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IMPACT THE ARMY AIR FORCES' CONFIDENTIAL PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II In eight hooks, declassified
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Air Forces' Confidential Picture History published in eight books.
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The
Penalty of
Overconfidence Essay by Albert Speer
About the author: Generally recognized as the ablest of
neared, he couyitermanded Hitler's "scorched earth" order
Adolf Hitler's subordinates, Albert Speer was born in 1 905 in Mannheim. His father was an architect, and Albert Speer became one also.
much of Germany as possible. Nuremberg trials he was accused of having plotted to wage aggressive war, of participating in it and of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Found not guilty on thefirst two counts, he was sentenced to twenty years in Spandau prison for the third. The only defendant of the twenty -two Nazis tried who acknowledged
He joined the Nazi party in 1931 and came to Hitler's notice with the design of party buildings at
This led
to his
and personal Berlin
for the grandiose redesign of which Hitler devoted large portions of
architect
—a project
his time right
Nuremberg.
becoming the Fiihrer's protege, confidant
up
to
until the
Nazi
A year later he was given full responsibilityfor
direction of the
German war economy, managing
At
guilt,
as
the
Speer served the whole sentence, occupying his time
from memory, a remarkably detailed Third Reich, which was published in 1 970 and became a world-wide best-seller. In 1976 he wrote another important book, Spandau: The Secret Diaries. His essay for the Impact series is a definitive and succinct summary of air power's decisive conby writing, entirely
defeat.
In 1942 Speer was named Minister of Armaments and Munitions and I ?ispec tor-General of Roads, Water
and Power.
to destroy
to
achieve a rise in output every month until September 1 944 with prodigious executive skill and ingenuity. The accompanying photograph shows him awarding citations to officers of a transport corps under his command. As the end
and eloquent
book. Inside the
tribution to the collapse of the
Third Reich.
-JP-
Q
weeks be-
whose sum total undoubtedly contributed war perhaps even dissipated what otherwise might have been relative equality. Hitler was right when he repeatedly declared that the loser of the war would be the side committing
a handwritten
the worst mistakes. In his blindness, he naturally
decisions
II
March
29, 1945, only a few
fore Adolf Hitlers death,
I
sent
him
mv last, which included this comment: "It pained me deeplv during the victorious days of 940 to see how many among our leaders were losing their inner integrity. This was the moment when we should have commended ourselves to Providence by letter,
1
our decency and inner modesty."
assumed
German leaders dence. They believed the
governments would remain weak, that the military lesson Germany had dealt them would have
cratic
will to construct a new line of resisWhat is more, the preparations for the fatal attack upon the Soviet Union can be regarded as the
paralyzed their tance.
— which, as so
often in history after a series of successes, almost
seemed
to
provoke the wrath of the gods for such
hubris.
bv no means possible (o explain all the events of the war bv material causes. God also is at work, and in hopeless situations that should never It
is
—
be forgotten never forgotten in the sense that pride, arrogance and passionate obsession turn the wrath of God upon those in responsible positions. Decency and modesty are without doubt still the
right about Hitler. On July 20. 1944. after learning of the unsuccessful attempt on Hitlers life. (Churchill exclaimed that he was glad his best ally was still
last letter
of mine to Hitler,
1
continued:
"But during those months we were weighed in the balance and found too light for ultimate victory. As if we were being warned by Providence, from 1940 on all our military undertakings were dogged by unprecedented ill luck. Never before has an outside element such as the weather played such a decisive and devastating role in this, the most technological of all wars: the cold in Moscow, the fog around Stalingrad, and the blue sky above the winter offensive in the West in 1944-1945." During those fmal months. Hitler kept on emphasizing that precisely because of the hopeless situation Providence would bring about a turn for the better. On the basis of the preceding arguments I took issue with that view: "I believe in a Providence .
that
is
just
this
It is worth providing some evidence to support view of Cihurchill's.
There are unquestionably some authoritarian systems of government that have passed the test of time. For example, the positive aspects of the Gatholic church have continued over many cenwould be wrong, therefore, to assume that must inevitably lead to outrages and catastrophic errors, as happened under Hitler and because of him. But Hitler became more and more the prisoner turies. It
dictatorships by their nature
of his own totalitarianism. He demanded subordination from his associates, abolished all criticism,
and subjugated his administration from top to bottom, and then he was victimized by the system he created. Moreover, he was violating an ancient Pru.ssian custom which had proven its value as a safety valve for internal stresses and as a corrective of internal sources of error. All military organizations,
including those of democratic countries, are subject
prerequisite for great successes. In that
he would make
alive.
Norway and France, were drunk with overconfithat the countries with demo-
outcome of that overconfidence
that because of his genius
the less serious mistakes. But C;hurchill was ecjually
After the easy victories in
direct
—
to shortening the
and inexorable, and thus
I
.
.
to certain types
of error because thev must be run on
and measures
authoritarian principles. In the Prussian armv, later in the
German armv.
criticism of
taken by the top leadership was a prescribed duty; such criticism had to be set forth in writing in the military logs kept bv the lower army units. For personal reasons Hitler found this tradition discomfiting,
and he issued
a
decree by which
it
was sus-
pended. In his arrogance. Hitler thought himself able to decide within seconds in fact, many of his decisions were such snap judgments with his superior insight, matters on which air force or army com-
—
manders
—
schofiied bv the General Staff
bate for hours sions. Hitler
and then come
would de-
to different conclu-
was (onvinced that
his intuition
would
believe in
G(xl.'*
This overconfidence on the part of Hitler and his lieutenants resulted in countless
wrongheaded
From Speer's letter to Hitler of March 29.
1945. Hitler refused
to accept deliver)' of the letter. For the circumstances, see Albert
Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 453-456.
At the time, of course, he was referWhere his own affairs were insight failed him.
always guide him aright. He did make an effort to it with a study of the facts, but I had the impression that he often adduced rational argu-
plain,
ments only after having made an emotional decision, that he was looking mainly for evidence to back his intuitions. Often he might think problems through rationally up to a certain point and then allow his feelings to take over. If he could not find some logical chain of reasoning he was likely to veer off into irrationality, especially during the last phase
Undoubtedly a magical effect radiated from To minimize this phenomenon would mean to underestimate the threat of future
bolster
of the war.
No one can deny that in 940 Hitler could point 1
to impressive results
from
his intuitive decisions.
But it should not be forgotten that such an approach decision-making is essentially frivolous; it could have been effective only in a general military situation that permitted frivolity to win campaigns despite the doubts of military men. So long as Hitler to
had overwhelming
military forces, the superficiality
of intuitive decisions did not matter so much, but once the current turned against him. Hitler's tactical incompetence became apparent. For example, from the autumn of 1942 on, when the growing striking power of the British and American air forces could easily
him
be predicted. Hitler's intuition failed to tell was the only answer to
that a defensive strategy
this peril.
-<^^ow .oward the end of the war, when Hitler's predicament took more dramatic shape, when neither reason nor feeling could offer endorsement for his plans, wishful thinking or daydreams, he switched to faith in the road Fate had presumably laid out for him. He remained unshakably convinced that Fate had chosen him to achieve victory. All the signs seemed to confirm this belief: his rise from unknown corporal to head of state; his success in overcoming countless, seemingly insurmountable obstacles; the repeated failure of attempts on his
he
said.
ring to his enemies. involved, his
Hitler's words.
politicians with similar charismatic powers.
The gift
of being able to influence people to an unusual
degree was as crucial an element in Hitler's success as all his other abilities put together. His military adjutants would tell many an anecdote about how this or that general with a negative attitude toward one of Hitler's proposals would disappear into Hitler's office; after several hours of discussion the general would emerge converted to the dictator's view. Such people had literally fallen under Hitler's spell, and the spell obviously held in spite of extraordinary stresses.
Even when Hitler could no longer exercise abwhen the approaching end had stripped him of his former nimbus and when the outlines of doom had become all too clear, his gift of persuasion alone still permitted him to impose his will on men who had led troops in>the First World War and had won high honors in frontline commands. So even in this last phase of his life Hitler must have had some emanation which had nothing to do with superior argument or rational persuasiveness or threats. By then, moreover, his outward appearance could not solute rule,
have contributed to his psychological power. He looked like a weary, bedeviled man. His speech was no longer fluent but halting, and he groped for words with a helpless air and without a trace of elan. In the exultation of his victory over France, Hitler still had enough insight to declare repeatedly in his table talk that even the best soldiers could be defeated if they were inadequately armed. In a modern war, he maintained, the chances for success could be predicted purely on the basis of the country's capacity for armaments production. But this observation, which he himself had made during the period of his victories, was no longer acceptable to him during the years of defeats. Instead, he blamed the generals. Goebbels,
him new confidence. If he had conviction, he would have been
at Stalingrad and the mounting air attacks upon Germany, noted in his diary on March 9, 1943, that "the Fiihrer's opinion
Yet in the spring of 1943, during the advance into Russia, Hitler out of the blue suddenly began talking about drowning men grasping at straws. People in danger were incapable of seeing reality
of the moral qualities of the generals, in all branches of the service moreover, is devastating. A priori he does not believe a general. They all deceive him!" Two months later, on May 10, Geobbels repeated that Hitler "has expressed a devastating opinion of
life,
so that the attempted assassination of July 20,
1944, only gave
abandoned this abandoning himself.
confronted with the defeat
generals
the losses from bombing."* In the principal
are traitors." Rather than face the truth. Hitler dismissed his generals' views as worthless.
categories of manufacture, the figures were as fol-
the generals as a class. All generals
lie, all
Suppose the American or British political leadership had openly expressed similar distrust of their air forces. Would any cooperation have been possible? Within Hitler's authoritarian system, disgrun-
lows:
% 1940
weapons Artillery
of Hitler's influence and the fact that his overconf'idence in Piovidence and in his own gifts led to
All types of
none of the
Allied
powers
Increase
Automatic infantry
dement, apathy and abrogation of responsibility by blind obedience to the authority of the commander-in-chief were the response to his method of dealing with his subordinates. This has been a lt)ng preface, but these things must be said if we are to undcrstancf the unicjueness
incredible blunders. In
1944
7.5
170,880
787,100
460%
5,964
55,936
930%
above
cm
caliber,
including tank
cannon
Armored
vehicles,
tonnage tions,
37,235
munitonnage
622,322 1,680%
865,000 3,350,000
380% upon and night
In spite of the enemy's concerted attacks
did there exist any constellation permitting such
the aircraft industry, in 1944 23,805 day
mistakes.
fighters
were produced, compared to 1,176 in 1940 a 1,340 per cent increase. However, the manufacture of heavy bombers was abandoned. But even if I draw up the score by weight alone, production for 1944 equaled 157,600 tons, compared to 55,200 tons for 1940 an increase of 280 per cent. But Hitler's overconfidence prevented the utilization of such energies in industry in the earlier period. A severe shock at thebeginningof the war, a kind of Dunkirk, say, would have been useful to the leadership. The easy victories produced a ruinous
—
—
I
do not mean to speak here of the political blunders Hitler committed his invasion of Czechoslovakia, for instance, by which he forfeited nor of all his political successes in Central Europe such military blunders as the declaration of war on the United States and the attack upon the Soviet Union. I shall restrict myself to events which took
—
—
place within ter of
my own
area of responsibility as Minis-
Armaments.
"We wasted a year of precious time luxuriating our easily-won success when we could have been girding ourselves for battle. That is why we were caught unprepared in the decisive years of 944 and 1945. If all our new weapons had been ready a year earlier, we would be in a very different position now," I wrote to Hitler in the above mentioned letin
1
ter
of March 29, I put it even
194.5.
more
bluntly in the final report
my associates in that memorandum
prepared for
the
dustry. In
I
armaments
I
in-
stated flatly that
"given similar concentration of energies," such as
my staff and
from February 1942 on, and had been ruthlessly eliminated as early as 940 and 94 we could then have attained the armaments production we finally did attain in 1944, since the new capacity constructed during 1942 and 1948 and the machine tools newly installed in the interval were largely canceled out by I
effect.
obvious that a manyfold increase in armaas was achieved in 1944 would have created great difficulties for the Soviet Union during the Russian campaigns of 1942 and 1943. For the production of 1944 would have sufficed, according to an estimate of the German General Staff, to re-equip 225 infantry and 45 armored divisions. By the time these production figures were attained in 1944, they were reduced to a fraction of their significance by the calculated attacks of the Eighth Air Force on the hydrogenation plants and the resulting acute shortage of fuel. But, as I wrote Hitler, even if this higher production had been achieved a year earlier, even if our aircraft plants had shifted over to making fighters only as early as 1 943 rather than in the panicky spirit It is
ments such
initiated
"if all obstacles 1
1
1
,
*Speer's copies,
memorancJum
stamped
associates in the
of )aniiary 27, 1945.
"(^onf'idenlial."
armaments
overview of their chiv R3)
Three hundred
were distributed among
indusirv lo prf>vide
his
them with an
own accomplishments. (Koblenz Bundesar-
of the spring of 1944, Germany's position in the air war might have turned out much better. From 1942 on, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, along with many other Luftwaffe generals and myself, repeatedly urged Hitler to build up a strong air defense on the
German home
front in order to be able to meet the expected giant air raids. The General Staff was very well-informed about the future strength of the enemy bomber formations. In his overconfidence. Hitler disregarded all such advice in 1942 and 1943. Even in 1944, when he at last authorized the building of a fleet of at least a thousand fighter planes to be kept in readiness for defense of daylight attacks, he adhered to this decision only for a few weeks.
one of his sudden reversals, he ordered the fighters committed to service at the fronts. Even more serious was his ban on the mass
Then,
in
production of twin-jet fighter planes, the type that later became known as the ME-262. In the spring of 1942 we were all ready to proceed with the mass production of this plane, although an element of risk was involved because the plane was as yet insufficiently tested. But similar risks had been taken in connection with the rushed production of the Tiger and Panther tanks in 1942 and of a new U-boat in fall of 1943. In turned out well.
the
As was
later
all
these cases the gamble had
demonstrated, we could have
achieved assembly-line production of 1,000 units a month of this aircraft within the space of a year. On July 8, 1944, we set up such a schedule, calling for attainment of the 1,000 aircraft level by April 1945. It is
a fair certainty that a thousand jet fighters a
month,
in addition to the
thousands of ordinary
fighter aircraft, could have kept the home front free of American daytime bombers in 1944. That in turn would have prevented the raids on the hydrogenation plants. It is
also significant that Hitler,
when
this jet
at last
if we managed to achieve a production of 300 more night fighters a month. On the other hand. Milch pointed out, it would not matter much one way or the other whether we pro-
discontinue night attacks
T
had it been created time and with the needed vigor, could certainly have diminished the night attacks by the RAF. Small as it was, it was often feared by the British bomber crews. Multiplying the size of this fighter force and thus vastly increasing the losses of the British fleets of bombers might have been Germany's greatest chance in the war. But here too .he night fighter force,
at the right
Hitler was disinclined to see reason. Instead, he gave
orders to increase anti-aircraft fire power in every conceivable way. "Let all the workers produce antiaircraft guns! Use all the material for that too!" In conjunction with this order he made insulting remarks about the cowardice of German fighter pilots.* It
should be noted that there was no need to
think in terms of destroying all enemy bomber planes. From our experiences with our dive bombers, we knew that a loss of seven per cent or more on
each mission sufficed to throw the crews into an unbearable state of demoralization. Furthermore, in the contest between fighters and bombers the expenditure of materials stood in a proportion of
one
and the number of was shot down stood
to six,
aircraft
began to be delivered in 1944, followed his intuition and ordered the plane to be transformed into a bomber capable of dropping a single 500-kilogram bomb upon the enemy. During a discussion of the night fighter situation in the Air Ministry on August 31, 1943, Field Marshal Milch argued that the enormous enemy losses from night fighters over Berlin, Regensburg and Nuremberg proved that the RAF would have to
plane
duced 300 anti-aircraft guns a month more or less. During that month of August 1943 only 48 night fighters were produced; a year later, during the panicky summer of 1944, Milch's demand was more than met. Although 421 night fighters were delivered in July 1944, there was no longer enough fuel to enable them to reach the enemy.
men
lost
when an
in a similar ratio.
Therefore, enemy superiority in material and men could be balanced out by the greatest losses. And when crews survived, the enemy crews became prisoners of war, whereas some of the German pilots could soon be flying again. Amid all these conjectures and hypotheses, it is reassuring to consider that even if Hitler had avoided these serious errors he could not have prolonged the war beyond the spring of 1946. All the German chromium stocks would have been in the supply pipelines by September 1, 1945. High-
"See Inside
the
Third Retch, pp. 406-409
.
produced without hiomiuni Allowing tor the time needed for processing this meant that the entire production of armaments would have come to a standstill in Marc h 1946. Long before that, however, the use of the quality steel cannot be
c
additives.
American atom bomb would have made reality
—
Hitler's
a
—
an altogether unforeseen fashion of decision in the spring of 1945 that he would in
tiucks
and planes would have been impossible, and
the units at the ront could not have been resupplied f
with
In addition, the lack of technical rubber
tires.
pioducts would have resulted in grave deficiencies throughout industry. In contrast to the richlysupplied .Allied war machine, we had long been living from hand to mouth. There were hardly any reserves to carry us over gaps in the supply lines. We had only enough Buna for two months. After the failure of an attack on the big Gold-
consign the German pecjple to annihilation. Fcjr his necrophilic mania had reached such an extreme that it remains highly dubious whether Hitler, in the depths of his bunker, would ever have signed a
enberg and Fortuna power plants, the British maga"Inzine Electrical Times wrote, on August 21, 194
surrender.
cidentallv,
The staffs of the united .American and British bomber formations could also have avoided mistakes stemming from overconfidence in their own
now recognizing
judgment. The
series of five
major
air raids
on the
Hamburg metropolitan area from July 25 to August 2, 1943, had catastrophic effects. (My own depression is fairly evident from the remarks made at the time: "We are now coasting downhill smoothly. The decision will come in the next half-year. If this goes on another few months, we'll be washed up.") The attacks on the German ball-bearing industry, on the I
fuel supplies and, in the late fall of 1941,
on
trans-
portation were extremely effective. But they were
not decisive because the targets were changed too frequentlv and the points to be destroyed were scattered too widely.
Every organism has certain vital nerve fibers: and complete paralysis can result. For example, one inconspicuous item, for lack of which the entire armaments industry would have been crippled, was the production of abrasives. Only sever these
eight small plants
manufactured the indispensable
grinding wheels without which no gun barrel, no crankshaft, no shell could be turned out. Those eight factories were easy to find; the glow of the big carborundum smelting furnaces could be seen far into the night. Given the tedious processing involved in the making of abrasives, destruction of
1
it
is
interesting to note that the
:
RAF
is
to the full the importance of elecsuppiv in keeping war munition factories running. We have laid much emphasis on this from the first and have ui ged the powers that be to seize every (opportunity that presented itself for damaging the enemy's electrical generating plant preferably to anything else, for we are convincecf that it is the most efficient way of preventing the wheels tricitv
from going round in every kind of war industry." These two major power plants had a combined capacity of 900 megawatts a considerable percentage of the entire power production of the Ruhr. Had thev been destroyed, an equally large part of the Ruhr's industry would have been paralyzed at one blow. Our production of electricity was being used to the limit, and there was no reserve capacity. Every loss meant reducing production by a corresponding amount. Possibly there would have been great difficulties in knocking out the hydio-electric plants, as the attacks on the Mohne Valley dam showed, but a loss of some twenty major power plants would have constituted the final catastiophe.
—
If in addition the
transformer stations, such as
Brauweiler, Hebertingen and Ernsthofen, among others, had been put out of action, this worst bottle-
these factories
our industry would have been doubly for, as we discovered to our alarm, both the steam-power plants and these transformer stations were extremely sensitive even to accicfcntal
year, but after only half a vear the
bomb
virtually all
would have been possible to attack the overland transmission lines, which stretched for thousands of miles. These could scarcelv have been protected from low-flying planes. With all the other essentials, such as fuel or rubber or ball bearings, there was always a reserve stock, not to mention what was already in the pipeline to insure smooth distribution. Thus in all such cases we could have stretched our supplies for many
would have halted production for a manufacture of armaments would have come to a
standstill. I used to have nightmares over the possibility of massive air raids on the four factories making syn-
thetic
rubber (Buna). As a raid
cjn Hiils
showed,
these plants were extremely susceptible to
bomb
damage. Any interruption in rubber production would have been fatal to our motorized units only a few months later; the manufacture of new tanks.
neck
in
shattered
factor,
—
hits. it
And
ultimately, to note a third crucial
•
months, even
production were halted.
if
alone could not be stockpiled,
member
Electricity
and we need only
the consequences of a blackout in that lasted for just a few hours!
re-
New
York City
Conjectures and speculations. But the fact remains that the bomber offensive against Germany actually opened a second front long before the inva-
The bombing had devastating upon Germany's defensive strength, first in Russia and subsequently in France. Quite apart
sion of the continent. effects
from the possible increases
in
production that went
unrealized because of Hitler's overconfidence, the losses
States Strategic
of holes, and it
proved
all
Germany was
roof efforts by the defenders to
front in
like a
futile.
.n saying this
we must also include the other Germany had to keep siz-
auxiliary problems. First,
numbers of troops at home in order to offer some defense against the air raids. Secondly, there were the losses the bombers inflicted directly upon German armaments. Since there was no way to pre-
able
which
or which factories were going to be attacked, the largest possible number of antiaircraft guns had to be distributed among innumerable sites, and large quantities of munitions had to cities
be stockpiled near them for use
in the
event of an air
attack.
The production of flak cannon from 8.8 cm caliber amounted to 21,197 from 1940
1944. In the
same period, the ammunition
guns came
to
to
to
for these
70 million rounds! Hundreds of thousands of soldiers, officers and staffs were busy keeping these anti-aircraft guns manned and supplied. All of them would otherwise have been free for the fighting in the East, or for resisting the invasion. These anti-aircraft guns and those 70 mil-
rounds of ammunition would have made things extremely tough for the Soviet tanks; in the very last phase of the war it turned out that the accuracy of lion
made
these
weapons invaluable for ground
in per-
Bombing
Survey estimated them at nine percent for 1943. My ministry's Central Planning Board estimated the gap between goal and actuality in January 1943 at 5.4 per cent, in December 1943 at 28 per cent.* Of course this gap was not exclusively due to air raids, but they were a principal cause. Moreover, all statistics indicate that the average production of industrial plants as a whole was far higher than that of the factories
working for the armaments industry,
which were of course the preferred targets of the air
ten percent in the principal areas of
I
flak
can be measured only
The home
patch
12.8
losses
The United
raids.
1944.
dict
These
centages.
from bombings became the decisive factor for war in the years 1943 and
the further course of the full
air raids.
I
feel
we may reasonably guess
at a loss
of about
armaments
production during the year 1943. In speaking to the gauleiters in August 1944, I stated that the losses of 1944 up to that point could be set at 30 per cent. This estimate was made before the catastrophic drop in production caused by the encirclement of the Ruhr, which from November 1944 on was cut off from the rest of Germany. If we include this later period, the loss during that year rises far above thirty percent. The losses registered up to August did not result in reduced deliveries of arms; they indicated only failures to attain our goals. In 1944, by ruthlessly throttling back other branches of industry and, in keeping with the desperate situation, shifting raw materials, manufacturing
facilities
and labor forces
centers, production
In that final
to the
armaments
was notably increased.
memorandum
to
my
associates
dated January 27, 1945, I noted that the year 1944 "was marked by extraordinarily severe and continuously mounting pressure by the enemy's air raids. An indication of the extent to which various branches of armaments production have been hurt by the air raids can be obtained by comparing the allocation of materials and the quotas promised for 1944 with the results actually achieved." The shortfalls, according to the memorandum, amounted to 31 per cent for light tanks, 36.8 per cent for medium tanks, 31.5 per cent for heavy tanks, 30.5 per cent for military aircraft. Assemblyline manufacturing was especially sensitive to air attack; the shortfall in the production of trucks amounted to no less than 42 per cent. These percentages are in accord with my state-
combat.
The second aspect of the heavy toll taken by the war over Germany was, as I have indicated, the losses to armaments production as a consequence of air
*Weekly report of the Planungsamt. 23 to 28 January, 1944 (Bundesarchiv Koblenz R3).
mc'iiLs to tlif
gaultilds. In
fact,
if
I
coiiipan' tluin
with theshoitiall of 28 ixrtcnt for DcccmlxM 1943, the above figures are prol)al)lv estimates on the low If,
tlien,
I
assume
ttie losses
for 1943 to be 10
in cjuestion
front.
Thus
side.
some of the guns and were being employed at the
take into account the fact that
ammunition
the losses inflicted by the
British air fleets constituted for
American and
Germany
the
per cent and for 1944 30 percent, the specific short-
greatest lost battle of the war, far exceeding the
arms decisive war can be estimated as follows: cannon from 7.5 cm caliber on up, including flak: 14,870 barrels; armored vehicles: 10,170, including 1,820 tanks of the Panther and Tiger
losses at Stalingrad, in the winter
falls
due
to air attack in categories of
for the conduct of the
classes;
the
munitions: 1,375,000 tons. These losses in
armaments industry were caused mostly by the
RAF
night attacks.
We
should add to these startling figures approximately 15,000 anti-aircraft guns of 8.8 to 12.8 cm caliber and some 50 million rounds of ammunition suitable for antitank use which was frozen for the defense of the homeland. These estimates
campaigns in Rusduring the retreat from France. In placing such emphasis on these losses I am not ignoring the impairment of Germany's war-making potential by the successful campaign against the hyclrogenation plants or the cutting off of the Ruhr. The one is sia, cjr
inconceivable without the other.
The truly decisive factors were the weakening German defensive strength and the immobilizing of German planes and tanks caused by the of the
American and
British air forces. Even before the encirclement of the Ruhr, the collapse was already final.
CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH— CONFIDENTIAL
iistribution:
;quadrons
This document contain* information affecting the national defense of the United State, within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C, 31 and 32, as amended. Transmission or revelation of contents in any manner to unauthorized persons is prohibited by law. Printed with approval of the Bureau of the Budgst, Executive Office of the President.
Vol.111
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON,
0. C.
No. 8
AUGUST, 1945
IMPACT August, 1945
CONTENTS Japan on the Eve Okinawa: Campaign
-
for a Base
•..'v^
-
-
3
-
-
4
Fire Blitz: Progress Report on Incendiary
Destruction of Jap Cities-
Force and Saigon
Fifth Air
vs.
Borneo Invasion
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Napalm in Luzon Jap Paper Balloons - - Blue "Cats" in the Pacific New Bomber: the XB-42 -
Air
Eleventh
18
Formosa
Force
40 46 48 54 58
60
the
in
61
Kuriles
Launching the JB-2
-
-
64
Spooks on Radar Scopes Back Cover
CLASSIFICATION: Overall clasof IMPACT, inchidint: sification To intext, is CONFIDENTIAL. sure that this overall classification is recognized, even when pages are torn out for instructional purposes all sheets have heen stamped CON
FIDENTIAL where
practical.
V
Thi'
not refer to specific photo graphs. The correct individual cla> photograph in the issue is given below:
does
sification for every
THRlirCH 4:
FRCliVT rciVER
%( rASMKit;ii
I
S:
I
n.NKIIll.N
A-1.5:
I
I
lAI.
.M.i.AssiFiEn
16: TOP, KESTRICTEn:
BOTTOM, INCLASSIFIED 17-25: I NrLAS.stFiEn 26-32: LEFT, CONFinENTIAL 32-33: lunioM center, i:Nri.AssiFiEn 33, RICHT-37: l:OMFinENTIAL 38-39: TOP, nclassifieo 39: itOTTOM, CONFIDENTIAL 40-43: UNCLASSIFIED 44: CONFIDENTIAL 45: TOP, confidential; i
BOTTOM, restricted 46-47: nclassified 48-53: top, confidential 53: bottom, unclassified 54-57: confipential 58-59: unclassified 60: confidential 61-63: unclassified i
64-back cover: confidential
CONFIDENTIAL
r^'^^
Keeping the Home Fires Burning: Kobe, 5 June
J apan on Ac E vc HOME FRONT AND WAR FRONT RAPIDLY BECOMING ONE THE
Okinawa marks
fiul ol ri'si.-taiice in
siu;nilifant niilfsloiif in llic Pacific
tlu'
passing
ol
a
war. The long march
up from the Solomons lias ended, and American forces are firmly estaMished on an island only a stone's throw from Japan, with no possiliility of hcing dislodged. In a sense aH has transpired in the Pacific u[) until now has heen merely a prelude to the big show. It has been an agonizing prelude hut a necessary one. Three-dimensional war against a sea-girt enemy demands a hase near enough his industrial that
heart
to
"•uHicienl
|)ermil
port
constant
operations against
air
and land space
it.
permit a I)uildu[) of
to
also su|)-
and men preparator\
to an amphibious assault against Thus, after nearly three years of constant battle, we have achieved what we liad to start with against Germany a base (see pages 1-17).
plies
that heart.
The great difference is that along with the iiase we now have a huge flood of equipment already pouring into it. whereas when we started operations from England our air was tiny. It didnl reach full size until two years by which time it was handing out blows of such magnitude that the war might have been shortened Ijy many months if we had been able to ojierate on that scale from the start. It will be interesting to see how Japan will stand u() against the much greater blows (5,000 tons a day average! promised recently by General Arnold. It is not nearly as solidly industrialized as Germany. Its rail system is pathetic by comparison. Its cities are tinder boxes (see pages 18-.'5y). Its factories, some of them already gasping from blockade, are jammed dangerously into a few areas. force
later,
damage shown by
hitter's
industry so resilient.
damage
is
pinned down and could be ignored.
Some were
out at our convenience.
still
Others are
there,
later cleaned
most of them
reduced to impotence by starvation and disease. A Jaji diary found on by-jiassed Biak describes the practice of exhuming malaria victims, then drying and eating the flesh. V^'hen a powerful enemy air base at Habaul had been knocked out. we were able to take a long and daring jump up into the Gilberts and Marshalls.
This put the Marianas
Prom here B-29s could reach Japan, and
for the
in
range.
first
time
ihe hot breath of invasion could be felt in
Tokyo. It grew hotter with the fall of the Philipjiines, Iwo Jima. Okinawa. Meanwhile the fringes of Japan's hard-won empire have been rotting away. Burma is gone. Borneo is going, her armies are backpedaling in Ghina. .She is on the eve of invasion and she knows it. Her press and radio have become somber, although the latter has for a long time viewed our island advances with a curious sort of double vision. Thus:
SAIPAN.
-iO
Junv 1144 (during):
liiipc ronfrontinf;
remorse for
for
/y
Jajian,
in
"The
IH July (alter):
LEYTE,
it
"If the Marianas,
Japan does not tfie
rise to the chal nation will have cause for
hundred years."
a
real
battle
is
yet to be fought."
Suvember (during): "The and the decisive
battle for Leyte is a Imttle battle for Greater East Asia, a battle
which Japan must win."
in repairing
// Junuary I94S (after): "The Leyte and Mindoro canipaitrns were mere l(ie,il operations."
LUZON, " January (during): "The battle has now assumed it> inmost gravity, so much so that the linal outcome in the Pacific will be determined by forthcoming developments in Luzon."
skill
the
on a large scale for onlv a
Guinea, clearing out enemy air power ahead of us before each jump. Large Jap garrisons were by-passed. They were
Germans, which made the We have been bombing Japan few months, and already the
In labor force has not demonstrated the
linmb
horizon. It was anything but that. Eroni Guadalcanal we cleaned out the Solomons and jumped up into the Admiralties. \^e look a series of jumps along the coast of .New
-'.{
extensive.
January (after:) "In any case, whatever the outcome of the battle lMiiIi[ipines, it is of minor importance as compared with the
of the
merely the last and the nearest in a long series. The first was Guadalcanal. There the Japs had built an airstrip, something we had to have if we were to start on our long trek north. Only with an airstrip could we attack nearby Jap airfields. Only by
Okinawa
is
not
tlii'
only ba>e.
It
is
Only maneuver our
such attacks could we establish local air superiority. with local air siqieriority could
we
hojie to
battle for the final stage of the war."'
IWO
JIMA, 22 February (during): "Tokyo and Washington agree that the war in the Pacific has entered a new phase. Viith the American as-sault against Iwo Jima, the battle for Japan has begun." ? March (after): the Pacific."
OKINAWA. llkiii.iwa
pathetically small land and sea forces in comjiarative safety.
Only thus could we concentrate them against Jap-held positions and at the same time prevent a similar concentration of the then (i\erw lielmiiig]\ superior enenn foriethe area.
in
Tlie Guadalcanal landing Japanese like a \erv innocent
I
.
^
must have seemed to main cloud low on the militar\
little
now reach japan frcuii Iwo Jima left Okinawa, have alreadv cut H-2<> losses sharjilv: see
S. figlitcr»<
l
i
and
p. .W,.
'/
"Iwo Jima
is
only one of the small islands studding
April (during):
means Japan's
"The outcome
of
the
l)attle
of
future."
8 June (after): "The Okinawa campaign has never been considered decisive. The problem of supply has caused most of the difficulty."
However, this campaign of strategic flapdoodle is over and not through choice. Okinawa is the last stop. There is no place beyonil the Hyukyus except Japan itself, no remaining island battlefield which can change overnight from How the Jap being "decisive" to being "inconse
home
islands,
when
the times comes, should
ing reading all over the world.
make
interest
Hfrtrv flak defenses have
now been
built
up on Okinawa.
almost
.4l first,
Their history
is
all flak iras
supplied by the ISavy.
a fairly
one of constant payment through the nose.
simple
Okiinawa
They paid them
tribute to the
who
Chinese,
invaded
intermittently
be-
tween 605 and 1609 A.D. After that they paid trib-
NEXT STOP JAPAN ITSELF?
ute
the
to
finally falling
IN
1853, during his negotiations with the Japanese.
modore Perry
also visited the island of
translation: the Offshore Rope).
Okinawa
He found
it
Com-
(literal
"fertile be-
vond measure." and signed a compact with the local king "whenever citizens of the U. S. come to Okinawa they shall be treated with great courtesy and shall be at liberty to ramble where they please without hindrance or having officials sent to follow them." Now, 92 years later, we are that
again
in
a position to
wander
there without official inter-
under
They
Jap are
too, Japs completely dominance.
industrious
King of moilore
Okinawa receivrH Com
Penv
fonlially in 1853.
|)eo])le.
inoffetisive
shorter,
better-
looking and better proportioned than the bandy-legged Japs, and have more hair on their bodies. There were about of them before tlie war, plus wild boar. deer. rats, and numerous poisonous snakes. The human popula-
1..50.000
bats,
tion has been declining steadily over a period of years.
The Okinawans devote themselves and
fishing.
principally to farming
Their standard of living
is
ference.
consider them their social inferiors and there
The inhabitants of the Offshore Rope are of Ainu stock, pushed out of Japan by the Japs coming over from Korea.
Japane.se
local irritation that there are so
army.
Their
low. is
few Okinawan
culture
is
stronglv
The Japs
considerable officers in the
overlaid
bv
Confidential
Anchorage in outer harbor in about 75 feet, Inner harbor available only to small craft with local
Okinawa Cliine.-e.
make
tvill
also
iilarly in the
|p\
fini' jlevl
anihorafie. also has enouiih
Formo>aii and Malayan
country districts.
[lersuadinp
much
the
women
not
to
as the\
The
and re-e()uippcd craft
tattoo
the
backs of their
is
in
Okinawa
There is no innumbers of
iiuilding great
large whitewashed horseshoe-shajied tombs.
The
Jaj)s
never
were farsighted enough to realize how useful these lomf)s would be as pill boxes when defending the island against the Americans. Okinawa is ()() miles long and varies in width from three to ten miles, witli a total area of 469 square miles. It is .U)() miles from soutfiern Kyushu and 8t5 miles from Tokyo. The northern lialf of it is extremely rugged, but the rest is fairly flat, and is now in the process of being built into the biggest air and naval base that the Pacific has ever seen. .Vs a starter we have lieen rejiairing and using the airfields built by the Japs, and will soon have j)ut to use every available scrap of flat terrain on the island in the construction of upwards of twenty Army. Navy, and Marine stri[)s. The former will ba-e M-29s of General Doolittles redeploved di.scouraged
('onfiilrii/iiil
this
practice.
Perha|>s
they
airfields.
Shoiin are six jap fields
Air Korce. also great numbers of airKenney"s tactical air force. There are already 25 miles of paved runway and over 200 miles of
(lartic-
strenu-
have for hundreds of years. chief recreation
many
iiitiiieiiccs.
Otherwise, things have been going on
(histry.
spare for
The Japs have made
ous efforts to eradicate these and have succeeded so far in hands.
flat
knowledge
i!th
of General
Present plans call for the moving of 21.500.000 cubic yards of coral earth. Meanwhile, supplies
hard-surface roads. are pouring into
Okinawa
current |)roblem
is
in an unending stream. Greatest unloading all this equipment, which, because of limited docking facilities, has been backing u|) Liberty ships in Saipan. Pearl Harbor and even San Francisco. The Navy alone now plans to put a huge quantity of men and materiel on Okinawa, considerably in excess of the 70.(M)0 men and 1.200.000 tons originally scheduled for delivery. To maintain this force will require an equal tonnage every few months, after an original 90-day supply level has beeti exhausted. To date (1 April to 31 July) over 2.000.000 tons of Army and Navy equipment has been
in
landed.
Preparations for invading Okinawa started about two weeks before the assault itself. On 18 and 19 March Task Force 58 suddenly appeared off the Ja|)anese coast and subjected the airfields on Kyushu and Honshu and shipping in ihe Inland Sea to a merciless drubbing. Four of its large
Supplies for Okinawa wait at Saipan for operation to In gin. Main staging route was from ports in the U. S.. throng
a traffic control point at
carriers were daniageci
On the 12th he lost 212. Baka> appearing for the first time. Damage to the Meet was heavy and continuous, but the Jap>
by extremely severe
in llie
air attack liur-
enem\ 281 jilanes in the air and 27.5 on the ground. Task Force 58 then retired to refuel, appearing off Okinawa on 2.'? March. This time it blasted the six Okinawa fields (including one on le Shima ing this operation which cost the
)
while the service elements of the Fifth Fleet, including an
armada
of landing craft,
the west of
a hail
moved
in.
Kerama
Ketto. just to
Okinawa, was captured on 26 March, and behind
of fire of all descri|)tions. the assault on
Okinawa
proper was launched on 1 April. All this time British carrier planes and the 5th Air Force had been keeping enemy air activity on Formosa at a minimum, while the 14th Air Force hammered Jap fields on the China coast. A certain degree of surprise had been achieved, but as soon as it became clear that we were committed at Okinawa, the Japs threw their full remaining air strength at our naval force. Suicide attacks were launched on a scale never before encountered. On 6 April Task Force 58 knocked down .^88 planes. There was then a lull while the enemy regained his breath. But on 11 April he was back, losing 211 more.
Carolines.
could not keep up the
ping dwindled.
Eniwetok.
In
])ace.
April.
staging area at
to chief
Normal turnaround lime
I
U.
S. to
Attacks against Okinawa ship-
1.700 enemy planes were shot
suicided on such attacks. In Ma\ the figure was June it fell to under .800. This is partly due to the tremendous attrition, partly to a series of B-29 attacks whicli were making a hash out of installations at the main Kyushu airfields from which the bulk of the Jap attackers wencoming ). and partly to the fact that land o|)erations in Okinawa were going in our favor. The Japs a|)parentl\ real ized that they couldn't prevent its capture and decided to save their remaining air strength for a last-ditch home defense. This strength is now widely dispersed on Japanese fields, and has lately concerned itself almost exclusively with "fugitive" sorties to avoid strafing or combat with American fliers. Eighty-one days after the landing, organized resistance on Okinawa ceased, ending the costliest operation in the history of the U. S. Navv. All together we lost .82 ships of
down or 700.
I
Okinawa
In
(
Confidential
I
••'-f^!^S^5^-t:
I)-I)av supplies arc ni-l li\
:er
is ahout two months. ina\ taite heeause of
\arious sizes to
enemv
artion.
I.STs Inini
(>ri<;inul pile-up
had
lion aloni'
Two hundred and
1
plate of
tlie
sixteen
larger ships, hut also herause they were
habitual ly placed in a sereening fringe around the fleet, and ionse(piently got the full blast of enemy attacks. All toL'cther.
rune destroyers were sunk by Kamikaze attacks and
IX hit.
10
On
DKs sunk and
6.S hit.
\^eather also took
3 June a typhoon struck, scattering naval
its toll.
unit.s
in all
hundreds of miles. The flight decks of four ligiit carriers were swept bare of everv plane. The bow of ihe Pittsburgh was lorn ofV. the DE Kicketts was seriously damaged, and lesser damage sustained by other vessels. l)e>pite this appalling cost (the Navy damage bill alone
ilirections for
amoiuits
to
se\eral
billion
dollars)
the
tangible cost to
Between KS March and 21- June they had 1()K ships of over 100 tons sunk and 377 damaged; 242 -hips of under 100 tons sunk and 7.'-i5 damaged. Their overthe Japs
all
was greater.
plane losses for the period total
C.iiiiU
.3.77f)
li\
ilili
had
landing harpe. Heavy stulT was ferried to anrlior aliout
''i
in
of a mile off shore.
on iieach was unmolested by Japs. \^ ar Siiippiiifi AdministraAverage rargo load: kflOO tons.
17 rargo ships aiding in assault.
«ere damaged. A large pari of this was the work of Kamikaze planes. Destroyers and DKs were the worst sufferers. This is not only heeause thev haven't the firepower and the
armor
MM'
sh
T.il..Tl\
against 965 combat
losses of American aircraft. The lion"s share of our claim> should be credited to the incredible Task Force 58. The lion's share of our losses should be credited to Kamikaze. In
from Tokyo Admiral Toyoda paid hom-
a recent broadcast
age
human bombs who
to 3.'}2
lost
their lives in carrying
out their duties. But the percentage of these lo
any
sort of target
Personnel
losses
11.000 captured;
who
got through
was small. on Okinawa were 109.000 Japs killed. Americans killed. 1.3.193 wounded.
.'11-25
20.S missing.
But the real asse.ssment of the struggle for Okinawa canmade from an examination of these figures. They take no cognizance of the fact that Japan's navy is virtually not be
extinct,
and
that her air force has been whittled
point where
it
is
doubtful
if
it
down
to a
could absorb another such
punishing period and survive.
The very
persistence of
its
attacks in the face of stagger-
a measure of Okinawa's importance in succeeding phases of the war. Japan has given everything she had to defend Okinawa, only to lose it in the end. ing losses
is
QKIRAnA
continued
Kamikaze Scored Many Misses Tlie large splashes in the sea
shown
on these two pages give a tiny glimpse of what was happening on a tremendous scale in the Ryuk^Tis almost daily for
weeks.
sis
well
may be
They
also
the last or the next to the
last full-scale efiFort
Force.
_
^^^
represent what
The JAF.
of the Japanese Air
at the start of opera-
tions preparing for the
Okinawa
land-
-jder t^arBrhi:;^had about 4.300 first-line planes, most of which were within striking or staging range of Okinawa. To replace losses there remained a monthly production rate of about 1.300 aircraft, all that was left after a series of B-29 attacks against factories had
ing,
cut production to the lowest rate in
many months.
-idering the strength and loss figures given here, l>e
remembered
In conit
should
that subsequent B-29 factor) strikes, plus
tlie
incendiary smashes at cities
may
explain the extreme caution recently displayed by all Jap fliers. When our fleet steamed close enough to Hokkaido and Honshu to shell them for several days in the middle of July, the air reaction to this
was
%'irtually nil.
Most of the splashes made by Japs during the Okinawa operation were from aircraft shot down while making conventional bombing, dive bombing, or torpedo attacks. These lit anywhere from Hell to breakfast But almost every suicider came pretty close to an American ship. Sttirider (arrotr) sae^ into sea niter missins
I
S> Cabot was
worst day of
ISS Pa*ndena.
This was tiltJaps flying lietween -K»0 and 6f((l sortie>.
barelv missed on 6 April.
all. the
This photo shoirs
terrific
intensity of flak.
f^
^/
/
iihli
niiliid (iirriir
:.(
/>
ilosr
sliiiii-
irinii siiiridrr
on 17
t/iril.
I'liatit
uas Inken from I'SS South Dakota.
^^a:i^'?\:
SiiiriiliT niisxfs ilcslrnyrr
(nlxnr) on II
tpril.
Heloir. iinolhvr miss ht'ltreen Essex
and Hunker
Hill.
17 April.
vninHnfl
ctniliiiiied
.
.
But Scored Many
.
Hits,
Too
Although Kamikaze attackers represented only a small enemy airrraft operative in the Ryukyus, just how small cannot lie exactly calculated. This is because many would-l>e suiciders were shot down by flak on their wav in. Also, i-arrier planes flying a dense combat air patrol succeeded in breaking up many formations, aided by and-based Marine and Army aircraft which were flying from Okinawa only 1 days after the invasion started. However, some idea of the number of suiciders may be gained from the following figures: One Jap mass attack had 24 suiciders out out of 187 aircraft, another had 12 out of 70. another of U. another 9 out of 25. In others the ratio was smaller. fraction of the
1
I.'-!
I
SS Bunker
almost written
The plane
effectiveness of the suiciders sortie
than
that
was much greater per
conventionally
of
Hill was hit by Jap suicider on 11 May and ofl". For close-up of damage, see next page.
flown
aircraft.
However, there are two ways of looking at this. Even though they absorbed tremendous losses, the conventional attacks salvaged a good number of planes and pilots from each day's operations, and these were able to operate on the following day. In suicide attacks, however, the mortality of planes is KM* percent and that of pilots about 99.9 percent. A few of the latter fall into the water from aircraft that are shot up while still quite high in the air. and of these one or two escape detection and swim ashore.) Thus, if I
the
Kamikaze
(iorps fails to stop a specific operation, there
another day to try again. The another conventional JAF outfit as a Kamikaze unit and kiss it good-bye. Captured documents indicate that such designation is the cause of is
no chance of calling on
only thing to do
is
it
to designate
sorrow among a unit's personnel, accompanied by a good deal of actual crying. However, there is no evidence yet of Kamikaze pilots refusing to go through with universal
their assignments.
L'.S.
^
ammunition ship exploded
18 March.
VSS Hancock
after strafing
by Jap plane
USS
Bennington.
Photo taken by plane of teas
struck hy a suicider on 7 April.
USS
St.
started
All pictures
Im i.\ Miicidal Tony, which .lin and damaged aircraft on the deck.
George sufTend
serious
fires
on these
pafies
(
i
were taken
in
Ryukyu
area.
OKINAWA
con tinned
^
>. ^^Bfc'
%
w ^
Bunker after 11
attack.
Hili
flight dec:
May
suicide
OKINAWA
con tinned
It
Was
Rough on Shore
Just as
Okinawa on mostly as the result of a pulverizing sea and air barrage, our ground forces ran into increasingly stiff reAfter a deceptively easy landing in central
I
A|)ril.
sistance
\
the
farther south
they
proceeded.
Full use was
made by the enemy of all defensive terrain features, including Okinawan tombs and numerous caves. All positions were covered by supporting fire. All were defended fanatically. It was necessary literally to hack our way south. On 21 June,
Marines of the Third Amphibious Corps reached the southern coast. By that time our troops were so intermingled with the last bitterly resisting Japs that further U. S. artillery and naval gunfire support was called off. leaving to individual field soldiers the mopping up of enemy remnants. As their last defensive positions were broken (many of these were stout fortifications apparently built to oppose landings on the southern beaches* large numbers of the surviving
Japs
*%"'i2
threw
themselves
together,
we
got
Marine Hame-throwing tank
gives it
Explosion reveals
Marines wait outside cave near
to
supposed be an
IS aha
the
sea.
more prisoners than
but the scale was
cave a squirt.
into
Some
Others, trying to surrender, were shot by their
Jap-held
ammo dump.
still
in
surrendered. officers.
too small to indicate a trend.
Grasshopper planes were
invaluable for artillery adjust-
ment, since heavy smoke hampered ground observation.
to pick off Japs flushed
All
any other operation,
^
by charge which has just exploded in entrance.
OKINAWA
One C-54
continued
foreground aiui two C-47s liackground -^ were among nine aircraft destroyed by a plane-load of suicidal Japs who landed on Yontan airfield on 24 May. (
l
-,*i"«*?t "xsr
I
I
Traffic circle near \onlan airfield was completed by
Seabee
construction
despite daily
traffic
a
weeks after landinf;. density of nearly 20.000 vehicles. battalion
six
A
Okina>\uii c-iviliuii», luoslh old aiul iiitinn (the \ouii'raii(l lii-iillln had lit-fii drafted I. were dazed liy the size and fury ijf the ((inlliil which siidderiK enjiulfcd their fjiiiet island.
(
nil fiilinliiil
Man\
of them were terrified of Americans until they learned
that they
the V. S.
were not to be ground up for dog food, shipped to The two squatting women are taking a short rest.
17
^
Fire Blit? PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCENDIARY BOMBING OF JAPAN lliaii
to
Japan In
in
ago.
tiionllis
ti\t'
L--'ampaigii
fire
2(i|li Air hnrce licgari its important industrial areas These months liave seen a new
ohlileratc
the
all
l>omliin<:.
kind of strategic air Mitzkrieg. Ortainly the (iomliined Homher Offensive against
pace so fast
in
Not that
at
no time during
Germany was
European joh wasn't done
tiic
Kather. a
(
as (juiekly
iirnhinalion of factors
Japan considerahK nmre Milnerahle
tlian
Germany
the
and
make
to stra-
jiomliing. particiiJarh to incendiar\ homliing.
German),
Against
American doctrine was pinpoint precision
iiomliing against ke\ factories in key target systems. Against
Japan, the American doctrine
is
the
same plus
the comple-
mentary incetidiary program. Kight now. in the summer months, uith relativeK few (!AVL davs over Japan the incendiary program dominates the precision program. Hadar liomliing is especialK suilahle against area targets and happil) most of Japans cities are on the sea where coastal
make
features \\
hen
tiie
identification
industrial
1)\
analvsts
radar easier. first
recommended
the in-
cendiary program for Japan, we were just starting the preofTensive in Kurope. having proclaimed the virtues
of our
method as against
We
philosophy that Iiecame
had
identi-
minds of many as strategic liomliing itself, some of us assumed the precision method could hest do the joli against Japan.
the
in
fied
the British area method.
pickle-harrel
xvorks in
same
these
centers.
about
I
3()<"r
Har more numerous than
of Japan's total
in
labor force
employing xvorkers or under i. thev he largely engaged in war production, and extremely inflammable. In many cases the "factorx "" buildxxere
factories
known
.'•!((
to
homes of
xvere obviously unsatisfactorx
These
the xvorkers themselves. pin|)oint targets.
F'urther.
it
had already been proxen. during the Battle of Britain and in Germany that many large factories, formerly considered fireresistant, xvere vulnerable if hit by concentrations of incendiaries. The analysis conceded that many big xvar plants were dispersed in isolated locations, but they still claimed that Japan depended primarily on the established homeland industrial centers for com|)onents and subassemblies as xvell as finished military products.
This left the isolated key xvar plants and all of the fire-resistant key plants in the urban areas to be knocked out. and this is where precision bombing
came
The plan
in.
called for destruction of the
heel target systems just as in the case of
case of Japan
cision
developed a
in
other countries
ings were the flimsy
terms of results.
efticienth as possilije.
tegi<-
the
jammed
Achilles-
Germany. But
in the
could be done quicker land speed is perhaps the most important measure of the worth of a strategic bombit
ing campaign!
many
In
the
of the key jilants
recommended combination. in priority target
Vthile
systems xvould not
be directly affected by incendiary area attack, there nevertheless xvould be an appreciable indirect effect by xviping out many of the component and sub-assembly plants feeding into
(ionsequently.
the large plants.
b\
transportation, destruction of valuable storage, administra-
itsrlf
Hut the industrial anahsts insisted otherwise.
mated
more than
that
tinder-hox cities
'M\f"r
were easiK
of
the
liuilditigs
They in
esti-
Japan's
comhustihle. as against
less
Germanx. Thex noted that conflagrations, virtuallx unknoxxn in Germanx in peacetime, xxere common in Japan. They said that, xxhereas the l.S leading HAF area targets contained otiIx aliout 12..H'"r of Greater Germanv's thin
total
in
\()'"f
lahor force, the
ahout
1
I
leading Jap urban areas contained
of Japan's homeland lahor force. They cited
I2.5'~f
war
Wr
Kor example. of Jap aircraft engines are produced in one citx. 'M)^( of aircraft assemhix in two cities. VS<"f of ordnance in seven citie>. rti)'"i of machine tools in four cities. 'Xl<"^ of electhe concentration of
tronii- lulie> in
to
the
ki'x
three lilies.
industries.
in addition, the experts pointed
ihousand* of small
nianx
""household"
industries
All this, plus disruption in utilities
and
breakdowns, dehousing of xvar xvorkers and loss of life were expected to shake profoundly, if not eventually destroy, the Japanese industrial communitv. tive
Basically
these
objectives
xvere
the
same
as
those
of
bombing. Hoxvever. if our experts xvere to be believed, we could do the job far (piicker. more thoroughlx and at infinitelx less cost in lives and materiel than ever dreamed of In the British in the ca.se of Germanv. British area
Clearly a plan that promised so
good, firm Finally on
answers. tim<- at
trial.
The
first fexv
much had
small
10 March. General I-eMay found
His full force of ."^uperforts. night with an all-incendiarx
to
tests xvere
be given a
inconclusive.
many
bombing
of the
for the
load, burned out
first
I.S.M
square miles of urban Tokxo. This removed all doubt that cities xxould burn the elaborate fire defenses xvere >implx saturated. Also it proved that a large number of
—
Jap
>mall factories plus somi- big ones could be xviped out Miilli|»i\
got
2'*
this
Max.
i.iiutiilrnlidl
scene
Kor
\<\
lliH rilx
ll«t
and
xoii
liaxe ulial ^ nkolKiin.i
hnrning. -ce picture on pp. 22-2'i.
iticendiarx bloxx.
the results
Thus came i-^
the green light.
in one An account of
contained on the rollox>ing pages.
19
#rt*i-!!^
LIKE LOCUSTS,
DOWN THEY SWARM
On
1
sight
June to
llu-
heliold.
>k\
alio\c
Osaka was
depcnditii;
a
lo\'eh
or iinloveh
on whether you were
lookiiit;
C.nfidrnlnil
^.
down
or looking up at
hfif.
Tlii>
('(in
fulential
ua-
a
lii-i
llif
li>(ii>l-lik('
cITort
and
tin-
~wariii of liomlis >efti
I'ariK
pavoH" \\a> only
aries,
fair.
li\
radar.
I7.S
l!-29.-.
nirked off anotlier
dropped 2.891 tons of incendi-
(>^f
of rily's lolal Iniilt-iip area.
21
'k'
^
lere is a dayliglit. Iiigh-allilude
BAPTISM OF FLAME FOR YOKOHAMA 22
large Jap rity area
is
v*;i
\it'\v
of uliat liappeiis
saliiraled with inreiidiaries.
when Hiiii-
Cllllflllcillilll
*
(lnil> of
>mull
fires
are seen joining in a conllafiralioM
(lemolislied M.Q square miles of the eily
('.(iiijiilfntidi
on 29 May.
liiat
Tliis
was ^ Okoliama's
first
over two-thirds of
llie
lire
Ireatincnl.
It
is
t-
eslinialed
that
population was rendered homeless.
23
rInC vontimied
^k
1\
-^
c
"X
-
•
BURNING OUT THE EMPIRE'S HEART 24
#
Tokyo has l)eeii carried out almost medium altitude. Here Tokyo Imrns on
assault on
i;';v;,:::;s,
at
Cnnfiilfntldl
#..'.»."
^%/
t;
%%
r
•S,~ rllif
iii;_'lil
all 2(llh
(pI
2(1
A!"
Coiiliilrnlidl
M;i\
(irt-
(liJiinj; llic
niissinTis.
mosi
I'or In.QO
|)ro(lii(tivc
anil co^lK
square miles of
ol
riiMile.
I,>~-.
slarliiij;
ua> In
2(1
j;o
r.-2')^.
off.
\l
\l
left,
riulil.
plioio
Mare
li.i~li
lii;lils
ir.'Mlcri
up
i.-
l)urniii.2
just eily.
25
Int continued
^\J
>^ o. Twenty-three
YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI Yokohama
s
(8.9
sq.
percent
mi.)
of
built-up area (ahove) was leveled in one hlou.
29 May. by 467 B-29s dropping 2.769 tons of incendiarie.s in dayliglit
was
from high
altitude.
Damage
severe, although mucii of the city's
the waterfront
was outside the
to
war production
heavv industry on
target area.
Kawasaki (mid-
dle right) already had gotten the fireworks on the night of
16 April
when 202
30 percent (3.37
Yokohama and
B-29s, dropping 1.213 tons, canceled out
sq. mi.)
part of
of this industrial suburb bet\veen
Tokxd (extreme
rJL'hti.
I/Anr IAUDL
Red.
in
this
and
tlie
following ma^l^. indicatrIn all
map-
shown. The
built-
areas wholly or mostly burned out.
onlv damage
inflicted prior to
15 July
is
up area of Kobe, this page, was 43T (8 sq. mi. destroyed by 780 B-29s dropping 5.424 tons of incendiaries in two -trikes. Storage and ship-servicing facilities suffered heavily. i
continued In six missions,
tlie last
on 17 May, 1,611
Nagoya, Japan's fourth city and third manufacturing center. Burned out was 29% (12.34 sq. mi.) of the city proper. The primary target areas were hit on the nose, and. in war production. Nagoya is relatively the deadest of Japanese cities. dustrial guts out of largest
111
OSAKA -j.
nil.!
largest
of city.
four missions, one
.lay. liie
l>y niglit
and
1.612 l5-29s knocked out
tlirpo liy
29<;j-
I
17. 61-
built-up area of Osaka. Japan's second
Tlie
commercial and financial
Osaka was more than
75^'c
destroyed.
.As
district in
in
the case
of Kolie. "eneral storage and shi[>-servicing plants, par-
ticularK
important
in
a
port citv. were heavy sufferers.
t^
^
continued
/^j
Ji
jm<
K
r"-S.2:-W-^^
V
TnKYn Ull I U I
^^^'^ Berlin.
equal
Tokyo has
to all of
than Manhattan Island.
It
really had it. Burned out is an area Pittsburgh and two and one-half times larger took 1.861 B-29s dropping 12.146 tons in six
incendiary missions, five of them at night. Of Tokyo's built-up area. 53% (56.34 sq. mi.) is gone. Besides its significance as Japan's capital
and greatest industrial in
the
AAF works
operational
and groggy Tokyo marks a milestone was here that Gen. LeMay uncorked
center, seared
history.
It
in the A.^F's first big
medium-altitude night incendiary
strike.
IRE
contintiefl
TOU(
INCENDIARIES One
hombers
thiiif! llie Sii|jt'iii)Tt liiv
are proving
that very large plants.
is
constructed of reinforced con-
iHiless
crete tlirougliout. can he seriously af-
Even suh-
fected hy incendiary attack.
have
usually
plants
stantially-huilt
roofs easily penetrated by small
"soft"
incendiaries. If the plant
located in the
is
midst of a number of other more combustible plants, a successful incendiary
incendiary-HE attack them is likely to achieve
or combination
aimed
at all of
HE
greater result than
a
before and after photos,
The
alone.
and on the opposite page, show what happened uhen incendiaries were u.sed against a cluster of j)lants in Nagoya. Largest and most important plant is No. 12. at left
Atsula Factory of
Nagoya Arsenal,
producer of and llexible
artillery.
field
this
guns
In
jire-
guns.
aircraft
attack analysis
a
AA
composed
target,
of both combustible and non-combust-
was
buildings,
ible
especially suitable
Yet the attack wiped out
tack.
•<—
(A
in
K)
.hops
-mall
ili-lrl,l- i-.irli.scd
prncl.irinir
.)rle>.
rinrk..
paper
prudiirls.
boats,
considered
not
for incendiary
by .l..M.cl I]n,-. r nmrhiniry. lik..
riibbir
m«i:nel„..
plants
Speeifie
eir.
tf«lil.-
['»"••
«ul..
at-
lOCr
r'r"diirl«.
b.iili-t.,
anil
lUii
bi-
har,li.otr.
brushes,
.mail
nf
farlurv
perrentUKe
Maelim.ry C... Iari:i' and Miiinltinns.
-[laiT
ile.lroye.i:
»c>rks
]>rndnr!ni;
(II
Kiibnia
maeliine
tunls
:
:
verted to prodiieinc airrrati
Works. largost <:...,
aireraft
Chemiral 1
plant,
rrafl
Plant, 10<7r;
Works,
-[.eri.ilizinn
in
What Jap
|>ar|.,
Q(K/,
,", ;
(
|
r,,ho l.a-
159^: (6) Shinaeana Mfc instrument-. 7,5%; (7) Nippon
Naijoya,
in
indiratins
lokai Klerlrodc Co., No, (8) probable branch o( Okamolo Air(10) (Ikamnio Aireraft Works.
1,')%;
(91 1I10<7,
:
Inn.lin,:
cear,
cities
cinatelv imagined
;m'/,
;
(111
(hiik>.i
Ma-
look like today can liy
b(
a look at this |)hot
SOME area of
llif
.>l
laiililin<:s.
ii'siill
.111
.i\crage
Miiic>sfiil
ap|>roxiniatfl\
could be expected from
that
ill.
PLANTS
BIG
HK precision UK strike done
A
strike.
very
undoubtedly Certainly
would
liave
vMiuld
have done damage
l)etter.
the
to
it
re-
inlnrccd concrete buildings that were seriously affected by incendiaries.
II. .1
M.AM'ver. the incendiary strike got not
Wr
..nU
of this
percentage of
l.iiiic
plant,
but a very
many
of the other
some of them
-iiii.iunding plants, iL.
in
.1
in
i,il.-.l
en-
key war production, as indithe annotation list below.
No.
Note that
the
14.
Nipi)oii
In-
Co.. built almost entirely of re-
-iil.ilor
only a lOff
inl.irced concrete, suffered
Very few Japanese factories are
I.I--.
wholly of such resistant construction.
Damage
major plants
to
.i|.|iosite past'
and the
annotation
in the
lit-d
shown
is
in
on the pre-attack photo on the
lil.irk
are identi-
|)lants
below. .After
list
photo at right, with targets outlined, emphasizes the tremendous destruction effected
the small-shoi) areas.
in
W..rk>. rfporlrd pmil.iriiii! uirriad ].arl-. W/c Al.i.m Knrlnrv of N.Boya Ar.riial. lh.> m«in ..f J>pan°> ih'.rd mn.l 'impnrlaiil army ai-rnal. rialiir in firW arlHIrry .....1 al.o JirnFi.-li.->.ii lo .l.ir,-. AA cm- an.l Dr.ibl.' airrralt i:..n-. iOVr 113) .i..i.l.-iilil..'
:
(l:(
r.rlott
:
anil
.rrii
MIt. n
Airrrud
Ai.'hi
(I..I
Ci... .1-
..lh>-r
r.-p..rl.-.l
an.i
(IKI. OOVc:
Vl.iik..
pall-.
..tdn.in<-.-
(18)
:
23%
pail-.
Al-..la
KK
Nihon
;
(17)
-ub
a
Slalinn. 09(
:
I
VVI.irli-
(16) n.mor.-J rar-. lanl...
KflVr
pr..(l.irini:
prnj.irini: la
pla.il
braiirli
£....
i.lanl
..(
(141
K..k1la
and
laihe*..
Liifim
Wnrk-. nnw prod.irinK B^ar
XV<:
(20) llaid.. tlrrlriral Slrrl Planl. 10%: COA) planl. 0%: (21) Higurlii Mar)iinery t.... 309r : (-31 O-aka Marhiniry -loiajr. «<7,
p.i.rr
(:2) ..ni.lrnlihrd »..tk.. irporlrd oi.)n.n.-.
part..
-)iaper-
:
pr...l..ri..c
n.«rhi„.-
Innl-.
:,irrf..(l
.in,l
'>(P
mixed
residential-industrial
kohama
after earthquake
and
district fire
of
in
192.'^.
{'j£:
jijr ]
J^
100 1
h
11
rik 34
%
r 96
85
S2
n bI
WHAT BURNED l.aif;!-
aii'ii.-
in
Ja|);iri >
anahsls said we'd
IN
cilio arc
One
ONE AREA OF TOKYO liciiij;
wiped
may
out. iml arc
we
^clliiij;
wlial llie
found |p\ examining; a lypical liurncd-out indiislrial section ihal contained a large numlier of small and mediumsized plants, such as that shown on the left. The map covers an area of Tokyo east of the Suniida river. Kxccjitiii'' numerous liny household industries, everything of industrial significance deslro)ed by inf;el?
of the answers
l>e
shown
in red. Ked dots represent small plants not identified in the appear the only structures not leveled, most of which proliahly sutTered internal fire damage. The major plant in the area, the Hitachi F.ngineering (^o. I.'WA. li. Cl. was not damaged due to its heavy construction, excellent fire protection. Also, it may not have received a heavy concentration of hits. However, other good-sized plants engaged in war production were destroyed such as Oriental \Waving Mills 78 & 82 converted to machining, ordnance com[)onents and glycerine products; Japan (]ast Steel Co. (861. machine tools and ordnance components, and Japan Vt'ea|)ons Co. (17). making A A |)arls. After |)lioto of area at left appears on next page.
cendiaries list
lielow.
is
In hlack
(
I
,
;.:
Yamannkii
Aliin (4) l«k«n.. (,l«.. ttork.: (.i) Kimiiru Co.. light \llin.il.ii (111 MIk. C".. wnnd and mclal «orklni!: (7) Kan.'k.. In.ii \X.>rk.: (8) Kameidn Snap Work.; (9) lakarnal-ii Liclll M.Mai Cn. : (10) Tnyoda EIrrlrir Co.: (H) Oia.a Cabling ttoik>: (12) Juneii Metal Wnrk«: (131 Ha.hinioto (;ia» Co.: (14) Morita Iron Vlo[k»: (LSI Ma)a>hi KIrrtroUtir Co.: (16) Fiijlmiira Co.. ma. rhinint: (17) Japan Wrapon. Co.. AA componi-nl. (IB) lokiioka Iron Work.: (19) Ni>Kan Chrmiral Co.: (20) Mliliara St.-el W ork> (21) Aziima Iron Workr.: abrasives: Tokin Kukii.hima Co.. (22) Mfi:. (23) Mfg. Co.. italvanizfd «1<'<'I plat.-: (21) .Sn^iikl Iron Uork>: (25) Kbara DruR Co.: (26) Kiinie Mrtal Work., alloy a/r roinpon.-nl.: (27) Daido St.-i-l Co.: (28) Azuma Mrtal Work.: (29) Higa.hi Iron Workn: Aziima Marliint- Shop: (31) Koliaya.hi Copper (30) Work.: (32) power tran.lotmer .tatinn : (.13) Aziima Work.: (31) Oriental Steel Workx: (35) Coi.ior Milado Kiibber I'rodurt. Co.: (3b) Tai.ai Cheniiral Co.: (37) YaiiaBi.hima Dr.iE Co.; (38) »arehou.e.; (39a. b. r) Hitaehi Knuin.erini- Co.: (40) Kikrn Steel l>rodurt» Co.; (41) Miianiolo Plalins Co.: (42) KawnMiala MfB. Co.. preei-ion iiiaehinery: (43) Yanai;i»awa (elhiloid Co.: (44) Tokyo Cork Co.: (43) Kynkoku Iron Work.: (4(>| Tokyo Chain Work.: (47) Kameido -ration and freight vard. (48) Sakai Mfg. Co.. rnllery: (>9) Steel Plate i'rodnel. Co.. (.50) Kawakura Con. lainer Co.. lank, and tilling, for .hip.: (SI) Urhi. (31
:
lA
:
Mela) Work.; (.53) (.54) Nakayama Mfg. Co.. .tamped metal produrt,: (.55) Ni..hin Textile Co.. converted lo pro.lurlion of a/e part.: (.56) Tokyo Tank Mfg. Co.; (.-.7) Ki.ing Sun Oil Co.; (58) Nakamura Mfg. Co..
vama Spring Co.; Tabe Ca.ling Co.;
(.S2)
Orhiai
(59)
Amiya Engineering
Worka: (61) Tokyo Du. Co. (62) Hamada Printing Ma. ty Co.. reported making |.i
(I]
and Ku
(63) Kameido Pi|.e Co.: (64) Hamada Iron Work.: (65) Mu«u»hi Machinery Co.: (66) Kobaya.hi
ponenl.:
.Mfg. Co.: .crew, and gear.; (67) Kanamono Engineer, ing Co.: Haltori Co.. Ol.iiki Branch, range(68) finder, and AA fire control apjiatalo.: (69) Japan
Chemical
indo.try Co.: (70) Yo.hida Container Co.: Sa.aki Ca.ling Work.: (72) Imai Foundry: (73) Mfg. Co.. honing and f.oli.hing marhinr.: (74) Spring Co.: (75) Snjuki Clycerine Co.: (76) Nakajima Mfg. Co.. .wilchboard and electric motor part.: (77) Yo.hizaKa Chemical Machinery Co.; (78 and 82) Oriental Weaving Co.: (79) Homma Iron Work.: (80) Mori Iron work.: (81) Ouchi Metal Eabriraling Co.; (83) Nakajima Mfg. Co.. .mall electric motor.: (84) Hazama Metal Work.: (85) Sanio Iron Work.; (86) Japan Ca.t Steel Co.. machine loola and -econdgrade bearing.; (87) Miyahata Machinery Co.: (88) A.ahi Oil Refinery: (89) T.nl.iii Mfg. Co.. machine tool, and machinery component.; (90) Tokyo Steel Product. Co.: (91) Kawade llldg. Material Co.: Sanua Mfg. Co.. machining; (93) I.hii Iron (92) Work.: (94) Nip|.on Container Co.: (95) Japan Roll Mfg. Co.: (96) Aoki Kolling Mill Machinerv Co.: (97) Sugiyama Spring Co.; (98) 1 aka.ag<. iron Work.: (94) Ma.aki Iron Work.; (100) Kakuda Konndry (1011 h.umi Alloy Pipe Co.: (102) Dailo Machinery Co.: (103) Tokyo Electric Co. .hop.; (104) Noharo .Metal Working Co.: (105) Ogura Oil Kehnery: (106) Yoko. vama Mfg. Co.. Jolo Work., ordnance component.: Sailo Iron Work.: (109) (107) Tale Iron Work... ,.„.., (108) „. Eng C... Inago.hi Foundry: (110) Hayak • (111) Fuji I (71)
Yuri Jolo
:
-
12
Kliirk reelailf;!*' .il
left.
Kelalion
in
aliove photo locales section of I'.ksM
i>
sjioun to total
Tok\o
-Ii,.\mi
destriiclioii. enilo.-cil
I.\
li\
il.ini.i-r in.ip
uhilc lines.
('.(iitfiili-nlidl
35
This photograph of fire 36
damage
in
Tokyo shows
exactly the
same area
as that
shown on the map on previous pa
THE OVER-ALL RESULTS ARE EXAMINED \n idea of
from
In-
total fa
estimates of per-
space destroyed
cilie- uii lo
JiiK
1
IndultrijI bidqi destroyed or
badly
dehoused
Nagoya Kobe
46% 53% 69% 32% 58%
Osaka
40%,
Tokyo Kawasaki Yokoliama
•
be
-h.iiild
in the six
:
Population
ll
liri'
gleaned
liomeless and percenlajiie of
left
major
may
Japan
follo\\in<;
llic
sons
cHect of
llic i)\cr-all
on
Ipimihirif;
lo
18%
Wr'c
(including
is
and machine
noted that industrial
than, sometimes
higlu-r
percentage of space dewhile fire stro\ed. The reason is that, structural might not destroy the main raise cor^iponents of a factory, it does the
The little with the innards. .swilchcs. gadgets, the wiring, bearings, motors are and small rul.Hcants hot burned out and. if the fire is |)recision machinery is ruined.
hell
enough.
The Germans found
that unlubricated
immediately procorrode tected from moisture, would Moreand become almost a lolal loss. machinery,
unless
reorganize proover, it of duction lines. ac(piire a new stock <-omponents anil raw materials. takes time to
has In Japan, the heaviest impact been on components and supporting endindustries supplying the military product plants. For exam|)le. it is estimated the machine tool production loss equals six to eight months of production
at
critical
l\pes
importaixiof
desperately to
level.
pre-atlaek
since
damaged need
new
This all
is
of
other
industries
now
machine
tools
replace lliose destroyed.
i)recision
:
:
26%
ished metal products.
indicates that percentage
invarial.ly
estimated: aircraft.
damage by
:
50% 36% 28%
four to six of production loss, in the l.omhing. weeks following incendiary double,
is
cities,
damage
ordnance. TCr shipbuilding. lOC^; electrical equipment. 2Kf fin-
atlacksl
and what we are now learning
Germany
major
or serious
!<>>>
factory space
The same
;
machinery
tools, 129f-
Since early June the Superforts have eoncenlraled on some :i5 smaller war
burned
in
to
the six
In
field.
following
29%,
Also, loss of factory space is producfar'^from a true index of actual the Battle of tion loss. Experience in
iinnoimions on holh
the
ii.
Yokohama and
I'.ritain
electrical
Likewise serious wire and cable
considered of priority significance, is an important supplier not only to industrv hut to communications systems the
28%,
the eases of
damage
lieen
greater
in
heavih-hit
production which, while not ordinarily
damaged
Naf;o>a.
-
has
not danui-e and residential damage are is alwaxs in the same proportions as slio\sn
the
of
true
j~
(•(piipment industry.
part
cases the
has
town
the
of
many
In
production centers.
been
For example. Hamamatsu W'r Gif"is HKf gone. Kagoshima. Kofu. f) l^r Takamalsu. 78';r 7 19f Such bombing has Shi/.uoka. 6f)9f. earned some results of immediate straout.
:
:
:
:
Take the aircraft The Sumimoto and pro|)eller plants at Amagasaki Shizuoka have been almost completcK significance.
tegic
situation.
pr'^)peller
Add
destroyed.
this
to
35%
destruc-
Japan Musical Instrument and Co. propeller plant at Hamamatsu moderate damage by HF and incendifactory ary attack to Sumimoto's Osaka acute and the Japs have been handed an Sumimoto supplies most bottleneck.
tion of the
the Japof the four-bladed props for serious anese Navy Air Force and a now shortage for new Navy types is precision believed to exist. Previous to aircraft factories involved
damage
production for the Japanese Air Force, so that bombing of prop plants was not duplicated
mostly
Army the
efTort.
as
There are other industries such
important,
as
just
electronics,
toll is being taken. Jap stockpiles of various materials are being eaten into by widespread destruction of general storage.
where a
critical
In addition.
The
full
fire
story can't
for a long time.
One
As the Sui)erfort
fleets
thing
be written is
certain:
grow apace and
the the incendiary campaign continues, Japanese war economy is taking a terfatal. rible .scorching that may prove
tirr idenluiil. Coiififlrntiiil
37
LOSSES LOW, GETTING LOWER The H-29
offensive against Japan is proving less costly and lives lost than the strategic bombing of Germany. Consider the following: In the entire AAF heavy bomber operation over Europe, one crew member was lost for every 18 tons of bombs dropped. In the first seven months of XXI B.C.. (now 2(Jth AFl operations from the Marianas (through .'^1 May I. one crew member was lost for every .SO tons dropped. And thi> rale is rapidly being lowered. In the six weeks period ending 16 July, it was one crew member for every 173 tons. Average aircraft loss rate per mission of the 8th AF Oct.. 194.3-March. 1944. when the 8th was really getting under rtay, was 3.2%. In a comparative six-month period for XXI B.C.. Jan. -June. 194.5. the average B-29 loss rate was 2.2%. For the last four months, it was only 1.4%. In June it was only 0.8% and July jiromised an even better showing. In June. 1.000 more sorties were Hown than in May. but losses were exactly halved 88 B-29s in May. 44 in June. Counterair force strikes In Army and Navy fighters and fighter escorl have been big factors. These statistics prove that low and medium altitude bombing, over which some qualms were in aircraft
—
fell at
Of
in the
Tokyo |)osite
first,
all
certainly has not resulted in higher
XXI
Tokyo
B.(l plane losses (through June). area.
los.ses.
46.5% were
Coordination of searchlights and AA in The new black bellies lop-
recently has been good.
page) are our answer.
The foregoing speaks their "balls of fire"
ill
for
Japans
air defense.
\X
(illuminating devices and rockets),
itli
air-
borne searchlights and other "inexplicable illuminations" the Japs are vainly attempting to increase the effectiveness of their night opposition.
Whizzing
^
fireball
is
seen b\ B-29 creus o\er
Osaka
1
Jinie.
Fireballs have lieen sighted almost exclusively at night.
Fhosplioroiis flak bursts underneath B-29 over Kagamigahaza. This has jtroven no more effective (ban H.f". Ilak. .H
In
a sellinf( of rnlhedral-like
Blurk bottoms now standard lif-'hls.
majesty, this B-29 of HI 4th
for B-29s. foil
enemy
searcli-
High-gloss black paint gives mirror reflection, eiimi-
W
inn
'•'*
nates diffusion.
and source of
nhout to go doun near Kobe, 5 June.
AA light
gunner sees plane surface only when have same angular relationship to
he. it.
^»*«^
\«,..
Only
\("/>
on
plant's
l.nzitn
nowadays are skeletons
one near
like this
wakes
Infra-red camera shot
Anfieles.
of the excellent harbor, one of
F ormosa NOW A
EX-BASTION
its
pri-
functions was that of convoy
|)orl
mary
and reallocation center for both troops and materiel outbound from Ja|)an. Its harbor and rail facilities, warehouses and barracks had therefore been highly de\eloped. Iniporlanl manulac-
5th AF "MILKRUN"
Inring
installations
like
the
Nippon
Aluminum Compain. former producer
A
year ago, the island
ot
I'orino.sa
was a thriving industrial center and bastion providing the Ja])s with materials and facilities for waging their
war
in the Pacific.
Exce|)t for sporadic
AF
from China
efforts
by the 14th
bases.
Formosa presented an almosi AAF.
impossible target for the
Today, thanks
to
tion of Clark Field,
proper
position
the strategic locait
has assumed
along
with
its
Kabaul.
of
5lh
AF's
neulralizalioii
targets
to
gun emplacements, camoullaged supply areas and narrow air strijis in New Guinea and the NE\. the .5th found, on a large scale. Europeantype targets like the rail yard shown in ihe pictures on the right. Bombardiers like
of
tiny
,5lh
AF
I5-2f
outfits
with
bombing error averages of ^>()((
feet
other familiar i)y-|iassed
jungle ings in
lessness again em|)hasizes the effective-
the
Long accustomed
tactics.
Nip strongholds. Its major cities lie smashed and crippled, and the manner in which they were reduced to life-
Wewak and
40
ness
established
targets,
circular less
than
on their earlier
discovered easv
pick-
Formosa.
Takao. second largest and leading city of Formo.-a. provided some typical inviting targets. Because industrial
of 10 |)ercent of the total Jap alumi-
num
output, chemical plants and
yards were concentrated
shi|)-
the heart
in
of the city.
Strikes on
Takao were perfectly
ordinated between
While
heavies
all units
co-
of the 5th.
pattern-bombed
main and
industrial targets, the B-25s. A-20s fighters
tackled gun
positions or tar-
gets of opportunity.
were
reversed,
as
on
Sometimes .-it)
roles
May when
on Takaos As a result ol
B-2-ls laid '^50 tons of frags
heavy
AA
batteries.
combined Navy and AAF attacks. Takao can now be written off the books as a military asset to Japan.
Parafrafjs look pretty to
Above. Chickunan
nl. l(f-I5
I'lak
ellort
on
page
gunner of
a
.'^Hth
Homh Group
B-25, but not
mess they cause. just about to get it.
rail
yards on Formosa's northwest coast
is
miles aivay, appear close.
over Formosa
ail
to the tail
the Ja[i transportation officials responsible for clearing the
in the
lace of our
has heen rugged, as shown 4.S.
Over 1.600 known
de-
fended positions had heen ])lotled as of June. Consequently, every mission 1
Kormo.sa must he planned for minimum exposure to AA. .Strict adlierenre
In
lo
hriefed routes cuts losses, hut devi-
ations caused
with
hy frequent encounters
summer thunderstorms has
spelle
serious damage.
\fl the effects of .5th Al' attacks are already clear, hecause tiak no longer challenges single planes.
heing reserved only for big missions. Heceiit
pattern of missions against
I'ormosa has heen that of hitting any airfields that might still he operational.
The JAF
there
defensive sorties, hut
flies
occasional
now makes
little
Perhaps the greatest advantage gained from the .Slh AF's hlasting of Formosa was prevented Jap aircraft from that it staging through to strike at our fled or no attempt at interception.
ilurinji
Ihe
Okinawa
invasion.
Propaganda
leaflets
I
right center
l
llutlor
down
at
(Ihickunan. while a storage
background shoots skyward. On-the-deck tactics are typical of those used by the 5th AF to neutralize Formosa. Below, a later view of the strike.
tank in the
left
5th
AF continued >*'
^ ^
^ ^
-4 TX. iz.2 !^
r^ri^
V'
^__rm^
T^Sr*^^ "?<
'«# keisho sugar mill
in
alcohol until the 5th
AF
that
Jap liastions
facilities.
l-oiniosa liegan
produced
commercial
systematic oliliteratioii of
Ahove. a parafrag (center fore-
iirouiidi
ju.~l
mcisliot >luiaj;c shed.
several liomhs explode in the ))lant.
alcohol |iroduclion
in
Helov\. a
moment
By
90 percent
Julv.
Formosa uas estimated
to
later, ol
he destroyed.
Spe<-lacular crash at,B>oritsu oil lefiiKry. Formosa, was pliolojrraphed by a B-25 of the 5th AFV 345th Bomh Group on 26 Ma\ just as it released its string of ])arafrags. No. 192
was hit by flak from a camouflaged battery and trails smoke. gaping hole is visible on the pilot's side (top). Below, a split second later, the Mitchell hits in flames.
A
^fm&r//^'^'*'
*^
I
MtRINC kk.
^
.*TJ;-<-M w*f-^'t
Bi^ explosion marks 5lh AF
ilestructiot
FIFTH AF ALSO SOCKJ At a time when virtually the entire
Jap homeland
Navy
is
under heavy
AAF
attack, the strategically
and
located
is doing the lion"s share of denying the enemy access to the vital resources of his stolen Southern empire.
5th ,AF
Much of this job had already been shipping hitting accomplished by along the coasts of French Indo-China and SE China IMPACT. Vol. III. No. 6 1. Recent reports from search aircraft and subs show that Nip shipping I
moving up toward Japan has greatly diminished in volume. The attacks shown on these pages by the 5th \\ against Saigon afford good examples of another phase of this blockade.
Saigon was being used
to the fullest
extent by the Jap as the receiving and
supply center for his armies in Southern A.sia and Malaya. Simultaneously, bumper rice crops from Cambodia and Cochin China were brought to Saigon for shipment to the Iimer Empire. Its
Saigon naval yard Note near miss on SS
(
lop
I
was
target of two 5th
at top. left of
AF
renter picture.
B-24 attacks. 23 and 25 April.
l>ort
Results were excellent: 500
point
ft.
of waterfront destroyed (liotlonil. includiiii; small drxdock and marine RR. The FT!) in large drvdock was fired. SS damaged, two SDs destroyed. 16 barges sunk.
44
provided for
an
traffic
excellent
stopover
between Japan
and
Ships that had previously been damaged were easily repaired in
Singapore.
fuel .iloraiie area at Saigon. 4 May.
ihr Sorony
f
irroii-
at
the left lorates
the navy yard
shonn opposite.
NDO-CHINA SHIPPING ii
shown on The destruction of Saigon's
(xccllent drydocks
llii
fi.
Miily
targets
constituted
therefore
important step
\\w |iri-
in isolation of the
an
HYA.
Strikes on Saigon followed the usual
\V
and fighters masthead level, wliile the li-2 Is smacked at it from medium altitudes and then turned to land targets such as navy yards, docks, and oil storage areas. Striking at Saigon river shipping, for example. 2H April (he Air Apaches CvLSlli ()?i Homli Group and P-S8s of the 8th 5lh
B-25s
])attern.
I'omhed and strafed
at
I
Fighter 1().(M){)
.i.MM)
Group sank 16 ships totalling tons, damaged four more of tons. By the middle of May
.Saigon's
naval
facilities
had
made unserviceahlc prohahU rest
heen
for the
of the war.
\AF for the
claims first six
2.2H2,(HM)
tons
in the
.Southwest Pacific
months of of
194.5 include
shipping sunk or
June
.lainaged
IM.OOO in
>liipping lanes. (lie
tons
were sunk or
the hlockade of southern
Much
of this was due to
5th AF's outstanding performance.
|{.;i2 iiig
IVnniiiaUtrs,
get to
llu-
airiiciil-.
l'liili|.
pines,
l.iitaiHil
lh(MaU>.
sliowii lu-ic (liiniiglraiiiiii;; lli?;hl in
shak.d.iwii iiii>sions again>l tiie
plants.
>i2s
Formosa with
the
have heen carr\iiig
Towering
:52ft.
tail
Stii
AF.
lO-toii
.ii<-
no"
ll>-
First \'I.H liomi.er to
loads against
makes ihem easy
to
Formosan recognize.
45
'ip^
wm
M
J
B ornco BALIKPAPAN FINALLY OURS |)f)olo^raplis ihal really tell a story,
Tothetheoneaironcomlial the
add
Here, in a vertical of the Baiikpa|)aii invasion on July, the camera has caught near-perfect execution of two main air tasks in tri|)hibious assault against an left.
I
—
enemy-held coast smoke-screening landing boat.s and heach-hombing first
The Aussies took Balikpapan fuel
the
oncoming
neutralize the
foe's
line of defense.
ago IHth ''ii^-
hide
to to
AF
from this source heavy bomber
largest
in oil-rich
They
Borneo.
suffered the
losses ever incurred in the
Pacific: 19 Libs in four missions.
Balikpapan's
Ten months
.standing up.
heavies tackled the job of denying the Japs
oil facilities
By
the time
Southwest
we invaded.
were badly smashed and the Jap
much even for local needs. Last November the Nip air order of battle
wasn't getting
for Borneo was was nine! This retrenchment can largely be attributed to L'^th AF neutralization of Borneo airfields following capture of Palawan. P.L As a result. Jap reaction to the invasions of Tarakan, Labuan and Balikpapan never amounted to much more than occasional strafings by lone float plan<'s. a far cry from the Kamikaze holocaust at Okinawa.
220 planes. On
1
July
it
Consider what Borneo means to us. First, it provides a oil, rubber and other valuable raw materials. Secondly, it places our air and naval forces in the very heart of the NEL only 700 miles from Singapore or Soerabaja, within 800 of Batavia. According to General Maclarge .source of
Arthur, this will
now "enable our
communications from Timor H-IIoiir
^
aircraft to
to eastern
minus 13, Balikpapan on
lilankel Ja[> defenses as barges
1
smash enemy
Sumatra."
July: 5th
AF
Libs
advance through screen.
rods on beaches didn't faze Aussie invaders. From Jnnel Julv l.Hth softened u|> Balikpapan willi .()70 Ions.
Ste*-! l.'i
(.(iiifxlriilidl
1
47
3
i4
Two Thunderbolts
of
Command
bore in to near the Ipo Dam past of Manila. 17 May. Bursts from flight ahead mushroom
drop napalm
48
fire
5tli
Figliler
bombs on Japs dug
in
up
in the tangled jungle at lower left. The initial blast of a napalm belly tank spreads over an oval-shaped section aboul 70 by 150 ft., virtually dooms the enemy troops within.
(:
[Napalm BOMBS TURN
FIRE
Till- case lor (loiiiil 111
napalm
recenlK
Ugliter
Stli
1p\
(ire
TRICK AGAINST HOLED-UP NIPS
homliing was rlinclicd lieyond
all
Thuiulerholts. I.ightiiiiigs and Mustangs
(Command during mo|)ping-u[>
o|jerations
the entrenciied Japs in central
and norliiern Luzon. one on IMPACT'S rover and llio.-e on the next four pages, testifies to what liajjpens wiien ihidisands of gallons of napalm gel descend upon the ditches and caves in which a fanatical enemv has holed up. hirst used in the Marianas campaign a year ago. later in KTO (IMPACT. Vol. II. No. I2l. napalm has heen the subject of many hot arguments. The .Sth AF has at last demonaj;;iiMsl
The picture
trated
that
enough
at the left, like the
it
can.
if
em|)loyed hy a fighter force large area completely, cure even the
to saturate the target
most malignant case of Nip resistance.
The rough
Japs, following the fall of Manila, withdrew to the hills northeast in the I|)o
Dam
area, chief water reser-
There they took advantage n( the wooded knolls, hills and valleys, augmenting natural delcnse harriers with fortified caves and an interlocking s\>tem of fire trenches. They had weapons of all calibers up to 15()-mm artillery, with some AA guns depressed for ground fire. By mid-May the 43rd Infantry Division found its advance slowed almost literall) to a few yards a day. In one of its excellenth written reports, the 5tli AF gives the following account of what was done to break the deadlock. "'Five enemy strong points were selected as target areas, each one consisting of about .lOOO.OCK) stpiare yards. Obvi-
bombing is used in a tactical rather than physical sense, meaning that suflTirient bomli coverage was provided to negate enemy oppo>ition. To administer the blanket of fire treatment. 2(t() to 2.50 5tli AF fighters came in low. wave after wave, four to eight abreast, with air and ground controllers giving
and regulating traffic. At first, the closely found that smoke from preceding waves oliscured the target. The problem was overcome by directing the bomliing runs downwind, with each successive wave dro|)ping its bombs on the near side of the bursts from the wave which preceded it. The fighter bombers followed each other at 10- to 15-second intervals. A-20s then came in. showering the area with parafrags and winding u|) with a thorough strafing.
LUZON
Ma>. Ipo area: Our lro(jps closely followed strikes and overran all target areas with a bare minimum of friendly casualties.
Conservatively estimate at least 650 Nips killed by air action with other casualties caused by Nips running from fire and burning areas and being caught by combined frag bomb.s. artillery and mortar fire. All areas hit had previously held u|) our attack, causing friendly casualties to mount. At least five large gas dumps of uneslimated gallonage were destroyed along with food, supplies and
ammunition still serviceable and found abandoned by the enemy in his flight to safety. In addition, approximately 75 to 100 caves were sealed by bombs, some of which were known to have contained Nips and guns. Since our last strike, enemy resistance has been negligible as our forces continue moving forward. The 43rd Division has counted over 2.100 Ni|) dead in their area.
\oir for the Philippine capital.
ously, in a target of this size, the term saturation
IN
2.5
""In Mith Division area: Following closely behind our
napalm
strikes the troops captured, with negligible resistance, areas struck (targets which the troops had been attacking for five to seven days, meeting stiff resistance with little
advancing
The
I.
All target areas have ben consolidated to date.
division stated they
had counted 600
to
700 Nips dead
area killed by air action and artillery, with ammo. gas. food. sup|)lies in flames for one-half to two hours after in their
""
strikes."
who weren't killed were almost scared to death. Prisoners .said that, when planes began dro|)ping naj)alm. they became too frightened to do Ob.servers re|)orted that the Japs
—
anything but run for cover a futile gesture, because the intense heat soon forced them from whatever protection they sought.
They deserted
their
nervous chickens.
foxholes
Caves were no either sufTocated or were smoked
to
better,
run around like
because there they
out.
target information
spaced
fighters
"From
were so successful thai target areas had to be changed daily to keep ahead of our advancing infantry. The following Support Air Party summary of the first three days action, from 16 to 18 Ma\. inclusive, gives a graphic picture of their effectiveness: the
Cunfiilcutial
first,
the saturation strikes
Thus, the 43rd Division was able to go in literally "'standing up." In some places they found no resistance at all. just dead Japanese and guns twisted and broken by the intense they found survivors had been crushed, though a enough to man the remaining machine These pockets were small, scattered and heat.
In
others,
will to fight
whose morale and few were still game guns and mortars. soon reduced.
To Brigadier General Frederic H. Smith, Commanding, Fighter Command, came this message:
5th
you and your brave airmen for on Ipo which made possible the early capture of the vital Ipo Dam."' It was signed by General Vt alter Krueger. ("ommanding. 6tli Armv. '"My heartfelt thanks
their splendid
to
supjiort of our attack
49
..:
.;^
Line aljreast luiniallun IIuvmi 1i\ 5tli AF Lightnings during napalm strikes against Nip's Shimbu Line defenses near Ipo iJam. Luzon, from 16-18 May is illustrated above. Planes
50
came
in
low, 50-100
ft,,
wave
after
wave of four
to eight in
Succeeding waves dropped their fire bombs to land short of preceding bursts, so that the target was not
each
flight.
oliscured by smoke. flights.
Over
Inlervals of 10 to 15 seconds separated
2rH).(l(¥)
gallons
during the three davs hv 144
of
P-.'^8s.
napalm were dropped 18 P-47s and f4 P-51s.
Beginning at tl54.S each day of the strikes a P-61 weather recce plane covered the area every 15 minutes. Only slight mortar and AA fire was met; none of our planes were lost.
SI
smoke towered 3,000 ft., despite the fact that four inches of rain drenched the Ipo area just prior to the Pillars of strikes.
52
Some
5th
AF
pilots
even managed
to
plop their
bombs
into cave nioutli-.
flame all the way.
where
llie\
Many Jap wing
Killed inside,
spewing
tanks captured at Clark
Field were filled with napalm, then returned to their makers.
Confidential
InfantrMiien and ground control Ici; uith ictorv" Division got this view of 5th ull ii|is after
dropping
fire
>eariM;:
li\
napalm.
4Srd "Ringed
P-38s in sharp
bomhs on 16 May. Napalm has
Mrlropolilan road, scene of Ipo Dam ill Ma\. was repaired Iinl
the
AF
MK
.-.lilT
b\
and
Nip I'^rd
re.-i>tan
near the
Division engineers.
^hellfirc
is
still
evident.
hecome a favorite of our ground troops. They like to wattli it shower down on areas thev later must caijture. because they know it shatters Jap morale, makes their job far easier.
(Antral
V» allt'r
Knipfier
looks ii\er the \ital
I
po
l
right
Dam
i.
(^)th
with staff
Army Commander, officers.
Area was
taken three da\s ahead of sriieduic due lo air cooperation.
53
JAP LONG-RANGE BOMBERS ARE PAPER BALLOONS "We
choose bombs of the larg-
will
say five tons or more, and
est caliber,
bomb New York and Washington least twice a
day
.
.
.
at
Several million of
Japan's airborne troops will be able to land on the American mainland and
day will not be long off." These two dire threats were broadcast from Tokyo to the Philippines They last November and February. referred, first, to the development of a new stratosphere bomber; second to Jap balloons which could carry troops as well as bombs. that
The extent to which these threats have materialized only emphasizes how far the reality falls short of the boast.
Balloon-borne bombs, carried by air currents from Japan, have indeed been
On
dropped.
14 November 1944 the
balloon was picked up in Hawaii.
first
From
that date to 7 July a total of 165 paper balloons and three rubberized silk balloons have been recovered in
Canada. Mexico. Designed to start forest fires, they have caused no property damage, and no casualties except in May when five children and one adult on a fishing party in Oregon were killed when a bomb exploded while they were inspecting it. U. S.. Alaska, Hawaii, and at sea. the
Inefl"ective as
it
balloon
is
balloon
itself at
is.
however, the Jap
The
an ingenious device.
a true sphere,
maximum
100
feet in
altitude
is
circurrifer-
It is made of five layers of mulberry paper, each about as thick as
ence.
cigarette paper, but strong
when cemented
repellant
and water-
together.
It
hydrogen. Suspended like a chandelier below the envelope by 19 shroud lines, each 45 feet long, is a device for automatic control of is
with
filled
altitude. this
The bomb load
"chandelier" with
mechanism.
release
is
an
attached to
automatic
The balloon
is
further equipjted with automatic demolition
blocks which
destroy
165
it
in the air.
are supposed
On many
recovered
balloons
to
of the
the
self-
destroying device failed to function.
A more detailed description of new Japanese gadget is given on
this
the
next three pages.
Cloniplete
Jap balloon
laboratory
tests at a Cialifornia base.
was recovered
at
is
inflated for It
Alturas. Cal.. 10 Jan.
Confidential.
Hulloons are shot down, ph(.t..s.
MMH)
l.y ft.
Treed balloon.
as
shown
in
gun camera
near Attn. 11 April, at mOOO to (note P-38 at lower right). Mne were shot 11th
AF
Indians chop
down
a tree to get a Jap bal-
loon wtiich landed harmlesslv near Nixon. Nev.. 29 March.
Confidential
two hours. It is relatively easy to bring down either by AP ammo, which downs them slowly or by incendiaries, which ignite the envelope.
down
in
balloons
Another balloon Most easlerU
is
found near Bigelow. Kansas. 23 Feb.
point for balloon landing was in Michigan.
55
first launched in Japan, and take about an hour At the end of an hour, they blow out a fuse whicli sets the entire aneroid mechanism in operation, after tlir necessary altitude has been reached. \^ ithout this hour's delay, the aneroid barometers would function prematureh. releasing sandbags almost as soon as the balloon was
balloon
Here
What Makes Balloons Tick
Is
Shown below device which
borne it
mind
in
rises
to
is
a pliolo of the automatic altitude control
the balloon's "brain center."
is
that after the balloon
about HO.OOO
feet,
then
is
is
It
should be
released in Japan,
carried westward by
swift currents which prevail at high altitudes during winter.
to
is
burn.
launched.
end of the a self-destroying mechanism.
The large aluniiiuun ring is perforated with 72 holes. Between each two holes an object (sandbag or bomb ma\ be hung from a T-hook. Each hook is held in place by tun blowout plugs in.serted in the holes. When either or both of the i)lugs are blown out. the object is released.
is how it works. supplied from a two-volt, wet cell battery housed in a nest of plastic boxes at the top. Below it is a box con-
Only two plugs at a time can operate. When these anblown out. a delay fuse is ignited which operates a jark switch on the smaller ring above. The pur|)Ose of this is to
taining four aneroid barometers, so arranged that, when the balloon descends below a predetermined altitude, a circuit is completed. This blows out a plug, which in turn releases
close the circuit again, so the next pair of plugs will be
It
is
necessary, then, that the balloon hold these altitudes
for three or four days to
North America.
—
the time required to
This device
purpose, and. in addition, drops journey, and sets off \^
is its
designed just for that
bombs
at the
is
a ballast sandbag.
Thus
lightened, the balloon rises again
into the air current, continues
westward
drops another sandbag, and the process bag being dropped each time.
until is
it
sinks again,
repeated, a sand-
will be noted that
the aneroid box.
This
the trip
ithout going into technical details, this
Current
It
make
is
the
two long fuses are wrapjied around These are ignited on the ground when the
balloon's
nllitude
control
device,
with
I
ready last
to
work.
After 31 sandbags have been dropped, the
four pairs of plugs in the series are blown out, which
releases the payload of four incendiary intervals.
An
additional
HE bomb
bombs
at the
usual
or large incendiary
is
suspended from the center of the "chandelier." and is released by the same fuse arrangement. Einally. a demolition box is set off which destroys the ballast mechanism. Not shown below, this block normally rests beside the battery.
some
of
its
sanilhaifs
and homhs
hiinn
in
place.
HL'ht paths, spe«
A
:
-
-
m.:-
•nur
lid "center,
aneroias snow
how
air pressure forces
ilh
•
controls the balloon's mini-
Exploding fuse nhich
if
the master faib. Uncovered
in
covered
-e others are used
the electrical circuit
down
able errors in the location of launching areas. Greatest number of balloons <72» was found in March 1945. Findings tapered off sharply in May. In June only three were found, all of which had landed earlier. If the Japs continue this ineffective balloon warfare, it will probably start up in OcL
is
closed
when increased
the disk, bringing a wire loop in contact
a horizontal pin which pa.«ses through center of the loop.
Confidential
this
rigged
mo\ie with
still.
31
bombs and one the
center and
releases a sandbag is shomi Here the "chandelier" is fully
sandbags, ."iJ-lb.
L«
the
four
10-lb.
incendiary
HE bomb last
which hangs from object to be released.
57
Mine
(leloiialioii
Gakrci
experts are discharged by Cat
in Ja|i-iiifcsted area.
Reception party
is
off
Puerto
made up
of
Ulipino civilians and guerrillas who know location of Jap
mines
that
have been raising Cain with
\T
operations.
Mis-
sions such as this heli)ed keep Japs in a per])etual state of frustration, did
much
to
keep them thoroughly disorganized.
want them, and endeared themselves to everyfrom generals to dunked Hiers and escaped internees. Trained originally as a "Dumbo" outfit, the squadron cut its teeth at Biak and moved to the Philippines before the first wave was scarcely ashore at Leyte. From there on in. there was nothing humdrum about the work. The Cats (lew generals who wanted to size up their layouts from the air. They flew guerrilla units to Japanese sore points. They flew men and supplies to isolated outposts. .And. of course, they evacuated wounded and fished pilots out of the water. On these two pages. IMP.ACT shows some squadron operations that delighted Allied forces and befuddled the Japs. the Japs didn't
BIG BLUE The
"CATS" PROWL PACIFIC
Philippines
campaign
was
an
unorthodox
affair
which featured multiple landing forces, a highly ingenious guerrilla army, and an air cooperation force that did the damnedest things yet. No air unit was more resourceful or competent than the 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron which o|)erated under the 5th Emergency Rescue Group of the 5th Air Force. Pooping around in ponderous blue Catalinas
AAF
(things which frivolous
transportation
for dead
Guns and ammunition of
Moro and Sulu
lagoon, got
pilots regard as being suitable
dowagers
I.
they went everywhere
are flown on furtive sortie to band
guerrillas.
Cats unloaded 5.000
lbs. in
away before Japs could do anything about
it.
l>ody
Cats rescued American evadees wherever happened to be. This two-year-old was daughter of pathologist. Family was evacuated just before Jap arrival.
Blonde aboard. they
W
^vi..g
j)il<»l>, l'luli|i|iiiic \riny brigadier geiu'ral. and San Francisco i>anker recently escaped from internment. Lire rescued from inland lake in Japlield southern Luzon.
Two Navy
This
.series
of four photos shows rescue of two
A-2(t
crew members from the waters of Manila liay. While the rescue was fjoing on. Corregidor in background, upper left) was being given a pre-invasion bombardment by a Navy (
task
force
downed
which
lliers.
was throwing shells directly over the to fly through this stuff and land
The Cat had
heavily mined waters to effect the rescue. The downed had broken nose. jaw. and ciieekbones. [lilul jji 1h)\s cif raft
in
I
I
Filipino guerrilla, shot in head and in very had siia|)e. ilifted aboard and llown to base hos|)ital. Man was shot at Calapan out|)ost. Thanks to (4uick rescue, he recovered.
hut he was able to i)addie line
lupjjer
right
I
.
(
upper
left
I
the
Tiiereafter.
and
to
handle the
Cat crew
lili
took over,
patched him up and de him aboard (lower left him to home base (lower right I. In five months operations. 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron saved an aver lielped
I
.
livered
age of one to
man
a day.
This record jirompted the squadroi
adojit the slogan "Don't
advice
is
heeded
in
tiie
swim back.
best
circles
Call a Cat."
of distressed
The
pilot
mJBP^'^^'i^-^^
Mose
vieic reveals
\B-42
as
our sleekest bomber,
icith
no
turrets or engine nacelles to interrupt streamlining
BOMBER
EXPERIMENTAL XB-42
is
First in 400-iyiile-per-Hour Class
Although there pictured here,
bardment
is
its
is no present requirement for the plane approach to the basic problems of bom-
so unusual that
it
is felt that
IMPACT
readers
will be interested in hearing
about it. The traditional American bomber, the B-17 or B-24. is a large, relatively slow plane capable of carrying a moderate tonnage a long distance. It is less efficient as a freight car than its British counterpart, but it is more heavily armed and armored. This means a loss of range or load, also of speed because added turrets, etc.. do not improve streamlining. The B-29. the B-32 and yet-unborn monsters like the B-36 are basically like the B-17. They are faster, better armored, but are still "flying fortresses."' depending on their inherent durability to keep them going. Increased armor or range means more weight and more gas. which means bigger engines, which means bigger wings, which again means more weight, etc.
The
result of all
larger and larger as
its
this is
efficiency
that the plane gets
improves.
However, the bigger you are. the better target you make. Perhaps we are on the wrong track in bomber design. There
no sign of
B-29 being well able to take cart But the develop ment of new- anti-bombardment weapons, such as the Ger man X-4 and Viper (IMPACT. Vol. III. No. 7). could con ceivably prove us wrong. is
this yet. the
of itself against present countermeasures.
Hence the B-42. which depends primarily on speed safety.
It is
small (35.702-lb. gross weight),
is
for
beautifulK
its two engines lower the efficiency of this wing. It has no gun turrets, thus saving weight, which is used instead for gas or bombs (it will carry up to four tons internally I. The theory behind this is simply that high speeds multiph gunnery problems. Closing speeds between two hisliperformance aircraft make nose attacks impractical. De
streamlined, has a laminar-flow wing, with in the rear so as not to
flection shots do not pay off. This leaves level and pursuit curve attacks from the rear. To combat these are remote
controlled flexible guns in the wings, aiming
aft.
Further-
more, one pass is about all the conventional fighter can make. By the time he is back in position, the B-42 is many miles away. Intercepters are given very little time to reach the B-42's altitude. In addition, its speed and maneuverabilility permit violent evasive action. A ground-attack version has fixed nose guns in various combinations ranging all the way from eight .50 caliber' guns to one 75-mm cannon and two .50s.
Side view shows counter-rotating pusher props, flexible wing guns.
Maximum
speed
is
410 mph
at
27,100
feet.
4rtPB^
V
£1
I
'
Pariiniushiru Sirail shininirrs in ihe
nth
1100 p.m.
.^I^S'
j^^^yr
iF
Arctic siinsci as 11 ih
li-'J.'is
AF KEEPS KNOCKING AT JAP'S BACK
strike
(it
DOOR
Mp shippins.
IN
11 May.
KURILES
shooting up of (page 55K the 11th Air Force has been busily knocking away on Japan's well-guarded back door up in the barren, fog-bound Kuriles. Hot spot of these islands is that portion of Shimushu (foreground) and Paraaddition
I\Nip
lo f;etliiig
some
""suck fxpeiii'iice." as pilul> call
tlic
papi-r balloons
to protect themselves from the potential Kamchatka, the Japs have concentrated more air facilities and ground defenses than anywhere else in the whole northern chain. Tiie only good anchorages servicing their bases are located along Paramushiru Strait. i5-2ls and Mitchells, as well as Navy Venturas and Harpoons of Task Force 9(). have found good hunting in this area the past three months desjiile severe flak and aggressive interception which, in May alone, accounted for two 21s and five 25s. Samples of the shipping encountered are shown on the next two pages. To hit such targets, the 11th has had to buck what is probably the
nuishiru showti above.
There. perha])s
threat of their Russian neighbors on
In the first 23 days of July, missions could only be scheduled on -seven. Almost 70 j)ercent of the time strikes were canceled because of fog at our Aleutian bases of Attu and Shemya. Last year the Japs carried on extensive
world's worst weather.
Cost nn
1
1
Ma\ ua-
.Another Liniicd
Confiilrri/idl
in
llii-
ll.irniri
l^i-^ia. a- di
i'.-2:.
fishing acti\ities as the
much
as 125 miles ofTshore
llth's e\cr-increasing efforts,
from
the Kuriles. This year,
due
fo
ihev have been forced lo stick close to home.
61
Already hit twice, a 2,2UU-ton AK (Fox Tare Charlie j is about to get Shimushu on 11 May. Other vessels are a trawler (top left) and a
off
Jap sailor swings ail
11th
AF
a light
machine gun
B-25 strafing his
fl^hi^l;
into action against
boal
^^ Paramushiru.
Bridge
it
again
coaster.
Same AK,
a
furiously with
of a Fox Tare
Dog
few seconds afterward, bi '' its stem blown clean off.
blazes after 11
Kuriles. Trawler at lower left smokes
from
May
strafing
m-
strike in
damage.
^VSxW ;d
trawler scurrying
away
at the
lower
was thoroughly strafed by the B-25s.
iow many Japs
can you find here?
5aiiuirai postures, at least
i
\
dcfitiders of
lower right) from same formation sweeps over Kashiwabara army base on Paramushiru after bombing a freighter. Two Nip ships were sunk, four damaged.
B-2i>
I
Not in their best Paramushiru can
be seen seeking dubious cover in the snow at Kashiwabara
on 11 May. Note the ostrich-like pose of Nip
lfe»\
at right, center.
Wilh motor and rockets going, the JB-2 takes off easily from
50-ft.
ramp, drops sled after 400
ft.
as
soon as
rock^t^
AMERICAN BUZZ BOMB NOW GETS To
get a buzz boml) airborne,
III
must attain a speed of 235-240 mph. The Germans achieved this by constructing a ramp in the shape of a long heavy tube. This was like an engine cylinder, in that it had a piston inside. A slot in the (op of the tube allowed this piston to be connected to a dolly, on which the buzz bomii rested, the dolly sliding on rails on the top of the tube. Now. all that was necessary was to find an explosive which would push the piston up the tube at such a rate that the buzz bomb resting on the lo|) would reach flying speed by the time it got to the end of the ramp. The rise of pressure had to be slow and persistent in order to get the bomb moving gradually. If it were not, it would either get
it
damage moving
factory
Rocket launcher about 90
mph by
B-17 modified
weiL'li-
the lime
to carry
I
.'Kio it
||,~
ha- bii//
bomb going
readies end of 5U-ft. ramp.
the
bomb
fast
it
I
or else would be so weak as not to
enough.
The Germans found
hydrogen
a satis-
and potassium permanganate iKMNO^) Since we felt that this was not as good as some others, we
one JB-2 under each wing. Gross weight
is
propellent
60,425
lbs.
in
peroxide
(H.,0,)
About half of ten bombs so far
releasti
T
.^
M' hiirnint:.
I
bomb
/
into steep climb, as above, but
il
recovers rapidly.
RAMP
steam and have found it to be satisfactory substitute for use with the German-type ilotted ramp. But this requires a steam generator and much leavy equipment. So a still better method (the multipleThis involves ;artridge method has been developed. alacing seven small explosive charges along the tube. They ire detonated in series as the bomb goes up the ramp, buildng up pressure steadily and rapidly in back of the piston. However, the tube is 162 feet long. It takes time to set up. and altogether weighs 50-60 tons. Accordingly, a rocketpropelled dolly which was used originally on a 500-ft. ramp (IMPACT. Vol. III. No. ll has been tried out on smaller nd lighter ramps. The most recent, a 50-ft. ramp, is carried jn a large trailer, and can be set up anywhere almost immediately. Trailer and all. it weighs under 10 tons. Over 85 percent of JB-2 launchings from this ramp have been successful. It is now being experimented with on an LST. been
jS^/
pivard thrust of rockets sometimes sends
IR FROM 50- FOOT LAUNCHING a\L-
^^-
(.'xperinieiiling with
I
e developed
motor
failure
due
to
W
ing rack for JB-2 reduces s])eed of B-17 ahout id mpii. is accomplished with standard D-7 bomb shackle.
Release
mixture problems encountered during launching
at airspeeds
of
200 mph.
mjp 1^
\
/
/ SPOOKS SOMETIMES SHOW UP ON RADAR SCOPES The presence of a ghostly image of one of our bombers floating through the radar screen of another bomber, has often astonished servers both in the
European and
radar ob-
Pacific theaters
when seen for the first time. This is not It is more properly described
a true radar
as a radar one plane is flying at a lower level than another, and roughly within a thousand feet of it. some of the impulses from the higher plane's radar will fail to get back from the ground because they will be blocked by the low plane. This has the effect of creating a "no-echo" area exactly the shape
echo.
shadow.
When
of the low |)lane on the high plane's scope.
The
shows such a phenomenon. The shadow cast is by a B-29 over Formosa. At top right a B-24 does the same thing in the ETO. The reason no true echo from these aircraft is seen is scope photo
at top left
because they are so close planes that the true echo is spot of the radar scope. craft
are
shown
in
to their respective
high
lost in the bright center
True returns of three
the photo at bottom
left.
air-
At
another phenomenon: an interference pattern from the nose and wings of the transmitting aircraft, producing dark and light bands.
bottom right
is
l3« OFFICE OF THE DISTRIBUTION:
SQUADRONS
Vol.
NT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, WASHINGTON,
D.
C.
2
Ill
No. 9
SEPT.. OCT., 1945
IMPACT 1945
Sept.-Oct.,
SWAN SONG This is the final issue of IMPACT. It is devoted entirely to the part played by the Army Air Forces in the war against Japan. No attempt has been made to give a full account of the achievements of the Navy, Marines and Ground Forces. It
who
believed appropriate, in this swan song, to identify those
is
have produced the magazine. IMPACT was brought to life in April, 1943, by Mr. (then major, later lieutenant colonel) Edward K. Thompson of LIFE magazine. He was succeeded in June, 1944, by a group of three editors: Lt. Col. Robert E. Girvin, formerly of the San Francisco CHRONICLE; Major Maitland A. Edey and Capt. Tom Prideaux, both formerly of LIFE. At war's end the editorial staff also included Capt. Peter B. Greenough, formerly of the Cleveland PLAIN DEALER; Capt. Gordon G. Macnab, formerly of the Associated Press and Capt. Hugh Fosburgh, formerly of LIFE. Layouts have been by Sgt. David Stech, formerly of the Popular Science Publishing Co., and maps and art by Sgt. Jerry Coniinsky, former New York free lance artist, and Sgt. Frank Chilton, formerly of the New York WORLD
TELEGRAM. been
else has
of the
Throughout
&
Capt. Carl E. Hill has served as executive the able hands of Miss
in
Montgomery, its
life,
Sons, Baltimore,
Mary
All
officer.
Morgan, formerly
C.
Ala., high school.
IMPACT
has been printed by Schneidereith
Md.
CONTENTS Part
1— INTRODUCTION— An war, pp.
Part
2—THE
analysis of
LONG TREK—The
—
6-31.
ASIA FLANK— Story of the Tenth Air Force Fourteenth in China, pp. 32-41.
in
of attrition against Jap shipping and the B-29 mining blockade of the Homeland, pp. 42-51.
5—THE
B-29erS— The life and achievements of Force in the Marianas, pp. 52-83.
Part 6
— PAYOFF — How war economy —ATOM BOMB —The B-29
in five
Part 7
Some Part 8
India and the
BLOCKADE — The war
Part 4
Part
the Japanese lost the
story of the Fifth, Thirteenth, Seventh
and Eleventh Air Forces, pp. Part 3
why
1-5.
the
Air
20lh
the Twentieth Air Force wrecked the Jap months, pp. 84-93.
two
jolts
at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
speculation on the future, pp. 94-101.
—FINALE —What
the Japanese themselves have to say about the
effectiveness of the B-29, pp. 102-Back Cover.
PICTURE CREDITS:
Thi
issue of •
IMPACT
con ains
iciu res
from
par
IMPACT'S
Magazine
thank, (or the :ollo» ng: 99. bol om ion 101 hot om bottom; 111. top 112. 113 and bac k c all »ke n by George Silk; and 65. taken by W Euge ne Smith. n I ddilio n. »o AAF photogra hers were assigned spe cifir ally 5 obtain pic ure for this iSM e of 104.
bor
om;
-
110.
t
t
IMPACT
They
Loom s D ho took the (ol 5? except lop 1 d; 67, 68 bouoro; 70 71, 73, 77. 81 and cent er; 83; and Capl. David F. Steven s, who took the tnlio are Capl.
lefl; 56. 57. 59, 66.
lop; 101
top; 102, 104. lop; 105. 106
107, 108. 109, 110
to]
;
111
,54
82 98
bottom
top 99. left.
(Correction: The detonations along shore during the Balikpapan invasion as pictured on pages 46-47, IMPACT. Volume 3, No. 8, were mistakenly attributed in the ca|.tion to aerial bombardment. The explosions, immediately inshore of the first wave of amphibious tractors, were caused by rockets fired by LCI gun boats and rocket ships of Amphibious Group Eight, U. S. Pacific Fleet. On the same pages. Balikpapan beach defenses were mistakenly identified as steel rods, actually ihey were leg barricades which were destroyed by amphibious underwater demi lition teams making it possible for the Australians to be delivered on the beachhead with dry feet.)
Printed for
use with approval of the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President.
official
V
r-
-^^^Jto
r
L ..^
H^HB^ Li*^, *
1
r
»
—^
•
m
"•
^^
^
/
/^
THE BEGINNING Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941
w
J^fli^
Part
1
NTRODUCTION 3iortal Japs Faited as '^Sons of Heaven 99
II /ff/ ih4> 7
(tri
n the II
^o
December, 1941, some crude carnage of Oahu. They said
leaflets fluttered
—"Goddam
down
Americans
Period.
to hell."
abysmal cfl^ort at psychological warfare proved )ne thing. It proved that the Japs knew as little about us 1.S we knew about them. A dispassionate observer on Hickam leld might well have waved his hand at the departing Japs md answered their leaflets on behalf of the American people Til is first
"You dumb bastards." Japs bad made a stu|)endous under such as only a misinformed, benighted, naive people :ould make. .Although we were appalled and frightened by Vt
e sensed, even then, that the
what bad happened, we knew that some time, somehow, the Japs would be sorry. Not "so sorry." Just plain sorry.
about A.-iia
how much
average American didn't have the slightest idea
Tiie
we were going
to
beat the Japs.
He knew
it.
that
He had
never thought
Japan was an island
inhabited by a preposterous musical
He knew
off the coast of
comedy
species of
you had to cross the by some islands named Vt'aikiki. Guam, the Philippines. Tahiti and inhabited by hulas, missionaries, and whales. That was about all. He had never heard of logistics. He bad never heard of a task force. He had never heard of radar. amj)tracks. very long range ombers, LSTs, or General Keiuiey. He figured he didn't need to know about them, because he knew that they'd come along as and when necessity demanded. They always had. Tliey would again. Anybody who didn't think we could beat the Japs was just plain dumb. lumanity.
I'aiific
The
—a
that to get there
huge expanse dotted
—
Ja[)s didn't think so.
of invincibility.
In fact, they reveled in a spirit
P^nhanced by centuries of victorious
tra-
by myths and fairy tales, and bolstered by years of one-track education. Japanese confidence of victory was even greater than our own.
dition, cultured
The Japs had something which we a srheme.
It
of Heaven.
was a grandiose scheme
We
Co-i)rosperity
didn't have.
They had
that befitted true
Sons
know of it as "The Greater East Asia Sphere." The name was illusory because it came
to
entailed a great deal more than .Asia and had nothing whatever to do with co-prosperity. It had been in the back of the Japanese mind just about as long as the Japanese had been trying to become a modern nation ever since Commodore Perry reawoke them to the
—
fact that there
was a world going on.
For two hundred years prior to that time, the Japanese had been living a proud, feudal, insulated existence and had liked it or at least the ruling Japanese liked it, which is all that has ever mattered in Japan. Commodore Perry did not convince them that they were backward and ridiculous. On the contrary, he merely convinced them that if they were going to maintain their separate existence, they would have to incorporate modern methods and expand the
—
area of insulation.
That, in brief,
Co-prosperity Sphere
—a
down
crew in
of the California
iJK-
already capsized and
its
abandon
the ship as
it
settles
Harbor. The Oklahoma has bottom can be seen in background.
waters of Pearl
the Greater East Asia
and ideals would be immune from the provoking influences of the Occident, large enough to provide all the necessities and luxuries of life, and long enough and wide enough and powerful enough to be impenetrable.
The
Ja[)ancse scheme failed.
can be argued that the Japs never had a Chinaman's chance anyway that they were a bush league club playing in the big time, and were just lucky to knock a couple of It
—
balls over the fence in the
first
inning.
But we can be more
specific than that.
The Japs
failed,
first
of
all,
becau.se
Germany
failed.
assumption of victory on a German victory and planned her grand strategy on that assumption. History will show that Stalingrad was a catastrophe for Japan no less than for Germany.
Japan
jiredicated the
—
The Japs failed, secondly, because they could not keep pace with Allied production. They started the war with numerical superiority in practically every field of army and navy equipment and vastly increased that superiority in the opening months of the war by attrition against the Allies. Thereafter, the scales turned quickly against them.
\^'hen
bombers to bear on the Home Islands, so that production and attrition would work hand in hand, the Jafis didn't have a chance. They were faced with Allied superiority in planes, ships, and all the im|)ediContinued nn next pagr the U. S. finally brought strategic
Tile
is
great realm where Japanese ideas
INTRODUCTION continued meiita of
war which rapidly snowballed
to
stupefying pro-
portions.
The Japanese failed, thirdly, because they did not possess "know how" to compete qualitatively. Jap equipment rapidly became inferior to ours. At the end of the war they did not have one single operational weapon which was superior to ours or which we could not have produced. In the critical new weapon developments of this war. Japan a scientific
was practically at a standstill while the Allies were racing ahead. Japanese radar was crude by our standards. She had nothing that even approximated a B-17 or a B-24 let alone a B-29. And she was constantly perplexed, bewildered, and confounded by a galaxy of Allied weapons air-to-ground rockets, napalm, computing sights, proximity fuses, aerial mines, bazookas, flame throwers, the atom bomb. It was these things, and the Japanese inability to produce them, which
—
—
the
Nip post mortem
The Japanese
artists are
blaming for
failed because their high
their defeat.
command
failed.
Japanese strategy was based on the assumption that the United States could he surprised and beaten before we could arm ourselves and fight back effectively. They made the
own propaganda
—
was internal dissension in the United States, that Americans were peace loving and decadent, and that it would take them years to switch from luxury production to war output. "Goddam Americans all go to hell." Enough said. mistake of believing their
that there
their war straight out of the rule books. The rule books were never revised until the Japs learned, through ugly experience, that they were obsolete, and when the Allies got out editions of their own, or fought off the cuff, the Japs were dumbfounded and incapable of effective countermeasures. A case in point was the Jap belief that "unsinkable aircraft carriers" would afford impregnable barriers to our advance across the Pacific. When it was proven that superior carrier air power could knock out island bases, and land-based planes could keep them neutralized, the Japs had no alternative defense.
Japanese
strategists
and
tacticians
fought
Japanese strategists apparently could not foresee a situation in which they did not have the initiative. Their conception of war was built around the word "attack." When they were put on the defensive, it took them a long time to learn that there were better stratagems than an heroic Banzai charge and, when the trend was against them, they sometimes lost their capacity for straight thinking and blundered themselves into a mess. Witness the Marianas incident, when the cream of the naval air force was caught outside its radius of action, or the Yamato engagement, when the pride of the Jap fleet, in a futile move toward Okinawa, was sunk by carrier planes. Or the first weeks on Guadalcanal, when the Japs couldn't utilize an overwhelming air superiority efficiently enough to wipe out Henderson field.
The Japanese the
of
air
power.
Like the Germans
—
failed, last of all. because their men am were inferior not in courage but in the intelligen use of courage. Japanese education. Japanese ancestor wor ship, and the Japanese caste system told off time after timi in uninspired leadership and transfixed initiative. In a |ire dieted situation that could be handled in an orthodox man ner, Japanese soldiers were always competent and sometime resourceful. Under the shadow of frustration, however, thi obsession of personal honor extinguished the spark o ingenuity; and a deteriorating situation would provoke ai
The Japanese
—
—
officers
increasingly irrational resistance.
The Japanese
attempt to break up the Leyte landing days, the Japs tried conventional shot
down by
the
Failing in
age.
conjure
is
used as support for naval forces and ground armies.
Be-
cause they themselves had no formula for the use of strategic air power, they overlooked the possibilitv that
it
would
be used against them and so were unprepared to counter fighters that
it.
around a force of short range bombers were flimsily built, arniorless. fire traps.
built
air force':
a case in point.
bombing
tactics
Foi
and wen
hundreds without doing appreciable dam the only improvisation they couk
this,
up was suicide
attack.
Contrast
this
desperati
failure with Allied success in the Battle of the Bismarcl
when less than 150 miscellaneous Fifth Air Force plane: coordinated tactics and techniques to skip-bomb, machitu sea,
gun, and precision drop an entire convoy
bottom with
to the
range of a numerically superior Jap air force.
in
All of these failures add up to one thing.
The
executioi
was not equal to the grandiose demand: of their strategy. They found out that the exquisite ambition: of the Sons of Heaven could not overcome the limitations o
of Japanese plans
the
common, mortal
Jap.
But sometimes we were lucky. We must admit that. Wt were lucky, those first few months, to be fighting an enem; who was mentally incapable of exploiting his advantage \^e were lucky the Japs didn't throw everything at Oal at Port Moresby when General Mac Arthur played them for suckers with a superb bluff on bust hand. After that, the deal shifted, and all the luck ii the cards couldn't help the Japs to escape the show-down
And we were lucky
;
By
One
the time the
American offensive got
started at
of Lt. Col. Doolitlle's B-25s lakes off
they
thought of air power in terms of an attack weapon to be
and
places and doing things that the Japs hadn't anticipated sooi enough. The Japs learned about big time air war but the; just as guinea pigs learn abou learned it the rough way shock treatment from scientists.
strategists did not understand, until too late,
potentialities
The JAF was
The bombers were incapable of sustaining an offensive tha really packed a wallop. The fighters were increasingly in effective against Allied bombers that were forever flyinj
JL-»
.
UA V*
.
-»-
.
Guadal
from the
on 7 August, 1942. ihe Japs had gone a long way
lal
I
reaching their goal of strategic isolation.
i.iicl
t
i^es so
far distant that only an occasional submarine
-rratch feebly at the jugular vein,
mile's monumental
and only
Lt. Col.
gesture of defiance could cause a
tremor of the heart
itiuritary
I
.Allies
[Mished hack to India, to .Australia, to Hawaii, to Alaska
\r
I
The
it.self.
formidable, she was vulnerable.
Japan had delicate and a bad heart. The value of her captured land ri--'- and the armed forces that defended them was in VI proportion to the ability of her shipping to keep them -|i|iiii(l. to keep the forces mobile, and to bring back to .pan the raw materials that make it possible to wage iclri war. Destrov the shipping, and Japan for all pracIdl [iiirposes would be four islands without an empire 111 Inlands on which were a few dozen made-to-burn cities whirii were jam packed the people and the industry that tj.iliir made up the Japanese war machine. Destroy the .iliniif.' and burn the cities, and the whole empire complex
(
111.-
,
form of more and better planes, ships, and equipment, and more men, the prospects of developing the whole field into a bonanza looked excellent. We could go ahead.
The technique of triphibious warfare was evolved and became so standardized in its pattern that it was almost a Submarines were usually the advance agents, snoopand raising hell with enemy supply. Long range reconnaissance bombers might be the next on the scene or it might be a carrier task force that would come quickly, concentrate a Sunday [luncli on the enemy air force and shipping, and retire before the Jajjs could bring tactical superiority to bear. There would follow a few weeks, or perhaps months, when land based planes would take over ritual.
Mtliimgh the Japanese empire was vast and her armed f
with confidence and the promise of increased ca[)ital in the
•
I
ing, harassing, diverting,
the job of interdicting the base, neutralizing the air facilities,
II
I
i
—
and knocking out
gun positions and strong points. In due would arrive, escorted by a suitable task force which would do as much as artillery preparation and aerial bombardment could do to smooth the way; and then the ground forces would establish a beachhead and push inland: and then the combat engineers, or the Scabees, the
time, the landing force
or the construction battalions, or the air engineers, or per-
11
;
haps Tin -e were the basic conceptions of .'\merican strategy
of attrition against Jajianese shipping that
i\iai ij I'l
would be
on an ocean-wide front coincidentally with a gouging positions to straight towards the Home Islands land based bombers could sever the arteries and
—
III' ien-
>und away at the heart.
The future course of the .Allied offensive was determined Guadalcanal. It seemed a long way to Tokyo. It was. seemed like a pretty small beginning. It was. It seemed ce a lot of men and time and effort going into the acquisi)n of a jungle
mud
hole.
was worth it. The Japanese reaction to our landing was oof enough of its strategic value. But the Guadalcanal It
)eration
|)aid
off
in
higher terms than real estate.
We
rospected a theory on Guadalcanal and brought in a gusher.
theory was that an .Allied force, working with an air-
tie
Id
and some planes (a muddy jungle slash and obsolete would do could beat off the Japs and eventually them back to decisive defeat. We did just that. .Armed
'hters ish
e
Hornel
I
to hoitih
Japanese
cities
on IH April 1942.
them, would
of
all
take over,
with
bulldozers and
carbines; and then an airfield would be ready and planes
would
start
to
come
in,
artillery
sj)otters
first,
then
the
and night fighters, and then the bombers; and then the place would be declared secure, and the Japs would write off one asset and we would start to process another. For a long time it was muddy going in low gear but in 1944 the .Allied offensive started to roll. By that time we had fighters
definite superiority,
quantitative and qualitative, in ships,
and technique. General Mac.Arthur hedge-hopped up the islands towards the Philippines. Kwajalein and then Eniwetok fell in short snappy campaigns. .And Navy task forces, no longer tied down to direct support operations, flexed their muscles and paraded forth to cuff the enemy in his vaunted strongholds and to slap his face with the established fact that from henceforth the U. S. would make a hobby of the Pearl Harbor game. planes,
equijiment.
June
15,
19M
was the day
that the
American offensive
reached level ground and switched to high gear. That was the day that (^hina-based B-29s cast their shadows on Yawata and that was the day that forces stormed ashore on Saipan. It was the day that the Japanese high command had to admit, to themselves at least, that their beautiful dream of insulation had turned into an horrendous nightmare.
Having taken the Marianas, we were
finally in a position,
with the B-29. to wage a strategic war of attrition against the Japanese empire.
z.
From
would go hand
here on
in,
the increase of .Allied
hand with the deterioration of the Japanese capacity to fight back. We were ready to launch a vicious spiral of destruction from which there could not possibly be any escape. If the Japanese backed up farther, we would advance more quicklv. If they chose to stand and fight, we would destrov them and have so much less to cope with later on. It was as simple as that. It was as simple as that because the Allies had amassed a power that was titanic. The Japanese could not stand up to it and there was no place they could go to get away from it. They had no immovable sircngtli
object the)
to
had
in
place against the irresistible force. just
one
final
choice
Eventually
—give up or be destroyed.
\
'*-*?
.^,^:
-V (.'*?*»".
4
Part
2
THE LONG TREK if'i'oss
thv
i^M0'ifii' it
Was Hop.
The road to Tokyo started where it had to: started from where we picked ourselves up after being kicked out of the Philippines, out of the East Indies, out of all the places thin reach of Japan.
On
the first
day of war we lost two-thirds of our aircraft Hawaii was erased as a source of immediate
reinforcements for the Phili|)pines.
.And in the Philippines
where enemy attacks continued, our planes were whittled down rapidly. The kicking out phase was under way. with the 19th Bombardment Group taking its 14 B-17s to Australia and then to Java for a brief but futile stand. The 24th Pursuit Group continued to give such aid as it could to the troops as they gradually gave ground in the Philippines, but extinction
its
was
in sight
The Japanese sweephad brought Port Darwin
Fearful anxiety gripped .Australia. ing in through the East Indies,
under air attack. \X'hile battering launched another prong of their offensive with air attacks on northern New Guinea, the .Admiralty islands. New Ireland, New Britain and the Solomons. .Australia was being sealed off from the noith. Late January landings at Kavieng. Rabaul and Bougainville made it clear that Australia's supply line from the United States was threatened. The same landings w-ould protect the enemy's left flank and serve as springboards for in\asion of cities
the Fifth .Air Force, they
the island continent.
So
l<>n^, Sally.
virtually
no
had arrived in .Australia from Java and few bombers. It was a
fighters
negligible factor until replacements could arrive.
.Australia
was similarly weak. Outpost garrisons in its island possessions to the north were over-run and it had only 4,'5 operational combat planes. The gravity of the situation was apparent and reconnaissance planes' reports of massed enemy shipping at Rabaul increased the tension. Just to the north of Australia, in southern New Guinea, was Port Moresby. Its loss to the enemy would eliminate Townsville and other northeastern .Australian cities as plane bases, would shove our planes back from within reaching distance of Rabaul. \^ hen in early March a Jap convoy sent troops ashore at Lae and Salamaua in northern New Guinea, the noo.se was beginning to settle. Planes from two U. S. carriers op[)oscd the Lae-Salamaua landing, sinking 15 vessels after spanning the mountains from the gulf of Papua, but the landing went on.
before the end of 1941.
The air efFort to hold the iVetherlands East Indies radiated from a main air base at Malang. Java. Japan's 10-to-l numerical air superiority and the swift onrush of its invading troops soon forced abandonment of all hope. In late February 1942 evacuation was ordered and by early March the [danes of the Fifth Air Force, around whicii Southwest Pacific air strength was to be built, were in Australia.
and other western
Tlie Fifth Air Force
with
itself
It was a lonj: trek, made over a bridge whose spans were pushed forward one hv one and anchored to bases won by the combined strength of land, sea and air. This is the story of how we got to our starting point, and how the Army Air Forces hel|)ed to build and use the bridge.
in the Pacific.
Ship and •tump
Bursting |)arabonibs beat an accom()ani-
ment to this refrain from Guadalcanal Tokyo. This Sallv was shattered bv 5th
to
Borneo. Tarawa to
AF
on Boeroe, N.E.I.
Coral Sea and
The
Midway
enemy, annoyed but not seriously worried by the Doolittle Tokyo raid of 18 .April, then pushed a convoy into the Coral sea, aiming it at Port .Moresby. Two carriers, seven cruisers. 17 destroyers, 16 victory-flushed
warships, 21 transports and two submarines were spotted by a reconnaissance plane on 4 May. U. S. unidentified
concentrated in Australian waters, challenged it. Land-based planes struck at enemy airfields at Lae and Rabaul to neutralize them, while carrier planes attacked the convoy. It was an air engagement. Neither fleet's surface fleet units,
within gun range of the other. By 9 May the was over, the convoy routed by the carriers. The Japs had suffered their first major defeat of the war and Port Moresby had a new lease on life. units
got
battle
Then came the events which slowed the tempo of Jap expansion and stabilized the outer perimeter of the enemy's conquests in the Pacific. On ?i June, Jap warships were sighted west of Midway. B-17s of the Seventh .Air Force reached out to them for initial attacks while our carriers under forced draft got within fighter range. As in the Battle of the Coral Sea there was no contact between surface forces, and also as in the earlier engagement, the Japs Continued on next page
LURIi InfcR continued suffered a crushing defeat.
Four
carriers,
two cruisers, three
destroyers and a transport were sunk, others were
damaged
and 275 of the enemy's planes hit the water. We lost a carrier, a destroyer, 150 carrier planes, two B-17s and two B-26s. Our Navy's carrier arm had established its superiority over the Jap's; had depleted the enemy's carrier forces so sharply that never again could Japan strike as swiftly, in as great strength, over as vast an area as she had before. While the Midway force was steaming toward
disaster,
another group of vessels was playing hide and seek in the Aleutian fog. It lost a lone plane over our then secret base at Umnak on 3 June and launched its attack on Dutch
Harbor the next day. It was met by fighters from Cold Bay and Umnak, and our bombers sought the carrier force. A few contacts were reported, and a carrier was damaged, but the weather was so bad that vessels could be held in sight for only a few minutes at a time.
The Japanese
with-
drew under cover of the fog and a week later reconnaissance showed them in possession of Kiska and Attu. The Early Days
in
New
Guinea
The Midway reverse slowed the enemy, broke the previously unrelieved gloom in which the Allies moved, but did not eliminate the tension in Australia or the threat to Port
tremendous difficulty. As they strafed and bombed Japs along the trail and hit at supply dumps, they rarely saw their targets, concealed in the jungles. Vague reference points in a confusing welter of trees and valleys and ridges were all they had. But they struck at them and at airfields and at coastal shipping. They flew as long as the planes would hold together, then tied them up with stray bits of wire and flew some more. TTiey improvised: old P-400s (modified P-39s) were turned into dive bombers with a 500-pound bomb slung underneath, .^nd then as the .Australians stopped giving ground and halted the Japs just 30 miles from Port Moresby, the Fifth Air Force played its biggest role in the campaign, sparking the start of MacArthur's since-famed hop, skip and jump warfare.
With Gona-Buna in enemy hands. Port Moresby would never be secure, Rabaul could not be neutralized and an advance out of the Southwest Pacific could not get
started.
The Papuan campaign was initiated with the ground pusii back across the Kokoda trail and an airborne leap of 15.000 men across the mountains to near Buna. The Troop Carrier
Command
ferried
engineers with equipment
moved
to
hack out
equipment. The lack of aircraft was as acute for transport as it was for combat, and bombers were pressed into service and loaded airstrips, then
in the troops
and
their
Moresby was under unremitting air attack; was bombers which moved to it from Townsville. refueled, hit Rabaul, and scampered back to Australia. But Moresby was an essential in the MacArthur promise to
with artillery. The ground forces were dependent on air supply for food, ammunition and equipment. The air supply route was maintained with its terminus almost in sight
General George C. Kenney. who took command of the Fifth Air Force, gave assurance that with the few planes he had, plus expected reinforcements, he could get and hold air superiority. And so. despite con-
Buna was overrun on 2 January 1943, and the threat Port Moresby was ended. The first span was in place.
Moresby.
too hot for heavy
return to the Philippines.
tinuing air attacks and the ever-present possibility of assault
from the sea, Moresby was developed through the spring and summer of 1942, with seven landing strips taking shape. It was the base we had to have to trade blows with the enemy; the base from which we could reach Rabaul.
Moresby could be held only if Kenney's planes could meet the Jap air attacks and beat them down, exacting a heavy toll while husbanding their own numbers. They had to do it with far too few planes which had to fly too many hours in every week. They had to do it with planes which could not match the Zero in maneuverability, in speed of climb or speed in level flight. But they had some tools the Japs lacked. They had the B-17, a weapon which could outreach anything the enemy had, striking from bases relatively immune to attack. They had fighter planes which were built for defense as well as offense and would not become flaming torches at the flick of the enemy's trigger. They had men, too, with ingenuity in maintenance, flying and tactics. These were the things which kept the Fifth Air Force in Moresby through the spring and summer of 1942.
Then in late July the Japs landed at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the northeast coast of New Guinea, just over the Owen Stanley mountains from Moresby. They started to push up the Kokoda trail while Australians fought a delaying action in retreat. Kokoda fell, the Japs pressed on through the mountain pass and then Port Moresby began
—
Troops staged there moved out to meet the enemy in the mountain jungles. The Fifth's planes got their first taste of co-operation with ground troops under conditions of to
pay
off.
of the Japs.
Casualties were evacuated on the return flights.
Meanwhile
to
summer
of 1942 the Solomons camimmediate objective also was the security of Australia. The Jap invasion of the Solomons had pressed the sharp cutting edge of the expansion knife close to the Australian supply artery. The entire push back to the Philippines depended on building Australia into a tremendous storehouse of men and materiel, and it was endangered to a critical degree when Guadalcanal was occupied by the Japanese. Guadalcanal had to be retaken. in the late
paign was started.
Its
Solomons Campaign
AAF
planes, later to be formed into the Thirteenth Air
Force, launched attacks from Espiritu Santo on Jap posi-
on Guadalcanal and Tulagi while Fifth Air Force at Rabaul. Navy and marine fliers ranged up and down the Solomons, striking at ship})ing and at airfields, preparing for the day of invasion. On 7 August 1942 the marines went ashore on Guadalcanal. For three critical months they battled the Japs on little better than even terms. Allied strength was barely adequate and the enemy kept pouring reinforcements down from Rabaul. But incessant naval and aerial patrol and attacks on shipping, gradually cut into the Japs' ability to bolster their failing troops and turned the tide of battle. By late October we had aerial superiority and by mid-November, heavy bombers were flying from Guadalcanal's Henderson field. The battle was won and mopping up completed in February. 1943. Guadalcanal was the first step toward Rabaul and it was followed by invasion of the New Georgia islands in the Central Solomons at the end of June and by invasion of Bougainville tions
planes struck
\ iM'niluT ii
i
taken easily.
[Mil
III
put
Haltaul
Ground
fighting
Fiut
was
easy
within liarl)or
Its
and
Bougainville
hitter
and
costly.
iicmy struck with his full air |)owcr again and again.
I
,i~
il
steps
Thirleentli Air Force.
tl)e
could be kept under daily attack.
Ills
lilt
Ilu-se
I'H.-).
range of
1
New
ill
Guinea,
tlie
U.
S. (Hers
were
his masters.
They
met overwhelming numhers and hy oul-ll\ing and outinkiii'i the enemy, iiad racked up ratios of 10. 20 and even
III
|m
I
destroyed.
I
By
late
191.S
pyramiding enemy
with mounting U. S. |)roduction
liil
iii|
-hill lion of the
made
it
losses
clear that
Jap Air Force was only a matter of
tiine.
Guadalcanal and Port Moresby were being made riiir and the first advances made beyond them in the Southi~l I'acific. other events had been giving notice of growing liril strength. In the Aleutians. Kiska was by-passed and a niliiiL' made on Attn in May. 1943. This former American mil had been bomiied occasionally from Adak and nil lillka. but persistent low-hanging clouds made it less rotiiable for attack than Kiska. The Attn landing, then, was surprise maneuver, going past the island most heavily III kid and most heavily defended. Attu fell on 2 June and nil lean forces stood between Kiska and its supply base in le Northern Kuriles. On 15 August, ("anadian and American oo|)s stormed ashore on Kiska and learned that the byassing technique was effective. There were no Jajis on the land. They had ()ullcd out in late July under cover of a eather front so thick that one of the evacuating destroyers iw Little Kiska island dead ahead, thought it was an merican warship, and opened fire. Not only had American )il been freed of the invader by the Aleutian campaign; e had moved into position for the Eleventh Air Force to egin its strikes against the Kurile islands. These attacks, hich increased steadily as radio navigation aids and radar issened the need for good weather, forced the Japs to conder the possibility of an attack from the north, forced them ) tie up more men and planes and ships than they could fford when their southern flank was crumbling. \\ liilc
I.
Oscar makes
its
death turn under two Eleventh
over Paramushiru fighter
is
seen
in
AF
Mitchells
northern Kuriles. Landing gear of Jap
lowering after .50 calibers ripped plane.
I
Ontral Pacific, too. things were beginning to jell, had been hit occasionally by the Seventh Air orce in flights staging from Midway, but since the Seventh sending most of its planes into the Solomons action nder the Thirteenth Air Force, it had little offensive power, n April. 191.'?. however, phosphate-rich Nauru and Tarawa These islands continued to be 1 the Gilberts were blasted. ccasional targets aiul in September Army and Navy [)lanes oined to give Tarawa a thorough pasting. The explosive In the
['ake island
orce
with
acifir in
lampaigns \| A
which liie United 1911 \\as bci;iniiiii'_'
for
New Guinea and
States
rocketed
across
the
to jzather.
the Marshalls
Guinea's rc-conijuest. to spring from Australia by
and Gona. required two things above all: to the Japs, and protection of Vllii'd troops from aerial attack. The Fifth Air Force acThe first obligation •epti'd major responsibility for both. vas spectacularly fulfilled in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. ^a\
of
lini.il
I'luna
(if
reinforcements
Kenney's ubiquitous bombers had been roaming the coastand ranging out to sea with increasing frequency as he Fifth began to gather strength. On the first of March. ines
Coiilinucd on piigc 17
Takeoff taxi
out.
in
snow, landing
in fog.
Aleutian Liberators above
wait out squall, take off before next.
fogged. B-21 below finds tiny
isle
at
night,
All bases
lands safely.
Airfield on Kaliaul is uruler paialiomli allack. tijilil lu neuliuli/c on when Allied air power was trickling to the Pacific and JAF was
*
•
Kaliaiil uciil in full flood.
i^auT"
Hollandia strip was reverses in
New
a place where the Japanese Air Force met one of its major Guinea. B-25s are here processing the strip into a graveyard.
Fifth
4F B-24s aided hy heavy
rail]
BASES: THEIR DEATI Japanese air bases never took any ribbons for superior quality. They were (and the ones still in existence are) rumdum affairs which had blue
all the faults
and none of the beauties An American
of primitive handicraft.
heavy bomber trying to come down on one of them might very possibly have gone through the surface before it ran out of runway. Nevertheless, the air bases were adequate for Japanese purposes and whether or not we eventually planned their facilities, planes, to use them and runways were priority targets. To neutralize them so that they could be
—
—
taken (
)n Los Negro:
again anyway. Condition of
10
handily
fear of future field indicates
Japs weren't trying hard
to
keep
it
up.
first
or
by-passed
flank
attack
without
— was
the
and most important preliminary
"•^mf.
(Jlark field in pre-war
k
facilities.
Japs got
it
days was a pretty place with compact and conspicuous virtually undamaged, turned it into a major air base.
^#
^ il^.
tishi'd
IND
lift
this airfield
on Palawan.
The same
field under .American air attack in July 1945 is deluged with phosphorous parabombs. Facilities are wrecked and only scattered planes remain.
RESURRECTION
^
^Ans:^.
n every step on the road to Tokyo.
The job was done
well.
o Formosa, the Pacific
is
From Rabaul marked with
)verf»rown graveyards of the Japanese
Force. And scattered along with hem, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. he ocean is dotted with huge glittering )ases built on the antique ruins of \ir
-^i^S?
[apanese outposts.
The lad
a
struggle for the ocean air bases
symphonious theme
to
here were endless variations. itanic quest for gold,
leered,
claimed,
which Like a
they were pio-
exploited,
and
left
)ehind.
Scenes from the death and resurrecsome of the bases we wrecked, hen rebuilt, and some we left to die,
^mtrnmsd^
ion of
ire
on these and following pages.
chirk fuhl
i^
note that Japs
tiiiished for the Japs.
made no
Compare
additions or changes
this picture with
in their
one
at to|>
in.
three years of ownership.
^ m^WkZ ^ Maloelap in the Marshalls was
as
fi.
--e as the
Japs could build in 20-odd years of uniiisputea tenancy.
Strip
on iSoemfoor
is
The same
place
gets the by-pass treatment.
often enough to keep
invested by paratroopers the day after
it
r*^
^ « s-^T'-^M^^^^f^^
»^—
d
w
..u
.
5
unserviceable for
Base
is
enemy
bombec aircraft.
had been deluged with 230 tons of bombs.
^:^-.
it
MarHK* 'Tiutr^ii:
hni: A.-T,
fia7'?
uORhiiiii
;-::lu!:ii:iiH
on Sampan lad EaraiRtiiatief
liirrer-i. ;.
attack, imfaliis in
buameas
is Bo
^
make
.Itarines will rjrive atnrigfit for
-ire ^^
'v-i'iina'
Tif
JtTj
f-:rTR.
AsiitOv twa pictures belrrw. has been taken ami renamefl
Jap planes are nnnecteii in front of mined baritrars Tafrr field is ready for TBFs and P-47*. For Tirttir^ tF Isefv jerrpnl montiis later ~iTn fo pa^e IT. Isely.
and Cwo days
^
The Japs up.
hil
back
Air strikes
at Port
at rear bases
Moresby and
fuel storage goes provided occasional setbacks.
Weather and terrain delayed the progress of
Planes burn after a few Japs get through to bomb Funafuti. JAF was confined more and more to a defensive effort.
airfield conlruction
on Leyte far more than enemy
action, j
lenderson field on Giiadalnnuil aolohun on Leyte a.-f
in
iiifiusl
1944
is
huHl on the mud-hole that marines look luo years before.
in June 1945 was already a staging and storage depot hundreds of miles from front lines.
Eiiiwetok in April 1944 was base for operations against Carolines, later became a naval air replacement depot.
llie
%,
^
Kwajalein was a mess when air and naval bombardment had jirocessed it for invasion. Air power first neutralized Jap islands to the east which were then by-passed in a tactical
surprise
that
literally
caught
the
enemy
off
base.
Two
moiilhs later, the iciiicainalinn nf Kwajalnn looke and planes from here haunted the Japs all the uaj lo Truk and Saipan. When we moved on to the Mariana: Kwajalein became just another way stop on the long trek. M< like this
^
1
recotinaissaiicf
a
:.
1
M.
It
spotted a largo convoy
iM
.
,1
ii\.i\.
made repeated bomb
witli
New 12.000 men for
dawn
sendinj;
-. -
llic
i,ac.
day.
the next
A-20s
the
Fifth
immohilizp the
to
mustered airfield
all at
the masts.
,ere
fell.
I.aler
in
da\
ihe
a
liipht
of H-I7s attacked
a
^1
.ieaiiligliters lieii .lie
March
date
went
with in
strafing targets. liea\ies
I'JIH
llie
first,
As
it
entered
Huon
With
AA
fire
it
of
its
tasks, protecting troops
from
air attack,
The next jump
of MacArlhurs forces from Buna was lo Not only was it in the right direction for the move loward the Philippines, but its jiossession would be a powerful factor in the neutralization of Habaul. In aid of the Lac offensive, aviatioti engineers made a long overland trek lo K) miles southwest of the coming battlefield and cleared a As soon as transports could land. site for Marilinan field.
(M7s moved
in
an airborne engineer battalion with
altitude and
(.(iiilinuod
lite first
^•j;^--.^-
-^
all
on pa/if
its
2.i
Marianas-hased H-2*f takes of) to hoinh Jni>an.
2'-'
\
.S
and when
to rafts
Lae.
gulf,
aipan. two weeks before
mop-up was on
an end
too. It was met by belter flying in combat, by surprise attacks on airfields which destroyed the grounded planes, and bv construction of airfields in forward areas.
lessened and scattered.
medium
final
aerial
taking the screening destroyers as
picked their targets from
The
H-2.Ss put
commitment was met
unsuspecting Jap ('onvoy was
eternity.
as darkness
I.aiul-based
The second
ihc theater.
.eeping
The convoy was dead
next day attacks on the Lae airfield continued as
involved destruction of the Jap air force in sucli numbers ihal eventually replacement would be foolhardy. That
)
trim-
up and over
been met.
the Proving Ground (command at Egliii field, had estahlishcd the feasibility of masthead bombinglow-level broadside attack with the bomb plunking ipiarely into the side of the vessel. Synchronized high-level tla
Tests hy
la.,
on
just before they pulled
airpower had demonstrated that could stop an invader before port i-ould be reached. From that time on. the Japs were forced lo spirit their troops along the coast of New Guinea al night in camouflaged barges which hugged the shore and darted for cover at the approach of dawn. The commitment of the Fifth to prevent reinforcement of New Guinea had lifeboats.
ackpot day.
nil' ill
The
properh emphned.
the ships
as
bombs
All the while. P-.SHs were overhead engaging the
March when Reaufighters and
and H-17s with P-'W escort to the attack. The convo\ and liondied from medium altitude. Kour ships
-link.
The H-25s and A-20s then sprang and
planes .searched for survivors.
its
Lae.
maneuvered under a cover of squalls. 'Iial inght the weather changed and by morning the conov was entering Huon gulf under clear skies. That was the ^aiti
their
convoy's fighter cover.
as ^i^iiti'd
•
runs.
big surprise, raking the decks as they approached,
dropping
When uord
of this juicy plum was hark to hase. a lli^dit of HI7s was dispatched. The however, was hidden in a front and contact was not At
^
more than
carried supplies and
iiement of
.
H-2-^
iMiscr escort sleaniiiig west off the northern coast of
.
-
^^
Risinf!
smoke on
i'.orrefiidor
shows thai
il
is
heine;
processed for ini^asion by Fifth Air Force bombers.
THE RETURN TO THE ROCK Corregidor If the
is
to
Manila bay what a fuse
fuse doesn't work, the
bomb
is
is
to
a bomb.
a dud.
The Japs hoped to turn Manila bay into a dud for the Americans by keeping Corregidor. At best they thought they could keep it indefinitely. At worst, they were confident of inflicting fearsome casualties on the American force that would come to take it. Three years before, after violent artillery shelling had pulverized its antiquated fortifications, the Japs had assaulted the rock and had been handed 8,000 casualties by Gen. Wainwright's troops in the first 15 hours. Now, in their hands, it was a death trap the kind of hell-hole where fanatical Japs love to
—
make
a suicide stand
—a
massive tunneled rock with hundreds of caves and hiding places that would give them a wall for their backs and a shelter for their heads the kind
—
where they couldn't be blasted out, where the enemy would have to come and get them across the water and up the cliffs. It was a fine gruesome prospect, only the Americans didn't want any of it. Instead of coming across the water of
18
place
Marked
o
and working up, they started at the top and went down, and the Japs found that their guns pointed in every direction except up, and that their tunnels and caves faced the wrong way, and that shelters over their heads protected them from bombs, yes, but they also hid the Americans, which was very bad. In fact everything was very bad and couldn't have been much worse as far as the Japs were concerned. They put up effective resistance for only two weeks and all 6,000-plus of them were killed, except the 24 who were captured. Two hundred and ten American soldiers lost their lives. This fantastic operation was the end product of 30 months' development in the art of triphibious warfare. All the tools and specialists of air. ground and naval forces were pooled together to turn out a perfect job.
The Corregidor return drama developed along the classic With enemy air and naval strength thoroughly knocked out by Navy carrier forces and the Fifth Air Force, and with MacArthur racing toward Manila, Cor-
Allied pattern.
was virtually isolated by 23 Januday Fifth Air Force bombers began neutralizing the neighboring mutually supporting fortresses of it and Carabao, Caballo and Fort Drum. On 13 February, three days before D-Day, the Navy pitched in with shelling by Continued on page 20 regidor, as a battlefield,
ary,
the
SOUTH DOCK
the lui> paralroop drop areas
and the
landing; bench.
U fiive the rock a good turning over on invasion mornng and round up 25 days of heavy air strikes on this target.
under wav.
ili()li>i:rai)h art-
:B-2
.\-20s
Mountains of Balaan loom
go after targets later
in
background.
of opportunity while invasion
is
worked "on call" from ground troops.
19
page 18 and destroyers. With the enemy jiaralyzed a dazed, minesweepers cleared the waters around Corregifl After a D-Day dawn homhing by heavies, followed by A-2(l.-. Cdiiliniii'd jruin
cruisers
V
Troo|) Carrier
Command
landed paratroojis on top of
tin
smoking rock. They found only scattered op|)osition. and sr up positions to cover amphibious forces arriving exactly lu. hours later. Shortly thereafter reinforcements could get in without serious opposition and from then on it was just ^ question of time. As the final curtain rang down, there wa>i an earth-quaking explosion at Monkey Point as a grouji nf Japs
blew
up
themselves
in
a
typical
gesture of defiai
frustration.
The
picture on the preceding |)ages indicates
decided to invade Corregidor from the
Parahoiiibs (Inipiicd \<\ \-2ii- M(ju ij|> ,i;mi positions, help kep|) Japs under cover just iiefore arrival of troop planes. supplies crash down on Godforsaken Topside. Of men jumping. 222 were listed as casualties.
Men and 2.065
^
only landing beach
obviously any troops
is
in
])ut
air.
why
it
was
Obviously,
the vicinity of South
the
Dock and
ashore there would have a bottle
necked, murderous fight to reach Topside. An air landiii" was perilous and problematical but it was the only alterna tive to slaughter.
£^- \
Continued on page
rii«-
plan Morks. l'aialio()|is an- in (Diilrol wave of landing ciafl has luilnaileil at
lirsl
nl
'l<>|i-i(li'.
Sonlli f)ock
and
all
come;;
i-\ic|pI
in.
oni-
hoal air
Smoke on
(in
the lieach
«a\ mil a> seioiul wave prohaldy from land mines
llic is
LUnU
llftlV
continued
Text continued jrom page 20
The
feasibility
of
paratroop
the
landing on Topside was predicated Tlie first was would catch the Japs flatbelow ground and waiting footed patiently for the amphibious assault. The second was that a pre-invasion air-naval bombardment, carried right up to the first paradrop. would drive any Topside Japs to cover long enough for the troops to hit the ground and consolidate their position. Both assumptions were correct. The
on
two assumptions.
that
it
—
•u
two lifts of the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team found so first
opposition that the third lift to avoid
little
went to the rock by boat drop casualties.
Holed-up Japs down American
are blasted out at point-blank range. Portable heavy weapons cu casualties by
making
it
unnecessary to charge places like
this
The amphibious landing at South Dock, covered by air bombardment and
units firing into Jap jiosi-
fleet
was carby units of the 3rd Battalion,
tions at point blank range, ried out
34th Infantry.
two forces on the one on Topside and one at South Dock, concentrated on joining up, while air and naval units operated Thereafter,
shore,
"on call"
to
Once
this
been
secured,
\
blow up strongpoints.
rendezvous had been accomplished and su])ply lines had regidor
settled
the
battle
down
to
for
Cor-
the
ugly
nauseating business of wiping out the
cornered Japs. Mortars, flame throwers and 75-mm guns kept them holed
and demolition crews sealed them underground. Even then, they were dangerous. Our worst casualties of up,
the
campaign came from
the suicide
explosions of entombed Japs.
Men side.
of the 503rd Parachute Hegimental Combat Team come down from Top First contact with South Dock force has been made and the crisis is over
Fort Drum i!fls a (lumlifi lioni a 1.000-pound bomb, dropped by a B-24 from 6,000 feet and then (right)
low-flying B-25s follow up.
integral part of the
Fort Drum, an
Manila harbor defense, was as
nearly blast resistant as any concrete fort can be.
Not and
bombs tore the guns apart was it siThen oil was pumped through the portholes
until
lenced.
set afire
while the Japs inside were
still
dazed.
::imurtl froin
pti^e.
17
plus anti-aircraft guns.
|iii|i[iient
Tliis field
was exiiaeided
ml -oon became the major base from which U'ewak was put
Four Jap airfields were in the W'ewak area imI all of them nested scores of planes. The big show^ at II \%,ik |)reliminary to the intensive phase of the Lae camopened on 17 August 194.1 At dawn the heavy iinijicrs unleashed frag clusters, demolition and incendiary iinilis. They were followed by B-2.Ss and P-38s which mill
,11
attack.
II
across the airfields disgorging parafrags. their
ani|iered
The |)erformance was repeated the Then came a day of rest, followed by two more the same attack pattern. The result was 228 enemy
laihine guns chattering. r\i
(lay.
.i\~
of
'l:ini~
LMiM~l
destroyed on the ground and 81 shot out of the air our loss of ID planes. W'ewak was out of business as
Miir base.
III
lew days later a landing east of Lae was effected,
\
fol-
lUMil by the first extensive use of paratroops in the Pacific. it was Nadzab. tliilfd preparation was made and the jump was a model rxrcllence. \^ hile Gen. MacArthur and Gen. Keiuiey nii-i about overhead. B-25s |)ut the Nips undercover with -hating and parafrag attack. They were followed by A-20s a\ iiil: a smoke screen, behind which 96 (M7s shucked out .Tnii \merican |)aratroopers. Nadzab was ours and a week ml a half later Lae fell. As infantrymen crossed the airiilil. lliey found it a junkyard of shattered planes, souvenirs IIIFifths visits. The entire Huon gulf area was cleared ml a few days later with capture of Finschafen. It reIm il the im|)ortance of Habaul and established a protected lank for future leaps Id the west along the New Guinea
n
a sizable force behind the Jap lines at Lae,
|iut
iriilfd
capture
to
Markham
the
valley
site
of
•
I
il
il
I
I
oa.'-l.
in
the late fall of
191.3.
this
was the
|)icture
throughout
he Pacific: in the north, the Japs had been driven out of he Aleutians, back to the Kuriles: in the (Central Pacific, the (ap-held
islands
were
taking
occasional
attacks:
in
the
Southwest Pacific, the key base of I^abaul, one holding the dual threats of slashing the sup|)ly route to Australia as well is
invading
Habaul rific
still
cost as
'larbor iiegan it
ship|)ed
was
it,
had
itself
threatened with isolation.
air strength but
it
was maintained
to fall into
at ter-
Allied hands,
which slapped such face as the Japs still bad Habaul were those which gave it the indignity of the
riie final i)lows it
i)y-|)assed.
Tarawa and Makin uere invaded on 211 November 191.3. The marines went ashore after seven days of intensive aerial softening. The Marshall islands to the north were immobilized by concurrent attacks. The invasion s[)elled the end of reinforcements in strength for Habaul, but more than thai,
it
set
the
first
Truk now became the important base, with Palau likewise looming larger in the Japanese scheme of reinforcement of forward areas. Hut those forward areas were soon to be lost. American task forces ranged through the eastern perimeter islands striking .Mili. Jaluit. Kwajalein. Wotje and Nauru, churning their runways into coral rubble, burning their supjilies. The same islands and others nearby were hit in daily sorties by H-2ls. By mid-December, fighters and bombers were taking off from newly won Makin to strike the Marshalls. Kwajalein was invaded in a brilliant maneuver which caught the Japs by surprise as we went through to the northern part of the Marshalls, skipping the more obvious southern invasion points. Throughout February, airfields in the
Marshalls were l)ombed into uselessness, and our planes ranged westward to immobilize the staging areas. Forty-two B-24s plastered Ponape in the Carolines on 14 lebruary, and two days later a naval task force gave the great naval and air center of
Truk a thorough .shellacking, and destroying 74 on the ground while losing only 17 of its own planes. It was an action limed to kee{) the Japs off balance while we invaded Eniwetok, where troops went ashore on 17 February. All of the Marshalls and Gilberts were under constant fighter and iiomber attack from that time, and as we gradually moved in and captured the key islands, air pressure by the enemy was kept at low level by destruction of planes and airfields both in those islands and in the Carolines to the west. Four major Ja|) islands were left to bake in the Pacific sun under an umbrella of smoke raised l>y almost daily neutralizing attacks. Mili. Jaluit. Maloelap and Vi'otje remained to the end as practice targets, symbols of the fate of the by-passed. shooting
down 127
aircraft
\^hile the Gilberts and Marshalls were being taken
hand by Force,
pier for our bridge across the Gentral
Pacific.
The pattern of Pacific ad\ance was one of taking the bases we needed and liy-jiassing the others. Those by-|)assed were not forgotten, however. They were hit again and again and again. And after they had lost all possibility of usefulness to the enemy, they were made practice targets for new crews; targets which still could put up some AA fire to season the crews at minimum risk. To the end of the war, Rabaul was getting a daily pounding although as a factor in imped-
Guinea.
in
the Navy, the
the
ground forces and the Seventh Air Thirteenth Air Force made a jump to the Ad-
miralty islands north of our
our planes blasted it with rising tempo. Its to lose importance as the points to which
men and supplies began
ing the push to Tokyo it had faded completely after the Tarawa landing doomed its reinforcements and subsequent landings at Arawe and Ca|)e Gloucester put it under land threat from the west.
That made
it
Huon
gulf holdings on
New
a |)artner of the Seventh in blows on
the Carolines, with special attention being given to Truk.
These blows along the falling while Gen.
(Central Pacific route to
MacArthur moved
his
Japan were
forces westward
along the north New Guinea coast. Infantrymen slugged their way through inland valleys parallel to the coast, and as they pre.ssed the Japs back, amphibious operations put other troops behind the Japs to effect a [lincers. The Fifth .Air Force continued its systematic destruction of the Japanese air force in New Guinea while blasting supplies, defensive installations and troops. In the last week of February 19-14. 900 sorties were flown and 1.000 tons of bombs dropped on the W'ewak. Madang. Alexishafen and Hansa bay areas, leading to the ,5 March landing west of Saidor behind the Jap lines. Hollandia was the major enemy ba.sc after W ewak was shattered, with the Schouten islands and the Halmaheras backing it up as rear bases. But Hollandia was soon to share the fate of what in 194-1 was the sorrv lot of all Jap forward ba.ses. On 30 March, B-24s, P-38s and P-47s hit it. The next day B-24s and P-38s gave it a final polish. Tlie box score: Japan, 219 planes destroved or damaged: the U. S., one P-.38 lost. Three days later a force of 303 B-24s. B-25s, Continued on page 25 23
\
Balikpapan, once the IHlli AF's toughest Borneo target -^ was pretty much a "milk run"" hy 1 July \vheri Aussies landed. Above. 5th AF Libs assist in liie |ncin\ asion bombardment.
Inspection of Balikpapan proved that FEAF's long neutral ization campaign was successful. Below, Dutch oil engineers assess
damage
at a
bomb-blasted cracking installation.
A
liKirdeti harfje fuel, hidden along a\
near Bandjermasiii.
Idtnli hits, strafing,
iiniiniH'd
is
Borneo jungle
located by 13tli
scattered
and
fired
AF
vvater-
"snooper."
hundreds of drums.
column
Ceram.
and P-38s pulverized the area and shot 26 planes out sky. Hollandia was finished as an enemy bastion and '22 April a long jump was made to it by invasion forces. he -ame day a precautionary firewall was built between it till the by-passed areas by a landing at Aitape. Then in inn ranie \X'akde island on 17 May. Biak island on 27 May. v'otinfoor on 2 July and Cape Sansapor on 30 July. Western New Guinea was under control. The route now lay orlli through the Halniaheras to the Philipijines. till'
ri
end of New Guinea the close of July, the Central Pacific forces under Adniral Nimitz's command had swept into the Marianas and ikewise were set to move north or west. They reached the llarianas in one tremendous thrust from the Marshalls. past he Carolines, into Saipan on 15 June. This was accomhed on the familiar pattern of neutralization of all surounding bases. Daily strikes were made on Truk, Ponape. X^oleai, and Yap. The Peleliu airfield in the Palaus was the arget of five attacks in three days. While the Seventh and
MacArlhur poised on
the western
t
Air Forces were neutralizing the Carolines, car-
planes attacked Saipan. Tinian. Rota, and Guam in the niniediate invasion area. The fleet started shelling Saipan ier
itui
Tinian two days before the landing.
)laiics
made
sustained attacks on the
On D-Day.
carrier
enemy bases on Iwo,
laha and Chichi islands. These attacks on bases from which he invasion could liversion
rises
over storage tanks
shows against towering its
Fifth
AF
base.
while Eleventh Air Force and Fleet Air
bombed Paramushiru and Shimushu
in
the
Wing Four
in the
planes
northern Kuriles.
the battle for Saipan [)rogressed. carrier planes continued sweep Guam, Rota. Pagan and Iwo while the AAF concentrated on Truk. \^'olcai. Yap and Ponape. The by-passed bases at Rabaul and in the Marshalls were attacked daily. .As
to
The
was obvious and was discovered west of
threat in U. S. occupation of Saipan
the Jap fleet
came out of
Guam, and our
hiding.
It
carriers attacked on 19 June.
Philippine Sea was another
in
The ensuing the series of
naval engagements in which all of the contact was from the
hrust to the Marianas
riiirteenth
smoke
as jilane completes job. heads for
Battle of the
Willi
of oil
A-2()'s silhouette
from page 23
M-'nI
Black tliuiiderliead at Boela.
be hampered were accompanied by a
north.
The navy
shelled
Matsuwa
island
and in which Japan's fleet was defeated. The enemy lost 428 planes, including those hit on the ground on Marianas bases in accompanying side action. Jaj) ship losses were 17 sunk or damaged. The U. S. fleet lost 122 aircraft and 72 men. During almost the entire action, the .\merican carrier planes were striking at about the limit of their radius of action, and most of our losses were due to forced landings in the sea when the ])lanes gave out of gas. The enemy's air reaction to the Saipan landing was strong, but our air superiority was never in serious jeopardy. From the opening of the pre-invasion attacks on 11 June to a relatively stabilized condition on 28 June, enemy plane losses in the Marianas and to the west in the Philippine sea totaled more than 750. air
On D plus 5, an engineer aviation battalion began unloading equipment and on D |)lus 6 began repairing the runway at Aslito (retiamcd Iscly) airfield. On D plus 7, Seventh Air Force Thunderbolts, ferried from Hawaii by CVE. landed and took off on missions against enemy ground Conlinued on next page
25
LONG TREK continued The engineers widened and lengthened the runway, bomber strip. They interrupted their work on the night of D plus 12 to wipe out 300 Japs who had broken through and overrun the airfield, but it was only a temporary halt. The Saipan operation was
Fourteenth against harbors and shipping along China
typical of the speed with which aviation engineers prepared
since
new
derson
forces.
then turned to construction of a heavy
21 June, operational for 22 June, for Liberators 9 August, for B-29s 15
airfields: Isely field, started
fighters
Kagman
October;
Point
field, started 1 July,
operational for
20 July; Kobler field, started 1 August, operational for heavy bombers 11 November. The engineers moved 4.500.000 cubic yards of coral and earth, produced 127,322 tons of asphaltic cement, paved 11,000.000 square feet of surface and consumed more than 1.250.000 gallons of diesel fighters
fuel in their round-the-clock performance.
After Saipan came Guam on 21 July, followed by Tinian on 23 July. Again both invasions were preceded by heavy air and naval bombardment, some of the help coming from the land-based planes on Saipan, The islands were "secured" by mid-August although isolated Japs were being picked off
months
later.
Planes of the Air Transport
Command
followed almost
in
prop wash of combat planes as new bases were taken. Operations on the long overwater route steadily increased, with personnel flown from the United States to the Pacific theater in nine months of 1945 totaling 80.847 as against 75.560 in all of 1944. Similarly, in 1945, through September, tonnage flown was 39,518 and in 1944 it was 28,861. Evacuation of casualties to the U. S.. a major factor in reducing the death rate from wounds, totaled 36.000 in 1945 and 10,498 in 1944. the
Meanwhile, preparations went forward for the long-anticiOn 15 September, the Palau islands were invaded, the marines heading into tough opposition on Peleliu, and army ground forces having a somewhat easier time on Angaur. This placed the Central Philippines within range of our heavy bombers. MacArthur moved into Morotai. north of Halmahera, and the stage was set for all forces to unite in a single plan. pated drive back into the Philippines.
Back
to the Philippines
In no previous Pacific operation did the preparatory phase
cover such a vast area and involve so
The leading
many
difTerent striking
was played by a tremendous carrier force of the Third Fleet, which struck along a vast arc from the Philippines to Marcus island, the Ryukyus and Formosa, In late September, they wrecked the Manila area, destroying 357 aircraft, and the next day pounded Leyte, Panay and Cebu. Then, in early October, they cut loose with a series of terrific wallops: Marcus island on the 9th, the Ryukyus on the 10th, Formosa on the 12th and 13th, and Manila again on the 15th and 17th, Their score was 915 enemy planes destroyed, 128 ships sunk and 184 damaged. They lost no ships and only 94 of their own planes. This was essentially an operation to isolate the battlefield, to elements.
make
role
for the enemy to reinforce the Philippines. same scheme were three attacks on Formosa by China-based B-29s, constant attacks by the Fifth and Thirteenth air forces on the southern Philippines and East Indies flank, by the Seventh on the Ronins. and by the it
difficult
Fitting into the
26
On 20
coast.
October, troops poured ashore at Leyte.
Leyte was a dud from the beginning. As far as the air To it was mostly a case of mud.
forces were concerned,
bogged us down everywhere. For the first time we had struggled with the mud hole that became Hen-
rential rains
field, airfield construction was agonizingly slow, became apparent before long that our bomber strength could not be pulled into Leyte. Tacloban airstrip was the
and
it
only strip that proved of real value. From it. the V Fighter its planes jammed wingtip to wingtip. for weeks
Command,
did an all-around air force job, handling
normallv would have been given
to the
many
tasks that
bombers. The
latter
Tins from Morolai. the Palaus. and bases -..-. :... .... -^-.-
^V: I
.
...
•
hi
.ou:-
-
-
.
Le\te was the closest osirr
we had
:
oarcameis.
;
\l
?
oar
>?
mkr
ises.
thr
was
ilai>e^
--
inlands liiisiii Lsiis ^-
27
LURU IntK continued of the Seventh Fleet, though short of ammunition, together
with a
of
fleet
defeated the
PT
boats, destroyers
enemy
and
cruisers, decisively
force which attempted to join the battle
The Jap bid to halt the Leyte invasion had failed and their fleet had been reduced by sinkings and damage to task-force size. Our losses were the carrier Princeton, two escort carriers, two destroyers and one D.E. through Surigao
strait.
During all the operations in September and October, it was the carrier forces of the Third Fleet that dominated the air action and deserved the major share of credit. On the eve of the Battle for Leyte gulf, the Navy's vast Carrier Task Force 38 had a complement of 1,082 planes, and its Task Force 77, with the smaller carriers, could put some 600 planes into the air. The Far Eastern Air Forces (Fifth and Thirteenth) had 1.457 planes assigned to tactical units and 524 held in ready reserve. The Seventh, in the Marianas. Palaus and Marshalls, had another 526. While there were more land-based aircraft, the mobility of the carriers enabled the massing of great carrier striking strength at any required point. Truly, in these two months, carrier air, in a war dominated by sea masses rather than land masses, proved itself indispensable.
The end
at
Leyte came when the Japs discovered it was back at New Guinea to reinforce a be-
just as difficult as
sieged garrison.
Ormoc on
On
10 November, a Jap convoy bound for by B-25s in a masthead
Leyte's west coast was hit
attack which sank three transports and six escorts.
The next
day Navy planes smashed another Ormoc-bound convoy. On 7 December, Fifth Air Force fighter bombers sank all vessels in a 13-ship convoy, and four days later destroyed most of another, both near Ormoc. Jap Air Debacle on Luzon
Throughout the Leyte campaign the Japs had dissipated their
air
strength
in
frequent,
small
attacks.
Their op-
when heavy, sustained pressure might have turned the tide. When we made an amphibious landing at Ormoc bay. followed on 15 December portunity was missed at the beginning
by a landing on Mindoro. the Japs struck hard. But this time it was too late. Once on the firm soil of Mindoro, the Fifth Air Force was able to pull its main bomber strength up to the Philippines. The Fifth now took up where the carriers had left off. In three weeks, the remainder of the Japanese air establishment in the Philippines was utterly demolished. On 9 January, when MacArthur invaded the Lingayen gulf, only two Japanese planes appeared over the beach. Never. in the European war or previously in the Pacific war. had such a crushing air defeat been administered. The Fifth Air Force destroyed more than 2.000 enemy planes in the Philippines. Yet the Japs had plenty more. Japanese aircraft production reached its highest level at this very time. They up sending more planes into the Philippines because the organization to operate them had been wiped out. The Fifth Air Force not only made every decent airfinally gave
field
unserviceable,
hut also
storage depot a shambles.
system collapsed.
When
left
The
repair shop and ground maintenance
every
entire
our forces reached Clark
field,
they found a George fighter which needed only a carburetor to fly. Dozens of carburetors, as well as engines, wheels and hundreds of other parts, were found dispersed at nearby Mahalacat town in shacks, under buildings, and even buried
28
in the fields.
The George wasn't
alone.
Many
planes were
in
almost flyable condition.
From this overwhelming defeat, the Japanese high command, however reluctantly, could draw only one conclusion: it would be senseless, in the future, to continue using their air force in the conventional manner. There was only one course left: a Kamikaze, or suicide, air force. For the balance of the Philippines campaign,
the Fifth
Air Force was free to roam at will against the shipping routes of the South China sea and to neutralize Formosa This meant the Fifth had taken over air commitments within range of the Philippines, freeing the carriers for two major tasks
— Iwo and Okinawa.
Daylight attacks on Formosa started in January and soon B-24s, B-25s, P-38s and P-5Is were making regular strikes
which
at first
were
in
preparation for and later in aid of the
Okinawa campaign. The B-24s
also reached out across the
China sea to disrupt communications in Indo-China. B-25s were a potent striking force against shipping with their precision
low-level attacks.
In the
Philippines, the Fifth
whirlwind bombing and troop carrier show at Corregidor. and. without air interferrni e. swept against enemy troops wherever they still faced MacArthur. Outstanding were missions in aid of guerrillas, and napalm fire bomb attacks on Japs holed up in mountain caves. put on a
a
The Thirteenth Air Force, meanwhile, had been protecting MacArthur turned north from New
the left rear flank as
I£ast Indies and southern knocking out harbor installations, airfields, oil facilities and shipping. Borneo. Java. Celebes, Ambon, Ceram and lesser islands were scoured by planes of the Thirteenth and the RAAF. Snoopers (single B-24s) picked off shipping in Makassar strait. The oil center of Balikpapan was put out of action in four major strikes in which Fifth Air Force heavies joined. The East Indies thus were eliminated as a staging area for Philippines reinforcement and were softened up for invasion.
Guinea.
It
policed the Netherlands
Philippines,
Meanwhile, the Central Pacific forces forged their
final
arch in the bridge needed to put fighters over Japan.
To
bombing Japan from the Marianas, Iwo had come increasingly annoying. To convert this warning
be-
the B-29s
sta-
and interception point into a haven for distressed B-29s and a forward base for fighter sweeps over Japan, it was invaded on 19 February. Hardly had the bloody struggle for Iwo ended when Okinawa was invaded. Coming so soon after Iwo and at the very doorstep of the Home Islands, the invasion of Okinawa was a show of power that jolted the American public into the realization that the war against Japan might be approaching the final phase. tion
The Kamikaze Onslaught This time the preparation included sustained strikes at itself. The February blows in the Tokyo- Yokohama
Japan
Iwo landing were dwarfed by those which preceded the Okinawa invasion. The Fifth Fleet on 18 and 19 March disposed of most of what remained of the Jap fleet and destroyed 475 enemy aircraft as its planes struck at airfields and anchorages in southern Honshu and Kyushu. From 23 to 29 March it made daily attacks on Okinawa and on southern Kyushu to disrupt reinforcements and supply. The Fifth Air Force intensified its attacks on Formosa and was
area prior
to the
i
I
'^he
men
anil their tools
on
l'-47
le.
spans final
iiap to jajKin
trmii riiincay
shaped
!ty
IntUtlozers, engineers.
oined hy British carriers in strikes on airfields and trans)ortation
facilities.
Jap
airfields
on the east China coast
vere neutralized by the Fourteenth.
Okinawa was invaded on 1 .April and, after a few days of our ground forces ran into Japanese resistance
;asy going,
hat remained fanatical
)eared in •At
its
Leyte.
to
where the Japs
han an individual
Japan's air force ap-
the end.
new trappings, and
the
Navy went through
hell.
suicide tactics on
more
first tried
they were a menace, but not a Okinawa, the Japs came up with a prelominantjy suicide air force and the threat was critical in he extreme. The U. S. fleet and ships off Okinawa, were a ;rilical
one.
Now,
scale,
at
nade-lo-order target for •epeal the
Kamikaze
The Japs did
attack.
not
piecemeal mistake of Leyte.
date of the first intensive attack, the Navy was down the Kamikazes without a moment's respite From dawn to dusk. Major assaults were made five times during the month and on the other days there were attacks it frequent intervals. The fleet's air patrol intercepted most sf the Kamikazes but a large number inevitably got through
On 6
.April,
cnocking
A
few pierced Proximity fuses, which detonated the ships' antiaircraft shells even though direct hits were not made on the enemy planes, inEC
the
the outer screening ring of destroyers.
defenses and reached the major
sreased the toll of suiciders, but
fleet
damage
units.
to surface craft
mount. In the 81 days of the Okinawa campaign 32 ships were sunk and 216 damaged by aircraft. Oestroyers. destroyer escorts, minesweepers and smaller craft were the heaviest losers. Nine destroyers and one destroyer escort were sunk: 68 destroyers and 24 destroyer iiontinued to
Final gignpo6t, totem pole style, is erected at le. tells the good news that the men haven't much farther to go.
Continued on next page 29
LONG TREK continued damaged. Two ammunition ships were blown up in one attack. None of the major fleet units were sunk although many were severely damaged and lost for the campaign. The Kamikazes used both new and obsolete planes and carried introduced the Baka a piloted bomb-with-wings to the scene by a bomber and then released for its short and only flight. As the fleet stayed off Okinawa, shelling enemy positions and aiding the troops with carrier aircraft strikes,
escorts
—
—
menace of the suicide attacks grew. To lessen this, from which the Kamikazes flew were brought under sustained attack. Both the Amami group and the Sakishima group of islands, north and south of Okinawa respectively, were attacked daily by American and British carrier planes. Task Force 58. which had been giving its major attention to the Japs on Okinawa, with a side excursion on 7 April to sink the battleship Yamato and five other warships which apparently were moving out on a hitrun mission to Okinawa, initiated the sustained program to put Kamikaze bases out of commission. The carrier planes on 15 April strafed, bombed and rocketed airfields on Kyushu. The next day carrier planes. Marine Corps medium bombers and army fighters from Iwo worked over the same area. Then on 17 April B-29s entered the picture. Five times in six days the Superforts dropped their heavy loads on Kyushu airfields, then after a three-day lapse, closed out the month with five consecutive days of attack. Through the the
increasing success whittled
May
seven times in the
11 days.
Carriers picked up where
Kyushu a three-day dusting. By late May, P-47s joined the attacks, flying from the small island of le Shima near Okinawa. These operations, combined with they left off and gave
Morthern Japan blazed loo.
Here Third
enemy
May
or suicide attacks; in
June
attacks.
it
was
less
the total
than 300.
In the
dropped
Our ground
first
month
Kyushu
airfields, for
to
700 and
successes were
the breaking
greater factor in this reduction than
with the island definitely falling
up
in
a
of
to us.
the Japs withheld the bulk of their planes for a last-ditch
defense of the
Home
Islands.
Long before Okinawa was wholly won. we began
to carve
out a network of bases which
was to hold the invasion air force. As the Japs were compressed into the southern part of the island, fields began to blossom profusely over the central parts. As the bases took shape, they began to fill with planes and daily strikes were made on Kyushu, paralyzing transportation, airfields, and cities. The final softening up for invasion in November was under way. Throughout July the tempo increased and by early August, despite unfavorable weather, between 350 and 450 sorties were being down daily. This was scarcely a sample of what was in store, for from 23 bases on le and Okinawa, the re-deployed, B-29-equipped Eighth Air Force was to join Gen. Kenney's huge tactical air force in smoothing the invasion path. Even as tiie war ended the Navy was basing 625 planes on Okinawa. 32 B-29s had arrived and 1.317 planes of the tactical air force
the B-29s continued these blows, striking first
our troops on Okinawa, gradually
of
the scale of
of the invasion. 1,700 Jap planes were involved in ordinary
the airfields
early part of
down
It
so
were ready
was an ironical
much
to get a
with so
to go.
twist of fate for
little,
Kenney, who had done
particularly in the early days, finally
force of really great size just
when
it
was no longer
needed. For without a landing in Japan to put the final span of the Pacific bridge in place, the long trek ended.
Fleet carrier planes irork oier the
town of
ISeniiira
on Hokkaido.
lere, at last, J-25>
— attack*
ne Miichfll a
^
the end of the long Irek for the Fifth".* on Japan itself. Above, camera has caught moment after boml>s awav on an oil refinerv.
is
The
refinery,
at
koyagi Shima.
off the
Japanese mainland,
has erupted into a mass of flames and bursting
B-25s
[lull
away.
Attack was
made
early in
bombs
as the
August.
A
s^.
s\
m
'•^s^"
4^*
..
i*
'ip
^^.
.K^
Part
3
KSIA FLANK
and
lOih America
-s
aerial effort in Asia
nixisc and.
al
\liatpvcr
first,
means
clin^
to
making
uitna were in
force. it
to
to
rould.
it
vigorous air
)dox.
was
h\ rircumslances
forced
III.
loiif;
its It
Its
an undernourished
fend for
to
im-
slender thread of
life
itself:
developed into an unmain achievements in
possible for Allied trooj)s to exist
jungle hy supjilying. evacuating and transporting on an unprecedented scale and in making the Japanese -ilion untenahle. literally through starvation, hy destrucof their supply bases which disa|)peared in a welter of ilic
m
•
ri
iiilicd
HH
bridges, river boats, railroad trackage and freight In China
lions.
it
achieved
command
of the skies over
and lore gaping holes in the enemv supply on land and sea. Between India and China it (lew the
iric-e lroo|)s. ili>
mp iit
the
in
greatest
of the war.
And
sustained it
transportation
achieve-
did all this in weather which for
than half each year was so bad one pilot was moved remark. ''Flying, hell! This is an amphibious operation; need gills more than wings.'"
lie
e
The rciilh
aerial
infant
from which
Bunna and China
Knlpti the .lir in
I iih
grew was born by
this
Air Force acti\ation 12 February 191-2.
Before
that.
American air power in Asia consisted exclusively of the American Volunteer Grou(). Claire L. (ihennault. master tactician for (China's air force had obtained 100 obsolescent I*- lOs. and 100 American pilots to man them, and some 200 ground personnel to keep them in the air. ^ hen this group of Flying Tigers met their first Jap over Rangoon on 20 December 1941. they were a single bright light in an otherwise dismal sky. China was isolated except for the Burma road and Hong Kong, with the latter about to fall. Japanese forces were firmlv entrenched in French Indo-China. had moved through Thailand, had swung one s[)earhead down the Malay peninsula and another into South Burma. Rangoon fell on 10 March, then came the "walk-out" of a motley array of British. Indian and Chinese troops led by Gen. Sir Harold Alexander and Gen. Joseph W. "NX e-took-a-hell-ofaliialing Slilucll. By May most of Burma was gone, the (
i
Kytiiuhin, on Jap supph route in central Burma, blazes during interdiction attack by lOth AF B-2.Ss. one of whose shadows is shown passing f)ver the five pagodas al lower left.
Burma road new low
hit a
During
cut
and China
isolated.
Vt'eslern prestige
had
in the Orient.
this
|)eriod
of
unrelieved
Allied
military
dis-
AVG
and a handful of F{AF ])lanes performed brilliantly in local engagements, but could do no more than impede the enemy advance. Bases were bombed out by the Ja|)s and the Flying Tigers were pressed back into China. Always outnumbered, and flying relatively slow aircraft, the AVG nevertheless hung up a phenomenal record during the seven months of its ojjerational life: 298 enemy planes destroyed in combat for a loss of 12. This proved the soundness of Chennault's precepts, which were to fly in pairs, take one swipe at the enemy and get gone. It also punctured the balloon of invincibility growing up around the speedy. highly maneuverable Zero, and |)roved that ruggedness. speed in dives, and fire power could be made to beat an enemy who. although a fancy dog-fighter, was not so rugged. The Tenth .Air Force got a handful of planes in March. 1942. It had the B-17 and the UVM) (early B-2H with which Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton and his party had flown from the Netherlands East Indies. It added six B-17s and ten P- 10s which had been scheduled for Java but which w'ere diverted. \X ith this tiny force it expected daily to have to help repel an invasion of India. But by May. 1942. this no longer appeared imminent so the primary mission of air in Asia then shifted from defense of India to aid to (^hina. This meant ferrying operations over the Himalava mountains llie famed Hump route. A few planes from China National Airways and some DC-.'ls obtained via Africa and flown by commercial airline pilots started the operations. The first transport assignment was delivery of 30.000 gallons of gasoline and 5(M1 gallons of oil. intended for Doolittle's 18 April raiders. By August 1942 they had become the IndiaChina Ferry Command, and on 1 December the Air Transaster, the
port
(Command took
On
over.
ATC
had only 29 transwar in (!hiiia. In all India the Tenth had only 16 heavy bombers. 15 mediums and .SO fighters operational. planes in ("hina that day I'. S. totaled 10 mediums and 50 fighters. These pathetic numbers were due parllv to a diversion of reinforcements, partly to an actual withdrawal of jdanes to the Middle East, both in the
first
anniversary of war.
port planes to fuel a!id sujiply the
Continiu'tt
(in
piipr .IT
33
Adifl
rLRnn ronnnued
Three carriers
tell
story of India air bases: native labor
Maintenance can't wait: neither will Burma rain. Ground crews rig tarp for overhaul of B-25 at forward airfield. 34
and burros, the builders; and planes, the
Elmer
users.
the Elephant loads C-46 for Hump Haul, can do in handling drums of fuel.
work of more than dozen natives
ieneath this C-46
is
the
Hump, whose rocky peaks and
ice-filled
from page 33 n effort to repel Rommel's drive on Egypt. The Tenth lost all of its ea\ y bombers in this way and had none at all for some time. ATC grew le fastest. At first it carried gasoline, oil. and replacement parts to
clouds were conquered for supply of China.
aw*
'ontinued
INDIA mnui
Gradually it started carrying heavy equipment. October 194,-5 a schedule of night flights over the stormy barrier eaks was added. By 1 August 1945 ATC was able to tally up a month's elivery of 7I.(M)0 tons over four times the capacity of the old Burma cad and it had stepped that up to a rate of more than 85.000 tons lonthly in the final days of the war. Before it could begin to expand, owever. it had to have bases. It had to get its own supplies, as well as hose it was transporting to (]hina. from harbors to the take-off point via ir or inadequate rail, highway, and river transportation. Its planes in ite spring, summer, and early fall flew in monsoon weather of rain, ail. wind, and turbulence. In winter they flew through ice-laden clouds, But they flew in liled high above the 18.000-foot Himalayan peaks. iver-increasing numbers.
."TfTMiM
^
^CHIHA
hina-based aircraft.
')
—
—
The
INDO
CHINi
THAIIAND
AVG
was absorbed into the Tenth Air Force on 4 July 1942 and |edesignatcd the China .Air Task Force. Chennault, recalled to active uty as a brigadier general, was n^med its commander. In March 194.3 he China .Air Task Force became the independent U. S. Fourteenth. Continued on page 37
Long supply Note only
a
lines were vulnerable to interdiction. road connects Lashio and Lampang.
35
J^
l^d"'
'^-
*^(
^^?^'
"^^
^
•j%i*
.r
^>
'^Mte.P "^"^ISP
^
Air drops such as
.fe.
36
icntched by Brilishers. kepi
more than 350.000 troops
in action in
Burma
in
1945.
>
Kiillit l#t
this,
Air
lliousaiid feet
Lommando?
in the air
put?
\\
on a nylon
line, glider of
ingate troops behind
enemv
lines.
Broken
hridtrt
jungle.* for Japs.
-pelled
starvation
throughout
Burma
Dive-homhins B-24s of IDth .\F did
this.
'/ii-
are the airfield builders.
-.ued
Thruu^huiil China, at here
Htinttin.
the CLtoliei supplittl
Meanvthile. two British land campaigns were set in motion
infiltration units struck the rear lines
Burma
tions.
combat the grossing Japanese forces there which >ere threatening to drive across the Indian border and cut iff the ATC bases now being built in Northeast India. Both h«se ground operations were on a limited scale. On the entral front Britain's Gen. Orde Charles Wingate infilrated a brigade of jungle troops through the Japanese and or three months harried the rear areas while depending I'holly on air supply. Farther south, in the .\rakan. the tritish engaged in an orthodox, unsuccessful campaign. n
at
to
its decision on the experience of these two operaQuebec conference in .\ugust 1943 approved plans or a determined drive the following year a drive which as to utilize the lessons of 1943. and profit from a unified t>mmand. coordinating efforts of the Tenth .\ir Force and he RAF Bengal Air G)mmand under the Eastern .Air Ojmnand. commanded by Maj. Gen. George Strateroeyer. .As he India forces were depleted in 1942 to support the Middle vast, they were reinforced from the Middle East once the was Vf rican campaign was won. The 7th Bomb Group H he one which was called out of India and it was sent back. fbe 12th Bomb Group iMt. whose B-25s had fought across •Jorth .Africa, also was assigned to the Tenth .Air Force. The push l>egan in late 194^5 with a limited British-Indian
Basing
ions, the
—
•
I
•ITensive
the
pauer.
from page 35
into the
.Arakan.
.As
it
i
moved ahead. Japanese
and cut communica-
But unlike the previous year, the troops now were supplied by aerial drops from planes of Brig. Gen. William D. Old's Troop Carrier Command. They held, strengthened, and broke out of the trap. Northward on the central fronL a similar situation developed. Two British-Indian columns, moving out of ImphaL had been hit on the north and the south flanks by a major Japanese drive. The enemy pressed on. entrapping the British on the Imphal plain, and posing a critical threat to the -Assam-Bengal railway over which supplies were moved to Chinese-.^roerican forces building the Ledo road. For the second time Gen. Old's Troop Carrier Command came to the rescue. The 3th Indian Dixision. with all its mountain batteries and mules, was lifted into the Imphal area in GO hours. Two brigade groups were flown to Kohima. Two hospitals and thousands of wounded and non-essenlial personnel were flown out. .\nd. most important of all. food and ammunition were flown in. The result was inevitable. The British troops had a secure air supply route while the Japanese had a land supply route which was under constant harrassment by combat planes. The threat to India was ended and these operations became the pattern for the ensuing campaign for all Burma. Japan's forces in Burma were supplied by a long, slender Continued on pafie 39 37
14th
AF P-38
Under
cuts loose
attack b)
]
1th
bridge takes misses (left)
38
U'il/i
« fire
AF C25^. .
bomb (below
'>.000-foot
Yellow
tail) against
river
near misses (center), hits (right).
Note
1,100-foot bridge at
AA
struck.
Wan
Lai-kani in
Burma.
tower near bottom, left, liritlge was repeated!) Flimsy Jap repair job once put locomotive in river.
oiiliniieil
from page 37
ail-hif;luvay-rivcr system,
only a
uitli
ft-w
lines
and
riintiin<2
Broadway was read)
the next aflcrnoon
Ity
for C-47s.
and south. The interdiction campaign in Iturma was ased on the fact that with Hangoon and otiier south Ikirma lorts under sustained air attack, the enemy was forced to This meant carrying ise Bangkok as his ])rinci|iai port. U[)piies on an additional stretch of rickety railroad running
Complete sur|)rise had been achieved. A second field was set up the night after the first. Men and sup])lies poured in. By D plus (>. the total was 9,052 men. 175 ponies, 1,183 mules and 509,083 pounds of stores. During the entire operation our bombers and fighters were masters of the air
hrough miles of coastal country hefore they could he moved There were hundreds of hridges on this line. The olution, then, to denial of supplies to the enemy was to ;nock out the bridges and railroad trackage. This was done \ith regularity. The Japs were skillful at repair but our rcrafi were able to keep ahead of the rejjair crews. Radio;ui(ieii bombs were used with excellent results, and B-24s ven worked out a 2.'S-degree dive angle technique which ncrcased accuracy. The Jap supply prol)lem became critical, nd troops at tiie north end of the line eventually became tarved and disease-ridden. These were the troops facing jen. StilwelFs Chinese-American forces who were working
over
ortli
heir
way ahead of
the engineers building the
Air supply was vital to Stilwell's drive. )f
volunteers
.'lOOfl
— Merrill's
Marauders
Ledo road.
\ picked group
— following
the
echnique of Gen. Wingate. struck ofF into the jungle as an idvance s|)earliead probing toward Myitkyina. From 23 when Myitkyina airfield was taken •'ebruary until 17 May
—
Marauders were entirely supplied by air. Nearly Chinese troo|)s were flown over the Hump from \unian\i. China, in one operation, as front-line reinforcements
—the
II Hid
By the end of October. 1944. 75.527 had been llown into North Burma. 7.693 had been shifted within the area, and 28.181 had been flown out. or Stilwell's forces.
jersonncl
In \ct anoliifi
leliberate
choice
1911 operation an army was able to make a of entrapment through reliance on air.
The First Air Commando Group under Col. Philip G. Cochran was organized to put Gen. W'ingate's troops inside Burma between Myitkyina and Katha, to supply them, to acuate the casualties, and to sweep in front of the columns with bombers and fighters. The objective of \^'ingate's to cut supply lines in the rear of Japanese troops opposing Stilwell and Merrill.
men was
-March 5 was time was set to
D-Day i)ut
for
Wingate and Cochran. Take-off
the gliders, with their cargoes of troops,
airborne engineers, bulldozers and mules, over the secret jungle clearings of "llroadway" and "•Piccadilly" just after dusk. So secret was the operation, that the clearings were
would divine the and obstruct them. But. on a hunch. Col. Cochran
not reconnoitered for fear the Japanese intention
reconnaissance |)lane out the alternoon of wet prints were handed to him 15 minutes before take-off and he found that Piccadilly was a death trap. sent
a
D-Day.
|)hoto Its
The Japs had
covereil
it
with logs.
Plans were changed swiftly Broadway alone and. with a minutes, the gliders,
first
headed
wave of
east.
A
2f)
put the force down on postponement of only 30 transports, each towing two to
second wave was dispatched, but
all
planes except one were called back because the landing field
had become landing due
littered to
with gliders that had smashed up in
overloading.
Of
the
.51
gliders in the
first
wave, 17 did not reach Piccadilly becau.sc tow lines snapped. Despite the lo.sses and confusion, 539 |)ersonnel, three mules and 29.972 |)ounds of supplies and equipment were landed that first night. Airborne engineers went to work
Vt
ingate's troops.
More
lorth.
troo|)s
and
were ferried
su|)plies
to the fighting area.
Light planes landed beside the advancing columns on hastily scralched-out clearings, to j)ick up casualties. The exact will never be available be-
on the ''grasshoppers''
statistics
cause the
commandos took
literally
General Arnold's
in-
junction: "'To hell with |)aper work; go out and fight.' •
reasonable guess
When in
the X.X
China
is
that they flew
more than 8.000
A
sorties.
Bomber (;ommand's B-29s ended operations
in late 1944, they
turned their heavy loads loose in
Burma campaign while awaiting a final shift to the Marianas. Singapore and Palembang were hit but blows against Hangoon and Bangkok were their jirincipal assignments. In their first maximum-load attack each plane dropped 10 500-lb. bombs, wiping out a Hangoon rail yard. VX'hile the North Burma forces were advancing. Britishaid of the
Indian troops which had withstood the Jap attack at Implial Their advance was speeded by air leaps to airheads (airfields captured or built to keep supply
also took the offensive.
When on 8 March 1945 Mandalay and Lashio fell, the route to China was clear. Rangoon remained. By 1945, it was almost useless to Japan, but not until it was in Allied hands would the Burma campaign be ended. The British, with air la.shing out in bases near the advancing front).
front of them, continued southward.
commanding the Group: "You have been a Slim,
troops,
Lt.
radioed
Gen. Sir William the
12th
Bomb
])owerful factor in helping us give
the little bastards a thorough thrashing."
By March. 1945. the southward-moving troopi in Burma wholly dependent on air supply totaled .356.000. With the monsoon season near, it was decided to bridge the distance to Rangoon by a seaborne invasion aided by the whole weight of Allied aircraft. On 1 May, Gurkha paratroopers jumped from C-47s, swept meagre
resistance aside,
next day the seaborne troops piled ashore to find abandoned. The Burma cam|)aign was over.
and
the
Rangoon
All this time the Fourteenth Air Force, which eventually included the Chinese-American (iomposite Wing, made up of U. S.-trained Chinese and .AAF airmen, was ranging over China, assisted by a re|)orting net of thousands of Chinese. Initially it operated from bases prepared or planned before
America's entry into the war. It gradually acquired new bases until finally there were 63 which the coolies had laboriously fashioned. Because of them. Gen. Chennault was able to shift his forces when enemy air or ground opposition
became too threatening
— as
it
often did
— and
employ them
without delay against new targets. Greatest of the bases was Chengtu.
Its nine fields were 1944 in nine months by a peak of 365.000 workers who moved two million cubic yards of earth and laid two and a quarter million cubic yards of paving at a total cost of nine billion (Ihinese dollars. This was the B-29 forward staging base from which the first attack was launched on Japan. It also was the springboard for attacks on North
built in
China. Manchuria, and Formosa.
Continued on page 41 39
HaiN rUHnt^contmued
Straight line in pattern of rice fields
At
Siaukicheii,
planes lay
40
down
iiitt-riui
bull's-eye
(iliiiia,
bomb
is
broken by 14th AF
Chinese-American
Wing
pattern to blot out rail yard.
hit
on
rail line
River grave
between Yochow and Changsha.
is dug for junk ami il> carjjo at Haipliung. French Indo-China, by China-based 14th Air Force raider.
had no connection with the B-29s Thfir main duties were:
Cliennaiilt's fliers
I
iliaii
(lefftisf
lion
of
anil
-.
of the hases.
Hump,
the
chjse cooperation
attacks on shippiiif;
and
rail
witli
China's
communications.
made up for its tiny size by reliance on which (^hentiault was a past master. He knew If ra|ial)ilities. numliers and speeds of the enemy and by jiiilicioiis employment of feints and bluffs, he used this ou ledge to insure that he met the enemy where and when wanted. Thus, even in the early days when he was greatly iiliuimbered. he often managed to have local air superiority id almost always managed to be on lop of the enemy so lal the high diving speed of his P- lOs would count. In one ISC. late in 1912. Chemiault saw to it that Japanese agents uind of an impending )l strike from a forward base against ong Kong. The mission got under way on schedule; the ips got set to defend Hong Kong. At the last minute, the S. force of eight liombers and 22 fighters, after appartl\ being on the way past Canton to Hong Kong, swung arply into Canton and caught the off-balance Jap derulers coming up below them. Result: 22-2.3 Ni[) planes sln)\ed in the air and more iin the ground: no American Fourteenth
lion, at
•
was nothing new to the Chinese: they had been giving ground since \')M. Miit evacuation and demolition of the laboriously constructed airfields and the necessary destruction of precious supplies was a bitter blow to them as well as ti>
llie
Fourteenth.
Although (^hennault's men were driven from one base to another, operations against rail lines and freight yards, supply dejiots. airfields, moving troops and river shipping were carried on remorselessly. Throughout this period, as earlier, the incredibly vast Chine.se information net was invaluable. Vi'hen river craft assembled and river shipping was an integral jiart of the transportation system the Fourteenth was advised. Its total tally of 24.299 miscellaneous river craft claimed sunk or damaged was the result. So effective were its rail attacks that Japan could neither fully use the lines she had nor extend lines which would have ex|)loited the Indo-China link. From the days of the AVG, iiualitative sujieriority in the air was always on the side of China. The 2..3.5.H Jap aircraft destroyed and the 780 probably destroyed in China were never replaced in sullicient numbers to overcome the more effective fighter pilots, bomber crews, tactics and planes of the United States.
—
—
lanes lost.
Gen. (^hennault liina seas in
bombers ranged over the South and East Staging at East China
s
quest of Jap shipping.
asc^ for their missions, until these bases were lost early in
night and low-ceiling attacks. >liips
f
bombing They became the scourge gradually forcing them farther
they utili/cd to the fullest low altitude radar
)\'i. )r
following the coast,
where
Ml
One of
tiiey
became prey
to
U.
S.
was aid enough more in enongli hmd iiouer Id go where they would against If >lubbi)rnl\ conle^ling but ill-equipped Chinese. The ourleenth con Id. and did. impede the advances and make hem costly. It cmild do little more, but in the final analysis lal was enough. Japans imwiliingness to [)av the price
The
Ja|)anese always had
—
Iways saved China.
The first when
yi-'i
direct air aid to troops
the
enemy launched a
outiiwest of the
Yangtze river
was
in the late
spring of
limited offensive south and in
the Tungting lake area.
a few planes were available.
About all that could be daced on the credit side of the ledger was experience for )nl\
and bolstered morale for the overpowered (!hine.se. lOl.H. seven Jap divisions struck at Changteh. outheast of Tungting lake. This time they met stiffer ground esistance. heavier air attack from a stronger Fourteenth iUr Force. The Japanese had sullicient power to move ahead ^ut they were looking for a cheap victorv and this was fie
pilots
-ater
ml
liie
in
place. Tlie\ withdrew.
in China came in end of the year the invaders. Iriving west from Canton and southwest toward Indo-China. evered East China from West China with consequent isolaion of East China air bases, cajitiired the air liases at Jengvang. Lingling. Kwcilin. Liuchow and Nanning. and •slaidished a continuous line of communicalion from French ndo-China to North (.liina. In early 1915 the Japanese eized all of the norlhsouth rail line from Hankow to iatilon. then pushed ea>tward and look the Fourteenth's East Ihin.i aiifiiliU ,il Suiiln\ari ami Karnli>>u. l.o-~ of lerrilorv 1
lie
high tide of the Japanese advance
yH. Between Ma\ and
tlie
When
Southwest China and
North China in the early spring of 1945. one of the tasks which had been set before our air power in Asia in 1942 had been accomplished. But the picture was no longer the same. ATC was IKing into China a greater tonnage than the road could ever carry and the triumjiliant Pacific forces of the United States were pounding Jajian from island and carrier bases. Japan, now. began to w itlulraw her forces from their points of deep penetration. As they moved back, they were pushed by the revitalized (Chinese and hit by everything which could However, it was a planned lie thrown at them from the air. withdrawal. Jajian was through as an occupant of interior China. Her position in the war had deteriorated to a point where the occupation l)rought diminishing returns.
Burma
submarines.
the Fourteenth's most heart-lireaking tasks
(liina's armies.
So complete was aerial mastery that Japan dared not atby day and its last inland night bombing was against Kunming in December 19-4-1. By April 1945. all air attacks against American or Chinese installations had ended and tlie Japanese air force in ('hina was an all but forgotten foe. lack
Ja|)
reverses
in
in
finally led to re-opening of the land route to
The Japanese warlords' proud plans for Asia had been crushed when air power and land power were linked to turn back the thrust toward India and to re-open the Burma road. Their hope of substituting a land route for the effectively shattered sea route to the riches of the south faded when the Fourteenth blasted their highways, railroads and river craft into uselessness. The value of China as a granary for them lessened as their cargo carriers, in ever increasing numbers, splintered from bombs and bullets. They were opposed by armies strengthened by airborne equipment and supplies. And. finally, having lost the air. their own armies were wide open to the most-feared fate of any ground force constant, iinciiallenged attack by the op()osing air force.
—
So the Japanese withdrew, moving north under pressure of ground and air forces.
And
the Fourteenth in the final
days of war. shifted its attack to the targets far to the north which stood before the Soviet armies: targets on a road to Tokso llial never wa-; needed.
>^*.4
<
^
I
Part
BLOCKADE AirpUtncH. Mines Siranyied the
Siihs.
blockade of Japan was. from [he beginning of the one of the main objectives of American air and sea )o\ver. It was jjostulated on a set of conditions which were 'l"hc
Homeland
The Fourteenth concentrated on
river shipping
and
vessels
Aar.
traveling along the China coast, achieving notable success with a method for making low-level night strikes by radar,
lelieved to
make Japan at least as vulnerable to blockade any great power in modern history. First, she was surrounded by water. .Second, she had a huge population, and lepended on extra-territorial sources for at least 20 per cent )f her food. Her nutritional standards were so low already that denial of this 20 per cent was expected to re-
("arrier-based
IS
real
ult in
privation for a large part of the population.
mudi of her manufacturing
potential
was
in
Third,
the
home
whereas most of the raw materials which her inustries consumed were not. For example. 90 per cent f all oil came from overseas. H8 per cent of all iron and 21- per cent of all coal. Fourth, the bulk of her domestic coal su|)ply was in Kyushu and Hokkaido, with the result that .57 per cent of all coal was water-borne at some point between mine and factory. Fifth, terrain and the coml>aratively |)oor development of the Japane.se rail system made her verv dependent, even for domestic transport, on islands,
coastal vessels. Ill
Meet
Japan had
short.
lleet if
to
have a large and active merchant This
she expected to exist as an effective combatant.
reached
its
maximum
size
in
1942.
It
consisted
of
over ]00 tons each, and had a total gross weight of 7.500.000 tons. No calculation has been made of the small coastal vessels, river boats and sampans of under 100 tons gross weight, whicti swarm in Japan as alioul .5.000 vessels of
I
thickly as
fleas
on a Mexican mongrel.
I
Because of the
rapid expansion of Jap military activity to the south in the early days of the war. this fleet was strained to the utmost,
and attacks by American submarines and aircraft were felt immediately. The Fifth Air Force ravaged sfiipping lanes to the south,
introducing,
in
the all-im|)ortant
Battle of the
Bismarck sea. low-level skip bombing by its i^25s. This was a growing scourge until the end of the war. In the Southwest Pacific, the Thirteenth Air Force developed a IligiiK sucfes>ful long-range snooper technique for its M-2ls.
Jap
suilor!;
in water after their frigate goes down M) miles below Amoy. sunk by B-25s Forces' famed .HlStli "Air Ajiache" Group.
flounder
off lndo-(!liina coast
of the Fifth
\ir
Navy planes sank
vampire on
ships everywhere.
Jafian's jugular vein
proved
to
But the
be the sub-
marine. Day in and day out it chewed its way through more than 100.000 tons a month with relentless regularity. The
were manifold. They led to a general weakening of the Jap effort on the various southern and island fronts, and eventually dictated a squatter policy in these places rather than one of aggressive military develop-
effects of these attacks
ment.
In addition to this they so restricted the deliverv of
raw materials facturing
to Ja|)an that
jjlants
was
left
an increasing numlier of manuidle.
(le[)redations caused a virtual
Finally.
U. S. submarine
abandonment by cargo
of the great east-coast Japanese ports of Tokyo.
vessels
Yokohama
and Nagoya. This was more important than it sounds. It meant that a vast amount of shipping was now being funneled into a few places: the Shimonoseki strait, whence it could ])roceed in safety u|) through the Inland sea: and a handful of smaller ports on Japan's west coast, from which cargoes were transported to the mainifacturing centers by rail. The first half of the joli was now done. The aerial half remained. If we could clog u|) Shimonoseki and these west-coast ports with mines. Ja|)an would almost certainly crumble rapidly as an organized industrial society. It
was not
until the spring of
1945 that development of
range of Japan had proceeded to a point where a mining campaign could be undertaken on the huge scale believed necessary for success. By that time Japan's
air bases within
merchant marine was down to about 2.500.000 tons. She had been completely unable to replace losses, and as the space in which her remaining ships could operate became more and more constricted, the airplane became an increasingly terrible menace. In January 1945. aircraft accounted for more than double the number of ships sunk bv subs.
The first mining misiim was flown on 27 March bv B-29s which sowed 900 mines in the apjiroaches to Shimonoseki strait. Japan's greatest bottleneck, and by that time, handling 40 per cent of all marine traffic. In the next four months over 12.000 mines were laid, completing the largest blockade in hi>tor\. one that literally strangled Japan.
43
SHIPS AFLOAT
SHIPS SUNK
ATTLISHIPS
CARRIERS
CRUISERS
and submarines are The damage was slow in
stroyers
THE END OF JAP SEA POWER Here are the final results of the most decisive anti-marine on record, an effort which virtually erased the world's tliird largest navy, and so weakened the world's third largest merchant fleet that it was totally inadequate at the end of the war to take care of more than a fraction of the needs iif its country's industry and its country's people. The Jap navy is in an even sorrier condition than the drawing above shows. The one battleship afloat is badly damaged. So are two of the four carriers. Two cruisers are damaged, the other two decommissioned. Many of the deeffort
CARGO
starting.
Save for a few
Then came
three resounding defeats: the Battle of Midway June 1942, where four carriers and a heavy cruiser were scratched in 24 hours: the bitter struggle for the Solomons in October and November 1942, resulting in the loss of two battleshi|)s, three cruisers and 12 destroyers: and finally the great sea battle of the Philippines in October 1944. which cost Japan three battleships, four carriers, ten cruisers and eight destroyers, all in four days. Otherwise. Japan hoarded her major fleet units and let the lighter ones do the work. These were consumed at an enormous rate. 32 destroyers going down in the waters around New Guinea, the Solomon* in
i
i
-^^^ :;ii,-.^-^iiit,
.^4.
-t*- -^ML -dfe
.^1.
i
-^i.
,^^X^^
.At-
-^
>M^
1897
^***^
SHIPS SUNK
OVER 1000 TONS ^ii^i^ 2300 SHIPS SUNK 100—1000 100 — 1000 TONS
^ "*^
^^
ii'**
-^^^
-•^"*+
-** -*»-»*
-
^-
'
-*».
-
-«a-.«>x
:^^'^
-
t
^
,,mA..^tt,
.^A.
"^^^"^^^ '^'^::21i '^:21'^ "^^^ '^^^'^'^^^'^ --
.,
,**.,**-«*. .^t,,^^
^^.^
^
~t^
~^ - "^ "^ "^
^ "^^^ it ^^ ^
'^^:2j '^^:2i ^^^
---^-^i:It^:::i^^
^•^j^-^j^^
^^^2^-^^^^^^^:^:2t;ii "^
m:it'**' -^^**-*» --i-»»:ti
"***
^^^ -^^ **^
" *
"** -** -*» -*^ --a
-
..iki
.
*
-**
, k
.A,*
.
t
i^
.^jt
-
«
-I*
--J-^-a.-a..i^,,^
,^A
-** -*« -u. -*»
.1
..
"^T
"^ i2r i^
CARGO
"it
,*fc-M.,.iut
"**
"^ -^ ^iit "^ "^ "^ "^ "^ "^ "^
^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^ .^..^.^
.^-**-»4. ,-*.-.-.--.
:tl::^:^ :lt'^'^ :it:i:^
it:iJ^
^^'^
"^^ "^^ -*^
""^^
'^* -^* -^^ -^^ ^*' "^^
"^
"^
"** -*{
!it "**
de-
stroyers and one carrier, there were no losses for six months.
iii^ ii|IWWWIPIWWiiiBpPi ^i.wimtiA j yy-^^ ~^k St^ .^^ .Jj.
wsmSS^^^^E^
VESSELS
in a similar state.
VESSELS OVER
"^'^
^it
"^t"
a^.
'"'
"**"
,^-»fc,«.^32
:^'^'^ :ii::2t:ii^:^ li^zSiit
^!S!-^ -y
^^
-**- "^*' .^^^
:it -^^ ^*' -^*
"^ "^ "^ "^
1000 TONS
.^L,
"ii -*^
"^
«*^
-*•' -**-
^-^ .^ ..^•%^-«^',>^
_^»^'»^*}^^kkk^k^4^^ki^ttikittWfe*fci
DESTROYERS ;mil
tlie
Hisitiarik
addition to
In
archipelago in
194.^
SURMARINES
alone.
capture and salvage, the Japs finished the year 1942 with the same-sized merchant fleet (5,950.000 tons)
struction,
naval types listed above, the lollduing were sunk up through 1 June 1945: three seatlu-
])rinci[)al
that she started with, despite a total loss of 1,060.384 tons during the period. In 1943. she lost 1.871.510 tons; in 1944. 3.990.744; and in the first seven and a half months of 1945.
two training cruisers. 93 escort vessels. 80 minelayers. 29 minesweepers. 42 combat iiaiisports. 19 coastal patrol craft and 11 miscellaneous \i "(Is. Of 600 naval vessels sunk, submarines got 199. airI'laiif
-III.
'
,1
carriers,
chasers.
21
1.323.593 tons.
She started the war with 5.945.410 tons adding during the war 3.520.568 tons built, caplured or salvaged. At the war's end she had lost 8.236.070 Ions, and wound up with only 231 vessels with a tonnage of K60.936 able to operate. And these were disappearing at the rate of nearly 20 per cent a month. All together, subs afloat,
got 220. surface craft got 114. the rest being sunk by roMibination of these or bv other agents.
lali
he following figures on the Jaji mercliant marine refer to \r— tis of over 1.000 tons only. They represent current nliirial .Army and Navy estimates, but are subject to coriti lion. They are the |)ayofT on a campaign that began immediately after Pearl Harbor. However. becau.>ie of conI
^gy,.^i l|iatf^yWWj|
I Li
CARGO
5.128.425 tons, aircraft got 2.275.197 tons, mines got 296,428 tons (over 60 per cent of this in 1945 alone I. The balance is miscellaneous or unknown.
got
B^^
VESSELS
100—1000 TONS
4.^ ^
Shippirifi at
-jj^
Rahmil, major Jap port
Small cargo vessel, attemptin" troo])s
on
New
in iror's early phase,
ivas
Jap
attack.
bay after 5th
AF
at
Britain, settles in shallow
urerked by 5th AF
li-25s
on 2
/Vor.
1943.
Use of such oliscure hays was resorted to after strikes Rabaul (above) had made it too iiot for shipping.
to sii|)|ily lieleaguered
]]^^^J|B?»»wj^-^
^
s«*
Jap
i-uiifoy
(Ainvoy of bv 5th
AF
was caught
3()-pIus shijjs
in
off
Kavieng, Neiv Ireland, by
was erased
March 1913. Below.
in
Bismarck sea action
300-ft cargo vessel burns.
FEAF homhers on 16 February
1944, luu
.i/m/as
Fuel barge, skulking under cloak of vegetation
in
sunk.
Pelikaan
hav. Timor, flames after strafins bv Fifth .Air Force B-25s.
Jap frigate writhes
Snooper B-24 in
the
in
an inferno of
fire
from three 5th AF B-258,
of the Thirteenth Air Force caught this Japanese tanker
Makassar
strait
near Balikpapan on
19
March 1945. sank
it.
will
soon sink (see picture on page 42).
Battleship Hyuga, smashed into a shambles by carrier planes, rests on bottom of Inland sea.
;9
Mines
lire
Inid
by radar In
li.2*)s
at
flyinf!
.i,
000-5. 000
uUitude.
ft.
MINING COMPLETED ISOLATION OF lAPAN ID coniplcto the lilockatle started
ol
Jajian
by the suhmariiie. Operation
"'Starvation" (strategic mining of Jap-
anese
waters
by
B-29s
)
was
com-
menced on 27 March 1945. The mines
^
<^
O <^J
used were of two sizes: 1.000 lbs. for water uj) to 15 fathoms, and 2.000 Il)s. for water
them
up
rested
All of to 25 fathoms. on the sea bottom, and
could function |)roperly
in
ten feet of
mud. .Mechanically,
the
marvel of ingenuity. pilot.
"The damned
mines were a Said one B-29 things can do
everything but fry egg-^-"
They could
be equipped with a "ship count" de\i(f wliich permitted a specified
num-
ber of ships to pass into their field of
Mines were strung (listaiues
between
in
each.
rows with set To ensure
straight flying. B-29s took bearings on small islands or points of land. This is western approach to Shimonoseki.
inlluence without
causing detonation.
This effectively foiled Jap minesweepers, but was only used occasionally because it allowed some valuable Ionnai'c to slip by. A "delayed arming"
Ma^iieli*'
mine
laciicil
filiolographcd
ilrop.
is
It
uilh
|Mia(iuilc
will sink to bottom,
when influenced by metal ship.
during in
al test
explode passing
Acoustic mines were also used.
Continued on next page
49
coniinuea device permitted the mine to come alive only after a specified time had elapsed. Every mine was equipped with a "sterilizing" mechanism which rendered it impotent after a predetermined period.
The map
at the right shows all mines laid, and gives a general idea of the overblockade strategy. Below are shown details of various stages in the mining campaign. This was divided into five phases. all
Phase tion.
1 : 27 March to 2 May. This was planned in support of the Okinawa operaBy mining the great ports of Kure, Hiroshima, Tokayama (naval fueling
point) and the big base at Sasebo, naval units, which otherwise would have rushed
defense of Okinawa, were blockaded. Equally important was the mining of Shimonoseki strait, which prevented the enemy fleet from speeding to Okinawa through Shimonoseki and down the relatively safe western side of Kyushu. to the
Phase II: 3 May to 12 May. Called the "Industrial Center Blockade," this phase severed all major shipping lanes between the great industrial cities which de-
pended on water transportation for 75 per cent of their goods. The operation extended from Shimonoseki strait east to Tokyo bay, with particular emphasis on the vital Kobe-Osaka port system. Ship passages in the strait were reduced to two and four a day by the end of May, compared with 40 a day in March. III: 13 May to 6 June. The "minelayers" now went to work on ports in northwestern Honshu, even going as far up as Niigata, which the Japs thought was "too far north" for the B-29s. As a result, the heavy and direct ship routes to the Asiatic mainland thinned away to almost nothing. At the same time, the B-29s
Phase
continued to pollute the Shimonoseki strait. In fact, nearly half of all mines dropped during "Starvation" were earmarked for this bottleneck area.
Phase IV: 7 June to 8 July. Intensified mining of Northwestern Honshu and Kyushu ports maintained the blockade. The great port system of Kobe-Osaka was also mined repeatedly, as these ports were offering repair facilities to wounded Jap shipping which was constantly attempting to limp through the Inland sea. Phase V: 9 July to 15 August. To complete the blockade, mines were dropped again on major harbors of Northwest Honshu and Kyushu, and as a final touch the B-29s mined Fusan, on Korea's southern tip, and other Korean ports. On 6 August only 15,000 tons of operational shipping were photographed at Fusan. whereas over 100,000 tons had been spotted there a few months earlier. Ship losses for Phase V were estimated to be in excess of 300,000 tons. Only a trickle of All raw material shipment had traffic still flowed from the continent to Japan. ceased, and the shipment of food was only a fraction of that required.
As for the aircraft score, a total of 1,528 B-29s were airborne to lay 12,053 mines in the targets with the loss of 15 aircraft. In a unique operation, demanding the utmost precision and navigational skill, the 313th Wing of the XXI Bomber Command, and particularly its 505th Group, had made possible the first strategic mining blockade in military history. Admiral Nimitz cabled to General Le May: "The continued effectiveness of mining is a source of gratitude. The planning and operational execution of aircraft mining on a scale never before attained has accomplished phenomenal results and is a credit to all concerned.
AFTER GLOSU OF EUST-CO, BY SUBMARI
—
Before mining most cargo
50
line)
went
little
(dotted
lines)
(thick
Shimonoseki.
through to
west
coast.
After
first
seki shrank.
mines laid
phase traffic in ShimonoRed areas in maps show
in
phase discussed.
The
close-in blockade of (above) started when subs and
Ja .^
After' second phase traffic al stopped in Shimonoseki. Inland sea, grew on the west coast (thin lines).
MWTES TD CIAST
SIttLL WEST-
PUTS (COMECTD
YOKOHAMA OBAAAA
AAAIZURU
NAGOYA
MitualK CLMilL-r~.
-(n.rcil Tlifii
(liirci
iniiiiii;;.
VfttT tliinJ phase.
roiitr-
i
M.irk arn.usi
Mining of west Shimono-
iM-t ports cut activity there. cki.
ic,
ra-l
with -ome litip rmiii direct air
Inland sea continued blockaded.
Sliimonoseki, the Inland sea (Kure, Kobe. and west coast ports such as Matsue, Toyama, Niigata.
cld^^ird
attack,
O^-aka
i
After fourth phase. Intensification mining campaign cut flow still further. Korean ports were now vital.
of
.\fter
phase. All-out mining Korean ports, reduced tiny and haphazard trickle.
fifth
effort included
imports to
51
4.
flce
•»
Part
THE B-29er$ Prohpgue: Jtission to Yawaia. 7 Aug. tfHii The briefing began on 7 Augusf at a half hour before midminutes ahead of time the B-29 crews of the
Five
night.
498th Group crowded into the big
was
roof which
wore one-piece
their
hut with
tin
headquarters on Saipan.
its
barrel-vault
Most
them
of
ready for the takeoff. Except for something in their suntanned faces, sharpened rather than hardened by combat, you would take them for any group of college freshmen with a few upper classmen thrown in. flying suits,
They sat on long rows of backless wooden benches. front rows sat the airplane com-
In
the
manders,
who maybe looked a
To them, as
older.
if
elders of the church,
black
—
were handed the
On
hymn books.
like
wall were posted
huge maps,
the front
and
Only a half hour earlier the Group Intelligence staff had been climbing ladders, hurrying to paste up these maps, marking
and
figures with colored crayons.
had been instructed, the target was to be the Empire's largest steel center, Yawata, the Pittsburgh of Japan. everyone
As
In
A
some ways Yawata was a
little
earlier
when
this
prologue
Tom
the 20lh Air Force
and Osaka.
first
of industry.
to
IMPACT'S
Prideaux describes the principal B-29 operations. His epilogue, or conclusion, picks up No. 1 1 again and takes it to Yawata and back home. Editor aspects of
groups
in
Planned as had been
most
of
crews
the
become somewhat
it
and
Yawata had It was
expected that the steel plant would be heavily defended, particularly by antiaircraft. Losses during the past six weeks
had been phenomenally low. Crews had begun to take these night incendiary missions almost casually. But now they were returning to the rugged days of old, or so They recalled the
they thought.
opposition at Tokyo
body
The briefing that was about
it
of
its
prologue and epilogue.
While Yawata deserves no special prominence as a mission, also marked the end of a major phase of B-29 operations.
"Mae fort
checked commander during
takeoff
Vi
est*
from
.
Guam
.
.
flak suits
final
aboard?"
asks Super-
inspection of his crew before
on the "Hirohito Highway"
to
Japan.
start
each of the three wings taking part: the 73rd Wing This was word "routine" can be brings some 3,000 young
the South Pacific to scan maps, to study winds
was part
to
one hut on Saipan would be repeated times that night. For there were 1 1 separate briefings for each of the four
in
days when some men questioned whether the B-29 would justify its existence. Now, a year later, the question was answered, and in a few days the war would be ended. In that one intervening year the whole extraordinary success story of the B-29 had been written, and by chance Yawala
to pilot
No-
very casual about Yawata.
felt
routine procedure, of course, to
American
fierce
and Nagoya.
on Saipan, the 58th and 313th Wings on Tinian. applied
again
of a bugbeor.
on the Japanese homeland. Out of 68 planes that had taken off from the staging base at Chenglu, in China, only 47 hit the primary target. Five planes were lost, all because of operational failures. Damage to the target was slight. Those were the
Nagoya
up for the
split
Yawata, then, was leftover business.
the story of
Prideaux.
B-29 attack
Tokyo,
a daylight mission requiring visual bombing, scheduled for two months, postponed again because of poor weather.
Pacific editor, tells about the 7 August mission to Yawata. on which he flew with the crew of No. 11. 498th Group. Following the prologue, which gets No. 11 w^ay. Captain the started on
historic
enormous 500-
its
like
highly effective "night burn jobs" on Japan's smaller centers
milestone.
the target for the
wound up
Since then the wings had been
over a year ago, on 15 June 1944,
Yawata had been
by a massive force, composed was over six weeks
hit
Actually, the phase
plane attacks on single industrial areas
iinw the B-29ers lived and fought,
in
other statistics pertaining to the mission.
routes
the last target to be
To In
(lajitain
bound
charts,
was
of several wings.
little
they were special
target folders for the mission,
It
the
if
any procedure that
flyers together at
many thousand
midnight on two remote islands
and
in
clouds,
tons of machinery against a
swarm
of hostile islanders. First to address the 498th Group was its commanding officer, who announced the target. Next was the operations officer who told the size of the effort (three wings, or about 400
pointing to the big aerial
B-29s).
Then the intelligence
map on
the wall, described the importance of the industrial
Yawata.
complex
at
route to
and from
In
officer,
turn,
he described the 3,000-mile
the target, check points, assembly point,
aiming points, flak situation (moderate to intense over target), enemy fighters (45 enemy aircraft might be airborne).
Continued on
pae,o
^6 53
North field. Guam, are planes of the 29th 314th Wing. This view, looking east, shows part of the southwestem area of the diagram helow. The 10th I'.G.s B-29s are locatt'd in tlie liackeround.
Squatting
in their dispersal area at
Bomb Group.
NORTH RUNWAY
SOUTH RUNWAY 29tli
BOMB GROUP
TAKEOFF METHODS Truly the "Miracle of the Marianas'" was the ground traffic direction control system used at the start of a B-29 mission to Japan. The diagram above shows how one wing at North field, Guam, took off on a typical "Night 14S
ION
i'
f
10S
lis
I' 12S
\'
i'
I5S
Burn Job." Each group appears at normal strength of 33 planes, plus two
lES
ft
'
spares.
13S
SOUTHWiST SECTtON NORTH
FIELD,
GUAM
By
the war's end the
maximum
NORTH
FIELD,
314th
GUAM
WING
A-39th BOMB GROUP |-330th BOMB GROUP
C-29th BOMB GROUP
D-BtkMWBSMIUP
group strength averaged well over 40. At Zero hour plus one minute Wing leader in No. 1 of the 39lh Bomb Group (A) is airborne at the end of the North runway while No. 1 of the 29th B.C. is halfway down South runway, 30 seconds behind. Others are ail lined up ready to go on signal from a green Aldis lamp. One by one. the rest move out on exact schedule from their hardstands and taxi into position (follow red arrows). Vacant stands are
occupied by planes either unassigned
As soon
as the
first
planes have been
or in repair.
Uncompleted areas are
given the gun (again at 30-second in-
shown
outlined in white.
terval),
At
in gray, left
(opposite page)
is
the day-
time takeoff i)rocedure for one group. This differed from the night system only in that each group used both runw'ays to speed up assembly into formation.
Here the 29th Group,
take off after the 19th and
third
.39th,
to
flies
32 planes, which are divided into two sections. North (N) and South (S).
8
N
taxis
while 2 S slides
way
over behind 7
down
into starting position.
tinues until all the
N
N
the South run-
This con-
planes are lined
backlog of seven S For clarity all Superforts are shown out on the taxi
Then
up.
the
planes takes position.
strips: still
in actuality
the last
16 would
be dispersed on their hardstands
at the
time the group leader takes
off.
55
Cowling inspections were lahorious rouline for ground crewmen who frequently made engine changes overnight. Continued jroni page 53 The weather
officer
and types of bombs (500-pound average of 24 clusters per bomber). Bombs would be dropped at a signal given by the squadron leader or his deputy. Tight formations were vital. How to avoid the guns af Shimonoseki was stressed, along with orders when to jam the enemy's radar. altitude (21 ,000 feet),
incendiary
clusters;
Altogether the group briefing took about a half hour. the crews broke up for separate, the airplane
gunners,
commanders,
flight
more detailed
Then
briefings for
engineers, radio operators,
and radar teams, which included navigators and
bombardiers.
With a few minutes to spare for themselves, many crews went to their own barracks where some men, not flying the mission, were asleep. In the dim light they picked up their personal gear, stuffed a book or candy bar in their pockets,
went a
to the latrine,
frisky
yellow
and,
pup
of
one case, said goodbye to Yaki, Japanese ancestry who had been
in
acquired from a local laundress.
Yaki, a shameless turncoat,
wanted desperately to fly the mission, and had back into the barracks with blandishments and About 0100 the crews went
home
to the
tomato
to
be coaxed
threats.
mess hall for scrambled
bread and butter, canned fruit cocktail. They then jumped onto the trucks that were waiting outside to carry them to their own planes on the hardstands of Isely field. For a moment, when the trucks began to chug up the bumpy coral road, their headlights smothered in dust, there was on outburst of talk. One boy called back to his fat friend, "Hi, bulbous one." Then everybody was quiet. Up on the hardstands the show was going full blast. The big planes glistened under a battery of work lights. Electric power plants rattled and roared. Ground crews scrambled eggs,
56
fried potatoes,
juice,
his precise job of
])lacing a fuze into the tail of a 500-lb. demolition
up the portable scaffolds
briefed nexf (4/10 clouds af target;
showers between target and base). Then the operations officer spofce again, giving the assembly procedure (near two Jima),
bombing
Superfort armorer concentrates hard on
to
bomb.
reach the enormous engines.
anatomy were being With their own peculiar set of surgical instruments, the crews were tightening and testing nerves and tendons, making sure they could stand the strain of combat, making Every crevice, every crack
in
the planes'
probed.
sure that the vital fluids ran smoothly through the metallic
One
veins.
carrot-topped mechanic cut
Somebody
corner of a cowl flap.
wound.
A
much
a
of
little
his
head on the sharp
held a flashlight to the
blood seeped through the red
hair.
It
wasn't
cut.
On one
hardstand rested a new plane, still unnamed, and as "No. 11." Bombs were being towed toward her on a string of dollies. Each dolly carried a bomb. One by one, the dollies were rolled under the open bomb bays,
known only
and a bomb.
copper wire was looped under the was attached to a lifting mechanism inside the plane which hoisted the 500-pound bomb high into its gaping belly. As it rose, the bomb teetered on its wire, was steadied by a calm hand, and finally latched into place. single strand of This wire
Meanwhile the crew had stowed their chutes, Mae Wests, and other equipment into No. M. It was only a half hour before takeoff when an officer rolled up in a jeep. He announced that the entire crew was scratched, taken off the mission. It seemed that over on a nearby hardstand engine trouble had developed in a plane that was to be flown by a squadron lead crew. The plane itself couldn't be flown, but the experienced lead crew was needed. They would fly No. 7?. So the original crew hauled their belongings back out. They were not unhappy about it. canteens, oxygen masks,
The new crew was
commanded by
round-faced, sandy-
He wore a dark two bars pinned in front. Jaunty as it didn't make Criss seem any less calm and reliable.
haired Captain George Criss of West Point. red crew hat with
was,
it
his
B-29s were already turning clumsily out of their hardstands
and
lining
up on the
taxi strip for the takeoff.
Beams from
•W alking
props" through
llie
is
Excess
inloif engines are started.
the mechanics' last task oil
flusiied
is
nore motors began to howl.
crew members Sergeant "Red" Edwards, the radar
lad taken possession. operator from
In
Cleveland Heights,
felt
He had bored a
ucky silver dollar. riission
No. M, the
way.
More and
landing lights slashed through clouds of dust.
'heir
this
he had flown.
J I
pocket for
his
in
small hole
There were 33 holes.
in
it
his
for every
Sergeant Martin
Rosenberg, once a night club head waiter
Philadelphia,
in
ook out a photograph of his pretty wife, Clarice, and hung above his radio table. Rosey always took Clarice to Japan.
"Clear on the left!" shouts starts his engines.
had told Captain lake a jeep back
her.
Fifteen minutes before takeoff he
about
Criss
The Capioin ordered him
it.
to
to his barracks and pick up Clarice. Now, Yawata would be "Rosey's" 35th mission and he was due to go home Jo his wife.
The story of a 6-29 (along
off
might well be a story of
closing doors.
bomb boy
doors."
pushed a switch, and on No. ll's under belly four metal doors swung up and joined. By this ritual, the plane had, as it were, accepted its cargo of bombs, and committed itself to delivering them over the target. Fizer
"Doors and hatches closed." These had been gases
could
open as long as possible so
left
generated
escape,
the
inside
plane
auxiliary motor which operated the landing gear. of doors
was a simple job, done by hand.
Captain Criss and
his
co-pilot,
Lt.
Hugh
that
any
by
the
This closing
At the same time.
Sherriil,
reached up
windows over the pilots' seats. The night wind was expelled, and with it the smell of land.
and
slid
shut the
Then No.
I
I
plane ahead of to the
he
must begin
Criss Still
to roll in
stationary, the plane it
flagman's
"Cowl
Now
that Captain
He pushed
shuddered as
were mustering its strength hand dropped. No. Captain Criss gave another order. effort
meant
This signal
10 seconds.
in
if
the throttles.
one supreme The
to forsake the earlh.
surged
J ?
and
forward,
flaps closed."
the
small
square
around the engines,
like
flaps that are hinged on some monstrous flower,
ventilator
petals
closed up. This third closing of doors streamlined the engines,
made them To many
less
wind-resistant.
crews, the 40-second trip
longest leg of a mission.
down
They sweat
it
the
runway
is
the
and needed to
out, mentally
All power from all four engines is usually some 137,000 pounds of airplane into the air. If one engine confcs out before you are airborne, H is too late to stop. You probably crash. No. 11, however, cleared the runway easily, and Captain Criss gave the last order. literally. lift
With his crew in place, and engines started. Captain Criss gave the order over his interphone to Flight Engineer Lt. Fizer. "Close
just before
The flagman, who stood about 30 feel from the whirring propellers, raised his hand.
t
Only once he forgot
commander
the
Signal warns anyone close to the props.
taxied almost to the starting point. it
shot
white starling
down
line.
Now
edged up ahead was airborne.
the runway. No. fhe plane
As the
1
1
"Gear up." The co-pilot snapped another switch. The nose wheel withdrew into its well, the left and right landing gears folded up, and three more doors closed under them. The airplane had finally renounced all connection with the earth. It was trimmed It rocketed off into a sky filled with moving lights. for flight. But they looked as small and remote as the stars.
On
No.
?J,
heading toward Iwo Jima, the
right
gunner,
from Tennessee, crawls into the long padded tunnel that connects the two pressurized compartments, and snatches an hour's sleep. His sleep is fairly peaceful because he knows that he stands an excellent chance of surviving this,
Tom Gore,
Jr.,
or any, mission,
and going home
to run his
own
farm.
This
tremendously important fact involves all the history records and tactical doctrines of 6-29 operations. They are the answer to the question:
Why
can Tom Gore sleep? C.nntinued on next page
57
Operational Grou^ng Pains; Mission Planning Behind every combat mission flown by the B-29s lay an
amount of
incredible
planning, sweat, sacrifice,
training,
This informal report touches only a few random details of the story. If they jostle together incongruously a general's courageous decision next to a sergeant's silver dollar it can only be pointed out. perhaps platitudinously.
and
guts.
—
that life itself
incongruous and
is
final values are
seldom
known.
shakedown missions over Truk and I wo, the three famous recon missions of Tokyo Rose, and ended up with the first Tokyo attack on 24 December when 111 B-29s at Isely Field, Saipan. took off on the 1,500-mile-long "Hirohito Highway" to bomb the Musashino aircraft engine plant. \^
hether his muse ran dry, or whether he
felt the subject
unsuited to verse, the corporal did not, at any rate, go on
The history of B-29 operations in the Pacific can be dated from the arrival of the first bomber, an event which a corporal in an air service group celebrated in a lengthy ballad. It
ing period in high-altitude flying over the plains of Kan.'^as. the six
began:
THE FIRST On
B-29
citizens of
Saipan heard a great four-motor roar.
Bulldozers fled the runway, and soldiers stopped to cheer
As down came
And
all
"Joltin' Josie
the Japs
Peered out
still
in fear,
— the Pacific Pioneer."
lurking in the cane fields and the caves
and ghosts of Japs were peering from
their graves.
Their plans for co-prosperity they knew they'd have to cancel
As out
of "Joltin' Josie"
In stanzas
tliat
are
bounded General Haywood Hansell.
somewhat
less flowing,
but historically
how the first air service groups two months earlier, built roads out of crushed coral, hauled supplies, set up maintenance equipment on the line "to be ready for the coming of the first B-29." In full detail he designated Brigadier General Hansell as the comaccurate, the corporal told
had moved
mander
in
of the
XXI Bomber Command,
And
the
No.
1
able aid to navigation, but
the thirteenth of October back in nineteen forty-four
The
problems that beset this pioneer wing. problem was weather. Japanese weather showed its hand right from the start. On the first Tokyo mission only seven percent of the bombs were dropped on the target, due to heavy cloud cover. (Radar was an invaluto list the countless
told of the long train-
it
could not
at that
time insure
from high altiudes.) During the first two and a half months that the 73rd Wing, commanded by General O'Donnell, carried on alone, its bombing results were far from decisive. But this was a period of courage and dauntless perseverance, when problems were discovered, diagnosed, and solved, a period as essential to the ultimate sucprecision
cess of the 20th Air Force as a firm foundation
Indicative of the 73rd Wing's fighting spirit
is to is
a
that in ten days, starting with its debut over Tokyo, Jap capital was walloped four times and this despite hazards of blazing a new air route, flying a new and fully perfected type of aircraft. Once it had started,
—
Buddy attacks
stands by and escort
to it
guard back
this
crippled 29 from fighter
to a safe
landing
at
fort.
the fact the
the
not the
^
Iwo Jima.
««#^
Journey's end for this water off' the runway
was in shallow Saipan. on 27 Feb.
ostrich-like Superfort at
Isely
field,
With
iT.dnii pounds, a B-29 is tough to its gross weight of handle on takeoff if an tiigiue conks out, as it did here. I
Continued on page 60 58
u~&«cio con tinned Wing
kept punching
to the limit of its strength.
The Japs struck back. Shortly after midnight, 27 Noveml)er, when the B-29s were lined up on Saipan's runway to launch at dawn their second Tokyo strike, Jap raiders sneaked in to bomb and strafe the base. One B-29 received a damaged other aircraft on It exploded and direct hit. adjacent hardstands. But the mission was run as scheduled. Radio Tokyo was broadcasting threats of Kamikaze ramThese seldom materialized, but they were a source of some anxiety to our crews. Jap fighters appeared to be bamboozled by the high speed and heavy armament of the B-29. Almost all of their effective attacks were head-on. At liigh altitudes, they didn't have enough speed differential to attack from any other quarter. And even in head-on attacks, with a closing speed of more than 500 miles an hour, the B-29 could usually dodge its attackers by a quick flip of the mings.
wing.
Jap fighters found they could do better by waiting until flak, lagged behind its formation, and then, like vultures pouncing on wounded prey, chase it 50 or 100 miles out to sea. In most cases, though, the B-29
some B-29, crippled by
got away.
This policy of attacking stragglers continued throughout It was counteracted by our "Buddy System," in which one B-29 would fall out of formation to defend the
the war.
had to ditch, circle above the and directing air-sea rescue units to the scene. Sometimes an entire formation would slow up in order that a limping B-29 could keep pace. crippled plane, and,
if
it
survivors, dropping life rafts
Fighter attacks, however, grew more and more fierce, and accounted for most of our losses over the target. (At very high altitudes flak was generally too inaccurate to be effecDuring the first five high-altitude strikes (28,000 to
tive.)
on the Mitsubishi aircraft plant at north Nagoya, the B-29s were met by a total of 1,731 fighter attacks. Our gunners shot down 48, probably destroyed 50 others. And on the Wing's 14th strike against the Jap homeland on 27 January, "fighter opposition of unparalleled inCombat reports go on to tell how tensity was met."
33,000
feet)
"fanatical hopped-up pilots pressed their attacks right the
down
stream of fire, dove into formations to rammings, and sprayed fire at random." Five
formations'
attempt B-29s went
down over
the target.
Two
ditched on the
way
home, and 33 returned with battle scars. In turn, the B-29s on this same mission destroyed 60 Jap fighters. "Fuji in '44" became the
men who had used
name
of a select group of air-
famous Japanese mountain as a check B-29 formations against snow-capped Fuji appeared as often in the Marianas as pictures of Niagara Falls in oldtime parlors. point.
Pictures
the
of
Greatest hindrance to bombing accuracy was the high winds over the target. At 30,000 feet, high wind velocities up to 230 mph were met, causing ground speeds as high as 550 mph when bombing downwind. These velocities were far beyond the maximum provided for in the AAF bombing tables. Moreover, the crews were often subjected to extreme cold when the pressurizing system in their planes was knocked out by enemy fire. This gave rise to a grim quip having to do with a remedy for fleas. "Take your fleas with you over Japan, and stab them with an ice pick."
But by now one fact was clear: the B-29 could take it. It had come through its baptism of fire, had felt the full force of Jap fury and Jap weather. It was a superb combat weapon.
By now' it was clear to any observer that the strategy for bombing Jajian would follow much the same pattern as in Germany. And this was to bomb aircraft production first. As set forth in FM 100-20 on the Command and Employment of Air Power, "The gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any major land operation."! Before any priority targets were selected, however,
intel-
was culled from every conceivable source. In marked contrast to the European theater, where U. S. target specialists could benefit from British intelligence and where the Germans themselves, with their zeal for documentation, had published volumes of facts and figures about their resources, wartime Japan was virtually terra incognita. ligence material
Planning war for many years, the naturally secretive Ja[ anese had taken extra pains that their plans should not be
known. In one of history's greatest fact hunts, information had to be pieced together from reports made by missionaries, commercial travelers, former residents of Japan, U. S. engineers who had been hired to build Jap plants, even from snapshots taken by American summer tourists. Added to this were the first reconnaissance photos taken back in the spring of 1944 by 20th Air Force pilots whose daring Chinabased photo missions, flown by single B-29s deep into enemy territory, were among the war's most heroic deeds. Starting with this remarkable
compendium, much of
it
two committees met in Washington: the Committee of Operational Analysts and the Joint Target Committee. They compiled a list of 1,000 precision objectives.
still
valid,
From
picked out Jap aircraft and oil industries, shipping, and the Japanese industrial urban areas as major targets. The final priority list was drawn up by the CO. A. in this order: (1) aircraft industry, (2) urban industrial areas, (3) shipping. A broad directive was issued to the XXI Bomber Command, saying in effect, "Here are the types of targets. Now the job is up to you." this the Joint Chiefs of Staff
production, the coke,
To transmute
a general
orders for individual still
a vast
steel,
Washington
bomb crews
amount of work.
directive into specific
in the
Marianas required is what
In rough outline, this
happened
The job was assigned to target specialists of the Bomber Command's A-2 (Intelligence), cooperating closely with A-3 (Operations).
Their most crucial need was for detailed,
up-to-date facts about specific targets and the routes thereto.
These had to be obtained largely from aerial photos. Starting in November, 1944, and operating out of the Marianas, the 3rd Photo Squadron ran almost daily missions to Japan, flying B-29s modified for camera equipment. Guns, incidentally, were not sacrificed. By 1 August, the Squadron had completed 433 such missions and had photographed literally every square mile of Japan. Here were the eyes of the B-29ers the advance echelon of eyes.
—
Once preters)
the film
got
was printed the Pis (photographic
They
busy.
magnifying glasses, analyzed
targets,
scrutinized
spotted
even
enemy
estimated
inter-
each print through defenses, landmarks,
what kind of building Continued on page 62
60
m-£
^ Twin-engined Japanese fighter (ISick) scuttles by a Siiperforl's tvinn (top center) during a head-on attack.
One wing gone, Hak
hit.
Over
a 29 hurtles
down
40<~f of all losses
in
flames after a direct
occurred
in the
Tokyo
area.
Another victim almost
to hits
of accurate Jap flak
during
its
bomh
was
this B-29.
blown
run near Nagoya on 26 June.
61
materials were used so that the bomb experts would know what type of bombs could do most damage.
Armed
with such data, the A-2 and A-3
men
at
Head-
quarters then proceeded to lay out specific missions.
The technique of planning
a mission evolved with prac
Eventually, a planning meeting was devised, an in formal round-table gathering of veteran operations officers tice.
along with specialists on targets, navigation, weather, enemy and antiaircraft defenses, radar, radio, armament,
fighters
ordnance, and chemical warfare. Pure theory was not repre These were men who from first-hand flying experi
sented.
ence "knew what the hell
it
was
all
about."
Together they drew up a kind of blue print for each mis sion. It told the force required, bomb loads, routes and alti tudes to and from the target, navigational check points aiming points, axis and altitude of attack. These mission; were then submitted to the commanding general for his ap proval, and
wrapped up for future
Fast game of medicine ball on the beach at Saipan was tonic for Gen. Hansell (second at left), first CO of the XXI B.C.
use.
Immediately, however, each complete "blue print" was sent to the A-2 at each wing headquarters. Called a fragmentary plan, it was a tip-off, a forewarning of what missions might be
coming up, any time from three days
to three
Several frag plans might be submitted at one time.
weeks.
Thanks to this advance warning, the wing A-2s could assemble most of the data for a mission maps, charts, and and keep them on file until more specific orders were so on issued. This system also enabled the wings to recommend target studies, based on the frag plan, for their own respective bomber groups. In other words, it enabled the airplane crews to do homework on possible future targets, instead of depending entirely on the final briefings.
—
—
Headquarters staff also benefited by the system. They were not committed far in advance to bomb any single target. They could cut their cloth according to last-minute requirements. Had they been committed and, for example, had the target been "socked in" by bad weather, it would have meant sitting idle until the weather improved. Now there were alternate targets to pick from, and the entire air force was ready to roll on any one of them. Final orders from the
XXI Bomber Command were
by the commanding general (1)
in
Good games.
for morale were these officers vs. enlisted men ball Above. Cpl. P. F. Murphy lays down a neat bunt.
issued
two installments.
Intentions, usually one or two days ahead of a mis-
sion, clinched the target, authorized the
groups prepare
all
wings
to
have their
material for briefings, and to haul bombs.
Firm Decision, 12
to 24 hours ahead of a mission, wings after the final weather forecast. It usually included the date and hour of takeofi^, and gave authorization to load bombs. All this was passed on to the
(2)
was issued
to the
groups.
Each wing issued its own field orders, which included the order of takeoff for each group. The group A-3 then prepared a schedule, known as a flimsy, which was handed to every airplane commander, stating the exact time and order of takeoff for each individual aircraft within the group.
Thus each pilot, with his briefing and target study in mind, and with his target folder and flimsy in hand, was ready to bomb Japan, backed up by the knowledge and experience of many thousand men. In the deepest sense, the 11 crewmen in a B-29 did not fly alone.
62
Pfc. Reese L. Bybee (left) upheld honor of the AAF on Saipan by out-pointing Sailor Bob Robinson in a close bout.
'^aipun (Country for 15-29 crewnieii
(Hub featured who wanted to
matches
higli-class tennis
forget the
war for
a spell.'
Sweating out takeoff time of a mission wasn't so tough for Superfort crews when they could play some quiet poker.
Woontioirn: Miott ihe 3iarianus Meanwhile, a ()attern of had hegun to take form and with minor variations repeated itself on living
all
three islands: Saipan.
Guam.
The
Tiriian.
bat-
remnants of Japoccupation were anese pushed aside. The Age Bulldozer had of the dawned. Seabees and avitered
ation
engineers
pitched
pup tents in the morning near some clump
tiieir
of trees for a landmark,
and Gen. Arnold talks shop nilh B-29 rreir chief, S/Sgt. Flifss.
at
couldn't
they
nightfall find
their
way
home. The landmark was gone. The bulldozers had been around. Acres of jungle were uprooted in a few hours, making way for new air strijis and bivouac areas. \X'hat once looked like a tropical paradise on a tinted postcard took on the character of all American pioneer settlements shanty towns, lumber camps, gold rush towns. 191-l-'45 was a season of mud or dust. ground echelons of the .314th Bomb Group arrived on 18 January, they hacked a site out of the jungle,
circle
at
Guam
and
in the
evenings drove eight miles to
Harmon
field for
and were dust-covered again by the time they got home. Men working on the runway at North field set up ihfir cots on the sidelines and rigged up pu|) tents on top of the cots. On more than one morning they woke up after a heavy rain to find that the water around tiieni was cot-higii. a siiower,
and the pup tents presented the rather miraculous appearance of being pitched on the surface of a lake. Japs were still around but they were more of a nuisance than a menace. The 1th \X ing had its own private banshee, [ircsumably a Jap. who yowled hideously out of the jungle about ihiee o'clock every morning for a week, and was never
M
caught,
it
was not
restful.
groups, which had pitched
its
One of the Wing's air camp on the edge of the
service
jungle,
was so luinerved by the sights and sounds of prowling Japs that at night thev arranged their vehicles in a big semi-
and directed
The Japs threw
their headlights into the wilderness.
all
stones at the headlights.
The home-making instinct burgeoned. Over on Tinian. where the 313th Group flew its first mission on 4 February, officers were seen triumphantly bearing a cracked little wooden box they had discovered in the canefields. It would be used in their tents for a shelf, table, chair, bureau, or bar.
On Guam some men were no bees
tried to grow^
to pollinate the
tomato plants, but there One moonlight night
blossoms.
was seen transferring pollen from blo.ssom blossom on the end of a pipe cleaner. Growing vegetables on Saipan was forbidden for a while because the soil was declared unhealthy. But there was no ban on flowers. One airplane commander beautified the front yard of his Quonset a general's aide to
home
with a picket fence, morning glories, dahlias, sun peas, and Burpee's Giant Zinnias (zinnias
flowers, sweet
grew
in the
Marianas far beyond the dreams of Burpee).
A
Rats were rampant.
big de-ratting contest was held by
the residents of several Quonsets on Saipan. For every rat shot dead, a rat was painted above the front door. For a rat that got away, half a rat was painted uj). and "a probable." At the end of two weeks, the men in the winning Quonset were given a beer party by the losers.
wounded listed as
The winter of Vi'hcn the
Were Amerieanized
\^
hiskey was
common
currency.
A Jap Samurai
sword, in
the open souvenir market, could be bought with three to nine quarts of Old Grand-Dad. Open-air movie theaters sprouted in
the jungles
ancient Greece.
and on
Many
hillsides like the amphitheatres of
audiences sat on rows of
bomb
crates.
Church services were held, outdoors, in tents, and finally in real churches, which were usually Quonsets with a bunty But the spire pointed heavenlittle steeple stuck on top. ward. Baseball fields, basketball and squash courts were built, and used whenever possible. Music was everywhere in the Marianas. Radios were forever blaring Lonely Side.
./ l.ittli-
on thr
Galleries of pin-up girls appeared on the walls and
ceil-
Family snapshots were near every bed. Of all the four-letter words current in the .\rmy, "home" was the most popular. Cooks mixed chocolate custard in the big plexiglas blisters from wrecked B-29s. A general at a staff meeting blew off because his post's ice cream freezer was too long out of order. (.(tnlimu-d on nrxl page ings of shacks, tents, airplanes.
63
D-&9crS continued Such of the
details, insignificant in themselves,
Army's
effort to
keep
alert, to
make
were
all
evidence
the best of
poor
if
By April Guam's Route No. 1 became what is practically the symbol of America: a straight paved road, lined with telephone poles, and jammed with traffic. You felt that such a highway must lead to a big city. The road had other plans. Riding northward on Route No. 1, you came to a rise, and then suddenly it was spread out before you: North field with its two 8.500-foot runways, its miles of taxi strips and
set
hardstands. covered by a sea of B-29s, their rows of wings
It
tail
rudders arching up like surf. and another to end
—
was a satisfying way for one highway
to begin.
An air war has some peculiar characteristics, which are doubly felt when it is waged from island bases, 1,500 miles from the main targets. A large part of the war existed in men's minds. Day by day. there was little evidence of combat or violence, and when it came it was shortlived, except in men's memories. A B-29 has engine trouble on takeoff, cannot gain altitude, and crashes into the sea with an appalling geyser of flame. In one moment it is gone, while men on the shore watch helplessly. A B-29 comes back to Tinian the last one had after a mission with three engines shot out
—
50 miles from base. The pilot has radioed ahead. Ambulances and fire trucks are waiting to meet him, if he makes it. The suspense exists in hundreds of minds. Miraculously, the pilot does make it. And after that, it is something to tell about, to remember.
failed
A
takeoff at North field is scheduled for 1900 (7 p.m.). a maximum effort job. involving all four groups of one wing, or about 140 planes. Ground crews, officers, enlisted It is
MWO9 B'29
was a psychological
benefit.
It
was there
back on.
the first crippled B-29 landed there, end of the war, 2,251 Superforts landed at Iwo. A large number of these would have been lost if Iwo had not been available. Each of the B-29s carried 11 crewmen, a total of 24,761 men. It cost 4,800 dead, 15.800 wounded,
and 400 missing to take the island, a terrific price for the Navy and Marines to pay. but one for which every man who served with the 20th Air Force and VII Fighter Command eternally grateful. started
with
is
last
planes are out of sight. Not out of mind.
Sweating out a mission is an Air Force rite. Different men it in different ways, some by playing poker, or waiting for radio reports, or trying to sleep and forget. But nobody quite forgets. A ground crew member who is charged with keeping a certain No. 3 engine in perfect condition, and has named it after his wife, is sweating out all 18 cylinders of No. 3. A colonel who briefed a group on enemy fighter op position wonders whether his briefing will save or cost lives. Not all sweating is done on the ground. The crews in the air are thinking ahead about the few moments over the target.
do
A bomber
outfit is full of thinkers.
So seldom do these inner emotions produce any outer' evidence, that when they do it is worth noting. There was one target known as "Old 357," or "General O'Donnell's Pet Little Target." It was the important Nakajima aircrafti ])lant near Tokyo. To destroy it became the special job of the 73rd Wing on Saipan. and the target seemed to be jinxed.
They bombed planes.
On
it
on 13 different missions,
at
a cost of 58
the nights before the later missions were run
Old 357. the barracks where the crew members slept were and dark as usual. There was only the meagerest evidence of what was going on in their minds, while they took the bomb run over and over again, while they weighed their chances of living or dying. It was a row of cigarettes glov to
quiet
ing in the dark.
crude
dirt
runway
that
barely ac-
the
first
Superfort. which was refueled by gaso-
line carried in the
machinery which could handle scores of B-29s. This in.
is
They
where Major Charles A. called
him
easier to see
ice Station," the
him
(Rocky)
Stone came it was
chief of B-29 maintenance but
as the operator of "Rocky's Wayside Servmost important drop-in-and-fix-it station in
Rocky
the world.
is
an ex-navigator
who
got his Iwo job
by telling a colonel in the States, "Sir, I think your maintenance section stinks." A produce trucker from California, Rocky, with his square, stubble-bearded face under a billed cap and a hunk of tobacco always clamped in his jaw, looked the part of a big-time shop foreman. The story of hisi Iwo works is well told by an officer who visited there early in July during the period of night fire missions: 'At 3:30 a.m. Rocky is up. waiting in greasy khakis on the line.
There
nothing
is
except the soft
murmur
in the
sky
yet,
not a light or sound,
of the night wind from the sea. The
highway through the clouds west of Iwo is empty, but Rocky and other cap-billed men who huddle by the runway know the traffic will come booming down it in a few minutes now. in the packed, early morning rush back to the Marianas.
"The a
Tail lights dwindle into the clouds and the
helmets of marines. At war's end. it had an elaborate system of blacktop runways, gas pumps and
From 4 March, when
Iwo
In less than an hour, the entire group
sense of relief.
airborne.
each
feels a
commodated
to the
is
man
the
—
it
of wheels finally leaves the ground, each
first as
As
for
Iwo is eight miles long a very little island. But never did so little mean as much to so many. Located about midway between Guam and Japan, Iwo broke the long stretch, both going and coming. If you had engine trouble, you held out for Iwo. If you were shot up over Japan and had wounded aboard, you held out for Iwo. If the weather was too rough, you held out for Iwo. Formations assembled over Iwo, and gassed up at Iwo for extra long missions. If you needed fighter escort, it usually came from Iwo. If you had to ditch or bail out, you knew that air-sea rescue units were sent from Iwo. Even if you never used Iwo as an thanksgiving.
to fall
two. the planes begin to take off. slowly at
Haven and Fighter Springboard
To every B-29 crew who flew to Japan after March, fact that Iwo Jima had become a U. S. base was a cause
emergency base,
up on the mounds of coral along both runways.
line
they could never raise their tremendous bulk.
living conditions so that the big job could be done.
shining in the sun. their
64
men
Two by
behind
first it
is
airplane a second
light
and
comes out of the north, and The string of them begins Continued on page
third.
iwo campaign is symbolized by these skeleon the hillside near Motoyama airfield organized resistanre reased on If) March. 2() days
iL:::e«liiess ot -
Nn.
(if
1.
Jap -Ml
plane.-
U-Uay. though nioppingup la>ted until iujl! .\pril. Marine casualties were high (32.6rj^ of force involved I. but Onlv •HQ2 were captured. ihe enemv lost 22..322 killed.
alter
65
b-ZSCrS continued -J */
^^
./
^
-
I
'
a liii.si<-sl
iilaii'
on
hiiininint: /u'o
Major Rocky Stone
(right) sizes
irc/s
up
j/ic flitiht
line al Central field after a ni^ht mission to Japan.
the repairs or service
needed and wastes no time getting his ground crew rolling.
66
Here the
i
"Oflf with the old, on with the new" might have been a slogan for Ivvo's mechanics, shown iiere installing a prop.
-?\vv
•ived ichalever repairs they
Runaway prop ri|i|ip(l
this
hupp
lieu
nil.
liolc
kiiorked out
in
Itfo fiUinfi slalion
needed.
the
llie
fuselage
No. of
I
engine and
Superfortres.s.
supplied super-deluxe rapid service
Same B-29 29
at Iwo.
l<>
the H-29s.
as at left craslicil into anutlu-r lialtlc ilanidpiiil
Bombardier's sprained ankle was the only injury.
67
Locked brakes from a Tokyo
caiiM-il
strike, to
this
Suiifrlurl.
reluming
to
hvo
careen througli fonr P-51s parked
Though no longer able
to
Tuo creu llifiht line. Men crouched behind jeep
on
nieniheis were liunied .severely. to
avoid exploding ammunition.
power a B-29, these hattle-danmged engines were stripped
to
provide spare parts.
move across. They are on the way home. Then one bead rops out of the necklace of lights. The bead wheels down nd away from the rest of the string. Its crew is not happy. has troubles. Except for Iwo it might have to crash in the
}
Rocky watches
cean.
up.
much
the plane as
it
He
takes shape.
sizes
as a filling station operator sizes
main traffic ound-house foreman aves the
line
and turns
in
up a car which under his shed, or a
sees a locomotive steam in.
Exi)ertly
on its approach. It is still pitch ark. The descending R-29 looks more like a platform than n airplane. It is a tremendous steel platform, weighing 25.000 pounds and flashing with lights. Its landing gears e studies the Superfort
ome down
like
club feet lowered inquiringly into space,
grope delicately for the more solid but treacherous
'hey
'Engines are okay." Rocky says. 'Refuel ob.' Before the plane stops he has it shunted to the refueling
evel of the ground.
No
action.
lalf circle, t
No
delay.
time wasted. The taxiway
built in a
and the bomber simply contimies around
reaches an area of gas pumps.
I'hich will
is
form
there,
is
It
the
and automatically
first in
until
first in
"The next plane landing ar out in the sky as
it
is
different.
turns to
smoke hangs out behind
it
come
still.
^ ou can see that
in.
A brownish
trail
like a thin tail in the light
low half moonlight, half dawn. nd
One engine
is
feathered
stands out looking crippled and sore, like a
It
roken hand. Crash truck and ambulance drivers tense. The lane
logy and
is
it
waves from side
to side as
it
jockeys
In the
expected
men on
the sideline, straightens. Before it has Rocky's men steer it into the main maintenance department where serious overhauling is done. The good engines scarcely jerk to a halt before mechanics begin tearing out the bad one. and a new engine is already on its way from the shop. rolled to a stop.
"In a jeep. Rocky rides lierd on these monsters that
come
dawn sky. He drives right up into the |ioun(ling bombardment their propwash beats in the dust. He and other men in jee|)s. sparrows pecking at eagles, [)eck piling out of the
and [)rod them into their right places. There
and
of haste
is
the feeling
The big boys have dropped momentarily and everyone on Iwo Jima is hurrying to get
strain.
out of the race
them back in it again. No minute can be wasted. Nothing must delay the continuous bombing of Japan.
"Rocky watched a burning Superfort come in recently, was crabbing in sideways. One wing was in full blaze. Rocky didn't move from his place near the runway. The it
plane partially landed, [)artially out of all sides of
"Then going to
way and
it
as
it
fell
on the
Men
strip.
came streaking down
piled
the strip.
Rocky saw something else. The plane wasn't stop. It was going to rush off one side of the runinto
a
line of [larked
airplanes.
He
ran along-
and signaled to the pilot to stop. Then suddenly he realized there was no (lilot in the plane. The pilot had scrambled out with the crew, fearing explosion. side of
it
It
exju.«t
grand strategy of the Pacific war. Iwo Jima was to serve
primarily as a base for fighters escorting
As stated above, it served the B-29s even more importantly. But it did become the ba.se for the VH Fighter (iommand. which made combat history in its own right. B-29s.
Pilots of the Vllth flew some of the longest, toughest missions ever undertaken by a fighter outfit. They had to fly
weather that earned every
in
lexicon of abuse.
name
foul
in
the
Army's
Jack-knifed into the cramped cockpits of
P-51s.
their
they flew for eight or nine hours over 1.600 miles of sea. for only a few minutes' strafing of enemy air-
fields and other targets. "It wasn't .so bad after the first hour because your legs got numb." said one pilot. "But when you got home, you didn't feel much like sitting. You were raw."
The Mustangs
started moving to Iwo early in March. The chores were aid on Iwo itself to the still embattled marines, and neutralizing raids against Jap positions in the
nearby Bonins. As all-around trouble shooters,
in his jeep
"Rocky thought fast. He brought the jeep beneath the pl.iiii'"wing, and leaving his jeep running, hurtled
the P-51s
often found that trouble had evaporated before thev had
much chance
to shoot at it. The expected Jap attacks on Iwo seldom materialized. In part, this was because the presence of fighters scared them off and partly because, with the lo.ss of Iwo and the threatened loss of Okinawa, the Japs decided to pull in their horns and concentrate on Kamikaze attacks.
On
Rocky Stone, the diagnostician, stands motionless. Major cause.' he says. 'We'll put her over the maintenance mat.' The plane yanks sideways on the landing, but. fortufor the
In the plane — which might have — he applied the brakes. .stopped
short of the line of parked airplanes."
or a straight landing position.
[lately
hot cabin.
first
ine to take off.
f
the
ploded any moment
a long line
placed
it is
it
into
was
7 April the Fighter
be P-51s took to
its ofl'
No. to
1
Command
assignment.
escort
began what presumably
One hundred and
eight
B-29s on a daylight mission to
Tokyo, and proved their usefulness
at once by shooting Jap fighters at a loss of only two P-51s. From that date until the Jap surrender, ten escort missions were llown. This relatively small number was due to the sudden increase of night incen(liar\ attacks for which no escort was required.
down
21
The as
fighters' real foe, as always,
they
was weather. On
1
June,
returned from escorting B-29s on a daylight
cendiary attack on Osaka, 24 P-.51s were lost area extending from the surface to 2.H,000
in a
feet,
in-
frontal
with zero
heavv rain, snow and icing conditions. \JTiaf these planes went through, battered aiul tossed in a .seething cauldron of black weather. nobod\ will ever know. Two more fighters collided and crashed. One pilot from the 14th Fighter Squadron spent six days iti a one-man raft, and was knocked out of the raft five times by waves. He was finally picked up by a submarine, which by pure luck happened to be surfaced. On his fifth day he weathered the typhoon which ripped the bow ofl" the cruiser Pittsburgh. His only comment on the ordeal was. "I just sal there." visibilitv,
On
Command
began its series of sweeps on and for the first lime was in business for itself. Altogether, it was able to launch 3.'^ effective strikes, and was going strong when the war ended, a partner of the much bigger and, of course, more powerJap
ful
16 April the
ground
Navy
installations,
carrier air forces.
no question that these attacks helped deny the Japs the use of airfields in the TokyoNagoya-Osaka area, while the Okinawa-based fighters did likewise for the
There
is
Contimiril
nil iK'xt
piipr
69
D^ZfCrS continued
tt'nisl
siunner of escort B-29 trrilches a trio of Mustangs flying close-in
Kyushu-Shikoku area. The Japs were forced to camouflage their planes under trees, in revetments, in cemeteries. Planes were parked as far as five miles from airfields, which meant that by the time a plane had been taxied to its field its engines had become so overheated that it couldn't be flown for awhile. This enforced dispersal complicated the Jap maintenance problem tenfold and the Japs at best were never too good at maintenance. From the fighter pilot's viewpoint, it was discouraging sometimes to get all the way to Japan, and not be able to rip into a sitting duck.
—
running
tories,
power houses, facand coastwise shi]jping became prime targets of airfields
knocked
out. railroads,
opportunity.
As a sidelight, it is interesting to note that the Japs appeared to have no adequate aircraft warning facilities. Our fighters were continually catching Japs running for cover, jumping off bicycles, piling out of trains and trucks, even
70
tennis
to Japan.
It became a court martial and non-military targets such as
courts.
offense to strafe civilians
isolated houses, silos, hospitals, schools.
The success
of the fighter strikes depended to a large
extent on licking the navigational problem.
This involved
a reversal of the standard procedure of fighters escorting
bombers, and required that the B-29s be used as
The
tactical unit for the P-51s
escorts.
was the group, which con-
squadrons of 16 planes each, plus two spares The fighters took off^ two at a time, with 15-second intervals between each pair, and fell into formation about five miles offshore, then proceeded to the rendezvous point at Kita, a pinpoint volcanic island about 40 miles north. There the group joined three navigational B-29s which had taken off from Iwo about a half hour earlier, and were circling over Kita until the fighters pulled in. sisted of three jjer
With
from
during a fighter su^eep
It
squadron.
was
the job of the liig ])lanes to lead the
little
ones
Pointinii for
Tokyo. P-5Is on
this
mission arent strayinii far from the "shepherd" who takes them holh
across the 600-mile stretch of sea to Japan, giving them the
and standing ready to drop rescue equipment in case a fighter was forced down. The lead squadron of the fighter group flew about a quarter of a mile behind the H-29s. and other formations benefit
of their superior navigational
aids,
followed close after.
Thus chaperoned, Point, usually about
squadrons attacked the target, while the third provided top Then the covering squadron came down and took a crack at the target, while another squadron went upstairs. But the group as a unit always stuck together, .'\fter the strike, the planes proceeded by units of not less than a pair back to the Rally Point where the B-29s were waiting. cover.
the fighters |iroceeded to the Departure
20 or 30 miles
off the
Jap coast, and
then struck off by themselves to attack the target.
Mean-
proceeded 50 or 100 miles to the Rally Point, where the fighters were expected to reassemble after the strike. For the B-29s, it was sim|)ly a case of circling the l^ally Point for a half hour or longer, waiting for the scrajipy smallfry to come back if they did. while, the B-29s
—
Ii was customary for each group to concentrate on only one target at a time, in order to provide mutual protection against enemy air attack and ground fire. Usually two
irays.
The rounding-up of of
plane-to-plane
the fighters
radio
was expedited In
a
telephone communication,
system which
enabled one or more groups of fighters to be in constant touch with their navigational guides. (This same system links
the
fighters
with air-sea-rescue units, and has been
many pilot-s lost in bad weather or forced down at sea. The fighter pilots and their B-29 guides are like characters in a vast combat drama, making their entrances and exits as they careen through the clouds at lightning speed, speaking lines that sound like responsible for .saving the lives of I
double-talk but are often a matter of
life
or death.
i.nnlinurd on papr
7.i
eM^^' Engine of
this
Mustang conked on
4
Another P-5I Its stabilizer just
made
it
is
V
hoisted
take-off
due
runway
after
to Iwo^s volcanic dust.
Injured pilot (right)
is
helped away,
[
*%
from
Itvo's
its
almost sliced in two by ]a.\) AA this Mustang hack to Iwo OK. Mt. Suriliarlij is at right.
1
engine
quit.
The
fire is
from the plane
in picture above.
P-tTNs liegati operations from Iwo in July. shake-down mission, this one spun into a hill,
\^'hile
on
a
killed pilot.
Inini /Hif^c 71
('(irili/iiicd \\ lull
hiaiil as
l(ill(iu> lit'ic is a
aiilicld.
lliiiifji
(III
Tlii'
code
;
tlial
Kally Point alter
l>c
iiiifjlit
ati
attack
are fiilional, hut follow
riaini's
The
clo-cly the actual names.
Small Kry
of dialo-jiif
stialcli
a|i|)n>a(li the
llif lij;liti'is
characters: 48 fighters called
divided into three squadrons
known
respectively
Doctor. Lawyer. Merchant; three Navifjalional B-2')s
as
liMcle
Adam, Uncle
lairsea-rescue B-29
llie
I
hen our action
\\
Bill.
Uncle (Charles; a -Super Dunilio
known
as Cartwheel.
starts, the fifihters
are just returning to
Bally Point ahout 20 miles off Japati. where the three
l)-2''s
are orhiting. waiting to guide them home.
Adam
L'nci.f.
Any more Doctor
(the lead B-29):
Give Uncle
lapproacliing the Bally Point?
Uncle Chaki.ks: Uncle Adam,
Adam
ships
home on a 185 course. Adam: All Small Fry coming
Fm
same position. Mayday.
his business.)
is
Adam
Uncle
the last two Sm.all Fry.i
calling all Small
Fry.
I'm heading
This
home
on course 360. Follow me.
MISSION COMPLKTLD into the Bally Point:
Uncle ('harles has just headed on course 185. Follow him. Five more Small Fry join Uncle (Charles and start home. A lew miruilcs later Uncle Bill rounds up 1.'^ Small Fry and also starts lioinc. Uncle Adam waits for the last three I
stragglers.
ruhher life raft I. Rooster showing
and Navy, the sub heads toward the enemy coast to pick up the downed airman, while the Super Dumbo stands by until the rescue is completed. Meanwhile. Uncle .Adam continues
proceeding L'nci,e
I
with
lays this message to Cartwheel 42. Vt ithin ten mimites Cartwheel 42 arrives over the man in the ruhher raft, and then calls a submarine to the scene. Defying the Jap Air Force
Uncle Adam: (Picking up
is
Goodyear
in
circling scene
(This last remark refers to his IFF system which will help guide Cartwheel 42 to the .scene. Again. Uncle Adam re-
a call.
Uncle Charles. 1 have seven Doctor ships with me. and ten Lawyers. I'm this
Man
Calling (-iartwheel 12.
For the B-29 |)ilots this escort work mav sound like a comparatively easy assignment. They did not run into much combat. But most of them would far rather have faced combat and been spared the worry and strain of .shepherding a flock of fighter pilots
who had become
their close friends.
]
O.ne (a fishier): This is Doctor Bed One calling Cartwheel. (Cartwheel is one of the Super Dumhos la B-2yi circling a submarine posted at one of the Air-Sea-
DoCTOK Bed
Bescue stations. Due to faulty communication. Cartwheel does iiol hear llie lighter's message,
came back to Iwo after two fighters had been shot down over Japan. "You live and eat with these boys. You take their money at poker. You know " He didn't feel like talking all about them. That's why "Hell," said one B-29
[tilot,
as he
—
any more.
l
IInci.k rclav
\|)\m: Dtxtor
\our message
Red One.
to (!artwheel
this
is
Umle Adam.
I'll
1'2.
DocToH Bed One: My engine's smoking from llak hit. code for his location) at Silver Moon, seven Zero
Fin
I
(ioiiig to splash.
Uncle Adam: Boger. (He Kescue radio channel.) This uheel
12.
Si)lash at Silver
switches to a special Air-Seais
Uncle
Caktwheei. 42: Roger.
Proceeding
DiKTdH Bed Two
man
Sluiilows
fireii-
(winji
Adam
calling Cart-
Moon, seven Zero. to
fifihlt-rs
got hark
Beturning from a mission, pilots usually retired to a bath house built especially for fighter clientele. Here was a rubdown talde and a row of deep tin tubs. The tubs were fed by hot. sul|iluirous water that springs from Iwo's volcanic depths. Hot water is an almost unheard-of luxury in the soaking their muscles in these curative baths, still another reason to thank God, and the Marines, for one of the world's most ugly, useful islands. Pacific.
scene of splash.
In tlir fifilitiT in Irouhli'):
long hefon' the
Fighters were also aided bv radar-equipped Black Widows lP-61s) who, in addition to patrol and combat duties, often guided P-51s onto Iwo's runways when they were socked in.
home
.After
U. S. airmen had
to luo.
Missions used to
last eight
hours or longer.
B-29 PAYOFF continued
^.
10,000'
Weather on Mission 183 ^5,000'
1
15,000'
V
'
''^H
^-...^iHf
20,000
1/10
2/10
5/10
:^^^H'
'
10
10,000'
/
5.000
1/10/
/
—A.X.
/tl
_
-
:
:
:=
_4/J_0
RBSPB
„
»**^*'
5/J_0
;->?*'P^" -^v^-t^^'-^r
9/ .1°
'°'>
^^^^mH gg
1
74
ROUGHEST MISSION
20th's
liolli llic l'a< itic
and
furious mission thai
its
tlii"
hiiro[>(ari air
war- had diw
survivors will never forget.
It
liirct-.
stands
out above the others because our losses were espeeially heavy and the combat was especially bitter. In Europe it was. of course, the famous Regensburg-Schweinfurt attack on 17 August 194.3 when we lost 60 bombers. In the Pacific it was Mission 18.3 to Tokyo's urban area on the night of 25-26 May 1945. Facts and figures pertaining to 18.3 are treated graphically on the two diagrams at the left.
Of
all the
Also
costly.
Twentieth Air F'orce missions, it was the most profitable.
this
was the most
Of 498 airborne planes. 464 bombed the primary target. Twenty-six were lost to enemy action, which is 5.6 per cent of the attacking force.
Of
the 5.586 crew
On
the credit side. 18.9 square miles of
out
— the
Our
members. 254 were
casualties.
Tokyo were wiped
record for a single incendiary attack.
known causes are indicated by the blue lower diagram. Of |)lanes that were mi.ssing for unknown reasons, the majority were undoubtedly accounted for by AA. One hundred Superforts. 21.3 per cent, losses
numerals
to
in the
got back with flak damage.
The Japs put on
a spectacular
display of searchlights, rockets, weird "balls of
bombs and
all the
other tricks in their bag.
fire."
Some 94
Baka
attacks
were attempted by the enemy interceptors. Seventeen were claimed to have been shot down and four damaged.
From each wing there were twelve pathfinder planes, whose routes are indicated, on the lower diagram, by narrowwhite lines. These lines coincide with the blue "wing lines" from their bases to Iwo Jima. Then they converge in a solid white line on the route from Iwo to Tokyo. Flown by specially .500-lb.
trained
incendiary
crews,
resistant concrete buildings
and
B-29s
pathfinder
these
bombs designed
to penetrate the
carried
most
fire-
to start large-scale fires that
the target areas for the wings that followed
would identify later.
Air-sea rescue submarines and surface vessels destroyers remained at their indicated stations I
or destroyer escorts
i
Catalinas and during the 14-hour mission. Dumbos and four B-29 Super Dumbos stood by until the strike aircraft had passed. Then they moved up near Japan, all
(
IMTsi
searching for anybody who was in trouble. Oash boats stayed on duly during takeofTs and landings at the Mariana bases. (See next page for an account of the organization of air-sea rescue,
i
at the top of the page shows the weather encountered on the route to Japan by the B-29s. The fractions (8/lOth. etc.) indicate the amount of cloud cover observed
The diagram
at
various stages during the mission. Because weather conwere so terrible at Iwo Jima. only one battle-
ditions
damaged plane was able
to
land there on the return trip. It by each of the four
will be noticed that the altitudes flown
wings are shown bv white legend as the blue lines
lines
in the
which are keyed lower diagram.
to the
same
In the target area, towering smoke columns and violent thermals forced 300 planes to bomb by radar, some as high as 20,000 feet, although weather at Tokyo was actually clear.
75
D-AifcrS continued
A
Tale of MPuntboSm Super IPutnbos and Subs
Not even the ugly gulls were Hying from Iwo the morning Being birds, being smart, they knew when flying things were supposed to stay on the ground. Yet when a B-29 pilot returning from Tokyo sent a distress message from 250 miles out at sea, a Flying Fortress carrying a boat under its belly slipped up into the whiteness. A little later the plane, flown by Rescue Pilot Lieutenant Ernest Vt'itham, of Gary. Indiana, nosed down through a hole in the fog and dropped its life boat to 10 men bobbing in the surf off Sofajoan Rock. Ten men crawled into the boat and were saved by the surface craft that \^ itham soon guided to their of 16 May.
rescue.
to
Dangerously low on gas. the plane circled. Then the control tower operator radioed from the ground, "Fly around just 10 more minutes and you can land." '"But,"
got
said the
bumps and
"that
pilot,
holes in
runway's not finished
yet.
ticipating in the mission so that
to finish
it
right
now
—
in the next
around knocking down bunkers and filling up holes. In 10 minutes the field was finished and the Fortress came in for a rough but safe landing. It was just another routine Air-Sea Rescue flight. The Flying Fortress which s])0tted the crippled B-29 and saved its crew did not just happen along. It was part of a tremendous life-net of airplanes, and any craft available, which could be thrown quickly across any part of the Pacific where Americans were flying. In the Marianas the Navy controlled Air-Sea Rescue, but the Army's 4th Emergency Rescue Squadron furnished the B-17s and Catalinas which carried the biggest burden in Twentieth Air Force Operations. B-17s, carrying boats, flew side by side with Navy PBYs, and both Army and Navy men flew that traditional Notified of a survivor's position
by these searching airplanes, submarines, destroyers, even battleships have veered from their course to rescue a single man. the exception of takeofi" crashes, the great majority
enemy action over the planes going down on the homeany B-29 mission to Japan, a more
of distress incidents were caused by
ward
which resulted
trip.
in
Therefore, for
or less standard pattern of rescue stations
(planes, boats,
subs) was spread along the return route between Japan and Iwo Jima.
A single rescue team usually consisted of a submarine with one or two Dumbos (B-17s) circling over it. These teams were spaced so that any point along the return route could be reached by a rescue plane in 20 to 30 minutes, and by rescue vessels in four hours, at the most. Three subs and one surface vessel were customarily spread out between Japan and Iwo. with the northernmost sub 20 or 30 miles from the Jap coast. During fighter strikes the subs moved as close as five miles. Due to their hazardous position, they were usually covered by two Super Dumbos (B-29s). 76
When
the mission
was
in progress, if
any
distress incidents
occurred, the call for help was usually radioed to
^
ing
Headquarters, which assumed the responsibility of notifying the rescue agencies on Iwo or Saipan. Direct communication between disabled aircraft and rescue units at sea was also
carried on. but the wing was still the focal point for information regarding its own aircraft in trouble.
all
—
From November of last year when mass operations began against Japan through the month of July, more than 600 20th AF flyers were saved in open-sea rescues. To make these pick-ups, more than 2.000 miles were flown for every saved.
Cold
so they did. rushing
rescue boat, the Catalina.
target,
crews could be properly
—
—
man
10 minutes."
With
its
Each wing was expected to provide its own Super Dumbos usually two for sub cover, and crews were,
—
it."
"Sure," said the operator, "but I've called the Aviation Engineers. They're going
And
the plan worked, as
mission
rotated for this special duty.
as a dark storm blew up, all Witham and his crew worry about was themselves. They found Iwo hidden in fog when they returned. Only one small uncompleted runway was visible.
It's
is
a
briefed.
Now
had
how
it was finally evolved. was scheduled, Bomber Headquarters' phoned to ComSubPac at Guam and received immediate information as to which subs would be available, their calls and positions. This data was included in the request dispatch which was then sent to Air-.Sea Rescue units at Iwo Jima. calling for surface vessels and Dumbos. The rescue plan was also sent to each Bomb \^ ing par-
Here
When
statistics
can never
tell
the life or death story behind
They can never tell, for example, how Lieutenant Lamar Christian felt when he bailed out of his P-51 five miles from the Jap coast. As he floated down over the water, he knew that the Japs were watching him from shore,
every rescue.
and would most certainly put out a boat to capture him. From out of nowhere a Flying Fortress appeared, and began to circle him. The minute he splashed, the plane came low, dropped a smoke bomb beside him to mark his position. Then it flashed a message to a nearby submarine which in turn raced for the dirty a
plume on
smudge
the horizon.
smoke now standing
of
like
Thirty minutes after he jumped,
Lieutenant Christian was safely aboard the sub.
Meanwhile another
fighter plane
had come staggering out
A man
could have jumped through the flak hole in its wing. In its cockpit Lieutenant Frank Ayres of Lake Charles, Louisiana, knew he could never make it back to to sea.
base, never
would
get
home
to tell
about the two Jap fighters or so it seemed
he had just bagged over Shimodate airfield
—
he spotted the friendly B-29. "I'm bailing out," he shouted into his radio.
until
"We
know," came the answer. "But a sub's picking up man now. If you can stay aloft for five more minutes we can give you better attention." Within Better attention within five miles of Japan? range of Jap shore guns? Ayres wrestled with his plane and another
kept
it
in
the
air
the additional
five
minutes.
When
he
jumped out the submarine coasted alongside him and picked him up before he could free himself from the parachute. "Again?" said Ayres. It was unbelievable now that he had time to think of it. Twice he had faced what .seemed almost certain death upon bailing out over the ocean. Twice he had been picked up just as he struck the water. This was the second time he had been saved from the ocean within a period of one month.
ISearrh mission i.|iiipped 1
r.tii
proceeds for a P-51 at
Chirlii
with "Flying
airfield
Jima.
|)ilot
Dutchman"
on Iwo Jima.
is
shot
down on
Specially
lifeboat
plane pictured
a strafing
modified
B-17.-
and operating
in this sequence.
Rescue plane, with photographic e?cort. skirls the shore Previous advice radioed from the P-51 squadron leader has fixed approximate position of distressed pilot, a very small target in the open sea.
2
has spotted their man and has released "Flving Dutchman." W hen lifeboat hits water, smoke markers go ofT to show its location. In three and one half years, air-sea rescue changed from haphazard luck to scientific operation.
4
complete the rescue. B-17 has stayed Most vital factor in successful rescue is dependable radio communications which everyone concerned knows how to operate properly.
6
315-17 crew
5
Destroyer arrives
around
to
to vector the ship to the lifeboat.
of Chichi at low altitude.
Pilot
is
in the
boat before the smoke markers burn out.
Air-sea rescue was a smooth running business in which
standard procedures were developed for submarines, naval craft,
and planes
Pilot
to
cooperate
comes aboard for
saving hundreds of
in getting
back downed men.
the trip back to Iwo.
lives,
Besides
rescue service was a morale
booster that paid off in increased efficiency.
was the chief combat flying.
It
factor that mitigated the fears of over-water
77
D-Z96rS continued
Turning Point: Gen. Le May^s Great Decision On 20 January, Major General XXI Bomber Command,
of the
LeMay
Curtis
with
took charge headquarters on
its
assume command of months after they had started. Now he had left India to assume command of R-29 operations in the Marianas two months after the first Tokyo mission. A B-29 can run into a good deal of trouble in two
Guam. He had
Europe
left
in
1944
to
the India-based B-29 operations, two
months. In China the main trouble had been distance, supply and to
some
extent,
Due
weather.
weather.
In
the
Marianas
it
was largely
to treacherous, un|)redictable weather, not
one
was destroyed in the first 2,000 sorties. A third of the total effort had been spent on MusaTarget 357 and it was only four per cent destroyed. shino There was only one opportunity for visual bombing during General LeMay 's first six weeks at Guam. Even when good weather prevailed over the target, the B-29s often had to battle their way through severe fronts on the long overseas flight. Formations were scattered and many crews missed the briefed landfall by a considerable distance. With a small fuel reserve on high-altitude missions, errors in navigation were sometimes impossible to correct and aircraft were forced to return early or bomb a target of opportunity. An added obstacle to navigation was the fact that Jap-held islands on route could not be used as check priority targets
of the 11
—
—
points for fear of alerting the
enemy radar system. But
the
toughest problem, as mentioned earlier, was the terrific wind velocity
True, some crews
high altitudes over Japan.
at
But they were an exception, proving that more than average training and unusual a|)titude were needed to do the job (a lead crew school was started in an effort to discover and train such leaders). Another result of the high-altitude attacks was the cumulative strain on men and equipment. Long formation flights shortened engine life, contributed greatly to crew fatigue.
were able
to hit the target consistently.
Against this background of ))oor conditions and |)oor sults,
was decided
it
to
re-
depart radically from the traditional
Just how radically was known to most of the flyers until the memorable morning 9 March when in all briefing rooms throughout the Mari-
gets located in those
them out by separate pinpoint attacks. Incendiary operations were not new. Several trials had been made. On some attacks a mixed load of HE and incendiary bombs had been used with indifferent results. On three missions jirior to 9 March incendiaries alone were used. According to the Phase Analvsis reports, from which much of the foregoing data was assembled, these results, too. were indifferent. This was partly because the ballistic characteristics of incendiary clusters rendered them inaccurate when dropped from high altitudes in strong wind, jiartly because not enough B-29s had been available for a major strike against a big urban area. But by the start of March the .31.3th Wing had joined the 73rd \^ ing as a fully operative unit, and two groujjs from the 314th. recently arrived on Guam, were ready for action. Thus, the combined force now totalled more than .300 aircraft enough to strike a spark.
of
anas an announcement was made. It was followed by a sudden, shocked silence as the crews began to realize what they
had
just
(1)
heard
A
series of
were (2) (3)
to
be
maximum
effort night incendiary attacks
made on major Japanese
industrial cities.
Bombing altitudes would be from 5,000 to 8,000 feet. No armament or ammunition would be carried and the size of the
crew would be reduced.
(4)
Aircraft would attack individually.
(5)
Tokyo, bristling with defenses, would be
first
tiie
making his
daring decision. General to
get
LeMay was
better
not
performance
crews and aircraft. Nor were these operations con-
ceived as terror raids against Japan's civilian population.
The Japanese economy depended heavily on home industries carried on in cities close to major factory areas. By destroying these feeder industries, the flow of be curtailed and production disorganized.
78
lowering the altitude
15-29 flying in
formation
per cent of the possible
at
bomb
to
load.
between
A
single
high altitude could carry only 35
bomb
vidually at the lower altitude.
load of a B-29 attacking indi-
This was made possible, of
course, because individual attacks required no assembly over the base at the mission's start or reassembly on route to the target.
Aircraft would go directly from base to target and
and allowing a greater bomb load. would be encountered at the lower altitude, and the heavy, gas-consuming winds of high altitudes would be avoided. The weight of extra crew members, armament and ammunition would go into bombs. With the largest bomb load carried to date to Japan, each B-29 would bear six to eight tons, largely the new M-fiQ fire bomb, composed of an incendiary cluster containing a jelly-gasoline compound. It was felt that the weakness of Jap night fighters justified the elimination of armament. return, thus saving gas
Better weather
Time was
a crucial element in the
new
plan.
Jap night fighters were known to be weak, but flak losses were ex|)ected to be substantial. By making a night-time attack it was hoped to minimize these losses, since enemy radar gun-laying devices were thought to be comparatively inefficient, and heavy AA guns would thus have to depend on searchlights for effective
fire
control.
was found that the best time for takeoff was around dusk, so that the planes could benefit by at least some daylight for ihe getaway. This brought them to the target just before dawn, and, most important, enabled them to make the homeward flight by daylight, thus avoiding night ditchings of It
battle-damaged aircraft. Finally, these missions had to be completed in time for
this
motivated simply by the desire
from
in
5.000 and 10.000 feel was the increased
target.
In
i
—
One main advantage
doctrine of strategic bombardment. not
Tokyo or Nagoya might have the some of the priority tarareas, making it unnecessary to knock
flagration in a city like
further advantage of spreading to
vital parts
A
could
general con-
the
B-29s to coordinate their efforts with the naval strike
Okinawa (see B-29 Blockade, page 49). Since the first of the Okinawa operations was scheduled for 23 March, only a little more than two weeks were available in which to hit the at
—
Tokyo. Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe. Viewed in retrospect, it appears that almost everything was in favor of the low-altitude night attacks. Nevertheless, it took extraordinary courage to risk 300 unarmed aircraft
four big targets
new type of attack (lircctK (ipposi-d
.1
ri
to the traditiunal
bombing for which the '.'2'>had been expressly designed. The imagination, the Itxiliility of mind, the unwillingness to be bound by estab.H iiiru"
of high-altitude precision
-iiuation
.•.hlri-liip
at
hand
— these
qualities
in
our Air Forces
contributed beyond measure to our victory, and
indeed our secret weapon.
ir
\(
first
historic ones against
and Tokyo, was sweated out with more anxiety than 'I March strike on Tokyo. This time, in the event of ailiirc. nobody could claim that we were pioneering against This time the risk of men and equipin unknown enemy. mill was many times greater. This time it was later in the larnc and the need for decisive air action was more acute. Mw.ita
III
On I'll!
nlcl \
in.
I
March, when one by one the B-29s the Marianas, the verdict became known. Pilots
the afternoon of 10
rued to
how Tokyo
""caught fire like a forest of pine trees."
few hours later came the photographic evidence. Sixteen a half square miles of Tokyo had gone up in smoke. per cent of the target area was destroyed. And included 16 targets which were numbered for pinpoint
iijhl\-five hi-
iiiai ks. 111
Out of
.302 aircraft
largest loss suffered
over the target, 14 w-ere
on any of the
lost
five missions.
36 hours later the R-29s were off again, to During this strike the crews peered down on what 'looked like a gigantic bowline renter witli ail the allevs Less
than
Vagova.
Leiiflels like this, droppcil \ictks of war. listed
some
)
cit les
B-29s on Japan during la>t which were slated for attack.
left
an alley of flames." But the
final results
were not too good. A total of 1.56 square Nagoya was unfinished business.
miles was destroyed.
Osaka.
These were next on the timetable.
Kobe.
On
March more than 300 B-29s destroyed 8.1 square miles Osaka, and on 17 March 2.1- square miles of Kobe, in-
13 of
cluding 11.000.000 square
I'ldhably no mission, except the I
and
precepts once they no longer proved applicable to
i^lircl
In
lighted up: each flight had
scattered fires never joined to create a general conflagration
cinders.
return
Fifth
trip
to
dropped some the
and
dock area, were reduced to was made on the
Nagoya when again more than 2.0<)0 tons
on the
bombing on
scattered
were dropped
feet of
last attack in the series
in
city.
B-29s
.300
Over-compensating for
the |)revious attack, the
bombs
too small an area, and only .65 square
miles of the city were destroyed.
But nobody doubted, least
of all the Japs, that the blitz was a holocaust.
In five mis-
more than 29 square miles of Japan's chief industrial centers were burned out beneath a rain of bombs that totaled 10.100 tons. By comparison, on the Luftwaffe's greatest fire sions
raid on London, only 200 tons were dropped. And on the Eighth AF's record strike on Berlin (3 Feb., 19451 over 1.000 heavy bombers made a 1.000-mile round trip to drop
2.250 tons.
During the ten-day
blitz,
nearly this same ton-
nage was carried on each mission by only round trip exceeded 3.200 miles.
Our
losses
to
AA
and fighters were
.3(K)
less
B-29s.
than
1.3
The per
cent of aircraft over the target, and they were soon to drop
even lower.
Crrpatpst source of
alarm
to
our
livers
were the
Ibis tipnti iMialilcd Japs to ticc cilu^. hul nnnnilcii their helplessness,
iiicin
of
and confused them as to exact targets. Continued on next page 79
This rain of bomhs
is
pouring down on one of four small Jap
cities
which were burned out on 16 July.
D-ZsCrS continued terrific
thermals. or hot air currents, that rose from the blaz-
ing targets and sent our aircraft into a black hell of
(no losses were ever attributed directly
to
smoke
thermals).
One
B-29 commander related what ha|)pened over Osaka: "\^ e headed into a great mushroom of boiling, oily smoke, and in a few seconds were tossed 5. ()()() feet into the air. It was a jerky, snappy movement. The shock was so violent that I felt I was losing consciousness. 'This is it.' I thought.
T
can't
pull out of
it.'
Smoke poured
every light was blacked out.
burning
dump
heap.
It
into the ship
and
smelled like singed hair, or a
Everybody coughed.
^
e
were tossed
around for eight or ten seconds. Flak helmets were torn off our heads. The ship was filled with flying oxygen bottles, thermos jugs, ear phones, latrine cans, cigarette lighters,
We dropped down again with a terrible few more seconds pulled out into the clear."
cans of fruit juice. jolt,
and
in a
Discussing the morale of the B-29ers after the
blitz,
one
"The phenomenal success of our new tactics had precipitously salvaged the morale and fighting spirit of our report said,
80
crews by providing a degree of battle success proportionate to the effort expended Amazingly, the number of cases of flying personnel disorders due to flying, which had increased .
steadily prior to 9
.
.
March
fell
off
sharply after 19 March
1945."
Cases were reduced from one per cent of the n\ing personnel to tivo-tenths of one per cent, or a
total total
reduction of 80 per cent. If
our crews were encouraged bv the low losses and good
results of this initial phase, they truly hadn't seen the half
More and more B-29s were put on the job. Tail were reinstalled for minimum protection. Fighter escort was available, if needed. In May and June forces of 400 planes, and more, were launched against the big targets. By 15 June they were so completely destroyed, that the B-29s started a new campaign against more than 60 of the smaller of
it
yet.
guns
industrial cities (see Part 6).
Losses continued to nose dive.
In June the average B-29 loss rate per mission was .08%. In
July
it
was .0'i%- In August
it
was .02%.
In the
Marianas
a low altitude incendiary attack on Japan was considered to
be about the safest pastime a
man
could enjoy.
I
Yanaia
Kpilofiuv:
iivi^otni^s
Finished Uiisinvss
Tom Gore,
/he sleeping gunner on "No. I ?" nearing Iwo gray dawn of 8 August 1945, it would hardly seem :hal all the foregoing achievement was designed just lo instill nore peace and confidence into his catnap. Even in his dreams To
lo in the
jeneral Arnold was not saying, "Tom, ou."
Yet,
in
ecause some
my
boy,
was
it
all for
a sense, was. He was breathing easier men had stopped breathing altogether. He it
reathed easier because Iwo Jima had been won, because he slept a vast system of air-sea rescue units was already n operation, because months ago a decision had been made 'hile
300
and 3,000 crew members on a low had "salvaged the morale and fighting pirit of our crews." He was waking up more refreshed, better able to do his job because of all the planning, the work, he sacrifices that had advanced the war thus far. In turn, ther Americans would wake up more refreshed because of he job that Tom Gore was doing. o
risk
tititude
This
aircraft
attack that
does not imply that war
that the din of battle
is
from Tennessee.
But
it
ruthlessly sacrifices
some,
is
a benevolent enterprise, or
a lullaby for sleepy young farmers
nature of war that while
is
the
it
does
profit others.
It
is
it
the nature
American character, at its best, to put a high price on Tom Gore and his kind were not cut out to be Kamikaze pilots. of the
the individual.
Crawling out of the long dark tube of "No. 11/' he took place at the gunner's window. "No. I?" was soon circling, ts own appointed sector of space, above the pinpoint island of Kila Jima. The time was about 0600. Holding a his
red Aldis lamp. Gore
began
to
signal to
other B-29s that
were showing up at the Assembly Point. The red flashes simply identified "No. J /" as the lead plane. It was a strange kind of rendezvous as one by one the B-29s appeared in the lonely gray light over a sea of thick clouds, orbiting around a
signpost
theoretical
above
the
earth's
surface.
But
the
signpost existed firmly in every navigator's mind.
Within the hour all planes in the squadron had assembled, and "No. J?" led them toward the Reassembly Point above the island of Kushino Shima where any planes that had strayed off would have a second chance to join the squadron. The distance from Kita to Kushino Shima was about 750 miles. From there the squadron began its 18C-mile lap to the Departure Point
on the coast of Kyushu.
Some
observers soy that as a crew gets really close to Japan, they become grimmer, tenser. But on "No. 11" they simply
became
Mae
busier
— of
least,
outwardly.
Flak
suits,
para-
were strapped on. Oxygen masks were tested. Although they were not necessary in the pressurized compartments, they would be worn The two side gunin case the plane was punctured by flak. ners, Gore and Sgt. Devon Franklin, scanned the air for enemy fighters. Tech. Sergeant J. J. Farrell, the Central Fire Control gunner, sat up on his revolving pedestal and peered out the top blister. The tail gunner. Sergeant Kenneth Grumbine, had crawled back to his post. The guns were manned but no men were at the guns. The gunner's job was to spot the target through his finder, and by an astoundingly complex mechanism the gun would be automatically aimed and fired. C.onlinued on next page chutes,
Wests,
portable
dinghys
A catnap
during a long mission is taken by a crew member, West, in the long tube that connects pressurized conipartmenls. Lielow: Beginning bomb run. jiilot switches
wfaring
Mae
on automatic
pilot,
while bombardier (center) adjusts sights.
'
'v-zsers
coiij-mue
Once over Japan,
fhe
firsi
iJTt'»H-^. M^'^
^^^^^C_^^^,3^^^|
w
Meal time aboard
this B-29,
fancier than usual.
Generally, crews were given sandwiches,
with trays of vegetables, was
cans of juice, gum. candv. They brought their
own
peanuts.
It
consisted of tfiree groups
Wing based on nearby le Shima. They below the B-29s, waiting to pounce on any Jap fighters that might rise for the kill. As it happened, no enemy fighters attacked "No. J?," though a few were sighted, and one was seen to go down in flames. As "No. ? ?" passed the IP and neared the target at an altitude of 21,000 ft. two phosphorus bombs, dropped from a Jap fighter that had managed to sneak overhead, dangled their woolly white tentacles a half mile away. Flak was meager, for the target area by now was obscured by 8 lOs to 10/ 10s cloud. This meant that the bombardier's ;'ob devolved upon the radar operator. Sergeant "Red" Edwards, who sat in his windowless, dark room towards the back of the plane and watched the outlines of Yawata appear in ghostly light upon his scope. The bomb bay doors were already open. The moment of payoff was at hand. By turning a dial so that two cross hairs intersected over the target image on his scope, a red-headed boy from Cleveland dropped some 10,000 pounds of explosives on a city in Japan a city of some 650,000 inhabitants, only a little smaller than his own hometown. The incendiary clusters were fuzed to open in mid-air, at 5,000 feet, and sprinkle of
;
P-47 escort requested
of the
from Okinawa began to appear. ttie
301st Figf)ter
ranged
far
—
over the target area. Mixed with the clusters magnesium bombs, included because of their
their contents
were some
"penetration characteristics."
The plane surged upward, relieved of its burden, and veered to the left to avoid the AA fire that was expected from the Shimonoseki strait area. From Yawata a column of gray
smoke towered 35,000
feet
and mingled
with the clouds.
For one crew, the Yawata mission, with anxiety, passed with anticlimactic ease.
—
its
long build-up of
To be sure, they were
more than 1,500 miles from base gas and engines had be sweated out. But the worst was over. If trouble had come, it would have been sudden and violent. Not coming, it seemed so remote as to be almost nonexistent. For a few hours, now, eleven men, sealed up in their own world, would enjoy that remoteness which is peculiar to their business. The future, and part of the past, was hidden by IQ/lOths clouds.
still
to
They did not know that during the takeoff of the 58th Tinian, seven hours earlier, two B-29s had blocked both runways by a crackup and 96 aircraft were canceled from the mission; that another B-29 from the 58th Wing had ditched after a flak hit and nine men would be rescued; that a B-29 from the 313th Wing on the same mission had ditched at sea after being hit by a Jap fighter and the entire crew was missing; that another B-29 from the 313th had crashed at sea after the takeoff and nine men were missing; that out of 120 planes airborne from their own wing, none were lost; that 32 of their planes had landed at Iwo Jima, mostly on the
Wing on
Sweating out gas on a return trip from Japan, this tightlipped B-29 commander is watched by his flight engineer in background. Below: Bombardier relaxes on homeward trip.
return route.
They did not know that 151 P-47s had escorted their mission five had been lost; that 55 to 65 Jap fighters had shown up, evidently on the assumption that the B-29s would not be escorted, and offered the strongest recent aerial opposition encountered in the Kyushu area, that our own over the target and
fighters
had
shot
down
13 of the Japs,
and
the B-29s
had
two more; that four of our fighter pilots had bailed out at sea; that two B-29s were slightly singed by phosphorus bombs and 22 others were hit by flak; accounted for at
least
that
1.22 square miles or 21
percent of Yawata had been
destroyed; that the Pocific war would be over
one week.
in
As "No. ?I" cruised over the green islands of the Inland sea
and out across
the Pacific,
some
of the watchfulness went
out the crew's faces. They all looked younger. They
unpacked sandwiches^ cans of pineapple juice, bags of candy, and "ACK ACK, the chocolate covered nut roll." They opened up their books and comic magazines: "The Pride of Montana," "The Nazarene," "Captain Marvel " After functioning together as a team, each man seemed to withdraw a little into himself. Bristling
with half a million dollars' worth of precision instru-
ments, the gunner's compartment took on the look of a kids'
shack built out of metal scraps and packing boxes, the kind
Fitiniliar pattern
of JSorth field.
Guam,
is
of place that
you find
in
thousands of American backyards.
and maturity that these same men had shown an hour ago. It is a reminder of This
is
not a reflection on the courage
our or/gins.
man wearing been called grim. It is not. But it bears the stamp of a man with one single purpose; to get a job done with the greatest possible dispatch at the least possible cost. He might be in the pilot's seat, giving Captain Criss a chance to rest, or if he were tired himself, he might His dignity does not depend upon be lying on the floor. posture. True to the legend, which probably irks him, he would be wreathed in the smoke of a large cigar. It
two
was not hard stars.
to
imagine with them another
His face has
a uonderful sight to B-29s returninfi after a 3,000-mile mission.
-
jB*Wj(t.
<:m
i'
*
'•• »
r;
o
Part
PAYOFF
B-29
in Five 3Monihs •Mftpan^s
War Economy Was
Japan's ability to continue the war finally collapsed amid the ashes of her
hurned-out
cities.
Her industry, blockaded
the case of the aircraft pro[)eller industry,
in
the specific bottlenecks caused
and bombed into a shambles, finally could no longer support modern war machine. This situation was caused by the B-29, which, in the final phase of the war, was the de-
here are
cisive factor.
in
a large,
phase was swift. President Truman's announcement of the surrender came 157 days after the Twentieth Wt force first cut loose with fire bombing. In those 157 days, the main strategic air weapon literally wrecked the enemy
The
For one picture of what happened
some estimates
area and precision attacks in 12 major war industries, listed
order of their importance. Pre-attacl Plant Area in '000s of sq. ft.
Indusfry
Here was no They dispersed, well-organized system like Germany's. knew that only a few vulnerable target areas had to be obliterated before Japan would be on the ropes. A study of her cities showed that the wood and plaster buildings were a setup for area incendiary bombing. Only 10 per cent were pation
when they examined Japanese
industry.
Ordnance
Electrical
Air Force went to work. Their success is, if anything, considerably understated here because information is still incomplete in many instances. The aerial camera cannot peer
every remote corner of a country and disclose if this or that piece of factory machinery has been dispersed, gone underground, or whether it is scorched, corroded and useless. into
Until extensive surveys are rc|)()rt
can
at
best
made of each bombed
be only a partial one.
It
area,
any
cannot, except
of
1
9%
30,000
17%
50,000
24%
and Gen. storage area
200,000
12%
445.000
20%
Industrial
damage the
69
288,000,000 square
totaled cities
blitzed,
feet.
Of
27.4 percent was badly
Many
un-
factories were of no use because the blockade
and
damaged. Yet
this fails to tell a
complete story.
of supporting industries denied them the necessary to
fabricate.
Likewise,
it
is
impossible to trans-
damage into s|)ecific production loss. On the basis of what we learned in Germany, where fire bombing was much less successful than it was in Japan, the perlate physical plant
lo.ss
for six weeks after incendiary
missions was sometimes double the percentage of space destroyed. The Japanese, in contrast to the Nazis, did almost nothing to repair damage. They cleared up rubble inside plants, then abandoned them completely. Other factors contributing to loss of out|)ut were: (1) shortages of materials; (2) transportation interruptions; (3) lowered
bombed-out
(4) absenteeism; and (5) administrative All these probably added up to an actual percentage of production loss nearly double the percentage
worker morale; disorganization.
of physical plant
what B-29 incendiaries did to 69 Japanese cities August. Formerly is this night view of burning Toyama on a big prnducer of aluminum, the city was 95.6% demolished.
Sample
14%
130,000
others
centage of production the Twentieth
150,000
Mil.
materials
bombers of
110,000
28% 33%
All
dangerously low for large-scale fire fighting. In addition, our experts discounted all talk about Japan's ability to survive through her Manchurian industry alone. They were convinced that once the heart of the Empire had been gouged licked.
5%
40.000
Textiles
damaged bombing
was
15%
50,000
1
Machinery & finished metal prod. Metals (*errcu5 and non-ferrous) Chemicals Rubber
time conflagrations had been frequent in Japan: this had not been true of Germany. \^'ater supplies, never adequate, were
the basis of these facts, the
37% 15%
45,000
repair
equipment
industry in
On
destroyed or badly damaged
110,000
and
made of stone, brick, metal or reinforced concrete. Many modern factories were hemmed in by solid masses of flimsy workshops, the very homes of the workers themselves. Peace-
out. she
Industrial bidgs
140.000
Aircraft
Shipbuilding
intelligence analysts rubbed their hands with antici-
Japanese industry,
to
of factory space destroyed by both
Oil (including storage)
Our
show exactly
by bombing.
final
nation.
Ituined
damage.
Important results table
above.
Oil
percent destrovcd.
in
target
some
instances
areas are
However, due
are hidden
reported
as
to the fact that
in
only
the five
most pro-
Cnntinued on next page 85
D-£9 rHIUrr continued duction was confined to a relatively few modern facilities, the 315th Wing, by concentrating on 11 of Japan's newest
reduced over-all
refineries,
oil
output by 30 percent in
little
excess plant capacity and production in hidden sites
(in-
cluding a small number of underground shops), the Japs, like the Germans, were still able to produce a sizable num-
month of operations. Synthetic production sagged even more sharply with a drop of 44 percent, which represents an actual loss of some 265.000 barrels.
ber of aircraft despite our prolonged attacks. Also, they had
Germany, fundamental importance was the
dropped on the aircraft industry against aeroengine plants. Another 49.5 percent went on airframe assembly plants. This probably denied the JAF between 6.400 and 7,200 planes through July 1945. These, if it had been possible to employ them as Kamikazes at Okinawa, might well have delayed the outcome of the war.
more than
As
in
a
case
the
treated
to
Against
this
both
the
of
high
target system of
aircraft industry
explosive
type of target, the
first
fire
and
which was
incendiary
attacks.
bombing was even more
had been anticipated. Many large structures were consumed by flames which gave added dividends by ruining machinery that possibly could have been salvaged Despite our attention to this inif subjected to HE only. dustry, Japan still had plenty of planes at war's end so one might assume that the B-29 effort was a wasted one. It was not, and for very simple reasons. effective than
On
in production.
The Twentieth Air Force expended 45.5 percent 15.000 tons
of the
it
Strangely enough, a portion of the remaining five per cent dropped on subsidiary aircraft industries by the Twentieth, plus extremely successful fire attacks against Osaka and Shizuoka. would have hurt the Japanese most during the
balance of 1945. The Sumitomo propeller plants at AmagaShizuoka and Osaka, making 70 percent of all the
August 1945 Jap monthly production was estimated at 1,834 combat planes. This figure was 75 percent of their production for December 1944, before bomb damage became appreciable. It indicates that by some dispersal, use of
saki,
In January 194-4, presumably alarmed by the invasion of Tarawa, Jap intelligence oflScers began speculating on the
document showing the enemy estimate of tht and direction of such attacks was captured on Okinawa The basic figures contained in it are reproduced above
1
possibility of
86
planned a considerable increase
bombing
attacks against Japan.
An
elaborate
props used on
first-line
Jap combat aircraft, suffered 60.5
percent damage, which, together with some
damage
Japan Musical Instrument Co. propeller plant
intelligence scale
in
to the
Hamma-
iiai>u.
curtailed
prop output
production
iioriths
loss.
It
is
sufficiently to cause a five estimated that the resulting
would have forced aircraft production down to its 1 January 1945 rate by November of 1945. iinuilativp efTects would have l)cgun to he felt seriously just lie time our invasion was scheduled. It undoubtedly was mr of the factors that ronvinced the Japs that the situation iiiilleiiccks
|nrcent of
tl
It
I
\ia-
hopeless.
Though
aircraft contiruied to he No.
1
priority, other in-
an ample share of attention. Shipbuilding \'-J Day. partly due to the fire of Kobe. Osaka, and Yokohama, but principally
chi-lries received hail
droppeil 60 percent by
liniiihiiig
hicause of steel shortages.
Ordnance, a particular pet of was cut 40 percent. Iron, steel and coke. ilir key heavy industries of war, were down 56 percent liriinarily because of the blockade, but also partly due to Fwentieth.
tlir
Iminbing. Aluminum output shim[)ed 35 percent. ami industrial storage areas also suffered heavily. I
nlike the
Military
bombing program for Germany, where transalong with aircraft and oil, we reached the stage where it was necessary to
|Hirtation rated top priority liail
not
yet
concentrate on
rail targets. Japan's rail system, incidentally, her industry, was far more vulnerable than Germany's. Not until 14 August, the last mission of the war. did the 29s hit a Jap rail target. Nonetheless, the fire blitzes had
like
an amazingly potent efTect on land transport. Together with depreciation of already poor rail equipment, they cut railroad traffic to less than half the volume of a year ago. With coastwise shipping also disrupted, the Japanese were faced with what was admittedly their worst economic bottleneck.
This was the most important by-product of the incendiary attacks.
Many
lesser industries contributing to the
economy
Japanese war
also were heavily affected by H-29 bombing.
Elec-
equipment production, already irisulTicienl to supply demands, was down .15 percent. These in turn were badly needed for repairing bombed-out factories and for retooling damaged machinery. The little factories of 30 workers or less, where the Japanese produced components for delivery to larger assembly plants, took a terrible beating from area attacks. Just as the experts predicted, they were wiped out by the thousands in all the big cities. tronics
Continued on page 90
Actual
toilliagc^^
dropped m
Jap failure to forecast the launched by us. Tliey were equally poor
direction.
They expected 75 percent
of
tlie
effort
from China,
got less than one per cent, apparently had no idea that
plcle
at predicting its
would soon be operating from
the
we
Marianas and Okinawa.
-€^.:
xi^mtJk arsenal well kicked by pinpointing
Battleship
Kure, before it got its B-29s on 22 June, made heavy armaments for Jap Navy.
Kure naval arsenal was 70 percent (2,949,690 sq. ft. of destroyed or damaged by the 20th AF. Car-
roof area)
88
bomb
rier in
hit
Haruna had
during
strike.
;4
blown
kn
by a 4,000-lb. Navy planes sank her on 28 July.
its
stern
off
planes also scored some hits. Intense flak from warships damaged 59 per cent of attacking Superforts.
the harbor
o
I
Mi;ine
icili
and turbine factory (bottom left and naval M;i\ were precision targets of H'2'>> mi I
fi
filant
IVrfffl bomliins blotted -iil.-rction-
..I'
till-
oiil
llie
t\N(i
larirels.
Kiiir navjl ai-enal
i.n
whicli were
..|.|H,-ili-
page.
i
III
X
ML wm
iSm
I'rodnction of long-range Jap seaplane Emily collapsed at Hiro after the 29'- sot tlirnnsb. Photo inlelligenre
71.5 percent deslruction {M of .-i.S buildings in riglit Ki) plant area biti. Tlie engine factors ua~ over half
i
'
.
.1
89
Take a good look at the pictures on these two pages. They the story of what the Superforts did to Japan's warmaking capacity more vividly than words. Much of her war industry was crammed into these five cities. For example, 40 per cent of all aircraft engine production, 25 per cent of all final aircraft assembly was at Nagoya. Ordnance was somewhat more widely dispersed, but Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya each contained about 10 per tell
cent of the total.
Tokyo,
in addition to
being the Empire':
administrative and political nerve-center, teemed with thous
ands of shack-like workshops, too numerous to be selected ai individual targets. Osaka, with its 1940 population 3,252,240, was second only to Tokyo among the leading in dustrial communities of the Far East. It produced arma ments, shipping and other tools of war. Yokohama also ranked high.
were wiped out. Here is what the Tokyo radio announced on 23 August concerning casualties from air attacks in the home islands; 260,000 killed; 412,000 injured; 9,200,000 homeless; 2,210,000 houses demolished or burned, and another 90,000 partially damaged. Though these figures may not be entirely accurate, they compare favorably with estimates of our analysts who say that housing for 10.548.000 persons was destroyed. This is 50.3 per cent of the 1940 population in the 69 cities. Considering that half the population in the industrial centers was de-housed, the effect this had upon labor morale and absenteeism must have been enormous. The completeness of the chaos was reflected
in
the
breakdown of
all
administrative controls.
Workers, lacking orders from higher up, were hamstrung.
Wide
Tokyo, Osaka. Nagoya, Yokohama, and Kobe caught 44.1 per cent of all Twentieth Air Force tonnage. Serious damage to identified industry ranges from 25 per cent in Osaka to 43 per cent in Nagoya. The aircraft industry within these cities suffered 50 per cent damage. Ordnance and metals were lowest at 21 per cent. Kobe's industrial area was 41 per cent obliterated. So thoroughly gutted were most sections of the "Big Five" (their burned areas totaled 103.22 sq. mi.), that they were no longer considered essential
variations
exist
in
the
percentages of pre-attack
damaged within the 69 cities. Fukuoka, with per cent, Takamatsu with 89.3 per cent represent two
industrial area
only
.6
extremes.
Damage
9.1 per cent for
to
residential
Nishinomiya
to
structures
ranges
from
98.2 per cent for Toyama.
Impressive as these figures are, again they fail to tell the whole story. The "planned target area" was much smaller than the built-up urban area in nearly every case. Thus,
lessly
after the last great fire mission to Tokyo on 25 May. some 86 per cent of the "planned target area" had been eliminated. Small wonder that a newspaperman could write. "Superfortress reports of damage in Tokyo were not exaggerated; if anything, they constitute the most shocking under-l
all,
statement in the history of aerial warfare."
targets
except for occasional pinpoint "policing
Once they had taken care of
"
attacks.
the big fellows, the 29s relent-
went after the Toledos and Bridgeports of Japan. In 69 cities were treated to "burn jobs." On the basis of
KObG Eight square miles (55.7%) has been eradicated. Red areas in these photos show sections burned out by the B-29s.
90
available photo coverage, 175 square miles of urban area
Y0k0h3in3 ^ a.T production slumped after "day burn job" on 29 May. Built-up area has been 57.6 per cent destroyed.
\
lOKyO alliliuie
Proving groimd for AAF's technique of niediumnight incendiary boniliing. the Jap capital suffered a
US3k3 20th
Al' ignilcil cotillagralions that
per (cnt (17.61 sq. mi.
I
consumed
35.1
of Japan's second industrial city.
loss of
56.34 square nilK
far left
had 35.2 per cent
NagOya
lire
arsenal to
lM,n>h>
bits.
i,pi<
ihe
:
I.-!
Gutted was lu per cent of
B-29 fireworks.
tlie
of this big city proper.
91
B-29 PAYOFF ronHnued
WERE
IF IT
69 U.
If the
map
U.S. on the
S. cities
1^
had heen battered
at the right
hy Jap bombers free
any
to strike
lime and anywlierc at will in this country, you can vividly imasjine it would have upon our morale and war
frightful impact
liie
had
Yet
|)0tentiai.
this
what the B-29s did because
of
nature
of
constricted
country
that
cent of our
And
Japan.
very
the
precisely
is
to
—55
per
population squeezed
our
into a land only four per cent
same area effects were in-
size (ap|)roximately the
as
Montana)
—
the
more disastrous than they
finitely
would have been
our
in
The comparison here a
1940 census
of
basis
case.
made on
is
In each case a U. S. city
with a Japanese city
figures.
paired
is
(in red)
of
approximately the same popula-
The
tion.
or
percentages
(also
in
of Japanese cities destroyed
red)
damaged
badly
are
the
esti-
mates of our intelligence analysts.
They show only
results
the
Force
Air
Twentieth
of
incendiary
and high explosive attacks on the urban areas of Japan, ex-
l(uilt-up
cluding results of one-plane R-29
Navy, Fifth and Seventh
strikes.
Air Force attacks.
The U. to
give
S.
a
throughout
were chosen
cities
broad
representation
nation.
the
tempt was made
to
terms
industrial
of
tance.
their
Naturally,
been able
to
match
if
bomb
No
at-
cities in
impor-
had
the Japs
the heart of our
war industry, they would have cluded
among
places
as
their
Detroit.
targets
in-
such
Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh.
Tokyo radio on 2.3 August announced a list of 42 cities which had suffered over 50 per cent loss of buildings by fire to air attack. The broadcast named 15 cities, including Osaka and Nagoya, in
which, according less than
Of
the
were
92
hit
50
|)er
to
our estimates.
cent was destroyed.
46 largest Jap cities, 36 by R-29 fire bombing.
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Part
ATOM BOMB Tiro •§ohs Opvn \eir 3Miiiiarif Visias nt Hiroshima sllll(l(U'rin(T jolts, inlfc With \\\(i Hi rr»*iliirn;i and •A1^A Nagasaki, \'nfTnc-iL-i two sluuidfiinp at war skidded to a halt. Soldiers the world over, their jaws agape, hegaii lo wonder how the sudden crazy shift of military values would affect the familiar f)atterns of conflict. A few things are clear. The atom bomb will not. at one blast, wipe out navies or ground armies, as has already been widely proclaimed. That it will change them almost beyond recognition is without question. But they will remain. Warfare has existed in many forms since men first banded together to destroy men. but it has always been waged in all the elements over which man had some control or. more correctly, in which he could move freely. For a long time all battles were on land. Later they were on land and water. When man began to exercise control over the air. war moved into the air too. There now remains only "under the ground." It may be that atomic power will force future military strategists to fight in that dimension also. But they will never fight in that, or any dimension, alone. Since atomic explosives were first used by the .Army Air Forces, and used conventionally (i.e. in the form of a bomb drop|)ed by conventional methods from a conventional aircraft), it may seem that air will be less affected than land or water. This is not so. The single fact that atom bombs Vt'itli
the
—
are 2.000 times as powerful as ordinary will
make present-day
bombs
air forces obsolete.
Until
eventually
now
they
have depended largely on size for their ability to crush a city or an industrial system. In the future a handful of planes will
—
do the same joli provided they can get to the improvement of antiaircraft defenses probably force future bombers to fly at great heights
theoretically target.
will
The
inevitable
and speeds. The aircraft we know cannot fly as high (oven with the reduced loads made possible by atomic explosives) or as fast as theory already requires. If improved ground defenses or air defenses do not
demand
increased altitude
and speed, improvement in the efficiency of atomic explosives probably will, to ensure that a bomber is not caught in its own bomb's blast. All this will mean fundamental changes in the design of aircraft. These may be so difficult to engineer fur example, getting adequate lift omI of a supersonic airI
f/^^IIi .^i- i(.<^ ^l.^.i ^..^.»:. foil I. or the destructive capabilities of future fighters may be so great that the remote control of weapons resembling
the
German V-2 may
not occur over night.
be resorted
We
to.
Naturally, all this will
will continue to
use conventional equipment for
some
manufacture and
time.
But.
it
will not
be long before our present air force will seem as curious as
lumbering triplanes of the last war. In the words of Marshal Harris. "In World War 11 the battleship was the Dodo. In the next war if there is one the heavy bomber will probably be." the
Britain's .^ir Chief
—
(Consider for a
moment
the simplicity of military organ-
and effort required to w reck two large Japanese cities. The two bombs which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dropped by the 509th Composite Group, part of the .313lh Wing of the Twentieth .Air Force. It had its own Troop Carrier Squadron, Ordnance, and Technical Service Detachment, nothing else except about a dozen scientists who arrived in Tinian on 1 July. The Hiroshima mission was flown on 5 ,\ugust. Two planes participated iti it. one to carry the bomb, the other to act as escort. It went off without a hitch. Bombing was visual. On the second mission, the same two planes participated, but their roles were ization
According
This time weather caused a great deal of trouble. to Major Charles W. Sweeney, pilot of the plane
with
bomb, "The navigator made landfall
reversed.
We
the
perfectly.
passed over the primary target but for some reason
it
was obscured by smoke. There was no flak. We took another run, almost from the IP. .Agaiti smoke hid the target. 'Look harder.' I said to the bombardier, but it was no use. "Then I asked Commander Frederick .Ashworth (Naval adviser to the [)roject) to come up for a little conference. We took a third run with no success. I had another conference with the commander. We had now been 50 minutes over the target and might have to drop our bomb in the ocean. Our gas was getting low 600 gallons were trapped. We decided to head for Nagasaki, the secondary target. There we made 90 percent of our run by radar. Only for the last few seconds was the target clear." Back at Tinian. crew members claimed that they were no more worried over dropping atomic bombs than any other
—
Ll. Jacob Beser. the only man to lly on both missions, went to bed but was roused by his friends lo go to a dance. Three hu?idred inirscs had just arrised at Tinian and all watited lo dan
Second atuniir iionih was ust.
Its
dro])ped on Nagasaki on 9 Aug-
explosion sent a column of debris and dust, topped by 45,000 feet.
a cloud of white vapor, boiling to a height of
95
Six stages
in
shown above.
atomic Start
test
of
explosion in
reaction
UIDHCUIUA DCCnDC' nmUOnilYlA DLrUnL.
(first
New Mexico three
'^'''t
f"
delta
of
pictures)
''^^
the
are is
carpetllat
Ota
river.
Hiroshima. iJOjx H'-SO.-loSi was an ideal target for the blast of an atomic bonih. .An important army transport base, it (
characterized
amount of
hv instantaneous release of an enormoii> and light of an unearthly brilliance. Naturi
heat,
contained large ordnance, food and clothing depots, also a shi]ibuilding
company, several rayon and textile mills, a oil stores and an electrical works. It was
railway station, Japan's seventh
largest
city.
Destroyed area
is
outlined.
of small granular disturljance
growing and disappearing
center of explosion has not been revealed,
Historys exploded uiping out 60
HIROSHIMA AFTER: .(liter
ilit ill
a
(pI
IliiD.-luiiia.
may
first
in
in
be steel tower
atom bomb the
air
over
|)erccnt of the city
few seconds. Oni\ the strongest stone and brick build-
Above, the light gives way to a huge fiery vapor which boils skyward above a pillar of dust.
disintegrating. ball of
ings withstood the withering blast which stri|iped all leaves
from
trees,
to dust. 7().(X)()
and turned house, shrine, automobile and
Factories collapsed, so did bridges.
citizen
Ja|)s state that
people were killed. 75.000-200.000 others injured.
ATOM BOMB
contintted
Hi^X4* From near
at liaiul, Hini-lnina a|i|irar~ a- a toy city
ruthlessly trampled on. ture below.
Bridge
is
same
^
as at bottom of pic-
Both photos are looking towards the southeast.
Center of Hiroshima was obliterated by first atomic bomb, aiming point was bridge fourth from top in center. Same bridge is shown at right in photograph on opposite page.
^
#
»*
H'
'.
'til'
^^^^-^ -^
-
i^
'
^-s^^v^^i^^^^l^
lAfe goes on in ramshackle shanties built out of .Vngasafci's ruhhle.
Mitsubishi steel works tal-o -^lioun. t<>|p o|)|io~it(i uabomb wbich proved to bi- tmi. hm.i.- .1. -ii i,.. • ii
!'uttr,l l.\
-<-(ond atomic
Hiroshima.
"»nwm«'lhil^ ^
dj
^
'^?'~^i^-5ifj
i^ K
"^fci-i,
^
Part
n
FINALE llfV/f
or without
Atom
Uomb.»Mapttn
Although some Japanese have been trying to sell the world on the idea that it was the atomic bomb and Soviet war declaration which forced them to surrender, there is now abundant evidence to the contrary, much of it from the lips of high-ranking and informed Japanese themselves. The following testimony tells with stunning emphasis that Ja|)an was utterly finished as a war-making nation before the first
atom bomb was dro|)ped.
"Production of military supplies, which had been seriously affected by curtailment of our marine transportation facilities, was dealt a severe blow by this turn of the war
and almost insuperable difficulties began to multibeginning with the spring of this year With the loss of Okinawa and the consequent increase in the striking power of the enemy's air forces, even communications with the China continent were rendered extremely hazardous As regards railway transport, frequent air raids, together with depreciation of rolling stock and equipment, brought about a steady lowering of its capacity and a tendencv to lose unified control Moreover, various industries suffered directly from air raids which caused huge damage to plants and lowered the efficiency of workmen. Finally the country's production dwindled to such a point that any swift restoration of it came to be considered beyond hope." On 14 September. Higashi-Kuni further said. "The Japanese people are now completely exhausted." He estimated that there situation, ply,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
were 15.000.000 unemployed
in the
home
islands,
the Superfortress attacks the turning point in the
and called war.
Rear Admiral Toshitane Takata. ex-Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Combined Fleet, also saluted the B-29: "Superfortresses were the greatest single factor in forcing Japan's Mlisashiiio airrrafi enj|jiii«' plant in outskirts of Tokyo was wrecked principally by ME precision strikes. .At peak of production it was making 2,800 radial engines a month.
Thi'outjh
surrender. These planes burned out Japan's principal cities, reduced military production by fully 50 percent and affected the general livelihood of the Japanese people."
On the sudden cessation of enemy air activity after the end of the Okinawa cam[)aign. General Kawabe. Commanding the Japanese Army Air Forces, had the following to say:
'"It
end],
was
to
combat invasion
[5.000-plus
aircraft
The most interesting and most complete statement comes from Prince Higashi-Kuni. speaking before the Japanese Diet on 5 September: "'Following the withdrawal from Guadalcanal, the war situation began to develop not alwavs in our favor. Especially after the loss of the Marianas islands the advance of the Allied forces became progressi\ely rapid while the enemy's air raids on Japan proper were intensified, causing disastrous damage that mounted daily.
Was
refused
all
planes
challenge
we hoarded
that
remained to
fight
operable
the Third
all
at
Fleet,
city-destroying Superfortresses, and the hardhitting
our
war's the
FEAF
which was blasting targets on Kyushu during the last six weeks of the war. But while we waited, the air war was carried to such extremes of destruction, including use of the atomic bomb, that the Emperor decided to capitulate on the basis of the
Potsdam Declaration."
\^
Kamikaze. Kawabe replied. "Vie had had no other way to use our pilots."
hen questioned about to
do
it
that
way.
\^'e
One of Tokyo's district fire marshals, when interviewed by an IMP.ACT editor, stated: ".After the first big incendiary attack
I
realized
utterly helpless in
that our system of fire prevention was stemming attacks of such magnitude.''
Among industrialists, war manufacturer Chickuhei Nakajima stated that Japan had been so wrecked by bombardment that it would take from two to five years for her to get back on her feet, but only if trade with the U. S. was resumed instantly. If not, "even the bare essentials of life cannot be produced." following weeks, more of the same, in greater be forthcoming as our interrogation crews complete their work. But this further testimonv will onlv reiterIn
the
detail, will
ate
what we already know
have demolished Japan.
—
that
The
blockade and mass bombing
of this double attack days of the war that many Japs, especially troops overseas, were not even aware of the imminence of catastrophe. The following statements, by three POWs taken shortly before the end and speaking in all sincerity, illustrate this point: "Bombing will have no effect on the people except to instill greater hatred toward the .Allies." "Japanese resistance will become stronger as the bombings increa.se." "Bombing alone will not bring about capitulation." The Tokyo radio station which put out a large part of the misinformation on which such remarks were based is Station JO.AK. piled
up so
effects
fast in the closing
103
Hyuga, one
of two 30,0<)l)-ton battlesliips modernized by
the Japs in 1937,
now
lies
wallowing
in the
mud
Naval Base, riddled from incessant carrier plane
of
^
Kure
strikes.
Tokuyania naval fueling ond
station was the oldest and secby the Jap navy. Both it and an adjacent plant were razed by B-29 HE attack.
largest used
synthetic
oil
A
MilMil>islii tlir |i\
1!
airframe plant
29s three times.
ihe
.!14th
\X'ing.
in
Najioya
was
hit
by
^
After the last, an incetidiary attack was nearly 70 percent destroyed. it
.Mitsuhislii
a/c engine plant, also
in
Nagoya. was
hit
seven times, finished the war only six percent intact. It formerly produced 40 percent of all Jap combat a/c engines.
^
-'
^'•«'ir
;.
m^m '
f fcr
yS ?lki ^^ '^
»:
r.i
1
^^
3B^
'i
's^li
iI
mi
;#*f:i [fy
^
^fpf
-
1''^^-"'
mi i^M
1
-itapf
."^^
^-
M^
r-
1 #
'
Tl'
PI IS 'i
1%
ur^
A
t
iiiKmsni
M^
m\ i'^lj
':ititm
\m
.^irlV*.:
aircraft complex was one of the largest in the included the engine plant shown above and at
The Mitsubishi
3 -ACRE
MITSUBISHI
SKELETON
world.
It
^^
iv
I
«-• ^>u.\
^^. •'."^:^.
licliiiin
of previous jiape. also
lop of previous page.
The
latter
airframe plant shown at was bigger than Willow Run
llie
and assembled a fifth of all Japan's combat aircraft. Both factories were burned to cinders by B-29 incendiary attack.
107
Musashino aircraft plant (also shoivn on page 102) was Musashino was divided built
of
reinforced
into two ])arts.
concrete,
was
Part shown below,
relatively
undamaged.
niosl
homhed and most missed
-Musashino East, tooth affair.
tlie
of
all
Japanese
targets.
destroyed half, was standard saw-
Crater l)elow was
made by one
4,000-|)ounder.
I'irtnril ilotrn
l>\
American
ATCIIPI AIDTin n OUUI nllir ILLU n
'
iIh\
laiiiN
iI
ilh
Hi thi-
power, Jap planes on
''^"^'
'^'"'^''
'""'^
many
Anieri-
rans got of Japan was when
I
(iiMicd u
air
H2 miles from Tokyo. It was them wrecked, many in good
lighlcr base
|ilancs.
some
of
leads to one of maze of corridors which lionevcombed ground beneath .Atsugi's runways.
runnel enlraiK-e lilerally
Flotsam of a healen air force was assembled on
Alsiipi
were squashed hy collapse of woollen hanpar.
condilioii.
liiK
llie
had a junky, tinny
jicnpral
air force.
ini|)ifs>ioii It
was
llial
si-enied as if they
tin-
Ja|)>
had been
war with Woolwortli merchandise. was shoddy, typical of Jap fields.
trying to fight a Tiffany
Even
maintenance
AtsufiPs tunnels were used as a vast storage depot tor food, clothes, ammunition, machine tools and aircraft parts. ilsuiii.
includintl
wcll-irnlilnhd
\at\ Jacks helow.
rlllALfc continued
^mm.
•
'Jf-::^if
<*--'
as;
-^mf^-^f-m^ Shizuoka, city of 206,200, was 66 per cent destroyed by one Hitachi was one of four small cities fired by B-29s on 20 was 78 per cent destroyed. Nothing remains over most
July,
fire attack
which also got a
vital
propeller plant.
its area but charred husks of flimsy houses. Fields or gardens have prevented spread of fires to factory (upper right).
of
|
Factory al Kmlanialsii u-as gulled by incendiaries on nighl of l!y-I6 July.
"home"
factory among many thousands exterminated n Yokohama sliows what fire did to Japs' sweatshop industry.
i3ne
fl.
Monie owners lalli
Only chimneys irilhslood the
Yokohama
fire.
have been living in (in and shacks constructed from what the B-29s didn't bum.
^
in
FINALE continued
«'
*i
.J^
\
?•'
/L..
APPENDICES
Index Index
to
to Essays
Impact Facsimiles
Declassification Notice
Index
introductory malerial, iruihiidual es-
'he
biographical sketches, two picture
ays,
portfolios, and Book cover photographs are ndexed here. References are made to Book lumber (I, II, III, etc.) and page number i,
III,
II,
\efer to
Page numbers
etc.).
in hnjldface
to Essays
AMERICAN-BRITISH CONFERENCE NO
leaving Ploesti. ILcover
ANDREWS. FRANK as
Commander
of
B 25 (MITCHELL). of.
V:xx
M.. Ixii
GHQ
biographical sketch of. ILiv essay by. II:iv-ix
German, I).
IV
v-vi
III xiii
IR iIR
CORPS TECHNICAL SCHOOL. Ixii DEFENSE OF CIREAT BRITAIN (ADflB). Ill xiii
UR FORCES. i« direct nam entry, e.g. GERMAN AIR FORCE. ROYAL AIR FORCE, ^(t MR FORCES. L' S See enlrvs for numbered atr fmus, e.g.
EICiHTH AIR FORCE,
rtc
IR-GROUND CCX)PERATION.
Ilvii. See also
tactic;al air power UR LOGlSncS. Ilviii UR PlJVNNING. V :vi. See also AIR POWER; strategic AIR POWER: TACTICAL AIR POWER essay about. IV:iv-xiii primar> objeclivfs of
UR POWER.
See also
(European
theater).
IV
vii
STRA FEGIC AIR POWER;
photograph
and
.Axis operations,
comparison
POWER AS JOURNALISTS SAW
2.
"Teamwork on I-and at Sea and in Hanson W. Baldwin. Il:iv-ix "The lesson of (jssino." by Cyrus
IT."
VI
UR-TO-SURFACE VE.SSEL RADAR
(ASVs), use
2.
MR WAR PLANS
DIVISION
Vl:x Vllxiii
xix
BLOHM AND VOSS SHIPYARDS,
bombing
of,
Vlix
BOEING-VULTEE-DOUGLAS (BVD) PROGRAM, (B
&
B)
IILxiv
TWO-EfXiED SWORD." 1
(navigational instrument).
use
Morison. quoted. ILviii IILxiv. xv, xvi V:xxiii
"ATTACKS BY NIGHT," AWPD-1 (AIR
44),
TURKEY SHOOT,"
BLirZKRIEG. Lxv.
2.
".Attacks by Night." by
essays:
Dudley Saward. VLvi-xi
"Daylight Precision Bombing." by James H. DoolittJe. with Bcirne Lay. Jr.. VLxii-xviii
BRADLEY. OMAR.
VII xi. xiii-xiv on strategic bombing of C»erman petroleum resources. IV;xii
(quoted
AVIATION ACT
lllxv
43-Mar
"BIG
"BOMBING NIGHT AND DAY: THE
V:xix
essay by Dudley Saward.
VLvi-xi (July 1926). Lxii
WAR
PIJ^NS DIVISION-I).
IV:viii-ix. x, xii. xiii
Plans and Strategic Effecu," by Haywcxxi S. Hansell. Jr.. IV:iv-xiii "The Benefits and Conditions of Surprise Attack." bv Minoru C^nda. IVxviii-xxi
Minoru C
305th. V:vii-viii. xvii 487lh. V:xix
V:x»iii, xxii
Hiroshima mission,
"USAAF
essay by
IV:xviii-xxi
PRCK.RAM.
ATOMIC BOMB,
of IILxiii
ATTACK. THE,"
BERLIN (GERMANY), bombing campaign (Nov
BOMB GROUPS
x-xi
ASVs (AIR-TO-SURFACE VESSEL R-^DAR).
Eliot
(BOMBARDMENT AND BLOCKADE)
PROt.RAM. IILxiv BAYERLEIN. FRITZ. Vlllxiv. xv BEASLEY. PETER. Vviii "BENEFITS AND CONDITIONS OF SURPRISE
BOMBARDMENT AND BL(X;KADE
Guam, Vxix viii,
Allied
IV:xi; V:xxi; VTILix.
REGENSBURG-SCHWEINFURT
Illxi-xii
Ira C. Eakcr and. Lix, x 8th Air Force and, V:viii-ix; VLxiii
ATC (AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND). IIIxv ATIJ^STIC B.\m± WOS. THE. work by Samuel
xvi also
1.
U. S. Ixvii. See also entrus/or numtfred air forces, e.g. EIGHTH AIR FORCE. eu air planning and strategic effects, lV:iv-xiii cooperation with sea forces, ILvi-vii early organization of. IILix ARNOLD, HENRY HARI.EY ("Hap"). l:\i. xv; IILix; IV;xxi as .American .\ir Chief. IV:ix ARNOLD. HENRY HARI.EY ("Hap"), con/. British air power and. IILxiii Casablanca Conference and. IV:x
Normandy,
power and.
MISSIONS B i B
of. IILxiii
L.
UR-SEA COOPERATION. ILvu. See TACTICAL AIR POWER UR SERVICE COMMAND. Vxix
MR TRANSKJRT COMMAND (ATC), AIR WAR PIj\NNING." essays:
See also
FORCES. U S. ARMY AIR FORCES.
ARTIFICIAL HORIZON
the Air." by
Sulzberger. II:x-xv
UR SCOUTS.
strategic air
Lix; V:vHii. ix
North African invasion and. IV:x sinitegic air power and. IV:viii; V:xxi-xxiii U. S. air power and. Lxii-xiii
essays: 1.
.
3I5th Combat Wing and. V:xxii ARMSTRONG. NEIL, photograph of. V:xxui ARMY AIR CORPS. U. S. See ARMY AIR
at
evolution of. I:ix-xvi ground-sea-air cooperation. II:iv-ix
AIR
ARMSTRONG, FRANK A
Ixyiii
BALL BEARING INDUSTRY. CiER.MAN.
in 1915, IV:xviii
of.
Lxiv-xvi
ILiv
of.
BAl KAN AIR FORCE.
VILxv
Robert Ixjvett and, IILti.
Allied cooperation. I:xvi-xx; III:xiii-xiv Allied
7lh,
U.S., 5th, Lxix; VILviii
at
TACTICAL AIR POWER
V:xxii
Ilxiv
BALDWIN. HANSON W
British, 8lh I:xix; VILviii
NO.
(DOMINATOR).
BAILEY BRIDGE.
ARMIES
kDGB (AIR DEFENSE OF GREAT BRITAIN),
Ill cover; IV:cover RESS). IVx; Vxxi-xxUi
B-36. IV x; V:xxii
xii
APHRODITE PRt)JECT. VLxvi ARCADIA CONFERENCE, IV:ix
kBC-l
I
Saipan. V:coTer
B-32
Air Force. V:v
(ITALY). ILxi.
(SIPERFOR
B-29 at
taking of the beachhead. VILviii
(AMtRlCAN BRITISH CONFERENCE
(LIBERATOR). V:v
B-24
1
(ABC-1). lV:v-vi
ANDERS. WLADYSlJ^W, Ilxiv ANDERSON. FREDERICK, photograph
ANZIO-NETTUNO
photographs.
"Fl\Hng Bomb." VI xvi .Memphi, BelU. IVxxi
ALLEN. Honk." Ilxii ALLISON ENGINE. Illxiv
AWPD-4. IVix AWPD-42, IV:x,
at St.
Lo.
VILxv
BREPf. GEORGE.
IILix
BRII AIN. BAITLE OF (1940). Lxix BRI I ISH ARMY. 8ih. Lxix; VILviii
BUI
(.E.
BA ITLE OF THE (DEC
lighter contrails above.
44).
VII
ix
VLcover
BULL! IT. WILLIAM, photograph of. Vxix BU rr REPORL. VIvii BVD (BOEING VUITEE-DOUGI.AS) PROGRAM. Illxi-xii
xii, xiii
(AWPD-1),
1
IV:viii-ix. X. xii. xiii
MR WAR PLANS MR WAR PLANS
DIVISION
4
B
(AWPD-4). IVix
DIVISION-42 (AWPD-42).
IV:x,
xii. xiii
ALEXANDER. atC:assin<>.
II
photograph
SIR
HAROLD.
xi. xiii
of.
V:xzi
Ixix B-I5, V:xxii
B-I7
(FLYING FORTRESS), V:v
C-47 (DAKOTA SK^TRAIN). ILv; CANADIAN AIR FORCE. xviii CANNON, JOHN K VILviii I
photograph
<>l,
Vxxi
VII cover
CARPET BOMBING, ai Normandy. Iliviii CASABLANCA CONFERENCE (Feb 43). l:x.
1.
xvii.
V:xxi; VI:xiii
xviii;
2.
CASABLANCA DIRECTIVE.
Vxxi;
lV:x-xi;
(ITALY),
CASTLE. FRED,
Ira C.
by Sir John Slessor,
VIxvi. See
also
WINDOW
CHANEY, JAMES E., V:viii CHENNAULT, CLAIRE L., CHERWELL. LORD. VIvii
(B-32).
xvii, xviii
xiv
fighter-bomber. IILxii
Vxxii H. ("Jimmy"). IVxxi; V:xx
aboard \he Hornet, IV:xx
8th Ixiv.
VIILv
VLxiv; VII
German. VIILviii
FIGHTER PLANES. VLxv
biographical sketch of. VI:xii-xiii 8ih Air Force and. V:xxi
CHURCHILL. SIR WINSTON.
xix
campaign. VILvii-viii
FIGHTER PILOTS. navigational
VLxii II:iv
Axis, I:xiv
vs.
:vi
VILvi
DOOLITTLE. JAMES
Allied, Lxvii
Allied
in the Italian
instrument). V:xix
DOMINATOR
IV:iv; V:xxi
Ilvi
attitude toward Hitler.
of.
FECHET. JAMES E.. VILxii FIELD ORDER. THE. V:xvii-xviii FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE. Lxviii.
FIFTH AIR FORCE. Ill cover at Dagua. New Guinea. IV. cover at Nadzab. New Guinea. VILcover
Eaker and. IV:xxi
DG (DIRECTIONAL GYRO;
CHIANG KAI-SHEK, photograph of. Iliv CHIANG KAI-SHEK, MME., photograph of, CHIEFS OF STAFF.
Air." by
essay by. VII:vi-xi
photograph
epilogue quoted, I:xx
CHAFF,
by Ira C.
L., I:x. xix
biographical sketch of. VII
II:x-xv; VILviii
V:viii. ix
CENTRAL BLUE, THE. book
Command."
"Cooperauon Between Land. Sea and Sir John Slessor. I:xvi-xx
DEVERS. JACOB
VI:viii-ix, xiii
CASSINO
"The Evolution of Air Eaker. Lix-xvi
Bomber Command
and. VI:x
Dwight D. Eisenhower and. V:ix. xx
LEO F.. photograph of. Vxix FLYING BOMB. See B-17; V-1 FLYING FORTRESS. See B-17 FLYING TIGERS, IV:iv F0C;KE-WULFE FW 190, Lxv FORRESTAL, JAMES, Illviii FREYBERG, sir BERNARD, Ilxiii FULKROD, BEN, Vxix FLIESS.
essay by. VLxii-xviii
Casablanca Conference and. V:xxi Casablanca Directive and. IV:x-xi Ira C. Faker and, I.x quoted on: Allied air power, I:xx Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe, Lxiii
DOUGLAS, DONALD,
DOUHET. GIULIO, photograph
of.
DOWDING. HUGH.
DRAGOON
IILxi
V:v
IV:xviii IILxiii
(operational code name). VILvi
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION, IVx
GALLAND, ADOI.PH, VLxv
essay about, IILv-xvi
CIVILIAN-MILITARY TEAMWORK IN WARFARE. THE." essay by Robert A.
Me-262 and, VLxvii Lovett.
CIVILIAN-SOLDIER, concept
CLARK, MARK.
of, IILvii
Lxviii
EAKER. IRA C,
at Cassino. ILxi. xiii
CODE-BREAKING COHEN, RALPH, V:xix COLLINS, -LIGHTNING JOE,"
COLOGNE
(FRANCE).
1,000
VILxvi
bomber
raid on.
VLviii
COMBAT WING. 315th. Vixxii COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE. VLviii-x,
IV:x;
Vxxi;
xiii
on German war producUon, 1943-1944, VLx-xi COMPUTER, and the military. IILxvi
CONCENTRATION OF FORCE,
principle of.
ILvii
CONINGHAM, ARTHUR, photograph of, IV:xxi CONTINUOUS BOMBING, concept of. IILxiii "COOPERATION BETWEEN LAND. SEA AND AIR," essay by Sir John Slessor, I:xvi-xx
CORLETT, CHARLES H.. VIIxv COWART. WILLIAM. V:viii CUNNINGHAM. SIR JOHN. Lxix of.
Commander
\. T. Harris and. VLvii-viii in 1926, IV:xviii
DAVISON,
F.
TRUBEE,
bombing of Japanese
Beirne Lay.
DEE. P
essay by Jr..
by Ira C. Eaker. Lix-xvi
lxix; Vlix.
DESERT AIR FORCE, Lxviii, xix "DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF AIR essavs:
of.
V:xxiii
E,. Lvii
GODDARl), ROBERT.
IILxvi
quoted on:
Allied
bombing of Berlin. Vl:x bombing of Hamburg. VLix
Adolf
Hitler. Vlllvi-vii
PLANTS,
attack on.
VIILix
(operational code name).
GROl GROl V:ix
P P
AM) WING INTEGRITY. FORMATIONS,
V:xviii
standardization of. V:xviii
(;R0UP TRAINING. Vxix
GRUENTHER. ALFRED M ILxi. GUADALCANAL. IIv GUNNERY, for stiategic bombing. GUSTAV LINE. ILxi .
IV:vii.
VLix
(.ROSS, BOB, lILxi
xiii;
ENOLA GAY (airplane). V:xxiii "EVOLUTION OF AIR COMMAND. THE."
L. VLviii
POWER. THE."
V:v
KOBKRT
xii-xiii
V:xx
C.. IILix
VLxii-xviii
DE GAULLE. CHARLES. VILxi DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY. JEAN.
lxii;
BARNEY, photograph
GIRVIN.
VIILix
EMMONS. DELOS
essay about. VLxii-xviii Doolittle. with
CilLES,
CiOMORRAH
V-1 and. VLxvii
bombing and.
vii. xi
GOLDENBERG AND FORTUNA POWER IVxi; VILvii
Doolittle and, V:xx; VLxiv Eaker and, V:xix
Allied strategic
VILxii IILxiv
Lxii;
IV:vi.
VILxv
FORCE.
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY. GERMAN.
"DAYLIGHT PRECISION BOMBING." James H,
7lh.
at
IV:cover See C-47
DAYLIGHT BOMBING,
power and.
v
GEROW. LEONARD T.. IVv GHQ (GENERAL HEADQUARTERS) AIR
See also
Allied
D., Lxviii;
Normandy, V:xviii at St. Lo, VILxv as Supreme Commander (ETO), tactical air power and, VILxi
V
Ixi. xix:
Regensburg-Schweinfurt attacks and. V:xix
COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
Ira C.
airstrip at.
DAKOTA.
AIR FORCE.
Panzer Lehr division. VILxiv. xv
Casablanca Directive and, IV:x bombing and. VLxii-xviii development of strategic bombing and, V:viii-ix,
Jimmy
photograph
IV:xx
of.
GERMAN ARMY
Southern France invasion and, VILx strategic air planning and. IV:x
EDEY. MAITLAND, A., Lvi-vii EIGHTH AIR FORCE, Lxix Bomber Command, Lix; VI;vii-viii.
xxi
IV:viii
KING OF ENGLAND,
VI.
GOfBIUl S.JOSEPH,
NORMANDY INVASION
DAGUA (NEW GUINEA),
planning and.
strategic air
GEORGE
Fighter Command. VLxiv night fighter force. VIILviii
Ira C. Eaker and, Lix-x: VILvii heading for Germany, Lcover at Normandy, IV:xvii; VII :xv Royal Air Force and, Lxx
D See
of. IV:xviii
Allied strategic air
Mark (airplane) and, IV:xix quoted on bombing of Cassino, ll:xv
Question
EISENHOWER, DWIGHT
D-DAY.
photographs
"GENDA CIRCUS. THE."IV;xviii GEORGE, HAROLD L., IV:v; V:vi.
GERMAN
daylight precision
V:xxi
VLix
(1943).
biographical sketch of. IV:xviii essay by. IV:viii-xxi
essay by. Lix-xvi
effects
photograph
xxi, xxii
of the MAAF, I:xviii-xix; VILvii Jacob L. Devers and. IV:xxi; VILvii 8th Air Force and. V:viii-ix; VLxiii Dwight D. Eisenhower and. V:xix as
bombing of Hamburg
GENDA. MINORU IVxx; V
I:ix; ILvii:
Robert Lovett and, IILviii
I..,
(radar device), VLviii
use in
biographical sketch of Jc»hn Slessor by, Lxvi-xvii Casablanca Conference and, V:xxi
Axis, I:xv
vs.
GEE
biographical sketch of, Lix
Allied, I:xix-xx
Allied
GATES, ARTEMUS
E
IILv-xvi
FAIRCHILD. MUIR S.
IV:
essay
H H2S RADAR. VLviii H2X RADAR. VLxiv HALSEY. WILLIAM. Ixiv HALVERSON. HARRY, photograph
of. IV:
IIi.
I
II
iC.KKMANM
Willi K(.
II
i
MON
ANSU
1..
.
LA
IT
I\' viii M \KKI\I AN W hKH HARRIS, SIR AR MLR RAVER.S, l:xv; V:ix as commander of RAF Bomber Command, 1
.
James H. Doolitde
essay by
I
photograph
of.
of,
V:xxi
V'II:xvi
COIR
1
NKV. Vllxiii
llOOh, RO^ ph.il.iKiaph of. HOPKINS. IIARR^ slraiegic .
.
K \\(
il
^
lESSC
Ci.Mipand.
H.imli
S(|-|tli
I.EMl
stralegii df< i•.lon-m,lki.l^ .iiid. Vlllv-vii
ILxiii
lxiv
)\
I
)l
Vviii.
IV:xix air planning and.
1
IIURA rOR
I
l(,HINING(P-38).
xxi
ix.
NADZAB (NEW
NAVIGATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
V:vii-viii
IN(.ALLS. DAVID.
A., transatlantic night
oL
xii
I
code-breaking. Lxv-xvi; xix-xx. See also use in modern warfare, ILvii-viii
ULTRA
VI
strategic air
power and. See
L.
Normandy, VLxvii
at
Commands.
.Air
VILxiii-xiv
I\':x
GERMAN
AIR FORCE
NOR LH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Allied air strategic
power
in. Lxviii
planning
Elwcxxl Quesada
for. IV:ix-x
in,
VILxiii
for, iV:vi-viii
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. .Mlied ccHiperation
ILvii: V;xxii.
leaving Ploesti. ILcover
Bav of the Seine. ILv breakout (Julv 44). ILv-vi carpet bombing during. ILviii 8th Air Force and. VLxvii tactical air power in. VILxiv-xv
vii
invasion
planning
for. VLviii
Allied air p
viii
biographical sketch of. lILvi-vii essay by, IILv-xvi
LUFTWAFFE.
INTERDlCriON .SLRATEGV, II viii INVASION OF EUROPE. See aUo Normandy
radar devices
NIMITZ, CHESTER W.. Lxiv; NINTH AIR FORCE. IVxi
Tactical
A. C. B..
IX
NORDEN BOMBSIGHT. Vvi. xvii; VlLxv-: NORMANDY INVASION (6Jun 44)
ILviii
I.OVETT. ROBERT A.. Ivi. "Hap" Arnold and. ILvi
INIEl.LIGENCE
VLviii.
evsay about. Vl:vi-xi
definition of. lILvi
LOVELL.
(Directional Gyro). V:xix
NIGHT BOMBING
(B-24). ILcover; V:v lILxii
Dcvers. Vllvi
hislor^ of. Ivi-vii
DC
GEE.
VALLEY (ITALY). ILxiii LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT COMPANY. IILxi LODGE. HENRY CABOT. JR.. quoted on Jacob
IMPACT MAGAZINE,
Horizon. Vrxix
Artificial L.
l.IRI
LOGISTICS.
at.
VILcover
xii
I
(.UINEA). paratroops
NACiUMO, CHUICHI. IVxxi
VILx
hi.
\SSINO, THE," essav by Cyrus
t
LINDBERGH. CHARLES .
N
i:xv
S„l/l„-,ger, ILx-xv
IV :x
HULL. HARRIS B
Ilvii
M
in. Lxviii
ground campaign. VII:vii-ix Monte C^assino. II:x-xv tactical air power in. VILxiii
IWOJIMA.
viii
quoted. ILviii
.
with, VLxii-xviii
biographical sketch of, V:xvi davlight Iximbing over Japan and. VLxviii essav bv. V:xvi-xxiii photo^'iapbs of. V:xvi, xix, xxiii
1
AI>OI.F. I:xiv
C.erman comnmni(.itions and. Mc-2(i2 and. VI xvii oveltonridemc of. VIII v. ui
I
ix
V:iv
LEAD CREWS. Vxviii LEAHY. WILLIAM D., IVix; V;vi LEMAY. CURTIS E. ("Old Iron Panis"),
taker and. VI:vii-viii photograph of. V:xix Ira C.
HEWI n. H. KENT, photograph HIROSHIMA (^JAPAN). bombing
strategic
VIII VII xviii
quoted. V:xix
VI:vii-viii
HOIX.KS.
MUSSOLINI. BENI ro, MUSrAN(;. .V« P5I
biographical sketch of, Viv-v essay by. V;iv-ix
:<
I
MORISON, SAMl El EI.IOI M0R(K:CAN GHOIMIERS.
Lxix;
Vl.ix. xi
\KI)I\(., SIR |()M\ llMi
HITLER.
RE DETASSIGN Y.JEAN DE.
LAV. BEIRNE.JR.
plititui^t.iph ol. I\' iv
1
E
I
I
.
fssav bv. IV':iv-xiii
H
id.
attacks
(ASSINOd AIY), II M(JNl(.OMER\. BERNARD.
IViv
liioHiaphiial ski-iih ol.
I
V
an |>owei
EV DAM.
siipriioiitv ol
MOIINE VAI
(25 iul 2 Aii(! 43). Vlllix Voss shipviirds. hoiiibinj! ol. VI :ix HAYVVOOn S JR V :vi
M.ls nil
hill ,in
MEDI ERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES MACARTHUR. DOUGLAS. Lxiv; Vxxii
ILvii; IVxiii
.MAAF. See
George
Kenncy and. Vrxix
C.
MCCRACKEN. WILLIAM. MCNAIR. LESLIE J..
MARIANA ISLANDS.
.
MANAGEMEN r OIINISIII.
VILixLxiii.
iiii
"Hap" Arnold and, IILx attitude toward role of air power. IV:vi; V:vi at
Normandy. V:xviii
planning and. IVviii use of the atomic bomb over Japan and. IILxiv
strategic air
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES IMAAF).
K
in in
MEDI
1
h
KATYN
EORI-sl MASSACRE. Lxix MAN, (II \RLESC.. photograph oL IVxx KENNEDN. |OI-, |R VLxvi KENNl-A (.EOR(.E C Lxiv. Vxxi KE<.EI
Ol Ol Ol
I)
l)S.
See
ol.
V
xxiii
WAR
RR \NE AN COASTAL FORCE.
I
AKIJIRO. IV
xix
IRON PANTS." S« LEMAY. CUR ROBERL. Vvii
^MPK
OPI-RA OPl-RA
I
1
I
ipeiaiion.il
ION Ol ^MPIC.
OPERA HON
SI
RAN(.I
VLix
IILxiv E.
I
xix; VII:viii-ix
(OEEICE OE WAR PRODUCTION mana(;emeni). Vc war PRODUCIION
OPM
BOARD OSTFRIESLAMD
(battleship).
Vvi
Lxviii
h (airplane). lV:xxi MARINE, IV:vi
III 1 1
MER< HANI
MESSERSCHMin AIRPLANES Me MW. Lxv
.
.
.
Dougl.is M.iiArthui and.
V
xix
DEVICE. VILxv
KEPNhR. BILL. VI
xv Lxix: ILx; VILvii, KIN(.. fRNESI |., Illxiii; IV:x; Vvi .11 Noi iii.iruh. V:xviii KNlDSfN, WII lAM S.. IILxi
KESSEI RIN(., AI.BERI
.
MIDWAY. BA
viii
rri.E OF. IVxxi
MITCHELL
(B-25). IILcover;
MITCHELL. WILLIAM
I
See
oL xii photograph oL IV xix
court marii^il
I
P-38(LIGHININ(;). P-47
(THUNDERBOI
Ill xii I
).
I
xv; III
vi;
IV;;
P.5I (MU.STAN'G). Lxv; III vi. xiv use as escort plane. \'II xin
MILCH. ERIIARD. VIILviii MISSION REPORIS. \ XX
I
KL lER. AlRfNC.E S.. IV:v; V:vi, xvii KYUSIU ISLAND iJAPAN). Allied invasion oL Ohinpic opciation
Mc-2li2. VLxvii; VIILviii
MEW (MICROWAVE EARLY WARNING)
IVcover
("Billv")
IS E
xHle name). IILxiv ION l)RA(.OON. VILvi I.
OPERA HON (.OMORRAH.
Lxviii-xix; V:ix; VILvii-viii
Operation Strangle. VILviii Southern France invasion. VILx
Mt.MI'llls
(OPM)
PRODUC:i ION B(JARI)
IV;xiii
IVv VIII:
.
I
Lxii
MARSHALL. GEORGE C. BOMBARniERINC. lILxii JAPANESE NAVY. IVxix JEI AIRPLANES, Me-2fi2. VLxvii; lOHNSON. LOUIS. IILviii
ODONNEI.I EMMEI ph graph OFFICE OF WAR PR(JDUC: ION
ILviii
MARSEILLES (FRANCE), JAt.C.hR
o
1
PAN AMERICAN GOOD WILL EI K.ll PANZER ARMY. 5TH. VII xiv PANZER DIVISIONS, 9TH AND l()IH. VILmv-xv
I
PANZER LEHR DIVISION, PARTON, JAMES. Vixxi
Vllixiv, xv
biographical sketches by. I:ix-x;
II:iv. x; III:vi-vii;
IV:iv. xviii-xix; V:iv-v. xvi; VI:vi, xii-xiii: VII:vi. xii;
tactical air
(7
viii
Dec
41). IV:ix
xviii;
essay about, IV:xviii-xxi
PEASLEE, BUDDJ.. VIxvi
air
PENALTY OF OVERCONFIDENCE.
THE,"
essay
bv Albert Speer. VIILiv-xi
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. GERMAN, strategic
bombing
II
Allied
IV vii, xii, xii (graph) 9th Air Force leaving.
of,
PLOESri (RUMANIA),
photographs
ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE. IILxiv ROMMEL ERWIN, Lxiv; Vllxiii ROOSEVELT. ELLIOTT. VLxvi ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO,
I:xviii
cover
POLISH PARTISANS. Lxix PORTAL, SIR CHARLES. IV:ix; V:xx PRA rr. FLETCHER. Ilviii PRIDEAUX. TOM. Ivii
and, VLxviii
SOUTHERN FRANCE INVASION VILvi ground operations,
SPAATZ, CARL
Lxiv, xv
(15
Aug
44),
VII:ix-xi
A., IV:xx, xxi;
Vxx
Allied cooperation and, Lxviii
potential and, IV:viii-ix
Neil
Casablanca Conference and, V:xxi Casablanca Directive and, IV:x-xi North African invasion planning and, IV:x ROYAL AIR FORCE (RAF), Lix; V:v in the Battle of Britain, Lxix
Command, Command,
Armstrong and, V:xxiii
Jimmy
Doolittle and, VI xv, xvi-xvii, Eaker and, Lix Dwight D. Eisenhower and, V:ix Charles C. Kegelman and, IV:xx in 1915, IV xviii
xviii
Ira C.
Bomber Command, IVx. xi; VLvi-viii; VILx See also Combined Bomber Offensive Coastal
Vxxi
of. Lxvii;
quoted. Lxvii
SMITH. BEDELL, Jimmy Dooliltle SMITH, CYRUS R. IILxv
IILxv
power
ILvi. vii
essay by. Iixvi
V:xvi, xix; VLxiii
Illvii.
JOHN.
biographical sketch of. Lxvi-xvii Casablanca Directive and. IV:x
RAPIDO VALLEY (ITALY). ILxi. xiii. xiv REGENSBURG-SCHWEINFURT MISSIONS.
Ixix; VII:ix
power and. VII :xi
PATRICK. MASON, l:xii PATTERSON, ROBERT P., PATTON. GEORGE S.. JR.. PEARL HARBOR, attack on
SLE.SSOR. SIR
RAF, See ROYAL AIR FORCE RAINBOW 5 WAR PLAN. IV:v-vi
Vllliv
historical introduction by. I:vi-vii
PARIRIDGE. PAT, VI:xvii PATCH, ALEXANDER, M..
SKYTRAIN.5ff C-47
nighl bombing and use of. VLviii RAF and use oL IILxiv SCR-584. VILxv weather and use of. V:xix
at
Normandy. Vxxii Mark (airplane) and. IV:xix
Qttestion
Harry S Truman and, V:xxii-xxiii
ILvi VILxiii
Fighter 8th Air Force and, Lxx at Normandy, VLxvii; VILxv ROYAL NAVY, Lxviii; ILvi
20th Air Force and, V;xxiii U. S. Strategic Air Forces and.
SPANISH CIVIL WAR. SPEER.
VLx
Lxii
ALBERT
air power in Europe and. Lxiii quoted. IV:xi-xii. xiii biographical sketch lA. VIILiv
Mlied
Q
QUESADA. ELWOOD
VIILivxi photograph of. VIILiv Regensburg, Schweinfurt missions and, V:xix
essay by.
R.
biographical sketch of. VILxii
SPI IFIRE (British airplane), l:xv; U:\n SPRUANCE, RAYMOND, Lxiv
essay by. VII;xii-xvi
photographs
of.
QUESTION MARK
IV:xix; VILxii (airplane). I:xii;
VILxii
IV:xix Ira C. Eaker and, Lix
crew
of,
R RADAR ASVs, Illxiii H2S, VLviii H2X, VLxiv MEW (Microwave Early Warning) de
LO (FRANCE), VILxv SAIPAN (MARIANA ISLANDS). ST.
20th Air Force
at.
V: cover
SAUNDBY. R. H M. S., VLvii, SAVILI.E. GORDON, VILx SAWARD, DUDLEY biographical sketch essay by, VI:vi-xi
photograph
of,
viii
oL VLvi
STATISTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM, STEWART, JAMES M., V xviii STIMSON, HENRY L., IILxv Robert Lovett and, IILviii-ix power and. IV:viii. x (operational code name),
strategic air
STRANGLE
Lxix; VlLviii-ix
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,
U.
S.,
Lxx; V:vi,
VLvi
SCHNEIDER, MAX, IVv SC;HWEINFURT mission
STRATEGIC AIR POWER See
background
REGENSBURG-SCHWEINFURT MISSIONS
command
VILxv
definition
SCR-584 (radar
IILxiv; V:v
device),
SHUTLLE BOMBING,
Lxix
SINCLAIR, ARCHIBALD. V:xx
to
development, V:iv-ix
realities. V:xvi-xxiii
oL
V:v; VILvii
effects in Axis
Europe.
IV:xi-xiii
effects in the Pacific. IVixiii; V:xxii-xxiii
n
M
\F
^ \
Ml,,r
I
k
\
I
pl.inniti^. I\'iv-xiii
K(.l(
tNKSnS 1.
The
2.
"I'he
\
.111(1.
I
will
.MR POWKR: DtSIROYINC. IHK W.\R RESOIRCES." essays;
Background." by Beirne Lay. Jr.. V:iv-ix Realities. " by Curtis E.
Command
I.eMav. V:xvi-xxiii
STRA EGIC BOMBING SURVEY. U
S
I
.
VIII
CYRUS
SIN
of.
Allied
bombing of. IV:vii. xii-xiii SIR HUGH. V:v strategic bombing and. Lxi; V;ix
strategic
RENCHARD. photograph
of,
relationship with Stimson
TUNISIA.
IV.U. military tactician, quoted. IV:xxi
SLl'KRFORTRESS. ,S>f B-29 RFRISE ATTACK. bcnerit.s and
SI
AIR FORCE.
in the Italian
TWENTIETH conditions of.
Vll:vti-viii
AIR FORCE,
IV:xiu
NATHAN
F
.
Lxv. xix
"WEARY WILLIES."
VI xvi
WEATHER AND WEATHER SERVICES Allied.
Allied
Lxx I'j
Axis. Lxv bombing and.
W'EYLAND.
OP
WHl rn.E.
SIR
V:xviii-xix
FRANK.
(
Lxix; VILvii aiCassino. Ilxiii
photograph
of.
V:xxi
as Allied targets. ILxiii; IV:x
Allied counteroffensive against (1943). Lxvii-xviii;
WORLD WAR
WINIXiW.
.
I.
evaluation of air power
isolation of the battlefield. VlLviii
SURVEY.
US
"USA.AF Plans and
Haywood
Side." b\ Jacob L. Devers.
UTAH
S.
Strategic Effects." essay by Hansell.Jr,. IV:iv-xiii
(battleship). V:vi
YAMAMOTO. ISOROKU.
IVxix
quoted on Pearl Harbor operation. IV;xx-xxi lxix
YUGOSLAVIA PARTISANS,
VII:vi-xi
"The Air Side." by Elwood R. Quesada. VII:xxi-xvi
TACTIC OF GRADUAL DECREASE,
concept
of.
IVxix
TARCiET FORMULATION.
IILxii
-TEAMWORK ON LAND
I
A
W
AIR."
SEA
AND
Baldwin.
IN
I
THE
II:iv-ix
TEDDER, SIR AR HIR. xviii; IVxxi T^^^^S()N AI KRU). IORD. quoted. Ixx I
in. Lxi-xii
Lxv-xvi; VILxiii. x>i I
"TACTICAL AIR POWER CUTTING THE ENEMY'S AR.MS AN» LEGS." essays:
2.
xiv
UNITED STATES ARMY. 5TH. xix; Vllviii UNITED STATES NAVY. Lxviii UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Sre STRATEGIC BOMBING
ground operations. Vll:vi-xi identification of ground targets. VILxvi
"The (iround
I
V-l
evaluation of. Lxiv .Allied war prtnluction, Lxx .Axis,
t'l
VI:ix,S«
ULTRA,
definition of. V:v; Vlli.-ii
1.
II
Ilvi
air operations. VII:xii-xvi
blitzkrieg.
Ill xi
Illvii
WA 11. ROBERL WATSON.
WILSON. SIR HfcNR^ MAITLAND Jumtm"),
u Ilvii
vi
COpie"). Ilvii; Vllxiv VI xvii WI1.HEL.MSBIR(. K.ER.MANY). Iximbing of (1943). VI IX
VILvii
U-BOATS
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND. I9ih. TACTICAL AIR POWER. Ixviii
WASHIN(.roN, (,EORGE.
strategic
on Saipan. Vxover
IVVINING.
essav about. IV:xviii-xxi
and Marshall. Illxv
Lxviii-xix
campaign.
WAR PRODI (HON BOARD.
.Mlied
Ilv
TWELFTH
Ilx
V
IV.s, U. S,
organiutiiin of. Illviii War Plans Division. IVv
WEAPtJNS SrraLo
IV:xix S. Vxjdl
TRUMAN. HARRY
I..
IIx-xv
photograph
WALKER, Kenneth S WAR DEPAR IMEN I.
VIII cover
TOWERS. JOHN H., Illxi IRANSPOR lATION SYSTEM. GERMAN. .\llied
biographical sketch of. Il:x essiiv bv.
LOGO, HEIH.^C:HIR0. IVxix
I
quoted. I:xiv on defeat of Japan. IV:xiii
I
.
TOKYO (JAPAN), fire damage. TOULON (FRANCE). Vllix-x
x
extracts from. IV:xi-xiii
SL'I7.BERGER.
w
HOMPSON. EDWARD K vi-vii HOR ION. CHARLES B IILxiv; V:vii IHUNDERBOII (P-47). lxv; IILvi; IV:x
Air Force. Vviii-ix
ol Will
I,
.
I
vv,
ZEKE
V-l. VI xvii
VERSAIII ES IREATY.
Lxii. xiv
ZERO.
(Japanese airplane), Lxv Set
ZEKE
Index
made to Book number (I, II, III, month and year of issue (Apr 43), and page number. Page numbers in boldface inReferences are etc.),
Impact Facsimiles
to
Rhine crossing, VII May 45:58-59 Sept 43:37 Southern France invasion, V Oct 44:37, 38 Sicily, II
COMMANDO
AIR
FORCE,
1st, in
invasion of
Northern Burma (5 Mar), IV May 44:1-9, 1-9 AIRCRAFT. See also spenfu names and designations, e. g. B-17, MESSERSCHMITT AIRPLANES,
dicate illustrations.
ZEKE,
EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE, ROYAL AIR FORCE, etc. AIR FORCES, U. e.
A-20 (BOSTON: HAVOC), IV May 44:cover A-26B and, compared. IV Jun 44:37 flak hit at Kokas,
planes for Russia, strafing attack in
52-53 use by French
V
Sept 44:39
lease activities in,
II
Oct 43: 34-37, 35
ABERDEEN (SOUTH CAROLINA),
night gliders
over, III Jan 44:47
ABERDEEN AIRFIELD (BURMA), IV May 44:6 ACCRA (GHANA), Air Transport Command activities at,
I
Aug
43:12, 12-13;
II
Dec
43:38-39, 38-39
ACQUASPARTA
(ITALY), bridges bombed near, VI Mar 45:23, 24
ADEN MARU CLASS FREIGHTER, ADLER, ROBERT, II Dec 43:23 ADLER WERKE (FRANKFURT),
III
destroyed bv
45:
VII Jul
49
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, Los Negros,
AEAC. AEAF.
battleship),
See See
III
ALLIED EASTERN AIR COMMAND ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR
FORCE AERIAL BOMBS, AERIAL MINES
I
Aug
43:16, 16
Jun 45:18, 19 use in Japan blockade, VII Jun 45:18, 18-19; VIII Sept/Oct 45:49-50, 49-52
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. See PHOTOGRAPHY AFCE. See AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL
EQUIPMENT AFRICA.
See
NORTH
AFRICA:
NORTHWEST
AFRICA AIRACOBRA. See P-39 AIR APACHES (345th Bomb Group, Force), VII
Jun 45:cover,
5,
Sept/Oct 45:43
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS Burma, IV May 44:1, 1-9; VII Jun 45:back cover Corregidor, VI Apr 45:29, 30-33; VIII Sept/Oct 45: 20, 21,
Nadzab
22
air strip, II
Oct 43:22, 22-27
Netherlands, V Oct 44:iiiaide cover, V Dec 44:28-31, 29, 30-31 Noemfoor Island, IV Aug 44:11 Papua, 1 Apr 43:12, 12-14
1,
22, 22-23;
airfield,
III
Feb 44:5
AN/ASP-13 (radar
ANDERSON,
tail
V
warning device),
LIEUT..
Oct 43:
II
Arado
ANSBACH (GERMANY),
VI Mar 45:25, 25-27 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron (5th Air Force), VIII Aug 45:58, 58-59 S. destroyer pick-up, VI Apr 45:back cover
AIR SUPPORT COMMAND, 8th, III Feb 44:5, 5; V Nov 44: cover, 40-44 AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND (ATC) at Accra, Aug 43:12, 12-13; II Dec 43:38-39, I
38-39 African air route, I India to China run.
Aug
43:8-9, 8-13
III Jan 44:1, 1-9 Lagens field air base, IV Jul 44:34, 34-35 Overseas Technical Unit, photographs by, II Sept 43:22-23; II Oct 43:34-37 supply activities to Russia, II Oct 43: 34, 34-37; IV Aug 44:30-31, 30-36 AKASHI (JAPAN), Kawasaki aircraft plant, VI Apr
May
over, VII
plant,
1st
Dec
II
Tactical Air Force
45:2 railway attack
at,
ANSHAN
works missions, V Sept 44:52, inside back cover model combat sequences, V Nov 44:46-47 reconnaissance photographs, V Oct 44:46, 46-47 ANTHEOR VIADUCT (FRANCE), V Oct 44:32-33 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. See FLAK ANTISUBMARINE COMMAND. II Oct 43:42-43, 43 ANTWERP (BELGIUM). Ford and General Motors plants. I Jun 43:1; III Jan 44:44
(CHINA), Showa
ANZIO-NETTUNO
steel
(ITALY)
beachhead, III Mar 44:cover, I, 7, 1-9 reconnaissance photographs, IV Jun 44:21
battle for
AOUINA, EL (TUNISIA),
airfield,
I
Jul 43:1,
14-15
APARRI (LUZON),
Japanese aircraft bombed
at,
VI Apr 45:24
AR 234C (German plane), VII Jul 45:24 ARAIDO ISLAND (KURILE ISLANDS),
45:22, 23 ALAMEIN, EL,
ARAKAN HILLS (BURMA), Taungup I
Mav
also
Air Transport
Command
air bases,
harbor,
II
Oct 43:31
43:36-37, 36-37
Nov
Pass, II
43:14
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS; ATTU; IV Aug 44:
ARCTIC SURVIVAL,
I
May
43:34-35, 34-35
ARDENNES See BULGE, BATTLE OF THE AREZZO (ITALY), attacks at, IV May 44:40; V Sept 44:23
32-36
Tirana
airfield, II
ALBERTA (CANADA),
Dec 43:29
Command
Air Transport
IV Aug 44:32-33
ALBINIA (ITALY),
railway bridge,
II
Dec 43:42
ALCONBURY (ENGLAND), bomb loading accident at, II Sept 43:34, 34-35 ALEUTIAN ISLANDS, See 1th Air Force
model,
I
also
bombing of, Jun 43:34
I
ARGENTAN-FALAISE GAP. See FALAISE-ARGENTAN GAP ARIANO DEFILE (ITALY), II Nov ARMIES 22, 22-23;
Jun 43:34, 34-37
Bntish, 8th,
German,
VIII Sept/Oct 45:33
I
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE (AEAF) Cherbourg capture, IV Aug 44:38, 38-39 fliers of. III
Mar
ALSFELD (GERMANY),
44:38, 38-39
railway attack
at,
VI Apr
1,
I
May
7th.
May 43:36; I Jun 43:42 V Nov 44:18-19, 18-19; VII May
45:28
Feb 44: back
ALGERIA, Tindouf air base, II Dec 43:40 ALIFE (ITALY), III Jan 44:43 ALISON, JOHN R., IV May 44:1, 5 ALLANMYO (BURMA), Aug 43:26-27 ALLIED EASTERN AIR COMMAND (AEAC), IV Aug 44:14 Burma pipeline bombed by, IV Aug 44:15
1st,
45:56, 56-59
U.
ALEXANDER, HAROLD,
V
43:6
V Oct
44:in9ide cover, Dec 44:28-31, 29, 30-31; VII
Allied Airborne,
ATTU; KISKA
williwas (winds) over airfields. III
French
VI Apr
45:43
45: 17
relief
Oct
11
AKASUKA WARD (TOKYO), VI Apr 45:13 AKYAB (BURMA), III Mar 44:27 ALA (ITALY), 12th Air Force attack at, VI Feb
1
I
Schipol airport,
43:13, 14
cover
5th Air 5-13; VIII
AMSTERDAM (NETHERLANDS),
ANKLAM (GERMANY),
eu.
Force),
air bases in,
types of, VII
ISLANDS),
lifeboat, II Dec 43:34 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron (1 3th Air
U,
May 44:47
(NEI), Amboina, IV
ANNWEILER (GERMANY),
ALBANIA, Japanese,
for numbered air forces.
g EIGHTH AIR FORCE,
ALASKA. See KISKA
Mar 44:25
III
Apr 44:27
Mav 44:47
photographs, IV
AMBON ISLAND
AMCHITKA (ALEUTIAN
organization in Pacific, VIII Sepl/Oct 45:76, 77
Mar 44:32
Allied bombings, VII Jul 45:43
ADMIRAL SCHEER (German
S. See entries
AIR-SEA RESCUE
Mar 44:38-39
fliers, II
A-26 (INVADER), V Dec 44:32, 32-33 B model, IV Jun 44:36-37, 36-37 A-36 (MUSTANG), targets in Italy, II Dec 43: 44 A/A FIRE. See FLAK ABADAN (IRAN), Air Transport Command lend
(NEl), night reconnaissance
44:48,48
parachute-borne
Oct 43: 34, 36-37 advance, IV Jul 44: 52,
II
Rome
night reconnaissance
photograph, VI Mar 45:8-9
AMBOINA
Jun 43:35
elc.
problems of recognition, IV^ Mav 44:37,37 AIR FORCES See direct name entiy. e. g. ALLIED
A-3 (FALCON), IV Jun 44:36, 37 A-4. See V- WEAPONS, V-2
45:43
ALSTADT (GERMANY),
S,
May 45:28 Apr 45:52; VII Oct 43:47 7th, VII May 45:30 9th, VII Mav 45:28, 35 VII
1st,
3rd, VI 5th,
ARMY
May
45:9, 9, 28
II
AIR FORCES, US.
numbered
air forces,
e.
g.
See also entries for
EIGHTH AIR FORCE,
etc.
Europe. V Sept 44:3. 4-19 bomb tonnages, V Sept 44:4-5 targets analysis, V Sept 44:6-19 in the Pacific, review of progress (1944), VI Jan 45:10, 10-11 (map)
growth of power
in
VRNOl
HENRY HARI EY
D.
C Hap").
Apr
I
4S J7; Vlll Sepi^Oct 45 63 Bradlr> and. ai Normandv. IV Jul 44:11 P-80 and. V Srpi 44;24 quoted on the B-29, III Feb 44:23: IV Jul 44:44 ARTILLERY, L'. S.. b
Omar
^SC;ENSI0\ island. at.
Aug
I
.Air
Command
Transport
Jan 45:42-43 ftSTR.A ROMAN A OIL REFINERY (PLOESTI). II Sept 43 16. 18-19 review of attacks (Aug 43-Aug 441. V Dec 44:35. 38. 38-39 target damage, ground views. V Oct 44:29-31 17.4(70 MARL' (Japanese shipl, III Apr 44:33
AIR TR.ANSPORT fiOMMAND ATHENS (GREECE) S^r
Elensis airfield. Ill Jan 44:40
Taioi airfield.
Dec 43:30
II
ATLAS MOLNTAIN AREA (MOROC;CO).
II
Dec
4340-41
ATOMIC BOMB.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
missions (6 and 9 Aug). Vlll Sept/Oci
45 94-101,95
ATSLGI (JAPAN),
VIII Sept'Oct 45:109
airfield.
ATTERBLRY DOME (GREENLAND). 16.
Mar
Ill
16
ATTL (ALEUTIAN ISLANDS) Jun 43:34; Aug 43:36 Force offensive. Jun 43:34; I Jul
ChKagof harbor. Ith .Air
I
I
I
I
43:24. 24-31 Holtz Bav. I Jul 43:26-27; I Japanese balloon bomb shot
Aug 43:38 down near.
Vlll .Aug
45:55
map.
Jul 43:24 photographic studv. I
I Aug 43:36-39,37 VII Mav 45 32 ALGSBL'RG (GERMANY), aircraft faaories bombed at. Ill .Apr 44:5; VII Jul 45:16 ALLOCK. COL VON. V Dec 44:2
ACER (GERMANY).
AUSTRIA Drau. VII Mav 45:42 Innsbruck, reconnaissance photograph. Ill .Apr 44:39 Klagenfurt air base. IV Mar 44:2 Linz. 1 5th .Air Force heading for. VI .Apr 45 inside cover. 1 Neuberg airfield. VII Mav 45:41 StevT bearing plants. IV Mav 44:14 Vienna. 15ih Air Force over. VI Feb 45:27 Wiener Neusiadt aircraft factory. II Oct 43:16-17; II
bail
Dec 43 43; III Apr 44:3 out over. IV Jul 44:37
ALTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL EQUIPMENT (AFCEl.
Ill
Apr 44:48
use bv lOth Air Force.
I
Aug
43:26-31
AVENGER S« TBF AVIATION ENGINEERS, construction.
Makin
II
Island. Ill
airfield
and
air
base
Nov 43:33. 22-27 Apr 44:16-17
Saipan. VI Jan 45:innde cover,
1.
22-23. 22-33
II Oct 43.32.32 (bombing device). VI Mar 45:32-35. 33. 35 AZORES. Lagens field air base in. IV Jul 44:34.
TsiliTsili.
AZON
34-35
B I
B-17
I
Me Me
vards. VII
rail
Mav 45 70-71 \SCHERSl.EBEN (GERMANY). Tighter factor\. Ill Apr 44:5 \SLITO AIRFIELD. S« ISLEY FIELD \STIER (FR,ANC.E1. aircraft assembh plant at. VI
44
model combat sequences: FW 190. Jun 43:6,6
43:8-9.9-11
^SCHAl FFENBLRG (GERMANY),
ATC
43:28. 28-31; II Dec 43 46. 47; III feb 44 36. 38-39: IV Mav 44 38; V Dec 44 20-21.21 ditching prcxedure. I Jul 43:32-33. 32-35 downed. lapse in air discipline. V Sept 44 87. 37 leaving Lorient. I Mav 43:lack cover mid-air collision. I Aug 43:22-23
(FLYING FORTRESS)
I
V
Mav
cam
targets in Italv.
II
JB-2. VIII Aug 45:64 P-47 escort taaics for. II Nov 43:28. 28-31 pick-up rescue tests. VI Jan 45:8. 8-9
B-24
I
May
43:24,
Ma
bombed
storage depot
oil
VII Jul 45 30
at.
BAD DIRKHEIM FRANKENSTEIN ROAD.
Emerson 128 ball n<»e turret for. V Nov 44 45.45 downed, search on Cocos Island, III Jan 44:48. inside back cover
Feb 44:37 Hamp versus, model combat sequences. Ill .Apr 44:28 leaving Ploesti. II Sept 43:cover N model. V Dec 44:22. 22-23 over Norman coast. IV Jul 44:14 out of control, saved. I\' Mav 44:34. 34 "Shack Date." IV Jul 44:32. 32-33 sinking of German submarines, II Oct 43:42-43,43 targets in Italv. II Dec 43:43 trailed bv Me 410 over Alps. IV Mav 44:back cover "Z-Bar." IV Jul 44 32-33 flak evasion. III
B-25 (MITCHELL).
I
model, rocket insullaiions
for.
IV Aug 44 42
over Hong Kong harbor. VI Jan 45:34. 34 model. Ill Mar 44:34-35,35
minimum
altitude
installations. Ill
Mar
bombing.
I
of,
44:30-31.
down due to mistaken identity. IV Mav 44:36.37 sinking of Japanese cargo vessel at Swatow. Ill Jan 44 18-19 targets in Italv, II Dec 43:42 B-26 (MARAUDER) flak hit, II Dec 43:46, inside back cover ground rocket hit, IV Jun 44:15 Mediterranean targets, II Dec 43:42: III Jan 44 42. 42-43 Spitfire escort. II Nov 43:40, 41, 42-43 tail gunner window hit, Jul 43:hack cover West Europe targets, II Nov 43 40, 41 B-29 (SUPERFORTRESS) shot
I
V
Sept 44:28-2'' bomb bav loading tests, V Sept 44 50-51, 51 characteristics of, IV Jun 44:47-48, inside bick
cover Culver Cjdet and, IV Jun 44:cover ditching procedure, VI Feb 45:50. 50-52, 52 effectiveness of, Japanese testimony. VIII Sept/ Oct 45:103 formations, VI Feb 45:44-47, 45-47 incendiary missions, VII Jun 45:24, 24-37; VIII Aug 45 38, 38-39; VIII SeptyOct 45:84-93, 8.5-87
docks, VI Feb 45:42, 42-43 Nagova, Kobe and Osaka, VII Jun 45:24, 26, 28-30. 24-33 Tokyo. Vlll Sepi;Oct 45 74-75. 75 introduction of. Ill Feb 44 cover. 22-25. 23 Iwojima operations. VI Apr 45 18; VIII Jun 45 inside cover, 1, 38-39. 38-39; Vlll Sept/CVi
Hankow
operations. Vlll SepuOa 45:52-83 air-sea rescue. Vlll Sepl/Oct 45 76. 77 mission planning. Vlll SepiyOct 45:58. 60. 62.
model weather photographs. VI Feb 45:48-49
Mav 45 62-63
VII
Mav 45 64
VII
BAD MUNSTER (GERMANY),
rail
bridge. VII
Mav 45 70
BAD VOSLAl (GERMANY). bomb
missir>n.
15th Air Force plot studv. IV Jul 44:62-63.
62-63
BAILOUT HI and H-2
oxygen assembly. IV Jul 44:36.
36-37 use of parachute
in. II
Dec 43:32. 32-34
BA|A R.AIL BRIDGE (HUNGARY), bombing
of,
VI Jan 45 2-3 BAKA (Japanese suicide plane), VII Jun 45:42. 42-43
BALIKPAPAN (BORNEO) Allied invasion (1-2 Jul), VIII refineries attacks,
V Dec
Aug 45 46-47.47
44:inside cover.
1,
15-17
15, 16.
BALKANS Srr oho CZEC:HOSLOVAKlA: HUNGARY: YUGOSLAVIA in, II
Dec 43:28, 28-31; VI Jan
45:2-3, 2-4 railroad
30-31
B-32 and. compared,
of,
bombing
bombing missions
J
modifications for
bombing
BAD DL RKHEIM KAISERSLAUTERN ROAD.
oil
Jun 43:covct
58-62 I
Aug 45:45
BAD BERKA (GERMANY),
24-25
Jun 43:44 75 mm cannon
preparatioru for first land-based attack on Japan. IVJul44 41.44. 41-45 Saipan runway construction for. VI Jan 43:iaaidc cover, I, 22-23. 22-33
5th Air Force use of, Vlll
Dec 43:44
(LIBERATOR)
adaptation for aerial photography.
H
54-55
Tojo versus, model combat sequetKes, V Nov 44 46-47 Tokvo R<«e," VI Jan 45:27 B-32 (DOMINATOR), V Sept 44:28-29, 28-32 B-29 and, compared, V Sept 44:29
43:12-13. 13
Oct 44:42-43
mcxtification to
45 64.65-73,69-71.73
SepiyOct 45:76. 77
combat damage.
I
163.
Mananas
air-sea rescue activities in the Paofic. VIII
Apr 43 back cover;
109.
take-off methods. VIII Sep(/Oc1 45:54-55.
mining operations in Japan blockade. VIII Sept/Oci 45 49-50. 49-52
and
airfield attacks.
IV Jun 44:30-33, 31.
32.33
BALLALE ISLAND (SOLOMON ISLANDS).
II
Dec 43:4
BALL BEARINGS. German described. IV
Mav
manufacture
44: 14
Sirr
alio
namn
^prnfu plants, t g SCHWEINFURT BALLOON-BORNE BOMBS. Japanese.
45
of
Aug
VIII
54-57
54.
BALTIMORE (BOMBER).
BANGKOK (THAILAND),
I
Aug
43:9
raihards.
V Nov
44:37
BARI (ITALY) Jul 43:9 Crtrrman Air Force attack. Ill Mar 44:10-11 BARNFKOV. ALEX. VII Jul 45:30 airfield.
I
BARR. J E. II Nov 43:12 BASSFIN (BURMA), dock
facilities at. II
Nov
43 12-13
road
ba.st(k;nf
German
(Belgium),
strafing of
tanks on, VI Feb 45:7
BATAAN PENNINSULA,
VI Apr 45:26-27; Vlll
SeptyOct 45 19
BATF.SON, R N., quoted IV Jul 44:64 BAriIPA(.LIA-EBOLI HIGHWAY (ITALY), N..V
II
43 6
BAZ(K)KA (light rocket), V Oct 44:2 BEADLE, FRANK L II Nov 43:22 ,
BKAUFKiHTER (Bniish plane), V Dec 44 34 BEAUFORT S( ALE, III Apr 44 46 BK KHAM, WALTER, IV Jun 44:6 BEl EM (BRAZIL), Aug 43 8 BELFORT (FRANCE), railvard attack at, V Nov I
44 20-21
BELGIUM ,Antwerp, Ford and General Motors
pbnu,
I
Jun
43 1; III Jan 44 44 Bastognc Road, VI Feb 45:7 Battle of the Bulge targeo, VI Mar 45 10-11. Sw o/«.
BULGE, BArrUE OF THE
Charleroi railvard. IV Jun 44 10 landfall stnp. Ill Feb 44 20-21
La Roche, VII May 45:47 Mont, VI Feb 45:6 Namur railvard, IV Jun 44:12 Ostend, III Feb 44:35 St. Vith, VI Feb 45:6-7; VI Mar 45:10 BELGIUM, BATTLE OF. See BULGE, BATTLE
fragmentation.
use at Castel Benito. I Apr 43:4 use Sicilv. I Jun 43:22. 22-25 I Jul 43:20-21 "glip," VII Jun 45:14-17, 15 Grand Slam, VII Jun 45:46, 47 ground markers for, VII Jun 45:58 H2X radar methods, use for, V Sept 44:36; VII May 45:24-25; Jul 45:60 heavv bomber formations, effectiveness tested, I\' Jun 44:28-29, 29 high altitude, IV Jun 44:18-19 P-38 formations for, V Sept 44:back cover
m
Oct
II
,
attacks on,
I
Apr
43:28,
28-29
BERLIN (GERMANY) string bridge
Apr 44:41 VI Mar 45:14,
at. III
8th Air Force attacks,
14;
VI Apr
45:39 Erkner bearing works, IV May 44:12, 13 Royal Air Force attacks, VI Apr 45:50-51
BERNBURG (GERMANY),
aircraft plant at. III
BERNIERS SUR MER BESER, JACOB. VIII Scpt/Oct BETIO ISLAND, II Dec 43:6
BETTY
45:95
45:34, 34-35
BIG BEN See V-2 BIG DELTA (ALASKA), Air Transport Cominand air base at, IV Aug 44:32 BILIN ROAD BRIDGE (BURMA), bombing of, VI •
Feb 45:39-41
BISMARCK
SEA,
BATTLE OF THE
1-4
(
Mar
43),
quoted on Allied 45:64
BOELA (NED,
air
attacks
Oct 44:cover,
on Japanese
attack
on
oil
tanks
at,
V VI
BOEROE ISLAND
(NEI).
Namlea
airfield,
IV May
oil
refinery target model,
VII Jun 45:52
BOLINSKY, SAM. VI Jan
45:31
(ITALY), bombings
at. II
Dec
GUINEA),
etc.
BOMB PLOT STUDY,
usefulness of, IV Jul
44:62-63, 62-63
BOMBS AND BOMBING. V-WEAPONS
ako
ROCKETS;
plant.
II
damage from photographs,
I
Mav
43:26-27, 27 atomic, Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions, VIII
SeptyOct 45:94-101, 95 Azon, VI Mar 45:32-35, 33, 35 C-1 Automatic Pilot, use for, I Aug 43:26-27,
26-31 carpet, VII
BORGOFORTE
(ITALY). Po River bndge bombed
VII Jun 45:50 Batde of the Bulge, VII Mav 45:45-46,
air accident involving,
Air Transport 44:33
Apr 44:40
Ill
(BURMA).
May
I\'
44:5.
5-8 railwav attack
at.
VI
BRUEHL (GERMANY),
bombing
of.
VII
May
45:65
BRUGES UNITS
(harbor installations). VIII Sept/Oct 43:29 BRUNEI BAY (NEI), attacks on Japanese fieet VI Jan 45:14-15
at,
Mar
aircraft plant. Ill
44:43
bombing
of,
VI Feb
fuel plant,
IV Jul 44:59
BUDAPEST (HUNGARY) Baja railroad bridge, \I Jan 45:2-3 railvards, IV Jun 44:30-31 oil refinery, IV .Aug 44:23 Vesces airfield and aircraft plant, IV Jun 44:30
BUIN (SOLOMON ISLANDS). Ill Apr 44: 10. BUIR (GERMANY), railvard. VII Mav 45:66
BUKA (SOLOMON
II
Nov
43:36;
11
II
Dec 43:5,36-37
BOUGAINVILLE (SOLOMON ISLANDS) II
ISLANDS),
BUKA PASSAGE, II Dec 43:36-37 BULGE. BATTLE OF THE (Dec 1944).
45:56, inside back cover; VII Jul 45:30
corrected by photographs,
Air Force
Jun 43:42
Szony
BALIKPAPAN
VI Feb 45:54, 54-55 Lutong refinery, VI Mar 45:back cover Sandakan, VI Feb 45:57 BOSTON. See A-20 BOTTROP (GERMANY), oil plant at, VI Jan
Dec
43:35. 35-37
2-13; VII
38-40
29-31; aircraft factory. II
Nov
air
operations, analysis and review, VT Feb 45:cover, inside cover, 1-19; VI Mar 45:2,
Mav
45:45-46, 48, 46-49
BUNA (NEW GUINEA),
Torokina perimeter defensive, IV Jul 44:38,
BOURGENAIS (FRANCE),
air bases in, I\' .\ug
(FR.ANCE).
I
45:28
(BREMEN). 8th Air Force attack. V Nov 44:7 BO RIZZO (SICILY), airdrome, I Jul 43:8 BORKUM ISLAND, field drainage ditches at. III Apr 44:38
Kahili airfield. II Oct 43:8-9
May 45:27-28
I
BRUX (CZECHOSLOVAKIA),
BORGWARD TANK AND TRUCK PLANT
map
German
VI Jan 45:35, 36
BRUNSWICK (GERMANY),
VII Jun 45:64
invasion
(1940).
Apr 45:43
Dec 43:27
Nov 43:38
See also
Feb 44:17-18.
for air attacks. Ill
BRITISH ARMY, 8th, Mav 43:36; BRITISH COLUMBIA (CANADA).
6, 9,
BORDNER, DALE E., I Jun 43:38 BORGEN BAY (NEW GUINEA), camoufiaged at, II
Apr 44:41,41
III
BRUCHSAL (GERMANY),
8th Air Force attacks, I Jul 43:41 Matford engine works, I Jul 43:41 Rovan and Pointe de Grave, VII Jun 45:54-55.
BORNEO
Seine River. pre-Normandy invasion attacks, V Nov 44:16, 16-17 tvpes in Europe, photographic interpretation,
BROADWAY AIRFIELD
Feb 44:29 Jan 44:38
oil installation strikes,
See
\'I Jan 45:2-3, 2-4 Burma, IV Jun 44:20, 20; VI Feb 45:38-41,39 Central Italy targets, survey of effects. VI Mar 45:22. 22-24
in
BRITTANY
III
at. III
See also names of specific locations
Balkans,
Command
Dec 43:8-9
II
1
43:16, 17
Bolzano and Trento hits, II Oct 43:inside back cover Mediterranean Allied Air Forces tactical attacks. VII May 45:43,43 i2th Air Force bombing over supply line, VI Feb 45:22-25,23 BRERETON, LEWIS H VIII Sept/Oct 45:33 9th Air force and, VII Mav 45:7 BREST (FR.ANCE), I Jun 43:back cover
in.
BORDEAUX (FRANCE)
at.
May
BRITAIN. BATTLE OF
44:13, 15; VI Jan 45:17,
VI Jan 45:17, 17-21 AIRFIELD (NEW GUINEA), II Dec 43:5
barges
43:44-45; VI Mar 45:28 "Rover Joe" system, use near, VII Mav 45:40 BOLZANO (ITALY), II Oct 43:inside back cover; II Nov 43:3 BOMBERS. See specifu dfsignations. e. g. B-17, B-29,
at
V Oct
54-56
44:46
I
17-21
neutralization attacks,
cement oil installation at,
over. Ill Jan 44:13; III
Dec 43:back cover
II
Borgward tank and truck plant, V Nov 44:7 Deshimag shipvard, VII Jul 45:48, 49 Folke-Wulf aircraft factorv, Jun 43:4-5, 5 perspective target map. III Feb 44:18, 19
BRIEFING AIDS,
IWO JIMA
Oct 43:2 bombers in formation over.
19, 20, 20-21
BOHLEN (GERMANY),
assessing
Chichi Jima. 18-19
See also
airfield, II
Feb 45:54. 54-55
BOLOGNA
JALUIT ATOLL
See
searchlight installation
BOENJOE ISLAND,
release over.
bombing of
Mav 45:49 28-31 Shoran, VI Mar 45:28-3 spike-bombs, IV Jul 44:48, 48-49 Tallboy, VI Apr 45:46-47; VII Jun 45:46, 46-47 through clouds and overcast, II Nov 43:36-37, 37; III Jan 44:12-14, 12-14 BONG, RICHARD, air combat exhibitions. III Feb 44: 14, 14-15; IV Jun 44:46, 46
BORAM (NEW
VII Jul 45:64 power in Europe, VII Jul
Sept 43:22 VII Jul 45:53
Feb 44:3-4
bomb
BRIDGES
saturation, VII
BONIS 45:29
BODENSCHATZ, KARL,
II
bombing through clouds
in
BONIN ISLANDS
Sept 43:11
BLUMEFIELD, IRVING, VI Jan
I
CAMOCIN,
BREMEN (GERMANY).
,
43:7-11
BONHAM
BLECHHAMMER BLOHM AND VOSS SHIPYARDS (GERMANY), II
V Sept 44:34. 34-35 parabombing. VIII Sept/Oct 45:6 Corregidor. VIII Sept/Oct 45:20 Rabaul airfield, VIII SeptyOct 45:10 phosphorus See PHOSPHORUS BOMBS rapid calculation bombing, of ships, I Aug
1 ,
I Mav 43:cover, I, 1-9; I Jun 43:45; VIII Sept/Oct 45:47 first-hand accounts, I Jun 43:44 model air combat sequences, I Mav 43:12-13 Rabaul harbor, pre-battle view, I May 43:10-11 statistics, I May 43:1 BIZERTE (TUNISIA), seaplane base, I Apr 43:3 BL.\CK WIDOW. See P-61 NORTH, VI Feb 45:28, 29
IV Aug 44:20 BRAZIL Belem, Aug 43:8
BRENNER PASS
offset,
IV May 44:17 (BURMA), taking of (15 Dec), VI Feb
IV Jul 44:22 Jan 44:3
III
I Aug 43:16. 16 balloon-borne. VIII Aug 45:54. 56, 54-57 jB-2, VI Jan 45:5,6 5-7; VIII Aug 45 inside back
BOMBING
Apr 44:18-19
airfield, III
(INDIA),
BRASOV (RUMANIA), rail center at, IV Jun 44:32 BRATISLAVA (CZECHOSLOVAKIA), oil refinen,
BREMER VULKAN SCHIFFBAU (VEGESACK),
medium altitude. III Mar 44:24-25, 25 minimum altitude. See MINIMUM ALTITUDE
Jul 44:16
(Japanese plane), turret gun.
BHAMO
INCENDIARY BOMBS
cover
(FRANCE), IV
11
Japanese aerial.
Apr 44:5
Hawkins
incendiaries See
Oct 43:
BRAHMAPTURA
Jun 43:24 I Apr 43:6. 6
fuses,
BERGEN ALKMAAR AIRDROMES
bow
I
F. R., II
BRADLEY, OMAR, V Sept 44:41 H H Arnold and, at Normandy,
effectiveness of.
OF THE Pancevo bridge, VI Jan 45:4, 4 Sava River rail bridge, VI Jan 45:2 BENEVENTO (ITALY), bombing of, 43:back cover BENTZ, G II Dec 43:23
(NETHERLANDS),
BOYLES,
45:48.48
BELGR.\DE (YUGOSLAVIA)
W
43:20
46-49,48 use in Italy, VII Jun 45:58, 58-59 "Crawfish" (radio release device), VII Jun
BUNKER
II
I
Apr 43:12;
I
Jun 43:27,
Nov 43:39
HILL. U.
S.
S
,
kamikaze
attacks, VIII
Aug 45 9, 11. IMJ RKK JOE. IV Jun 44 :S9 Bl'RMA Srr also namri of sprnfic
n
Bl
Nov
II
at. Ill Apr 44:28 Apr 44 28. 29 CAP GRIS NEZ (FRANCE). Ill Feb 44:34 CAPST. JACyUF.S (INDO-CHINA). reconnaissance photograph. Nov 44:37 CAPUA (ITALY). II Nov 43:5
Target
largfls
43:8.
H-18; VIII Sepl/CXl 4.S:Sl-S9, S3-39 \N.n bnmbinK device, use in, VI Mar 4.S:S4, <':.
Hill. Ill
|.t Mar). IV May 44:1-2. 1-9 43:inndc back covrr; II Nov 43:8 Ill Mar 44:27. 27-J9; IV Jun 44:20,
CARE.
mips.
CARNEY FIELD (GUADALCANAL). CAROLINE IS1.ANDS Set TRUK CARPET BOMBING
|ul
largeu.
20; IV Jul 44:48. 48-Sl operations, review of. VI Feb 45:32. 31-41 Air Force in, I Apr 43:15-16; IV Jun
c.H.ii.al
Mill,
14 18-19 iiv
.Automatic Flight Control
111
Aug
Equipment
in.
I
43:26-27. t6-Sl
RMA DENTAL SCHOOL." IV Jun 44 JO RMA ROAD. II Nov 43:15 BIRNEVAL CASTLE (FRANCE). Crf^rman radar
-Bl
Bl
site at. Ill
|an 44:15 raUyards. IV
SK.NY (FRANC:E).
Bl
44:1,
iNEW GUINEA).
I
III
Bl
Oct 43:S;
II
Dec 43:8;
Apr 44:27
BOMBS.
/./
II
.
II
tVt 43:11
insullations (1939). VI
VII Jun 45:50 of the Bulge. VII
II
Sept 43:22
in Battle
May
CCX:HRAN, PHILIP G IV May ,
Apr
I
(SICILY).
CATALINA Ste PBY CATANIA (ITALY), bombings
AIRDROME, Jun I
at. II
Sept 43:40,41
Jul 43:9
against. VI Mar CBI (CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER). Stt BURMA; C:HINA; INDIA; and names of speafu
(
and (PHILIPPINES). targets
Uhug
air strike.
(ITALY). raU bridge destroyed
at.
IV May
44:39
CELEBES (NED
AUTOMATIC
PILOT.
I
Aug
43:26-27. 26-31
power boost stick for. IV Aug 44:53. 53 C-46 (COMMANDO), III Jan 44:2, 3, 9 C-47 (DAKOTA; SKYTRAIN), II Sept 43:37; III Jan 44:2 in commando invasion of Northern Burma, IV May44:I,S, 5, 6, 9 over the French Riviera, V Oct 44:37 in Normandy invasion, VII Jul 44:12, 19
Mav 43:20. 20-21 CAl (;ARY (CANADA). Air Transport Cx>mmand air base at. IV^ Aug 44:33 CALIFORNIA. Muroc Lake, airplane pick-up test VI |an 45:8 U. S. S., after Pearl Harbor attack. VIII Sepi/Oci45:2
at.
CAUFORNIA.
M BEARINGS WORKS (PARIS).
Ill
Feb
44:6
CAMOCIN
(BRAZIL), rainstorm over.
Sept
II
V Oct 44:22 Normandy invasion. IV Jul 44:19 Southern France invasion. V Oct 44:38, 39
CHANGSHA-YOCHOW RAIL LINE atucks on. VIII Sept/Oct 45:40
CHARLEROI (BELGIUM),
railyard.
IV Jun 44:10
CHATEAU BOUGON
(FRANCE), aircraft factory Nov 43:20 (FRANCE), airfield strikes. V Sept
at. II
CHATEAUDUN
44:16-17; V Oct 44:iiiride bKk cover CHENNAUI.T. C1.AIRE I... Apr 43:25. 27; Jul 44:45; IV Aug 44:3; VIII Sepl/Ort I
45:33.35
(FRANCE), capture of (27 Jun 44) IV Aug 44:38. 38-39 coastal defenses. IV Aug 44:38 (map) German soldiers taken at, IV Jul 44:21 CHICHAGOF HARBOR (ATTU), Jun 43:34; I air attacks.
DUMMY
VI Jan 45:17, 18 Fuumi Ko harbor, VI Jan 45:18-19 CHICKUHEI NAKAJIMA, quoted on effectiveness of B-29, VIII Sepi/Oct 45:103
German
industrial sites. VII Jul 45:44-45 II Nov 43:38. 38-39 locomotives. IV Jul 44:50. 50-51 CANADA. Air Transport Command air bases IV Aug 44:30-31. 32-33
CANC;ELL0 (ITALY).
II
Oct 43:48;
II
in,
Nov 43:4 Apr
(CHINA). Tien Ho air base. II Nov 43:48. iiuiae hack cover I
43:26;
CAP DE LA HAGUE (FRANCE), insullaiion.
I
navigational
Jul 43:44-45
CAPE ADALAER (GREENLAND). Ill Mar 44 16 CAPE BREW.STER (GREENLAND). Ill Mar 44:14 CAPE ENDAIADERE (NEW GUINEA). Jun I
43:30
CAPE C;L0UCE.STER (NEW GUINEA) Jan 44:36 B-25 out of control over. IV May 44:34. 34 Japanese camouflage at. II Nov 43:39 airfield. Ill
13,
15;
Japanese.
CANTON
Oct 44:
CHICKUNAN (FORMOSA),
railyards, VIII
Aug
45:41
CHINA.
and targets V (Vt 44:8,
Stt also names of speafu locations
re%iew and analysis, 8-12; VII SeptyOct 45 32, 32-41 Air Transport Command in. III Jan 44:1, 1-9 B-29 air base construction in, IV Jul 44:44-45 rail system attacks, V Nov 44:40 (map) supply operations, V Sept 44:32, 32-33 21st Photographic Squadron in, V Nov 44:30, 30-37
air operations,
CHOam
(Japanese submarine lender), damaged Rabaul harbor. Ill Feb 44 33 45:76
CHRISTIAN. LAMAR. VIII Sept/Oct C:HUB0DA. E J Jun 43:44 .
I
Mar 44 16
III
marshalling yard,
CONCHES AIRFIELD, II Nov 43:41 CONCORDIA VEGA OIL REFINERY
V Dec
(PLOESTI),
review of attacks (Aug 43-Aug 44), V Dec 44:44, 44-45 ground views of bomb damage. \' Oct 44 26-29 CONGER. PAUL A.. IV Jun 44:4. 5 CONWAY. H C V Nov 44 iiuide back cover COOGAN. JACKIE. IV Mav 44 3 .
CORAL
SEA.
BATTLE OF THE IMAY
1942),
VIII Sept/Oct 45:7
CORI-GUILIANELLO ROAD (ITALY),
strafing
IV Jul 44:52-53 (PHILIPPINF.S) recapture of (16 Jan 45), VI Apr 45:26-27, 26-33 Far East Air Forces attacks, VI Mar 45:49, 49 attack on,
CORREGIDOR
parade ground, VI Apr 45:30 paratroops at, VI Apr 45:29, 30-33 San Jose beachhead, VI Apr 45 28-29 supplv and gun drop, VI Apr 43:30 reconnaissance photograph. V Nov 44:37
C0RSIC;A, Nonhwesl African Coastal Air Force
at.
Sept 43:41
COULMIER (FRANCE), airdrome. VII Mav 45:56 COURSEULLES SUR MER (FRANCE). IV Jul
CHERBOURG
CHICHI JIMA (BONIN ISLANDS), V
COMPIEGNE (FRANCE),
II
IV
I
See also fuadmgs beginning uith
briefing model. III Feb 44:17
COMANCHE BAY (GREENLAND), COMMANDO See C-46
operations review, VIII Sept/Oct 45:18, 20, 22, 18-22
(CHINA).
Aug 43:36
43:22
CAMOUFLAGE.
beam
in:
NetherUnds.
C-49 (rescue plane), I Mav 43:35 C-54 (SKYMASTER), recognition of, IV May 44:37 C-87 (LIBERATOR EXPRF.SS), III Jan 44:2 CABOT. U. S. S.. kamikaze attack. VIII Aug 45:8 CABOLRC (FRANCE). IV Jun 44:14 CACiLIARI (ITALY), high altitude bombing at. I
C. A.
Gorontalo. 5th Air Force atuck, V Dec 44: 14. 14 Langoan airfield. II Dec 43:12 B-29s at, VIII Sept/Oct 45:66 CERAM (NEI), Boela, attacks on Japanese oil tanks at, V Oct 44 cover, 19, 20. 20-21 CG-4 (Hadnan glider), III Jan 44:47 A model. II Sept 43:37
CENTRAL FIELD (IWO JIMA),
use
C:OLLEVILLE SUR MER (FRANCE), IV Jul 44:20 C0L(X;NE (GERMANY), after Allied bombing, VII May 45 65 COLOMBIA AQUILA OIL REFINERY (PLOESTI), II Sept 43 16;, 20-21; V Dec
44:7
VI Jan
45:16
C-l
COC;OS IS1.AND (COSTA RICA), search for downed B-29 on. Ill Jan 44:48. iiui
44:46,46
Far East Air Forces miisiom 45:50, inside back cover
CECINA
VII Jul
cover
43:4, 4-5
locations
at,
44:1, 2, 4; VIII
Sepl/fVt 45:39
C:ASSIN0 (ITALY) Set MONTE CASSINO C:ASTEL BENITO AIRDROME (TRIPOLI),
CEBU
VI Apr 45:24, 25 bridge atucki
45:36
CAVITE (LUZON).
2. VI Jan 45:5-6. iiuide back cover B^ BEE. REESE L.. VIII Sepi/Oct 45:62 B^ )RITSU OIL REFINERY (FORMOSA). 5th Air Force aiuck on. VIII Aug 45:43
losses,
COBLENZ (GERMANY),
45:45-46,
46-49, 48 technique described, VII May 45:27-28 use in luly, VII Jun 45:58, 58-59
I
Mar 45:46
recapture of. VIII Sept/fVt 45:11 Far E-asi Air Forces aciivities. VI Mar 45:46,
46-47 Japanese
air accident.
harbor.
V-WEAPONS. V-I 5-7; VIM Aug 45:64,
Set alio
JB
<;
CLARK FIELD (LUZON)
43:24, 25
12. IS
Bl
R.
CASTELVETRANO
May
I
44:27
I
J5
...iiimando invasion r.iil
(ITALY), airfield. II Sept 43 48 Dl LITfORIA ilTAI Yi. II Mar 44 3 C;ITTADE1.1.A (ITALY), rail line bombed at. VI Feb 45:24 CIVITAVECCHIA (ITALY). |ul 43:6-7; IV Aug
phosphorus bomb, use
ntui and
operations, review and analysis.
.iir
CIAMPINO CISTERNA
low-level photographi. Ill Jan 44:36
.
44:17
C:RAII.SHEIM (GERMANY). marshalling Apr 45:44
vard, VI
CRANE. LEON, IV Aug 44:36 C;REDITUL MINIER oil refinery (PLOESTI). II Sept 43:16, 19; Oct 44:31 review of attacks (Aug 4S-Aug 44), 44:40. 40
V
Dec
CREIL (FRANCE), railv^rd. IV Jun 44 11 CRETE. TVMBAKI AIRFIELD. II Dec 43
CULVER CADET
31
(U S airplane). IV Jun 44:eo»er
Cj'.ECHOSLOVAKIA Bratislava oil refinen. IV .Aug 44 20 Brux. VI Feb 45 28 fuel pUnt, IV Jul 44 59
D DACIA ROMANA oil REFINERY (PLOESTI), V in
Dec 44:49,49
DAGUA (NEW Gl airfield, II
Japanese
INEA). II Oct 43:3 Dec 43 8-9 burning on ground
aircraft
at,
HI Jan
bombing of VI Feb 45:14. 14; VII Mav 45:44 ground panorama after capture. VI Apr 45:46-47
44:38
minimum
Apr 44:24-27 AFRICA). Air
altitude attack on. Ill
DAKAR (FRENCH WEST Transport
Command
DAKOTA. See C-47 DANZIG (POLAND),
DUSSELDORF (GERMANY). Rheinmetall Borsig works at. V Nov 44:6 DUTCH EAST INDIES. See NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES
Dec 43:39. 39
at. II
shipyards attack
Dec
at. II
DUTCH HARBOR (ALASKA). Apr 43:34 DUTCH NEW GUINEA. See NEW GUINEA I
43:18-19
DARA (THAILAND),
bridge
bombed
at.
VI Feb
45:38
DASBURG (GERMANY). German
transport
burned near. VI Mar 45:3 DAVAO (PHILIPPINES). V Oct 44:17. 17
HOWARD C
DAVIDSON.
Aug
44:48; IV
Nov
II
E
43:8: IV Jul
44:3
GLENDON
DAVIS.
V..
combat narrative quoted.
EAKER. IRA C. VI Feb
EDGERTON LIGHT
IV May 44:32
NORMANDY INVASION
D-DAV.
See
DEAN.
H. W..
I
EDMONTON
Oct 44:7
DEBRECZEN (HUNGARY).
DENKO
IV
Aug
Command
44:55
DESHIMAG SUBMARINE SHIPYARD (BREMEN). VII Jul 45:48 DESERT AIRFIELDS, special problems. 43:36. 36;
I
at. I
May
VII
IV Jun
Mav 45:67
Apr
Dec 43:23
|ul
I Jul 43:32-33. 32-35 VI Feb 45:50. 50-52, 52 CARL. V Oct 44:34
oil
airfield
refinery
at.
VII
45:30
DOLLMAN.
GEN., war diary quoted. VII
Jul
radar installation
at.
I
Jul 43:44
DOMINATOR See B-32 DONDANG BRIDGE (BORNEO),
oil
pipeline
bombed. VI Feb 45:55
DOOLITTLE. JAMES
H.. plane of crashed on Chinese hillside. I Jun 43:19 335 (German fighter bomber). VII Jul 45:25
DORNIER
DOUBLE LUFBERRY
(defensive combat
Apr 44:10-11. 10-11 DOUVRES-LA DELIVERANCE (FRANCE), radar station. IV Jun 44:14 DP (DEEP PENETRATION) BOMB. See maneuver).
Ill
TALL-BOY
DRAU (AUSTRIA), air attack near, VII May 45:42 DROHOBYCZ (POLAND), oil refinery attack at. IV Aug
44:inside back cover
DUBLON ISLAND (TRUK), III Apr 44:34, 36 DUISBERG (GERMANY), after bombing attacks. VII Jun 45:46
DULAG BEACH (PHILIPPINES), burning ammunition dump after Japanese attack
at.
VI
(B-17s), air-sea rescue activities in the
Pacific.
VIII SeptyOct 45:76. 77
DUMMY PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS Jan 44:36 Dieppe/Bois airfield. II Nov 43:32 Ploesti refinery. II Oct 43:46 Politz refinery. IV Jul 44:57 Skoda Works^ VII Jul 45:44, 45 at
Cape Gloucester.
Ill
DUMMY PLANES at Aslito airfield.
V
recognition of.
.Apr 43:32-33
DUNKERQUE Ill
I
Oct 44:14
(FRANCE),
invasion defenses near.
I
V
and airdrome
Jul 43:36
7;
attacks.
Chateaudun.
V
V Nov
VII Jul 45:111-11.
VI Apr 45:40-41.
formations:
assembling through overcast. VII Jul 45:58-59. 58-59 12-ship stagger. IV Jun 44:28-29 18-ship stagger. I Mav 43:36; II Sept 43:30. 30-33 Gentile and Godfrey combat team. IV Jun 44:44-45, 45 I Apr 43:20. 20-21; II Sept 43:8. 8-15 ball bearing plants. II Oct 43:18, 19; II Nov 43:18-19; III Feb 44:6-7; III Apr 44:8; IV May 44:12, 13; V Sept 44:34. 34; VII |ul
industrial targets (miscellaneous).
Pecnemunde. V Nov 44:4. 4-5 reviews of VI Jan 45:51. 52. 51-56, inside back cover; VII Jul 45:40-45,41 truck and tank plants. V Nov 44:7. 7 Weimar armaments works. V Nov 44:6. 6 LeBourget missions. II Oct 43:14-15; III Jan
44:45 long-range escort for. problems. Ill Mar 44:40-41. 40-43 Nantes mission. II Nov 43:20, 21 in Normandy invasion, VII May 45:22 (diagram). 23 pre-invasion attacks. IV Jun 44:1-3. 9. Tours attack. IV Jul 44:24 Sept 43:8. 8-9; 24. 22-25; III Mar 44:44-45 oil refinery attacks. IV Jul 44:56-59
Drohobycz, IV
Aug
review.
EISENHOWER. DWIGHT D V Sept EL ALAMEIN. See ALAMEIN. EL EL AOUINA. See AOUINA. EL
44:41
V Dec
destroyer), attacks on.
in the Aleutians.
19.
Sept 44:16-17
II
44:8
1 Jul 43:36-42 rail system attacks. VI Apr 45:42-45 ammunition trains. V Oct 44:back cover Belfort. V Nov 44:20-21 Dillenburg. VII May 45:67 Euskirchen. VI Mar 45:3 review of VII Jul 45:36-40, 37 Robert Ley (cruiser), attack on. VII Jul 45:49 at Royan and Pointe dc Grave. VII Jun 45:54-55. 54-56 size in 1942. IV May 44:13 325th Photo Wing, target model made by. VII Jun 45:52-53 use of radar for bombing. Ill Jan 44:12-14. 12-14 Vegesack mission. I May 43:16 Wilhelmshaven mission. I May 43:14-15; I Aug 43:18-19 EINANSHO AIRFIELD (FORMOSA). Ill Feb 44:9
bombing
precision
44:34
Munster. VII Jul 45:18 mission. Ill Jan 44:44 in Battle of the Bulge. VI Feb 45:8. 8-9, 18, 19 Berlin attack (3 Feb). VI Mar 45:14. 14; VI Apr 45:39 bombing record in Europe, VII Jul 45:6, 7 briefing aids provided by. III Feb 44:17-18. 17-18, 20-21 casualties (to 8 May 45). VII Jul 45:60 55th Fighter Group. VII May 45:4 fighter bomber effectiveness. V Dec 44:6-7. 6-7
missions.
target
damage. V Nov
ELENSIS AIRFIELD (ATHENS). ELEVENTH AIR FORCT.
40-41
Norway
Feb 44:34-35
DUNE AIRFIELD (GERMANY). DURE. LEON S.. IV May 44:2 DUREN (GERMANY)
44:6-7;
44:8-9; 9; VII Jul 45:28, 29.
30-35
ELBING (German
4319-21; HI Sept 44:6-7; II Jul 45:10, 10
Oct 43: cover,
of V Sept
reviews
.
45:42
Mar 45:42
DUMBOS
VI Jan
44:1. 6. 1-9; IV Jul
Antwerp
45:inside back cover
DOMBURG (GERMANY),
II
(diagram) reviews of V Sept 44:6-7, 10-11
for B-29.
DOLLBERGEN (GERMANY),
44:3;
Apr
Heinkel Flugzeugwerke (Rostock).
Regensburg.
for B-17.
DOLK.
aircraft plant
44:2-3
train engines
II
Apr 43:7
44:60 Marienburg. II Dec 43:13. 13-20 Matford. VI Feb 45:20. 20-21
Jan 44:15 II Nov 43:32
Ill
44:9 at.
I
45:38-39; VII Jul 45:5
dummv airfield at. DIjON-LONGVIC AIRFIELD (FRANCE). destroyed
.
See
aircraft plant attacks. Ill
DIEPPE (FRANCE)
DINAH (Japanese airplane). DITCHING PROCEDl'RES
IV .\ug 44:32
ALAMEIN. EL EIGHTH AIR FORCE. V Sept
Jun 43:43
DILLENBURG (GERMANY),
at.
underground
VII Jul 45:20
EGYPT.
Sff PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
Burneval Castle.
base
air
EGELN (GERMANY),
DICING."
•
(CANAIJA). Air Transport
EDMUNDSON. JAMES V
Mar 45:39
(Japanese airplane). VI
45:27
(large flare), use for night
May 45:34
operations, VII
Magdeburg. IV Apr 45:46; VII Jul 45:32 Pohtz. IV Jul 44:56-57
Attn.
I
Jun 43:34-37
I
Jul 43:24-31. 26,28-31 II
GILBERT AND ELLICE
ELLICE ISLANDS. ISLANDS
See
ELMAS AIRPORT
(SARDINIA).
ELMER THE ELEPHANT", II
Dec 43:18
Feb 44:35 Me 109 over. Ill Jan 44:28 rocket bursts over. Ill Feb 44:1
invasion defenses.
Ill
EMIDJ (MARSHALL ISLANDS). 46-47, inside back cover;
44:inside back cover
\'
I
ENGINEER COMMAND. 9TH. stnp
at
Normandy. IV
Ill Feb 44:46. Aug 44:8 construction of air
Jul 44:23;
Aug
IV
44:37
ENGLAND Alconburv. bomb loading accident at. II Sept 43:34. 34-35 London. V-1 damage. IV Aug 44:47-49
ENIWETOK (MARSHALL
ISLANDS). IV
Jul
44:47; VIII Sept/Oci 45:15
ERKELENZ (GERMANY), bombing of
ERKNER BALL BEARING WORKS May
VII
May
(BERLIN). IV
44:12, IS
ESCHWEILER (GERMANY), bombing
ESPIRITU hangar
rail
tunnel blocked by
near. VI Feb 45:19
SANTO (NEW GUINEA),
airport
Nov 43:23
at. II
ESSEN (GERMANY) bombing. VII Jun 45:52
Krupp works. V Nov ESSEX. U. S
S..
VII
44:6. VII Jul 45:41
Aug
45:9
ETEN ISLAND (TRUK). EUROPEAN THEATER.
1-15
May 43:20
ELSTER. ERICH. VII May 45:30
EMDEN (German cruiser). EMDEN (GERMANY)
after
44:22.
I
loading fuel in
Burma. \lll Sept/OcI 45:34
air
12.
Jan 44:40
Sept 43:25. 25-27 in the Kuriles. VI Feb 45:60. 60; VIII Aug 45:61. 61-63 Photographic Charting Squadron, photographs by. IV Aug 44:4-7 Kiska.
Apr 44:34
Ill
See alio namti o] ipenfu
loralwru. targets, campaigns,
III |an
Ill
operations reviews. 44:3. 4-19
I
Jun
and
battles
43:1. 1-7;
V
Sept
Allied campaign. VI Apr 45:38-41. 38-45 9th Air Force activities. VI Mar 45:2, 2-13 Northern Europe, VI Feb 45:cover, inside
cover, 1-22 escort formations. strategic
bombing
cover,
1.
VI Jan 45:44-47. 44-49 analysis.
V Nov
44:inside
2-3, 2-7; VII Jul 45:entire issue
airirafi plants. VII Jul 45:5. 8-27 VII )ul 45:50-55,51 cnnn-pi aiid (li-vclopmc-nl. VII Jul 45:3-7 costs and operational dimrultics, VII Jul 45:56-61, 57-60 industrial targets (tniscellant-ous). VII )ul 45:40-45, 4 oil rerincries. VII Jul 45:28-35. 29-31) rail targets. VII Jul 45:56-39, 37 shipping targets. VII Jul 45:46-49, 47 sorties and tonnages. VII Jul 45:6, 7 testimony from German leaders. VII Jul 45:62-64, inside back cover, back cover
Feb 44:43-44 air base used by. VI Mar 45:17 Guidonia airfield. Ill Mar 44:5 Sardinia and Ij Spe/ia. VII Jun 45:iniide back cover Senio and Santerno Rivers. \II Jun 45:58-59 Terni. Ill Mar 44:cover radar Jamming devices used by, VI Feb 45:30-31.
in Italy. Ill
I
30-31
Bomb Group, formations. Ill Jan 44:41.41 use of Soviet air bases in the Ukraine. IV Aug 44:54. 54, 55, 56, inside back cover
301st
Ma\ 45:entire
tactical o[K-rations analysis. \'ll
FIEIH AIR FORCE
issue
advanie on Clermanv. VII May 45:51. 55, 56, 51-72, inside back cover, back cover
Balikpapan inyasion. VIII Aug 45:46-47 of the Bismarck Sea. I Jun 43:44.44 C;orrcgidor operatic'ms. VIII Sept/Oct 45:18. 20.
Allied
Africa. VII
May
in
in Battle
45:7-H
May
Battle of the Bulge. VII
Formosa
and theory. VII May 45:3-4
in at
FAI.AISK-ARGENTAN GAP. V Nov
44:18-19.
18-19; VII Mav 45:26 FAl.tON .V^' A-3 FALLtRSI-EBF.N WORKS (GERMANY). V Nov
44:7; VII Jul 45:40
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
(FEAF). VI |an 45:12.
12-13, 14-16. 14-16 at
Luzon. VI Apr 45:24; VIII
Aug
45:cover.
Iximbing operaticins.
II
.Nov
FLAK
Kavieng. VIII Sepl^Oci 45:47
in Philippines
campaign.
Europe. VI |an 45:50. 50; VII |ul 45:60.61 evasion tactics. II Dec 43:46. 47. 46-48, inside
effect of air operations in
V Oct
44:17. 17;
V Nov
44:42.43
in
Corregidor. VI Mar 45:49. 49 Leyte and Mindoro landings. VI Mar 45:42. 42 Luzon. VI Mar 45:43-45, 46. 46-47, 4H. 48, 50 review of operations. \'l Mar 45:inside cover, 1,41. 42. 41-50, inside back cover ihe South China Sea. VI Apr 45:3(i. 36-37
back cover, back cover; III Feb 44:36. 36-39 importance of intelligence information about. V Sept 44:38-39 over Okinawa. VIII Aug 45:4 defenses, at Ploesti. V Dec 44:52. 52, inside back cover in Sicily campaign. II Sept 43:38,39 I' S. artillery assistance against. VII May 45:34 'diagram). 35
AF Sfr FAR EAST AIR KJRCES FERRVVILLE (TUNISIA). Jul 43:17 Ff
I
FICLT.LE (ITALY), Mar 45:24 FIDENZA (ITALY),
rail
first
bridge
bombed
near. VI
Shoran mission against
rail bridge at. VI Mar 45:30. 0-31 FIESELER AIRCRAFT PLANT (KA.SSEL).
II
assessed.
bomb
VI Feb 45:27. 27-29 Athens. Ill |an 44:40 Bad Voslau. IV |ul 44:62-63. 62-63 Balkan railroads and airfields. IV |uri 44 30-33, 31. 32. 33; VI Jan 45:2-3. 2-4 hall bearing plants. Ill Feb 44 6-7 Bratislava oil refinery. I\' Aug 44:20 Ncuberg (Austria) airfield. VII May 45:11 Ober Traubling. Ill Apr 44:6. 6 Odertal. VI Feb 45:28 Ploesti. IV |un 44:33. 33; V Oct 44:31. Src also
43:28.
at.
safe return.
I
in
May
Ill
|an 44:40
Europe. VII
Jul 45:6, 7
45:60 57th Fighter (Irc.up. VII )un 45:61 n.ik hits. VI |an 45:50. 50; VI Feb 45:29 45). VII |ul
.
(ITALY), railvards
FLYING BOMB Srr V-WEAPONS. V-l FLYING FORTRESS. Sre B-17 FLYING WING'.W HORTEN V FOAMI TE (flame extinguisher). VI Jan
FW
200.
43
10. I
I
|uii
Sept/Oct 45:22
FORT (lADAMES (LIBYA). May 43:26, 27 H)RT NELSON (CANADA). Air Transport Command air base. IV Aug 44:33 FORT ST. JOHN (CANADA). Air Transpon Command air base. IV Aug 44:33 I
JOHN C. V Nov 44:32 FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE. IV Aug FOSTER.
Air Transport 44:8-9 in
in
Command
Burma. HI Feb 44:12-13; VIII Sept/Oci 45:32, 32-41 China.
Nov 43:47-48,
II
back cover;
V
II
inside back cover, Sept 44:32. 32-33; V Oct
44:8. 8-12
Hongkimg and Canton.
M.i\ 44
37
Apr 43:25. 25-27; V
I
Dec 44:cover, 10. 10-11
Hunan and Kwangsi
provinces.
V Dec
44:8. 8
system strikes. V Nov 44:40 (map) review of operations. VIII Sepl/Oci 45:32. 32-41 in Formosa. Ill Feb 44:8-9. 8-11 reconnaissance studies and sketches. Ill Mar 44:36. 36-37 "glip" bombing lechnicjue. VII Jun 45:14-17, 15 rail
Indo-China. HI Apr 44:47-48, inside back cover; VII Jun 45:14-17, 15 St. Jacques. V Nov 44:37 Gia Lam railvards. VI Feb 45:58-59, 59 Song Koi River. IV Aug 44:15 Japanese shipping attacks. V Nov 44:38. 38-39 in
Cap
(map) low-level rcnket attack
and
strafing technique.
I\*
Aug 44:42.42
Bomb Group. VII Bomb Group. VII
|un jun 341st Troop Carrier Scjuadrons. V 23rd Fighter Group, mission Jan 44:20. 20-21
308lh
I
I
45:16 45:14-17, 15 Sept 44:32. 32-33 re-enactment. Ill
I
|un 43 24
Apr 43:4 .Apr 43:6. 6
Sicily.
I
in.
V
IVi 44:6.7 6-7
Oil
44:32-41, 33 V-l launching sites in. IV Aug 44:43-46 V-2 rcKket sites. V Sept 44:41-45 FRANGIBLE BULLET (r-44 projectile). VI Feb 45:53. 53 FRANK (^lapanese airplane). VI Mar 45:39
FRANKENSTEIN-BAD Dl RKIIFIM ROAD (GERMANY), bombing
1\'
44:14
supplies for. Ill Jan
INVASION
45:32-33
43 6;
10-11
Apr 43 31;
Jan
Ill
newspaper for air drop over. HI Mar 44:23 Southern France invasion (15 .Aug 44). V Oct
Apr 43:5
I
190. IV May 44:32.32 model combat secjuences.
(CHINA).
(PHILIPPINES). Nimbing of VIII
8th Air F'orce destruction
45:26. 26
58.
MM
Jan 43:22. 22-25 Srr also names aj ffxafr alus and largrls hangars bombed, ground views. V CXt aircraft 44:inside back cover Allied invasion (6 June 44). Sr, NORMANDY
Iximbingof. IV May 44:41 Ijomb size effectiveness evaluated. VI Feb
FW FW
DRl
FRANCE.
43:43
shipyard. Jul 43:39 IfSS. S SGT VIII Sepl;()cl 45:63
FlORfNCE
I
use in |ul
I
H
Ill
55:18, 18-19 reconnaissance photographs. Ill Mai 44:36-37; IV May 44:48, inside back cover; \ Nov 44 33 Shinchiku and Tainan. Ill Feb 44 10-11; III Mar
effectiveness of.
44:34
FOCKE-WULFE AIRPLANF.S
PLOESTI Skoplje (Yugoslavia).
Feb 44:8-9. 8-11 as Japanese supply base. V Nov 44:41 (map) leaflet for air drop over. Ill Mar 44:23 map. Ill Feb 44:8 Okayama. Ill Mar 44:37; \' Nov 44 36; V Dec
At Cjstel Benito.
B-17 damaged
attacks.
bombing record
45:40-41.40-43 14th Air Force attacks.
FRAGMENTATION BOMBS.
against. \*ll Jun
.
after b
Mav
I
45:49.49
FLEMING. RUSSELL P I\' May Fl.ENSBURG (GERMANY)
FIFTEEMll AIR FORCE
casualties (to 8
bomber damage
28-31 use of phosphorus
Sept
43:15
bombing
I'- S,
Aug
5ih Air Force attacks. VII )un 45:5; \lll
44 38
43 33-35 formation for. Ill Feb 44:30-31 New Guinea. II Oct 43:2-4 Hollandia. IV Mav 44:22-23. 22-23; 1\ |un 44:41 Japanese shipping attacks. IV Mav 44:cover, 19. 20-21; IV Aug 44: 12. 12-13 Ue. II Oct 43:5 Nadzab airstrip. II Oct 43:22-27 Port Moresby. VIII Sept/Oct 45:8 Rabaul. Ill Feb 44:32-33; III Apr 44 30; \III Sept/Oct 45:46 Tsili Tsili airfield. II Oct 43:32 Wewak. Ill Apr 44:24-27 phosphorus bombs, use by. Ill Apr 44:28. 28-29 Saigon attacks. VIII Aug 45:44-45. 44-45 3rd Emergency Rescue Sc)uadron. activities of, VIII Aug 45:58, 58-59 345th Bomb Group. VII |un 45:cover, 5. 9-11, 5-13; VIII Sept/Oct 45:43
I
P-475 hoisted aboard
44:27
FORM
FOR
in
F-5A (reconnaissance planel. Mav 43:23; l\ Jun 44:21,22,23 FAIRBANKS (ALASKA). Ladd airfield. IV Aug 44:32, 36.36
V Nov
carrier at.
Japan blockade. VIII Sept/Oct 45:42. 46-47
Tiiiniinuin altitude
tenter attacks. VI
rail
IV
44:36,37
48-53, 49
Feb 45:10; VI Mar 45:3
at.
Oct
|ul 43:9; II
I
436
FORD ISLAND (HAWAII).
FORD BAYARD AIRFIELD
Aug
attacks. VII |un 45:5; VIII
45:40-41.40-43 Gorontalo attacks. V Dec 44:14. 14
maps. VII May 45:12-13, 22-23 Mediterranean .Mlied Air Forces. VII May 45:40-43. 40-43 Normandy invasion. VII May 45:10-32, 11-14 use of radar. VII May 45:33-38. 34-39
EUSKIRCHEN (CIERMANY).
Aug 44 56 K)(.(;iA (ITALY), airdrome.
22. 18-22
45:45-46. 48.
46-49 history
FO< SANI (RUMANIA), atuck on airdrome
in France. Ill Jan 44 39-40 freak aircraft acndeiii. Ml jun 45:50
cilics.
FRANKFUR
I
(GERMANS
of. I.
VII M.iv 45:62-63
Adlei
Werke
Ixmibi-d.
VII Jul 45:43 FRti: FRENCH, Cross of Lorraine, emblem of. Mar 44:38 FREJUS BEACH (FRANCE). V Oct 44:35-36
III
FRENCH INDOCHINA. See INDOCHINA FRENCH RIVIERA. Sc*- SOUTHERN FRANCE INVASION FREYA RADAR INSTALLATION, FRIEDRICHSHAVEN (GERMANY),
I
Jul 43:45 V-2 rocket
V Dec 44:27 FRISIAN ISLANDS. May 43:14 test site at.
field
FULDA (GERMANY),
rail
GISORS (FRANCE), German at, V Dec 44:6
troop train destroyed
GIULIANOVA
bridge
Ill
Apr 44:38
center, after attack. VII
FUNAFUTI (GILBERT ISLANDS). I Jun 43:7 airfield. I Jun 43:8 Japanese bombing of. VIII Sept/Oct 45:14 FURTH (GERMANY), bombing of fighter factory at. III Apr 44:5; VII Jul 45:17 FUSO CLASS BATTLESHIP, I Apr 43:9
FUTAMI KO HARBOR (CHICHI
JIMA), attacks
on, VI Jan 45:18-19
rail
GUAM.
at. III
quoted on Allied 45:62
GUIANA,
GUNNER
II
GAETA
(ITALY), war plant bombed
at,
V
Sept
44:10-11
GAGGENAU (GERMANY). attacked
at,
Daimler Ben/ plant
VI Jan 45:52, 52-53
(ALASKA), Air Transport Command
GALENA
air
Aug 44:33, 34-35 GALLAND, ADOLF, VII Jul 45:62 base,
IV
quoted on Allied
air
power
in
Europe,
\'1I
Jul
GANZBUHL, ANN. iV May 44:29 GASMATA (NEW GUINEA). Aug I
43:1, 3;
II
GAVIN. JAMES M.. V Dec 44:30 quoted. V Dec 44:31 GEERLINCS. GERALD K., Ill Feb 44:17 GELA. GULF OF (SIC:iLY). II Sept 43:39 GELSENKIRCHEN (GERMANY). Scholven Buer oil refinery after bombing. VII Jul 45:31 (ITALY) ammunition barge bombed at. VII Jun 45:64
GENOA
harbor
installation.
GENTILE. DON,
air
II
Sept 43:28
combat exhibition, IV Jun
44:44-45, 45
GEORGE
(Japanese airplane).
GERBINI
(SICILY),
air
base
VI Mar 45:39
at, II
Sept 43:36
GERMAN AIR FORCE analysis of failure.
Mar 44:10-11
Bari attack, III in Battle
VI Jan 45:35-41. 38-43
of Britain, VI Jan 45:35, 36 7th. V Nov 44:18-19, 18-19; VII
GERMAN ARMY, Mav 45:28
GERMANIA SHIPYARD
(KIEL), I Jul 43:38 GERM.ANY, air war against. See abo appropnale mb-headmgs under EUROPEAN THEATER, and names of specific cities and targets Allied advance into, tactical analysis. VII May 45:51. 51-72, inside back cover, back
cover of routes. VII May 45:55
map
industries described:
IV May 44:14
ball bearings,
hydrogen peroxide. V Nov 44:4 armament, V Nov 44:6 synthetic fuel oil, IV Jul 44:58 GHANA, Accra. Air Transport Command at, I Aug. 43:12, 12-13; II Dec 43:38-39, 38-39 GIA LAM RAILYARDS (HANOI), attack on. VI Feb 45:58-59, 59 light
GILBERT AND Funafuti.
I
ELLICE ISLANDS
Jun
43:7, 8; VIII Sept/OcI 45:14
-15, VII )un
H H2X RADAR. V
Allied invasion of the Netherlands, V Oct 44:inside cover, 1, 22, 22-23; V Dec 44:28
Sept 44:36; VI Feb 45:28. 28-29; 45:24-25; VII Jul 45:60
May
VII
HADRIAN. Sff CG-4 HAGUE, THE (NETHERLANDS), bombing
invasion of Northern Burma. IV 44:1-9 invasion of Southern France. V Oct 44:38, 39 Normandv invasion. IV Jul 44:12, 13, 19
by Royal Air Force. IV Jul 44:64-65. 64, inside
May
back cover
HAHA JIMA RETTO (BONIN
Dec 43:18 combat exhibition. IV
cruiser). II
at.
H.,
Jun
I
43:7, 8; III
GORIZIA
HAMBURG
IV Jun 44:38; IV
MARV
V
44:3;
Apr
attacks,
VI Jan 45:26
(GERMANY),
attacks at
Glinde ordnance depot. VI Jan 45:54-55
V Dec
(NEI). 5lh Air Force attacks.
V
Sept 44:8-9 1; VII ships and shipyards. II Sept 43:10-11, Jun 45:47,51; VII Jul 45:47, 48, 49 (GERMANY), attack on marshalling vard
oil refineries.
I
(Japanese ship), destroyed Feb 44:32
in
Rabaul
HAMM
Ill
GOTHA
(GERMANY), attacks on aircraft factorv at. Ill Apr 44:4; VI Apr 45:41 PRAIRIE (CANADA). Air Transport Command air base. IV Aug 44:32
at.
VI Apr 45:45
HAMP (Japanese
and airdrome
GRAND
airplane). B-24 versus,
combat sequences.
Apr 44:28.
III
model
(bomb). VII Jun 45:46, 47 GRASSHOPPER. See L-5 GRAVE (NETHERLANDS), paratroops landing at. V Dec 44:29 GRAVENHORST (GERMANY). Mitteland Canal bombing attack at. VI Mar 45:16 GRAY. LEON W.. IV Jun 44:22. 22 GREAT FALLS (MONTANA). Air Transfiort Command air base. IV Aug 44:32
B-24 downed near, VI Feb 45:18 tire plant, VII Jul 45:42 HANCOCK, U. S.'S., kamikaze attack, VIII 45:11
GREECE
HANNOVER (GERMANY),
Dec 43:30; III Jan 44:40 bombing targets in, II Dec 43:28, 28-30 GREEN ISLANDS, capture of, IV May 44:24-25, to.
III
air
GREVENMACHER at.
Mar
in
HAP
paratroops
Sept 43:30; VIII Sept/Oct
(Japanese airplane),
I
Apr
43:23. See also
quoted, VIII
MARU
air
base
HASLACH (GERMANY),
at, II
tribute to the
work
of,
IV Aug
railyard
Aug
bombings
approaching rain cloud over,
railyard.
at.
VI
IV Jun
HA TRUNG (INDOCHINA),
42), VIII Sept/Oct 45:8-9
III
Apr
II
HAVOC. HAWAII at,
rail bridge attacks 44:48, inside back cover; VII Jun
45:16
Sept 43:22
F-5A photo plane on. II Dec 43:36 Henderson field. VIII Sept/Oct 45:15 rapid calculation bombing of Japanese ships
HASSELT (NETHERLANDS), 44:10
44:inside cover
GUADALCANAL Field,
Nov 43:34-35
Jan 44:26 Jan 44:11
Apr 45:38
GROUND CREWS,
Carney
of, II
Sept/Oct 45:95 (Japanese battleship), VIII Sept/Oct 45:88 HARUNA (Japanese ship). III Feb 44:33
at,
of (7
III
HARUNA
I
V Dec 44:28 (ITALY), bombing of
S.,
III
HAMP ARTHUR TRAVERS,
Nov 43:37
battle
bombing
HARRIS,
Moselle bridge
VI Apr 45:inside back cover
landing
altitude
45:58,62
VII Jul 45:64 Europe. VII Jul
GREW, JOSEPH C Jun 43: 14 GROESBEEK (NETHERLANDS),
GROSSETO
of, VI Feb 45:42, 42-43 VII Jul 45:52 Sept 43:12-13 HANOI (INDO-CHINA), Gia Lam railyards attack, VI Feb 45:58-59, 59
bombing
incendiarv
HANSELL, H
44: 13, 13-19
power
(GERMANY). ,
May 45:71 (CHINA) Nov 43:47
Oscar attacks B-25 over. phosphorus bombs over.
GREIM, ROBERT RITTER VON, quoted on Allied 45:64
VII
Aug
hangar bombed
air base, II
minimum
IV May 44:27, 27-29
Mar 44:13
weather stauons.
at,
HANKOW
airfield
HANSA BAY (NEW GUINEA)
24-26 Japanese resistance III
HANGELAR (GERMANY),
tire factorv, II
airfields, II
GREENLAND map.
HAP
See also
HANAU (GERMANY)
GRAND SLAM
Athens
44:18;
Oct 44:13
Goeroea
VI Feb 45:56. 56
44:14. 14
GOSEI
Aug
HALVERSON. HELDA.
by 15th Air
Jun 45:inside back cover
Force. VII
attacks
Sept/Oct 45:40
HALE, WILLIS
HALMAHERA ISLAND (NEI),
bombed
ISLANDS),
VI Jan 45:20-21
HAINAN ISLAND. Samah. II Nov 43:48 HAKUSAN MARU (Japanese ship). Ill Feb 44:32 HAIPHONG (IND0-C;HINA). bombing of, VIII
by bombing attacks. VII Jul 45:36 GOEROEA (NEI). attack at. VI Feb 45:56. 56 GOKTEIK VIADUCT (BURMA). I Jul 43:46 GONA (NEW GUINEA). I |un 43:27. 28
harbor.
Nov 43:39 GATEY. LIEUT. COL.. IV May 44:5
II
Dec 43:18-19
II
May
commando
GORONTALO
45:62
SIGHTS, K-I4 and
May 45:56
45:56-58
(Italian cruiser),
|ul
Sept 43:23 AIRFIELD (ROME), III Mar 44:5 ("Pappy ), III Mar 44:35
IV May 44:5
use in: Allied advance into Germany, VII
air
VII Jul 45:62 power in Europe, VII
GYDNIA (POLAND),
Nov 43:7
GODFREY. STUART. II Nov 43:23 GOERING. HERMANN. VII Jul 45:back cover GOERING BRIDGE (NEL'WIEDSAGS). destroyed 43:41
air
tropical clouds over,
GUIDONIA GUNN, P.
Mar
Jun 44:44-45,45
I
VIII Sept/Oct 45:54-55.
field.
GUDERIAN, HEINZ.
I
night operation. III Jan 44:47 194th Infantry Regiment, VII
GNEISENAV (German GODFREY. JOHN T..
GABES (TUNISIA). Jun
43:7, 7-11
North
54-55, 83
45:44-45, 44-45
44:25 HS-293.
GLIDER BOMBS, GLIDERS single-tow,
Jul 45:38
(ITALY),
Aug
44:2; IV
I
drainage ditches on. FROSINONE (ITALY). Ill Mar 44:3 FULCHER. G. H.. V Nov 44:32
Borkum,
Apr
map. Ill Apr 44:13 Makin Island. Ill Apr 44:14-17 Tarawa. II Dec 43:6; III Apr 44:12. 18,19 review of bomb damage. Ill Mar 44:46, inside back cover, back cover GILES, BEN. Ill Mar 44:13 GIROPA (NEW GUINEA), I Jun 43:30
I
See
A-20
V Nov
P-47s
at,
Peari
Harbor
44:27
attack (7 Dec 41), VIII Sept/Oct
at,
I^inside cover, A|>i
HAYASAKI
III
AN
HUNKH.
sliipl.
daniaKid bv
IIYK.A (lapanese
R.ibaiil
I\
RMANV), Rum
HhNKHRW
aiiluld.
rail aita.ks. I\
|iil
I
I
HINDKNBKRC. RAIL BRinCK (GERMANY),
\
II
Jul 43:back cover
and
(^lAP.AN). engine
\III ,Sept/<).(
tiirhuie lartory ai.
45:110
attack. VIII SeptyOct
H01)A(;AVA PLAN
Jul 45:inside back cover
(,|APAN).
I
B-'.".i
bombnig
ol.
\II |un 45:34.36
HOEER. RALPH
K.,
combat narrative quoted. IV
Japanese- ship),
damaged
at
(
Rabaul liarl>or. Ill Ecb 44:32 Saar River reconnaissaiuc HOLBl RV. ROBER r mission ol. \l Apr 45:52. 52-56, inside back cover HOLEKER. |OHN 11.. VII May 45:4f) .
I
NE EHERLANDS HOI.LANOIA (NEW GLINEA). VIII
HOLLAND
See
SeptVOct
45 10 .aptureol (22 Apr 44). IV Jun 44:4 I. 41 lapanese airfield attacks at. IV May 44:22. 23. 22-23 HOI.I.OWAV. BRLC.E K.. Ill Jan 44:20 quoted. VI Ecb 45:61
HOI.I/ BAY (ALEUTIAN ISLANDS). Jul Aug 43:38 43:26-27; HON (;AY (INDOCHINA). II Nov 43:47 H()N(; KONC; (CHINA). Kowloon docks. Apr I
I
I
43:25; cover;
HOR lEN
\
back cover, back |,iii 45 34 34 S S.. \ HI SepiOii 4.". 4-5 ELYING WING"). VII Jul 45:24
Noi
II
V HORSET. r
43: inside
44
I)e.
(
1(1.
10-11: VI
VI Mar
HOI EEALI/.E (BELGIUM), bombing oL 45 10 293 (glider bomb).
HS HSIN ISIN (CHINA),
II Nov 43:7 peasant laborers
Sept/Oit 45:37 (IN1)()( HINA). atuck S P M.n 43:9
HIT HI
1
I
.
43:2(1. 20-21;
HUNAN
IKA
in.
Dec 43:41
E(j
I
((IREENLAND). weatber station at. Ill Mar 44:17, 19 illustrations
B-29 operations from, VI Apr 45:18; VII |un 45:in
from. VI Apr
I
editors
II
c;.. I
at.
V
Det 44:11
and staff Vlll
45:in9ide cover
bombs
Ill Feb 44:3 clusters. VI Apr 45:19. 19-23, 22-23 M-76. IV Jul 44:64-65. 64, inside back cover napalm. V Sept 44:49. 49 at Klcinhau. VII May 45:39 at Luzon. VIII Aug 45:cover. 48-53, 49 at St. Malo. V Dec 44:2. 3-4 use against Japanese cities. VIH Aug 45:18-39, 19. See alw juimes of specific cities B-29 missions. VII Jun 45:24. 26. 24-33; Mil Sept/Oct 45:78-80. 79-80, 84-93 U. S. aircrafi losses. VIII Aug 45:38. 38-39
Sepl/Oct 45:64, 69-71.
JABOR roWN (MARSHALL
syntbetic rubber plant.
Aug
I
Aug
Air
43:17
E
INDONESIA.
INEAN IRV. |ul
See
U.
after 7ih Air Force
V
invasion.
IV
\- Nov 44:12-13 Normandy invasiim. V Nov 44:14. theory described. V Nov 44:12-13
oil refinery. IV Aug 44:23 Vcsccs airfield and aircraft plant.
Jun
Mil
45:2-4, 2-5,
VI .Apr 45 6-7 (map).
factors.
I
Jun 43:18-19. 18-19 evaluation
of
M
Mar
45:36-40. 37
(LUZON),
incendiary
bombing of VIII
45:cover, 48-53, 49 IRAN. Air franspori Command activities 43:34-37, 35 II
Nov
JAPANESE ZERO. THE
Normandy
On
43:15; HI
invasion. IV
44:21
DE CE/.EMBRE (FRANCE),
use of naplam
at.
290 going down
JENA (GERMANY). Kahla underground
Apr
Jul
model comlut
.W
airirjil
45 21,22-23 27; VII Jul 45 24 V Sept 44:26, 26-27
s«-<|uetues,
P-80
JOHN.SON. GEN I\'
.
IV
Aug
44:3
,Aug 44:5 ,
B-29 down off runway at. VIII Sepl/Oct 45:58 7th Air Forte at. VI |an 45:17 alter U. S. landing, \lll SeptyOct 45 13, 17 II
VII
JONES, H. E HI Jan 44:46 JIT.ICH (tJERMANY), under May 45:52-53
VI Jan 45:22. 23
M
at.
JET AIRPLANES German, IV Jul 44:26-27.
(juoted,
Sept 43:41
ISFRES/LEIUBE AIREIH DilKWt
I
JB-2 (tximb), VI Jan 45:5-6, 5-7 launching of VIII .Aug 45:64. inside back cover
U. S.
44:2. 3-4
OF BASriA (CORSICA). Ju
(recognition filml,
43:22 in. II
laitorv after
airstrip construction at.
I\'
and background, VI Apr
JAPANESE AIR FORCE,
ISLEY FIELD (SAIPAN; /»r
Szony
targets
10-12. 10-13
weather
14-21
.•\iig
II
and
of specific cities
8-9, 8-9
in
V Det
aLw PACIFIC
.SV.-
and names
industrial concentration,
the Bulge, VI Feb 45:2-3 (map)
diagram.
ISLE
bombing, VI Jan 45:back
against.
at Okinawa, \III Aug 45:8, 11,8-13: Mil SeptyOtt 45:28-30 reviews of IV Aug 44:1-20; VII Jul 45:2-23; ScptyOct 45:42-51, 43, 44-45, 49-50 strategic Liclors, V Nov 44:38-39, 38-41 strengths and weaknesses, study of VI Apr 45:2-23, 2-23
history
INEERDUT'ION STRATEGY
ISIGNY (FRANCE),
war
land-bas<-d attack, IV Jul 44:41. 41-43 Kamikaze Corps, VII Jun 45:40, 41, 42, 41-43
INSEIN (BURMA), HI Feb 44:12-13
DAM
air
THEATER,
44:18
in Battle ol
44 8
first
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Normandy
Aug
cover
JAPAN,
4th, in
foil.
map. HI Feb 44:46
on
rec
S.,
(BONHAM) A
Emidj. HI Feb 44:44:46. 46-47; 1\ labor Town. IV Aug 44:8
Saigon. VIII Aug 45:44-45. 44-45 shipping. VIII Aug 44:15; VII June 45:6-9. 10-11. 10-11
off
Baja rail bridge. VI Jan 45:2-3 Buda[K-st railyards. IV Jun 44:30-31
4. 6-7, 7
JAI.UIT
Haiphong. VIII ,Sept/Oct 45:40 Hue. V Dec 44:11 rail bridges. HI Apr 44:47. 47-48, inside back cover; VI Feb 45:58-59, 59: VII lun 45:14-17
ISLE
HUNCiARY
44:3,
attacks
Cap St. lacques. Nov 44:37
|ul I
PR0VINC;E (CHINA). 14tb in. V Oct 44:11. 11
44:4330
Air Transport Command operations in. Ill Jan 44:1-9 B-29 preparations for first land-based attack on Japan. IV |ul 44:42-43, 44, 45
INDO-CHINA.
ISLANDS). IV Aug
44:8 |ACK (Japanese airplane), VI Mar 45:39 JACKSON. A. v.. V Di-c 44:12 JAC;OBSEN'S (NEW GUINF:A). 1 Aug 43:4 JAHN. GEN., quoted on Allied air power in Europe. VII Jul 45:62
Mar 44 30
Sept 43:7
V Oct
VIH
M-6y
IRRAWADDY RIVER (BURMA).
Jun 43:38
BAY (NEW GUINEA).
(r.Hketl.
1;
7lh Air Force attacks, V CXi 44:13, 15; V Nov 44:44,44; VI Jan 45:21 as U. S. fighter base, VII Jun 45:38-39. 38-39; VIII Aug 45:2
45:2-3 ( )(
Aug
44:24-25. 24-29 Northwest African Air Force in. II Nov 43:1, 1-6; II Dec 43:42, 42-45 retonnaissanie photographs, I\' Jun 44 21, 22 Shoran targets, VI Mar 45:28, 30-31 typical target range found in. photographic interpretation. Aug 43:24 use of phosphorus Iximb over. VII |un 45:49. 49
IWO |IMA
STRATED ACCOUNT UE THE MONGOL INVASION. AN.
Mai 45 22. 22-24 Mas 44 39. 41. 39-41
offensive, IV Jul 44:.54-55, 55; IV
I
invasion defenses
equipment //./.(
IPO VIII
in.
o|Krations
HVAR
Europe.
INVADER. .W A-26
I
UrcllES. MAR\ IN mi.S ((iERMAN^). HI MBOI.I
tn
INDIA
May 44:33
HOKVYO MARC
targets
KkI shipyard bombing.
I-
HIROSHIMA
HI PEER. AOOLE. Vil
power
leb 44:35
at. Ill
1S(^^1)IAR^
4.-i:89
II
I|MU11)EN (NETHERLANDS),
Sept
MP! ROR. VI Apr 45:8 i|AI'AN). atomic bonib mission (6 Auk •"'). \lll S.ptyOcI 45:95. 96-99 HISPANO Sl'l/A PLANT (PARES), target damage. \ Noy 44:9 HI lACHI (JAPAN), destroyed by incendiary HIROIIIK).
KdlERN (MOROtXX)).
IMI'ACT (magazine), I
.\llied air
I(T!LAND. Cfcrman reconnaissance planes down Apr 4 3:.30. 30-31 I
power
air
in Kuiope, \II |>il 4r>:64 Hl-R()\ A (NORWAY). I Scpl 43:8-9 HK.ASHIKINI. PRINCE, quoted on elTeitiveness ol (he B-2'.). \III SepiyOct 45:103 HI(;(.INS BOAIS, l\ May 44:24-25, 26 HIMAl AVAS, III Jan 44:1
HIRO
IBEL, GEN., quoted on VII Jul 45:63
Api 44:36
|()HN P.. Jun 43:44 in NS( 11H\ OSCAR, quolcd on Allied
4.V36 R. 1.
and
VI Mar 45:17
.Allied Air Forces operations, VII .May 45:4(l-43. 40-43; VII Jun 45:.5H. 60, 58-64,
Rome
iBrilish airplane). Ill
I
in.
Mediterranean
Oct 44:4S
\'
\M6
|nl
map. HI Feb 44:43
I-.20, 24 |ul II 26. '.'"
iCl
of ipetifu iitus
Sept/Ou
III!
HH.KUJl AND
namn
See aUii
I5ih Air Force has.-
AlRI'lANKS
III. miidil (uiilbiil scqucntcs.
MINES.
battlesbipl. VIII
ITALY.
PEENEMUNDE
iniide back cover bridge targets, VI
ItiJ. \ II
A
43:7
44:4. .SVca/j..
15:48. 104
III-
l.(
V Nov
P.,
Mr
HH
VII |un 45:62
Italy.
IIVDRCH.KN PEROXIDE. German manulailure
M)-t-t:32 \ll May -tSilfi I Juii 43:44
harl)ot. Ill
111- 2HII.
ANDSi,
ISI
I
l.ipaiRsc
i
HA^^S. KRU). I\
lUK
I) ((.II
18-19
II
HKAl).
use in
1-2. S
HAWKINS AIRKIH
<>.
t
artillery fire.
Ml
JUNGLE Air Trans(M>n (Command, and londitions over Africa. II Dec 43:38-39, 38-39 search for B-24
downed on Cmos
Island, III
Jan
KIRCH CONS AIRFIELD (GERMANY), bombing
44:48, inside back cover survival in
New
Britain Island,
I
Jun 43:48, 38-39
JUNKERS AIRPLANES Ju 88, V Oct 44:42 destroyed 45:17
at
of, VI Feb 45:10 KIRI LEAF (leaflet),
Leipzig-Mockau plant, VII Jul
bomb damage
pick-a-back, VII Jul 45:25 Ju 290, II Sept 43:41
K KALEWA GRUB PONTOON BRIDGE (BURMA), rocket blast
at,
(JAPAN). Hachiman shnne
V Sept at.
VI
Ipo Dam. VIII Aug 45:53 letter from, quoted. VIII Aug 45:49 at
at
Okinawa. VIII Aug SeptyOct 45:28-30
VII )un 45:40-43, 41. 42 45:8. II. 8-13; VIII
KAMMLER.
GEN.. VII
airfield.
IV Aug 44:12
Jul 45:20
KANHLA (BURMA), Japanese
pipeline bombed Aug 44:15 KARA AIRFIELD (SOLOMON ISLANDS). II Dec near. IV
43:4-5
KARELIAN FRONT.
Air Transport
Command
ALFRED,
KARLSRUHE (GERMANY), Ulm
railyards, VII Jul
KUDAMATSU FACTORY
(JAPAN),
Jun 44:34.34
(CHINA).
Ill
Jan 44:2,
5, 8
See also
Aug
45:61. 61-63
map. IV Jun 44:17 reconnaissance photographs, IV Jun 44:16-17; Aug 44:4-5. 4-7
KWAJALEIN (MARSHALL ISLANDS).
air base, II
Nov
V Dec
43:27;
44:8,8
Fieseler aircraft plant. II Sept 43:15; VII Jul
(GREECE). German radar
installation attacked on.
KYUNDON
Henschel plants. VII Jul 45:43
(BURMA),
IV Jul 44:25
attack
at,
Sept 43:15 "KATUSHA" (rocket), V Oct 44:2 KAVIENG (NEW GUINEA). II Nov 43:39;
(JAPAN), Sasebo naval base, IV
Aug KRZESINKI (POLAND), 44:18-19
II
Dec
43:9
aircraft plant,
Aug
(JAPAN), incendiary bombing
B-29
of.
attack.
(JAPAN),
VIII
L-5
Allied attacks
I
IV May 44:22. 23; IV Aug
by. II Oct 43:22 role in Pacific campaign. VIII SeptyOct 45:7-30
Nadzab mission described passim
on defense
44:8
quoted on Allied 45:63
air
KHORRAMSHAHR
power
Jul 45:63 in
Europe, VII Jul
installations at.
(IRAN), harbor.
II
Oct
Aug
I
43:4-7
dummy
I
Jul 43:38; III Feb 44:3, 4; VII Jul
45:48, 49 shipyard cranes, photographic interpretation. IV Jun 44:35
44:61 housing development
Mockau
Jul 43:6-7
Apr
44:8-9; IV Jul
Apr 44:39
at. Ill
45:17 VIII Sept/Oct 45:78
aircraft plant. VII Jul
LEMAY. CURTIS.
LETHBRIDGE (CANADA), Air Transport Command air base, IV Aug 44:33 LE TRAIT (FRANCE), shipyard, II Nov 43:44 LEUNA OIL PLANT (GERMANY), VII Jul 45:28, 33, 34-35
VERDON
(FRANCE), attacks on German V Dec 44:34 (PHILIPPINES). VIII Sept/Oct 45:27-28
destroyers off.
LEYTE
VIII Sept/Oct 45:14
V Nov 44:42,43
VIII Sept/Oct 45:28
LIANGSHAN
(CHINA). B-29 emergency landing
at, V Sept LIBERATOR.
44:52 5<-c B-24
LIBERIA. Roberts
See C-87
airfield. II
Dec 43:38-39
Casiel Benito airdrome at Tripoli,
LICANAN
LA GOULETTE (TUNISIA). Jul 43:17 LAHA FIELD (NEI). night reconnaissance
LIGHTNING.
photograph of. IV May 44:47 (PHILIPPINES), air strike 45:16
44:10; III
I
45:17
planes al. I Apr 43:32 Japanese planes down at. II Oct 43:5 LADD FIELD (ALASKA). Air Transport Command air base, IV Aug 44:32, 36, 36 LAGENS FIELD (AZORES), IV Jul 44:34. 34-35
Ill
Jan
Apr 44:32 1.
1
I
sinking of the Tneste off coast of. 16-17
I
Jun
Apr
43:4, 5
I
LICHTENFELS (GERMANY),
railway attack
at.
VI
Apr 45:43 Sff P-38 II
Nov 43:44
I Apr 43:21 Vendeville airfield. B-26 downed over. II Dec 43:inside back cover LILY (Japanese airplane). P-39 versus, air combat photographs, II Dec 43:21, 21-23
target objectives.
VI Jan
LALAGHAT (INDIA), airfield. IV May 44: LA MADDELENA (SARDINIA). Jul 43:8
I
Gadames, May 43:26-27 (PHILIPPINES), airfield. V Oct 4417. 17
Fort
LILLE (FRANCE). at.
LAKUNAI AIRFIELD (NEW GUINEA).
43:35.35
Sept 44:14
plant.
LIBYA
LAHUC
KIEL (GERMANY)
V
at,
and hvdrogenation
LIBERATOR EXPRESS.
43:45
I
KESSELRING. ALBERT, VII
attacks at.
(GRASSHOPPER), IV May Okinawa. VIII Aug 45:15 I
I
43:9; III Jan 44: 10; 44:3; VI Mar 45:42
at
LAE (NEW GUINEA). Jun
KENDARI (NED. II Dec 43:12; VI Mar 45:16 KENNEY, GEORGE C. Apr 43:12. 12; May
(ITALY), bombings
LEYTE GULF, BATTLE FOR,
after
attack on.
44:22.
Far East Air Forces landing al, VI Mar 45:42 Ormoc Bay, Japanese convoy attacked in, VI Apr 45:cover, 34-35, 35 Tacloban, Mar 45:42; VIII Sept/Oct 45:15
VI Apr 45:17
KEARBY. NEEL. Ill Mar 44:20, 20 KEISHO SUGAR MILL (FORMOSA), VIII Aug 45:42 KEITH. ALLEN R.. VII May 45:16
Mar
.
beachhead.
45:26
KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT PLANT
III
L VI Jan 45:26
airfield construction on.
IV Jul
44:60,61
Japanese convoy bombed off. VIII SeptyOct 45:47 KAWABE, GEN., quoted on effectiveness of B-29, VIII Sept/Oct 45:103
KAWASAKI
L.
refinery
Heiterblick aircraft plant. Ill
LE
KYUSHU ISLAND
Sept 43:30
LE HAVRE-LE GRAND CLOS (FRANCE). German gun position bombed at. IV Jun 44:14 LEIPZIG (German cruiser). II Dec 43:18 LEIPZIG (GERMANY) 8th Air Force attacks. VI Apr 45:40; VII Jul
VIII Sept/Oct
45:32
11
LEE.
Apr
Ill
44:12; VIII Sept/Oct 45:16 P-61sat. IV Aug 44:10 Roi field. Ill Apr 44:20, 21 7th Air Force at. IV Jun 44:38. 38-39; IV Jul
KWEILIN (CHINA),
II
Jul 43:42
22-23 review of technique, with examples. VI Mar 45:18-21, 19 LEBOURGET AIRFIELD (FRANCE), II Oct 43:14-15; III Jan 44:45 LECHFELD (GERMANY), airfield, IV Jul 44:27 LEDO ROAD, IV Jun 44:34
oil
PARAMUSHIRU
Ilth Air Force attacks. VIII
I
I
LEGHORN
(JAPAN)
KURILE ISLANDS.
at.
I
after
incendiary bombing, VIll Sept/Oct 45:111 CRUISER, II Dec 43:11; VI Jan 45:13 KUMKIDU (BURMA), airstnp construction at. IV
KUNMING AIRFIELD
base
.
KUMA CLASS
KYTHERA ISLAND
Spinnfaser textile plant,
submanne
VII Jun 45:inside back cover
45:41
45:37
45:12-13
combat formations over.
LARISSA AIRFIELD (GREECT). II Dec 43:29 LA RIVIERE (FRANCE). IV Jul 44:17 LA ROCHE (BELGIUM), attack on. VII May 45:47 LASHIO (BURMA). Apr 43:15 bombing of. V Oct 44:10, 10 oil dump, Aug 43 30 LA SPEZIA (ITALY), ship bombed in harbor at. LAY. BEIRNE.JR VII )ul 45:9 LEAFLET DROPS. Jun 43:14-15;
VII Jul 45:inside back cover (ESSEN), V Nov 44:6; VII Jul
KRUPP WORKS
44:46
KASSEL (GERMANY)
LA PALLKT. (FRANCE)
KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH,
Oct 43:36-37
activities along, II
(NEI), II Dec 43:12 VII May 45:16 photographs taken by, VII May 45:18
LANKER, ALBERT,
I
Hyuga, destroyed at. VIII Sept/Oct 45:104 incendiary bombing of. VIII Sept/Oct 45:88
Apr 45:5
KAMIRI (NEW GUINEA),
44:46
LANGOAN AIRFIELD
|iil
I
KRUEGER. WALTER
KURE
KAMIKAZE ATTACKS.
43:45. 45
planes at. I Apr 43:33 llth Air Force missions, I Jun 43:36-37;
VI Feb 45:33, 33 44:40. 40
KAMAKURA
Nov
at. II
dummy
43:30-31 Japanese evacuation, weather conditions. II Oct 43:28-29 Japanese main camp at. I Apr 43:34-36; I |ul 43:30 KITZENGEN (GERMANY), marshalling vard. VI Apr 45:45 KRALJEVA (YUGOSLAVIA), Morava River bndge bombed at. VI Jan 45:3
K-3 (gunner sight). VII Jun 45:44 K-14 AND -15 (gunner sights), VII Jun 45:44-45, 44-45 KAGAMIGAHAZA (JAPAN), incendiary bombing of, VIII Aug 45:38 KAHILI AIRFIELD (BUIN), I Apr 43:10, II; II Oct 43:8-9 KAHLA AIRCRAFT FACTORY (GERMANY), VII Jul 45:21; 22-23 KAISERSLAUTERN (GERMANY), bombmg of targets at, VI Feb 45:4; VII May 45:64, 67, 71
(SWEDEN), V-2
.
air-naval operations, II Sept 43:24-25, 24-27
V Nov
44:22-23
KALMAR
I
KISKA (ALEUTIAN ISLANDS)
P-6I versus, model combat sequences,
LAMPANG (THAILAND), airfield. IV Jun 44:19 LAMPHIER. THOMAS G.. )R.. Aug 43:14-15 LANCASTER (bomber). VI Apr 4546-47 LANDON, TRUMAN H IV Jun 44:38 LANGER ISLAND, seaplane base. Ill Apr 44:37 LANGGOER (NEI), night photograph of, IV May
Jun 43:14
I
43: 16.
LIMBURG (GERMANY),
railyard
bombing
at,
May 45:69
LINDEMANN, GEORGE,
quoted on Allied
air
VII
power
Europe.
in
V'll
Jul 45:63
river strip at. night phoiiigraph. V'll
LINZ(ALSTRIA) 45:iiiiide
LlPPt (tit.RMANY).
VII
(ITALY).
Sep! 43:42.
II
(FRANCE), bombing at. during Normandv invasion, IV .Aug 44:back cover
LORENZO (ITALY), railvard. II .Sept 43 LORIENT (FRANCE), Apr 43:16-17; 1
43:back cover; base
42. 44-45
Ma\
1
at,
field. Ill Apr 44:27 V. S S II Sept 43:24 LSTs, in capture of Green Islands. IV Mav 44 24-29
;
(
attack
attack
rail
on VI
Apr
43:2-3
ISLANDS).
Ill
GERMAN AIR FORCE .
oil
refinerv attack at. \
I
of.
attack on.
attacks
on
44:12, 12-13
V Nov 44:25
VII Jul 45:36
LVnoW
(German cruiser), II Dec 43:18 (PHILIPPINES), VIII SeptyOct 45:28 Mar 44:46. 46-47; VI Apr 45:24.
field. Ill
25; VIII Sept/Oct 45:11 Far East Air Forces activities 46. 48. inside back cover
VI Mar 45:43-50,
I
LYNCH. THOMAS
II Dec 43:23; III Feb 44:16; J., IV Jun 44:45 air combat exhibition. IV Jun 44:46 LYON-BRON (FRANCE), airfield. IV Jun 44:9 LYOSS MARL' (Japanese ship), damaged at Rabaul
Feb 44:33
VIII Sept/Oct 45:52-83 8th Air Force mission.
Dec 43:13. 13-20 MARICNY (FR.ANCE). launching of rocket atuck near, drawing. V Oct 44:6-7 II
MARILINAN (NEW GUINEA). II Nov 43:22 MARINES. U S at Okinawa. VIII Aug 45:14 MARKHAM RIVER (NEW GUINEA). Aug 43:6 MARKHAM VALLEY (NEW GUINEA). II Oct .
M
Command activities MARSEILLES (FRANCE)
See MEDITERR-ANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES MACARTHLR. DOUGLAS, I Apr 43:12; II Oct 43:22; IV Jun 44:41. 41; IV Aug 44:3; V Oct
MAAF
in the Pacific (to
end of
1944). VI Jan
45:11 (map)
Papua invasion described
bv.
MAGDEBURG (GERMANY), attacks on. VI
I
oil
See also
Aug
44:1
43:14 I
Jul
45:20.
20-21
M.ATSUWA ISLAND (KURILE ISLANDS).
sketch of, VII Jul 45:32
(BURMA).
II
44:5 Japanese installations 44:6-7
IV
Nov 43:17
MAINZ (GERMANY) bombing. VII Jul 45:50, 51
in the at
at.
IV Jun 44:
17;
IV Aug
B-17s on route
to.
V
1
44: 14
MERSEBURC (GERMANY) airdrome. VII Jul 45:25 Uuna oil plant. VII Jul 45:28, 33. 34-35 reconnaissance photograph of. VI Apr 45:inside back cover for U. S. artillen. VII Mav MERTON GRID, use
MERTERT (GERMANY), 45:32
MERVILLE (FR.ANCE). II Nov 43:coTer, 41 MERZIG (GERMANY), reconnaissance photograph VI Apr 45:53
Mav
I
43:12-13, IS;
42-43
down. VI Jan 45 41 262. IV Jul 44:26, 27; V Sept 44:27; VI Jan 45:40. 40-41 Me 323. I Jul 43:14-15; II Sept 43 41 Me 410. IV Mav 44:back cover MESSINA (SICILY). I Jul 43:8 railvards. II Sept 43:40 (LUZON). VIII Aug METROPOLITAN shot
Me
METZ (FRANCE). V Dec 44:5; VI Feb 45:19 MEW. See MICROWAVE EARLY WARNING MEZA BRIDGE (BURMA). IV Jun 44 20 •MICKEY" RADAR See H2X R.ADAR MICROWAVE EARLY WARNING (MEW) DEVICE I
tactical uses.
Nov 44 23 VII Mav 45:34.
36-37. 36-37. 38 1942). VIII
MIDWAY. BATTLE OF (MAY
I
I
I
Balkans. VI Jan 45:2-3. 2-4 Pass. VI Feb 45:22-25; \
Brenner
Sept 44: inside cover,
P.61 and.
(BURMA), railroad. I Aug 43:28 (FRANCE). Apr 43:20 Mav 43:27; Jul 43:37 MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES (MAAF) Potez works.
Apr 44:44-45 bombed
DEVICE I
MEAULTE
Ill
aircraft fadlilies
45:53
M.ATFORD AERO-ENGINE WORKS (BORDEAUX). Jul 43:41; VI Feb
MAYMO
Jul 45:32
Jul
ROAD
Woije. IV Jun 44:40; IV
MARTABAN. GULF OF (BURMA). II Nov MASSACRE BAY (ALEUTIAN ISLANDS).
plant
I
Jul 43 16-21
VI Jan 45:42
at.
KW AJALEIN
Emwetok. IV Jul 44:47; VIII Sept/Oct 45:15 Mili Island. I Aug 43:34-35, 35; III Feb 44:47
Apr 43:12
Apr 45:46; VII
I
Jul 43:12. 12-13 163, IV Jul 44:26, 27; V Sept 44:26. 26 model combat sequences. V Oct 44:42-43.
Aug
44:16. 17
Jul 43:cover, 1-23
Jul 43:cover, 1-9 Jul 43 12-15 master plan agairut German transpcjn. I
I
model combat sequences.
43:25
45:19. 19-23,22-23
See also
targets
Me
Bruges units at. II Sept 43:29 submarine installations. Ill Jan 44:39
.MARSHALL ISLANDS.
I
and
MESSERSCHMITT AIRPLANES Me 109. V Oct 44:42
IV Jun 44:4. 5 Air Transport at. II Dec 43:40-41
V..
MARRAKECH (MOROCCO).
45:back cover
I
operations review.
attacks in lulv.
of.
MARLOWE. MACIE
ci/i/i
MERRILL. FRANK. IV Aug
review of campaign. VIII SepL'Oct 45:9. 12. 15-16, 17 7th Air Force activities. Ill Apr 44:12-13. 13 (map). 20-23; IV Aug 44:8-9 Jaluit atoll. Ill Feb 44:46. 46-47; VI Jan
M-46 (photo fiash bomb), Aug 43:34-35, 35; VI Mar 45:6 M-69 (incendiarv bomb), use against Tokyo. VI Apr
of spectfu
MERKWILLER (GERMANY).
44: 13. 13-15. See also
43:26
incendiarv bombing of. VTII Aug 45:cover, 48-53, 49 Japanese losses at, VI Apr 45:24. 24-25
Sept
43:29
MARIANA ISLANDS. V Oa in.
V
IV Aug
44:24-25. 24-29 Torrito oil pipeline. IV .Aug 44:22 plant attacks. VI Feb 45 27. 27-29 oil P-38 low-level photographs uken bv. V Nov 44:24. 24-25 review of operations. VI Feb 45:22-29 Tactical Air Cx)mmands of. VII Jun 45 60. 60-62
.MERIGNAC (FRANCE),
at,
I
at.
offensive. IV Jul 44:54-55. 55;
MERGUI HARBOR (BURMA).
arch bridges
B-29 operations
Sept 44:14 44:39. 41. 39-41;
shipping atucks. I Jul 43:22-23 B-26 formations for. III Jan 44:42, 42-43 submarine combat, tight-turn problems. I .Aug 43:32-33 MEGALO MIKRA AIRFIELD (GREECE). II Dec
IV Jun 44:14
GUINEA), at. IV Aug
44 10-11
Apr 44:42. 42-43
43:10-11
MARIENBURG (POLAND).
Mar 45:b«ck cover
LUTZEL RAIL BRIDGE (GERMANY),
.Sept
V IV Mav
North African urgets.
SAIPAN; TINIAN
LL'TONG (BORNEO),
urgets. 44:2
rail
Rome
air
Mar
Ill
at. Ill .Apr 44:41 VI .Apr 45:43 MARETH (TUNISIA), air-ground operations. Jun 43:40-43
44:10. 10
V
plant.
C:assino. Ill
MEDITERR.ANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES.
(PHILIPPINES). 3rd Emergency
(ITALY), bombing Sff B-26
attack
Monte
and namfs
MARAUDER. rail
Caeu war
fighter tactics.
Japanese shipping
elliptical
45:40-43. 40-43; VII Jun 45 58.
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER.
MARBURG (GERMANY)
Mar 45:39 LL NA.MAN. MT (NEW GUINEA). I Aug 43:6 LLNDEY. NOEL R II Dec 43:23 LL'NGLING (CHINA). II Nov 43:15; V Oct
MAINGKWAN
Aug
Rescue Squadron in. Mil Aug 45:59 MANNEVILLE-ES-PLAINS (FRANCE), radar
MANTUA Ill
(Japanese airplane). VI
Ill
I
(CHINA). See also ANSHAN \*II Jun 45:20 (map), 21
of.
station at.
at.
44:10-11. 10-11 See
MANCHURIA
MANOKW ARI (NEW attack
Apr 45:42 LL'FBERRY (defensive combat maneuver). LL FTW AFFE
GUINEA).
44:28. 28-29
dockvard area. \II Jul 45:42-4S
LLDVMGSLLST (GERMANY),
after
Jun 45:5
Feb 44:45; III Apr 44:21,23 IV Aug 44:8, 9 bombing of. VIII SeptyOct 45:12
MANILA BAY
on German ocean
LIDWIGSILAVEN (GERMANY),
advance
in. \'I1
MALOELAP ATOLL (MARSHALL
resources
49
liner at, VII Jul 4.i:48,
harbor.
activities
MANDALAY-YE-U R-AILWAY (BURMA).
.
LLBECK (GERMANY),
Clark
ISLANDS),
airfield.
Jul 43:40
I
Jun 4550
accident. V'll
Mav
port of l-eghorn.
Mav 43:10
Jun 43:back cover
I
WVISVILLE.
LLZON
VIII
3;
Apr 44:14-17 (FORMOSA), attack on Japanese
MALAHANG (NEW
LOS NEGROS (ADMIRALTY ISLANDS), Momote
LLKE
VII Jun 45:2-4,
I
LONGLES
I
I3th Air Force attacks on
in.
MALAGA (SPAIN), cement plant. II Dec 43:27 MALAGUNA AIRDROME (NEW GUINEA).
Aug
44 47-49
VII
bridge urgets, V Sept 44 23; VI Mar 45 22-24
Dec 43:11
II
landing. Ill
S.
shipping
Feb 44:41 V-1 damage. IV
liner). III
LONDON (ENGLAND).
U
after
MAKO HARBOR
.
U>MB.\RI)I.\ (Ilaluin
(NED.
Japanese shipping SepL'Oit 45:48
MAKIN ISLAND (GILBERT
46-47; III Mar 44:4 bomb fall plot. II Sept 43:46 L(H.KW(K)D, LYMAN B II Nov 43:24
bombing
in luly.
IV
site.
60, 58-64, iniide back cover
MAKASS.AR STRAITS.
Mav
V-l launch
44 43
MAKASSAR
airfield aliatk ai.
43:49
LITTORK) AIRFIELD
carpet
MAISONt ELLE (FRANCE). Aug
cover, 1 R.nal Air Korce over. VII Jul 45:2
submanne
45:43.43
Mav
4538-39
Apr
I5lh Air Korcc heading for. VI
II
Mas
Sept/Oct 45:7-8
MIELEC (POLAND).
Heinkel faciorv
at.
IV Jun
44 24-25 (Japanese airplane). B-17 versus, model combat sequences. I Mav 43:12-13, IS MILAN (ITALY), railvard atucks at. VII Mav
MIKE
45:43
I
(MARSHALL ISLANDS).
MILI ISLAND
Ill
ammunition dump.
MINBU (BURMA),
Aug
I
Nov
II
in
43:17;
III
MISBURG (GERMANY), S. S..
II
1
Nov
IV Jun 44 20
NETTUNO NEUBERG
VI Apr 45:16; VII Jun 45:24. 24-25,
WORKS
SeptyOct 45:101 MITTELAND CAN.'\L, attacks on, VT Jan 45:51
Jun
attacks near. \'I1
45:61,62 bridge.
rail
See NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCE NACHI CLASS CRUISER. HI Feb 44:33 NADZAB (NEW GUINEA). II Oct 43:22, 22-27 NAGASAKI (JAPAN), atomic bomb mission (9 Aug
MOMOTE
FIELD (ADMIRALTY ISLANDS).
Ill
tunnel
flvmg through. IV Mav 44:1(1. 10-11 (BELGIUM), night reconnaissance photograph of. VI Mar 45:6 MONTABAUR (GERMANY), attack at. VII May
MONT
45:8
CA,STRO (ITALY),
rail
bridge.
Dec 43:42
MONTANA, air base,
Great
44:42-43; IV
MONTELIMAR wreckage
Falls .^ir
Aug
IV
MONTE CASSINO at,
Command
Transport
of. 111
Oct 44:41
(YUGOSLAVIA), VI
,
Dec 43:40-41 landing at. V Oct 44:16
MOROTAl, MORSCHEID (GERMANY), bombing
Feb
V Sept 44:27 AIRFIELD (IWO JIMA).
VIII
Apr
44:12; IV
Aug
MULHOLLEN. HAROLD S., IV May 44:34 MUNDA (SOLOMON ISLANDS). Aug 43:3; I
III
43 10-11
NAMLEA AIRFIELD
(NEI), night reconnaissance
of, IV Mav 44:46 (BELGIUM), railvard, IV Jun 44 12 NANCV-ESSEY (FRANCE), airfield. I\ |un 44:8
photograph
NAMUR
NANPO SHOTO ISLAND CHAIN, bridge
VI Jan 45:
at, II
17
Nov
II
Nov 43:21
development and
use,
V
Sept 44:49. 49
Kleinhau. VII Mav 45:39 at Luzon. VIII Aug 45:cover, 48-53, 49 at St. Malo. V Dec 44:2. 3-4 NAPLES (ITALY). I Jul 43:5 bomb damage. Ill Feb 44:40. 40-42 N.ARNl (IT.\LY). bridge bombed near. VI
Jan 44:34. 34-35 Konigs Platz. VII Jul
NATIONAL STAR
II
at at
at.
Gasmata
III
airfield.
1
jungle survival on. map. I Jun 43:38
See also
I
at. II
Nov 43:38
Jun 43:38-39 j
Vunakanau
airfield.
I
Aug
43:2
ISLANDS).
Oct
11
43:40. 40-41
NEW GUINEA. See also HOLLANDIA; PAPUA; RABAUL.
and names of specific localiom and
targets
air-land offensive. I Jun 43:26-31; 27; VIII Sept/Oct 45:9. 10, 12, 17 bombing of Japanese shipping lanes off coast.
20-21 crash inspection and recovery work on. IV 44:16-18. 16-18 Japanese bases on. II Dec 43:8. 8-9 leafiet drop over. Ill Mar 44:22
May44:cover,
NEW IRELAND.
IV
19.
Kavieng,
II
Nov 4339;
II
Mav
Dec
bombing of. VII Jul 45:48 NICHOLLS. W.. V Nov 44:32 (PHILIPPINES), Japanese FIELD NICHOLS S. S..
fliers at (1935).
VI Mar 45:46
(Japanese airplane). VIII Sept/Oct 45:61
underground
Mar
Mar I
Aug
Dec 43:11
NEGROS ISLAND (PHILIPPINE ISLANDS) bombing of Japanese cruiser off. VI Jan 45:13 Dumaguete airfield. VI Jan 45:16
aircraft plant at,
VII Jul 45:20
NIGHT FIGHTERS. See P-61 NIGHT GLIDERS. See GLIDERS, night operation NIMITZ, CHESTER WILLIAM, III Apr 44:13; IV Aug
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES NETHERLANDS
RABAUL
.Aug 43:1, 3
Japanese camouflage
goodwill
INSIGNIA, introduced, 11
Goering bridge
VII Jul 45:36
NEW BRITAIN ISLAND
NIEDERSACHSWERFEN (GERMANY),
Palau. IV Jun 44:42.43 Saipan. IV Aug 44:40-41. 41 Tarawa and Wake. II Dec 43:6-7
NEI. See
Jul 44:28
NEUWIEDSAGS (GERMANY).
NICK
harbor installation at. II Sept 43:28 7th Air Force missions, I Jun 43:7, 7, 9-11 reconnaissance photographs. III Feb 44:48, inside back cover NAVY. U. S. at Kiska, II Sept 43:24. 24-27 at Nauru Island. Ill Feb 44:48, inside back cover at
Mav
VII
airfield attack at.
NEUKIRCHEN (GERMANY), bombing of. Vll Mav 45:54 NEU ULM (GERMANY), railroad installation at. IV
43:9 .V£IV YORK.
43:10-11
NATORI CLASS CRUISER.
MT. FLEURY (FRANCE). IV Jul 44:8 MUKDEN (CHINA), reconnaissance photographs. V Nov 44:34, 35 MULHAUSE (FRANCE), rail bridge bombing at, VII Jun 45:48
45:45
Nov
NAURU ISLAND
Sept/Oct 45:65
Oct 43:40-41;
at, II
43:back cover
45:11; VI Mar 45:12-13 Old Road bridge. VII Jul 45:36 (British airplane), model combat
Ill
bridge
44 18-19 ol. \'I
MOSQUITO
MUNICH (GERMANY),
rail
45:22
VI Feb 45:9
MOUNTBATTEN. LORD.
(OTA), VI Jan 45:34, 37
(BURMA),
NARSARSSAUK (GREENLAND),
of road
MOSELLE RIVER BRIDGES, bombing
MOTOYAMA
Vll Jun 45:18 (map) at. VIII Aug
at
activities at, II
sequences,
NAMKWIN
NAPALM,
MORGAN, ROBERT K VI Jan 45:29 MOROCCO, Marrakech, Ah Transport Command
at.
at.
May
ANZIO-NETTUNO
NEW GEORGIA (SOLOMON
U. S. Marines
NANTES (FRANCE),
materiel
Jan 45:3
junction
(OKINAWA).
NAKAJIMA PLANT
Apr
Mav 44:42-43 (FRANCE), German
V
45:105-107
NANSANKYIN (BURMA)
44:32
(ITALY), bombing
MORAVA RIVER BRIDGE
Mitsubishi aircrafi plant. VI .-Vpr 45:10, 11, 16; VII Jun 45:24. 24-25, 30-33; VIII Sept/Oct
NAK.AJIMA AIRFIELD (TOKYO). VI Apr 45:12
MONSOONS,
MONTALTO DE
of, VIII Aug 45:32-33, 32-33 burned-out area. VIII Aug 45:28 (map): VIll Sept/Oct 45:91
45 14
railroad
IV Jun 44:21
at,
(JAPAN) incendiarv bombing
map. VII Jun 45:30 mine blockade of harbor
(AUSTRIA),
destroved
NAGOYA
NAHA
Apr 44:27
MONASTER.'\CE MARINA (ITALY),
1945), VIII Sept/Oct 45:94, 95, 100-101
Azon
drop on. VI Mar 45:32
(ITALY). See
45:41
NAAF. See B-25
MOERDYCK (NETHERLANDS),
Jun 45:2-4,3 Balikpapan. See BAI.IKPAPAN Boela, V Oct 44:cover. 19-21, 20 Brunei Bay. VI Jan 45:14-15 Goeroea. VI Feb 45:56. 56 Gorontalo. V Dec 44:14. 14 Kendari. VI Mar 45:16 Timor, VIII Sept/Oci 45:47 economic importance of. V Oct 44:18. 18-19 Japanese defenses at. II Dec 43:10. 10-12 44:46-47
N
30-33; VIII Sept/Oci 45:105-107 reconnaissance photographs. VI Apr 45:10, 11 (NAGASAKI), VIll MITSUBISHI STEEL
II
VI
night reconnaissance photographs. IV
kamikaze attack, VII Jun
MODEN.-V (ITALY), bombing
Azon drop. VI Mar 45:32
Dec 43:19 E.AST INDIES (NEI)
II
attacks at. VII of,
MYITKYINA (BURMA). IV Aug 44:14 MYITNGE (BURMA). lOth Air Force operations.
VI Jan
MITSUBISHI AIRCRAFT PLANT (NAGOYA) of.
Feb 44:20-21
bridge.
NETHERLANDS
See A-36; P-51
(BURM.^), incendiarv bombing
MVITTHA BRIDGE (BURMA).
45:40
MITI;HELL. bombing
Wocnsdrecht.
of.
4556 MISSOURI. U.
rail
Schipol airport. IlT Feb 44:5
VI Jan 45:27, 30; VII Jun 45:34. 34-35; VIII Sept/Oct 45:102, 108
bombing
44:28-33 from below target. IV Jul 44:25 ot Netherlands airdromes. I Apr 43:28. 28-29 MIOZZI. LEROY F., Ill Mar 44:20 oil plant attacks,
Moerdvck
43:10-11
Feb
escort formations for. in the Pacific. Ill
landfall strip of. Ill
MURPHY, P. F.. VIII Sept/Oct 45:62 MUSASHINO AIRCRAFT PLANT (TOKYO).
Jul 43:46. 46-47. inside back cover;
Mar 44:25 Bismarck Sea. I May 43:9
43:33-35;
BaiUe of the
Aug
1
Hasselt railvard. IV Jun 44:10 Ijmuiden. invasion defenses. Ill Feb 44:35
VI Jan 45:8
test at,
Mar 45:16
AERIAL MINES
See
rail lines
bombing, \ll Jul 45:18
bombed. VII Mav 45:66
MU RIVER BRIDGE (BURMA). Ill Mar 44:28-29 MUROC LAKE (CALIFORNIA), airplane pickup
MYEBON
(PHILIPPINES). Far East Air Forces landing at. VI Mar 4.i:42
MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING.
airfield, after
MUSTANG.
43:31
MINDORO MINES.
airborne operations. \' Oct 44:inside cover. 1, 22. 22-23; V Dec 44:28-31, 29. 30-31 bombing German airdromes in. 1 Apr 43:28-29
MUNSTER (GERMANY)
Feb
44:47 night photographs of, I Aug 43:34-35,35 MILLER, G. M., V Dec 44:21 MILLS. LIEUT.. II Oct 43:11 MILO (SICILY), airdrome, fraginentalion bombing of, I Jun 43:22, 22-23 MIMOYECQUES (FRANCE), V-2 rocket site. V Sept 44:44
44:3
advance in Pacific (as of Sept 44), VI Jan 45:11 (map) cable from, quoted, VIII Sept/Oct 45:50
NINH BINH (INDOCHINA),
rail
bridge attacks.
VII Jun 45:14-15
NINTH AIR FORCE VII Alamein,
in Africa.
El
May 45:7-8 Mav 43:36-37. 36-37 1
combat photographs. VI Jan 45:38 in Allied advance into Germanv. VII Mav 45:54, 60-61, 62-63, 66, 67, 70, back cover air
attacks:
Metz fortifications. V Dec 44:5 Montabaur, VII Mav 45:8 rail targets,
VI Apr 45:43;
\ II
Mav
Jul 45:36 Malo, V Dec 44:2, 3-4 Schipol airport, HI Feb 44:5, 5 Sousse (Tunisia), I Jul 43:18, 18-22 St.
45:5; VII
V-l launch in
Bank- t>l 45:47,48
IV Aur 11 44, 45 Bulge. VI Feb 45:2-19; VII May
reionnaissance photographs. VI Mar 45:4-5. 4-9 II Dci 43:28. 28-Sl in Normandy invasion. VII May 45:10, 18-21,
in
I
.-Vug
photographic sequences from gun cameras Sepi V 44:20-22
air
hit
Trondheim. Ill Feb 44:26-27 photographit interpretation of sites
in. Ill
Apr
44:38, 39, 40
of.
NUGENT. RICHARD, VII May 45:28 NURNBHRG (German cruiser). II Dec 43:18
PliK'Sti mission. 11 Sept 43;cover, 16-21 review and analysis of operations, VI Mar 45:2, 2-15
(LIGHTNING)
P 38
by Hak oil loasi. Ill Feb 44:38-39 Ill Jan 44 22. 22-25 Hcroya. 11 Sepi 43:8-9 Rjukan. Ill |an 44:22, 24; III March 44:44-45
on Seine River. V Nov 44:16. 16-17 pre-invasion air base and rail attacks. IV Jun 44:1-3. 1-15
NURNBERG (GERMANY),
after
bombing. VII Jul
May
45:
Tactical Air Force of.
VI Feb 45:2-4,
"
44:26.16 Shihhweiyao docks and iron works missirm. re-enacimeni. Ill Jan 44:20. 20-21 Zeke and Zero versus, mtxlel combat sequences.
railvards.
Harbor I
(NEI). reconnaissance photographs of I.anggoer IV May 44:46 N()KMF(K)R ISLAND (NEW GUINEA), landing at. IV Aug 44:11; VIII Sept/Oct 45:12
at.
Command
glider factory.
I
43:34 after
bombing. VI Feb
45:28
O'DONNELL. EMMETT. VI OFFENBURG (GERMANY),
IV Aug 44:33,36
NORMANDY INVASION
(6 |un 44). IV Jul 44:cover, 1-24 air plan. VII May 45:14. 16 air strip construction after, l\' Jul 4423; 1\'
Apr 45:55
O'CONNOR, O, J,. May ODERTAI. (GERMANY),
air
attack at.
Jan 45:29 marshalling yard
VI Apr 45:45
OISSEL (FRANC;E). rail bridge. IV Jun OIVI (NF:W GUINEA). Jun 43:26
44:4
I
Aug
OKAYAMA (FORMOSA) V Dei 44:18. 18-19 reconnaissance photographs. IV May 44:48, inside back cover; V Nov 44:36 airfield. HI Mar 44:37 OKINAWA, invasion of (1 Apr 45). VIII Aug 45:4-8. 4-17; VIII Sept/Oct 45:28-30. 29 OKLAHOMA. U, S, S,, at Pearl Harbor. VIII Sept/Oit 45:2 OLD ROAD BRIDGE (COBLENZ). VII |ul 45:36 ONOE MARL' (Japanese ship), damaged in Rabaul harbor. Ill Feb 44:33
44:37
aircraft plant.
area map. IV Jul 44:10-11 beach defenses. VII May 45:18-21 landing o|x-ration. IV Jul 44:18-21
Longues. bombing German guns 44:back cover pre-invasion air attacks, IV Jul 44:4. 4-5, 8-9 interdiction strategy.
Jun
V Nov
Aug
at. IV'
44:1-3, 1-15; IV
44:14. 16, 14-18;
VII May 45:16-17 reionnaissance [photographs, VII May 45:16. 18-21, 24-25 review and analysis. VII May 45:10-32 weather charts. IV Jul 44:6-7
ONNEKOTAN ISLAND
at.
(BLACK WIDOW)
P-61
Ju 88 versus, mtxlel combat sequences. V Nov 44:22-23 at Kwajalein. IV Aug 44:10 use as night fighter. IV May 44:44-45. 44-45 P-80
(SHOOTING
.STAR).
mainland
VII )un
targets
Dec 43:cover, I. 1-12; VI Jan 45:10. 10-11 (maps): VI Apr 45:24-27 Central Paiifii. Ill Feb 14 45-48, 16. inside back cover; III .Apr 44:cover, 12-23
ORIVAI. (FRANCE), rail bridge. IV Jul 44:4 ORLY (FRANCE), airfield bombed. IV Jul 44:5
43:10. 10-11 role of 9th Air Force in. VII May 45:7-8 Tunisia air support. I Jun 43:cover, 40-43 Youkes Les Bains .iirfield. II Oct 43:33
ORTE (ITALY), bridge bombed at. VI Mar 45:22 ORVIETO (ITALY), highway bridge bombed near.
maps of advances.
VI Mar 45:23 OSAKA (JAPAN), incendiary bombing oL VII Jun
use of napalm
1
ORMOC BAY destroyed
I
rail
attack
at.
VI Apr
45:42
NORTH FIELD
(GUAM).
VIII SiptVOct 45:54-55.
43 36, 37;
NOR
II .Sept
III SE.A. attacks
ISLANDS).
I
43:24. 27
on German shipping
in.
VI
(Command activities ai
Air Transport
IV Aug 44:33 AFRIC;A. Air Transport Clommand Aciia. Aug 43:12. 12-13; II Dei
air base.
I
NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCE at
in
III
|an 44:39;
V
.Sept
II Sept 43:41 invasion of Italy. II Oct 43:47;
(NAAF).
Dc< 43:42. 42-43 Foggia. II Oil 13:6 II
attack tm.
II
Nov
43:1.
.
S,
I
III
photographic interpretation.
(BEl,c;iUM). anti-aircraft batten iie.ir, HI Feb 44:35 OSTIENSE (ITALY), railyards at. IV Aug 44 26 OTA (JAPAN), aircraft plant, attacks on. VI Api 45:18; VII Jun 45:34,37
over. VI
HI Apr 44:55
IV Jun 44:42. 45; V Oct 44:5 landing at (15 .Sept 44). Oct 44:16. 16 (PHII.IPPINE-S). Puerto Princesa airdrome. VI Jan 45:16 PAI.AZZOI.A BARRACKS (SICILY). II Sept 43:36 PALERMO (Sl( II.Y) attuks at, Mas 43:22; II ,Sept 43:back cover bomb dain.lge. II Noy 43:46 dcxk area. I Jun 43:35 PANAY (PHII.IPPINE-S), bombing of Japanesi task lone near, VI Jan 45:12. 15 PANCEVO BRI1X;E (BEL«.RADE). attacks on. VI I
HI Jan 44:23 at,
ship).
air attacks.
Apr 44:40
OS'TEND
44:3
Corsica. 1-6;
I
PAK NEM
PALAWAN
OSLO (NORWAY) skating course
43:38-39. 38-39
Apr 44:54; VIII Sept/tkt
V Sept 44:49. 49 PHAU (BURMA), leallel drop in.
PAIM) MARf (Japanese PALAU ISLANDS
airirafi plant.
bombing ot, II Sept 43:15; II Nov 43:36; Mar 44:32-43; IV |ul 44:61
Ill
45:26-27
Mar 45:18
45:26. 26-27; VIII Aug 45:20-21, 38; VIII .Sept/Oct 45:91, back cover burned-out area. VIII ,\ug 45:29 (map)
OSCTIERSI.EBEN (GERMANY), (ALASKA).
NORTHWE.ST
Jun 43:32;
victory analysis. VIII Sept/tki 45:eiitire issue
(Japanese airplane). I Apr 43:24 over Paramushiru. VIII Sept/Oct 45:9 versus. mt>del combat sequences. V Dei P-47 44:12-13. 12-13
Jun
Jan 45:51
NOR IHWAY
(PHILIPPINES). Japanese convoy VI Apr 45:cover, 34-35, 35
at.
OSCAR
54-55, 83
NOR III HEAD (ALEUTIAN
Sept 44:24. 24-25; VI
air operations. II
Alamein. I May 43:36. 36-37 dock and airport targets. I .\pr 43:2, 2-7; |ul 43:16-21 master plan against German transport. Jul El
V
Feb 45:61-63. 61-64 model. V Sept 44:25 in Italy. VII Jun 45:57. 57 jet engine described. VI Feb 45:62-63. 62-63
A
PACIFIC THEATER, Srr alio SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, and namn oj iptcifu island and
(KURIl.E ISLANDS).
volcano crater. IV Aug 44:4 (ITALY), rail bridge bombed 45:63
ORA
NORTH AFRICA
II Oct 43:10, 10-11 down. IV May 44:38 over Southern Frame and Northern Italy. low-level photographs. V Nov 44:24-25. 24-25 larricr transport, Hawaii to Saipan. V Nov 44:27. 27-29 D-23 in.Klel. V Dec 44: 12-13. 12-13 esiori tactics. II Nov 43:28. 28-31 Hying bomb versus. IV Aug 44:50 N model. V Nov 44:10. 10-11 in plane pick-up rescue tests. VI Jan 45:8. 8-9 rear attack evasion tactics. II Oct 43:12 P-5I (MU.STANG). IV May 44:30. 30-33 as B-29 escort. VIII Sept/Oct 45:71 Me 163 versus, model combat sequences. V Oct 44:43 riK'ket installations for. IV Aug 44:42 take-off and assembly procedures. Ill Mar 44:41
a.iidenllv shot activity
RAUBI.ING (GERMANY),
VI
•onibal photographs.
air
attack. VIII Sept/Oct 45:inside
HI Apr 44:6. 6
airfields at.
I
II
P4- niUNDFRBOLT)
(HAWAII). Nov 44:27
OCEANIA (German liner). II Dec 43:19 0C;KFEN (GERMANY), reconnaissance photograph
NOtHOt KFROFAN ISLAND
(AL.^SK.A). Air I'ransport
o OBER
IV Jun 44:S1
photographs.
II Nov 43:11 bridge bombing models. II Nov 43:12 as decoy for P-38 bombing mission. Ill Jan 44:20-21
cover, 1-2, 3
use of radar by. VII May 45:33-38. S4-S9 Vienna mission. II Oct 43:16-17
NIS (YUGOSLAVIA),
base.
Aug 43:14. 14-15 (AIRACOBR-M, air combat Dei 43 21.21-23
Pearl
10-11. 15-17
43:23
P-40(WARIIAWK).
OAHU 3. 5. 6-7,
I)e<
I
due
high altitude b
II
1
II
Jul 43:28 to larelevsness. II Oct 43:38-39 drixipsniHiI photo plane. V Nov 44:24-2,5, 24-25
irash.
4.5:52
Sept 43:42-48 Saar River reconnaissance mission. VI Apr 45:52. 52-56, inside back cover in Sicily, II Sept i:f:36 Messina lerrv d
combat photographs. Attu.
at
P-39
Rome
NOME
Mediterranean.
missions.
interdiiiion attacks
I
i
B-17
23,26
!
'
submarine attaiks 43 32, 33
NORWAY
Grille mission.
fNORIHKlM ((.FRMANY).
r
Rome. II Vpi 43 42, 42-48, inside back cover .Mareih line atuik. I |uii 43:cover, 40-43 •Marsc-illes mission. iToit 43:6. 7
sites in Kran.x-,
iht-
Ill
J.in45 4.4
PANOPE ISLAND (CAROLINE ISLANDS).
HI
Apr 44:57 PANTEI.I.ERIA
2-3
(I
I
ALYl.
I
Jul
13 cover,
1
map,
I
Jul 43:2 after capture,
I
Aug
43:40-41,
airborne invasion of, I Apr 43:12, 12-14 Buna, I Apr 43:12; I Jun 43:27, 29-31; II
Nov
43:39 I Jun 43:27, 28 Port Moresby, I Apr 43:13, 14; Sept/Oct 45:8, 14
Gona,
I
Jun 43:45; VIII
PARABOMBING, at
VIII Sept/Ocl 45:6 Corregidor, VIII Sept/Oct 45:20 Rabaul airfield, VIII Sept/Oct 45:10
VI Feb 45:60, 60; Aug 45:61, 62, 63; VIII Sept/Oct 45:9 installations at, II Oct 43:30, 30-31; IV Jun 44:16, 17
Ith Air Force attacks,
Japanese
PARATROOPS.
(BRAZIL), PARIS (FRANC:E) bridges
II
Apr 44:41
PATTON, GEORGE S, JR VI Mar PAXSON, E. W., Ill Jan 44:26 ,
45:28, 31
PEENEMUNDE PLANT (GERMANY), V V Dec 44:26 PELELIU ISLAND, V Oct 44:16 rescue mission near, VI Mar 45:25 PELIKAAN BAY, bombing of fuel barge (FRANC;E), attack
at,
VII
May
gun camera, value of. II Dec 43:21. 21-23 purpose and functions, I May 43:23, 23-25
PHU LANG THONG (INDOCHINA)
factory
at,
VII Jun 45:44, 45 of. III Feb 44:44 refineries
oil
27, 31;
H2X
PORTO MARGHERA
VIII
V Nov 44:26
V Sept 44:36 II Sept 43:cover, 16-21, 44:35 photographic interpretation of installations at, II Oct 43:44, 44-46 review of campaign, V Dec 44:35, 36, 35-52, inside back cover effects on oil production, V Dec 44:36-37
development and
V Dec
flak defenses,
(PLOESTI),
44:52, inside back cover
smoke defenses, V Dec 44:50-51, 50-51 target mosaic,
II
Sept 43:16
POINTE DE GRAVE (FRANCE).
VII Jun
45:54, 54
POIX (FRANCE),
V
PHOSPHORUS BOMBS.
Ill Jan 44:10, 10-11 over Italy, VII Jun 45:49, 49 at Ponape, IV Jul 44:back cover at Rabaul, III Jan 44:cover, 10. 10-11 use in the Pacific. Ill Apr 44:28. 28-29
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION Jun 43:12-13. 12-13 43:26-27, 26-27
Bougainville invasion map, II Dec 43:35, 35-37 bridges, types in Europe, III Apr 44:41.41 Burma military installations. II Nov 43:16, 16-17
train
bombing
at. Ill
Apr
44:back cover
(ITALY),
III
Apr
I
43:20;
)ul
1
43:37
(ITALY).
43:2
Feb 44:44 IV Aug 44:52, 52, 53 account of Yawata mission by,
Ill
PRESSURE SUITS, PRIDEAUX, TOM,
for pilots,
VIII Sept/Oct 45:53, 56-57, 81-83
PRINCE CHRISTIANS SOUND (GREENLAND), weather station
PRISONERS OF
at. III
WAR
Mar 44:13
(POWS), German, VII May
45:59, 72, inside back cover
PROME (BURMA), railyards, Aug PROME-TAUNGUP ROAD, II Nov
43:29 43:14 VI Mar 45:35, 35 I
on bndge
strike
at,
PRUFENING AIRCRAFT FACTORY (GERMANY),
III
PRUM (GERMANY),
Apr U.
44:6, 7
S. artillery
attacks
at,
VII
May 45:35
PUERTO GALERO,
3rd Emergency Rescue .Squadron operations at. VIII Aug 45:58
PUERTO
princ:esa airdrome (PHILIPPINES), attack at. VI Jan 45:16
PUFFENDORF (GERMANY), VI Feb 45:12-13 PYINMANA bridge (BURMA), Azon drop on, VI Mar 45:34, 35
PYRAMID DEFENSES,
on French Riviera.
V
Oct
44:34.34
QUAN SON
Q
(INDO-CHINA),
(^UEREM (GERMANY),
rail
bndge.
III
aero-engine factory
Apr at,
VII
Jul 45:16
QUESADA,
E. R.,
VII May 45:
16,
25
R
attacks:
Drohobycz, IV
Aug
44:inside back cover
Krzesinki aircraft plant. IV Jul 44:60,61 Mielec factory. IV Jun 44:24-25
IV Jul 44:56-57
target mission planning,
II
RAAF.
See
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE
RABAUL (NEW GUINEA),
II
Dec 43:cover,
I,
1-3
on Japanese shipping at, VIII Sept/Oct 45:46 harbor mosaic, I May 43:10, 10-11 Japanese radar installation at. Ill Jan 44:37 parabombing of, VIII Sept/Oct 45:10 use of phosphorus bombs at. III Jan 44:cover, 10, 10-11; III Apr 44:29 attacks
RADAR AN/ASP-13 (tail warning device), V Oct 44:48, 48 bombing through overcast by. III Jan 44:12-13.
Feb 44:43
POLAND
Politz,
Dec 44:38, 39
use. Ill
26-33
V Dec
(charts)
POLA
storage area
oil
technique). Jan 44:26-27, 32,
radar, use against,
17;
45:9, 9
(ITALY),
bombed at, IV Aug 44:22 POSITION FIRING (air combal
9lh Air Force mission, at,
43:13, 14; VIII
44:47
ground views o{ bomb damage, V Oct 44:26-31,
Far East Air Forces in, VI Jan 45:12, 15, 16; VI Mar 45:inside cover, 1, 41, 41-50, inside back cover first heavy bombing strike, V Oct 44:17, 17 invasion of (17 Oct 44), V Nov 44:42-43,42-43 review of campaign, VIII Sept/Oct 45:26-28
Dec 43:27. 27
bridge
bombed at, VII Jun 45:17 PHU LY (INDO-CHINA). rail bridge, II Apr 44:47 "PICCADILLY" AIRFIELD (BURMA), IV May
I5th Air Force attacks, IV Jun 44:56-57
Nov
CORREGIDOR;
PHOENIX ORION OIL REFINERY
PHOTOGRAPHY (AERIAL). See also PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION: PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
briefing aids for. III Feb 44:17. 17-18
,
See also
See also
reconnaissance pholograph(s) as a sub-heading under names of spenfu locations and targets low-level, purposes and value. III Jan 44:36, 36-38; IV Jun 44:21, 22, 21-23 9th Air Force operations, VI Mar 45:4-5, 6, 4-9
PLOESTI (RUMANIA),
reconnaissance photograph at, VI Apr 45:53 PERMINOV, GEN IV Aug 44:54, 55 PERUGIA (ITALY), rail bridge bombed at, VI Mar 45:23 PESCARA (ITALY), II Nov 43:3 railyards, IV Aug 44:26 reconnaissance photograph near, IV Jun 44:22
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. LEYTE; LUZON
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE.
PISA (ITALY), bombing
Sept/Oct 45:47
plants, II
I
1
Apr
I
Jun 43:45
I
44:4,5
PERDENBACH (GERMANY),
May
Jul
dump,
Azon
dummy
44:4, 4-5;
I
I
(PAPUA),
Sept/Ocl 45:8, 14 oil
PILSEN (C;ZECHOSLOVAKIA), Skoda works
use for air-sea rescue, I Jun 43:39; II Sept 43:27; VIII Aug 45:58, 58-59 PEALE ISLAND, I Jun 43:20-21; II Dec 43:7 PEARL HARBOR, attack on (7 Dec 41), VIII Sept/Oct 45:inside cover, 1-2, 3
cement
PRATO
44-47
PBY (CATALINA),
I
Ploesti installations. II
I
at. III
III Jan 44:45 Renault works. I Jun 43:2-3; II SepI 43:1-6; V Nov 44:9 suspension bridge at. III Apr 44:41 SKF plant, IV May 44:15 target damage, V Nov 44:8-9 Trappes marshalling yards, VII May 45:14-15 Villacoublay airfield, II Oct 43:14-15 PARMA (ITALY), rail bridge attack at, VI Mar 45:31 PASADENA. U. S. S., kamikaze attack, VIII Aug 45:8 PAS DE CALAIS (FRANCE), IV Jun 44:15; IV Jul 44:8,9 PASING (GERMANY), rail line at, IV Jul 44:28
barriers,
POWS. See PRISONERS OF WAR PRAC;TICA DI mare (ITALY), II Nov
testing butts,
M. works. III Feb 44:6 LeBourget airfield, II Oct 43:14-15;
bomb damage,
May 45:32, 34 Munda installations.
target range in Italy,
Sept 43:23
C. A.
PELTRE
POTEZ WORKS (FRANCE),
Aug 43:24 Aug 43:25 vectographs, Aug 43:inside back cover Yawata and Anshan steel plants, V Oct 44:44-45,
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
See
PARCURU
beam type
Matsuwa mosaic. IV Aug 44:6, 6-7 Merton grid oblique, use by U. S. artillery, VII III Jan 44:34, 34-35 Oct 43:44, 44-46 puzzle pictures. Ill Apr 44:38-40 radar and navigational beam installations. 43:44-45. 44-45 solenoid lowers, I Aug 43:25 swinging bass compass, I Aug 43:24
PARAMUSHIRU (KURILE ISLANDS) I
PORT MORESBY
railroads, typical installations.
PAPUA (NEW GUINEA)
at
installations. Ill Mar 44:36. 36-37 IV Jul 44:28-29 harbor and shipping installations, II Sept 43:28-29; IV Jun 44:35, 35 invasion defenses. III Feb 44:34, 34-35 iron smellers. II Dec 43:26, 26 Japanese industrial sites. IV May 44:48, inside back cover
Formosa
damage
survey of 40-43
Dec 43:13, 16-19
12-14 Freya radar, drawing of, I Jul 43:45 H2X methods, V Sept 44:36; VI Feb 45:28, 28-29; VII May 45:24-25; VII Jul 45:60 installations, photographic interpretation, I Jul 43:44-45, 44-45 jamming devices used by 5lh Air Force, VI Feb 45:30-31,30-31 1
POLITZ (POLAND), oil refinery. IV Jul 44:56-57 POLTAVA AIRFIELD (UKRAINE). B-17s destroyed at, V Oct 44:24-25, 24-25 POMPEII FLYING FIELD (ITALY), IV Jun 44:26-27, 27
POMPETTI, PETER, IV Jun POMPILI, L
A..
II
44:4, 5
Oct 43:10
PONAPE (CAROLINE ISLANDS), III Apr 44:37 POPPADURA FIELD (PAPUA), Apr 43:13, 14 I
PORTAL. SIR CHARLES, May 43:16 PORTER, EDWARD H., II Oct 43:37 I
Microwave Early Warning (MEW) device.
V Nov
44:23, VII May 45:34, 36-37 scope shadows, VIII Aug 45:back cover value to tactical air operations, VII May 45:33-38, 34-39; VII Jul 45:60 Wurzburg system, I Jul 43:45; III Jan 44:15, 15-17
RAF
See
ROYAL AIR FORCE
RANGOON
(BURMA),
Sule Pagoda docks,
I
II Nov 43:14 May 43:32
MANDAl
RAN(.CK)N homlxd.
A\ RAll ROAD, i.rniimis M,n ISSS (a INKA». airlUld. Aug -ISS;
1
W
RAl'OPO iNt
III Apr 44 32 RKAC.AN. RONAl
RKI)
CROSS
III
I).
Apr
I
V
I
I
Sled suspension bridge at. Ill Apr 44:41 largei damage. II Sepi 43:1-6; V Nov 44:9
RESCLE OPERATIONS air-sea.
44:cover,
B-2
E Jan 44:48, inside back
REUTLINGEN (GERMANY),
attack at. VI
rail
I
trenches
Apt
Ml
ai.
rail
Aug 44:56 IV Jun 44:32. 32
(GERMANY),
((uoted
bombing. VII Jul 45 inside
after
on Allied
V'll
power
in
Europe.
\'II
Jul
crossing of. in .Allied advance into Germany. Mav 45:56. 56-61 slratcgii bombing of bridges. VII Jul 45:36
V'll
RIMINI (ITALY). Ill Feb 44:43 RJl'KAN (NORWAY), power plant and chemical factory at. Ill Jan 44:22, 24; III Mar 44:44-45 ROBERT LEY (Ck.-rman cruiser), after attack. \'ll
C. J..
IV May 44:2
\'
Transpon Command supply activities to. II Oct 43:34. 34-37; IV Aug 44:30-31. 30-36 Ukraine air bases. IV Aug 44:54. 54-56. inside back cover Poltava airfield. B-17s destroyed at. V Oct 44:24-25. 24-25
\\i
RYUKYU ISLANDS.
See
II
Nov
II
OKINAWA
in low-level attack
Jun 45:62 IV Aug
44:42. 42
use in fighter aircraft. 2-7
Ill
Feb 44:1;
V Oct
44:2-4.
ROHDEN. HERHLTH VON. power
in
quoted on Allied Europe. VII Jul 45:62
ROI FIELD (MARSHALL ISLANDS).
Ill
air
Apr
44:20-21
ROMANA AMERICANA OIL REFINERY (PLOE.STI). V Sept 44:36 review of attacks. V Dec 44 42, 42-43, 50
(ITALY)
Apr 43:33 airpon. dummy planes at. offensive (II Mav-4 Jun 44). IV Jul 44:52. 52-53, 54-55. 54-55; IV Aug 44:24-25. 24-29; VI Mar 1
45:23 mission (19 Jul 43).
II
pre-Anzio bombings
Sept 43:42, 42-48 Mar 44:4, 5
staticm at. III
Apr
44:22
ROSTOCK (GERMANY).
Heinkel Flugzeugwerke
V Nov 44:2-3 JOE SYSTEM, for
attacks.
ROVER
•
c(H)pcration. VI
bomb tonnages
(
I
air-ground
May 45:40
I
ROYAL AIR FORCE
(RAF)
|an-31 Jul 44). V Sepi 44:10 |ul 45:4-5, 6, 7
Bomber Commanel oL VII Lagens
field air base-.
IV Jul 44:34. 34-35
missions:
44:8-9; VII Jul 45 16 airdromes. I Apr 43:28. 28-29
aircraft factories. Ill
Bergen Alkmaar
Apr
positions
S
S,. II
Sept 43:24
(ITALY), attack on Ckrman VI I Jun 45:59
at.
Jul
of bridges I
Nov
at. II
Jun 43 16-17:
I
43:8
SARPOLUS. SAVL
SARZANA
I
May 43:29
(ITALY), bombing of bridge
ai.
IV
Jul
44:55
SASEBO (JAPAN), naval base. IV Aug 44:18-19 SAUNDERS. LAVERNE. IV Jul 44:45: IV Aug 44:3 railroad bridges
Jan 45:2-3 capture ol Cireen Mands. IV
in
quoted on 45:62
Bad Munster rail bridge, VII May 45:70 reconnaissance mission. VI Apr 45:52. 52-56, inside back cover SAARBURG (GERMANY). VI Apr 45:54 SAHARA. Mt. Zebniss. II Dec 43:40 SAIGON (INDOCHINA), attacks at. VIII Aug 45:44-45. 44-45
ANDRE LEURE
(FRANCE), aircraft hangar Oct 44: inside back cover ST AUBIN SIR MER (FR.\NCE). IV Jul 44:16 ST BRIEUC (FRANCE), mud flat at low tide near. Ill Apr 44:38 ST. GEORGE, U, S, S.. kamikaze attack. VIII Aug 45:11 ST JOSSE AU BOIS (FRANCE), attacks on V-1 launching site at. IV Aug 44:45 ST. LO (FRANCE), VII May 45:27 after Normandy invasion. V Sept 44:18-19 ST. MALO (FRANCE), use of naplam at. V Dec
SI
bombed
ST.
1
on radio and weather
U
EE.
May 44:28
SCHACHT. HJALMAR HORACE GREELEY.
near.
V
44:2. 3-4
at. Ill
ROMMEL. ERW IN. May 43:36. 37 RONGELAP ISLAND (MARSHALL ISLANDS), attack
VI
Apr 45:28-29
SBDs.
SAAR. IHE (GERMANY)
V-2 and
strafing technique.
and
on Dondang
attack
VI Feb 45:55
VII
Jul 45:62
V-WEAPONS.
44:S, 4. 6-7; VII
at.
SAN JOSE BEACHHEAD (CORREGIDOR).
SAVA RIVER (YUGOSLAVIA),
Dei 4:1:38-39
\.:l
H\ AR. V Oct
43 27. 31 Feb 45:57
.Vpt 43:25
bombed. VI
Vi.l. 7; III Feb 44:1; \ll Jul
15 26-27, 27. See also
Apr
43:4-5
Oct 44:2-3, 3-4
L.rman.
attack at. VI
SARDINIA. LA MADDELENA.
45:49
|ul
ROBERTS. W\\.. II Oct 43:11 ROBERTS AIRFIELD (LIBERIA). R()( KETS l(.i/
rail
45:42
SAPRI (ITALY), bombing
RUSSIA
RHINE RIVER
Dec
airfields at. II
SANTERNO RIVER
May 45:70
45:63
RUSSHON.
1
air
I
airfield. III
43:28.29
SAIJCWEDEL (GERMANY),
SANTE
44:6; VII Jul 45:63
headquarters bombed.
45:39
RHENANIA OSSAG OIL REFINERY
ISLANDS).
Jan 44:40
SALONIKA (GREECE),
bridge
center.
(Xi
Sept 43:26-27
II
I
PLOESTI
Furnu Severin
|iil
SALMON LAG(JON (ALEUTIAN Jun 43:36. 37;
II
Jan 44:back cover;
-SALON DE PR0VENC;E (FRANCE),
ERASCISCO. U. S. S.. II SANGA SANGA (BORNEO),
Rl'NSTEDT. KARL RUDOLF GERD VON. V Dec railvard atiai ks
Ill
SA\'
F
ai. Ill
Apr 44:40
cover.
rail
VII Jul 45:36
at.
.MAMA Ploesli. See
World War
RHEINE (C;KRMA\V).
ROME
(GERMANY). Hindenburg
(Japanese airplane). VIII Scpi/Oci 45 6
attacks.
.SAMAH (CHINA). II Nov 43:48 attack at. V Oct 44:12. 12 SANANANDA (NEW GUINEA). Jun SANDAKAN (BORNEO), attack ai. VI
Oct 44:cover, 20 (FRANCIE). VII Jun 45.54-55. 54-56
Rl Dl-SIIEIM
Rl
45:43
RHEIMS (FRANCE).
".
RON AN
I
SALLY
at
V
IhhIkc destroyed
nighl search, after B-24 crash. Ill Jan 44:46
I
AI S TRAI.IAN AIR FORC:E (RAAF).
Selaroc- Island.
AIRSEA RESCl
.SVi-
jungle search lor cover
ROYAL
43:2
I
Jun 43:45 (ITALY), bombing 43:47; II Nov 43:6.6
airfield.
Mar 45:16 VII Jul 45:28. 31. 32. 33. 34-35 reviews of. VI Apr 45:46-47. 46-51; VII Jul 45:50-55.51 Schweinfurt bearings plant. VII Jul 45:42 ships and submarines. V Nov 44:back cover; V Dec 44:34; VII Jun 45:47, 51; VII Jul 45:46-49, 47 Sicgen railvards. VII Jul 45:38 use of Tall-Bov bombs bv. VII Jun 45:47
S
V Nov
SALAMAUA (NEW GUINEA), Aug
Mitteland Canal. VI
Dl (AI.ABRIA (ITALY). Jul 43:8 RENAULT WORKS (PARIS). Jun 43:2-3
air-ground. itchnii)ni- dcsirihed. 48. 48, inside back cover
I
SALERNO
Jul 45:41
oil refineries.
(diagram)
REGGIO
44 10; \ Oil 44 13. 13-15; \ Jan 45:17 S invasion of (15 Jun 44). IV Jul 44:46. 46-47; VIII Sepl/Oct 45:13
U
Krupp works. VII
milit.uN iiiM.ill.mmn. II Nov4S:I7 RtC'.tNSBlRC. (CIKRMANY). airirati faiiorv bombings ai. II (M 43;iy. 19-21; III Apr
44:6-7;
Feb 44:12. 12-13; VI Feb 45:32.
Ill
cover
-»S:22
UM- bv JaparifNc on Burm.i
isNciituil).
Burma. 36-37
Diiren, VI Feb 45:14. 14; VII Mav 45:44 the Hague. IV Jul 44:64, 64-65. iniidr back
I
NAZAIRE (FRANCE)
submarine base iron smelter
at.
at. II
attacks on.
I
Apr 43:18-19
Dec 43:26
R.APHAEL (FRANCE). V
Oct 44:35 ST VITH (BELGIL M). attacks on. VI Feb 45:6-7; VI Mar 45:10 SAIPAN (MARIANA ISLANDS). Ill Apr 44:37 B-29 runway constructicm at, VI Jan 45:inside cover, 1. 22-23. 22-33 establishing air bases at. IV Aug 44: 10. 10-11 Islev (Aslito) field. V Oct 44:13. 14; VI Jan 45:17. 22. 23; VIII SepiyOct 45:13. 17.58 lapanese retaliation for Tokyo raids. VI Jan 45:32. 32-33 pre-invasion P-47 transport. V Nov 44:27. 27-28 7th Air Force at. IV Jul 44:46, 46-47; IV Aug ST.
.Allied air
power
in Flurope. \'ll Jul
SCHIPOL AIRPORT (NETHERLANDS).
Ill
Feb
44:5
SCHLIEFFEN PLAN. VI Jan 45:35 SI:HNEIDER. christian, quoted on power
in
Europe.
\'II
Allied air
Jul 45:inside back cover
SCHOLVEN BUER OIL REFINERY (GERMANY). VI Apr 45:47; VII Jul 45:31
SCHUADTHEIM (GERMANY) burning German trucks near. VI Mar 45:3
Mav 45:47
aiucksai. VII
SCHWEINFl RT (GERMANY), attacks on. III
Apr
II
Oct 43:18,
44:8; IV
Mav
ball
19; II
bearings plant, 43:18-19; V Sept
Nov
44:12, 13;
44:34.34 damage. VII Jul 45:42
target
SCORESBY SOUND (GREENLAND).
Ill
Mar
44:13. 14, 15
SCS-51
INSTRUMENT APPROACH SYSTEM.
IV
Jul 44:30. 30-31
SEA WAVES, use in navigation. Ill Apr 44:46.46 SEDES AIRFIELD (GREECE). II Dec 43:28 SEETIER (German destroyer), attacks on. \' Dec 44:34
SEIDEL. HANS-GEORG. VII Jul 45:63 quoted on .Mlied air power in Europe. VII
Jul
45:63
SEINE RIVER, bridge bombings. IV V Nov 44:16. 16-17
SELAROE ISLAND (NED.
attack
on
Jul 44:4. 4-5; airstrip at.
V
Oct 44:cover, 20
SFNIO RIVER (ITALY), attacks cm German gun IXW11I..I1S .11. VU Jun 45:58. 58. 59
SEVEN
III
AIR FORCE
Bonins and Volcan<» neutralization attacks. VI Jan 45:17. 17-21 Central Pacific operations, review and analysis.
Ill at
in
Apr
the Marianas, V Oct 44:13, 13-15 Saipan, IV Jul 44:46, 46-47; IV Aug 44:10; VI
Jan 45:17
Aug
43:3;
II
Oct 43:40-41;
III
SOTTEVAAST
P.,
May
I
STUTTGART (German
site.
V
SOUSSE (TUNISIA), bomb damage
SOUTH CAROLINA,
Sept
assessment,
III
(B-24 bomber), IV Jul 44:32,
I
32-33
"SHADY LADY" (airplane), VI Jan 45:29 SHANTUNG PENNINSULA (CHINA), Tsingtao VII Jun 45:15 (CHINA), II Dec 43:26 model of docks and iron works at, mission
airfield attack,
SHIHHWEIYAO
Jan 44:20, 20-21 SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, mine blockade Jun 45:18 (map) re-enactment.
III
SHIMUSHU ISLAND (KURILE
of,
ISLANDS),
VII
II
Oct
43:30,31
Aug
1th Air Force attacks, VIII
44:10-11;
III
III
Feb
Mar 44:37
SHIZUOKA
(JAPAN), after incendiary bombing, VIII Sept/Oct 45:110 SHOOTING STAR. See P-80 SHORAN (bombmg device), VI Mar 45:28-31, 28-31 targets in Italy,
VI Mar
45:28, 30-31
SHOWA STEEL WORKS
(CHINA), V Sept 44:52,
inside back cover reconnaissance photographs,
V
Oct 44:46, 46-47 SHWEBO (BURMA), II Nov 43:15 SIAOKICHEN (CHINA), bombing of, VIII Sept/Ocl 45:40 SICIUA (Italian liner). III Feb 44:41
SICILY Bo Rizzo airdrome,
Jul 43:8 campaign, review of operations, I
Castelvetrano airdrome, II
I
II
Sept 43:36-41
Jun 43:24, 25
Nov 43:37
Licata, fortified positions near,
I
Jun 43:12
Messina, I Jul 43:8; II Sept 43:40 Milo airdrome, I Jun 43:22-23 Palermo. See PALERMO
SIEGEN (GERMANY),
railyards after
bombing, VII
Jul 45:38
SIENA (ITALY),
railroad car
bombed
at,
V
Sept
44:2
SIERLS LES BAINS (FRANCE), destroyed at, VII May 45:67
SIMMERN (GERMANY),
rail
VI Apr
45:43
V-weapons sue
at,
Tropics operations report Jan 44:inside back cover (PILSEN), dummy factory at, VII
45
SKOPLJE (YUGOSLAVIA),
railyards attack. III
Aug
(15
VIII Sepi/Oct 45:39 (13th Air Force), rescue
VI Mar 45:25, 25-27 (NEI), II Dec 43:11
ISLANDS.
See also
V
44),
at,
Mav 43:32
attack, VII
SWATOW
Jun
(CHINA), sinking of Japanese cargo Jan 44:18-19 V-2 rocket
SWEENEY. CHARLES
blast at.
V
Sept
W.. quoted. VIII Sept/Oct
45:95
Oct 44:32-41,33
SWIGERT. HERBERT.
Ill Mar 44:20 See SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA SYKES. R. B. Ill Mar 44:13. 19 SYURI MARU (Japanese ship). I Aug 43:17
SWPA
V
Oct
GUINEA; PHILIPPINES, am/
names of spenfu
island targets
aircraft crash inspection
May
and recovery work
in,
IV
T-44 PROJECTILE.
44:16-18, 16-18
escort formations for. III island airfields attacks, 43:1, 1-7
Feb 44:28, 28-33 II Oct 43:2, 2-5; Aug I
Japanese installations in, II Nov 43:38, 38-39 Japanese shipping attacks. III Mar 44:24-26, 25
minimum
altitude
bombing
in, II
Nov
43:33,
BOUGAINVILLE;
See
FRANGIBLE BULLET
(PHILIPPINE ISLANDS),
and storage depot
at.
A., quoted, II
SPAIN, Malaga cement
Nov
plant, II
TAGGIA
Dec 43:27
SPERRLE, HUGO. VII
Jul 45:64 quoted on Allied air power in Europe, Vll Jul 45:64 SPEZIA (ITALY), I Jul 43:4 SPIES, GEN., quoted on Allied air power in Europe, VII Jul 45:62 SPIKE-BOMBS, IV Jul 44:48, 48-49 SPITFIRE (British airplane), VII May 45:3 as B-26 escort, II Nov 43:40, 41, 42-43 flying bomb versus, IV Aug 44:50, 51 Me 109 versus, model combat sequences, I Jul
43:12, 12-13
SQUADRONS
I
Nov 44:8
Oct 43:46;
(PLOESTI),
V Dec
44:48,
B-17 crash landing
photographs. 44:36,37
Ill
Feb 44:8. 8-9;
TAIWAN See FORMOSA TAKANNI CLASS DESTROYER.
III
Mar
VII Jun
45:11. 11
TAKAO (FORMOSA) Aug 45:40 reconnaissance photographs. IV Mav 44:inside back cover; V Nov 44:33 TALL-BOY (bomb). VI Apr 45:46-47; VII Jun 45:46. 46-47 attack on. VIII
TANAC.ROSS (ALASKA). Air Transport Command air base. IV Aug 44:33 TANCHUK (CHINA), air base. V Dec 44:8, 9 TARAWA (GILBERT ISLANDS), II Dec 43:6; Apr
III
44:12, 18, 19
bomb damage
assessment.
III
Mar
44:46, inside
ISLANDS),
III
TATOI AIRFIELD (GREECE), II Dec 43:30 TAYLOR, RALPH, VI Jan 45:26 TBF (AVENGER), use of rockets by, V Oct 44:4-5 TENGCHUNG (CHINA), bombing of. V Oct 44:8 TENTRAI (Japanese airplane). VI Mar 45:39
TENTH
bearing plant, IV May 44:14 Daimler-Puch factorv, II Oct 43:16-17; 43:43
STIAKATIS, CONSTANTINE, V Nov
II
Dec
44:48,
inside back cover
W.,
(Japanese ship). I May 43:8 reconnaissance
TAINAN (FORMOSA),
back cover
Mar 45:17
STILWELL, JOSEPH
V Nov
Feb 44:45
STEAUA ROMANA OIL REFINERY II
MARU
(British).
Ill
TAREA AIRSTRIP (MARSHALL
(PLOESTI), V Dec 44:41.41 STEAKLEY, R. S., VI Jan 45:27 II Sept 43:16-17; 48; IV Jun 44:32
TAlMEl
(ITALY).
2nd
May 45:28 Mar 44:1
44:16. 16-17; VII
43:1
staging VIII Sepl/OcI 45:15 1st (Allied). V Sept 44:3.
Mav 45:48, 49, 64, 70 over Annweiler. VII Mav 45:2 at Haslach. VI Apr 45:38
TACTICAL AIR FORCE.
33-35
SPAATZ, CARL
near, VI
TACLOBAN
TACTICAL AIR FORCE.
ball
activities of,
SOERABAJA
I
44:40.40
STEYR (AUSTRIA) See C-54
"SNAFU SNATCHERS"
SUPERFORTRESS. See B-29 SUWANNEE. U. S. S., kamikaze
vessel at. Ill
airborne formations, V Oct 44:40 beaches, V Oct 44:34, 34-35 German materiel wreckage, ground views, 44:41 map of approach, V Oct 44:32 pyramid defenses, V Oct 44:34
STEINBOURG (FRANCE),
Jan 44:40
SKYTRAIN.Sff C-47 SLIM. SIR WILLIAM,
ball
44:8; IV
SWEDEN. KALMAR.
attack, VIII
STANDARD PETROL OIL REFINERY Sept
SKODA WORKS
SKYMASTER.
SOUTHERN FRANCE INVASION
(PARIS), target damage,
V
SIXTH AIR FORCE, Jul 45:44,
VI Apr 45:36, 36-37 S. S„ kamikaze Aug 45:9
SOUTH DAKOTA. U
attacks in,
STANDARD OIL GENNEVILLIERS PLANT
44:15,42,43 III
SEA, Japanese shipping
20th Tactical reconnaissance, VI Feb 45:34-35 21st Photographic, V Nov 44:30, 30-32 27th Troop Carrier, V SepI 44:32
SIMPSON, WILLIAM VII May 45:28 SIMS, JACK A, III Jan 44:42 SIMS CLASS DESTROYER, II Sept 43:24
SIRACOURT (FRANCE),
Apr
45:41
2nd Emergency Rescue, VI Mar 45:25, 25-27 3rd Emergency Rescue, VIII Aug 45:58, 58-59
train engine
attack at,
Dec 43:19 bearing works
liner), II
May 44:14 SULE PAGODA DOCKS (BURMA), SUMMERS, TOM, IV Aug 44:56 III
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA (SWPA). See also NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES; NEW
45:61, 62
SHINCHIKU AIRFIELD (FORMOSA),
night gliders over Aberdeen,
Jan 44:47
SOUTH CHINA
VI Feb 45:20, 20-21 IV May 44:4; IV
E.,
STUTTGART (GERMANY),
43:9
(FRANCE), V-2 rocket
44:41
43:6, 7
plant,
Aug 44:3, 14 STREETT, ST. CLAIR, IV Aug 44:3 STURGIS. SAMUEL, VI Mar 45:42
I
SORENSEN, EDGAR
attacks at
storage buildings near, VII
STRATEMYER, GEORGE
Jan
Jul 43:18, 18-21
"SHACK DATE"
SOLOMON
Matford aero-engine I
44: 12
(FRANCE),
German barracks and May 45:49
44:44
1
Tarawa and Wake attacks, II Dec SFAX (TUNISIA), I Apr 43:2
quoted.
STRASBOURG
43:5, 36-37
campaign review, VIII Sept/Oct 45:8-9 Green Islands, capture of, IV May 44:24-25, 27,
SONNENSTEIN, RAYMOND, Jan 44:1 SORELLERIE III (FRANCE), attacks at, IV Aug
I
Grosseto,
,
44:34, 34-35
I
1
STRAND, W. H V Dec
1
Munda,
Jaluit atoll,
terrain
Apr 43:10, 11 Buka, II Nov 43:36; II Dec Buin,
A. ("Rocky"), VIII Sept/Oct
45:64, 66,69
Dec 43:4
Ballale, II
24-29
Feb 44:46, 46-48, inside back cover; IV Aug 44:8-9 VI Jan 45:back cover Kwajalein, IV Jun 44:38, 38-39 Mill Island, Aug 43:35 Wotje, IV Jun 44:40 Nauru Island mission, Jun 43:7-11; III Feb 44:46, 48, inside back cover night rescue, air crash. III Jan 44:46 in Philippines campaign, VI Mar 45:inside
in the Marshalls, III
cover,
STONE, CHARLES
GUADALCANAL
44:12-13, 12-23
Iwo Jima, V Nov 44:44, 44; VI Jan 45:21; Vll Jun 45:38-39, 38-39
1
Apr 43:27; IV Aug
44:3; VIII Sept/Oct 45:33
AIR FORCE. IV Aug 44: 14 Automatic Flight Control Equipment, use
by.
Aug 43:26-27, 26-31 Burma operations, II Nov
Mar
43:8, 9-17; III
I
44:27-29 Insein, III Feb 44:12, 12-13
Myebon, VI Mar 45:16 Myilnge and Gokteik, Apr 43:cover, 15, 15-16; Jul 43:46. 46-47, inside back cover; I
I
Nov
II
4.^:10-11
iil.
TKRM
Tll.Ml AM) Bangkok railvards. reconnaissance
photof^rapli.
station at.
Ill
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE B-29 o|>eralions in llie Mananas. VIII SepKOcI 45 52-83 air-sca revue. VIII Sept/Oa 45:76.77
Apr
44:35
HARBOR (SOLOMON
TONEI.EI Apr 43
ISLANDS).
I
Iwo Jima
11
TOROKINA RIVER (BOIGAINVILLE). offensive
al.
attacks at, VI
at.
airfield. I\'
)un 44:19
58-62
IV
take-off methods. VIII Sept/Oci 45:54-55.
Aug 44:22
lOL'LON Mar
VIII
(FR.\NC;E). attacks 44:12; \' Oct 44:32
lOYAMA
SepiyOd 45:«-y
54-55 Yawala mission. VIII Sepi/Oct 45:52, 53. 56-57.
(JAPAN),
Jan 44:39;
at. Ill
81-83 Bonins and Volcanos neutralization attacks. VI Jan 45:17. 17-21 Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions. VIII Sept/Oct 45:94-101,95 imendiars bombing of Japanese cities. VIII .Aug
III
bombing,
after incendiary
VIII SepiVOii 45:84
V Dec
Balikpapan. 45:47
Borneo
Aug
44:15. 16. 15-17; VIII
oil inslallalions.
VI Feb 45.54. 54-55;
Truk. IV Mav 44:35. 35 Woleai air base (Caroline Islands). I\' |uii 44:42.42 Vap Islands. IV Aug 44:13 over Koror Island. V Oct 44:17 2nd tmergencv Rescue Squadron. VT Mar 45:25. 25-27
VI Feb 45:54. 54-55; VI Mar 45:l»ck cover typical formation of. Ill .\pr 44:31 of.
THIITABWF tanks,.
THOMAS.
IBLRMA).
oil fields
Jul 45:63 power in Furope. VII
Jul
45:63
THINDFRBOI.T quoted on .Mlied 45:63
P-4VII Jul 45:63
.?<•,•
THVSSFN. FRITZ.
air
power
in Fairope.
TIBLRTINA RAILYARDS (ROME).
IV
VII Jul
I
Apr 43:26;
11
Nov
43:48,
inside back cover Felikaan Bav. VIII Scpi;Oct 45:47 Penioei airfield. II Det 43:10 reconnaissance photograph. I\' Mav 44:46
TINIAN (MARIANA ISLANDS).
Ill
Apr 44:37
44:49 Dec 43:29 TIRI'ITZ (CJerman battleship), after bombing. VII Jun 45:47 TOJO (Japanese airplane), model combat sequences. IV May 44:30-31; V Nov 44:46-47
napalm drop on.
bombed
\' Sc'pi II
(JAPAN), bombing
sieel industry attacks. V Sepi 44:52. 52, inside back cover preparations lor first land-based attack <»n Japan. IV Jul 44:41.41-43, 44
of.
SeptOu
XX Bomber Command
attack at,
bridge
TRIESTt:
at,
VI Feb 45:11
(Italian cruiser), sinking of.
I
Jun 43:16.
Sept 43:22
off. II
RIPOI.I (LIBYA), Cjsicl Benito airdrome. I Apr 43:4,5 TRONDHEIM (NORWAY), attack on submarine base at. Ill Feb 44:26-27 I
TROOP CARRIER COMMAND.
ISLANDS),
Apr
Ill
.
V
Dec 44:21
(RUSSIA). U
>>
air
ba«s m.
I\
44:34.
Jul
45:37
UM.ANAK (GREENLAND), III Mar 44:18 I NIREA SPERANTZA OIL REFINERY
TSINGTAO AIRFIELD
UTAH BEACH.
(CHINA),
I
.Arab farms,
bomb damage
I
I
IV
Jul
44 19
Jun 43:40-43
I
assessment.
I
Jul 43:18.
for.
1
Jun 43:14
VAL
(Japanese airplane), wrc-ckage rc-coverv on Guinea. IV Mav 44:16. 17. 18 VALOGUES (FRANCE). \ Nov 44:19
VAPOR TRAILS
Jul 43:1, 14, 15,16
(ITALY).
Fiat ball
bearing plant.
Ill
Feb
rail
center. IV
I
Mav
TWFI.rTII AIR FORCE.
Ill
Jan 44:39-41: VI Mar
by. II Nov 43:28. 28-31 use for phoiographit 1 .Aug 43:inside back cover (GERMANY), attack at. Mav 43 14
VEGESAC:K
I
16.17
45:22. 22-24
Bomb
43:18. 18-19
shown
VECTTOGRAPHS.
interprelalion.
Jun 44:32,32
Wing of \ll Jun 45:49. 49
Feb 44:43-44 over Apennines. Ml Mav 45:6 Bologna mission. II De. 43:44. 44-45 Brenner line bombing, VI Feb 45:22-25, 23 La Spe/ia harbor, \ll Jun 45:inside back cover Ora rail bndge, VII Jun 45:63 Rome, sirafing attack, IV Jul 44:52, 52-53 use of phosphorus bombs, VII Jun 45:49, 49 Verona, Cierman transport attack. VII Jun
in Italy. Ill
VEITH. KARL JACOB, quoted on in
I
Jul
43:18. 18-22
Allied air
power
Europe. VII Jul 45:63
\ EI.I.FIRI
il
lAI.Yl.
rail
junction. Ill
I F AIRFIELD (FRANCE). 43 inside back cover
VFNDFVII
Mar 44:5 II
Dec
\'ER<)NA iTTALYi. attack >m (k-rman transport near, VII Jun 45 60 VESUVIUS, MT (ITALY). Ill Feb 44:42 eruption, damage to Pompeii Flying Field. IV Jun 44:26-27.27
VIENNA (AUSTRIA).
4560 Sousse.
avoiding.
escort laclics
Tl RNl SFVERIN (RIMANLA).
at
I
-Apr 43:1
44:7
57ih
airborne invasion of.
New
surrender passes Tunis.
Isi
Apr 43 12. 12-14 USSR. ,W RISSIA
Jul 43:1, 14. 15. 16
harbor targets, I ,Apr 43:2. 2-3 Mareih. air-ground operations.
TURIN
strafing attack
(PLOESTI). V Dec 44:41.41
UNITED NATIONS.
Jun 45:15
TUNIS (TUNISIA). TUNISIA
Sousse. 18-21
Aug
Aug 44:56. 56, inside back cover LM RAILYARDS (GERMANY), bombing of. VII attacks on. I\'
Jun
34-36 harbor shipping strikes, IV .Aug 44:13 reccmnaissance photographs. III .Apr 44:34-35 13th Air Force attack, IV Mav 44:35, 35 TSILI TSILI AIRFIELD (NEW GLINEA). II Oct 43:32 on. VII
43:31
44:54. 54-55 I
I
AROLINE ISLANDS).
i(
F
u UKRAINE
43 36 Rl K
Oil 44:44^7; VI
T^'MBAKI AIRFIELD (GREECE). II Dec TYPHCX)N (British airplane). V Oct 44:2
9th. in
Netherlands airborne invasion, V Dec 44:28-29,31 TROPICS, hazards of flying in. VIII Scpt/OcI 43:22-23. 22-23
TROLT L.\GOON (ALEUTIAN
V
60. 62. 78
TWINING. NATHAN
16-17
TRINIDAD, thunderstorm
of.
Feb 45:42. 42-43, 46. 46
XXI Bomber Command oL VI Feb 45:44-45, 45. 47. 47; VI Apr 45:16, 17; VII Jun 45:34. 34-37; VIII Aug 45:38; VIII Sepi/OcI 45:58,
HER (GERMANY), bombing of Moselle River
Akasuka Ward, VI Apr 45:13 burned-out area, VIII Aug 45:30-31 (maps), 34-37 (maps); VIM Sept/Oci 45:91, 112, inside back cover gin/a, shopping district. VI Apr 45:13 Musashino air.rali factory. VI Jan 45:27, 30; VII Jun 45:34. 34-35 waterfront. VI Apr 45:10-11, 20-21 TOKYO MARL (Japanese- ship), damaged ai Rabaul
rail
VI Apr 45:43
\I Apr 45:19,
22-23; VIII Aug 45 24-25; VIII 45:74-75, 75 air defenses, VI .Apr 45: 12, 12
RI\ ER (ITALY). German column VII Jun 45:61
at.
RELCHTLINGEN (GERMANY),
bombs over
(NKI)
TIRANA (ALBANIA),
RESINARO
I
1
Aug
44 28-29
HO (CHINA).
al,
.
I
(.FORG. VII air
84-93 Japanese
VII May TRAVIS, CAPT VII Mav 45:46 RFNTO (ITALY), II Oct 43:in5ide back cover
and storage
IV |un 44:18
quoted on .Mlied
(PARIS), 45:14-15
I
Bougainville. II Oct 43:8-9; II Dec 43:4-5; I\ Jul 44:38. 38-40 Corregidor. \l Mar 45:49. 49 Dumagueie airfield. VI Jan 45:16 Goeroea. VI Feb 45:56. 56 Makassar Siraiis. VII |un 45:2-4, 3; VIII Sept/Oci 45:48 Niclson field (Lu«>n). VI Mar 45:4«. 48 Sandakan. VI Feb 45:57
Snoopers"
45:18-39, 19: VIII Sepi/Oct 45:78-80. 79-80,
TRAPPES MARSHALLING YARDS interdiction aitacks
Mar 45:back cover
\'l
VIII Srpl/Oci 45:64. 69-71.
mission 183 (Tokyo urban area). VIII Sepl/(3ci 45:74-75. 75 mission planning. VIII SepiyOct 45:58. 60. 62.
(Kl RILE ISLANDS).
Feb 45:60, 60 (ITALY), oil pipeline bombed
air bale.
73. 65-73
Japanese
IV Jul 44:38. 38-40
TOROSHIMA RETFO
attacks:
TOKYO
ISLANDS).
(ITALY), German supply depot bomUd, VI Feb 45:25 TOSHITANE TAKATA, quoted on effectiveness of the B-29, VIH SiptyOa 45:103
I
TIMOR
(JAPAN),
TORIONA
THANBVrZAV.^T(BLRMA). II Nov 43 17 THA/I (Bl RMA). Mav 43:33; II Nov 43:9 THIRIKKN ril AIR FORCK. IV Mav 44:24:
TIFN
ROSF"
TOL ISLAND (CAROLINE
\'
bridge, VI Feb 4.i:S8
rail
Ijmpang
TOKYO
TOKL YAMA
TORRITO
Nov 44:37 Dara
3l9lh Mrdiuiii Hoiiili I.Tc.up. ukr ..II and landing system. \ Vpi 4446-47. 46-48 Troop Carrier Air Division ol. V (kl 44:37
Feb 44:32 (B-29 bomber). VI Jan 45:27 attack on naval fueling VIII Sepl/Oci 45:104
harl>or. Ill
VIII SepiyOd 45 :S2. 52-41 rail lines. I\' Jul 44:4K. 48-49 Sule FaRoda d.xks. I May 4S 32. J2-SS lormations: javelin down. Ill Mar 44:27 tor monsiKms. IV Mav 44:10. 10-11 7rli Btip. I\' |iin 44: IM. 18-19 (IT.AI.V). II Oil 4S:48 Uiinhing oi rail junition ai. Ill Mar 44:cover TKZPIR ilNDI.A). Air Transport Clommand ai. Ill )an 44 7 review
spike-bomblnK
45:27
I.5ih
Air Force user. VI Feb
VIETINGHOFF, GEN. VON, power
in
VIETNAM.
quoted on Allied Europe. VII Jul 45:64
air
VIGNACOURT
site at.
IV
(PARIS), bombing
Tropics.
VILLINGEN (GERMANY),
marshalling yards. VI
Apr 45:44
VIPER"
(rocket-propelled interceptor). VII Jul 45:27.27 (ITALY), railroad car trapped after bombing. IV Aug 44:24 VOLCANO ISLANDS, attacks on. VI Jan 45:17.
AIRFIELD (NEW GUINEA).
I
44:15,15 London damage. IV
Aug
44:47-49
S. version (JB-2). VI Jan 45:5-6. 5-7 V Sept 44:40. 40-45; V Dec 44:24, 25. 25; VI Mar 45:cover test sites. V' Dec 44:26, 27 trajectory studied. V Dec 44:26-27. 26-27 V-3, VII Jul 45:26, 27
U.
V-2.
1
WALLACE. DEAN D., Ill Jan 44:46 WALSH. MAJ. GEN.. IV Aug 44:54, 55 WALSH. JOHN R., IV Mav 44:38 WAN LAI-KAM (BURMA), bombing of
Apr
III
IV Jul 44:37 naval base.
I
(GERMANY), airdrome
WOENSDRECHT at. II
Sept 43:14
combat narrative quoted. IV
Mav 44:32
WASSERBILLIG (GERMANY),
bridge bombings
VI Feb 45:11
(CANADA).
Air Transport
Command air base. IV Aug 44:32 WEAPONS. See BOMBS AND BOMBING; ROCKETS; V-WEAPONS, and names of speafic tfpes
WEATHER CONDITIONS,
effects
on
air
2, 5;
Tactical Air
1st
V
base.
Oct
44:11.11
YOCHOW-CHANGSHA RAIL
LINE,
attack on.
Sept/Oct 45:40
YOKOHAMA
(JAPAN)
and earthquake of 1923. VIII Aug
after fire
45:22-23 incendiarv
bombing
of,
VIII
Aug
45:22-23; VIII
Sept/Oct 45:111
Aug 45:26
burned-out area, VIII Sept/Oct 45:90
(map); VIII
AFRICA),
airfield.
Oct 43:33
YUGOSLAVIA bombing of bridges
at,
VI Jan 45:2,
Jun 44:31
Aug
Air Transport 44:30-32
Command
air
bases
IV
in.
in.
Aug
VIII
45:16 at.
VI
YURCONIC. MAX.
YVRENCH
V Sept 44:45 (NETHERLANDS). II Dec 43:19
IV Jun 44:42, 42 WOLFF. GEN, quoted on
construction
(CHINA), air base II Nov 43:24. 24-27
YUNTAN AIRFIELD (OKINAWA).
site at,
Jan 44:9 (FRANCE), V-1 launch Ill
IV Aug
site at,
44:44
air base attack
.\llied air
power
in
Europe, VII Jul 45:63
WOTJE (MARSHALL ISLANDS), Aug 44:1 (BURMA), Japanese
attack at,
IV Jun
44:40; IV
WUNTHO
supply center
WURZBURG (GERMANY),
after
bombing. VII Jul
45:54-55
WURZBURG RADAR SYSTEM.
I
Jul 43:45; III
Jan 44:15. 15-17
X (missile).
44:47,47
(B-24 bomber), IV Jul 44:32-33
ZEBNISS,
MT
.
II
Dec 43:40 fuel plant.
.\pr 45:48-49 ZEKE (Japanese airplane).
43:5-6;
II
Dec 43:23;
IV Jul 44:58; VI
May 43:13; VI Mar 45:39 I
I
Aug
captured at Saipan. IV Aug 44:40-41. 40,41 kamikaze attack on U. S. S. Missouri, VII Jun 45:40 Mitsubishi Type 0, Mark I, I Apr 43:22-24 P-38 versus, model combat sequences, I Aug 43:14. 14-15
ZELL (GERMANY),
attack
on
fuel
dump
at,
VI
Mar 45:2
ZERO See ZEKE ZWEIBRUCKEN (GERMANY),
attacks
at,
VII
May
45:48, 49, 66
VII Jul 45:26, 27
(PLOESTI).
Z-BAR"
ZEITZ (GERMANY), at,
IV May 44:9
XENIA OIL REFINERY (charts)
(CHINA). Japanese supply
at.
X-4
(maps)
at. Ill
44:inside back cover
YUNAN PROVINCE
WOLEAI (CAROLINE ISLANDS),
operations Aleutian Islands, III Feb 44:back cover Arctic, I Mav 43:34, 34-35 Greenland. Ill Mar 44:13, 13-19 importance of obtaining, air accident. II Dec 43:24-25, 25 lapan, VI Feb 45:48-49, 48-49 Kiska, Japanese evacuation, II Oct 43:28, 28-29
monsoons. IV May 44:10. 10-11 Normandy invasion. IV Jul 44:6. 6-7
Apr
YOCHOW
YUKON, IV Mav 44:1.
Force over, VI Feb 45:15, 16
rocket
of canal bridge
bridge destroyed
Skoplje, III Jan 44:40
reconnaissance
VVITHAM, ERNEST, VIII Sept/Oct 45:76 WITTENBERGE (GERMANY), rail attack
WIZERNES. V-2
Oct
IV Jun
4,4
VIII Sept/Oct 45:39
45:3
V
at.
oil plant.
VII Jun 45:14
Belgrade,
Apr 45:43
May
VII
at,
YEN LY (INDO-CHINAl.
Nis railvards, IV
photograph. VI .\pr 45:56
at.
attacks
(BURMA),
YEN DO (INDO-CHINA). bombing
II
WINGATE. ORDE CHARLES.
VIII Sept/Oct 45:38 See P-40
R.,
Dec 43:43;
WISSEMBOURG (GERMANY), bridge
(CHINA),
44:12, 12; VIII Sept/Oct 45:38
YENANGYAUNG
YOUKES LES BAINS (NORTH
WILTINGEN (GERMANY),
WARHAWK.
WARLIMONT. WALTER.
II
aircraft
cover
I
YELLOW RIVER 44:18, 19
Mav 43:14. 14-15; I Aug 43:18-19 WILLe! HANS KARL. VII Jul 45:inside back
I
WATSON LAKE
Nov 43:24
S., II
Oct 43:16-17;
bail-out over.
I Jun 43:26 Jun 43:20 bombing of. II Dec 43:6-7; IV Jun 44:40 Japanese installations at. Jun 43:21
at.
.
44:6, 6
WILHELMSHAVEN (GERMANY),
WAIROPE (NEW GUINEA).
WARREN. JACK
Dec
II
44:3
w WARNEMUNDE
(POLAND),
WIENER NEUSTADT (AUSTRIA), II
attack on. VI
attack on runwav at. IV Aug 44:13 Y.'\W.'\TA (JAPAN), steel plant bombing of. IV Jul 44:4 1 41-45; V Oct 44:44; VIII Sept/Oct 45:52, 53. 56-57, 81-83 mosaic of, IV Aug 44:16-17 reconnaissance photographs, V Oct 44:44-45 YE (BURMA), attacks on rail center at. VI Feb 45:36-37. 36-37
Oct 43:2; III Mar 44:26; III Apr 44:24-27 Japanese shippmg, II Nov 43:33; IV Mav 44:cover, 19, 20-21 mosaic, II Dec 43:8-9 WEYLAND, O. P., VII Mav 45:25, 28 WHALEN (GERMANY), bombing of road junction at. VI Feb 45:9 WHISTLER. C. F.. V Dec 44:12 WHITEHEAD. GEN.. IV Aug 44:3 WHITEHORSE (CANADA). Air Transport Command air base. IV Aug 44:30-31, 32 WICHITA. U. S. S.. II Sept 43:25 factory,
Rabaul
at
CLASS BATTLESHIP,
YAP ISLANDS,
VI Feb
attacks, II
44:43. 43-51; VII Jul 45:20 fighter planes versus. IV Aug 44:50-51, 51 launching sites. IV Aug 44:43-46; V Sept
ISLAND.
in.
WEWAK (NEW GUINEA)
Aug
damaged
(Japanese ship), Ill Feb 44:33
YAMAMOTO Jan 45:14
bombing
bombing, VII May 45:inside cover, landing zones for gliders at, VII Mav 45:57 target model, VII Jun 45:53
2-3; III
YAMABIKO harbor.
after Allied
44:32. 32-33
WAKE
V Nov
attack on,
V-WEAPONS V-1, IV
VI Feb 45:47. 47 winter, use of radar for 45:28, 28-29
WELBOURNE, CHARLES WESEL (GERMANY)
Apr 44:29 (NEW GUINEA). Ill Mar
Dec 43:1.
28-31
1 .
formation.
43:18-19
VOLTURNO RIVER (ITALY), III Jan 44:42 VOROKOV. LIEUT.. IV Aug 44:56 VUNAPOPE BEACH
VI Mar 45:28-3
WEIMAR ARMAMENTS WORKS (GERMANY),
17-21
II
device).
Sept 43:22-23. 22-23
II
WEICHBAHNHOF WHARF
VITERBO
VUNAKANAU
and bombing through. II Jan 44:12. 12-14; VII Jul
XXI Bomber Command bad weather
Oct 43:14-15
43:2;
III
45:58-59. 58-59
Shoran (bombing
Aug 44:46
Aug
missions. Ill Jan 44:22. 22-25
Nov 43:36-37;
(FRANCE). V-1 launch
VILLACOUBLAY AIRPORT of, II
Norway
overcast, assembling
INDO-CHINA
See
V Dec
ZWISCHENAHN (GERMANY), 44:27
airfield.
IV Jul
IMPACT CLASSIFICATION Past issues of
IMPACT
have been declassified or down-
graded as follows by authority of the Commanding General,
Army
Air Forces, effective 19 September 1945.
The following
1943
Miy
*April
Januiry
June
-
been declassified: Au(HSt
Joiy
Septembtr
*
December
March
February
April
May
-
June
December
September
Augusi
1945
-
November
October
1944
ittuea have
April
The following
have been downgraded to
issues
RESTRICTED 1944
July
194
January
5
November
Gotober
Marcb
February
The September-October 1945 is
unclassified,
CONFIDENTIAL classified
The
and only
the
May
•
(final)
June
August
IMPACT
issue of
1945
-
July
issue
remains
All remaining classified issues will be de-
when change
declassification
in security policies allow.
and downgrading
is
authorized as a
matter of security review only. Release for publication (for use by
the
cleared in accordance with
\ll'D
other than
• r,ru
iJirir
official
Army and Navy) must
be
circular 236, 3 August 1945.
iMPACT.
„/
OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF,
2
Washington, D. C.
DISTRIBVTIOIS: For
distribution to
Squadrons with
the September-October (final) issue of IMPACT.
«-a8»a.ir
The dusker Group. Mary F. Tomaselli
Design: Index:
Inc.
Graphic preparation: Davis-Delancy- Arrow Inc. Printing and binding: R.R. Donnelley &- Sons Company
^mh0%y!)'i^n.'r'':-
