Military History 2010-05

Letters Revisiting the Pueblo Incident [MTOTÄRY HISTORY

Why Did North Korea Seize the Puebio?

ever be captured. As the SERE school instruction reflected official Navy thinking as regards the Pueblo incident, and barely five years after the incident itself, 1 find the author's assertion puzzling. Michael NoUet MELCHER-DALLAS, IOWA

Mitch Lemer's article on the capture of USS Pueblo was excellent. However, it failed to tell us the last part of the story What is the status of our ship on the rolls of the U.S. Na\'y? Is il still there, awaiting retum or recapture? Or has it been written off as a lost ship? 5ieve Carmick CHEHAUS, WASH.

Editor replies: Pueblo remains on the US. Naval Register, listed as "Active, in commission." Pyongyang has made ovettures to retun\ the ship, but only if the United States were to normalize diplomatic relations.

Father Duffy o •—t

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Enjoyed reading "Broadway's Fighting Priest" [Valor, March], by David T. Zabecki.

•1ILITARY HISTORY

In your piece "Acts of War" [by Mitch Lerner, March], the author writes, "Many in the armed forces continued lo treat the men [of USS Pueblo] with contempt for surrendering and cooperating v^th their captors." This assertion contradicts my own experience. In 1973, as newly minted naval flight officers, I and my classmates were sent to SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape) school. During the resistance phase, we were held in a "POW camp" to receive training in how to resist during captivity. Our instructors had nothing but praise for the Pueblo crewmen and held them up to us as role models to aspire to should any of us Duffy was no stranger to death and dying. On March 7, 1918, 21 men of 1st Platoon, Company E, 165th Infantry Regiment, were the first soldiers of the old 69th to fall in battle in the wood they called the Rouge Bouquet, a slice of land with twisted trenches, the bottoms duckboarded over so soldiers would not sink up to their knees in mud. Dufty; chaplain of the 165th, chose St. Patricks Day as a time to commemorate the fallen, and those in the trenches who could get away slipped up to hear tbe service. "What your forefathers have done in the past," Duffy said, "1 feel confident you will do in the future. The Irish love right and liberty, and they have fought and always will fight and fight valiantly when either right or liberty is at stake." Pointing toward the sound of German guns, he explained. "You will uphold on that front the name and reputation of the 69th, of which I am proud to he chaplain.'' In the afternoon, the regiment held a concert under the

trees, and Duffy recited Joyce Kilmer's newly penned "Rouge Bouquet." As the chaplain read the final words of the poem, the bugler standing next to him played "Taps," while a distance away another answered. Major G. William Glidden (U.S. Army National Guard, Ret.) Vice President and Historian New York State Miíiíaí3' Heritage InstituLe SPRINGS, N.Y.

Stolen Valor Want to compliment you and William H. McMichael regarding "Thieves Among Us" [March [, the great article concerning Stolen Valor and all the fake "heroes" with bogus service among us. Good reporting on this concern. This article should bring more attention to this serious problem. There are more resources out there to help stop the phonies. One is Report Stolen Valor at w%vw.report stolenvalor.org, and another great one is at www.pow network.org, which tracks

phony POWs along with bogus veterans. Lt. Col. Tom iMsser (VS. Army, Ret.) REDONIX) BEACH, CAUF.

As a Marine Vietnam vet whose highest personal decoration is a richly undeserved Good Conduct Medal, thank you for your article, "Thieves Among Honor." When I was in the Massachusetts Senate, State Rep. Royall Switzler (R-Wellesley) claimed heroic service as a Green Beret in Vietnam. He was exposed as a fraud when he ran for governor in 1986, ending his career in politics. Unfortunately, some exposed frauds, like Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) whose fictional tales of heroism were exposed by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), still continue to serve. Both are in B.G. Burkett's great book. Stolen Valor. Robert A. Hall DES PLAINES, 111.

Hidden Cities Enjoyed the pictorial section on the Manhattan Project cities ["Secret Weapon, Hidden Cities," January]. I have always wondered about these sites but have never been able to find anything in deptb about them. I would be interested to know what was done at each facility, how people were chosen to work there., what the security measures entailed, what

life was like inside the wire, etc. Tom Owens BOWJE, MD. Editor responds: For more background and ¡mages of the Manhattan Project cities, check out the book Historic Photos of the Manhattan Project (Tumer Publishing, 2009, $39.95).

Blunders I read with much interest the article "Germany's Palal Blunders" [by Williamson Murray, January]. Normally, 1 would not find myself on the

side of critics of your authors. However, the essential premise of Murray's article—that the German General Staff of hoth world wars lacked strategic vision, and this resulted in their ultimate defeat—seems to tum military historical thinking completely on its head. Military leaders are supposed to he tactical, not strategic, thinkers. That is what they are trained and hired for. I believe this view is widely shared by the political masters of the military and can be summarized by a quote from Georges Clemenceau on the subject: "War is too important to be left to the generals."

The scenario for failure itivolves the straying into the tactical arena of the political leadership, which should have confined itself to the strategic objectives of waging war. Had the political leadership of Germany stayed out of the tactical arena, there would have been no Stalingrad, there would have been no two-front war (three, if you include the campaign in North Africa), and many of the battles of the war would have been conducted ver\' differently History is filled wiLh examples. Vickshurg and Gettysbui^ were successes because, unlike Chancellorsville and Freder-

EADERSWIP

icksbuig, they were not micromanaged by Lincoln, though the president had a better idea than any of his generals up to Grant that the object was to destroy the Confederate army, not take Richmond. The examples go on and on. Geoffrey K. Wäscher GERMANTOWN, WIS. Send letters to Editor, Military History Weider History Group 19300 Promenade Dr. Leesburg, VA 20176 or via e-mail to fflilitaryhistory@

wetderhistorygroupxom. Please include name, address and telephone number.

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News

By Brendan Manley

DISPATCHES Survivor of Both Atomic Blasts Dies Tsutomu Yamaguchi, 93, the only officially recognized survivor of both the Hiroshima and Naga.saki atomic bombings (see Aug/ Sept News), succumbed tos stomach cancer in January. ;

David Weber appeared at a Veterans of Foreign Wars event with a spurious rank and medals.

California l\1an Pleads Guilty to Violation of Stolen Valor Act Former Marine Corps Staff Sergeant David Vincent Weber is among the latest tale-tellers to viólale the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Witnesses contacted authorities after the 69-yearold Ramona. Calif., resident appeared in public with a chestful of medals, claiming to bc a retired two-star Marine general with a background in military intelligence. In December federal prosecutors charged him under the act, and a month later Weber pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of wearing medals he had not earned. At his sentencing in April, he faces up to a year in prison.

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Investigators say Weber obtained a false tnilitary identification card on the basis of a Marine Corps Association directory that erroneotisly listed him as a major general. Officials at Miramar Marine Corps Air Station confirmed that the base issued Weber an ID card and is investigating the breach. Marine Corps records show that Weber served from 1958 to 1967 and was discharged with eight medals to his credit, but those do not include two Purple Hearts and five Legions of Merit he wore to a local Veterans of Foreign Wars gathering last fall. A photograph taken of

Weber at the event later appeared in the Ramona Sentinel.

Veterans advocates estimate that hundreds of Americans have faLsely claimed military service and/or medals for bragging rights, event invitations, specialty license plates and, in the tnost egregious ca.ses, undue benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs. The 2005 act stiffens the penalties for such offenses, tai;geting those who wear medals they didn't earn or who make false claims verbally or in writing. The U.S. Justice Department has prosecuted 48 offenders under the statute since ils implementation.

*A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to put its pants on' —Winston Churchill

CM

MILITARY HISTORY

Yamaguchi, a former ship engineer For Mitsubishi Hea\7 Industries, was in Hiroshima on business on Aug. 6, 1945, when Little Boy detonated over the city, scorching Yamaguchi's torso and rupturing an eardrum. At home In Nagasaki three days later, he was recounting his injuries to a skeptical boss when tat Man exploded over that city.

Ironclad Portrays Siege of Rochester Producers oí the forihcoming lilm Iroiictaä, which centers on Kingjohn's 1215 sicpi' iiT Horlicster Castle

(see R 50). promise a gruesomely realistic depiction of medieval warfare. Paul Giamatti (John Adams, Cinderella Man) portrays King John, whose post-Magna Carta tantrum sparked the barons' revolt at Rochester. Ironclad, which began filming in Wales in 2009, is slatai for release later this year.

Zulu Warriors to Get Overdue Nod

Where Is Pemulwuy?

The South African province of KwaZulu-Natal is raising funds for a monument at Isandlwana to ihe 10,000 Zulu warriors who perished fighting in the Anglo-Zulu

Aborigine leaders capitalized on Prince Williams most recent visit to Australia to request the reinains of the famed indigenous rebel Pemulwuy, who was killed in 1802 by a British bush patrol. Colonial officials shipped Pemulwuy's preserved ;> head to London \ for study by the Royal College of Surgeons. Some claim the head ended up in the Natural History Museum, though the museum has no record of it. Others claim it was repatriated in the 1950s

War, even .o UKU

work to disco\"er and record Lhe names of the fallen. On Jan. 22, 187^, in the war's first major clash, a 20,000man Zulu impi overwhelmed 1,750 Briüsh troops at Isandiwana. Today, caims mark the site of British mass graves.

Family Buries Iwo Hero's Death Mask The family of Corporal Tra Hayes—one of six U.S. servicemen shown in Joe Rosenthal's iconic photograph of lhe February 1945 flag raising on Iwojima—liave finally laid their famous son's spirit to rest on his

Gila River Rf-servation, Ariz., home, smashing and burying a death mask secretly cast after Hayes' 1935 death. A Phoenix artist made the mask to create a memorial sculpture but died before she could begin work. The mask changed hands several times over the years before a family member spotted ii in a gallery and asked for its retum.

and later misplaced. Aborigine officials have asked Prince William to aid their search. Pemulwuy. bom near Botany Bay around 1750, led Aborigine resistance to the British colonization of Australia. Known as lhe "Rainbow Warrior" for his I Lolorful attire, he | raided settlers' I farms, killing live- è stock and burning i crops. Shot seven times during one clash with the British, Pemulwuy escaped from the hospital and eluded authorities for another five years.

'[Pemulwuy] has now lodged in him, in shot, sluggs [sic] and bullets, about 8 or 10 ounces of lead' —Australian colonist John Washington Pnce

Historian Claims to ID 'Man Who Never Was' Toronto University professor Denis Smyth claims to have firmly established the uoie identity- of "Major William Martin," the man whose body was central to Operation Mincemeat— the World War 11 British deception plan revealed in Lt. Cmdr. Ewen Montagu's 1953 book TÍ\e Mau Who Never Was. In advance of tbe 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily, intelligence officers acquired an anonymous corpse, dressed it in uniform, planted false papers on it and set it adrift off Spain. The false documents fell into Nazi hands, convincing them the assault vi'ould come in Greece and not Sicily In his forthcoming book, Sm)tli claims to have found a secret memo betvi'een Mincemeat director Montagu and the coroner who secured the corpse. Smyth says the memo conclusively proves the body was that of a homeless, mentally ill Welshman named Glyndwr Michael, who died from ingesting rat poison.

WAR RECORD Spring has long served as a backdrop for dramatic turning points in the history of warfare, offering fair weather for the climax of hostilities, acls of legendary valor or the arrival of terrifying new threats on the battlefíeld: • April 11,1856: Costa Rican drummer boy tumed martyr Juan Santamaría is shot while torching El Mesón de Guerra,

stronghold of American filibuster William Walker (see P 42), at the Second Battle of Rivas. Costa Ricans honor Santamaría with a holiday. • April 22,1915: German troops employ poison gas for the first time on the Western Front, against Allied forces at ^^res. The race to develop an effective battlefield gas mask (see P 58) intensifies in the years following the attack. • May 12,1780: Continental Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln surrenders to British Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton, ending the Siege of Charleston. The humiliating defeat represents the Patriots' largest single loss of manpower and equipment during the war (see P 34). • May 31.1902: Boer and British officials sign the Treaty of Vereeniging, ending the Second Boer War in South Africa. As the Boers shifted to guerrilla warfare, British forces developed effective new containment tactics (see P 26) that would be used in future confhcts.

News Researcher Heralds 109-Year-Old as Last Female World War I Veteran A British geroniologisi has ideniiHed a previously unknown living female veleran of World War 1—109-year-old Florence Green, who served with the Women's Royal Air Force (WRAF) in 1918, Green, who worked

is now the oldest-known female veteran and joins the exclusive company of Canadian soldier Jack Babcock, Royal Navy seaman Claude Choules and American doughboy Frank Buckles, all 109, as one of the war's four surviving veterans. Researcher Andrew Holmes, who tracks and validates the ages of all people over 110 and Brits older than 107 for the U.S.-based Gerontology Research Group, happened upon Green's service record in Britain's National Archives |\vwv^" .nationalarchives.gov .uk|. The records show she enlisted at age 17 under her maiden name, Florence Beatrice Patterson, in September 1918 —two months before the war's end. Now a mother of three, grandmother of four and great-grandmother of seven. Green was unaware ot her headline-grabbing status. Prior to Holmes' discover)', WRAF waitress Gladys Powers, who died in Canada in 2008 at age 109, was believed Royal in 1918. to be the last female veteran of World War I. as a waitress in the officers' mess at Nor- Ivy Lillian Campany, a 107-year-old veteran folk's RAF Marham and Narborough air- of Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps, died fields, didn't see fronlline action but still that same year, preceded by 109-year-old qualifies for benefits, according lo the char- U.S. Naval Reserve Force veteran Charlotte ity Veterans Aid [www.veierans-aid.net]. She Winters, who died in 2007.

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'How important it is for us to recognize and celebrate our heroes and she-roes'

—Maya Angelou

MILITARY HISTORY

State Budgets Short Civil War Flags Critical cuts in stale-level funding pose a critical threat to the nation's Civil War battle Hags, niany of which reside in state-owned collections. States that liave scaled

back or discontinued flag presen'aiLon efforis include Indiana, Oliio, Pennsylvania and New York. Advócales fear the cuts may portend rollbacks to next year's planned Civil War sesquicentennial celebrations.

Aussie Search Team Finds AHS Centaur A state-funded Australian search team using side-scan sonar and a remotely operated submersible has located ihe wreck ol the World War II hospital ship Centciur off the Queensland coast. In May 1943, ajapanese submarine torpedoed Centaur,

claiming the li\cs of 268 medical personnel and crew members. Within days ihe Allies lodged a protest with Japan, and Australian officials have since demanded an apology; but Japan maintains the details of the sinking are mconciusive.

Cold War'Magic Tricks' Exposed Espionage historian H. Keitli Mellon and former CIA officer Robert Wallace have published The Official CIA Míjnuaí oj Trickery and Deception, based on declassified Cold War manuals that instructed field agents on the

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C.I.A. MANUAL OF TRICKERY AND DECEPTtOh use of magic and illusion. The 1953 source manuals, written by magician John Mulholland. relaie a hosi of spy techniques, from pocketing small items and using shoelaces for signaling lo surreptitiously spiking a drink.

Great Wall Miners Dig Themselves Hole Mongolian gold prospectors have damaged a remote section of Chinas Great Wall— butit, ironically, to keep their ancestor hordes at ba>: Flouting warnings from Chinese cultural officials, Hohhot Kekao Mining dug two shafts in a 300-foot stretch of wall dating from the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BC). Researchers

Alexander Girded for Battle with...L/nen? Researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay [ www .uwgb.edul believe Alexander the Great and his men relied upon Kevlar-like armor crafted from laminated linen, not metal, as they marched east in the 4th century BC to conquer much of the known world. Hundreds of references in Classical art and literature reference the armor, known as linothorax, and modem field tests prove it was more than adequate lor stopping a range of projectiles. In their ongoing project, Greg Aldrete and Scott Bartell have subjected sets of reconstructed linothorax armor to a battery of abuse from swords, spears and arrows. Coated in glue, the hardened fabric disperses the force of the blows. It was highly disposable, too: When Alexander's men received 25,000 new suits while in India, they simply torched their old armor.

'To punish the Persians, I have come to Asia' —Alexander the Great

WWII Dispatch Names 'Capt. Corelli' Killers Prosecutors in Rome have found a wartime dispatch that identifies by name German participants in the September 1943 e.xecution of some 5,000 Italian officers and men on the Greek island of Cepha- >•Ionia—a massacre that .inspired tlie critically acclaimed novel and fihn

man men—each 19 years old at the time, now 86. Both have denied any involvement

Captain CoreUi's Mandodiscovered the damage during a survey of the 5,500mile wall along Chinas Mongolian border. Vandalism of the wall Ls punishable hy fines and imprisonment.

lin. In the account, a military chaplain recalled overhearing two Wehnnacht soldiers bragging about the mass killing. Prosecutors were able to locate and question the Ger-

in the massacre. Only one defendant has ever been successfully prosecuted: General Hubert Lanz. sentenced at the 1948 Nuremberg Trials to 12 years in prison.

WOMEN OF WAR British World War I veteran Florence Green (opposite), 109, may be the oldest-Uving woman to make history in a uniform, but she's surely not the first. While none claim Green's longevity, other storied female warriors include: • LakshmJbai, Rani of Jhansi:

The Joan of Arc of the Indian struggle for independence, the Rani personally led her troops into battle during the Rebellion of 1857. She is believed to have perished during the June 1858 clash for Gwalior. • Catalina de Erauso; In 1596 de Erauso (aka the "Nun Lieutenant") left convent life in Spain to become a soldier of fortune in Peru. Disguised as a man, she fought several duels, unwittingly killing her brother. Captain Miguel de Erauso, in one of them. • Boudicca: The queen of the Brittonic Iceni tribe led an uprising against Roman rule in AD 60 or 61, sacking Londinium (London) before the Romans rallied at the Battle of Watling Street. At its close, Boudicca poisoned herself to avoid capture. • Maid Ulliard: This swordwielding Scottish heroine, seeking to avenge the death of her lover, was killed at the 1545 Battle of Ancrum Moor—but, legend has it, not before cutting down English commander Sir Ralph Evers.

Interview Sir Max Hastings: War as Journalism and History

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mong the best-known and most pioUfic modern writers on miUtaiy conßid as both news and history, Britain's Sir Max Hastings has experienced war jirsthand. As a television reporter and print journalist, he covered JI conßicls, ranging from Northern Ireland and Vietnam to Biafra and the Falklands. He has held senior editorial positions al London's Evening Standard and The Daily Telegraph iind is the author of nearly two dozen boohs ojmilitary histoty. Highly regarded for both his prose style and the depth of his research, Hastings has also drawn criticism for his determination to look beyond easy patriotic or political clichés to find the hard truths that underlie mankind's age-old fascination with war.

ship in America. I had a series of great assignments—Northern Ireland, the end of the Biafran War, the Middle East war. Vietnam, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and many more. I found that, as with most ambitious young journalists, war reporting was hugely stimulating and rewarding, and 1 wasn't too bad at it.

what prompted you to choose journalism over soldiering? On an attachment to a Parachute Regiment battalion in Cyprus when 1 was 17., I realized how unsuited I was lo militar)' life—I was chronically ill-disciplined, physically clumsy (in 1963 I was described as the worst pupil ever to gel through the British army's jump school) and pretty selfish. I retained my admiration for and fascination with warriors but realized 1 would have to write about them rather than become one.

Whai are a war correspondent's most critical skills? A lot of luck and some literary skill, skepticism but not cynicism., and a real sympathy for soldit-rs. One needs ruthless determination and persistence, and a willingness to break rules, to get to ihe front and see what is happening.

Which medium is now best suited to war reporting? Print is much easier than television, because you don't have to lug a camera —yoti can see without being seen. I could never have done for TV what I did as a print reporter in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, sneaking up to the Golan Heights and the Suez front with a colleague because we could get no official authorization to go to the front. But that was only possible because we had no cameras.

What about fear? It is much less scar)' heing accredited to an army than roaming tlie countryside covering a gtierrilla conflict, which gets a lot of journalists killed. I have always been most frightened when I've been at the mercy of a child soldier with a Kalashnikov.

How did you get started writing books about warfare? When I was 27,1 wrote a biography of Montrose, King Charles I's great general in England's Civil War. Jim Wade of the Dial Press in New York commissioned me to wTite a book on the RAF's World War II bomber offensive. Many

Did those experiences help you write military history? lt has been a huge help that 1 saw quite a lot of the "sharp end" when 1 was young- Only by experience can one leam to write convincingly about the normal plight of the soldier in combat, which means being exhausted, wet, filthy and hungry before the enemy even gets into the story.

ál've always been most frightened when I've been at the mercy of a child soldier with a Kalashnikovf

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What was your experience covering the Falklands War? It was physically ver)' hareh. Yet it was by far the most rewarding for me personally, because there were fewer ihan a dozen print journalists on the island and no live TV feed, so my copy got huge play in every British newspaper. It was the greatest adventure of my life, chiefly because we won and I came back in one piece.

How did you transition into being a war correspondent? After returning from a 1967-68 fellow-

MILITARY HISTORY

How do war reporters differ from other journalists? In some ways war reporting is easier than routine journalism, because one is simply called upon to describe dramatic events. The hard part is that many of today's battlefield ¡ournalisLs are good writers and very brave but know pathetically httle about armies, war and tactics. How important is that knowledge? Unless you know how to interpret what you are seeing, a battle just looks like a lot of men in camouflaged suits running about and shooting.

of the senior wartime commanders— including Sir Arthur Harris—were still alive then for me to interview. When the book was published in 1979 it upset a lot of senior RAF people, but it sold well and won the Somerset Maugham prize, which did a lot to put me on the map. 1 wrote Das Reich, about the German army versus the French Resisunce. in 1981, and in 19841 published Overlord, about the Normandy invasion. Writing books is like any oiher business—if you can find and hold a market, you keep at it. Why should we read military history? Because the cliché is correct: Wars reveal human beings at iheir best and worst. Whal marks a good military history? The key ingredients are those of any other kind of history: The book should keep you turning the pages, should try to tell you things about the past that are true, and should say at Ieasi some things a reader didn't already know. Many of the stories about people that I liave recounted in my own books are so remarkable that it has been a privilege to play some part in preserving and publishing them. I love having the opportunity to tell others about some of those things. What is the worst mistake military historians make? The biggest error is to impose the values of the 21st century upon the utterly different circumstances of the time. Then there are those who go on turning out nationalistic twaddle about ''our brave boys." The proper job of all of us is to try to tell the truth about what happened, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable and doesn't feed patriotic myths. What is your goal as military historian? To explain to a modem civilian readership what human beings do in wars, what ordinary people did in extraordi-

nary circumstances. My purpose always is to describe how people thought and acted then, what was going on in their minds.

joyed writing this book more than any other 1 have done, hecause the man vras so utterly irresistible, even when he was wrong. These 70 years later, why does World War II still fascinate us? Because it was the greatest event in human history. There is always more lo learn, something more to say. But 1 don't buy all the nonsense about the people of that era being "the greatest generation." They were pretty much like any other generation, but when thrust into extraordinary circumstances, many of them achieved extraordinary things.

Who are today's best military historians? My favorites are Antony Beevor and Rick AikinI son, because what they do is closest to what I Sir Max Hastings, seen above after entering Port try to do, but I am also Statiley during the 1982 Falktands conflict, has a great admirer of Douwritten about war as both journalist and historian. glas Porch. Williamson Murray and Carlo DEste. Carlo's DeciYour most recent book is a wartime sion in Normandy was written almost profile of Winston Churchill. What 30 years ago but, for me, remains the do you think of him? best book on the campaign. 1 am a huge admirer of Winston Churchill, one of the greatest human What's the most rewarding aspect of beings of all time and certainly being a military historian? Britain's greatest war leader. But many I feel very lucky that I discovered aspects of the story are much more quite a large readership for the kind complex than people recognize. To of books I write and love doing them me, the story is that of Churchill, —the archive research, the inter\'iews himself a hero, always wanting more with veterans, the travels to many obfrom the British people and the scure comers of Europe and, later, the British army than they were capable world. The compliments I have valued of delivering. most about my books have been from Even though 1 thought 1 knew a \'eterans who say, 'Yes, that is how il was, lot about Churchill when I started how it really felt. ' (^ the book, there is always more. 1 en-

wnat we Learnea... from the Arab Revolt By T.E. Lawrence

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n August Î917, Major TE. Lawrence—the celebrated "Lawrence of Arabia"—penned a brief guide for British officers who would be assisting Arab forces in their ongoing revolt against the Ottoman Turks. Puíí/isht'ií in The Arab Bulletin, a highly secret magazine on Middle East politics intended for Bñiish leaders, Lawrence's "27 Articles" succinctly summarized what he had learned the preceding year as a highly successful adviser to irre gulai Arab troops. Military Histor>' presents key elements of the article here in edited form.

and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquir)'. • Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. • Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. • Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. • Do not be too intimate, too prominent or too earnest. • The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. • Cling tight to your sense uf humor. You will need it every day. • li is dilTicuk to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper, the greater your advantage. Also, then you will not go [nad yourself. • Do not \ry to do too much with your own hands. Beti ter the Arahs do it tolerÎ ably than that you do it pers lectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. • Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe....A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat, your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in puhlic. • Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can

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Lawrence, right, was a fluent Arabic speaker and a keen observer of his hosts' strengths and weaknesses.

• Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad Stan is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. • Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills

wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform.... Also then the Turks will not hang you when you are caught. • Religious discussions will be frequent....Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life, is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food. • ln familiar conditions, they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small.... The more unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don't play for safety. • Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible or inscnitable in the Arab. • Avoid too-free talk about women, lt is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally • The beginning and ending of the secret ofhandlingArabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing; watch yourself and your companions all the time; hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses, and keep everything you find out to yourself. • Have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it. (^

vaior The Navy's First POW Hero By David T. Zabecki

Lieutenant Edouard Izac was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions while a German prisoner.

douard Izac was bom in Iowa in 1891, bui grew up speaking German at home. (His father hailed from the German-speaking area of Alsace, France, while his mothers parents had emigrated from an area of Gennany whose dialect was similar iti that spoken in Alsace.) Izac concealed his facility with tlie language from German captors when ihe>- held him aboard their U-boai in 1918. Had they known Izac understood all they were saying, they would have spoken less freely.

USS President Lincoln, which had been a Gemían Hamburg-America Line passenger steamer of the same name until seized by the U.S. government. By spring 1918, Izac had made five transatlantic crossings from New York on President Linco/n, which transported some 23,000 troops to Europe. By thai fifth voyage, Izac had become the ships executive officer. In late May 1918. President Lincoln disembarked its latest load of iroops al Brest, France, and on the 29th started for New York in a convoy escorted by destroyers. At sundown ihe following day, the escorts left the convoy as it passed beyond what was considered the U-boat danger zone. But just before 9 the next morning, the German submarine U-90 put three torpedoes into President Lincoln.

Izac graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1915 and initially served on the battleship ÜSS Florida. When America entered World War 1, he transferred to the Naval Transport Service. In July 1917, the junior-grade lieutenant was assigned lo the troopship

Although the transport sank in little more than half an hour, most of the 715 men aboard managed to gci into the lifeboats. U-90, meanwhile, surfaced, and its commandt-r demanded the transport's captain accompany the sub to Gennany as proof of the sinking. Izac,

Edouard Izac U.S.Navy Medal of Honor North Atlantic and Germany June-October 1918

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speaking English, lold the Germans the captain had been killed in the attack, so the U-boat crew took the executive officer prisoner instead. While aboard U-90. Izac listened to and watched everything around him. Gaining critical intelligence that could be used againsi the U-boats. Izac knew he musl get the information to Allied authorities. Soon after arriving in Germany. Izac was placed in a POW camp, from which he made several escape attempts. A month laler, guards put him on a train to anoiher camp. En route he leaped from a window of the speeding train under fire. Recaptured and severely beaten, Izac attempted escape again after reaching the new camp. After scaling the barbed wire one night, he purposely drew fire from guards, enabling other POWs to flee. Izac and a fellow prisoner then made their way ihrough lzac's ancestral homeland, hiding In the woods and living on raw vegetables. Reaching ihe Rhine, they evaded German .seniries and swam across to Switzerland. Izac finally reported to ihe Bureau of Navigation in Washington, D C , on Nov. 11. 1918, the day the war ended. The fact that lzacs information was no longer useful detracted in no way from his heroism during more than five months as a POW. He received the Medal of Honor, but the injuries he sustained during his escape attempts ended his Navy career. He was medically relired in 1921 as a lieutenant commander. Erom 1937 to 1947, Izac served in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat from California. A member of the House Naval Affairs Committee, he joined a delegation of lawmakers that inspected the liberated Buchenwald, Mittelbau-Dora and Dachau concentration camps in April 1945. Izac died in Januar\-1990 at age 98. The U.S. Navy's first recipient of the Medal of Honor for heroism as a POW was buried with full honors at Arlington National Cemetery. ^

-iand Tool

By Jon Guttman-iUushation hy Gregory Proch

MacuahuitI A big slick with a decided edge Obsidian blades were affixed to the club with bitumen, plant resin or turtle dung.

A stout handle and leather thong kept the macuahuitl firmly in its owner's grip.

Period accounts of the macuahuitl describe its ability to sever limbs. The club itself was typically 3 to 4 inches wide with a blunt end.

Aztec eagle and jaguar warriors (right) used the club to stun enemies for subsequent sacrifice.

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vive. The wooden club, which varied in length, wa5 typically 3 to 4 inches wide and car\'ed with slotted edges into which obsidian blades were affixed using bitumen, plant resin or turtle dung. The blades could be set at inier\ als for sawlike use or close together for use as a slashing weapon. Although the macuahuill long predated the Aztecs, it attained ils greatest notoriety in the hands of Aztec jaguar and eagle warriors, who carried either a 3- to 4-footThe last authentic maaiahuiil was delong single-handed version in conjuncstroyed in 1884 when a firc ravaged the tion with a round shield called a dúmaUi Armería Real in Madrid, Spain. But ample or a twcvhanded version reportedly as long period descriptions and illustrations surbsidian, volcanically formed glass, has long provided humans with razor-sharp cutting edges for tools and weapons. Ancient Mesoamericans embedded it into the business end— or rather, edges—of a cross between a club and a sword thai had no Old World equivalent. This fearsome weapon was known under various spellings by a UtoAztecan name, the macuahuitl

as a man was tall. A warrior sought to disable an opponent with the blades of the macuahuitl and then stun him with its blunt end for capture and ritual human sacrifice. Bernai Díaz del Castillo, a conquistador who accompanied Hernán Cortés on his 16th cenlur)" conquest of Mexico. wTote of Aztecs beheading a cavalry horse vvith their macuahuilh. Despite the weapons strengths, it was unequal to the sword in close combat, as it required room to swing and was useless as a thrusting weapon. Many an Aztec warrior met his end al Spanish sword point. (^

^ower Tool

By Jon Gunman ' lUusttation by Gregory Proch

Thompson Submachine Gun Favored by the Coast Guard, cops and Capone

Thompson abandoned the rfbbed barrel and pistol-style foregrip on later models of the gun. The Blish lock, part of the breech, required use of the .45-caliber round used in the M1911 pistol. July 1940: British PM Winston Churchill gives the Tommy gun a go. Thompson first pitched the gun to law enforcement, above. Armed forces later added it to their arsenals.

The original 50-round spiral fed Thompson drum magazine had a tendency to jam.

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uring World War I, Brig. Gen. John Taliaferro Thompson, who supervised small-amis production for the U.S. Anny, set his sights on developing an automatic weapon that wouid be simpler and lighter, have a higher rate of fire and less recoil, and be more reliable overall than the Browning automatic rifle then entering serxice. He focused on a friction-delayed blowback action patented b>' John Bell Blish. In 1916 Thompson established the Auto-Ordnance Corporation lo develop a weapon around the Blish lock, but the war ended before he could field test the prototype, dubbed the Annihilator.

Fine machining and wood grips and stock put the Model 1921 beyond most customers' price range.

Thompson's initial production Model of 1921 cost S225 at a time when a Eord Model T sold for $400. Regardless, Colt, under contract to Auto-Ordnance, rolled out 15.000 "Tommy guns" that first year. Its chief buyers were law-enforcement agencies and such notorious gangsters as M Capone. The U.S. Postal Service bought the weajxîn to thwart robbers, while the Coast Guard used it to subdue rum-runners. In the 1920s and '30s, the Tommy gun made its combai debut wilh the U.S. Marines in Central America and China. The Army ordered 20.000 of" the M1928 in 1940 and an additional 319.000 in 1941.

In April 1942 the simplified Ml entered production, soon followed by the even simpler MlAl, which took a 20-or 30-round magazine in heu of the signature 50-round drum of earlier types and fired up to 700 rounds per minute versus the original 1,000 rounds per minute. Allied forces praised the Thompson for its reliability but bemoaned ils weight, its inaccuracy beyond 50 yards and its lack of penetrating power. Despite such limitations, the weapon turned up in numerous other conflicts, including the 1922-23 Irish Civil War, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the wars in Korea and Indochina. (So

SECOND BOER WAR • 1899-1902

FARME THE FIRST MODERN INSURGENCY-AND HOW THE BRITISH CRUSHED IT ÖT MMK I IN UULaAKU

The war in South Africa was over. bravery during the 1857 Indian Rebellion, Field Marshal Lord Frederick Sleigh Rob- while Kitchener was fresh from decisive erts, the legendary British commander, victories in North Africa that led to the remarched his 38,000 men into the main plaza occupation of Khartoum in the Sudan. The in Pretoria, then capital of the Boer confed- white-haired Roberts was 67, and Kitcheeration. It was 2:15 on the ner, with hisfierceblack musafternoon of June 5, 1900. tache that seemed to spread They had marched 300 miles from one ear to the other, across the Transvaal wilderalmost 20 years younger. ness in just 34 days, meeting Together they represented very little Boer resistance. the past and future of British Roberts had taken Johannesimperial military power. burg and its gold mines a week This was Britain's second earlier. The citizens of Pretowar with the Boers. The first, ria, knowing they were next, 19 years earlier, had been had basically handed the city a humihation. Its signature to Roberts byfleeingin terror. British defeat was the rout of Riding at Roberts' side was Sir George CoUey^s forces atop Lord Horatio Herbert KitchMajuba Hill. Colley himself ener. Both men had made The quintessential Boer farmer-turnedtook a sniper's bullet through their reputations in Britain's commando leader, Christiaan de Wet, above, the head as he turned to rehighly elusive when pursued by the imperial wars—Roberts was proved treat. Within days Britain British. Boer soldiers, right, were skilled awarded the Victoria Cross for marksmen capable of living off the land. sued for peace. ITARY HISTORY

Now, as Roberts' men snapped to atwith a force of more than 12,000 men tention, the aging Union jack that onee and anticipating that de Wet remained flew over Majuba was nm up the flagin the vicinity of Roodewal, Kitchener pole in Pretoria. Roberts was linking the surprised the Boers as they prepared finale of both wars, replacing the memto demolish the rail line into Pretoria, ory of Colley's epic blunder with his own seeking to deprive British troops of epic triumph. All he needed was for the sorely needed foodstuffs. Boers to come forth and disctiss terms. "But my plan was to come to nothing," Two days later. Boer leader Chriswrote de Wet. British and Boer forces tiaan de Wet did step forward. But surengaged one another in the night near render was the last thing on his mind. the Leeuwspruit railway bridge. A train Striking with lightning speed, the guerhappened to approach from the British rilla leader and his band ol commandos side of the lines, recalled de Wet, "on killed or captured more tlian 700 British which the burghers opened such a fierce soldiers near the railway line in Roodefire that it was speedily hrought to a wal. They also captured standstill. General [C.C.I more provisions, arms Froneman at once gave 'Striking with and ammunition than orders to storm the train, iightning speed, at any previous point in but his men did not cany ihe war—so much that out his orders." the guerrilla leader de Wet expressed deep The Boers had no way and his band of regret about having to of knowing, but Kitchcommandos killed leave most of it hehind. ener himself was on

or captured more hoard. Had the Boers atSo began a two-year tacked the train, de Wet game of cat and mouse than 700 British seethed, "Lord Kitchener between de Wet and soldiers near would have fallen into Kitchener. The tactics the railway line' our hands!" and consequences would serve as foreshadowing Instead, Kitchener offfor guerrilla wars of the 20th century— loaded a horse from one of the rail cars, as well as the means used to crush them. mounted up and raced alone into the night—escaping what would have been a humiliating capture by de Wet. U should like to be present at their meeting, for meet they must," wrote a New York Times correspondent of Ubique means, 'They've caught de Wet, an ' the much-anticipated clash between now we shan't be long.' the British and de Wet's Boer forces. Ubique means, 'i much regret, the beggar^ The reporter added: "If [de Wetl is not goin' strong!' killed in one of his forays. That he lives —Rudyard Kipling, Ubique is the expressed wish of all the English officers atid of Kitchener himself." Roodewal was nol the first time the "I will give Lord Roberts three years British had heard of de Wet. He was 45 to catch me," de Wet had reportedly and arguably the most famous Boer boasted to friends. "I will give Kitchener general. Bom in the Orange Free State three months." in 1854, the year Britain granted it inActually, just three days would pass dependence as a republic, he had spent until their next encounter: Advancing his entire life defending that freedom.

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Piet Jacobus Joubert A veteran of the First Boer War and rictor of that conflicts tSSl Baitle of Majuba. Joubert was by 18*^9 commandantgeneral of the Boer army. Seen as overly cautious by some, he took little active role in the fighting.

'•"^RY HISTORY

jacobus de la Rey One of the most able Boer commanders, dc la Rey had nn formal military training. He was a primary architect uf the Boers' guerilla tactics, and iic and his men remained active and in the field until the end of the war.

In 1865 the 11-year old de Wet fought alongside his father in the second of a series of wars against the Basotho tribe. Sixteen years later, de Wet participated in the storming of Majuba Hill. "Give me one man like de Wet, and I will send home one-third the army," Kitchener reportedly said. The Boer leader was a broad-shouldered man who favored homburg hats and knee-high leather riding hoots. De Wet spoke with a lisp, which might have prevented him becoming such a leader of men were it not for his furious temper and profound ability to preach fire and brimstone about the cause of Afrikaner independence.

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n the early years of what has since become known as South Africa, it was the Dutch ancestors of the Afrikaners who settled the southern tip of the contitient. The Dutch East India Company, needing a long-range supply port for its ships traveling between Europe and tlie spice-rich lands along the Indian Ocean, established Cape Town in 1652. British ships and such famous voyagers as Captain James Cook made the Cape Colony a regular stop on any long journey, but it remained profoundly Dutch. In the lead-up to the Napoleonic Wars, however, Britain seized the region to better control the seas. The colony soon split between the more urban British and the agriculturally oriented longtime residents, who had rechristened themselves as trekboers ("wandering farmers"). This was later shortened to Boers. To them, the arrogant, easih' sunburned Britons were rooineks ("rednecks") giving rise to the derogatory tenn still in use today. The Boers were a blend of Dutch, German, Flemish and French Huguenots who had come to the region as Louis Botha An able field commander, Botha won ttiany victories against the British. After the war he befriended his former enemies, siding with Britain in World War I and becoming the first prime minister of [he Union of South Afriea.

colonists during the reign of the Dutch East India Company. Boers were renowned for their independence and piety and were defiantly anti-government. As fanners who often spenl their days hunting, they were expert trackers, crack shots and formidable horsemen. Such were also the basic skills required of a soldier. As part of the Cape Colony's defense system against hostile African tribes, men between the ages of 16 and 60 were required to make themselves available for military service in case of attack. When called, each man mobilized with his own horse,rifle,ammunition and enough food to last eight days. This mobile force would become the model for de Wet's commandos.

In the mid-1830s, fed up with British rule, the Boers abandoned the Cape Colony and embarked on what became known as the Great Trek. This 12,000person exodus sent Boers en masse to the north and east in search of farmland beyond the reach of British rule. Just as with the westward migration occurring simultaneously in America, the newcomers warred with the native inhabitants. Hostilities between the Boers and the Basotho and Zulu were brutal and deadly, killing thousands on

each side. Within a decade, however, the Boer had their farms. Soon after, they established the independent republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. But the discovery of diamonds and gold in those regions in the 1870s and 1880s roused British interest. "The metal is so uniformly distributed," war correspondent and Sherlock Ho/nifs author Arthur Conan Doyle wrote of the Rand gold mines, "that the enterprise can claim a certainty which is not usually associated with the industry It is quanting rather than mining." Years of diplomatic maneuvering followed, but the descent into a second Boer War is all but traceable to Conan Doyle's simple observation. In an era long before oil

Frederick Sleigh Roberts The son of a general and a highly compeieni field commander in hoih India and Afghanisian. Roberts look command in South Africa in 1^00 He led lhe relief of Kimberly, and his forctrs captured the Boer capital of Pretoria.

Horatio Herbert Kitchener Sent lo South Africa as Lord Roberts' chief of staff. Kitchener sucecded him in command and instituted the successful but highly controversial containment and antiguerrilia strategy that imallv defeated the Boers.

Robert S.S. Baden-Powell A highly accomplished cavalr\' officer and scoui with extensive experience in India and .Africa, he won fame for his defense of Mafeking in the face of superior besieging Boer forces. He later founded the Scout Movement.

While rifle marksmanship was the basis of Boer military prowess, the insurgents made effective use of artillery-including weapons such as this captured British gun.

became the currency of war, it was gold and gems that sent an empire on the march—not once, hut twice. The Boers were the first mihtary force of European heritage the British had faced since the Crimean War But ihe Boers did not comprise a standing army, and their hit-and-run guenilla tactics had more in common with forces the British had faced in Afghanistan, India and the Sudan. The burghers, as Boer citizens were known, elected their lop military officers. The service of all citizen soldiers was gratis, witli few exceptions. A typical military imit was composed of men from a single region and was lcnown as a commando. Each burgher would train individually for battle, as the commando met only sporadically at a wapenschouw (field day, from the Old English for "weapon show"). At the close of batde, Boer uniLs disbanded, and the tnen returned to their ianns. Ltx)sely organized as their commando system may have heen, the Boers had perfected it long hefore the Great Trek and Zulu wars. Roberts and Kitchener may have captured Pretoria, but they were caught up in conventional military thinking. The commando s\ stem was alive and well all around them, able to rise up and go to ground at a moment's notice. The solution, as tlie British learned all too well after the massacre at Roodewal, lay in not just holding key cities, hut also capturing key cuiumando leaders. And none was more determined to elude them than de Wet, who had vowed never to let hLs men surrender

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ix weeks after Roodewal, the British found dc Wet again. They had trapped the Boer commander, along with three other guerrilla leaders, within the Brandwater Basin, amid the peaks of the Orange Free State. Dividing the 9,000 Boers into four separate columns, de Wet and the other leaders attempted to break out through the high passes. Only two of the columns made it. De Wet and 2,000 burghers rode to freedom, even as the British captured 4.000 others. To de Wet's horror.

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many of the Boers had given up voluntarily. "A more senseless course of action could hardly he imagined," he later wrote. De Wet and his band took it uptm themselves to wieak havoc on the British forces. Between July and November, his men cut communication lines, destroyed railways, captured supplies atid ammunition and generally hit the enemy when and where they least expected it. The British ran themselves ragged giving chase. "The enemy had not been able to pursue the laager [camp], as their draft-cattle and horses were so completely exhausted that they had fallen down dead in heaps," wrote de Wet. '1 would soon begin again to wreck railway lines and telegraph wires.,..I had made it a rule to never to be in the neighborhood of a railway withoitt interrupting the enemy's means of comtnunication." At one point his swath of destruction was so great that de Wet was Forced to repeat himself. "The bridge I had destro} ed had been rebuilt," he lamented in September, "and so I was forced to bum it again." Burghers rallied to his cause, and his army swelled. Roberts' controversial tactic of burning Boer farms brought hundreds of newly homeless recruits. De Wets whereabouts became the worlds greatest tnystery, as correspondents marveled at his ability to disappear. By the end of November, Roberts was no closer to finding him than he had heen in June. In the British Empires version of ''mission accomplished," Roberts declared victory, handed over command to Kitchener and reUtrned to London a hero. ln December 1900, Kitchener set a trap. Suspecting that de Wet might attempt to cross the Orange River, the Irorder between the Cape Colony and the Orange Eree State, he positioned men at all bridges and fords. With the river at flood stage, de Wet had no other means of reaching the opposite bank. "We reached the Orange River.. .but alas! what a sight met our eyes!" wrote de Wet. "The river was quite impassable, owing to the floods, and, in addiiion, the ford

SECOND BOER WAR OCT1899-MAY19O2f

The Second Boer War had its origii|s in a land dispute between the Dut(^ colonial Boer farmers and mostly British uittanders (Afrikaans for "foreigners") who poured into the Transvaal during a gold rush in the 18SOs, soon outnumbering the Boers. In 1899 Britain demanded full voting rights for the uitlanders, the Transvaal government refused, and the war was on. The Boers struck first at British garrisons in Natal and the Cape Colony. Britain hit back hard and captured Pretoria, The Boers then resorted to guerrilla warfare. The British answered with a hard-line scorched earth policy to contain Boer territory and root out the guerrillas.

GERMAN H WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) .

To isolate Boer territory, the British built some 8,000 stone blockhouses, each within a few hundred yards of one another and linked by barbed wire fence.

»CAPE TOWN

BIERA

RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE) PORTUGESE EAST AFRICA (MOZAMBIQUE)

As they patrolled Boer territory, the British destroyed anything that might sustain the mobile guerrilla forces —burning crops and farmhouses, slaughtering livestock and even poisoning wells.

TRANSVAAL KEY

PIETERSBURG

Blockhouses and Fence

BECHUANALAND (BOTSWANA)

Rdilroads Territory Borders Concentration Camps De Wet Offensives

^JOHANNESBURG

Gold Mines

LOURENÇO MARQUESO

LADYSMITH Ç COLENSQ?;'

Leeuwspruit

e British moved displaced Boer civilians into dozens of hastily buitt, ill equipped, unsanitary tent camps. By war's end, more than 27,000 internees, mostly women and children, would succumb to disease, exposure or malnutrition. The British had won, but at a terrible cost.

BLOEMFONJ^IN

LONDON

C^PE: ' OOLONY EAST LONDON

Africa

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PORT ELIZABETH i mi Ikm

1100 TÏÔÔ

1200

Map5 by Steve Walkowlak

1200 1300

CAPE TOWN

detail area

was held by English troops...Oh, the English had caught me at last!" Kitchener had given the British ordets not to take prisoners. AU through the evening, de Wet and his men raced from bridge to bridge, searching for that elusive unguarded crossing. "They had cornered' me, to use one of their own favorite expressions," be lamented, Just before sunset, de Wet's persistence was rewarded. The Boers found an unguarded ford 12 miles uprivcr. A furious Kitchener gave chase. This time the Boer leader led his men on a daring dash through a gap in Kitchener's lines. "The distance," de Wet wrote of their sprint to freedom, "[was] 3,000 paces. Over these terrible 3,000 paces our burghers raced, while a storm of bullets was poured in upon them from both sides. And of all that force—8,000 strong—no single man was killed,"

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n another echo of the American West, Kitchener ordered the plains of the Boer homeland he fenced. But instead of livestock, he vras enclos-

MILITARY HISTORY

Though British forces made wide use of such conventional weapons as railway guns, above, it was their controversial but effective anti-guerrilla tactics that prevailed.

ing men. Each length of barbed wire was five strands high and connected to fortified blockhouses a few hundred yards apart. Some blockhouses were round, others sharply angled. Each had an iron roof and gun slits about four feet from the ground. "Narrower and narrower did the circle become," wrote de Wet, "hemming us in more closely at every moment... .The English seemed to tliink that a Boer might be netted like a fish." They were right. Little by little, the British captured more and more burghers and their caltle. Kitchener increased the pressure by intensifying his scorched-earth campaign. His troops forced families from their homes at gunpoint, then moved in to fire the structure and fields. The British then led these homeless women and children to another of Kitchener's toots of persuasion—the concentration camp.

De Wet remained at large but felt the effects of these heartbreaking tactics at a logistical level: Burghers took to leaving their family wagons at home when joining their commando units, so their wives and children might flee in advance of the British. But this diminished the Boers' ability to transport ammunition and supplies. Kitchener's three-pronged tactic of fencing, farm burning and civilian internment was working. But his inability to capture de Wet made the burgher commando a folk hero in the British press, while Kitchener's cruel tactic of turning out families, destroying their homes and then interning them for fear they would seek revenge made him a lightning rod for controversy. The concentration camps, in particular, were considered "a method of barbarism," as one parliament member decried. Kitchener did not invent them, but they were in vogwe among military thinkers at the time. A few years earlier, the Spanish had used concentration camps to suppress Cuban rebels.

and the Unilcd Slates had used them to similar effect in the Philippines. But what had begun as an impulsive British desire to punish rehels and their families soon turned into a tragedy. An estimated 160,000 women, children and elderly men were incarcerated (if captured, their POW husbands were shipped to Ceylon or St. Helena). The camps wererifewith dysentery, cholera, measles and typhoid. The British had huilt them for miUtary purposes with little regard to location, causing many deaths from exposure in the winter. In all, according to a postwar investigation by Transvaal archivist PL.A. Goldman, 26,521 women and children and 1,421 old men died in the camps. The numbers are even more startling when one considers that total British war casualties numbered 21,942 and tlie Boer commandos lost between 7,000 and 9,000. None of those statistics bothered Kitchener as much as his inability to capture Christiaan de Wet. By December 1901, 18 months after the lall of Pretoria, de Wet was still at large. Kitchener had conducted three intensive "de Wet hunts," to no a\'ail. The full weight of the war had fallen on Kitchener's shoulders, and the workaholic commander was starting to show signs of strain. "His gifts were those of an administrator who practiced rigid economy and who had an inordinate capacity for hard work," wrote South African historian S. Burridge Spies. These gifts and his resolution and drive were offset, however, by his reluctance to delegate authority, by his rigid and at times stubborn adlierence to his chosen course of action, and by the fact that he often neglected the human element in his calculations." At no time was this more obvious than in December 1901. Fencing the veld was yielding roughly 1,000 prisoners a month, which was a coup but certainly not the sort of number that would end the Boer conflict anytime soon. Farm burning had backfired in many ways, as British troops had gotten into the habit of burning all farms, even those of British sympathizers, who were quick to complain to Kitcheners superiors back in London. And the uproar about the concentration camps had become

so great ihat British military officials had been forced to let an independent humanitarian group investigate. Kitchener, for iiis part, blamed the unsanitary habits of Boers for the casualty rate. On Christmas Day, 1901, came the devastating news that the unstoppable de Wet liad struck again. At 2 a.m. de Wet had led 600 men up a steep gully in a surprise attack against a blockhouse at Tweefontein. Walking in their stocking feet so as not to be heard, de Wet and his men came up over the crest of the ravine and raced down onto tlie British tents. They fired as they ran, killing many in their sleep. The British rallied, and for 40 minutes the two sides fought in brutal combat, some of it hand to hand. When it was over, 300 of the 550 British soldiers stationed there were dead or wounded. The Boers were so short of clothing from their months on the ntn that some wore womens dresses. The next day, before setting the remaining 250 British free, the Boers stripped them naked and took their clothes. "It is very sad and depressing that the Boers are able to strike such blows," Kitchener wrote, adding that "desperate men" were always a threat in the night.

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died down until only the crack of single shots was heard. Then all was again quiet. The Boers' attempt to break the British circle had failed. A few of them succeeded in crossing the line, and among these was General de Wet." But over time, Kitchener's relentless sweeps paid off. Many commandos were star\ing. thanks to Kitchener's destruction of farms and livestock. Morale was disastrously low among those whose wives and children were interned. And many more were anxious about family members w ho had escaped the camps only to roam the veld, easy prey for roving bands of British soldiers, hostile Africans and wild animals. The time had clearly come to talk peace.

Fittingly, Kitchener and de Wet met face to face for the first time in Pretoria. The date was May 19,1902, a Monday They shook hands and sat down at the negotiating table in Melrose House, Kitchener's stately Pretoria headquarters. Kitchener was uncharacteristically humorous, attempting a few light jokes. De Wei was as defiant as ever, promising to con'Farm burning tinue the fight if talks broke down. As the talks had backfired conlinued over the next in many ways, as 10 days. Kitchener manBritish troops had aged to pull de Wet aside so the two of them could gotten into the craft a "civil" surrender. habit of burning Of the two British neall farms, even gotiators, it was Kitchener who insisted on those of British lenient terms.

ust when it seemed the guerrilla war might drag on forever. Kitchener's "stubborn adherence to his sympathizers' own course of action" The treaty was signed paid off. On Feb. 5, 1902, his line of at 10:30 p.m. on May 31. Kitchener sat blockhouses and barbed wire was finally at the head of the dining room table. complete, with some 8,000 blockhouses De Wet sat at his right hand. and nearly 4,000 miles of fence. SuppleThe two men turned to one another menting his own forces with specially afterward. "We are good friends now," armed black African troops, he began said a weary Kitchener. a series of sweeps designed to end the Then, and only then, did de Wet Boer War once and for all. ride out and order his men to lay down their arms- (2B "In the northern section, the Boers made a most desperate effort to break through." reported The New York Times For further reading, Martin Dugard on February 14. "The British pickets recommends: The Boer War. hy Denis opened a terrible fire, and the Boers Judd and Keith Surndge, and The Boer were everï^where met with a relentless War, by Thomas Pahenham. Chnstiaan hail of bullets....This lasted for some de Wet's Three Years' War offers the most 20 minutes, when gradually the rattle vivid desciiptions.

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BYRICHARQJHOLMES

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'' Napoleonic Wars in this 1880 Charles Green oil The G/f/ / teft Se/i/nd Aie. Veterans of the American War formed the core of this hardened Britiigliiafmv.

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he way nations remember history is more important than 5tricl truth, argued 19th centim^ French writer Ernest Renan, and that is especially true where military history is concerned. The American War (as the Revolutionary War was known in Britain) has spun its own web of mytholog)^, casting the ultimate winners as noble Patriots selflessly devoted to "the glorious cause," while the losing side is often pilloried as a coalition of mercenary' Gennans, loutish Redcoats and Tories who richly merited the dispossession \Tsited on them after the war. Mythologies aside, it is important, when evaluating the merits of opposing sides, to acknowledge hard truths about armies. Good men canfightwell in a bad cause, there is no consistency in valor, and today's hero may prove tomorrows poltroon. The best-conducted armies, whether wearing the king's red or Congress' blue, contain a sprinkling of zealots, sadists and the plain terrified. And no army is a monolithic structure, obeying doctrine and responding predictably to ever)' tug on the chain of command. So there is a case for taking seriously the Redcoats. "Crown forces won the great majority of the battlefield engage-

> •

Officer. 16th Light Dragoons. 1776

MILITARY HISTORY

ments of the American War," notes Matthew H. Spring, whose With Zeal and With Bayonets Only is ihe best book yet written on the British army of the era. But, like many soldiers before and since, RedcoaLs discovered that winning such battles as Bunker Hill, Brooklyn,

^Discipline was strict. Men were flogged for minor offenses and executed for more serious crimes' Brandywine, Germantown, Savarmah, Camden and Guilford Courthouse did not necessarily win a war. Who were these Redcoats who so often fought so effectively? The rank and file of the British army during the American War were, in theory; volunteers, who had signed on after listening to a regimental recruiting party of an officer, a sergeant and a couple of drummers.

Staff Officer. Adjutant General. 1775

Officer, ¿ôiuFùui, 1774

Not a few "volunteers" were tricked, ha\ing gone to bed in a tavern drunk and been rudely awakened with a hangover and the king's shilling in their pocket. More found hunger the most eloquent recruiting sergeant, Scottish diarist James Boswell chatted to a foot guards sentry who confessed tliat he was a tailor and had enlisted to escape arrest for debt. In emergencies the govemment authorized the compulsory enlistment of "all such able-bodied, idle and disorderl)^ persons who cannot.. .prove themselves to exercise.. .some lawful trade or emploj'ment." In 1778 the undersherifT of Berkshire told a government minister that he held men condemned for highway robbery and horse stealing, hut who were "exceedingly proper fellows for either the Land or the Sea Service." Enlistment was generally for life, though the services introduced shorter terms for specific wars. In practice, a man might soldier on until he was too infirm to serve or until the army reduced its numbers—as it always did at the end of a war—discharging soldiers and sending off officers on half-pay Before being formally attested, a potential recruit had to ''pass the doctor," but both the state of medical knowledge and pressure to fill vacancies ensured

Officer. 3rd Foot Guards. 1776

that examinations were often perfunctory. Age limits for enlistment ran from 17 to 50 at the height of the war. though drummer boys were taken younger. At the time of the American War, just over half the rank and file came from England and Wales, the remainder from Scotland and Ireland. Most British soldiers in North America were infantrymen: Just over 60 regiments ol foot served there for at least part of the war, though accurate accounting is complicated by the raising, in North America, of units then carried on the regular establishment. Only two regular cavalr)' regiments—the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons—were sent overseas, though the use of Loyalist horsemen somewhat made up for Britain's shortage of cavalry The British army, traditionally small by the standards of such major European land powers as Erance or Prussia, expanded with war and contracted with peace. During the American War, its establishment rose to seven battalions of foot guards and 111 battalions in the line, with 30 regiments of cavalr>' (use of the term "battalion" poses other questions, but at this time most regiments

William Redmore Bigg's Trepanning a Recruit three corporals, two drummers and 47 •private men.' Light and grenadier comportrays a British recruiting party pressing a compliant "volunteer" into the king's service. panies had higher establishments but fielded fewer men than paper strengths suggested. Captain John Peebles of had a single battalion). Each British the 42nd Royal Highlanders acknowlbattalion had 10 companies, eight batedged that in the second half of 1779, talion companies—their soldiers known more than 50 of his 80 grenadiers were as "hatmen" for the tricom hats they sick, so that even this elite company wore—and two ñank companies, one had a fighting strength of fewer than light and the other grenadier, whose 30 men. Cavalr)' regiments comprised members also wore distinctive caps. eight troops, each a captain's comtnand. At its full establishment strength, an Britain's shortage of cavalry meant tliat infantry battalion should have numbered regular horsemen were often scattered around 600 officers atid men. In North in penny packets: The troop of 17th America most British battalions were Light Dragoons present at the 1781 smaller: Elank companies were posted Battle of Cowpens did well to put 60 away to form light infantr)' or grenadier officers and men into the field. battalions, gaps left by casualties remained unfilled, etc. On the eve of the Battle of Camden, the 33rd Regiments eight battalion companies totaled 238 officers and men, and the two Guards battalions at Guilford Courthouse went into battle with about 200 men each. The company, commanded by a captain assisted by a lieutenant and an ensign, was the battalion's basic building block and in 1768 should have numbered three officers, three sergeants.

Battalions in the field were commanded by a lieutenant colonel, although command sometimes devolved upon the battalion's major or even the senior available captain. Regular army regiments were effectively "owned" by their colonels, usually senior officers who got their appointments as a reward for past ser\'ice. A regiment's colonel could expect to profit from the difference between the money given him by

the govemment to equip his regiment and the actual cost of items supplied. He also drew the pay for commanding one of the battalion companies, but the real work was entrusted to the battalions captain-lieutenant, who ranked above the lieutenants but below the captains. The colonel's influence ("interest" was how it was expressed in the 18th century) was crucial in detennining how officers were appointed to, and promoted within, ihe regiment. Colonels mighl be active, perhaps by laking a close (and often exasperating) interest in the minutiae of uniform, or they might delegate their duties to London-based contractors who handled the details of the regiment's nonoperational identity. Until the 1750s, regiments were known hy the names of their colonels. Thereafter, they were numbered by seniority from the date of their raising, although some regiments had tiames that remained more fatniliar than numbers. Thus, the 1st Foot was the Royal Scots, the 2nd was the Queens, and the 42nd was styled the Royal Highlanders or the Black Watch. A regiment's sen-

MILITARY HISTORY

The Redcoats prevailed at Bunker Hill rn 1775, above, and on most other battlefields of the American War. But the Patriots persevered.

iority was a matter of import, as peacetime reductions always struck first at more recently raised units. Career officers understandably craved billets in senior regiments. The horse and foot regiments were the responsibihty of the army's commander in chief, usually an experienced professional officer. That post was held from 1766 to 1769 by the Marquess of Granby, and ft"om 1778 to 1782 by Lord Amherst, with an interregnum during the early part of the American War. The commander in chief was not responsible for artillerv', engineers, fortifications and associated stores, which were entrusted to the master general of the ordnance, a peer who usually had a seat in the cabinet; Viscount Townshend held the post between 1772 and 1782.

T

here were sharp differences between the officers of British horse and foot regiments and the "gentlemen of the ordnance." Artil-

lery- and engineer officers were commissioned after passing through the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and then promoted by seniority Young men who sought commissions in the horse and foot had to produce a letter testifying to gentlemanly status and could then buy the rank of ensign (for the infantry) or comet (for the cavalry). Then, subject to regulations that increasingly demanded time in rank, they could buy promotion as vacancies became available. But an officer could only buy his way to Heutenant colonel, after which all promotion was by seniority. What seemed a simple system was actually complex. Although most first commissiotis between 1660 and 1871 were purchased, in wartime the abundance of first commissions as new units were raised outstripped the supply of young gentlemen whose families were prepared to disgorge a substantial sum and thus give the lad a chance at early death. Free commissions might be obtained by the active interest of powerful men; by joining a regiment as a gentleman volunteer, like Thomas Anburey, who served as

such in America with the grenadier company of the 29th before being given a commission in the 24th. It was also possible to be commissioned from the ranks. Jacob Brunl, for example, enlisted in 1770, was commissioned into the 55th Foot in 1793 as ensign and adjutant, took a free lieutenancy in the newly raised 83rd, and eventually became a lieutenant colonel in the same regiment in 1811. Vacancies creaied when an officer died or was killed were filled by seniority within the regiment. The August 1775 order book of Maj. Gen. William Howe, then commander in chief in North America, shows how the process worked following the death of a captain in the 49th Foot: Captn Lieut James Grant to he Captain Vice [in place of| HepluneDead Lieut Robert Wlhon to be Captn Lieut Vice Grant Preferred

Ensign Wilim Roberts to he Li Vice Wi/son Preferred John Wrigglesworth Volunteer lo be Vice Roberts preferred. The process was prone to manipulation. An officer with money could

Officer. 4th Foot. 1779

dart aboui the Army List so as to finish up in his desired regiment. Arthur Wesley (as he then spelled his name), the future Duke of Wellington, was commissioned into the 73rd Foot in March 1787, promoted into the 76th that December and slipped, via lhe

^Regular pay, the prospect of promotion, good rations and a generous alcohol allowance all helped' 41st Foot and the 21st Light Dragoons, to a captaincy in the 58th in 1791. He moved on, by way of the 18lh Light Dragoons, to a majority in the 33rd Foot in April 1793 and a lieutenant colonelcy in the same regiment in September that year at ihe age of 24. Seniority made him a colonel while he was commanding the 33rd, and he reached major general in 1802.

NCO, 2nd Fool Guards, 1775

A

rmies rely upon a mixture of coercion and reward lo mainlain their cohesion, and it is easy to identify the British army's fonnal processes during the American War. Discipline was strict. Men were flogged for minor offenses and executed for more serious crimes, although officers dispensing capital sentences tliought hard about their moral responsibilities. Executions—often for desertion, that bane of I8th centur>' armies —were designed to impress and deter, and victims were often pardoned at the last moment. In July 1779, Private John Sutherland of the 64th, condemned for desertion, was reprieved at lhe foot of the gallows, and "fainted with joy when his pardon was pronounced." Casual brutality, however, was rare in most regiments. Captain Peebles much regretted hitting a drunken soldier, while others wrote of their suq^rise at the way certain British officers knocked about German troops serving under them. At the other extreme, regular pay, the prospect of promotion (especially the 'brevet" rank granted officers for distinguished service), good rations and a generous alcohol allowance (intended to alleviate lhe rigors of campaigning rather than to send

Sergeant, 27th Foot, 1777

Grenadier Sergeant. 18th Foot, 1776

men into battle dead drunk) all helped. So too did prize money, produced Trom the sale of captured enemy public property, although the distribution by shares according to rank often aroused ire. It is harder to agree on the effect of the intimate bonds that lie at the very heart of soldiers' motivation. Admirers of the regimental system argue that the ties of loyalty, burnished by long service in a unit with its own culture. generated cohesion on and off tbe baitlefield. But historian John Houlding long ago sbowed that peacetime deployments saw regiments broken down into smaller groups, impeding both collective training and tbe acquisition of esprii de corps. Soldiers received basic training in drilling and weaponry on joining the army, but battalion maneuvers and training in collaboration between different arms of the service was liampered by the fact that the army was scattered about Great Britain. There were some peacetime "camps of instruction," and in wartime, regiments often assembled in Britain to perfect their own advanced training and to work with other units, ln the summer of 1774, seven light companies came together in camp near Salisbury lo have William Howe teacb them his excellent new system of skirmishing drills. Howe based his tactics on his own experience of the n5'^63 French and Indian War, and many senior officers were also combat veterans. But the overwhelming majority of officers and men had no combat experience before they reached North America.

o

Matthew Spring bas sbown tbat distinctive paraphernalia like regimental colors and grenadier caps were rarely seen in North America, as dress was radically modified to meet local demands. Moreover, many regiments had short histories, and the practical demands of campaigning meant tbat new men were constantly entering their ranks. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence thai unit identity mattered greatly to British soldiers serving in America. Sergeant Roger Lamb describes how, when the 23rd Royal

MILITARY HISTORY

Welch Fusiliers approached the Rebel first line at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781 and saw American muskets leveled across a rail fence, there was a "general pause." Lt. Gol. James Webster rode forward and said, with more than his usual commanding voice, "Come on, my brave Fuziliers." Although the Rebel volley was, as one

TtircRo DuCï «It DBsriHAunoM. Firft Baiialinn of PENXSTXTANIA L O Y A L I S T S , commainird hy His Exccllcticy Sir W I L L I . A M Howe. K a A L L INTltEl'lT) ABLE-IiODIED

HEROES, W

HO .Tji- uitting to fi:r\v lilt ULIJESTT KDSQ GEORG E the Tliini, in Ddrncc of thrir Cfflmtrv, Liiw.'i .lnJ ConHmifKni. :t>::ûnfl die .-u-bitmiy L'furpariniis of H lymnnical fii'iigrrls, li:ne now not ordy ail Opjmnuiiily iit" nianifcning ilicir Sniril, bv aílilíiny ill n-diitinjj: to Ohcclitncr llicir tno-loiig deluded (J-tmnnnicn. IHH alPj (jf ari|ninnK the jwÜte Accoiiiiitilhriiciits of a SolriuT. hy Icrviiig only two "^rars. or (luring ilic ¡ircfciit Rcbcllitip \n America. Siitli ljiirii(!il IVHoffs. will) an: wiBiiii; to ntpiigr. lïill lie n-Hai-il«! at rlic Knil of the Win-, jiHidiu ibcii Laurels, with 50 Acn-s of I-nml, nhci-crrcry galLint Hem mny iT-tirc I'jich Vitliiiiterr will nrfcirc, an a Buunhr. F l T ï IJuLLAus. hctrili-s Arm«, Cltmihiiii: niiiJ Ac.'imlrcincriH, nml I'-ry i)lhrrHr(]ii¡|iii-]Hii|irrii» acniiuiiia flaira Crriiii iriaii SoMirr. l>y :i|i[iiyirit; m l.inilcii:irit Al.LFIN. or at C.ipiaiii ki.Miw's Rrn , Ml P A r U t C B T r i . M t ï ' s ,

tllliT DlHirS IlIlilVC

ftnri, i» Sc A period poster urges Pennsylvania Loyalists to acquire "the polite accomplishments of a soldier"' with two years* service in uniform.

officer grimly recalled, "most galling and destructive,'' most of the American line took to its heels when the British, heartened by this appeal to their tribal loyalty, pressed forward. Conversely, when 2nd Battalion Light Infantry buckled under a surprise attack at Germantown in October 1777, Howe yelled, "For shame. Light Infantry! I never saw you retreat before. Form! Form! lt is only a scouting part)^' The light infantry gained wry satisfaction when Howe realized they were indeed facing a major assault, and a blast of grapesbot rattled about his ears. Spring rightly adds "self-assurance and xenophobia" to the Redcoats' motivational brew. Given the reasons for enlistment, it is chastening to see how those who owed their country so litde

could strive so hard on its behalf. A Hessian captain attributed ii to their "confounded pride and arrogant bearing." A French observer of the Yorktown surrender in Í781 was astonished to see British "arrogance and ill-humor in the face of peasants who were almost naked.. .and who, nevertheless, were their conquerors." Dislike of foreigners in general and irregulars in particular, together with the euphoria of the charge and the desire to avenge comrades hit by musketry, often meant that Rebels who might have surrendered were ¿ bayoneted out of band in the fury I of battle. I There were also a few occasions I when royal troops went further. I For example, on Sept. 28, 1778, I 12 companies of British light ing fantry under Maj. Gen. Charles Grey ¥ overran elements of the 3rd Regi1 ment of Continental Light Dra5 goons under Colonel George Baylor. I The Americans had quartered for E the night in several barns in HarI rington Township, N.J. During the I surprise night attack, some of the •j British troops obeyed their officers' Í prompting to kill Americans who bad surrendered.

B

ritish tactics in America are only now being properly understood. The pressure to make infantr)' more agile predated the war. As Private Matthew Todd observed in 1757, "We were frequently Exercising by Bushfighting, Street firing, etc." Tactics, dress and equipment were modified to enable infantry to deal with irregular opponents in the wild or forested countr)', and officers ensured that "regiments are frequently practiced at firing with ball at marks." However, tension remained about the relationship between musketr)' and cold steel. Some officers admired the Prussian pattern, in which infantry slammed out volleys as rapidly as possible. But this was incompatible with combat in broken countr); and volley fire was arguably more difficult in practice tlian it was in theory Although the infantry certainly hammered away toe to toe at some bat-

ties, like Camden in August 1780, such instances were less common than we might think. When attacking, the BriUsh generally fired a single volley at close range—say, as little as 35 )'ard5—cheered and then charged with the bayonet, a tactic that often broke their opponents. This fire-cheer-chaige sequence outlasted the American War and proved extraordinarily successful in Wellingtons great victory at Salamanca in 1812. The striking dilTerence there \vas that broken Frenchmen had no refuge from the cavalry that thundered in to cut them up as they ran. In North America, broken troops (whichever side they were on) usually took refuge in the woods and, all being well, reassembled later. The British did not lack cavalr)' in America because they had none to send but because the terrain meant they could rarely go beyond tactical victor)' to destroy the beaten arm)'. Nor were successful infantry chaiges necessarily useful in woodland, for the advantages of discipline and cohesion enjoyed by regulars were at a discount in a formless battle.

Burgoyne's 1777 defeat at Saratoga, above, brought France into the war. shifting the balance of power to the American cause.

American Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene (together with Commander in Chief George Washington himself) recognized that defeating the British might well involve losing every battle but ensuring that the beaten Continental Army retained enough cohesion to fight another da). That controversial British cavalry officer Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton was right to obser\e that victor)' at Guilford Courthouse was pointless, as "a defeat of the British would have been attended with a total destruction of Earl Comwallis" infantr); whilst a victor)' at this juncture could produce no very decisive consequence against the Americans." Rebel successes, on the other hand, often had an impact resonating far beyond America's shores. In strictly military terms, British Gen. John Burgo)Ties defeat at Saratoga was not a tnajor event, but it encouraged the French to join the war, presenting the British with a conflict

of strategic priorities in which ulbmateiy safeguarding the British Isles would be more important than retaining control of North America. Comwallis' surrender at Yorktown had an even greater effect, for it persuaded the British political establishment, always of two minds about the war, that the game was up. In truth, the king's men had no answer to what Spring has called "Rebel resilience." -An experienced German officer maintained that after initial British failure to nip the rebellion in the bud, "the Rebels couldn t help but become soldiere." And so the)- did; British inability' to destroy the Continental Army was central to their greater failure to convince the colonial population that rebellion would be extinguished. And populations, as my generation knows to its cost, can defy' purely military predictions. (^ For further reading, Richard Holmes ivcommends With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783. by Matthew H. Spring.

MAN OF

DESTINY FILIBUSTER WILLIAM WALKER AIMED FOR THE STARS BUT GOT A FIRING SQUAD BY RON SOODALTER or a man who assembled personal armies, invaded foreign lands and even carved out his own countries, William Walker wasn't much to look at. At 5 feet 2 inches and 120 pounds, with a slender frame and thinning hair, he appeared frail, and with his somher dress and mild manner he was easily mistaken for a man of the cloth. The last thing one might take Walker for was a fighting man. And yet, as one contemporary noted; "Anyone who estimated Mr. Walker by his personal appearance made a great mistake. He arrested your attention with the first word he uttered, and as he proceeded, you felt convinced that he was no ordinary person." Charismatic almost in spite of himself, William Walker dramatically embodied the adventuresome spirit and philosophy of 1850s America. Born in 1824 in Nashville, Tenn., Walker was a prodigy. He attended the University of Nashville, graduating at the top of his class at 14. He studied at the universities of Heidelberg, Edinburgh and Paris and earned a medical degree from the University of Pennsylvania at 19. Walker practiced medicine in Philadelphia, grew weary of it and moved to New Orleans to study and practice law. Tiring of that, he became a Walker hardly looked founding partner in the New Orleans Crescent, like a man destined to wear a conqueror's at which he employed an aspiring young poet crown. Yet his ambition, charisma and penchant named Walt Whitman. for intrigue belied his Walker was ill at ease staying long in one place, stature and made him and when his fiancée died during a cholera king of the filibusters. MILITARY HISTORY

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epidemic, he moved lo San Francisco. The year Walker's escapades had purchased the vast Louisiana Territory from was 1849, and the Gold Rush was in full swing. often attracted former France. Central America now beckoned, as did Adventure seekers, fortune hunters, gamblers soldiers to his cause, the islands of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philipand rogues flooded California, and the peri- but many recruits were pines and Cuba. And while the United States patetic 25-year-old was right at home. He raw, requiring training had signed a treaty with Great Britain, ensuring briefly resumed his newspaper career, then in the most basic skills. a hands-off policy in Central America, AmeriIn this period engraving. can adventurers regarded the agreement as again pracliced law. In 1853 Walker decided to establish a repub- Walker personally drills merely a minor impediment. These men came a squad of his troops. lic of his very ovim, inside Mexico. to be known as "filibusters." He could not have picked a more auspicious For most modern Americans, the term "filitime to try his hand at nation-building. American independbuster" evokes images of long-winded senators seeking ence was scarcely 60 years old, and the brash young Amerito drown opponenis' legislation in a sea of words. In the can eagle was spreading its wings. The nation had fought 1840s and 1850s, however, filibuster had a different, darker two wars wiih Great Britain and, as one early chronicler and more exotic meaning. The term is derived from the noted, "Success in the struggle for existence had produced Dutch word vnjbuiler, which translates as "freebooter." The unbounded egotism and self-confidence." Many Americans Spanish corrupted the term, and from their/ilibusiero believed tliat territorial expansion was not jusi a right, but an came the English version, which meant plunderer or pirate. obligation. Bombastic newspapennan and Democratic rabbleIn the words of a former filibuster, il came to mean "advenrouser John L. O'SuUivan gave a name to this belief in the turers who, during the decade preceding the Civil War, were rightness of unbridled national acquisition: Manifest Destiny engaged in fitting out and conducting under private iniThe United States had already taken huge pieces of land tiative armed expeditions from the United States against from Mexico, adding Texas and Califomia to the Union, and other nations with which this country was at peace." Some

MILITARY HISTORY

of these adventurers meant to annex their new kingdoms to the United States, and as the Southern states particularly supported and encouraged the Filibusters, the newly acquired lands would join the Union as slave states. Others merely sought tbe opponunity to carve out private fiefdoms by force. William Walker resolved to establish himself as the preeminent filibuster of bis era, and for a brief span (1853-60), he was indomitable in his quest. First, he traveled to the port city of Guaymas, Sonora, ostensibly to petition the Mexican government for a grant allowing him to create an American colony, in return for which he would provide protection against marauding Apaches. The Mexicans understandably turned him dov\Ti; Sonora was rumored to be rich in silver deposits, and tbey suspected Walker intended to establish bis own state tbere. Indeed, just weeks before leaving San Francisco for Guaymas, Walker had printed up and sold bonds stamped REPUBLIC OF SONORA. Undeterred. Walker returned to San Francisco and set about acquiring men and arms for his invasion. He opened a recruiting office, and sold scrip for land in Sonora, attracting volunteers by the score and taking in enough money to finance his expedition. Most of his recruits were Southerners—Mexican War veterans, failed gold seekers, men in search of adventure and plunder. Filibustering was, however, against the law, and in October 1853, when Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the U.S. regional miUtary commander, beard of Walkers plans, be confiscated the adventurers anned brig Arrow. A sympathetic federal court soon ordered the ship released. Meanwhile, Walker and his recruits sailed lo Baja California aboard the brig Caroline to await supplies and additional men. Although his ultimate goal was Sonora, Walker established a foothold in Baja before proceeding south. On November 3, he and his band of 50-odd armed recruits— dubbed the First Independent Battalion—seized the capital city of La Paz, captured its governor and raised the banner of the Republic of Lower California, Walker declared the entire peninsula a "free, sovereign and independent" country, named himself president and forever renounced all allegiance to Mexico. He further stipulated that his new domain would employ the same set of laws that governed Louisiana, including legal slavery

W

hen word of Walker's 1833 capture of La Paz reached San Francisco, enlistment boomed, someone planted a version of his flag on a street comer and the local newspapers celebrated his "great victor)'." W^alker's former law partner, Henry P Watkins, soon sailed south with 230 more recruits. Walker wasted no time: The self-appointed president moved his capital to Ensenada, selected a cabinet and declared his new little country open to world trade. He penned a letter to the American people, explaining that "to develop the resources of Lower California, and to effect a proper social organization therein, it was necessar>' lo make

Walker's Quest to Be King William Walker's desire for martiaj immortality led him from his native Tennessee to California, and from there to Mexico and Central America. His journey was long, arduous, blood-soaked and ultimately unsuccessful. May 8,1824 Walker is born in Nashville, the son of a distinguished family. A child prodigy, he graduates summa cum laude frorri the University of Nashville at the age of 14. 1843 After traveling widely in Europe and studying medicine at several of the continent's most prestigious universities, Walker receives a niedical degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He practices only briefly before moving to New Orleans to study law and work as a newspaperman. 1849 Following the death of his fiancée in a cholera outbreak. Walker moves to San Francisco. He ultimately becomes editor of the city's Herald newspaper Oct. 15,1853 Deciding to seek his fortune as a filibuster. Walker sails from San Francisco with a group of followers-dubbed the First Independent Battalion —bound for Mexico. Jan. 18.1854 Capturing La Paz. Walker declares it the capital of his new Republic of Baja California. He soon establishes the

larger Republic of Sonora, and his victories spur the arrival of additional recruits. Ultimately defeated, he and his men return to California. October 1854 Walker stands trial on federal charges of violating U.S. neutrality but is acquitted. May 4.1855 Walker and 56 followers sail from San Francisco, this time bound for Nicaragua. Sept. 4,1855 The filibuster forces defeat the national army of Nicaragua at the Battle of La Virgen. Oct. 15,1855 Walker captures Nicaragua's capital. Granada, and takes control of the country.

May 20.1856 The U.S. government officially recognizes Walker as Nicaragua's governor. April 11.1857 A coalition Central American army deteats Walker at the Second Battle of Rivas. He and his men return to the United States in May 1857. Aug. 6.1859 After several earlier, unsuccessful tries to return to Central America. Walker and his men capture Truxillo. Honduras. They soon suffer huge losses and are picked up by the Royal Navy vessel HMS Icarus. Its captain turns over Walker to Honduran authorities. Sept. 12,1860 After a brief thai, William Walker is sentenced to death and executed by firing squad.

it independent." As one early historian assessed Walker's pretensions: "The spectacle of a man still in his 20s, with some two-score social misfits as his total support, solemnly explaining to 25 million people why he had seen fit to create a new nation on their borders, needs the pen of a Cervantes to do it full justice." In early December, Mexican forces counterattacked Walker's "country" but were driven off. During the assault, Caroline—then holding two captured Mexican governors— suddenly weighed anchor for Guaymas, taking with it the iiUbusters' food and reserve ammunition. Two veterans who later wrote about their experiences conjectured that the imprisoned governors had persuaded the crew to leave "hy threats or * promise of reward." Three days after Christmas, Watkins arrived with his guns and reinforcements, but no food. Walker now had a force of nearly 300 men and nothing to feed them. Foraging became the order ol the day, and Walker's men grew increasingly discontented. Desertions were rife.

camp. With many of his men unused to military discipline. Walker's attempts to maintain strict control only led to further desertions. Finally, unable to proceed, he gave it up and tumed hack. Arriving back in San Vicente, Walker learned a lesson in real power: He found that local outlaws had slaughtered the 20 men he had left behind, and those same outlaws now made it their business to plague Walker. Faced with the prospect of total destruction, the self-styled president of Sonora led his remaining 33 men to the American border, where on his 30th birthday—May 8, 1854— Walker surrendered to Major J, McKinstry, commander of the American military post at San Diego. McKinstry placed Walker and his men under arrest and accepted their "parole of honor" to travel to San Francisco, where they would face federal charges of violating the neutrality laws of the United States. At his trial the following October, Walker delivered a rousing speech on Americans' expansionist rights, and remarkably, after just eight minutes' deliberation, the jur)' acquitted him. Walker remained in California and again took up the practice of law—albeit briefly.

With the coming of the new year. Walker decided he was ready to take his war of liberation to Sonora. First, he raided neighboring ranches Had Walker's filibustering ended Not content with carving for provender, then sat down to pen some with thefiascoin Baja Califomia, he would have remarkable decrees: He proclaimed he was his own countries from become little more than a footnote to history. annexing Sonora, changing the name of his existing nations. Walker However, the resolute "Man of Destiny " saw far country to the Republic of Sonora and carving even designed the flags greater challenges in his future. He next set his out two separate internal states with defined of his new lands. His sights on Nicaragua. borders. In Lhe process, he elected himself pres- Nicaragua flag, top, bore ident. An 1854 editorial in the Alia Califomia a single star, while his n the mid-19th century, it could take as observed, "It would have been just as cheap red-and white Sonora long as six months to travel or send a letter and easy to have annexed the whole of Mexico banner sported two. from Boston to Califomia by way of Cape at once, and would have saved the trouble of Hom, and America's attention was fixed making future proclamations." on ways to shorten the irip. Alternatives included overland Dissatisfaction with the food and conditions became treksby way of Mexicos Isthmus ofTehuantepec, the Isthmus a growing problem within Walker's "army," and desertions of Panama or the Isthmus of Nicaragua. increased. At one point. Walker ordered the men to swear New York railroad and shipping magnate Cornelius an oath of allegiance, but 50 men refused. Tempers Qared, Vanderbilt saw in Nicaragua the possibility of a waterway weapons were drawn, and a shootout was narrowly averted connecting the Caribbean with the Pacific and ohtained the when the 50 took their weapons and left. Only Walker's rights to dig a canal. When this proved unfeasible, he estabdirect intervention prevented his loyal recruits from firing lished the Accessory Transit Company to convey passengers a field piece into the withdrawing deserters. With his across the isthmus by steamboat and coach to the Pacific remaining 130 men. Walker resumed preparations for the port of San Juan del Sur. The company opened in mid-1851 invasion of Sonora. and proved profitable, carrying tens of thousands of pasOn February 13, he marched his reduced force out of sengers annually. Many Americans thus perceived NicaraEnsenada, leaving a garrison of 20 men in the nearby village gua as a land of boundless opportunity William Walker ol San Vicente to guard the camp. The campaign became described it as "a countr)' for which nature has done much a nightmare, as illness, bandit attacks and more deserand nian little." He wanted in. tion whittled away his force. At one point. Walker ordered in Nicaragua a major civil conflict had been raging for two deserters shot and two others ilogged and driven from years between the country's two political factions—the

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narrow city streets, where Legitimist troops aristocratic conservatives, or Legitimists, based Walker fought two in Granada, and the elite liberals, or Democrats, pivotal clashes in Rivas. poured volley after volley of small-arms fire into the outnumbered American force. The filiIn León. Having heard of Walker, the underdog Nicaragua, along the busters sought refuge in several adobe houses, Democrats hired him to help defeat the Legiti- passenger route to tbe mists. Walker attracted a small band of volun- Pacific. The first, above, as the Legitimists, according to Walker, "pressed them from all sides." teers—referred to by admirers as the Immortals marked his dismal —and on May 4, 1855, he sailed for Nicaragua debut in battle, while Walker and most of his remaining men ultiwith 57 men. Walker himself described them the last set him on the mately broke through the Legitimist cordon and as "men of strong character, tired of the hum- road to a firing squad. escaped the city, leaving some of their wounded drum of common life/' Historian Laurence behind, five of whom were "barbarously murGreene characterized them as "vigilante fugitives from San dered,"' noted Walker. The filibusters withdrew to San Juan Francisco, wharf rats from New Orleans and villains from del Sur, where Walker commandeered the Costa Rican half the countries of the world." Shortly after Walker's Landschooner San José to evacuate his men. All told, the Ameriing on June 16, some 200 Nicaraguan liberals joined his cans suffered U dead and five wounded, leaving Walker force. Walker formed the Americans into a separate comwith only 35 men in the field. Though he had acquitted mand, dubbed La Falang,c Americana, the American Phalanx. himself bravely in his first combat action. Walker—who had On June 29. Walker attacked Rivas, a key town along had no previous military training or experience—proved the Accessible Transit route and bastion of ibe Legitimists. disastrous as a commander. He had formed no real strategy, Walker met with heavy resistance, prompting his Nicadid no reconnaissance and apparently had no idea of the raguan troops to flee. But the phalanx held fast. Fighting size or location of the opposition. And he abandoned his was fierce, often hand to hand, and it ranged through the wounded men to a vengeful enemy.

Walker nonetheless managed once again to emerge unscathed and with his reputation intact. Appropriating La Vifgen, one of Vanderbilt's steamboats, he ferried a force to Granada and attacked the city—this time establishing and foUowing a battle plan. He took the Legitimists by surprise, and after negotiating a tmce with the enemy commander. General Ponciano Corral, he assumed the rank of major general and commander in chief of the Army of the Republic and appointed a puppet president, Don Patricio Rivas. Shortly thereafter, Walker brutally executed Corral for "conspiracy." According to one of Walker's veterans, "From this time until Marcb 1856, peace prevailed throughout the republic." Indeed, things were quiet. But it was only the calm before the storm. At the time, the president of neighboring Costa Rica—fearful of Walker's evident lust for acquisition—declared war on the filibuster general. Walker attempted a pre-emptive strike agairist Costa Rica, but his forces were defeated at Santa Rosa, The Cosu Rican army then invaded Nicaragua and occupied Rivas. Walker, forgetting the costly lesson he'd learned at the previous Battle of Rivas, attempted a frontal assault on the invading forces and was roundly thrashed. But his luck held: Cholera swept the Costa Rican army and rather than pursue and destroy Walker and his men. the invaders returned home—where the disease spread with devastating results. Meanwhile, inspired by the stories of derring-do that had liltered back to the States, hundreds of American volunteers boarded steamers and sailing ships and made their way

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But Walker had made a critical mistake. Realizing that without steamships for logistical support he had little hope of maintaining control of the country, Walker had revoked Vanderbilt's Accessory Transit charter and commandeered the company's steamboats. In so doing he made an enemy of the richest and most powerful man in America. Furious, Vanderbilt pressured Pierce to withdraw recognition of Walkers presidency, supported the opposition coalition, shipped guns and gold to Costa Rica and sent agents to Nicaragua to foment uprisings and recapture his steamboats. Without firing a shot, Vanderbilt's agents, in alliance with the Costa Ricans, gained control of Walker's steamships and fortifications, thereby cutting him off from any possibility of reinforcement. With few options left. Walker again entered Rivas, where the combined opposition forces—which now included American mercenaries in the pay of Cornelius Vanderbilt—kept him bottled up from December 1856 to May 1857.

Finally, the captain of the U.S. sloop of war SI. Maty's, which had been dispatched to San Juan del Sur to protect American citizens, negotiated an agreement that allowed Walker and his officers to retain their sidearms, ride under escort to the coast and board the vessel for transport to Panama. The rest of his men were to be given amnesty and allowed to remain in the country' if they chose. Walker's invasion of Nicaragua was over— at least for now. Walker made his way to New York, where he was again charged with neutrality violations, tried and acquitted. Almost immediately, he hegan to raise funds for a return to Nicaragua. The filibuster had captured the popular imagination, and his standing among the American people was

Walker became a folk hero stateside, where books and theater shows romanticized his misadventures.

espite his protestations of populist s^Tnpathy Walker had no feeling for the people whose lands he claimed as his own. He saw them as inferiors, and didn't hesitate to steal from them—or shoot them—as he felt the situation demanded. When retreating from Granada, the oldest Spanish colonial cit>' in Nicaragua, he left a detachment with orders to level it in order to instill, as he put it, "a salutary dread of American justice." It took them over two weeks to smash, burn and flatten the city, but flatten it they did; all that remained were inscriptions on the ruins that read AQUÍ FUE GRANADA (HERE WAS GRANADA).

MILITARY HISTORY

Events were about to take an ominous tum for the filibuster. Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala formed an alliance and jointly occupied León, while Costa Rica invaded once again. Nicaragua's ineffectual puppet president ran for his life, denouncing Walker as a usurper. Walker then assumed the presidency of Nicaragua, declared English the national language and again legalized slavery. Shortly thereafter. U.S. President Franklin Pierce— a strong proponent of expansionism—officially recognized Walker's administration.

at an all-time high. Writers dashed off poems, songs and even a three-act play to commemorate his deeds. Walker himself virote a book, The War in Nicaragua—part apologia, part self-glorification. "Insanely confident of success," as one contemporary described him. Walker mustered another group of wouldbe conquerors and again sailed to Nicaragua. He landed his force at Punta Arenas on the Costa Rican coast in November 1857, but before he could make any further headway, LI.S. Navy Commodore Hiram Paulditig arrived at Punta Arenas aboard the 50-gun frigate Wabash, came ashore, arrested Walker and sent him home. The following spring in New Orleans, Walker, for the third time, was tried and found nol guilty of violating neutrality laws. Still obsessed wiih his mission, Walker again assembled a mini-army, which included some of his original Immortals. This time their schooner struck a coral reef off Belize. A British warship rescued the frustrated little army and returned them to port in Mobile.

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were wounded, including their leader. "Coast fever" spread among the desperate men and rendered their situation hopeless. Again, rescue appeared in the form of a naval vessel—this time the British man-of-war HMS karus. Commander Nor%'ell Salmon took Walker and his men aboard and personally gave them assurances of safe conduct. For reasons that remain unclear, Salmon seemingly changed his mind and sailed to Truxillo, where he tumed over Walker and his chief of staff. Colonel A.H Rudler, to Honduran authorities. Rudler was sentenced to four years in the mines, but Walker was condemned to death. On the morning of Sept. 12, 1860, Honduran soldiers marched him from his cell and, at the order to fire, finally stilled Walkers relentless ambition. The "Gray-eyed Man of Destiny" was 36 years old. Salmon conveyed Walker's men to Roatán, the largest of Honduras' Bay Islands, where, in the words of one of the few sur\ivors, they were ''left to live or die, as might happen. Out of 91, only 12 retumed to tell the story."

*0n the morning of Sept. 12,1860, Honduran 5oldiers marched him from his cell and, at the order to fire, finally stilled William Walker's relentless ambition»

he wreck of his ship didn't deter Walker from making a fourth attempt to retake "his'' country. But this time the British—who maintained a strong presence in Central America—proved his undoing. Walker landed his force of 91 men on the coast of Honduras and, on Aug. 6, 1859, captured the city of Truxillo (or Trujillo) and began a march toward Nicaragua. They would not make ii. Along the way, the Americans encountered overwhelming opposition from Honduran infantry and suffered major losses, leaving in their wake dozens of dead or mortally wounded men. A flotilla of 15 British ships off the coast prevented reinforcements from joining Walker, and his army was soon reduced to 31 men, nearly all of whom

Filibustering—perhaps the most extreme form of the Manifest Destiny impulse, died with William Walker Within the next few months, the South seceded from the Union, giving the American people a great deal more to think about than the fate of one megalomaiiiacal freebooter. Given his lack of militar)' ability, it was inevitable Walker should fail. His shortlived successes were due mainly to a combination of luck and his delusional inabilitv to realize when he was beaten. © Forjurther reading, Ron Soodalter recommends The War in Nicaragua, bv William Walker, Reminiscences of the Filibuster War in Nicaragua, by C.W Douhieday; and Filibusters and Financiers: The Story of William Walker and His Associates, by William O. Scroggs.

1215 and All That IN THE BITTER 13TH CENTURY STRUGGLE BETWEEN KING JOHN AND THE UPSTART ENGLISH BARONS. THE MAGNA CARTA WAS FAR FROM THE LAST WORD BY JAMES LACEY Vengeance has been called the true sport of kings, and few monarchs have taken it as seriously as England's King John. While not nearly the warrior his older brother Richard the Lionheart had been, John proved himself more than adept at ^ exacting revenge for injuries real and imagined. Among the former were insults hurled at the monarch by the same barons who in June 1215 had forced their sovereign to sign one of history's great documents, the Magna Carta, which limited John's royal powers and protected the barons' privileges as freemen. John's signature would have ended the long- King John, left, took standing strife between king and barons, had either side England's throne following °

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the death of his older

possessed the good sense to make some small measure of accommodation toward the other Unfortunately, that is ^

brother Richard i (the i-'on'ieart).ini206John ordered extensive repairs

not the way of over-proud men. No sooner was the 'Great to Rochester Castie, Charter" signed than the barons turned to drink and, in right, unaware he would later have to storm the

their drunkenness, loudly proclaimed John a "disgrace,"

© ADAM WOOLFITT/COHBlSi INSET: THE GRANGER COLLECTtON, NCW ÏDBK

walled city and its keep.

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"a worthless man and a king contemptible to his people," "a slave" and "the scum of the people," according to 13th century FngUsh chronicler Roger of Wendover. Upon hearing of these insults., John flew into an impressive rage, "gnashing his teetb, scowling with his eyes, and gnawing at the limbs of trees," Once he calmed dowTi, he shifted his energies to the business of vengeance. And serious business it would be.

them to desist from their revolt or face excommunication. Soon after, when John refused to meet the barons for a peace conference, England's bishops, whose sympathies lay with the barons, used the exact wording of the papal bull to excommunicate all "disturbers of the peace." As the barons saw themselves as peacemakers and the king as the true disturber of the peace, the dreaded papal anathema and excommunication had little immediate effect.

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With the pope's blessing in hand and a formidable mercenary army now

ohnls first concern was to ensure the safet)' of what he still possessed. He sent royal writs 10 the mercenaries guarding his castles, ordering them to secretly provision their strongholds and prepare for war. He then snuck off to the Isle of Wight, accompanied by the seven nobles who remained faithful to him. There, John gathered forces for a campaign that would break the power of England's barons. For VA'O months, John busied himself with amassing funds and buying the loyally of the southern ports' garrisons. Even as he tackled these tasks, his emissaries were making their way to Rome to seek papal support, while his military commanders were dispatched to France to gather a mercenary army. In the first of these tasks, John's cause was greatly assisted by his having ended a long conflict with Pope Innocent 111 two years before. As part of the deal he made with Innocent, John agreed to become the pope's vassal, thereby transforming Innocent from bitterest foe to closest ally That process also made England a part of Innocent's papal holdings.

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So when Innocent learned of the baron's revolt and the Magna Carta, he saw Lhe latter as a challenge to his papal prerogatives and reportedly exclaitned, "Are the barons of England removing from the throne a king who is under the protection of the apostolic see? By Si. Peter, we cannot pass over this insult without punishing it!" He then condemned and forever annulled what he called the "shaming and demeaning document," and composed a letter to the barons, ordering

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A Once he learned that d'Aubigny and his followers had occupied Rochester, John ordered his murderous throng to attack f '

at his back, John was ready to march by late September 1215. The barons, on the other hand, had spent ihe months since the signing of the Magna Carta waiting in London in a siate of indolence. Not unlil Johns war plans became obvious did they rouse themselves to action and besiege lhe royal strongholds at Oxford and Northampton. In early Oclober, the barons advanced into Kent to engage the king. who was in Canterbury at the head of a small reconnoitering force. Realizing he was only a few miles from the full might of the barons' army, John beat a hasty retreat to Dover, where his mercenaries awaited their orders. Ironically, the barons—upon hearing a rumor that the king was advancing from Canterbury—withdrew despite their superior numbers.

To delay King John's advance while ihey concentrated their force for a decisive battle, the rebellious barons convinced Reginald of Comhill, then securing Rochester Castle for Archbishop of Canterbury Stephen Langion, to turn over the fortress to them. One of Englands most formidable fortresses, Rochester stood athwart the route from Dover to London. Whoever held it would dominate most of Kent and control London's communications to the south and the sea.

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he site of a timber fortification since Roman times, Rochester took form as a castle proper when the Normans built stone walls in the late 11th century. Henry I presented the caslle to Archbishop of Canterbur\' William de Corbeil in 1127 and charged him with building its great keep, a formidable tower within the castle. By the 13th centur)', Rochester Castle was considered virtually impregnable. Attackers faced three lines of defense; the walls around the town of Rochester itself, then the castle's solid curtain walls and, finally, the formidable keep, with six levels and four towers. By any measure, taking the castle by force was a daunting challenge. Ironically, just before the Barotis' War, John had improved the castles defenses, an act he surely regretted now that he faced the task of storming the very walls he had reinforced.

To hold Rochester Castle against John's attack, the barons picked a force of 140 knights led by veteran warrior William d'Aubigny. When d'Aubigny and his men arrived in Rochester, they expected lo find the fortress well stocked and ready for war but instead found it completely unprepared to withstand a siege. Many of the knights thought to abandon the mission but were held lo their duty by the exhortations of d'Aubigny, who simultaneously shamed them and appealed to their martial vigor. In a burst of activity; the small band of warriors stockpiled all available supplies within the town. But within three days of their arrival, John and his army appeared at the walls of Rochester.

And what an army it had become. Joined by knights from Poitou and Gascony loyal to the House of Anjou (which ruled much of northern France) and to John, by opportunistic warriors who coveted tbe lands of England's barons and by battalions of mercenary' crossbowmen who, in the words of Roger of Wendover, "thirsted for nothing more than human blood," tbe royal army was so immense that one contemporary' chronicler asserted, "All who beheld it were struck with fear and dismay" Once he learned that d'Aubigny and his followers had occupied Rochester, Jobn ordered his murderous throng to attack. For tlie townspeople manning Rochester's walls, the sight of John's fearsome professionals was too much, and they fled the battlements. Johns knights hurst through the town gates and in a short, vicious fight pushed d Aubignys troops across the castle drawbridge and into the stronghold. If some chroniclers are to be believed, the defenders fought only to cut their way through John's men and beat a hasty retreat to London.

John reluctantly signed and affixed his seal to the Magna Carta at a June 15, 1215. ceremony at Runnymede meadow. Pope Innocent III later upheld John's repudiation of the charter, sparking war between the king and his barons.

But they failed miserably and were now trapped within the keep, facing one of the greatest castle breakers of the Middle Ages.

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espite recent attempts to rehabilitate his reputation, neither history nor literature speak well of King John. Most historians have agreed with Enghsh medievalist William Stubbs, who in 1875 labeled John "the very worst of all our kings...a faithless son. a treacherous brother...polluted with every crime... false to ever^'obligation. ...In the whole view, there is no redeeming trait." Indeed, the monarch gained the nickname "John Softsword" after losing Normandy to tbe French, supposedly because he would not leave the bed of his young bride.

In truth. Normandy and the rest of the Angevin Empire's once extensive possessions in France could not have resisted the resurgent power of the French monarchy. Even Richard the Lionheart. against whom Johns supposed military failings are often measured, was hard-pressed to hold what his father, Henry II, had gained. Still, it was John who lost an empire, and with it his military reputation. In reality, John had an enviable war record; In 1202, for example, the king marched bis army 80 miles in 48 hours to rescue his aging mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, who was besieged in Mirabeau Castle. He routed the unsuspecting besiegers, freed his mother and captured almost all of ihe enemy nobles. Jobn was equally effective at assaulting strongholds, as he proved in 1206 when he took the supposedly impregnable fortress of Montauban. In short, few of Johns contemporaries would have underestimated him as a combat conmiander. Indeed, throughout 1215 the harons showed a marked reluctance to face the king in battle.

With six levels and four towers, the kc p was an immensety strong defensive position and defenders' iast redoubt.

Three tnwers, each a self-contained strongpoint, guarded the eastern approach.

. ^ .contrôfiedaccess '--..to the; .. which'was ringed y ts own walis7

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Rochester Castle River Medway

Built on ihe site of Roman-era timber fortifications, the castle first look shape when the Normans built stone walls sometime in the late 11th century. Continuously enlarged and strengthened over two centuries, the riverside fortress was considered virtually impregnable by the time of the 1215 siege. Attackers faced three lines of defense—the walls around Rochester town itself, the castle's soHd curtain walls and, finally, the keep. ILUtSTRATION AND MAP BY GREG PROCH

Attackers who breached the curtain wall had to

Several f^fet thick^ and crenellated^i on top,tfie \\ il wasadauqting'i outer defense. "

The northwest bastion anchored le castle's riverside defenses.

For some historians, John's failures resulted from his inability to win a peace: He could not resist kicking his opponents when they were down, thtis his many enemies never forgave him for his slights and insults and pounced at any opportunity for revenge. No matter how many armies John defeated or how many castles he hroke, his arrogance, inability to compromise and maladroit diplomatic efTorts ensured he would have more enemies and fewer allies.

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he barons in London seemed paralyzed with consternation at Johns rapid response to their seizure of Rochester. They had sworn to rush to d'Aubignys aid. were he attacked, but two weeks passed before they took any action. On October 26, Robert Fitzwalter led 700 knights to lift the siege. They had only reached Dartford—less than 20 miles from London—^when tliey learned John was marching to confront them. Contemptuous chroniclers noted that although Fitzwalter's warriors faced

MILITARY HISTORY

In May 1213, King John ceremonially surrendered his kingdom to Pope Innocent Ill's legate to end a dispute over who would elect the Archbishop of Canterbury, ensuring the pope's later support against the barons.

httle more than a mild south wind, they retreated to London to amuse themselves with gambling, drinking and "practicing all other vices." On the first day of his siege of Rochester, an emboldened John set up his headquarters on nearby Boley Hill and ordered the erection of five great siege engines. He also ordered the destruction of the bridge over the Medway River, isolating the castle from any support from London. Finally, John sent orders for every smith in Canterbury to work nonstop making pickaxes and send them immediately to Rochester. Day and night, John pressed his attack on the castle. As his siege engines rained large stones upon the defenders, the king's archers and crossbowmen maintained an unceasing bar-

rage of missiles. Through it all, John ordered continual assaults on the walls. D'Aubigny and his men repulsed every attack with courageous detennination. Despairing of ever receiving the king's mercy and ''endeavoring to delay their own destruction," they made no small slaughter amongst their assailants," according to Roger of Wendover's account ot the siege. For several weeks, d'Aubigny's exhausted band of men "hurled stone for stone and weapon for weapon from the walls and ramparts upon the enemy." Ultimately, however, John's forces breached the castle walls, either with the siege engines or by mining. "The soldiers of the king now rushed to the breach in the wall," wrote Roger of Wendover, "and by constant fierce assaults, they forced the besieged to abandon the casde, although not without great loss on their own side." The defenders then fell back into the castle keep, pressed by John's men. Some attackers managed to force their way into the keep, but D'Aubigny's fierce counterattack slew many of the king's

men and "compelled the rest to quit." By this time, hunger—an enemy as deadly as King John's army—was laking its toll on the defenders. They had been living on the rotting meat of their slaughtered warhorses for a week. Now even that was gone. But John did not have the patience to let starvation do his work. He set his miners to work undercutting the foundations of the keep. On November 25, the miners reported they had tunneled beneath ihe 13-foot-thick stone walls, bracing the passages with wooden supports. John then sent a royal writ to Hubert de Burgh, bis chief minister, ordering him to "send to us with all speed by day and nighi 40 of the fattest pigs of the sort leasi good for eating to bring fire beneath the tower," according to the Bamwell chronicler. The miners used the pig fal to fire the tunnel supports. (Today, a monument at Rochester memorializes the 40 pigs that made the ultimate sacrifice for the king.) The subterranean blase brought the intended result, collapsing the southeast comer of the keep, and John's soldiers swarmed into the breach. D'Aubigny led a countercharge and pushed thtkings men to retreat, but fresh assault^ followed one upon the other, and John? men were at last able to force back the defenders. Even then, a quirk in the keep's construction brought d'Aubignys men temporar>- respite: A wall bisecting the keep restricted the assault force to one half of the stronghold, while the defenders look refuge behind a wall as stout as those the miners had spent weeks undermining. By then, though, starvation was doing Kingjohn's work for him. Perhaps still hoping for succor from ihe barons holed up in London, d'Aubigny decided on a desperate move: He ordered that all men unfit due to hunger or wounds be expelled from the caslle. Bui if d'Aubigny was counting on the king's mercy, he had misjudged his adversary's temper. Incensed by the continuing resistance, John ordered the hands and feet of many of the outcasts cut off. His food gone, d'Aubigny held a council of his knighLs. Despite

what John had done to theiT expelled brethren, they voted to surrender, deciding it would, in Roger of Wendover's words, 'be a disgrace to them to die of hunger when they could not be conquered in battle." On November 30, two months into the siege, the surviving defenders marched out of the castle. Considering the delay the castle's resistance had imposed on his plans, the number of his troops slain and the cost of ihe

Forefather of Our Country William d'Aubigny's deliveranee from the gibbet in 1215 would, 500 years later, have a profound effect on the course of American history. When d'Aubigny died in 1236. he was succeeded by his son, also named William. William, in turn, died in 1247, leaving only daughters. One of them, Isabel, married Robert de Ros. Their marriage produced a direct line of descent to George Washington, who thus numbered among his ancestors one of the 25 barons chosen as guar^ antors of the Magna Carta.

siege, John found il hard to contain his fur>^ He ordered gallows prepared and swore he would hang every captive. In the end, he allowed himself—however reluctantly—to be dissuaded by one his loyal knights, Savaric de Mauleon, who told John, "My lord king, our war is not yet over, therefore you ought carefully to consider how the fortunes of war may turn; for if you now order us to hang these men. the barons, our enemies, will perhaps by a like event take me or oiher nobles of your army and, following your example, hang us; there-

fore, do not let this happen, for in such a case, no one will Tight in your cause." John contented himself with imprisoning the leading knights and banding over the men at arms to his soldiers for ransom. The only defenders hanged were the mercenary crossbowmen, whom Johns men generally despised for the carnage they had caused.

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ith Rochester Castle and his line of communication lo the port of Dover now secure. King John unleashed a revenge-driven campaign of terror intended to bring the barons to their knees. Considering London too well fortified to be taken in a winter siege that might wreck his own army, John marched on Northampton. As Roger of Wendover related: (John,} spreading bis troops abroad, burnt tbe houses and buildings of the barons, rotting them of their goods and cattle, and thus destroying every thing that came in his way, hepresentcda misera ble specla cle to a I! who beheld it. .And if the day did not sa tisfy' the mahce of the king for the destruction of property, he ordered his incendiaries to set ñre to the hedges and lowiis on his march, that he might refresh his sight with lhe damage done to Ins enemies and by rotary might support the wicked agents of his iniquity. As John expanded his depredations, tlie despondent barons, in 1216, invited Prince Louis, son of King Philip II of Erance. to bring an army to England and claim lhe throne, Louis accepted the offer and landed in England on May 21, 1216. Within a week he was in London, receiving the homage of the barons. John, distrusting the loyalt)' of his own Erench mercenaries in bailie against their prince, retreated west as a reinvigorated baronial army took lhe offensive. The tides of war had turned against the despised monarch when he succumbed to dvsenterv in October 1216. (ffil For further reading, James Lacey recommends:]ohn Lackland, by KateNorgate, and Flowers of History, by Rc^er of Wendover.

Il FROM THE FIRST USE OF POISON GAS ON THE WESTERN FRONT IN APRIL 1915. GAS MASKS BECAME A FIXTURE ON 20TH CENTURY BATTLEFIELDS-AND ON THE HOME FRONT

lere is an undeniably absurd aspect to the gas mask—with its froggish eyes and elephantine snout. Its even comical in numbers, as generations of recruits have found when preparing for chemical warfare training. On go the masks, followed by inevitable jokes about "gas" and "smells." Then into a chamber they shuffle, talking tough to dispel any unmanly nervousness. The door slams shut, and the laughter dies down. An instructor pulls out a harmlesslooking canister and pulls the pin... A centur}' ago armies of untested soldiers —boys really—slipped on their masks and emerged from bunkers and trenches into the nightmarish reality of chemical warfare on the Western Front. "The world 1 had left 1 could see dimly thru mica eyes," wrote a British conespondent in 1917, describing a 58 MILITARY HI

Gemían gas attack on a French bunker. "Through the muffled door we could hear occasionally the phut-phut of the gas shells. Presently they stopped. The deathlike silence was nerve-racking. The gas seemed to have kiUed all sound. My mask was stifling, and 1 felt that 1 must be suffocating." Between 1914 and 1919, opposing armies deployed some 50,000 tons of chemical agents—burning, suffocating, blinding or other\\ise incapacitating more than 1 million men. Nearly 100,000 died. While the 1925 Geneva Protocol explicitly prohibited any Riaire use of opposite, emerge from poison gas, neither soldiers a Western Front dugout nor civilians were taking in 1918. Above, a poster the U.S. Chemical any chances, as the follow- from Warfare Service depicts ing images attest. Gas-attack the horrible drowning drills remain a sobering symptoms caused by part of military training.

inhaled gases such as chlorine and phosgene.

faced a learning curve when training with their awkward new gear. German soldiers on the march in 1915. top, wear abbreviated masks and makeshift respirators, only useful against tearing agents. The soldiers above are better equipped, though their mule may suffer. Peeling onions, right, is no trick.

be prepared, the message behind a World War ll-era poster, left. A snug fit was crucial, as a Tommy demonstrates, lower left. Next came practice on the firing range under simulated gas attack, below. Finally came field exercises. Practicality often took a back seat, as light machine gunners of the German Cyclist Corps, bottom, illustrated in 1939.

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similar gas-attack drills, the masks lending a surreal aspect to otherwise predictable domestic scenes. In the täte 1930s, railway workers in Blackpool. England, top. sit patiently for inspection, as do two of three Airedale terriers in a Surrey boot camp, above. Masks were the latest fashion in wartime London, right.

and chilling about the sight of children in gas masks. It wasn't Halloween, and the fear was all too real for an English schoolboy, left, in 1916. Below, in 1939 the parents of Neville Mooney—the first baby born in wartime London-stoically cradle f2

their encased son. For London schoolchildren, bottom, mask drills accompanied the three Rs.

'•^j MILITARY HIST

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IN A GOLDEN AGE OF WHEELED WARFARE, HITTITE AND EGYPTIAN HORSEPOWER VIED FOR MASTERY OF THE MIDDLE EAST BY STEVEN WEINGARTNER

Jn 1275_BC th_e_armies of the Hittite and Egyptian empires clashedv in one of the greatest chariot engagements in history In the Battle of Kadesh, the climactic military encounter in a long struggle for control of what is now Syria, the Hittites confronted the Egyptians ^ i t h a new system of chariot combat that featured mobile tactics of unprecedented scale and scope. Key to the development and i m { ^ mentatiöTTöf tlïësê^taciîcs was â-rêdëslgned chariot made possiM by one extraordinary man, a Mitannian horse trainer named Kikkuli. Kikk-uli entered Hillite military service in the mid-Hth conneetion with training inter\als, gaits and classification century IK most likely during the reign of Suppiluliuma !, of horses al various training stages. lo train horses for ibe kings chariotry arm. While so enKikkulis presentation is terse, straightforward, ecogaged be wrote an extraordinary manual thai outlined a nomieal. There are no literary embellishments, no Rowseven-monlb training regimen designed to prepare young ery phrases. Nor does he express any emotion toward horses for chariot combat. Preserxed on four clay tablets ibe horses. His job was to condmon them mentally and and written mostly in Nesite, ihe Hittite language, the physically for the arduous task of pulling chariots in cuneiform inscriptions of Kikkuli s texl exhibit a genius battle. Perit>d. for equine eare and conditioning tbai anticipated modem Yet. despite his lack of affeci, Kikkulis instructions are practices by several thousand years. informed by a clear concern for the horses' welfare. He Tbe manual begins with the pronouncement. Thus knew tbe primary requirement for a chanot horse was speaks Kikkuli, ibe horse trainer of the land of Miianni.'^ endurance. Tbe animal bad to be strong, in bolb mind Name, job title, country of origin; this ^ d ^Y^ t« ^«'»"'•^ ^^e rigors combat lName,JOUlllie, LUUiiii)'umngm, 11113 ' is all Kikkuli lells us about himself The Hittite Empire reached the peak of its imposed. He also e\idenlly believed Tbe language of ibe lexl is more re- military might between the 14th and 12th thai such mind body slrengtb was not vealing. Significantly, 'borse trainer" centuries BC. due In large part to its supffior innaie but had to be developed m ihe is rendered as assussani, one of many chariotry. captured in dramatic fashion in a horses formative years. In the natureIndo-Aryan terms ibat appear fre- period bas-reiief. opposite. A horse trainer versus-nurlure débale. Kikkuli was quenily in ibe text, particularly in named Kikkuli was critical to its success. firmly on tbe side ofthe lauer, and he

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firmly believed the horse's wellbeing was foundational to the nurturing process. To be sure, his humane training methods may owe their origins to pragmatism. But whatever his motivation, his training regimen does address to a remarkable degree the horse's physiological and psychological needs. Kikkuli clearly recognized that the young animal's rates of physical and mental development differ, with the former advancing faster than the latter. Accordingly, his regimen unfolds in three stages, the first two emphasizing the development of the horse's mechanicalskeletal and cardiovascular systems, and the third focusing on the neuromuscular system. The process centers on physical development, in the form of enhanced strength and heart-lung function, to promote self-confidence. The prescribed workouts feature aspects of what is now termed interval training. Each workout comprises several heats, or intervals, conducted at varying gaits—trot, canter, gallop—over different distances. Between heats a trainer briefly rests his horse. During these pauses, the horse's heart rate drops, but the trainer hegins the next heat before it achieves full recovery to its resting heart rate. Thus, over the course of a workout, the heart is under constant stress but at different levels. Alternating the gait and distance of the heats enhances the conditioning effect. Kikkuli put horees through as many as three workouts a day. Sometimes he would repeat a workout or set of workouts over a period of several daj^. Horses were also given rest days, and Kikkuli incorporated slow days with short, easy workouts. In the early stages of the Kikkuli regimen, the horse was tethered to a chariot and led through its workout. Eventually the horse graduated to pulling a chariot in harness with another horse. The intensity and difficulty of the workouts increased, though the horse was never exercised to mental or phys-

MILITARY HISTORY

Trainers taught horses to swim and conducted a number of workouts at night. Kikkuli rigorously preI scribed meals—when, how much, what to feed the horse—as well as warm-down and cooling periods and rub-downs. The Kikkuli regimen constitut' ed merely the first phase of a chariot horses education. Conditioning was its sole objective. Training the horse how to perform on the battlefield, in harness with another horse and in concert with other chariots, would follow. The horse would then learn the moves characteristic of chariot warfare—fast starts and stops, sudden sharp turns, backing up and linear advances at varying speeds. It would learn to make these moves on the chariot driver's command, expressed vocally or through distinctive tugs on the reins.

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A circa 3nl century BC bronze rein ring from the region settled by the Hittites depicts a trainer working with a horse, evincing that culture's pioneering attempts at equine domestication.

ieal exhaustion. At all times, the horse was allowed to develop at its own pace. If it needed additional days off or slow days, it got them; and when it returned to the training regimen, it picked up on the day it had left off. This is why the number of days a horse actually spent in training probably exceeded the 184 training days stipulated in the text. Kikkuli's method included a fourday culling process, during which trainers identified and dismissed horses deemed unsuitable for further training.

ikkuli's regimen aimed to develop both a horses stamina and its physical strength, a necessity giv1 en the relative robustness of Hit's tite chariots compared to Egyptian i chariots. The latter was a nimble Ï machine, smaller, lighter and fastI er than its Hittite counterpart and I more maneuverable due to the I placement of the axle at the rear of the vehicle. The bigger, heavier Hittite chariot was slower and less agile, but it was sturdier, more stable and able to carry greater weight, attributes conferred by placing the axle in the tniddle of the vehicle. In time the superior conditioning and strength of Kikkuli-trained horses enabled the Hittites to place a third armed warrior in the chariot cab—a strategic advantage implemented less than 50 years after Kikkuh entered the employ of Suppiluliuma 1, early in the reign of Suppiiuhumas grandson MuwattaUi II. The third mounted crewman was previously a "runner."' a dismounted man-at-arms common to all Bronze Age chariot forces. In those chariot clashes, rutmers jogged into battle

exercises echoed in modern-day interval training and the attention given to pre- and post-workout care and feeding of the horse. Day 93 The following morning, they [the grooms] harness them and he [the trainer] makes them go at a trot for two miles. When they unharness them, they line them up and hitch them to the post. Of water and fodder, they give them none. When midday comes, he gives them a handful of hay. In the evening, they harness them and he makes them go at a trot for 1/2 mile and 20 fields and then at a gallop for 38 fields.

"K-j.-^-^

19 Days in the Life of a Kikkuli Horse This compilation of Days 93-102 from Kikkuli's training regimen is adapted from Emilia Masson's Van de soigner et d'entraîner les chevaux. Texte hittite du maître écuyer Kikkuli (1998). Masson's translation of the Nesite-inscribed tablets (example above) is one of several, which differ from one another in key respects, particularly in the interpretation of terms for distances and gaits. For example, the term "mile" stands in for the Hittite danna, which scholars have interpreted as a time measurement of about two hours, equating to 6.6 miles. A single "field" (Hittite iku) is a sub-unit of "mile," and 100 iku comprise a single danna. This selection is representative of the Kikkuli Text as a whole, specifying a mix of

One specifies (this) by: sinisella auzamewa [Hurrian/Mitanni term]; one translates it thus: "From this side one has them go at a gallop for 20 fields and from that side for seven fields." One calls (this) "double gallop." But when they unharness them, in the course of one night five times with water they massage them by rubbing; and when they bathe them, the first time he does not give them grass; but the second time they give them a handful of grass; then, the third time, they don't give (them any); but the fourth time, he gives them a handful of grass. But water, on the other hand, they drink a measure each time. When they come out of the water (from the river), they give them a trowel of gruel mixed with straw, and their fodder is poured. Then they harness them. Days 94-101 Next, for eight nights they make them go at a trot for six miles. They eat five times. The fifth [i.e. 98th] night, they bathe them with hot (water); [when they come out of the water] they eat their ration. And all through the eighth night they eat their rations. Each time (with each ration) they give them a measure of water. Day 102 The ninth day they eat a handful of highest quality hay but two handfuls of mixed grain; then they hitch them to the post. In the evening, they harness them and make them go at a trot for two miles. When they unharness them and line them up, they drink water and, then, during the whole night they eat abundantly of fresh hay.

alongside their vehicles—to protect them from assauli by enemy runners and chariots—and attacked enemy chariots and their runners. Accordingly, chariots advanced into battle at a canter or trot, not at the gallop, so as not to outdistance the runners and thus lose the runners' offensive

The Egyptian chariot, above, was built for speed and maneuverability, with room for a driver, an armed warrior and a runner who dismounted just before battle. The heavier Hittite chariot, top, was a stout battle wagon, able to carry its driver and two armed warriors to the fight. and defensive support. Runners could also help chariot drivers control panicking horses by seizing the reins or cheek straps. The three-man vehicle opened up new possibilities for chariot warfare

MILITARY HISTOPY

and thus warfare in general. Menat-arms riding in chariots did not tire as quickly as runners, and they could go anywhere their chariots went. This allowed the Hittites to dispense with the restrictive conventions of set-piece battles, pounding affairs in which opposing forces lined up opposite each other and advanced to contact in the "battlespace," where they slugged it out—first with bows and arrows and then with hand weapons—until one or both could no longer carry on. The three-man Hittite chariots could now range beyond the battlespace. allowing them to mass greater numbers of chariots for a single engagement and employ large formations in battles of tactical maneuver in which they could apply surprise and concentrated force. uwattalli unveiled his threeman chariots at Kadesh, engags ing an Egyptian army comi manded by Pharaoh RameZ sses U. The armies were fairlv I evenly matched, each num1 bering about 20,000 combat I troops of all types. But MuI wattalli had more chariots, ? perhaps as many as 3,700 machines (estimates vary) against i 2,000 Egyptian. And most if I not all of the Hittite chariots ^ carried three men and were pulled by superbly conditioned horses —graduates of the Kikkuli program. In a set-piece battle, the larger Egyptian army would liave enjoyed a distinct advantage. But Muwattalli's goal was to fight a freewheeling battle of tactical manetiver with his massive chariot formations. So he selected Kadesh as the venue of battle, as the flat, open terrain around the city was suitable for wideranging chariotry operations. Ramesses likely expected to meet the Hittite army at Kadesh. Muwattalli sought to convince the pharaoh the

Hittites would still be far away when the Egjqitians arrived. This he accomplished through the use of double agents, who told Ramesses on the morning of the battle that the Hittite army was near Haleb (Aleppo), some 125 miles north of Kadesh. In fact, the Hittite army had already massed jusi northeast of Kadesh. Ramesses evidently believed their story. At this point, Ramesses' army lay southwest of Kadesh, within a day's tnarch of the city, lt was organized into four combined-arms battle groups, each comprising about 5,000 men organized inio an infantry brigade of 3,500 troops—mostly the heavy infantry of the phalanx, with some light skinnishers and archers—and a chariotry unit of 500 machines with threeman crews (warrior, driver and runner). In the van of the Egyptian host marched the Amun battle group, with Ramesses in command, protected by a contingent of Sherden swordsmen. Eollowing Amun were, respectively, the Ra, Ptah and Set battle groups, each separated from the other by a gap of about two miles. This configuration played right into Muwattalli's hands, as it would allow the Hittites to engage the Egyptian battle groups in detail—a necessary precondilion for fighting a maneuver battle with chariotry against a numerically superior foe. Ramesses acled in complete if unwitting accord with Muwatiallis designs. Convinced that Kadesh was his for the taking, the pharaoh ordered his Amun battle group to occupy the city on the double. The other battle groups would follow at their normal, considerably slower, marching pace. Ramesses and the Amun division forded the Orontes River and hastened north across the Kadesh plain, pitching camp just northwest of the city The entire Hittite army—infantry and chariotry—lay in wait on the other side of the city, which concealed its presence. Fortunately for Ramesses, the Hittites, thus situated, were not in position to attack the Amun division as it marched up from the Oronles. Ramesses had moved faster

Bas-reliefs in the 13th century Great Temple at Abu Simbel, Egypt, illustrated above, flatter Ramesses at Kadesh, hut Hittite chariots, at right, nearly overran his camp.

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than his foe expected, arriving at Kahard toward the Amun camp, their slain. Ramesses and his troops mandesh before Muwattalli could deploy martial ardor fired by the prospect of aged to hold the rest of the Hittite his forces. kilhng the pharaoh and winning the chariots at bay. battle outright. Not incidentally, in MuwattaUi adjusted his plan acRealizing he had lost control of his doing so, they would also win glor>' for cordingly, moving his chariots behind chariot strike force, if not of the battle themselves and any spoils of war to be Kadesh into attack positions south itself, Muwattalli committed his charhad by looting the camp—powerful iotry reserve to the fighting at the of the city but keeping his infantry incentives to keep attacking. camp. He withheld his infantrj; howto the northeast as a counter to the ever, perhaps because he had Amun battle group. Meanwhile, ._ received reports that yet anthe Amun troops, still obliviother Egyptian battle group, a ous to the proximity of the Hitcombined-arms force of cbariCite army, were busy setting up otry and infantry called the camp—a task that included Ne'arin, was approaching from erecting a palisade of shields, Hittite the northwest through the implanted in the ground around camp Battle of river valley. Muwattalli had not the camp perimeter. Kadesh positioned troops in the valley Muwattalli wisely elected to to block a thrust from that diforego attacking the camp, at 1275 BC rection, perhaps hoping to deleast for the time being. Why ^ stroy the Egyptian main force bother? The pharaoh and his before the battle group arrived. troops weren't going anywhere Regardless, he was either unMuwattalli could dispose ot prepared or unable to prevent them at his leisure. First he them from entering the fray. would deal with Amun's wouldThe attack of the Ne'arin, cobe rescuers. The Ra battle group • Hittite forces inciding with a counterattack had crossed the Orontes and HI Egyptian forces by Ramesses and his Amun was marching north in column troops, drove the Hittite characross the Kadesh plain when iots back across the Orontes, Muwattalli unleashed his chareffectively ending the battle. iotry. Some 2,000 Hittite chariots had massed in a lightly The Ne'arin had saved the wooded grove on the Orontes' day for Ramesses, and probaDivision of Ptah bly saved his life as well. As west hank, awaiting the signal the Egyptians held the battleto attack. When it came, this Division of Set I field when the fighting ended, enormous force emerged from ° Ramesses could and would the trees and thundered across ^~ declare victory. But it was a specious Ramesses approched Kadesh from the south, the Kadesh plain, striking the Eg)'ptclaim. Days later, his badly mauled unaware that Muwattalti was already encamped ian battle group in the ilank before it army withdrew south, toward Egypt, northeast of the city. Ramesses' Amun battle could redeploy to meet the attack. The with the Hittite army—also greatly group mad« camp before Muwattalti could act battle group quickly disintegrated, its reduced—in slow and cautious purbut the Hittites smashed the Ra group, then hit troops scattering before the rampagsuit. Ultimately, the Hittites achieved Ramesses' camp^ Tbe Ne'arin rode to his rescue. ing Hittite chariots. their strategic objective, control of Within minutes the Hittite force the kingdom of Amurro (south of Kahad encircled the camp and was Many of the Amun battle group's desh)—a clear victory for Muwattalli. attacking it from every direction. chariot warriors, terrified by the HitThe Egyptians may have won the Muwattalli probably did not sanction tite onslaught, leapt aboard their mabattle—barely—but the Hittites had this action. Attacking a fortified posichines and drove headlong from the won the war. ßft tion with chariotry unsupported by incamp. Undaunted, Ramesses rallied fantry was highly problematic. It is his remaining troops and, mounting likely Muwattalli had meant for his his own chariot, led them in repeated For further reading, Steven Weingartner chariots to halt by the river and block daring counterattacks. A few Hittite recommends: The Organization of the the advance of the follow-on Egyptian chariots broke through the shield wall Hittite Military, by Richard H. Beal. and battle groups, Ptah and Set. But the the Egyptians had erected around the From Sumer to Rome: The Capabilities Hittite chariotry troops, likely intoxicamp, hut instead of pressing their of Ancient Annies, by Richard A. Gabriel cated hy their success in smashing Ra, advantage, the attackers paused for arui Karen S. Metzi and The Kikkuli Methcould not be restrained. They drove some impromptu looting and were all od of Horse Training, by Ann Nylatul.

MILITARY HISTORY

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WíirrJwíníí: The Air War Againstjapan, 1942-1945, by Barrett Tillman, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2010, $28

Barrett Tilltnan has written a workmanlike and comprehensive journalistic acTIE All K*R «GAllSr JiFAM l U l - l f t S count of the air war against BARRETT TiLLMAN ,»-^;l-» Japan. Whirlwind represents much more than jusl a retelling of the massive strategic bombing of Japanese cities by B-29s that bumed out the heart of Japan's major cities. It presents the reader with a judicious discussion of the wider role of air power in the Pacific war between the United States and Japan. And air power in the Pacific was not just the realm of the Army Air Forces but of the Navy and Marines as well. In fact, as Tillman makes clear, without the Navy's massive island-hopping campaign—which reached the Marianas in summer 1944—there would have been no effective strategic bombing campaign of the Japanese Home Islands

WHIRLWIND

until much later. Such a delay would have had immense strategic consequences. Tillman opens his book with an examination of prewar doctrine in the Army Air Corps and the technological developments that would eventually make possible the bombing ofJapan. He also provides the necessary background to the U.S. Navy's development of carrier aviation. Nevertheless, in an account that supposedly coveTs the air war from 1942, Tillman spends no time examining the crucial air and naval battles around Guadalcanal, the Solomons and New Guinea. Those battles proved

crucial in breaking the back of Japanese naval and army air forces and creating the basis for the American surge toward Japan, which had begun in November 1943 at Tarawa and had carried U.S. military power to the islands of Guam and Tinian eight months later. Moreover, huried in those events is the astonishing performance of Lt. Gen. Geoi^e Kenney, whose leadership of Fifth Air Force placed him among the most innovative and imaginative airmen ofWoridWarll. Barrett's book is thus chiefly abovu the aerial campaign against the Japanese Home Is-

lands rather than the overall use of Allied air power against Japan's military might. As such, it provides a thorough and interesting account of the differences between the B-29 offensive and that waged by the Navy's massive force of fast carriers. The 1944 B-29 assault from China was an almost complete failure, and, as Tillman highlights, the initial effort from the Marianas was not much more successful. Desperate to make the B-29 a success, given its immense cost, the chief of Army Air Eorces, General H.H. 'Hap" Arnold, tumed to Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay who would launch the nighttime firebombing raids that ultimately devastated Tok>'o. By summer 1945, Japan lay in niins under an aerial onslaught that had wrecked its cities, ravaged its landscape and military bases and largely cut off its oceanic trade through aerial mining in conjunction with submarine attacks. Tillman does not directly address whether the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary, but he implies there was little choice—the bombings ended the war before the mass starvation of the Japanese people and the catastrophe an invasion would have been for both the American and Japanese people. Despite their desperate situation. Japans leaders showed httle willingness to consider

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Young Nelsons: Boy Sailors During the Napoleonic Wars, by DAB. Ronald

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eviews surrender. Tilltnan captures that mindset in a startling quote. Vice Adm. Takejiro Onishi confided to his diary, "The enemy^ offensive operations are drawing ever nearer to the home islands, and air raids.. .are getting more severe by the day... [and] the logistical situation...has become dire." Yet he concluded, "1 can guarantee absolutely that Japan will not lose....The war isjusl beginning." Overall. Tillman has written a solid account of ihe air war against Japan in the last two years of the war. lt is crisply written and aimed at the amateur military historian interested in air power. For those interested in the broader story about the last year of the war and the pohtical and military factors surrounding the surrender of Japan, it is doubtful whether anything will equal Richard Frank's Down/fli/(1999). —Williamson Murray ChurchiU's Bunker: The Cabinet War Rooms and the Culture of Secrecy in Wartime London, by Richard Holmes, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 2010, $27.50

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The best niche histories teach readers new information about oft-covered events, and this World War U account of Winston Churchill's underground headquarters is an admirable example. During World War I, writes veteran British military historian Holmes, German aircraft dropped about 300 ions of bombs on Britain, catising

MILITARY HISTORY

1,500 deaths and a good deal of terror. These sorties had no effect on the wars outcome but great influence laier, as Britisb leaders assumed bombing would determine the outcome of the next war. In 1936 the Air Ministry estimated that raids on London in any new conflict would kill 60,000 during the first week (in faci, 80,000 Londoners died during all of World War 11). Working on an assumption ihat "the bomber will alwa>^get through," British leaders decided the best way to deter a potential enemy was to match his bombing capacity (a take on "mutual assured destruction" two decades before the Cold War nuclear standofi). Thus, when rearmament began, lhe Royal Air Force clamored for bombers. In 1937. realizing it could not afford them, it switched to defensive (and far cheaper) fighters. We now know what British intelligence didn't—that Germany ignored the prevailing obsession with bombing. Adolf Hitler intended the Luftwaffe as tactical support for ground forces and never built a hea\ybomber fleet. In the debate over civil defense, British leaders decided against evacuating London, as much to avoid mass panic as due to its difficulty They did consider evacuating the government. Indeed, many departments moved to ihe country, but in 1938 the search began for a safe place in Whitehall to house ihe

leadership. The prime minister's residence at 10 Downing Street, old and unreinforced, could not serve. The Office of Works quickly settled on the steel-framed New Public Offices, iwo blocks away. Its huge basement, 10 feet below ground, housed archives. Widiin a month, crews had cleared, reinforced, soundproofed and installed communications in several of what became the Cabinet War Rooms. By the war's outbreak, dozens of rooms were functional, fitted with air conditioning, independent water and lighting, medical facilities and sleeping quariLTs. The Office of Works cotisidered the arrangements temporary, and the budget for expansion was tight. Inijbitants paid the price. The rooms were chilly, damp and poorly ventilated. In an era when almost everyone smoked, tobacco fumes mingled with cooking odors and smells from lhe primitive toilets. ironically, while low-level staff worked there permanently, Churchill preferred meeting above ground. Even during the 1940-41 Blitz, leaders met in the bunker at night, when air raids were likely, but elsewhere during the day. Use by senior staff declined sharply in 1942 and 1943, peaking again in early 1944 during the "little Blitz" and later thai year when V- Is and V-2s posed a risk. The war had barely ended when nostalgia for Britain's

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The Saboteur. by Electronic Arts, 2009, $49.99 (PlayStation 3, Xbox 360, PC) The Sitbotfii r is an action/ adventure game set in Nazi-occupied Paris. You play .Sean Devlin. an Irish expatríale based on real-life war liera William Grover-William.s —a Grand Pri.x driver living in France who worked for the Special Operations Execulive (SOE) and French Resistance. Devlin sabotages Nazi opérations for lhe French Resistance and SOE. slipping away either stealthily or via high-profile car chases. The pre\'ailing theme of "freedom" extends to the play itself. One can thoroughly explore wartime Paris (authentically recreafed. for lhe most part), driving any vehicle and climhing any structure—yes. especially the Eiffel Tower. The graphics are creative and stunning. Ai the Stan, occupied Paris is pallid, à la film noir. Bui as Sean sabotages Nazi operations, color surges back (o the city's departments as Parisians regain hope. Despile somewhat clunky conirois. The Saboteur is a unique and highly entertaining World War U ihriller. —Ryan Burke

eviews MODERN WAR STUDIES Waging War in Waziristan Tfie British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947 Andrew M. Roe 'A masterful and timely history that should be required reading for those policy makers chaning the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Roe argues convincingly that history and culture matter a great deal in the wars of the 21st century—and we can either pay attention to their lessons or suffer the consequences."—Peter Mansoor, author of Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq 328 pages, 21 photographs, Cloth 34.95

America's Captives Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror Paul J. Springer 'At last, a balanced treatment of a subject whose modem history has been marked as much by ignorance and demagoguer)' as by reason and rule of law. It belongs on the desk of any scholar, policymaker, legislator, or bureaucrat who is contending with the legal aftermath of the War on Terror and its implications for the law of war."—Roger Spiller, author of An Instinct for

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America's School for War Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in Worid War il Peter J. Schifferie 'A concise, focused, extensively researched and nicely balanced study of the Leavenworth schools—the institutional, intellectual, and professional heart of the U.S. army from World War I to World War II—and their impact on a generation of officers."—Timothy K. Nenninger. author of The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Educatior\. Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the U.S. Army, 1881-1918 304 pages, 17 photographs. Cloth $39.95

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MILITARY HISTORY

finest hour occasioned an avalanche of requests to visit the bunker; only a favored minority was granted informal tours. The govemtnent ultimately set aside money to restore the complex, under the auspices of the Imperial War Museum. The Cabinet War Rooms opened to the public in 1984. Its success prompted the opening of the adjoining Churchill Museum ¡htipy/cwrivvniorg uk| in 2005. With nearly two dozen history books to his credit, Holmes has no trouble delivering an opinionated, thoroughly entertaining account that follows the hyperactive Churchill, his family, servants, staff, advisors, cabinet and generals as they troop in and out of the bunker, various London command centers, country estates and world capitals while fighting World War il. —Mike Oppenheim The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy, by Peter H. Wilson, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2009. $35 For the avid reader of military history, the Thirty Years' War has everything—European Realpolitik, religious conflict, dramatic characters, military innovation and violence enough to satisfy the most lurid imagination or touch the coldest heart. University of Hull history professor Peter H. Wilsons volume is a superbly written, thorough introduction to the most violent, and arguably most confusing, conflict in European history. Wilson sets out to make three points about the war: First, he seeks "to reconnect the different elements through their common relationship to the imperial constitution." Second, he argues that though religion played a major role in participants" lives, the conflict was not waged over religion. Thiiïl, he allies against the idea that ihe Thirty Years' War was inevitable. The

RKETPLACE first 260 pages of the hook limn the war's political, diplomatic, mihtary and confessional contexts. Wilson even provides a lucid description of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. After that, he narrates the course of the war, with a particular focus on military, political and diplomatic maneuvering, before closing with several chapters on the cost and consequences of the war. Unlike many other historians of early modem European military affairs, Wilson has little interest in the dehate over the so-caUed 'military revolution." Far from fitting into the technologically determinative mihtary revolution narrative, Wilson argues, "It is more appropriate to see imperial ways of war as an amalgam of different experiences and ideas." He does just that, discus.sing two major influences on warfare at the time: fighting on the Turkish frontier and positional warfare in the Netherlands. He examines not just the technical or theoretical changes but looks ai the networks of experienced officers that developed in the years before the outbreak of the w^ar. Wilson has little patience for the idea that Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus ranks as one of the great captains of history. Nor does he believe the monarch deserves high praise for his military innovations, arguing, "Such praise is the product of the teleological nature of most military history thai searches the past for lessons and precedents for contemporary' doctrine." The author also appears less than impressed with the effects of linear tactics, criticizing Gustavus' dull frontal attack at the 1632 Battle of Lützen and attributing French victor)'a I Rocroi in 1643 to superior command and control at the regimental level rather than to tactical innovation. Wilson centers on the broader narrative of the war, and though he includes information on other countries, the Holy Roman Empire remains his focus. —Mitchell McNaylor

MUSEUM National World War I Museum at Liberty Memorial 100 W. 26th St. Kansas City, Mo. (816)784-1918 www. theworld war. org Since opening in December 2006, the National World War I Museum has welcomed tens of thousands of annual visitors to its 80,000-square-foot facility at the base of Kansas City's 217foot Liberty Memorial. Now a generous gift from the estate of a private collec-

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tor has ensured the museum will meet its teaching mission for years to come. The 1.700-item collection centers on the machine gun and its impact on the war. The late Carl Hauber, whose father served in World War I, had acquired all but one of the known machine gun models used during the war. Related relics include ammunition, muzzle guards, gunners' insignia, condensation units from water-cooled machine guns, and a chain-mail shoulder pad and mitts used by U.S. gunners to handle overheated barrels. Visitors enter the museum via a glass skywalk over a field of 9,000 poppies (one for every 1,000 wartime combat deaths). Inside are two multimedia theaters and state-of-the-art exhibits showcasing everything from a tank, cannon, guns and uniforms to period maps, photos and video. The museum is open Tues.-Sun. 10 a.m.-5 p.m. year-round. —Editor

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allowed b Valley Forge, Pennsylvania By Andrew A. Zellers-Frederick

F

ew place names evoke such strong emotions in the American psyche as Valley Forge, site of the 177778 winter encampment of Maj. Gen. George Washington's Continental Army. Although it was just one of seven such Revolutionary War cantonments for the Americans^—including Morristown, site of a much harsher 1779-80 winter layover—Valley Forge is the one that inspired legendary stories of misery and suffering, dedication and patriotism. series of fortified redoubts and entrenchments, though much of the planned interlocking defensive works remained unfinished by spring. On Dec. 19, 1777, following a six-mile march from White Marsh, the American army entered the field camp at Valley Forge (re-enactors commemorate the march with an annual ceremonial program), which lacked shelter of any kind. Washington ordered the construction of huts—14 feet by 14 feet, with proper roofs, fireplaces and doors. But in their impatience for protection from the elements, the troops ignored their commander in chiefs instructions and threw together 1,000 or so wooden cabins in whatever manner feasible with the few available tools. Washington visits troops at Valley Forge, a Although Valley Forge for many location he recognized as easily defensible calls to mind anguish in the face against a British sortie from Philadelphia. of seemingly insurmountable diffi-

Following British Maj. Gen. Sir William Howe's textbook September 1777 capture of Philadelphia, the forces of King George 111 settled in for a relatively comfortable occupation. When told of the city's seizure while in Paris, ambassador Benjamin Franklin confidently replied, "No, Howe has been taken by Philadelphia." Indeed, the British army entrenched itself hehind a system of fortifications and rarely ventured forth for the next nine months.

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Meanwhile, Washington selected Valley Forge, within 20 miles of Philadelphia, as an almost impregnable position from which the Americans could readily observe the British and react to any enemy movement. Washingtons chief engineer, French Brig. Gen. Louis Duportail. diligently planned the American encampment around Valley Forges natural defensive features as a route of retreat. He designed a

MILITARY HISTORY

Re-created huts help more than 1 million annuai visitors appreciate the winter conditions sofdiers endured at Valley Forge.

culties, it should also be remembered as the place where the American Army came together as an effective force capable of defeating die British army. Valley Forge is also where that same American Army achieved a diversity not seen again for generations: The 1st Rhode Island Regiment of General James Mitchell Varnum's brigade, for example, comprised primarily blacks and American Indians, while other regiments represented a range of nationalities. On Wednesday, May 6, 1778. Maj. Gen. Baron Friedrich Wilbelm von Steuben's troops conducted—much to the delight of Washington and his stafT—an elaborate grand parade and/eu de joie (literally "fire ofjoy," a gun salute) in exact order and with precise discipline to celebrate the new alliance with France. Valley Forge evolved into a site of national recognition when Romantic-era historians and generations of schoolteachers essentially reinvented the experience, relating stories of widespread starvation, mountains of snow and a lone Washington in silent prayer. In reality, the winter was among the mildest of the 18th century, disease—not starvation—was the primar)' cause of death, and the iconic image of Washington was an unsubstantiated tale promulgated by 19th century parson and author Mason Locke Weems (who

also invented the tale of Washington and the cherry tree). Still, the uinter at Valley Forge did bring hardship: nearly 2,000 soldiers of Washingtons 12,000-man army died. Americans held observances to honor the Continental Army at Valley Forge as early as 1828. Campaigns throughout [he 19lh century sought to preserve and memorialize the area, culminating in its 1893 establisbment as Pennsylvania's first stale park. By the 1960s, Valley Forge had become primarily an open green space in wbich visitors enjoyed many interests apart from bistory. Park managers did retain the camp's lines of fortification, an artillery park. Washington's headquarters in the Isaac Potts House, the parade grounds, recreated soldiers" huts, memorials, monuments and markers. The dominant manmade feature is the National Memorial Arch, dedicated in 1917 to commemorate the soldiers' "patience and fidelity" that winter. Valley Forge became part of the National Park System in 1976. Today, Valley Forge National Historical Park |wT\^v.nps gov/vafo 1 encompasses approximately 3,500 acres and welcomes more than 1 million annual visitors. A series of touring roads traverse the park, offering visitors the chance to appreciate the defensive capabilities of the encampment, a characteristic the British never managed to put to the test. | ^

Weapons we're glad they never built

Hannibal's Animals

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ust how did Hannibal get all those elephants across the Alps? In 218 BC he arrived in Italy to conquer Roman show business. He brought with him the elephants he'd trained lo do tricks while performing winter sports, Hannibal met with Petrus Tiberius Barnumus., who promised him stardom, then cheated the naive Carthaginian and ran off with the elephants. Barnumus founded Circus Maximus Trio Orbitus, featur-

MILITARY HISTORY

ß^ Riefe Meyerowitz ing the talented pachyderms. He became fabulously rich. Hannibal was enraged. He spent 15 years marching all over Italy trying to get his elephants back. The Romans just ignored him. Eventually, he returned to Carthage, intent on starting a Third Punic War. But nobody remembered what Punies were, so Hannibal, Carthage's greatest animal trainer, ended his days teaching synchronized swimming to the royal elephants in Bythnia—wherever that is. | ^