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'^t*,^:
Fields of Glory An Illustrated Narrative
of
American Land Warfare
by William H. Nelson and Frank
E. Vandiver
ds ol Glory Illustrated Narrative of
I
Imericaj}
Land Warfare BY
LIAM
H.
NELSON
AND
NK
E.
VANDIVER
lfore has any aspect o^ ameri-
y been
covered with the author-
excitement and color of
lume. Far from being jre book, this
y
is
this
jtist
a first-rate,
an-
com-
American land warfare from War, when a series of masost drove the settlers from Ne^v to the Korean conflict. of
ip's
are writers as ^vell as scholars
)rs
the
igh
md
text
is
extensively
re-
amazingly comprehensive,
it
d foremost, immensely readable, wealth of material has
been
dis-
a fresh, concise, fast-paced nar-
illuminates
t
)m
its
earliest
American
inilitary
beginnings to the
o supplement the fine text, there ps of campaigns
and
battles
and
magnificent illustrations selected y hitherto neglected soinxes.
the conftision of a strictly chron-
rrangement of wars and rs
lire of ;
battles,
have presented their material the conflicts.
The
first sec-
voted to wars of "Liberty and
md n,
covers the colonial wars, the the
War
of 1812, the
War
for
dependence and the Civil War. ^es show graphically the gro^vth
At *
ields
strated Narrative of American r
Land Warfare
William H. Nelson and Frank E. Vandiver
listration ,
of Glory
Building
California
Copyright, ©, 1960 by
William H. Nelson and Frank All rights reserved.
E.
Vandiver
Printed in the U.S.A.
FIRST EDITION
No
part of this
book may be reproduced
in
any
form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer
who
wishes to
quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper or broadcast
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-12105
^^^
BOOK
TO PRESENT A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN WARS, ILLUSTRATED
IS
luminated by reproductions of numerous drawings and photographs. that have shaped the design of the book,
;
naturally, subjective.
We
pictures.
have
and our choice of
pic-
Sometimes we have included, and sometimes however, to keep the focus of our
tried,
illus-
^merican soldier himself and on war as he must have seen and
felt
conceived, the book was to be restricted to the Civil War, but
we
many
along that there were too
It
expand the scope
jrefore decided to
means do we claim completeness as typical,
splendid pictures of other conof the project,
in this
or significantly atypical.
Some
volume.
quibble about those presented. For what vity; for
what
included
is
od before the Civil
we
we
missing
is
were obliged, of course,
we
more
when we
used,
We
place to the events they portrayed.
rawings and paintings of
present
have
plead the
confess personal prejudice,
War we
untings and drawings. Here
What we
will miss pictures they
our
to find
could, drawings clos-
have also included some
re-
recent wars, finding sometimes in
an emphasis or an interpretation missing in the photographer's
1
;ver,
photography that has furnished us most of our
ng thousands of photographs of war,
rimary documents of more use
who
orian
uses
that
we
than he generally
to the historian
them can glimpse the
illustrations,
we became convinced
past with a different eye, can
perspective beyond the traditional dimension of the written page,
and Gardner photographs
of the Civil
War,
irough the matter-of-fact pictures of the First )n shots of the
Second World War,
still
unsurpassed in
World War and
to the finely-done Signal
the
Corps
orean War, photography has given us an invaluable portrait of the
—of
his
ictures
boredom,
his
agony and
his
endurance,
the design of this book,
we decided
humor,
we found shaped
his
ony with a running narrative— a narrative aimed ;
hope
will
make
at
the pictures especially eloquent.
We
There has always been
nerican wars to interest us.
to
com-
giving a back-
found several a certain con-
can military history, a continuity best described by the word "coninitial
confusion and obsolescence. United States armies have risen
and again. But the price merican war
after
is
invariably fearful.
another a terrible
initial
We
found, for ex-
confusion out of which
ht finally, not by amateur improvisation, but by the professional le ;
career
found
army
officers
also in the
who,
American
in
most American
histories,
occupy such
soldier himself a very old tradition of
PREFACE
6 generally the most over-equipped in any theater of war. If our battlefields, they will get to those fields
One
other continuity
with
as
many
men must
die
on the
of home's comforts as possible.
we found, one which has already proved disturbing to the Times came in recent years when we could not
national ego: the tradition of victory.
win, or could
and
ill
this surely
afford to win. History has not prepared us for martial compromise,
we
will
have to learn.
For the pictures we have used we wish
to
thank the National Archives, the De-
partment of the Army, the Library of Congress, and the
We
New York
Public Library.
are especially grateful to Miss Josephine Cobb, Miss Josephine Motylewski
Miss Carrol M. Blanchard of the
Major Ann M. Curtin,
WAC,
which
Department of the Army,
assisted us in the preparation of
tween
we divided
I
(through the
the second half by Vandiver. Parts II and
Our
sulted for certain operations.
Ernest
illustrations
and in editing the
War
illustrations be-
of 1812) was written by Nelson,
were written by Nelson,
III
and IV by
sources were standard military histories, with specialized studies con-
The most
American Campaigns; Vincent
J.
ROTC
useful sources have been
Esposito,
Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy,
Department:
V
Rice Uni-
as well as to
and the arrangement of
the narrative
us: the first half of Part
Vandiver.
to
our manuscript.
Although we worked together in selecting our entire manuscript,
and
and
and Mrs. Bonnie N. Cooper, Audio-Visual Branch,
Office of the Chief of Information,
versity
Pictures Branch, National Archives,
Still
Matthew
Military Heritage of America, and
Manual #145-20, Military History
\J. S.
Army
of the United States, 1607-
1958.
William H. Nelson Frank E. Vandiver Rice University, Houston, Texas
F. Steele,
West Point Atlas of American Wars; R.
Contents Preface
PART ONE
LIBERTY AND UNION The
Colonial Era
The American Revolution
16
The War
36
of
1812
The Texan War The American
PART
TWO
\RT THREE
PART FOUR
12
for Independence,
Civil
War, 1861-1863
48 54
THE TRAIL OF TEARS Indian Wars in the East
86
Indian Wars in the West
94
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA The Mexican Wars, 1846-1848
140
The Spanish- American War, 1898
156
The Mexican Punitive Expedition, 1916-1917
176
THE YANKS ARE COMING World War I
World War
PART FIVE
1836
186
II in
Europe
214
THE OPEN DOOR The Far East
before 1941
World War II
in the Pacific
244
262
Korea
292
Index
308
aps 29
Concentration of Forces at Yorktown
The Northern The
Frontier in the
War
Eastern Theater in the Civil
The Western Theater
in the Civil
^6
of 1812
War
60
War
70
Wilderness to Petersburg
76
Drive to Atlanta
77
The Mexican War,
141
1846-1847
l^S
Area of Operations, Greater Antilles
164-5
Siege of Santiago
Western Front, 1914-1918
190
Meuse-Argonne Offensive
205
The North
African, Italian and Southern France Theaters
22tf
Northern Europe
The
275
Philippine Area
The Korean
Conflict, 1950-1951
Palacios appearing
293 ^^4
Korea, 1952-1953
Maps by
221
on pages 60 and 70 from
THIS HAL-
by Bruce Catton, one of the Mainstream of Inc., in 1956. of America Series published by Doubleday 8c Co.,
LOWED GROUND
PART
The To
Colonial Era
THE
FIRST ENGLISH SETTLERS
war was no brought
ON THE EDGE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN WILDERNESS,
Along with
stranger.
their language
them an ancient system
Avith
New
of the English counties. In godly
and laws and
religion, the colonists
of universal military service, the militia system
England, boys of ten were taught "the exer-
smale gunnes, halfe pikes, bowes and arrowes," and every male above
cise of armes, as
the age of eighteen was expected to keep clean and ready a flintlock musket, with bullets
and powder and "2 fathom of match." Not
crime hardly
less
a proper day for
to attend militia exercises
grave than not attending church, and the Sabbath
company
Precisely because
by the colonists was
was a
was thought
itself
regimental muster.
drill or
was universal, however, the concept of military service held
it
and narrowly defensive.
also unprofessional
A
regular standing
army, wielded as an instrument of state policy, was regarded with alarm and even
in-
comprehension. Seventeenth century England, whence these new Americans came,
had brought back a king
to get rid of Crom^vell's army,
king to be rid of a Royalist army.
was determined
of France,
to live
and would drive out another
England, only hours away from the terrible power
If
without a standing army, the remote American
colonies could hardly be expected to support garrisons of regular soldiers.
Thus
it
was that by the middle of the eighteenth century, when their swelling expansion
and burgeoning wealth brought the colonies into mortal
conflict
with the vast Ameri-
can ambitions of France, the million English-Americans could hardly match, in real military force, the
The ally
fifty
thousand French-Canadians scattered along the
beginnings of organized warfare
preceded the founding of the
first
among Europeans
in
St.
Lawrence.
North America
English colonies, and never, from the
actu-
first set-
tlement of Jamestown to the end of the colonial period, were the colonies free of war or the threat of war. South Carolina and on occasion even \'irginia lived in fear of
Dutch conquered
the militant Spaniards to the south; in the Middle Colonies the the
little
New
colony of
New
Englanders fought
colonies the frontier settlers'
first
and violently King
then was
in almost all the
with blazing Indian villages or
as
if
pillaged,
p.
87.]
their
England, so called
New
fall
of that year
it
England would be destroyed. One
towns of the frontier were taken by surprise, burned and
More than once
inhabitants massacred.
panies, poorly trained
and badly
led,
fury of Philip's braves was checked,
command
War in New
For a few terrible months in the
every white settlement in interior
and
American colonies appeared suddenly
outbreak of King Philip's
Metacomet, son of Massasoit, sachem of the Wampanoags from
Philip, or
after another the scattered
ized
set alight
serious early military crisis in the
in 1675 with the
1662 to 1676. [See below,
seemed
Dutch and then the French; and
the
now and
homesteads.
The most after
Sweden, and were themselves conquered by the English; the
the
little
militia
com-
broke and ran from the Indians. Eventually the
when
the
New
Englanders accepted a central-
and, abandoning their reliance on the militia, used trained and pro-
fessionally-led volunteers in offensive forays against the Indians.
The forgotten
lessons of
many
King
Philip's
War were
times again in American
forgotten, as similar lessons
history.
The
militia
system,
were
to
be
which had
LIBERTY AND UNION proved so
ineffective,
Dominion
lived
New
of
13
was kept unaltered; and when, during the period of the short-
Edmund Andros
England, Governor Sir
force of regular British troops to garrison the colony,
the soldiers had
When
come
to "teach the people to drink,
blaspheme, curse, and damn."
New
Andros's regime was overthrown by the Revolution of 1688 in England,
England lapsed into the military ineptness and disunity
American colonies up
the
was sent out with a
was complained bitterly that
it
to the
that
were
to characterize all
Revolution.
In 1689 began the great war for empire between England and France, a struggle that was to involve the
American colonies
The Americans disregarded the war were known in Europe, and
in
one way or another
ornate dynastic
for nearly a century.
by which the phases of
titles
this
used instead such homely names as King William's
War, Queen Anne's War, King George's War, and the French and Indian War. In
American involvement
general, able.
South of the province of
Indian
allies of
the French,
militia of each colony.
in these affairs
New
and
New
was
and sometimes even
slight
profit-
York, the only serious fighting was that against the
was usually carried on
it
by the
inefficiently
local
England, with her oiulying settlements and, more im-
more
portant, her fur trade situated in Indian country claimed by the French, was
in-
timately touched by war.
During King William's
some 450 men, ably
force of
War
(1689-1697) a
led by Sir
French base of Port Royal in Nova
Royal
Scotia. Port
French, and had to be taken again during to
New
little
England expeditionary
William Phips, captured the
Queen Anne's War (1702-1713),
be renamed Annapolis and kept for the English Crown. After the
Royal the French built an elaborate situated so as both to threaten the
Quebec through
the Gulf of
St.
fortress at
held
lightly
by the
^vas later repossessed
this
time
loss of
Port
Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island,
New England
coast
and
guard the approach to
to
Lawrence. In King George's
War
New
(1744-1748)
England, with only scant support from the other colonies, equipped a force of more than 4,000
men
for
an assault on Louisbourg. This
little
commanded by
army,
Wil-
liam Pepperell, had "a merchant for general, and farmers, fishermen, and mechanics for soldiers." Pepperell chose his officers well,
ously. His attack
the
West
For the
and
Indies,
first
to
a British naval
after a siege of forty-nine days the
American
and extensive
up
attack, stood
to bitter
disgust, however, the British returned
by the treaty which ended the war.
And American
men
own
enemy
Louisbourg
thirteen colonies,
had participated
Some
3,600
to
officers,
fire,
him.
had
and won.
to the
French
impatience with Britain was not
lessened by the disastrous failure of a British-led attack, early in the war,
Spanish Caribbean port of Cartagena.
rigor-
squadron from
French surrendered
time in history American soldiers, fighting under their
carried out an aggressive
Much
however, and drilled his
on Louisbourg was well supported by
American
in this adventure,
troops,
on the
coming from
all
succumb
to
most of them
to
Spanish bullets, yellow fever, or dysentery.
The
War
culmination of the long struggle with France came in the French and Indian
or, as
it
was known in Europe, the Seven Years'
French took the lish colonies
War
(1756-1763). This time the
initiative early, in the thinly settled western
were most vulnerable
the French had swept away the
country where the Eng-
to attack. Before the official
frail
beginning of the war,
network of English outposts
ing young George Washington's tiny Fort Necessity.
in the west, includ-
They then roused
the Indians as
FIELDS OF GLORY
14
Georgia and South Carolina for a concerted attempt to push back the
far south as
English line of settlement. In 1754 and 1755 the whole American back country came to
know
New
the terror which
Vermont country
the
to
England had experienced in King
Georgia the blackened ruins of
War. From
Philip's
homesteads smol-
settlers'
and the wagons of refugees lurched do^vn the stump-filled roads
dered,
Even the proud gentry
to the east.
and the complacent merchants of
of the Virginia tidewater
Philadelphia were alarmed, though not sufficiently to achieve any real measure of
abandon reliance on the
intercolonial co-operation, or to
The on the
militia.
key to the whole French position in the west seemed to be Fort Duquesne,
what
site of
nies' willingness
is
now
Pittsburgh. In the spring of 1755, despairing of the colo-
or ability to defend themselves, the British government sent out
Major General Edward Braddock
to take Fort
Duquesne. Braddock had,
of his force, two badly depleted regiments of British regulars, filled
raw colonial
These men he had
recruits.
poorly chosen route, with
little
to
march an enormous
up
as the core
to strength
by
distance, over a
help from the colonies he had come to defend. His
Indian scouts never arrived; the colonial governments supplied him with broken-
down
horses and rotten provisions. Nevertheless, Braddock organized
and made one
of the finest marches in British military history, arriving at last within seven miles of
There, at the Battle of Monongahela, his army was massacred by a
his objective.
organized band of French and Indians scarcely half the size of his ally,
Braddock's defeat seems to have been due at
least as
much
own
force.
to his failure to ob-
serve, as to his failure to modify, the formal rules of eighteenth century
warfare. Unfortunately, however, the
main influence
dis-
Actu-
of his tragic failure
European
on Ameri-
can military thought was to reinforce the colonists' existing prejudice against professional soldiers
were not
when
to
and parade-grounds
remember
it,
discipline. I-ater in the war,
Brigadier General John Forbes painfully and methodically built a road and a
series of forts across Pennsylvania,
and by the
forced the
abandonment
vania, the
new Royal American regiment
by
although Americans
professionalism was redeemed, and Braddock avenged,
of Fort
a Swiss precisionist. Colonel
Duquesne.
best standards of
Finally, in 1763 at
European warfare
Bushy Run, Pennsyl-
of light infantry, trained
Henry Bouquet, was attacked much
and commanded as
Braddock had
been, but kept perfect discipline and routed the French and Indians with a skillful flanking counterthrust.
During
of the wars with the French, the great British-American objective
had
been the capture of the citadel of French power in North America, the walled
city
of
all
Quebec. As early
as
King William's War, a joint Massachusetts and
New York
pedition against Quebec had been attempted and had failed miserably. In
Anne's
War
ex-
Queen
another expedition had collapsed when a force of British regulars was
shipwrecked. In King George's War, after the the French had burned Saratoga and attacked Albany, an ambitious plan for a concerted attack on
Quebec and Montreal
by troops from seven colonies miscarried ^vhen the help expected from Britain failed to arrive. Finally, in 1759 a massive expedition against
Quebec was launched from
Louisbourg, which had been recaptured by the British. Eight thousand regulars,
accompanied by
a battalion of
powerful British
fleet.
Wolfe,
who had
American
Commanded by
rangers, were landed
a brilliant
below Quebec by a
young Englishman, General James
learned war by service and by reading
Xenophon and Thucydides,
LIBERTY AND UNION
15
he British force was, for a time, stalemated by the able defensive movements of the i^rench
commander, Montcalm. At
ittle-used
path to the top of the
last,
cliffs
however, Wolfe took his
north of the
city,
and
men by
there,
night
up
a
on the Plains of
Abraham, one tremendous British volley swept away the French in North America. Ironically, although Wolfe's victory gained
hem
the
American
urn their attention ion of
Quebec
Canada
colonies. Free of the threat of to relations
for the British,
for the British,
it
helped lose
French attack, the colonies could
with Britain. And, while Wolfe had settled the quesit
was
nore, once during the Revolution
to
remain unsettled
and again during the
vere to launch attacks against Quebec, both times to
fail.
for the Americans.
War
Twice
of 1812, Americans
The American The is
Revolution
causes of the American revolution remain a matter for endless debate,
sufficient
it
here to observe that the political connection between the colonies and
England had never been properly defined,
that English policy took
the growing maturity of the colonies, and that the
no
real account of
American outlook was intensely
provincial and inveterately hostile to the claims of Parliament. For a length of time
almost
which separates the Revolution from the present day, the
as great as that
colonies had gone their
own
way, had in fact achieved a real independence from Brit-
ain which the Declaration of Independence merely confirmed.
In dealing with the rate military
from
War
of the Revolution, however,
Had
political concerns.
whose enmity was not
in doubt,
it is
it
very difficult to sepa-
is
been a "normal" war bet^veen peoples
it
fairly certain that the British
could have extin-
many
guished organized American resistance in the campaigns of 1776 and 1777. For
months, the British commander in America, Sir William Howe, hesitated
critical
fatally
to
between
commission
his
wage war against them.
initial
American
to negotiate peace
was
It
with the rebels and his commission
this British hesitation,
perhaps more than the
which allowed the Continental Army time
resistance,
skill of
to develop
into a reasonably effective military force.
The 29.]
strategy of the
During most
War
of the Revolution was essentially simple. [See
map,
p.
of the war, the long coast line of the colonies was helplessly ex-
posed to British sea power, so that while American mobility was severely limited by
bad communications, the British could move
freely
along the coast, concentrating
their forces almost at will. Similarly the political co-ordination bet^\een the thirteen
separate states was hardly better than the
roads linking them, while
the
British
fought under central direction. This British advantage was, of course, partially neutralized
by the presence of considerable pro-American sentiment
same time,
in all of the
to Britain.
The
American
states there
in England.
At the
were substantial groups of people
loyal
Tories were concentrated in the west, along the seaboard, and in the
New
former Middle Colonies; in
York, for example,
it
is
probable that a majority
of the population was Loyalist or neutral. In Canada, too, the French population
stayed loyal to Britain, into the
^^'hile
the
St.
La^vrence gave British sea power a long reach
American continent. All along the
frontier the Indians
and
their
Tory
allies
upheld Britain's cause, and threatened the security of the west. The Revolutionists did possess one clear physical advantage, however, in the fact that the strongholds of
and
the Revoliuion were in the rich
fertile
remote from both the sea and the western had, in the main, to
Of
come
men and
supplies
3,000 miles by sea.
the obvious requirements for ^var, America possessed relatively few.
was no armaments industry try to clothe
to
compare with
an army. There was,
of a system of mobilization.
some military experience
them with
it is
There were
in the
at least a
There
that of Britain, not even a textile indus-
true, in the militia of
a surprising
number
each state the skeleton
of
men who had
gained
French and Indian War. For example, of thirteen
general officers in the Continental eight of
agricultural regions of the Piedmont,
frontier, while British
Army
in 1775, eleven
had
ser\'ed in earlier wars,
regimental command. During the years of political
agi-
LIBERTY AND UNION
17
tation preceding the outbreak of war,
men," had been formed
companies of militiamen, known
immediate service
for
in case of fighting.
On
as
"Minute-
the other hand,
there was in 1775 no body of genuinely trained and ready troops in the thirteen colo-
no system
nies,
command, no regular system
of general
of supply or transport, not
even a central government capable of financing and directing a war.
The war
into three
itself falls
months of 1776, was fought
main
New
in
phases:
The
and 1777, involving the heaviest fighting of the war, took place nies of
New
York,
New
and Pennsylvania; and the
Jersey,
early
in 1776
Middle Colo-
in the
culminating in
final phase,
and 1781.
Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown, was fought in the South in 1780
The
and the
phase, in 1775
first
England and Canada; the second phase,
skirmishes at Lexington and Concord in April, 1775, with which the war
New
began, were followed by weeks of feverish activity in tried to assemble supplies
and
train
men
transform Boston into an adequate base for what they police action. For, despite their losses
on the
still
Americans
as the
attempted to
British
regarded as merely a
from Concord, the British were
retreat
Had
disinclined to take Americans seriously as soldiers.
England,
and the
for war,
not the great General Wolfe
himself written that his American troops were "in general the dirtiest, most contemptible, cowardly dogs that you can conceive"? for
American
fighting ability that led General
was undoubtedly
It
Howe
to
make
this
contempt
on the
a frontal assault
American entrenchments overlooking Boston. Howe's men climbed Breed's Hill close formation, carrying sixty-pound packs,
beaten back by the withering Prescott. Finally,
dropped
when
their
first
formed
in
and second
in
were
tries
Yankee militiamen under Colonel William
of the
the Americans were running low
their knapsacks,
that carried the
fire
and on
order,
file
American works. Having
on powder, the
British
and made a furious bayonet charge and Bunker
lost Breed's
hills,
the Ameri-
cans tried to retreat, but under pressure they forgot discipline, and ran. Bunker Hill
was a British
victory,
but an expensive one; their casualties were more than 1,000 to
400 for the Americans.
At almost the same time
as
Bunker
ated the Continental Army, and given
Congress in Philadelphia had cre-
Hill, the
command
of
to
it
George Washington. Wash-
ington came to Massachusetts, and through the rest of 1775 worked tirelessly to
make
an army of the multitude of ninety-day volunteers, militiamen, adventurers, and hangers-on he found at Cambridge. a
maze
of colonial jealousies
He managed tions,
and
With no
at the
sure judgment he picked his
semblance of military order,
to gain a
same time
facilities for
With
and personal animosities
to
A
country, Knox's
and rope, or
to get.
men moved
Working
the heavy guns
in
des-
all
trails.
tinental headquarters; nearly sixty flints.
and
this
Washington sent Briga-
midwinter in wild and mountainous the
in flat-bottomed boats, or with oxen, or
and thousands of
Army was
considerable store of captured arms had fallen into Amer-
one-ton mortars over mountain
balls,
officers.
to improvise a system of requisi-
keep the British from venturing freely out of Boston.
ican hands with the capture of Fort Ticonderoga,
Henry Knox
way through
appoint a corps of
heavy-ordnance manufacture, the Continental
perately short of cannon.
dier General
to
way
across
New
England by
sled
sometimes even by manhandling
In January, 1776, the ordnance arrived at Con-
cannon and mortars, tons
Washington was then able
of
musket and cannon
to fortify Dorchester
overlooking Boston, and in March, 1776, the British evacuated the
city.
Heights
,
iwQ
^,:rin^.'N^\>
'I
i
4
Ai^
_.
T
'
W'-
British ships of
war landing
at
Boston in 1768 (New York Public Library)
in
m
ip\i)ii> Pi.N
Ire ili\Si)tis
U;dks Isf ininrn MIS
'
1.1
..
ihwaiil ruul
vritlijOiil'i<'ls(i(ii-i'.
liL-* l;iva.;'i-h'.-Iiid
Kane .nr,tr<-trht),Wrhk.-hH..Hb<; TI„-pbintiv.-C.h..l>g iwumi \\2Z'iiL omminHIT iIhuIV-x. n.rralrK.ts v;niinili;; .wt llH'irl'i-. .n^msWs f.r «^.„> ,>,„, n>rlalrK.ts..^»>usT«nrsfor
rim nan s <'.inui
^.//./-
The Boston
:^£^
''"f-'^^lnT'
of tl.>.L-,ml -'i^*'^'"^'^^^ HtaatchO.- r,tenU.^.\-illa.„ fto„, 1W,„1.
C)'lr"^[ h[i-.r,r,.
.
W
-
'5>«Ulreachajuu«Ewhoi.evercanl^biiW
InM^m
(i
Massacre: a contemporary engraving by Paul Revere {New York Public Library)
III
I
!
20
5^i««i*:^^
*
,^a'9|.'"
Sri Plate I
Plate II
famous prints of the battles of Lexington and Coi shows the fighting at Lexington; Plate II shows the Regulars mar into Concord, with two British officers in the foreground studying the J^ cans who were mustering on East Hill.
Amos Plate
Doolittle's
I
it^f^iM^-'^
Plate III
A.
'}f!^*j^
Plate
*te III "te J i
is
engagement at the Xorth Bridge in Concord; and firing on the Regulars from behind a stone wall, while the houses of Lexington burn in the background, {New York Public Library) a view of the
IV shows militiamen
IV
FIELDS OF GLORY
22
While the winning
ever,
strategic defeat at Boston, they were,
Canada. In September, 1775, two
a clear victory in
moved
armies had
were suffering a
British
into Canada: One, under General Richard
the short route from Ticonderoga to Montreal, which
and then on
Quebec.
to
The
little
how-
American
Montgomery, went by
almost without resistance,
fell
commanded by General Benedict Arnold, one officers, made a fantastically difficult
other,
of the most brilliant and energetic of American
march
across the wilderness of interior Maine,
Quebec
in
had concentrated there
American
assault
a swirling snowstorm;
American columns
Montgomery was
Americans abandoned the
remnants of the American
By
force.
John Adams wrote,
deroga, as
killed
The
attack.
touch with each other in
lost
and Arnold wounded, and
Quebec and rout
Americans
July, 1776, the
back
%vere
the
Ticon-
at
defeated, discontented, naked, undisci-
"disgraced,
Both in American and British vital place in the colonies. Its
cess to the interior
up
the
Hudson
and Massachusetts, offering the York's
heavy
after
following spring reinforcements ar-
up with vermin."
plined, eaten
New
The
practically all of the small military force in Canada.
rived from Britain, and Carleton was able to sally out from
most
force near
on the town was well planned, but miscarried; the French did not
join in the attack as expected; two
losses the
and joined Montgomery's
November. Quebec was cannily defended by General Guy Carleton, who
Tory
Valley;
it
possibility of
inclinations
New York
eyes, the city of
harbor was the
made
it
was
America;
finest in
strategically the
controlled ac-
it
was roughly midway between Virginia
movement
and
finally,
to the
Ameri-
in either direction;
attractive to the British,
and
cans suggested the need for an occupying garrison. Shortly after the evacuation of
Boston, Washington concentrated the bulk of the Continental
Then
leaving Boston defended principally by the militia.
Howe weeks
Army
in July,
in
New
York,
1776, General
landed on Staten Island with 10,000 British troops, built up in succeeding to
more than
whom nearly
30,000, of
posing American force of
less
a third
were German mercenaries.
Late in August, after methodical preparation, over to
Long
Island.
The
op-
than 20,000 men, was poorly equipped and badly trained.
Howe moved most
of his
men
Washington, perhaps unwisely, had put a third of his force in
Brooklyn, keeping the remainder on Manhattan Island in case the British should
tempt to go up the Hudson.
When Howe
discovered that the
left flank
of the
at-
Amer-
ican position along Brooklyn Heights was not secured, he ordered an attack which
crumbled the American 8,000
men
engaged.
left,
and
cost the Continentals over 1,000 casualties out of
The remainder
defenses on Brooklyn Heights. his strength of character
and
of the
American
force fled back to the
Here Washington demonstrated in
his military inexperience.
He came
full
camp
measure both
personally to the
demoralized camp and rallied his men, but he also reinforced them from his main body, thus further dividing his army.
Howe
It
has never been satisfactorily settled
why
did not attempt to go up the East River and land between Washington's two
forces. Instead
force to escape
he entered upon regular siege operations, and allowed the Brooklyn
and rejoin the main army
in
New
York.
The
actual evacuation of
Brooklyn was brilliantly directed by Washington, and expertly carried out by Salem
and Marblehead boatmen, but
it
should never have been necessary.
For three months in the autumn of 1776,
Howe
pursued Washington's army in
LIBERTY AND UNION
23
leisurely fashion— to the tip of
and
into
across
New
Jersey.
Manhattan
Island, to
Though some
White
Hudson
Plains, across the
Mary-
of his Continentals, especially his
land and Virginia line troops, began to act like veterans, Washington was unable to
an engagement with the British without the defeat, and usually the rout, of part
face
of his army.
The New England
would almost
Army, but Howe seemed almost
the Continental
On
militiamen, in particular, proved undependable.
several occasions a relentless British pursuit
certainly have destroyed
men, perhaps
to restrain his
be-
cause he expected an early end to the rebellion, and wished to avoid bloodshed.
By December, Washington's army was dwindling ware into Pennsylvania. Most of
its
British pursuers
into winter quarters; several thousand were left
New
in
fast
and had crossed the Dela-
had gone back
on garrison duty
Jersey. Fearing that his demoralized troops could not last
to
through the winter
without some encouragement, Washington determined on a bold move.
mas
night, he took 2,400
men
across the ice-choked
A
New
tially to restore his
Many
Germans, confused and
somewhat
disor-
American daring was
Jersey for the winter, allowing Washington to
army
Christ-
few days later Washington successfully raided the British
garrison at Princeton. Howe's cautious response to this
abandon most of
On
Delaware and surprised the Hes-
sian garrison at Trenton. After a two-hour fight, the
ganized, surrendered.
New York
at various places
at
rest,
and
to
par-
Morristown.
of the legends of the Revolution, current afterward in America, concerned
between British and American concepts of warfare.
fanciful differences
In frontier regions and in parts of the South, developed, and here fighting in rough and
abandonment
of
European formations.
it
is
true, essentially guerrilla warfare
wooded country often
It is also
necessitated the
true that the vast distances, poor
communications, and scarcity of supplies in many parts of America forced the British
modify their usual
to
of their
with
it
diers'
logistical
arrangements— to use
American wagons instead
light
own ponderous and specialized vehicles, to reduce their impedimenta and the number of horses they required, and even to reduce the weight of sol-
packs to facilitate long and rapid marches.
Under conditions
of guerrilla warfare, the
American long
rifle,
whether used by
Revolutionists or Tories, had an advantage over the standard British musket, whether
used by the British or by Continentals. In the larger engagements of the war, however, where the infantry fired in volleys, the British Bess, it
was often more
lost in
was
effective
range and accuracy.
slight, since
than the long
The
pean
and
rules,
less.
Tower musket,
made up
difference between British
as the
Army from
war progressed American
tactics
or
Brown
in rapidity of fire
and American
most American guns were captured from the
In drill and discipline, the Continental
rather than
rifle. It
what
artillery
British.
the beginning adopted Euro-
came
to
resemble British more
Indeed, the most useful service performed for the Continentals by
European volunteers was
to teach
European methods of
discipline.
Baron von Steu-
ben, perhaps the most valuable of European officers to serve with Washington, personally instructed both
By
American
officers
the latter years of the war, the best
disciplined veterans
applied
it
who had
and troops
of
the line in drill
tactics.
and most dependable American units were
learned thoroughly the European practice of war and
with slight modification to American circumstances.
FIELDS OF GLORY
24
The most
critical
year of the
war was
American cause with the adoption by the ily
have
South
split the
off
from
New
1777.
It
began inauspiciously for the
British of a strategic plan
which could
eas-
England, destroyed the Continental Army, and
won New York and Pennsylvania back to a British allegiance. The plan was British force from Canada, commanded by General John Burgoyne, would recapture Ticonderoga, join a Tory and Indian force coming down the Mohawk Valley from the west, and move on to Albany, where it could co-operate with the main perhaps
A
simple:
under Howe. Howe's army, under
British force
ton in
New
this plan,
would
tie
down Washing-
Jersey or Pennsylvania, and stand ready to aid Burgoyne in case of need.
Washington would thus be caught between Burgoyne's hammer and Howe's
anvil.
Happily for the United States the plan went badly awry. After taking Ticonderoga, Burgoyne's
army marched south toward Albany, only
the attrition of long and insecure supply lines. Burgoyne's
Vermont militiamen
sharply repulsed by
from Colonel Barry had, in ley
won
fact,
men
St.
Leger failed to
at
to suffer increasingly
German
foragers
were
Bennington, and the help he expected
arrive. St. Leger's force of
Tories and Indians
Mohawk Valmen had clubbed and knifed
a bloody victory against General Nicholas Herkimer's
at Oriskany.
The
violence of the battle, where
each other to death after both sides ran out of ammunition, had, however, dismayed St.
who
fled
back west. As Burgoyne found himself in increasingly
resistant country,
without the help he expected, he should, of course, have
Leger's Indians,
hostile
and
moved back toward
his
to
officer,
and pushed on
doom.
General long
Ticonderoga. But he was a vain and frivolous
summer
Howe
had, in the meantime, obligingly taken the bulk of his
cruise,
disembarking
finally at the
army on
a
head of Chesapeake Bay. Howe's tem-
porary disappearance had enabled Washington to reinforce the army under General
Horatio Gates that was moving toward Burgoyne. Once landed, his military
competence in a
series
of fierce
Sir
Howe
demonstrated
engagements with Washington. At
John Burgoyne {National Archives)
LIBERTYANDUNION
25
when Comwallis
Brandy^vine, the Continentals narrowly escaped annihilation
up the American right by a
ally cut to pieces
flank.
silent
their bayonets to kill 300
adelphia, the
American
At
General Anthony Wayne's division was
Paoli,
men. In September,
Howe marched and
chalked their white gaiters,
brass,
band and bagpipe.
A
few days later Washington
attempted an ambitious attack against the British camp
Germantown. Taken by
at
Howe
and threatened with defeat from a much improved adversary,
surprise
abandoned
fully
triumphantly into Phil-
while the Continental Congress fled in confusion. For
capital,
the music of
to
compact defense,
a
advantage of early-morning tinentals.
liter-
and brutal night attack in which the British used only
the occasion, the British polished their boots
and marched
rolled
fog,
Only the energy and
skill-
force into small brigades and, taking
split his
thoroughly confused and finally scattered the Con-
Greene in restoring
steadiness of General Nathanael
order saved Washington's army from a rout.
Three days
after
Germantown, when,
Washington knew,
so far as
his cause
desperately close to extinction, Burgoyne found himself in serious trouble. His
American
was, in fact, short of supplies and nearly surrounded by an
The
made
force
was
army three
a savage effort to break the Continental line,
but
Daniel Morgan's sharpshooters attacked Burgoyne's right, and Benedict Arnold's
men
times
its size.
British
struck his center. Burgoyne was forced to retreat into a trap, and surrendered his
army
at Saratoga.
The blame Burgoyne
aid,
main
his
but in fairness
force
from
a position
Howe, bungling
to
formed of Burgoyne's precise
Howe
been widely distributed.
for Saratoga has
by removing
to the disaster
plans.
certainly contributed
where
it
could have given
London had
in
left
him unin-
Burgoyne himself probably deserves a major
share of blame for his defeat. In any case, the consequences of Saratoga were incalcu-
although by no means
lable,
swift. Strangely, indeed, the
winter following Saratoga,
the winter of 1777-1778, was the grimmest time of the whole
Army. The
flight of the
war
for the Continental
Congress from Philadelphia had nearly destroyed the
structure of central government in America. Supplies for Washington's
most
to nothing; requisitions
men
could not be made; taxes could not be collected; the
Continental currency became nearly worthless. Yet even while Washington's
army
suffered at Valley Forge,
and while
ladies of Philadelphia, the slow
power
in the thirteen colonies
Britain, bringing to
The
last,
longest,
at
and powerful to
forces that
little
and courted the Tory
British officers feted
had begun
America the
overwhelm Comwallis
frail
fell al-
were
to extinguish British
move. France entered the war against
supplies, the
men, and the naval power that were
to
Yorktown.
and perhaps the
least
consequential phase of the war was
fought mainly in the South. In 1778 the British abruptly abandoned Philadelphia
and consolidated
their forces in
mand by General Henry
New
Clinton,
York. General
who
Howe
was replaced in com-
in 1780 left a formidable garrison in
New
York, and led an expeditionary force against the defenses of Charleston. After a two-
month
siege.
General Benjamin Lincoln surrendered Charleston and an American
garrison of 5,000
men
to the British,
and Clinton returned
General Charles Comwallis to pacify the South.
plunged the Carolinas into the rilla
The
to
New
York, leaving
presence of a British army
bitterest civil strife of the war.
Whig and Tory
bands chased each other over the country, and both sides produced some
guerbril-
26
An
engraving (above) by John Godfrey of the Battle of Bunker Hill (Library of Congress). Battle of Long Island in September, 1776, showing the retreat of the Americans under General Stirling across Gowanus Creek (National Archives)
The
%r^4f^
,l>^
'•^'^"*i'S'' »«<•-?- ii**r'-
New Jersey from the Hudson River in November, 1776: Engineers on Cornwallis's staff (New York Public Library). (below) the attack on the Chew house (Libraiy of Congress)
British forces (above) landing in
original
drawing by an
Battle of
officer of
Germantown:
FIELDS OF GLORY
28 liant partisan leaders,
like the
"Swamp
Fox," Francis Marion, and, on the other
Banastre Tarleton. As Cormvallis
Sir
side.
men
advanced
methodically
from
inland
Charleston, the Continental Congress sent the incompetent "hero of Saratoga," General
Horatio Gates, to South Carolina to halt the British. At Camden, Gates's force of
3,000 men, half of
whom
whom
were
militia,
met Cornwallis's
were Loyalist partisans. Gates disposed
his
force of 2,200
men
men, a third of
badly; the militia fled the
Gates with them, while his regulars fought on to defeat. Less than four days
field.
after the battle. Gates
was two hundred miles away, which caused Alexander Hamil-
man
ton to observe that his speed of flight did "admirable credit to the activity of a at his
time of
life."
American honor pens early in 1781,
South was redeemed, however,
in the
when Daniel Morgan with
a
Cow-
at the Battle of the
thousand men, two-thirds of
whom
were nervous militiamen, fought a British and Loyalist force of about the same
size,
but made up of regulars and veterans and led by Tarleton, the ablest of the Tory
commanders. Morgan adopted a formation and that of
Hannibal
at
of his line, allowing
Cannae, placing his
them
to
plan almost identical with
battle
least reliable troops in the front
and center
break and run at the British attack, and then execut-
ing a perfectly planned double envelopment of the nearly victorious British line.
The
British
and
Loyalists lost 300 killed
gan's casualties were twelve killed
and
and wounded and 600
sixty
prisoners, while
In a series of further engagements in the Carolinas, the British tactical victories,
ble help from
Mor-
wounded.
won
several close
but Gates's successor. General Nathanael Greene, with considera-
Morgan and from
American
partisan groups, was able to keep
resist-
ance in being, and thus to prevent the complete return of the Carolinas to British allegiance. Cornwallis's losses eventually persuaded
him
to retire to
Wilmington on
the coast, where he reorganized his army. Then, apparently deciding that Virginia
had been stripped of defenses
to supply the Carolinas,
With
7,000
conducted a
men he
and perhaps hoping
moved north
ultimately a junction with Clinton, Cornwallis
to effect
into Virginia.
swept aside light resistance from Lafayette's small force, and
and
series of raids
sorties
which began
to
draw Continental
reinforce-
ments into Virginia. This was seemingly what Cornwallis expected, and, secure in belief that
he could be supported by
sea,
on the Yorktown Peninsula. Assured that Grasse could support him, Washington
his
he moved into a strong defensive position a
French squadron under Admiral de
moved
the bulk of his
army
to Virginia,
New York with 17,000 men. To his astonishment, Corn8,000 men confronting 8,000 French regulars and 9,000 rather than a British fleet offshore. The British fought
while Clinton stayed idle in wallis
found himself with
Americans, with a French skillfully
and
gallantly,
nally, in October, 1781, full
but were gradually driven back on their inner defenses. Cornwallis surrendered his army. His
Fi-
out with
honors of war, between lines of French and American troops, whose bands
played a popular tune of the day entitled
War
men marched
"The World Turned Upside Down." The
of the Revolution was over.
The
military lesson of the Revolution was clear: Militiamen
unteers could not be counted on in battle, except able conditions, as at
Bunker
when used
Hill. Properly trained
and
and short-term
vol-
defensively under favor-
officered,
however, Ameri-
can troops were the equal in battle of the best Europe could send against them. As
29
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AT YORKTOWN April-Octobir 1781
Concentration of Forces at Yorktown
30
A
Currier
&
Ives print
showing Marion's Brigade crossing the Pedee River in South Carolina (Library of Congress)
31
The surrender of
Cornwallis at Yorktown {Library of Congress)
32
Baron von Steuben
A supply
drilling troops at Valley Forge (Library of Congress)
train of Washington's
army
at Valley
Forge (National Archives)
LIBERTY AND UNION )bvious as it may seem, this was
33
which the United
a lesson
would have
States
to
earn again and again.
Despite Washington's earnest protest, the Continental Congress disbanded the
army
regular
I
in 1784, keeping only
and Fort
Point
few hundred
Pitt,
about 100
men
men were
was increased considerably.
The
guard military
of old
Miami country
by this defeat [see below, p. 91], the worst of
:o
"Mad Anthony" Wayne his
men
its
St.
Clair was
of Ohio.
precise
and
skillful
ambushed
kind since Monongahela, Congress
Pitt,
Wayne
set to
men,
work
to
with a thoroughness and rigor reminiscent of von
Timbers near the present
site of
test at
the
Toledo. There his force was
utacked by a large and confident body of Indians, against I
1790,
Finally aroused
Steuben at \'alley Forge. In 1794 his system of discipline was put to the Battle of the Fallen
in
to train a regular force of 5,000
be called the "Legion of the United States." At Fort
nake an army, drilling
and
next year, however, a force of 1,500 militia-
nearly destroyed by Indians in the
luthorized General
forts,
and Indians, the number of regular
nen and 600 newly raised regulars under General Arthur
md
West
stores at
to the several states. In 1786
number
raised to garrison a
"ollowing two disastrous battles between militia ;roops
to
and leaving questions of defense
whom Wayne
double envelopment, scattering them with small
carried out
loss to his
own
men. Wayne's methods were confirmed in a series of further engagements with the Indians, culminating in forces of
Type
o£
General William Henry Harrison's great victory over the
Chief Tecumseh at Tippecanoe in 1811.
cannon used by the Continental Army
at
Valley Forge [Xational Archives)
34
The battle-torn
flag of the
3rd Maryland Regiment {National Archives)
(Left)
American riflemen of the
Revolutionary War: on the left, a sharpshooter in white coat and breeches; on the right, a regular Pennsylvania infantryman wearing a dark brown coat light brown breeches (National Archives)
and
(Facing
page,
Left)
A
48th
R(
{National Archives).
(R:
soldier
of
the
British Grenadier
Foot,
wearing
of
tt
white
b
and a red coat trimrae white and blue {National Archives
35
The
king's colors— the flag of the 7th Fusiliers {National Archives)
The War of 1812 It
is
tempting to regard the war of 1812 as a shabby epilogue to the revolu-
The
tion.
verdict of the Revolution
essentially, the
change
to
War
this verdict. It
least victorious
of
and
them
was far too great for the
Canada should remain
of aggression ever fought by the least glorious of
United
States,
this,
the
should also
States mobilized nearly half a million
militia or short-term volunteers.
command
British;
American wars.
During the course of the war, the United men, nine-tenths
that
somewhat halfhearted American attempt
perhaps not entirely to American discredit that
is
war
nearest to a forthright
be the
had been
of 1812 represented a
system of the
little
This
regular
vast untrained
army
horde
to deal with,
and
the result of indiscriminate enlistment was simply to destroy the efficiency of the
A
existing military forces.
handful of
first-rate
regular
officers,
men
like
General
Winfield Scott and General Jacob Brown, struggled valiantly to turn raw recruits into soldiers, but their efforts were overtvhelmed by the ineptness of
and
political
amateur
officers
appointees like Brigadier General William Hull and Major General
James Wilkinson.
The campaigns United its
of the
States to adjust
its
first
year of the war illustrate nicely the failure of the
ambitions, military as well as political, to the realities of
position. General Hull, for example, after contemplating an invasion of Canada,
prudently surrendered Detroit with ish,
without firing a shot.
refused to keep
The
its
garrison of 2,000
men
to a force of
700 Brit-
British thought so little of Hull's militiamen that they
them prisoners and turned them out
of
camp
to save the
expense of
feeding them. Along the Niagara frontier an American force of 900 newly formed regulars
and 2,300
militia essayed
an invasion of Canada.
The
THE NORTHERN FRONTIER IN
X
THE WAR OF
•'"1
0* '"•
1812
'"«Mt.» Oct •!)
The Northern
Frontier in the
War of
1812
regulars were attacked
LIBERTY AND UNION
37
on the Canadian shore of the Niagara River, and cut their
them.
own size, while the much larger militia force refused to cross the river to help From Ticonderoga, General Henry Dearborn attempted to follow the old inarmy
vasion route to Montreal with an
who
by a British force
to pieces
man,
refused, almost to a
with some 65,000
men
men. Half of these were militia
of 6,000
to cross into
Canada. In sum, the United
then
States,
launched four separate invasions of Canada in 1812
in arms,
and was soundly thrashed by British
and a
forces totaling fewer than 3,000 regulars
few hundred Canadian volunteers. Fortunately for the honor,
not also the survival, of the United
if
the
States,
second and third years of the war were not quite so catastrophic. In the autumn of
William Henry Harrison followed up Perry's great victory on Lake
1813, General
Canada through
Erie with an invasion of British
Thames
position along the
enemy
Considerably outnumbered, the
Detroit.
had abandoned Detroit and retreated about a hundred miles
to a defensive
There Harrison, with some 3,200 men, met the
River.
some 800 regulars and 1,200 Indians, and routed them
force of
envelopment of the British
line
the war, however, that after
It is characteristic of
after a swift
by a Kentucky cavalry regiment. this,
the only offensive victory
[
i
win on
the United States was to
and
volunteers, son,
let his
"who never won
land, Harrison was forced to dismiss his one-year
militiamen go home. And, to the
fled
had made another attempt
Canada with 13,000 men. At the
to attack Montreal, crossing into
Americans
General James Wilkin-
east.
a battle nor lost a court of inquiry,"
back into the United
States, leaving eastern
mixed
control of a British force of 2,000
regulars, Canadians,
was free of war in Europe.
It
undisputed
first
time in twenty
was only a matter of time before the most
formidable army in the world could be turned against the United 1814,
opposition, the
in the
and Indians.
In April, 1814, Napoleon was driven into exile and, for the years, Britain
first
Canada
States.
In July,
before British reinforcements could arrive in strength. General Jacob
launched a carefully planned invasion of the Niagara peninsula with 4,000
had spent the winter and spring learning force of about the
same
size
drill tactics.
The
Brown
men who
met him with a
British
along the Chippewa River. Expecting the Americans to
break and run as they had done before, the British commander, General Sir Phineas Riall,
watched instead
Brown's
as
one of the war's rare tributes
"Those are
regulars,
British finally
at
American
steadily
under
Finally, Riall in
fire.
soldiering, exclaimed
in
amazement,
by God!" Threatened with an American flanking
withdrew
and Americans met
men advanced
to
across the
attack, the
Chippewa River. Shortly afterward the
Lundy's Lane in July, 1814, in the
fiercest
British
and most evenly
I
I
I
!
I
1
i
i
matched
battle of the war.
An
who counterattacked and were
initial
American attack was thrown back by the
The
in turn beaten back.
exhausted and holding their original ground; each side
wounded, 40 per cent
of the American,
battle lost
some 850 men
and 30 per cent of the
British,
ended with both
was drawn, strategically
it
and
British troops involved.
Both Brown and General Winfield Scott were seriously wounded and, although cally the battle
sides
killed
tacti-
was a British victory; the remnants of
Brown's army retreated to Fort Erie on the border,
The most down army
serious threat to the
United
States
the Ticonderoga-Lake-Champlain route in of 14,000 of Wellington's veterans
during the war was that of invasion 1814.
The
British
assembled an
who took Ticonderoga without
effort,
and
38
A
lithograph showing the Battle of the
Thames
in October, 1813 {Library of Congress)
39
(Left) ficers
An American general and staff offording a river {National Archives)
(Bottom left) Three American infantrymen. Note the characteristic stovepipe hats (National Archives)
(Right) Officers and infantrymen in uniforms of the War of 1812 {National Archives)
40
^^ w
'^vi
i^k
-a^
^^9^^
•'^^l^^^^^l
Major General Jacob Brown, one of the comparatively few heroes of the War of 1812 (National Archives)
^1 Winfield Scott leading a storming party against Fort George: from a painting by Alonzo Chappel (National Archives)
^^B**^"
Pitcher, but an unidentified lady serving an artillery piece with hot shot at Niagara {National Archives). Hand-to-hand combat (below) in the Battle of Chippewa, perhaps the fiercest engagement of the War of 1812: from a painting by F. O. C. Darley (National Archives)
Not Molly
FIELDS OF GLORY do— take New
42
might very well have succeeded in doing what Burgoyne had
York from behind— had tory over a British fleet
Thomas Macdonough's
not been for
it
failed to
on Lake Champlain. As
it
brilliant naval
vic-
was, lacking control of the lake, the
British retired into Canada. It is
not
pick out the most disgraceful incident of an inglorious war:
difficult to
the abject failure in August, 1814, of 7,000
American
advance force of 1,500 from taking the capital ish
militia to prevent a British
Washington. Meeting the
city of
Brit-
near Bladensburg, Maryland, the militia fired a couple of desultory volleys and
The
fled the field in terror.
where they
British proceeded to occupy Washington,
burned the Capitol, the White House, and a number of other public buildings
wanton American destruction of York (now Toronto), the
taliation for the
Upper Canada. After burning Washington,
and
the British were re-embarked;
when they attempted to attack Fort McHenry outside Baltimore. Weary with almost a generation of war, the British entered upon peace
driven
later
off
United
tions with the
mas Eve, United
The
1814.
States
peace
which were concluded
war remained
real or fancied goals.
its
be fought
to
had been signed, but before news
To
New
take
negotia-
Ghent, in Belgium, on Christ-
at
matters precisely as they had been before the war; the
left
none of
States gained
battle of the treaty
in re-
capital of
Orleans, and with
at
of
it
New
Oddly enough, the bloodiest
Orleans two weeks after the peace
had reached across the
sea.
control of the Mississippi, the British had sent
it
Lieutenant General Sir Edward Pakenham and 14,000 of Wellington's toughest
Defending the
erans.
motley army of 5,000 men, only 800 of
son, with a
he had no chance against the British
from behind
vet-
was a ruthless and canny American, General Andrew Jack-
city
fortifications.
in
open
battle,
whom
were regulars. Knowing
Jackson determined to
fight
them
In a defensive position his poorly disciplined militia
could best be controlled, and both the marksmanship of his Tennessee frontiersmen
and the expert gunnery of
flat
ground behind
securely against a
French and regular army artillerymen could be used
his
Jackson selected with great care the position he would defend:
to full advantage.
a canal, his right flank
swamp.
He
anchored on the Mississippi River, his
left
kept his troops busy with spade and pick until he had
He then Howe had
powerful earthworks topped with stacked bales of cotton to shelter them. awaitea the British attack. As contemptuous of American irregulars
been
at
Bunker
American
Pakenham
Hill,
sent his
position. In twenty-five
men on
a parade-grounds
minutes the British
lost
2,000
as
march toward the
men
killed,
wounded,
or captured, out of an attacking force of 8,000. American casualties in the area of the
main
attack
The War
were seven
of 1812
men
killed
and
six
wounded.
was followed by a generation of comparative peace, marred
only by a continuation of earlier Indian troubles. the Seminole
regular
of 1835-1837, did,
it is
army and an uncounted number
an exception
Under came
War to a
built into
first
worst of the Indian troubles,
of militia. [See below, p.
command
of Winfield Scott, the
United
time a highly professional organization,
States
But
Academy
at
West
Point.
As
fine a
diplomat
as
Army
its officer
competence by the handful of young men who came
the Military
93.]
this
was
time of general quiet.
the able
for the
The
true, cost the lives of one-third of the small
quietly be-
corps gradually
to it every year
he was a
from
soldier, Scott, in
the Canadian border incidents of the 1830's, in his relations with the Indians,
and
LIBERTYANDUNION
43
even in his management of the threatened revolt of South Carolina in 1832, proved as effective at
preventing war as he was to be
In these peaceful times, however,
group of irregulars who were the outlying
The burning
to
Mexican province
add
it
at
winning war.
was not the regular army, but rather a new
luster to
American arms— the faraway
settlers of
of Texas.
of Washington: Briiish troops
marching through the abandoned capital of
the United States {National Archives)
An
New Orleans, from a sketch made by Major Latour, General Jackson's chief engineer {National Archives)
accurate view of the Battle of
An
New Orleans. Note the barricade of cotton mountain men and Negroes (National Archives)
old print of the Battle of
bales,
and the
46
A
militia drill, with the militiamen apparently unimpressed by the strutting officer
on
the right {National Archives)
\
'Johnny Bull and the Alexandrians": a bitter contemporary comment on the fraterniz tion between the British and citizens of occupied Virginia (National Archives) IfCil
./v« (/
u-n^ Him rr^f,t yo^r forttr and
J'ruu
f'l
'
pvetuUQmOKn
tiull <^onl
m
the
Umr
t-<
of
ftrtU
ton hnrrj
our
rjnl'Ofyo
h„f,
thrm.
lllrrr
/
ttum mort
III,
J»/>a
An American
orderly on horseback, 1813 [National Archives)
Between wars: a review of the National Lancers on Boston Common, from a lithograph by Fitz Hugh Lane, made in 1837 (Library of Congress)
I
-^ma^iii^
The Texan War To
for Independence, 1836
THE SQUALID HAMLET OF WASHINGTON-ON-THE-BRAZOS
i
MARCH, 1836, CAME A
IN
motley delegation from the disgruntled English-speaking settlements in Texas. These
Texans had been
loyal
Mexican
but
citizens,
American settlements in northern Mexico, most prominent
F. Austin,
to
Mexico City
to bear
settler
They looked
loyalty wavered.
and leader of
settlers, for
to explain the sensitivity of his fellow
arms and
hand of tyranny
as the ancient
their hatred of oppressive taxation.
to
fell
on
Stephen
guidance, and he had gone
Texans concerning the
When
right
he was clapped in the
calabozo for his pains, the patience of his Texas followers ended.
The
Washington came not
delegates to
gress or to the
happy
hostelries of
in the finery of the Continental
They came
firm as their earlier counterparts and their cause was also freedom. clare that
Texas was and ought
Con-
urbane Philadelphia, but their purpose was
and independent. And while they
to be free
as
to de-
deliber-
ated on a declaration they thought of defense.
No
one in
Texas knew so much about military matters
all
Sam Houston,
as
former governor of Tennessee, long-time friend and blood brother of the Indians, and all-round adventurer.
mand
The Texan Convention made him
a general and gave
of the scattered units hopefully called an "army."
military situation looked poor indeed.
There were
When
him com-
he took charge the
several small outfits spread
around
south Texas, poorly armed, short of supplies, out of money, and opposed by growing
numbers eral
of well-equipped, well-trained
Mexican
Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna realized
repressed to
show
that the sovereignty of
and
cavalry.
Texas must be
Mexico could not be
Gen-
swiftly
flouted.
tiny unit in a position to threaten or delay Santa Anna's
Houston had only one advance into Texas;
infantry, artillery,
that rebellion in
was the garrison of the Alamo mission in San Antonio.
this
Houston thought the garrison too small
to
do much and ordered the commander.
Colonel William B. Travis, to save his men, destroy the Alamo, and retreat to join other
Texan
forces.
In one of the great moments of American military history,
Travis ignored the order.
If
Santa
Anna
could be pinned
down
in
San Antonio for a
Texan Convention would have a chance to build a war. At dawn on February 23rd, Mexican cannon opened on the Alamo. Inside, the Texans had a few guns, some powder, a little food, and a sick man named Jim Bowie. time, the
For a while Mexican ing mission and
its
tactics
were standard. Formal siege
lines
outbuildings. Rolling claps of artillery
gunners and the deliberate nature of the
siege.
The
surrounded the sprawl-
fire attested
the skill of the
battlements were wreathed in
smoke; almost every Mexican shot tore chunks out of the adobe. Gradually the
shell-
ing wore away portions of the walls, and the garrison retired closer to the mission
proper to conserve men. Several times, after the artillery had pounded the walls into
lumps of
debris, the flower of
Mexican infantry charged;
several times they
were
beaten back by dogged, sharp-shooting defenders.
When
the sun
came up on each
of thirteen days, February
23-March
Texas gun signaled that yet the Alamo held—one more day deposited of
Houston and Texas.
Texans who
still
On
the thirteenth day, the final charge came.
could fight fought outside the
Alamo
6,
a single
to the account
The
handful of
proper, retired inside, emptied
|
1
LIBERTYANDUNION the mission's
when
49
cannon point-blank
bullets ran out,
enemy
at the
and stabbed when
as they
all else
crashed the doors, clubbed
went. At the door of the invalid
Bowie's room, so the story goes, a high stack of dead Mexicans gave proof of the lethal
nature of Jim's throwing arm. But this was the end. In the swirling smoke and chaos of those last lives.
No
moments, Bowie, Travis, and Davy Crockett paid
defender
said to have survived.
is
Texas with
for
The Alamo monument, on
grounds in Austin, carries the proud and tragic motto of that
their
the capital
"Thermopylae
fight:
had her messenger of defeat, the Alamo had none." Thirteen days was not enough time, of course, but Houston put the semblance of an
army
in the field, despite the fact that 300
surrender at Goliad.
hound
it.
The
victorious Santa
Texans were shamefully duped into
Anna began
to track
Houston's army, to
But Houston eluded the enemy and picked up bands of volunteers from
over the United
States.
Hundreds came
to help the
all
underdog; some in time to die at
the Alamo, others to join in the great retreat.
For seven weeks Houston kept his army, raised
at its highest point to
men, retiring before ranging Mexican dragoons. As he continued melted away in disgust; the old
Houston moved on, halted at
last at
man
wouldn't
fight,
past the site of the future city
some 1,500
to retreat,
and they had come which would bear
men
to fight. Still
his
name, and
an apparently poor position on the banks of San Jacinto Bayou.
On
April 21, 1836, after spending the morning resting in full view of Santa Anna's serried legions,
Houston attacked. In the afternoon,
Texans— about
1,100 of
them— formed
siesta
time for the Mexican Army, the
a line of battle.
To
Doodle," the line moved slowly forward, picked up speed
toward light Mexican works, broke formation
became a
as the
that
it
climbed the gentle slope
men began
wild, cheering mass of hellions racing into the
erally caught napping, never got into the fight. Before
the piped notes of "Yankee
as
enemy
men
he or his
an army of rugged amateurs had violated the rules of decency
rules of war, the Battle of San Jacinto ended.
but an empire
The Mexicans
to run,
lines.
lost
and
at last
Santa Anna,
lit-
quite understood
to
improve on the
not only a battle,
as well.
For nine fighting years the Republic of Texas stayed
Texas become part of the United
States.
The
victory he
free.
won
Houston
lived to see
that April day at
San
Jacinto gained more land for the Union than any victory since Yorktown, and gained it
in the best tradition of independent
American arms.
50
Exterior of the
Alamo
chapel. This view was
Army
drawn by Lt. Edward Everett "Houston Post")
Plan of
the
sketches of Lt. Lt.
^*V
AiyV
, ,
^•^•iX-k'i-
^^ ^' —-<-*
TRAVIS
i=%\^
t^h a
k BARRACKS
Alamo J.
Stockade, based Blake, 1845,1
Edmund
Edward Everett, 1846, and on a m drawn by Capt. R. ^^ Potter, 1841 (Courtesy the "Houston Post")' ^ ^
NDDTM WAll U/Air BREACH IN NORTH
"If-^
of the U. S.
in 1846 {Courtesy the
Mia^k^
Col.
William B. Travis, commander of the (Courtesy the "Houston Post")
Alamo
David Crockett, one of the casualties of the Alamo. Photograph of a painting in the Capitol
of
Texas,
Austin (Courtesy
"Houston Post")
the
t)Z
lexas Army, President of the Republic of lexas (Courtesy the "Houston Post")
Capitol of the Republic of Texas, 18371839 (Courtesy the "Houston Post")
k
y
#^^^ra 4Hk
H
Ml SHI
ffi 'R^
Piiiiiiiiiii
'Ifnni
^^^^
^
k^ M'~
^-^S^-:
!^
i
«
LIBERTY AND UNION One more States
and Mexico.
in 1845,
53
thing resulted from the Texas Revolution: war between the United
When
Mexico viewed
it
Texas achieved annexation and became part of the Union as a direct insult to
her sovereignty. This attitude, plus
other simmering points of grievance, finally brought conflict in 1846.
War ficers
[see
below,
p. 140]
The Mexican
has often been considered the "baptism of fire" for later
and men of Union and Confederate armies, and
sound. Certainly in the Mexican
War many
future
to
some degree the idea
commanders learned
ofis
a great deal
about maneuver, the use of the three basic arms of the service in concert, and the value of cutting lines of communication to success. as
when
"the book"
no longer pointed the way
Largely from General Winfield Scott's operations
many
later leaders
such
Grant, Lee, Jackson, Beauregard, and McClellan learned the changing nature of
the military art.
During the
1840's,
armies grew larger than anything in previous
American martial experience, and problems
of
Mass was almost the key word in 1846-1848,
as
command it
certainly
multiplied proportionally.
would be
in 1861-1865.
The American Nothing
Civil
War, 1861-1865
more confusing to historians than causes of wars, and no war has
is
more complex
causes than the Civil War. North and South split over slavery, eco-
nomic
and ways of
systems,
life,
and each
side
had
its
share of justification.
The
South,
T. Harry Williams has perceptively observed, was out of harmony with nineteenth century America. The North, burgeoning with money and people, embraced the Inas
Age with gusto and could have
dustrial
ward.
If slavery
men were
way
stood in the
created equal, then the institution
and progress could not be denied. the status of a lition
little
would
sympathy
of democracy, in the
would have
of a nation in
which
demanded
to go. Progress
all it,
the reckless career of the United States toward
If
modern world power troubled an balm and bromide.
serve as
for a section looking back-
way
occasional conscience, perhaps abo-
the stern
If
New
England
abolitionists
could pronounce their consciences clear once the black man's fetters were torn away, the other sections' easier ethics need hardly feel troubled about size or greed or ex-
Then,
ploitation.
too,
there were obvious economic rewards which
would accrue
should the South be eliminated.
For
its
part, the
South shielded a sense of exclusion behind an aggressive de-
fense of slavery, the plantation system,
and the
ineffable "Southern
way
of life." Nei-
much about what was going on in the other section. made up. Such rigidity led to secession as the remedy
ther North nor South really cared
The mind
of each was fully
employed by the South— the section which thought ity.
With
secession, the
North
rallied to hold the
alone stood for constitutional-
it
Union
indivisible.
The bombardment of Fort Sumter by the newly created Confederate States Army on April 12, 1861, touched off the Civil War. President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to uphold the laws of the Union. From all parts of a North which had been
all
too apathetic
the Midwest, the clerks of
up
dian fighters of the frontier. preserved.
to the time of
New York They
stores,
all felt
Sumter came the the millworkers of
one thing in common: the Union had
Most of them had no notion of what
them could handle were pretty
scared.
needed. Not
all
of
a gun.
And
men— the sodbusters of New England, the In-
it
was
like to
like all citizen armies, a
be a soldier; not
good many of these
to be all
of
recruits
But they came, because the Rail-Splitter had said they were
them had voted
and many thought him
for the Illinois lawyer
a caricature of a President.
who
sat in the
White House,
But they were frightened by the
man elected to run the country and the army and What he said generally went. The men who put on the heavy woolen blues were better than many of their officers. By now long enmeshed in martial matters, the United States still gave little consistent attention to a standing army. The tradition of the minuteman continued. And when the latter-day minutemen flocked to the vicinity of Washington, command turn of events, and he was the
navy.
became
a real problem.
There was
a core of
West Pointers around which
to build
an
army, but the core was for some time held together instead of being distributed
throughout new
outfits.
As a
result,
raw
officers
often
commanded raw
the professional officers confessed themselves out of practice. As one of service
on the Indian
frontier taught
young
officers all
recruits.
Even
them observed,
about commanding
fifty
dra-
LIBERTYANDUNION
55
And
goons but nothing about commanding a division.
The
lem—size. oi the
The
to
quota
its
to
fill,
as the old thirteen colonies
ous of their right to elect
first
Army
officered
West
of
its
own
units
and sent them
officers
Southerners contributed to the myth of
was
said,
and
The South had
were remarkably good.
myriad schools of martial caste dotting the region.
it
like their
patriotic, distrustful of "brass,"
Pointers, Virginia Military Institute graduates,
Southerners,
to the field
jeal-
Despite these absurd elections, which were abolished
officers.
Southern
after a year or so.
many
comprise the
had done. These grayclads were much
Yankee counterparts -independent, hardy,
number
to
be commanded by someone.
Confederacy, too, counted on citizen-soldiers. Each state (finally there were
eleven of them) had
much
who gathered
thousands of Union soldiers
Potomac had
that was the crux of the prob-
were
initial
so used to
The
a large
and products
military
mien
of so
Confederate advantage in
of the
many So
talent.
arms and the sport of the
field that
they could easily take the plowboys and shopkeepers of the North.
Neither side found the taking easy.
When
the job grew wearisome and the glory
men not caught up in the initial surge of volunteering grew cautious. When of men to the armies thinned to a trickle, both sides faced a crisis. In April, the flow 1862, the Confederacy met the crisis head-on. The South, in a striking display of military realism and cold constitutionality, passed a draft act. Many Confederates reacted
wore
off,
violently,
but not to the point of outright resistance, and the most individualistic
tion of the old
the
Union
and
in
also
New
United
came
States
submitted
first
to a draft. Curiously
sec-
to the rigors of regimentation. In 1863
enough, reaction there took a violent turn,
At
York, rioters screamed their loathing of so stern a police measure.
length, of course, both sides accepted conscription,
and the era of the "national army"
arrived.
Civil
lasting changes not only in the social structure of
war wrought
but also in their economic structure.
amounts of supplies
to
keep the
the elements of logistics, took
on new dimensions.
fort.
it.
As
it
armies
citizen
demanded
both sides incredible
Food, clothing, munitions, transportation,
field.
armies operating in restricted theaters.
Everybody had a part in
Huge
It
became
War
a massive, all-embracing,
became a war of
all
ceased to be a thing of small
logistics, it
became
total
ef-
clear that
the North could better wage such a war. Factories, furnaces, textile mills, leather shops, arsenals, ironworks, shipyards— all these transformed
raw materials into muni-
The North had more mines and factories and more men to operate them South. The Yankees, too, had the capital to sustain a war of production.
tions.
the
At the
start the
than
South had almost nothing. In the course of the war the Confed-
eracy became a small industrial power, but resources, factories, and labor were on a
small scale compared with those of the enemy. centralization in an attempt to
support a total war. Despite the
Still,
the South submitted to stern
manage an inadequate economy evils of states'-rights
efficiently
philosophy of government ingrained in the Southern conscience, the ministration did create something of a national war, and ran lines.
Even
ization,
it
if
enough
to
governors and the splintering
it
Richmond
ad-
along almost modern
President Jefferson Davis had been able to achieve complete central-
remains doubtful whether the South could have done
Militarily the land
war was divided into three
parts:
much
better.
the eastern theater, cen-
tered in Northern Virginia; the central, in the Mississippi Valley as far east as East
56
Cannons on the Confederate
shore, facing Fort
Sumter
in the distance {National Archives)
(Above
right)
Going
into
camp
at
n
{Library of Congress)
(Below) "Off to the wars," from Fond Lac, Wisconsin (New York Public Libi
58
A winter camp for
infantry
(National Archives)
- Camp
of United States Zouaves (National Archives)
A
traveling forge, vital
equipment
armies (National Archives)
to
(IS
of Charleston, South Carolina, seen
from the Circular Church (National Archives)
Captured Confederate guns (National Archives)
of artillery going into action, by W. H. Shelton (Library of Congress)
,ch
k
.A
\^''^^'^y:'' ..^--\
'
LIBERTY AND UNION
61
Tennessee; the western, in the Trans-Mississippi area to the remote sands of Arizona.
Most of the drama and most of the famous generals concentrated in the eastern ter.
Here Robert
Army Army
E.
thea-
Lee commanded the most glorious of Confederate forces— the
of Northern Virginia. Against "that incomparable infantry" fought the Federal of the Potomac, a splendid organization which suffered the sorrow of a succes-
sion of poor
commanders
George G. Meade and U.
until the arrival of
S.
name
In the central theater, the leading Confederate force bore the
Grant. of another
The Army of Tennessee fought against several Union armies, each bearing the name of a river (after Yankee fashion): the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the Cumberland. The Confederate
state (a
Confederate custom).
commanders less
in this theater ranged
from bad
exception—Joseph E. Johnston.
rater;
P.
to mediocre, with
brilliant
but luck-
first-rate
second-
Albert Sidney Johnston was probably bad; Braxton Bragg was weak; John B.
Hood was
disastrously bad.
Carlos Buell,
A
long procession of Federal commanders included
Henry W. Halleck, William
T. Sherman, and U.
S.
Grant.
The
last
S.
Beyond the
three were far
and away the
Army
Mississippi military organizations were often informal.
with the
of Missouri, the
last
best,
although
The
Southern
strategist.
were divided into several groups variously called the
forces
Don
Rosecrans, George H. Thomas, William
Rosecrans shared Bragg's ability as an organizer and
the
one
G. T. Beauregard was a
Army
of
New
Mexico,
Western Army, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi,
the favorite name. Federal forces bore a host of names.
were generally obscure, but some were excellent.
Among
Commanders
the better Rebels were Ed-
mund
Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, John B. Magruder, Samuel Bell Maxey, Stand
Watie
(a
Confederate Indian brigadier), and Jo Shelby. Fairly competent Federals
included E. R. In
whose
all
S.
Canby,
theaters
abilities
S.
R. Curtis,
and with
all
S.
D. Sturgis, and William
armies there
S.
Rosecrans.
^vere, of course, a host of lesser generals
ran the gamut from good to bad. So too the abilities of the generals
charged with management of lesser forces or subtheaters. Hardly
army commanders,
for instance,
ford Forrest, and Joe
Wheeler
less
important than
were the horse soldiers— "Jeb" Stuart, Nathan Bedfor the South;
James Wilson, Phil Sheridan, and Ben-
jamin H. Grierson for the North.
General Philip H. Sheridan (National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
62 In the eastern area of military operations, the tionately
known throughout
Johnston and Beauregard
Rebel
victory,
the South as Lee's
at First
of Northern Virginia, affec-
Army, gained
its first
fame under Joe
Manassas (Bull Run), in July, 1861.
A
brilliant
Manassas nerved the North to a grim war and confirmed Southern
overconfidence. But with Lee's assumption of
new
Army
command, Virginia operations took on
determination. In early 1862, Lee's ablest lieutenant,
curious
man
Campaign. With
Union
Thomas
("Stonewall") Jackson, that
J.
of kind heart and stem discipline, began his famous and brilliant Valley scarcely
more than 18,000 men, Jackson paralyzed some 60,000
troops in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, and proportionately reduced
General George B. McClellan's chances of capturing Richmond from the southeastern, or Peninsula, side. Following Jackson's successes, for co-operation with the
main Confederate
force
Lee called him
to
Richmond
which then defeated the Army of
the Potomac in the Seven Days' Battles—June 26-July
2,
1862— a
series of actions de-
signed to turn the Yankee right flank and roll the Federal army into the James River.
McClellan had a sixth sense of self-preservation, a cautious nature, and the careful attention to logistical details of a good businessman.
He
contrived to escape the worst
consequences of Lee's attacks, and saved the bulk of his army by tucking
of
Richmond, broke the back
Clellan,
and
stalled a
Adhering
of the largest
enemy army, humbled
the proud Mc-
to the basic Confederate strategy of offensive-defensive,
won
a victory
new
movement
Lee hurled
his
army under General John Pope. over Pope's advance at Cedar Mountain in early Federal
August, and Lee relentlessly pursued the main Federal force. a huge flanking
under
lifted the siege
major invasion of Virginia.
victorious forces northward against a
Stonewall Jackson
it
He
cover of his gunboats. Nonetheless, Lee's campaign was brilliant.
(Stonewall's specialty) to strike
He
detached Jackson on
Yankee communications
in the rear. Jackson destroyed Pope's base at Manassas Junction, near the old First
Manassas
battlefield,
eral attacks
army
to the field,
ized him,
then took a strong position and beat off several desperate Fed-
on August 29-30. In the meantime, Lee brought the remainder of
and the two wings smashed Pope's
left
flank
on the
and drove him pell-mell into Washington.
General
Thomas J.
his
30th, demoral-
("Stonewall") Jackson {National Archives)
LIBERTYANDUNION
63
So successful had the Confederates been in stalling enemy offensive strategy and in repelling invasion that tions dictated
Lee pondered carefully
his
next move. Various considera-
an invasion of the North. Virginia, bare of supplies in
counties, could not support the Confederate army,
might gain important diplomatic and military
and war carried
results.
its
northern
enemy
to the
This was especially true since
General Bragg launched an invasion of Kentucky in August; a two-pronged Rebel
might win the war.
offensive
Lee took
his
army
into Maryland,
hoping
cident gave McClellan (restored to Federal
to
go on into Pennsylvania, but an
command) unexpected knowledge
ac-
of Lee's
plans and an opportunity to attack separate portions of the Rebel army. Attack McClellan did, and the speed of his advance forced Lee to concentrate near Sharpsburg,
Maryland, on September 16-17, 1862. There, on those fateful days, occurred the bloodiest battle either
army had
yet experienced.
The
Rebels called
it
Sharpsburg.
the Yankees, Antietam.
On
the night of the 16th a tranquil
bayonets glinted along the Antietam,
moon shone on the gathering legions. Federal Mac pulled more men in from beyond
as Little
the mountains. Campfires winked far along the stream as 70,000 to 80,000 boys in
blue waited for battle on the morrow. Lee's troops huddled along a ranging line of
between the Antietam and Sharpsburg. Their backs were toward the Potomac,
hills
and
a lot of
on the
left,
them were not
yet
on the
along the more open
troops, to the curving slopes of the right, street, lay
The I
From
field.
hills of the
the cornfields in Jackson's front
center defended by General D. H. Hill's
defended by blunt General James Long-
about 35,000 men. battle
began with the crack of dawn on the 17th. General Joseph Hooker's
Corps moved through woods and into the cornfields along Jackson's
derous claps of artillery rifled
guns blasted
rifles replied,
Brigadier killed
at
rolled across the
it
was the mainstay of Southern
made what answers were
lines,
whole Confederate
left as
front.
Thun-
heavy Federal
Rebel batteries behind the gray infantry. Some Confederate
but generally
Napoleons, that
Confederate
at
fire
artillery, the
possible. Masses of bluecoats
12-pounder
edged toward
shoved them back, and the awful firepower of the serried ranks cut
General Israel B. Richardson, the "Bloody Lane," Antietam (National Archives)
64
Field works at Atlanta, Georg {National Archives)
Chevaux-de-frise,
the
"barbo
wire" of the Civil War (National Archives)
Making
gabions, which wei used in hea\7, semipermaner fortifications {Natiotial Archive.
t
'rt
of the Confederate works at Atlanta, Georgia (National Archives)
of the Confederate
de
at Petersburg, Virginia
(National Archives) I
frt
Hell in the Petersburg lines (National Archives)
66
Sketch of a section of the works at Vicksburg, Mississippi (National Archives)
Another section of the works (National Archives)
^ ^^jJ^^-S^^SMk^^t&..§*
I
A picket
post,
probably near Atlanta {National Archives)
Charge of Humphrey's Division
at Fredericksburg: sketched
Congress)
by A. R.
Waud
(Libraiy of
FIELDS OF GLORY
68 the Rebels fields
down
The
in thousands.
ran red with gore. Jackson
cornstalks were sheared off knee-high,
most
lost
men and by
of his
and the
eleven in the morning
could hardly hope to hold his front longer. Another Union thrust doubtless would
have reached Lee's
He had
tested the
and
parison,
3,000
a line of guns
came huge Federal
and found
left,
it
strong.
The
to the
forces.
on some commanding
The
Confederate center.
center seemed feeble by com-
H. Hill had nothing with which
was. D.
it
men and
but McClellan shifted attention
rear,
enemy
to
hold the center except
Against his makeshift line
hills.
bluecoats shoved the Rebels steadily back until
brought to a halt by a line of Confederates grimly dug in along a sunken road. So desperate raged the slaughter here, so fierce the attack and defense, that the short bit of road
would be known forever
Again McClellan had
By
late
left,
committed them
all
went
as
final push.
of his
men— those
to the
dubious charge of General Ambrose E.
movement
Burnside, and hoped a flanking
Bloody Lane.
won, but shifted the attack before the
moved most
afternoon he had
reserve— to the
after as the
his battle
he did not keep in cautious
against Lee's right
planned, the Confederates would be cut
would win the
day. If
from their one road
off
to the
river.
The
Confederate right had been stripped to save the
there were scarcely
rest of the battle,
more than 5,000 Rebels holding along
IX Army
Against them went Burnside's 13,000-man
Nothing apparently could save the Army
and
the guns he could get to the right,
of
and now
a mile of high ground.
Corps.
Northern Virginia. Lee brought
forty or fifty hot muzzles sprayed grape
canister at the slow-moving blue ranks as they forced a crossing of the
all
and
Antietam and
began a ceremonious march up the slope toward main Rebel positions, established, ominously enough, near a cemetery.
At a moment which comes both sides take a
final breath,
in
most
battles, a
iously the road to Shepherdstown Ford,
ment
wing remained
of Jackson's
Yankee
garrison,
would comel
and
Hill,
if
moment
when
of curious quiescence
Lee got reinforcements! All day he had watched anx-
hoping
to see Confederate dust.
A
large seg-
Harpers Ferry to arrange the surrender of a
at
only that segment under redoubtable General A. P. Hill
pushing his infantry hard most of the morning, heard the crashing
roar of musketry and artillery, and as the air filtered the sound in eerie waves he
charged up and
down
his
march saved the army,
men came
to gather itself. Hill's
and charged.
Down
column, laying the
for his 3,000
left
change
of his saber to laggards. His desperate
flat
when
arrived just
on the
left
of the
the Federal line paused
Yankee
line,
deployed rapidly,
the slopes raced his tattered regiments, a line of butternut
screaming the Rebel Yell tried to
in
men
front,
as they ran.
Unprepared, and
but could not do
it
in time.
The
briefly stalled, fierce attack
broke the Union
elements; soon the whole Federal front collapsed and Burnside took his
to the Antietam.
The
Confederates.
men
back
day had been saved for the Rebels.
Although he wanted chance. McClellan
demons
the Federals
felt
to
too
More than
engage McClellan on the 18th, Lee did not get the
weak
to
renew the
fight,
and
it
was
just as well for the
10,000 Rebels lay on the grisly slopes of Sharpsburg;
than 12,000 Yankees lay near them.
The
17 th of
September marked one of the
more costli-
est battles of the war.
When
Lee retired
| to \'^irginia
on the
19th, the right
prong of the great Confed-
LIBERTYANDUNION erate
summer
69
offensive was blunted,
and Lincoln had a semi-victory upon which
hang an Emancipation Proclamation. The also
come
left
Kentucky venture had begun
to grief. Bragg's
well.
He had
brilliantly out-
maneuvered General Don Carlos Buell, sneaked between the Federals and at Louisville,
and gained a chance
He marched away from
Louisville,
and away from
to
Middle Tennessee.
Buell,
success. After a series of pointless political
fought the battles of Perryville and Murfreesboro,
He won some
territory,
lost the fruits of
their base
At
for glittering victory along the Ohio.
mactic moment, however, Bragg cracked.
to
prong of the Confederate offensive had
that
cli-
away from
maneuvers, he
and
both,
but could have had so
retired
much more.
After the failure of the double offensive in 1862, Confederate fortunes were never the
same.
Lee
Army
of
still
fought successfully in the
the Potomac
at Fredericksburg
east.
and
In December, 1862, he defeated the killed or
maimed
12,500 Federals. In
May, 1863, he and Stonewall Jackson gained the masterful victory of Chancellors\ ille.
But the
cost
was
far
beyond the
prize;
Jackson was mortally wounded. With no
time to lament the fallen, Lee, in an attempt to relieve pressure on Virginia as the west,
took his reorganized army into Pennsylvania.
as well
The northward push was
a continuation of offensive-defensive strategy.
At Gettysburg, on July famous battle of the Civil to
1-3,
War.
any of Lee's recent combats.
subordinates failed pages of history
him
Lee fought General George G. Meade in the most
It
was a curious
He
seriatim,
fought
and the
marked a throwback
began the decline of the
Army
of
it
battle, for it
bore
little
resemblance
piecemeal and in an apparent daze. His
final
charge of Pickett and his
men into the The battle
to the tactics of the war's first year.
Northern Virginia, but
it
did not win or lose the
war.
The winning and
losing was going
on
Buell and Rosecrans, and General John
Army
in the west.
Bragg had begun losing against
C. Pemberton,
commanding
the Confederate
of Mississippi, continued the losing with his operations against Grant near
\'icksburg in May, June,
and
July, 1863.
Confederate General John C. Pemberton (National Archives)
LIBERTY AND UNION
71
After several frustrating stabs at the Rebel river fortress, Grant decided on bold tactics to take it in
May, 1863.
He wanted
two and make further splintering
easier.
it,
for
would cut the Confederacy
its fall
He
dable Rebel batteries on the river and the landing of his army south of Vicksburg.
managed both
The
and moved inland
feats,
in a
sweep
far to the east of the fortified city.
idea was to cut off potential Vicksburg reinforcements,
about 30,000
men
between isolated enemy
tion of the principle of getting
mishes, one pitched battle,
and
to pin the garrison of
Grant did these things in a bold and
in the city.
in
His new plan called for by-passing formi-
brilliant applica-
units. After several skir-
and some fumbling on Pemberton's
Grant trapped
part.
the Rebels in the Vicksburg works. Joe Johnston, with a ragtag force, was supposed
Pemberton, but had not enough
to help
July 4th Pemberton gave
up
Waters rolled "unvexed to the
Cut
became
main
all
much
of anything.
On
and once more the Father of
began a precarious dual existence.
virtually a separate
About
the hard-pressed east.
or horses to do
sea."
in twain, the Confederacy
Mississippi area
men
the Vicksburg pocket,
domain, and offered
that Jefferson Davis could count
The
Trans-
little assistance
to
on now were the two
armies east of the river.
field
After Bragg's failure to push the victory at Chickamauga in September, 1863, and his
subsequent disasters
at
Johnston in charge of the
When
general.
in the west
the
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Davis put Joe
Army
of Tennessee, although he
campaign of 1864 opened
and Lee
still
Army
led the
in the
had
faith in the
little
summer, Johnston commanded
of Northern Virginia.
There were
scattered
Confederate forces holding some coastal positions, and General Richard Taylor had
from the Trans-Mississippi
a small force
to harass Federal operations in the
New
Orleans sector.
The
Yankees, though, were going to decide what happened in 1864. After his
brilliant success at Vicksburg,
commanding
Grant rose rapidly in Lincoln's estimation and became
general of the armies of the United States in March.
a plan consistent with his
the North and South.
hammering
And he
He had
a plan,
military philosophy, and with the resources o£
thoroughly understood the management of a war of
logistics.
Leaving
his friend
Sherman
in
command
of three
armies— the Tennessee, the
Ohio, and the Cumberland— to deal with Johnston, Grant ensconced himself with the
Army
of the Potomac, although he left
Meade
in
nominal command. Beginning in
May, a double-edged sword would be wielded against the tottering Confederacy.
While the Army of the Potomac pursued the sound objective of knocking out the main Rebel army, Sherman's men would not only try to eliminate Johnston's army but would also endeavor to wreck the feeble industrial network of the Deep South.
While Lee fought
to
hang on
to
Richmond, Sherman would cut
its
resources out
from under the Confederacy. The strategy combined military with economic objectives,
and represented
The campaign tories for
Lee
ing closer to
which began
at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania,
treating to lick
of the
a real plan for total war.
in Virginia,
in early
wounds and change commanders,
Richmond by
May, resulted in
tactical vic-
and Cold Harbor. But instead of the
Army
of the
re-
Potomac kept edg-
the left flank. Finally, in mid-June, Grant slipped south
James and Appomattox
rivers,
and attacked Petersburg in a revival of McClel-
72
Desei led \iigiiiia
\
illage, ihc
residue of
war
(National Archives)
(Upper right) Before Petersburg, July, 1 by A. R. Waud (Library of Congress (Lower
right) Battle of
Currier
Union
prisoners at Salisbury,
&
North Carolina (New York Public Library)
H%
u
Second Manassa
Ives {Library of Congress
m
4 C-^f;
..%
-:^f-
/^
'4
"
^f iiS^iiLr
74
Confederate dead near the cornfield, Sharpsburg (Antietam), Maryland {National Archives)
The "Bloody Lane"
at
Sharpsburg 1
^^j^^^^^^-T^^^:£^~^>~ "- -^'
The Army
of the
Potomac on
a winter campaign, January, 1863: by A. R. (Library of Congress)
Burnside's Bridge over the Antietam (National Archives)
'^' .
iH
Waud
FIELDS OF GLORY
76 lan's old
scheme of getting
of Petersburg
From some
and
a
new
Richmond from behind. So began
at
era in
the earliest days of the Civil
extent.
American
effective the light
not on a grand ginia, that his
officers
who had
Lee found, shortly
men had
field
and firepower became cruelly
adept at throwing up
after
fortifications
dirt.
had been used
hesitate to use them.
he took over the
a natural aversion to digging
behind earthworks represented some ever,
War,
fought in Mexico had seen at firsthand
Mexican works had been, and did not
scale.
a nine-month siege
American warfare.
Army
and seemed
to
how But
of Northern Vir-
to feel that hiding
cowardice. As the war dragged on, how-
sort of
effective,
both Yanks and Rebs grew amazingly
At Petersburg ditchdigging became a
the city a thirty-mile labyrinth of trenches,
communicating
fine art,
trenches,
WILOERNESS TO PETERSBURG M«y(M4-/kprii laes
Wilderness to Petersburg
and around
and "bomb-
LIBERTYANDUMON
77
proofs" sheltered both armies. Views of these works the snaking miles of ditches lacing the
burg
lines held until April 2, 1865,
fenses to the breaking point.
march
to
that
Western Front
when day
still
in
World War
his lines
his
held at Petersburg, Johnston,
positions,
made
ston's lines
American
stronger by digging. At
I.
from
Lee's Peters-
too,
his
9th.
refined
entrenching tech-
to Atlanta in
one of
annals, Johnston successively held strong
Kennesaw Mountain
were so strong that he repulsed a
And when Sherman approached
different
were breached and he began
army on April
As he grudgingly backed down the railroad from Dalton
the great Fabian campaigns in
little
attenuation and attrition thinned his de-
Appomattox, where he surrendered
While Lee niques.
On
show them
full-scale assault
in June,
1864, John-
with heavy slaughter.
Atlanta in July, he found the city ringed with works
DRIVE TO ATLANTA 4May-2S
Drive to Atlanta
78
jfel^^
Idealized version of Pickett's Charge {Library of Congress)
Confederate dead at Little
*J.
Round Top
(National Arci
^
ilry
-^f^,
charge near Brandy Station, Virginia, 1864: by Edwin Forbes (Library of Congress)
View
of the Battle of
Chickamauga, Georgia (Library
^^
/_,^^^JW^,
of Congress)
80 SO fearsome as to give
was in
at last Atlanta
and
base were
its
him
FIELDS OF GLORY when win. The enemy army
pause. Johnston had retreated, fought, retreated, and
Sherman
sight,
still
had
his
campaign
to
still intact.
Jefferson Davis finished the
campaign
for
Sherman by changing commanders
mid-July. In Johnston's place he put the "dealer of manly blows," General
Hood, who dealt some blows and evacuated Atlanta
Hood
itself off
completely from
the Vicksburg operations that
Sherman
forgot his rear, lived
the sea.
Hood, thwarted in
maneuver.
army
his
He
botched his
at Nashville in
base.
its
in B.
in September. Following that,
decided to attack Sherman's communications, for he
could not cut
John
felt
still
that
an army
But Grant had shown Sherman
in
modern war could be waged off the enemy's country; off Georgia until it howled, and marched relentlessly to
his
first
tactics,
plan,
won
turned toward Tennessee in a sound
and wrecked
a Pyrrhic victory at Franklin,
December. That battle virtually eliminated the Army of Ten-
nessee as a factor in the war. Johnston was called out of retirement to preside over the
weeks of his old army, and had the sad duty of surrendering
last
it
to
Sherman on
Durham Station, North Carolina. Outlying operations sputtered to a finish by May 26th, when Kirby Smith yielded his domain. The war was over. Much about war had been taught to Americans between 1861 and 1865. Modconflicts, it was clear, could not be won without great organization, centralizaern tion, and logistical management. There were no longer any real noncombatants. The April 26, 1865, at
Cavalier attitude toward war as a contest between gentlemen died; war was the grim-
mest of
human
need be cited It
endeavors. It was, in Sherman's apt word, "hell."
to
show the changed nature of war than the
had mobilized most of
its
material strength, shot
its
bolt,
and
ing except total effort could have achieved such total collapse.
perienced total war.
A new command
man
to
lines.
The war changed
run the military
it
Of sound very best,
if
went
better evidence
lost utterly.
The
Noth-
North, too, ex-
concept had worked; the President found a
side of things while
he organized the nation behind the
the country— it catapulted the
Union
Strength had grown with the stimulus of danger, and the stronger than
No
total defeat of the South.
into the Industrial Age.
Union came out
of the
war
among
the
in.
military lessons there were many. Civilian soldiers were
properly led. Fed and Confed alike had proved the bravery of the Ameri-
can soldier when he had leaders, and sometimes
when he
led himself.
of hand-to-hand combat appeared about ended. Although there could
Still, still
the era
be grand,
awful moments like Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, Grant's at Cold Harbor, Sher-
man's
and
at
Kennesaw Mountain, and Hood's
rifled
Out
at Franklin, the effectiveness of the rifle
cannon made war more a thing of machines than of men.
of all the terror, heroism, glory,
and baseness of those four years of
civil
war came a new America. North and South had experienced the worst of wars. The South lost it, but had saved honor and added much to the "best traditions of the service." So
had Grant and Sherman and
crucible of Union, but
be
little
noted.
it
all
the boys in blue. It
had proved the American fighting man.
had been
The
a tragic
proof would
View of
the Battle of Pea
Ridge (Elkhorn Tavern), Arkansas
(Libraiy of Congress)
View
* ji^
-«^
"^'^^^j gai '
r lj
of the Battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee (Library of Corigress)
82
Winter quarters, cavalry (National Archives)
i^^B^sflJJ^TlP*'
^^Z,
^'W^
I^ Baici)
D, ^L '.Olid
United States
Artillery, inaction .u I'ciciibu.g,
K
Li^nwd
{National Archives)
A group from
the
Army of
the
Potomac watching
a cockfight, August, 1864
(National Archives)
^yfflf*S^«fl
m f^-'>"
/^
^
.-
Ruins of Richmond, Virginia, 1865 {National Archives)
THE TRAIL OF TEARS
Indian Wsrs in the East The
title of this section refers specifically to only one incident in the
relations
between whites and Indians in America— the
when
kees
in 1838. Yet
it
march of the Chero-
terrible
Andrew
they were driven from their homeland by
Jackson's government
can be applied with equal justice to the whole bitter story of the In-
dian tribes from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, as they lessly
from the remorseless aggression of the white
when
that
the
aborigines,"
Founding Fathers landed, they
settlers.
on
"fell
For
back help
fell
not entirely true
if it is
and then on
their knees
certainly fair to say that the struggle between the settlers
it is
and
the the
Indians was cruelly and steadily waged as long as the Indians had any lands the white
man
wanted.
The fundamental impotence of the Indian to resist the clearly seen in retrospect; it was much less clear to the actual all,
white
the hostility of the Indians had permanently discouraged
America— the Norsemen
settlers in
had contributed board, the
in the eleventh century;
out the colonial period, in military might,
the
Kennebec colony
the Indians were often able to
fact,
and sometimes
little
overmatch them in military
to
European
on the Atlantic in Maine.
match the
skill.
woodland Indians of the East
the nineteenth century were the
first
and unfriendly Indians
to the destruction of the first English colonies
Roanoke settlement and the
may be
settlers
combatants. For, after
to
Not
sea-
Through-
colonists in
until early in
be subjugated thor-
oughly, and then, after scarcely a generation of ease, the white settlers were to find in the Plains Indians of the
The
first
the mainly
West an even more formidable and obstinate enemy.
Indians with
Algonquin
whom
the colonial Americans
tribes along the Atlantic coast
These were woodland
tribes of
a few thousand souls.
They were
from
came
in contact were
New England
a Stone
Age
people, separated from seventeenth
century Englishmen by a cultural gap perhaps
thousand years wide. They were
five
hunters and food gatherers and, some of them, primitive farmers.
weapons were the bow and arrow, wooden clubs and stone-tipped
and
knives.
Their military organization was
as
the
New
England
later,
though superior in
to
as
many
hun-
as a
attempt war alliances with each other. Their ene-
who were
similar to the
political organization.
Muskhogean
Algonquin peoples
They dominated
and Pennsylvania and the upper Ohio Valley. principal tribes were of
numbered
under the stimuli of English enmity and French support,
were
tribes
mies were the Iroquois,
Their original
spears, stone axes
simple as their political; war parties
of the Delawares or Narragansetts or Pequots seldom
dred braves, though
to \'irginia.
sometimes only a few hundred, and never more than
stock,
To
the interior of
culturally,
New York
the south, centered in Georgia, the
and included more numerous and
ticated farming folk like the Chickasaws, Choctaws,
sophis-
and Creeks.
In the contacts between alien peoples suddenly come upon each other, trade usually goes along with,
settlement of
New
and
influences, war.
Within a generation of the
first
English
England, the local Indians had acquired and learned to use Euro-
pean muskets. In the South,
it is
true,
where the fur trade with the Indians was
less
important, the "trade muskets" came into Indian hands more slowly; as late as 1715 the Yamassees in South Carolina were fighting the English with
bows and arrows
only.
THETRAILOFTEARS The musket
87
added
of the colonial period
than might be expected to the fighting
less
potential of the Indian. It was a clumsy weapon, most effective
when
fired
from
massed ranks, which the Indians seldom used. Indians could shoot their arrows,
from concealment, several times in the awkward and noisy minute
silently
load and
fire
maintain their guns, nor did they ever learn to use artillery
erly to
Of
traditional offensive tactics, the
surprise.
enemy
The
preferred Indian
on
in a quick raid
method
one on which the Indians
took to
sense, the Indians
his settlement, or to
ambush an enemy
trails.
Of formal
had none. They avoided pitched
The
bat unless they already had a clear advantage.
from horseback, or in country where
at all.
laid
most
stress
was
of warfare was to strike at an unsuspecting
but not an obvious place along the forest
pean
it
a musket. In addition, the Indians never learned to repair or even prop-
force at a favorable
battle tactics in the Euro-
battle or hand-to-hand
com-
eastern Indians hardly ever fought
their enemies could use horses.
Their defensive
arrangements were weak, although occasionally, even in the colonial period, some
attempted to protect their villages behind stockades carelessly copied from those
tribes
of the whites. Generally the Indians disliked fighting in winter or, despite legend, at night.
The
eastern Indians
made
little
distinction
between enemy combatants and
noncombatants and, although they preferred sometimes to take as captives,
would
kill
them
unhesitatingly.
be inhumanly cruel in war; some
On
"vermin,"
as
women and
children
standards, the Indians could
example, regularly practiced the cere-
tribes, for
monial torture of captured enemies. regarded Indians
By European
the other hand, the white settlers generally
only to be exterminated. Indian prisoners were
fit
often killed or sold into slavery, and several colonial governments paid bounties
Indian
on
scalps.
New
In the earliest English settlements, both in Virginia and in
England,
rela-
tions with the Indians followed a similar pattern: a few years of uneasy peace fol-
The
lowed by an ill-concerted Indian attack on the settlements. 1622 devastated the
little
was killed before the survivors villages
which had been their
rallied bases.
and defeated the Indians by destroying the
Even
so,
colony in force in 1644 and again in 1676. In
gagement with the Indians, the Pequot rivalries
among
the Indians; the
War
the Indians were able to attack the
New
England, in the
which permanently destroyed
1675, however, a remarkable Indian leader, Metacomet, or
most of the
New
stroy the English colonists. laid waste the outlying
England Indians
For
first
serious en-
of 1637, the colonists were aided by
Mohegans and Narragansetts joined
a series of forays against the Pequots
in uniting
Indian Massacre of
colony of Virginia. Nearly one-fourth the white population
in a desperate
King
and
the whites in
their power. In
Philip, succeeded
fierce
attempt to de-
months the Indians systematically and one by one
five
New England
towns, while the
New
England Confederation
could only look on, paralyzed by an inefficient militia system, inexperienced com-
manders, and internal discords and jealousies. Finally the
New
Englanders, under
Josiah Winslow, struck back in a winter campaign of extermination against the Narragansetts. less
common and
By
from the
the spring of 1676 the tide had turned decisively against the Indians, skill of their
action.
killed.
opponents than from their own incapacity for sustained
King Philip was betrayed by one
of his warriors
and hunted down
Eventually the Narragansetts were nearly destroyed and their
out of southern
New
England.
The
cost
was heavy, however: Twenty
allies
New
driven
England
FIELDS OF GLORY
88
towns were razed and perhaps 6 per cent of the trade was temporarily destroyed
total
white population killed; the fur
New
and the whole
England economy seriously
damaged.
King it
War marked
Philip's
a turning point in the colonial Indian wars. Before
most engagements with the Indians had been
local
afterward the Indian
affairs;
wars became involved increasingly in the great struggle between Britain and France
North America. As
for control of
early as 1613 the French
had aroused what proved
permanent enmity of the great Iroquois Confederacy by supporting an
to be the
Algonquin attack on an Iroquois camp along Lake Ontario. The Iroquois entered into close trade relations,
first
with the Dutch and later with the English, and were
probably responsible for keeping the French out of the Hudson and
More and more, Iroquois as
allies of the
tribes usually as allies of the Spanish or French.
the colonial
governments eventually to adopt something
rational system of frontier defense.
This system had two main
New York
The
raids.
and guard against
ranged from mere village blockhouses to extensive and
"forts"
on the European model. They were never
well-laid-out establishments to
a
southern Virginia; and second, mobile military forces, usually called
to
"rangers," enlisted in times of trouble to patrol the back country
merous
like
features: First, a series
and Indian War, extended from
of frontier forts which, by the time of the French
Indian
the
threat of Indian attack along the frontier, constant in most of the English
forced
colonies,
valleys.
allies:
English; most of the Algonquin tribes as allies of the French;
and the powerful southern
The
Mohawk
Indians appear in war as white men's
1680, the
after
sufficiently nu-
a chain of regular frontier defenses and, in colonies
form
without any
them were
regular military establishment, they were usually undermanned. Most of
not large enough to shelter the civilian population in their areas in case of need. Nevertheless, they were seldom attacked by the Indians, fied positions. Occasionally, siege; at
Presque
it
is
true, the Indians
who
disliked storming forti-
would attempt something
like a
1763 they even dug regular approach trenches, though they
Isle in
did not then attempt an actual assault.
The
usual Indian response to the frontier forts was to evade them, and attempt
to infiltrate
between them and raid the
territory behind.
To
most of the colonies enlisted companies of men, occasionally but usually
cope with as
this threat,
full-time regulars,
militiamen, to scout the back country between the
as short-term
forts.
Where terrain and weather permitted, these rangers rode horseback, though sometimes they scouted on foot or even on snowshoes.
The combined
system of forts and
rangers could provide a measure of protection along the frontier, as the different experiences of Virginia and Pennsylvania during Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763 showed.
more than
Virginia kept
from Indian risons
a thousand militiamen
attack; Pennsylvania kept a
and saw
its
much
on frontier duty and suffered
little
smaller militia force in sedentary gar-
whole western region ravaged by Indians. Although no
factory system of passive defense against the Indians was ever devised,
really satis-
the early
eighteenth century forts are the forerunners of the more familiar system of army posts in the
West more than
Virginia, Massachusetts,
a century later;
and the
little
ranger companies of
and the other colonies are the ancestors of the Texas Rangers
of the next century.
From King
William's
War
through the
rest of the colonial period, the pattern
THETRAILOFTEARS of the Indian wars
89
remained
essentially the same.
Time and
time again the Indians
w ould attack the English frontier settlements, provoking generally a confused, uncoordinated, and ineffective response from the colonial governments. In 1690 Schenec-
New
tady,
York, and a half-dozen upper
attack. In 1703-1704, in
New
England towns were destroyed by Indian
Queen Anne's War,
the Abenakis raided the
Maine
settle-
ments and massacred almost the whole population of Deerfield, Massachusetts. In 1745, during
King George's War, the French and Indians burned Saratoga and even
On
attacked Albany.
New
the other hand, by driving the French out of Acadia, the
Englanders were able to deprive their Indian neighbors of French support, so that by the middle of the eighteenth century the focus of Indian danger
had moved south
of the Iroquois country, to the back country of Pennsylvania, Virginia, linas.
It Avas
French
forts
government
this
and trading
lars,
posts in the
Ohio
prompted the
Valley, that finally
move was
this
British
The
to send regular troops to the defense of the colonies in 1755.
mediate result of
up
and the Caro-
Indian threat, supported and directed by the tightening ring of
largely of Indians. [See above, p. 14.] It was, nevertheless,
rather than colonial militia or frontiersmen,
who by
im-
made
the catastrophic defeat of Braddock by a force
mainly British regu-
1763 destroyed the power
behind the eastern Indians by driving the French out of North America. Before admitting the finality of defeat, however, the Indians lately allied with tlie
French made one furious and desperate attempt
This was
at self-preservation.
Pontiac's conspiracy of 1763, the most formidable Indian rising of the colonial period.
Pontiac was an Ottawa chief
who managed
tion almost all the tribes of the
Ohio
for a
moment
to unite
under
his direc-
West
Valley. In a few weeks every fort in the
except Detroit and Fort Pitt was taken by the Indians, and the frontier from Niagara to Virginia ravaged.
Hundreds
wiped
of frontier families were
out, their charred
The
cabins standing years later as grim reminders of the fury of Pontiac's braves. colonial governments proved, as usual, incapable of resolute
and the militia almost
as helpless against the Indians as
tide of Indian victory
was turned back by a small but
British troops. In August, 1763, Colonel
and concerted
action,
The
were the frontiersmen.
brilliantly led force of regular
Henry Bouquet was attacked much
as
Brad-
dock had been, and not many miles from the scene of Braddock's defeat, near a creek called
Bushy
Run
in western Pennsylvania. Surprised and, unlike Braddock, far out-
numbered. Bouquet formed
his
Surrounded and under heavy
men
attack.
in a hollow square as
Bouquet
if
to repel a cavalry charge.
realized that
he could not defeat the
Indians by remaining on the defensive, so he deliberately weakened part of his defense perimeter to allow the Indians to close in for the
himself led out an attack party "from a part of the
observe and
fell
upon
rified the Indians,
their right flank."
Bouquet
By
hill
The
bined with the raising of the siege
As they
command. Fort
defeat of the Delawares at at
did.
a disciplined bayonet charge
scattered them, saving his
haps the whole western frontier.
kill.
Bouquet
they [the Indians] could not
which
ter-
and
per-
Pitt,
Bushy Run, com-
Detroit shortly afterward, discouraged the
Indians. Pontiac's allies began to desert him,
and
finally
he himself made peace with
the English in 1766.
By
a series of events
Indians were given one
which they never pretended
last
During the Revolutionary
to
understand, the eastern
opportunity to challenge the advance of white settlement.
War
the Indians found their old enemies, the English,
90
A
frontier fort of the colonial period, and a prototype of the western forts of the next century: Seybert's Fort, built prior to 1758 on the south branch of the Potomac River near what is now Franklin, West Virginia (National Archives)
THETRAILOFTEARS
91
supporting them as the French had once done, while the rebellious American colonists
assumed the role previously played by the
British.
Although they never fought
had shown
the British with quite the enthusiasm they
allies of
The Cherokees
Indians were glad enough to wage war once again on the frontier.
back country, while in the North the western settlements
laid waste the Carolina felt
The
again the fury of sudden attacks.
and murdering frontier
New York
of the little
The
massacre.
burned some
worst of these were in 1778. In July of
and Indians swept through the Wyoming Valley, burning home-
that year the Tories steads
months
folk. Several
following year a Continental
The
under General John Sullivan
force
upper
forty Indian "towns" in
New
York, including
all
but one of the
systematic destruction of their villages
make
corn supply finally forced the Iroquois to
them by
later nearly all the inhabitants
settlement of Cherry Valley perished in a sickening Indian
villages of the Five Nations.
feated
as
for the French, the
and
their
a concerted stand, and Sullivan de-
a frontal attack, using picked riflemen supported by
cannon
fire, fol-
lowed up by a flanking attack of veteran infantrymen using only bayonets. Just as the French and Indian
War
Revolutionary tire period.
In the
War
was followed by Pontiac's
was the
rising, so
followed by some of the most savage Indian fighting of the en-
summer
of
1
commanded by Colonel now northern Ohio by a com-
782 an American expedition
William Crawford was disastrously defeated in what
is
bined force of Delawares, Wyandots, Shawnees, and Tory Rangers. Crawford's force
had stumbled into a desultory engagement with the Indians in which ficient discipline to take
on the
Plains. Believing
tioned a night withdrawal; despite his pleas, his
Most
in a body.
of the
captured and burned of
John
men withdrew killed;
Kentucky
and
field
cost the
led by a few
commanded by Daniel British, made an unchar-
militia
engagement the Indians, urged on by the
this
in groups rather than
Crawford himself was
hundred Wyandots
alive. Shortly after this, several
charge that carried the
foretaste
he was encircled, Crawford sanc-
Americans were ambushed and
Butler's Rangers defeated a force of
Boone. In acteristic
lacked suf-
mounted Indians— a most unusual
the Americans were harassed by parties of of the later Indian wars
it
advantage of the indiscipline of the enemy. In addition,
Kentuckians heavy
losses.
For several years after the Revolution, the military initiative in the old Northwest lay with the Indians. In 1790, for example, an American force of 1,300 men,
most of them
was soundly beaten near what
militia,
the
Miamis and
eral
Arthur
St.
An
their allies.
is
now
Clair to avenge this defeat, was completely routed with the loss of
more than a thousand men.
It
was not until the establishment of a regular American
army, the "Legion of the United States,"
commanded by Anthony Wayne,
white Americans managed to regain the initiative. Having
and disciplined
his troops,
the Iroquois in 1779. to
the
make
a stand
enemy
Wayne adopted
around the Indian
main
Wayne,
when up
that the
thoroughly trained
had used against
he forced the Miamis
his choosing. Exactly acquainted
by his scouts with
first
sent light cavalry
them, and then delivered a frontal bayonet
"Rouse the Indians from
Bayonet," he ordered, "and
villages,
in the Battle of Fallen Timbers,
flanks to confuse force.
first
the technique Sullivan
By destroying Indian crops and
on ground of
position,
tack with his
Fort Wayne, Indiana, by
expedition, sent out in September, 1791, under Gen-
.
.
their backs, followed by a brisk charge.
.
.
deliver a close .
."
at-
their coverts at the point of the
and well directed
The Miamis were
routed,
fire
on
and Indian
FIELDS OF GLORY
92
power began
a rapid decline in the old Northwest, a decline confirmed in 1811
mixed regular and
defeat of the Shawnees at Tippecanoe by a
by the
under
militia force
Governor William Henry Harrison.
By the
early years of the nineteenth century, several clear lessons, not all of
understood
at the
emerged from the Indian wars.
time, had
people in most other primitive
societies,
them
First, the Indians, like
were often courageous and
skillful in battle,
but were incapable of long and enduring strategic operations. Their marginal econ-
omy
with
never-abundant food supplies was vulnerable, and the destruction of
its
their villages, their crops,
and
them
their stored corn could force
into disadvantageous
combat. At the same time, in order to defeat Indians in the country they knew so well, white
men had
to learn
how
maneuver
to
in dense woods. This, in turn, re-
quired discipline and training of a high order. In general, the most effective Indian
were well-trained
fighters
men
light troops, like the
Wayne's Legion, who com-
of
bined the mobility of the Indians with the cohesion of European troops and the
European use of the bayonet. The next-best Indian pean or American, properly trained
in standard
fighters
were regular troops, Euro-
European
tactics.
ing necessary for maneuver or for making a disciplined charge, and the
Considerably
were the frontiersmen enshrined in American legend, who lacked the
effective
instead of
rifle
upon
the bayonet. Least effective of
all
the white
less
train-
who relied upon men who fought
Indians were untrained militia and volunteers. It
was not military defeat so much
the years after the
War
as the irresistible tide of
The
Gradually they subsided into utter helplessness. Jefferson, of
removing the Indians
taken ruthlessly during
Andrew
to the
They had vanished
been absorbed into other
Jackson's administration.
as societies;
tribes or
were
once recommended by
policy,
Far West beyond the Mississippi was under-
names were remembered with dread by old removal.
white settlement in
of 1812 that completed the destruction of the forest Indians.
settlers
their
lost in
Many famous
tribes
whose
could not even be assembled for
remnants had
fled to
Canada or had
the multitude of white settlers. Most
of the others were too feeble or, in the case of the industrious agricultural tribes of
the South like the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks, too docile to offer
much
resist-
ance to their expulsion. Between 1829 and 1837 ninety-four Indian treaties were
concluded by which tens of thousands of Indians gave up their lands in the East to settle in
what
is
now Oklahoma.
Here and there the policy of expulsion met which had ceded hills of
United finally
its
resistance.
The Cherokee
nation,
Carolina hunting grounds to the whites and retreated to the
northern Georgia on lands solemnly guaranteed to States, refused to leave.
Probably only the
tact
and
by treaty with the
it
skill
of Winfield Scott
persuaded the Cherokees to abandon their lands and move to the West. Per-
haps a tenth of the whole Cherokee nation perished from diseases and exposure on the "Trail of Tears" to Indian Territory. in 1832
To
one of the most disgraceful incidents
lations. In 1831 the Sac
Illinois into Missouri,
their cornfields
the north, in Illinois, there occurred
in the
whole history of Indian-white
and Fox Indians under Chief Black
abandoning their lands
to white squatters
and even plowed up the graves of
however, the tribe crossed back into
Hawk had
their ancestors.
Illinois after suffering
re-
crossed out of
who had enclosed The following year,
famine and the threat of
attack from hostile Sioux. Although the Indians intended only to search for vacant
THETRAILOFTEARS
93
land on which to plant their corn, they were prepared to militia
fight,
and regular troops were ordered out against them. Black
and the
Hawk
Illinois
attempted to
lead his tribe to safety, but the Indians were caught as they tried to recross the Mississippi; in the
massacre that followed, Indian men, women, and children were shot
down indiscriminately. Of the eastern Indian inevitable
made
only one
tribes,
a
determined
Florida, a people descended
from dissident Creeks with a considerable admixture of
other Indians and runaway Negroes.
The
Seminoles remembered bitterly Andrew
Jackson's filibustering campaign in their country in 1817, and chiefs signed a treaty of
agreement and went
ment
effort to escape the
consequences of white encroachment. This was the Seminole tribe in
to
war under
of 110 regulars was
when
their chief, Osceola. In
ambushed and
killed
December, 1835,
and another
a detach-
force of Florida volun-
Although competent leadership by General
teers severely beaten.
a few of their
removal with the United States the tribe repudiated the
Scott
and Colonel
Zachary Taylor enabled the army to crush large-scale resistance by the end of 1837, the
war dragged on
for five
more
years.
It
proved nearly impossible to drive the
Seminoles out of their desolate strongholds in the Everglades and the
mangrove swamps
of Florida that
horrors of jungle warfare. for
It
American
soldiers
were
was not unusual in the Seminole
first
War
it
was, in fact, in
to
experience the
for
men
to fight
months, watching their comrades shot down, without ever seeing one of the
enemy. During the course of the war, which was Indians, ence,
some 1,500
finally
regulars, or one-third of the little
were killed or died of wounds.
How many
"won" by
died. Ultimately
in exist-
regulars died of disease
known, nor how many thousands of militia and volunteers were
many Seminoles
starving out the
American army then
casualties,
is
not
nor how
some 3,200 starving Indians were shipped
west; a
few hundred held out in the most remote fastnesses of the Everglades, where their descendants
still live,
conquered by time but not by arms.
Indian Wars in the West By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Indian wars of the east were over The very pace of white settlement, however, which had overrun the woodland In dians, now began to bring the whites into conflict with a new kind of Indian. The native peoples of the Great Plains were,
it is
true,
but, in a radically different environment, they
kinsmen of the eastern Indians
had developed
the sixteenth century the Spaniards had lost or set free
west a few of their horses.
Some
of these
had bred, grown wild, and adapted them
The
their
de
Indians of the region learned to tame and ride
these horses and, in so doing, transformed their
own way
of
life.
paratively sedentary existence, distinguished from that of the if
a different culture. In
the plains of the South
West where, by the eighteenth century,
selves to the rich grasslands of the
scendants roamed in great herds.
upon
From
living a
com-
woodland Indians
by,
anything, greater poverty, the Plains Indians became rich hunters of the buffalo,
and true nomads. Having no
settled
homes and cornlands,
the Plains Indians were
invulnerable to the technique of destruction used successfully against the eastern tribes.
With
the whole life of their society nerved
and tensed
to
hunt the
buffalo,
they developed the knoAving, predatory ferocity of a true hunting people and, with it,
the nomad's stamina
The horsemanship
and speed
white Americans to observe
George Catlin stant he
is
in
movement.
of the Plains tribesmen, it.
The Comanche
now
legendary, astonished the
being "able to drop his body upon the side of his horse
as
passing, effectually screened
from
first
warrior, for example, was described by
his enemies'
weapons
as
he
at the in[lies]
in a
horizontal position behind the body of his horse, with his heel hanging over the horse's back;
by which he has the power of throwing himself up again, and chang-
ing to the other side of the horse
expert," but
still
wondered
if
necessary." Catlin observed that a people
on horseback must
the greater part of their lives
necessarily
at the skill of the Indians.
corpulence, and general unattractiveness of the typical
on
to observe that "the
moment he
comes handsome, and he gracefully
The
flies
away
Describing the small stature,
Comanche
hand upon
brave, Catlin
his horse, his face
went
even be-
like a different being."
Plains Indians based almost their whole practice of war on their skill as
horsemen. Like that of case,
lays his
who spend
"become exceedingly
all
Indians, their favorite offensive tactic was surprise; in their
however, surprise took the form of lightning raids by mounted
dians had skillfully adapted their
armament
to the
parties.
The
In-
requirements of war on horseback.
The Comanches, for example, carried small light bows, not over three feet long, and as many as a hundred arrows, which they could shoot so fast as to keep one or more in the air at a time,
and
through the body of a flint,
or
steel, as
at short
man
range with enough force to drive the shaft straight
or horse.
well as shields of
They
also carried light lances tipped with bone,
smoked buffalo hide tough enough
to deflect
any
bullet that did not strike at a right angle.
To combat
these formidable horsemen, the early
American
settlers
on the Plains
had only the inappropriate weapons of the eastern woodlands. Neither the long nor the military musket could be
men. The
traditional cavalry
easily carried, let alone effectively fired,
weapons of lance and sword, both used,
rifle
by mounted
at times effec-
THETRAILOFTEARS tively,
95
by Spaniards and Mexicans against the Indians, were unknown
American. Being unable to settlers
fight the Plains warriors
customarily fought defensively from
on
own
their
to the pioneer
terms, the early
the ground, dismounting
men were
such a case the white
The
but in
fatal, as
more than one group
of
Texans learned
Comanches.
six-chambered .34-caliber revolver, which Samuel Colt began to manufacture
in 1838, finally gave the western settler
were
off,
nearly helpless in attempting pursuit. Indeed, to
pursue mounted Indians could be in their dealings with the
attacked
if
while on horseback. Their firepower could sometimes drive the Indians
at that
an
weapon. The Texans, who
effective cavalry
time the only Americans seriously engaged in fighting the Plains Indians,
welcomed the new weapon eagerly and gave of the Pedernales in 1840.
some seventy Comanches
it its first test,
This was a skirmish between
in
which the Comanches
lost
apparently, in the "battle"
Texas Rangers and
fifteen
nearly half their force. In an-
other engagement the same year a party of Rangers was attacked in the Nueces canyon
The Rangers
by a superior force of Indians.
from the ground and then, much
rifle fire
their horses
and charged; the Comanches
that followed, the
Rangers cut them down
replied to the
Indian attack with
first
astonishment of the Indians, mounted
to the
back in confusion and in the pursuit
fell
^vith pistol fire.
A
Comanche
chief
who had
participated in this affair said later that he never wanted to fight the Rangers again,
had
that "they
a shot for every finger
on the hand, and
The sixfold increase in firepower which the Colt men had much to do with the gradual decline of
that
he
lost half his warriors."
mounted white
revolver gave to the
Comanche menace
in Texas.
Eventually, to be sure, the Indians themselves added the revolver to their arsenal of
weapons and,
after the Civil
War,
first
men and
the white
then the Indians adopted
the breech-loading magazine rifle or carbine— the ultimate cavalry
weapon
of the In-
dian wars.
The Comanches were
the
first
white Americans came in numbers. the
Comanches were the
of the Plains Indians into
And
in the
fiercest of the
whose hunting grounds
opinion of a good
many Indian
fighters,
western Indians. Colonel Dodge, however,
thought the Cheyennes exceeded, and the Kiowas nearly equaled, the Comanches in daring.
At any
rate, there
of redoubtable fighting
were among the 200,000 Indians of the Plains many
men. Their very names retain
still
a note of pride
Nez Perce, Blackfeet, Arapaho, Ute, Paiute, Modoc, Apache, and Sioux. northern plains there had grown up in the decades following the
network of
little
army
posts, established
These
of the fur trade.
forts
War
tribes
and menace—
On
the
of 1812, a frail
mainly for the protection and encouragement
with their sawmills, gristmills, and blacksmith shops
represented the foothold of white settlement in the Northwest, and were supple-
mented of
after the
Mexican War by the new army
New Mexico and
Arizona.
The
posts in
Texas and the
Indian population around the army
always hostile, since agricultural tribes like the Pawnees and the the hunting tribes as
Pawnees and
much
as
territories
forts
was not
Omahas dreaded
did the whites. Indeed some of these people, the
in particular, furnished the
army with
the famous scouts
who were
its
eyes
ears.
War
with the Plains Indians, already familiar to the Texans, broke out in the
North in the
late
1840's.
Here homesteaders
in
close to the true buffalo country, while the great
Minnesota and Iowa were edging
wagon
trails of settlers
bound
for
96
Sutter's Fort, at
New
Helvetia, California (above), built in 1839 (\alional Archives).
Presidio of San Francisco (below), occupied by United States forces in 1849 (\^ational Archives)
The
n
TRAILOFTEARS
[THE
97
Far West were being driven straight across the plains of Kansas and Nebraska.
ithe
were not attempting
Since, as yet, the whites
with the Indians was sporadic
wagon
on the western
plains, warfare
of Indian raids
on the
or against parties of white hunters. In the decade of the I850's, the
trains,
"wars" in the West;
distinct Indian
army fought a score of thirty-seven
to settle
and took the form usually
army expeditions were involved
in
one
in
year,
1857,
combat with the Indians. Most of
these
engagements were more nearly skirmishes than battles and,
dians
and the army were fighting
for limited objectives, they
both the In-
as
were indecisive. The
(Indians never succeeded in destroying or preventing the supply of the western forts,
and the army made no attempt in
pendence of the western
The
ll
Civil
War
period seriously to interfere with the inde-
this
tribes.
might conceivably have afforded the Indians of the Plains an
jopportunity similar to that taken by the eastern
There
was, however,
no concerted
co-operation with the forces of the Confederacy.
To
be sure, the settled
own
direct
interest
slave-
and the
Indian tradition of supporting the weaker side in white men's quarrels,
On
gave considerable aid to the South.
the other hand, the Apaches
raided into the western regions of the Confederacy with as
on the northern
Minnesota showed in their attacks
in
no systematic
the Plains tribes,
iowning Indians of Oklahoma, following both their classic
during the Revolution.
tribes
among
rising and,
much
settlers.
and Comanches
zeal as the
Sioux
was necessary,
It
both in the North and South, for the whites to abandon temporarily some of their
more exposed outposts. But ilndians in the It
end of the war, the balance between whites and
at the
West remained
substantially unchanged.
was in the dozen years following the Civil
War
major Indian cam-
that the
I
jpaigns of the
West took
resentful of white ,tated the
place.
As early
1862 the Sioux tribes of the Dakotas,
as
encroachment on their hunting lands, had attacked and devasseries of raids
Minnesota frontier region in a
i
•
and massacres reminiscent
hundred white
of those in the East a century before. Several
the
number
Sioux were hanged ceremoni-
iously at is
of captured Indians
Mankato.
now Wyoming
A
were
killed; thirty-eight
troops engaged in lished
to build
and garrison
this
In retribution, a
army moved
a line of forts along the
work, and attempted
to
what
The Sioux
attacked the
a force of Sioux,
Arapaho, and
which had gone out from Fort Phil
train
Kearny in the Big Horn Mountains to secure wood.
William Fetterman, who had boasted
into
Bozeman Trail
prevent the garrisons already estab-
from getting supplies. In December, 1866,
Cheyenne warriors attacked an army
;tain
Plains.
sullen truce followed until, in 1866, the
leading to the newly discovered gold mines in Montana.
,
were killed
settlers
before the Sioux could be driven farther west onto
that,
An
arrogant young
officer,
Cap-
with eighty men, he could ride
through the entire Sioux camp, was sent out, with eighty men, to the relief of the train.
Although he knew there were
Fetterman disobeyed his orders not his his
command across Lodge Trail men were found later, frozen
several
to
thousand Sioux in the neighborhood,
pursue the Indians, and disappeared with
The
mutilated bodies of Fetterman and
in the snow,
the corpse of one officer bristling
Ridge.
with 120 Indian arrows.
Overconfidence could be the enemy of the Indian
The
year after
as well as of the
Fetterman's Massacre, and only a few miles from
its
white man. site,
there
98
the Missouri River, just above the mouth of the Yellowwas built by the American Fur Company in 1830 to serve as a center for trade with the Assiniboins and other Indians of the Northwest.
Fort
Union on
stone. It
(^National Arcliives)
A German
lithograph of the Battle of Bad Axe in the Black (Libraiy of Congress)
Hawk War
of 1832
yii-iiwvo
of the Whiles
,•
.Mr
A
I
oiirlliiHilr.-.l
(ii..
I
.irf.iie
,.r
III.-
""....
l>y
Wl.ii,., .1
.1.
,1
the
n..ri,lii.
li, ..
Iii(iiaii«.
!
•
1
i„ »,.,,. ,„|„.r
(ill »;. |i„,.
„.
ti..-
I
and Blacks
^a.V „„|j,
I..irlmrin ul ,u.
n,
IVb-.m,,
.>e-r... -
1
I
,
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in
Florid
1|„r.li»M.I ii-iM !».:;« ...Imi...
crude representation of one of the incidents of the Seminole War of the I830's. This typical of illustrations in the popular journals of the period. (Library of Congress)
is
An
early,
and
friendly,
meeting between Americans (the
1st
Dragoons) and Comanche:
(National Archives)
,,xspj.-
'^fe'
^-fe/*a.
~^.,
FIELDS OF GLORY
100
occurred one of the most remarkable engagements of the Indian wars: the famous
Wagon Box fight. The army had set up a sawmill along Big Piney party of men of the 27th Infantry, under Captain James W.
Creek, and a small Powell, had been
posted nearby to guard the log-cutting operations. Including Powell himself, there
were only thirty-two soldiers in the party; they were armed, however, with new long-range, breech-loading
The
flattened sides.
Powell ordered the wagon boxes used in hauling
rifles.
running gear and
logs taken off their
set in a
and Avheat backed up by green pine the sides of the wagons.
On
August
and two-inch
logs, 2,
barricade in the form of an oval with
wagon boxes were
spaces between the
1867, a force of 1,500 Sioux
Cloud swept down on the sawmill camp. The loggers managed
wagon
own men
he had taken his
fort after
Indian cavalry.
The
"Look
confusion.
off in
be back." They came back on
and
grass,
men
his
held his men's
and
soldiers,
until
fire
to
open
your
Finally
Red Cloud
Powell
lost
against
fire
back. Baffled and
called off the attack; he
officer
gentlemen," Powell
and
six
men
to
the
furious,
wagon
had
lost
180
men
most of the
from inside the
and wounded.
killed
in
a handful
which
of soldiers used
fight, for
example,
army on
manpo^ver fragmented into innumerable garrisons and guarding
mobility of the Indians
made
in
to Powell's fort.
in 1868— the net effect of these constant Indian forays was to keep the
The
the
Powell
killed.
Although there were other engagements
its
"They
the Indians charged
form an outer wall
had
boxes.
killed
fire
superior firepower to stand off large parties of Indians— Forsyth's
defensive,
said.
their bellies, wriggling through
on
waves until their crumpled dead appeared
one
posts,
Hit by what seemed
fire.
Again they met the murderous
fell
off the
confidently attacked
had ever encountered, the
the Indians were convinced they
rose to charge.
and again they
barricade,
to
foot, or
range opened a withering
at close
to get inside Powell's
camp and then
a solid sheet of hot lead from the most rapid firing they
will
in
charge the Indian horde nearly rode over
first
wagon boxes before Powell allowed
Indians rode
were drilled
under Chief Red
out in a daring sortie to draw
Indians burned the logging
Powell's makeshift fort. In their
the
with bags of hay
filled
firing holes
it
difficult
pursuits even where conditions favored
it.
for
the
army
to
the
parties.
organize successful
In short, the classic problem of the earlier
Indian wars— how to nullify the Indian's elusiveness by finding his weakness— reasserted itself
simple:
on the Great
was
it
months, while the
in
if
basic solution
which the army found was
soldiers,
who
could carry their forage in their supply
the weather was not too severe, continue to
summer. The
in the
The
Indians were inactive and comparatively immobile during the winter
forage the
could,
Plains.
impose winter fighting on the Indians. Because of scarcity of
to
first
West was made
trains,
fight nearly as effectively as
serious attempt to apply the strategy of winter campaigning in the fall of 1868 by troops
commanded by General
Philip
H. Sheridan. Three converging columns were sent against the Cheyennes and their Arapaho and Kiowa allies in the valley of the upper Arkansas. The campaign was successful,
and the Indians were
forced, temporarily, onto reservations.
In the early 1870's there was a lull in the Indian wars of the Northwest, while the Indians
made
a desperate attempt to
strength of the whites scribed territory.
On
and
accommodate themselves
to continue their buffalo
to
the growing
hunts in increasingly circum-
the north Pacific coast, hoAvever, the
army fought
its
only major
THE TRAIL OF TEARS
101
campaign against the Indians west of the Rockies. The Modocs, who had been forced ,
'
on
a reservation with their traditional enemies, the Klamaths, tried to go back to
their old lands
white
around the lower end
settlers there,
braves
Lake Klamath. They came into to deal Avith
numbered only about one hundred, they were Chief Jack. After an
to the whites as i
of
and troops were sent
lava beds east of ness, they
Mount
skillfully led
with
Modoc man known
by a
Indians withdrew to the
initial skirmish, the
Shasta where, in impenetrable country of almost lunar bleak-
held out against the army for several months.
surrender after mortar
conflict
them. Although the
fire
They were
finally forced to
from the 4th Artillery had driven them away from Tule
j
Lake, their water supply.
More
!
creditable than the
Modoc War
^vas the
campaign of
pacification which,
between 1871 and 1874, Colonel George Crook carried out against the Apaches in the '
Southwest. Some, at
least, of
the subtribes of the Apaches were
among
the fiercest
and most intractable of North American Indians. For centuries they had been both weakly and treacherously dealt with by Spaniards, Mexicans, and •
•
finally
Americans,
and had learned an abiding hatred of and contempt for whites. In three years Crook, by implacable firmness, resolute pursuit, and scrupulous spect
Arizona, Crook had become a
methods were simple.
He
first-rate
trained his
Indian fighter
men by
as
transport.
won
He
well as diplomatist. His
arduous conditioning marches and
He abandoned
re-
as far
unwieldy gear, and relied on carefully pampered pack mules for
persuaded numbers of Apaches to enlist
their loyalty
re-
process, in the wilds of
connaissances in the most inhospitable country he could find. as practicable all
had won their
fairness,
and even a measure of co-operation from them. In the
by treating them
fairly
and with
Avith
respect.
him
as scouts,
When
and then
an Apache band
General George Crook (National Archives)
102
Troop E
Camp Verde, Arizona Territory, about 1875 {National Archives)
of the 6th United States Cavalry at
Bird's-eye view of Fort Apache, Arizona Territory (National Archives)
^^^K
F
f/vijaagstMioMaB^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B
iB
^
^-''g5!3g:...a^"•^f^:.
^B^^^
...
'.i^^
*
m
K^i^'flipp^isail^^^^^^^H
103
w^^
»
inrr
Sunday-morning inspection
Men
at
Fort Huachuca, Arizona (National Archives)
of the 6th Cavalry training horses at Fort Bayard,
(National Archives)
New Mexico
FIELDS OF GLORY
104
broke the peace, however, Crook insisted that his columns never abandon the pursuit until the Indians at
peace for the
first
had been found. By 1874 the Apache country was quiet and time within memory.
Late in 1875 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington received a port that the Sioux and Cheyennes were again getting out of hand.
The
re-
uneasy
peace in the Northwest that the Indians had been perhaps more willing than the whites to keep was breaking down. struction of the Indians'
in the decade after the Civil
men and
The fundamental
economy by white
settlement.
War, been built
cause was the gradual de-
The
railway lines that had,
across the Plains
homesteaders into what had been buffalo country.
had been wantonly slaughtered by white hunters.
To
were bringing
The
the Indians this attack on the
foundations of their economy was war, and a war they were rapidly losing. termined, apparently, not so
much
cattle-
buffalo themselves
low the diminishing herds of buffalo where they could find them.
They
them, and
to fight the whites as to ignore
The
defol-
Indian Bu-
reau called on the army for help, and Sheridan gave Crook and General Alfred H.
Terry the main job of quieting the Sioux and the Cheyennes. Following the strategy of the winter campaign. Crook decided to strike at the Indians before the spring pastures gave them their accustomed mobility. By the standards he had worked out in the Apache country. Crook found his troops woe-
overburdened.
fully
He
therefore ordered both officers and
men
in his
command
to
take only the clothes they wore, plus two blankets or one buffalo robe; he allowed
them gear,
to carry four days' rations,
one
To
tin cup.
combs and brushes and nounced
The
if
essential
wisdom
J.
of Fort
that curry-
behind, and an-
left
ponies— by pawing grass up from
necessary.
came apparent, however.
moved out
Crook ordered
but emergency supplies of forage be
all
that the horses could feed as did Indian
under the snow,
Joseph
100 rounds of carbine ammunition and, for mess
the horror of veteran cavalrymen.
of the Indian disinclination to fight in winter soon be-
On
the
first
of March,
1876,
Crook with some 800 men
Fetterman toward the Powder River. His cavalry, under Colonel
Reynolds, got ahead of his main column and located a Cheyenne village
near the mouth of the Little Powder River. Reynolds made a dawn attack in bitter weather, destroying the Indian village and capturing most of the Indians' ponies.
The Cheyennes
rallied,
however, and fought back; Reynolds, his
men
from
suffering
the extreme cold, ordered a withdrawal; the Indians pursued, harassing the troops
and recapturing
their ponies.
with the advantage of surprise six
men
Crook came up lost,
to Reynolds's relief soon after,
and because of the weather— Reynolds had
suffering from frostbite— he was obliged to return to Fort Fetterman.
porting column under General Terry had been unable to
move out
but
sixty-
A
sup-
against the In-
dians because of the weather, and the winter campaign had to be given up.
Late in May, Crook
set
out from Fort Fetterman again,
this
time with a consid-
erably larger force of fifteen companies of cavalry and five of infantry. This was to
form one of three army columns which Sheridan, following methods he had fully applied in the
campaigns of 1868-1869, hoped would converge
ans near the Yellowstone River along the present boundary between
Wyoming— the
heart of the Sioux country.
success-
to trap the Indi-
Montana and
While Crook with 1,250 men was moving
north and west from Fort Fetterman, Terry with 1,000
men was moving
south along
THE TRAIL OF TEARS if ^
from Fort the
11
I
The
vent the Indians' escape from Terry. In the meantime Terry's reconnaissance parties a heavily traveled Indian trail
dians
Horn
whom Crook
had fought; they were attempting
!
Custer discovered that
trail to
it
did,
determine whether
he was not
for a junction with Terry's
and wait
to follow
main
Rosebud and
leading south along the
River. This was, in
fact,
the trail of the In-
to escape
by retreating west-
ward into the mountains. Terry ordered Colonel George A. Custer Cavalry and follow this
j
and Cheyennes under
move back into what should have been the army's trap. Crook pulled back Tongue River, where he had left his supply trains and where he could pre-
to the
then west toward the Little Big
'
large force of Sioux
followed was indecisive, but the Indians were
fight that
forced to
had reported
[
east
Montana, along the north bank of the Yellowstone. After crossing
Ellis,
Rosebud River, Crook encountered a
Chief Crazy Horse. '
105
and Colonel John Gibbon with about 450 men was marching
the Yellowstone,
it it
farther,
but was to move south
and Gibbon's
force
to take the 7th
led to the Little Big Horn. If
which was
force,
to
join Terry.
Admittedly Sheridan's strategy of converging columns was complicated, but in this case
volved,
was probably sound.
it
and
George Custer disobeyed rious
officer.
I
!
somewhat perhaps
He had
precise
his orders. Custer
obedience
of
in-
Unfortunately,
orders.
was an ambitious and rather a vainglo-
been a brigadier general during the Civil War, but had had a
He had
frustrating career since.
felt
did require close co-operation of the forces
It
of course required
this
not yet regained his wartime rank, and
he had not had an opportunity to display his
full talents as a soldier.
He found
that the Indian trail did indeed lead to the Little Big
instead of
moving
to the south,
he continued to follow the
Horn. Thereupon,
trail until
he came upon
an Indian encampment of some 2,500 warriors. Although he was unfamiliar with the terrain, ignorant of the strength of the
enemy, and unaware of Crook's
gagement with the Indians, Custer decided periment on
his
battalions, each
to attack. In addition,
own with converging columns, and beyond supporting distance of the
divided his
earlier en-
he decided to ex-
little
force into three
other.
under Major Mar':us Reno, forded the
Little
Big
Horn, dismounted, and attacked the Indians. Overwhelmed by numbers, Reno's
men
One
of Custer's battalions,
fought their way back to a high bluff overlooking the river, where they were joined
by the second column under Captain Frederick dered back to join Custer but was cut join Reno.
Trapped on
off
their bluff, Reno's
fering severe casualties,
until they
were
W.
Benteen. Benteen had been or-
by the Indians and had no choice but to
and Benteen's men fought finally
relieved
bitterly,
by Terry's main
suf-
force.
own movements are not fully known. He had entered the valley of the Little Horn several miles below the Indian camp. Coming up along the river, he had taken his command into an ambush. The soldiers had dismounted and fought stubCuster's
Big
bornly, but were killed to a
The
the worst defeat inflicted
destroyed
man; Custer's body was never
Battle of the Little Big
St. Clair's
army
Horn
on white Americans by Indians in 1791.
The
since the
and was
Miamis had
For a moment the Indians glimpsed reprieve; in
mind's eye they must have seen the Plains free of white buffalo.
identified.
cost almost 300 soldiers their lives,
army, however, was not prepared to abandon
Sheridan stripped the western posts of every available
men and its
dark again with
campaign against them.
man
in order to reinforce
106
An
undoubtedly accurate sketch by
Remington of a cavalry dressed for Indian campaigning (National Archives)
Frederic officer
Indian
fighters:
fleers of
noncommissione
the 13th Infantry
(National Archives)
Men
A
Negro trooper of the 10th Cavalry (National Archives)
of the 22nd Infantry at a picnic, Fort Keogh, Montana, 1890 (National Archives)
^kfi'Jk if-^^l^'^'i'Ui^
A squadron
on review at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, 1889 (National Archives)
of the 9th Cavalry
i
i
Troop
of cavalry riding out from Fort San Carlos, Arizona (National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
110
He
Crook and Terry.
re-equipped twenty-four companies of artillery for infantry
on the Atlantic and
duty, even taking units from the coast-artillery fortifications
By
Pacific coasts.
men
with 2,000
early August,
each.
The
Crook and Terry were able
were short of food, and Crook was ready
Cheyennes lasted
under Colonel Ranald
The
village.
to
their
Horn
normal hunting. By November they
to inflict a winter
campaign on them. One
Mackenzie, trapped the main body of the
S.
Powder River. In
in a gorge of the
from dawn
resume the campaign
Indians were relentlessly pursued far into the Big
Mountains and thus kept from carrying on
of his columns,
to
a fight of attack
and counterattack
that
dusk the Indians were defeated, and Mackenzie destroyed their
Indians escaped, but were in desperate need of food and clothing.
who
they appealed to the Sioux for help, Crazy Horse,
When
own
lacked food for his
peo-
turned them down. Embittered, the Cheyennes surrendered to the army, and
ple,
some of
their warriors even enlisted to fight their former allies.
While Crook was operating against the Indians from
his base at Fort Fetterman,
Colonel Nelson A. Miles with seven companies of infantry had penetrated to the
northern redoubt of the Sioux, near the confluence of the Tongue and the Yellow-
There, on a high bluff overlooking the Tongue, he found Crazy Horse's
stone.
vil-
Miles had with him two old twelve-pounder Napoleons with which he was able
lage.
to shell the
They made freezing
men
Indian encampment while his
Sioux attempted
to fight
scaled the icy slopes of the bluff.
The
and
fled.
but were thrown into panic by the
their escape in a snowstorm, but
artillery fire,
were so demoralized by a winter
of
and famine that most of them, including Crazy Horse himself, surrendered
in the spring.
A remnant,
erly. Sitting Buffalo),
With
the Sioux
led by the victor of the Little Big Horn, Sitting Bull (prop-
took refuge in Canada.
and the Cheyennes defeated, there remained
in the
Northwest
only one important tribe which had not accepted confinement to a reservation. These "nontreaty" Indians were the Nez Perce, a formidable but hitherto peaceful people,
whose white
traditional settlers
home was
Oregon. In the early 1870's sul-
Idaho. In the spring of 1877, after several white
set-
what
is
now
killed
X'alley of
and the Nez Perce had moved
push into their
had been
abandon
Wallowa
to
lenly eastward into tlers
in the
had begun
valley,
by a group of Nez Perce, the tribe was peremptorily ordered to
claim to the Wallowa Valley and settle on other tribal lands near
its
Lapwai, Idaho. This the Indians refused to do.
The Nez as
Perc^ were led by a
was he a born guerrilla fighter leader
who
of remarkable capacity,
known
to the whites
like
Geronimo; he was a patient and statesmanlike
had, for years, counseled reason and restraint in dealing with the whites.
Like Black Hawk, he went to war tle
man
Chief Joseph. Joseph was not a mystic and an enthusiast like Sitting Bull, nor
finally
only in despair, but, once at war,
this gen-
and mild chief proved perhaps the most resourceful antagonist the whites had
among the Indians. His among Indians. Although,
and cohesion un-
ever met
people, too, possessed discipline
usual
unlike the Plains Indians, they did not scalp or
mutilate their enemies, they were exceedingly tough and resolute fighters.
The campaign against the Nez men, who had been sent
of ninety
Perce began in June, 1877, to
compel the Indians
was ambushed and routed in White Bird Canyon, eral Oliver
to
east of the
when an army
force
go onto a reservation,
Wallowa
Valley.
Gen-
O. Howard, commanding the army's Oregon Department, thereupon
set
Chief
Red Cloud
o£ the Sioux nation {National Archives)
112
??!*V
r
The
execution, for the murder of white settlers, of thirty-eight Sioux Indians at kato, Minnesota, in 1862 {Library of Congress)
Man-
Custer's
camp
at
Hidden
Wood Creek
during the Black Hills expedition
(National Archives)
114
A
Remington
sketch
of
Indians watching Custer's
advance (National Archives)
TOy>-
The
_:jtj
"Villa of Brule," a Sioux
encampment near Pine Ridge, South Dakota, (National Archives)
..^^,
.
.-JiiM. ,iLj,.j^,.„
in
1891
THE TRAIL OF TEARS
115
out against the Nez Perc^ with 400
men and
caught the Indians along the Clearwater
River. In the two-day engagement that followed, both sides, of about equal strength, suffered only light casualties; the Indians were forced back across the Cleanvater, but
were able
break
to
engagement and outdistance Howard's pursuit. Following
off the
the Lolo Trail through the Bitterroot Mountains into Montana, Joseph
unknown
evade an army trail-block and, using paths
managed
through the mountains and south along the Bitterroot River. Knowing he had
Howard
to
to the whites, took his people left
behind, Joseph rested his tribe at the Big Hole Basin. There, however,
far
the Nez Perce were caught in a surprise dawn attack by six infantry companies commanded by Colonel John Gibbon who had been informed by telegraph of their
movements. In twenty minutes Gibbon's lied their warriors
men
took the Indian camp, but the chiefs
For three days the Indians besieged Gibbon's men, a third of
wounded women,
the
in
the soldiers
if
the
action;
children,
ral-
and forced Gibbon on the defensive with a flanking counterattack.
Nez Perce
eighty-nine,
lost
whom
were killed or
seventy of
whom
were
and old men. Undoubtedly the Indians would have annihilated
Howard had not finally arrived, whereupon the Nez Perce again made Howard himself said of the fight at Big Hole Basin that "few
a successful withdrawal.
military
commanders with good troops could
better have recovered after so fearful
a surprise."
A
few days
later, realizing the
ried out something almost
attack against the its
real purpose:
army was
unknown
still
enemy vanguard. Only four soldiers were killed, but
central
but
now
week on the
Nez Perce made
in unfamiliar country, the
Montana. They eluded another army force sent
skillfully
Nez Perce
the attack achieved
soldiers and, although
a rapid
march through
to intercept
them by an old
executed ruse: horsemen carrying sagebrush "brooms" rode
direction stirring
car-
the Indians drove off the army's pack mules, which temporarily
halted Howard's pursuit. Joseph gained a full
they were
in close pursuit, the
in the annals of Indian fighting— a surprise night
up
other direction. By
a cloud of dust, while the
now
it
seemed possible
that Joseph
people safely across the Canadian border; to forestall
under Colonel Miles
to
off in
main body escaped undetected would succeed
this,
the
one
in an-
in taking his
army ordered
a force
proceed north and west along the Yellowstone to intercept
him. Even though the Nez Perce were carrying with them their wounded, their
women and
children,
ahead of Howard's
and
force.
all their
They
worldly possessions, they were
still
able to keep
had, however, to fight a running battle for 150 miles
Crow mercenaries serving with the army. At won two more skirmishes, crossed the river, and escaped comparative security of the Bear Paw Mountains. By this time, it was late in
with parties of horsemen, most of them the Missouri River, Joseph into the
September; Joseph had brought his people 1,600 miles across some of the roughest country in North America.
He
had, in three months of marching and fighting, en-
gaged nine separate army commands in a dozen battles and skirmishes. His tribe was still
intact,
but food and ammunition were running low, and the Nez Perce were
tired.
At the northern edge of the Bear Paw Mountains, only a Canadian boundary, the Indians halted
day's ride
for a few days of rest.
It
from the
was here that
Colonel Miles found them. Miles had with him 400 fresh troops, including six companies of infantry, five of cavalry, and two field guns. Although Joseph had believed
116
"The Approach
of the Chiefs": Indians arriving for a council (National Archives)
A charge of mounted
''-
Indians {National Archives)
"^
"""^'m^
hMi
flK-
i
'"^Sl
jW
V
mm
^/
^
r-
4
,,k
1 '
-.f-
F
It'jfyJ
^
^/''V^'
e^-ay^..
> '
1r
FIELDS OF GLORY
118
he was
he had chosen an excellent defensive position and improved
safe,
trenches and
When
rifle pits.
the entrenchments, digging with knives and pieces of pans. supply, the Indians
dammed up
it
Nez Perce women
the soldiers appeared, the
To
with
finished
ensure a good water
a stream and, incidentally, cut off
most of the army's
water. Miles,
who had
not fought the Nez Perce before, began his attack with a frontal
assault. In the first charge, the 7th
115 engaged, including
all
but one
one company losing a third of
Cavalry
lost fifty-three killed
Two
officer.
and wounded out of
infantry companies lost every
men. Some of the army wounded had
its
night on the field near the Indian lines, and the Indians brought them water.
same night Miles established
up
his artillery
Nez Perce
around Joseph's camp, and
and shelled the Indians. Miles then attempted
to surrender.
The
General Howard had
after
siege lines
negotiations
first
finally arrived
the army's terms: these provided that the
failed,
to
officer,
to be left over-
later
On
the
brought
persuade the
but on October
5,
1877,
with his troops, Joseph agreed to accept
Nez Perce would be
treated honorably
if
they returned to Idaho and lived on the reservation provided for them. Chief Joseph's
surrender speech was as appropriate, as dignified, and as eloquent a statement of defeat as
any commander ever made.
best declaration to the white
"...
I
hulsate
am is
I
The
as the Indian's last
will fight
.
no more,
Perce
War
These unwarlike and
was nearly the
illiterate
called
.
last of
the Indian wars, and, as General Sheris
any record."
people had fought with almost scientific precision, us-
lines, field fortifications,
official report,
.
forever."
wrote, "one of the most extraordinary Indian wars of which there
ing skirmish
and
Our chiefs are killed. Looking Glass is dead. Toohulmen are all dead. ... It is cold and we have no blankets. am tired; my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now
old
chiefs. I
The Nez
man
could with justice be taken
tired of fighting.
dead.
Hear me, my stands
It
man:
advance and rear guards; General Miles, in an
them "the boldest men and
marksmen" he had ever
best
en-
countered among the Indians. Moreover, they were humane; they practiced none of the usual Indian cruelties, treating
enemy wounded and noncombatants kindly. It is made to them when they sur-
States that the promises
not to the credit of the
United
rendered were not kept.
They were
sent,
of the Indian Territory, where in a few
and other
diseases.
When,
not to Idaho, but to a bleak and hot region
after seven years, they
the Northwest, they were split into two groups
With
a third of the tribe died of malaria
months
were
and
finally
settled
permitted to return to
on
different reservations.
the surrender of Chief Joseph, the ruthless pacification of the Northwest
was complete. In Arizona, however, trouble had broken out among the Apaches again. After
Crook had
left
the region, the Indian Bureau
and concentrate the Apaches.
A
number
of
had attempted
to resettle
bands led by guerrilla chieftains
like Vic-
Geronimo, and Chato, had deserted the reservations and established themselves in the wild country along the Mexican border. From their strongholds, these bands raided settlements both in Mexico and in the United States, taking refuge on whichtorio,
ever side of the border was safer.
The
Indian Bureau had to
call
on the army
for help,
and once again the army sent Crook. The Mexicans had already killed Victorio and broken up one Apache band, when, in the spring of 1882, Crook subdued the fanat-
A Remington sketch of soldiers guarding a supply
Troops on the march up the Cheyenne River
train (National Archives)
in 1890 (National Archives)
20
m
Custer George Armstrong
Archives) suit (National in a \,ucVs\.in
An army
picnic in 1875; General Custer in the center {National Archives)
122
Graves of unidentified and the bones
diers
'"^^il
horses
sol-
of
on the ridge where
Custer's
men made
their
stand {Xational Archives) last
^mr^^
A
view of Custer's battleon the Little Big Horn, showing soldiers' graves in the foreground; the cross marks Custer's field
grave. {National Archives)
r
/
A classic view of an Indian archer {National Archives) 'Low Dog" carrying
a
tomahawk
(National Archives)
"Crow King" wearing an army
jacket
(National Archives)
l-il-J^
124
FIELDS OF GLORY
ical
Chiricahua subtribe by marching 200 miles into Mexico (with Mexican permis-
sion) to defeat
Chato
shortly afterward
mountain camp. Chato and Geronimo surrendered
in his
and returned
Apache
to the
reservation.
Again the Apaches were
deceived and mismanaged by the Indian Bureau, and in 1885 Geronimo and a band
An army column
of warriors slipped off into the mountains.
Mexico
the border.
There followed
whom
Crook,
an unexpected attack by Mexican
but, after suffering
a tortuous series of negotiations between
alone the Indians trusted.
When
ment would not honor Crook's promises mobile columns
With Geronimo's submission, unhappy sequel
to
an unhappy
it
finally
Mexico
far into
West was
the
became
Geronimo and
War
clear that the
Geronimo, Crook asked
to
and was succeeded by General Miles. Miles after sending small,
pursued them into
irregulars, retreated to
Depart-
be relieved
to
secured Geronimo's surrender to destroy his supplies.
quiet.
There remained, however, an
As sometimes happens with a demoralized and
tale.
defeated people, the western Indians turned to religion, not for consolation, but for exhilaration. In
among
men
1888 what white
The
West, exciting one tribe after another.
was imprecise, but
its
religion appeared
theology of the Ghost Dance religion
adherents believed that through certain symbolic dances and
songs the spirits of departed ancestors could be brought to that the spirits of the land
plains
Dance
called the Ghost
the somber Paiutes in Nevada. It spread like a grass fire through the whole
would
would come
itself,
life.
Indeed,
arise to destroy the
man and
white
works.
all his
and the plains teem again with great herds.
alive,
would be
impieties, these white men's sores as
it
was.
And
so,
among
erased,
spirits
and
the
camps— all
these
and the land would heal
itself
hundred broken and captive
a
Dancers whirled in frenzy, and the
and old
was thought
The buffalo spirits The railroads, the
telegraph lines, the mining towns, the cattle ranches, and lumber
and be
it
of the trees, the streams, the mountains,
were invoked
tribes,
the Ghost
do what bows and arrows
to
had not done.
rifles
The Sioux were
Ghost Dance excitement that the
so affected by the
local Indian
agent on their reservation at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, asked the army for help. In
October, 1890, troops were sent to Pine Ridge, and thousands of Indians fled to the
Badlands in terror and excitement. General Miles, searching for something concrete
and
tangible, ordered the arrest of Sitting Bull,
war. Instead of sending white
who
fell
in the
men
to
make
into a dispute with Sitting Bull
and
melee that followed. Sitting Bull was
who was
alleged to be counseling
the arrest, the his followers. killed,
army
sent Indian police,
Someone
fired a shot,
along with eight of his
and
men and
six policemen.
With
the news of Sitting Bull's death, several skirmishes between soldiers and
Indians took place in the Badlands, and the army
December
28, 1890,
of "hostiles"
Major
S.
M. Whitside
set
about disarming the Sioux.
of the 7th Cavalry discovered a large
under Chief Big Foot camped on Wounded Knee Creek. Big Foot
promptly surrendered, but the following morning while
armed
The
On
band
fighting broke out, apparently
when some
his
men were
being
dis-
of the Indians resisted the troops.
troops fired into the Indians indiscriminately, killing between two and three
hundred men, women, and children, including Big Foot. Twenty-nine killed.
Many wounded
Indians, left
on the
field, froze to
soldiers
were
death in a blizzard the
fol-
I
." ^^..
'A Dash for Timber": sketch of a white party attacked by Indians {National Archives)
"Protecting the Herd" (National Archives)
Departure of a dog train from Pine Ridge, South Dakota, in 1873 {National Archives)
Stretcher carrying a
^:irjiC^::iy:M1^
man wounded
Slim Buttes, Dakota Territory, in 1876 (National Archives)
at the Battle of
12'
Old 12-pounder Napoleon guns of Civil War vintage about to start on the Wolf Mountain campaign against Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse in the winter of 1876-1877 (National Archives)
lowing night. With conflict
this,
the Massacre of
Wounded
Knee, two and a half centuries of
with the Indians ended.
The tradition
influence of the Indian wars on the development of an is
difficult
army
generations of
to
estimate.
officers
One
obvious
American military
of Indian
effect
Ewell remarked during the Civil War, he had, in a professional Plains, "learned
all
fighting was that
learned to think of war in very small terms. As General
about commanding
fifty
United
life
States dragoons,
spent on the
and forgotten
everything else." At the same time, the Indian wars nourished a professional military tradition
which otherwise might not have existed in America. Perhaps Indian
fighting taught the
army
and mobility, and too of
mind which
may have been
to attach too
little
importance
much importance to the
need
to the value of surprise
for central
these wars encouraged, the expectation of final
a dangerous legacy.
At
least
it
was
to
command. One
habit
and absolute triumph,
be of doubtful value in the
twentieth century when Americans found enemies they could not destroy, and other
enemies they could not afford to destroy.
Randall in 1882, under guard of
Bull and his family at Fort of defeat: Sitting Portrait i-ortrait oi & Archives) ^^^ ^^^^ infantry {National
"The Truce":
the surrender of Chief Joseph {National Archives)
130
^^ -4\
131
Group
mo
(National Archives)
of
Apache
"hostiles" [National Archives)
132
Apache country:
the entrance to Cochise's stronghold (above) in the Dragon Mountains Apache brush huts {National Archives)
of Arizona {National Archives). (Below) Typical
-"*%f'
>
133
Some Apache
scouts (above) at the
Crook (below) with
his
San Carlos Agency (National Archives). General George
mount and two Apache
scouts (National Archives)
A
Crook and Geronimo (center) (Xational took part in Crook's expedition (below) into Mexico in 1883. Ofin this campaign rode mules, since horses could not live on pine burrs and sword grass. (National Archives)
(Above)
Archives). ficers
rare photograph of a council between
Men who
^ '^omM^t'^mr
Company B
ol the 10th
United States Infantry crossing the Gila River in Arizona Territory (National Archives)
136
iimti i >-^.- "..
t*a?
Geronimo and some
of his warriors after their surrender, but before being disarmed
(National Archives)
1
Group
of surrendered Apaches at Fort Bowie. at the right.
Note the
tattered moccasins
(National Archives)
on the man
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
The Mexican War, The annexation
of texas posed thorny problems for the united states, some
fumed
anti-Texas politicians
that another sla\e state
others that the quarrel between
Union. All in
for the
1846-1848
all,
it
Texas and the
seemed
as
had been added
New Mexican
Anna and Nueces
to the
the feeble Republic could do
With
about defending
little
United
to the
its
borders.
With annexation,
Mexican
to press Manifest Destiny
toward the south. Not
all
against old foes.
began
and the Texans yearned
States,
War came
all
the excuse
in the
more than an even chance
for
dramatically in May, 1846.
border clash between American and Mexican cavalry
as the result of a
units near the
with
of the United States
war with Mexico. But the flame of imperialism burned brightly
southern United
It
will
ill
of petty irritations, brought diplo-
list
matic relations to a boiling point and gave President James K. Polk
desired a
alive,
looked upon annexation as a direct slap at the
sovereignty of Mexico. This, combined with a
he needed
to snatch the
States.
the United States also inherited
the argument,
The Mexican government
interest.
moment
keep the Texas issue
to
northern Mexican boundary were pressed, and
as the
handed over
the border argument was
Rejecting the decision of
friends waited only for a ripe
Republic back into the Mexican federation. Just
Mexican claims
ill
though Texas got the best of the annexation
bargain, especially considering the attitude of Mexico.
San Jacinto, Santa
to the South;
Territory boded
Rio Grande. United
States
dragoons had been sent to the river
to
uphold Texan claims and Yankee posture, and while roaming the stream they came
upon
a hostile patrol from the south. In the ensuing skirmish sixty-three
soldiers died,
and
at last President
American
Polk had a war. Volunteers flocked to swell the
ranks of the small United States Army;
officers
who had
spent their careers in some
backwater Indian campaign or on tranquil garrison duty soon received orders
move
south. For the
American troops were
first
War
time since the Canadian campaigns in the
to carry
combat
to
to
of 1812,
an enemy country.
Neither side could be called ready. American troops were scattered thinly over vast areas;
younger
the officer corps was superannuated
officers
were graduates of the United
Point had yet to prove
its
and laced States
in
army red
tape.
Military Academy, but
value to old line soldiers. As yet, the young
Many West
men were
an
uncertain quantity, and most of the regulars had the same distrust of a book-trained officer as of
an untrained
civilian volunteer.
Obviously time would be wasted whip-
ping a motley assemblage of raw humanity into the .shadow of an army. Fortunately, however, the enemy seemed even more demoralized.
Supply problems were to plague both belligerents. Neither the United States
nor Mexico was geared to produce war material, and precious months slipped by while both nations tried to convert to a wartime economy. In the long run, of course, the United States could
time the
full
ovenvhelm Mexico with production, but by the
weight of an avalanche of supplies was
felt
the
war might well be
decided.
There were two major
theaters of war.
the second in the heart of Mexico. In May,
The
first
1846,
lay close to the
Rio Grande,
General Zachary Taylor's
men
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
141
had two heavy combats with General Mariano
On
Arista's troops.
the 8th Taylor
won at Palo Alto, and next day gained victory in the battle of Resaca de la Palma. The two battles vastly inflated American military ego and left no doubt of American martial supremacy over the Mexicans. But these battles took place north of the
Rio Grande, and Americans had
yet to get into
enemy
country. Taylor crossed
on the 17th and 18th of May, occupied Matamoros, and planned
the river
a rapid
campaign toward Monterrey. Taylor's doings absorbed Mexican attention.
Matamoros gaps
left
just long
enough
the arduous marches across south Texas.
too, to co-ordinate
operations with General John E. Wool.
can army started for Camargo, took
it
For a month Taylor concentrated
interest
general remained at to
fill
by the shorter-term enlistees whose fascination with the glories of war had
dimmed during
base.
The Yankee
some new twelve-month regiments
to receive
the curious
tionary regimes rose
political
and
on the
14th,
men and
He
stayed long enough,
On
July 6th the Ameri-
and built
supplies
into an advanced
it
there and
viewed with
Two
heavings of the Mexican government.
fell as
Mexico sought a war
came Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. At
just
policy.
Out
revolu-
of this confusion
about the time Taylor began to march
from Camargo toward Monterrey, Santa Anna returned from Cuban exile with the blessing of the United States.
over control of
all
No
sooner did he arrive in Mexico City than he took
military operations,
and consequently control of
While Santa Anna busied himself with becoming on toward Monterrey, which
fell
to
him
after a
dictator.
all
Mexico.
General Taylor pushed
bloody four-day
battle,
September
20-24.
Monterrey had been so lowed the
making
battle,
costly for both sides that
an eight-week armistice
during which time the two governments could have another
peace. In the midst of the armistice Santa
The Mexican War,
Anna made
1846-1847
his
fol-
fling at
move. With a
142
Ringgold's Battery in action, Mexican
War
(Library of Congress)
m^-
View
of the battles of Resaca de la
Palma (above) and Palo
phases of the Mexican
War
Alto, fought in the early
(Library of Congress)
"Ies
FIELDS OF GLORY
144
army brought
sizable
peak of morale by
to a
He
north and the Yankees in Monterrey.
Wool departed San Antonio
for
operations while the armistice
and made preparations
his
heady rhetoric, he struck for the
on September
started
28th, just as General
Chihuahua. Santa Anna arrived in the theater of lasted,
still
set
up headquarters
San Luis Potosi
at
for combat.
Taylor's position was weaker than he wanted to admit, both in Washington and
Mexico. Apparently the Washington government viewed his Whiggery with suspicion and hoped to raise another hero in his place. Winfield Scott, of Lundy's Lane
and Chippewa renown, and
a
Whig
of small political repute, received the
would open the second major theater
viable of assignments; he
amphibious force somewhere on the Mexican
Mexico
City. Unfortunately for Taylor, Scott
army
the
east coast,
and
had orders
of war,
fight his
to take
most en-
would land an
way inland
to
some troops from
Mexico, and in December, 1846, he went to Texas to get
in northern
them. After a futile attempt to meet Taylor— who had terminated the armistice with
Anna on November 5th and aggressively pushed on toward Saltillo and Vicmen he wanted and seriously reduced Taylor's strength. Old
Santa
toria—Scott detached the
Zach had
to give
up
his salient at \'ictoria
and
back
fall
to
Monterrey, where he
picked up feeble reinforcements. Disgusted at the gutting of his army, Taylor nonetheless refused to be bluffed
by Santa Anna's advance from San Luis
important victory. sides.
Potosi.
It
The American
was a hard-won
victory,
cavalry distinguished
at
meet
to
Buena Vista and gained an
marked by shining courage on both
were broken into segments by gaping arroyos cutting the
lines
and the action fragmented into
battlefield,
Outnumbered, Taylor went
him on February 22nd and 23rd
Santa Anna, fought
Mexican
several separate engagements.
but ran against some steady American
itself,
The
artillery.
flower of Mexican infantry broke before a crack Mississippi regiment using the novel tactic of
who
an open V
to suck
them
Jefferson Davis, Mississippi planter.
the general
was
and rake them from both
in
flanks.
commanding. One
West Pointer, and the estranged son-in-law
result of the praise lavished
his persistent conviction of his
own
on Davis
had won
all
the laurels allotted a
his advisers
Whig
threw their support to
March
5,
1847.
his
He had and
Scott's
amphibious invasion. After
New
limitless
were no rules
to cover
Scott prepared well,
ordinating movements of
if
frustrat-
field
and
amounts of ammimition. Everything about
Army
tried
an amphibious oper-
problems of co-operation between the army and
navy (and rules probably would have been planning a landing on a hostile
Taylor
Orleans, on
an army of about 15,000 men, acres of supplies,
virtually
venture was new. Never had the United States
ation; there
shifted.
general with presidential hopes, and Polk
ing delays, Scott's expedition departed from Lobos Island, near
siege artillery,
of
after the battle
military genius.
Following Buena Vista, the center of military activity abruptly
and
The man
devised this unique application of Miltiades' tactics at Marathon was Colonel
useless),
no experience
to
draw on
in
coast.
not expertly.
flotillas
Tremendous energy had been spent
from eastern and southern ports
in co-
so that the entire
expedition would arrive near \'eracruz at the same time. Scott chose a naval anchorage called Anton Lizardo for the rendezvous point of the expedition and a section of beach opposite the island of Sacrificios, about two
and
a half miles
from Veracruz
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA and well out of range of
fortress
145
San Juan de Ulua's heavy guns,
as the
landing
site.
Apparently the Mexicans were caught by surprise; no hostile force appeared
and on the morning of March 9th the landing began. Accord-
to contest the beach,
The
ing to plan the army hit the beach in successive waves.
view of a unique
moment
and naval
and from them darted
escorts,
American military
in
boats, filled with blue-clad troops.
The
line after line of specially designed assault boats, the
men and
their bright muskets, the
men were
ashore
American combined operation was a
signal
white beach— all were framed fleetingly in the sunlight; then the
and the beachhead secured. The
The
success.
\'eracruz fortress frowned silently,
no
glinted with cannon,
mander
first
and though the ancient
American
shots greeted the
deliverance by Santa Anna,
The Americans drew
city's walls
The Mexican com-
intrusion.
realized his small garrison could hardly sally out of
a well prepared foe. Far better to
grand
clear day offered a
history. Offshore stood the transports
fortifications against
its
huddle beneath the cover of heavy metal and await
who had promised
a siege ring
early succor.
around the
city's
brought up hea\7
walls,
ordnance, and pounded away day after day. Thunderous cannonading did
damage
to either side,
Anna
but the Mexicans could not escape and Santa
little
did not
come. Dispirited and worn by continuous vigilance, the defenders surrendered on
March
27th.
Fearful of the yellow-fever season in the rapidly westward along the National tains
humid
toward Mexico City. Why, no doctor could
free of yellow fever.
yellow fever Scott
had
cal efficiency
less
say,
And though mountains might be
made them
move
lowlands, Scott sought to
Road which snaked
steeply through the
moun-
but high ground seemed always the natural allies of defenders,
also the allies of invaders.
luck moving out of Veracruz than he had moving
which distinguished the early
in.
The
logisti-
stages of the landing evaporated; supplies
did not arrive, and those which were on hand remained stranded for want of transportation. Sufficient horses could not be found, lost.
wagons
failed to arrive, artillery got
Scott used vital time trying to unscramble the confusion.
could the point of his column take the road toward the
first
Not
until April 8th
American objective—
the town of Jalapa, seventy-five miles west and over four thousand feet up. Initially the only discomfort
came from
that ancient foe of all armies, diarrhea,
and even that was palliated by the gorgeous country through which the infantry
The contrast of the upcountry with the fetid flatness of Veracruz was fanThe highlands were aburst with a riot of flowers, and the air grew cooler with
marched. tastic.
each mile. Seldom, surely, had an invasion begun so pleasantly.
The had
it
only uncertainty was the enemy.
What had happened
assertions of victory
and had countermarched southward
ican invasion. Santa Anna's appreciation of the desired.
to Santa
Anna? Rumor
that he was coming; that he had accepted defeat by Taylor with rhetorical
He had had
to intercept the
military situation left
himself sworn in as President of Mexico on
and made immediate preparation
to
do something about
new Amerto
little
March
21,
be
1847,
Scott.
Although the Mexican Army under the President's charge numbered scarcely
more than 6,000 men,
it
had
to be classed as a veteran
command. Santa Anna's
tering fulminations about dying rather than seeing the Yankees desecrate
City had put some of his
own
steel into his
blus-
Mexico
men; the army was ready. Santa Anna had
146 f
WJ-'
K
Some close action
View
of the United States
Army
of
Occupation, commanded by General Zachary Taylor, near Corpus Christi, Texas, October, 1845 {Library of Congress)
in the Battle of
Monterrey (National Archives)
United States troops (above) landing
at
Vera Cruz, Mexico (National Archives). United on Vera Cruz, March 24 and 25, 1847
States naval battery (below) firing
{Library of Congress)
n
FIELDS OF GLORY
148 the advantages.
all
the
maps
He knew
available to Scott.
his country,
and
Although
would have been good
up from
cans while they toiled
were
to stand at a point
command
Cerro Gordo. Here he could
far
more
reliable than
to get at the
Ameri-
higher ground offered better defensive
tierra caliente,
and Santa Anna decided
positions, hill called
it
his guides
dominated by the conical
a crossing of the
Rio del Plan;
could defend his right flank with guns on three rugged promontories, his center
with guns on Cerro Gordo and the
Gordo and on and
a
hill
The Mexican
Cerro Gordo.
in front of
on the
hills
commanding
almost as
with guns on Cerro
right, his left
called Atalaya, standing to the left
would have brought
field
a
glint
of
admiration from any Caesar. Scott was no exception. First glance convinced him that
would be
a frontal assault
suicide.
Reconnaissance indicated that the Mexican right was protected by an "unscalable" precipice and the
and
by "impassable"
left
route for a turning
movement around
right ^vhile a flanking force
enemy
the
on April
the field as the enemy, Scott attacked
Mexican
But Scott pushed the scouting,
terrain.
Captain Robert E. Lee of the engineers found a rugged but feasible
at length
With about
left.
worked around the other
progress, the flankers abruptly switched objective
and,
hill,
new American
operation continued, and
Under cover
Discovered in
killing batteries
with success,
elated
stormed Cerro Gordo. They were sharply repulsed by accurate Atalaya to lick their wounds during the night.
many men on
flank.
and charged the
on Atalaya. Amazingly enough, they carried the
as
American units engaged the
17th.
fire,
and retired
to
of darkness the flanking
plans called for the flankers to reach the
National Road behind the enemy just before the assault on Cerro Gordo began on the
morning
of the
Once
18th.
The
by the flanking party.
morning the Mexicans began the road
the Mexicans broke, their retreat
strategy
good
all a
and shortly
But the
flankers
would be cut
were slow
battle,
losses of
and one that boded well
to reach
good portion
he had taken some
trap. Still, Scott estimated
and could report
off
after seven in the
in the course of retreat. Consequently a
3,000 prisoners, including five generals,
337 wounded. All in
fairly well,
to quit the field.
and struck the enemy
Mexican Army escaped the
of the
worked
only 63 killed and
for the future.
Wearily and happily the victorious invaders tramped into Jalapa, capital of the state of \^eracruz,
Many
of his
ments came
on April
men were sloAvly.
Faced with the
Even
But
problems grew with each passing mile.
Scott's as
their enlistments expired,
and
Avell at
Scott
Cerro Gordo.
had
to
admit that these despised
He would now
be
left
troops just Avhen the campaign reached the crucial stage. As he saw
ening up the
yoimger
George J.
set
officer
vmits.
The
corps.
His
it,
he would
Robert
Bernard
E. Bee,
ate armies.
officers
William
to constitute a
Some
as
were P.
potentially
excellent.
Among
the
G. T. Beauregard, Zealous B. Tower,
Braxton Bragg, John B. Magruder, Thomas Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Grant, Daniel H. Hill,
E. Lee,
Jackson, William T. Sherman,
These were
rest his
time would be put to use in drilling and in smart-
were such West Pointers
B. McClellan,
citi-
with untested
have to stay in Jalapa for a time to reorganize his withering regiments, to
men, and reconstitute
replace-
they came, raw recruits could hardly replace veterans.
if
loss of tried volunteers,
had done
zen-soldiers
19th.
about to depart
B. Franklin,
Joseph E. Johnston, Richard Stoddert Ewell.
muster of the High
Command
of the high brass assisting Scott
would
of both
still
Union and Confeder-
be around during the later
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
149
would distinguish themselves. Gid-
war, but few save "Old Fuss and Feathers" himself
eon
army
at Fort
command
a Con-
contempt of
his fel-
general and friend of President Polk, would
political J. Pillo^v,
federate
Donelson, abandon
and earn the
it,
lasting
low Rebels. John E. Wool, of the army of the North, would be superannuated by 1861, but would render some service, as would David E. Twiggs.
would have
either passed
After the defeat at Cerro Gordo the Mexican
had
the dictator
to devise
once again. Since
Army
from Veracruz had followed the National Road which
field
made
did the next best thing— he
army
but isolated the army
all
the 4th of May,
and
all
Scott's
army occupied
there two weeks later.
came up from
as they
For several
his strength, Scott lost his.
The twelve-month men were
wondered what the general would
On May
he awaited reinforcements, Scott plotted an advance.
ments of
lines
Santa
at Jalapa.
While the Mexican general recruited
home on
Scott,
extensive use of guerrillas. These partisan
anxious weeks the army lay in camps around Jalapa. sent
American supply
throw in front of
to
bands lurked in the mountains, raided American wagon trains Veracruz, and
and
virtually melted away,
of the fiercest terrain in all Mexico, the
were uncommonly exposed. Shorn of a
Anna
other commanders
stopgap means of defense while nerving his compatriots
Scott's route
some
twisted through
The
from the scene or retired from active duty.
the city of Puebla,
do.
While
15th the forward ele-
and army headquarters moved
the hard part of the campaign lay ahead and could not
Still
be attempted without reinforcements. At Puebla the army once again suffered short
on July 8th reinforcements
supplies and waited for help from home. Finally,
and future President Franklin Pierce brought more on August 500
men
men
to
Scott again
begin a campaign, and Scott especially
on Polk's desire could
A range
moved forward on August
Avait
no
to discredit
him and dash
his
7,
felt his
No
10,-
general ever has enough
weakness. Part of
Whiggish hopes
it
he blamed
for the future.
But he
longer.
four-day march brought the United States at
1847.
arrived,
With about
6th.
10,000 feet, and spread before
it
was a
Army
peak of a mountain
to the
sight to beggar description.
Thirty
miles west and half a mile below lay the ancient capital of the Montezumas. Travelers since the days of Cortes
quate to the
task.
had
tried to describe that view, but
The awesome grandeur
military viewers by
its
of
obvious impregnability.
between the Americans and the
city.
A
series of lakes
it
lakes
were
and formed part of Santa Anna's defense pattern. The main causeway
too costly. Scott called for reconnaissance,
the southern shores of two lakes
would bring
Mexico from the south. He determined
ele-
Each causeway was, of course,
enemy
ing in from the east offered the most direct approach, but strong
made
so to the
and marshes stood
Threading through the system of
vated causeways, offering the only entry into the capital. fortified
none proved ade-
Mexico City was made more
and learned
that a
lead-
positions
march around
the Americans to a road leading into
and
try to
turn
Worth's, Pillow's and John A. Quitman's
men
to flank the eastern defenses
the entire Mexican position.
On
August
17th
William
J.
reached San Agustin on the road leading south to the
city.
highway led past the hacienda San Antonio, through the into Mexico. Scouting parties reported San tified.
Some other way
to get at
From
this small village the
village of
Churubusco and
Antonio and the town of Churubusco
Mexico must be found. Close
for-
to the western edge of
.
150
View
of Cerro Gordo: General Twigg's division storming the {Library of Congress)
The United
States assault
on Chapultepec, September
s\V *
'^T^Wr
>V--'^
main
13,
heights, April 18, 1847
1847 {Library of Congress)
151
Hand
to
hand
at Chapultepec's walls:
drawing by A. Castaigne (National Archives)
Climax of the attack on Chapultepec (National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
152
San Agusti'n, and running parallel to the highway for almost a mile, was a forbidding lava field called the Pedregal.
There seemed
the crusty, pitted face of the lava but
little
chance that troops could get across
they could they might flank the defenses at
if
San Antonio and Churubusco. Captain Lee, on August
1
8th, took a small party into
the Pedregal and found a usable path for part of the army.
Once
clear of the lava he
spotted a road— a road Avhich gave promise of leading into Mexico from the southwest
and of taking San Antonio
in reverse.
American units picked
their
way
across the Pedregal
but the pioneer troops soon came under
fire
from
on the morning of the
artillery
around the ranch, and
(Contreras). Before the day ended, a full-scale battle raged issue yet lingered in doubt.
manding
the United States detachment, learned of a of a diversionary attack
the Mexicans from the
by
Scott's
made
a steady,
When
noon.
to the rear of his opponents,
morning drove
early the next
Churubusco, where
to the positions near
determined defense against heavy attacks until
late in the after-
the day ended, the Americans had carried the approaches to the southern
Mexico but had not breached them.
gates of
way
army
field.
Pursued hard, they retreated northward they
at
During the night General Persifor Smith, com-
dusk the
and with the aid
19th,
near the Padierna ranch
with few American
more captured
casualties.
Still, it
While 4,000 Mexicans
in the actions at Padierna
had been
day of double victory
a
wounded and
^vere killed or
and Churubusco, the American
losses
3,000
were
es-
timated by Scott at 137 killed, 879 wounded, and 40 missing.
Canny Santa Anna recognized newed
the threat poised at the gates, doubtless feared re-
might crash them, and turned
attacks
A
to statecraft for defense.
truce was ar-
ranged, with the full blessing of Scott and American Commissioner Nicholas Trist.
During the
truce, efforts
presumably would be made for a
final
ing ceased on August 24th, and a fortnight's quiet prevailed.
peace settlement. Fir-
On
September 6th Scott
gave notice that the truce wotild terminate the next day. Peace negotiations had lapsed,
col-
and repeated violations of the truce arrangement frayed the general's patience.
Nothing
for
it
but to storm the capital, or threaten so sternly
as to
produce surrender.
Tactically the truce caught the Americans in poor positions, and they strictly con-
formed
to the terms of armistice in not
improving their
situation. Scott
had quickly
to
concentrate scattered forces in the vicinity of the Tacubaya suburb. Here the Americans were close to a
main causeway leading
into
causeway lay under the guns of a formidable
Mexico from the southwest— but the
castle called
Chapultepec.
A symbol of na-
tional strength, the castle,
which since 1833 had been Mexico's military
mounted
hill.
castle
a steep, 200-foot
looked
down on
Cannon
entire system
itself
its
walls.
From
a group of buildings not over a mile
range) called the Molino del Rey.
The
bristled in
embraced
The Molino formed part
a rectangular park encased in
its
away
college, sur-
western face the
adobe
standing at the eastern end and the Molino at the western.
walls, ^\•ith the castle
A
large cypress gTOve
covered the park between the Molino buildings and the base of the castle
causeway leading
to the
something ^vould have
gun
(well within
of Chapultepec's defenses.
hill. If
the
San Cosme and Belen gates were to be used by the Americans, to
be done about Chapultepec.
Faulty intelligence precipitated a costly storming of the Molino on September 8th
which resulted Still
in
heavy casualties and possession of but one end of Chapultepec park.
the castle frouned on the causeway. As one participant in that ghastly day's
work
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
153
observed, the Americans "were like Pyrrhus after the fight with Fabricius— a few
army would be destroyed."
h victories and this
Mil
Not only had he gained a dubious success tion
were taking a deadly
tory
had
be achieved
to
toll
of an
army
else swift defeat
Scott
had other reasons
isolated
would be
certain. Scott decided to get at
Carrying Chapultepec would be tough.
and
first
vic-
Mex-
step
.
.
.
Chapultepec."
to carry
avails
attri-
deep in enemy country. Quick
by western and southwestern approaches, and announced that "the
ico ^^•as
to worry.
but disease and
at the cost of morale,
more
a garrison of
had some thirteen big guns within
It
its
about a thousand excellent troops, including the corps of cadets
of the military college.
Scott took his time getting ready. Pioneers
were put
to
work bringing up
equipment; skirmishing was kept up on the southern approaches to the confuse the defenders about the main attack; heavy
on September 12th and continued
bombardment
cannon's roar dro;vned the lesser sounds of
reached the castle from the southwest, the storming was over.
When
its
rifle pits
men and
worn and rugged
vet-
Actually
eral operations
Grasshoppers.
had
it
also
flashed fire
and .smoke and the
muskets. As the relentless Yankees
defenders gave up the contest and in an hour
New England regiment cut Army had won the gTeatest battle it
Major T. H. Seymour of the
the Mexican standard, the United States
had ever fought on foreign
soil.
won
the war, for
Mexico City was occupied next
day. Periph-
continued for a time, but the main fighting ended on the Hill of the
On May
but far from
last
peace came with the formal acceptance of the Treaty
30, 1848,
Guadalupe Hidalgo by both
first
12th, 6,000
the hill from the west, southwest, and southeast— waded straight into a
flaming, roaring madness as line after line of
of
began
fonvard, their blues dirty enough to blend with the ancient Aztec dust.
moved
They stormed
down
of the castle
for about fourteen hours.
At eight o'clock on Monday morning, September erans
scaling
city so as to
belligerents.
The
intervening months had marked the
United States experiment in military government.
The Mexican War
taught countless lessons to a generation destined to profit
from them. General Scott proved the best teacher. Staunchly he preached the
largely
value of discipline, sound training, and regular troops. Staunchly, too, he advocated the use of those
young
officers
he delighted in calling the "graduated cadets," and no
one more appreciated their invaluable lasted four or five years
of their
if
He
move
possible,
war was
this:
rapidly; reconnoiter every
the war might well have
plan logistical details Avith care; concentrate
enemy
and then attack with everything
position, fix
available.
sue—these were the ingredients which led to success busco,
felt that
war knowledge came from him.
Scott's short course in
force;
service.
without their professional knowledge. Actually, though, most
and Chapultepec, and on many
almost the Civil
Two
War
a Civil
War
at
him
in his lines, flank
Be audacious,
Cerro Gordo, Padierna, Churu-
field as well. Scott's
campaign was
in microcosm.
other important lessons could be learned from the Mexican War.
ular officers shed their
him
scout, flank, pur-
contempt
for volunteers as the Avar progressed.
The
Many
reg-
sad experi-
ences of militia were not repeated, largely because no state militia units were sent to
Properly trained, the American volunteer ranked as one of the
the
field.
He
yielded to none in steadiness under
fire,
in bravery, or in stamina.
finest soldiers.
Good
troops.
FIELDS OF GLORY
154
though, counted for first to
little
And
without good commanders.
would have been
Scott
the
urge the need for eliminating political generals. Civilian leaders had their areas
The t^vo were separated and should remain command in an army be preserved— Polk's re-
of responsibility; military leaders, theirs. Especially was
so.
it
vital that
unity of
peated blimders in sending politicians to Mexico with conflicting authority proved the
Both lessons— the soundness of American fighting
point.
command— had
to
And
be relearned in 1861-1865.
men and
forgotten until the United States for the second time carried
The
years of Reconstruction, the surge of big business,
West took the country's imagination
iron into the
drew Johnson's administration offered policy;
General Grant's even more.
formed a
little
The
Civil
war
to a foreign foe.
and the spread of shining
in the period after "the war."
good deal of
a
the need for unified
learned then, they were promptly
interest in politics
War seemed
to
country into a strong, modern state flexing
and
be a catalyst which its
muscles.
An-
in foreign
To
trans-
a nation
basking in sudden wealth and strength, prolonged peace can grow boring. Especially
can
it
bore a vigorous people, yearning
to shoAv their
newfound po^ver- a people
luiini-
pressed by protracted Indian fighting and Avho forgot in two decades their sate of blood in the 1860's.
Raw
|
strength backed by financial and journalistic bullying
scious of itself in the 1890's.
A new
spirit of
the world-wide craze for imperialism.
stemmed from to
lift less
a naive desire to
A
of America's imperialism, to be sure,
nation ^vith so
privileged peoples to similar affluence.
by those chosen doubt, only
its
for
first
Cuba? The
island
uplift
might be resented
The
policy was not in
objective.
Providence seemed to provide an objective so logical
American missionary
much had an obvious duty
That such
was beyond comprehension.
elevation
con-
Manifest Destiny appeared, urged on by
Some
do good.
made America
zeal.
Where
had suffered
as to
prove the sanctity of
better to begin uplifting oppressed
a sputtering civil
war
humanity than
in
for almost t^venty years; Spanish
occupation had decayed to the point of tyranny and the heroic struggle of Cubans for
independence excited .American admiration.
A cause so
in keeping with
American
tra-
dition could not go unaided. In addition, expulsion of Spain's domination over a part of the
New World comported
well with the
Monroe
Doctrine.
Cuba
Libre!
^ »
=•<
.-
m.
t
United States infantry (above) protecting a convoy against Mexican attack {National Archives). American forces (below) entering Mexico City {Library of Congress)
The Spanish-American War,
1898
History HAS TREATED THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR MORE AS A JOKE THAN ANYTHING It
was an opera
boitffe affair, a
United
to the
States military tradition. For as in so
country went into
tures, the
war." There
little
is
something
men
but the war had grimmer overtones to those whose
history's levity,
and
"splendid
Cuba without
many
died in Cuba,
of America's martial ven-
preparation, without organization, and vir-
Untrained volunteers and rusty regulars struggled
tually without plan.
the shackles of gargantuan incompetence in the administrative bureaus
overcome
to
and
in
commands. Once again the "doughboy"— as he was known even then— had
field
ELSE.
be said for
to
some
to fight
his country's battles in spite of the brass.
Worst
of
the whole thing seems to have been the result of a sickening series of
all,
diplomatic and propaganda errors. in the
War
could just as easily have come in the 1870's as
During Grant's administration, provocation
1890's.
Spain waxed almost hotter than two decades
an
insult to the
Cuban
American
home had
people at
nineties
cost
some American
lives.
fact,
charm
a nation just
But times were
Here
The
yearned.
happy red
some extent by
historical research,
but there
American "yellow journalism" brought jingoism
first flirted
for peace.
Under heavy
had
it still,
it
15, 1898.
pressure to aid
been bloodied, and now there was nothing the slogan of the day, and as
a
war message
for
it
but
fight.
casualties, the flag
"Remember
was shouted in banner headlines
it
drowned any small voice and sent
He might
This episode could hardly have been
There were 260 American
fortuitous for the newspapers.
it
some
not been for the sinking of the battleship Maine in Ha-
vana harbor on the evening of February
States
is
to a boil
with diplomatic negotiation; then, when assured of virtual
Spanish abdication of rights in Cuba, he rejected diplomacy and tried war.
have avoided
flag
which the
old idea that the war of 1898 was William Randolph Hearst's
and helped weaken President McKinley's desire Cuba, McKinley
in 1895, a
at last ^vas the crusade, the great cause for
has been modified to
truth to the assertion that
pressure,
its
for a fight in the seventies. In the
resumed bet^veen the rebels and Spain
hostilities
new nation
came
different,
emerged from an enormous rebellion of
America was not spoiling
flapped in America's face.
more
against
Virginius affair posed
was.
it
When
own brew
and
up arms
to take
The famous
other things to worry about, and the plight of a few tattered
rebels failed to
own. In point of
flag
later.
of moderation. Finally
to
Congress on April
1
all
the
On
be-
over the United
McKinley yielded
1th.
had
Maine"
to
popular
April 25th the war
res-
olution cleared both houses, and the people had a place to vent their frustrations.
Anyone could
see that
putedly had a strong
fleet
on paper the war would be no and
large
ground
contest.
forces in Hispaniola,
vealed the decadent condition of Spanish arms.
The United
States
Although Spain
re-
Cuban successes reNavy had reached a
high peak of efficiency and could be counted on to deal with the ships of Admiral Cervera's
command. Tough,
Spanish regulars
who
at the
American boys would make short work of the
tired
had contended long and bootlessly with the Cubans under rebel
General Calixto Garcia.
and have
willing
All' that
had
to
be done was gather the men, provide the
ships,
enemy.
Early preparations went according to expectations. All the
men
that could pos-
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
157
be wanted offered themselves to bolster the 26,000-inan regular army. Promi-
sibly
nent people jumped
at the
chance to serve, some to equip commands. Theodore
Roosevelt, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, quit the sea service and joined the
United
1st
Volunteer Cavalry,
States
and command of a Nebraska sufficient,
"silver" regiment.
And
if
names was not
the influx of big
history.
Among
make
this the
the battalion of the fourth estate
Richard Harding Davis, Stephen Crane (who would find grimly accurate
as
what he had imagined of war the Washington Star,
more.
Riders, under Colonel Leonard
old Democratic war horse, accepted a colonelcy
droves of newspaper correspondents appeared at army camps to
most overwritten war in American were such
Rough
alias the
Wood. Even William Jennings Bryan,
The Red Badge
in
John Black Atkins
The war seemed made
for
of the
William Dinwiddle of
of Courage),
Manchester Guardian, and too many
newsmen. After the drama of the Maine and the
ini-
excitement over mobilizing, American "secret" agents— official and unofficial-
tial
roamed through various
parts of
New
What
Spain.
better grist for the journalistic mill
than the story of Lieutenant Henry H. Whitney masquerading as a seaman for ten days as
he spied enemy positions on Puerto Rico? Or the escapade of escapades— the almost
incredible trek of Lieutenant
Andrew
S.
Rowan, who received orders
to carry a dis-
patch to General Garcia but no indication of where he might be found? Obediently,
Rowan
with remorseless dedication to duty,
searched
all
across
Cuba, exposed to con-
stant capture, until at last he delivered the deathless "Message to Garcia."
But the war was not
to the liking of serious military
men. The Quartermaster De-
partment, hampered by short appropriations, and unable to buy uniforms early enough
Cuban summer campaign, issued regular blue woolens to men unacsummer in the Caribbean. The Ordnance Department, fighting ossifica-
to get ready for a
customed
to
had
tion at the top as usual,
just
changed
to the Krag-Jorgensen rifle,
verted completely—with the result that old Springfields
confusing assortment of ammunition.
made
smokeless powder had
ordnance
officers,
its
And
despite the fact that
appearance and was not
no provision had been made
to
but had not con-
appeared along with a
still
on the world scene
unknown
manufacture
to
United
States
artillery or small-
arms ammunition with the new material. The Spanish, on the other hand, used smokeless charges
guns and shoulder weapons.
for
suddenly swamped with thousands to feed,
fell
The commissary
contracting and were soon victimized by profiteering packers
or
"embalmed" beef
to the troops
All these problems were slow to
to
General William R. Shafter.
A
make themselves
troopers.
would he receive his brusqueness
make him to
his
and
The
due
felt,
however, and in the
thoughtful, corpulent little
time on
man
tact
navy
with a hawkbill
and
little
reporters reciprocated his enmity in kind,
in the
obesity,
spoiled
task of getting at the Spanish to the
nose and formless mustache, Shafter wasted
on paragraph
who shipped
and poisoned them by platoons.
meantime the administration gave the and
authorities,
back on the standard practice of
affection
and never
hundreds of columns written in Cuba. But for
all
he had a hardness and determination which seemed to
a logical leader for the
amphibious expedition that would carry the war
Cuba. Shatter's
To him raw
fell
problems were not unlike those of Winfield Scott a half-century the task of organizing a huge fleet of transports
recruits, of
planning
strategical, tactical,
and
and
earlier.
escorts, of training
logistical details,
and of attacking
FIELDS OF GLORY
158
and Shatter had
Scott
war
The
most advantageous point.
at the
to
problems did not end here. Both
similarity in
cope with willing but ignorant administrations
grand and simple terms: Attack, sweep the
in
who saw
win! As troops gathered
field,
slowly at various camps of instruction and as Shafter groped for a rendezvous point, the full complexity of his plight
V
His
pronounced the Cuba.
even
seas cleared of
Why Tampa
virtue of
size,
but port
lous Florida
hard to
is
would wait
Florida,
phantom enemy
facilities
Tampa Bay
see.
F.
Tampa Bay
money, and
its
Hotel, and
Plant. Plant
had
worked
literally
promoting by pre-empting the single
seers.
accommodations
put
Tampa on in
the
erecting the
money. The army meant
civilian visitors— relatives, sweethearts,
on the
rail line to
city,
and Plant continued
the docks for the use of sight-
Quartermasters could whistle for the trains—civilians had the money.
Shafter finally built tion
rail
for
had the
certainly
and
city
zealously to attract
coming would bring many
the idly curious. So a milling melange descended his
the navy
was selected because of the enterprise of a fabu-
map, had sunk a huge sum in the development of the Moorish
until
and would then embark
fleets,
were absurdly meager and
Tampa
promoter— Morton
clear.
Tampa,
at
became the base
adequate. Probably
less
came
Corps would assemble
enough
for only
being regulars.
holding
the
off
would make spearhead,
United
it
up
a force of about 20,000
17,000.
The
The War Department and main
at
Tampa
with transporta-
General-in-Chief Nelson A. Miles were
invasion until after the yellow-fever season; Shafter's force
do more
a start, gain a foothold,
had a good number of
States Cavalry,
men
troops were good in general, a sizable portion
and the
1st
if
possible.
tried troops.
Among
But because its
it
best outfits
formed a
was the
1st
Volunteer Cavalry which deserved to be rated
Another sound unit was the 10th (Negro) Cavalry. These organizations were supported by regular and volunteer infantry and by newly formed machinefairly crack.
gun
units.
AREA OF OPERATIONS, GREATER ANTILLES
Area of Operations, Greater Antilles
1
159
"Bully!"
A
charge somewhere in Cuba: drawing by
W.
G. Read (Libary of Congress)
FIELDS OF GLORY
160 Shafter stood to be well served by his
Leonard
Wood and
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
good number of regular army
officers,
In addition to (then) Colonel
officers.
among
the volunteers, he had a
and two ex-Confederates— Generals Fitzhugh
Lee and Joseph Wheeler. Wheeler would serve virtually
and
primary
as
field
commander and would do
and the Confederacy proud. Field-grade
States
second-in-command
as
the military tradition of the United officers
seemed competent, and
the
younger contingent of company-grade West Pointers had a brilliance reminiscent
under "Old Fuss and Feathers" in Mexico.
of the group which served
After incredible logistical snarls Shafter got his expedition to sea on June 14th.
The
trip to
Cuba seemed
in keeping with the whole spirit of the expedition. For
several days the flotilla sailed along in plain view of the
burned
ship's lights
The vaunted
the invaders.
enemy
coast.
At night each
bands played, and no thought to security disturbed
brightly,
Spanish torpedo
fleet
could have sunk American hopes
deep indeed. But the only trouble Shafter had came from the navy. Admiral William T. Sampson, whose
fleet
had the Spanish Armada bottled in the harbor
of
Santiago, wanted the army to assault both sides of the harbor entrance, climb steep
and capture Monro Castle and the opposite
cliffs,
navy would clear the mines
knowledge of military history reminded him that proved
make
and yet
Again
close
Here the American
enough
to reach
it
somewhat similar venture had
towns of Daiquiri and Siboney, some
his landing at the
east of Santiago.
a
the
fleet. Shafter's
eighteenth century, vetoed the suggestion and de-
fatal to the British in the
cided to
That done,
batteries at Socapa.
harbor mouth and attack the enemy
at the
forces
would be out
fifteen miles
of range of the city's guns
before the yellow-fever season wrecked the invasion.
Shafter's considerations paralleled those of Winfield Scott.
Cuban
rebels
reported that although Spanish works existed at Daiquiri and
Siboney, they were virtually unmanned.
Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares, in
charge of the defense of Cuba, pulled back his detachments at the two outposts
and thus opened the way
for the Americans. Shafter
knew
the odds.
There were
had the advantage of previous position and opportunity
The Americans
at
They
12,000 Spanish regular infantry within supporting distance of Santiago.
least
to choose their battlefields.
could scarcely believe their good fortune
when
the landing, begun
at Daiquiri on June 22nd, encountered no opposition and when no hostile shots
were
fired at Siboney. If
the landing seemed easy, the next steps might not be.
the Americans had to climb through a range of
somehow surmount
hills, cross a
several high hills in front of their objective.
scant two or three miles
from the beaches claimed
road— the obvious route
to the interior— snaked
road
at a cut in the
To
range of
loomed
hills
first
A
attention.
through the
a series of high
get to Santiago,
well-watered plain, and
hills.
range of
hills a
From Siboney
a
Overlooking the
and strong Spanish
posi-
tions hinged on the small settlement of Las Guasimas. Determined troops could
make
those
positions
formidable indeed, and the longer they had to strengthen
them, the more formidable the barrier. in the attack tradition,
seemed
Wheeler had gone ashore As soon Guasimas
as
early
to
No
one except an ex-Confederate, trained
understand the urgency of the situation. General
on the 22nd, and had soon moved
his base to Siboney.
he glimpsed the enemy situation he determined to move against Las
at the earliest possible
moment. Shafter did not want
to
engage the enemy
I
Group at Tampa, Florida, June, 1898. Ex-Confederate General Joseph Wheeler is in foreground. In background are, left to right: Major George Dann, Major Brodie, Chaplain Brown of the Rough Riders, Colonel Leonard Wood, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. (National Archives)
United States loading docks, Tampa, Florida. These were used by the Quartermaster Corps to load troops and supplies for the Cuban expedition. (National Archives)
4.11
FIELDS OF GLORY
162
forbade
as yet,
in fact, but
it,
Wheeler had fought the
first
Wheeler understood
that
works
by the time
news reached
this
if
General Linares chose to throw a large force into the
Las Guasimas, he might bottle the whole American army on the beach and
at
turn a successful landing into a dismal disaster.
weakened
road— far
good defensive strategy dictated holding the pass
that
As Wheeler saw
enemy
defenses from
old Confederate procedure and they federate
dawn— on June
at all
the pass could not be forced by a direct attack along the
it,
better to hit the
Wheeler
24th,
two
Flanking
sides.
worked pretty
still
At
well.
were
tactics
early
dawn— Con-
attacked.
His battle plan called for a probing strike to be made by the dismounted
Volunteer Cavalry on the
on the
The
right.
and by the dismounted
left,
volunteers,
Wood and
under
section of the 10th Cavalry
attacking wings together.
would advance
Once
would follow
Roosevelt,
Things went
fairly well
had infantry handy
If
and machine guns. The Spanish smokeless powder confused and them, and not long after contact with the enemy,
A
and hold the two to
things got too hot
to support his
except for some unexpectedly heavy
Riders for a time— they could not aim at unseen
a narrow
Guasimas.
would be made
effort
turn the enemy out of his works by getting around his flanks. for Wheeler's advance elements, he
at Las
it
straight along the road
was joined, every
battle
1st
and 10th Regular Cavalry
1st
which roughly paralleled the main road and intersected
trail
to
Wheeler could not know, and proceeded
heights. His decision, of course,
on the sound principle
General Linares had
Actually,
about 1,500 and had determined, incredibly enough,
his garrison to
abandon the
hazards.
headquarters
field
War.
battle of the Spanish-American
fire
950 troopers.
from Mausers
rattled the
Rough
But action soon steadied
foes.
about 7:10 a.m., the green
at
troopers charged the Spanish right near the village like veterans. Their attack relieved
pressure on Wheeler's flank and helped win the battle.
While the Rough Riders grimly
stalked
up
action on the right. His advance ran into the
The
village.
for the
1st
enemy
machine-gun and
hove in view. resistance.
men and
rifle fire. Finally,
artillery,
his
own
line
and began
to
probe
Wheeler's attack stalled under heavy
on, but at last the head of the infantry
appearance, plus the aid of the volunteers on the
As the enemy
the spirit of the
Wheeler fought
about 7:30 a.m., near the
with a cavalryman's reluctance, he called for
The morning dragged
Its
at
and 10th regulars fanned out their skirmish
flank. Short of
fantry support.
their hill,
enemy
fled their
left,
in-
column
broke Spanish
works and headed for Santiago, Wheeler caught
moment. He leaped
to his feet and, in a victorious frenzy, yelled,
"We've got the Yankees on the runl" The
first
land battle of the war went to the
invaders at a loss of sixteen killed and fifty-two wounded.
With away.
Wheeler pushed
the road cleared to the interior,
his
advance inland and
reported to Shafter that Santiago lay clearly in view some seven or eight miles
finally
Had
the old soldier been free to
of the city; but the
commanding
do
so,
he would have pressed on
to the defenses
general had myriad problems which forced
him
to
consolidate before the invasion continued. Fantastic logistical confusion arose in the
Siboney.
supply fast
The
trains.
wake
of the landings at Daiquiri and
road to Santiago was narrow, rutted, muddy, and impossible for heavy It
enough and
had
to
efforts
be improved. Then,
would have
to
too, supplies
be redoubled,
else
were not coming ashore
bad weather might con-
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA
163
ceivably drive the supporting fleet away while the
army lacked
sufficient
food and
ammunition. These considerations gave Shafter pause, and he halted any further advance while he made base.
A
prudent general studies his ground, and Shafter took time for prudence.
Wheeler had
told
him much about
the terrain the day of the
first
battle.
The
caval-
ryman's description had been accurate— as Shafter gazed out from the Las Guasimas ridge a relatively level plain stretched for about six miles toward Santiago, then broke
upward
erratically
were high enough
in a series of ridges for
good
which appeared almost
At
artillery positions.
to ring the city
and
glance these strategic heights
first
looked deserted.
Although General Linares had thrown away at
a golden chance to halt the
Yankees
Las Guasimas, he did not intend to give them easy access to the inner
These
hills offered
good defensive
possibilities for infantry
Heavy works, machine-gun
artillery.
and
and barbed-wire systems covered the ridge
pits,
in front of the southern approach to Santiago; Linares's southern flank tection of a watercourse
and
from Santiago and was anchored on ing the village of El Caney. attackers,
and were made
heavy naval guns. His
finally of
The
a
commanding
had the pro-
left
flank stretched out
hill called
El Viso, overlook-
Spanish positions were anything but enticing to
by the knowledge that they were defended by some
less so
12,000 men. Within supporting distance Linares had another 12,000
reach his
hills.
for the fine Spanish
who could
quickly
lines.
own
Shafter finally decided to go ahead with an advance. His
force of about
15,000 had the advantage of early victory, the promise of heavy reinforcement, and
might achieve notable success ahead of the main invasion army scheduled later. hill
On
the
morning
of
June
30th, Shafter
and
staff sui-veyed
about a mile in front of the main Spanish ridge. Their
to
come
the situation from a
command
post on El Poso
gave them a view, too, of El Caney, where Shafter had dispatched Generals Henry
W. Lawton and Adna
A
R. Chaffee to reconnoiter.
council of war decided that on July
with a heavy attack on the enemy's lines
and
that El Viso sported a stone fort
that
the assault
1st
at El
on Santiago would begin
Caney. Chaffee and Lawton reported
below
it,
extending around El Caney,
were trench and wire systems— all apparently well manned. carry El
main
Caney
at the start so that the
American
thrust straight at Santiago, over Kettle
decision at El Caney, a battery.
Lawton would
While Lawton took care
of the San
and San Juan
attack with his
of the flank,
When Lawton
Juan Heights.
right flank
It
seemed prudent
would be cleared hills.
whole
To
assure a swift
division, supported
two divisions would deploy
cleared El Caney, he
to
for the
by
in front
would push ahead
and link with the main attack against San Juan. This good plan went significant, held
Spanish defenses.
to pieces in execution.
The
El Caney positions were in-
by no more than 500 men, and formed an outwork of the main
They had no
was the garrison that
it
real
importance other than
as
an outpost, and
so feeble
could have done almost nothing to impede a direct advance
on Santiago. At most, El Caney should have been immobilized by the detachment of a small force. Instead, Shafter sent
about half his army against it— no
less
than 6,500
men. El
Caney came under
fire
at
6:30 a.m. on the
first,
but the American guns
Siege of San
July 1-17, 1898
166
Cuban General some
Calixto Garcia with
of his staff (National Archives)
General Garcia's army on the march in Cuba (National Archives)
v-t
•tv^A"
/.!
167
Mess of the Rough RidSan Antonio, Texas. Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood are at the head of the Officers'
ers,
table.
Sixteenth United States Infantry in San Juan Creek bottom, under Hill, July I, 1898 (Library of Congress)
(National Archives)
fire
from San Juan
^' w / ^ iifJIuW^-^
tMi^
FIELDSOFGLORY
168
were beyond was the
tive
range and did
effective
artillery, in fact, that
little
damage
to the fort
and
finally retired
it
on El Viso. So
ineffec-
hours
for several
the
left
battle to the infantry.
The
group of defenders guarded an ancient blockhouse and some trenches
tiny
fenced in barbed wire against an overwhelming American force which inched cautiously,
almost somnolently, forward. This slow-motion caricature of a battle unfolded
most of the morning until
for
Caney's limits.
speed— the
killed
bounced
light battery
bead on the stone
finally the
Americans came within
fort.
Chunks
yards of El
unlimbered and drew
closer to the town,
masonry erupted from the
of
men, and the creeping infantry took
and two hours
fifty
no general attack began. At about 2:30 p.m. the action picked up
Still
combat
of house-to-house
A
heart.
at length
effective
walls, bursting shrapnel
charge gained the town
won
the fort
and the
limits,
The
battle.
desperate and imexpectedly long action cost 441 American casualties— 81 killed and
The
360 wounded.
Spanish
General Vara del Rey and 235 killed and wounded
lost
plus 120 prisoners.
main
Shafter planned to launch his
effort
But so long roared the action on the right
would
on Santiago.
arrive to forestall an attack
agonizing decision while fighting
pinned down
A just
there, the
main
when
still
attack
it
main Spanish
the
American commanders
and overworked, he came
Ill
to an
must go on.
positions
on El Poso stood Kettle
on San Juan.
and San Juan
that Kettle
cleared.
raged at El Caney. Even with half his army
scant mile in front of battle headquarters
behind
Caney works were
the El
he feared Spanish reinforcements
that
hills
A glance
at the
map
and
Hill,
convinced
were interdependent positions.
Fire from one protected the other. Both hills had to be assaulted, but Kettle Hill
must be taken
approach to San Juan.
to ease the
first
The Rough
Riders,
still
glowing over their heroism
at
Las Guasimas, drew the
unpleasant duty of taking Kettle Hill in company with the rest of the dismounted cavalry division. First, of course, the division had to get to the
almost as hard as attacking
were few,
it.
hill,
and enemy
visibility nil, the heat stifling,
artillery,
this
proved
shellfire shatteringly accurate.
Every approach to the Aguadores River, which ran in front of the
by Spanish
and
Pathways through the heavy vines and undergrowth
hills,
was covered
and each became an avenue of death. All kinds of confusion
reigned as troops tried to go forward. Frequently they were forced to stand quiet or lie
down under
a blanket of bullets.
ability to shoot back.
bullets with your
when you
men
lay
As one
own
under
Nothing unnerved them more than
later wrote:
"Now
it
carbine smoking in your hand, but
a hell of fire
and
their in-
hard enough to face those ugly
is
it
becomes doubly hard
can't fire a single shot in reply."
Everywhere
asked to be sent up, to get a chance at the enemy. Finally, about one o'clock,
the order
came
to cross the river
Roosevelt, the
and organized the
would be madness.
and go up the
new commander attack.
He
Rifle pits
of the
hill.
Rough
Riders, galloped along his line
clearly understood that a slow advance
were placed
to
ized
Rough
Riders' charge seen
and the
riders
on
so
were not riding— but
many it
Kettle Hill lines.
The
was not
like the ideal-
post cards— it took place
on the wrong
only chance lay in a full-scale charge, and he ordered one.
hill,
up
wreck regularly advancing It
worked. Happy in their release from the
rain of death in the bottomland, the cavalrymen almost ran
up
the
hill.
The
de-
THE HALLS OF MONTEZUMA fenders gave
gave
in confusion,
name was
its
it
To
way
169
and the huge sugar
kettle that
crowned the
Yankee hands.
in
the left of Kettle Hill the attack on San
Juan got going. humorous blunder. An observation balloon bounded
ghoulishly
It
began with a along the
gaily
moment
line for a look at Spanish outposts near the river. Until that
American
and
hill
the
dense undergrowth had been as baffling to the Spanish as to the Americans, and Spanish
gunners had been
denly the
silk
the vast green sea without specific targets. Sud-
firing into
bulb pinpointed the American columns, and a storm of
into the infantry preparing to deploy.
point
this
command went
the rear,
Wheeler came up
manders
lost their units.
late
No
to pieces
when
the
started.
on the American
front. Shatter lay
ill
at
and knew nothing of what went on, brigade com-
detailed battle order
mate of enemy strength came from
company commanders, who
shell ripped
sickening carnage stopped only
and the ascent of San Juan
river was crossed
At
The
intelligence. It
came from headquarters; no
esti-
was assumed by the regiment and
and San Juan
actually fought the battle, that Kettle
hills
They would have been astounded to know that enemy mismanagement was even greater than their own and that barely 1,500 men barred the way to Santiago. Numbers counted for little, of course, when
were held by almost
the
enemy
One
position
idea
all
of Linares's 12,000 men.
and lack of American co-ordination were considered.
came
clearly to all subordinate leaders— get out of the
Confused, disorganized, virtually panic-stricken, the
attack!
1st
bottoms and
Division got across
the Aguadores and began the assault.
The
charge began under
stopped somebody yelled,
fire
"Come
Come
on!" At that
most impressed observer Richard Harding Davis was the
heeded the
call. "It
seemed
One's instinct was to
When had
as if
someone had made an awful and
them
call to
to
terrible mistake.
come back."
the scattered few began their climb
a chance. It surely
when their rattling moment the thing that relatively few men who
cover from Catling guns, and on!
was the height of
no one who saw them thought they
folly to expect a
ragged handful to carry
such formidable works so doggedly held. Everything about the advance smacked of a forlorn hope. Davis noted the unheroic nature of the thing:
ing bayonets, they were not massed in regular vance,
bunched
together,
and creeping up a
roared and flashed with flame.
and stepped heavily
as they
The men
array. steep,
"They had no
glitter-
men
in ad-
There were
a few
sunny
the top of which
hill,
held their guns pressed across their breasts
climbed. ...
It
was
much more wonderful
swinging charge could have been. They walked to greet death
at every step,
than any
many
of
them, as they advanced, sinking suddenly or pitching forward and disappearing in the high grass, but the others the crest was in
Spanish
fell
waded on
American hands and a
Newsmen would it
.
.
higher and higher up the
hill." Finally
rush carried a stubborn blockhouse.
The
back to secondary works and the battle of San Juan Hill ended. glorify the charge at
would help promote Colonel Roosevelt and
.
last
would rank with the
to
San Juan Hill; an erroneous version of
it
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
great military achievements of the nineteenth century.
Far-reaching results, indeed, for an effort conceived in ignorance and executed in desperation.
To
all practical
purposes the battle of El Caney and San Juan Hill (American
170
Twelve-inch gun emplacement (above), Spanish Santa Clara Battery, Vedado, Cuba {National Archives). A taste of modern war: barbed-wire entanglements (below) in the Santiago area {National Archives)
A
glimpse (above) of past glories: old muzzle-loaders in the Bateria del Faro, Cienfuegos, Archives). (Below) More of modern war: armored railroad cars, used in Cuba (National Archives)
Cuba (National
•
-
HL
j-X
iwK^^
B/yj 1^^^ ('
^^^^^
T^
&^ ^'^Sf^'
4^H ^R'-' ^Bjjfe^,
Ni t Colt automatic gun
The famous "dynamite gun" which threw
'
sticks of
dynamite into enemy
lines {National Archives)
^^
Four American positions near Santiago
17:
A view of Santiago, Cuba {Xational Archives)
Raising the American
flag at
Santiago (National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
174
ended the war. The
casualties over 1,000)
The
little
which Shatter timidly clamped on Santiago. Protracted negotia-
between Shatter and Toral resulted in the complete surrender of Cuba on July
The advance
17, 1898.
war
effort
suffered total de-
Spanish changed land commanders, but General Jose Toral could do
to relieve the siege
tions
under Cervera made a gallant
on July 3rd but ran into the blockading squadron and
to escape feat.
fleet
forces of the
United
States
had won the main objective of the
month.
in less than a
General Nelson A. Miles,
Commanding General
charge of a 5,000-man force to s^veep the
Army, took personal
of the
Spanish strength from Puerto
last vestige of
Rico. In a swift, brilliantly planned and executed campaign which restored the tarnished luster of
American arms, he landed
in Puerto
some
of
Rico on July 25th, out-
flanked and outmaneuvered several Spanish units, and had the island under control
when fighting ended on August 13th. The Spanish-American War had more tion "splendid little
of iron
and the sternness of land fighting
Philippines,
and blood
in
war" implies. Fierce naval combats raged in
it
in
than the designa-
Cuba and
in the
the Pacific islands surpassed the
butchery of the "Bloody Crossing" on the Aguadores. Deeds done by Generals Shafter
and 'Wheeler and Admiral Sampson were
easily rivaled
patriot Emilio
Aguinaldo did
is
by those of Generals Wesley
What
Merritt and Arthur MacArthur and Admiral Dewey.
they and the Filipino
recorded on other pages. But their doings reinforced
the lessons learned in Cuba. Neglect of the army, a decaying, pernicious militia system,
of military interest put a high price
and lack
on mobilization and created
confusion and chaos. Once more volunteers had proved their worth
and once more,
young West Pointers proved
too,
if
properly led,
that a cadre of trained officers
could pick up the pieces left by superannuated and incompetent brass. Obviously new weapons and techniques demanded new command ideas, more careful preparatory planning.
The
But the
lessons
had been dearly bought,
as usual.
signing of a final peace treaty between the United States and Spain, on
December
10,
1898^
World. The same destined to
make
ended the
treaty it
Avar
and Spain's
last
vestiges of glory in the
launched the United States on a colonial career of
an international power,
make
to
it,
its
New own
in fact, almost- the Spain
of the twentieth century.
In the years after the "splendid war," Americans savored the heady exhilaration of dictating
where and when island governments would
live
and
die.
After this
Teddy Roosevelt's candid took Panama," and the Roosevelt Corollary. The Corollary merely repugnacious and xenophobic sentiments of the Monroe Doctrine in
experience nothing could have been more logical than boast that "I iterated
the
modern terms and served
notice on a suspecting
world that America had special
spheres of interest and influence in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. Such a policy, of course, carried with
it
European intervention
in
American
states,
governments of
grave responsibilities. financial
If the
United
States
frowned upon
and internal problems of Central and South
then the United States would have to police the finances and the its
ne^v protectorates so that international
commitments could be
honored. Unfortunately for protector and protected, neither understood the other.
175
Seventh United States Artillery entering Ponce, Puerto Rico, August, {National Archives)
IJ
The Mexican Punitive
Expedition, 1916-1917
Nowhere was misunderstanding more clearly revealed than
when
United
States
the revolu-
and foreigners and foreign investments were threatened, the
tion erupted in 1910
grew diplomatically
cool. President
Wilson,
who
earnestly declared a
improve relations with Latin America, became alarmed
desire to
relations with
in
Mexico. During the Diaz regime relations were tolerable, but
ability of successive rebel regimes to protect foreign lives
avowed
tain order. In a reversal of his
at the
apparent
and property and
to
Mexican
policy he dabbled directly in
in-
mainaffairs
deposing the Victoriano Huerta regime and recognizing that of
to the extent of
Venustiano Carranza. Through the complicated period 1914-1916, while Carranza struggled to the top, the mysterious figure of Francisco Villa clouded Mexican politics.
He had
served Francisco Madero, flirted with Carranza, and seemed to approve Amer-
ican desires to stabilize Mexico.
satrapy in best
way
Chihuahua with
to achieve Carranza's disappearance
rassment with the United
good many of
killed a
Mexico, and,
as
States. Villa
When
Mexico and Texas.
No
But Wilson's support of Carranza threatened
extinction. Carranza
citizens,
seemed
New
Europe threatened
much
it
so sternly,
Newton D. Baker authorized the State Department
envoy which would
aid in the
finally
9,
New and
1916,
to stay out of
war with Mexico while
but Villa had gone too
would have
Secretary of
far.
War
pursuit of Villa across the international boundary, and
worked
feverishly to complete
on both
an agreement with Carranza's
sides of the line. Carranza's gov-
but not exactly to what developed.
to
J.
to 1,500
men—and
be sent against him. Supposedly the Carranzistas would
manhunt, and would make the American
Brigadier General John
he
Mexico, on March
had a large force— it ranged in popular myth from 400
a large force
The
be to involve him in embar-
desired peace, could ignore the outrage at
legalize "hot pursuit"
at length agreed,
Villa
Villa's
go.
he achieved the ultimate in embarrassment for
Columbus. President Wilson wanted desperately
ernment
to
would
proved, for himself.
it
government, however
affairs in
to go, else Villa
began by raiding several border towns in
he hit Columbus,
its
had
But
task easier.
to ensure success
Pershing received orders to take a provisional division-
commanded some
15,000
men— into Mexico
began crossing the Rio Grande on March
15, 1916,
and break up the
and
so
began
his
banditti.
He
famous Punitive
Expedition.
"Black Jack" Pershing,
Negro 10th Cavalry, American
officers.
ridiculous
orders
who
got his nickname after a hitch as
of Carranza which
commander
in the field.
had imposed severe
limits
on American
arteries, railroads
rights in Mexico.
should not be used,
towns could not be entered without express permission of the official.
Nothing
to embarrass relations with the de facto govern-
Operations must be restricted to north-south
Carranzista
of the
of the younger
But when he crossed the Rio Grande he acted under the most ever to hobble an American
must be done, enjoined Washington,
ment
commander
probably knew more about modern war than any
jefe
politico or a
Conversely, of course. Villa operated everywhere with virtually
wholehearted approval of the local populace, and in some cases even of Carranza's followers.
General John
J.
Pershing and some of his staff crossing the Rio Grande during the PuniExpedition against Pancho Villa {National Archives)
tive
FIELDS OF GLORY
178
on the expedition were enough
Political restrictions
other things about
hua—an
anger any soldier, but
were equally hard. Villa had disappeared into north Chihua-
it
of endless alkali crust was broken here
oasis,
a struggling rancho,
poor
a
and there by a deep arroyo, a
The awesome
village.
man and
attendant hardship to
by night.
The
beast;
by the National and
east
New Mexico
the serene and lofty grandeur of the Sierras.
Chihuahua plain
A
in a series of
Railroad and on the west by
The mountain
ranges filtered
rugged foothills— timeless
down
a
pattern of passes cut through the mountains to rich lands west, and
moimtains— what more splendid
foeman of mettle. In
to banditry.
and
earlier
been led by the misfortunes of
by penury
stage for an actor like Villa?
Mexican
easier times almost a
had exacted
iest
States
its toll
have
of
the thirst-
fighting sharpened the instincts of a
mountain
and Pancho
Villa
light cavalry— made
bandidos—exceUent
his
a deft and shrewd tactician. If he erred in baffling mountains, regroup,
life
now ranked with
in character
Long years of many campaigns with
every peon's hovel he
and
Covered with a Robin Hood mantle in Mexican mythology,
of bloodletters.
hunter, and
was
he had
patriot,
North Mexican
politics to isolation in the
rail-
He
he had for a time robbed the rich and shared some with the poor— but a license
to
Apaches and
for
forts
within the ranges lay tempting plateaus and ambitious mining towns. Plains, roads, oases,
the
all
was alternately baked by day and frozen
it
obvious theater of operations lay within this arid plateau and was
bounded on the
other hostiles.
lone-
spread of scarred
wasteland was subjected to the typical weather of the Great Plains with
the
The
arid flatness decked with an occasional mesquite, a yucca, or an agave.
monotony some
to
he could always
tactics,
and raid again. Every
knew— all were open
to
rail
He
him.
line
back
fall
and road, every
was, as Carranza
is
him
to the
path,
reputed
to
"everywhere and nowhere."
said,
Pershing did not have to catch "The Wraith of the Desert," but he did have to find his
band and destroy
its
effectiveness.
and made excellent use of the
latest
He
set
about
this
equipment available
considerable task briskly
to the
The ground
army.
was, of course, ideally suited for cavalry, but the further Villa retired into Mexico,
the longer grew
American
lines of
commtinication. Denied the railroads, Pershing
decided to use trucks to sustain his base. Numbers of White one-and-a-half-tonners
and
Jetfrey
Quads were put
into service, chauffetired by civilians.
A
well-regulated
convoy system evolved, and in time trucks and wagons shuttled from Columbus,
New
Colonia Dublan on schedule. Pershing's rapidly moving
field
Mexico,
to the base at
headquarters kept in touch with scattered units by means of the radio,
and messages
to really
the United States
Signal Corps
remote parts of the theater were carried by the
Squadron. Pershing's expedition would rank
of cavalry,
new
Army— lessons
infantry, artillery,
as the first
1st
Aero
modern campaign waged by
he learned about handling a combined expedition
motor
units,
signal
units,
machine-gun
units,
and
planes were invaluable on the Western Front a scant year later. Military operations in Mexico were far
and, as a matter of seventies, eighties,
moimted
fact, differed little
and
nineties.
From
more
prosaic than Pershing's
from hundreds
equipment
of cavalry operations of the
his base, Pershing
fanned three columns of
troopers into the mystifying country seeking traces of Pancho.
Nothing.
Gradually the three columns broke into smaller units, and the expedition pene-
179
United States Army (above) supply wagon (National Archives). View (below) of part of the United States supply point at Colonia Dublan, Mexico (National Archives)
P" ^^,.
•-''^^'"^^^^^ftfeii^l^Jifjt*^^^.^^-
-.
FIELDS OF GLORY
180 trated deeper into
rumor had just
it.
Chihuahua. Several times Villa eluded capture, or
at
least
so
Once, wounded by Carranzistas, he escaped through the mountains
He avoided snares so successfully through who resented the gringos anyway, came to
ahead of a probing Yankee troop.
March and April
that the local citizenry,
regard the expedition with derisive contempt.
worked
Villa's irritating disappearances
men. The longer they looked
double hardship on Pershing and
a
up
save his political skin he had to stand
and
to ^Vilson
his
madder grew Carranza. To
for their fleeing foe, the
Long and
to Pershing.
unpleasant talks failed to persuade the United States to withdraw the expedition,
and
length
at
armed
to the point of
the situation deteriorated
between
conflict
Yankees and Carranzistas.
many
Curiously enough, fought not with 1916, a
the
of
real
battles
Punitive venture were
the
of
but with troops of the de facto government.
\'illistas
On
April
12,
detachment of the 13th Cavalry under Major Frank Tompkins entered the
town of Parral
purchase
to
the detachment began
Local
supplies.
were
Carranzistas
departure they began to
its
fire
at
hostile,
the Yankees.
retired in splendid order, fighting a brilliant rear-guard action.
By
and
as
Tompkins
his cool leadership
he avoided a pitched battle ^vhich could have had serious diplomatic repercussions.
But
his disquieting
combat with the supposedly friendly government troops marked
only the beginning of fierce encounters. the
hamlet of Carrizal
Mexico and the United Carrizal
a
is
The most
one of the most
at
serious occurred
critical
on June
21st,
near
periods in relations between
States.
bad moment
American military
in
combat apparently shed a good deal of
discredit
history.
Usually ignored, the
on the 10th Cavalry, and tended
to
confirm long-standing army contempt for Negro soldiers. But the troopers of the
who
10th
fought, died, or were captured at Carrizal deser\'e only praise. Respon-
humiliating defeat there must go to the
sibility for the
officer in
command
of the
detachment, a Captain Boyd. 'Willing, brave, but an inexperienced and untrained
he bargained with Carranzista forces for permission
officer,
to pass
through Carrizal
while they entrenched themselves on high ground, then ordered an attack in open
dismounted order against well-hidden foemen equipped with guns.
That any
of the
had been the aggressor was But
States.
all
in a way, Carrizal
and machine
rifles
detachment survived seems incredible. The
fact that
that prevented a victory for jingoism in the
seemed
senses— Wilson and Carranza took
to bring
up
Boyd
United
both governments abruptly to their
the question of friendship in good earnest.
Although the Punitive Expedition did not withdraw from Mexico immediately, grew appreciably
lations
While doing everything he could the search
for Villa.
Cavalry ran into the
had raged
had retired
all
to enjoy
last
hills.
on May
stages of a battle
5,
1916.
There
a
men
squadron of the 11th
between Carranzistas and
\'illistas.
The sides
an evening's libations— all in accepted Mexican form. But the
lines flushed the Villistas
nants into the
avoid war ^vith Mexico, Pershing pressed
day on the 4th, but had brought no casualties and both
11th Cavalry arrived with intent to
on two
to
Probably the most effective blow dealt by Pershing's
against Villa occurred at Ojos Azules
action
re-
less frigid.
This
fight
kill.
Early on the morning of the 5th an attack
from the
village
may have wrecked
and pushed the shattered remVilla's last large force in the field.
I
181
General Pershing and stafE (above) in Mexico, hunting Pancho Villa [National Archives). Two war correspondents (below) en route to the front in Mexico, May 2, 1916 {National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
182
Subsequently, villages and ranches here and there were harassed by small bands, but
not by small armies.
Pershing realized that after Ojos Azules one phase of his campaign had ended,
and he changed
tactics.
broken into scouting
commander and upon
instantly,
Instead of covering so vast an area with large columns
parties,
he devised a
resident police force.
and
very
as a result
each district Avith
district system,
Any
little
report of
\'illista activity
its
own
could be acted
trouble occurred. Nevertheless Pershing
did not withdraw— the United States wanted some guarantee that Mexico could
prevent a resurgence of banditry on the border. Not until February the last United States soldier recross the
1917, did
5,
Rio Grande, and bring the expedition
to
an end.
Hardly productive of great or immediate tion
had an importance
logistical snarls
beyond
far
its
results, the
numbers or
war
Mexican Punitive Expedi-
achievements.
The
fantastic
which developed in Pershing's rear indicated that the army hardly
stood ready for extended operations anywhere. the
its
in Europe, a great deal of preparing
take an effective part.
Worst
of
all,
If
the United States should get into
would have
be done before
to
the efforts to call out the Neu-
militias as a sustaining force for Pershing
and
as
it
could
Mexican and Texas
guardians of the border showed the
old militia system decayed to the point of uselessness. Mobilization and concentration took incredible time, confusion reigned everywhere, states misunderstood their
army
duties,
officers
found
impossible
it
to enforce discipline, supplies failed
materialize. If such chaos prevailed Avhen the country
war, defeat might
come
became involved
to
in a large
swiftly indeed.
Pershing's expedition had the negative distinction of alerting the United States to
its
happened south of the border reinforced what
military danger. All that
tary of
War
modernized training program. These
War and
the Spanish-American
forgetfulness were about
The
Secre-
Elihu Root had long preached about the need for a revitalized and
to
things, ^\•hich
War, had been
had been understood
in the Civil
and now the
forgotten,
^vages of
be paid.
Punitive Expedition marked the
last
large-scale
American military adven-
ture in Latin America, but far from the last intervention.
Still,
despite later un-
pleasantness with Central and South America and occasionally cool relations
-ivith
Though Americans had
their
Mexico, thirst
affairs
to
the
south grew
less
worrisome.
for imperialism slaked considerably in
World War
I,
they soon found that
the United States had been thrust into the role of reluctant leader.
France in 1917 marked the
first
Yankee
The march
to
steps to worldliness.
i
183
One
of the Indian scouts attached to General Pershing's forces in Mexico, May, 1916 (National Archives)
View of some Mexican
troops {National Archives)
THE YANKS ARE
C
OMING
World War I By the time
men RECROSSED the
PERSHING's
RIO GRANDE
the war
in
EUROPE HAD
reached incredible proportions. Casualties piled up along the wall of trenches on the
Western Front
numbers reminiscent
in
emboldened by undersea
of Egyptian
successes in strangling Britain,
German submarines continued
to
out
much
if
they
felt
Imperial
in
vessels.
"He
1916 on the slogan
was clear by February, 1917, that he could not keep America
it
longer. Everything
participation, they
virtually un-
protests,
blockade Britain and to sink United States
Although President Wilson had been re-elected kept us out of war,"
had opened
Despite American
submarine warfare early in 1917.
restricted
Roman conflicts. The more The Central Powers,
and
cared for "neutral rights."
fierce the war, the less either side
depended on the Germans.
curtail their naval operations
might
If
they feared American
and soothe Yankee
ire.
But
they could win a swift victory by continuing the blockade, a victory
which would take France and England out of the war before the United could really get into
Germany made
it,
the
then American neutrality was
wrong
doomed
States
to rapid extinction.
decision. Partially blinded by the glittering prospect
of the "Mistress of the Seas" begging for peace as a result of
German submarine
vic-
German government decided to flirt with American intervention. American troops were unready— the Germans did not ignore the lessons of Mexico— and before they could get ready the European phase of the war should be over. Once tories, the
England surrendered, France would have
to
do the same. With the principal Allies
out of the war, the United States could hardly hope to wage a transatlantic
and some
would have
sort of peace
conflict,
to result.
In March, 1917, everything indicated that the Germans were betting on a sure thing. Britain virtually
hung on
from the United
dwindled
all
the wiles
it
States
knew, had failed
desperately hoped America
to
the ropes; rations grew scarce, munitions supplies to a trickle.
The vaunted Royal And
break the submarine cordon.
would enter the war,
Navy, employing while the English
there was real concern as to whether
or not the intervention could be effective in view of the U-boats. If effective, could it
come
in time to prevent the collapse of the British Expeditionary Force
and the
armies of France?
Wilson, very position,
much concerned
found himself pushed
ships were spurlos
ships
came
to a
head
and morality of the American
the right
and
t^ersen A <— barbarities of
ican public. Everything
more American
for
closer
in
closer to war.
More and more American
unannounced sinkings shocked the AmerMarch.
On
had gone down— this on top
of
the 18th
came news
that three
news of German attempts
to
provoke a Mexican war by means of the infamous Zimmerman Note, proved more than even a patient President could bear. CongTess met on April 2nd and heard
Wilson ask
for war.
He
stated the case for an
American Crusade.
Congress declared war and put the army and navy squarely on the the Spanish-American fact,
and
conflict,
the navy seemed readier than the
spot.
army— it
As
in
was, in
able to plunge into the problem of antisubmarine operations with the British to achieve startlingly successful results.
awkward discovery during
Pershing's
But the army? The army had made an
Mexican campaign: the creaking
militia system
THE YANKS ARE COMING
187
would not work. Confusion, overlapping,
conflicts of all kinds arose. Officers
long out
I
knew
of service
Men who
of the latest techniques in military affairs.
little
might be
I
willing
enough
country were not willing to be bossed around, bullied
to die for their
and put on "KP." The age-old complaints of a
citizen
army were heard louder than
ever. I
One
I
i
of the best things to
War had
Civil
come from
which
fense Act of 1916, against
all
the Villa vendetta was the National De-
kinds of objections were raised. Never since the
been necessary for Congress
it
to prescribe a stiff military course for
I
j
i
the country,
and people were not
Nevertheless the
entirely ready.
passed and
bill
provided that over a five-year period the regular army would be increased to 220,000
men and True,
Guard would be increased
that the National
and reorganized.
to 450,000
was a long time, possibly longer than the country could wait, but
five years
i
!
the fact of the law was encouraging, the time
and
war was declared there were
set the stage for later
at least
some new
rapid expansion.
recruits in
By
camp, and the
people had some awareness of a terrible problem. j
Now
United
that the
had joined the
States
who would command
cide
from the standpoint of experience and
better qualified
drove Villa to cover. Brigadier General John soon got the rank of
full
general to give
Pershing's initial tasks had
liam Shafter before him. His
some
first
him
trained men;
instruction
all
ability
de-
one seemed
than the
man who
Pershing got the assignment, and
status
among
the Allied commanders.
and Wil-
problems were logistical—getting the troops in
National Defense Act and Plattsburg
tially
J.
No
similarity to those of Winfield Scott
combat shape and then transporting them
The
do was
Allies, the first thing to
the United States troops going to France.
across the Atlantic to the theater of war.
Movement promised
the General Staff plans
for
mobilization
to
provide some par-
promised camps of
over the country to speed the building of an army. Congress finally
assured an adequate force by passing a draft act.
Transportation problems were
solved
by the government taking over the railroads and by the new submarine
tactics.
Once
the
army took form, what would be done with
Pershing, of course,
had pulled
since 1914. After he
them busy
tactics,
were bound
would be
his
to
men
to the future
results in
Europe
he saw that they learned
but stuck to the basic rules of open
produce
in
out of Mexico in February, 1917, he kept
With an eye
at rigorous drilling.
trench-warfare felt
it?
knew something about what had been going on
combat— rules which he
any war. Training in trench
essential for fighting in France.
By 1917
tactics
probably
the Western Front was a giant
angry scar across France, festering with barbed wire and blood. Over 400 miles of ditches brief
yawned from the border
moment
bedded
in
of
maneuver
ground. Military
happened, but
all
conceded
of Switzerland
at the
men it
to
the
English
Channel. After a
beginning, both sides had found themselves em-
could not explain quite
was
how
the trench stalemate
frightful. Actually, of course, firepower
had out-
manpower— defense had overtaken offense. And encased in the trenches and bottomless mud both German and Allied armies huddled in relative security. Now stripped
and then one side or the other would ditch, dig in
and
sit
again.
The
front,
attack, gain
some small
stretch of shell-torn
by April, 1917, resembled a gargantuan snake
troubled by an occasional minor muscular spasm.
Curiously enough, both the Raiser's advisers and Allied leaders expected that
FIELDS OF GLORV
188 the ensnarement of the trenches
what then? Each
had
side
would be broken. But once out
of the trenches,
which looked toward a "breakthrough," but
tactical plans
with limited mechanized transport, with "lines of communication" extending over
enemy concentrations building behind
devastated groiuid, and with heavy breach,
no smashing victory seemed
the wire, get out of the
The
mud on open
ground, and maneuver.
had been prepared
tions provided a seven-day preparation;
some tanks were used
men and
German
The
an attempt
in
to brave
engines of war battered
of
fire
machine gims, and
smashed against the front
assault
assisted
by heavy
artillery in
all
of
it
had
failed.
A
gained,
little territory
Novem-
enemy morale dented— this
exchange for 400,000 British and 200,000 French troops. German
it
men
was that
cially
cost of cave-dwelling. Espe-
did the Allies ponder the question. True, things looked a
in the year
when
a large Russian offensive piled
and forced a reduction
in
German
to the
The world
could not best machines and ditches.
wondered, of course, how long Europe could absorb the
in
had not
losses
been inconsiderable: 500,000. The horror of the trenches was brought home
whole world; clear
the
ground for^vard through wire and
lines,
trench in desperate hand-to-hand fighting, here and there successful, and by
ber 25th
in
positions— positions carefully entrenched, laced with barbed wire, cov-
ered with interlocking rear.
offensive
huge gun concentra-
for a breakthrough:
the holocaust of machine guns and crack the lines; the
Somme
prospect of maneuver had lured the Allies into the
July, 1916. Everything
the fancied
dream lingered— Get through
possible. Still, the
little
better later
up one million Austrian
casualties
strength on the Western Front. But by the time
Pershing reached France the situation had deteriorated to the point of collapse.
The
reason for the sudden reversal lay in the odd personality of French General Robert
Georges Nivelle.
who
Nivelle, the sort of officer
meant
that they could
enemy
front
French
first
the hit
A
The
fact of
modest gains
the post given to Nivelle.
isolate the
had already pointed
German
Noyon
would
pierce the
combat superiority had made
1917 unpalatable to the French
in
The new commander
submarine bases on the Belgian
to the
lines in the salient
weakness of the
coast,
salient; the
Noyon salient during most Even though the enemy had retired on the
sector.
attack;
the
Allied forces could
defending
estimates of their vulnerability coincided with
remarks about his objective. Without waiting to
Noyon
difficult.
off parts of
and perhaps swing
ground favored
to attack in
were long and supply
evacuated the
once declared
at
between Reims and Arras, press on
salient
both faces of the bulge and possibly pinch
German
prominence, announced early
swift stroke, said Nivelle,
Germany. Not by accident did Nivelle choose
Joffre
to
venerable marshal was removed as commander-in-chief of the
eliminate the
toward Belgium, into
year.
to victory.
Joffre's plans for
The
Army and
he would
win that
and open the way
Marshal Joseph government.
way
brags his
newly won combat superiority of the Allies on the Western Front
in 1917 that the
test his boast,
of March. Nivelle
strongly fortified
forces.
Nivelle's
the
ill-concealed
Germans
quietly
remained undaunted.
Hindenburg Line,
the
retrenchment did not invalidate his plan— or so he thought. At any rate he went ahead, shifting the point of his attack to the chalk bluffs comprising the ridge of
des Dames. Unfortimately the
German
lines.
Any
Chemin
des
Dames proved
reconnaissance at
all
to
Chemin
be the strongest part of
should have anticipated
this fact, since
Famous World War I " 'Tis a Long, Long Way perary.
United
." .
.
poster: to
Tip-
(Library of Congress)
States platoon drilling in attack formation, near Harmonville, France, August,
1918.
These men were part
of the
2nd Division, U.S.M.C. (National Archives)
.*«
^A^^^V
.».
t
FIELDS OF GLORY
190 the ridge was high, the ground was rough and offered
little
cover.
French began their push along the Aisne on April 16th, and
But even
so,
the
failed miserably. In a
matter of not quite seventy-two hours, 100,000 French casualties dotted the Chemin
Dames
des
Such
bluffs.
fierce slaughter
to the lowest
could hardly be borne. Morale in the French ranks sank
ebb in the memory of the nation; revolt and mutiny erupted in
segments of the army. As one
we
\vill
French
official
Panic
The Germans
fills
"By the end
Germans nor General Pershing knew
apparently did not learn the late to
notice of the alarming state of the front
full
large
summer
appeared. In order to check any
front, the British
at
Cambrai
on July
9th,
by which time General
German attempt
to restore morale,
j
squashy French
to exploit the
in
November could not be
exploited,
ill
afford; all
reserves
since
had
offensive.
prospects, then, ^^•hen Pershing reached France
could
,
more thoroughly than
were dismal
in the extreme:
French morale shattered, the army in mutiny; the British committed effort they
the
comprising the Third Battle of Ypres. Limited British success
been drained by the sustained
The
serious-
Expeditionary Force had to keep attacking to^vard the north in a
series of costly actions
with tanks
its
among
do them any good. Pershing received
the staggering defeat wrecked Allied hopes for 1917
Still,
of
extent of defection
Henri Philippe Petain had replaced orator Nivelle and had begun
first
of the
our fighting men." But the mutiny remained one of the
French legions until the end of June, too official
at the time:
have guns, planes, to say nothing of the Americans— but there will be no soldiers.
war's best-kept secrets— neither the ness.
noted
to
an offensive
hopes for a mass Allied attack in 1917 gone. "This
adverse situation after three years of struggle," observed Pershing, "was so depress-
ing that the prospects of Allied victory probably never before looked
One
less
hopeful."
thing stood clearly revealed by Allied reverses: America would have to
make
a
I Western Front, 1914-1918
THE YANKS ARE COMING more strenuous
far
ing that an
and
army
effort
one million Americans be thrown into France by May, 1918,
of
some three million men be
that ultimately
Men
were only one of the urgent needs
how many
down
would
less
France. Constantly Pershing was
in
The importance
planes the United States could send over at once.
had not impressed American
of air superiority over the trench lines
they saw the
Anything
sent to Europe.
but not changing the outcome of the war.
result in prolonging
asked
191
than most had expected. Pershing cabled Washington, urg-
damage German planes did
in strafing
and bombing
imtil
officers
raids, in cutting
attacking infantry, in spotting concentrations. Every question about Ameri-
can planes Pershing had to parry— America probably could not put a single combatready plane in the
air,
and counted qualified combat
pilots
on the
fingers
of
two
hands. Could the United States supply artillery? No, in fact Americans would have
Could America contribute
use Allied guns.
to
America needed
to
borrow British bottoms
combat units into the
to British shipping tonnage?
to transport troops.
No, there were none
lines at once?
Could America
to send,
No, filter
with the possible
exception of one division.
moment he
Pershing knew from the Chief,
American Expeditionary
inter-Allied co-operation.
Even
received the assignment as Commander-in-
Forces, that his
most pressing problem would be
knowledge of French and British military
a casual
operations in the war would be enough to convince anyone that the two Allies retained latent hostility, that
commanders and
real co-ordination of effort
had yet
without such unified observed that
it
effort the
to
troops vied with one another, and that
be achieved. Pershing clearly understood that
Germans had every chance
to
win the war. Napoleon
took no real effort to beat a coalition. Affairs on the Western Front
appeared once again to prove the Corsican's genius.
If
they could not get along with
They
each other, could the British and French get along with Americans?
denied any troubles arising from nationalism, but denials could not negate the beginning, too,
A
it
good many people
seemed in the
the French, but nothing at
that
they should be French ranks.
In
American nationalism would make things worse.
United States
all to
stoutly facts.
felt
the British. If
Time and
we owed something we
sent
men
to Lafayette
and
to fight in Allied ranks,
again this delicate matter strained Pershing's
rapidly developing diplomacy.
But of tion of
how
all
matters ^vhich confounded the American commander's task, the ques-
to use
American troops stood
of desperation, the Allies naturally as
soon
at the
head of the
list.
Pushed
to
extremes
hoped American units would be shipped abroad England, and then siphoned into British
as assembled, possibly trained in
and French combat units where they could be battle-hardened by veterans. While this
scheme seemed
logical to the Allies,
it
did not jibe with American plans. In
orders from President Wilson, Pershing received clear directions
on
this point:
"The
underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate
and
distinct
component
of the
preserved. This fundamental rule
is
combined
forces, the identity of
subject to such
which must be
minor exceptions
in particular
may approve." So Pershing kept firm to the idea American Army operating under its own commanders on its own front.
circumstances as your judgment of a distinct
He
recognized that some troops would have to go in here and there with the Allies
to bolster particular pieces of line
and
that the sooner token units could arrive
and
192
Part of the 168th United States Infantry making a raid near Badonviller, France, 17, 1918 (National Archives)
March
193
American Negro infantry (above) going to the front in the Argonne (National Archives). United States troops (below) attack behind a light smoke screen on the Western Front (National Archives)
194
come
reach the battlefield, the better. If a unit could
where
instance,
A
best to put
soon, his
FIELDS OF GLORY own 1st Division, for
it?
quiet area in the Vosges sector near Luneville seemed the best locale.
had been
line there
the great
relatively stable since
German
trench duty would give the green troops some feel for combat.
ber 21, 1917, Yanks
drive in
On
vember 3rd the
a
American
man
German
Americans were about them. Early
patrol picked
its
twelve
dead— the
fell
made
admitted
American
men
in line
French generals were solicitous and
for a display of Allied fraternity.
and had been baptized
he could talk sternly to the British and French. die in France, they ^vere going to have to give
to transport
supplies were scant;
some concrete
would take time
it
The
munitions across the Atlantic.
in blood, Pershing felt
more Americans
they wanted
If
guns would have
States lagged badly in artillery production:
Ammunition
Three Ameri-
were wounded and
the affair seemed inauspicious, none of the Ameri-
If
Pershing and several
it.
men were
that his
of the post finally yielded.
battle deaths in the ^var—-five
ceremony an occasion
the funeral
Now
first
enemy hands.
into
officers
The GerThe post sud-
trapped in a box barrage and then under close attack. Fighting
itself
valiantly but without experience, the
cans were
of No-
artillery.
Division.
1st
dawn
moved toward
the barbs and
objective was an isolated post of the 16th Infantry,
denly found
can
way through
just as curious
in the
As usual the patrol worked under cover of
lines.
and
Across the wire and pocked ground
filed into the front line.
as the
The
the night of Octo-
were the enemy sandbags and machine guns. The Germans proved about the Americans
1914,
to
to get into
be lent by the
Allies.
mass production and
Inter-Allied Munitions Board
would
have to make supplies available. Transport— trucks, vehicles, trains— would have
be provided along with increased port
facilities.
preciate the desperate need for supplies,
would have
No France. ices.
to
and
come through. They agreed
one understood so clearly
Combat
as
Washington apparently in the crisis the Allies
The war was one
on
of logistics
on the scene
General Pershing the new nature of war in strain
on the supply
unprecedented in military
a scale
roles.
The
And
awful
fact of logistics
as the
"lines of
Force, Pershing found himself
communication" took
as
many men
serv-
history. Every-
where Pershing looked he saw thousands of British and French troops
and supply
to
failed to ap-
at last to help.
immobile position imposed incredible
of
to
The United
assistance.
in support
as the front lines.
bore in on Headquarters, American Expeditionary
more and more forced
into the role of super-quarter-
The manner in which he set up supply organizations, broke bottlenecks, found men who could keep supplies coming won the admiration of the Allies. Finally the War Department recognized the nature of the task and confessed grudging ad-
master.
miration for the American supply system in France.
The
situation in
that of every field
men
which the commander of the
commander
in the lines he
had
in
Yankee military
to struggle to get
them put
AEF
found himself resembled
history.
into the
While struggling
army
at
home,
them with proper clothing and equipment, and worry not only about the situation but also about high political matters.
severance and rare
tact.
to get
to supply
military
These myriad duties required
per-
Fortunately Pershing discovered he had latent talent in
all
I
these areas.
Time became
the most precious of
all
commodities.
The
sustained British effort
TH E YANK in the
ARE COMING
S
1
95
north propped up the Western Front until the French were able to regain
some confidence through limited
Chemin
offensives late in the year at
Dames
des
and near Verdun. But things looked extremely serious by mid-November. Despite Powers were able
restricted Allied successes, the Central
over the Italians in the Battle of Caporetto, October \
itious offensive Austrian
and German
and piled up almost 300,000
atic
attack resulted from
Oskar von Hutier,
eral
to crack the First
at last
The
casualties.
new German
smashed the
forces
Italians
decisive victory
1917. In a
12,
back to the Adri-
appalling speed and success of the
infantry tactics. These tactics, developed by Gen-
broke the power of defense over offense, and promised
Western Front wide open.
used in the Riga offensive in September,
employment
win a
to
24— November
the novel scheme for
1917,
war and
of infantry set the style for the last battles of the
for battles in
a later world conflict. Simple and easy to understand, Hutier tactics depended on secrecy,
on the
machine gun, and on
light
a high degree of troop training. Picked
group operations, advanced behind a rolling
units, carefully trained in battle
barrage— a barrage close ahead—and struck
at "soft spots"
enemy
in
through the weaker positions, the battle groups wrought havoc in rear fused communications, and
made
easier the
mopping up
artillery
Once
lines.
areas, con-
of strong points. Infiltration
techniques were carefully perfected, and their advantages were clear after Riga and Caporetto.
From then
on, the
German
infantry could be expected to rush forward
in small groups, followed by heavy support columns.
combating
this
technique,
There seemed
hope of
little
with mobility. Fortunately for the Allies, Per-
except
shing had insisted from the beginning that American troops receive "training for
open warfare." Pershing's reaction showed, he
said,
to
Hutier
"that nothing in the great
tactics
was one of
war had changed
They
satisfaction.
this age-old principle
of the art of war."
Pershing's Americans got a chance to display their
than anyone could have wished.
man for
It
came
own
proficiency a
little
sooner
gamble by the Ger-
as the result of a great
General Erich Ludendorff. True, he seemed to be gambling with a pat hand,
by the beginning of 1918 he could boast of
slight
combat superiority on the
Western Front. Russian collapse in the East followed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
made possible mass transfers of Central Powers troops summer approached, Ludendorff could count on a 10 in the
West and on a much greater superiority
into account along with
little
hope
Kaiser's legions could force a decision
Hindenburg Selected
in fresh divisions.
made
facts,
taken
necessary Ludendorff's risk.
announced
by midsummer, certainly by winter.
that he
would win and
that to
But
do
it
To
the
he could
one million men. Germany accepted the odds. Marshal Paul von
agreed,
and Ludendorff began preparations
German
divisions were quietly
for 1918.
removed from the front during January
and February, strengthened with crack replacements, and sent
to the rear for train-
ing in the "maneuver of rupture." While training proceeded, the
mand made
These
and with the constant
and the immediate superiority there seemed every chance the
tactics
Reichstag, Ludendorff afford to lose
Western Front. As the
per cent general superiority
for a negotiated peace,
build-up of American strength in France,
with the new
to the
a careful survey of the front, seeking
Count Alfred von
Schlieffen himself
German High Com-
the most likely point to attack.
had pointed out the advantages of an attack
196
(above) in action near the Saint-Mihiel salient, September, 1918 {National Archives). Tanks (below) going to the front: part of the preparation for an attack in the Argonne, September, 1918 {National Archives)
An American gun
1^
197
Outpost in Alsace. (Above)
Amphershock
A
sector of Alsace,
team of American soldiers holds out at an outpost in the August 29, 1918 (National Archives). Trenches symbolize
(below) the fighting during \\'orld
War
I.
Doughboys
picture. (U.S.
J^vw
are going "over the top" in this
Army Photo)
.
:
FIELDS OF GLOR: cut the BEF off from
198
which could
in Flanders along the Belgian coast, an attack vital jX)rts in France,
could turn the
Front and
into a pocket or drive
fall
of
its
them
roll
own
^^eight,
German
the fields of Flanders too late
of Allied armies along the Western
them
pell-mell southward. Paris
wou
and the war would be won. The count's great plan had
Command
most worked in 1914, and the High fascinated all
left flank
did not forget.
some urged the 1918
strategists:
would remain
a
muddy bog
effort
The Flanders be made there.
-
al-
area B.::
and April might pro\ e
until April,
.\merican troops continued to arrive in the numbers rumored. As matters
if
stood, Ludendorff felt
he had to attack no
later
than Afarch to win the race Mcith
Yankee replacements. Time, then, ruled out Flanders. The Saint-Mihiel cult terrain lay in front of the salient, terrain complicated
salient? Diff-
by a river skein invohir.;
Mame, and Seine. .\nd from Saint-Mihiel, too, Paris lay a good distar. Any drive toward Paris would leave the British, French, and supportir. American units considerable maneuvering room cmi the German flank. ^Nliile lerr. tor\' might be won, strategic success might be negligible. The \'eniun sector a".the Meuse,
to the west.
offered difficult groimd. devastated battlefields to cross in case of success, strategic possibilities. It
Circumstances dictated an attack in the
Somme
and
limite
area.
could be argued that no substantial ground objective lay beycmd the Allie
Somme, but
lines in the
was
this consideration
offset
by the
possibility of a brea
through to the sea which would separate the British and French, and possibly British into a jxxrket.
Most important, though,
most lightly held part of the
.\llied front,
the fact that the
\*"as
.\fter
Somme
roll ir
was
::
the Hi^
careful reconnaissanre,
Command
designated a section of line running from .Xrras southeast to La Fere as
the atuck
zone—a zone of almost
To
fifty niiilesi
ensure success Ludendorff brought General \on Hutier to the Western Frcr.:
in charge of
one of the three German armies assigned
to the offensive.
The who
force, consisting of over fifty divisions. Avould
be hurled at the British between
Oise and the Scarpe, dose to the junction
British
tial
and French.
The
ingredient, was almost p>erfectly preser\ed.
Secrecy, the esser.
learned of a probab
.\llies
r
tr. r
r
and guessed that Hutiers presence in front of General Hubert Gough
attack
British Fifth .Army
meant tne blow would come
estimate the terrible force of the blow,
its
there.
But
intelligence failed
careful organization,
its sot^ie.
Wreaths of mist shrouded the shell-swept ground in front of Gougji's in the
morning of March
21st,
and added
to the eerie stillness.
men
ear/
At 4:00 a.m a thunder-
ous barrage broke the quiet. Thousands of shells shrieked into the British trench r
and erupted into churning mushrooms of ditches
and spread insidiously along the
illuminated a night field
now
dirt
and blood. Gas oozed slowly into
front.
The weird
mans
land came the
rwo crack divisions stormed
first,
German
followed
infaiitry.
SA*-iftly
the critical period.
Out
some
dirt to hide behind? Just as Perching
open warfare.
and from the
boilir ;
and the
The awn;
Fifth .\rmy retreated.
Tommies seemed lost, and Where were the crerKhes; where \*"as
of the ditches, the
streamed to the rear in increasing confusion.
for
lifted
.\nd what infantry! Thirf-
by n*enty-eight more.
barrage, the gas, the force, crushed the Briti^ lines
Now came
ir.
which ohe:
only blended with the fog to confuse defenders.
Suddenly—it must have seemed ages later—the barrage inferno of no
battle light
had
feared, the Allies
were unprepared
THE YANKS ARE COMING
199
Everything that could be thrown into the breach— for breach the advance. After several days of fighting, days of fog
Western Front was
fluid.
the effort began to
as much as forty The Royal Flying Corps, bravGerman artillery had not been
the infantry; supply services had been unable to solve the prob-
lem of previously devastated ground; and
The
drive stalled
retreat, the
time since 1914 the
tell.
ing terrible weather, strafed the advancing units;
up with
first
halt
By March 28th the Germans had advanced
Then
miles in some places.
able to keep
and death and
had been completely pierced. For the
British defense zone
was—did not
it
on April
4th.
finally the
German
But Ludendorff had reason
soldiers just got tired.
hope:
to
his
men had
captured 70,000 prisoners, inflicted 200,000 casualties, and taken 1,100 guns. True,
German
casualties
had been almost
as great as the Allies',
but the advantage
still
lay
up
the
with the attacker. Success bred audacity. Since the British had stripped the Lys sector of their front to prop
middle, Ludendorff secretly shifted his divisions and hit the English on April 9th just south of Ypres.
the open.
By
Again the Germans broke through the enemy
the 12th
it
looked
though the British were
as
lines
and got into
finished. Field
Marshal
Douglas Haig called on the newly created Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies Marshal Ferdinand Foch, for help. Foch denied
in France,
Hold
reserve for a counterthrust. barely. Initial great
German advances were
He had
dorff called off the attack.
it.
on, he urged the British,
inflicted
He
sought to build a
and hold they did—just
contained, and by April 29th Luden-
305,000 casualties but had absorbed
350,000 himself.
With Allied to
draw men
on Flanders, Ludendorff decided on a diversion
attention focused
and leave the weakened English vulnerable.
off
of his attack— this time to familiar
He
swerved the point
ground near the Aisne. The chalk
bluffs so dearly
bought by two French drives seemed so strong that the sector had been denuded of
A
troops for use elsewhere.
thin curtain should be able to hold.
On May
27 th, after
preparations as secret as any before, Ludendorff struck once again. During the
first
day on the Aisne the Germans covered more ground than had been won in any twenty-four hours since 1914— thirteen miles.
A quick decision had How far should
troops literally poured into the breakthrough. the Aisne effort be turned into the
main
to
German Or should
be made.
they go?
attack? Ludendorff could not resist tempta-
Reinforcements were swiftly diverted from Flanders, and the drive rolled
tion.
exorably on.
The Marne
stood between the
French capital— the government prepared for sight; Paris lay
Germans and
On May
exile.
Paris.
in-
Panic seized the
30th the
Marne was
in
but thirty-seven miles away. For Ludendorff, victory had almost been
won.
The drama
shifted to the harried headquarters of Marshal Petain,
commanding
what defense was being made. Could he have help, he asked Pershing? The American commander had already pledged anything at his disposal to Foch, and in
re-
sponse to Petain's plea the United States 3rd Division, untried, green, but eager,
moved that
to the front. It
meant
No
little
was the best trained of
when up
all
American units then on hand, but
against the best of the
division could have received a
German Army.
more formidable assignment. Block the
Marne! Hold the crossings near Chateau-Thierry
May
31st,
at all costs.
In the afternoon of
while the whole French front in the Soissons area wilted, the 7th Machine
200
_.
American tanks (above) going into action in the Argonne, near Boureilles, Meuse, September 2G, 1918. Note the modern appearance of the doughboy following the tank in the foreground {National Archives). "Shadows": a classic sketch (below) depicting World War
I— or any war
(Library of Congress)
^ ,1Ji,
X
.^^ V.-V.
t
A
French town (above) in the fighting zone. Company K, 110th United States Infantry, marching through Varennes-en-Argonne, Meuse, at 4: 10 p.m., September 26, 1918 {National Archives). Traffic jam in Esne, France, (below) during an American advance northwest of
(
Verdun (National Archives')
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FIELDS OF GLORY
202
Gun
Battalion reached Chateau-Thierry as the lead element of the United States 3rd
The Americans found
Division.
Marne and were
the
that the
Germans held
trying desperately to get across
pany with eight guns undertook
to
the part of the
on three
town north of
One Yank com-
bridges.
hold the secondary bridges, while another with
nine guns fought for the railroad bridge. Action began on the morning of June All day the
Germans
American machine gunners. During the day, infantry units of the 3rd Division into line along the
Marne and
1st.
but every attempt was wrecked by the
tried to force crossings,
reinforced the thin French units.
No German
filed
cross-
ing survived.
On
another part of the line the United States 2nd Division also got a
battle for the
Thrown
time.
first
taste o£
across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road, the division
held the Germans, and on June 6th launched a counterattack forever famous as the
Wood. Now
Battle of Belleau
German
the
particular the sharpshooting ability of
Despite no the
Noyon
salient
area.
less
than 600,000
and use the men at
for a
such
new
first
Ludendorff struck again,
this
lessen logistical problems,
time since his
But
effort against the British in Flanders.
terrific cost
the Allies. So, in order to keep pressure
the
Yankee infantrymen surprised the enemy.
total casualties,
time in
Ludendorff would have preferred to evacuate the dangerous Soissons
up ground bought and thus
The mettle of American German Headquarters. In
drive halted.
troops had been tested, and caused considerable worry at
to give
would have enraged Germany and delighted
on the French,
to
broaden the Noyon front
he threw 21 divisions forward on June 9th. For
series of offensives
The
began, he ran into a line ready for him.
French had learned something by defeat. Instead of holding a strong front line they constructed a defense in great depth. fell
The
back quickly on strong points and
front line was lightly held;
finally
its
defenders
on the main positions some 2,000
to
3,000 yards back of the outposts. Artillery was safely to the rear; reserves were strategically placed for counterattack. After sive sputtered out
on the
12th. Losses
an advance of about nine miles, the Noyon offen-
were out of proportion
to gains.
He knew
Everything seemed to be going to pieces for Ludendorff.
that P6tain's
build-up of reserves had been successful and that the French would launch a large
home had lowGerman Army was ravaged by in-
counteroffensive soon; he knew, too, that unrest and talk of peace at
ered the morale of his troops and that fluenza.
The
initiative
much
appeared to have slipped from his grasp.
projected two attacks in July, one aimed at larger, against the British in Flanders.
man
The
lost,
Reims
German
some headway. For the Chateau-Thierry. crossings,
and
last
They ran
time the gray
its
its
front,
gained a footing pressed fonvard. attack with
German
men went Reims
legions crossed the still
divisions
tell
why:
it
over
made
Marne near an im-
"It prevented the
while on either flank the Germans
Our men,
he the
holding the
in the raging fight along the river the 38th Infantry earned
crossing at certain points on
it
much
shifting of Ger-
his
into the United States 3rd Division,
mortal place in American military annals. Let Pershing
man
made
outset, but west of
German
regain
concentrations could be seen.
Ludendorff plunged ahead anyway and on July 15th
the top. In general the attack stalled almost at
To
as a feint, the other,
scarcity of reserves
troops fairly obvious and this time the
Secrecy
of the
firing in three directions,
who had
met the Ger-
counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two into
complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners."
The
38th
THE YANKS ARE COMING
203
would popularly be known
Infantry from that day
"the Rock of the Marne."
as
When this last German effort stalled on July 17th, final initiative passed to Now seemed the time to create a separate American organization, to get
Allies.
scattered
American units together and make a national
American Army, and he
I
Corps was organized in time
on July
sector
18th.
cost
many German
in Flanders.
soon
He had
vastly
it
a
Aisne-Marne
effort in
What happened
salient,
enhanced Allied morale and Foch's reputation.
and extinguished any hope
lives
Even an Austrian
fizzled out.
won
to participate in Foch's counterattack in the
and
The
called for his divisions.
This important attack, which eliminated the Marne
proved so successful that
the
Pershing had
effort in France.
established the principle— at the expense of severe arguments with various French British officials— of a separate
the
It
for Ludendorff's cherished attack
June along the Piave
in Italy lacked
punch and
next seemed up to Foch.
plan for the rest of 1918. Although uncertain that the war could be
in that year,
the pressure on to recapture the
he was sure about 1919.
And
Amiens
made
every effort would be
Germany, whose morale showed
serious decline. First,
salient in front of the British (which
on August 8th by Haig), and then the Saint-Mihiel
keep
to
Foch proposed
was handsomely achieved
salient, so
long a thorn in the
Allied side. This assignment went to the newly created United States First Army,
Pershing in command.
way— it was
Plans for attacking the venerable salient were well under
a task
Pershing had cherished. According to these plans the assault would be carried out by fourteen United States and three French divisions. American deficiencies in artillery,
and planes were partly made up by the French. Virtually
tanks,
hatched a new plan. Divide the American
forces,
Foch
at zero hour,
he urged Pershing, divide them into
three parts, each part to participate in a general offensive along the whole line in or-
The
der to exploit the victory of the Aisne-Marne. No! Pershing categorically refused.
and French had promised
British
in a great effort.
to return his
men when needed and
to support
Payment on the promise was due. After lengthy argument,
agreed that the Saint-Mihiel offensive would be reduced in scope, and after objectives were achieved
American units would be
them
it
its
was
lesser
shifted to participate in a great
drive in the Meuse-Argonne.
At 1:00 covering
fire
A.M.,
September
of 3,000 guns
1,500 planes, over 600 of
the salient
12th, the Saint-Mihiel offensive began. It
and with the support of the
them American. At the end
had disappeared.
A
greatest air
of fighting
began under
armada ever seen—
on September
great victory had been won, but the Americans
26th,
had no
time to gloat. Foch's plan called for a pincers aimed at the heart of the Western Front.
The BEF,
German communications on
driving from the north, should strike for Aulnoye,
while the French and American forces struck for Mezieres. Capture of these two cities
would deprive the Germans of
vital rail
connections to the rear and force a
general withdrawal. American participation required adroit ble rapid shifting of divisions transfer of 600,000
men
from Saint-Mihiel
to the
staff
work
to
make
possi-
Meuse-Argonne region. The
without serious delay brought high commendation for Colonel
George C. Marshall, Pershing's chief of operations, who planned the entire movement.
No
one appreciated the
positions in the
difficulties of the attack
Meuse-Argonne were organized
more than Foch. The German
in three
main defensive
lines
with
fj'' •**J-*fr^'
^
>
Gas masks (above) were standard equipment for all soldiers during World War I. Here Battery B, 15th United States Field Artillery, is firing gas shells, June 30, 1918. 308th New York Infantry (below) resting after taking a German secondary trench in the Argonne (National Archives)
205
up in support of the Allied offensive in the Argonne. Near BettinSeptember 28, 1918 {National Archives). Action in the Meuse-Argonne. (Below) A 37-mm. gun, model 1916, in action during the Argonne offensive. This is one of the finest action photographs to come out of World War I. (t/.S. /4rmy F/joto)
Supplies (above) going court, Meuse,
206
United States machine-gun unit (above) in action on the Western Front, World War I {National Archives). View (below) of a support, or communicating, trench on the Western Front, World War I (National Archives)
A
i^y..
:*'J *'"^jSj*J»
'*1
u
1
a
attack: American infantrymen (above), newly in France, being trained in the techniques of gas warfare in August, 1918 (U.S. Army Photo). Martians? No, doughboys (below) in France prepared for gas attack (National Archives)
Gas
?^y \
.i*>'
m
a;
'^^51VA
.J
I'
i^'
Mi
^•'rf^
FIELDS OF GLORY The entire front
208 a fourth supporting line backed
up by
large
gun
concentrations.
was fenced by wire and covered by machine guns. But Foch gave the order, and the great offensive began at 2:30 a.m., September 26th.
The
and the surprised Germans
lines.
serves
had
came up; but
in a
fell
back on succeeding
first
line gave
way
swiftly,
Resistance stiffened as re-
few days most of the southern part of the Meuse-Argonne
fallen to the attackers.
The United
States First
but stalled against the third. By October 3rd the
Army
first
cleared two
German
lines,
phase of the offensive came to
an inconclusive end. Pershing shifted more experienced units into his
line,
and on the 4th began
hack his way through the third enemy position. As the ground grew more the
Germans made good use
piled up. ress
The American
its
defensive possibilities, and American casualties
front was extended as
more troops
arrived, but
seemed painfully slow, so slow that Clemenceau wanted Foch
shing's removal
hammer
still
prog-
to request Per-
from command. Foch knew Pershing and President Wilson too well
to try so drastic a step at the
cans
of
to
difficult,
moment
of climactic Allied victory.
He
let
the Ameri-
ahead, and by the end of October had the pleasure of noting that the
shattered, gas-steeped
Argonne was again Allied ground and
were through the main German
By now Austria had
that
the
Americans
positions.
capitulated and efforts were afoot in
Meuse-Argonne Offensive
Germany
to
end the
THE YANKS ARE COMING war. Foch and the Allied
209
commanders knew
keep up the pressure on a disintegrating the advance
on November
foe.
artillery,
Army resumed
retired in
some
dis-
due
mass
fire
of this success was
By November 7th the
II.
States First
Germans
that the
Much
techniques recently introduced by American
World War
The United
and did so well
1st
order along the west bank of the Meuse.
fected in
of these negotiations but proposed to
to
techniques to be further per-
Army
First
reached ground over-
looking Sedan, and prepared for an advance on Montmedy. But Allied successes
German resistance November II, 1918.
along the whole line from Flanders to Saint-Mihiel had cracked
and an armistice was arranged Freedom, humanity,
to
go into
civilization,
effect at 11 a.m.,
had triumphed. One hundred maimed or fallen "somewhere in November morning, all was quiet on the
democracy
twenty thousand American crusaders had been
When
France."
Western Front
the guns
for the
that
silent
fell
time in four years.
first
The
quiet would
two decades.
last
Peace always seems to come for the victors at the wrong time. At a
supreme national achievement, a moment of sublime can deflate and confuse. So
moment
of
unity, the outbreak of peace
was with the Allies in I9I8. True, France and Britain
it
were exhausted after four years of
maximum
even
effort;
so,
they were unready for
the sudden armistice. All sorts of conflicting emotions racked the war-weary nations.
The United
States
sistance caught to
had yet
make
to
America on a
a
maximum
rise of patriotism,
end war had ended before
it
effort,
and the end
of
German
re-
almost in midstride; the great crusade
really began. Confusion, revulsion to war, a
nervous
sense of release, replaced unity.
So
was that the
it
victors
made peace
as inexpertly as at first they
made
war.
Unready, with aims scrambled together with national ambitions, hating the enemy but happy
at the
ster of a peace.
leaders insisted partial
same time that he no longer harried them, they constructed a monEverything began well enough. Marshal Foch and Allied military
on an armistice, a pull-back of German
disarming of enemy
forces. Total,
forces
from
all
occupied areas,
unconditional surrender seemingly would
not be demanded. In the end, of course, unconditional surrender would have been
better— that, or something
less
intolerable to all defeated nations than the Versailles
Treaty, the Treaty of the Trianon, the Treaty of Sevres.
Germany
surrendered, expecting a peace based
upon President Wilson's famous
Fourteen Points. Wilson entered into negotiations on that so did the rest of the Allies.
openly arrived
Few
at,"
and
this
One
of Wilson's points had to
basis,
turned out to be the biggest joke of
of the Allies took Wilson's
program
seriously.
and on the surface
do with "open covenants all
fourteen.
Clemenceau, for instance,
is
reputed to have snorted in reply to a question as to his opinion of the President's peace formula: "Mr. Wilson has Fourteen Points? son,
who came
to get a
to
Europe
League of Nations built into the
to barter
away most of
tions turned the
it
only ten!" While Wil-
Versailles Treaty, he
his points. National jealousies,
former Allies into
worked desperately
found himself forced
hidden enmities, colonial ambi-
fierce competitors.
In the end Wilson pretty well failed. refused to accept
God had
to participate in the peace deliberations,
He
got his precious League, but Congress
or the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the nation which had
put the finishing touches on the war, had taken an honest,
if
ineffective, lead in
mak-
Not
until
ing the peace, remained out of the League and out of the final settlement.
FIELDS OF GLORY
210 1925 did America
on the
A
officially
end
its
own war with Germany. By
then the next was well
Avay.
series of
disarmament conferences in the twenties indicated
that a ner\ous
world, and especially a nervous Europe, feared war had not been abolished in 1918.
The United
States,
although aloof
at
first,
joined in assorted naval conferences, in
the Locarno agreements, in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and in several efforts of the will-
ing but feeble League of Nations to outlaw war. Wilson's efforts had been defeated at
home by a rising tide of isolationism which 1930's. The horrors of war must be avoided
crested in the pacifist propaganda of the in the future virtually at
timent which found magnified echo in war-racked Britain. Peace
became the unspoken program
of
most of the old
at
any cost— a senany price! This
Allies.
I
I
I
\
A
reindeer team crossing the Dvina River dining the United States North Russian Expe-
through the latter part of 1918 and first half of group of some 5,000 American troops joined a British expedition in the Murmansk-Archangel region, and sustained heavy casualties while guarding supplies and communication lines. The Allied force was withdrawn after the White Russians were dition. Following the Russian Revolution,
1919, a
clearly defeated. (^National Archives)
U2
United States outpost overlooking the Padenga River, Ust-Padenga
front,
North Russia
{Natiotial Archives)
I
i
Motorcycle orderly. United States North Russian Expedition {National Archives)
Bolshevik prisoners sawing wood.
They
are guarded by Allied soldiers. (National Archives)
Wbrld War II But no
would buy
price at all
Germany
fairly clear.
Europe
in
peace, the blunders of Versailles
German
order of the war was a leader to restore
war depression. The new messiah arrived
man
little
with the slanting brush of hair and
Chaplin mustache, became the symbol of "new order" to a sick and
in beerhalls to disquieted
with the moment, a
and misguided
its
students, a
and pathetic example of the
silly
him
over Europe. Others saw
Communism and
who
ranted and frothed
demagogue who would
jobless ex-soldiers so
With
Lenin and henchmen were
a return to stability,
pass
numerous
which spread
as part of the international sickness
alter ego. Fascism.
Hitler and company, rightist.
bound
of post-
and twisted form of a
floundering Germany. Comical, some called him, a maniac
all
made that
to reverse the
and pull her out
self-esteem
in the surprising
Austrian painter. Adolf Hitler, the short the Charlie
was needed
especially "carried a stone"; all that
leftist
products,
came, these "isms" were
if it
to yield to reason.
happy platitudes screened an awful
All these
fact:
there was nothing transitory
or fanciful about Hitler and his National Socialist party.
had a vision of how
He
certainly was a product
Germany
in a place of
importance. His whole warped, fanatical, brilliant vision he revealed in
Mein Kampf,
of a dislocated time, but he
a
book widely read but
little
came he became Chancellor to such as of his
prominence was the
own
evil genius.
got away with
it,
When
appreciated in Europe and America.
his
time
Germany and finally the custodian of peace. His rise result as much of Weltschmerz and pacifism in the West
of
In a bold
move he
and thus ripped the
man Army, expanded
to relocate
re-entered the Rhineland in the 1930's,
Versailles Treaty to shreds.
He
rebuilt the Ger-
the Air Force, manufactured tanks, guns, military equipment,
and ranted about Lebensraum. As the Luftwaffe grew and the Wehrmacht became formidable, Britain and France quaked. Peace, they cried, while peace was being
crushed under
German
hobnails in the Rhineland and kicked to bits by Italian
le-
gions in Ethiopia.
Benito Mussolini, a
lesser
genius than his
sessed of a lesser vision of destiny, nonetheless
and tottering to
Italy
needed in the years
after the
decay and finally to obscurity in the
honor, to weld a
new
German
Great War.
Haile
Selassie,
man a weak The monarchy had sunk
as the strong
rise of the Fascist party.
To
restore Italian
nation, Mussolini found a victim. Tiny, enfeebled Ethiopia felt
the invader's heel in 1935, fought fiercely without the Lion of Judah, had
emperor appealed
dictatorial counterpart, pos-
had emerged
to the
to give
modern weapons, and Emperor
up Addis Ababa
League, of which Ethiopia
%vas a
in
May, 1936. The
member, saw
it
would and
could do nothing, preached a funeral oration to the General Assembly, and retired
from
his country. Hitler learned
to stop peaceful
an invaluable lesson— the League would do nothing
or violent aggression. Henceforth, the League ceased to concern
him.
Both he and Mussolini watched with feeble Spanish royal house in
its
War
place.
Communist
interest as Spain erupted in July, 1936.
A
had collapsed in 1931 and a tottering republic had risen
infiltration
produced
rightist reaction,
and the Spanish Civil
raged the length and breadth of Iberia. Here was a grand testing ground for
THE YANKS ARE COMING
215
new weapons and tactics, and the opportunity did not go unimproved by Germany and Italy, who poured men and especially materiel into the legions of rightist Francisco Franco. Russia, vainly preaching alarms to the old Allies, strove to prop up the sagging republic.
Communist, Anarchist,
Fascist,
ist—everyone fought everyone else in Spain.
If it
Royalist, Anarcho-Syndicalist, Nihil-
had been
gruesome
less
been the greatest martial circus of modern times. But through ism,
and horror ran the stringent undercurrent of
The
testing.
it
would have
the humor, hero-
all
republic crumpled in
March, 1939, and Right had prevailed again.
The outcome
of the Spanish venture could have been of only passing concern to
He had
Mussolini and especially to Hitler. achieve.
New weapons and new
by a revitalized General
achieved in Spain
had been put
to battle
had systematically rid
Staff that
comfortable theories of World strategy, the tactics, the
tactics
War
I.
weapons had
After
failed.
all,
New
all
he had wanted to
and had been evaluated and
of the shibboleths
itself
Germany had
lost the last
war; the
new effort. how far he could go peacefully, Wehrmacht would be ready.
ones would be used in a
Hitler had learned that there might be no limit to
but in case he pushed the flaccid West too far the
He pushed with
ventures.
hard in March, 1938, after he had bolstered his international prestige
pledging the support of Italy and Japan in certain mutually profitable
treaties
German
forces crossed the Austrian border,
and annexation under guise of
Anschluss was accomplished before anyone could react. Hitler pushed on.
He had
a serious
problem
The West
did nothing, and
before he could hope to
solve
to
complete the domination of Europe. France and Britain had concluded several small central
European nations; the strongest
gressive Czechoslovakia, sions.
This
little
which boasted the Skoda arms works and
Germany
nation thrust into
treaties
with
of the Little Entente was pro-
like a sword,
and
it
forty crack divi-
would have
to
be
plucked out.
The world
listened as Hitler's hypnotic voice ranted, raved, pleaded the case for
the long-suffering Sudeten Germans.
gather in
all
He had
Germany had
a mission,
Germans wherever they were. The Fatherland would
a mission, to
protect
and keep
them; the Sudeten Germans would join their Austrian brothers in building the Third
and
greatest
Reich of
maneuvers along the sure; their allies
all.
To
dramatize his pleading Hitler sent the Wehrmacht on
well-fortified
Czech border.
The
Czechs were determined and
were not.
At Munich in September, 1938, Allied diplomacy concluded the most shameful and, as
it
proved, most fateful, sellout since that of the Trojan Horse.
Take
the
Sudetenland, Hitler was told, but leave the sop of peace. In March, 1939, in violation of the
Munich "agreement," German
into Prague. Czechoslovakia was threat to full physical control:
Hitler wanted to
The
it
Italy
and Japan and achieved a rapprochement
The German
rear was
now
to take
protected until such time as
the front.
Russian understanding cleared the way for a
would have crises
make
beyond the Sudetenland
Russia. So, with typical acumen. Hitler forgot his
vaunted Anti-Comintern Pact with with Stalin in August, 1939.
troops went
no more. Germany ruled Europe, with only one
final
on France: the acquisition of Poland.
A
move
before
series of
Germany
manufactured
aroused the Western Allies to some futile protests. While England cherished
the hope of "peace in our time," the
Wehrmacht poised
to stab at
Poland. Marching
FIELDS OF GLORY
216
came on September
orders
1st.
All the craven hopes of France and England crashed
around them, but they took the shock
as well as they could.
honored one claim of one
years of dishonor, they
ally
On
September
and came
3rd, after
to the aid of hard-
They declared war on Germany, and the armistice ended. The new war began just as Hitler planned, and, it seemed, almost with France and England's consent. The Blitzkrieg engulfed Poland in thirty days, while Germany impassively guarded the Westwall fortifications— the Siegfried Line— out of repressed Poland.
Maginot Line.
spect for the dread
The Maginot Line
typified the static, defensive thinking of France
existence showed clearly that victory in 1918 had brought in
and England.
wake
military
complacency and comfortable obsolescence. The Maginot-Line philosophy
lost the
Its
war
for France, almost for England,
the
German General
counted on
it,
used
it.
would be committed
for the
Western world. Hitler and
did not underestimate Allied dedication to a "Sitzkrieg,"
Staff
When
pocket and the Belgian
and well nigh
its
they turned to the West in 1940, they broke the Flanders
Army
knowledge that many French divisions
in the sure
Maginot Line and
to the
that the
French and English mobile
would be oriented toward Belgium and Holland, where they could be cut
units
from France. Everything worked
for the
Germans. Holland capitulated, and
sult of modified application of the Schlieffen plan a
chopped up and driven hurled back
to
French army and the
BEF
were
Dunkirk. By mid-June, 1940, French armies had been
southern France, the British had pulled out the BEF, Italy had
to
off
as a re-
at-
tacked France from the rear, and the Allied cause teetered on the brink of defeat.
France sued for peace, and on June 25th an armistice resulted, arranged in the same
Compiegne
railroad car at
With France
man
that
had been used by Foch two decades
Norway and Denmark
neutralized, with
northern and central fronts in the West were secure, the southern front
tensibly was guarded by Italy, neutral France,
now could be trol
earlier.
already captured, the Geros-
and quiescent Franco Spain. Attention
focused on England. Landings could not be
made
had been achieved by the Luftwaffe, and from August 18th
there until air con-
to the
1940, the Battle of Britain raged. British Spitfire pursuit planes
end of October,
and
British radar
proved more than a match for German bombers and the Messerschmitt-109
fighters.
In the end the great air effort failed, and halted the threat of an invasion of Britain.
While the Churchill
made
mounted
Battle of Britain a strategic decision
in intensity.
Prime Minister Winston
which some military men regard
as the
most im-
portant of the war: without real troop strength at home, he reduced what he had to the extent of available mechanized units and sent to Egypt an armored brigade and reinforced
it
as
soon as he could. Thus he held on to North Africa and the Mediter-
ranean. True, the battles there were by no means over or the issue beyond doubt, but the coming actions could have been British
commanders
in
doomed without
With
reinforcements.
North Africa not only hurled back a strong
the brigade,
Italian effort along
the North African and Egyptian coast, but detached troops to aid in Greece's valiant,
and
forlorn battle in late 1940 nesus,
combined with the
early 1941.
loss of a
rebuilt the strength of the Eighth
base
Army
on
Even with detachments
to the Pelopon-
Crete, Britain clung to Egypt
until
it
and slowly
drove Field Marshal Erwin
back in the decisive Battle of El Alamein, October 23
to
November
4,
1942.
Rommel Had the
THEYANKSARECOMING
217
North African front been
lost,
of Russia might have gone
and the Germans might have linked up with
Near
the Suez Canal, the
East,
and everything south successful Japa-
commit the immediate strength
nese forces in India. Churchill's decision to
of the
weaker side paid high dividends and proved again the wisdom of fundamentals in the military art.
But with the
I
and the consequent defensive posture of the
of France
fall
the United States took a grave view of the war.
had indicated
lin D. Roosevelt
ened
self-interest, of the
to
United
From an
Churchill where the sympathies, indeed the enlight-
States lay. In August, 1940, Roosevelt
the famous "destroyer deal" to bolster sagging British naval strength,
while America
and American
United
officers
No
held
United
crisis leader.
States could
sooner or
He knew
be of
A By
the regular army.
We
were hoping
of war." But Roosevelt proved a
something about war, understood clearly that the
we would have
use unless ready, believed
little
limited National
Emergency
had given him authority
in Europe,
with supplies.
to aiding Britain only
would "keep us out
and imdertook a program of preparedness
later,
tionist opposition.
war
conversations" on the prospects for the would-be Al-
"staff
that Roosevelt, like Wilson,
remarkable
in early 1941,
co-ordination could, of course, be achieved, since the isolationist
would consent
States
had authorized
and
debated the wisdom of the Selective Service Act of 1940, British
still
the war.
lies in
British,
early date President Frank-
to call
fight
1939, at the outbreak of the
in
up
to
in the face of stern isola-
Guard and
the National
the middle of 1941 there were about a million
recruit
and a half men
with the colors, and more coming.
The United
strategic situation for
tience, rattling
seemed about
its
saber,
Germany
would
divert
upon
Peril
war with the United
stood to benefit immensely. Complete involvement in the Far East Britain. So
it
behooved Germany
to fan Asian
remaining out of the argument.
At the same time Britain had everything
to lose
by American preoccupation in
True, British possessions there were exposed and doubtless would be swallowed
Asia.
up
Japan was trying American pa-
the West. If Japan should go to
American strength from
hatreds, while
Pacific
and prating about "greater East Asia." The Yellow
to burst full
States,
both Britain and Germany in 1941 hinged on the
was no secret that in the
States. It
in
barely
an Asiatic holocaust. But Britain could not
hang on
in the West. If
fight a two-front war; she
America took on Japan,
be preserved but probably at the cost of the
home
British Asian holdings
islands.
could
might
America would have
to
be committed to holding Britain and fighting Germany. With that in mind, British efforts
had centered
after 1940
on persuading the United
policy dictated delaying actions in the Pacific to defeat the
if
war came
States that
it
was probably the right
strategy,
deed had not the Germans made a serious
On December
7,
but
it
United
effort
significant States.
In
would have been suspect
in-
political mistake.
1941, the timeless day of infamy,
Japan attacked without warn-
ing at Pearl Harbor and other American positions in the Far East. States
major
prime Axis Power was made in Europe. In one of the most
victories of the war, Britain sold this idea to the inexperienced
the long run
sound military
there, while a
The United
responded swiftly with a declaration of war, but most of the American Navy
in the Pacific lay
smoking or sunk
at Pearl
Harbor. Everything would have to be
218
^^,UL Second battalion, 16th United States Infantry, (above) marching through Kasserine Pass, February 26, 1943 {U.S. Army Photo). United States infantry battalion (below) advancing up a hill about ten miles from Bizerte, Tunisia, on May 7, 1943 {U.S. Army Photo)
ieutenant atton,
General
commanding
George
S.
the United
ates II Corps, personally directig
an American drive toward
abes,
Tunisia, on
IMS
{U.S.
Army
March
15,
Photo)
United States soldiers operating antiaircraft
{U.S.
gun
in Tunisia, 1943
Army Photo)
FIELDS OF GLORY
220
thrown into the
Her partner
Germany had her great diversion. had come through. And at this moment of virtual Axis
Pacific to retrieve the situation;
in the Axis pact
Germany and
victory in Europe,
declared war on the United States. This
Italy
stupendous error was made apparently to honor Germany's pact with Japan; but why
honor should come
when
to the fore just
victory glittered
Possibly the declaration anticipated Russian
on the horizon
a mystery.
is
on Japan. At any
attacks
Ger-
rate,
many's declaration gave Britain just what she needed, and soon the United States
found
an
itself
ally
The United
States in effect
different, the operations so
European phase and
its
European phase,
it
The
undertook a two-front war and to strategic,
fell
its
and
all intents
problems were so
As
Pacific phase [see below, pp. 262 to 285].
for the
Bernard Montgomery the British
of General
Rommel
Afrika Korps into headlong retreat. As
back on Tunis, the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (British
and American, acting
for
except Russia and China), determined on an American and British thrust
North
into French
Africa.
them from the United
This thrust would serve multiple purposes, but the best States'
standpoint was a chance to get at the Germans on
relatively simple terms. Plans called for
an Allied attack in Algeria, and a huge
was mounted. Everything was
gistical effort
set for
D-Day on November
French forces over from the Vichy government ings took place,
and the time schedules
Some French
up
at
Oran, and Algiers were almost
Casablanca; but this ended soon, and
by November 11th French North Africa could be used
Rommel
reacted as expected.
The
as
an Allied
base.
Desert Fox retired rapidly to good ground
up reinforcements
covering Bizerte and Tunis, picked
lo-
1942. After
to Free France, three separate land-
at Casablanca,
resistance held things
8,
in an attempt to bring the
some remarkable behind-the-scenes diplomatic haggling,
kept.
tactical
began in North Africa.
to the steady command Army had pushed Rommel's
all Allies
of
and
logistical,
independent of each other that the war will be discussed in
Thanks Eighth
to
in the Mediterranean.
purposes two separate wars.
in
and China, and agreeing
Britain, Russia,
of Free France,
war
decisive plans for
Fatherland, and fortified a long corridor, with his
from the
in a belated gesture
left flank to
the sea and right fac-
ing the oncoming Americans. His real front faced south toward Montgomery's victorious Eighth
Army, and was well entrenched. Realizing
build up huge reserves against him, and hack at his elected to attack swiftly.
On
that the Allies
airlift
to
German
would
bases,
he
February 14th his tanks raced westward, cutting through
Allied advanced positions in difficult mountain terrain, rushing pell-mell to the flanks
and
striking straight ahead.
American units were panicked into a
virtual stam-
pede, and the Battle of Kasserine Pass threatened to eliminate the American hold in Africa. Allied reaction, slow but firm, finally pinched off the
Rommel's breakthrough netted him
the end
exactly
German
however, almost forged a great victory out of what had been designed
As a
diversion, the Faid-Pass
main German
Rommel many air
and
May
to
a sick
and Kasserine thrust
positions, shattered
man, and
his successor,
unable
Rommel
finally
had,
break the
Corps, and enabled
went back
men because German and Italian
to evacuate his
sea superiority, surrendered a quarter-million
13, 1943.
II
He
as a diversion.
stalled British efforts to
morale in the United States
hold Tunis for three more months.
drive. In
what he expected— time.
to Ger-
of Allied
troops
on
-
H
FIELDS OF GLORY Army had been successful.
222
The The
first
Allies
major Allied victory over a whole German
commanding on
some
in charge of sea operations,
officers
the ground. Several lessons were learned in Africa:
terribly inexperienced,
American armor
D. Eisen-
British officers
and both British and Americans
in charge of the significant air covering activities,
were
D wight
had worked under the supreme command of General
hower, with British naval
light
American troops
and badly managed, the Allied
command structure cumbersome and slow. Eisenhower changed much of the command organization, modified logistical plans, adopted tactics to suit the Blitzkrieg, ordered better armor. In the post-Kasserine shake-up, inevitable after a major verse.
and
Major General George Patton rose
new United
finally the
States
nent role in the next American
prominence, took over the
to
II
re-
Corps
Seventh Army. This army would have a promi-
Mediterranean— the invasion of
effort in the
Such an attack would keep the pressure on Germany, sustain Allied
Sicily.
and
initiative,
Neither Germany proper, nor France,
retain control of the vital Mediterranean.
could be invaded, the Combined Chiefs thought, until 1944. Therefore some offensive that
would keep hammering
at
Germany and drain
off
German
reserves
from
Russia had to be launched.
Operation Husky took some time
but
to organize,
was launched against
finally
the southeastern face of Sicily after careful feints in other directions.
Army Group
ing craft put assault waves of the Fifteenth British Eighth) ashore
mans
carried
on July
10, 1943.
Allied land-
(United States Seventh,
Italian resistance evaporated, but the Ger-
out a brilliant delaying action which ended on August 17th with
German remnants
escaping to the Italian mainland.
Dismal military failure shattered Mussolini's government and ultimately cost
Duce
Marshal Pietro Badoglio assumed
his life.
command ad
II
on orders
interim,
from the king, who emerged from enforced obscurity. Secret negotiations with the Allies looked toward a separate Italian peace, but tions
and sent heavy columns into
Germany
hold the
Italy to
the Italians quit the war. After September 8th
all
vital
suspected Italian inten-
southern front. Even
enemy operations
so,
were
in Italy
conducted by the Germans.
With German though inferior
resistance stiffening, the going
in
Marshal Albert Kesselring, and he proceeded in defense. After the initial British
October, 1943,
German
Germans had
the
first
to the
of canny
stern lessons
in southern Italy in
ill-starred
attempt to land behind their lines at Anzio,
but always at high
truly impossible
terrain,
resistance until
May,
1945. All
Finally,
on June
fell
4,
in-
after
1944.
German
forces in Italy
On
and for
forces of the entire war.
Allied efforts in Italy had not been without military mistakes.
Rome
cost.
on May 2nd, ending one of the most grueling campaigns
and defensive
tion (which
some
Gothic Line in the Apennines, then to the Po River Valley,
Germans protracted
the Alps capitulated offensive
and American landings
to yield ground,
some
spectacular fighting in
Retiring
command
to teach the Allies
the Gustav Line through most of the winter. As Allied pressure
to
creased, the
surely be hard. It was. Al-
defenders pulled back up the peninsula, stiffened for a time
on the Voltumo, anticipated the and held
would
numbers, German armies were under the
occasions
when American
happened more than
once),
terrific
leaders
losses
would
American superiority
or without serious
err
on the
in
men and
side of cau-
material
jEi'-r
Half-track and personnel (above) of Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored 1st Armored Division, looking for enemy aircraft near Kasserine Pass, February 24, 1943 (U.S. Army Photo). United States troops (below) moving supplies to the front in Infantry,
Tunisian mountain campaign, April, 1943 {U.S.
Army Photo)
224
Benedictine Monastery (above) under fire by Allied artillery, Cassino area, Italy, February 15, 1944 (U.S. Army Photo). Anzio Beachhead (below), January 22, 1944 (U.S. Army Photo)
^:-**.
.ri*,.'"
TjTi
,--:\rf""':^
United States M-3 tanks (above) of the 1st Armored Division at Kasserine Pass, February, 1943. The tanks are advancing to strengthen the American front lines (U.S. Army Photo). Cassino Castle (below) on the small hill and the Benedictine Monastery against the skyline, Cassino, Italy, February 6, 1944 (U.S. Army Photo)
>A»^
226
Puptent village (above) built by United States troops near Cassino, Italy, January, 1945 {U.S. Army Photo). Omaha Beach (below), D day, June 6, 1944 {U.S. Army Photo)
THE YANKS ARE COMING could
regain
An
the
important
227
fact
however,
wastage,
initiative;
bound
was always
about the summer campaign in 1944
that
is
while the supreme Allied effort developed on the coasts of France.
command
of real significance:
relationships were so successfully
it
be high.
to
was conducted
One
other item
worked out
in Italy
were used in other operations.
that they
Planning of other operations concerned not only the Combined Chiefs of
Staff
but also the heads of the Allied governments. At the Casablanca Conference in Janu-
where the invasion of
ary, 1943,
had been decided upon, the question of
Sicily
vading Hitler's Fortress Europe came up, discussion. tions, all
This time, despite the tremendous
needed
effort
When
for the effort.
for the
Sicilian opera-
and where the blow would
would be organized, who would command— all
later.
in-
invariably did in any top-level Allied
it
agreed that Europe must be breached and that bits and pieces of Allied
must be hoarded
forces it
as
With
how
fall,
would be decided
these questions
the idea accepted in principle, matters of detail were discussed at each
subsequent gathering of the high
brass.
At Cairo
November and December,
in
at
Teheran, sandwiched between Cairo meetings, the urgent need for a Second Front
The Red Army had
received full treatment.
stopped the
German
drives to the in-
terior—with Hitler's help— and had counterattacked, but none would deny the rible threat
still
posed by the greatest army in the world.
derequipped Red legions were surgence, help
would have
A
munitions and supplies.
maintain the initiative and prevent German
to
to
come from
the Allies in
Second Front, a Stalin
fetish,
ter-
undermanned, un-
the
If
more
definite
would
force
re-
form than
Germany
to
reduce Eastern strength and give the Russians breathing time. should be emphasized that the decision to
It
The problems
took plain, solid nerve.
Pentagon parlance— involved ing and allocation of in another.
The
would
reserves to hold in
war" in
the careful husband-
one part of the world and
If the assault
strike
would
on Europe succeeded and Ger-
surrendered, then the full strength of the victors would be hurled at Japan.
The European the
"global
get naval aid, but Allied land operations there
be conducted without reinforcement.
many
Europe
a great effort in
war— a
fantastic logistical considerations,
manpower
Pacific
mount
world-^vide
of a
project got a code name, Overlord,
Supreme Commander
in England.
During the
and would be supervised by
AEF, General Eisenhower. The build-up took place half of 1943 and the first half of 1944, thousands of
of the
last
American troops poured into
Britain. Staging areas, bases, cantonments, training
grounds were established in a crowded countryside. Airfields sprang up to service
hundreds of new bomber and Britain
bore Yankee
fighter
groups coming
ceeded in friendliness anything known during World ups, of course, but nothing serious. All appeared If
to aid in the invasion.
War
happy
most amiable, and amiability counts for self-respecting Nazi spy could
much
I.
that
he seemed not quite the brightest general on the Allied
No
There were some
flare-
Eisenhower would
lead.
side,
he was doubtless the
in a co-operative effort.
have missed the point of the American con-
centration in Britain, and the Allies counted on the efficiency of the
nage system. Several
Westwall
command
Great
hordes with characteristic stoicism. Inter-Allied relations ex-
false invasion
into thinking the
region. This region appealed to the
German espioGerman
reports leaked, and actually fooled the
main blow would
Germans
as
most
fall
in the Pas de Calais
logical, so the Allies let
them
228
<2 o
•*
23
a,
THE YANKS ARE COMING deceive themselves.
And
maneuver, some
possibility for
comparatively weaker enemy defenses, and
ports,
and support units knew exactly what
which would put the
had
been much
it
The total number of men much less than three million. and
the greatest single logistical
won
go awry
would
start
as
on June
tactical effort
moved
and without
superiority
air
would
ings the assaults
to be involved in the opera-
All in
all,
it
proved to be
put forth by the Western Allies, and
on the
Eisenhower. Weather conditions de-
so with
enough
in sternly
to
threaten cessation of air activities;
over the beaches
designated
the
for
land-
initial
gruesome butchery. Eisenhower delayed one day.
dissolve in
Longer would probably have forced
it
the
But generals throughout history have seen plans
and
and speed was urgent. Fortunately,
So
as
ready as he could expect, Eisenhower decided that 5th.
at the caprice of nature,
teriorated, clouds
start
and reworked
While the armada
the grudging admiration of the Russians.
With everything about the attack
tested,
do.
would have pleased Eisenhower and subordi-
it
larger.
tion could not have been
even
to
France struck most observers
Allies in business in
most awe-inspiring sight ever seen, nates
divisions
chosen for the landings offered some usable terrain inland for
proximity to air cover. Preparations were carefully rehearsed, until all assault
German
several
on Normandy beaches had been made.
until the initial landings
The ground
229
up
their misconception helped tie
whole month's
wait,
skies ^vere clearing
on the
a
several
weeks anyway,
5th; the invasion
would
6th.
was that on the 6th of June, 1944, the world listened
hower spoke
his halting
and calm message of invasion
to
as
Europe,
General Eisenas
General
De
Gaulle reported proudly to France that liberation was coming, as the leader of the Belgian government-in-exile almost sobbed the happy news to Belgium. In the early
dawn
man
of the 6th, paratroops
dropped near Cherbourg and along the rim of Ger-
defenses as far as Caen. Aerial
bombing
followed around
hit the target areas,
6:00 A.M. by naval guns pounding the beaches. Half an hour later the
went
first
wave
in.
The beach accustomed
landings would have been nothing to troops in the Pacific, by
to the landing craft, to the tense
moment when
the whole assault
comes within range of the enemy's machine guns and mortars,
men who run the craft, and to that down and a small slice of hell yawns
calm of navy splashes
Pacific soldier lost in
to the
sickening second in
could have told his buddies going in
front. at
The
now wave
impersonal
when
the gate
moment— the next moment is
next
France— the
water; in the desperate striving for firm footing under the awful weight of
equipment, the chunk, chunk of lead hitting water and the thud of lead hitting
Over the whole
of that tiny cataclysm
is
a steady dull roar as rockets, shells,
flesh.
machine
drum a background to an immortal minute in history. The Pacific boys could not have done more nobly than the Allied Expeditionary Forces that sixth of June. They hit beaches guarded by crack German divisions under over-all command of Desert Fox Rommel. Despite stiffening resistance, the landings stuck, the beachheads were secured. The problem now was not to stay, but to get out of the German defense perimeter onto maneuvering ground. This guns
proved something of a job.
The German
defenders, building strength as
more armor raced toward what was
230
"88 Alley" (above) near Saint- L6, France, July, 1944. The tank destroyer is raking hedgerows to "dust out" snipers {U.S. Army Photo). United States howitzer in action (below) near Carentan, France, July, 1944 {U.S. Army Photo)
The famous
23
GIs in the Ardennes during the Bulge
crisis
(National Archives)
Members of the 101st Airborne Division move out of Bastogne, Belgium, to drive Germans, who have besieged them for ten days, out of a neighboring town. The photograph was taken while Bastogne was still under siege, December 29, 1944. (U.S. Army Photo)
FIELDS OF GLORY
232
now
clearly recognized as the Allied
beaches in the
Normandy
Avreck Allied tanks, the
had
fallen
still
came over
On
by then
to seal off the invasion
Using the hedgerows of the Cotentin peninsula
area.
Germans held up the advance
to the Allies,
but so shattered were
Omar
July 25th General
States First
do
managed
effort,
its
to
Cherbourg
until July 25th.
port facilities that supplies
the beaches.
German cordon
the
main
at
Bradley's two armies launched an attack that broke
Avranches. Through a narroAv gap sternly held by the United
Army, Lieutenant General George Patton's Third Army dashed out
fantastic execution.
The German
the Germans. Patton's army,
moving with
behind a mass of German divisions near
army working
south, cut off
to
cordon, once broken, became a death trap to the speed of the 1940 Blitzkrieg, cut in
and
Falaise,
in
company with
some 100,000 enemy troops
in the
a
Canadian
famous 'Talaise
pocket." Scarcely taking time to count the prisoners, Patton struck for the Seine to
German
intercept retreating
coastal units
August 18th Patton had reached the river the upper Seine crossings and deprived
and remnants of the at
By
Falaise disaster.
Mantes, which forced the enemy to use
them of
Paris as a reconcentration point.
As the German defenses cracked in western France, those
were put
in the south
by the landing of the United States Seventh Army, including French elements.
to rout
Operation Anvil turned the southern flank of German units in France, and the landing on August
Some
prise.
ficiently to
of
it
15,
changed plans
suf-
Although not expecting such
Result:
commander, General Lucien K. Trus-
for a gradual build-up to a general attack
force knifing north toward the units.
sur-
check the impetus of the Allied attack.
spectacular initial achievement, the American cott,
German Army by
and never was reorganized
1944, caught the defending Nineteenth
got cut off in the initial landings
the Nineteenth
upper Rhone Valley
German Army was
and sent a
special task
German
to intercept retreating
eliminated as a factor in the war.
Breakthrough in Normandy, speedy advance from southern France, Patton ing into the heart of the old for the Allies. Paris
I
battlefields— all this spelled
rac-
amazing success
was liberated by the French 2nd Armored Division on August
Belgium had been entered, Luxembourg
25th; by September 11th
many
World War
penetrated. Holland greeted the
most of the Channel
coast,
first
of the Allies
freed,
on September
and Gerand
12th,
with the exception of last-man outposts here and there,
was in Allied hands. All of these successes
had come with great and disconcerting speed. As
and American columns struck north and
east,
and
as Bradley's
army group
British hit into
the Ardennes, supply lines were stretched beyond the limits of Allied logistical support.
Exhaustion of supplies and weariness of advancing troops began
to stall
the
drives.
At
this
moment, about the beginning
shifted his divisions toward the north to
attack
the
on Antwerp. Strategy and
left
of September, General Eisenhower over-
strengthen
wing of the advance, but the
for
Antwerp was overriding;
against the
Ruhr and
Marshal Montgomery's
fact that the British got
gasoline earned the lasting resentment of Patton's
need
Field
tactics dictated that all available
it
for an attack
would
equipment go
to
most of the available
Third Army. Nevertheless, the
serve as a
base
for
direct
operations
on the launching pads of the menacing V-2
rockets. After the tragic expedition of the British 1st
Airborne Division against
Am-
THE YANKS ARE COMING hem, and the
233
Montgomery's race to the Ruhr, steady hard fighting gained
failure of
Antwerp on November
opened the port
9th. Engineers
Eisenhower now faced a moment similar
come
Foch's conclusion— the time had for "tout le
monde
an "unrelenting offensive,"
for
The
a la bataille."
and
the shock of the Allied successes
idea
at the
made
prophesied for a two-front war were being realized
The
reeled
from
effects of a re-
horrors which Schlieffen
scale in
full
at
Foch put
or, as
Germans
sense; the
same time suffered the
drive in the East by surging Russian forces.
sistless
on the 27th. after the initial
Aisne-Marne drive in July and August, 1918. Eisenhower arrived
success of his
it,
for business
one Foch faced
to the
Now
Berlin.
was
the time to press on.
Calling for all-out production of artillery ammunition at home, Eisenhower
launched the
Army
First
Two
vember.
main German
came up
plies
some
Germany. Aachen
into
Metz yielded,
fried Line. Fortress
aimed
pincers
at
in October, a breach in the Sieg-
Rhine reached
the
it.
on the
Pressure continued
defenses, but in the Siegfried Line resistance was bitter. Allied sup-
and
slowly,
keep pressure applied the High
to
Thus
units to strengthen others.
lightly held.
fell
did strong defenses on the Moselle by late No-
as
Eisenhower and
enough
terrain was strong
to
it
happened
his advisers, like the
be held by relatively
that
Command had
French in 1940, fe^v
to bleed
the Ardennes sector was
men.
On
felt
the Ardennes
a seventy-mile front
running roughly from Malmedy to Trier only four Allied divisions occupied the
line.
Europe, in early December, 1944, suffered terrible weather. Fog hung heavy in the Ardennes,
early hours of greatest
the
swirling in
churned the sky into a
flat
December
forests,
blending with the snow. Fog and clouds
grayness which prevented any air reconnaissance. In the
Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, one of Germany's
16th, Field
commanders, hurled what was
left
of the flower of the
Wehrmacht
into the
Ardennes. Some ten armored and fourteen infantry divisions crashed through the skirmish line of four Allied divisions. Rundstedt apparently struck for Antwerp.
he reached
it
he would
effectively divide the British
them of a
vital
immediate
tactical value.
men and
1940, the
Although the plan lacked
port.
a future objective,
German Army
the
had sound
it
possessed the striking
power of
materiel of those happier days, the Ardennes drive might have
resulted in a larger,
man Army made
Had
If
and Americans, and deprive
more
disastrous Dunkirk.
As
it
happened, an enfeebled Ger-
a last-ditch counterattack for a limited objective.
Nothing should have prevented the achievement of the limited German goal of Liege.
One
The
only thing that did was the stouthearted defense of two indefensible places.
especially deserves a deathless page in
togne lay on the
German
munications hub, and
left flank,
expanding the bulge.
vital to
stood squarely in the middle of the six days
German
tide.
It
Von
salient. It
was a com-
held, as did Saint-Vith,
which
Rundstedt's situation in about
was reminiscent of Ludendorff's during the Aisne offensive in May, 1918—
he had to broaden his
salient,
and Belleau Wood. The
up by reinforcements
The
man
American military annals— Bastogne. Bas-
near the edge of the opening
left
sent
but ran into a position similar to Chateau-Thierry
flank failed to crumble,
and the
from various parts of the Allied
right soon was shored
front.
holding actions at Bastogne (never taken) and at Saint-Vith stalled the Ger-
drive long
the end of
enough
to get troops
December the German
from some distance away into the breach. By
attack had fizzled,
and reduction of the sixty-mile
234
A patrol
of the United States 504th Parachute Infantry brings in a Nazi SS prisoner near Bra, Belgium, on Christmas Day, 1944. Fighting in the Battle of the Bulge was still rag-
ing
when
this picture
was taken. (U.S. Army Photo)
United States infantry patrol hugs the hedgerows near SaintL6, France, July, 1944. The patrol was under timed artillery fire from German guns south of Saint-L6. (U.S. Army Photo)
Ruins of Saint-L6, France, July, 1944
(U.S.
Army
Photo)
Disabled United States tank (above) and dead GI at entrance to Saint-L6, France, July, 1944 {U.S. Army Photo). GI dashing down Saint-L6 street (below) under sniper fire {U.S. Army Photo)
'?1 t
THE YANKS ARE COMING
237
The end came
Bulge began.
with
German
totaling almost a quarter of a
losses
million men, plus irreplaceable equipment. Failure in the Ardennes contributed to failure
on the Eastern Front
later that winter.
Using standard German off
huge enemy
forces.
und
tactics of kiel
The tremendous
continued to pinch
kessel, the Allies
haul in prisoners
testified to a deteriorating
Wehrmacht. Eisenhower's planning had envisioned a huge
and strength was weighted
cept,
gomery would launch an attack of the
Ruhr.
A
to the
in
final offensive,
again a Foch con-
northern Allied armies. Field Marshal Mont-
North Germany aimed
at
the industrial centers
northern attack could turn the Siegfried Line and open the way to
enemy and Montgomery by crossing the Oppenheim without warning and without resistance. The next day, March final general offensive began. The Germans fought with accustomed tenac-
the Elbe. In late March, Patton shocked the
Rhine
at
23rd, the ity,
but
it
uas
all
over.
Almost 400,000 prisoners were taken
became demoralized. The Weser was crossed by the armies during the cities
first
week
in April;
integration could be glimpsed on last-ditch stand
March
as the
Reich
and Ninth United
States
in
week
the Elbe ceased to be a barrier a
and assorted disorganized troops were
Tyrol for a
First
all sides;
falling into Allied
later;
hands every day. Dis-
Hitler's threat to retire to the Austrian
was patently ridiculous. There was nothing
left to fight
with.
At Torgau, on April tary
and
25, 1945, the Eastern
political considerations
concerning
and Western Allied armies met. Mili-
who would occupy
what, resulted in a
highly dangerous Berlin situation, but at the time everything except the union of Russian, British, French, and American armies seemed unimportant. signified the real
end
The
"link-up"
of the war. all organized German units were new German government— Hitler ap-
Fanatical resistance continued in pockets, but
out of action by
May
6th. Representatives of a
parently perished in the rubble of Berlin— surrendered to the Allies at
May
7,
1945.
VE-Day had come
at last!
Reims on
238
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin after planning for the final defeat of Yalta Conference, February, 1945 (U.S. Army Photo)
Germany
at the
A-
United States troops of the VI Corps move down 16,
1945.
The
destruction
is
a street in
much of Germany Army Photo)
typical for
Waldenburg, Germany, April at the end of the war. (U.S.
I
PART
THE OPEN DOOR
The
Far East before 1941
Although America's commercial relations with the far east go back into the colonial period, States
was not until about the time of the Mexican
it
War that the United The acquisition of
developed a serious political interest in the Pacific region.
California suddenly gave the United States a Pacific coast line and, at about the same time, the expansion of whaling in the
American
ships into that region.
hammer
their
showing
interest in the closed,
The
North
brought a great number of
and both the
into the Chinese Empire,
way
Pacific
British were already using their sea
and hitherto remote, kingdom
teenth century, Japan had rigorously avoided
to
of Japan. Since the six-
intercourse with the West, except
all
through the small trading post which the Dutch East India to
power
and Russians were
British
Company was
allowed
maintain in Nagasaki harbor. Yet, among Western merchants in the Orient,
in-
cluding the numerous Americans engaged in the China trade, there was a persistent
Japan was potentially a rich market. In 1846 an American naval mission
belief that
made an
abortive attempt to persuade the Japanese to open their ports to Western
commerce, and Perry's
Commodore Matthew
in 1852
first
including two steam warships which
Bay below Tokyo. Perry anese,
much
Bonin
Islands,
up by
later given
on a similar mission.
impressed the Japanese, put in at Yedo
from President Millard Fillmore with the Jap-
left a letter
and announced he would return
of the
C. Perry was sent
appearance in Japanese waters was in July, 1853, when his squadron,
in the spring.
He
then took possession of some
and established a coaling base on Okinawa Island— acquisitions
the United States. Returning to
Yedo Bay, Perry found
the Jap-
anese disposed to negotiate. By skillfully mixing blandishments with displays of his
squadron's gunnery, he finally secured a treaty of friendship which allowed the
United
States restricted trading rights in Japan.
From
the
first
breach in Japan's policy of exclusion, the United States and other
Western powers were
to extract further concessions until, in the early
movement among
aroused an antiforeign a
number
of foreigners
and American
had been murdered, and
legations, the
United
1860's, they
a section of the Japanese nobility. After after
mobs had burned
the British
States participated in a punitive expedition led
by the British which bombarded the port of Shimoneseki in 1864. Alarmed at the threat of foreign intervention, the Japanese abandoned their exclusionist policies
and entered upon a frighteningly rapid program of westernization. Within a generation, they were to challenge the West on its own terms.
The opening up Western commerce
of
Japan
American seamen, the United Rodgers
to
left
only the Hermit
Kingdom
in the Far East. In 1870, after the Koreans States sent
of Korea closed to
had murdered
several
a naval squadron under Admiral
John
attempt in Korea what Perry had succeeded in doing in Japan. In June,
up the Han River toward Seoul, only to be fired on The Americans fired back, and put a force of Marines and
1871, Rodgers's squadron sailed
by Korean shore
batteries.
sailors ashore to
reduce the Korean
burned and,
in a battle
on June
11,
forts.
Five
Korean
batteries
were taken and
1871, 250 Koreans were killed
Americans of three killed
and nine wounded. The Koreans
to negotiate with Rodgers,
and he withdrew.
It
still
at a loss to the
refused, however,
was not until 1882 that the United
I
Japanese onlookers (above) watching Admiral Perry's troops performing an exercise in the temple grounds at Shimoda, 1854 {Library of Congress). A contemporary Japanese view (below) of Perry and his escort (Library of Congress)
r
»
244
Korean dead— the
interior (above) of a
Korean
tort destroyed
by American Marines in
1871 (National Archives). (Below) Marines in Korea, 1871 (National Archives)
»« •*^,
'^
THE OPEN DOOR managed
States
245
Hermit Kingdom. In
to sign a treaty of friendship with the
ing this treaty, the United States successfully detached Korea from
many years later, in 1950, an awkward moment for the United
salage to the Chinese Empire; their old claims at
In retrospect, these Far East seem that they
and
first,
traditional vas-
its
the Chinese were to reassert States.
tentative encroachments of the
and comparatively innocent. Perhaps
trivial
United
their
and then
the
States in
main importance
were portents of an American involvement in Asia that was
substantial,
negotiat-
to
become
is
vast
both to Asiatics and Americans.
terrible
In 1898 burgeoning American imperialism brought the United States into the "splendid
little
war" with Spain. [See above,
On
156.]
p.
the
first
day of May, while
American attention was focused on Cuba, Commodore George Dewey boldly United
States naval
squadron of
six vessels into
sank the Spanish Pacific Fleet without the
loss of a single
American
gan an American involvement in the Philippines that was quickly acter of
comic opera, and was to culminate forty years
Within
Dewey
in
and encouraged
from the land side with
itself
a Filipino rebel his guerrillas.
couraging Aguinaldo, other Americans were
would not
Thus
be-
flatly
This
yield.
force.
He
there-
named Emilio Aguinaldo
While Dewey was thus
to
en-
promising the rebels their inde-
they would help in the war against the Spaniards.
if
life.
assume the char-
later in starkest tragedy.
an embarrassing position, since he had no landing
fore blockaded the city
invest the city
pendence
to
few days of Dewey's victory, the land batteries surrounding Manila
a
harbor had surrendered to him, but the city of Manila placed
sailed a
Manila Bay, in the Philippines, and
Too
late,
Dewey
learned that the American government had no intention of giving the Philippines to
When
Aguinaldo.
men under
an army force of 11,000
General Wesley Merritt
reached Manila Bay, the Americans were faced with the problem of
finally
get rid of the Filipino insurrectionists
how
whose aid they had been courting. By
to
this
time, August, 1898, the Spaniards were willing to surrender Manila to the Ameri-
but not
cans,
to the insurgents. Delicate negotiations finally
persuaded Aguinaldo to
allow his forces around the city to be replaced by Merritt's men.
were
iards
and
to surrender in
a sharp light
to the
Finally,
all
under
By the peace
treaty,
United
in the Philippines,
the United States received from Spain the island of
States also
To
consolidate her sudden expansion
annexed the Hawaiian
where the insurgents
armed truce ended
felt
3,000
Manila which was
men
to
American
Islands. All
Fortu-
Guam
1899,
The
easily repulsed; in a
when
An
S.
Otis,
insurreclos attempted an attack
few days' fighting the Filipinos
who had
un-
fighting broke out be-
casualties of 250. After receiving reinforcements sent
the United States, General Elwell
the
in
was well, except
they had been used and tricked.
in February,
tween American troops and Aguinaldo's men. against
learned that
States.
and entered upon negotiations that resulted in the token purchase
of the Philippines for $20,000,000.
easy period of
all three, sides
between Spain and the United
terms, the Americans were to have Manila.
its
in the Marianas,
Pacific, the
was smoothed out; the Spaniards surrendered
Americans on August 14th. Then both, or
a peace had already been concluded nately,
the Span-
broke out between the American and Spanish troops, in which the
insurrectionists joined.
Manila
Then
gentlemanly fashion. But somehow, matters went awry,
lost
from
succeeded Merritt in command,
began a systematic campaign against the Filipinos. In March, 1899, the Americans
!;?
S**--
-
% m -
An
infantry firing line in action: the
Washington Volunteers
in the Philippines
{National Archives)
The American advance on
Malolos, the insurgent capital, 1899 {National Archives)
...^A
An American
outpost near Ma-
lolos (National Archives)
American troops entering Malolos during the Philippine Insurrection (National Archives)
248
Ruins of Malolob i^Xatiunal
Arcliives)
24'
Captain John J. Pershing commanding the advance on Fort Ba^
colod,
Mindanao
Island, in the
Philippines, April, 1903
Emilio Aguinaldo (National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
250 took and burned the insurgent capital of Malolos.
From
Malolos, General .Arthur
Mac.\rthur drove up the central plain of Luzon toward San Fernando, while another -Ajnerican column advanced on the resistance in
had
to
of Santa Cruz.
to\\'n
Luzon was nearly broken, when the summer
Bv May, insurgent
rains came,
and
o{>eratioiis
be suspended for four months. In October, the .American offensive
sumed, and by the following March, Luzon
re-
v*-as
pacified except for small guerrilla
\-.zs
bands in the mountains.
The
insurgent revolt spread, however, through the whole Philippine aTchif>elago,
and the year of fighting following the suppression of was the most bitter
large-scale resistance in
army fought more than
a thousand separate engagements, most of
and jungle. This was a
lieutenant's war, in
bands of guerrillas through the jungle.
The
and even the Gatling gun had
ambush or
surprise attack,
to
be
left
The
behind.
and in the southern
the Philippine Insurrection
interesting place Pacific
an
is
v^-as
successful
favorite insurgent tactic was
weajwn
of
a razor edge.
\s-ith
regarded in a purely military way,
midway between
mountain
nearly useless,
islands the favorite
the Filipinos was the fearsome bolo, a kind of Mala\-an scimitar If
in
was that of the Indian
style of fighting
against Filipinos. Because of the nature of the country, artillery
the
them
which small, mobile columns pursued
and the techniques Crook had used against the -\paches proved
vsars,
Luzon
Between May, 1900, and June, 1901, the
p>eriod of the war.
occupies an
it
the Indian wars and the jungle fighting in the
during the Second \Vorld War. And, corps for the CivU War, so did
as the
the
Mexican W'ar had served
Philippine
Insurrection
to train
train
the
men who were to command .American forces in the First World War. The outcome of the war itself was inevitable. In March, 1901, .\guinaldo captured by a ruse, and the insurgents lost what unity of command they had
f>os-
ofl&cer
sessed.
Sustained fighting ended in the
occurred
later,
summer
and the savage Moros on the
pacified until 1906.
By
the end of the
of 1901,
island of
though sporadic outbreaks
Mindanao were not thoroughlv
more than 100,000 .American
affair,
had fought nearly 3,000 engagements, and suffered 7,000
and 100,000 died
Filipinos were killed
of famine
\\'hile the fighting in the Philippines
also
become involved
in another little
foreign feeling in China had been of that country
v\-as
was
war
on the
Some
casualties.
soldiers 16,00
and plague.
at its height,
the United States had
in the Far East. For
rise.
was
some years
.Among the numberless
one called the "Boxers," whose members were sworn
foreign devils" out of China. In June, 1900, the Boxers,
tacitly
anti-
secret societies
to drive the
encouraged by the
old Dov\ager Empress, massacred several hundred foreigners and Chinese Christians in Peking.
The
where they
foreign
community
of Peking took refuge in the legation
vsere besieged by thousands of Chinese, including Chinese
as well as Boxers. .A relief
compwund
.Army troops
expedition was organized to march to Peking;
it
includec
2.500 .Americans, as well as Russian, Japxanese, British. French, .Austrian, German,
and
Italian contingents.
marched
to Tientsin,
.August the allied force, tile
This force was assembled
which
it
at the
Chinese port of Taku, then
took in mid-July after a fifteen-hour battle. In early
numbering about 18,000 men, fought
its
v^ay
throu^
hos-
country to the outskirts of Peking. .After the Russians had made a premature
attack
on the Outer
City,
from which they had
to
be rescued by their
allies,
the
expedition succeeded in breaking through to the relief of the beleaguered legations.
I
riie first train (above)
Bam, 1899 (National
over a bridge rebuilt by United States
Army
Archives). In reality, (below) not the Kansas
Engineers at
Railroad, but the tramway from Manila to Malabon, 1899 {National Archives)
n^Ku
» 1^5^
'^
•'*'-:>:
Bam
and Utah Short Line
252
:f^1 VjiL'.
;rf«i>
'ifSSHi^
Bringing in a wounded
man from
fighting
on the outskirts of Manila, 1899
(National Archives)
American troops on the advance
to Malolos, 1899 (Xational Archives)
'»C'^
-..M.
r^
Si*»^)
An insurgeiu
Infantry crossing a
bamboo
firing line [i\'atiunal Archives)
br dge near San Fernando (National Archives)
r
f
|||^9S0^|
^
a
^W
jk
j
mg^ s ^^H Hi R 1 ij ji
3^H
^j^j3.
254
-
Ruins
at
Malabon
after the insurgents
were driven out {National Archives)
American outpost near Manila (National Archives)
j!
IV
Insurgent dead at Santa (National Archives)
Insurgent prisoners at Malolos, 1899 (National Archives)
w
Ana
FIELDS OF GLORY
256
In this action, units of the United States 14th Infantry scaled the Tatar Wall and
covered the British entrance into the last
city.
The
next day the
Chinese stronghold, the Inner City, after American
at point-blank range.
allies
artillery
penetrated to the
had blasted the
gates
For some months there was desultory fighting in the provinces,
but the Chinese were forced to make peace and pay reparations to the part of the settlement, the
European powers and the United
keep small military forces in China
to
guard foreign
lives
States
As
allies.
continued to
and property. The United
maintained a few soldiers and Marines in China until the eve of the Second
States
World War. Occasionally
these garrisons were reinforced, as in 1932,
Infantry was sent to Shanghai to reinforce the Marines,
when
the 31st
because of the tension
between the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese.
During the holocaust name. The United
as its
minor engagements early in the war.
of the First
World War,
States entered the
in the region
America
the Pacific was nearly as peaceful
war too
late to participate in
any of the
which occurred between the British and Germans
did, however,
become involved
paign in Siberia as an aftermath of the war. In the
in a nearly forgotten cam-
summer
of 1918, the Allies de-
cided to send troops into Siberia as well as into European Russia.
The nominal
pur-
pose of this intervention was to secure the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road so as to evacuate a large Czech force which, in the confusion of the revolution,
had fought
its
way
across Russia into Siberia,
Western Front. The
real
and wanted
to fight the
Germans on
the
purpose of American intervention was to prevent the Japa-
nese from acting unilaterally. In August, 1918, the 27th and 31st Infantry regiments,
which had been serving the next year forces.
The
and a
in the Philippines,
half,
participated in a
were landed
number
at
Vladivostok and, during
of skirmishes with Bolshevik
Czechs were duly evacuated; the Japanese were eventually persuaded to
withdraw, and the Americans
left in
April, 1920.
In the years following the First World War, American policy in the Orient was forced to
move
increasingly in response to two great political changes in the region.
One, in the long run by
far the
more important and,
for the
United
States, the
ominous, was the Chinese Revolution. During the 1920's and 1930's
more
this great up-
heaval was in a merely nationalist phase, without the truly revolutionary aims later
developed in
its
Communist
came more and more sympathetic States
came
to
period.
American
policy,
Chinese nationalism
as
suspicious at
first,
both China and the United
into conflict with the rising ambitions of Japan. For the
triumph in Japan
of an aggressive militarism was the other major Asiatic revolution of the time.
the 1930's,
no one could
it
be-
easily foresee the limitless strength
revolution, or the fatal weakness of Japanese imperialism.
And,
in
and future of China's
r
Portrait of a "Boxer" carrying spear
and banner {National Archives)
258
-^^s Men
'li^k'^
in.tU^'^iSm^-t',
of the 9th
at Tientsin during the Boxer Rebellion (National Archives)
United States Infantry landing
American
artillery
bombarding Peking, August, 1900 (National Archives)
4 ^r>^..
Guns
of Reilley's battery blasting the gates of the Inner City of Peking (National Archives)
United States cavalry in the
of Peking— General (National Archives)
streets
Adna R.
Chaffee in center
Troop
M
of the 6th United States Cavalry riding alongside the Great
Wall of China
(National Archives)
on a practice hike near Vladivostok, Siberian campaign, December, 1918 (National Archives)
Soldiers of the United States 31st Infantry
Chang
Tso-lin,
Manchurian war
lord, being received with honors at quarters, Tientsin, 1927 {National Archives)
American head-
Color guard of the 31st Infantry passing through the streets of Shanghai, February, 1932 (National Archives)
Wbrld War
II in the Pacific
After the Japanese attack on manchuria and Japan deteriorated
States
oped into a
war
full-scale
in 1931,
When
steadily.
United
in 1937, the
strategic materials to Japan, including the oil
economy depended. After 1939 ever-growing temptation
left
in
States protested,
the
but continued to ship
and scrap iron on which Japan's war
Europe presented the Japanese with an
toward aggression in the western
occupation of France and
with Germany,
war
the
relations between the united
Japanese intervention in China devel-
The German
Pacific.
Netherlands, and Britain's life-and-death struggle
the Asiatic possessions of these powers lying helpless before the
Japanese. Only two considerations kept Japan under some restraint until 1941.
One
was the threat of Russia, which was abruptly removed by Hitler's attack on that
The
country.
other was fear of the United States. In the
summer
of 1941, however.
President Roosevelt declared an embargo on shipments of industrial raw materials to
Japan. This presented Japan with the choice either of abandoning the war in China or of securing alternative supplies of raw materials by seizing Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Despite
some opposition from moderates, the
militarists controlling the
Japanese government adopted the latter policy.
As its
early as July, 1941, the Japanese
best troops
the year Japan
men
had nearly 2,500,000
in reser\'e.
British,
Army began
from China and equip them
quietly to withdraw
By
for aggression else^vhere.
first-line troops,
of
with 3,000,000 partially trained
Her navy, with more than 200 major
Dutch, and American naval forces in the
some
the end of
ships,
Pacific,
was a
fair
and her
match
for the
air strength
was
considerably greater than that available to the Western powers in the area. In addition, Japan's best troops
in China, efficient
and most of her airmen were seasoned veterans of the war
where the Japanese military machine had already achieved a
co-ordination of land,
air,
and
sea power.
By planning an
close
and
offensive well in
advance, the Japanese were also able to dispose their forces where they could be
most
Indochina, which the Japanese had occupied with the consent
effectively used:
of the "Vichy" French, was to be the principal base for an invasion of Malaya and the East Indies;
Formosa and the Ryukyus provided bases
and the Japanese-mandated
pines;
operations against Hawaii, It is
in
Guam, New Guinea, and
barely sufficient for the vast
heavy
home
islands,
losses of either
capacity was
work
of transporting
merchant or naval its
ships.
Her
and
less
and even
of only 6,000,000 tons, was
raw materials
to,
and war supplies
aircraft industry
to
make up
could not, in case
output of 5,000 planes a year. Japan's
scarcely a third that of Britain,
for
total industrial
than one-tenth that of the United
In the latter years of the war, a deterioration in the quality of Japanese equip-
ment was
The certain
Her merchant marine,
and her shipbuilding capacity was not adequate
of need, double or triple
States.
were available
the Solomons.
true that there were certain areas of weakness in Japan's economy,
her military establishment.
from, the
for attacking the Philip-
islands in the central Pacific
to
become
military
contempt
noticeable.
men who dominated for cold
economic
the Japanese government seem to have had a
facts, particularly for
mystique of Japanese militarism there was
as little
room
unpleasant ones. In the
for truly defensive
planning
THE OPEN DOOR to
263
And
was for kindness toward defeated enemies.
as there
so the Japanese determined
sweep away in one great offensive the crumbling structure of European and Amer-
ican imperialism. Their very weakness drove
up
their enemies build
them
against
them
attempt
to
one blow,
this in
forces they could not possibly match.
Japanese attack against the United
States,
War
with the Chinese
lest
Thus, the
unresolved and
Southeast Asia unoccupied, was an act of desperation analogous to Hitler's attack on
when he had not
Russia
defeated Britain.
That war with Japan was United
States in the
and perhaps imminent was perfectly
likely
autumn
1941.
of
Most American military
clear to the
experts, however,
underestimating both the ambitions and the fears of the Japanese, assumed that they
would
first
attack the
main American base
more vulnerable
British
on Oahu
in the Pacific,
and Dutch
in the
colonies. Nevertheless, the
Hawaiian
forced and warned of the possibility of sudden attack.
The
had been
Islands,
rein-
heart of America's whole
position in the Pacific was the naval establishment at Pearl Harbor,
on which was
based the Pacific Fleet. Guarding the naval base was a military establishment of some 60,000 men, as well as several hundred army and navy planes.
morning Pacific
of Sunday,
War. In an
air
December
and submarine
stroyed 200 killed
and a number of other
army and navy
American
aircraft.
first
on the
that,
blow of the
assault lasting only a few hours, the attackers
put the Pacific Fleet out of action, sinking or seriously damaging cruisers, three destroyers,
was here
It
1941, the Japanese struck the
7,
and 1,300 wounded. The Japanese
casualties,
lost
five battleships, three
In addition the Japanese de-
vessels.
mostly navy men, were 3,300
twenty-nine planes,
five
midget sub-
marines, and one larger submarine.
Within
Midway
a few days after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese
Island, attacked
Wake
Island and
had bombarded
Hong Kong, overrun Guam, made
a
num-
ber of landings in the Philippines and the East Indies, and invaded Thailand and
Malaya. Japanese strategy foresaw three phases of the war: the neutralization of the pines,
American
and the Dutch East
Indies,
The
phase included
first
Pacific Fleet, the occupation of Malaya, the Philip-
and the acquisition
southwest Pacific to form a defense perimeter.
The
and
of islands in the central
second phase was to see a consoli-
dation of the perimeter, with a ring of heavily defended island bases extending from the Kuriles in the north through the Marshall and Gilbert
Archipelago, northern
The
final
New
phase of the war, as the Japanese saw
the United States, in which
American
perimeter would be destroyed. Australia or of the
garrison on
first tests
Wake
the United States
The
it,
was
of
Wake
rison's planes
be a war of attrition against
it
in the Pacific
came
under the command of Major James
had 378 Marines and seven medical had twelve
suffered heavy sea
fighter planes,
and
States
turned out, represented a gross
will.
American fighting men
Island. Here,
side arms; they also
quarters.
to
Japanese had no plans for an invasion either of
cluded six 5-inch guns, two 3-inch antiaircraft guns,
and
Bismarck
American mainland, and apparently expected the United
misunderstanding of America's power and of the
the
forces attempting to break through the defense
eventually to acquiesce in their conquests. This, as
One
Islands,
Guinea, through the East Indies and Singapore to Burma.
air attack
officers;
fifty
to the little
P. S.
their
Devereux,
armament
machine guns, plus
in-
rifles
but no fortifications or protected
on December
9th;
most of the gar-
were destroyed, but the Americans sank a light cruiser and a destroyer.
FIELDS OF GLORY
264
On December
14-15 Japanese bombers destroyed the island's
during the next week the put out of action.
power plant and
island's
On December
all
and
airfield,
in attacks
but one battery of guns were
22nd the enemy attempted a landing but was
re-
pulsed and two destroyers were sunk. During the next two days, however, the Japanese succeeded in landing several thousand men; the
"The
read proudly,
issue
had shot down more than
is
a
last
message received from
in doubt." In their defense of
still
dozen enemy planes, sunk seven enemy
Wake
Wake,
the Marines
ships,
and damaged
several others.
During the ica
and
first
few weeks of the war, despite occasionally
Hong Kong
exposed, the British colony of
lessly
fierce resistance,
Amer-
were forced back everytvhere under the Japanese onslaught. Help-
its allies
Christmas day, after
a valiant defense.
on Borneo and Celebes
surrendered to the Japanese on
In early January the Japanese landed in force
Dutch East Indies and,
in the
after destroying Allied naval
forces in that area in the Battle of the Java Sea, proceeded to attack Java. Early in
March
the Dutch surrendered the entire East Indies.
vaded Malaya and, two days
after the attack
Wales and Repulse by
capital ships Prince of
Malayan campaign was a pull back to Singapore
Meanwhile the Japanese had
on Pearl Harbor, had sunk the Malayan
air attack off the
31st,
and
coast.
The
were forced
brilliant success for the Japanese; the British
on January
in-
British
to
on Febru-
to surrender their base there
ary 15th.
The major American involvement early
months of the war was
in land fighting against the
Japanese in the
There naval and
in the Philippines.
air superiority
enabled the Japanese to land nearly a quarter of a million troops at several places on
and southeast
the northwest
coasts of
Luzon, the principal
island.
To
oppose
this
army, General MacArthur had on Luzon 18,000 army troops, 2,500 Marines and sailors,
men
and some 60,000
12,000 Philippine Scouts,
open
clared Manila an
partially trained
Army. Following plans made
of the Philippine
and
city
skillfully
and poorly armed
years earlier,
withdrew most of
MacArthur
his troops
de-
onto the
rocky Bataan peninsula where they could be supported by the guns of the fortress
Manila Bay.
of Corregidor in
shortly proved impossible to penetrate the Japanese
It
blockade and supply Bataan by
and
sea,
January
as early as
11,
1942, the troops
Bataan were put on half-rations. Through January and February MacArthur's
were forced back
on
men
but the line they had established across the peninsula was
steadily,
not broken. Indeed, on February 25th MacArthur launched a counterattack which
drove the Japanese back this time,
as
with Singapore
much
lost
as five miles,
and delayed
and the Dutch East Indies
their final offensive.
falling,
By
Bataan had become
a completely isolated little center of resistance to the Japanese. Allied strategy deter-
mined
that Australia
would have
to
be the main base for the war against Japan,
and MacArthur was made supreme commander of the Southwest to leave Bataan.
This he did on the night of March
Pacific
11th, escaping to
and ordered
Mindanao by
PT-boat, and thence to Australia by plane. In leaving his troops to fight on to
mate
defeat,
ulti-
MacArthur could console himself with having organized and directed
a brilliant defense,
On March furious attack
which continued under General Jonathan Wainwright.
24th the Japanese under General
on the defenders of Bataan,
ing them from the
air.
This
assault
shelling
Tomoyuki Yamashita opened them by land and
sea,
a
and bomb-
continued until April 2nd when enemy infantry
THE OPEN DOOR
265
Struck the left of the
were
closed.
Heavy
wright back to his
The
line
on the right center of the
defense on Bataan.
assault
line.
on the
right,
On
who managed
to cross to
General Edward
P.
line,
however, forced Wain-
and Wainwright had
to
men and
a
abandon Bataan few army nurses
Corregidor under strafing attacks from Japanese planes.
King surrendered the 37,000 men trapped on Bataan, but the
on Corregidor kept up the
5th, after
was breached but the gaps
April 8th the American line was envel-
back to Corregidor. With him went about 3,500
fall
garrison
attacks
last
oped by a Japanese
and
American and Filipino
fight for
almost another month. Finally, on
weeks of bombing and point-blank shelling from Japanese
batteries.
May
General
Wainwright surrendered when the Japanese achieved an actual landing on Corregidor. It
later that
America learned what had happened
the Japanese captured
on Bataan and Corregidor. Most of
was not until nearly three years
to the 50,000
men whom
the Bataan troops were tortured, beaten, and starved to death either
five-mile
to
received one mess kit of rice, and
some received no food
at all.
prisoners were permitted to drink water from dirty streams
They were sometimes marched on
on the infamous
Camp O'Donnell, or later at the prison camp itself. On the eightymarch to Camp O'Donnell, which took from six to twelve days, some men
"Death March"
bicycles; often they
at a
were forced
From time
to
time
and carabao wallows.
slow shuffle, sometimes at a
trot,
paced by guards
to retrace their steps for several miles,
and some-
times they were halted and kept at attention in the hot sun for hours. Stragglers were
i
Aerial view of Corregidor (U.S.
Army Photo)
266
Searchlight crew at
work on Cor-
regidor, January, 1942 (U.S.
United States Army Finance
Office in a tunnel
on Corregidor
Army Photo)
{U.S.
Army
Photo)
Three
soldiers
on Bataan
"Voice of Freedom" {U.S.
Men
listening to the
Army Photo)
of an antitank
^'-^
company holding
Corporal Ray "Slats" Spencer, motorcycle rider, cat napping on Bataan. Notice the ever-ready weapons. {U.S. Army Photo)
dispatch
their position
on Bataan
{U.S.
Army Photo)
FIELDS OF GLORY
268 beaten or bayoneted, shot or run
down by
trucks.
At night prisoners were jammed in
buUpens, into which their guards occasionally charged with bayonets, for sport. At
Camp was
O'Donnell prisoners were deliberately starved; a
fifty
food and drugs sent through the
Red
oners were similarly treated, being given their captivity. After this,
Cross were withheld.
no food
The
Corregidor
pris-
at all for the first seven days of
most of them being almost too weak
forced to parade through the streets of Manila. This was the
Yamashita
two weeks the death rate
after
day among American prisoners, and 500 a day among Filipinos. Supplies of
to stand, they
manner
in
were
which General
promise to treat prisoners honorably, and in accordance with
fulfilled his
the principles of international law.
By May,
1942,
when Corregidor
surrendered, the Japanese had effected a rapid
New Guinea and
conquest of Burma, had also landed in force in Islands, tralia,
and were threatening
Australia.
They had not intended an
Solomon
the
invasion of Aus-
momentum
but might very well have carried the war there had not the
of their
conquests slackened. In six months they had occupied an empire stretching from the borders of India to the central Pacific, and from
where they occupied the
islands of Attu
air forces were, for the
ning to find
it
a bowstring. It to send
difficult to
men and
moment,
sovereign.
The
Japanese were, however, begin-
maintain their lines of supply, by
true they operated
is
to the Aleutians,
and Indian oceans included in their empire, their naval
vast areas of the Pacific
and
New Guinea
and Kiska. Within, and even beyond, the
on
now
interior lines, while the
supplies 10,000 miles or
stretched tight as
United
more along an outer route
States
had
to Australia.
But neither Japanese industry nor the Japanese merchant marine was quite up
to
overcoming the strain of supplying simultaneously forces scattered over 15,000,000 square miles of ocean and island.
To
cope with
this
overgrown and deadly empire, the United
States
and
divided the areas remaining under their control into four great theaters of
its allies
command.
One, the Southeast Asia Command, included India, Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, and the Indian Ocean, and was designated an area of British responsibility.
and support of China was assigned primarily
W.
Stilwell
became Generalissimo Chiang
Pacific Area, including Australia, the
to the
United
States,
Kai-shek's chief of
The
supply
and General Joseph
staff.
The
Southwest
Netherlands East Indies, the Solomons, and
the Philippines, was put under the supreme
command
of General MacArthur. Finally,
operations in the rest of the Pacific were put under the direction of the United States
W. Nimitz
Navy, Admiral Chester theater
command was
to
work
serving as commander-in-chief. This system of
internally with considerable efficiency; but
grave strategic mistake that there was no supreme
War. Where the operation. In
theaters of
Burma, the
command
British
sion of responsibility in the Pacific between
The
first
and
it
was a
over the whole Pacific
joined, there was often notable lack of co-
on the one hand and
other were never able to achieve a thoroughly
to duplication of effort
command Stilwell
common
and the Chinese on the
purpose. Similarly, the divi-
MacArthur and Nimitz was
to lead both
to lack of co-operation.
sign of a turning point in the Pacific
naval battles of the Coral Sea and of Midway, the
War came in the two great airfirst in May and the second in
June, 1942. These established a new pattern in naval warfare in that each was fought out between the planes and carriers of the opposing
fleets,
which did not themselves
THE OPEN DOOR make
contact.
The
269
Guinea and Australia when for an assault
expected to Fiji Islands,
New
Battle of the Coral Sea was fought in the waters between a Japanese carrier force attempted to prepare the
on Port Moresby on the southeast
coast of
New
Guinea.
The
way
Japanese
make Port Moresby a base for operations against New Caledonia, the and Samoa which, if successful, would have cut the American line of
supply to Australia. Tactically, the Battle of the Coral Sea was a draw, with both
damage, and both withdrawing; but the Japanese aban-
sides suffering considerable
doned
their attempt to attack Port
American
decisive
Moresby by
victory, the first in the war.
the navy destroyed
all
The
sea.
With
Midway was
Battle of
a
the loss of the carrier Yorktown,
four carriers of the Japanese task force which intended to
Midway. Midway was saved, and the Japanese Navy was put on the
take the island of
defensive in the central Pacific.
Denied easy
access to
On
Caledonia by their failure to land in the
Solomons and
set
August
1942, the navy landed the 1st
7,
Moresby,
at Port
about constructing an
would have dominated American communications
air base there that Pacific.
New
on Guadalcanal
the Japanese landed
the South
in
Marine Division on Guadalcanal,
while other Marine units were landed on the nearby island of Tulagi. Meeting no
from the small Japanese force on Guadalcanal, the Marines pushed
serious opposition
ahead rapidly; within forty-eight hours they had secured the partially completed Japanese
airfield,
which they renamed Henderson
Japanese crippled the navy task force
off
Field.
Guadalcanal by
Then, on August
air attack; the
9th, the
navy had to
withdraw, leaving the Marines already ashore without reinforcements and short of supplies.
Unable now
to finish clearing the island, the
Marines established a
static
defense perimeter around Henderson Field and held on against Japanese counter-
The
attack.
Japanese reinforced their Guadalcanal force from Rabaul and, in four
consecutive monthly attacks from August to November, attempted to wipe out the
Marines. Pacific
The
fighting
War. Most of
undergrowth was
The
it
on Guadalcanal was,
some ways, the most
in
so thick that
men
often could not see an
enemy
fifteen feet
away.
Japanese, trained jungle fighters, repeatedly infiltrated the American lines, espe-
cially at night.
month
after
On
The Marines were on
short rations and, as they fought
month, most who were not
killed or
soft
if
unsupported and uninformed
frenzied,
able and
inhuman enemy,
the
The Marines had been
to fight a
men
at all.
You shoulda
of the 1st
It is
to
stayed
their education:
tellin'
you
to
do
doubtful that the Marines on Guadalcanal were
infernal jungle, they
The
be
"Boy, I'm afraid you ain't a
home, or joined the army." Or, "Boy, it
I've
this
worn
way, the
much aware
the wide issues of the war, but for the task at hand, they served. In the gloomy
but incomparable
left
screaming, apparently innumer-
Marine Division were the ones
out more sea bags than you have socks, and I'm
Marine way!"
and pampered troops the Japa-
taught an iron discipline of obedience and austerity,
which even taunts were part of
Marine
malaria.
any American soldiers were to be
nese expected Americans to be. Indeed,
chosen.
on unrelieved
wounded were weakened by
Guadalcanal, however, Japanese fanaticism encountered a rare brand of
American toughness. The Marines were not the
in
hellish of the
was in ravines and on ridges in rain-soaked jungle where the
matched the taut
hysteria of the Japanese with their
of
and
own rough
esprit.
Japanese made the
tactical
mistake of committing their forces on Guadal-
270
Casualties
on
lighter,
Munda
Point,
New Georgia,
1943 (U.S.
Army Photo)
Flamethrowers of the United
States 7th Division smoke Japanese out of a blockhouse on Kwajalein, February 4, 1944. (U.S. Army Photo)
A
United
States patrol
moving through
a jungle in the Pacific area: a classic view of jungle warfare {National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
272
canal piecemeal, instead of building up, as they might easily have done, an attack
which would have overwhelmed the Marines. Perhaps the most crucial phase of the Guadalcanal fighting was a bitter three-day engagement in mid-September, the Battle
Here the Japanese made a
of the Ridge.
Marines on a ridge
frontal attack against the
which was the anchor of the whole American
Once
position.
the Japanese drove a
breach in the American lines which was closed only by a brilliantly directed artillery barrage. Stalemated finally in the September fighting, the Japanese rebuilt their forces
and launched
October offensive in division strength, supported by the heavy
their
guns of their battleships offshore. ment, held ing, there
off this attack,
had been
The
Marines, finally reinforced by an army regi-
and even drove the Japanese back. During the island
occurred the naval Battle of Guadalcanal,
1st
By January, the United
when
From then
twelve loaded troop transports. failed.
On November
several indecisive naval engagements.
fight-
13-14, there
the Japanese lost two battleships and
on, Japanese strength
on Guadalcanal
Army XIV Corps had been landed, and the Japanese troops who fought at Guadalcanal, almost
States
Marines withdrawn. Of 42,000
40,000 were killed or died of disease; fewer than 500, mostly from a labor battalion,
were captured.
Having
failed to take Port
land, over the forbidding
Moresby by
Owen
sea, the
Japanese attempted to reach
it
by
Stanley Mountains from their bases on the north
New Guinea at Gona and Buna. Their march in August and September, 1942, Owen Stanley range was one of the most impressive demonstrations in the
coast of
across the
war of
mountain and jungle
skill in
fighting.
At Kokoda, however, only
thirty miles
from Port Moresby, they were stopped cold by the 7th Australian Division, which then drove them back across the mountains.
from the
air,
in
what was
between ground and
to
become
The
Australians were largely supplied
the classic pattern in the Pacific of co-operation
air forces. In the
Buna-Gona area the Australians were joined
by the United States 32nd Infantry Division, which was flown over the mountains.
The
Japanese dug in at Buna-Gona behind an
efficiently
log and earthen bunkers, arranged in depth, and the
tempts to break through these defenses were repulsed.
constructed network of
American-Australian
first
The American
at-
troops were
inexperienced at jungle warfare, and the Australians were exhausted from their mountain campaign. After six in
their positions,
weeks of
fighting, the
through disease and enemy action. At
was sent by MacArthur the use of artillery,
and
to take
this
rallied the
Gona, and early in January Buna
and the
to
still
firmly entrenched
lost half their force
Robert L. Eichelberger
the system of supply
and
demoralized Allied troops. Gradually the Japanese
fell
On December
to the Americans.
had been wiped out in eastern
threat
point, General
command. He reorganized
were driven back within their defenses.
the Japanese
Japanese were
while the Australians and Americans had
Australia had ended.
New
By
9th the Australians took the end of January, 1943,
Guinea, as well
MacArthur was able
as
on Guadalcanal,
to begin
his great
counteroffensive against the Japanese.
In a
little
over a year, from the early spring of 1943 to the late spring of 1944,
MacArthur's American and Australian forces pushed some 1,300 miles through the
Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago, and along the northern coast of to within striking distance of the Philippines.
number
of interrelated circumstances:
The
New Guinea
This advance was made possible by a gradual decline of Japanese, and the
rise
I
THE OPEN DOOR
273
of American, air power; the diversion of Japanese naval Pacific to deal with Nimitz's
Mariana
not
islands; and,
and
air forces to the central
advance through the Gilbert, Marshall, Caroline, and
the skill of MacArthur's generalship. At no time in campaign did MacArthur have more than a fraction of the resources available to American commanders in Europe. This forced him to practice the most rigid economy least,
this
men and
in the use of his
less garrisons, as
Thus, instead of dispersing
men and and
the Japanese had done,
and maintenance behind him
for supply
was assured by the same
stallations
an economy which may well have contributed
supplies,
to the success of his operations.
supplies by
air, to
MacArthur
advance of his ground
enemy
number-
The
security of these in-
enabled MacArthur to move
neutralize by-passed Japanese installations by air attack,
forces.
By one
of defense
of the
more
and supply by
men
force of 100,000
to rot.
air assault in
sensible decisions of the Pacific
War, MacArthur by-passed Rabaul, the main Japanese base leaving an
his strength in
only skeleton organizations
he advanced.
as
air superiority that
weaken the whole Japanese system
to
left
Without
in the southwest Pacific,
clear air supremacy,
Mac-
Arthur's strategy would not, of course, have been possible.
given
him
directly
by General George C. Kenney's Fifth
by burgeoning American
directly
As early
aircraft production.
cline in the quality of Japanese planes
and
pilots
The air supremacy was Army Air Force, and inas
1943 a certain de-
was becoming evident, and by
1944 there was no hope of the Japanese regaining the initiative they had possessed in the air early in the war.
By
the
summer
pines, the forces
of 1944
when MacArthur's
forces
were within reach of the Philip-
under Admiral Nimitz's command had advanced an even greater
The main
distance across the central Pacific.
purposes of this advance were to draw
out and destroy Japanese naval and air forces, to seize naval and air bases for the
United
States,
and
to support
MacArthur's advance by engaging enemy forces that
otherwise would have been used against him.
secondary to air and naval action.
It
The
was limited
land fighting in this theater was
to the small
but deadly engagements
fought by several Marine and army divisions on the tiny islands whose names, hardly
known
to geographers before the war,
became household words
in the
United States
—Tarawa, Makin, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian.
The advance
in the central Pacific was preceded
by an assault on the Japanese
base on Attu in the Aleutians. In May, 1943, the 7th Infantry Division had landed
on Attu and, in an eighteen-day
battle,
wiped out the Japanese garrison of 2,500
men. The larger enemy garrison on Kiska conducted a
skillful
evacuation under
when American and landed on Kiska in August, they found the island deserted. The while it involved a comparatively small number of men, was car-
cover of the fogs and mists characteristic of the Aleutians, and
Canadian troops
on Attu,
fighting
under some of the most
ried out fare,
difficult
conditions in the history of American war-
on volcanic mountainsides and quaking muskeg, where the cold and fog were
terrible
and
distinctive in their
way
as the jungles of
as
Guadalcanal.
In November, 1943, the 2nd Marine Division landed on a heavily defended
beach
at
down on
Tarawa, in the Gilberts. For twenty-four hours the Marines were pinned the beach by withering fire
were ashore in island.
from Japanese
sufficient strength, the
pillboxes.
Finally,
when
they
Marines organized an assault and cleared the
In three days' fighting they suffered more than 3,000 casualties and killed
Troops of the 132nd Infantry, 57th Engineers, Americal Division, landing on Guadalcanal, December 8, 1942 {U.S. Army Photo)
American
flag flying
over Attn, Aleutians. Old Glory was affixed to an abandoned Japawhen the Yanks gained their foothold. (U.S. Army Photo)
;
I
nese landing boat
?Sl #
^9^
->i#Pvf,
-Jf.
\^
\
27
>L-^^
Landing
of 503rd Parachute Infantry
on Kamiri
East Indies, July
Mopping up on
3,
Airstrip,
1944 (U.S.
Noemfoor
Island, Netherlands
Army Photo)
Bougainville. At night enemy soldiers would infiltrate American lines, morning the Yanks went out to get them. This photograph shows a tank going forward and infantrymen following in its cover. Note the ejected shell case in the air above the rifle of the GI in the act of firing. (U.S. Army Photo)
and
in the
FIELDS OF GLORY
276
The heavy Marine
4,500 of the enemy.
in later landing operations.
On
losses
on Tarawa afforded
navy
a lesson to the
where there
the tiny atolls of the central Pacific,
was no possibility of achieving surprise and where every yard of beach was swept by
enemy
bombardment before landing had
fire,
port during landing operations
The
necessary.
much
closer
be
to
much more
sustained,
and sup-
and more accurate than had been thought
landings at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls in January, 1944, were
preceded by two days of the most intense and concentrated air and naval bombard-
ment ever directed sion in
its
Tarawa, but
it
on the
sistance
against so small a target.
The
casualties of the 7th Infantry Divi-
landing were considerably lighter than those of the Marines on
initial
took more than a week of heavy fighting to extinguish Japanese
re-
island.
Following the occupation of Kwajalein, army and Marine combat teams destroyed the
enemy
garrison on Eniwetok Atoll in a three-day fight, completing the
sweep through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Control of these islands enabled the navy to dominate the great Japanese base
Truk
the navy next landed the
itself,
the 27th Infantry Division
on Truk
in the Carolines. Bypassing
2nd and 4th Marine
on the island of Saipan
divisions, followed
by
The fighting on Pacific. The Japanese
in the Marianas.
Saipan was the heaviest of the whole campaign in the central
fought desperately to hold Aslito Airfield, and delayed the American advance from the beachhead for several days, mainly by concentrated
Even
the Japanese continued to fight from caves in the slowly, driving the terized
enemy toward
and accurate mortar
and of Garapan, the principal town on the
after the loss of the airfield
hills.
fire.
island,
The Americans advanced
the north end of the island across country charac-
by broken, jagged ridges, blind ravines, and sheer
cliffs.
In the
last
days of
the fighting, the Japanese surged out of their caves in one of the most bizarre counterattacks of the war. Several thousand of the
many armed into the ing,
only with
American
sticks,
made
The Marines and
lines.
enemy, including many wounded and
a shouting, screaming "Banzai" attack directly
infantry fired point-blank into the surg-
howling enemy mob, but the Japanese came on straight into the
tions of the 10th Marines, until the
second and
fire
dead ahead
in this weird charge.
When
Marines had
artillery posi-
to set their fuses at four-tenths of a
Perhaps 3,000 Japanese were killed
at a fifty-yard range.
the Japanese were finally driven to the northern tip of
Saipan, the Americans witnessed what a Marine major called the "crowning horror
Hundreds
of the whole campaign."
of Japanese civilians
who had
caves acted out a hysterical orgy of self-destruction. Mothers
and
strangled and shot their children, then hurled their bodies over
Women combed
and arranged
with their husbands. this
morbid show
The killed;
tion
The most
their hair carefully
taken shelter in
fathers stabbed cliffs
and
into the sea.
and then jumped over the
cliffs
battle-hardened American Marines were sickened at
of Japanese fanaticism.
fighting
on Saipan
army and Marine
lasted nearly a
casualties
were
month.
15,000.
It cost
the Japanese 25,000
During the heaviest
men
fighting, fric-
had developed between the army and Marines; the Marine commander abruptly
relieved the
commander
of the 27th Infantry, touching off one of the most explosive
controversies of the Pacific States for the
first
War. The occupation
of Saipan, however, gave the
United
time a base from which heavy bombers could reach both the Phil-
ippines and the Japanese
home
islands. In addition, the attack
on Saipan drew out
THE OPEN DOOR to destruction
277
the last sizable reserves of Japan's Naval Air Force; 450 Japanese
planes, with their irreplaceable pilots,
The
were destroyed.
and the capture
the Japanese,
American
control,
MacArthur was preparing There had been
By
di-
the end of July, 1944, the Marianas were
and Nimitz's
forces
were poised
to support the attack
against the Philippines.
no question
is
that, for
Douglas MacArthur, a return to the Philippines
supreme personal goal ever since he
a
defended by
lightly
Tinian by elements of the 2nd and 4th Marine
of
visions in nine days of heavy fighting.
firmly in
of Saipan was fol-
fall
lowed quickly by the reoccupation of Guam, which was only
Bataan in the spring of 1942.
would be
It
behind him the defenders of
left
difficult
to maintain that the reconquest
of the Philippines was not also a strategic necessity for the United States, given the
military situation in the Pacific as
nomic damage
that
it
could be judged in 1944.
Japan had already
in
know
Europe was reaching a crescendo, and no one,
that
would be over
it
bomb were
still
sumed
Japan would
islands,
that
and
after
another winter.
degree of eco-
known to the summer of
considerable part of her merchant marine, was not fully
war
The
mainly from the destruction of a
suffered,
The
in the
Allies.
awful implications of the atom
only guessed at by a handful of scientists and technicians. finally
The
1944, could
was
It
have to be defeated by landings made on the
as-
home
for such operations the Philippines provided the only adequate base.
command becommand of
In the plans for an invasion of the Philippines, the division of
tween MacArthur and Nimitz was retained, although forces under the both would be engaged in the landings.
XXIV Army MacArthur
command
to
of "MacArthur's admiral,"
Third
awkward and tortuous
fleet,
command, was turned over
moment
it
forces
to
were put under the
C. Kinkaid. But Admiral William F.
was
to protect
MacArthur's landing and
remained under Nimitz's ultimate direction. This
division of
logic of a plain division
priceless
Thomas
although
Fleet,
co-operate with Kinkaid's
one
3rd Amphibious Force, including the
work with the 7th Amphibious Force; both
Halsey's mighty
ward
The
Corps, which had been under Nimitz's
command, which did not even have
the straightfor-
between army and navy, presented the Japanese with
of opportunity which, happily for the
American
cause, they
did not grasp.
MacArthur's main assault
force, designated the Sixth
Army and commanded by
General Walter Krueger, went ashore in the Philippines on the island of Leyte on
morning of October
the
craft,
escort carriers—dwarfed side,
the
20, 1944.
The
invasion armada of some 800 ships— landing
rocket ships, assault transports, cargo ships, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and
though
Normandy
any force previously gathered in the
Pacific
did not compare in immensity with the invasion
it
landings a few months before.
The
War by
fleet
either
assembled for
landing, in the protected waters of
Leyte Gulf, went smoothly; within a few hours the troops ashore had secured a firm
beachhead, and
men and
supplies were being landed swiftly. It was at sea that the
crucial struggle for Leyte occurred, in the
known
complex
of naval
and
air
engagements
collectively as the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Aware
of MacArthur's general intentions, Admiral
mit more than half the ate effort to
total
Toyoda had decided
remaining strength of the Japanese Navy
wipe out the American landing
force.
The
to
com-
in a desper-
Japanese adopted a compli-
cated strategy of converging task forces, one of which they hoped
would
get through
278
On
the sands of Saipan: three dead United States Marines {National Archives)
Marines advancing under
fire in
northern Saipan {National Archives)
¥^\<|
The United
States
beachhead on Saipan (National Archives)
A dead Marine being moved to a burial ground on Saipan (National Archives)
280
Marines, using an ammunition cart, haul supplies to a gun position on Saipan. (National Archives)
Marines throw demolition charges into a Japanese position on Saipan. {National Archives)
FIELDS OF GLORY
282
American landing
to the
American
attack,
The
area.
converging
and did not manage
forces,
however, came under heavy
to arrive in Leyte
Gulf simultaneously; thus
on October 25th three widely separated naval engagements took
By nearly win-
place.
ning a victory in one of these engagements, the Japanese had a brief opportunity
to
do irreparable damage: Halsey, serving under separate command from Kinkaid, and insufficiently
aware of the protective role he was
Third Fleet more
to play, took his
than 300 miles from the landing area in order to engage Admiral Ozawa's powerHalsey
ful carrier force.
Admiral Kurita's
1st
won
a decisive victory over
The Americans
Seventh Fleet.
took a severe battering and,
pressed on and attacked the landing area rita
broke
off his
Ozawa, but while he was gone
Attack Force had engaged a weak carrier group of Kinkaid's
engagement and went
Ozawa's
to
Kurita could have
^\•o^se,
Fortunately, after several hours, Ku-
itself.
aid.
MacArthur's landing may
have been saved by the Japanese commander's lack of resolution and
tactical sense.
In any event, the battles of Leyte Gulf broke the back of the Japanese Navy, and the
Army consolidated its position ashore. The Japanese made a determined effort to
Sixth
For a few weeks they were able of
contain MacArthur's forces on Leyte.
send reinforcements to the island. By the middle
to
December, howe\er, Kenney's land-based
nearly cut off the flow of reinforcements.
fighters
The
and Halsey 's
Japanese
carrier planes
many
lost so
they were obliged to use sailing craft to carry reinforcements. For once, the
had numerical superiority,
icans
equipment. In ahead.
steadily
difficult
In
November
By the end of the
as well as a clear superiority in air
they encountered the crack Japanese
around Ormoc year, victory
in
was one of the most rapid and first
A
naA-y,
the air force,
nese,
in
series of diversions,
On
sight
9,
efficient
1945, the Sixth
landing operations of the
on
a fifteen-mile
guerrillas,
Avhile
11th Airborne Division
ious landing south of Manila while a parachute regiment was outskirts of the city.
By
the
first
week
by the end
A\ith skill
by the
forces
of February,
on Luzon
troops of the
Corps landed near Subic Bay and drove across the Bataan peninsula
The
Avar:
had thoroughly confused the Japa-
and the landing on Lingayen Gulf caught the major enemy
defensive stronghold to the Japanese.
Army
Lingayen Gulf.
beachhead three miles
planned by MacArthur and executed
and by Filipino
imbalanced motion. Krueger struck rapidly for Manila,
on the
Division,
and Krueger's Sixth Army
January
at the classic invasion spot of
day, 68,000 troops \vere ashore
deep.
1st
December.
on Leyte was in
was landed on the beaches of Luzon It
in
delayed Krueger's advance but was ground to
this outfit
was relieved by Eichelberger's Eighth Army.
of the
Amer-
power and
country and in a season of heavy rains, the Americans pushed
brought from Manchuria; pieces in the fighting
had
troopships that
to
XI
deny that old
made an amphib-
dropped near Cavite
American troops were
clos-
ing in on Manila from the north, northwest, and south. Despite the hopelessness of their position, however, the Japanese fought a bitter street-to-street, house-to-house
defense of the
city,
which was not entirely cleared until the end of February. Even
then the Japanese held out on Corregidor where Kenneys airmen had dropped 3,000 tons of
the
air.
bombs before
troops of the 503rd Parachute
Regiment had been landed from
Finally the remnants of the Japanese garrison blew
tunnel system on the "Rock." Fort Avith gasoline
piunped into
its
Drum
up themselves and
nearby was destroyed by burning
ventilating system.
it
the
out
-^^J^.
e MiUS
\
SOUTH
Hi V'''
(
—
s.
1
I
N^
*
Uort'laP
*J
Co 'ti).0O''
CHINA
)RNEO
* "^ *
)
y^
.,-''•"
50" 901
THE PHILIPPINE AREA
'^
/ ^
The
Philippine Area
'-^
FIELDS OF GLORY
284
By
Manila Bay was once again open
early March,
MacArthur had accomplished
two months what had taken the Japanese
in
1942. In addition, General Yamashita
in
for the defense of Luzon, far better
Arthur three years before.
It
American shipping, and
to
equipped than the
difficult
is
had had nearly a quarter of
thought and outfought by MacArthur. By
little
this
fury and tactical expertness, but they had lost
confidence had given them added
as their
In the months following the
fall
men Mac-
force available to
time in the war, an intangible but
some
still
with suicidal
fight
essential ingredient of spirit. Just
momentum
judgment and paralyzed
their
months
not to conclude that Yamashita was out-
profound change had come over the Japanese: They would
doom weakened
six
a million
in 1942, so
now
a sense of
their decision.
of Manila, the remaining Japanese forces in the
Philippines were split into smaller and smaller fragments by the remorseless tentacles of the
Eighth and Sixth armies. Large-scale fighting had ended by the time the
rainy season began in June, but bands of Japanese continued guerrilla resistance in
With
the hills until the end of the war. killed in the Philippines
While
about 60,000, MacArthur had
casualties of
more than 300,000
of the enemy.
fighting raged in the streets of Manila, three
Marine divisions were taking
punishment in one of the most savage engagements of the war— the
terrible
battle
Iwo Jima. Iwo Jima was the stump of an extinct volcano, a waste of rock and sand, eight miles square and lying half^vay between Saipan and Tokyo. Nimiu for
judged
an air base for fighters and
essential as
it
medium bombers
operating against
Japan, and to provide an emergency landing for the Superforts that were blasting
Japanese
it
cities.
For seventy-two consecutive days before the Marines landed, the
had been bombed by both land-based and carrier-based planes;
island
had been blasted by
stroyers.
derous orate
Yet when the Marines landed on February
fire
and
as air-raid shelters at will
during the bombing, and were
during the defense of the
expertly camouflaged pillboxes and covered
had been marked out laid.
ten of the
kill
cruisers
and
de-
were met by murelab-
system of tunnels which honeycombed the entire island; these
move men
had been
19, 1945, they
from the Japanese. The Japanese garrison had constructed a most efficient
had served
island
and supporting
a task force of six battleships
little
for three days
The
for
mortar and
island.
gun
positions.
artillery fire,
Every square yard of the
and extensive mine
Japanese had sworn to defend Iwo Jima
enemy
before dying."
The
to enable the garrison to
Supplementing the tunnels were
to the last
on Iwo Jima
fighting
fields
man and
"to
lasted for almost a
month. In wiping out the Japanese garrison of 23,000 men the Marines and navy suffered 22,000 casualties, all but
Assuming
that the
1,200
among
the Marines.
war would eventually have
to
be carried to Japan
Joint Chiefs of Staff had, since 1943, contemplated a landing in the just
below the Japanese home
island of earlier. It its
terrain
islands.
The most
Okinawa, where Perry had established
logical place for a
The
airfields
Okinawa was
and sheltered from the
sea.
1945, the largest landing
and, on April
1,
invasion of
landing was the
to serve as a
than elsewhere; and
mand
the
Islands,
his coaling station almost a century
was the only one of the Ryukyus large enough was more suitable for
itself,
Ryukyu
armada
major
base;
beaches were wide
assigned to Nimitz's com-
yet seen in the Pacific
converged on the western beaches of the island. Preceded by a of the landing area, advance forces of the United States
its
terrific
War^
bombardment
Tenth Army, commanded
THE OPEN DOOR
285
by General Simon B. Buckner, went ashore. Japanese opposition had been expected to be fierce,
but was very
and was entrenched
was not until after several days that Buckner
light. It
enemy had abandoned
ized the
in the
mountains that ran
These defenses were formidable enough
to
name— the Machinato
130,000
in the Japanese style. Garrisoning the
first-rate troops,
American attack against
tacks
on both
cliffs,
supported with artillery than was usual.
far better
fenses by continued frontal assault or
the Marines suggested.
He
Line, a deep,
and hon-
Machinato Line were
these defenses penetrated the outer line, but
few miles. Buckner had to decide whether to
after a
Okinawa.
straight across the center of
have a
interconnected system of works, making use of sharp ridges and steep
eycombed with caves
real-
the landing area and the northern part of the island,
The
first
bogged down
break the Japanese de-
try to
by attempting another landing behind them
decided to try frontal assault again, with his heaviest
flanks, so as to
prepare the way for a double envelopment. This
as at-
strat-
egy worked, but only after two months of heavy fighting, characterized by artillery
The
duels on a scale not seen before in the Pacific War.
May
3-4 contributed no
and
assault
little to
Buckner's success;
it
Japanese counterattack of
was a
cost the Japanese 5,000 of their best troops.
futile
and unprepared
Buckner did not
live to see
the final success of his campaign; he was killed on June 18th, only two days before
The Okinawa campaign
the collapse of Japanese resistance.
cost the
Tenth Army
40,000 casualties, to 120,000 for the enemy.
With Okinawa,
And
the United States had an advance base for an invasion of Japan.
with the end of the war in Europe, the United States and Britain had almost
limitless resources to use against the Japanese.
the Philippines, islands.
This was
While
their forces
MacArthur and Nimitz planned an invasion to include a landing
were massing
of the enemy's
on the island of Kyushu
in
home
in the fall of 1945,
1946. The home army of two million men, and a long and excampaign was expected. Had American intelligence been better, and
followed by the landing of three armies on
Japanese were hausting
known
to
American statesmanship
Honshu
in the spring of
have a
wiser, the
economic
paralysis that
had gripped Japan might
have been better understood, and the desperate attempts of the Japanese to negotiate a peace
more
seriously considered. In any event, of course, the
gust after the United States had dropped
With
itself,
much
of China,
and the whole region of the western
devastated. Like Europe, the Far East was a
uum
Au-
in
the end of the fighting, not only was Japan's ramshackle empire destroyed,
but Japan
acing in
war ended
atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
its
helplessness as
it
had been
only the power of the United
vacuum
in arms.
There was
hands of the Kuomintang.
And
The
available to
fill
was
men-
this vac-
Union, and the Chinese Com-
States, the Soviet
munists. American and British forces occupied Japan nial lands of southeastern Asia.
Pacific
area in 1945, nearly as
itself
and reoccupied the
colo-
Chinese Communists took China from the feeble
the Russians occupied
Manchuria and the
Kuriles.
Korea, which under the Japanese had been almost as secluded from the world as
when
she was the
Hermit Kingdom, was
arbitrarily
and roughly divided between
Russian and American occupying forces along the 38th Parallel. In sion of an ancient nation between rival powers were
this casual divi-
sown the seeds of
later trouble.
286
City of Garapan, Saipan, after it capture by United States forces July, 1944 (U.S. Army Photo)
Members
of a
United States antistraggler patrol pinned down by sniper July, 1944 {U.S. Army Photo)
fire
on Saipan,
^
^m^. Men
of
Company H,
382th Infantry, picking their way through underbrush south of Yuza, Okinawa, June 1945 (U.S. Army Photo)
*^3^^
Men
of the United States 7th Division head for the 1945. {U.S.
A
Okinawa beaches
in
LVT's, April
1,
Army Photo)
flame-throwing tank, of the 713th Flame-Throwing Tank Battalion, goes into action on Coral Ridge, Okinawa, May, 1945. {U.S. Army Photo)
im^
y
28(
Some
of the
first
army nurses
to arrive
on Okinawa, May, 1945
GIs smoking out Japanese snipers in the bitter Okinawa {U.S. Army Photo)
(U.S.
Army Photo)
fighting, April 19, 1945
i
^§V^'
^-^*^
'.\
290
General of the
Army Douglas
MacArthur
General Joseph
W.
Stillwell
2i
Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz and Major General Sanderford
Jarman
Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner
Korea As
THE PARTITIONED GERMANS AND INDOCHINESE, THE PARTITIONED KOREANS PRO-
DID
duced two mutually by
men who had
paigns, while the South
Korean government was
The world
the United States.
and Americans
sians
The North Korean regime was dominated
hostile governments.
served with the Chinese Communists in the North China cam-
at large
though there
respectively,
with exiles returned from
staffed
regarded both regimes
South Korea possessed a dangerous autonomy. At
as
puppets of the Rus-
evidence that both North and
is
least
it is
certain that neither Ko-
rean group regarded the 38th Parallel as a legitimate boundary, and prising that after years of mutual saber rattling, the
hardly surpar-
had been withdrawn by
this
June, 1950.
allel in
Both the Russian and American occupying time, although the Russians had
the
it is
North Koreans crossed the
done a
forces
equipping and supplying
far better job of
North Koreans than the Americans had done
Korean People's Army began the war with an
The North men and re-
South Koreans.
for the
active force of 100,000
same number. Perhaps 25,000 North Koreans were veterans of the
serves of about the
China and Manchuria. The ten divisions which began the invasion of
fighting in
South Korea were well equipped with Russian small arms and
artillery,
and had
about 100 Russian T-34 tanks; the North Korean Air Force had more than 100
The South Korean Army numbered about
planes.
divisions with
no
reserves,
no
aircraft,
no
tanks,
100,000 men, organized in eight
and no medium or heavy
Four of the eight divisions were busy fighting Communist
artillery.
guerrillas in the interior of
the country.
On June infantry
umns were
to
oppose the invasion.
in their
The
it
These were
had persuaded
The war sive training
to
difficult terrain
than by enemy
June 26th, before the United Nations had taken any
Truman had
reans.
col-
demoralized South Korean troops broke
North Koreans were held back more by bad roads and
States
Other Communist
was already clear that South Korea
engagements, abandoning most of their equipment, and the
first
opposition. Already on
President
North Korean tank and
the South Korean capital, Seoul.
driving deep into the south, and
was helpless
and ran
28th, three days after crossing the parallel, a
column entered
action,
ordered American forces sent to the aid of the South Ko-
become nominally United Nations that organization to endorse
forces after
the United
intervention in Korea.
its
caught American forces in Japan and on Okinawa unprepared. Inten-
had been abandoned, and American troops were
far
from ready
for
combat. Of the four divisions MacArthur had in Japan, plus one regimental combat team on Okinawa, none was at
more than
two-thirds of
its
proper strength, and
were short of armor, ammunition and up-to-date equipment of tion,
because of the speed of the South Korean collapse,
the principle of mass, first
American troops
and commit American sent into the
it
all
kinds.
was necessary
to disregard
forces to the fighting piecemeal.
war were two
rifle
all
In addi-
The
companies and some support-
ing units of the 24th Division, which reached the "front" on July 2nd and were
promptly chewed up by
a
North Korean Division. In
Americans were outflanked and had
a five-hour
to retire in haste,
engagement, the
abandoning most of
their
"7=^
THE KOREAN CONFLICT 1950
-
1951
The Korean
Conflict, 1950-1951
FIELDS OF GLORY
294
equipment. By they attempted
July three understrength American divisions were in Korea;
late
to hold a line along the
first
Kum
River near Taejon, but were flanked
and forced back. By early August, the Americans, with the remnants
of the South
Koreans, had been driven back into the southeastern corner of Korea, in an arc
around the port of Pusan.
now commanding both American and South Ko-
General Walton H. Walker, rean troops, ordered a
stand along a 140-mile perimeter outside Pusan, and,
final
though there were serious gaps in the
North Koreans' supply creasing attack from base, as
equipment began from one
North Koreans
locally,
were beginning battalions
and the
to
planes.
come
to
from the United
in
and keep them
come in— the 2nd
from the United
balance.
off
By moving
States.
Walker was able
Division, the
By
1st
August reinforcements
late
Team
from Hawaii;
from Hong Kong. American military advisers were
were suffering heavy casualties in
forces built
up
The North
local fighting,
their striking po^ver,
best to take the offensive. South
Korea
poor roads and a sketchy railway network. anized American forces and
it
seemed
It
is
also
Kore-
and were begin-
daring,
and turned out
Chiefs of
Staff,
to
MacArthur had
was not
likely that the
at all suited to the highly
to his
problem was simple,
be brilliantly successful. Despite the doubts of the Joint
and against the advice of the navy, he landed an amphibious and on September 29th the amphibious
15th,
Corps under General Edward M. Almond, entered Seoul.
at
first,
The day
force at
This was
United
States
after the land-
He made
little
but when the North Koreans realized they might be enveloped by
Almond's corps they retreated
made
lines.
force, the
ing at Inchon, Walker had launched a general attack in the south.
headway
mech-
North Koreans could hold up
Inchon, below Seoul, more than 200 miles behind the North Korean
on September
to decide
a mountainous, rugged country with
an American advance indefinitely. MacArthur's solution
X
his small
to tire.
As the American
how
to in-
Marine Brigade, and four tank
beginning to restore some order among the South Korean troops.
ning
al-
the
to counterattack the
Regimental Combat
States; the 5th
British 27th Brigade
ans, for their part,
this time,
Pusan was becoming a well-stocked supply
spot to another.
critical
By
the perimeter held.
had grown awkwardly long, and were subjected
lines
American
reserves
line,
hastily.
On
September 26th Walker's Eighth Army
contact with Almond's force, and in the weeks that followed, the bulk of North
Korean
forces
still
With 100,000
south of the 38th Parallel were compelled to surrender. prisoners
and the enemy
in flight before him,
MacArthur chafed
while he waited for Washington's permission to cross the 38th Parallel in pursuit. Despite the strong possibility of Russian and, or, Chinese intervention. President
Truman
authorized American forces to enter North Korea, and early in October,
Walker sent three main columns
across the parallel.
Within three weeks, American
and South Korean troops were nearing the Manchurian border, having advanced 200 miles from the 38th Parallel. In position.
this
advance, they met scarcely any organized op-
Meanwhile, MacArthur had sent Almond's
phibious landing, at
Wonsan and Iwon on
X
Corps
to
make
a second am-
the northeast coast of Korea.
Almond
quickly occupied the industrial area along the coast and headed north toward the Man-
churian border. Between him and Walker's Eighth Army, there were only very light
and
scattered South
Korean
units.
29
Near Inchon, Korea, Marines look over a disabled North Korean T-34 17, 1950. {U.S.
View
Army
of Inchon, Korea, after United States naval
bombardment. September
(U.S. Ar?ny Photo)
\ ^r
tank,
September
Photo) 16,
1950
One
come out of the Korean conflict, this shows has been killed being comforted by another GI. Note the corpsman methodically counting casualty tags in the background. Near Haktong-Ni, of the most striking of all the pictures to
a grief-stricken
GI whose buddy
Korea, August 28, 1950 (U.S.
Army Photo)
I
THE OPEN DOOR On October 3rd forces other than
297 the Chinese
Communist government had warned
any
if
South Koreans crossed into North Korea, Chinese troops would
MacArthur and Walker chose
enter the war.
that
number
ignore the growing
and
to ignore this warning,
also to
The
of Chinese troops encountered after October 25th.
temptation to reach the Yalu River seems to have blinded MacArthur to the dangers facing his troops.
The
become
enemy.
his worst
very confidence that had inspired the Inchon landing had
And Walker
On November
pressing on toward the Yalu.
now
clearly disregarded the principle of security in
8th the Chinese divisions which had
been contesting Walker's advance abruptly broke
off contact. This, instead of
being
taken as an invitation to establish a buffer zone between United Nations forces and the Chinese, seems to have inspired a belief that the Chinese
would not
On November
fight.
Walker launched
front.
Eighth
Army was
a general attack.
in contact
had been
24th, with his forces deployed thinly
The North Korean
bluffing
units with which the
back, but on the next day Chinese forces hit the
fell
Americans with a furious and massive coimterattack.
On
the Eighth Army's right, the
South Koreans melted away under the Chinese attack. Walker called out to straighten the line,
and
on a very wide
his reserves
but the Chinese smashed the reserves, and threatened to en-
velop the remainder of the Eighth Army. Walker had no choice but to retreat in some disorder,
first to
Pyongyang, and then back across the 38th Parallel, burning supplies
he could not take with him. At the 38th Parallel the Chinese broke
Almond,
had been entirely cut
in the meanwhile,
X
the bulk of the
off
Corps was being driven back toward the
off their pursuit.
from Walker's east coast.
forces,
The
1st
and
Marine
Division and two battalions of the 7th Division were encircled near the Changjin
and had
Reservoir,
to fight their
tain disadvantages in the
way out through
successive Chinese roadblocks. Cer-
American dependence on motor transport now began
be
to
The
Chinese, moving rapidly over mountainous terrain and, on occasion,
using cavalry,
demonstrated a mobility which the Americans could not match.
apparent.
Finally, however.
and return
to
Almond was
Pusan
Several conclusions First, in
able to evacuate the bulk of his force from
to join the
must be drawn from the American defeat in North Korea.
disregarding the Chinese threat,
MacArthur undoubtedly
reflected the feel-
ing of most Americans that the United States should not show fear of
China;
if this
was an unwise sentiment President
generally must share the blame for
it
expose them to unnecessary
risks.
The
Truman and
the
a
paramount duty
to his troops not to
hasty advance to the Yalu, without clear in-
telligence of the enemy's strength or intentions, or even his identity, justified.
Communist
American public
with MacArthur and Walker. As a military
commander, however, MacArthur did have
be
Hungnam
Eighth Army.
was too risky
to
In particular, MacArthur's separation of Almond's corps from the Eighth
Army showed poor judgment. At
the
same time,
it
should be pointed out that both
Walker's and Almond's retreats were executed with nerve and
skill.
The army had
been defeated, but not routed.
On December mand
23rd General Walker was killed in a motor accident, and com-
of the Eighth
Army was
given to General Matthew B. Ridgway. Ridgway
about establishing a defense line that might be held just below the 38th
New
Parallel.
Year's Day, 1951, however, the Chinese launched a heavy attack that
could not hold.
The United
set
On
Ridgway
Nations forces were forced to abandon Seoul to the
298
Long Toms
IX Corps, United States Eighth .\nny, in Korea, Xovember, 1951 (U.S. Army Photo)
of Battery B, 937th Field Artillery,
action near
Munema,
Corporal Sella Vitalicio of the 65th Infantry guards a pass about 12 miles north of Hamhung, Korea, with a 75-mm. recoilless rifle, December 12, 1950. {U.S. Army Photo)
300
Wounded men
X
Corps, being evacuated by heliof the Raiders, Special Activity Group, copter near Yechon, Korea, January, 1951 {U.S. Army Photo)
Thanksgiving dinner on the Yalu River. Men of the United States 7th Division get turkey with all the trimmings on November 23, 1950. They moved out soon afterward. {U.S.
"^
Army
Photo)
I
The Lone
Star in Korea. Loyal
Texans {U.S.
Men of
the
fly
their
banner on the front
lines,
January 1952.
Army Photo)
2nd Division on patrol duty near Kumgangsan, Korea, January, 1952 (U.S.
Army Photo)
^^
«^,
302
•
"Big Bruiser"
The gun
is
firing in
a
f*'
support of the 9th Infantry, 2nd Division, Korea, January, 1952. of Battery B, 937th Field Artillery. {U.S. Army Photo)
Long Tom,
303
T-66 multiple rocket launchers of 2nd United States Field Artillery firing a salvo at Communist positions, November, 1952 (U.S. Army Photo)
304
Korea, 1952-1953
30
\
A United
.
States front-line trench west of
i
\T'
Chorwan. Korea, January 1952 (U.S. Army Photo)
FIELDS OF GLORY
306
enemy and withdraw Ridgway
up
built
about
to positions
miles below the 38th Parallel. Here
fifty
began a methodical advance,
his strength and, in late January,
ridge by ridge, using superior firepower to blast the Chinese and North Koreans from
By
their positions.
Han
the
running roughly along the 38th General MacArthur of
had regained the south bank of the
of March, Ridg^vay
first
March had recaptured Seoul and
River, and by the middle of
Parallel.
command
On
April 11th President
established a line
Truman
and named Ridgway
in the Far East,
commander
sor:
General James A. Van Fleet replaced Ridgway
On
April 22nd the Chinese began a major counteroffensive; the Eighth
ground slowly and, when the Chinese June,
Van
had regained and
Fleet
began
offensive
slightly
as
relieved
as his succes-
of the Eighth
Army.
Army
gave
By
to flag, counterattacked.
improved the position Ridgway had held in
March. This strange war, which had begun with violent movement across hundreds of miles, was settling
were counted in
On June eral
down
to a
war of entrenchment and
the Eighth
1st
Army was
advance beyond the 38th
Parallel,
after the failure of their spring offensive,
for both sides the
gan
and toward
^vas assigned the
at
tiations
late in
were disinclined
major objective of the war began
were resumed,
this
time
to drag on, with interruptions, for nearly
two
ued, oddly and severely limited, almost as
became increasingly an unreal war for the
men who
for the
in a
if
instead of the 38th Parallel, the
it
as they
Chinese,
and
military vic-
These were broken
off
by the
was resumed. In October, nego-
During
These were
time the war contin-
this
was being fought in an arena.
at large,
little
Ridge. Finally,
sullen truce which restored things
move away from
a village near Kaesong.
years.
world
fought and died in furious
Hook, or the T-Bone, or Heartbreak
lines.
local, fighting
Panmunjom,
at
to
The
to try a general attack,
July negotiations for an armistice be-
a political settlement. Early in
August, and sharp, but
job of keeping contact
forces off balance.
his
Kaesong, in the no-man's land between the
Chinese
which gains
forbidden by \Vashington to attempt any gen-
and
with the enemy, harassing him, and keeping
tory
attrition, in
yards.
It
while remaining real enough
battles
on July
on Sniper Ridge, or the 27, 1953, hostilities
ended
had been before June, 1950, except that
boundary between North and South Korea became
ground between the Communist and United Nations forces. the Korean War to the United States was 34,000 men killed and 103,000
the scourged and bloody
The cost of men wounded, fitting,
and
as well as
that could not be
victory,
an incalculable cost in self-esteem.
It
is
perhaps not un-
however, to end a sur\'ey of American wars with a war that was not
won. For
but of endurance.
if
there
is
any glory in war,
it is
lost
not the glory of
"People are no
damn
ginia, speculates
good!" Pfc. Preston L. McKnight, on war near Yoju, Korea, January
of
New Cumberland, West Army Photo)
10, 1951. (U.S.
Vir-
Index
4
Page numbers
in italics refer to illustrations.
Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., 53, 61, 62, 148
A
Bee, Bernard E., 148
Belgium Abenakis Indians, 89
World War I, 198 World War II, 216 Belleau Wood, battle
Abolitionists, 54
Adams, John, 22 Aggression in Pacific, 262 Alamo, Siege Albany, N.
of, 48,
Y.,
of, 202 Bennington, Vt., 24 Benteen, Capt. Frederick W., 105 Big Foot, Chief, 124
50
14
Big Hole Basin, battle
Aguinaldo, Emilio, 245, 249 Algonquin Indians, 86, 88 Almond, Gen. Edward M., 294
Blackfeet Indians, 95 Black Hawk, Chief, 92, Black Hawk War, 98
Alsace, France, 197
American Expeditionary Force, 191 American Fur Company, 98 Amphibious Invasion, Mexican War, 144 •
Blake, Lt. J.
Blitzkrieg, 216
Andros, Gov. Sir Edmund, 13
Bloody Lane,
95, 97,
101,
Edmund, 50
Boone, Daniel, 91 Boston, Mass., 16 Boston Massacre, 19
104, 118, 131
Huts, 132
Bougainville, 275 Bouquet, Col. Henry, Bowie, James, 48
Bows and Arrows,
Scouts, 133
Arapaho Indians,
95, 97,
10
68, 74 Bolshevik prisoners, 213
13
Antiaircraft in N. Africa, 219 Anti-Comintern Pact, 215 Antietam, battle of, 63, 74 Anzio Beachhead, 224
Apache Indians,
1
Black Hills expedition, 113
Anarchist, 215
S.,
93,
Bladensburg, Md., 42
Anarcho-syndicalist, 215
Annapolis, U.
115
of,
218
Bizerte, Tunisia,
86,
89
14,
94
Bra, Belgium, 234
100
Braddock, Gen. Edward, Bradley, Gen. Omar, 232
Ardennes, France, 231, 233 offensive, 205 Arista, Gen. Mariano, 141
Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 61, 69, 148
Armored railroad cars, Cuba campaign, 171 Arnold, Gen. Benedict, 22, 25
British Expeditionary Force, British Forces Revolution
Argonne
Army of the Cumberland, the, 61 Army of Missouri, the, 61 Army of New Mexico, the, 61 Army of Northern Virginia, the, 61, 62, 68, Army of the Ohio, the, 61 Army of the Potomac, the, 55, 62, 69, 71 Army of Tennessee, the, 61 Army of the Trans-Mississippi, 61 Atkins,
John Black, 157
Atlanta, battle of, 80, 64
Battle Fleet,
flags, 34,
89
35
28
Landing 71
14,
in
New Jersey,
27
Sea power, 16
Indian Wars,
89, 91
Bozeman Trail, 97 Brandy Station, Va., 79 Brandywine, Va., 24 Breed's Hill, 17 Brodie, Maj., 161
Brooklyn Heights, N. Y., 22 Brown, Chaplain, 161 Brown, Gen. Jacob, 36, 40
Atom Bomb, 285 Attu, Aleutians, 274 Austin, Stephen F., 48
Bryan, William Jennings, 157
Axis Powers, 217
Buell, Gen. Carlos, 61, 69
B Bad Axe,
battle of,
98
Badonville, France, 192
Baker,
Newton
D., 176
Barbed-wire, Cuba, 170
Bastogne, Belgium, 231
Bam Bam,
P.
I.,
Bataan, P.
I.,
264, 267
251
Battleof Britain, 216 Battle of the Fallen Timbers, 33 Battle flags, 34, 35
Buena
Vista, battle of, 144
Buckner, Gen. Simon Buffalo Country, 95
285
B.,
Bull Run, battle of, 62, 73 Bunker Hill, battle of, 17, 26
Bureau, Indian, 104, 118, 124
Burgoyne, Sir John, 24 Burnside, Gen. Ambrose
E.,
Burnside's Bridge, 75
Bushy Run,
battle at, 14, 89
Butler, John, 91
Boxer (Chinese), 257 Boxer Rebellion, 250, 258
68
W. W.
I,
186
INDEX
310 Corregidor, P.
I.,
265, 266
Cornwallis, Gen. Charles, 25, 28, 31
Canby, E. R.
S.,
Crane, Stephen, 157
61
Crawford, Col. William, 91
Cannon
Crazy Horse, Chief, 105, 110 Creek Indians, 86, 92, 93 Crockett, Davy, 48, 51
Confederate, 59
Cuba, 171 Indian Wars, 127 Fort Sumter, 56 Caporetto, battle
Crook, Gen. George, 101, 104, 105, 106, 118, 133
Crow Crow
195
of,
Carbine, 95
Indians, 115
King, 123
Carleton, Gen. Guy, 22
Cuba, 156-174 Currier and Ives, 73
Carranza, Venustiano, 176, 178, 180
Curtis, S. R., 61
Cartagena,
Custer, George A., 105, 120
Carentan, France, 230
S.
A., 13
Czechoslovakia, 215
Casablanca Conference, 227 Cassino, Italy, 224, 226
Casualties (Pacific), 270 Catlin, George, 94
Cavalry, U.
S.,
102, 156, 158, 162, 176, 180, 194
Cerro Gordo, battle
of, 148, 150,
153
R., 163,
259
De
Tso-lin, 261
Chapultepec, Mexico, 149, 150, 152, 153 (S.
C), 59
Chato, Chief, 118, 124
Chemin
des Dames, France, 188
Cherokee Indians,
86,
92
Gaulle, General, 229
Cheyenne Indians, 95, Cheyenne River, 119
97, 100, 104, 105, 110
Dinwiddle, William, 157 Dodge, Colonel, 95 Dominion of New England, 13
Amos, 20
Dorchester Heights, 17 Draft, Civil
Chickamauga, battle of, 71, 79 Chickasaw Indians, 86, 92 Chief Joseph (Metacomet), 110, 115, 129
Chiricahua Indians, 124 battle of, 37, 41
89
86,
Devereux, Maj. James, 263 Dewey, Commodore George, 245
Doolittle,
Cherry Valley massacre, 91
Chippewa River,
265
at Bataan,
Delaware Indians,
Chappel, Alonzo, 40 Charleston
Death March
Deerfield, massacre of, 89
Changjin, Korea, 297
Chang
41
Dearborn, Gen. Henry, 37
Central Powers, 186
Adna
C,
Davis, Jefferson, 55, 144 Davis, Richard Harding, 157
Cervera, Admiral, 156
Chaffee, Gen.
Dann, Maj. George, 161 Dailey, F. O.
Central theater in Civil War, 55
War, 55
Dragoons, United
States, 127
Drill tactics. Rev., 23
Durham
Station, N.
C, 80
Dutch East India Company, 244 Dynamite Gun, 172
Chinese Revolution, 256
China Trade, 244 Choctaw Indians, 86, 92 Chorwan, Korea, 306 Churchill, Sir Winston, 216, 217, 238 Churubusco, battle of, 149, 153 Civil War, American, 54-83 Clinton, Gen. Henry, 25, 28
£ Eastern tlieater in Civil War, 55; (Map), 60 Eichelberger, Gen. Robert L., 272
Eighth Army, British, 216, 220 Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 222-223 El Alamein, battle
of,
216
El Caney, Cuba, 163, 168, 169
Cochise, Chief, 132
Eleventh Cavalry, U.
Cold Harbor, battle of, 71 Colonia Dublan, Mexico, 179
Elkhorn Tavern, Ark., 81
S. A.,
Esne, France, 201
Colt, Samuel, 95
Espionage, German, 227
Comanche Combined
Indians, 94-97, 99
Ethiopia, 214
Chiefs of
Europe, invasion
Staff,
Commissioner of Indian
Communism,
227
Affairs, 104
214, 215, 256
Concepts of Warfare, 23
Concord
180
of,
229
Everglades, Florida, 93 Everett, Lt.
Edward, 50
Ewell, Gen. Richard
S.,
127, 148
(battle of), 20, 17
Confederate Forces, Continental Army,
54, 78 16,
32
Continental Congress, 25, 33
Fascist Party, 214, 215
Coral Sea, battle
Fallen Timbers, battle
of,
268
of,
91
311 Far East, 244-307
Catling Gun, 172
Fettemian's Massacre, 97
German
Filipino Insurrectionists, 245
Germantown,
Filipino Prisoners, 255
Geronimo, Chief, 110, 118, 130, 134-136 Ghost Dance, 124 Gibbon, Col. John, 104, 105, 115
Fillmore, Millard, 244
AEF, 194
First Division,
Five Nations, The, 91 First
U.
First Cavalry,
Global War, 227
A., 162
S.
U.
battle of, 25, 27
Gila River, Arizona, 135
Aero Squadron, 178
First Cavalry,
Mercenaries, 22
Godfrey, John, 26
Volunteer, 157, 158, 162,
S.
168, 169
Gold mines, 97 Goliad, Texas, 48
Flanders sector, 198
Cough, Gen. Hubert, 198
Fort Apache, Arizona, 102
Grant, Gen. U.
Fort Bowie, 137
S.,
53, 61, 69, 71, 80,
148, 154,
156
Forts, colonial, 88
Grasse,
Fort Duquesne, 14
Graves of Custer's Massacre, 122
Admiral
de, 28
Fort Erie, 37
Great Wall of China, 256, 260
Fort Fetterman, 104
Greene, Gen. Nathanael, 25, 28
Forts, French-Indian, 89
Grierson, Gen. Benj. H., 61
Fort George, 40
Guadalcanal, battle
Fort Hell (Petersburg), 65
Guam,
Fort Kcogh, Montana, 107
Guerrilla Warfare, Continental Army, 23-25
Fort
McHenry, 42
of, 269,
271, 274
Island, 245
Gulf of
St.
Lawrence, 13
Fort Necessity, 13
H
Fort Phil Kearney, 97 Fort
Pitt, 33,
89
Haig, Field Marshal Douglas, 199
Fort Robinson, Nebraska, 108
Henry W., 61, 148 Adm. William F., 277 Hamhung, Korea, 299 Halleck, Gen.
Fort San Carlos, Arizona, 109
Halsey,
Fort Sumter, 54, 56
Fort Ticonderoga,
24
17,
Hamilton, Alexander, 28
Fort Union, 98
Fourteenth Infantry, U.
Harmonville, France, 189 S. A.,
Fortifications, field. Civil
256
Harpers Ferry, Va., 68
War
Harrison, Gen.
Atlanta, Ga., 64, 67
Vicksburg, Miss., 66 Forbes, Edwin, 79 Forbes, Brig. Gen. John, 14
Gen. Nathan
Herkimer, Gen. Nicholas, 24 Henderson Field, 269
Hidden Wood Creek, 113
B., 61
Hill,
Fourteen Points, The, 209
Hiroshima, Japan, 285
W. W. I, 186 W. W. II, 214
Hitler, Adolf, 214, 215, 216, 227, 237, 262
Homesteaders, 95
Franco, Francisco, 215
W.
B.,
Hood, Gen. John
148
Fredericksburg, Va., battle
of, 67,
69
French, colonial, 86, 88, 89, 91
Army
World War I, 186 World War II, 216 French and Indian War, 13,
B., 61,
Hooker, Gen. Joseph, 63 Houston, Sam, 48, 49, 52 Howard, Gen. Oliver O.,
80
110, 115, 118
Howe, Sir William, 16-25 Hudson Valley, N. Y., 22
American Revolution, 28
Fur trade,
63, 68, 148
Hindenburg, Marshal Paul von, 195
France
French
Gen. D. H.,
Hindenburg Line, 188
Fox Indians, 92
Franklin, Gen.
H., 33, 37, 92
Heartbreak Ridge, Korea, 306
Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 199, 209
Forrest,
Wm.
Hawaiian Islands, 245 Hearst, William Randolph, 156
Petersburg, Va., 65
Huerta, Victoriano, 176 Hutier, Gen. von, 198 13, 16,
88
95
Inchon, Korea, 295
Gabes, Tunisia, 219
Indian Bureau, 104, 118, 124 Indian raids, colonial, 14
Garcia, Gen. Calixto, 156, 166
Indian Scouts in Mexico with Gen. Pershing,
Gas Attack, 204, 207 Gates, Gen. Horatio,
Indian Territory, 118
183 24, 28
312
INDEX
Indian Warfare, 86 Imperial German Navy, 186 Invasion of Canada, 36
Lee, Gen. Robert 76, 148
Legion of the United States, Lexington, battle of, 20, 17
Iroquois Confederacy, 86, 88 Italy, attack on,
Italian front,
Iwo Jima,
E., 53, 61, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71,
222
Leyte Gulf, landing
W. W.
203
I,
at,
33, 91
277
Linares, Gen. Arsenio, 160
battle of, 284
Lincoln, Abraham, 54, 69, 71, 80 Lincoln, Gen. Benj., 25 Little Big
J
Horn,
105, 122
Little Entente, 215
Jackson, Andrew, 42, 86
Jackson, Gen. Thos.
Round Top, 78 Locarno Agreements, 210 Little
53, 62, 68, 69, 148
J.,
Jalapa, Mexico, 149
Logistics
Jamestown Settlement,
12
American Revolution, 23-28
Japan, 215, 217, 244, 262-285 Japanese closed door, 244 Jefferson, Joffre,
Ci\il W^ar, 55
Mexican War, 140 Mexican Punitive, 179
Thomas, 92
Marshal Joseph, 188
Spanish-.American, 157-160
"Johnny Bull and the Alexandrians," 46 Johnston, Gen. Albert
Johnston, Gen. Joseph
S.,
61
E., 61, 62, 71, 77, 80,
148
World War I, 187, 191, 194 World War II, 220 Long Island, battle of, 26 Longstreet, Gen. James, 63
"Long Tom," 302 Lookout Mountain,
battle of, 71
Kaesong, Korea, 306
Louisburg, Canada, 13
Kai-shek, Gen. Chiang, 268
Low
Kaiser Wilhelm, 195
Dog, 123
Loyalists, continental, 28
Kasserine Pass, Africa, 218, 220-235
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 210
Ludendorff, Gen. Erich, 195, 198, 199 Luftwaffe, 214
Kentucky Militia, 91 Kennesaw Mountain,
Lundy's Lane, battle
of,
King, Gen.
Edward
P.,
Adm. Thos. C, 277
Kiowa Indians, 100 Klamath Indians, 101 Knox, Grig. Gen. Henry, 17 Korea, Hermit Kingdom, 244 Korean Fort, 19,11,243 Korean War, 292-305 Krag-Jorgensen
rifle,
M
265
King George's War, 13, 89 King Philip (Metacomet). 12, 87 King Philip's War, 12, 88 King William's War, 13, 88 Kinkaid,
37
battle of, 77, 80
Kenney, Gen. George C, 273 Kesselring, Marshal Albert, 222
157
Krueger, Gen. Walter, 277
Madero, Francisco, 176 Macdonough, Thomas, 42 MacArthur, Gen. Arthur, 250 MacArdiur, Gen. Douglas, 264, 268, 272, 273, 277, 282, 284, 292, 294, 297
Mackenzie, Col. Ronald
Maginot Line, 216 Magruder, John B., Maine, V.S.S.. 156 Malabon, P. I., 254 Malolos, P.
I.,
S.,
110
61, 148
246, 248, 250
Manassas, second battle
of,
73
Kumgangsan, Korea, 301 Kuomintang, 285
Manassas Junction, Va., 62 Manchuria, attack by Japanese, 262 Manilla Bay, 245
Kurita, Admiral, 282
Manilla, P.
Kwajalein, 271
I.,
252, 254
Mankato, Minnesou, 112 Marion, Francis, 28, 30 Marines, U.
S.
Casualties, 279
Marquis de, 28 Lake Champlain, 37 Lane, Fitz Hugh, 47 Las Guasimas, Cuba, 160 Lafayette,
Latour, Major, 44
Lawton, Gen. Henry W., 163 League of Nations, 210-214 Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, 160
In Korea. 1871, 244 Pacific Theater, 263-285
Marne, battle
of,
199
Marshall, Gen. George
C, 203
Matamoros, occupation of, 141 Maxey, Samuel B., 61 McClellan, Gen. George B., 53, McKinley, Pres. William, 156
62, 63, 68, 148
INDEX
313
Meade, Gen. George
G., 61, 69, 71
Mein Kampf. 2\4 Merritt, Gen. Wesley, 245
"Message
to Garcia," 157
Metacomet (King Philip), 12, 87 Meuse-Argonne offensive, 203 Mexican Anny, 48, 101 Mexican Punitive Expedition, 176-182 Mexican troops, 183 Mexican War, 95, 140-154 Mexico City, 155
Miami
Indians, 91, 105
Midway,
Noemfoor
Island, East Indies, 275
Norsemen, 86 North Africa, attack of, 216, 220 North Korea, 292 North Russian Expedition, 213
O Ohio, campaigns
Trading
in,
OjosAzules, battle
Okinawa
Omaha Omaha
Militia, 91
Osceola, Chief, 93
Militiamen (colonial),
Minutemen,
46
12, 17, 28,
17
Missionary Ridge, battle
of, 71
Modoc War, 101 Mohawk Valley, 24 Mohegan Indians, 87 Monroe Doctrine, 154 Morgan, Daniel, Morristown, N.
Morro
Palo Alto, battle
Cuba, 160
Castle,
Pawnee
146
Montgomery, Gen. Bernard, 220 Montgomery, Gen. Richard, 22 Munda Point, New Georgia, 270 Munema, Korea, 298 Munitions Board, 194 of,
81
Pedee River
219, 222, 232
C), 30
(S.
Pedernals, battle
of,
95
Peking, China, 250, 258
Pemberton, Gen. John C,
69, 71
Pepperell, William, 13
Pequot War, 86, 87 Perry, Admiral Oliver Hazard, 37
Murmansk-.Archangel Region, 211
Perry,
Muskets, 86
Pershing, Gen.
Muskhogean
S.,
Indians, 95
Pea Ridge, Arkansas, battle of, 81 Pearl Harbor, attack of, 217, 263
of, 141, 144,
Murfreesboro, battle
143
of,
Patton, Lt. Gen. George
Monongahela, battle of, 14 Montcalm, General, 14 Montreal, Canada, 22 Monterrey, attack
Gen. Elwell S., 245 Ottawa Indians, 89 Ozawa, Admiral, 282 Otis,
Paiute Indians, 95, 124
23
J.,
Indians, 95
Beach, 226
Padenga River, Russia, 212
28
25,
180
of,
Island, 285, 288
Miles, Col. Nelson A., 110, 115, 158
battle of, 268
33
Posts, 89
Commodore Matthew C,
Indians, 86
John
243, 244
176, 177, 178, 180, 181,
J.,
182, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 198,
Mussolini, Benito, 214, 215, 222
249
199, 202, 203, 208,
P^tain, Gen. Henri Philippe, 190
N
Petersburg, Siege of, 71
Philadelphia, Pa., 25
Nagasaki, Japan, 285
Philippine Islands, 245
Narragansett Indians, 86, 87
Phips, Sir William, 13
National Army, 55
Pickett's Charge, 78, 80
National Defense Act, 1916, 187
Pierce, Pres. Franklin, 149
National Emergency Act, 217
Pillow,
National Guard, U.
Pine Ridge, South Dakota, 114, 126
S. A.,
187
Gideon
149
J.,
National Socialist party, 214
Plains Indians, 94
Nazi prisoners, 234
Plant,
Navy, United States
Plattsburg military training camps, 187
Morton
Spanish-American War, 156, 160
Poland, 215
World War
Polk, Pres.
II,
217-263
James
158
K., 140
Ponce, Puerto Rico, 175
Negroes, 93
Negro Infantry, W. W.
I,
Pontiac's Rebellion, 88, 89
193
Pope, Gen. John, 62 Port Royal, Nova Scotia, 13
New England Confederation, 87 New Orleans, battle of, 44, 45 Nez Perc6 Indians,
95,
Niagara, battle
41
of,
1
10,
1
15,
1
18
Potter, Capt. R. M., 50
Potomac, -Army
of,
75
Powell, Capt. James W., 100
Niagara Frontier, 36 Nihilist,
F.,
Prescott, Col. William, 17
215
Nimitz,
Adm. Chester W.,
Nivelle,
Gen. Robert Georges, 188
268, 273
Presidio of San Francisco, 96
Presque
Isle,
attack
at,
88
314
INDEX
Princeton, N.
J., 23 Pusan, Korea, 294
Sampson, Admiral William T., 160 San Carlos Agency, 133 San Fernando, P. I., 253 San Jacinto, battle of, 48 San Juan Hill, Cuba, 163, 167
Pyongyang, Korea, 297
Santa Ana, P. I., 255 Santa Anna, Gen. Antonio Lopez de, 48 141,144,145 Santa Clara Battery, Vedado, 170 Santiago de Cuba, 160, 173
Quebec, Canada, 13-15 Queen Anne's War, 13, 89 Quitman, John H., 149
140
Saratoga, battle of, 14, 25 Schlieff^en,
Scott,
Rangers
36, 40, 53, 92, 144-149
Selassie,
159
Emperor
Haile, 214
Rebels, Cuban, 156
Selective Service Act, 217
Red Cloud,
Seminole War, 93, 99 Seven Days, battle of, 62 Seven Years' War, 13
Chief,
Reilley's Battery,
1
;;/
10,
259
Reindeer Team, 27/ Remington, Frederick, 119 Reno, Maj. Marcus, 105 Resaca de
la
Revolution,
Palma, battle
Seventh U.
J.,
Gen.
Shafter,
16-35
104
Shelby, Jo, 61
Richardson, Brig. Gen. Israel Richmond, Va., S3 B.,
Shelton, B.,
63
H., 59
Sherman, Gen. Wm. T., 61, 71, 80, Shimoda, Japan, 243 Sioux, Execution of the, 1 12 Sioux Indians, 92, 95, 97, 104, 105,
297
Long, 94
Rifles,
W.
Sheridan, Gen. Phil H., 61, 100, 105
Riflemen, Revolution, 34 War of 1812,^6
Riga
Sitting Bull, Chief,
offensive, 195
1
10,
Ringgold's Battery, 142
Siegfried Line, 216
Rio Grande River, 1 76
Siboney, Cuba, 160 Sixteenth Infantry, U. Slavery, 54
Roanoke
Settlement, 86
Rocket Launchers, 303
162, 168
Smoke 169
Root, Elihu, 182
Rowan,
Riders, U. Lt.
S.,
Andrew
S.,
61,
69
157, 158, 162, 167, 168, 169
S.,
194
Edmund Kirby, 61, 80 Smith, Gen. Persifor, 149
174
Rough
S. A..
Smith,
216, 220, 229
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 217, 238, 262 Roosevelt, Theodore, 157, 160, 161,
Rosecrans, Gen. William
121, 124
Slim Buttes, Dakota, 126
Rodgers, .\dm. John, 244
Rommel, Marshal Envin,
158, 160, 162
168, 174, 187 Shanghai, China, 261 Sharpsburg, battle of, 63, 68, 74 Shawnee Indians, 92
Sir Phineas, 37
Ridgway, Gen. Matthew
Cavalry, 105, 118, 124
Seymour, Maj. T. H., 153 Gen. Wm. R., 157,
of, J-f3
The American,
Revolver, Colt, 95 Rey, Gen. Vara del, 168 Reynolds, Col. Joseph
S.
Seyberts Fort, 90
Revere, Paul, 19
Riall,
152-
Scouts, Indian, 101, 133 Secret Agents, U. S., 157
Indian Wars, 88,91,95 Texas, 95
W. C.
.Alfred von, 195
154, 157, 160, 187
colonial, 14
Read,
Count
Gen. Winfield,
157
Royal Flying Corps, 199 Royalist, 215
Rundstedt, Marshal Gerd von, 233 Russia. 213, 215, 220, 227, 229, 262, 285, 292
Screen, 193
Sonime offensive, 188 South Korea, 292 Southeast Asia
Command, 268
Soviet Union, 285
Spanish-American War, 156 Spanish Civil War, 214 Spanish colonial wars, 13 Spanish Navy, 160 Spotsylvania, battle of, 71 Springfield rifle, 157
Gen. Arthur, 91 Leger, Col. Barry, 24 Stalin, Marshal, 215, 238
St. Clair, St.
Sac Indians, 92 Saipan, 27 S, 280, 281, 286 Saint-Lo, France, 230, 235 Saint-Mihiel, France, 196, 198, 203
Staten Island, N. Y., 22 Stilwell,
Gen. Joseph, 268
Stirling,
General, 26
Stuart,
Gen. "Jeb," 61
118, 148
110, 124
163
INDEX Sturgis,
S.
315 United Nations, 292 Ute Indians, 95
D., 61
Sullivan, Gen. John, 91
Supply
train. Valley Forge,
11
Sutlers Fort, Calif., 96
Valley Forge, Pa., 25
Winter Camp, 32 Cannon from, 33 Van Fleet, Gen. James
Tactics, Indian war, 86
Tampa,
Tank
Florida, 158, 161
attack, 196,
200
Taylor, Gen. Zachary, 93, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146
Tecumseh, Chief, 33 Teheran conference, 227
Verdun, France, 195 Vicksburg, battle
of, 66,
69
Victorio, Chief, 118
158, 162, 176, 180
Villa, Francisco, 176, 178, 180
Villa of Brule, 103
Territory, Indian, 92
Terry, Gen. Alfred H.. 104, 106
Virginia, campaigns (Rev.), 28
Virginia colony massacre, 86
Texas, Republic of
War
306
Veracruz, attack of, 144, 141
Taylor, Gen. Richard, 61,71
Tenth Cavalry (NegTo),
A.,
Varennes-en-Argonne, 201
Tarleton, Sir Banastre, 28
Virginia Military Institute, 55
for Independence, 48
Virginius
Convention, 48
affair, the,
156
Vladivostok, occupation
Capital, 52
of, 256,
260
Volunteers, Revolution, 17
Texas Rangers, 95
Civil
Texans, 95
Thames, battle of the, 38 Third Division, U. S. A., 199, 202 Thirteenth Cavalry, U.
S. A.,
War, 54
Von Steuben,
Baron, 23, 32
W
180
Thirty-eighth Parallel, Korea, 292
Thomas, Gen. George H., 61 Tien Tsin, China, 250, 25S, 261 Ticonderoga, battle
Tippecanoe, battle
of,
92
Tompkins, Maj. Frank, 180 Toral, Gen. Jos6, 174
fight, the,
100
Wainwright, Gen. Jonathan, 264
Wake
37
of, 33,
Wagon Box
Island, attack of, 263
Waldenburg, Germany, 239 Walker, Gen. Walton, 294
Wampanoags
Tribe, 16
Tories, 16, 24
War of
Toyoda, Admiral, 277 Tower, Zealous B., 148
Trade Muskets, 86
Washington, burning of, 43 Washington, Gen. George, 13, Washington on tlie Brazos, 48
Trans-Siberian Railroad, 256
Washington Volunteers, 246
1812,36-42,95
Travis, Col. William B., 48, 51
Watie, Stand, 61
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 195 Treaty at Ghent, 42
Wand,
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 153 Treaty with Spain, 1898, 174 Treaty of Versailles, 209
Trench warfare Civil War, 76 World War 1,
16-28, 33
A. R., 67, 73
Wayne, Gen. Anthony, 25, 91 Weapons, Cavalry, 94, 95 Weapons, Indian, 86, 94 Wehrmacht, the, 215 Western theater in Civil War,
61
(Map), 70 191, 204, 206
West Point Military Academy,
Trist, Nicholas, 149
Wheeler, Gen. Joseph,
Truman, Harry
Truscott, Gen. Lucien K., 232 Twenty-seventh Infantry, 101
Western Army, the, 61 Western front. World War Whigs, 25
Twiggs, David
White hunters, 104
S.,
E.,
292
149
Whiteside, Maj.
U
Whitney,
Lt.
S.
U-Boats, 186
Union Army
140
I,
187
M., 124
Henry
Wilderness, battle
33, 42, 54,
61, 160, 161, 162, 163, 169
H., 157
of, 71
Wilkinson, Maj. Gen. James, 36 Wilson, Gen. James, 61
Array of the Potomac, 15, 82
Wilson, Pres. Woodrow, 176, 186, 191, 209
Battle scenes, 51, 58, 59
Winslow, Josiah, 87 Wolfe, Gen. James, 14
Indian Wars, 99, 101 Prison Camp, 12
Wood,
Col. Leonard, 157, 160, 161, 162
316 Wool, Gen. John
E., 141, 144,
Wounded Knee massacre, World War I, 186-213 World War I Poster, 1S9 World War II
149
127
In Europe, 214-239 In the Pacific, 262-307
Worth, William
J.,
149
Yalu River, Korea, 300 Yechon, Korea, SOO
Yedo Bay, Japan, 244 Ypres, battle of, 190
Yoju, Korea, 307 Yorktown, Va. Battle of, 17
Campaign, 28 Yuza, Okinawa, 287
Yamashita, Gen. Tomoyuki, 264 Yamassee Indians, 86
Zimmerman
Yalta Conference, 238
Zouaves, U.
Note, 186 S.,
58
I
I
I
I
1
1089
About
the AntJu
WILLIAM in
NEL^oN
H.
He
Omalia, Nebraska.
Ph.D.
received his
University, and
Cohimbia
at
was born
has taught at the University of To-
ronto and
at
Dr. Nelson
is
New
York University.
cuiTently Associate Pro-
fessor of History at
Rice Institute in
Houston, Texas.
FRANK E. VANDIVER received his Ph.D.
at
Tulane University. He has
been the recipient of two Rockefeller
Foundation Fellowships and
genheim Fellowship. ciate Editor of
A
a
Gug-
former Asso-
The Journal
ern History, Dr. Vandiver
is
of South-
Professor
of History at Rice Institute.
Jacket by Gilbert Riswold
E.P.
DUTTOf
300 PARK AVE. SO'
/-a // JLJ
& COMPANY NEW YORK
10,
N. Y.
— - —
(Continued from front
flap)
A. H'E next section, "The Trail of Tears," deals with the Indian wars and contains fascinating, little-known facts abont Indian fighting techniques
and about American frontiersmen ers.
Here
a
is
as
Indian
fight-
sweeping survey of the wars the
American army fought with the Seminoles, the Commanches, the Apaches, the Cheyennes and the
including Custer's famous stand
Sioux,
Little
at
Big Horn.
The Mexican War,
War
the Spanish-American
and the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916-17 are fidly described called
"The
in the section
Halls of Montezimia." These wars,
bloody and wasteful
how much
and analyzed
as they were,
preparation
War
Spanish-American
its
army
taught America
still
The
needed.
was a war for newsmen,
military shambles in which our troops were
pered by poisoned food, lack of iniiforms and arms.
sufficient
The Mexican
in-
Punitive Expedi-
by Pershing, was significant
tion, led
a
ham-
as the
modern campaign, in which radios, trucks, and machine gun units were used. first
army's planes,
"The Yanks Are Coming," which
brilliantly de-
scribes the trench warfare of W^orld
War
Em^opean theatre
of the
I
and the
Second World War,
also
includes background material on the rise of Hitler
and Mussolini.
The
final section of Fields of
Glory traces the
tory of America's military activities in
East"
— Rodgers in
his-
"The Far
Korea in 1871; Dewey
in
Ma-
annexation of the Philippines; the Boxer
nila; the
Rebellion; Japan's aggression in the Pacific: the
bombing
nese victories; detail to
rama it
of
Harbor and subsequent Japathe Korean War all are covered in
of Pearl
round out
—
this
unique and
stirring pano-
American land warfare and the
has nlaved in our inilitnrv historv
vital part
