Military History 2007-10

Letters The Real Uncle Sam

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^ ^^^ tickled to read "Patnotic Poster Boys" [July/August], featuring my great-grandfather, James Montgomery Flagg. lt is always a joy to find current publications on the history behind Uncle Sam and the infamous "I Want You" World War I poster. I am a true believer that only history can tell the past, and if that history is lost or forgotten, so then are the stories for future generations. At the same time, misinformation can replace facts.

Your caption states that Flagg "sketched Uncle Sam's face after his own, to avoid having to hire a model." It was my grandmother Faith Flagg's lifelong quest to right r: history of the misinformation passed along by so many uninioinied agencies and organizations that consider themselves master historians, I feel it my duty to continue the quest and share the true story of how James Montgomery Flagg originated the image that would become an icon. One rainy night on a train bound for Parris Island, Flagg spotted a handsome (young) straight-backed figure headed for Marine boot camp. He said, "That's what 1 call a Symbol of His Country, by Christ! Sam in this World War II poster, Not some old hayseed in hence the comment by FDR. striped pants and galluses," Kylie A. Uendrichs Flagg was delivering a portrait TEM?E, ARIZ. of one of the officers and was able to secure a 24-hour pass for the young recruit, as "boots" 1 found the section of "War Dewere not allowed off' post until clared!" [by Jonathan Turley, they had finished basic training. July/August] about the start of He was no more than 17, but the Mexican-American War to my great-grandfather aged his be misleading, Turley insinuface by 40 years and tumed a ates that the U,S- provoked circus clown's costume into Mexico into war. The real probsymbolic dignity lem was that Mexico would By 1941,atage64,Flagg had not accept ihe loss of Texas grown to look like the original and was willing to go to war and began lo use himself in with the U.S, several later pieces. The "model Since 1836 Texas was an hire" misquote comes from his independent nation recogletter from Franklin Delano nized by the U.S-, England Rooseveltregardingan early war and France, Texas claimed its poster ("Jap,.-You're Next!"), border as the Rio Grande and The last paragraph says: "By not the Nueces, as claimed by the way. I congratulate you on Mexico. The U.S. had every your resourcefulness in saving right to accept Texas as a state, model hire. Your method sug- Mexican President Herrera gests Yankee forebears." Flagg stated that if necessary, he did indeed use himself for Uncle would defend Texas by arms.

War Declared!

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President Polk sent John Slidell to negotiate the border with Mexico and purchase additional land, but he was refused a meeting and dismissed, Mexico sent large numbers of troops to the Texas border, and President Polk responded, ordering General Zachary Taylor to Texas to defend the border as the Rio Grande. On April 12. 1846, Mexico gave Taylor 24 hours to remove his army from the Rio Grande, He refused. On April 24, the Mexican army crossed the Rio Grande and killed or wounded 16 American soldiers. This incident started the war, Texas claimed the Rio Grande before it became a state, Mexico refused all negotiations, and the boundary dispute over the Rio Grande was just an excuse for war, Mexico wanted all of Texas back. President Potk was nol the "wild-eyed" warmon-

ger Turley made him out to be, John McTeman MlUERSTOWN. PA-

I wondered why [Turley] didn't reference the Greek city-state of Sparta? It seems that just as our founders decided to not let the power of declaring and making war reside in one person, Sparta also seemed to have had difficulty in allowing just one person to have so much authority. The same conclusion was reached, ai different points in history, for the same vexing problem, at the same social level within their respective societies: The investment of supreme power into one person has proven, by historical record, to be a disastrous choice, ThomasJ. Ba^lin ROCHESTER, N.Y,

Italian Lessons? "French Lessons" iVoice, by Geoffrey Norman, July/ August] was written in defense of France^ martial endeavors. ]According to the article,] British historian J.FC, Fuller even equates Napoleon with Alexander the Greai and Augustus, For completeness, Norman should have mentioned that Napoleon was of Italian descent- He was bom in Corsica and spoke Italian as a child. The onginal spelling of his name was Napoleone Buonaparte. Viva la France? B.A. Randazzo VIA E-MAll

ArmchairGenerai.com and HistoryNet.com are proud to present the

PBS Ken Burns Special Haig's appalling ideas in World War I Field Marshal Haig parallel those of Russians in the East. [Re. "The Worst General," by Geoffrey My father graduated from his "West Norman, June:] While Field Marshal Sir Point" in 1912 and was accepted into an Douglas Haig made many mistakes during Imperial Guard rifle regiment. As an elite the Great War, the British army learned a force, they were thrust into battle immegreat deal from the mistakes it made diately using the same obsolete tactics as during the Battle of the Somme. Where is Britain. His memoir describes the Austroit mentioned that 30 percent of all the ar- Hungarian attack on Warsaw at Opato\', liHery fired during the Somme were duds September 21, 1914, as a bitter introducor that afterward artillcr)' officers changed tion for the guards to machine guns, their targeting techniques and teamed to trenches and artillery. fire over the heads of infantry so as not to Ironically, a cavalry general, Vladimir devastate the landscape the infantry would Bezobrazov, commanded the Imperial have to traverse? Or the increased use of Guard. His order of battle dated July 14, tanks? I could go on and on with the les- 1916, urged victory in the Brusilov Camsons learned and changes in tactics the paign. He signed it "General of Cavalry." British employed. While Haig deserves My father described an attack on the blame for the failures, doesn't he also village of Tristen on July 29: "As expected, deserve credit for ihe successes? our losses were colossal. It's enough to Gregory R Samuels say that in my company of 250 men we MANSFIELD, CONN. ended the attack with only 32. In our neighboring company there was about Geoffrey Norman picks and chooses his the same, and its commander. Col. V. facts. Quoting Churchill as an expert on was killed the moment they had seized strategy is really pressing the issue; the the enemy guns. Farther than the battery man largely responsible for the disaster they could not advance, and they had to and slaughter at Gallipoli is no one to cast draw back a few steps to old German stones at others. The Somme became a trenches, leaving their commander's body behind." (It was later recovered at night.) grim episode in a battle of attrition. Along with the rest of the world I am Haig might not be the brightest light in the sky, but he gradually learned his astonished at how stupid we are. Your lessons. The Somme gave out by the fall magazine teaches clearly of the past, but of 1916; the German army's regular cadres we learn nothing for the future. George Toumanojj were devastated by this battle. The impePETERBOROUGH, N.H. rial German army was never the same. Too many regular cadres killed, captured or wounded. Paschendaele should have Corrections been stopped halfway through. The prime On E 38 in the September feature "La Liberaminister had the authority to do so. David tion!" the caption to the upper right photo Lloyd George understood the issue of war reads in part, "Leclerc is all smiles as he weariness in the collapse of Russia. He congratulates officers oj the Free French took extraordinary measures to keep the divisions." Leclerc is pictured with a mixed British public sympathetic to the war and contingent of Allied officers. to keep working. On P. 52 oj the September feature "GhilNone of the armies engaged in the First dren at War," the photograph in the lower World War performed with perfect strat- right corner was dated to 1939. It was taken egy or tactics. 1 am afraid the Field Mar- inApiil 1945. shal Haig "straw man" doesn't do the job. OnP 8 oj thejuly/Au^t News section. Daniel David North Korean leader Kimjong-il is incorFLUSHING, N.Y.

rectly rejerred to as Kim UJung.

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Jews Longship Retraces Vikings' Oar Strokes Across North Sea under the direction of the Viking Ship Museum [www .vikingesktbsmuseet.dkj, which houses its four sister ships. Following a successful 2004 launch and extensive sea trials, project director Preben Rather Soerensen decided to put the 98-foot, 22.5-ton craft to the test on a 1,000-mile voyage to its port of origin. The goals: to gauge its seaworthiness and gain insight into the hardships faced by Viking crews. Sea Stallion set sail from Roskilde on July 1, manned by largely Danish crew of 65 volunteers working in fourhour shifts. The longship offer5 no shelter, no lavatories, and each crew member is limited to about 9 square feet of living space. Unlike their Viking forebears, the crew wears full-body survival suits, and GPS-integrated maps plot the ship's progress on the project Web site [www.sea Shipwrights used 300 original timbers to reconstruct Sea siallion.dkj. In the absence Stallion, which set sail in July, bound for its Irish port of origin. of wind, the crew must take to Sea Stallion's complement Sea Stallion is the largest of it and the four other long- of 60 oarsfive longships discovered at ships to block the channel to The restored longship will the bottom of Roskilde Fjord invading Norwegian Vikings. remain on display at the in 1962. Archaeologists traced The project to reconstruct Nationai Museum of Ireland the ship's origins to the Glen- Sea Stallion, using traditional [www.museum.iel through dalough woods near Dublin, tools and techniques and 300 the spring, then return to where Scandinavian ship- original timbers, began on the Viking Ship Museum wrights felled oaks to build the Roskilde docks in 2000, in Roskilde. For the first time in nearly 1.000 years, a reconstructed Viking warship has left Danish waters, bound for Irish shores. But education, not invasion, is the aim of this ship's masters.

the vessel around 1040. Danish Vikings based in Ireland used the warship in clashes with rival factions. Following the 1066 Norman Conquest, the Danes sailed the ship to Roskilde, scuttling

'Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake' —Napoleon Bonaparte

DISPATCHES

Constantine's Head Was in the Gutter Archaeologists recently found a marble head of Consiantine while clearing an ancient drainage system in the Roman Forum. Carved 1,700 years ago, the 2-fooi-high noggin likely capped a statue of the emperor in full armor. Ii appears ihe piece was deliberately placed in [he sewer, possibly to divert water or perhaps out of pagans' spite for their Christian emperor.

Is Preservation in the Cards? In 2003 U.S. Army psyops distributed playing cards with the names and photos of the most-wanted ofTicials in Saddam Husseins regime. The cards were such a success, the Pentagon has dealt a new deck, this one depict-

ing Iraq and Afghanistan's cultural and archaeological treasures, with tips on safeguarding the sites. The Defense Department will distribute 40,000 decks to the troops.

News Film to Spotlight Buffalo Soldiers Filmmaker Spike Lee has optioned James McBride's novel Mirade at St. Anna, which follows four members of the U.S. Army's all-black 92nd Division ('-Buflalo Soldiers") trapped behind enemy lines in Italy in 1944. Based

on the real-hlc i^ massacre oi more than 500 civilians at the Tuscan village of Sant'Anna di Stazzema, the story contrasts the racism black soldiers faced back home with the trust they built among villagers and local partisans. The movie is scheduled for release sometime in 2008.

Saddam's Golden Gun on Display A gold-plated assault rifle thai belonged lo Saddam Hussein is now on display at the Australian War Memorial I www.awni,gov.au 1 in Canberra, During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, coalition troops found crates full of similar weapons, vv-hich the Iraqi dictator would distrib-

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ute as mccntives to senior regime members. Maj. Gen. John Cantwell, deputy chief of the Australian army and former director of strategic operations in Iraq, presented the weapon to the museum as an example of Saddam's "gross excess."

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Napoleon's Sword Nets $6.4 Mil, Stays in Family An intricately etched, gold-encrusted saber wielded by a young Napoleon Bonaparte has sold at auction for $6.4 million. Osenat auction house, across the street from the emperors imperial castle at Fontainebleau, wouldn't disclose the buyer, other than to say the sword will remain in Napoleon's family. In 1800 then-First Consul Napoleon carried the sword into battle at Marengo, launching a surprise attack that drove the Austrian army from Italy After the campaign, he presented the sword to his brother as a wedding gift. Its 32-inch curved blade is modeled after Arab swords Napoleon admired on his Egyptian campaign. Declared a national treasure in 1978, ii is the last of Napoleon's swords in private hands.

'War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory' —Georges Clemenceau

Iwo Jima Reverts to Pre-World War II Name Iwo Jima, site of the bloody World War 11 battle between U.S. and Japanese troops, has reverted to its prewar name, Iwo To. In 1944, as U.S. forces swept across the Pacific, the Japanese imperial navy evacuated civilians from Iwo To (Sulfur Island), which it mispronounced as Iwo Jima (in written Japanese, the names look and mean the same). U.S. troops perpetuated the mtsnomer when they invaded the island in February 1945, and it persisted right through the islands occupation and subsequent return to Japanese control in 1968. Last year exasperated islanders petitioned Japan's Geographical Survey Institute for the name change after the box office hits Flags oj Our Fathers and Utters jrom Iwo jima repeated the mistake. U.S. military and historical groups were quick to dismiss the name change, insisting the 8-square-mile patch of ground where nearly 7,000 American soldiers gave their lives would forever be known as Iwo Jima.

WAR RECORD October is proof positive of the "power of 10," as many of military history's greatest figures made power plays during the 10th month of the year. Highlights include; • October 1,331 BC: Alexander the Great takes down Darius III at the Battle of Gaugamela. • October 3, 1990: Cold War ist kaput, as East and West Germany reunite. • October 14, 1066: Williatn of Normandy wastes no time winning the Battle of Hastings. • October 15, 1863: Horace Hunley, builder of the Confederate submarine H.L Hunley, drowns with his crew during a training exercise. • October 17, 1781: George Washington sends the British packing at the Battle of Yorktown. • October 21, 1805: Lord Horatio Nelson thrashes Napoleons Franco-Spanish fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar, securing British control of the high seas. Nelson falls mortally wounded. • October 25, 1415: Hetiry Vs longbownien target the French at the Battle of Agincourt. • October 25, 1854: Lord Cardigan leads his light brigade on a disastrous charge at the Battle of Balaclava. Wiihin weeks Alfred, Lord Tennyson pens his famous poem about the cavalry charge.

Steei from Worid Trade Center Site Used in Prow of USS New York When the U.S. Navy's new amphibious warship USS New York hits the water sometime in 2008, it will bear a resolve stemming directly from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. New York's bow stem, or leading edge, is made from 24 tons of steel salvaged from the wreckage of the World Trade Center. The ship's motto: "Never Forget." The 684-foot San Antonioclass assault ship, among the Navy's latest weapons to combat terrorism and other small-scale conflicts, was in the planning stages when terrorists struck the twin towers. Within months. New York Governor George Pataki contacted Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, asking him to gram an exception and name one of the surface ships after his state. (Current Navy policy assigns state names only to nuclear submarines.) England approved the request, and a year later steelworkers in Amite, La., poured the World Trade Center steel into the foundry molds. In 2005 shipbuilders in Avondale, La., weathered Hurricane Katrina for the privilege of working on New York, some even sleeping in bunks and on a

The Mummy Who Would Be King A mummy long ihought to be thai of King Thuimose 1 was recently determined to be an imposter, prompting ideniity checks for more than 40 royal mummies al Cairo's Egyptian Museum I wwu' cg>'pi la nm use u m. gov. e^l. Prominent Egyptologist Zahi Hawass discovered in June that the mummy in question belonged to a young man who died of an arrow wound. Historical record shows thai Thutmose I died in his 60s. Researchers will use CT scans and DNA tests to link ihe other mummies.

Gimme Shelter Equipped with three landing craft and either four UH 4b bea Knight helicopters or two MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, Mew York will support amphibious missions worldwide.

Navy barge after their homes were destroyed. "On September 11, our nation's enemies brought their fight to New York," Pataki said. "USS New York will now bring the fight to our nation's enemies." Later ships in the class will include USS Arlington (named for the site of the

Pentagon attack) and USS Somerset (named for the Pennsylvania county where United Flight 93 crashed after its passengers fought with terrorists for control of the plane). Said Secretary England, "This new class of ships will project American power to the far corners of the Earth."

*Never let the enemy pick the battie site' —George S. Patton

Chongqmg, Chinas World War II capital, reopened several air raid shelters this summer as a means for ctiy

residents to escape high temperatures. Upgrades cost the city $65,400. Meanwhile, Germany intends lo sell some 2,000 ol' its Cold War shelters, which cost $2.7 million per year to maintain. One near Bonn will reopen as a Cold War museum.

Jews Search Resumes for Bonhomme Richard

DOG TAGS

Battlefield casualties used to fall as unknowns, until On September 23, 1779. —just in lime- The shattered dog tags gave voice to those dui'ing a fierce sea battle off the Bonhomme Richard soon slipped who had been wounded or killed. Metal tags date to the Yorkshire coast, Continenta! beneath the waves. More than two centuries 1899 Boer War. They've since Navy Capiain John Paul Jones faced a tough choice: His flag- later, a team led by the Con- evolved into mandatory gear, necticut-based Ocean containing both identifying Technolo^ Foundation and medical information. www.oceanlechnolog)' .oriv'BHR.htm] may be •Civil War Before mounting close to finding the ship a suicidal attack at the 1864 made famous by the Battle of Cold Harbor, Union Father of the U.S. Na\y soldiers pin pieces of paper Last year, using com- to iheir uniforms that list puter models, side-scan their names and addresses. ship, USS Bonhomme Richard, sonar and a marine magnetom• Second Boer War: British had been holed and was sink- eter, the team scoured the seaing l")eneath him. An ofTicer on floor off Flamborough Head, and Australian troops cany ID the BriLtsh warship HMS Scr- marking probable targets. cards, which prove no match apis demanded his surrender. This summer it searched those for combat conditions. Metal "1 have not yet begun to sites using scuba divers and identity disks, the precursor to fighi!" came the famous reply, a remotely operated vehicle. dog tags, replace the cards. as Jones rammed Serapis, then The foundation vows to press boarded and captured the ship on until it finds the ship. • World War I: Soldiers now commonly wear identity disks stamped with name, battalion 'It is the object only of war that makes it honorable' and sometimes religion.

—Thomas Paine

GPR Reveals Battlefield Ground-penetrating radar (GPR), which emits electromagnetic pulses to map buried features, is the latest tool archaeologists use at historic battlefields to pinpoint stmctures, relics, even bodies. Using a GPR device mounted on a wheeled cart equipped with an odometer, researchers sweep the site in a grid pattern. By revealing likely targets, GPR cuts project limes and boosts success rates, while leaving buried objects undisturbed. This spring a team in Lincolnton. N.C., used GPR to search for a mass grave containing the bodies of 70 to 100 soldiers killed during the June 20, 1780, Battle of Ramsour's Mill. In June researchers with the National Park Service's Southeast Archeological Center iwww.nps.gov/history/seacl scanned the grounds of Andersonville National Historic Site with GPR, identifymg more than 120 structures, including the stockade wall of the notorious Confederate prison.

• World War II to present: Soldiers wear rectangular dog tags suspended from ball chains, listing name, service number, blood type and religion. The Digital Age has seen the introduction of the Personal lniormation Carrier (PIC), a wearable flash drive medics can plug into a PDA to view a soldiers medical information. The information is eventually uploaded to a central database that records what soldiers are encountering on the battlefield. The device is still in the test phase.

Bunker Hill Museum The National Park Service has opened an expanded Bunker Hill Museum (43 Monument Square, 6J7242-7275) in the former Charlesiown branch of the Bosion Piililw 1 ihrary The

new space, across the street from ihe Zll-foo! Bunker Hill Monument and original exhibit lodge, features a cyclorama painting of the June 1775 Revolutionar)'War liaiile, dioramas and relics from the conflict, including a British drum captured by the colonists.

Overdue Honors Private Richard Lancaster of ihe Uncashire Fusiliers was laid to rcsi with full military honors this summer—more than 90 years after the battle that took his life. The 31-yearold Brilish army reservist was lost on November 10, 1914, lit the First Battle of Yprcs in Belgium. In 2006

archaeologists discovered his body, still bearing metal identity disks. Two soldiers lound with Lancaster remain unidentified. More than 300 people, including Lancaster's 69-ycar-o!d granddaughter, attended (he reinterment ceremony at Belgium^ Prowse Point Cemetery.

iiitervlew Ronald Arkin: Building Trust in Combat Robots

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n 1958, shortly ajter the Soviet launch threats. We don't have that threat anyoj Sputnik, the Department oj Defense more, so things have been moving heavicreated ihe Dejense Advanced Researchly into urban terrain, which is probably Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and the most dangerous kind of battlefield apply cutting-edge advances in milifor soldiers. taiy technology. Sten]mingjrom DARPA's research is a recent $127 billion Army How advanced are modern-day project known as Future Gomhat Systems, combat robots? a high-tech network designed to link Oh, they're quite advanced. For example. injrastructure, platjorms and weapons there's a big order for micro-UAVs lunacross all branches oj manned aerial vehicles], the U.S. Armed Forces. little cameras on viangs Part of that research that can get views v^ithfocuses on combal robotout putting soldiers at ics, which have been in risk. Fielded systems use since the 1930s. The include SWORDS ISpePentagon expects that cial Weapons Obserby 2015 ajull third oj vation Reconnaissance its deep-stnke aircrajt Detection System] by and ground combat vehiFoster-Miller and Packcles will be unmanned. Bots by iRobot. The jirst autonomous robot soldiers could enter The same iRobot that service by the 2030s. manufactures a robot In 2006 the Army Revacuum cleaner? search Ojjice awarded Exactly...the Rooraba. a $290,000 grant over And they made a robot three years to projessor doll as well. Very diRonald Arkin, a leading roboticist and verse portfolio. director ojthe Mobile Rjybot Laboratory at Geor^a Tech, !o develop an ethical jrame- What do these robots look like—the workjor batilejield autonomous systems— Terminator or the humidifier? giving deadly combat robots an artijiNeither. "Baby tanks" is the best way to cial conscience. describe them—treaded vehicles, some-

1 ultimately believe robots can exercise better judgment than human soldiers in the battlefield'

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Isn't combat robotics a proven field? Indeed, it has been around for quite some time. One of the primary developments in tlie early days of DARPA was a robotic scout that would go over hills in advance of armored forces. The unmanned ground vehicles program and the like were targeted tovrard Cold War

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HISTORY

times with aniculated levers in the front to help lift them up. Such systetns are typically used in caves and in buildings to peer around a comer, so the soldier can see things without putting himself ai risk. Why send a robot to do a soldier's job? Robots don't have the satne survival instincts. They can sacrifice themselves.

And you don't have to write a lelier home to the mother of the robot if ii gets destroyed. How do you envision the humanrobot interface? Voice commands? Joystick? Keyboard? All of the above. Also gloves fitted with haptic sensors, so the robot can see your gestures. Feedback from the robots, with tactile sensors, so you could feel the presence of something approaching. Heads-up displays. Anything that can l3e done to improve situational awareness on the battlefield, because you could get shot while looking at a computer screen. Aren't robots and their networks vulnerable to hackers? Network-centric warfare is a concern. Yes. Could they be taken over? Conceivably so. The question is how to authenticate users. Retinal scan? Fingerprints? Voice print technology? You can secure these systems against most threats. Has any military force deployed autonomous systems? South Korea is on target to deploy an autonomous border guard with the capability to deploy lethality And I suspect the rule of engagement in the DMZ is, If you're in the DMZ, you get shot. Will autonomous robots be able to learn? Oh yeah. They do right now. They can leam new behavior. They can learn what constitutes a better target. Machine learning is a very, very powerful tool. Isn't that risky? Are you talking about a robot uprising sort of thing? What ahout a HAL scenario, if a robot were to refuse an order? You could bitild in an override—perhaps a two-key switch. But if taken, along with that override would go the respon-

sibility for that action. The fact that we haven't come up with good protocols for what's called "mixed-initiative automation"—where the systetii or the human can be in control, and ideally the best agent will be in charge at the right time—has led, unfortunately, to things like 9/11. That was completely avoidable with existing technology. You could L-asily pul an anti-collision system onto a commercial airliner that would usurp control from a pilot if it were on a collision course wilh a building. But we inist people more than we imsi robots.

on roboethics? This is a personal passion and commitment on my part to further the field 1 have helped to make. I ha\'e to bear some responsibility for the creation of this technology as a young roboticist. The joy of discover)' and ihe intellectual curiosity that fuels scientific endeavor makes you passionate about creating new thing?. But I want to take control of it proactively What is your goal? r-"irst, to ascenain what people think of battlefield autonomous systems. A survey

Do you allow for changing technology and opinions? Yes. These systems have to be fluid and incorporate changes as they occur, t mean, no one ever thought of eyeblinding lasers in 1900, so there were no protocols against it. Indeed, there may be protocols eventually written regarding, perhaps even forbidding, the use of autonomous systems in the battlefield. Do academic colleagues ever challenge your approach? More so in Europe and Japan ihan in the United States, Most robotics researchers in the United States have research funding from the Department of Defense, so it's easily justifiable. The recent pacifistic tradition in Europe seems to counter that. What does the future hold? in the early days, I had a hard time convincing a robot to do anything. Now people think that robots can do everything, and they can't. There's still a lot of work to be done in basic research, and the rush to deployment is a bit of a concern to me. It does have good foundations, but those foundations need to be shored up with good basic science before we start introducing high levels of autonomy into the field.

Ronald Arkin amid some of his wards at Georgia Tech's l\1obile Robot Laboratory.

Shouldn't we? U goes hack to this ultimate trust in human authority being best under all circumstances. I would contend that emotions, the "fog of war," and issues surrounding the battlefield tend to cloud human judgment, severely. Many commanders might agree with me. I ultimately believe robots can exercise better ethical judgment than human soldiers in the battlefield. I'm not talking 2008-^rm talking in the future. Is that why you've chosen to focus

currently under way |see link below] will gauge opinion from robotics researchers, military personnel, policymakers and the general public. The second part, which continues through year three Qune 2009], is the construction of an ethical basis for their deployment. Who determines the ethical and moral parameters? The Army and international treaties. What 1 am doing is taking existing guidelines and embedding them within these robotic systems.

Do you have any lingering concerns? I would be happy if anything that I'm creating in this regard never had to be used again. Bui I'm a realist as well and don't expect that's going to be the case. I also consider myself a patriot. I don't hke seeing our young men and women thrown tn harmfe way without adequate support from a technological perspective. 1^ To participate in the Mobile Robot tory's online survey regarding the use of combat robots, visit dtttpJ/www.cc.gatech .edu/projects/rohotsurvey/miihist.htmlj.

IICIL ¥VC I.G3IIICU... from Isandlwana Lt. Col Mike Snook

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anuary' 22,1879. Eleven days have passed since Lt. Gen. Lord Chelnislord's column crossed the border from Natai into Zukiland. In that time, the British force, reliant on ponderous ox-drawn transport and a poor excuse for a wagon road, has covered only 12 of the 85 tniles to King Cetshwayo's capital at Ulundi. For the past two days, his lordships command has been encamped at the foot of an eye-catching

British officers make their last stand against Zulu warriors in a 19th century painting by C.E. Fripp.

hill called Isandlwana. Intelligence reports now indicate that the main Zulu impis—a dozen superbly drilled, age-grouped regiments—departed the capital five days ago, intent on forcing a decisive battle. At 1:30 that morning a staff officer clutching an urgent dispatch shook his lordship awake. The message was from Major John Dartnell, now nervously encamped on a hillside 10 miles farther into Zululand, reporting a twilight contact with 1,500 Zulus. Concluding that the main impis simply had to be in front of Dartnell, the general

MfL!TAf?Y HISTORY

decided to split his command and give battle. He would lead a flying column at dawn. Left behind to guard the camp will be Lt. Col. Henry Pulleine, with six companies of the 24th Infantry, 100 mounted volunteers, two 7-pounders and 500 poorly armed African conscripts. Lt. Col. Anthony Dumford is ordered to reinforce the camp with five troops of mounted natives. He reaches Isandlwana at 10, but is confused by his orders, incorrectly concluding that the general must require his services on the far side of the plain. Midday Lord Chelmslord is chasmg shadows 10 miles away Meanwhile, Dumford has sallied forth with his horsemen to investigate enemy sightings on the high ground north of camp, having first insisted that Pulleine should support him with redcoat infantry. Turns out, the main impis are not in the east, but concealed just five miles northeast of camp in the Ngwebeni Valley. British mounted patrols stumble across them not long after noon, and 25,000 warriors race into position lo execute a devastating "horns of the buffalo" double envelopment. Pulleine and his battalion mount a heroic but futile resistance. Close to 1,400 British, Anglo-South African and black African soldiers die over the course of the next two hours. The Zulus suffer more than 3,000 casualties.

Lessons: • Never assume you're entitled to win because you are lechnologically superior, more prosperous or perceive your-

self as morally or ethically superior. You win wars only when you soldier better and think straighter than the other man. • Quantity can have a quality al! of iis own. Isandlwana revealed that an army of 25,000 souls spans a five-tnile-wide front. If you present a one-mile front in response, find a way to secure your flanks. The British fell back into the obsolescent fighting square and other close-order formations. • Don't commit too early When facing a highly mobile foe, expect surprises. Retain uncommitted reserves at all times and at all levels of command. As soon as one reserve unit is committed, begin fonning a new one. • Leave no blind spots. If you do, the enemy will find and exploit them to devastating advantage. Field surveillance must be systematic. • Ask...and listen. Consult your brightest, most experienced officers and be open to iheir feedback. You may be the big cheese, but they are detail men, there to help you get it right. Chelmsford failed to confer, failed to delegate, resisted suggestions and wavered. • Lose the deadwood. If you've lost confidence in a subordinate, have the courage of your convictions and relieve hitn. Chelmsford threatened to replace Dumford less than a week before Isandlwana, but left it at a written warning—1,400 men lost their lives as a result. • Clarify, clarify, clarify. Make sure everyone understands what is required of him. Chelmsford'5 orders to Durnford left too much latitude to a man who could not in the end be trusted to make the right decisions. • Leam from your mistakes. Isandlwana was the first in a string of militar)' blunders that nagged the British army between 1879 and 1900, most notably in the Anglo-Boer War. There followed a decade of reform from which emerged the British Expeditionary Force of 1914—arguably the best army ever to leave British shores, l2Q)

voice When Is War Justifiable? By Brian Orend

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t. Augustine was obsessed with squaring what seemed a circle: How could one be a follower of Christ, whose life exemplified pacifism, yet also justify the use of armed force and, indeed, mass kilHng, particularly against heathen barbarians bent on ruining Rome and conquering Christianity? Augustine's answer: A ruler owes his people the duty of protection, thus wars of self-defense are morally permissible. But a ruler's intent in ordering such wars should only be love for his people and have nothing to do with such deadly sins as hatred, anger, bloodlust or greed. His concept is known as the just war theory.

Just war theory has also influenced development of the intemational laws of armed conflict, for instance through the seminal Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and in the Hague and Geneva Convetitions, Today the doctrine frames basic rules to aid decision-makers confronted by what Tolstoy simply, yet monumentally, referred to as "War and Peace." These rules fall Into three categories, still referred to in their original Latin: jus ad beilum ("justice of war," regarding political rules for starting wars); jus in hello ("justice in war," regarding rules for soldierly conduct during war); and jus post bcllum ("justice after war," regarding rules to guide the transition frorn conflict hack to peace). jus ad helium focuses on when, if ever, it is justifiable to unleash what Shakespeare referred to as "the dogs of war." The consensus is that wars of selfdefense from aggression are morally justified. Such wars aren't simply smart, or "wars of necessity," they are fully good and morally just. They are so because aggression involves the use of armed force to violate the fundamental rights of individuals and communities to live in peace and pursue happiness as they see fit. To Wolate such rights is to negate the basic possibilities of human civilization. just war theonsts have been unable to reach consensus on whether nondefensive wars, or "wars of choice," can ever be justified. Some, such as

*A ruler owes his people the duty of protection, thus wars of self-defense are morally permissible'

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Millennia in the making, the doctrine continues to influence military policy and political practice worldwide. Its basic tenet is that warfare is sometimes morally permissible. This sets the theory apart from pacifism, which denies this principle, as well as from realism, which stipulates that war and morality have nothing to do with each other and that war ought to be considered solely as a selfish calculus of national interests in things like power, security and natural resources, Augustine (354-430) is often identified as the doctrines founder, though this ignores substantial prior GrecoRoman contributions from the likes of Aristotle (384-322 Bc) and Cicero {106-43 Bc), The theory's real-world influence tends to wax and wane in opposition to realism, its main rival.

MILITARY HISTORY

Aristotle and Cicero, justified wars of preemption, anticipation and even of empire-building, sporting, shall we say, a robust concept of defense. Others, like the Conquest-era Spaniard Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), argued that offensive wars are akin to "punishing a man for a sin he has yet to commit," The rules of jus ad helium permit war only if one can demonstrate: a just cause such as defense of the people; a good intention absent ulterior motives like ethnic hatred or greed; probability of success; and proportionality (the problem is so severe—like fanatical, aggressive conquest—that it truly requires war to check it). Furthermore, one must only resort to war after exhausting peaceful means of dispute resolution, and then publicly declare war through a proper authority jus ad helium is meant lo guide those with the power to make war, often heads of state. Jus in hello, by contrast, is to guide officers and soldiers and includes the following guidelines: Do not directly and intentionally attack civilians; extend benevolent quarantine to surrendered or captured enemy soldiers; observe proportionality between means and ends in planning attacks; do not use prohibited weapons such as chemical or biological arms; avoid punitive reprisals against enemy violations of the laws of war; and shun means "evil in themselves," such as forcing captured soldiers tofightagainst their own side. These rules have the deepest pedigree in the theory, predating aristocratic medieval sporting tournaments like the joust all the way back to the Old Testament, which urged that targeting food supplies (like fruit trees) be considered an illegitimate act of war. Contemporary instances of jus in hello concern the treatment of captured enemy prisoners and terrorists, as well as the status of civilian populations, Jusi war theory urges against the use of tor-

St. Augustine, portrayed as the self-reflective Christian philosopher in a circa 1480 fresco by Sandro Botticelli, is considered the father of modern-day just war theory.

lure and strongly in lavor of a robusl hands-off policy regarding civilians. Some realists view the mandates as hopelessly quaint, arguing that 9/11 ushered in a new era in which ihe bare-knuckled struggle for survival should be given free rein. TV shows like 24 encourage such thinking. Many such declarations in the past, however, have proven historically hasty and false. Just war theory counsels that, ultimately, winning well is the best revenge. Michael Watzer, arguably the dean of living just war theorists, explores the notion thoroughly in his book /us( and Unjust Wars (first published in 1977, now in its fourth edition). Jus post helium is a nascent, cuttingedge aspect of just war theor)' that addresses such concerns as military disarmament, apologies, war crimes trials, compensation and punishment, publicly declared peace treaties, and aid and rehabilitation. One can witness tension between those preferring more limited postwar ideals, stressing punishment and trials (a revenge paradigm), and those supporting more bold experimentation in institutional change (a rehabilitation paradigm). Successful instances of modem postwar reconstruction—notably the South after the Civil War and West Germany and Japan following World War II {note U.S. presence in all three)—provide rich material of manifest relevance to current world cotiflicis. Statesman James Dobbins addresses the latter in recent RAND reports. How can, and should, a victor transform the loser's regime and society in the wake of conflict? What does history say about best practices in this regard, and are similar conditions in place in the current situations? Just war theory has its critics. Some suggest that linking warfare with justice only makes war more destructive and "crusadelike" in character. Proponents reply that something as serious as war requires moral restraint and justification and that an amoral, cynical approach to war is hardly likely to result in less destruction.
ndiiu Blowgun

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By Jon Guttman Illustration hy Ted Williams

Easily crafted, inexpensive, silent and lethal

lthough primarily a hunting weapon, the blowgun has been used for— to borrow a phrase from Carl von Clausewitz—warfare by other means. The weapon dates back thousands of years to Southeast Asia and is believed to have originated independently in Europe and America. East Indian Dayaks, Filipinos, native Panamanians, South American Jivaro and Huaorani Indians, and even 20th century Viet Minh and Viet Cong used the blowgun as a guerrilla weapon in woodland combat. Assassins in Renaissance Italy used blowguns, as did Japanese ninjas, tipping their darts with poison from the/ugu (pufferfish). Members of ihe Nazi SS took lives with cigarette-sized models that fired ricin-tipped darts. Silent and accurate at short ranges, the blowgun slill makes an inexpensive but effective itistrument of underhanded terror. Essentially a hollow tube of wood, ivory, metal or even rolled leaves, the blowgun is often fitted with a funnel-shaped mouthpiece, boosting the force of the users breath on the missile. Ammunition ranges from small stone, clay or lead pellets to darts, usually tipped with a local poison such as curare or toxin from the skin of a poison dart frog, (^

By Jon Gutiman Illustration hy Ted Williams

SPAD VII

A favored powerhouse of World War I flying aces

Inner struts and blocks between double bracing wires reduced vibration and drag.

Wingspan: 25 feet 8 inches Length: 20 feet 3.5 inches Height: 7 feet 6.5 inches Empty weight: 1,102 pounds Gross weight: 1,632 pounds Maximum speed: 119-127 mph Ceiling: 17,500-21,818 feet

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rom Its arrival at the from in late August 1916, the SPAD VII became the standard French fighter lor much of World War I. Designed by Louis Bechereau for the Society pour I'Aviation et ses D(^ri\res (SPAD) and first tested in March 1916, the SPAD 7.C1 single-seat fighter plane, commonly known as the SPAD VII, was an aerial weapons system that masterfully combined Bechereau's robust airframe with Swiss engineer Marc Birkigts eight-cylinder 150-hp Hispano-Suiza 8Aa engine, although it took some doing to devise a reliable radiator for it. Its .303-caliber Vickers machine gun was synchronized to fire between the spinning propeller blades.

SPAD ultimately built 3,535 Vlls, which served in the air forces of several nations.

Among the many aces who flew the plane, Georges Guynemer, France's secondranking ace, with 53 \actories, played an active role in its development. One improvement came in December 1916, when Birkigt increased his engine's compression ratio from 4.7 to 5.3, raising its output to 180 hp. The first SPAD VII powered by this new 8Ab engine, No. S254, was presented to Guynemer, who scored 19 victories in it and never had to replace the engine, despite months of hard combat service. This historic plane is on display at the Musee de l'Air et de l'Espace at Le Bourget near Paris. Development of the more powerful, geared 220-hp Hispano-Suiza 8Cb and BB

A .303-caliber Vickers machine gun was synchronized with the propeller.

The annular radiator was later covered by adjustable slats.

engines in 1917 led to more potent fighters: the SPAD XII, with a 37mm Puteaux cannon, and the SPAD Xlll, with twin Vickers machine guns. Initial problems with the geared Hispano-Suiza engines delayed the SPAD XIII's arrival, but the SPAD VII held its own until its replacement could be deployed in force. Some units were still using SPAD Vlls well into 1918. Other Allied aces who flew the SPAD VII include Italys Francesco Baracca (34 victories), Britain's William J.C.K. CochranPatrick (21 victories), Russia's Ivan Vasilyevich Smimoff (12 victories), America's Paul Frank Baer (also 12 victories) and Belgium's Edmond Thieffry (10 victories). (Jl

trom Military History Mysteries of Motive

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n a recently discovered unpublished account of one 18-year-old farm boy's service in the 5th Illinois Cavalry, he (we'll call him Harry) notes this farewell exchange with his stepmother: "As I left the house, my stepmother asked, 'Where are you going?' 'I am going to the War,' 1 replied and walked away" And that, in Harry's brief memoir, was that, No exploration of motive, no signs of self-analysis, no psychologizing about war and danger, life and death—indeed, in 1861 psychology as we know it had not yet been invented. So perhaps to taciturn young Harry, hiking off on a November afternoon to join the Union I Army just seemed like a good idea at the time. Eventually, after many privations, dangers, some combat, one rifle wound and several bouts with disease, Harry did reflect at greater length on his experiences, but not much on his motives, then or later. Today we've accumulated an enormous body of knowledge both inside and outside the military about individual motives and behaviors, about small-group cohesion, about the dynamics of leadership. But in historical investigations, most of it does not help answer that most tantalizing of historians' questions: "Why did he do it?" The question works at all levels, from privates to top officers, when assessing decisions and behaviors in war. Why did General A call for a retreat at the end of a days fighting that had left his troops in command of the field? Why would General B fail to counterattack when the enemy forces were so obviously faltering? Why would General C agree to a hopeless suicidal charge into a valley surrounded by a numerically superior foe? Why indeed? Absent a self-evident motive, a detailed, self-analytical diary or a post-operation interview, there may be no answer that satisfies historians who are reaching back from our own hyperanalytic age across the generational and cultural divide. Perhaps the only answer available is the plain and obvious one of sheer, unexamined impulse, as acted upon by cavalry volunteer Harry back in the fall of 1861: It just seemed like a good idea at the time. (Jj

k

BIG WIN AT

SARATOGA Twice battled to a standstill by fiery Benedict Arnold, Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne lost his army—and Britain's best shot at ending our Revolution By Geoffrey Norman King George III was so excited by the news ihat he broke into the queen's bedchamber, where she sat dressed only in a chemise. Highly irregular, perhaps, but understandable. It seemed that General John Burgoynes troops had taken Ticonderoga—the "Gibraltar of North America"—on July 6,1777. Now the upstart colonists— who had shown the insufferable cheek to assemble in Philadelphia just a year earlier and announce to the world a repudiation of their sovereign—would be broken in two and defeated in detail. The king was in a state of such high emotion that, as he read to the queen from the letter he had just received, he didn't even notice her immodest state. Nor, evidendy, did he recognize that as Burgoyne moved closer to Albany, his supply Maj. Gen. Benedict lines were becoming dangerously Arnold rides into battle on September 19,1777, extended and his army more and rallying his men against more vulnerable. It was Englands a force of German and British troops at the neck in the noose, and the rope was Battle of Freeman's Farm, tightening. In three months, those the first of two main clashes at Saratoga. troops under Burgoyne's command

that had not been killed, wounded or captured—and had not deserted— would march onto a field near what is now Schuylerville, N.Y., on the west bank of the Hudson River, and ground their arms. The surrender of Burgo}Tie's army in October 1777 would be the turning point in the American Revolution, an event that changed everything by bringing France into the war on the side of the colonists and by demonstrating to the world—and more important, to the revolutionaries themselves—that the British could be beaten. In the words of the eminent military historian J.EC. FuHer, "At Saratoga las the campaign came to be known], the sword of Damocles fell, not only on Great Britain, but, because ofthe fervor of the American Revolution, upon most part ofthe Western world." FuUer, being British and a Tory to his toes, wouldn't be inclined to celebrate the victory of the Americans and would dwell, instead, on the forces unleashed in Europe by the battle that validated, by arms, the Declaration of Independence. Studying Saratoga, he saw the

seeds ol ihe French Revolution, which flowered into Napoleon and the fall of the old European order. Americans might be expected lo think a little differently about the battle, but in truth, when they hear the word "Saratoga" today, most probably think of horse racing. The great battle that saved our revolution seems oddly overlooked, in a way that, say. Gettysburg is not— and for a variety of reasons. That George Washington was not in command ofthe Americans at Saratoga may account, in part, for why the victory is not more conspicuously celebrated. In the minds of most Americans, Washington is the general of the Revolutionary War, and they would be hard-pressed to name another. At Saratoga, the nominal commander of the American forces was a man named Gates who never got close to the action. It is unlikely that parents ever urged their sons to model themselves after the example of Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, remembered as cold, remote, vain and inclined to petty feuds. Among those he quarreled with is the man who earned and got credit for

Men of the 1st New Hampshire Regiment (left), under Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor, met troops of the 21st Regiment of Foot, or Scots Fusiliers (right), under Maj. Gen. James Inglis Hamilton, at Freeman's Farm.

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MILITARY HISTORY

leading the colonists to success in two of the bloody battles that determined the fate of the Saratoga campaign. That man was Benedict ArnoldIt feels awkward, at best, to celebrate a battle when the hero ofthe fight is also the greatest traitor in your history. Still, it is impossible to deny the key role Benedict Arnold played in the Saratoga campaign. He unwaveringly rode to the sound of battle, rallied troops, inspired them by his own bravery and aggressiveness. One of the men who fought under Amold described him thus: "He was dark-skinned, with black hair, and lof] middling height: There wasn't any waste of limber in him. He was our fighting general, and a bloody fellow he was. He didn't care for nothing; he'd ride right in. It was, 'Come on boys!'—it wasn't, 'Go boys.' He was as brave a man as ever lived." After the Battle of Freeman's Farm on September 19, where Arnold's leadership first helped secure an American victory. Gates spitefully relieved him of command. But when the next major action began, some days later, Arnold listened to the sounds of battle until he

could stand it no longer. "No man shall keep me in my tent today!" he linally shouted. "If 1 am without command, I will fight in the ranks; but the soldiers, God bless them, will follow my lead. Come on! Victor)' or death!" So once again he charged into battle, rallied disorganized soldiers and led them in repeated attacks against the enemy, until his horse was killed and he was badly wounded in a leg that had been injured earlier in the war. While Arnold was up fighting, Gates was back at his headquarters, a good mile from the shooting, arguing politics wiih a captured British officer. Arnold was a man whose resentments e\'enlually consumed him, and the slights he suffered at the hands of Gates were, no doubt, among the justifications he employed when he decided on treason.

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rnold's role makes Saratoga a problematic subject for Americans. You don't compose odes to heroes who betray you. And then there is the complexity of the campaign. What we call Saratoga was not a single battle but a long campaign of many battles, at least four of them major actions by the standards of the time. Saratoga was a large strategic undertaking, and judged on those terms, the British initiative was militarily sound. One large British force was to move on Albany from Canada, down Lakes Champlain and George. This army, commanded by General Burgoyne, was supposed to move and supply itself by water, except for one 12milc stretch of dry land. A second force, under the command of Lt. Gen. William Howe, was to advance up the Hudson River toward a junction with Burgoyne, effectively cutting off New England from the rest of the colonies. Good plans may be necessary to military success, but they certainly are not sui'ficieni. There is also the matter of execution, in this case, two widely separated armies were required to move in coordination, a tricky business under the best of circumstances. There was no one in overall charge of the operation, and there were no reliable communications between Howe and Burgoyne.

At one point late in the campaign, when growing desperate for Howe to arrive and relieve the increasing American pressure on his army, Burgoyne attempted to send a message concealed inside a silver bullet. The messenger was captured and executed as a spy Howe, for his pan, received conflicting and tardy instructions from London and, in the end, relied on his own cautious instincts. He never made it to Albany; indeed, he never really tried. Burgoyne was left on his own, pushing deeper and deeper into densely wooded terrain that favored the enemy Despite the setbacks, in the weeks before Burgoyne began sending messages for assistance that never came, his campaign seemed headed for success. The force that Siiiled up Lake Champlain on July 1 comprised 8,200 officers and men—British regulars and German regiments, along with a few Canadians and some Indians, whose presence in the enemy's ranks later in the campaign worked to the Americans' advantage as a propaganda tool. Morale was, by all accounts, high. The men believed in their officers, especially Burgoyne. With regard to their mission, Thomas Anburey, one of Burgoyne's officers, wi'ote, "As to our army, I can only say if good discipline, joined to health and spirit among the men at being led by General Burgoyne, who is universally esteemed and respected, can ensure success, it may be expected." Burgoyne and hi5 fine army came to grief, though, and one can point to ^ v era! reasons for their failure. First, as noted, the anticipated junction with Howe never occurred. Howe's lack of follow-through is neither Burgoyne's fault nor due to any great feat of generalship on the American side, though it could be argued Washington's two victories—at Trenton and Princeton—the previous winter had made Howe and other British generals more cautious. But Burgoyne and his officers made mistakes of their own. One was leaving the water after they had taken Ticonderoga—the fort that commands the narrows between Lakes Champlain and George—and striking out over land. Burgoyne may have been intoxicated by victory and disinclined to backtrack to

King George lit His majesty celebrated a bit prematurely after hearing of Burgoynes July 1777 recapture of Fort Ticonderoga, then tbrew a royal bissy over the surrender at Saratoga.

Horatio Gates Though osiensihly in command of Pairiot forces at Saratoga, Maj. Gen. Gates was content to oversee from his tent al the rear while Maj. Gen. Arnold rallied men in the field.

Benedict Arnold The most debated figure of thf conflict, Maj. Gen. Arnold was truly heroic in the field M Saratoga, riding into battle at Bemis Heigbts despite having been relieved of command.

John Burgoyne Following up on his victory monlbs earlier at Tieonderoga, Lt. Gen. Burgoyne unwisely left bis supply route and reinforcements hebind, tben engaged tbe enemy on its home turf.

William Howe Lt. Gen. Burgoyne can't be held solely responsible for tbe British defeat, as a caulious II. Gen. Howe failed to rendezvous witb him along tbe Hudson or proceed toward Albany.

Daniel Morgan Colonel Morgan's regiment was compo.sed of frontiersmen who depended on good marksmansbip to survive. Tbese sbarpsliootcrs picked off several key Briti-sb officers at Saratoga.

BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM SEPTEMBER 19, 1777 As British columns under Burgoyne approached Freeman's Farm, Morgan's Patriot corps advanced to meet them. Fraser's infantry on the British right soon pushed back Morgan. Then Arnold rallied the Patriots for a seesaw four-hour battle. Reinforcements under Riedesel arrived on the British left and stalled the Americans. Arnold pleaded in vain with Gates to commit their reserves. But Gates refused, relieved Arnoid and withdrew, leaving the field to the battered British.

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BATTLE OF BEMIS HEIGHTS^i^ OCTOBER 7,1777 '^ Burgoyne sent a 1,500-man reconnaissance against the Patriot left that was met by Morgan, plus large coiumns under Poor and Learned. One of Morgan's riflemen soon picked off Fraser as he was rallying his outnumbered men. The demoraiized British feli back to two strongpoints, the Batcarres and Breymann Redoubts. Arnold led an attack on Baicarres, which proved too strong, then drove the assault that broke Breymann— receiving a serious leg wound. In less than an hour, Burgoyne lost half his forces and any chance of a British win.

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GATES O H "

HORATIO GATES Uniike his British counterpart Burgoyne, Gates was conspicuously absent from the fieid at Saratoga. He preferred to issue orders from the rear, hampering rather than heiping Arnoid, his ablest frontline general. Despite remote leadership and seeming resentment of his junior officer, Gates, not Arnoid, was the victor of record at Saratoga.

MILITARY HISTORY

BENEDICT ARNOLD Despite his fixed place in American memory as a traitor, 'Arnold was the undisputed Patriot hero of Saratoga. Twice disobeying Gates' orders to refrain from battle, Arnold rallied his men to a numerical I victory at Freeman's Farm and a £ decisive win at Bemis Heights. Yet I the only sign of his participation at -«
AMERICA , .CAMP

^erican River Fortifications

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JOHN BURQOYNE

An engaged, determined commander who fought gside his men on the , Burgoyne drove the Ish columns hard in bid to capture Albany isolate New England, hard, it turns out, as his troops soon outstripped their supply lines, leaving them precariously extended In enemy territory.

Redoubt

THE BATTLES OF SARATOGA ^

n June 1777, Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne set out from St. John's, Newfoundland, with an 8,200sirong force of British regulars, German mercenaries, Canadian troops and allied Indians. Easily overrunning Ticonderoga, the key fort hetween Lakes Champlain and George, Burgoyne jjcontinued south toward Albany. His goal: to link u p with an eastbound force under Colonel Barry 'St. Leger and a larger army under Lt. Gen. William Howe, headed north from New York along the Hud-W W)n. Together, they planned to seize the Patriot papital at Albany, divide the rehellious colonies in two and conquer. The Americans had other ideas. Brig. Gen. John Stark struck the first hlow for the Patriots, defeating a raiding force of German dragoons at Bennington, thus depriving Burgoyne of critical supplies. The British commander pressed on to Saratoga, unaware of St. Leger's withdrawal after the Battle of Oriskany and Howe's decision to mount an ultimately irrelevant attack on Philadelphia. Burgoyne's men were on their own, ill supplied and deep in enemy territory. Two fierce clashes—at Freeman's Farm on September 19 and ^ m i s Heights on Octoher 7—sealed their fate and turned the tide of the Revolution in Americas favor.

Massachusetts

the fort (he had pursued the colonists beyond it), thus losing both time and contact with the enemy. So he pushed on into increasingly difficult terrain that required heavy labor by his troops. Roads had to be cut, bridges built, supplies carried and dragged along behind the army When he left the water. Burgoyne gave up the advantage of secure supply lines and mobility and allowed his enemy to fight on ground where it was most comfortable. To many minds, he had committed the greatest error of his campaign: He simply underestimated his enemy

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lthough the Americans were on the defensive, and Washington had yet to win whai could be called a major victoiy, the commander ofthe Continental Army was an able strategic thinker. Washington not only read his enemy's intentions, he also saw how to exploit flaws in the British plans. "As they can never think of advancing," Washington wrote, "without securing their rear by leaving garrisons in the fortresses behind, the force which can come against Ithe Americansl will be reduced greatly by the detachments necessar)' for this pui"pose." Washington saw opportunity and moved to exploit it by, among other actions, sending his hardest-fighting general, Arnold, and some of his best troops. Daniel Morgan's riflemen, to take part in the fight. If the British held American generalship in low esteem, they felt absolute contempt for its soldiers—an arrogant attitude that would cost them dearly

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Concealed sharpshooters under Colonel Daniel Morgan used long muskets with rifled barrels to pick off conspicuous British officers, throwing troops into disarray.

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MILITARY Wi<=TnDV

II is a common belief that the British operated in parade-field fonnation while the Americans Iought almost intuitively using terrain for concealment. The distinction is fundamentally accurate at this stage in the war, though by most accounts, Burgoyne's men adapted well enough to tbe terrain. But they were facing a Continental Army whose tactics and temperament were perfectly suited to the ground on which they fought. These men didn't have to adapt; they were tn their natural element. And many of those American troops were using a weapon that gave them an enormous

advantage over ihe old smoothbore Brown Bess muskets iheir enemy carried. American gunsmiths had perfected a piece that iired a smaller hall than the British musket, its barrel rifled with grooves lo spin the projectile. The barrel was also much longer than those of the old muskets, hence the name "long rifle." The extra barrel length and rifling made the weapon exceedingly accurate out beyond 100 yards (twice the range of the smoothbore) and dangerous well beyond that. It was suited to the needs of the American frontier, where men hunted lor meat and became good shots or went hungry. During the Revolution, these Irontiersmen^-often dressed in clothes made from hides of game they had killed—formed units of riflemen, like the one commanded by Dan Morgan. In a fight, riflemen could take out enemy troops—especially the conspicuously uniformed officers—from concealed ground positions or trees they had climbed. It was exceedingly demoralizing for British and German soldiers to take casualties at the hands of an enemy they could not see and from ranges at which their own weapons were useless. British officers, especially thought it unsporting. The Americans didn't see it that way. Morgan and his men used the terrain and their effective new weapons with an lUisc that came from experience. To signal one another, they would imitate ihe gobbling of a wild lurkey. One can only nnagine the leelings of one of Burgoyne's men, an ocean away from anyihing familiar, dressed in a brilliantly colored uniform that made him a spectacular target for strange men who had just taken down his officer at more than hundred paces and were gobbling back and forth to one another from positions Jn the dark tangle of what could only be called a wildetness. The British lost several fights to such men. Among those battles was one near Bennington in August 1777 against a unit commanded by Brig. Gen. John Stark, who is described, pungently, by Fuller as "one of those many intractable Americans who could command, but who could not be commanded." When he gave the order to attack. Stark

Benedict Arnoid, despite his heroics at Saratoga, is remembered as a traitor.

PATRIOT AND TRAITOR

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ad Benedict Arnold been killed by the ball that struck him in the leg at Bemis Heights, he would have reaped-albeit posthtjmously-a large meastire of the fame he sought. He almost certainly would have been known as the "hero ot Saratoga." There wouid be statues of him on village greens all over New England. There might possibly bea school named for him in New London, Connecticut, a town he burned almost to the ground after betraying the cause for which he'd nearly lost his leg.

By this time, another, less admirable side of Arnold's character had surfaced. He was inclined to feuds and felt insufficiently appreciated. He was jealous of the reputations o( other men-some of whom were promoted over him-and hungry for money. After Ticonderoga, he submitted a bill that drew the scrutiny of the Continental Congress, which suspected him ot inflating his expenses.

A few months later he led an audacious campaign against Quebec that required a desperate march ttirough the Maine wilderness few other men would have attempted. Arnoid brought it off through sheer force of his leadership, and he might have taken the city and won the war had the British not been tipped off and waiting. Arnold was wounded in the fight.

the rankot brigadier general. He had sold out, cheap, to the losing side, for which he then fought well and ruthlessly. But he died bitter and without honor. Visitors to the Saratoga battlefield will find-near the site where Arnold was wounded-a small statue of a leg. There is no name inscribed,

Once he had recovered from the wound he received at Saratoga. Arnold was posted to PhiladelArnold, then, was no ordinary traitor. Or perhaps phia, where he married a (much) younger woman he was. Certainly there was nothing ordinary about and spent himself into debt. His resentments and his resume, long before the Saratoga campaign, he appetites led him to sell out the cause he had once had proved himselt a natural combat officer and an espoused. ("Good God," he had cried after the inspired, intuitive leader. He was fearless in battle, Boston Massacre, "are Americans al! asleep and and men rallied to the force of his personality and his tamely giving up their liberties?") aggressive example. But his star never shone brightly In the end, Arnold was as disappointed in treason enough to suit him.The bold May 1775 capture of Fort as he had been in loyal service. When his scheme to Ticonderoga was due to his plan and leadership, but deliver West Point was exposed, the British gave him EthanAllen and the Creen Mountain 8oys got the gloiy. oniy a fraction of the money he'd been promised and

-Geoffrey Norman

shouted, "We will gain the victory, or Molly Stark shall be a widow to-night," Fine words, but at one point it looked as though they would not be enough. Starks men were collecting prizes on (he battlefield when a British relief force arrived. Just as Starks men were falling hack, however, Seth Warner and several hundred Vermont miHtiamen, the Green Mountain Boys, arrived

BENNINGTON FLAG The Bennington Flag, or Fillmore Flag (above), has long been associated with the August 1777 Battie of Bennington, in which Patriot troops under Brig, Gen. John Stark defeated a Hessian raiding party under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, thus denying the main British force much-needed supplies. According to family lore. President Millard Fillmore's grandfather, Nathaniel, brought the flag home from Bennington, But the banner, now on display in the Bennington Museum, likely never flew in battle. It has since been dated to the early 19th century and was made perhaps for Maj. Gen. Lafayette's visittotheUnJtedStatesinl824orto celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in 1826,

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on the field and tipped the balance once again in die Americans' favor. Bennington had heen an attempt by Burgoyne to capture much-needed supplies—horses, cattle, forage, ammunition and other items an army on the march needed to survive and fight. The battle not only deprived him of those supplies but also cost him almost 600 men, dead or missing- Among the dead was one of his most able subordinates, Lt. Col, Friedrich Baum.

MILITARY HISTOR^

Burgoyne now realized his enemy was no pushover: lt could fight and was growing numerically stronger by the day No British reinforcements would be coming unless Howe made his move up the Hudson. Before he could fight his way on to Albany, Burgoyne wotild need to resupply. This process took almost a month, during which time he remained camped on ihe eastern side of the Hudson. By September 11, the British force had accumulated what Burgo>Tie estimated to be five weeks' worth of supplies. He crossed the Hudson on a makeshift bridge of supply boats, which his men then broke up. Metaphorically, he had burned his bridges. Now he had no real choice but to fight his way to Albany Gates, by now, was waiting with his army of 7,000 men, entrenched at a place called Freeman's Farm. Burgoyne advanced, delennined to defeat the colonists. The fighting began around noon on September 19 when the Americans, inciuding Morgan's men, engaged the British, What began as a kind of picket action soon developed into a general batde. When things began to go against the Americans, Benedict Amold begged Gates for permission to join the fight and finally rode out to the action on his own initiative. He rallied troops who had advanced directly into the massed British formation and scattered. The fight then settled into a seesaw action that lasted all afternoon. The British had the advantage in anillery, the Americans inriflemen.While Gates remained in his headquarters, Burgoyne rode into battle and was nearly picked off by one of the Americanriflemen,who instead shot the general's aide-de-camp, a target thanks to the lace saddle blanket on his horse. German reinforcements under Maj, Gen, Friedrich Riedesel from another part of the battlefield arrived late in the day, and the Americans, running low on ammunition, fell back behind their earthworks. By the traditional measure, the Brilish had won the battle, as they remained in possession of the battlefield. In a letter, Burgoyne called it a "smart and very honorable action/' Again, fine words. But Burgoyne was no doubt aware that while he hadn't given any ground, neither had he ad-

vanced any closer to Albany. And he would still have to fight his way through a formidable enemy force if he wanted to get there- His army had sulfered far more casualties than the Americans, who could, unlike him, count on reinforcements, Burgoyne's losses amounted to some 600 killed and wounded—almost a third of those engaged. The Americans lost 65 killed, 218 wounded and 33 missing— less than 10 percent of those engaged. The battle established conclusively, if proof were still needed, that the Americans could, and would, fight and were not, as Anburey put it, "that contemptible enemy we had hitherto imagined them, incapable of standing a regular engagement, and that they would only fight behind strong earthworks," Burgoyne wanted to press the attack the next day, but his army was in no condition to continue the fight. The arrival of reinforcements at the end of the day had forced the Americans to retire from the field. Burgoyne may have consoled himself by calling it a victory, but it was, by any measure, an exceedingly hollow one.

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n October 3, Burgoyne was obliged to cut his troops' rations. A gambler, the British general was reduced to one last throw of the dice. He called a council of war: A proposed general attack on his enemy's left flank was rejected as too risky, so he adopted a more conservative plan. With some 1,500 men, Burgoyne would lead a "reconnaissance in force" that would attempt to find a suitable place to attack the Americans, His troops moved out on October 7The subsequent Battle of Bemis Heights began around midday Again, Gates remained in his headquarters while Burgoyne was in the thick of things. And Amold, who had been relieved of all command, rode impetuously into the fight, Tbe British were outnumbered 3-to-1, Still, they held their own in a struggle that lasted some five hours. The fight, however, seemed to go out of Burgoyne after one deadly episode: Arnold had noticed a particular British officer who seemed, like him, to be especially good at rallying his troops. He pointed out the

officer to Morgan, who gave the order to a rifleman named Tim Murphy Murphy climbed a tree and look aim at Brigadier Simon Fraser. His first shot cut a leather strap on Fraser's horse. The second went through the horse's mane, Fraser ignored pleas from his aide to get out of the sharpshooter's sights. Murphy's next shot hit Fraser in the abdomen. He was taken to the rear, laid out on the very table at which he had planned on dining that night, and died the next moming.

attack, he was shot in the leg. It was a serious wound, the second in that leg, and he had to argue doctors out of amputating. He was hospitalized for three months but eventually returned to duty.. .and infamy.

A horse had been shot from under Burgoyne. Another bullet had gone through his hat, and one more nicked his jacket. But it was the loss of Fraser, the subordinate he counted on most, that convinced him ihe battle was not one he could win. He ordered the retreat to save what was left of his force. Arnold, meanwhile, couldn't seem to get enough. He rallied some disorganized troops and led them in an attack on a British defensive position known as Breymann's Redoubt. During the

urgoyne tried to extricate his army, but the trap had now closed. It was October. The ground was wet, and movement was difficult. Several of his senior officers were dead or badly wounded. His supplies were almost gone, and there was no way to replenish. According to one British sergeant, the troops were still "willing and ready to face any danger when led on by officers whom they loved and respected and who shared

Burgoyne's troops held the field at the Battle of Bemis Heights, but heavy British losses forced his surrender to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates on October 17, 1777, depicted in a period painting.

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with them in every toil and hardship." But they were beaten, and in the fashion of those times, Burgoyne and Gates met as gentlemen to work out the details of a surrender. Three weeks after Burgoyne's men grounded their arms, Benjamin Franklin got the news in Paris. France saw the opportunity and took it. In London, meanwhile, according to Horace Walpole, on hearing of the "total annihilation.. .of Burgoyne's army," King George, "fell into agonies..-but the next morning, at his levee to disguise his concern, affected to laugh and be so indecently merry that Lord North endeavored to stop him." Perhaps the king understood what history has since made clear. Saratoga had made the Americans' victory in the war not merely possible but inevitable.© For further reading, Ceoffrey Norman recommends: Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War, by Richard M. Ketchuni.

HESSIANS The Best Armies Meney Ceuld Buy ll was just business: Hessian soldiers were the sole asset of a nation in the military-for-hire trade By Dennis Showalter

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o account of the American Revolution is complete without reference to the Hessians. They are vilified in the Declaration of Independence as "foreign Mercenaries" imported to complete Britain's v^^ork of "death, desolation and tyranny" They are the garrison of Trenton, celebrating Christmas not wisely but too well, until George Washington and his men rudely interrupt their revels. A Hessian ghost is implicated as the Headless Horseman in Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow. They are the villains in D.W Griffiths 1909 film The Hessian Renegades, one of the earliest war movies. A Hessian (Yosemite) Sam Von Schmamm even serves as a cartoon foil for Bugs Bunny, finally collapsing in frustrated exhaustion with the memorable line, "Vm a Hessian without no aggression." Recent research is revising those traditional impressions. Hessians made up only about half of the German troops that served in North America during the Revolution, and scholars point out that almost half of these settled here after the war, intermarrying along classic immigrant lines. Military historians have even vindicated the Hessians at Trenton, demonstrating they were in fact

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Hesse-Kassel Landgraf Frederick II, depicted in a circa 1773 German oil painting, committed 12,000 men to fight for the British in the American Revolution, thus funding economic reform, as well as his own opulent lifestyle.

alert and ready—just outfought by the Americans. The Hessian image nevertheless remains incomplete: They appear on the American stage without context, then vanish with little explanation. What's missing is a clear sense of who they were, where they originated, and why they came to America to fight, kill and die in a war that was not their own.

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o begin with, the Declaration of Independence was wrong: Hessians were not metrenaries in the generally accepted sense of the term—men serving the British as individuals under specified conditions of enlistment. Instead, they were classified under intemational law as "auxiliaries," subjects of a ruler who assisted another by pro\^iding soldiers in ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ retum for money. In a |8 modified form this s process remains recI ognized in law and I practice. In Vietnam, ihe United States supported a Korean contingent financially and 0 materially. In turn, 1 during Desert Storm, The new I some Slates thai did states went not send troops to the Middle East provided into the army funds that helped debusiness for fray America's costs. themselvesThe 18th century, however, is generally rather iike and correctly understate-run stood as the great age military temp of subsidy armies. Dubbed Soldatenhanagencies' del (the "soldier business"), it centered on Germany, and the principality of HesseKassel was its archetype. The roots of the trade are best sought in the Thirty Years' War, as states sought to pay their bills by recruiting and leasing soldiers to the highest bidder. That practice was easy to legitimize once the Treaty of Westphalia recognized the sovereignty of Germany's lesser rulers. Instead of authorizing the enlistment of mercenaries in the traditional way, through contractors and taking a cut of the profits, the new states went into ihe army business for themselves, raising men, organizing

MILITARY HISTORY

regiments and negotiating contracts with larger, richer countries—rather like state-run military temp agencies. Hesse-Kassel had always been poor— a midsize land of villages shaped by subsistence agriculture. At the same time, it lay between two parts of Prussia and athwart some of the regular routes of the contending armies. The result was catastrophe on all levels: the countryside wasted and the government deprived oi its usual sources of revenue. Military service was not particularly popular as Hesse slowly recovered from its bruising. And that recovery was limited—so limited it was difficult to sustain a force sufficient to protect Hesse's political sovereignty and territorial integrity In 1676 its army totaled a mere 23 companies. The following year, the Hessian Landgraf Karl leased I Oof those companies to Denmark for a total sum of 3,200 thalers. In 1687 Karl rented 1,000 men to Venice for 50 thalers apiece. Fewer than 200 returned home, but the Hessians had fought well enough to attract a more generous paymaster. The Estates of Holland had a full treasury and a long history of hiring fighting men from outside their borders. In 1688 Karl sent 3,400 of his subjects to serve William of Orange. They took no part in the invasion of England, but did so well on the continent that the Dutch wanted more of them for longer periods. In the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Hessian troops established a solid reputation for discipline in the field, steadiness underfireand willingness to endure the high casualties characteristic of flintlock-and-saber battles. Britain's Duke of Marlborough praised their valor. Prince Eugene of Austria, also no mean judge of fighting men, took 10,000 Hessiaris into Italy in 1706 and led another contingent against the Turks in Hungar>'. At this stage of its development, ihe Hessian army was recruited in more or less traditional fashion from society's expendables, including a strong infusion of men from other small German states. Karl saw it as a means of maintaining sovereignty, not a source of profit. Honor was also involved. Five of Karl's sons served under arms; two were killed

in action. And despite generous French offers, Karl, ruler of a Galvinist state, refused to do business with any bui Protestant employers. The pattern began lo change after 1715, when the Stuarts incited rebellion in Scotland. That year Britain's George I sought the services of no fewer ihan 12,000 Hessians. In 1726, when Britain reasserted a continental commitment by joining ihc Grand Alliance of Austria, Bavaria, Spain and other entities, it paid Hesse an annual retainer of £125,000 for first call on its army Eive years later, wilh no war on the horizon. Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole convinced Parliament to vote £240,000 to keep 12,000 Hessians ready for British service. Reluctant to depend on a single connection, successive electors sought to

expand their clientele. Results were not always positive. In 1744 a treaty with Bavaria briefly put Hessians on both sides in the War of the Austrian Succession. That same treaty for the first time included a blood money clause providing extra compensation for dead and wounded. In battle, however, the Hessians sustained and enhanced their reputation for rock steadiness. In 1745 and again in 1756, Hessian regiments shipped out to a Britain fearful of invasion by French and Scots. Landgrave William Vlll had a defensible case when he declared: "These troops are our Peru. In losing them, we would forfeit all our resources." The outbreak of the Seven Years' War placed major demands on Hesse-Kassel's resources. While a member of Britain's parliamentar)- opposition, William Pitt

had been an eloquent and forceful critic of military subsidies. But as prime minister of a state at w^r, Pitt opened the treasury' to create an army on the continent whose regiments were largely German. Of the 90,000 men under arms in 1760, only 22,000 were British—2,000 fewer than the Hessian contingent alone. The Hessian soldiers once again proved themselves among Europe's best. Under the overall command of Ferdinand ot Brunswick, they played a central role as "His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany" and tied dovm superior numbers of French and imperial troops in an unheralded campaign, enabling Frederick of Prussia to outfight his enemies for seven years. The Hessian people paid the price. Hesse was a major theater of operations for five campaigns—occupied, reoccu-

Frederick II, leading his men into battle in this 18th century German painting, was a master of military logistics who subdivided Hesse-Kassel into armed cantons, each responsible for maintaining home regiments.

pied and drained by requisitions, contributions and simple plundering by both sides. But as its tax base shrank, and the prospects of actually collecting taxes diminished, more and more English gold flowed into the treasury The subsidy conventions concluded between 1702 and 1765 met a good half of Hesse-Kassel's total budget. It was money gained without having to consult the Landtag, or diet, the assembly of merchants, townsmen and nobles who in principle controlled Hesse's purse strings. Initially, subsidies

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had been used to maintain the army: soldiers supporting soldiers in accepted European fashion. But the kind of money the new treaties generated was becoming a different matter. Subsidies brought in foreign exchange, which could be used to support investment in commerce, industry and agriculture. Since they went into the military treasury, directly under the Landgrafs control, the government had a potentially powerful fiscal weapon against the diet—should it prove necessary. Well before the Seven Years' War it was clear Hesse-Kassel lacked the strength to pursue an independent foreign policy On the olher hand, integration into a stable subsidy system enabled postwar recoristruction without the penny-pinching and baitstrapping necessary' after 1648. In the long terni, subsidies also enabled the administration to develop and finance a spectrum of development programs without turning to his people for money-— a revival of the medieval axiom that "the prince should live of his own." The mid-18th century was the heyday of enlightened absolutism, the concept of promoting public welfare from the top down through the application of reason and method. The optimistic belief that it was possible to improve humans and their institutions alike encouraged rulers to think of themselvesas servants, or at least custodians, of ihe state and its people. In countiies the size of Spain or the Habsburg Empire, where central authority eroded in direct ratio to its remoteness, enlightened absolutism tended to evolve toward window dressing. In smaller states—the size of Hesse-Kassel— central oversight enabled the establishment of regimes strongly prefiguring the modem bureaucratic welfare stale. The governments position as a pdmary source of funding encouraged cooperation on the pan of the diei, "Corrupiion" is a harsh word; "patronage" a gentler one, !n Hesse-Kassel one spoke of mutually acceptable arrangements among gentlemen.

MILITARY HISTORY

The necessary administrative apparatus was at hand. Military taxation and recTuitnieni. to be effective, required ii^creasingly meticLiIotis records, increasingly comprehensive enforcement of the increasingly comprehensive laws regulating military •xrvicQ and its ramilicaiions, and increasingly large numlxrs of bureaucrats lo keep the paperwork in order. [ "lesse-KasscIs subsid)'-fueled recovery irom the Seven Years' War was impressive. The administration sought to expand ihe states economic base b)' underwriting everything from trade fairs to road and river transportation. Hesse largely produced its own uniforms and weapons, increasing the number of craftsmen and skilled workers. Government experts improved peasant agriculture, particularly by encouraging potato cultivation and sheep raising. The rural population grew apace, providing a larger pool of potential soldiers. Increased wool production expanded the textile industry lo a point ihai workers were described as being able 10 eat meat and drink wine on a daily basis. Kassel, the capital city, became a showplaceofpublic works and buildings. Subsidy money built and maintained schools, hospitals and—pragmatical!)'— a combined malemit}' hospital for unwed mothers and orphanage. All of this provided architects and construction workers with steady, profitable work. Taxes even shrank, b)' about a third overall between the early 1760s and 1784. Present-day taxpayers can only marvel.

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he arniy on which this social edifice depended began taking definitive lorm in 1762. As casualties mounted, keeping thousands of men under nnns became an immense human burden for a state whose population was no more than 275,000, Frederick II responded by dividing Hesse-Kassel into cantons, each responsible for niaintaining afieldregiment for the subsidy army and a garrison regiment for home defense. Some towns were exempt. So was a spectrum of what similar American legislation a century later called "deferred occupations." In practice, those owning more than 250 thalers in property fulfilled their obligation with money instead of blood. Craftsmen, apprentices and servants,

workers in military-related industries and men essential to tbe prosperity of their farms or the support of their families were also exempt. All other men between 16 and 30, over 5-foot-6 when fully grown, were listed as available for military service, to be inducted and assigned as needed. Hesse-Kassel thus became, in numbers and percentages, the most militarized state in Europe. Us army stabilized

CaK'inist m practice. Ghildren were inculcated at an early age with fundamental concepts of duty and calling. Enhanced by secular indoctrination of loyalty to ihe ruler, concretized by rigid discipline in field and garrison, they produced soldiers worthy of their hire. That is the master story; there were several subtexts. Conscription itself was a two-tiered process, withfieldregiments

A Hessian civilian is conscripted into service during the American Revolution in a 19th century color engraving. Hessians comprised a full quarter of the British forces.

taking the most expendable recruits: the landless, the jobless, the feckless, supplemented by a steady trickle of foreigners. The "less expendables" were assigned to garrison regiments that were essentially militia formations, brought together annually in early summer for anywhere from three to six weeks of training and otherwise remaining part of the civil population and its economy In field regiments as well, at minimum about a third of each company was on leave at any one time—working as craftsmen or laborers, assisting on family farms. That number could reach as high as 50 percent over 10 or 11 months, depending on the regiment and the circumstances.

at a strength of 24,000 men; a l-to-15 soldier-civilian ratio, twice that ol Prussia. In contrast to Prussia, while foreigners could enlist in the Hessian army, it consisted overwhelmingly of native sons. One household out oi four was represented in its ranks. In Prussia the ratio was l-to-14. Both travelers and militaryinspectors consistently remarked on the size and fitness of the Hessian regulars, qualities frequently credited to iheir austere upbringing on hardscrabble smallholdings. No less remarkable was their apparent acceptance of militaryfife,despite a term of service totaling 24 years. Again this was frequently ascribed to nurture, with young men hearing from fathers and uncles tales of adventure in lar places while omitting the negatives. Moral factors were involved as well. The Hessian countryside was still strongly

A Hessian soldier, ihen, was hardly isolated from Hessian society Conscripts and militiamen could volunteer for ihe field regiments, and ihe stale encouraged thai in concrete ways. An active soldiers pay was higher than that of a domestic servant or farm laborer—enough, properly husbanded, to buy a cow or two pigs a month. That gave a man infiuence in his parental household. Once mas-

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tered, moreover, the routines of drill and service were significantly less demanding than those of a menial job in a subsistence economy. Discipline might be harsh in principle, hut its weight fell primarily on the 10 percent that cause 90 percent of the problems in any military unit: the sullen, the stubhom, the stupid. Small wonder, then, that Hessian field regiments had little trouble keeping their ranks filled—or that many of the regulars saw even the voyage to America to help suppress a popular revolution as an adventure and an opportunity 1,^^^^^^^^ When mobihzed, the Hessian army was an infantry force: around two dozen regimentsof foot,fieldand garrison, supported by a few squadrons of s cavalry and two or § three artillery compau nies whose pieces were 'Even before I distributed as "regithe outbreak mental guns." Each of revolution in infantry regiment had a grenadier company its American composed of picked colonies, men and usually assigned to a separate the British grenadier battalion on government active service. For the had begun American expedition, the army added somenegotiations' thing new: a field Jaeger (hunter) corps of two companies. Foresters, hunters and the occasional poacher from all over Germany volunteered, attracted by high bounties and high pay., bringing their own rifles. Performing many of the duties of contemporary rangers, the Jaeger were widely considered the elite of the British army in North America. An officer's career in Hesse-Kassel was both honorable and a good way to share in the subsidy system benefits. The officer corps was characterized by long service—an average of 28 years for captains and majors of one regiment in 1776. It was primarily native—about half noble and the other half either bourgeois who began as "free corporals," with the understanding that a commission was in the offing, or commoners

MILITARY HISTORY

promoted from the ranks. In contrast to most German states, Prussia in particular, an officer's official status and precedence were based on his military rank and not his social origins. Senior appointments were, nevertheless, largely filled by aristocrats through the end of the period. Flector Karl recognized the risk of professional stagnation in a small army By 1771, 61 officers and cadets were studying academic subjects at the Collegium Carolinum, Hesse-Kassel's foremost university. By the time of [he French Revolutionary Wars, Hessian officers were among the leaders in developing new tactical doctrines. An officer who joined in 1777 described the change: "In my early youth, who could last longest at a drinking bout, who showed the most dueling cuts was held to be a fine fellow, and whoever had cheated a Jew was considered a genius. This fashion has completely changed." A bit optimistic perhaps, but indicating an internal d)Tiamic that produced solid leadership at regimental levels for an army designed to fight under alien high command.

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hat was frequently described as Hesse-Kassel's "golden age" had its downsides. The need to maintain the army's strength and effectiveness opened the door to an increasing intrusion of govemment into ever>'day life. If someone in an exempted category enlisted, his case might even be investigated to make sure he was a true volunteer. On the flip side of the coin, the state encouraged a steady supply of marginalized "have-nots" by adjusting patterns of inheritance and employment. Parents were held responsible for sons who emigrated—even imprisoned until the miscreants reported for duty One ambitious local official pushed for creation of a commission to enforce the fidelity of wives whose husbands were fighting in North America, This precursor of what modem commentators call the "mommy state" was, however, more irritating than alienating. More significant was the diet's growing perception of the subsidy system as a threat to the society it was supposed to

nurture, not to mention on its own financial interests. In part this reflected an emerging critique throughout Europe of managed government, or dirigismt', in favor of more open economic systems. Us major taproot, however, was pragmatic. In 1773 new legislation in favor of mral primogeniture, with cash payments for younger brothers, created a large number of men suddenly—and unhappily—eligible for conscription. It also generated a legal crisis, as courts were flooded v^nih suits and countersuiis involving issues like the right to sell or mongage land. The resulting social disruption was enhanced by what initially appeared lo be the greatest triumph of Hesse-Kassel's subsidy system. Even before the outbreak of revolution in its American colonies, the British government had begun negotiations with the Landgraf— who was, not coincidentally. an uncle of King George III. The resulting treaty put almost 20 million thalers into HesseKassel's treasur)'—much of it up from, a rare phenomenon in subsidy arrangements. Conditions included payment at British rates—well above local ones—a guarantee not to commit Hessiar\s outside North America, and another guarantee that if Hesse-Kassel itself were attacked, Britain would come to its aid. Finally, in contrast to contemporary British treaties with other German states, Hesse-Kassel's did not include a blood bonus—to official Hesse-Kassel, proof of its mler's enlightenment and goodwill. All the UrndgmJ, Frederick U, had to do was maintain some 12,000 men for service across the Atlantic. Meeting the original number required mobilizing four garrison regiments in addition to the field anny. Despite the strain on the system, the proposition seemed ideal to the diet, which supported the treaty enthusiastically; it also provided support for the personal lifestyle of Frederick, The general population benefited from more than a half million thalers in pay and bonuses distributed directly to soldiers' families, Times, however, were changing. In Europe and in Germany, intellectuals and publicists raised a cry against a "trade in human flesh" that flew in the

face of everything the Enlightenment supported. Casualty replacement became an unexpected problem. British soldiers and diplomats promised quick victory. Instead, almost 19,000 Hessians, 7,000 more than the original contingent, crossed the Atiantic alter 1776. Five thousand died from all causes, more than 80 percent from disease alone. Another 1,300 were wounded. Between 2,500 and 3,100 went missing. Many of those simply remained in the New World. Their number nevertheless suggested a significant degree of alienation from the subsidy system among those at its sharp end, The long absence of so many men bore heavily on their families and on a subsistence economy that proved more dependent than expected on the labor of lurloughed soldiers. The subsidizing of trade and industry had absorbed funds without generating what would later be described as an economic takeoff. The last Hessian losses were recorded in 1784. William IX, who succeeded Karl as Landgraf in 1785, responded to critics by revising land

Hessians troops and cavalry, shown in uncharacteristic disarray in a 19th century engraving, flee from Patriot forces during George Washington's 1776 surprise attack on Trenton.

inheritance laws in ways intended to leave more muscle on family farms. The conscription system was modified to eliminate the complex structure of occupational deferments. The concept of "expendability" was applied lo the entire male population, the term of service reduced to 12 years as a tradeoff. Administered with a cautious eye on local reactions, the revamped system for practical purposes restored the army to its central place in Hessian society. William IX was Francophobic—a tendency encouraged after 1789 by the serious direct threat revolutionary France posed to the small German states across the Rhine. The Landgraf was correspondingly willing to engage his army for lesser sums than his predecessor. Britain, however, was still a reliable paymaster and partner, willing to pay premium prices for good men. A four-year

treaty of alliance in 1787 provided annual payments for 12,000 troops never called on to deploy—among the few cases of "something ior nothing" in the subsidy systems history. A series of treaties in 1793 and 1794 brought 12,000 men plus artillery into British service, where they fought as well as ever in the Low Countries and Westphalia. Hessian regiments served in Ireland against the 1798 Revolution, with more success than their predecessors in North America. William was able to parlay his troops' service into an electoral title from the Holy Roman Empire in 1803. Three years later, in the aftermath of the Battle of Jena, Hesse-Kassel was merged into the Confederation of the Rhine, and William was an exile in Austria. Hessians continued to fight across Europe under foreign colors, this time French ones. But the Hessian mercenary state had passed into history—and into myth. 0 For further reading, Dennis Showaller recommends: The Hessians, by Rodney Atwood, and The Hessian Mercenary State, hy Charles W Ingrao.

From the Old West to the Western Front, from a troop of Buffalo Soldiers to a million doughboys, Pershings globe-circling career is a virtual history of the U.S. Army By Kevin Baker

e has all but faded from our collective memory: A terse, uncharismatic figure in a drab, old-fashioned uniform. During the war in which he commanded, he accepted no unconditional surrenders, invented no famous strategies. He never defied a president or harbored obvious presidential ambitions. And yet, no other American general ever held significant command positions in so many diverse theaters of war. No American general besides George Washington ever held such high rank. None ever commanded so many different types of troops, from one of the nation's last all-black combat regiments to the first U.S. ground force to fight in i Europe. And probably no American officer ever went on so stoically doing his

BY fifiO MARKET ST. SAN FRANCISCO

American Expeditionary Forces in Wbrld War I, likely inspired likely inspired an an Army Armyrecruiting recruitingposter. poster.

appalling personal tragedy

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He was General of the Armies John J. "Blackjack" Pershing, commander ofthe American Expeditionary Eorces (AEF) in World War I. Over the course of his 38-year career, he fought Apaches in New Mexico, Sioux in the Dakota Territory, the Spanish in Cuba, the Moros in Mindanao, Pancho Villa in Mexico and the Germans in France. Along the way, he would pick up a law '*^^*""8 chats with a French child in °

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Soissons, France, In August 1919. The

degree, a teaching position at West Point, a mistress in Paris earlier loss of his wife and three young and a Pulitzer Prize for his memoirs of the Great War. He (daughters had been devastating.

had a knack for being in the right place at momentous times—^Wounded Knee, San Juan Hill, the Argonne—and for influencing important people. He would command most of the generals who would shape the American century. Among his aides, and friends, he would count

MILITARY HISTORY

In 1919, to recognize Pershing's performance as commander of the American Expeditionary Forces. President Woodrow Wilson promoted him to general of the armies.

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boih George C. Marshall and George Patton, and be would find occasion to personally dress down Douglas MacArihur—however unfairly. And in his final command, he made decisions that v^-ould have enormous ramifications for American foreign policy to this day.

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ershing was a small-iown boy, hom in Laciede, Mo,, on September 13, 1860, to a staunchly Unionist storekeeper and his wife. His earliest memory was of a deadly raid on his hometown by Confederate bushwhaekers. His father survived but was ruined by the Panic of 1873. John was left !o scratch out an education as best he could, working a fiarm with his younger brother when he was just 13, then teaching first black and then white schoolchildren while sttll a teenager himself. His ambition was lo become a lawyer, but when he won an academic competition for the right lo apply to West Point, he grabbed at the cbance and left his home state for the first time. Pershing graduated from the Point in 1886, near the middle of his class academically, but with ihe highesl leadership honors as captain of ihe Corps of Cadets. He was a natural officer, both in spirit and appearance. In every photograph, at every stage of his life, he looked like a caricature of his profession. As biographer Gene Smith put il, "As an immaculate and snappy and severe and disciplined soldier of perfect military bearing, he was unsurpassable." Pershing demanded this severity—a constant emphasis on proper drill, dress, demeanor, readiness, attitude—botb of himself and those he commanded. It would become a hallmark of his eareer, carried, at two critical junctures, to extremes that threatened to alienate all tbose around him. Dunng bis year as a tactical officer at West Point, he handed out so many demerits that the cadets subjected him to "silencing"—falling mute whenever Pershing set foot in tbe academy mess hall. They also saddled him with his niekname, not the newspapersanitized version, but the infinitely more derisive "Nigger Jack." He was undeterred. In World War 1, commanding a foree tbat would number more than 2 million men, most ol them newly

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drafted, Pershing issued the impossible order that the Point's standards would apply to cvciyoni:: "The rigid allention. the upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instruction required ofthe cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our artnies in France." Even a jilted fiancee—George Patton's sisier—would describe him at this time as "a little tin god on wheels." And yet, Pershing was a surpassingly adaptable soldier, one who continually saw beyond the parametei-s of his proles-

* No other American general has ever held significant command positions in so many diverse theaters of war'

sion. It was as if his reliance on discipline and drill were a grip he kept on his own deeply passionate and inquiring nature— one he tightened whenever he feared it might fly out of control. This served him best when be had to struggle vigorously to keep bis very command—the greatest command in U.S. history to tbat point.

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e could not have anticipated any such challenges at tbe outset, lieutenant Pershing graduated into a U.S. Army that consisted of fewer than 25,000 rnen, most of them assigned to desolate forts throughout the rapidly

vanishing Western frontier. Us officer corps, just 2,000 strong, was hopelessly stagnant. Pershing himself took 15 year,*^ just to nse to captain. He spent much of his career fruitlessly chasing various hostiles across the empty Western landscape—Chiel MangLts' Apaches ihrough the hills and mesas of New Mexico; Chief Big Foots Sioux across the Dakota Territory during the Ghost Dance uprising; Pancho Villa through the dust of Chihuahua; a band of Cree attempting to return to Montana from Canada, In between, he duly provided the other eclectic services expected of an American officer at the time, spending four years teaching and drilling cadets at tbe University of Nebraska. He seldom complained about any of it. Not tbe lonehness and isolation of the distant forts; not the daunting weather extremes or trivial nature of many of his duties. He remained, instead, doggedly self-reliant, flexible and observant—all qualities that would serve him well. He didn't just adapt to the West; he seemed to love it, including its native peoples. The treatment of tbe Indians, he would write, constituted "the most cruel, unjust, blackest ]iage of American history"—even as he pursued some of them relentlessly Later, he would fight a remarkably successful campaign against Islamic insurgents in a complex civil war halfway around the globe. He was a romantic without illusions, always eager to study, understand and even sympathize with ihe dizzying array of peoples he was supposed to fight, Everylhing seemed to fascinate him. In a time when an officer's career promised neither riches nor glory, Persbing made the most of it. Sent the long way around to figbi the Moros in the Philippines, he visited with Parisian an students in the Latm Quarter and perused the Louvre and Versailles, where he would one day have to battle for the independence of America's greatest army Reluming from his post as military attache in Tokyo, Pershing took his young family on the newly completed Trans-Siberian Railway to Moscow, toured St. Petersburg. Berlin and the Waterloo battlefield, and lived for several months in Tours while trying to improve his French. A ladies' man, he enjoyed (successively) a loving marriage

General Pershing and staff ford a river during his command of the 8th Army Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas. In 1916 Pershing invaded Mexico to capture Pancho Villa but failed to do so.

and a loving, decades-long affair with a French-Romanian painter—and perhaps some hriefer interludes that threatened to ruin his career and reputation. They didn't, in part because Pershing was also adept at making the right connections. Like Dwight Eisenhower, he was a consummately political general who advanced by not indulging in the spiteful politics of a peacetime army It was no coincidence that he won the two biggest promotions of his career from two presidents—Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—who could not have been more different in temperament or loathed each other more. But then Pershing was always able to make the best of a situation. Stuck in Lincoln, Neb., for four years teaching military science to farm boys, he used the opportunity to get his law degree, pass the Nebraska bar, lead his charges to a national drill championship.. .and make friends with a congressman named George Meiklejohn, whose ambition of becoming assistant secretary of war Pershing heiped to fulfill. Thirty-five years old by the time his stint in Nebraska ended, still a bachelor.

Bom September 13 Pershing's small-lown Missouri neighbors consider his younger brother Jim the real comer.

Enters West Point Pershing is just shy of 22, the legal age for admittance. Rrst assignment, New Mexico On one occasion, Pershing is knocked out of his saddle and loses his revolver to an Apache.

Teaches school in Prairie Mound Pershing beats up one parent after being threatened with a pistol.

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still a lieutenant nine years after leaving the Point, Pershing considered taking up the law. Instead, he accepted what a lesser man might have seen as yet another demeaning assignment, command of a troop of the ] 0th Cavalv)'—the al!-black regiment cadets would later deride—at Fort Assinniboine, Mont. His troops seemed to like him, respect him, and gave him their own nickname, "Old Red," during his two years there. When war broke out with Spain in 1898, Pershing, then stuck in a miserable tenure at West Point, begged for the chance to see action. Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn found an opening in his pre\ious posting, commanding a troop of the 10th Cavalry. The 10th was one of four African-American regiments at the time, commanded by white officers and stationed at W''esiern outposts, as far as possible from white population centers. Getting them into position to invade Cuba was almost a war in itself: The black troops found that the cheering that greeted their troop train at every station stopped abruptly once they crossed into the South. Bivouacked outside Lakeland, Fla., they had to

endure the animosity of local whites, who alternated between gawking openly at the sight of armed lilack men in unifnmi and vehemently denying them access \o restaurants, bars, stores and brothels. Brawls, shootings and even a full-scale riot broke out between black regulars and white citizens and volunteers. Once deployed in Cuba, they had to endure the same poisonous rations, archaic weapons and erratic leadership as the rest ofthe invasion force in this most precipitous and chaotic of all the nation's warsPershing picked up a case of malaria in Cuba and was nearly killed in a stream by a Spanish artillery shell thai landed close enough to leave him soaking wet. He led his men through the jungle and then in ihc tiosperatc. improvised rush up San Juan Heights on the left of Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. "If it had not been for the Negro cavalry, the Rough Riders would have been exterminated," one of Teddy's men claimed later. "We officers of the 10th Cavalry could have taken our black heroes in our arms. They had again fought their way into our affections, as

Santiago Campaign, San Juan Hill Pershing calls this campaign "a time of rejoicing. It was glorious."

Ordered to Manila, Philippines Proves a brilliant counterinsurgency officer, but scandal would dog him.

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they had fought their way into the heans ofthe American people," Pershing exulted. In this, he could not have been more wrong, but he won a Silver Star, a captaincy—at last—and a command in the ensuing savage war in the Philippines. There, Pershing fought a strikingly modern counterinsurgency campaign against the fiercely independent Islamic Moro peoples. He alternated patient negotiation with the ruthless reduction ol Moro strongholds, yet openly admired ihe intelligence, customs and even the cuisine of those he fought.

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ershing's work in Mindanao won him the public praise of nowPresident Roosevelt, the man he had followed up Kettle Hill, who was intent on instituting military promotions based on merit rather than time served. In 1906 he raised Pershing Irom captain to general over 862 senior offtcers, making him military govemor of Mindanao. Soon after, a story broke in the press that Pershing had kept a querida, or "sweetheart," while on that first posting in Mindanao, fathered two

Assigned to patrol Mexican border Pershing plays both diplomat and general, preparing for war.

1914

children by her and subsequently offered her hush money not to expose him. It would not be the last time accusations conceming an alfair threatened Pershings career (the next concerned an heiress who would become Douglas MacAnhur's first wife). He never quite denied the charges, but the War Department dismissed them out of hand. True or not, they were transparently the work of officersjealous of Pershing's promotion. In 1905 Pershing married Helen Frances "Frankie" Warren, the daughter of a wealthy, powerful U.S. senator from Wyoming. It was another propitious connection, but also seems to have been a love match. Frankie, nearly 20 years Pershing's junior, was devoted to him, bearing him three daughters and a son in the first seven years of their marriage, while following hitn around the world without cotnplaint. Spirited, loyal and intrepid, she was living with the chiidren in the dilapidated officers barracks of San Francisco's Presidio on August 27, 1915, just a week from joining Pershing at his latest post, at Fort Bliss in El Paso. In the early moming hours, a fiir swept through

House tire kills wite and daughters Warren, his surviving son, would enlist as a private in World War II.

1915

ns President Wilson gives Pershing an unprecedented degree of autonomy.

1917

their rooms, suffocating Frankie and the couples three girls, ages 3 to 9. Only their son, 6-year-old Warren, survived. lt was a devastating blow, one made worse by the fact that Pershing blamed himself for the suspected cause ofthe fire, a dining room floor he'd recently had vamished that had caught fire when some coals fell out oi a grate. This supremely self-controlled officer was reduced to screaming and weeping openly before friends and junior officers, exclaiming, "1 can understand the loss of one member of the family, but not nearly all!" Those around him feared he might go mad. Yet Viithin weeks Pershing was back on duty al Fort Bliss. He was needed there—and unbeknownst to him, he now stood on the verge of a dizzying chain of events that would shoot him to the top of his profession. His rise began with the Punitive Expedition, the campaign against the famous Mexican bandit chieftain Pancho Villa that must have seemed to Pershing yet another hopeless pursuit. For months prior, Pershing had conducted his patient brand of diplomacy to keep the revolution that

Retires as General of the Armies A unique, personalized rank, one attained by no other living American general. Dies July 15 George C. Marshall cites Pershing's "perfection in soldierly qualities. Appointed Chief dynamic leadership of Staff and American patriotism." Pershing fights in vain for universal military training and a robust peacetime army.

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had been raging in Mexico from crossing the border. He had boasted particular success culUvating Villa, who posed grinning for pictures with Pershing, and kept hands off American interests. Thai changed when President Wilson, without consulting Pershing, allowed troops of a rival Mexican faction to cross American soil by rail, outflank Villa and largely annihilate his army. Vengeful and desperate. Villa responded by trying to widen the war, pulling 19 American engineers off a train in Chihuahua and

directions and conduct a campaign that adroitly avoided setting off a full-scale war, but satisfied the administrations need to save face. The Punitive Expedition punished its way 350 miles into Mexico, diligently pursuing Villa for 11 months and dodging several ambushes. Pershing's command eventually reached a total of 11,000 men, almost a tenth of the U.S. standing anny He saw firsthand just how short even its best units were of tbe latest arms, vehicles, planes; how unprepared it was to fight a modern war

Officers of the 6th Cavalry, including 2nd Lt. John Pershing, and attached officers at the Pine Ridge Agency, S.O., in January 1891. after the Battle of Wounded Knee.

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murdering ihem by the raiibed, tben launching a bloody night raid against tbe garrison town of Columbus, N.M. Pershing was ordered to bring Villa to justice. Thus he would become the first, but Ear from last, American officer over the course of the century ordered to pursue a hazy objective, under an even cloudier set of restrictions. He was authorized by the deputy chief of staff to attack Mexican towns if Villa and his men were there, bui he was not to use the Mexican railroads to resupply his force. His troops were to "do as soldiers in the circumstance must do," and if Villa's troops broke up into smaller bands, "our people must more or less scatter in order to follow him." Somehow, Pershing was able to "more or less" decode these equivocal

MILITARY HISTORY

This was information he would need. Within two months of Pershing's return to El Paso in 1917, the U.S. had declared war on the Central Powers. Persbing was clearly the only senior officer young enough, fit enough and experienced enough to lead the planned AEF, and he had impressed superiors with his handling of the delicate assignment in Mexico. Yet the appointment was probably an even better choice than Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker realized, for it would be as much a diplomatic mission as a military one.

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ersbing shipped out almost immediately, arriving in England on June 8, 1917. Tbere and in France, he was greeted by giddy.

cheering mobs and in response made al! the right gestures: kissing Napoleon's sword and laying a wreath on Lafayette's tomb {wbere, as Pershing always insisted, it was bis paymaster. Major Charles E. Stanton, who actually uttered the words, "Lafayette, we are here!") The only trouble was he bad no one with him, beyond a hastily assembled staff of some 187 officers and civilians. Nor would an army materialize anytime soon. Despite all the lobbying for preparedness over the past three years by Teddy Roosevelt and others, the country had largely chosen to ignore tbe possibility it could be dragged into the most terrible war in buman history. Months, maybe a year, would be needed before any sizable American force could be assembled, trained, equipped and shipped to Europe—and it wasn't clear the Allies had tbat much time. Even as Pershing arrived in France, tbe feckless Nivelle Offensive was grinding to a halt. The traumatized French army had suffered another 200,000 casualties over the course of two months, and mutinies would sweep tbrougb 54 combat divisions. Only the strictest military secrecy kept tbe enemy from realizing tbis and breaking through to Paris. That fall Russia capitulated to the Bolsheviks and then to tbe Germans, and the Italians collapsed at Caporetto. Some 265 German and Austrian divisions, Pershing feared, migbt now be massed on the Western Front for one last overwhelming offensive as soon as tbe weatber improved. By the winter of 1918, a quartermillion doughboys had arrived in France. but for the most part tbey lacked artillery, planes and transport. They were, in short, not an army The British and French argued tbat they didn't need to be. Tbe Americans could be fed into the Allied annies as they arrived by the battalion, platoon or company, some 50 to 150 men at a time. The Europeans would supply all munitions and any officers above the rank of captain. Pershing adamantly opposed that idea from the start. "The United States will put its troops on the battlefront wben it shall bave formed an army worthy of tbe American people," he had

announced soon after coming to France, and he stuck to his guns. One by one, they came to remonstrate wilh him— rtrst the generals, Haig and Foch and Petain, then the premiers, Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Even King George V traveled to Paris to tell Pershing he had to give his men over. "1 should have liked to argue with the king and set him right," Pershing joked later, but the arguments grew more urgeni and ferocious as the German offensive neared. Pershing was visiting Petain at his headquarters at Compiegne in late March when he heard it coming, a low, ominous rumble of artillery that shook the furniture and rattled the maps in ihe French general's office. Some 64 German divisions went over the top, driving a wedge 45 miles wide and 55 miles deep into the Allied lines, wrecking an entire British army and taking 90.000 prisoners. Another 65,000 poilus surrendered along the Aisne at the end of May, their retreating

time may come when the American army will have to stand the brunt of this war," and insisted that meanwhile he would not "fritter away our resources."

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ershing could be confident of his own standing, thanks to the unwavering support of Wilson and Baker. But he alone still bore full responsibility for what was, in the words of biographer Richard O'Connor, "one of the most prolonged and coldly calculated gambles in military history," It was

US, troops—fighting together, under their own flags and commanders, uninfected by French and British pessimism—would also be instrumental in winning the war. In this, the fighting would bear him out, as inexperienced but enthusiastic American troops were able to break through against exhausted and demoralized German veterans. Politically, Pershing's position was unassailable. The U,S, approach to World War 1 must seem incomprehensible 10 manv Americans todnv That ftrst

comrades crying out, "La guerre estfinie!"

as they streamed back from the front. German aircraft and artillery were now bombarding Paris. The Allies raged at Pershing, appealed over his head to Washington, confiding in each other, in their diaries and in their memoirs that the American was an egomaniac, an incompetent, Pershing was "unable properly to train or command his troops," Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir William Robertson reported to the British War Cabinet. Marshal Foch, the newly anointed supreme Allied commander, warned Pershing that the British would be pushed into the sea and the French to the Loire, while the Americans would be left tr>'ing "in vain to organize on lost battlefields over the graves of Allied soldiers." Prime Minister Lloyd George found Pershing's stand "maddening" and seethed over his "invincible obstinacy" and "professional egotism." Matters came to a head at a heated conference at Versailles, on June 1 and 2, 1918, when George told Pershing to his face, "We will refer this to your president." "Refer it to the president and be damned," Pershing answered. He later argued more judiciously to Foch, "The

Generals Alvaro Obregon, Pancho Villa and John Pershing meet in Nogales, Ariz., on August 27,1914. Pershing's careful cultivation of Villa would soon be negated.

based on several assumptions, one of them naive, the rest highly perceptive. The American commander was understandably wary of British and French trench-war fa re tactics, which through 1917 had cost the Allies over 2.5 million more casualties than they had inflicted along the Western Front. He also believed that no matter how many troops ihe Germans amassed along the Western Front, they would be unable to break through. Where Pershing was naive was in maintaining that long-range rifle training and "fire and movement" tactics could replace trench warfare. The Great War was the war of the machine gun and the hand grenade—something his European allies had learned years before. Finally, Pershing constantly reiterated that the freshness and morale of

American expedition on European soil was also the lasi time CS, forces would fight as a junior partner, at least formally under the direction of a supreme commander who was a foreign officer. To do more than this would have been to seriously endanger the integrity of the AEF's mission. The French and British generals had been reckless to the point of obscenity wilh iheir men's lives. Who could know what they might do with a limitless supply of other people's sons— and the consequences could have been enormous: The slaughter of vast numbers of doughboys at the behest of foreign officers might well have destroyed American suppon for the war. Even if it had not, the bitter memory of such losses could well have tipped the scales against inter\'eniion in World War 11.

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Yet as successive German offensives thundered on through the spring and summer of 1918, Pershing realized he would have to make some sort of compromise. If [he Americans did not yet have an army in place, Pershing at last conceded, they could at least fight in division strength in coordination with the Allies. Starting on May 28, ever-increasing numbers of American troops— commanded by their own officers— swung into action. Throughout the rest of the spring and summer of 1918, they fought with considerable skill and elan, blunting the German thrust at ChateauThierry and counterattacking at Belleau Wood and Soissons. Names of these battles and others soon became household words in the States, but the claims of American newspapers that they had "saved" France were exaggerated; at Ghateau-Thierry the AEF had provided only two of the 45 Allied divisions used to stop the German advance. Ironically, the results bore out Pershing's contention that the French and British could hold out until an American army was ready, but the pressure to hand over his men piecemeal continued. As many as 250,000 doughboys were arriving every month now, and the logistical problems alone were overwhelming, Pershing responded as he always had, by working all the harder at his Chaumont headquarters, constantly touring the U.S. positions and encampments and paying more attention than ever to detail and discipline. He was equally unsparing of anyone under his command, lambasting or replacing some of his oldest friends from the regular army when he felt they were not up to their tasks. This could become excessive. Encountering the disheveled, weary Rainbow Division just after it served a punishing 82 straight days in the front lines, followed by a 37-mile march through the mud, he bellowed at Colonel Douglas MacArthur that his troops were "a disgrace!" and "just about the worst I have seen." To the men, Pershing was "that sonuvabitch [whol roared past our column in his staff car, spattering every one of us with mud and water from

MILITARY HISTORY

head to foot." He seemed forever cold and unbending, even uncaring. Pershing contributed to this image, working hard to maintain his imposing aura as commander, posing ramrod straight for all photographs and even keeping his pockets empty to emphasize the trim of his uniform. At the same time, he was viilling to listen to junior officers or men who had a legitimate complaint or suggestion; retained both his temper and a sense of humor; and worried constantly over the state of his soldiers. It was as if

Mf they had given us another 10 days, we would have rounded up the entire German army, captured it, humiliated i t '

he were trying to physically impart to them his own immeasurable pride, selfcontrol and self-confidence. "When you stumbled upon a tost American doughboy in a godforsaken Lorraine hamlet," the journalist Frank H. Simonds wrote, "his bearing, the set of his tunic, his salute, all authentically recalled the general who sat in Ghaumont." By September he finally had an army, the First American Army—at 550,000 men, the largest in U.S. history, even if its supporting artillery and planes were still supplied by the French. It quickly crushed the Germans' Saint-Mihiel

salient, then tumed within two weeks to assault the Meuse-Argonne sector, an area the enemy had made, in the words of Pershing's chief of staff, James Harbord, "the most comprehensive system of leisurely prepared field defense known to history." Here, Pershing's remaining illusions about the murderous nature of trench warfare were shattered. The Argonne was a bloody 47-day slog, one in which Pershing committed close to 1-2 million troops and absorbed 117,000 casualties fighting a much smaller force. In the end, though, the Germans broke—and it was the end. By the close of the battle, they were left without a single reserve division in the sector, and Hindenburg himself later wrote that the Meuse-Argonne was "our most sensitive point" and that "the American infantry in the Argonne won the war." It may have been more a coup de grace than the decisive blow, but the war was over within days, much to Pershing's chagrin. Alone among the Allied war councils, he had insisted throughout on winning an unconditional sunender from Germany, not merely an armistice. "We shouldn't have done it," he commented at the time- "If they had given us another 10 days, we would have rounded up the entire German army, captured it, humiliated it....The German troops today are marching back into Germany announcing that they have never been defeated....What I dread is that Germany doesn't know that she was licked-" It was a prescient insight, ln 1944, while living out the final years of his long, pleasant retirement at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Pershing received a birthday message from another President Roosevelt that read in part, "None of us will forget that in 1918 you wanted to go through to Berlin. Howrightyou were!" Such was the vindication of a leader who had taken care to understand both his allies and his enemies. (SB) For further reading, Kevin Baker recom-

mends: Blackjack Pershing, hy Richard O'Connor, Pershing, General of the Armies, by Donald Smythe, and Until the Last Trumpet Sounds, hy Gene Smith.

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Allied commanders General Henri Philippe Petain, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Marshal Ferdinand Foch and General John Pershing stand in front of Chateau Bombon (Foch's headquarters) in Seine-et-Marne, France, in 1918.

WORLD WAR I

AN ARMY FROM SCRATCH Stereoscopic images capture the American Expeditionary Forces as they prepare their gear and themseives for World War I

When Congress declared war on the Central Powers on April 6, 1917, they were bluffing. The United States had an army of just 125,000 men, scarcely in the same league with the millions engaged in Europe. Scrambling for transport, the U.S. shipped some 14,000

soldiers, elements of several infantry regiments, by June 1917. But millions more were needed, and America had to build a huge army, essentially from scratch. What the U.S. did have was plenty of manpower (population: 103 million) and a mighty industrial capacity In 1917 and 1918, virtually all men aged 18 to 45 registered for the draft—more than 24 million all told. Training camps sprang up all over America, and by the Armistice in November 1918, the U.S. had 1.2 million men in arms. The creation of that Army was a public process, recorded and viewed widely on 3-D stereoscopic view cards—the television news of its day. The Keystone View Company dominated the marketplace with its high-quality photographs, from which this portfolio is drawn. Cards included captions in the breathless patriotic prose quoted here. ^ o o

MILITARY HISTORY

Pack Inspection of 139th Regiment Infantry, American Army Camp, USA.

From training camp...

Class of Officers Practicing the Short Point Stab, American Army Camp, USA.

Projectile Weighing 1,070 Pounds; Powder, 325 pounds. One Load for the 12-Inch Disappearing Gun. Fortress Monroe, Virginia.

.to thefiringline

Our Answer to the Kaiser-3,000 of America's Millions Eager to Fight for Democracy.

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Making the World Safe for DemocracyOur Boys Training for the Firing Line.

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MILITARY HISTORY

In the roughly organized armies of 16th century Europe, there was literally a woman with every man. They were partners in pillage By John A. Lynn hen you recruit a regiment of German soldiers today, you do not only acquire 3,000 soldiers; along with these you will certainly find 4,000 women and children." So observed Johann Jacob von Wallhausen in his 1615 treatise on war, Kriegskunst zu Fuss. During the 16th and 17th centuries, great crowds of camp women were not unusual; they were the rule. Not mere camp followers, women were an essential element of military forces in the field, providing many services to the troops. In fact, the presence of these women helps explain the very existence of early modern European annies when Holy Roman Emperor and King and the conduct of war. of Spain Charles V The tasks performed by camp women did include pros- besieged Tunis in 1535, titution, but also traditional women's work like laundry, meal women carried much of the food and supplies, preparation and petty commerce, and even heavy camp as recorded in this labor—contemporary woodcuts often illustrate a soldier contemporary painting. paired vvdth a woman, who is usually bent under a heavier load than that borne by her male companion. The most important contribution of women in this era, however, was the seizing and managing of pillage. Without pillage, armies could not exist. During the 16th and 17th centuries, European rulers, including Philip II of Spain and Louis XIII of Erance, commonly fielded annies they could not afford to pay or supply Troops from the Spanish army of Elanders, for instance, charged o o o

MILITARY HISTORY

in 1594 that they had not been paid for 100 months. Even when men did receive their pay, it was often insufficient to sustain them. A 1574 document complained that whereas a frugal soldier would need 10 pattards per day just for food, he received only four. Although soldiers were supposed to be fighting to earn money, one observer of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) wrote, "If you will consider how their wages are paid, I suppose, you will rather think them Voluntaries, at least very generous, for doing the greatest part of their service for nothing." Some commanders even saw an advantage to paying troops irregularly "To keep the troops together, it is a good thing to owe them something," observed the greai Spanish general Ambrosio Spinola. His harsh logic held that troops would be less likely to desert if they expected to receive back pay in the future. However, while underpaying troops might keep an army together, it practically guaranteed a breakdown in discipline, as troops turned to plunder as a form of compensation.

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Troops with empty pockets and empty stomachs took matters into their own hands. Some responded by mutiny: the Spanish 'The married army of Flanders, commanded by Souldiers fared such great generals as the dukes of better...and were Alva and Parma, suffered more able to do more than 45 mutinies between 1572 duty than the and 1607, including the horrenBatchellors; and dous 1576 Sack of Antwerp. all the spite was Most troops sought sustenance done the poor and compensation on campaign women was to be hy pillaging the civilian commucalled their nities that lay in their paths. "It is husbands' mutes' deplorable that our soldiers dedicate themselves to pillage rather than to honourable feats," wrote Pierre de Brantome of his experience during the French Religious Wars (1662-74). "Bui it is all due to their not being paid." Princes might issue highsounding declarations condemning troops for abusing civilian populations, but the bitter reality was that if those same rulers actually eliminated such excesses, they would have had to disband their armies as unaffordable. The practice of allowing soldiers to pillage permeated the era. It was accepted as a distasteful but practical necessity. "One finds enough soldiers when one gives them the freedom to live off the land, and allowing them to pillage supports them without pay," concluded the annual register of current affairs, the Mercure Francois, in 1622. French monarch Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) offered the same observation in his memoirs for the year 1666: "Of late, some commanders are found who have made great armies subsist for a long time without giving them any pay other than the license of pillaging everywhere." Pillage and its associated savagery—beatings, torture, rape and murder—certainly warranted condemnation, even when

MILITARY HISTORY

inflicted on civilians loyal to the enemy However, raiders made little distinction between friend and foe, even victimizing the loyal subjects of the govemment served by the soldiers. One observer described shameful conduct by the Florentine Black Bands as they marched through friendly territory in 1527: "[They are] worse than Turks. In the Valdarno, they have sacked three Florentine villages, raped women and perpetrated other very cruel things." Troops fielded by the Bourbon kings of France notoriously ravaged the French countryside during the first half of the 17th century. Because pillage was officially outlawed—if actually tolerated—the take from plunder was not tallied in royal accounts, even though it constituted a high proportion of military personnel expenses. Consequenily, the true size of the pillage economy will always remain more or less unknown. This is further compounded by the fact that pillage supported not only soldiers, but also the vast array of civilians who accompanied them in the field, including camp women, who mastered the brutal business of plundering.

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military force in the field during the early modem period did not resemble an army as we know it today. Soldiers constituted only part of a campaign community, in which they lived symbiotically with male and female noncombatants. Officers and soldiers employed servant boys. Teamsters hauled wagons and cannon using draught animals supplied by private contractors. Fntrepreneurs supplied bread to armies, sending their own staffs, including bakers, into the field. A large collection of other tradesmen—blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters—served the community. Merchants and sutlers sold essentials and amenities to the troops. Comprising such a varied multitude, a campaign community rivaled in complexity and size all but the largest towns of the day A force of 25.000 soldiers with its accompanying supporters represented a larger population than that of contemporary Bordeaux, Strasbourg, or Turin. It is no exaggeration to describe military camps as cities on the march. The campaign communities, moreover, formed a world apart, living according to their own rules, whicb were often quite hostile to civilian society—and vice versa. A mercenary principle drove enlistment; most common soldiers joined the ranks because they had few other options and hoped to fare better on campaign. A German woodcut dating from the 1530s makes this point with a poem attached to an illustration of a would-be Landsknecht, the much-feared, heavily armed Germanic mercenary of the 16th century: A tailor complains. "I must sit long hours for little pay wiih which I can hardly survive," so he decides to try his luck in "the open field to the sound of pipes and drums." The Englishman Sydnam Poyniz confessed a similar reason for enlisting in the 1620s: "My necessitie forced mee, my Money being growne short, to take the manes of a private soldier." Women opted for camp life with much the same rationale. This need to survive and a desire to prosper ensured that men and the women who joined them on campaigns would

prey upon the unfonunaie civilian communilies thai lay in their paths, Troops quartered in civilian homes abused their hosts; pillagers stole, raped and murdered. The result of such violence was a pervasive animosity toward armies that, in tum, inspired the campaign community to reject the civilian world, its mundane life and its standards of propriety. Although common soldiers came from the peasantry and urban working classes themselves, they announced their separation from such origins by sporting distinctive and often outlandish apparel. Most extreme was the bizarre multicolored and slashed garb of Landsknechts, though soldiers of other nations adopted their own extreme fashions. An early 17th century description of Spanish infantr>' claimed, "It is the finery, the plumes and the bright colors which give spirit and strength to a soldier so that he can with furious resolution overcome any difficulty or accomplish any valorous exploit." These sons of the laboring classes transformed themselves from subservient sparrows to aggressive peacocks. Campaign communities lived by codes that were libertine and brutal. Soldiers of the early modem era were known for drinking, gambling, wenching and fighting. The novelist Johann Jacob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, who had fought in the Thirty Years' War, summed up the soldiers' lifestyle with its violence, suffering and poverty: Their whole existence consisted of eating and drinking, going hungry and thirsty, whoring and sodomizing, gaming and didng, guzzling and gorging, murdering and being murdered, killing and being

killed, (oituring and being tortured, terrifying and being terrified...pillaging and being pillaged.

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British regiments through the late 18th century chose wives to accompany them. A period engraving depicts the 3rd Regiment of Foot helping the women ford a stream-and vice versa.

ithin this hard and hostile community, women perfonned a broad range of tasks- The most obvious, but by no means the most characteristic, employment was prostitution. The term "camp follower" is often regarded as synonymous with prostitute, and there is no question that prostitutes plied their trade with the troops. Many military authorities favored having them in camp for reasons of public order and efficiency Public order argued that soldiers who relied on camp prostitutes for sex would be less likely to trouble respectable women; according to Mathieu de la Simonne, writing in the 1620s, "It is good for the local inhabitants, it is said, because their wives, daughters and sisters will be more in security" Efficiency justified bringing along a limited number of prostitutes to satisfy the men's urges instead of dragging along a far greater number of wives who would encumber armies. Over time, however, tolerance of camp prostitution declined. Rising rates of venereal disease led commanders to see prostitutes as dangers to health, and the strict moral codes brought about by the Reformation and Counter-Refomiation advocated marriage and condemned prostitution outright. Frederick William, the great elector of Brandenburg, banned

Wives and whores applied Scenes of debauchery such as themselves to traditional and nec- the prostitutes' lair depicted essary women's work. Laundering, above in a period painting for one, was almost exclusively a were common in early feminine chore that soldiers re- modem camps. Tolerance garded as unmanly. In The Life for prostitution dropped of Courage: The Notorious Thief, off by the late 17th century. Whore and Vagabond, Grimmelshausen has his female antiheroine. Courage, declare, "1 refused to let [my husband] stay in the castle without me for fear he would be eaten up by lice, as there were no women to keep the men clean." Basic nced]ework also fell to women, who repaired clothes, stitched shirts and sewed linens. Nursing, loo, was considered a particularly feminine talent. When Robert Venables. one of Cromwell's favored generals during the English Civi! Wars, was censured for including his wife and allowing German soldiers, no sooner an expedition arrives, saddle themselves some soldiers to bring their wives on his disastrous expedition to the West Indies in 1654-55. he replied that experience in with frivolous and hose women with whom they contract "May the Irish wars had demonstrated "the necessity of having ihai nuiniages," whom they drag here and there just as millers do their sex with an army to attend upon and help the sick and sacks. The soldiers enhance the situation by pretending that in war wounded, which men are unfit for." Cooking, although not they cannot get along without women; they are needed to take care narrowly defined as a woman's task, also fell to camp women. of clothes, equipment and valuables; and in cases of Illness, injury or any other personal harm, the women are needed to nurse and Such gender-defined work was so valuable to an army's take care of them. health and well-being that a certain number of useful women prostitutes from his army by an article of war in September 1656, as did Louis XIV from French forces in the 1680s. The great majority of camp women belonged to two other categories: wives and so-called "whores"—the unmarried female partners of soldiers. These women were not prostitutes, as each accompanied a single man, yet contemporary accounts ofien refer to them as "whores." and the officer in charge of keeping order among camp women on the march was known in German as a Hurenweibel, or whoremastcr. The nature of the relationship between a soldier and his whore is suggested by the German practice of "May marriages," agreements to stay together for the campaign season, which traditionally began in May. Dionysius Klein, writing at the end of the 16th century, described such liaisons and their rationales:

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icmaincd with regiments in ihe field even after most wives and whores were driven From camps in ihe late 17th century. From then until the French Revolution, a contingent of 15 to 20 women usually marched in the train of a French regiment, while the British brought along about six wives per 100 soldiers until the late 18lh century Camp women also scrambled to earn whatever they could through petty commerce. Some became sutlers {vivandieres in French), peddling food, liquor, tobacco and sundries to officers and men. And camp women could be extremely creative in garnering money by more extraordinary schemes. During the occupation of Freiburg by the Swedes in the 1630s, one citizen complained of "the soldiers' abominable wives," who trespassed in local gardens, cut produce as soon as it appeared, and had ihe gall to sell what they did not consume in the Freiburg market. Men with female partners enjoyed an advantage. Sir James Turner, in his Pallas Armata (1683), argued that during the 1624-25 Spanish siege of Breda, in the Netherlands, "The married Souldiers fared better, look'd more vigorously, and were able to do more duty than tbe Baichellors; and all the spite was done the poor women was to be called their husbands' mules by those who would have been glad to have had such mules themselves," Turners use of ihe lerm "mules" points to the heavy labor these formidable women performed. An anonymous handwritten Gennan manuscript of 1612 detailed the load carried by women on the march: Seldom is one found who does not cany al least 50 or 60 pounds. [The] widier.. .loads straw and wood on her, to say nothing ofthe (act that many of (hem carry one, Iwo or three children on their bach. Normally, however, aside from the clothing ihcy are wearing, they carry for (he man one pair ofhreeches. one pair of stockings, one pair of shoes. And for theniselves the same numher of shoes and stockings, one jacket, two Hemmeter (shifts], one pan, one pot, one or two spoons, one sheet, one overcoat, one tent and three poles. They receive no wood for cixtking in (heir hillets, and so they pick it up on the way. And to add to their fati^e, they normally lead a .small dog on a rope or even cany him in bad weather.

The presence of so many women in the train t)f the army constiiuied a sizable labor pool ihaifieldcommanders were quick lo exploit. They even participated, according lo Wallhausen, in the hard physical labor of siege work: "The whores and the hoys |of the campl also helped in binding fascines, filling ditches, digging pits and mounting cannon in difficult places."

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he most important contribution made by camp women lay beyond iheir traditional women's work, petty commercial ventures and taxing manual labor. First and foremost, they took part in pillaging, without which early modem forces could not have maintained themselves on campaign. Grimmelshausen's antiheroine Courage boasted, "No one could match me at loraging." Peter Hagendorf, author of the only extant diary

by a common soldier in the Thirty Years' War, reported how wives, his own included, pillaged the fallen ciiy of Magdeburg in 1631 even after the fires thai would destroy the cily had broken out: A cty (hen came from throughout the citv as house^i all fell on each other Many soldiers and their wives who were searching to steal something died. God indeed protected (my wife}. After an hour and a half she came out of the city accompanied ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ by an old holy woman, who helped her carry bedding. She also brought me a large tankard with four liters wine. In addition, she found two .silver |iei(,s and clothes, which I was able to cash in for 12 thaler in Halerstadt.

But women did more than steal; there is good reason to believe they guarded the booty and held the money gained by selling it. In woodcuts showing Landsknechts and their women, the men carry the weapons, ready for battle, while women are often shown with fat purses. Free from the immediate risks of fighting in the front rank, they held the money for iheir fighting men. The preceding description of May marriages confirms that women carried their men's clothing and other personal items, including

'In woodcuts showing Landsknechts and their women, the men carry the weapons, ready for battle, while women are often shown with fat purses'

their "valuables." A poem accompanying a 16th century woodcut claims that among a whores duties was guarding the plunder: Do well with me, my pretty lass And $tay with me in the Landsknechts You'll wash my shirts Carry my sacks and flasks And if some hooty should he mine You shall keep it safe and fine So when we put paid of this crew We'll sell the booty when we are through.

Among artisan couples in the civilian community, women were similarly entrusted with holding goods and managing funds. Masters' wives regularly made sales and tended ihe till. If the business maintained a market stall, this was the wife's preserve, for the husband was needed back at the shop. Pillage was a form of this early modem family economy. Pillage was also the business of the army. Because the campaign community was based on mercenary principles, versus (hose ol state service or patriotism, iis members were easily seduced by greed. In his 1516 colloquy "Of a Soldier's Life," the great Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus confronted a soldier with the charge. "It was noi the Love of your Country, but

the Love of Booty that made you a Soldier," to which the soldier replied, "I confess so, and I believe very few go into the Army with any better Design." He also admits, "The Hope of Booty made me valiant." In fact, only a few common soldiers and their women profiled, but it was just enough to tempt others in a kind of lottery psychology. When Erasmus inquires of his soldier, "Well, have you brought home a good Deal of Plunder then?" the soldier replies with a shrug, "Empty Pockets."

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he unintended consequence of such unrealistic hopes of riches was the survival of military forces on campaign. Before European states developed the capacity to maintain their armies in the field, it was pillage that sustained them. The fact that women were key agents in securing and managing pillage explains the need for great numbers of them in the campaign community, as well as the radical reduction in their numbers after 1650. Ultimately, pillaging and the abuses inescapably associated with it imposed limits on the reliability, efficiency and size of armies. To overcome these limits, European states developed the political power and administrative means to command revenues and tap credit sufficient to maintain their armies. Rulers curbed pillage by holding officers responsible for their soldiers' conduct

MILITARY HISTC

and by imposing and enforcing Women take an active role stricter codes of discipline, but in an early 17th century pub such efforts would have been fruit- brawl, captured by Flemish less were it not for major improve- painter David Vinckboons. ments in military administration Those on campaign became and logistics, which in turn re- especially adept at pillaging quired advances in the state's abil- towns and grabbing spoils. ity to mobilize and disperse resources. These critical military and political changes affected different countries at different times, but in general the transformation occurred during the latter half of the 17th century With distinct national twists, they were the work of Louis XIV in France, Frederick William the Great Elector (1640-1688) in Brandenburg-Prussia and Peter the Great (1682-1725) in Russia. These monarchs' accomplishments demonstrate that war was the engine that drove state formation in Europe. Tbus the history of camp women and their involvement in pillage merges with far greater issues—the rise of the modem army and the emergence of the modem state. | 0 | For further reading, fohn Lynn recommends: Battle Cries and Lulla-

bies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present, hy Unda Grant De Pauw.

Reviews RECOMMENDED

Defeat from the Jaws of Victory ALMOST A MIRACLE

Aimost a Mirade: The American Victory in the War oj Independence, by John Ferling, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, $29.95.

To senior historian John Ferling, the American Revolution was a race to see which side would lose first. Throughout the aptly titled Almost a Miracle, he remains sharply critical of actors on both sides of the conflict. A case in point is the 1777 Pennsylvania campaign. Ferling describes British General Howe's sluggishness after landing in Pennsylvania, negating any advantage he might have achieved through surprise. Meanwhile he charges George Washington with throwing away victory at Germantown by committing loo many resources to an assault on the Ghew House. Although Ferling served as professor of history at the University of West Georgia for more than 30 years, his work here involves popular, not academic, history. To anyone who follows the scholarly debates over the American Revolution, the word "Republicanism" may

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seem oddly absent. Ferling presents a narrative of the military side of Lhe conflict in this companion volume to his Leap in the Dark, which addressed the political aspects of the struggle. Throughout Almost a Mir'otlc, Ferling eschews analysis. The figures of the American Revolution emerge through descriptions and asides. For instance, when describing the escape of Washington's army from Brooklyn in 1776, Ferling wryly comments that "in the singular lemon-yellow light made by the sun and fog, the Continentals completed the

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operation, an extraordinary undertaking that succeeded through a mixture of rare decisiveness, careful and shrewd planning, and good fortune." This engaging account will prove an antidote to any reader inclined toward an overly triumphal or determinist view of the American Revolution. At times, the absence of analysis is felt. For instance, after a fine job of describing the pivotal Battle of Saratoga and British surrender, Ferling ends the chapter with a scene of officers from both armies settling down to a meal to-

gether. This marvelous scene would have benefited from reflection on its significance, an opportunity Ferling passes up. In a discussion of the career of General Howe, Ferling ascribes his cautious generalship, especially his tendency to shrink from attacking entrenched American positions, to the hold of the disastrous Batile of Bunker Hill on Howe's imagination. That explanation is adequate but begs the question. Why didn't Howe devise more creative soiutions to operational problems? Eighteenth century British military history held several excellent examples of how to force an opponent out of a fortified position, including General Wolfe's landing at Anse-AuxFoulons near Quebec in 1759. The latter was certainly familiar to Howe: He commanded the first troops to land in the assault. Rather than exploring Howe's caution at all, the author might have considered why a fear of taking casualties produced inaction from Howe, The final chapter of the book is quite interesting but regrettably short, especiaiiy when one considers the length of this book. Ferling offers an explanation of America's victory, which is well encapsulated by the statement, "nothing was foreordained about the outcome of ihis war." He does conclude that America was lucky to have George Washington as commander-in-chief. —Mitchell McNaylor

FIVE GERMANYS 1 HAVE KNOWN

rwnv Ml H\ Five Germanys I Have Known, by Fritz Stern

The world witnessed several difTerent Germanys over lhe course ol' ihc 20ih century, and Friiz Stem experii-nced ihcm all. Fivf Gcvmams 1 Have Kjimvn IS a unicnic liKik ai the nation that played such a pi\'otal role in world affairs. Stern tells his story through firsihand accounts and his dealings with leading inlelleauakand poiiiidans.

Imagining Future War. byAntulioJ. Echevarriall

I lindsighl is 10/10, e:.pecialiy when dealing; with history. In /mci^iiini; Fulure War. Antulio J. Echevarria II examines predictions about the future of warfare made by military minds anti oihcrs ai the m m of ihi20thcentuiy How'd [hc\ do? Echevarria believe^ these thinkers got it righi in ihe short lerm bin erred over the long nin.

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To the Last Salute: Memories of an Aualrian U-Boat Commander, by Georg vnn Trapp, LIniversily of Nebraska Press, Lincoln. 2007, $21.95. This memoir was originally published in 1935, bui unless you could master Bis zum ietzten Flaggenschuss, you had to wait 72 years for iMst Salute. Which is incredible, given that its author is Georg von Trapp, patriarch of the immortal family singers portrayed in The Sound of Music. This Austrian U-boat commander, as he modestly describes himsell, was AustroH angary's lop submarine ace in World War I. Within this slim but well-iliuslraled book, you'll find neither the stern martinet ofthe musical—von Trapp was popular among his crews, who hailed from all parts of the Auslro-Hungarian Empire— nor an account of his 10 adoring children by two marriages. Regrettably, you will not find a comprehensive tally of his war record, either, 1 hough the captain logged 19 patrols and was credited with sinking 12 cargo ships totaling 45,669 ions, as well as the 12,500-ton French armored cruiser Leon Gambetta in the first night submarine attack and the 225-ton Italian submarine Nereide in a torpedo duel. What you will fmd is a significant account of tbe little-known Adriatic naval war by a good-humored, thoughtful and finally melancholy leader. Von Trapps two early U-boats were gasoline-engined, and he explains that if the enemy didn't get you, in time the fumes would. He sounds the theme of U-boat crews as one organism, of loss of compassion for one's enemy, and of suffering on the home front. Throughout underlies the sorrow of a great naval officer whose countr)- lost not only a war but its seacoast and, therefore, its navy.

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Call of Duty: Roads to Victory,

by Activision, 2007, $39.99. Due lo ils gritty, fast-paced, realisUc portrayal of World War II conibai, Cali of Duly has long been regarded among the best First-person shooter series. Most of this is attributable to the horsepower of such consoles as the PlayStation 3 or Xbox 360. on which you can hear bullets whiz by and explosions rend the surrounding landscape with such realistic sound you could swear you were actually there. Roads to VUiory brings the senes to the handheld market, available exclusively for the PlayStation Portable {PSP), But does the realism carry over to tlie less powerful device? The answer is an emphatic yes. The game offers three campaigns — fn.im the persjiective of an American soldier, a Canadian soldier and a British stildier—each demonstrating how individual and collective efforts cotnbine to achieve victor)'. The accuracy of weapons and vehicles is as high as players have come to expect of this series. In addition to the bitsic play mode of engaging enemies, you'll spot enemy tank locations for Allied artillery; among other objectives. The only drawback has nothing to do with the game itself, but more to do v^ith the PSP, The tack of a second analog stick makes aiming and strafing somewhat difficult, though the game compensates hy including an "aim assist" feature to help wayward shots iind iheir mark, —Ryan Burke

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Von Trapp touchingly reveals thai he was loyal "to the last salute of our flag." When it appeared in 1938 that the Nazis would insist he sail under their flag, he led his family in a successful escape from his beloved Austria, —Roderick S. Speer Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacifie, 1879-1884, hy William F. Sater, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2007, $60.

CIVILIZATION The Definitive History of Warfare narrated by WALTER CRONKITE

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Once, while working on a freighter docked at Matarani, Peru, I mentioned to a native that our next stop was to be Arica, Chile, "Oh, no," he corrected me, "That is Arica, Peru. We are going to take it back someday." To a South American, the War of the Pacific was not between ihe Allies and the Japanese, but between Chile and two of its neighbors, Bolivia and Peru. This vicious five-year conflict, equally epic to its North American counterpart, is the subject of William H Sater's fascinating new book, Andean Tragedy.

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The Atacama Desert, in what is now northem Chile, is among the most inhospitable regions on earth. It had originally bflons^ed lo Boli\'ia largely by default, because neither Chile nor Peru had any use for it. For that matter, Bolivia, whose population resides largely in the high Andes, had little use ANDEAN for its bleak coastal TRAGEDY desert either. Just about the only thing able to survive in the desolate Atacama were vast hordes of seagulls. For tens of millions of years the gulls had nested along the coast, thriving on the rich fishing ground. Since it almost never rains, the byproduct of those gulls was never washed away but simply continued to pile up for millennia. Then, in the middle of the 19th century, somebody realized that the noisome material, known as guano, could be used for

eviewa fertilizer and as an ingredient ofexplosives. It proved to be as momentous a discovery as that of gold in Califomia. Suddenly lhe Atacama Desert was a highly desirable piece of real estate—a region over which nations were willing to. and did, go to war. The ensuing conflict was as complex as any since that lime. The problem of waging a modern war tn a hostile environment far from home taxed the logistical capabilities of all three nations. In addition, the War of the Pacific involved an extensive naval campaign to determine which side would be able to carry out amphibious operations against the other. After a number of dramatic fleet and single-ship actions, the Chilean navy prevailed, resulting in the invasion of Peru and the occupation of a number oi important cities, including the Peruvian capital. Lima. Chile ended up acquiring a

substantial portion of southem Petnj, alotig with Bolivia's entire coastal region. A great deal of acrimony remains between the antagonists. Lindlocked Bolivia still maintains a vestigial navy, the existence of which it celebrates each year, reminding its people of the territory it hopes someday to regain. Chile and Pent both erected many statues of, and named streets for, their respective war heroes. Each still distrusts the other, and they maintain sizable fleets against the day they ever have occasion to renew hostilities. Relying extensively on archival sources from the nations involved, Sater has produced what may well be the definitive work in English on a much overlooked event, Andean Tragedy recounts the ground and naval campaigns in great detail and also explains the complex intemational relationships that led to the war, as well as

Many have left their mark on history. Fortunately, there's still time for you.

the reasons Chile was able to emerge victorious against the combined forces of two of its neighbors. —Robert Guttman Garibaldi: Invention oj a Hero., by Lucy Riall, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 2007, $35. During the 1960s, it became the fashion among college students to display the image of the Argentine-bom communist revolutionary Emesto "Che" Guevara, Although his actual achievements amounted to little outside of Cuba, Che's flamboyant and romantic persona appealed to the equally flamboyant and romantic sensibilities of the young. In some respects, however, Che was merely aping the style of a far more successful man from the prior century: Guiseppe Garibaldi,

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Reviews MODERN WAR STUDIES

Death of the Wehrmacht The German Campaigns of 1942 Robert M. Citino "A winner across the board by one of the masters of operational history. Tbe capstone to a four-volume study on modern mobile warfare, it solidifies Citino's posiiion among the very best scholars who have written on the 'German way of war.' In particular, his treatment of the 1942 Russian campaigns is fully level with the best of David Glantz's work from the Soviet perspective and restores both Stalingrad and El Alamein to their rightful status as major turning points in the war."—Dennis Showaltcr, author of Patlon and Rommel

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Wings, Women, and War Soviet Airwomen in Worid War II Combat Reina Pennington 'A vivid and often moving saga of women in combat. Both harrowing and inspiring, it should become a classic of World War II aviation histor)'."—World War 11 History 320 pages. 45 photos. 6 maps. Paper $24,95 Available et bookstores or from the press.

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The War: A Ken Bums Film The documcniary THE WAR explores ihc liislory and War II Irom an American perspective hy fallowing tht loriunes of soV allL-d ordinary men and women. This epic lilm focuses on the stories "f litizcns from four American lowns laking the viewer tiirough their I" t3on;il and harrowing journeys, painting vivid portraits oi how the \\ .ir dramatically altered thcjr lives. 6 DVD set. Viewing lime: 15 hours. Available in Ottobcr afler fhc complete airing on PBS. 1TI;M:WTWD $]09.»*9

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Garibaldi appealed lo the progressives of his generation in much the same way thai Che's did lo his. It is no coincidence, for example, that a statue of Garibaldi stands in Washington Square Park, tbe very beart of Manhattan's Greenwicb Village. Nciiber is it a coincidence, autbor Lucy Riall explains, that Garibaldis image could bave been invoked almost simultaneously by botb Benito Massolinis Italian Fascists and by ibose Italians wbo volunteered to Tight against fascism tn the Spanish Civil War. Tbe bicentennial of Garibaldis birlb, in 1807, adds a particular timeliness lo tbis new biograpby of tbe hero of Italys national unification. The author goes beyond merely recounting her subjects acbievemcnts, however, to tbougbifully explain how tbis dynamiL revolutionary became an enduring symbol oi boib Italian nationalism and international democracy. Garibaldi did not instigate tbe movement toward Italian unification knov^'n as tbe Risorgimento, nor was be its most important political leader. He was, however, its most visually conspicuous and militarily successful leader. Although political movements are bom in the minds of tbe intellectual elite, tbey generally come to notbing wiibout tbe influence of a cbarismatic individual able lo inspire people into action—witness sucb diverse leaders as George Wasbington, Napokon Bonaparte, Lajos Kossutb, Abrabam Lincoln, Robert E. Lee, Pancho Villa, Vladimir Lenin, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Mao TseTung, Fidel Castro and Osama Bin Liden. Born in Nice in southern France, Garibaldi was a sea captain at tbe age of 23 and became an exile after participating in an unsuccessful Italian rebellion. Afler spending tbe next dozen years as a South American bandit/revolutionary. Garibaldi returned to Italy in 1848 to participate in a series of uprisings against Austrian and

papal rule. His experience as a military leader in South America, as well as bis undoubted personal charisma, quickly propelled him to tbe forefront of tbe Italian unification movement. Tbe exotic appearance of Garibaldi and his volunteers, as well as their esprit de corps and lack of military formality, engaged the attention botb of Italian political leaders and the intemational press. Tbe autbor shows how Garibaldi^ heroic image was as much a product of the leaders of bis political movement and tbe conlemporar)- press as it was self-gene rated. Riall establisbes tbat. the Risorgimento would not bave succeeded without Garibaldi or someone with similar cbarismatic appeal. She also demonstrates bow succeeding generations of Italians bave manipulated Garibaldi's image to canonize bim as a sort of secular saini, as well as to symbolize sucb movements as fascism and communism that tbe leader bimself migbt very well bave opposed in bis lifetime. Garibaldi is a fascinating study, not so mucb of tbe life of tbe man bimself tban of his image and tbe uses to wbicb that image bas been pui by his own as well as succeeding generations. —Robert Guttman

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With nearly 400 historic photographs, many never before published, this photographic history of the 82nd Airborne Division captures Tiglilinji across Sicily, Italy, France, Belgium, .ind Germany, This book is an essential addition to any serious World War Ii collection and a trihute to the fighting spirit of this legendary division. 192 pages, hardcover, h'oniiat: 10" xIO".

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101^^ AIRBORNE: THE SCREAMING EAGLES AT NORMANDY

EXHIBIT "Symbols of Power: Napoleon and the Art of the Empire Style, 1800-1815" October 21, 2007-January 27. 2008 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston In 1804 members of Napoleon's state council convened to prepare for bis coronation and to select a symbol tbat would represent tbe new Frencb regime. Tbe cock, tbe elephant and tbe lion were considered but discarded in favor of two classic emblems: the eagle, symbol of botb Jupiter and Charlemagne, and tbe bee, used by Merovingian King Childeric I. Napoleon also appropriated GrecoRoman and Egyptian motifs to signify bis military and political power. Tbese

This volume stands as a lasting tribute to thcs. American folk heroes. Author Mark Banilshares decades of research, the result of nwu than 900 interviews with lOIst members ani numerous trips to Normandy. He recreates iln paratroopers' perspective of events that too! place on D-Day. 156 pages, hankover. Fonnai 10" x 10".

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Reviews JOHN WAYNE AS A U.$. CAVAUIY OFFICER A 12-inch Action Figure Sideshow Collectibles is proud to loin the John Wayne Estate to expand the

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symbols would adorn not only weapons and robes of stale, but also many personal items. The impressive new exhibit at Boston's Museum of Fine Arts showcases nearly 200 pieces from the Napoleonic era, including furniture, artwork, clothing, jewelry, tapestries and household objects. The grandeur of the regime is embodied in items like Napoleon's ceremonial cuirass (below), a gift from the armorers of Paris in 1805, bearing a depiction of the Roman god Mars preparing for battle. The emperor's sword is decorated from pommel to tip with eagles, bees, stars, inscriptions.

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thunderbolts, laurel crowns and other imperial insignia. Similar iconography also appears on a chain for the Legion of Honor medal and on a presentation set of firearms Napoleon reputedly gave to the Spanish Duke of Gravina, The opulence of these ceremonial pieces stands in sharp contrast to the strictly functional furniture used by Napoleon on his military campaigns. Included in the exhibit are a steel bed frame, a wooden chair, and a three-legged table, all of which could be easily folded and stowed for transport. Designed to be durable and portable, these simple but elegant pieces provide a striking counterpoint to Napoleons elaborate imperial throne. —Susan E. Martin

MILITARY HISTORY'

Hallowed Grouna Masada, Israel By Gary L. Rashha

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asada, the mountaintop fortress where nearly a thousand Jewish rebels held out against Roman Proconsul Lucius Flavius Silva's Legion X Fretensis hetween AD 72 and 73, is far more than an archaeological site. It is a symbol of steadfastness—both rebel and Roman. Atop this desert outpost, Jewish rebels fought for their beliefs, then killed themselves, not out of desperation, but in a conscious decision to die with dignity At the eastern edge of the Judaean Desert, Masada is a diamondshaped plateau rising some 1,300 feet above the Dead Sea. In the 30s BC, Herod the Great, the Roman-appointed king of Judaea province, fortified this natural bastion as a refuge in the event of a revolt. That isn't to say it was an austere military post. Herod added conveniences becoming a king, including palaces, a sophisticated Roman bathhouse and other comforts. When relations between the Jews of Judaea and their Roman masters deteriorated into revolt in AD 66, the Sicarii, an extremist branch of a religious sect known as the ,

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Herod the Great fortified the remote desert redoubt in the 30s BC. Above,

a 1754 engraving depicts it at the time of the AD 72-73 Roman siege.

Masada and used it as a base of operations. (The Sicarii were named for the sica daggers they carried and freely used against their enemies.) Rome largely subdued the rebellion by AD 70, takingjerusalem and sacking its temple, but pockets of resistance remained. The Sicarii, in their desert mountain fortress, represented the last vestige of the revolt. Reaching the site today requires a long drive down through the desert to the Dead Sea, the lowest point on Earth. Leaving the comfort of an air-conditioned car, the first thing one notices is the intense heat. While 15,000 Roman soldiers sweltered on the desert floor, the rebels on Masada lived comfortably with ample food and water, the latter collected by catchments and cisterns. In an early form of psyops, tbe rebels flaunted their advantage, throwing garbage-tainted water at the thirsty Romans below. It was soon apparent that starving out the defenders was noi an option.

In the confusion of those final moments, a handful of Jewish women and children took shelter in one of the cistems. These seven survivors provided an account of the dramatic end recorded by historian Flavius Josephus, a turncoat Jewish commander who chronicled what became known as the First Jewish War. Recognized as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2001, Masada has been left largely untouched for nearly two millennia, due no doubt to its remote location and desert climate. The fortress is accessible today by cable car or by foot via the Roman ramp or a steep, winding trail known as the snake path. Ear below stand the remains of a three-mile-long siege wall built around the mountain's base to prevent escape. These comprise the most extensive survi\'ing Roman siege works in the world. While the palaces, baths decorated vidth colorful mosaics and frescoes, storerooms, \illas and fortifications might suggest luxury.

Determined to break the Sicarii, Silva ordered construction of an assauk ramp on Masada's westem slope. Engineers built a wooden frame, then forced thousands of Jewish prisoners to fill it. with tons of stones and earih umil the ramp reached 330 feet, high enough for the Romans to deploy their siege engines. It was an epic feat of engineering that survives to this day The message was clear: Rome would spare no effort to destroy enemies of the Pax Romana. Visitors can imagine how the Sicadi must have felt as the Romans steadily closed on the summit, especially when they brought forward the battering ram (a film production replica now stands below). Realizing his men were no match for Roman regulars, Sicarii commander Eleazar Ben-Yair entreated his cohorts in an emotional speech: "Let us die unenslaved by our enemies Masada, now protected as a UNESCO World Heritage Srte, retains much of the structure and leave this world as free men in present two millennia ago, when Sicarii rebels took their own lives rather than suhmit. company with our wives and children." The rebels opted to kill themselves. To deny the Romans the life for the Sicarii was difficult, considering the works were built pleasure of looting, the Sicarii torched all but the food warefor a king and his entourage and not intended to hotise the hunhouses; the quantities of food would give testimony that their dreds of Jewish rebels who sought refuge from Roman wrath. end had nothing to do with shortages. A visitor center at the loot of the mountain tries to put the past in In order not to contravene the Jewish prohibition against suicide, the defenders killed their wives and children, then drew lots and slew one another in tum, lea\'ing but one man to fall on bis own sword. They died free people, undefeated, and soured the Roman victory. Catching a quiet moment before the crowds arrive, one can imagine the eerie stillness that greeted the Roman assault troops when they finally reached the desolate outpost, the smoke from its smoldering ruins thick in the air.

perspective, but there^ a deeper, more elusive emotional current. Masada has become part of Israel's national ethos, a symbol of heroism, a place where few stood against many and opted for an honorable death rather than slavery. Modem Israel lives by the credo never again to find itself in such a situation: Units of the Israel Defense Forces conduct swearing-in ceremonies atop Masada at the conclusion of basic training, echoing the cry, "Masada shall not fall again!" |ffi(

Weapons we re glad they never built Nesting Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles By Bruce McCall

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his five-in-one system would have slashed missile launch costs by 400 percent, its proponent claimed—but since the proponent was General Secretary Brezhnev's ne'er-do-well nephew, Arkady, the

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Soviet Academy of Rocket Science declined to develop the concept. Arkady went on to invent the matryoshka, or souvenir Russian nesting doll, and now lives in baronial luxury on the French Riviera. 10