Osprey - Campaign 264 - Fall Gelb 1940 (1) Panzer Breakthrough In The West

FALL GELB 1940 (1) Panzer breakthrough in the West

DOUG DILDY

ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

CAMPAIGN 264

FALL GELB 1940 (1) Panzer breakthrough in the West

DOUGLAS C DILDY

ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS Series editor Marcus Cowper

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

CONTENTS ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

5

CHRONOLOGY

9

OPPOSING COMMANDERS

11

German commanders „French commanders

OPPOSING PLANS

15

Fall Gelb plan „The French Plan D

OPPOSING FORCES

19

German forces „Allied forces „Orders of battle

THE CAMPAIGN

31

The Luftwaffe strikes: 10–12 May „‘Three days to the Meuse’: 10–12 May „Assault across the Meuse: Rommel at Dinant: 10–14 May 1940 „‘On the fourth day, across the Meuse’: 13–14 May „The Panzer breakthrough: 15–17 May „The French riposte: 17–19 May „A change in the air: 15–24 May „The British response: 19–24 May „Haltbefehl rescinded: 26–31 May

AFTERMATH

88

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

91

FURTHER READING

93

GLOSSARY

94

INDEX

95

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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN How the situation would turn out if France and England march into Belgium and Holland is constantly the concern of the Führer Oberkommando der Wehrmacht War Diary, 6 October 1939 Fresh from their speedy and victorious offensive through southern Poland, on 24 October 1939 Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt and his Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South) staff travelled by train across the breadth of Germany to establish their new headquarters at Koblenz, thus becoming Heeresgruppe A. Before they arrived Adolf Hitler was already hectoring his OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Hitler’s personal joint military staff) to organize a blow against the Western democracies – he was anxious to quickly and decisively end the war that had already expanded beyond his initial designs. In a final, futile political act attempting to reverse the disastrous course of events in Europe, on 1 September 1939 France and Great Britain issued an ultimatum to Hitler to cease his invasion of Poland and withdraw his military forces. However, the Wehrmacht was already driving deep into the Polish Army’s rear areas and there was no thought of turning back.

Hitler and OKH staff members at the planning map table. (Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1971070-61)

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Unfortunately committed – and woefully unprepared – the allied French and British had no recourse but to fulfil their promise to the Poles and their threat to the Nazis, and they declared war on the Third Reich two days later. The French Army’s half-hearted offensive into the Saar region (7–12 September) – a vain attempt to distract the Germans from completing their crushing campaign in Poland – only antagonized the Führer. Consequently, Hitler desperately wanted to defeat the impertinent western Allies before they had opportunity to recover from their ill-considered unpreparedness, enlist the support of neutral Belgium and Holland, and advance to Germany’s western frontier, thus threatening the Ruhr industrial basin and presaging a destructive defensive conflict on German soil. ‘The enemy gains strength’, Hitler said, ‘and one winter night England and France will be on the Maas [the Meuse in French-speaking regions] without firing a shot and without our knowing about it.’ Consequently, on 9 October, he directed the three service chiefs to plan a pre-emptive offensive campaign ‘on the northern flank of the Western front, through Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This offensive must be launched at the earliest moment and in the greatest possible strength.’ Issued ten days later, and revised ten days after that, the army’s plan (Aufmarschanweisung Fall Gelb or ‘Deployment Directive, Case Yellow’) was produced under the direction of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, the army high command) chief of staff General der Artillerie Franz Halder. In order to meet Hitler’s demand for an offensive before winter, he developed a hasty plan that called for a direct frontal attack by the German forces then stationed in the west. These consisted of 56 infantry divisions deployed defensively to protect the Reich from attack by the French and British armies advancing through Belgium and southern Holland, reinforced by nine newly arrived or recently formed Panzer divisions. In the plan’s initial iterations the main thrust was to be through central Belgium with armoured, motorized troops on the northern wing, mountain troops advancing through the Ardennes on the southern flank, and airborne forces landing in the rear, near Ghent, to disrupt Allied mobile forces attempting to reinforce the Belgian front lines. On the north side, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock’s Heeresgruppe B (43 divisions in four armies, plus two air-delivered divisions) was to cross the Maas/Meuse between Nijmegen and Namur and drive to the Channel coast. Dutch neutrality was to be respected, except for the necessity of transiting the ‘Maastricht Appendix’ (a sliver of the Netherlands on the east bank of the Maas descending south between Belgium and Germany), which Generaloberst Walter von Reichenau’s Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 6 had to cross in order to bypass the Liège fortresses to the north, while Generaloberst Günther Hans von Kluge’s AOK 4 skirted Liège to the south. These two armies – including nine Panzer and four motorized divisions – would link up west of Liège and advance together through Brussels and Charleroi to Calais and Boulogne in France. In the German centre, Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe A (22 divisions in AOKs 12 and 16) was to protect Bock’s left flank from French attacks from the south-west. In the south, facing the indomitable Maginot Line, the role of Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb’s Heeresgruppe C (19 divisions in AOKs 1 and 7) was purely defensive, holding the Rhine and preventing a more determined replay of the French offensive into the Saar. Air support for 6 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

the offensive would be provided by General der Flieger Hellmuth Felmy’s Luftflotte 2 and General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3. None of the participants – the OKH, the Luftwaffe, the army group commanders, or even Hitler himself – were pleased with the plan. Particularly dissatisfied was Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, Rundstedt’s chief of staff. His assessment was that there was little to commend it: it required a frontal ‘push’ against the bulk of Allied mobile forces in Belgium to gain territory rather than a manoeuvre designed to annihilate the Allied forces, securing the required territory as a natural consequence of victory. Additionally, it was vulnerable, even with Heeresgruppe A’s best efforts, to French counterattacks from Lorraine which could drive north-eastwards and trap German forces in Belgium. Most critically, Manstein stated, ‘The 1939 operation plan contained no clear-cut intention of fighting the campaign to a victorious conclusion. Its object was, quite clearly, partial [sic] victory (defeat of Allied forces in northern Belgium) and territorial gains [sic] (possession of the Channel coast as a basis for future operations).’ Rundstedt agreed and both began needling OKH for a major change, urging a shift of the Schwerpunkt (the main weight of the assault) to the southern wing of the offensive. Meanwhile, in November Hitler too began to ‘tinker with’ the plan’s fundamental concept. Presciently, he foresaw the offensive’s first phase – now to be launched mid-winter – stalling in central Belgium due to poor weather and ground conditions. For the second phase, he ordered a small mechanized (one Panzer and one motorized division) corps be added to Heeresgruppe A to make a penetration via Arlon, Belgium, cross the Meuse at Sedan, and attack towards Laon, in order ‘to ease the task of Heeresgruppe B in [the advance] beyond Liège’. Obediently, on 9 November, the OKH assigned General der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian’s XIX Armeekorps (motorisiert) (AK (mot.)), then in OKH reserve near Berlin, to Heeresgruppe A. Guderian’s branch of the follow-up assault was added to the Fall Gelb orders as an amendment. Now supported by the clear vision and energetic voice of Guderian, Rundstedt and Manstein pressed the OKH repeatedly for a third army – heavily armoured and mechanized – to be assigned to Heeresgruppe A. While their badgering continued – seven messages in ten weeks – the army’s commander-in-chief, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, Halder, and the OKH staff saw these petitions as altering the plan’s fundamental concept of operation and steadfastly refused to do so. The OKH’s position was that, during this the worst European winter in 50 years, with blizzards covering roads in up to 3ft of snow and ice, a large body of mobile forces could not move through the icy, snow-clogged roads of the Ardennes. Therefore, even in the January 1940 revision of the Fall Gelb deployment order – occasioned by the infamous ‘Mechelen Incident’ in which portions of the Luftwaffe’s part of the plan inadvertently ended up

Chief architect of the Fall Gelb plan: OKH Chief of Staff General Franz Halder. (Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1970-052-088)

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The instigator for change: Generalleutnant Fritz Erich von Manstein. (Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H01757)

in Belgian hands – the plan’s authors stayed with the original concept, which now formally included the subjugation of Holland, Hitler’s third (diversionary) axis of attack, emphasized the requirement for surprise, and reduced the Panzers’ final assembly time to 24 hours. However, Halder soon saw an Achilles heel – the vulnerable southern flank – in his campaign plan as he personally witnessed two ‘command post exercises’. The first was by the Heeresgruppe A staff at Koblenz on 7 February, the second by Generaloberst List’s AOK 12 staff at Mayen one week later. These exercises visibly and dramatically demonstrated the potential for failure if additional forces were not assigned to the southern wing of the offensive. Meanwhile, Hitler was having similar reservations. After reviewing the detailed dispositions of the Fall Gelb deployment order, he feared that the Panzers would be stopped at the Maas and stalled in the ‘barricaded and fortified’ region around Liège. He predicted they would be ‘much better employed at Sedan, where the enemy would least expect them’. On 13 February, two OKH plans officers were called to the OKW HQ to prepare a formal assessment of the Führer’s suggestion. Hitler’s clairvoyance was vindicated four days later when, during a luncheon for the five newest army corps commanders, Manstein (who had just been given command of XXXVIII AK, in the OKH reserve) used the opportunity to explain his own vision in detail. He lobbied for strengthening Guderian’s Panzer corps to form the Schwerpunkt that would break through at Sedan and drive to the Somme estuary on the Channel coast. This would completely encircle and destroy the Allied armies in Belgium, thereby achieving a decisive result. At noon the next day Halder appeared before Hitler with an outline of a new OKH plan to do just that. The new concept was even more drastic than anything Manstein had ever proposed. First, Kluge’s AOK 4 was moved from Bock’s command to Rundstedt’s. More critically, five Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions were concentrated in an army-level formation on the extreme left end of the advancing front. They were to make a massive assault across the Meuse from Sedan to Dinant, with a fifth army (General der Kavallerie Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs zu Glon’s AOK 2, all infantry) following to protect the southern flank of the advance to the Somme. This, the fourth iteration of the Fall Gelb plan, conformed closely to Hitler’s own ideas and he immediately ordered the changes made. The completely changed plan was published in Aufmarschanweisung Nr 4 Fall Gelb on 24 February, assigning Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe A the new mission of ‘crossing the line of the Meuse River between Sedan and Dinant with an operational probing attack by Panzer and motorized elements pushing towards the mouth of the Somme River’.

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CHRONOLOGY 1939 1 September

Germany invades Poland, starting World War II in Europe.

3 September

Britain and France declare war on Germany.

10 September

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) begins arriving in France.

27 September

OKW initial planning conference for the assault on the West.

9 October

Hitler’s ‘War Directive No. 6’ orders the OKH to begin planning for the invasion of northern France and the Low Countries.

19/29 October

OKH produces the original/revised Fall Gelb plan for the Western offensive.

24 October

Heeresgruppe A headquarters established at Koblenz.

31 October

First Heeresgruppe A memorandum to OKH urging a complete change in the concept of operations of the Fall Gelb plan – it is rejected.

20 November

Hitler’s ‘War Directive No. 8’ orders the OKH planning to be flexible enough to shift the Schwerpunkt of Fall Gelb from Heeresgruppe B to Heeresgruppe A if an opportunity for greater success in the south presents itself.

1940 10 January

German courier aircraft mistakenly lands near Mechelen, Belgium, and copies of the airborne portion of the Fall Gelb plan are captured.

25 January

Fall Gelb plan is revised to include the occupation of Holland.

7, 14 February

Heeresgruppe A ‘war games’ convince OKH Chief of Staff, General Halder, that a major revision of the Fall Gelb plan is necessary.

17 February

At a luncheon Hitler hears Manstein’s recommendation to shift the Schwerpunkt of Fall Gelb to Heeresgruppe A.

18 February

Halder delivers to Hitler a completely rewritten draft OKH plan, which places the Schwerpunkt of the attack through the Ardennes – Hitler orders the Fall Gelb directive to be changed accordingly.

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24 February

Hitler signs the Aufmarschanweisung Nr 4 Fall Gelb deployment order.

20 March

Général Gamelin, Supreme Commander of Allied Armies, adopts ‘Dyle–Breda’ designed to meet the German invasion in Belgium while the Maginot Line holds the French frontier.

9 April

German naval units, army divisions, and Luftwaffe squadrons begin the invasion of Denmark and Norway.

10 May

Fall Gelb – German invasion of the West – begins.

12–13 May

The battle of Gembloux, focusing Allied attention in the north while German Panzers approach through the Ardennes in the south.

12–14 May

The battle of Dinant – Rommel crosses the Meuse against a disorganized defence.

13–14 May

The battle of Sedan – Guderian overwhelms unprepared French defences – Huntziger withdraws southward; Guderian turns west.

14–15 May

Reinhardt crosses the Meuse at Monthermé and drives to Montcornet; the breakout begins.

16 May

Rundstedt’s first ‘halt order’ is issued and either ignored or not received by Panzer units.

17, 19 May

De Gaulle’s counter-attacks have no effect on the German advances.

18 May

Following a crisis in command, Guderian is allowed to continue a ‘reconnaissance in force’.

19 May

Gamelin is replaced by Général Weygand – Panzers released to continue advance.

20 May

Panzers reach the English Channel, cutting off all Allied forces north of the Somme River.

21 May

BEF spoiling attack at Arras stuns German Army leaders.

22 May

Panzers invest Calais and Boulogne.

23 May

Lord Gort orders the BEF to withdraw to Dunkirk.

24 May

Rundstedt again orders the Panzers to halt – Hitler affirms decision with the OKW-directed Haltbefehl.

26 May

Operation Dynamo – evacuation of BEF from France – begins; Hitler rescinds the Haltbefehl.

28 May

Belgian Army surrenders.

31 May

French 1ère Armée surrenders at Lille.

4 June

Evacuation of Allied forces from Dunkirk ends.

5 June

Fall Rot – final conquest of France – begins.

22 June

France signs armistice with Germany.

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OPPOSING COMMANDERS GERMAN COMMANDERS Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt had already completed an exemplary military career, retiring at 62 years of age as a Generaloberst commanding Gruppenkommando 1 (‘Army Group Command’ – the precursor to the Heeresgruppe) in Berlin on 31 October 1930. Born (12 December 1875) into the military aristocracy, he was a captain commanding an infantry company in Alsace at the opening of World War I and an army corps chief of staff on the Russian Front by its end. When Hitler came to power he was a General der Infanterie commanding the Berlin Military District. Within a year of retirement he was recalled to help plan – and lead one of the two army groups in – the Polish Campaign. Despite his age, Rundstedt was known for his resourcefulness and flexibility and was universally respected as a ‘brilliant exponent of grand tactics … who grasped the essentials of any problem in an instant’. Indifferent to both minor (tactical level) details and strategic issues (national level), he focused on what today is termed ‘the operational art of campaigning’, taking advantage of his subordinates’ talents and allowing them great latitude in achieving his operational objectives. As a Clausewitzian purist, he excelled in mass and manoeuvre and was a strong adherent to the ‘principles of war’ – consequently he viewed the advent of Panzers and ‘blitzkrieg tactics’ with great caution. For this reason, when Halder grouped five Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions into one powerful armoured phalanx within his command, Rundstedt and the staunchly conservative OKH hierarchy searched for a more traditional commander who could ‘rein in’ the aggressive young Panzer generals. This they found in General der Kavallerie Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist, a 58-year-old veteran who had retired in 1938. The scion of a famous Junker military family, he graduated from a military school in 1900 and was a captain in the ‘Totenkopf Hussars’ at the start of World War I, rising to command a cavalry regiment by its end. Recalled to duty for the Polish Campaign, he commanded XXII AK, which eventually included one Panzer and one light mechanized

Commander of Heeresgruppe A: Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1987-047-20)

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Commander of what is frequently called Panzergruppe Kleist: cavalry General Ewald von Kleist. (Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1986-0210-17)

General Heinz Guderian. As this image portrays, Guderian was obviously greatly admired by his men. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-139-1112-17)

division. Experienced in handling armour but considered ‘old school’ on tactical matters, he had the balance that the OKH leadership thought necessary to control a notoriously ‘difficult subordinate’ such as Heinz ‘Brausewetter’ (‘stormy weather’) Guderian. Aggressive, impetuous and temperamental, General der Panzertruppen Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was commissioned in his father’s Hanoverian Jäger-Bataillon Nr. 10 in 1908. A short, serious officer of exceptional courage and dedication, during World War I Guderian initially commanded a cavalry signals company, eventually rising to become an army-level (AOK C) operations officer. Such were his recognized talents that he was appointed to the elite Großer Generalstab. Four years later, he joined its Weimar successor, the Reichwehr’s Truppenamt (‘Army Troop Bureau’), as a general staff officer to the Inspekteur der Verkehrstruppen (‘Inspector of Transportation Troops’). There Guderian ‘approached motorization with inventive zeal’ and began studying, lecturing and writing on mobile tactics in military history. In 1931 he was rewarded with command of the 3. (Preußen) Kraftfahrwesens Bataillon (3rd (Prussian) MotorTransport Battalion), the Reichwehr’s trial motorized unit, where he started experimenting using ‘dummy tanks’. Promoting his developing theories of deep penetrating armoured thrusts, his treatises were published in his book, Achtung – Panzer! six years later. By then he and others had developed tactics for decisive armoured attacks: massed tank assaults penetrating deep into the enemy’s rear areas to paralyze their command and control, using air attacks as ‘flying artillery’ and accompanied by infantry in motorized vehicles. From October 1935 Guderian commanded the 2. Panzer-Division and three years later was appointed Chef der Schnellen Truppen (‘Chief of Mobile Troops’), being granted direct access to Hitler. Leading XIX AK (mot.) – one Panzer and two motorized infantry divisions – in Poland, he broke through fortified defences along the Narew River near Wizna (8–10 September) and executed a deep, wide envelopment of the enemy’s Northern Front, driving all the way to Brest (Brzeŋþ) and almost capturing the Polish High Command. After Guderian the single most impressive Panzer leader would be an infantry officer who had benefited both from being a Great War hero and his proximity to Hitler. Generalmajor Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel’s aggressive leadership and creative tactics as a company commander on the Italian Front won him the Pour le Mérite at Caporetto in World War I. Not talented as a staff officer, he languished in the Weimar’s Reichswehr, finally finding his niche teaching tactics

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at the Potsdam Infanterieschule (‘infantry school’), and later commanded the (former Austrian Army) Wiener-Neustadt War Academy. When mobilized the faculties of these schools provided security details for various staffs and headquarters. Rommel commanded the Führerhauptquartier battalion protecting Hitler’s mobile military HQ during the Sudetenland crisis, the Munich crisis, and the Polish Campaign. When Hitler asked him what command he wanted, Rommel unhesitatingly requested a Panzer division. He was given the newly formed 7. Panzer-Division in Kluge’s AOK 4 and Hoth’s XV AK.

FRENCH COMMANDERS Général d’Armée Maurice Gustave Gamelin was the Chief of the General Staff of National Defence for France and Supreme Commander of all Allied land forces. Graduating first in his class from Saint-Cyr military academy in 1891, at the outset of World War I he was Joffre’s operations chief and, in 1916, at the age of 44 he became one of France’s youngest and most capable divisional commanders (9e Division). Steeped in the successful – though atrociously costly – defensive tactics of the Great War he was disinterested in technology and thus incapable of assimilating mobile warfare concepts that emerged during the next two decades. A small, compact man approaching 70, Gamelin was politically adroit, intellectually superior and professionally detached. Not a leader of men, he preferred to be thought of as a ‘philosopher general’ who managed resources and composed detailed plans to do so. He and his 15-officer staff were ensconced at Château de Vincennes on the eastern outskirts of Paris so he could be near the political power centres. Eschewing radios for fear that the Germans could locate his HQ by homing in on their transmissions, he relied on the national telephone/ telegraph network and motorcycle dispatch riders for communications with his Grand Quartier Général (GQG) headquarters at Montry, which prepared, elaborated, and distributed his guidance – resulting in a ‘decision cycle’ time of nearly 48 hours. In charge of actually ‘running the war’ was Général d’Armée Alphonse-Joseph Georges, an officer who had risen entirely through professional merit and was considered by many to be France’s finest soldier. The polar opposite of Gamelin in temperament and character, Georges had joined Foch’s staff during World War I and afterwards became Pétain’s chief of staff. Passed over in 1935 for Gamelin’s position largely because of his right-wing political associations, as the former’s star waned (and he approached mandatory retirement age), their relationship deteriorated to where ‘they could hardly exchange civilities’.

Generalmajor Erwin Rommel, in his usual element – leading from the front. (NARA)

Général Maurice Gustave Gamelin, Commandant Suprême des Armée Alliées. (Corbis)

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Général Alphonse Joseph Georges as the Chief of Army Personnel Bureau in the mid1930s. (Max Schiavon) Général Charles Huntziger, Guderian’s adversary. (Corbis)

From his HQ at La Ferté-sousJouarre, Georges’s role was to coordinate the operations of three army groups stretching from the Channel coast to the Swiss border, apportion the air force effort supporting them, and direct the assignment of army reserves. The most critical part of the front was Groupe d’Armées 1 under Général d’Armée Gaston-Henri Gustave Billotte. Commanding four French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), he naturally paid more attention to the two French armies and BEF advancing into Belgium and southern Holland, largely ignoring the 2e and 9e Armées holding the line along the Meuse River. Commanding 2e Armée – at the hinge of the French line swinging into Belgium – was Général d’Armée Charles Léon Clément Huntziger. Graduating from Saint-Cyr in 1901, Huntziger had significant combat experience fighting in the pre-World War I colonial wars in Madagascar and Indochina and commanding a battalion in the Great War. Considered another brilliant intellect, Huntziger was promoted rapidly, becoming the youngest commander on record as the chief of French forces in Syria. Viewed as Gamelin’s most likely successor, he was also arrogant and complacent – a dangerous combination – and consequently lacked any interest in considering any alternatives to the ‘proven’ concept of the unbroken linear defence. Commanding 9e Armée – which was to move into southern Belgium and hold along the Meuse from CharlevilleMézières to Namur – was Général d’Armée André Georges Corap, a 62-year-old Norman who had spent most of his career in North Africa. Beginning with great promise, he graduated first in his class from Saint-Cyr in 1898 and, after passing through World War I as a staff officer, became famous for his capture of the Moroccan rebel Abd el-Krim in 1926. However, in spite of being promoted thereafter, Morocco remained the high point of his career. Living on past glory, Corap became overweight and slovenly but was well liked by his troops and ‘held in high esteem by his superiors’. In the late 1930s he headed the somnolent 2e Région Militaire (Amiens) and once war was declared was assigned the equally ‘quiet’ Ardennes sector where he could do little harm. Once actively engaged, he proved surprisingly energetic, but being totally ignorant of modern mechanized warfare he could not anticipate the speed or the violence that two Panzer corps would unleash upon his sluggish, largely reservist, infantry formations.

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OPPOSING PLANS The objective of Fall Gelb is … to defeat, by an attack through Belgium and Luxembourg territory, the largest possible forces of the Anglo-French army; and thereby to pave the way for the destruction of the military strength of the enemy Führer Directive Nr. 10 for the Conduct of the War, 24 February 1940

FALL GELB PLAN Fall Gelb was a detailed deployment order designed to launch the initial phase of Hitler’s military campaign to eliminate the Western democracies from the European conflict. But it was only the first part of that campaign. Because, in the Industrial Age, military campaigns could rarely accomplish strategic political aims in one decisive action – the best example of an immense failure being Germany’s ‘Schlieffen Plan’ of 1914 – typically, modern campaign plans consisted of several parallel (near simultaneous) ‘branches’ and one or more subsequent actions, called ‘sequels’. Fall Gelb was initially designed to achieve Hitler’s limited aims of acquiring a geographical position from which to further prosecute the war against both France and Britain. The sequels to this plan would be Fall Rot (Case Red) – the final conquest of France, coupled with its Italian-accommodating step-sibling Fall Braun (Case Brown) – and what we know today as the Battle of Britain, derived from the Luftwaffe’s Studie Blau (Study Blue). Once matured, Halder’s Fall Gelb plan included four parallel branches, all to be executed simultaneously. These were as follows: Vigorous attacks against the Maginot Line by Leeb’s Heeresgruppe C in order to pin the 24 divisions of ‘interval troops’ (including the British 51st ‘Highland’ Division) to their positions and thus prevent them from being used to attack the southern flank of the German breakthrough. The airborne invasion of the Netherlands by the Luftwaffe’s ad hoc Luftlandekorps (‘air landing corps’) with ground relief provided by General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler’s AOK 18. Both these formations were components of Bock’s Heeresgruppe B. The strong advance through central Belgium by the third component of Bock’s command, Reichenau’s AOK 6, designed to ‘push back any threats to the Ruhr… [and] divert to themselves the strongest possible Anglo-French forces’. 15 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

As soon as the dreadful winter of 1939/40 thawed enough to allow, German units began training in large-scale exercises, practising river crossings using the Mosel and the adjacent Eifel region to simulate the Meuse River and the Ardennes forests. (Max Schiavon)

The advance through Luxembourg and southern Belgium by the armoured formations of Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe A designed to achieve a major breakthrough between Sedan, France, and Dinant, Belgium. Exploitation of this breakthrough was intended to encircle the French Groupe d’Armées 1 in the north, pin them against the coastline, and result in a Kesselschlacht (‘cauldron fight’ or battle of annihilation). The infantry formations of Heeresgruppe A following behind the Panzer spearhead were to secure the southern flank of the advance by taking defensive positions along the Aisne and Somme rivers. The Fall Gelb deployment order detailed only the initial unit dispositions and the first phase of operations, those designed to achieve the Panzer breakthrough. Subsequent operations were presented as general directions and ultimate military/geographical objectives. The plan’s Schwerpunkt was a heavy, mechanized and armoured blow aimed at the hinge point between Huntziger’s relatively static 2e Armée and Corap’s forward deploying 9e Armée, units of which had to move across portions of southern Belgium to occupy defensive positions along the Meuse River. The armoured spearhead of this offensive was Gruppe Kleist,1 an armylevel formation of two Panzer and one motorized corps, advancing in file, one corps after another. The point of the spear was Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.), consisting of three Panzer divisions and the elite Großdeutschland (‘Greater Germany’) motorized infantry regiment. Behind Guderian was Generalleutnant Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) with two Panzer divisions and a motorized infantry division. Security for the Panzer’s left flank was provided by General der Infanterie Gustav von Wietersheim’s XIV AK (mot.) of two motorized infantry divisions. Following the Panzer formations was Rundstedt’s ‘leg’ infantry, hustling forward to prevent gaps from forming behind the advancing Panzers, and deploying to the left, first along the Aisne River, then later the Somme, to protect the southern flank of the armoured thrust. These were organized within List’s AOK 12 and Generaloberst Ernst Busch’s AOK 16, totalling 22 infantry divisions and one mountain division in six corps, with Weichs’s AOK 2 following, and another 45 divisions and six corps HQs behind them in the OKH reserve. 1 Contemporarily, this formation was never known as Panzergruppe Kleist. The ‘Panzerguppe’ designation was not devised until June 1941, but it has frequently been retroactively applied to the Fall Gelb organization.

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On Guderian’s right wing was General der Infanterie Hermann Hoth’s XV AK (mot.), two more Panzer divisions, ensuring that the Allied mobile forces in Belgium could not strike the Panzer spearhead’s northern flank. Hoth’s corps was part of Kluge’s AOK 4, whose nine infantry divisions trailed his Panzers through Belgium. The key to the success of the Fall Gelb plan – as Manstein and Halder plainly saw – was the concentrated armour formation on the far left of the broad-front advance. However, without Manstein as his chief of staff to help manage Kleist’s Panzers, Rundstedt’s conservative nature and his staff’s anxieties soon constrained the mechanized forces he had so persistently requested. As an ‘insurance policy’ Heeresgruppe A allocated to Gruppe Kleist only the four southernmost roads through the Ardennes, leaving the others for List’s infantry to march to the Meuse ‘thereby restrict[ing] the scope of the potential fiasco’. If Guderian’s Panzers bogged down in the Ardennes, they would only block the trailing Panzers; the infantry would still get to the enemy’s defensive line. Additionally Kleist was not given a sector of the front; instead his deployment operations and supply functions passed through List’s AOK 12 (hence the popular though erroneous notion that Gruppe Kleist was a component of List’s army). Finally, Rundstedt told Kleist that his command would remain independent only if it stayed ahead of List’s infantry – if not, it would be absorbed into AOK 12. Consequently Guderian’s mantra – which he drummed into all of his subordinate commanders – became ‘three days to the Meuse; on the fourth day across the Meuse’.

THE FRENCH PLAN D While Fall Gelb was an expedient designed to launch an immediate offensive, the premise of the French counter-plan was that it would be 1941 before the Allies had the strength necessary to defeat Hitler’s Wehrmacht. Therefore, the intent was to defend the French-German border with the Maginot Line while establishing an integrated forward line of defense in central Belgium to hold the Germans until a counter-offensive could be launched. From the few secret, cursory contacts with the Belgian Army staff in November 1939, Gamelin knew that their intended main line of defence was along the Albert Canal and Maas River – a line that stretched into a large salient from Antwerp to Liège to Namur. However, Gamelin also knew that his mobile forces could not reach this line before German mechanized units overwhelmed the Belgian infantry defending it. Therefore, Gamelin decided on an intermediate – and shorter and straighter – defensive line from Antwerp through Louvain and Wavre to Namur, Givet and Sedan. He calculated that two of his three motorized armies, the 1ère Armée and the BEF, could reach this line and establish an effective defence, provided the Belgians held the Germans at the Albert Canal–Maas line for four to seven days. Because the Louvain–Wavre section of the line was anchored on a small stream generously named the Dyle River, this Allies’ defensive deployment was called Plan D. From the line of the Dyle–Meuse rivers Gamelin intended to fully employ the French Army doctrine of the bataille conduite (‘methodical battle’) whereby the defender’s advantages, especially in firepower (artillery and 17 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

machine guns), coupled with an involved ‘deliberate planning’ process, were expected to halt the German advance. In case of a breach in the ‘continuous line of battle’ his riposte (counter-action) was the colmatage, the ‘plugging’ of the gap by moving reserves into the path of the enemy breakthrough. The main element of the Réserve du GQG (GQG reserve) was the Allies’ third motorized formation: Général Giraud’s 7e Armée. This command – one mechanized, two motorized, and three infantry divisions – was initially positioned around Reims, behind Huntziger’s 2e Armée, able to support either Général Gaston Billotte’s Groupe d’Armées 1 along the Dyle–Meuse Line or Général André-Gaston Prételat’s Groupe d’Armées 2 behind the Maginot fortresses. However, in the early springtime, Gamelin became worried that the Allied plan unnecessarily sacrificed the Netherlands. Believing that including the small Dutch Army in the Allies’ overall defensive array would force the Germans to divert forces to their northern flank, Gamelin willingly sacrificed his mobile reserve in order to link up with the Dutch north-east of Antwerp, at Breda. Consequently, Giraud’s 7e Armée was transferred to the far north end of the Allied line, a position from which it would race to Breda and thereby be completely unavailable to plug openings in the defensive line, wherever they might occur. Gamelin’s decision left Georges with a weak reserve: only three recently formed and incompletely trained armoured divisions; two corps HQs with their associated artillery, engineer and reconnaissance troops; and 13 infantry divisions, only one of which was motorized. On 20 March the ‘Dyle Plan–Breda Variant’ was issued – effectively sealing the destinies of Billotte’s southern two armies manning the Meuse defences, and with them, the fate of France.

While the Germans conducted command exercises, practice river crossings and large-scale tank manoeuvres, the French forces were kept productively employed building fortifications and tank traps. Consequently, they would not be psychologically or physically prepared for the stresses of combat. (M. Romanych)

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OPPOSING FORCES The Führer now approves the preparations and is manifestly confident of success. OKH chief of staff General Franz Halder’s Diary, 16 March 1940

GERMAN FORCES Heeresgruppe A

Formed on 5 March 1940, Fall Gelb’s armoured spearhead was a unique and powerful concentration of Panzers and motorized infantry divisions known as Gruppe Kleist. A provisional formation of three corps reporting directly to Rundstedt’s HQ, initially Kleist’s command was an independent equal to the numbered armies comprising Heeresgruppe A. With his three corps advancing through the Ardennes in file they formed a mighty lance, the point of which was Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.): 745 armoured fighting vehicles, of which 174 were PzKpfw III medium tanks. Many historians assert that the 19.5/19.8-ton PzKpfw III Ausf. E/Fs were inferior to the French tanks – especially the heavy Char B1 bis – due to their lighter armour and armament. Technically, this simplistic comparison may be true; h o w e v e r, technologically the German tanks were far superior to their French adversaries. The Germans had learned early – at the Kazan testing grounds in the USSR in 1929–33 – that the tank’s commander needed to be situated high in the turret, with a dedicated optical system and individual hatch for greater battlefield visibility and situational awareness, a dedicated two-man gun crew, an

A PzKpfw III Ausf. F medium tank driving through Belgium, May 1940. The 16–19.8 ton (depending on variant) PzKpfw III was the Wehrmacht’s main battle tank for the campaign, some 226 equipping four Panzer divisions in Heeresgruppe A. (Thomas Laemlein)

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The PzKpfw IIIs were augmented by 325 Czech-built PzKpfw 35(t) and 38(t) light tanks in three other Heeresgruppe A Panzer divisions. (Thomas Laemlein)

A Luftwaffe Do 17Z dropping 100kg bombs. Although commonly classified as a medium bomber, the Do 17Z’s small bomb-load made it a twin-engine light bomber like the Bristol Blenheim. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-3410489-13)

internal intercom system to control his own vehicle, and a radio to manoeuvre with other tanks in his unit. Additionally, the PzKpfw III’s electrical system, gunsight, speed and manoeuvrability were all superior to its French adversary. These advantages became obvious when tanks were organized and employed in formations. Guderian’s tanks were augmented by 104 PzKpfw IV fire-support (‘Bunkerknacker’ or ‘bunker buster’) tanks and some 467 PzKpfw I and II old, light tanks. Behind ‘der Schnelle Heinz’ (often Anglicized as ‘Hurrying Heinz’) followed Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) two Panzer divisions. Stemming from traditional cavalry formations, mechanized in 1938 to become leichte Divisionen (‘light divisions’), these two units were equipped with 234 confiscated Czech-built PzKpfw 35(t) and 38(t) tanks. These 10-ton (10.5 and 9.4 tons, respectively) vehicles were classified as light tanks, but their 30mm armour and 3.7cm main guns made them the combat equivalent of the PzKpfw III. They were augmented by 120 PzKpfw Is and IIs, and supported by 47 PzKpfw IVs for destroying fixed fortifications and other defensive positions. Echeloned to the north of Guderian’s spearhead was Hoth’s XV AK (mot.) with two more Panzer divisions, equipped with an assortment of 52 PzKpfw IIIs and 91 PzKpf 38(t)s, supported by 56 PzKpfw IVs and 319 light tanks. Altogether these powerful Panzer units created a densely packed armoured wedge only 60 miles wide, comprising seven divisions totalling 551 medium tanks, backed up by 207 fire-support and 906 light tanks. Followed by three motorized infantry divisions, this Panzer phalanx formed the single greatest concentration of mechanized forces ever seen in the history of warfare.

The Luftwaffe

Heeresgruppe A was supported by a dedicated Luftwaffe air fleet: General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3. Consisting of a large defensive fighter command (Jagdfliegerführer 3 or Jafü 3) and three Fliegerkorps (‘flying corps’) of bombers, it was a robust, well-balanced strike force equipped to aggressively take the battle to the enemy. Fliegerkorps V was tailored for deeper strikes against 20 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

interdiction and strategic targets, but the command’s primary mission was to support Heeresgruppe A’s penetrations of the French defensive line along the Meuse. To provide short-ranged close air support and battlefield interdiction, Fliegerkorps I was attached to Kluge’s AOK 4 and Fliegerkorps II supported Gruppe Kleist. Sperrle’s command was equipped with 12 Kampfgruppen (‘battle groups’, meaning bomber groups) of 302 serviceable twin-engine Heinkel 111 medium bombers and 22 of the new Junkers 88A Schnellbomber (‘fast bomber’). Following the initial, doctrinally proscribed airfield attacks to eliminate the enemy’s fighter force on the ground, these two types would largely target the French railway system, making it difficult for Georges’s reinforcements to move to the front. Surprisingly Luftflotte 2’s primary tactical weapon was the older, seemingly less capable Dornier 17Z. Although commonly referred to as a ‘medium bomber’ because of its size and four-man crew, due to its limited bombload the Do 17Z was actually a twin-engine light bomber, on the order of the Bristol Blenheim. Nine Kampfgruppen in Fliegerkorps I and II possessed 264 operational examples of this type. Taking advantage of the aircraft’s exceptional manoeuvrability (for a bomber), Do 17Z units had perfected ultra-low level bomb deliveries and specialized in airfield attacks with their 1,000kg bombloads. They would also strike the French command centres, troop concentrations, motorized columns, and other tactical targets once they were located by the command’s five squadrons of (mainly) Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft. Additionally, Fliegerkorps I and II included 103 of the dreaded Ju 87B ‘Stuka’ dive-bombers. Delivering a 551lb (250kg) high explosive and four 110lb (50kg) fragmentation (anti-personnel) bombs with devastating precision and unnerving terror, the Stuka was the Luftwaffe’s equivalent of the army’s Panzer in terms of its material and psychological impact upon the enemy. The three Stukagruppen of Luftflotte 3 would eventually be joined by six more (198 Stukas, plus 38 Hs 123 assault aircraft and another 83 Do 17Z tactical bombers) when Generalmajor Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII was transferred to Sperrle’s command, once the great feint in Belgium had succeeded. Finally, Sperrle’s Fliegerkorps included six Jagdgruppen (‘fighter groups’) and four Zerstörergruppen (‘destroyer groups’) to escort the command’s bombing missions and to take control of the airspace above the battlefield. These totalled 216 serviceable Bf 109Es single-engine – an exceptional

The single most potent and effective weapon in the Wehrmacht’s arsenal, the dreaded Junkers 87 ‘Stuka’ divebombers, a formation of them seen here during a mission over Poland eight months before Fall Gelb. (Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1987-1210-502)

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fighter by any standard – and 50 Bf 110C/D twin-engine heavy fighters. The Fliegerkorps’ fighters would be augmented by Jafü 3’s 266 Bf 109Es and 24 more Zerstöreren, who were responsible for protecting the extended columns of troops and vehicles and their supply lines, from the Rhine westward, from Allied air attack.

ALLIED FORCES The French 2e and 9e Armées

The heavy (31.5 ton) Char B1 bis was the French main battle tank in 1940, some 200 equipping three Divisions Cuirassés. With its hull-mounted 75mm and turret-mounted, high-velocity 47mm guns and 60mm thick hull protection, it potentially could have prevailed against the much lighter PzKpfw III and its consorts. (Antoine Misner)

On the banks of the Meuse River, opposite Rundstedt’s approaching Panzers, were two French armies – the 2e and 9e Armées – almost exclusively infantrybased formations. Confident that the Ardennes forests, hills, and ravines ‘never favoured large operations’ (Gamelin, 1937), the French frontier fortifications were the weakest from La Ferté to Givet, along Belgium’s south-western border, where these two armies were stationed. Behind the deep, unfordable, 200ft-wide Meuse River, the westward continuation of the Maginot Line was composed of a string of concrete blockhouses interspersed with smaller, machine gun-armed pillboxes. The blockhouses were each manned by 10–12 troops from one of the four regiments of the Secteur Fortifié de Montmédy and mounted one or two machine guns and anti-tank guns. The fortress troops – all machine-gun companies augmented with anti-tank guns – were well-trained regulars with high morale. In the Sedan sector, the 147e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse (RIF) manned five sections of this line, totalling eight blockhouses, an artillery casemate and 46 pillboxes. The two flanking sections – extending westwards along the Meuse, facing Donchery from the Bar River to Frénois, and eastwards along the river from Wadelincourt to the stream Thélonne, facing Bazeilles – were quite strong. A weaker section lined the Iges Canal (separating the indefensible northern loop of the Meuse) facing north and west, and a half-dozen pillboxes covered the three bridges spanning the city. But there were none facing east guarding the riverbank from the Iges Canal to Sedan. The Ligne Principale de Résistance (main line of defence), connecting the two flanking sections, had only one blockhouse and eight pillboxes spread between Frénois and Wa d e l i n c o u r t . Another 16 casemates were under construction to fill gaps and provide defence in depth on the slopes of 1,000ft elevation La Marfée Heights, but they were incomplete, necessitating infantry ‘interval troops’ to protect the few fixed defences.

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The infantry defending the Sedan sector, the 55e Division d’Infanterie (55e DI), was one of six (three of them reservist) that along with SF Montmédy formed the basis of Huntziger’s 2e Armée. Screening to the east, along the Semois River and into the Ardennes, were two light cavalry divisions (Divisions Légère de Cavalerie or DLCs), each consisting of two horse-mounted regiments, a third containing four companies of lorrymounted infantry/engineers and 40 small machine-gun-armed AMR tankettes, and a fourth with 12 Panhard AMD armoured cars, 12 Hotchkiss H-35/-39 light tanks and two squadrons of motorcyclists. In reserve Huntziger had three battalions of Renault R-35 (3e Bataillon de Chars de Combat, or BCC) and FCM-36 (4e and 7e BCC) light infantry-support tanks, as well as another brigade of horse-mounted cavalry and three regiments of engineers. Corap’s 9e Armée, which was to advance across part of western Belgium to occupy its positions on the Meuse, was of similar composition. Primarily organized around one fortress and six infantry divisions (four of them reservist), Corap also had two mixed horse/motorized cavalry divisions – plus a brigade of horse-mounted North African Spahis – to range beyond the Meuse and into the Ardennes. His reserves consisted of three battalions of Renault R-35 (6e and 32e BCC) and badly outdated FT (33e BCC) tanks and three engineer regiments. The front-line troops were generously supported with artillery: 300 updated 1897-pattern Puteaux 75mm light field guns and 120 155CS (155mm) heavy guns with two reinforced corps artillery regiments providing 108 105LS and 72 155L heavy guns. Of all these, only 36 heavy guns (plus the cavalry’s 48 75mm pieces) were tractor-towed, the rest being horsedrawn, with all the limitations and vulnerabilities associated with that transportation mode. As is almost always the case, these aggregates are misleading because the division destined to receive the initial impact of Guderian’s Panzers was equipped with only one mixed artillery regiment, containing 36 light and a dozen heavy guns. Additionally, the front line infantry of these armies were supported by some 243 Renault R-35, FCM-36, and (ancient) FT light tanks. While the toylike WWI-vintage FT was patently obsolete, the other two types were modern 10.43/12.15-ton vehicles armed with a 37mm cannon and a single MAC31 7.5mm coaxial machine gun. According to French Army doctrine the independent battalions

Despite the success of the Model 1897 75mm field gun in World War I, and the fact that many of these guns, still in service, were modernized with pneumatic tyres and a new gun shield, they were outranged and outclassed by the Germans’ newer 10.5cm artillery. (Thomas Laemlein)

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of light infantry-support tanks would be parcelled out as individual companies (13 tanks) and platoons (three tanks), resulting in their destruction in detail, their modest defensive capabilities being totally overwhelmed at the Panzers’ point of contact. The main elements of the Réserve du GQG were spread out behind the front and included 13 infantry divisions (three of reservists and one of exiled Poles) and the Groupement Cuirassé (armoured group) under Général François-Pierre-Louis Keller. This formation consisted of three heavy infantry-support tank divisions, called Divisions Cuirassée (DCr, or armoured divisons), which were each composed of 68 Char B1 bis tanks, supported by 90 modern Hotchkiss H-39 light tanks, a battalion of truck-mounted infantry, and a small regiment of tractor-towed artillery. Called Stahlkolossen (‘Steel Colossus’) by the Germans, the 31-ton Char B1 bis was the French infantry’s primary weapon for counter-attacking enemy breakthroughs, and for creating their own. This heavily armoured tank incorporated both a ‘bunker busting’ capability with its hull-mounted, stub-barrel 75mm ABS SA 35 howitzer, and its turret-mounted 47mm SA 35 gun was especially effective against enemy tanks and anti-tank emplacements. However, the Char B1 bis was ponderously slow and had a limited 60–90 mile range. Because their engines required high-octane aviation gasoline, they were tied to their special, tracked refuelling vehicles (called bowsers). Additionally, they had archaic gunsights, few radios, and a one-man turret in which the tank commander had to verbally direct his driver and the 75mm gun crew, load and fire the turret’s 47mm gun, and maintain a constant awareness of enemy targets as well as the location of friendly vehicles. The best Armée de l’Air fighter was the imported Curtiss ‘Hawk’ H75-C1, 600 of which had been ordered, and 200 delivered by May 1940. Some 120 of these robust, but under-armed, fighters equipped two Groupes de Chasse each in ZOAN and ZOAE. (Private collection)

Allied air power

Air cover for Georges’s Theatre d’Operations Nord-est (TONE) armies was provided by the Armée de l’Air’s (Army of the Air or AdA) Forces Aériennes de Coopération du Front Nord-Est (Air Forces for Cooperation with the Northeastern Front or FACNE) under Général Marcel Têtu. The most powerful of FACNE’s three component commands was Général François d’Astier de La Vigerie’s Zone d’Operations Aériennes Nord (‘North Air Operations Zone’ or ZOAN), boasting a total of 1,250 French and British aircraft. However, ZOAN’s 11 squadronsize ‘groups’ of fighters were parcelled out to protect the command’s constituent armies, Paris, and the lower Seine (British lines of communication). The allocation of defensive fighter forces in this manner was a holdover from World War I, where each formation was responsible for a prescribed sector of the front.

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Covering Huntziger’s and Corap’s two armies was Groupement de Chasse 23 – three fighter groups containing 50 obsolescent Morane Saulnier (MS) 406s and 25 modern American-made Curtiss H75s (French versions of the USAAF P-36 Hawk), augmented by a squadron of ten Potez 631 twin-engine night-fighters operating in the bomber-destroyer role. These could be supplemented by missions from Zone d’Operations Aériennes Est’s (‘East Air Operations Zone’ or ZOAE) Groupement de Chasse 22 (six fighter groups) but the process to do so was complicated, cumbersome, and divisive. The AdA’s offensive air power was caught in the midst of re-equipping. Anxious to modernize his bomber force, once war was declared Général Joseph Vuillemin (Chief of the AdA) withdrew 20 of his 33 bomber groups to the south and in December began re-equipping them with brand-new French and imported American aircraft. Of the remainder, six flew ancient Amiot 143M and Farman 222 night-bombers and six were equipped with fast, modern Loiré-et-Olivier (LeO) 451 medium bombers and Breguet 693 twin-engine assault aircraft. The last unit had re-equipped with the Americanmade Martin 167F reconnaissance-bomber, but these were not yet operational. Most of the AdA’s meagre bomber force was organized into the 1ère Division Aérienne (‘1st Air Division’) assigned to d’Astier’s ZOAN. This command mustered only 14 operational LeO 451 day bombers, 17 obsolete Amiot night-bombers, and 25 Breguet 693 assault aircraft. Next door, ZOAE’s 3e Division Aérienne could contribute another 23 Amiot and Farman night-bombers, but these had negligible combat power in the daytime tactical role. To provide an Allied offensive capability in the absence of a French ability to do so, the RAF established the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), based at airfields around Reims. Originally intended for strategic strikes at Germany’s Ruhr industrial basin, they would almost immediately be called upon for tactical missions against the advancing Panzers. This force of light bombers comprised eight squadrons totalling 110 serviceable single-engine Fairey Battle Mk. Is and two more equipped with 24 twin-engine Bristol Blenheim Mk. IVs. Once the slow, unmanoeuvrable, and under-armed Battle demonstrated its woeful vulnerability to the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitts, the AASF was also assigned three squadrons of 54 Hawker Hurricane Mk. I fighters to protect them.

The British Advanced Air Striking Force: To make up for the Armée de l’Air’s bomber deficiency, the RAF provided eight squadrons of shortranged light bombers to form the AASF. These slow, unprotected, and inadequately defended Fairey Battles proved disappointing in this role. (IWM, CH 769)

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ORDERS OF BATTLE German forces HEERESGRUPPE A – GENERALOBERST GERD VON RUNDSTEDT Gruppe Kleist – General der Kavallerie Ewald von Kleist XIX Armeekorps (mot.) – General der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian Corps Troops: AR (mot.) 49 102. Flak-Rgt (Luftwaffe) 1. Panzer-Division – Generalleutnant Kirchner Pz.-Rgt. 1 Pz.-Rgt. 2 SR (mot.) 1 AR (mot.) 73 2. Panzer-Division – Generalleutnant Veiel Pz.-Rgt. 3 Pz.-Rgt. 4 SR (mot.) 2 AR (mot.) 74 10. Panzer-Division – Generalleutnant Schaal Pz.-Rgt. 7 Pz.-Rgt. 8 SR (mot.) 69 SR (mot.) 86 AR (mot.) 90 IR ‘Grossdeutschland’ – Oberstleutnant Schwerin XLI Armeekorps (mot.) – Generalleutnant Reinhardt 6. Panzer-Division – Generalmajor Kempf Pz.-Rgt. 11 (+) SR (mot.) 4 AR (mot.) 76 8. Panzer-Division – Generalleutnant Kuntzen Pz.-Rgt. 10 (+) SR (mot.) 8 AR (mot.) 80 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) – Generalleutnant Bader IR (mot.) 5 IR (mot.) 25 AR (mot.) 2 XIV Armeekorps (mot.) – General der Infanterie Wietersheim

13. Infanterie-Division (mot.) – Generalleutnant Rotkirch-Panthen IR (mot.) 66 IR (mot.) 93 AR (mot.) 13 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) – Generalleutnant Lemelsen IR (mot.) 15 IR (mot.) 71 AR (mot.) 29 AOK 4 – Generaloberst Günther von Kluge II Armeekorps – General der Infanterie Strauß 12. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Seydlitz-Kurzbach IR 27 IR 48 IR 89 AR 12 32. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Böhme IR 4 IR 94 IR 96 AR 32 V Armeekorps – General der Infanterie Ruoff 251. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Kratzert IR 451 IR 459 IR 471 AR 251 267. Infanterie-Division – General der Panzertruppen Feßmann IR 467 IR 487 IR 497 AR 12 VIII Armeekorps– General der Artillerie Heitz 8. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Koch-Erpach IR 28 IR 38 IR 84 AR 8 28. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Obstfelder IR 7 IR 49 IR 83 AR 28

XV Armeekorps (mot.) – General der Infanterie Hoth 5. Panzer-Division – Generalleutnant Walsporn Pz.-Rgt. 15 Pz.-Rgt. 31 SR (mot.) 13 SR (mot.) 14 AR (mot.) 116 7. Panzer-Division – Generalmajor Rommel Pz.-Rgt. 25 (+) SR (mot.) 6 SR (mot.) 7 AR (mot.) 78 62. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Keiner IR 164 IR 183 IR 190 AR 162 Army Reserve 4. Infanterie-Division 87. Infanterie-Division 211. Infanterie-Division 263. Infanterie-Division AOK 12 – Generaloberst Sigmund Wilhelm List III Armeekorps – General der Artillerie Haase 3. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Lichel IR 8 IR 29 IR 50 AR 3 23. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt IR 9 IR 67 IR 68 AR 29 VI Armeekorps – General der Pioniere Förster 16. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Krampf IR 60 IR 64 IR 79 AR 16 24. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Tettau IR 31 IR 32

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IR 102 AR 24 XVIII Armeekorps – General der Infanterie Beyer 5. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Fahrmbacher IR 14 IR 56 IR 75 AR 5 21. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Sponheimer IR 3 IR 24 IR 45 AR 21 25. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Clößner IR 13 IR 35 IR 119 AR 25 1. Gebirgs Division – Generalleutnant Kübler GJR 98 GJR 99 GAR 79 Army Reserve 9. Infanterie-Division 27. Infanterie-Division AOK 16 – General der Infanterie Busch VII Armeekorps – Generalleutnant Heinrici 36. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Lindemann IR 70 IR 87 IR 118 AR 36 68. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Braun IR 169 IR 188 IR 196 AR 168 XIII Armeekorps – Generalleutnant Vietinghoff-Scheel 17. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Loch IR 21 IR 55 IR 95 AR 17

34. Infanterie-Division – Generalleutnant Sanne IR 80 IR 107 IR 253 AR 34 XXIII Armeekorps – Generalleutnant Schubert 58. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor Heunert IR 154 IR 209 IR 220 AR 158 76. Infanterie-Division – Generalmajor de Angelis IR 178 IR 203 IR 230 AR 176 Army Reserve 6. Infanterie-Division 15. Infanterie-Division 26. Infanterie-Division 33. Infanterie-Division 52. Infanterie-Division 71. Infanterie-Division 73. Infanterie-Division

3.(F)/121 2 Ju 88As/3 He 111Hs Fliegerkorps V – Generalleutnant Robert Ritter von Greim JG 52 72 Bf 109Es JG 54 68 Bf 109Es V.(Z)/LG 1 27 Bf 110Cs I./ZG 52 23 Bf 110Cs KG 51 48 He 111Hs/22 Ju 88As KG 55 71 He 111Ps 4.(F)/121 1 Ju 88A/7 Do 17Ps Jagdfliegerfürher 3 – Oberst Gerd von Massow JG 2 109 Bf 109Es JG 53 157 Bf 109Es ZG 2 24 Bf 110Cs Flakkorps I – General der Flakartillerie Herbert Weise I. Flak-Bde Flak-Rgt. 102 Flak-Rgt. 103 II. Flak-Bde: Flak-Rgt. 101 Flak-Rgt. 104

LUFTWAFFE – GENERALFELDMARSHALL HERMAN GÖRING

Théâtre d’Opérations du Nord-Est – Général d’Armée Alphonse-Joseph Georges

(Note: numbers represent serviceable aircraft strength on 10 May 1940) Luftflotte 3 – General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle 1.(F)/123 3 Ju 88As/6 Do 17Ps 3.(F)/123 2 Ju 88As/7 Do 17Ps Fliegerkorps I – General der Flieger Ulrich Grauert JG 77 38 Bf 109Es JG 3 38 Bf 109Es ZG 76 53 Bf 110Cs KG 1 108 He 111H/Ps KG 76 87 Do 17Zs III./StG 51 31 Ju 87Bs 5.(F)/122 9 Do 17Ps Fliegerkorps II – Generalleutnant Bruno Loerzer KG 2 85 Do 17Zs KG 3 92 Do 17Zs KG 53 75 He 111Hs StG 1 72 Ju 87Bs

Réserves du Grand Quartier Général (GQG): Groupement Cuirassée – Général Keller 1ère Division Cuirassée – Général Bruneau 25e BCC 26e BCC 28e BCC 37e BCC 5e BCP 305e RATTT 2e Division Cuirassée – Général Bruché 8e BCC 14e BCC 15e BCC 27e BCC 17e BCP 309e RATTT 3e Division Cuirassée – Général Brocard 41e BCC 42e BCC

Allied forces FRENCH ARMY – GÉNÉRAL D’ARMÉE MAURICE GAMELIN

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45e BCC 49e BCC 16e BCP 319e RATTT 21e Corps d’Armée – Général Flavigny 14e GRCA 621e RP 109e RALH 23e Corps d’Armée – Général Touchon 19e GRCA 623e RP 123e RALA Reserve Divisions: 10e DI 14e DI 23e DI 28e DI 29e DI 36e DI 43e DI 3e DIM 1ère DINA 7e DINA 5e DIC 7e DIC 2e DIP Groupe d’Armées 1 – Général d’Armée Gaston H. G. Billotte 1ère Armée – General Jean Georges Blanchard Commandant les Chars – GBC 514 and GBC 515 Corps de Cavallerie – General Prioux 2e Division Légère Mécanique – Général Bougrain 8e Cuirassiers 13e Dragons 29e Dragons 1ère RDP 71e RATTT(+) 3e Division Légère Mécanique – Général Langlois 1ère Cuirassiers 2e Cuirassiers 12e Cuirassiers 11e RDP 76e RATTT(+) 3e Corps d’Armée – General de la Laurencie 6e GRCA 603e RP 105e RALH

1ère Division d’Infanterie Motorisée – Général de Camas 1ère RI 43e RI 110e RI 15e RAD 215e RALD 7e GRDIm 2e Division d’Infantrerie Nord Afrique – Général Dame 11e RZ 13e RTA 22e RTA 40e RANA 240e RANLA 92e GRDI 4e Corps d’Armée – Général Aymes 7e GRCA 604e RP 106e RALH 15e Division d’Infanterie Motorisée – Général Juin 4e RI 27e RI 134e RI 1ère RAD 201ère RALD 4e GRDIm 1ère Division d’Infantrerie Marocaine – Général Mellier 1ère RTM 2e RTM 7e RTM 64e RAA 264e RALD 80e GRDI 5e Corps d’Armée – – Général Altmayer 3e GRCAm 605e RP(+) 104e RALA 12e Division d’Infanterie Motorisée – Colonel Blanchon 8e RZ 106e RI 150e RI 25e RAD 225e RALD 3e GRDIm 5e Division d’Infantrerie Nord-Africaine – Général Agliany 6e RTM 14e RZ 24e RTT

25e RAD 225e RALC 95e GRDI 101ère Division d’Infantrerie de Forteresse – Général Béjard 84e RIF 87e RIF 148e RIF 161e RAP(-) Reserve du Armée 32e Division d’Infantrerie – Colonel Savez 7e RI 122e RI 143e RI 3e RAD 203e RALD 38e GRDI 2e Armée – Gén d’Armée Charles Huntziger Commandant les Chars – GBC 502 and GBC 503 2e Division Légère de Cavalerie – Général Berniquet 5e RC 18e RCh 3e RDP 73e RATTT 2e RAM 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie – Général Chanoine 11e RC 12e RCh 15e RDP 78e RATTT 5e RAM 1ère Brigade de Chasseurs – Général Galliard 1er RH 8e RCh Secteur s Fortifié de Montmédy – Général Burtaire 132e RIF 136e RIF 147e RIF 155e RIF 99e RAMFH I/169e RAP 10e Corps d’Armée – Général de Corps Grandsard 12e GRCA 610e RP 110e RALH (+)

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55e Division d’Infantrerie – Général Lafontaine 213e RI 295e RI 331e RI 45e RAMD 65e GRDI 11e BM (attached) 3e Division d’Infantrerie Nord-Africaine – Colonel Mast 12e RZ 14e RTA 15e RTA 20e RANA 220e RALNA 93e GRDI 18e Corps d’Armée – Général de Corps Rochard 16e GRCA 618e RP 118e RALH (+) 41e Division d’Infantrerie – Général Bridoux 101e RI 103e RI 104e RI 13e RAD 213e RALD (+) 36e GRDI 1ère Division d’Infantrerie Coloniale – Général Roucaud 3e RIC 12e RTS 14e RTS 1er RAC 201e RALC 71e GRDI 3e Division d’Infantrerie Coloniale – Général Falvy 1er RIC 21e RIC 23e RIC 3e RAC 203e RALC (+) 73e GRDI Reserve du Armée 71e Division d’Infantrerie – Général Baudet 120e RI 205e RI 246e RI 38e RAMD 60e GRDI

9e Armée – Général d’Armée André Georges Corap Commandant les Chars – GBC 518 1ère Division Légère de Cavalerie – Général d’Arras 19e RD 1er RCh 5e RDP 75e RATTT(+) 1er RAM 4e Division Légère de Cavalerie – Général Barbe 8e RD 31e RD 14e RDP 4e RAM 77e RATTT(+) 3e Spahi Brigade – Colonel Marc 2e RSA 2e RSM 2e Corps d Armée – Général Bouffet 1ère GRCAm 602e RP 102e RALA 5e Division d’Infanterie Motorisée – Général Boucher 8e RI 39e RI 129e RI 11e RAD 211e RALD 1ère GRDIm 11e Corps d’Armée – Général Martin 17e GRCA 611e RP 111e RALHC 18e Division d’Infanterie – Général Duffet 66e RI 77e RI 125e RI 19e RAD 219e RALD(+) 30e GRDI 22e Division d’Infanterie – Général Hassler 19e RZ 62e RTA 116e RTA 218e RALD 18e RAD 24e GRDI 41e Corps d’Armée de Forteresse – – Général Libaud 402e RP

482e RPC 146e RALH 61e Division d’Infantrerie – Général Lhéritier 248e RI 265e RI 337e RI 51e RAMD(+) 58e GRDI 102e Division d’Infantrerie de Forteresse – Général Portzert 42e DBMC 52e DBMC 148e RIF 160e RAP(+) Reserve du Armée 4e Division d’Infanterie Nord-Africaine – Général Sancelme 13e RZ 23e RTA 25e RTA 33e RANA 233e RALNA 94e GRDI 53e Division d’Infanterie – Général Etcheberrigaray 208e RI 239e RI 329e RI 22e RAD 222e RALD 66e GRDI

ARMÉE DE L’AIR – GÉNÉRAL JOSEPH VUILLEMIN HQ: St-Jean-les-Deux-Jumeaux Forces Aeriennes de Cooperation du Front Nord-Est – Général Marcel Têtu HQ: La Ferté-sous-Jouarre Zone d’Operations Aériennes Nord – Général François d’Astier de La Vigerie HQ: Chauny (Note: numbers represent serviceable aircraft strength on 10 May 1940) Fighters: Groupement de Chasse No 23 – Général Romatet GC II/2 22 MS 406s Allocated to 9e Armée GC III/2 28 MS 406s Allocated to 1ère Armée GC I/5 25 H75s Allocated to 2e Armée ECMH 1/16 10 Potez 631s

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Tactical Reconnaissance: GR II/22 Potez 63-11s Assigned to 2e Armée GR II/52 Potez 637/63-11s Assigned to 9e Armée Bombers: 1ère Division Aérienne – Général Escudier GR II/33 6 Bloch 174s GR I/52 10 Potez 637s Groupement de Bombardement du Jour No 6 – Général Lefort GB I/12 7 LeO 451s GB II/12 7 LeO 451s Groupement de Bombardement du Jour No 9 – Colonel François GB I/34 8 Amiot 143s GB II/34 9 Amiot 143s Groupement de Bombardement d’Assaut No 18 – Général Girier GBA I/54 13 Breguet 693s GBA II/54 12 Breguet 693s Strategic Reconnaissance: GR II/33 13 Potez 637/63-11s and 6 Bloch 174s

BRITISH FORCES BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (BEF) – GENERAL LORD GORT I Corps – Lieutenant-General Barker 27th and 140th Field Artillery Rgts 3rd and 5th Medium Rgts 52nd Light AA Rgt 1st Division – Major-General Alexander 1st Guards Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade 2nd, 19th and 67th Field Artillery Rgts 21st A/T Rgt 2nd Division – Major-General Loyd 4th Brigade 5th Brigade 6th Brigade 10th, 16th and 99th Field Artillery Rgts 13th A/T Rgt 48th (South Midland) Division – MajorGeneral Thorne 143rd Brigade 144th Brigade 145th Brigade 18th, 25th and 68th Field Artillery Rgts 53rd A/T Rgt

II Corps – Lieutenant-General Brooke 60th and 88th Field Artillery Rgts 53rd and 59th Medium Rgts 53rd Light AA Rgt 3rd Division – Major-General Montgomery 7th Guards Brigade 8th Brigade 9th Brigade 7th, 33rd and 76th Field Artillery Rgts 20th A/T Rgt 4th Division – Major-General Johnson 10th Brigade 11th Brigade 12th Brigade 22nd, 30th and 77th Field Artillery Rgts 14th A/T Rgt 50th Division – Major-General Martel 150th Brigade 151st Brigade 25th Brigade 72nd and 74th Field Artillery Rgts 65th A/T Rgt III Corps – Lieutenant-General Adam 3rd Rgt Royal Horse Artillery 97th Field Artillery Rgt 51st and 56th Medium Rgts 54th Light AA Rgt 42nd (East Lancashire) Division – MajorGeneral Holmes 125th Brigade 126th Brigade 127th Brigade 52nd and 53rd Field Artillery Rgts 56th A/T Rgt 44th (Home Counties) Division – MajorGeneral Osborne 131st Brigade 132nd Brigade 133rd Brigade 57th, 58th and 65th Field Artillery Rgts 57th A/T Rgt Line of Communications Troops 12th (Eastern) Division – Major-General Petre 35th Brigade 36th Brigade 37th Brigade 23rd (Northumbrian) Division – MajorGeneral Herbert 69th Brigade 70th Brigade

46th (North Midland and West Riding) Division – Major-General Curtis 137th Brigade 138th Brigade 139th Brigade General Headquarters (GHQ) Forces 5th Division (BEF Reserve) – Major-General Franklyn 13th Brigade 17th Brigade 9th, 91st and 92nd Field Artillery Rgts 52nd A/T Rgt 1st Tank Brigade 1st and 2nd Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades 1st and 2nd Regiments, Royal Horse Artillery Four medium field artillery regiments Eight medium, three heavy and three super-heavy artillery regiments 1st, 2nd and 4th AA Brigades Note: 51st (Highland) Division attached to French 3e Armée, behind the Maginot Line.

ROYAL AIR FORCE British Air Forces in France – Air Marshal Barratt Advanced Air Striking Force – Air Vice Marshal Playfair Fighters: 67 (Fighter) Wing – Wing Commander Walter 1 Squadron Hurricane Is 73 Squadron Hurricane Is 501 Squadron Hurricane Is Bombers: 71 (Bomber) Wing – Air Commodore Field 105 Squadron Battle Is 114 Squadron Blenheim IVs 139 Squadron Blenheim IVs 150 Squadron Battle Is 75 (Bomber) Wing – Group Captain Wann 88 Squadron Battle Is 103 Squadron Battle Is 218 Squadron Battle Is 76 (Bomber) Wing – Group Captain Kerby 12 Squadron Battle Is 142 Squadron Battle Is 226 Squadron Battle Is

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THE CAMPAIGN As long as we make special provisions if any enemy attacked [through the Ardennes] he would be pincered as he left the forest. This is not a dangerous sector. Marshal Philippe Pétain, Address to Senate Army Committee, 14 March 1934

THE LUFTWAFFE STRIKES: 10–12 MAY At 0245hrs CEST2 the first of some 500 Luftwaffe twin-engine bombers lifted off from their German airfields, took 45 minutes to gather into their attack formations, and within an hour began crossing the frontier headed for their targets: 72 airfields in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In the north, Luftflotte 2’s dawn attacks were largely effective, destroying some 190 French, Belgian and Dutch aircraft. In Heeresgruppe A’s area, Sperrle’s initial effort was less consistent. I. Gruppe/Kampfgeschwader 1’s (I./KG 1) raid on Cambrai-Niergnies decimated one ZOAN fighter group (GC III/2; air cover for Général Georges Blanchard’s 1ère Armée), destroying eight MS 406s and damaging five more so seriously that Général Têtu had to transfer another unit (GC III/7) from ZOAE to replace it. Other Heinkels destroyed seven Potez 63-11 and Bloch 174 reconnaissance aircraft (GR II/33 and GR II/36) while Do 17Zs knocked out five Am 143 bombers (GB II/34) and six Fairey Battles, as well as caused serious damage to hangars and workshops at three AASF bases. The Allies’ fighter forces were otherwise unscathed, fully alerted, and began launching 363 AdA and 178 RAF fighter sorties, meeting the Luftwaffe’s second wave – another 500 twin-engine bombers that took to the air at 0415hrs – in a vigorous and ferocious defence. These, plus the third wave – another 500 bombers, launched in the afternoon – struck 17 rail centres, 16 factories and military camps, and 45 communications centres, headquarters, and permanent fortifications in France, but losses were heavy. Sperrle’s initial failure cost him 40 bombers. Half of these were Do 17Zs. Kampfgeschwader 3 lost 14 Dorniers to Curtiss H-75s (GC I/4 and GC I/5) 2 Central Europe Summer Time, also called Berlin Time, was one hour ahead of French and British ‘summertime,’ which was GMT/ UTC+1. CEST is used throughout this work.

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2

3

1 4

THE DESTRUCTION OF RAF NO. 114 SQUADRON AT CONDÉ-VRAUX AIRFIELD, 11 MAY 1940 (PP. 32–33) Taking off at dawn from Aschaffenburg airfield, 25 miles southeast of Frankfurt, Oberleutnant Oskar Reimers, commander of 4. Staffel/KG 2, led his nine Dornier Do 17Z-2s at very low altitude, heading west. Crossing the French frontier south of Sedan, the formation of three Ketten (three-aircraft ‘vics’) flew down the Aisne River valley, passing to the north of Reims, before swinging round to the left at the Aisne–Marne Canal to approach their target from the north-west. Their target was Condé-Vraux, an RAF Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) airfield approximately 25 miles south-west of Reims, where 11 Bristol Blenheims of No. 114 Squadron were ranged upon the aerodrome, armed and fuelled, waiting for their aircrews who were just finishing their morning mission briefing. Ordered to attack the bridges spanning the Albert Canal in Belgium, takeoffs were scheduled for 0600hrs. At 0545hrs, Oberleutnant Reimers, flying Do 17Z-2 U5+LM (1), approached Condé-Vraux at church-steeple height, achieving complete surprise. Reimers and his two wingmen each released

ten 50kg fragmentation bombs, followed by six other bombers. The second Kette (2) followed about 20 seconds behind the leaders, offset to one side to attack the Blenheims not targeted by the leaders. The third Kette (3) followed 20 seconds later, hitting the squadron fuel dump. The entire attack lasted 45 seconds. The RAF ground crewmen dived for cover as the Dorniers crossed the airfield boundary, roaring in at low-level and high speed. The small bombs erupted amongst the parked Blenheims (4), blowing up one after another. The attack was so sudden that the base’s anti-aircraft gunners had no time to react, a solitary Vickers .303in. machine gun opening fire as the last Dornier egressed to the east. Six Blenheims were destroyed in the attack. The remaining five were all damaged to some extent and, when 114 Squadron evacuated the Condé-Vraux seven days later, they were all abandoned. No RAF aircrews were lost and only two ground crewmen were slightly wounded in the surprise attack.

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and AASF Hurricanes (1 and 73 Sqns) while KG 2 lost a further half dozen to Hurricanes (1 and 87 Sqns) and GC I/5’s Hawks. Hardest hit amongst the Heinkel Gruppen was I. Fliegerkorps’ III./KG 1 which lost six bombers – and their commander – in an unescorted raid on the Potez aircraft factory and surrounding airfields at Albert. Similarly V Fliegerkorps’ III./KG 55 lost its commander and four He 111Ps to French fighters (GC I/2 and GC II/4) defending Nancy-Essay airfield. While the German airborne assaults on ‘Fortress Holland’ and the Belgian Fort Eben Emael took the spotlight, in southern Belgium the Luftwaffe also attempted an air-delivered special operation – called ‘NiWi’ – to seize the crossroads at Nives and Witry that controlled the Panzers’ routes into France. Some 98 Fieseler Fi 156 ‘Storch’ light liaison aircraft attempted to deliver two companies from III. Bataillon/Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland (III./IRGD) while three Junkers Ju 52/3m transports provided airborne resupply. However, morning fog caused the whole affair to go awry with the assault force being scattered throughout the countryside – 16 Fi 156s and one Ju 52/3m were lost – and the only effect was that they cut numerous telephone lines. All this did was prevent two companies of the bicycle-mounted Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais from receiving their orders to withdraw. Meanwhile, overhead the Panzer columns Oberst Gerd von Massow’s Jafü 3 Messerschmitts flew standing patrols, shooting down one (a Po 63-11 of GR I/22) of the 11 AdA reconnaissance aircraft that Général François d’Astier sent roaming across Belgium and Luxembourg. The others reported the German Army’s presence in alarming strength around Maastricht as well as discovering two large, long motorized columns snaking across the Luxembourg countryside. By 0930hrs, the latter reports began arriving at FACNE HQ and Têtu requested permission to strike the armoured columns but Georges, who regarded them as a feint, forbade attacks near towns or villages due to fear of civilian casualties.

Consistent with their doctrine, the Luftwaffe launched the offensive with massive bombing strikes against Armée de l’Air and AASF airfields. The Do 17Zs approached at low level, frequently taking their targets by surprise. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-342-0603-25)

Although largely caught on the ground, ZOAN lost only one fighter group in the Luftwaffe’s initial airfield attacks, the AdA launched 363 defensive fighter sorties, shooting down 40 Luftflotte 3 bombers, during the first day’s battles. (Private collection)

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Battle P2200 ‘GBƔK’ was shot down by flak on the first day of battle while attacking motorized columns advancing through Luxembourg and crash-landed at Clémency where all three crewmen were captured. (Thomas Laemlein)

More aggressive and less inhibited by collateral damage concerns, Air Marshal Arthur Barratt, commanding the British Air Forces in France (BAFF), authorized AASF commander Air Vice Marshal P. H. L. Playfair to mount interdiction strikes that afternoon. Four unescorted formations of eight Battles each attacked through vicious anti-aircraft fire from the two motorized regiments of I. Flak-Brigade, losing 13 aircraft shot down. Even bombing from heights as low as 250ft, they caused negligible damage. In the first day of battle, the Luftwaffe lost 88 twin-engine bombers,3 plus many others were damaged or developed mechanical problems, so for the next four days the daily operations tempo fell to between 800 and 1,000 sorties, largely attacking lines of communications to a depth of 50 miles beyond the Meuse, trying to keep Georges’s reserve units from getting to the front. Nevertheless, Luftflotte 3’s disappointing first day’s results required its Do 17Zs and He 111s to continue attacking French airfields, 23 of which were struck on 11 May and 11 more the day after. The extra efforts finally began to take effect, destroying eight of the AASF’s Blenheims and another half dozen Battles on the ground, as well as 31 French bombers and 68 AdA fighters, during the next four days. Damage to French airfields and the destruction of aircraft – coupled with Vuillemin’s overall force-conservation strategy (he expected a protracted defensive campaign during which exposure to losses should be minimized) restricted most units to one mission per day – limited the Allied air defence to an average of 434 AdA and 160 RAF fighter sorties each day. Against these 600 sorties, the Jagdwaffe’s daily average of 1,500 sorties was overwhelming and proved instrumental in wresting the all-important aerial superiority from the Allies. Destroying 147 enemy fighters for the loss of 80 Messerschmitts during this critical period, the Jagdflieger forced their opponents to increasingly defend the airspace over their own bases, well behind their lines. Meanwhile in the north, Heeresgruppe B’s successes during the first three days forced the AdA, AASF, and Belgian air forces to launch 74 bomber sorties against the captured Belgian bridges spanning the Maas. Thirty-three of these were shot down. Additionally, on the third day, once General der Kavallerie Erich Hoepner’s XVI AK (mot.) Panzers were sighted advancing across the Belgian plain, ZOAN sent its Groupement de Bombardement d’Assaut 18 (GBA I and II/54), with 18 new, fast Breguet 693 twin-engine assault aircraft, to attack them. Ten were blasted from the sky by the Panzers’ accompanying motorized flak batteries. The twin effects of these dramatic and alarming losses caused Vuillemin and Playfair (now down to 72 serviceable bombers) to abandon daylight 3 The Allies lost 24 AdA fighters and five Hurricanes while inflicting these losses.

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Movement of German forces through the Ardennes, 10–12 May 1940

5

XX

XX

II XXX

XI XXX

XI 9 Martin

XX

XI

II

8 II

III

5

II

II

II

Houx

Godinne Yvoir 39 66

Ciney

4

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Marche Rochefort

L ess e

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St Hubert

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BELGIUM

Viesalm

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Wietersheim

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List

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Busch

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X

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C

XXXXX

Leeb

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Saarlautern

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Hillesheim

7 XV Rommel

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Reinhardt

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Gerolstein

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A

Merzig

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Rundsted A

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Trier

VII 16 Heinrici

VII

VII

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Kleist

Bitburg

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XIII VietringhoffScheel

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GERMANY

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XXXX

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Dahlem

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XI XXX 4 A II 4 Kluge Strauss

Prüm XXX

12 Haase

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III III III

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VI 12 Förster XXX

GD

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Guderian K

XIX

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XIX XX

XX

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Saarburg

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79

XXIII 16 XXIII XX Schubert 76 XXIII

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XLII

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XLII

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Echternach

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Wallendorf

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Remich

Grevenmacher

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VI

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Vianden

Diekirch

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Cruchten

LUXEMBOURG

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Luxembourg City Esch 3

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Bastogne

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Houffalize

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Longuyon 24

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Nims

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Sem ois

Florenville

Reported French tanks

Tintigny Carignan

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Fort La Ferté

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XVIII

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10 miles 1 Col

Liese

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Revin

Meuse

Charleville

Monthermé XLI

XLI

Mézières Flize 55

Bulson

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Dun

X 2 Grandsard

FRANCE

0 10km

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Rocroi 61

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XLI 9 Libaud

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Chémery

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Poix Viel-St Remy Corap

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German Panzer units German motorized infantry units German marching infantry units Allied advances Allied retreats Maginot Line

9

XXXX

Bar 2 Huntziger

XXX

XXX

Meuse

37

attacks, except under the most dire circumstances. For the Luftwaffe, once it was recognized that the bombing threat to the Ruhr was eliminated, additional Jagdgruppen were released from Reich air defence duties for combat over the front lines. The synthesis of these decisions resulted in even increased numbers of Messerschmitt fighters defending against the diminishing numbers of Allied bombers, resulting in disaster when they were again forced – by Guderian’s success at Sedan – to attack in broad daylight.

‘THREE DAYS TO THE MEUSE’: 10–12 MAY

Guderian’s primary adversaries in the Ardennes were the horse-mounted cavalry and motorcycle-infantry of two French light cavalry divisions. The cavalry (note spurs on the trooper in background) and infantry included MAC 7.5mm FM 24/29 LMG teams, such as seen here. (Thomas Laemlein)

In the pre-dawn darkness (0535hrs), the first of 41,140 motorized vehicles belonging to Gruppe Kleist crossed the border and drove through the small, peaceful, and defenceless Duchy of Luxembourg. Four hours later, on Guderian’s central route of advance (called a ‘Rollbahn’ by the Panzertruppen), the leading elements of Generalleutnant Friedrich Kirchner’s (1. PanzerDivision) Kradschützen-Bataillon 1 (Kradsch-Bat. 1) motorcyclists and Aufklärungs-Abteilung (mot.) 4’s (Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 4) armoured cars, entered Martelange, Belgium. There they surprised and routed the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs Ardennais’s 4e Compagnie (4e Cie/1er ChA). Continuing the advance through the Sûre River valley, the motorcycle battalion approached Bodange, where 5e Cie/1er ChA had fortified the small village. Dismounting – and expecting the same results – the motorcycle infantry attempted another hasty assault. With ‘Operation NiWi’ having intercepted the company’s orders to withdraw, the Belgians fought fiercely, repulsing the initial attacks through effective use of the terrain. After the third battalion of Kirchner’s Schützen Regiment (mot.) 1 (III./SR (mot.)) attacked, supported by their 7.5cm leIG 18 guns, the defenders finally surrendered at 1900hrs, having lost two of the company’s three officers killed in action. Similarly, though not as dramatically, on the northern Rollbahn, Generalleutnant Rudolf Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division was held up at Nives until II./SR (mot.) 2 cleared out the Chasseurs Ardennais and the road blocks they left behind as they withdrew towards Namur to join the Belgians’ main line of defence. On the southern Rollbahn, at about 0900hrs Generalleutnant Ferdinand Schaal’s (10. Panzer-Division) Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 90 clashed with the two horsemounted regiments of 2e DLC at Habay-la-Neuve, north-west of Arlon. When Sperrle’s Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft spotted the cavalry’s Hotchkiss light tanks, Panhard armoured cars, and lorried infantry driving northwards out of Mouzon, Longwy and Montmédy, it caused a major scare. Kleist ordered Schaal to wheel left and attack in strength. 10. Panzer-Division quickly mauled the lightly armed horse cavalry before the mechanized elements arrived, forcing Général

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Berniquet to abandon Arlon, withdrawing to the south behind the Semois River. By the end of the first day, Guderian was six hours behind schedule and Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) was still in Germany. Kleist’s response was to order Veiel’s 2. PanzerDivision off the northern Rollbahn and allow the 6. Panzer, followed by the 2. InfanterieDivision (mot.), to move forward. The next day, Kirchner’s reconnaissance elements encountered Huntziger’s 5e DLC, forming a 20-mile-wide screen of defensive positions with artillery support from Libramont to Rossignol. Before these hastily prepared defences, Kirchner deployed PanzerRegiment 1 (Pz.-Rgt. 1) which, following a devastating Stuka bombardment, quickly drove through the cavalry’s positions and destroyed half their artillery (II/78e RATTT). Hard pressed, Général Chanoine withdrew his troopers to the Semois as well. This time Huntziger dispatched an infantry battalion (I/295e RI from Général Pierre Lafontaine’s 55e DI) to bolster the forward defence centred at Bouillon, and ordered it held ‘at all costs’. Huntziger’s withdrawal of his cavalry to the south left Corap’s horsemounted 3e Spahi Brigade alone in the Ardennes. When unit commander Colonel Olivier Marc learned this, he withdrew to the west, to the Meuse, creating the first crack between the 2e and 9e Armées. Without the Spahis covering his left flank, Chanoine’s reinforced cavalry holding Bouillon could easily be outflanked. That evening Kirchner’s Kradsch-Bat. 1 discovered this fact and overnight established a bridgehead to the west, at Mouzaive. From the air Guderian’s 112-mile-long vehicle columns could not be missed. While his light motorized units ranged well ahead, the heavy mechanized units – Panzer regiments, combat engineers, corps artillery, and supply columns – soon became ensnarled in horrendous traffic jams, clogging the few roads allocated to them. When Generalmajor Werner Kempf’s 6. Panzer-Division finally crossed the Belgian frontier, angling onto Guderian’s right wing, as the 6. Panzer-Division’s war diary relates, ‘The division was forced apart during the advance by elements of the 2. Panzer-Division as well as the 16., 23., and 24. Infanterie-Divisionen [units of List’s III and VI AKs] which slipped in between [our formations]. In the afternoon and evening there was no longer any clear picture as to where the march movement groups and the individual formations were located.’ Assimilating the results from his Potez 637/63-11s roaming over southern Belgium, d’Astier reported to GQG, ‘reconnaissance shows that the enemy is making an

A PzKpfw IV Ausf. D command tank of 4./Pz.-Rgt. 1 in Belgium, 12 May 1940, knocked out by a French 25mm anti-tank round that destroyed its transmission. Repaired, it was in battle again south-east of Sedan two days later. (Thomas Laemlein)

In the background vehicles of 1. Panzer-Division ford the small Semois River at Bouillon, Belgium, on 12 May 1940. Under sporadic and desultory French 155mm fire from Torcy, Guderian’s engineers (foreground) begin construction of a wooden trestle bridge. (NARA)

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Along the French-Belgian border the French constructed eight maisons fortes (blockhouses camouflaged as houses) mounting machine guns and anti-tank guns and manned by the 15e Compagnie, 147e RIF. MF13 (seen here) on the road from Bouillon to Sedan delayed elements of the 10. PanzerDivision for two hours before being overcome. (M. Romanych) MF10, on the road from Mouzaive to Floing and Sedan, delayed SR (mot.) 1 for over three hours, until II./Pz.-Rgt. 2’s Panzers arrived. Today the ruins stand as a memorial to Lt. Boulenger and his four-man crew who gave their lives in the battle. (Author’s collection)

important drive westward in the Ardennes. The columns are carrying pontoon bridging material. Large motorized and armoured forces are driving toward the Meuse at Dinant, Givet, and Bouillon, coming from Marche and Neufchâteau. One can therefore conclude that the enemy is carrying out a very serious movement toward the Meuse.’ Focused on the tank clash developing on the north Belgium plain, Gamelin, Georges, Billotte and the army commanders discounted the AdA’s reports, believing that they only indicated a feint. Before dawn the next morning, at Mouzaive Kirchner’s Kradsch-Bat. 1 – followed by a battalion of Panzers (II./Pz.-Rgt. 2) – outflanked Chanoine’s cavalry line along the Semois. Threatened in the rear, when attacked by SR (mot.) 1, the defenders at Bouillon crumbled. The infantry battalion, a group of ‘fat and flabby men in their thirties’ with ‘slack discipline’ and weak NCOs, scattered and ‘only 300 demoralized men were seen again, crying “treachery” against the cavalry and devoid of any value for the actions the following day’. The defenders had blown the town’s bridges but the Semois was merely a meandering trout stream and Pz.-Rgt. 1’s tanks were soon fording the river at several points while the combat engineers of Pionier-Bataillon (mot.) 37 (Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37) constructed a new bridge. Learning that the Semois line had been broken, Georges gave 2e Armée first priority for Allied air support, but Huntziger failed to order any sorties. On his own initiative d’Astier requested 50 sorties from the AASF to bomb Neufchâteau and Bouillon that evening. Playfair’s command, heavily committed in northern Belgium, could muster only 15 aircraft from four squadrons. They failed to hit anything meaningful and another six Battles were shot down by German flak. At Cugnon, Schaal’s Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 90, followed by the riflemen of Schützen Brigade (mot.) 10 (SB (mot.) 10), assaulted French positions on foot, turning Chanoine’s other flank and allowing the 10. Panzer-Division to cross the Semois as well. While Huntziger ordered Chanoine’s cavalry to defend from the line of eight maisons fortes (‘fortified houses’), one on each road leading into the Sedan sector, the two Panzer divisions soon ejected the 2e DLC once again and that afternoon converged on the city. By nightfall their leading elements occupied portions of the northern bank of the Meuse. Despite the fact that XIX AK (mot.) had advanced to the Meuse in three days, due to the chaotic, 155-mile-long traffic jams on the northern Rollbahn, Reinhardt’s two divisions had been seriously delayed and were confusingly intermixed with two of List’s infantry corps. Consequently, true to his threat, on

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14 May Rundstedt decided to subordinate Gruppe Kleist to List’s AOK 12. On the French side of the Meuse, Georges finally reacted positively to the reports that Panzers were approaching Sedan. Anticipating the possibility of a breach in his ‘battle line’, he transferred Général Jean Flavigny’s 21e Corps d’Armée HQ from GQG reserve to Huntziger, assigning him the 3e Division Cuirassée (3e DCr) and 3e Division d’Infanterie Motorisée (3e DIM) to form his colmatage (‘plug’) behind Sedan. For his part, Huntziger ordered the 71e DI from his reserve to Général de Corps Pierre-Paul-Charles Grandsard’s 10e Corps d’Armée to take position between the 55e DI and the 3e Division d’Infanterie Nord-Africaine (3e DINA). Additionally, Lafontaine ordered his reserve regiment (213e RI) forward, but allowed them to bivouac 6 miles short of their intended positions. These movements began on the evening of 12 May, with orders for the units to be in place within two days. However, there was no sense of urgency because, at every echelon of command, the French generals were victims of what we now call ‘mirror imaging’. As Général Joseph Doumenc, commanding the GQG Reserve, wrote later, ‘Crediting the enemy with our own battle methods, we imagined that he would not attempt to cross the Meuse until he had brought up a considerable amount of artillery. The five or six days we thought he would need were to give us time to reinforce our own defences.’

A PzKpfw II of 2. Panzer-Division driving through Sugny, Belgium, headed for Sedan, 13 May 1940. Having the furthest distance to travel, and the most traffic jams to negotiate, this unit did not arrive at Sedan until Guderian’s other two divisions had begun their cross-river assaults. (Thomas Laemlein)

ASSAULT ACROSS THE MEUSE, ROMMEL AT DINANT: 10–14 MAY 1940 In the northern part of the Ardennes – between Namur, Belgium, and Givet, France – from opposite sides both armies were racing to the Meuse. After threading their way through the lengthy lines of infantrymen forming up at the frontier (General der Infanterie Adolf Strauß’s II AK), the leading elements of Hoth’s XV AK (mot.) – Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division, with Generalleutnant Maximilian von Hartlieb genannt Walsporn’s 5. Panzer-Division following – crossed the border, skirted the Belgians’ initial demolitions by motoring off-road, and drove to Saint-Vith in three hours. At this sleepy Belgian town, a special operations unit of the OKW Abwehr (3. Kompanie/Bau-Lehr-Bataillon zbV 800 ‘Brandenburg’4) captured three of the town’s four bridges intact, allowing Rommel to continue his advance unabated. Racing towards the Ourthe River, at dusk his Kradsch-Bat. 7 drove headlong into the 3e Cie/3e ChA’s prepared positions at Chabrehez. From fieldworks well sited amidst the undulating countryside, the Belgians put up a ferocious defence and by the time Rommel could deploy his heavy units, darkness had fallen, leaving him 12 miles short of the day’s objective. 4 The Abwehr was the OKW’s intelligence bureau: Amt Ausland/Abwehr im OKW, or ‘Foreign Affairs/Defence Bureau of the Armed Forces High Command’. The special operations unit’s cover name translated to: ‘Construction-Training Battalion (for special purposes) 800’.

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Like Guderian’s and Reinhardt’s Panzers, Rommel – seen here riding in his staff car – had little difficulty driving through the impassable Ardennes. (NARA)

From the west, Général Corap’s two mixed cavalry divisions (1ère and 4e DLCs) crossed the Meuse, their mechanized elements (Hotchkiss tanks, Panhard armoured cars and motorcyclists) pushing on to the Ourthe, with the horse cavalry and lorried infantry following the next morning. Behind them 9e Armée infantry were not nearly so expeditious. Caught by surprise, Général Julien Martin’s 11e Corps had most of its 22e DI on exercises in the rear area and had to reorganize before beginning their march. The 18e DI had to travel 55 miles from their bivouac in France to their positions opposite Dinant, so Général Duffet sent two battalions (one each from the 66e and 77e RI) ahead by lorry, and planned to arrive at the Meuse with the rest of his division in four days. The next morning Rommel’s heavy units smashed through the 3e Cie/3e ChA at Chabrehez and at about 1345hrs his Aufkl.-Abt. 37 arrived at the Ourthe to find the French 4e DLC on the other side, blowing up one bridge after another. However, once the bridges were destroyed, Général Paul Barbe withdrew his cavalry to Marche. With no defensive fire covering the demolitions, Rommel’s Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 58 easily threw pontoon bridges across the river and Aufkl.-Abt. 37’s armoured cars rushed forward, followed quickly by his PzKpfw 38(t) tanks (Pz.-Rgt. 25). Surprised by Rommel’s sudden and savage onslaught, Barbe’s cavalry and infantry companies scattered. His dozen Hotchkiss H-35/-39 light tanks (4e RAM) attempted a counter-attack which, badly outnumbered and heavily out-gunned, was immediately crushed, and the shattered division fled into the forests in disorder. The delays at Chabrehez and the Ourthe had the benefit of allowing Walsporn’s Aufkl.-Abt. 8 and Pz.-Rgt. 31 to join Rommel, and Hoth attached these units to the 7. Panzer-Division for the final push to the Meuse. Organizing two ‘pursuit detachments’, Rommel sent them off through the hills, firing liberally – but blindly – into the forests on both sides to scare off the scattered French cavalry. ‘Gefechtsgruppe Bismarck’ (Oberst Georg von Bismarck with his SR (mot.) 7 and II./Pz.-Rgt. 25) descended into Dinant mid-afternoon on 12 May, while ‘Gefechtsgruppe Rothenburg’ (Oberst Karl Rothenburg with his Pz.-Rgt. 25(-) and SR (mot.) 6) arrived at Yvoir, 5 miles to the north, a short time later. At his HQ in Vervins, Corap was alarmed by the dual harbingers of an aerial reconnaissance report describing an enemy motorized column 15 miles in length approaching Marche and the precipitate collapse of his cavalry screen. In response he ordered the 1ère and 4e DLCs to withdraw behind the Meuse and for all the bridges, from Dinant to the Bar River, to be blown. Additionally, he ordered Général Jean Bouffet (2e Corps commander) to detach one battalion from his 5e DIM (II/39e RIM) and send it to the 11e Corps to cover the gap between Yvoir and Dinant. Corap also assigned the withdrawing 1ère DLC to Martin, who distributed it amongst his infantry, dispersing its combat power to man defensive positions along the riverbank. Martin also hurried four more of his own battalions to Dinant. The exhausted infantrymen, plus some divisional artillery, arrived about 1600hrs that afternoon, just as Rommel’s motorized

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forces lined the opposite bank of the river, looking intently for a way across. Between Yvoir and Dinant, at Houx Aufkl.-Abt. 8 found an undefended crossing point: an ancient weir connected to a long wooded island to which, on the far side, was attached a lock-gate for transiting river traffic. The French unit assigned to cover this sector (II/39e RIM) failed to occupy its riverbank positions in time, deploying instead on the wooded high ground – Bois de Surinvaux – overlooking the Anhée basin. About midnight Rommel’s motorcycle troops threaded their way across the weir, island and lock to establish a bridgehead on the opposite shore. Following early morning raids by two Kampfgeschwadern of Do 17Zs (KGs 76 and 77) at Dinant, Rommel’s assaults across the Meuse began with shelling by his Artillerie-Regiment 78 (AR (mot.) 78). Beneath the barrage his combat engineers (Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 58) and riflemen (SR (mot.) 7) began crossing the 250ft-wide river in rubber boats. From the rocks and houses along the riverbank the French 66e RI fought back tenaciously, machine-gunning and mortaring the approaching boats. Only a few troops made it to the opposite shore and, as Rommel recorded, ‘The crossing had now come to a complete standstill, with the officers badly shaken by the casualties their men had suffered. On the opposite bank we could see several men [who were] already across, among them many wounded.’ The French machine-gun nests were well concealed and Rommel’s artillery was unable to target them so he brought up some PzKpfw IIIs and IVs and a pair of howitzers to take the enemy defences under direct fire, silencing enough of them to resume the crossings at 1100hrs. By midday SR (mot.) 7 occupied Bouvignes and, moving from one position to another, slowly eliminated the French riverbank resistance. The battered remnant of the 66e RI withdrew to Sommières allowing Rommel’s riflemen to establish a secure bridgehead about 3 miles deep. Hidden by the early morning mist the motorcycle troops at Houx expanded their bridgehead, but once the fog cleared, the French (II/39e RI) began a determined resistance, initially halting all further reinforcement until the Germans’ repeated assaults dispersed them. Once the French infantry were driven off, three battalions of Walsporn’s SB (mot.) 5 crossed the river and began attacking Boucher’s 129e RIM at Anhée. Soon afterwards, pioneers rigged a cable ferry using the 8-ton bridging pontoons as boats, bringing across armoured cars, anti-tank guns and other heavy weapons that afternoon. Boucher organized a counter-attack against the bridgehead’s northern flank at Haut-leWastia, ordering his reserve battalion (II/129e RIM) to support a score of machine-gun armed Renault AMR-33 tankettes (4e Esc/14e RDP/4e DLC) and eight Schneider P-16 half-track

Opposing Rommel’s river crossing at Dinant were French infantry, whose machine guns, such as the 8mm Hotchkiss Modèle 14 (M1914), proved very effective in thwarting the initial attempts. (Thomas Laemlein)

In addition to his PzKpfw IIIs and IVs, Rommel ordered a pair of leFH18 10.5cm howitzers brought down to the riverbank to fire directly into the enemy machine gun emplacements on the opposite shore. Note that the third span of the bridge has been dropped into the river by Belgian demolition teams. (NARA)

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FRENCH (AND BELGIAN) UNITS 1 8e Régiment d’Infanterie/5e DIM 2 Belgian II Bn/5e Régiment Chasseurs Ardennais 3 Remnants of 4e DLC (withdrawing to the west) 4 II Bn/14e Dragons-portes Régiment 5 1er GRDI/5e DIM 6 II Bn/129e Régiment d’Infanterie Motorisée 7 39e RIM (minus II Bn)/5e DIM 8 129e RIM (minus II Bn)/5e DIM 9 II Bn/39e Régiment d’Infanterie Motorisée 10 1ère Cie/1er RAM and 3e Esc/6e BCC 11 66e Régiment d’Infanterie/18e DI 12 77e Régiment d’Infanterie/18e DI 13 125e Régiment d’Infanterie/18e DI 14 19e RAD, 111e RALHC, and 219e RALD (artillery) 15 30e GRDI/18e DI and ad hoc units defending the Flavion River position 16 1ère Division Cuirassée 17 37e BCC/1ère DCr (Char B1 bis) 18 26e BCC/1ère DCr (H-39s) 19 28e BCC/1ère DCr (Char B1 bis)

ORET GRAUX 15

16 FURNAUX STAVE ERMETON-SUR-BIERT

17 18 19

FLAVION FLAVION RIVER

14

SERVILLE

MORVILLE XXXX

9

ANTHÉE

12

CORAP BOIS DU ROI

EVENTS 1. 12 May, 1600hrs: the last of 9e Armée’s cavalry units withdraw across the Meuse River and the bridges are blown, effectively halting the pursuing Panzers. 2. 2100hrs: motorcycle infantry of 3./Aufkl.-Abt. 8 successfully infiltrate across the river at Houx and establish a foothold, quickly being reinforced by Rommel’s Kradsch. Bat. 7, and expand the bridgehead towards La Grange. 3. 13 May, 0600hrs: Rommel attempts assaults across the Meuse near Yvoir (Schützen-Rgt. 6) and Dinant (Schützen-Rgt. 7), but both are repulsed with heavy losses. 4. Morning: the motorcycle infantry drive the II/39e RIM from La Grange and clear the Bois de Surinvaux, allowing Schützen-Rgt. 14 to begin crossing the Meuse. 5. 1000hrs: with direct fire support from PzKpfw IVs (3./ Panzer-Rgt. 25), the crossings north of Dinant resume and Bouvignes is occupied, clearing the 66e RI from its riverbank positions. 6. Midday: Schützen-Rgt. 14 drives westward towards Haut-le-Wastia, securing the plateau above Anhée, while I./Schutzen-Rgt 13 crosses the Meuse and begins pushing the 129e RIM back across the Moligne River.

13

7. Afternoon: Général Boucher orders a counter-attack against the Haut-le-Wastia salient using II/129e RIM and the 1er GRDI’s motorcycle infantry and machinegun carriers. However, a Stuka strike (III./StG 51) disrupts the infantry approach march, dispersing them into the Bois de Ronquière, so the attack is postponed and subsequently cancelled. 8. 2000hrs: Général Martin orders a counter-attack against the Bois de Surinvaux, but the infantry (I and III/39e RIM) fail to arrive at the start line in time, so the tanks (3e/6e BCC) drive to Bois de Surinvaux without support, and subsequently return to Bois de Foy. 9. Afternoon: Schützen-Rgt. 7 wheels south to envelop and destroy most of the 66e RI, the remnant of which retreats north-west to near Sommières. Threatened, 77e RI withdraws to defend Onhaye. With the bridgehead secured, the Panzer-Rgt. 25 begins ferrying tanks across on pontoon barges. 10. Overnight: a pontoon bridge is completed at Houx and the Panzer-Rgt. 31 crosses, driving to Sommières and destroying the remnant of the 66e RI. 11. 14 May, daybreak: Schützen-Rgt. 7 advances to Onhaye and, supported by five tanks, begins to clear the town. At 0900hrs, Panzer-Rgt. 25 follows with approximately 25 tanks, sweeping around the town to the north to block the defenders’ retreat, annihilating them.

12. Afternoon: Panzer-Rgt. 25 continues west through Anthée, destroying the scattered defenders in detail, until darkness forces Rommel’s Panzers to halt at Morville. 13. Afternoon: Panzer-Rgt. 31 attacks to the west, resulting in a see-saw battle with the 18e DI’s reserves, reconnaissance group and other ad hoc units attempting to hold along the Flavion River. The Panzers eventually reach Falaën by nightfall, after which the defenders withdraw in disorder. 14. Evening: the 8. Infanterie-Division crosses the Meuse behind the 5. Panzer-Division, pushes across the Molignée, and attacks through Warnant to Bioul, pushing back the 5e DIM and covering the Panzer’s right flank. 15. Evening: driving all night, the 1ère DCr arrives from Charleroi the next morning. With their fuel exhausted the division’s three tank battalions deploy in fields to await the arrival of their refuelling vehicles.

ROMMEL CROSSES THE MEUSE AT DINANT, 12–14 MAY 1940 The crossing of the Meuse River by Rommel at Houx and Dinant. 44 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

GERMAN UNITS 5. Panzer-Division A Schützen-Rgt. 13 B Schützen-Rgt. 14 C Panzer-Rgt. 15 D Panzer-Rgt. 31 7. Panzer-Division E Schützen-Rgt. 6 F Kradsch.-Bat. 7 G Aufkl.-Abt. 8 H Panzer-Rgt. 25 I Schützen-Rgt. 7 J 28. Infanterie-Division

ST GÉRARD ARBRÈ

BESINNE

ROUILLON BIOUL

BURNOT STREAM 4

3

STUKA ATTACKS

RIVIÈRE

DENÉE 14

6

7 BOIS DE RONQUIÈRE

1

5

WARNANT GODINNE

7

SOSOYE

SALET 2 MOLIGNÉE STREAM

FALAËN

6

A

ANHÉE

B

YVOIR

8 BOIS DE FOY

1

10

C

EVREHAILLES

9 E 4

15 13

8

10

BOIS DE SURINVAUX

D F

2 LA ROCHE

SOMMIÈRE G WEILLEN

J

BOUVIGNES 5

11

9

ONHAYE I 3

LEFFÉ

11

H

DINANT

12 MEUSE RIVER

SORINNES

XXX

IV

HOTH

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 2km (1.24 miles)

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The village of Bouvignes under fire by Rommel’s artillery and tanks – as seen through his own Leica camera – as his pioneers and riflemen cross the Meuse and eliminate the French defenders (out of view to the left). (NARA)

armoured cars from his divisional reconnaissance group (1er GRDI). However, a strike by two dozen Stukas (III./StG 51) shattered the infantry on their approach march and it was 2100hrs before the counter-attack could be organized again. By that time, due to darkness Boucher’s artillery (11e RAD and 211e RALD) could no longer provide fire support, so the attack was postponed to the next morning, when it was repulsed by eight Panzers from Pz.-Rgt. 31. Martin also organized a counter-attack, planning on hitting Rommel’s riflemen in Bois de Surinvaux at 1930hrs, using two infantry battalions (I and III/39e RI) to support a squadron of 15 Renault R-35 light tanks (3e/6e BCC). The tanks were accompanied by nine Renault AMRs from the 1ère DLC and supported by a 10-minute barrage by Martin’s three artillery groups (19e RAD, 219e RALD, and 111e RALHC). A half hour late, the French armour attacked, driving to the forest, where they captured seven motorcyclists but encountered no significant enemy forces. Even with the delay the French infantry failed to arrive in time to accompany the tanks and, unable to hold the terrain they’d cleared, the Renaults withdrew. The AdA provided an aerial counter-attack that afternoon with seven LeO 451s (GB I and II/12) bombing the crowded columns of vehicles backed up on the road between Dinant and Sorinne. Covered by 27 Bloch MB 152s (GC I/1 and I/8), the raiders arrived successfully, but bombed ineffectually, and returned safely with only three bombers damaged by Rommel’s flak batteries (Flak-Abts (mot.) 59 and 86). There were no French ripostes against the southern bridgehead and Rommel’s engineers used their larger 16-ton bridging pontoons to build barges, ferrying some 30 tanks to Bouvignes overnight. Early the next morning Bismarck’s SR (mot.) 7 advanced 3 miles to Onhaye followed closely by Rothenburg’s Pz.-Rgt. 25. The advancing Panzers were taken under fire by French artillery and anti-tank guns on the flanks, which knocked out several and damaged more, including Rothenburg’s tank and Rommel’s command/ signals vehicle, slightly wounding both. By nightfall, however, Rommel’s Panzers had advanced to Morville, clearing enough room west of Dinant for his entire division to assemble and continue the advance the next day. During the two-day battle Général Duffet’s 18e DI, a reservist unit, had been decimated. The 66e RI was overrun and destroyed, the 77e RI ‘appeared to have fled’, and the 125e RI fell back in disorder. Reacting to Martin’s defeat, Corap rushed the 4e DINA from its reserve position at Trilon, on the French frontier, to Florennes, and Georges redirected the 1ère DCr to Flavion from the GQG reserve, to plug the gap. Back at the Houx bridgehead, Walsporn’s 5. Panzer-Division also regrouped, taking position on Rommel’s right wing, the two Panzer divisions now poised for a major thrust towards Philippeville. Meanwhile Strauß’s II AK and Heitz’s VIII AK mopped up French resistance on both banks of the Meuse north and south of the crossing.

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‘ON THE FOURTH DAY, ACROSS THE MEUSE’: 13–14 MAY When the sun arose off the right flank of 2e Armée on 13 May, it found Huntziger’s units off-balance, malpositioned and unprepared to meet the horrendous assault about to be unleashed upon them. Général Lafontaine’s 55e DI was shuffling its forward companies to the west, building a ‘defence in depth’ behind Colonel Pinaud’s 147e RIF, which manned the blockhouses and pillboxes in this sector. This allowed Général Baudet’s 71e DI to move into positions south-east of Sedan. However, the elderly and ailing Baudet was tardy in beginning his unit’s movements and marched his men 37 miles overnight; the morning found them ‘weary and unsettled in their new position’. As they were moving to their new positions, many of the 55e DI elements were caught in the open when the Luftwaffe appeared overhead at 1000hrs and ‘therefore took refuge in the woods for the day, meaning to rejoin their units on the following night’. Additionally, Lafontaine’s reserve regiment (213e RI) was still 6 miles from its assigned positions, leaving the division’s ‘Ligne Principale de Résistance’ stretching from Frénois to Wadelincourt unsupported. Even with the infantry disorganization – which was expected to be resolved by the end of the day – Lafontaine initially remained confident, primarily because he was now assigned most of the corps artillery (110e RALCH), an additional four dozen 155CS heavy guns. This provided Lafontaine with 104 ‘tubes’.5 Next door, Baudet had 48 guns (38e RAMD), a dozen of which could also cover the southern portion of Lafontaine’s front. While the defenders seemed to have plenty of artillery, tragically, neither of the two French reserve divisions, and none of the fortress troops, had any anti-aircraft guns whatsoever. Instead, they were expected to use their infantry machine guns to defend themselves against the Stuka attacks to come. As Gamelin later stated, ‘by placing medium and light machine guns on the slopes [of La Marfée] behind the left bank [south side of the river], it was possible to prevent Stukas from diving into the valley’. Lacking even a basic understanding of air power, he could not have been more wrong. Facing this disorganized defence, across the river Guderian’s troops had regrouped overnight and were systematically deploying in preparation for their afternoon assault. The main attack would be in the centre, crossing the river just north of the city, executed by XIX AK’s Sturmpionieren

Guderian, with his aide Oberstleutnant Riebel, watching his engineers complete rebuilding the bridge at Bouillon, 12 May 1940. (NARA)

5 Most histories credit Lafontaine with 174 guns, but these include two battalions (24 guns) near Mézières, and thus out of range, three units (34 guns) from the GQG Reserve that had not yet arrived, and the surviving battalion from 5e DLC (I/78e RATTT, 12 guns) recovering in the rear.

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LUFTWAFFE ATTACKS

AA

II/147e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse I/147e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse III/147e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse I/331e Régiment d’Infanterie 6e Cie/295e Régiment d’Infanterie III/295e Régiment d’Infanterie II/295e Régiment d’Infanterie 7e BCC and 213e Régiment d’Infanterie 4e BCC and 205e Régiment d’Infanterie 3e Division Cuirassée 3e Division d’Infanterie Motorisée 138e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse III/120e Régiment d’Infanterie II/120e Régiment d’Infanterie I/120e Régiment d’Infanterie I/126e Régiment d’Infanterie 2e Régiment de Spahis Algériens/3e Brigade de Spahis 18. 2e Régiment de Spahis Marocains/3e Brigade de Spahis Blockhouses: 44. Grand-Condé 45. Paquis-des-Cailles 46. Fosse-Colin-Noizet 47. Vaux-Dessus 48. Bellevue 49. Pépinière-Creplet 50. Côte-du-Pré-de-Meuse 51. Côte-de-la-Vallière 52. Longues-Orgières 60. Grand-Pâquis 61. Palletto

XIX

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

1

18

XXX

FRENCH UNITS

A LA CHAPELLE

GUDERIAN

GIVONNE

N

FLOING

B FLEIGNEUX

J

I

H

ST MENGES G E

C D

F Q

IGES

BALAN

GAULIER 8

2

5

K

PONT MAUGIS 9

GLAIRE

5

7

SEDAN

1

50 11

49 VRIGNEAUX-BOIS

48 O

47 P

U

R

WADELINCOURT

FRÉNOIS 6 6

46

4

BOIS DE LA MARFÉE

DONCHERY

S T

3 4

VRIGNE-MEUSE

10

VILLERSSUR-BAR

45 44

CHEVEUGES

BAR RIVER ARDENNES CANAL X

18

EVENTS 1. 13 May, 1200–1600hrs: after two hours of small harassing attacks, II Fliegerkorps launches the largest, most concentrated bombing assaults flown by the Luftwaffe during World War II. Stukas hit artillery emplacements and riverside bunkers, while Do 17Zs bomb the front-line positions and interdict the reinforcements’ routes of march. 2. 1600hrs: following a 50-minute artillery barrage three battalions of SR (mot.) 1 with Kradsch. Bat. 1 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37 make simultaneous crossings at four points north of Sedan against feeble opposition. Most of the reservists flee before the attackers, allowing SR (mot.) 1 to reach the railway line by 1730hrs. At Sedan, II./IRGD and Sturm-Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 43 cross at two places in the face of fierce machine-gun fire from II/147e RIF. 3. 1600hrs: simultaneously 10. Panzer-Division attempts two crossings south-east of Sedan. The one at Bazeilles by SR (mot.) 69 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 49 is repulsed by I/147e RIF with heavy losses. At Wadelincourt, SR (mot.) 86 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 41 are driven back before they can get their rafts into the water. 4. 1730hrs: I. and II./SR (mot.) 2 with Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 49 attack at Donchery against stiff resistance by III/147e RIF. On the east side, II. Bat. gains a foothold and begins to eliminate the defenders along the riverbank, allowing I. Bat. to cross at 2000hrs. The riflemen then advance south securing the wooded heights of Croix Piot by midnight. 5. 1830hrs: II. and III./SR (mot.) 1 attack the western end of the blockhouse/pillbox line of II/147e RIF, overcoming tenacious French defence in an hour-and-a-half long battle and push through Frénois.

17

F

6. 2100hrs: SR (mot.) 1 continues its advance towards Cheveuges. Without orders I/331e RI withdraws southwest, but III/295e RI hastily deploys and temporarily halts SR (mot.) 1’s advance. After a sharp action, around midnight this unit, too, evacuates the area allowing SR (mot.) 1 to capture Chéhéry unchallenged.

17

7. Evening: SR (mot.) 86 finally establishes a bridgehead at Wadelincourt. 8. 14 May, 0100hrs: Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37 completes its pontoon bridge at Gaulier and Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 4’s armoured cars begin crossing at 0300hrs, followed by the vehicles of SR (mot.) 1. Tanks of II./Pz.-Rgt. 2 begin crossing at 0720hrs. 9. Early morning: Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 41 builds the second pontoon bridge across the river at Wadelincourt, and once I/147e RIF vacates its southern positions, Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 49 builds one near Bazeilles. 10. 0600hrs: SR (mot.) 1 begins a powerful drive southwards against very little opposition. II./SR (mot.) 1 splits off to the west, capturing the bridge at Omicourt at 0730hrs. IRGD splits off to attack the remnants of French units at Bulson at 0900hrs. 11. 0600hrs: II./SR (mot.) 69 attacks II/147e RIF positions while I./SR (mot.) 86 attacks II/295e RI. This opens the way for Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 4 to drive to Chaumont, cutting off the French retreat and guarding the flank of IRGD as they attack Bulson. 12. 0700hrs: the left wing of the French counter-attack begins its drive to retake Chéhéry and secure Bulson; 7e BCC is followed 20 minutes later by 213e RI. At Bulson, they encounter 4./Pz.-Rgt. 2. Additional Panzer companies join the battle and by 1000hrs, the French are defeated and withdraw to Chémery.

13. 1045hrs: the right wing of French counter-attack is finally organized, but Lafontaine cancels it, ordering the 4e BCC and 205e RI to withdraw into Bois de Raucourt. 14. Midday: II./Pz.-Rgt. 2 and StPion.-Bat. (mot.) 43 attack Chémery, capturing the city and its bridge to Malmy by 1300hrs. 15. Afternoon: IRGD advances south, and secures Maisoncelle and Villers. 16. 1400hrs: Guderian orders Kirchner to wheel 1. Panzer-Division right and drive to the west as far as possible before sunset. 17. 1500hrs: after beating off feeble counter-attacks by 3e Spahi Bde., III./SR (mot.) 1 drives west 6 miles to capture Signy, signalling the breakout of Guderian’s Panzers. 18. 1500–1615hrs: approaching from Bouillon, XIV AK (mot.)’s 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), and the pontoon bridges near Wadelincourt are attacked repeatedly by AASF light bombers. Fighters and flak shoot down 43 aircraft – bombing is ineffective.

GUDERIAN CROSSES THE MEUSE AT SEDAN, 13–14 MAY 1940 The crossing of the Meuse River by Guderian’s XIX Armeekorps at Sedan. 48 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

51

GERMAN UNITS

BB

DOUZY 13 M CHIERS RIVER

BAZEILLES 3

L

61

12

60 52 REMILLYAILLICOURT

2 7

14

16 15

ENNEMANE RIVER

CHAUMONT

V RAUCOURT 13 12 Y

W 9 BULSON VILLERS

MAISONCELLE

BOIS DE RAUCOURT

15 Z

14

12

CHÉHÉRY

STONNE

8 CHÉMERY

A. XIX AK (mot.) HQ B. 1. Panzer-Division HQ C. Kradschützen Bataillon 1 D. I./Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 1 with 1./Pionier Bat. (mot.) 37 E. II./Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 1 with 2./Pionier Bat. (mot.) 37 F. III./Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 1 G. II./IR ‘Großdeutschland’ with Sturm-Pion. Bat. (mot.) 43 H. III./IR ‘Großdeutschland’ I. I./IR ‘Großdeutschland’ J. 10. Panzer-Division HQ K. Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 86 with 1./Pionier Bat. (mot.) 41(+) L. Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 69 with 1./Pionier Bat. (mot.) 49 M. Panzer-Brigade 4 (Pz.-Rgts. 7 and 8) N. Panzer-Regiment 2 O. 2. Panzer-Division HQ P. I./Panzer-Regiment 3 Q. II./Panzer-Regiment 3 R. 2./Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 5 S. 3./Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 5 T. 1./Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 5 U. Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 2 with Pionier-Bat. (mot.) 38 and Kradschützen-Bat. 2 V. Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 4 W. IR ‘Großdeutschland’ X. II./Schützen Rgt. (mot.) 1 Y. 4./Panzer-Regiment 2 Z 8./Panzer-Rgt. 2 AA. 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) BB. 36. Infanterie-Division

16

11

N

10

BOIS DU MONT-DIEU

XXXX

HUNTZIGER

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 2km (1.24 miles)

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Standing on the bridge in front of where Guderian was standing in the preceding photo, looking above the buildings in that photo’s background, even today one sees the Hotel Panorama, where Guderian based his HQ on the evening of 11/12 May 1940. (Author’s collection)

(StPion.-Bat. (mot.) 43), Kirchner’s riflemen (SR (mot.) 1), and the elite Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland (IRGD). Following the central assault, the flanks would be covered by the timephased crossings of 10. Panzer-Division to the east and 2. Panzer-Division to the west. Supporting the main attack Guderian concentrated most of his artillery – his corps artillery (AR (mot.) 49), Kirchner’s regiment (AR (mot.) 73) and the heavy battalions from the other two divisions (III./AR (mot.) 74 and 90); altogether he had 96 ‘tubes’. However, since these units had only their ready ammunition with them, 50 rounds per battery, they would not begin their heavy barrages until after the Luftwaffe completed its ‘preparation of the battlefield’. Aerial bombardment was provided by Generalleutnant Bruno Loerzer’s II Fliegerkorps, augmented by StG 77 from Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps, just transferred from supporting Heeresgruppe B in northern Belgium. Following morning harassing attacks by small formations of Do 17Zs, at midday the first wave of 90 Stukas arrived in Gruppe strength and began pounding the French artillery emplacements. The Stukas were followed by Loerzer’s Dorniers, flying 310 sorties total, bombing the French riverside positions (KG 2) and routes of march (KG 3), isolating the front-line troops from possible reinforcements. Then the Stukas returned, completing 180 sorties, dive-bombing individual casemates along the riverbank, shattering the defenders’ nerves with their screaming dives, whistling bombs and crashing concussions. The defending French fighters (primarily GC I/5) were distracted by similar attacks supporting Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) assaults across the Meuse at Monthermé, consequently out of nearly 500 sorties the only loss was a single Stuka (3./StG 76) hit by ground fire and crash-landing near Bouillon. With no Allied fighter opposition to counter, Massow’s Messerschmitts went ‘down on the deck’, strafing French troops attempting to move to the front and attacking their field HQs with 20mm cannon, shooting off their command post radio antennas, further isolating the front-line defenders. As the last Stukas left the battlefield, Guderian’s 96 guns unleashed a 50-minute barrage pinning down French front-line troops, cutting off reinforcements and silencing the surviving French artillery. Additionally, Guderian brought up the 102. Flak-Regiment’s heavy battalion – 36 8.8cm Flak 36/37s firing in the horizontal mode – and some PzKpfw IVs to take the surviving French casemates under direct fire. Aiming at the gun embrasures in a technique called ‘posting’ – as if pushing a letter into a mailbox slot – these weapons were augmented by IRGD’s six mechanized 7.5cm Sturmgeschütz (StuG) III assault guns (StuG-Bty (mot.) 640). At 1600hrs, as the noise, smoke and dust dissipated, four battalions of combat engineers (StPion.-Bat. (mot.) 43, Pion.-Btls 37, 41 and 49) dragged

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their heavy kapok rafts from concealed positions among the riverside buildings down to the banks, launched and loaded them, and began crossing the 65-yard-wide river. Though dazed by the bombardments, the surviving French fortress troops immediately manned their weapons, sweeping the water’s surface with a maelstrom of machine-gun fire. At Bazeilles, flanking fire from Baudet’s heavy artillery (IV/38e RAMD, near Douzy) helped the I/147e RIF successfully repulse SR (mot.) 69’s attempted crossing, destroying 81 of 96 rafts. Downstream, at Wadelincourt, the men of SR (mot.) 86 were slow getting their rafts to the water’s edge, the defenders (II/147e RIF) – fighting from three blockhouses and 12 pillboxes – recovered from the bombardments and their vicious firestorm drove the assault teams back behind cover. On the southern end of the nearly 2-mile-wide front of 1. Panzer-Division’s assault there were only two pillboxes facing the attackers and from these positions II./IRGD weathered a hail of bullets that wiped out three of StPion.Bat. (mot.) 43’s assault squads before two companies (6. and 7./IRGD) of riflemen could get to the other side and begin eliminating the defenders. Opposite Kirchner’s northern wing, Lafontaine’s reservists – 6e Compagnie/295e RI manning open earthworks – were totally devastated by the pre-assault bombardments and fled at the first sight of the Germans’ river crossing. Lacking the strength, training, discipline, leadership and fortified positions needed to meet the enemy’s onslaught they abandoned their positions, making the crossing by Kirchner’s II./SR (mot.) 1 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37 seem, as Guderian later observed, ‘as though it were being carried out on manoeuvres’. On the right flank, Kradsch.-Bat. 1 and I./SR (mot.) 1 crossed onto the undefended ‘Iges peninsula’, a northern loop of the Meuse severed at its base by a canal. They quickly got across the canal against dwindling resistance and joined the rest of SR (mot.) 1 just in time for the aggressive commander, Oberstleutnant Hermann Balck, to launch a powerful assault on Lafontaine’s ‘Ligne Principale de Résistance’. This string of eight pillboxes and a blockhouse – many of them unfinished and some unarmed – stretched from Frénois to Wadelincourt. However, because the 213e RI had failed to take its positions supporting this line, Balck’s riflemen overran the nine scattered casemates by sunset. At this point the French defence crumbled. Overwhelmed, Lafontaine’s reservists broke and ran, allowing Balck’s riflemen to advance into a virtual vacuum.

Luftflotte 3’s Stuka group was reinforced with Richthofen’s StG 77 for the assault at Sedan. Ju 87Bs flew 180 dive-bombing sorties against French bunkers, artillery emplacements, communications centres and field HQs, effectively neutralizing and paralyzing some defenders before the first of Guderian’s pioneers placed their rafts into the river. (André Wilderdijk)

From Casemate 104 ‘Paquis de Cailles’, an FCR Type A4 blockhouse, and others III/147e RIF repulsed the initial cross-river assaults by 2. PanzerDivision. Note the scaffolding on the left (evidence of lack of completion) and the effects of direct fire (‘posting’). (M. Romanych)

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3

2 1

4

‘VICTORY OR DEFEAT WILL DEPEND ON THOSE BRIDGES’ (PP. 52–53) At 0100hrs on 14 May, 1. Guderian’s Pioneer-Bataillon (mot.) 505 completed constructing a 16-tonne Brückengerät B across the Meuse River, connecting the villages of Gaulier and Glaire. At midday, with 2. Panzer-Division’s Pioneer-Bataillon (mot.) 38 still working to finish their own pontoon bridge at Vrigne-Meuse, Guderian ordered that division to send its Panzers and selfpropelled anti-tank guns across the Meuse using the Gaulier– Glaire bridge. Seen here is the last PzKpfw III Ausf. E tank (1) of PanzerRegiment 3’s 4. Kompanie crossing the bridge while the first Panzerjäger I of Panzerjäger-Abteilung (mot.) 38 waits its turn to cross (2). Tank number ‘435’ was the fifth tank of 4. Kompanie’s 3rd platoon, as its number coding indicates. The yellow unit marking – including 2. Panzer-Division’s ‘two-dot’ symbol – and white ‘K’ for ‘Gruppe Kleist’ are carried on the upper glacis of the hull, while the yellow triangle stencil on the turret indicates the 3rd Platoon. Realizing the danger, the AdA and AASF mounted a maximum effort to destroy the bridges. After an initial misdirected effort by ten RAF Battles – the two morning raids attacked bridges upstream from Sedan, well inside friendly lines – the French launched mid-morning strikes by Bre 693 assault aircraft, followed

by modern LeO 451 and ancient Am 143M bombers at midday. These attacked the 10. Panzer-Division’s pontoon bridge at Wadelincourt and the mechanized columns queued up to cross it. In the mid-afternoon the AASF sent 45 Battles and eight Blenheims also against pontoon bridges east of Sedan and the vehicles queuing up for them, followed by 29 Blenheims from Bomber Command that attacked troop concentrations and vehicle columns from Givonne to Bouillon. The Gaulier–Glaire bridge was not attacked all day. However, flying to attack the eastern bridges and vehicle columns, the RAF bombers frequently overflew the Gaulier–Glaire bridge – such as the ‘vic’ of three Fairey Battles (3) shown here – en route to their targets. Guderian’s bridges were defended by the respective Panzer division’s attached Luftwaffe flak battalions, such as the two 2.0cm FlaK 30s (4) seen here from Flak-Abteilung (mot.) 83, as well as elements of the corps-level 102. FlakRegiment (mot). The Luftwaffe anti-aircraft guns shot down 19 Battles, while defending Messerschmitts destroyed another 11 Battles and 13 Blenheims. An additional ten Battles were so badly damaged they were abandoned on their airfields during the ensuing retreat.

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By midnight his four battalions had expanded the bridgehead to 5 miles deep, reaching Chéhéry after brushing aside a single battalion (III/295e RI) hurriedly deployed along La Marfée heights. This advance relieved the pressure on IRGD, allowing III. Bataillon to cross south of Sedan, followed by I./SR (mot.) 86 establishing a small foothold at Wadelincourt after nightfall. Meanwhile Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division – which had to drive the ‘long way round’ through Sugny, Belgium, to get to their ‘jumping off point’ – finally arrived on Guderian’s right flank at Donchery as the other divisions’ assaults began. Without waiting for a preparatory artillery bombardment, two pioneer companies (Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 38) and two battalions of riflemen (SR (mot.) 2) began crossing at 1730hrs. Attacking in the face of withering fire from three blockhouses, an artillery casement and eight pillboxes, they were repulsed. Once Balck’s riflemen had advanced through Frenois, the assault engineers of 3./StPion.-Bat. (mot.) 43, specially trained in attacking bunkers, rolled up the east flank of the defenders (III/147e RIF) by eliminating Artillery Casemate 47 and its two 75mm guns, and the large Blockhouse 46. After sunset Veiel’s riflemen crossed the river and advanced through Lafontaine’s secondary line, vacated by the panicked I/331e RI, securing the heights of Croix-Piot. At his command post in a wooded ravine a mile south of Bulson, by 2000hrs Lafontaine’s confidence had evaporated and he began organizing a counter-attack. However, by this time a fully-fledged fiasco was unfolding. The commander of SF Montmédy’s I/169e RAP (supporting I/147e RIF against 10. Panzer-Division), positioned north-east of Bulson, reported shell explosions on the eastern slope of La Marfée heights, suggesting they might be from Panzers. As this information was passed upstream, the shell explosions became ‘muzzle flashes’ of Panzer cannon, and ‘they were approaching’! The word spread to Lafontaine’s gunners (45e RAMD) and once Colonel Poncelet, commanding 110e RALH, made the premature decision to retreat, artillerymen from both units piled into lorries and fled their batteries, shouting ‘Panzers at Bulson!’ to everyone they encountered. The developing defeat now became a rout. Meanwhile, with the Meuse secured from Donchery to Wadelincourt, Guderian’s engineers (Pion.-Bat. 505) immediately set to work building pontoon bridges. The first, connecting Gaulier and Glaire, was completed early the next morning and Kirchner’s Panzers began crossing the river at 0720hrs. He quickly sent them south to take the Bulson Ridge, the next high ground beyond La Marfée heights.

Built along identical lines was Casemate 107 ‘LonguesOrgières’, between Pont-Maugis and Remilly-Aillicourt, from which machine-gunners and an anti-tank gun crew helped repulse 10. Panzer-Division’s initial cross-river assaults upstream from Sedan. (Author’s collection)

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Général Pierre Lafontaine’s 55e DI HQ was located in a bombproof bunker built into the rocky wall of a heavily wooded ravine south of Bulson, known as Fond-Dagot. With some effort, it can be located today. (Author’s collection)

Thirty minutes later an Hs 126 observation aircraft from Kirchner’s aviation squadron (2.(H)/23 (Pz)) spotted two columns of French tanks advancing from Chémery – one due north along the Bar River valley and the other angling north-east towards Bulson (a third was converging on Bulson, unseen, from the south). This was Lafontaine’s long-awaited counter-attack – three companies of small, slow-moving FCM-36 infantry-support tanks (7e BCC), each leading a battalion from 213e RI – also ordered to secure Bulson Ridge. Being faster,6 six PzKpfw IIs and eight PzKpfw IIIs of 4./Pz.-Rgt. 2 arrived at Bulson first, but after crossing the ridge they ran headlong into approaching 1er/7e BCC and a short-range firefight erupted, the 13 FCM’s 37mm guns destroying two Panzers outright and soon disabling all but one of the others. Kirchner ‘fed the fight’ sending three more Panzer companies directly into battle as they came off the Gaulier bridge. Two of these drove straight to Bulson and, joined by the advance units of IRGD, mounted a coordinated counter-attack that drove both French columns from the ridge, only ten FCM-36s (mostly 2e/7e BCC) surviving the battle. The next company (8./Pz.-Rgt. 2) was sent towards Connage where a pair of 3.7cm Pak 36 anti-tank guns had initially halted the approaching FCM tanks (3e/7e BCC). Aided by a pair of half-track-mounted 8.8cm guns (Zgkw 18t of schwere PzJäg.-Abt. (mot.) 8) the arriving Panzers destroyed the French tanks by shooting into their more vulnerable sides, while the two companies from StPion.-Bat. (mot.) 43 drove the infantry (II/213e RI) back into Chémery. In the centre IRGD continued its advance southwards, capturing Villers and Maisoncelle, where they found 40 abandoned artillery pieces. By 1300hrs Lafontaine’s last line of defence was overrun and the shattered remnants of his division withdrew southwards to Roucourt Bois to join Flavigny’s 21e Corps. Guderian had lost only 120 men killed and 400 wounded in the two-day battle. After the 3e DCr and 3e DIM arrived at Le Chesne that morning Huntziger ordered Flavigny to ‘contain the bottom of the [enemy] pocket’ by deploying around Bois de Mont-Dieu and ‘having contained the enemy, counter-attack as soon as possible in the direction of Maisoncelle–BulsonSedan’. Despite the fact he commanded one of France’s most powerful mobile formations, Flavigny was assigned a defence-first mission – so, passing on the opportunity to mount an immediate armoured counter-attack, he obediently 6 The diminutive, two-man FCM-36 was purposely designed to keep pace with advancing infantry, its speed limited to roughly half that of the PzKpfw III.

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dispersed his armoured division into small static packets to await the approaching Panzers. Meanwhile, another bridge had been completed overnight at Wadelincourt, allowing 10. Panzer-Division to move its heavy vehicles towards the battlefront, and a third bridge went up north-west of Remilly-Aillicourt. Belatedly realizing the danger to his far right flank, Groupe d’Armées 1 commander, Général Gaston Billotte, ordered a ‘maximum effort’ by the AdA and AASF, telling d’Astier, ‘victory or defeat will depend on those bridges’. Following an initial misdirected effort by ten RAF Battles, the morning’s first raid against Guderian’s bridges was flown by nine Bre 693 assault aircraft (GBA I and II/54). Escorted by 15 Hurricanes (73 Sqn) and 15 Bloch MB 152s (GC I/8), the attackers ingressed without interference and surprised the flak batteries – but their bombing proved ineffective. This raid was followed by a midday strike by 11 Am 143Ms (GBs I and II/34 and II/38) and five LeO 451s (GB I and II/12). The faster, modern LeO 451s led the way, attacking 10. Panzer-Division columns stretching through Bazeilles, losing one bomber to flak. The lumbering, obsolete Am 143Ms followed, escorted by a dozen MS 406s (GC III/7) with twelve MB 152s (GC I/8) and nine new Dewoitine 520s (GC I/3) sweeping ahead. The fighters held off Massow’s Messerschmitts but 102. Flak-Rgt’s 135 vehicle-mounted 3.7cm and 2cm anti-aircraft guns shot down five of the old bombers. The Allies’ main effort was mid-afternoon when Playfair’s AASF sent 63 Battles and eight Blenheims against the two eastern pontoon bridges and the mechanized columns queuing up for them. Escorting Hurricanes (1 Sqn) shot

The next morning the pontoon bridge at Gaulier was completed, allowing the Panzers to cross to join the battle. Here a kleine Panzerbefehlswagen armoured ambulance (SdKfz 265, modified from a PzKpfw I) passes a motorcycle courier and a group of French POWs to join a PzKpfw II and III on the far side of the river. (Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1978062-24)

The target: long lines of vehicles crowding the roads from Bouillon to Sedan. Mostly these were the support units of the 10. Panzer-Division and Guderian’s corps supply column (seen here). Note the ‘K’ on the trucks’ windscreens, designating these as ‘Gruppe Kleist’ vehicles and authorizing priority on the Ardennes roads, and the half-track-mounted 3.7cm Flak gun in the background, guarding them. (NARA)

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The attackers: although patently obsolete and initially relegated to night bombing, even the ancient Amiot 143Ms were thrown into the fray, attempting to halt the Panzers crossing the Meuse at Sedan. Of the 11 bombers attacking, five were lost to flak. (Private collection)

The only armour available to Huntziger’s 2e Armée at Sedan, at least until the arrival of the 3e DCr, were 90 FCM-36 light tanks. These small, two-man infantry tanks mounted a 37mm gun but proved vulnerable to flanking fire, especially through the sidemounted radiators. (Alain Alvarez)

down five Bf 109Es (I./JG 53) without loss, and the bombers accounted for three more of the defending fighters, but the Messerschmitts destroyed at least 11 Battles and five Blenheims. The bombers that made it to their targets braved a maelstrom of flak and another 19 Battles were blasted from the sky. A follow-up raid by 29 Blenheims from Bomber Command (21, 107, and 110 Sqns) lost eight aircraft to the ever-present Bf 109Es while attacking troop concentrations and vehicle columns (29. Inf-Div(mot.)) from Givonne to Bouillon. The effort was a disaster for the RAF – the highest losses of any day in the service’s history thus far. None of the bridges were touched and 2. PanzerDivision followed Kirchner’s tanks across the Gaulier bridge while its Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 38 constructed another one at Vrigne-Meuse. By sunset over 600 Panzers were on the west side of the Meuse. With his lines of communication across the Meuse secure and his opponent reeling southwards, at 1400hrs Guderian made the decision upon which the entire Fall Gelb campaign turned: he ordered Kirchner to wheel west and advance as rapidly as possible across the Bar River and Ardennes Canal. The II./SR (mot.) 1 had already captured an intact bridge at Omicourt and repelled several feeble attacks from Marc’s Spahis, and after Balck regrouped there, at 1500hrs he struck out to the west, his III./SR (mot.) 1 driving 6 miles to Signy by midnight. In this decisive battle, Lafontaine’s 55e DI had been destroyed and Baudet’s 71e DI had deserted, the only surviving element (205e RI) being reassigned to the 3e DINA. At the end of 15 May, the 10e Corps and both divisions were deleted from the French Army’s order of battle. That same day, Generalleutnant Gotthard Heinrici’s VII AK (AOK 16) arrived at the Chiers River east of Sedan, prompting Huntziger to withdraw his 3e DINA and 138e RIF further to the south-east, evacuating 130 casemates along the river and fatally exposing Fort La Ferté at the eastern end of the Maginot Line. There would be more battles at the Sedan bridgehead, with IRGD and 10. PanzerDivision fending off numerous attacks by Flavigny’s 21e Corps – the cauldron battle at Stonne being the best known – but Fall Gelb’s Panzer breakout had begun.

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THE PANZER BREAKTHROUGH: 15–17 MAY At midnight on 12/13 May, as Rommel’s motorcyclists crossed the weir at Houx and Guderian’s staff planned the next day’s assault at Sedan, 6. PanzerDivision arrived on the Meuse at Monthermé. Reinhardt’s Panzers had made surprising progress, especially considering that the first vehicle of Generalmajor Werner Kempf’s division had not crossed the Luxembourg border until 0600hrs that morning! At Monthermé the Meuse cuts through the Ardennes ridge via a deep gorge and Kempf’s reconnaissance troops (Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 57) and riflemen (SR (mot.) 4) found the heavily wooded terrain rugged and steep. The only road bridge over the river had been properly ‘blown’ leaving only twisted half-submerged trusses jutting from the water. The Monthermé sector was defended by the 42e Demi-Brigade de Mitrailleurs Coloniaux (DBMC), a regiment-size unit of Malagasy and Vietnamese machine gun companies. Part of Général Portzert’s first-rate 102e Division d’Infanterie de Forteresse (DIF), they were dug into well-prepared positions and finished casemates overlooking strategic points along the west bank. With Kempf’s artillery (AR (mot.) 76) still ensnarled in the traffic jams to the east, the Luftwaffe provided support, II Fliegerkorps diverting some 360 bomber and 90 Stuka sorties from the Sedan bombardment that day. Despite the air attacks the first attempted crossing, upstream from the destroyed bridge, was repulsed with heavy losses. However, Kempf’s engineers (Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 57) soon discovered that the twisted metal of the destroyed bridge was snagging the empty rafts as they floated downstream and, once some PzKpfw IIIs and IVs blasted the casemates covering the mangled wreckage, they were able to string the rafts together into a rickety footbridge. After dusk riflemen began crossing and by midnight had established a small, tenuous bridgehead. The next morning Portzert’s artillery (160e RAP) smashed the footbridge, isolating the battalionsize bridgehead and ending Kempf’s progress for the day. South of Kempf’s bridgehead, General der Artillerie Curt Haase’s III AK arrived at Nouzonville and the 3. Infanterie-Division began its assaults across the river. The 52e DBMC fought back stubbornly from well-hidden and wellsited positions, repulsing the first two crossing attempts, but once Stukas pounded the defenders into submission, a third assault succeeded late in the day. To the north, at Givet – between Kempf’s and Rommel’s bridgeheads – the French 22e DI was under the command of its chief of staff, the commander, Général Hassler, having been injured in a car accident. Witnessing the destruction of the 18e DI on his left at Dinant, the ‘acting commander’ ordered his regiments to withdraw 6 miles to the west, falling back at the first sight of Strauß’s approaching infantry.

Balck’s motorized infantry, near Omont, await the command to resume the advance on 15 May. Once Guderian wheeled Kirchner’s 1. Panzer-Division westwards and crossed the Bar River, the Panzer breakout had begun. (NARA)

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Following Guderian through the Ardennes, Reinhardt’s units became entangled in horrendous traffic jams, slowing their progress to the Meuse and delaying supporting units such as artillery. (NARA)

Général Martin, whose 11e Corps had been battered by Rommel’s assaults, attempted to salvage the situation by forming a defensive line south of Florennes. Having just received the 4e DINA, he ordered the commander, Général Charles Sancelme, to establish a blocking position astride the road to Phillipeville, with the remnant of 18e DI on his left and the 22e DI on the right. However, with his army unravelling before him, Corap decided to withdraw en masse 15½ miles to prepared positions lining the French frontier, and he duly informed Billotte. The Groupe d’Armées 1 commander agreed but recommended an intermediate stop-line between Charleroi and Rethel. With three different defensive lines now proposed by the French commanders, orders to the retreating units became hopelessly confused. With communications broken by movement and spotty receipt of orders, the elements of three divisions became scattered between Martin’s blocking position and the French frontier. Into this chaos was sent France’s premier armoured formation, the 1ère DCr. Initially moved to Charleroi, Billotte held this division in reserve awaiting the outcome of the clash in the Gembloux Gap. Realizing, too late, the magnitude of the disaster at Dinant, he assigned it to Corap early on 14 May ‘to clear the Dinant pocket as from today’. That afternoon Corap transferred the 1ère DCr to Martin, who ordered Général Marie-Germain Bruneau to assemble his division north-east of Florennes to ‘attack in the Dinant direction as soon as possible’. Travelling 23 miles overnight along bomb-blasted and refugee-clogged roads, three battalions of Bruneau’s tanks (25e BCC lost its way) arrived at the assembly area between Ermeton-sur-Biert and Flavion early on 15 May. They were followed by the motorized infantry and artillery, and lastly the fuel and supply columns. Because of the excruciatingly slow pace, the 65 Char B1 bis and 40 Hotchkiss H-39 tanks used all their fuel and had to await their bowsers before attacking. After pausing overnight to regroup, that morning Rommel’s 7. PanzerDivision headed for Phillipeville, leading with Pz.-Rgt. 25. Bruneau’s 28e BCC stranded tank crews spotted the Panzers passing only 2 miles to the south and the Char B1s opened fire, disabling several before Rothenburg rerouted his tanks through a wood further south. Avoiding a head-to-head engagement, Rommel brought his artillery (AR (mot.) 78) to bear on the stationary Stahlkolossen destroying all save seven before he had safely bypassed the enemy armour. Trailing Rommel in right echelon, Walsporn’s Pz.-Rgt. 37 smashed Bruneau’s 26e BCC (H39s) and 37e BCC (Chars). Late in the day, Bruneau ordered his tank battalions to withdraw to Beaumont, but only 14 Chars and 20 H-39s were able to do so. Meanwhile Rommel’s Panzers overran the scattered elements of the 4e DINA, rolled through

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Breakout of German forces from the Meuse to the Sambre canal and river, 15–17 May 1940 Ai

0

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Chimay

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II

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Ciney

Paliseul

Rochefort

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Yvoir VIII VIII

Hoth

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Attigny

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La Horgne Bouvellmont

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Signy l’Abbaye

Cerfontaine

2 DCr

Liart 2 DCr

2 DCr

Rumigny

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Saint-Michel

4 DB

2 DCr 2 DB

309 TTI

Ecly Rethel

Novion-Porcien

Chaumont-Porcein

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ChâteauPorcien 14

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TO T N-E Touchon

ois

XX

ne Ais

Bar

3 DLC

Dizy-le-Grox

Soize

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Maubeuge Forts Complex XX

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Solresur-Château

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Anor

Hirson

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Maubeuge

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Berlaimont 5. Pz-Div 7. Pz-Div

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La Capelle

2 DCr

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Rundstedt’s halt line 16 May

Montcornet

Saint-Pierremont

AG 1 Corap Vervins

Marly 9

Chivres

Marle

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FRANCE

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TO 2 N-E Huntziger

Sem

Dercy

Ribemont

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Le Câteau

Solesmes

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0

Cambrai

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Moy

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SaintQuentin

Le Catelet

Jussy

l et te

German advances Front lines on 15 May 1940 Allied advances Allied retreats Maginot Line

Meuse

X

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Runds te Halt Lindt’s 16 Ma e y

Sa Ca mbre na l

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Rommel’s Skoda PzKpfw 38(t) Panzers on the attack. (Thomas Laemlein)

Phillipeville at midday, and drove 6 miles beyond, piercing both Martin’s blocking position and Billotte’s intermediate stop-line. While Corap’s decision to withdraw made sense for Martin’s defeated 11e Corps, it spelt disaster for General Libaud’s neighbouring 41e Corps d’Armée de Forteresse (CAF). At Monthermé the 42e DBMC dutifully evacuated most of its fortifications just before Kempf’s SR (mot.) 4 renewed its attacks, now accompanied by flamethrowers and a tremendous artillery barrage (AR (mot.) 76). By 0830hrs the reserve lines and rearguard were overrun, with the unit commander captured. A pontoon bridge was quickly thrown across the Meuse, and soon Pz.-Rgt. 11 broke out into open country. At Nouzonville the 52e DBMC also withdrew, allowing Haase’s III AK to build two pontoon bridges, permitting Generalleutnant Adolf-Friedrich Kuntzen’s 8. Panzer-Division to join the pursuit. Since French fortress units lacked motor transport, Reinhardt’s two Panzer divisions quickly rounded up the straggling elements of the 102e DIF. Of the division’s 9,926 fortress troops, only 1,200 escaped – Général Portzert was not one of them. North of Monthermé the 61e DI also retired as ordered. Being a reservist unit it had little organic motor transport and this was parked well to the rear, forcing the infantrymen to retreat on foot. They were quickly overhauled by Reinhardt’s Panzers; only 700–800 men made it to Billotte’s intermediate stop-line. By the end of the day, Libaud’s 41e CAF was completely overrun, creating a vacuum ahead of XLI AK (mot.). Into this empty void stumbled Général Albert Bruché’s 2e DCr. This hapless armoured formation, initially sent to Charleroi on 14 May to back up Blanchard’s 1ère Armée, was diverted to join Corap’s 9e Armée, its tanks travelling by rail, all others by road. There, Bruché was told that his now scattered division was to go to Signy-l’Abbaye, at the south end of Billotte’s intermediate stop-line, and that his unit was now assigned to Army Detachment Touchon. Général Robert-Auguste Touchon, a decorated Great War hero commanding the small 7e Armée near the Swiss border, was ordered to establish a force linking Corap’s and Huntziger’s armies, answerable directly to Georges’s TONE HQ. He was assigned the nearly non-existent 41e CAF, the 14e and 36e DIs arriving from the south, Marc’s 3e Spahis, and the 2e DCr. Bruché’s tanks were shipped to Hirson, where they detrained and headed cross-country, more or less falling into column with his motorized infantry, tractor-drawn artillery and supply columns driving from Guise. Through this

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large, irregular stream of vehicles, men and units – spread across some 25 miles – Kempf’s Gefechtsgruppe Esebeck7 slashed like a sabre late that afternoon. Smashing through Bruché’s artillery (309e RATTT), destroying two of its three battalions, the Panzers clashed with the leading battalion of Char B1 bis tanks. Totally surprised, the French scattered, their tanks reeling west and north, spreading themselves widely between Hirson and SaintQuentin, while others escaped to the south. Bruché tried to regroup at Rethel, but found he had only two companies of motorized infantry, one company of H-39s, four Char Bs and a battery of artillery. Meanwhile Kempf arrived at Montcornet by midnight. To the south Guderian was anxious to make similar progress but was stymied by the last vestiges of French resistance. 1. Panzer-Division’s SR (mot.) 1 led the way but Kirchner’s right wing quickly clashed with Marc’s 3e Spahi Brigade, which tenaciously defended La Horgne. Fighting all day, the horse cavalry was eventually destroyed, suffering 629 casualties, with both regiment commanders being killed and Marc captured. At Bouvellemont, Kirchner’s left wing encountered the 152e RI, the leading element of Général de Lattre de Tassigny’s just-arriving 14e DI. This unit also fought determinedly, checking the Germans’ advance but losing one third of its men. By nightfall it was forced to retire towards Rethel, where another defence was being organized. At this point Kleist would have preferred to consolidate the bridgehead and build a defence along the southern perimeter, but after a heated discussion, he granted Guderian his freedom of movement. Leaving 10. Panzer-Division and IRGD behind with Wietersheim’s XIV AK (mot.) to defend the south flank at Stonne and, bypassing Rethel the next day, Guderian surged westward with his other two Panzer divisions. They drove 40 miles into open French countryside, dispersing the 3e DLC (sent from 3e Armée to join Général Charles de Gaulle’s group forming near Laon) joining Kempf at Montcornet. Early on 16 May, at Bastogne Heeresgruppe A HQ learned that Kempf’s pursuit detachment had reached Montcornet during the night. Seeing that the southern edge of the Panzer thrust stretched some 55 miles from Stonne to Montcornet, with only the 12-mile front around Stonne defended, Rundstedt ordered all units to halt at the Beaumont–Hirson–Montcornet–Guignicourt line, except advanced units which were permitted to continue a maximum of 30 miles to the Oise to seize bridgeheads between Guise and La Fère, but an advance beyond the Oise would not be permitted until 18 May. The southern flank ‘was to be covered as the armies closed up [with] AOK 12 to be brought forward with all speed [to make] the southern flank more secure from French attack’.

French prisoners being escorted back to Givet. The speed of the German motorized forces overwhelmed the French infantry as they attempted to retreat to their frontier defences resulting in over 50,000 prisoners being collected in three days. (NARA)

7 Kempf’s ‘pursuit detachment’ was composed of Pz.-Abt. 65, Kradsch-Btl. 6, 2./Pion-Btl. (mot.) 57, 1./PzJäg-Abt. (mot.) 41, two artillery and one Flak batteries, led by Oberstleutnant Hans-Karl Freiherr von Esebeck, commander of 6. Schützen-Brigade.

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Once clear of the French frontier defences, three of Kleist’s Panzer divisions roared across the open countryside, brushing aside small scattered French units as they drove 75 miles from the Meuse to the Oise River in just two days. (Thomas Laemlein)

When 9e Armée reported ‘about 100 [enemy] tanks have reached Montecornet’, d’Astier launched 26 LeO 451s (GB I and II/12 and I/31) against them. To avoid high losses the bombers attacked singly or in pairs over a five-hour period, dispersing their effort over time and space and, therefore, failed to do more than briefly delay the Panzers’ westward drive. (Private collection)

That evening, OKH commander-inchief Brauchitsch – who had the same apprehension – was relieved to learn of Rundstedt’s decision to halt the Panzers. He fully and immediately endorsed Heeresgruppe A’s Haltbefehl (halt order). Earlier that day Guderian met Kempf in the marketplace at Montcornet. Since Kleist’s delineation of corps boundaries only went to Rundstedt’s Haltlinie (stop line), Guderian took charge, sending Kempf towards Guise, Veiel to Originy, and Kirchner to Ribemont and Moy to secure crossings over the Oise River. Blatantly disregarding his superiors’ instructions, he ordered the three divisions – not just advance units – to drive ‘until the last drop of petrol was used up’. Along the Oise, Général Georges spread the scattered tank companies of the 2e DCr at numerous crossing points. These small bouchons (corks) were leaderless – Bruché’s command post was moving from Rethel to Guiscard – and totally lacked artillery and infantry support. Attacking forcefully at 1900hrs, unsurprisingly Kempf’s Panzers ousted the four companies (8e BCC and 14e BCC) deployed at Guise and Proix, destroying two of them; by the morning of 17 May he had secured two bridgeheads across the Oise. Back at Bastogne, Rundstedt became increasingly anxious about his extended southern flank, ‘especially in the Laon area. This southern flank is just an invitation for an enemy attack.’ For that reason he further ordered that the Oise and Sambre rivers were to not be passed without his authorization. Rundstedt, the staunchly conservative Heeresgruppe commander who was still steeped in the methodical ways of World War I, had been just as surprised as his French adversaries by Guderian’s spectacular success at Sedan. He considered it a ‘miracle which [he] could not understand’. Hitler, too, was visibly agitated over the apparent vulnerability of the extended Panzer thrust and, not placated by Brauchitsch’s explanations, travelled to Bastogne on midday of the 17th to see for himself. There, he too was relieved to learn of Rundstedt’s decision and, fortified with this knowledge, returned to Felsennest (his campaign HQ, a bunker complex in the Münstereifel Forest, south of Bonn), to rant against the OKH for not ‘building up as quickly as possible a new flanking position to the south … and ordered [Brauchitsch and Halder] peremptorily to adopt the necessary measures at once’. Meanwhile, unaware of their leaders’ mounting fears, Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division struck at Origny, destroying another company (3e/8e BCC) of Char B1 bis. By the time Kirchner’s two pursuit groups arrived at Ribemont (Gefechtsgruppe Kruger – Oberst Walter Kruger with his SB

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(mot.) 1(-) and Pz.-Rgt. 2) and Moy (Gefechtsgruppe Nedtwig – Oberstleutnant Johannes Nedtwig with his Pz.-Rgt. 1(+)) at 0900hrs. Bruché’s three surviving companies withdrew their H-39s to the south-west. Angry that Guderian had exceeded his remit, at 0700hrs Kleist ordered an immediate halt and flew to Guderian’s HQ at Soize (just east of Montcornet) to personally enforce it. During a violent reprimand, Kleist accused Guderian of disobeying orders. This altercation caused a crisis of command during which Guderian resigned, recalled Veiel by radio to have him take charge of XIX AK (mot.) and informed Rundstedt of his resignation. The Heeresgruppe commander immediately ordered List to go to Soize and defuse the matter. That afternoon List informed Guderian that he was to remain in command and that the ‘order to halt the advance came from OKH [referring to Brauchitsch’s endorsement] and therefore must be obeyed’. With Rundstedt’s approval, List fashioned a compromise whereby Guderian was allowed a reconnaissance in force to the west but had to keep his HQ at Soize. Guderian, typically, ordered his units – now once again including Schaal’s 10. Panzer-Division and the IRGD – to continue westwards that evening. Dutifully leaving his HQ at Soize, he followed with his advanced HQ, laying miles of telephone wire so that the Wehrmacht’s wireless intercept units could not monitor his communications or learn his location.

One of several ‘corks’ used to stopper the bridges along the Oise River, at Guise the ten Char B1 bis tanks the 8e BCC’s 3e Compagnie (2e DCr) could not halt Kempf’s Pz.-Rgt. 11. Char 260, ‘Ouragan’, was immobilized by the failure of its Naeder steering system, with its righthand tracks blown apart for good measure. (Antoine Misner)

THE FRENCH RIPOSTE: 17–19 MAY On the north side of the Panzer salient Rommel now had a new adversary. Général Henri Honoré Giraud was the energetic and aggressive commander of 7e Armée, which he had led into southern Holland – the ‘Breda extension’ of the Dyle Plan – but had been rebuffed by the 9. Panzer-Division. Subsequently, his army was split up: 16e Corps augmenting the Belgian Army at the Scheldt Estuary and his mobile units sent south to help stem the onrushing steel tsunami of Panzers. At 0500hrs on 15 May, Billotte telephoned Georges asking to have Giraud replace Corap as commander of 9e Armée, saying, ‘It is essential to put some life into this wavering army. Général Giraud, whose vigour is well known, appears to me to be best fitted to take on this difficult task and able to effect the necessary re-invigoration.’ Georges, who was beginning to take a more active role in coordinating the defence, approved the move, firing Corap. He also transferred Huntziger’s 2e Armée to his direct control, and once Giraud was in place, did the same with the decimated 9e Armée. With these moves, Georges took charge of the defence against the rapidly advancing Panzers. Arriving at Vervins late that afternoon, Giraud received situation briefings and afterwards, at 2030hrs, reported to GQG, ‘The 4e DINA appears to have some units west of Philippeville. The 18e and 22e Divisions … are completely 65 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

disorganized. The 61e Division has abandoned Rocroi… I have ordered Général Martin to take charge of the defence line within our frontiers. My impression is grave.’ The next evening (16 May), Giraud and Touchon received special orders from Georges: ‘You must first clear the area between the Oise and the Aisne … by an operation based on mechanised transport. Then [Touchon] must follow up this clearing operation by attempting a breakthrough north of the Aisne at Attigny–Rethel– Château Porcien.’ To mount the clearing operation, from the north Giraud sent what was left of Bruneau’s 1ère DCr to the Avesnes–La Capelle area to prepare for attacks against the northern flank of Guderian’s salient. Of the 50 tanks Bruneau had gathered at Beaumont, only 17 were not immobilized by mechanical breakdowns or fuel exhaustion. Passing through Avesnes, they blundered unexpectedly into Rommel’s Panzers. Meanwhile, Rommel had overrun the 1ère DLC at Rance, capturing its motorcycle infantry battalion in a surprise encounter, then penetrated the thin frontier fortifications south of Solre-le-Château in a classic, wellcoordinated combined arms assault. Driving relentlessly, Pz.-Rgt. 25 arrived in Avesnes about midnight, just as Bruneau’s tanks rumbled into town from the north-east. As Rommel stated: ‘Our most ardent commander’ – highly respected, Général Henri Giraud was the natural choice to take over the disintegrating 9e Armée. But he was not a miracle worker – his command lasted only three days. (Getty Images)

There must have been a battalion [25e BCC] of tanks [which] made good use of the gap [between I. and II. Bataillons] in the Panzer Regiment, and French heavy tanks soon closed the road through town. II. Bataillon at once tried to overcome the enemy blocking the road, but their attempt failed with the loss of several tanks. The fighting grew steadily heavier … and lasted until about 0400hrs. Dawn was slowly breaking when the battle was ended and contact was re-established with the II. Bataillon.

Only three French tanks survived the battle, retreating to Maubeuge. Without pausing, Rommel drove through Landrecies, crossed the Sambre River and arrived at Le Câteau at 0615hrs the next day. The 7. PanzerDivision had advanced 50 miles in 48 hours, passing Rundstedt’s halt line because his command vehicle’s radio receiver had gone out, allowing him to transmit only. Meanwhile, Walsporn’s 5. Panzer-Division, having decimated the 1ère DCr near Florennes, drove to Beaumont, where it destroyed the last of the 37e BCC and overran the remnant of Duffet’s 18e DI on 16 May. The next morning, crossing the Sambre at Berlaimont, the 5. Panzer-Division was stung by a counter-attack from elements of Général Picard’s 1ère Division Légère Mécanique (DLM; from Giraud’s disbanded 7e Armée), which had just arrived from northern Belgium. Attacking late in the day with ten Panhard AMD-35 armoured cars (6e Cuirassiers) and 15 S-35s (4e Cuirassiers), Picard’s effort lacked sufficient strength to destroy the Panzers’ bridgehead and they retired to Le Quesnoy at dusk with heavy losses. 66 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

On the south side of the Panzer salient, the only forces Touchon had available to execute Georges’s ordered breakthrough operation was an assortment of mechanized units hurriedly gathering at Laon. Christened the 4e DCr and assigned to de Gaulle, formerly the Commandant de Chars (tank operations officer) on the 5e Armée staff, it included two battalions of Char B1 bis, three battalions of Renault R-35s, a squadron of Somua S-35s, one company of the new, but notoriously unreliable Char D2 light tanks, and a motorized infantry brigade, plus reconnaissance, artillery, engineers and signals units. On paper the 4e DCr was the most powerful armoured unit in the French inventory, but as an ad hoc conglomeration of many geographically separated units it would take time to organize. Unlike most French commanders, de Gaulle was not going to wait – ‘I am going to attack tomorrow with whatever forces I have.’ His mission was to defend the Rethel–La Fère area against a possible Panzer thrust towards Paris and gain time for the new 6e Armée (formerly Army Detachment Touchon) to establish itself along the Aisne and Ailette rivers. To do so, the aggressive de Gaulle determined to secure bridgeheads on the Serre River at Saint-Pierremont and Montcornet, defend there and bombard the German columns (Gefechtsgruppe Kruger) moving westwards through Marle. The next morning, 14 Char D2s (345e CACC), 36 Char B1s (46e BCC) and 90 R-35s (2e and 24e BCCs), together with a battalion of bus-borne infantry (4e BCP), gathered just east of Laon, and at daybreak they set out in two columns headed north-east. Crossing the Canal de Desschement at Chivres they overran a detachment from Gefechtsgruppe Nedtwig’s Aufkl.Abt. (mot.) 4 and destroyed a 30-vehicle supply convoy, then the Char B1s and D2s angled towards Saint-Pierremont while the Renaults continued towards Montcornet. At Saint-Pierremont, elements of Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37 defended the bridges but the Chars battled their way across. About the same time as the trailing 4e BCP approached, one of Balck’s motorized infantry battalions arrived to retake the bridges and a desperate battle ensued. Lacking additional infantry, de Gaulle could not hold the

Following the nighttime battle in Avesnes, the 25e BCC retired to the north. The next afternoon Rommel sent II./SR (mot.) 6 after them, and found these Hotchkiss tanks ‘formed up alongside the road, some of them with their engines running. Several drivers were taken prisoner still in their tanks.’ (Thomas Laemlein)

French Renault R-35 tanks on the attack. (Thomas Laemlein)

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At the end of the day-long battle along the Serre River, de Gaulle’s tanks finally retired under fire by the self-propelled 15cm sIG33 infantry guns of schwere Infanterie Geschütz Kompanie 702. (NARA)

bridgeheads and began withdrawing at 1700hrs, covered by a reconnaissance regiment’s (10e Cuirassiers) half-track armoured cars. At Montcornet, 25 R-35s threatened Kirchner’s 1. Panzer-Division’s HQ, but were halted by more pioneers and some light flak guns (le Flak-Abt. (mot.) 83), and finally repulsed by a group of Panzers just coming out of the repair shops. The Renaults finally withdrew at 1900hrs, under heavy fire by six self-propelled 15cm sIG33 infantry guns of schwere Infanterie Geschütz Kompanie 702. The following morning the Panzers’ reconnaissance in force surged forward across the Oise River and Sambre Canal. Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division took Saint-Quentin at 0900hrs, and Kirchner’s Gefechtsgruppe Nedtwig seized Péronne and its bridges across the Somme by mid-afternoon. Rommel drove to Cambrai, while Kempf’s 6. Panzer-Division destroyed the last component of the 2e DCr (15e BCC) at Le Catelet and captured the 9e Armée HQ just before midnight. Unaware of these deep penetrations, Giraud travelled to Solesmes to order the 1ère DLM to retake Landrecies. However, with Walsporn’s 5. Panzer-Division attacking Picard’s left flank at Le Quesnoy, a second counterattack was out of the question. Returning to Le Catelet, Giraud found the town ablaze and his HQ destroyed – he was captured in a farmhouse the next morning. Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe A had finally and completely annihilated Corap’s 9e Armée, his six leading Panzer divisions having destroyed the two most powerful French armoured units and out-manoeuvred and sidelined the third. By 19 May Billotte fully realized the gravity of the debacle to the south and telephoned Georges, telling him, ‘We must [now] decide what we are going to do in the eventuality that our forces become separated.’ His army group was already conducting a three-phase withdrawal – from the Dyle to the Senne, to the Dendre and then to the Escaut over a four-night period – to prevent the rampaging Panzers from curling in behind his right flank. Georges, for his part, extended the southern defensive line from La Fère, along canals connecting the Oise to the Somme River and following the Somme to the sea, moving divisions from behind the Maginot Line to form a new 7e Armée under Général Aubert Frère. That same day Gamelin – who had done nothing to affect the conduct of the defence or course of the battle until now – assumed command of TONE from Georges. Late that afternoon, learning from d’Astier’s limited reconnaissance that there was a ‘complete vacuum [of enemy forces] in the triangle Laon–Montcornet–Neufchâtel’, he instructed Georges, ‘we must throw mobile forces against the rear of the Panzer divisions and the motorized divisions which are following them. At the moment there appears to be nothing behind them.’

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No sooner had this order been issued, Gamelin was sacked by French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, who replaced him with the 73-year-old Général d’Armée Maxime Weygand, putting all counter-offensive operations on hold for two days until the new commander-in-chief determined the French Army’s next move.

A CHANGE IN THE AIR: 15–24 MAY At this stage the Luftwaffe operated with near impunity. On 15 May – the day the Panzers broke out of their three Meuse bridgeheads – the two Luftflotten briefly switched back to airfield attacks, bombing 16 AdA and RAF bases. The next day 35 MS 406s were destroyed on the ground at Le Quesnoy, annihilating GC II/6. That day the AdA flew only 153 fighter sorties over the main battlefields, down two-thirds from the daily average of 470 sorties during the first week of the campaign. Three days later a dozen Heinkels struck Persan-Beaumont airfield where about 14 LeO 451s (GB I and II/12 and I/31) were parked or lining up for take-off. Destroying ten, the raiders left 6e Groupement with only ten serviceable bombers. After losing another four in action the next day the unit was withdrawn to Orleans to rebuild.8 Likewise, 9e Groupement withdrew their ancient Amoit 143Ms to Nangis, east of Paris, to reequip with the new Amoit 354. This began a wholesale evacuation of Allied air forces from the battle area. Because of initial fears that Guderian’s Panzers were headed for Paris – and would overrun AASF airfields en route – Air Vice Marshal Playfair began withdrawing his surviving forces as well. Two decimated Battle squadrons (105 and 218 Sqns) were disbanded while his two Blenheim units (114 and 139 Sqns) passed their last nine bombers to the BEF’s Air Component (BEF (AC)) and returned to England to rebuild. The remaining Battles and Hurricanes began departing their aerodromes for primitive airfields around Troyes. Spending the next six days regrouping, they contributed little more to the battle. Additionally, on 19 May BEF (AC) withdrew its Blenheim bombers and all but two Lysander (army co-operation) squadrons to England, its 66 surviving Hurricanes following the next day. Flying from stations in Kent, Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group attempted to provide defensive patrols, but the squadrons’ time over the battlefield was severely curtailed. Coordination with Bomber Command for offensive support missions involved debilitating delays, invariably resulting in the targets moving on before the Blenheims arrived to attack. Additionally, the chronically vulnerable light bombers required fighter escort to survive, siphoning sorties

On 17 May the Luftwaffe raided Bacqueville airfield, destroying five Potez 63.11 reconnaissance aircraft of 9e Armée’s GAO 4/551. The exceedingly high losses, plus the disruption caused by units withdrawing to rearward bases, severely curtailed the AdA’s ability to track the Panzer spearheads driving towards the Channel. (Thomas Laemlein)

8 These were to have been replaced with 1er Groupement de Bombardement du Jour, which had four squadrons of Martin 167Fs (GB I and II/62, and GB I and II/63) and two of Douglas DB-7s (GB I and II/19), but these would not be operational until near the end of May.

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0

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Fortified defences

Allied unit retreats

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Forward reconnaissance 20 May

German Army advances 20 May

German Army advances 19 May

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Aumale German Army advances 18 May

French counter-attack 19 May

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The drive to the sea: from the Oise River to the Channel coast, 18–20 May 1940

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from the defensive cover missions. As the British official history states, ‘the Air Force took no effective part in the fighting on this most critical day [20 May – the day the Panzers reached the Channel]’. Against sporadic and ineffective opposition, the Luftflotten’s offensive efforts shifted to transportation interdiction, bombing 198 railway yards/ stations during the 12 days following the Meuse River breakouts. While France’s efficient railway system largely compensated for the damage by rerouting, the resulting delays slowed deployments and precluded timely counter-attacks. Additionally, these attacks forced d’Astier to apportion an average of 42 per cent of his fighter sorties to protect railway stations, depriving the front-line units of air cover. The railway interdiction missions were mainly flown by V Fliegerkorps, KG 51’s new Ju 88s being particularly effective in the dive-bomber mode. Kleist’s thrust to the Channel was directly supported by Loerzer’s II Fliegerkorps, with Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps being fully dedicated to supporting Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.) from 19 May. To get closer to the action, Richthofen’s Stukas began moving forward to abandoned French bases, with three Stukagruppen (I. and II./StG 2 and I./ StG 76) arriving at airfields around Guise on 17 May. Two days later StG 77’s two groups flew into Rocroi, with StG 2’s components continuing forward to Cambrai-area airfields during 20–26 May. On the 25th some StG 2 Ketten (three-aircraft flights) and a Gruppe of fighter escorts (I./JG 27) advanced further to Saint-Pol. Shielded by JG 27’s Messerschmitts, KG 77 Dorniers covered Guderian’s southern flank, attacking French columns around Montdidier, while StG 77 Stukas struck railway targets in the Panzers’ lines of advance and StG 2 provided short-notice close air support. When de Gaulle counter-attacked again from Laon on 19 May, his tanks (20 Char B1s, 12 D2s, and 80 R-35s) clashed with Schaal’s 10. Panzer-Division (which was moving westwards to rejoin Guderian), but were driven off by four hours of Stuka bombardments, with III./StG 2 destroying most of de Gaulle’s artillery (322e RATT) and motor transport. Two days later, Richthofen formed the special Kampfgruppe Weiss of two Jagdgruppen (I./JG 21 and III./JG 54) and one of Hs 123 assault biplanes (II.(Sch)/LG 2) to directly support Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division, basing them near Arras, only 21 miles from the front. When the final French armoured counter-attack (2e DLM) – 40 S-35s and H-35s followed by 150 lorries hauling infantry – approached Cambrai on 22 May, it was bombed relentlessly by the Henschel biplanes, which destroyed five tanks and immobilized ten, while the Messerschmitts strafed and scattered the lorried infantry. On the ground, two Luftwaffe 8.8cm flak batteries (I./Flakregiment 33) destroyed another five H-35s at the outskirts of the city, finally repulsing the attack. At this point the Luftwaffe’s main problem was not the Allies’ air defence but the pace of the advance. Although the very efficient, radio-equipped

By the time the Panzers reached the coast they had outrun the Luftwaffe’s ability to provide fighter defence and close air support. On 24 May, several Ketten of Stukas (StG 2) and a Gruppe of Bf 109Es (I./JG 27) began arriving at former BEF Air Component airfields around Saint-Pol, restoring the Luftwaffe’s capabilities. (Thomas Laemlein)

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forward air control system (Luftnachrichtenverbindungstruppen or ‘air signals liaison detachments’) enabled Stukas to attack targets within 45–75 minutes of notification, their capabilities were limited by the ability of Ju 52/3m transport units (decimated in the near-disastrous airborne assaults in Holland on 10–14 May) to keep the advanced units supplied with fuel and bombs. The dislocation of the Allies’ fighter defence gave the Messerschmitts unprecedented aerial supremacy over the battlefield, reducing Richthofen’s losses to only 30 aircraft in the ten days following the Panzer breakout. However, when the Panzers wheeled north and drove to Boulogne and Calais – and towards Dunkirk – they finally arrived within the effective range of the 11 Group Spitfires and Hurricanes, prompting Guderian to acknowledge, ‘The enemy air force was very active, bombing us and firing their guns at us too, while we saw little of our own Luftwaffe.’

THE BRITISH RESPONSE: 19–24 MAY The same day Giraud was captured and Gamelin was fired, Guderian was relieved of his reconnaissance in force restriction. Early that morning Kirchner’s Gefechtsgruppe Nedtwig forced a bridgehead across the Somme at Péronne. To the north Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) drove west from Le Catelet. At this point, Georges knew that he had little left to block the Panzers’ routes to the sea and, once Kleist’s Panzers arrived there, all lines of communications with Billotte’s Groupe d’Armées 1 would be severed. This was especially critical for the BEF, whose supply lines extended across northern France, from Normandy to Flanders. Only one water barrier remained across Kleist’s path: the unfinished Canal du Nord, stretching from Péronne on the Somme to Douai on the Scarpe. Having no more French units with which to defend this last line, Georges directed General Lord Gort, commanding the BEF, to send his 23rd (Northumbrian) Division to guard the canal crossings. This unit was one of three untrained Territorial Army formations (along with 12th and 46th Divisions) sent to the BEF to provide manpower for airfield, railway and base construction. Woefully understrength, these ‘divisions’ universally lacked artillery, anti-tank weapons, transportation and other attributes of a combat formation. Collecting 11 field guns and two howitzers from the Royal Artillery (RA) training centre in Arras, the 23rd Division’s two brigades9 dutifully deployed along the northern 16 miles of Canal du Nord. This position was already compromised by Kirchner’s capture of Péronne to the south, and early on 20 May Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division arrived at Combles, turning the Northumbrian’s right flank. Abandoning the canal line, the division split: the 69th Brigade withdrew north behind the Scarpe while the 70th Brigade began marching westwards to defend the Arras–Doullens road. Unopposed, Kuntzen’s 8. Panzer-Division crossed the Canal du Nord at Inchy-en-Artois and quickly overran the retreating 70th Brigade. Just as with 9 During World War II a British infantry brigade was the combat equivalent of a French or German regiment; a British regiment was the source organization for the battalions assigned to combat formations.

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the French infantry on the Meuse the week before, the rampaging Panzers crushed the straggling foot soldiers: only 233 men escaped. Meanwhile Hoth ordered Rommel’s drive from Cambrai to Arras halted to await infantry reinforcements. Once the newly formed SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’ (‘Death’s Head’) of motorized infantry joined him, Rommel closed on Arras and began attacking the city while the SSDivision ‘Totenkopf’ passed on his left to begin encircling it to the west. Arras, the BEF’s main base and formerly home for Lord Gort’s General HQ (GHQ), was defended by the 150th Brigade (50th Division), an ad hoc squadron of light tanks, and 18 field guns from the RA Base Depot. Realizing the need for offensive action to reduce the German pressure on the city – at least until his numerous support elements could evacuate – Gort organized ‘Frankforce’: the 5th and 50th Divisions and 1st Army Tank Brigade under Major-General Harold E. Franklyn. Gathering his forces in the Vimy area, Franklyn was ordered to ‘support the garrison in Arras and to block the roads south of Arras, thus cutting off the German communications to the east’. Having sent half his infantry and almost all his artillery to defensive positions, only two infantry brigades and the 1st Army Tank Brigade remained with which to launch a spoiling attack. While Général René J. A. Prioux, commanding the 1ère Armée’s Cavalry Corps, wanted to couple Franklyn’s attack with a major counter-offensive ordered by Georges for the next day, Rommel’s persistent attacks on Arras precluded any delay. The best Prioux could do was to add his (now brigadesized) 3e DLM as a flank guard for Franklyn’s right wing. Holding the 17th Brigade in reserve, the attack would proceed under Major-General Giffard le Q. Martel (sometimes referred to as the ‘British Guderian’), with the two battalions of the 1st Army Tank Brigade each leading an infantry battalion, two batteries of anti-tank guns, one of field artillery, and a motorcyclist company. Crossing the Scarpe River 5 miles west of Arras, the two columns were to sweep around the city’s outskirts in a counter-clockwise flow – clearing German units from the city’s approaches – to the Cojeul River at Monchy-lePreux and Pelves. The BEF’s 1st Army Tank Brigade consisted of two battalions from the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), totalling 88 tanks. Sixteen of these were Matilda Mk. IIs, a 26.5-ton ‘infantry tank’ mounting a

Just beyond Cambrai, Rommel was ordered to halt and await the arrival of the SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’ and follow-on infantry from II AK. Here he waits impatiently in his SdKfz 251/6 command vehicle, amidst the tanks of Rothenburg’s Pz.-Rgt. 25. (NARA)

An 8.8cm FlaK 18 gun of the Luftwaffe’s 2./Flak-Abt. (mot.) 59, assigned to Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division, in action against British tanks near Wailly, 21 May 1940. (Thomas Laemlein)

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AUBIGNY-ENARTOIS

ALLIED UNITS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

SCARPE RIVER

3e Division Légère Mécanique (-) 7th Bn. Royal Tank Regiment 8th Bn. Durham Light Infantry/151st Bde. 260th Battery/65th Anti-Tank Rgt. and 365th Battery/92nd Field Rgt., RA 4th Bn. Royal Tank Regiment 6th Bn. Durham Light Infantry/151st Bde. 206th Battery/52nd Anti-Tank Rgt. and 368th Battery/92nd Field Rgt., RA 150th Bde./50th (Northumbrian) Division 17th Bde./5th Division (Frankforce reserve) 4th Bn. The East Yorkshire Rgt./150th Bde. 13th Bde./5th Division

ACQ MONTSAINT-ELOI

1

A HAUTEAVESNES

MARŒUIL 12

AGNEZ-LESDUISANS

2

3

2

8 DUISANS 3

1

BERNEVILLE

6

5

B WARLUS

DAINVILLE ARRAS

5 SIMENCOURT

4 8

11 CRINCHON RIVER

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BEAUMETZLES-LOGES

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WAILLY

AGNY

9 7

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G BEAURAINS 6 O

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NEUVILLEVITASSE

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EVENTS 1. 1430hrs: 60 S-35s and H-39s of the 3e DLM cross the Scarpe and, discovering Pz.-Rgt. 25 to the west, wheel and attack the Panzers as they secure Haute-Avesnes in preparation for their own assault at Acq (to begin at 1600hrs). 2. 1430hrs: while Rommel’s preparatory artillery barrage shells Marœuil, 7th RTR and 8th DLI, accompanied by anti-tank and RA batteries, advance through the town to secure Duisans. Leaving two companies and two batteries to hold the town, the remaining infantry advance south as far as Berneville, covering the flank of 7th RTR. 3. 1500hrs: from near Anzin, the 4th RTR and 6th DLI, also followed by anti-tank and RA batteries, advance through Dainville, headed to Agny. 4. 1530hrs: approaching Agny, 4th RTR encounters advance elements of I./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 6, dispersing them to the south, then crushes PzJäg.-Abt. (mot.) 42’s anti-tank batteries. 5. 1540hrs: 7th RTR drives to the Doullens–Arras road and turns west, where they are engaged by 3./AR (mot.) 78 howitzers, 2./Flak-Abt. (mot.) 59’s 2cm and 1./ Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23’s 8.8cm anti-aircraft guns at Wailly. Rommel personally directed the spirited defence, using AT and anti-aircraft guns to keep the Matildas from reaching the exposed artillery.

6. 1600hrs: one element of 4th RTR drives towards Mercatel but is repulsed by Flak-Abt. (mot.) 86 and Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23. Another attempts to take NeuvilleVitasse but is decimated by I./Artillerie-Rgt. (mot.) 78 howitzers and Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23’s 8.8cm anti-aircraft guns; 36 British tanks are destroyed. 7. 1530–1700hrs: following 4th RTR, 6th DLI secures Agny and takes Beaurains. II./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 6 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 58, which have been following I. Bn. through Beaurains, immediately withdraw southward towards Mercatel, while II./Artillerie-Rgt. (mot.) 78 pulls back to Wancourt. Once 4th RTR is destroyed, II./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 6 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 58 regroup and attack 6th DLI at Agny and Beaurains from the south. 8. 1730hrs: following a hard-fought battle in which 20 French and 12 German tanks are destroyed around Haute-Avesnes and Agnez-le-Duisans, 3e DLM disengages and drives south, routing elements of SSDivision ‘Totenkopf’ near Simencourt. After dusk the French tanks retire towards Berneville. 9. 1800hrs: III./StG 2 Stukas attack 6th DLI positions at Agny and Beaurains, finally breaking the British defence. Surviving elements retreat northwards into Arras.

10. 1800hrs: to draw attention away from the 6th DLI, two companies of the 150th Bde. make a brief diversionary attack southwards from Saint-Laurens towards Tilloy-les-Mofflaines. 11. 1830hrs: II./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 7, followed by I. Bn., arrive at Wailly and advance towards Beauville and Warlus. The drive stalls when they encounter French tanks near Berneville. 12. 1900hrs: Rommel orders Pz.-Rgt. 25 to attack south-east to destroy British forces between Warlus and Dainville. The attack begins three hours later, forcing the 8th DLI to evacuate. The last company escapes the trap aboard six French tanks and two armoured personnel carriers.

THE BEF ATTACKS ROMMEL AT ARRAS, 21 MAY 1940 The BEF’s spoiling attack against Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division and elements of the SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’ motorized infantry division at Arras. 74 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

GERMAN UNITS A. Panzer-Regiment 25 B. Forward elements of SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’ C. Artillery battery of SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’ D. 2./le Flak-Abt. (mot.) 59 (2cm) E. 3./Artillerie-Rgt. (mot.) 78 F. 1./sch Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23 (8.8cm) G. Panzerjäger-Abt. (mot.) 42 H. 2./le Flak-Abt. (mot.) 86 (3.7cm) I. I./Artillerie-Rgt. (mot.) 78(-) and Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23(-) J. II./Artillerie-Rgt. (mot.) 78 K. Artillerie-Abt. (mot.) 48 L. I./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 6 M. II./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 6 and Pioneer-Bat. (mot.) 58 N. I./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 7 O. II./Schützen-Rgt. (mot.) 7 P. Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 37 Q. Kradschützen Bat. 7 and Aufklärungs-Abt. (mot.) 32 R. Leading elements of 5. Panzer-Division

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Matilda IIs burning after the Arras battle. (Thomas Laemlein)

A fight to the finish: one of Rommel’s PzKpfw 38(t)s (Pz.Rgt. 25/7. Panzer Division) destroyed by a Somua S-35 (4e Cuirassiers/1st DLM) that was, in turn, damaged and abandoned. (Erik Barbanson)

2-pdr cannon and having 75mm armour – an opponent superior to Rommel’s PzKpfw IIIs – but the vast majority were machine-gun-armed 12-ton Matilda Is and tiny 5-ton Vickers VI tankettes, divided between the 4th and 7th RTRs. The attack began at 1430hrs with the 3e DLM’s 60 S-35s and H-39s engaging Rommel’s Pz.-Rgt. 25 just south of the Scarpe, allowing Martel’s right-hand column to advance to the Arras–Doullens road. At Berneville the infantry (8th Bn Durham Light Infantry or DLI) engaged SS stormtroopers, who immediately began faltering. Continuing forward 7th RTR ran into an advanced artillery battery (3./AR (mot.) 78) and two flak batteries at Wailly. In a spirited defence the heavy fire repulsed the tanks. Martel’s left column continued around the south side of Arras, 4th RTR overrunning Rommel’s antitank guns (PzJäg.-Abt. (mot.) 42) between Agny and Beaurains, the villages being seized by the 6th DLI. The British tanks continued southeast and were heavily engaged by artillery (I./AR (mot.) 78) and a heavy flak (Flak-Abt. (mot.) 23) battalion. The tanks’ machine guns could do little against artillery and the 10.5cm howitzers and 8.8cm flak guns quickly destroyed 36 British tanks. With the 4th RTR eliminated, SR (mot.) 6 counter-attacked at Agny and Beaurains, supported by a heavy Stuka raid (StG 2), driving the 6th DLI back into Arras, while SR (mot.) 7 launched a late attack from Wailly against 8th DLI at Warlus. Meanwhile, after destroying 20 French tanks (for the loss of nine Pzkpfw IIIs/IVs) and disengaging from the 3e DLM, that evening Rothenburg’s Pz.-Rgt. 25 attacked from the north-west, forcing the 8th DLI to withdraw also. The attack came at a great price: 14 Matilda IIs, 32 Matilda Is and seven Vickers tankettes were destroyed, including those of the two RTR battalion commanders, both of whom were killed in the fierce battle. Meanwhile, south of Sedan, while General der Pioniere Otto-Wilhelm Förster’s VI AK guarded the Stonne sector, Haase’s III AK faced Touchon’s 6e Armée on the Aisne, and General der Infanterie Eugen Beyer’s XVIII AK filled in along the Ailette (all AOK 12 formations). This allowed Wietersheim’s motorized infantry (XIV AK (mot.)) to move westwards and cover from La Fère to Ham. Once Schaal’s 10. Panzer-Division rejoined XIX AK (mot.), Guderian used it as his flank guard while sending the other two Panzer divisions charging for the Channel coast. The only thing standing in their way were the three widely scattered and unsupported brigades of the 12th (Eastern) Division, each attempting to hold a vital road/railroad intersection. Early on 20 May, Kirchner’s 1. PanzerDivision drove through Albert to destroy

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the 37th Brigade at Amiens, some survivors escaping south of the river as the Germans established a strong bridgehead 4 miles deep. Leapfrogging ahead, Veiel’s 2. Panzer-Division raced to Abbéville, destroying the 35th Brigade, his reconnaissance battalion (Aufkl.-Abt. (mot.) 5) arriving at the Channel shore by sunset. Paralleling Guderian’s thrusts, Kempf’s 6. PanzerDivision captured Doullens, completely annihilating the 36th Brigade. In one broad sweeping stroke, three Panzer divisions had eliminated a British infantry division and decisively altered the Allies’ situation. While Hitler was ‘beside himself with joy’ and Rommel was battling Martel’s spoiling attack at Arras, the OKH spent the following day restructuring Heeresgruppe A for the next phase of Fall Gelb. To fight on two diametrically opposed fronts, Rundstedt’s command was split: List’s AOK 12 was to defend the southern (Aisne–Ailette–Somme) side of the corridor while Kluge’s AOK 4 was to continue offensive operations to the north. To do so, Kleist’s group, minus Wietersheim’s motorized corps, was transferred to Kluge’s army. Also within AOK 4, Hoth’s command was upgraded to a Panzer group with the arrival of XVI AK (mot.) and XXXIX AK (mot.) from Heeresgruppe B. The latter, consisting of 20. InfanterieDivision (mot.) and the independent SB (mot.) 11, was assigned the Arras sector, allowing the Panzers to swing round to the west to envelop the city. Offensive operations resumed the next day, 22 May, with Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division crossing the Scarpe west of Arras but was once again stung by a spoiling attack, this time by a remnant of 1ère DLM engaging with 11 Somuas (6e Cuirassiers), three Hotchkiss (4e/18e Dragons) and two infantry battalions (I and II/4e RDP) attacking at Mont-Saint-Éloi. Picard’s troops stopped the Panzers and held the heights until Walsporn’s 5. Panzer-Division arrived the next morning, freeing Rommel to outflank them to the north. At 0800hrs the next day Gort ordered Arras abandoned, withdrawing behind the Aa–Aire–La Bassée Canals, known as the Canal Line. Initially Kleist held Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.) on the Somme to guard against any counter-offensive by Frère’s just-forming 7e Armée, and on the north side deployed Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) west of Arras, from Hesdin to Savy-Berlette. Additionally, to safeguard against any further surprises, he held Schaal’s 10. Panzer-Division at Doullens as his group reserve. The next day he ordered Guderian to head north and take Boulogne and Calais while Reinhardt covered his inland flank by advancing towards Saint-Omer. At 0800hrs on 22 May Guderian’s two Panzer divisions and the IRGD launched northwards to besiege the two Channel ports. Anticipating Guderian’s objective, Général Alfred Fagalde, commanding the 16e Corps on the Scheldt Estuary, sent Général Félix Lanquetot’s 21e DI across Flanders to block them 10 miles south of Boulogne. Only the 48e RI arrived, deploying from the seashore to Samer; the 65e RI was overrun by Kirchner’s Panzers while still in their trains, and Fagalde wisely halted the 137e RI at Bourbourg, avoiding the same fate.

Riflemen dismount from their SdKfz 251/1 half-track armoured personnel carriers. Once the two Panzer divisions arrived at the Channel ports of Boulogne and Calais, it was time for their motorized infantry to go to work. (NARA)

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KRISIS ARRAS: ‘I PERSONALLY GAVE EACH GUN ITS TARGET’ (PP. 78–79) Generalmajor Erwin Rommel’s attack west of Arras, intending to surround the city from that direction, was still being organized when the defending British launched a spoiling attack designed to clear the southern approaches to the city of Rommel’s forces, and thus delay his attack. At the head of Schützen-Regiment (mot.) 6, the 7. Panzer-Division commander was hustling to rejoin Panzer-Regiment 25 when his column came under heavy shellfire from the north, driving his motorized riflemen into defensive positions behind the Crinchon River near the village of Wailly. There, Rommel found his advanced battery of howitzers, 3./ Artillerie-Regiment (mot.) 78, being attacked from the west by British tanks (7th Bn. Royal Tank Regiment). Defending the rather exposed battery of four 10.5 cm leFH 18 field howitzers were a troop of three half-track mounted 2.0cm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft guns (1) from 2./leichte Flak-Abteilung (mot.) 59 and a battery of 3.7cm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns (2) from Panzerjäger-Abteilung (mot.) 42, covering the western approaches to the howitzers from their left flank. As Rommel later related: After notifying the divisional staff of the critical situation in and around Wailly we drove off to a hill 1,000 yards west of the village, where we found a light anti-aircraft troop and several anti-tank guns located in hollows and a small wood, most of them totally under cover. About 1,200 yards west of

our position, the leading enemy tanks, among them one heavy, had already crossed the Arras-Beaumetz railway and shot up one of our Panzer IIIs (out of view to the left/west). At the same time several enemy tanks (3) were advancing down the road from Bac du Nord and across the railway line towards Wailly (4). It was an extremely tight spot, for there were several enemy tanks very close to Wailly on its northern side. The crews of a howitzer battery (5), some distance away, now left their guns… I brought every available gun into action at top speed against the [enemy] tanks. Every gun, both anti-tank and anti-aircraft, was ordered to open rapid fire immediately and I personally gave each gun its target. With the enemy tanks so perilously close, only rapid fire from every gun could save the situation. We ran from gun to gun. The objections of the gun commanders that the range was still too great to engage tanks effectively was overruled. All I cared about was to halt the enemy tanks by heavy gunfire. Soon we succeeded in putting the leading enemy tanks out of action. Over by the howitzer battery also – despite a range of 1,200 to 1,500 yards – the rapid fire of our anti-tank and antiaircraft guns succeeded in bringing the enemy to a halt and forcing some of them to turn away.

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At Boulogne Lanquetot’s forces also included two battalions (VI/310e RIF and one from SF Flandres) and divisional instruction centre troops. Being the site of Gort’s Rear GHQ and the BEF’s main supply port on the east end of the Channel, the British reinforced them with the two-battalion 20th Guards Brigade, brought into the harbour aboard two steamers and a Royal Navy destroyer. Outflanking Lanquetot’s outer defences, Veiel’s SB (mot.) 2 riflemen attacked the 2nd Welsh Guards from the north-east. The battle continued all day, 23 May, with the defenders receiving gunfire support from French and British destroyers, ensuring that 2. Panzer-Division’s attack progressed slowly. A devastating attack by two dozen Stukas (I./StG 77) at 1930hrs sank the French destroyer L’Orage, and, as the Germans advanced into the suburbs, the War Office ordered the British brigade evacuated. Seven Royal Navy destroyers (19th Flotilla) operated under heavy fire to rescue 4,368 troops, the last leaving the battered and burning port just after midnight. Naturally exasperated by his Allies’ precipitous departure, Lanquetot’s troops fought tenaciously for another 36 hours, engaging Veiel’s riflemen in vicious urban combat until finally surrendering, exhausted and out of ammunition, at midday on 25 May. Two days earlier, Kirchner’s 1. Panzer-Division had invested Calais. This port was defended by the remnant of Lanquetot’s 65e RI, a fortress battalion (V/310e RIF), and the British 30th Brigade, accompanied by the 3rd RTR battalion (27 12-ton Mk. I Cruiser tanks and 21 Mk. VI tankettes). Eighteen cruisers and nine tankettes were quickly lost in a misguided attempt to join the BEF’s main body near Saint-Omer and while escorting a rations convoy to Dunkirk. Once Kleist realized that the Arras attack was a one-off event, he released Schaal’s 10. Panzer-Division and Guderian sent it to Calais, ordering Kirchner to drive east towards Dunkirk. Schaal’s division invested Calais early on 24 May and at dawn began a heavy artillery bombardment. Fort Nieulay (V/310e RIF) succumbed that morning and soon the British riflemen, commanded by Brigadier Claude Nicholson, were heavily engaged in fierce street fighting, retreating begrudgingly behind the thick walls of the ancient city. Two Royal Navy light cruisers and six destroyers (Nore Command) supported the defence – HMS Wessex being sunk by ‘a horrific Stuka bombardment’ (StGs 2 and 77) – but for the sake of Allied solidarity this time an evacuation was not permitted. The end was inevitable: Schaal’s riflemen finally isolated and overwhelmed Nicholson’s last defenders as daylight faded on 26 May. During the night Royal Navy vessels rescued 440 survivors from various spots along the shoreline. While these sieges progressed, the psychological effects of Martel’s spoiling attack – called Krisis Arras in German sources – caused great anxiety among senior German commanders. Not realizing that the

Rundstedt wanted the Panzers halted so that the marching infantry could catch up and fill in the southern flank of the Panzer corridor. Hitler had political reasons, and wanted to preserve the Panzers for Fall Rot. Their mutual agreement cost the Nazis the greater victory. (Thomas Laemlein)

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1st Army Tank Brigade had been reduced to only 28 tanks, Kleist worried about what the Arras counter-attack portended and his own rising losses, reducing his five divisions’ strength to only 1,220 Panzers. More concerned with the lack of supporting infantry, Kluge telephoned Rundstedt at 1640hrs on 23 May saying that ‘the troops would welcome an opportunity to close up tomorrow’. Obtaining Rundstedt’s consent, Kluge telephoned Kleist’s and Hoth’s HQs stating that AOK 4 would not advance on 24 May so as to allow the lagging infantry to close with the leading Panzers. That day Hitler visited Rundstedt’s HQ, now at Charleville, France, to discuss the situation, OKH’s plan to eliminate the Allied pocket, and the impact on the follow-on Fall Rot (‘Case Red’; Fall Gelb’s sequel, which would result in the conquest of France). Influenced by OKW chief Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, who had spent ‘considerable time in Flanders in the first World War’, Hitler worried that the Panzers would bog down in Flanders and not be available for the coup de grâce against France. Additionally, in a twisted piece of Nazi logic, for political reasons he wanted Heeresgruppe B to push the Allied forces out of Belgium – and against the Panzers soon to be arrayed along the Canal Line – so that their final surrender would take place on French soil and not in neutral territory. Following the meeting Rundstedt ordered the ‘attack on the line Dunkirk– Hazebrouck–Merville to be discontinued for the present’. Returning to Felsennest Hitler directed the OKH to issue a Haltbefehl. Passed to Kluge’s AOK 4, it read, ‘By the Führer’s orders … hold the favourable defensive line Lens–Béthune–Aire–St Omer–Gravelines, and allow the enemy to attack it… The principle thing now is to husband the Panzer formations for later and more important tasks.’

One of Rommel’s PzKpfw 38(t)s crossing the La Bassée Canal. Once the Haltbefehl was lifted, the Panzers struck with a fury, practically destroying the BEF’s 2nd Division along the Canal Line. (NARA)

HALTBEFEHL RESCINDED: 26–31 MAY During the two days of waiting, Hitler’s hoped-for westward movement of the Allied armies did not materialize. Instead, they were tenaciously resisting Bock’s Heeresgruppe B in Belgium. Along the Canal Line scattered Allied units were digging in, and between the two fronts, the southernmost BEF units and French 1ère Armée were withdrawing northwards towards Dunkirk. Consequently, midday on 26 May Hitler directed his OKW staff to telephone OKH authorizing XIX AK (mot.) to close within artillery range of Dunkirk ‘in order to cut off, from the land side, the continuous flow of transport [ships]’. At 1530hrs this call was followed by a ‘go order’ directing Heeresgruppe A to resume its offensive with ‘a forward thrust from the west by Panzer groups and infantry divisions in the direction[s of] Tournai, Cassel [and] 83 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

Some of the many British and French captives rounded up by Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division once the offensive resumed. (NARA)

Dunkirk’. At Château Bonne Étable, near Béthune, the word arrived at Kluge’s AOK 4 HQ via Fieseler Storch and immediately the Panzer commanders were notified. However, it took over 12 hours for the Panzers to deploy, so their assaults could not begin until the next morning. Guderian’s motorized infantry started their attacks immediately, but at Bourbourg his IRGD was repulsed with heavy casualties by Fagalde’s wellsited and well-supported defences (137e RI and two battalions of artillery). At Watten the newly arrived SS Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (mot.) (‘Bodyguards of Adolf Hitler’, or SS-LAH) crossed the Aa Canal, and made good progress until Fagalde’s reinforcements halted them at Bollezeele. Early the next morning Veiel’s Pz.-Rgt. 4 joined the stormtroopers’ assaults, the Panzers overrunning the defenders (mostly from SF Flandres), the surviving battalion and some artillery withdrawing to Drincham. Similarly, along the coast Kirchner’s SR (mot.) 1 broke through to ring Gravelines and Fort Philippe. At the south end of the battleline, the next morning three Panzer and two motorized SS divisions (SS ‘Totenkopf’ and the SS ‘Verfügungs’ (‘Expeditionary’)) assaulted the 20-mile length of canal from Aire to La Bassée against the scattered battalions of Major-General Noel Irwin’s 2nd Division. Following a devastating artillery bombardment, in the pre-dawn darkness the Panzers launched vicious attacks. With no anti-tank guns and little artillery the British were overrun at every point. On the north flank, by noon the 6th Brigade was virtually wiped out by Generalleutnant Horst Stumpff’s 3. Panzer-Division, the survivors seeking shelter in the Forest of Nieppe. In the centre, the battalions of the 4th Brigade were battered, surrounded and systematically destroyed by Generalleutnant Johann Joachim Stever’s 4. Panzer-Division and the SSDivision ‘Totenkopf’. To the south the 5th Brigade’s battalions were beaten back by Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division. A small counter-attack by a company of the 1st Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders supported by six Somua tanks (1ère DLM) briefly spoiled his success, but Rommel recovered to launch a powerful coordinated assault that drove an armoured wedge towards Armentières that afternoon. The sacrifice of Irwin’s division allowed Gort to transport four others out of the Lille end of the pocket, withdrawing towards Dunkirk. The French 1ère Armée – now commanded by Général Prioux – followed, but marching on foot, exhausted and hungry, most of the French units could not keep up. While Général de la Laurencie’s 3e Corps followed the British divisions north of Lille and briefly established a fresh defensive line along the Lys River, Général Aymer’s 4e Corps made it only to Seclin, regrouping the next day. Général René

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Altmayer’s 5e Corps came under heavy artillery fire and almost continual Luftwaffe attacks and soon became lost, frustrated and confused. The next morning (28 May), after three days of unrelenting attacks against Dunkirk completely destroyed the port’s facilities, the Luftwaffe turned its might against Prioux’s exhausted units. Completely bereft of air cover, the 4e and 5e Corps were pounded mercilessly, stopping all movement. Of de la Laurencie’s 3e Corps, only the 12e DIM, two battalions from the 32e DI, two artillery regiments (15e RADT and 215e RALHT) and two reconnaissance groups (7e and 92e GRDI) escaped. To cut off the French retreat, Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) drove to Hazebrouck and Cassel. Between these two towns, Gort’s second defensive line was based on the widely scattered battalions of Major-General Edmund Osborne’s 44th Division. Taking more than 24 hours to get into position, Kuntzen’s 8. Panzer-Division began its attacks at dawn on 28 May, but the gaps between Osborne’s units allowed the Panzers to penetrate swiftly and deeply in several places. Attacking the scattered battalions from multiple directions, the Panzers ousted the defenders from every point, forcing Osborne to rally them to the high ground called Mont des Cats, the site of 12 RA field guns (52nd and 65th Field Regiments) defended by a machinegun battalion (1st/8th Middlesex). Fighting from this dominating position throughout the following day, Osborne’s battered troops allowed the 2,500man remnant of Irwin’s 5th Brigade to straggle northwards behind them, through Watou. Kempf split his 6. Panzer-Division, his motorized infantry (SR (mot.) 4) joining the SS-LAH regiment to attack Brigadier J. M. Hamilton’s 144th Brigade at Wormhoudt. Following a heavy artillery bombardment, relentless assaults overwhelmed one battalion and forced the others to fight their way out with rifle, grenade and bayonet, regrouping at Bambecque that evening. To the south Kempf’s Pz.-Rgt. 11’s Skoda 35(t) light tanks drove to the walled hilltop town of Cassel, defended by Brigadier the Hon. Nigel F. Somerset’s 145th Brigade. The brigade’s 24 anti-tank guns and four 18pdrs repulsed repeated attacks that, lacking infantry support, suffered grievous losses. Though tactically victorious, by the end of the day the defenders were surrounded. After defending Cassel another day, as darkness fell on 30 May Somerset’s men attempted to escape to Dunkirk, heading north-eastwards in a single column. They soon stumbled into the Pz.-Rgt. 11 laagering in preparation for its southwards move. After a series of running battles through the night, Somerset, 40 officers and 2,000 troops were surrounded and surrendered near Watou. Along the coast, Kirchner’s SR (mot.) 1 and Pion.-Bat. (mot.) 37 besieged Gravelines

A Waffen-SS PaK 37 gun crew destroys a Renault R-35. Depite reservations about using Waffen-SS in the campaign, OKH sent two SS motorized infantry divisions forward for the final phase of the offensive. These well-equipped, elite units joined the Panzers and fought well, but they also committed the first publicized atrocities of the war. (Thomas Laemlein)

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XXX

10 Pz

0

0

1 Pz

11

II

X

K

Kleist

4

20

XIV

XXXX

XX

X

1 Pz

III

XIX

II

137

SS LAH

III

Watten

1 Pz

10 miles

German advances 28 May Defensive fortifications

German advances 27 May

German advances 26 May

Allied unit movements 28 May

PzB 4

FR

III

SF

XXX

8

Forêt de

XX

XLI

Aire

9

Blaringhem

48

BR

X

Wietersheim

4

Hoth

3

H

H

XVI

XXX

XXX

XVI

XX

132

X

44

X

XX

1 DLM

44

XVI

Hoth

4 4 Kluge

XXXX

XX

2

BR

BR 4

A

4

X

25

FR

(-) 23

3 DLM

5

32

XX

Lens

(-) H Reg

X

H Höpner

XV

XX

5

(-) Cav

III

(+) XV

2

XXX

II

4 Strauss

II

XX

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12

125

XX

25

10

9

BE

XX

42

FR 1 IV

V

IV

XXXX

FR

4

11

32

XX

XX

II

Douai

II

Seclin Carvin

XX

FR 2 NA

9

XX

XI

6

XX

42

II

XX

1

XX

I

I

32

1

XI

8

XXVII

XX

FR

VIII

1

XX

III

253

FR

XI

VII

8

III

XX

XX

B

216

XX

XXX

XX

VIII

83

XX

IX

Heitz

VIII

VIII

4

XXVII

XXX

XXVII

XX

IX

VI

XX

Tournai

267

6

XXVII

Heeresgruppe B XXXX Heeresgruppe A

217

XXVII

XX

6 Res

Wëger

269

XX

XX

BE

56

4

XX

VI

(-) VI

BE

Ly s

5

XXXX

XXVII

35

XX

BE

Reichenau

6

Courtrai

Mouscron

XX

6

XX

BE

XX

Kortzfleisch

XI

1 ChA

Thielt

(-) VII

XXX

255

Roubaix

III

XX

BE

VII XX

XX

BE

Orchies

FR

XX

BR

Scarpe River

12

BR

II

7

Tourcoing

Menen

X XX

3

2 ChA

XX

XI 30

Lecdegem

BR

267

XX

VII

Iseghem

19

BE

XX

Roulers

XX

XX

II

Lille

3

BR

XX

BELGIUM Belgian Army surrenders: 0400hrs, 28 May.

Schwedler

XXX

14

IV

IV

IV

BE

XX

Comines

XX

IV

XXX

Lomme XX

BR

X

61

XX

I

I

XX Prioux 4 IV V FR FR XX 5 V 15 IV NA l a e FR FR

1 Ma roc

Fournes

BE

XX

Thourout

Zonnebeke

BE

XX

IV

De Riveule r

48

31

Armentières

BR

BR 42

15

XX

4 BR

X

5

18

BR 143 X

42

BR

X

12

4 13

X

5

2

Passendale

Ypres BR

X

Fort Engles

FR

X

127

BR

X

4 17

126

XX

50

3

50

10

BR

X

BR

X

BR

X

BR

X

3

PzR 25

XXX

7

FR

XX

Estaires

Lorgies XVI

XX

11

150

151

9

BR

X

3

Dixmude

Noordschote

12 III (-) FR III

BR

X

Bailleul

FR

XX

69

La Bas sée Canal

50

(-) Cav 1 X

44

XX

Merville

BR

X

BR

Gort

BR

BR 8

X

Loo 7 G

(-)

Poperinge

BEF

FR

XX

XXXX

2 DLM

M on t d es C a t s

XVI

2

Yser

Steenvoorde

46

Béthune

XXXX

SS T

XX

BR

X

1

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Dunkirk Perimeter established 27 May

BEF GHQ

Watou

BR

X

BR 131

La Motte 6

1

Strazeele

133

II

BR

Furnes

12 RL

BR

X

Eecke

139

Forêt de Nieppe

SS V

XIV

XIV

48

Hondeghem

Cassel

145

SR 4

Ledringhem

Air Canae l

XX

X

BR

Bambecque

La Panne

Hazebrouck

PzR 11

Arneke

SS-LAH

XLI Clairmarais

XLI K Reinhardt

XLI

XX

Aa

29

144

Wormhout

SB 11

Cochte

69

Bergues

BR

II

FMN

6 GH

Dunkirk

Steene

20 ID (mot.)

Bollezeele

PzB 4

XXX

Bray-Dunes

Fagalde

XVI

FR

Spycker

XVI

310

IRGD

FR

XX

Drincham

pK Gr XX XX p H Gr

Lys

Lumbres

6

XX

II

FR

Abrial

XXXX

Brouckeque

Bois du Hamoret

21

21 CI

XIX

III

Saint-Omer

XIV

Allied unit movements 27 May

10km

SF

Saint-Momelin

XX

4

FR

III

Fort Mardyke

IV

Loon-Plage 68

272

310

Bourbourg

GD

III

FR

II

St-Pierre-Brouck

1

1 Pz

310

VII

Petite Fort Phillipe

Allied unit movements 26 May

FRANCE

Ardres

II

FR

37

II

Gravelines

Les Attaques

XIX K Guderian

4

X

1

X

Grand Fort Phillippe

English Channel

Forces Maritimes du Nord

XXX

86 XXX

Aa l Cana XXX

N

Haltbefehl lifted – the offensive resumes, 26–28 May 1940

and Fort Philippe (II and VII/310e RIF). Anticipating the 210-mile movement south-east to join List’s AOK 12 for Fall Rot, Guderian withdrew the division’s Panzer brigade to laager near Boulogne. At this point the Panzers were replaced by Wietersheim’s XIV AK (mot.). This formation now consisted of the small 9. Panzer-Division, the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) and SB (mot.) 11. Wietersheim was also assigned the IRGD and SS-LAH regiments and two battalions of Guderian’s heavy artillery, and took over the Panzers’ positions between the Yser River and the coast. Meanwhile, at Rundstedt’s HQ Brauchitsch and Halder met with the Heeresgruppe A commanders and Luftflotte 3 representatives to brief the OKH’s deployment directive for Fall Rot, signed by Hitler the day before. As soon as the generals returned to their HQs movement orders flew to their subordinate units, realigning the armies and air fleets for the assault across the Somme, thus removing Guderian’s and Reinhardt’s Panzer corps from the siege of Dunkirk. They were no longer needed. With the last British and French units straggling into the Dunkirk perimeter and taking their positions behind the complex network of water barriers, Guderian correctly reassessed the situation: ‘A tank attack is pointless in [this] marshy country… Furthermore AOK 18 is approaching from the east. The infantry forces of this army are more suitable than tanks for fighting in this kind of country and the task of closing the gap on the coast can, therefore, be left to them.’ Meanwhile, further south, Hoth’s XV AK (mot.) closed the trap on Prioux’s 1ère Armée, which was now huddled around Lille. To do so, Rommel was once again assigned units from the 5. Panzer-Division. Once Rothenburg’s Pz.-Rgt. 25 overran a last remnant of the 3e DLM at Lorgies, opening the way ahead, he sent Oberst Paul Werner’s Pz.-Rgt. 31 to Fournes, closing on Lille from the west. Rothenburg then swung his regiment around to the north, avoiding Fort d’Englos, drove to Lomme to cut the road to Armentières. Rommel’s motorized infantry, reconnaissance battalion and anti-tank companies then established blocking positions astride the roads and repulsed repeated attempts by the 25e DIM to break out. Closing from the east Wäger’s XXVII AK captured Prioux in his command post at Steenwerck and, meeting the outlying elements of Rommel’s 7. PanzerDivision near Armentières, completed the encirclement of the six depleted French divisions. Following two more days of hard fighting Général Molinié finally surrendered his 35,000 troops when ammunition, food and water were exhausted. In recognition of the defender’s valiant stand, the Germans allowed them to march out with their colours flying. Having realized Manstein’s vision and achieved Halder’s aims for Fall Gelb, the Heeresgruppe A staff diarist correctly noted, ‘The task of Army Group A can be considered to have been completed.’

While the BEF and the remnants of various French units were evacuated from Dunkirk, the French 1ère Armée fought and finally surrendered at Lille. The Germans respected the courage and determination of the French forces and allowed them to march into captivity with their dignity and their colours. The surrender of the French 1ère Armée signalled the end of Heeresgruppe A’s contribution to Fall Gelb. (NARA)

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AFTERMATH The German attack in the West was one of the most shrewdly and skilfully contrived plans in the annals of modern warfare. Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940 The immediate effect of the success of Fall Gelb was that the defending Allied armies were split, the northern portion – nearly half a million men – hemmed into a small pocket encompassing Dunkirk, France, and Nieuport, Belgium. Of these, Operation Dynamo, the great seaward evacuation organized by Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay’s Dover Command, rescued some 357,362 men, of whom approximately 170,475 were French soldiers, most of which were immediately shipped back to France to reorganize and await the sequel, Fall Rot. In the first four weeks of Hitler’s campaign against the Western democracies and the neutral Low Countries, Heeresgruppe A destroyed 18 French infantry divisions, six (of seven) motorized divisions, two (of five) light cavalry divisions, one armoured (the 1ère DCr)10 and all three mechanized cavalry divisions. At the tactical level the relative loss ratios are starkly revealing, the best example being from Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division. The division’s Fall Gelb operations summary claims that the unit destroyed 313 Allied tanks and captured 48 more, and took 6,849 prisoners. But losses in the three tank battles – plus mechanical breakdowns during the intense, high-speed dash across Picardy – took their toll as well. When withdrawn for Fall Rot, only 86 of Rommel’s original 217 tanks remained operational, including only five of his original 24 PzKpfw IVs. But in the ten days before launching the final offensive many of these would be returned to operational condition. This wholesale destruction of the proud and legendary French Army, which only two decades before had defeated the Kaiser’s forces upon the very same terrain, was equally the result of the German mechanized weapons, dominant air power, and the highly aggressive offensive tactics as well as the French attempt to fight a dynamic campaign with a static-war mindset and a complicated, overwrought command structure. Over the seven decades since the event many causes, reasons, and excuses for the dramatic German victory and precipitous French collapse have been 10 The 2e DCr was reconstituted by gathering assorted independent tank battalions and companies under one command, assigning it initially to Général Frère’s 7e Armée to guard the sector between Ham and Péronne.

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cited. But fundamentally, from the perspective of the military operational art, there are primarily four reasons the Germans won so dramatically. First, the overwhelming concentration of heavily armoured and better armed units – three Panzer divisions – at the point of contact against a single infantry division composed of older, unprepared and poorly led infantry reservists made the victory at Sedan inevitable. While deficiencies in defensive arrangements allowed the Panzers’ riflemen to establish bridgeheads north of the city and the desertion of the interval troops resulted in its rapid expansion, the crossing of 600 Panzers by the end of 14 May – when they faced only 158 tanks of the 3e DCr – enabled Guderian to launch his campaign-winning Panzer breakout within 24 hours of the first Meuse crossings. Secondly, as if the breakthrough by XIX AK (mot.) was not bad enough, Rommel’s simultaneous penetration at Dinant – under essentially the same tactical circumstances – also enabled Reinhardt’s XLI AK (mot.) to cross at Monthermé, thus creating a huge hole in the French continuous line of battle that no colmatage could plug. As Colonel A. Goutard, the best French military historian addressing this campaign, concluded, ‘We lost the battle when the enemy by-passed the 9e Armée on the south at Sedan and the Bar River, and drove it north. This army was in full retreat by 15 May, and this rapidly degenerated to a rout. The disappearance of this army made a 60-mile gap in the centre of our front, through which the Panzer divisions poured headlong towards the sea.’ Third, the impact of the Luftwaffe’s week-long effort virtually removed the Allied air forces from the battlefield – both in diminishing their defensive fighters’ effectiveness and in decimating their hapless bombers. They then executed efficient, heavy and timely air attacks on Allied ground forces, which multiplied exponentially the effect of the Panzer thrusts. It was air power that enabled Guderian’s, Reinhardt’s and Rommel’s seemingly reckless advances deep into enemy territory. Finally, there was a decisive difference in how the two high commands handled their reserves. On the German side, the Halder and his staff’s ability to transfer units readily from the OKH reserves and Heeresgruppe B to fill the void created behind by the advancing Panzers – and thus protect the breakthrough’s flanks – is a littlerecognized secret to Heeresgruppe A’s extraordinary success. On the other hand, while much has been made of the effectiveness of the ‘Matador’s Cloak’ feint into Belgium by Hoepner’s XVI AK (mot.), once he realized the initial mistake it was Georges’s overreaction at the other end of the front that doomed the French defence. Once the Schwerpunkt’s true location was recognized, Georges – along with all the other French generals – anticipated that the crossings at Sedan, Monthermé and Dinant signalled a German intent to swing around the west

Universal carriers and a Vickers ‘Dutchman’ (Commercial Light Tank), as well as numerous lorries and autos, left behind at Dunkirk. The Haltbefehl saved the BEF from destruction at the hands of Heeresgruppe A, allowing them to evacuate some 186,587 troops during Operation Dynamo. (Thomas Laemlein)

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Général Huntziger signs the Armistice document at Compiègne, France. (Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-P50284)

end of the Maginot Line and envelop the vaunted French fortifications from behind. After dispatching two armoured (1ère and 2e DCrs) and three infantry divisions from the GQG Reserves to Blanchard’s 1ère Armée in central Belgium during the first five days of the campaign, in order to prevent Kleist from outflanking the fortress line and crushing Prételat’s Groupe d’Armées 2 from the rear, Georges dispatched another seven infantry and one armoured divisions (3e DCr) to Huntziger’s 2e Armée, redirecting only three divisions (1ère and 2e DCrs, 1ère DINA) to Corap’s crumbling 9e Armée. The next day, Georges sent the GQG’s remaining four reserve divisions southwards to block the route to Paris. When, instead, Guderian turned west and headed for the coast, the French were caught moving in the wrong direction and their command’s overwrought 48-hour decision cycle was too slow to react effectively to the rapidly changing operational situation. Subsequently, the 1ère DCr was destroyed by the 5. and 7. Panzer-Divisionen near Dinant, 2e DCr was destroyed en route to Signy-l’Abbaye in an attempt to block Guderian’s 1. and 2. PanzerDivisionen and the 3e DCr became embroiled in what developed into an irrelevant defensive battle against 10. Panzer-Division at Stonne, on the sidelines of Guderian’s thrust to the sea. This wholesale transfer of GQG’s remaining reserves to defend the end of the Maginot Line and guard the route to Paris was why – when Churchill was briefed on the dramatically deteriorating situation on 16 May and asked, ‘Where is the strategic reserve?’ – Gamelin could only shake his head and reply, ‘There are no longer any.’ Following the ten-day Operation Dynamo to save the BEF from destruction at Dunkirk, both sides regrouped along the Somme–Aisne Rivers, redeployed and on 5 June the Wehrmacht launched Fall Rot. At this time the three German Army groups comprised 120 divisions, counting the ten Panzer units, with another 23 infantry divisions in the OKH reserve. Opposing them were 65 French divisions, including three armoured units, and two British divisions, the 51st (Highland) Division and the recently organized and incomplete 1st Armoured Division. Due to the relative strengths alone, the outcome of Fall Rot was never seriously in doubt, resulting in the rather precipitous French change in leadership – the World War I hero Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, recalled from his ambassadorial position in Spain, became Prime Minister on 16 June – and its immediate petition to Hitler for an armistice the very next day. The effectiveness of Fall Gelb – just as Manstein had envisaged and Halder had implemented – resulted in the destruction of the most powerful forces in the French Army and the evacuation of the bulk of the British one, decisively establishing the conditions that would result in the conquest of France. That it was accomplished so swiftly was a surprise to everyone involved from both sides – except perhaps ‘Hurrying Heinz’ Guderian.

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THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY The key to the success of the Fall Gelb campaign was the battle of Sedan, 13–15 May. Visiting the battlefield today, the military historian and enthusiast will discover that while Napoleon III’s decisive defeat in 1870 and the two battles fought there in World War I are well accommodated with monuments, memorials and museums; the later defeat that cost the French the 1940 campaign – and four-and-a-half years of freedom – is not nearly so well commemorated. The most persistent relics of the Sedan battle are the many concrete casemates still dotting the countryside, too strong to demolish except in the most profitable circumstances. For instance, driving west from Sedan towards Donchery along road D724 reveals Blockhouse 46 and Artillery Casemate 47, which were instrumental in III/147e RIF’s repulse of 2. Panzer-Division’s initial crossing attempts. Likewise, south-east of Sedan pillboxes, blockhouses and casemates dot route D6E, these having been used in I/147e RIF’s repulse of the initial assaults by both of 10. Panzer-Division’s rifle regiments. Today, these are but empty tombs dedicated to the men who died inside them. Commemorated as such is Maison-Forte (MF10) Saint-Menges – one of eight positioned along the roads from the Semois into Sedan – which is located along the east edge of D6, about 2 miles north of the village by the same name. Additionally, it is also possible to locate the large command bunker of Général Lafontaine and his 55e DI staff, approximately a mile

Fabricated from pieces and parts of several tanks, this Char B1 bis is a memorial guarding the crossroads in the village of Stonne. It is painted to represent Char 382 ‘Toulal’, a 49e BCC tank that fought in the vicious battle here and on the high ground to the west, while Guderian’s Panzers drove to the sea. (Author’s collection)

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North of Pont-Neuf in Sedan, the Meuse now flows peacefully. The bunker visible above the riverbank to the far left (between the first two trees) is Casemate 211, from which determined defenders initially held off the elite IRGD. However, because there were no other defences for the next 1.75 miles, beyond the bend in the distance SR (mot.) 1’s crossing went ‘as though … on manoeuvres’. (Author’s collection)

south of Bulson, about 150yds into the woods just south of Au Jardin de Bulson (east side of D29). For all the completed defensive positions dotting the landscape south of Sedan, when one examines the frontage along the Meuse that was subjected to 1. Panzer-Division’s assaults, it is striking that northwards from Casemate 211 – easily viewable just north of the Pont Neuf bridge – there were none for over a mile to the corner of the Iges Canal. While the gunners of Casemate 211 made IRGD’s crossing costly, the two battalions of Kirchner’s SR (mot.) 1 faced only three rifle squads and a machine-gun team in open positions. The lack of meaningful resistance allowed 1. Panzer-Division’s riflemen and pioneers to cross – as Guderian described – ‘as though it were being carried out on manoeuvres’, and once afoot on the far side they were able to quickly organize a powerful advance through the widely spaced casemates forming the Ligne Principale de Résistance. Upon seeing the battlefield in detail one appreciates the possibility, had this section of the Meuse been fortified with casemates manned with resolute 147e RIF fortress troops like the rest of 55e DI’s river frontage, that the 1. Panzer-Division’s assaults could have been repulsed just as were both the Panzer divisions on its flanks. The observant viewer is also struck by the very restricted fields of fire – narrow arcs and the limited range of their weapons – provided by gunners ensconced in the widely separated casemates, and thus the necessity of the interval troops, the ones that panicked and fled. In their absence, it is easy to see how the German riflemen were able to infiltrate between and around the concrete casemates and eliminate one after another by attacking from their blind sides. While there are few memorials to the May 1940 combats in the vicinity of Sedan, further south, beginning at Stonne, memorials and monuments to the stout defence presented by the many component units of the 3e DCr and 3e DIM abound – even though that battle proved irrelevant to the outcome of the Fall Gelb campaign. Nevertheless, the displays at Stonne provide the viewer with an up-close look at a well-maintained Char B1 bis tank – its armour marred but unpierced by several noticeable enemy hits – and an APX 47mm SA 37 anti-tank gun. At Sy – the location of the HQ for the 3e DIM’s artillery regiments – can be seen a modernized Model 1897/1935 75mm cannon. These and other pertinent sights are well organized along the ‘Bataille de Stonne Circuit Historique’ route. While the museum in the famous ‘Château Fort de Sedan’ contains nothing pertaining to the May 1940 battle, numerous small museums in the Sedan area can be recommended. These include Museum May 1940 in Margut, the Spahi Museum at La Horgne, the Museum of Battle May–June 1940 at Semuy, and the Maginot Line fort at Villy-La-Ferté.

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FURTHER READING Finally, 72 years after the event, there is at last a German account of their 1940 invasion of France. Written by Karl-Heinz Frieser, chief of the Bundeswehr’s Military History Research Office, The Blitzkrieg-Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2012) covers campaign planning, the decisive battle at Sedan, and the resulting panzer breakthrough to the coast in extraordinary depth and detail, providing for the first time in English the German view of many operational issues, from the development of the Fall Gelb plan to Hitler’s decision to stop the Panzers short of Dunkirk. However, despite the expansive tag line, it excludes entirely the airborne invasion of the Netherlands as only ‘an operational deception maneuver to divert attention from the actual point of main effort at Sedan’, treats the feint into Belgium as an afterthought, and virtually ignores air power, allowing only two small sections regurgitating old generalizations on the preassault Stuka bombardments at Sedan on 13 May, and the Allies’ attacks supposedly targeting the pontoon bridges the next day – totalling only nine of the 319-page narrative. However, for the military enthusiast narrowly focused on Guderian’s ground operations, it is recommended. Unwilling to accept that their previously victorious and much vaunted army could actually be defeated in battle, most French – and many British – histories sustain this premise with aggregate comparisons of tanks, aircraft, and divisions involved, then try to divine some systemic flaw – cultural, social, political, industrial, organizational or psychological – that was responsible for catastrophe. Instead, as Colonel A. Goutard’s The Battle of France, 1940, (translated by Captain A. R. P . Burgess Fitzgibbon, Ives Washburn, Inc., 1959) and Jacques Benoist-Méchin’s chronological Sixty Days that Shook the West: The Fall of France, 1940 (translated by Peter Wiles, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1963) correctly describe, there were a host of military failures resulting in manifold, simultaneous defeats on several battlefields. Also recommended are two excellent publications by ‘After the Battle’. Jean Paul Pallud’s Blitzkrieg in the West, Then and Now (Battle of Britain Prints International Limited: London, 1991) is exceptionally comprehensive – although the text is taken mostly from secondary sources, with their flaws – and lavishly illustrated, providing the reader with an excellent visual context for each portion of the narrative. Equally thorough is Peter D. Cornwell’s The Battle of France, Then and Now (Battle of Britain Prints International Limited: London, 2007), a meticulous study of the campaign’s aerial combat, detailing and correlating each day’s losses, and substantiating beyond doubt that the AdA and RAF bombing attacks on 14 May were flown against targets well upstream instead of bombing the crucial pontoon bridge at Gaulier. Barbanson, Erik, with François Vauvillier, La 1ère DLM au Combat, Histoire & Collections: Paris, 2011 Battistelli, Pier Paolo, Battle Orders 32: Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg Years 1939–40, Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2007 Bekker, Cajus, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, Doubleday & Company: New York, 1968 Benoist-Méchin, Jacques, Sixty Days that Shook the West: The Fall of France, 1940, translated by Peter Wiles G. P. Putnam’s Sons: New York, 1963 Christienne, Charles, and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of French Military Aviation, translated by Frances Kianka, Smithsonian Institute Press: Washington, 1986 Cornwell, Peter D., The Battle of France, Then and Now, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited: London, 2007 Deichmann, Paul, General der Flieger, Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army, 1939–1945, Ivy Books: New York, 1996 Ellis, Major L. F., The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, 1953 Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, translated by John T. Greenwood, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2012 Goutard, Colonel A., The Battle of France, 1940, translated by Captain A. R. P. Burgess Fitzgibbon, Ives Washburn, Inc.: New York, 1959 Guderian, General Heinz, Panzer Leader, translation of Erinnerungen eines Soldaten by Constantine Fitzgibbon, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.: New York, 1952 Hooten, E. R., Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe, Arms & Armour Press: London, 1994 Horne, Alistair, To Lose a Battle: France, 1940, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1969 Jackson, Robert, Air War over France 1939–40, Ian Allan Ltd.: London, 1974 Macksey, Kenneth, Guderian: Panzer General, Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited: London, 2003 Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von, Lost Victories, translation of Verlorene Siege by Anthony G. Powell, Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1958 Pallud, Jean Paul, Blitzkrieg in the West, Then and Now, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited: London, 1991 The Rommel Papers, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart, translated by Paul Findlay, Harcourt, Brace, and Company: New York, 1953 Taylor, Telford, March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America: Baltimore, 1991

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GLOSSARY AASF – RAF: Advanced Air Striking Force. AK – German Army: Armee Korps or ‘army corps’. AOK – German Army: Armee Oberkommando or ‘army command’. AdA – French Air Force: Armée de l’Air or ‘Army of the Air’. BCC – French Army: Bataillon de Chars de Combat or tank battalion. BCP – French Army: Bataillon de Chasseurs Portés or lorried infantry battalion. BAFF – RAF: British Air Forces in France, comprising the AASF and BEF (AC). BEF – British Army: British Expeditionary Force. BEF (AC) – RAF: British Expeditionary Force (Air Component). CACC – French Army: Compagnie Autonome de Chars de Combat or independent tank company. DBMC – French Army: Demi-Brigade de Mitrailleurs Coloniaux or colonial machine gun demi-brigade. DCr – French Army: Division Cuirassée or ‘armoured division’. DIF – French Army: fortress division or Division d’Infanterie de Forteresse. DINA – French Army: North African infantry division. DLC – French Army: Division Légère de Cavalerie or ‘light cavalry division,’ mixed horse-mounted and mechanized (motorcycle infantry, armoured cars, and light tanks) cavalry. ECN – French Air Force: Escadre de Chasse de Nuit or night fighter wing. FCM – French Army: Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, a French tank manufacturer. FT – French Army: Renault company designation for their 1917 tank design. Fliegerkorps – Luftwaffe: ‘flying corps,’ comparable to an army corps. GHQ – British Army: General Headquarters. GQG – French Army: Grand Quartier Général or ‘general headquarters’. GRCA – French corps-level reconnaissance group: Groupe de Reconnaissance de Corps d’Armée. GRDI – French division-level reconnaissance group: Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d’Infanterie. Heeresgruppe – German Army: ‘army group’. Jagdfliegerführer – Luftwaffe: ‘fighter flying command’. JG – Luftwaffe: Jagdgeschwader or ‘fighter wing’. KG – Luftwaffe: Kampfgeschwader or ‘battle wing,’ meaning ‘bomber wing’. Luftflotte – Luftwaffe: ‘air fleet,’ equivalent of an army group. OKH – German Army highest level of command: Oberkommando des Heeres. OKW – German military: Hitler’s personal joint staff, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. PzKpfw – German Army: Panzer Kampfwagen or ‘armoured battle vehicle,’ i.e., tank. RAF – British air force: Royal Air Force. RAD – French division-level light (75mm) artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Divisionaire. RALD – French division-level heavy (155mm) artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Lourde Divisionaire. RALH – French horse-drawn heavy artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Lourde Hippomobile. RALHC – French colonial horse-drawn heavy artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Lourde Hippomobile Coloniale. RAM – French armoured car reconnaissance unit: Régiment d’automitrailleuses. RAMD – French division-level mixed (75mm and 155mm) artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Mixte Divisionaire. RAP – French emplaced artillery: Régiment d’Artillery de Position. RATTT – French tractor-drawn artillery: Régiment d’Artillery Tracté Tout Terrain or ‘all-terrain artillery regiment’. RDP – French Army: Régiment de Dragons Portés or lorried infantry regiment assigned to a mechanized or light cavalry division. RI – French infantry: Régiment d’Infanterie. RIF – French infantry: Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse. RIM – French motorized infantry: Régiment d’Infanterie Motorisée. SF – French fortified sector: Secteur Fortifié. Spahis – French Army: light horse-mounted cavalry regiments recruited primarily from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. StG – Luftwaffe: Stukageschwader or ‘dive-bomber wing’. TONE – French Army HQ, commanded by Général Georges: Théâtre d’Opérations du Nord-Est. ZOAE – French Air Force: Zone d’Operations Aériennes Est or ‘East Air Operations Zone’. ZOAN – French Air Force: Zone d’Operations Aériennes Nord or ‘North Air Operations Zone’.

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INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations. Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) 25, 31, 34, 35, 36, 40, 49, 54, 57, 69, 94 Aisne River 3, 16, 34, 61, 66, 67, 76, 77, 90 Albert Canal 4, 17, 34 Ardennes 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 57, 58, 59, 60 Armée de l’Air (AdA) 24, 25, 31, 35, 36, 40, 46, 54, 57, 69, 93, 94 Armeeoberkommando: AOK 2 8, 16 AOK 4 6, 8, 13, 17, 21, 26, 61, 77, 82, 83, 84 AOK 6 6, 15 AOK 12 6, 8, 16, 17, 26, 41, 61, 63, 76, 77, 82 AOK 16 16, 27, 58, 61 AOK 18 15, 87 Bataillon de Chars de Combat (BCC) 23, 27, 28, 44, 46, 48, 49, 56, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 91, 94 Belgium 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 50, 55, 61, 66, 70, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 93 Billotte, Général d’Armée Gaston-Henri Gustave 4, 14, 18, 28, 40, 57, 60, 62, 65, 68, 72 Blanchard, Général Jean Georges 28, 31, 62, 70, 90 Bock, Generaloberst Fedor von 4, 6, 8, 15, 83 Brauchitsch, Generaloberst Walther von 7, 64, 65, 87 Bristol Blenheim 20, 21, 25, 34 British Army General Headquarters (GHQ) 30, 73, 81, 82, 86, 94 British forces: British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 4, 9, 10, 14, 17, 30, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 90, 94 Royal Air Force (RAF) 25, 31, 34, 36, 54, 57, 58, 69, 93, 94 Busch, Generaloberst Ernst 4, 16, 27, 37 Corap, Général d’Armée André Georges 4, 14, 16, 23, 25, 29, 37, 39, 42, 46, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68 De Gaulle, Général Charles 10, 63, 67, 68, 71 Dinant 4, 8, 10, 16, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 59, 60, 61, 89, 90

Division Cuirassée (DCr) 24, 41, 44, 46, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94 Division Légère de Cavalerie (DLC) 23, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 61, 63, 66, 94 Dornier: Do 17P 21, 27, 38 Do 17Z 20, 21, 27, 31, 35, 36, 43, 48, 50 Fairey Battle 25, 31, 54 Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 58, 77, 83, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93 Fall Rot (Case Red) 10, 15, 81, 83, 87, 88, 90 Flavigny, Général Jean 28, 41, 56, 58, 61 Fliegerkorps: I 21, 27 II 21, 27, 48, 50, 59, 71 III 35 V 20, 27, 71 VIII 21, 50, 71 French Army 6, 15, 17, 23, 27, 58, 69, 88, 90, 94 French Army Grand Quartier Général (GQG) 13, 18, 24, 27, 39, 41, 46, 47, 65, 90, 94 French forces: 1ère Armée 10, 17, 28, 29, 31, 62, 73, 83, 84, 87, 90 2e Armée 14, 16, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30, 40, 47, 58, 65, 90 7e Armée 18, 62, 65, 66, 68, 77, 88 9e Armée 14, 16, 22, 23, 29, 30, 39, 42, 44, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 89, 90 55e Division d’Infanterie (55e DI) 23, 29, 39, 41, 47, 56, 58, 91, 92 147e Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse (RIF) 22, 28, 40, 47, 48, 49, 51, 55, 91, 92 French tanks: Char B1 bis 19, 22, 24, 44, 60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 91, 92 FCM-36 23, 56, 58 Renault R-35 23, 46, 67, 68, 71, 85 Frénois 22, 47, 48, 51, 55 Gamelin, Général d’Armée Maurice Gustave 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 22, 27, 40, 47, 68, 69, 72, 90 Georges, Général d’Armée AlphonseJoseph 4, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 27, 35, 36, 40, 41, 46, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 89, 90, 94

German forces: 1. Panzer-Division 26, 38, 39, 48, 49, 51, 59, 63, 68, 76, 81, 92 2. Panzer-Division 12, 26, 38, 39, 41, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 58, 64, 68, 72, 77, 81, 90, 91 5. Panzer-Division 26, 41, 44, 46, 66, 68, 74, 77, 87 7. Panzer-Division 13, 26, 41, 42, 44, 60, 66, 71, 73, 74, 77, 80, 84, 87, 88, 90 8. Panzer-Division 26, 62, 72, 85 10. Panzer-Division 26, 38, 40, 48, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 71, 76, 77, 81, 90, 91 Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland (IRGD) 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 63, 65, 77, 84, 86, 87, 92 Luftwaffe 7, 10, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 31, 35, 36, 38, 47, 48, 50, 54, 59, 69, 71, 72, 73, 85, 89, 94 Stukageschwader ‘dive-bomber wing’ (StG) 27, 44, 46, 50, 51, 71, 74, 76, 81, 94 XIX Armeekorps 4, 7, 12, 16, 19, 26, 37, 40, 47, 48, 61, 65, 70, 71, 76, 77, 82, 83, 86, 89 XLI Armeekorps 4, 16, 20, 26, 37, 39, 50, 61, 62, 70, 72, 77, 82, 85, 86, 89 XV Armeekorps 13, 17, 20, 41, 87 German tanks: PzKpfw 38(t) 42, 62, 76, 83 PzKpfw I 20, 41, 57 PzKpfw II 20, 56, 57 PzKpfw III 19, 20, 22, 43, 54, 56, 59, 76 PzKpfw IV 20, 39, 43, 44, 50, 59, 76, 88 Giraud, Général Henri Honoré 4, 18, 65, 66, 68, 72 Givet 4, 17, 22, 37, 40, 41, 59, 61, 63 Gort, General Lord 4, 10, 30, 70, 72, 73, 77, 81, 84, 85, 86 Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d’Infanterie (GRDI) 28, 29, 44, 46, 85, 94 Guderian, General der Panzertruppen Heinz Wilhelm 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93 Halder, General der Artillerie Franz 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 64, 87, 89, 90

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Haltbefehl 10, 64, 83, 86, 89 Heeresgruppe A 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 31, 63, 64, 68, 70, 77, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89 Heeresgruppe B 6, 7, 9, 15, 36, 50, 70, 77, 83, 86, 89 Hitler, Adolf 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 64, 77, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94 Hoth, General der Infanterie Hermann 13, 17, 20, 26, 41, 42, 61, 70, 73, 77, 82, 83, 86, 87 Houx 37, 43, 44, 46, 59 Huntziger, Général d’Armée Charles Léon Clément 4, 10, 14, 16, 18, 23, 25, 28, 37, 39, 40, 41, 47, 56, 58, 61, 62, 65, 90

Maas 6, 8, 17, 36 Maginot Line 4, 6, 10, 15, 17, 22, 30, 37, 58, 68, 90, 92 Manstein, Generalleutnant Erich von 7, 8, 9, 17, 87, 90 Martin, Général Julien 29, 42, 44, 46, 60, 61, 62, 66 Messerschmitt 25, 35, 36, 38, 50, 54, 57, 58, 71, 72 Bf 109E 21, 22, 27, 58, 71 Bf 110C/D 22, 27 Meuse River 8, 14, 16, 17, 22, 44, 48, 54, 71 Morane Saulnier (MS) 406 25, 29, 31, 57, 69

Jagdgruppen ‘fighter groups’ 21, 38, 71

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) 5, 8, 9, 10, 41, 83, 94 Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19, 64, 65, 77, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, 94 Oise River 4, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70 Operation Dynamo 10, 88, 89, 90

Kempf, Generalmajor Werner 26, 39, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 77, 85 Kirchner, Generalleutnant Friedrich 26, 38, 39, 40, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 68, 72, 76, 77, 81, 84, 85, 92 Kleist, General der Kavallerie Paul Ludwig Ewald von 4, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 26, 37, 38, 39, 41, 54, 57, 63, 64, 65, 71, 72, 77, 81, 82, 83, 86, 90 Kluge, Generaloberst Günther Hans von 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 21, 26, 37, 77, 83, 84, 86 Koblenz 4, 5, 8, 9 Lafontaine, Général Pierre 29, 39, 41, 47, 49, 51, 55, 56, 58, 91 La Marfée Heights 22, 47, 55 Leeb, Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von 4, 6, 15, 37 Loiré-et-Olivier (LeO) 25, 30, 46, 54, 57, 64, 69 Luftflotte 2 7, 21, 31 Luftflotte 3 7, 20, 21, 27, 35, 36, 51, 87 Luxembourg 4, 6, 15, 16, 35, 36, 37, 38, 59

Namur 4, 6, 14, 17, 38, 41

Playfair, Air Vice Marshal P. H. L. 30, 36, 40, 57, 69 Reichenau, Generaloberst Walter von 4, 6, 15, 86 Reinhardt, Generalleutnant GeorgHans 10, 16, 20, 26, 37, 39, 40, 42, 50, 59, 60, 61, 62, 70, 72, 77, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89 Richthofen, Generalmajor Wolfram Freiherr von 21, 50, 51, 71, 72 Rollbahn 38, 39, 40 Rommel, Generalmajor Erwin Johannes Eugen 10, 12, 13, 26, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89 Rundstedt, Generaloberst Karl Rudolf Gerd von 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 41, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 77, 81, 83, 87

Schall, Generalleutnant Ferdinand 26, 38, 40, 65, 71, 76, 77, 81 Schwerpunkt 7, 8, 9, 16, 89 Sedan 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 22, 23, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 48, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 76, 89, 91, 92, 93 Semois River 4, 23, 39, 40, 61, 91 Somme River 8, 10, 16, 68 Spahis 23, 29, 39, 48, 49, 58, 62, 63, 92, 94 Sperrle, General der Flieger Hugo 7, 20, 21, 27, 31, 38 Têtu, Général Marcel 24, 29, 31, 35 Theatre d’Operations Nord-est (TONE) 24, 62, 68, 94 Touchon, Général Robert-Auguste 28, 61, 62, 66, 67, 76 Vuillemin, Général Joseph 25, 29, 36 Wadelincourt 22, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57 Walsporn, Generalleutnant Maximilian von Hartlieb genannt 26, 41, 42, 43, 46, 60, 66, 68, 77 Wehrmacht 5, 17, 19, 21, 65, 90, 94 Wietersheim, General der Infanterie Gustav von 16, 26, 37, 61, 63, 76, 77, 82, 87 World War I 11, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 64, 90, 91 World War II 9, 48, 72 Zone d’Operations Aériennes Est (‘East Air Operations Zone’ or ZOAE) 24, 25, 31, 94 Zone d’Operations Aériennes Nord (‘North Air Operations Zone’ or ZOAN) 24, 25, 31, 35, 36, 94

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First published in Great Britain in 2014 by Osprey Publishing, PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK PO Box 3985, New York, NY 10185-3985, USA E-mail: [email protected] © 2014 Osprey Publishing Ltd OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF THE OSPREY GROUP. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978 1 78200 644 2 E-book ISBN: 978 1 78200 645 9 E-pub ISBN: 978 1 78200 646 6 Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Index by Mark Swift Typeset in Myriad Pro and Sabon Maps by Bounford.com 3D bird’s-eye view by The Black Spot Battlescene illustrations by Peter Dennis Originated by PDQ Media, Bungay, UK © Osprey Publishing. Access to this book is not digitally restricted. In return, we ask you that you use it for personal, non-commercial purposes only. Please don’t upload this ebook to a peer-to-peer site, email it to everyone you know, or resell it. Osprey Publishing reserves all rights to its digital content and no part of these products may be copied, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise (except as permitted here), without the written permission of the publisher. Please support our continuing book publishing programme by using this e-book responsibly. Every effort has been made by the Publisher to secure permissions to use the images in this publication. If there has been any oversight we would be happy to rectify the situation and written submission should be made to Osprey Publishing.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is deeply indebted to a number of individuals whose help made this book such a thorough study of the epic battle of Sedan and the Fall Gelb campaign. Foremost was retired French Army Colonel Max Schiavon, a noted authority on French World War II generals, who was immensely helpful in providing period photos, detailed maps of the Sedan defences, and directions on locating the most militarily significant points on the battlefields around Sedan. Also instrumental was Mme Ann Raedts of the Office de Tourisme du Pays Sedanais, who directed me to the more significant – and certainly less well marked – points of interest from the 1940 battle, with many helpful suggestions for exploring the entire battlefield. For their excellent support in locating and providing photographs of French subjects, I am deeply indebted to Msrs Alain Adam, Antoine Misner, Alain Alvarez, Eric Denis and Erik Barbanson. Misner’s superb French World War II armour website, www.chars-francais.net and Eric Denis’s www.atf40. fr/ATF40 ‘Armée de Terre Française 1940’ are highly recommended for anyone – even non-French speakers – interested in further study of this compelling story. Thomas Laemlein and Marc Romanych’s outstanding support – as well as the superb professional photo research assistance provided by Mrs Gina McNeely, MA, – were instrumental in providing a balanced assortment of interesting contemporary images. Additionally I am grateful to fellow Osprey authors Marc Romanych and Ryan Noppen, whose substantial time investment and excellent critical feedback make this concise discussion of this monumentally significant military campaign far better than it could otherwise have been. Finally, I thank my wonderful wife, Annette Dildy, for her enduring patience, limitless support, and incredible inspiration, especially in the face of her recent life-threatening illness. In light of the last-mentioned, editor Marcus Cowper’s understanding and patience, as well as his superb editorial expertise, made completing this work possible.

ARTIST’S NOTE Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should be addressed to: Peter Dennis, Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT, UK E-mail: [email protected] The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

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