Hitler versus Stalin - The Eastern Front 1943 - 1944 Kursk to Bagration (Images of War)

IMAGES OF WAR

HITLER VERSUS STALIN: THE EASTERN FRONT 1943–1944

The Panthers, type D, committed to the Kursk were prone to mechanical failure. At least four caught fire from fuel leaks in the assembly area and the tank’s weight was too much for the engine and final drive which resulted in numerous breakdowns on rough terrain.

IMAGES OF WAR

HITLER VERSUS STALIN: THE EASTERN FRONT 1943–1944 Kursk to Bagration RARE PHOTOGRAPHS FROM WARTIME ARCHIVES

Nik Cornish

This book is dedicated to my mum, Dorothy, to Liz and to our children James, Charlotte and Alex

First published in Great Britain in 2017 by PEN & SWORD MILITARY an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS Text copyright © Pen & Sword Books, 2017 Photographs copyright © as credited, 2017 Every effort has been made to trace the copyright of all the photographs. If there are unintentional omissions, please contact the publisher in writing, who will correct all subsequent editions. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978 178346 399 2 eISBN 978 147386 172 5 Mobi ISBN 978 147386 171 8 The right of Nik Cornish to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the imprints of Pen & Sword Archaeology, Atlas, Aviation, Battleground, Discovery, Family History, History, Maritime, Military, Naval, Politics, Railways, Select, Social History, Transport, True Crime, Claymore Press, Frontline Books, Leo Cooper, Praetorian Press, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and Wharncliffe. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact Pen & Sword Books Limited 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

Contents Preface Acknowledgements Photograph Credits Introduction

Chapter One Kursk, the Northern Flank

Chapter Two Kursk, the Southern Flank

Chapter Three Operation Kutuzov

Chapter Four Operation Rumiantsev

Chapter Five West to Smolensk

Chapter Six West from Leningrad

Chapter Seven Kiev, Back in the USSR

Chapter Eight Across Ukraine

Chapter Nine Out of the USSR

Preface

T

he concept behind this book, and the others in the series, is to provide the general reader of military history with a heavily illustrated overview of the war on the Eastern Front between the years 1941 and 1945. Each book will be self-standing and cover a particular time period during this titanic four-year campaign. In the entirety of human history there has never been war waged with such ferocity. It was indeed, as one eminent historian of this conflict entitled it, ‘a clash of Titans’. On the one hand, the brown-shirted followers of Adolf Hitler on the other the red-flagged communists of Joseph Stalin. With two such totalitarian regimes where the power was highly concentrated in the hands of an individual who issued edicts through a vast civilian and military bureaucracy the manner in which military and political advice was taken and acted upon frequently verged on the erratic. The autumn and winter of 1942/3 had proved to be a disastrous time for the Axis, particularly in the south of the USSR. Operations designed to reach and control the Volga River and the Caucasus had gone to hell in the Stalingrad inferno. The Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armies had been ruined and were shortly withdrawn from the front. The limited summer offensive that the Germans planned for 1943 and the subsequent retreat of the three Army Groups from north to south will be the major campaigns featured in this volume, culminating in the Soviet offensive of 1944, Operation Bagration, which took the fighting beyond the borders of the USSR.

Acknowledgements

T

he usual suspects to whom I am indebted include Dmitry Belanovsky, Norbert Hofer, Stephen Perry and Andrei Simonov – many thanks boys. Further thanks are due to Alex Cornish for many hours of technical assistance coupled with interesting and useful comments and criticisms. The debt that I owe to the staff members of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces and the Krasnogorsk Archive in Moscow is immense – thank you all.

Photograph Credits

All images are by Nik Cornish at www.Stavka.org.uk aside from the following: Courtesy of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, Moscow via Stavka: p. 10T, p. 17T, p. 19T, p. 20B, p. 21T, p. 22T, p. 23T, p. 34T, p. 35B, p. 37T, p. 40T, p. 43, p. 49T, p. 50B, p. 51B, p. 54, p. 58, p. 65T, p. 66. p. 67, p. 69, p. 70B, p. 71T, p. 73T, p. 86, p. 89T, p. 90B, p. 92B, p. 101T, p. 102T, p. 108T, p. 109B, p. 117, p. 119, p. 122, p. 123B, p. 131, p. 136B, p. 138B, p. 139, p. 143T, p. 151, p. 153, p. 154B, p. 155B, p. 158T, p. 159T, p. 160B From the fonds of the RGAKFD in Krasnogorsk via Stavka: p. 16B, p. 19B, p. 22B, p. 24, p. 36, p. 39B, p. 42B, p. 52T, p. 57T, p. 64T, p. 71B, p. 74, p. 84, p. 85, p. 100T, p. 102B, p. 104B, p. 105T, p. 116B, p. 134B, p. 140T, p. 152T, p. 154T, p. 158B, p. 159B, p. 160T Andrei Simonov: p. 91

Introduction

F

or the Axis the summer of 1942 and a second winter in the depths of the USSR had proved a mix of success and disaster. Army Group South’s (AGS) advance on a front stretching from Voronezh to Grozny in the Caucasus, with Stalingrad roughly in the centre, had marked the deepest penetration made by the invaders. But it was an unsustainable situation and, as more and more troops were sucked into the Stalingrad street battle, the Sixth Army’s vulnerable flanks proved its undoing. When Stavka (the Soviet High Command) launched the several phases of the winter offensive Germany’s most powerful force, for such Sixth Army was, was within a week trapped in and around the city it had failed to capture. The gradual reduction of what was known to the Germans as the Stalingrad Kessel (cauldron) lasted roughly ten weeks from late November to early February. The failure of a relief expedition, commanded by General Erich Manstein, combined with the Kessel’s stubborn defence allowed the greater part of the Axis forces in the Caucasus to retire to a defensible line along the Mius and Donets rivers, west of Rostov on Don. Heavily reinforced, the Soviets struck once more capturing Belgorod and Kharkov in a bid to reach the Dnieper River crossings and complete the destruction of AGS. However, Manstein, also reinforced particularly with armoured units, hit back and restored the line east of Kharkov and Belgorod. A plan involving a combined operation involving Army Group Centre (AGC) and AGS to recapture Kursk was frustrated by a firm Soviet defence coupled with a spring thaw that effectively brought operations to an end. To the north in the Arctic, where Finns and Germans fought the elements as well as the Red Army, the situation had changed but little from the autumn of 1941. The failure of the Soviets to raise the siege of Leningrad and the Germans’ inability to break through the city’s defences extended the population’s suffering into 1943. Despite the Red Army’s dramatic achievements in the south they had failed badly in their attempt to crush the Rzhev Salient, a position that Stalin characterized as a ‘pistol’ pointed at Moscow. Operation Mars, the elimination of the Rzhev Salient, had cost the Red Army vast numbers of men and masses of materiel. When German Ninth Army withdrew, with few casualties, from Rzhev it provided a welcome source of veteran combat troops for use in the upcoming summer offensive. Replacing men, guns and armour was a much easier task for the Soviets. Now much of their military industrial plant was back in production and Lend-Lease support flowed steadily towards the front via the Iran–Caucasus route and the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. Furthermore, the Red Army’s leadership had learnt from its success and failures during earlier campaigns. Therefore, as the Axis forces, now mainly German, in the USSR were less able to mount a broad front summer offensive the Soviets were growing stronger and more capable and were certainly better able to conduct powerful operations. The campaigning

season of 1943 was set to be an interesting time for both sides.

German POWS cross the frozen waters of the Volga River at the beginning of their march into the depths of the USSR. Following the collapse of Sixth Army, AGS found it difficult to replace men and equipment.

The failure of Manstein’s counterattack, codenamed Operation Winter Storm, to relieve Sixth Army bought time for the Axis forces in the Caucasus to escape from their exposed positions.

In the far north the fighting had ground to a halt during the autumn of 1941. The relatively small-scale actions in this area were limited because of the harsh environment and primitive infrastructure.

The acute shortage of men forced Germany to acknowledge the enlistment of anti-communist troops in formations such as the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). More a propaganda success than a military one, the ROA was a resource that was never exploited to the extent that it could have been. Here the colours of the ROA are displayed in Smolensk during the spring of 1943.

German armour was manufactured to higher standards than its Soviet opponents. However, productivity was lower and the qualitative difference was insuffiient to offset the lack of numbers. Baldly put, the Red Army could lose more tanks than the Germans and still maintain the momentum of its offensives.

Chapter 1

Kursk, the Northern Flank

F

or the Germans the westward facing bulge in the line that centred on the city of Kursk was unfinished business, left over from their counteroffensive of February–March 1943. On 13 March, within days of the recapture of Kharkov and Belgorod, Hitler listed the tasks for his men on the Eastern Front. Of these the main priority was the destruction of the Kursk Bulge. This was to be accomplished by a simple, two-thrust pincer movement; one attack from AGC; one from the southern flank by AGS. Later that month the Führer considered operations south of Kharkov to reconquer the industrial region of the Donets River. However, in mid-April those participating in the Kursk offensive, codenamed Operation Citadel, were informed that they should be prepared to attack at six days’ notice sometime after 28 April. This was what Hitler termed ‘the first offensive of the year’. With the die cast, AGS’ Fourth Panzer Army and AGC’s Ninth Army were to spearhead Operation Citadel and began to receive powerful reinforcements. However, a combination of continuing bad weather and technical problems with the new tank, the Panzer V Panther, led to the offensive being postponed several times. But, every day that Hitler vacillated and factors beyond his control intervened gifted the Soviets more time to prepare their defences. For much as the German leadership was not entirely united behind the Führer in support of the summer offensive, Stalin’s generals and marshals were less doubtful of success. Having lost the offensive momentum following Manstein’s counterattacks, Stavka was eager to regain the initiative. Therefore, Stalin consulted his senior officers for their assessment of the strategic situation with reports to be ready by mid-April. The conclusion reached resulted in the decision to ‘concentrate our forces in the Kursk area, to bleed the enemy forces here in a defensive operation, and then to switch to the offensive and achieve their full destruction’, as described in a Stavka memorandum. The German northern pincer would be commanded by General Walter Model, the wellrespected defender of the Rzhev Salient. Model’s Ninth Army would deploy six panzer divisions: 2nd, 4th, 9th, 12th, 18th and 20th alongside 10th Panzer Grenadier Division and 14 infantry divisions. The 2nd, 9th and 20th Panzer divisions and 6th Infantry Division would spearhead the attack. After the postponements and false alarms of May and June information from newly captured German POWs was sufficiently convincing for Zhukov to order the artillery to fire a pre-emptive barrage to upset enemy assembly and artillery positions. Although the damage inflicted was minimal, it did wrong-foot the attackers, causing a delay of over 2 hours. However, an attack on Luftwaffe bases on both flanks of the bulge achieved very little. Then, at 0430hr, on 5 July the German artillery opened fire followed 60 minutes later by the ground attack.

A feint by XXIII Army Corps at the junction of Thirteenth and Forty-Eighth armies at the eastern end of the bulge pushed 1.5km into the first defence line where it was held by counterattacks, 3km short of the road junction of Maloarkhangelsk. But the main attack by XXXXVII and XXXXI Panzer corps with strong air support advanced 5km in the direction of Ponyri railway station. Rokossovsky’s Central Front, facing these attacks, fought back deploying armour and mobile obstacle detachments while simultaneously falling back on the line of ridges outside of Ponyri. By sunset Ninth Army had pushed into the first defence line to a depth of 8km across a front of 15km. One German noted, ‘We’re getting there! Not easily, and the battle has been bloody and costly. But we are getting there.’ However, ‘Nowhere has the enemy been taken by surprise. Nowhere has he been soft. He had clearly been expecting the attack . . .’ That night Rokossovsky’s armoured reserve, Second Tank Army, began to move forward in preparation to counterattack. Model’s panzer units counted some 20 per cent of tanks and assault guns lost from the 300 committed. The Soviet counterattack was to be met by 2nd and 9th panzer divisions supported by the Tigers of 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. From 6 July upwards of 1,000 tanks would be locked in a huge battle that swung to and fro along the Ponyri ridge line, Hill 274 and the fortified villages of Olkhovatka and Samodurovka. Renewing the attack towards Maloarkhangelsk, 18th Panzer Division and its accompanying 86th and 292nd infantry divisions were stopped short of Ponyri by well-entrenched infantry and cleverly sited anti-tank guns. Described thus by a German observer, ‘The Russian infantrymen allowed the tanks to rumble past their well-camouflaged fox holes and then came out to deal with the German grenadiers in their wake. Thus the battle continued to rage on in sectors that the forward tank commanders believed already won . . . and the tanks and assault guns were out of fuel.’ Such holding actions by the Soviet riflemen bought time for their armour which had been experiencing great difficulty moving forward through the maze of their own defences. This slow movement resulted in less effective, piecemeal attacks. Such was the pressure that 140th Rifle Division from Seventieth Army on the Soviet left flank was sent in support. As dusk fell concealed Soviet infantrymen and engineers scuttled about the battlefield sowing mines, killing the members of tank recovery and repair crews and generally creating havoc. On 7 July the Red Air Force finally gained control of the air over the bulge’s northern flank. Now the Shturmovik not the Stuka would pulverize enemy armour as it ground forward through the dust and smoke. As dawn spread across fields littered with smashed tanks, guns and men, Model brought up the hitherto uncommitted 4th Panzer Division with 101 tanks. During the course of the day four attacks were launched through the unharvested corn that covered the fields near the fortified village of Samodurovka. ‘The (panzer) grenadiers swept on, capturing trenches and encountering new ones . . . Companies became platoons’, an anonymous officer of 4th Panzer Division reported. Elsewhere 4th Panzer Division took the village of Teploe at the junction of 70th and 175th Guards rifle divisions, but tanks and infantry arrived to seal the breach and once more the Soviet line held firm. German accounts paid tribute to the Soviet defenders, ‘the Soviet infantry refused to panic in the face of the roaring Tiger and Ferdinand tanks . . . Everything had been done to inoculate the troops against the notorious “tank panic”.’ Firing over open sights, Soviet

anti-tank gunners poured fire into the advancing panzers while infantry weapons pinned down their supporting panzer grenadiers. To reinforce the attack on Ponyri 10th Panzer Grenadier Division was brought up to face two Soviet airborne divisions, 3rd and 4th Guards, which it pushed back to the outskirts of the town. But this was Ninth Army’s last effort in this area, men and machines were at their last gasp, their last drop of fuel. However, there was still sufficient strength remaining for one last attempt to breakthrough into open country. On 9 July, as Ponyri’s fate hung in the balance, Model concluded that his best chance of success lay in taking the ridge near Olkhovatka. Mustering the last 300 armoured fighting vehicles of 2nd, 4th and 20th panzer divisions, Ninth Army’s units entered the fray once more. A massive aerial and artillery bombardment preceded the tank attack. Pulverized though they were, the Soviets held their ground, thanks in part to reinforcements in the shape of 162nd Rifle Division, another fresh unit. When this last gamble failed to pay off it was clear that Model’s offensive was over. Moscow’s response was swift. Bryansk Front and the left flank of Western (W) Front were ordered to go over to the offensive. While AGC was preoccupied with Operation Citadel’s northern thrust the Soviet preparations for their offensive continued. However, timing was paramount, Ninth Army must not be strong enough to wheel and counterattack. By 11 July this requirement had, in good measure, been met. Model’s forces had lost some 50,000 men killed, wounded or captured along with 400 tanks for an advance of no more than 15km. Therefore, Stalin’s forces north of Kursk could move over to the attack. Exhausted as Rokossovsky’s Central Front may have been, Stavka had other forces available that could be unleashed on the salient around Orel. The attack that AGS was mounting on the bulge’s southern flank was Hitler’s only hope of capturing Kursk and restoring the situation.

Hitler was uncertain that Operation Citadel would achieve its objectives. When asked by Guderian why Germany should attack in the East during 1943 Hitler commented, ‘Whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns over.’

Stalin and Stavka had decided to use the Kursk area to ‘concentrate our main forces . . . to bleed the enemy forces here in a defensive operation, and then to switch to the offensive and achieve their full destruction’, as a Stavka memorandum detailed. German preparations coupled with information from other sources, including the British, made the decision an easy one.

On 10 May the entire civilian population was ordered to leave the area of Ponyri, Maloarkhangelsk and nearby villages. Here women dig an anti-tank ditch to the accompaniment of a regimental band. Thousands were thus mobilized.

This group of panzer troops are sitting on their Panzer III en route to the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge. The unit marking on the right of the front glacis plate is that of 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich. Strongly equipped with tanks, it became a panzer division later in 1943. There is a noticeable lack of camouflage on the transport denoting confidence in the Luftwaffe.

Ninth Army deployed 590 tanks, mainly Panzer IIIs and IVs, and 424 assault guns. However, many of the tanks were obsolescent and under gunned. After two years of the war Soviet tank crews were increasingly confident and capable of dealing with German armoured forces.

The Sd Kfz 184 Jagdpanzer Tiger (Porsche) Elefant was also known as Ferdinand after its designer Ferdinand Porsche. This Tiger reject was basically an armoured box equipped with an 88mm gun. A total of 105 of these monsters were deployed into the 653rd and 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Detachments under XXXXI Panzer Corps. Lack of vision ports and machine guns made them easy prey for tank-hunting infantry.

A group of female partisans. Partisan groups played a useful role by sabotaging supply lines, particularly railway lines, during the build-up to Operation Citadel. They also provided valuable intelligence. Alongside intelligence from the British and the spy network known as the Red Orchestra, the picture of German intent was very clear.

A mixed group of machine-gunners, anti-riflemen and sub-machine-gunners wait for another German attack. To the rear centre of the image is a disabled Stug III. The spoil from the trench has been roughly covered with straw to avoid detection from the air.

A cover image from Signal magazine. The Germans had to negotiate minefields of an unheard of density on both flanks of the bulge. Groups of Soviet engineers would replace those cleared by their opposite numbers at any opportunity. Thirteenth Army sowed 2,400 antitank and 2,700 antipersonnel mines per mile of front in the first defence line.

Chevaux de frise swathed in barbed wire were one of many such devices deployed by mobile Soviet engineer units to plug gaps in the line.

The original caption states, ‘Sergeant Zhukov, combat engineer, clears mines in the Kursk region.’ Behind him is a Stug III comprehensively eliminated from further action.

A triumphant German panzer man cheers the downing of a Soviet aircraft. He is standing on a Panzer III command tank, identifiable by the dummy gun and aerials. Soviet air superiority forced the Germans to concentrate their assets on specific targets.

Soviet infantrymen walk along the railway sidings at Ponyri station during a lull in the fighting. By the end of the German attack very little was left standing of this heavily defended position.

In the front line on the ridge line around Ponyri. The line of buildings to the rear would have been fortified and garrisoned. However, the lack of damage indicates this is a pre-action image.

A group of senior Soviet officers, including Rokossovsky (fourth from right), study a captured Elefant. The strength of its armour can be seen by the three visible shell craters. However, the broken track (to right) would have spelt out the end for this machine as it was so heavy, 65 tonnes, that it required specialist prime movers. This is possibly the one displayed at Kubinka Tank Museum in Russia.

Panzer IVs of 4th Panzer Division move up to support 20th Panzer Division in the fighting around Samodurovka on 8 July. By now

camouflage is important.

A PTRD 14.5mm Model 1941 anti-tank rifle. Deployed on the flanks to shoot at the thinner side armour of enemy tanks, this weapon was still effective at close range in the hands of cool, expert crew men. It could penetrate 25mm of armour.

Soviet reserves moving up towards the third line of Central Front’s defences. The Red Army issued very simple, practical kit, as can be seen here. A haversack, greatcoat and ammunition pouches were the basics.

German forward artillery observers note the fall of shot and communicate adjustments. With stay behind Soviet troops an everpresent threat these men are in constant danger.

Chapter 2

Kursk, the Southern Flank

T

he German force deployed on the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge was considerably stronger than that available to Model. The largest formation was Fourth Panzer Army, lead by General Hermann Hoth. From left to right Fourth Panzer Army lined up a follows. LII Army Corps’ three infantry divisions would cover the left flank of the strike force XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ 535 tanks. This unit consisted of 3rd and 11th panzer divisions, Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutschland and 10th Panzer Brigade with 200 of the new Panzer V Panther tanks as well as 66 assault guns. On the strike force’s right flank II SS Panzer Corps, commanded by SS Obergruppenhfuhrer Paul Hausser, comprised 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte, 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich and 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, with 390 tanks including 42 Panzer VI Tigers and 104 assault guns. It aimed directly at the defence lines of General N.F. Vatutin’s Voronezh Front which covered the road to Kursk. The Germans did not fully realize the strength of the forces deployed against them. Vatutin’s tank fleet numbered over 1,700 vehicles including self-propelled guns and tank destroyers. The German attack would fall on Sixth and Seventh Guards armies which held the 85km front. Manstein’s tanks would strike at a 45km-long section to the north east and north west of Belgorod with the initial objective being the town of Oboyan, roughly halfway to Kursk itself. To the right of II SS Panzer Corps, Army Detachment Kempf, commanded by General Kempf, was to cover the right of the main thrust and drive into the shoulder of the salient where Voronezh and South Western (SW) fronts connected. Kempf led 9 divisions, 3 of which, 6th, 7th and 19th, were panzer divisions that fielded roughly 340 tanks including 45 Tigers of 503rd Heavy Panzer Detachment. However, behind Vatutin’s units Stavka had positioned powerful reserves, General I.S. Konev’s Steppe Front as well as General P.A. Rotmistrov’s Fifth Guard Tank Army. Whereas Model used his infantry with armoured support to break Soviet defences, so Manstein and Kempf, understrength in infantry, would rely on their tanks to provide the key to unlock the route to Kursk. The lack of infantry was going to prove an increasing handicap in the days to come. Now Germany’s most up-to-date and largest tank force was to challenge the USSR’s most formidable, well-supported defensive position. Following a pre-emptive Soviet barrage and air attack the panzers rolled forward over the steppe at 0400hr along a 45km front between Gertsovka on the left and Belgorod on the right. XXXXVIII Panzer Corps attacked in line abreast with 3rd Panzer Division on the left, Gross Deutschland in the centre, with 10th Panzer Brigade’s mighty force of newly made and recently arrived Panthers, and 11th Panzer Division on the right. Within minutes Gross Deutschland and the Panthers had run into trouble, finding themselves mired in boggy ground or stuck in an unmapped minefield. As their infantry pushed ahead the armour spluttered to a halt as tracks

whirred uselessly in the swamp or tore away as mines exploded beneath them. Confusion reigned as engineers were called forward to clear the minefield and the infantry were shot to pieces. A staff officer of the Gross Deutschland Division described the situation: ‘Ten more hours had to pass before the first tanks and selfpropelled guns got through and reached the infantry.’ However, to the left and right 3rd and 11th panzer divisions were making better progress. The latter outflanking the Soviet defenders in front of the bogged down Gross Deutschland grenadiers and capturing the village of Cherkaskoye, 8km into the Soviet position, and smashing an infantry brigade in the process. After initial problems the first Soviet line was breached and its defenders fell back to the west and north as Vatutin pushed reinforcements forward to launch a counterattack southwards. However, 3rd Panzer Division was driving forwards and during the late afternoon broke into the second Soviet line and, dragging the other divisions of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps in its wake, pushed forwards towards the main defences of the second line along the Pena River. Vatutin dispatched tank units towards this position in an attempt to restore the situation. In the centre II SS Panzer Corps was making significant progress. From left to right 1st SS, 2nd SS and 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier divisions pushed forward, ‘the very first hours of fighting showed that Hausser’s divisions were encountering a well-prepared and well-functioning defence’. By early evening Das Reich had lost thirty-three tanks, seventeen of which were Tigers, to superbly handled anti-tank gun units. Leibstandarte had orders to cross the Psel River, south of Oboyan, some 30km from its start line that day but, such was the resilience of the defences, that it was fought to a standstill. On the right Totenkopf was slowly wheeling to the right but was unable to crush its opponents north of Belgorod. This move was an attempt to link up with Army Detachment Kempf, which had launched its attack on the same day eventually establishing several bridgeheads across the Upper Donets River. By the end of 5 July Kempf’s forces had established a 36 square kilometre position and ripped a considerable hole in Seventh Guards Army’s first defence line. However, this progress was insufficient to provide firm protection for II SS Panzer Corps’ right flank which was pushing ahead faster than Kempf’s men. Throughout the night both Vatutin and Manstein’s forces rested, reinforced and resupplied. Technicians and tank crews worked to repair those vehicles that had been recovered from the battlefield. On 6 July XXXXVIII Panzer Corps advanced again. On the left 3rd Panzer Division reached the Pena River which proved to be impossible to ford, thus forcing the corps to realign to the east. Here they ran into tough opposition in the shape of III Mechanized Corps and yet more anti-tank gun units. As was noted by a Gross Deutschland officer, ‘Numerous Panthers had already been put out of action . . . [they were] left for the following repair echelons to repair’. The panzers were now being subjected to a war of attrition, with numbers stacked in the Soviets’ favour. To Vatutin the major threat was II SS Panzer Corps which, during the course of 6 July, had pushed forward a further 12km, breaching the second Soviet defence line – Sixth Guards Army’s position was starting to creak ominously. V Guards Tank Corps, in disarray, had been pushed to the left by II SS Panzer Corps. One of its brigades was all that stood before the SS and Prokhorovka to the north east. Therefore, it was in that direction that Hausser permitted his men to march, all the while keeping a cautious eye on his increasingly vulnerable flanks. At 21.15hr that evening II Guards Tank Corps struck at the SS Panzer Corps’ right flank.

However, the combined efforts of the Luftwaffe and units of Totenkopf blunted the attack. This diversion of Totenkopf’s resources weakened its eastward push to join up with Army Detachment Kempf. Kempf’s forces struck powerfully out of their bridgehead on 6 July, breaking through Soviet positions and wheeling northwards to positions that were favourable for further advances but that would expose and extend their right flank. But the Germans were not alone in facing dilemmas. Vatutin had all but exhausted his front’s reserves and could not exploit the German’s weak flank defences without further reinforcements. Therefore, he asked Stavka for more men, specifically four tank and two aviation corps. Furthermore, he ‘consider[ed] it necessary to move Rotmistrov [Fifth Guards Tank Army]’ which was a part of Steppe Front’s reserve group. Later that night Stalin authorized the movement of Tenth and Second Tank corps to the Prokhorovka area and the release of Fifth Guards Tank Army to the Kursk region. Bringing these formations into play would require the current positions to be held by the units already in place – it was now a race against time. Time was something that Hoth did not wish to allow Vatutin. He had decided to exploit the road heading towards Prokhorovka which, although it led Fourth Panzer Army away from Oboyan and Kursk directly, it did offer the opportunity for swift progress into the Soviet rear over more open ground. To achieve this safely it would be necessary for XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to carry out two missions. First, to protect the left of II SS Panzer Corps and second, to continue the advance on Oboyan – and, of course, it also had to ensure the security of its own left flank. Leibstandarte moved on Prokhorovka and nearby settlements with infantry units, threatening but not capturing them in the face of heavy Soviet counterattacks, on 7 July. Simultaneously, SS armour from Leibstandarte and Das Reich pushed through V Guards Tank Corps along the Prokhorovka road thus extending its flanks, the right being covered by elements of Totenkopf. As the sun set Leibstandarte was ordered to move to its left to join up with XXXXVIII Panzer Corps on the following day. The loss of Prokhorovka would endanger Vatutin’s position as it was a vital ‘fixing’ point in that sector. To shore up the position orders went out to Thirty-Eighth and Fortieth armies facing eastwards and covering XXXXVIII Panzer Corps flank to provide reinforcements for the defences south of Oboyan to Prokhorovka. As the SS pushed ahead so did Gross Deutschland and 11th Panzer Division, grinding their way through 1st and 3rd Mechanized brigades where the dug in T 34s proved difficult to winkle out. XXXXVIII Panzer Corps made 5km that day, the situation described by a Gross Deutschland officer: Unfortunately for the attackers [Gross Deutschland] . . . the Panthers suffered enormous losses [as they] drove into a minefield which had not been identified . . . Very heavy attacks by enemy close-support aircraft disrupted these movements considerably . . . The advance proved to be slow and laborious: heavy close-quarter fighting broke out over every single position. Night fell and brought no rest. The sky was fire red, heavy artillery shells shook the earth, rocket batteries fired at the last identified targets. This fire was covering a Soviet withdrawal further to the north and east to avoid the German

armour erupting into the rear areas. Nor was this move premature as, on 8 July, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps pushed ahead along the eastern bank of the Pena River up the Oboyan road as 3rd Panzer Division followed in Gross Deutschland’s wake clearing the river bank. As Gross Deutschland’s war diary noted, ‘The effect of enemy fire from the bank of the Pena on the mass of Panzer Grenadiers attacking from the south and east was especially uncomfortable and disruptive.’ The road to Oboyan now seemed to be opening up. Vatutin was aware of this threat and moved XXXI Tank Corps and 3rd Mechanized Brigade to cover the Oboyan road along with reinforcements from Fortieth Army. VI Tank Corps was also to be committed in this area and pointed itself towards XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ left flank. The Germans decided to wheel Gross Deutschland west to link up with 3rd Panzer Division, eliminate this threat and then proceed alongside 11th Panzer Division to Oboyan. Thus was the scene set for 9 July. Meanwhile, II SS Panzer Corps was to reconfigure its line of advance away from Prokhorovka to Kursk once again, and elements of Totenkopf would swap places with elements of Das Reich on the right flank. But what the SS did not consider likely was a Soviet armoured counterattack which, luckily for them, was pre-empted by Totenkopf’s attack. The result for the Soviets was a disruption of their plans. Instead of a concerted attack the Soviet effort broke down into a piecemeal affair and heavy casualties were incurred. The confident manner in which the Soviet attacks on his corps’ right flank were defeated led Hausser to continue his advance to meet up with XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. Nevertheless, the strength of the attacks caused Hausser to leave Das Reich covering his right flank in strength as III Panzer Corps remained frustrated in its efforts to move north. Again, this was due in considerable part to the strength of the Soviet forces on its right flank. In fact, 8km had been made by 6th Panzer Division but 19th Panzer Division was unable to exploit this achievement. Once more, however, Vatutin was alert to the threat III Panzer Corps posed but had sufficient confidence in General M.S. Shumilov’s methods and careful deployment of reserves, which maintained the pressure on Army Detachment Kempf’s right flank throughout 7 and 8 July. The 9 July was an important day with fateful consequences for both sides. It was now clear to Stavka that Model’s operation had virtually run out of steam and nor was it, as they had believed, the main attack on Kursk. Relieved of this thrust, the Soviets were free to concentrate on the upcoming offensive towards Orel and the danger posed by AGS. During the night 8–9 July the movement of reserves to Voronezh Front was speeded up. This was particularly so for the over 600 armoured vehicles of Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was instructed to be in place between Oboyan and south east of Prokhorovka no later than 2300hr on 9 July. Supporting them were the infantry and guns of Fifth Guards Army, some 80,000 men. As these orders were carried out so Vatutin further redeployed his own front to slow the steady advance of II SS and XXXXVIII Panzer corps. Across the line Hoth was also gathering his forces for what he anticipated would be the final push northwards. The plan was for 11th Panzer Division with part of Gross Deutschland to link up with Leibstandarte and Totenkopf to complete the breakthrough to Oboyan. Das Reich would continue to guard the right flank, 3rd Panzer Division and parts of Gross Deutschland the left. At first the German plan went well. Throughout 9 July the SS made good progress and joined up with 11th Panzer Division. Worryingly, however, the pressure on Das Reich’s positions

was increasing and nor was III Panzer Corps making any worthwhile progress. Soviet comments on the day’s fighting are noteworthy, ‘The battle took on an especially bitter character. The Hiterlites suffered great losses but our forces were also exhausted.’ With Gross Deutschland’s main units diverted to deal with Soviet armour on its left flank, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, despite making good progress that day, was clearly not strong enough to continue. It was for that reason and Soviet defensive prowess that it was decided to point II SS Panzer Corps once again at the apparently weaker sector of Prokhorovka. Hoth believed that this shift of axis would, with heavy air support, open the way north for the relatively fresh Army Detachment Kempf to come north and assist with the drive on Kursk. As Fifth Guards Tank Army had been moving at night Hoth was unaware of its strength. His orders to Hausser had set the scene for what has been described as the greatest tank battle of all time. While XXXXVIII Panzer Corps kept pressing Sixth Guards Army’s defences, the II SS Panzer Corps completed its regrouping and prepared to launch its attack. To the south the following day, 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf finally marshalled its armoured divisions which, led by the Tiger battalion, reached to within 30km of Prokhorovka, thus presenting the Soviets with another threat. Furthermore, Stavka was aware that Manstein was preparing to commit AGS’ reserve 5th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking and 10th Panzer Division to the offensive. The defence of the Prokhorovka road was the responsibility of III Tank Corps, the three brigades of which attacked at dawn on 10 July. They faced units of Das Reich and Leibstandarte. All day fighting swirled around the Komsomolets State Farm and Hill 241, but as dusk fell the SS still held the ground. But to the rear of the Soviet tanks 9th Guards Airborne Division was digging in around Prokhorovka itself – and all the while Fifth Guards Tank Army was heading south. En route units were ‘bolted on’ increasing the number of tanks and artillery pieces of all types with this already formidable force. But the SS were not waiting on the Soviets. On 11 July, with massive air support, the panzers of Leibstandarte pushed further up the road taking another collective farm and hill, but they also experienced worrying fire from both flanks and the right in particular. However, Leibstandarte’s appearance near to Prokhorovka, under the very eyes of Rotmistrov himself, changed the nature of the Soviet counterattack from a well-planned operation into a hasty meeting engagement. During the night 11–12 July Rotmistrov aligned his units across the road and fields outside of Prokhorovka. Just after dawn the SS advanced and ran directly into the Soviet guardsmen. As Rotmistrov put it, ‘Indeed it turned out that both we and the Germans went over to the offensive simultaneously.’ The Leibstandarte’s divisional diary recorded the following impression: ‘They attacked us in the morning. They were around us, on top of us and between us. We fought man-to-man, jumping out of our foxholes to lob our magnetic hollow charge grenades at the enemy tanks, leaping out of our Schutzenpanzerwagens to take on any enemy vehicle or man we spotted. It was hell!’ By 0900hr the armour of both sides was heavily engaged. The history of the Leibstandarte records, ‘destroyed about 62 T70s and T34s in a three hour long battle that could almost be termed hand to hand tank combat’ so close was the fighting. As the afternoon wore on the fighting died down. Das Reich had spent much of the day in an attempt to protect the right

flank. A Das Reich officer noted, ‘Russian attacks on our flanks are tying down half our effectives and taking the steam out of our operation against Prokhorovka.’ And then it rained. Rotmistrov’s armour had held the SS but Totenkopf was still in a position to launch an outflanking move from the left into the rear of Fifth Guards Tank Army. News of III Panzer Corps’ advance also caused Rotmistrov concern as it could threaten his left flank. A remarkable piece of cheek and bluff had allowed 6th Panzer Division to advance to within 15km of Prokhorovka. To support the infantry facing this move, Rotmistrov committed his armoured reserve. Despite 6th Panzer being reinforced, it was unable to do more than hold the Soviet attack and no more progress was made. On the left flank XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had broken a powerful Soviet attack but was itself too weak to advance. The 12 July was the tip over point of AGS’ efforts to reach Kursk. Stavka ordered Vatutin to maintain the pressure along the whole of Voronezh Front’s line, which included Fifth Guards Tank Army assuming a defensive posture. Hoth issued similar orders to II SS Panzer Corps but allowed Totenkopf the chance to break into the rear of Fifth Guards Tank Army, although this was unsuccessful. On the map AGS’ situation looked promising: all that was required was one last push for II SS Panzer Corps to link up with III Panzer Corps and maybe something could still be achieved. The 13 July was a momentous day. Hitler summoned Manstein to his HQ in East Prussia. While the SS and II Panzer Corps battered vainly to encircle their Soviet opponents Manstein and von Kluge were told that Hitler intended to cancel Operation Citadel due to the Allied invasion of Sicily on 10 July, the Soviet offensive towards Orel that had started on 12 July and the Soviet build-up to the south of Kharkov. Although Manstein was allowed some days in which to wear down the Soviets, Citadel was at an end. On 14 July Model was given command of Ninth and Second Panzer armies. It was up to him to contain the first major Soviet attack – Operation Kutuzov – but it was only a tithe of the power that Stalin planned to unleash during the course of that summer. The Germans would have good reason to rue the day they committed so many precious resources to their limited offensive.

Vehicles of the Gross Deutschland Panzer Grenadier Division reconnaissance unit wait for further orders. Gross Deutschland was the army’s elite combat formation. It was issued with new equipment at the same time as the senior SS divisions and often fought alongside them.

An SU-152 tank destroyer waits for its prey. It was the only Soviet machine that was guaranteed to kill a Tiger at long range. Although it was not issued with armour piercing rounds until after Operation Citadel, the weight of its high-explosive round was more than adequate to wreck the interior of any German tank and kill its crew.

A German 15cm Nebelwerfer 41 prepares to fire in support of an attack by AGS on the second day of the offensive. It had a range of 6,700m. During the initial barrage of Operation Citadel more rounds were expended than during the Polish and French campaigns.

A more modern form of aircraft detection than that shown here, the Freya radar system, enabled Fourth Air Corps to intercept a massive Soviet air strike before it could hit the Luftwaffe bases. This interception granted the German ground forces air superiority along the entirety of the 50km front at least on the first day.

Guards scout Sergeant Frolchenko enjoys a smoke having returned from a successful mission to capture a ‘tongue’. The term referred to a POW who could be coerced into giving away useful information.

Senior Lieutenant G.V. Ivanov commanded an anti-aircraft gun crew that was credited with shooting down ‘many fascist’ aircraft. The Soviet press publicized heroic figures such as this man, lauding them as ‘Defenders of the Motherland’ more than simple communist stereotypes such as the industrial hero A.G. Stakhanov of pre-war times.

Seen here in the usual firing mode, Katyusha rocket launchers were also fired over open sights directly at their targets. This involved raising the back axle on a convenient slope or building an earth mound to achieve the same effect. This became a common tactic during the Kursk fighting.

A Stug III assault gun of SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich moves over damp ground loaded with panzer grenadiers. The weather during early and mid-July was a mix of heavy rain and sunshine. The division fielded thirty-four assault guns on the first

day.

The Panthers, type D, committed to the Kursk were prone to mechanical failure. At least four caught fire from fuel leaks in the assembly area and the tank’s weight was too much for the engine and final drive which resulted in numerous breakdowns on rough terrain. Indeed, General Guderian had refused to certify the Panther as combat ready but was overruled by one of Hitler’s sycophants.

The Sd Kfz 250 to the left has a traffic marshal standing in it with his baton. The Panzer IV is the machine of a regimental signals officer as indicated by the RO3 turret marking. It would seem that these personnel are controlling the others’ movements in the restricted visibility caused by the dust and smoke. To the rear are a selection of SdKfz 251 armoured personnel carriers, Panzer IVs and Tigers.

Led by a T 34 model 1943, a unit of Fifth Guards Tank Army prepares to move off. These troops would be committed straight from their 100km march to support Fifth Guards Army. The tank army’s commander was General P.A. Rotmistrov, a seasoned and gifted leader.

The remains of a Panzer IV platoon are inspected by a Soviet officer. In many actions the Soviets recorded a Tiger ‘kill’ when it was a Panzer IV. The reason for this was the additional turret and side armour altered the profile of the vehicle making it appear to be a Tiger.

A T 34 model 1942 burns. The original caption notes that it was hit as it reversed out of its hull down ambush position. Often the exhaust smoke gave away the tank’s position as the crew fired up the engine.

Panzer grenadiers watch a dogfight during a lull in the ground battle. Such events brought a welcome distraction.

Parked in an unharvested field of cereal, a Tiger of an unidentified unit waits for orders. The smoke generated by fires in such areas added to the confusion of the battlefield.

The wreck of a Hanomag SdKfz 251/10. This variant was a platoon leader’s vehicle armed with a 37mm anti-tank gun. The tactical number is just visible on the side of the hull.

The figure in the dark uniform, Colonel V.S. Sytnik, commander of 24th Tank Brigade, V Tank Corps, issues orders to his battalion commanders. Sytnik was killed in action on 17 July in the fighting around Orel.

A Panther in the hands of the Red Army. It is number 824 of the 52nd Panzer Battalion. Clearly Hitler’s order that no intact Panther should fall into Soviet hands has not been carried out in this instance.

Germans march towards their captors. The central figure is holding up an extemporized white flag. Replacing such infantry losses was to prove more and more problematic.

Rewarding the victors. From left to right: Major General A.G. Kravchenko, the commander of V Guards Tank Corps, receives his award from General N.F. Vatutin as N.S. Khrushchev (later Soviet Premier) looks on in his capacity as a member of the Voronezh Front’s Military Council.

Chapter 3

Operation Kutuzov

O

peration Kutuzov had first been mooted in March and April 1943 during Stavka’s consultations regarding the course and conduct of the summer offensives. The Orel Salient lay directly north of the Kursk Salient penetrating eastwards for roughly 150km from its base to the town of Novosil at the tip. At the centre of its base lay the city of Bryansk through which ran several important railway lines on which the supply network for AGC relied. The main line that ran south east from Bryansk into the salient passed through Karachev and Khotinets then to Orel, which was the hub for the salient’s rail traffic with vital bridges spanning the north–south-flowing Oka River. From there one line ran south towards Kursk, another north east to Mtsensk. The region lacked roads and was heavily wooded. The large town of Bolkhov was situated roughly 75km north of Orel and was another important transport and supply point for the Germans. Around the salient’s perimeter of some 300km were ranged, from north to south, three Soviet fronts, W, Bryansk and Central. These were commanded by Generals V.D. Sokolovsky, M.M. Popov and K.K. Rokossovsky respectively. Only Central Front had been involved in the Kursk fighting, therefore the other two were relatively fresh and full of fight. The defence of the salient rested with General Schmidt’s Second Panzer Army which, denuded of its tanks for Operation Citadel, consisted of fourteen infantry divisions in three corps, LV, LIII and XXXV with two weak security divisions for antipartisan duties. The 5th Panzer Division with 102 tanks constituted the reserve with 8th Panzer Division’s 101 tanks available should the situation warrant it. However, on 10 July Schmidt was arrested by the Gestapo for anti-regime comments which led to control of both Ninth and Second Panzer armies coming under General Model’s command. The bulk of its armour and many infantry divisions were facing Central Front as the Kursk fighting died down, so the power of the Soviet attack came as an horrific shock. Indeed, the only senior German officer who appears to have noted the enemy build-up was General Rendulic commanding XXV Army Corps from his position facing Bryansk Front in the nose of the salient. In common with other commanders in the area, Rendulic had ignored the Führer’s orders and prepared a series of minefields, bunkers and entrenchments to protect his corps’ position. Waiting for the Soviet armour was a large number of well-entrenched antitank guns of varying calibres. Indeed, XXV Army Corps’ preparations were to prove invaluable as the number of units lying concealed was considerably greater than the losses at Kursk should have suggested were still available. The most powerful force was W Front, which held the line from the northern shoulder of the salient, facing the town of Zhidra, for 75km. The forces in place along this line, from west to east, were Fiftieth Army and General I.K. Bagramian’s Eleventh Guards Army, which were supported by I and V Tank corps which would provide armoured support and mobile

penetration. The mission assigned to these units was to cut the railway from Bryansk to Orel then provide the anvil on which first Bryansk and then Central fronts would hammer the German forces in the area. These 2 armies included over 200,000 men, 750 tanks and more than 4,000 guns and mortars. Bagramian’s strike force numbered 60,000 men with 600 tanks deployed on a 16km front. Stavka held in reserve for this point of the W Front Eleventh Army and Fourth Tank Army, which fielded 650 tanks. Bryansk Front’s Sixty-First Army, led by General P.A. Belov, connected with the left of Eleventh Guards Army. Popov’s main attack was to be launched by Third and Sixty-Third armies in the Mtsensk area and were to move directly westwards towards Orel itself. Support for these 170,000 men and 350 tanks was to be provided by I Guards Tank Corps. Again, Stavka had a reserve here of 731 tanks, which constituted General P.S. Rybalko’s Third Guards Tank Army that would act as an exploitation group if the need arose. The Sixty-First Army would conduct a subsidiary attack on the fortified town of Bolkhov, north of Orel, as a precursor to moving down the railway rolling up the defences from the flank. It was anticipated that these operations would divert German attention from Kursk which would enable Central Front’s Seventieth, Thirteenth and Forty-Eighth armies to strike out from the region around Ponyri and link up with Bagramian, thus enveloping Ninth and Second Panzer armies. As with all plans on a tabletop map at HQ it looked remarkably straightforward. Matters on the ground would prove rather more problematic. During the night of 11–12 July Soviet reconnaissance units moved forward to engage German outposts: the 2-hour barrage by guns of both W and Bryansk fronts concluded at 0610hr Moscow time. As the last shells fell the frontoviki (front-line soldiers) advanced. Overhead Soviet bombers returned to their bases from raids deep in the salient. Unsurprisingly, Bagramian’s attack at the point where two German infantry divisions met was rapidly successful leading him to send in I Tank Corps. However, the proximity of 5th Panzer Division contained this threat with a series of increasingly desperate counterattacks during the early evening. V Tank Corps was sent in to support its sister unit forcing the defenders back some 10km. The advance was stopped when it came up against the second line of defence. The following day Fiftieth Army attacked but the Germans were ready for them and held their ground. By nightfall, however, Bagramian’s forces had created a salient some 15km deep by 23km wide and breached the Germans’ second line. It was clear to Kluge at AGC HQ that the Orel Salient’s northern flank must give way unless reinforced speedily. Consequently, Model dispatched 12th, 18th and 20th Panzer divisions to fend off Bagramian during the night of 13–14 July. With the railway to Orel in good condition the armoured units could be moved rapidly and with little likelihood of air attack. Furthermore, Orel housed all the fuel, ammunition and spare parts they would require: it was also the centre of a network of new, upgraded roads that the Germans, in occupation for nearly two years, had created. While Ninth Army disengaged from operations against the Kursk Salient and rejigged their forces the attack by Bryansk Front had run foul of Rendulic’s XXV Army Corps’ preparations. Attacking across a bridge over the Susha River, two Soviet Rifle divisions had been cut to pieces and a massive attack by KV-1s, without infantry support, had, on 12 July, been smashed with the loss of sixty tanks; however, it gained a sliver of ground that included the first defence

line. A Soviet staff officer commented, ‘behind the first captured trench was a second, after each occupied position there was another and beyond each line another appeared’. This was not a breach that it would be possible to exploit. Strapped for resources, Rendulic set his reserve to seal the broken line and the arrival of elements of 8th Panzer Division, sent by von Kluge, and 2nd Panzer Division from Ninth Army held the Soviet advance. On the afternoon of 13 July Popov ordered I Guards Tank Corps up with the aim of breaking XXV Army Corps’ defences, but this formation, with 207 tanks, was swiftly bogged down amid the trench and bunker system surrounded by infantry combat. Around the fortified town of Bolkhov the Soviets had begun the attack it was hoped would proceed south to Orel, rolling up the German left flank, committing Sixty-First Army against LIII Army Corps. A total of four Soviet rifle divisions struck at the junction of two infantry divisions. A penetration of 7km was rapidly made, sufficient Belov, commanding Sixty-First Army, felt to insert XX Tank Corps on 14 July. However, again Soviet armour was caught up in an infantry fight and by the time it had extricated itself 12th Panzer Division was in place to counterattack. Quite remarkably, given that there was little to exploit, Stavka allowed Popov to bring Third Guards Tank Army into play. Moving at night for 48 hours, the Guards’ tanks arrived and mustered in the nose of the salient. But by now Bryansk Front’s attacks had lost their momentum as German reinforcements arrived by the hour from the south. Consequently, Stavka ordered Third Guards Tank Army to attack Orel from the south west. With almost 700 tanks the Guards commander, General P.S. Rybalko, rushed them into action with little or no preparation. Roughly one-third of his armour was of the light T-70 type or British Valentines and Matildas. These were not the sort of tanks that would fare well against the Tigers or Ferdinands attached to the pair of waiting panzer divisions. The Soviet attack began at 1030hr on 19 July. They managed to cross the Obsha River and had advanced 12km by day’s end but failed to force the Oka River line east of Orel. On 21 July the greater part of Third Guards Tank Army pushed its way to the south of Orel and eventually, on 25 July, cut the Orel–Kursk railway. That was to be its final success as Ninth Army had by this time been withdrawn from the Kursk area and was fighting a stolid defensive battle that allowed no weaknesses for the Soviets to exploit. On 15 July Central Front had joined the battle but, although they added to the German’s problems by their mere presence, the men were tired and in need of resupply after the fighting of earlier in the month. As Rokossovsky put it, ‘instead of a swift thrust the offensive deteriorated . . . we were, in effect pushing and jostling him out of the Orel Salient’. Bagramian, meanwhile, was making progress in the north. There the infantry and tanks of Eleventh Guards Army had broken through west of Bolkhov. The 9th Panzer, 10th Panzer Grenadier and 253rd Infantry divisions managed to form a defensive screen but proved to be too weak to rebuild the line. Nor were the Luftwaffe in any better condition to offer support. With their fuel almost at an end, only the most essential missions were undertaken. As early as 16 July Model had ordered the construction of the Hagen Line, at the base of the salient, to follow the Desna River wherever convenient as a screen to defend Bryansk. On 20 July Hitler forbad Ninth and Second Panzer armies from withdrawing but reversed his order two days later authorizing Model to carry out an elastic defence policy. This was simply a recognition of the realities of the situation as, on 21 July, Eleventh Army had moved into the line between Fiftieth and Eleventh Guards

armies increasing the power of the northern operation hugely. As the Soviets pushed forward during the last week of July Hitler received news of the fall of Mussolini. Von Kluge was ordered to free up troops for the Italian theatre, therefore the Orel Salient had to be evacuated despite work on the Hagen Line being incomplete. On 28 July orders went out to start Operation Herbstreise (Autumn Journey), the retreat from Orel. For two days prior to this Bagramian had been desperately trying to break through to Karachev and cut the Orel–Bryansk railway. German resistance here was savage as they withdrew their forces from Bolkhov and reformed along another defence line only 10km from the railway tracks. As Model’s exhausted men were nearing the point of collapse the tank-rich Gross Deutschland Panzer Grenadier Division arrived, just in time to prevent Eleventh Guards and II Guards Cavalry Corps from achieving their goal. During the night of 31 July–1 August AGC began to fall back on the incomplete Hagen Line. It was now obvious to Stavka that the Germans were retreating. Therefore, to ease command and control, Eleventh Guards and Fourth Tank armies were placed under Popov’s command, Third Guards Tank Army was allocated to Central Front, indeed both front commanders were to finish the business with alacrity. Von Kluge was equally keen, ‘The staff of the Army Group is fully aware that its previous intention to strike the enemy as much as possible during the withdrawal is now impossible to fulfill, because of the over exhaustion and reduced fighting capacity of the troops. It is now a question of getting out of the Orel Salient as fast as possible.’ During the night of 3– 4 August Soviet troops, elements of Third and Sixty-Third armies, reached suburban Orel. The Germans had succeeded in evacuating up to 20,000 wounded and over 50,000 tons of supplies which was testimony to their fighting skills and organizational capacity. Rokossovsky’s forces were by now south west of Orel, in Kromy, pushing back Model’s right flank. By mid-August AGC had withdrawn Ninth and Second Panzer armies to the Hagen Line which the Soviets reached shortly afterwards. Model had once again shown his talents as a defensive leader in a remarkably dexterous manner. Despite the Red Army’s heavy losses during Operation Kutuzov, Stalin was pleased as it removed yet another potential threat to Moscow. Rokossovsky and Zhukov, among others, recalled in their memoirs that the offensive could have achieved more if it had focused on the shoulders of the salient with Bryansk and not Orel as the main objective. However, Stavka had not finished with AGC, more was yet to come. But as the forces of W, Bryansk and Central fronts enjoyed some well-deserved and welcome rest, Stalin and Hitler turned their attention to the eastern Ukraine where great things were about to happen.

Before the counteroffensive around Orel began partisan units were tasked with information and sabotage missions. They successfully identified enemy units and destroyed road and rail communications.

The loss of air superiority was one of the reasons that led AGC severely to underestimate Soviet strength around the Orel position post-Kursk. Intelligence-gathering flights were almost impossible because of the numbers of Soviet fighters in the air. Although officially withdrawn from front-line service in 1942, the Henschel 126 reconnaissance plane, seen here, was sometimes pressed into service.

General Rendulic, commanding XXXV Army Corps, ordered twenty-four 88mm anti-aircraft guns to be redeployed into an antitank role as a part of his efforts to counter Soviet armoured attacks.

The Soviet’s skill at camouflage is well illustrated here. Under swathes of netting a PE-8 heavy bomber undergoes maintenance. Unfortunately, of eighteen such machines flying in support of Operation Kutuzov eight were lost during one raid during the night of 17–18 July.

AGC had two security divisions covering its rear areas. Poorly equipped, these men usually found themselves engaging partisans in the depths of swampy, mosquitoinfested forests. Seen here covering their faces against insect bites, these units were often committed to the front line fighting an enemy that they were ill-suited to meet.

A post-war portrait of General I.K. Bagramian, commander of Eleventh Guards Army during Operation Kutuzov. Armenian by birth and a professional soldier from the age of 18 as a protégé of Zhukov, he rose to lead First Baltic Front in late 1943.

Soviet infantry tactics were moving away from the massed charge of earlier years. Here a section moves along one of the few roads in the Orel Salient. The machine gun is the usual Maxim M 1910 but lacks its shield for ease of movement in dense undergrowth.

By 1943 the KV-1 tank was being phased out. Nevertheless, it was still used in specialist units. Quite a few were lost on 12 July when they drove into a minefield. The large rivets secured additional armour plate.

Third Guards Tank Army fielded over 450 T 34s but it also included a number of Lend-Lease Matildas. These were outclassed by the majority of German armour. Soviet tank troops nicknamed them ‘field crematoriums’ as they had tended to be highly flammable.

Vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft guns performed in an infantry support capacity, providing mobile fire support for the defenders. This Luftwaffe flak crew work a quadruple 20mm weapon. Such units claimed to have accounted for over 200 tanks by the end of July.

The Ferdinands that fought at Kursk were still available to Ninth Army. They were more useful in the conditions of ambush and defence that were AGC’s lot during Operation Kutuzov. However, when mechanical failure or fuel shortages prevented them moving the crews were under orders to destroy them. This vehicle has been blown up by its crew and captured by the Soviets.

A captured Nebelwerfer put to good use against its former owners. The tube carries a star marking. The use of ‘trophy’ weapons and equipment was common practice for both sides.

As the Soviets closed in on Orel rear area staff were evacuated as priorities dictated. Despite the efforts of the partisans, thousands of wounded were moved westwards from hospitals such as this.

As the Germans pulled out they carried out a thorough scorched earth policy, burning villages, unharvested crops and destroying any industrial facilities or plant. It is estimated that over 250,000 civilians were forcibly re-located, and inevitably collaborators were among this number.

A heavily camouflaged Stug III waits for a Soviet attack. During the last week of July four panzer divisions were sent to support Ninth Army. They extracted a bloody price from the newly arrived Fourth Tank Army.

In a relatively unscathed village Soviet scouts, dressed in their distinctive camouflage suits, make use of a local’s knowledge.

When not destroying crops the Germans made use of them to prepare ambushes. Tanks, anti-tank and assault guns were often dug in at strategic points. If time allowed, alternative positions were prepared so that relocations could be speedily made.

Simply exhausted, Red Army men sleep where they dropped.

Factory fresh aircraft arrive at the front to provide yet more problems for the hard-pressed Luftwaffe. The La-5 fighter, seen here, was an excellent plane that outperformed the Me-109 and helped the Red Air Force to gain superiority during the summer of 1943.

Chapter 4

Operation Rumiantsev

T

he defensive fighting in the Kursk Salient had achieved Stavka’s aim of grinding down the armoured strength of the German forces in the USSR, and the Allied invasion of Sicily had provided Hitler with the politically face-saving excuse of calling off Operation Citadel. Denying Manstein his wish to continue the offensive, the Führer had acquiesced to AGS’ request to carry on with a series of limited attacks to reduce the power of the Soviet tank forces facing it. This spoiling strategy was given the codename of Operation Roland. Essential to Roland’s success was the establishment of a continuous line left and right of Prokhorovka. Therefore, on 14–15 July Manstein ordered his much-reduced armoured divisions to regroup. The panzers drove the Soviet forces back pushing them to assume a defensive stance. The II SS Panzer Corps carried out limited attacks while Army Detachment Kempf completed the concentration of III Panzer Corps. Supported by its two infantry divisions, III Panzer Corps drove the Soviets back and, following a period of intense fighting that rivalled that of the previous week, established a continuous line. However, the cost had been heavy. Although the Soviets had lost many tanks, they were in a better position to replace them than their enemy. Indeed, the Soviets were steadily moving even more armoured units into assembly areas around Oboyan. The task assigned to these formations was to drive the men of AGS back to their Citadel start lines, but in the event this did not prove necessary. On 17 July II SS Panzer Corps was ordered back to Belgorod to make the long journey to Italy. On the same day SW and Southern (S) fronts opened their offensive against the German lines along the Mius and Upper Donets rivers. With the SS tanks and Gross Deutschland’s armour moving out west and north respectively, AGS was not the force it had been less than three weeks before. The Soviet attacks along the Mius River and into the Orel Salient came as no surprise to the Germans. However, the scale and the power of the Soviet offensive that began on 3 August came as a ghastly shock as the Germans believed the Red Army to be too weak to carry out such an offensive. The main Soviet offensive was codenamed Operation Rumiantsev and had been planned as far back as April 1943. However, the final details were dependent on the outcome of the fighting around Kursk. In common with previous Soviet counteroffensives it was ambitious: the aim in this case was, first, the destruction of Army Detachment Kempf and Fourth Panzer Army and, secondly, the isolation of First Panzer and Sixth armies. Voronezh and Steppe fronts were tasked with the first part of the offensive, with units from both commands operating as the pincers of an encirclement that would liberate Belgorod and Kharkov. However, to avoid the danger of flank attacks, as had happened earlier in the year, the main attack would be delivered by units at the front’s junction and then spread from this epicentre outwards towards the flanks.

Furthermore, the armoured and mobile exploitation formations would be committed immediately following the infantry’s penetrating the German lines. Despite this being the strongest part of AGS’ defences, Stavka anticipated that the attack would create problems for Manstein who would be unsure as to where he should commit his reserves. Finally, this central attack would reduce the command and control difficulties inherent with a combined front attack. Zhukov, who was responsible for overall planning, requested a postponement of the attack to ensure that the attacking force would be as strong as could be. Stalin agreed and the attack was therefore scheduled for 3 August. Manstein, with a much-depleted force at his disposal, had fallen back to several incomplete defence lines, none of which were particularly strong or well manned, incapable of achieving little more than providing a temporary barrier to a determined attack. Indeed, the Germans mustered but 205,000 men backed by roughly 250 tanks and assault guns to face over 950,000 Soviet infantry and almost 2,500 tanks and self-propelled guns. Unaware of the Soviet build-up, Manstein was confident that the time that they would need to assemble a powerful enough force in this area would allow him to deal with the threat in the south. The Soviet barrage began at 0500hr and at 0800hr the infantry attack began. After 2 hours the German line was creaking which led Vatutin to unleash elements of Voronezh Front’s First and Fifth Guards Tank armies. By 1500hr these armoured formations had broken through the Germans’ first defence line. Elsewhere, Soviet armour was reduced to supporting infantry attacks against skilful defenders. As the first day’s combat drew to a close Stavka began to receive a succession of positive reports from both fronts. The Guards’ tanks had pushed 25km into the German position and carved out a salient 10km wide at the point where Army Detachment Kempf and Fourth Panzer Army met. In an attempt to control the increasingly perilous situation, Manstein brought SS Panzer Grenadier divisions Totenkopf, Das Reich and Wiking up from the south and was reassigned Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutschland from the fighting around Orel. As these units were rushed to their assembly points 19th and 6th Panzer divisions fought desperately to contain VI and XXXI Tank and III Mechanized corps’ penetration west of Belgorod. It was at this point that the Soviet advance began to slow down. As their infantry was lagging behind the armour, the latter risked isolation and could not therefore take a chance on leaving too many Germans in their wake where they could interrupt the poorly protected supply lines. Konev’s Steppe Front was facing tougher resistance from 3 August onwards. While his armour pushed steadily south westwards, both infantry and armour had to be diverted to deal with strong German pockets. This was particularly so around Borisovka where elements of five divisions were encircled. The 11th Panzer Division and early arrivals of the Gross Deutschland were able to cut an escape route for the trapped formations which pulled out on 9 August. Hitler had ordered that Belgorod was to be held no matter what the cost. Consequently, it had become by late on 6 August the tip of an 80km-long salient. When it became clear that the city was about to fall the order to evacuate was finally issued and the Red Army marched in and Steppe Front pressed on towards Kharkov. Despite these frustrations the growing breadth of the Soviet offensive was bearing fruit. By late evening on 7 August the gap between Army Detachment Kempf and Fourth Panzer Army had grown to 50km. Two towns were to become the focus of both Soviet and German

commanders’ attention – to the west Akhtyrka and to the east Bogodukhov. The latter, a major railway junction roughly 45km west of Kharkov, was the assembly point for II SS Panzer Corps. The former, 50km west of Bogodukhov, was a road junction around which armoured divisions of Fourth Panzer Army were coalescing. One of the German units falling back on this assembly point was a battlegroup formed around 52nd Panzer Battalion commanded by Major von Sivers. Designated Kampfgruppe von Sivers, the 52nd Panzer Battalion was a powerful formation boasting 136 Panther tanks. However, when Operation Rumiantsev began only twenty-seven were operational. Isolated by the rapid advance of Fifth Guards Tank Army, von Sivers abandoned the unserviceable vehicles and spent the next six days conducting a fighting withdrawal of 100km towards Akhtyrka. Resupplied with fuel by Luftwaffe airdrops and gathering stragglers on the way, this motley collection of men and machines destroyed forty Soviet armoured vehicles. But such was the mechanical unreliability of the Panther that only nine operational tanks reached safety. Nevertheless, nine Panthers formed a useful addition to the German’s armoured strength. Von Sivers’ force had arrived just in time to join in with a series of counterattacks launched to protect the road and rail links with Kharkov. Soviet forces were also assembling to reinforce those already in place. Therefore, when the German attack began on 12 August incomplete Soviet units were caught illprepared. First Tank Army lost over 100 armoured fighting vehicles and was only rescued from destruction by Fifth Guards Tank Army, which itself sustained heavy losses in both men and machines. To complete the German recovery III Panzer Corps drove Sixth Guards Army and the remains of First Tank Army back some distance effectively ruining them for immediate operations. Following the loss of Belgorod the forces aimed at Kharkov made good progress and Konev’s men positioned themselves to cut the city’s railway links, forcing the Germans to withdraw thereby avoiding the perils of urban warfare. Naturally, Hitler had ordered Kharkov be held but General Kempf was not prepared to sacrifice his men to the Führer’s vanity. This pragmatism led to his being replaced by General Otto Woehler on 14 August. West of Kharkov Fourth Panzer Army attacked from Akhtyrka in an effort to link up with III Panzer Corps attacking from Bogodukhov and thus encircle the Soviet armoured spearheads. This operation began on 17 August just as Vatutin was gathering his strength to outflank Akhtyrka. Incredibly, the German plan succeeded, albeit briefly, but by 19 August Voronezh Front’s Forty-Seventh Army was threatening Fourth Panzer Army’s rear. Meanwhile, Kharkov’s defenders, now renamed Eighth Army due to Kemp’s dismissal, were given permission on 18 August to abandon the city. The loss of Kharkov would unhinge the entire German position to the south all the way down to the Sea of Azov. However, the Germans still had plenty of fight in them and were determined not to cede Kharkov cheaply. The armour of Das Reich and Totenkopf were combined into a single force that was ordered to keep Rotmistrov’s Fifth Guards Tank Army at bay. Indeed, preventing the encirclement of Kharkov was the German’s priority and in this they succeeded. Furious attacks by Rotmistrov’s tanks, supported by the infantry of Fifth Guards Army, failed to seal the defenders into a pocket. During the afternoon of 22 August Soviet reconnaissance aircraft noted German forces pulling out of Kharkov. Konev, aware that his foe was slipping away, ordered a night attack, as he put it, ‘to storm the city, drive the enemy out of it, and polish off what was left of him

outside’. The task fell to Sixty-Ninth and Seventh Guards armies attacking from the east and west respectively. Illuminated, as if by sunlight, by the explosions from ammunition dumps, booby traps and targeted demolition charges, the Soviet attacks went in. Smoke and dust darkened the night sky as the infantry cautiously made their way through the shattered streets. However, there was little to fear by way of defenders as all but a handful of stragglers had made good their retreat. As the fires raged men of 89th Guards Rifle Division reached the city centre and claimed the honour of raising their banner over the ruins. The city’s liberation became official at 12 noon Moscow time. Once again the defence of a doomed city had granted the Germans time to extricate their forces from areas to the south. Interestingly, on 11 August Hitler, in principle, had agreed to allow the creation of the ‘Ostwall’ or Eastern Rampart, which would provide a solid defensive line behind which the German forces could shelter for the winter and gather their strength for the 1944 campaigning season. This line ran, in theory, along the banks of the Molochnaya River, into the Sea of Azov, along the Dnieper and Sozh rivers, then east of Orsha, Vitebsk and Pskov, including Lake Chudskoye and along the Narva River to the Baltic Sea. The useful feature of Russian rivers being the higher western banks enabled the Germans to locate their positions so that they overlooked the approaches to the river line. Plans included the construction of bridgeheads on the eastern bank to act as jump-off points for an offensive to recapture eastern Ukraine should the Soviets be fortunate enough to liberate it. On 13 August S and SW fronts, after a ten-day pause, resumed their attacks along the Mius and Upper Donets rivers from which Manstein had robbed Peter to pay Paul and weakened the defenders. Now these river lines could not be held, nor were there any reserves anywhere that could be sent in to plug the gaps. Four days after the fall of Kharkov Rokossovsky’s Central Front lent its weight to provide Steppe and Voronezh fronts with further impetus as it drove southwestwards towards Poltava and Chernigov. As Rokossovsky put it, ‘The main attack [by Central Front] was in the direction of Sevsk and was delivered by troops of the Sixty Fifth Army and Second Tank Army [substantially understrength] . . . Our neighbour on the left, the Voronezh Front, was to attack together with us, with the object of routing the enemy in the Kharkov area and then advancing on Poltava and Kremenchug and taking bridgeheads on the Dnieper.’ The rippling of Soviet offensives north and south of Kursk had shattered the German position in eastern Ukraine. They were now being pursued back across the almost indefensible steppe in what became known as the race to the Dnieper. But the Soviet efforts were not all being made in the south. There was further trouble brewing for AGC west of Orel as the next phase of the Soviet campaign began to unfold.

Soviet tank troops recover a Panzer III from the Prokhorovka area. It has a short barrelled 75mm L/24 gun for infantry support. Production of the Panzer III ended during the summer of 1943. Many continued in service as command tanks or fulfilled other roles.

Armoured units of AGS. A Tiger unit, with its accompanying Panzer IIIs, withdraws from the

positions gained during Operation Citadel in the last week of July.

Panzer IIIs that were of little value other than as scrap iron. These vehicles of XXIV Panzer Corps were involved in the heavy fighting along the Mius River. Despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Soviet attackers, the offensive served its purpose and drew German forces away from the Kharkov region.

As an SS flak unit passes down the road a pair of army engineers wait for the last before they lay mines. They are carrying what appear to be Teller anti-tank mines. These were often sown along with anti-personnel mines to maim tank repair crews.

To secure the build-up of attacking forces dummy defence lines and radio traffic were created by Voronezh Front. When the attack began on 3 August the artillery barrage was particularly effective.

Shturmovik ground attack aircraft ply their trade: their support was part of the well-designed and executed softening up of the weak German defences. The air strikes began at 0745hr precisely just as the smoke of the Katyusha rocket strikes was dispersing.

As the Soviet barrage switched to targets beyond the front line teams of specially trained infantry and combat engineers with supporting tanks crossed no-man’s-land to break into the defences. Here an engineer cuts through barbed wire.

Manstein is briefed by his staff. His hopes of delivering another defeat on the Soviets as he had at Kharkov were slim as the forces at his disposal were shadows of their former strength.

A very clean T 34 provides cover for a group of German infantry during the fighting of mid-August. Advanced elements of First Tank Army were isolated and incurred losses of upwards of 100 tanks. However, this achievement did little but cause the Soviet armoured forces to pause and regroup.

Bedecked with flowers, Soviet infantry of Steppe Front enter Belgorod on 6 August. Despite an order from Hitler to hold the city, even though it stood at the tip of an 80km salient, it was evacuated when its fall was imminent.

Greeting their liberators, the sign reads ‘Glory to Orlovtsy and Belgorodtsy!’ (residents of Orlov and Belgorod). The NKVD would follow the combat troops and seek out collaborators.

A German anti-tank gun team withdraws somewhere in eastern Ukraine. The Soviet advance was not inexorable and the rearguard actions savage.

Soviet air attacks sometimes caught German soft-skinned vehicles in the open and dealt with them accordingly. In this region partisan support for the Red Army was weak as the terrain was so open that it proved difficult to organize hiding places.

Carefully, Soviet engineers probe for mines and check a recently liberated town for booby traps. The Germans were past masters at demolition and booby trapping as many a careless Soviet soldier discovered to his cost.

A well-travelled dirt track across the Ukrainian steppe. Carrying infantry into action was a Soviet tactic and transporting them, as seen here, a practical necessity. The terrain is typical of that over which the fighting took place.

Eastern Ukraine was criss-crossed with railway lines making the use of armoured trains practicable. The Germans employed several to keep open the lines and cover retreating units. The train seen here is possibly PZ 62 which saw extensive fighting from August 1943 onwards.

Infantry losses during 1943 led the Waffen SS to dilute its ethnicity requirements for recruits. Several divisions were raised from volunteers in countries such as the Baltic States. The quality was variable and the equipment issued often obsolete. Heinrich Himmler, the SS leader, is seen in the centre of this image with his hand in his right pocket.

As well as men the Germans also lost vast quantities of equipment such as this pair of 88mm guns, abandoned on the open steppe.

A rather tired looking gunner digs in near his anti-tank gun. The weapon appears to be a Soviet model, the 76mm divisional gun converted to an anti-tank role. It was a stopgap measure adopted in 1941 but these pieces remained in service until the war’s end.

A female member of a ground crew team pauses for the camera as she prepares to load a belt of ammunition for an La-5 fighter. The Soviets made far greater use of women in the armed forces than the Axis.

Chapter 5

West to Smolensk

T

he loss of the Orel Salient and the German retreat to the Hagen Line was rapidly followed up by an offensive that involved both Bryansk and W fronts as well as elements of Central Front; it was codenamed Operation Suvorov. This was to be launched against AGC and its objectives were: to clear German forces from the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, prevent the movement of German reinforcements to AGS and as well as liberating chunks of territory gain control of the transport network so vital to both sides. As had been the case with Operation Rumiantsev, this was not to be one almighty push by all fronts but a series of attacks designed to keep the Germans off balance. Similarly, the point of attack was not the flanks but the centre of the position towards the railway junction of Roslavl, 80km behind enemy lines on the western bank of the Desna River. With this attack underway the attacks on the flanks would ripple outwards. However, unlike the sweeping armoured thrusts across the open steppe of eastern Ukraine where the ground favoured the attacker, the terrain in central Russia definitely favoured the defender. Much of the land outside of the main population centres was virgin, almost primeval forest where the ground was covered with dense undergrowth. To make things worse there were a number of rivers including the upper reaches of the Dnieper, the Desna and the Dvina. Summer rainfall had the effect of turning large areas along the river sides, particularly the lower eastern banks, to swamp overnight and as this was the direction from which the Soviets would be attacking it would present them with considerable difficulties. Furthermore, in the Soviet rear areas a comprehensive programme of destruction had been carried out by the retreating Germans which left the roads and railways in an appalling condition. AGC had created a series of defensive positions to cover the cities, towns and villages as well as road and rail lines and supply depots at, from north to south, Smolensk, Roslavl, Bryansk and Yelna. To the east of these lay, respectively, the fortified towns of Dukhoshvina, Yartsevo, Spas-Demensk and Karachev. The Germans had or were in the process of building up to six zones of defence. The first zone comprised two lines up to a depth of 15km and consisted of well-sited anti-tank and machinegun nests with overlapping fields of fire. To the front lay minefields and barbed wire positioned with the purpose of channelling attackers in the German gun sights. The second line was similar and acted as a screen for the heavy artillery. The third zone generally included fortified towns such as those noted earlier: buildings overlooking roads and junctions would be strengthened with concrete and even armour plate. Natural obstacles such as rivers and water-logged ground would be incorporated wherever possible. Facing von Kluge’s forces were, from north to south, Kalinin Front (General Y.I. Yeremenko), W Front (General V.D. Sokolovsky) and Bryansk Front (General M.M. Popov), which abutted

the right flank of Rokossovsky’s Central Front. The combined forces of the three main fronts numbered some 1,250,000 men backed by 20,000 guns and mortars along with 1,400 armoured fighting vehicles. Their opponents were, again from north to south, Third Panzer (General Georg-Hans Reinhardt) and Fourth (General Gotthard Heinrici) armies, Model’s Ninth Army and Second Army which combined to field over 800,000 men with 500 tanks and assault guns. In Model and Heinrici the Soviets faced two of Hitler’s foremost defensive experts. Both had ignored the Führer’s directive that no secondary lines of defence should be dug lest such encourage the men to fall back. W Front had the task of liberating Roslavl during the first phase of the offensive, with Kalinin Front providing support from its left flank in the direction of Smolensk. W Front’s attack would then, having taken Roslavl, drive into the rear of enemy forces behind Bryansk to the south while Kalinin Front pushed on past Smolensk. The strike forces, nine armies from W Front and four from Kalinin Front, were concentrated into a frontage of roughly 60km, one-sixth of the front line in this area. W Front’s main attack would be confined to a line 15km long into which Fifth, Tenth Guards, Thirty-Third and Sixty-Eighth armies with V Mechanized and VI Guards Cavalry corps were crammed. The latter two units were to provide the mobile exploitation group. As one Soviet tanker, of V Mechanized Corps succinctly put it, ‘Some fool in the General Staff planned an operation . . . the terrain there was forested swamp’. Before going into action some formations were elevated to Guards status. This involved a ceremony at which the Guard’s oath was sworn by all ranks. It was repeated aloud as follows: On my Guard’s honour (I swear) not to retreat, only to go forward, sweeping away everything in our path. Shame and death to those who falter in our ranks. I swear to you our Russian motherland that while there is still at least one guard alive that this banner will proudly fly over the battlefield calling for new victories. I swear this on my life and will not break this sacred oath. W Front’s artillery began its barrage at 0630hr on 7 August. Heinrici’s men were under orders to leave the front-line positions sparsely occupied, then as the bombardment died down to move forward and re-occupy them. As Soviet fire plans were, by this stage of the war, quite predictable this was an eminently sensible move that minimized casualties. After almost 2 hours of firing the Soviets attacked but were rapidly pinned down. Despite committing Sixty-Eighth Army during the course of the day, by night fall the penetration was a scant 5km. Nevertheless, the attacks continued in the same fashion, shells, rockets and bombs were expended by the ton on thinly manned defence works as the losses in armour and infantry mounted inexorably. The Soviets had achieved little more than a 40kmsquare salient and had not broken through anywhere along Fourth Army’s front. A former Stavka member, Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov, criticized the Red Army’s conduct at this time in the following manner: OKH command knew all about the operation and was prepared for it; German defence lines were exceptionally well prepared firing points reinforced by trenches, barbed wire minefields etc. Several Red Army rifle divisions were insufficiently prepared to perform an assault of a multi-lined defence zone. This was especially true for reserve divisions, whose

training was not always properly supervised. There were not enough tanks committed to battle, forcing Red Army commanders to rely on artillery, mortars and infantry to break through Wehrmacht lines. Moreover, numerous counterattacks and an abundance of minefields slowed down the infantry’s progress. The interaction between regiments and divisions was far from perfect. There were unexpected pauses during the attack and a strong will of some regiments to ‘hide’ from the attack and expose another regiment. Many Red Army commanders were too impressed by Wehrmacht counterattacks and failed to act properly, even if their own troops outnumbered those of the Wehrmacht. The infantry were not using their own weapons (such as their own heavy guns and portable mortars) well enough. They relied too much on [the] artillery. The fact that the offensive was postponed from 3–7 August gave German troops more time to increase their readiness. This virtual stalemate resulted in Fourth Tank Army and VIII Artillery Corps being moved from Bryansk Front to support the attack near Smolensk. Equally unimpressive was the performance of Kalinin Front. Thirty-First Army, the main striking force, numbered 7 KV, 22 T 34, 18 T 60 and 4 T 70 tanks. The front’s Mobile Exploitation Group was made up of 42nd Guards Armoured Brigade, 2nd Guards Motorcycle Regiment and 529th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment. However, no use was made of these units as the penetration in this sector was barely 5km when the attack began on 13 August. Nevertheless, Stavka consoled itself with the simple fact that AGC had not been able to send reinforcements to the aid of AGS. Even so the Soviet advance did require a pause to allow units to realign and for roads to be cut through the forests. In many areas a good number of the new roads were paved with felled tree trunks. Indeed, organizing the traffic flow behind the assault troops was a staff officer’s nightmare so crowded were support echelons. Nor did frequent German air and artillery strikes make the job any easier. Once again, on 20 August, W Front was ready to attack. However, this time, due to the efforts of Bryansk and Central fronts in the direction of Bryansk itself Sokolovsky’s forces were to switch objectives from Roslavl to Yelnia and then towards Smolensk in support of Kalinin Front’s stalled offensive. Unfortunately, the expenditure of artillery ammunition had been such earlier in the month that it was now in short supply. As W Front shuffled its forces to the north west, Kalinin Front, after a five-day respite, attacked once more towards Dukhovshina, east of Smolensk. For two weeks the men of ThirtyNinth Army with limited armoured support battered away at Third Panzer Army’s positions for little gain. Ammunition shortages reduced the Soviet gunners’ ability to provide effective preparatory fire. Finally, on 28 August, W Front was ready to launch itself in the direction of Yelnia. It was at this point the tide began to turn in the Red Army’s favour. On the first day an 80km-square salient was driven into the German lines and further ground taken the following day. The Mobile Exploitation Group of cavalry and armour was pushed in to support II Guards Tank Corps. This formation had been released from Stavka’s reserve. Its initial strength was 131 T 34s, 70 T 70s and 22 T 60s. It took five days to travel into position such were the logistical problems behind the lines going into action almost off the march. The country here was clearer and therefore better for tank exploitation which is precisely what the Guards armour did, advancing 18km to take Yelnia. Three days later the cavalry were watering their

horses along the banks of the Dnieper River. This was the breakthrough that W and Kalinin fronts had been waiting for and now W Front began to expand its operating zone. Simultaneously, Bryansk Front captured an important area of high ground that dominated the Dubrovka region north of Bryansk, which gave it a good jump-off point from which to attack the city. However, the Germans recovered swiftly from these setbacks and by means of a series of counterattacks and stout defensive actions brought the Soviets up short of their objectives. W Front’s centre armies, Tenth Guards, Twenty-First and Sixty-Eighth, now reduced to 380 serviceable tanks and desperately short of artillery ammunition, failed to breakthrough. To their left Tenth, Thirty-Third and Sixty-Eighth armies were hacking their way, painfully, expensively and sometimes literally, through dense forests south east of Yelnia. Away on the right Fifth and Thirty-First armies found themselves in similar conditions. Once more the Soviet offensive had faltered as Kalinin Front’s attacks broke down on 7 September. Realignment was again forced on the Soviets as units lost co-ordination amidst the trackless, gloomy treescape. Stavka, recognizing the difficulties faced by the men in this area, redefined the offensive’s objectives. As well as Bryansk and Smolensk, Orsha and Vitebsk were now included on the list for liberation during the third phase of the operation. Inevitably, every Soviet period of rest and re-supply allowed the troops of AGC an opportunity to strengthen their positions, sow more minefields and re-deploy their scant reserves. Furthermore, as they retained control of the rail network, despite the partisan’s best efforts to put them out of commission, re-supply and redeployment were a simpler matter. Nor was there much interference from the Red Air Force. What is sometimes overlooked is the role played by Soviet partisans behind AGC’s front line. Here the terrain was as forested and wild as that which the Red Army was fighting its way through and for the occupation forces equally lethal for it was prime partisan country. From almost the day the Germans arrived during the early autumn of 1941 Red Army stragglers, civilians and Communist Party members had waged a brutal war on the occupation forces. The activities of the partisans are still the stuff of legend in the states of the former USSR because of their contribution to the Axis defeat. The Germans took them seriously as the efficiency of their supply lines depended on the railways that criss-crossed AGC’s rear and they were at the partisan’s mercy. During the weeks prior to Operation Citadel partisan units across the rear of AGC had waged the so-called Rail War, the purpose of which was to interrupt the movement of men and munitions to the east. AGC retaliated with a series of punitive expeditions involving both security and front-line units and armoured formations. In the late summer the partisans embarked on a similar campaign, Operation Concert, to impede the German retreat. This they certainly did as a report from AGC’s transport staff noted, ‘during the night from 15–16 September on the Belarus railways [there were] 1103 explosions on the tracks, 65 train crashes, 38 attacks on trains and 171 cases of blocked lines’. As well as disrupting the railways the partisans were a valuable source of intelligence. On the other hand, AGC’s rear harboured a strange experiment in local autonomy – the Lokot Republic, south of Bryansk. Here B.V. Kaminski, a local brewery engineer and Soviet political prisoner from 1937–41, became effective ruler of the area and commander of an antipartisan brigade recruited from locals and Red Army stragglers. The RONA (Russian National Liberation Army), as Kaminski’s unit was known, took an active part in German led anti-partisan

sweeps during 1942–3. However, when Operation Citadel failed the brigade’s 10,000 men and its 20,000 dependents were evacuated westwards where they continued their activities. Realigned, reinforced and re-supplied, Kalinin and W fronts were once more in a good enough condition to resume the offensive. On 14 September W Front’s Tenth Guards, TwentyFirst and Thirty-Third armies, II Guards Tank Corps, V Mechanized Corps and VI and III Guards Cavalry corps were tasked with first cutting the Roslavl–Smolensk road and rail lines and then, in conjunction with Kalinin Front’s left wing, taking Smolensk, crossing the Dnieper River and advancing on Orsha. The mechanized and tank corps were each allocated a cavalry corps and told off to act as Mobile Exploitation Groups. The left flank of Kalinin Front was to move on Vitebsk following the liberation of Smolensk. Tenth Guards Army led the attack alongside Kalinin Front’s Thirty-Ninth Army. Both were provided with a massive weight of artillery transferred in from quieter sectors of both fronts. Thirty-Ninth Army struck first on 14 September at 1020hr following a 75-minute barrage supported by rocket fire and air strikes. Thirty-Ninth Army, grinding slowly forwards, made some 30km during the next four days at considerable cost in men and armour. W Front’s 2-hour barrage the following day helped Tenth Guards Army break into the German defences and within 24 hours it had gouged a 200km-square salient into its enemy’s lines. On W Front’s left wing good progress was made towards Roslavl. This pattern was repeated for the next six days with Kalinin Front north of Smolensk in the direction of Vitebsk, which it had been ordered to take by mid-October. W Front, to the south and east of Smolensk, was given until 27 September to achieve its liberation. Twenty-First Army now took the lead, advancing on a front of 5km with solid armoured support. With virtually no forward movement on day one, II Guards Tank Corps was committed to support the infantry. Finally, on 23 September the Smolensk–Roslavl railway was cut and Tenth Guards Army was approaching Roslavl. On 24 September the right wing of W Front, Thirty-First, Fifth and Sixty-Eighth armies struck at the defences around Smolensk itself from several directions. Fighting through the night, the city was officially liberated on 25 September, the same day Roslavl was taken. In Moscow celebratory salvoes announced these victories to the world. Kalinin Front, however, made little headway towards Vitebsk and nor were Western Front’s efforts in the direction of Orsha and Mogilev any more successful. Finally, on 2 October, Stavka ordered W Front to end its attacks and put its chaotic rear areas into some sort of order. The retreating Germans had used the time to shatter cities, towns, roads and railways to such an extent that movement on any scale was well-nigh impossible. The last town of any significance to fall was the important transport hub of Nevel on 6 October just before Kalinin Front ceased its major operations. AGC now dug in but it was effectively separated from AGS by the vast, stinking morass of the Pripet Marshes. This section of the front was generally quiet until the summer of 1944. But elsewhere the front was anything but quiet. To the north Army Group North (AGN) was soon to feel the violence of the next multi-front Soviet offensive.

In contrast to the ground over which AGS was fighting the terrain held by AGC was better suited for defence particularly against armoured attacks. Rougher and more wooded, it was infantry country as this German patrol shows.

German intelligencegathering was much more efficient during this period.

Patrolling was an essential feature of German security precautions in some of the more isolated areas of AGC’s position. There was no continuous line and therefore fortified villages and entrenched strongpoints were utilized to act as breakwaters for Soviet attacks.

The Soviet build-up included a generous allowance of artillery. A common gun was this 122mm howitzer. Developed from a 1910

Schneider model in 1930, it was, by 1943, almost obsolete. Nevertheless, many remained in service until they became total losses or were replaced.

To strengthen their fixed defences the Germans dug in Soviet tanks or simply their turrets, as seen here, to provide additional firepower. This BT 7 tank has a 45mm gun that was able to fire high-explosive as well as armour piercing rounds.

Thousands of civilians were conscripted to work on the German defences. This image is one of many for home consumption that fostered the illusion that such workers were well treated and eager to labour against the Soviet system.

Outlining the local plan of operations, a staff officer uses a sand table. His audience comprises officers of all branches including two Political Officers (known as Politruks, the Russian abbreviation of their full title) at first left and second from right. Doubtless after the briefing one of the Politruks will deliver a motivational speech.

A battery of 120mm mortars prepares to fire. The preliminary bombardment began at 0440hr and continued for 2 hours when the ground forces went into the attack. Western Front committed Fifth, Tenth Guards and Thirty-Third armies.

The Soviets committed two air armies, First and Third, to support the initial attack. However, the bulk of the aircraft were ground attack machines. Here a heavy bomb is loaded into the bay of a PE-8 night bomber.

In the ranks of Thirty-Third Army were troops of the Polish 1st Tadeusz Ko ciuszko Infantry Division, seen here on the right in their distinctive headgear. The division first saw action at the battle of Lenino on 12 October. During 72 hours of combat it suffered 25 per cent casualties and was withdrawn to regroup that week.

V Mechanized Corps, part of W Front’s armoured force, was equipped with British Matilda and Valentine tanks. This Matilda has fallen victim to the numerous anti-tank guns deployed by the Germans. Useful in an infantry support role, the Matilda was hopelessly outclassed in armoured combat.

Ammunition replenishment for a Stug III assault gun takes place close to the battlefield. The munitions carrier is an SdKfz 252. The crewman passing the shell is wearing the assault gun troops’ grey version of the panzer uniform.

This German supply train, at a station in AGC’s rear, mounts a 20mm anti-aircraft gun that was equally useful against ground targets. Out in the countryside the ground was routinely cleared for 100m either side of the track to cut down on the likelihood of surprise attack.

Axis punitive expeditions varied in scale and composition depending on the nature of the local threat. Here civilians, mainly women and young children, leave their burning village for an uncertain future

Recruiting for collaborationist and partisan units had elements in common. Not all Soviet citizens were loyal nor were they all sympathetic towards the partisans. Most just wished to be left alone to carry on their lives untroubled by any regime. Consequently, the partisans used coercion to fill their ranks, as did the Axis. This man is typical of many of those in Axis service, identified by a brassard as a member of a local security force but armed with a Soviet carbine.

However, the ‘regular’ collaborationist troops in the German army were distrusted and this fear of a mass betrayal led, in the autumn of 1943, to their redeployment to Western Europe. This Ukrainian formation is part of the garrison in the Channel Islands.

Civilians supplied the partisans with food and shelter. This image shows the nature of some of the almost primeval swamps behind AGC. The lady has brought home-made bread to a partisan group.

Cossacks in German service provided a useful anti-partisan force. They operated in the rear of both AGS and AGC.

German walking wounded fall back along a corduroy road. The vehicle is being pushed over a particularly rickety bridge.

The central zone of the Eastern Front was not ideal country for armoured warfare as this formation of T 34s ploughing through deep undergrowth shows.

Chapter 6

West from Leningrad

W

hen Operation Northern Lights was put on hold AGN reverted to a defensive posture. General Kuchler, once again in full command of AGN, presided over different positions around the city and beyond. Eighteenth Army was containing Leningrad and the Oranienbaum Pocket on the coast. From the Oranienbaum lines to Pushkin, directly south of Leningrad, west to east some 95km of the front was defended by the four divisions of I Army Corps. The position along the Neva River as far as Shlisselburg where the Neva ran into Lake Ladoga was held by LIV and XXVI army corps. The shoreline defences of Lake Ladoga were roughly 10km in length, much of it marshland which continued south west from the lakeside to the Siniavino Heights. This latter area had been the scene of heavy fighting and was vital in dominating the country for kilometres around and key to the German positions blocking access to Leningrad. The Volkhov River Line, facing almost directly eastwards, was manned by the six divisions of XXVIII and XXXVIII army corps. This position terminated at the northern tip of Lake I’lmen in and around the city of Novgorod. However, strong as Eighteenth Army’s positions were, the bulk of its armoured divisions, Luftwaffe support and the more combat worthy infantry divisions had been deployed elsewhere during the early part of 1943. Despite some replacement ground troops, mainly Luftwaffe field divisions, being brought into the line it was not a ‘thick’ defensive position. Furthermore, Kuchler’s reserve consisted of 5th Mountain and 96th infantry divisions which were not geared for rapid movement. Nor was Sixteenth Army, covering the sector from Lake I’lmen to the junction with AGC, in a much better condition. As the offensives around Stalingrad ripped Sixth Army and AGS apart and increased the Red Army’s confidence in itself, General A.-K. Govorov, commander of Leningrad Front, drew up plans for an offensive to begin in January 1943. The version that was agreed with Stavka was named Operation Spark (Iskra) and aimed at restoring the land route into Leningrad along the shore of Lake Ladoga and liberating Shlisselburg utilising Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. There would be two armies involved, Sixty-Seventh from the west and Second Shock, which would take over from the units of Eighth Army after they had made the initial attacks, from the east. The operation was scheduled to begin at 0930hr on 12 January 1943 and involved three divisions striking across a 12km front. Artillery support exceeded 1,800 tubes and rocket launchers as well as waves of ground attack aircraft. The Sixty-Seventh Army’s task was a difficult one as its infantry would be simply charging across the open ground of the frozen waters of the Neva River into the teeth of the German guns lining the opposite bank. The Soviet infantry, which were to charge first, were housed in well-camouflaged bunkers sited as close as possible to the jump-off point to reduce the exposed gap across which they would be running. Nevertheless, despite the planners’ best

efforts, the men still had to carry out an awful rush of 600m. What their thoughts were as they huddled in the dank, foetid atmosphere of the riverside positions as the barrage wound down are not difficult to imagine. Hard on the heels of the last shells falling, the men of the three divisions poured out of their shelters and charged forwards knowing full well what awaited them. As the smoke cleared and Soviet casualties mounted the German line broke and, by the end of the day, a 15km square bridgehead had been established. At breakneck speed the engineers built bridges to rush heavier armoured support in to exploit the breach. Volkhov Front’s attack began at roughly the same time and made good progress, penetrating several important positions covering the shores of Lake Ladoga and the all-dominating Siniavino Heights. The next day, 13 January, Second Shock Army pushed into the German lines, reaching to within a couple of kilometres of 136th Rifle Division, the leading unit of Leningrad Front’s drive eastwards. However, it was at this point that the Soviet operation began to run into trouble. AGN’s staff reacted to the Soviet offensive with commendable speed, allocating resources to both the threatened areas but in particular the Neva Bridgehead, which posed the greatest threat. Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 502 were committed to counterattack at Gorodok on the Neva River supported by infantry of 5th Mountain Division. For the time being the men of Leningrad Front were held on the southern flank of the bridgehead but to the north they had reached the outskirts of Shlisselburg to which point the Tigers were now despatched. Second Shock Army was now in a position to recapture Shlisselburg as the majority of Kuchler’s reserves had been committed to battle. Bowing to the inevitable, those German units that could fell back towards the strong positions of the Siniavino Heights. When Shlisselburg was liberated on 18 January the corridor south of Lake Ladoga opened up and work began to build a railway line into the city. The siege was broken even though German artillery continued to fire into the Shlisselburg Corridor, which was not much more than 8km wide. The Soviets now re-positioned themselves as they faced the prospect of attacking the Siniavino positions. Opening the land route into Leningrad was not the Soviets only objective. The next phase of the winter offensive in the north was intended to overshadow even the destruction of Sixth Army. Operation Polar Star’s (Polyarnaya Zvezda) aim was the encirclement of both AGN’s Eighteenth and Sixteenth armies as well as AGC’s Seventeenth Army – Stalin was certainly nothing if not ambitious. Nor had Hitler abandoned his plans to take Leningrad, it was no longer enough to starve it into submission, it was to be taken and then comprehensively wiped from the face of the earth. As the buds of spring showed their wary tips above the ground the Führer agreed to AGN’s plan codenamed Operation Parkplatz, which proposed first retaking the Shlisselburg corridor and second the city itself. Hitler’s agreement was predicated on the success of Operation Citadel. Stalin set no conditions for Operation Polar Star. The main attack would be conducted by North Western (NW) Front against Seventeenth Army in the Demyansk Salient. Having penetrated this position it would then push north westwards to link up with Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the rear of AGN, thus completing the encirclement. At roughly the same time Leningrad and Volkhov fronts would undertake a series of attacks to pin Seventeenth and Eighteenth armies in place, denying them the opportunity to ship reserves elsewhere. Leningrad Front’s Fifty-Fourth Army was tasked with effecting a breakthrough at Krasny Bor to link up

with Volkhov Front at Tosino. From that point they would wheel to the south west disconnecting Sixteenth and Eighteenth armies. As a precaution against German redeployment, as had happened in the past, Second Shock and Sixty-Seventh armies would carry out diversionary attacks. Mobile Exploitation Groups of cavalry, skitroops and armour would be expected to carry chaos and confusion into the German rear. The Spanish and SS policemen of 250th infantry and 4th SS Polizei divisions defending the 32km Krasny Bor position were the first to feel the weight of the Soviet attack during the second week of February. Badly shaken, those units fell back, ceding Krasny Bor 5km behind their original line on 10 February, but elsewhere the defences held firm. Volkhov Front made barely any progress despite laying a carpet of dead and allowing the switching of a Tiger platoon to the support of the Krasny Bor sector. As Volkhov Front’s attack mired down to a crawl, Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock armies launched their offensive against the Siniavino Heights across to Gorodok on the banks of the Neva River on 12 February. Gorodok was liberated after six days of heavy fighting, but this approach failed elsewhere and did not stop the movement of units from this sector. Soviet casualties mounted as the Germans fought doggedly and when an unexpected thaw came the Soviet offensive ground to a halt. Little had been achieved and Moscow’s hopes now rested with NW Front, which attacked on 15 February. First Shock and Twenty-Seventh armies threw themselves at the solidly entrenched Germans and, during the course of the next 12 days, suffered 70,000 casualties and even then did not prevent the evacuation of the Demyansk Salient. Stalin halted this clearly futile sacrifice as the Germans re-distributed the divisions freed from Demyansk in support of the defences around Novgorod. As NW Front’s spearhead units were in no condition to burst through towards the Baltic coast it was, once more, the turn of Leningrad and Volkhov fronts’ weary troops to attack. However, the setbacks suffered by the Soviet armies around Kharkov forced Stavka to limit its northern ambitions to the capture of two important transport hubs, Mga and Staraya Russa. During the first week of March diversionary attacks were mounted but now the Germans were too strong to be panicked into premature reserve movement. Consequently, when Leningrad Front launched its attack on 19 March around Krasny Bor, despite initial success against 4th SS Polizei Division, Tiger tanks and Belgian SS troops drove them back. As March ended and the thaw set in so Operation Polar Star drew to an end. The area remained quiet for several months until it became obvious, following the disaster at Kursk and the subsequent Soviet advance towards the Dnieper River, that the Germans would not renew operations around Leningrad. To relieve the Shlisselburg Corridor of German artillery fire and to draw German attention back to AGN it was decided to fight again for Mga. A pincer movement involving Volkhov and Leningrad fronts was mooted raising the spectre of yet more costly attacks on the Siniavino Heights. The attack on the latter defence network began on 22 July. From the minute the German machine-gunners opened fire the carnage began. With little or no cover and advancing in waves with armoured support, the Soviet riflemen were cut to pieces as the Tiger gunners calmly picked off their opponents by the dozen. Yet again Stavka was forced to reduce the scale of the operation. From 22 August the only Soviet objective was the Siniavino Heights. There were two simultaneous attacks, to the east and to the front, which followed a creeping barrage that eventually, on 15 September, gave the men of XXX Guards

Rifle Corps the victory and the positions that had cost so much blood. The loss of this critically important position led to a re-appraisal of Eighteenth Army’s entire situation. As Hitler had given permission for the building of defences along the Dnieper River as part of the much-vaunted Eastern Rampart, so he allowed Kuchler to create in AGN’s sector of the Eastern Front the Panther Line. This position would run from Ostrov, the junction with AGC, through Pskov and onto the coast at Narva. Wherever possible the Panther Line was to follow the course of rivers, lakes and waterways, no effort or expense was to be spared. Nor were the lives of thousands of Soviet civilians set to its construction considered of any value. The Germans were to be given little respite as Soviet planning for the next phase of the destruction of AGN began in late September. This time Eighteenth Army, commanded by General Lindemann, was the target of choice. The codename for the offensive was Operation Neva and, somewhat predictably, it involved a series of pincer movements. This time, however, there was a twist in the tail as one of the pincers would be launched from the long quiescent Oranienbaum Bridgehead on the coast west of Leningrad, isolated since late 1941 and supplied by sea. This pincer would link up with Forty-Second Army moving out from Leningrad in the area around Krasnoe Selo. If this move succeeded then Forty-Second Army would realign to the south east to close up with Sixty-Seventh Army pushing south westwards from Leningrad. Again, if this junction was effected then all the forces involved would fan out and head westwards towards Kingisepp on the Luga River. Diversionary attacks would be the responsibility of Second Baltic Front (formerly W Front) and these would take place south of Lake I’lmen to keep Sixteenth Army occupied. With both the Soviets and Germans heavily engaged in the central and southern zones of the Eastern Front neither Stalin nor Hitler could spare much for the north. Hitler’s forces were, however, in a weaker condition. Events elsewhere had led to a considerable reduction in the infantry strength of AGN’s two armies and Heavy Panzer Battalion 502 had moved south. Once again, the replacements were of low quality, if they arrived at all. It was two such formations, 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions, that provided the infantry force covering the Oranienbaum Bridgehead. Behind them were positioned 11th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Nordland and 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Brigade Nederland which included the only armour in the entirety of Eighteenth Army. This unit, known as III SS Panzer Corps, disposed of over sixty Panthers and roughly thirty Stug III assault guns. Local security and labour battalions of Latvians and Estonians were being drafted into the Waffen SS in late 1943; the former coalesced into VI SS Volunteer Corps. They were to prove doughty fighters defending a line drawing ever closer to their homelands. Kuchler was no fool, it was obvious that a Soviet offensive would begin and it was simply a question of when. He was well aware that reinforcements were being ferried into Oranienbaum and other locations. Therefore, work was stepped up along the length of the Panther Line and other defensive positions. However, Kuchler thought he had more time than the Soviets were willing to grant him. Hitler had given permission for AGN to retire to the Panther Line on 22 December and Kuchler believed this would take place in an orderly, phased series of withdrawals between January and May 1944. Nor was Stavka oblivious to the fact that AGN might retire. Therefore, the planned offensive had an alternative version in case withdrawal should prove to be the case. Happily for Moscow, when their armies began the offensive on 14

January AGN was not moving until it was forced out. The first attack was mounted from the Oranienbaum Bridgehead at 1040hr and crashed into the junction point of 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field divisions. Within 24 hours Second Shock Army had gouged into enemy lines a salient of 70km square. Forty-Second Army joined the fray three days later. Over the course of the next couple of days the pincers drew towards one another, enveloping two German divisions and a mass of difficult-to-move siege guns. Counterattacks by III SS Panzer Corps were hamstrung by the mechanical difficulties of its Panthers, which were virtually immobile and often proved more useful as static gun positions. Kuchler requested permission to withdraw some of his more exposed units from Mga as 12th Panzer Division and Heavy Panzer Battalion’s Tigers moved up from the south. Their movement was delayed for several critical days by very efficient partisan operations, which were a feature of this offensive. On 19 January Second Shock and Forty-Second armies linked up but the infantry support was too slow to prevent thousands of Germans from slipping through the armoured net. Now the whole of Eighteenth Army was in retreat. To add to Kuchler’s distress, Volkhov Front struck at his right flank, crossing the frozen waters of Lake I’lmen and driving a wedge 20km deep between XXXVIII and XXVIII army corps. Without authority, Kuchler pulled his men out of Novgorod leaving Eighteenth Army without flank anchors and Sixteenth Army’s in peril. However, the Soviet field commanders did not press their advantage with as swift a pursuit as Stavka intended despite liberating Mga. Nevertheless, by the last week of January the Soviet advance developed some momentum just as AGN began to scrape enough units together to stabilize its flanks and restore the connection with Sixteenth Army. Now the German retreat assumed a more orderly progress as the Red Army’s pursuit slowed due to a succession of warmer days and the damage that had been done to the infrastructure, which gave rise to a log jam in their rear areas and reduced the efficiency of re-supply units. As its line became shorter AGN had more troops available to man the defences. As these positions firmed up in the Panther Line, the staff noted that, in Eighteenth Army’s case, they had fallen back up to 100km and lived to fight another day. From the Soviet point of view Leningrad was no longer under threat, no matter how slight, and AGN, although down, was not out. The next few months would be very quiet as both sides dug in and the Soviets rebuilt the shattered road and rail lines that their renewed offensive would depend on.

Officers of 5th Mountain Division survey the Soviet defences from the front line. The division formed part of Eighteenth Army’s reserve. Their specialist light weapons and pack animals proved their worth in the dreadful terrain that AGN was enmeshed in.

A machine-gun team of 1st Luftwaffe Field Division in their bunker. Surplus Luftwaffe men were drafted into infantry formations and, after substandard training, placed into apparently quiet sectors of the line.

Attacking across the Neva River was a crucial element of Operation Spark. The river’s ice had to be thick enough to bear the weight of light armour, such as these T 40 types seen here. Although originally designed as amphibious tanks, this capability had been withdrawn from later production runs.

A Tiger I of 502nd Heavy Panzer Battalion waiting for its winter camouflage. Elements of the battalion were committed in the Shlisselburg sector. However, they were soon short of fuel and several were lost during the withdrawal from this area.

It is possible that these Katyusha rockets are being launched from the STZ-5 artillery tractor. By 1943 the ‘Stalin Organ’, as it was nicknamed by the Germans, was widely used for saturation bombardment.

German POWs march into captivity. Comparing their clothing with that available during the winter of 1941–2 it is obvious that valuable lessons had been learnt. Well-padded and comfortable, this winter gear was commonly available.

Very prettily posed, a Soviet infantry patrol ‘goes into action’. The effectiveness of their snow camouflage suits are shown to good advantage.

Celebrating the Red Army, ski-soldier dolls on sale in Leningrad during late 1942. Such propaganda efforts as this were supported by allowing selected Leningraders to visit quiet sectors of the front line so that civilians could put their trials and tribulations into perspective by seeing at first hand what the soldiers were enduring. Equally useful was the point that the soldiers could see those they were fighting for face to face.

A German 50mm anti-tank position in the marshy lands around Lake Ladoga. This lesspowerful weapon was still effective at the short ranges common in this region, particularly against the lighter tanks deployed by the Soviets here.

Many of AGN’s units were not as mobile as would have been ideal. This region, however, was lacking in the infrastructure that would suit motor vehicles. Consequently, simpler means of transport were often the most effective, such as this local wagon and its horse team shows.

A Communist Party official, Comrade Pristavko, explains the progress of the offensive to a group of well-fed women in the Red Corner of the area management office. Unsurprisingly, military details would be scanty.

Praising the bravery of the people of Leningrad in the face of fascist aggression and decorated with a noble image of Comrade Stalin the first supply train rolls into Leningrad through the Shlisselburg Corridor. Under fire from German artillery, the line was firmly established from 7 February 1943.

Moving reserves took many forms. A captured Maxim M 1910 machine gun (left sled) is being transferred along with men and supplies to the rear of Krasny Bor.

Spanish volunteers of the Blue Division in full winter kit fall back during the Soviet offensive of February 1943. These men had earned themselves a good reputation during the heavy fighting of 1941–2 and were respected by their German allies.

One of the odder defensive weapons deployed by the Germans was the Goliath remote-controlled, wire-guided demolition vehicle. A single-use tracked vehicle, the SdKfz 302, the version seen here, was an interesting experiment that was intended to deliver a 60kg explosive charge against fixed defences or vehicles. With a speed of less than 10km per hour and a cross country range of 0.75km, it was an extremely vulnerable device.

German ski-troops cover the withdrawal from the Demyansk Salient. Armed with light weapons, here a sub-machine gun and a carbine, these troops were considerably fewer in numbers than their Soviet counterparts.

57mm anti-tank guns firing shrapnel, as seen here, were symptomatic of the Soviet determination to bring any weight of shell on to a target. The light weight of the round made it almost useless in this role. Nevertheless, the psychological boost for the infantry of so much firepower was worthwhile.

A RAD (Reich Labour Service) unit marches to prepare defensive positions in the rear of AGN during the summer of 1943. From August 1942 these units had formed part of the German army. They were distinguished by the unit number on their right sleeves. The swastika brassard was usually dispensed with at the front as it proved a useful marker for snipers. Here it is being worn for the benefit of the camera.

At times the retreat of AGN threatened to collapse into rout. One of the reasons it did not was the efficient use of communications at all command levels.

Soviet anti-tank gunners pose before digging in. The following three months would be a time of rest, re-supply and preparation for the next series of offensives that it was hoped would drive the invaders out of Mother Russia.

Chapter 7

Kiev, Back in the USSR

B

y the end of August and into early September Operation Rumiantsev had succeeded in pushing the forces of AGS back from Kharkov. Soviet advance guards were now moving towards the crossing points of the Dnieper River at Kiev, Kanev, Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk. Simultaneously, Rokossovsky’s Central Front had driven a 75km wedge between AGC and AGS, reached the Desna River on a broad front and liberated Konotop, a hub for railway lines that connected Minsk, Odessa, Kiev, the Donbass and Moscow. Central Front’s left then moved towards Bakhmach, which covered the approaches to AGS’ rear thus facilitating an attack by its neighbour to the south – Voronezh Front. This rapid success by the Central Front resulted in Stavka issuing a directive in September instructing its forces in the south to push ahead and secure the crossing points of the Desna and Dnieper rivers, preferably before the Germans were in position to cross themselves. The fronts that were to undertake this operation were, from north to south, parts of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, SW and S, all with armies that had already fought long and hard throughout the summer. Maps that show this and subsequent operations across Ukraine for the next ten months give the impression that the Soviets did little but advance from river to river and the Germans did no more than pause on the river banks before dashing off to the next waterway. Superficially, this is true but, inevitably, there was a lot more to these events than cartographers would lead one to believe. For much of the time the Red Army was advancing across literally scorched earth. Manstein had requested permission to fall back behind the Dnieper River and the Eastern Rampart on 8 September but had to wait a week for an answer. When Nezhin, east of Bakhmach, less than 100km east of Kiev, fell on 15 September to Sixtieth Army, Hitler agreed with Manstein that the bulk of AGS was in jeopardy and authorized AGS to withdraw to the Eastern Rampart. But by now Manstein’s northern flank, Fourth Panzer Army, was broken into three parts. The Voronezh Front’s Thirty-Eighth Army was ordered to support the Central Front’s inclination to the north, cross the Desna River and then push across the Dnieper and establish a bridgehead south of Kiev. To support this push Stavka released Third Guards Tank Army from its reserve. Moving with incredible speed, the Guards established a bridgehead at Buhkrin. However, the men of Fortieth Army supporting the Guard’s tanks did not wait, they simply crossed the river on anything that would float. Soviet accounts note four men being responsible for leading this action – Petukhov, Ivanov, Semenov and Sisolyatin. They crossed by commandeered fishing boat, swiftly followed by others during the night 22–3 September. Holding off several counterattacks, the Soviets strengthened their position over the course of the next few days. Chernigov, the regional capital, was liberated by the Central Front’s

Thirteenth and Sixty-First armies giving these troops a springboard to cross the Dnieper River, which forward elements began to do on 22 September. As September drew to a close more and more Soviet troops reached the eastern bank of the Dnieper, undeterred by German pamphlets warning them that they had ‘clad the banks of the Dnieper in concrete and shod it with iron . . . Death awaits you on the Dnieper. Stop before it is too late.’ There were now twenty-three bridgeheads of differing sizes in Soviet hands. To expand the bridgehead at Bukhrin Stavka decided on a large-scale airborne assault by First, Third and Fifth Guards Airborne brigades. However, faulty intelligence, due to the cancellation of aerial reconnaissance, led the Soviets to believe that the paratroopers would drop into a virtually undefended sector of the line. The reality would be somewhat different. Indeed, confusion reigned even before the transports took off. Had the Soviets but known it, 19th Panzer Division along with other units was passing through the drop zone. Half the men had only jumped from training towers and, as they pulled their rip chords and felt the lines jerk, flak and small arms fire screamed up to meet them. Roughly 50 per cent of those dropped, 2,300 men, managed to organize themselves but, as their supplies were missing along with most of their weapons, they were by 26 September a spent force. The Germans took 900 prisoners and those not captured or killed tried to link up with the partisans. Official Soviet histories gloss over or ignore this shambles. Stavka did not repeat such an action again. The units that the Soviet paratroopers dropped on were but the tip of the iceberg that was the German retreat. Units of all types were falling back as rapidly as they could to the apparent safety of the Dnieper River. Luckily for those immense columns of men, animals and vehicles, Soviet aircraft were unable to make more than token attacks, due in part to the weather but mainly because of a lack of good, forward airfields and fuel. Nevertheless, not all the German troops were pulling out. Rearguard actions and counterattacks were mounted on a regular basis. The 23rd Panzer Division struck back at XXIII Tank Corps near Pavlograd inflicting heavy losses on the surprised foe. Similar actions elsewhere demonstrated that it was vital to call a halt to the offensive simply to allow its leading elements a chance to resupply and refuel. Therefore, early October was a time of consolidation for the Soviets along much of the Dnieper line. However, the Soviet advance towards the lower reaches of the Dnieper River by the S and SW fronts still moved forward in the directions of Melitopol and Zaporozhye respectively. Melitopol lay on the banks of the Molochnaya River which covered the approach to the Crimea and it was felt by the Germans that holding it was essential. In the fighting around Melitopol 13th Panzer Division, Sixth Army’s mobile reserve, engaged more than 200 T 34s drawn from XX Tank Corps and IV Guards Mechanized Corps. This action began on 10 October and was known as the Battle of Oktoberfeld. Soviet losses were roughly one-third and their attack failed but Melitopol fell on 23 October. The loss of this city led to the S Front overrunning the region, the Tauride, above the Crimean Peninsula as far as the mouth of the Dnieper River at Kherson. In conjunction with the SW Front, S Front had freed the mineral rich Donbass area. The SW Front halted in front of the strongly fortified German bridgehead at Zaporozhye. There was another smaller bridgehead opposite Nikopol. Hitler had demanded that AGS defend these positions as he anticipated holding the Eastern Rampart until the next summer when such positions could be used as jump-off points for an offensive to re-occupy the Donbass. Naturally,

Stalin required the elimination of these positions. The initial attack, directly from the marsh, failed, so Malinovsky (S Front’s commander) delegated the task to Chuikov’s Eighth Guards Army, which had defended Stalingrad so tenaciously twelve months earlier. Additional support was provided by Third Guards and Twelfth armies along with more than 200 tanks and Seventeenth Air Army. The attack began at 2200hr on 13 October, a night operation agreed by Chuikov and Malinovsky, with Eighth Guards striking head on, flanked to left and right by Third Guards and Twelfth armies respectively. Within 24 hours it was all over and the SW Front could now expand its bridgehead at Dnepropetrovsk and, in co-ordination with Konev’s Steppe Front, push on towards Krivoi Rog with the objective of trapping First Panzer Army. Stalin, preparing to attend the Teheran Conference with Churchill and Roosevelt scheduled for November, knew that it was necessary to demonstrate the power of the Red Army. Equally valuable for domestic propaganda and morale purposes, it would be a good thing to liberate Kiev, the cradle of orthodox Russia and capital of Ukraine. Therefore, the now renamed fronts south of Kursk were to bend their efforts to this end. On 20 October Voronezh, Steppe, SW and S fronts became 1st–4th Ukrainian fronts respectively. At the same time, Manstein’s staff was re-aligning its confused forces with a view to launching a series of counterattacks, which were designed to drive the Soviets back across the Dnieper River in as much disorder as could be contrived. Several German attacks on the bridgeheads had been mounted from the day the first Red Army boot hit the mud on the western bank but little had been achieved. The newly christened 1st Ukrainian Front was given the honour of liberating ‘our fair city of Kiev’ by 7 November, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Vatutin prepared rapidly. A sophisticated maskirovka (a deception and camouflage operation) was put in motion to convince the Germans that the attack would come from the Buhkrin Bridgehead, south of Kiev when in reality it was to be launched from the Lyutez Bridgehead to the north. To this effect all of Third Guards Tank Army, VII Breakthrough Artillery Corps and scores of infantry and ancillary units moved north. The only bridge in this area was subjected to continual air and artillery bombardment but the Soviet engineers kept it open by working around the clock in all weathers, inevitably suffering heavy casualties. There was to be an attack from Buhkrin but it was merely a diversion to draw German reserves from the real attack to the north. The former began on 1 November when Fortieth and Twenty-Seventh armies struck in the direction of Fastov, south west of Kiev, as its objective. Two days later the main attack started with 400 guns per kilometre firing as fast as their tubes could cope with on a narrow, 7km front. By nightfall Third Guards Tank Army had cut the Kiev–Zhitomir road to the west of the city by driving through the night closely supported by the infantry of Thirty-Eighth Army. Swiftly these units reached suburban Kiev. On 5 November the central railway station was taken by Czech riflemen. As demolition charges exploded all around them, German VII Army Corps pulled out of Kiev. At 0500hr, 6 November the staff of 1st Ukrainian Front reported, ‘the city of Kiev has been completely cleared of fascist occupiers’. Troops and reinforcements poured across the river into Kiev to prepare for the inevitable German counterattack. But west of the city Vatutin’s forces pushed westwards and Zhitomir, Fastov and Korosten were all freed within the next

fortnight dislocating the German railway network. Once again the links between AGS and AGC were severed. It was at this point that AGS struck back. Hoping to emulate his tactics that were so successful around Kharkov earlier in the year, Manstein hoped to catch the Soviets with his ‘backhand blow’. Hitler, concerned that Kiev had fallen so cheaply, agreed to give Manstein strong armoured forces. Every tank that could be spared was grouped into six panzer divisions under the control of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps grouping around Berdichev. This mass of almost 600 tanks included 70 Panthers and 30 Tigers. The target of this formation was the left flank of Third Guards Tank Army near Fastov. With this force broken it was anticipated that other Soviet forces on the west bank of the Dnieper River would be driven back and Kiev recaptured. The attack went in on 15 November but was mired in mud and pouring rain. Over the course of the next few days losses on both sides were heavy, but such attrition was more easily borne by the Red Army. Although Third Guards Tank Army was forced to concede ground, the anticipated rout did not materialize. The Germans resumed the offensive on 6 December in the direction of Radomyzl but again heavy losses forced XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to assume a defensive posture seventeen days later. To AGS’ horror the Soviets counterattacked on 24 December in overwhelming strength, the reinforcements having been brought into the line completely unobserved. Zhitomir became Soviet on 31 December. The position of Fourth Panzer Army was now critical, as indeed was that of AGS. Zhukov now arrived at Vatutin’s HQ to oversee the total destruction of the Eastern Rampart along the Dnieper. Aware that AGN was to be subjected to pressure around Leningrad but also conscious that further progress against AGC was unlikely until the summer, the western Ukraine was now Stavka’s prime objective. In Crimea Seventeenth Army was bottled up along with various Romanian units posing little or no threat and therefore it could be left to rot quietly. Now Stavka counted heads on its southern flank. To face Manstein’s much reduced forces the Red Army mustered 169 rifle and 9 cavalry divisions with more than 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Their air power stood at almost 2,400 machines and effectively controlled the winter skies. Soviet ‘shock and awe’ in the south was predicated on three factors. First, the Soviet’s industrial system by concentrating its output on tried and trusted weapons that required little in the way of sophisticated engineering and were familiar to the troops at the front was outproducing that of the Reich significantly. Secondly, the growing confidence and experience of the commanders from platoon sergeants up to the dizzy heights of the Kremlin and including the men themselves, the ordinary frontoviki, was such that operations were carried out with the expectation of success. No longer was the much lauded Wehrmacht the undisputed victor, the events of 1943 had proved that in spades. Finally, Soviet supply lines were filling up with the Lend-Lease vehicles that provided the rear echelon units with the mobility to move munitions and foodstuffs from the railheads speedily enough to maintain an offensive’s momentum. Germany had irretrievably lost huge amounts of materiel from Stalingrad onwards. Although the quality of new tanks was theoretically good, the Tiger and the Panther, in particular, suffered from innumerable mechanical problems which were difficult to cure in the conditions that maintained during the fighting of autumn–winter 1943. Simply put, the Germans could not afford a war of attrition whereas Stalin could and neither he

nor Zhukov shied away from doing just that. During the first and second winter campaigns the ambitions of the ‘Boss’ had proved to be greater than his force’s capabilities. However, by late 1943 they were certainly more achievable for he no longer wielded an imperfect sword. Doubtless the Red Army was not yet a finely tuned weapon, but, as events were to prove, it was approaching a degree of sharpness and flexibility that the Germans would be hard pressed to parry. 1944 would be known as the ‘Year of Ten Victories’ and this title would be won by the blood, sweat and tears of the men who had learnt their lessons in the hardest school of warfare yet experienced by mankind.

All civilians between the ages of 10 and 60 were ordered to proceed to the western bank of the Dnieper River where they were to be employed building the Eastern Rampart and similar defences. For many this was not a bad option as the NKVD would be searching for collaborators in liberated areas.

The Gross Deutschland, 11th Panzer Division and 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich all had Panther battalions. Dozens were lost during the retreat to the Dnieper, eighty in September alone. Gross Deutschland’s remaining eighteen were used to form a defence around Kremenchug in an abortive effort to prevent Fifth Guards Tank Army from crossing the river there.

A T 34 unit of Third Guards Tank Army during its epic two-day 160km march to the Dnieper River. Beginning on 18 September, the Guards had established a bridgehead at Buhkrin by 22 September.

Initial crossings of the Dnieper were made by small units of infantry. To provide them with a modicum of support light artillery and mortars were ferried across by any means possible. At least one 45mm anti-tank gun has been loaded onto this heavily camouflaged raft.

Partisans such as these men provided the Red Army with valuable information regarding local crossing points as well as hiding boats and constructing rafts to cross the Dnieper River. Manstein had said, ‘Watch where the Soviet pontoon stocks are.’ In the event it was extemporization that facilitated the initial crossings.

A mobile 20mm anti-aircraft gun under camouflage. Voronezh Front’s 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards Airborne Brigades were ordered on 23 September to parachute onto the western bank of the Dnieper River and support the tenuous bridgeheads established at various points near Kanev. The drop was a disaster with many paratroopers falling victim to weapons such as this.

Repairing a T 34/76 of Third Guards Tank Army. The speed of the Soviet advance had taken a massive toll on even the reliable T 34. Time out for routine maintenance such as this gave AGS precious hours to get more men and machines back to safety.

Rushing to a new position a Soviet machine-gun team drags their Maxim M1910 behind them during the fighting for Kiev. One Kievan who had lived through the occupation recalled hearing, ‘in the loveliest Muscovite Russian, “Comrades come out, Soviet power is back.”’

To help prop up AGS 2nd Fallschirmjager Division was airlifted to Ukraine, west of Kiev in October 1943. It was committed to the defence of Kirovograd in January 1944 and remained with AGS, withdrawing across the Dniester River, until May 1944.

Another new arrival was the understrength and inexperienced 25th Panzer Division. It arrived in October 1943 and was attached to Fourth Panzer Army. This Panzer IV has wide snow tracks and track pieces welded on to add further protection.

A remarkable image showing a pair of Panthers during the fighting around Fastov.

Soviet infantry rushing forward in the wake of their barrage. In the distance can be seen the German defences – rows of steel chevaux de frise, spun with barbed wire and possibly backed up with a sprinkling of land mines.

The Red Air Force ranged far and wide above the skies of Ukraine. This flight of IL-2 Shturmoviks is just completing a strike against a column of soft-skinned Axis vehicles.

The Soviet armoured forces did not advance unscathed as this abandoned T 34 demonstrates.

On 7 September SS and army units were ordered to destroy not only the strategic infrastructure but also anything that could be of use to the enemy. On the list were things such as homes, industrial concerns, wells, seed stores and cultural symbols. The legacy of occupation was ruin and death. The situation did not improve and nor did food production recover for several years after the end of the war.

A unit leader receives map co-ordinates for a counterattack during December 1943. To the right of the image a Hiwi (a Russian collaborator) helps with a maintenance task. Thousands of such men worked for the Axis forces in the USSR and generally proved very loyal.

Chapter 8

Across Ukraine

A

s the New Year of 1944 began the position of AGS looked worse than bleak. The fall of Kiev, the failed counteroffensive and the collapsing Eastern Rampart combined to produce all the elements of catastrophe. Furthermore, all direct land communications with AGC had been cut. The next step for the Red Army was now the liberation of western Ukraine. The plans for this great leap forward had been in place for some time and were nothing if not ambitious. The broad brush picture of the Soviet winter offensive was to advance from south of the Pripet River near Mozyr in the north to Khakovka on the Dnieper River just above the Crimean entrance. This westward thrust would bring the Red Army to the pre-1941 border with Romania, into pre-1939 Poland and place it in a very threatening position south of AGC, the front line of which would overhang Ukraine like a balcony from Belarus. In more detail, from north to south, First Ukrainian Front would push towards Lutsk on the Styr River inclining south, while Second Ukrainian Front would drive forward towards Moghilev-Polotsk on the Dniester River. Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts were tasked with the destruction of Sixth Army which still held the eastward facing bulge of the lower Dnieper River and a solidly defended bridgehead on the eastern bank at Nikopol. As this bridgehead now held all of Hitler’s dreams of a summer offensive aimed at recovering the Donbass it had been created with that in mind. An alternative to this ambition was the option of mounting a relief expedition to re-open the route into the beleaguered Crimea. Stalin, in his turn, was leaving the liberation of Crimea until the forces of Fourth Ukrainian Front had moved further along the Black Sea coast as far as the estuary of the Dniester River beyond Odessa. The four Ukrainian fronts comprised twentyone infantry and three tank armies excluding the Independent Coastal Army, which awaited orders to advance towards Sevastopol from the bloody Kerch Peninsula. First Ukrainian Front had begun its operation by taking Zhitomir on 31 December, following this up by moving on Berdichev to the south. These successes cut AGS’ shortest route to Germany and brought Vatutin’s forces 80km into the German positions across a front of 240km. Once again Fourth Panzer Army was falling back under pressure from Third Guards Tank Army, supported on its right by Thirteenth, Sixtieth, First Guards and Eighteenth armies and to its left by Thirty-Eighth, Fortieth and First Tank armies. Konev’s forces began their offensive on 5 January. Having rested and received reinforcements, Second Ukrainian Front’s forces were, when compared with those of Vatutin, relatively fresh. Konev’s objectives were to facilitate encirclements to the north and south: with First Ukrainian Front between Konev and Uman; with Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts Konev would move to cut off AGS units retiring from the Dnieper River bend. Second Ukrainian Front’s main thrust

was southwestwards beyond Kirovograd. Happily for the men involved the weather was good and the ground relatively solid when the attack began. Within three days Kirovograd lay over 15km behind Soviet lines. However, the very speed of Konev’s advance was creating a dangerous salient between it and Vatutin’s forces with its tip at Kanev on the Dnieper River. Neither front was individually capable of dealing with the increasing danger that outrunning German forces, if reinforced, posed to the rear of either or both fronts. Indeed, the further both First and Second Ukrainian fronts proceeded the greater the problems they faced and Vatutin’s mobile units were already moving faster than their hardpressed supply chain could keep pace with. The inevitable then happened – food, fuel and ammunition began to run perilously low. Consequently, Stavka, on 12 January, ordered both front commanders to focus on the Korsun Salient to trap a mixed force comprising elements of twelve German divisions including 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking. Stavka believed that this salient contained the bulk of Eighth Army. First Ukrainian Front was instructed to halt until the Korsun situation was dealt with. With its forces in position, Second Ukrainian Front allocated 27 divisions to eliminate the Korsun Salient (also referred to as the Cherkassy Pocket) along with 370 tanks. The operation began on 24 January and an initial penetration of 8km was made that day. The following day Fifth Guards Tank Army struck at the salient’s base around Shpola, while simultaneously Sixth Tank Army attacked from the north, with these units linking up next day. An inner and outer cordon were then formed, however, operations effectively ceased with warmer weather generating mud that glued even the broad-tracked T 34s in place. The Korsun Pocket, as it was now called, was nicknamed ‘Little Stalingrad’ due to the severity of fighting that took place. Luckily for the Germans, the pocket included an airfield that enabled the Luftwaffe to fly in supplies and evacuate the wounded. With a radius of some 15km, the ground was hilly and somewhat marshy thus favouring the defence. Manstein rapidly organized a relief force composed of III and XXXXVII Panzer corps that were both understrength. Nevertheless, on Hitler’s orders an attempt was to be made that would not only relieve the pocket but encircle in the Soviet forces. It would prove overly optimistic given the strength of the opposition. The units in the pocket were named Group Stemmermann, after their commander General Wilhelm Stemmermann. The relief attack commenced on 11 February, six days after the Soviets had begun their attempt to split the pocket into smaller pieces. The Soviets had failed in this due to savage defensive fighting during which the men of SS Wiking distinguished themselves by a series of counterattacks. Flieger Korps VIII provided transport aircraft that flew around the clock missions concentrating on fuel and ammunition for the SS armour. Slowly, however, the Soviet pressure told and the area of the pocket decreased and the thaw slowed the relief column’s progress to a mud-splattered crawl. At this point Zhukov was authorized to offer terms to Group Stemmermann, but these were rejected and on 12 February Korsun town and its airfield were captured. This forced the defenders to become a mobile group as it would have to move and fight its way towards the nearest relief force, III Panzer Corps. A series of engagements frustrated Soviet efforts to halt the group’s progress as it passed through a succession of villages before finally reaching Shanderovka, where they regrouped prior to a last dash for safety. Abandoning their severely wounded, Group Stemmermann split into three for the final stretch,

as sanctioned by Manstein. From 2300hr on 16 February they moved out, catching the Soviets unawares. Throughout the night the advanced units filtered gratefully into III Panzer Corps’ lines. However, the slower moving rear formations began to fall victim to the now-alert men of Second Ukrainian Front. Konev ordered that the fugitives be annihilated. From dawn onwards cavalry and armour tore into the straggling tails of the columns. The situation became particularly critical along the bank of the still-flowing Gniloy Tikich River where panicked Germans swam the icy, turbulent waters in their hundreds. Stemmermann was killed fighting with the rearguard. As the sun set on 18 February all those who could had straggled into friendly lines. Both sides claimed the events as a victory, both sides also over-estimated the other’s losses. Nevertheless, there was no longer a threat to either Soviet front’s flanks or rear and the Soviets now regrouped to continue their advance. January had not been a good month for Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts. Their renewed efforts to breach the German lines during the middle of the month had failed with heavy casualties. Undismayed and reinforced, they tried again. Malinovsky’s Third Ukrainian Front struck on 30 January followed a day later by Tolbukhin’s Fourth Ukrainian Front. On 5 February the German positions started to crack under the intense pressure. Two divisions of Forty-Sixth Army (Third Ukrainian Front) broke through towards Apostolovo, which fell after a 48km advance that put the German positions at Krivoi Rog and Nikopol in danger and split Sixth Army in two. Tolbukhin’s forces then attacked the Nikopol Bridgehead, which was cleared by 9 February forcing units of Sixth Army to retreat through the swamps to the west. Krivoi Rog was Malinovsky’s next objective. The orders from Stalin were to capture the city with its vital power station intact by 22 February, the day before Red Army Day and thus in time for the celebrations. Both tasks were accomplished on schedule but it took a further week of fighting to push the last Germans across the Ingulets River and gain a firm lodgment on the western bank. Stavka was now able to rejig its armies for the march to Odessa and the liberation of Crimea. The Germans, having sustained significant losses in territory, men and equipment were now anticipating a period of relative inactivity in the south. Indeed, the mud that resulted from the thaw would inhibit movement and surely, they reasoned, the Red Army would be desperate to put their supply lines on a sound footing, bring up reinforcements and simply catch their breath. As an AGS staff report read, ‘If they are to renew their offensive then it is unlikely to be within the near future and then on a limited scale.’ But as the survivors of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket gratefully puffed on cigarettes and gulped ersatz coffee around a cottage stove, the Boss outlined his plans in the comfort of the Kremlin. Stalin and Stavka now had the bit well and truly between their teeth and had no intention of letting AGS out from under the cosh. As Fourth Ukrainian Front was being stripped of its better units, Tolbukhin was ordered to Moscow to discuss the liberation of Crimea which was to start in early April. In comparison with the other Ukrainian fronts Fourth’s operation was to be a mere sideshow. Stalin anticipated nothing less than the total destruction of AGS, with March as the start date. As the Soviet operations in the centre and to the north had ground to a halt, Stavka decided to commit its six tank armies to the offensive against AGS. The right flank of First Ukrainian Front, along with some units from Rokossovsky’s newly christened First Belorussian Front,

became Second Belorussian Front and other formations were shuffled to balance the three Ukrainian fronts that would be involved. The plan would include Second Belorussian and First, Second and Third Ukrainian fronts in a huge push westwards, which it was anticipated would extend the southern penetration below the right flank of AGC, clear the Black Sea coast beyond Odessa and reach the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains beyond Lutsk, Tarnopol and Chernovitsy. All fronts would attack during the first week of March in the usual staggered fashion to keep the Germans off-balance. Second Belorussian Front was to move towards Kovel, 150km south east of Brest Litovsk in AGC’s rear; First Ukrainian Front aimed for Chernovitsy to cut off AGS’ line of retreat north of the Dniester River and towards Brody, 100km east of Lvov. Second Ukrainian Front would advance on Jassy in Romania, west of the Prut River and Third Ukrainian Front’s target was Odessa. Second Belorussian Front was not to attack until 17 March as a precaution against the Germans counterattacking into the flank of First Ukrainian Front with units from AGC. Zhukov, now in command of First Ukrainian Front, began his attack on 4 March striking the junction point of Fourth and First Panzer armies near Volochisk. The advance was spectacular, and within two days a penetration of 40km across a front of 160km had been achieved as Third Guards Tank, Fourth Tank and Sixtieth armies hurtled towards the Lvov–Odessa railway line. Reeling from the shock, Manstein committed armoured and infantry formations in a desperate attempt to shore up the crumbling front. But still the Soviets hurried forwards fanning out in the general direction of Chernivitsy, Vinnitsa, Kamenets-Podolsk, Brody and the Dniester River. Konev’s forces attacked on the following day and, if anything, Second Ukrainian Front’s achievements were even more impressive. There were three tank armies, including Fifth Guards Tank, pushing German units aside in an almost casual manner. The ground favoured the attackers as they drove towards the vast supply dumps of Uman, which fell on 10 March. And still Konev’s men surged westwards. The loss of Uman unhinged this sector of AGS causing chaos and allowing the Soviets to cross the Bug River virtually unopposed. By 13 March the Bug had been bridged at several points along an 80km frontage. Rotmistrov’s next objective was the Dniester River, which his advanced guard reached and crossed on 17 March. A corpssized bridgehead was solidly established four days later as more and more units drew up to the river’s eastern bank. First Panzer Army was not cut off from its right flank cover, Eighth Army, as they were pushed north westwards and south respectively. Third Ukrainian Front commenced its offensive on 6 March. Taking advantage of the open, featureless steppe, Malinovsky committed his Mobile Exploitation Group, IV Guards Cavalry and IV Mechanized corps, led by General P.A. Pliev, to a deep outflanking move that aimed to cut off the German retreat to the lower reaches of the Bug River north of Nikolaeyev. Herding Sixth Army before it, Third Ukrainian Front reached the lower Bug on 22 March, its lead elements being less than 150km from Odessa. To capitalize on these stunning victories Stavka pressed all three Ukrainian fronts to coordinate their operations. Zhukov was to push on but with support from Konev to achieve the isolation of First Panzer Army. Meanwhile, Konev and Malinovsky were to cooperate in an attempt to cut off Sixth and Eighth German and Third Romanian armies. Pausing but briefly to re-supply and firm up the rear areas that were facing increasing difficulties from German stragglers, the Soviets allowed Manstein some days to stabilize his fragmented line.

Second Ukrainian Front reached the Prut River in Moldavia on 25 March just north of Jassy as Zhukov’s armoured spearhead crossed the Dniester River north west of Kaments-Podolsk. Between them, trapped around Kaments-Podolsk was a large part of First Panzer Army. Once again Moscow looked forward to a repeat of the Stalingrad Kessel. Separated by a mere 15km, First and Second Ukrainian fronts were just too weak to close their pincers around First Panzer. Furthermore, the encircling forces were now spread too thinly. In part this was due to the need to liberate Tarnopol, where the encircled German garrison was putting up an unexpectedly stout defence that required more resources than the Soviets had anticipated. Indeed, the city did not capitulate until 17 April. Nevertheless, the Soviet fronts began to move closer to one another. They were also preparing to defend against a breakout attempt towards the south based on intelligence gathered from radio intercepts. However, the blow Manstein struck on the outer perimeter of the almost complete encirclement came as a terrible shock as did First Panzer Army’s breakout attack to the west. By early April a thoroughly battered First Panzer Army had extricated itself from the jaws of doom. However, for Manstein it was too late. Even though he had managed to restore his front to some semblance of order, he was pensioned off. Indeed, AGS itself was reorganized into Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group South Ukraine with command being given to two Hitler stalwarts, generals Model and Schorner respectively. This change of command preceded the fall of Odessa, to Third Ukrainian Front on 10 April, by five days. Malinovsky followed this by reaching the Dniester River less than a week later where his front linked up firmly with Second Ukrainian Front’s left flank. To the north Zhukov suggested the offensive now aim for Lvov to support Second Belorussian Front’s comparatively poor rate of progress. Now Stalin intervened, it was time to consider events and plan for the summer.

On the left General P.A. Rotmistrov, leader of Fifth Guards Tank Army, on the right, General I.S. Konev, commander of Second Ukrainian Front. Both were promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1944 for their efforts during the winter campaign of 1943–4.

A Soviet 152mm howitzer firing. Its nine-man crew could loose off four rounds per minute to a range of 17km. A modification of a 1910 design, it was gradually replaced by the 1937 ML-20 piece of the same calibre.

Inside the Nikopol Bridgehead an 88mm gun deployed for action against ground targets. As the Eastern Rampart to the north disintegrated, AGS clung desperately to this last toe hold on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River.

German troops manoeuvre their anti-tank gun into place. The gun is a modified French 75mm Model 1897 gun. Originally designated 7.5cm FK 231(f), then, following a change of role from field gun to anti-tank gun, Pak 97/38. In this latter role it combined elements of the Pak 40 with the original gun. It served with the Italian, Romanian and Hungarian armies as well as the Germans.

An immaculately camouflaged Marder II, towing its ammunition limber, leaves its base during early 1944. Issued to the anti-tank battalions of panzer divisions, they were most effective in the ambush role due to their thin armour and open tops.

Soviet heavy artillery moves into place. This is a 280mm Br-5 model 1939 mortar. Generally deployed to Artillery Breakthrough units, this piece was crewed by fifteen men and was capable of hurling a 200kg round over 10km every 2 minutes. Their deployment was classified as it was generally indicative of a serious attack.

A Tiger burns on the road to Berdichev. Fourth Panzer Army was driven westwards and suffered heavy casualties from increasingly experienced Soviet tankers. Carrying infantry on its rear decking, a T 34 moves ahead. Roads in this area were raised so that they stood above the waters of the spring thaw.

Exhausted SS men rest amid the ruins of a railway station during the retreat across Ukraine in early 1944.

A pair of Tigers with infantry support engages Soviet armour during the fighting to relieve the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket, February 1944.

Weather permitting, the Soviet aircraft attacked both the defenders and relief forces engaged in and around the KorsunCherkassy Pocket. However, they were hampered by a lack of suitable airfields and shortages of fuel. This flight of PE-2 ground attack aircraft is returning from such a mission.

The funeral of General N.F. Vatutin. He was ambushed by Ukrainian anti-Russian partisans on 28 February 1944 and died six weeks later. Western Ukraine was a hot bed of Ukrainian nationalism and such forces were to be a thorn in the Red Army’s side for a decade after the war ended.

In part the ability of the Red Army to take the offensive so quickly was due to the recruitment of locals into the army where they were ‘trained’ on the job. As the Axis had released many Ukrainian POWs to their homes in 1941 there were also men with experience to conscript. Local partisan units were enrolled en masse and sent to the front.

One of the simpler German methods of infrastructure destruction was this track ripper. The hook at the front of the train would be lowered onto the track, the locomotive would be reversed and the sleepers literally ploughed up. Heating the rails and then bending them completed the task most effectively.

In western Ukraine the most defensible positions were the rivers. Crossing these was problematic, as can be seen here. A KV-1 lends its strength to retrieve a pair of T 34s stuck in the mud on the eastern river bank of an unidentified waterway during March 1943.

Lend-Lease vehicles such as these US supplied Studebaker US6 trucks played an important part in keeping up the momentum of Soviet offensives by moving vast quantities of fuel and ammunition to the forward units.

AGS lost considerable numbers of tanks such as this Panzer IV. There was little chance of such losses being anything other than total due to the speed of the Soviet advance. During 1944 German industry achieved its highest production figures of the war.

The two major battles around the Romanian town of Targu-Frumos during April–May 1944 effectively ended the Soviet attempt to invade Romania via Jassy. It was the combined efforts of the Gross Deutschland Panzer Grenadier Division, 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf and 24th Panzer Division that stemmed the tide. Here a soldier of the Gross Deutschland takes cover.

Led by a Panzer III, a platoon of Gross Deutschland’s Tigers drives through Targu-Frumos. Their opponents were elements of Second Tank Army. Among the armour deployed by the Soviets was the new IS-1 Heavy tank, named after Josef Stalin.

Little information is available from Soviet sources regarding the battles of Targu-Frumos. The Germans claim to have destroyed over 350 enemy tanks. Second Ukrainian Front was ordered over to the defensive on 6 May, four days after the second battle began.

The liberation of Crimea began on 7–8 April with an airstrike and a short bombardment. The Axis garrison comprised German Seventeenth Army and two Romanian mountain divisions. Facing them were Tolbukhin’s Fourth Ukrainian Front. Having broken through the defences on the Perekop Isthmus, the Soviets pursued Axis forces towards Sevastopol.

The Soviet pursuit was steady, herding the Axis units in the direction of Sevastopol. Hitler intended to hold Sevastopol but its defences were ruins and the forces available had lost most of their heavy weapons during the retreat. The city was a trap not a fortress. It was now a question of waiting for the Soviets to capture it. The evacuation of personnel began on 14 April.

Soviet naval infantry in Nakhimov Square, Sevastopol. Fort Constantine is just visible under the arch. The date is 10 May, the day of the city’s liberation. Over the course of the next 3 days Romanian and German naval units evacuated over 45,000 personnel from various embarkation points in the peninsula. Seventeenth Army had effectively ceased to exist.

Chapter 9

Out of the USSR

I

n late April to early May 1944, the Soviets halted in their advance, the line from south to north, from coast to coast resembled a reversed S running from the Black to the Baltic seas. Where the Red Army’s summer offensive would strike was a matter of debate on the German side and one of absolute secrecy in Moscow. Stavka ordered a campaign of misinformation to further cloud OKH’s (Oberkommando der Heeres (German Army Supreme High Command)) judgement by convincing them that the Baltic and the Balkans were to be the targets. In reality, AGC was the target and it was to be attacked almost head on by, from north to south, First Baltic, Third, Second and First Belorussian fronts. These formations were commanded by Bagramyan, Chernyakovsky, Zakharov and Rokossovsky. Stalin appointed two co-ordinators to oversee two fronts each, Vasilevsky and Zhukov – north and south, respectively. The final Soviet plan was to take the form of the tried and trusted rippling series of attacks. Leningrad Front was to mount a powerful assault on the Finnish lines close to Leningrad early in June, by which time Stavka anticipated the long-awaited landings in western Europe would have begun. With Hitler’s attention focused on the Anglo-American invasion and the situation in Finland, the main summer offensive would begin on 19 June with the codename Operation Bagration and the ambition of destroying, once and for all, the forces of AGC. Third and First Belorussian fronts were to be the main forces involved with First Baltic Front covering the right flank from any intervention by AGN. Second Belorussian Front would follow in the other’s wake to mop up any remaining enemy forces and reinforce where necessary. German analysis of intelligence reports was poor and fuddled by wishful thinking. Although in no doubt that a summer offensive was inevitable, OKH was fed underestimates of Soviet strength opposite AGC and overestimates of those facing Army Group North Ukraine (AGNU). Indeed, the more optimistic staff officers were convinced that AGNU would be the Red Army’s enemy of choice, with a thrust aimed at Lvov to be followed by Warsaw which would find them in the rear of AGC. This wishful thinking was the reason why AGNU had been built up to the point where it was the strongest Axis grouping on the Eastern Front. AGNU controlled the bulk of Germany’s panzer divisions deployed in the East. The inability of the Luftwaffe to provide aerial reconnaissance, due to its lack of aircraft and Soviet air superiority, was a major factor contributing to the blindness of German intelligence-gathering during this critical period. Denuded of armour, AGC’s only panzer division was 20th, and nor were its thirtyfour infantry divisions of the best quality in common with the seven security divisions or the two Luftwaffe field divisions. With 400,000 combat troops of varying types and roughly 550 tanks and assault guns, AGC was spread dangerously thin. Facing them, the Red Army deployed roughly six times as many armoured fighting vehicles, twice as many combat troops (including 6 cavalry

divisions) and nearly 10,000 guns and mortars. The skies over Belorussia belonged to the Red Air Force from the outset as Luftflotte 6 had but 600 aircraft, a seventh of those available to their opponents. Whereas in previous years Hitler had an offensive planned for the summer, in 1944 there was no such project on the drawing board. Maintaining the status quo in the East was Germany’s aim, while smashing the invasion in the West was the absolute priority. When that was achieved, only then would resources be diverted back to the war with the USSR. Consequently, AGC was, as it had so successfully done in 1943, to defend vigorously causing the maximum damage to the Red Army. AGNU would when attacked, as anticipated, inflict a crushing defeat on the Soviets that would change the course of the war on the Eastern Front. The defences of AGC rested on the so-called Fortified Places of, from north to south, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk, all of which lay on bridging points for the Dvina, Dnieper and Berezina rivers. The ground over which the offensive would be fought was densely wooded, cut by numerous waterways and in places very marshy. This was good for defenders but difficult for attackers. Consequently, the Soviets paid particular attention to these problems. They used specialist armour equipped with mine rollers to deal with the extensive minefields the Germans had sown, while bridging units stockpiled huge quantities of materiel to build corduroy roads and submerged bridges, and troops were trained to negotiate the swampy ground flanking the waterways. The commander of AGC, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, was not an officer given to swift reactions or to questioning orders from his Führer. The situation he would face when Operation Bagration began would require flexibility and dynamism, qualities that were sadly lacking in his repertoire. Operation Bagration began on 23 June, two weeks after the attack on Finland and seventeen days after D-Day. The artillery of First and Third Belorussian fronts fired for 2 hours, starting at 0500hr. Then the infantry went in. The aims of First Baltic and Third Belorussian fronts were to envelop Vitebsk and its road and rail bridges over the Dvina River and break through Third Panzer Army’s defences. Within two days the city was almost isolated and I Tank Corps was moving up to act as a part of a Mobile Exploitation Group under First Baltic Front’s control. On the right, south of Vitebsk, Orsha was under threat, laying as it did astride the Smolensk–Minsk highway it was a vital junction. To protect this area AGC’s strongest unit, the 78th Sturm (assault) Division, was deployed. The left flank of this unit was covered by 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, which was almost as strong. Here Soviet attacks, by Eleventh Guards Army, were held up by strong, heavily mined defensive works. However, north of the city, a breakthrough was made that forced Busch to commit one of his only four reserve divisions, Panzer Grenadier Division Felderrnhalle, which moved into a secondary defence line on the Dnieper River. With Orsha now in Soviet hands, Chernyakovsky committed Fifth Guards Tank Army, supported by II Guards Tank Corps, to drive along the Minsk highway where the ground was better for armour. The speed and weight of this Soviet thrust finally convinced OKH that this was not a diversionary attack. Consequently, permission was given to transfer 5th Panzer Division from AGNU despite Hitler’s conviction that this area remained Stavka’s main objective. The 5th Panzer was to take up positions around Borisov, roughly 100km west of Orsha at the point the highway and the railway crossed the Berezina River, where, so it was hoped, a firm defence line could be established. When the leading elements of 5th Panzer Division arrived they went straight into action as the speed of Fifth Guards Tank

Army’s advance had carried it past retreating German units that were losing cohesion by the hour. Utilizing infantry to cut off retreating Germans from the Berezina, Soviet tankers drove their machines into the river to form a bridge near Borisov. By 30 June several crossing points had been created putting Borisov in danger of envelopment, and indeed it fell the next day. Now nothing stood between Third Belorussian Front and Minsk, roughly 75km to the west, other than the remnants of 5th Panzer Division and a collection of poorly equipped police formations. To the south First Belorussian Front was now also making progress towards Minsk. The 20thth Panzer Division attempted to shore up the crumbling defences but was seriously damaged in the process. As AGC fell apart, Busch flew to Germany to plead with Hitler for some powers of defensive flexibility only to be sacked for his trouble on 28 June. North of Bobruisk, 20th Panzer Division was falling back on the city to avoid encirclement by I Guards Tank Corps, which had just secured several crossing points along the Berezina River. First Belorussian Front had now cut off some 40,000 German troops east of Bobruisk. Too disorganized to break out, this force was ground down by artillery and air strikes and just 6,000 or so made it through to Bobruisk, only to be trapped once more. An attempt by 12th Panzer Division, hastily moved down from AGN, failed to break through the Soviet cordons. On 29 June Bobruisk was liberated, with less than 15,000 men of Ninth Army managing to elude capture. General Walter Model, Busch’s replacement at the head of AGC, was given no fresh units to defend Minsk. Consequently, the burden of protecting Belorussia’s capital while it was being evacuated fell on the weakened shoulders of 5th Panzer Division and 13,000 stragglers, many of whom were unarmed rear echelon personnel. Hitler had agreed to the evacuation of Minsk on 2 July, the day after the destruction of its important infrastructure assets had begun. In the early hours of the next morning II Tank Corps’ reconnaissance troops appeared in the southern outskirts, rapidly followed by men and machines of I Guards Tank Corps in the south-eastern suburbs. These representatives of First and Third Belorussian fronts drove through a landscape of burning buildings, breathing the foetid air, rank with the stench of decaying flesh. With no opposition worth the name, the city was officially liberated that day. With Minsk almost recaptured and Operation Bagration clearly a success, Stavka had, on 28 June, issued fresh orders for the offensive’s next phase, an even deeper penetration westwards. The new objectives were Grodno, Bialystok and Brest Litovsk, each of which was an important river crossing point. Kaunus, Grodno, Bialystok and Brest Litovsk were the next objectives. All were important transport hubs with Kaunus and Grodno at crossing points on the Niemen River and Brest Litovsk on the Bug River. These were ambitious targets but, given the almost total collapse of AGC and the lack of resistance, achievable even when the exhaustion of the Soviet troops and the huge extension of their supply lines were taken into account. Also included was the move against AGNU, which would involve the southern wing of First Belorussian Front and the huge bulk of First Ukrainian Front. In this sector the initial objectives were the transport hub of Lvov and crossing points over the Vistula River south of Warsaw in the rear of AGC. As Model desperately attempted to salvage something from the wreckage of his new command, he was conscious of the 70km void between AGC and AGN. In an attempt to plug

this empty space he created Second Army from the remnants of various formations around the nucleus of the former Ninth Army. The line this cobbled together force was to hold ran from Vilnius through Lida down to Baranovichi. The rump of Third Panzer Army was to hold Vilnius, to the north, to the Führer’s usual ‘last man’. By the end of July Lida and Baranovichi had fallen and Vilnius was under siege, falling, with the loss of another 12,000 POWs, on 13 July, followed by Grodno three days later. To the south, Pinsk, where both road and rail bridges crossed the Pripet River, 120km east of Brest Litovsk, was liberated on 14 July. Nothing Model could conjure up was capable of stopping the Soviet juggernaut that now held bridgeheads on the west bank of the Niemen River south west of Vilnius. It was here that the Red Army finally halted during the third week of July. There was little left to their front but to the rear was chaos. Supply lines had to be cleared, rebuilt or repaired. Although the speed of the German retreat had left them little opportunity to carry out as comprehensive a scorched earth policy as had been the case in Ukraine, much destruction had been wrought. Furthermore, new, locally recruited men were being pressed into service. Often entire partisan groups were enrolled in the Red Army and they had to be organized and trained. There was also a vast number of German stragglers to be dealt with and POWs to be processed. All this would take time and allow the men of First Baltic and the Belorussian fronts time to rest and recuperate. AGNU, now led by General Josef Harpe, had enjoyed several months of relative tranquility during which it had taken the opportunity to construct a solid defensive zone some 30km deep running from just north of Kovel to a position to the south of Tarnopol. To hold this line Harpe commanded roughly 900,000 men, 900 tanks 6,000 guns and 700 aircraft. Harpe’s strongest formations were deployed to cover the approaches to Lvov grouped around III Panzer Corps. Facing them was the Red Army’s most powerful front, First Ukrainian, disposing of over 1,000,000 men, 1,600 tanks, 14,000 guns and mortars and 2,800 aircraft. Rokossovsky’s units to the right added two more infantry armies to this host. On 12 July the Germans, informed by deserters and local sympathizers that the Soviet offensive was imminent, denuded their front lines of infantry to reduce casualties. Konev, aware of this move, dispensed with a bombardment and struck from Lutsk, north of Lvov, with Third Guards and Thirteenth armies. By 15 July, following two days of intensive fighting, Brody was surrounded opening a gap in the German lines. Into this Konev inserted a cavalry and Mechanized Infantry Exploitation Group while to its right First Guards Tank Army pushed westwards towards Jaroslav and Przemysl on the San River, 175km away. To counter this Harpe released 1st and 8th Panzer divisions. This led to Konev unleashing his major armoured formations, Third and Fourth Guards Tank armies. Rapidly, Soviet strength in numbers began to tell and on 17 July cavalry squadrons reined in within sight of Lvov’s churches. And on the next day Eighth and Sixty-Ninth armies of First Belorussian Front moved on Lublin and the Bug River at a swift pace. However, the Soviets were now hampered by heavy summer rains and this slowed the armoured forces’ movements towards Lvov, which was being reinforced with four infantry divisions. Konev had hoped to capture Lvov off the march avoiding the siege conditions that maintained around Brody. Happily for First Ukrainian Front, Brody capitulated on 22 July, netting 30,000 POWs and drier weather allowed First Guards Tank Army to resume its march towards the San River. Harpe abandoned Lvov, which was occupied on 27 July along with Przemysl.

The next naturally defensible lines available to AGNU were the Carpathian Mountains and, to the north, the Vistula River. Pushing as hard as possible, Rokossovsky’s armies crossed the Vistula at Magnuszew, 32km south of Warsaw on 27 July shortly before Konev’s units established a strong bridgehead at Sandomierz, 160km south of Warsaw. The obvious next step for the Germans was to eliminate these bridgeheads before they could be exploited. To this end armoured units that had failed to recapture the important transport crossroads as Siedlce, east of Warsaw, were to be redeployed. Although battered, AGNU had not suffered the dramatic collapse of AGC and had benefitted from significantly stronger rear defence lines and the freedom to manoeuvre. Elsewhere, few reinforcements had been transferred from AGN as it too had been subjected to a Soviet offensive, and in fact only AGSU had escaped Stavka’s immediate attention. One of the major events triggered by the destruction of AGC was the so-called ‘Bomb Plot’ of 20 July by which Hitler was to be assassinated by a group of German army officers. A bomb was detonated in one of the briefing rooms at the Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s HQ at Rastenburg in East Prussia. In the confusion that ensued an attempt to take over power in Berlin and negotiate a peace with the Allies failed. The repercussions included an orgy of arrests, show trials and executions topped by a massive erosion of the Führer’s trust in the army and more dependence on his own genius and the SS. Another was the Warsaw Uprising, which began on 1 August, the day on which men of Rokossovsky’s First Belorussian Front arrived on the eastern bank of the Vistula River in the Warsaw suburb of Praga. Polish partisans, known as the Home Army, rose up in an attempt to occupy their capital before Stalin was able to put a pro-Soviet administration in place. As August 1944 began there were few at OKH other than the Führer himself who viewed the summer of 1944 with anything but pessimism. The Red Army was closing in on the Reich from the East just as Anglo-American forces were moving across France towards its western boundaries.

During the summer of 1944 little more than half of Germany’s armoured forces were deployed against the USSR. From November 1943 priority for weapons allocation had been given to Western Europe to counter the anticipated Allied invasion. This column of SdKfz 251 half-tracks is moving towards the mist-shrouded Carpathian foothills.

A man of the 14th SS Division Galizien recruited in Galicia, eastern Ukraine. This anti-Soviet/Russian unit was almost wiped out during the fighting around Brody. Nevertheless, there were sufficient volunteers forthcoming to restore the division during the next few months, such was the antipathy felt towards their eastern neighbours and Stalin’s regime.

With the majority of its fighters deployed to the Reich to counter Anglo-American bombers, Germany’s air force in the East conceded control of the sky to the Soviets. Consequently, aerial reconnaissance was monopolized by the Red Air Force. Here a formation of PE-2 bombers heads out on a mission during Operation Bagration.

Maskirovka, concealment and deception, involved hiding men and machines, moving only at night, dummy weapons, strictly controlled signals traffic and disinformation, an art that the Red Army excelled at. Here a 76.2mm gun is moved under cover.

Finnish troops launch a weak counterattack during the Soviet offensive. The attack on Finnish positions in the Karelian Isthmus was launched on 10 June in such strength that the Finns sued for terms on 21 June. Terms were offered but refused and the fighting continued until the end of August when the Soviets halted having gained much ground in Karelia and elsewhere.

Partisans hunting German stragglers. Operation Bagration marked the high point of Soviet partisan activity. As the Red Army marched westwards most of the population claimed to have belonged to a partisan unit and launched expeditions like the one seen here to demonstrate their zeal and loyalty, much to the chagrin of those who had fought the Axis from the summer of 1941.

A Sherman tank M4A2 advances during July 1944. Third Guards Tank Corps was equipped with this Sherman variant. For ease of resupply and maintenance they were not mixed with other armour. Soviet tank crews found them to be more comfortable than the T 34 but prone to overturning due to the high centre of gravity.

Soviet infantry tactics had developed after 1942–3. The broad front attack had been replaced by a narrower, more focused type with a more sophisticated artillery fire plan in support. Exploitation of success was undertaken by armoured units.

The 78th Sturm Division was equipped with thirty-one Stug III assault guns, such as the one seen here. In addition, it had eighteen ‘Nashorn’ (rhinoceros) tank destroyers. Such machines demonstrate the defensive nature of many of AGC’s formations.

A Soviet SU 152 rumbles forward. During the fighting for Orsha regiments equipped with twenty-one of these heavy assault guns supported specialist T 34 units to deal with German bunkers. However, many fell victim to German infantry tank hunting squads.

A Red Army traffic controller directs vehicles under a signpost that includes Lvov (top right) during the operations against AGNU during July 1944.

General Walter Model (holding map) was a defence specialist who was given command of AGC on 28 June. However, even Model’s abilities were insufficient to hold a line that was starved of men and equipment. Nevertheless, he was decorated for his achievements during the summer of 1944 before transfer to the West.

Heavy Tank Battalion 505 was part of 5th Panzer Division and consisted of twenty-nine Tiger I tanks. During the evening of 28 June it went into action against the M4A2 Shermans of 3 Guards Tank Corps, which suffered heavy losses.

A neatly turned out mortar crew prepares to fire its 81mm weapon. Close support such as this was essential when faced with determined opponents. German sources refer to the efficacy of Soviet mortar units.

An FW 190 burns. Luftwaffe resources were so weak that HE-177 bombers were pressed into service to conduct low-level attacks on Soviet armour east of Minsk. Of the forty aircraft sent, only thirty returned, an unacceptable casualty rate that halted such operations.

The fate of so many towns and cities and so much German equipment during the Soviet summer operations.

The Smolensk–Minsk highway. Soviet armoured troops inspect the results of a Shturmovik raid.

An unopposed river crossing in the wake of the front-line troops. Note the heavy camouflage in case of an aerial attack, the Soviets were clearly taking no chances.

On 17 July 1944 upwards of 60,000 German POWs taken in Belorussia were marched through the streets of Moscow guarded by NKVD troops. With senior officers at its head, the silent parade provoked, as an eyewitness recalled, feelings of sympathy for the POWs and many threw bread and cigarettes to them. Afterwards the streets were washed to prevent the spread of diseases such as dysentery and as a symbolic act of purification.