Impact The Army Air Forces Confidential Picture History of World War II vol.6

u^

IMRACr ^ THE ARMYAIR FORCES' "CONFIDENTir

IMPACT BOOK

6

IMPACr THE ARMY AIR FORCES' CONFIDENTIAL PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II In eight hooks, for

tlic

cicclassifiecl

ocncnd fnthlic

with fourteen

new

and now

for the

jnthlished

first

time

retrospective essays

bv World War II leaders and journalists

BOOK 6

Sponsored hv

THE AIR FORCE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION Published by

JAMES PARTON AND COMPANY

INC.

NEW YORK

Cover: Fighter contrails above the Battle of the Bulge {Impact, February' 1945)

All introductory material in this

by James Parton and Company,

book Copyright

©

1980

Inc.

All rights reserved.

Published by James Parton and Companv, Inc. 15 East 48th Street

New

York,

New York

10017.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-91997

IMPACT: The Army of

World War

II,

Air Forces' Confidential Picture History published in eight books.

Book 6 First edition

Printed in the United States of America

Published simultaneously in Canada

Bombing Night

And

Day:

The

Two-Edged Sword Essays by

Group Captain Dudley Saward, O.B.E., RAF and Lieutenant Creneral James H. Doolittle, USAF with

Colonel

Beime Lay Jr., USAPR

(Ret.)

(Ret.)

(Ret.)

•

I

•

ATTACKS BY NIGHT by

Group Captain Dudley Saward, O.B.E.,

About the author: ficer in

Commissioned an

1934, Dudley Saward served

RAF Pilot

first

RAF

(Ret.)

Of-

on India's

Northwest Frontier, winning the Viceroy's Certificate for

and devotion to duty" in rescue work after the 1935 Quetta earthquake, though himself seriously injured. In 1939 the RAF Specialist Electronic Course led

"gallantry

first to eight

Command

months service in France as Second-in-

2 Army Cooperation Squadron; then Commander in England with a bomber squadron whose specialist task was to detect the German beambombing system and destroy the transmitters; andfinally, in of No.

Flight

1942, appointment as Chief Radar Officer to Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command (Sir Arthur Harris), a position he held until the end of the war. Promoted to Group Captain in 1 943, he was awarded the Order of the British Empirefor work on radar and tivice mentioned in dispatches for "distinguished the

author of two books.

The Bomber's

He

service. "

is

Eyeanrf Marshal

of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Harris

(to

be

published after the subject's death).

-JP-

P

..^^^ er Ardua Ad Astra," the motto of the Royal Air Force "Through Adversity to the Stars" was truly symbolic of the extreme difficulties which confronted RAF Bomber Command at the outset of

—

World War

—

From the beginning of the war with Germany in

Command had

neither the

nor the navigational and bombing aids to undertake effectively, either by day or by night, a

aircraft

strategic

inadecjuate protective

due to low speeds and armament, their design hav-

ing concentrated on

maximum bomb load. This was

which order to reach Germany's industrial targets were far greater than those which would permit fighter not short-sighted, for in any case the ranges

II.

September 1939, the

those planned for the future were entirely unsuitable for daylight operations

bomber offensive against the enemy. In the

case of day bombing, the aircraft at

its

disposal

and

Bomber Command was required

at

to strike in

cover.

In 1940 and 1941, after the

Bomber Command

therefore

fall

of France,

embarked upon

its

campaign

of night

bombing,

attac

principle that saturation attacks dustrial installations

king towns on the would destroy in-

and town property

alike.

How-

ever, despite euphoric

Ruhr

created in the

reports of the devastation and other town areas in Ger-

figure in the Royal Air Force.

He

was stockily and

powerfully built with sandy hair, which had earned him the name of "Ginger" in prewar days, and was blessed with a robust wit. His wit could be caustic on

many, there were those in Biitain who suspected that aircraft were not finding their targets and that

comments on an eminent scientist who had tried to impose his ideas cjn the bombing policy: "His only claim to qualify as a

when thev did succeed in correct location their fxmibing aids were so inade(]uate that they rarely

competent authority on air strategy is his exceptional knowledge of the sexual behavit)r of an-

bombs in the target area. The greatest skeptic was Lord (iherweli,

occasions, as witnessed by his

placed their

thropoid apes."

Winston (iluirchiUs Scientific Adviser, anci he caused a searching inquiry into the performance of Bomber Command to be set in motion. This was conducted by a Mr. Butt, a member of Churchill's War Cabinet Secretariat, beginning in August 1941.

tion in

It

revealed a deplorable state of affairs. After ex-

amining 650 photographs taken by night bombers during June and July purporting to be taken at the time of

bomb

release, or, alternativelv.

position which was believed to have

graphed

in the target area,

sorties onlv

the target,

one

i.e.

he found that of the

in five got to

total f)f

within the 75 sc|uare miles surround-

ing the target. In fact,

bombs

the

within the five miles

manv of the

aircraft credited

with attacking a target successfully their

naming

been photo-

in

had dropped

open country.

who was then head of the RAF DelegaWashington, D. C, returned to England shortly after the U. S. A. entered the war and took up his appointment as Commander in Chief on February 22, 1 942. Harris had been the commander of one of the bomber grcjups from September 1939 until Ncnember 1940, when he had been posted to assume the duties of Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and was a highly experienced pilot and a sound technical man. As Director of Plans prior to the outbreak of war, he had laid down the specifications for the four-engine heavy bombers which were yet to come. Over the years from 1922 until the outbreak of war Saundby, the new SASO, had freHarris,

quently served under Harris, and thus the real beginnings of a new team to conduct the strategic night offensive against Germany was born. first few weeks an event occurred which was of supreme importance to the successful development of the strategic bombing offensive in Europe in the years ahead. The advance echelon of the United States Eighth Air Force, which was in fact

Coincidentally, during Harris's

as

B

'omber Command was critical of the Butt Lord Cherwell convinced Churchill that,

Commander

the nucleus of

in (^hief,

its

U.

S.

VIII

report, hut

arrived in England at the

even allowing for statistical errors. Butts findings were sufflcientlv striking to emphasize the supreme importance of improving the Commands navi-

Texan and an

gational

and bombing

ordered

a top priority

scientists

of radar aids for the night bombers. At the Command of Bomber

same

As a result, Churchill on the development by the

aids.

time, the question of the

Command came under

scrutiny.

Before the end of 1941. Air Vice Marshal R. H. M. S. Saundby was moved from the post of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Technical) to take up the appointment of Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) at Headquarters, Bomber Command. Hot on the heels of this change came the appointment of Air Marshal A. T. Harris to replace .'\ir Marshal Sir Ri(hard Feirse as Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command. Harris was already a legendary

Bomber Command,

end of February 1942,

under the command of General quaintance was

Ira C. Eaker, a

old acquaintance of Harris. first

made

in

1938,

The

ac-

when Harris was

America on a buying mission and Eaker was on General H. H. Arnold's Air Staff in Washington, and it was renewed when Harris was again in Washington in 1941. The Headquarters of VIII Bomber C>ommand were established at Wycombe Abbey, a famous girls' school which had been requisitioned for the purpose and whicfi was situated within a few miles of the headc]uartersof R.'\P Bomber Command. But when Eaker first arrived Harris insisted that he stay with him at Springfield, his official residence, while the VIII Bomber Command Headquarters were being prepared. Also during this period, Eaker spent most of his days working at RAF Bomber Cx)mmand sent to

,

alongside Harris, attending all operational planning sessions and being brought into close contact with

every aspect of the

who was

Command's

activities.

Saundby,

also living at Springfield, wrote of this

"Harris and Eaker were firm friends, and they laid the foundations of a cooperation between

liaison:

the two long-range bombardment forces that was both admirable and enduring."

demonstrate a crude instrument. By July he was equipment of remarkable performance to Harris's Chief Radar Officer on a Halifax bomber. A top priority for production and installations of this equipment, known as H2S, which was to revolutionize RAF Bomber Command's bombing capabilities by night and through cloud, was immediately demanded and ap-

able to demonstrate a prototype

proved.

Thus

the third

component required

for a

successful ijomber offensive, radar aids, was added.

Without the

I

.t

was, however, to be

Americans were

some months before

in a position to operate.

the

Indeed,

their first Flying Fortresses did not arrive in England until July 1, 1942, and their first operational mission, which was against the marshalling yards at Rouen in France, was not flown until August 17, 1942; their first mission against a German target, Wilhelmshaven, was on January 27, 1943. But during the waiting period the links were forged be-

tween these two potentially great offensive bombing forces which were to produce that concerted effort of round-the-clock bombing in 1944 and 1945 which made the invasion of Europe possible and which finally brought Germany to her knees. As much as Harris would have liked an all-out combined bomber offensive to have started in 1942, he knew it was impossible. He himself had neither a big enough force at his disposal nor the necessary scientific navigating and bombing aids to make the Command effective enough to make a proper contribution, quite apart from the fact that the U. S.

Vni Bomber Command self

up

assist

Harris to

rec|uired time to build

it-

had conspired to become more accurate, and there-

to a viable force.

But

fate

more devastating, with the arrival of radar aids for bomber operations. At the beginning of 1942 GEE, the first radar navigational device, was being installed in all bomber aircraft, and the new fore

of the

skilled assistance

particular Lovell

and

scientists, in

his senior colleague Dr. P.I.

Dee, the night bomber offensive would have failed. Under the command of Harris, the successes of Bomber Command soon became apparent. The " ,000" raid on Cologne on the night of May 30-3 1 1

1942 was an outstanding example. Led by 200

GEE-equipped Lancasters and Halifaxes, the 1

dropped ,445 tons of highbombs on the target area 90 minutes, creating absolute havoc. Some 600

,000-plus aircraft

1

explosive and incendiary in

acres of built-up area were completely destroyed,

and more than 250 factories were destroyed or seriously damaged; 200,000 people had to be evacuated from the city, and all services were seriously disrupted. The raid brought howls of fury from Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister f)f Propaganda. However, it was not until the middle of 1943 that Bomber (Jommand was to begin to reach its maximum power with its strength greatly increased by the four-engine Lancaster and Halifax aircraft. Its bombing accuracy had also received a considerable boost

now

that a substantial

number of aircraft

were equipped with Lovell's H2S, whose performance had been greatly improved to give excellent reproduction of coastlines and inland waterways and far better resolution of towns and built-up areas, thus facilitating accurate identification. It

was also

at this

time that the U.

S.

VIII

were

Bomber Command was coming into its own. On February 4, 1943, RAF Bomber Command and U. S. VIII Bomber Command received their new directive, which had been approved by the Com-

being equipped on the production line. More important still, a young scientist by the name of Dr. A. C. B. Lovell had conceived the idea of using the principles of the night fighters' radar Air Interception (AI) equipment to produce a continuous map picture on a cathode ray tube of the terrain over which the aircraft was flying. By January of 1942, with Churchill's priority for development of aids to bombers to support him, Lovell was able to

bined Chiefs of Staff at their Casablanca conference. It was one of the most important directives of the war and was addressed to the appropriate British and United States Air Force Commanders. The instructions delivered to Harris and Eaker read: "Your primary objective will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a

"heavies," Lancasters, Halifaxes

and

Stirlings,

point

where

their capacity for ariiied resistance

is

then detailed primary objecsuch as submarine construction yards, aircraft

lataily vveakeneci." It

tives

industry, transportation, the (Continent,

vou

will

and Armies re-enter

plants, et cetera,

oil

tinpliasi/ed that "VVhenever Allied

afford

all

possible support in

maimer most effective." It also stated manv should be attacked by day and In the

that Cier-

night "to

on German morale" and "to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force and to contain Cierman fighter strength awav from the Russian and Mediterranean sustain contiimous pressure

theatres of war." In |ulv

1943 the fust real sign of the combined

bomber offensive was made evident with the bombing campaign against Hamburg. Hamburg was the second largest city in Germany with a population in excess of a million and a half. Its shipyards were the most extensive in Kurope, housing many

under construction and in varyThe famous Blohm and Voss vards were responsible for some forty-five percent of the total output of Germany's U-boats. It was the largest and most important port in the Reich and contained .S.OOO industrial establishments and 5,000 commercial companies, most of which were engii,ged in the transport and shipping industries. In addition there were major gasoline lef'meries, the second largest manufacturer of ships' screws, and ships

and

L'-boats

ing stages of completion.

various factories for precision instruments, machinery, and aircraft components. Next to Berlin it was

defended and occupied tuiope. the most heavilv

citv in the

(ierman Reich

"Gomorrah," was planned in masterly fashion by Saundby, now the Deputy Cominander in Chief, to take place on four nights, the first assault being on the night of July 24-25. The route was over the North Sea to a position exactly 1 5 miles northeast of Heligoland, at which point the Bomber Force was to turn tcnvards its target. Navigation was excellent, timing perfect, and concentration maximal. The H2S aircraft easily identified on their equipment the coast near Cuxhaven and the River Elbe as it unfolded itself on the screen as far as Hamburg and tinallv revealed the bright fingers of light which represented the dock area. Within thirty minutes 740 aircraft, out of 791 dispatched, rained down 2,396 tons of bombs, 980 tons of which were incendiaries. "Window" was also tipped out. and the radar-controlled search-lights waved aimlessly in all directions, anti-aircraft gunfire was inaccurate, and German night fighter controllers were thrown into confusion one was heard to shout over the radio: "I cannot follow any of the hostiles; they are very

—

cunning." Goebbels described the raid as "a real catastrophe ... an exceptionally heavy raid with most seri." But there was more to come. ous consecjuences With the clefenses of Hamburg in tatters, the U. S. VIII Bomber Gommand made a highly successful precision-bombing attack with 68 Fortresses against the port and district of Wilhelmsburg on the morning of the 25th. Then, to add to Hamburg's confusicjn, 53 Fortresses battered the Neuhoff power works on the morning of the 26th. On the night of .

the 27lh/28th R.AF

.

Bomber Command struck again,

with 739 heavies dropping 2,417 tons of bombs, of

which fifty peicent were incendiaries. This was followed by a third night attack on the 29tli/30th. w hen 726 aircraft dropped 2,382 tons of bombs into the

H

third c^uarter of the reeling city.

amburg, being a seaboard town, was an ideal H2S target, with its coastlines and rivers providing easy identification on the cathode ray screen. Quite apart fiom H2S, the entire Bomber Force was now ec)uipped with the latest GEE, which gave fixing facilities well beyond the range at which ,

Hamburg

lav. Lastly, a

device

we

called

"Window,"

which consisted of bundles of metallized paper, so cut

in

length that

when

strips

of

scattered in large

would "drown the enemy's radar surveillance svstem and make it impossible to detect the approaching aircraft, was to be used for the first time. The operation, which went by the code name

(juantities

"

The

coup de grace

was delivered on the night of .August 2-3, when 462 aircraft attacked and dropped a further 1,462 tons cjf bombs into what was now a blazing inferno. It was more than a week before the extent of the damage could be assessed because the target area was blotted out by a continuous pall of smoke. When photographic evidence was available, it showed that seventy-five per cent of the city had been razed to the ground. Goebbels wrote in his diary on the 29th of July, the day after the third aid. of "a catastrophe the extent of which simply staggers the imagination. A city of a million inhabitants has been destroyed in t

a

." manner unpaialleled in history The combined bomber offensive had .

.

truly

a

begun. Although the U. S. contribution was still small, it was rapidly to grow to huge proportions in 1944, soon after RAF Bomber Command's campaign against Berlin was completed. In the Berlin

major raids were made against the from November 18-19, 1943 to March 24-25, 1944; 9,1 12 sorties were dispatched, all four-engine

assault, sixteen

capital

heavies except for 162 Pathfinder Mosquitos, drop-

combined bomber and the round-the-clock bombing that Harris and Eaker had envisaged back in 1942 became a reality. It started with the "Transportation Plan" when railway communication targets in France were allotted to the two forces. By D- Day, June 6, 2 1 ,949 British and American bombers had attacked 80 targets, dropping 66,517 was

at this stage that the true

offensive began

bombs

ping 29,341.5 tons of bombs. Over 5,000 acres of

tons of

built-up area were devastated, including such major

network of the Region Nord. The combined bombing also extended to heavy and continuous attacks on the enemy's defenses in the planned invasion area just prior to the invasion, and to attacks in support of the Allied Armies after the invasion. At the same time, RAF Bomber Command and the U. S. VIII Bomber Command continued

Siemens complex, which was a major producer of guns employing 18,000 people, Daimler-Benz, AEG, Lorenz, BMW, Dornier, Heinkel and Telefunken. Among the administrative areas which were severely damaged were the Reich Chancellery and the Armaments Production Ministry. In one outburst during the campaign Goebbels wrote: "Devastation is again appalling in industrial establishments as the

the Alkett

the

Tank

factory, Borsig,

Government

pletely destroyed rately that

section .

.

.

.

.

.

Alkett

is

almost com-

the English aimed so accu-

one might think

spies

had pointed

their

to create a terrible paralysis

over the

entire railway

their strategic attacks against Germany with everincreasing ferocity, the targets now being selected as those most likely to bring Germany's war effort to a

dead

stallations,

These included oil targets, chemical incommunication centers in Germany and

armament

factories.

stop.

way." Berlin was not the only town to suffer in this period.

From November 1943

to the

end of March Germany,

1944, 26,297 sorties were flown against

on Stuttgart, Stettin, Essen, Nuremberg, Frankfurt, and other industrial towns. the raids being centered

At the beginning of 1944, when General Eaker command of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, General James Doolittle took over the U. S. VIII Bomber Command. The change made no difference to the close cooperation between the two U. K. based bomber forces which Eaker and Harris had established. Indeed it was intensified with the rapid growth in the strengths of the two commands at this stage of the war, as was the close liaison between Harris and General Carl Spaatz, the Commanding General of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Spaatz, Doolittle and Harris saw eye to eye on all strategic matters in connection with the invasion of Europe and the aftermath, and their joint purposefulness undoubtedly welded the Strategic Air Forces into the potent weapon that brought about the collapse of Germany. By April of 1 944, both RAF Bomber Command and the U. S. VIII Bomber Command had been placed under the overall command of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, for the task of preparing for the invasion of Europe and the support of the ground forces when the invasion was launched. It took

T

.he

effectiveness

bombing soon became

of round-the-clock Germany's fighter

decisive.

force was so stretched that it failed abysmally in its attempted defense of the homeland, with the result that the Allied air forces quickly gained complete air superiority and their losses dwindled to negligible proportions. So successful was this combined bombing that by 1944 seventy-five per cent of Germany's anti-tank gun production had to be modified to anti-aircraft purposes and diverted from the Russian front and the Western front to the defense of the homeland towns, thus throwing Germany completely onto the defensive on her Russian front. Another example of the effectiveness of the bombing during 1943 through 1944 was the changed priorities in aircraft production. A study of records kept by Albert Speer's Armaments Ministry reveals an incredible state of affairs and is perhaps the most telling evidence of the success of the combined bomber offensive. At the end of 1942, bombers absorbed 53 per cent of all German aircraft production and fighters absorbed only 26. 1 per cent. By the middle of 1944, bombers were down to 26.2 per cent and fighters up to 53.7 per cent

—

Bv October 1944. bomber produtdon was down to 7.6 per cent and fighters were up to 75.5 per cent of total production. However, all Germany's efforts to improve its defense at the expense of offense were utterly negated bv the growing destruction of her aircraft production bv the Allied bombing. By October 1944, her production rate of dav and night fighters had been reduced to less than half of the planned program! Also b\ October 1944, a%iati()ii fuel reserves had been reduced frcjin 574.000 metric tons (oniplete reversal.

in .April of that vear to onlv 117,000 tons, and monthlv production had fallen rom 75,000 tons to 20,000 tons, tven if the fighter aircraft had been available, the pilots would have had to fly "on a wing and a prayer!" From 1943 to the end of the war in Kurope in f

1

May 1945. RAP" Bomber Command, under the command of Sir .Arthur Harris, dispatched 331,001 enemy dropping 906,973 tons of enemy waOf the total tonnage of bombs dropped,

sorties against the

bombs and ters.

laying 45,428 sea-mines in

865,715 tons were dropped in 1943, 1944 and 1945. In addition to this prodigious figure, the U. S. Eighth Air Force added 62 ,260 tons over the same period. The entire weight of the attacks against the enemy over those three years was closely coordinated to produce the maximum effect. Indeed, the day and night bombing was not competitive, as has so often been stated by ill-informed historians. It was a combined effort, originally conceived by Faker and Harris and undertaken when the two forces of RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. VIII Bomber Command were ready for the exercise. 1

•k

/

-k

DAYLIGHT PRECISION BOMBING hj Lieutenant General James

H.

with Colonel Beirne Lay, Jr.,

About the author: non-Regular in

officer to

—

War II the He had begun his

World

"Jimmy"

Doolittle

was

the only

command major combat air forces Twelfth, Fifteenth and Eighth. astonishing career as a Regular,

becoming a First Lieutenant in the Army Air Service

1920. Tiuo years flight, from

nia, with

later

Pablo Beach, Florida, to San Diego, Califorstop. Next he went to Massachusetts Institute

one

of Technology for two years aeronautical engineering. In take off

in

he made the first cross-country

and land

to

solely with

resigned his Lieutenancy

to

commission was switched

earn a Ph.D. and teach

1929 he was

the first pilot to

instruments. In

1930 he and his

enter private industry,

to

Major

in the Specialists Re-

Thus he skipped the rank of Captain completely, as he would later skip that of Colonel. Named manager of the Aviation Department of the Shell Oil Company, he conducted numerous aviation tests and won many flying races and trophies. At various times he went on active duty with the Army to conduct other tests, and in 1932 he set a world speed record. In 1940 he

serve.

became President of the Institute of Aeronautical Science. That same year he was ordered back tofull-time active service as

a Major and sent

to

Detroit to work on the

conversion of automobile plants to aircraft parts manufacture. In 1941 he went to England to study the Blitz

and British aeronautical such vital fields as radar.

science, by then far

And on

advanced

April 18, 1943,

in

now

a

Lieutenant Colonel, he led the famous first attack on

Japan, taking off in the first of sixteen B-23s from the

Hornet, 670 miles off shore, inflicting trivial damage but giving Japanese "face" a resounding slap and American morale a huge boost. Nine of the 80manforce lost their lives; Doolittle and his crew parachuted carrier target

USAF (Ret.) USAFR (Ret.)

Doolittle,

— to sdfi'ty

C.hiiui.

1)1

Upon

his rclunt to the IJ. S., Presjdi-nt

Rooscvflt pcrsoiudh pn'sniti'd hnu

Medal of Honor and promotion

ivilli

tlw ('.on^essional

to Briii^adirr (General,

and

he thus bypassed the rank of Colonel.

In July 1942, Doolittle n>as sent the Twelfth

to

England

Air Force with a large portion

creu's sent there

for the Eighth hut

to

begin

of the planes

and

now detached for

the

suddenly-decided-upon invasion of North Africa. Promoted Major General, he took command of the Twelfth in

Sorth .A/nia after the landing. In March 1943, he took

(imimand

of the Fifteenth

fanuan 1944 he

Air Force (Strategic), and in

luent north to

England with General

Eisenhower's "team" to become commcinder of the Eighth Air Force.

After D-Day, he took portions (f the Eighth Air Force Far East, hut Japan's surrender made extensive

to the

Laden with honors, Doolittle 946 and returned to Shell Oil as a Vice Presi-

particifjatton unnece.s.sary. retired in 1

dent

and

Director.

-JP-

B

"oth day

and night bombing had

merits and their problems. British

their

Bomber Com-

mand, under Air C>hief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had the larger bomber force luitil mid- 1944, when the Eighth Air Force caught up and eventually surpassed the RAF in numbers of bomber aircraft. The point is that, in combination, the night and day bombing attacks had a profound effect on ending the war against Nazi Germany and assured an Allied victory, having deprived Hitler of much of his war-making capability, thanks in large measure to the clear-cut Combined Bomber Offensive directive agreed upon by (Churchill and Roosevelt at the Casablanca (k)nference in 1943. I will confine myself to recounting what the day bombing of (iermany entailed after I took command of the F.ighth Air Foice on January 6, 1944, and ample crews and planes began arriving to do the Job; this in contrast to the experience of Lieutenant General Ira C. taker, my immediate predecessor (General Carl Spaatz pronounced "Spots" having been, as a Major General, the Eighth's origi-

—

nal

commander). Eakei

built

left

me

practically

a "going concern,"

from

which he had

scratch. Win.ston (Churchill

expressed Eaker's situation very well when he promised his embattled countrymen "blood, sweat

— and

The phrase

hardly an exaggeration of number of aircraft and crews at his dispo.sal, he had never been able to overwhelm the enemy defensive forces. tears."

Eaker's ordeal.

Due

is

to the small

On August 17, 1942, Eaker had personally accompanied the first American mission, led by Frank Armstrong, against enemy-occupied France with a mere handf ul of twelve B- 7s (six more B- 7s flew a diversionary mission). He had been forced in 1943 to absorb losses of upwards of twenty per cent, prohibitive, on missions against Regensburg and Schweinfurt, short on bombers and without longrange fighter escort. Never, from 1942 through 1943, had a force been at his disposal which could utilize the principal o{ mass, namelv to apply sufficient force to prevail, to get the job done promptly. Rarely had he been in a position to dispatch more than two to three hundred bombers. General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, in the cauldron of Washington, simply had not been able to give Eaker the crews and planes he needed in time, although theoretically the European Theater of Operations (ETO) held first priority in the grand strategy of the war. This is no reflection on Arnold. Torn between the conflicting and desperate demands of commanders in the Pacific and in North Africa, to say nothing of the Navy and the Army, Arnold played his cards in the high-stakes area of allocation of aircraft with consummate skill and impartiality. There were just not enough planes to go 1

1

around. Eaker had come heartbreakingly close to his goal when I took over at the propitious moment to reap the harvest of his magnificent preparations. I was, however, to be responsible, in my own right, for a key deci.sion in the day bombing of Germany ordering our fighters to go on the offensive of which more later. Fate planned my course during World War II to complete a full circle. On April 18, 1942, I took

—

off from the aircraft carrier Hornet, followed by fifteen other

bombing other

B-25 Mitchell bombers, on

a

day

Tokyo and of the Japanese homeland. Three and a

raid against military targets in

cities

half years later

I

was

battleship Missouri in

to stand

on the deck of the

Tokyo Bay

as the

Japanese

surrendered, my eyes straying across the bay to the objective of my first bombing mission.

Along the way it had fallen to my lot to particibombing of all three of the Axis capitals: Tokyo, Rome and Berlin. I led the first air raids against Tokyo and Rome and planned and directed pafe in the

first American bombing raid against Berlin. It had been my destiny to join the ranks of four other fighter-type pilots who commanded bombers, as well as fighters, in World War II: Ira Eaker (CO., Eighth Air Force), Curt LeMay and Pat Partridge (successive C.O.s, 3rd Air Division), and Bill Kepner (CO., 2nd Air Division), all of the Eighth Air Force. I classify myself as a "fighter" pilot because I was a

the

fighter pilot instructor

—

gunnery

in

— in

combat and

aerial

and because of my expeand demonstration of between World War I and World

World War

I

rience in the flight-testing

pursuit aircraft

War

II.

All five of us

fighter pilot's "loner"

to "take the offensive" pilot,

shared the individualistic

temperament and

inclination

— whereas the ideal bomber

with his flight crew behind him,

is

more

apt to

"team player" and is better fitted to "sit there and take it" through flak and fighter attacks as he concentrates on his primary task of getting to and offhanding his bombs on the target. be a

stoic

exaggerating when I tell you that in my opinion you have shown during the past year the greatest degree of improvement of any of the senior United States officers serving in my command. You are every day rendering services of inestimable value to our country.

Note

that

Eisenhower

tactfully refrained

from

alluding to the tremendf)us degree of improvement that

was necessary. But

encomium,

I

gratefully accepted his

as was.

My

early assessment of the Eighth Air Force of January, 1944, was as follows: 1. Before the planned invasion of the Continent could begin, we must, as soon as possible, effectively task, as

eliminate the Luftwaffe. (Shortly after arrival in England I had a comprehensive briefing on the invasion plans.) 2.

Within the constraints of supporting Eisen-

hower's invasion, over which we had no control, we must continue to concentrate on hitting important strategic targets

and sapping the German warmak-

ing potential.

D paigns,

firing the North African and Italian camI had organized and commanded the

Twelfth Air Force and the Northwest Africa Strategic Air Force (the American part was later designated as the Fifteenth Air Force) under Eisenhower and Spaatz. Thus I came to the Eighth not entirely innocent of bomber experience; and, as was true of Eaker before me, I was to benefit from the wisdom and vast knowledge of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Chief of British Bomber Command. Through it all, I never lost my sense of awe at the enormous responsibility of commanding what eventually grew to be the world's largest air force, consisting of both bombers and fighters. At its height, the Order of Battle enabled me to mount a force not of "3,000 bombers," as has been widely reported, but 3,000 aircraft of all types roughly 2,000 bombers and 1,000 fighters. Personnel strength topped out at 298,000, just short of my goal of 300,000. With the vote of confidence that had been extended to me, I set about my task with a will. General Eisenhower had just sent me the following com-

—

munication: Dear Jimmy: when you joined me

much of what

it

takes to exercise high

in London you had command. I am not

3. We did not yet have enough bombers or fighters, but as soon as the B-17 Fortresses, B-24 Liberators and long-range P-51 Mustangs, P-47 "jugs" and P-38 Lightnings arrived in sufficient quantity we would go on the offensive and apply the principle of Tnass. During the "Big Week" in February 1944 I was

hard-pressed to dispatch as

many as

1

,000 bombers,

compared to double that number on D-Day, four months later. 4. We must never underestimate the Luftwaffe

Command's

deadly counter the Luftwaffe's new radar-controlled flak batteries, a major advance. 5. We should take full advantage of the innovations Fighter

capabilities. It carried a

And we must

sting.

warfare that were germinating in fertile minds: flying bombs. Air Scouts flying ahead of the bomber streams to provide up-to-the-minute rein air

ports

H2X

on weather and enemy dispositions, improved radar bombing through the overcast (H2X

radar, a refinement of the cruder British

assist

H2S

set,

MIT), setting fires at the target to the RAF's night pathfinder bombers on

was developed

at

follow-up missions.

We

should use the experience and the augmencrew strength, as combat losses were reduced, by extension of the traditional 25-mission combat tour to 30 or even 35 missions. This was later justified, and wise, as our combat losses gradually declined from an average of around six per cent. In any case, neither enemy action nor excessive losses ever turned back American bombers from their 6.

tation of our air

"

—a pioiid record.

targets

As the new coniniaiuling general of the Eighth Air Force I ahnost immediateiv got oft On the wrong foot.

I

recalled two missions before they got to their

targets.

It

was that old bugaboo, the English

weather, clear

at takeoff

but unpredictably shifting

bombers approached their targets to a serious threat of fogged-in bases upon their return. Both times the forecasts proved c apricious, and I was left, as the bombers returned in bright sunshine, with egg on my face. The costly bomber offensives had been mounted and aborted, by me, shoit of their targets, with nothing to show for the investment. Spaatz sent for me and greeted me coldlv. as the

"Doolittle,"

the guts to

said,

"it

looks like vou don't have

command a large air force. else who has."

If

you haven't

someone

get

111

he

My

I had had it, I on the grounds

heart sank. (Convinced that

nonetheless defended

mv

decision

the restrictions being placed on his fighters' freeof action in their prevailing role of escorts to

dom

the bombers.

My eye was caught by a prominent sign

Command: THE FIRST DLTV OF THE EIGH FH AIR FORCE FIGHTERS IS 1() BRING THE BOMBERS BACK

in his office at Fighter

ALIVE.

"Who dreamed "The

that

sign was here

one up.

when

Bill?"

I

asked.

arrived," he an-

I

swered.

"Take

THE

down,"

it

said,

I

"and put up another

DUTY OF THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE FIGHTERS IS TO DESTROY GERMAN

one:

FIRST

FIGHTERS." As the message sank in. tears sprang to his eyes. "You're authorizing me to take the offensive?" he asked. "I'm directing you to," I said. "We'll still provide a reasonable fighter escort for the bombers, but the bulk of your fighters will go hunting for Jerries. Flush them out in the air and beat them up on the

that I would ne\er gamble with the lives of my crews on an "uncalculated risk" and pointed out that if the airfields had closed we could have lost, on one mission, a major part of the force that we had been laboriously building up. Spaatz was cryptically non-

get out of his office.

committal.

the occasion.

ground on the way home. Your

first

priority

is

to

take the offensive."

Kepner was on the phone almost before I could

I

And

the fighter pilots rose to

never had cause to regret the decision. In the

our bomber losses plumbelow one per cent. The irony of it was that German fighter production, which had long been one of our first priority targets, no longer really mattered, although it actually increased despite continued attacks. The Germans might just as well have spared themselves the frantic recuperative effort devoted to repairing bomb damage, since the customer could no longer use the product for lack of fuel and trained replacement pilots. Germany was getting down to the bottom of her good man-power barrel, and the poor material inadequately trained replacements never had a chance against our superior quality, well-trained, combat-experienced fighter pilots. Shortly before the end of the war, our tighter pilots were shooting down on the order of ten German fighter planes for the loss of one of twilight of the conflict,

A

iTieted to

.few days later I was to accompany Spaatz on an inspection tour of our bases, with local weather forecast to be clear. When sunshine turned

and the weather rapidly

to rain rate,

we

started to deterio-

hastily took off in Spaatz's B-17, piloted

combat veteran, and headed for home.

by a

We

were soon forced down to treetop level with dangerouslv low visibility. We finally sighted an empty, unprepared field through a break in the fog and managed to scoot to an emergency landing just short of a stone wall. Spaatz was very c]uiet when we climbed

out.

"Jim, he said, uncalculated risks. "

"I

see what you

mean about

Even though we were soon mounting large missions, we were still sustaining serious losses to Jerry fighters. Something had to be done, and it was on a visit to Bill Kepner that I made my most important decision of World War H. Bill Kepner was a typically aggressive fighter pilot, and he was chafing under

—

—

ours.

Speaking for German Fighter the war. fighter ace

Command

after

and commander General

Adolph Cialland stated unequivocally in his book, The First and the Last, that the day the Eighth Air Force fighters went on the offensive was the day the

Germans lost the Our coimtcr

air war.

to the increased accuracy

of Ger-

man

radar-controlled flak was the dropping of

"chaff

(called

minum

strips

—by and

—

"Window" by of certain

the British) alucarefully analyzed

in front of the bomber formations up the enemy's radar screens. There were moves and countermoves by the offense and de-

lengths

to clutter

fense, but generally speaking chaff was a big help in "blinding" the Luftwaffe's radar-controlled defenses.

Another marked improvement in bombardment tactics was the brainchild of one of our most experienced commanders. Colonel Budd J. Peaslee of the 348th Bomb Group. Peaslee came to Kepner and then to me with the novel proposal, "Air Scouts."

One

of our most serious problems was finding

the weather on the Continent very different

were war-weary and therefore called "Weary Willies" were equipped with radio control and loaded with 20,000 pounds of TNT. They were taken off the ground by a pilot, who presently bailed out over England. They were then guided by remote control from a second B-17 to a terrific explosion it was hoped on the target. I watched a test and observed the devastation of trees in the target area and saw large, more distant trees bent almost to the ground by the blast. It was spectacular,

—

—

—

but the project, called "Aphrodite," never played a significant role in the war, and it was unreliable and dangerous. In poignant fact, future President John F. Kennedy's older brother, Joe, was killed in a Navy Liberator "Flying Bomb" when its electrical system

malfunctioned, causing a premature explosion.

from

what the meterologists had predicted. This necessitated having one or more alternate targets in addition to the primary. It was, of course, desirable to minimize the distance the bombers had to travel and the time they were in a hostile environment. This was accomplished if they could go directly to the

open

target.

Peaslee's idea

bomber

was

to

have specially trained ex-

leaders scout the general area in P-51s,

wingman to cover them. They would go out ahead of the bomber stream, as Air Scouts, to report weather conditions over the various targets, enemy fighter activity and other useful information. I warmed to Peaslee's proposal instantly, authorizing Kepner to form Air Scout units in each of our three Air Divisions from the P-51s at their disposal. We had already diluted the control of Fighter Command by assigning its aircraft indirectly to the Air Divisions. This scheme enabled us to make the best use of some of our best veteran bomber leaders with a P-51

(who jumped

at the

chance to

careful to have the Air Scouts

fly P-51s).

visit

We

were

several potential

weather reconaissance so as to avoid tipping our hand on the real target. The Air Scouts became a resounding success. Brigadier General Elliott Roosevelt (FDR's son) also furnished us weather information with his Recce Wing, which was ranging the Continent with P-38 and RAF Mosquito photo-reconaissance aircraft. But primary credit must go to the RAF, which pioneered aerial photography in the ETO, for its targets for

M,

,y extension of coinbat crew tours from 25 to 30 and later to 35 missions was highly unpopular at first, but the air crews came to agree as our loss rate steadily decreased and the chance of

survival correspondingly increased. It

crew

was during its

really learned

bomber hump, its

ten missions that a

Once over

effectiveness increased dramatically,

that

and

it

struck

me as wasteful, when we were trying so hard to build up

the size

crews

and

effectiveness of the force, to send

home just when

they had

become

full-fiedged

professionals, combat-hardened. I had flown twenty-some combat missions in North Africa and Italy and found that the "Old Man" flying with them greatly increased flight crew

morale. Shortly after arriving in England I was briefed on the invasion plans. No one knowing the plans was supposed to risk falling into enemy hands. Although I knew that I would not be permitted to fly missions as regularly as before, I still hoped that one exception would be made and that I could personally lead the first American bombing mission

over the

German

capital, Berlin.

I

discussed this

and he grudgingly agreed. planned to lead, with a wing man,

with Spaatz, I

overall contribution to the war.

Immediately

Another new project was the "Flying Bomb," which was assigned to General Pat Partridge's 3rd Air Division. Specifically modified old B-17s they

my

—

first

its job.

skills in

I

in a P-51.

started practicing in order to freshen

the fighter plane.

The

practice

came

to

naught when Spaatz, after having given me the preliminary green light, changed his mind, citing the

danger of risking ilu' a|)iurt' ot a senior officer with suspected the knowledge ol tlie invasion plans. reason he had changed his niind was a veto from F.isenhower. Characteristi( alK he did not say so hut ,il)soihed responsihiIil\ lor the unwt'ltome news (

I

.

himself.

from an outspoI got a dillerenl kind ol rehuf ken voung pilot when Spaat/ and I paid a visit to one of our hard-luck homh groups whi( h had suffered a succession of ahnormal losses. I'his occurred occasionally hy the hand of fate, hut it was usually because a formation hecante broken by up enemy action, bad weather or mechanical failure and lost its concentrated defensive fire power. "(ieneral," he said, "we know why you're down I

You think our morale is shot. Well, it isn't. know what realh hurts our morale? It's when a couple of high-ranking generals come poking around to find out what's wrong with our morale." here. \\

anta

and hard

to hurt, but the raids, together with

to the

French transportation system,

set

back the German missile program by at least three months. Flisenhower declared later that if the Germans had been able to use the V-I a few months sooner, the invasion would have been "exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible." On D-Dav itself, under a tremendous umbrella of tighter cover furnished by 171 s(|uadrons, the Allies iTiade good all their landings. The Eighth and Ninth Air Forces each sent more than 3,000 planes into the IxUtle; between them they fiew 8,722 coiribat sorties, and the RAF", during the day, flew 5,676. I was up befot e dawn on invasion day, flying a P-38 (easily identified by its twin tail as friendly by ground gunners and other aircraft), accompanied by Pat Partridge in another P-38. We were highly

interested observers of the Eighth Air Force ers

on

their mission to "soften

bomb-

up" the beaches for

the invasion forces.

louche. Characteristicallv, .Adolf

Hitler himself con-

determined misuse of the MF.-262 jet fighter, the first "jet" to go into action in World War II, which easily flew circles around our best fighters. The ME-262's appearance against our bombers, except for sporadic attacks, was delayed because of Hitler's decision to employ it as a fighter-bomber in support of ground forces, despite eloquent pleas from General Adolf Galland tributed to our caiise by his

it be used purelv as a fighter. Finally Hitler did Galland organize and lead an ME-262 unit against our bombeis. I shudder to think of the con.secjuences had the Luftwaffe possessed this air-

that let

craft in large

numbers and employed

For the German,

We had

was a case of too

it

it

little

no

jet

fighters at

too

late.

all

carrying about a ton of explonose, was the predecessor, though

pilotless jet aircraft its

giound-launched, of today's much-publicized airiauiu bed "Gruise Missile"), but the sites remained so

menace that they received top priority two months before the invasion. Fhey were hard to inu( h of a

It was necessary to use radar bombing as the weather was cloudy. The shoreline, however, gave a good image on the radar screens. In retrospect, I believe that our worry about the possibility of bombing our own troops caused the lead bombardiers to introduce too large a factor of safety, or the heavy bombers could have been even more effective in helping the ground troops than they were. On the way home I saw a hole in the clouds and dove through. Just at that instant Pat had his head down in the cockpit turning on another fuel tank; by the time he looked out again I had disappeared. So, after checking around for a while, he went on home.

properly.

and the British had only a few that got into cotnbat, and these not against the Cierman ME-262. Sir Frank Whittle worked assiduously to get his jet engines ready, and RAF jet fighters did see combat against the V-1 "Buzz Bombs" over England. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Eighth Air Force was primed to strike the "West Wall" with just about every aircraft that could fiy. We had already parried the serious threat of the "Buzz Bombs" by attacking lauiuh pads across the Ghannel (the V-1, a small sives in

see

damage

I

immediately flew back, at low level, to the invaI was provided with a bird's-eye view of perhaps the most unforgettable spectacle in the history of warfare. One of my fondest dreams mate-

sion beaches.

rialized

when

I

realized that

German

air

opposition

was virtually nil. I did not see a single enemy fighter, although I undeistand that a few German fighters did get through to the beachhead, but for nuisance value only. We had achieved complete air supremacy.

Immediatelv upon landing back in F^tigland, 1 hurried to Ike"s headcjuarters to give him his first eyewitness account of how the invasion was pro-

and the good news about the Luftwaffe's no-show performance. Shortly afterward, I paid another visit to SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) headquarters and came close to los-

gressing

ing

my job. Our bombers had been directed to carry out a up an area just ahead of advancing ground forces. The wind had re-

saturation attack to soften

the

versed after the crews had been briefed, and instead of blowing the smoke and dust of the exploding bombs over the enemy lines it blew back over our

own

lines, obscuring the aiming points. Successive waves of bombers bombed ever closer to our own troops. This was a costly mistake, as some of our own troops were killed. I was taken to task by Ike's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Bedell Smith. I explained what had happened, expressed my regret, and then added that close support bombing was not our mission, that we were not trained for it, and that our real job was strategic bombing. Smith bridled. "You were directed to carry out the mission," he replied heatedly. "We did carry out the mission, regardless," I answered. He flushed and dismissed me. I went to Spaatz posthaste and warned him that he had better get to Eisenhower before Bedell Smith did or I would be out of employment. Spaatz saved the day for me. The role of air power in Germany's capitulation

has been debated at length. It is true that we did not "bomb Germany into defeat." It is also true that time ran out on us, with Germany surrendering before air

power could complete the task it had carried almost to completion, and without which a cross-Channel invasion would have been impossible, as Hitler learned during the Battle of Britain. The Eighth Air Force was deployed to Okinawa too late to participate in the death throes of Japan. Spaatz advised me that I'd have to hurry if I wanted

our B-29s before the war ended, alluding to the expected Japanese reaction to the A-Bomb devastation of Hiroshima and to get off a mission of

Nagasaki. "Sir," I answered, "if the war is over, I would not risk one crew or one aircraft just to be able to say that the Eighth Air Force had participated in the bombing of Japan." Curt LeMay's B-29s had already

completed that task superbly well. It is interesting to note that the American bombing experience in Japan differed radically from the experience in Europe. As he had in Europe, LeMay started his job precision bombing by day. But, because of the high operational losses from engine failure at high altitude and the falling-off of Japanese fighter and flak ability he finished his job area bombing from low altitudes at

—

—

night.

The

coup de grace was dealt with two atomic

bombs dropped

in daylight

from high

altitude.

'•i'^!ua^?rr.-<.yA-

uONFIDENTIAL — CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH

lism

This dnciiment contains information affecting the national deftnse of thr United States within the meaning of the F.ipionage Act, 50 L'. S. C, 31 and 32, as amended. Transmission or revelation of contents in any manner to unauthorized persons is prohibited by law. Printed with approval of the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the Preside.

.>

P'4

>

OFFICE OF THE DISTRIBUTION:

SQUADRONS

Vol.3

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, INTELLIGENCE WtSHINGTOH,

D. C.

No.

JANUARY, 1945

IMPACT COnTEHTS jnnunRV, 1945 Balkan Bridges

-

-

Bomb

U. S. Buzz

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

8

Plane Pick-up Pacific

5

Review

10

FEAF

12

Bonins

17

Springboard to Tokyo B-25s at

Hong Kong

-

-

-

-

-

22

34

The

GAF

35

ETO

Escort

44 50

Flak

8th

AF

Strikes

Obituary

-

51 -

CLASSinCATION sification text,

is

Back Cover

-

:

Overall

cks-

of IMPACT, including CONFIDENTIAL. To in-

sure that this overall classification recognized, even when pages are out for instructional purposes, every single sheet has been stamped

is

torn

CONFIDENTIAL

on at least one This does not refer to specific photographs whose correct indi-

side.

vidual

are

classifications

given

below:

FRONT COVER THROUGH

4:

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL 6-7: RESTRICTED 8-9: CONFIDENTIAL 10-13: UNCLASSIFIED 14-15: BOTTOM, CONFIDENTIAL; REST UNCLASSIFIED 16: BOTTOM RIGHT, CONFIDENTIAL; REST, UNCLASSIFIED 17: CONFIDENTIAL 18-19: BOTTOM LEFT, CONFIDENTIAL; REST, UNCLASSIFIED 20-22: UNCLASSIFIED 23: CONFIDENTIAL 24-27: UNCLASSIFIED 28: TOP AND LOWER LEFT, RESTRICTED; LOWER RIGHT, CONFIDENTIAL 29: UNCLASSIFIED 30: CONFIDENTIAL 31: CENTER, CONFIDENTIAL; LOWER RIGHT, RESTRICTED; REST UN5:

CLASSIFIED 32-33: CONFIDENTIAL 34: UNCLASSIFIED 36-37: CONFIDENTIAL 38-43: UNCLASSIFIED 44-47: CONFIDENTIAL 48-50: UNCLASSIFIED 51 THROUGH INSIDE BACK COVER:

CONFIDENTIAL

BACK cover: unclassified

Confidential

*<*'-^--^«::'^

Confidential

.

WE ARE FIGHTING Baja railroad britlse across Danube 90 miles south of Budapest looked

like

this

Red

01

dirins "Droopsnoot" /'

to

Army

is

MAP

Beneficiary of

Their efforts someuhat obscured by

magnitude of events elsewhere, of MAAF have been contributing substantially to the campaign against the Hun on the Eastern front. Outstanding example of this is the "Balkan Strangle" conducted last fall when the Russian armies began adthe

fliers

vancing into Hungarv". Czechoslovakia and ^ ugoslavia. The campaign was similar to the earlier "strangle" operation in Italy

i

IMPACT.

Vol. 2. No. 7

•

month during the Balkan campaign. 15th AF and RAF components In one

of the Strategic .\ir Forces flew

Twin Sava river railroad bridges at Belgrade. \?Tiite City" of the Partisan Jugoslavs, seen here after 15th AF attacks 3. 6 and 8 Sept. 205 Forts and Libs dropped 565 tons of 1,000-lb.

RDX

bombs

at cost of

one B-24 due

to

Confidential

lAH

flak.

5.3

mis-

and dropped 8.0X) tons of bombs on rail and road bridges, marshaling vards and ferry installations. The high-altitude attacks on bridges were particularly efi^ective and for a long period, through rail traffic became almost impossible for the enemy. sions

EASTERN FRONT, TOO

[HE

Her strike by 15th

AF B-24s 21

Operation

Strangle"

in

Sept.

M.4.4F played

bifs

role in strangling

German escape

routes from Balkans.

Balkans

As soon as Rumania capitulated and through to Turiiuon the DanSeverin (The Iron Gate the Russians l)roke

I

uhe in

in

August, the "strangle" started

earnest.

"Rat Week"

I £-^:-^^;

at the begin-

^.^

.

.,

*t*«fc. ..i

ning of September saw the 15th AF operate directly with Russian and Partisan

ground

forces.

The

15th"s

contribution was an outstanding record of

bridge-busting.

Eight

liridges

in

Hungary and Jugoslavia, four of them across the Danube, were rendered impassable between 2 and 25 September; several were completely destroyed, as

shown on these pages. Reconnaissance disclosed that during "Rat Week" heavies cut all main rail lines from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to Budapest and Vienna. December saw the 15th AK cut loose farther west, against communications in Austria and Southern Germany.

Altempis of Germans to !..>> M.>ia\a river at Kraljevo. lugoslavia. proved when 48 15th AF H-24s on 19 Sept. snapped temporary wooden structure above, next to wrecked rail bridge, with 500-Ib. RDX bombs from 18.000 ft. <

futile

Continued on next page

Confidential

i Proof

of

the Believing

is

in

Seeing

The Russians refused to believe that high-altitude bombing could be accurate enough to knock out a bridge until they saw these photographs of what 15th AF heavies did to the great Pancevo bridge across the Danube at Belgrade. Jugoslavia. Pancevo is only one of a series of bridges attacked during "Rat \^ eek." September climax to the Balkan "Operation Strangle" described on the previous page. Seldom has there been a more graphic example of accurate precision bombing.

Top above

:

Thousand-lb.

GP bombs make

pattern on Pancevo bridge from 24.000

ft.

perfect

Strike on

3 September was cf rried out bv 54 15th AF B-17s with 25 P-38 escorts. At right and below: second span from south end of bridge is completely gone. Heavy damage was also done to piers at north end.

n^ AAF^s

jet

bomb, JB-2,

flares

aumv some energy

in

Wright Field wind tunnel during recent

U. S. The

ATSC

experiments.

BUZZ BOMB

picture above, which starts our story with a flash and

a hiss, gets you about as close to a buzz

bomb

want

as you'd

This version of the German V-1 was made by ATSC.

to get.

was shot late on a Sunday night, when Wright wind tunnel could operate without sucking too much power out of nearby Dayton's lighting system.

and

the photo

Field's

Cameramen from Tech Data Lab took this picture through window. The JB-2 was actually upside down in

a thick glass

above has been inverted to show you what the pilots saw who were up among these things, shooting them down, when the robots were swarming across the channel skies towards England. the tunnel, but the photo

The upper cylinder seen here with ,lB-2's

propulsion unit.

11

ft.

3

in.

its

long.

tail

aflame

Diameter

is

is

1

the ft.

forward end. 1 ft. 4 in., for the rear half. The unit is of the simple impulse duct type, with 40-50 impulses per second. It burns a low-grade aviation fuel. UI'Vj

in.

at the

The JB-2 carries one 2,000-lb. warhead. The AAF is also experimenting with other jet-driven missiles, one of which is expected to contain 4,000 li)S. of explosive, but the present story is concerned only with the JB-2. The next two pages

"Chinese copy" angles,

had

to

of German's V-1, JB-2

is

studied from all

be fixed bottoms up in wind tunnel

tests.

you pictures of its mechanism and launching deand the bomb in action at Eglin Field Proving Ground. Continued on next page

will siiow vices,

Some innards

Germans adjust compasses

No.

Eglin Field Proving Ground, this

of JB-2, and how they are installed. Photo shows important parts of control devices; No. 2 shows some of them in place. In No. 3. compass is being "swung." 1

away from launching

track

in

non-magnetic buildings; is

done

in

at

wooded place

and other magnetizing

influences.

What Makes Buzz Bombs Tick Some

idea of the complications in-

volved in putting together and launching the JB-2 may be gained from what pictured on these two pages.

is

The servos and Photo No.

the gyro unit seen in

above, perform the task

1,

of moving the jet bomb's controls. They are monitored by the magnetic compass installed in the nose. The

propeller-like device

little

the air log

where

nose,

the

flight.

and

It

fitted

is

it

known

as

onto the front of spins during the

clicks at every fifteenth turn,

this

action

is

registered

on the

which measures the amount of air passed through and is pre-calculated for range, ^'hen the target is reached, this counter starts the mechancounter,

ism which

fires

two electric detonators

and these position the

in the tail,

ele-

Cart for JB-2 shuu^

^xlifrt-

bunib

i>

plated for launching.

cylinders at the rear are rockets which

will

give the cart

I

its

lit

h\e covered

initial

velocity.

vators for the dive.

The JB-2''s launching track is 500 ft. long with an incline of six degrees. When the bomb is ready on the cart, the jet system

is

turned on: air flow

is

by a compressor connected with the engine, fuel is forced in, and spark plug ignited. The engine carries on

started

without further help from the ignition

system

the

or

Engine runs

at

compressor air flow. comparatively low effi-

ciency until high speeds are reached.

After the

jet

system

is

started,

the

five rockets at the rear of the cart are

—

then cart and bomb go whizzup the track. The stubbornest problem in connec-

set

ofiT

ing

tion

with

takeoffs

is

that

of

speed.

With a 155-ft. ramp, the Gerntans got about 250 mph in one second. Present AAF scheme gets this speed in about 2 seconds, using 400 feet. This has

Bomb on

important advantages, now

fortress-like building of very

secret.

track, with electric cables running back to control structure, the squat, heavy concrete seen beyond the launching tracks.

Confidential

JB-2 uaits on track, which has small stakes

/<>om-/oom-zoom, and into

space.

homb

At one

reached

r).()(H)

containing devices for helping to measure takeoff speed.

its Wellsian flight Proving Ground test, jet altitude, was then shot down by ob-

the JI5-2 hejiins

Eglin ft.

at left

Field

serving plane.

was unusual robot

Confidential

In

tlie flight

in that

levelled

ofl'

it

at

pictured above, the rocket-thrust

propelled cart heyond the ramp. The .V.SOO ft. before it flew out of sight.

«M»

Airplane pick-up

B-17

test

ready to start

at

Muroc Lake,

Calif.,

with P-47's tow-bridle loop strung to poles.

PICKS UP P-47 AT 160 MPH

RESCUE TESTS

IN

the problem of AAF fighters downed in incombat areas, the Equipment Laboratory of the ATSC at Wright Field has been experimenting with planesnatching methods. The photos on these two pages show how a B-17 can scoop up a P-47 and tow it to a repair base.

To

solve

accessible

The technique and equipment to those

used

in the

human

for this project are similar

pick-up (see

IMPACT,

Vol.

2.

Experiments have also been made with P-51s, which have been lifted from the ground by B-17s, C-47s, and B-25s. The medium bombers have worked best with Mustangs, just as the heavy bombers have proved most effective with Thunderbolts. Pilots, parNo. 11)

Propeller rigged for pick-up, P-47 waits with pilot in cockpit. Experiment has been successfully conducted with and without props. When used, prop is lashed tight as above.

and

in

the old glider tow-off.

ticularly those in the fighter planes, must be highly skilled, and they require special training for this type of work.

The

aircraft that

is

to

be raised has the pick-up loop of

tow bridle strung across the tops of two upright poles, as shown in the picture above. The rescuing plane swoops low, dragging a hook at the end of the wooden arm shown in the middle photo on the opposite page. The P-47s in these experiments have had their takeoff distance reduced to the astonishingly small space of 500 ft. When the planes arrive at the designated bases, the towed aircraft release themselves, and their pilots make dead stick landings. Fighters with props release by electrically-controlled T-D explosive connector links (cylinder in front of spinner, photo in middle, left). If prop is off, standard glider release is used. its

Pictures at right show Sinbad trick operating, with B-17 flying low at 160 mph for contact, then hoisting P-47 up-

winch in this C-47 resembles larger installation in Winch and twin pulleys reel out tow rope as necessary

Electric B-17s.

to decrease pressure

and "g" force on the towed airplane.

ward. Poles that hold tow-rope loop are not seen; they are out of sight to left in first two photos, to right in next two.

Bottom picture, with photo plane's wing cutting across left edge, shows prop-less P-47 being pulled along in level flight.

n^r

mmmm

WpbA^

PACIFIC SITMTIOR at

At start of 1943.

AAF

AAF from

Aeu- Guinea, Tarawa, and China

Presented as a quick, year's end review, these three maps the progress made by the AAF in the Pacific during the Individual campaigns are not delineated.

Solid

Army Air

Forces

red arrows show roughly where separate

make no attempt arrows show

operated, but

two big.

light red

to trace their courses.

The

the general direction of the

and MacArthur from the south. Areas of principal Naval action are symbolized by

main drives: Nimitz from battleships.

the East

Jap-held territory

is

shown

in black.

end of 1943. Based firmly on Guadalcanal, New Guinea. Tarawa and Makin, the A.\F strikes

Situation at northeast at

Rabaul. Wewak. Kwajalein. and other Jap strongholds in

The 10th and 14th AF lash out in Burma and China, harassing Jap shipping, cooperating with .Allied land armies. But as yet the double drive toward Japan's Inner Empire is in its infancy. the Marshalls.

Situation

made

on

1 September, 1944. Great progress has been

The pattern for triphibious war. inand carrier-based planes, land and Naval action, is clearly established. Result: we have won bases on Kwajalein. the Admiralties, and other strategic spots. Japs are left to rot in Rabaul and mould in the Marshalls. Truk. too. is being emasculated, and from its new Saipan base. "The Leaping 7th" is attacking the Bonins. Possibly most important. B-29s have already begun their giant strides in eight months.

volving

10

AAF

only at periphery of huge Jap Empire.

THE PACIFIC: 1944 REVIEW

IN

show

past year.

hammers

end of 1943

toward Japan, striking at steel targets in .\nshan and Yawata. MacArthur's drive has virtually ousted the enemy from New Guinea, and new .\_\F bases bring our bombers within easier range of Japan's rich resources in the East Indies. .A. milestone is reached on 1 September when B-24s hit the Philippines

I

Davao

I

for the

first

time since 1942.

Situation at end of 1944. Converging in a terrific explosion of synchronized air. land, and sea power, the twin drives of Nimitz and MacArthur now point at the heart of Japan's Inner Empire. In the short period of four months, our forces have set up bases on Guam. Palau. and the Philippines. Now for the first time our Air Forces, hitting from East and West. are engaged in the same combined operations, with B-29s packing a major wallop. This teamwork was exemplified by the October attacks on Formosa, when B-29s. strildns from China in coordination with carrier-based planes, knocked out the Okayama aircraft plant. This bore an obvious relationship to the historic Leyte landings, as it cancelled out aircraft that might have reinforced the Japs in the Philippines. On 24 November the first Saipan-based B-29s hit Tokyo. From almost every point of the compass, seven U. S. air forces, including the XX and XXI Bomber Commands, now keep the Japs dizzy wondering where the next bombs will fall. On the next 23 pages, you will see how and where some of these Pacific air forces operate.

Confidential

CHINA

PACIFIC SITUATION 1

MarArthur and

War

at!ainst

CHINA

!\imilz

September 1944

push deep into Jap Empire, and have won many neiv bases. B-29 attacks have begun.

japan reaches new intensity; great galaxy of

air, land,

sea forces engage in

combined

attacks.

-.:

.

•A'

:-/.Jltctf::-

'

*

Leyte-hounil Jap task force cork-screws in vain to avoid

FEAF Works Out

October victory over the Japanese fleet in Philippine waters. Landings at Leyte faced the enemy with a critical decision. At all costs they had to prevent the first step in the retaking of the islands, of all

lanes

to

the

to

because loss of the Philippines

control of the South China Sea and

South.

of 13th

AF

Libs on

26

Oct. west of Panay, P.

I.

on Jap Fleet, Sinks Pair of Light Cruisers

The Damon and Pythias act of AAF and Navy in the Pacific again came into the spotlight during the great

would mean an end

bombs

This would eventually place

A fourth major task force of 12 vessels seen above was headed for Leyte undetected until it was successfully attacked on the morning of 26 October in the Sulu sea by the self-styled '"Long Rangers" B-24s of the FEAF. Other units fleeing from the Suriago strait naval engagement were caught by the FEAF southwest of Negros. (

Photos

a

Kuma

class cruiser taking evasive

"Bomber Barons" of the The B-24s used 1.000-lb. and 500-lb. bombs from 9.700 feet. Four direct hits caused fires and

GP

alize at Leyte. the Japs at long last sent out their will-o-the-

Nearby

wisp navy in force. Three elements of this fleet were routed by the U. S. Navy east and south of Luzon and Leyte.

show

action while being attacked by the

Malaya and the NEI in much the same position as New Guinea and New Britain mere limbs for us to prune sooner or later. \^ ith this ominous prospect b^inning to materi-

—

at right

)

13th

AF

off

Negros.

explosions amidships; the cruiser sank three hours

later.

same morning 5th AF Libs made it two Kuma class cruisers for the day when they hit another which bleu up and sank when the magazine exploded.

Confidential

the

^

^S*-.

i^r

Confidential

13th

AF Long Rangen

FEAF "Long

Rangers" in their 26 October strike (shown here) on Jap battlewagons in the Sulu sea, successsolved the problem of hitting moving naval targets from high level. The lead bombardier of the formation fully

explains his solution as follows:

"By describing a course at right to the enemy fleet while we sought a suitable target, we caused angles

most of the AA fire to be aimed on an arc and gave Jap gunners problems of deflection firing. Formation lost 500 feet on approach run; as a result the first A A fire was 500-800 feet above.

First verticals (both photos above) of ship

—

largest in the Jap

Panorama

navy

—show

Yamato

class battle-

the huge ship taking

evasive action during attacks by

on 26 Oct.

Two

direct hits,

"Long Rangers"

many near

of 13th

AF

misses were scored.

of Jap fleet units in hiding at Brunei bay, MEI, on 7 ISov. following defeat at Leyte shows (1) BBs,

BBs

Against Nip

ide

warships took evasive action with a left turn. Flak threw my bombsight off level twice during the '"All

run,

tlie

course

but

A

hold.

was not

difficult

to

bomb

re-

few seconds before

lease point the

wave began

Kongo type BB's bow As the BB com-

to shift.

mitted itself to a right turn, 4° drift

"bombs away" before helped solve the course problem. Because the bombsight cannot solve

correction

curved

course

problems,

the

impact

The BB ha seconds for evasion from

point had to be estimated.

only

2iS.7.S

bombing

altitude of 9.000 feet."

••:i»^ Konpo

class

battleship

liomlis (luring

26 Oct.

(2) CI

C.-is.

.

(3)

strike

(4)

by l.OOO-lb. on Jap task force off Panay.

(topi

is

bracketed

Lower photo was taken 9,000

ft.

CU, (5) DDs. and (6) MVs. FEAF on 16

after Libs

made two

direct hits

from

All 27 planes were holed by accurate heavy dak.

^^n. made 5

hits

here on a BB, 4 on a CA.

FEAF

continued

Explosions

among grounded

aircraft

Airfields Hit Too FEAF's and

Part of

force's job in the Pacific

of every is

nous task of neutralizing Jap It

air

the monotoairfields.

a steady process of attrition, of

is

bombing

fields,

hangars and

shops,

other facilities and continuing to hit

them so repairs cannot be completed.

Shown here ful

FEAF

are three typically success-

airfield strikes that

helped

reduce Jap air attacks on General MacArthur's troops following the Leyte landings.

At right

is oblique of Puerto Princesa airdrome, Palawan, showing 1,000-lb.

bombs walking

neatly

down runway

during 28 Oct. attack by FEAF. Among 23 destroyed and 10-15 damaged are (1)

Bettys and

aircraft.

(2)

unidentified

low altitude, did not meet

13th

AF

••i.oML'

again with

Dumaguete

16

S/E

Libs unloaded 72 tons from

C>5

Itaiiiiir-"

AA

or E/A.

liit

jack-pot

tun? of SUU-pounders on

airfield,

Negros, 11 Nov.

Confidential

and cratered runways were

results of

6

ISov.

FEAF

strike at

Lahug, Cehu.

VOLCANIC BONINS RE-ERUPT UNDER 7th & 20th AF BOMBS '

II

-

aiU.iricf-

new

M al

llic

in

Pufific atv gi\iM>." oUI-tiiiR-

yeograpln

alolls of the south

'linf; I.I

in

li-sxiiis

Uoiiifi

In

.

and central

7lli

contrast to the F'acific.

ihev are

AF-"

lush

now

rugged, dismal targets such as the vital Volcano islands

(>iijecti\es

shown on the next four pages. 7tli and 20th AV neutralization atare part of a chain known as the Nanpo

of recent

tacks, these islands

Kxtending 700 nautical miles in a north-south line from the entrance to Tokyo Hay to within .'^00 miles of the

.•^lioto.

Nanpo .Shoto form part of the ituier Jap empire defenses. Strength is concentrated in the more southerly i)art. wlu-re there are airfields on heavilydclcnded Iwo Jima (Sul|)lHir island of the Volcanos and on northern Marianas, the ring of the

I

In I'arkiiifi Areas

on

Islfy Field, Saipan,

lli)\sr

Till

-iF

Chichi Jiina iBaih island and naval hase.

The Bonins

of

i

llic

I'.onins.

a j)otent seaplane

are strategically important hecause thev

lie

directly on our Superfortress" route to

Tokyo. Therefore. it is imperative that thev he kept neutralized. Also the Japs are using Iwo and Chichi as hases for efTective attacks on our B-29s in the Marianas see page .'•52). The islands in this group are extinct volcanos. Their shores are mostly steep rocky cliffs with few narrow sandy heaches in small coves. On Iwo. nauseous sulphur gases constantly huhble from countless blowholes. Iwo's small plateau has two air strips and a third under construction. Con/inucd on next page I

Libs await orders to atlrivk the Bonins and Volcanos.

-a-^

1

m

ONINS

continued

CHICHI JIHA

Bleak rolcanir peaks mark formidable Chichi Jima, the most heavily defended island of the Bonins. Shipping a Crippled Futami

Ko

harbor. Chichi Jima, during 7th

AF

attack

19

A'or.

Considerable previous damage to naval bast

New-type Jap at anclior

bomb

hichi trns target for 15 7th fotfcr right)

and chief

city

AF

falls

is

our

LST

rides

Mf^

B-24s on 19 Movember.

Oniura (top right)

auxiliar)- transport similar to

Futami Ko harbor. Chichi Jima. just as first nearby during 19 Nov. 7th AF shipping strike.

in

evident.

•> Taken

a few seconds after the picture above, this view from

15.000

ft.

transport.

shows

One

from the Liberators straddling the from a 500-pounder did the trick neatly.

sticks

hit

^J

Naval base

On

Nov.

AK

I

at

this

Futami Kn

same

cargo ship),

i<

^li<^ioIl

set

ilrhimnl

I'V

7th .\F

bombs on 2

21 H-21~ with 30 tons sank one

another

afire,

damaged two

others.

Continued on next page 19

BONINS

continued

Haha

Jinia Retio (above), southernmost of the Bonins. has but an excellent anchorage for shipping. Despite accurate flak. B-24s on 16 Nov. here scored one hit on Jap

no

airfield,

sub chaser from 17.000

feet,

two near misses on another.

Terraced

hillsides at Higashi Minato l)ay (below), overlooking ruined Kitamura town on northwest coast of Haha Jima, are cleared for growing sugar cane and fruits. Vegetation in Bonins forms dense tangle of tropical undergrowth.

Small Jap craft hug to

steep cliffs of

avoid strafing of low-flying 7th

AF

Haha Jima

in attempt Libs on 19 Nov. (see

Jap phosphorous bombs (above

right) failed to halt 7th

4 Nov. One TE and one SE aircraft were destroyed on ground. Five unaggressive fighters were airborne: intense A A damaged 5 B-24s.

AF

Iwo Jima

attack on

airfield installations

like summer shower on 4 Nov. Iwo was 6 Dec. when 82 B-29s and 102 7th AF Libs bombed by PPl without

Frags sprinkle Iwo Jima Biggest mission to date on of 20th loss

front cover). thick

Pilots often

cumulus cloud cover

must

fly

exists

low

in

Bonins, because

some 50 percent of

time.

AF

through

10/lOths

cloud.

Results

were unobserved.

SAIPAN: B-29 SPRINGBOARD TO TOKYO

One

truck

every

40 seconds moves out of enormous Saipan quarry, carrying was

and used for the

first

to

surface strip.

historic land-based

bombing

Building the Base

mission over the Jap capital.

Washington engineers said it couldn't be done. Tokyo Rose over the Japanese radio said it couldn't be done. But They overcame all the the Aviation Engineers did it. technical problems of building giant, B-29 runways on

came ashore and began the big job. Within 24 hours they had filled in some 600 craters made by our air and naval bombardment. Then they added 1.000 feet to Aslito strip, now part of Isley field, and started to build the new heavy bomber strip. To get tons of coral, needed for construction, an army of bulldozers went to work and literally chewed down two coral mountains. One is shown above. A procession of more than

Six days after

Saipan. Today this fifteen-mile-long island in the Marianas,

Bonins page 17), has become a springboard to Tokyo. Here, and on the next 11 pages, are pictures showing how the base in addition to being a base for B-24s attacking the

(see

22

built

coral

we took Saipan on 14

June. Aviation Engi-

neers calling themselves "Flying Castles,"

Confidential

From Longest Runway to

Nippon, opening a

Asphalt topping

is

half

in

the Pacific, B-29s on

new phase

of the

campaign

done on "hley Mo. i," longest

100 four-ton trucks carried away coral shavings to provide surfacing for runways, hardstands. roads. Another necessity was liquid asphalt to be used as a final surfacing.

This problem was wliat

made

the Vt'ashington

experts warn that "black top couldn't be used in the Mari-

anas," because liquid asphalt cannot be shipped.

decided to ship hard asphalt in drums.

made" melting

An

But

it

was

ingenious "home-

plant was rigged up by the engineers out of a former Jap sugar boiler, with a smokestack made of welded oil drums. Seven hundred tons of liquid as])lialt were produced on Saipan daily.

24 Nov. 1944 Roared Away to

wreck Jap war industry

strip in the I'uviju.

It

is

ii.oOO jeei

l>\

200

feet.

Getting the runways built was considered such a priority

job that not even the General's jeep was allowed to travel around the island without carrying coral. Normally the engineers would have built living quarters first, but not this time. Officers and men dug in to erect their own tents, mess halls, offices, showers and latrines. Building the field and the complex system of hardstands went on all night under batteries of spotlights. One obsener said it looked as if Henry Kaiser had taken over the island. How Saipan received its first '"Super" visitors, and how they prepared and took off for their first "Super" mission is depicted on next pages.

Continued on next page

Confidtnfial

23

TOKYO SPRINGBOARD

Making

continued

fttmiliarizalion flights over the

Marianas soon after their

INo redcaps unloaded luggage for crews of newly arrived B-29. hut tliey got the job done easily by tossing their luggage from plane to truck, parked in foreground.

24

arrival,

B-29s flew same formations the

"Here's where you live." luggage

to huts

where crews

Trucks niuv live in relativ:

29s Arrive and Settle Down the Saipan base was being readied for its new tenants, the tenants themwere on their way. By 6 Novemlior a consideralile number of B-29s had

\\ liile

selves

finished the

first

leg of their

Honolulu, and were all Saipan was Kwajalein.

set

journey from the U. S. to John Hodgers airport near Their only stoji lietween Oahu and

to take off again.

was the last, long peaceful journey these back again to the States. The crew took turns sleeping on the two berths in each Superfort. At Saipan they had a big reunion with ground crews who bad made the trip by water. On these two pages you see how their new island home looked to them immediately upon arriving. Soaring high over the Pacific,

this

planes would enjoy until some would

(ly

^

>pic(l

Ill

''

I"

111

i

later

\'r|,i

jump

on Tokyo missions.

^^||,n

lor

Jap night raiders force

llicir

foxlioles.

One

small jeep, like friendly pup.

Journey's end Avialiori

Hatliilion

for awhile. uhicli

\\eril

H-2') iiilo

t:rtvi.s

parks

in

nml Inuls iwiii-onxT

lo hnrdsland.

the tent area of the HOlth fjii:iiiiir

Saipan ininicdialely after the assault forces.

Continued on next page 25

ork and Play

Mopping-up

operations

by

crew

At lunch hour a mechanic catches up on sleep

Not

26

during Jap air

is

this lesson

turret.

raids.

the

"Special

Delivery"

make

Not in a bathtub, mechanic inspects cowling as part of 50-hour inspection.

the line of duty, but very beneficial to on the fine points of a B-29's top forThe teacher is Corporal Ralph Taylor, a tail-

strictly in

morale

ward

lost

of

the

plane

look

spruce

after

trip.

"Daniit,"' pet pup. gets snapped

in

rear escape hatch with Sgt. L. L. Lee.

gunner from Langford, South Carolina, and his pretty blond pupil is Lieutenant Helda Halverson of Chicago, one of the flight nurses now on duty with the XXI B.C. on Saipan.

Confidential

Tokyo Rose

»^

Tokyo Rose'' returns safely

to

Saipnn on 12 November after getting much-needed recon photos of Tokyo.

IVlusashino aircraft factory, the future B-29 target at Tokyo, was covered by "Tokyo Rose" in the first U. S. mission over the Japanese capital since Lt. General Doolittle's famous visit in April, 1942.

Confidential

li. .S. Steakley poses beside iiis plane winning Distinguished Flying Cross for leadership during the first B-29 recon. flight over Tokyo. Continued on next page

(Captain after

27

TOKYO SPRINGBOARD

continued

^>8R«s

Ready, Set, Go Piled

A

three-high,

these

500-Ih.

(•!'

Ixihirs

tvait

to

be

500-lb. aimable cluster is hauled to a B-29. Of the total load on first Tokyo mission on 24 November, about two thirds were 50()-lb GP bombs, one third was incendiaries.

bomb

28

dropped on Tokyo^s doorstep by Super-storks.

Fusing Bombs is supervised by Ordnance Bombs shown here are incendiaries. Tokyo was later

Confidential

officer.

blasted

by an all-incendiary mission flown by B-29s.

.50 ral. is

ammunition

loaded aboard a B-29

for

the

first

in in

quantities

preparation

hombardment mission.

"Shady Lady"

her upper forby an armament man before she pays a call on Tokyo.

ward

^Ik'

7^ Navipj

r,

checks

is

equipment

minute

lis

that

T/ieyVe

off.

Lt.

Irving

make

Blumefield.

— one

of

last

for success.

gets

turret adjusted

J

Brig. General Enimett O'Donnell.

who

will

officers

lead the mission, briefs his

with

maps

of the

Tokvo

area.

Fueling the B-29s from fuel trucks is one more crucial operation leading up to the historic first take ofT.

^ttm Last cheek is mad; .;. !>:.-• '-"'-ijl ODonnell and his pilot. Maj. Brogan. just as they prepare to take ofT.

Croirds of engineers and ground rreicnien watch the giant planes begin

first

Tokyo mission.

Bombs over Tokyo on 24 November plunge towards the primary target (bottom, center), the important Musashino aircraft engine plant. Due to bad weather, which changed 30

during the mission from 2/10 to 9/10 undercast. this is best of the photos showing the attack. Heavy clouds during later missions continued to make picture coverage a problem.

Confidential

I Ilis

streak of licht nipnnt siirress.

It

the pattern

is

made by

the lanrlinc liphts of a

Boxscore \^

homeromint; B-29.

& Battle Damage

hen more than 100 B-29s lined up

vemher. they began not only the

first

at

dawn on 24 No-

Saipan-based attack on

Tokyo. They started a new phase of the Jap air war. \^ hat added most to their achievement is the fact that it was followed up again and again, with more and more success. Hitting in two waves, totalling 35 planes, the Superforts began to dump their bombs on the priman,- target about noon (see p. 30) from 27.000 to 33.000 feet. An added 54 planes hit industrial targets along Tokyo's waterfront. About

125 Jap aircraft provided the fighter opposition, which, for the most part, was "moderate."' The greatest percent of attacks came from level and high front. Flak was heavy, but damaged only one of our aircraft. One B-29 was lost after colliding with a fighter, and another .was forced to ditch. Its

crew was saved. Our claims: seven destroyed. 16 prob-

ables, five

This vertical picture taken from the iiiM.I. shows a gunner sorting ammunition left over after

l^fl-overs! of a B-29

the first mission.

But the Japs will get

Close hut not too

Tokyo

<•lo^»•

came

the

it

sooner or

20mm. Jap

o\t

shell

inspected here by Sergeant

Sam

Bolinsky,

left

i

It is

gunner.

successful attacks on the Mitsubishi aircraft plant at Nagoya.

The Saipan-Japan express was

later.

that ripped the hole in this B-29"s de-icer boot.

damaged.

Bv 18 December the XXI Bomber Command had hit Tokyo three more times. Iwo Jima once, and had made two

Pony collided

really rolling at last.

with this No. 3 engine of a B-29 on a 3

December Tokyo mission. Plane got back lost control, collided

with another Tony.

to base,

but

Tony

Both went down.

Continued on next page

Confidential

31

The Japs Hit Back Anybody who expected that the Japs would hit Saipan in retaliation for our Tokyo was not disappointed. Between 1210 and 1455 on 27 November (Saipan time) 16 Zeke fighters made a determined assault upon the R-29 parking

attacks on

area

Isley Field.

at

Attacking at

minimum

altitude, the

Zekes destroyed three

and damaged others. The effect of Jap raids on Saipan is described informally but well in a letter from an officer on Saipan dated 7 December. "There are Jap raids galore. Those babies aren't fooling. Ever since the first Tokyo raid they have come over night after night and despite the great numbers of planes we shoot down, they manage to get in their damage and keep everyone on the alert. It's getting so everyone scrams at the slightest noise and we really have built some sturdy foxholes." B-29s, as

Zeke's

shown

tail

in these pictures,

(left) ends

up by

tail

of B-29 which

it

rammed and

After Jap attack four charred motors of a B-29

tell

destroyed.

one side of the

story.

Hulldozer fights

Here

is

J^K

the other:

among

sniok

Of the 16

attack

fire

'ckape of B-29s. ^anese planes,

R-29

u-in/; is

covered

13 were destroyed

—

six

tcilh

foamite, a snowy-looking chemical useii to twiininiish jUimcs.

by fighters, seven hy

A.4.

The other three are

listed as possibles.

B-25S AT

HONG KONG

Low-Level Attack Sinks 5 Ships This photo sequence of B-25s over

Hong Kong harbor on 16 October shows part of the attack in which eight low-sweeping Mitchells of the 11th and 491st squadrons,

341st

Bomb Group

(M), using 500-lb. GP bombs, sank two 6,000-ton freighters, two 6.000ton

tankers,

one 4,000-ton freighter,

and damaged one 6,000-ton transport and four other ships. The B-25s released at 75-100 foot altitudes.

The

attack

was accompanied by a

high-level B-24 assault on the

docks (see

IMPACT,

Vol.

2,

Kowloon No. 12).

The heavies and mediums were escorted by P-51s and P-40s. Of eight attacking Nip fighters, one was deTwo B-25s were damaged stroyed.

B-25 on

severely, but all returned.

ship in background and

String of bombs obvious "overs."

34

low-level

dropped on second target with many Note center ship was not attacked.

is

run at is

Hong Kong has

ju.
scored a direct

liit

on one

starting to swerve to right toward another victim.

Geysering

bomb

bursts

show

although near miss behind stern

target No. 2

was lucky

may have caused damage.

THE

A

Great Air Force

German Army

\^'hen the

backed up

it was was twice

rolled into I'oland in 1939.

the finest air force in the world.

liy

It

the size of the

the long race of battle.

First TesI

Flunked

the Battle of Britain in full

ability

to

destroy the

RAF

confident in

strength,

(first

England, according to the Schlieffen Plan

RAF

its

step in the invasion of I.

Its

estimates

have been acwas a logical deduction that this puny force could be overrun rapidly by a series of devastating blows at the fighter fields of England.

of the

fighter strength are believed to

Consequently,

curate.

it

on 8 August 1940. Day after day bombers sailed across the channel, and day after day many of them were knocked down. Despite their small numiiers and small but steady losses, the British fighters seemed always to be in the sky

The Plan began

to roll

Own

Its

Mistakes

or on the continent. That ended the invasion. The Hun,

seeing his forces disintegrating against an

enemy

fortress

which was outwardly as strong as ever, switched to night attacks against British cities. That was his second mistake. He didn't realize how pitfully few Spits and Hurricanes there were left. British analysts have since estimated that the Fighter Command could not have held out for more than a few weeks more if the attacks had continued. The far-reaching consequences, had this error not been committed, are chilling to contemplate. England would have been invaded promptly, probably successfully, and the combined bomber offensive, on which the Allies subsequently pinned their hopes, and which was later to shake Germany to her foundations, might never have been launched.

Drawing on

The conquests of Poland. France and the smaller Eurotpean countries were mere exercises for the GAF. It came up 'to

sea.

Reasons:

Longer.

and

Allied Growth. Allied Attacks

Royal Air Force, three times the size of the |U. S. Army Air Corps. It was a formidable weapon of both [long-range and high-performance fighters, bombers of all [kinds, troop carrier, transport, long and short range recon[naissance and other types. Although regarded by German military minds as primarily a ground support weapon, they believed it to be equipped for any kind of aerial warfare. Its planes were uniformly excellent, its training and maintenance superb. But for reasons which will be shown, this marvelous weapon has been unable to stay with its foes in I

No

Great

is

(§m

recovered

its

a large accumulated reserve, the losses.

By

powerful than ever. But the period despite the

GAF

quickly

1941 it was more had doubled in the same

the spring of

RAF

German bombing

attacks of the winter,

and the golden opportunity was gone. Germany turned her attention toward Russia, having decisively lost the first real test of her air force. However, she had learned three lessons. Her planes, from now on, carried self-sealing tanks, more armor plate, and heavier offensive and defensive armament. With improved engines, they constituted an increasingly dangerous weapon.

increasingly large formations of

at

the right

place, waiting.

German

Intelligence began to

Its

What was

Planes and

lis

the nature of this

Peculiarities

weapon?

has, four outstanding characteristics.

had, and

It

First,

it

still

concentrated

working on the side of the British. This was radar, which made possible the most economical deployment of British fighters. Also, the first of the G.\F's few but incredibly

had one principal single-engine fighter, the Me-110; one dive bomber, the Ju-87; three long-range bombers, the He-Ill, Do-17Z and Ju-88; one four-engine reconnaissance bomber, the F\X'-200K; and one outstanding transport, the Ju-52. Fight planes in all, compared to 17 which the US.A.AF has in large-scale operation today. There were other types

The German

including numerous small transports, flying boats, gliders,

wonder

if

it

had correctly estimated the

size of the

RAF

Fighter Command. It had. but it did not know that an unknown weapon, familiar now but revolutionary then, was

costly

mistakes revealed

itself

at this

time.

and bombers both suffered from an insufficiency of armor and armament. And they did not have self-sealing fighters

fuel tanks.

The Schlieffen Plan was sputtering. An all-out effort was made to put it back on schedule. On 15 September every available bomber was employed against England. During the day. 185 enemy aircraft crashed on English soil. It is estimated that two or three times that number fell into the

on a very few types. fighter,

etc.,

the

It

Me-109E; one long-range

but nine-tenths of the work of the

GAF

was done by

the planes mentioned.

Second, these aircraft had to be versatile. In addition to doing their own jobs well they were expected to do numerous others. The Me-109. for example, has seen service as a day fighter, dive bomber, night fighter and photo plane; the Ju-88 as night fighter, day and night bomber, intruder and reconnaissance plane.

Continued on next page

35

ue

0!

BDITtlN

GAF STRENGTH

PRODUCTION

&

DEC.

Changes

in

JBL. -,

.

GAF

strength

_

^J^^^ ^^p GAF

progress

Third,

,

continued measured contmuea ^„,.„red

by

has

been

improvement of

types and existing engines rather than by intro-

existing

duction of new ones.

GAF

is

still

the exception of two fighters, the

\^ ith

FW-190 and Me-410, and the

(medium lone) and production (dark tone)

the jet aircraft just

now coming

in.

basically represented by the planes with

The Me-109 now exists in the F and G models. An improved Me-110 is still in use. The Do-17Z has been improved and is now the Do-217, the Ju-88 has become the Ju-188. The Ju-87 is now a better Ju-87D. The which

it

started the war.

started at the

He- 11

3,

a

are shoivn above.

same time but

still

very small, very fast

successful racing plane.

It

Figures at

developmental. fighter

left

modeled

died almost at birth.

of

gi

Item: the after

a

Item: the

Hs-129, a bullet-headed ground attack plane, slow and unwieldy. Item: the Me-321, largest glider in the world,

capable of carrying 130 men and with a wing span forty feet greater than that of the B-29. Item: the pressurized Ju-86P. a high-altitude reconnaissance bomber. It flew so high in Africa that standard Spits couldn't get up to

it.

but

tradi-

something was wrong and it faded. There are others, some undoubtedly that Allied Intel ligence doesn't even know about. But the experimenting goes on. In some instances, it is unrealistic to a degree. Although the GAF Bomber Command

and vigorous experimentation. This has persisted for five years despite the handicaps and shortages of the war, and the failure of some critical models to get into

has not prevented continued work being done on at least six multi-engine bombers, despite the inescapable conclusion

The great achievements of this tradition have been the introduction of the Me-16.3, the Me-262. the V-1 and the V-2. which represent the successful application of

cient

He-Ill

is still itself.

Fourth, and in apparent contradiction to the third char-

mentioned, the

acteristic just

GAF

reflects a

German

tion for bold

production.

three offset

new and these

the

German

develop a haunt them. Their so-called failure

to

"heavy" bomber always rises to heavies are mediums by our standards. The only fourengine bomber they had was the FW-200K, a converted peace-time

transport.

He-177 was quantity.

It

did

its

job.

but only just.

The

but has never emerged in any Endless production problems and numerous bugs, to

replace

it,

apparently growing out of

unusual adaptation of four engines to only two propellers, have slowed it up. However, it has been just good enough to discourage abandoning it and starting something else. There are also others on which much time has been spent, and which have failed to pay off. Item: the He-280, a

jet

now

that

virtually defunct (as will be discussed shortly), this

none of them can expect

numbers

its

plane very

much

like the

Me-262,

in

to

become operational

in suffi-

time to affect the outcome of the war.

The Third Error

methods of aerial propulsion. To

different

successes,

is

To

get back to the Battle of Britain,

it

continued with a

blows at British cities, aimed at industry and morale, but these dwindled as British flak and night fighters contributed to the growing German conviction that the GAF was not winning the war with bombardment. This conviction was to have repercussions of the utmost series of shattering night

seriousness. If their

It

lulled the

Germans

into a sense of security.

magnificent air force had failed

to

destroy the small,

weak, crowded target of England, how could anybody expect to do the same to a powerful and militant Germany,

whose industry was scattered over an area many times the England, and much of it so far distant from England that it was believed that no bomber formation could reach

size of

II II n p

H '' I

I

1943-1944

imhirs of airrrnfl. il

and

live, niiifli

learned

al)i)iit

Dollt'il

Besides.

less set lionie.

radar,

irhih- line

and had an

effirient

at

ritihl

Germany had wow early-warning net

its own. Those who helieved that tactieal support of ground operations wa.s air powers true function seemed to have a strong case. It was to he further strengthened. The W ehrmacht plunged into Russia, and much of the energy of the GAK hecame involved there. In addition, all availahle long-range aircraft were put to work over the .\tlantic on anti-convov work. In neither in.slance was high-level liom-

indicates

recent

increasingly

risinix

rapid

production trend.

movement

of

|)lanes

from reserves

to

meet expanding demands. Durmonths wastage in Russia cut reserves to 500

operational units in order

to

of

ing the next six

liardnient tiecisive.

and actual strength to 4.000. For the first time since the start of the war all was not serene on the German military horizon. An immen.«e effort to capture Moscow was failing, a British offensive was being launched in Africa, and R.AF bombing attacks in western Germany were beginning to assume serious proportions. The GAF was smaller and weaker than at any time since the start of the war. It has been established that at some point in the first half of 1942 the decision was finally forced on the Germans to reorganize their aircraft industry and build it up. This called for increasing utilization of foreign workers (which by the end of 1943 comprised over 60 percent of the aircraft industry's personnell. a great simplification and standard-

This failure to reap any conclusive rewards from three honihardment can he traced directly

applicatiotis of heavy

the

to

initial

German

that

lielief

an air force should he

them from going deejjly into the sulijecl of strategic honihardment. which in turn affected their homher design and even the size of their homber force. tactical.

It

prevented

undoulitedly contrihuted to the slowness in getting the

It

Hel77 under way. and factory suhstilute

And

it

is

when

to

the failure to develop a satis-

the 177

easy to understand

abnormal enlargement of the "f Britain. ^ ou do not again

come home

began

to

emerge as a lemon.

why no effort was made at bomber force after the Battle

))Ut

your

shirt

fails to

the

first

time.

At the outset of the war actual G.AF strength in combat aircraft is believed to have been about l.SOO planes. This was backed bv a reserve of l.ftOO. Production was a little

under

I. (MM)

a month.

Losses during the Battle of Britain,

Norwegian campaign, and the invasion of Greece ate slea
production.

The

on a horse after

Nor was the fighter force abnormally ex|)anded. It seemeil big enough to support contemplated o|)erations. It did not fear enemy air attacks. it

ization of jobs so that the.sc foreign workers could be used,

and the development of component and assembly "complexes" in order to achieve maximum output by centralizing

i.oniplex lias

Its

Day

To meet the growing threats of RAF attacks by night and US.AAF attacks by day. the increase was to lie entirely in single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

Production of other

types was not stepped up. and the shift over of the

from an offensive

to a

defensive role was

the steady curtailment of on.

made

bomber production from

This fundamental change

GAF

official

by

this point

in ])olicy is best illustrated

by

jumped 875 |)ercent between January 1942 and October 19 U. while production of long-range bombers declined 85 percent during (he same period. Three Me-KW complexes were developed the fact that production of single-engine fighters

Continued on next papr

ler Kills These 8th and 9th AF gun camera pictures represent the subtraction from the GAF of only 22 of its aircraft. Yet it is a bad day when our fighters fail many more. On 27 November, for example, an 8th AF fighter sweep to get garnered 98 for a loss of 11. The day before the bag was 114. Simple arithmetic of this kind helps explain why present monthly production of German fighters is insufficient to maintain the GAF as an effective weapon.

at

Leipzig,

Wiener Neustadt, and Kegensburg; and four

FW-190 complexes, whose facilities were centered at Kassel, Oschersleben, Tutow and Marienburg. Manufacture of the Me-110. 210 and 410 was at Brunswick, Gotha and Budapest. Germany has been criticized for this centralizing of her industry. Such criticism is not warranted, even though the theory of centralization did spring from the false belief that the complexes would be safe from Allied bombers. Actually, it was the false belief itself which was

aircraft

38

dangerous because it had led Germany into a more fundamental error. If, after the Battle of Britain, she had realized that she had just two years before the blistering wind of the Combined Bomber Offensive would hit her, she would have started then to enlarge and centralize her aircraft industry. If she had done this, her complexes could have operated without serious interruption during that period and produced literally thousands of fighters. This would have resulted

in

much

greater

losses

of

Allied

bombers when

their

strategic attacks

began, whicli

slower buildup of strength

in the 8th

would have meant a

AF and RAF Bomber

Command, which in turn would have greatly reduced the damage thev could have been doing. This would have prolonged the productive further to the

number

life

of the complexes and added

of defensive fighters which the

still

GAF

The .\llies could not have campaign when they did. nor could thev have launched an invasion when they did. With luck we would

have

had

available.

shifted to the strategic oil

probably would be at this moment where we were a year still slugging at the aircraft complexes. Vl'hat actually happened was this: German plane production of all tvpes had risen slowly from 850 a month in 1939 to 1.300 by the end of 1942. It was at this point that the fruits of centralization at Leipzig. Regensburg and \^'iener Neustadt began to ripen. By July 1943 production was up to

ago.

1.740 a month, which is sufficient proof that the idea of the complex was a sound one if timed right. GAF actual Continued on next page

39

GAF

continued

Me-262, Germany's most successful

jel

plane,

nailed by 8th

is

strength reflected this increase immediately, rising from 4,100 to 5.600 in the first six months of 1943. It would have continued to grow as the result of the program expansion

(which called for monthly production of 2,900 by the end of 1944), but unfortunately for

now

large

blows

enough

to

launch the

Germany,

first

the 8th

AF

the

of a series of crippling

complexes.

complexes were dispersed. This went ahead so rapidly

tliat

even though April 1944 saw the largest tonnage in history

dropped on enemy aircraft rose. The following figures

plants, their production actually tell

the story:

Tonnage

6,372

March 2.412

Total production

1.400

1.300

February

In other words, the

maximum

April

9,846 1.400

which Allied bombers

effort of

were then capable, considering their other obligations, could not prevent a decentralized

slowly increasing

its

German

aircraft industry

production. This

from

a fact of the utmost

is

point in Europe. Because of heavy attrition, the GAF could only show an increase in strength of 300 aircraft during the

why tonnages against plane The general opinion that plane production had been wiped out. when the GAF failed to show up for the Normandy invasion, when it failed

bitterly contested

to

latter half of 1943. But Allied bomber and fighter strength grew enormously. It uncorked a series of hammer blows at the complexes in February during a

period

of

intensive

operations

now known

"Big Week" and rightly regarded as one of the great achievements of

as

the

American airpower.

importance, and

By not

is

rights the

GAF

a tribute to

it

explains

have declined since April.

factorie.s

oppose the Riviera landings or the rapid Allied ground

advances during the Battle of France, Production has, as a matter of plain since March,

produced

)

and

is at

entirely erroneous.

is

fact,

increased steadily

number of aircraft The total weight of

present greater (in

than at any previous time.

aircraft produced, however, has not materially increased.

cannot,

Exit the

40

Another Me-262, caught between

P-51.

was

Wiener Neustadt. Regensburg. Oschersleben, Kassel, Marienburg and Leipzig were all seriously damaged between July and September. It was during this period that the bloodiest air battles of the war were fought. Germany developed the airborne rocket, whose threat was only parried by our perfection of overlapping escort tactics and the final delivery of sufficient numbers of long-range fighters to accompany our heavies to almost any at

AF

Complex

production

should have been crippled. That it was the ingenuity and speed with which the

As soon

all the

resources

as the shift to

completed

Confidential

It

now thrown into aircraft and manpower she has available.

because Germany has

making nothing but small planes

(one bomber equals two

or

three

fighters

is

in

I

,4F P-51s, gel

weight,

same

man hours and

increase in the

Death of an Me-163

50-cal. massage.

number

materials), there will be no further

w hich were in France. And, most important,

of aircraft produced monthly.

of fuel, which has seriously curtailed

\^

hat

more probable, it will tend to drop, as the growing strains of a losing war begin to exact a heavier and heavier toll from the over-all German economy. is

Recent Allied attacks have been aimed at engine plants, where dispersion is most difficult, at air parks where planes jet production centers, and at those component and assembly plants which appear large and active enough to warrant attacks. The difficulty of the Allied task in further reducing German plane production by bombing is indicated by the fact that there are now more than 200 known places where some form of aircraft production or assembly takes place, plus a somewhat smaller number where it is reported, but where the nature of the construc-

are stored, at

tion or the location of the plant is not confirmed.

Also, as

has often been rumored in the past, production has

some

now

in

cases gone underground.

^"here. then,

the

is

GAF?

effect

a sentence,

it

is

snowed

It

rendezvous,

when our rise in

target

it

is

contributing to

all

its

than

it

is

Little

the situation as

was

in 1939.

is

very short

training

program;

it

present low degree of fighting value.

Too That

its

I'-47,

Its

it

Too Late

exists

now. The

GAF

planes are better. But

is

it is

larger

virtually

impotent because of the omnipotence of the air power opposing it. On two successive days late in \ovember 1944 it flew

800 and 750

of the war.

They do not

this

G.AF

effort

kind are inconclusive.

stop Allied attacks, and have lately resulted

in losses to the Its

sorties, the largest defensive

But operations of

GAF

on the order of 100 fighters

at a time.

offensive capabilities are at an even lower ebb. having

bomber unit after another has beThe V-1 and V-2 programs, which in essence are attempts to substitute a cheap and expendable bomber virtually vanished as one

come

inactive.

force for the one thus being cannibalized, are brilliant engiIn

can only run the risk of large-scale opposition our bombardment missions when, through our failure under.

recorded hy gun camera of 8lh Air Force

is

to to

sees an opportunity for an attack, or

so important that

it

feels

compelled

defense regardless of the consequences.

and maintenance facilities are strained, so It suffers from a shortage of vv<'ll-e()nip|)«'(l

is

its

Its

to

repair

manpower.

fields, the best

of

neering achievements, but both came "too

and too late" program, also a brilliant achievement, is likewise too little and too late. Its relation to the present situation is best expressed by the flier who said he would prefer to fight a war with 100 P-36s flown by well-trained pilots than with 10 P-51s flown by halfbaked pilots. In the air over Europe numbers and welltrained crews reign supreme. And we have both. to affect

anything but the peace.

The

little

jet

Continued on

Confidential

next,

page 41

Underground assembly

of

F^

-190s was started in France

facilities at

Merignac (above)

Cluster of

German and American

persiiatled

Germans

to

move

when bombing

to large

cave

lathes was hrought to Astier

of

at Astier.

Entrance of cave at Astier (65 miles t of Bordeanx) is shown above. Originall

from above-ground plants

at

Merianar. Raralan. Degl

-,-t"nf ..,)i

quarry,

it

has SOU.UUO square feel

-pace, extends 1.500 feet into hillside.

ihraround dining room,

ivilh

FW-190

fuselages are stacked along wall, uaiting patiently but hopelessly to be Cave has its own power and lif;ht plant, also a lake 75 feet deep.

assemliled.

modern kitchen behind balcony

lie

in

background, can feed

all Astier's

workmen.

\^

hen American heavies began liomhiiig Europe in tinof 1942. they sometimes hail the lienefit of diversion,

summer

ETO ESCORT Three-Dimensional Diagrams Show Route and Escort Formations Evolved After Two

ary sweeps hy fiAF fighters; more often they were on their

own. They never had escort as we know it today. Tliis \sas not dangerous at first because of the tentative nature nf German fighter attacks and the shallowness of our penetrations. But it soon became so. As our formations grew, increasing numbers of defensive fighters were massed in the lowlands to match that growth. Attempts were made to overwhelm us by mass attacks of several hundred Me-loys and FW-190s. Later, rocket-carrying Me-llOs and 410s were thrown into the struggle. The need for escort fighters

Years of Rugged

Battling with the Hun

became

critical.

I t.M«-300» ytis.

CLIMB FORMATION, a year ago, 8th AF fighter groups headed for the Continent with a medium power setting in climb and cruise, in order to obtain an altitude of 25,00027,000 feet before crossing the enemy coast, and to be above the bombers at rendezvous. With the Hun moving inland, fighter groups can now climb from base to rendezvous at

minimum power 44

settings,

thus extending their endurance.

The formation flown

a flat one. its purpose being to have and opposite each other to cover each others' blind spots. Distances between squadrons are given above, each squadron flying a close formation of flights staggered down in trail. 300 yards apart. Flying as close as shown is particularly effective against large numbers of enemy aircraft, as it allows most of the group to engage. is

units flying parallel to

Confidential

I

irst to

''7

reach England in the sprins; of 1913 were three On 1 Mav they received their baptism, im-

"roups.

proving themselves. They successfully shepherded Antwerp and hack without loss, whereas an unescorted force three days before had lost seven out of •latelv

heavies to

7

during a mission to St. Nazaire. These early P-47s operated without belly tanks. The Hun soon learned their range, and wailed to attack the bombers after their escort had turned for home. On 28 Jui\ a rude shock was delivered 7t!

with the introduction of a 75-gallon belly tank which inBy the time he tiie range of the P-47 to 2K() miles.

creased

bad adjusted himself to this novelty the Hun found iiimself coping with a lOS-gallon lank wiiich furllier extended P-47

range

to

.32(t

During the summer and fall four more In October P-3fis ap-

miles.

P-47 groups were made operational. peared, and in

December

the

first

of a

swarm

of P-51s.

which were eventually to provide continuous cover on missions of 600 miles or more. There were now no open spaces where German fighters could gang up. In the encounters

following

the

P-Sl's

the

introduction,

enemy

suffered heavily, lapsing finally into a practice of attacking the bombers only when the fighter escort had failed to effect

rendezvous.

Our fighter; now play an offensive role. They engage the enemv and destroy him wherever possible, in contrast to their earlier, primarily protective function.

r
6OO-S00yDS.

BATTLE FORMATION,

l l

n

rr .--In^

into

enemy

territory

group lormation shown opposite is loosened some what, and each squadron assumes the pattern shown above Red and blue flights move off to the right 600-800 yards Blue and yellow flights fly parallel to one another and be hind and above white and red to give them cover. If the squadron is alone, these high flights are placed 700-l.OfX) the tight

iimnii. lliey are placed

yards up.

If

yards up.

Too much >preading

it

i-

in

;i

at this point

hard time controlling identification of all elements as friendly

The leader has

a

only 175-350 is

his

dangerous. squadrons,

aircraft

is

not

always possible, and excessive power must be used by pilots in order to maintain formation in turns. .Also, in case of attack, only one or two flights can engage the enemy. Continued on next page

45

tdtORT rURMATION. The above diagram shows

the most deployment of a fighter group around a bomber force after rendezvous has been effected. One squadron is flying a mile in front of the bombers. It is divided into sections of eight planes each (two flights), one level with the bombers, one slightly higher. Their mission is to roam

common

46

8th

AF

out ahead and to each side of their big friends in the hope

enemy

which may be waiting in ambush. and because of this their flights may fly in trail as well as side by side as shown above. The second squadron is flying just the same as the first, but with one flight on each side of the bombers instead of a mile ahead. of sighting

They weave

Confidential

fighters

constantly,

S

OK

Of PlA/tiS WAM//¥^ AAfP 01/ r /OM/itS,i/P APPROX. BOMBCR. Llt^Bi. SQ.

j^f/SAD Si//V,

\

They may even lag

a

little

behind

to

be prepared for enemy

formations ganging up above and to the rear. The third squadron is also split. Half of it flies top cover, roaming 1.000-1.300 yards above the bombers.

Tlie other half flies

any bandits

about ten miles ahead and up sun,

to intercept

who may be queuing up and who

will be invisible at that

distance to the rest of the escort because of the bright sun. All these planes play an aggressive role. They are ex-

enemy aircraft approachmeans leaving the bombers unprotected. However, the leader must exercise discretion, and should not commit all his planes to attack a small decoy force. Continued on next page pected to pursue and destroy any ing, even if

Confidential

it

47

FIGHTER ESCORT

confinued

'frHjMt^.

48

High fighter cover passes over bombers after rendezvous They have flown course parallel to or slightly converging

with that of bombers, can spot big formations 15-25 miles

Single flight of high cover weaves above bomber box. Thick persistent contrails like these simplify rendezvous problem considerably, make bombers visible for 30 miles

or more. This flight

away.

Note nearly invisible bombers on cloud horizon.

is

showing tendency

spread to afford good protection, as a unit in case of

Confidential

may

to get too

widely

not be able to work

sudden enemy attack from above.

From underneath, this.

a flight of high-cover P-51s looks like

Contrails clearly

show constant weaving

that enables

individual pilots to cover each others' blind spots.

Flight

probably second from left. His wingman has just Second element has also crossed over from left to right, will soon swing back into position. leader

is

crossed over behind him.

Confldtntlal

49

J

•

Tremendous concentration

of continuously pointed

GERMAN FLAK

To of the

heavy flak

rises to

meet 15th result

GAF

fighters.

of \ital

German

targets are

density every week.

defenses

growing

Recent

ETO

in

fig-

ures show It

is

More Rugged Than Ever

Over Munich, 15th

50

AF

is

during attack on

located

rail yard.

62 percent of definitely alheavv bomber combat losses

B-24 from the

turned into a torch by hit from heavy

from

offset the declining effectiveness in the air. the flak

AA

shell.

Seconds in root,

Confidential

later, right

AF

Libs over I'ienr 38

flak.

percent

fro:

Enormous concentrations

AA now

around Leipzig ar matching those alreao existing in the Ruhr Valley and in tl neighborhood of Vienna (above). exist

Merseburg.

wing of B-24, shorn

follows rest of aircraft in

last

off

by intense

flaming plunge.

fi

BUT WORK GOES ON Gets

8th

-4

tnoke markers and litleland irges

Canal

after

GP IJlh

4

head for Millelaitd Canal through overcast.

AF PFF

were washed through

80-ft.

attack on 26 Oct.

breach

in

Five

embankment

cut by 851 -ton load.

drained.

Like an

in

Greatest Blows

iiuliistrial

comijlex.

whirli

originates in the automobile business

and then spreads out

to include

fields as radio, refrigerators

and

such

diesel

locomotives, is the 8th Air Force, always ready and willing to get into a new business. In September it undertook to fly in supplies at 200 feet to the airborne armies in Holland. In October it dried up a canal (below). In November it dropped 5.000 tons of frags on enemy front line positions in one day. At the same time it has never lost sight of its primary mission: to

numb German pages

And ber

industry

(see

next

6

)

the blows get heavier.

17.717 bombers

tons on

German

In Octo-

dropped 43.615

industrial targets.

Canal and adjacent aqueduct were both More barges are seen stranded on canal bottom.

AERO ENGINE PLANT HIT DB Works

at

Gaggenau Reduced

to

Shambles

Because of the elaborate plant setup required to manuaircraft engines, their production cannot be dispersed as readily as can that of other aircraft components.

facture

This explains why, even as late as the autumn of 1944, there

remained in Germany juicy targets like the Gaggenau Daimler Benz plant shown he^e. After two attacks in less than a month, Gaggenau is now, nearly three months later, still in bad shape. Lately repairs have been started on the huge areas of roofing which have been blown off. Piles of debris have been carted away, or pathways cleared between

still

them. But latest reconnaissance indicates that Gaggenau will not be completely operational for

some

time.

/-— ^•^.

^

> Gaggenau before. in the river near

as well as

DB

Plant

is

a large one located on a bend

Baden Baden.

It

produces motor vehicles Me-109s and Me-llOs.

aircraft engines for

W^

\

Gaggenau

during. Previously damaged by 8th AF bombers on 10 September, plant is seen at height of second blow on 3 Oct. Bulk of 403 tons fell squarely on the target.

52

Gaggenau plant.

after.

Damage

demolished. Photo cover as

Confidential

is

extremely heavy throughout

All main buildings have been late as

hit. most of !iem nearly 27 November shows only

minor clearance and reconslriiclioii. Annotated are: 1 final assembly and machine shop gutted. (2 larfie machine shops (

I

I

very liadK damajjcd with

much

of rool destro\ed.

l'.\\

sta:iip-

and heat treating shops badly damaged. (4) body assembly and paint shops nearly destroyed, 5) woodworking shop hall gutted. (6) power station inactive. ing, pressing

I

Continued on next

Confidential

pitge

53

8TH AF

continued

^

L.

f

»

'A.

&

'J

"*

'[

*

*

ifiWk

c

ii

^0^00^ m»

^?'Wili" ^^ar^>^ ^50

Attack on

Hamburg /Glinde on 6 October

nearly destroyed

its

54

three main ordnance buildinfis (1), did seric

in the relentless spotlight of this

photograph.

removed.

No Business As Usual During Alterations

FT

superb damage Hamburg/Glinde ordnance depot resembles with the log nothing so much as an ant colony under a log

Caught

ORDNANCE DEPOT ROCKED

500

Like eggs piled hastily enormous stacks of supplies visible

—

to at

one

side

the left

are

the

and top of

tafiv

to

ihrt'v

the )ii(tuie.

of livfhe standard

Like ants

anil freifilil cars. 111

III

the anlliill are tlie

The

I, ike

llie

tliciiiselves tlic

huildintis

arc the mimcrous trucks

and storerooms uarcliouscs. llicir contents open

ruptured

roolless

ramped

f:allcric.s

sun and sky. attack on Hanihur'r/Glinde was

made on

(>

October

(2), destroyed smaller unidentified building (3).

89 bombers, which crossed from Southwest to Northeast, straddling it perfectly with 637 5()()-lb. GP and 319 100-Ib. IB. Of the three largest warehouses, one was almost completely demolished, one two-thirds destroyed, one half destroyed. Continued on next pagr liy

tiie

relatively small force of

the target

55

SYNTHETIC OIL Two Huge Plants Walloped

Misburg before. with

Synethetic

plant

monthly pre-attack capacity of

25.000 tons looked like this in 1942.

29 November by 391 8th AF heavy bombers GP. Wreckage is widespread and includes the following: (1) lubricating oil treatment plant. (2) boiler house

Misburg smolders who dropped 1.152 damage

to

after attack of

Bottrop before.

tons of 500-lb.

plant

and transformer, (3) distillation. (4) de-asphalting plant, (5) tankage, (6) distillation and polymerization units. (7) Dubbs cracking unit. Misburg was attacked nine times in 1944, most successfully on 20 June and 12 September. Present capacity is estimated to be down to about 15,000 metric tons a month.

56

Confidential

is

This synthetic

the heart of the Ruhr,

pre-attack tons.

oil

located near Gelsenkirchen in

capacity

of

had a monthly 8.000

metric

Photo was taken after plant had

suffered

some damage in earlier at19 November mission.

tacks, but before

Joltrop after. Plant looked like this after series of 8th vF attacks, the latest one on 19 November. Annotated are: li coolinf; towers wrecked. (2) tankage about one-third lestroyed.

lagcd

as

(3)

three direct hits on group of tanks camou-

slag heap,

(4|

boiler house,

power plant and

ransformer station heavily damaged. (5) injector houses .nd hydrogenation stalls moderately damaged, (6j distil-

undamaged, (7) solvent regeneration plant damaged, (8 coal crushing plant, colliery buildings and headgear slightly damaged. Numerous small unlation

units

slightly

1

identified buildings are

damaged or destroyed. Dotted

show location of camouflage, much of photo, although badly tattered.

tankage

Confidential

in the

it

Originally

it

still

lines

visible

covered

western and northern parts of plant.

in

all the

©faituarp Above

is

a recent portrait of the late but uiilameiitecl

Jap island of Jaluit. which died after a lingering illness brought about by an overdose of 7th AF bombs. The deceased was known in its brief heyday as an "unsinkable carrier" for Jap planes in the Marshalls. From November 1943 through September 1944. Jaluit was blasted by approximately 1.500 tons dropped by B-24s of the 7th AF. These attacks tapered off sharply Mav 1944. with the last reported mission being

after

on 21 September when three R-24s dropped three tons for old time's sake.

Though casionally

officially

and

dead, the corpse

rattles

its

bones,

still

gets

whereupon and Marine

up it

ocis

light smacked down again by Navy bombers and fighters, which have taken over the job since 1 October. They have made about 1,000 sorties and 35 strikes, using Jaluit for practice operations as if it

were a corpse

in

a medical school.

r-

CONFIDENTIAL — CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH

L'nitcd Slates within the

affectinK the national defenacof the ng of the K«pionage Act. 50 C. S. C, 3

prohibited by law. oval of the Bureau of the

t.

Printed with Kxecuiive Office of the Preside

WRINKLED BY ICY WINDS CROSS

See

im ETO

DISTRIBUTION:

SQUADRONS

TO

BOMI«

beginning p. 2

Vol.3

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON,

D. C.

FEBRUARY, 1945

IMPACr February, 1945

CONTENTS ETO

(North Europe)

MAAF

Operations

-

-

-

2

-

-

22 32

Burma B-29 Hankow Strike B-29 Formations - Weather over Japan B-29 Ditching Procedure The Frangible Bullet . Asia Roundup P-80 is Easy to Fly -

Hun

CLASSIFICATION: text,

53

54 6!

-

Overall rias-

IMPACT,

of

iiiclu.linf;

CONFIDK.NTIAI,.

is

50

Back Cover

Bail-outs

siticalion

42 44 48

T.,

m

sure

that this overall rla^siliraticjri is recopnizeil. even when pages are torn out for invtrurtional purposes,

every

sirifile sheet has l)?en stamped on at least one This does not refer to specific

CONHDENTIAL sifle.

photograjihs.

The

correct indiviilual

classification for every

the is.sue

photograph

in

given below:

is

FRON'T niVKR-l: INCLASSIFIEn

23: 4:

h

I.DNKIIIF.NTIAI,

MUsslFIKn

I

.S:

(

OM-irif,,\TIAI,

l.'i:

M

1

14: IIKM

i.AssiFIEn

TKn

nil

15: UNCr.ASSIFIED 16: BOTTOM RIGHT, RF.STRICTEn:

KEST INCI.ASSIFIEn 17-25: UNCLASSIFIED 26: rONFIDENTIAL 27-28: UNCLASSIFIED 29: TOP, CONFIDENTIAL;

BOTTOM,

UNCLASSIFIED 30-31: CONFIDENTIAL 32: .\f I.ASSIFIED 33: oNFiriENTIAL I

I

3141

IM

:

LASSIFIED

42-43: RESTRICTED 44-47: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED (iMinENTIAL

4?j-4Q:

52:

5fl

(

ED LASSIFIED 56: ROTTO.M, RESTRICTED; REST, I

.14-.).):

I

M

UNCLASSIFIED 57: UNCLASSIFIED 58-59: CONFIDENTIAL 60: UNCLASSIFIED ftllNSIDE BACK COVER: CONFIDENTIAL

BACK COVER: UNCLASSIFIED

CORRECTIONS: On I.

in

page 31. IMPACT. Vol. III. No. flak-damaged 6.29. Ihe aileron uas called a de-irer boot. The nllirer in ihc

a iiirliirc of a

erroneously l.ielure

Lt.

is

Ihe

U.

slated

S. in

Cny Dobbs. On page 29 the name of Robert K. Morgan «as incorrectly spelled Anganr island was assa.ilted and taken by

Lt.

Colonel

"Brogan."

KIsI

Infantry

IMPACT.

Vol.

DiviMon. not No. 10.

by

II.

CONFIDENTIAL

Marines as

[^

CONFIDENTiAl

wm* 9eMi

8th AF

COMBAT WINC EN ROUTE TO GERMANY Str ETO, Next

»

P«ge«

-

"^

MONSCHAU

f

V

TMAWiDY STAvliOT

[

l^^

J»

V

CFUSS

\MAnCHIi

xocȣronr

lA nocHB

9uuAS

,ST.HV9tKT

HOW

AIR

MET THE BILGE CIISIS KAtSSRL

mJOU

KAIL

LINES

,

^ ^J

90UBLE TRACK LINES SINGLE TRACIC LINES

-"^-^

MA/^ KOADS BOMBED COMMUNICATION CENTER f

%

©

NOMBl/A

AIR BASES I

EI^HTEK-BOMSER ACT/O/f

MAIN IN7ERVICT/&N L/^FS

(Buice fS

SMOW^

/IT

MAX/MUM AS OF 2S fisc.)

I

JSAARBni/CkEH

ETO %

ip

Another Tactical Air Triumph air power can be a major factor in checking a grandenemy offensive was proved conclusively in the Battle

That

^€SSiN

scale

On

the Bulge.

(if

tlu'

a smaller scale, this

is

block the Nazi breakthrough. Again,

Force jumped

tegic Air

in to

in

Normandy our

a|)|)lying

the

in

at

to

Stra-

help solve a tactical problem.

But the Belgium emergency was the real of

what happened

Kasserine Pass when our heavy bombers pitched

test.

It

was a case

doctrines already learned, and applying

on the spot.

tlicin liot

war (1, ground the enemy's planes; 2, isolate his battle area by slashing supply lines; .3, cooperate with ground troops), the first tenet

Of

the three basic tenets of tactical air

taken care of when The LuftwafTe proved still

seemed

well

opened.

wpamkMrt

m

value, but

it

the to

German

offensive

have some nuisance

could exert no decisive influence. It became to cut Nazi supply lines, using the

imperative, however,

same

interdiction

technique that isolated

the

Seine-Loire

IMPACT, Vol. II, No. 11). On the map at left are shown the main German

triangle

(

and roads leading

to the Bulge,

rail lines

and, in red. the interdiction

followed by the 8th and 9th AF. Previous to the key centers had been attacked frequently

pattern

breakthrough,

from September through early December. But the enemy was able to deliver supplies at railheads as close as 10 miles to the front, due largely to autumn weather which reduced ihe effectiveness of Allied air attacks and reconnaissance, liut also due to the absence of sabotage on home territory.

was in direct contrast to the Normandy situation, where railheads were KM) to 150 miles from the front. Furthermore, road movements now profited by long nights, fog, and cloud cover. Within the Bulge the enemy road situation was not so fortunate. Main rail and road routes run north and south, and only a few secondary roads run west. These main routes were denied von Rundstedt by the Allied infantry, which held the enemy's llank. while the holding of Bastogne and

This

the bitter struggle at St. Vith denied him even the full use of the secondary road system through the Ardennes.

When the German offensive started on 16 December, weather restricted air counter-attacks for six days so that Nazi tank columns and supply lines were able to operate without fear of strafing. On the seventh day the weather and then the air story began. As shown here, most of the fixed

cleared,

targets were behind the Monschau-Coblenz-Trier triangle. Inside the Bulge, the TAF began its epic attacks on German armor, rail and road centers, described on following pages.

Bulge

in

On map portant U)

the

red bands

rail lines

December

to

uliere air lashed

KAHLSnuHE

show pattern

of interdiction.

All im-

were cut. Bombs indicate principal targets. 4 January. Fighter-bomber symbols show

Germans

in

general battle area.

Continued on next page

Cl\J continued

^

An American B-26 loads

its

of the Franco-American Air Force un-

100-lb. incendiary

bombs on

the

German

industrial

and communication center of Kaiseriautern which was

at-

tacked repeatedly in

was taken

bomb

just as the

December and January. This picture B-26 surged upward due to loss of its

weight, causing plane to blur in photograph.

Confidentia

AAF III

Fighters Scored Heavily liallK'

llic

ol

bomhs

of

man. Not 2.()()()

wind, snow

coiilrolled

im-

could the

TAF

the i)ullets

down

get

3.000 sorties daily for

to

the

and the weather cleared on 23 Decem-

until )

tloiitl.

iialure

of"

ber (see chart lielow

Hying from

Bulge,

tlie

palpat>le suhstaiices

in

to business.

five days.

First

were communication centers, bridges, rails, roads, moving vehicles, and troop concentrations. In summary, the weather permitted intensive TAF operations on priority targets

eight of the

first

19 days, but visual

bombing

for the heavies

on only three. Despite

appears

our interdiction behind the enemy's lines nowhave seriously snarled his time-table. However,

this,

to

wretchedness of the weather prevented

the

being conclusive because

it

it

alone from

gave him time to repair some his lines. Of equal, or even

some of

of his bridges, clear

importance were the TAF attacks on vehicles and armored spearheads inside the Bulge, for they destroyed material in use or in immediate reserve. Also, they forced a halt in the German ofifensive while materiel and troops were dispersed or concealed. Here the fighter stole the show and became a truly decisive factor in tactical warfare. Tribute to the po,tency of our fighter action was paid greater,

by to

Germans

the

neutralize

it.

V(

aircraft.

On

against the 8th and 9th Air Forces.

As

this elTort did not

seriously interfere with our tactical operations, an alternate

type of attack was tried on

New

Year's day, coinciding with

ground ofTensive in the south. Shortly after dawn very heavy strafing attacks were made against Allied airfields, effective mainly in the Brussels and Eindhoven areas. In all, 700-800 aircraft took part, of which not all reached the airfields. Some 127 .Mlicd operational aircraft were destroyed and 133 more damaged. Eleven pilots were lost. SHAEF report.s GAF losses were as follows: 160 aircraft shot down in the air, 300 claimed by AA. The GAF must iiave lost at the Nazi

least

180-200

pilots.

These costly attempts to knock out the TAF fighters, both in the air and on the ground, failed conspicuously. In the final stage of the German "withdrawal" from the Bulge, the TAF hastened the parting guest with a stupendous show of air power, a climactic blaze of glory that ranks with the

outstanding achievements of this war. Lists

of

enemy

losses

have become commonplace,

these figures deserve special attention.

through 24 January, the 9th

AF

In four days,

but

from 21

alone claims to have de-

stroyed 3.151 motor transport, 1,185 railroad cars. 28 loco-

attempts

motives, 56 horse-drawn vehicles. 89 armored fighting ve-

SHAEF reports that during a period of GAF single-engine fighter force on the

and 80 tanks. Damage figures in the same categories Thus, the grand total for pieces of heavy equipment destroyed and damaged by the 9th AF in four days is 8,421, enough seriously to jeopardize the efficiency of at least eight German divisions, including two Panzer divisions.

repeated,

their

in

months the estcrn Front was

two

Smashing the German Offensive

built

occasion

it

up

if

sporadic,

more than 1,000

to a strength of

operated

noticeably on 23

all out,

Decembci when between 1,000 and 1,200

sorties

were flown

hicles,

total 3,832.

• GO

00 000«€#000#«€«###€i#00€

0,000

iiSOO

¥,000

3^00 Sfioo

1^00 2,000 /,500

f,000\

50o\

tn II

IS

23

*«A if* rAcr/c4t r^tr MB rtcriett. TAP (i^'tis. J nx lurj

Thi§ chart shows bv the

tP3 utirit/crrp, ffr rtK MB afft>/sift OPS. cA/*ctii.tc

the relationship between weather

AAF

and RAF'

in

I

indi-

number

of dailv

the Battle of

Belgium

cated by two top rows of circles) and the Mirtifs flown

O %

between 17 December and 15 January. It will be noted that good flying weather prevailed considerably less than half the time. Area bombed is shown on pages two and three.

Continued on next page Confidential

its spidery network of roads (see map on page 2), was a key communications center captured by the Nazis in the Bulge. Here it is blasted by more than 100

Si. Villi, with

B-26s on Christmas afternoon, in part of a campaign by 9th

AF

routes.

B-26s.

A-20s, and A-26s against

More than 1S5

German supply

tons were dropped on target.

••J

Four Nazi tanks in field in

are caught dispersed Bulge area, 24 December.

Incendiary bullets from 9th figliterbomber strike the nearest tank.

"and then there were three." Tank explodes. Many others were also hit.

^ M. Vith, after bombing, ecoM pilot on 27 December. ;,

On

this

is

photographed by a 9th

^X'ith

more than

formerly active German road junction

the liustogne road, 9th

AF

AF

ten fires still

(i-ihlers strafe a

is

re-

column

under murky weather conditions thai handicap both fighters and reconnaissance photographers. II

irialing Nazi tanks

duced

to

an unrecognizable mass of debris. Bombed almost

every day after the big Christmas attack.

captured on 23 January by First

Army

St.

Vith was

re-

lank spearheads.

This kind of attack, plus paratroop reinforcements, was responsible for liberating on 27 December the American garrison which had held out at Haslogne since 18 December.

Continued on next page

ETO

continued

Weird shapes are formed by smoke markers for 8th

The 8th Hits Airfields Overcast conditions that forced the 8th

on

PFF bombing

emplified above.

ondary role

make

to

to rely

Belgium

fitted

Battle,

f*Fh honihinf^, such as toas used during Bulge Battle,

Squelch Attacks on Our Fighters

mostly

during the German offensive is well exThough the 8th necessarily played a sec-

in the

type of attack

AF

AF

each air force and each

together like the pieces of a puzzle to

the air job a success.

For example, on or about 24 December the 8th and the RAF Bomber Command were carpeting 14 airfields in the Frankfurt and Cologne areas, which were serving either as bases or advance landing grounds for the majority of Nazi

in the battle area. The purpose of this bombing was to pin down the GAF for a few days of expected good weather so that the fighter-bombers could get in their licks without having to jettison their bombs to become fighters again. This purpose was achieved. But the success of the air campaign was not reached without losses. In December strategic and tactical preliminary loss figures in the 8th were 2.37 bombers, 247 fighters; the AEAF lost 531 fighters. On the next pages are pictures of enemy damage, showing why these losses were worth while.

fighters

Confidential

Kev road

First

and

junction at Whalen. near Duren. looked thus on a

Christmas before 8th

lite

Bombs

rail

erupt,

AF

began bombing road

dumped by

iSth

AF on

targets.

road junction

bridge at Morscheid, southeast of Trier. 25 Dec.

Confidential

In a

compact

P)(h AF bombs blast Vt halen road German communications to the front.

cluster,

junction, helping block

iMore bombs on Morscheid disrupt one of key links in Nazi communication lines. A total of 36 B-17s hit this target. Continued on next page

ETO J-

'

continued

.

*.1^>^

^T^ .v;;^'-

•^^

9lh

AF bombers on 12 January

cut every line of

Rails leading into Euskirchen (above) are also ripped; supply train is halted here.

German

rail

hub

at

u

Euskirchen, isolated 20 engines (left).

Kirch Gons, a fighter landing field near Frankfurt, is bombs in the campaign to keep the Luftwaffe away

saturated with 9th fri)in

AF

the battle area.

Bridges and

Rails

happened rman bridges, railroads and airI)eI- when U. S. air power on unleashed for i'fr was suddenly n'se pictures typify what .

2.''5

days irig

decent

of

of the 9lh

I

flying

Bombardment Division

9th AF. operating

iif

mh

in the

Germany. had

made 1.300

this

il

-

in

%'.-'

only seven sorties

ped 2.500 tons on numerous like

it

By 29 December.

Division alone, with -.

break-

area and directly behind

;irn

I

weather.

bridges was a principal assign-

and tar-

Moselle river bridge.

bridge-busting wasiil

all.

Other

of the 9th lent vigorous aid to the

and Third Armies, bombed gun dumps, inflicted heavy losses lie Luftwaffe. On one of its busiest days. 26 December, the 9th knocked out 136 tanks and armored vehicles. 520 motor vehicles. 15 horse-drawn transports and 21 gup positions, damaged 100 rail cars, hit 10 rail passes and .37 towns and blew up three ammunition dumps. One fighter pilot spotted a Nazi column of 200 vehicles moving to the front. "It was lovely." he said, "all we had to do was dive and I

lions,

I

take

squirts

armored

at

cars.

trucks,

\^'e

left

tanks,

and

dozens burn-

ing."'

For the

final

week of December the

9lh AF's claim against motor vehicles

was 2.105 destroved and 625 damaged.

Two

Itricl^t'M, rail and highway, were knocked out bv the 9th at Vt'asserbilli".

bridge, near Trier, a 21 Dec. by l.OOO-lb. bombs from 9th .'Moselle river

vital route for

AF

enemy reinforcement

is hit

on

H-26s. four of which can be seen above.

Continued on next page ConfiJcnliul

Air Battle above the Froit A

vivid pattern of air-ground teamuMtrk north of Bulge at Puffendorf is etched by AAF-GAF contrails above M-Sl crew. The Luftwaffe rarely appears in such nu mhers.

Confihusd on ncxf pope

RAF on 16

I\ov. while

8th hiiminered outskirts. Photo was taken two days later.

Duren Breakthrough Bombing

bombing methods were employed, which are proving more and more satisfactory, especially when apparatus can be

(Center of Diiren

was erased by

Paving the way for a grouiul advance liy a blistering bomhardment of enemy positions directly in our path has become an established AAF procedure. It was tried at Cassino. It succeeded brilliantly in Normandy preceding the St. Lo breakthrough. In mid-November the Army called

14

moved

into a specific area for specific operations.

The prob-

lem was to bomb close enough to the troops so the first hard crust would be broken. As hundreds of war prisoners have testified, it isn't so much the actual effect of bombs on well dug-in troops that counts, but the paralyzing effect of the

for the complete obliteration of Duren. a heavily fortified

explosions.

German stronghold blocking its push toward Cologne. From the air point of view, this kick-off on the midNovember offensive towards Duren and Julich was con-

On 16 November, when Duren was hit. the 8th dispatched 996 B-17s and 243 B-24s against tactical targets in the Duren area, dropping a total of 4,120.2 tons of frags. The

sidered very successful, as the picture above indicates. Blind

RAF

contributed 2,970 tons additional on the city proper. Confidential

Ten

tj tin

li-

1st

I

it

jh over Siegfried line near H issemltourj: on mission lo In this picture the

B-26s vs Nazi Strongpoints Tlifr.e

Marauders lalxuei arc

()l.

\

t- It-

raii> ot

tlu'

Tunisian. Sicilian. Italian, and Southern France campaigns,

now giving the area behind the southern end of the Siegfried line the same treatment they gave to the Gustaf, Hitler, and Gothic lines in Italy. They are part of the First Tactical Air Force, an administrative unit of the 9th AF. also known as the First FrancoAmerican AF because French pilots are operating with them. Their job is to work hand-in-glove with the Seventh U. S. and First French armies. they are

bomb German

mediums

stron^points.

are over the enemy's outer

defenses where two triangular fortresses on a hilltop command three villages and the surrounding road system. The

rectangular structure between

New Year

is

for storage and personnel.

on 1 January 111 B-26s Annweiler and nearby towns, hit barracks and workshops at Kaiserlautern. and other enemy positions around Bordeaux. On another typical day. 2 Starling the

bombed

rail

right,

stations at

January. 108 mediums bombed similar targets in the Saarbrucken-Karlsruhe area, while 440 American and French fighters cooperated with ground forces, attacked communication targets, and flew sweeps from Kaiserlautern to Bilche.

Continued on next page Conftdfiilial

15

#

iTO continued

y "^ y

%^

f^OAPk

^PXA0<^f(S

/.'/> 'a'

.X'%.

r.>v

'^^r Bombs

* n».

falling on

German

defenses near

Wissembourg

the southern section of the Siegfried line were

Bombs

strike

in

same Wissembourg

area shown above, plaster defenses.

16

in

dumped by

"Dragon's teeth,"

B-26s of the First Tactical Air Force. This heavily defended village on a

also

troops at Siegfried line.

main road

is

in the

path of the Seventh Army.

shown above on annotated photn. aic

AAF

..\rnuii by U. S. aiming points are strongholds behind such defenses.

Confidential

in

A

riinwav, due from a mission

-li|)|HT_\

\

hil-

l'-l-7,

hi luid

to

skid

uimiIht, into

. i

,

several

.

J

_;

r-,'.?8

re-

trucks at a

complete with pilot and bombs, is towed through TAF mission, covering 6th Army Group.

mii
Confidential

Belgian base and start this Maze. The

V-'.Vu

had been attack-

ing targets hindering the progress of our ground troops.

Mopping up

a

muddy

strip for First

one more of the endless

mud

T.AF operations

is

just

troubles at forward bases.

Continued on next page.

ETO

continued

Hazards of flak are once again brought home by a picture. An 8th AF Liberator is shown spewing bombs and debris,

Two

8th

AF Forts explode after collision

in

murky English

after a flak hit,

ber

when

and going down near Hanau on 12 Decemaimed its blows at German rail yards.

the 8th

weather, illustrating one danger of winter operations.

Ciiiifidrnliul

Here's

What

Halts the

Hun

The kind of bombing that has stopped the Germans dead in their tracks in Belgium, and before that,

France,

in

illustrated

on

and back in Africa, is The two pictures below graveyards of wrecked planes,

Italy,

this page.

are typical of the

behind by the Luftwaffe as it has pulled out They symbolize the deadly effectiveness of hundreds of AAF attacks directed toward keeping the GAF out of battle areas. left

of base after base.

For the Bulge

Beautifully blocked by 9th AF fighter-hombers. this rail tuiinfl near F^schueiler formerly served as a supply line to the German front.

battle, as stated previously, the

GAF managed

to fly

in the fighting

area

approximately 3.500 sorties days of fair weather

in five

from 23 through 27 December. But despite this respectable showing, the G.AF could not exert a decisive influence on the battle because it lacked the punch. Fundamentally, this lack of punch was the pay-off from our long-term attacks on German aircraft industries and liases, plus the numerical superiority of our planes and the superior ability of our pilots.

From 6 June to 31 December, the 8th and 9th Air Forces knocked down a total of 5.2 H enemy aircraft, of which 1.483 were destroyed on the ground in just such scenes as you see here. The 8th alone finished off 1,156 proud German eagles, caught squatting, never to fight again for the Bulge or

any place

else.

Evidence of the A.AF's power to stall the enemy on the ground, as well as in the air. is shown in the picture of the Eschweiler tunnel above.

and lit-

mjirht\

include

9//i

AF

creus

(

Irom

at

\t

.ill

left

to

right

III I

former \azi base

Me-lOy. F\X-190. and a Ju-87. in

From 16 December

9th

blasted

through which the

to

4 Januar)- the 8th

more than 60 such Germans were trying

targets to feed

troops and supplies into the seething Bulge.

France clean up \te-109s wrecked by B-26s so more B-26s can take

u

'T.

d. t!"^?^

off.

Matford plant

at Strasbourg, after 8th

AF bombing.

One Blow— Out for Good Before the war Strasbourg was known widely for

mashed goose the 8th

on 27

livers

{pate de joie gras)

AF gave the Matford aero-engine May 1944, shown at right in one

.

The mashing

its

that

plant at Strasbourg

of the first ground approximates the goose-liver treatment. The Strasbourg bombing typifies our strategic air war against the German aircraft industry, and is one of the reasons why the Allies dominate the air over Europe. This particular mission was carried out by 52 B-17s, with fighter escort, which dropped 132 tons of HE bombs. The job took only two minutes from 1303 to 1305, and only one Fortress was lost. Alsatian workers at the plant said that 80 percent of the bombs hit the target, gutting compictures,

—

pletely the heart of the big factory

where engine components were made. The plant produced 200 to 300 Jumo engines a month for Ju-88s, many of which were modified for use as night fighters or rocket-carrying day fighters. factory whistle never blew after 27 May 1944.

The Matford

In wrecked factory at Strasbourg, where aircraft engines were made, 40 percent of the machine tools were destroyed, and remainder was shipped to other German plants. Area at right is also shown by dotted line on aerial photo, above.

20

IT'heeling in tight formation, these

12th

AF

Mitchells range over ISorthern Italy in the unceasing canipai^i

'

Ala before. One of tour electric power transformers on Brenner route between Verona and Trento. it was a primary objective 6 Nov. 1944, during 12 AF interdiction campaign.

Ala

diiriii
lAtremely heavy concentration

scored on target by 36 B-25s with 267 500-lb. assisted

of

was bombs,

liil>

GP

by 16 P-47s with 26 500-pounders and 57

'*?

rockets.

gle Nazi

communicalion and sitpply

lines to the battlefront.

Arrows trace supply flow

to .\nsi front in Italy,

MAAF BRENNER INTERDICTION

PLAN

Transformer Stations Are Knocked Out The -MAAF

recently

showed

it

is

still

full of

new ideas

for

giving the Germans a never-ending supply headache in Italy.

approaching and maximum bombing Air Force set out to force conversion from electric to steam power on the Brenner line, most direct route for German militarv' supplies (see map above^. Such a conversion would mean reduction of the line's capacity to a point where the Germans must keep it open for SO'^'c of the time to get minimum supplies needed. TAG figured even winter weather couldn't keep its planes from making this verj- tough indeed for the enemy. Since elimination of any three consecutive power '"feeders'' on the line would force conversion on that section. T.\C hit and destroyed the transformers at Verona, Domegliara. Ala (see left and. for good measure, Trento. Since then the Trento-to- Verona electric train service has been nil. thus creating the desired bottleneck. Turn the page to see how TAG is following through with bombings of the Brenner line and other rail routes.

With bad

flying weather

effort therefore impossible, the Tactical

I

Ma

after. -

Severe explosion occurred during early

of attacks. Control house has been heavily

dam-

aged and transformers have been completely destroyed.

Continued on next page

AND THE RAIL-CUTTING CONTINUES .Jt£<:

Aim: Keep Ahead of the Nazi Repair Crews Probably the

busiest,

up

the

fighter-bombers are doing to key

rail

Below

at

the left

is

in Italy belong to German repair damage Tactical Air Force mediums and lines from the Reich to the Italian front.

most harrassed men

battalions which must clean

a typical example of the type of cuts fighter-bombers

inflict with their 500-lb. wing bombs. Between New Year's eve and 12 January 407 such cuts were reported, chiefly on the Brenner line and along the important route from Vienna to Padua (see map on preceding page). TAG is thus following up the transformer station bombings with real vigor.

An

average of 34 cuts a day. if maintained, means over 1,000 cuts a month. It from 12-24 hours to repair a single cut. When numerous cuts are made near each other along a few miles of track, repair trains must work from the ends toward the middle, taking the cuts one by one. Bridges can be replaced with takes

insecure timber-trestle structures within 10-14 days, but immediately this has been

done 12th

^

AF bombers

have stepped up and batted them down again.

of 12th AF made this rail cut at Gittadella 9 Dec. on the important supply link from Udine to Verona, along which Nazi materials flow from Austria and Czechoslovakia. Trains are snarled as far as the eye can see.

Thunderbombers

Gun camera

series shows how 15th AF P-38s sometimes steal stuff of the 12th AF. An ammunition truck gets it. The explosion, through which the Lightning had to fly, knocked out its right engine, blew pieces of Nazi uniforms, shell casings and even some empty German cigarette packages into the dazed pilot's airscoop.

Perfect

example

of

pin-point

medium bomhing

is

this

Nov. 12th AF B-25 strike on the key German supply depot at Torlona. 50 miles west of Milan in the Po Valley. Upper left depot is important source of

series of pictures of the 16

—

supplies for the Italian front. tack by

first

wave of

—

Upper right at height of atLower left when smoke

Mitchells.

—

cleared, three-fourths of the buildings had been destroyed. Lower right second wave of 25s blankets remaining area.

—

Continued on next page

25

WHAT BOMBS DO THE TRICK? Some Conclusions

12th AF Reaches Those concerned with sizes of

bombs

of different

against various targets will find the pictures

here instructive.

They

bombs and bomb

hits to

AF

relative effectiveness

rail target, the

illustrate

relationship of types of

damage

effected at a typical 12th

Florence Marshaling Yards.

Constant surveys by 12th

AF Ordnance

Section indicate

GP bombs

should be used against yards having a predominance of commercial and light freight traffic. Best for locomotive repair yards is the 1.000-lb. GP bomb. The thai 500-lb.

.1

second nose and .025 second

tail

fuzings, the only delays

used in both types, have proved very effective. Moderate

damage done by

the

100-lb.

bomb

to

both engines and

coaches suggests use of heavier types for such

rail targets.

Direct hit by 1.000-lb. GP demolished cab completely. Engine cannot be lifted from crater without heavy equipment.

JT^;' Terrific blast

effect of halt-ton

Middle coach was

split

bomb

is

illustrated above.

and gutted, other two derailed.

Near miss by 500-pounder broke two main

shaft, a

drive wheels and bent

good example of the potency of

this

bomb.

»i"-Tiiim Beyond repair after

hunth i>a( k very near miss by 500-lb. bomb is

W

recked boiler is only part of engine damaged by direct hit of a 100-lb. GP.

Coach was

slightly

damaged, tracks

bent by very near miss of 100-pounder.

Confidential

'I'liUing the String^'

over Vienna, 15th

AF

Liberators encounter a rare C.Af

Main product of

15TH'S "BIG WEEK"

vs.

OIL

I

day

in their icinter oil

campaign.

synthetic and crude oil refineries in the

1.5th AF bombers is aviation gasoline. Most of the output is concentrated at three synthetic plants Blechhammer North and South, both in Germany, and Brux in Czechoslovakia and three natural refineries (Odertal in Germany. Oswiecim in Poland, and Florisdorf in .Austria). If these six could be knocked off, production in the area would be reduced by 73 percent. Total German production would be reduced by 20 percent. The 15th went to work on 16 December. That day Brux was attacked by 115 B-17s and 205 B-24s with 675 tons of 500-lb. RDX bombs using PFF. By Christmas night Brux was inoperative, smothered under a total weight of 1,149 tons. The two Blechhammer synthetics in seven separate attacks were treated to 1.41 1 tons of RDX almost equally divided. Oswiecim where visual sighting was possible, suffered severe damage in two attacks on 18 and 26 December from .320 tons of RDX. Odertal received considerable attention in three separate smashes on 17. 18, and 26 December. By 28 December these six major refineries were, for the time being, inoperative. The 15th had achieved its goal. The 8th .AF. preoccupied during late December with the "Bulge" crisis, cut loose in January with a campaign to knock out refineries which the 15th couldn't reach. Continued on next page

area within range of

I

German Synthetic Plants Plastered To

its

long

list

of success stories, the 15th

AF

last

Decem-

ber added another: a whirlwind strategic blitz against synthetic

and crude

oil refineries in eastern

Germany. Czecho-

slovakia and Austria.

Ever since the third of all the Nazis

mum

loss

German

of Ploesti. which could supply one

gasoline and liquid fuel requirements,

have been attempting furiously to maintain maxi-

capacity in their synthetic oil system.

Around

these

all-important installations they have set up defenses which

Commanding MA.AF. describes as "commore serious than Ploesti defenses.'" The difliculties of attacking such targets are made even more acute by notoriously bad winter weather conditions which exist along the route over the Alps from Italian bases. For example, between 1 and 12 January strategic operations were Lt.

General Kaker.

parable to or

conducted on only two of the twelve days because of snow, icing, fog or thunderstorms either at base or along route.

Confidential

I

27

MAAF continued

W%

Well above

flak,

15th

AF

B-24s hoiuh Odertal by PFF.

Bursts

mushroom through low

stratus at

Brux 25 Dec.

AAF

WINTER WEATHER AIDS NAZIS

forecasters to be certain that fliers will not encounter impossible flying conditions en route to target or on return. From Foggia to eastern Germany 15th AF heavies must

cross the Dalmatian coast, where the heaviest precipitation

Operations Tough Without Micitey

in all

Europe occurs in January and February. The freezing low and icing is often severe.

level is

when the 15th AF planes strike at strategic Europe as they did during "Big Week" last December they are faced with the problem of overcoming weather in addition to enemy defenses. "Mickey" radar for PFF bombing helps in overcoming the difficulty of hitting invisible targets successfully, as is shown by photo of Blechhammer North at top of opposite page. Chaff and carpet (see pages 30-31) cut down flak losses. It's up to In mid-winter

targets far into Nazi

28

Because three separate weather areas Austria

and

watch weather and in Russia.

affect conditions in

must carefully England, in the western Mediterranean Fronts in either of the first two can upset Low stratus as seen above at Brux and

Czechoslovakia,

forecasters

in

15th missions. Odertal often occurs because of an extension of the Asiatic high pressure ridge from Russia. As a result, weather may

be

fair,

but low stratus will hang like fog in basins for days.

m^

m f

WKt^^m7

-

.

-

^s

1^^'

^^^^K^

1^

^^J ^•^^^^^^^^t^K^

r

Blechhammer \orth uater gas plant

on 27 Dec. shows holes

111; blower houses (2)

in roof of

damaged; main

compressor house (3l severely damaged; low temperature

Flak knocked out the control cables of this 15th

AF

(4j damaged; H,S removal building damaged: gasholder (6» destroyed; boiler house (7( damaged refinery 8 damaged; tanks (9j heavily damaged.

carbonization plants (5l

;

(

I

Lib over Yugoslavia, but

it

got

home on

engines alone.

•

r^gfr'^'i^gr^y'-'

-

Carpet, effectively used by 15th AF's lead groups, aids in preventing accurate tracking by

EFFECTIVE JAMMING OF

German

radars.

HUN

RAD,

Intense heavy flak, as any combat pilot knows,

is harder to sit and by enemy fighter pilots. But, by the proper use of the jamming devices "Carpet" and "ChafF"

take than the most aggressive attacks

("Window"), the hazards of flak are considerably reduced. The 1 5th Air Force has found that carpet and chaff have definitely lowered flak losses during PFF missions. Carpet, as shown in the illustration at left, acts

much

like

an electronic razzberry.

Installed

up a powerful, controlled interference designed to get a terrific reaction from the small \^urzburg. the radar commonly employed by the Germans for directing AA fire. The 15th AF tunes its carpet transmitters one megacycle apart to insure best results. The newest type will jam a wider range. in

lead groups,

A common

it

sets

mistake of

fliers

is

the belief that

jamming

will not

provide any protection from flak when the weather is clear. Even in CAVU weather radar is often used in conjunction with optical height finders.

Electric

Bronx cheer

effect looks like It

30

what carpet's jamming on the scope of small Wurzburg. is

obscures the true position of the formation.

It

pays

off to

jam under

all flying conditions.

small Wurzburgs are tuned on the 560 megacycle band, while secondary ranges are usually about 530 mcs., although they may range anywhere from 525 to

Eighty

to ninety percent of the

original

Confidential

i

maximum

For

protection, following 15th

AF groups

ELPS CUT 15th AF FLAK

I

I

I

I

fly

within 2,000 feet of chaff released by lead groups.

LOSSES

595 mcs. Barrage jamming, as employed by the 15th. is like shooting a many pellets in the air at once. Spot jamming, used

shotgun, with

when occasion demands,

is

like

aiming a

rifle at

a specific Vl'urzburg

frequency has been detected by airborne radar. Most effective jamming partner to carpet is chaff or window. These aluminum and paper strips, which decorated many Christmas trees in Kurope last year, create false echoes in the Wurzburgs (see photo at \\h()se

right)

gaps

and cause misdirection of A.A

in chaff, so the 15th

AF

fire.

The Hun

is

quick to exploit

has experimented thoroughly

in the

most

uiji

y

J'

methods of distribution. At present the 15th uses 324 units of American-type chaff per minute for a formation of 18 aircraft with the second group of 18 following closely.

effective

Dispensing is begun three minutes before the initial point and is continued until clear of the target area. The 15th has also been experimenting with the use of P-38s for covering the target area with chaff immediately preceding arrival of lieved that

bombers should

fly just

bomber formations.

It

is

Hying in it. because the Germans are being forced by jamming to barrage flak into the chaff colums.

sible without actually

('.onfjdfnlinl

1

be-

as close to the chaff trail as pos-

Chaff appears on scope as mess of small

streaks.

This effectively conceals exact location of echo which single plane, or formation of planes,

would make.

3!

Supply IJnes^

Weather Set

War Pattern The Japs

fight in

Burma because

it

country which they would like to hang onto, because it is a good jumping-off point for an invasion of

is

a rich

India,

and

because

they

if

control

Burma

they can keep the rear supply door to China closed. Among other

we fight in Burma to keep this door open. It is a strange and intermittent war which has resulted, shaped by the weather and the terrain. During the June-October monsoon the country becomes a tropical mush and all fighting ceases while resounding rainfall reasons,

records are

hung up,

in

some areas

250 inches. Railroads are washed away, roads disappear, leaving the dismal soldier with little to do but trim the long green whiskers from his good pair of shoes and wait for the country to dry out. When it does, an everlasting battle of road blocks and broken bridges flares up again as each side tries to capture or wreck the communication lines of the other. Everything in Burma runs north and south: rivers, mountains, rails, and reaching

roads.

Off the road

is

jungle, thorny

and impenetrable, with a procession of jagged mountain ranges and river valleys extending like the teeth of a

saw for hundreds of miles to the east and west. The delta land is flat and soggy, and laced with innumerable rivers.

Burma

Small forces can operate

in

—Generals Wingate and Merrill

demonstrated

that.

But for ordinary

operations, the necessity of keeping the

few existing lines open is obvious. This is what makes air power so important.

Much

of

the

success

of the

present

from the operations of the 10th AF and the RAF. They have supplied and reinforced troops cut off by the enemy, rendered invaluable front-line tactical assistance, and kept up a relentless tattoo on enemy boats, bridges, and rail lines. campaign

32

results

^VFijk^

k Kalewa ilic

G

lb

largest in

Drop zone

Tii:ht

is

pontoon bridge

tlie

is

1.154 feet long, one of

world, took two and a half days to finish,

across river, behind trees at

concentration

is

left

of bridge.

Biscuit zone.

bomber from Assam

In foreground

is

releases parapacs over

a British

AA- crew.

drop

Dropping of

supplies was at no time interfered with by Jap aircraft.

achieved by tcorld's most talented supply droppers.

Vital Link Some power

may

idea of the importance of air

to

ground operations

Burma

in

comparing the scenes of peaceful industry shown here be

gained

by

with the variegated flashes of destruction pictured

on the next eight pages.

Kalewa Grub bridge

is

crossing

west of Shwebo. .African troops

monster pontoon

a the It

Chindwin

was

built

river

by East

who were supplied

en-

from the air by "Biscuit Bombers" of the US.^AF First Combat Cargo Group operating out of Tulihal. Assam. Our ground forces took Shwebo a few weeks after it was completed. Although it was vitally important as a tirely

supply link for .Allied forces bearing down on Shwebo. the pontoon bridge

was attacked only once by Jap aircraft, which succeeded in putting one small hole in a deck board. Reason: ceaseless attacks by Eastern .Air Command planes have driven Japanese aircraft almost completely out of the northern

jnd central areas of Burma. Continued on next page 33

Three camouflaged Jap supply trucks blaze brightly on road near

Bhatno

Two

Taken on 15 December after a long and bitter siege. Bhamo is a perfect laboratory example of cause (Allied air power isolated it) and effect ChiI

nese troops captured

in the relation

it)

Burma.

of air to ground operations in

Bhamo where

is it

on the Ledo Road, just above joins

Burma Road.

the

If

Allied supplies were to be kept out of

China,

the

Bhamo. could

not

had

Japs

They

tried

live

hang onto

to

hard.

forever

on

But they air

and

jungle insects. Constant Allied surveillance of the roads leading into

(above)

reduced

to

a

Bhamo

dribble

the

slender flow of supplies creeping north over bomb-blasted southern rails and roads.

The

luckless Japs

Bhamo never heard most that fell

from

in

34

abandoned of the

at

bombs

Burma, but they suffered

their effects as surely as if the

bombs had

fallen

stripped Oscars were

den in thicket

on Bhamo

itself.

Confidential

off

Bhamo

Bhamo

left hid-

airstrip.

during strafing attack by P-40s of

2\

Airstrip was made unserviceable by who dug 29 three-foot ditches.

Japs,

^>*

(iral

Reconnaissance S(/iiadron.

Sccdnd airstrip it

at

jasoline drums.

Bhamo was It

Bhanio

itself

was almost compleleh

obstructed with hundreds

was cleared while

battle

was

still

in

inuli-lwd hy aerial

ih-

bombardment.

Then 10th Engineers flew in, repaired other strip menaced by front-line fire only 500 yards away.

progress.

while

^:-

•--*.•• ,

»^j*

-*«^

.v^:

DUKIVIM

continued

Low-level attack by

RAF

Liberators creases rail yard at

Pinpointing at Ye Just as the enfeebled enemy air strength in Burma cannot prevent our building bridges, dropping supplies, and generally bedeviling him in the battle area, so is it unable to

prevent our attacks at his tender and exposed supply Chief of these from the beginning

arteries far to the south.

36

Ye for a distance of 600 yards on 6 November,

Burma war was the rail line from Rangoon to Mandaand Myitkyina, with Rangoon acting as the main port of entry for Jap stores and military personnel. Because of this. Allied attacks have hammered Rangoon until it can no longer be so used with any degree of safety. These were brought to a climax on 3-4 November when, in a joint effort, B-29s of the XX Bomber Command combined with heavies and fighters of the Eastern Air Command to drop 503 tons of the lay

Confidential

mr V

^^^

'•»

"

'*^

-^.

m*4

Same

tracks, a

on Rangoon's

little later,

show advanced case of acne. Shed and rectangular pond are same

rail facilities, largest

single load in the history

extend that

far,

Thus. Ye becomes the

Result of all this is that the Japs have had to find other unloading points for their supplies. Two such spots are Moulmein and Ye, across the Gulf of Martaban from Rangoon and farther south. Both have good docking facilities and are connected to Rangoon by rail. Another place

its

still

farther

down

than

Ye

is

Mergui, but the

rail line doesn't

facilities

both pictures.

and supplies have to be trucked to Ye. rail head for two vital Jap ports, and become correspondingly important if ade-

of the India-Burma Theater.

rail

in

quate Jap supplies are to continue to roll north. Why they don't is made clear by the two photographs above. In addition to the damage shown. 15 freight cars were destroyed,

damaged or

derailed, and 70 yards of track leading to the locomotive depot were obliterated.

Continued on next page Confidenlial

37

has been perfectly placed. As plane turns away, which blew away entire center pier can just be seen over tail. Attack was made at minimum altitude on 1 Nov. by four volunteers from the 7th Bomb Group.

Dara Bridge during. Bomb blast

Dara Bridge before. Low has

just

dropped

whose splash

38

is

flying B-24

short-delay

bomb

seen near center pier.

River water still boils from bomb blast as bridge settles This was one of main spans on Bangkok-Lampang rail line, which has also suffered recent low-level attacks at Uttaradit and Pitsanuloke,

Dara Bridge

after.

firmly on bottom.

>

Bridge during. This is one of three between Moulmein hit from minimum altitude on 13

pad d

ember bv Liberators of the Strategic Air Force.

ml

severed.

the Bridf/es Falliny Everyivhere Moulmein and power

ith

Rangoon. ^

gui

hammered by

.\llied air

thev have been

virtually

I

Road Bridge

after. Una more Jap artery neatly Road is important because it can be used to truck supplies from Bangkok and Ye if the rail bridges are out.

Bilin

e.

aban-

unloading points for Jap it is not hard to understand the ing importance of Bangkok, which learly 400 air miles farther from ed airfields than Rangoon and has less n attacked correspondingly .Mso. enemy transports can ;h Bangkok with comparative safety going up through the Gulf of Siam d of exposing themselves to d

as

-.

ed air and submarine action in the

For

of Bengal.

linked

up

the

this

reason,

the

Burma and Siam

systems with a line between Bang-

and Ye. thus insuring for themcontinuous track from a "safe" 1 to the front lines via Rangoon and ndalay. Bangkok is important for s a

another reason. tion of the

In case of inter-

Rangoon-Mandalay

line.

can be shipped by rail to upang. thence to Lashio over the ndabout Kengtung motor road. plies

This looks fine

on paper. But

it

fails

consider that the severe epidemic of tosis

which has

.ndalay line jxactly •

what

Command

afflicted the

may

spread.

Rangoon.And this

happening. Eastern has ruptured both the is

ngkok-Mandalay and Bangkok-Lamng lines. Result: more and more rved Japs in the jungles in the north.

Bilin Rail Bridge before.

I

sent one of the

m

-t

spans

in

Burma. Japs can no longer nejiciui on Rangoon and Ye as ports, must use it to carrN- supplies from Bangkok. To see what happened to it. turn to next page.

39

BURMA

continued

Bridgeless Bilin

is shown the same bridge later the same niornin snapped from a B-24 of the 7th Bomb Group on its way

Aliove

another target.

The

picture of the Bilin rail bridge on the previous page

was taken

40

just as a

bomb

hit the

water next to the center pier.

B-24).

So

is

It

is

clearly busted

(the

a temporary structure to the

porary structure to the

right.

Keep them

bridge, not

left.

I

tl

So is a ter and Banj

that way,

Confidrntii

«i m

^^

.

r'

ft

'j^m:*-%

19

r

kok"s usefulness disappears, for supplies cannot he moved in this saturated delta country except over these hridges. Water

everywhere in large and small patches as far towards the horizon as the camera will record. Fly a little more higher, take another photograph. \X'hat do you see?

glistens

—

Confidential

.Anil >et you are looking at a country wiiicii is beginning to enjoy what is known as its "dry season."' As a rule of thumb. "The worse the terrain, tlie more important the plane." This explains the value of air power in Burma, whose terrain ranks among the world's worst.

water.

41

More than 400 bombs Specks of

light

fall

together towards Hankoiv during the incendiary attack of IH Uec. This

gleaming through smoke are

is

the conipl

fires.

SKY FULL OF BOMBS All-Incendiary Mission Guts Mission No. 21 of the

XX

Hankow Dock Area

Bomber Command

is

notable be-

shows what devastating firebugs the 29s can become when carrying a full incendiary load. Tlie target was the

cause

it

great inland port of

Hankow,

selected because

it

is

the sup-

ply and communications center for Jap inland operations in the Celestial Empire.

The problem was

to destroy as

much

and dock area running along the waterfront, and regarded as flimsy and inflammable, an ideal combination for incendiaries. The attack was launched on 18 December from 18,000-21,000 feet by 90 B-29s which dropped a mixed all-incendiary load of 540 tons. Main weight of the attack fell in the northern end of the target area, completely gutting a residential and small industrial section three-quarters of a mile long and over a thousand as possible of a large industrial

feet wide.

Forty planes carried M-76 IB, a 473-lb. pyrotechnic gel bomb, fused instantaneous nose and no delay tail. Thirty carried similarly fused M-47 IB, a 69-lb. bomb which can be filled either with gel or napalm. Twenty carried 500-lb. aimable clusters, each of them containing 110 four-lb. magnesium incendiaries, fused to scatter at 5,000 feet. Continued on page 44

»

nsit" of one groiif), vavh ithine's honibs living circled in

while.

Earlier groups have already started

Reconnaissance photo of north section of tvaterfront shoivs nearly every building gulled except

H.

%

at

Vfi

*

some

fires.

lower right.

.1

•^^i

'XV if..;

•r tit'.

.'./'

•

/•5''-fi''f

—

B-29s continued

"**»..

Typical group combat formation

XXI

now being flown by Superforts

B. C, groups are separated by the 2-minute interval

of the

XXI Bomber Command

shown below. Wavy

lines indicate

is

shown above.

where distance has i

— * '

i*^ wwiis

Pi

fc=r*

fc=*

.

Confidential

THE VHB FORMATIONS Command

XXI Bomber To

penetrate

Squadron

Flies 11 -Plane

enemy defenses and bomb

successfully, four

basic requirements must be met by all types of formations

flown by very heavy bombers: 1.

2.

bombing

Ability to develop a

erly cover

any target

pattern which will prop-

likely to be attacked.

Development of maximum defensive fire power against becomes too severe.

fighter attacks, plus mobility if flak 3.

Control by the leader of other planes w ithin the formaso

tion

that

in

case of

losses

remaining planes can

the

quickly be repositioned in the most desirable manner. 4.

Ease of flying to prevent undue pilot fatigue.

The XXI Bomber Command

fulfills the above requirements by employing two 11-plane squadrons in group formation as shown on these pages. The XX Bomber Command does it with the basic formation shown on the next page.

According to XXI B. C.'s tactical doctrine, the lead element flies in a very tight "V." In training wing men fly level with and nose to tail on the lead plane. \^ ing tips of wing men neither clear nor overlap the lead, as compared to the slight clearance allowed in XX B. C. formations. The rest of the squadron of 11 is made up of two elements in diamond, the whole making a big "W" The plane in the slot of the right hand flight flies just above the top of his lead's vertical fin and nose to tail with the wing men. In the slot of the left the plane filling in the diamond flies just lowenough to clear prop wash. Vertical distance between flights is 150 ft.; lateral distance. 400 ft. from the noses of "B" and "C" flight leader to nose of "A." Xumber 2 squadron, nearest one in sketch at left, flies 1.200 ft. to the right and just back of No. 1. By stacking up 1.000 ft. No. 2 squadron gives the whole group formation an appearance similar to the 12-plane stagger (see next page

element

I

On

long over-water flights

XXI

formation. This type, involving

B. C.

lieved the best for weather penetration, as Vi'hen the

flies

minimum

combat zone over Japan

is

a loose route

dispersion,

is

be-

shown on page

47.

reached,

XXI

B. C.

meet whatever defenses the enemy where flak losses have become far higher

formations are adjusted

lane

squadru ns conlrasl

led to

show the

ttilh

12-plane

flifihl

of

\\

li.

C.

entire formation tcithin space limits.

to

employs. In ETO in proportion to those inflicted by the overwhelmed GAP. large formations are advised to loosen up accordingly. Over Japan flak has not yet become too serious; on all missions up to the present only one Superfortress has been destroyed by

making

AA

defensive

fire

power.

fighters or ,A.A is taken

Most

Fighters remain the chief danger,

fire.

tighter formations usually

No

during

fliers agree that

more desirable

it

is

bomb

run by

no more

XXI

B. C.

difficult to fly

close

A

high-

formation in B-29s than it is in B-17s or B-24s. ranking 20lh .\F operations officer observes:

apparent ease with which either good tight formation. It appeared me much easier than keeping a B-24 in position."

"I

|)ilot

to

to obtain

evasive action as defense against

was amazed

at the

or co-pilot could

fly

Continued on next page 45

B-29c continued

Highly successful

in the

ETO, shoun above

is

the formation currently also being floiin by China-based B-29s.

XX BOMBER COMMAND Modified 12-Plane Stagger

is

Basic Unit

\X Bomber Command combines tlie four basic formation requirements (see preceding page! by employing a modified 12-plane squadron stagger (IMPACT, Vol. 2, No. 61. that already has been successfully battle-tested in Europe. Each element of three

Minimum

flies

striking force

in

"V." Under battle condi-

employed by

tions,

depending on whether

flak or

enemy

fighters are met,

the formation can loosen or tighten up. Desired position for

wing men is nose to tail at a close interval from wing tip to wing tip with the lead. Vertical distance between wing men and lead is 50 ft. The four flights in the squadron also form a "V" as illustrated above. Vertical distance between flights Relative positions remain constant. If "B." top is 150 ft. element, is forced to shift from high right to high left because of the sun or nature of enemy fighter attacks, then "D." low left flight, must move to the right side. "C" middle slot shifts slightly to the right of "".A." the lead.

XX Bomber Command

is

in

three squadrons in trail spaced 2 minutes apart.

-2000'-

f\4>iile

formation of the \\l

li.

(..

^1000'-^

slum-n in rear vieiv allows pilots leeway for relaxing on

For penetration of had weather from route formation,

WI B. C. squadrons lake

FLYING This

flights.

the positions indicated above.

IN

How XXI

is

long

B. C.

THE SOUP Penetrates Weather

In addition to the inherent weariness brought on by the

long roundtrip

flight

between the Marianas and Japan, pilots

often face all kinds of bad weather, particularly over their targets (see next two pages on

Japan weather

I.

Since the success of missions depends on holding formations together, a procedure is necessary for both a comfortable route formation and for flying through fronts. The route formation shown in the top diagram is designed so that the formation can fly level, climb, or descend without ap-

preciably changing the relative cruise control data. By spreading out over a wide area pilots can fly on auto pilot and maintain position with minimum effort. If an emer-

gency

in

quickly

the

form of enemy attacks

be closed for

maximum

arises,

formation can

firepower.

going on instruments squadron leaders in the inform leaders of the other two flights their true heading and base altitude. Each flight leader is responsible Prior

XXI

to

B. C.

for relaying this information to all

members

of his flight.

For penetration from route formation squadrons adhere to the following procedure: Each aircraft takes up the magnetic heading given. New positions of individual aircraft

may

be compared with previ-

ous ones in the diagrams above. The leader in the center remains at base altitude, as does left wing man of the left element and right wing man of the right flight of four. The others move 500 ft. up or down as shown. \t'ithin a flight planes maintain a spread of 1.000 ft. from nose to nose and

Side View of weather formation above shows ing.

The

vertical spac-

original tight formation can quickly be resumed.

Compare the diagram at left to ft. between wingmen. combat formations of XXI B. C. on pages 44-45. Continued on next page

2.000 the

47

^'Winter Weather" photo shows

how Japan confronts

a B-29 pilot approaching

THE WEATHER PROBLEM Model Technique Shows Typical

portant by the

Saipan

it

is

XXI Bomber Command

considered so im-

that

from

its

base on

schedules three "Weather Strike Missions" daily.

Primarily, these B-29 missions obtain weather data over

—

just to make the Japan. Secondarily, bombs are dropped trip even more worth-while. The Japs call them "nuisance

raids."

Actually, they are

much more

weather information helps to bulk of our bombs will fall.

A ever,

For this determine when and where the than that.

long-term strategic bombing campaign requires, how-

more than a day-by-day weather

report.

It

requires a

knowledge of the seasonal weather pattern that prevails generally over the entire area to be bombed. On these pages two weather patterns over Japan winter and summer are illustrated by means of two annotated model photos prepared for IMPACT with the aid of the AAF Weather Division and Cartographic Branch, AC/AS, Intelligence. Here,

—

—

it

is

believed

for

the

first

time,

is

a

three-dimensional

representation of the Japanese weather problem as

it

affects

B-29 bombing operations from both Asia and the Pacific.

48

ATTACKING JAPAN

IN

Met by 29s Operating from

Conditions

Marianas

In the \^'inter photo above the white arrows indicate a

Forecasting the weather over Japan and along the 1,300-

mile route from the Marianas to Japan

from Saipan, looking northwest.

flow of cold air that sweeps across the entire length of the

Japanese island chain. Such an airflow results from the accumulation of a great mass of cold air over the icy interior of Siberia an air mass whose principal escape route is toward the southeast across the main Japanese islands. This

—

initially cold, dry Siberian air picks up considerable heat and moisture over the Sea of Japan. By the time it has reached the Japan coast, it yields cloud and precipitation on the windy northwestern slopes where it is lifted (see photo above). Targets along this cloudy coast are not recommended for winter bombing.

Then

this

far-traveling Siberian air. dried in

over the mountain backbone of the islands, and

its

ascent

warmed

in its

descent on the other side, arrives clear and dry over the plains that face the Pacific. Consequently, these areas are

This weather situation is parthe important target areas the southeastern coastal plains of Honshu and Kyushu.

characterized by clear skies. ticularly favorable for in

including

As

this

bombing

Tokyo and Nagoya. same cold air sweeps out across

the Pacific

toward

Confidential

ZZ

:^

of cold oir

Strong flow of

i

worm

oir

mm ^ ro/cro

Summer Miim.

U eulher" photo,

tilso

from Saipan approach, shous

utulerruns warm, tropical air and produces the

it

frontal area with towering clouds,

iil'iileiit

shown on

the

model photo hy the arc of clouds in the foreground. from the Marianas to Tokyo must penetrate fronts on their routes.

.iiiirr

IniiiNers flying II

-I

W

liilf

in

winter

there

high

a

is

j)rol)ahilit)

viaihcr over targets near Tokyo, there

clear

of

no certainty of it. \ li-ling of weather conditions reported on the first eleven UL -' ale homhing missions to Tokyo and Nagoya. executed 111' early winter, shows that weather jjrohlems exist even n this most propitious season. is

II

24 Nov.. Tokyo. No clouds

to

9/10 undercast.

27 Nov., Tokyo. Jap mainland completely cloud-covered.

clearest homhinfi area note norlhtcest roast.

Strong winds and icing, typical

of any

On

high altitude

December, for example, a 200-mile-an-hour wind swept over the target at an altitude of 29.000 to 81.000 ft. On another mission one B-29 landed home with only 80 gals, of gas, having used too much gas from the IP to the target because of winds. Also, its rear bomb bay doors would not close for three hours after bombing due to bad icing. Others reported severe icing on the astro-hatch after one hour's continuous flving at 30.000 feet, and the loss of 25 mph due to rime icing. winter

flight,

In the

are reported frequently.

Summer

photo above

it

'.i

will be noted that the cloud

cover has shifted to the Pacific side of the Japanese islands, leaving a new set of targets exposed on the northwestern

Here the broken white arrows indicate a weak flow air circulating over the Sea of Japan. This air converges along the lower edge of the cloud area shown in the model with a strong flow of warm air from the Pacific. A sheet of clouds is then formed in the warm air as it ascends over the wedge of cold air. Where the warm air climbs the mountain backbone of Japan, clouds build up to great heights. These high clouds, and the rains that fall from them, are restricted to the southeastern side of the

coast.

29 Nov., Tokyo. Solid undercast .3

/.V

at target.

Dec, Tokyo. Clear with excellent

of cool

visiliilit\.

Dec, Nagoya. 1/10 cloud.

IH Dec. Nagoya. Three scjuadrons reported ing and Visibility Unlimited)

Squadrons reported 8/10 22 Dec, Nagoya. 6/10

to

to

CAVU

(Ceil-

directly over target.

10/10 cloud.

10/10 cloud.

-T Dec, Tokyo. 1/10 cloud. Excellent i Jan., Nagoya. Primary target

CAVU

visibility.

to

2/10 cloud.

CAVU.

'-'

Jan..

Tokyo. Primary target

/ /

Jan..

Nagoya. Primary target 8/10

to

10/10 cloud.

Six

mountains, affording a protective

summer

blanket for such

Tokyo, while clear skies prevail on the northwest. Japan may be likened to a man in bed who pulls up the blanket to keep his ears hidden, only to expose his toes. targets as

Continued on next page ",onfidenlial

49

D-29s continued

DITCHING THE SUPERFORT kiHiuiii^ how to ditch a li-29 and (linih out afliT it has hit tht> drink is acutely iin|M)rlant to the nu'ii honihiri^ Japan, particularly those ll\in^ the Pacilic approat-h. who ha\e to make long round trips over lonely stretches of -.itcly

The first ditching pr(K"c. r the method -ii. u nt. now heconii water, crew nienihers Before til jettison the same type items as in other iMunhers. hut he( ause the B-29 is built differently, ditchintr station> and wa\s of reaching them are f)e{-uiiiir \\ater.

i\

I

i

,

to the Superforl. Most of the crew takt- h ing [M)sitions in the forwanl pressurized c partment: unlike other tail gumiers. the BcalMKJse man stays put. Two of the otln-r men in the rear, however, crawl forward to t stations through the turmel connecting fore aft pressurized sections. It has been determined that the airplane c mander should land in a cross wind paralU the swell in winds up to 35 mpli. The p should be landed into the wind onl> when wind is above 35 mph, or is very light, and t! is

no

swell.

to the

Flaps shoidd be set

in

amount

Front section of forward pressurized compartment has ditching stations for airplane commander ( 1 pilot 2 bombardier (3), flight engineer i5 and right gun,

'

j

pmpor

of jxiwer available, for ininin safe forward and d«)wnv\ard si)eeds. To see how the crew should leave the I liter it has hit. turn to third page of article

,

,

(6). Commander and pilot brace feet on rudder pedals, knees flexed. Bombardier lies sideways on floor, with bis back against the air commander's aisle stand.

ner

Navigator, No. 4 in sketch, raises bis table and sits facing aft. He escapes through easily removed astrodome a reached just above tunnel entrance b Astrodome is removed before ditching; three men exit there. Like other crew niembers facing rear ,

'

.

in bracing positions, navigator should cush-

ion his back against impact with chute.

V

.

R«:ar unjirwrtturumd tHim|iurLiiKail jiMrd i'A rem'.at- tttmtrtil

i:nd radttf tiitt*«n «r •rnlriil

iirt

ctintrtil

iiittntK. r
ticifZ)

it-

i»v.ri

turrtn «ruim«"

JO

^

wiio comt- frrm

and radur

ctanjiif^.

Tidl ^unii«r, »t ind

in Ine fmeemiraied

-

-

-

<*

——JjLSgl^^^

'

'•

—

UL.iiii

L.UK. Ifli-f

'uiTL VuuiKi] ti

i^

!

'

Ljj-

i..i:

iird

cuxD-

ie£l r^uuner

ri^bi punner. iTrawlttd {rcini rear- fitmikt iitfT

4i)w«vt> hIjui

in

iird ftir |tboti' ul rijrht

dnclimr:.

nt^l

It-

vat

iKtltrm..

GETTING OUT Some When

[NGiNHliS WINDOW

Do's and Don'ts

the warning "Brace for im-

pact!" comes over the interphone, there

I

PIIOIS

WINDOW

L

1

few seconds before the plane hits the drink with a bump and a crunching noise. When it has slid to a stop, crew members leave by their will be only a

All

GUNNEIt'S

WINDOW

Df ID

iSCAPi HAICH

designated exits, and climb along the top

of the

fuselage to

positions at the

wing

their

I.

I

RD

D

DM

E

COWMANDfflS

WINDOW

Personnel going out escape windows and hatches should not inflate their Mae Wests inside the plane. Two six-

man

AS

AID

proper

roots.

ISumbers in diagram correspond to those used in picture captions below.

are in special compart-

life rafts

ments on top of the fuselage; release handles will be found to the doors of these compartments and at the forward end of the fore-to-aft tunnel rafts are automatically freed and inflated when handles are pulled. There are also emergency radios and accessory kits. The importance of successfully floating and manning these rafts cannot be ;

overstressed.

When

they

are

in

the

dangerous to jump into them men doing this have gone through. Capsized life rafts of the older style should be righted from the wing; newer models have righting handles underneath to permit their being turned over by men in the water. water,

it

—

is

Ditching photos were made at Wright Field under direction of Tech Data Lab and Emergency Rescue

Branch,

AAF

Astrodome left

headquarters.

is

exit for

gunner (8). who go

ROM

and navigator (4), who goes

52

(7)

to right

and

wing,

to left.

Pilot (2) and bombardier (3) go out right window to right wing; plane com-

Flijilil eiifiiiieer (5)

mander

position

RCT

(

1

)

exits left, goes to left wing.

gunner

(9)

and radar observer

(6) leave by

Tail

and right gunner

window beside

and proceed

gunner

leave!^

to

In-

engineer's

right

luo-iii l/iJ

(10) leave by rear escape hatch and go

cabin and

proceeds forward

forward

other crew

members on

to

stations on

the left wing.

wing.

to

join

the left wine.

ConfidenHul

Jl

BULLET

FRANGIBLE

A new kind of bullet that crumbles on impact is greatly improving the accuracy of AAF flexible gunnery who now

trainees,

learn

moving planes under

to

virtual

fire

at

combat

Students in a B-17 shoot an attacking P-63 which is especially armored for frontal and pursuitcur\e approaches and has a nose light that flashes on each time the plane is hit. enabling students to see how

conditions. at

"they're doing.

Experimentation with the frangible began in 1942. Glass was first

bullet

but

tried,

now

the projectile

is

made

powdered lead and plastic materials. It is fired from a modified .30-cal. machine gun at the rate of 800 rounds

of

per minute. of

velocity

per second,

The

The

bullet has a muzzle

approximately is

up

eflfective

scoring

device

to

on

1.360

ft.

600 yds. P-63

the

operates through pick-ups. sensitive to

impact, attached to the dural deflector plates that cover the aircraft.

\

hit

on

any part of one of these plates results in a pick-up excitation which relays the electrical impulse to the nose light in the spinner and to a counter in the cockpit. The pilot of the P-63 can at anv time tell the gunner his total score over the

VHF.

Combat veterans

find that frangible-

bullet training has most of the excite-

ment of first

Rl'h.i yose Lisht flashes like this ichen

bomber gunner

scores a

hit.

real air battles,

time the student

is

and for the

learning gun-

nerv bv being a gunner.

^LZ Armored

ItadiiiL'

^liich leaves its

of P-63 is nicked by frangible bulmark, causes no damage. However, gun-

edge

are instructed not to fire within 200 yds. of target plane.

'lenlial

projectile, has tip of plastic and powdered lead which crumbles easily on impact. Project is under the supervision of Maj. Cameron D. Fairchild at Laredo .^rmy .Air Field.

T-44

53

Blues on Boenjoe play for Jap garrison of Borneo-coast island as lone B-24 "Snooper" of the 13th AF, on 18 December dawn patrol, approaches camouflaged oil

tank area.

Visiting firemen have just

bombed

a ship in the nearby harbor.

Snooper swoops, makes 150

three runs fro

drops nine 500-lb. bombs, anc fuel supplies go up in flames. Lib also st to

ft.,

Asia Roundup 13th AF

"SNOOPERS" KEEP BORNEO

OIL

BURNING

While the major current AAF efforts in the war against Japan have been directed Philippines and at enlarging the operations of the 20th Air Force, at the same time a steady harassing air war has been quietly but persistently waged from one end to the other of the sprawling Far Eastern front the longest in the at the

—

history of warfare.

Six air forces are partners in this campaign: the 5th. 7th and

13th in the south, the 10th in Burma, the 14th in China, and the 11th in the Aleutians. Their targets range in importance from single

sampans

to the largest oil

sometimes call for fifty heavy bombers, more often for one or two. Such varied and diluted operations are hard to summarize, or even to assess accurately. But their cumulative effect is not unlike that of deep soft snow on a man trying to carry a heavy load a long distance. One phase of this campaign has involved extreme-range strikes at Borneo oil refineries in the Orient; missions

AF B-24s operating singly or in very small numbers. For example, four missions were flown by single aircraft against oil targets at Lutong between 8 and 12 December. Damage was out of all proportion to the number of aircraft involved. On 8 and 10 December one-plane forays were flown against oil and docks at Labaun. On the first day a large explosion was caused in the refinery and eight storage tanks were blown up. Two days later, the second of the B-24 installations by 13th

solo attackers dropped incendiaries which caused other widespread fires. Additional December attacks are shown in the photos on these two pages. The first three pictures

tell

the story of a visit

made by

a single B-24 to the oil storage area

on the jungle island of Boenjoe. near the great Tarakan oil plants. The other picture shows damage done to the Dondang bridge and pipeline near Balikpapan. (Editor's Note: in the invasion of

54

Full story of the part played by the U. S.

Luzon

will

appear

in the next issue of

Army

IMPACT.)

Air Forces

Attack completed; there was terception. Homing crewmen of the Libeid i

look back on a scene of destructive bei^

mv

he

tall

ml

li\

nialii><.'aii\

trees

liplited

u|)

a risir)g sun thai |)roves to he

.mhol for Ni|)s on Hoenjoe island.

l>y ati

m^^mm

Hil pipeline across Honilang hridse near Sarisa Saiiga. lioriieo. was damaged ilh \1' l.ihs which also ignited refinery and six tanks, w itii and tired lis three I

27 SOO-pounders. 9 Dec. Kiver shipping was also

hit

;

smoke was

visible

100 miles.

Continued on next page 55

Bomb

explosions, seen from shoreline of Goeroea bay. de gun and damage the director equipment

stroy at least one

Parafrag clusters guns

in arc

dcsceiul fatally un Jap 73 iimi.. iiRHlel IjV, emplacement. Fire control center is below chutes.

HITTING JAP GUNS AT GGEROEA to the main weight of a coordinated primary requisite for success. Here it is seen being done by the 13th AF on 8 December at Goeroea. important Jap base on Halmahera island in the Dutch East Indies. Before a medium-altitude attack by 16 B-25s and 15 P-38s, the preliminary foray against one battery, shown here, was made by four Lightnings with eight 165-lb. incendiary bombs and four Mitchells with a dozen parafrag

Neutralizing flak prior

attack

is

clusters.

a

This kept the

AA

B-25s and P-.38s fired and

position out of action while the

damaged

the supply area.

Fire control center battery

commanders

is

shown

after strikes by parafrags. Set

binoculars, second dugout from

IMPACT -

BESTOWS

left

MEDAL

To the 13th AF PI genius who identified the water buffalo as "female" in this recon photo taken in north Borneo, IMPACT makes the above

award.

Even

RAF

PI experts

regard this feat with awe.

56

Confidential

Itjre

good work

\>\

B-25s of

13tli

AF: here we

see

them

at-

Sandakan. Jap supply and shipbuilding center in Upper photo is over-the-shoulder look rtliern Borneo. om one of two Mitchells, just after hitting dock housing. k

A moment

later

i

lower photo) othci

i...ii,i.

and B-25s arc over shipbuilding area.

i.ui-i- aiv

.-i.i..

Devastation proves

effectiveness of the 13th's previous attacks, which left only

charred bones of shipbuilding shops.

Note camouflage.

ASIA ROUNDUP

continued

Railway yards and adjacent in 14th

I

AF

>liops at

recon photos of 26

Hanoi are shown

November 1944.

Damage I

assessment, after dropping of 320 250-lb. demos shows 45 cars destroyed, nearly 100 damaged.

'-

m^ /

i

'w

^^am^^^gt^B

/

iV^^^H fin

1^

CAHS ANCf.

1>SSTR0YED

2/ f r.

V

\

iSI^^H

4.

Juicy target

is first

day's

is

attack

struck by 17 Libs on 27 Nov. First on rolling stock crowded into yards.

Next day, 17 more Libs drop 204 500-lb. demos to cause damage and destruction to yards and shops.

extensive

;

USES INSTALLMENT PLAN TO DESTROY ITS BIGGEST TARGETS A

•;amccock

Miiall.

force,

air

llic

often compelled to go after

14tli is

its

biggest targets on the installment plan. How this pays off is seen in these

photos of the two-day attack on the Gia railway yards at Hanoi. French

Lam

Novemher

Indo-(;hina. in

1914.

Vinh railway shops out of commission (IMPACTT. Vol. II. No. 4 1, the Gia Lam yards became Transportation Target No. 1 in Indo-China. Hecon photos of 26 November showed 18.'^ cars jammed on the sidings, three times the usual numAfter the

The

ber.

against

put the

fill

1

14th"s quarterbacks decided

thinly

a

tack over the

|)attcrned

whole

single at-

target, settled in-

on missions for two successive

stead

days, in order to deal two concentrated

The

knockout blows.

was aimed

first

the rolling stock, to be dusted ofT

at

before

could

it

roll

shops.

repair

the

on; the second, at Seventeen B-24s

went each day and scored heavily.

SVartIs and •

shops, or what

is

left

of them are here shouii after both

attacks.

Key: car shop

1

(

)

x 90'.

.'^05'

25%

destroyed; car shop (21 110' x 90', 50%; car shop (3) 300' x 70'. 40%; shop bidg. (4) 155' x 60'.

100%-;

100' x shop bldg. (5i 100%^; shop bldg. (6) 135' x 40'. 125' 100%: .shop bldg. (7) x 70'. 100%f shop bldg. (8) 25' x 25'.

40'.

;

100%; 100%;

10%

100%-; 35'.

55' x 20'.

(9)

(10) 50' quarters bldg. (11) 60' x freight bldg. 12) 25' x 15'.

prob. control bldg.

10%;

X 20'. 50'.

bldg.

.storage

:

(

(13)

bldg.

station

125'

x

14) 75' x 20'. storage bldg. (15) 160' x 20'. car repair shop (16) 110' x

25%

;

.storage bldg.

100%; 100%; .50'. 15%; shop bldg. 10% shop bldg. 181 (

;

(

(17) 50' x 25'.

\0%;

35' x 30'.

19 145' x 65', 100%, shop bldg. (20) 120' X 30', 40%p; stor-

car repair shop

au'c

bldg.

storage storage

)

(

110'

(21)

(23)

bldg.

X

20',

100%o;

90%:

70' x 25'.

(22)

bldg.

120'

x

20'.

100%c; storage bldg. (24) 40' x 20'. 100%c; storage bldg. (25) 100' X 20'. 100%c; 3 quarters bidgs. (26) 35' x 30' ea.. all 3.

bldg.

(27)

70'

quarters bIdgs.

(

28

x I

100%; quarters 15'. 100%: 5 70' x 15' ea.. all

100%: quarters bldg. (29) 40' x 35'. 100%: quarters bldg. (.301 35' X 2.V. 10%.

.5.

Continued on next papr (,.,,li,lr,itiul

•'^ UP On

the

northern flank of the vast

battlefront

Pacific

which

PARAMUSHIRU

IN

Paramushiru.

lies

has been turned

in recent years

into a sort of minor-league

Gibrahar

by the Japs. Ahhough not much is happening here at the moment, they feel that they must keep 50,000-60,000 troops on Paramushiru, not knowing when a haymaker may be thrown at

Only B-25

in 77th

riaht during attack

Squadron lost lu mci on Toroshima Ketto

ainiat't in

I'M

Nov. Oscar

1

iiokirit; at

i

ow.

ieftj

bores

in.

them from the north. It is these troops, their installations, and the ships supplying them which have occupied the attentions of the 11th Air Force since the Aleutian

Jap fishing

campaign ended. fleet also gets its

A

large

share of

attention.

Despite

bad

notoriously

weather

conditions, the 11th has been banging

away with

at

the

gusto.

on

Japs

Paramushiru

The economy

of

their

almost daily low-level strikes is well illustrated by the record of a B-25 squadron which suff'ered only one loss to

enemy

plane

is

aircraft during 1944.

shown under

the target for the

Target on 6 Nov. ing Paramushiru.

day below.

is

That

attack at right,

Toroshima

Now smoking Oscar breaks

badly, B-25 slowly swings Low losses result from

off.

Retto, a small island adjoin-

Besides strafing the Jap garrison there

to

starboard, will crash in a

tight formations. flying

(see photo), four B-25s sank

on

two power barges, damaged

four others, got one Zeke (sure), and one Oscar (probable).

:

X

you see

it

in flight

— AAF's spectncular

rn'w jel-propvUi'd fighter, the

Thv r-HO

Is luisii 1o rill

from an old-lime fighter ace. the AAF's P-8() is Not only that, it's easy to fly. Since its introduction IMPACT. Voh II. No. 9) the P-80.

Take

it

;ally hot.

(

'"Shooting Star."' has developed and before the end of this year should be in combat. ere's what Col. Bruce K. Holloway. former 14th AF grouj) ommander. who has flown the 80. has to say about it First of all. the cockpit is very simple. There are only iree engine instruments to keep track of. in contrast to six r more in a standard pursuit. Better still, all you have to andle is one lever, the throttle no pitch control, no mixjre control and no blowers. You don't have to warm it up. ecause the jet engine's full rated thrust is available about jcently

christened

the

ipidly

—

seconds after starting.

"At

first

may seem a bit hard to taxi isn't much rudder control

it

ecause there bout 60 '"In

mph

)f

power.

That's

you reach

doesn't take long to catch on. is

so

smooth and quiet

that

in a

impressed

a prop plane

iccelerate.

until

normal voice with the engine going full me most was the absolute lack of On takeoff the initial thrust and surge of power

\X'hat

'ibration. )f

it

contrast to a P-51. the 80

ou can talk >last.

I.AS. but

the P-80.

is

noticeably lacking.

You

don't .seem to

l)ut

rather have a constantly increasing feeling

You

roll

along and gradually gain flying speed. no torque. Flaps help on take-

3est of all. there is absolutely

"Shooting Star," over California.

because you need a much longer run in the P-80 than you do in a P-51. but that's true of any jet-propelled job. '"As soon as it picks up a little speed, you really begin \^'ith the constant thrust the jet to appreciate the power. gives, you still have the same terrific rate of acceleration at high speeds that conventional jobs have on take-off. Once the P-80 is wide open, it seems to float through the air very off,

easily. tion

at

other

t\

There's absolutely no sensation of tension or vibraall

when

it's

opened up.

in

direct contrast to

any

pe of plane.

marvelous with the cockpit so far forward. is beautiful as long as ample speed is maintained. The power-boosted ailerons help greatly here. It has a fine rate of roll, but can't turn at low speeds as "Visibility

On

is

acrobatics the 80

well as an orthodox plane. "It's

actual

apt to fool you coming in for a landing, not on the

landing

itself,

because like

all

tricycle gear planes

hard to judge your entry into traffic. It takes much longer to slow down, because even with the jet off there still remains some thrust and there's no effect of prop drag to slow you up. If you're undershooting, it's wise to remember that a sudden burst of power won't have the immediate effect it does with a prop because there is no quick reaction similar to the effect of prop blast it's

a pipe to land, but because

on the control surfaces.

It

it's

really

is

a cinch to fly."

Continued on next page

!^i&^

P-80 continued

v^

'^m^

X

Cockpit arrangement of the I'-HO

is

simplirily

How P^SO^s

Here^s To understand how

the awe-inspiring P-80

flies

it is

sary to have a basic knowledge of the principle of

pulsion and

how

it

itself, arlitally

neces-

jet

pro-

applies to the P-80"s General Electric

type 1-40 engine shown on the opposite page.

The way

works can be seen (by following the diagrams at top. opposite. Air is drawn in through intake ducts and screened before entry into the engine. The free air flows into a high-speed compressor similar to a turbo-supercharger. Thick arrows represent highly-compressed air which then passes into a combustion arrows)

the engine

in the

chamber, one of ten such units that help make up the 1-40 engine. By the combustion of kerosene, the fuel at present being employed in the P-80, temperature of the compressed air is raised rapidly with a correspondingly great increase in pressure. Sufficient energy is obtained from the turbine to drive the compressor and accessories. Energy remaining in the gas, represented by streamlined arrows, is used to produce the high-velocity jet. Terrific thrust is developed through reaction to this discharge, much similar to the

62

easier

/<»

eherk than

lluil

of

I

he familiar AT-6.

det Engine Works eflfect

of pressure

Advantages of

coming out of

jet

a garden hose nozzle.

propulsion units over conventional

engines are numerous.

Among

air-

most important is that they will operate with almost any type of low grade, inexpensive fuel. Complex cooling mechanisms, oil coolers and large oil tanks are eliminated. Cooling is accomplished craft

the

by using only a small fraction of the air taken in intake ducts.

pressor there

Drag is

is

thus greatly reduced.

In

to the

the com-

an ample source of air for cabin pressur-

makes it pospower plant and fuselage to an absolute minimum. Landing gear weight is lessened, the mechanism simplified. Servicing is improxcd. izing, a feature of the P-80.

sible

to

reduce

ground

Absence of

clearance

])rops

of

Better aero-dynamic characteristics are obtained. tion of

Elimina-

continuous ignition firing improves radio reception.

Details of performance of the 1-40 engine and the P-80 ratHiot yet be revealed, but sharp eyes will see that the air-

speed indicator (at the top. left-hand side of the instrument panel above

I

is

calibrated to 700

mph.

Confidential

rilllNE WIEEl

HIR INTAKE DUCT

TYPE 1-41 lET PROPULSION ENGINE

Length of the type 1-40

jet

propulsion engine helotv

is

8

ft.,

7,2 in.; diameter: 51 in.; weight: 1,900 lbs.

Continued on next page Confidential

63

.^•^

Heal ( 1,000° C) from

jfl shotcs

prominently

Frontal view shows air-intake duets and

in this rieic of I'-HO.

armament

Mote the target battleship on Miiror hike.

of six .50-eal. nigs.

Span of "Shooting Star"

is

39

frri.

I

ni< r-l<>< (lied wiiif! unil

'roflle

forward cockpit are prominent from ahoie. dross ueipht of the P-80

of the P-fiO shoirs length of

32

feet.

is

11,8HH pounds.

I'oicer-hoosled ailerons increase performance at hiuh speeils.

m

w

^ HAPLESS HUNS HIT THE SILK-AND OFTEN The

five

Kraut pilots shown

liere

are lucky.

They

suc-

ceeded in getting overboard before their planes exploded

up from the effects of American .50 calilier Of these five, two or three may have bailed out over Germany, may not have broken ankles or legs on landing, may still be fighting for the Fuehrer. Hundreds of their or otherwise broke bullets.

comrades, however, have not been so fortunate. This continued drain of experienced pilots has contributed to the present low fighting value of the GAF. This is not so much the result of a pilot shortage, but rather

is

due

to a

reduction

The hot fliers are replaced by pilots not so hot, whose chances of becoming hotter are fairly remote. There are too few good flying fields, too little in the level of pilot

experience.

gas to conduct a proper training program.

TV.i

CONFIDkNilAL — CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH

-fer^of t!^••-:, Umtf^ Mitts ..:-.r :i- --.• ..r : : J I. i. L.. i\ Aod 32, 2* amcsied. TransmUtton or rrv'r!alk>n of coQtrr.tf tn ar.y manner to uaaulhoriz«d pcrtoai it prohibiird by law. Prjntoi mr.h approval of tic Bureau of ttc Budget. Eieculivc OSce of the PraiJenl. •

-

^

NAZI

U

ROCKET ZOOMS BETWEEN

6 17 NACELLES

OFFICE OF THE ISTRIBUTION:

QUADRONS

Vol.111

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF. INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON,

0. C.

M^^

MARCH, 1945

^/J^

IMPACT

..x\>

March, 1945

CONTENTS

\

9th AF: Operations and 2

Results

Bombing of

-

14

Situation

15

Berlin

German Gasoline

-

-

Miscellany

16

Psychological

Bombing

Bridge Lessons from

-

-

18

22

Italy

"Snafu Snatchers"

-

-

-

25

Shoran and Azon

-

-

-

28

Jap Air Power

-

-

-

36

-

41

FEAF

in

AF

13th

{

the Philippi nes

"Snoopers

J\

>r

'

Back Cover

CLASSIFICATION: sification text,

is

Overall clas-

of IMPACT, including CONFIDENTIAL. To in-

sure that this overall classification recognized, even when pages are torn out for instructional purposes, every single sheet has been stamped is

CONFIDENTIAL

on at least one This does not refer to specific photographs. The correct individual classification for every photograph in the issue is given below: side.

FRONT COVER THROUGH 13: UNCLASSIFIED 14-15: 16:

CONFIDENTIAL

BOTTOM

PAIR, CONFIDENTIAL;

REST, UNCLASSIFIED 17-18: UNCLASSIFIED

19-21: RESTRICTED

22-35: CONFIDENTIAL

37: UNCLASSIFIED 41-45: UNCLASSIFIED

46-47: TOP left, confidential: REST, UNCLASSIFIED

48: TOP, confidential: bottom,

UNCLASSIFIED 49: UNCLASSIFIED

50-51: CONFIDENTIAL

BACK COVER: UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

^-v >-lk^irf-—

^wi^

^" ioA^J

m

AF UBS LEAVE PALAU TO HIT JAPS ON LUZON See p. 41

Wham

goes another Nazi fuel dump, this one at Zell near First U. S. TAF B-26s did the trick.

Strasbourg, on 2 Feb.

Dispersed by 9th AF

man convoy

strafing attacks on 22 Jan., this Ger-

Bulge

fleeing the

is

easy meat for the fighters.

9AF Smashing Windup American THAT maturity was amply

to

the

tactical air

Ardennes

Bulge

power has reached

its

Battle full

demonstrated in the closing stages of eliminating the Ardennes Bulge. The 9th Air Force, on the basis of this great performance alone, can await with confidence the coming climactic battle for Germany. Despite our losses in late December and January, this is a fact: the 9th AF did far more damage to von Rundstedt's armies in the open than would have been possible

much

had he kept them under cover of the Siegfried Line. Constant escort to the German withdrawal provided by TAG units in a large measure is responsible for the present comparative ease with which General Patton's Third Army is penetrating the Westwall near Priim. The Nazis are now trying to hold us back in this area with divisions below mini-

mum

size for effective defensive operations.

No airman

has ever contended that air and air alone off"ensive. even in perfect weather.

could make or break an

Yet the destruction of German armored columns shown on these pages can stand as a textbook example of tactical air power soundly applied under correct air-force doctrine. Together with the Falaise Gap, Dasburg in Germany will long have a special significance in the Wehrmachts book of bitter memories. Here on 22 Jan. a classic instance of tactical teamplay between bombers and fighters resulted in calamity for the fleeing Germans. Traffic jammed on main and secondary roads within 10 miles of Dasburg was under strafing and dive-bombing attack by groups of Tactical Air Command fighters when two B-26 groups dropped 96.5 tons on the highway bridge over the Our river. Damage to bridge approaches was sufficient to stall movement from west of the river and to enable the fighters to really pour it on. Combined with claims of transport on other roads out of the Ardennes, XIX TAG alone was able to report 1.808

Was

Costly

a

Experience

for

the

Germans

or damaged, more than doubling the September 1944 against retreating columns south

destroyed

vehicles

record of

1

of the Loire river in France.

Farther north on the same day Thunderbolts of IX TAG were having themselves a time. Although only three groups were in the air, 1,029 motor vehicles were destroyed or damaged, together with 82 armored vehicles and tanks. Pilots cheerfully reported that

many

soldiers in the strafed

columns wore the black uniforms of hated SS units. Equally important in this period was the role of 9th AF bombers. While fighters worked over the highways and gun positions,

the

mediums maintained

interdiction

lines

in

back of the front. Often forced by bad weather to employ PFF methods of the HBs, they kept major road and rail bridges between Cologne and the Moselle in a constant state of disrepair, as

is

evident in the picture at the right.

While enemy transport underwent this rough treatment, XXIX TAG was busily reducing the available supply of rolling stock in strikes on rail lines and marshalling yards. Because of its one day's work on 22 January, the enemy had to write off 879 railroad cars and 16 locomotives. Air statistics tend to become monotonous, but the 9th AF's claims for the week 22-29 January, when weather as always left

much

to

be desired, are worth repeating:

Types

Destroyed & Damaged

Motor Vehicles Armored Vehicles and Tanks

8,185

Railroad Gars Locomotives

2,871

This

is

460 53

a staggering total of 11.569 pieces of heavy equip-

German logisticians nervous breakdowns. Small wonder POWs report that their greatest fear is the "Jabo" abbreviated German for fighter-bomber.

ment, enough to give

rning

Hun

transport

Rotten weather

made

litters

Black columns

road near Dasburg on 22

strafing attacks extremely tough.

of

smoke stream from two Nazi trucks near

Eight others damaged

Schuadtheim.

line

the highway.

II.

tire

landscape around

rail

and road junctions near Euskirchen has been changed by 8th and 9th AF bombs

r'j^. ^'3

l^*^

.

>^l
1 i

^k (paj

1

'^

jsS^.

H

>^

^^ .,

7^ '^

t

^ ^^

1

4

J

IE _4

b

'^>M% L.

,.

fm-\ *sifc^-

^

>

\^

9th

AF

z^^'r-

continued

>-;

^/' •^

3^^ *^'j

.»*-uu»-

,:AJ**

Jtfii^'

flK&4^-^

r

I

7 This

is

how

a ISazi road convoy looks to a '^dicing" 9th

The Recon Planes Confirm Fighter Claims The series of consecutive pictures above illustrates one way tactical reconnaissance pilots operate in ETO. Usually the recon flier is the first to spot enemy columns and troop concentrations and reports their exact location by grid coordinates to the fighters. In this case, the pilot to see just

what dive bombers and

is

checking up

strafers did to this

enemy

AF

tac

recon

pilot.

Farther up the road wrecked trucks

convoy retreating from the Bulge between St. Vith and Schonberg, Belgium. From the angle of the pictures it can be observed that the plane was banked slightly in a shallow dive and was probably going like a pregnant fox in a forest fire. Technique in ETO for such a reconnaissance run would be to come jinking in up-wind so that there would be less chance of sound-detection. The presence of three 20 mm light flak weapons in the

Confidential

i

<^

^

^•1-1^

II

of strafing fighlen on

ight-hand side of the

22 January.

last

picture

He

flies

proves that the

rishl ihrotiiih fire of three

Hun

knows perfectly well the greatest threat to his operations is a combination of flsable weather and the 9th AF. The proportion of Hak allotted by the Germans to their troops in the Bulge proved higher than in any previous similar operation of this war's history. Nazi flak units were given tiighest priorities in fuel and ammunition. According to P<)\\ reports. 545 light flak weapons and 198 heavy guns

Confidential

-4

-<

suns (smoke puffs

al

right).

(exclusive of numerous self-propelled units covered the Bulge from HoufFalize westward alone. So efficient was their organization that no communications center in the Bulge wa^ without an adequate flak defense. Despite such rugged going, between 15 January and 2 February only six 9th AF recon planes were lost during 1.IM12 sorties. Tuni the page to see how night reconnaissance supplements the performance of the day recon fliers. i

Continued on next pagr

Night

No Longer

\^ hen 9th AF claims read, as they did on Valentine's Day, "... 1.039 railroad cars and 49 locomotives were

destroyed tion.

.

.

.

Fighters

."

it

know

is

from an accidental proposiwhere to go and precisely the

far

just

juicy targets they'll find, thanks to the great

work

be-

ing done by tactical reconnaissance. Newest and most unique partner in the tac recco team is the 155th Photo

Reconnaissance Squadron, photography shown here. Night recon

is

specializers

in

night

the

particularly important from

Novem-

ber to February in ETO. when there are twice as hours of darkness as of photographic light.

many Two

methods are used. The first, the M-46 photo flash bomb, is best for medium altitude coverage. Acting

Protects the much

Enemy

news photographer's flash bulb, an 18second delay M-111 fuse causes the bomb to burst well below and behind the plane. A light of terrific intensity (700 million candle power) and of very short a

like

duration

I

150 milliseconds)

actuates

camera so as

to receive

a photo cell peak reflected

which

trips the

light.

The second method, involving no delay

as with

Edgerton electric flash, better for low altitude work. A high-voltage discharge lamp mounted in the plane illuminates the area covered and is svnchronized with the K-19 camera. M-46.

the

is

the

Greatest problem of night reconnaissance navigation. (see

Radar has done much

page 28)

should be the

to solve

final

is it.

accurate

Shoran

answer.

1000 FT I

¥3 t^sf^/aes

Caught

in act of advancing from

Four nights

later considerable

Germany

Hun

into Belgium

activity

is

is

a Nazi convoy on the night of 22 Dec, 1944

observed around Mont, just north of Houjfalise (page

10).

^^ but the yard

Althou;;h as a rule due to liferent lifting in the exposures, the pictures used is panorama were unusual in that they provided rnt stereo corerage. During the left-to-right run the target (as riewed below) one flash bomb was •ed for each exposure to insure maximum rvvcrage. idinfES,

is still »cr>-ircablc.

h

i

*C

^

^

//

.^

^ i

'---,/

\

*

Continued on nexf page

\

An ex-town

in the ex-Bulge

is

A camouflaged patrol advances

Houjfalize, Belgium, victim of 9th AF's into shattered St. Vith,

pounded

mediums and

to hits hy 9th

fighters plus shellfire

AF (IMPACT,

Vol.

Ill,

No. 2)

Bridges arc overliead.

slrirtly

no place

as evidenced by

to

he when TA("

P-1-7.S

positions of these two

an-

German

armored vehicles factor

in

in Hel-iiiim.

routinp

Attacks like this were a prime

Von Kundstedt's midwinter advance. Continued on next page

('ii'ltlilrlllidi

911 Ht cominuea

DooMe

paroflr again!

9th

AF

fighters catch a

locomo-

live on a bridge across the M«Melle River ngmrJLxt

bmK^ and

paiith

iM both

in

one bomMnjg i^

«

W iii

g-*1

a-

41

SiSi Bf S-i

era

/l?^^^

5maH wonder

the Nazi government has quit Berlin for ISUrnherg

Here's definite proof that there isn't

BERLIN

much

left

of Nazi-

dom's former nerve center. The picture above is of the

Wilhelmstrasse area following the devastating visual daylight strike on 3 February by 937 8th AF B-17s. At a cost of 34 Forts, the 8th added 2,266 tons of

already caused by incessant

age has been done

14

to

RAF

HE

to the ruins

night attacks. Severe dam-

an area approximately one and a half

—

this

is

the heart of the capital

miles square, including Anhalter Station (1)

and Allied Insurance Haus den Crafts (3) ;

GAF

Office

(2)

Flieger,

;

the

;

on 8 Feb.

Europa House

Museum

of Arts and

Hermann Goering's

office as

Wertheim's stores Reich Presidential State Railway Directorate (7) (6) Air Ministry (9) Ministry of Transport Chancellery (8 (10) Post Office and National Post Office Museum (11) and Goering's office as President of Prussia (12). Other

chief of the

(4)

;

Prussia House (5)

;

;

;

I

;

;

;

;

outlined areas include destroyed residential buildings.

Confidential

Anyone using petrol the

for purposes other than

immediate conduct of operations a

considered

saboteur

be

will

and court-martialled

stallations at

Oswiecim

at

AF (IMPACT,

in Silesia

and

Poland, once frequent targets for the 15th Vol. Ill, No. 2). Immediately threatened by

Red Army's advance

often-bombed Piilitz, Germany's Not far ahead of the Russians in the area around Leipzig lie seven huge plants at Briix, Merseburg/Leuna, Lutzkendorf. Zeitz, Magdeburg. Bohlen and Ruhland. The past two months they have been subjected to tremendously successful day and night attacks by the 8th AF and particularly the RAF. Briix and Piilitz are at present inoperative (as of 15 Feb.). The same probably holds true for Merseburg/Leuna, Zeitz, and Lutzkendorf. Magdeburg received major Blh AF visits on 3, 9 and 15 February. The 15th AF has hit Moosbierbaum hard, including the largest single attack it has ever mounted, on 31 January, when it cut lose with 1,356 tons by PFF. Synthetics in the Ruhr are also completely inactive. Because of the recent increased tempo of the oil campaign, production for February may be knocked even lower than indicated in the

without mercy.'

Blechhammcr North and South in

is

largest single producer of gasoline.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt must have been when he recently issued the above general order to

I

Iroops on the Western Front.

loncerncd him

;

advances

-Ian

,1

(I-

l>

to

less

than 20 percent of

began

level

its

April

in

I.

I

the

iLili

I

'

gasoline production

Consumption is now limited to production. Germans are still producing almost 100,000 fuel monthly (25 percent being low grade benzol), i\e exhausted their reserves and are now living in a

I'

hi

German

strategic air offensive against oil

ilie

\

that

is

reduced by American and British air attacks and

M

I

mouth

'

]•

this ris,

it

s

II

i;ii

i

should not

concerned.

critical

that

they

unable to launch another counteroffensive like the advance. By saving up gasoline and making some short, notably the Luftwaffe, they could scrape

enough

r

is

enemy ground and air be expected that bombing can ever

Germans" fuel situation io

ihe I'f

fashion as far as gasoline

has greatly hampered

'ver-all

oil

picture becomes even

more

inter-

GAF

and the aviation gasoline needed High octane gas is almost entirely in the synthetic plants shown on the map below, i>ne crude oil refinery, Moosbierbaum near Vienna, oiluce some aviation gasoline, -ian advances have overrun the major synthetic inII

I

lie

terms of the

it

I

in

the air.

cl

map shows NOBTM

Synthetic

oil

plants cannot be easily dis])ersed and relo-

cated as were the aircraft complexes. to

fuel to start a limited offensive.

German

the chart below.

rebuild, repairs

still

further attacks occur.

Despite frantic efforts

require several

weeks even

reports

the contrary,

All

to

if

cannot be readily put underground because of tremendous problems involving headspace and ventilation.

The

GAF

can put forth only occasional large-scale efforts

as during the early stage of the Bulge campaign.

Although

plenty of fighter planes are available, the Luftwaffe's gas

supply

is

now quite unable

the locations of Germany^s last aviation gasoline plants.

to

keep pace with

Dark areas mark

Allied lines

its

demands.

on 14 Feb.

St

GERMAN AVIATION GASOLINE SITUATION

srlfifHAM

,

no

they

' ''iH^'

jrtiliiiiiiM>iiiiiiiiifiiiiiiiwi*ir

wmi

MONTHLY PRODUCTION AS COMPARED TO PRE ATTACK CAPACITY

<^" 20;

2?.

27 V

19-

31 X'

i

MISCELLANY IMPACT has on hand interesting pictures not

Occasionally

related to articles being prepared. Since most of these pictures are of interest at the

and

much of pa^e two such as this will appear

time,

later lose

their value, a

or

frequently

in

future issues.

75mm gunners crouch 13th AF B-2SS strafe Kendori.

Surprised Nip as

catchall

Top: 10th AF "Earthquakers" drop fire bombs to neutralize beaches at Myebon, Burma, for British landing forces. Below: the bombs hit.

The Mitteland Canal (left) at Gravenhorst, Germany, used to be an Important Nazi route of supply. The

RAF paid It two visits, on the nights of 22 Nov. 1 944 and 1 Jan. 1945, after which it looked like this.

burning engine caused the crash-landing of this B-17 near Steinbourg, France. After the crew bailed the pilot set her down, and although he clipped off the pole in foreground, his in|uries were minor.

ut,

ultures lilt

observe no

one crashed

pattern above Calcutta, wing tank and stuck there.

traffic

Into a

It a midwinter tcene at a 1 5th AF base In Italy. Pretty picture, but not for tho beyt who live there.

This

*#*

Paper bombs on Burma on military installations Asiatic theater

18

is

-*^^

««*.

different

down in wake of B-24 attack Pak Nem Phau. Distribution in from that in Europe, as targets

rain

at

and

and pin-point principle and troop population is denser, saturation technique has been found most effective. in East is

used.

In

in Pacific are scattered,

ETO, where

the civil

Confidential

<(illcl

''There

lellinf! ISazis

is

no middle way" shoux

leatli-ls

which

Ir

planes drop on the

cause

that

doubt

soldiers bringing tillimaliini to

enemy

and fear

ht/

Aachen garrison.

thv

AAF

are to

along his nerves, cutting down his eagerness for

and

ordeal

ii

AAF

bombs

:-\chological

>.

.

Bombing

1^sffeltol0pyi€al rWV.

I

logical iiakes

for

warfare

this

is

propaganda of

his

own

leaders.

as old as conflict itself, but total

technique possible on an enormous scale

now be fairly definitely measured, through German and Japanese prisoners. That ii'imber crews on leaflet missions are not just dropping 'iii is shown by many available figures, such as the cfTectiveness can

iilarly

'

!

77 percent of all German prisoners France either carried leaflets in their pockets or ail used them to surrender. Psychological bombardment becomes increasingly imi)ne attesting that

'

!

,

M-d in

war seems nearer, and is particuretreating and severely shelled from Northern Europe reveal a stepping

ortant as the end of the \r\\

devastating

rmifs.

Statistics

iCii

against

Wo

p in the aerial distribution of this material by the special jafleting squadrons of the 8th and 9th .Air Forces and the

;AF (luring 19+1. In December 194.1 ertdropped in that area, in April

19.1 14..^0()

X'

leaflets

1944 there were 7.227.272. In December 1941. the combined air forces aised the figure to 106.319. -367 leaflets dropped (this really mounted to 245.949.771 "units," as some of the leaflets in le first count were a two-in-one type). The statistics are Iso high for Italy and the Balkans, and the count from he Far East, while not very great in 1944, is expected to go p considerably this year: between 1 October 1944 and 15 anuary 1915. the I'hili()|)ines alone were papered with !0.184.'350 units. 13.771.1.30 of them for Jap soldiers. This material

is

prepared by

0\^'I writers

'syrhological \^'arfare Division. heir

work

is

due

to

F'arl

V

HIER IM flu(t«ug«

i

I

information

to

settle

bets in the

WESTEN irr

Wtit«n.

D
ein-

turn

iionunlifvn cingetetit

-N.

•^UDEN ruBd Die

75

IS-

der

d«uuch««

reic^en

ic^on

J»|ef

Keutc

mchr »ut. u"^ d'e l»b«ni«.clMil«n Vtrkthn- und Produknicht

of the effectiveness of

[OAunUjen

vor

dt'

Z«m3run|

which

proved especially formidable in the case of the leaflet lewspapers that are dropped on German troops: prisoners ndicale how they have come to rely upon these journals its

?

Schutl der Verkchrt- gnd Produk-

Morg.o

las

vhen they use

«ind

ichli«f|lich

and the .Army's

their principle of truth-telling,

sind die

deutschen Jager

POU

Another way of gauging the efl'ectiveness of these eaflets is by the reactions of the German and Japanese leaders. But threats and drastic punishments have not pre.ented their people and armies from reading and being ifl^ected by the pamphlets that flutter down from our planes.

k

X

'-.'yAj^r^U-VrZ*"'

lollen


|if»r

luch no
:amps.

Confidential

"Vi here are German fighters?" asks strategic leaflet showing Allied bomb damage. This was printed in London and not. like tactical ones, on mobile presses in the field. Continued on next page 19

PSYCHOLOGICAL BOMBING

continued

iPofftetfij&etn 9*1 WiUf4< S«lt«t,

Mr

kidcn 9ani
o»t<

k«nit< 'I" •>• 3«i4«« ftiMt «tr<>4ni SiU
Mc6».

Ct

^t

1lii(»ru4 *u| tkl»|tt«iiiif uuft, vtnii

Mli(. ir]lli
tfi

vick

|»

kclk

ivif

mtfUt)

•(faltrrajMt calftnit.

/l-r^'^r. EMgliscke Vbtrsttvtttg nachuehcul.

ab AnwHsumg am

die

attitenen

Sie dttmt

Vofpazum.

SAFE CONDUCT is

The Gcrauo soUicr who caniet this safe contntt wiac it as a siga of his gtouine wish to (ive

UoHcIf Hf.

He

is

to be

disarmed,

to

be well

loiAed after, to receive food aad aiedical attention as required, aad to he rtauned from the daofer

Safe conduct and fair treatment under terms of Hague and Geneva conventions are guaranteed by Gen. Eisenhower to surrendering German soldiers who lay down arms, remove helmet and belt, walk toward Allied lines waving one of these passes.

TVo

picture panels from

leaflet

friendly Lolo tribesmen in Western to

20

dropped

in

China

to

Yunnan show them how

recognize grounded American airmen and get them to

Air threat to Japan is pictured in leaflet whose reverse warns civilians to stay away from military objectives. Ja} harder to demoralize than Germans, who surrender oftenei fatalistic subjects of Mikado. Japanese do not give up e

safety.

Since literacy level of tribe

are effective. lives of

is

low, simple pictures

Leaflets of this type are responsible for saving

many American airmen

in

remote areas.

and leader? shaken. Face-saving an words like "lay down are used instead of "surrender." In 6 mos.. Burma ratio s killed to those raptund fell from 114:1 to 20:1.

Iiave faith i

<

in ideals

soldiers believed ready to quit;

iiiii

series suggests good-luck coins Nip soldiers carry. puns (a favorite Japanese mode of expression

j;.ii u.-es

on popular slogans to emphasize coming disaster.

(

One way hero,

of undermining

shown by this mocked by Japanese

leaders

is

king, asks Nips

why

Nip

soldiers"

confidence

in

their

which an ancient Chinese writers for drowning himself for his

leaflet,

they throw

in

away

lives in a suicidal war.

.Monroe bombs, each containing »MJ(J
ETO

bv B-17s of 8th AF. 21

Truss bridges

like this

water.

one northwest of Orte are usually

girder.

and

Strikes (a), (b),

bombs fused .1/.025;

put out of commission by hits that smash piers and abutments or knock the strongly built truss off them into the

Id

(c), above,

were by 1,0001b.

(a) left truss intact, (b)

split south pier; 500-lb.

bombs

damaged one

finished the job.

BRIDGE LESSONS FROM ITALY One

made of the bombs and their

of the most valuable studies yet

ship of various types of aerial

relation-

of the narrow spans, but those wider than 22

fuses to

least

bridge destruction has come from the Ordnance section of the 12th Air Force, which has been conducting ground sur-

to

the

Po

last year, a

party of Ordnance

officers

from the

terrain.

targets

for the

MAAF

in

enemy-held

The inspecting group studied reconnaissance,

.;

iwi r-

.1--

Narni, were hit at (b) and (c) falling debris of tower

22

.

north end of highway bridge near ;

the

damaged support and

made north end

of truss collapse.

of

required

at

all

types of span, as this permits

penetration

before explosion.

For

;

masonry bridge

Reinforced concrete structures are even more difficult to destroy, and steel-truss spans are toughest of all they require more than one hit, in a concentrated area, on to

collapse.

—

How this kind of bridge, and the others, can be most effectively knocked out, is shown in the photos on this and the following two pages. (When two fusings parallel girders.

demolished by the retreating Germans that exact bomb damage could not be fixed. The survey showed that 500-lb. bombs could collapse most

Abutment and toner,

amount

they are close to piers, hardly ever cause a

strike,

and damage-assessment photos of these targets, then determined on the spot the location and effect of each hit, and noted the measurements and construction of every bridge. The final report dealt with 29 of the targets that had been visited; many of the others were found to be so thoroughly

aLi-i

be most destructive to right

ft.

fusing delay of .01 seconds proved

made by its perforation. Detonations beneath arches rarely do much harm ground shock from near misses, even when

12th and 15th air forces examined 50 of the bridges that

had been primary

A

masonry bridges a delay of .025 seconds is equally effective except when spans are so thin that the bomb might pass through without causing much more damage than the hole

veys of the effect of air attacks on targets in central Italy. After the "Strangle" operation forced the Germans north of the

1,000-pounders.

.1 / .025. first figure is for head, second for tail; stands for instantaneous fusing.)

are given, as initial (I )

,

South abutment,

dropped is

hit at

(a)

by 1.000-lb.

GP

fused

truss into river, indicating that .01 seconds

sufficient

to

delay

destroy masonry supports of truss bridges.

Confidential

|

Completeness of destruclion

ful for the job.

20

would have been increased, and sary to complete the destruclion

lo two west piers of this wide railway bridge near Perugia by 1.000-Ib. bombs suggests that 5()0-lb. GPs might liave been sufficiently powerft.

i in- lliiiruii^liiie^? uilii uliich this highway overpass near Acquasparla was smashed by two 1,0001b. GPs with I/. 025

fii-iiiir

ijiows the vulnerability of non-reinforced concrete.

Had

lliey

betii used, the probability of

the

number of

miizlil

hit.-

sorties neces-

ha\c been dirrca-i-d.

Near Misses

at (ai and lb) cracked piers and spans of this narrow railway overpass near Perugia, and although made l)y

l.(IOO-lb.

bombs

they did not render bridge impassable.

^Ml^i^: >••

Span of highway hridpe

near Rome.

rated but not demolished by 500-lb.

are

1

Ifl. wiilo.

bomb.

preferable against such strongly

was

pc>rfo-

l.OOO-pounders

reinforced concrete.

Direcl hits liy 5(l(l-lb. bombs tiiat knocked out old. 18ft. wide highway bridge near Orvielo prove that they were correct type missile for this narrow structure of brick and stone.

Continued on next page Confidential

23

BRIDGE LESSONS

^I£^^£l^^

continued

^^^v^W '.V

K -r

-,'

'>iJ6i»>-^^:-^'; II ft.

took 1,000-lh. bombs wide highway bridge near Acquasparta. strong because

width

to shear in half two spans of 25-

and short spans.

Note

the

partial

Another example of correct bomb use

of

reconstruction.

is

this 15-ft.

Even

1,000-lb.

this 29-ft.

GFs

••^

•

'"^.r^.

did not entiieU denioiisii west span of

wide railway bridge near Ficulle; as in picture at bombs would have been inadequate for the job.

left, 500-11).

,'

,

wide bridge near Acquasparia destroyed by 500-lb. GPs.

^^^^M

"SNAFU SNATCHERS" Rescue Experiences The days Saving

"Rescue Cat" r life rafts.

of the \'Mh

AF

patrols the Pacific looking

Hescue missions average more than 10 hours.

the 13th Air Force

in

of hit-or-miss in air-sea rescue are gone forever.

fliers

forced

down

scientific a basis that

at

rescue

sea has been is

fast

placed on

becoming a

provided that correct ditching procedure

is

.so

certainty,

followed. Typical

of this streamlining are the achievements of the crack Second

Emergency Squadron of

Known

the Kith Air Force.

as the "Snafu Snatchers," this squadron was the

.AAF unit of its kind in the Pacific. In July 1944, it was assigned to the 5th A"F. from which it was transferred to the \'Mh last October. Using 0,A-10s (equivalent to Na\y PMYs). the 2nd Squadron retrieved HOO airmen from death or capture during the first six months of its activity. The squadron keeps planes in readiness for distress calls, and first

maintains

patrols,

but

its

principal

efforts

are

carefully

planned preventive measures; rescue is an integrated part of every field order of the 13th AF. Air crews have great confidence in the methods; a pilot recently picked out of the sea by the 2nd Squadron says, "It was my second ditching and

waving

who had no be rescued as Cat lowers its He was spotted because of Cats low searching altitude.

/ildly

his arms, this Australian pilot

gnaiing devices oats.

'axiint:

is

about

to

toward four survivors of a B-24 crew, a 13lh

I

wasn't worried about the rescue plane showing up

hoped

it

would

—

I

just

get there before tlark."

Continued on next page

AF

Catalina comes in for a rescue near Peleliu island.

—

Crew member who

harl

of

OA-10 searches

been 20 hours

"SNAFU SNATCHERS"

in

for

life raft

A tiny dot, hard to find, raft is 1(|{ three hours later. Crewmen usuall'ij

containing survivors of a B-25

the water after a mission to the Philippines.

continued

months gave the 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron an average of 1.6 per day, a percentage that was higher during the last two months of the period, when 134 men were rescued for an average of 2.2 per day. Saving

.300

men

in its first six

This increase was due

to

improvements

in

methods of sighting, reporting, and

searching, and also to the fact that longer-range missions to places like Balikpapan

and Luzon intensified hazards and forced more planes into the sea. These rescue stories are as exciting as any that Joseph Conrad wrote ahout this part of the world. There was. for example, the time last September when one of the Cats snatched a P-.38 pilot from a rough sea off the rocky shores of Waigeo island. Dutch New Guinea. The OA-10 became damaged making a landing amid the 20-foot high waves and. after the survivor was taken aboard, the Cat's pilot decided to remain afloat overnight because of the heavy seas; he kept the engines running to |)revent the aircraft from drifting into the rocks. The seasick crew spent the night bailing out the rocking plane, and at dawn a successful takeoff was made and the P-38 pilot was rushed to a hospital. Then there was the rescue of another Lightning pilot from heavy seas after an attack on Borneo oil in January 1945 again the Catalina was smashed in making a landing, and this time when it took off it skipped from swell to swell, getting

—

damaged with each bounce, but finally lifting to fly home safely. Also in January there was the quick rescue of an A-20 pilot near Ceram, under the pressure of attack by a Jap plane; and there was the lime twelve men of a B-24 crew were taken aboard a Catalina as an armed Japanese patrol boat sped toward them. Such incidents make up the daily entries of the 2nd Squadron's log book. Other squadrons are providing world-wide coverage for AAF units: the 3rd further

and 4th, also in the Pacific; the 5th in Europe and the 1st in the Mediterranean. The last-mentioned has been on duty since March 1944, and its members wear the Presidential (Citation. More squadrons are being organized, and B-17s equipped with "P lying Dutchman" lifeboats will soon be helping out. Other improvements

—such

as radar beacons

will be put in use as

26

and

reflectors, belter

soon as production

pyrotechnic signals and

facilities permit.

Downed airmen are helped aboard

life vests

4

Cat.

None of them were

v*

injured, an

Confidential

\

aboard dinghies; keep contact.

Girl" transmitters >lane$

and shore

chcd plane

stations

skillfully,

llowed ditching

and

and crew mem-

survival rules.

3

Kesciie plane is taxiini; ((.ward lall. uiih Mp-li.-ld i-land -i-eii in hackfrrouiul. light surgeon and enlisted medical personnel are ready to give first-aid. I-

Homeward

hciiind,

fatalities after rescue,

rest. The 2nd Kmergency Rescue Sqdn. has though the men are often Imrned or otherwise in;

nicii

\.

27

Shoran-equipped B-25s

hit center of

Bologna ammunition

dump

through 10/10 clouds on 15 December 1944,

New Bombing The development

SHORAN world, idea to

ing by the application

in

every

its

500-foot circle from 20,000 feet

is

still

the

not a bad

a radar scope take the place of the rather fuzzy target out-

successful

theater

now an old story, so old in fact that it remember once in a while that dropping

is

never be as good as the human eye unaided. Why not, then, apply radar in such a way that the human eye is eliminated. That is what is done in Shoran. Three small clear pips on

bomb-

of precision

USAAF, and

is

a

of

bomb

in a

a miraculous per-

line

produced by the

H2X

scope.

whenever the weather is good. Suppose, however, that the weather is bad, as in Western Europe in winter, or as in certain cloud-covered areas in Japan. Suppose the target is only 50 feet wide. Suppose you want to hit it at night. In

Shoran equipment was designed by the Radio Corporation of America and has been shepherded to its present operational state by the Office of the Air Communications Officer. It is light (650 pounds for each ground set, 290 pounds for the complete airborne set), readily transportable, and can be set up in a few hours. It can be used in any multi-place aircraft. Its signals are strong and resistant to jamming.

the light of these requirements, just how "precise" is our standard of precision? The AAF's answer to this question

How

formance. Yet we do times that we have

may

it

every day.

come

to

We

have done

it

so

many

expect results on that order

continuous experiments in the technique of bombing, two of which have paid off handsomely. be read in

The

its

first is Shoran, a bad weather device. Our bombing based on visual methods. For a long time that meant seeing the target in order to hit it. The development of H2X and similar radar equipment has recently made it possible for us to bomb unseen objectives by producing on a radar screen an image of the target. Another miracle, and a constantly improving one, but it suffers from one inherent weakness. It still depends on the eye, and at its best will is

28

Techniques

the System Operates

Shoran

is

limited

to

line-of-sight

range because of

its

However, these limitations are not very restricting. A plane operating at an altitude of 12.000 feet has a range of 173 miles around a ground station at an elevation of 200 feet. At 35.000 feet the range is 285 miles. Within these ranges distance has no effect on the accuracy of Shoran or the clarity of its signals. use of radar.

The other precision aid is Azon, a bomb for clear weather whose direction can be changed after it leaves the airplane. For Azons at work, see pages 32 through 35.

use.

Confidential

Shoran missiun, plane locales target by broadcasting signals

(I

>li'iran

works on a simple principle. A transmitter

in the

anr --ends a constant stream of impulses to each of two

-Iruments on the ground, wiiich re-transmit them l)ack to e

The time

|.lane.

trip is

•uiiii

and

it

takes these impulses to

make

the

converted into distance by the airborne equip-

shown

on two dials on the front of the ground jti ins is calculated with extreme accuracy. In a bombing rnllini the distance from each of them to the proposed is measured. These distances (known as Shoran coiliialesi are then set into the airborne equipment by IJM-ling two knobs, very much as information is set into a >nil -ight. The pilot takes off and flies in the direction of i-'et. either by ordinary navigation, or by a series of iken from the equipment by the Shoran operator. ent.

is

To

|iiiljnient.

1.M

1

in miles

start

with, the location of the two

t

I

Imaginary Circles

lie

irh

J

iruri.

ai

a

sooner or later pass directly over the target

point where

the

circle

rauii

around the other ground

tiirli

the plane

flies

is

intersects station.

a

The

similar circle station

around

called the drift station, the other

The functions of the two are interchangeThe plane can fly around either one. according to requirements of the mission.

thr rate station. Mi-. ^le

—

Accordingly, the drift pip is seen to be traveling towards the marker pip. At point B it has reached the marker pip. This immediately tells the operator in the plane

station.

that

do

The drawing above shows how

this

I

Icreen in the

tationarv.

plane has three pips on

and

is

he

is

now on

is

the imaginary circle.

All the pilot has to

a course which will keep these pips together, and

fly

he will eventually pass over the target at point X. He does this by watching two needles on a small pilot direction indicator which is wired to the Shoran set. Meanwhile, as he approaches X. the rate pip moves towards the marker pip. \^ hen it too reaches the marker pip. the plane is at X.

Correcting For Drift

imaginary circle is described around one station. radius equal to the distance from that station to the it is obvious that a plane flying around the perimeter

that circle will

I

the other two pips from it. The drift pip and rale pip move around the circular sweep of the radar scope towards the marker pip if the plane is approaching the line of their respective imaginary circles, away from it if the plane is moving away. At point K. the plane has taken off" from its own airfield and is approaching the circle around the drift

an

It

two ground stations (details below).

to

it.

The radar The marker pip is

works.

used merelv to measure the distance of

That at

X

fine for navigation, but

is

would

altitude,

if

bombs were

released

nowhere near the target. Accordingly, speed, type of bombs, etc.. are all set into a com-

they

fall

puter, again just as in a bombsight. This afl^ects the position

of the rate pip in such a

pip when the plane

is

at

way

that

point \.

it

will reach the If

bombs

there they will hit the target, providrd there

there

is, it

too

To keep

is set

is

marker

are released

no

drift.

If

into the computer. This afi^ects the drift

marker pip together (after must fly a slightly difl'erent course as shown in the heavy broken line above. This will bring him to point C. llie proper release point from which direct hits should be scored on the target. pip.

drift has

the drift pip and the

been

set in)

the pilot

Continued on next page 'onfidenlial

29

NEW BOMBING TECHNIQUES

continued

First Shoran mission was flouii against li
Fidenza during. floud-oliscuied

Location of bridges has been inked in accurately on Smoke from the strike boils up between them.

Bombs

in air

show

best

Shoran formalil

target.

Shoran got

its

chance

in

September 1944

when a Shoran-equipped B-17 and two ground were assigned to MATAF. \^'eather had been seriously hampering both strategic and tactical operations in Italy for months and this sets

was seized aggressi\ely. were obtained and put into B-25s of the 310th Bomb Group. By December crews had been trained and the ground to overcome Four more complete

chance

sets relocated.

On

it

sets

10 December the

first

mis-

was flown against the Fidenza rail bridge (see pictures at left) by four boxes of six H 25s. each led by a Shoran aircraft. The target was obscured by clouds, necessitating a Shoran drop. Several errors were made, which was to be expected on the first mission. One Shoran bombardier inserted an incorrect rate, another sion

Fidenza after. Compare Simple errors kept

30

this

with tup photo for location of Shoran craters.

mission from being an unqualified success.

determined his true altitude incorrectly. All planes encountered a fade in the signal of one ground station during part of the bomb run,

Confidential

m Second mission, bridge.

I.

/

be jaielined

I

up

bomb

rail

release point.

v-^

.

to aroiil siy,n(tl-j(iiutuing.

vhich could have been avoided by

flown on 14 December, was directed at Parma/Vi est

Scattered clouds obscured the target at the

bombing

I'ariiia West during. As plane pa.->f.- u\ii target, clouds have cliared away, allowing view of tight concentration directly on one end of bridge.

at

higher altitude. Nevertheless, the pattern was iccurately placed by any but Shoran standards, 1

;nd astounding,

Irop by

The mistakes ind corrected. s

considering that

it

was a blind

medium bombers.

shown

jhoran

at

have demonstrated what if used properly. of,

right)

capable

is

Mthough

of this mission were discovered Later operations (one of which

the

shakedown period

MATAF

is still

far

from

already able to report the ollowing advantages of the system: (a) the ;ngagement of pinpoint targets is independent )ver,

)f

is

lb)

target visibility,

flak losses

should de-

forced to rely completely Jn radar-controlled AA fire, (c) close coopera:rease as the

ion

enemy

is

ground troops can be maintained

with

inder overcast conditions,

)ombing fied,

is

possible,

(e)

(d)

accurate night

navigation

(f) target mis-identification is

is

simpli-

minimized.

Parma/West

after.

Shadow

experienced crews Shoran

by bridge shows four spans cut. \^'ith runs can be cut down to thirty seconds.

cast

bomb

Continued on next page Zonfidential

31

Multiple Azon drop shows

bombs

Strike photo shows one direct

hit,

in flight

towards Moerdyck

several near misses.

rail

Four bombs

bridge in Holland on 25 August 1944 at

bottom apparently got out of control

I

EW BOMBING TECHNIQUES

continued

SOIENOID SfRVO

STRUT

ANTENNA RADIO

lever

|!ontrol lbs

Azon

used by bombardier to steer

is

or

right

to

tail

assembly

gyro and solenoids

while falling earthward.

left

^^^M

There is probably no bombardier in the world who. having made an imperfect release. has not watched his bombs go down wide of target without wishing there were some way he could iiiuc their course in the air. This is now made possible the controllable Azon. which is nothing more than a

^^1 W

!i

lard 1.0001b.

M

I'P

I

M-65 bomb with

a special

tail that

enables

the plane

lin

which activates a servo motor 'ted to rudders in the fins. .Also packed into the tail gyro and solenoids to change the pitch of small

dropping

receiver in

1

Kins

in

the

it.

This

is

accomplished by a small

tail

the fins to prevent rolling of the

bomb

while

There is no provision for controlling range. the bomb's name. Azon. for azimuth only. Varying imuth while in flight causes the bomb to lose range and

llitrht.

ii

;t

to

fall short of its target.

Consequently, the Azon

employed against long narrow

is

targets such as roads.

dges. railroads, landing strips, docks

and

ships.

same hold

size as

standard

steady, radio

it

Any bomber can drop consisting of

pounds.

Any

Azons.

tail of M-65 bomb, contains and servo motor to steer it.

The airborne equipment,

a transmitter and control

box, weighs 100

of six transmitter frequencies are available,

which permits simultaneous drops of six different bombs, its own bombardier. From 15.000 feet an Azon can be steered 2.0n0-.'1000 feet, left or right. each controlled by

How

the Bombardier Works To drop an .Azon. the bombardier

steered to the left or right on receipt of radio signals

m

is

to

Norden bomb. .\zon

is

after

it

eye, the five

sight

and

lets go, just as

sights it in on the he would with an ordinary

A

one-million candlepower flare on the tail of the automatically ignited by a delay fuse 8-10 seconds leaves the plane. By following this flare with his

bombardier can detect azimuth errors as small as

or ten feet at an altitude of 15.000

feet.

He

corrects

them by merely pushing the handle of the control box (shown above) to left or right. Training .Azon bombardiers A capable is simple, can be accomplished within a week. bombardier can do it after six or eight practice drops. Continued on page 35

TRAJECTORY OF BOMB FROM PLANE TO TARGET IN THOUSANDS Of FEET

lO CONTROL USED UNTIL BOMB

4.

5

IS

2 3

OF

WAY TO

TARGET

10

SECONDS ARER RELEASE

LEFT

I

CONTROL

BIGHT

CONTROL

NO CONTROL

drawing shows projected path of typical .Azon drop rom 20.000 feet. Bomb reacts sluggishly to control, and

the tendency at

first

is

to over-control

learn to apply control before

it

it.

Operators soon

looks as though they should.

33

'-C'^l-i?

V

Oireft hits are scored, Uncontrolled 2.000-lb. bombs were nw -liirh hits river bed above bridge.

also dropped,

•

I

4^

:

Second pass is made. Attacks started at 1313 made at altitudes varying between 8.800 and

r:-.-!

"M''

hours, were

9.400

feet.

More

direct hits are scored. Old craters are from numerous other attacks, under which bridge stood up for two years.

/>-*

Third pass steel

34

is

made

span on main

for good measure.

rail line

Bridge is a 3()(l-ft. between Rangoon and Mandalay.

Still

more

and

12

was 18 l.OOO-lli. 1/10-second delay.

hits. Total load in three passes

2.000-lb.

bombs, both fused

Confiflrnlii

w 1 %£

^^

^*#-.

^\

^

v*

<

li/f exhibit of the If.

1.

>ho\vino; three

1

Burma Azon bombers

Azons

hittin";

is

this strike

smack alon"

the middle

BOMBING TECHNIQUES

lEW

Taungup road l)ridge while uncontrolled bombs miss. The B-24s left the bridge impassable with three big gaps. of

continued

brand-new ideas, the Azon had a hard time getting born. Originated by Defense Research Committee, it was given exhaustive tests at Wright iM. and then was turned over to the Special Projects Section of the Office of the r otnmunications Officer. This latter agency has had the thankless job of "birdie"' Azon. seeing that it got to theaters and seeing that it was given a proper It was finally tried out in Italy, where a spectacular first mission J there. In neither place I- iliiwn against the Brenner pass, and later in \^'estern Europe. li it prove entirely successful. Good weather, which is an absolute must, if the iir i- to be followed by the liombardier. was infrequent. Enemy flak and fighters oiiiidcd (evasive action after release, except for changes in altitude, makes it i|.n--ilde for the bombardier to steer the Azon accurately). ikr all

I

\.itional

i!

<

in

/«iiis It 111

"

Burma

decided to try it in Burma. The weather there is ideal for half the year iriemy fighters and flak are infrequently a serious problem. Most important, piiority targets were small narrow bridges, roads and rails, requiring bombing \\as

ihc

utmost accuracy. Ten combat crews were trained

at Ft. Dix,

New

Jersey.

work was not until several months later, in December Ml. after a "crash"' team of one officer and ten men had also been sent out from Dix. that the first ."Vzon was dropped in Burma. But that first mission sold /nil- to the 10th ,\ir Force. The target was the Pyinmana bridge, which had in attacked often, but with little success, for the preceding two years. Three 21- made three passes each, dropping one Azon on each pass. The bridge was i-ii'i\ed. Three days later four B-21s carrying 28 .Azons made four passes at a riiLr and adjacent by-pass bridge on the Prome-Taungup road. Both were niiikid out by 16 Azons. There were now 12 Azons left. so. on two passes, eight iliiin were used to knock out the Okshitpin bridge, which another squadron had 111 earlier in the day with ordinary bombs. That left only four Azons. These I.I

out.

-lilt

liiling

Personnel was scarce in

gas over the

Hump.

Burma and

they were soon put to

It

1.

I

111

dropped on a fourth bridge, which was destroyed with three

direct hits.

while the crash team was Mtiigether, seven Azon missions were flown in rr. and 127 Azons dropped. Fourteen bridges were confirmed destroyed, one

Burma

II

rnlialde

and two possible

—

all in

a period of 15 days.

Mechanical failures

(in

and does not respond to remote control at all. or in lili the flare fails to ignite) amounted to only two percent of all Azons ri.|i|i(d. Burma is, at the moment, the most Azon-conscious place in the world. liii

h

the

bomb

li

inlidt'ntial

falls true

.4zon mass oonlrol is being tested. Top. regular drop, bottom Azon drop.

35

'

JAP AIR POWER JAF

The

TWO ONLY turned up

Better

Getting

Is

but

Japanese planes, both Navy fighters, Lingayen beach on 9 January, when the American forces landed to recapture Luzon. One was a Zeke. the other a Jack. They both strafed the beach without doing any damage. The Zeke got away. Jack was shot down by antiaircraft batteries and crashed without burning. The dead pilot

at

was found dressed

in a

known

black kimono

as the

"black dragon gown."

on the day of landing only two Jap planes show up. And the incident is given further significance by the pilot's black kimono, interpreted to mean that funeral services were performed before departure on a suicide

(both

fact that to

mission. the

Yearly aircraft production of the

Army and Navy

greater than in 1940.

Its

air

forces)

is

now

some of our own.

JAF

ten times

planes are vastly improved

are as good or better than

How

—some does

it

happen, then, that the dead pilot seems to symbolize a mighty air power, resorting now to suicide measures that are admittedly effective but in the long run futile, to combat a foe it had overwhelmed only three years ago in the same place? How does it happen, too. that a mighty U.S. carrier force dared, in mid-February, stand only 300 miles off Japan and pour waves of planes at Tokyo itself without fear of the whole task force being wiped out by homeland-based Jap aircraft?

The answer

is

easy to discern

when one examines

the

Just after the infamous day in December. 1941, when the at Pearl Harbor, their strength of combat planes

Japs struck

combat units totaled some 3,500. An estimated total of produced during the year 1941. The total of U. S. combat aircraft available at the end of 1941 was approximately 3,300. After the Jap destruction on 7 December we had only 674 combat planes overseas, slightly more than half in Pacific areas. Shortly thereafter, in the Pacific, we had almost none. in

3,750 Jap planes was

not surprising, therefore, that the JAF reigned for the first few months of the following year.

umphant

tri-

superiority.

36

it

its

adversaries. Val, the

to the

havoc

at

Navy

Pearl Harbor,

was very effective in these first days. The Army fighters, Oscar and Nate, and the Army bombers, Lily and Sally, were good enough at the start to give the JAF the fatal delusion that it was invincible. Perhaps the most outstanding fact about the JAF is that planes were built chiefly for attack. In Japanese military thinking, and consequently in Jap technical and tactical doctrine as reflected in their training manuals, "attack" was the predominating factor. This does not spring from anything mysterious in the Jap makeup. To a small hemmedin nation with a dream of Empire, the attack concept was as natural as it was to Germany which was obsessed by the need for "Lebensraum." The Jap parallel is found in the doctrine of "Hakko Ichiu," whose literal translation is "the four corners of the world under one roof." The attack concept so mesmerized the Japanese military mind that Jap aircraft were built with amazing maneuverability but practically no thought to defense.

said,

Many JAF

pilots

Our

First

As soon

Lessons

as our pilots caught their balance after Pearl

Harbor, they began to profit by their first terrible lesson. We were able to adapt our tactics to meet an enemy who had already shown his hand, who was already committed to a specific

some

program of training and production.

Being

to

extent a Johnny-come-lately on the scene might have

But we had the

flexibility

and

make

the

the ill

wind blow us good. Most important, our tactics and our aircraft were predicated on the need for both defense and attack our planes were designed to take it as well as dish Although we still had much to learn, we had not it out. started out with any basic misconception about the character of the war. We did not have much to unlearn.

—

Our

fighter

pilots

soon discovered that the Zekes had

and firepower for lightness and slowspeed maneuverability. One good burst on the Zeke's tail would strip off its thin aluminum-alloy skin like a banana

sacrificed toughness

Continued on page 38

Its

was not due entirely to numerical were superbly trained. Their planes were excellent. The Zeke, called by many the Zero, was more maneuverable, could climb higher and faster than our own fighters. Its normal combat weight was 5,500 pounds. early success, be

bomber which contributed

dive

capability for quick, huge-scale production to

Early Jap Strength

is

or less than half the weight of

been a severe handicap.

background and war history of Jap military aviation.

It

the American Offensive

to

its

Although the convoy was under heavy and somewhat damaging air attack on the way to Luzon, it is still a remarkable were able

Up

Can't Stand

Still

At the right are sixteen pictures of Japanese planes in various stages of the destruction that is daily being wrought upon Nippon's air forces. \^ hat you see happened eight times more often to the Japs than to our planes in the last quarter of 1944. Navy as well as Army kills are shown.

Confidential

Fuel tanks unprotected by self-sealing compositions were quick to explode. Jap firepower was far inferior to ours. Neither the first Jap fighters nor bombers had any armor whatsoever. Clearly, it appeared as if the Japs peel.

expected to win the air war by swift, sudden attack, had made little provision for self-defense and leaned heavily on the unusual qualities of their aircraft for dog-fighting.

While the Japs were engaging in fierce small-scale encounters with General Chennault's Flying Tigers in China and with our first P-39s and P-40s heroically defending Port Moresby, the JAF in 1942 was first checked in the battle of the Coral sea

of

Midway.

spectacular defeat in the battle In both these battles, although surface forces

and met

its first

were involved, not a shot was exchanged between ships. They were essentially air duels, with attempts to sink the opposing carriers and destroy the opposing aircraft. The two contestants hoped either to open the way for. or to stop, the advance of surface forces and ground troops. Our air power won both the Midway and Coral sea battles, and the enemy surface forces, with accompanying troop-laden transports,

were turned back.

Jap

vs.

the Bismarck sea. The General took advantage of a good weather break and tossed the works, giving the Japs their first taste of the deadly "Kenney Cure": eight forward-firing 50s in B-25s attacking at low level. For the first time landbased aircraft virtually wiped out a big convoy. Jap losses:

approximately 20 ships; 50 planes, 24 probables. Our losses: six planes. Jap tacticians have never come up with so beautifully coordinated an attack.

With Jap

JAF was

Allied

forces

the

1942 half again as great

aircraft production in

as in 1941, the

air

well able to fighting

^

outnumber

in the Pacific

a two-front war.

November 1942 and March 1943

the

Japs

in

Between aerial

en-

counters outnumbered our bombers by 2.6 to one, and our fighters

down

in

by 1.4

to one.

Yet we

lost

(known

to

have been shot

encounters) only one percent of our bombers

inter-

cepted, and 2.7 percent of our fighters, while our bombers

accounted for 13.3 percent of the enemy interceptors, our fighters for 16.9 percent of planes encountered. meant that our bombers destroyed approximately 34 anese aircraft for each bomber lost, and our fighters down enemy aircraft at the rate of 13 Jap planes to

and This Japshot one.

May 1943 the people of Japan needed be soothed. When General Takeo Yasuda took over as chief of the Japanese Army Air Force, he remarked to Japanese journalists. "I do not say much, but I can give you Obviously, then, by

U. S. Tactical Ability

to

impact of our growing air camThe JAF paigns after our occupation of Guadalcanal in August 1942, followed up by our air offensive against Jap ground forces attacking Port Moresby over the Owen Stanley Mountains. first

felt the

1942 reports came in that the was tapering off. General Kenney stated that "His (the Jap's) original highly trained crews were superb but they are dead. His new crews cannot fly in bad weather, his night efforts are piddling and his combat skill In

of

the

fall

good Jap

quantity

of

pilots

Our hurriedly trained youngsters outshooting him at every encounter." is

low.

are outflying and

This condition was somewhat alleviated for the JAF, as newly trained pilots were put into the air. "Some of them are damned good and others not so hot," was the verdict of one American ace. Wide difference in pilot ability was found in both the Navy and Army air arms, but it was generally conceded that the Navy fliers were decidedly superior.

might be observed here that Jap pilots appeared to be of their own national philosophy which dethe manded automaton-like obedience, and the total submergIt

victims

ence of self for the glory of the Empire. The individual was of secondary importance. Dying for Japan was an honor. This point of view is certainly not unrelated to the fact that, at least in the early days, Jap aircraft provided virtually no defense for crews and pilots. In combat the

Jap showed plenty of guts. But he lacked personal initiative and judgment. Having been taught to fly and fight in certain ways, he stuck doggedly to those ways even when the situation called for something else. with their tradition of sports and self-reliance, teamwork and initiative were usually second Teamwork, as exemplified by close formation nature.

To American

tactics,

pilots,

was one of the greatest single factors contributing

to

our success. prime example of American ingenuity versus Jap stereotyped thinking was General Kenney 's bold stroke in

A

38

my word

that

we have absolute confidence

in

bombing

the

U. S. mainland." The sanguine Yasuda proclaimed further that Japanese pilots were better than Allied pilots, not only

because of better training, but because they were more (This concern for spiritual and poetic values is apparent also in the official names which the Japs give their spiritual.

Navy

planes.

George, a new Navy

fighter,- is

;

called Violet

Myrt is Painted Cloud, Francis is Milky Way, Jill is Heavenly Mountain, and Paul is Auspicious Cloud. Army planes do not have official names, but are given nicknames such as Falcon for Oscar and Divine \^ ind for Babs.) Lightning.

Our Formula

for Conquest

Meanwhile, our Pacific forces were evolving a new formula for conquest. In simplest terms, it consisted of 1 softening up a Jap island base by air and naval power, (2) landing on the base, (3) establishing there a new air base from which to attack other Jap islands. (4) by-passing strongly defended bases by neutralizing their air power. Following this formula, our forces have occupied such places as Tarawa, Makin, Kwajalein. Eniwetok, Hollandia, Biak, Morotai, Saipan, Guam, most of the Palaus, strategic points in the Philippines and, now, Iwo Jima. (

)

The two most prominent victims of the "by-passing" technique were, of course, Rabaul and Truk, both of them bastions of the JAF. At Rabaul the neutralizing effect of our air power was proved conclusively in January 1944. There, out of 627 Jap fighters destroyed in the South Pacific area,

458 were downed

the Jap fighters for the

in aerial first

combat, and on 27 January

time refused combat altogether.

But the operations that represented the most successful application of the formula, as well as the greatest defeat for the JAF. were the Philippine landings at Leyte. Mindoro,

Confidential

'.

i'

I

j

>

;

Luzon. In the soflening-up phase for the Leyte Octoher our Naval air forres. striking; at enemy |Miuer all the way from the Hyukyus down through later at

1.1

I

and

(Jiniosa

into the Philippines, destroyed in 12

days some

Jap planes. These attacks, coordinated with (l.irks on air bases in Formosa, plus FEAF' strikes

B-29

Id

nilhern East Indies and the southern ili-rupt

.

flow of Jap

the

in the

Philippines, served

However.

air reinfon-ements.

General Keiuiey's air engineers were struggling

lull'

on the

iiiM air hases

muddy

fields of Leyte. the

to

Japs were

from literally dozens of near-by islands. Our .nil'crs Hew in from Palau. Morotai. and New Guinea ,1-1 ~. The JAF called in planes from Ghina. Hainan. North nil ICO. South Kyushu, even the Ku riles, and "victory hung lo attack

l.lc

balance."

ilii'

I

Luzon Catastrophe

lie

!

\

li

iew

of Luzon's importance to Ja|)an's defense and

performance there was curiously weak. has suffered sizable losses from the continual it ling it had received since the Philippine campaign be20 October. But it still held a number of bases on e. the JAF's

III

And Japan's

Ml.

I/.

current estimated production of

more

2.000 planes per month does not suggest that there was

lian

M

,il

shortage of aircraft, had the Japs chosen to send in

irplacements.

II

1

JAF was stopped

in the

Philippines by

was staggering beneath the It had become iii'ikout blows of our own air power. iriii.K aware of the need for preserving its air strength for It had underIndefense of the Japanese homeland. -tiiii.iled the speed with which Allied planes would get ^illllll unremitting range. It had overestimated the pioteci\i \alue of an admirable network of dispersed air bases. \laii\ of its ground installations (hangars, repair shops, had been destroyed, and its command had become disMu iiiized. It was like a punch drunk prize fighter who "iilihi't stand up to fight. During 14-15 January, the Japs "-I ')t-72 planes, mostly on the ground, a sample of how lie J \F was forced to meet another crisis lying down. of factors.

roiiiliination

ii

i

Among

It

at a time when the JAF seemed most imJapan's aircraft production was greater than ever.

I'

uadoxically.

I

ill.

planes,

its

were the best

technically,

yet.

Tn challenge the B-29 they are designed to fly faster. While iilIii 1. and with considerably increased fire power. uun fighters still have the lead over the Japs in engine

GEORGE. An SE interceptor fighter with 2.0(X) hp at takeoff, its estimated maximum speed at 19.000 feet is 407 mph. It is

believed to carry four 20

mm

two additional 7.7

LUKE.

This

mm

wing guns, and can mount In combat.

fuselage guns.

twin-boom SE pusher type, with a rear

a

is

2.000 hp. Estimated maximum Designed as a high altitude interceptor fighter. Luke mounts one 30 mm and two 20 mm guns, and climbs to 26.250 feet in 9.7 minutes. Though it is still in the experimental stage, there may be several prototype models

Engine

propeller.

at takeoff

:

speed: 437 mph.

in action.

ZEKE

A

52.

carrier-borne mainstay. Zeke's performance

has gradually improved; It is

now goes 340 mph

very maneuverable. climbs well, but

maximum

suffers at

speed, and

its

at

20.000

feet.

maneuverability

its

performance

poor

at

fighter

is

is

high altitudes.

TENRAI.

experimental,

Still

obviously designed

hp each

to

at

combat

19,700

Carries one 30

DENKO. such.

Its

This

mm is

and

the

mm

rated 1.750

engines are rated

reportedly climbs to

it

speed: 420 mph.

guns.

Jap night

first is

Its

Maximum

and four 20

single engine

twin-engine

this

the B-29.

feet,

32.800 feet in 11.25 minutes.

hp

.

fighter designed at

29.500

as

Esti-

feet.

mated maximum speed is 420 mph at 32.800 feet. It carries two 30 mm. two 20 mm and two 7.7 mm guns. Still experimental.

Of the Navy dive bombers. Judy has replaced the obsolescent Val, with a top speed well in excess of our standard Of

SBDs.

the flying boats, four-engine

protected fuel tank and heaviest

ilMimance. the difTerence li

aIm I

le.ss

is

than four years ago.

1940 Jap engines produced only 1.000 hp for takeoflT, mus now 2.000 hp can be developed from three recently lilied engines, mentioned below. Several new fighters altered the 400 mph class, and experimental fighters are urd

li.i.

is

for

critical

altitudes

evidence, too. that

of

new

26.000

to

fighters are

mm

29,000

feet.

designed

to

cannon, adapted from the German 20 mm Oerlikon. Hhine-metal M. G. series. Mk 103 or lOS series and the U. S. Browning type. As yet. the Japs have not produced a satisfactory self-sealing tank, although their iaii\ 25.

.30.

and 40

current leak-proof design

is

vastly improved.

Emily has the

armor of any Jap

best

plane.

maximum speed of nearly 300 mph an excellent patrol bomber. Of the recce planes, carrier-borne Myrt. in the 400 mph class, is outstanding and far better than the widely used sea planes, Jake and Paul. Of the twin-engined bombers. Frances is the best, althougli the new Betty is greatly improved. Four-engine Liz proved Its

4.000-mile range and

make

to

Of

it

be unsatisfactory, and the torpedo bombers.

used now mostly as a transport.

is

Jill

speed of ,350

mph

New Army Best

among

at

is

the

main

type, although

by Grace, which has a

will ])robably be replaced

III

1

fighters arc the following:

Already in combat, this is an SE (single-engine) interceptor. Engine at takeoflf: 1,900 hp. Estimated maximum speed: 407 mph at 17,400 feet. Latest version mounts four 20 mm wing guns, and two 7.7 or 13 mm cowl guns.

I

mil

I"

Planes newer Navy

the

JACK.

at 1.700

,i|ipears that the

1

New Navy

in

ii.liMLis

19.680

it

maximum

ft.

Planes the

new Army

fighters is:

rated at 2.000 hp at takeoff. 422 mph at 21.000 feet. Maximum armament recovered is two 20 mm and two 12.7 mm guns, but this may be increased in later version. In combat.

single engine

FR.iNK.

Its

F.stimated

maximum

Tojo

is

faster,

speed

is

is

more rugged and

less

maneuverable than

previous Jap fighters, while Tony, with its heavy armor, new Ha- 140 engine, and leak-proof tanks, represents the growing trend towards greater

armor

protection.

The new .^rmy

Continued on next pagiConfidenlial

39

the successor to Sally, has a maximum speed between 340-350 mph, carrying a heavier bomb load than any previous Army bomber, and. in addition, has been used as a torpedo carrier.

bomber Peggy,

Most significant over-all factor in the JAF of today is the comparably greater increase in production of fighters as against other types. Like the Germans, the Japanese for some time have been fighting against superior ofifensive air forces. Faced with defending the homeland as Germany has been doing for the past two years, the Japs since early 1943 have placed overwhelming emphasis on defensive air power, which must be a bitter pill for the Jap air planners who envisioned their air power primarily in an offensive role.

JAF

In

tactics the future

ing suicide crashes, of aerial ramming, air-to-air bombing,

and much greater emphasis on

teamwork.

fighter

Suicide Attacks Plenty of Jap pilots are available for

ramming

ramming

assign-

At a closing speed of

600 miles per hour, it requires only a flick of the wing for a B-29 to dodge its would-be rammer. Both the Jap Army and Navy are short on pilots with enough experience to go upstairs and do the job.

The

suicide crash

became a primary combat weapon for

JAF

during the Leyte invasion in October. These attacks reached a new high at the time of the Luzon landings

when between 6 and 14 January

least

at

36 attempts

at

suicide dives were tabulated.

As

yet there appears to be

The JAF

tactics.

enced

pilots.

No

no consistent pattern for such and inexperi-

sacrifices both experienced

particular type of plane

is

selected for the

mission.

Aircraft approach the target ships both from high

altitudes

and very low

ship's stern to avoid

altitudes.

Some

maximum AA

fire,

explosive effect of the bombs, which are deprived of the velocity they would attain in a normal dive-bombing attack. Several action reports show that crash dives were made by planes which apparently carried no bombs, relying entirely fire

damage.

Born of desperation and fanaticism, the suicide dive is a serious problem. The large number of suicide planes lost to Allied aircraft or AA fire compared to the few which carry through their missions indicates, however, that it will be extremely costly to the JAF, not only in terms of first-line aircraft, but in terms of trained pilots

—of whom there has

long been a critical shortage.

Future of the JAF The future of the JAF, even with its increased production and technical improvements, remains gloomy. Our strategic bombing campaigns have already cut into aircraft produc-

40

JAF appears

to

have

lost the capability

of

inner lines.

its

improve unit strength

Its ability to

out

of increased aircraft production seems to be limited by (1) the continuing heavy loss of aircraft, pilots, crews, and

command

personnel, (2)

probable shortage of adequately

its

trained replacements, (3)

the disruption of training bases

Formosa, the Philippines and the southern areas, comparatively inferior maintenance and repair.

in

On

its

credit side,

the

JAF

still

(4)

retains the capability

for (1) strong offensive actions against our carrier strikes

and amphibious operations, (2) numerically strong defense of the homeland, (3) limited offensive action in Luzon and China conditioned by policy of conserving strength, (4) defense of oil producing and refinery areas of Sumatra and Borneo, and strategic Singapore, (5) offensive action against our new base at Iwo Jima. Japan has been called by the German historian, Oswald

moon

Spengler, "a

culture" because, like the

ing the earth's light,

more

it

reflects

creative cultures.

In

the

moon

reflect-

the achievements of other, field

of

combat aviation ^

emulate Germany. Like Germany, Japan never developed an effective long-range bomber. To us, the long-range heavy bomber proved an inestimable advantage, enabling us to hit farther than the Jap, neutralize Japan, at the

start,

chose

to

extreme range, thereby affording security to our we built and progressed. Like Germany, Japan started the war with poorly armed aircraft. Like Germany, Japan has produced some brilliant engineering achievements Jap jet-propelled planes are well within the realm of possibility. But until recently Japan has failed to develop the tactical teamwork that enables our own fighters to kill their attackers and live to fight another day. his bases at

own

bases while

—

planes head for a

while others approach from bow on, or from other angles. The lack of special equipment is reflected in the bombs employed, which have largely been the 250-pound AP or SAP bombs. Most sinkings have been caused by consequent fire rather than the

on the

At present the

for large-scale, sustained offensive action, except in defense

of aircraft in flight, notably B-29s.

requires great skill and experience.

the

tional inefficiency.

promises further development in

attacks on surface ships and amphibious landings includ-

ments, but the

A lack of harmony between the Jap Army and Navy Air Forces, reflecting the long, deep-seated conflict between the Army and the Navy, may continue to result in opera-; tion.

Our

Superiority

The answer to why a bigger and better JAF could send only two Jap fighters to Lingayen Beach on the day of landing and to why our Navy dared to expose its carrier force simple fact that the growth, performance of our air forces has proved so far superior to the enemy's. The JAF is in the position of a good jerkwater football team attempting to beat Notre Dames best. to

Tokyo-based planes

strength,

How

and

lies in the

over-all

may

the Japanese themselves regard the future

indicated by a broadcast given on 31

be

December by Kazunobu

Kanokogi, Director of the Japan Public Opinion Information Association. "Our step-by-step retreat during the past year was due to a lack of scientific industrial techniques, Should the shortages of shipping, and the lack of aircraft we perhaps be defeated, it would not be because of the enemy, but due to the punishment of Heaven for our sins in not conforming respectfully and sincerely to the Imperial Rescript on War. The greatest battle of 1945 will be within ourselves." Whether the Jap believes that punishment is coming from Heaven or the Allied Forces, it is now obvious that he knows it is inevitable. .

.

.

Confidential

I

FEAF IIJTHE PHrilPPlHES CAMPAIGN ANOTHER GRAND SLAM FOR THE KENNEY JAPBUSTERS MANILA'S fall marks the climax. if not the actual finish, of the long Philippine campaign. This article

shows how land-based planes of

FEAF

played their part

the

in this great,

air-sea-land

assault, from the slow Leyte to the final grand slam Lufon.

start at at

In

preparation for the Leyte land-

ings, the

and

FEAF pounded

Jap shipping mainly in the Mindanao This was in addition to other

airfields

area.

FEAF assignments in the Halmaheras. northern Borneo, and the Celebes Then

to Leyte. the

FEAF

sent

its

long-

range bombers, staged through Morotai, to reinforce troops gaining their first foothold. Because Leyte and Samar bases were too muddy even for

mediums, the XIII Fighter did a

bomber

Command

as well as a fighter job.

while the B-24s, now aided by a group of 7th AF heavies based at Palau, still flew in

from distant bases. Their daily of Visayan and Mindanao air-

bombing fields

reached a climax in an 81-sortie on the Negros island hornet's nest on 14 Dec. when fighters joined in the destruction of more than 100 Jap aircraft just before the .Mindoro attack

/»

F^ '•'*-i 'A

BORNEO

landing. At the same time (14-16 December) Navy planes erased from the Luzon skies at least 235 enemy aircraft

•^

^MINDANAO

over the invasion force. Once on firm terrain the

on

Mindoro

FEAF

^

piled in with a full team of fighters, attack bombers, mediums, and

n

opposition came hot and heavy, but too late. General Kenney's Japbusters.

heavies.

|^*o«otai

Stunned

at the start.

Jap

air

making up for a slow start at Leyte, almost obliterated Jap air power, and paved the way for our Luzon victory.

This

map

shows how the FEAF conPhilippine campaign. The rows of planes start from main U. S. ducted bases.

its

The

knife,

symbolizing

the

FEAF's

striking power since Luzon has been won, slashes across Formosa and the China sea; thus, with the air forces, virtually

other

Navy and cuts

off

Japan's water supply route to her East Indies Empire. 'ifidential

Continued on next page 41

PHILIPPINES continued

vmil^^l^-'^^MMt

J

^

Lfmjft

^

/

i'.uu^hl

with their carriers down. Naval planes land on

Tacloban

strip,

\^

hen the history

FEAF

and one does a nose-over.

NOW DOMINATES

JUMPING FROM LEYTE TO MINDORO TO LUZON, THE FEAF of the

Leyte,

in the

is

THE PHILIPPINES

^

written

Philippines

the campaigns at Leyte and Mindoro will offer a study in contrasts. Leyte was a head-

ache.

Comparatively, establish-

ing air bases at

much

Mindoro was

\*

simpler. Each was equally

vital to the Philippines victory.

At Leyte the

FEAF

met a

new type of problem. Theretofore, in landing

on small island bases, it had been almost always possible by first over-

whelming

.^

^^

the local air defenses

General George C. Kenney, with complete an occupation withColonel Samuel Sturgis (left), greets out serious interference from P-38s arriving at Tacloban. first the air. But at Leyte the Japs were just around the corner and able to reinforce quickly from Japan. Already well-known is the history of how the Tacloban strip was feverishly readied in four days by Aviation Engineers, to

how more than 50 Navy planes, made emergency landings

sunk,

with their carriers

damaged

or

(see above)

on the unfinished strip during a Jap air attack, and, finally, how the first P-38s came in on 27 October to establish the First Philippine Assault Air Task Force. From then on the fighters carried the ball, hitting Jap ships, troops, and installations, and providing air defense.

Ammunition dump attack in the

42

first

burns at Duiag beach after a Jap rough days at the airstrips on Leyte.

At Mindoro the going was easier but not uneventful. During and after the landing on 15 December, Jap Naval and Air Forces attacked the beach. By 30 December enemy sorties exceeded those set against Leyte at the peak of enemy activity there. But by then the FEAF was firmly entrenched, and all of the Jap Philippine bases were wide open to Navy or land-based air assault. Once on Mindoro, the FEAF was over the hump.

Confidential

V J;ipaii.-se motorized ilaj. '

•

.1

|im..|.

.

nuim

..

-:

i . :

-

trucks

camou-

dck-clcd going llirougli a -outhern Luzon anfl attacked at low level with parafrags. After the l.y

foliage,

is

l.eyte and Mindoro. the FEAF had comi)let<' supremacy and could extend cooperation to Genera! MacArthur"s troops to the extent of aircraft available. Continued on next page

r.uuiuests at air

43 Icnlial

PHILIPPINES continued

On 10 January Parafrags

fall

these two

FEAF

on a cluttered

'^y^^lk'T—

.4-20s take part in extensive attacks

rail

center in Luzon, a

on Jap railroad

new and welcomed type of

lines in

target for

southern Luzon,

FEAF

bombers.

f^i^l

exploding and car

Lolive

is

wuni

another

(liiririf;

KKAI'

soiillierii

spliiiler.s

Luzon

slioot

sky

attack.

Be

iween 25 Dec. and 16 Jan.. 5th

\V

units di-stroycd

79

loco-

motives. 466 railroad cars. 67 staff cars. 486 motor trucks. Continued on next page

45 ConfidoiitidI

Clark Field installations, 1939, presented this neat and peaceful appearance with old-type fighters and bombers lined up in rows outside of hangars.

THE FEAF TURNED CLARK FIELD INTO A RUBBLE HEAP The

'/'t^\ '***iuki^

n.,

^\

^

return of the

chapter

in

AAF

to

Clark Field

is

the story of U. S. air power.

cember 1941 Clark Field and

its

an epic In De-

satellites consti-

tuted the biggest U. S. air base in the far Pacific.

After capturing

it.

added

strips,

the Japs, too,

made

the big-

it

kind outside of Japan. \^ ith hangars, workshops. Clark became

gest installation of

its

the strongest link in the chain of air bases stretch-

ing from Japan deep into the Pacific.

After our Naval Task Force attacks the Japs sensed

in

visiting Nichols Field, in

1935.

disaster.

last

fall.

Planes were

bamboo

groves. Engines were buried Base personnel took refuge in nipa palm huts in the underbrush. Japan's resolve to hold Clark Air Center to the bitter end was clear almost to the day that Allied troops were wading ashore in Lingayen gulf.

concealed in

Historical footnote: these characters are Jap goodwill fliers

impending

churchyards.

In

one of

its

vividly written reports, the

SWPA

Weekly Summary goes on to tell of the almost daily attacks on the Clark Field bases. On 22 December 24 Liberators roared up from Palau and, with 63 P-47s. shot down eight Jap planes. On 24 December the FEAF's campaign really started to roll when 22 heavies and 60 P-47s shot down more than half of 60 Jap fighters. The next day the Japs challenged their attackers with 70 to 80 planes. Again we shot down more than half of them. Understandably discouraged, the Japs did not intercept our attacks at all on and 4 January. On the 9th a climactic assault was made by 20 heavies, accompanied by low-flying, hard-hitting A-20s and B-25s, flying a total of 707 sorties. A minimum of 228 Jap aircraft were destroyed on the ground, while out of a total of 203 enemy planes in the air, 139 were shot down. Capture of Clark by U. S. troops was proclaimed on 26 January. The first Air Intelligence officer to arrive reported "everywhere is evidence of disorganization and general shambles over 200 new engines were found in Mabalacat town scattered beneath houses, old rice mills, public buildings, even on sidewalks and in alleys." 2

.

.

.

Clark Field (right) is a chaos of wreckage during an FEAF parafrag attack. 7 January. The crumpled hangar is one of the same buildings shown above.

46

Nielson Field,

now

Nielson Field is blanketed under parafrags, as once again the 13th lives up to its reputation for bombing accuracy.

AF

attack

on 6 January.

NEW TARGETS FOR "THE JUNGLE

AIR FORCE"

captured, looked like this after carrier strikes and before 13th

A

considerable change of complexion

is

noticeable on

Nielson Field after a facial treatment by the FEAF on 6 January. The big base outside of Manila had already suffered its

some damage from Navy

installations

AF dumped

carrier planes.

But

many

escaped until 24 Liberators of the

80 percent of

damage

their frag

bomb

of

13tli

load directly on

runway, the adjacent ware house and shop areas, and dispersal revetments. One un identified plane was destroyed on the ground. AA fire wa; fairly heavy and accurate, but no 13th AF planes wen brought down. This strike at Nielson is a sample of wha the target, causing

the 13th did to

many

to the

Philippine airfields.

leaflets over Manila which was a change of scenery for the crews. Members ol ''The Jungle Air Force," they had never flown combat mis sions over a real city. Balikpapan. Truk. Yap, New Guinea Rabaul, Palau, the Solomons their former targets wen part of the jungle tradition that won the 13th its nickname

After the mission, the B-24s dropped

—

—

Con/idrnti
noiher honeyard of icrecked Jap planes, near Lingayen, bears witness to the FEAF's daily pounding of air bases.

VIBATTLEDCORREGIDOR WAS AN FEAF TARGET Shaped

small island of Corregidor in another landmark singled out by imperishably in American history. Corregidor

like a polliwog. the

iimuth of Manila bay

'

-tiii\

to live

-ten

1-

id ip:-

\

amazing

ictory.

is

contrasts,

not

only between our defeat

but in the development of air power. \^"hen the

it in the spring of 1942. their aerial bombardwas like a whisper compared to the mighty roar of FE.^F attacks which helped win back Corregidor in

captured

lent le

lebruary 1945.

and February embattled Corregidor was subalmost daily FE.\F assault. On 17 February, followig a bombardment by the 7th Fleet and FE.\F. the XI Corps, In January

;ct to

1

a closely coordinated parachute and amphibious move-

lent.

accomplished a double landing. The 503rd Parachute

.egiment dropped successfully, took batteries in the rear,

from Bataan. The from Corregidor's caves promised to

len joined elements of the 24th Division

sb of ousting all Japs e difficult,

'onfidential

but the bay's entrance

is

cleared for action.

Continued on next page

Corregidor under

attack

by B-24s of the 13th

softened up for the landing of U. S. troops on

AF

gets

17 Feb.

PHILIPPINES eontmaeii

-.>

>

-

'-

fJ

!>i^

^^oseirAL

^Al^SffOi/seS

eA//A€AO BAf

MAH&A^

0tL

TAMK

A/A tMPi.Ace*^eHT^ .4<

l/ie

Jap naval base

at Cavite

.',.i-\

most of the installations were

While most of the major

CAVITE, 9 JANUARY around Manila had been

targets

subject

heavy bombardment before the Lingayen landings on 9 the big Jap naval base at Cavite escaped real punishment until after the American forces had landed. It to

January,

50

intact

on the day of our Lingayen

landing.:

appeared as if Cavite were being saved for dessert. But by' the time our first troops had entered Manila on 5 February,! the target was chewed up. The 11th Airborne Division cap-' tured it on 14 February. On the next page are described

some of

the missions that cancelled out Cavite.

Confidential

»« than a monlh

';AYITE, 5 i".\.

FEBRUARY

kr,l

is

how

The chronicle

Cavite looked after the of successive

at-

tacks which reduced Cavite to the

desuetude includes the 21 January hearing more tlian 100 tons down on the bi? naval base and Corregidor. On the

|iKlurc(i slate ol

ni--inii r.i.

later, this

wheti

43

heavies

FEAF had

obliterated almost every building.

morning of 30 January, during

the

Grande island amphi-

bious operations. FEAF heavies again struck Cavite with area. nearly 6.5 percent of 60 tons falling within the target On 1 February over 100 tons of explosives were dumped

on the crowded base.

By then

Cavite's

doom was

sealed.

IT

WAS ALL DONE BY FOUR "SNOOPERS"

The widespread damage caused by four 13th AF B-24 "Snoopers" at the Lutong oil refinery and tank farm in Borneo, when they flew in one at a time during three days in December, shows how a few single sorties, skillfully planned and executed, can in some instances be as Lutong, second only to Balikpapan as a Borneo oil center, was particularly valuable to the Japs for its much-needed black oils. devastating as one big attack.

8, 10, and 12 December at minimum and incendiary bombs followed by strafing. On 8 December the cracking plant and six On 10 and 12 Dephoto at right tanks were fired cember the cracking plant. Trumble units, boiler house and more tanks were hit.

Attacks were on

altitude

with

GP

I

1

.

The picture below shows principal Lutong area

after

four strikes. Two Trumble units and a fractionating column were severely damaged. Steam and oil lines

were shattered. Thirteen oil tanks had been demolished long before by the evacuating Dutch; the Snoopers destroyed four more and damaged five. Smokestacks, boilers, pumphouses and shop buildings also suffered. Operational analysis estimated the four Libs smashed Lutong more effectively than average expectancy from

48 planes each dropping nine 5G0-lb. GPs.

J^trftrr'*'-

lUtNTIAL

BRITISH — CONFIDENTIAL

Vol. Ml

ISTRIBUTION:

QUADRONS

ASSISTANT

CHIEfV

AIR STAFF. INTELLIGENCE WASHINUTON, D. C.

APRIL, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPACT 1945

April,

CONTENTS Japan

2

-

6

Production and Defenses

10

Industrial

War

....

Review

General

Concenfration

The Recent Big

Strikes

-

-

-

14

-

-

24

-

-

26

-

-

34

-

36

Pacific Milestones Air Losses on Luzon

.

Recapture of Corregidor Battle of

Ormoc Bay

-

Blockading South China Sea

ETO

All-out

Air Smash

Bonnbing by the

RAF

38 -

Daring Dicing Mission

^

B-29 Rescue

CLASSIFICATION: sification text,

is

Overall clas-

sure that this overall classification is recognized, even when pages are torn out for instructional purposes, everv single sheet has been stamped

CONFIDENTIAL

on at least one This does not refer to specific individual correct photographs. The classification for every photograph in the issue is given below:

side.

FRONT COVER THROIXH THREE: INCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

8-9:

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP TWO, unclassified: bottom, confidential 12-13: confidential 10-11:

14-15: unclassified 17:

If)

confidential

TOP two and bottom, unclassified: middle, CONFIDF.NTIAL

18:

19: TOP,

unclassified;

bottom, confidential 20-21: unclassified

22-23: PHOTOS, confidential: .MAP,

UNCLASSIFIED

24-35: UNCLASSIFIED .36-37:

CONFIDENTIAL

38-41: UNCLASSIFIED 42-43: MAP, confidential; PHOTOS, UNCLA.SSIFIED 44-47: UNCLASSIFIED

48-51: CONFIDENTIAL

THROUGH back COVER,

52 I

52

Back Cover

IMPACT, including of CONFIDENTIAL. To in-

4-7:

46

NCI.ASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

When Kublai khan, Moni^nl ..Mi|iirr..r nf \>ia \i>il Marco Polo, twice invaded Japan, in 1274. 1281. he estab.

beachheads at Hakata bay. just south of Yawata. His foot-soldiers were driven back to sea by mounted archers, violent storms sank his ships both times,

lished

today's target.

JAPAN A Study

o\ trie

Cncmy

s

jtrcngtns and WcaKnesscs

ability to

contain

enemy and

wage war. Future

detailed

articles

Japan and her Empire job

still

issues of

on

that

facing us in the Far

our F'acific enemy. Our ignorance was natural Japan away, comparatively few Americans visited it: Japanese people, language, land, way of life are remote as the stars from anything familiar to the Western world. The :

on

utterly different outlook lo

our understanding these peculiar people.

things are not unrelated.

sensitiveness

lo

others'

the

which wrecked Kublai's armadas, saved Japan from Mongol mastery; but they, in pride of race, take the typhoons as proof of intercession by their gods: they were the Divine Wind sent to preserve them in their hour of peril by their ancestress Amaterasu Omikami, Goddess of the Sun. The generations of Japanese since Kublai's days have

no

less

today, that they are

in-

vincible, can't be invaded.

We

think otherwise.

Now,

at

the beginning of the air

it is timely to take stock of our attempt to draw up a balance sheet reflecting his

offensive against Japan,

enemy,

to

is

maintained by

playing on their loyalties, by the creed of Shinto, making the legends of Japan's origin, her Emperor's divinity, an

gales

believed, as they believe

(

was a bar

of the Japanese

grip of their feudalistic, militarist masters

Every Japanese remembers that in the six and a half centuries since the repulse of Kublai Khan no invader has set foot on the soil of Japan. This fact gives them a prideful conviction of their prowess. Fortunate for them were the

life

t

Those people are Japan's chief asset. 75 industrious, fivefoot, literate millions of them. Of all the world's peoples they are probably the most homogeneous; they are also perhaps the best prepared, spiritually, for war. and the two

the ;

In

opinions which make them For more centuries than America has history they have lived under feudal domination. The

EDITOR.

in the past

-lii|>^.

far

article of the national faith.

legend is in the ])resent, invaders IN Japan, scenes above epitomize both.

1.000

..I

naturals for dictatorship.

will

important aspects oj have a bearing on the East. — THE

2..S0()

tion of

is

a

the factors that affect his

IMPACT

ni.-n.

Japanese are now urged. "Have the courage of our ancestors: the Divine \^ ind will save us!" Above, archers attack the Mongols on 10 October 1274. At right above. Takezaki Suenaea, leading counterattack on invaders. crisis.

They are by nature gentle, cheerful, and clean, with strong loyalties, sense of duty, reverence for family. They have also a reverence for authority, an ant-hill mentality and

This article is intended to give the men who fly against Japan an opportunity to gain a better under-

standing of this

1281 Kublai lost 100.000

In

modern

current strategic position, to get to know him a little better. One of the ways we got caught short by war was in informa-

name

Thus what

the militarists

of their puppet, the Emperor,

is

do in

presented to the

'

people as the sacrosanct mandate of the gods.

These people have long been told that the individual is that the most glorious u.se of life is in death for

insignificant

:

the nation; that bushido. the \^"arrior's

\>l'ay. is to

fight with

grim, fanatical tenacity to victory or to death. Today every is a warrior. And they are a tough people. Accustomed, most of them, to living at bare subsistence level; familiar from childhood, all of them, with catastrophe fire and flood, earthquake, volcanic eruption and tidal wave, typhoon and pestilence they aren't awed by death, aren't discour-

man

—

—

aged by hardship. All this adds up to

national spirit.

That

Yamato damashii. their term for a Japan means nation-worship,

spirit of

and love of country, pride in serving, complete self-abnegation. It means that the soldier often prefers a useless death by his own hand in the ice of Attu, death by starvation in because bushido so the Melanesian jungle, to surrender

—

commands. These same peo])le arc Japan's biggest

liability.

To

begin

Confidential

'

uinded by 13th-century bomb. At right, under trees at amakura, Takezaki reports his success as scribe records \'-

Two

or\.

severed

Mongol heads,

Mongol Invasion."

H-

there

ith.

trophies of battle, roll

Pictures are from ""An Illustrated Account of

i:round.

II

are

too

were painted about 1293.

Scrolls

many

them.

of

The 75 million are

acked into a space the size of California, which accommoseven million.

ates

Hut only

lf)9r

of Japan's surface

is

rable; to do your mental arithmetic, the population density

over 3.0(K) to the tillable square mile.

just

i

—

The average

arm family wrests its living and feeds a city family rom 2.6 acres of ground. And every vear 1. 000.000 more apanese arrive than die. Also on the liability side are that

ualities

iroach

to

make

— need

the Japanese

it

be said?

— the very

the world's nearest

the perfect social animal.

ap-

Individuality doesn't

under dictatorship: there is no greater social sin in showing initiative. Co"being different." iperative effort is their strong point. the\ lean on each lourish

apan

than

ither; they don't

theirs

iren't

work well

— the

singly, self-reliance, adaptability

life-long

of taking orders

habit

is

too

The Japanese is the ideal serf: he's been exploited o long he doesn't know what they're doing to him. But ifter all the Japanese is human. And. when it eventually lecomes starkly plain to him where his militaristic leaderitrong.

has placed him. a

ship

eadership

is

revulsion

of feeling against

that

certainly a possibility.

The value is both asset and liability. apparent enough in the heart-breaking COM to us of merely reaching her front door: yet in her back vard she has Asia, with lush agricultural lands, fabulous mineral wealth, to make her a great "have" nation. Arriving Japan's land. too.

)f

her isolation

is

Japan's front door by wav of the spaces of the we are faced with landing on islands fantastically for military operations, as witness Iwo Jima.

at

Pacific, difficult

Asia

Japan. stands, coasts;

1.200

for

plains on

miles.

The few plains are small (the largest, where Tokyo some 60 by 90 miles I. mostly shallow, on the the

mountains

are

the

Alpsi

called, ;

rising

Confidential

dominating Kyushu. They

ever-present,

from Hokkaido

everywhere, rugged, craggy

range

look for sizable

top of the Rockies, and you don't find them in

feature of the landscape are

You wouldn't

(just

to

west of

Tokyo

feet.

Highest

is

the sea. to eight or ten thousana

Fuji. 12..388 feet.

Landing beaches there are. good ones along the coast from to Tokyo bay and beyond, some in .southern Kyushu and on the Japan sea coast: but when the plains have been won there are the mountains again, heavily forested and impregnable, defiant. VI here there aren't mountains there are the rice-paddies, innumerable tiny dike-rimmed fields, lakes in growing season, knee-deep in fragrant muck the rest of the year (Japan's "national air'' arises from these paddies, fertilized with "night-soil" thriftily collected from the nation's privies). Neither mountains nor paddies are adajjted to mechanized warfare, and the paddies aren't quite deep enough for naval operations.

Nagoya

Japan's kind of terrain breeds nasty weather, for which is famous. It is governed by the North Pacific mon-

the land

may or No. 2 I. His chances can be estimated from the fact that Tokyo has 154 days annually with 8/10 to 10/10 cloud cover.

soon, which means, to the

Japan is a spiny ridge, top of a mountain-chain rising from the sea-floor to make a great barrier reef off the coast i)f

more than 80 miles from

is

a

from its wild picturesqueness, the Japan from sea level in a country where you can't be

may

man

in the R-29. that

not get a look at Japan (see

In a country the size of reach.

Until

now

it

IMPACT.

Japan everything

Vol.

is

he

III.

handily within

has been an asset to them to have (heir

six great cities within a

where the .AAF comes

in

150-mile radius.

—

it's

But now

— here's

a liability.

That very compactness means vulnerability to sirategic bombing. In this respect, Ja|)an will be a far easier nut As against Germany's 25 or 30 lo crack than Germany. industrial complexes, spreading her industry over a great Continued on next page

— |)art

of her area, Japan's

is

concentrated in three great iiudr

and two smaller ones; where much of Germany's is buried far in the interior, Japan has no interior; we have captured subterranean factories which the Nazis had operated for years, but Ja|)an has just started to talk about going unde

ground. Japan's great 41

'!f

cities

are extraordinarily full of people:

of the country's population lives on the plains where

the three industrial too. of

complexes of Honshu are located.

An example

industry.

importance: aircraft production.

industry of vital

Full,

the concentration in oni

is

In

tb

Kanto plain sprawl Tokyo, second city of the world, th manufacturing center of Kawasaki, the great port and ship center of Yokohama, the No. 1 naval base o Yokosuka. and a half a dozen other packed industrial cities the skies of Kanto swarm with planes not only from th( dozens of army and navy flying schools, airfields of every sort, liut from testing-grounds for factories which do just about half the job of keeping the Japanese air forces in the The Nakajirna plant in Tokyo's Musashino suhurii air. makes about half of all Japanese fighter-plane engin shipped to the company's plants at Ota-Koizumi 40 miles the north, they power around 40% of the output of army and navy fighters. Nagoya is not far behind, has the gigantic Mitsubishi works (world's largest aircraft plant), which, together with two other Nagoya companies, makes at leas 40% of total combat aircraft. (See strike photo, page 1()

building

Ritual dramas,

beloved

war's beginning, are

during

rest

by

all

Japanese, suspended at

now performed

in

curtailed versions

periods in factories. The themes of

dramas remind the Japanese of

many

their "divine"

of these

origin.

Other industries are equally concentrated (see maj) pii. Nagoya and Osaka-Kc account for the bulk of oil-refining, machines and machine-

6-7), with the result that Tokyo,

tools, chemicals,

motor

vehicles, radio

and other

electrical

equipment, a score of other types of war goods. Japan's two other industrial nodes, smaller than the big three, are in north and west Kyushu. Served by coal fields producing two-thirds of Japan's total, and close to the iron ores and coal fields of Korea and North (^hina. is the Yawata-TobataKokura node, which alone has a quarter of the iron and steel

producing capacity of the entire Empire. Also in this node, along adjacent Shimonoseki straits, are important harbor facilities that handle much of the shipping to and from the

mainland of Asia. The base

Haehiman, God of War deified),

(4th-century

was worshipped before war

night festivals like this represents

Emperor

Ojin. later

semi-annual midone. Below, students at kendo, which at

combat with samurai sword, builds

fighting spirit

fifth

node centers around the naval

Sasebo, shipbuilding and ordnance at Nagasaki and

at

and basic chemical industry

the coal

at

Omuta.

\^'here the factories are, there naturally are the workers

and again a comparison with Germany Berlin

has

6%

German

of

industrial

Japan's are massed in Tokyo; in

is

illuminating.

workers,

Hamburg

14%

of

there were under

the square mile, in Osaka there are over Tokyo's incredibly supersaturated Asakusa ward (completely wiped out in the B-29 incendiary strike of

6,000 people 45,000 and

—

to

in

I. over 130,000. They live in industrial slums, about their factories, on tortuous streets which would baffle any bucket-brigade, in houses of traditional

9-10 March clustered

Text continued on page 8

Kamakura, noted

Buddhism in Japan, has |^ Hase-no-Kannon (Goddess of Mercy I.

ancient seat of

shrines:

to

At right is the "guardGreat Buddha Haehiman shrine. He squats at the enreminder that the God of ^X ar is a rugged god.

Haehiman Daibutsu

ian" of Kamakura"s trance, a stern

Confidential

(

I

.

t

JAPAN continued

(

81

wmf^^^

SHIMONOSEKt • SIOM

TOKUYAMA

HIKOSHIMA

^rxLjL

^•OMUTA

^A^^

11

KYUSHU I40IE0KA

KIHAMA*

\ \

s

H

r H

o

t

i^

OSAKA

NON-FERROUS METAL OIL REFINING

NAVAL BASES IRON AND STEEL

Industrial

Concentration

then locating the small solid red areas iri the circles, you can see how highly concentrated Japan's war industries are. Of the total production of the eight basic war industries symbolized, twois located in these small solid red areas. This means that to flatten Jap war production, 20th Air Force crews need familiarize themselves with only a handful of target areas. Also, the main industrial units and supporting "home"

thirds

This

map

illustrates Japan's greatest

weakness from the

American strategic bombing point of view. By following the five numerals and adjacent symbols to their respective circles and

Confidenlial

JAPAN SEA

II

OCEAN

II

•

ha»aOic

AtMIWAtAK

I NklNI

I

*«OltUMI

MIO*

tl

TOKYO

lAUATiU

x

Miilusiiii-s .iTC

jariimftl so closely togfliicT

ainiosi t-vci V t)onil). regardless

ofvvhcrc

il

in

liils,

llir

.iicas thai

docs some daiu-

war eitort. Ilie big fellows are lokyo. )v.ik.i-K()l)e and Nagoya. S\iiil)ols on the map are weighted by size to show approxiTTi.iic lelative importaiue. Also, symbols for an industry are alliiuliisive within thai industry. For example, airtialt symbol

.!!<'•

to die eneiiiy's

<

'^onfitlfiitial

A^^y

nn hides engines, This

is

ihc

/i

aii

hriirl of

frames

to the contrary. |apaii has

and

.iiid

assembh.

all talk about Manthuria developed industries in Manchuria,

industiial japan,

also in C:hina, but they are insignificant

compared

to the

homeland. Once the war plants in small solid reel areas are kiicx ked out b\ our bomb.irdment, Japan's days are numbered. industrial concentrations in the

.

paper-and-bamboo.

bombing

of the

Pictures on following pages of results

of such bee-hives in

Tokyo show

that build-

ing of reservoirs by Japanese for water-storage, years of

air-

and demolition of tens of thousands of buildings to make fire-breaks, have been of no avail. Flak and interception, feeble by European standards from the beginning of the bomber offensive, aren't likely to impress ETO crews. raid drills,

One tem.

of Japan's tenderest spots

is

her transportation sys-

Result of the same conditions of terrain which have

gathered her people and

cities on the coast is long, vulnercommunications. Except in the plains there are no rail nets such as we are accustomed to; lines circle Honshu and Kyushu, but cross-country routes are few, with small hauling capacity. Lines follow the coasts often bridges and trestles are practically on the landing beaches

able lines of

Emperor Hirohilo

1939 is here riding with retinue to review of his armed forces. The white horse, reportedly a B-29 victim, is the one that Admiral Halsey wants to ride.

rail

—

—

run four to the mile, 1,200 tunnels are sensitive points

in a

by earthquakes. The critical Tokaido line, one of the few lines double-tracked throughout, lies exposed both on the coastal plain from Tokyo much of the way to Kobe and on its extension, the San-yodo, to Shimonoseki. If its 4,000-foot bridges and five-mile tunnels were land daily shaken

knocked out, the raw materials for the war plants of Tokyo would have to make a circuitous way through the backwoods, by longer routes with still more bridges and tunnels. At the other end of the country, Nagasaki on its long cape is connected with Japan by one line, winding through a chain of bridges, defiles, valleys and tunnels. And there aren't any good roads: a major highway in Japan is two lanes, graveled except in urban areas. roads,

with 400,000 bridges,

a

Of sixth

the 600.000 miles of is

suitable

for

all-

weather motoring. Water transport has been heavily depended on to supplement the much over-burdened railways, but it is becoming scarce, as even small craft are impressed for the task of keeping

raw materials and food flowing

in

from abroad.

Old print shows seppuku

or harahiri

(both

mean

"cut

belly"), ceremonial suicide performed by samurai, warriors of old. to expiate faults.

Rite was barred to lower classes.

j

The metamorphoses of the \-sen piece, equivalent to our^ cent, neatly sum up Japan's rags-to-riches-to-rags position Japan was a great in resources. The original copper coin exporter of copper for centuries

— —disappeared

in the

middle

war economy required imports of more than production, was replaced by one struck from aluminum. Aircraft requirements began to strain the aluminum supply and for a time tin sen jingled in the citizen's pocket. Today there's no time to worry over money, tin is needed elsewhere and the supply is uncertain; citizens spend fiber sen.

'thirties,

as

is as poorly endowed with resources as she is endowed with breathtaking beauty of nature. Since she is a group of islands, this makes her very life depend on her ability to import food and raw materials. She gets

Japan

lavishly

such basic requirements as iron ore, copper, aluminous shale, magnesium, and a few lesser ones, from her ManchuriaNorth China bloc. But her shipping situation has become so precarious that already she

is

having trouble getting what

she so desperately needs across the Japan Sea and into the

homeland. Also, the Southern Empire on which she relied for materials even more critical, is now virtually cut off. These materials include the petroleum of the Indies, the rubber and tin of the Indies and Malaya,

factories of the

All soldiers are samurai today, often commit seppuku rather than be captured. Grenade held at chest, pistol at temple or

dynamite cap

in

mouth

kills as

dead as traditional sword.

the

lead,

tungsten

and zinc of Burma, the nickel of

the

Celebes, the bauxite of the Indies and Malaya.

Confidential

i> the tightest pinch. Japan's own production northwest coast and in Hokkaido) is minuscule,

I'lirdlcuin .aloiip the

peace time supplied only

10%

of requirements, was from shale, low-grade and {nsatisfactory for aviation gasoline. The synthetic petroleum ridustry before the war was microscopic down to 1942 (ven in

lupplemented

Manchuria's

liy

oil

—

was coal-liquefaction; uMn'r from

been

they've

oil.

Probably

ul'lier.

lately,

synthetic

while we've been making trying to

production

make oil from now equals that

rom natural sources, but 85% of aviation gasoline came null the NEI. The Japanese have busily accumulated lcirk|)iles of petroleum products as of other materials

—

now

before 1937. but

iiu'i'

shortage of aviation gasoline. They're

critical

in

no con-

Malaya are practically

a

videnced by their ingenious experiments with sufu titutes.

It

is

Shipping

— sub-

well to observe, however, that substitutes

some

for

iiffire

^

war now that the Indies Lost Empire; they know it. as

industrially, to fight a long

lition.

ind

are believed to be approaching

may

time.

Even food shortages growing serious. Half the calories of the national diet onie from rice, but Japan can grow no more than fourifths of her needs. Today, controlling 70% of the world's ire. she has given up trying to import it, instead her people the crux of the crisis.

is

ire

lavc to cat unfamiliar foods, unpalatable sufu.

Much

of the

work of cutting Japan

from the

off

vital

southern Regions had been done by our air forces and the ilent warfare of submarines

("you can walk

to

Tokyo on

he periscopes," they are saying in Singapore today iiavc

I.

which

Our conquest

destroyed a third of her shipj)ing.

of

Luzon, with consequent tactical air and naval control of sea leaves her standing, as Premier Koiso

lanes to the south,

recently said in an official statement,

"on the dividing-line

between survival and death."

The

strategic

opened, yet

it

bombing campaign against Japan has Japan

finds

in

Old biplanes just

an incomparably weaker posi-

tly above Tokyo's Asalii Sliimliun iMorninf; during fete in '.'-JOs. A great pre-war newsjiajier. the -Sun now issues only two pages daily, all government poop.

Sun

I

Germany at the same stage of destiny. \^ hen we are able to base more bomber strength closer to Japan, the problems of destruction of her industry will offer much less difficulty than has been the case with Germany the first >i;iL't'. the bombing out of her aircraft industry to permit us tion than

—

III

attack the rest with

under way.

minimum

interference,

Japanese industry was taxed

was cut off from materials, technical developments electronics, before

it

—

is

already well

to the limit,

try to

to

even

match our

aircraft-design,

jet-

They've done miracles, for them, because mass production isn't a Japanese habit. It isn't enough. Japanese propulsion.

and air forces have shown they couldn't take

fleet

on

the

chin

— and

are

unable

to

defend

their

it

—except

homeland

against us.

This doesn't mean the Japanese are yet ready thai.

too. isn't a

catastrophe

with

to

give up

Japanese habit. They will go on. meeting characteristic courage,

eating their rice-

— named — taking

forming their Kamikaze suicide-bands for the Divine \^'ind which saved them once before

sujistitutes.

it

on the chin.

else

is

The

an aspect of

whom we

real

this

—

reason they will is

fail

—everything

the little brown-skinned

return in the end: he isn't a free man.

Confidential

man.

to

F-ml)odyin
the

trumpet

call.

:

ci:._ ......

Taps have sounded for most

of

i

them by now.

JAPAN continued

/vrca DomDing Vvreclj one respect. Japans industrial economy is different from any other nation. Japan has her big factories, but she also has a supporting system of many thousands of small "home" factories where parts are being fabricated for delivery to the large plants in which the final product, such as

IN

that of

an

airplane,

These small units

assembled.

is

—

—and

they

homes of the workers are located in large, congested areas in Japans main industrial centers. Such, in large part, was the area hit in Tokyo by our 9 March strike. literally are the

The small, feudal-type workshop, centering around one or several families, has always been a factor in Japan. Such

workshops, supplied with machine tools and electrification. were naturals for conversion to war production. The greatwhich the est number are two-storied, flimsy homes in

Japan's industrial expansion, since 1925. is typified by comparison of the above photo and that on the right, opposite page. Above is seen the Mitsubishi A/(^ assembly plant. Nagoya. when it was a mere fledgling in IQi^O. standing alone on a relatively undeveloped waterfront

fill

area.

'

its shop downstairs. It was easy making metal ashtrays for export before the

family lives upstairs, has for a family

war

to

An

convert to stamping out metal parts for an airframe.

idea of the importance of this elaborate system of sub-

contracting

may

be gained from statistics for immediate

Tokyo waterfront,

below,

is

'

studded with industrial plants.

This was not target for 9 March incendiary strike, although small areas at extreme right were hit. Key: 1) Asahi Glass Co.: (2 steel and shipbuilding co. and iron works; (3) en(

I

gineering works: (4. 191

eum plant,

center:

(top left

saki Electric

Cable

(6)

(^o.;

I

Tokyo Gas Co. works; (7)

electric electric

power

Power Plant; (9|

Japan

Steel

(8)

station,

plants; (5) petro(top)

steam power

(top right)

Kawa-

probable Showa Wire and

Tube Co.; (10) Showa

Ferti-

I'

'

Home

up

Industry

jrcwar years. They show that n(irc

persons totaled

'i.i"l"

in

13. (KK)

Nagoya and

that

[jlants

all

in

Tokyo.

employing

five or

15.()()0

Osaka.

in

the ^rcat hulk of these there

in

than 30 workers.

vvcn- less

The sub-contracting "area complexes" make area homliiiig Such in the strategic campaign against Japan.

lecpssary

!)ombing reinforces the effect of precision attacks on the major factories by interrupting the flow of components into final

assembly.

15esicles

direct

attacks already have caused

damage

to

huge man-hour

equipment, area losses due to the'

disorganizing effects of de-housing, casualties, disruption of utilities

clogging

services,

of

transportation

and general

administrative disorganization. area bombing. Japan

I"(ir

AI>out

.'ii

proper

is

a juicier target than Gerrnaii\.

per cent of the total industrial labor force of Japan six

in

is

cities

— Tokyo.

Yokohama.

Kawasaki.

Nagoya. Osaka and Kobe. Oidy 12..'^ per cent of the total labor force of "Greater Germany" was located in the 15 cities that were the K\F""s prioritN area target--.

Reeeiit reoonnaissance shows the Mitsubishi plant today, the largest aircraft assembly works in the world. Plant area is

bounded by white

-Small

enclosed

stood in

1930.

line.

section

Arrow

is is

B-29 damage is visible at left. where entire plant (opposite key

to

direction in both photos.

Asano Cement Japan Service Co.. Fuji Steel Works. Ikegai Auto .Parts ^'orks. Toa Machinery Co.: (15i Tokyo Auto Co.: (161 Haneda airport (17l Ebara Manufacturing Co. (18l 20 Japan Special Steel Co.: (21 Tokyo Gas steel works; 22 KH yards: and Electric Engineering (aircraft plant (2.3) Shibaura \^'harf and Hinode-cho Pier (right I; (21) 25 Tsukiji market, warehouse: 26 and 271 freight vards: lizer: (J).:

(11) two oil refineries (right): (12)

(l.'^l

:

:

I

I

(

I

(

dockyards:

(281

I

:

(

I

(

corner of the

Imperial

Palace grounds.

r>%«

.

A.

yO

B

AV

/

tATTf Hits

JOMA-TIC

WEAPONS

PROX. SCALE

l/33,500

next pal

JAPAN continued

These are the

lokyo

s

fields

from which Tokyo^s defending

Air Defense

Weak

!\akaiinia, center,

is

a ISo. 1 B-29 target.

five B-29s. The bomber gunners got 57 fighters. On 25 Feb. the B-29s weren't intercepted at all, but this probably was due to a snowstorm. Of real significance, however, was the total lack of interception of the 4 March strike, made through 8/10 to 10/10 cloud, and feeble interception on the

down

Do Far

any place Japanese fighter defenses should be it is Tokyo. But Tokyo's defenders, despite myriad airfields and plenty of available aircraft, have been unable to cope with B-29 attacks. Not that they haven't tried. On 27 January, a XXI B.C. mission to Tokyo experienced 1.050 fighter attacks. This has been (to 22 March) the heaviest interception over the Jap capital. Nip fighters shot If there is

potent, certainly

fighters rise.

9 March night strike.

ramming tactics and other attempts to solve problem posed by the B-29's high speed, our losses to both AA and fighters continue to be extraordinarily light. Despite Jap

the

Confidential

his is

tie

part of Tokyo's

Akasuka W ard,

typical congested area of

scene below is in the area marked (5) on the anon page 23. where the Ginza, the shopping

tated vertical strict,

runs into the financial district.

K^?'^

The bigger buildings

inflammable two-storied

''home'''' factories.

below are built of reinforced concrete, largely withstood the incendiary attack of 9 March, while the smaller buildings, of light construction, such as wood and stucco, were burned out.

JAPAN

voiitiniiett

"^^o-"-

o^v

J*'^

xV^^^

co^

}^

.^^^ ^'-

^^+'^'

^v^v^ V- V^

V

ClJ/i..

>s^ ^^

-z.

^

^

6,

A^

^

^

map is a very unpleasant one for shows what Premier Koiso was thinking about when he announced on 11 March "we must be prepared for the time when our homeland will be a battleground." Illustrated is cumulative carrier action up to but not including the recent strikes in Japan's Inland Sea. on Kyushu and., The perspective

rrom rom

the

wind tney wina tri< sowe d

now comes 14

tne wnirlwind

Japan's leaders.

of this

It

Confidentl

\

„ \

CV

V

V

Clt^^Mql

»Sutr

^-

V\

^ \J^^'^\. "Pc PLnq I

/, ^

tlif

Hyiikus.

Carrier aircraft

hit

ItidoChiiia. Hainan. Hong-

Amoy. other places along the China Coast Formosa and the Kyukus to isolate the Luzon

kong. Canton.

and up

to

days of our operations there. Nov\ the carriers have moved up into homeland waters while the air forces have taken over the joh of lilockading the South battlefield in the early

tJiina

sea route to the Indies

The e\er-swelling parade Japan's great

cities

(see

most pressing concern. territory

still

held

l>y

and Malaysia.

of B-29s from the Marianas to the enemy's China show, roughly,

following pages

Red areas the (Chinese.

Pacific are those that have heen

in

i

!>>

Light red areas

conquered or retaken

in

Continued on next

'onliili-ntiiit

the

liv us.

paf;e

15

JAPAN continued

Damage First

targets

plants, for the

16

Nagoya

at of

A/C

XXI Bomber Command

same

many. Above

Plant

were aircraft

strategic reason as in the case of Ger-

is

the Mitsubishi

A/C

engine works at Nagoya

after four B-29 attacks with 500-lb.

GPs and

incendiaries.

Important structures are: (A) main shop. (B) possible tool shop. (D) warehouse, (G) machining, engine and cylinder assembly. (H) storage, (I) machine shop, (J) shop storage.

Confidfntit

lilv.

lO

foundry.

nance

Kawasaki A/C! I'.

2'>

GP

attack.

eiifiiiic

10 Jan.

plant at Akashi

Kcv

:

is

sliown after one

(Al stoves. (Ml

final

assem-

shop.

(Hi

assembly. iD) machining. (E) heat treatment. (F) (G and Ml storage. (Hi tool shop. (I) mainte-

unidentified. (Kl boiler houje. (LandOi shop-type building. (Pt cafeteria. (Qi forge. .subassembly. (Si foundry and heat treatment. .shops. (J)

(N)

Continued on next page 17 infidctititil

dHrHII continuea

m

B-29s

Navy Helldivers

is

the

hit Ota A/C plant, north of Tokyo. 10 Feb. This one of the biggest fighter assembly factories in Japan.

n

cross the coastline near

single-engine

aircraft

to

Tokyo on 16

attack

Japan

Feb.,

proper.

Attacks

(^arrier

Two

first

tremendous importance stand out in the daring carrier strikes at the heart of Japan. (1) Japanese land-based air power is in such a state of impotency that our surface vessels weren't even attacked during strikes against Tokyo. (2) The Jap fleet (or remains thereof didn't show up even when ports along the Inland Sea were hit. facts

of

I

Task Force 58 attacked Tokyo on 16-17 February prito pin down the Jap air forces for the invasion of Iwo Jima. Targets were airfields, three A/C engine plants. Claims: 332 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, 177 on the ground one DD. one DE. one CVE and one cargo vessel sunk. Losses: 49 carrier planes. Not a single enemy plane got near the surface force. Admiral Mitscher hit the Tokyo area again on 25 February. Claims: 158 enemy aircraft demarily

;

stroyed.

Enemy struck

Losses: nine carrier planes.

planes

finally

attacked

Kyushu and Inland Sea

when

the

carrier

ports on 18-21 March.

force

Five

damaged, not seriously. Claims: 281 E/A in the air. 275 on the ground, six freighters destroyed, 15-17 combat vessels damaged. Losses: eight carrier planes. carriers were

The

carriers were doing all right.

Iwo Jima now becomes haven for B-29s

Ola plant

is

here under carrier aircraft attack on 25

This plus B-29 strike in distress.

Marines crowd around

left

at first

factory 75

leli.

per cent destroyed.

emerfiency landing 10 March.

f-,.*'

\ doom, results of B-29 incendiary Tokyo on 25 Feb. Black spots are hurned out

First lasle of impending

areas

lioniliing of

many

Armorers load a B-29 with M-69 incendiary

II

-n(.\N

Dvercd

city.

Letter

"A" identifies two of when holocaust hit.

iieliriak.- largely ineffective later

clusters.

TIic

M'69 Goes

to

Work

M-69 bombs rain down on Japan like giant firecrackers. They come in bunches of '.^8 strapped togelher inside a melal container (see left which is fused to break open at 2.000 or 5.000 feel depending on bombing altitude, and scalier ihe I

seconds after the big fireexplosive charge violeniK ejects a sackful of gel which burns intensely. The sack holds the gel in one spot thereby producing a holler fire. individual bombs.

crackers

Three

they go

hil.

oflT.

to five

An

These, together with some M-47s. a buildings and scatters gel

in all

bomb

that

penetrato

directions so as to burn oul

the insides. are the ones doing the

damage shown above and

on ihe next four pages. Note for Koiso: a belter cluster-type bomb M-7 1 is on the way. C.ontinufd on next page (

('onfidrnlidi

1

19

JAPAN continued

m "fl

i^

.%^i.

-

O

03

O)

2

X

C

E

o

—3

u

!-

£ -= -

5

£

"

a.

»-

6C

ti SE

—

c: J; "c

«

N 4,

•

c

I*

— s

-^

M

=

-C J=

1 ^

^^ V _ O 2

5

-:^

-=

0/

tt

O

-S

11

s

'J

^ c


i:

--

S

2 5

a o

|

CL

5 o

ca

„ -^

i :=

Ir

-'

?

.=

H

<^-

C

E

-r-

~

~J

E

.SP

2:

E

iM

si

i^ O" -=

JHrflll continued

Tokyo area, except a few spots in the distant background near the Ara river, is now burned out. "X" and arrow correspond to those on damage photo at right. Note area above is only a small part of the total destroyed. All this

This vertical view of Tokyo taken after the atlackf

I3»2 square miles are gone The devastated area of Tokyo about half the size of Manhattan

I

13.2

square miles)

Island.

above, within the zone bordered by the black

Devastated area, black, is shown in relationship to rest of Tokyo city proper, white. Tokyo thins out gradually info open country. The white area defines only what is really "city."

22

Black area

is

bigger than

all

of Wilmington, Del.

On

the

is

photo

line, the

only

areas which escaped complete destruction show up as dark splotches, such as the big electrical plant at No. 3. Only

exceptions are black areas at No.

The two main areas and

2.

No.

1,

6,

which are log ponds. by Numbers 1

affected are indicated

west of the Sumida river, includes the densely

Confidential

^liin h

'

slums, iiilhin the black borders, the area of preiilrst

|H.|M]lated r.i'

Akasuka ward

—

liotli

a

residential

and manii-

luring district where predominantly consumer goods, but

war goods, were produced. The No. 2 area was jam"'little men" supplying gadgets that went into |,iM„,.r war production plants. Here. too. were many interin' Jiate-size plants, and major targets producing heav) 'I'liical equipment, aircraft and ordnance components. i^ion instruments. Numbers 4 and 5. near palace, indiI'l. ii' ;ji)vcrnnietil offices and financial district, and No. 7. outside black border, signifies scattered waterfront damage. Of special interest are the firebreaks indicated by the

-orm-

|iarkcd with

I

'

Confidential

di-strtirlion.

dotted lines at "A."

\iimher.i

art-

keyed

in le.xl beluic.

These show clearK on the photo on

page 19, taken before the strike. The fact that there is no trace of them above proves that they fail to check fire, when incendiaries are dropped on both sides of them. This, and what happened at Osaka and Kobe a few days later, is just the

beginning.

big industrial areas

is still

The job

of destroying Japan's

a tough one.

I'oor weather, in-

summer, and the long distances still to be coveretl. are handicaps. The Japs have defended themselves poorly so far. but their defenses may improve. There is no creasing

in

the

doubt, however, as to the ultimate fate of their

cities.

23

,

*.*

^
This Sally hung out of these parafras bombs i

that are here seen settling near

it

bv 5th

AF

B-25s.

Ncarbv Nick was riddled bv fragments.'

Vitviiiv MilvsiuMivs No.

1:

THE ENEMY'S HUGE LUZON AIR LOSSES

made by the shattered and Luzon campaign was cogent proof of our superior air strength. These two pages show some of the disasters to Jap aircraft and bases on Luzon.

THE

showing, or lack of

bewildered

The

JAF

it.

units in the

— networks of airdromes — has from

Japs' principle of dispersion

airfields

Lae to mothered by a few major Luzon been met by our counter-principle of breaking up central bases, thereby making smaller dependent ones useless. IMP.\CT last month told the story of the early Navy and the later AAF attacks on Clark air center, which was the largest Nip base outside the homeland and the big spider in the Philippine web. Further reports, after ground occupa-

Clark Field hangars, after attacks by

AAF

bombers.

tion,

show more than 800 planes found

at

Clark alone.

This figure includes not only bombed aircraft but many that are almost flyable. proving how completely we broke

Some planes had only one part missing. Various parts, even engines, were scattered through adjoining towns or buried nearby in frantic, dog-like haste. up maintenance.

By mid-March, even the unoccupied parts of Luzon offered no aerial resistance. The severe A.\F attacks had disorganized the Japs' No. 4 Air .Army, which since Wewak has been playing reverse hopscotch toward Tokyo, leaving as testi-

mony

to the

potency of our air forces a wake of crumpled and swiss-cheese runways.

planes, charred hangars,

!i>i)k

ns

if

sicamis of lorusis had picked them clean.

rluddled in destruction, these Jap planes were caiisht )n the sround bv our bombers during Clark Field attacks.

Here

is

ichal

it

.\-\F

and

reachins

Na>">" all the

planes are making jimk^arcis ot Jap air bases

wav

looked like inside one of Clark Field hangars shoicn

to the

in

network that siiards Tokvo

the picture at

left,

itself.

opposite.

MILESTONES continued

The smoking rock of Corregidor,

CORREGIDOR attaciced tant

it

symbol

in in

at

entrance to Manila harbor,

was more than a military objective when we

February: "the Rock" had become an imporAmerican history as our last Pacific outpost

enemy in the early stages of The Japanese took Corregidor on 6 May 1942

of any size to fall to the

the war.

after a

fairly long siege of attrition followed

by landing operations

which their casualties amounted

5.000 killed and 3.000

in

wounded

in 15 hours.

We

to

recaptured the island nearly three

years later in a perfectly coordinated triphibious assault in

which our losses were only 136 killed and 531 wounded. The Japanese opened their attack on Corregidor with an aerial bombardment on 29 December 1941. five days after General MacArthur moved his headquarters there, but the heaviest attacks throughout the siege were from artillery

26

is

blasted by the '^Jolly Rogers" Liberators off

based on Cavite and, later, on Bataan. When the last American troops on Bataan surrendered on 9 April, the enemy was able to mass his artillery for an all-out shelling of the

Rock and

its

antiquated batteries.

Although the network of tunnels through Corregidor's hills afforded protection to the American garrison, much of the defense activity had to be carried on in the open. By 4 May, many of the guns had been knocked out. the water supParticularly ])ly was low. and casualties were mounting. heavy shellfire prologued the Japs' attempt to land the next night: their officers later admitted that they had been amazed at the savage resistance, which accounted for the sinking of about two-thirds of their barges. The American losses durins those fifteen hours before the final surrender on

Confidential

'**^^-

RECAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR

No. 2: i

Bomb (>

Group,

at

H-Hoiir minus one, 16 February 1945.

May were from 600

^

to

800 dead and 1,000 wounded.

Itutaun peninsula ran be seen in the barkiiround.

Corregidor with 3,163 tons of bombs. to the fireworks on 13 February. with cruisers and destroyers shelling from close to shore; on minesweepers began operating around llie following day, the island. During all this time while the stage was being elTcctive sorties hitting

avenge that surrender, our airland-sea team was perfectly conditioned by the long fight iiack from New Guinea. In December 1943, the softening up iif Cape Gloucester, New Britain, before the Marine landings there, gave the Pacific theater a new verb for intense pre-

The Navy began adding

invasion bombings

interfered with the

hen the time came

to

Gloucesterize.

The Gloucesterizing of Corregidor began on when heavy bombers dropped .S95 tons on

2.''5

1945,

January

the Hock.

Daily strikes by the A.AF continued through 16 February, the day paratroops swung down from the sky onto the island, and extended another week, until most of the remaining Nips had been rooted out of ravines and caves. Preliminary figures for the 23 January-24 February period show 2,028

set

for invasion, not a single

enemy plane or naval vessel Then 16 February came,

proceedings.

and after a sunrise attack by B-24s and an hour of lowbombings and strafings by A-20s. the ,503rd F'arachute Regiment began dropping out of C-47s of troop carrier units of F"EAF. They came down on the western heights known as "Topside." while a beachhead was being established by elements of the 24th Infantry Division at San

allitude

Jose on the east end of the island.

Continued on next page Confidt'iitidl

27

MILESTONES-CORREGIDOR

Beachhead

Elements of the 24th Infantry Division began successful land

shelling

assault here, broke through to meet paratroopers.

at San Jose is shown being softened up by from naval vessels on both sides of Corregidor.

Amphibious forces churn through the waters toward

their landing place at

;# 5i£'

San

Jose. In battles that followed, 3,038 Al

Taken Quickly

opside I

liiec

hours after leaving their Min-

the 503rd Regiment parawere in possession of '"TopThey had a hard landing at the

liase, ,i>

1

!

\\.'

'

liny "go-point" areas, for a 16-18

wind sprang up as the planes along, necessitating a change of in

L'

. :

_

i[)

the

counts.

juni|)niasters'

gruelling air and naval softenof the

Rock had

left

the defend-

Japs dazed and scattered but they rallied, and for nearly two w-eeks nir

groups of them fought on with frenzy. But several days March our forces were in t)efore 1 possession of Corregidor, opening the Snest harbor in the East to Allied hipping. More than 4.000 Japs were isolated

uicidal

tilled at Corregidor. and many more drowned while swimming away from Others, estimated to be ihe Rock.

thousands,

sealed

themselves in sub-

terranean passages, and those stroyed

themselves

reverberate plosions for

a

with

made

who

the

underground

many days

de-

island ex-

afterward.

defeated 6,000 Japs on the Rock.

Near miss on artillery

A-20s

still

U. S. destroyer as Jap guns on Rock keep firing at our ships. Nip enemy planes or ships showed up.

operated, on reduced scale, but no

attack

at

lotc-level

just

before the air-and-sea envelopment.

^,.

u

Continued on next page

MILESTONES-CORREGIDOR

Parade ground years' peace,

at Corregidor,

becomes scene of

ronr,n„e./

in review during 40 triumph as paratroops descend for action.

wherci^(^^^^^iers passed battle

Supplies and guns are dropped from C-47s to the airborne troops who, after landing in areas on "Topside," had knocked Japs off this dominant plateau.

(tne of irurfnre's tnost thrilling scenes unfolds as fnirulriwps of aOSrd botiili-sluiltered iirore

pool

I

.

S. oJJit'tTs

Regiment descend in beyond the siriniming

used before

I'eorl

Harbor.

^

MILESTONES-CORREGIDOR

Paratroops land on "B" zones.

32

field, one of their two tiny drop This one was edged by 500-foot cliffs, and some

of the men went into the water; most of these were rescued by our small craft operating along the shores of the island.

Confidential

ij

_V>.

\

Cleaning up Topside, ll.isted

terrain,

are

The toughest job

-r-^

the

about

to

JT-O

paratroopers advance over lionibpolish

some cornered

Japs.

of all was routing Nips out of the cave-infested

Here, two skytroopers are

hillsides.

off

proceeding cautiously.

\l descend

to

Confulrnliiil

smoke

and dehris of hattle. the airliome tn)op^ join the watcrborne assault forces near the beach

riirougli the

Flaf; ruisecl over (!orregidor heights as soldiers shinn\

up pole while Jap snipers bang away

at

tlieni.

33

MILtSIURtS-UUKKttilUUK rontinued

-s:

/

3^.-

r^.

B-25 hugging

Ormoc bay

No. 3:

SLAUGHTER OF THE JAP CONVOY THAT TRIED H

attacks an 8,000-ton

Destroyer escort pictured on

IMPACT

cover

Fox Tare Able loaded with a cargo of trucks and

is

broken

in

two by

hits

field pieces.

amidships that hurl debris high into

ISole

air.

in)

Fox Tare Able it.

Ship

seen at left

is

in serious trouble, with

later sullered direct hits;

two of

its

homh

l>ursts

geysering near

type were sunk during the attack.

manning guns.

lurking rather than

NFORCE ORMOC IMP.A(T"s cover and these two show in part what happened on November 1944 to a Jap convoy

(ages

rying

reinforce

to

Our

)rnioc, Leyte.

the

big

base

at

forces at that time

ere fighting for Leyte: an important

lement

was the failure

in their victory

enem)

f

hrough.

reinforcements

to

get

They haven't been getting

hrough ever since the battle of the Bismarck sea. early in 19411 when we legan destroying their convoys. In the 10 liils

November

attack, the high

around Ormoc bay helped con-

eal B-25s of the FEAF's 38th Bomb jroup (Ml until they roared over the

)ay )y

masthead

al

level,

accompanied

P-38s and P-47s that shot

down

16

20 intercepting planes. The mediims' iS6 500-11). bombs sank at least hree of the convoy's transports and six escorting ships, while damaging )f

several others.

Flak was intense: when

came home from

the smoking was the roughNext mission I ever hope to see. lay. Navy planes smashed up another onvoy bound for Ormoc.

planes )ay.

one

pilot said "It

"

t

(Continued on next page Confidrntidl

Fox Tare Charlie, above, also with deckload of materiel and another B-25 victim. Below, same bomb run. -hi|. iv. dm- Mm

Hi

kiiiL' Jap-i.

i>

I

No. 4:

BLOCKADE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Another Jap freighter is sunk; important fact about this one is

tin-

that

end came in the South China Sea. through which the enemy must pass to

:

keep his Empire

f

its

alive.

Japan's supply situation

is

critical.

Rail lines going north from Singapore

and Saigon are continually dislocated by our Asia-based air forces, compelling the

enemy

to use trucks that creep

along under cover of night.

And

these air forces joined by the

now based on Luzon, ting off the

with

FEAF,

the pincers cut-

main supply routes have

another claw, one that closes in daily on the South China sea. The 5th AF alone, according to figures announced by Major General Ennis C. Whitehead, sank 90,320 tons in the first ten days of March, probably sank 13,695, and damaged 50.790. The truest measure of the enemy's desperation is the infrequent

creasingly

B-25s of

FKAF open

A moment

attack on Jap freighter in South China sea, 1 March,

later, more 345th Bomb Group planes sweep loun on ship, and one or more direct hits are scored for-

ward, causing freighter fies

daily

FEAF

appearance,

for

convoy protection off China, of aircraft which can hardly be spared from operations in the Inner Empire.

to start

activity

foundering. This strike typi

along

this

important sea route.

1

E

Five minulex later, the sinkini( ship Still

being pounded

|Ki--r(!.

freighter

is

after

another

listing to port, its

ix

five

bow and

still

under attack,

minutes

liave

forecastle sub-

trith

the water swirlini;

from more homli

liurst».

merged. Note wreckage of ship floating away, with smashed and bobbing heads of swimming, unhappy Japs.

crates

ALL-OUT

ETtl

German Communications Rocked of 1945

winter AsEurope,

became history in dream of Allied long last become a

the great

air planners

had

at

The two-year

camhad job, and well. The enemy was

reality.

strategic

paign seemed far in the past.

done

its

out

finally

I

of

the

It

lacking

fuel,

the

equipment he needed to maintain an unbroken defense of the Reich.

Now

all air forces in

ETO

could be

employed as planned in a tremendous tactical blow to crush all resistance and to make final mopping up easier. Every airplane became tactical, from the heavies to the escort fighter.

Every

bomb dropped on Germany had a direct bearing on how many days the war would last. Some of these bombs were still falling on what were formerly classified as strategic targets. But these targets, such as synthetic oil plants, were now tactical. Every drop of fuel still being produced by the Nazi was for immediate needs and had a direct bearing on their capabilities

on the ground and

to resist

There

still

in the air.

remained the hard crust

of Germany's inner fortress to penetrate. This called for an all-out assault

[

on already weakened Nazi transport, a repetition of Operation Strangle and the Normandy interdiction campaign of last spring

and summer.

rail system, by which any cracking part of the hard-pressed front had to be reinforced, the Allied air forces threw everything they had on 22-2.'^ February heavies, mediums,

Against the

—

bombers, even escort fighters. Everyone went out in small wolf-packs

attack

hundreds of targets, among them where even the heavies could bomb with comparative safety from medium or low altitude. The weather to

places

was

exceptionally

visual

bombing

in

permitting

good,

almost

all instances.

rail

yards, bridges, repair

facilities, tracks,

platforms, roads and

Targets were

them.

The

AFs and

the

anything that moved on 8th, 9th,

RAF 16.608

Marauders

TAF

chalk up bull's-eyes on their target, rail yards at Haslach, during the campaign to disrupt Germany's battered transportation system.

38

of First U.S.

12th and 15th

combined sorties

flew

entirely

an

estimated

against

Nazi

communications on 22-23 February, dropping the stupendous tonnage of

Confidential

i

ERIAL SMASH AFs and the RAF

9th. 15th

t

l!1.vU>. U. S. losses were 38 bombers and 54 fighters.

The tactical air forces, particularly the 9th. originator of the plan, did

a

Incomplete tactical remarkable job. claims from 22 February to 21 March

-how

locomotives.

3.:^1()

17.624

ii<.

(

motor

.36.17.3

rail

transports

de-

-iroyed and in addition 4,000 rail cuts.

Those 3.300 locomotives were eight ]n'T cent of Germany's remaining stock of 40.000. much of which was already unserviceable.

1

Though only

three per

of the Reich's railway cars,

rent

the

7.000 destroyed in those four weeks

nuide

previous

the

rate

3.000

of

A.ekly seem puny.*

The 8th and (

15th could appraise the

victory of the past year by

-trategic

omparing

for

statistics

pek'" against the

\\

German

the

'"Big

aircraft in-

1^44 with (hose for the transcampaign that came exactly vear later. The statistics showed:

ilustry in

portation iitii-

8th

t,

"Big

15th

AFs combined

Week"

Rail

Smash

21-25 Feb. '44

22-2i Feb. '45

4.199

7,682

10.040

20.111

252

64

X

Etfectlve

Bomber

^

Sortle$

Tonnage Dropped

>

Bomber Losses

Fighter &

657

Bomber Claims

34 (air) 58 (gr.)

In one year bomb tonnage doubled. At the same time losses were reduced from six per cent to an infinitesimal eight-tenths of one per cent. Opposition, flak excepted,

had become meager.

Truly, the strategic campaign had paid off.

Air power, concentrated against communications, was proving lo be one of the most effective factors in final phases of the war in Europe. By

23 March lo the

all major rail routes leading Huhr had been interdicted; the

battlefield

lated

for

through

was the

a

large extent iso-

grand-scale break-

which began on 24 March.

rnir larliril air poxrt ha. had in Ihr CTO deac-ribrd in a romprrhcnitive article lo appear the forlhroininrl May i..>ir n( IMPACT.— Edilnr.

• Thr win be in

to last

Confidential

L Cascades of bombs pour in unison from 8lh AF B-17s just as they reach the smoke markers over Berlin on 26 Feb. Three major rail stations were the targets. Continued on next

ptipr

39

ALL-UUI SMASH continued

Beating up Nazi dromes near Leipzig on 27 Feb. paid dividends to 8th

Pick-aback Ju-88 and FW-190 clobbered by 8th AF P-51 on 3 Feb. near Hamburg. TNT-filled JU-88 is a guided missile.

AF

fighters.

Claims were 81 destroyed^

Scenes from Last Days

of the

GA

In 1943 and most of 1944 the most difficult job of Stra-

ETO

was escorting the Forts and was true only on very limited occasions. By then the Luftwaffe, paralyzed by earlier attacks on aircraft production and particularly on aviation Force fighters

tegic Air

Libs.

fuel,

in

But by early 1945

rise but sporadically

could

the time fighters,

this

intercept.

to

The

was being caught on the ground by as shown in the photograph above.

German

it

fighters

rest of

strafing

during the month of February made only AF heavies. Accord-

feeble attempts at interception of 8th

ing to General Spaatz, only one Nazi plane

came within range

94 bombers for that month, almost all to AA fire, was less than half of one per cent, an all-time low in the history of the 8th AF. of a

bomber gunner. The

loss of

Escort fighters shot down a mere 125 in this period. Because of lack of air opposition they were able to drop down to destroy 275 parked planes, damage another 154. Despite

dangers from automatic weapons and small-arms fire, only 108 8th AF P-47s and P-51s were lost in February. It

took attacks on the

Confidential

jet aircraft

assemblies and few

ro


4. 'moke clouds pour from 21 (German "siltinp

hu Uy

ViaUinH

tlCWCU

AT

Clirhth LI^IIUI

hi

f/urfc*"

CirrhtorC riglllCIo

near Goiha on 9 Feb. Strafing P-Sls claim 34 destroyed.

Mounting page stands

shown on the oppoisite Mustangs got three pickalark^. on,Ju-88.

of the composite aircraft out.

some of the l.uftMarch near Mapde-

(laining synthetic oil plants to bring out t^afTe's

old-time aggressiveness.

)urg 8th

AF

fighters

On

2

and bombers claimed 74-9-31 while the aground. Losses were 17 bombei-s.

>ursuit fliers got .36-0-29

lighest for weeks, but still relatively low.

Though

not as spectacular as claims of tactical

fliers

dur-

ng the tremendous assault against German transportation >n 22-23 February. 8th .AF escorts set a fine record. Among

many

heir

targets on those two days were:

Type

Destroyed

Locomotives

|— ^_^ .,

114

69

Freight Cars

58

552

Tank Cars Trucks and Armored Cars...

31

25

48

40

Oil

Hard to understand in the light of its wretched state was GAF"s preoccupation as late as February with unsuccess-

the ful

experimental contraptions

shown on air blows wafl^e

lhe.se

pages.

like

mounted, it was washed up as an

'

effective fighting force.

Confidential

—:7-^ .^^

_

_^

^^^^^- ^

r-.

-% ^.^

^^^^^^•^.^^^^^^^^^^^L

the composite aircraft

By mid-March, as the tempo of .'\llied was more obvious than ever the Luft-

^

St J^^^'^Jr ^^^^"^

Damaged

.^^^^^ ^H^F^ '

^^^^^r

^^^Hv

^^^^ ^^_ ^__

'

'

^^' .^^^ J tf^^^T' r

ConlTm/ed

iijin

0»«t

pog9

«fe-

Ludwigslust. 22 Feb.. 8th AF.

Northeim. 22 Feb.. 8th AT.

Target: Nazi Transportation Vital to

shown on vances

(

Germany this

I

object of the tremendous air blows de-

scribed on the preceding pages.

All

While Allied ad-

from 22 February through 15 March, prior to 3rd and

ate into the ever

7th

is

map.

red flames

Salzwedel. 22 Feb.. 8th AF.

the rail

network

decreasing Reich, this web became the

attacks on railroads

Army

break-throughs in the Saar

area, are plotted

below

as follows:

':^. iS s'

)

Ach«,hfurt

>

?£;r^i

4

S^BRNitRC

^

J

>. . <_

represent

lines

Almost

all

thin

major

lines

are

double-tracked, but are not as important.

Large

attacks on

circles

show

strategic

marshalling yards.

circles are strategic

llDUISBURG^

FRANKFURT

Thick white railways.

AF

AF

Small

attacks on

all

Treuchtlingen. 23 Feb.. 8th AF.

(itlicr

rail facilities,

h\\-.

Triangles

Alsfeld. 22 Feb.. 9th AF.

Ansbach.

2.3

Feb.. 8lh

AF.

such as bridges or

locate

where

tactical

Framing the map an photos of visual bombing of 12 \.i/i marshalling yards. Accuracy was •jnatlv enhanced bv the good weather. \l

>lrikes occurred.

Meutlingen.

1

March. 9lh AF.

Uruchsal,

1

Mai.li.

:^il.

M

Conlinued on next

piif,i

43 ConfiJentidl

Mm

'vm^Y

'mi

«

j\.

y*

Oailsheini M/Y, before and after 80 8th AF Forts drojiped 226.5 tons in two waves from 11,700-17,000 ft. on 23 Feb. Both visual and

Chaos

44

H2X

sighting methods were used.

All lines

best describes results of the 22 Feb. attack by only 11

AF B-17s on HE accurately

8th

Villingen marshaling yard.

of

placed from 8,600

ft.

to

It

took 32 tons

produce the rubble

were cut or

in

damaged

many

places and blocked by derailed, destroyed

tacks like this disrupted

heap shown above. entire

Hundreds of highly successful atGermany's rail system on 22-23 Feb.

freight cars.

yard, every

badly damaged.

Rolling stock was scattered over the line

At

was cut and repair facilities were 65 freight cars were destroyed.

least

Confidential

Repairs -laricii iIh

to hatlcred rail

communications

almost immediately after 183 8th

at

AF

Kitzengen were heavies attacked

\ards with 548 tons on 23 Feb. from 8.000-16.700

^K

ft.

t-

.^'

.,.:

.•^*^

• ,

: t

i

Jam-packed at

Hamm

16 Feb.

uilli

tnatmrl lor

tin-

lui-h

i

were saturated by 598 tons from 2U8 Slh Reported destroyed: 350 cars, 57 tanks

Confidrnti/il

liu-

AF

yards 17s on

in transit.

bum among rolling slock and cuts on all Offenburg arc visible after a highly sucmid-February by First TAG AF Marauders.

.•^ixltcii fires still

through tracks

at

cessful attack in

45

Ground panorama

of Dijren was taken shortly after

troops on 25 Feb. from the only tower

left

16 Nov. a huge tactical effort was mounted by 8th and in

an attempt

at a St.

center and outskirts.

Ruined Magdeburg

refinery, courtesy 8lh

and

its

capture by

standing in the

RAF

city.

1st

Army

Last year on

strategic

bombers

Lo type break-through. Over 7.000 tons fell on Diiren's Thousands of Nazi soldiers were reported killed, but

RAF bombers.

RAF ft

is

a Poted

in 194S and 1944 were and the RAF employed their saturation tactics, the two forces now operate in a much similar fashion. The successful joint oil and aircraft production campaign now permits the RAF to operate around the clock with relative impunity and to practice daylight bombing as devastating as the 8th AF"s best. The shattered remnants of captured German cities like Cologne and Diiren above are mute testimony to the tremendous success of RAF Bomber Command's years of pounding the Reich into submission. Berlin in particular proves the effectiveness of Allied mass

Where American bombers

the pin-point specialists

Lethal combination at reducing

German

cities

ground forces were unable to take advantage of the attack because of the flooded Roer river. From Nov. until capture, the city took consistent poundings from 9th \V bombers and fighters. The area above was hit by the RAF. Rubble can be seen piled in places as high as 10-20 feet. For the most part nothing is left save heaps of razed brick and broken glass. it.>i

Lanrs

y^mbintf Partner results

-i--,iiilts.

Onff

it

housed

neutral sources,

of

which appear on pages 50-51. people: now. according to

4.25l).nO() it

barelv can cope with .500.000.

RAF attacks dwarfs even the Kths greatest efforts. On two successive days. 11 and 12 March. Essen and Dortmund were buried under T.2ln and 5.50() tons respectively. Intention of the mi-sions was to disorganize and destrov rail facilities, The

of recent

size

the "remaining built-up remarkable tonnage now l.HJng carried by RAF bombers. 19 Lancasters deroved the Amsberg rail viaduct on 18 March with iruhistries

arias."

and.

To

note

illustrate

this,

the

.-I

1

En

'
tons,

more than seven tons per airplane.

the Lancaster

and 12.000'lh. Tallboy below.

hit

Srholvcn. 22 Feb.

IS'ole

RAF

bambini! furnialion.

TAROET

AREA

Magnesium

flares, fires

and

flak bursts cast

an eerie

light

RAF night attack of 16-17 Jan., results of which are shown on the opposite page. A force of 319 Bomber Command Lancasters dropped 1,483 on Zeitz synthetic

48

oil

plant during the

tons visually in clear weather.

plosion were observed.

Many

A number

fires

and a large exmounted

of attacks were

by

the still-active Luftwaffe night fighter organization; nine Lancasters were missing and one crashed in Belgium.

Confidential

i|HM n ^u^Spl^w^ [

B^HB^BfcAMBl^teB.—.^^

^-

]

W^;:9

.

.—

^a^

4

.

;

>

^?ei^^^fc;7

r^V

/-^^i-r Kk

sate-:-. -.

.?^- i.^

•^^''•^41 '^

had an annual

capacity of 300.000 1944 before the Eighth .AF cut loose with five major attacks. By 16 January repairs were almost completed when the RAF stepped to bat. Zeitz

metric tons.

It

pre-attack

looked like

this in

^*-->-

'•V^l^Xl M.

Pulverized by the strike shown stallations at Zeitz are kaput.

at the left,

all ke)

in-

Most recent photographs

show only minor repairs are in progress. Conservative estimates say that there will no production for many weeks.

continued

^

Berlin before.

This area

is

immediately north of the

Tiergarten on both sides of the River Spree as

it

ap-

peared prior to tremendous RAF night assaults in late 1943 and early 1944. Mosquito attacks are adding final touches.

A

Damage here was caused almost entirely by Typical of missions that created this mess was that

Berlin after. fire.

when 640 Lanes and Halifaxes dropped and 1.188 of IB at a cost of 46 planes.

of 20-21 Jan. 1944,

1,111 tons of

HE

^

This was another part of Nazi capital in palmier days. The area shown is just south of the Tiergarten. Berlin's Central Park, about a mile from the Wilhelmstrasse section

smashed by 8th

AF

on 3 Feb.

(IMPACT,

Vol. Ill, No. 3).

M

Just to cause a few

more Berliners

to

blow

their tops

(and their houses too), from 20 Feb. through 19 Mar. an average of 60 RAF Mosquitoes smacked the capital accubombs. rately every night with approximately 80 tons of

^ir:S:

-«

—

Run

Daring Dicing PARLY

January, when grimly

in

the 3rd

engaged

Army was

relieving

in

the

siege of Bastogne, a danger-

developed on

ous situation its

right flank.

revealed Reconnaissance roadbed coverings on barges along the Saar river between Merzig and the Moselle to the north

I

map

see

below,

ends

Bridge

right).

were

under construction at several points. It was believed that the barges could be quickly

moved into place at these bridge ends to get Panzer units located nearby across and launch an attack

When

obtain

to

The

right engine

been

hit three times.

Army

was hot; the coolant radiator on it had I stayed on the deck to the last minute

and pulled up over the

hills

with plenty of speed to spare.

and soon was circling the field at 300 feet with visibility about one mile. I landed OK climbed out and patted that good right engine." Capt. Holbury returned to his base with the left vertical I

got a vector to base

stabilizer shot

off",

almost minus the plane.

The

large holes in the horizontal stabilizer, left

rudder and with

hits

all

over the

pictures on these pages, which give one a feeling

almost like going on the ride, are among the 212 he took which revealed every detail the 3rd Army wanted. For his daring mission Capt. Holbury received praise from Gen. Patton for "very superior performance," commendations from Generals Vandenberg and Weyland and a

recommendation

for

the

Distinguished

Service

Cross.

in that thinly-held sector.

the weather turned

perative

for the Third

bad on 5 January, it became imGerman movements. Only

pictures of

available method was a low-level mission, often used prior

when

GREVENMACHE

photographs of beaches and vital installations are required for briefing landing forces. This invasions

to

strip

mission requested of the

wa.s the first dicing

Command

Air

since the

Normandy

XIX

Tactical

invasion.

Holbury, assistant operations officer of AF, volunteered to fly the "pilot killer." That day the ceiling was only 600 feet; all other missions had been cancelled due to the extremely bad weather. Even more hazardous was the terrific concentration of flak along his 12-mile route down the Saar. Here in part is Holbury 's own account of the flight: Capt. Robert

J.

the 10th Photo Group, 9th

"It occupied

the

my

full attention to follow the river

same time avoid

hitting obstacles.

and

Hills were above

at

me

on either side most of the way and I concentrated on staying down as low as possible. Jerries were firing at me, but I was too busy to do anything but follow the river. Suddenly red balls, about three-quarters the size of billard balls, were arching around me. I felt several sharp impacts as the wheel tried to jerk out of my hands and the right rudder went forward. It took heavy pressure to neutralize the controls, but they responded normally. "I flew as close to the

for the damage.

My

left

ground as possible while

I

looked

coolant gauge began creeping past

the red line. A glance in the rear view mirror showed a stream of white vapor behind me. I immediately feathered

By

the prop.

this

time

I

didn't

know where

I

was

—

all

my

careful memorizing of the route was forgotten.

was plenty frightened, but it soon changed to anger. speed dropped off' from 330 to 250, I saw several Jerries shooting at me and I would have given anything to have had some guns to dish out some lead myself. I received "I

As

fire

my

in

"After up.

I

me I didn't my camera run.

several places, but as they didn't hit

consider

it I

felt

necessary to break away from

rounded a sharp bend intense flak again arched rudders jar and knew I had been hit again.

my

Map

shows route Holbury flew from below Merzig up to the Saar-Moselle junction and thence westward along the Moselle. Continued on page 54

52

Confidential

]

Jiisl

north of Merzig the nose camera spots barbed wire defenses and a road bridge demolished bv the Mazis.

Pontoon bri
r

in

mid-stream. In center background are dense barbed wire

entanglements that guarded approaches

to

the

V^'estwall.

SAAR RECON continued

S>W-

^1^ n Frequent target

of 9th

AF

fighters

miles from the Saar-Moselle junction.

Armored Division on 24 Feb. without

54

was Saarburg, seven It

fell

se-

10th

cured three bridgeheads across river near Saarburg on 22

Though

Feb., leading to capture of important fortress city of Trier.

to the

opposition.

bridge above was completely destroyed, the 94th Division

Confidential

Nazi soldiers working on pontoon bridge ends at Ockfen F-5. haven't as yet caught on to the approach of Holbury's Moored to the left embankment are barges with roadbed cov-

jn easily be moved into place to make a bridge heavy equipment across the river. This photograph provided considerable valuable "gen" for 3rd Army. eriiii:-

iluii

'

that will carry

Continued on next page

55 Confidrnlial

SAAR RECON continued

Dragon's teeth and pill boxes of the Siegfried line cover Wiltingen on the Saar's east bank. Despite his expert gyra-

Banking sharply ichere the Saar hends

tresttrard,

tions, accurate

20

mm AA

fire

knocked out Holbury's

left

engine just before he reached the Saar-Moselle junction.

Holbury finds a freight

train

southbound toward Wiltingen.

Buzzing low over in

deserted streets and bomb-scarred houses

Mertert, the recce plane was then headed southwest back

The abulmenu of a Moselle bridge

at

the up the Moselle valley toward France. The area across Feb. river in the upper left fell to 3rd Army troops on 23

bombings. Grevenmacher stand nakedly after Na» demolitions and 9th AF

C:^

DESTROYER RESCUES B-29 CREW FORCED DOWN RETURNING FROM JAPAN The floating B-29 seen above was ditched in the Pacific on 13 December 1944 when it got lost and its fuel ran low en route home to Saipan after a bombing mission against Nagoya. It was a night ditching, with landing lights turned on the black surface of the ocean. The pilot put the big plane

down

neatly,

and the

entire crew got into rafts.

The

iiombardier had been pitched through the plane's nose but

was unhurt.

The men

drifted all night, cold

efforts to attract a passing

and seasick;

plane with flashlights failed.

At dawn the B-29 was seen still floating nearby, even though one bomb bay door had not closed before ditching. Crew members went back aboard, retrieving equipment they had left behind in their hasty exit. The Gibson Girl radio, which should have been used during the night, was put into

Navy PBY and other planes circled S. destroyer came and men aboard (lower photo). To sink the B-29, the

operation, and by noon a the rafts.

^^^^^^235/^"^^^

took the

Late in the afternoon a U.

destroyer's guns fired on sisted

40-mm and

it:

and the big plane turned on

-^ijS

the Superfort stubbornly re-

wing tanks and slowly sank.

5-in. shells until a shot hit the its

side