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'on 1950
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great amphibious assault
GORDON L ROTTMAN joined the US Army in 1967, volunteered for Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served In the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1969-70 and subsequently In airborne Infantry, longrange patrol and Intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. He was a special operations forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years and is now a freelance writer. He Is based in Texas, USA.
PETER DENNIS was born In 1950. Inspired by contemporary magazines such as Look and Learn, he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historical subjects and Is a keen wargamer and modelmaker. He is based in Nottinghamshlre, UK.
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Inch'on 1950 The last great amphibious assault
Campai gn • 162
Inch'on 1950 The last great amphibious assault
Gordon L Rottman · Illustrated by Peter Dennis
First published in Great Britain in 2006 b y Ospre y Publ ish ing , M idland House ,
Acknowledgments
West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, United Kingd om . E-mai l: info @ospreypublishing.com
The author wishes to thank Don Boose (Col, USA, Ret) and the staff of the US Marine Corps Historical Center,
© 2006 Osprey Publishing Ltd . All righ t s reserved . Apart from any fair dea ling for the purpose of privat e study, research. criticism or review, as permitted under the Cop yright, Designs and
Abbreviations
Pat ent s Ac t, 1988 , no part of this publication may be reproduced , stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic. electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying , recording or otherwi se, without the prior written perm ission of the copyright own er. Enquiri es should be addressed to the Publishers. ISBN 1 84 1769614 Design: The Black Spot Index by Alan Thatcher Maps by The Map Studio 3D bird 's eye views by John Plumer Batt lesc ene artwork by Graham Turner Originated by The Elect ronic Page Company , Cwmbran, UK Printed in China through Worl d Print Ltd . 06 07 08 09 10
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
For a catalog of all books published b y Osprey please contact: NORTH AMER ICA Osprey Direct , C/o Random House Distribution Cent er, 400 Hahn Road , Westminster, M D 21157, USA E-mail : info@osprey di rect.com AL L OTHER REGION S Osp rey Direct UK, P.O. Box 140, Welling borou gh, No rthants, NN8 2FA, UK E-mail :
[email protected] www.ospreypublishlng.com
AAA
anti-aircraft artillery Airborne DMsion amphibian tractor (see LVD High -speed transport (aka destroyer -transpor1) Airborne Regimental Combat Team Battalion Combat Team Cavalry Division Destroyer Force Beachhead Line Far East Command Infantry DMsion .JomtChiefs of Staff (US) Joint Task Force Seven Korean Augmentation to the US Army KoreanMarine Corps Korean Pec ple's Army (NK) landing Craft. Mechanized Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel Landing Ship, Med ium (Rocket ) Landing Ship , Tank landing Ship, Utility Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored) Mk V landing Vehicle, Tracked Mk III Covered (amtrac) Manne DMsion MarDiv NK Nor1h Korea(Democratic People's Repubiic of Korea), North Korea'll Prov MarBde Provisional Marine Brigade RCT Regimental Combat Team ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) Republic of Korea Army ROKA Task Force TF Unrted Nations UN Unrted States us Unrted States Marine Corps USMC (-) less (elements detached from parent unrt) reinforced (additional elements attached) (+)
AbnDiv Amtrac APD ARCT BCT CavDiv DD FBHL FECOM InfDiv JCS JTF7 KATUSA KMC KPA LC M LCVP LSM(R) LST LSU LVT(AI5 LVT(3)C
Batt alions organic to US Marine and Army regiments are designated with the batta lion and regimental number. for examp le: 1/5 Marines=l st Battalion, 5th Marines; 2/ 32 Infantry=2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment. Companies and be tteries are designated, for example Bl10=Battery B, tst Battalion , 10th Mamas and the battalion designation not shown.
us Marine and Army Officer Rank s Kay to mlUtary Iymboh
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CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
7
The battleground
CHRONOLOGY
22
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
24
American commanders • North Korean commanders
OPPOSING ARMIES
30
UN forces • North Korean forces • Order of battle
OPPOSING PLANS
42
The American plan - Operation Chromlte The North Korean plan - too little too late
OPERATION CHROMITE
54
Preliminaries and the approach • Assault: D-Day Beach Red , 1730-1830hrs • The drive to Klmpo: D+1 to D+2 Crossing the Han River· The Yongdungp'o fight Attacking the ma in line of resistance
AFTERMATH
83
The battle for Seoul
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
93
BIBLIOGRAPHY
94
INDEX
95
~ ~~~~~b~~ f~san Perimeter prior ~ ~~dlf;~~~~gp atlnch'on, Seoullhrust, _
UN Pusan Perimeter, September 15 NKlines onSeptember 26anerPusan breakout andInch'onlanding
o
CHINA
100miles
I
i i
o
100km
MANCHURIA
Korea Bay JAPAN SEA
38'
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....
YELLOW SEA
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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
o rea i Chosan in Korean , Chosen to th e J ap an ese ) had been an em pire since 2333 Be. Its stra tegic lo cati on meant th at it was cove ted by both Ch ina an d J ap an , e m pires with which Ko rea ex pe rie nced varied an d co m p lex rel ations, neve r as allies, bu t as a co u n try d esired as so meth ing to possess. J ap an occupied Korea duri ng th e 190 4- 05 J apan-Russian War a nd an nexed it in 191 0. T hey undertook ex te ns ive effo rts to in corporat e Korea into th e e m pire in o rde r to explo it its resources an d peopl e. Korean s were third-class citizens within th eir own land, an d th e Japan ese ran all aspects of th e co lo ny, from th e go vern me n t to in stallingJapan ese man agers to o pe ra te busin esses. J ap an ese was tau ght in schools, and all face ts of Ko rean cu ltu re a nd tradi tions were su p p ressed . It eve n becam e ma nda tory fo r Korean s to ado pt J ap anese nam es. Du rin g World War II th e J ap an ese ex ploi te d Korean industry and agricu lture to su p port th eir war effort. Millions of Ko rea ns were d rafted into th e armed fo rces, em ployed in industry, o r eve n sh ip ped to J apan , an d forced into service as labo re rs and co m fo rt women th rough ou t th e occu pied co u n tr ies. With th e e nd of th e war, XXIV US Corps occu p ied so uthe rn Korea o n September 4, 1945 wh ile th e Sovie t Red Army occ u p ied th e north from Au gust 12, th e di viding lin e bein g th e 38 th Parall el just north of Seou l. Whil e th e Un ited Na tio ns so ugh t nati onal e lec tio ns to re-uni fy th e co u n try, it was not to be . Backed by the USSR and Co mm u nist
K
South Korean refugees wa it their tum to cross the Han River as the North Koreans approach. The military would not let them cross on the bridges for fear of saboteurs, so log and plank rafts were built alongside the supports. The bridges w ere destroyed on June 28 . (USMC)
7
A marin e automatic rifleman hammers rounds at an NK position from behind an overrun street barricade. The BAR was an accurate weapon; w ith It s 20-round magazine and using the slow rate of fire It was easy to put bullets through a w indow or small opening. (USA)
Ch ina, th e Democrati c Pe ople 's Republi c o f Ko rea - No rth Korea (N K) - was es ta b lished o n Augus t IS, 1948 with n o inten tion of unitin g with th e so uth unless it was in co n tro l. Sovie t occu patio n forces d eparted in December 1948 leavin g th ei r eq ui p men t b ehind. T he d ivision was unequal in both a rea a n d p opula tion. T he so u th co ns iste d of 37,000 sq ua re mil es a n d a p opulati on of 2 1 million , wh ile th e n o rth had 9 million people in 48,000 sq uare mil es. T he Korean Peopl e 's Army (KPA) was formall y estab lished o n Aug ust I S, 1948 , bu t its fo rmatio n h ad begu n in 1946 und e r cover of the Peace Pr eservati on Corps . Com ba t uni ts were covertly organ ize d un d e r the guise o f secu rity force training sc hools, wh ich p ro vided leade rs a n d ca d res fo r th e fir st d ivisions. By th e time o f th e North Ko rean in vasion of th e so u th, three co rps, ten infa ntry di visio n s, an a r mo re d b rigade , a n d nume rous su p po rt and secu rity u n its h ad b een raised , alo ng with a small air fo rce a n d n avy, as well as a b orde r consta b u lary, T he USS R p ro vid ed th ousands o f adv ise rs, a n d m ost of th e weapons, eq u ip men t, muniti ons, a n d su p p lies to the KPA, in ad d itio n to training th ousands o f technicians a n d specialists inside th e USS R. At th e time o f th e invasion th e KPA co n ta ined 223,08 0 troops. T he Republic o f Korea ( RO K - p ron oun ced "rock"), was p roclaimed o n Augus t 15, 1948 afte r UN -su pervise d e lec tio ns ." The ROK Ar my (RO KA) was es ta blished o n th e same d at e fro m th e ex isting Korean Cons ta b u lary, whi ch itself d ated fro m 1946. Th e last US occu patio n tro ops d eparted in June 1949 . At th e tim e of th e in vasion th e fledgling RO KA p ossessed e igh t under-strength and p artly train ed a n d eq u ipped di visions with a total of 98, 000 men. Besides securing the 38 th Parall el , p a rt of th e army was e ngaged in com bating northern guerrillas. T he Co m m u n ist invasion ca ug ht th e US and ROK comp le tely by su rp rise when NK troops poured across th e 38 th Parall el a t 0400hrs o n June 25, 1950. The m ain North Ko rea n a ttac k was aimed at Seou l, a nd th e 8
1The UN recognized the ROK on December 15. but it was not admitted to the UN until 1991. as was North Korea.
victorious divisions continued to press south. Events occurred rapidly. US forces were authorized to conduct combat operations; the UN passed a resolution approving the use of armed force to restore peace; Seoul fell three days after the invasion and Inch'on on July 3. A small US combat element, Task Force Smith, was deployed to Korea from Japan arriving on July 1 and was defeated two days later. Subsequent US efforts were defeated and the battered ROKA was pushed south. US units, inadequately trained and equipped from occupation duty in japan, were rushed in, along with Commonwealth forces. Efforts to establish defensive lines failed and the UN forces were pushed into the southeast corner by August 4 to make what many perceived as a last stand at Pusan. UN reinforcements continued to arrive and for the next mon th and a half the NK forces battered themselves against a stout defense. By mid-September the NK divisions were spent and few reinforcements arrived. Their ammunition and supplies were running out, while the UN forces within the perimeter continued to receive reinforcements and supplies. Even before the tide had turned against the North Koreans, Gen Douglas MacArthur was making plans to break out of the Pusan perimeter, conduct a dramatic outflanking amphibious assault to cut the enemy's supply line, and drive them north beyond the 38th Parallel. For an army tottering on the brink of defeat just weeks before, the plan could be considered nothing but bold and audacious, and, many said , bound to fail. Reduced forces
In mid- I950 the US Army and Marine Corps were a shadow of themselves five years previously, as were the navy and the air force (which had onl y become service separate from the army in 1947). The US armed forces had just undergone a major transformation. Instead of separate departments of war and navy co-ordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff OCS), they were now under the Department of Defense, of which the JCS was a component. Answering to the Department of Defense were the departments of the army, navy, and air force. A civilian secretary headed each department, who answered to the the president, the Commanderin-Chief. While all the armed services suffered from rapid postwar reductions, the Army was in particularly bad shape. It had declined in size from 89 divisions on V:J Day, to seven infantry, two airborne, and one armored division in 1950. With the exception of the 1st InfDiv in Germany and the 82d Airborne Division (AbnDiv) in the States, all were severely under strength. Rather than the 18,804 men they should have mustered at full strength, they contained between 11,000 and 13,650 men. The Army itself was authorized 610,900 personnel , but only 593,000 were on the rolls. The divisions were essentially gutted. The three infantry regiments lacked their third battalions; each battalion had only two companies, and the companies themselves only two platoons. There were 36 rifle platoons in a division instead of the required 81. Divisional tank and AAA battalions had only a single company/battery and lacked a battalion headquarters. Field artillery and engineer battalions had only two companies/batteries. The batteries had four howitzers instead of six. Infantry regiment tank companies were non-existent. Other divisional units were likewise reduced and older equipment was mostly
9
in use for trammg , whi ch also suffered . Em p hasis was placed o n p ro viding training in skills use ful in th e civilian world as well as civilian ed uca tio n . Co m bat training was se ldo m undertak en a nd th en o n ly a t th e sm a ll unit level. T he four infantry d ivisions ( Ist Cava lry, 7th , 24 th, 25 th In fantry) o n occ u pa tio n duty in J a pan were in eve n worse shape because o f training restricti ons. T he po o r sta te of J apan ese roads and bridges m eant th at o n ly light tanks we re issu ed . Live range-fi ring was almo st unh eard of. Th e tu rn ove r ra te was ove r 40 percent a year. T he Marin e Co rps was in eq ually dire straits - if not worse. T he corps co ns isted of two under-strength divisions, down fro m six wartime units. Few su p po rt uni ts ex isted a nd Ma rine Aviatio n co nsisted of 16 sq ua dro ns, four with j e ts. Of th e 74,279 marines, fewe r th an o ne third were in th e Fleet Malin e Force , th e co rps ' co m bat uni ts. The 1st Marin e Division (MarDiv) in Califo rn ia had 8,000 men with o n ly o ne three-batt ali on regiment an d a single artille ry battalion . Th e 2d MarDi v in No rth Ca ro lina had two infantry regim en ts, but one had o n ly two battali ons, and three artillery battalions to total 9,000 troops. War-strength divisions were authorized at 22 ,000 troops. It was in te nded that co m bat units would be removed from th e Marine Co rps, and th eir gro u nd and air assets wo uld be redeployed to th e o ther se rvices , re d uc ing th e se rvice to a naval base sec u rity force and p ro vider of troops to sh ips' d et achmen ts. To aggravate thi s situa tio n, eve n th ough th e US was n ow ex pecte d to be d eployabl e wo rldwide because o f th e eme rg ing Co ld Wa r co nflicts, o n ly limited sea and airlift d eployment capabilities ex isted. Ove rseas logistics infrastructure was a lso wan ting. Th e US was ill-pr epared to d eploy a nd susta in co m ba t forces in remo te underd eveloped th eat e rs. The US a rmed forces, th ough , had o ne thing go ing for th e m : many of th e oflicers (eve n a t co m pa ny level ) a nd th e NCOs had co m bat experience . Co m ma nd an d co n trol syste ms, logistics su p port, training techn iqu es, an d tacti cs we re well d eveloped , and th e many lessons learned du rin g World War 1\ had been stud ied and in corpo rat ed in to d oct rin e. The 11th Marines' 105mm M2A1 howitzer prepares for a fire m ission. Three battalions in both marine and Army divisions were armed with this excellent w eapon. (USMC)
10
T he Eigh th US Army occ upying J apan was mainly co ncerned with d efending th e Hom e Islands in th e event of invasion by the USSR - an unl ikely sce na rio. No plann ing was co nd uc ted for co nt inge ncy o perations in th e Far East in respon se to sma ll-scale regiona l co nflicts. No defen sive plan s were mad e for Korea. Wh en the NK hordes swarme d acro ss th e 38 th Parall el , th e four o ccupati on divisions in J apan were far fro m prepared . TF Smith , an under-strength battalion , was ru sh ed to Kor ea by th e 24th InfDiv in th e first d ays a nd was easily brush ed aside. Th e two-battali on 34th Infantry Regim ent wh ich foll owed almos t imm edi at ely suffe re d a similar defeat. Defendi ng Pusan
The remnan ts of five ROK division s with 45,000 men defended the north side of th e 160-mile Pusan perim et er, while th e 1st Cav and 24t h and 25 th InfDi vs d efended th e west side with 30,000 troops. T he 2d US InfD iv, th e 1st Prov MarBde, and 27th British Infantry Brigad e arrived at th e end ofJuly an d beginning of Augu st. Tank battali ons, third battali ons for th e infantry regim ents, artill ery batteri es, replacem ents, and su pplies wer e flooding into Pusan. The marin e bri gad e was ru sh ed to Pu san in resp onse to MacArthur's plea for help. His World War II ex pe rie nce had shown him th e value of th e marines a nd he also wanted a n a m ph ibio us fo rce. MacArthu r's plan s saw far beyond th e imm ediat e d efensive battle. Th e l st MarDiv, fro m whi ch th e marin e brigad e had been spaw ne d, was still re b uild ing its stre ngth fo r d epl oyment to Ko rea. MacArthur had long-ran ge plan s for thi s unit as well. Th e 7th InfDiv was still in J apan , having been gutted a nd was being re filled to se rve as th e Far East Co m mand (FECO M) Reserve . This unit, too , would se rve hi s futu re plan s. As beat en ROK and US for ces plunged south before th e No rth Korean o nslaug h t, MacArthur's mindset was far fro m d efeatist. The co n tem porary Marines , covered by a M26 t ank, fight their way through t he c ity street by street. Seoul's heavily constructed buildings se rv ed th e NK as ready -made st ro ngpoi nt s. (USMC)
....
-11
media (and later histo rian s) often describe th e Pusan peri meter as a last sta nd, a defeat in th e making, and pred icted an "Ame rican Dunkirk." In reality, th e batt ered Eigh th Army was now positioned to d efeat the NK in d etail. The Eighth Army had suffered 6,000 US and 70,000 ROK casualties. T he ten NK division s, however, had sh ru n k to a few th ou sand ex ha usted fighters eac h. The NK had lost almos t 58,000 tro ops and on ly 40-plus T 34 ta nks were thoug ht to rem ain o ut of ISO. O n ly abo ut 21,000 were veteran troops, th e res t bein g raw recrui ts whose morale was plum met ing. T heir su p ply line , running almos t 300 miles fro m Pyongyan g, th e NK capital, an d th rough Seoul to the uni ts sca ttered o n a wide fro n t, was over-exte nde d and under UN air and naval attack. Am ple air su p po rt was provid ed to th e Pusan perimet er from carrie rs and bases in J ap an , o nly a co u ple of hundred miles away. The su rviving NK now face d 92,0 00 well su p plied and well su p ported UN tro ops, some of them fres h . All that MacA rt h ur felt needed to be d one to accom modate a break out, a co u n teroffe ns ive to d rive th e in vad e rs back north , was to sever th e fragile NK su p p ly lin e , bu t h e needed th e tools to d o it, a nd it was questionable wheth er th ey would be made available . While uni ts and co m ma nds wo rldwide we re be in g co m bed for tro ops and eq u ipmen t th ere were valid co ncerns th at th e whole matte r mi ght be a di ve rsion for a Sovie t in vasion of West Germany. T he 82d Abn Div, th ough re q ues ted by MacArthu r, was untouch abl e as was th e 1st InIDi v in Germany. The 82 d was all that re mained of th e Ge neral Reserve ; othe r di visions being gu tte d. Th e two under-strength marine di visions were needed fo r o the r co n tinge nc ies . MacArthur had req uested a ma rin e division , but th e J CS said th ey we re unavail abl e. Fo r what he had in mind he also needed an army di vision , a nd non e was read ily availab le. FECOM possessed no am phibious ca pability. T he marine brigade o n Gua m had bee n disbanded in Apri l 1949. No viab le am p h ibio us tra in ing had been undertaken by th e divisions in J ap an or by any o ther army division. In lat e 1949, as a co n tingency for a Soviet invasion ofJ ap an ,joint na vy a nd marine training teams were formed to train o ne regim ent in eac h of th e four divisions for am ph ibio us co u n te r-land ings. The pro gram had o n ly just begun at the tim e of the in vasion. T he first co ncep t of a flanking amphibious o peratio n o n the Ko rean peninsula was a modest effort in volving the 1st Cava lry Division (CavDiv) still in J ap an. The amphibious training tea ms we re ret asked to provide as much tra ining as po ssible to th e 1st Cav in th e short time available. Operati on Bluehearts, th ough, d egenerated into sim ply landing th e l st Cav as reinforcem ents for Pu san. By any ra tio na l assess men t th e two un d erm ann ed, under-equipped, untra in ed di visions tasked with th e Inch 'on-Seoul o pe ra tio n were in capable of accom plish ing th e mission. The " O l d Breed"
12
MacArth ur had immediat ely aske d the J oi nt Ch iefs of Staff (JCS) for a marine div isio n, b ut had been to ld no ne was available. It ap pears, h owever, th at thi s d ecision was mad e by th e J CS withou t consu lting th e Navy Depart m en t. On Jun e 28 the Co m man da nt of th e Ma rine Corps recom men ded to th e Ch ief of Nava l Ope rati ons tha t a mari ne u nit be co m m itte d to Korea , a nd Co m ma nder, Nava l Fo rces, Far East was advi sed that a Marin e Regim ental Co m ba t Team (RCT) was available.
Marines carry a wounded comrade across bullet-swept streets in the suburbs of Seo ul . Even after an area had been cleared there was still a constant danger from bypassed and infiltrating snipers. (USMC)
So , on July 2, th e day TF Smith battalion arrived in Kor ea , MacArthur, requested a marin e RCT2 accompanied by air su p po rt, knowing that th e marin es co u ld quickly field one. Discussi ons were also underw ay to prepare a marine division as a reserve for Kor ea. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade ( 1st Prov MarBde) was hastily form ed at Cam p Pendleton, Califo rn ia onJuly 7 under BGen Edward A. Craig and built around th e 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33) . More than just an RCT, th e bri gade consisted of a full co m plemen t of su pport units. The 1st MarDiv was gu tted to form th e brigade and troops were flown in from th e 2d MarDiv. The three infantry battalions were eac h a rifle co m pa ny short, but third rifle platoons were assembled for th e six co m pan ies, although th ey were still each 50 men sho rt. The tank co m pa ny, trained o n M4A3 Sh ermans, was outfitted with M26 Pershings pulled from sto rage . The infantrymen were arme d with th e new 3.5in . ba zooka; it was already clear that th e 2.36in. was worthless against T3 4s. MAG-33 was assigned three F4U Corsair fighter squadrons, one night-fighter-equipped, plus an observation sq uad ro n with spotter planes and h elicopters. The brigade sh ip ped out July 12-14 with over 6,500 pers onnel. Without benefit of coll ective training, th e bri gad e was assembled from m en of many units, complet ely re-equipped, embarked, and on its way in a week. Whil e en route to Japan , th e brigade's ground element was ordered directly to Pusan because of th e d et eriorating situation. It arrived on Au gu st 2 and was immedi at ely thrown into th e perimeter. On th e 6th , in co nj unc tio n with 25th InfDiv eleme n ts, th e brigade launch ed an a ttac k westward to throw th e e ne my off ba lan ce. On the 12th the bri gad e was ordered to move north to su ppo rt th e 24th InfDiv during th e battl e of th e Naktong. Committed to action on th e 17th, th e brigade was instrumental in recovering lost ground. The brigade was pla ced in reserv e on th e 21st and it received replacem en ts 2 A marine or army RCT co nsisted of a core infantry regiment. 105mm artillery batta lion. engineer and medical companies, usually a ta nk element, other combat support elements as necessary, and small service support elements .
13
Marine av iation would play an important role In the Inch'on-5eoul Campaign, both carrier- and land-based. This Marine Fighter Squadron 312 " Check board s" F4U -4B Corsair sits on Klmpo Airfield. (USMC)
14
and trauung. As hi gher h eadquarters fought ove r th e question of e m p loying th e bri gade in th e plann ed Inc h 'o n la n d ing , it was returned to th e Na kto ng Bu lge o n Se p te m ber I, wh ich had again been overru n. It h e lp ed resto re th e situatio n a nd th e ove ra ll ac tio n h elped b reak th e back of th e final NK o ffe ns ive to carry the Pusan pe ri m ete r. Asse m bling at Pu san o n Se p te m ber 7, th e ex hausted m a rin es found thi rd companies h ad arrived for each ba ttali on alo ng with replaceme nts. T hey also found they were d eparting Pu san for p oin ts unknown. A hurried week was spe nt re-organizin g , incorporating a nd tra ining re placements, re-equi p p ing, tra in ing the a ttached 1st Ko rean Ma rine Corps (KMC) Regim en t, and e m barking aboard sh ips. T he b rigad e sailed o n th e 15th h aving been formally d isbanded a n d re-in corporat ed in to the IstM a rD iv. While the 1st Prov MarBde was m aking hi story a t Pusan , th e Ma rin e Corps was fra n tica lly preparing th e 1st MarDiv to foll ow. Ma rin e uni ts th rough out th e corps were stripped of men to fill th e d ivi sion. It co n ta ined less than 3,400 tro ops when th e brigad e d eparted a n d th e l st Marin e Airc ra ft Win g ( Ist MAW), wh ich would accom pany th e di vision , abou t 2,500. No t o n ly did th ese two uni ts have to be rebuilt a n d d eployed , but th e 2d MarDiv, 2d MAW, and num e rous n on-divi sional u n its had to be filled . T h e 129,000 Marin e Rese rvists were immedia tely mobi lized and Marin e Security Forces and o ther b ra nc hes co n tr ib u ted 50 pe rcent o f th eir p ersonne l. In th e first week of Aug us t, almost 14,000 regu lars and rese rvists a rr ived at Ca m p Pe ndl e to n . T he first divisional un its were sc hed u led to d epart o n Aug us t 10 a n d for all practi cal purposes th e uni ts did not ex ist. The l st Ma rin es was bui lt fro m scratch, as were o ther uni ts. The 2d Ma rDi v's three a rt ille ry battali ons we re se n t fro m North Carolina; th e 1st Ma rDi v's o n ly a rt ille ry batta lion was with th e b rigade. T he second regim ent wo u ld be provided by th e l st Pro v MarBde , wh ich wo uld be a bsorbe d into th e d ivision . O nce p u lled fro m th e Pusan perimeter it would be leading th e Inc hon assault ten d ays la te ): The thi rd regim ent, orde re d raised o n Augus t 10, a nd o ther su p porti ng un its wou ld co me pa rtl y fro m th e 2d MarDiv. T h is regimen t, th e 7t h Marines, wo u ld not d epart for Korea until Se p te m ber 3. It was bu ilt fro m th e 6t h Ma rin es wh ich a r rived a t Pen dl et on o n August 16 with two wea k batt ali ons alo ng
c
The USS George Clymer (APA -27) prepares to cast off for Inch'on at Kobe. Landing craft, medium (LCM) can be seen on the aft cargo deck. (USN)
with o the r 2d MarDiv tr oops. The 6th's 3d Battalion was afloa t in th e Mediterranean a nd would j oin th e regiment in Korea via th e Suez Ca nal. RCT-7 would foll ow later, Wh at littl e training time was availabl e was sp ent o n co nd itio n ing drills and test-firing weapons. Th e 1st MarDiv sa iled Aug us t 10-22, but it was reall y o n ly a third of a division, with th e 5th Marines already in Korea and th e 7th Marin es to follow. Th e su p po rt ing battalions had o n ly o ne or two co m pa n ies as th e oth ers were with RCT-5 and RCT-7. Staff grou ps we re flown ah ead to Kor ea to begin planning and to co -ord inate th e di vision's arrival. Th e division a rr ived at Kob e , Japan betw een Au gu st 29 and September 3. Littl e tim e remain ed until th e sc hed ule d Septembe r 15 Inch ' o n la ndi n g. Individual and am p h ibio us in struction took place aboard sh ips. Little fie ld trainin g tim e was gran te d at Kobe because o f th e need to undertake ad d itio nal co m bat-load ing of eq uip me n t and su p plies, and thi s was fu rth er hampered by a typhoon . Th e 1st MarDiv co m p rised a co re of regulars with co m ba t expe rie nce, offi cers and NCOs. Virtually all co m pany co m m ande rs and up had seen co m bat. However, most o f th e active-duty junior officers, junior NCOs, and e n liste d m en had no co m bat expe rience, whil e of th e reservi sts, 99 percent of th e offi cers and 77.5 percent of th e e n listed were World War II veterans. A co m bined arms brigade , wh ere non e had existe d, had been rais ed , d eployed , and successfu lly co m m itte d to co m bat in four weeks. A division with on ly 2,500 troops was filled out, sh ip pe d , and co nd uc ted an amphibious assault in e igh t weeks. Th e fact that th ese formations were thrown to geth er from scores of units, mann ed by regu lars and res ervi sts who just weeks before were pursuing civilian en d eavo rs, and had been afforded virtual ly no co llec tive or large unit tacti cal tr aining ca n be d escribed as nothing less than a ph enom enal feat. The " B a y o n e t Division"
In many ways th e second division to particIp at e in th e Inch 'o n- Seo ul operation was in worse shape than th e 1st MarDiv. Th e 7th InfD iv was headquartered in Sapporo on Hokkaido , th e sec o nd north ernmost of
15
7th Marines' machine gunners board a transport at Kobe, Japan bound for Inch'on. They are armed with .30 cal M1919A4 light machine guns, and their un iforms and equipment were the same as those worn by their comrades In World War II. (USMC)
16
th e J apanese Hom e Islands. Like th e o ther th ree occ u pa tio n di visions, it was seve ra l th ousand m en under-strength whe n th e war began. T he di vision was seve re ly gu tte d to fill the o ther th ree as th ey d eployed to Korea. Thre e infantry battali ons were broke n up as fillers fo r the 1st CavDiv. So me 1,640 tro ops were re-ass igned to th e 24 th a nd 25 th In fDivs. The 7th was next tasked to fill th e vacu um left by th e d eparting d ivisions a nd se nt undermanned u nits th ro ugho u t J apan to secure th e form e r occu pa tio n uni ts' areas. T his m ad e any form of un it training impossib le . Individual re p laceme nts co ntin ue d to be d rawn fro m the di vision an d its stre ngth fell to 5,000, as d id moral e. On July 4 it was d ecided to e m ploy th e 7th fo r a n amph ibious o peratio n a nd it was slowly bui lt u p with a targe t d at e of August 15. Repl acem en ts filte red in a nd th ree cad re ba ttalions (officers, NC Os, specialists) we re assigned fro m the 3d InfDiv in the Sta tes, with th e intent o f fillin g th em with replacemen ts; 20 percent of th e replacem en ts fro m the Sta tes were o rdere d to th e 7th InfDiv and 30 percent o n August 10. In Augus t the di vision co nce n tra te d in a training a rea n ea r Yok o hama and was promised much in th e way o f replacemen ts and eq uip men t, but received little . Troops co n tin ue d to draw off to Pu san . Th e division now possessed 8,8 00 tro o ps, less th an half its au thorized stre ngth of 18 ,800. T he 7t h was re lieved o f occu pa tio n duti es o n J u ly 26 . Be twee n Aug ust 23 and Septembe r 3 all infantry re placements from th e States were se n t to th e 7th and all art illery replacem en ts to th e 8th, 5,8 00 in all. This o f co u rse d e ni ed re p lacements to th e di visions defending Pusan. On Augus t 18 , less th an a month fro m D-Day, th e di visio n was in form ed th a t 8,637 repl a cem ents were arrivi ng in Yoko ha ma. Organizin g tr an sp o rtati on , th e commander ru sh ed to th e port to find co m p letely untrain ed an d o fte n u nfit Ko rean recru its press-gan ged off the streets of Pusan . They required d el ousin g, un iforms, eq ui pmen t, a nd wea po ns. They were to be o utfi tted, tr ai ned , and in tegrated in to Ame rica n uni ts. The la nguage barrie r was insurmoun tabl e a nd th e re were man y mo rale a nd cu ltu ra l issues. T hese Ko rean Augmen tatio n to th e US Army personnel (KATUSA - pronoun ced "ka-te-sa") were to be
So
Inner the
in co rp orat ed into US uni ts. Abo u t 100 were assigned to eac h rifle co m pany an d a rt illery batte ry, meaning th ere were more Korean s th an America ns in th e uni ts. The 32 d Infan try, th e division 's main parti cip ant in th e battle , co ntained 3, 110 America ns and 1,80 2 Koreans. Training co n tin ue d, but th ere were serio us co ncerns with regard to th e rebuilt di vision 's readin ess. To replace th e 7th as th e FECOM Rese rve , th e 3d InfDiv arrived o n Se p te m ber 16, th e d ay afte r th e In ch 'on landing. Including a ttach me nts, th e 7th d eployed with 24,845 tro ops and was o n ly 1,400 men short. MacArthur wanted o ne o ther army unit for Operati on Cliromite. H e requested a n RCT fro m the 82 d Ab n Div. TheJ CS, th ough , refused to tap th e 82 d, th e nati on 's o n ly Ge neral Rese rve unit. The 187th ARCT (Airborne Regim ental Co m ba t Team ) fro m th e 11th AbnDiv co u ld be se n t, but had to be built up and tr ained. With th e p rohibition o n airlifting uni ts to Korea , th e unit would have to be sea-lifted a nd would no t arrive until O ct ober 18.
4
Ir
THE BATTLEGROUND Geographic and hydrographic cha rac te ristics would mak e th e In ch 'on landing o ne of th e most diffi cult eve r attempted. In ch 'on is situated o n th e upper west co ast of th e Republic of Korea , 20 mil es west-southwest o f Seoul a nd 30 mil es so u th o f th e 38 th Parallel. Known asJinsin g to th e Japanese , a nd with a prewar populati on o f 250 ,000 , In ch 'on sa t o n a blunt two sq ua re mil e short peninsul a. It was an industri al city a nd had long served as Seoul's seapo rt. Th e coastal terrain was mostly flat , bu t seve ra l small hill s rose within th e city, th e most notable bei ng Ce metery Hill (130ft) a nd Briti sh Co ns ulate Hill (150ft), Hill 117 (384ft), and a forest ed rid ge about 700 yards sq uare, so me 500-700yd inl and , Obse rvat o ry Hill (200ft). The inl and base of th e peninsul a was hilly, and th e hill s rose farth er inland until disappearing into th e la rge plain of the Sowolmi·do is in the ce nter of this picture with its causeway to the left connecting it to Wolmi-do. In the upper right, edgingby black smoke, Is the OuterTidal Basin. The smaller InnerTidal Basin lies beneath the smoke. (USN)
17
The hills on the northwest side of Seoul were higher and more rugged. The NKs established their main line of resistance across these hills and ridges . In the foreground is a railroad embankment. (USMC)
The Inch'on Railroad Stat ion still burns on 0+1 from the nat bombardment it received the ~ before. (USMC)
18
Kimpo Pen in sul a wh ich stre tched n orth wit h the Yellow Sea o n its west side a n d th e Han River es tua ry o n its eas t. Wo lmi -do (Moon T ip Island ) d om in at ed th e ha rb o r, being SOOyd wes t o ff th e e nd o f th e In ch 'on peninsu la. Th e ro ug h ly tr iangularshape d island measured so me 1,OOOyd eac h side. Most of the island was occu p ied by a steep-sided, brush -cove red 35 1-ft hill , known as Rad io Hill because of th e co m mercial radio a nte n na. T he isla nd 's no rth east sid e a n d north ern tip was oc cupied by an industri al area. It was also a fishi ng bo at base a n d tou rist att ractio n with a swimm ing po ol , shops, a nd restau ran ts. A SOO-yd ca useway con necte d Wolmi-do with th e m ainland. Anothe r 750-yd ca useway jutting so u th fro m th e west co rn e r was co n necte d to Sowolm i-do, a ro cky, hill -like islet with a lighth ouse . Th e two 12-yd wid e ca useways se rved as breakwat e rs e nclosing th e north and west sides o f In ch 'on Harbor (Inc h ' o n Hang ) . Th e north east side of th e ha rbo r was edged with a wate r fro n t of pie rs, ware ho uses , a nd port facili ties. Sto ne a nd co ncre te seawalls (up to 15ft hi gh at h igh tid e )
faced the city and port waterfronts, as well as Wol mi-do itself On the so utheast side of the h arbor was a large tid al basin , a nd thrusting o ut I ,400yd fro m it was a sto ne breakwat e r th at d efin ed th e so u th side of th e harbor. Po rt faciliti es also lin ed th e shore o uts ide th e main harbo r to the north . On the so ut h side were th e Inn er and Oute r Tidal Basin s providin g a haven for shi ps when reced ing tid es would leave th em stra nded on th e mud f1 ats. Near th e base of both sides o f th e peninsula we re la rge sa lt eva poratio n pan s. T he city's streets were a chaotic ma ze a nd man y b uild ings we re o f co nc re te a nd mason ry co ns tructio n. To reach In ch 'on fro m th e Yell ow Sea , eithe r th e weste rn Flying Fish Chan nel (So Sudo) or th e n ear-sh ore Eas t Chan nel (To ng Sudo) had to be negoti ated from th e so u thwes t, wind ing through scattered islands, mud banks, ro ck o utc ro p p ings, an d stro ng cu rre nts; both ro utes were 50 mil es long and th e chan nels 36-60ft d eep. T he East Chan ne l ra n between Yongd u ngpo-do an d Taebu-do , 15 mil es so u th o f In ch 'on (Tae b u-do was occu pied by No rt h Korea ). Flying Fish Chan ne l ra n north of Yong-hong-do . T he two chan nels co nverge d at Palmi-do, an islet 10 mil es from In ch 'on . To mak e matters wo rse, th e fleet would have to mak e thi s d an ge rous ap p roach in darkn ess to ta ke adva n tage o f the m ornin g hi gh tid e. Th e Flying Fish Chan nel was se lec ted with fewe r hazards. There was no maneuver space in th e 2,000-3,500yd cha n ne l between Inch 'on and Yongjong-do a nd its fringing 6,000yd wide mu d f1 a ts to th e northwest if the invasion flee t was a ttac ke d by air, a nd even less when th e tid e e bbe d. On ce In ch 'o n was sec ured the m arines would have to cove r 20 miles o f g ro u nd to reach Seoul o n th e In ch 'on-Seoul Highw ay, which had a rail ro ad ru nn ing parallel alo ng it. T he ground was co m paratively f1 at , but th e re we re nume rous sca ttered hill s afford ing th e No rt h Ko rean s d efen sive positi ons. Th e low, ro u nd-to p ped hill s a nd rid ges had
e
e
ivai day
The north-central section of Seoul with Government House, the capitol , in the upper center. Tothe right can be seen the DuksooImperial Palace. The hills on the city 's north side are just off the top of the photograph. (USA)
19
Marines move cautiously up a side street in a residential ne ighborhood. Most Korean homes are surrounded by stout masonry walls. The marine in foreground carries 81mm mom projectile tubes on his back. (USMC)
grad ua lly slo pe d sid es a nd were ei the r bare or partly co vere d by brush or pin e tr ees. However, th ere were num erous gullies o n th e flat gro und a nd hill sid es and a few wooded areas o ffe ring cover. The level gro un d co nsiste d of cultiva ted fields a nd rice paddi es cu t by sm all stre ams. The area had also been used as a Japa nese tr aining ground a nd was dotted with co ncre te pillbo xes a nd obstacles, whi ch th e j o rt h Koreans e m p loye d . Asco m City3, Sosa , and Yongdungp 'o lay as tr ide th e ro ute. The latter, a n industri al su b urb, sa t on th e so u th side o f th e Han River o p posite Seoul. Between th e town a nd river was a vast sa ndy flat on wh ich th e sm all Seoul a irstrip sa t. T he main air fie ld in th e a rea, th ough, was Kimpo to th e northwest o f Yongd u ngp'o and so ut h o f th e river. The hi ghway and rail ro ad bridges co n nec ting Yongdungp 'o and Seou l had be en d e stro yed before th e No rth Kore ans to ok th e city. Fr om Yongdungp 'o a hi ghway ran so u th to Suwon and O san. This was th e main No rt h Korean su p ply route to Pusan an d it would also be o ne of th e routes Eighth US Army would tak e north o nce it b roke o u t. Ferry cro ssings were loca ted at Ha engju northwest of Seoul , and Sinsa-ri on th e city's so uth east sid e , but all th e ferries had been d estroyed. The northwest-flowing Han presented an obstacl e o n th e route to Seoul , but th e river was slow and only a few hundred ya rds wide . Its d epth though , even fa r inl and , was affec te d by Yell ow Sea tid es. Whil e it se parate d regiments o f th e 1st Ma rDiv for part o f th e operati on, th e NK never took full ad van tage o f it as a barri er. The marine and a rmy am ph ib io us tra ctors (a m tracs) were invaluable in th e crossing o f thi s and o ther wat er o bstacles . In 1950 Seoul (Keijo to th e J apanese , and still identified as suc h o n maps) was th e fifth largest city in Asia, with a populati on of 680,0 00. Situat ed o n a bend o n th e north bank of th e Han , Seoul was a relati vely modern city with man y multistorey co ncrete and mason ry bu sin esses, co m mercial buildings, and apart ment blocks. Among th ese were th e city 20
3 Ascom City 's native name is Taejong -ni. During the US occupation it was developed as the Anny Service Comma nd base resul ting in "Asco rn," the common name used in official histories.
lut I
the
.rt a r
hall , large school comp lexes, ch u rc hes, ho tels, embassies, Yongsan Rail ro ad Sta tio n, Sodaeman Priso n , and th e ancien t Du ksoo Imperial Palace . T he J apan ese had built Gove rn me n t H ouse, th e largest concrete building in Asia, in front o f th e Imperi al Palace grou nds to obscure it. Governm ent H ouse h ad se rved as th e J apan ese co lon ial cap itol, the Republic o f Kor ea ca pito l building, and a No rt h Korean strongpoint. In th e sp rawling su b urbs were wooden and masonry dwellings. Hills and rid ges were sca ttered through Seoul and d efined its limi ts. On th e north and northwest sid es it was overlooked by forested hill s. The streets were broad and severa l rail ro ads ra n th rough th e city. Main high ways ran northwest to Kaesong , northeast to Uijo ng b u, and so u theast to Ch'ungiu. The hydrographic cha rac te ristics o f th e In ch 'on area were a major issu e with invasion pl ann ers a n d hi gh er he adquarte rs. Inch 'on experie nced th e second m ost drasti c tid al changes in th e worlds, At the tim e o f th e landing th e sp ring tid e would be hi gh er th an normal, with 23-33ft tid es. A 25ft tid e was necessary for sma ll landing craft to reach the seawall. O n September 15 th ere would be a 3 1.5ft tid e , high er th an normal. This would p ro vide th e 29ft o f wat er required by th e Land ing Ships, Tan k (LST). Only o n a few d ays in th e middle o f Se p te m be r and O ctober would sufficie n t d epths be available. The morning high tide would be at 0659hrs followed by a low tid e th at saw th e bay em pty of water tearing out at 6--7 kn o ts. Evening high tid e would be at 1919hrs with a flood rate of 3 kn ots. Wh en th e tid e was o u t any sh ips rem aining in th e nearsh ore bay would be strande d o n mud flats, althoug h sh ips in the chan ne l remained afloa t. In case th ey were strande d, shi ps were armed with gre na des and su bmach ine gu ns to gua rd against No rt h Korean infantry a ttac ks acro ss th e mud. Day tem peratu res we re warm, upper 80 °F with fre q ue nt rain squalls a nd the skies partly overcast o n D-Day. Nights were cool in th e low 70°F range. Nigh tfa ll was a t 1900h rs. Th e var ied terrain would be a cha lle nge to th e marin es and so ld ie rs in volved in thi s ca m pa ign. They would co nd uc t a n a m p h ibio us landing , fight in large m odern cities and cru de peasant villages agains t a well-entren ch ed e nemy; th ey had to ca rry o u t multiple river cross ings and face armor a ttacks o n hill s, ridges, o pe n plains, a nd rice paddies.
4 The most drastic tidal changes are found in the Bay of Fundy. Nova Scotia .
21
CHRONOLOGY
1950 25 June
North Korea (NK) invades the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the backing of the USSR.
27 June
US forces authorized to conduct air and naval operations in support of the ROK south of the 38th Parallel. UN passes resolution authorizing armed force to restore peace . US Reserve forces authorized for call-up .
28 June
Seoul seized by NK. US Seventh Fleet assigned to Naval Forces, Far East.
29 June
Naval blockade of Korea authorized and first US Navy offensive actions occur. Offensive air operations authorized in NK. US ground forces authorized for commitment to ROK in support role.
30 June
US ground forces authorized for commitment to ROK for combat operations.
1 July
US Task Force Smith , deployed by 24th US InfDiv, arrives.
3 July
First UN carrier air strikes executed in NK. Inch'on seized by NK.
5 July
Task Force Smith defeated by NK forces in first US ground action .
7 July
1st Prov MarBde formed for immed iate duty in ROK.
12-14 July
1st Prov MarBde departs for ROK.
13 July
Eighth US Army in Korea headquarters formed.
14 July
ROK forces placed under United Nations command.
17 July
ROK forces delegated to Eighth US Army.
2 August
1st Prov MarBde arrives at Pusan.
4 August
Pusan (aka Naktong) perimeter established as UN forces are pushed
8-18 August
Battle of Naktong defeats NK penetration of Pusan perimeter.
into the southeast corner of Korea.
10-22 August
1st MarDiv (-) departs for Japan.
15 August
Korean Augmentation to the US Army approved.
23 August
Decision made to land at Inch'on.
26 August
X US Corps activated in Japa n.
28 August
X US Corps issues Operation Order 1 for Inch'on.
30 August
Naval Forces Far East issues Operation Plan 108-50 assigning JTF7 the mission of seizing Inch'on.
31 Aug-19 Sep
Second batt le of the Naktong.
1 September
Reconnaissance of Inch'on Harbor and approaches commence.
3 September 4 September
Korean Marine Regiment attached to 1st MarDiv. 1st MarDiv issues Operation Order 2-50 for Inch'on. JTF7 and TF90 orders are issued conc urrently.
22
5-12 September
1st MarDiv departs Japan for Inch 'on.
13 September
1st Prov MarBde depa rts Pusan for Inch 'on.
10 September
Preliminary air attacks commence in Inch'on area.
11 September
JTF7 formally activated to execute landing.
NKprisoners are marched past a battered T34. Prisoners were oftenstripped because of the fear of concealed grenades and pistols. (USMC)
13 September
1st Prov MarBd e re-abso rbed into 1st MarDiv and departs Pusan for Inch 'on . Pre-landing bomb ardment commences.
15 September
1st MarDiv lands at Inch 'on.
16 September
Inch 'on secured .
16-22 September Eighth US Army breaks out of Pusan perimeter. 17 September
NK co unterattacks outs ide of Inch 'on . Ascom City and Kimpo Airfield sec ured. 7th InfDiv arrives at Pusan. 7th Marines departs Japan for Inch 'on.
18 September 20 September
7th InfDiv begins debarking at Inch' on . 5th Marines cross Han River. NK co unterattac ks outsiae Yongdun gp 'o.
21 September
Yongdungp'o secured . 7th Marines arrive at Inch' on .
22-24 September Approaches to Seoul secured and NK main defenses penetrated. 24 September 25 September
1st Marines c ross Han River into southwest Seoul. 1st MarDiv launches main attack into west Seoul. RCT-32 crosses Han River into south Seoul.
26 September
Eighth Army elements from Pusan and X Corps troop s from Inch' on link up at Osan.
27 September
Seoul liberated by US and ROK forces.
28 Sep-3 Oct
UN forces co ntinue to drive north from Seoul and secures Uijongbu .
29 September
Seoul re-established as capital of ROK.
30 September
ROK forces cross the 38th Parallel.
4 October
China decides to intervene in Korea.
5 October 6-8 October
X Corps assembles at Inch 'on and begins embarkation for Wonsan.
Inch 'on- Seoul Campaign co mpleted.
9 October
First US forces cross the 38th Parallel.
25 October
China co mmences surprise offensive into NK.
1951 4 January
Seoul evacuated and falls to Chinese .
5 January
Inch' on evacuated.
14 March
Seoul liberated by ROK forces.
23
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
AMERICAN COMMANDERS he re is no disputing th at General o f th e Army Douglas MacAr th ur (USA) was th e moti vating fo rce behind Ope ra tion Chromite. It was his willpower and ce rta inty th at thi s was th e bes t co urse of action th at d ro ve him to force th e o peratio n th rough , ofte n in virtua l d efian ce o f his su pe rio rs and th e co u nse l of his su bord inates. Argua bly th e most co ntroversial ge neral in Am eri can histo ry, he was co nstan tly aware of his place in that history. MacArthur was born in Ark an sas in 1880 and en te red th e Military Academy in 1900. He was co mm issio ne d in th e e ng ineers in 190 3 and se rved in th e Philippines. Between 1904 and 1912 he was an aide to Co m ma nder, Pacific Division, served in an e ngi neer unit, atte nde d th e En gin eer School, was aide to Presid ent T heodore Ro osevelt, and an in structor, From 191 3-1 7 he served o n th e Ge neral Staff and took part in th e 1914 Vera Cruz Expe d itio n . He served in France fro m 1917-1 8 as chie f of staff of the 42d Division and commande d th e division during th e Sedan Offensive. He was Su perintende nt of th e Milita ry Academy fro m 1919- 22. He co m mand ed the Man ila Distri ct from 1922-23 a nd th e n o n vario us corps staffs through 1930. From 1930-35 he was Ch ief of Staff of th e Ar my. He personally di rected the su p p ressio n of th e bonus march e rs in Wash ingto n (the 1932 ga thering of World War I veterans demanding im medi at e co m pensatio n of th eir war service), an unsavo ry task fo r wh ich he received much cr iticism. In 1935 he becam e th e mili ta ry advise r to th e gove rn men t of th e Philippin es.
T
VIPs visit the Inch'on beachhel D+ 1. From left to right: LtGen Lemuel C. Sheperd, Jr. (Fleel Marine Force, Pacific), Vice Arthur D. Struble (JTF7/Seve Fleet), Gen MacArthur, MaJG Courtney Whitney (Chief of Government Section, FECOMI and BGen Edwin K. Wright (Assistant G3, FECOM). (USN)
24
iad,
m th
MacArthur retired from active duty in 1937, but co n tin ue d in his po sition with th e Philippine go vern men t. In 194 I , with war on th e hori zon , he was rest ored to active duty and took co m mand of US Army for ces in th e Far East. O verseeing th e initial defense of th e Philippines, MacArthur was o rdered to Aus tra lia. There he co m ma nded th e Sou thwest Pacific Area and th en was d esign at ed th e Su pre me Allied Co mma nder to execute th e in vasion ofJapan and its occu pa tio n. H e presid ed over J apan 's surre nder and was instrumental in th e co un try's reconstruction. As suc h, he held th e titles of Su pre me Allied Co mm ander, J apan ; Co m mand ing Ge ne ral, Far East Co m m and; and Co m mande r-in-Ch ief, Allied Forces, Far East, and inJuly 1950 , Co m ma n der-in-Ch ief, UN Co m ma nd. His managem en t of th e d efense o f Ko rea was co ntroversial and his o utrig h t d efian ce of Pr esid ent Tru ma n resulted in his dismi ssal fro m co m mand in April 1951. Going gra ce fu lly into retirement at age 71, he was without qu estion o ne o f th e most influential men of th e era in Asian and Pacific affairs. He di ed in 1964 . ViceAdm Arthur D. Struble (USN) was born in Oregon in 1894, e n te re d th e Naval Aca demy in 1911 , and was co m missio ned in 1915. He se rve d aboard cru ise rs and d estroyers an d was assign ed as an instructor to th e Naval Academy fro m 1921-23. He n ext se rve d o n th e USS California until assigned to th e Battl e Fleet staff in 1925. This was foll owed by two tours in th e Navy Department, th en th e USS New York, foll owed by a cru ise r, and additional fleet staff assign men ts. He was exec utive o ffice r o f th e USS Arizona fro m 1940-41 and co mmande d a light cru ise r in th e Pacific. In 1942 he se rve d in th e Offi ce of th e Chief o f Naval Operati ons, went to Britain in 1943, and was o n th e Naval Forces, Eu ro pe staff resp onsibl e for th e Norma ndy landing. Returning to th e Pacific in 1944 , h e to ok co m ma nd o f th e Seventh Fleet 's ("MacArth u r's Navy") am p h ibio us force a nd co nd uc ted numerous landings through out the Philippines. After th e war h e co m manded th e Pacific Fleet's mine force to clear min ed areas th rough out th e region. This was followed by co m mand o f Am p hibio us Force, Pacific Fleet until 1949. He was prom ot ed to vice ad m iral during that tour and th en served as th e Deputy Ch ief of Naval Operati ons until 1950 , at which tim e he assu med co m m and o f th e Seven th Fleet based in the Philippines. As suc h h e co m m anded th e naval forces of th e In ch 'on and Wons an landin gs u ntil taking ove r th e First Fleet in March 1951. H e next head ed th e US naval and military d el egati ons to th e UN Military Staff Co m m ittee . From 1955 he co m manded th e Eastern Sea Frontier and th e Atlantic Reserve Fleet until his retirement th e foll owin g year, at whi ch tim e he was p romoted to ad m ira l. He di ed in 1983. MajGen Edward ("Ned") M. Almond's (USA) assign me n t as X Corps co m mande r has been co nside re d by so me as unfortunat e as he had absolute ly no ex pe rience with am ph ibious operations. His military career to thi s poin t, while impressive on th e surface, had been so me wha t lackluster. Born in Virginia in 1892 and raised with a stro ng reverence for th e Civil War's legacy and famil y bonds, he attended th e Virgini a Milita ry Institute grad ua ting in 1915. He was co m missio ne d in th e US Army in 1917 a nd assigned as a 4th Division ma chine-gun co m pany co mmande r. Wounded o n his first d ay of co m ba t, he later co m mande d a ma chine-gun battalion for o ne month of co m bat. H e se rved as an Reserve Offi cer Training Co rps instructor until attending th e Infantry Sch ool in 1923,
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26
and th en was an instructor th e re until attending th e Co m ma nd and Gen eral Staff School from 1928-30. Hi s o n ly betw een-th e-wars tro op duty was as a battalion co m ma nder of th e Philippine Scou ts. In 1933 he attended th e Army War Co llege a nd th en se rve d o n th e Army Ge neral Staff fo r th e nex t five yea rs. Un dersta nd ing th e necessity forj oin t warfare , he a tte nded th e Air Co r ps Techni cal School and th en th e avy War Co llege. Wh en th e war began he was assigne d as the assistan t division co m m ander o f th e 93 d lnfDiv (Colo re d) . H e h ad been se lec ted for thi s assignment because of his reputati on as a strong di sciplinarian , his ex te nsive military in structor ex pe rience, a nd service with native tro ops; his So u thern background was also co ns idere d a d esirabl e trait fo r co m m an de rs o f Afri can-American units. It was a duty neith er he no r many o ther whit e o fficers relished. He had o n ly limited bat talion co m m an d tim e and had never co m ma nde d o r even been assigned to regim ental or bri gade sta ffs. Before long he received co m ma nd of th e 92d In fDiv (Co lored ), which d eployed to Italy in 1944. Th e unit's performance was less th an successful, with so me units breaking and runn in g , oth ers were spiritless; a few performed well. Withdrawn from co m bat, it underwent retraining, but wh en again recommitted at th e beginning o f 1945 its performan ce was still poor and two black regiments were withdrawn a n d repl ace d by white and J apan ese-Am erican regimen ts. Alm o n d's a bility to lead th e division was neve r qu estioned and he received no blame . H e suffe red an other form o f tragedy losin g his so n an d so n-in-law in co m bat, a powerful blow to o ne steepe d in So u thern family traditions. He was given com ma nd of th e 2d InfDiv sche d uled for redeployment for th e invasion of J apan , but th e war was over. In ea rly 1946 he was o ffe re d th e position of milita ry attac he to th e USSR, but he d eclined, asse rt ing th at he d espi sed Co m m u n ism and th e co nd uc t of th e Red Army in th e war, Almond understo od th at his command of a lackluster bla ck division and his rej ection of th e USSR du ty may have d amaged his career. He was assig ne d to MacArthur 's staff as th e G-I (pe rso n ne l) . Hi s hard wo rk an d reputation fo r exac tness ca ug h t MacArthur's atte n tio n and in February 1949 h e becam e the FECOM Ch ief o f Staff. In th e first traumatic m onths o f th e Korean War Almond worked tir elessly. With plans underway for In ch 'on and th e formati on of a new co rps to oversee th e o pe ra tio n, MacArthur promised X Co rps to Ned Alm ond and he assum ed co m ma nd o n Au gu st 26. His co m ma nd, though , would not be with out its problems. Almond was frequently overd emanding and even un trusting o f his su bord inate co m m ande rs, and som e of th e plans he proposed were far-fetch ed. H e was ofte n impatient and arrogant. Hi s G-3 stated, "He co uld precipitate a crisis o n a d esert island with nobody else a ro u nd ." H e was p romoted to lieutenant ge ne ral o n February IS, 1951 and co mmande d X Co rps until July IS. Hi s last assign men t was Co m m anda n t o f th e Ar my War Co llege. He retired in 1953 as a lieutenant ge nera l and passed away in 1979. MajGen Oliver P. Smith's (USMC) early ca reer was less impressive th an Almon d's. H e was co m m issio ned in th e Army Reserve , but transferred to th e Maline Co rps in 1917 . H e missed th e co rps ' glory in France , se rving in stead o n Gua m. Sm ith was born in Texas in 1893 and worked his way through th e Un iversity of Califo rn ia. Th rough th e 1920s h e se rved in m arine barra cks, aboard th e USS Texas, o n th e Marine Co rps staff, and in Haiti in th e ge nda rme rie . From 1931-30 he atte nded th e
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Field Officers' Co urse an d then was an in struct o r a t Q uantico. H e spe nt two years at France 's prestigious Ecole Superieur fa da Guerre and then went back to Quanti co as an in structo r. He was co m ma ndi ng 1st Battalion , 6th Marines when World War II b roke o ut and he led th e unit to Iceland. Upon return he aga in se rve d o n th e Marine Corps staff an d d epart ed for the Pacific in ea rly 1944 to co m mand th e 5t h Marin es o n New Britain with the 1st MarD iv. He th en se rved as assista n t di vision co m ma nder o n Peleliu and on Okinawa as a d eputy chief o f staff in Ten th Ar my. Hi s postwar assign me nts included co m m and ing th e Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, at which tim e he was dual-billeted as co m ma nder, 1st Special MarBde, a Caribbean co n tinge ncy fo rce , and th en as chief of staff and later as comm andant o f Headquarte rs, Marine Co rps . Sm ith took command of th e 1st MarDi v o n July 26, 1950 co m ma nd ing it until Ap ril 2i, 1951. From February 25- Ma rc h 5, 195 1 he served as the temporary commander of IX Corps aft er th e co m man der di ed o f a heart attack, but was quickly rep laced by an a rmy o flicer. Sm ith was a temperat e , religious man, who seldo m showed a nger o r swore . H e was especially kn own for not risking his men needlessly. Regardless, th e press so me times co nfuse d him with Gen "How lin ' Mad" Holl and M. Sm ith, a personality who was the opposite in every way o f "O .P." Sm ith . Co nsidere d slow and plodding bysome, his stud ious quietness led to another ni ckname , "the Professo r." Regardless of his am iable nature , his re latio ns h ip to Almond was tumultuous. After Korea, Sm ith co m manded Ca m p Pendleton , Ca liforn ia then Fleet Marin e Force , Atlan tic. H e re tire d in 1955 and di ed o n Christmas Day, 1977 . MajGen David G. Barr (USA) was a nothe r So u thern o flicer, havin g been born in Alab am a in 1895. H e se rved in th e 1st Division in World War I and received th e Silver Sta r for valor. Regardless, he was never considered a good co m ba t lead er or field co mmander. T he hi gh est peacetime com ma n d he held was as co m pa ny co m ma nder. He was an excellent staff oflicer th ough , and havin g grad uated fro m the Co m ma nd and General Staff Co llege and Army War Co llege he served as th e ch ief ofstaffof several hi gh co m ma nds du ring World War II: Armored Fo rce from 1942-43; North Africa n Theat er o f O pe ra tio ns 1944 wh ere h e was promoted to major ge ne ra l early in the yea r; an d Sixth Army Gro u p in France 1944-45. From 1945- 48 he was ch ief o f personnel of th e Army Ground Forces. He was given co m ma nd of th e 7th InfDiv in 1949 m ainly based on his sen iority. T he phon e call th at had offe re d M ,~ Gen Almond the military attac he assign men t to th e USSR had been m ade by Barr, and it \I~lS he who subse que n tly assign ed him to MacArthurs GH Q . Barr was noll' under Almond's co m ma nd and di sagreements were co m mon . It is said that he was p robab ly m o re qu alified to co m mand a division when he took over the 7th , th an Alm ond wh en he took co m mand of th e ill-sta rred 92d. While he was two years junior in rank to Almond, he ac tually had almost as much co m m issio ne d se rvice tim e as h is su pe rior. Like Almond, Barr was a profi cien t staffer, but he was quiet and reserved co m pared to the more dynamic Almond. H e did seem to lack co m ple te se lfconfidence, and, because o f hi s honesty when re porting his division 's faults, he made himself easy prey to Almond. H e and his staff neve r tended to question o rde rs from Almo nd's headquarters, n o matter how problematic they might be , but sim ply d ro ve o n and su ffered th e consequences. His G-3 said o f him , "I adm ire d a nd resp ected Ge ne ra l
MajGen Oliver P. Sm ith, 1st MarDiv (left), discusses the operation with MajGen Edward M . Almond (X Corps). Over Almond's shoulder is MajGen Field Harris (1st MAW). The relationship between Smith and Almond can best be described as fiery. (USMC)
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Barr, although he was not what I would term a co m bat o ffice r o r troop co m mander type. H e was co u rt ly, kind, fri endly, very intelli gent, ca pa ble, and , I think, aware o f his shortco m ings ." H e left th e 7th Inilliv o n J anuary 26, 1951 to become co m ma nda n t of th e Ar mor School until he retired in 1952. He di ed in 1970. The o ther key leadership of X Corps' divisions fo llows: 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) Assista n t Division Co m ma nder Ch ie f of Staff 1st Marin es 5th Marin es 7th Marin es 11th Marin es (Art illery) 1st KMC Regim ent Ist Marine Aircraft Win g 1st Co m bat Support Croup 2d Engineer Sp ecia l Brigade
BC en Edward A. Cra ig Co l Cregon A. vVilliam s Co l Lewis B. Pull er LtCol Raymond L. Murray Co l Hom er L. Litzenberg,Jr. Co l James H . Brow er Co l Shin HyenJun M~Cen Field H arris Co l j.S. Co o k Co l J ose ph j. Twitty (USA )
7th In fantry Division Assistant Division Co m ma nde r Ch ief o f Staff 17th Infantry Regiment 3 1st Infantry Regiment 32d In fantry Regim ent 17th ROK Infantry Regiment Division Art illery
BC en Henry 1. H odes Co l Louis T. H eath Co l Herbert B. Powell Co l Rich a rd P. Overshine* Co l Charles E. Beau ch amp Co l Paik In Yup BCen H om er W. Kiefe r
* Rel ieved Octo ber 5. replaced by Co l Allen
D. MacLean .
NORTH KOREAN COMMANDERS
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Virtually no informati on exists on No rt h Korean co m ma nders at In ch 'o n and Seoul. On ly th e nam es o f a few are known and no biographical information is available . Most NK office rs, eve n many o f th e junior o ffice rs, were co m bat-experienced. One of th e few kn own co m ma nders was MajCen Wol Ki Chan who co m mande d th e 25th Rifle Brigade in Seoul. Another is 40-year-old BCen Wan Yang, commanding th e 1st Air Force Division at Kimpo Airfi eld. Nothing else is known o f either other than th ey were Chinese-train ed. Am ong th em were form er anti:J apan ese gue rrillas, Japanese-rai sed co lo n ial police, form er co nscripted Korean o ffice rs and so ld ie rs who had se rved in th e Imperial J apan ese Arm y a nd th e J ap an ese puppet Manchukuo Army in North China, so me 40,000 Korean Volunteer Army troops who fought with th e Ch inese Co m m u n ist People 's Libe rati on Army agains t th e nati onalists in e igh t Ch inese di visions, an d th e Vi H omg-gwan g Detachment. Man y o f th e men of th ese uni ts had d eserted fro m th e Japan ese Army. The Korean Volu n teer Army a tte m p ted to return to Korea in 1945 , but th e Sovie t occu pie rs would no t permit it. In 1946-47 th ey were allowed to re tu rn and incorporat ed in to th e fledgling KPA. Th e Vi Homg-gwang co n tin ue d to se rve with th e Ch inese until 1948
wh en it, too , returned to Korea . So me 2,5 00 Kor eans who h ad fough t at Stalingrad with th e Red Army were also se n t to North Korea. Most of th ese men had been Soviet citize ns; a large Korean co m m u n ity res ide d in Russia. T he Ko rean guerrilla fo rces had been train ed by th e Soviets to fight the Japa nese through World War II. Mu ch of th e hi gh er leadership of th e KPA ca me fro m th e gue rrillas. Th ey had been well indoct rin at ed by th e Soviets and th eir re tu rn was perm itte d in 1945. Kim II Su ng, th e Premier and Supreme Co m mander-in-Ch ief, ca me from thi s so u rce. Th e Pyongya ng Mili ta ry Aca demy was established in 1945 along with three sec uri ty office r tra in ing schools, and for th e next th ree yea rs th e main fo cu s was o n training a large cad re of office rs rather th an ac tua lly ra ising a n army. From 1946-49 thousa nds o f K tro ops were se n t to Ch ina, both to aid the Ch inese fighting th e Na tio nalists, and to ga in even m ore co mbat ex pe rie nce. Th e o ffice rs, many with minimal ed ucation and unfam iliar with th e world o uts ide No rt h Korea and th e places whe re th ey fough t, were under total Co m m u n ist co n tro l. Besid es military skills and tactics, th ey were saturat ed with an ti-capitalist, an ti-de mocratic, an tiSouth Kor ean, anti-American , anti-Un ite d Nations, and anti-Western propaganda. Many North Koreans were sent to th e USSR fo r technical training and th e KPA was backed by th ousands of Soviet advisers. Tactics focu sed on th e unrelenting offe nsive with th e sole go al o f co nq ue ring South Korea. Discipline was strict and harsh. Failure was un acceptable and th ose not giving th ei r all o r violating regulations were ex pected to co ndem n themselves in se lf-con fessio n sessio ns before unit members. Offi ce rs co uld be banish ed to "re-ed ucatio n" (pe na l) uni ts and possibly return ed to co m ba t uni ts as e n liste d m en . The Ge neva Co nventio n was sco rned. Ma ny p risoners and ROK gove rn ment officials were execu ted. Su rviving p riso ners were treat ed brutall y, wh ile many ROKA pri son ers were re-armed and forced to figh t fo r th e KPA. K co m ma nders were almost as merciless with th ei r own so ld iers . They had no reservations about co m m itting th em to near suicida l attacks with littl e hope of ob ta in ing thei r o bjectives. Regardless o f who th ey we re individually, a great ma ny of th e No rt h Korean officers a t In ch ' o n a nd Seoul had ga ined co m ba t ex pe rie nce fighting agains t th e Na tio nalist Ch inese and to a lesse r ex te n t th e Japan ese . T hey were used to aus te re milita ry life , h arsh di sciplin e , and h ad se rve d m ostly in th e field. T hey kn ew th eir weapons, we re used to Spartan di e ts a nd uncomfortabl e livin g co n d itio ns in th e field. Th ey were totall y d edicat ed to winning th e Fath erland Lib eration War at wh atever cos t.
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OPPOSING ARMIES
UN FORCES he various armed forces d efending th e Republic of Korea were under United Nations ' co n tro l. Wh en 53 of th e nations comprising the UN General Assembly voted to interven e in Korea, 15 vowed to commit ground forces. At th e tim e of th e In ch 'on lan di ng, though, few non-US for ces had arriv ed. Th e ROK itself was not a member of the UN, but its armed forc es were placed under U N control onJuly 14 and directly under Eighth Army control on th e 17th. Gen MacArthur was additionally named Commander-in-Chief, UN Command onJuly 8. Th e In ch 'on-Seoul Campaign wou ld be co nd uc ted mostly by US for ces . Two ROK regiments and a few small craft would participate along with 20 Co m mo nwealth warships. Th e General H eadquarters, UN Command was on e and th e sa me wit h the GHQ, Far East Command, h eadquartered in th e Dai-Ichi Bui lding in Tokyo. Th e two co m ma nds were forma lly merged on July 24 as FEC jUNC. T his same staff also served Suprem e Commander, Allied Powers in Japan and Commander-in Chi ef, Allied Forces, Far East Gen MacArthur. FECOM contro lled three major US operational co m ma nd s: Eighth US Army, the ground forc es; Na val Forces, Far East (NAVFE) ; and th e Far East Air Forces (FEAF). NAVFE, under Adm C. Turn er Joy, consisted ofa large number of sp e cialized task forces and groups. Th e Seventh Fleet (TF70) sai ling from th e Philippines was assig ned to NAVFE on Ju ly 28 and became its main operating force. All UN and ROK naval clements were under th e huge fle et. FEAF, co m m a n ded by Gen George E. Stratemeyer, consisted of the Fifth Air Force in J apan, Thirteenth Air Force in the Philipp in es , and Twenti eth Air Force on Okinawa. As with any large-scal e joint amphibious operation, th e Chromite co m man d structure was complex, involving US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force elem ents. X Co rps, rather than being assigned to Eighth Army as other FECOM ground forc es, was directl y under MacArthur's co n tro l.
T
Commander-in-Chief, Far East/UN Command Commander, Naval Forces, Far East Com mander, Joint Task Force 7 Co mmander, Att ack Force (TF90) Commander, Amphibious Group 1 Commanding General, X US Corps (TF92) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division
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Gen Douglas MacArthur ViceAdm C. Turner Joy ViceAdm Arthur D. Struble RearAd m James H. Doyle RearAdm James H. Doyle MajGen Edward D. Almond MajGen Oliver P. Smith MajGen David G. Barr
1st Marines troops head for Beach Blue on the southeast side of Inch 'on aboard LVT(3)C amphibian tractors. They pass LSTs awaiting their tum to beach. (USMC)
Joint Ta sk Force -;
JTF7 was built within th e Seven th Fleet, with its co m mander d oubling as JTF7 co m ma nder. This joint amphibious force co n tro lled th e en tire operati on . It was o rgan ized into th e Attack Force (T F90), Blockad e and Co vering Force (T F9 1) , Landing Force (X Corps - TF92) , Patrol and Reconnaissan ce Force (T F99), Fast Ca rrie r Force (T F77), and Servi ce Squadron (T F79) . So me 26 1 vessels were assigne d to th e o peratio n, th e largest naval force since World War " a nd also th e largest am ph ibio us o peratio n of th e Korean War: 194 US, 15 ROK, 12 British , three Austra lian, two New Zeal and, and o ne French . Among thi s armada were four airc raft carriers, two escort ca rriers, six cru isers, 33 d estroye rs, five assault tran spo rts, 15 assault ca rgo ships, 32 tra nsports and ca rgo ships, 15 frigat es, th ree d estroyer-t ran sp orts, two am ph ibious co m ma nd sh ips, three landing sh ips, d ock; three landing sh ips, medium (rocket) (LSM[R]); man y sma ll cra ft suc h as minesweepers, tugs, e tc.; and d ozens o f aux iliaries . A~ fo r la nd ing craft, th ere were 85 landing sh ips, ta n k (LST) 5; 20 landing ships, utility (LSU), 70 landing craft, mech anized (LCM), almos t 200 landing craft, veh icle and personnel (LCVP), and almost 200 landing vehicles, tr acked (LV[ - amtracs).
x
US Co rps
X Co rps ("Te n Co rps") had been activated in May 1942 at Ft Sh erman , Texas. It subsequently served on New Guin ea , Leyte, and other sou th ern Ph ilippin es islands. It was d e-activat ed in Japan in January 1946 after co nd uc ting occupation duty. The co rps was re-activated in Tokyo on 26 Au gu st 1950 from th e GHQ FECOM Sp ecial Plans Staff (a ka "Fo rce X") with M~ G en "Ne d" Almond co m mand ing. Ch ief of Staff was M ;~G en Cla rk L. ("Nick") Ruffn er who head ed a hastily thrown together staff with virt ually no am p h ibio us expe rie nce . Other than th e sma ll Force X co re, th e staff had no opportunity to tr ain togeth er. X Co rps was crea ted spec ia lly for th e In ch 'on landing as th e JTF7 Landing Force - TF92. Assign ed th e 1st MarDiv an d 7th Inilliv, th e Co rps also received o the r units , to o. Co rps troops we re asse m bled from uni ts in J apan and o the rs 5 32 LSTs were crewed by Japanese and were on loan to the Shipping Control Administration. Japan to replace the huge numbers of inter-coasta l ships lost during the war which were vital to ensure the country 's recovery and
development. The use of these Japanese-ma nned ships was of questio nable legality.
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sent from the States: 2d Engineer Special Brigade (an amphibious support unit), 5th Artillery Group with three battalions (two 155mm , one AAA), 6th Quartermaster Group, 60th Ordnance Group, plus engineer combat and construction, signal, transportation, and medical battalions plus many smaller support units, all intended for Eighth Army, but diverted to X Corps; in all, 69,450 troops. After the Inch'on-Seoul Campaign, X Corps remained under FECOM control and conducted the unopposed Wonsan landing on the upper North Korean east coast in October. This was followed by the Chosin Reservoir Campaign and the Corps' subsequent evacuation from Hungnam. The Corps was assigned to Eighth Army after this, December 26, 1950. It operated in the eastern portion of the line for the remainder of the war. The US and ROK divisions assigned to X Corps constantly changed throughout the war. X Corps left Korea in September 1954 and was inactivated at Ft Riley, Kansas on April 27, 1955.
A
111 th w;
1 st Marine Division (Reinfo rced)
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The 1st MarDiv had been raised in February 1941 from the 1st MarBde at Cuantanamo Bay, Cuba. It had fought on Guadalcanal, America's first amphibious landing in World War II, in late 1942. The "Old Breed" then secured a lodgement on Cape Gloucester, New Britain fighting there from late 1943 into 1944. The division next landed on Peleliu in 1944, then on Okinawa in the spring of 1945. Tasked with the invasion of Japan, the division instead conducted occupation duty in North China from September 1945 to June 1947. It redeployed to Camp Pendleton where it remained until 1950. Except for a two-and-a-half month stint with IX Corps in early 1951, the 1st Mar Div remained with X Corps until March 1952 fighting in eastern Korea. One of its more notable battles was at Chosin Reservoir. From then on it served under I Corps in western ROK until it returned to Camp Pendleton between February and April 1955. No overseeing marine force headquarters was established in Korea. Instead, Commander, l st MarDiv (Reinforced) doubled as the senior marine commander in the country to include responsibility for the 1st MAW. The 1st MarDiv was organized under the 1947 table of organization plus augmentation. In 1950 the Marine Corps no longer possessed a corps-level echelon providing support and services to subordinate divisions. A small number of non-divisional support units were under the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and Atlantic, but a deployable corps-level headquarters did not exist. These units, which included armored amphibian tractor, engineer, and artillery battalions, could be attached to the Marine Corps' two divisions. For this reason the marine division possessed more organic support units than in World War II. These included amphibian tractor, engineer, medical, motor transport, ordnance, shore party, service, and signal battalions, significantly larger units than found in army divisions. An armored amphibian tractor battalion and a second motor transport battalion were attached along
atl
atl
r lt Covered by the eight Sin. guns of the USS De Haven (00-727) LCVPs carrying RCT-5 head lor Beach Red near the upper rig of the photograph. (USN)
ri f l
ri fl M1
The marines pioneered the use of helicopters In Korea, using them for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and medical evacuation. They proved extremely valuable in allowing commanders to maintain contact with their widespread units. Herea Sikorsky H03S-1 lifts off. (USMC)
A marine fire team returns sniper fire. The fire team, of which therewere three per rifle squad, wasled by a corporal with an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and a rifleman, ali with .30 cal M1 rifles except the automatic rifleman, who carried a .30cal M1918A2 BAR. (USMC) It
with num erou s smalle r uni ts. T he 1st Co m ba t Su pport Grou p (Medi u m) was also a ttac hed. which incl uded headquarters, maintenan ce , su p ply, su p port, and truck co m pa nies plus smalle r d et achmen ts. The di vision 's three in fantry regimen ts had a fu ll stre ng th of 3,902 men . It had a 28 I-man headquarte rs and service co m pa ny, a 140-man m orta r co m pa ny with 12 x 4.2 in. M2 mo rtars, a 1I 2-man an tita nk co m pa ny with 12 x 75mm M20 recoilless rifles and 5 x M26 ta n ks, and three I , I23-man in fantry battalio ns. Each ba tta lion had a headquart ers co m pany, a wea po ns co m pa ny with a plato on of 4 x 8 1mm M I mortars, two plat o o ns with 4 x .30cal MI 917AI heavy mach ine-gu ns, and an assa ult plat o on with 18 x 3.5in. bazo ok as; an d th ree rifle co m pa n ies with a headquart ers, a mo rtar sec tio n o f 3 x 60m m M2s, a machine-gun plat oon with 6 x .30cal MI 919A4 light m achine gu ns, and three rifle plat oons. Platoons had a headquart ers an d th ree 13-man rifle squa ds, eac h with th ree .30cal MI 918A2 Browning au to matic rifles (BAR). Rifle co m pa n ies were d esign a ted A-C in th e 1st battali o n , D-F in the 2d, and
33
G-I in th e 3d. The weapons co m pa n ies we re n ot lett ered, but id entified as, for e xa m p le , Weapons Co m pany, 1st Battalion. T he II th Marin es, th e artill e ry regiment, h ad three battalions o f 105mm howitzers and on e , th e 4 th , o f 155mm howitzers. Each battalion had a h eadquarters and servi ce battery, and three six-tu be batteries. Attach ed was Batte ry C, 1st 4.5in . Ro ck et Battalion , with 12 x 4.5in. T66E2 24-tube rock et la u n c h e rs. Th e 1st Tank Battali on had a h eadquarters and servi ce co m pany and three tank co m p a n ies with 15 90mm gu n-a r med M26 Pershing tanks. Th e 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was eq u ip p ed with LVT (3)C amtracs. Th e Army's a ttached Company A, 56th Amphibious Tractor Battalion had LVT (A)5 75mm howitzer-arm ed amphibious tanks. Both th e 5 th Marin es , arrivin g from Pu san , and th e 7th Marin es, e n route from th e States and th e Mediterran ean , were supplemented by compani es detac h ed from divisional support batta lion s to form Regim e n tal Com bat Teams (RCTs) . T he battalions were also reinforced with d e tac h m e n ts from regim ent and division to form Ba tt ali o n Landing Teams ( BLT) . T h e 1st MarDiv was additionally reinforced by th e 1st KMC Regim e n t and various arm y units. 7th Infant ry Division
34
The 7t h InIDiv had been re-a ctivated (it had se rved in World War I) at Ft Ord, Califo rn ia , on July I , 1940 in th e regular a rm y. It first received d esert training and was initially o rg a n ize d as a m otorized divi sion , (a lthoug h it n ever received th e n ecessa ry truck s) a n d th en underwent a m p h ib io us training with th e m a rin es. It seize d Att u Isla n d in th e Ale u tia ns in 1943 h avin g received n o co ld-weathe r tr aining . Part of th e di vision secu re d unoccupi ed Kiska . Th e "Bayo n e t Division" se ized Kwajalein in 1944 , fo llowed by la n d ings o n Leyte a n d th en Okinawa in 1945. From 1945-49 th e divi sion pulled occu p a tio n duty in So u th Ko rea until it was withdrawn in phases to J apan. There it co n tin ued occu patio n duty o n th e n orth ern island of Hokkaido h aving replaced th e II th AbnDiv. Th e 17th In fa ntry would initially se rve as th e Eigh th Army Floating Res erve off Pusa n and wou ld d epart J a pa n o n Se p te m be r 6. Th e table of organization for th e infantry division dated from 1948 . Division troops in cl ud ed m edium tank and e ngineer co m ba t battalions and a reconnaissan ce co m pa ny. This last unit was eq u ip ped with M8 and M20 armored ca rs, M24 ligh t tanks, half-tracks , and machine-gun j eeps. Divisio nal sp ecial troops formed a m e d ical battalion, p lus signal, ordnance maintenance , q uartermaster, mi litary pol ice , and replacement co m p a n ies. T h e tank co m pa n ies had 20 M26 tanks. Th e division a rt ille ry was organ ized and arm ed as th e marine artille ry regim ent, exce p t for th e addition o f an a n ti-airc raft artillery ba ttalio n of four batteries , eac h with 8 x twin 40mm M 19 and 8 x quad .50 cal se lf-p ro pelled AA gu ns . Only one battery participated in th e operation , however. On th e surface th e three infantry regiments were sim ilar to th eir marine co u n te rpa rts, but th ere were many differences. The army regim ent had more su p po rting units to include a 285-man h eadquarters an d h eadquarters co m pa ny, a 19Q-man h eavy m ortar com pany with 8 x 4.2in. mortars, a l 86-man service co m pa ny, and a 2l4-man medi cal co m pa ny. Although a u tho rized a tank co m pa ny ( 148 men , 22 tanks), th e 7th InfDi v had non e . The three 9 17-man infantry battalions had a 119-man
Marine Tanks The primary tank employed by the marines at Inch'on-Sooul was the M26 Pershing heavy tank. Introduced at the end of World War II (and also used by the army), it mounted a OOmm gun and proved to be more than a match for the NK T34/85. A secondary tank was the M4A3 Sherman flame tank. This Wor1c' War II workhorse mounted a 105mm howitzer and beside It a flame gun. Tbs obsolete tank proved to be extremely valuable as an assaull gun. Other 105mm-anmedM4A3 tanks, without flame guns, were fitted wllh dozer blades to breach street barricades and buildings, seal tunnel openings, and destroy pillboxes. Both tanks had a five. man crew and were additionallyarmed with a .5OcaJand two .3Oca1machine guns. The 1st Tank Battalion lost only Pershings and two Shermans, all withn Seoul. (USMC)
Amphibian Tractors The marines employed the landing vehicle, tracked Mk III (covered) or LVT(3)C amtrac. This was an upgraded World War II model seeing lis only useal Okinawa in 1945. It could carry 24 troops or 12,OOOlb of cargo, and mounted a .5Oca1and a .3OcaJma gun. Besides assaull landings and river crossings, they were used to transport troops inland, deliver supplies. and evacuate casuallies. The army provided 18 LVT(A)5 amphibian tanks, the "lA)" meaning armored. It was an upgradea the World War II LVT(A)4 in that the 75mm howitzer was now gyrostabilizer. It, too, mounted .50 cal and .3OcaJ machine guns. (USMC)
headquarters and headquarters co m pa ny, a 165-man heavy weap on s co m pany with a machine gu n platoon of four each M1917Al heavy and M1919A6light machine guns (with cre ws to man o nly four), recoilless rifle platoon with 4 x 75mm rifles, and a mortar platoon with 4 x 8 l mm. A battalion 's three rifle co m panies had a headquarters and a weap on platoon, with 3 x 57m m recoill ess rifles and three 60mm mortars. Th e three rifle platoons had three nine-man rifle squa ds, eac h with a BAR, plus a weapons squa d with a light machine gu n and a 3.5in. bazooka. Th e regimental h eadquarters had a j e ep-m ounted intelli gen ce and reconnaissan ce plat oon and th e battali on s a sim ilar sec tion (ma rine regiments did not have organ ic reconnaissan ce eleme nts). Com pa nies were design at ed A-D in th e 1st battalion, E-H in th e 2d , and I-M (no 'j") in th e 3d . Co m panies D, H , and M were heavy weap on s. Regimen tal co m pa n ies were d esignated, for exam ple, Service Co m pa ny, 32d Infantry. Whil e th e ea rliest US Arm y units to arrive in Korea were arme d with the 2.36in. ba zooka, which was ineffe ctive against T 34 tanks, th e 1st MarDi v and 7th InfDiv arrived with th e 3.5in . "su pe r bazooka" at co m pa ny level. They still had 2.36in . ba zookas assigned to headquarters and su ppo rt units for antitank "de fense ." Co ntrary to popular misconception , th e 3.5in. was already in lim ited production, but had not yet been issued to division s in th e Far East. Republi c of Korea units
Two ROK units participat ed in th e cam paign . The 1st KMC Regim ent was attac hed to th e 1st MarDiv as a third regiment in th e abse nce of th e en route 7th Marines. The KMC had been es tablishe d in April 1945 from selected naval personn el and advised by US Marin es who instilled th eir esprit de corps. Th e unit had co nd uc ted raids o n th e west coast o pe rating from Chej u Island where it had co nd uc ted an ti-gue rrilla operati on s. It arrived in Pusan o n th e 5th . It was armed with Japan ese weap on s, khaki uniforms, and co n ta ine d many partly trained recruits. Eighth Arm y re-armed and uniformed th e unit pri or to its shipping out for In ch'on. Only o ne range-firing sessio n was allowed to train th em in th e use of th eir As the tide ebbs LCVPs and lCMs nose up to the Outer Tidal Basin bulkhead for offloading by 3~·ton crawler cranes, September 20. Civilians who had already been hired as st eved ores linethe dock. (USMC)
35
Troops of the ROKA 17th Infan Reg iment move into the east side of Seoul. Three-man teams carry .30cal M1917A1 heavy a M1919A4 light machine guns still fitted to tripods on their shoulders Japanese-style. (USMC)
n ew weapons. The KMC would mainly p rovide rear area security and mop-up, in creasin g its e xpe rie nce . So me battali ons were to play a more ac tive rol e . One ROKA unit was a ttached to th e 7th InfDiv in th e fo rm of th e 17th Infan try Regiment (Se para te), a ka Seoul Regim ent. It was a ttac hed to th e Ca p ita l Division , but th en pulled o u t o f Pu san to p articipate in th e In ch 'on-Seou l Ca m paign, initiall y to replace th e 7th InfDiv's own d etach ed 17th Infantry. I ts in clusio n in th e o pera tio n was esse ntia l to allo w ROK in vol vem ent in th e lib e rati on o f th eir ca p ita l, but was mainly used fo r rea r secu rity a n d m op-up.
NORTH KOREAN FORCES Kor ean People 's Army units co mm itte d to In ch 'on- Seoul were ofte n sim p ly ad h oc elemen ts d eta ch ed fro m th eir parent units. Others were in complet e units with elemen ts d eta ch ed e lsewhere, o r under-strength owing to previous combat o r th e re-assignment of p ersonnel to battered units fighting on at Pusan. Standard tables o f o rg a n iza tio n were m eaningless. A~ Inch 'on and Seoul were d eep in th e e nemy's rear and th e NK did not expect a maj or landing, many of th e units e ncou n te re d were sec u rity a n d su p po rt units. Their co m m itmen t was o fte n pi ecemeal , with units co ns tan tly a rriving from th e north, eas t, a nd sou th . Wh ile units were in complete a nd underman n ed , th e sta ndard KPA rifl e di visions is e xa m ined to provide a n underst andin g o f unit o rga n iza tio n. At full stre ngth, rifle divisions numbered 11,000-12,000 troops . Those fighting at Pu san we re d own to 3,000-5,000 men. Divisional troops included antitank (12 x I 4.5m m AT rifles, 4 x 45 m m AT guns) , AA ( 12 x I 4.5mm machine gu ns), e ngineer, signal, in formation a n d traini ng, a nd m edical ba ttali ons plus reco nnaissance an d transport co m pan ies, company-size su p p ly sec tio n, a nd ve te rinary un it. Th e art illery regiment 36
6 The terms "rifle" and "infantry" were used interchangeably by the UN to identify KPA units.
ry
d
Anned with a M2·2 flamethrower, a member of a battalion assault platoon bums out an NK bunker onWolmi-do. (USMC)
had two ligh t artillery battalions with 76.2mm guns and a heavy bat talio n with 122m m howitze rs. Battali o ns had three four-tu be batteries. Some di visions had a ba tta lio n of 36-45 SU76 self-pro pe lled 76.2mm gu ns; a few we re encountered in Seoul. T he th ree 2,500-man infan try regim en ts had a headqua rt e rs, submac h ine gu n, signal, mortar (6 x 120mm ), artillery (4 x 76.2m m howitzers) , and AT (6 x 14.5mm AT rifles, 4 x 45mm AT gu ns) co mpa nies. The three 650-ma n rifle battali on s ha d headquarters and mo rtar (9 x 82m m mortars, 2 x 45 mm AT l:,'lll1s) co m pa nies, and three 150-man rifle co m pa n ies. Rifle co m pa nies had three 45-ma n rifle platoons of fou r sec tio ns (squa ds) eac h wit h a light machine gun. The weap on s platoon had four 60m m morta rs and four heavy mac h ine gu ns. KPA rifle b rigad es typically had fou r or five rifle battali ons, an art illery ba ttali on , and m inim al service u nits. K "marine" un its were assigned to th e Ko rea n People 's Navy for base sec urity and coastal d efense. T hey h ad no o ffe nsive am p h ibious mission . Th e vario us sec u ri ty un its were light infa n try with m inimal cre w-serve d weap ons. The 2,00 0-man 226 th Marin e Regim ent and a co u ple of batte ries of 2d Battalion , 9 18th Coast Artillery Regiment were responsibl e for th e d e fense of In ch 'on. Th e latter was arme d with e igh t 76.2mm field guns, all o n Wolmi-do , a lo ng with so me light AT guns; some 400 tro ops from both units defended Wolmi-do. Th e ma rin e regiment had defensive positi ons edging th e seawalls and cove ring th e harbor's piers and o the r possibl e landing sites . O the r positions were locat ed o n Ce me tery, Observat ory, a nd Briti sh Co ns ula te hill s a nd o the r h igh ground in th e city. The regim e ntal 120111111 mortar co m pa ny was lo cat ed o n Ce me tery Hill. Four aba ndone d 120mm m ortars and fo ur 76.2mm gu ns were found o n the Munhang Peninsul a so ut h of Seou l. A typi cal ad ho c unit was th e " Ist Air Force Division" d efendin g Kimpo Airfield, a di vision in nam e o n ly. It co m p rised : 107th Sec uri ty Regimen t 226th Ma ri ne Regim ent (survivors fro m In ch 'on)
37
Marines march surrendering NK soldiers to the rear while M26 tanks prowl the st r eets. Some NKs have changed to white civilian clothing, a common practice as they attempted to flee. They were easily detected because of their close-cut hair and the fact that most young South Korean men had been conscripted into the ROKA. (USMC)
2d Battali on , 1st Regim ent 3d Co m pa ny, 1st Battali on , l st Reg ime n t 877th Air Fo rce Un it (400 m en , unkn own co m pos itio n /fu nc tio n) 1st and 3d Co m pan ies, En gin ee r Battali on , Fighter Regim ent Fin an ce Co mpany, 3d Technical Battali on Supply co m pa ny
38
The 4,000-5,000-ma n 25th Rifle Brigade d efending Seoul co nsisted of a rifl e, 120mm mortar, a rt illery, e ngineer, a nd four machine-gun battalions. The 87 th Regim ent, 9th Rifle Division had been left in Seo ul when th e rest of th e division was se nt to Pusan. The 9th had been raised in earlyJuly from border co nsta bulary troops. T he largest KPA formation to fight in th e cam paign was the recen tly raised 18th Rifle Division , e n route to Pusan from Ch'orwo n when the landing occ urred. It co nsisted of th e 20th, 22d, and 24th Rifle Regim en ts; its artillery regime n t may have been th e 18th, but this is not co nfirme d . T he division had o nly 8,000- 10,000 tro ops and so me may have been sen t sout h as repl acem en ts. The 3 1st Rifle Division had been formed as th e Seo ul City Regim ent in July and August and was re des igna ted a division just before the landing. It o nly co nsisted of th e 3 1st Rifle Regim ent, with mu ch of its stre ngth from press-gan ged Sou th Korean s. The 105th Tank Division was in the so u th, but th e KPA also possessed so me se parate tank regime n ts. T hese un its were eq u ip pe d with th e Sovie t T 34/ 85. Ar med with an 85m m gu n an d two machin e gu ns, th e T 34 was well p rotected by heavy sloped armor. The 2.36in . bazo ok a was in effe ctive against it , as were 57m m a nd 75m m recoilless rifles an d th e 37 m m AT gu ns used by th e RO KA. T he T34 gave th e KPA a d ecisive edge, but large numbers were lost to UN fighter-b ombers, tanks, and th e 3.5 in . ba zook a. A KPA ta n k regim ent was ac tua lly of battali on-size and co m p rised o f three co m pa ny-size "ba ttalio ns" o f ten tanks with th ree "co m pa n ies" o f three tanks. T he 42d an d 43d Tank Regimen ts in th e Seou l area were ap pa re n tly read ying to head so u th .
Rl 2
F
6 r d
ORDER OF BATTLE Inch'on-Seoul Campaign 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) organization and strength HQ Batta lion, 1st MarDiv 1st Amphibian Tractor Batta lion, FMF 1st Engineer Batta lion 1st Medical Batta lion 1st Motor Transport Battalion 7th Motor Transpo rt Battalion, FMF 1st Ordnance Battalion 1st Shore Party Batt alion 1 1st Service Batta lion 1st Signal Battalion1st Tank Batt alion 3 1st Marines 5th Marines 11th Marines (artillery) 4 1st Combat Suppo rt Group, FMF5 1st Amphibi an Truck Company, FMF Marine Observation Squadron 6 Det , Marine Tactical Air Contro l Squadron 2 Total US Marine and Navy 1st KMC Regiment US Army HQ Detachm ent US Army Signal Detachm ent 2d Engineer Special Brigade 73d Engineer Combat Batt alion 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) Company A. 56th Amph ibious Tractor Battalion 50t h Engineer Port Cons truc tion Company 65th Ordnan ce Ammunition Company Total US Army
Grand Total 7th Marines (en rout e)6 Administrative Center, Pusan Division Adm inistrative Center, Kobe & 1st Armored Amphibian Tract or Battalion?
Remarks: , Includes detachments, Naval Beach Group 1, 2 Includes Carrier Platoon, FMF. J Includes Tank Platoons, AT Companies, 1st and 5th Mannes. 4 Includes Battery C, 1st 4.5in. Rocket Battalion, FMF. < bldudes 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon, 1st AerialDelivery Platoon, andNaval Beach Group 1 (- detachments). - 'dJdes attachments from sionaI supportbattalions. es non-deployable " -year-olds.
916 868 1,038 566 686 430 533 648 873 652 81 1 3,850 3,850 2,360 1,291 244 62 55 19,733 2,786 38 37 952
724 388 151 214 256 2,760
28,039 5,638 182 1,344
1st Marine Division task organization for Inch'on Landing HQ Battalion (+) (- detachments), 1st MarDiv Detachm ent , 163d Military Intelligence Detachm ent (USA) Detach ment , 441st Counter-intelligence Corps Detachm ent (USA) 1st Signal Batt alion (+) (- detach ments) Detac hment, 205 th Signal Repair Company (USA) Carrier Platoon , FMF Detachment , 4th Signal Batt alion (USA) 1st Motor Transpo rt Battalion 1st Ordnance Battalion (- detac hments) 1st Service Battalion (- detachments) Detachment, Marine Tact ical Air Control Squadron 2 BLT-3 , RCT-5 3d Batta lion, 5th Marines Detachment, Company A. 1st Tank Battalion Detachment. Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 1st Signal Battalion
39
Reconnaissance Detach ment, 11th Marines Team 1, Shore Party Gro up A RCT-5 5t h Marines (- 3d Battalion & Tank Platoon, AT Company) Company A, 1st Eng ineer Battalion Company C, 1st Medical Battalion Detachment, Air-Nava l Gunfire Liaison Company, 1st Signal Battalion 2d Battalion, 1st KMC Regiment Company A, 1st Tank Batt alion (- detachment) Shore Party Group A (- Team 1) Detachment, Signal Company, 1st Signa l Battalion Forward Observer & Liaison Sec tion , 1st Battalion, 11th Marines RCT-! 1st Marines (- Tank Platoon, AT Co mpany) Company A (+), 56th Amphibian Tank and Tractor Batta lion (USA) Co mpany C (+), 1st Engineer Batta lion Company D (-), 1st Medical Batta lion Batt ery C, tst 4.5 in. Rock et Batta lion Detach ment , Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 1st Signal Batta lion Sho re Party Group B (- Team 3) Forward Observer & Liaison Sectio n, 2d Battalion , 11th Marines 11th Marines (- 3d Battalion) 96th Field Artillery Batta lion (USA) Deta chment, Company B, 1st Engine er Battalion 1st Amphibious Truck Company, FMF 1st Tank Battalion (+) (- detachments) Tank Platoon, AT Company, 1st Marines Tank Platoon , AT Company, 5th Marin es 1st Engineer Battalion (- detachments) 1st Shore Party Battali on (- detachments) Shore Party Communicati on Section, 1st Signal Battali on Team 3 , Shore Party Group B Reconnaissance Co mpany, 1st MarD iv 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF Marine Observation Sq uad ron 6 1st KMC Regime nt (- 2d Batta lion)' • 5th Battalion, 151 KMC to join at a later date.
2d Eng ineer Special Brigade (+) (USA) 1st Combat Support Gro up (Medi um), FMF (- detachments) 1st Fumigation & Bath Platoon, FMF 1st Aeria l Delivery Platoon, FMF Naval Beach Group 1 (- detachmen ts) 7th Motor Transport Battalion, FMF 73d Engineer Combat Batt alion (USA) 50th Engineer Port Co nstru ction Company (USA) 65th Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA)
40
RCT- 7 (en route) 7th Marines 3d Battalion, 11th Marines Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion
Company E, 1st Medical Battalion Company D, 1st Motor Transport Battalion Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion Company D, 1st Tank Battalion Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion
7th Infantry Division organization Division HQ & HQ Company 17th Infantry Regiment 31st Infantry Regiment 32d Infantry Regiment 17th ROK Infantry Regiment Division Artillery 31 st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) 48th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) 49th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) 57th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) Battery A, 15th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion Division Troops 73d Tank Batta lion (Medium) 13th Engineer Combat Battalion 7th Reconna issance Company Division Specia l Troops 7th Med ical Batta lion 7th Signal Company 707th Ordnance Maintenance Company 7th Quartermaster Company 7th Military Police Company 7th Replacement Company 7th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Korean People's Army units encountered in the Inch'on-5eoul Campaign Only elements of many of these units were employed, They are listed in the order in which they were encountered. Unit
Area Encountered
226th Marine Regiment 2d Bn (-), 918th Coast Artillery Regt 42d Tank Regiment 1st Air Force Division' 107th Securit y Regiment Specia l Cultural Battalion
Inch'on Inch'on Between Inch'on &Seoul Kimpo Airfield Kimpo area West of Yongdungp'o (re-habitation unit) Yongdungp'o Yongdungp'o & Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul & Uijongbu Suyuhan
87th Regiment, 9th Rifle Division 18th Rifle Division 25th Rifle Brigade 43d Tank Regiment 19th AA Regiment 76th Regiment, 42d Division 78th Independent Regiment 513th Artillery Regiment 10th RR Security Regiment 31 st Regiment, 31 st Rifle Divisiont 36th Bn, 111th Security Regiment 75th Independent Regiment 27th Rifle Brigade
Estimated Strength 2,000 200 500 unknown 2,500 230 2,000 8,000 -10,000 4,000 -5,000 500 1,200 3,000 2,000 1,500 900 3,600 750 2,000 5,000
, Ad hoc formation which included 107th Secunty Regiment and survivors of 226th Marine Regiment.
41
OPPOSING PLANS
THE AMERICAN PLAN OPERATION CHROMITE n th e m orning ofJun e 25, 1950 Ge n MacArthur flew fro m To kyo in to Suwon Airfi eld 15 mil es so u th of Seoul. Th ere he was met by Presid ent Syngman Rh ee , th e ROK minister of defense who d oubl ed as prim e minister, th e US ambassad or, a nd US adviso rs to th e ROKA. Borrowing a ca r, MacArthurs e n to u rage d ro ve north to a point ove rlooking th e as yet to be blown railroad bridge crossing th e H an River o ut o f Seoul. Th e capita l was burning, a rtille ry rounds were bursting o n its north side, a nd th e ro ad s full o f th ousands of re fugees. Th e re m na nts of th e retreatin g ROK 1st, 7th , and Capita l di visions we re fleeing th e city as th e 3d a nd 4th NK Divisions lun ged in fro m the north ; th e 6th NK Division head ed for In ch 'on . It was he re MacArthur mad e th e d ecision to turn th e tid e a nd re q ues t auth o rity to co mm it g ro und tro ops a nd air su p port fro m Presid ent Tru man . He already had a plan in mind, an d it required an a m p hibio us land in g in th e e nemy's rear. MacArthu r is o fte n cred ited as co nceiving the In ch 'on lan di ng, b ut th e true au thor is Donald McB. Curtis, a Pentago n staff mem be r who pr epared co n tingency plan SL-17 o n June 19, by co incidence just days before the NK invasion. Th e plan presupposed a n NK invasion, a re treat so u th, establish me n t of a pe rim et er at Pusan , and an o utfla n king am ph ibio us landing to su p port a co u nteroffensive o nce Pusan was reinfo rced. MacArthur's Ge ne ra l Headquarte rs (G HQ) requested co pies
I
Here a marine 155mm M1Al howitzer is towed by a dozer. t ractor off a pontoon ralt. marine and army divisions had one " 155" battalion, and two battalions we re assigned to X Corps, one being self· propelled. (USMC)
42
Army comma nders. The 32d Infantry was the principal army unit to participate in the campaign. From left to right: Col Charles E. Beauchamp (32d Infantry), MajGen David G. Barr (7th InfDiv), MajGen Edward M. Almond (X Corps), and Marine BGen Edward A. Craig (Assistant Division Commander, 1st MarDiv). (USA)
Amarine M26 Pershing heavy lank, nicknamed " Fighti n' Fool," drives off an LST ramp at the base of a sea wall as the t ide recedes. c-ratlons for a week are secured to the vehicle. (USMC)
within d ays of the invasio n. MacArthur may not have been th e author, bu t it was his d rive and visio n th at saw its implem entation, and of co u rse his staff th at accom plishe d th e ex pa nded planning to make it happen. Macarthur 's chief of staff, MajGen Edward M. Almond and his GHQ staff qui ckly d evelo ped an in itial plan , Operati on Blu ehearts. Bluehearts envisio ne d the 24t h InfD iv depl oying to Pusan fro m J ap an and dri ving north to Suwo n to block th e NK advance. It was assumed Seo ul co uld not be held . It would be followed by th e 25th InIDi v, which would position itself in th e ce n tra l portion of th e peninsula and back up th e faltering ROKA. On ab outJuly 20 an am phibious assault at In ch 'on would be co nd uc ted by a hoped-for marine RCT an d th e l st CavDiv to cut th e NK su p ply line. This plan was discu ssed o n J uly 4 at GHQ in Tokyo with marine represen tatives present. Whil e a so u nd plan , it was impossible to accomplish with th e availabl e un d er-str ength and ill-trai ned divisions. The NK were moving too fast and th e ROKA cru m bling at a proportion at e rate. Of co urse the defeat of Task Force Smith th e next da y dash ed an y hopes of exec uting Bluehearts
43
Fou r LSTs bea ched at Beach Red d ischarge t heir ca rg o. Supply dumps ca n be see n t o the left. Inch 'on wa s t he only US amph ib ious operation In which a major operational port was secured on D-Day, a factor contributing to the operation's success. (USMC)
44
as co nceived . Still th e lst CavOiv ru sh ed to e mba rk, ex pecting th e plan to be ca rrie d o u t. In stead, Blu ehearts tu rned in to an am p h ibio us reinforcem ent landing at Po 'han g-dong 70 miles north of Pusan. The landing was un opposed, althoug h th e NK were closing in . Po 'h an g was chose n as port faculti es at Pusan we re overly co nges ted . While a much smaller operation, Bluehearts offered navy amphibious forces a muchneeded shakedown before th e more challenging In ch 'on landing. Even though Bluehearts evo lved into so me th ing different, MacArthur rec ognized th e need to cu t th e NK su p ply lin e and es tablish a force in th eir rear to su p port th e Pusan breako ut. It would also hurt th e NK psychologically and mat erially as well as force them to fight o n two widely se pa ra ted fro nts. Reestablishing Seo ul as the ca pi tal o n ly th ree months afte r th e K invasion would be a sign ifica n t politi cal victory. In ch 'on was Korea 's second largest port (the first being Pusan ) and Kimpo Air field was th e best o n th e peninsul a. Th e In ch 'on landing has been charac terized as b rilli ant, d aring, and ex trao rd inary. It was ce rtainly d arin g as th e forces involved we re so hastily assembled, under-trained, and lacking in re hearsal - ex te ns ive practicing and dry-runs had long been d eemed esse n tia l for a ny amphibious o pe ra tio n. It was also bold because of th e dange rous a p p roac h chan nel th at was negoti a ted at n ight, th e tid al hazards, and th e co n finemen t o f th e invasion flee t in suc h a small man euve r area. Th e d o ctrin e o f landing a n amphibious fo rce d e ep in the e nemy's rear, es pecia lly when th e fri endly force dom inates th e sea a nd sky, was well es ta blished and n ot with out precedent. T he Allied landings at Anz io and Sal erno , Italy in 1944, both o n th e west coast of a peninsul a , h ad been eq ually risky for th eir own reasons, but successfu l. MacArthur's staff co n tin ue d to d evelop flanking landing plan s. Operation Plan 100-B for Inch 'on, 100-C for Kun san o n th e west coas t so me 100 mil es from Korea 's so uthwes t tip and less th an halfway up the coast toward In ch 'on , and 100-0 at Ch u m u nj in-u p o n th e eas t coas t just
K
The early capture of Klmpo Airfield would not only provide abase lor close ai r sup port fighters, but also fo r re su pp ly and medical evacuation. Here an R4C (C-47) of Marine Transport Squadron 152 oflloads f uel at Kimpo. (USMC)
south of th e 38th Parallel. Kunsan was not far enough behind th e enemy's rear and th e landing force co uld too soon meet e nemy tr oops withd rawing fro m Pusan. It still left much of th e NK lin e of co mm unica tio ns intact. Whil e secondary sup ply lin es served th e east coast, th e Ch um u nj in-u p co urse of actio n would not sever th e main line th rough Seoul unl ess th e landing for ce fou ght all th e way across th e peninsula. So me recommended it as th ey feared the hazards of th e In ch 'on basin , but it would have required a two-division for ce (with it'> own len gth y and vu lnerable su p ply lin e ) to traverse 160 miles, expos ing th ei r flanks to withdrawin g e ne my divisions. For an amphibious assault of thi s ma gnitude, a 16O-day planning phase was recommended; GHQ planners had 34. MacArthur issued Operati on Plan 1000B for Inch 'on o n Augus t 12 (D-34) . He did not provide a co py to th e J CS altho ug h th ey kn ew that it was underw ay, The Na tio na l Defense Act, which outline d th e relati on ship between th eJCS and theater co m manders-in-chief was nebulous, and MacArthur opted to keep things in close-hold. Two days previously th e J CS had bri efed President Truman th at while a marine division was en ro ute to Korea , th ey did not feel a landing at In ch 'on was a viabl e co urse of actio n . FECOM pressed on with plan s for th e landing and th e Pusan breakout. On Aug us t 23 (D-23) a top level co nfe re nce was h eld at FECOM headquarte rs in Tok yo , attended by MacArthur, Gen J. Lawton Co llins (Army Ch ief of Staff), Ad m Forrest P. Sh erman (C h ief of Naval Operati ons) , ViceAdm C. Turn e r J oy (Naval Fo rces, Far East ), LtGen Lemuel C. Sheperd, J r. (Fleet Marin e Force , Pacific), MajG en Edward M. Almond (FECO M Ch ief o f Staff), MajG en Oliv er P. Smith ( 1st MarDiv) , M ~ Gen David G. Barr (7th InfDiv) , an d RearAdm James H . Doyle (Attac k Force Co m ma nde r) . T he d ay befo re , MacArthur had informed MajGen Sm ith th at hi s div ision would spearhead th e In ch 'on
A marine DUKW·353 or " Duc k" 2 ~·ton amphibious truck c rawls across the Inch 'on mud fl at s. Silplings have been la id as a corduroy road on wh ich w ire IIleSh matting Is laid using a special rack. (USM C)
45
~Choogbong-do
ff21
D~ c
in do -
YEL LOW SEA
46
landing , wh ic h was th e fi rst Smi th had h ea rd o f suc h a pl an . Refl ec tin g Doyle 's co ncerns with th e In ch 'o n tid es a n d th e treacherous chan n el, Smith suggeste d th at a better landin g site m ight be Posung-Myun just so u th o f In ch ' o n. Almo n d di smissed thi s o p tio n. Oddly, n eithe r Sm ith n or Sh epe rd were in vite d to the To kyo m eeting , bu t MajGen Barr, th e follow-on divi sion co m man de r, was. Ma cArthur was ad a m a n t th at th e landing wo u ld be a t In ch ' on. Th e navy's obj ecti ons regarding tid es, te rrain, a n d o ther physical h andi caps suc h as Wolmi-do whi ch th ey feared was h eavily forti fied a n d d ominated th e landing beaches, were brush ed aside . T he n avy also recom men ded a th re e- to four-day p reparato ry bombardm ent, bu t th e FECOM sta ff felt suc h a long bombardm ent wo u ld e lim inate tac tical surprise a n d allow th e North Koreans to sh ift forces to me et the landing. MacArthur felt th at th e reca p ture o f Seoul would save 100 ,000 lives a n d lead to a qui ck e n d for th e war, whi ch h e ex pec te d to b e ove r by Ch ristmas. H e closed with , "We shall land at In ch ' on a n d I shall d efeat th e e nemy." The navy and m arines made a last effort to co nvince MacArthur to land at Posung-Myun , but it was d ismi ssed. MacArthur's mind was fixed o n th e immediate se izu re of a p ort to sus ta in th e force . At th e e n d o f th e m eeting Doyle m ade th e co m ment, "Ge neral, I h ave n o t been asked n or h ave I volu n teered my o p in io n a bou t thi s landing. If I were asked, h owever, th e best I ca n say is In ch 'on is n o t impossibl e. " T he n avy W,L'i n ot
th e o n ly co ncerned party: Ge n Co llins, too , held reservatio ns regard ing e nemy stre ngth and capabilities at In ch 'on, whi ch h ad been barely addressed. He also questioned whether Eighth Army co uld break ou t and link up o n a tim ely basis and o n ly received reassurances backed by no facts. M ~ G en Barr m ad e a so mewhat positive o bse rvation, "It's so wro ng that it 's rig h t. The e lement of su rp rise will be great." So me gave it a 5,000to-I chance o f success. MacArthur was co m ple te ly co nfiden t. Anoth e r MacArthurian blow to th e marines foll owed when he inform ed LtGen She perd th at MajGen Alm ond had been p romised co m m and o f th e as-yet-to-be-activate d X Co rps, th e landing force . With ex te ns ive am p h ib io us ex pe rt ise, She pe rd had hoped for th e co m mand; Almond h ad non e. Gen Walk er, co m m a nd ing Eighth Army, proposed an alte rn a tive plan to Gen Co llins, Army Ch ie f o f Staff. Radio intercepts indicated th at th e N K we re go ing to th row every re m ain in g uni t at th e perimete r in d esp erate h ope o f d efeating to ttering UN forces. It was kn own th at th e bulk o f th e fo rces would a ttac k th e west side of th e Nakto ng River, m ostly d efended by Am e ricans. Once th e initial attacks had spe n t th emselves Walk er pro posed to co nd uc t limited o bjective attac ks to d rive th e e ne my to th e west , as well as probing attacks by th e ROKA in th e north to pu sh th e NK into th e m ountains a nd away fro m th e perim ete r. A main attac k would be launch ed northwest toward Taej on o n th e K su p ply lin e a nd at th e same tim e an amphibious assault co nd uc te d at Kun san. This force , besid es cu tting a main coasta l ro ad and sec u ring a second ary harbo r, wo uld a ttac k northeast to Taejon. It was hoped th at a large porti on of the NK th at had survived th e attacks o n th e a kto ng front would be e nve lo pe d and trapped in so u thwest Korea. Whil e Co llins liked th e plan , MacArthur's dramati cs swayed th eJ CS to let him have his way, although it is apparent th at so me th ought h e would choose an othe r co u rse o f ac tio n. On Augus t 24 (0 -22) Far East Air Force began planning th e allocatio n of air su p po rt to both th e upcoming landing and to reinforce Eighth Arm y's breakout. On th e 26th (0 -20) MacArthur announced Alm ond 's assignment as X Co rps co m ma nde r upon ac tivation o f th e corps in Tokyo. T ha t same day Ge n Omar . Bradl ey, Cha irman o f th e J CS, bri efed President Tru ma n o n wha t Ge n Co llins and Ad m She rman had learned o f the In ch 'on plan at th e Augus t 23 co nfere nce. They had not been asked to approve th e plan nor was MacArthur obli gated to ask th em to do so. Whil e th e se rvice ch iefs had reservations, Truman was optimistic. Th e.JCS gave its co nd itio na l appro val o n August 28 (0- 18) for a landing at ln ch 'on o r a beach to th e so u th, indicating th ey were no t co mfo rta ble with th e former. T hey re q uire d MacArthur to keep th em ab reas t of cha nges and recommended th at an alternative plan be developed fo r Kunsan. On Augu st 30 Co m mander, Naval Forces, Far East assigne d Joint Task Force 7 (JTF7) to co nd uc t the In ch 'on landing. JTF7 was not activated until Se p te m ber II (0-4). T he vario us naval task fo rces transp orting and su p port ing th e landing force would d epart from fou r ports inJapan and Kor ea between September 5 and 13. Preliminary aerial bombardment of Wolmi-d o and In ch 'on would co m mence on September IO (0 -5) with naval shelling o n th e 13th (0 -2) . X Co rps Operati on O rder I was issu ed o n Augus t 28 (0-18) and received by 1st MarOiv o n th e 30th. The division, th ough , had received a
47
Ships of the JTF7 Transport Group take up position in the transport area outs ide Inch 'on Harbor. (USN)
48
preliminary briefing on August 19 (0-27) and commenced planning. Not on ly was this the shortest planning time ever allotted for a divisional amphibious assa ult, but only a quarter of the staff was aboard the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) to undertake the myriad of planning tasks. T he d ivision issued Operation Order 2-50 on September 4 (0-11). Planning time was so short that, contrary to normal practice, the division wrote detai led landing plans for the regiments rather than the regiments and battalions preparing their own after receiving the higher echelon's order. The X Corps operation plan had begun to be developed by the GHQ Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group in July. It was taken over by the GHQSpecial Planning Staff (aka "Force X") on August 12. This staff provided the nucleus for the X Corps staff. The X Corps plan called for the 1st MarOiv to conduct an amphibious assault to seize Inch 'o n on September 15 (D-Day), secure a beachhead, advance as rapidly as possible to seize Kimpo Airfield to provide a base for close air support aircraft, and clear the south bank of the Han River. It wou ld then assault across the Han, seize Seoul, and secure the high ground to the north. It would fortify a line to the north with reduced forces and await relief (tentatively by 3d InfDiv still in the States). The division wou ld then recross the Han and seize a line 25 miles southeast of Seoul. The 1st MAW wou ld provide close air support, air warning, and air control operating from Kimpo Airfield. The Pusan breakout wou ld commence on September 16. It was considered that the NK might reinforce Inch'on-Seoul with units attacking the Perimeter. The closest were the 3d , 10th, and 13th divisions astride the Taegue-Taejon-Seoul Highway, the route the main breakout force would take. The 7th InfDiv would land behind the marines on about 0+4 and advance to secure high ground so uth of Seoul and the Han. It wou ld move into Seoul, secure a line to the north to the right of the 1st MarOiv, and then conduct a reconnaissance-in-force south of Seoul where it would secure a line. Alongside the l st MarOiv to the east, the two divisions would face south to provide the anvil to meet NK forces withdrawing before the ham m er of the Eighth Army breakout. The tides were a major planning factor. The navy wanted to make the perilous approach up the Flying Fish Channel during daylight. This meant the four-hour approach would arrive at I 130hrs and low tide. The tide would be receded by 1300hrs. The next high tide allowing landing craft to run ashore was at 1919h rs. Wolmi-do would have to be secured in
th e eve n ing with o n ly two h ours of light re main ing for the ma rines to clear th e island whi ch was h on eycombed with fo rt ifica tio ns. Afte r th e eve n ing tid e receded th ey wou ld have to spen d th e night on a n in completely sec u re d island a t risk o f infantry a ttac ks across th e ex posed mud flats . Th e main landings into In ch 'on would th en be co nd uc ted during th e morning hi gh tid e . This wo u ld allow th e NK much of th e previous d ay a n d all nigh t to b rin g in re in forceme nts a n d position tro ops to m ee t th e main landin gs. Th e a p proac h would h ave to be m ade in th e p re-d awn d ark a n d the fir st landing to se ize \<\'o lmi-do made during th e m ornin g hi gh tid e . The main landings into In ch 'on would occu r in th e eve n ing with just e no ug h tim e to secu re beachh eads. While d oct rin e ca lle d for assa u lt tro ops to land in a m tracs, because of th e 15ft seawalls, th ose aimed a t Beach Green a nd Beach Red wou ld h ave to land fro m Landing Cra fts, Personnel a n d Veh icles (LCVPs) usin g scaling ladde rs. Am tracs wou ld b e used o n Beach Blu e as there was n o seawall. Afte r a pre-landin g bomba rdm ent th e m arin e p la n ca lle d for 3d Battalion, 5 th Marin es (3 /5) to assa u lt Wolmi-do (specifica lly, th e 50ydwid e Beach G reen o n th e small No rt h Point p eninsul a ) a t 0630hrs (L-Hour), Se p te m be r IS. T h is would sec ure th e islan ds d ominating the ha rb o r a nd th e tid e wo u ld soon ebb. T he marines on Wol rni-d o a nd Sowo lm i-do would be o n their own waiting for the eve n ing hi gh tide. Naval a n d a ir b omba rdm ent wou ld co n tin ue o n In ch ' on a n d approaching NK reinforcem en ts be fo rced to m ove in d aylight. Just pri or to th e landin g M~G en Almon d proposed three in an e plan s that were fortunat el y rejected. One was fo r th e 822 7th Army Un it (Eig h th Army Raide r Com pa ny), re in fo rce d by 100 ha ndpicked marines, to paddl e 3 m iles to shore in rubbe r boa ts to land 8 mil es n orth o f In ch 'o n, m ove 9 mil es ove rla nd by foo t to Kimpo Airfield, seize it in a surprise a ttac k, a n d h old u ntil re lieved . Sm ith wisely re fuse d to p ro vide the m arin es, pointin g o u t that the 5t h Marines had o n lyj ust withd rawn from co m ba t an d was under-strength. Furth erm ore , 500 l Z-year-olds had been pulled o u t o f the division , there was no time for the un it a nd the re-assigned marin es to reh ea rse togeth e r, an d lastly, Smith need ed to retain his experie nced troo ps. It is h ighly un like ly the 224-man un it co u ld h ave h eld o u t until reli eved by th e landing tro ops, which took three days to reach the air field. Almon d still pla n ned to launch the raid ers witho ut th e marin es, but it was ca ncelled a t th e last minute . It was earlie r planned to land thi s unit, withou t ma rines, a t Kuns an fa r to th e so u th to create a diversion an d mak e it a ppear a division was landing , a tall o rde r for a 124-man u nit. Ele ments of th ree TK di visio ns in th e area would have m ad e short wo r k of it. Another pla n proposed by Almon d was to land a battalion of th e 32d In fa n try, 7th InIDiv o n Wolmi-do in th e eve ning during th e main landings, load it a board m a rin e trucks a nd tan ks, and drive 20 mil es to se ize hi gh grou n d o n the edge of Seoul. Sm ith re jected thi s idea to o , sta ting h e co uld n ot affo rd th e veh icles a n d felt it was a tacti cal impossib ility. T his fo rce wo u ld also have had to be su pporte d by air a n d naval gu n fire; artillery o n \"Tolmi-d o was o ut of ra nge . Besides tacti cal im p racticality, all res upply wo uld have to be by air. It too k the m arin es e igh t d ays to reach the ba tta lio n's p roposed objective. Both sc hemes also would h ave placed res tric tio ns on fire zo nes forward of the advan cing marines, a n unnecessal)' hindrance .
49
Loo ki ng south, Inch'on bums after heavy naval and ai r bombardment. The wh ite rectangular area on the waterfront beneath the black
0'
column smoke is Beach Red where RCT-5 landed. Just to its left and hidden mostly by the smoke is Cemetery Hill. The dark area near the upper center with white smoke to its ri ght is Observatory Hill. (USN)
50
The navy would co n tro l th e ai rsp ace aro u n d In chon , with th e Far East Air Force restrict ed from co nd uc ting o pe rat io ns within a 100-mil e radius o f In ch 'o n unless requested byJTF7. Th e air force had o p posed placing suc h a large a rea under naval co n tro l, but it was ap p ro ved . Th e navy and m arin es would co nd uc t co n tin uo us air pat rols in a 25-m ile radius around In ch' on . The main landings would occ ur at 1730hrs (H-Hou r). No rth of Wolmi-do, the 500yd-wide Bea ch Red was situate d o n th e Inchon wat erfront, but outside o f th e main harb o r. The 5th Marin es, minus 3/5, would land here and push inl and up to 1,000yds to establish a 3,000-yd lin e , th e O-A Lin e , stre tch ing from a few hundred yards north o f the beach and so u th to th e east e nd o f th e Inner Tidal Basin enc o m passing Ce me tery an d Obse rvat ory hills. 1/ 5 would land o n th e left and 2/ 5 o n th e right, with both battalions co m ing asho re in a co lu m n of com pa n ies. So me 4,000 yards to th e southeast o f Beach Red lay th e I ,OOO-yd wid e Beach Blu e o n th e edge of In ch 'on . Doct rin e ca lle d for a division 's two assau lt regim ents to land adjace n t to o ne ano ther unl ess terrain rest rictions or e nemy di sp ositions di ctated o the rwise . In World War II th e marin es co n d uc te d o n ly two landings wh e re th e landing force was se pa ra te d by a co nside ra ble di stan ce , at Tinian and Guam. Th e men of 2/ I would land to th e left o n Blu e I , an d 3/ I o n Blu e 2 to th e righ t; eac h battali on would land with two co m pan ies abreast abo ard am tracs an d preceded by army amphibian tanks. Blu e 3 was so u th o f and at a right a ng le to Blu e 2 and was a q uestio na ble alte rna tive. Th ey would fight through a n industrial a rea u p to 3,000 yards inl and to sec ure th e 4-m ile 0-1 Lin e . Th e 1st Ma rin es would co n tro l by fir e th e In ch 'on-Seoul Hi ghway. Key o bjectives were Hill 117 n o rth ea st of th e beach; Hill 233, a long ridge 1,500 ya rd s so u theast of th e beach ; and Hill 94, a small ca pe flankin g th e beach . Th e plan ca lle d for 1/1 to co me ash ore in LCVPs 45 minutes aft er the assault bat tali ons. Th ere were n o pl ans fo r RCT-S a nd RCT-I to link up o n D-Day. Wh en Beach Red was sec u re d , e igh t LSTs would beach to off-load c rit ical a m m u n itio n and su p p lies before n ig h tfa ll. Two a r tillery batt ali on s a n d su p po rt troops would land o n Wolmi-do a t 1900hrs to
T'VI aft
So
SU I
o r il g ro
Its
un',
provide artillery support to the marines on the main land. Th e marines wou ld maint ain defensive posi tions throug h the n igh t and co mmence clearing th e remainder of th e city, lin k up , a nd co n tin ue toward Seo ul. Intellige nce
Littl e was kn own of th e No rt h Ko rean order of battle , disp osition s, stre ngth, and ca pa bilities d eep in th e rear areas. Man y uni ts were str ip pe d of tr o ops to se n d so u th to Pusan . T here were still subs ta n tia l units in th e area, a lthough th ey were disp e rsed and under-strength . In addi tio n , J ap an ese map s and hydrographic cha rts were often ina ccurate and o utdated. Villages, streams, roa ds - even e n tire hill masses - were incorrectly position ed o r o m itte d . Different grid syste ms were used , making locati on reporting and fire co n tro l difficul t. Det a iled h yd ro graphic d at a o n th e port of In ch 'o n was sca rce and wh at was available was often sus pect or co n flict ing. Aerial phot ography a ugme n te d m aps, but di fferen ces in a ltit ude a n d p e rsp e ctive co m p lica te d th ei r use . Th e h e ight o f th e sea walls co u ld not be accurately d et ermined from aerial photos. It was d et ermined th ere were no manmad e boat o bstacles. In an effort to co llec t up-t o-dat e in telligence on th e Flying Fish Chan ne l, Wolm i-do , and Inch 'on Harb o r, the navy se nt Lt Eugene F. Clark with two Korean inte rp ret ers by boat to Yong-hon g-do island 15 miles so ut hwest of Inch 'on and o n th e west side of th e Flying Fish Cha nnel. Acco m pa nie d by rati on s, rice, and weapo ns, Clar k establishe d a sma ll privat e "army" of teenagers from th e island 's friendly inhabitants and set up cam p o n September 1. Some o f th e teenagers served as coas t-watche rs to sec ure h is base , th e NK occ u pied Tae b u-do 3 miles across East Cha n ne l. Others posed as fish ermen to recon noite r Wolmi-do and the harbor, reporting back to Clar k with descriptions and locati on s of d efen ses, seawall and pier data, cu rre n t speeds, and water d epths. He ca ptured j K sam pa ns to obtain info rmatio n fro m pri son ers and reconnoit ered the harbor himself. He even walked th e low-tide mud Oats proving th at in some areas Two LSTs rest on the mud flats after the morning tide re ce ded. Some areas of the flats could IU\lport vehicle traffic ; it was originally thought that a
grounded LST would break itsback, but this fear p roved unfounded. (USN)
51
Marines examine an abandoned NK trench on the outskirts of Inch'on. In the background is one of the city's industrial areas. Virtually every piece of defendable terrain inside and outside Inch'on was honeycombed with fortification!>. Fortunately the NK did not possess the troops In the area to man them. (USMC)
A Soviet-supplied NK 76.2mm M1942 field gun emplaced on Wolmi-do. The wheels were intentionally removed. This extremely effective weapon served as NK divisional artillelJ, and was also employed as an anti-tank and coastal defense gun. Note the rice straw sandbags. (USN)
52
th ey were sufficien tly firm for foo t and eve n vehicle traffic. He also discovered that th e ligh tho use o n Palmi-d o was still operational. Wh en Clark radioed this info rm atio n he was directed to turn o n th e ligh t at midnight, Sep te m be r 14. A less successfu l reconn aissan ce was co nd uc te d o n th e ni gh t of 11-1 2 Se p te m ber by Eighth Army Raide r Co m pany. Th ey an d a smaller grou p o f British sa ilo rs reconnoitered two beaches at Kun san so u th o fI nc h 'o n . The uni t was d et ect ed and tak en und e r fire with th e loss o f two d ead and o ne wo u nded . The recon naissance was an effort to d ete rm in e if Kun sari 's beaches were su itable as alte rnative landing poin ts. In ea rly Se p te m ber X Co rps estim ated that there were 1,500-2,500 N K tro ops in the In ch ' o n a rea, m ostly re cru its. Many of th ese m ay h ave been p ress-ganged So u th Ko rean s, a common prac tice. Prior to the landing th e e nemy est imate was revised to c.7 ,OOO in th e In ch 'o n- Seo ul area: 1,000 in In ch 'on , 5,000 in Seoul, and 500 a t Kimpo . T he n u m bers and ca pa bilities o f uni ts th at co uld reinforce th e area after th e landing
were unknown , bu t were thought to be within a few days' march. It was assumed that some tanks wou ld be in the area, but numbers and lo ca tions we re u n kn own . TK air force capabi lities were limi ted, and they possessed no j et fighte rs o r bombers. Seve ra l models of Sovie t-su p plied Yak ovlev an d Lavochkin pro p-d riven fighte rs were in use.
THE NORTH KOREAN PLAN TOO LITTLE TOO LATE The formal d et ails o f th e NK d efense plan are unknown , so histo rian s can o n ly assess th eir ac tual movem en ts and ac tio ns. It is unlikely th at th ey possessed a well d evelo ped plan . Un its available in the Inch 'on - Seo ul a rea were in co nstan t tu rmo il as they passe d throug h to the so ut h. O th er uni ts were constan tly be ing ordered to se nd re placeme nt d rafts south. There was also no single kn own majo r co mma nd in co ntrol of th e area o ther th a n possibly so me region al ad m in istra tive headquarters. Suc h a headquarters would not have been suited for th e planning, co mma nd, and co n trol of d efensive and co u n terattac k o pe ratio ns. Part of th e plan may have been to use wha tever u ni ts were available, to include rear service troops, as ad hoc defense fo rces. Elemen ts of th e 18th and 19th KPA Divisions we re kn own to be in Seoul. T he K probably felt th ere was littl e cha nce ofa major a m ph ibio us landing di rectly in to In ch 'on becau se o f th e very reasons th at mad e th e J CS, navy, and o thers hesitant. Little was kn own of NK d efensive techniques as UN fo rces had only expe rienced th eir offensive ta ctics. Naval forces were ex pe rience d with NK coas t artillery: 76m m, 85m m, and I22mm. These Soviet-ma de gu ns (mos tly 76m m at Inch 'on ) were often em placed in open positions. There were sco res o f prepared arti llery, mo rtar pos itions, and tre nc hes throug ho ut In ch 'on, but most were un occu pied. Ove r a hundred harden ed position s were d et ected by ae ria l reconnaissan ce. It was assessed th at the NK had on ly minimal troops in th e area to defend aga inst am phibious raid ers. Because of th e man y prepared, but un occupied fortification s, the NK probabl y planned to ru sh troops to th e city fro m Seo ul if a major landing look ed imminen t. T his was ano ther good reason for US forces to esta blish beachhead s with in Inch 'o n on D-Day itself. Delaying the esta blishment of beachhead s would have given the ene my the cove r o f darkn ess to move up reinforcemen ts. Th ere were no air defenses. Th e marines esta blishe d th eir beach heads and cleare d Inch 'on reason abl y eas ily. Resistan ce was uneven in th e inte rvening towns o n the roa d to Seoul, Asco m City,Sosa, Kimpo, and Yon gdungp 'o. Cou nterattacks were piecemeal , usually small in strength and unsupported by artillery. Whil e th e origina l NK plan may have envisione d a defense o n the Han River, resistance th ere was light. T he NK esta bllishe d th eir defense line in th e hills o n the west and northwest sides of Seo ul. Strongp oin ts were built within th e city, and streets were barricad ed, but th ere were no identifiable defense lines within Seo ul.
53
OPERATION CHROMITE
PRELIMINARIES AND THE APPROACH he 1st MarDiv, with th e 1st Prov MarBde but minus RCT-5 a nd th e e n ro u te RCT-7, assembl ed a t Kobe ,Jap an be tween Augus t 29 and September 3. With th e d ivision bill et ed ashore an d aboard transp orts, su p plies an d eq u ip ment were tr an sferred fro m ca rgo sh ips to assault sh ips. On th e 3rd, Typh o onJan e sla m med into Kobe suspend ing loading o pe ra tio ns for 24 h ours. Only th e assa ult ele me n ts co uld be co m ba t-loaded . Some 2,750 a rm y troops of artillery, tank, and e ngineer units were a ttac hed . Th e co m pla in ts o f parents to co ngress me n regarding th e di spatch of l7-year-olds into co m ba t forced th e Sec re tary o f th e Na vy to o rde r 500 you ng men to be pulled from uni ts. They were re-assigned to th e 1st Armored Am ph ibian Tr actor Battali on , whi ch was to rem ain in Kobe. It was ex pected th at thi s uni t would be unde re m ploye d a nd had been gu tte d by transfe rring man y of its tro ops to th e 1st Tank Battali on . Th e l 7-ye a r-olds wo u ld be se nt as co m ba t replacem en ts as th ey turned 18. Tanks and am tracs had to be se rvice d , a nd water had d am aged tank am m u n itio n a nd re placemen t cloth ing. A j oint sho re party o rga n izat io n was thrown togethe r under th e army's 2d Enginee r Specia l Brigade. Th ere was a great d eal of co nfusio n du rin g th e cross-loa d ing a nd em barka tio n . As th e re was no tim e for d et ail ed lo ad planning, much less exe rcises and reh earsals, o n ly th e ex te n t of the ve te ra n m arin es' a m p h ib io us ex pe rie nces e ns ured a successfu l
T
LST-859, It s forecastle fest with 40mm and 20mm guns, it s weather deck crowded w' veh icles, beaches on the Be Red seawall. Eight LSTsbeat here by 1900hrs on D·Dayto off-load critical supplies and equipment. Bes ide the LST is LCM. In the foreground, rna . take cover in captured trent The Nippon Flour Company in the background. (USMC)
54
LCVPs move the line of departure in column . They will form into a line before making their run to Beach Green on Wolmi·do. In the background Inch'on burns. (USMC)
e m ba rka tio n. Most o f th e a m trac crews had not d riven th ei r veh icles in th e water. T he co m ba t-ex haus ted m arin es of RCT-5 at Pusan rus hed to load an d prepared to lead an am p h ibio us assa ult. Wh en th e b rigad e merged back into th e division o n September 13 th e b rigade co m mander becam e th e assista n t division co m ma n de r an d th e staffs co m bine d . Ce n Walk e r, co m ma nd ing th e h a rd -p ressed Eighth Army, wan ted to hold back th e 1st Prov MarBde from Inch ' o n . It was a reason abl e request , but Ce n Sm ith was co u n ting on RCT-5 to co nd uc t th e critica l Wolmi-do a nd Beach Red assa ults. Smith was charged with co nd uc ting a co m plex am p h ibio us assault usin g uni ts lacking e ithe r am p h ibio us training or reh earsa ls. At least RCT-S was blooded and , as a result of th eir co m bat expe rie nce, kn ew how to o pe ra te together smooth ly. A co nfe re nce was held o n September 3 to ad d ress th e issu e. Almond asked Smith if RCT-7 would a rrive in tim e to be su bstitu te d. Receivin g a negative a nswe r, h e proposed that th e 7th InfUiv's 32d Infan try be e m ploye d . Sm ith resp onded th at virt ually non e of th e leaders of th e 32d had any am p h ibio us expe rie nce . If th e 32d was su bstitu ted for th e 5th , the schem e of man euver would have to be drastica lly cha nged . RCT- I would hav e to be given th e 5th's mission o f landing o n Wolmi-do , th e Bea ch Blu e landing would be ca nce led, th ere wou ld be a d ela y sec uring a bea chh ead in so u the rn Inch 'o n and th e hi ghway would be blo cked as th e in experien ced 32d would hav e to foll ow th e 1st asho re o n Red : all in all, an unacceptable risk. Adm Str u ble suggeste d th e alte rna tive o f withd rawing th e bri gad e from Pusan as plann ed and positioning a 7th In ill iv RCT offs hore as a floating reserve. Once th e break out occu rre d thi s RCT would be re leas ed to fo llo w th e di vision int o In ch ' o n . This is th e co urse o f ac tio n that was finally foll owed. Th e 17th ROK Infantry Regim ent was to be a ttac hed to RCT-5, but th e 17th mi ght not be abl e to be re leased fro m its positions o n th e Pusan perim et er. T he 1st Prov MarBde ch ief o f sta ff proposed th e 1st KMC Regim e n t be substituted and CHQ approved th is. The division had 29,731 marin es, sold iers, and sailo rs assigne d fo r the assault. They were load ed ab oard an am p h ibious co m ma nd ship, six assa ult transporL~ , eigh t assault cargo transports, three d estroyer-transports,
55
An LCVP carrying 3d Platoon, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines makes its run for Wolml-do. Note the wooden scaling ladders built in Japan. (USMC)
3d Platoon, A/5 Marines stonn ashore on Wolmi-do over the seawall using scaling ladders. (See Battlescene 1, page 66 for details.)
56
three LSDs, 49 LSTs, o ne LSM, a nd 12 LSUs. T F90, th e attack force , departed fo r Inchon o n differen t da tes to e ns u re sec recy, accom mod ate th e different sh ips' speeds, a nd to rendezvous in th e So ut h Ch ina Sea so uth west of Korea. Divid ed in to movem ent gro u ps , th e Pontoon Movement Grou p d epa rted Yok o hama o n Sep te m be r 5, th e LSM (R) Grou p fro m Yok oham a o n th e 9th , Trac tor Grou ps A a nd B left Kobe o n th e 10th, Tra nsport Grou p from Kobe o n th e 1I th , a nd th e Adva nce Attac k Grou p left Pusan o n th e 13th . The 1st Prov MarBde was disenga ged fro m th e Pusan pe rim ete r a t m id n ight o n Septem ber 5. T he thi rd rifle compan ies a n d replacemen ts for th e bat talion anived by air from J apan. The 1st MAW h eadqua rte rs d epa rted Kobe aboard sh ip as Tac tical Air Co m ma n d, X Co rps unde r BGen T homas J. Cus h man, th e assista nt 1st MAW co m man de r.
Marine Aviation 1st Marine Aircratt Wing HQ Squadron 1 Manne Wing Service Squadron 1 Manne Aircratt Group 33 HQ Squadron 33 Marine Service Squadron 33 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 Marine Tactical Control Squadron 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 2 12 ' Musketeers" Marine Fighter Squadron 3 12 "Checkboa rds"
MarineFighter Squadron (Night) 513 "Flying Nightmares" Marine Fighter Squadron (Night)
542 SQuadrons afloat M
The fightersquadrons (\IMF) were 9CI-'PPed with 24 Chance Vought ' 4,,-48 Corsair fighters. The nightsquadrons were different: VMF(N) "3 had12 F4U-5Ns, while VMF(N) 542 t'
Even th e d eparture was a ga m b le , as Typho on Kezia, much stro nger than th e earl ie r TyphoonJan e , was bearing down on th e East Ch ina Sea, but fortun atel y it c urved more to th e north , a lth o ug h th e fleet felt its effec ts, Th e fle et e n te re d th e now qui et YelIow Sea scree ned by th e b lo ckade a n d screening Force and headed north. Th e 1st MarDiv's fin al o pera tio n plan was bri efed to Alm ond o n th e 6th wh en h e was inspecting th e division at Kob e . H e had previously in sp ec ted th e 7th InfDiv Au gust 3 1- Se p te m be r 3. Alm ond approved th e pl an , but felt th e marin es' m ovem ents ashore were too slow. He urged quickly securing Kimpo Airfie ld and moving on to Seoul. Almond was bri efed on th e 7th InfDiv's plans on th e 9th. H e was co nc e rned abou t co-ordination and liaiso n with th e marin es , whi ch would prove diffi cult. The marine units were briefed on th e operation's obj ective and plans whi le e n route . The preliminary bombardment co m m e nc ed on September 10 (D-5) wh en three flights of marine Co rsairs from th e USS Badoeng Strait (CVE116) a n d Sicily (CVE-118) sa tura te d Wolmi-do with napalm to burn off trees and reveal d efenses . Naval ca r rie r p lanes pounded In ch 'o n and Seoul on th e 12th a n d 13th . On th e l Oth a ROK patrol boat discovered th e NK laying mines in th e chann el. Floating mines were discovered in Flying Fish Ch a n nel o n th e m orning o f th e 13th (D-2) as d estroyers and cru isers moved in to so fte n th e objective. Th e sh ips pounded Wolmi-do and Inch 'on as navy and marin e p lan es bombed e nemy positions. NK coas ta l gu ns re tu rned fire a n d m ost were d estroyed afte r revealing th emselves. Three d estroyers were hit, but damage was minimal. More mines were di scovered as th e sh ips d eparted , but were d estroyed and no more were e ncou n te re d. At midnight o n th e 14th, naval Lt Eugene Clark switch ed on th e ligh tho use on Inch 'ori's ch an nel. Three hours later the Advance Attac k Group steamed past , led by th e USS Ma nsfield (DD-728). At 0454hrs navy a n d marine fighter-bombers began o rb iting Inch 'o n. Four cru isers and seve n d estroyers anch ored in a lin e alo ng th e cha n ne l and o pened fir e on th e island a t 0545h rs with 5-, 6-, a nd 8-in . guns. At 0600hrs Co rsairs made their first run on Wolmi-do, blasting it with bombs and ro ck ets . Th e air a ttac ks ce ase d at 061 5hrs, three LSM (R )s clo sed in and la u n ch ed hundreds of 4.5-in . roc ke ts.
ASSAULT: D-DAY Ab oard th e USS M ou nt McKinle)' L-Hour was co n firmed at 06 30hrs. Th e marines of 3/5 were boated aboard th eir LCVPs by 0600hrs and on sign al made th eir run to Beach Gree n o n th e short p eninsula jutting from th e north e n d of Wolmi-do . Th e fir st wave of seve n LCVPs hit the b each at 06 33hrs. The underwat er d emolition team h ad failed to clear boat wre ckage from th e beach , a n d landing cra ft h ad to maneuver about. Co m pa ny H , reinforced by a Co m p a ny G p latoon , sto rme d ashore as fighters stra fe d 50 ya rds in front o f th e m arines. Th e sec o nd wave brought in th e remainder of th e two co m pan ies two minutes la te r. Only random sh o ts g ree te d th e marines. Pausing bri efl y to re-organize, Company G, 3d Bat tali on , 5 th Marin es (G/5) , turned sou th a n d drove up Rad io HilI , m eetin g light resistan ce and stu n ned, su r re nde ring d efenders. T he America n flag was h oisted a to p th e hilI a t 0655hrs.
57
II I
1%1
226{·l
EVENTS 1. 0633 H RS , SEPTE M B ER 15 . 3d Battalion, 5th Marines land on Beach Green, Wolml-do . 2. 08 07 HRS , SEPT EM B ER 15 . 3d Battalion, 5th Marines secure Wolml -do. 3 . 1200HR S, SEPT EM B ER 15 . 3d Battalion, 5th Marines complete mop-up 01 Wolml-do and Sowolmi-do. 4 . 13 00HR S , SEPT EM B ER 15 . Morning tide completely receded. 5. 1705H RS , S EPT EM BER 15. Three LSM(R) s launch 6,000 rockets In vicinity 01 Beaches Blue and Red . 6 . 1724H RS , S EPT EM BER 15 . Beaches Blue and Red assault waves cross line of departure. 7. 1730HRS , S EPT EM B ER 15 . 3d Battalion, 1st Marines land on Beach Blue 1. 8. 1730HRS , SEPT EM B ER 15 . 2d Battalion, 1st Marines land on Beach Blue 2. 9. 1731HRS, SE PT EM BE R 15 . 2d Battalion, 5th Marines land on Beach Red.
58
10. 1733HRS , SEP TEM B ER 15. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines land on Beach Red.
11. 1755 HRS, S EPTEM B ER 15. A/1/5 Marines secure Cemetery Hili. 12. 18 00H RS, S EPTE M BE R 15.E/ 2/5 Marines secure British Consulate Hili. 13. 18 30HR S , S EPTEM B ER 15. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Regimental Reserve) begin landing on Beach Blue. 14. 184 5HR S, SEPTEM BER 15 . C/1/5 Marines secure Observatory Hili. 15 . 190 0HR S, SEPTEM BER 15. Eight resupply LSTs beach at Beach Red . 16 . 190 0HR S, SE PTEM BER 15. 1st & 2d Battalions (105mm), 11th Marines land on Wolml-do and ready to deliver supporting Ilres at 2150hrs. 17 . 1919HRS, SEPTEMBER 15. Evening tide reaches lull he ight (evening twilight 1909hrs). 18 . 22 30 HRS, SEPTEMBER 15 . F/2/1 Marines secure Hill 117 to cover Inch'on-Seoul Highway with l ire,
D-DAY, INCH'ON, SEPTEMBER 15, 1950 tst MarDiv launched their amph ibious assault to seize Inch'on on September 15 (D-Day), they quickly secured the beachheads and advanced as rapidly as possible on September 16 to secure Hill 117, nearing their ultimate objective of seizing Kimpo Airfield to provide a base for close air support aircraft, and clear the south bank of the Han River. Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 500 meters
xx
~ l Mar. Div. SMITH
"'
~ l Mar. DiV. PULLER
3d Balt alion, 51h Marines Company G, 3d Batt alion, 51h Marines Company H, 3d Battalion , 51h Marines Compa ny I, 3d Batt alion, 51h Marines 2d Batt alion, 1sl Marines 3d Batt alion, 1st Marines 1st Batt alion, 1st Marines (Regimental Reserve) Co mpany D, l sI Batt alion , l sI Marines Company F, 2d Baltalion , 1sl Marines Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines Company H, 3d Battalion, tst Marines Company I, 3d Battalion. 1st Marines 1st Battalion (-), 1st Marines elements , 1st Battalion, 1sl Marines 1st Batt alion. 5th Marines 2d Batt alion, 51h Marines Company A, 1sf Baltalion, 51h Marines Company B, 1st Battalion, 51h Marines Companies C and F, 1st Battalion . 51h Marinps Com pany D, 2d Battalio n, 51h Marines Company E, 2d Battalion , 5th Marines
59
60
MacArthur a board th e M ou nt M cKinley sim p ly sa id, "T hat's it. Let's ge t a cu p of co ffee ." H / 5 cleare d th e North Poin t a n d the industrial area, as well as th e ca useway access to In ch 'on. 1/ 5 foll owed beh ind H / 5 a n d was surprised to find a bypassed NK pl at oon m akin g hit-and-duck gre nade a ttacks. The marin e tank pl ato on accom pa nying 3/5 sealed th em in th eir h ol es with a d o zer tank. So me 30 No rt h Koreans su r re n de re d after two gOm m tank ro u n ds were fir ed into a tu n nel. Mop-up co ntin ued as marin es swe p t over th e island . Engineers laid AT mines o n th e ca useway and H / 5 es ta b lished a ro adbl ock , co vered by tanks fro m 1st Tank Battalion 's Com p a ny A. At 0800hrs the m a rin es radioed to th e flagship th at Wolmi-do was secure. Th e much-feared island d ominating th e harbor was in m arine hands. MacArthur a n no u nced, "T he Navy a n d Marines h ave n ever sh o ne m o re brightly th an thi s m orning. " A G/5 infantry/tank team advanced d own th e so u th ca use way to Sowolmi-do at 1000hrs. An NK platoon pinned th em d own a n d th e isle t was sa tu ra te d with n apalm by m arine fighte rs and barraged with m ortars. The islet was sec ured a t I I 15hrs. A~ 1/5 dug in o n Nort h Point, a n d H / 5 in th e industrial a rea, G/5 o n Radio Hill an d Sowolmi-do p repared for possible atta cks across th e mud fla ts from In ch 'on . Mutually su p porting trench es covere d th e island, alo ng with gu n p ositions. Mop-up was co m p le te d at noon. A ve ry small numbe r o f NKs escaped by swim m ing to In ch 'on , but 108 d ead we re co u n te d an d 136 pri son e rs tak en. There were estimates of 150 m ore d ead buried in the island 's co lla pse d positions a n d tunnels. Marine casua lties were 17 wou n ded . The tid e receded by 1300hrs. No NK tanks charged d own th e ca use way, no infantry swarmed across th e mud fla ts. Only a few civilians were spotte d in In ch 'on streets. The 3/5 o bservatio n post o n Radi o Hill ca lled in a co u p le o f fire missions a nd reported th e locati ons o f gun e m p lace ments. The accompanying shore party gro up unloaded ammu n itio n an d su pp lies from beached LSUs that had foll owed th e assau lt waves, a n d a reconnaissance party selec ted positions for th e two artillery battalions th at would a n ive in th e even ing. Because of th e almost co m ple te lack of e nemy ac tivity in ln ch 'on , th e 3/5 co m ma n de r re q ues ted permission to sen d an infantry tan k force into th e city to reconn oiter or sec ure Bea ch Red. Ca u tio n p rompted th e co m mander to d eny thi s permission, Th e hi gh tid e began flooding a t 1400hrs a t a ra te o f 3-~ kn o ts, faster than ex pected . H-H our was co n firmed as 1730hrs. Marine Corsairs an d n avy Skyraiders b egan to hit targets in In ch ' on , coordi nate d with naval gu n fire co m menc ing a t H-180 minutes. Rain squalls drifted th rough th e area and Beach Blu e was co vere d by ove rcas t and smoke . Assau lt tro ops soon began boating aboard almost 200 LCVPs, 70 LCMs, 12 LSUs, 164 am tracs, a n d 85 DUKW amphibious trucks. Destro ye r-transp orts took up sta tio n off of Beach es Red a nd Blue a n d a pat rol boat off Green to gu ide in th e a rtillery and cargo landing craft. At 1645hrs th e 18 a rmy a m p h ib io us tanks crossed th e lin e of d eparture h eading fo r Beach Blu e , with RCT-I foll owin g aboard a m tracs. In th e transp ort area 5 mil es to th e so u th th e LCVPs h eaded for Red a n d Green. The gu n sh ips began blastin g In chon a n d th e LSM (R )s laun ch ed 6,000 ro ck ets into th e city in 20 mi nutes. Th e m a rines in th e pitching Hi ggins bo a ts and amtracs riding in unde r gloomy skies a n d roaring gu n fire , drench ed in rain a n d sp ray, kn ew th ey we re assa u lting directly into a large Asia n city, so meth ing th at h ad n ever been a ttem p te d.
BEACH RED, 1730-1830HRS At H-8 minutes RCT-5 (-3/5) crosse d th e lin e o f d eparture in th eir LCVPs heading fo r Beach Red to th e north east of vVolmi-do . On Wolmi-do 3/5 opened a covering fire of ma chine guns and mortars backed by tanks. An e ngineer team advan ced down th e causeway to clear a route for th e tanks that would meet th e Beach Red tro ops. Marin e fighte rs streaked d own , strafing th e seawall behind LSM (R) barrages. The ap proach ing LCVPs, riding th e still-floo d ing tid e , e ncoun te re d only light fire. At I733hrs A/5 landed o n the left and th e assault platoon s gaine d th e seawall with little diffi culty usin g sca ling ladders. They adva nced toward Ce me tery Hill. At 1731 hrs E/ 5 landed o n th e righ t and mad e fo r British Co nsulate Hill. They met little resistan ce , but A/5 lost several men to submac h ine-g u n fire and th e rest were pinned down in a tr ench behind th e seawall. A ma chin e-gun bunker was sile nced with gre na des. The second wave was lat e , but A/5's 2d Plat oon pressed o n un opposed to sec ure th e Asahi Brewe ry. Part o f A/5 was pinned down , however, when th e second wave landed o n the bea ch . IstLt Baldomero Lopez was killed atte m pting to kn ock o u t a pillbox, which also killed a flam ethrowe r team. With 1st Platoon pinned, th e 2d Plat o on charged up Ce me tery Hill flushing o ut and ca p turing NKs. On th e crest, scores o f K so ld iers e me rge d from tr en ch es to th e plat oon 's dism ay, but only to surre nde r. This was th e 226 th Marin e Regim ent's mortar co m pany d azed by th e h eavy bom bardm ent. Ce metery Hill , whi ch d ominat ed Beach Red had been tak en in ten minutes wit hou t a cas ualty o n its slo pes. On th e righ t, E/5 moved inl and gain ing th e rail ro ad and th en th e Nippon Flour Co m pa ny building to th e so u th. Here th ey re-o rga n ized and moved on un opposed to British Co nsu late H ill, which th ey sec u re d a t 1845h rs. Twenty-two landin g waves would follow. Th e foll owin g C/5 was tasked with se izing th e north half o f Observato ry Hill and D/ 5 th e so u th half. Th ere was co n fus io n o n th e beach as waves o f men were a rriving so fast th at uni ts were intermi ngling. At l 830h rs th e e igh t LSTs bound for Beach Red crossed th e lin e of d eparture. See ing th e co ngestio n o f marin es o n th e bea ch th ey assume d th ey were not able to fight th eir way inl and . NKs o n Observato ry Hill o pe ned fire with mach in e gu ns and mortars hitting so me LSTs. Th e LSTs return ed fire with 40 m m a nd 20mm gu ns, but th ey also fired o n positions held by marines, dri ving th em off Ce me tery Hill and killin g on e and wou nd ing 23 in th e Nippon Flou r Co m pa ny. So me marines direct ed fire o n th e LSTs until th ey received th e message to cease fire. All e igh t LSTs were be rthed by 190 0h rs and the re was a ru sh to off load th em before th e next high tid e , a nd th e arrival o f more ships. A C/5 platoon rea ch ed th e sad d le between th e two main peaks on Observatory Hill at 1845h rs. With a non-operati onal ra d io, th ey were un abl e to noti fy a nyo ne o f th ei r success. Becau se of th e "m issing" plat oon whose position was u nknown , and d el ays o n the beach , B/ 5 was ordere d to take over C/5's mi ssion , and with D/ 5 prepared to a ttac k th e hill. At 2000hrs B/ 5 reach ed th e top with o n ly six wo unded. Fo r so me reason D/ 5 th ou ght part of E/5 was already o n so ut he rn Obse rvat o ry Hill. They sim ply march ed to the hill top up a stree t, but ra ther th an meeting E/ 5, th ey ran into NK d efenders. A short fir efight d eveloped, with th e co m pany losin g o ne d ead and th ree wo unded . Th e NK we re d riven off as d arkn ess
61
Yongjong-do
o C:15 Marines~(·) ~
"""'"-.-,.
RED ~
Cmetery Hill
GRE~JBEACH BEACH
3 ~5 Marines / '
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_ 105
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Marine landing, Sept 15 Marine positions, night, sept 15 Marine positions, night, sept 16 Marine Beachhead Line (BHLI 2m~
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fell. An F/ 5 platoon was placed in a ga p in th e lin e and Observatory Hill was secured. All units h ad reach ed th e O-A Lin e , but th ere was a ga p to th e so u th o f Observatory Hill a n d th e Inn er Tidal Basin . This was outposted by F/ 5 tro ops a n d th e re main de r o f th e co m pany es tab lished a position b esid e th e basin afte r m idnight. Beach Blu e was to the so u theast of th e Outer T idal Basin and sa lt pans. ReT-1 was loaded a board LSTs, alo ng with th e amtra cs that would run th em ash o re. Th e rain , h aze , smoke, a n d brisk cu rre n t, co u p led with in experi en ced a m trac cre ws a n d n o co m passes in th e a m tracs led to som e co n fusio n . Only a few m o rt ar rounds were received as th e first waves ran for sh o re. The army amphibian tanks ad va nced inland but were halted by an ea rt h slide. At I730h rs th e 3/ I assault amtracs ca me ashore on Blu e I . On th e left , D/ I rem ain ed mounted , m oved inland until halted by th e ear th slid e , and di sm ounted to co n tin ue o n . On th e right, F/ I dismounted , cleared a kn oll , a n d moved inland , but so me o f th e co m pany' s amtracs had gro u n ded o n mud Oats . On Blu e 2 th e 3/ 1 landing was m ade at 1740hrs b ecause of probl ems at th e lin e of d eparture a n d amtra cs we re sc a tte re d in th e smo ke a n d h az e .
In suffi cien t gu ide boa ts were ava ila ble a n d the a m tracs co uld not always lind th e b oat lanes. G/ I landed o n th e left a n d 1/ 1 o n th e right with a mtracs in termi ngl ed be tween waves. So me la nded on Blue 3 to the righ t. A d rain age ditch , the boundary betwee n 2/ 1 an d 3/ I , b loc ked so me o f th e a m tracs , Th e assa u lt tro ops we re h eld up b riefl y a n d m oved inland th rough d ense smoke a n d burnin g buildings that obsc ured landma rks. Despite th e co nfusio n, few casualties were suffe re d. After the third wave , th e foll owin g amtracs became serio us ly sca ttered a n d the co m panies re q u ired ad d itio nal tim e to asse m b le as it gre w d a rk e r. Th e regim ental reserve , 1/1 , was to land aboard LCVPs a t 1845hrs, but was mi sdirect ed a n d scatte re d with so me bo a ts landi ng a t th e Outer Tidal Basin befo re relaun ching. Rega rdl ess, the b a ttali on asse m b led a halfmil e inl and , but a n h ou r late . 0 / I secu re d its ro ad intersecti on a t 2000h rs and F/ I occupied most of Hill 117 to cover th e In ch 'o n-Seou l Hi ghway. At 1900hrs II 1 se ized part of Hill 223 a nd G/ I reach ed its bl o cking positi on a t 1930h rs. Most of G/ l filled th e ga p be twe en 1/ 1 a n d G/ l, whil e o ne o f its pla toons sei zed Hill 94 o n a ca pe so u th o f th e beach es. Thirty e nemy dead were found o n th e we ll-e n tre nc hed o bjective. RCT-I h ad successfu lly occ u p ied its 0- 1 Line. An H /l pl at oon was to h ave secured Hill 233 2,000yd to th e west, but the d a rkn ess a n d ro ugh te rrain allo wed th e platoon to reac h o n ly Hill 180 at h alf th e di stance. Havin g crossed th e ca useway into In ch o ' on , 3/5 linked up with th e rest of th e regim ent a t 2000h rs as the reserve . Both regim en ts se tt led d own for a long , ra iny, but qui e t n igh t. D-Day cas ualties were 2 1 d ead , o ne mi ssin g , 174 wounded , a n d 14 n on-battle injurie s; a fa r cry from th e di re predi ctions o f many o f the co m man ders . In th e eve ni ng o n \Volmi-do D UKW am p hi bian tru cks landed 1/11 a n d 2/ II Ma rines' 105mm h owitze rs to su p port RCT-5 a n d RCT-I , respectively. In additi on , 4/ 11 landed o n Beach Red in su p po rt of RCT5 o n 0 + I , an d th ey were foll owed by th e 96 th Field Art illery Battali on o n 0 +2 to su p port RCT-l ; both were armed with 155mm a rt illery. So me 500 tons of su pplies a n d eq ui pment were off lo ad ed from eac h o f th e e igh t LSTs beach ed o n Red so th ey co u ld retract a t th e m orning tid e. Resuppl y o f the assa u lt uni ts wen t as plann ed a n d th e shore party accom p lished m an y successes suc h as res toring trai n s into o peration a t the In ch ' on ra ilyar d . In three d ays trains were h auling tro ops a nd su p p lies to Ascom City. Based on th e n ecessity o f ge tt ing o u t o f In chon as soon as possible , th e orde r to co n tin ue the a ttack after d awn was issu ed that nigh t. RCT5 wo u ld push inl a nd to the 0-2 Lin e p lac ing it abreast RCT-I 's 0 -1 Lin e to form a con tin uo us b oundary. Th e Ist Korean Marine Co rps Regim ent (he ncefo rth I KMC) would land a t d awn a nd m op-up th e city. 0 +1 was clear a n d m ild when th e a ttac k began at 0600hrs with RCT-5 adva nc ing in co lu m n : 2/5, 1/ 5, a n d 3/5. Th e city was deserted a n d eerie as the troops moved o u t. Two hill s o n th e n o rth side o f th e hi gh way were occu p ied by 2/5, wh o co n tin ued to adva nce b eyond th e 0-2 Lin e to link-up with 2/ I a t Hill 117 a t 0900h rs. Mari n e fighters di scovered six T 34 tanks in Kangsong-n i 5 mil es a head of th e m a rines a nd d est ro yed th em . To th e so u th, 1/1 becam e th e regim ental rese rve as 3/ 1 swep t th e Munh an g Peninsul a to th e so u th . Resistan ce was n egli gibl e in all zon es, althoug h num e rous p rison ers were tak en , h eavy wea pons ca p tu re d, a nd
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Troops of Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines man a roadblock. on the causeway connecting Wolmi-do to mainland In ch'on. They are armed w ith a 3.5in. M20 bazooka and a .30cal M1919A4 light machine gun. The black tubes are for bazooka rockets. (USMC)
th e area was found to be well fo rt ified. Th e NK lacked the forces to co nd uc t a co u n te ra ttack as th e marin es broadened th eir foo th old. The adv ance was ru sh ed ra p id ly to th e 0 -3 Lin e , a 3-m ile-lo ng lin e at th e ba se of th e co njoined In ch' on and Munhan g pe nins ulas, 1 to 1% mil es beyond th e 0 -2 Lin e . At 1045hrs th e o rder was given to adva nce toward th e Force Bea chh ead Lin e (FBH L) , a right-an gle lin e anc hore d on th e sea at both e nds. Th e 5-m ile-lo ng no rth side ra n parallel with th e In ch 'on-Seoul Hi ghway, then turn ed so u th o n a 7-mil e fron t. It e ncom passed the so u the rn half o f Asco m City and th e Namdong Peninsul a to th e so uth . Th e hi gh way was th e boundary between th e two regime nts. T he at tack was laun ch ed at 1335hrs. Wh en th e 5th Marin es reached Kanso ng-n i th ey found three o f th e T 34s still operational, bu t th ey were d estro yed by ma rin e tanks before th ey co u ld fire . On e of th e six had escape d. Th e 5th Marin es dug in o n a lin e of hill s alo ng th e north side of the FBHL and stre tc h ing so u theast o u tside of Ascorn and 3,000 yards short o f the FBHL. Th e 1st Marines took up n ight positions so uth of the hi ghw ay and farth er so u th on th e Namdong Peninsul a. Only sn iping had been e nco un te re d du rin g th e d ay, costi ng th e di vision four d ead and 2 1 wounded. Som e 120 NKs were killed an d 30 pri soners ta ke n . T he division co m mand post was es ta blished o n th e so u theast o uts kirts o f In ch 'on by n oon . Th e am ph ibio us assa ult phase was co m ple te d 24 hours afte r th e landing.
THE DRIVE TO KIMPO: D+1 TO D+2
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Th e night of Sep te m be r 16-17 was quiet. Th e reality was that the NK in Seoul did n ot kn ow marine locati ons and beli eved they were still in In ch 'on . Th at night 0 / 5 occu pied a hill o n th e west side of th e In ch 'o n- Seoul Hi ghway a n d o u tposte d a kn oll 200 yards to th e northeast cove ring a bend in th e road o n th e edge of Asco m City. T hese
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positions were re inforce d by F/ 1 to th e so uth and a plat oon of tan ks with bazo ok as a nd recoill ess rifles co ver ing th e road . A co lum n of six T 34s and 200 infantrym en ap proac hed j us t before d awn . As th e unsusp ecting Ks passed th e o u tpos t th ey were engaged and wiped o ut in short o rder. MacArthur visited th e battl efield that day. Th e next move was to se ize th e cri tical Kimpo Airfi eld 6 miles to th e north east of Asco m City. At 0700hrs th e attack began, with 2/5 moving up th e Inch 'o n- Seo ul Highw ay, and th en swinging north into Ascom City, two square mil es of homes, factori es, and storage faciliti es which was occu pied by NK su rvivors from In ch 'on . 3/ 1 KMC attacked through 2/ 5 into th e west side o f Asco m . The 2d Engineer Sp ecial Brigade relieved th e rest o f I KMC o f In ch 'on sec u rity lat er in th e day. At 0900hrs 2/ 5 began figh ting its way up th e eas t side o f th e co m plex. Men of 3/5 moved into th e west side to su p port 3/ 1 KMC, which moved north to occupy hi lls west of Kimpo. Supported by tanks, 2/ 5 followed ro ads leading out of Asco m to th e north east toward Kimpo , whil e 1/ 5 took up positions to th e south o f Kimpo. Outside Ascom, no enemy was to be found and th e road was clear to Kimpo. Meanwhile , 2/5 advanced north to the airfi eld and at 1800hrs 0 / 5 was o n th e so u th e nd of th e nll1way expe riencing littl e opposition . Th e air fie ld was surro u nde d by villages and bas e faciliti es and proved diffi cult to clea r, even witho ut resistan ce. There was an aft ern oon skirm ish around th e train sta tio n, as well as sniping as th e marines closed in o n th eir night positions. Th e division was advi sed that RCT-7 had a rrived at Kobe , was preparing to re-embark, and would arrive at In ch 'o n on th e 2 1st. Th e NK 1st Air Force Division , a hodge-podge of se rvice and combat units includ ing su rvivo rs of Inch 'on, was attempting to establish a d efense, but was sitting on unfavorable terrain between Kimpo an d th e Han River. T h ey were disorganized and panicked at the spe ed of th e Am erican a ttac k; man y d eserted. Regardless, three co un te ra ttac ks were launched at 2/ 5 during th e night, but o n ly a few hundred men were co m m itte d without su p port ing fire , th e first a t 0300hrs. One o ut pos t Marines pause beside a still burning T34, probably knocked out by US tank fire. As the marines closed on Seoul the hills became higher. (USMC)
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BEACH RED SEAWALL, 1733HRS, SEPTEMBER 15 (pages 66-67)
Medal of Honor citation best describes this Naval Academy graduate's sacrifice:
The first wave to land on Beach Red was made up of four landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP) (1) carrying A/5 Marines assault platoons on the left tasked with seizing Cemetery Hill. In addition four LCVPs with two assault platoons from E/5 were charged with securing British Consulate Hill on the right flank. From Wolmi-do 1,000yd to the southwest 3/5, who had landed earlier, provided covering fire. LCVPs were employed because t he seawall could not be negotiated by amtracs. It was felt LCVPs could clear the area more quickly than amtracs had they been used to nose up to the seawall and disembark troops. Room had to be made for eight follow-on landing sh ips, tank (LSn carrying ammunition and supplies. Each LCVP was equipped with two makeshift scaling ladders (2). Platoons were split between two LCVPs to form boat teams of 20 -plus men. The boat team concept was implemented in World War II. Each boat team, under an officer or NCO, was task-organized and augmented with machine guns, 3.5in. bazookas, and flamethrowers from the company weapons platoon and battalion assault platoon. They would fight inland as boat teams until the situation stabilized and they reconstituted into squads and platoons. 1stLt Baldomero Lopez's (3) 3d Platoon, A/5 came ashore in the second wave. The platoon was pinned down by machine-gun fire from behind-thebeach pillboxes and casualties mounted. 1stLt Lopez attempted to attack one pillbox (4) with a grenade and was hit, but sacrificed his life to protect his exposed men. His
"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Rifle Platoon Commander of Company A, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces during the lnch'on invasion in Korea on 15 September 1950. With his platoon First Lieutenant Lopez was engaged in the reduction of immediate enemy beach defenses after landing with the assault waves. Exposing himself to enemy fire, he moved forward alongside a bunker and prepared to throw a hand grenade into the next pillbox whose fire was pinning down that sector of the beach. Takll under fire by an enemy automatic weapon and hit in the right shoulder and chest as he lifted his arm to throw, hetel backward and dropped the deadly missile. After a moment he turned and dragged his body forward in an effort to retrieve the grenade and throw it. In critical condition from pain and loss of blood, and unable to grasp the grenade firmly enough to hurl it, he chose to sacrifice himself rather than endanger the lives of his men and, with a sweeping motion of his wounded arm, cradled the grenade underhim and absorbed the full Impact of the explosion." His platoon's two flamethrower operators (5) were hit attempting to destroy the bunker. The 2d Platoon on the right, as yet to suffer any losses, were directed to support the 3d and they were able to clear the bunkers as 1st Platoon assaulted Cemetery Hill to allow follow-on waveU land safely. Only two other Medals of Honor were £warderl at lnch'on, one of which was posthumous.
ma rin e plat oon was fo rced to withdraw back to its co m pa ny whe n a T34 appeared , as th e platoon lacked a n ti-ta n k weapons. The sec o nd attac k was at 0500hrs, and th e last a t d awn was disrupted by 1/ 5. The area arou nd th e airfi eld was cleared by 1000hrs o n th e 18th and high ground to th e east soon sec u re d. Marin e cas ua lties we re light, wh ile th e NK lost over 100 dead a nd ten prison e rs. On Se pte m be r 19 Tactical Air Co m mand, X Corps was es tablished o n Kimpo and three fighter squadrons flew in from J apan to co m mence o pe ratio ns. On th e morning o f th e 17th, RCT-I was hi t by a co m pa ny attac k in its positions to th e so u th o f Asco m, but it was disp e rsed by F/ 1. Th e lead battalions moved o u t to a ttac k eas twar d so uth o f RCT-5. They we re soo n e n meshed in fir efi ghts in th e hill s, with E/ I pinned d own. The attac k co n tin ue d, but a surprise assau lt push ed ba ck part of 3/ I. A co un te rattack was launched a nd th e area cleared. Marine losses were light and th e NK lost 250 men and 70 p rison ers, as well as a T 34 a nd six AT guns d estro yed. Alm ost 5,OUO yards had been ga ined and new position s were assu med o n a lin e stre tch ing from th e Ascom-Sosa Hi gh way so uth with 2/1, 3/ 1, and 1/1 on lin e. Th e division re connaissan ce co m pany patrolled th e Namdong Peninsul a to th e so u th. In th e meantim e , Eighth Army b roke o u t of th e Pusan pe rim et er o n th e 16th. It to ok three d ays of hard fighting to sec ure a bridgehead on th e far side o f th e Na kto ng and co m mence th e dri ve to Seoul. On th e sam e d ay, the 19th, th e 1st MarDiv CP mov ed into O eoso-ri 1-1 %miles so u theast o f Kimpo. The 7th InfDiv began landing at In ch 'on o n th e 18th with the 32d Infan try th e first to co me ashore , accom pa n ied by th e 49 th Field Artillery Bat tali on . T he 3d InfDiv, sa iling fro m th e Sta tes, wo uld n ot a rrive in tim e to participat e in th e ca m pa ign, but th e 187th ARCT would arrive o n th e 23rd.
CROSSING THE HAN RIVER The mornin g o f th e 18th found RCT-5 o n th e move north east o f Kimp o. Th ere was ins ign ifica n t resistan ce an d o nce its o bjectives were occ u pied th e battali ons co nd uc ted pat rol s to th e fro nt: 1/1 a nd 3/ I KMC sec ured th e base of th e Kimpo Peninsula o n th e RCT-5 's le ft flank. T he 17th ROK Regi m ent landed a t In chon o n th e 18th and was attac he d to th e 1st MarDiv to patrol th e area between Asco m and th e sea where scattered NK were holding o u t. On th e morning o f th e 18th RCT-I a ttac ked eas t fo cu sin g o n Sosa a nd Hill 123 behind th e to wn in th e northern portion o f its zo ne. Nava l gu nfire so fte ned up what were th ought to be stro ng e nemy positions. The assa u lt was led by 2/1 , th en 3/ I passed through abo a rd am tracs and Du cks. By noon th ey were in Sosa expe rie nc ing ve ry light opposition ; 3/ 1 th en occu pied Hill 123. On th e left 1/ 1 adva nced 4,00 0 yards. Both regimen ts dug in for th e night. On th e same d ay repo rts fro m air observers and civilians from across th e di visio n 's front indicat ed th e K were co ncentra ting west of Yongdungp 'o and north o f the Han. T he e ne my eas t of Kimpo was withdrawin g toward Yongdungp 'o and co nce n tra tio ns were spo tted on th e Kimp o Peninsul a to th e northwest. Other troops we re moving int o Seoul from th e no rth and eas t. It was ap pa re n t th e marines were goi ng to be hit with multiple fro n tal and flanking a ttacks. In th e afte rnoo n
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TANK AMBUSH AT ASCOM CITY, SEPTEMBER 17 (pages 70-71 ) On the night of September 16 the 5th Marines were approaching Ascom City from the southwest. On the west side of the Inch'on-Seoul Road 0/5 established a perimeter atop Hill 186. Some 200yd beyond was a large knoll abutting the edge of Ascom, on which the company commander, 1stLt H.J. Smith, posted 2ndLt L.R. Smith's 2d Platoon. The main road passed through a cut on the knoll's southwest side with high ground on the other side. After dark an NK truck barreled down the road, was halted by 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, and its five occupants, one an officer, were taken prisoner. It was apparent the NK had no idea where the marine lines were. At 0545 hrs Just as the sunrise brightened the sky, six T34 tanks of the 42d NK Tank Regiment approached the outpost from the east. Strung out for 200yd were an estimated 250 infantry on foot and riding on the slow-moving tanks. The infantry were from assorted units of the 18th NK Division in Seoul. They were Ignorant of the marines' presence and they were eating and talking as the tanks rolled down the road. 2ndLt Howard reported the force to 1stLt Smith. Howard allowed the force to continue on toward Company D's position and both marine units opened fire with rifles, BARs, machine guns, 3.5In . " super bazookas," and 75mm recoilless rifles. The NK Infantry were cut down In minutes. The attack was Initiated by Cpl Okey
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Douglas with a 2.36In. bazooka (1). He had slipped down the knoll and opened fire, knocking out the lead tank and damaging the second. The others continued down the road through a barrage of fire and were met by the marine lank platoon, which pumped 45 90mm rounds Into the tanks and panicked infantry. In the end, 200 enemy dead and all six tanks were scattered on the road with only one marine Iighllr wounded. Marine battalion assault platoons were armed with the new 3.5in. M20 bazooka when they deployed', but company and platoon headquarters were provided with the older 2.36in. M9A1 bazooka as a supplemental antl·lank weapon. Often condemned as ineff ect ive against the T34, nonetheless the World War II weapon could knock one out from the side or rear. The "three-point-flve," though, became the mainstay Infantry anti-tank weapon and was widely issued to other UN and ROK forces. Weighing 141b,the weapon was light for the capabilities It offered, and its HEAT rockets were 8.5Ib. Its maximum effective rangewas 300 yards. The Soviet-made 32-ton T34 tank (2) had been perfected during World War II and proved deadly against German armor. The original model was armed with a 76.2mm gun, but those In Korea mounted an effective 85mm ZIS-S-53 (3). It also mounted a co-axial 7.62mm DTM machine gun and another in the bow (4) manned by a four-man crew. The accompanying NK Infantrymen Wl!Ili armed with 7.62mm M 1944 bolt-action carbines (witha folding bayonet) (5) and 7.62mm PPSh41 submachlne gUl1l • It is often assumed the 3.5in. bazooka was not developed unUilhe2. found inadequate agains t the 734. bu t the 3.5in. had already beens although it had not been fielded to Army units in the Far EBst.
Army LVT(A)5 amphibious tanks of Company A, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion c ro s s the Han River. They mounted a 75mm howitzer and three .3 0 ca l machine guns. The M arines' own 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been left in Japan - It was undermanned as many personnel had been sent to fill M26 tank crews. (USMC)
mortar barrages began to intensify and th e marines prepared for a lon g night. T hey were de ployed with 1 KMC northwest of Kimp o, RCT-5 south of Kimp o , RCT-l so utheast of Sosa, and th e 32d In fantry so uth of Ascom in l st MarDi v Rese rve. Th e 17th Infantry would arrive o n th e 20th. Regardless of th e build-up, o rders were issu ed in th e lat e afternoon for RCT-5 to reconn oiter th e Han th e n ext day and cross it o n th e 20th. On ce th e e ne my north of th e Han had been d efeated, th e regim ent would drive eas t to Seo u l. O f th e th ree fe rry cross ings, th e o ne o pposi te Kimp o a t Haen gju was th e best situa ted. In suffi cient bridgin g materi als were o n hand to spa n th e wide river, but th ere were large numbers of a m tracs and Du cks, as well as two 50-to n pontoon rafts . In preparati on th e 32d In fantry moved into th e lin e left of RCT-l at 1200hrs o n September 19 relievin g 1/1 , and th e marin es side-slippe d to th e right. At th e same tim e it was re leased back to 7th InfDi v con tro l. Movin g no rth , 1/1 re lieved 1/ 5 o n th e so uth e nd of its lin e, while 2/1 KMC co n tin ue d to adva nce in th e no rth. The l st Am ph ibian Tractor Battali on was re lieved fro m su ppo rt ing RCT-l and marsh aled a t Kimpo, and th e Du ck co m pa ny moved th ere too . The 1st Sh o re Party Battalion co nce n tra ted at O eoso-ri, 1/ 5 Marines ga ine d a position near Haengju, the cross ing site . Littl e time re m ained for pl anning as th e Reconnaissance Co m pa ny would cross th at ve ry night and th e main assault wou ld co m me nce a t dawn . Un its assigne d th e cross ing included : l st Mari nes l st & 4th Battalions, 11th Marin es l st Am ph ib ian Tractor Battalion l st Engineer Batt ali on l st Shore Party Batt alion 2d Batta lion , 1st KMC l st Amphibian Truck Co m pa ny Reconnaissance Co m pany, l st MarDiv Co m pa ny A, l st Tank Battalion Co m pa ny A, 56 th Am ph ibia n Tank & Tractor Battalion At 2000h rs a 14-man reconnaissan ce co m pa ny team swam across th e Han , followed a t 2 100h rs by th e rest of th e co m pa ny and eng ineers
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EVENTS 1. S EPTE MB ER 19 . 5th Marines H approach Han River from Kimpo Airfield on night of September 19 . 2. 2000 HRS-2040HRS, SEPTEMBER 19. Reconnaissance Company 14-man team swim river. 3 21 OO HRS, SEPTEMBE R 19 . Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by engineers, attempt to cross river aboard nine LVTs and are turned back by heavy fire from Hill 125. 4. 0615 HRS, SE PTEMBER 20 . 15-mlnute artillery preparation by 1st & 4th Battalions, 11th Marines. 5. 0630 HRS-0650HRS , SE PTEMBER 20 . 3d Battalion, 5th Marines cross river aboard LVTs in the order of Companies I, H, and G. 6. SEPTEM BE R 20 . 1/3/5 Marines conduct two-pronged attack on Hill 125 (Objective 'ABLE') and secure It against heavy resistance. 7 . SEPTEMBER 20 . NK troops f1eeln9 Hill 125 are attacked by four Marine Fighter Squadron 214 Corsairs. 8. 0940 H RS . S EPTEMBER 20 . G/3/5 Marines attack and secure Hill 51 (Objective 'BAKER').
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9. 0940 H RS, SEPTE MBER 20 . H/3/5 Marines attack and secure Hill 95 (Objective 'CHARLIE' ).
10 . 1000HRS- 1030 HRS, SEPTEMBER 20. 2/5 Marines cross river, advance north to Hill 51, then move west to Objectives IDOG' and 'ECHO' stili aboard LVTs. 11 . SEPTEMBER 20 . 2/5 Marines forced to dismount LVTs because of swamps outside Sojong. 12. SEPTEMBER 20 . 2/1 KMC cross river aboard LVTs and Ducks to protect 5th Marines' rear. 13. SEPTEMBER 21 . 1/5 Marines cross river, assemble near Hill 95, and prepare to lead
next day's advance to Seoul. 14 . 1400HRS, SEPTEMBER 2 1. 5th Marines CP cross river and establish at Sojong. 15 . 1415HRS. SEPTEMBER 21 . 0/2/5 Marines secure Objective 'ECHO.' 16 . 1415HRS, SEPTEMBER 21 . E/2/5 and F/2/5 Marines secure Objective 'DOG.'
HAN RIVER CROSSING, SEPTEMBER 20, 1950 The 5th Marines ' and the Korean Marines' commenced their assault crossing of the 400yd-wide Han River on September 20, while en route to Yongdungp 'o. The attack on North Korean troops was supported by air strikes from Marine Corsairs in the surrounding area of Hill 125 (Objective 'ABLE'). Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1 kilometer
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MARINE FORCES 15th Marines (oj 2 Reconnaissance Company 1st MarOiv 3 3d Battalion, 5th Marines 4 Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines 5 Company G, 3d Battalion , 5th Marines 6 2d Battalion, 5th Marines 7 Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines 6 Company D, 2d Battalion . 5th Marines 9 Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines 10 Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines 11 2d Battal ion, 1st ROK Marines 12 tst Battalion , 5th Marines NORTH KOREAN FORCES NK units
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aboard nine amtracs. The company was to seize and hold three hills, one on the river's edge and two others up to 2,000yd distance, until relieved by 3/5. It was too ambitious a mission for the small lightly armed unit. Finding no significant defenses, they signaled the amtracs to cross. When their engines turned over, the NK on Hill 125 overlooking the river opened fire. The amtracs attempted to cross regardless, but two were stranded in mud and abandoned when the order was given to withdraw. Casualties were light, but the undetected NK battalion on the hill had foiled the first crossing attempt. Concerned with the image presented by marines unable to cross a 400-yd-wide water barrier, commanders relaunched the attack at 0630hrs after a short artillery preparation. Marines from 3/5 crossed under heavy fire, but no amtracs were lost and casualties were negligible. As Corsairs blasted Hill 125, I/5 overran it. The fleeing NKs were struck by the Corsairs. By 0940hrs C/5 and H /5 had secured Hill 51 north of 125 and Hill 95 northwest of 125. Soon after 2/5 crossed the Han and, still aboard amtracs, moved north to Hill 5] then west through Sojong to seize hills beyond Hill 95. Later, 2/] KMC soon cro ssed to protect the rear of RCT5, followed by 1/5 on the 2]st. The Marines dug in for the night in a secure bridgehead north of the Han, suffering only 21 casualties. Satisfied that Chromite was a success after so many dire predictions, Cen MacArthur enplaned after a final tour of the battlefield and returned to Tokyo on the 2]st. That same day X Corps established its command post (CP) in Inch'on. RCT-7 arrived with 3/1] Marines, a much-needed artillery battalion. Fears of an NK attempt to retake Kimpo materialized as two enemy battalions were reported facing 3/] KMC, but they made no serious attempt to cross the Han after suffering air attacks. Air support and artillery became more important as the lead marines were now beyond naval gunfire range. The 1st MarDiv was now split, with RCT-5 on the north side of the Han and the rest of the division to the south.
THE YONGDUNGP'O FIGHT
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Yongdungp'o was an industrial town on the southwest side of the Han opposite Seoul. It was overlooked by high ground to its west. Between the hills and the town was the narrow Kalchon River, which presented only a minor obstacle. The east side of the Kalchon was backed by levees providing the NK defensive positions. The road and railroad bridges linking the two cities had been dropped. Separating Yongdungp'o from the Han was a 1 ~ by 2~-mile sandbar on which was situated the small Seoul airstrip. While Yongdungp'o could be reinforced and resupplied at night by ferry across the Han and the open sandbar, the town was isolated during daylight and the defense could not be sustained. At dawn on the 19th RCT-I advan ced from Sosa to secure hills overlooking Yongdungp'o. Hills on the RCT's north flank adjacent to the Han were secured by 1/5, who then encountered mortar and small arms fire and a 500-man counterattack. This force was trapped on low ground and suffered 300 dead and 100 prisoners. Other groups of marshaling NK were pasted by artillery. 3/1 and 2/] also met stiff resistance, and mines hindered the tank advance, but they secured objectives over-
Marines from t he 1st Engineer Battalion assemble pontoon rafts in t o two 50 -ton-capac ity rafts to fe r ry tanks and veh icles across the Han River. Insufficient pontoons w ere ava ilable to span the 400yd-wid e r iver. (USMC)
Marines advance t h roug h the suburbs of Inch'on, 0+1 . The NKs had mostly fled the city. It would have taken significantly longer to clear the c ity if more resistance had been offered. (USMC)
lookin g Yong d u ngp 'o , infli cti ng 350 casualties o n th e No rt h Koreans. Having reli eved 1/ 5 adjacen t to th e river, 1/1 was hit by infantry and five T 34s before d awn o n th e 20th . Daylight reveal ed 300 NK d ead, two d estroyed T34s and o ne ca ptu re d. The marin es suffe re d a se tbac k as th e powe rful 4.5in . batte ry lacked th e necessary fuses for its roc kets , whic h did not arrive until the 28 th. T he fighti ng and maneuvering in th e low hill s adj acen t to th e rive r by 1/1 lasted through th e 20th . In th e so uth e nd o f th e RCT-1 zone , 2/1 repulsed an NK mornin g attack as it advanced o n th e hi ghw ay to ward Yongdungp 'o and ca p tu re d intact th e bridge ove r th e Ka lch on River. To its so uth, th e 32d Infantry was still movin g up o n lin e with the marines. NK hidden alo ng th e riverbank managed to a m bus h a wire-layin g d et ail and so me e ngineers, killin g or cap tu ring all o f th e men . After a qu iet night, (apa rt than the co nstan t she lling ofYon gdungp'o ) 1/1 and 2/1 assaulted th e town in th e morning. The K had co nce n tra ted th eir defenses in th e north near th e Han and in th e so uthwes t, but the cen tral western portion was d efenseless. In th e north 1/1 seized the Kalchon bridge and fou ght through a series o f fortifi cations to secu re a foothold in th e northwest co rner o f th e town . The NK were deployed in sequential co m pa ny stre ng th lines o n dikes and levees, but the American attac k stalled becau se of co nfusio n over requests for artillery su ppo rt. This was because th e artillery saw th e 1/1 attac k as heading north to Seoul, but becau se of the o rien tation of th e NK po sitions, th e battalion was atta cking so uth . To th e artill ery, it ap peared that th eir fire wou ld hit the battalion rear. Once th e misunderstanding was so rte d o ut, however, marine fighters joine d in blasting th e enemy positions. Whil e most o f th e battalion was stalled, A/ 1 took an un exp ected route across a mi le of rice paddies and forded th e Kalchon , co nce aled by high rice stalks. By n oon th ey had pen etrat ed well into th e heart of Yongdungp 'o withou t d et ecti on. The town 's bui ldings were widely interspaced and th ey had good observatio n all around. Makin g their way almos t all th e way through th e town , th e co m pany reponed their position
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and th e battali on co m m a n de r o rde re d them to co n tin ue. Th ey approach ed th e juncti on with th e Han River b rid ge highway and engaged su rp rised NKs, who sca tte re d a t th e sigh t of m arin es deep insid e th e town . The m arines took up a n elo ngated defen sive position ato p a dike . From th eir van tage point th ey co uld see ac ross th e wide sa nd ba r to Seo ul an d saw NKs withdrawin g before a siste r co m pany's assault to the northwest. Wh at ap pea re d to be a coal pil e was ac tua lly th e main am m u n ition dump fo r th e Yongdungp 'o d efenders, so it was blown up. A nearby building was found to be filled with US artillery, ammunition , equ ip men t, an d m edi cal supplies, th e last of great value to th e now cu t-orr co m pa ny - their radi o had di ed. The NK made repeated a ttacks o n th e penet rati on. The Marines dug d eep fo xh ol es, whi ch saved th em a t dusk when five unescorte d T34s
A marin e sn iper f ires at target s from the south side of the Han River. He is armed w ith a .3 0c al M1903A1 Springfield rifle fitted with an ax Urertl telescope . The railroad bridge is the farthest to the left. (USA)
a ppeared. T hey ra n th e length of the dike five times, blastin g th e marines with 85 m m a nd machine gu ns at 30 yards . Bazook as kn ocked o ut o ne and damaged two befo re th ey with drew. On e marine was injured. Before midnight five grou nd assa ults we re re p ulsed no rthwest. A ca p tu red NK ofli cer m an aged to run off yelling warnings to his co m rades to halt th ei r attack as th e marines were too stro ng. They heeded his advice. They left behind 250 d ead a nd aba ndo ned all the T34s. In th e so u th 2/ I crossed th e bridge they h ad seized th e d ay befo re , but were tak e n under h eavy fire as th ey a p proache d a secon d, thi s o ne cross ing a Kalch on tributary. Casua lties were high a nd th e unit had su ffe re d earlie r losses. Str iking fro m th e n orthwest, 3/ 1 was co m m itte d to reli eve th e ba tta lio n a n d as th ey fo rd ed th e Kalch on , met resistance on th e levees. As n igh t fell both bat talions we re dug-in o n both sides of th e In ch ' o n- Seo u l Hi ghway and remained ou tside th e town . Th e 32d Infantry, fac ing littl e res istance, swu ng far to th e so ut h a n d cu t th e rail road a n d hi ghway leading so u th to Suwon . They were positioned so u th o f Yo ngd u ngp'o, but th e re was a 2-mi le ga p between th em a nd RCT-I. Th e loss of th e a m m u n itio n dump to A/I forced th e e ne my to give up Yongdu n gp 'o a n d th ey left behind m ost o f their h eavy wea pons. On th e 22d RCT-I cleared th e town a n d took up p osition o n th e Han . Th ey would cross into Seou l th e n ext d ay.
ATTACKING THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE On th e 2 1st RCT-5 was a rraye d to a p proach Seou l alo ng th e ra ilroad leading into th e ci ty fro m th e n orthwest. On th e 22 11(1 3/5 o n th e left flank se ized Hill 2 16; 1/1 KMC to ok Hill 104 in th e ce n ter ove rloo king th e rai lroad; and 1/ 5 took Hill 68 betw een th e railroad a n d th e Han. Two quality NK uni ts had established a m ain lin e of res ista nce ove r 6,000yd lo ng o n high er hill s behind th e ini tial ma rin e objectives. It stre tch ed n orth east fro m th e Han across Hill s 105-S, 56 , 88 , 296, a nd 338 , a maze o f h ills and rid ges cu t by ra vines, draws, a n d sp u rs with additional d efenses dug into o ther hill s to th e rea r. T he 25 th Rifle Brigad e and 78th Independe nt Regim ent we re prepa red to o ffer a sto u t res ista nce to d efend Seoul. (T h e re we re th ree Hill s 105 in the immedi a te a rea, one in eac h battali on zo ne, and were d esign at ed No rt h, Ce n tra l, a nd So u th to prevent con fus io n .) Hill 2 16 o n th e north flank was tak en with ease, but th e Korean marines m et much res ista nce o n 104, althoug h th ey eve ntually sec u re d it. T he marines o f 1/ 5 experie nced no difficul ty taking 68 to th e sou th . Problems began , though , when 3/5 co n tin ued from 216 to 296. They reported it sec u re d , bu t three la rge so u thern sp urs were still d efended ; Hill 296 was o ne o f th e K ce n te rs of d efense . Hills 56 , 88, 10S-N, 10S-C, 72, a nd 10S-S wou ld all h ave to be cleare d a t great cos t. On Hill 296 H /l began to ex perie nce diffi culties with co m pa ny-size co u ntera ttac ks and fire from th e overloo king Hill 338 . It took all th ree 1/5 co m pa n ies to sec ure 105-S, finally ach ieving it lat e in th e d ay, with 43 casualties. Having run into th e ce n te r o f resistance o n Hill 56 , 1/1 KMC was force d to withdraw to 104. Because o f th is, o ne 1/ 5 co m pa ny \V;:L~ withdrawn to Hill 68 in order to su p port th e Korean marin es' ren ewed assa ult th e following morning.
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On the road to Seoul part of a marine squad digs in on a hillside for the night. A marine rifle squad had three .30cal Browning automatic rifles (BAR), while army squads had only one. In comparison, an NK section (squad) had one 7.62mm DPM light machine gun. (USMC)
The road to Seoul saw repeated ambushes and firefights. Every hill and ravine had to be cleared. Farther ahead are marine M26 tanks, followed by an M4A3 dozer-tank and a jeep. (USMC)
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On the 23rd RCT-7 was finally ready for frontline operations. It had been doing mop-up to allow it a shakedown before commitment. The regime n tal CP and 3/7 crossed the Han and was positioned to the rear of RCT-5. The next day 2/7 northwest of Kimpo was relieved by the 187th ARCT, which had just arrived. The 7th would move to the northeast of RCT-5 to protect its flanks, rear and prevent the enemy from escaping north from the city. On the morning of the 23rd 1/ 1 KMC attacked to straighten out the lin e. While preferring a flanking attack, the time remaining in the day forced 2/5, attacking through the KMC, to make a frontal attack on Hill 56, through which ran a rai lroad tunnel. No one realized that this was part of the main NK defense line. The hill was taken, but as D/5 continued on to the next ridge, named Smith's Ridge after the company
A Soviet-supplied T34/85 tank. This one appears to have been knocked out by aerial rockets and/or bombs. (USMC)
commander, th ey were hit heavy and losses were high . The su rvivors dug in for th e night, but fortunat ely no co u nterattac ks were received. The other two ba tta lio ns held d efensive positions through th e da y as 2/ 5 gained a foothold in th e hills and th ey did fight off co u n te rattac ks. That sam e day, th e 3 1st Infantry took over sec u rity ofSuwon , 3 1 miles so uth of Seoul , and es tablishe d a blocking position. The attac k on th e 24th was again carried o ut by 1/ 5 to secure the remainder of Hill 56 and clear Smith's Ridge. F/ 5 had onl y 90 men, but D/ I was closer to full strength when it assaulted a large knob atop 56. It was soon pinned and th ere were co nstan t gre nade duels and efforts by both sides to outflank th e o ther. Strength dwindled and the reserve co m pa ny was co m m itted to push o n th e assa ult. Afte r a heavy bombardment, th e 44 remaining effectives cha rge d th e knob , overru n ning it, and th en clearing much of Smith 's Ridge. Only 26 effectives remained. T he reserve , E/ 5, was sent to take 105-N, but an enemy stro ngpoin t on 72 blo cked th eir way and th ey were forced to wait a day. An estima ted 1,500 d ead NK were found o n 56 and Smith's Ridge and anothe r 1,750 o n 296. The cos t was high , but th e marines had punch ed th eir way into Seoul. At a staff meeting o n th e 23rd Alm ond proposed that RCT-5 contin ue its attack from th e northwest, whil e RCT-I be moved from Yongdungp 'o and cross into Seoul from th e so u theast, with the goal of man euvering the e ne my o u t o f th e city. Smi th o p posed splitting h is d ivision and wante d RCT-I and -5 to co ntin ue th eir attac ks as planned and bring RCT-7 around to the north to flank th e e ne my, prevent his esca pe in that d irection , and be in position to attac k into th e city ce n te r if th e RCT-5 attack was halted by e ne my resistance wh ich was proving stro nger than ex pected. The 32d In fantry, already to the so uth, co uld swing in fro m the so utheast. Almo nd was pressin g fo r Seoul to be liberat ed by Septembe r 25, three months to th e d ay after the NK invasion . He was angered and on th e verge of relievin g Smith, but th e political fallout would probably ha ve ruined him", At 0800h rs, after e ngineers had cleare d th e ex te ns ive mines, 2/ 1 crossed th e Han a t Sogan g 3 mil es west of th e d owned Han bridges
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aboard amtracs from Yongdungp'o. They linked up with C/5 in the afternoon. Because no pontoon rafts were available no tanks were able to accompany the battalion. Hill 79, 4,000yd from th e crossing site, was the battalion's objective. The regimental CP and 1/1 came over next, with the battalion ordered to pass through the rapidly moving 1/2. Resistance was light and the railroad yard was seized at I500hrs and the first American flag was raised in Seoul. That evening 3/1 crossed into Seoul, and the 1st MarDiv's regiments were all on the same side of the Han. A good deal of mopping up was req uired in the RCT-I zone. The 32d Infantry continued its end run to the south and took up positions on the Han on the 24th where it was joined by th e 17th ROK Infantry. The 32d Infantry was pushing south toward Suwon. Far to the south, on the 23rd th e NK forces fighting the Pusan breakout began to crumble. The battl e for Inch'on was over, but Seoul had yet to be liberated.
7 In 1944 marine LIGen "How lin' Mad" Smith commanding V Amphibi ous Corps had relieved army MajGen Ralph
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Smith commanding 27 th InfDiv on Sa ipan to create a serious rift between the two services, which eventually
resulted in the marine Smith's reassignment.
AFTERMATH
THE BATTLE FOR SEOUL y th e 25th RCT-7 was o n Seoul's north side, RCT-5 o n the eas tern hills overlooking th e city, RCT-I in th e southeast suburbs, and th e artill ery positioned both northwest of Yongdungp 'o and to th e so uth. Malin e am tracs brou ght th e 32d Infantry across the Han 5,000 yards east of th e main bridges. They occ u pied South Mountain (Na m-san) overlooking th e city aga inst little opposition . In th e afte rnoo n the 17th ROK Infan try was brought across, but received heavier artill ery and mortar fire. With th e 32d o n th e line th e 17th would mop up. The 7th InfDiv was assigne d a zone e ncom passing th e sou theastern third of th e city. The 1st Ma rDiv a ttack into Seoul co m menced at 0700hrs o n th e 25 th. As RCT-7 sec ured the north side a nd se ized grou nd blocking th e Seou l-Kaeso ng Highway, RCT-5, with 1/ I KMC and th e reconnaissan ce co m pa ny, pun ch ed in from th e west , aim ing for th e city ce n te r. It first cleared th e remainder of th e hill s. With 2/ I KJ"IC, RCT-I , struc k fro m th e so uth west, skirt ing So u th Mountain a nd dri ving toward th e high gro u nd o n th e city's north east sid e . Th e Division reserve , 1st KMC Regim ent (-) wou ld tak e over as th e city occu patio n for ce , while 3/ 187 ARCT provided rear area sec urity. Th e NK had establishe d in-depth defenses through out th e city, fortifying th e heavily co nstruc ted buildings and e rec ting hundreds of rice
B
Seoul was laid out as a modern city and its wide streets made exposed movement de adly. Speed when crossing open areas improved the chance of survival. IUSMC)
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Barricades worked both ways. In many sectors the NKs constructed barricades from earth-filled rice bags and debris including vehicles at 20Q-300yd intervals. These marines, having gained a barricade, fire on submachine-gunners In upper floor windows. (USMC)
Marine infantrymen move toward Seoul with a platoon of M26 tanks interspaced In their column. This picture prov ides an example of typical terrain between Inch'on and Seoul , with rice paddles crisscrossed with roads and low hills. (USMC)
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bag and debris barricades. AA fire was heavy over the city and several aircraft were downed. After a morning of artillery preparation , 3/5 completed clearing Hill 296 and 2/5 assaulted 105-N, which was secured by 1545hrs; 1/5 then re lieved 3/5. With the reconnaissance company, 1/ I KMC blocked the approaches to 216 and 296. RCT-5 had to make a 90-degree change in direction and moved toward Hill 105-S with tank support. This resulted in a gap between RCT-I and -5. Hill 105-S, which was previously presumed secured, proved to harbor NK holdouts, whi ch were routed. The two battalions fought their way 2,000 yards into Seoul in th e vicinity of Hill 82. Meanwhile, as 2/7 to the north occupied its objective by noon on the road into the city, 1/7 patrolled the area between it and RCT-5. MajorGeneral Almond declared the city captured, a claim that was to prove premature.
An army M4A3 Sherman tank pushes damaged marine tanks into an LSU for evacuation to Japan and repair. The obsolete Sherman served on in the namethrower and tank-dozer roles. (USN)
Shortly aft er 2000hrs on the night of th e 25th , 1st MarD iv re ceiv ed un expe cted orders to co nd uc t an imm ediat e night attack into th e heart of Seoul. X Co rps had reported that ae rial o bse rve rs detected NK troops withdrawing from th e city. MajG en Smith question ed thi s report, beli eving th ey might be fleeing civilia ns. En em y ac tivity to th e d ivision 's fro nt gave no indication of a withdrawal. H e so ug h t co nfirm atio n from X Co rps, a nd warned th at a nigh t attac k into a stra nge city was d an gerous. In hi s haste to d eclare the city sec u re d, Alm ond ignored Smith 's co ncerns and o rdere d him to ca rry o ut th e attack immediately. Artillery preparation co mmenced, and just as RCT-5 and -I were about to d epart at 0200hrs, a stro ng NK attack struck 3/ I with T 34s and SU76s . This held up th e assault and lasted until da ylight. Seven NK co m bat vehicles were knocked out, 500 dead co u n ted , and 80 pri soners were ta ken. As this fight was going on, an NK battalion attacked 2/32 on South Mountain. The lin e was restored with a loss of 400 NK d ead and 175 prisoners captured. On th e 26th th e attack co n tin ue d, but RCT-7 to the north was also to be co m m itte d, reinforced by th e Reconnaissan ce Company and th e rec ently arrived 5/ 1 KMC. (T he re was no 4th battalion as Koreans co nside red "4" to be bad luck. ) Th e 7th would pinch o u t RCT-5 1,200 yd beyond Government House and co ntin ue d th e ad van ce besid e RCT-7. Hilltop objectives were assign ed on th e north east side o f th e city. Th e KJ\;rC was prepared to ta ke over city sec urity, but 3/ 1 KMC was attached to 3/ 187 ARCT for Kimp o Peninsul a sec u rity. Ahead o f th e regime n t 0 /7 adva nced d own th e In ch 'o n- Seoul Hi ghway and was a m b us he d, fo rcing it to withd raw. On th e 26th and 27th RCT-7 cleared th e hills on th e north side of Seoul. Elem en ts of RCT-5 co n tin ue d to clea r th e Hill 296 co m plex and o ther hills northwest of th e city. It was up to RCT-I to take th e heart of the city. On th e 26th 2/1 advance d o n th e streetcar line , while 1/1 cleared the railroad statio n beside South Mountain. Tanks had to blast th e defended rice bag barricades th at were erec ted every 200-300 ya rds. Snipers and su bmac hine-gu n ne rs fired from windows and rooftops. By nig htfall 2/1 had adv an ced 1,200 yards, whil e 3/ 32 attacked 3,000yd northeast overrunning a ridge on th e east side o f Seoul and cutting the highway. Th e 32d was reinforced by US 2/17, alon g with th e 17th ROK Infantry. RCT-I establishe d co n tac t with both RCT-7 and th e 32d that day. On th e 26th 7th InfDi v eleme n ts made co n tac t with Eighth An ny at Osan . The 27 th saw 3/ 7 clear th e ap proaches to Hill 338 and 2/7 secured 343, but th e form er 's attempt to take 342 failed, eve n th ough South Korean civilians had marked the NK minefield. In th e meantime , 1/7 was e ngaged several mil es to th e west, resistin g attacks by NK holdouts. As RCT-I and -5 co n tin ue d to fight th ei r way into Seoul, 3/5 finish ed clearing Hill 296, while 1/ 5 took 338 overlooking th e capitol, for which 3/5 was now heading. Then 2/ I took th e French Co nsulate and the Middl e Sch o ol. In th e ea rly afternoon 3/5 rea ch ed th e capitol, from which the NKs fled. Meanwhile 1/ 5 co n tin ue d up th e streetcar line and reach ed 338 by nightfall. Earli er 2/1 raised th e US flag over the USSR Co nsulate.
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"' ~ 7 Mar. LITZENBURG
"' ~ 5 Mar. MURRAY
"'
~ 1 Mar. PULLER
1 Mar, Div.
SMITH
EVENTS 1. SEPTEMBER 22 . Hill 105S was secured by 1/5 Marines. 2. SEPTEMBER 22 . Hill 296 was secured by H/3/5 Marines. 3 . SEPTEMBER 23 -2 4. Smith's Ridge was secured by 2/5 Marines and KMC. 4 . MORNING , S EPT EM B ER 2 4. 1st Marines cross Han River unopposed aboard 15t Amphibian Tractor and 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions. 5 . AFTERN OON , S EPT EM B ER 2 4. 32d Infantry cross Han River lightly opposed in morning aboard 1st Amphibian Tractor and 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions followed by 17th ROK Infantry. 6 . SEPTEMBER 25. 1111, 2/ 11, and 4/11 Marines positioned northwest of Yongdungpto and 2/11 Marines and 96th Field Artillery Battalion Inside the city provide fire support.
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11. SEPTEMBER 25 . 3/5 Marines secure high ground overlooking Seoul's main highway Intersection. 12. S EPTEM B ER 26 . 2/7 and 3/7 Marines secure high ground east of Hongjeoe-ri. 13 . SEP TEM B ER 26 . 3/5 Marines east flank of Hili 105N and fight off NK counterattack. 14 . SEP TEM B ER 26 . 2/1 Ma rines advance Into he art o f Seoul. 15 . SEPTE M BER 26 . 111 Marines secure west fl ank of South Mountain and link up with 32d Infantry. 16 . SEP TE M BER 26 . 3/3 2 Infantry re aches ea st side of Seoul. 17. S EPTE M BER 27 . 0/2/7 M ar ines advance from Hong jeo e -r i, September 27 a nd are repulsed . 18 . SEP TE M BER 27 . 2/1 Marines sec u re major hi ghwa y intersect ion and high ground in
7 . SEPTEMBER 25 . 32d Infantry secure South Mountain and southern side of Seoul.
east Seoul .
8 . S EPTEM BER 25 . NK counterattack against 32d Infantry.
19 . S EPTE M BE R 27 . 3 / 5 Mar ines se c ure ROK Cap it ol .
9 . S EPTEM BER 25 . 3/1 and 1/1 Marines secure main road Into Seoul and Hill 82 . and fight off NK counterattack.
20 . SEP TE M BER 27. 115 M arin es se c ure Hili 33 6.
10 . SEPT EM B ER 25 . 2/5 Marine se c u re Hills 72 and 105N.
THE BATTLE OF SEOUL, SEPTEMBER 25-27, 1950 The marine battle for Seoul began with the crossing of the Han River and the securing of various objectives surrounding the city limit. On September 26 marines penetrated the heart of the city, fighting amidst the dense modern infrastructure to secure the key object ives, including the ROK Capitol on September 27. Note: Gridlines are shown at intervalsot 1 kilometer
MARINE FORCES 1 1st Battalion , 1st Marines 2 2d Battalion, 1st Marines 3 3d Battalion . 1sl Marines 4 1st Batta lion, 51h Marines 5 2d Battalion , 5th Marines 6 3d Battalion , 5th Marines 7 1st Battalion , 71hMarines 8 2d Battalion. 7th Marines 9 3d Battalion . 7th Marines 10 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry 11 2d Battalion , 32d Infanlry 12 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry 13 17th ROK Infantry NK FORCES A NK Troops
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B
A marine helicopter delivers a wounded marine to a floating dock inside Inch 'on Harbor, to be carried immediately aboard the USS Consolation (AH-15). (USMC)
Defended barri cades, sn ipe rs, and suicide attac ks co n tin ue d to plague th e attac ke rs. The 32d Infantry re mai ned o n South Mountain denying it to retreating NKs, but did cle ar so me areas a t its bottom. By evening RCTI had reach ed the eas t side of Seoul as NK resistan ce co llapse d and they dug in for a co m pa ra tively quiet night. Final o pe ra tio ns insid e Seo ul were con d uc ted o n the 28th , with RCT7 ad vanc ing up to 2,600yd whil e it cleared th e high gro und o n th e north sid e and its sec to r of th e city. RCT-l cleared th e remainder of its zo ne, but encou n te re d so me resistance and many mines. The 1st MarDiv moved into barracks insid e Seoul after displacin g from O eoso-ri. As mop-up co n tin ued by all units, preparations were mad e fo r th e liberation ce re mony. In th e pre-dawn hours of th e 29th the NK managed to launch co u n te ra ttac ks in both RCT-7 and I zones. In sp ite of holdouts a nd th e danger o f attacks, MacArthur and President Syngma n Rhee arrived. Undete r re d by gu n fi re a nd glass falling from th e Govern men t House dome , th e two notables re-established th e capita l of th e Republic of Korea and th e republic' s flag was hoisted at 1200h rs. Operations co n tin ue d through th e da y to clear th e city and its e nviro ns. Redeploymen t and result s
Th e pursuit of th e fleeing NK forces began o n th e 28th , with th e 1st Marines and th e KMC clearing hill s eas t o f th e city. The 7th Marines drove north toward Uijo ngb u, whi ch th ey rea ch ed on O ctober 3. As 3/5 push ed northwest, th ey reach ed Suyu han o n th e 2nd . Th e 7th InfDiv es tab lishe d bl o cking positions to th e east fac ing north a nd to th e so u th . Other US an d ROK uni ts to ok up th e p ursuit, an d th e 1st MarDiv and KMC closed o n In ch 'on be tween O ctober 5 an d 7. A marine ce metery was es ta blished o u tside In ch 'on as th e di vision was inform ed th ey would mount o ut fo r a no ther amphibious o peratio n. T h is o ne would see th em
landing a t th e eas t coast port o f Wonsan an d would take th em to the Chosin Reserv oir. The l st MarDiv, barely abl e to field a regimental co m ba t team , deployed a co m ple te brigad e to Kor ea , regenerated itself to full stre ngth, d eployed overseas with an aircraft wing, plann ed a co m plex amphibious operati on, successfu lly exec uted th e landing, fought its way inland, co nd uc ted th ree rive r cross ings, cleared several urban areas, ca p tu red an important airfie ld, liberated th e ca pita l, and pursu ed th e enemy o ut of th e are a, all in 64 days. The feat of th e 7th InfDiv to re bui ld to a full division and d epl oy in a few weeks was eq ua lly impressive. The In ch 'on landing and th e following explo ita tio n speeded th e rapid disintegration of th e North Korean forces at Pu san, co m ple ted th e disruption o f th e NK su p p ly lin e , denied reinforcem en ts to th e Pusan fro n t, secured port fac ilities to su p port the o ffe nsive d riving th e NK north o f th e 38 th Parall el , an d ac hieved a politi cal and psych ological victory for th e ROK an d th e UN . The l st MarDiv was cre d ited with taking 4,692 prisoners, infli cting 13,700 casua lties, and kn o cking o ut 44 tanks. Th ei r own losses were 415 d ead, six missing, and 2,029 wounded. The 7th InfDiv killed so me 4,000 NK and cap tured abo ut 1,300 , whil e losin g 106 d ead , 57 mi ssin g, an d 409 wounded. Of th e to tal cas ualties, 106 were Korean s (KATUSAs). KMC and ROKA cas ua lties are unknown . Five marines wo n th e Medal o f Hono r at In ch 'on-Seoul. After th e Ch inese e nte re d th e war o n O ctober 25 a nd push ed th e UN forces sou th across th e 38 th Parallel , Seoul was again evacua ted o n J anuary 4, 1951 and In ch 'on on th e 5th . On December 22nd LtGen Walk er co m m and ing Eighth Army o rdere d th at In ch 'on be totall y d est ro yed, a defeati st o rder. Walk er d ied th e next d ay in a jeep acc ident a nd th e o rder was fortunat ely not carried o u t; it would have re q uire d far too man y resources to reconstru ct th e city when again libe rat ed. In ch 'on was not really occu pie d by th e e nemy thi s tim e as th e US Navy presen ce neutrali zed its value . On March 15 Seoul was o nce again libe ra ted , but thi s tim e by th e ROK 1st Division, with out ce re mony.
89
DOG COMPANY PINNED DOWN, OUTSKIRTS OF SEOUL , SEPTEMBER 26 (pages 9D-91)
92
On the morning of September 26, three US marine, the KMC, a US Army, and an ROK regiment closed in on Seoul from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. To spearhead the 7th Marines' advance, 0/7 under Capt Richard R. Breen, was sent southwest on the Seoul-Kaesong Highway t o secure the Sodaeman Prison on the northwest edge of the c ity. As 0/7 approached Seoul between the steep slopes of Hill 296 on the right and Hill 338 on the left, they were greeted by cheering Koreans. The column was taken under fire from a water tower 400yd to the front and the civilians scattered (1). NKs then opened fire from the hillsides only 100yd away. The company deployed on both sides of the road returning fire, but was pinned down. The marines were unable to deploy flank security because of the civilian crowds. The company mortar section under 1stU Paul P. Sartwell (2) set up two 60mm mortars (3) and immediately knocked out an enemy position. Totally exposed, the lieutenant directed the mortar fire and was hit three times before being put out of action. Two rifle platoons maneuvered to clear the slopes, but resistance was heavy. A tank-infantry relief force sent by the regiment was turned back. The company, faced with encirclement, all officers wounded, and casualties mounting, withdrew 1,000yd back up the road. The mortars delivered covering fire during the withdrawal. Carrying all of their dead and wounded, they established a perimeter on both sides of the road in the late afternoon. Before dark they received an airdrop of ammunition and supplies and prepared for a tough night. The NKs, though, contented themselves with
remaining in their hill positions. The rest of the 2/7 was attacking eastward and the 3/7 also attacked east to secure a foothold on the north end of Hill 338. 0/7 was relieved in the morning. Army and marine rifle companies were allocated an array of supporting weapons, but their distribution differed. A marine company had a machine-gun platoon of three sections, each with two squads armed with a Browning .30cal M1919A4 light machine gun. A section was generally allotted to each rifle platoon. Within the company headquarters was a mortar section with three 60mm M19 mortars. The marines concentrated 18 3.5-ln. M20 bazookas in the battalion assault platoon, with two attached to each rifle platoon. Army rifle company weapons platoons had a mortar section with three 60mm mortars and a special weapons section with three 57mm M18 recoilless rifles (not used by the marines). Army rifle platoons had a weapons squad with a bazooka and an M1919A4 machine gun. The 60mm M19 mortar was the rifle company's workhorse, its resident "artillery." While artillery support was usually available, the benefit of the Immediate fire that a company's own mortars could provide was invaluable. The M19 was essentially the same as the M2 used in World War II, but was provided with a selector lever on the tube's base plug allowing it to be drop-fired or trigge....fired. Some units deployed to Korea with the M2 and they were also issued to ROK units. Their ammunition was interchangeable with that of the Chinese 60mm Type 31. Ammunition included high explosive (4) and white phosphorous smoke (S) as well as illumination (parachute-suspended flares, not pictured). The maximum range was 1,985yd and its minimum was 50 yards.
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
nch 'on and Seoul have grown immeasu rabl y and are now large, mod ern cities virt ua lly unrecognizable to veterans of th e battl es. Th is ap plies to most of the mral areas between the cities as well. Over a d ozen brid ges now spa n the H an River. T he once u ndevelo ped Yonghon g-do island o ffshore of In ch 'o n has been m uc h ex pa nde d by landfill a nd now houses th e In ch 'o n In te rn atio nal Airport. Inch 'o n has a vast subway system co nnecting it to Seo ul. The In ner and much of the O uter T idal Basin have been backfi lled and serve as industrial sites , while th e causeway to Wolmi-do now se rves as a bulkh ead ; m uc h o f the harb or enclosed by the ca useway a nd Wol mi-do too have been backfilled . Wolmi-do is no lo nge r recogn izab le as an island, th o ugh it still bears that nam e. T he port has ex panded and is now Ko rea 's largest. Besides servi ng as a co m mu nica tio ns hub, In ch 'on is also a popular tou rist d estinati on a nd is kn own fo r its wide variety of en tertain men t attractions, hot els, and res tau rants. T he Inch 'o n Peace Park hosts a 16ft marble statue of MacArth ur gaz ing over th e harbor, and small memorials are foun d on the three landing beach es. Other th an these th ere is litt le to remind o ne of th e war and the last large-scale am phibious o peration in the histo ry of warfare.
I
The American flag waves in front of Government House, September 29. The Republic of Korea flag has been ho isted onthe taller pole to the right. Gunfire was stili r attli ng when Gen MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee held a ceremony re-establishing Seoul as the capital of the ROK. (USMC)
93
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, Joseph H., Battle of the Barricades: US Marines in the Recap ture of Seoul, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washingt on , DC (2000) Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washingt on, DC (1 961) Blair, Clay, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1 953, Times Books, New York (1987) Clark, Eugene F., The Secrets of Inchon: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Covert Mission of/he Korean War, Berkley Publishing , New York (2003) Field , James A., History of United States Naval Operations: Koree , Government Printing Office, Washingt on , DC (1962 ) Hasting s, Max, The Korean War, Simon & Schu ster, New York, (1987) Heinl, Rob ert D., Jr., Victory at High Tide: The Inchon- Seoul Campa ign, J.B . Lippin cott , Philadelphia (1968) Langley, Mich ael, Inchon Landing , Crow n, New York (1980) Mantross, Lynn and Canzo na, Nicholas A., The Inchon-Seoul Operation, Vol. II, US Marine Operations in Korea, Historical Branch , G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington , DC (1955) O'Baliance , Edgar, Korea: 1950-1 953, Rob ert E. Krieger Publishing , Malabar, FL (1985) Rottman, Gordon L., Korean War Order of Battle: United States , United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces , 1950-1 953, Praeger Publishers, Westport , CT (2002) Rice, Earle, The Inchon Invasion, Lucent Book s, San Diego (1995) Sheldo n, Walt, Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Landing at Inchon , Ballantine Books, New York (1968) Simmons, Edwin H., Over the Seawall: US Marines at Inchon , Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington , DC (2000) Stanton , Shelby L., Am erica 's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 , Presidio Press, Novato, CA (1 989) Stanto n, Shelby L., US Army Uniforms of the Korean War , Stac kpole Books , Harrisburg , PA (1992 ) Summers, Harry G. Jr., Korean War Almanac, Facts on File, New York (1990)
94
INDEX
Figures in bold refer to illustra tio ns 38th Pa rall el 7, 8 , !l, I I, 17, 23 , 89 airc ra ft Ch an ce Vou ght F4 U Co rsa ir 13, 57 F4 U-4 B 14, 5 7 F4U-5N 5 7 Co nva ir OY- I Sentinel 5 7 Dou glas R4C ( C.-4 7) 45 Grumman F7F Ti gercat 5 7 North Korean 53 Sikorsky H O :IS-I 33, 57 Almo nd, MajGe n Edward "Ne d " M. 25-21; , 27, 30 , 31 , 4 3, 43 , 45 , 4fi, 47, 49 Operation Ch romit r 55 ,57,8 1,84,85 amph ihian tra ctors, Ma rin e 34 LVr( 3 )C 3 1, 34 amph ibious tank , LVT (A) 5 73 amphi b io us tr uck, DU KW-353 ("Du ck") 2-ton 45 Ascom City (Taej o n g-n i) 20, 23, 53, fi:~ , 64 , 65 tank ambush , Sept. 17: 64-65, 70-72
Badoeng Strait, USS 5 7 Barr, M'tiG en David G. 27-28 , 30, 43 , 45 , 46,47 battlefield today 93 Beaucham p, Co l Charles E. 28, 43 Bradley, Ge n O mar N . 47 Breen, Capt Rich ard R. 90-92 British In fa nt ry IIrigade I I Camp Pe n dl e to n 13, 14, 32 China/Ch inese, Comm u n ist 7-8, 23, 29, 89 Chumunj in- up 44-45 Clark, Lt Eu gene E 5 1-52 , 5 7 Collins, Gen J Lawton 45, 47 commanders . Ameri can 24-28 commanders, North Korean 28-29 Communist invasion 8-!l, I I, 22 Consolation, USS 88 Crdig, BGen Edward A., US MC 13 , 28,43 Curtis, Donald I-.lcB. 4 2
crossin g 69, 73 , 73 , 76 today !13 Ha rr is, MajGe n Field , US MC 27 , 28 H owa rd , 2n d Lt 70-72 lu c h 'o n 50,77 battleg round 17- 2 1 IIr itish Consn la te lI ill 17, 37, 6 1, 68 Cemet ery H ill 17, 37,50, 50 , 61 ,68 e vac ua te d 89 fa ll of 9 lI a rh o r ( Inc h' o n Hang ) 18-1 9 , 5 1 H ill 94 : 50 Hill 117: 17, 50 lI ill 180: 63 H ill 223 : 63 Il ill 233: 50 In n e r Tidal Basin 17, 19 lan d in gs 4-1, 45~16 , 47 , 48~9 , 50 , 62 Beach IIlu e 4!l, 50 , 55, 60, 62 , 63 Bea ch Gr een 49. 57 Beach Red 32 , 44, 49 , 50, 50, 54, 55,60 Bea ch Red , 1 7:~0- 1 850 hours 56, (il-64 , 66-68 Obse rvatory H ill 17, :\7, 50, 6 1,62 Out er Tidal Basin 17, 19, 35 Railroad Station 18 Sowolmi -do 17, 18 , 49 , eo tidal c h a n ges 2 1 to day 93 trenches 52 Wo lmi-
Dr Haum , USS 32
Douglas, Cp l Ok ey 70-72 Doyle, Rea rAd mJ a m es H . 30, 45 , 46 East Channel (To n g Sudo ) 19 Fl)ing Fish Chan ne l (So Su dol 19 , 48, 5 1, 57 f-gt'
elymrr, USS 15
Haengju 20, 73 Han River 7, 18, 20, 23 , 48, 53, 79 , 8 1-82, 3
Kale ho n Rive r 76 ,77,79 Kim II Sun g 29 Kimpo 53 Kimpo Airfield 14, 20, 23, 37-38, 44 , 45 , 48,49, 57 ,65,69 Kimpo Pe n insul a 17-1 8 Kobc .japau 15 , 16, 54, 56 , 57, 65 Korea 7 Kor ea , North ( De m ocra tic People 's Re p ublic of Korea ) esta h lish e d 7-8 fo rc e s 31>-:18 Korea , South ( Re p u b lic of Korea ) 8
Korea Army, Republic of (So u th) 8, 9, II , 47 In fa nt ry Reg ime n t (Separate ), 17th (Seo u l Reg im ent ) 36, 36, 55 , 69 , 83 units 35-36 Ko rean Marin e Corps (So ut h Kor ea ) 88 Regiment, l st ( I KMC) 14,22 , 35-36 , fi3, 65 , 69 , 79 ,80,83,84 ,85 Korean People's Army (KPA) (No rt h Kor ea ) 9, 12, 18 , 42 , 47, 48 , 52- 53, 69 "Air Force Division, 1st" 37-38,65, 69 a nd hattie for Seoul 83-84,85 co m ma n d e rs 28-29 estab lished 8 a n d In c hon la n d ing 60 ,6 1,64 In d e pe n d e nt Regiment, 78th 79 in fantry regiments 37 Rifle Brigade , 25 th 38 , 4 1, 79 rifle division 36 Rifle Division, 9th 38 Rifle Division . 181h 38 , 4 1 Rifle Division , 3 1st 38 tank amhush a t Ascom Cily 70-72 Tank Division , 1ll5th 38 u ni ts 36-38, 4 1 Vi Ho mg-gwa n g Det achment 28-29 Yongdun gp 'o fight 77,7ts Korean Volunteer Army 28 Kor ean War, strate gi c situa tio n 6 Knnsan 44, 45, -19 , 52 LCM ( La nd ing Craft, Medium ) 15 , 35, 54 Le,'ps (La n d in g Cra fts, Personnel a n d Vehicl es ) 35 , 49, 55 , 56, 5 7, 66-68 Lopez, 1Si Lt Bald o m e ro 61, 66-68 LST (La nding Ship, Tank) 2 1, 3 1, 44, 5 1, 54 L'>T-859 54 LSU ( La n d ing Ship , Utility) 85 :\lacAnhur, C en Do uglas 9 , II , 12, 17, 24, 30 , 42~1 3 , 45~lli , 47 , 76 , 93 biograph y 24-25 landings 60 , 65 lib eration of Seoul 88, 93 Mansfield, USS 57 Mount AlcKinlp], USS 48 , 57, 60 Naktong, battles of 13, 14, 22 .I PP also Pusan National Defense ACI 45 Nippon Flour Company 54,61
Operation Blu eheart s 12, 4~4 Ope ration Chromi tr 17,24 ,l fP also hatti e field today; plan , American co m ma n d structure 30 preliminaries and th e approach 54-57 assa u lt: D-Day 57, 60 Beach Red , 1730-1 850 hours 6 1-64
95
th e drive to Kimp o: D + I to D + 2: 64-65, 69 crossing th e Han Rive r 69, 73, 76 Yongpnngp'o fight 76--79 a uack ing th e m ain lin e o f resistan ce 79-82 Ope rati on Pla n IOQ..B 44, 45 order of baili e 39-4 1
96
Uijo ng bu 23 Un ite d Na tio ns 7,8,9 forces 12, 23, 30- 36 Ge neral Asse mbly 30 US Air Force 9 Far Eas t Air Force 30,47,50 US Army 9- 10 Abn Div (Airbo rn e Divisio n ), 82d 9, 12, 17 Pal mi-d o islet 19, 52 Amphi bious Tan k and Tra ctor Battal io n , 56 th 73 pla n , American 42-53 see also Operatio n ARCf (Airborne Reg im e n ta l Combat Chromite Team) , 187t h 17, 69 , 83, 85 in te lligence 5 1-53 Ar my, Eight h II , 12, 20, 22, 23, 30, 69 landi ngs, lIanking 44-45 plan , North Korean 53 Raider Com pany 52 CavDiv (Cava lry Divi sion ), l st 10, II , Pohang-don g 44 12, 16, 43, 44 Posnng-Myun 46 prison ers o f wa r, No rt h Korean 23 , 38 Co rps , X (TF92) 22 ,23,26,3 1-32,47, 48,52,56, 76,85 Pu san 9, 11-1 2, 13, 14, 16,22,45, 48, 56, Co rps , XXI V 7 89 InIDi v (Infan try Divi sion ), 1st 9, 12 Pyongyan g 12 InIDi v, 2d II Pyongy an g Milita ry Academ y 29 InIDiv, 3d 16, 17, 69 Inmiv,7th ("Uayone t Div; sion ") 10, II , rafts, pontoon 76 15-17, 23, 27 ,28, 34-35,48 , 83, 88, 89 refugees, South Korean 7 co m ma nde rs 27 , 28 re sul ts 8!l Ruffn er, Maj Gen Cla rk L. "Ni ck " 3 1 Operati on Chromite 55, 57 , 59 o rga n izatio n 4 1 Sartw ell , IstLt Panl P. 90-92 Inilliv, 24th 10, II , 13, 16, 43 Seonl 8,9, 11, 13, 17,20-2 1,23, 36,42, Inmiv, 25th 10, II , 13, 16, 43 InID; vs (Co lored), 92 d /93d 26 46, 53, 69 b at tle fo r 83, 83-85, 84 , 88-89 In fant ry, 3 1st 8 1 In fa nt ry, 32d 17,43, 55, 73, 79, 81 , 82, Do g Co m pa ny pinn ed d own on o uts kirts 83 ,85,88 90-92 d rive to 78 In fa nt ry, 34t h II Duksoo Im peri al Pal ace 19, 21 Ko rea n Augmentation personnel Gove rn men t House 19, 21 , 85, 88,93 (KATUSA) 16--17, 22 TF Sm ith ba ttalio n I I, 13 H ill 56: 80-8 1 H ill 104: 79 US Department of Defense 9 Hill 105: 79, 84 US forces 9- 11 FECO M (Far Eas t Co m ma nd) 11,1 2, H ill 296 : 79 hill s on the northwest side 18 30,45,46 north -ce n tral sectio n 19 redepl oym ent 8R-89 reoccupied a nd lib erat ed again 89 T'Lsk Force Sm ith 9,22, 43 US Ma rine Corps 9, 10, 11, 13, 14,20,52, roa d to 80 65,80,84,88 So u th Moun tain 85 , 88 au to ma tic rille me n 8 , 80 to day 93 She pa rd jr., LtGen Lemuel C. 24, 45, 46, bat tali on assa ult plat oon 37 47 Co m ma nda n t 12 Sh erman , Adm Fo rrest P. 45, 47 Eng ineer Ba ualion , l st 76 sh ips 15, 48 see also LST; LSU fire team 33 MarD iv (Mari ne Division ) (Rei n fo rce d), Sirily, USS 57 1st 10, II , 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 27 , Smith, IstLt Iq . 70-72 32-34, 76 Smith , 2nd Lt L.R. 70-72 battl e for Se o ul 83, 85, 88 , 89 Sm ith , MajGen Oli ve r 1'., USMC 26-27, 27, 30,45-16,49,55,8 1,85 co m ma nde rs 28 Sm ith 's Ridge 80-8 1 landin gs 54, 55-56, 57 Sosa 20, 53, 69 o rga n iza tio n a nd streng th 39 pla ns for landings 45-46, 47-48 Sovie t Red Ar my 7 Ma r Div,2 nd 10, 13, 14 Str u b le , ViceA d m Art h ur D. 24 , 25, 30 , Mari ne Aviat io n 10, 57 55 MAG-33 (Marine Air Group 33) 13, 57 Syng ma n Rh ee , Presid ent 42, 88 , 93 Marin e Figh te r Sq ua dron 3 12: 14 Taej o ng-ni .I PP Ascom City Marin e Tra nsp ort Sq ua dron 152: 45 ta nks .IPP also a m ph ihio us tank, LVT (A)5 MAW (Marine Aircraft Wing ) , l st 14, 48,56,57 ~1 4A3 Shennan 13, 34,80,85 ~1 2 6 Pers h ing II , 13, 34, 38 , 43 , 80 , 84 Marin e Regim ent , l st 23 , 3 1,50,64 T34 12,23, 38 , 6 3, 64,65,70-72, Marine Regime n t, 5t h 13, 15, 23, 34, 50, 6 1-62,64 ,65 78-79 T 34 / 85: 81 1st Bat tal ion , Co m pany A (A/5) 6 1, Tru ma n, Presid ent Harry S. 25,42,45,47 66-68
l st Bat tali on , Co m pa ny A, 3d Platoo n 56 ,66-68 1st Bauali on , Com pany D 64-65, 70-72 2d Bat tal io n , Co m pa ny H, 3d Platoon 56 ,64 3d Bat tal ion 49 ,57,60,6 1,76 3d Battali o n , Com pa ny G 57, 60 3d Battal io n , Com pany H 60 Marin e Regi m en t, 6th 14 3d Batta lio n 14 Marin e Reg ime nt , 7th 14- 15, 23, 34, 88, 90-92 D Co mpany 90-92 machi ne g unners 16 Ma ri ne Regiment, 11th 10, 34, 63 Prov MarBd e ( Pro visio na l Marin e Brigad e ) , Ist II , 13-1 4, 22, 54, 55, 56 RCf (Regi me ntal Co m ba t Team ) 12, 13, 34 RCf-1 40, 55, 60 , 62-63, 69,76--79, 8 1-82,83,85,88 RCf-5 15,32,40,50, 83, 84 , 85 BLT-3 39--40 Ope rati on Chromite 55, 6 1, 63, 69, 73, 76,79, 81 RCf-7 14,1 5,40-41 , 65, 80-81 , 83, 84, 85,88 RCf-32 23 rille sq uad 80 sniper 79 US Navy 9,50 ./TF7 (joi nt Task Fo rce 7) 22,3 1,47, 48. 50 Seve nt h Flee t (T F70) 22, 30, 3 1 TF90 56 USSR 7-8, I I , 29 Walk e r, LtGe n 47,55,89 Wan Yong, BGe n 28 wcapons bazooka, M9AI 2.36i n. 13,35, 70- 72 bazooka, M20 3.5i n . 13, 35, 64, 72 Bro wning automa tic rille (BAR), .3OcaJ 8,33,80 ca rb ine, MI 944 7.62 mm bolt -action 70-72 field gu n , Sovie t M 1942 76.2mlll 52 lIam eth rowe r, M2-2 37 howitz er, MIAI 155mm 42 h owitze r, M2Al I05mm 10 InlDiv, 7th (US Army) 34, 35 m achin e gun , MI917AI .30ca l heal} 36 mach in e gu n , M 191 9A4 .30 cal light 11 36 ,64 MarDi v, l st (US MC) 33-34 mortar, 8 1mm 20 mortar, M 19 60 mm 90-92 'o rth Korean 36--37,53 rille , M I .30 ca l 33 rille , M 1903AI Spri ngfield .30cal 79 suhmachine gu n, PPSh41 7.62mm 70-72 Wh itn ey, Maj Ge n Courtney 24 Wol Ki Chan, 1vI;yGen 28 Wrigh t, BGe n Edwi n K. 24 Yo koham a, J a pan 16, 56 Yo ngd ung p 'o 20 ,23,53, 76--79 Yong-H ong-do isla nd 5 1, 93
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Accounts of history's greatest confl icts, detailing the command strategies, tactics and battle expe riences of t he opposing
Inch'on 1950 The last great amphibious assault
forces t hro ughout t he crucial st ages of each campaign
Inch 'on was probably the most sign ifican t campaign in the Korean th eat er, as well as bein g th e last maj or amphibious assault of division-size in the hi story of warfare . The odds were stacked against th e UN Full col or battlescen es
3-dim ensional 'bird's-eye view' maps
troop s, with Virtually no time for training, and man y of
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th e divisions were unprepared
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for th e con flict. Th e success of th e Inch 'on campaign is a testam ent to th e shee r initiative of th e officers and NCOs who conducted it. Thi s book details
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Photographs
Maps
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th e strategy and tacti cs that led to th e victory and narrates th e experien ce of th e battle in fascina ting detail.
ISBN 1-84176-961-4
OSPREY PUBL IS HIN G
www.ospreypublishing.com
9 781841769615