French Flanders - The Battle of Neuve Chapelle (Battleground Europe)

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First published in 2000 and reprinted in 2009 by LEO COOPER an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Limited 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire S70 2AS Copyright © Geoffrey Bridger, 2000, 2009 9781783409884 A CIP catalogue of this book is available from the British Library Printed by Redwood Books Limited Trowbridge, Wiltshire For up-to-date information on other titles produced under the Leo Cooper imprint, please telephone or write to: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, FREEPOST, 47 Church Street Barnsley, South Yorkshire S70 2AS Telephone 01226 734222

Table of Contents

Title Page Copyright Page SERIES EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter One - THE PLAN Early Stages Chapter Two - THE CAPTURE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE 10 March 1915 Chapter Three - THE FIGHTING CONTINUES Chapter Four - IMPASSE 11th March Chapter Five - COUNTER ATTACK 12th March Chapter Six - THE AFTERMATH Chapter Seven - VISITING THE BATTLEFIELDS A brief guide to travellers APPENDIX 1 - GLOSSARY OF TERMS APPENDIX 2 - Simplified British Order of Battle for Neuve Chapelle March 1915. [Infantry Only] 1 APPENDIX 3 - Simplified German Order of Battle for Neuve Chapelle March 1915. [Infantry Only] 1 APPENDIX 4 - Simplified Order of Battle - Royal Flying Corps on 10th March 19151 BIBLIOGRAPHY & RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING INDEX

Wire entanglements at Neuve Chapelle which the artillery fire failed to cut, causing many losses among the British troops.

SERIES EDITOR’S IN TRODUCTION The Battleground Europe series has moved on from the battlefields of the Salient and the Somme to other parts of the British line on the Western Front, not as well known to most of the battlefield visitors. A start has been made in the Arras sector and the Hindenburg Line; this book has the distinction of being the first to deal with the area that might loosely be called French Flanders, centred on La Bassée. Geoff Bridger ’s account, description and tours will, I am sure, make this important battlefield more accessible to the many visitors to the Western Front, many already drawn here by the writing of Lyn Macdonald. Neuve Chapelle is an important battle, and the countryside round here was very important to the British Expeditionary Force, most particularly in the first half of 1915, when the battles of Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge and Festubert took place. Apart from the tragic action at Fromelles in July 1916, this became a quiet sector until the hectic days of the German Spring Offensive of 1918 and the Battle of the Lys. At the end of 1914 the relatively small BEF found itself situated around Ypres and this low-lying part of France. Perforce, the French Army took the bulk of the pressure from the German Army, and also made the running when offensive operations recommenced in early 1915. It was important, however, that the British were seen to take an active part, difficult though it was. The army had suffered heavily in the early months of the war; the casualties were small in comparison with the major players, but were significant to a force that was both small and all-volunteer. Although the British could expand their army to continental dimensions given time, it had nothing like the potential in reserves and trained manpower (particularly of junior officers and NCOs) that these conscript armies could fall back upon to replenish their strength. Thus a long period of time was required to train these men. What the British could call upon was the Territorial Army and the manpower of the Indian Army. By the end of 1914 both of these elements had arrived in France and Belgium in significant numbers and, along with the arrival of regular troops from far-flung parts of the Empire, there was available the potential to launch limited attacks - small in scale in the context of the operations taking place on other parts of the Western Front; large in scale by the standards of the British Army. In general terms, the British infantry was well up to the standard of their opponents; but there was a significant defect in the artillery, mainly in heavy calibre guns and howitzers, and in the quantity (and quality) of ammunition available. The result was that the British were able to launch the attack at Neuve Chapelle, their first major offensive of 1915: although it had only limited success, it was not the complete disaster that some historians considered it to be. Certainly the casualties were huge and disproportionate to ground gained - but success (or relative success) in war is not merely a matter of territory - that is merely an important indicator. The British had conducted some important experiments with new techniques, most especially in artillery; the troops had caused considerable disquiet to the Germans; and they had

conducted their first important and independent action of the war. Certainly it is a battle whose importance (as so much of what happened in 1915) has been overlooked - or at least neglected - by many historians. It was one of the first steps in the evolution of the British Army into the great continental force that it became by the autumn of 1916.

Nigel Cave Ely Place, London.

Bringing up one of the British guns in prepartation for the battle at Neuve Chapelle.

A CK N OW L EDGEMEN TS The Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office by whose permission Crown Copyright material at the Public Record Office is reproduced. This particularly applies to War Diaries under document class number WO/95 which were extensively consulted for this book. The Trustees of the Imperial War Museum for allowing access to, and permission to quote and reproduce from, the collections in the Departments of Documents and Photographs. The documents quoted are from the papers of Captain M D Kennedy, 2/Scottish Rifles; Sergeant A Self, 2/West Yorks; Lt G Tennant, 1/4 Seaforth Highlanders. The copyright holders of the papers of Captain M D Kennedy, the School of East Asian Studies, the University of Sheffield and especially Lawrence Aspden, curator of Special Collections & Library Archives. The Times for permission to quote from the newspaper and The Times History of the War. John Terraine for permission to quote from his 1914-18 Essays on Leadership & War. Every effort has been made to obtain copyright permission for material quoted in this publication. In the event that anyone’s copyright has been inadvertently infringed I offer my sincere apologies and ask that they contact the publishers. It would be very unwise to attempt to write a book on the Great War without enlisting the help of those erstwhile organisations that house the nations archives and military treasures. Their staff are, without exception, most professional and unstinting in their help. The bodies I refer to of course are: The Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew; The Imperial War Museum (IWM) at Lambeth, London; The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) at Maidenhead; The National Army Museum (NAM) at Chelsea. I wish to acknowledge with grateful thanks the help and assistance given in the compilation of this book by the persons and organisations named below. There are so many who have contributed that it would be almost impossible and very unfair to attempt to quantify their help. I would like to thank Roderick Suddaby, Keeper of Documents, The Imperial War Museum; Simon Robbins (Dept of Documents) IWM; Derek Butler & Christine Woodhouse, Commonwealth War Graves Commission; William Spencer, Public Record Office; Chris & Gary Buckland, Naval & Military Press. And the following: Andrew Tonge, Bob Elliston, Brian Goldsmith, Brian Howard, Henri Lequien, Clive Metcalfe, Joe Warr, Joyce Collins, James Brazier, Julian Sykes, Liz Metcalfe, ‘Mac’ McIntyre, Terry Whippy, Tom Donovan, Paul Turner, the Mayor of Neuve Chapelle, and my many friends in the Western Front Association. Of all the people who have helped me there are nevertheless a few I must single out for special mention. One is my old friend Paul Reed whose expertise on matters relating to the Great War I greatly respect and admire. As always he has unstintingly helped me whenever I have asked. Colonel

Terry Cave gave me most valuable advise on military matters and willing help in scanning the manuscript for my ‘deliberate’ mistakes. I am most grateful to Susan Rowland, on whose cartographical skills I relied upon for my maps. She modified those taken from the Official History and patiently created the guide maps to which I kept adding! Robert Mallevay of Neuve Chapelle has been a great source of local pictures, having researched the general history of his village for many years. Nigel Cave has been most helpful and supportive and extremely patient with me over the period I have been compiling this book. There is one other person I must mention. My wife, Anna-May, has as ever been the tower of strength that has kept me on track whenever I have weakened. She has offered much needed guidance when my English became repetitive or just simply dried up. She has consoled me when my computer has refused to respond and I have shouted at it - and then patiently recovered my ‘lost’ documents for me. She has accompanied me on field trips, supplied me with refreshments on demand and generally been the most wonderful wife and friend I could wish for. Thank you Anna-May.

The centre of Neuve Chapelle before the Great War.

IN TRODUCTION Why Neuve Chapelle? Countless books have been published on the various aspects of the Great War. Indeed many were written whilst the war was still in progress. A large proportion of the books in English confine themselves to events that took place on British sectors of the Western Front. But not all of it. Examination of any bibliography soon reveals that most works concerned themselves with the German invasion, the various battles around the Ypres Salient, the Somme and the traumatic events after 21 March 1918. Other areas reasonably well covered include Cambrai, Vimy and Arras. One aspect of the First World War that has often been neglected is the ‘in between’ area. I refer to the areas ‘in between’ the two major British war zones, the Ypres Salient and the Somme. Quite recently some splendid books have appeared to redress the balance and start to fill in the gap. There does however still remain quite a void, especially in that rather flat and soggy area between Armentières and Lens. During 1915 some of the fiercest fighting of the War took place in that sector. The conditions at the front were appalling; the techniques for fighting a modern war still in their infancy and the inevitable casualty lists high. Map 1: General location of Neuve Chapelle.

This aerial photograph taken in 1998 shows almost all the area over which the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought in 1915. The Indian Memorial is in the foreground. NIGEL CAVE After the debilitating Battles of Ypres, which tailed off in late November 1914, there followed a period of entrenchment and recovery. Numerous local actions took place during the winter of 1914/15 to harass the enemy but no large scale offensives were mounted for a variety of reasons. Some of those local actions occurred near Neuve Chapelle. That village was no stranger to the sounds of gunfire. During October 1914 Neuve Chapelle, and much of the surrounding countryside, was the scene of bitter fighting involving units of the Indian Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks) and II Corps (General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien). The battle swayed to and fro until finally, on 27 October that year, the area passed for the winter into enemy control. That day was actually rather significant for it was the first time any chemical weapons were used in the Great War. Some 3,000 shrapnel ‘Ni-Shells’ containing Niespulver, a form of sneezing powder, were fired at both British and Indian troops at Neuve Chapelle. The recipients did not notice the irritant mixed in with the shrapnel balls. It was not until after the Armistice that the details were discovered in German records, but it was nevertheless a milestone in history. A further attempt to wrest parts of the area by infantry and engineers of 23 Brigade, 8th Division on 18 December 1914 ended in failure. Some valuable lessons were learned for future operations. Neuve Chapelle itself is a small farming village located nine miles south west of Armentières in the Artois. Its only real claim to fame, aside from lying by the front-line for four years, is being utterly destroyed during the intense fighting in March 1915. There was so much selfless gallantry displayed during the ferocity of this short battle that no less than nine Victoria Crosses were awarded. Six of these most valiant men perished achieving their accolade. Battles even as short as four days can be confusing when examined in detail. Their basic concept and execution were however usually fairly simple. That is certainly the case with the 1915 Battle of Neuve Chapelle. A short pen picture to summarise the situation will assist in comprehending the greater detail.

In order to draw attention from French battles planned on other parts of the Western Front, and to prove the British fighting spirit, it was decided to stage an offensive early in 1915. The area chosen for the battle was the village of Neuve Chapelle and its surrounding salient. It formed part of the enemy defences of the low but strategically important Aubers Ridge which lay within a mile to the east of the village. The ridge was six miles in length and, at its highest point some thirty-five metres above sea level. Even that low elevation, however, enabled the Germans to oversee British defences and also gave them a much drier entrenchment. Intelligence judged the area to be weakly defended and little resistance was forecast. The overall plan was to pinch off the salient and follow through to seize the ridge. If the assault was successful the British forces would, with the aid of the cavalry, charge on to conquer the vital pivotal town of Lille lying some twelve miles behind the German front line. The method involved delivering a short but very violent artillery bombardment followed by a substantial infantry assault with speed and surprise being essential. The date set was 10 March 1915. The original calvary at the junction of Armentieres Road and Rue Jacquet.

The attack was made by powerful elements from two army corps, one British and one Indian. Despite initial successes along much of the two mile wide battle front, the soldiers quickly became bogged down in the capture of the village. Hindered by poor communications, flawed judgement, confused orders and shortage of munitions, they were unable to proceed further. The secondary and ultimate objectives were unattainable at that time. Over the four days of intense fighting at Neuve Chapelle the allies suffered around 12,000 casualties. The Germans sustained rather more. Why specifically Neuve Chapelle? The Times History of the War states,

Possession of the [Aubers] ridge was so important a step towards possession of Lille that its occupation was regarded as almost implying the capture of that town. Lille it must be remembered was a major industrial town and also a most vital rail junction. Its loss to the Germans was a great material and morale blow to the French. The Times continued,

Neuve Chapelle formed the gateway which gave access to this ridge. The capture of Lille would indeed have been of the highest importance. It would have placed the allies in a fair position to move against the Germans between that point and the sea. For this the capture of Neuve Chapelle was a necessary preliminary. From its first violent and dramatic days of action in October 1914 until the area was finally freed from the invader in October 1918, Neuve Chapelle was effectively on the front line. Many traumatic events took place during those four years of which the battle in March 1915 was just one. Whilst the main battle only lasted four days, it was nevertheless quite a complex operation involving many army units. Due to space constraints the deeper elements of political and military intrigue have necessarily been omitted together with the minutiae of the initial planning for the battle. All ranks quoted throughout the text are those held during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. Indian ranks and equivalents are given in the glossary. References to grave locations in a particular cemetery are in the format: Plot (Roman numerals), Row (a capital letter), Grave number (Arabic numerals). For example the reference to the grave of Lieutenant-Colonel Bliss in Brown’s Road Cemetery would be: VIII.J.10. [Plot 8, Row J, Grave 10.] Where geographical positions are mentioned, e.g. ‘left flank’, it is from the British perspective unless otherwise specifically stated. As the general direction of attack was towards the east it can thus be assumed that ‘left’ is to the north. Italics are used to distinguish German army units from others. To illustrate the status of the infantry units in the battle, and indeed to explain the composition of the forces involved, a schedule of those units, officially called the ‘Order of Battle’, is reproduced as an appendix. There is also one for the Royal Flying Corps and another for the principal German infantry units taking part. Several technical terms are explained in the glossary. It is recommended that those unfamiliar with military terminology consult these appendices before continuing.

Headquarters of 21 Brigade which was held in reserve for the second wave of the attack

Field Marshal French watching his troops march past on their way to battle.

Chapter One

THE PLAN Early Stages The idea for an attack against the German lines on the Western Front, following the establishment of entrenched positions, was conceived as early as January 1915. At that time of stalemate, various suggestions for a new front were being mooted. Field Marshal Sir John French, in command of the British Expeditionary Force in France, was opposed to the diversification of his forces. He wanted to try to break through the German lines, which he considered was just a matter of deploying sufficient resources. General Joffre, in overall command of the French Armies on the Western Front, was of like mind and plans were discussed for a joint offensive. It seemed the right time for an offensive as the Germans were withdrawing troops from the Western Front to reinforce their armies fighting the Russians. Their remaining garrisons, somewhat undermanned, were, for the time being at least, on a defensive footing.

Sir John French.

General Joffre. The German lines of communication to their forward units were somewhat lengthy and vulnerable. They offered an obvious target for an Allied assault. If those perilous lines of communication could be severed or even seriously threatened then the aggressor would be forced to withdraw. Various plans were discussed and the British wanted to be involved. The French had little respect for the British offensive spirit, considering that small armies were capable only of defence. General Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the First Army, was asked by Field Marshal French to submit detailed plans for an offensive against Aubers Ridge. It was to be carried out in conjunction with a proposed massive attack by the French Tenth Army in the Lens - Vimy - Arras area. If both attacks succeeded, the German supply lines would be cut. It would forestall any Germans plans to send reinforcements from nearby fronts that had not been threatened. The Anglo-French co-operation was however conditional. Joffre insisted that British troops take over from French forces the part of the front line north of Ypres. He also wanted the British to launch a second attack near Armentières. Unfortunately there were insufficient British reserves, trained and equipped for battle, to satisfy the French demands. Those few that existed were already earmarked for other duties. Sir John faced a dilemma. He could either attack alone or abandon the entire plan. There were several good reasons to go ahead. After being severely mauled from Mons to Ypres, our troops had faced an unpleasant winter in the trenches. It was time to get them mobile again. This would also tie in nicely with Sir John French’s ambition to prove to a sceptical Kitchener that it really was possible to break through the German lines on the Western Front. Yet another of his objectives was to regain the confidence of his French allies, demonstrating that the BEF was indeed a potent fighting force. He decided to press on with the attack. The area chosen for the opening assault was essentially that taken by the Germans in October 1914. The salient it formed stretched from the cross-roads in the south named Port Arthur to the Ferme Vanbesien (Moated Grange) in the north. It measured some 3,300 yards around. The attack, planned by Douglas Haig and his First Army staff, involved three brigades attacking initially on a 2,000 yard frontage. It received the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. All they awaited was better weather and the anticipated co-operation of the French. Heavy guns, medical and engineering support units retained for allocation at General Headquarters (GHQ) level were assigned to Haig. Additional support and artillery was withdrawn from other Corps and sent to support the action. Two of the three corps of First Army were allocated the task. They were the Indian Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir

James Willcocks) and IV Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson). The area they originally occupied was reduced to enable their forces to be concentrated into a smaller frontage. Each corps was comprised of two divisions.

General Sir Douglas Haig

Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson

The last Christmas card to be received by so many men of the 7th and 8th Divisions. BRIAN GOLDSMITH I Corps spread itself a little thinner on the southern flank of First Army’s front. The Canadian Division, attached to the First Army, guarded the part of the original front of IV Corps north of the area designated for the main battle. On 6 March Rawlinson’s letter to Lord Kitchener commented on the atrocious weather and continued,

Things look hopeful I think for an attack on Neuve Chapelle which is tentatively fixed for the 10th but if the wet continues it will be absolutely necessary to postpone the date. We shall have a very considerable predominance of Arty and infantry, assets which we have never before possessed and we certainly ought to be able to force a big hole in the enemy’s line. Whether we shall be able to follow it up and get the Cavy through behind him is another matter but I think there is a reasonable prospect of our being able to do so. Anyway conditions are more favourable than they ever have been before and if we cannot obtain a distinct success now, we never shall be able to in this theatre of trenches ,wire and mud.1

This cartoon typifies the stoic humour of the day. BRIAN GOLDSMITH

This was at a time when both Sir John French and Joffre were opposed to opening another theatre of operations and thus diluting the forces available to the Western Front. It would appear Rawlinson did not share their view. He wanted to support Kitchener for, later in the same letter, he comments on the Dardanelles naval operation and states,

You can’t leave it all to the Navy so I was not surprised to hear of troops proceeding to that theatre. Considering he was ‘only’ a Western Front corps commander, Rawlinson seems to have been privy to a lot of secret information. Obviously the ‘need to know’ principle was way in the future. In part of his letter it is not clear if he really is praising General Haig or preparing Kitchener, lest anything should go wrong, for where to rest the blame! It reads,

Douglas Haig is just the person to have at the head of affairs for you may be sure that if the thing can be done he at all events possesses the character and determination to push it through. Sir John was very wise to allot this task to the I rather than to the II Army. He was however most enthusiastic about his men, even if some of his phraseology was unfortunate. A postscript to the letter of 6 March stated,

You must not be under the idea that the troops we have here and who have been sitting in trenches for 4 months are in anything but the best of health and spirits. I have

been astonished at the Brigades of the 7 & 8 Divn which have now been pulled out to do a week or 10 days route marching and drill. They are in magnificent form, full of health and dying to have a go at the Germans. They are the survival of the fittest for all the weaklings have been weeded out and those that remain are a magnificent lot nearly full up with officers and very little short of war strength in numbers. I wish you could see them. They are a far finer lot than I had at Ypres and I’d gladly take on an equal number of Germans any day.

German soldiers in Neuve Chapelle shortly before the March battle. The buildings show signs of damage from earlier fighting.

Complicated diversions were organised to be executed simultaneously with the main thrust. The remaining forces on either side of the main battle zone, however, were deprived of sufficient artillery to attempt more than boisterous and, as it turned out, costly demonstrations. Control over the few allied general reserves, consisting of two cavalry corps, (one British, one Indian), and just one infantry division - the untried 46th (North Midland) Division - was retained by Sir John French. Former residents of Neuve Chapelle were interviewed to learn the precise geography of the village, especially the relative strength of its buildings and the location of cellars, etc. Patrols reconnoitred the lie of the land and the depth of the ditches. Intelligence showed that the German forces opposing the First Army consisted of two seriously weakened divisions of their VII Corps. And that was spread out over a thirteen mile frontage. Their reserves were few and not immediately accessible. In the entire area facing all three corps of Haig’s First Army there were but 20,000 German soldiers to Haig’s 87,000. The narrow area he planned to assault with fifteen battalions on 10 March was defended by only one and a half German battalions. A surprise British attack within this sector could expect little initial opposition and few reinforcements being deployed for several hours. The Germans had, however, many more machine guns and the advantage of well-developed trench mortars. The British had superiority in the number of artillery pieces but suffered from a limited availability of shells, whereas the Germans seemed to have an inexhaustible supply. Speed in attack was vital. It was estimated that with a delay of just one day the Germans could rush at least 16,000

fighting soldiers into Neuve Chapelle.

German contemporary postcard of church in the Bois du Biez.

To make best use of the British artillery it was gradually placed in position amid great secrecy and the guns laid upon their targets with care and precision. Just a very few ranging shots were permitted each day and then only at times when the enemy positions might expect to be shelled anyway. Extra telephone lines were buried deep in the ground and dumps of ammunition, rations, trench stores and engineering equipment hidden in strategic places. Additional trenches were dug to accommodate all the infantry near the old front line. Trenches in the area could never be very deep, for the water-table was less than two feet below the surface, so breastworks were added to give protection. Tramlines, utilising wooded rails to minimise noise, facilitated the supply of the war material. One item in short supply were wire-cutters. Secret instructions ordered that,

The wire cutters will be issued to trained wire cutting men in each platoon and must be tied to the man by a lanyard to prevent loss. During operations wire cutters must be collected from casualties.

The detailed planning incorporated some hitherto unique features which were to be used again and again in future encounters. The artillery was to shoot according to precise timetables and at very specific targets. Some batteries were delegated to create a curtain of shrapnel fire behind the German front line to prevent reinforcements arriving. Because of the flat terrain it was extremely difficult to observe the fall of shot. Two observation towers and other improvised sites were constructed and shared by several artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOO). The barrage was timed to lift to fresh objectives at certain intervals and the number of shells to be expended was carefully regulated. This latter feature had of course a lot to do with the diminutive supply that was available for the entire battle. The infantry was to advance to predetermined objectives and there wait before further advance. This rigidity of purpose had many benefits over the somewhat haphazard assaults of earlier battles but it also had its drawbacks. It took the initiative away from local commanders to take advantage of a situation that had not been predicted. It also prevented movement if adjacent forces in the battle were held up.

Moving up to the front-line before dawn on 10 March 1915. The Royal Flying Corps had been experimenting with aerial photography since September 1914. They had had only limited success right up to early March 1915 but nevertheless the results achieved greatly aided the planning of the battle. Numbers 2 and 3 Squadrons, with great difficulty, took a series of vertical photographs of the German positions. These enabled the first reasonably accurate trench maps to be prepared which gave a plan of the enemy trench systems in depth. Alas, the techniques of properly interpreting those aerial photographs had yet to be honed to perfection. In consequence the full extent of certain well-camouflaged German fortifications escaped attention. The maps, mostly on a scale of 1/5,000, nevertheless were invaluable. They were distributed in quantity to commanders in the field so that,

for the first time in its history, the British army went into action with a picture of the hidden intricacies of the enemy defences, and, after the first assault, bombing parties were able to make their way, without loss of time, to their separate objectives’.2 A new camera, primitive by today’s standards, but an innovation then, made its debut. It enabled

photographs to be taken more easily during the actual course of the battle - weather permitting! On 3 February 1915, a spy, Carl Müller sent a letter to his contact in Holland. The apparently innocent letter contained a secret message written in invisible ink between the lines. The hidden message stated that 15,000 British troops had recently departed for France. Some were no doubt reinforcements for 7th and 8th Divisions at Neuve Chapelle. The Secret Service intercepted the letter and Müller was arrested. He was tried, found guilty and subsequently shot by a firing squad of eight guardsmen at the Tower of London on 23 June 1915. The bullets for the execution had been specially prepared by filing off the tips to cause them to expand and thus inflict maximum damage and a quicker death.3 In addition to other preparations, the initial assaulting battalions were withdrawn on 2 March from front line duties. They received extensive extra training and, where time permitted, a little rest. The ‘rest’ though was in the form of drill and route marches, when no fatigues were required! Map 2: The first trench map.

The three brigades chosen for the attack were 23 and 25 from Major-General F. Davies’s 8th Division and the Garhwal Brigade from the Meerut Division (Lieutenant-General C. Anderson). Their initial objective, with a front of about 2,000 yards, was the village of Neuve Chapelle itself. Larger forces were then to be deployed to fan out through the gap created in the German lines. They would seize the territory in front of Aubers Ridge and then occupy the ridge itself, utilising the cavalry held back in reserve for just such a breakthrough. The weather did not seem to bode well. It had been unsettled and bitterly cold with rain and occasional snow and yet the ground was still soft and difficult to negotiate. The skies cleared for a time as darkness fell on the eve of battle and during the night the ground froze. The decision to go ahead as planned was taken at 10pm and the troops ordered to move into position. Their arrival at the jumping off trenches was timed for one hour before daybreak. During their journey a hot meal was provided; the last so many were ever to eat. The holding battalions moved aside to make room for the assault troops who made themselves as comfortable as possible in the cramped, cold and wet conditions. British barbed wire was silently removed under cover of darkness and gaps cut in hedges

to allow access to No Man’s Land. It seems that at least some of the preparations were observed by the enemy. A prisoner, taken a few hours later, told how his officer discovered that the lines were fully manned. As the British were apparently about to attack, he pleaded that his artillery open fire on the their trenches. The officer was reportedly told that his request could not be acceded to as only the corps commander could authorise such a bombardment – and he was asleep! It seems bureaucracy was not unique to the British Army and because of this, the men had a rather narrow escape that morning. Map 3. The objectives.

Map 4. The bombardment plan. After a period of tense anticipation, the order by General Haig to attack on schedule was sent from his advanced headquarters in Merville at 6.30am on Wednesday, 10 March 1915. All was finally ready. 1 Kitchener Papers. Rawlinson’s letters (6/3/15). PRO 30/57/51 2 Official History of the War. The War in the Air. Vol II. p.91 3 PRO. WO141/2/2

Chapter Tw o

THE CAPTURE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE 10 March 1915 To everyone’s dismay a German aeroplane, whether by coincidence or not, flew low along the crowded British trenches just after dawn. It was reported later in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur. A bombardment of that area at 7am, perhaps called up by the German flyer, caused casualties among the 2/Leicestershire Regiment and the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles who were assembled there in readiness. The battle was timed to commence one hour after sunrise. It would then be light enough for the gunners to spot the fall of their shot and make any last minute adjustments. The only 15” howitzer available and christened ‘Granny’, was dug into position one mile south-east of Sailly-sur-la-Lys. Its tremendous ‘boom’ broke upon the ears of the waiting troops as it signalled the start of the battle. That first shot was a 1,400lb shell sent thundering towards Aubers. The church tower there was being used by the Germans as an observation position and they were imminently due for a rude awakening. General fire was opened at 7.30am with the intention of cutting the German barbed wire, pulverising his front line trenches and destroying known strong points. ‘Granny’ the 15” Howitzer whose roar signalled the start of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. IWM Q.61871

Map 5. Deployment on 10th March, 1915.

Map 6: The Battlefield perspective. The barrage fired that morning came from the greatest concentration of artillery brought together so far in the war. The guns and howitzers belonged not only to the Indian and IV Corps but also to every reserve that could be tapped. Approximately 350 artillery pieces were brought together for the forthcoming battle. More were lined up in support on either flank. With one disastrous exception, in front of 23 Brigade, the bombardment was largely, but not entirely, successful. The first task was cutting the enemy wire and neutralising his front line trenches. A British observation plane, at great risk, was observing our barrage from a low altitude and attracted a considerable amount of enemy flak or ‘iron ration’ as one officer called it.

There are many graphic descriptions of this opening barrage which, despite the issue of cottonwool for ear plugs, was nevertheless deafening. Lieutenant Charles Tennant of 1/4 Seaforth Highlanders was in reserve in trenches near Richebourg-l’Avoue. He said that,

‘the din was terrific, the whole air and the solid earth itself became one quivering jelly’. As he was not yet in action he was able to notice things denied others that morning. He observed,

Through all the bombardment and indeed through all the heavy shelling of both this and the following day, the larks mounted carolling up to Heaven with shells screaming all round them, as though all that devil’s din were but a monstrous fabrication - an insane nightmare in diseased men’s brains - and as though all that was really true and

vital was the sweet coming of spring.1 Another version comes from 2/Middlesex Regiment who were at that time suffering from the illusion that the destruction on ‘their ’ front was complete. Their history states,

For half-an-hour the waiting troops watched the inferno across No Man’s Land; a wall of dust and smoke, from 50 to 100 feet high, had shot up from the German trenches, as the shells fell thick and fast upon the enemy’s barbed wire and front line; it seemed impossible that any living thing could emerge from the wreckage created by that awful tornado of lyddite and shrapnel; timber and sand-bags, clods of dirt, heads, arms and legs and mangled bodies were flung about in horrible confusion; the upper half of a German officer, with the cap thrust down over the distorted face, fell in the front-line British trenches. Only with great difficulty could the British officers restrain their men and persuade them to keep their heads down until that dread half-hour ended; fascinated, though the shells from their guns engaged in wire-cutting passed barely 6 feet above them.2 After thirty-five minutes the sights were raised and the artillery concentrated on shelling the village and identified nearby strongpoints. Other batteries fired to protect the flanks of the leading battalions and to saturate the rear German areas to discourage reinforcements. Heavier pieces turned their attention onto enemy artillery, known machine-gun positions and certain strategic targets. The location of some enemy heavy gun positions that were still firing was established by aeroplanes equipped with wireless. They signalled the position of those guns direct to nominated British batteries so that they could be shelled. The aircraft were unfortunately unable to spot well concealed and much smaller machine-gun nests. The use of aerial observation during the rest of the battle was hindered by deteriorating visibility. Immediately the shelling lifted from the enemy trenches and wire at 08.05 the three assaulting infantry brigades left their forming up positions and dashed forward. Their packs had been left behind and their greatcoats were worn with the skirt fastened back in French fashion to aid mobility. Most of the enemy front line trenches had been pulverised. But, as we shall see, not that in front of 2/Middlesex Regiment. The Garhwal Brigade ushered the attack in their sector on a frontage of 600 yards. Four battalions led the charge but unfortunately one of these, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles, commanded by LieutenantColonel E. Swiney, lost direction almost immediately. Number 4 Company in the vanguard veered off sharply to the right of its objective. It was closely followed firstly by Number 2 Company and then the others. Why this happened is not recorded, for all six of their British officers in that assault perished in the onslaught. In consequence no reliable explanation is available, but most likely they simply just lost direction. It does seem, however, that the enemy trench they should have attacked was scarcely touched by our bombardment. That was not a unique tale that day. What is clear though are the costly consequences of their action. The area where they made contact with the Germans had not been shelled at all. The wire, trenches and enemy soldiers were all intact. With incredible bravery, and not much option, the Garhwalis ripped at the barbed wire and hacked their way through to the terrified defenders who were then killed. They now occupied some 200 yards of the German front line - but

not in the area that was planned.

Indian bombers in a shell hole near Neuve Chapelle come under German shell fire.

Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi, 2/39 Garhwal Rifles, winning the first Victoria Cross of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The remaining three battalions, (2/3rd Gurkhas, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles and 2/Leicesters), crossed the first 200 yards of No Man’s Land to their designated objectives without being checked and with few casualties. The German wire was very well cut there and presented no obstacle. Having secured the devastated front line they pressed on to the second line of trenches, still without stopping. Such opposition as was encountered was swiftly and ferociously dealt with. The 2/39th Garhwal Rifles suffered some casualties from flanking fire and shortly after had the distinction of one of their men winning the first Victoria Cross of the battle. He was No. 1685 Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi, who had led the bayonet party which accompanied the bombers. Part of his citation states,

[he] ‘entered their main trench, and was the first man to go round each traverse, driving back the enemy until they were eventually forced to surrender.’ The short citation concludes with the simple statement, ‘He was killed during this engagement.’3 The whole advance thus far had taken just fifteen minutes. The Indian soldiers reached their final objective for the opening stage by 9am and in the course of their advance took over 200 prisoners. Their original target had been the Smith-Dorrien trench4 which, unbeknown to them, was now flooded. In consequence they crossed it and dug in close by. The position of the Garhwal Brigade was one of rather mixed fortunes. The three battalions which had followed their battle plan successfully that morning finally entrenched near Layes Brook. They occupied an area from Lorgies Road on the right to Brewery Road on the left. 2/Leicesters were on the right of the advance with 2/3rd Gurkhas and 2/39th Garhwal Rifles to their left. Elements of the Garhwals and Gurkhas had earlier entered the village and met up with 2/Rifle Brigade. There they witnessed Rifleman Gane Gurung gallantly enter a heavily defended house on his own and threaten the occupants. Soon after he emerged with eight German prisoners at the point of his bayonet. The British troops were so amazed that they cheered his bravery in the midst of the fighting. This event

was evidently reported right up through the chain of command. It reached the ears of Sir James Willcocks who was enthralled and presented him with the Indian Order of Merit (2nd Class). Many acts of bravery were witnessed that day. Another instance was when 1569 Havildar Bahadur Thapa headed a bombing party and entered a barricaded house. His team killed sixteen Germans and captured two machine-guns. The Havildar also received the Indian Order of Merit (2nd Class). The remaining battalion of the brigade, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles, was now isolated by a gap of about 300 yards which separated them from their nearest comrades, 2/Leicesters. Following the deaths of all their British officers they were commanded by Subadar Kedar Sing Rawat. They were short of ammunition and all efforts to relieve them met with costly failure. The survivors held on all day against repeated attempts by the enemy to dislodge them. The trenches between them and 2/Leicesters were crammed with angry Germans from 16th Infantry Regiment who had not received the full impact of the earlier bombardment and in consequence were still full of fight. They began to launch attacks against positions captured by 2/Leicesters but were repulsed by bomb and bayonet. LieutenantColonel Swiney, severely wounded at his headquarters at Port Arthur, could see what was happening and tried desperately to organise reinforcements to help relieve the situation. He was advised that 1/Seaforth Highlanders of the Dehra Dun Brigade and two companies from 3/London (Territorial Force) Regiment would assist, but that he must also commit any surviving men from his own battalion. The 2/Lincolns in action at Neuve Chapelle.

The area assigned the, as yet, inexperienced 25 and 23 Brigades of 8th Division was to the northeast, commencing some seven hundred yards further around the arc of the salient. Their attack was planned to converge, as if towards the hub of a wheel, with that of the men of the Meerut Division. 25 Brigade had an initial frontage of 400 yards.

During the night 9th - 10th all our wire in front of our breastworks was very carefully removed. In order that the suspicion of the enemy might not be aroused, no posts or chevaux-de-frise trestles were removed, the wire being merely stripped off them.5

The 25 Brigade’s two leading battalions, 2/Lincolnshire on the left and 2/Royal Berkshire to their right, advanced in the direction of the village as soon as the opening barrage lifted at 08.05. The enemy wire had been thoroughly cut and his front line trenches pulverised in this area, so relatively few casualties were sustained in the opening assault. This was made under ‘cover ’ of the second phase bombardment. During both bombardments the Berks suffered, ‘somewhat severely from ‘shorts’ of the British artillery’. Lieutenant-Colonel Feetham’s report stating that,

one shell alone buried twelve or fifteen men, who were only extricated after the advance, some dead and others badly wounded.... Casualties from ‘shorts’ continued till the first objective was reached.6

Pte William Munday 2/Royal Berks. Wounded 10 March 1915. Gallantry was not confined to British and Indian soldiers. One report concerns two German officers manning a machine-gun whose entire crew had been killed. The officers continued to fire on the ranks of the Berkshires until charged and bayoneted by men from that regiment. The British attack continued on towards the German support trenches some two hundred yards further on where they paused. The two remaining regular battalions of 25 Brigade, 2/Rifle Brigade and 1/Royal Irish Rifles, moved up in support, ready for the next stage. They also waited for the second phase of the bombardment, this time of the village, to lift at 08.35. Shelling of strategic enemy positions and gun batteries continued throughout.

The 2/Rifle Brigade and 2/39 Garhwal Rifles meet at 8.50 a.m. on 10 March 1915 in Neuve Chapell. So far the attack had gone mostly to plan in this sector and, in accordance with that plan, 2/Rifle Brigade and 1/Royal Irish Rifles passed through the lines of the Berks and Lincolns towards Neuve Chapelle. A & B Companies led the Royal Irish forward at the double with Captain Graham blowing long blasts on a French postman’s horn and shouting hunting ‘holloas’, just like a huntsman rallies his hounds. They entered the village within five minutes but had to withdraw for a while as British 6” howitzer shells were still falling there. One early casualty was Lieutenant-Colonel George McAndrew, commanding 2/Lincolns. His life’s blood ebbing away, he lay propped up against a parapet and, with dimming eyes, watched his men advance. His last words were, ‘Have they taken the trenches?’ The Lincolns reported that,

... our guns, however, started decreasing their range instead of increasing it and I found it necessary to retire 50 yards...Lt Col G B McAndrew was killed between the first and second German trench - his right leg was blown to pieces by one of our own shells. He died asking after his regiment without any complaint of the pain he was suffering.7

A soldier surveys the devastation.

The village was entered at 08.50 by elements of 2/Rifle Brigade where they met up with men from 2/39th Garhwal Rifles and 2/3rd Gurkhas already there. The task of clearing the shell shattered village of the isolated but deadly pockets of resistance continued. Each building had to be searched and, if any enemy occupant failed to surrender speedily, he was killed. The devastation was massive. Even the graves in the cemetery by the church had been unearthed and the long buried cadavers exposed. And it was not only the long dead who were disinterred. John F Lucy, Royal Irish Rifles, states that survivors had told him,

that the bodies of the men of our battalion [killed in October 1914] had been blown out of the ground after five months, and their corpses, bearing the same buttons and badges, lay mingled with those of the newly killed men.8 Lieutenant Charles Pennefather, D Company 2/Rifle Brigade, had plenty to say about the part his battalion played in the battle. His comments were no doubt coloured by bitter personal experiences and not all of his statements are corroborated by history. Both the Royal Berks and the Rifle Brigade had casualties from British artillery, as we have seen, but fortunately the numbers actually killed, although heavy, were not quite of the magnitude stated by Pennefather. Extracts from the letter written to Lieutenant Hoskyns of the same battalion read,

At 6.30 we all had a good swig of rum and at 7.30 our guns started off a most unholy bombardment the Lord ever saw, this lasted for half an hour, it killed about a 100 of the Berkshires and about 10 of ours. At 8.5 the guns lifted and off boosted the Berks and the Lincolns who captured the German trenches. Then away went the R.B. and R.I.R. to capture the village. We simply boosted through the village capturing about 200 Deutchers. Byatt, Verney, Bulkley-Johnson were shot in this part. We then arrived at the other side of the village and joined up with the Indians on our right, and our job was finished since we had broken a gap in the line and we could have gone to Berlin at least if there had been anyone behind, but as you know our

brilliant staff had two men and a boy behind and also 20,000 cavalry which they refused to let go because they said it was too foggy, all balls because there was no fog. 9

The Armentières Road, abut 800 yards away, as seen from the German strongpoint at Nameless Cottages. Such a distance was ideal for their ’08 machine-guns.

Sandbagged positions amid the ruins of Neuve Chapelle. The 1/Royal Irish Rifles moved to occupy the area within a triangle of roads just north of the village. It contained a small cluster of houses and orchards and was named, without too much imagination, Road Triangle. The Irishmen were performing their task admirably in mopping up Germans at the north of Neuve Chapelle. They were intended to work in conjunction with their accompanying battalion, 2/Rifle Brigade. Little concerted resistance had been met so far. Indeed, all would have been well except that the third element of the morning’s attack, 23 Brigade, had run into serious trouble. Because of this, the battalion 1/Royal Irish Rifles expected to be supporting their left or northern flank had not yet arrived. Time started to be wasted. As the history of the Royal Irish Rifles states,

The chance of a “break-through,” that will-o’-the wisp of the first years of the war, had actually appeared, but did not remain long when it was not taken. Lieutenant-Colonel George Laurie (Royal Irish Rifles), realising that the 23 Brigade was in trouble, asked if he should swing around to his left and help them. He wanted to skirt behind the virtually undamaged German front line which was still firing on the Middlesex and Scottish Rifles. Permission for this manoeuvre was refused. He was instead ordered to hold his present position. Shortly afterwards the Irish Rifles experienced heavy machine-gun fire from their exposed flank and three of their four company commanders were killed or wounded. The murderous enfilade fire came from two as yet untouched German strong-points. One was at Mauquissart and the other among a group of houses entitled ‘Nameless Cottages’ some 500 yards to the south of that point. Those strongpoints were part of the German rearguard positions behind Neuve Chapelle. It had been intended to build one every few hundred yards and then link them together to form a second line of defence. Shortage of manpower and the difficult geographical conditions had delayed the work. The Brewery in Neuve Chapelle.

Discarded barrels amidst the detritus of a destroyed village.

Neuve Chapelle ruined by shell-fire. Despite the problems on their left, 25 Brigade was actually doing well. It had reached all its objectives and their losses were still relatively light. The enemy in their area were dead, captured or fleeing, mostly without their equipment, for the Bois du Biez - the large wood to the south east of Neuve Chapelle. So far so good. What followed was the first in a series of command misjudgements. Lieutenant-Colonel Stephens, commanding 2/Rifle Brigade, confirmed that there was nothing to stop him advancing and sought permission from Brigadier-General A Lowry Cole, in command of 25 Brigade, to do so. He could see no obvious reason why pursuit of the remnants of a thoroughly disorganised and evidently shaken enemy on his front should not take place. His request to spearhead an advance was, however, refused in line with the policy of a broad front approach. Instead Royal Engineers were sent to help fortify the positions already gained. This was because 23 Brigade, which should have been in echelon with his left, had not arrived.

The Battalion continued to dig all day but lost a good many men from the fire of two field guns and from a Maxim which moved up and down the road in front of the Bois du Biez. One of our mountain guns which was being rushed up into the village, was knocked out with all its team by a shell.10 When elements of 23 Brigade (Brigadier-General R Pinney) did eventually break through to the north, they too were halted to consolidate the ground so far captured. The brigade frontage was 400 yards. Its leading battalions were 2/Middlesex with 2/Scottish Rifles to their right.

The group of nameless cottages which abutted the lane, were the site of a formidable German strong-point. IWM Air 38/889 The progress of 23 Brigade was directly influenced by the failure of a vital part of its artillery support. It was the old story of the battle being lost because of a missing horse shoe nail. In this case the battle may well have been ‘lost’ because of the few days delay that the two 6” howitzer batteries of VII Siege Brigade incurred in England. Its two batteries, 59 and 81, were a vital part of the entire operation. Their principal assigned task was the total destruction of the first and second line enemy trenches facing 23 Brigade. They failed. As a result they were responsible for many casualties in both 2/Middlesex and the adjacent 2/Scottish Rifles. Why they failed is most relevant. It would be unjust to attribute all the blame upon those gunners without examining the circumstances.

For the artillery to hit its targets with constant precision several factors have to coincide. The artillery piece itself has to be in excellent order with no excess wear to the interior of the barrel. The shells have to be manufactured to the highest standard and the charge that propels them must be consistent in composition and quality. An artillery piece has to be properly sited and restrained on a firm platform so that the barrel returns precisely to the same position after each round is fired. The recoil on firing tends to upset this precision. Much of the skill in setting up a gun or howitzer is in arranging it so that minimal adjustment is required after each shot in order to maintain accuracy. The crew have to be well trained and preferably experienced in shooting under adverse conditions. The targets have to be pin-pointed and the weapons aligned upon them with great precision. All this takes time. Map 7: The situation at 10 am on 10 March.

Most of the artillery involved in the battle had brought their pieces into the arena well in advance. The guns were well positioned and sighted upon their unsuspecting foe. Several rounds had been fired at irregular intervals to check upon accuracy whilst the Observation Officers ordered final adjustments. Apart from some old 4·7” guns, which bore the nickname ‘strict neutrality’, most were in good order, even if some of the ammunition was suspect. In this respect Rawlinson had told Kitchener on 6 March,

We want.... better 4·7 shells. We have had several driving bands strip (4·7), which drop the shell 3000 yards short of the target and the other day we killed some of our own men in this way. Then again we burst a 4·7 gun three days ago owing to the shell exploding in the gun.11 The gun crews had at least some battle experience. They were rested and ready for action. All that is,

except for two batteries. In addition to all the guns and howitzers thus far amassed for the operation yet another heavy artillery brigade was required. None was available in France and so one was sought from England. VII Artillery Brigade had arrived at Fort Fareham, Hampshire from India in January 1915. They were allotted their task in France by the War Office as early as 26 February. They did not arrive at their assigned positions until the afternoon of 9 March. This was despite repeated requests for their urgent presence. No good reason for the delay is known but the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 8th Division did note in his report after the battle,

[the failure] fully justified our request which was made when the operation was first contemplated that all batteries which were required to shell the German trenches should be in position at least 10 days so as to enable careful registration to be carried out.12 Both batteries concerned were armed with four new 6” 30cwt howitzers. They had a maximum range of between 5,200 and 7,000 yards depending on how they were set up. As they arrived so late there was insufficient time remaining to complete all the necessary preparations. The gunnery officers did the best they could but it was impossible before darkness fell to align their howitzers by sight. Their targets were hard to identify in the distance. They realised that when the barrage commenced there was no way their shots could be distinguished from any others. No last minute corrections were possible. They were inexperienced in battle and their previous training had been carried out in India under wholly unrealistic conditions. They improvised to their best ability and hoped for a miracle. It did not materialise.

An aerial view of the area from which the Indian Corps launched their attack. Port Arthur is clearly visible on the eastern edge of the photograph. Most trenches were not named at this stage of the war. IWM Air 46/260 They were ordered initially to shell specified targets in the rear for the first ten minutes. After that their primary target was those vital 400 yards of enemy front-line trenches in front of 23 Brigade. It was the trenches themselves and their occupants that were the point of aim. Instead of being obliterated, parts of the enemy line remained untouched. It seems likely that 81 Siege Battery, shooting in front of 2/Middlesex, did not switch targets to the enemy front-line trenches at all, for their account of the shoot is at odds with the bombardment plan.13 However they were not the only ones to blame.

According to survivors of 2/Scottish Rifles, who were there during the opening bombardment, the barbed wire in front of that doomed stretch of front had not been properly cut. This contradicted reports by the CRA. That failure did nothing to improve the chances of the leading waves racing towards well defended and untouched enemy trenches. The responsibility for wire cutting was given to the 18pdr batteries of 8th Division which were all situated well within the stipulated 1,700 yards range for that task. And yet they failed adequately to cut the wire protecting the two companies of 11th Jägers defending that section of trench. One way or another the leading companies of 2/Middlesex and 2/Scottish Rifles who led the attack here must have had less than generous thoughts about their gunners! The perilous 400 yard frontage was that immediately to the left (north) of Signpost Lane. One company of 2/Middlesex thrust forward with A and B companies of 2/Scottish Rifles on their right. Both units suffered heavily, especially the Middlesex and A Company Scottish Rifles. Only a few eyewitness accounts exist. One, from Sergeant Daws waiting for his turn to attack, states,

The front line advanced and as they leave their trenches we shout, “Go on the Middlesex. Go on the Die-Hards!” They are met by terrible machine-gun fire. Few reached the German wire, but these tore in vain at the thick entanglements until their hands were torn and bleeding and their uniforms in rags. The second line fared no better and were decimated. Sergeant Daws, in the third wave, continues his account,

A whistle sounds, and over the parapet we go. “Go on Die-Hards!” The sight which met our eyes almost staggered us, our poor first and second lines lying in all positions. Then we saw red: we reached the barbed wire, trampled on it, cut and hacked it, the barbs cutting us in all places. We were beaten back. 14 Because of their losses 2/Middlesex could not continue the fight without help and proper artillery support. Another eyewitness to the slaughter was Lieutenant (later Captain) Malcolm Kennedy of B Company 2/Scottish Rifles. Most of the men from A Company on his left were shot down. Fortunately Lieutenant Kennedy survived the massacre and his account, vivid though it is, can but be a morsel of the true horror actually experienced by those brave young men. On a reconnaissance two days earlier he had been assured by a gunnery officer he met that the German defences would ‘be pulverised’ and that the advance would be a ‘walkover ’. Kennedy estimated that the depth of No Man’s Land at his point of attack to be fifty to sixty yards. German machine-gun position that caused so many casualties among the 2/Middlesex and 2/Scottish Rifles on the morning of 10 March 1915. IWM Q49208

We had synchronised our watches previously so that everything would work out exactly to the second, and precisely at 7.30am there was a deafening roar as our batteries in rear opened fire. Heralded by a deep-toned vibrating sound overhead, as though hundreds of express trains were rushing through the air, Hell seemed then to break loose as shell after shell, from guns of all calibres, burst with ear-splitting explosions on the German positions opposite. The whole ground quivered as in an earthquake, and only by shouting at the top of one’s voice was it possible to be heard above the din. The men were in great form, cracking jokes with one another and singing as though they were on a picnic. I went round from time to time to see how they were getting on. Some of them laughingly held out their hands for me to shake, in case either they or I got “blotted out”. The prospect seemed to amuse rather than upset them, and one realised then, as never before, what a wonderful bunch of fellows they were, and how damned lucky one was to have such men to command. The tragedy of the whole thing is that most of them are now gone. The battlefield here is strewn with the bodies of men from the 2/Scottish Rifles killed

on 10 March 1915. IWM Q49213

The bombardment was timed to lift from the first line of German trenches onto the village of Neuve Chapelle itself at 8.05am and the assault was to be launched half-aminute before it lifted. Shortly before 8 o’clock Gray-Buchanan, the Adjutant, came round to see how things were going, and we cracked jokes together about meeting again in Lille in the evening. More than three years were to pass, however, before Lille was to fall into British hands, and within ten minutes of our conversation poor GrayBuchanan was lying dead and I myself was lying wounded and unable to move. It was getting near the time for the guns to lift, and I was keeping an eye on my watch, when he nudged me and shouted: “There goes Ferrers!” [Company Commander, B Company] Looking up I saw Ferrers in the act of scrambling over the parapet 20 or 30 yards to my right; so, calling to the men to follow, over I went too. For a moment, everything seemed strangely silent as the barrage lifted, only to reopen a few seconds later onto the village to our right front. Simultaneously, with a sound as of a nest of giant hornets suddenly let loose, the air became filled with the whistle of hundreds of bullets, as the German machine-guns belched forth their deadly streams of lead, and the German infantry opened rapid fire with their rifles.

During the bombardment preceding the assault, the Germans had several times traversed our parapet with machine-gun fire; but we had then been in comparative shelter and safety at the bottom of the trench. Now, however, we were out in the open, without so much as a blade of grass to shelter us. From the intensity of the fire which was brought to bear on us as we struggled across the rough ground, it was clear that our gunner officer’s forecast about the flattening out of all opposition had been unduly sanguine; yet it seemed almost unbelievable that, after such a pounding, the German positions appeared to have suffered so little. There to our front was the same line of trench that I had seen earlier in the morning, with the same thick hedge cresting the parapet, and the masses of twisted wire in front, nothing seemingly much worse for wear; and from this trench the Germans were firing at us at point-blank range, a deadly fire with rifles and machine-guns. It probably did not take much more than half a minute to reach the German wire; but even in that short interval of time men were falling fast, and I just remember a fleeting glance at ‘A’ Company on our left, with the men dropping as though some giant scythe were sweeping through their ranks. It was a ghastly sight, but I had other things to occupy my attention; for almost before I had time to realise it, I found myself up against the German wire. It was barbed and twisted and almost unbroken, for the bombardment had proved ineffective at that particular point. Of how we got through that wire I have no very clear idea. I have a vague recollection of tearing at it with my naked hands and, with the help of one of my corporals, dragging away the remains of a chevaux-de-frise, while a German fired at us at a range of only four or five yards and missed us both. After that, the fellow must have bolted, as I remember throwing myself through the remaining strands of wire and looking through the hedge on the parapet at a group of Germans running back as fast as they could. Immediately opposite the point we had struck was a communication trench, leading back to a support trench (also topped by a thick hedge) 60 or 70 yards away. The ground in between had the appearance of an orchard. Not more than 15 or 20 yards up

this communication trench was a group of Germans all struggling to get past one another in their hurry to reach the support trench in rear. It was too good a chance to miss and, having but recently been a target myself at point blank range, I could not resist the temptation to get a bit of my own back. Resting my elbow on the parapet, therefore, I fired off all six rounds of my revolver into their struggling mass, and then, hurriedly reloading tried to break my way through the hedge. Having forced our way through the hedge, we found ourselves standing on the crest of the German parapet. As a point of historical interest, it may be mentioned that all the officers of ‘B’ Company carried their swords into action that day. Whether those of other companies did likewise I am not certain; but I believe I am right in saying that it was the last occasion on which swords were carried in the attack. Shortly after this Lieutenant Kennedy was shot twice and pitched backwards through the hedge. Corporal Forster, on seeing him hit, helped staunch the blood pouring from his wounds. Private Neil McHugh, who was himself mortally wounded later that day, also helped. The account continues,

McHugh, as I fell, was in the act of pulling his bayonet out of a German. His victim, it seemed, after firing at him and his pals while they were tearing their way through the wire, had lost his nerve at the last moment and scrambled up onto the parapet. If he intended to ask for quarter, his decision came too late; for McHugh, whose blood was up, lunged at him with his bayonet and ran him through. The wretched man’s body crashed forward close to where I lay, and there it remained, huddled up in a grotesque fashion, with body and head on the ground and legs pointing upwards supported by the side of the parapet. Meanwhile, the two supporting companies [C & D] had come up and were breaking their way through the hedge, closely followed by men of the Devons and West Yorks. It must have been a nerve-racking ordeal for them advancing under heavy fire over that bit of ground, thickly strewn as it was with our dead and wounded, and with little bunches of our dead hanging limply in the tangled mass of barbed wire. Among others in my own platoon who were killed in the attack was my bugler, Forrester. Armed with nothing more venal than his bugle and a pair of wire clippers, he went over the top with the rest of the platoon when the attack was launched. I had advised him beforehand to take a rifle; but there was no spare one to be had, so he said he would pick one up from the first man he saw wounded. Apparently he did not do so, as he was last seen hurling his wire-clippers at a German, who was on the point of firing at him. Being only a few feet away, he hit his mark all-right, but almost at the same moment he himself fell dead, with a bullet through the head. Eventually, after lying out, bleeding and freezing for six hours, Lieutenant Kennedy was carried by exhausted stretcher-bearers to the Regimental Aid Post. Just after he arrived Major Hesperus Lloyd, commanding D Company, was brought in and laid down on a stretcher beside him. He was evidently suffering badly but never made a sound except to request morphia. Soon afterwards he died from his appalling injuries. Kennedy was then moved to the Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) at Merville before

being repatriated to England for a long period of treatment at the Royal Herbert Hospital, Woolwich. Another officer wounded that day was Captain ‘Uncle’ Ferrers, who Commanded B Company. He was one of the first to reach the German trenches but was then shot through the ankle. Disabled, he waved his sword to indicate the line of attack to his men. He was disturbed to see soldiers trapped by the barbed wire and being killed. Just then he was shot again - but this time the injury was critical. Captain Ferrers propped himself up against the German parapet so that he could see better and, insisting on staying where he was, calmly proceeded to light a cigar. He expected to die, but his only real concern was the progress of the battle. Virtually all officers of 2/Scottish Rifles had become casualties. By the end of the first day only two, Major Carter-Campbell who had been slightly wounded and Second Lieutenant Somervail, remained. The next day Carter-Campbell was hit again and forced to give up. Lieutenant Kennedy finishes his account with the graphic statement,

It was left therefore to Somervail, the young 2nd Lieutenant to take command [of the battalion], and it was he and Sergeant-Major Chalmers who subsequently lead the battered remnants out of action when they were relieved by fresh troops a day or two later. Of the Battalion that had gone into action a thousand strong three days earlier, only 143 remained. 15 It was said of 2/Scottish Rifles, who faced uncut barbed wire in the opening battle and tore at it with their bare hands, that, ‘go back they would not, go on they could not’. Brigadier-General Pinney asked his chief, Major-General Davies for a renewed bombardment of the undamaged German positions facing his brigade. A decision to digress from the strict battle plan was made by Pinney after he consulted the commanders of 2/Middlesex and 2/Devonshire. The second wave of 23 Brigade consisted of 2/Devons and two companies 2/West Yorks. As the Middlesex were pinned down, that second wave was directed to lend most of its weight to the more successful 2/Scottish Rifles attack. After penetrating the line in their sector, they were to turn north and attack in enfilade the German trenches facing the luckless Middlesex. A smaller group of Devons moved along the communication trench Rotten Row, in direct support of the Middlesex and many casualties were suffered at this juncture. One of the officers killed was Second Lieutenant George Clinton Wright of 2/Devons. His company commander wrote to his parents,

He was in my Company and we had made three attempts to take a German trench all failed. I then sent him with five men with bombs to a part of a German trench which had been taken, and he actually cleared 150-200 yards with his revolver and bombs and so enabled two regiments to advance. He continued this bombing, the Germans put up a white flag, and your son in getting over blocked part of traverse was shot dead by a German officer. One of the bombers threw a bomb at the latter and blew him to pieces. Besides enabling the British troops to advance without loss, these six killed about 30, and took, or caused to be taken, about 80 prisoners. His gallantry is being talked about by everyone about here.

2/Lt George Wright. 2/Devonshires. It seems that Second Lieutenant Wright was recommended for the Victoria Cross. It was not approved. He was however mentioned in a Despatch from Field Marshal Sir John French dated 31 May 1915. Published in the London Gazette on 22 June 1915 it read, ‘for gallant and distinguished service in the field’. A situation report about this time would show that the main attack had been most successful but that there were two hold-ups. They were on the left hand of 23 Brigade front and an isolated pocket of resistance of some of 200 yards of enemy front line near Port Arthur. The main body of troops were now dug in awaiting the two flanks to catch up. By today’s tactics this would not be regarded as good strategy. While the flanks were trying to catch up, the Germans were busy strengthening their defences. At 10.10am the fresh bombardment, requested by Pinney, of the so far untouched front line in front of 2/Middlesex, commenced. This time XLV Brigade RFA, 31st 4·5” Howitzer and 4th Siege Batteries were assigned the task which they successfully accomplished. So successful was their devastating fire that the surviving Jägers surrendered. The two reserve brigades, the Dehra Dun and most of 24 Brigade, in support, were moved into new positions at this stage. The Dehra Dun occupied the trenches vacated by the Garhwal Brigade and awaited further orders. The three available battalions of 24 Brigade took up their positions initially in the lines vacated by 23 and 25 brigades that morning. The 2/East Lancashire was then moved to the area where Signpost Lane met Armentières Road. They filled the gap of several hundred yards which had opened up between those brigades. The 1/Worcestershire and part of 2/West Yorks (23 Brigade Reserve) were assigned to assist 2/Middlesex in their hour of need. Together they occupied the trenches vacated by the Jägers. This disposition of 24 Brigade troops was to have repercussions. The 1/39th Garhwal Rifles on the right flank were still in trouble. They were holding out in the isolated stretch of trench south-east of Port Arthur which they had inadvertently taken earlier, and desperately needed help. Their commanding officer had asked urgently for reinforcements. All that was immediately available were two companies of 3/London and they had been dispatched to help. The Germans of 16th Infantry Regiment were still in the section of trench between the Garhwalis and 2/Leicesters. The enemy attacked the Leicesters and a pitched battle with bombs from both sides

ensued. Fresh supplies of bombs were brought in by the Sappers. Captain Romilly of the Leicesters led a platoon along the enemy trench forcing them back and personally shooting five of them with his revolver.16 Private Buckingham, also of the Leicesters, displayed the greatest bravery and devotion to duty in rescuing and aiding wounded men under heavy fire.17 A British bomber hurling a No 1. MK 1. hand grenade at the enemy.

Private William Buckingham 2/Leicesters, whose valour was rewarded with a Victoria Cross. Help, in the shape of elements from Dehra Dun Brigade in reserve, was available, but it was to be some hours yet before they received their orders to attempt the rescue. It was another case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing! Not until after 1pm did they start out to get into position and even then they were further delayed by an unexpected artillery bombardment from the divisional artillery – unexpected that is from the viewpoint of the relief forces. Somehow General Anderson, commanding the Meerut Division, thought that the Seaforths had been thwarted in their rescue attempt which, in fact, had not yet started! He decided to help and bombard the enemy trench on their behalf and without their prior knowledge. This caused more delay whilst the Seaforths dodged their own shells. Eventually, at around 5pm and in poor visibility, the relief finally commenced. The 1/Seaforth Highlanders attacked from the left flank whilst the remnants of 1/39th Garhwal Rifles and those two companies from 3/London, waiting nearby, made a frontal assault. After severe fighting the enemy endeavoured to retire north-eastwards but was out-manoeuvred on all sides and about one hundred of them finally surrendered. The elimination of this pocket of resistance opened the way for the attack on the Bois du Biez. It was however getting rather late in the day. We have now further entered the arena of confusion and delay. One has already been reported. Why was there so much confusion and delay? We should be aware of what control a commander could exert during the course of a battle in the First World War, especially in the early stages of the conflict.

A trench in the Bois du Biez, photographed by Unteroffizer H Walterman, 22/Field Artillery Rgt. 13 Division. JULIAN SYKES Virtually the only influence higher command could have upon the outcome of a battle already under way was to commit reserve units to aid progress where deemed necessary. The forces out in the field were effectively incommunicado. Their actions could not readily be altered until they had accomplished - or not - a preconceived plan. The largest unit which could, in practice, be directly influenced during an engagement was a company. The din of battle was such that no shouted or signalled order could normally reach more men. It must be remembered that communications were primitive. They were mainly by telephone, the wires for which were channelled deep in the ground. However deep they were buried, they were still very vulnerable to damage by shell fire. Extra lines were laid between successive levels of command, but there was no lateral communication. That would have in any event been impracticable as theoretically the forces were mobile and the telephone lines static. If an officer of one battalion had a problem and needed to pass a message to an adjacent one, it usually had to be transmitted back to the Brigade HQ by chain of command; and then out again. If a major decision was required, the message had further back to travel - perhaps to Division or Corps or Army or even the Commander-in-Chief himself. The instruments and telephone lines were maintained by the Signal Service of the Royal Engineers. Once telephone lines were cut, the only other realistic means of passing information was by runner.

This human message carrier was even more vulnerable to being hit than a telephone wire. Even if he got through, the time delay was enormous. And he still had to return with the reply. It must have been a nightmare for a battalion commander wanting, for example, a previously unplanned artillery barrage to relieve his hard pressed troops, not knowing if his runner had passed the message or not. Carrier pigeons were used exclusively at this stage of the war for intelligence purposes. Although soon destined to become a most valuable supplementary method of communication, none were yet available for sending battlefield messages. Conventional visual signalling by flag or lamp had fallen into disuse owing to the close proximity of the enemy on the Western Front. Any sighting of a flashing light at night or flag signals by day brought an immediate and violent response. Neither trench wireless nor the shielded and directional electric light signalling systems were available for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle; nor indeed for many months to come. Those who fell during the first wave of the attack.

‘The village is caputred.’ The situation was just as frustrating for Haig and his corps commanders. The information they received about the progress of the battle was confusing, not always accurate and always received well after the event. Indeed misleading reports early in the battle caused Haig to seek approval from the Commander-in-Chief for the release of cavalry in reserve. French dispatched 5 Cavalry Brigade to positions near Rouge Croix in order that they be immediately ready to exploit the anticipated breakthrough! The generals were not in the front line, for that would have been both pointless and irresponsible. A commander ’s job was to be available to make decisions and bring up reserves as he saw fit; or perhaps order a fresh attack; or call off an attack; or even abort the whole battle. None of these functions could have been achieved if he was out of contact visiting the front line or, even worse, if he had been killed by a stray bullet. To try and clarify the rather confusing situation at Neuve Chapelle, Haig did actually travel briefly, and on more than one occasion, from his advanced headquarters at Merville to visit his corps and divisional commanders.

Privates S C Climpson and F Luddington were each awarded the DCM for attempting to repair broken telephone lines under fire and then conveying vital messages by hand. 1 The Papers of Lt. Charles Tennant 1/4 Seaforth Highlanders. Letter 21/3/1915. (p.1 transcript) Imperial War Museum. [Lt Tennant was killed in action 9 May 1915.] 2 Everard Wyrall. The Die-Hards in the Great War. Vol 1 p. 99 3 The citation appears in the London Gazette of 27 April 1915 and Army Orders 167/1915. He is commemorated on the Neuve Chapelle Memorial. 4

This was the reserve line dug in October 1914 occupancy of the area after a little straightening of our positions. It was named after General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commander of II Corps at the time. 5 PRO War Diary WO95/1671 (8 Division General Staff) 6 PRO War Diary WO95/1729 7 PRO War Diary WO95/1730 8 J F Lucy. There’s a Devil in the Drum. p.332 9 Lt Charles Pennefather, 2/Rifle Brigade, killed in action as T/Captain 14/6/1916. He is buried in Aveluy Communal Cemetery Extn. The letter quoted is from the Tom Donovan collection. 10 The Rifle Brigade Chronicle. 11 Rawlinson letter (6/3/15) op. cit. 12 PRO War Diary WO95/1671 21/3/15 13 PRO War Diaries WO95/225 and WO95/87 14 Wyrall, Vol 1 p. 100. 15 The Papers of Captain M D Kennedy. IWM & Sheffield University. As a Captain, William Somervail DSO, MC was killed in action on 4/10/1918. 16 Captain Francis Henry Romilly was awarded the DSO for his bravery. He was subsequently killed in action on 25 September 1915 at the Battle of Loos. He is buried at Rue-du Bacquerot No 1 Military Cemetery, Laventie. 17 Private William Buckingham was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry both on the 10 and 12 March 1915. He was subsequently killed on 5 September 1916 and is commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial.

Chapter Three

THE FIGHTING CONTINUES It was now 11.30am. Faulty intelligence reports indicated that the position known as the Orchard was strongly defended by the Germans. Its capture was regarded by Rawlinson as vital. He would not permit Major-General T Capper ’s 7th Division to deploy 21 Brigade, which was ready and eager to get into action, until it was secured. A bombardment of the Orchard was ordered and then it was rushed by the surviving Middlesex men supported by 2/West Yorks. The Orchard was deserted, taken without loss and no evidence of German fortification was discovered. The West Yorks (23 Brigade Reserve) now moved northwards towards the Moated Grange. Technically in No Man’s Land prior to the battle, it was frequently occupied by parties of Germans. The position had been softened up all morning by trench mortar fire and was fairly easily captured. The mortars used by the British were mostly manufactured locally and were unfortunately not very reliable. They were largely experimental and fired an improvised bomb of around 3·7” diameter. The West Yorks achieved their goal about mid-day, and finding little opposition requested permission to press on. They wanted to move eastwards but permission was refused. Eventually shelled out by British guns, the West Yorks had to retire. They joined the growing number of units digging in – or rather, in their case, making breastworks, as they struck water at eighteen inches.

2/Lt Edward Matthews. 2/Northants, was leading his men towards the second line when he was hit in both shoulders by shrapnel and died immediately. 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers moving towards trenches evacuated by 23 Brigade on 10 March. HENRY LEQUIEN

The much feared Minenwerfer launches its deadly cargo. JULIAN SYKES Ever since trench warfare had been established in 1914 the British had been harassed by German Minenwerfers. They were a mortar firing a large projectile a relatively short range - ideally suited to lobbing their deadly cargo into trenches just a short distance away. By a happy coincidence Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Rawlinson, Lieutenant-General Rawlinson’s brother, happened to take an interest in this subject and his experiments proved most useful to the fledgling mortar teams.1 Using

the General’s influence, he scoured French arsenals and museums for obsolete mortars that might be modified and pressed into service. Alas, despite his best endeavours, the bombs they were to fire were few in number by the time of the battle. The 7th Division was meanwhile still champing at the bit. 22 Brigade manned the front-line north of Moated Grange. Barring a complete rout of the Germans, it was not planned to use them in the opening stages of the battle. The division’s leading assault brigade, the 21st, was brought into position ready to occupy 8th Division’s support trenches as soon as they were vacated. They were scheduled to advance through 23 Brigade and attack the line Piètre - Moulin du Piètre. 20 Brigade, in First Army reserve, was released to IV Corps to support 21 Brigade if necessary and proceeded towards the front. The actual advance however depended on Lieutenant-General Rawlinson’s authority. This was not forthcoming until 1.19pm. It had taken a long time to discover that the Orchard was undefended, and then to relay this information along the chain of command. Permission was finally granted for 21 Brigade to proceed, but only as far as the now empty German front line. After despatching 21 Brigade, Rawlinson consulted with Willcocks at 1.35pm as to when the Indian Corps troops would be ready. Not yet, he was told, and in consequence the 7th Division once more continued to wait. The day was getting on. All was not quiet however. It rarely was on the Western Front. The 23 Field Ambulance attached to 20 Brigade moved up with the troops. Major J Linell, one of their doctors, was keen to establish an advanced dressing station. He eventually chose a damaged farm building and gave aid to the many wounded who appeared. It was unfortunately well within range of the enemy. Suddenly the padre, Wilfred Abbott, appeared. He was described by Linell as,

One of the most eccentric and gallant men I have ever known. Death for him held no more terrors, and he persistently refused to use a communication trench, if the going was the slightest bit difficult, but walked straight across the open to visit the front line through the whipping bullets. A while later, during a particularly heavy enemy barrage, the padre reappeared, preceded by a staffofficer who leapt off his horse, ran in and said,

“There’s a madman loose about half-a-mile back, a parson. He was on a bicycle coming this way, and, when I got level with him, he got off, stopped me, and told me he did hope I didn’t think this was his best machine; he had a much better one up at his billet. And in the middle of all that!” he added, pointing outside. Linell’s tale continued,

A minute later and our redoubtable Wilfred hove in view, slowly pedalling towards us, just as if he were out for a constitutional in a peaceful English lane. I hooted for joy - but not for long. An agitated officer ran in to us. “O my God!” He cried, “an old padre has got a shell all to himself just outside and is blown to pieces!” I dashed

outside to pick up what remained and ran right into Abbott coming through the gate and positively beaming through his spectacles. “I heard you were blown to pieces,” I said. “I believe it was very near, at least I thought it was but then I’m such an amateur, so to speak, at the game that I had an idea it might be a frequent happening which a professional would laugh at.” Located in the same farm buildings was a group of officers from 5/Black Watch. Major Linell reports,

All the time branches were being torn off the trees, and bricks, fuses, bullets and big bits of shell were hurling about. In the afternoon a ‘Jack’ [Jack Johnson, a famous black boxer nicknamed the ‘Big Smoke’. Large calibre German shells which exploded with dense black smoke were named after him.] missed the corner of the house by inches and burst ten yards away, blowing Bowes-Lyon endwise on to the top of me, but uninjured.2 The Reverend Wilfred Abbott, Army Chaplains’ Department, led a charmed life and appears to have survived the war. Whilst the British forces waited until their line was neat and tidy to continue their advance, the Germans were not idle. Their front line had been penetrated and its garrison almost destroyed. They had hardly any reserves immediately to hand but the few troops available, initially just two companies from 11th Jägers, were deployed as soon as possible. Their immediate task, now that the village itself had fallen, was to strengthen the strong points at Mauquissart and Nameless Cottages, in their fragmented second line of defence. Another defensive position in this sector, as yet unknown to the British, on a slight rise and amid some old ruins at Layes Bridge, was hurriedly reinforced with extra machine-guns. As man-power slowly became available other defensive positions were improvised and strengthened. Further German reserves, one battalion of 13th Infantry Regiment, were rushed to brace the front from the Moated Grange to Fauquissart and thus prevent any further exploitation north of the existing bulge in their lines. A gap in the German defences did exist however. The Bois du Biez was largely devoid of organised resistance and open to exploitation until early evening when the first German reinforcements arrived. An opportunity was to be lost.

The German strong-point at Mauquissart is in the centre of this aerial photograph taken a few days after the battle in March 1915. Their second line was incomplete during the battle. IWM Air 38/239 It was not until 2.15pm that 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers and 2/Yorkshire (Green Howards) of 21 Brigade moved off. They passed through 23 Brigade’s lines about 100 yards east of the Moated Grange and advanced some 300 yards before once more being halted. They were soon joined on their left by 2/Wiltshires and were to be prepared to move on the Moulin du Piètre as soon as the artillery barrage lifted and 24 Brigade was in position on their right flank. The barrage from the artillery of both the 7th and 8th Divisions was intended to soften up the known German strongpoints. It was however not too successful for they were well concealed and difficult for the artillery officers to spot. Even when pinpointed it was almost impossible to pass instructions to the guns for most of the telephone lines had been cut and valiant attempts by signallers to repair them mostly ended in failure.

Orders to 24 Brigade (Brigadier-General Francis Carter) to be ready to attack were issued at 1.30pm. There was a delay before Carter received them and then a further delay occurred in extricating his troops, dispersed to help 23 Brigade earlier. Rawlinson, with Haig’s approval, had been anxious to recommence hostilities at 2.00pm. With delays in the communication of messages, the hold-up of the Meerut Division and the difficulties in re-assembling 24 Brigade, it was not until 5pm that the advance finally commenced. Three battalions from 21 Brigade pushed on, moving generally north-eastwards. By now, because of poor weather, the light was fading and the progress over the obstacles of ditches, trenches and hedges was slow. Severe fighting was encountered, but slowly the Germans were forced back down their trenches for several hundred yards until it was too dark to distinguish friend from foe. Meanwhile 22 Brigade, still manning the old front line, assisted by firing on any enemy passing in front of them. As touch with 24 Brigade was lost by 21 Brigade it was decided at about 7pm to stay where they were and dig in. They were assisted by 2 and 55 Field Companies, Royal Engineers. 24 Brigade fielded 1/Sherwood Foresters and 2/Northamptonshires, who were deployed along Armentières Road on either side of Signpost Lane. They advanced from there at 5.30pm into the gloom and a withering fire from Nameless Cottages and the Layes Bridge Redoubt. Progress was slowing as units from both brigades, each from different divisions, became intermingled. They halted, like 21 Brigade, to dig in and prepare to resist any counter-attack. The line now ran from the junction of the Signpost Lane/Layes Bridge Road, where it met Nameless Cottage Lane [see Glossary], to a point near the German defences north of the Moated Grange. 20 Brigade, which had been waiting all afternoon to go forward in support, was stood down. There was confusion in the transmission, reception and implementation of orders that afternoon. There is also considerable disagreement in the various diaries and contemporary accounts as to the exact times each unit did what - and even where! To return to the southern part of the battlefield, we find that the Dehra Dun Brigade (BrigadierGeneral C W Jacob) was now ready to advance. The isolated German enclave between the Leicesters and 1/39th Garhwalis had finally been cleared. The 1/Manchesters and 47th Sikhs, from Jullundur Brigade, were attached to help as one of Jacob’s own battalions, the 1/Seaforths, had been allotted to the Garhwal Brigade to assist with their particular problem. The five battalions now forming Dehra Dun Brigade avoided the area south-east of Port Arthur which was still in enemy hands. They advanced along the Edgware Road for just under half a mile before turning right until the Port Arthur to Neuve Chapelle road was reached. There they deployed with 1/9th Gurkhas on the left, 2/2nd Gurkhas to their right and 1/4 Seaforths in support. They reached their first objective, Layes Brook, unopposed and crossed it with difficulty. Their advance continued in rapidly decreasing light towards the Bois du Biez, still some 400 yards distant. Progress was aided by the light from a nearby burning building. That same light also assisted well-concealed German machine gunners to aim at them from both flanks and cause some casualties. In the growing gloom, at around 6pm, two German reserve battalions (56th and 57th) rushed from Violanes and Salomé during the day, arrived at the eastern edge of the Bois du Biez. They moved under cover of the wood to fill the gap that existed in the German lines. When darkness fell they set about strengthening the ditch in front of the wood. Before they got there 2/2nd Gurkhas had reached the western edge of the wood and started to dig in. Gurkha scouts entered the wood and took several prisoners who were interrogated. Their information was ‘extracted under threats’. Captain Mullaly, who also ventured within the wood, reported that he and another officer had been, ‘roaming in the

wood at will.3 Despite the officers’ reconnaissance, which probably reflected the true state of affairs, the information divulged under threat by the terrified prisoners suggested a far greater German presence existed. They must have been brave men indeed to lie under the circumstances, for the Gurkha kukri fighting knife is very sharp indeed! As touch with 1/9th Gurkhas had, for the moment, been lost it was decided to be prudent and withdraw the 2/2nd Gurkhas, initially to a support line just outside the wood. They remained there until 8pm with, it transpired, 1/9th Gurkhas not too far to their left in the gloom. The Germans made repeated unsuccessful attempts to outflank them and it was decided that, without the additional support from the 8th Division, their position was untenable. They then, with the full agreement of both General Anderson and Sir James Willcocks, withdrew to the western bank of the River Layes and set about defending it from possible counter-attack. They were joined by 1/4 Seaforths whilst the 1/Manchesters and 47th Sikhs were returned to their own brigade. Lt Tennant, 1/4 Seaforths commented,

My own feeling about the first day’s show is that if we and 9th Gurkha had been allowed to go on and take the risk of being cut off we would have carried the wood.... The shelling of the morning had so demoralised the Germans that I am fairly confident that the moment was one in which it would have been both legitimate and strategically sound to take big risks. A determined advance at one point such as I believe could have been effected against the Bois du Biez and a subsequent threatening of the German rear to right and left would have completed their demoralisation and made a general advance along the whole front possible. As it was they were given the whole night in which to dig new trenches and to get up reinforcements both of men and guns, with which they were able successfully to defend ground which had been occupied without any difficulty and practically no loss the day before. Brigadier-General Jacob in his report considered that the 1/4 Seaforths, a Territorial battalion, ‘showed itself to be the equal of any regular regiment’. The area around Port Arthur had by now been cleared and was held by the 1/39th Garhwalis and 1/Seaforths. The whole Indian Corps front extended from south of Port Arthur, where the Bareilly Brigade held the original front line, to a point due east of central Neuve Chapelle and midway between the village and Layes Bridge. Two brigades from the Lahore Division (Major-General H D’U. Keary) had moved forward during the day and battalions from the Jullundur Brigade had been deployed although not called to action. By the end of the first day the Neuve Chapelle salient, including all the village, had been captured. An area from about 500 yards north of the Moated Grange to Port Arthur was now in allied hands. Wherever possible hot food and tea were brought to the men in the trenches.

2/Lt William Barrie, 5/Black Watch, surveys the ruins of Neuve Chapelle on 10 March 1915. HENRI LEQUIEN Various feints by units on the flanks of the battle had proved only partially successful. The Germans quickly realised the extent of the main thrust and set about diverting as many troops as they could spare to help the hard pressed garrison. Because of the general reduction in strength of German divisions on the Western Front few were immediately available. The German VII Corps (General von Claer), in whose area Neuve Chapelle lay, sent any that could be spared. He was determined to regain lost ground as soon as possible. Battalions then had to be brought in from as far away as Ypres to reinforce the front. Many artillery units were detached from their parent units and ordered to help. To attempt the recapture of Neuve Chapelle even more troops were required. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, out of the line at rest, was hurriedly recalled and sent to the area by train. Such a move had been anticipated and the Royal Flying Corps disrupted the rail traffic whenever possible. Unfortunately the RFC scouts did not see the arrival of several of these troop trains which arrived in the area after dark to escape detection. However, some were however reported arriving towards dusk at Wavrin, east of Neuve Chapelle. The newspapers of Thursday 11 March reported the Paris communiqué of Wednesday as follows:

Between the River Lys and La Bassée canal the British Army, supported by our heavy artillery, achieved an important success. It carried the village of Neuve Chapelle to the east of the road from Estaires to La Bassée and advanced to the north-east of this village in the direction of Bois du Biez, capturing 1,000 prisoners, including several officers and some machine-guns.

The German losses were very heavy. A later communiqué elaborated,

The 4th and Indian Corps advanced yesterday on a front of 4,000 yards, for roughly three quarters of a mile, and captured all the intervening hostile positions and trenches. The German version stated,

The British attacked our position near Neuve Chapelle, at some places penetrating into the village. The fighting continues. The Royal Flying Corps had kept up a presence over the battlefield itself whenever the weather permitted flying. Their duties included spotting for the guns and sending wireless messages back so that corrections to the shooting could be made. Several hair-raising low level flights over the battlefields were made to supply vital intelligence. Alas, the poor visibility diminished the value of these daring missions, which were fraught with danger. One aircraft was shot down. Two others were hit during the battle but managed to land safely. A new trench was dug across No Man’s Land by the Wiltshires to link up captured trenches near the Quadrilateral with the old front line. At least one battery of 4·7” guns was moved closer to the scene of action to try and overcome that weapon’s inaccuracy. The British rested, as best they could, whilst guarding their positions from an expected counter-attack. They were prepared to resume the offensive on the morning of 11 March, in accordance with Haig’s First Army Operation Order No.11. This had rather grandiose objectives, considering the setbacks of the first day and the Germans nocturnal activities, which ought to have been anticipated. They had worked frantically throughout the night reinforcing their existing strongpoints. They created a defensive line of breastworks and barbed wire to link together as many of them as possible. Some two hundred yards west of the Bois du Biez a new trench was dug, similarly protected, and heavily manned. This was in the area previously occupied by 2/2nd Gurkhas only a few hours earlier. British casualties at Neuve Chapelle. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Intelligence reports, largely from aircraft, confirmed the arrival of some German reinforcements. Unfortunately the arrival nearby of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (four regiments each of three battalions) was not observed. As there was no prospect of those soldiers arriving in the front line before daybreak on 11 March, they were kept hidden in woods and villages nearby throughout the day until dusk. There were potentially therefore an extra 12,000 enemy soldiers just behind the front lines of which the British were unaware. They were well rested and getting ready for action. The Bois du Biez from the air in March 1915. IWM Air 46/257

Map 8. The situation at nightfall, 10th March, 1915. 1 Originally an owner/driver as a chauffeur for very senior officers in France under the auspices of the Royal Automobile Club, he obtained a temporary commission, and rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was instrumental in the expansion of trench mortar units. 2 Privately printed notes in 1915 by Major J W Linell. RAMC, MC, MD 3 Col L W Shakespear. History of 2 King Edward’s Own Gookhas.

Chapter Four

IMPASSE 11th March The IVth and Indian Corps were ordered to continue their advance towards Aubers and Ligny le Grande in the morning. Both places are some two miles beyond the farthest point achieved the previous day! And they were behind the, by now, well-defended German positions. Not only that but the element of surprise was lost. The 7th and 8th Divisions were to try and achieve their original third objective of the battle. This was a line running from Rouge Banks in the north, to La Cliqueterie Farm via La Plouich. The Indian Corps, on the right flank, was to force its way through the Bois du Biez and then join up with 8th Division between Ligny le Grande and La Cliqueterie Farm. The new line, if achieved, would cut deep into German held territory, encircle the town of Aubers and capture the low but highly desirable Ridge. It was an ambitious and optimistic plan. The weather first thing on 11 March was very misty. This made it almost impossible for artillery Observation Officers to register the fall of their shells and make corrections when the short bombardment on known enemy positions commenced at 6.45am. Many of the new German positions were simply not seen and consequently not attacked during the fifteen minute barrage. It was limited to this duration to conserve the rapidly dwindling stock of shells which were being fired at a far greater rate than could be replaced. The seriousness of the situation can be judged in that the siege guns were only allotted five rounds each for that opening barrage. Even the 18 pounder field guns were only permitted to fire fifteen shells each!1 The shell scandal was still under wraps but would not be kept from the public for too much longer. Colonel Repington, War Correspondent of The Times, tipped off by Sir John French, was soon to explode the story to the world in his column. Sir John was using the undeniable shortage as his primary reason for the failure to break through at Neuve Chapelle. Although stockpiles of shells had been husbanded for several months for the battle it seems no one had accurately prophesied just how many would be required. Before battle commenced Rawlinson had told Kitchener,

From what I can gather we shall be sufficiently well off for amn to carry on a week’s hard fighting and after that the chances are we shall be better off in this respect than the enemy but we want more H.E. shell for the 18 pounder and better 4·7 shell.2

The Chateau east of Road Triangle in ruins. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Scene of German stand at the northern corner of Neuve Chapelle. On 7th Division front 21 Brigade troops were dug in all night between the Orchard and Mauquissart. They tried to proceed when the paltry barrage lifted but could make no progress against the welldefended German positions. 20 Brigade started out from the Moated Grange region at 7am to link up with 21 Brigade and was immediately greeted by small arms and artillery fire from many wellconcealed enemy guns. There was no shell shortage on the German side and they kept up a punishing barrage for three hours along the whole of the British lines. No real progress was made but an unfortunate report was received from 1/Grenadier Guards (20 Brigade), whose objective was the road junction called High Trees Corner, situated between Mauquissart and Nameless Cottages. The report indicated that they had crossed Layes Brook - some quarter of a mile beyond their objective and the German lines. It seemed to the generals that a breakthrough had after all been achieved. In fact the Guards had stumbled across one of the many ditches that lay between their starting point and intended objective. The misleading information caused the lengthening of the range of some British guns which were at that time still firing on German strongpoints. The latter therefore were no longer molested but free to continue to pour their deadly fire on the troops. The other battalions of 20 Brigade made no progress at all. Together with the Grenadiers they dug in and waited out the day under heavy shell fire. Numerous casualties were incurred during this time, most especially by 2/Gordons. It was during the course of this day that a most unfortunate incident occurred. Private Isaac Reid of 2/Scots Guards (20 Brigade), unable to stand the cacophony and stress of battle, deserted from his position. He was discovered in a rear area a few hours later and arrested. Reid subsequently appeared before a Field General Court Martial and, despite expressing regrets for his actions, was sentenced to

death. He was shot by firing squad on 9 April 1915 and initially buried at Laventie Communal Cemetery. Around 1950, owing to a shortage of space for civilian burials, the fourteen military graves there were removed to Longuenesse (St Omer) Souvenir Cemetery.3 Reid was not the only deserter from Neuve Chapelle but he was the only one executed as a direct consequence of it. The 8th Division fared no better than their comrades in the 7th Division. 24 Brigade leading the attack simply could not advance against such strong enemy fire. Telephone communications had failed and runners were killed. No one was quite sure what to do. In the circumstances they largely remained where they were. The 2/Rifle Brigade was still dug in east of the village. They had not been relieved since the initial assault and appeared to have been forgotten when the rest of their brigade, the 25th, had been re-deployed north to near Signpost Lane to reinforce 24 Brigade. According to the War Diary of 2/Rifle Brigade they received orders to, ready to relieve the Rifle Brigade but that,

‘withdraw when relieved by W. Yorkshire Regiment and to form up with the rest of the 25 Brigade ready to become a reserve to the advance of 24 Brigade. The W. Yorks never took over our trenches and the battalion remained where it was’.4 According to accounts by 2/West Yorks, in a different brigade we must remember, they relieved instead the Royal Irish Rifles. They state they had one company ready to relieve the Rifle Brigade but that,

‘the latter, however, owing to congestion in the trenches, did not vacate its position and in consequence the relief did not take place’.

2/Lt A C Walsh. X Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. Mortally wounded on 11 March 1915.

Lt Maurice Darby. 1/Grenadier Guards who was killed on 11 March leading his platoon. His last words were, ‘Come on lads’. He breasted a little bank and was shot dead. Whatever the truth of this, the consequences were dire. A very tired and fed up 2/Rifle Brigade remained to hold quite a long stretch of front during which time they were heavily shelled. Perhaps, because of the mix-up over relief and re-deployment, they never received all their subsequent orders. The Dehra Dun and Garhwal Brigades of the Meerut Division got into position during the night, ready to play their part in the attack on the 11th. Their general objective was the Bois du Biez. At this stage no one realised that the Germans had crept right through and then out of the wood during the night and had dug a new trench some 200 yards in front of it. An opening British bombardment, to soften up their foe first thing, was fired into the wood itself. Trees can absorb a great deal of punishment from shells and the defenders sheltering in the wood were largely unaffected by the desultory fire. Naturally their colleagues, actually in the new front line, were entirely unaffected by the shells, which sailed harmlessly overhead.

Many German soldiers killed in the battle remained unidentified.

Once more we find that confusion reigns. The original order that the brigades were all to advance together still applied. On the left flank of Meerut Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade kept a careful eye out for the arrival of their friends in the 8th Division. They expected several battalions from 25 Brigade to be moving forward on their left. The (stalled) attack was actually made by 24 Brigade, out of sight in the mist to the north, leaving 2/Rifle Brigade stranded. At about midday their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Stephens, received a message from Brigade HQ that, if the enemy attacked he was to counter attack ‘and follow him up’. Stephens advised that there was no sign of an enemy attack. He asked for permission to assail the north-west edge of the Bois du Biez with the support of the rest of the brigade. His request was refused. The Dehra Dun Brigade tried to advance but was checked by fire from the new German trench, enfilade fire from Layes Bridge and the sheer difficulty of crossing Layes Brook. The Jullundur Brigade, moved forward to support the Dehra Dun, was likewise impotent. Rumours of a German counter-attack mid-morning proved erroneous but nevertheless caused more precious artillery shells to be poured wastefully into the Bois du Biez. As no counter-attack by the Germans had so far materialised, Rawlinson ordered a fresh attempt to take their strongpoints. His orders to the 7th and 8th Divisions at 12.19pm were uncompromising.

It is most important that the buildings at the Moulin du Piètre and at the Mauquissart - Piètre cross roads should be captured without further delay. Lose no time in getting guns on to them and assaulting the buildings with infantry. Artillery support was arranged but no account was taken of the trenches by now linking the strongpoints. As yet no one realised they existed! Units from all three divisions tried to continue the thrust after a supporting barrage but could make no headway against the well-defended German positions all along the line. There were by now no gaps to be exploited. Communications once again proved almost impossible to maintain. Haig sent fresh orders to the Corps in the early afternoon. Corps then passed them on to the divisions. And then they were sent on to officers in command of units far away and out of touch. It was all very well giving orders, but there was no one available to receive and carry them out! The only fighting soldiers to actually learn of the fresh attack by 24 Brigade were two companies of the Worcesters. They were finally ordered to spearhead the advance some five minutes after the supporting barrage had ceased! They tried desperately to get forward and convey to the other battalions the general order to advance. A few got through and then attempts by the Northants, Sherwood Foresters and the other two companies of Worcesters met with costly failure. They were being shot down like targets at a fairground. The only progress, if it can be called that, was the occupation, at great loss of life, by the Sherwood Foresters of two isolated and damaged buildings by the Mauquissart Road. This position, which was later to achieve notoriety, was subsequently renamed the Duck’s Bill.

A wounded Indian soldier photographed after his capture at Neuve Chapelle by Unteroffizer Heinrich Walterman. 22/Field Artillery Rgt. 13 Division. JULIAN SYKES Back with the Meerut Division there was still confusion. Once again messages were delayed in transmission and when finally received by operational units were far too late to implement. The difficulties of communication throughout the battle, and the time required to ensure orders were actually received at their intended destination, were grossly underestimated. Such is the typical case of the Dehra Dun Brigade. They had waited all morning for 25 Brigade to appear and support their left. When they did not show, the brigade-major visited 2/Rifle Brigade and was told of their last orders, to remain in situ unless attacked. When there was still no sign of 25 Brigade in response to the orders for the afternoon attack, the brigade-major once more journeyed to see their nearest battalion, 2/Rifle Brigade. He was actually shown the message ordering them not to move forward. They had not been informed of the existence of a renewed afternoon attack and had no alternative but to remain where they were pending proper orders to do otherwise. The staff officer was not best pleased - nor was Brigadier-General Jacob commanding Dehra Dun Brigade! In consequence, as there was evidently to be no co-operation on the left flank by 25 Brigade troops, the attack of the Dehra Dun Brigade was called off. When it was realised by Major-General Davies in the middle of the afternoon that 24 Brigade was making no headway he ordered 25 Brigade to attack in conjunction with the Dehra Dun Brigade. Brigadier-General Lowry Cole called on 2/Rifle Brigade to arrange that advance. He was surprised to learn that following the abortive visit of the Dehra Dun brigade-major, that brigade was probably going to abandon its own attack. With no means of lateral communication being available he was

rather thwarted, and in consequence called off 25 Brigade attack. The Dehra Dun Brigade did indeed abort its own attack and, with divisional approval, withdrew to more secure positions. Thus two brigades had each planned to attack in conjunction with each other. As each in turn erroneously thought the other was going to abandon its own attack, both brigades then cancelled the advance and neither went forward! This group of Indian prisoners captured at Neuve Chapelle was also photographed by Unteroffiezer Heinrich Walterman. 22/Field Artillery Rgt. 13 Division. JULIAN SYKES

The work of the medical services deserves special attention. Unfortunately, because of the ferocity of the fighting, there were some long delays in getting help. Many stretcher bearers were killed collecting the wounded. A casualty was first taken to a Regimental Aid Post close by where the principal job was to stop the bleeding and temporarily dress the wound. The man was then moved back to a designated medical unit called a Field Ambulance. There were several of these situated as close to the scene of battle as was judged reasonably safe. A field ambulance had many functions. It supplied further treatment at its Advanced Dressing Station. It could also offer temporary accommodation to the lightly wounded or transport for the more serious cases. The latter were moved on to a Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) which was a temporary hospital set up out of the fighting zone. Sometimes 800 patients arrived at a time, many without adequate dressings on their wounds. There were seven opened for Neuve Chapelle. Those at Aire, Chocques, Lillers and Merville were for the British. Three more, at St Venant, Busnes and Lillers were designated for Indians. Together they admitted 8,181 wounded during those few days.5 The principal task of the CCS was to receive and stabilise wounded soldiers and then arrange for their early evacuation, depending upon the severity of the injury. Some soldiers, with a ‘Blighty’ wound, were recommended for repatriation to Britain. The CCS rarely kept patients more than a few days; the exceptions being cases with severe abdominal wounds where it was judged there was little chance of recovery. Most often the men were passed, by ambulance trains and other means of transport, into the care of the larger stationery hospitals, several of which were set up along the coast. The hospitals in Rouen and Boulogne had

previously been emptied as much as possible in anticipation of casualties from Neuve Chapelle. Many patients were returned to England. Hundreds of wounded Indian soldiers were sent to Brighton, Sussex for treatment. They were accommodated in emergency hospitals created for the purpose. A committee of convalescent Indian officers was appointed to ensure that all caste regulations, especially in the cooking and distribution of food, were observed. Special provision was made for religious observance and a temporary musjid was built in the absence of a mosque. Some 647 men came to the Kitchener Hospital, formerly a workhouse, as a direct result of injuries received at Neuve Chapelle. Others were treated at the Royal Pavilion, Brighton which resembles an Indian temple. Those few Hindu and Sikh Indian soldiers who unfortunately died as a result of their injuries were cremated at a special burning ghât erected on the South Downs overlooking Brighton. The Chattri (monument) was later erected on the site in their honour and their names are recorded on the Memorial in Hollybrook Cemetery, Southampton. The Musulmans (Muslims) who died of their injuries were originally buried in the grounds of the mosque which had been established at Horsell Common, Woking, Surrey in 1899. In 1969 they were re-interred in the Great War Plot of Brookwood Cemetery, about four miles away. The following extracts from a letter written at a temporary Canadian War Hospital give some idea of what life must have been like then for the nurses.

March 11th [We are] informed that a train load of about 250 was being sent on, of which number, 84 were bad stretcher cases. It is close upon midnight when the ambulances make their first journey from the station and the unloading and passing before the Admitting Officer begins. Quickly and silently they file along the corridors, these broken men from the trenches, whose accumulated miseries we cannot realise. Khaki caked with clay, ragged, dirty, and worn out, they stagger into the warmth and light of the wards. A long line of stretchers fills the hall-ways next and even here it is the exception to hear a groan or complaint. Bodies are literally shattered, and the journey must have been a terrible one, even in the wonderfully fitted hospital train. At each station we were told some dead had been removed and cases of gas-gangrene have already developed and in thirty-six hours are very far advanced.

The dedication of the Indian Chattri on the Downs near Brighton on the first of February 1921. “How many hours before you were picked up?” asks a sister of one. “Twenty-six, sister, but I dug my head into a refuge, and was only hit once again, thank God.” “How were you wounded?” another is questioned. “It was at the last of their trenches that a big Prussian got me, but it was his last shot,” and he shows me a helmet with a bayonet thrust cleaving it, which he has treasured all the way from the field. Another apologises: “I can’t sleep, a bed is sort of queer; I haven’t been near one for eight months; but it is good to have a hot bath and clean clothes, mine haven’t been off for a month.” In one cot there is a lad picked up on the field without a coat, identification disc is absent, no name or number can be found about him, and a brain injury makes it a question whether he will ever be included in any list but ‘missing’. As a rule these sufferers are silent, but here and there writhing forms and smothered groans tell of agony drugs cannot relieve. Some have limbs reduced to pulp, others have lost an eye, while a few unconscious cases claim close attention. Just when the new arrivals are finally settled, a list of names is sent up to the wards of those to be transferred to another hospital farther south, owing to the policy of constant evacuation in order to keep vacant beds nearest to the front.

Captain Alastair St John M Warrand. 4 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

Back at the front the dead were collected during the night and buried by a working party. Communication trenches were dug and positions strengthened. The Royal Flying Corps had been in action earlier in the day. Three BE2b aeroplanes from 4 Squadron, each carrying two 100lb bombs, took off at 4.45am on the first ever attempt at night bombing. They were heading for the railway junction south-east of Lille. One aircraft crashed soon after take-off but the others headed east into the darkness. There was thick fog and the two aircraft, descending very low to see their target, were shot down by flak. Captain Alastair Warrand and Captain Gilbert Mapplebeck survived their forced landings into enemy territory but Warrand had been wounded in the leg and was captured by the Germans. He was transferred to hospital in Lille where he died from his injuries on 19 March 1915. He is buried in Lille Southern Cemetery. Captain Mapplebeck was initially more fortunate. He evaded capture after his crash near Lille, and made his way back to Britain via Holland. He resumed flying, only to be accidentally killed when his aircraft suddenly plunged into the ground during trials on 24 August 1915. It is possible to summarise 11 March 1915 as a day of little real movement but considerable loss of life occasioned by abortive attempts to assail unassailable German positions. The problems were again caused by poor communications and the inability of the artillery to hit virtually invisible targets. Haig personally visited the 7th Division HQ in the afternoon to appraise the position himself at first hand. He ordered more guns to be brought closer to the battle zone so that they would stand a far greater chance of actually hitting their targets when the battle was resumed the following day. 1 The Seventh Division 1914-1918 by C T Atkinson p.142. 2 Rawlinson’s letters 6/3/15 op. cit. 3 Shot at Dawn. J Putkowski & J Sykes p. 40; Also PRO WO71/406 4

PRO War Diary WO95/1731 5 Official History - Medical Services, Casualties & Medical Statistics of the Great War p.28 Map 9. German reinforcements on 11 March.

Chapter Five

COUNTER ATTACK 12th March When darkness fell on 11 March those German battalions which had remained hidden all day moved into position ready for the planned recapture of Neuve Chapelle. Their offensive was to cover the entire front from north of the Moated Grange to the German trenches south of Port Arthur taken by 1/39th Garhwal Rifles that first day. Further reserves in the shape of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division were on hand. They were all in position ready for the counter attack to start at 4.30am. In total 16,000 enemy troops [see the German Order of Battle] were poised waiting for their revenge. A ferocious, but fortunately largely ineffectual, bombardment commenced, and after half an hour the infantry rushed forward. German shells bursting close to British postions during the battle. IWM Q49207

Sergeant Self, of 2/West Yorks machine-gun detachment, had been in action the first day. Following the first morning’s infantry advance he skirted north of the village. By early afternoon his team with Maxim guns passed through an orchard and set up in a ruined building well in advance of the rest of the battalion. They could not understand why the British did not press on that first day. They eventually stayed there all night and fortunately met little opposition. Early on 11 March Captain Perry, with Sergeant Self and his team, moved to a new position near to the Bois du Biez. They were about 400 yards in advance of their own main force and Sergeant Self said, ‘It was fantastic to see our shells dropping from the sky’. The isolated Maxim gun team stayed hidden throughout the day and waited for the counter-attack. It did not come that day and again they waited. He describes the events which occurred on 12 March.

At about 5am it happened. A shout, “They’re on us”. And they were. The gunner pressed the button. A stream of bullets, 600 rounds per minute met them, an enemy grenade thrower blew up with his own bombs. The gunner was hit by a bit of shrapnel, a Blighty one. I took his place. The M.G. officer stepped into my place [and] next moment he was hit. He died on the 15th, three days later. I emptied the belt of 250 rounds, the rush was checked with the sole exception of one man who crawled into our trench badly wounded. They did not pass. [On] reloading I saw another mass come out of the wood, what a target. One could not miss. It was just slaughter. A third lot came out of the wood further down, but there was no escape. It was again a dose of their own medicine with interest.1

German Reserve troops in a base camp three miles behind Neuve Chapelle.

Because of the poor light and mist the first waves of Germans had advanced very close to our lines before being spotted. Some got as close as fifty yards. Although the artillery barrage gave fair warning of the onslaught, the exact time of its emergence from the gloom was unknown. All eyes were peeled but it is just as well that Sgt Self’s unit was to hand. In addition to recovering all the ground lost on 10 March the Germans wanted to seize the cross-roads at Port Arthur which were held by the Indian Corps. During the course of 12 March great gallantry was to be shown and eight Victoria Crosses awarded. The German counter-attack was under way. 21 Brigade, which covered the area in front of the Quadrilateral, held on grimly despite 2/Wiltshires having one of their companies overwhelmed, with great loss. Help initially came in the shape of experienced bombers from the brigade reserve bombing company. The bombers did sterling work and one of them, Corporal William Anderson (2/Yorks), won the Victoria Cross for his exploits. His citation describes the action. Cpl William Anderson, 2/Yorks winning the Victoria Cross on 12 March 1915. He was killed the next day.

For most conspicuous bravery at Neuve Chapelle on 12th March 1915, when he led three men with bombs against a large party of the enemy who had entered our trenches, and by his prompt and determined action saved, what might have otherwise have become, a serious situation. Corporal Anderson first threw his own bombs, then those in possession of his three men (who had become wounded) amongst the Germans, after which he opened rapid rifle fire upon them with great effect, notwithstanding that he was at the time quite alone.2 The 2/Yorks (Green Howards), still having their machine-gunners with them, had repulsed the Germans on their own front and caused substantial losses. Further round, opposite 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers, the Germans broke through before 2/Bedfords countered. Their attack was costly in British lives until Captain Charles Foss DSO (2/Bedfords) enfiladed the Germans with a grenade attack. His gallantry, like Corporal Anderson’s, was also rewarded with the Victoria Cross, the only one to an officer during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The citation, which was not published in the London Gazette until 23 August reads,

... After the enemy had captured a part of one of our trenches, and our counterattack made with one officer and 20 men having failed (all but two of the party being killed or wounded in the attempt), Captain Foss, on his own initiative, dashed forward with eight men, under heavy fire, attacked the enemy with bombs, and captured the position, including the 52 Germans occupying it.

Captain Charles Foss, 2/Bedfords, wins the Victoria Cross.

The capture of this position from the enemy was of the greatest importance, and the utmost bravery was displayed in assaying the task with so very few men. The King presented the Victoria Cross to Captain Foss on 28 October during an inspection of troops paraded near Hesdigneul-les-Béthune. During that day the King’s horse reared suddenly, slipped back and fell on him after being startled by the three hearty cheers given without warning by the soldiers. His Majesty was quite badly injured and had to be stretchered off to receive urgent medical aid. Foss’ action most certainly precipitated the hurried departure from the scene of very many more Germans poised to attack when the opportunity presented itself. The position itself, a salient now into the German lines at a point near Mauquissart, was perhaps of greater importance to morale than of strategic significance. It was not one of the deadly strong points that the British had striven so hard to destroy. Captain Orbell Oakes, a Boer War veteran, was killed in this action. He was hit in the head by a bullet and, according to the letter of consolation sent to his parents, his death ‘was instantaneous’. As the official date of death is given as 13 March it makes one wonder just how quick ‘instantaneous’ was. Map 10. German counter-attack on 12th March, 1915.

The sector east and north-east of the village was defended by 24 Brigade. The German steam-roller against them initially lost much of its impetus due to a delay in implementing the order to attack. It was not only the British Army that suffered from communication difficulties. As a result, two German units became intermingled and their attack was not as co-ordinated as they would have wished. The 11th Jägers, reinforced by 21st Bavarian Reserve and 133 Saxon Regiments attacked the front held by 1/Worcesters and 2/Northants. Leading the Bavarians was ‘a fat old blighter on a horse’.3 The enemy there was repulsed by accurate rifle fire. The Sherwood Foresters farther south were not so fortunate. They still held that outpost situated in a couple of wrecked farm buildings in No Man’s Land, just beyond the eastern end of the Sunken Road [later - the Duck’s Bill]. Naturally it was the first part of the battalion lines to be attacked. After fierce fighting most of the defenders were killed. Almost simultaneously, the Germans turned their attention on the three companies situated in the trench alongside Nameless Cottage Lane, south-west from the Sunken Road, and forced them to retreat. The Germans, by driving into the British lines in that area, found themselves in a small salient. They were greeted on all sides by a flurry of bombs and rifle fire and then charged separately by units from both the West Yorks and Worcesters. In desperation the Germans retreated back to their lines after suffering several hundred casualties. The Worcesters, not content with pushing the foe just back to his starting point, continued the thrust and secured the notorious Nameless Cottages position.

Cpt Orbell Oakes, 2/Yorkshires.

The Worcesters had their tails up with a vengeance. They chased the Germans up and down that muddy field like terriers after rats. They pursued them with the bayonet round the trees.4 From their advanced position they requested additional support from 24 Brigade for a further advance they thought ought to succeed. The 24 Brigade was unable to offer help owing to the mauling it had received earlier. The Worcesters held on alone, repelling German counter attacks and dodging artillery shells from both sides. Eventually their position was encircled on three sides by the enemy and became untenable. They were forced to retreat to their former line losing many men, including 85 their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Wodehouse. It seems the British gunners were not aware that their comrades had taken some German trenches along the Mauquissart Road. Those trenches were shelled and their British occupants either killed or forced to retire. This happened largely because artillery officers were unable to distinguish between friend and foe at the distances involved, given the poor weather conditions and lack of observation positions. Intended targets were not often properly pinpointed and troops waiting to go forward were sometimes hit. Another reason was, of course, poor communications between the batteries and troops on the ground. All this was ‘allowed for ’ in the calculation of estimated battle casualties. Unfortunately however, the incompetence of some batteries also had a part to play in the generation of unnecessary deaths and injuries. The diary for 81 Siege Battery, which had had so much trouble the first day, includes these notes. 12th March

No light for observation. FOO could not see more than 50x [yards].

13th March

Told during bombardment that our shells were falling short into our trenches. Hardly think it possible as I had gone up 30’ from last registered round. 5

Those guns were not properly registered until 15 March. A trifle late.

Although severely mauled when overrun by the German advance at first light, the Sherwood Foresters mustered enough strength to force their way back to the trenches they had lost. During the action yet another VC was won, this time by Jacob Rivers (1/Notts & Derby - Sherwood Foresters). His citation refers to two separate acts of courage during that morning’s frantic fighting. Such was the ferocity of the conflict that on the second occasion he was killed and, in the confusion of battle, his body lost forever. Pte Jacob Rivers, 1/Notts and Derby, who was killed winning the Victoria Cross on 12 March 1915.

The next section of the front to feel the weight of the massed German infantry was the half mile stretch in front of the Bois du Biez. The German reserves moved forward from where they had hidden overnight in the depths of the wood. Their first wave was already crowded into the new trench, dug in front of the wood on the night of 10/11 March. Advance parties had even occupied the evacuated Dehra Dun trench. The Garhwal Brigade, supported on their northern flank by 2/Rifle Brigade (25 Brigade), had intelligence that an attack was imminent. They were assembled ready to meet the German onslaught which soon materialised, having crossed silently over Layes Brook by means of portable bridges. The shadowy forms in field grey blended into the haze at first but gradually became discernible as the enemy. The German force here was exceptionally strong. Some five battalions were in the first massed attack. They were supported by three more in reserve. They presented an unmissable target. Hundreds were annihilated by the ·303 bullets which did not stop with the first man hit, but continued on through the bodies of successive ranks. Besides 2/Rifle Brigade, 2/3rd Gurkhas and 2/Leicesters also experienced a taste of revenge. General Anderson calculated that the enemy’s losses in dead alone on the front occupied by the Meerut Division amounted to 2,000. The power of the machine-gun was most ably demonstrated by Captain Lodwick, 2/3rd Gurkhas and machine-gun officer of the Garhwal Brigade. He surveyed the area and positioned the brigade’s twenty guns to their best advantage. By his foresight and direction of his guns in action, Lodwick was to a great extent personally responsible for the enemy being halted so decisively. He was awarded the DSO for his courage and expertise. The courage and fortitude of the Indian engineers must not be overlooked. Havildar Ismail Khan of 21 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners was working in front of the line when he was shot through both legs, one being smashed. The havildar ’s reaction is remarkable,

His first expression of opinion was one of admiration for the German sniper, who, he considered, had carefully waited until his legs were in line, so as to damage both with one shot! The havildar, who expressed his view with grave and measured approval, evidently looked upon this feat as a fine example of war economy.6 The southern-most part of the German offensive was pitched against the other two battalions of the Garhwal Brigade, namely 1/39th Garhwal Rifles and their rescuers of 10 March, 1/Seaforth Highlanders. Like their sister battalions they too were aware of the enemy’s likely intentions. The Port Arthur salient and the crossroads there were the centre of attention for elements of 16th, 56th 104th and 139th German Infantry Regiments - an estimated 2,000 troops.7 Initially the area was heavily shelled. One officer described it as, ‘a foretaste of hell’. The artillery fire extended to Roome’s Trench and the Crescent. When the Germans attacked they were swept with rifle, mortar and machinegun fire and brought to a complete halt with massive casualties.

At 5.45am dense masses of Germans appeared, coming on at their usual jog-trot. In the uncertain light they resembled Highlanders, their overcoats giving the appearance of kilts, but when they arrived within 100 yards of our line, the spikes of their helmets could be discerned. It seemed at first as if no fire could stop them, so impressive was the sight of this great multitude of men. The effect of concentrated machine-gun and rifle fire must, however, be witnessed to be fully appreciated. The surging mass came on much as a heavy swell rolls towards the seashore. At one moment the very earth seemed to be advancing towards our line, and nothing apparently could save us from being overwhelmed. The next moment a furious fusillade broke from our trenches. It ceased just as daylight appeared, and where before were swelling lines of men moving on in their awe-compelling progress, now, as an officer relates, nothing was to be seen but heaps of dead and wounded Germans. Piles of wriggling, heaving bodies lay on the ground, and the air resounded with shrieks, groans, and curses....The slaughter was prodigious. In front of the Leicesters, 1st Seaforths and 2/3rd Gurkhas, some 600 dead were counted. 8 A flank attack on 2/Black Watch, manning the old front line along the Rue du Bois south of the crossroads, was also repulsed. Isolated pockets of Germans cut off from their own lines along the whole front were attacked with bomb and bullet. Many surrendered. Those who chose to fight on were, in the main, killed. The communication problems suffered so far did not improve. Higher Command was not aware of the extent of the German attack or that it had been rebuffed with a possibility of a British follow-up but only if they acted immediately. Orders did not allow for this eventuality. On the previous day Haig had issued instructions for the British offensive to be resumed at 10.30am on 12 March. He had not planned for the enormous German counter-attack that morning and a large scale retaliatory initiative was not the province of local British commanders. Despite the horrendous enemy losses, those of the British were still severe. The survivors were wet, cold and very weary. Some had been in action in the

trenches for well over two days without rest and little proper food. Initially, because the weather did not permit aerial observation to aid the artillery, that day’s attack was postponed at the request of Rawlinson. It was re-scheduled for 12.30pm following an attempted artillery bombardment of the residual German strongpoints. Fortunately the one at Nameless Cottages was now in our hands. The bombardment, the Brigade diary states was, ‘ineffective’ and positions such as Layes Bridge redoubt remained virtually undamaged. Despite this both Corps commanders agreed with Haig that his planned attack should go ahead. Two battalions of 25 Brigade pushed forward at 12.30pm. The Irish Rifles from their position in the north of Road Triangle, moving towards Layes Bridge were greeted by heavy rifle and machinegun fire. ‘Almost every man who exposed himself was instantly shot down.’9 Captain Collins and several others who volunteered to cut the wire were killed. As advance seemed suicidal, LieutenantColonel Laurie ordered a halt. Brigadier-General Lowry Cole, on realising the attack had faltered, came to see why. He agreed it would be a sheer waste of life to press on before dark. His orders were however countermanded at 4pm and, after yet another equally ineffective bombardment, a fresh attack commenced. Every man going forward was knocked down. Once more the attack ground to a halt. This time Colonel Laurie was counted among the dead. The 2/Rifle Brigade in turn advanced towards the north-west corner of the Bois du Biez and Layes Bridge. They had to advance some 400 yards over ploughed ground intersected by dykes. The angle of attack imposed upon them invited and received severe enfilade fire from the enemy and many good men were lost. They were badly mauled and beaten back by the massed machine-guns within Layes Bridge Redoubt and the new trench in front of the wood, both of which had been reinforced over-night. Small inroads were made by individual units but in the main the attack halted just three quarters of an hour after it started with virtually no progress. A planned attack by the Sirhind and Jullundur Brigades of the Lahore Division and covering nearly a mile of front facing the Bois du Biez, was postponed just minutes before it was due to commence at 11am. Once more the time it took to pass messages nearly caused disaster. Elements of 1/4th Gurkhas and 2/Leicesters actually did advance to the old Dehra Dun trench by Layes Brook, which had been evacuated the previous night. In doing so they killed several and captured more Germans skulking in that trench following their abortive early morning counter-attack. The actual Indian Corps attack finally got under way at 1pm following an artillery bombardment. It was not a success, for the German stützpunkt at Layes Bridge inflicted severe losses on both 1/4th Gurkhas and 1/Highland Light Infantry. That same strong-point, virtually untouched by artillery and still bristling with machine-guns, also defeated the attack by the Jullundur Brigade on the left of it. They in turn were expecting their left flank to be supported by 25 Brigade which, as we have seen, was also pinned down. Two battalions of 20 Brigade, 2/Scots Guards and 2/Borders, suffered severely on 12 March as a result of a breakdown in communications. Both battalions proceeded with the planned attack at 10.30am unaware that it had been postponed. The reason was simple enough. There were no telephone lines to either battalion and the runners sent had perished trying to get through with their messages. Another German strong-point lay ahead. It was the Quadrilateral and was heavily defended by machine-guns. It inflicted many casualties before the attack was halted pending artillery support. Fortunately the shells found their mark here and the Quadrilateral, with many of its defenders, was at last captured. A survivor of this part of the action was Private J McCauley of 2/Borders. He described to his local newspaper in the Isle of Man his dash to the German lines and expressed surprise that he

had survived.

... in our wake piercing screams and appealing cries for stretcher bearers. The whole strip of ground, the longest strip of No Man’s Land I ever raced across throughout the whole war, was now blood drenched earth. Each brigade required their battalions to contribute a number of men to train in the art of ‘bombing’ or grenade throwing. They came under the jurisdiction of their brigade and groups of them were detached to assist whenever a battalion went into action. A cadre was retained by the brigade to allow for a reserve of bombers which could then be dispatched to places of crisis. About the same time as the Quadrilateral was stormed, 20 Brigade dispatched their bombers to help the Wiltshires in their push on the left flank. This small group of men included two from 1/Grenadier Guards - rather appropriate considering their job that day was ‘grenadiers’ or bomb throwers. They were Lance Corporal Wilfred Fuller and Private Edward Barber and both won the Victoria Cross independently in the course of that assault supporting the Wiltshires. Neither incident was connected, although similar in execution and result - namely the large numbers of prisoners they each secured.

Pte Edward Barber 1/Grenadier Guards winning the Victoria Cross. Both citations were published in the London Gazette of 19 April 1915 and read: L/Cpl W Fuller VC, 1/Grenadier Guards.

No. 15624 Lance-Corporal Wilfred Dolby Fuller, 1st Bn Grenadier Guards. For most conspicuous bravery at Neuve Chapelle on 12th March 1915. Seeing a party of the enemy endeavouring to escape along a communication trench, he ran towards them and killed the leading man with a bomb; the remainder (nearly 50) finding no means of evading his bombs, surrendered to him. Lance-Corporal Fuller was quite alone at the time. No. 15518 Private Edward Barber, 1st Bn Grenadier Guards. For most conspicuous bravery on 12th March 1915, at Neuve Chapelle. He ran speedily in front of the grenade company to which he belonged and threw bombs on the enemy with such effect that a very great number of them at once surrendered. When the grenade party reached Private Barber they found him quite alone and unsupported with the enemy surrendering all about him. Fortunately these two gallant men were not left alone for too long and help arrived to occupy the trenches they had fought over. The front line in this area was now broadly parallel to, and quite close to, the road running from Mauquissart to Rue Tilleloy. The area was very complex and more than one unit became lost in the maze of ditches and trenches which criss-crossed it. The road itself was in No Man’s Land and the hamlet of Mauquissart remained in German hands. 22 Brigade still occupied the front line north of the battle area which had remained static throughout. Their troops, often at near right angles to the enemy as they retreated, continued to fire upon them whenever an opportunity presented itself. The close proximity of 22 Brigade did nothing to aid communications, however. A misleading report was received by First Army Headquarters at 1pm on 12 March. It implied that the road junction north of Nameless Cottages had been taken by 24 Brigade. A further report one hour later seemed to confirm the general advance in that area. It intimated that the Moulin du Piètre had been captured and that the units involved were still pushing on. In the din and confusion of battle British prisoners being

escorted through Germans lines near Mauquissart had seemed to distant observers like a vanguard spearheading an advance. If indeed a breakthrough had occurred, as it so appeared, then it must be exploited with all speed and vigour. After consultation, Haig issued a directive to his corps commanders at 3.06pm for immediate onward transmission. It was [in hindsight!] over optimistic and, in view of the true situation seemed heartless. It ordered,

‘Information indicates that enemy on our front are much demoralised. Indian Corps and IV Corps will push through the barrage of fire regardless of loss, using reserves if required’. If the units out in the field felt isolated and incommunicado, so too did High Command. It sometimes took hours for messages to get right through from a front line platoon officer to Haig’s Headquarters. The staff there then had to consider the overall strategy and decide the best course of action. They had to take into account resources (thought to be) available, known (or supposed) enemy dispositions and the known (or supposed) location of adjacent brigades. It was not all one sided. The village of Neuve Chapelle in 1915. IWM AIR 38/877

The staff officers did not have adequate communications. They were plagued with inaccurate information. They did not have aerial reconnaissance reports for much of the battle due to poor visibility. They were constrained by the necessity to conserve artillery ammunition. And they did not have a crystal ball. All they could do was make their best judgements based upon information available at the time. Because of faulty information they sometimes issued faulty orders. Hindsight was not yet available as an option. To take full advantage of any actual breakthrough Haig needed more reserves, especially cavalry, ready to pour through any gap. He contacted his Field Marshal for extra help and it was approved. Further costly diversionary attacks were ordered and commenced on the fronts adjacent to Neuve Chapelle. Willcocks, on receipt of Haig’s missive, attempted to get the attack on his Corps front kick-started again. The division detailed was the Lahore and they were in no position to proceed. Their two advance brigades were bogged down and the Ferozepore Brigade was in still reserve and not yet in the battle area. It was brought into immediate readiness and set off at 5pm to cover the two miles to bring them to the firing line. General Haig, anxious to learn from his corps commanders what exactly was happening, journeyed from his advanced headquarters in Merville the four miles to La Croix Marmuse, to visit the Indian Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Willcocks. Haig was told of the earlier failure of the Sirhind

and Jullundur Brigades at Layes Bridge and for once sanctioned a spearhead attack on the right of the battlefield along the La Bassée Road. He agreed to by-passing that formidable stützpunkt rather than again confronting it head on. Brigadier-General Egerton, commanding Ferozepore Brigade, was instructed to ascertain when a fresh attack by all three brigades would be ready to proceed. He needed to consult with Brigadier-General W G Walker VC, the senior brigadier who had led both Sirhind and Jullundur earlier that afternoon. They finally met at 7.20pm and then the true state of the two brigades that had fought earlier became apparent. They were exhausted and certainly not fit and ready to traipse across country to take part in Haig’s suggested flank attack at the proposed time of 8.30pm. Willcocks was informed of the situation and instead of re-scheduling the attack for a later hour abandoned it altogether. Sir Henry Rawlinson did not get a personal visit from his chief. He nevertheless decided, upon receipt of his orders at 3.20pm, to call on both Major-General Capper (7th Division) and MajorGeneral Davies (8th Division). He stressed the importance of a determined assault and not to pay heed to the cost in human lives. Rawlinson also wanted cavalry immediately available to exploit the expected breakthrough. To cover the advance of the two divisions a bombardment by heavy artillery commenced at 4.40pm. Unfortunately the precious shells were largely wasted. They were not aimed at the German front line, thought to have fallen to British troops, but at rear areas, the destruction of which was not so essential at that time. The 7th Division had 21 Brigade and elements from 20 Brigade spread out in the maze of trenches and ditches from the Moated Grange to the Quadrilateral. It was found impossible to co-ordinate any coherent attack and General Capper was eventually obliged to confess that situation to his Corps Commander. Essentially the 7th Division was unable to contribute to the planned late afternoon push. At this stage initial preparations commenced for renewed fighting the following day. In the more southern sector of the 8th Division, 25 Brigade responded at 5.15pm, when the Irish Rifles and Rifle Brigade launched their attack. It was no use. They were immediately cut down as they clambered out of their trenches, despite great heroism being once more displayed by their men. A second attempt by C and D Company of the Rifle Brigade was ordered. The progress of both was hampered by murderous machine-gun fire and belts of barbed wire. Two men, great friends, immediately volunteered for the suicidal task of cutting a path through it. They crawled out under a hail of bullets and began cutting the strands with wire-cutters. At first they seemed to be succeeding, for it was the bottom strands they cut first. As they worked their way upwards into the tangle first one then the other was shot. One man, CSM Harry Daniels, was hit in the thigh and just after that his friend, Corporal Reginald Noble, was mortally wounded by a bullet in his chest. Daniels made a full recovery after hospitalisation in England. Noble unfortunately died of his injuries in hospital near St Omer. By 5.45pm the situation was so hopeless that the desperate attempts to get forward were mercifully cancelled. For their courage both Daniels and Noble were each awarded the Victoria Cross - theirs would be the last for the battle of Neuve Chapelle.

Cpl. Noble

CSM Harry Daniels The action during which Cpl. Noble and CSM Daniels of 2/Rifle Brigade each won a Victoria Cross.

23 Brigade deployed 2/Devons and 2/Scottish Rifles. Their orders were to force their way through to the Piètre Road - a hopeless task. Both battalions had suffered severe casualties already and were now being asked to sacrifice more. 24 Brigade was still holding the line gained earlier. They deployed 4/Cameron Highlanders, from reserve, into the fray. Initially the Highlanders become lost in the confused trench system. All attempts by the three battalions to push forward failed. And each time they halted, the men of 23 Brigade collapsed into almost catatonic sleep. They were in a state of

complete physical, and no doubt mental, exhaustion, having been fighting since 8am on 10 March and awake a lot earlier than that. It was almost impossible to rouse them - or, indeed, to distinguish sleeping soldiers from the numerous corpses which littered the battlefield. To add to the problems a low, but very thick and wire reinforced, thorn hedge was discovered in their path. It was virtually insurmountable. By now it was nearly midnight and the situation was judged hopeless. As no progress was being made, and information filtered through that the divisions on either side had also failed, the attack was at long last halted. St Christopher’s Church bell amid the ruins of the church. ROBERT MALLEVAY

By the issue of First Army Operation Order No 13 at 10.40pm on 12 March, General Haig officially ended the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. His order stated,

The 4th and Indian Corps will continue to hold the advanced line reached by them today. This line to be established as a defensive line and secured against attack including wiring. The general advance will not be continued tomorrow without further orders and reliefs may be carried out within Corps accordingly.

Map 11. Opposing lines at the close of battle. Church Street after the war. The buildings were reduced to rubble. ROBERT MALLEVAY

All that was left of St Christopher’s Church. The crucifix, propped up but still standing, can be seen in the background. ROBERT MALLEVAY

The crucifix which stood alongside St Christopher’s Church and was still standing at the end of the war with only moderate dameage.

Following a visit from Haig on 13 March, Field Marshal Sir John French accepted the situation. He then told his boss in Whitehall, Lord Kitchener, ‘Cessation of the forward movement is necessitated today by the fatigue of the troops, and, above all, by the want of ammunition’. Kitchener was not best pleased. He had a particular sensitivity to the expenditure of artillery ammunition and regarded any shells fired above certain set limits to be a complete waste of money. His combat experiences were unfortunately confined to the vast open expanses of Africa where a few well-placed shrapnel shells would often rout the enemy. Kitchener had not allowed for the well concealed, strongly entrenched, and highly professional German Army in the confines of France. The 7th Division had one more go early on 13 March to press forward near Mauquissart, but that attack was unsuccessful and costly in lives. Many battalions from the 8th Division ‘holding the line’ still came under fire and casualties continued to be suffered in the aftermath of the battle.

Fresh graves amid the ruins of Neuve Chapelle. The battle was over. The recriminations were about to begin. Jobs were at stake. 1 The papers of Sergeant A Self MM MiD. 2/West Yorks ‘Gunner in a Ring Side Seat.’ IWM Ref 74/154/1 2 London Gazette 22 May 1915 and Army Order 219/1915. He was unfortunately killed in action the following day and is commemorated on the Le Touret Memorial. 3 Captain H F Stacke. The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War. p.63. 4 Ibid.

5 PRO War Diary WO95/225 6 Lt/Col J Merewether. The Indian Corps in France. p.240. 7 Official History 1915. Part 1. p.137 footnote. 8 Merewether. p.254. 9 Cyril Falls. The Royal Irish Rifles in the Great War. p.30. German soldiers surrender at Neuve Chapelle.

Chapter Six

THE AFTERMATH The first duty was to relieve as many of the exhausted troops as possible. From the 7th Division both 20 and 21 Brigades were withdrawn to Corps Reserve. 22 Brigade which had, with few exceptions, not advanced during the battle, was to remain pro tem holding the original northern front line. Their total casualties had been very light when compared to the other brigades of the division. The 8th Division, which suffered twice the casualties of the 7th Division, was ordered to relieve them. One would have thought they had already ‘done their bit’. Their turbulent front now ran from Neuve Chapelle itself to the Moated Grange. 24 Brigade went into reserve - for just one day. It was then recalled to the front to relieve 22 Brigade and take over their lines right up to Chapigny! The shattered 23 and 25 Brigades remained on duty! In the Indian Corps the Lahore Division relieved the Meerut Division, which was placed in Corps reserve, out of the firing line, near Locon. On 21 March the Corps moved north and took over the whole front line from IV Corps, so they could have a little rest at last. I Corps took over the old front occupied by the Indian Corps. Congratulatory messages were sent out by Sir John French and supplemented by others from Sir Douglas Haig. Both commanders were initially generous with praise for all concerned and Haig especially mentioned his staff and the undoubted thoroughness of the battle plan. It was a little later that the recriminations began. The reconstructed Neuve Chapelle from the air. ROBERT MALLEVAY

The Times’ considered opinion of the battle was summarised by the statement,

For the first time the British Army has broken the German line and struck the Germans a blow which they will remember to the end of their lives. The importance of our success does not lie so much in the capture of the German trenches along a front of two miles, the killing of some 6,000 Germans and the taking of 2,000 prisoners. It is the revelation of the fact that the much-vaunted German army-machine on which the whole attention of a mighty nation has been lavished for four decades is not invincible.1 One of the main difficulties in deciphering the reasons given for the failure of a breakthrough at Neuve Chapelle is the clash of personalities among the various top commanders directly involved. Just how much did this personal animosity bias the impartiality of their reports? This was not a new problem nor was it confined to one man. Some of the protagonists were Kitchener, French, Joffre, Haig, Rawlinson and Davies. Additionally there was much acrimony between politicians such as the Prime Minister, Asquith, and men such as Churchill and Lloyd George, each of whom was jockeying for power. There is neither the space nor is it appropriate here to expound in detail upon the many individual grievances between the various personalities, which often started years before the war. A few examples will suffice. From the start the relationship between Joffre and Sir John French was most variable and sometimes quite stormy. At times they expressed great cordiality towards each other. At other times they distrusted each other ’s intentions. They each felt the other had let them down in supporting their respective forces during the early phases of the war. Their professional working relationship was greatly hindered by Sir John’s poor understanding of the French language. Interpreters rarely translate the nuances in a conversation. Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, was a General. Sir John French, commander of the BEF, was a Field Marshal and considered himself more experienced than his opposite number. This alone led to tension between the two leaders.

From the outset the British Expeditionary Force operated under rather unusual circumstances in France. The British force was minute when compared to the French armies and yet was not under their control. The BEF was an independent army whose role was but one of co-operation. Kitchener, as Secretary of State for War, had made it plain to Sir John that he was to assist the French Army when prudent to do so but not to jeopardise his men unnecessarily. The French Generals were not yet acquainted with this principle. Kitchener and French at best disliked each other. Kitchener regarded both French and his Deputy Chief of Staff (until January 1915), Henry Wilson, as incompetent. French thought of Kitchener as interfering with his operational strategy and totally outdated in his thinking. French was suspicious of Rawlinson’s loyalty and ambitions ever since the latter, in 1904, had attempted to block the appointment of a staff officer French had chosen. His concerns were, it seems, justified, judging by the correspondence between Rawlinson and Kitchener. It is doubtful if Sir John was aware of this frank liaison between them. Oddly enough one person with whom Sir John French got on reasonably well, until the outbreak of war, was the Kaiser himself! Haig, too, went behind his chief’s back. He told the King that whereas he considered him loyal, he did not consider the Field Marshal had either the temperament or expertise to fulfil the role of Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. We have seen that initially praise was heaped on all concerned for the respective parts they had played in the fighting. A little later these testimonials were modified somewhat. Various attempts to shift responsibility were made but little finally resulted from them. German positions captured at Neuve Chapelle. HENRI LEQUIEN

For example, parts of Haig’s initial assessment of the battle on 16 March read,

I attribute the failure to capture the ridge and the Bois du Biez to the delay in

advancing after the capture of Neuve Chapelle.... There were, however, many causes which tended to check the advance.... The infantry were greatly disorganised and tactical unity to a large extent was destroyed by the advance through the gaps cut in the enemy’s wire, by the passage through the maze of trenches, and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to reorganize units to some extent before pushing on. It was also necessary to secure the ground gained. The fact that the left of the 23rd Brigade had been held up had acted as a drag on the 8th Division, and had involved a portion of the 25th Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its proper direction of advance. This naturally had to be adjusted. The Orchard a thousand yards to the north of Neuve Chapelle was still reported at 1.30pm to be in the enemy’s hands, and threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers Ridge. On the other hand, the GOC, 8th Division had at his disposal the 24th Brigade, which had not yet been engaged, and the GOC 4th Corps had the 21st Brigade of the 7th Division at his disposal, and these brigades should have been pushed forward without delay. 2

Sir John French’s dispatch of 5 April agrees with Haig’s assessment.

I am of the opinion that this delay [10 March] would not have occurred had the clearly expressed orders of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully observed. The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding 4th Corps had been able to bring his reserve Brigade more speedily into action. As it was, the further advance did not commence before 3.30pm. Sir Douglas Haig was in the ascendant and generally praised for the meticulous planning of the battle - even if some of the plans did go askew. Sir James Willcocks and his men received nothing but praise for the part the Indian Corps had played in the battle. Sir Henry Rawlinson was not quite so lucky. As we have seen he received much criticism for the failure of his Corps to break through that first morning and then press on. But he was a wily old general with friends in very high places. He was concerned to appear in a good light after Neuve Chapelle and, in turn ‘dropped the buck’ firmly upon Major-General Davies’ shoulders. All Rawlinson’s letters to Kitchener were addressed, ‘My Dear Field Marshal’ and most skilfully written. Rawlinson wrote to Kitchener on 15 March outlining the course of the battle, as he saw it, and added,

The 6” Hows did very well on the whole but one of the new batteries just arrived from home were not in the best of form as regards accurate shooting and dropped quite a number of their large shells amongst our own infantry. It was I think our failure to press forward rapidly in the first instance that prevented us from gaining more ground and for this I am afraid Davies is to some extent responsible though he was not very well served by one of his Brigadiers. Then again on the second day he did not direct his leading brigade on the right objectives with the result that the Indians were somewhat exposed on their left flank, so after talking the matter over with Douglas Haig I have decided to ask for him to be replaced.

Rawlinson wanted Davies to be reverted to a training position back in England. He formally wrote to GHQ via Haig, who endorsed his opinion. When Davies heard that Rawlinson blamed him for the failure at Neuve Chapelle he was outraged. He wrote to his Corp Commander expressing his displeasure at the way he had been treated. Rawlinson had no alternative but to forward that note to Haig with an admission that it was he (Rawlinson) who had delayed the advance from the village ‘until 3.30pm’. Haig passed this information on to French and then visited Davies to tell him that he had discovered that Rawlinson had tried to shift the blame. At a meeting between French, Haig and Sir William Robertson (Chief of the General Staff) on 17 March, Rawlinson’s future was discussed. He came very close to being sacked but escaped with a severe warning about his behaviour. Despite his warning Rawlinson was still blaming others for the delays. On 23 March he sent a long follow-up letter to Kitchener discussing the skill of the German machine-gunners, the courage of the British bombers, and the bravery of the infantry soldiers. He lamented the casualties, especially the junior officers killed, and then subtly interposed his excuse, almost in subliminal form, before following on with more stories designed to impress the Field Marshal.

... There is no doubt that we surprised the Germans and had we been able to push on more rapidly with fresh troops on the first day we might have gained considerably more

ground. Unfortunately the Brig which had been told off to follow up and press through the village had in some measure been involved in helping a portion of the leading troops to get through the first line of trenches. At one point on the left the new 6” How Battery just arrived from home did not make sufficient good practice to knock the German out so that when the Middlesex and Scottish Rifles advanced to the assault they were met with very heavy rifle and machine gun fire which caused serious casualties. The Bombardment had to be repeated and the reserve called in to help this situation so that when later on the reserve was required to press forward to the attack of the next position in turn it took nearly three hours to collect the Brigade. The German counter attacks which were delivered with great élan were easily driven off, the men shooting down the attackers by the hundred in the most deliberate and effective manner. I don’t think the men took more prisoners than they could help! They found many cartridges in the German trenches with the nose of the bullets snipped of by wire cutters and some with the bullets reversed so as to fire them base first. They were greatly incensed at this. I think it might do [to] be made public. One man of the Rifle Brigade found a cellar full of Germans in Neuve Chapelle so he called out to them to come out. Having counted 8 of them he just dropped a bomb into the middle and punished the lot. Douglas Haig was very anxious to get the cavalry through the line to raid through and in behind the German front, but on this occasion it never looked as if the cavalry would be able to penetrate the line for the hole was never large enough. The letter continues with thoughts on future battles and the New Armies under training. Rawlinson was trying to ensure it was not his name that might end up tainted in Kitchener ’s eyes. And perhaps the best way to achieve that was to distract the old war lord with exciting tales and just a hint that someone else might be to blame after all - if indeed any blame was about to be apportioned. One wonders exactly how Rawlinson expected (in retrospect) Davies to have acted differently from the way he did. Brigadier-General Pinney, 23 Brigade, had two of his battalions cut to ribbons and needed help. Brigadier-General Carter, 24 Brigade, supplied that help and in doing so dispersed his battalions and incurred delay in their re-assembly. That must surely have been anticipated. The alternative would have been to abandon 23 Brigade to its fate pending the second bombardment of the hitherto undamaged German front line. If that had happened the intact 24 Brigade would have only had to climb over the dead bodies of their friends in 23 Brigade before proceeding with the renewed offensive that first afternoon. Perhaps that’s what was wanted! Sir Henry does admit in his Corps diary that,

‘losses have been very heavy and the 8th Division will require rest and reinforcement before it can again be used for offensive operations’. 3 The outcome of it all was that Davies, now exonerated, was promoted on 27 July 1915 to take over VIII Corps in the Mediterranean, However Brigadier-General Carter was returned home ‘sick’ on 16 March. The fifty-seven year old brigadier-general does not appear to have had any further command or promotion. Of the battalion commanders involved nine were killed or died of wounds during the

battle. A further five were seriously wounded. There was no shortage of front line leadership or courage there. And indeed little adverse criticism was directed at them. So was it really appropriate to point the finger of blame either at the time or today? Or was there a more simple explanation of the failure at Neuve Chapelle? Whereas there were undoubtedly errors of judgement and shortcomings among the commanders, it is difficult to apportion all the blame in any one quarter. As John Terraine, one of our most eminent military historians so aptly said,

It was the only war that has ever been fought without voice control. Generals became impotent at the very moment when they would expect and be expected to display their greatest proficiency. Not only was it the only war so fought, but Neuve Chapelle was the first experience of just how bad that communication problem could be. The Times History of the War gives a cautionary warning to those predisposed to be hyper-critical of the events with the wonderful benefit perhaps of hindsight. It reads,

It is easy to be a critic of the closet, the part can be played by any man capable of writing with a fluid turgidity, combined with a daring lack of military knowledge. It then continues to sum up the battle,

The first part of the battle of Neuve Chapelle showed that artillery in the attack is under modern conditions the dominating factor. The second, when the Germans by the pause in the advance had been able to rearrange their defences and provide them with a large superiority in machine guns, proved the enormous value of the rapid fire from these weapons, one of which can pour forth a fire equivalent to that of fifty infantry men. The battle was as creditable to the Germans as to the British. The British massed secretly large forces and an overpowering weight of artillery. They fell upon a small force of unsuspecting Germans, and burst a way for themselves through the enemy’s first line of defences. In this phase of the battle it is businesslike organisation which we have to commend on the British side: the infantry could not help winning those battered trenches. Yet there was also an admirable display of British valour on the left, where the 23rd Brigade was hung up by the wire entanglements. The second phase of the battle was the converse of the first. It showed the organisation at fault, which brought about the fatal delay, with the sad accompaniment of British gallantry displaying itself to the full but in vain, as the men dashed themselves, time after time, against the storm of machine gun bullets. During the final days of the battle this exhibition of valour they shared with their enemies, whose counter-attacks, however recklessly unwise in their inception, were certainly carried out bravely. The Germans were entitled to congratulate themselves upon the ready skill and tenacity with which

they took advantage of the British blunder on the first day, and the success which attended their efforts; they could not help losing their first line of defence; only determined fighters could afterwards have saved, as they did, the Aubers Ridge and the road to Lille. I have illustrated some of the more obvious problems that were encountered during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. I have also tried not to condemn most individuals who, despite apparent shortcomings, undoubtedly did the best they could at the time with the information then available. So who or what was to blame for our casualties? I have examined the difficulty in communication. The shortcomings of elements of the artillery have been exposed. The tactics of modern war were not implemented by the Generals. But how could they have been? This was arguably the first modern war. Those tactics were yet to evolve. The circumstances prevailing at the time and the war itself were, I consider, the real culprits. British losses were very high, but not outrageously so considering the number of troops deployed, the experimental methods of attack and the formidable obstacles facing the two corps involved. It is difficult to be precise about the actual number of killed for many oft quoted sources include ‘missing’. Most of the ‘missing’ were actually dead. A few, though, were undoubtedly made prisoners of war. Another difficulty is that some units evidently did not take a daily roll call. The 2/Middlesex, for example, only reported six ‘other ranks’ killed on the first day! And just ten more during the rest of the battle. It was not until 14 March, by which time they had ceased all fighting, that a further 130 deaths were added to the list. By comparison 2/Scottish Rifles, who attacked at the same time and place, reported 149 deaths that first day. Many more men died of their injuries during the days and weeks that followed. For artillery, medical and engineer units it is not always clear on which part of the front the casualties were serving. When taking all the anomalies into account I estimate that slightly more than 3,500 perished during or shortly afterwards, and as a direct result of, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. It was perhaps easier to record injuries and Sir John’s despatch of 5 April states that a total of 8,533 were wounded. A popular picture after the battle depicting Indian lancers collecting souveniers.

Some wounds were slight, some hideously severe. Many men were destined never to live a full or normal life again. For example, a Captain John Ransom, 2/Royal Berkshire Regiment, won the Military Cross at Neuve Chapelle. He was severely wounded on 12 March 1915. The damage to his leg made amputation inevitable. Blood poisoning followed the operation and as a result his recovery was protracted and painful. He did eventually recover, if that is the right word following the loss of a limb, and he returned to France. Ransom survived the war only to succumb to pneumonia and heart failure at 24 General Hospital, Etaples on 4 September 1919 aged twenty-seven. His death was undoubtedly directly attributable to his earlier injuries at Neuve Chapelle from which he had never properly recovered. The real tragedy is that many of the lessons learned at the battle were promptly discarded. For example, that vital element of surprise achieved by a short but very violent hurricane bombardment was not regularly used again for over two years. At many interim battles the obvious intention of attack was heralded by lengthy artillery fire which gave the enemy plenty of warning of what was to come. A final quotation from John Terraine sums the whole situation most succinctly.

I often think that many who concern themselves with British casualties in the Great War, and squarely blame them on our generals, are rather like a detective, investigating a murder, who suspects everyone except the man found standing over the

bullet-riddled corpse with a smoking revolver in his hand. I am a great believer in simplicity in war studies - and it is a simple fact that the overwhelming majority of British casualties in the Great War were caused by German weapons wielded by the German Army, an institution very well able to do precisely that. So I blame the Germans. Or perhaps the pragmatic attitude of many Frenchmen is appropriate when they simply say, ‘C’est la Guerre’. Of one thing I am absolutely certain. Whatever failings there may have been in some of the commanders, our troops fought splendidly. Every officer and soldier present in the firing line during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle did his duty in full to his King and Country with the utmost courage and determination. May they never be forgotten. 1 The Times 19 April 1915 2 PRO. War Diary WO95/154 3 PRO. War DiaryWO/95/708.

Chapter Seven

VISITING THE BATTLEFIELDS A brief guide to travellers The general map [13] of the area indicates the location of the cemeteries and memorials mentioned, but it does not show all the roads. It is advisable to carry both the Commonwealth War Graves Commission overprinted Michelin Map sheet 51 and the IGN Map number 2 in series green (Lille, Dunkerque). If greater detail is required then the IGN maps in the blue series, which are 1/25000 in scale, are superb. The ones which cover the Neuve Chapelle battlefields are 2405 est (Lens) and 2404 est (Armentières). As hotels and restaurants have a reputation for change depending upon not only the season but also the whims of the proprietor, with few exceptions, none are referred to in the text. For up to date information it is suggested you contact the French Government Tourist Board who will quickly supply, free of charge, excellent general guide books and details of accommodation required upon request. They may be contacted at: 178 Piccadilly, London. W1V 0AL. Telephone (premium line number): 0891 244123 Fax 0171 493 6594 E-mail: [email protected] Ask for the guides and accommodation details for ‘Nord. Pas-de-Calais’ which is the area we are visiting. The recommended route from Calais by car is via Dunkirk on the excellent free auto route, A.16 [E.40]. Turn off at Junction 28 towards the A.25 [E.42], which is also free, and drive as far as Junction 9, just before Armentières. The distance from Calais to Junction 9 on the A.25 is around sixty miles. From there it is about ten miles to Neuve Chapelle. A regular bus service links Armentières with Neuve Chapelle for those arriving in the area by public transport. When parking please exercise care, and respect the land on which you leave your car. All areas ‘off road’ are private property and if you wish to cross fields etc the permission of the landowner must be sought. With the appropriate maps referred to and perhaps a compass and pair of binoculars it really is unnecessary to stray from public roads. This is after all a small battlefield when compared to the vast areas fought over later in the war. As places of interest are often linked in the text the exact choice of route is left to the reader. The significance of most of the places referred to will be apparent from the main text and I have only recounted a few supplementary anecdotes here.

Map 12. Places of interest near Neuve Chapelle today.

Wal ki ng Ne uve Chape l l e See Map 12. Places of interest near Neuve Chapelle today. The numbers in square brackets refer to the places marked on the walk map. This ‘walk’ covers the village centre and is additional to the drive around the cemeteries and other places of interest in the outlying area. Much of the ‘walk’ can be driven if time is short or one can combine the two. It really is only the Sunken Road and the road to the site of Moulin du Piètre which should not be attempted in a vehicle.

Neuve Chapelle was utterly destroyed after four years as a front line village. Virtually nothing has survived from pre-war days and yet there are still gems to be seen and a great deal of atmosphere left to absorb. It was around here after all that so many men died in those four days of bloody fighting. Many of their bodies were never recovered. Despite the initial successes on the morning of 10 March, German snipers still lurked among the cellars and ruins of houses ready to shoot unwary soldiers. That well-known lithograph by J P Bendle of the first line of the 2/Rifle Brigade and elements of 2/39th Garhwal Rifles, moving cautiously together through the centre of the village, was set as early as 8.50am. A good place to start a visit to Neuve Chapelle is at the Mairie just in front of the church. [1] The mayor and staff are most helpful and they have general tourist information about the area. Within the Mairie are a couple of cabinets of interesting artefacts found locally. As far as the buildings nearby are concerned there are few war-time scars left, but it is certainly worth spending a few minutes in the locality reminiscing on the events of the battle. A bar close by will slake any thirst built up by indulging at the ‘mobile friterie’ which seems to have taken root in front of the church. St Christopher’s Church before the Great War. ROBERT MALLEVAY

The Mairie, with French War Memorial, at Neuve Chapelle. St Christopher’s Church is in the left background. One of the most famous pictures to emerge from the Battle of Neuve Chapelle is that of a lone crucifix. It has an almost intact figure of Christ, standing as a landmark among the rubble of the village. That original statue still exists and is to be seen in St Christopher ’s Church, which should now be visited. There are actually two famous crucifixes connected with Neuve Chapelle. They are unfortunately often confused. One originally stood beside the church and was the memorial to M. l’Abbé Lefébvre, the parish priest from 1868 to 1912. It survived the ravages of war and rose amid the ruins for all to see. When the church was rebuilt, this time to a different design and orientation, the figure of Christ from the old crucifix was brought inside. It is now positioned high up at one end of the south-west aisle and the marks of battle can be clearly seen. Outside, at the western corner of the church land, stands a reproduction of the lower part of the old cross. A spent shell is embedded in it. That shell, which could have been placed there after the war, can nevertheless be clearly seen in the contemporary photograph of the crucifix in its original position. The other crucifix, which had an equally fascinating history, will be discussed later in the walk.

Display cabinet full of battlefield artefacts, in the Marie at Neuve Chapelle.

The church of St Christopher in Neuve Chapelle.

The battered figure of Christ which stood amidst the ruined village throughout the war, now in a place of honour in Neuve Chapelle church. The ruins of the church and the cemetery. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Rue de l’Eglise (Church Street) before the war. It is very different today. ROBERT MALLEVAY There is really nothing left of the pre-war church and cemetery. The photograph shows how it used to be before the war with the narrow Rue de l’Eglise and houses opposite. They have all gone and are now replaced by modern dwellings. The churchyard, where several men, including four officers of the Rifle Brigade killed in the 1915 battle were buried, was obliterated during later fighting. These men are specially commemorated in a nearby cemetery. Before leaving the church note the small private memorial inside, near the main door, by the French memorials to their own war dead. It is dedicated to Lieutenant Thomas Pilcher, 2/Rifle Brigade, who was one of those originally buried in the churchyard. After leaving the church proceed along the Rue du Moulin westward in the direction of the D.170 the Rue de Carnin. You are essentially going back along the line of attack of 25 Brigade on The restored base of the memorial outside the church. The figure of Christ stood here throughout

the war. The shell imbedded in the post is clearly visible.

The remains of the cemetery. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Memorial to French war dead in St Christopher’s Church. In the middle is a crucifix commemorating Lt Thomas Pilcher, 2/Rifle Brigade, killed in action 12 March 1915. the first day of the battle. There are two cemeteries off this road. The first one reached, originally named Moggs Hole Cemetery, is now Neuve Chapelle British Cemetery [2]. One of the few named burials (grave D.1.) of the battle is Private Bartlett Heath of 2/Royal Berks who was killed on the first day. Many graves in this cemetery and the old churchyard were lost in subsequent battles. Where the exact location of a grave is not known, a special memorial is erected instead of the usual headstone. Among those commemorated here are Lieutenants Pilcher and Gilbey who were both killed on 12 March. A corporal from Lieutenant Eric Gilbey’s platoon wrote to his father,

When we made the charge at 2pm we were met by the most awful fire of shells and bullets, and Lieut. Gilbey was the first to leap over the parapet, and shouted for us to make for another parapet a hundred yards in front. Lots of men fell in that hundred yards. The next instant I happened to look round, and there was your son, who had run back for about ten yards, in the open. He was bending over a young fellow, and the next second he fell. He had been wounded some hours previously, but he refused to make his way to the dressing station, and so home to England, invalided. Shattered graves. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Neuve Chapelle British Cemetery today.

Proceeding north-east we reach Neuve Chapelle Farm Cemetery [3] which is sited virtually on the old British front line. In grave T.1. lies Second Lieutenant Cyril Cameron. It was not just the infantry who perished at Neuve Chapelle. Cyril was the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) for N Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, on 12 March when he was killed by a shell. The job of a FOO was very dangerous. It involved sighting the fall of shot of his guns and communicating corrections back to the battery. It was difficult to see and not be seen. Because of the flat terrain suitable observation posts were in extremely short supply and several FOOs were killed during the battle.

Lt Eric Gilbey, 2/Rifle Brigade. The original Neuve Chapelle British Cemetery. ROBERT MALLEVAY

Neuve Chapelle Farm Cemetery. A little farther north-west we find Rue de Carnin which runs parallel to the old front line. Many reinforcements were entrenched along this road waiting their moment to join the fray in March 1915. The area of attack of 25 and 23 Brigades of 8th Division can be seen eastwards between the buildings which now border the road. Continue north-east until the road joins Rue Tilleloy and the Moated Grange Farm [4] is reached. This place, originally Ferme Vanbesien, featured early in the history of Neuve Chapelle. To try and eliminate snipers it was blown-up on 27 November 1914 by 15 Field Company, Royal Engineers. The demolition party was commanded by Lieutenant Philip Neame and it was to the same place that he was to return during a later diversionary raid by units of the 8th Division. There was virtually no preparation for this raid and only a very brief bombardment, as shells were already in short supply. The attack began on 18 December 1914 when companies of 2/Devonshires supported by 2/West Yorkshires and Royal Engineers assaulted the area around the Moated Grange which lay in No Man’s Land. A recent aerial view of the Moated Grange.

The operation was initially successful with many Germans being caught by surprise and bayoneted in their dug-outs. They recovered however and staunchly defended their lines. Stopped eventually by barbed wire, and after losing many men, the remaining 2/Devons held on tightly to the lengths of captured enemy trench already won. The 2/West Yorks relieved them during the night only to be counter attacked in the morning. The Germans were using time fused small grenades that could be thrown around forty yards and they began to re-conquer their trench. Moated Grange Farmhouse.

Typical battlefield debris from the area around the Moated Grange. It began to look serious for our soldiers especially as our improvised grenades, made from old jam tins filled with gun-cotton and scrap iron, had a fuse that needed to be lit before throwing. Wet fuses and the lack of proper ignition matches meant our troops could not light their bombs and retaliate properly. Lieutenant Neame was called upon to assist. He took charge of the situation and, devising an emergency method of lighting the fuses, personally threw dozens of bombs at the Germans whilst the infantry withdrew. For his part in this operation Lieutenant Neame was awarded the Victoria Cross, the first at Neuve Chapelle. His citation reads,

‘For conspicuous bravery on 19 December 1914 near Neuve Chapelle when, notwithstanding the very heavy rifle fire and bomb throwing by the enemy, he succeeded in holding them back and in rescuing all the wounded men whom it was possible to move’.

Crucifix Corner. The present cross in Neuve Chapelle stands at a junction towards the north of the village.

View looking south-west along the Rue du Bois, the high street in Neuve Chapelle, from Crucifix Corner. Reference to the map will aid your path to the next few points of interest, including the site of the Quadrilateral [5]. This place, together with Mauquissart [6] and the group of ‘Nameless Cottages’ [7] some 500 yards south of it, had been heavily fortified by the Germans well before the battle commenced. Not so the Orchard, [9] which was never strongly defended and has now disappeared from the landscape. This is reached by walking along the old Sunken Road. It is no longer ‘sunken’ and affords views over much of the battlefield fought over by 23 Brigade. None of these places show much in the way of visible scars of battle yet they were in the heart of the carnage and one should pause at each place to reflect upon the lives lost at that point. From Nameless Cottages especially, one can clearly appreciate the field of view the German machine-gunners would have had of the 23 Brigade attack on the morning of 10 March. Just west of the junction of Sunken Road and the lane on which the nameless cottages are marked (Nameless Cottages Lane), there is a small copse. It is the site of the Duck’s Bill [8]. Return to the southern point of Road Triangle to the north of the village and locate the wayside calvary with the second figure of Christ [10]. This has a quite different yet equally fascinating history. It originally stood at the junction of the Rue du Bois and Rue Jacquet, about 250 yards north-east of the church. The road due north of that junction is still part of the Rue du Bois but during the war was renamed Gurkha Road and Armentières Road at different times. The calvary belonged to the Bocquet

and Plouviez families who lived nearby. The figure was blown off the cross and sustained greater damage than the one in the churchyard. Eventually it was found by Portuguese troops when they arrived in the area. Devoutly Catholic, the soldiers viewed the broken figure of Christ with great reverence and carried it into their trenches for divine protection. After their rout in April 1918 the statue was abandoned, but later recovered by its former owners and returned to the original site. It remained there until 1958 when it was transported to Portugal and now forms part of the tomb to the Portuguese Unknown Warriors. The new wayside calvary was erected at the cross-roads on the original site. View towards Aubers Ridge from Sunken Road.

The site of a German strong-point at Mauquissart Farm.

Farm buildings at Mauquissart. This copse is on the site of the Duck’s Bill.

Two German bunkers behind the Duck’s Bill- evidence of their prolonged occupation of this area.

Christ of the trenches. It now reposes in Portugal. ROBERT MALLEVAY A visit to Bois du Biez [13] is essential. One can walk around the wood or drive through the middle of it by car. There is ample evidence of heavy shelling within the wood, and this can be seen from the road, but actual entry should not be attempted for it is privately owned. There are concrete bunkers here but these date from the time after March 1915. It is interesting nevertheless to inspect one that lies next to the road on the extreme east of the wood [12]. On one of the walls a clock face has been painted and nearby are the letters, ‘G.M.U.’ (Gott Mit Uns). A detour at this stage would take you to Port Arthur and the Indian Memorial [11] but we shall cover that area in detail in the section that follows.

Standing on Layes Bridge [14], a fortified position, one can very easily picture the obstacle a swollen and defended Layes Brook would have posed. The hamlet of Piètre [15] is then easily reached by road. West of Piètre, where the road crosses Layes Brook is another post-1915 pill-box [16], in fact they fairly speckle this whole area. The next junction links the road you are on with Nameless Cottages Lane. The junction was called High Trees Corner [17], especially by 7th Division troops. Today farm buildings mark the spot. Return to the D.41a and proceed north-east for half-a-mile. From there a short walk will conclude this journey at the famous Moulin du Piètre [18]. Although there is a road leading to the mill site it is best walked as turning at the end is difficult. The present building was built in 1923, according to the pattern in the roof tiles. Looking south-west from junction in Mauquissart towards another German strong-point at Nameless Cottages.

German bunker on Rue de Piètre (post March 1915). Layes Brook passes under the road at this point.

A substantial post 1915 German pill-box on the eastern edge of the Bois du Biez. G.M.U. (Gott Mit Uns) This lettering, and other markings, were still visible in 1998 on the walls of the largest bunker on the eastern edge of the Bois du Biez.

The reconstructed Moulin du Piètre.

DRIVING T HE SURROUNDING AREA See Map 13. Location map for touring the surrounding area. The numbers in square brackets refer to points on the map. They correspond for convenience to the numbers on the Commonwealth War Graves Commission overprint of the Michelin Map 51 section 5. This journey, to visit a few of the men who perished during the March battle, is merely representative, for so many brave men died. Most of the cemeteries in the area contain the graves of soldiers from that conflict and they all deserve the same respect and remembrance. Several also bear witness to the sacrifices made by other units adjacent to the Indian and IV Corps in diversionary actions. Whereas the descriptions approximately follow a pattern on the map, it is left to the individual visitor to decide their precise itinerary. The vast majority of the Indian soldiers who were killed in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle have no known grave and are commemorated on the Indian Memorial at La Bombe cross-roads, Neuve

Chapelle. There are a few isolated graves, however, and two are included on the tour. A good place to start the tour is at the very busy La Bombe crossroads. The café at the road junction, Auberge de la Bombe has the name, ‘Port Arthur ’ and the date, ‘10 Mars 1915’ over the door. It is well worth a visit for there are not too many refreshment stops in the area. The building stands on the site of wrecked predecessors but the name, ‘Port Arthur ’, does not appear to have any links with the Great War. It relates to the crossing and may well date back centuries. Lunchtime, evening meals and drinks (both alcoholic and other beverages) may be purchased at reasonable cost. As a customer of the auberge, one would perhaps feel entitled to use the ample car park whilst stretching their legs briefly after lunch! There are several places to see hereabouts. Diagonally opposite La Bombe stands the magnificent Neuve Chapelle Indian Memorial [39]. The memorial is circular and has a fifteen metre high column flanked by tigers on its northern circumference. Over 5,000 dead from Indian units are commemorated on the panels including Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi VC of 2/39th Garhwal Rifles. Auberge de la Bombe at Port Arthur.

Map 13. Location of sites in surrounding area.

The magnificant Neuve Chapelle Indian Memorial at Port Arthur. Designed by Sir Herbert Baker, it was innaugurated in 1927.

The private memorial to 2/Lt Cyril Crichton, 3/London Regiment, is siturated near the Indian Memorial at Port Arthur. A few yards from the cross-roads along the Rue du Bois is a private memorial dedicated to Second Lieutenant Cyril Crichton, 3/London Regiment. He was shot twice leading his platoon on the first day of the battle and died soon afterwards. What the memorial does not mention is that Cyril has an identified grave and is buried at Le Touret Military Cemetery in Plot IV. C. 34. The private memorial was erected by his proud parents from Oxfordshire, originally nearer to the crossroads before it was moved for safety. At Rue-de-Berceaux Military Cemetery, Richebourg-L’Avoue [41] two commanders of Indian battalions lie buried. They are Lieutenant-Colonel P C Elliott-Lockhart of 59 Scinde Rifles and Major, acting Lieutenant-Colonel, David Young of 1/4th Gurkha Rifles. Both were killed on 12 March 1915. A group of veteran Indian soldiers form part of the honour guard at the inauguration of the Neuve

Chapelle Memorial, on the 7 November 1927. CWGC

The graves of several officers of the 2/Scottish Rifles, including their commanding officer, Lt-Col Wilfrid M Bliss. They lie together in Brown’s Road Military Cemetery. A short drive will bring one to Festubert where Brown’s Road Military Cemetery [44] is situated. Within that cemetery lie Lieutenant-Colonel Bliss and several brother officers of the 2/Scottish Rifles. They rest in a line together in Plot XIII Row J with an unknown British officer in their midst. Not far away is the Guards Cemetery, Cuinchy [45] where Second Lieutenant George Wright is buried in Plot IX. D. 41. His gallantry on 10 March was mentioned in despatches. The Le Touret Memorial to the Missing, by architect J R Truelove, is situated on Rue du Bois (D.171) at Richebourg-L’Avoué. It is a most important memorial in connection with the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for most of the men, apart from Indian soldiers, with no known grave as a result of that battle, are commemorated here. There are many notable names on the panels but perhaps best of all is to slowly walk around all the panels and reflect on how many names are listed for the battalions involved in the battle. Three men who won the Victoria Cross at Neuve Chapelle are commemorated here. They are Private Jacob Rivers (panel 27), Corporal William Anderson (panel 12), and Private Edward Barber (panel 2). Captain Oakes is commemorated on this memorial as is Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Wodehouse, commanding officer of 1/Worcesters. North of Le Touret Memorial is the village of Vieille-Chapelle where many units were billeted prior to the battle and whence the exhausted survivors limped back. Several victims from the battle are buried in Vieille-Chapelle New Military Cemetery [37] having been discovered in isolated graves and concentrated here after the Armistice. Among them is an Irish Captain serving with 2/East Lancs.

William Gallagher was most probably killed, as the Commonwealth War Graves burial records show, on 10 March. This is however just one of many instances where ‘official’ records disagree, for Officers Died in the Great War shows his date of death as 12 March. Le Touret Memorial.

Nearby is the peaceful Zelobes Indian Cemetery at La Couture [30]. It should be approached with care for the path leading to the cemetery, rather slippery in wet weather, is bordered by a steep ditch. Among the Indian soldiers buried here is Rifleman Parlad Gurung of 2/3th Gurkhas who died of wounds nearby. The area was the site of Field Ambulances from November 1914 until October 1915. Another cemetery on the route is Euston Post Cemetery, Laventie [32]. Actually it is situated about half a mile north of Port Arthur along the main road (D.947 - La Bassée to Estaires). The name was originally given to a strong-point situated about 400 yards farther north along the road. Evidently a light railway ran by here and was christened, ‘The London and North Western’ and from this, the area became Euston Post after the London railway station of similar name. There are thirty-nine graves here, among them the much decorated Major Hesperus Lloyd of 2/Scottish Rifles. Private Ralph Colbourne, 24 Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps is also here. It was not only combat soldiers who perished during the fighting. Map 14. Cemeteries in the area.

Just over a mile on towards Estaires is located Pont-du-Hem [31]. This is the name of both a small hamlet and a war cemetery which was begun in July 1915. A Field Ambulance was stationed nearby during the war. After the Armistice 1,345 British graves from isolated sites were concentrated into the established burial ground. Two of the graves are of battalion commanders who died at Neuve Chapelle. They are Lieutenant-Colonels George Laurie (1/Royal Irish Rifles) and Colin McLean (6/Gordons). It was upon 6/Gordons that Rawlinson heaped praise in one of his letters to Lord Kitchener.

The men fought magnificently. They charged the enemy’s works repeatedly and one of the battalions which made the most gallant efforts was the 6th Battalion of the Gordon Highland [Territorials]. They dashed forward with the utmost gallantry and showed the way to several regular battalions. Perhaps Sir Henry appreciated their fighting spirit which is epitomised in this battalion by men such as Captain James Campbell. The heir to the isle of Jura in Scotland, he was formerly the adjutant of 8/Argylls. Part of their marching song illustrates the character of those young officers.

Lt-Col Colin Mclean. 6/Gordons

Jura Jock the Adjutant Twice as stiff as starch On his Irish charger Regulates the march. Jock Campbell fell among the barbed wire entanglements without his trusted steed. His body was brought home to be buried on Jura, the isle of his birth. It was rare for the bodies of the fallen to be repatriated. A couple of miles farther along the D.947 is the market town of Estaires. Accommodation and refreshments can be obtained here. Situated within the town is Estaires Communal Cemetery [19]. Two more Lieutenant-Colonels from the battle are buried here. They are Henry Uniacke of 2/Gordons and Lawrence Fisher-Rowe who commanded 1/Grenadier Guards. They lie in Plot II together with Brigadier-General John Gough VC [II.A.7]. Although shortly due to leave the First Army and take command of a New Army division, we shall never know how the outcome of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle might have varied but for the untimely death of Johnnie Gough. He was a very able and experienced officer who had won the Victoria Cross at Daratoleh, Somaliland, in 1903. As Chief of Staff First Army he was naturally heavily involved in the planning for the forthcoming battle. Johnnie Gough was visiting his old battalion, 2/Rifle Brigade, when he was shot in the stomach on 21 February 1915. Despite emergency surgery he died the following day. We must not forget the Royal Engineers who worked so hard behind, and often in front of, the front-line in many different ways. Their jobs were most numerous and included moving trench stores into position, entrenching, erecting barbed wire, tunnelling, communications, and building roads and bridges. They also made, and often threw, the improvised jam-tin bombs. These contained guncotton and were filled with stones, nails and similar objects. The fuze was of variable length. Sometimes they were thrown when not properly lit. Sometimes the Germans, realising this, lit them and threw them back! This practise was stopped by deliberately throwing ‘unlit’ bombs with fuze instantaneous in place of the normal fuze as a booby trap. Thereafter our bombs were not returned.

The engineers went in with the infantry to place temporary bridges over rivers and then, when in the enemy’s front-line, erected trench blocks. They were expected to act as fighting soldiers when required. In short, they were very versatile and much in demand by the battalions. In Estaires is one such man from the Royal Engineers. Sapper Thomas Jones, 15 Field Company, won the DCM whilst serving with Lieutenant Philip Neame VC in action at the Moated Grange the previous November. His unit, during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, was attached to 23 Brigade and Sapper Jones was mortally wounded in action with them. He died of his injuries on 15 March 1915 and is buried in Plot III. B. 19. Just over a mile east of Estaires lies Laventie Military Cemetery [20]. There are many men from 1/39th Garhwal Rifles buried here. All were brought in from the battlefields after the war and include several British officers of the Indian Army who served and died with that battalion. Also here are a few rare Indian Hindu graves. One is to Rifleman Kedar Sing Rawat and he lies in Plot V.D.1. Although he has a named headstone showing he was killed on 10 March 1915 he is not mentioned in the current copy of the Register. Another half mile north-east along D.166 and down a short track off that road, where presently farm buildings are located, ‘Granny’ belched forth her half ton missile that signalled the start of the battle on 10 March 1915.

Sapper Tom Jones, 15 Field Company RE.

This aircraft was observing on 10 March when it was struck in flight by a large British shell. The crew of two were killed. IWM Q 49212 Moving on to Royal Irish Rifles Graveyard [27] we find two lieutenants from 2 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. They were flying a Be.2a and observing for the gunners when they ‘got into the trajectory of our own guns’.1 The aeroplane was struck by a large calibre British shell at 11.00am on 10 March, and brought down. Albert Morgan the pilot, and Aubrey Irving, his observer, were killed. They are now together for all time, buried in adjacent graves in Plot III.F.4 and 5. Another man buried here is Captain Claude Alexander Lafone of D Company, 2/Devons. He joined the army in 1897 and served throughout the Boer War with distinction. Lafone was no stranger to

Neuve Chapelle for on 18 December 1914 he led his company in the abortive attack that day. For his gallant exploits he was awarded the DSO. Having escaped death then, it was ironical that he should be killed by a chance bullet passing through the parapet about noon on 12 March 1915. Claude Lafone, who came from Walton-on-Thames, Surrey, lies in Plot IV.D.6.

Captain C A Lafone, 2/Devonshires.

Captain C E Wood 1/Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Among the graves at Fauquissart Military Cemetery [33] are two more casualties of Neuve Chapelle. One is Captain Charles Wood. [H.9] He was adjutant to 1/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, part of 22 Brigade. They were holding the line to the north of the battle area and scarcely involved in the attack. A few casualties were inevitably sustained however. Some were killed by the general fusillade that spattered the entire front-line, and others, particularly from the Welsh Fusiliers, when they directly assisted the fighting brigades. On 11 March 1/Royal Welsh Fusiliers went to the aid of 2/Wiltshires, the extreme left-hand battalion, and casualties resulted. Among them was Captain Wood. Also in this cemetery is Second Lieutenant Gordon Wilson, of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry, who is recorded as being killed in action at Neuve Chapelle on 12 March 1915. The commanding officer of the 2/Lincolns, Lieutenant-Colonel George McAndrew, is buried in Rue Petillon Military Cemetery, Fleurbaix [23]. He was killed on 10 March leading his men and his grave is at Plot III.A.1. The final cemetery near the scene of battle to which I recommend a visit is Rue David Military Cemetery, Fleurbaix [16]. This contains, in Plot 1.G.40, the grave of Captain Sir Edward Hulse, 2nd

Scots Guards. It was he who gave us probably the most famous and detailed account of the Christmas Truce of 1914 ever published. He met with German soldiers in No Man’s Land over three successive days. As well as exchanging greetings and gifts Edward Hulse took the opportunity to bury British dead, strengthen his defences and spy out the German trenches. During the advance on 12 March, whilst attempting to render assistance to his commanding officer, Captain George Paynter, he was shot dead. He was evidently originally laid to rest under the rather splendid marker illustrated which interestingly shows the date ‘March 14th 1915’. He was an old Etonian who then attended Balliol College. There is a special memorial plaque to him in Salisbury Cathedral which was placed by his parents who lived in the city. After touring the cemeteries it is worth driving along the ‘ridge’ through Aubers to see just how much of our lines would have been visible to the Germans from even this slight elevation. One must appreciate also that water always finds the lowest level possible and therefore drained from the enemy lines to those held by the British. Aside from the military perspective, the ‘comfort factor ’ was also in the hands of the foe. In Aubers, the church, the first target for ‘Granny’, is worth a visit. It is almost impossible to miss the many concrete emplacements in this area built after the battle with a view to keeping the allies out. They succeeded for four years! Not all casualties were attributable to enemy action, as tragic accidents continued to occur. On 12 March Captain Reginald Cholmondeley, 3 Squadron Royal Flying Corps, was waiting to take off at Chocques Airfield in his Morane. Sergeant Joseph Costigan was loading it with Melinite bombs when one exploded killing both men and nine others. They are all buried in Chocques Military Cemetery, which is about fourteen miles east of Neuve Chapelle. The original burial place for Captain Sir Edward Hulse, 2/Scots Guards. HENRI LEQUEIN

If your route to the port or tunnel takes you via St Omer then please visit Longuenesse Souvenir Cemetery. Here is the grave of Corporal Cecil Noble who won his Victoria Cross at Neuve Chapelle and died in hospital nearby on 13 March 1915 [I.A.57]. His is the only grave on the Western Front of a VC winner from that battle. The three who survived the war are buried in England. Having read the account of the battle, and toured the area to see the evidence of the conflict, and savoured the atmosphere of the battlefield, I feel sure you will agree that this flat and soggy area ‘in between’ the famous war zones was well worth a visit. So many men died in this sector of the front-

line during the entire course of the war. It would be nice to think that their memory will now be rekindled. 1. PRO. AIR1/2395/258/1

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS BEF:

British Expeditionary Force. A global term for all the British Army units in France and Flanders in the Great War. At the time of Neuve Chapelle it was commanded by Field Marshal Sir John French.

Army:

An organised body of men armed for war and commanded by a general. It consisted of two or more corps and other supporting units and services including artillery, engineers, medical personnel, veterinary services and transport. By March 1915 there were two armies in the BEF. By 1918 this total had risen to five. A formation consisting of two or more divisions and again specialist forces responsible to the Lieutenant-General in charge.

Corps: Also the name used by units such as Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, etc. These two uses of the word ‘Corps’ must not be confused.

Division:

Almost a miniature army under command of a Major-General. Besides battalions of combat soldiers it contained all necessary support units to enable it to fight independently. Such units would include, for example, artillery, ambulance, engineers, transport and communication. Divisions were frequently moved during the war and came under the command of different corps or armies. There were also cavalry divisions. (Infantry) In 1915 a formation of four battalions commanded by a Brigadier-General. Note that the ‘2/Rifle Brigade’ is the title of an infantry battalion - it is not a separate brigade.

Brigade:

Battalion:

(Artillery) A grouping of three or four batteries of guns or howitzers commanded at full strength by a Lieutenant-Colonel. To distinguish it from an infantry brigade it was numbered in official writings in Roman Numerals. There were four or six field guns in a battery. Around 1,000 fighting soldiers and headquarters personnel when at full strength. It was under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel. With around 225 men in total under the command of a major or captain, it was a

Company: quarter of the fighting men of a battalion. Companies were usually named A, B, C, and D or W, X, Y, and Z. Cadre:

A basic unit forming a nucleus for expansion when necessary.

Indian Army Ranks (Infantry): Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers:

Other ranks:

Subadar-Major

} There were no

Subadar

} British Army

Jemadar

} equivalents

Havildar-Major

(CSM)

Havildar

Sergeant

Naik

Corporal

Lance-Naik

Lance Corporal

Sepoy

Private

Indian Order of Merit:

Established in 1837 by the Honourable East India Company, it is the oldest gallantry award of the British Empire. There were two military classes by the time of the Great War. The second class was equivalent to the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

Field Gun:

A mobile artillery piece. The most common British gun was the 18 Pounder. As its name suggests it fired a shell, either shrapnel or high explosive, each of which weighed 18 pounds.

Howitzer:

A relatively short range, but high angle firing, artillery piece designed to ‘lob’ a shell over intervening obstacles.

Shrapnel:

Strictly small balls of lead blown from a special shell after a time interval whilst the shell was still in the air. They were designed originally to burst just overhead of troops in the open. Later they were used to cut barbed wire with varying degrees of success. (Flieger Abwehr-Kanone) German term for anti-aircraft guns. The fire from guns designed or adapted for use against

Flak:

aircraft. The idea was not new but began as early as 1846. By 1870 French balloons in the Franco-Prussian war were being shot down by Flak. German anti-aircraft equipment was well developed and most formidable by 1915.

Enfilade:

Gunfire directed along a line from end to end.

Nameless Cottages:

The term used for the group of cottages situated 500 yards due south of the Mauquissart strongpoint. [stützpunkt] (see map). They were part of the German second line of defence for Neuve Chapelle, which at the commencement of the battle was incomplete. For convenience the lane on which they are situated is referred to in the text as ‘Nameless Cottage Lane’.

A PPEN DIX 2

Simplified British Order of Battle for Neuve Chapelle March 1915. [Infantry Only] 1 In addition to the artillery units on the strength of the forces involved many others were temporarily placed under General Haig’s command for the battle. The senior commanders: Commander-in-Chief.

Field-Marshal Sir John D P French.

Commander First Army.

General Sir Douglas Haig.

Commander IV Corps.

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson.

Commander Indian Corps

Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks

7th Division

Major-General Thompson Capper

8th Division

Major-General Francis Davies

Lahore Division

Major-General Henry D’Urban Keary

Meerut Division

Lieutenant-General Charles Anderson

The infantry battalions. There were additionally other units of engineers and mounted troops: 7th DIVISION: 20 Brigade:

Brigadier-General F Heyworth

1/Grenadier Guards 2/Scots Guards 2/Border Regiment 2/Gordon Highlanders 6/Gordon Highlanders (Territorial Force) 21 Brigade: Brigadier-General H Watts

2/Bedfordshire Regiment 2/Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards) 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers 2/Wiltshire Regiment 22 Brigade: Brigadier-General S Lawford

2/Royal West Surrey Regiment (The Queen’s) 2/Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1/Royal Welch Fusiliers 1/South Staffordshire Regiment 8/The Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment) (Territorial Force) 8th DIVISION: 23 Brigade: Brigadier-General R Pinney

2/Devonshire Regiment 2/West Yorkshire Regiment 2/Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 2/Middlesex Regiment 24 Brigade: Brigadier-General F Carter

1/Worcestershire Regiment

2/East Lancashire Regiment 1/Notts & Derby Regiment (Sherwood Foresters) 2/Northamptonshire Regiment 5/The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) (Territorial Force) 4/Cameron Highlanders (Territorial Force) 25 Brigade: Brigadier-General A Lowry-Cole

2/Lincolnshire Regiment 2/Royal Berkshire Regiment 1/Royal Irish Rifles 2/Rifle Brigade 13/London Regiment (Territorial Force) MEERUT DIVISION: Dehra Dun Brigade:

Brigadier-General C Jacob 1/Seaforth Highlanders 2/2th Gurkhas 1/9th Gurkhas 4/Seaforth Highlanders (Territorial Force) Garhwal Brigade:

Brigadier-General C Blackader 2/Leicestershire Regiment 1/39th Garhwal Rifles 2/39th Garhwal Rifles 2/3rd Gurkhas 3/London Regiment (Territorial Force) Bareilly Brigade:

Brigadier-General W Southey 2/The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 6th Jats 41st Dogras 58th Vaughan’s Rifles 4/The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) (Territorial Force) 2/8th Gurkhas (Divisional Troops) LAHORE DIVISION Ferozepore Brigade:

Brigadier-General R Egerton 1/Connaught Rangers 9th Bhopal Infantry 57th Wilde’s Rifles 129th Baluchis 4/London Regiment (Territorial Force) Jullundur Brigade:

Brigadier-General E Strickland 1/Manchester Regiment 47th Sikhs 59th Scinde Rifles 4/Suffolk Regiment (Territorial Force) Sirhind Brigade:

Brigadier-General W Walker. VC 1/Highland Light Infantry 15th Sikhs

1/1st Gurkhas 1/4th Gurkhas 4/Liverpool Regiment (The King’s) (Extra Reserve) 1 Adapted from Official History of the War. Military Operations. France & Belgium. 1915 Volume 1.App. 2

A PPEN DIX 3

Simplified German Order of Battle for Neuve Chapelle March 1915. [Infantry Only] 1 VII Corps. Corp Troops: 11th Jäger Battalion. 13th Division: 25th Brigade: 13th (less one battalion) and 158th Regiments 26th Brigade: 15th and 55th Regiments 14th Division: 27th Brigade: 16th and 53rd Regiments 79th Brigade: 56th and 57th Regiments 6th Bavarian Reserve Division: 12th Bavarian Reserve Brigade: 16th and 17th Bavarian Reserve Regiments. 14th Bavarian Reserve Brigade: 20th and 21st Bavarian Reserve Regiments. XIX (Saxon) Corp (part only). [only one battalion from each regiment was sent to assist in the counter-attack] 24th Division: 47th Brigade: 139th and 179th Regiments 48th Brigade: 106th and 107th Regiment

40th Division: 88th Brigade: 104th Regiment 89th Brigade: 133rd Regiment VII Corps, part of Sixth Army, was responsibility for the whole sector. The soldiers originally defending the Neuve Chapelle salient were, from north to south: 13th Regiment (1 battalion) [This covered the line from Fauquissart to Moated Grange] 11th Jäger Battalion (two companies initially) [From Moated Grange to Signpost Lane] (the other two companies arrived at 9.30 on 10 March and reinforced the strongpoints) 16th Regiment (1 battalion) [Signpost Lane to Port Arthur] [The remaining two battalions covered the area south of Port Arthur.] It will be seen that, in the line opposite IV Corps and Indian Corps there were, at 7.30 on 10 March just 1½ German battalions - about 1,750 officers and men. The other units shown above were reinforcements. Each regiment consisted of three battalions of around 1080 officers and men at full strength. In addition each regiment had a machine-gun company of about 100 officers and men. 1. In part: Official History of the War. Military Operations. France & Belgium. 1915 Volume 1.App. 2

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Simplified Order of Battle - Royal Flying Corps on 10th March 19151 First Wing (Lt-Col H M Trenchard, C.B., D.S.O.) No 2 Squadron based at Merville No 3 Squadron based at Chocques No 16 Squadron based at La Gorgue Second Wing (Lt-Col C J Burke, D.S.O.) No 5 Squadron based at Bailleul No 6 Squadron based at Poperinghe Third Wing ( Lt-Col H R M Brook-Popham) No 1 Squadron based at St Omer No 4 Squadron based at St Omer The total strength of the RFC in France was therefore 7 Squadrons and 1 flight of No 9 Squadron. There were a few more held in reserve at St Omer. The bulk of the close support work for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was carried out by the First Wing. Its various squadrons were detailed to work in close liaison with First Army Headquarters, the IV and Indian Corps and the two artillery groups. The other wings mainly undertook tactical bombing duties on supply lines and centres of communication in support of the fighting.

1 Official History of the War. The War in the Air. App I

BIBL IOGRA PH Y & RECOMMEN DED FURTH ER REA DIN G Gas! The Battle for Ypres, 1915. J. McWilliams & R.J.Steel. Ontario : Vanwell Publishing Ltd, 1985. Christmas Truce - The Western front, December 1914 Malcolm Brown & Shirley Seaton. London : Leo Cooper Ltd, 1984. I Was There Edited by Sir John Hammerton. Waverley Book Co Ltd. London. Playing with Strife by Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Neame VC, KBE, CB, DSO Pub: 1947 George G Harrap & Co Ltd, London Bloody Red Tabs Frank Davies & Graham Maddocks Pub. Leo Cooper London 1995 The Sky Their Battlefield by Trevor Henshaw Pub: 1995 Grub Street, London. History of the Fourth Battalion The Seaforth Highlanders Lieutenant-Colonel M M Haldane London. H & G Witherby 1928 The Historical Record of the 39th Royal Garhwal Rifles Brigadier-General J Evatt DSO Gale & Polden Ltd. Aldershot. 1922 The Times History of the War ‘The Times’ London. 1915 History of 2nd King Edward’s Own Gookhas, (The Sirmour Rifle Regiment) 1911-21 Colonel L W Shakespear CB CIE, Gale & Polden. Aldershot 1924 The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War Captain H F Stacke, G T Cheshire & Sons Ltd. Kidderminster. 1929 Official History of the War Military Operations, France & Belgium. MacMillan & Co Ltd, London. Various dates. Official History of the War The War in the Air. Volume II. H A Jones Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1928 The Indian Corps in France Lieutenant Colonel J W B Merewether CIE, John Murray. London. 1918 History of the Lincolnshire Regiment Major General C R Simpson CB, Medici Society Ltd, London 1931 The Royal Irish Rifles in the Great War. Captain Cyril Falls, Regimental Committee. Aldershot 1925. ‘The Kensingtons,’ 13th London Regiment Sergeant O F Bailey & Sergeant H M Hollier, Regimental Old Comrades Association. 1936 There’s a Devil in the Drum. J F Lucy, Naval & Military Press, London 1993. The Royal Berkshire Regiment F Loraine Petre. The Barracks. Reading 1925 The papers of Sergeant A Self 2/West Yorks

Adventures on the Western Front August 1914 - June 1915 A Rawlinson, Andrew Melrose Ltd. London. 1925 With the First Canadian Contingent Canadian Field Comforts Commission, Hodder & Stoughton. Toronto 1915 Shot at Dawn Julian Putkowski & Julian Sykes, Wharncliffe Publishing Ltd. Barnsley. 1989. Armageddon Road. A VC’s Diary 1914-1916. Billy Congreve. Edited Terry Norman. William Kimber. London. 1982 Work of the Royal Engineers in the War of 1914-19 The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France), R E Priestley, Institution of Royal Engineers, and the Signals Association. Chatham 1921 Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19 – Officers Died in the Great War 1914-19 HMSO 1921. Now available on a fully searchable CD-ROM Naval & Military Press. 1998 Cemetery and Memorial Registers The War Dead of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Maidenhead, Berks. Various dates.

IN DEX Abbott, Rev. Wilfred Aire Anderson, Cpl. William VC Anderson, Lt-Gen. C Armentières Road Armentières Artillery deployment Auberge de la Bombe Aubers Ridge Aubers Bahadur Thapa, Hvldr Barber, Pte. Edward VC Bliss, Lt-Col. Wilfred Bois du Biez Brewery Road Brighton, Sussex British Army: First Army Corps: I Corps II Corps IV Corps Cavalry Corps Indian Corps Divisions: 7th 8th 46th (North Midland) Canadian Brig ades: 20 21 22 23 24 25 5th Cavalry Infantry Battalions: 2/Bedfords 5/Black Watch 2/Borders 4/Cameron Highlanders 2/Devons 2/East Lancs 6/Gordon Highlanders 1/Grenadier Guards 2/Lincolns 2/Middlesex 2/Northants 2/Rifle Brigade

2/Royal Berks 1/Royal Irish Rifles 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers 1/Royal Welsh Fusiliers 2/Scots Guards 2/Scottish Rifles 1/Sherwood Foresters 2/West Yorks 2/Wiltshires 1/Worcesters 2/Yorkshires (Green Howards) Artillery: VII (Siege) Brigade RGA XLV Brigade RFA 4th Siege Battery RGA 59th Siege Battery RGA 81st Siege Battery RGA 31st Howitzer Battery RFA Royal Army Medical Corps: 23 Field Ambulance 24 Field Ambulance Royal Eng ineers 2 Field Coy 15 Field Coy 55 Field Coy Royal Flying Corps 2 Squadron 3 Squadron 4 Squadron Buckingham, Pte. William VC Busnes Cameron, 2/Lt. Cyril Campbell, Capt. James Capper, Mjr-Gen. T Carrier pigeons Carter, Brig-Gen. Francis Carter-Campbell, Major G Cemeteries & Memorials: Brown’s Road Cem. Festubert Brookwood Cem. Surrey Chocques Military Cem Estaires Communal Cem Euston Post Cem Fauquissart Military Cem Guards Cem., Cuinchy Hollybrook Cemetery Memorial Laventie Communal Cem Laventie Military Cem Le Touret Memorial Lille Southern Cem Longuenesse (St Omer) Souvenir Cem Neuve Chapelle British Cem Neuve Chapelle Farm Cem Neuve Chapelle Indian Memorial Pont-du-Hem Cem Royal Irish Rifles Graveyard Rue-de-Berceaux Military Cem Rue David Military Cem. Fleurbaix Rue Petillon Military Cem. Fleurbaix Vieille-Chapelle Military Cem Zelobes Indian Cemetery, La Couture Chalmers, Sgt. Mjr

Chocques Airfield Chocques Cholmondeley, Capt. Reginald Christ of the Trenches Colbourne, Pte. Ralph Collins, Capt Command frustration Costigan, Sgt. Joseph Crescent, The Crichton, 2/Lt. Cyril Daniels, CSM. Harry VC, Darby, Lt. Maurice Davies, Maj-Gen. Francis Daws, Sgt Dehra Dun Trench Duck’s Bill Egerton, Brig-Gen. R Elliott-Lockhart, Lt-Col. P C Fauquissart Feetham, Lt-Col. Edward Ferrers, Capt. E B First Army Operation Order No.13 Fisher-Rowe, Lt-Col. Lawrence Forrester, Pte. Alfred Forster, Cpl Fort Fareham Foss, Capt. Charles VC French Government Tourist Board French, Field Marshal Sir John French Tenth Army Fuller, L/Cpl. Wilfred VC Gallagher, Capt. William Gane Gurung, Rfm German Units: VII Corps 6th Bavarian Reserve Division 11th Jägers 13th Infantry Rgt, (VII Corps) 16th Infantry Rgt 21st Bavarian Reserve Rgt 56th Regiment (Reserve Batn) 57th Regiment (Reserve Batn) 104th Saxon Infantry Rgt 133rd Saxon Infantry Rgt 139th Saxon Infantry Rgt Gilbey, Lt. Eric Gobar Sing Negi, Rfm. VC Gough, Brig-Gen. John (VC) Graham, Capt Granny (15” Howitzer) Gray-Buchanan, Capt. Walter Haig, General Sir Douglas Heath, Pte. Bartlett Hesdigneul-les-Béthune High Trees Corner Horsell Common Mosque Hoskyns, Lt Hulse, Capt. Sir Edward Indian Army: Divisions:

Lahore Meerut Brig ades: Dehra Dun Garhwal Jullundur Battalions etc: 1/39th Garhwal Rifles 2/39th Garhwal Rifles 2/2nd Gurkhas 2/3rd Gurkhas 1/4th Gurkhas 1/9th Gurkhas 1/Highland Light Infantry 2/Leicesters 3/London 1/Manchesters 1/Seaforth Highlanders 1/4Seaforth Highlanders 64-65 47th Sikhs 3rd Sappers & Miners (21 Coy) Irving, Lt. Aubrey Ismail Khan, Hvldr Jacob, Brig-Gen. C W Joffre, General Joseph Jones, Spr. Thomas Keary, Maj-Gen. H D’U Kedar Sing Rawat, Rfm Kedar Sing Rawat, Subdr Kennedy, Lt. Malcolm Kitchener, Fld Marshall, Earl La Cliqueterie Farm La Plouich Lafone, Capt. Claude Laurie, Lt-Col. George Layes Bridge (Redoubt) Layes Brook, (river Des Layes) Ligny le Grande Lille Lillers Linell, Major J Lloyd, Major Hesperus Lodwick, Capt. J T Lorgies Road Lowry Cole, Brig-Gen. A Lucy, Sgt. John McAndrew, Lt-Col. George McCauley, Pte. J McHugh, Pte. Neil McLean, Lt-Col. Colin Mapplebeck, Capt. Gilbert Matthews, 2/Lt. Edward Mauquissart Road Mauquissart Medical services Merville Minenwerfers Moated Grange Morgan, Capt. Albert Moulin du Piètre Mullaly, Capt. C M M¸ller, Carl Munday, Pte. William

Nameless Cottage Lane Nameless Cottages Neame, Lt. Philip (VC) Neuve Chapelle Mairie Ni-Shells (Niespulver) Noble, Cpl. Reginald VC Oakes, Capt. Orbell Orchard, The Parlad Gurung, Rfm Paynter, Capt. George Pennefather, Lt. Charles Perry, Capt. George Piètre Pilcher, Lt. Thomas Pinney, Brig-Gen. R Port Arthur Quadrilateral, The Ransom, Capt. John Rawlinson, Lt-Col. Alfred Rawlinson, Lt-Gen. Sir Henry Reid, Pte. Isaac Repington, Col. Richebourg-L’Avoue Rivers, Pte. Jacob VC Road Triangle Robertson, Lt-Gen. Sir W Romilly, Capt. Francis Roome’s Trench Rouge Banks Rouge Croix Rue de l’Eglise Sailly-sur-la-Lys Salomé Self, Sgt. A Signalling Signpost Lane Smith-Dorrien Trench Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir Horace Somervail, 2/Lt. W F St Christopher’s Church St Venant Stephens, Lt-Col. R B Sunken Road Swiney, Lt-Col. E Tennant, Lt. Charles Trench Mortars Uniacke, Lt-Col. Henry Vieille-Chapelle Violanes Walker, Brig-Gen. W, (VC) Walsh/Lt. Archibald Warrand, Capt. Alastair Willcocks, Lt-Gen. Sir James Wilson, 2/Lt. Gordon Wilson, Mjr-Gen. Henry Wire-cutters Wodehouse, Lt-Col. Ernest Wood, Capt. Charles Wright, 2/Lt. George Young, Lt-Col. David