A l i M a s j i d , as M a l e r e c o r d e d i n h i s m e m o i r s :

T h e g o l d e n glory of the Eastern d a w n f l o o d e d e v e n t h e g l o o m y recesses o f t h e Pass, as t h e m e n , E u r o p e a n a n d n a t i v e , pressed o n , braced u p s o m e w h a t b y t h e k e e n air of t h e early m o r n i n g . Presently, e m e r g i n g f r o m the narrower defile, t h e

Afghan tribesmen, perched behind t h e cover o f a sangor,

s c e n e r y c h a n g e d . O n b o t h sides t h e r e

o r rock-lined redoubt, fire d o w n on enemy troops.

rose a succession of u n d u l a t i n g hills,

(Author's collection)

u n t i l a w a y i n the distance, a m i l e a n d a h a l f o r s o , o n e c o u l d see F o r t A l i M u s j i d

galloped u p into position a n d began shelling

strongly placed o n a rocky plateau, some

t h e guns of t h e fort. But t h e Afghans i n t e n d e d

6 0 0 feet a b o v e t h e b e d of t h e river,

to stand their ground, a n d immediately

w h i c h f l o w e d i n breaks a n d shallows

r e t u r n e d e f f e c t i v e f i r e , as M a l e r e c o r d e d :

along the valley below.

Impregnable

i n d e e d i t s e e m e d , b y its v e r y p o s i t i o n ,

A n d n o w t h e c r a s h o f t h e s h e l l s as t h e y

f r o w n i n g d o w n f r o m b e e t l i n g crags ...

exploded, a n d the constant rattle a n d

It was built of h a r d m u d , faced w i t h

roll of t h e rifle fire m a d e v a l l e y a n d

stone, w i t h n u m e r o u s g u n s . T h e slopes,

m o u n t a i n side alive w i t h

b o t h above a n d lower d o w n , bristled too

r e v e r b e r a t i o n . T h e m e n pressed o n

with

sung ah s [sangars],

a special f o r m of

deafening

w i t h impetuous valour; but the wild

sung ah

A f g h a n defence consisting of strong

defenders of fort a n d

walls of stone, b e h i n d w h i c h dense

n o t h i n g daunted. G u n answered gun,

bodies of m e n took u p position.

Now

a n d again guns were m o u n t e d here too.

were

w h i l e crowds of A f g h a n warriors could be seen r u s h i n g o u t to m a n t h e outer entrenchments, and even streaming

B r o w n e h a l t e d his m e n for a period to a l l o w

over the hillside.

t h e e l e p h a n t b a t t e r y t o r e a c h its p o s i t i o n u p the narrow paths that composed the crude

W i t h the arrival of the elephant battery came

a n d t r e a c h e r o u s r o u t e . A f t e r a b r i e f rest, t h e

t h e hoarse b o o m of t h e 4 0 - p d r s , striking at

bugles s o u n d e d t h e attack, e c h o i n g a l o n g t h e

t h e m u d a n d stone walls of t h e fort, gradually

m o u n t a i n s as t h e 8 1 s t F o o t a n d 1 4 t h S i k h s

silencing the A f g h a n guns a n d creating

p u s h e d f o r w a r d a l i n e o f skirmishers t o clear

gaping holes i n the walls w i t h explosive

t h e e n e m y f r o m t h e hillsides o n their flanks,

s h e l l s . S t i l l , as M a l e a p p r e c i a t e d , t h e m o s t

w h i l e at t h e same t i m e a b a t t e r y of artillery

difficult task was yet a h e a d , for t h e

sangars

Portrait o f a soldier

77

h a d t o b e t a k e n a n d t h e fortress itself s t o r m e d

failure to lay d o w n a d e q u a t e p r e p a r a t o r y fire

if this v i t a l r o u t e t o K a b u l w a s t o b e secured.

to support the infantry. W i t h the

T h e slopes w e r e l i t t e r e d w i t h t h e s e d e f e n c e s ,

of the enemy's defences better appreciated,

all c o n t a i n i n g concealed parties of r i f l e m e n

a battery of horse artillery c a m e forward,

strength

a n d o n e or t w o pieces of artillery. M a l e

clattering over stone a n d river b e d before

w a t c h e d as a C a p t a i n M a c l e a n , l e a d i n g a p a r t y

unlimbering a n d shelling the

of Sikhs r u s h i n g o n e s u c h e n t r e n c h m e n t , fell

A f g h a n s ' fire p r o v e d o v e r w h e l m i n g ,

sangars.

Yet t h e driving

w o u n d e d t o e n e m y fire, t o g e t h e r w i t h seven

off t h e Punjabis a n d Sikhs, d e c a p i t a t i n g a

N C O s a n d 2 0 r a n k - a n d - f i l e as c a s u a l t i e s . L y i n g

g u n n e r , w o u n d i n g several m o r e a n d

injuring

a n u m b e r of horses. A d d i t i o n a l guns

now

at t h e f o o t of a

sangar,

M a c l e a n called for

support, w h i c h arrived i n the f o r m of M a j o r

arrived i n the f o r m of a heavy field battery

H e n r y Birch at t h e h e a d of t h e 2 7 t h Punjabis,

a n d a m o u n t a i n battery, deployed to support

w h o advanced against h e a v y small arms a n d

elements of the 51st Foot w h i c h , guided b y

artillery fire.

t h e i r c o o l - h e a d e d c o l o n e l , crossed a s t r e a m ,

M a l e w a t c h e d as t h e h a i l o f r i f l e f i r e n o w

w h i c h M a l e w a t c h e d w i t h great suspense:

m e t this n e w target w i t h d e v a s t a t i n g effect: O n they went, and began to climb the D o w n w e n t Birch, shot d e a d , his face

slippery hillside i n support of the native

towards t h e foe, a n d r o u n d h i m

troops. For a m o m e n t t h e A f g h a n fire

thickly

fell his m e n . T h e y w a v e r e d ; t h e n fell

s e e m e d c h e c k e d . But ere this f i n a l , a n d ,

back, w i t h t h e r e m n a n t of Sikhs, a n d

perhaps, decisive m o v e m e n t c o u l d be

t h e w o u n d e d M a c l e a n . Birch's s u b a l t e r n ,

developed a n d carried out the

y o u n g Fitzgerald, w o u l d n o t b r o o k that

o f t h e n i g h t d e s c e n d e d , as t h e y d o i n

shadows

his c h i e f s b o d y s h o u l d lie there exposed

Eastern lands, all t o o suddenly, a n d t h e

to the w a n t o n ferocity of the fanatics,

bugles were h e a r d s o u n d i n g t h e 'Retire'.

w h o were used to mutilate w i t h such

E v e n as t h e m e n , P u n j a b i s a n d S i k h s ,

u n n a m e a b l e barbarity. H e called for

fell back u n w i l l i n g l y , t h e Afghans,

volunteers f r o m his o w n Punjabis to

recovering, swept again t h e slope w i t h

b r i n g i n t h e b o d y of t h e i r leader. But

parting volleys, a n d m a n y another was

alas! t h e A f g h a n f i r e still f i e r c e l y s w e p t

a d d e d t o t h e list o f k i l l e d or w o u n d e d .

t h e slope, a n d t h e r e was n o response. T u r n i n g to t h e Sikhs, w h o w e r e

forming

T h e assault h a v i n g failed, a n d w i t h

no

u p again near by, their o n e officer l y i n g

f u r t h e r p r o s p e c t o f success t h a t d a y , A r t h u r

desperately w o u n d e d , he shouted for

M a l e , i n h i s c a p a c i t y as c h a p l a i n ,

some of t h e m to follow h i m ; a n d fifteen

reflected o n the sullen a f t e r m a t h of battle

now

gallant fellows rushed forward to c l i m b

a n d u n d e r t o o k one of the principal, yet

again t h e slope of d e a t h . U p t h e y w e n t ,

m o u r n f u l , duties of that role -

step b y step, o n e a n d a n o t h e r f a l l i n g

f o r c o n d u c t i n g b u r i a l services f o r t h e f a l l e n :

here a n d there. H a l f w a y u p

responsibility

Fitzgerald

was struck, b u t w i t h h e r o i c r e s o l u t i o n

T h e after-scenes of a battle-field are

h e still pressed o n , i n t e n t o n his task

never pleasant. W h e n actual f i g h t i n g has

of rescue. H e r e a c h e d t h e b o d y o f B i r c h ,

ceased, a n d fierce passions are s o m e w h a t

raised it i n his a r m s , w h e n a b u l l e t a g a i n

allayed, m e n have t i m e to pause a n d to

struck h i m , a n d h e fell dead; t h e t w o

t h i n k , a n d t h e n t h e saddest t h o u g h t s

f r i e n d s t h u s side b y side i n t h e sleep

gather i n u p o n one. O n this occasion,

of death, almost w i t h i n t o u c h of t h e

h o w e v e r , t h e r e w a s scarce t i m e f o r

Afghan guns.

m e n t a l rest, o r p a u s e o r t h o u g h t . T h e fierce struggle was t o be r e n e w e d

A l m o s t n o n e of t h e 15 m e n i n v o l v e d i n t h e

at d a w n ; for t h e p o s i t i o n m u s t be ours

assault r e t u r n e d a l i v e - t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f a

at all costs.

78

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

For t h e l i v i n g t h e r e was a m e a l a n d m u c h - n e e d e d sleep; b u t for t h e d e a d t h e i r

t h e i r losses w i t h a s u c c e s s f u l s t o r m , f o r T y t l e r ' s w i d e f l a n k m a r c h h a d succeeded i n occupying

remains h a d to be interred. T h e crew of

the village of Kata Kushta, b e h i n d the Afghan

a battery composed the b o d y of one

position, effectively c u t t i n g off t h e enemy's

of their o w n , f i n d i n g a few coins i n his

line of retreat. O n l e a r n i n g of this, t h e A f g h a n

p o c k e t a n d a l e t t e r f r o m t h e m a n ' s sister,

c o m m a n d e r p a n i c k e d , a b a n d o n e d his guns,

w r i t t e n a m i d the pleasant surrounding of

tents, f o o d a n d o t h e r supplies, a n d m a d e a

the country h o m e , n o w sharing w i t h the

b i d t o w i t h d r a w u n d e r cover of darkness, o n l y

s t r i c k e n soldier t h e c a r n a g e scenes o f t h e

to b l u n d e r straight i n t o positions occupied b y

battle ground, a n d almost, too, the alien

t h e 1 7 t h F o o t , t h e 1st S i k h s , a n d t h e G u i d e s ,

grave. A n d thus o n e a n d a n o t h e r were

w h o h a v i n g r e m a i n e d o n t h e alert t h r o u g h

consigned to t h e quiet resting-place of

t h e n i g h t , s i m p l y r o u n d e d u p large n u m b e r s

m o t h e r earth's b o s o m . A n d t h e l i v i n g

of e n e m y troops, caught utterly unawares a n d

l o o k e d r o u n d f o r s o m e soft s p o t w h e r e

u n a b l e t o m o u n t a d e f e n c e . A n d so i t w a s t h a t

t h e y m i g h t t a k e a l i g h t e r sleep.

M a l e , a c c o m p a n y i n g B r o w n e a n d h i s staff, s t r u g g l e d u p t h e steep slopes a n d e n t e r e d t h e

I n fact, t h e r e was t o be n o f u r t h e r f i g h t i n g t h e

c r u m b l i n g fort, o n w h o s e r a m p a r t s a soldier

f o l l o w i n g day, a n d n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e d e e m

q u i c k l y r a n u p t h e U n i o n Jack.

O p p o s i t e page: A n air raid being conducted by a Handley Page V / 1 5 0 0 on an Afghan position, May 1919.

PART III

The Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919

Origins and background of the war I n the wake of the Second A f g h a n War,

c o n f i d e n c e a n d trust. T h u s w a s it possible,

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces c o n d u c t e d d o z e n s o f

d u r i n g W o r l d W a r I, f o r h i m t o m a i n t a i n

m i n o r operations along the

order over m o s t of the frontier, t h o u g h t w o

North-West

Frontier, m o s t n o t a b l y i n t h e T i r a h Valley,

tribes, t h e M o h m a n d s a n d t h e M a h s u d s , d i d

a r o u n d M a l a k a n d , a n d elsewhere, but

rebel i n 1915; the former were subdued b y a

relations w i t h Afghanistan, t h o u g h

blockade, w h i l e t h e latter were n o t quelled

at t i m e s , r e m a i n e d civil, if n o t

strained

u n t i l t w o years later o w i n g t o t h e d e a r t h of

altogether

disposable troops a l o n g t h e Frontier.

friendly. D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 8 ) , British a n d I n d i a n forces w e r e necessarily

T h u s i t w a s t h a t as R o s s - K e p p e l p r e p a r e d

diverted to the Western Front, Gallipoli,

t o step d o w n f r o m his post i n J a n u a r y 1 9 1 9 ,

Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a ( m o d e r n Iraq).

he confidently informed Lord Chelmsford,

V e r y fortunately for administrators i n India,

the Viceroy, that the frontier was peaceful

however, A n g l o - A f g h a n relations stood o n

w i t h a favourable prospect of a quiet

a f r i e n d l y , e v e n c o o p e r a t i v e , basis.

s u m m e r . Yet his p r e d i c t i o n was f l a w e d , for w i t h t h e r e n e w a l of peace i n Europe a n d the

Such was largely o w i n g to the policy of neutrality helpfully pursued throughout the conflict b y the Amir, Habibulla, to w h o m Sultan of Turkey, a n ally of G e r m a n y ,

the

had

a p p e a l e d as l e a d e r o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d t o join the

jihad

against t h e Allies. T h o u g h

M i d d l e East, H a b i b u l l a h o p e d t o receive f r o m Britain s o m e c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e policy of cooperation he h a d adopted during the c o n f l i c t , n o t least o w i n g t o t h e great d a n g e r i n w h i c h h e h a d placed himself f r o m those

anxious to prevent a joint Turkish-German

s t i l l a n g e r e d b y h i s f a i l u r e t o assist T u r k e y .

mission f r o m appearing in Kabul during the

Specifically, h e s o u g h t t o reassert h i s

w a r , lest h e risk c r i t i c i s m f r o m h i s d o m e s t i c

c o u n t r y ' s r i g h t t o m a n a g e its o w n f o r e i g n

pro-Turkish opponents, Habibulla prevaricated

affairs a n d t h u s rescind o n e of t h e p r i n c i p a l

a n d b l o c k e d requests for a c t i o n against

terms of the treaty that h a d concluded the

B r i t a i n . H e w e n t so f a r as t o b a r t r i b a l l e a d e r s

Second A f g h a n War. T h e viceroy was,

f r o m o p e r a t i n g against British possessions

however, prepared to consider A f g h a n

along the frontier, even w h i l e

mullahs,

h o p i n g to bring Afghanistan into the war o n t h e side o f t h e C e n t r a l P o w e r s , s o u g h t t o raise t h e b a n n e r of revolt a m o n g s t t h e tribes. A n y s u c h r e v o l t w o u l d h a v e c o m e at a critical t i m e , for m u c h of t h e I n d i a n

Army

requests a n d thus A n g l o - A f g h a n

differences

did n o t appear irreconcilable. Yet before talks c o u l d b e g i n , t h e A m i r w a s assassinated i n his t e n t w i t h a rifle shot, t o be succeeded b y his brother, 27-year-old Nasrulla, i n c o n t e n t i o n for the title of

w a s o p e r a t i n g overseas a n d British reverses

A m i r w i t h Habibula's third son, Amanulla.

i n G a l l i p o l i a n d t h e M i d d l e East e m b o l d e n e d

A s g o v e r n o r o f K a b u l , A m a n u l l a h a d access

those p r e a c h i n g resistance t o t h e a u t h o r i t y of

to t h e treasury a n d arsenal of Kabul a n d , w i t h

A n g l o - I n d i a n rule. M u c h of t h e credit for t h e

t h e support of t h e a r m y , h e arrested Nasrulla,

security o f t h e f r o n t i e r also l a y w i t h t h e C h i e f

charged h i m w i t h Habibula's murder a n d

C o m m i s s i o n e r of the N o r t h - W e s t

Frontier

sentenced h i m t o life i m p r i s o n m e n t before

P r o v i n c e , Sir G e o r g e R o s s - K e p p e l , w h o

p r o c l a i m i n g h i m s e l f A m i r o n 2 8 February.

earnestly cared for t h e welfare of t h e Pathans

A m a n u l l a s h a r e d his father's desire t o free

w h o i n h a b i t e d parts of this region, was fluent

Afghanistan of foreign control, a position

in their language a n d enjoyed their full

s h a r e d b y g e n e r a l o p i n i o n across t h e c o u n t r y .

T h e T h i r d A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r 1919

I n ousting f r o m p o w e r his u n c l e a n d o t h e r

81

disputatious factions. W h a t e v e r t h e Amir's

conservative e l e m e n t s i n society, h o w e v e r ,

i n t e n t i o n s , his c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f ,

the n e w A m i r placed himself i n a precarious

M u h a m e d , d r e w u p a p l a n for a n incursion

p o s i t i o n . By A p r i l 1 9 1 9 , it w a s clear t h a t h e

i n t o I n d i a . British authorities h a d arrested

Saleh

h a d to find some m e t h o d of placating b o t h

at Peshawar a n A f g h a n postmaster, w h o s e

t h e conservative a n d progressive e l e m e n t s

papers revealed t h e outbreak to c o m m e n c e

of society i n order t o r e m a i n i n power.

o n 8 May, to coincide w i t h the appearance

M o r e o v e r , as t h e a r m y s u s p e c t e d h i m

of A f g h a n troops i n the N o r t h - W e s t Province.

of c o m p l i c i t y i n his father's m u r d e r ,

T h e u p r i s i n g n e v e r c a m e t o pass, n o t o n l y

A m a n u l l a felt o b l i g e d t o placate t h e troops

o w i n g to t h e authorities w a r n i n g Ross-Keppel

w i t h increased pay, a n d e v e n seriously

beforehand, but by a premature Afghan

c o n t e m p l a t e d a c a m p a i g n to recover Peshawar

crossing of t h e border b y 1 5 0 A f g h a n troops

as a d i s t r a c t i o n t o h i s d o m e s t i c w o e s .

a t t h e w e s t e r n e n d o f t h e K h y b e r Pass f i v e

W h i l e n a t i o n a l i s m c o n t i n u e d o n t h e rise i n

days before t h e p l a n n e d rising. T h i s i n c u r s i o n

A f g h a n i s t a n , so t o o w e r e r u m b l i n g s o f d i s s e n t

resulted i n t h e occupation of t h e village of

in India, where a nascent independence

Bagh, t h e source of t h e w a t e r s u p p l y for t h e

sepoys

o f t h e K h y b e r Rifles s t a t i o n e d

m o v e m e n t h a d s p r o u t e d b e f o r e W o r l d W a r I.

500

Riots b r o k e o u t i n t h e P u n j a b w i t h fatal

o n the nearby Landi Kotal. M u c h of the

consequences, w h e n o n 11 April troops

A f g h a n countryside h a d already responded

under Brigadier-General Rex D y e r fired o n

to t h e Amir's call, a n d t h o u s a n d s of

a crowd i n Amritsar, resulting i n the deaths

tribesmen converged o n Jalalabad,

of 3 7 9 people a n d injuries to another

1,200.

N o f u r t h e r disorder arose, b u t t h e t r a g e d y h a d a p r o f o u n d effect o n I n d i a n p u b l i c o p i n i o n a n d e n c o u r a g e d A m a n u l l a , w h o s e advisers

stimulating the Indian government to order general mobilization. W h i l e the full extent of A f g h a n

intentions

was n o t k n o w n , Ross-Keppel nevertheless

m i s l e d h i m as t o t h e t r u e e x t e n t o f I n d i a n

advised C h e l m s f o r d to eject t h e

dissent, t o c o n d e m n t h e British for w h a t

t r o o p s f r o m B a g h b e f o r e l o c a l tribes rose i n

h e d e s c r i b e d as h e a v y h a n d e d n e s s a g a i n s t a

their support. T h e garrison at L a n d i Kotal

people w h o h a d loyally supported t h e m i n

h a d n o t b e e n fired u p o n , b u t it c o u l d n o t

Afghan

t h e war. M o r e critically, h e expressed support

d e f e n d itself w i t h o u t u r g e n t

for t h e justice of I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations

A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e m a i n seat o f a u t h o r i t y

reinforcement.

a n d , t o p r e v e n t a n y u n r e s t s p i l l i n g across t h e

i n t h e p r o v i n c e , at Peshawar, w h e r e

border, a n n o u n c e d his i n t e n t i o n t o m o v e

of Afridis rioted i n t h e bazaars, h a d to be

mobs

troops u p to the D u r a n d Line, the line of

secured to avert a n y possible insurrection.

demarcation established b e t w e e n British I n d i a

A m e r e b a t t a l i o n w a s a v a i l a b l e t o assist t h e

a n d Afghanistan i n 1893. 'Gird u p your loins,'

I n d i a n s at L a n d i Kotal, a n d o n 7 M a y

h e t o l d t h e tribal chiefs t w o days after

was rapidly transported b y a c o n v o y of

this

Amritsar, 'the t i m e has c o m e . ' A n o t h e r

several d o z e n h e a v y lorries t h r o u g h t h e

jihad w a s u n d e r w a y .

Khyber. O n t h e same day, British authorities

I t is n o t c l e a r i f A m a n u l l a i n t e n d e d t o

closed off Peshawar w i t h a c o r d o n of troops

i n v a d e I n d i a or s i m p l y sought t o b e n e f i t f r o m

a n d police, a n d threatened to d e n y water to

a n y disorder t h a t arose i n t h e P u n j a b , w h e t h e r

t h e city unless t h e ringleaders were

b y t h e d e p l o y m e n t of his o w n troops or

over. T h i s d e m a n d was d u l y m e t a n d t h e

through the instigation of a revolt of the

f o l l o w i n g day Peshawar was out of danger

tribes. W h i c h e v e r o p t i o n h e chose, or if h e

a n d business r e s u m e d i n t h e bazaars. Further

handed

m e r e l y t h r e a t e n e d either course, this p a t e n t l y

British a n d I n d i a n reinforcements were

anti-British stance w o u l d distract a t t e n t i o n

m o v e d u p the Khyber, bringing the

now

f r o m his d o m e s t i c p r o b l e m s , n o t least t h e

of troops at L a n d i K o t a l t o a brigade, u n d e r

strength

religious divisions w i t h i n A f g h a n i s t a n ,

Crocker, a n d o n 9 M a y it a t t a c k e d t h e

a n d consolidate support f r o m otherwise

A f g h a n p o s i t i o n s at B a g h .

Warring sides

T h e A f g h a n s at this t i m e m a i n t a i n e d a

b y territorial units composed of part-time

regular s t a n d i n g force of a p p r o x i m a t e l y

soldiers o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d for t h e defence

5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , o r g a n i z e d i n t o 75 battalions

of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , but w h o had, w h e n

of infantry, 2 1 cavalry regiments a n d m o d e r n pieces of artillery. To

280

supplement

m o b i l i z e d at t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e war, v o l u n t e e r e d for overseas service a n d b e e n

these forces, t h e g o v e r n m e n t i n K a b u l c o u l d

sent to I n d i a to replace regular units w h o

c a l l u p o n as m a n y as 8 0 , 0 0 0

w e r e d e p l o y e d t o t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t or, l a t e r ,

tribesmen

operating i n a n irregular capacity. To oppose

t h e M i d d l e East. M o r a l e w a s l o w : after f o u r

them, the Indian Army maintained

years o f d u l l service i n I n d i a t h e soldiers w e r e

eight

divisions, five i n d e p e n d e n t brigades a n d

anxious to return h o m e and were not keen

three brigades of cavalry, n o t

t o f i g h t t h e A f g h a n s - so m u c h so t h a t

including

Frontier Militias. Formidable t h o u g h

they

many

w e r e i n c l i n e d t o disobey a n y call for active

were in numbers, their quality could n o

d e p l o y m e n t a n d o n l y declined to carry out

longer m a t c h those of the 1914 I n d i a n Army,

their i n t e n t i o n s u p o n t h e direct appeal of the

f o r m a n y o f its best t r o o p s h a d b e e n lost i n

c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f i n I n d i a . If b o t h C r o w n

t h e f i g h t i n g i n F r a n c e a n d t h e M i d d l e East,

a n d I n d i a n A r m y forces suffered f r o m

a n d w i t h m a n y r e g i m e n t s still overseas

deficiencies i n m a n p o w e r a n d morale,

a w a i t i n g d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , those left b e h i n d

c o m p e n s a t i o n could nevertheless be f o u n d

i n I n d i a were c o m p o s e d of green recruits.

i n technology, w i t h m a c h i n e guns, armoured

W i t h respect t o u n i t s of t h e British A r m y , of the 6 1 regiments stationed i n the

cars, r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,

motorized

transport a n d aircraft all used i n t h e war.

s u b c o n t i n e n t i n 1 9 1 4 , all b u t eight i n f a n t r y a n d t w o cavalry regiments h a d b e e n sent

Afghan officers during t h e third Anglo-Afghan W a n 1919.

overseas t o fight. T h e i r places w e r e filled

(Photo by H u l t o n Archive/Getty Images)

"he fightin

W h e n o n 9 M a y Anglo-Indian troops attacked

w e r e t o p l a y a c e n t r a l p a r t i n h i s s t r a t e g y , as h e

t h e A f g h a n positions at Bagh, h a l f t h e

e x p l a i n e d t o C h e l m s f o r d ' s p r i v a t e secretary:

attacking force h a d b e e n d e t a c h e d t o protect the northern flank, leaving insufficient

There will shortly be a big collection

numbers w i t h w h i c h to capture all their

of troops a n d t r i b e s m e n at D a k k a .

o b j e c t i v e s . S t i l l , s o m e success w a s a c h i e v e d

W e c a n use a e r o p l a n e s t o s m a s h u p t h e i r

w h e n t h r e e R o y a l Air Force (RAF) aircraft

e n c a m p m e n t at D a k k a . W e h a v e

l a u n c h e d a raid o n t r i b e s m e n at Dacca, just

four aeroplanes here, a n d a n attack o n

twenty-

over t h e border i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T w o days later

D a k k a a n d possibly o n Jalalabad

the British resumed their attack, this t i m e

t h e air w o u l d n o t o n l y t a k e t h e h e a r t o u t

from

w i t h 18 pieces of artillery a n d 2 2 m a c h i n e

of the Afghans b u t w o u l d give all those

guns covering the lead attack executed b y the

w h o are at present h a l f - h e a r t e d a v e r y

2 n d N o r t h Staffordshires a n d t w o battalions

g o o d excuse for p u l l i n g out.

of the 1 1 t h Gurkhas, w h o forced t h e Afghans back at t h e p o i n t of t h e b a y o n e t . RAF planes s t r a f e d t h e A f g h a n s as t h e y r e t i r e d b a c k o v e r

Capture o f t h e fortress at Spin Baldak by Anglo-Indian t r o o p s during t h e T h i r d Afghan W a r 27 May 19 19. A late

t h e frontier. Ross-Keppel, seeking to ensure

19th century structure situated on t h e road f r o m t h e

that the Afghans did n o t r e n e w their offensive

Bolan Pass t o Kandahar it could n o t withstand m o d e r n

i n t o I n d i a , d e t e r m i n e d u p o n a p u r s u i t as f a r

artillery and aerial b o m b a r d m e n t . In t h e f o r e g r o u n d Sikh

as D a c c a , w h e r e t h e B r i t i s h c a m p f o u n d i t s e l f b o m b a r d e d f r o m a r t i l l e r y a t l o n g r a n g e as w e l l as t h e o b j e c t o f a n i n f a n t r y a t t a c k . A i r c r a f t

crews man a mountain battery, but in reality t h e artillery deployed was field pieces o f t h e Royal A r t i l l e r y . T h e f o r t fell after hand-to-hand fighting b e t w e e n British infantry (background) and Afghan regulars.

84

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

T h e British r e p u l s e d t h e assault a n d

Eustace. B e l i e v i n g t h a t T h a i , at t h e s o u t h e r n

l a u n c h e d a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k t h e f o l l o w i n g day,

e n d of the K u r r a m Valley, appeared the

b u t it was n o t u n t i l 17 M a y t h a t t h e Afghans

likeliest target, h e sent reinforcements,

w i t h d r e w f r o m their positions, leaving their

bringing local strength u p to o n l y 8 0 0 y o u n g

guns behind. Operations

a n d inexperienced I n d i a n troops, w i t h four

nevertheless

continued to be hindered by

unanticipated

unrest d e v e l o p i n g i n t h e rear of t h e British

m o u n t a i n g u n s a n d t w o m o r t a r s . T h e r e also r e m a i n e d the possibility that the Afghans

p o s i t i o n e x t e n d i n g t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r Pass,

w o u l d attack further south, in the upper

h e l d b y t h e K h y b e r Rifles. T h i s i n d i g e n o u s

Tochi Valley, defended b y the N o r t h

force, w h i c h h a d served loyally i n actions

Waziristan M i l i t i a w h o could n o t be

as r e c e n t l y as 1 9 0 8 , b e g a n l o s i n g m e n v i a

expected to h o l d their position without

desertion, a n d w i t h discipline failing a n d

assistance f r o m regular forces, of w h i c h

disaffection g r o w i n g , Ross-Keppel felt

Eustace c o u l d p r o v i d e n o n e . H e therefore

c o m p e l l e d to d i s a r m a n d d i s b a n d t h e corps.

o r d e r e d t h e m i l i t i a posts t o be e v a c u a t e d ,

Moreover, w i t h additional trouble brewing

u p o n w h i c h t h e Wazirs of Tochi rebelled

i n a n d a r o u n d Peshawar, troops were

a n d the Waziris a n d Afridis w i t h i n the

dispatched to observe the situation a n d quell

m i l i t i a deserted or w e r e otherwise

a n y p o t e n t i a l r e v o l t . As a m e a n s o f s t r i k i n g

u n f i t for purpose.

at t h e heart of t h e disaffecting influence, C h e l m s f o r d chose to attack Afghanistan

deemed

M u t i n y arose t h r o u g h o u t t h e area, p a r t i c u l a r l y a r o u n d W a n a , t h e base of t h e

sepoys

itself, a n d o r d e r e d his force t o c o n t i n u e

South Waziristan Militia, where

the advance f r o m Dacca to Jalalabad.

t h e treasury a n d a store of a m m u n i t i o n .

N o sooner w a s this offensive m e a n t t o get

raided

O n l y t h r o u g h the most trying circumstances

u n d e r w a y t h a n circumstances i n the south

w a s t h e c o m m a n d a n t , M a j o r G u y Russell,

t o o k a t u r n for the worse. Together w i t h the

able t o survive his b r e a k - o u t t o safety b y

a t t a c k t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r Pass, t h e A f g h a n s

m o v i n g south w i t h a small c o n t i n g e n t of

h a d p l a n n e d t w o others: one i n the K u r r a m ,

loyal m i l i t i a m e n , suffering u n d e r a terrible

a n d t h e other against Quetta. T h e

British

sun a n d constant attack by tribesmen a n d

sepoys

r e a c t e d f r o m Q u e t t a first, t h o u g h , crossing

rebel

t h e f r o n t i e r a n d c a p t u r i n g t h e fortress of

w i t h a relief force of m i l i t i a f r o m Z h o b .

u n t i l his force m a d e contact

Spin Baldak o n 27 M a y , forestalling a n y

Disaffection h a d proved the u n d o i n g of

further Afghan activity in the south, but

several units, i n c l u d i n g t h e S o u t h Waziristan

where

Militia, w h i c h was disbanded, together

c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r e d less h e a r t e n i n g .

w i t h m u c h o f its n o r t h e r n c o u n t e r p a r t .

I n Khost, west of the K u r r a m Valley,

T h e K h y b e r Rifles also ceased t o exist o n

G e n e r a l N a d i r K h a n , t h e best o f t h e

t h e basis t h a t , w i t h a u t h o r i t y b r o k e n

A f g h a n leaders, led 14 battalions t o t a l l i n g

t h r o u g h o u t Waziristan, British authorities

n o t a f f e c t i n g affairs f u r t h e r n o r t h

3 , 0 0 0 w e l l - e q u i p p e d troops, b u t his

could n o longer rely o n such units,

i n t e n t i o n s were u n k n o w n to his British

d e p e n d e n t u p o n r e c r u i t m e n t of local

counterpart, Brigadier-General

levies, for f r o n t i e r security.

Alexander

down

How the war ended

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e lawlessness g r i p p i n g

a fairly o p e n v a l l e y b e t w e e n steep hills.

Waziristan, British authorities h a d h i g h e r

There was n o w i n d a n d b u t little water,

priorities t h a n restoring order there. N a d i r

a n d as t h e d a y a d v a n c e d t h e s t o n y

K h a n h a d m o v e d a g a i n s t T h a i , l a y i n g siege t o

hillsides b e c a m e a furnace, t h e n a k e d

t h e t o w n o n 2 7 M a y . T h e r e , Eustace suffered

r o c k s t h r o w i n g b a c k t h e s u n so t h a t i t

f r o m a n u m b e r of disadvantages: fewer troops

s e e m e d t o s t r i k e f r o m t h e g r o u n d as

a n d guns t h a n his adversary, a shortage of

f r o m t h e sky.

supplies a n d a n i n e x p e r i e n c e d I n d i a n force, n o n e of w h o m h a d served i n t h e Great War.

D e p l o y i n g his guns against b o t h

A l l t o l d , it was n o t clear if h e c o u l d d e f e n d

b o d i e s , D y e r b e g a n f i r i n g as h e o r d e r e d

t h e place for a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d a n d a n e w

f o r w a r d his i n f a n t r y against t h e A f g h a n s '

enemy

division, m o v i n g f r o m Lahore to Peshawar

s o u t h e r n position. T h e artillery sufficed to

a n d i n t e n d e d for a n advance o n Jalalabad, was

force t h e t r i b e s m e n to w i t h d r a w before a n

directed instead to K u r r a m , w h e r e elements

infantry battle ensued, a n d by the e n d of

were detached to garrison t h e u n d e f e n d e d

t h e d a y T h a i l a y o p e n t o Dyer's forces.

t o w n of Kohat. At t h e same t i m e , a brigade

O n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, 2 June, D y e r

under Dyer was directed to m o v e hastily to

l a u n c h e d a n offensive t o t h e west; b u t at

relieve T h a i . But D y e r was t h e w r o n g m a n for

this p o i n t N a d i r K h a n sent f o r w a r d a n e n v o y

t h e j o b . Plagued b y illness a n d suffering f r o m

bearing a flag of truce a n d requesting a

fatigue, his r e p u t a t i o n has b e e n t a r n i s h e d b y

ceasefire. As his t r o o p s w e r e a l r e a d y f u l l y

t h e Amritsar massacre. M o r e o v e r , his troops,

c o m m i t t e d to the fight, Dyer resumed the

were of uncertain quality: m a d e u p of

attack, b u t before m a k i n g contact t h e Afghans

Territorials k e e n t o d e m o b i l i z e a n d local troops

w i t h d r e w w e s t w a r d s , w i t h a r m o u r e d cars,

of indifferent quality, a l t h o u g h h e d i d have

a i r c r a f t a n d c a v a l r y i n p u r s u i t . B o t h sides

some reliable G u r k h a s a n d Punjabis. H o w e v e r ,

concluded a n armistice o n 3 June. Militarily,

Dyer showed himself capable of inspiring

D y e r h a d f i n i s h e d t h e w a r o n a successful

t h e m , a n d t h o u g h short of food a n d water

note, but the Amritsar incident continued to

a n d s e l d o m t a k i n g rest o n t h e m a r c h u n d e r a

plague h i m . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his insistence

b l a z i n g s u n f r o m Peshawar, his forces c o v e r e d

that he h a d prevented a general insurrection

ground rapidly until they f o u n d b o t h the

i n the Punjab, he was relieved of c o m m a n d

n o r t h e r n a n d s o u t h e r n routes to T h a i blocked.

a n d d i e d a f e w years later i n Britain.

Dyer's biographer recorded t h e situation thus:

T h e peace c o n f e r e n c e o p e n e d at R a w a l p i n d i i n July. T h e A f g h a n s w e r e i n n o

A t T o g h , t h e G e n e r a l addressed his troops,

m o o d to be conciliated, despite t h e fact t h a t

e x h o r t i n g t h e m to m a k e a great effort to

t h e y h a d b e e n evicted f r o m I n d i a n soil. After

rescue t h e i r c o m r a d e s at T h a i . H i s w o r d s

h e a t e d discussions a treaty was

t o u c h e d t h e hearts of t h a t strangely

out a n d signed o n 8 August, w i t h the

assorted force o f v e t e r a n s a n d w a r levies,

Afghans achieving their principal aim: the

P u n j a b i peasants a n d L o n d o n m e n of

r i g h t t o c o n d u c t t h e i r o w n f o r e i g n affairs.

hammered

b u s i n e s s so t h a t t h e y m a r c h e d t o t h e l a s t

B o t h s i d e s r e a f f i r m e d t h e D u r a n d L i n e as t h e

of their strength; some of t h e m d r o p p e d

border, a n d the Afghans m a d e a n

i n their tracks. A t f o u r o'clock i n t h e

p l e d g e n o t t o interfere i n t h e p o l i t i c a l affairs

m o r n i n g o n 3 1 M a y t h e y set o u t a l o n g

of t h e tribes a l o n g t h e N o r t h - W e s t

important

Frontier.

Conclusion and consequences

T h e First Afghan W a n I 8 3 9 - 4 2

o t h e r a s s u r a n c e s t o B r i t a i n a b o u t its

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the reoccupation of Kabul

that could not have been accomplished

b y Pollock's force i n 1 8 4 2 , t h e r e p u t a t i o n of

through

intentions, but n o t h i n g h a d been achieved

B r i t i s h a r m s h a d s u f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y as a

diplomacy.

T h e true e x t e n t of t h e w h o l e disastrous

consequence of Elphinstone's ill-fated retreat

enterprise c a m e t o l i g h t o n l y a year after

t o J a l a l a b a d , r e v e a l i n g t h a t t h e forces o f t h e

E l p h i n s t o n e ' s sacrifice of t h e A r m y of t h e

British A r m y a n d EIC - albeit small i n that

Indus, w h e n Dost M o h a m e d returned to

particular c a m p a i g n - could be overcome.

this t h r o n e , complete w i t h British approval.

W i t h i n t h e C o m p a n y ' s forces t h e m s e l v e s ,

T h e r e h e w o u l d r e m a i n i n p o w e r for t w o

particularly those of the Bengal contingent,

decades, n o t o n l y peacefully inclined

some of the

sepoy

regiments had

performed

indifferently, a n d t h e b o n d s of trust b e t w e e n British officers a n d t h e

sepoys

had palpably

w e a k e n e d . F r o m a political perspective,

t o w a r d s British I n d i a , b u t also u n w i l l i n g t o b o w t o t h e pressure of Russian e x p a n s i o n i s m . M o s t astonishing of all, w h e n t h e R a j f a c e d i t s g r e a t e s t crisis o f a l l

A u c k l a n d ' s p l a n h a d failed. Russian forces

and depended o n non-interference

n e v e r e n t e r e d A f g h a n soil i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r

A f g h a n i s t a n - d u r i n g t h e great m u t i n y that

P e r s i a n a l l i e s , m u c h less t h r e a t e n e d B r i t i s h

was to engulf n o r t h e r n a n d central India

I n d i a v i a t h e B o l a n o r K h y b e r passes; a

between 1857 and 1858 - Dost

consequence n o t of t h e EIC's m i l i t a r y

r e m a i n e d obligingly neutral. His neutrality

presence i n t h e c o u n t r y , n o r of S h a h Shuja's

freed British authorities to divert troops

efforts, b u t of n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r w a y at t h e

from the Punjab which, having only been

Foreign Office i n L o n d o n a n d t h e Russian

a n n e x e d i n 1 8 4 9 after t w o conflicts w i t h

from

Mohamed

F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i n St P e t e r s b u r g . A t g r e a t

Britain, c o u l d w e l l h a v e staged a rebellion,

expense i n life a n d m o n e y , t h e w a r

a n d a l l o w e d t h e m c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e crisis

had

achieved n o t h i n g except to engender

Afghan

hostility towards Britain - specifically British I n d i a . It was exactly t h e reverse of

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m of t h e British

Auckland's i n t e n d e d policy.

p l a n i n t h e First A f g h a n W a r l a y a r o u n d t h e

V i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g h a d b e e n achieved, for even a cursory e x a m i n a t i o n of the

a r o u n d D e l h i a n d i n O u d h , h u n d r e d s of m i l e s t o t h e east.

outcome

of t h e w a r reveals t h a t t h e circumstances

had

h a r d l y c h a n g e d , except for t h e worse, since

fact t h a t t h e principal a i m , t h e

replacement

of a supposedly anti-British A m i r w i t h one favourably inclined towards L o n d o n

and

Calcutta - w h a t m a y n o w be t e r m e d 'regime

A u c k l a n d h a d l a u n c h e d his enterprise i n

change' - p r o v e d entirely unnecessary.

1 8 3 9 . T h e Russians c o n t i n u e d t o m a k e

T w o c e n t r a l issues h a d n o t b e e n p r o p e r l y

territorial gains i n C e n t r a l Asia, a n d t h e

e x a m i n e d w h e n Auckland dispatched the

EIC's a r m i e s h a d t o g e t h e r lost 1 5 , 0 0 0 officers

e x p e d i t i o n : firstly, t h e r e a c t i o n t h a t c o u l d

a n d m e n ( m o s t l y f r o m disease), q u i t e apart

be e x p e c t e d f r o m t h e various A f g h a n tribes,

f r o m m a n y thousands of c a m p followers.

all fiercely i n d e p e n d e n t , to forcibly i m p o s i n g

Fifty t h o u s a n d camels h a d died i n the w a r

o n t h e m a former ruler of Afghanistan w i t h

a n d t h e cost t o t h e Treasury a m o u n t e d t o

a n u n c e r t a i n degree of popularity; a n d

n e a r l y £ 2 0 m i l l i o n . Russia h e l p f u l l y g a v e u p

secondly, a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e prospects of

its c l a i m t o K h i v a a n d p r o v i d e d a n u m b e r

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces r e t a i n i n g c o n t r o l of t h e

of

C o n c l u s i o n and c o n s e q u e n c e s

country, presuming that they could conquer

a m o n t h before his w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e

it i n t h e first p l a c e , itself a v e r y s p e c u l a t i v e

capital, confessed to M a c n a g h t e n t h a t t h e

proposition. These were questions that

w h o l e enterprise h a d been a failure:

exercised c o n t e m p o r a r i e s b u t n o t , a p p a r e n t l y , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , at least

A n d yet, under the most

n o t w i t h sufficient d e p t h . W i t h

events, I w o u l d h a v e y o u share t h e

remarkable

favourable

foresight, M o u n t s t u a r t E l p h i n s t o n e , t h e

f e e l i n g w h i c h is g r o w i n g s t r o n g l y

former governor of B o m b a y w h o h a d b e e n

u p o n m e - that the maintenance

p r o p o s e d as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l i n 1 8 3 5

the position w h i c h we attempted to

but

of

d e c l i n e d it, o u t l i n e d t o a f r i e n d these v e r y

e s t a b l i s h i n A f g h a n i s t a n is n o

points o n the eve of t h e invasion:

to be l o o k e d to, a n d t h a t after our

longer

e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e last t w o w e e k s

[under

... w e h a v e [ n o w ] a s s u m e d t h e p r o t e c t i o n

siege a n d c o n s t a n t a t t a c k ] it m u s t

o f t h e s t a t e [ o f A f g h a n i s t a n ] as m u c h as

t o b e , if n o t i n v a i n , y e t u p o n e v e r y

appear

if it w e r e o n e o f t h e subsidiary allies i n

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r u d e n c e far t o o

India. If y o u send 2 7 , 0 0 0 m e n u p t h e

hazardous a n d costly i n m o n e y a n d i n

B o l a n Pass t o C a n d a h a r (as w e h e a r is

life f o r us t o c o n t i n u e t o w r e s t l e a g a i n s t

intended), a n d can feed t h e m , I h a v e

the universal opinion, national

n o doubt y o u will take C a n d a h a r

r e l i g i o u s , w h i c h h a s b e e n so s u d d e n l y

and

and

C a u b u l a n d set u p [ S h a h ] S o o j a h ; b u t f o r

a n d so s t r o n g l y b r o u g h t i n t o a r r a y

m a i n t a i n i n g h i m i n a poor, cold, strong

against us.

and remote country, a m o n g a turbulent people like t h e A f g h a n s , I o w n it seems

The Indian government made a pathetic

to m e to be hopeless.

attempt to claim victory i n the f o r m of a T h e battle o f Miani, t h e principal engagement o f Sir

I n t h e e v e n t , of course, A n g l o - I n d i a n forces did take Kabul a n d establish S h a h Shuja the throne, but even William

on

Elphinstone,

Charles Napier's conquest o f Sind in 1843, w h e n he defeated t h e Baluchis and annexed t h e i r country, w i t h its capital at Hyderabad. (Author's collection)

87

88

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

p r o c l a m a t i o n issued b y L o r d

Ellenborough

Britain. Dost M o h a m e d was A m i r once again;

at S i m l a o n 1 O c t o b e r 1 8 4 3 , exactly four

S h a h S h u j a w a s d e a d , w i t h his sons i n exile

years after A u c k l a n d h a d issued his o w n

i n India, a n d t h e British were back o n the

proclamation justifying intervention

Sutlej. Total a n d i g n o m i n i o u s failure did not,

in

A f g h a n a f f a i r s . E l l e n b o r o u g h w e n t so f a r as

o n the other h a n d , appear to discomfort

t o r e p u d i a t e A u c k l a n d ' s p o l i c y w h i l e still

B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e least, l e a v i n g s o m e

shamelessly asserting t h a t s o m e g o o d h a d

shockingly similar mistakes to be repeated

emerged f r o m the conflict:

less t h a n f o u r d e c a d e s l a t e r : f i r s t , i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Russian threat h a d receded even

Disasters u n p a r a l l e l e d i n their e x t e n t ,

before the war h a d begun; a n d second, that

unless b y t h e errors i n w h i c h

w h i l e prior to hostilities t h e Afghans were

they

at least n e u t r a l a n d at best f r i e n d l y , at t h e i r

originated, a n d by the treachery in w h i c h they were completed, having in

conclusion t h e y stood justifiably hostile

one short c a m p a i g n been avenged

a n d resentful.

upon

every scene of past m i s f o r t u n e s ; a n d

But p e r h a p s t h e greatest d a m a g e d o n e

repeated victories i n the field, a n d the

t o B r i t a i n as a r e s u l t o f t h e w a r w a s

c a p t u r e o f t h e cities a n d citadels of

psychological rather t h a n political or

G h a z n i a n d Cabul, have again attracted

f i n a n c i a l , a n d t h u s s o m e w h a t defies analysis.

the o p i n i o n of invincibility to the

T h e b l o w m a d e against British prestige c o u l d

British arms.

n o t be entirely e x p u n g e d b y the subsequent

T h e British a r m y i n possession of

v i c t o r i e s a c h i e v e d b y P o l l o c k , N o t t a n d Sale,

Afghanistan will n o w be w i t h d r a w n

a n d inevitably adversely affected morale i n

to the Sutlej. T h e

t h e C o m p a n y ' s a r m i e s w h i c h , at t h e e n d of

Governor-General

w i l l leave it to t h e A f g h a n s themselves

t h e day, r e m a i n e d t h e bedrock of British

t o create a g o v e r n m e n t a m i d s t t h e

power in India. Ellenborough m a y

a n a r c h y w h i c h is t h e

s o u g h t t o u p h o l d I n d i a n n o t i o n s of respect

consequence

have

for their overlords, a n d to boost the Army's

o f t h e i r c r i m e s ... C o n t e n t w i t h the limits nature appears

m o r a l e a n d r e s t o r e its c o n f i d e n c e i n B r i t i s h

t o h a v e a s s i g n e d t o its e m p i r e , t h e

leadership, b u t n o n e of these measures could

g o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w i l l devote all

e n t i r e l y efface t h e m e m o r y of t h e retreat

its e f f o r t s t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

and

f r o m Kabul. O n l y a h a n d f u l of

sepoys -

m a i n t e n a n c e of general peace, to the

p r o b a b l y those w h o deserted ranks i n the

p r o t e c t i o n of t h e sovereigns a n d chiefs,

f i r s t d a y o r t w o - m a d e i t b a c k t o I n d i a as

its allies, a n d t o t h e p r o s p e r i t y

and

h a p p i n e s s o f its o w n f a i t h f u l subjects ... T h e enormous expenditure required f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f a large force i n a false

survivors of t h a t h a r r o w i n g episode, but t h e y b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m accounts of execrable British p l a n n i n g , shockingly

incompetent

leadership a n d instances of cowardice that

m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , a t a d i s t a n c e f r o m its

m u s t h a v e eroded trust a n d w e a k e n e d the

f r o n t i e r a n d its r e s o u r c e s , w i l l n o l o n g e r

bonds that existed b e t w e e n the

arrest e v e r y m e a s u r e for t h e

r a n k - a n d - f i l e a n d t h e i r British officers.

improvement

of the country a n d of the people.

Indian

T h e M u t i n y w a s still 15 years i n t h e f u t u r e , b u t t h e r e is s o m e b a s i s f o r t h e t h e o r y t h a t

I n s u m m a r y , t h e w a r cost vast s u m s o f m o n e y , t h o u g h this w a s scarcely a p p a r e n t i n Britain, for t h e e c o n o m i c b u r d e n h a d fallen almost exclusively o n the shoulders of the I n d i a n r e v e n u e , c r i p p l i n g its f i n a n c e s f o r

t h e first seeds o f t h e r e v o l t w e r e s o w n d u r i n g the fateful year of 1842. H e n r y Lawrence, C h i e f C o m m i s s i o n e r of the Punjab, numbered amongst m a n y w h o

supported

this hypothesis:

years t o c o m e . British i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n h a d left n o c h a n g e except a

A t C a b u l w e lost a n a r m y , a n d w e lost

legacy of mistrust a n d h a t r e d b y Afghans for

some character w i t h the

surrounding

C o n c l u s i o n and c o n s e q u e n c e s

89

states. B u t I h o l d t h a t b y far o u r w o r s t

outside. I n June 1879, i n the wake of the

loss w a s i n t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f o u r N a t i v e

Treaty of G a n d a m a k , w h e n peace seemed to

soldiery. Better h a d it b e e n for o u r f a m e

h a v e b e e n secured for t h e l o n g - t e r m ,

if o u r harassed t r o o p s h a d r u s h e d o n

e x p l a i n e d to C r a n b r o o k precisely these

the e n e m y a n d perished to a m a n , t h a n

hopelessly optimistic a n d naive terms:

Lytton

t h a t s u r v i v i n g Sepoys s h o u l d be able to tell t h e tales t h e y c a n of w h a t t h e y saw

I t h i n k y o u need be u n d e r n o

at C a b u l .

a b o u t t h e satisfactory e x e c u t i o n

E u r o p e a n soldiers a n d officers are

anxiety and

results of t h e K a b u l T r e a t y or a n y

p l a c e d as e x a m p l e s t o N a t i v e t r o o p s , a n d

troubles i n Afghanistan

a g l o r i o u s o n e t h e y h a v e g e n e r a l l y set i n

o n t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f o u r t r o o p s ... T h e

consequent

the field; but w h o can estimate the evil

A f g h a n s w i l l like a n d respect us all t h e

w h e n t h e e x a m p l e is b a d - w h e n i t is

m o r e for t h e t h r a s h i n g w e h a v e g i v e n

not the Hindustani (most exposed to

Sher A l i a n d t h e lesson w e h a v e t a u g h t

c o l d , a n d least able t o bear it) w h o

t o Russia ... T h e A f g h a n p e o p l e c e r t a i n l y

clamours for retreat a n d capitulation,

d o n o t v i e w us w i t h a n y i l l - w i l l .

b u t t h e c r y is r a i s e d b y t h e m e n h e h a s been accustomed to look up to and to

Such views, like those expressed d u r i n g

l e a n u p o n as a s u r e r e s o u r c e i n e v e r y

t h e first war, s m a c k e d o f a d a n g e r o u s

emergent peril.

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the A f g h a n

mentality.

A l t h o u g h f r o m a military p o i n t of view the second war clearly e n d e d o n a higher

note

The Second Afghan War, I 878-8 I

t h a n t h e first, parallels n e v e r t h e l e s s r e m a i n ,

W h i l e British policy h a d originally entailed

t r e a s u r y , q u i t e a p a r t f r o m t h e h u m a n losses

d i v i d i n g A f g h a n i s t a n after t h e defeat of A y u b

- a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 , 0 0 0 d e a t h s f r o m disease

K h a n , this was n o t pursued,

a n d some 1,850 killed i n action or died

n o t least i n t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e w a r resulted i n a severe d r a i n o n t h e

notwithstanding

Indian

some debate about the viability of o c c u p y i n g

o f w o u n d s , w h i l e A f g h a n losses d e f y

K a n d a h a r f o r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d . I n f a c t , as

e s t i m a t i o n . As i n t h e first w a r , t e r r i t o r i a l

n o t e d earlier, all British garrisons w i t h d r e w

concessions f o l l o w e d , w i t h t h e

f r o m t h e c o u n t r y a n d A b d u r R a h m a n was left

i m p o r t a n t K u r r a m V a l l e y a n d K h y b e r Pass

strategically

t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s r u l e across A f g h a n i s t a n ,

given over to British responsibility b y A b d u r

t h o u g h w i t h some territorial concessions

R a h m a n . T h e ostensible cause of t h e s e c o n d

granted to British India, i n c l u d i n g t h e

war, m o r e o v e r - to l i m i t Russian influence

strategically i m p o r t a n t areas o f P i s h i n a n d

i n A f g h a n i s t a n - a g a i n i n its basic t e r m s

Sibi, near Q u e t t a , a n d t h e K u r r a m Valley,

r e s e m b l e d t h e m o t i v e s b e h i n d t h e first a n d ,

together w i t h t h e p o w e r t o oversee t h e Afridi

as b e f o r e , h a d n e v e r m a n i f e s t e d i t s e l f as a

c o u n t r y a r o u n d t h e K h y b e r Pass. R e l a t i o n s

b o n a fide threat.

w i t h Abdur R a h m a n proceeded o n a largely

I f , as i n 1 8 4 2 , A f g h a n r e l a t i o n s w i t h

a m i c a b l e basis i n t h e y e a r s t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e

Britain h a d been soured, they were n o better

S e c o n d A f g h a n W a r , w i t h Russia e x c l u d e d

w i t h t h e Russians, for w h o m A b d u r

f r o m a n y i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e f o r e i g n affairs

e n t e r t a i n e d s t r o n g s u s p i c i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y as

of t h e c o u n t r y , t h o u g h she c o n t i n u e d t o

a result of t h e Russian incursions a l o n g t h e

expand beyond the H i n d u Kush.

northern Afghan border that

As w i t h t h e first c o n f l i c t ,

Indian

Rahman

culminated

i n the a n n e x a t i o n of M e r v i n 1884 a n d the

g o v e r n m e n t officials consistently b e l i e v e d

o c c u p a t i o n of t h e P a n j d e n Oasis a y e a r later.

t h e A f g h a n s w e l l disposed t o at least l i m i t e d

T h e s e e v e n t s p u s h e d B r i t a i n a n d Russia close

British i n f l u e n c e i n A f g h a n affairs a n d , m o r e

to war and emphasized b o t h to the Afghans

remarkably, to leaders i m p o s e d f r o m t h e

a n d t h e British t h e n e e d t o clarify t h e precise

90

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

demarcation of the hitherto vaguely

defined

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier. I n 1 8 9 3 , therefore,

T h e citadel at Kandahar showing t h e main gate, August I 880. (Author's collection)

A b d u r R a h m a n o p e n e d discussions w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t i n Calcutta respecting a

The Third Afghan War, 1919

c o n f e r e n c e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . Sir M o r t i m e r D u r a n d a n d his mission d u l y arrived i n

T h e conclusion of the T h i r d A f g h a n W a r did

K a b u l o n 2 October. After several weeks

n o t e n d troubles for British authorities i n

of discussions, t h e m i s s i o n agreed o n

I n d i a , for t h e f i g h t i n g h a d caused unrest that

13 N o v e m b e r t o raise t h e s u b s i d y t o t h e

c o u l d n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y quelled, especially

A m i r i n r e t u r n for a treaty delineating t h e

in Waziristan, where the trouble deepened.

b o u n d a r y f r o m Chitral to Peshawar

and

T h e d i s b a n d m e n t or break-up of militia units

f r o m there to the p o i n t of juncture

between

i n the N o r t h - W e s t Frontier was naturally

Persia, A f g h a n i s t a n a n d B a l u c h i s t a n .

s e e n b y l o c a l t r i b e s m e n as a n

T h e n e w border, stretching m o r e

to f o m e n t trouble. T h e Mahsuds a n d Wazirs,

than

opportunity

a t h o u s a n d m i l e s , b e c a m e k n o w n as

t h o u g h t r a d i t i o n a l rivals, f o u n d a c o m m o n

t h e D u r a n d Line, a n d t h o u g h it solved

purpose i n exploiting British weakness

the p r o b l e m b e t w e e n British India

and

A f g h a n i s t a n , it n e v e r satisfied t h e various

a n d u n i t i n g a g a i n s t t h e m , m a k i n g use of w e a p o n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n l o o t e d or b r o u g h t

affected tribes w h o c l u n g fiercely to their

t o t h e f i e l d b y deserters f r o m t h e m i l i t i a ,

traditional independence a n d regularly

w h o possessed a degree o f m i l i t a r y

defied Anglo-Indian attempts to put

down

t h e i r revolts, t h e first b e i n g i n C h i t r a l i n

e x p e r i e n c e a n d t r a i n i n g useful t o t h e rebels. T h u s b e g a n years of o p p o s i t i o n to British

early 1 8 9 5 . T h u s , after Britain's second

authority, opposition that was to continue

n e a r l y fruitless conflict w i t h A f g h a n i s t a n ,

well into the 1930s.

I n d i a was left w i t h m a r g i n a l l y greater s e c u r i t y o n its w e s t e r n f r i n g e s , b u t

T h e war was hardly over w h e n , i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 9 , t h e B r i t i s h m a d e t h e i r first

w i t h t h e relentless task of p o l i c i n g

attempt to subdue the insurrection, w i t h

that perennially troubled region, the

M a j o r - G e n e r a l A n d r e w Skeen operating

North-West

against the Tochi Wazirs, w i t h

Frontier.

reasonable

C o n c l u s i o n and c o n s e q u e n c e s

9I

success. B u t t h e M a h s u d s p r o v e d a l t o g e t h e r

c a p a b l e o f f o s t e r i n g - i n s o f a r as is p o s s i b l e

more formidable opponents w h e n , i n early

i n a land of such ethnic diversity a n d

D e c e m b e r , Skeen's largely g r e e n t r o o p s l e d

geographical remoteness - a national identity.

b y i n e x p e r i e n c e d officers failed t o m a k e inroads, a n d it was n o t u n t i l t h e a c t i o n f o u g h t at A h n a i T a n g i t h e

following

year t h a t t h e M a h s u d s suffered grievous

T h e problems faced b y foreign powers b e n t o n direct i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghanistan f o r m e d t h e basis o f a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n

1842

b y a n extraordinarily prescient b u t sadly

losses - 4 , 0 0 0 c a s u a l t i e s a n d t h e b u r n i n g o f

a n o n y m o u s British officer, t h e accuracy o f

their villages. Such injuries persuaded t h e m ,

w h o s e w o r d s o f a d m o n i t i o n a p p l y as a p t l y

for t h e m o m e n t at least, t o cease h o s t i l i t i e s .

t o d a y as t h e y d i d i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f

There followed a British offensive i n

Victoria's reign:

N o v e m b e r 1 9 2 0 against the Wazirs i n t h e area a r o u n d W a n a , w h e r e o p p o s i t i o n ceased

To conquer a d o m i n i o n b y

the following m o n t h a n d the city was

t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f a s t a t e is a f e a s i b l e

controlling

r e t a k e n . M i n o r o p e r a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d as

policy, or to r e f o r m b y gradual m e a n s

e t h n i c A f g h a n raids a n d harassing attacks

w i t h o u t annihilating the institutions of

c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g 1 9 2 1 , w h e n the British

a subjugated c o u n t r y m a y be t h e effect

responded w i t h a n e w policy: the

of t i m e a n d perseverance, b u t to subdue

establishment of a p e r m a n e n t

a n d crush t h e masses of a n a t i o n b y

garrison

of I n d i a n A r m y regulars i n W a z i r i s t a n , i n

m i l i t a r y force, w h e n all are u n a n i m o u s

c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h reconstituted local militias

i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b e f r e e , is t o

(their predecessors h a v i n g b e e n d i s b a n d e d

attempt the i m p r i s o n m e n t of a w h o l e

d u r i n g the T h i r d A f g h a n W a r because of

people: all such projects m u s t be

desertions), w h o w o u l d d e p e n d o n t h e

temporary a n d transient, a n d terminate

support of t h e former.

i n a catastrophe t h a t force has ever to dread f r o m the vigorous, ardent,

* * *

concentrated vengeance of a n a t i o n T a k e n together, if a lesson emerges f r o m t h e

outraged, oppressed a n d insulted,

experiences of t h e three A n g l o - A f g h a n Wars

a n d desperate w i t h t h e b l i n d fury

i t is t h i s : t h a t w h i l e m o d e r n , w e l l - e q u i p p e d

of a d e t e r m i n e d a n d u n a n i m o u s will.

armies can defeat their c o n v e n t i o n a l A f g h a n counterparts, v a n q u i s h i n g their irregular

Since t i m e i m m e m o r i a l , operations i n

compatriots i n t h e countryside presents

Afghanistan have posed i m m e n s e

altogether m o r e c o m p l e x a n d perhaps

t o a n y p o w e r s e e k i n g t o i m p o s e its w i l l o v e r

insoluble military problems. T h e experiences

this seemingly unconquerable region of

of all w o u l d - b e c o n q u e r o r s since a n c i e n t

C e n t r a l Asia, w h e r e t h o u g h

times seem to c o n f i r m this point,

has c h a n g e d o u t of all r e c o g n i t i o n

including

technology

t h e abortive Soviet a t t e m p t at o c c u p a t i o n

t h e V i c t o r i a n era, t h e n a t u r e of t h e

from 1979 to 1989 and N A T O

a n d t h e resoluteness of t h e e n e m y

intervention

challenges

from fighting remains

since 2 0 0 1 . T h e m e r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a

largely u n c h a n g e d today. T h e

g o v e r n m e n t at t h e behest of a foreign p o w e r

f a c i n g N A T O forces t o d a y , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t

challenge

is n o s u b s t i t u t e f o r o n e t h a t e n j o y s b r o a d

rest w i t h t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a p p l y successful

s u p p o r t across t h e c o u n t r y , u n t a i n t e d b y

principles of asymmetric warfare i n the

a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t it serves a f o r e i g n m a s t e r .

field, i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h a f u n d a m e n t a l

T h e ethnic a n d linguistic diversity of the

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e country's social,

c o u n t r y strongly militates against all b u t

economic a n d political infrastructure -

strictly partisan allegiances t o a n y b u t a

challenges of considerably greater

domestically created populist

t h a n those faced b y Britain i n t h e past.

government

all

magnitude

Bibliography and further readin General Dodwell, H.

India,

Small Arms of the East India

H a r d i n g , D . F.

Victoria's Wars ( P e n g u i n , 2 0 0 7 ) H . , e d . , The Cambridge History of

D a v i d , Saul,

( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 3 2 )

Duncan, John & John Walton,

Heroes for

Victoria ( S p e l l m o u n t , 1 9 9 1 ) Farwell, Byron,

Queen Victoria's Little Wars

(London, Harper & Row, 1972)

Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World ( P e n g u i n , 2 0 0 4 ) F o r t e s c u e , J . W . , A History of the British Army ( N a v a l & M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 4 ) H e r n o n , I a n , The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the Nineteenth Century Ferguson, Niall,

(Sutton,

British Empire

The Rise and Fall of the (Abacus, 2 0 0 0 )

M o r r i s , J a m e s , Heaven's

An Imperial Progress

Command: (Penguin, 1979)

Armies, W e a p o n s a n d Uniforms B l a c k m o r e , H o w a r d L. British Military

Firearms, 1650-1850

( G r e e n h i l l Books, 1 9 9 4 )

The British Army on (1): 1816-1853 (Osprey

Barthorp, Michael,

Campaign

Publishing, 1987)

The British Army on (3): 1856-1881 (Osprey

Barthorp, Michael,

Campaign

Publishing, 1988) Beckett, I a n ,

The Victorians at War

(Hambledon and London, Farwell, Byron,

Mr. Kipling's

All the Queen's

2003)

Army:

Men ( W . W . N o r t o n

& Company, 1981)

Khaki & Red: Soldiers of the Queen in India and Africa

Featherstone, D o n a l d ,

( A r m s & A r m o u r Press, 1 9 9 5 )

Victoria's Enemies: An A-Z of British Colonial Warfare

Featherstone, D o n a l d ,

( B l a n d f o r d Press, 1 9 8 9 )

Weapons and of the Victorian Soldier

Featherstone, D o n a l d ,

Equipment

Books,

1660-1856,

4 vols. (Foresight

1997-99)

H a y t h o r n t h w a i t e , P h i l i p , The Colonial

Sourcebook

Wars

(London, Arms & Armour

Press, 1 9 9 5 )

H e a t h c o t e , T. A . , The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922 ( D a v i d & C h a r l e s , 1 9 7 4 ) H o l m e s , R i c h a r d , Redcoat: The British Soldier

in the Age of Horse and Musket (HarperCollins, Holmes, Richard,

2005)

Sahib: The British

Soldier

in India ( H a r p e r C o l l i n s , 2 0 0 1 )

K n i g h t , I a n , Go to Your God Like a Soldier:

2000)

James, Lawrence,

Company,

( B l a n d f o r d Press, 1 9 7 8 )

The British Soldier Fighting for Empire, 1837-1902

( G r e e n h i l l Books, 1 9 9 6 )

M a s o n , P h i l i p , A Matter of

Honour:

The Indian Army, its Officers and Men J o n a t h a n Cape, 1974)

The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda ( S u t t o n , 2 0 0 6 ) S t r a c h a n , H e w , From Waterloo to Balaklava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, Stewart, Jules,

1815-1854

(Cambridge University

Press, 1 9 8 5 )

Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-1854

Strachan, H e w ,

( M a n c h e s t e r U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 5 )

Afghan Wars (general) North-West Frontier/Afghanistan

Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the North-West Frontier ( A b a c u s , 2 0 0 1 ) B a r t h o r p , M i c h a e l , Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947

Allen, Charles,

(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002) Docherty, Paddy,

The Khyber Pass: A History of

Empire and Invasion Edwardes, Michael,

(Faber & Faber, 2 0 0 7 )

Playing the Great Game

(Hamish Hamilton, 1975) Elliot, M a j . - G e n . J. G . ,

1839-1947

The Frontier,

(Cassell, 1 9 6 8 )

Bibliography a n d f u r t h e r reading

H e a t h c o t e , T o n y , The Afghan 1839-1919

With Roberts to Candahar: A Tale of the Afghan War

Wars,

B r e r e t o n , C a p t a i n F. S.,

(Spellmount, 2003)

H o p k i r k , Peter,

The Great Game: On Secret

Service in High Asia ( J o h n M u r r a y ,

2006)

The Romance of the Indian Frontier ( J o n a t h a n C a p e , 1 9 7 4 ) M i l l e r , C h a r l e s , Khyber: The Story of the North M a c M u n n , L t . - G e n . Sir G e o r g e ,

West Frontier ( M a c d o n a l d a n d Jane's, 1 9 7 7 ) O ' B a l l a n c e , E d g a r , The Afghan

Wars, 1839 to

The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars ( P a n , 2 0 0 2 ) S c h o f i e l d , V i c t o r i a , Every Rock, Every Hill: The Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan ( B u c h a n , E n r i g h t , 1 9 8 4 ) S t e w a r t , J u l e s , The Savage Border: The Story of the North-West Frontier ( S u t t o n , 2 0 0 7 ) S w i n s o n , A r t h u r , North-West Frontier: People 1839-1947

(Corgi, 1969).

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Present ( D a C a p o Press, 2 0 0 3 ) .

Tanner, Stephen,

Bruce, G . , Retreat from Kabul ( M a y f l o w e r , 1 9 6 7 ) D u r a n d , Sir H e n r y M a r i o n , The First

Afghan

(Lancer Publishers, 2 0 0 9 )

F o r b e s , A r c h i b a l d , Britain

The 1st Afghan

Official Account

(Calcutta,

Army

Headquarters, India, 1908)

F o r b e s , A r c h i b a l d , Britain

The 2nd Afghan Ltd,

in

Afghanistan:

War, 1878-80

(Leonaur

2 0 0 7 ; orig. p u b . 1 8 9 2 )

(Constable, 1910) Hensman, Howard,

1879-80

The Afghan War,

( L o n d o n , 3 vols., W . H . A l l e n ,

1881) James, D.,

Lord Roberts

(Hollis, 1 9 5 4 )

Major-General

Low, Charles Rathbone,

Frederick Roberts

Sir

( U c k f i e l d , East Sussex,

N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 2 ; orig. p u b . 1 8 8 3 )

My God - Maiwand! Operations of the South Afghanistan Police Force, 1878-1880 ( L e o C o o p e r , 1 9 7 9 )

M a x w e l l , Leigh,

R o b s o n , B r i a n , The Road to Kabul:

First A f g h a n W a r

War and its Causes

(Blackie, 1 9 2 0 )

C a r d e w , F. G . , e d . , The Second Afghan War:

H a n n a , C o l . H . B., The Second Afghan War

Present (Brassey's, 2 0 0 2 ) R i c h a r d s , D . S.,

and Events,

93

in

Afghanistan:

War, 1839-42

(Leonaur,

2007; orig. p u b .1 8 9 2 ) Intelligence Branch A r m y

Headquarters

I n d i a , Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Vol. Ill - Baluchistan and First Afghan War, 1838-1842 ( U c k f i e l d , E a s t

The Second Afghan (Spellmount, S h a d b o l t , S. H . ,

of 1878-80

War,

The Afghan

Campaigns

( L o n d o n , 2 vols, 1 8 9 2 )

S t a c p o o l e - R y d i n g , R i c h a r d J.,

( T h e H i s t o r y Press, 2 0 0 8 )

Third Afghan War A r m y Headquarters India,

orig. p u b .1 9 1 0 )

a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 4 ) .

Catastrophic

Retreat from Kabul: The British Defeat in

Afghanistan,

1842 ( L y o n s Press, 2 0 0 2 ) .

1838-1842

( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 7 )

Account

(East Sussex,

R o b s o n , B r i a n , Crisis on the Frontier:

Third Afghan

Macrory, Patrick,

N o r r i s , J a m e s , First Afgh an War,

Official

Third Afghan War

1919:

(Richard Bentley, 3 vols, 1 8 5 7 )

Maiwand:

The Last Stand of the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment in Afghanistan, 1880

Sussex, N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 6 ;

K a y e , J. W . , History of the War in Afghanistan

1878-1881

2003)

Waziristan,

Naval

The

War and the Campaign in

1919-20

(Spellmount,

2004).

Memoirs, Journals a n d First-hand Accounts M a l e , R e v . A r t h u r , Scenes through

the Smoke

( N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 3 )

Second Afghan War A t w o o d , R o d n e y , The March to

Roberts o f Kandahar, Earl,

Kandahar

(Pen a n d Sword, 2008)

The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876-1880

Balfour, L a d y Betty,

(Longmans, 1899)

India

Forty-One

Years in

( N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 2 ;

orig. p u b . 1905). Sale, L a d y F l o r e n t i a ,

Afghan

A Journal

of the First

War ( O x f o r d P a p e r b a c k s , 2 0 0 2 ;

orig. p u b . 1 8 4 3 )

ndex Figures in bold refer to illustrations. Abdur R a h m a n (Amir) 68, 70, 72 Abu Akbar 30, 3 1 , 34 Afghan fighters (tribesmen) a g g r e s s i o n / p h y s i c a l courage of 16, 48 a s s e m b l y of 19, 8 2 barbarity/ferocity of 7 - 8 , 9, 34, 48 religious fervour a n d xenophobia 48 Afghanistan climate a n d terrain (influence o n fighting) 7, 9, 27, 28, 2 9 , 2 9 , 30, 3 1 , 4 3 - 4 , 4 5 - 7 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 53, 56, 57, 58, 5 8 , 60 c o n n e c t i o n with India 43, 44, 4 5 - 7 control t h r o u g h o c c u p a t i o n 8 ethnic p e o p l e s of 4 7 - 8 nature of rule from Kabul 4 8 right to c o n d u c t o w n foreign affairs 17, 85 'tribal lands'/'tribal territories' 44, 47 Afridis, actions of 12, 33, 47, 56, 72, 7 2 , 8 1 , 84 A h m e d Khel, resistance at 70 aircraft, RAF use of 7 9 , 8 2 , 83 Akbar K h a n 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 4 2 Ali M a s j i d fortress, fall of 5 8 - 9 , 6 0 , 74, 75, 7 5 , 7 6 - 8 A m a n u l l a (governor of Kabul), 80, 8 1 Army of Retribution, actions of 3 3 - 5 , 3 4 , 36 Army of the I n d u s 20, 2 1 , 24, 37 withdrawal from Kabul 7, 8, 37-42, 39, 4 1 artillery batteries 18, 19, 20, 2 6 , 2 9 , 32, 3 5 , 38, 4 1 , 5 5 , 56, 59, 6 1 , 63, 70, 7 1 , 76, 77, 83, 8 3 Arzu, actions at/in 70 Auckland, Lord 14, 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 1 , 24, 26, 33 Ayub K h a n (Durani leader) 70, 7 1 , 7 2 - 3

Bagh, action at 8 1 , 83 Bala Hissar fortress/royal palace 2 5 , 2 6 , 27, 28, 3 5 , 36, 62, 66, 67 Baluchis 1 8 , 54, 8 7 Baluchistan 20, 2 1 - 2 , 3 5 , 43, 8 7 Bolan Pass 14, 1 8 , 20, 2 2 , 23, 44, 4 5 , 50, 83 Britain a n d Afghanistan's foreign policy 17, 6 0 controlling the Russian threat ('Great G a m e ' ) 8, 9, 1 4 - 1 7 , 44, 4 6 - 7 , 5 0 - 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 60 a n d priority to Sikh interests 15, 1 6 - 1 7 use of force as imperial power 8 British Residency (Kabul), attack on 62-3 Browne, G e n Sir S a m u e l 56, 60, 74 actions of 3 6 , 58, 59, 5 9 , 74, 74, 75, 7 5 , 76, 78 Brydon, Dr William 7, 3 2 , 33 Burnes, Sir Alexander 1 4 - 1 6 , 17, 1 7 , 2 5 - 6 Burrows, Brig-Gen G e o r g e 70-1 camels, use of 2 1 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 57 C a v a g n a r i , M a j Sir Louis 60, 6 1 , 6 1 , 62, 6 2 , 63, 66 cavalry b r i g a d e s / r e g i m e n t s 18, 19, 20, 2 2 , 24, 56, 58, 6 1 , 62, 63, 66, 68, 70, 7 0 , 7 1 , 72, 82, 85 C h a m b e r l a i n , Sir Neville 5 2 - 3 Charasia, action at 6 5 - 6 C h e l m s f o r d , Lord (Viceroy of India) 80, 8 1 , 84 cholera, outbreaks of 59, 60 C o n g r e s s of Berlin (1878) 5 1 - 2 , 58 C o r p s of G u i d e s , actions of 6 1 , 63, 66, 6 7 - 8 , 76, 78 C o t t o n , M a j - G e n Sir Willoughby 20, 24, 26

Dacca, action at 8 3 - 4 Dargai Heights, action at 12, 7 2 Disraeli, B e n j a m i n 5 1 , 53, 59 Dost M o h a m e d (Amir) 14, 15, 1 5 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 1 , 23, 24, 25, 27, 50, 68 D u r a n d Line 8 1 , 85 Durani tribesmen, actions of 47, 48, 70 Dyer, Brig-Gen Rex 8 1 , 85 East India C o m p a n y , armies of 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 54, 70, 71 e l e p h a n t batteries, use of 4 5 , 55, 57, 6 1 , 76 Ellenborough, Lord 33, 3 4 - 5 , 36 Elphinstone, Maj-Gen William 16, 2 6 - 7 , 28, 3 7 - 4 2 , 3 9 Eustace, Brig-Gen Alexander 84, 85 Eyre, Lt Vincent 27, 2 9 - 3 0 Faiz M o h a m e d 5 8 - 9 Florentia, Lady Sale 28, 33, 37, 38, 3 8 , 39, 3 9 , 4 0 - 2 G a n d a m a k , action at 27, 3 1 , 32, 35, 37, 59, 60, 67, 6 8 Ghazis, actions of 67 G h a z n i fortress, taking of 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 - 5 , 2 3 , 34, 35, 40, 44, 70, 71 Ghilzais, actions of 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 3 1 , 3 1 , 32, 3 9 , 47, 48, 63, 70 G l a d s t o n e , William 59, 68, 70 G o r d o n Highlanders, actions of 12, 1 2 , 4 9 , 6 5 - 6 , 70, 7 2 Great Bazaar, destruction of 66 G u r k h a battalions, actions of 18, 4 9 , 57, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75, 76, 83, 85 Habibulla (Amir) 80, 81 Hazaras, lifestyle/religion/isolation of 48 H e l m a n d , British arrive at 71 H e l m a n d River 71

Index

Herat 14, 23, 47, 50, 52, 62, 71 British interest in 44 defence against Persian forces 14, 16, 20, 44 forces i n / a r o u n d 48, 55, 77 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 44, 4 5 - 6 l o c a t i o n / i m p o r t a n c e of 44 Hindu Kush 2 5 , 43, 44, 46, 50, 5 1 , 58 Horse Artillery 29, 31 Hyder Khan 23, 24 Indian Army 18, 20, 2 1 , 54, 6 1 , 67, 70, 75, 80, 8 2 Indian M u t i n y 32, 5 1 , 54, 75 infantry battalions/regiments 9, 19, 20, 55, 56, 57, 6 1 , 63, 6 5 - 6 , 67, 7 1 , 72, 8 2 Jabul garrison 2 6 - 7 , 2 6 Jagdalak Pass, actions in 3 1 , 3 2 , 33, 35, 4 1 , 4 4 , 6 8 , 7 2 Jalalabad fortress 7, 37, 47, 83, 84, 85 attacks o n 2 5 , 3 3 - 4 , 81 British forces a d v a n c e to/enter 16, 2 5 , 32, 3 3 - 4 , 3 6 , 56, 59, 5 9 Brydon arrives at 32, 3 2 defence of 2 5 , 33, 34 effects of earthquake o n defences 33 evacuation of 4 0 isolation/vulnerability of 33 jihad, calls for 58, 67 Kabul 14, 26, 2 8 , 44 Afghan forces d e p l o y e d i n / a r o u n d 5 5 , 67 Amir Sher Ali leaves 58, 59 British forces a d v a n c e on/enter 24, 2 5 , 3 5 , 56, 66 diplomatic m i s s i o n s in 52, 60, 61 destruction of in reprisal 36 preparation for defence of 24 failure to hold 8 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n from 44-6 location/strategic i m p o r t a n c e of 4 4 - 5 nature of rule from 48 rebels take m o r e control 25-6 resentment towards British 25-6

Russian threat 47 uprising in (1841) 16 withdrawal from (Army of the Indus) 2 8 - 9 account of 37, 3 9 , 4 0 - 1 , 4 2 attacks o n 2 9 , 30, 32, 38, 39, 3 9 , 4 0 - 1 d e a t h a n d disease 2 9 - 3 0 , 3 1 , 32, 3 5 , 38, 39, 3 9 , 40, 4 1 , 4 2 effects of winter weather 30, 37, 38, 39, 40, 4 1 , 4 2 rate of progress 30 r e m n a n t s of 3 0 - 1 , 3 2 route taken 3 0 sole survivor 32, 3 2 surrender of to Akbar protection 30, 3 1 terms for safe c o n d u c t 30, 37, 4 0 Kabul Fighting Force, actions of 65-6, 67-8 Kabul garrison, siege of 2 4 - 7 , 2 6 , 28, 38 Kalat-i-Ghilzai 34, 3 5 , 47 K a n d a h a r 14, 20, 2 2 , 23, 3 5 , 44, 50, 52, 83, 9 0 Afghan forces i n / a r o u n d 55 g o v e r n a n c e of 68, 70 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 4 6 location of 45 o c c u p a t i o n of 8, 24, 35, 56, 63, 7 0 - 1 Russian threat to 47 siege of 70, 7 1 , 72 K a n d a h a r Field Force, actions of 56, 70 Karim K h a n 56 Kata Kushta, o c c u p a t i o n of 78 Kauffmann, G e n K o n s t a n t i n 50, 53, 58 Keane, Lt Sir J o h n , actions of 20, 2 2 , 2 3 - 4 K h a n of Khiva, Russian e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t 2 5 , 50 Khan, General Nadir, strength of force 84 Khost, Afghan forces in 84 Khurd-Kabul Pass 2 5 , 30, 32, 3 5 , 37, 39, 4 0 - 1 , 4 6 Khyber Pass 14, 44, 53, 8 1 , 84 attacks i n / p a s s a g e t h r o u g h 20, 23, 24, 2 5 , 3 3 - 4 , 50, 53, 56, 58, 74, 75, 76, 81 protectorship over 72 r e n u n c i a t i o n of authority over 6 0 Khyber Rifles 8 1 , 84

95

Kohat, defence of 85 Kohistan, actions in 2 5 , 35 Kotwal of Kabul, e x e c u t i o n of 66 Kurram Valley, a c t i o n s in 5 6 - 7 , 60, 6 3 , 72, 84 Kurram Valley Field Force, actions of 5 6 - 8 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 59, 6 0 Landi Kotal garrison, reinforcement of 8 1 Lytton, Lord 5 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 1 , 66, 68, 70, 75 M a c n a g h t e n , Sir William 15, 16, 20, 24, 2 5 , 26, 27, 28, 35 M a c p h e r s o n , Brig-Gen Herbert 65, 75, 76 M a h s u d tribe 47, 8 0 M a i w a n d , battle of (1880) 8, 6 9 , 70, 7 1 , 7 1 M a l a k a n d , fighting a r o u n d 8 0 Male, Arthur ( m e m o i r s of) 74, 75, 76, 7 7 - 8 Massy, Brig-Gen D u n h a m 1 1 , 67 Miani, battle of (1843) 8 7 M i c h n i Pass, authority over 6 0 Mitford, M a j Reginald 6 5 , 67 M o h a m e d Akbar K h a n 16, 1 6 , 37, 4 0 M o h m a n d tribe 4 7 , 56, 8 0 Mudki, battle of (1845) 4 2 mullahs, role of 19, 62, 67, 70, 80 Nadir K h a n , a c t i o n a g a i n s t Thai 85 Napier, M a j - G e n Sir Charles 55, 8 7 N o r t h Waziristan Militia 84 North-West Frontier 9, 47, 50, 5 3 , 6 1 , 72, 7 2 , 80, 85 Nott, G e n Sir William 20, 2 2 , 23, 24, 2 5 , 2 7 , 35 P a t h a n Ghilzais 2 5 , 47, 8 0 Peiwar Kotal, battle of (1878) 49, 56-8, 57, 5 8 Persia, actions/threat of 14, 16, 2 0 - 1 , 44, 6 0 Peshawar 17, 2 0 , 28, 44, 50, 56, 75, 85 fighting for 15, 16, 36, 8 1 , 84 Peshawar Valley Field Force, actions of 3 6 , 56, 58, 59, 5 9 , 6 0 - 1 , 74, 74, 7 5 - 6 , 7 5 Pezwan, British c a m p at 7 pioneer b a t t a l i o n s 5 7 , 5 8

Index

96

Shagai Heights, occupation of 75 S h a h Shuja-il-Maluk (Amir) 1 3 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 20, 2 2 , 23, 24, 2 5 , 27, 28, 3 5 - 6 , 38 Shelton, Brig-Gen J o h n 26, 27, 3 2 Sher Ali K h a n 50, 5 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 5 5 , 58, 59, 68 Sherpur c a n t o n m e n t , attack o n 1 1 , 62, 6 5 , 6 7 - 8 Shinwaris, n e g o t i a t i o n s with 6 1 S h u t a g a r d a n Pass 56, 58, 59,

Pishin 4 7 , 60, 72 Pollock, M a j - G e n G e o r g e 33, 34, 3 4 , 3 5 , 36 Pottinger, Lt Eldred 20, 4 2 Primrose, G e n J a m e s 70, 71 P u n j a b (the) 15, 20, 3 5 , 81 Punjabi battalions 57, 59, 66, 6 7 - 8 , 70, 72, 85 Quetta

2 2 , 2 5 , 50, 56, 72, 84

Roberts, M a j - G e n Sir Frederick 5 6 - 8 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 60, 6 1 , 63, 6 5 - 6 , 6 5 , 6 6 , 6 7 - 8 , 72, 75

60, 63 Sibi, protection/control of 47, 60, 72 Sikh forces, actions of 15, 23,

Ross-Keppel, Sir George 80, 8 1 , 83, 84 Royal Artillery 1 1 , 57, 7 1 , 8 3 Russia, threat p o s e d by 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 2 1 , 44, 4 6 - 7 , 50, 54

6 3 , 70, 72, 76, 77 Sikh k i n g d o m 15, 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 0 Sind 2 0 , 3 5 , 4 2 , 4 5 , 50, 54, 5 5 Singh, Ranjit 15, 1 6 - 1 7 sirdars (tribal chiefs), actions of

Sale, Brig-Gen Sir Robert 2 5 , 28, 32, 33, 3 3 , 34, 3 5 , 37, 40, 4 2 Salisbury, Lord 5 1 , 53 S a m a r k a n d , Russian control of 50 sangars, Afghan use of 57, 7 6 - 7 , 7 6 sappers a n d m i n e r s 18, 20, 24, 29, 33, 71 scouts, use of cavalry forces as 19 sepoy (infantry) units 18, 19, 29, 3 1 , 38, 39, 40, 4 1 , 6 1 , 63, 7 1 , 84

19, 37, 48, 61 Soulter, C a p t 3 1 S o u t h Waziristan Militia 84 sowar (cavalry) regiments 18, 29, 3 0 - 1 Spin Baldak fortress, capture of 8 3 , 84 Spingwal Kotal 57 Stewart, M a j - G e n Sir D o n a l d 56, 68, 70 Stolietov, G e n Nikolai 52, 52, 53 Sturt, Lt, d e a t h of 3 9 , 4 2 Swat Valley, P a t h a n s in 47

Visit the Osprey website •

Information about forthcoming books

•

Author information

•

Read extracts a n d see s a m p l e p a g e s

•

S i g n u p for o u r free n e w s l e t t e r s

•

C o m p e t i t i o n s a n d prizes

www.ospreypublishing.com

territorial units (British Army) 82, 85 Tezeen Pass, fighting in 33, 35 Thai, fighting for 84, 85 Tirah Valley, fighting in 12, 7 2 , 8 0 Tochi Valley, defence of 84 Togh, fighting at 85 Treaty of G a n d a m a k (1879), signing of 6 2 Treaty of Paris (1856), restrictions of 50 Treaty of Simla (1838) 17 Tunghi Taraki Gorge, action in 31 Turkestan 43, 44, 48, 50, 58, 59 Turkey 5 1 , 52, 8 0 Tytler's brigade, a c t i o n s / c o m p o s i t i o n of 75, 76, 78 Vitkevich, Ivan Voktorovich 14, 16, 21 Wali of Kandahar, support for 71 Waziristan 43, 47, 8 4 - 5 Waziris, desertion of 84 Wazirs of Tochi, rebellion of 84 Yakub Khan 53, 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 1 , 62, 6 2 , 63, 66, 68 Z a i m m u k h t tribesmen, action against 6 3

About Essential Histories A m u l t i - v o l u m e h i s t o r y of w a r seen f r o m p o l i t i c a l , strategic, t a c t i c a l , c u l t u r a l a n d i n d i v i d u a l

perspectives

Available now (titles listed chronologically)

Each Essential Histories v o l u m e

provides

67

978 1 84603 036 9 Ancient Israel at War 853-586 BC

27

978 1 84176 357 6 The Peloponnesian War 431-404 BC

Philip de Souza

36

978 1 84176 358 3 The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC

Philip de Souza

Brad Kelle

26

978 1 84176 473 3 The Wars of Alexander the Great 336-323 BC

Waldemar Heckel

16

978 1 84176 355 2 The Punic Wars 264-146 BC

Nigel Bagnall

43

978 1 84176 305 7

Caesar's Gallic Wars 58-45 BC

Kate Gilliver

42

978 1 84176 392 7

Caesar's Civil War 49-44 BC

Adrian Goldsworthy

21

978 1 84176 359 0 Rome at War AD 293-696

Michael Whitby

33

978 1 84176 360 6

Byzantium at War AD 600-1453

John Haldon

Campaigns of the Norman Conquest

Matthew Bennett

12

978 1 84176 228 9

1

978 1 84176 179 4 The Crusades

David Nicolle

19

978 1 84176 269 2 The Hundred Years' War 1337-1453

Anne Curry

62

978 1 84176 569 3 The Ottoman Empire 1353-1699

Stephen Turnbull

54

978 1 84176 491 7 The Wars of the Roses 1455-1485

Michael Hicks

46

978 1 84176 480 1 War in Japan 1467-1615

Stephen Turnbull

47

978 1 84176 395 8 The French Religious Wars 1562-1598

Robert J Knecht Richard Bonney

a guide t o a m a j o r w a r or arena o f w a r :

29

978 1 84176 378 1 The Thirty Years' War 1618-1648

t h e origins, t h e key players, h o w

58

978 1 84176 417 7 The English Civil Wars 1642-1651

Peter Gaunt

34

978 1 84176 361 3 The French Wars 1667-1714 - The Sun King at war

John A Lynn

the

w a r was f o u g h t , w h o f o u g h t it, a n d its l a s t i n g i m p a c t o n t h e w o r l d a r o u n d i t .

W r i t t e n b y leading historians f r o m

44

978 1 84176 456 6 The French-Indian War 1754-1760

Daniel Marston

59

978 1 84176 521 1 The Plains Wars 1757-1900

Charles M Robinson III Daniel Marston

6

978 1 84176 191 6 The Seven Years' War

around the w o r l d a n d illustrated w i t h

45

978 1 84176 343 9 The American Revolution 1774-1783

Daniel Marston

photographs and maps.

7

978 1 84176 283 8 The French Revolutionary Wars

Gregory

Each v o l u m e f o l l o w s t h e same clear

66

978 1 84603 030 7 The Wars of the Barbary Pirates

Gregory

41

978 1 84176 466 5 The War of 1812

Carl Benn Alan C Huffines

Fremont-Barnes Fremont-Barnes a n d accessible s t r u c t u r e : Introduction - Chronology -

-

T h e f i g h t i n g - Portrait of a soldier

-

The world around war -

50

978 1 84176 522 8 The Texas War of Independence 1835-1836

25

978 1 84176 472 6 The Mexican War 1846-1848

Douglas V Meed

2

978 1 84176 186 2 The Crimean War 1854-1856

John Sweetman Stephen Badsey

Background

t o w a r - W a r r i n g sides - O u t b r e a k

Portrait

of a c i v i l i a n - H o w t h e w a r e n d e d Conclusion a n d consequences -

-

51

978 1 84176 421 4 The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871

56

978 1 84176 612 6 The Zulu War 1879

Ian Knight

52

978 1 84176 396 5 The Boer War 1899-1902

Gregory

31

978 1 84176 446 7 The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Geoffrey Jukes

65

978 1 84603 023 9 The Anglo-Irish War

Peter Cottrell

37

978 1 84176 369 9 The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939

Frances Lannon

28

978 1 84176 372 9 The Arab-Israeli Conflict - The Palestine War 1948

Efraim Karsh

8

978 1 84176 282 1 The Korean War

Carter Malkasian

Fremont-Barnes

Index

Praise for Essential Histories 'if y o u w a n t a full n a r r a t i v e o f t h e high p o l i t i c s t h a t led t o t h e N o r m a n i n v a s i o n , o r t h e d e t a i l s o f W i l l i a m ' s

49

978 1 84176 418 4 The Suez Crisis 1956

Derek Varble

c a m p a i g n s in E n g l a n d a f t e r H a s t i n g s , t h e n t h i s is t h e

38

978 1 84176 419 1 The Vietnam War 1956-1975

Andrew Wiest

place t o c o m e . ' (Essential Histories: Campaigns of the

20

978 1 84176 371 2 The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

Efraim Karsh

15

978 1 84176 422 1 The Falklands War 1982

Duncan Anderson

Norman

Conquest)

Times Educational Supplement

55

978 1 84176 574 7 The Gulf War 1991

Alastair Finlan

63

978 1 84176 805 2 The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-1999

Alastair Finlan

5

978 1 84176 856 4 The Greeks at War

6

978 1 84176 881 6

c l e a r a n d c o n c i s e ' History Today

7

978 1 84603 022 2 Liberty or Death Daniel Marston, Carl Benn and Fred Anderson

an e x c e l l e n t series' Military

4

978 1 84176 831 1 The Napoleonic Wars

1

978 1 84176 736 9 The American Civil War

2

978 1 84176 738 3 The First World War Geoffrey Jukes, Peter Simkins and Michael Hickey

3

978 1 84176 830 4 The Second World War Max Hastings, Geoffrey Jukes, Russell Hart and Stephen A Hart

' ... t h e s e v o l u m e s p r o v i d e a lucid a n d c o n c i s e n a r r a t i v e o f t h e c a m p a i g n s . . . as w e l l as p e n e t r a t i n g

Es

analyses o f s t r a t e g i e s a n d l e a d e r s h i p . Ideal f o r c l a s s r o o m use o r f i r e s i d e r e a d i n g . ' J a m e s M McPherson,

tial Histories S

al

Philip de Souza, Waldemar Heckel and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones

Pulitzer Prize winner, c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e A m e r i c a n Civil W a r b o o k s

Illustrated

Rome at War Kate Gilliver, Adrian Goldsworthy and Michael Whitby

Todd Fisher and Gregory Fremont-Barnes

v e r y useful, f a c t u a l a n d e d u c a t i o n a l ' Reference Reviews

Gary Gallagher, Stephen Engle, Robert Krick and Joseph T Glatthaar

accessible a n d w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d . . . ' Daily Express 'they make t h e perfect starting point f o r readers o f any age' Daily Mail

To o r d e r a n y o f t h e s e titles, o r for m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g , c o n t a c t : N o r t h America:

[email protected]

U K & rest o f t h e w o r l d :

[email protected]

www.ospreypublishing.com

US$17.95 UK£10.99

CAN $19.95

IS B N 978-1-84603-446-6

9

I

781846 034466

5 1 795