Osprey - Campaign - 101 - 2002 - Austerlitz 1805 - The Fate of Empires

OSPREY

Campaign

PUBLISHING

The fate of empires

A

lan Castle

Illustrated by Christa Hook

With foreword by Dr David G Chandler

IAN CASTLE was a founder member of the Napoleonic Association in 1975. Since then he has made an extensive study of the Austrian Army d the Napoleonic Wars period and is recognized as a leading English-languageauthorily on the subject. He has written several books and numerous articles on the subiect, including Campaign 33: Aspern & Wagram i809 and Campaign 56: Eggmiihli809.

CHRISTA HOOK began her illu~tratingCareer in 1986. Her walk has featwed extensively in the worlds of publishing and television, and she has established herself as one of Osprey's most popular illustrators. Her illustrations combine the historian's attention to detail with the artist's sense of drama and atmosphere, and they are sought after by collectors worldwide.

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Campaign

I0I

Austerlitz 1805 The fate of empires

Ian Castle

. I l l u s t r a t e d by Christa Hool<

Series edltor Lee Johnson

Consultant e d t o r D a v ~ dG Chandler

CONTENTS

FOREWORD THE ROAD TO WAR OPPOSING PLANS CHRONOLOGY OPPOSING COMMANDERS OPPOSING ARMIES The French Army. The Austrian Army - T h e Russian Army

OPENING MOVES

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Advance to the Danube The Surrender of Ulm

Napoleon crosses the Danube

The Alles Retreat

THE MARCH TO AUSTERLITZ The Eagles Gather

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The Allles Advance. The Armies Prepare for Battle

ORDERS OF BATTLE La Grande Armee .The Austro-Russian Army

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ

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The Battle in the South. The Banle in the Centre - T h e Battle in the North The Attack of the Russian Imperial Guard

Soult Anacks the Allied Lefl

The Flight Across the Ice

THE AFTERMATH THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY FURTHER READING INDEX

I wrote Auslmlitz 1805 - Bnltlv ofthe ?'hrupi;mpprmr eleven years ago; one of the first pair of titles published in the new Osprey Campaign series. As Hon. Consultant Editor I was pleased hy the popularity of the series. Since 1990 Osprey's Campaign books have continued from strength to strength, and now include over 100 titles by nrlmerorls military historians on a range of hattles. Over the intervening years there has been the opportunity for more research and a number of new writers ha\,e emcrged. By looking again at classic military engagements from fresh angles they are adding to our previous understanding of these great battles. Ian Castle is one of these writers. By chance I shared with him a visit to Vienna and Czechoslovakia in August 1989 with members of the Napoleonic Association, a visit that included trips to the battlefields of Aspem-Essling and Austerlitz. It was this that inspired him to begin his research. Since then Ian has contributed two very useful volumes to the Campaign series on the battles of Aspern-Essling and Eggmohl. These have added to our greater understanding of the Austrian involvement in these campaigns, an area that had previously heen under explored in the English language. Now I am sure our readers will en,joy his new Aurrmlitz 1805 - The 12ntenfi:mj~ir~s. After all, as Professor Pieter Geyl of Hollarid once said: 'Histor), is indeed an argumcnt without end'.

Dr. David G. Chandler, Septemher 2001

THE ROAD TO

WAR

pl\ n 9 November 180.1, the Lord Mayor of London acclaimed M'illiam Pitt, British Prime Minister and sworn enemy of Napoleonic France, as the 'the saviour of Europe'. The recent nelvs of Nelson's destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar had been the cause of great rqjoicing. In response, Pitt realistically declared 'Europe is not to be saved hy any single man. England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.' Twelve weeks later Pirt was dead and the armies of Austria and Russia, hvo oSEurope's great powers, lay defeated. One Inan stood preeminent across the continent - Napoleon Bonaparte, Empcror of the French and King of Italy. The path to war that led to the frosly Moraian countryside on 2 December 1805 began with the death of the Second Coalition. This wide-ransing alliance between Britain, Austria, Russia, Naples and Turkey was finally laid to rest at Arniens in 1802, although if anyone expected a protracted period of peace to follow they were to be disappointed. Following the coup of 1799 Bonaparte became First Consul, a title confirmed for life in 1802. The monarchs of thc old European order looked on suspiciously as this soldier-statesman began work to bring stabilitv back to France. Inevitably, the peace was short-lived. Fourteen months after Britain and France signed the Peace of Amiens, with relations between the two '

The Peace of Amiens, signed on 25 March 1802, was initially greeted with great joy in Paris and London. Yet the respite war brief and just over a year later the two countries were at war once again. (Musee Frederic M a s o n Sarnrnlung Alfred und Roland Urnhey)

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coulitries rapidly deteriorating, France placed an embargo on British shipping in Frcncli ports, to ruliich Britain responded hv declaring war. Manipulating evidence of Bonaparte's territorial amhitions - as demonstrated by his annexation of Piedmont and the French presence in Hanovcr, Holland and S\vitzerland - Britain agitated in Europe against France. Mcan\rhile, Bonaparte ordered a vast concentration of the arrrly along the English Channel coastline as he planned to rid himself of what he saw as the constant treachery of Britain. In response Britain called out the Militia and strmgthened her N a y 1-lowever, one final spark was required to rc-ignite the flames of a Eul-opcan war. Many Royalist opponents to Bonaparte's regime were conspiring, supported by British rnoney, to secure the restoration of the Bourbon royal firnily. Reports o l t h e actilities of one of these Royalists, the Duke of Enghicn, had reached the ear of Bonaparte, and determined to put an elid to plots asainst himself and l ~ i sfamily he ordered the arrest of the Duke. Tlie little rnatter that he iresided in the neutral territory of Baden sermed to be of no conscqucncc. Kidnapped and taken to the Chiteau dc Vincennes, he was charged with tl-cason, summarily tried, found guilty and execr~ted.The great rr~lingdynasties oSEuropc wcl-c outraged. As the situation in Europe unrlrniahly cook a turn for the wol-sc there was great public clamour in Britain for tlle return of William Pitt as Prime Minister. Pitt, a great opponent o l French expansion, had resigned in 1801. His policies had attacked France's trade and her colonies while financing her opponents in Europe. Now wirh war apparently ine\,itable, Pitt returned to office in 1804, a few weeks after the Engliicn affair. Tlie man that had done much to construct tlle First and Second Coalitions against France set to with a will to create a third. In Novernher 1804, Russia and Austria agreed a preliminary treaty indicating their determination to \vork together and pursue joint war plans. The proclamation earlier, in May 1804, declaring Bonaparte as Emperor of the French added to the urgency of their endeavor~rsto seck a satisfactory alliance. At his coronation on 2 December 1804, Emperor Napoleon, as Bonaparte had no\r hecome, symbolically placed the crown upon Iris own head amidst great pomp and ceremony. Five months later he added King of Italy to his titles - a move guaranteed to alienate Austria even fi~rllier.

1 OPPOSING PLANS "

hile tlie senior military olficers oli\ustria and Russia discussed plans o r war, the Russian Tsar, Alexander, opened discussions with Britain. In April 1805 the nvo governments reached asreenrent and signed an alliance. British financial s~~hsidies to both Russia and Austria agreed during these discussions TVCI-c finalised withor~tany representatives of the Austrian government heing present. This added fuel to the protests of those, led by the b1ar Minister Archduke Clial-les, who doubted tlre reliability of Russian promises and felt that the army was as yet unprepal-ed lor another war. Austria prevaricated arid it WAS not until August 180.5 that the Third Coalition was formalised, with Britain, Russia, Austria as ~vcllas Sweden and Naples united aglzinst Francc. Allied ellor-ts to bring Prxssia into tlre coalition stalled as France attempted to win Prussian support too. Initially King Frederick William 111 ad~wcatcda policy o l neutrality when he did finally decide to side with the. :\llies it was too late. Work began itnmcdiately to agree rhr grand strategy of the campaign. Driven on bv Russia the plan called for an rtnprccedcntcd Eul-ope-wirle advance against France and her recent tel-ritorial acquisitions. From the shores of the Baltic in the north to the heel of Italy in the south, numerous mr~ltinationalarmies, numbering half a million men, would advance and sweep the French away. A,joint force of Russians and Swedes y and bc in a position to with British support would o c c ~ ~ pHanovcr threaten Holland. Three Russian arrnics were to operate in central Europe. The rnost northerly of these, commanded by Rennigsen, was to advance fiom Russia through Bohemia with orders to keep an eye on tlie Prussians while protecting the right t a n k o r the main Russian army led by Kutuzov. His force was to march through Austria to &rvaria where it would link up with the Austrian army nominally commanded by Archduke Ferdinand, althor~glrFML Mack actuallv exercised command. Behind Kutruzo\s came a third Russian army, led by Rl~xhliwden,wliicli would he ahle to support either Kutuzov or Bcnnigscn as required. To the south of this great concentration in Bavaria an Austrian force commanded by Archduke John would hold the Tyrol, enabling communications to he rnairrtained \+,it11 northel-n Italy. I t was here that the main Austrian force would assemhle, under the command of rZrchdr~keCharles, with ordcrs to march westwarrls and sweep the French from Lomhardy. Then, co-opel-ating with the Arlstro-Russian forces in Bavaria, he wor~ldjoin the push towards France. On the sonthernrnost flank of the offensive an unlikely mixer1 force of Russians, British and Neapolitans was to cornhine and advance up the spine of Italy. It was hoped that as the grand stratcp gained momentum arlrlitior~altroops would become available as Bavaria and other German states recognised the wind of change, and threw in their lot ~ritlithe Allies. On paper the 'm

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plans looked impressive. However, the coordination of such a massive enterprise was beyond the capabilities of the Allies. The eventual declaration of neutralicy by Prussia and Bavaria's secret alliance with France were to deny the Allies many of the troops they had hoped for. In addition, disputes within the Austrian military hierarchy about the army's readiness for war and the strategy to be employed, coupled with last minute army reforms, did not auger well for a successful conclusion of the campaign. Inevitably, a scheme of this size could not hope to evade discovery by Napoleon's network of spies. The main strength of the French army was encamped along the Channel coast preparing for an invasion of England. This enterprise had been endlessly delayed by the inability of the French navy to gain mastery of the Channel long enough to enable Napoleon to transport his army across the thin strip of water. Now a great threat had manifested itself to the east. On the same day that Kutuzov commenced his march westwards from the RussianGalician border, Napoleon ordered the first of his formations to depart from their coastal encampments and march eastwards for the Rhine. Far

ahead of Kutuzov, the unsupported Austrian army led by Ferdinand and Mack had crossed the Inn River into Bavaria on 8 September and pushed on towards Ulm. The Austrians had anticipated that the Bavarian army would join forces with them and so were somewhat dismayed when the Bavarians withdrew having already concluded an alliance with Napoleon. The scene was now set for one of the great manoeuvres of the Napoleonic era - the encirclement of Ulm. At one stroke the plans of the Third Coalition were to be destroyed and its armies thrown into retreat.

CHRONOLOGY

25 March 1802 Peace of Amens 1 August 1802 Napoleon proclaimed Flrst Consul for f e 2 August 1802 France annexes Elba 2 September 1802 France annexes Pledmont 15 October 1802 France Invades Switzerland

5 May 1803 France piaces an embargo on British ships using French ports 18 May 1803 Britain declares war on France 1 June 1803 France occupies Hanover 15 June 1803 French army moves into camps along the Channel coast

14 March 1804 Kidnapping of the Duke of Enghen 21 March 1804 Execution of the Duke of Enghen 18 May 1804 Napoleon proclaimed Emperor 6 November 1804 Austria and Russia sign a prelimlnaty treaty 2 December 1804 Coronation of Napoleon in Par~s

11 April 1805 Alliance signed between Britain and Russa 26 May 1805 Napoleon crowns himself King of Italy 4 June 1805 France annexes Genoa 9 August 1805 Austria ions Britain and Russia in Thrd Coation 25 August 1805 Napoleon orders army from coastal camps to the Rhine 25 August 1805 Kutuzov's Russian army commences march to join Austrians 5 September 1805 Austrian army advances from Wes 8 September 1805 Austrians enter Bavaria 25 September 1805 French army cross the Rhine 7 October 1805 First French untts reach the Danube at Donauworth

8 October 1805 Battle of Wertingen 11 October 1805 Battle of Hasach 14 October 1805 Banle of Elchngen 20 October 1805 Mack surrenders Austrian army at Ulm 21 October 1805 Combned fleets of France and Span defeated at Battle of Trafalgar I

British fleet under Lord Nelson 26 October 1805 French army begins pursuit of Kuturov 28-31 October 1805 Battle of Caldiero in northern Italy

30 October 1805 Allied rearguard action at Ried 31 October 1805 Allied rearguard acton at Lambach 4 November 1805 Austrian rearguard action at Steyr 5 November 1805 Allied rearguard action at Amstetten 8 November 1805 Austrians defeated at Marlazell 9 November 1805 Kutuzov crosses to the north bank of the Danube

11 November 1805 Battle of Durnstein 12 November 1805 French troops enter Vlenna 13 November 1805 French capture bridges across the Danube 16 November 1805 Battle of Hollabrunn/Schongrabern 18-22 November 1805 Allies regroup and retreat to Omiitz 20 November 1805 Napoleon halts the French pursut at Brunn 20 November 1805 Cavalry clash at Raussnitz 24 November 1805 Alles decide to flght 25 November 1805 Russian Imperial Guard joins army at Olmutz 27 November 1805 Allies commence advance 28 November 1805 Allies take Wischau and advance to Raussnitz 28 November 1805 Napoleon orders French army to concentrate east of Brunn 30 November-1 Dec Allies occupy Pratzen heights 2 December 1805 Battle of Austeritz

OPPOSING

Emperor Napoleon

bsr 1804 mrat consul besame Napoleon, r oi me ~ramh.~ h n hbr, much to me

atlon ot E,,mper he added me

It was in 1796 that Europe first became familiar with the name of General Bonaparte. It was then that he took command of the unpaid, ill-supplied and demoralised Army of Italy. Bonaparte arrived like a whirlwind, reorganised the army with the help of his chief of staff, Louis Berthier, inspired his men and led them against the Piedmontese and Austrians. Brushing aside the Piedmontese he drove the Austrians back on Mantua. Having thwarted attempts to relieve the city, the Austrian army retreated after the Battle of Rivoli. Bonaparte pursued, and, without waiting for the authority of the Directory, forced them to accept his terms for peace in April 1797. The subsequent Treaty of Campo Formio established the Cisalpine Republic from lands Bonaparte had captured in Lombardy Before he was finished, he had organised its government and proclaimed a constitution, an extraordinary achievement for an officer of the army. Bonaparte was welcomed back in Paris as a national hero. Those men who had fought for him had learnt to admire him as a great leader and, perhaps more importantly, as one who managed to pay them and bring them victory in battle. Bonaparte learnt the great political value of military glory and had the opportunity to develop his ideas of warfare in the field. Meanwhile the Directory learnt that here was a man who had the support of the people and who could be a potential danger in the future. Rewarded for this success with the command 'of the Army of England, Bonaparte soon realised that the planned conquest of England was impractical while the Royal Navy dominated the Channel. Instead, he advocated an attack on - Egypt that would damage Britain's trade with India and the Middle East, leading to the advent of a new French empire of the east. The Directory was enthusiastic about the plan, if nothing else it would take Bonaparte away from Paris. The Egyptian campaign got under way in May 1798, but the French army suffered mixed fortunes. News reached Bonaparte in Egypt of the defeats inflicted on France by the Second Coalition and of the weakness of the Directory. Bonaparte determined to leave his army in Egypt and return to France. Back in Paris in October 1799, it was clear he had lost none of his popularity. In I November a coup d'itat established ~ o n ^ a ~ a ras te

I

one of three consuls who would govern France, though he eventuall! ' emerged as First Consul, the de facto ruler of France. From this positior of power Bonaparte led the army against the Austrians once more and defeated them in a very close-run battle at hlarengo in May 1800. A fi~rtherFrench victory at Hohenlinden eventually led to the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. Ronaparte hoped for a period of peace follorving Arniens during which h e could stabilise France. H e set ahour introducing a vast programme of cultural, social, civil and religious reforms, hut all the time his hatred of Britain remained nndirninislred. With relatio~is between thc turncountries tectering o n the edgc, Bonaparte created a new arrny, L n Grnndv Armie, which he stationed along the (:hanncl coast and prepared for an invasion of England. However, this highly trained and motivated army was never to cross the Channel and march on London, instead it was destined to sweep across Enrope to d o battle with the armies of Austria and Russia. This tirne they would not he let1 into battle by First C:onsul Bonaparte; this time rlle man who was to inspire them was Napoleon, Emperor of the French. Emperor (Tsar) Alexander I

Tsar Alexander I came to the thmne in 1801 and determined to establish Russia as the great arbiter d Eumpe. To oppose French expansion Russia joined with Austria and Britain and worked aggmssively towards the formation d a Third Coalition.

Alexander was horn in 1555, son of the obsessive and fi~naticalfuture Tsar. Paul 1, and gmndson of Catherine the Grcar. Catherine, placing little trust in her son Pal~l,exerted grcar influence on Alexander's upbringing. hoping he would mlcceed her. Hoxz~ever,follo\\~ingCatherine's death in 1796, Par11 became T ~ a ralthough there rvcre man) at the Russian Court who opposed his reign. Five yyra~r later, in 1801, Paul's assassination follor%lnga p ~ l a c ecor~psaw Alexander installed as Eat- in his place. The new Tsar, head o f the House of Romanox: was 23 years of age. As a ruler Alexander showed many positi1.c qrlalitics and emharked on a scries of relbrms that saw the creation of eight new ministries, bringing a more ordcrly administration to government. Hc promoted education and also went some way to improving the condition of tlie Russian serfs hut could not abolish the institution. Alexander had grace, charin and spoke Frcnch well. Even Napoleon took to him. He once described Alexander as, 'young, friendly, and very good looking; and he has more intelligence than is commonly supposed.' Others, liowever, considered Alexander unstable. Initially Alexander observed Bonaparte's progress with interest and believed his success cot~ldhring stability to a France t h n ~ ~ vinto n turmoil by revolution, hut he quickly changed his v i e ~ s .Having grown up under the influence of Catherine his determination to establish Russia as the grand arbiter of Europe grew, until he saw llimself as tlie one man who could restorr peace. Alexander was vain and impressio~iahleatid at court he sl~rrounded himself with a circle of young, confident, aggressive and arrogant aidesde-camp, to thr exclusion of more mature, experienced and car~tious officers. These men appealed to his vanity and encouraged him to overconfidence. In milita~ymatters he was naive and inexperienced, but under the influence of these flatterers Ire saw it as his duty to lead his army in the defence of Europe from French aggression. 4 s First Consul, Bonaparte made a n l ~ m h e of r overtures to Alexander to secure Russian support against Britain hut failed each t.

Continuing French activity in Germany, Italy and the Mediterranean appcared designed to provoke the anger of both Russia a n d Austria. 1Gtl1the Enghien affair, Alexander felt Napoleon had gone too far. No\+' rras the time to destroy Napolcon and return the Bourbons to their throne. Bringing Britain and Austria together with Russia, Alexander sowed the seeds oT the Third Coalition and dreamt oT fulfilling his destiny, bringing peace to war-rlnaged Europe. Althorrgh he lacked any rxprrience of battle, Alexander was to assume supreme command of the Allied forces at the climactic confrontation at Austcrlitz. Emperor Francis I (Kaiser Franz I)

I:t.;~nciswas born in 1768, thc sarne year as Napoleon Bonapartc, in Florence. His father was the l i ~ t u r cEmperor Leopold 11. Francis received some military training, then in 1786, his uncle, Emperor,Joseph 11, sent lri~non a military tonr of the Hahsbr~rgkingdoms of Rnhemia and Hungary. Ttvo ycars later he visited the Tnrkish front and in 1789 was prrsent at the capturc of Belgrade. ,Joseph died in 1790, Icaving the tlrrone to Francis's father, Leopold 11. However, Lcopold's reign was brief and in 1792 Francis became hcad of the House of Habsbrlrg as Francis 11. Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bohernia and Hungary. Mrnost itnn~ediatelyFrancis f o l ~ n dAustria at war wit11 revolutionary France, it rm~lldhe 23 years before peace f ~ ~ lreturned ly to his empire. Francis was an absolutist and firmly believed in his duty to nlaintain tl~rHabsburg dynasty as a major power in Eut-ope. He was not a great 1r;rdet-but he was popular wit11 Iris pcople. His application ant1 sense of' duty and,justice had earned him praise from Joseph 11, hut Ire was also criticiscd for being stubborn and lacking imagination. The subsequent wars against the French were disastrous for Austria. Forced to accept harsh peace terms in 1797 and again in 1801, Austria lust vast tracts of territory hut dcvrloped a burning desire for revenge tllr only question was when. In the meantime, Francis took advantage of Napoleon's decision to crown himself Emperor to attempt to strengthen Iri\orvn position. The power and glories of the Holy Roman Empire, long since rlndermined, dirr~inishedf~lrtlreras Napoleon's incr~rsionsand illrolrement along the Rhine increased. Francis took the opportunit), to cr~nsolidatehis power in Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and northern Italy, renouncing the title Francis 11 o f t h e Holy Rornan Empire in August 1804 ;and proclaiming himself Francis I Emperor of Austria. Thr approaching war of thc Third Coalition put Francis in a peculiar situation. At a meeting of the Russian and Austrian staff, tlrr Russians 11adstipulated that their main army, commanded by Kuturov, was to he rrlbordinate only to Emperot- Francis and Archduke Charles, Austria's nr~min;llWar Minister. Kr~trrzovwould not accept orders from any other :\urtrian general. Wit11 Charles commanding in northern Italy, Francis of nrcessity, worlld have to take his place with the main army in the field. The Factions in t h e Austrian High Command .As Rursia began pressing for a return to war with France, two hctions

li~rmedin Austria. One, led by governmcnt foreign ministers Counts Cohenrl and Colloredo, helie\zetl an alliance with Russia was the only 1 ~ 1 1to protect Austria from French amhitions. Opposed to them ;inother faction, clrampioncd by Archduke Charles, the U'ar Minister,

Emperor Francis I succeeded his father to the Habsburg thmne in 1792 and almost immediately became embroiled in the Revolutionary Wars against France. Francis was no military leader but the terms of the alliance with Russia required him to take the field in 1805.

chduke Charles opposed the 1 1 of 1805 and became mersed in a power struggle th FML Mack. Charles entually commanded in rthem Italy, fighting C C ~ S S ~ Uat IIY Caldiem before treating due to events in varia. (Heeresgeschichtliches Iseum, Vienna)

1 ~ had k been out of favour tee 1799, but with powerful pport behind him convinced ."cis that he alone was pable of rapidly reforming d mobilising the army for a sumption of hostilities with ance. (Heeresgeschichtliches ~seum)

argued against war, helicving tlie army was not yet suitahly prepared fol I a renewal of liostilities. In addition, Charles felt a period of peace would < allow Austria's econorny and prosperity vital time to recover, heforr i plunging into war again. I Charles, perceived asnustria's most ahle soldiet; held a strong position, I hut his rival ministers worked against him, gainilig tlie support of Francis. I The war parh then rcsurl-ected the career of Feldmarschalleutnant (FML) Mack, who had commanded the Neapolitan army in the 1799 campaigi~ with disastrol~s results. Bringing him ant of se~ni-rctircmenr, the) presented him as the cxperr who conld really take hold of the army anti shake it into a state of rearliness, sooner rather than later. Mack told Francis exactly what he wanted to liear. Hc announced that he could have the arm! mohiliserl in a very short time and introdr~cetactical and logistic reforms that w o ~ ~ place ld it on an equal footing with the French. Mlien Francis compared this with Charles's consistently pessimistic (though realistic) view of the state of' the arnly, lire became convinced Mack w w the man to trim at-ound the army's fortunes. Francis began to atrthorisc changes that weakened Cliarles's powerbase, while ele\.ating Mack to chief of thr Q~uarterrnaster Gcncral Stalf: (:harles continrled voicing his opinion5 on tlie unprepared state of the army, and advocati~ignorthern Italy as tlie main theatre of f ~ ~ t u operations, rc with the forces destined to move throngh Bavaria held hack nntil tlie Russians art-iverl.Meanwhile, Mack sas the move through Ravaria as the main thrust of any offensive. Franci~ considered tlie options, and Mark argned persuasively that Kntnzov'~ Russians would rendezvous with him in Bavaria five days hefore Napoleon cor~ldarrive. Convinced, Francis authorised Mack's advance towards the Bavarian capital, M ~ ~ n i cand h , to the Lech River heyond. To soothe Russian concerns about the status of the commander of this Austrian force, Francit appointed his brother-in-law, the young Archdnke Ferdinand d'Este. as nominal cornrnander in his absence. T-lowever, Ferdinand quickl! discovered that Mack held fill1 anthorih to overl-ide all his decisions. Against this backdrop of confnsion and rivalry, Austria entered the war, with Mack leading the way. His benefactor, Count Cobenzl, expressed his delight \\.it11 Mack's progress writing, ' ... what a difference one man can make in affairswheri he is capable and understands his business.' However. by the time the three armies confronted each othcr at Ausrerlitz, FMI. Freiherr Karl Lciherich von Mack fonnd himself I-elegated to the pages of histo17 21s 'tlie unfortunate Mack'. Mikhail l l l a r i o n o v i c h G o l e n i s h c h e v - K u t u z o v Born in 1745, Kl~trv;.o\rIiad hccn destined for a militaq, career righ~ from the start. His father, a fbrmer military engineer, saw to i t that h i r son enrolled in the i\rtille~-).Enginerr school at the age of 12. The young Kuturov did well and emerged with the reputation of hring a diligent and talented student. He saw action against the Polcs in 1764 and against Turkey in 1768 when his hravery under fire earned him a repr~tationlor courage. He proved talented and excelled in hoth staN work and field command. Fonr years later in the Crirnea lie was harll! worlnded in tlie head - t h e hullct entering 'henveen the eye and tcmplc on one side of his face went out exactly the same spot on t t ~ cother side'. Miracnlo~~sly he recovered and fbllowing his rctrlrn to duty, aagin in the Crirnea, he scrved under the great Russian general Alexander Suvoror:

a major influence on his thinking. War with the Turks broke in 1787 and Kutuzov, now commanding a J2ger corps at the chakov, received another dangerous wound. The wound was t the same spot as his previous one and although it was at ht fatal, he did recover, minus the sight of one eye. Kutuzov in the army, now with the rank of majorgeneral, and despite cal handicap continued to display bravery in battle that was

3 the talented Kutuzov was despatched to Constantinople to assador Extraordinary to Turkey, a service he performed with ess. A year later he returned to St. Petersburg where he was to lieutenant-general and command of the army based in :This was in addition to his appointment as Director of the Land orps, entrusted with the training of future officers of the army. Russia had further need of Kutuzov's diplomatic skills, and Paul I came to the throne he was despatched to Berlin, where ded in strengthening the relationship between Russia and ollowing the end of Paul's short reign Alexander installed military governor of St. Petersburg and Infantry Inspector for owever, in 1801 he was relieved of these responsibilities and retirement on his estate in the Ukraine. ,formation of the Third Coalition and the imminent war led to recall. Now 60 years old, he had lost much of his earlier spirit He was portly and fond of life's comforts - particularly alcohol en - but he was also cunning, shrewd, diplomatic and dogged. Alexander disliked him, his reputation and achievements that he was the obvious choice as commander-in-chief. He d the call, disapproved of the Allied strategy, but following his Russian army westwards. At the final confrontation at the presence of Tsar Alexander seriously undermined his commander-inihief. rence in the command structures of France and the Allies see. Napoleon bore supreme responsibility for all matters, and military. True loyalty from officers and men alike, coupled genuine belief in his abilities on the field of battle, ensured ers were executed without question, enabling him to respond to changes or developments. For the Russians and Austrians, the was far more complex. Internal dissension, intrigues, distrust, biuous plan and lack of a clear overall command structure 9 were at a disadvantage from the start.

Mlwlail Kutvrov began his highly s~~ce65fuI mllitay career at a young age, while at the same time developing g n a t dlplol~tlc skills. In 1806 he came out of retirement to lead the Ruslllan anny. (Sammiung Alfmd und Roland Urnhey)

OPPOSING A R M I E S

THE FRENCH ARMY he French army that ctnbarked on the campaign of 1805 was the most highly trained of any in the Rcvolutionary/Napoleonic era. T h e inevitable deterioration in relations bet\veen Britain and France, following thc Peace of Amiens, saw the French army reassemble in preparation fol- an invasion of England. In the srnnmer of 1803 Napoleon issued orders for thc formation of vast rnilitary camps alongthe Channel coast with others based in the newly acquired territory of Hanover and one at Bayonne. These camps became the permanent home of the army for the next two years. The soldiers ~vlioinhabited them had been moulded by the Revolr~tionaryWars, but Napoleon had plans to change them and develop new ways of r~singFrench manpower. The victors of Arcola, Rivoli, Marengo and Nohenlinden returned to school. Each day infantry companies exercised themsel\zes in the finer points of battalion drill, with regular opportunities for firing practice and bt-igade drill. Di\.isional drill in battle situations completed the training, with the whole process repeated constantly. T h e cavalry trained in a similar manner. This constant training and the allocation of regiments, based on the camps they occupied, to permanent brigade and divisional formations, and ultimately corps, developed a strong esprit de corps amongst tlie units. The r o q s d'arrnie was introduced as the standard military formation by Napoleon as the army retrained. Although it was not a new idea, he did pcrfect it to snch an extent that Austria, Prussia and Russia all later adopted the principle. A corps was an all arms fat-ce; an army in miniature, capable of holding its own in combat until snpport arrived, and because of this strength it could disperse while on the march but concentrate quickly for battle. By being able to disperse the elements of tlie corps it could advance more rapidly over a wider area, and tnore easily supply itself from local resources. The srrength of a corps could vary enormously dependant upon its purpose. Of the seven corps that advanced to the Rhine at tlie end of September 1805, the wrakest was Augereau's VII Corps with just under 14,000 Inen and 24 guns, while rhe strongest was Soult's IV Corps of about 30,000 with 36 guns. A corps ~ r o u l dcomprise nvo o r more infantry divisions, a light cavalry division (sometimes only a brigade) and artillery with supporting personnel. As part of Yapoleon's reorganisation he also created a cavalry reserve. This mass concentration of liea\y cavalry, comtnanded by Marshal Murat, grouped two heavy cavalry divisions of carabiniers and cuil-assiers wirh four mounted divisions and one dismounted divisinn ofdragoons, with artillery support. The dismounted division clearly demonstrates tlic great shortage of horses at thc outset '""""

A French light infantlyman of 1805. Men such as this moved into the vast English Channel camps in 1803, emerging at the start d the 1805 campaign as France's best-trained army of the period. (Le Bivouac, Rousselot Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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r~fthe 1805 campaign. Alongside his crcation of the cmzalry reserve, Sapoleon also developed a n artillery reserve. In July 1804 Napoleon reorganised liis Consular Guard as a slr~all corps in its own right, and renamed it the Imperial Guard. Placed under tl~ccommand of Marshal BessiPres the guard mustered six battalions of i~ifanmry10!! squadrons of cavalry and 24 guns, in all about 7,000 men. The organisation of line and light battalions was similar in that each ronsisted of nine companies; eight of filsiliers and one of grenadiers in the line (ligne) battalions and seven of chasserrrs and one each of carabiniers ;and voltigeurs in the light (legere) infantry. Three weeks after the army commenced its march for the Rhine, Napoleon ordered a final change; cach line hattalion was to conve~-t one of its fr~siliercompanies to voltigcr~rs. T l ~ rdifficulty of implernenting this on the march ensured that not all rorps managed to eflectively change tlieir organisation before Arlsterlio. .At fill1 strength hot11 line and light battalions theoretically comprised I.(liO men, ho~vc\~cr, maintainirig this level on campaign was impossible. ;\Strr the march ti-om the Channel coast to Moravia, \ia Vienna, and 14.itli mlmrrous battles and skirmishes along the way the average strength of a battalion in Sor~lt'sN Corps at Alusterlio was 730 men. t\-\lirrrwo yra1-s of intensive training the order finally came; England was n o longer the objective. Turning their backs to the Channel, I.(( ( f f n n l l ~ ;\riii?pheaded eastwards; seven corps, the Cavalry and Artillery Reserve, and tlie Imperial Guard, some 180,000 men, embarked on ajourney that would rlltinlately lead to one of Napoleonic France's greatest xictories.

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY \rclidoke Charles emerged from the campaign of 1800 with his rrputation intact and appeared the obvious choice to carry our the tnr~ch needed army reforms. Charles, at the head of the new M'ar \finistry, tturned his attention to the army's administration, groaning r~nderthe ~veightof its own hrureaucracy. Having streamlined matters he ;~r~thorired improvements in tlie training of ,junior officers a n d ;~ttemptrdto make service in the army more attractive for those sul~jcct to conscription. In an effort to prevent large numbers of these potential recruits 'disappearing', he amended the existing IiCelong conscription to a reduced prriod ofenlistmcnt; ten years i r i the inhntr): 12 ycars in tlw cavalry and 14 years in the artillery and other technical branches. The Austrian treasury was at this time very weak, rrhicl~hindered the training-of the army. Regiments were widely distributed, many in fortresses in tire eastern regions of the empire where expenses were less. Further linancial savings emerged from the almost universal employ~rrcntof the lilrloug-!I system, whereby new recruits received theil- basic military training, then were sent home on unpaid leave until required. \Vith ar much as 40 per cent of a unit's strength dispcrscd in this way rapid mohilisation hecame impossible. Despite this, the ordinary ilustrian soldier pcrformed well at the large periodic training- camps hut their officerscamr in for much criticism. In fact some ohsenrrrs claimed these exel-cises were o~~tdated, as a result of' which Archduke Ct~arleswas criticised fol- ~vasting roo much time and expenditure on administration and too little on preparing the army for ~var.

The French army's great sholtage of horses at the outbreak of war in 1805 forced the creation of a division of dismounted dragoons led by GCnCral de division Baraguey d'Hilliers. (Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

Auatrla~ unit as 1805 u authorl:

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The introduction of other cost-cutting exercises resulted in the cavalry losing seven regimens and a new three-battalion TirohJager Regiment replacing the 15 short-lived light infantry battalions. The advent of a new coalition, and ultimately a new war, changed everything. When talks opened with the Russians, Charles warned the Emperor that if war broke out Austria was likely to have to face France alone before the 'untrustworthy' Russians arrived, a fact that could have. serious imp lcauons for an economy that was already stretched. At this point FML ack had a critical influence on the preparations for war. As chief of the Quartermaster General Staff, Mack was now in a position of power, and in the spring and summer of 1805 he began to introduce a series of reforms in the army that contributed to the general confusion, occurring as they did on the eve of war. In the cavalry he reduced the strength of both light and heavy squadrons and in the infantry he recommended that the third line of infantry should be used to extend the line or operate as skirmishers to the front. However, his decision in June 1805 to alter the composition of the infantry regiments caused more confusion than any other change. At that time, an infantry regiment comprised three field battalions, each of six fusilier companies, a depot battalion of four companies and a grenadier division of two

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companies, in total 24 companies. The grenadier companies were detached from the parent regiment in the field and formed into composite grenadier battalions. Mack's changes rearranged these 24 companies into four field battalions and one depot battalion, each of four fusilier companies, and a grenadier battalion of four companies. No longer operating independently of their regiments, these grenadier battalions combined the original two grenadier companies with two companies drawn from the regiment's original first battalion. Mack instigated other changes too. He believed that one of the main reasons for recent French successes was the mobility of the army, while the ponderous supply columns of the Austrian army had always hindered rapid movement. At a stroke Mack decreed that the Austrian army would follow the French principle and live from the country they passed through. With no experience of supporting themselves in this way the Army suffered greatly from lack of food during the campaign. Charles objected, considering the eve of war an inappropriate time to make such sweeping changes. He failed to overturn the decision, however, and the confusing exchange of companies within battalions left one exasperated officer reflecting as he marched off to war that the 'common soldiers no longer knew their officers and their officers did not know their men'.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY Like the French and Austrian armies, the Russian army too had been through a period of change. When Paul I became Tsar in 1796 he had taken a backward step and modelled the army on the lines of that of his great idol, Frederick the Great of Prussia. However, Paul's reign was

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short-lived and with Alexander as the new Tsar thr re-modeinisation of the army began. Russia conscripted the army from her vast pool of manpower. The allnost incdieval structnre of Russian life, rvith downtrodden ~easants.or serfs. , . tied to the nobility and landowners, provided the army with an almost ine.~a~~stihle supply , of material to fill the ranks. Conscription rules allowed sribstitutes wherehy unscrupr~lous landowners could replace the chosen man with another of his workers. This meant that it was often the laziest, weakest o r most dishonest v.zorkers that went forward to the army. With i service lasting 25 years, once a recruit marched . .alvay his family never expected to see him again. The blind nhediencr a serf had learnt as part . of his upbringing made him perfect for service in the Russian army. The strict, formal drill imposed on the Russians, including the straight-legged 'goose-step' rnarcli, often instilled with excessive ~hysicalpunishment, cns~n-edthat the average soldier followed every order explicitly withont question even in the most trying of circumstances. Much emphasis on the rlse of the hayonet pertneatcd training, a weapon that seemed ideally srlited to the Russian soldier, while musketry practice played a lesser role. Many considered the Russian mnsker nnreliablc due to the poor quality of the powder the country produced. The Rrlssian infantryman was steady, reliable and obstinately brave hut poorly led. Russian line infantry officers at this time were considered by many to he the rvorst in Europe; poorly trained, r~neducaredand lacking experience in manoeuvring their men. In his changes Alexander reintroduced regimental names hased on regionalih: grouping regiments, prrrely for administration purposes, in 'Inspections' hased on provinces. Like the Anstrian army, the regiment was still the highest permanent organisation, limiting opportrrnities for officers to gain experience with larger fnrmations. Groupings at brigade or divisional level were on an ad hoc basis and could alter dnring a campaign. Alexander also altered regimcntal composition so that all grenadier, musketeer andjager regiments consisted of three hattalions. There is soriic conli~sionregarding the irniforrii of Kussian musketeers in 1805. The he;~rlwearof thc army was going through a period of change Srom 1803, with the old bicorn being phased ant. New shakos, first introducer1 in August 1803, had given way to a second version anthorised in Fehrr~ary 1805. However, anthorised changes rarely mean instant acloption and it is possible that both bicorn and shako were worn bv the musketeers in the field at Austerlitz. It is interesting to note, however, that it is generally accepted that cuirassier and dragoon regiments, also anthorised to change from bicorns to I~clrnersin 1803, had done so prior to the start of the campaign. The cavalry recruited in much the same way as the infantry, merely creaming off those serfs with any basic familiarity with horses. Howe\,cr, in 1803 the nced for economy in the arniy led Alexander to anthorise the conversion of seven regiments of expensive cuirassiers to dragoons. Irregolar (:nssack cavalry sr~pportcdthe line c;~\alry.

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Russian officers wearing their winter uniforms. The Russian Officer was in low esteem by contemporaw who considered them uneducated and poorly trained. (Philip Haythornthwaite)

The Chevalier Garde, t h e most prestigious regiment in the Russian army, formed part of t h e Imperial Guard cavalry. I t drew its manpower f m m the upper echelons of society. (2 Decembre 1805, Jack GirbalSammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

The artillery had begun a series 01' rcforms in 1801. The weight of the barrels as well as the gun carriages and caissons were lightened, following the example of France's Gribeawal system, but the new gnns lacked the hitting power of the French pieces. M'hen Kutuzov's arrny, some 46,000 strong, set out on 25 August 180.5 it had a long, gruelling westward march ahead of it. In order to get under way at all they were l~cavilyreliant on the Austrian arrny to supply them with many of their hasic reqnirements. To ensure the Russians kcpt moving Austria also supplied staff officers, a skilled role that was largely lacking in the Russian army. These weaknesses in snpply, equipment and leadership contributed to the rapid deterioration of Kut~~zov's command. Three months after it marched for Bavaria, Kuti~zov'sarmy had already been forced to fall back to Moravia. Having marched almost 900 miles and fought a series of rearguard actions, his command now numbered only about half its original strength.

ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE .

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R aving determined to turn his army away from England and prepare for battle with Austria and Russia, Napoleon wasted no time in issuing new orders for a concentration of the army on the Rhine. On 26 August 1805 Bernadotte's I Corps marched from Hanover towards Frankfurt while Marmont's 11 Corps left Holland marching for Mainz. The rest of the army departed its coastal cantonment5 and moved towards positions between Mainz and Strasbourg. At this point Napoleon knew little of the Allies' plan of campaign, but he anticipated intercepting them somewhere between the Lech and Inn Rivers in Bavaria. Some 750 miles away, far to the east of the Rhine, Krrtrrzov set out from Russian territory on 25 August and marched llis ponderous army across Austrian Galicia towards the border with Moravia, which he reached on 22 Septemher. H e was still some 265 miles short of his initial target, Braunau, on the Inn River. Meanwhile, La Olnnde Armie was already concentrating along the line of the Rhine, and launched its advance across the river on 25 Septemher. The Austrian army of FML Mack was also on the move. The leading elements of the army left Wels on 5 September and crossed the Inn River into Bavaria three days later. Having anticipated the 22,000 men of the Bavarian army joining him, Mack must llave been dismayed to find that (41

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MACK'S INITIAL DEPLOYMENT-

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Lafe Scptrmher 1805 PUSCIANS

Mack anticipated that the French would advance in two main thrusts and positioned his main force to intercept them on the lller River, believing that the Russians would be in a position to be able to oppose any French move further to the north.

Bavaria was now allied to France. Mack had intended holding a position on the Lech while waiting for the Russians, however, hearing news that the French were already on the Rhine he pushed forward. He chose a new position further west on the Iller River, between Ulm and Memmingen, from where he could oppose any French attempt to exit the Black Forest. Archduke Ferdinand, the nominal commander of the army, objected to the forward deployment but Mack refused to listen. Emperor Francis, arriving at the front, approved Mack's dispositions and departed again. Such was the bitterness between Ferdinand and Mack that they rarely spoke again, preferring to communicate in writing. It was Mack's opinion that the French would advance in two bodies. He anticipated one thrust on the Iller and the other further north, pushing towards Wiirzburg, where he believed it would enco3inter the

ABOVE Marshal Bemadotte, marching fmm Hanover, led his I Corps and Marmont's I1 Corps thmugh the neutral Prvssian territoty of Ansbach. This advance t m k Mack by surprise as he received assurances that Prussia would Oppose any such move. RiGHTThe French anny marching for the Danube. The weather in October 1805 was atrocious and the men suffered greatly; they in turn inflicted much hardship on the Bavarian villages they passed thmugh. (Girbal Sammlung Alfred und Roland Urnhey)

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Russians advancing in support. To face this tlireat he had a simple plan. M'ith his main force in position around the lller and flanking forces close to Lake Constance covering the Tyrol (FML,Jellacic), and on the Danube watching the north (FML Kienmayer), he felt secure. Prussia's declaration that they would defend their neutrality rcmoved any threat to his rear through the territory of Anshach and added to his feeling of security. U'ith his rear secure he would be ahle to swing his force to fac? a threat from his fiont or right without compromising a line of retreat, holding the French while the Russians moved u p in support. On 17 September Napoleon learned that the Austrian army had pushed forward to Ulm i n d the lller River. His original plan had been for his army to converge on the Danrlhe hetween Ulm and Donauwiirth. hut now, with this information he ordered a concentration slightly further to the east, between Giin7burg and Ingolstddt. The great sweeping advance of the French army was not as smooth as some accounts of the campaign would have us believe. Murat's cavalr!: crossing the Rhine at Strashourg, were to push through the Black Forest and occupy Austrian advance troops, thus shielding the movements of the army, hut most importantly, take prisoners to gather information on Austrian intentions. In this final task they failed. There was also friction between the corps commanders and Berthicr, the chief-of-staff, who at times issued contradictory orders. The advance also suffered greatly from the weather. If the opposing generals had been anticipating

plcasant autuninal rvc;ttllrr [hey werr to he dislppointed. Octohel- was a month of incessant wind, rain, sleet a n d snow. T h e roads disintegrated 111iderthe march of such a mass of men, and food was in short supply. The Bavarian inhabitants, France's new allies, who f o ~ m dthemselves in tlir path of Napoleon's marauding army srlffered greatly as cold, tired and hrtngry soldiers helped themselves to ~vhateverthey wanted. Although he did not yet know it, Mack was already in serious trouble. Late in Septemher Murat ((:avalry R e s c r ~ e )Lannes , (V Corps) and tlre Imperial Guard had crossed the Rhine at Strashourg. About 35 miles clo~vnstream Ney's VI Corps also crossed, ~vhilc further- down the river Soult's N Corps and Dsvont's I11 Corps commenced their sonthe;lsh\.ard move. Furthest north, Bernadette's I Corps crossed the Main River at Frankfurt, closely accompanied by Marmont's I1 Corps, which pasred the Rhine at Mainz. These nvo corps were heading for M'i~rzburg. Rernadotte, with overall command of this force and the Bavarians, was already in receipt of' orders to march through Anshach, defi'ing the P1.11ssianswlrose territol-y i t was. Despite their mrlrances to the Allies, I'russia did nothing to oppose this move. On 4 October Mack received information that convinced lrirn that tlre French prrsh through the Black Forest was a feint and that the main French army was moving north of the Danube. To face this threat he ordered a concentration of the army along the Danube from Ulm cxtcnding towards Donauriiirth. Then on 5 October hc rcccived news that French tl-oops >\rereapproaching through Ansbach. Napoleon also rrrei\~edinformation about this time of Mack concentrating his forces

Napoleon at Augsburg on the Leeh river with men of Marmont's 11 Corps. Having cmesed the Danube Napoleon set up his headqualters in the city while Bernadette secured Munich and Soult occupied Landsberg. (Musee national du chateau de Venailles Sammlung Alfred und Roland Urnhey)

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on Ulm. On 7 October Soult and Murat began to cross the Danube at Donauwcrth. Kienmayer, the Austrian right flank guard, fell back southwards to ensure communications with Ulm could be maintained. Mack considered his options but felt no major change was necessary. He was determined to maintain his position west of the Lech River, to await the Russians. He reasoned any withdrawal to the east would abandon the Tyrol to the French and a retreat towards the Tyrol would have exposed Kutuzov to the full weight of the French army.

NAPOLEON CROSSES THE DANUBE On 8 October Lannes, Davout, Marmont and Bernadotte began crossing the D a n u b while Murat's cavalry and Lannes' infantry combined to. overwheld an Austrian advance guard marching towards the Lech at wertingeq.%e battle gave Napoleon the prisoners he so desired. He was now suri that Mack was still holding Ulm and he had a good idea of his strength. Napoleon considered Mack's most likely escape routes would be to the east via Augsburg or south to the Tyrol. Accordingly he ordered Augsburg, Landsberg and Memmingen occupied. However, these dispositions had left opening for Mack. With almost all of the French army south of the Danube preparing for an Austrian movement east or south, only two divisions remained north of the river and one of those was about to be ordered south. Mack did not know just how weak the French were but intended to attack their communications. On 11 October the Austrian army, less one brigade left to hold Ulm, crossed to the north bank of the Danube from where it observed Dupont's

7 Manhall Ney o&n hia .oms8 the bridge at Elchln on 14 October. mis umeh prevented an attem imm Ulm by the garrl a number ot brilliant cha by the Austrian cavallry. IStadtarehiv Ulm Ilammluna lMed und Roland Umheyj

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upported division of VI Corps at Haslach. The .Austrians heavily outnumbered the French but it was only after a 16ng, bloody struggle, that the poorly co-ordinated Austrian attack eventually forced Dupont to withdraw. The Austrians returned to their positions at Ulm but Mack's complex plans to exploit the French weakness faced strong opposition from some of his commanders, leading to a postponement until 13 October. On that day Mack planned a breakout, but that too was disrupted as he insisted on rearranging the composition of the columns. Two columns, perhaps totalling 35,000 men, were to advance north of the Danube towards Elchingen to clear the way, with two more columns bringing up the rear. Brushing Dupont aside, they would make for Bohemia and unite with the Russians.

The report of tlie action at Waslach alerted Napoleon to the confirsion that existed in VI Corps and to Dupont's isolated position. In response he orrlered Ncy to secure tlie river crossing at Elchingen hy the morning of 14 Octoher. The last remaining escape rollte from the trap was a\>ont to he cut. Having set the move to Elchingen in motion, Mack began to ponder new information that was coming in. WThat he found confusing was that Frencli troops were moving towards Ulm and the Iller, south of the Danube. If Napoleon wanted to attack the city of Ulm, which lay on the north hank of the river, why would he approach fi-om tlle south? Then on the tirorning of 13 Octoher he received an r~noficialI-cporr that claimed a British force had lalided at Boulogne and that a revoll~tiollhad hmken out in France. Everything was clear to him now - Napoleon was I-etreating to tlie Rlrine and doing so on the 'safe' side of the Danuhc. T h e orders for tlie colr~rnnsdetailed to follow u p the breakout attempt on the north hank were countermanded; these troops would now be required to pursue the 'retreating' Frcnch to the sorrtlr. It was only later that Mack disco\~eredthat the infamous spy Charles Schulmeister had duped him. The collf~rsiondid not end there. O n the morning of 14 October one of Mack's columns fell back on Ulm, Iiaving been intercepted by tlie French at Elchingen. Mcanwliile tlie second column under FML M'erncck, vith the Resenre Artillen: unaware of events at Elchingen continued to push on unsupported.

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THE SURRENDER OF ULM -

Rack in Ulm all was gloorn and despondency. T h e myth that the Frcnch \rere retreating had been shattered and there now appelred little likelihood of escape. Mack argued with his officers and his on-going

The capitulation of Ulm. Surmunded by t h e French army and with no sign of Russian intervention, Mack surrendered on 20 October. Some 25,000 Austrians marched from the city into captivity.

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Wersailles Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

frud with Archduke Ferdinand hoiled over. He felt sure that by (lrl'ending the city they could tie down a large French force until the Russians arrived. Ferdinand llad had enough. He \\'as not going to cndore capture hy tlie French. Having confronted Mack onc last time, Frrdinand, supported by FML Schwarzcnherg, gathered 12 squadrons of cavalry and abandoned Ulm that night, hoping to link up with FML \l'crneck's colr~mnof 20,000 men. On 1.5 October the French completed tlie encirclement of Ulm a ~ r t lhegan an artillery bombardment of the walls, summonillg tlie ci? ti1 surrender. Mack rejected their demand - he had approximately '!1,000 men still under cornmand and was determined to tie down the Frrrich, hut the clock was ticking. Meanwhile the first exhausted unit.? ol' li11tu~o~'s Russian army had begun to arrive in Rraunau on the Bavarian horrler about 160 miles a ~ a y hut , it would be another nvo weeks before ~lreyregrouped and were ready for action. By then it was all ovcr. hhck received another summons to surrender on I ? October. In his ~m~\in desperation g he agreed to sr~rrendel-his army as prisoners of war or1 25 October if at that time there was no sign of Russian inte~~rention. ,411strianmorale in the ciry was shattered. Tlre weather continued its assault on hody and mind, and limited French infiltration into tlre city as parr of tlir agreement made matters worse. O n 19 October Napoleon met uitlr \lack and informed him that 14'erneck's column had surrendered. With a s,I-irrm guarantee from Berthier that the Russians could not arrive in the area in time, Mack signed rhe surrcndrr. The following afternoon an ,411strianarmy of 51 battalions, 18%squadrons and 67 guns marched out of Lllm into capti>ity. It \fils 20 Octoher; the following day Admiral Lol-d Yelson's British fleet destroyed the comhincd fleets of France ant1 Spain at Tmfalgar. ,All that remained of the Austrian army that had marched into Bavaria some 72,000 strong was Kienmayer's colunin and the mounted men that .Archduke Ferdinand had hrought out of Ulm, boosted by cavalry from Werneck's column that llad escaped capture. These joined Kutr~zorat Braunau. Jellacic's colr~mnSailed to cscape into the Tyrol and surrendered to Aogereau's VII Corps after its long march f r o n ~Brittany. The first I(r~trizo\, knew of the capitulation at Ulm was when Mack, on parole, rode into Braunau, on his way to Vienna and eventual court-martial. In northern Italy Archduke Charles had undertaken his task with little mthusiasm. He was convinced Mack would lead his army to disaster. ,Accordingly lie chose to stand on thc defensive, with Vienna's appro\al, and not push into Lombardy until the situation in Bavaria was clarified. O n I7 October Massha, co~nmandingthe French forces, commenced his adlance, encouraging Charles to fall hack on a prepared position at (:aldiero. Here, on 24 October, he received news of Mack's surrender and driermined to oppose Massha, defeat him, and thus gain tirne to nithdraw on Austria. The nvo sides clashed over three days at the end of Octobcr, eventually Massha fell hack allowing Charles to commence his retirement. The grand strategy of the Thirrl Alliance was in tatters.

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,At Bnrunau Kutuzo\. colisidered his options. Ultimately his choice was

On 13 November Marshal M u a t captured the vital bridge over the Danube in Vienna by a mixture of bluff and bravado. He then marched north and made contact with the retreating Russians but was himself duped, allowing the main body to escape. (Philip Haythornthwaite)

simple; he had no intention of risking his depleted force of 27,000 meii against a victorious French army. Having finally reassembled his men i~ was time to turn around and retreat hack the way he had comc Accordingly on 25 October he set out for M'els with the French it: pnrsnit. Napoleon had to consider this move carefully. By pnshine up the Danube valley towards Vienna, he extended his lines 01 communication at a time when it appeared Prussia was finally shakinc off its l e t h a r q in response to Bernadotte's violation of Ansbacl~. Napoleon decided to take a hold course and push on quickly in an attempt to crush Kuturov before he received reinforcements. Kutuzor handled the retreat well, fighting rearguard actions at Ried, Lambacli and Amstetten. An increasingly worried Arrstrian Emperor urged Kutuzov to defend Vienna by making a stand at St. Piilten. Howe1,rr. Kutuzov had no intention of risking his army to protect the Austria!! capital and crossed to the north hank of the Danube at I - e m s , the lash crossing before Vienna, burning the bridge behind him. Safe from immediate pursuit Kutllzov decided to turn the tables on the French and attacked the newly created Vlll Corps. Under Mortier it had crossed to the north of the Danube at Linz and was now isolated tiom the resl of the army. The clash that followed at Diirnstein on 11 November sal, Mortier's Inen extricate themselves from the Russian trap but only after a fiercely contested battle. Kutuzov planned to maintain his position a1 Krems to await Rnxhiiwden, hnt the following day Murat entered Vienna and on 13 November, by an extraordinary display of bluff and possible collusion, captured the main bridge over the Danube. With his position compromised Kutt~zovrecommenced his retreat. As soon as the Vienna bridge was in French hands Napoleon ordered a rapid pursuit of Kuturov, hoping to intercept him around Znaim on the road to Rriinn. Murat made contact with a Russian flank guard at Schongrabern, but in attempting to delay them by entering into negotiations he was double-bluffed by Kutuzov. The wily Russian sent two ADCs to discuss terms for an armistice. Completely taken-in, Mtrrat sent details of the armistice to Napoleon for verification, while the main body of the Russians continued their retreat screened by this flank gnard. Napoleon was furious when he heard, and he ordered Murat to attack. The Russian flank guard, commanded by Ragration, fought doggedly a ~ a i n s toverwhelming numbers and despite heavy casualtirs extricated themselves and rejoined Kutuzov two days later. Napoleon's pnrsuit of K u t ~ ~ z ohad v failed. Between 17 November and 25 November the great concentration of the Allied army took place at Olmi117. in Moravia. Here Brrxhowden's army, the Russian Imperial Guard and the Austrian Prince J o h a n n von Liechtenstein joined Kutuzo\.. Liechtenstein now commanded Kienmayer's men, as well as other troops that had been in the vicinity of Vienna. Resplendent amongst this great multinational gathering of mud-splattered and tattered soldie? stood their Imperial Majesties, Tsar and Kaiser, the Emperors of Russia and Austria. To Alexander and his arrogantly over-confident entourage, the widely dispersed French army, at the end of an extended line of commnnication, appeared v e n vrrlnerable.

THE MARCH TO AUSTERLITZ

THE EAGLES GATHER ~p

Prince Dolgoruki, one of the young, overconfident and

vocitemus ADCs who had great influence on the Tsar's thinking. (Hulton Getty)

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apoleon halted the pursuit of the Russians at Briinn o n 20 Novcmher. This was a vital respite for the exhausted and hungry army and allowrd ritnc for rest and for the vast rail of stragglers to he rounded up. Only four fortnations lay close hy, the Imperial Guard and Lannes V Corps were around thc city while Murat's Cavalry Reserve and Soult's IV Corps were positioned to the east of it. Bernadotte, with his I (:orps and a division of Bavarians, was some 50 miles nol-th-\vest of Briinn, watclrillg for any movement by Archduke Ferdinand from Prague. Marmonr's 11 Corps in Styria, ahorit 80 miles south-west of Vienna, could oppose i\rchduke Charles should he attempt to march on the Austrian capital. East of Vienna, Davout held 111 (:orps ready to counter any hostile movernent fiom Hungary while Mortier's maulcd MI1 Corps gart-isoned the city After Ulm, Mat-shal Ne) marched to the Tyrol and Augerearl's \'I1 (:orps provided a number of garrisons along the line of communications. T h e apparent weakness of the French army around Briinn, however, was misleading. By means of forced marches Napoleon felt sure he corlld rapidly add the corps of Rernadottc and Davout to his main force. Like the Russians, Napoleon too sol~glita battle, sooner rather than latel-, 21s reports that thc Prussian army had commenced rnobilisation were heginning to reach him. His s ~ ~ p p o s weakness cd now worked in his favour. On 20 Novetnher the Frcnch and Russian cnalry clashed heyond Briinn at Raussnitz. T h e FI-ench drove the Russians off hut the repercussions were to he great. Two of Alexander's ADCs, Prince Dolgoruki, one of the most vociferous and arrogant, and MTinoingcrode, were elaterl, cnmincing the Tsar that with his Imperial Majesty at its head the army could defeat Napoleon in a major battle. It lvas what Alexander wanted to hcar. The following day Sonlt's (:orps pushed heyond the 1x1-ge village of Ausrerlio while an advanced cavalry brigade occr~piedM'isclral~,ahout halfivay hetween Briinn and the Allied army Napoleon rnde out behind these forrvard posts and observer1 thc ground closely. O n the return journey from Wischar~he stopped on the mad close to a small hill henwen the village of Bellowio and the post Iiotlse at Posorsio. Turning to the sor~tlihe ohserved the ground carefully. It seemed clcar to him that this was the most suitable terl-ain he harl seen o n whiclr to fight the Allied army Situated about Sour miles west oSAustcrliv, a high platcau ahove the \illage of Praoe dominated the area. To the west of this plateau the ground sloped gently down to the wide valley of the (:oldhach stream, along which were strung a series of small \illages. Kct~lrningto Briinn, Murat and Lannes received orders to prepare their commands for an eastward redeployment. Cm,

Napoleon halted hie pursuit of the Russians at Br"nn on 20 November. Marshal Soult pushed IV Corps forward towards Austerlitz, where at the great banle of 2 December h e was to play a pivotal mle. (Philip Haythornthwaite)

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On 24 November Alexander called a Council of M'ar at Olmiio. The Allies had a number of options open to them. They could maintain their positions and await the army of Archduke Charles, who was retreating from Italy via Hungary and had already united with Archduke J o h n ' s army from the Tyrol. Alternatively they could either move into Hnngary, effecting an earlieqjunction wit11 Charles, or continue to retire eashvards, drawing the French afier them. A final option would be to advance and engage Napoleon. Reports on the state of supplies in the area made hleak reading. If the army stayed there much longer it would starve. K~~tuzov advocated a further retirement to fresh supplies; any French pursuit would find the countryside stripped hare. A nnmher of senior generals supported the commander-in-chief, hut in I-cality he was no longer in command. With Alexander present, Kutuzov commanded in name only. The Tsar's circle of belligerent staff officers urged that the army attack, defeat Napoleon and hring glory to Russia. N o one on the Russian side really cared what the Austrians thonght anymore. Since the surrender at Ulm friction had grown hemreen the nvo allies. The Rnssians now had a low opinion of the fighting capabilities of their Austrian allies and the continual oh,jections to Russian excesses against the civilian population irked them. However, there was still one Anstrian who had the ear of the Tsar, Generalmajor M7eyrother, Kutuzov's replacement chietloflstaff Follo\ving the death of FML Schmidt, at Diirnstein, Kutrrzov appointed Weyrother to replace him. M'eyrotlier has been described as possessing great personal courage hrn lacking confidence in voicing his own considered opinions or in offering contentious advice. He did, however, add the weight of his snpport for an attack towards Briinn. Alexander listened to the arguments but it was clear he wanted to face Napoleon on the field of battle. Kutnzov felt nnable to oppose the wishes of the Tsar and stepped hack. Emperor Francis, dcmoralised and a fngitive from his own capital, declined to oller any opposition. Alexander and his advisors confidently formnlated their strategy the following day, 25 November, with the intention that the Allied army would commence it$ advance. In essence the plan was designed to turn the French right at Bri~nn,threaten their communications with Vienna and drive them back through difficult country towards Krcms on the Danube. However, administrative delays meant it was not nntil the morning of 27 November that the 75,000 men of the Austro-Russian army lannched their offensive. It was only the following day that Napoleon heard of the advance, effectively shielded as it was hy the Allied advance guard nnder Bagration. Napoleon had deliberately nor pressed the Allies, hoping to create an impression of weakness that might encourage them to consider battle. No~vhe had the nelvs he wanted.

T H E ALLIES ADVANCE On the morning of 28 November the Rnssians pressed forward against the \illage of U'ischau, held by a brigade of Murat's cavalry. The rillage was taken, the news of which prompted Napoleon to send one of his trusted aides, General Savary, to Allied headquarters to seek information, under the pretcxt of peace discussions. Savary reported back on the lack of unity amongst the officers and that the Tsar's

The French army begins to strengthen the defences on t h e hill on which Napoleon anchored the northern end of his line at Au~terlitz.The hill, known to the French as t h e Santon, was fortified with captured Austrim guns. Wersailles Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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influential entor~ragewas encouraging him to seek battle. Napolcon determined to send S a ~ a r yhack with a request lor a meeting with the Tsar in ordel- to keep up the pretence that he \ra not in a position to accept battle. Then, turning his attention to the army, he hegan to issue a flurry of orders. The next day, 29 November, Soulr (IV Corps), east of Austerlio, and Murat ((:avalry Reserve), west of Rausmio, were to abandon their current positions and withdraw westwards to the position he had selected hehind the Goldbach stream, ahandoning the dominating Frauen plateau in the pl-ocess. Lannes' V Corps and the Imperial Guard also received orders to take up positions behind the Goldbach. Bernadotte, who was some 50 rniles away, close to the Bohemian border, as to march at once with I Corps, leaving the Bavarian di\ision to watch for Archduke Ferdinand. Davor~t's111 (:orps, spread out hchvccn Vienna and Presshnrg (BI-atislava),were ordered to commence the long march north. Napoleon rvould thus gather an army of 74,500 men. M'hile the French were mo\ing to their new positions the Allies spent 29 November redeploying their arm): currently concentrated against the French IeTt. This was not completed until the following day. Savary retnrned to the French lines, not mlth the Tsar, hut with Prince Dolgoruki. The Russian prince and other influential officers interpreted the apparent French withdra~valas a sign of wcakncss. The Tsar's overconfident AD(: bornharded Napoleon with demands, \vhich he listened to with increasing anger hcfore finally dismissing the Russian aristocrat, haling made sure he had observed only what Napoleon wmterl him to see. Dolgoruki returned to confirm the French were ~\lthdramlngand only ca\.alry patrols remained on the dominating Pratzen platcall. Later on 30 November Napoleon led the Corps commanders acl-ossthe area that would soorr become the battlefield. Starting at the northern extreme, thc lcft of the French line, they examined the hill hy the Briinn-Olmiiu road by which Napoleon had stopped on 21 November. Named the Santon by its defenders, effort9 to make the hill more

defensible were successful and a number of captured Austrian artill pieces enhanced its firepower. From here Napoleon and his entour rode up on to the Pratzen plateau and observed off to the east the Am Russian army manoeuvring into position. Here Napoleon expanded on plan of battle to his heedful audience, explaining that by abandoning high ground he hoped to draw the Allies into a major battle. Later I evening Napoleon received news that Bernadotte and I Corps wen Rritnn znrl navo~lthimself arrived ahead of his men. who were suffel

division and Bourcier's dragoon division would arrive in time for battl

T H E ARMIES PREPARE FOR BATTLE m e 49-year-old Lleutenantdo^^^, commander of I Column of the Allied army at Auruste~Ilb.Together wRh I Columnb Mvance under K l e n ~ y e he r formed on the extreme lee of the army.

On 1 December the Allied army, disordered during its redeploymer the south, received new column identification numbers. At the star the advance from Olmiitz the army had marched with an advance g~ and five columns, numbered one to five, starting from the right of line. Now the columns numbered one to five from the left of the I The confusion amongst the staff, attempting to issue orders for advance towards the Prauen plateau, must have been great. Des these distractions the Austro-Russian army finally took up its posi late on 1 December. On the left was Lieutenant-General Dokhtura command of I Column, which formed camp on the Pratzen pla~ above the village of Klein Hostieradek with a battalion of Jiger pus

The Allied plan acknowledged the weakness d the French right and was designed to allow four columns to sweep mund and drive it back on its main body when, with the added weight of the rest of the army, the French would be driven off.

LEFT Napoleon's plan depended

on convincing the Allies d the weakness of his own right. Once the Allies were committed he anticipated that Davout would arrived, aiding weight to the right while Soult unleashed IV Corps against the Allies' now weakened centre.

forward to the village of Augezd at the southern foot of the plateau. Kienmayer's Advance Grrard of I Column, encamped to the west of Augezd. To the right of I Column Lieutenant-General Langeron formed I1 Colltmn. Lieutenant-General Prehyshevsky had marched towards Praoe and halted 111 Colurnn on the plateau ahove and to the right of the village. These three colr~mns,rnainly Russian in composition, came under the overall command of Lieutenant-General Buxhtiwden. IV Column, formed of Russian and Austrian troops under the joint command of Lieutenant-General Miloraclovich and Feldzerrgmeister Kolowrat, took up a position on the plateau to the rear of 111 Column. The main cavalry force, V Column, nnder Feldmarschalleutant Johann Liechtenstein followed behind 111 and N Columns and were to make camp helow the plateau. Ragration's Advance Guard was in position to the north, across the Briinrl-Olrniitz road, reaching towards the Praoen plateau. In reserve Grand Prince Constantine held the Rnssian Imperial Guard on the high grorrnd between Austerlio and the Allied headquarters at Krzcnowitz. M'ith the left protected hv a series of shallou~ ice-covered ponds towards the villages of Satschan and Menitz, the centre on the dominating Praoen plateau and the right refr~sed,the position was strong defensively. Unfortrlnately for the soldiers of the Allied army the Tsar was not intending to wage a defensive hattle. With the advance of the Austro-Rnssian army the French cavalry outposts had withdrawn to their own lines. Napoleon had his army heavily concentrated on their left, presenting a wcak right to the Allies. Napoleon hoped to draw the Allies on to his right, then, with Davout arriving from thc south in strength he worrld rlnleash his left against the

Allies' right and reat-. I t was no\+,clear, Iiowe~r that Davorlt would not be ahlc to hring the ill weight of his corps to hear. In addition, nea came in that srlggestcd the Allies wcre massin. their strength frlrthcr to the south than he ha, anticivated. To combat this Naooleon orderri 1 Davout to march for Turas, ro thr west of the li118 of the (;oldhach to oppose any Allied push tha reached this far. Sorllt's n' Cot-ps was to make thl decisive move, an ohlique attack on the Praver plateau once the Allies were moving against 111, right, and drive a wedge hehvcen the two wingso 7 ' , the army. M~II-at's ca\.alry was to operate betweer Soult and Lannes' V Corps. In readiness hehinl , , : i,;. Lanncs was Oudinot's (;renadicr Division an11 Bet-~~arlotte's 1 Corps. In reserw, the Imperi~l ,.,. "I'i; .:'. (;rlard stood close to Nar~olcon'shearlorrarters on , 1 Zuran hill. Having cotrlplcterl these disposition, , :, tllr s ~ ~ c l d esoilnil n of firing far off to the solit disturbed Napoleon. Despatching staff to find o u ~ ~ 3 . : .>i -. what was happening, he was e\~entrrall~ informer1 .. at about midnight that the Austrians llad atracketl the vill;tgc oITrlnit/ and driven off the delenders. Napoleon rode 0111 to see for himself and was almost captured by a patrol of cossacks who chased hi111 and his party hack over the Golclbach. Napoleon returned to his hcadquartrrs through the hivouacs of the army. As he passed through the lines 0 1 solrliers they spontaneously held b r t r ~ ~ i ntorchei g alofi to ill~tminatehis progl-ess and in the process cartsccl the Allies to helicve the French were about to launch a torclllight attack. Howeve,:

,k

+ Y

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*& I:;r,*

A.

The Allied commanders discuss Weyrother's battle plan at headquarters in Krrenowitz during the night of 112 December. The assembled officers greeted the plans with little enthusiasm. (Sarnrnlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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&.*.I

+,$.

on the morning of 2 December Napoleon passed on his final instructions to the Corps commanders fmm his headquarters on Zuran hill. ~arshalSoult remained with Napoleon, as the timing of his anack was crucial. (sammlungAlfred und Roland Urnhey)

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L

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I

LEFT The night before the Battle 01 Austerlitz. Napoleon snatches a iinle sleep as the distribution of final orders is completed. On a reconnaissance that night he narmwly escaped capture by a Cossack patrol. (Hulton Gettyl

the move against Telnitz caused Napoleon to reconsider his positions once more. Although a rcgirncnt of Legrand's division of IV Corps had recaptured Telnitl, Napolcon deployed the remaining elements of the division along the Goldbacll t o defend the villages of Sokolnitl and Kobelnio. This denied Lannes his support, as Rcrnadotte moved to thc right to back up the spearhead of n'Corps, forming behind Vandamme, while the Reserve Grenadiers joined the Imperial Guard as army rcservc. Thcse were the linal dispositions before battle commenced. During thc day of 1 December MTeyrotlierhat1 hcen devising his battle plan. The Allies still did not hdve a great amount of information about the French dispositions, hut rrrovcment on the Rriinn-Olmi~o road, the strengthening of the Santon hill and ;I lack of troops along the Goldbach in the Telni~-Sokolnio-Ko11eI11itz area suggested a conce~ltration on the left. These positions gave hirttl to a plan that dernandecl a vast, well c ~ ~ r d i n a t esweep d hy the Allied left and centre that would drive the presutned weak French right back on its centre and left. Then, \%it11the added weight of the Advance Guard and canlry of V Columt~,supported

39

by the Russian Imperial Guard, the French would he forced north, off their line of communications, or hack on Briinn. At about midnight on 1 December the Allied column commanders gathered at headquarters in Krzenowitz whcrc TVeyrother lectured the assembled officers on their roles in the coming battle. It appears that those who were to carry out his plans were unimpressed. According to Langeron, commander of 11 Column, Kutuzov was 'half-asleep in a chair when rve arrived at his house, and by the time we came to leave he had dozed off completely. Buxhiiwden [overall commander of I, I1 and 111 Columns] was standing. He listened to what was being said, though it must have gone in one ear and out the other. Miloradovich [joint commander of IV Column] spoke not a word. Prebyshevsky [commander 111 Column] kept in the background, and only Dokhturov [commander I Column] examined the map with any attention.' Neither Alexander nor Francis was present. The advance by Buxhi)u~den3s left wing, tirned to commence at 7.OOam in the morning was to be preceded by an advance gr~ardof I Column, under the Austrian FML Kienrnayer, who would clear Telnio of it? defenders. The plan was clear evidence of the view amongst the Russian hierarchy that the French were weak and intent on avoiding battle. With little resistance anticipated on the (;oldbach to hinder the great sweep of the army Weyrother felt it unnecessary to allocate a reserve on the left. With no French counterattack contemplated the plan rcquircd that all units descend from the security of the Praoen plateau to ensure the French would not escape. The only reserve, the imposing formation of the Russian Imperial Guard, stood towards the right of centre hut too far away to influence matters elseurhere on the battlefield. Desperate staff officers spent the rest of the night attempting to distribute written orders. The night of 1/2 December had been freezing and the soldiers of the Austrc-Russian army spent it huddled around their meagre campfires until roused, while still dark, to prepare for the advance. A thick, cold and damp mist clung to the ground adding to the sense of confusion as the various brigades comprising each cohrmn shook themselves into some semblance of order. Beyond the line of the Goldbach the French troops too had endured a cold night, stoking their fires with anything comb~rstiblethey could tear from the nearby tillages. Napoleon called his corps commanders to him for their final instructions, the army was ready but initially it was required to play a waiting game; waiting for the Allies to commit themselves. The commanders returned to their men, except Soult, who remained with Napoleon. The timing of Soult's assault on the Pratzen was crucial to the French plan. Davout received revised orders; he was now to march in support of Legrand. Even while this meeting was in progress the battle opened.

I ORDERS OF BATTLE

Ill CORPS: MARECHAL DAVOUT Total strength approx. 3.200 nfantry, 830 cavalry, 190 artllery and train, 12 guns.

LA GRANDE ARMEE, AUSTERLITZ, 2 DECEMBER 1805 Commander-n-chief:L'Empereur Napoleon Chlei of Stan: Marechal Berthier Total strength of Army incudng stan - 74.500 Apprax. 605 staff personnel. 58.135 infantry. 11.540 cavalry 4.220 artillery and Iran. 157 guns. IMPERIAL GUARD: MARECHAL BESSIERES Total strength approx. 3,885 nfantly 1,130 cavalry, 660 artillery and train, 24 guns Infantry of the Imperial Guard Grenaders a o~ed(2 bns 1 Chasseurs B pled (2 bns) Royal 1tai;an Guard . ' rr

>,

7--<

, ,- ;2 -7

I

erne Dragon Division: GO Bourcier -Attached

to 111 Corps

from the Cavalry Reserve Brtgade: GB Sahuc 15brne Dragons (3 sqns.) 17erne Dragons (3 sqnsj

,.,'

Cavalry of the Imperial Guard Grenaders B cheval (4 sqns.) Chasseurs B cheval (4 sqns j Mameuks (% sqn 1

,

GRENADIERS DE LA RESERVE: GEhERAL DE DIVISION IGD) OUDINOTAND GD DUROC . . ., .:. I?.- I I iT I ^ . , ,I:'.

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26me Division: GD Friant Brigade: GB Klster 15erne LBgeie (2 bns. less the 33erne Ligne (2 bns 1 Bngade: GB Lochei 48eme L~gne(2 bns) 11Ierne Ligne (2 bns) Bngade: GB Heudeiet 15eme Legere (voltgeursl 108bme L~gne(2 bns)

~..,

.

25eme Dragons (3 sqns.) 27eme Dragons (3 sqns.) Attached (separatelyl to illCorps from the e r n e D a g o n Division of the Cavalry Reserve ler Dragons (3 sqns.) IV CORPS: MARECHAL SOULT Total strength appmx. 22,700 nfantry 2,650 cavalry, 1.320 artillery and traln. 38 guns l 6 r e Division: GD Saint Hilaire Bnsade: GB Morand

covs from both i8eme a 31&e ieaerei

Brigade:

Seme Grenadier RBgment (2 bns) - (3 Carab. coys and 3 Chass. coys. from both 12eme & l5eme Legere) I CORPS: MARECHAL B E R N A D O ~ E Total strength approx 10,900 nfantry 0 cavalrv 420 artillery and train, 22 guns. l6re Division: GBnCal de Division (GDJ Rivaud de la Raffini6re Bngade Geneini de Bngade iGBJ Dumoui#o 8erne Ligne (3 bns) Brigade: GB Pacthod 45erne Llane 13 bnsl

28me Division: GD Drouet Bngade GB Freie 27bme Legere (3 bns! Brigade GB W& 94eme L~gne(3 bns) 95eme L~gne(3 bns)

Biiyade: ZB vare 43eme L~gne(2 bns.) 55eme Llgne (2 bns) 28me Division: GD Vandamme Brigade: GB Schinei 24erne Legere (2 bns ) Brtgade: GB Ferrey 4eme Llgne (2 bns) 288me L~gne(2 bns.) Bngade GB Caodias 46bme Llgne (2 bns) Sibme L~gne(2 bns.) 36me Division: OD Legrand Biigade. GB Me& 26eme Legere 12 bns) T~ra~lleurs du Pb 11 bn.! T~ra~lleurs ~ o r s e $ (bn.) l Bngade: GB FOry 3 erne Ligne (3 bns.) Brigade: GB Lavasseui l 8 h e Liane 12 bnsi

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Ltghl Cavalry Bngade

tight Cavalry Brigade 8:'gade: GB Margaron %me Hussards (3 sqns i teme Chasseurs B cheval (4 sqns.) 2 k m e Chasseurs B cheva (3 sqns.)

,

. (.. . . . r,. 22eme Chasseurs B cheval (3 sqnsj

'. ., 7 .

3eme Dragon Division: GD Beaumont fmm the Cavalry Reserve. Bngade. GB Boye jeme Dragons (3 sqns.) 8eme Dragons (3 sqns.) 12bme Dragons (3 sqns.) Brtoade GB Scalfon "me Dragons (3 sqns.1 16eme Dragons (3 sqns) Zleme Dragons (3 sqns 1

- Attached to I V Corps

VCORPS:MARECHAL LANNES Total strength approx. 12.800 infantry, 1,130 cavalry, 500 artllery and train, 23 guns. 36me Division: GD Suchet Bngade GB ClaparMe l7eme Legere (2 bns) Bogadc GB Bekei 3deme L~gne(2 bnsj 4Oeme Llgne (2 bnsj Bogade: GB Valhubeii Meme Ligne (2 bns) 8"me Llgne (2 bns)

Light Cavalry Division: GD Kellemann -Attached to the Cavalry Reserve Corns fmm I Coros Brigade: GB van Mansy ?&me Hussards (3 sqns.) Seme Hussards (3 sqns.) Bngade: GB Picard 4bme Hussards 13 sans i 5Bme ~ h a s s e u rBi chevil (3 sqns.) Light Cavalry Division -Attached to the Cavalry Reserve Corps from V Corns Brtgade: GB ~krllard Seme Hussards (3 sqns.) loeme Hussards (3 sqns.) Bngade: GB Fauconnet 13bme Chasseurs B cheval (3 sqnsj 21bme Chasseurs B cheval (3 sqns.) ARTILLERY RESERVE PARK Total strength approx 410 artllery and tran. 18 guns

THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ARMY, AUSTERLITZ, 2 DECEMBER 1805

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l6re Division: GD Caffarelli Attached fmm 111 Corps

B~gade:GB Epplei 13eme Leghre (2 bns)

Bnoade GB Demonf

2eme Dragon D!vrs,on OD Walther rhe C ~ r a l l yReserve

- Attached to V Corps fmm

. 1, 3e& Dragons 13sqns.1 Seme Dragons I3 sqns.) Bngadc GB Roget lOeme Dragons 13 sqns.) 1lbme Dragons (3 sqns 1 Bngade: GB Boussaii 13eme Dragons (3 sqns.) 22bme Dragons (3 sqns.)

Supreme commander at Austerl~lz:Tsar Alexander I Cammandern~chefof Allled forces. Mikhail Kuturov Chef of Stafi: Generalmajor (OM) Weyrother Austnan Cammander. Feldmarschallerrtant (FML) Prince Uechtenstein Observing: Kaiser Flanz I Overall Commander of I. I 8 111 Columns: Lt.Gen. Buxhiiwden Total strength of Austra~RusslanArmy excud8ng general staff - 72,890 Approx 50.025 nfantry 14,265 cavalry, 7,800 an81lery and tran. 800 pioneers 318 guns. Austnan Army appron. 16.645 men: 11370 infantry 3,130 cavalry 1,715 artliery and train. 430 pioneers. 70 guns Russtan Army appron. 56,245 men: 38,655 infantry, 11,135 cavalry 6.085 artillery and train, 370 pioneers, 248 guns. (N.B. In Auslra-Russan formatons Austrian unltr are ndlcafed by A)

ARMY ADVANCE GUARD: LTGEN. BAGRATION Russian formation

CAVALRY RESERVE CORPS: MARECHAL MURAT Total strength approx 5.800 cavalry 380 artllery and train. 12 guns 1st Heavy Cavalry Division: GD Nansauty

Bngade: GB P8stoo lere Carabniers (3 sqns.)

i

9bme Cuiiassers i3 s i n s Brigade: GB Sant-Geimain 36me Cu8rasslers 13 sqns.) 12erne Curassers (3 sqnsj

Bngade: MaiGen. ~ittge"stein Pavlogiad Hussars ( l o sqns.)

,

.

Tver Dragoons (5 sqns.)

2ndHeavy Cavalry Division: OD d'Hautpooi Bngade: GB Norot lere Curassiers 13 sqns.) Seme Curassers 13 sans1 Bngade GB ~ a i n t : ~ u l b , c d loeme Cuirassiers (3 sqns) lieme Cuirassers (3 sqnsj

St. Petersburg Dragoons (3 sqns.) Attached to Army Advance Guard Bngade: MaiGen. Cllapiitz Khanenkov Cossacks (5 sqns.) Klselev Cossacks (5 sqns j Malakhov Cossacks (5 sans /

MPERIAL GUARD: GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE qusslan formation

lola strength approx 5400 nfantry 2600 cavalry 980 artllery and tialn, 100 pioneers, 40 guns juard Infantry: Lt.Gen. Maliutin

irigade: MalGen Depreradovich 1 'reobrazhensky Guard (2 bns) e jme"k ,y Guard (2 bns) rmallovsky Guard (2 bns.) ;uard Jager (1 bn.) 3ngade Maj.Gen. Lobanov h a r d Grenaders (3 bns) ;uard Pioneers (1 coy.)

:"ad Cavalry. Lt.Gen. Kologrivov 3ngade: MaGen. Jankovich iuard Hussars 15 sqns 1 2uard Cossacks 1 .2 sans1 , . 3ngade: M3.Gen. Depieiadonch li :hev31ei Garde (5 sans) iorse Guards 15 sqns.) 4DVANCE GUARD OF I COLUMN: FML KIENMAYER 4ustro-Russian formation iota1 strength apprax. 2.450 mlantry. 2,340 cavalry, 295 anlllery and train, 250 pioneers. 12 guns. 3rigade: GM Carneniie 7. Brod-Grenzregiment(1 bn.) - A 14 1 Sreckel~Grenrregment(2 bns) - A 15. 2 Sreckel-Grenzregment (2 bns) - A 3rigade. GM Stutteiheim 3. O'Reily-Chevaulegers (8 sqns.) - A 1. MeweldtGUhanen ( / sqn.) - A Srigade: GM Nastttl 4. Hessen~Homburo-Husaren 16 sons1 - A

dnached t o Advance Guard iysoev Cossacks 15 sqns.) Meentev Cossacks (5 sqns.) I COLUMN: LT.GEN. GENERAL DOKHTUROV Russian formation Total strength approx. 7.450 nfantry 210 cavalry, 1.570 artillery and tran. 90 poneers. 64 guns Sngiide: Ma;.Gen. Lew6 7. Jiger (1 bn.) 3 d nqermanand Musketeers (3 bns.! srigade MaiGen. Urasov Jaroslav Musketeers (2 bns.1 liladimir Muskel.teers13 bnsl Bnansk ~ " s k i t e e r s(3 bns Brigade: MaGen. Liedeis K~evGrenadiers 13 bns) MOSCOW Musketeers (3 bns.) V~atskMusketeers (3 bns.)

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Attached to N Column St Petersburg Dragoons (2 sqns.) lsayev Cossacks (1 sqn ) Ill COLUMN: LTGEN PREBYSHEVSKY RJssoan format on .. . , c.< ., , :, I", ' .- - . . , , 90 pioneers. 30 guns

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7. jiger (2 bns.) Gacia Musketeers (3 bns.) Brigade. Ma~.GenStvk Boutyrsk Musketeers I3 bns) Narva Musketeers 13 bnsl Bngade: Ma, Gen. ioshakov

IV COLUMN: LT.GEN. MILORADOVICH & FELDZEUGMEISTER (FZM) KOLOWRAT Austro-Russian formation Total strength approx. 11,795 infantry (2,875 Russian & 8.920 Auslnan). 125 cavalry (Austnan).1,865 anillery and train. 180 pioneers (Atlstrlan). 76 guns (40 Austrian 8 36 Russian) Advance Guard: LtCal. Monakhttn 1. Emherzog Johann-Dragoner (2 sqns.) - A Apcheron Musketeers (1 bn 1 Novgorod Musketeers (2 bns 1 Brigade: MajGen Berg Little Russia Grenadiers (3 bns.1 Novgorod Musketeers (1 bn.) Bngade: MaiGen. Repninsky Apcheron Musketeers (2 bns.) Smolensk Musketeers (3 bns) Brigade: GM Ronennund R20 Kaunltz (1 depot bn 1 A R23 Salzburg (6 bns I - A R 2 4 Auersperg (1 depot bn.) - A Bngade: GM Jurczik R 1 Kaiser Franz (1 depot bn.) - A R Q Cranoryski (1 depot bn.) - A R29 L~ndenau(1 bn.) - A R38 Wumemberg (1 bn.) - A R49 Kerpen (1 depot bn.) - A R55 Reuss-Greltr (1 depot bn j - A R58 Beaul~eu(1 bn A i ~ o t eme . two coys of v~onns~ s g e rnormay attached la tnls fomat,on n orders; Banle l o r ~ u s t e n ewere not lnvolved n the tlghtlng 1 V COLUMN: FML JOHANN LIECHTENSTEIN Austro-Russian formation Total strength approx. 4.620 cavalry (1,165 Austrian & 3.455 Russ~anl. 590 anilery and train, 24 guns (6 Austrian 8 18 Russian) Austrian Cavalw: FML Hohenlohe Bngade GM Weber 1 Kaiser-Kurassere 18 sons: 2 sans. detached to Armv HQI A

Attached to IColumn Densov Cossacks (5 sqns 1 11 COLUMN: LT.GEN. LANGERON R~ssian formation Total strength approx. 9,830 infantry 360 cavalry 735 anillery and tran, 90 poneers. 30 guns 8, jeger (2 bnsl Kursk Musketeers (3 bns.) Perm M~sketeers13 bns I vtborg M i s k e t e e i (3 bns) Brigade: MajGen Kameosw Phanagor~aGnnadlers (3 bns.1 R ~ z a nMusketeers (3 bns.)

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Russian Cavalry: LtGen. Essen I1 Brigade: MajGeo Pentzki Grand Duke Conslantlne Uhlans (10 sqns 1 Brigade: GeoAa). Uvarov El~sabethgiadHussars (10 sqns.) Kharkov Dragoons (5 sqns.) Tchernigov Dragoons (5 sqns.) Attached to V Column Densov Cossacks (2%sqns.) Gordeev Cossacks (5 SqnS.1 lsayev Cossacks (4 sqns.)

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ

THE BATTLE IN THE SOUTH -

Feldmarschalleutnant Kienmayer Opened the battle when he attacked towards the village of Telnib with the Advance Guard of 1 Column. The French put up a tenacious defence, preventing him from taking and holding the village. (Heeresgeschichtlichee Museum)

uornrumv's I Column advanced in support of Kienmayer and with the Russian 7. J=ger committed lo the attack the village of Telnitz finally fell into Allied hands. (Philip Hayihornthwaite)

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n the open plain below the Prarzen, on the extreme left of the Allied army, FML Kicnmayer had the 5,000 men of his Advance "-' Guard of I Column ready to move sometime before 7.00am. Sending some squadrons of 4. Hessen-Homburg Husaren ahead to scor~tthe approaches to Telnitz, Kienmaycr learnt that the French were defending a low hill in front of the village. Behind the hill, reaching down to the village, were a tangle of vineyards surrounded by a ditch. The SPme Ligne from Legrand's division of N Corps prepared to defend this strong position, supported by a cavalry brigade under General Margaron. Kicn~nayer probed forward with 2nd Batt.'1I'Ion 1. Szeckel Grenzers and as rhry emerged from the mist the French line erupted into action inflicting horrendous casualties on the Austrians. The first battalion of the Grenzer regiment came forward in support with two cavalry regiments. The two battalions, working together, drove the French back into Telnio, but it was clear that it would not he as easy to brush aside the French as M'eyrother had imagined. Kienmayer fed in his last three battalions, hut there was no sign of Dokhtnrov and the main body of I Column who should by now have been in a position to assist. The Grenz infantry finally gained the village, only to be pushed orrt again. Then, about an hour after the action had begun, Ruxhiiwden, the overall commander of the left wing, approached with Dokhturnv's I (:nlumn. Buxhiiwdcn ordered a brigade torward; the 7. J i g e r to snpport the attack and the three battalions of the New Ingermanland regiment to form a reserve. Reinforced, the Allies attacked the village once more with nun Grenz battalions and the Russian ,Jager. Suffering rnonnting casualties and now facing overwhelming numbers the order was given for 3 h e I.igne to evacuate Telnio. The French reformed in battle order wcst of the Goldbach sr~pportedby Mangeron's cavalry and artillery, now positioned on high-gronnd north-west of Telnitz. Althor~gh Kienmayer's orders were to press on over the stream, Ruxhnwden told him to wait. The plan called for the columns to advance in unison and the position of I1 Column was unclear. A brief period of calm descended on Telnio. Up on the platcau confusion reigned. The late hour of the final meeting and the necessity to draft maps with orders in German and Kr~ssiancnsurrd desperate staff officers were still distrihuting orders after 7.00am, the time specified for the beginning of the advance. The thick fog and sprawling encampments made the task difficnlt enough, but the fact that some Russian officers had left their commands during thr night for more comfortable billets in the villages behind the plateau, fnrtl~ercompoundetl the issue.

The Battles for Sokolnitz and Telnitz

Eventr~allvLangeron's I1 Collnnn was led forward through the fog down the gentle slope in thc general direction of their initial target, the Goldhach stream henveen Telnitz and Sokolnitz, to the right of I Column. Ahead of them initially stood hvo weak battalions - the Tirailleurs d r ~Pi, and Tiraillrrlrs Corses - but tlie sound of gunfire from Telnitz alerted General Legrand, the divisional comnrander on the southern flank, to the developing situation. He ordered tlie nvo hattalions of 2 6 h e Legere to Sokolnitz and General La\zasseur's hrigade (nvo battalions from both l8i.me and 7.5i-me Ligne) to cover the area fkom Kohelnio to~vardsthe

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Pheasantry, a large walled park about rhreeqnarters of a mile to the sor~th. All his troops were now committed to the defence of the Goldhach line. His men had just taken r ~ ptheir position when the leading brigade of Langeron's Column, having veered to tlie right of their intended line, loomed r ~ in p front of Sokolnio. Aware that the French were occup9ng the village, Langeron ordered the hrigade to deploy and open fire on the defenders, supported by their hattalion guns, while he awaited the rest of his command. Mliile this bombardment took place Prehysheusky's 111 Column came into view haling heen delayed further by the soft clinging mud of the ploughed fields on the slopes below Prabe ldlage. Finding Langeron much closer than he expected Prehyshe\.sky formed his column to the right of I1 Column, ficing Sokolnio Castle, a large country house surrounded by a wall with massive stone outbuildings, north oT the village. Three companies of second battalion 266me Ltgtre defended the catle while the rest of the battalion was drawn up to the rear on high ground with artillery support. Determined to waste no more time Prchyslievsky ordered a hrigade under Major-General Miiller to take tlie castle. A battalion of 7. ,]iger and thrce hattalions of the Galicia Musketeers advanced on the castle and easily drove away the defenders who fcll back to the main hody of their battalion. The disorganised Russians now came under close-range

One of the dominating granaries in Sokolnitr, close to the castle, possession d which was contested fiercely throughout the day of the battle.

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The second battalion of 26eme Legere charge into Sokolnitz and recapture the castle from Major-General MOller's Brigade of 111 Column. A swin Russian counterattack, Wpical of the fighting i n Sokolnitz, then ejected the 26Bme LCgere in turn. (Girbal Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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OVERLEAF THE BATTLE FOR TELNITZ. The small village of Telnitr on the banks of the Goldbach Stream was destined t o play a vital role i n the Battle d Austerlitz. An Allied attempt to secure the village during the freezing night before the battle failed, leaving the French i n possession. Anything that would burn was stripped fmm the houses to help warm the soldiers through the night. The attack on Teinitz began a t about 7.00am. With a thick mist still covering the gmund FML Kienmayer ordered his Advance Guard to capture the village. The defenders, men of the French 3hme Ligne, resisted femciously fmm a low hill outside the village bUt repeated assaults by Austrian troops forced the French defenders back amongst the shattered houses. Further attacks ejected them completely but they quickly rallied, counterattacked and regained the village. With the brilliant sunrise beginning to filter through the thinning mist Russian Jager from the main body of I Column joined the attack while the rest of the fome waited in resetve. Despite their heroic resistance, the men of 36me Ligne could not maintain their position and evacuated Telnitz. (Christa Hook)

artillery fire, which w o ~ ~ n d eMiiller, d and a countercharge hy the second hattalioti 26Pme LkgPre regained tlie castle for the French. The Russians in turn countcr-attacked with the weakened battalions of Major-General Stryk's Brigade and threw hack 266me Legere once more. To their left Langeron had cr~rlailedhis hornhardrnent of Sokolnio \illage and ordered an inrantry assault. His second brigade had still not appeared so the task fell to Major-General Olsur,e\: Nine of his 11 hattalions were cornrnitted, \uith just two hattalions of the Kursk Muskctecr Regiment in reserve. Leading with 8. J i g c r and Vihorg Musketeers, Olsuvev engaged the first battalion of 2 G m e Legere, and after a brief but ferocior~sstruggle the French were driven our of the southern end of the town and retreated into r~nexpecteddanger. Tlre remaining four Russian battaliotis swept into Sokolnitz and, with the town cleared, turned to the north. Here they added their weight to that of Stryk's Brigade of 111 Column, arrayed against the re-forming 2nd Battalion of 26eme Legere, Tirailleurs d u Pi, and Tirailleurs Corscs. Faced by ten battalions, in all ahour 4,000 men, the French fell hack. Mliile the fight for Sokolnitz had hccn taking place, the battle for Telnitz flared u p once more. From rhe early hours of the morning Davout had hcen driving the leading clcrr~entsof 111 Corps on as fast as the exhausted tnen and horses could go. The pace of the march from Vienna had been tough and many had fillen by the wayside. Davout \?:.as heading for Sokolnio but, recei~inga request for help from tlie French

right at Telnitl, he despatched General Heudclct's Infnntry Brigadc of Friant's Division and General Bout-ciel-'s Dragoon Division to theit assistance. The rest of his force pressed on towards Sokolnio. It wa? about 9.OOam when Heudelet's Brigadc (nvo voltigeur companiei I5Pme LkgPrc and nvo battalions 10tli.me Ligne) halted to re-form closc to Telnitz. The fog still hlalikcted the g~.omidwhen tlic hrigade emerged from it and burst into the village. The Russian 7. I i g e r fell hack in confusion onto a Grenzer battalion and these nvo battalions in turn fled. disordering the New Ingel-manland M~~sketccr Kegilnent standing ia reserve. This outbreak of firing in the fog and tlie sndden appearancr of fleeing Illen amongst them caused these Russian suldicrs tojoin the rout. The breathless hut elated soldiers of 108i-me Ligne briefly took possession of the body-stl-ewn hill east of Tclniv before becoming a target themselves. Deployed to the right of the Allies' reserve were six squadrons of 4. Hessen-Homhurg Hnsaren. They had already suffered a number of casualties that morning from French skirmishers around Telnitl, so when nvo squadrons reccivcd the order to charge they did so with relish. The 108?lne suffered heavily; r~nablcto offer any resistance the survivors fled hack through tlie vineyards and village, turning north towards Sokolnit?., the nultig~ur~ preventing any pursuit. Howerzer, the horror did not end there; as they moved northwards they ran into a new storm of fire. This time the 'enemy' was tlie first battalion 2Gt1ne Lbgere. Driven from Sokolnitz hy Olsr~ve\~'s men and surpl-ised by this body of men rushing towards them through the Sog and smoke of battle, the 26i-me Ltgere opened fire on their comrades. Eventually order was restored but the lO8Pmc had seen enough for one day and took no further part in the hattle. D e s p e r a t e Fighting i n Sokolnitz

The Allies took possession of Telnio once more and arlvanced their cavalry across the (;oldhach. IGenmayer was keen to p l ~ s hon, bot Ruxho~vdenwould not sanction it until he heard that I1 and 111 Columns had moved past Sokolnitz. As the gunfire around Tclnitz died dorun, the battle for Sokolnitl flared up again, rejoined with a far greater desperation than before. Some of the battalions of 11 and 111 Column5 that had eventr~allycleared tlie F~.encIiout of Sokolnitx had hccomc inrerrr~ingledand with the fog still hanging in the low ground it rvas taking time to reorganise the commands. The French now threw in a new devastating attack. After despatching Heudclct's Brigade toward? Telnitz, Davor~tand Friant had pushed on and were now closc to Sokolnitz. Informed that the Allies mrere occupying thc village and castle, Davout ordered Friant to recapture them. It was probably a little before 10.0Oam. General Lochet's Brigadc led the attack, fro111the nrcst. With 48Pme Ligne in fiont and the 11leme I.igne moving forward on their left in support, the French smashed illto the rc-forming Russian battalions. The leading regiment driving back the Perm Musketeers and the grenadier battalion of Kursk Musketeers while the second hit 8. J i g e r and \'ihorg Musketeers. As these men tumbled Srom the village Langeron rode amongst thetn, rallied them and sent theln back into hattle. The 1llPme were promptly driven hack out of thc village hut the 48eme, though also driven back, tenaciously held on to {lie southern end of the village. Friant then sent in his last brigade, commanded by

General Kister. The l.ii2me Legere attacked the north-western end of thesillage, pushing through the first resistance before encountering tlic grenadier battalion of the Kursk Musketeers. This time the Russians rtood their ground and the battle broke down into a series of \zicions individual hand-to-hand combats amongst the shattered buildings. The last battalion of Kister's Brigade, SSi2rne Ligne, bore down on the castle. The Russians of Major-General Stryk's ~ r i g i d fell e back before the fresh onslaught, regrouped and retrrrned to the fray. However, all along the Sokolnitz line the aggressive tactics and determination displayed by the outnumbered French prevented the Russians from p i n i n g the advantage. The battle flowed backwards and forwards, each side i~lomentarilygaining the upper lland before the pendulum suwng back the other way. Between Telnitz and Sokolnitz some 19,000 Allied infantry had been directly involved in the attack on the line of the Goldbach; they were hcld back by about 7,000 determined Frenchmen. Horvever, rather worryingly for the Allies there was as yet no sign of IVColumn, which should by now have been bearing down on Kobelnitz to the right of 111 Colnmn. For while this struggle was taking place on the Goldbach, N Column was involved in events elsewhere that were to determine the final outcome of the battle and the fate of the Ar~stro-Russianarmy.

THE BATTLE IN THE CENTRE Marshal Soult a t t a c k s t h e P r a t z e n P l a t e a u

Confusion appears to have been the order of the day on the northern end of the Pratzcn plateau in the early hours of 2 December. It seems that the overnight encampments of Liechtenstein's cavalry column (VColumn) spread over a~viderarea than intended. Although some were at the foot of the Pratzen on the lower eastern slopes, others appear to have been up on the plateau itself. When the order to move came, ITColumnmarched for the open country north of the Pratzen, towards Blasowio. In the process they traversed the formation area of 111 Corps, and possibly 1V Corps, disrupting their preparations. It was for this reason that I11 (:olumn commenced their advance later than I and I1 Columns. The march of N Column was due to take place an hour later than the other columns as the distance it was reqnired to cover was less. Althougll the strongest column in numbers (about 12,000 men), N Column wffered in quality. The column was composed of both Russian and .k~ustriantroops under the joint control of Russian Lieutenant-General Miloradovich and Austrian FeLrlzmpPirlw Kolowrat. All 14 Russian battalions had marched to Braunarl and back, rcducing their average strength to a much depleted 240 men, while a large number of the Austrian battalions were the regiment's depot battalions formed of semiinvalids and new recrr~itswith only the most limited degree of training. .Alexander rode up while IV Column made its final dispositions and urged Kntuzov to set it in motion. Although I11 Colr~mnwas not yet in place he felt unable to oppose the Tsar and ordered Miloradovich to send the advance guard forward. I t was ahont 9.0Oam when the staff officer leading the way across the plateau towards Pratze observed movement below in the low gronnd in front of the villages of Puntouitz and ,Jirzikowio.

TOP Feldreugmeister KolowratKrakowsky, the 57-yearold joint commander of IV Column at Austerlitz. Kolowrat, a veteran of the Turkish wars, led the main Austrian infantry tome of almost 9,000 men. (Heeresgeschichtliches Museum]

ABOVE Lieutenant-General M.A. Miloradovich, the 34-yearold Russian joint commander of IV Column. Miloradovich had served in Italy (1799) under the great Russian general Suvomv and had fought at D"rnstein in November as the Russians had fallen back fmm Braunau.

PHASE 1' Ma-1 SOUR launshea hs dMdons of St. l l s l m and Vandamme against the P m n PI*-u. St Hllsln Is to clear ma vlllage of Praks and move m the high gmund at the south end of the plateau while wandamme is m more m the hslght. of Ot.6 nnohrsdy i n the north.

PHASE 4: Me.shing v.r(rratds at the tsll end of 11 Colu ' M d o ~ a e n e nKamnuky l .sss part of St. Hllalmb Dlvislon advancing M..hs hafight. In hls mar. He lmmedlatsh turns his brigldeand.dvanwsbask upthsslopato awagethwn.Asme Rm Austrian w a d e Idns the attack St. Wilaimb two brigadss am to0 -the len of h s l r llne to fag both rtt.cks. A h a m 1 a t w l e der.lopa lor mntml of the high pmund.

VANDAMME

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KAMENSKY

PHASE 7: ma slmggletor C M m l of the southern bight. reaches ~IS cllmsx alter a vislous end blwdy engagement. The casualtlas m both s l d r am homndws and d ~ p l t drivlng s me

.~~~~~~~~~~. .... wrtlwlarW as the Austrian battalions w e n lamehl made up of umralned -ruth ~

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b m #on, and d e w boaps, but 1h.w men m d i(nnwskyb Russians am now in ntreat erstuatds.

SOULT'S ASSAULT AGAINST THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CENTRE

PnASE 5 In me sonh8slon of baffle G ~ottrmundb brigade 10- conun rmh OM Jurcdkb bd(l.de and maes 10 - u a 8t.d nnohrady .nths wbakly held n0.m.m artreme of the P m n Watesu w h a r thv rind themselves in ths path of wandammei npldhl rppma.chinp command.

2 December 1805, 9.00am-11 .OOam, viewed from the south-east, showing Marshal Soult's assault on the centre of the Allied line and the desperate struggle for the Pratzen Plateau

wiMt3IS PHASE 6: M d w ea&ard% byOnd the rillwe of P m , at me right ot van dam ma^ line mcwmr me M vMngaged Ruu(sn lome on the plateau. m(Ir.weak b.mllol* make a stand, but, unable to hold lhelr grwnd wind h.s u w o r Fnnch n u m k n , bnak and mn.

dot the plawau, lhe UDM I Y I M a n IR25 S.hburg olhr the Is# nolstano. ... e sends twr mglment. from hls command w l n m me amck I. WYI& aner a sustalmed nnnght, but a second, ,Fnnch attack outllanks the AusMms, and r R h ammunltlon runnlw l w , this unn of N Mlvmn i. d.hsn on h.P m n Plrtaau.

The French infantty of Soult's IV COWS await the order to advance. Positioned in low-lying ground amund the villages of Puntowitz and Jinikowitz, shmuded in the early morning mist, they were invisible to the Allies on the plateau. (GirbalSarnmlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

Initially he thought it was thc tail end of 111 Column, off course, then he realised the truth. From his battlefield headquarters on the Zuran hill Napoleon had peered blindly ahead into the grey since &wn. The thick fog that descended during the night had spread like a shroud over the Praoen plateau. It was just over three miles to the village oT Pratze, a little further to the high ground of Stark Vinohrady, hut nothing was visible. Then, around 8.00am the sun rose, like a great golden orb according to those who saw it, and slowly the fog on the plateau n~eltedaway and thr shroud evaporated. It was clcar to Napoleon that the Allied left was moving off the plateau to the south as he had hoped. Now it !$,as important to choose the right time to launch the attack on the \.acatrd position. Although the fog was lifting from the high ground, in the hollows around Puntowiv and Jirzikowiv i t still mingled with the smoke from corrntless campfires and provided a cloak of invisibility for the two divisions of Soult's N Corps standing silently, waiting. O n the left stood Vandamme's brigades, to the right those of St. Hilaire. M'hen their time came they were to gain the plateau as swiftly as possiblc from where they could wheel north or south into the rear of the Austro-Russian army. As Napoleon waited the sound of gunfire filled the air to the south and now artillery fire joined on the nortlrern flank too as the guns of Lannes, V Corps engaged Bagration's command. The entire frontline, some seven miles long, echoed to the sound of battle. I t was around 9.00am when he gave the order for Soult's 16,000 men to march.

Back on the plateau the horrifying news that the French were adrancing brought a flul-ry of orders. For the first time in many days tlie llies recognised the truth; the French were not preparing to retreat a1 all: they were intent on battle. Yet i t was also a shock for the French. Soult's orders informed him that the Allies had abandoned the Pratzcn platean and moved to the south. Thc small advance gnard of 630 Russian infantry (the remnants of three battalions) took np defensive positions around Pratzc, supported by two weak squadrons of thr Austrian Erzlierzog Johann dragoons. Tlien, on the suggestion of an Austrian staff colonel, Baron M'impffen, it was determined to occupy and hold the high ground of the Pratzeherg at the southern end o l t h e plateau. M'ith Alexander's approval Kutuzov ordered FZM Kolowrat to nlovc southwards with his two Austrian hrigades to secure this position while Milorado\~itcli'sRussian brigades would defend Praoe and the Stari Vinohrady, the high point at the northern end of the plateau. It appears that St. Hilaire's brigades pushed on more rapidly than Vandamme's command. General Thikhault was ordered to clear Pratze to which task Ire allocated the first battalion of l 4 i . m ~Ligne. .Anticipating littlc opposition the battalion, about 750 men, advanced straight for the village supported by nvo artillery pieces. Lying in wait ahout 250 men of the Novgorotl Mmsketeers destroyed the attack, with the supporting grenadier battalion of Apcheron Musketeers and three hattalions of Little Russia Grenadiers combining to capture the guns. Rrfore these Rrrssians had time to re-form, the second wave of Tlritbault's Brigade swept forward through the outnumbered and disorganised Russians and recaptured the guns. Both Rnssian brigade cornma~rdcrs, Major-Generals Berg and Repninsky, were wounded hefore five Russian battalions turned and fled, only the efforts of the two squadrons of Austrian dragoons preventing the French pursuit. However, these Russians had srrffered greatly in tlre campaign already and even the eftorts of Alexander and Kutuzov failed to stop their flight to the rear. Bloody s t r u g g l e f o r t h e P r a t z e b e r g

\leanwlrile, the 10Pme Lt.g@re,tlre leading element of St. Hilaire's Dixision follorved orders, by passed Praoc and continued on to secure the Praorherg. As they had moved west of tlie xillage and began ascending tlre slopes towanls their goal, Major-General Kamensky, thc Russian officer commanding the hrigadc of I1 Colurnn that Langeron was awaiting, turned as Ire marched on Sokolnitz and obser\,ed this threatening movement l ~ y I0Prne Li.gi.rc. Srnding this ilrforrnation to Langeron he immediately rrheeled his hrigade and headed back up the slope to intercept tlie French. liarnrnsky's force rvas strong, three battalions each of the Phanagoria Grenadier Regiment and Riazan Musketeer Regiment, ahout 5,800 men. The l 0 h e could muster about 1,500. Faced with this pressure to their front, the 10@mebegan a fighting withdrawal as the Russians attempted to use their greater numbers to outflank and turn the French right. As the Russians were closing St. Hilaire rushed forward with the rallied 1st Battalion of 14i.me Ligne ;and positioned them on the threatened flank. Then Thibbault led forward the rest of his brigade and fnrmed them on the left of IOeme LigPre, preparing to engage Kamensky's Russians. Vart's hrigade waited

at Pratze for Vandamme. However, just as the whole weight of the French line aligned against Kamensky, a large body of unidentified uoops approached from the east. On closer inspection it was clear they were wearing helmets but their greatcoats hid their uniforms. An officer shouted at the French not to fire as they were Bavarians. St. Hilaire consulted with Thikbault, both unsure what action to take. Initially they redeployed the line, pivoting the left back on the 1OSme so as to face the potential new threat. The line, already strengthened by six pieces of artillery, was bolstered further by the arrival of six 12-pdrs from N Corps reserve. As these new arrivals moved into the line an officer from the 'Bavarians' broke away from the main body and spoke to a Russian officer. It was now clear that the new arrivals were not Bavarians but Austrians. It was the brigade of GM Jurczik, part of Kolowrat's command despatched to take conuol of the Pratzeberg when the French had first shown themselves in front of Pratze. To their right rear GM Rottermund's Brigade formed in support. These two brigades mustered 15 battalions but seven of them were depot battalions. After the initial French attack on Pratze had turned towards the Pratzeberg, Kutuzov

I

gmund is evident

BELOW A view fmm the Pmzebeng down to the vll)aga of Pratze. The French lobme L W m advanced a c m u this gmund while the rest of St. Hllaire's Dlvlslon was nohtinp for control of me vlll agalnst Mil-dovlch's nun.

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position. Kamensky's Russian Brigade m&ched f d d too. The French held their fire before unleashing a storm of canister and musketry, tearing great holes in thg advancing lines. The Allies feu back in some disarray,Jurczik's Brigade pulling away to their left doser to the Russians. Rottermund's Brigade, which had been advancing in support, led by the Grenadiers of IR23 Salzburg, now found themselves alone in the smoke and confusion and withdrew back towards the Allied position on S t a d Vinohrady 'With the threat fiom the east apparently removed, St Hilaire formed his men in one line again and followed up Kamensky's retreating brigade. However, the Russians reformed as did Jurczik's Austrians, and prepared to engage the French once more. A terrific firefight now developed with the French, having advanced, becoming isolated. The numerous Allied staff officers present realised that the French were getting the best of the musketry and so prepared for a combined Ruskm and Austrian bayonet attack. The advance began,with the Russians on the left shouting loudly as they moved forward with the more sedate Rustrians

The land between the Sokolnitr pheasantry and the Praheberg. Langemn rushed the Kursk Musketeers and Podolia Musketeers towards the Praheberg to join the fight, but they arrived too late and faced the victorious French alone. (Martin Worel)

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moving forwarrl on their right. St. Hilaire pol~retl;I continrral fire of musketry into the Allied ranks, slo~vingtheir advance considerably, y t inexorably it edged closer, returning fire all the time. Jurcrik received a fatal wonnd, while M'eyrother had a horse shot from rlndcr him. Casnalti?~ werc mounting all aronnd as thc Russians dcsperarely pressed ahead tr)ing to come to grips with the French. St. Hilaire's men were sufferins badly too and the constant pressure from the i\llies forced them to slorvlr give ground hack towards their artillery. MThile this action Irad been progressing, Langeron rode u p from Sokolnio to see for himsell'whatx~~as developing. Corning up to Karnensky's hrigade \rhilc it rvas engaged i
line, now, having suffered heavy casualties, they were all but out of ammunition and facing a tiesh attack. Both regiments broke and ran. The brave Kamensky became a prisoner but very few othersjoined hirn as the bayonet did its work. Langeron, who had been urging the attacks on extricated himself and rode off to find Buxhijwden to acquaint him with the fearful news. He later claimed that his senior commander w a s l~nderthe influence of alcohol when he found him and refused to acknowledge the desperate nature of the situation. Although the Russians took the main force of the attack, some of the Austrian hattalions made a stand in the face of this onslaught. The depot battalion of IR49 Kerpen and a battalion of IR5R Beaulieu formed mnve tog-ether and fired on the oncoming French, forcing a temporary halt. However, IR5R was attacked and thrown back. Thc battalion of IR49 then launched an attack uirh the depot battalion of' IR55 Renss-Greio, coming under a hea\y fire as they did so. The attack faltered as IR49 began to waver although the battalion commander prevented his men liom breaking. They kept up volley fire, which deterred the French from closing, but in the mcantime IR55, having lost their commanding officer and a number of other officers, fell back. Standing alone, IR49 Kerpen had no choice but tojoin the retreat. With the Pratzcberg now clear of Allied troops Langeron's two battalions of the Kursk Musketeers finally approached the scene of battle. St. Hilaire's men re-formed to face this new enemy as support arrived from Lrlvasseur's Brigade of Legrand's Division, which had been in reserve near Kohclnitl. Seeing the movement of the Kursk hlusketeers, Lavasseur advanced with all four battalions (18eme and 75Pme Ligne). The Russians, numbering about 1,200 men, were first struck on their left flank by about 3,000 men then assaulted in front by St.Hilaire and collapsed. The sur\zivors of the Kursk Musketeers fled for safety. As these men made good their escape another Russian regiment arrived, the Podolia Musketeers from I11 Corps, now the only formed Allied unit on the southern extreme of the Praoen. They had already experienced a tough campaign with all three battalions together mustering only about 500 men. Lavasserrr turned his brigade to face them and outnumbering the Russians by about six to one there was only one possible outcome. The sur\,ivors of the Podolia fled fnr safety and took cover belii~ldthe walls of the Sokolnio pheasantry. St. Hilaire and his rxharlsted command were finally masters of the Pratzehel-g. Mliile the fighting here came to a conclusion that at the northel-n end of the plateau was reaching a climax. Last resistance on t h e Pratzen Plateau

Alter St. Hilaire's initial attack on Pratzc there was a short lull around the village as Vandamme brought his division up to where Vari. hcld his brigade. Vandamme bypassed Praue on the northern side. Just over a mile ahead, on the highest point of Stark Vinohrady, a solid line of Austrian infantry stood deterniinedly in his path. These men, GM Rottermund's Brigade, separated from the rest of Kolowrat's command during the attack on the Praoeherg, had fallen back arrd regrouped on the high ground at the northern end of the plateau under cover of Miloradovich's men. However, with St. Hilaire's successfi~lstorming of Pratze, the Krlssians had sr~ffkreda dra~naticreduction oftheir strength.

TOP A view of the gmund over vrhich Vandamme'. men advanced. me higher gmund on the left horiwn is Star6 Vinohrady and that on the right horizon is the Prakebecg. Contml of these two highpoints was cmclal to the outcome of the battle.

ABOVE Q 6 n k l de division Vandamme 11 -s dhrision towaids Stad Vinohndy at the nolthem end of the Praken Plateau, passing to the left of Prake. In their path atood the remnants of Milondovieh'. command.

The only units still in the field under Miloradovich's control were battalions (three of the Smolensk Musketeer Regiment, the gren battalion of the Novgorod Musketeers and a musketeer battalio the Apcheron Musketeers), numbering only about 1,000 men, supporting battalion artillery, the rest having fled. These men were to feel the weight of Vandamme's attack. Vandamme moved his division forward with each brigade aligne the next, Schiner's on the left (two battalions 24tme E g t r e ) , Fbre the centre (two battalions of both &me and 28tme Ligne) and Can on the right (two battalions of both 4Gme and 57Pme Ligne). As bypassed Pratze, Candras' Brigade discovered Miloradovich's Russi their path. Vandamme halted his division then advanced Candras' Bng boasting 3,000 men, against the thin line of Russians to their front. As brigade approached the Russian line the 57tme halted and a numbe artillery pieces opened fire. While this bombardment was taking place, W m e moved to the right to outflank the outnumbered Russians. Once in position the two regiments closed to musket range and unleashed a devastating fire. The Russians replied briefly, getting off a few artillery rounds before the pressure from two sides became too intense and the line broke and fled. As on the Pratzeberg the French bayoneted many of the wounded Russians rather than take them prisoner. Vandamme now ordered the 24tme L>re to deploy into skirmish formation, swarm forward through the vineyards covering Stark Vinohrady and dislodge the Austrians on the high ground. This formation now represented the last Allied force still operational on the Pratzen plateau. All six battalions of IR23 Salzburg, the only Austrian infantry regiment at the battle with more than one battalion present, formed the first line. Although the facts are unclear it is possible that IR24 Auersperg formed a second line in support to their rear. IR 23 numbered about 3,000 men and stood its ground well, firing regular volleys at the elusive Frenchmen probing at the front and flanks of the line. Despite IR23 presenting such a clear target, the 24tme were unable to overcome the regiment's determined stand, commanded by Oberst Stendahl. Failing to make progress Vandamme recalled the 24tme. But the respite was only temporary. The French regrouped and Vandamme ordered a more concerted attack on the stubborn Austrians. This time instead of two battalions he attacked with eight, totalling about

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000 men. Forming his battalions in one line Vandamme urged his forward. On the far left of the line were 46me Ligne, in the centre Ligne and 24Pme L6g$re, while on the right 556me Ligne were forward from Var6's supporting brigade. Moving forward slowly ugh the vineyards, taking heavy casualties from artillery fire, this eventually arrived in a position where its flanking battalions could ap the Austrian line. Once in musket range IR23 poured ,murderous volleys into .the encircling French line. Vandamme halted the advance and exchanged volleys, but with his muskets outnumbering those of IR23 by tw-tmne and Stendahl's men beginning to run low on ammunition, the volume of Austrian fire decreased and casualties mounted. As this pressure increased, the resistance of IR23 finally broke .and. the line collapsed. The formed battalion of IR24 Auersperg covering their retreat prevented any energetic punuit by Vandamme's men. It was about 11;OOam. and after a series of battles lasting two hours the Pratzen plateau from north to south b s in the possession of Napoleon's army. Napoleon, still positioned on Zuran hill, received kof Soult's success and prepared to move his headquarters to Star6 Vinohrady. Before moving he issued orden for Bernadotte to move I

Corps eastwards, Dror~et'sDivision moving rrp to the Pratzen plateau while Rivand's Division advanced to their left and almost immediatrli became involved in the fighting on tlie northern flank. He also issued orders for his reserve, the Imperial Guard and Reserve Grenadiers to march towards the Pratzen. From his new position on Start Vinohrady Napoleon was about to 1 witness the last great attempt to change the course of the battlc; tllc attack of the Russian Imperial Guard. However, while battle had heen raging on the Praoen, the opposing forces on the northern flank of tlrr battlefield had also clashcd violentlv.

THE BATTLE IN THE NORTH The commander of the advance guard of the Allied army, Peter Bagration, had been pmmoted to Lieutenant-General following his SUCC~S delay S~U of Ithe French pursuit at Sch6ngrabern. Now he formed the right flank of the army, waiting until the Allies' flanking move was under way before commencing his own advance.

Feldmanchalleutnant Johann Liechtenstein, the Austrian commander of V Column, a mixed force of Russian and Austrian cavalry. Liechtenstein's cavalry arrived late at their stalt position due to confusion on the plateau. (David Hollins)

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The G r e a t C a v a l r y Clash

As part of the grand plan, Bagration held his position in the hills around Posoritz until it became clear that the battle was underway. Then lie was to push fonvard, driving the French before him. Liechtenstein's V Column, composed entirely of cavalry, would occupy the largely open, gently undulating plain, benveen Bagration and N Column. In support of both these commands was the Russian Imperial Guard under Grand Duke Constantine. Facing Bagration, some three miles to tlie west, stood Lannrs V Corps and Murat's Cavalry Reserve. The confusion on the fog-shrouded Praven plateau at daybreak ensured that Liechtrnstein was late arriving at his appointed position between the villages of Blasowio and Krug. Due to the disruption caused by marching henveen elements of I11 Column, the horsemen arrived in two separate bodies, the Russian regiments arriving first. Bagration was already under way when the Russian cavalry rode up, his left on the villages of Krug and Holnbitz ~ 4 i i l ehis right extended across the Briinn-Olmiitz road to the high ground northwest of Posoritz po~t house. The Russian cavalry extended this line towards Blasowitz and thc Austrians protected the left of the line henveen Blasowio and the lowrr slopes of Start. Vinohrady. Due to the late arrival of Liechtenstein, Grand Duke Constantine had sent forward his battalion of Imperial Guard Jiger to occupy Blasowitz, supported by a Guard Fusilier battalion of the Selnenovsky Regiment. Like Bagration, Lannes too was ordered to delay committing himself until the battle was undenvay, then move eastwards and push along the Briinn-Olmiiv road, getting into a position to prevent any Allied retreat in that direction. He positioned Suchet's Division to the left of the road and Caffarelli's Di\ision to tlie right. The two battalions of 17Pme Legere were detached, the second Battalion garrisoning Santon hill, the anchor of the line, while the 1st Battalion extended to the villagc of Bosenio. Murat placed his light cavalr). on both flanks and held his two divisions of heaw cavalry in reserve. With these deployments complete this force edged forward sometime behveen 9.00 and 10.00am. To bring a halt to this forward movement the Russian cavalry, probably just General-ArIjutant U ~ a r o \ ~ 'Brigade s (Kharkor Dragoons, Tchernigov Dragoons and Elisahethgrad Hussars) advanced into a storm of fire as Lannes' whole frontline infantry and artillery exploded into action. The attack was repulsed and as the Russians

ivithdrcw to re-form, Mul-at sent Kellermann's light cavalry division (?$me,4 h e , 5Cmc Hussards and 5 t m c Cltns.sn~r~ i r/llr~vnOto protect idle front of 1,aiines' insantry. Observing this move and un\villing to wait Sir Uvarov's Brigade to rally the Grand Duke Constantine U1111~n.s charged the light cavalry. Observing this mass of Russian cavalry heading lowards him Kellermann retired through Lannes' infantry divisions, Iraving the Ul~lnnsto confront a deadly rolling fit-c of close-range ~nusket~y all along the line. By the time they had pnlled away, the L'l~lnns had suffered heavily and their comnlander was a prisoner of the French along with 16 other officers. There now followed a conlilsing sequence of charge anrl countcrcliarge as the French and Rnssian cavalry thrcw themselves hacking and tlirusting into a swirling mi-IPe, hesore irithdra~ving,re-forming and charging once more. O n the Frenclr side there were the cuirassiers and carabiniers nf Nansouty and d'Hautporll, irith Kellermann's hrlssars and rlzn,s.s~~r~:s i chn,nland Walther's dragoons. Against them rode Uvarov's dragoons and hussars from V (:olr~mnanrl llie cuirassiers and dragoons of the Army Advance Grlard. To the right uf Lanncs' position, Rivaud's Division of Rernadotte's I Corps appeared in front of Jirzikowitz and immediately attracted the attentions of the ,411strian7. Loth]-ingen Kiiro,s.si(lu,which delayed their advance. M'hilc these cavalry hattles swmii-led back and forth Ragration made a move oil his extreme right, thrusting torvards the vill;igc of Rosmitz and the stronghold of the Santon beyond. Making a wide arc to tlie north the Russian 5 . Jiigcr, supported hy the Mariupol Hussars a n d tlie Khaznrnkor (:c)ssacks approached Bosenitz. T h e outposts or first battalion l i e m e Legkre were driven back and the village raptut-ed. Beyond the village the main hod! of the first hattalion Sell back slorvlg on the Santon, from where artillery lire began to he directed o n the pursuing Russians. The Mariupol Hussars made a number of charges against the FI-ench battalion hut were llnahle to break them. As tllry rrithdrelv closer to the Santon the second hattalion I7i-rne was able to add its firepower to the contest. Asrailetl by these hvo battalions and the artillery on thc Santon, 5.Jiiger began to give gronnd. This rctirerrlent qoickly degenerated as the seconti battalion I'iCme swept down off the Santon in pursuit with the support of the light cavalry brigades of \lilhand and Treillard who drove off the Mariupol Mnssars.

Mareohal Jean Lanner, commander of French V Corps. Lannes occupied a position astride the Briinndlmiitz mad, in direct opposition to Bagration. Both commanders received orders not to commence their forward movements until the battle was under way.

A view of the northern flank of the battlefield, looking east fmm Santon hill, as it looks today, hardly changed over the interwening years. The old Briinn-Olmiitz mad, the axis of advance for Lannes and Bagration, is clearly visible running towards the horizon.

Fmnch V Corps, m glve me order for hls Nlo Infanby s t ~ side ~ rot me main -d. suffering their mot a Rurlen horu artl1l.w bntaw the Fnnch a n hMSh gun. am brought up to counter the pmblm.

KELLERMAN

PHASE 6: As The Fnnsh lnfamw nrmnmna, a*lr . h a m , twr mOY. foMd onInM mk&mfmmtheInfanrm. nta u n l w 01~elle-n and mow foruad In .upport

PHASE 1: The Inltlal mnWt batrmn the R d a n and F-h lorcn on me northem nank ~ n l M ltrl . In a u r h ot d r y MmQ The charges and countercharges c a v r nm-Ma! on both .Ida aIhough only one unb the a d Duke Conrt.ntkn Uhlans, a n drtrm on, by .e -l lnhntnam. As the miry on .idwithdraw and regroup the R u u m Imwrbal a d J g r am oscuplln. the vlllap. ot B m 0 J5n,w~W0rt.dby the Ulupol H-IO and Khnzbmmkw -oh, mine to the no* with the inantlon cbringa . village ot BMlb

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ABOVE General de division Suchet held the extreme left of the French army with his division. Together with General Caffarelli9sDivision they were to face attacks by Russian cavally as the battle developed on the northern flank. (Philip Haythornthwaite) RIGHT Nansouty's cuirassier. advance folward to clash with the Russian cavally of V Column on the gently rolling ground between Blasowitz and Krug. (Girbal Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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Back closer to the road the cavalry hattlc had cuntinued, hut thc repeated charges made by Uvarov's Brigade began to cake tlieir toll on the tiring Russian troopers. I-laving allo\ved his hcal? cavalry a chance to recover behind the infantry, while 1 3 t . m ~L t g t r e on the I-ight of Caffarelli's Division drove off a charge by tlie Kharkov Dragoons, Murat ordered them out again. M'ith Nansouty's Division to the fore, the restrd lica\y cavalry Sormed for battle. As Nansouty arranged his divisic~n,rvitli the let-and 2tn1e Catxhinier and 2Cme Cuirassir1- in the first rarik nit11 the 3i-me, Si-me and 12i-me Cuirassier in tlie second, to tlic soutli t l ~ r Austrian cavaly were making a last chargc. M'itli \'andamme's Division now in control of Stare Vinohrady, Kivaud's Divisio~lbegan to make progress again. Hohenlolie ordered 5 . Nassarl-Usingen Kiirnssi,ri. fonvard to forestall this mnve, however, with V,lndarnrne positioned on their flank the Austrian c o m n ~ a ~ i d soon e r retired his cavalry to the east, o u t of artillery range. Nansot~ty'smen were no!\. ready and moved Sor~vardtowards the area benveen Krug and Blasowitz \?here Uvarov's exhausterl cavalry was re-forming. T h e Russians gamely atlvanced towards the approaching carahiniel-s and cuil-dssiel-s but this time the rcsult was decisive and

Uvarnv's men fell hack to the high ground between the Kaussnitz strcaln and tlie A~lsterlioroad. Here they found tlie Tsar and what rernained of. Iris retinue. Lannes and M u r a t Secure t h e North

large gap had now opcncd hctwccn the Allied right and centre, occupied only hy tlie bartalion oT Russian Guard J i g e r in Blaso~vitz, seriously weakening Bagration's position. Bagration had received n o fresh orders since the battle began and ~vasunaware of the result of the fighting elsewhere. With the Allied cavalry threat now removed on his right, Lannes ordered his infantry forward, detailing 136rne I i g t r e anrl 5 l t m c Lignc to wrest Blasowitz Trorn thc Jigcr. Although outnumhcred, the Russian defenders managed to rehuSS an attack by tlie 136mc hut when they assaulted a second tirne in strength the isolatedJiger exited from the village only to run into the firc of a battalion of the 51e111r. T h e Iig-er headed eastwards to safety, followed quickly by the 500 men of the G ~ ~ a Flrsilicr rd battalion of the Semenovsky Regi~nent,~vlio,positioned heliind Blasowitr, f o ~ ~ ntlicmsel\~es d the new target for these four French battalions. Now the whole plain soutli of the Briinn-Olmiitz n,ad as ~vell as the Pratxen plateau was under French control. Lannes and Murat pressed forward against Bagration. A heaw exchange of artillery lire took place and alrhough the Russian line could not be hrokcn, with pressure f r o ~ nfront and left, it gradually began to give ground. T h r Russians protected thcir retreat hy a numher of self-sacrificing r~nco-ordinatedcavalry charges by those regiments still cling-ing to the main body. Rag~.atiorrfell back beyond the important jllnction on tlie Briinn-Olrniitz road, where a road hranched off to Austerlitz, and re-Sormed his men on the high ground aroond tlie village of M'elleschotrit/.. Tlie French pressure continued and it looketl as tliough Bagration would he pushed hack along the Olrniitz road, away from tlie rest of the arm), when help arrived. Rushing along the road from Olmiitz two hatteries of Austrian <,suns cornmantled hv, Maior ., Frierenhcrgcl- arrived and quickly deployed on high grorrnd north of ;\

TOP A view of Santon hill fmm the outskirts of the village d Bosenitz. The Russian 5. JBger captured the village but were unable to make any further pmgrese in the face of opposition fmm the French 17Cme Ligne and artillery positioned on the summit.

ABOVE An officer of the French 58me Hussards, part of Kellermann's light cavalry division. The 58me Hussards were heavily involved in the cavalty battles that developed in the open country on the northern flank. (Philip Haythomthwaite)

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m l qW *Ih hls Inhnby d M d m horn I Corpr ma wpmof m u e l prorldu an 1 a . l M i n d Wch the F n m h w a r e n s can rrthdm and n(wnr M n -rlw h.tny.

PHASE 4 8.IOnthe 11mme Llpne Is brol.n, h.W m e M h a n 0d.M m thelr .upwh M w Do I&, me trro b.11.loru lorm lmo IIW j u t a. h.-riw m- .quadron. of n w u a u d cu1rarrl.r .dn- ~ r d them. s m e ~nnck n n on a WIW but n ~ I I Sm h.n the hcavalry .rho cnsh Into me mln Ilm, and &r a b M but b l W , m d n the Inof the 2-me L.glnjoin the fllaht O the r r r . H-r, b I O n the Ru-hn -IR un ho sqludroll. of C h a u u n & 1and thnn sqludmns of 0rmadl.n 8 ch-1 of me ~ r m c imwdal h a u a d sh..se and d m them on. m e fir. F-h 0~1.dcavalry squadrons then &nu. .nd emck h.mnn Russian Puad ballallor* U M h.d earlier drlmn on th. Fnnsh 114hle.

ATTACK OF THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL GUARD 2 December 1805, vlewed from the soutt-east, shmng the defeat of the attack of the Russ~anImpend Guard

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PHASE 5: Th. three Rusalan O u d batt.llons determlludh .l.ndthdr g w n d b W l 9 m n c lthe worn oi mr m d r . ~ l d i n to p melr s u p m i -.qwdot Ruu1.n Guard m a l t y loln the m.1.e. l h * q w d r a s ot Ch.rallsr Omda nd tro ot O u d CouasL. M e dnlam imo d d b a r~~~~~~t l l t e m a la- tro mwdot m a n l i e r 0.- c h a m ln a the d g M flank oi the Fnnch Q u r d u n l w m e amw be& to the &&an~ embllnp the 1nt.W to plllback m d rdOrm.

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PHASE 9:

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OHENLOHE

PnASE 7 The Wo squadmns 01 Rvulan Horse Guard cu1ru.l.r that had earlier shamed the Fnnsh l l a m a Llgns a n d1nst.d to loln the mu carslw banls, a d r l n at ~ about me .am. urns i s m e Rnal squadron ot Gre.adlen i cheval. 17k squadrons of ~ n n c and h ~ u s s ~ cavalry an are now struggling to galn the upper hend.

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Wellcscliorvitz. The Frenclr line had now reached tlie I'osorio post house hut had no response to the accurate fire of these 12 guns. The French batteries pulled hack, losing some guns in thc process; the infantry halted. T h e French advance in the north had run its course.

T H E ATTACK OF T H E RUSSIAN IMPERIAL GUARD

TOP Lannes' attack presses forward beyond the village of Bosenitz. The Russians are holding their line just to the west of K w g and Holubitz. (Tapetenmuseum, KasselSammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey) ABOVE Repeated attacks by the French cavalry on Bagration's command as it pulled back failed to break its resistance. Here a Russian grenadier, wearing the 1805 shako, faces an attack by the French 4Ame Hussards. (Girbal Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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M'hile the hattle raged in tlie north, fighting had again flarcd up on the Praocn platcau. During tlre morning, Grand Duke Constantine moved u p to the east of' Rlasowitz with the Russian Imperial Guard, forming his illustriolls command in three lines. The three battalions that formed the Guard Grenadier Regiment were still a long way behind. Having pushed theJiger ibnvard into Rlasorvio and supported then1 with ;I battalion of Guard Fusiliers of' the Semenovsky Regiment, Constantine received a request from Milorado~ichfor help on the Praoen plateau. In response he despatchrd a battalion of Guard Fusiliers from the Izmailovsky Regiment, who arrived as the tide of Austrian and Russian refi~geesfleeing from Vandammc's assault on Start Vinohrady srvept passed and engrllfed them. Recognising the exposed nature of his position Constantine ordered the Imperial Guard hack to a position behind the Raussnio strcam, rvliere he hoped to combine rvitlr rallied element? of N Colrlmn. The C:r~ard,],iger and Fr~siliel-sof the Semenovsky Regiment previously driven away from Blasouio rcjoined the main body of the Gnard. Hohenlohe formed his k i i r / ~ r r i o rto ~ their rear, pn~tectingthe flanks. Vandarnme, on the high ground had a rcasonahly clcar \.ierv of this realignment hy thc Allies and was in the process of reorganising his division, rvhich had hceri disrupted by the fight fol- Stare \'inolirady. In

LEFT The leading squadron of Horse Guards of the Russian Imperial Guard charge towards the hastily formed square of the first battalion of the French 4hme Ligne. (Artillery Museum, St. Petersburg Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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BELOW. LEFT Soldiers of the French 4eme Ligne repel the first Russian Guard squadmn, but the second squadmn charged home and sent the battalion into headlong retreat. (GirbalSammlyng Alfred und Roland Umhey)

OVERLEAF THE CHARGE OF THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL GUARD. With Vandamme's division occupying the Star6 Vinohrady at the northern end of the Pratren plateau, Grand Duke Constantine, commander of the Russian Imperial Guard, was determined to prevent them pressing on further. An infantry assault by the Guard Fusiliers met with initial success before recoiling in the face of

preparation fbr a lilr-thcr advance he ordcrccl the two battalions of' 4i-me Ligne to move into thc vineyards that lay on the norrhern slopes of Srart Vinohrady to anchor his line. In a show of force designed to prevent the FI-ench dcsccnding fi-om the pl;itear~,(:onstantine rnoved hack across the Raussnitz strcarrl 'ivith his I-cordered command. The Jiger, who appear to Irave recovered quickly horn thcir defeat at Blaso\vitx, were protecting the northern flank of the formation with the Guard Hussars whrn they received an order to oppose this move by the 4?me Ligne. T l ~Jijgcr c irroved into the vinryarrl where a fircfight broke out \\.it11 tile second hattalion of the French regiment. With the stakes of thc vineyard rrlnning on an cast-west line the C;u;1rd Hussars, ~ v h ohad

concentrated French artillery fire and musketry. As the first battalion of the 4eme Ligne recovered fmm the Russian attack the cavalry of the Russian Imperial Guard moved up. The French battalion rapidly formed square, but as they awaited the inevitable onslaught Russian guns opened fire on the compact formation. Seizing the moment Constantine ordered two squadmne of the Horse Guards to charge. The leading squadmn, receiving a close range volley and veered away but the second squadmn =hawed home and Slashed their way into the disintegrating square. The prized Eagle of the battalion drew Russians like moths to a candle. Defended desperately by Sergeant Major Saint-Cyr, the Guard cavalry eventually hacked the Eagle from him, the bloodsoaked NCO slumping to the gmund having sustained numerous cuts to his arms and head. (Christa Hook)

With the Russians gradually gaining the upper hand Napoleon ordered his remaining two squadmns of Chasseurs cheval and a half squadmn of Mameluk. into the mCICe. In the illustrations the leading Mameluks clash with the Chevalier Garde. (Hourtoulle Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

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appnmched from the north Ilung hack in support or~tsidetlie vineyard. As soon as tliis e n g i g e m e n t was u n d e r way Constantine sent for\varcl four battalions of Guard Fusiliers of the Scrnrnovsky and Prcohrazhcnsky Regiments up the gentle slope thror~gliclie vineyard. So determined werc these men to get to grips rvith tlic French that discipline rv;~slost ant1 they co\zered tlie last 300 paces to the French linc at a run. Dcspite tlie conccntratrd tire fro111 the first Battalion 45mr Ligne, their- breathlessriess and the disrnption to their Sorrnations car~scd by moving tlirm~gh the vineyard tlie Russian Guardsmen smaslied into the French battalion at the point of tlie hayonet and hrokr their line. As the attack rolled Sorward, tlie second h'lttalion, rvho had (11-ivenhack the G~lard.J;igrt;retil-ed o n an artillery batter-y. T h e Kussians continued in sornc disordcr t o w ~ r d sthis sccond linc, but a destrr~cti~c concentration of artillery fire ;mrl musketry preventrd them fl-om I-eaching it. Blootlicd a n d barrered the) rctired to tlie edge oS tlie vincyarrl and regrouped. With the recall of tlie Russian Guardsmen the first battalion of 4Pme Lignc was able to rc-fonn and had just con~plererltheir reorganisation when a large lorce of Russian cavalry 17 sq~ladronsof the Russian Imperial Guarrl, advanced towards tliern. The French hattalion changed formation to sqrlal-camongst tlie bartered vines, and rhe 24trne Legere werc orderrd up ro support them, but Ixfol-e they coulrl respond tlie Rrlssians unli~nheredI ~ a l la barrely of (:nard Horse Artille~yand comlnenced blasting the c o m p ~ tormation. t Considering the French sqnare suitably rvcakmccl, the Horsr Guards prepared to ch;~rgc.M'itl~ Grand Duke Constantine at their Ilc;~dand rvith his cly 'For God, tllr Tsar arrd Kussia!' inspiring tllrm, txvo squadr~)nsof t l ~ crcgirnrnt closed on the squat-e. The

first squadron, advancing along the line of the \.iries, almost reached the French position when a vollcy crashed out with such power that the Russian horscmen veered away. Hcnvcver, the second squadron escaped this nienace and crashed into the square, laying about them left and I-ight, hacking and thrusting with their swords. The desperatc, maddened souls that gathered about the Eagle as the battalion disintegrated clcfcndetl it with their lives, hut it was cut from them and carried atvay - the sole trophy taken by thc Allies to balance against the many captured by the French. As the two Russian squadrons retired to their original position to rally, the breathless 2 4 b e Ltgere arrived, entered the vineyar-d and formed a line fkcing tlie Russian position. Observing their arrival tlie three remaining sqr~adronsof tlie Horse Guard spurl-ed Sol-ward and charged this blue line. The weight of the chargc carried tlie horsemen throngh the French infantry, breaking the tormation and throwing it into confusion. The 246me Sollowcd their comrades frorii the 4Pme Ligne. Napoleon and his entourage werc making their way up to the high point of Start Vinohrady as the mass of fleeing men frorn 4Pme flowed passed. Unahle to rally them, Napoleon recogniscd the danger and ordered Marshal BessiPres, commander of the French Imperial Guard, to attack the Russian cavalry. Leading with two squadrons of thc Guard Chnsreurr li chmnl supported by three squadrons of Guard Cr?nllrlim.r 1; cl~mnland two batteries of horse artillery, the French slammed into the ranks oS the Russian Guard squadrons, now disorganised by their charge and melee with tlie infantry, and drove them off. The impetus oS the charge carried the Frcnch cavalry on through the vineyard and into the ranks of the Russian Guard Fusilier battalions of the Semenovsky and Preohrarhcnsky Regimenrs. Despite

The final squadron of the Grenadiers a cheval charge into the melee. The Russians also fed in their last two squadmns and, although outnumbered, the greater discipline of the French began to take its toll. (Private Collection, photo A. Umheyl

the lnomentllm of the attack the infantry held firm and battlfd on, with a battalion of the Izmailovskv Guard Fusiliers in suooort: musket and L. b a y n e t against sword, sabre and pistol. While this combat hung in the balance Constantine threw in his last fresh reserves - five squadrons of the Chevalier Garile and two sqrradrons of Guard Cossacks. These fresh arrivals swung the struggle in favour of the Russians. To redress this, Napoleon, who was watching the combat unfold, ordered the last squadrons of his Guard into the struggling mass. Commanded by General Rapp, one of Napoleon's Aidesde-Camp, the last two squadrons of Chnsseurc ri chmal and the half squadron of Mameluks of the Guard sliced their way into the swirling m6li.e but their momentum was slowed by the sheer mass of men and horses. Napoleon ordered his last squadron, from the Grunadim~il chmal, to join the slaughter, and as they did so Constantine sent in the two squadrons of Horse Guards that had earlier s~~ccessfully charged the 4Pme Ligne. So confused had the action become that the Russian Guard Fusiliers no longer felt able to fire into the mass fbr fear of hitting their own cavalry. To the west of this struggling mass of infantry and cavalry, General Drouet moved up with his division. Part of Bernadotte's I Corps, Drouet's timely arrival provided a refuge for the tiring French Imperial Guard cavalry. Behind the massed ranks of these nine battalions, drawn up in three lines, the cavalry regrouped and returned to the action. The Russian Guard cavalry outnumbered those of the French Guard hut the discipline and control of the French horsemen was greater than that of their opponents and gradually they began to break up the Russian squadrons, who retired to the rear. With their proud cavalry beaten, the Guard Fusiliers extricated themselves as best they could from the blood-soaked maelstrom that had descended upon them and made good their retreat towards Krzenowitz. Some squadrons of the Russian Guard Hussars hovering on the northern flank of the battle prevented the French cavalry pursuing the Russian infantry with determination.

General de brigade Rapp, ADC to Napoleo", Presents the EmPemr With taken during the cavalry battle. Amongst the is the commander of the G ~ ~ ~ Repnine. (Hulton Gew)

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Hohenlohe's three regiments of Austrian heavy cavalry guarding the approaches to Krzenowitz gave the retreating troops the support they needed to avoid a rout. The long awaited appearance of the three battalions of the Russian Imperial Guard Grenadiers also helped stabilize the situation. The victory already belonged to Napoleon. The Allied centre had been broken and the French forces on the northern flank were gradually pushing the Russians back. The epic battle for the Pratzen and the determined encounter on the northern flank had been played out while Davout and Legrand were manfully holding back the Allied left wing in the Goldbach valley. It was now a question of the scale of the victory. Leaving Bernadotte to hold the northern end of the Pratzen plateau with Drouet's Division, Napoleon turned the rest of his available forces to the south in an attempt to surround and crush Buxh6wden9scommand.

/ ! i i SOULT ATTACKS THE ALLIED LEFT

Following the desvuction of Allied N Column on the Pratzen plateau, Kutuzov sent word to Buxh6wden advising him to break off the action on the Goldbach and retire. Whether he recdG3fhese orders or did not comprehend the seriousness of the situation on the plateau is unclear. What is certain is that when the French appeared on the summit of the plateau and prepared to march against his rear, the left wing of the army was still engaged in the long drawn out fight around Sokolnitz. With the threat from the Russian Imperial Guard removed, Napoleon ordered the battleweary divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme to march to the southern end of Pratzen plateau. Behind them followed the Imperial Guard and the Reserve Grenadier Division. It was probably about 2.00pm. St. Hilaire's Division was in position first, on the edge of the plateau looking down on the village of Sokolnitz and the Russian rear, occupying the position vacated by Langeron's I1 Column at dawn that morning. Vandamme needed time to re-form his two brigades that had been in action against the Russian Guard but his third, Candras'

Vim from the poshion occupied by St.Hilalrek Division on the Pleben plateau overtmling Sokolnltz Ion riaM ot photo). bngemn and Pmbyshevrlql Columns were still involved In the battle for the sontml of the ~IlIagewhen St.Hllalre's men marched against their mar. ~

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Brigade, hastened onwards and formed behind St. Hilaire in support. In preparation for this final onslaught Legrand fbrniccl tlie three brigades of liis dilision of n ' Corps on St. Hilaire's right flank, extending tlie line to the north of Sokolnio. Fighting flared up again in Sokolnio and around the castle as Da\rout continued his a~~ckacious auacks designed to tic down tlie Allied left wing. Just at this moment Langeron and Prehyslie\~sky, alrcady concerned hy their dwindling supplies of ammunition, saw St. Hilaire begin his descent fioln the plateau towards their rear. It was clear to them both that the hattle was lost, it was now up to them to extricate their men as best they conld. Langeron, rvho started the battle r\itli I? battalions, had hled away eight in the attack against St. Hilaire on the Praoeberg. Managing to get orders to five of his battalions (three battalions of Viborg Musketeers and nvo battalions of 8. J i g e r ) 1,angcl-on marched sol~th,away from the menacing St. Hilail-e. I-lis other four battalions, hea\ily ensaged with Friant's men around Sokolnitz and the castle, coidd not liglic thcir way out in time. After the initial battles lor control of Sokolnitz, Prehyshevsky had extended his command so that it defended the walled plieasant~? north of Sokolniu as well as the castle. The Galicia and Butyrsk Musketeer Regiments occrtpicd the pheasantry wit11 the hra\ily depleted Nan%,A/ov and Podolia Musketeer Regiments in rrscnc to the east. In an eRbrt to evade capture, Prehyshcx,sky ordered his command to attempt a hrcaki~utto the north, wlrcl-e if the overall i\llied plan had been snccessf~dlie hoped to find IV C:ollrinn. Such was tlie I brrakdown irr communications car~sedby tlie French assault on th PI-auen plateau that he was unaware that IV (:olunin llacl hecn d e h t y was a h r a ~ elfort hut it was doo~ncd.Prel~yshcvskycontinuccl to exert somc control over his increasingly desperate men as far as the Kobelnio ponds brlt hy then the pressr~rerras becoming irresiswhle. The sheer volrlrnc of French fire ti-om the encircling nnits of St. Hilaire, Legrand ;md Oudinot and tlie inability to replenish his own supplies led to the disintegration of111 Column. Prehyslicxsky and a number of senior oflicers became prisoners, along with agreat number of liis men. In the meantime, Sokolnitz and the castle were once more in French hands, the Russian defenders were ovenvhelmed and driven out, hi\ing made a desperate stand. The fighting had heen vicious and bloody. The main street of the \illage was dcscrihed as hcing, ' ... entirely covered wit11 tlie dead and rvonnded of hot11 sides. The corpses were heaped up on one another' Another participant reflected that the battle lor snpremacy of this clerastated collection of ruined huildings had been 'slar~ghtcr',individual Rllssians fighting on when all al-nnnd thcln were drad.

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THE FLIGHT ACROSS THE ICE

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\4%ile tlie dramatic FI-ench dcsccnt from the plateau fcll upon the rear of I1 and 111 Columns, Kienmayer and Dokliturov, on the extreme left of the Allied line, still had time to organise thcir retreat. Buxhiiwden lnovcd nfl. first, initially intending to move eastwards and form a junction with IV Column, although lie did not know exactly where he wnnld find it. Langcron's remnants of I1 Column followcd with the main hod? of I Column behind. Kienmayer and Dokhturna formcd a reargnard from Klenmayer's adsance guard of 1 Corps angmentcd I,\a'

With retreat beyond Augerd cut on and the narrow bridge over the ponds destroyed, the leading elements of the retreating Allied column attempted to make good their escape over the ice. Unable to bear the weight the ice began to break and French artillery fire added to the confusion. (Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umhey)

battalion of 7.,Jigcr. These were the soldiers that had confidently fired tlic first shots in anger eal-ly that morning, now they !$'ere pl-otecting the retl-cat of a defeated army. Once this hody was oil t l ~ rno1.e r tlie rearguard p~illedback from tlie \.illage of Telnirz on to the high grouncl tlie easl, still covering the retreat. On Kienrnayer's (11-dersGM Nostirz headed south with his c a ~ a l r ybrigade, comprising mainly 4. Hessen-Homburg Hrlsaren, leading the way for tlie gradnal retirement of the rearguard. His orders were to hold a position on high grolnid between Satschan and Ottnitz to prevent any French attcrnpt to cut off the r e a r g i ~ ~ r Follo~ving d. the edge of the fro7en Satschan pond lie turned eastrwards and crossecl a narl-ow carlsc\my separating it from Mcnitz pond. Rehind Nostitz marched the infantry of tlie rearguard. This movement attracted tlie atte~itioliof French artillery close to Telnit~.Their accurate fire causccl an ammunition wagon to explode on tlie cause\\ray,forcing some gnns to be abandoned and the troops follorring to detour across tlie ice of the Menitx pond, which Sorrunatcly was strong eiior~ghto bear the \+;eight. Buxhiiwdcn liad reached the vicinity o r Augcrd withor~tmeeting any opposition. Some Frencli infant17 had begun to appcar on tlre heights above out of mrlsket range and a Russian battery had iinlimbcrcd and npcncd fire on them. There was a narrow defile between the rillage and the Satschan pnnd, so to secure tlie line of retreat 8. J;rgcr from IT Column occupied the houses and gardens as the leading elements filed slorvly past. I-Iowever, the Frenclimcn gathering on the high ground, \klndarnmc's brigades that had experienced such fearsome fighting on Stark Vinnhrady, were finally arriving in stl-ength. The first to clcscend was first Rattalion 28eme Lignc, being quickly hustled down the slope to cut the I-wad that ran east from Augczd. With thc division's at-tillcry now in a position to lend support and the remaining regiments formed, Vandarnme ordered the battalions of 4Pme Ligne, 24t-me Legere and second Battalion 2 8 h e 1,igne to sweep down and take Arlgezd. The torrent engullcd 8. Jiigcr and the Rnssian gunners rvho

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PHASE 7: On the hlgh gmund above Augaul the mianlng slemanUI ot VldammsC DMsim Rnalhl fall In. They are immediately dispatch& down the slope to c a m r e Avgezd and p m e m me UIIes escaping. The R n t few unlts of the column push th-h but the M i n bodY RDd their -pa mum blocked. In d e ~ s d o maw n take their chance fall back tornmr ~elnltr. cmsshg me I C ~of satschan pwld while

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rearguard follow the maln bcdy of lmlantw, some crossing the Ice.

THE RETREAT OF BUXH~WDEN'SWING OF THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ARMY 2 December 1805, 2.00pm-4.00pm, viewed from the south-west showing the retreat of the Allied left wing and the flight across the frozenponds.

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Napoleon and his staff at the Chapel of St. Antonin at the southern end of the Pratzen plateau, overlooking the village of Augezd. From here Napoleon obsewed his cavalry fail in theit attempt to destroy the Allied rearguard. (Girbal Sarnrnlung Alfred und Roland Urnhey)

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defended their pieces to the last. Retreat past Augezd was now out of the question. Only a few groups had managed to get beyond Augezd before the route was blocked. Those leading the following section, headed by Buxhowden and his staff, veered off southwards and headed for a narrow wooden bridge that crossed the ponds. Buxhowden made it safely to the other side bnt the heavy traffic that followed smashcd throng11 tlre planking, denying this escape route to the rest of the column. With limited options now available a Inass of fngitivcs began to slither across the icr. The weight of men, horses and limbers was too rnoch for the icc to bear and inevitably it ga1.e way, clumping the soldiers into thc icy l~lacknessof the pond. Seeing the confusion, the French artillery opened on this struggling target. Luckily for the Russians the warel- was not deep and a number staggered through rn the safety of the far bank. PI-ohably about 200 men died in the pond, their hodies dragged fi-om thc water by comrades and \'andamme's men. Many more

An Austrian cavalry battery and the O'Reilly Chevaulegers prevented Beaumont's dragoon division fmm breaking through to the retreating Allied infantry. It was only after a battery of Guard artillery opened on them that the Chevaulegers finally withdrew.

becarnc pl-isoners. T h r rearrnost sections of t11c column, having srrn the horror de\zelop allcad, turned back rowards Telnitf wlrrrc the rcarg~lard was still l~olclingo n . The I-eal-gr~ard ca\,alry formed a pl-otecrive screen heliind rvhich the perplexed infnntn rcstot-ed order before rnarching to the causeway bet~vccnSatschan and blenit~p<,nds, the only escape I-oure remaining open. Some made a dash acros thc ice, which held firrn. The Austri;~n

Napoleon touring the battlefield after the fighting had ended. He regularly stopped and talked with the wounded. In this illustration he is receiving Allied officer prisoners and an array of Captured tmphies. (Chateau de Grosbois - Sammlung Alfred und Roland Umheyl

the command of GM Stutrerheim, with 11. Szeckel Husaren, led by GM Moritz Liechtenstein, behind. The Sysoev and Melentel. Cossacks hovel-ed on their llanks and a Rr~ssianinfintry unit still hung on around Telnio. Determined to prevent any more Allied troops escaping, Beaumont's 3eme Dragoon Division, attached to IV Corps, was orderccl to hreak through the cavalty rearguard. Opposed hy the O'Rcilly Chm~n~rhgrnr and some highly accurate lire by an Austrian ca\zally battery the dragoons failed. Napoleon grew angly as lic watched the cavalr\. fail to prevent the Russian infintry continuing their slow deliberate march to safety The O'Reilly Chmnuhgmr held firm until artillery lire from a 11attt.1). of Guard Artillel? inflicted h e a y casualties fol-cing them to retreat, hut they had succeeded in gaining cnougli time for all tlic remaining survi\zors of I Column to escape capture. The Srcckel Husaren had stood firmly in support of the chn~aukg(7~~ thronghont their attacks on tlie dragoons despite galling artillery lire. Now the r c a r g ~ ~ hearled ~rd for tlie causc~vay and safet): some venturing to make their own escape across thc ice. I t was nour around 4.00pm, the winter's sky was darkening and an icy rain fell or1 ~ i c t o rand vanquished alike. There was no furthel- French pursuit. The battle of Austcrlitz was ovrK Napoleon watched the last remnants of the Austro-Kussian army rnelt away into the gathering gloom. Accompanied by Berthier and Soult lie rode slowly down from the slopcs of tlie PI-atzen platrau towards the Satschan pond, moving through the ranks of his victorious soldiers. Later he jonrneycd north, stopping rcgulal-ly to o f k r comfort to wounded soldiers before reaching the Posoritz post house, where he slept that night, n o douht reflecting, with his grcat sense of theatre, that this day was the first anniversary of his corunation as Emperor. Here he wrote his proclamation to tlie army, opening with the line, 'Soldiers, I am pleased with you,' it went on to acknowledge the enol-mity of the armv's achievement. In conclusion he ended with tlie words, 'hly people will greet you with joy, and it will he enongli for yurt to say, "I rvas at the Battle ofhusterlitz", and they will reply "There stands a hero!" '

PAGES 84-85 THE ALLIED RETREAT ACROSS THE SATSCHAN PONDS With the battle clearly lost, those Allies still able to extricate themselves headed for the only Open escape mute between the southem end of the Pratzen plateau and the frozen Satschan pond. The French quickly blocked this avenue of escape thmugh Augezd, and forced south, the leading units veered towards a narmw wooden bridge over the ice. This soon collapsed under the weight of the panicked traffic, however, and left with no alternative the Allies began to venture on to the ice and make their way tentatively acmss, wagons and artillery limbers soon joining the flight. Unable to bear this weight the ice began to crack then break. Seeing this, French artillery now drawn up overlooking the village of Augerd opened fire on the frozen pond adding to the confusion. However, the pond was shallow and few men dmwned despite Napoleon's extraodinary claims of 20,000 dead. Rather than risk their lives on the ice, those still able turned back and made good their escape around the south side of the Satschan pond protected by a resolute rearguard. (Christa Hook)

hrough the night of.'L/.1 December the widely separated elcmmc of the Allied army retreated and eventually gathered togethe at Czeitsch on the road leading to Hungary. In the early hour of the morning Prince Johann Liechtenstein arrived at Napoleon' headquarters to arrange a meeting hehveen Emperor Francis an' Napoleon. The army continued to withdraw in appalling weathe unmolested by the French, who niistakenly believed the Allies wer retiring on the Olmiitz road. It was only after Napoleon moved hi headquarters to Austerlio that he discovered the error and recalle Murat and Lannes. On 4 Decernher the Allies began to cross the Marc River at Holic. The meeting behveen Napoleon and Francis took plac that day and an armistice was agreed, coming into effect the follo~vin day. Thc French army finally closed on the Allies on the day of th meeting, but it was too late for further fighting. Tsar Alexander agree to the terms that Francis had approved, which required the Russia army to return home. This they happily did, leaving the Austrians alon to negotiate for their occupied country as best they could.

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The meeting between Napoleon and Francis at SpBleny mill on 4 December. Accompanied by Prince Liechtenstein, Francis concluded an armistice with Napoleon that bmught a final end to the fighting.

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The talks that followed saw Austria suffer greatly for her part in the war. The Treaty of Pressburg, signed on 27 December 1805, decreed I that Aptria would lose her provinces of Dalmatia, Istria and Venice to Napoleon's new Kingdom of Italy, and Banria would gain the Tyrol and Vorarlberg in reward for its support. Baden and W~rttemberg gained teiritory too, while Ausvia suffered the further hum~liationof a 40 miuiowranc indemnity. With this further weakening of Austria's influenccjn the German territories, the sickly Holy Roman Empire was finally dissolved the following year, paving the way for the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine. Prussia had been close to intervention in the war when the Battle of Austerlitz changed everything. Napoleon extracted certain guarantees from Prussia allowing him free rein in southern Germany and Italy while forcing them to cede Ansbach to Bavaria and two other small principalities to France. However, he sweetened the pill for Prussia by handing over the longsoveted territory of Hanover. While the Austrians and Russians had been marching to defeat at Austerlia the supporting attacks that made up the Allies' grand strategy had also come to nothing. The landing m southern Italy was greatly

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A French d-n escort. a wounded M a n prisoner into UPnwnY. Allled 1 0 0 . 8 . were ~ ~ . . l u In e ;the m i o n oi 2g.000 men. The Ruulans lost a b u t 16,000 kllled or ununded, the M a n s some 600 kllled and 1,200 wounded. PIIsonen taken amounted to about 0300 Russians and 1,870 A u s t d a ~ Total ~ ~ . Fnnch lonw am put at 8,800, wlth about 1,2W npolted

.

Roland Umh.y)

delayed. By the rime it m k place Austerlitz had been fought and lost, forcing the British and Russians to abandon their mission. Similarly, delays negated other efforts by British, Swedish and Ruasian forces. Austerlitz left the Third Coalition in tatters and it ceased to exist. Austria was left with a festering bitterness as a result of the indignities Napoleon imposed on her and would take the field against the French emperor again in 1809. Prussia fought a campaign against Napoleon in 1806, suffering a crushing defeat at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt in October. Russia suffered a similar fate at Friedland in June 1807. Austerlitz had been a stunning victory for Napoleon. His army, honed to perfection at the camps on the Channel coast, had ouhnanoewred the ckunsv. uncoordinated efforts of the Allies. The control of the Allied army became compromised by the presence of Tsar Alexander, who, assuming supreme command, then allowed the overconfidence of his inexperienced advisors to seduce hi. As a result, Napoleon was able to draw the Allied army into battle on ground he had chosen in advance. The complicated Allied plan required a close ccmrdination that was beyond the capabilities of thejoint armies and left it exposed to the counterstroke Napoleon had already planned for the centre. It is testimony to the skilled and tireless manoeuvring of the French army, in particular St H i e and Vandamme's divisions of Soult's N C o w that after the battle Alexander believed the Allies were beaten because the French had formed superior numbers at all the crucial points on the battlefield. Yet it was these two divisions that had between them stormed the Pratzen plateau, defeated N Column, faced an attack by the Russian Imperial Guard, attacked the retreating Russians at Augezd and marched on the rear of I1 and I11 Columns at Sokolnitz. It is fascinating to consider that there probably would not have been a Battle of Austerlitz had the Tsar not been present. Kutuzov made it clear he was in favour of retinng further, playing for time, but was overruled. Reinforced by Archduke Charles's army from Italy and with the imminent promised intervention of Prussia, he could haveieturned

A French caltoon of the death of William Pitt. The devil is carrying Pitt down to hell, snapping the reins on George Ill, who is falling towads the chasm over a sack marked 'Depot of crimes of the English Government'. Some said the news of Austerlitz had killed Pitt.

to tlie offensive against a French army exposed at the end of a long srlpply line in corlntry cleared of food and forage by the Allies. The outcome may have been very different from that at Austerlit/. For the local population the hattlrfield was an indescribable horror. On 4 December they began to return to their shattered homes. Inside tliry found, 'stiff corpses and dying emaciated people, some of whom were trying to push their wounded insides back into their hl-oken torsos'. Two days later they were ordered to drag all the dead horses from the Satschan pond and recovered sorrlervhcre between 130 and 150; of lioman bodies they only fbund two or three more to add to the 200 or so that had been dragged out o n the day of battle. Napoleon's statement in his famous 30th Bulletin that 20,000 Russians had drowned in the ponds was pure propaganda. In addition, probably aronnd 90 artillery pieces were reco\,ered alirr tlie pond was drained. O n 8 Drcernbcr, six days aftrr the battle, tlic villagers from Satschan ventured on to the battlefield. One man, shocked by what lie saw, wrote there werr 'thousands o f corpses' amongst which there lvas 'a hand lying here, a leg lying there, a decapitated body, a torso. There was a horribly disfigured man who raised his bloody hand toward CIS, crying for help. There was another one who was digging deep into his own infected wounds, frozen up to his hips in mnd, pleading with ns, in his despair, to kill him.' News of Napoleon's great victory did not reach London until the last days of the year. When he first heard the news William Pitt, the BI-itish Prime Minister, architect of tlie Third Coalition and 'saviour of Europe', was devastated. Tnrning to a map of Europe hung on tlie wall he proplietically announced, 'Roll up that map; it will not he wanted thesr ten years'. Never a well man, Pitt took to his bed and on 1 6 January 1806 he died. Many said he too was a victim of tlir Battle ofAusterlit/.

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

-

Ithougli almost 200 vears have passed since the Eagles of France, Russia and Austria clashed on tlie cold and frosty fields of Moravia, large parts of the battlefield are unchanged 11y time. In 1992 the (:zecll government declal-ed the battlefield a national historic site, which hopcfillly will guarantee it rernains this way for future generations. The battlefielrl can be explored in a day and a reasonable over\.icw gained, but i f yo11wish to visit the museums and Slavkov castle too, then a little more time may be required. It is important to note that the traditionally familiar nanics of the \illages have changed. The former German names are now represented in their C7ech form. The following list may PI-ovenseful. Original rendition Austerltz Augezd Blasow~tz Bosenitr Holubitz Jirrikowitz Kobelnitz

Current rendition Slavkov u Brna Ujezd u Brna Blazov~ce Tvarorna Brno Holubice Jirlkovice Kobyntce

Krug

Kruh

Krrenowitz

Krenovice Olornouc Ponetovlce Prace Zatcany Slapanice Sokolnice Teln~ce

Brllnn

Olrnlltz

Puntowitz Pratze Satschan Slapanltz Sokolnitz Tenitz

The nearest large town to use as a base is Rrno although it is only a two-hoor drive from tlie Austrian capital of Vienna. From Brno there is now a ~riajorhighway that cuts across the northern flank of the battlefield, running parallel with the old Rriinn-Olmiio road. When approaching the battlefield white ~roadsignsbearing silhouettes of three soldiers and the narnes Santon, Zuran o r Mohyla Miru (Peace Monument) inrlicatc where to tnrn off on to the old road (the 430). The route you follo~varound tlic hattlefield is ohviously one of personal choice, hut as a srarting point you rnay wish to Sollow' the path I took. Fro111 the jr~nction~ v i t l i the main highway, follow the sign to the ZIII-an,tlie hill where Napoleon had his ticadquarters for the first part nf the battle. There is a distinctive tree marking the site, a small parking area and a relief map of the battlefield. From here the visitor can appreciate the vast size of the battlefield for the first time. By retracing your rorrte hack to the highway, and crossing it, you will come to tlie Santon, the hill on which Napoleon anchored the left of his position.

Leaving your car in Tvarozna (Bosenitz) follow one of the stepped footpaths to the top of the Santon from where there are excellent views across the northern end of the battlefield. Over this wide expanse of farmland spread out before you, Lannes led his two divis~onstowards Bagfation's Russian forces. In Tvarozna, wthin the building which houses the post office and local government offices, there is a diorama ofthabattle. Driving back to the 430, turn left and follow the road to the Starh Posta (old post office). This recently restored building played a ' prominent role in the battle. On the morning of 2 December it served as Bagration's headquarters, but that evening Napoleon slept there after his meeting with Johann Liechtenstein. The buildings now hosts a restaurant,/wine cellar and small museum. Retrace your route back along the 430 and take the left twn towards Blazovice. The gently undulating ground either side of the road is where the Frencband Russian cavalry fought out their desperate battles. From Blazovice llow the road southwards, cross the mlway and wind gently up to t h e ighpoint of Star6 Vinohrady (old vineyard) to where IR23 fought ~Ai5:damme'smen, passing the site of the battle of the Russian Imperial Guard on the way. Return to Blazonce, head towardsJirikovice, and ponder the attack of Soult's corps on the Pratzen plateau. If you stop between Blazovice and Jirikovice and look to the left of the road you will observe the country traversed by Vandamme and St. Hilaire. Once at Jirikovice turn towards Ponetovice and following the road you will be in the area where these two divisions deployed m low ground prior to their attack. From here the value of this ground is clear, as it is well hidden from any prying eyes on the Pratzen. A road leading from Ponetovice to Prace follows the line taken by S t Hilaire's men when they attacked the village. At Prace follow the signs to the Mohyla Miru (Peace

'ap

A photosn~h taken from the '-w tomrcls ma

dllaoe ot baemlh (now N.mmS. A mpmductlon F m h spdr pun .t.nd. on the rurnrnn ol the anton CIo a C-, bullt in 1852, to mplaee the OM dedwed

In

chapel, beneath which is an ossuary containing bones of some of those killed in battle. There is also a museum behind the monument. The monument, bnilt on thr Pratzeherg, marks the site of the vicious fighting between St. Hilaire, Kamensky and Kolowrat. Unfortunately the degree to which this part of the battlefield can be explored is limited bv the fenced-off area arorrnd a radar/transmitting station hrrilt on the site. From thc monument, turn left out of the car pal-k and follow the road to rhe sourhern end of the plateau, from where you can look down across the vineyards to the villages of Ujezd, Zatcany, Telnice and Sokolnice. Of the ponds that were so significant in the later stages of the battle there is no longer ally trace. Yo11 can either conrinne on the road down towards Telnice or return towards Mohyla Miru and take a left turn, which leads directly down to the wall of the pheasantry at Sokolnice. Along the wall of the pheasantry are marks traditionally claiming to show the positions of a French artillery battery, however, I have found no evidence that snggests the French held this eastern side of the pheasantry at any time in the battle. Continuing southwards, the village of Sokolnice contains the heavily restored castle that saw so much fighting, a vast granary barn and a number of other period buildings. Beyond Sokolnice lay the villages of Telnice, which saw heavy fighting, Zatcany, marking the southern side of the great pond, now replaced by open farmland, and finally Ujezd, from where the first advance to battle took place. Above this village, hidden amongst the private gardens and allotments of the ~illagers,is the Chapel of St. Antonin. Built in 1863 this chapel replaced the original one, destroyed in 1814. It was from this spot that Napoleon watched as the Russians attempted to escape across the frozen ice at the end of the battle. No tour would he complete without a visit to Slavkov (Austerlitz). Slavkov castle and its beautiful grounds belonged to the Kaunitz family. U'ithin the space of a few days either side of the battle, the castle was home to three Emperors, Alexander, Francis and Napoleon. For anyone planning a visit to Austerlio there is an excellent internet site at wv.austerlio-revi0n.c~which provides much ~ ~ s e finfbrmation i~l in English, French and Czech.

FURTHER READING

o r a battle as significant as Austerlitz there have been relatively few hooks written in English specifically analysing the campaign and the final action on 2 December 1805. Most writers until recently I-clied very lleavily on French accounts, often ignoring Austrian and Russian sources entirely. This has inevitably given an unbalanced view on the history of this campaign. Prohahly the most well known and readily available book on the suhject is Christopher Dr~ffy'sAz~strrlitz 1805 (London, 1977 and recently repnblished in papcrhack). Duffy was the first to attempt to redress this imbalance. Colonel F.N. Maude's Thp L'lm Cnmpni,qn 11805 (London, 1912) has, I believe, never heen reprinted, which is a great pity as this is a fascinating detailed cxalnination oT the early part of the 1805 campaign. Maude has interesting comments to make on the geography of the area, which adversely affected the movements of the Austrian army, and offers an insight into Mack's thinking. The reprinting of Major-General Srutterheim's A 1)rtnil~n' Arrovnl of lhr Bnttlr of Austrrlitz (London 1807; reprinted Camhridge, information on the Allied 1985) has made readily available much ~rsefi~l version of events. Colonel G.A. Frlrse's T/E Cnmj1r~2,p.s oJ 1805: Illin, Eflfa(qn?;Au.rt~rlilz (1905; reprinted Tyne & Wear 1995) was one of the first English accounts of the campaign and contains much usefi~l information although it should not he read in isolation. Fursc inclr~dcda detailed appendix pulling together all the research disproving Napoleon's claim of vast Allied casualties in thc frozen ponds. Claude Manceron's Austrrlitz (Paris, 1963, reprinted London, 1966) is an interesting read but in reality is a fictionalised account of the battle, very much fi-om a French viewpoint. Captain F.W.O. Maycock's Th? .?I(if~olronirCnml,ni~qof 1805 (Aldershot, 1912) was initially written for army officers and is a general overview of the campaign. The most recent work to cover the subject is Scott Rowden's ~\'npolron nnd Austprlitz - ' 7 % ~Glory Yunrs' of 1805-1807 (Chicago, 1997). Bowden has continued the trend set by Duffy hy attempting to bring the Allied viewpoint more to the fore, although I rlndcrstand some qr~estionshave heen raised as to whether all the Russian and Austrian sources quoted have a c t ~ ~ a lhccn ly consulted.

-

INDEX

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34

,Jigrl. i. 45. 45. 46. ill.78-ill F ~ r ~ l r ~William ick Ill,Riug 8 lii~~.': X. 4i. ill.X2 Frc.xx11; t r r n \ 18-Ill. 26 1iig<,r, (;,&,rcl ($7 1 (:<,wp, (n~r,,~,~l,>,Irl24, 27, :i:i, :15, 36, ,rig;~~lc .56, 57, .!i-.58 K,l,>~,l>ll:,'\ l>,ig;,.57, .:>7, .5s-.-> I ~I , S~~ C1~ ~ 1C ~ :~ ~ .XI, :,I .xi, 5:) >lilllllp~n-U~ingc#~ Ktiw,$?,,,r,,, .5. lili :,I O'Krillv [::i,njntik~eic 83. 81; l i , v v \ < , ;,rtill,CIC,~ <>I I,;,,,lc .l:l-l.l Y (iwp? (12alnc71 2i. :I:35, <. 19.6465, lii.70 I~I,~,,,;~~C,V~;, i;rrl,;t,~ir~~ .r>n \1 C:r>r[lr ( S r y l 2 i . 28 I ' o ~ l ~ ~>l li~; ~~ ~ k c c r r.?!I cs (:<>rl>> (:\,,~~r<.:,,,) 18, 39 1 ' r c ~ ~ l ~ ~Kl,,rtic~rl 24. :Y?, :$:I i'l.73-71; Riivis~l~ I C L.:?8T ~ C I P T I Y K<>,,er,,,,,,,~/l>

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,,

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4849. i ( l Ibiiliilllll.(;<.,,rlid ii. ili.58 T ~ % , < > , .s,,,.n,>~rl l , i li,,

mpaign

I0I

ounts of history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command tegies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing

Austerlitz

.es throughout the crucial stages of each campaign.

The fate of empires

Illustrations

o-=

Austerlitz is undoubtedly one of the most famous baffles of history. Not only was it the first campaign Napoleon waged as Emperor of France, but also thL k t great test for his Grande Armee. The Emperor himself regarded it as his greatest via-' and it undoubtedly won him 8 itery of Europe that would remain unbroken for almost a decade. Most accounts of the campaign have until now bees 1 based almost exclusively on .$ French sources, but following extensive research in the Austrian archives Ian Castle is :j now able to providea far mom $ balanced account of the Austerlitz campaign. In this all-new volume he chronicles the events that climaxed on t field of Austerlitz.

i

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