WATERLOO 1815 (2) Ligny
JOHN FRANKLIN
ILLUSTRATED BY GERRY EMBLETON © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CAMPAIGN 277
WATERLOO 1815 (2) Ligny
JOHN FRANKLIN
ILLUSTRATED BY GERRY EMBLETON Series editor Marcus Cowper
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
4
Napoleon escapes from the island of Elba The long march to Paris and return to power
CHRONOLOGY
9
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
13
French commanders Prussian commanders
OPPOSING FORCES
18
The command and composition of the French Army The command and composition of the Prussian Army Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS
29
THE CAMPAIGN OPENS
30
The French advance and the capture of Charleroi The Prussian withdrawal and the combat at Gilly Movements on the morning of 16 June Important decisions for the three commanders The struggle for the crossroads commences Final preparations at Fleurus and Sombreffe Vandamme attacks the village of St Amand Gérard begins the offensive against Ligny Orders to envelop Brye and St Amand Zieten launches a counterattack at Ligny Blücher intervenes in the fighting at St Amand The contest escalates at St Amand la Haie Urgent reinforcements bolster the attacks II Korps enters the fray at Wagnelée A column approaches from Villers Perwin Gneisenau sends a messenger to Quatre Bras Fateful decisions in the heat of battle Determined resistance at St Amand and Ligny Napoleon orders the Garde Impériale to attack Cavalry charges in the fields before Brye The Prussians retreat north towards Tilly Wellington holds the French at Quatre Bras
AFTERMATH
90
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
92
FURTHER READING
94
INDEX
95
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INTRODUCTION King Louis XVIII and the victorious coalition armies were welcomed enthusiastically by the Parisians when they entered the French capital in the spring of 1814, following Napoleon’s enforced abdication and exile. Upon his arrival at the Tuileries the obese Bourbon monarch made a solemn pledge of peace and prosperity to the nation, but his words proved worthless to the people of France. The reinstatement of Bourbon rule coincided with the return of the émigrés to French soil for the first time since the revolution, and many of these clergymen and nobles were immediately offered lucrative appointments within the new government. It was apparent that the king and his entourage, particularly his younger brother Charles Comte d’Artois, were determined to restore the numerous privileges of the aristocracy at the expense of the populace, and this led to widespread discontent. Nowhere was this more evident than within the French Army, which was subjected to extraordinary excesses. The tricolour was replaced by the white Bourbon cockade and the number of soldiers reduced, while experienced officers were demoted in favour of younger men of royalist persuasion. Louis insisted on the creation of a lavish Maison du Roi and dispensed with the veterans of the Garde Impériale. Indeed, the humiliation of the military also encompassed the maréchalat. Ney, Mortier, Oudinot and others were forced to submit to the odious regime, although Maréchal NicolasJean de Dieu Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, was appointed Minister for War. Unbeknown to the king, the torch of revolution had been rekindled.
NAPOLEON ESCAPES FROM THE ISLAND OF ELBA Within the confines of his island prison, Napoleon received intelligence of the discord in France and the bitter disagreements between the various European powers who were engaged in congress at Vienna. He also learned of the proposals made to the delegates by the French ministers to remove him from Elba, a haven which had been granted by Tsar Alexander of Russia, to a more remote location. The former emperor perceived an opportunity to return, and devised a plan to replace the monarchy and restore his personage upon the throne of France. On 26 February, following his usual Sunday morning mass, Napoleon issued a proclamation to the people of Elba announcing his departure. The date had been carefully selected as Colonel Sir Neil Campbell, the British officer charged with his captivity, was making one of his regular
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The inhabitants of Elba gathered upon the quayside of the tiny port to bid Napoleon and his suite farewell. Shortly after 8:00pm they boarded the Inconstant, and the small flotilla of ships set sail for France. Painting by Joseph Beaume. (Photo © RMN-Grand Palais (Château de Versailles) / Gérard Blot)
visits to Florence on the mainland in the brigantine HMS Partridge. Napoleon gave orders for a small flotilla of ships, consisting of the Inconstant, SaintEsprit, Caroline and three feluccas, to be prepared so as to convey his carriage, artillery and troops; a body of 1,000 men. His beloved mother and sister, who had joined him on Elba, were to remain on the island under the protection of the resident garrison and the governing junta. By 7:00pm the inhabitants had assembled upon the quayside of the tiny port, and wild acclamations greeted Napoleon and the imperial suite when they arrived and boarded the Inconstant. At 8:00pm one of the ship’s 16 guns fired the signal to depart. Because the French royalist government had engaged two vessels to patrol the waters between Elba and the coast of France, instructions had been issued for the flotilla to separate once at sea. Across the bay at Livorno rumours of an imminent escape had abounded for several days. Speculation was rife that Napoleon would make for the Kingdom of Naples, which was ruled by his brother-in-law and former cavalry commander, Joachim Murat. When Sir Neil Campbell was informed
On 1 March the flotilla anchored off the French coast at Golfe Juan, close to Antibes, and in the late afternoon the troops disembarked. Napoleon came ashore in the early evening. Painting by George Beaufort. (Breamore House, Hampshire, UK / Bridgeman Images)
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of these reports he determined to set sail for Elba without delay, and took the precaution of avoiding the gun emplacements when entering the harbour. It was a further three hours before the colonel could positively ascertain that Napoleon had departed, by which time the Elban ships were safely on their way. During the late afternoon of 1 March they anchored off the coast at Golfe Juan, close to Antibes, and the troops began to disembark. A detachment was sent to the town to distribute proclamations and to announce the emperor’s return to the soldiers within the citadel. Napoleon came ashore in the early evening, and with his customary zeal he immediately set out for Grenoble. The journey would take him through the mountains and the staunch royalist districts of the south.
Louis XVIII returned to the throne of France in 1814, following Napoleon’s enforced abdication. The Bourbon monarch believed in the divine right of royalty and granted favours and concessions to his devoted adherents. Painting by François-Pascal Gérard. (Apsley House, the Wellington Museum, London, UK / © English Heritage Photo Library / Bridgeman Images)
THE LONG MARCH TO PARIS AND RETURN TO POWER King Louis XVIII did not learn of Napoleon’s arrival at Golfe Juan until the morning of 5 March. He instantly called for his advisors, in the form of his brother, Comte d’Artois, and Maréchal Soult. A plan was formed, whereby the troops in the region would collect and confront the former emperor and his followers. Arrangements were made for the king’s cousin, the Duc d’Orléans, accompanied by Maréchal Macdonald and the Duc de Berry, to travel to Lyon and concentrate the main force in and around the city, while Maréchal Masséna would send a column from Marseille to Sisteron to attack the invaders from the rear. The particulars having been agreed, a royal decree was issued the next day permitting the people of France to apprehend Napoleon as a traitor and a rebel. Vague and contradictory rumours spread through the capital. Many suggested that the enterprise had already been thwarted and that Napoleon had taken refuge in the mountains around Grasse. However, the streets frequently resounded to the cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ and an air of apprehension prevailed as loyal Bonapartists donned the violet. Amidst this uncertainty a plot was contrived by several of Napoleon’s most ardent supporters. Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d’Erlon, who commanded a division of 10,000 men at Lille, along with Comte Charles LefèbvreDesnouettes and both François-Antoine and Henri-Dominique Lallemand, planned to journey south and join with the former emperor. But the conspiracy was discovered by Maréchal Mortier and Comte RémiJoseph Exelmans. The four collaborators were arrested and court-martialled for treason.
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It was very cold and the paths through the mountains were treacherous due to the ice. Napoleon rode in his carriage with comtes Bertrand and Drouot, while the troops followed in silence. The procession received a muted reception when it arrived in the towns of Grasse and Castellane, where food and provisions were requisitioned. At Digne proclamations were printed. These were addressed separately to the people of France, the army and the Garde Impériale, and described the betrayal by Maréchal Marmont in 1814, who had led his corps over to the Russians after surrendering Paris, and Maréchal Augereau, who had released his soldiers from their vows of allegiance. The former emperor called upon the troops to unite beneath the folds of the tricolour, and planned to seize the fortress at Grenoble in order to encourage this act. Lieutenant-général Jean-Gabriel Marchand, who had fought with distinction during the Revolutionary Wars, was the military governor of Grenoble. Realizing the perilous situation, he ordered a company of sapeurs from the garrison, under the protection of a battalion from the 5e Régiment de Ligne, to destroy the wooden bridge across the river by the small market town of La Mure, over which Napoleon and his men would have to pass. However, the townspeople did not wish the bridge to be destroyed, and they forced the detachment to withdraw as far as a narrow defile close to the village of Laffrey, without having accomplished their mission. A company of voltigeurs was subsequently deployed to block the approach, although the men told the officers that they would not fire upon their former comrades-in-arms. That evening the vanguard of Napoleon’s column reached the pass. The two bodies were drawn in line when the emperor appeared on the road wearing his famous costume. He dismounted from his horse and sent an officer to inform the defenders that he was coming forward, and that his troops would have their muskets reversed. Accompanied by his most senior officers, he advanced to within pistol range and then unbuttoned his grey overcoat and spoke: ‘Soldiers of the 5e Ligne, if there is a soldier among you who wishes to kill his emperor, he may do so.’ Shouts of ‘Vive l’Empereur’
Napoleon and his followers reached the defile at Laffrey, which was guarded by a detachment from the 5e Régiment de Ligne. Accompanied by his senior officers he advanced to within pistol range and, having unbuttoned his famous grey coat, spoke to the soldiers. The troops broke ranks and flocked to their former emperor in a state of exaltation. Painting by Vasily Sternberg. (Private collection / Photo © Christie’s Images / Bridgeman Images)
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immediately rent the air and a state of exaltation swept through the ranks. The opposing forces were united and marched towards the city, but before reaching Grenoble they were joined by the 7e Régiment de Ligne. As the regiment approached, its young colonel Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère, broke the skin of the drum being carried by the man at his side and removed an Imperial Eagle. Napoleon accepted the symbol of his reign and, having congratulated the officer on his patriotism, embraced him warmly. Grenoble capitulated and the news spread rapidly. When Maréchal Macdonald and the Duc d’Orléans arrived at Lyon they found it impossible to animate the troops, who displayed the utmost contempt for the king and the Bourbon regime. It was agreed that there were insufficient means to defend the city, and the party fled ignominiously to the sanctuary of the capital. Napoleon and his devoted adherents entered Lyon in triumph, and on 13 March he issued a series of decrees which reversed many of the measures implemented by the government in his absence. Throughout this period of unrest Maréchal Michel Ney had remained on his estate at Coudreaux. The marshal and his family had been rejected by the Bourbon court due to his humble origins, but now in their hour of need he was summoned to Paris for an audience with the king. Ney expressed his desire to avert civil war, and consented to collect the loyal troops at Bésançon in order to confront his former master. Upon his arrival in the town he discovered the true state of affairs. Most of the garrison had already defected and the remainder of the rank and file expressed their intention to do likewise. In addition, two officers belonging to the Garde Impériale, with whom he was acquainted, presented themselves. They carried a letter from Napoleon in which he ordered Ney to join him at Chalon-sur-Saône, and promised to receive him as he had done after the battle of Moscow. The marshal spoke with the men at length, and when they left he was in a state of great agitation. At dawn on 14 March Ney consulted with his officers and then ordered the troops to assemble. He addressed the soldiers and the expectant crowd with his sword drawn proclaiming that the Bourbon cause was lost forever and that in the form of Napoleon Bonaparte the legitimate dynasty would re-ascend the throne. On hearing these words the masses erupted, and any aspirations the king had of maintaining his crown vanished. Paris was in a state of tumult when the news arrived the following day. Revolutionary songs were sung contemptuously by the mob and the shadow of suspicion was cast upon Maréchal Soult, who was replaced as Minister for War. Louis XVIII went to the governing chambers and declared that he would share the fate of his people and not quit the capital. But in fact arrangements were being made for his departure. Shortly before midnight on 19 March a dozen carriages drew into the courtyard in front of the Tuileries, and within minutes the aged monarch was heading out of the city and then north towards the Low Countries. With all obstacles having been removed, Napoleon entered Paris to popular acclaim on 20 March. The cannon which had been placed in front of the Tuileries were removed, and the officers and men of the Garde Nationale stood before the railings awaiting the arrival of the emperor. When his carriage at last swept into the courtyard the large crowd which had gathered to greet their saviour surged forward. Napoleon was carried bodily from his conveyance up the steps and into the building, while the tricolour flew proudly from the highest steeple. 8 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CHRONOLOGY 1815 26 February
Napoleon escapes exile on the island of Elba with his tiny body of men and sails with a small flotilla to France.
1 March
The former emperor lands on the coast at Golfe Juan and begins the journey through the mountains towards Grasse.
5 March
News of Napoleon’s escape and subsequent return to France reaches King Louis XVIII and his followers in Paris. The 5e Régiment de Ligne defects to the emperor during a tense encounter at the narrow defile close to Laffrey.
6 March
Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère leads the 7e Régiment de Ligne over to the emperor and Grenoble capitulates.
13 March
Napoleon enters Lyon and issues a series of decrees reversing many of the measures implemented in his absence.
14 March
Maréchal Ney informs the garrison at Besançon of his decision to forsake the king and join the former emperor.
19 March
Louis XVIII and his devoted adherents flee Paris shortly before midnight for the haven of the Low Countries.
20 March
With all obstacles having been removed, Napoleon enters Paris to popular acclaim and arrives at the Tuileries.
1 June
Deputations gather in Paris for the Champ de Mai, the state occasion at which Napoleon amends the civil code and presents new Eagles to the French Army.
12 June
Napoleon leaves Paris in the early hours of the morning for the frontier, and arrives in the evening at Laon.
14 June
The emperor reaches Beaumont and from Imperial Headquarters issues orders of movement to the French Army.
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15 June 3:00am
The left wing of the French Army crosses the Sambre River and comes into contact with the Prussian outposts at Lobbes and Thuin.
4:30am
Generallieutenant von Zieten writes to Feldmarschall Blücher informing him of the cannon and musket fire heard at Lobbes and Thuin and his intention to withdraw to Fleurus, should it be necessary.
6:30am
A second letter is written to Feldmarschall Blücher in which Generallieutenant von Zieten confirms the fall of Lobbes and the fighting at Thuin. He also reports that Napoleon is with the French Army.
9:00am
Zieten writes to the Duke of Wellington in Brussels requesting him to collect the Allied troops at Nivelles. The commander of I Korps notifies the duke of his withdrawal to Fleurus.
11:00am
The marins and sapeurs of the Garde Impériale storm the bridge between Marcinelles and Charleroi and the town is eventually captured by the cavalry commanded by Comte Pajol.
3:30pm
Maréchal Ney and his aide-de-camp arrive at Charleroi, and to his surprise Napoleon appoints him commander of the left wing of the French Army, with instructions to seize Gosselies.
6:00pm
The French engage the Prussian rearguard at Gilly, and following a fierce action the Prussians retire towards Sombreffe. During the engagement Louis-Michel Letort is mortally wounded. Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command issue orders for the army to concentrate at Sombreffe, and establish a new headquarters there within the presbytery.
Lanciers Rouges of the Garde Impériale attack the Allied outpost at Frasnes, forcing the Nassau troops stationed within the village to retire upon the crossroads at Quatre Bras.
8:00pm
Napoleon retires to the Château de Puissant in Charleroi where his headquarters are established for the night.
11:30pm
The Duke of Wellington receives confirmation from the outpost at Mons of the French attack, and issues supplementary orders to the Allied Army. He informs Freiherr von Müffling of the planned movement, who immediately sends a messenger with the details to the Prussian high command at Sombreffe.
Midnight
While attending a ball being given by the Duke and Duchess of Richmond in Brussels, Wellington receives news of the French attack upon the crossroads at Quatre Bras. The Allied officers leave the event and make their way back to their units, while the duke and his staff prepare for the campaign.
16 June 4:00am
Napoleon rises at Imperial Headquarters in Charleroi and issues orders to Maréchal Ney at Gosselies.
6:00am
Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command leave the presbytery in Sombreffe and arrive on the heights by the windmill of Bussy at Brye. Prior to leaving the headquarters they learned that General Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz would not arrive with IV Korps due to a misunderstanding.
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8:00am
The Duke of Wellington and his staff ride out of Brussels for the front, stopping at the farm of Mont St Jean en route.
8:30am
Napoleon dictates a detailed letter to Maréchal Ney, and another shortly thereafter to Maréchal Grouchy, explaining his plans for the forthcoming campaign. He then travels to Fleurus.
10:00am
The Duke of Wellington and his party arrive at Quatre Bras, but finding everything quiet he rides to the windmill of Bussy at Brye to meet with Feldmarschall Blücher.
11:00am
Comte de Flahaut reaches Frasnes with the emperor’s letter for Maréchal Ney. The skirmishing between the outposts gradually increases and the French are pushed back.
Midday
The emperor and his suite arrive at Fleurus, and having made a reconnaissance of the enemy positions he is convinced that he merely faces the rearguard of the Prussian Army.
1:00pm
Wellington and his entourage arrive at the windmill of Bussy at Brye and a lengthy meeting with the Prussian high command ensues. The duke confirms his intention to support the Prussians at Sombreffe, as long as the Allied Army is not attacked at Quatre Bras. Despite the duke’s conditional assurance, the Prussian leaders decide to accept battle with the French.
2:00pm
Napoleon writes again to Ney from Fleurus, informing him of the intended action at Sombreffe, and ordering him to envelop the right flank of the Prussian Army at St Amand. The French commence the attack upon Quatre Bras as Baron Bachelu’s and Comte Foy’s Divisions, supported by the cavalry led by Comte Piré, advance in considerable force.
3:00pm
Comte Vandamme receives the order to commence the attack with III Corps. Baron Lefol is instructed to undertake this with the 8th Division. The French advance under a heavy cannonade and drive the Prussian skirmishers defending St Amand out of the village after charging with fixed bayonets.
3:15pm
Napoleon writes to Ney once again, ordering him to manoeuvre without delay upon the heights of Brye and St Amand and to envelop the right wing of the Prussian Army. Comte Gérard is ordered to begin the offensive at Ligny, and calls upon Baron Pécheux to storm the village with the 12th Division. The French penetrate as far as the church and the churchyard, but are prevented from advancing any further by the defenders in a brutal hand-to-hand struggle.
3:45pm
Napoleon dictates an order for Comte d’Erlon, directing him to march immediately upon the heights of St Amand and Brye with I Corps and by so doing cover himself with glory. This order is carried by Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère.
4:00pm
Generallieutenant von Zieten launches a counterattack at Ligny which expels the French from the centre of the village. Comte Gérard reacts by committing the 13th Division to the contest. They advance and, despite heavy losses, regain the lost ground.
4:30pm
Oberst von Hoffman mounts an attack with the Prussian forces at St Amand, driving the French back. The contest escalates when Comte Vandamme orders Baron Berthézène to advance with the 11th Division. The French repel the Prussians from the village and threaten those around St Amand la Haie.
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5:00pm
Comte d’Erlon reaches Villers Perwin where he receives the emperor’s order from Comte de la Bédoyère. He immediately orders I Corps to march upon Brye and St Amand. Napoleon’s second order is delivered to Maréchal Ney, who calls for Comte d’Erlon to advance on Quatre Bras.
5:30pm
The troops from the 7th Division are ensconced at the farm of la Haie within the hamlet of St Amand la Haie. During a ferocious attack upon the farm Baron Girard, the commanding officer, is mortally wounded and taken to the rear.
6:00pm
Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command order II Korps to reinforce the brigades already engaged in the fighting within the villages. Generalmajor von Tippelskirch deploys the 5th Brigade at Wagnelée, while elements of the 6th Brigade are sent to St Amand la Haie and Ligny.
6:30pm
Comte d’Erlon arrives on the outskirts of the battlefield opposite Wagnelée with I Corps and causes consternation in the French Army engaged at St Amand. He is now informed of the situation at Quatre Bras and decides to return with the majority of his men, leaving Comte Durutte and Baron Jacquinot to assist with the offensive on the left wing.
7:00pm
Seconde-Lieutenant von Wussow of the Prussian General Staff arrives at Quatre Bras with a message for the Duke of Wellington from Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau, who requests that the duke attack the enemy immediately. Comte Duhesme leads the Jeune Garde in an attack upon the left of the French line at Wagnelée and St Amand la Haie. The Chasseurs of the Vieille Garde move forward and deploy in rear of III Corps opposite St Amand.
7:30pm
The fighting around Tongrinne and Tongrenelle intensifies as the artillery and cavalry belonging to III Korps attempts to gain ground on the left of the Prussian line.
8:00pm
Napoleon orders the Garde Impériale to attack, and rides at the head of troops as they approach Ligny. Nine battalions of the Vieille Garde advance through the village and emerge in the fields on the opposite side. They are charged by the Prussian cavalry in a desperate attempt to prevent the French troops from making any further progress. Feldmarschall Blücher, who joined in the charge, is unhorsed. He is saved by Graf von Nostitz and several Uhlans, who escort him to the rear.
9:00pm
The centre of the Prussian line is pierced by the cuirassiers of IV Reserve Corps, but the two wings stream away from the battlefield in reasonable order towards Tilly. The French advance but do not pursue beyond the Namur road. At Quatre Bras the fighting ends in stalemate. The Allied troops retain the field and the French hold Frasnes.
10:00pm
Ney writes a short report of events to Maréchal Soult and awaits further instructions from the emperor and his staff.
11:00pm
Napoleon retires to Fleurus for the night, while Soult writes to Maréchal Davout in Paris with news of the victory. The Prussian high command decide to reassemble the army at Wavre and spend the night working to this end.
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OPPOSING COMMANDERS Waterloo maintains a unique place within the annals of military history, for it marked the end of a long and dramatic period of conflict. The strength of the coalition powers which aligned against France ultimately proved overwhelming, despite the perceived brilliance of the man to whom they were opposed. Here lies the principal fascination with a campaign which encompassed a multitude of different ingredients, and which has been subject to intense debate and scrutiny. Aside from the various military operations, the commanders were influenced by the political situation. While Napoleon was compelled to consider the frailty of his regime in France, and to garner support for the war from those he would normally consider opponents, Blücher and his immediate subordinates were faced with the difficult task of integrating the Saxon troops, who had fought alongside the French in numerous campaigns, into the Prussian Army. Each of these elements contributed to the course of events, and played a part in the final outcome.
FRENCH COMMANDERS Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France
Adorned by the laurels of countless victories and responsible for sweeping reforms to the constitution in France, Napoleon was undoubtedly a genius. Yet he remains one of the most divisive figures in history. Born on 15 August 1769, he was the third surviving son of Carlo Bonaparte, a wealthy Corsican lawyer of minor nobility. Having secured a position at the Military Academy at Brienne-le-Château, Napoleon embarked upon a career of unparalleled success. Upon completion of his academic studies he entered the École Militaire in Paris, where he trained as an artillery officer. He was subsequently commissioned in the Régiment de la Fère and afforded the opportunity to demonstrate his proficiency with ordnance during the defence of the Tuileries in 1795. His role in extinguishing the royalist uprising brought him to the attention of the National Convention, and he was rewarded with command of the Armée d’Italie. Napoleon now commenced a campaign against the Habsburg and Piedmont armies in Italy and Austria, during which he utilized a variety of different tactics. The victories he achieved secured considerable wealth and political influence in France. But his ambitions knew no bounds, and in 1799 he participated in the Coup d’Brumaire to overthrow the unpopular 13 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France was a military genius with an insatiable lust for power. Having returned to the throne with support from the army, he believed that victory in the Low Countries would secure his fragile position as emperor. Painting by Hippolyte-Paul Delaroche. (Private collection / Photo © Agnew’s, London / Bridgeman Images)
government. Napoleon was appointed Premier Consul and enhanced his position the following year with a decisive victory over the Austrians at Marengo. Following a long expedition to Egypt, he returned to Paris determined to be the absolute leader of France, and after judicious amendment of the constitution, he was crowned emperor by Pope Pius VII in 1804. The army was devoted to the force of his personality and, with this instrument at his disposal, Napoleon assumed a position of dominance over his adversaries. Austria and Russia were defeated at Ulm and Austerlitz, while the Prussians were crushed at Jena-Auerstädt. When the fighting ended Napoleon demonstrated his ability as an administrator, introducing reforms which affected all aspects of society. However, his maniacal desire to create a Bonaparte dynasty led the nations of Europe to take arms against him once again. The ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812 resulted in the nearannihilation of the Grande Armée, and the defeat at Leipzig in 1813 left him with little alternative but to withdraw to the haven of French soil, where he fought a series of successful battles against the coalition forces. This proved insufficient to safeguard his regime, as, having advanced to Fontainebleau, Napoleon learned that Paris had surrendered. He proposed to march on the capital, whereupon his marshals refused to lead the troops. Instead, they demanded his abdication, and together with a small garrison he was exiled to the island of Elba. Napoleon had been returned to power by virtue of the support he received from the army and the people of France. He believed that victory in the Low Countries would secure his fragile position as emperor.
Emmanuel-Henri, Marquis de Grouchy
An aristocrat with deep republican sympathies, he rendered outstanding service as a cavalry officer in the revolutionary and imperial armies. He was also the last of those elevated to the maréchalat by Napoleon. Born on 23 October 1766, he was the only son of François-Jacques, Marquis de Grouchy the head of an ancient family from Normandy. He was commissioned in the artillery in 1779, but three years later he transferred to the cavalry, and in 1786 entered the Garde du Corps. With the outbreak of the revolution he embraced the ideals of liberty and fraternity, and, despite his noble ancestry, was permitted to serve in the French Army. In 1795 he was promoted to Général de division and became the second-in-command of the invasion force charged with landing in Ireland. But as this was unsuccessful, 14 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Grouchy joined the Armée d’Italie. He was distinguished in the fighting at Novi in 1799, where he sustained numerous wounds and was eventually captured. He returned to France and the army reserve. His reputation as an outstanding cavalry commander was already established, and in 1806 he played a full part in the campaign against Prussia. He commanded a cavalry division and was the first to enter Lübeck. At Eylau and Friedland the troops under his leadership rendered invaluable service, and he was subsequently rewarded with the appointment of Governor of Madrid. Grouchy oversaw the repression in 1808, but was back in the saddle within a year to command the cavalry in Italy. He was further distinguished for the manner in which he commanded a division at Wagram, and thereafter was called to serve within the Grande Armée. In 1812 he led III Cavalry Corps at Smolensk and Borodino, and when the decision was made to retreat from Moscow that winter, Napoleon charged him with command of the escort squadron. It was a harrowing experience, because the superb cavalry was decimated, and at the conclusion of the withdrawal he requested a transfer to the infantry. However, this was refused by the emperor. Grouchy was undeterred, and fought admirably against the coalition armies during the defence of France in 1814. Following Napoleon’s return from exile Grouchy became the 26th maréchal and a peer of France. His importance was demonstrated at the end of May when the emperor placed him in command of the cavalry of the Garde Impériale. This was reinforced further when Maréchal Mortier withdrew from his normal position at the head of the veterans due to a severe attack of sciatica, as the entire body then came under Grouchy’s control. However, prior to the commencement of hostilities he was reassigned to command the four reserve cavalry corps. Grouchy was a loyal servant of France who had demonstrated his ability as a cavalry commander on numerous occasions. But his performance in the campaign would be the subject of considerable controversy.
Emmanuel-Henri, Marquis de Grouchy was an aristocrat with republican sympathies who demonstrated his loyalty to France as a skilled cavalry commander on numerous occasions. He was given command of the reserve cavalry and the right wing of the French Army during the campaign in the Low Countries. Painting by Jean-Sébastien Rouillard. (Château de Versailles, France / Bridgeman Images)
PRUSSIAN COMMANDERS Gebhard Lebrecht, Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt
The aged commander of the Prussian Army was an extraordinary character enthused with courage and energy. His achievements as a soldier secured the reverence of his troops and the deep affection of the nation. 15 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Gebhard Lebrecht, Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt was a remarkable leader enthused with a fiery energy and courage. He inspired the troops and retained their affection despite the difficulties the army encountered. His hatred of Napoleon defined the campaign. Painting by George Dawe. (Apsley House, the Wellington Museum, London, UK / Bridgeman Images)
Born on 16 December 1742, he was the eldest son of Christian Friedrich von Blücher, a retired cavalry officer from the northern state of Mecklenburg. At the age of 15 he enlisted in a Swedish Hussar regiment and fought against the Prussians in the Seven Years War. But in 1760 he was captured during a skirmish and decided to change sides. Blücher remained in Prussian service until 1772. However, the cavalry regiment in which he served had a reputation for debauchery and excess, and their ruthless interrogation of a Polish priest led to a variety of complaints. Several officers were discharged and a number of others passed over for promotion. Blücher believed that this was unfair and resigned in disgust. Following the accession of King Friedrich Wilhelm II, he rejoined the Prussian Army with the rank of Major, and by 1794 he had risen to Generalmajor. He distinguished himself that autumn against the French during the actions in the Vosges, and was a vehement opponent of the subsequent Prussian neutrality towards revolutionary France. His disposition towards the French meant that he eagerly engaged the forces under Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806. However, the Prussian Army was almost destroyed. Blücher led a valiant last stand to cover the retreat, but the defeat was absolute. From this moment he was consumed with a vengeful hatred of the French emperor and the people of France. During the ensuing peace he was forbidden from holding a senior command position on the Prussian General Staff. He suffered with ill-health, but with the creation of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813, Blücher returned to lead the remodelled army. Battles at Lützen and Bautzen in the spring were followed by a decisive victory over the French force under Maréchal Macdonald at Wahlstadt. At Leipzig, together with the Austrian, Russian and Swedish armies, he was afforded the chance to confront Napoleon. The French were defeated, and for his part in the battle Blücher was promoted to the rank of Feldmarschall. Further engagements took place as the coalition armies marched towards Paris. Blücher encouraged his troops with a fiery energy which drove them to greater endeavours, and when they entered the French capital he was rewarded for his contribution with the title of Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt. Blücher had no political aspirations. Indeed, he viewed politicians with contempt. Consequently, he retired to his estate in Krieblowitz, only for his tranquillity to be disturbed by Napoleon’s return to power. Blücher inspired the troops under his command with indomitable courage and waged war by instinct. Although he was undeniably flawed as a leader, these characteristics would define his actions during the campaign.
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August, Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau
Despite his humble origins Gneisenau rose to become one of the greatest generals of the period. He was among the principal architects in the rebuilding of the Prussian Army overwhelmed at Jena-Auerstädt. Born on 27 October 1760, he was the only son of August Wilhelm Neidhardt, an impoverished artillery officer serving with the Saxon Army. At the age of 17 he entered the University of Erfurt, but he left within two years to enlist in an Austrian cavalry regiment. He subsequently moved to Austria and took the additional name of Gneisenau. In 1781 he was sent to North America as part of the Anspach Jägerkorps which was under British command. He saw no active service, but gained valuable experience. Upon his return to Europe, Gneisenau entered the Prussian Army. Most of his time was spent on garrison duty, so he was able to pursue his military studies and develop theories on the methods of war. By 1806 he had attained the rank of Capitaine, and he served at Jena under General Wilhelm von Rüchel. The crushing defeat by the French resulted in his being sent to command the small garrison at Kolberg, but with his astute leadership the fortress was maintained until the signing of the peace agreement at Tilsit. For this Gneisenau received the Prussian Order ‘Pour le Mérite’ and was promoted to Oberstlieutenant. In the wake of JenaAuerstädt there was a reorganization of the Prussian Army, and King Friedrich Wilhelm III appointed him to the commission, under the chairmanship of Generalmajor Gerhard von Scharnhorst, charged with this task. Gneisenau was at the heart of the various reforms. The commission studied the methods employed by the French revolutionary armies and adopted many of the principles. Corporal punishment and the privileges afforded to aristocratic officers were subsequently abolished, while all able-bodied men were conscripted to enlist in either the Landwehr or the Landsturm (militia). A General Staff was established and the artillery, cavalry and engineering arms completely reformed. When the changes were implemented, Gneisenau was sent on clandestine visits to Austria, Britain, Russia and Sweden to solicit support. With the formation of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813, he was promoted to Generalmajor and joined the army under Blücher. However, Gneisenau was elevated to Generalquartiermeister or Chief of Staff, following Scharnhorst’s death. His military character complemented that of his commander, and together they were a formidable combination. For his part in the victory at Leipzig he was made Generallieutenant and awarded the title of Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau. It was inevitable that he would be called upon to fulfil the role when the army once again took the field. At the outset of the campaign Gneisenau viewed the British with the utmost suspicion and the Duke of Wellington with deep mistrust. These sentiments would be exposed prior to the battles at Quatre Bras and Ligny.
August, Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau possessed one of the finest military minds of the period. At the outset of the campaign he viewed the Duke of Wellington with deep suspicion, and maintained this disposition towards him during their subsequent encounters. Painting by George Dawe. (Apsley House, the Wellington Museum, London, UK / © English Heritage Photo Library / Bridgeman Images)
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OPPOSING FORCES
On 1 June deputations from the governing chambers and the military gathered in Paris for the Champ de Mai. It was a glorious state occasion at which Napoleon amended the civil code and presented new Eagles to the army. Painting by François-Joseph Heim. (Château de Versailles, France / Bridgeman Images)
The opposing commanders encountered a variety of problems prior to the start of the campaign. Their armies were hindered by a desperate shortage of manpower and equipment, and burdened by national politics. The royalist army Napoleon inherited upon his return numbered less than 200,000 men. This was insufficient to meet the coalition forces that would be assembled against him, and so he recalled former soldiers to the ranks and initiated a programme to enlist volunteers. These measures were supplemented by the transfer of Gendarmes and Marines from the police and navy to the army, and the activation of several battalions from within the Garde Nationale, which undertook various garrison duties, thereby releasing more experienced troops. An additional 220,000 soldiers were subsequently placed under arms. However, Napoleon’s fear of losing support for his fragile regime by conscripting men meant that this was only exploited when it became absolutely necessary. The number of soldiers he could call upon during the fighting was therefore significantly reduced. The Prussian high command also laboured under the burden of securing sufficient troops for the forthcoming campaign, and suffered with the problem of integrating the contingents at their disposal into the army. Beset by a lack of materials and funds, they had little alternative but to rely on strong leadership and to cooperate with the Allied Army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. They planned to exact retribution when they entered France.
THE COMMAND AND COMPOSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY Napoleon knew that the sovereigns and statesmen of the eight major powers would oppose his return to France, and within five days of his triumphant entrance into Paris this was confirmed. A declaration was published by the plenipotentiaries gathered at the Congress of Vienna, in which they agreed to maintain the peace. The terms were subsequently ratified as the Treaty of Chaumont, and the coalition began to mobilize an immense force against his person and those who supported him. 18 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Undaunted by the situation, Napoleon and Maréchal Louis-Nicolas Davout, the new Minister for War, prepared for the forthcoming campaign. They placed observation corps on the border to confront the approaching coalition armies, and sent a sizeable force under Lieutenant-général JeanMaximilien Lemarque to suppress the royalist uprising in the Vendée. Rather than fight a war of attrition on French soil as he had in 1814, Napoleon planned to attack the Allied and Prussian armies stationed in the Low Countries. The various units which comprised the strike force were assembled behind the line of fortresses in the north ready to advance rapidly across the Sambre River. Napoleon intended to lead the army in person. Maréchal Soult was appointed major-général or Chief of Staff, with the responsibility of coordinating the movements of the different bodies, while Maréchal Mortier resumed his customary position at the head of the Garde Impériale. Comtes d’Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard and Lobau commanded I, II, III, IV and VI Corps, which were supplemented by four reserve cavalry corps and a substantial artillery reserve. Dominique-René, Comte Vandamme, was appointed commander of III Corps. An experienced soldier with a reputation for being an insubordinate looter, he had risen through the ranks. After leading an important charge during the fighting at Austerlitz he held divisional commands at Adensberg, Landshut and Eckmühl. However, he was captured at Kulm in 1813, and subsequently brought before Tsar Alexander of Russia for interrogation. He played no part in the campaign in France, but Napoleon knew of his remarkable fortitude and loyalty. The III Corps was composed of three infantry divisions and a division of cavalry. The 8th Division was commanded by Baron Étienne-Nicolas Lefol; the 10th Division was led by Baron Pierre-Joseph Habert; the 11th by Baron Pierre Berthezène; the 3rd Cavalry Division was under the command of Baron Jean-Siméon Domon. As with each of the corps within the army, the divisions were supplemented by the reserve artillery, a body of engineers and numerous medical personnel. Maurice-Étienne, Comte Gérard, was a distinguished officer with a string of notable successes to his credit. He had fought with the emperor in all the major theatres of war and was a trusted subordinate. At Austerlitz and Jena he demonstrated his skills as a leader, and at Fuentes d’Onoro and Wagram he gained further distinction for his conduct. He was present during the invasion of Russia in 1812, and a year later was severely wounded at Leipzig. He rallied to Napoleon following his return to France and was rewarded with the command of IV Corps. The IV Corps was also composed of three infantry divisions and one of cavalry. The 12th Division was commanded by Baron Marc-Nicolas Pécheux; the 13th Division by Baron Louis-Joseph Vichery; the 14th Division was under the command of Baron Étienne Hulot; the 6th Cavalry Division was led by Baron Antoine Maurin. These were supported by the reserve artillery, a sizeable detachment of engineers and the normal medical and ambulance services.
Maréchal Adolphe-Édouard Mortier, Duc de Trévise, had assumed his customary position at the head of the Garde Impériale. However, he was struck down by a severe attack of sciatica and the command of the veterans passed to Antoine-Alexandre, Comte Drouot. Painting by Jacques-Louis David. (Musee de l’Armee, Paris, France / Giraudon / Bridgeman Images)
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LEFT The Grenadiers and Chasseurs à Pied of the Garde Impériale were the most feared infantry in Europe. The veterans were devoted to the emperor and had carried him in victory on numerous fields of battle. Print by Matinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris) RIGHT Maurice-Étienne, Comte Gérard commanded IV Corps during the campaign. A distinguished officer who rallied to the emperor upon his return from Elba, his leadership skills were tested when one of his commanders betrayed the army. Painting by Jacques-Louis David. (The Metropolitan Museum of Art / Art Resource / © Photo SCALA, Florence)
With preparations being made for the campaign, Napoleon turned his attention to the turbulent political climate in France. To gain support prior to the outbreak of hostilities he embarked upon a programme of reform. One of the principal proposals was the amendment of the constitution, whereby he would exercise legislative power together with the hereditary Chambers of Peers and the elected Chamber of Deputies. The latter was dominated by constitutionalists who posed a threat to his influence, and so to counter this Napoleon elevated a substantial number of loyal army officers to the Chamber of Peers. These changes were made during the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, which took place in Paris on 1 June. It was a glorious state occasion during which delegations from the various governing authorities intermingled with those from the military. The army swore a solemn oath of allegiance to Napoleon, who presented new Eagles to the regiments. At the conclusion of the ceremony the troops returned to their respective corps. On 3 June Napoleon wrote to Davout and Soult, informing them that Maréchal Grouchy was to be moved from his position commanding the cavalry of the Garde Impériale to that of the four reserve cavalry corps, under comtes Pajol, Exelmans, Valmy and Milhaud. Two days later Grouchy joined Soult in Laon, and they prepared detailed orders for the cavalry commanders. Rémi-Isidore, Comte Exelmans, led II Reserve Cavalry Corps. He was an officer of the highest calibre who had served as aide-de-camp to Maréchal Joachim Murat for several years. He distinguished himself at Austerlitz and commanded a brigade at Eylau. However, he was captured by the partisans
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in Spain and remained a prisoner in England until 1811. His courage was undiminished during the fighting at Borodino and the subsequent retreat from Moscow, and was conspicuous during the campaign in 1814. Napoleon valued his loyalty and service. The II Reserve Cavalry Corps comprised two divisions. The 9th Cavalry Division was under the command of Baron Jean-Baptiste Strolz; the 10th Cavalry Division was led by Baron Pierre-Louis Chastel. Each of these divisions was formed by two brigades of dragons, supplemented by artillery batteries. Édouard, Comte Milhaud, commanded IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. Recognized as one of the finest cavalry officers in the French Army, he had served under Murat and participated with great distinction in the battles at Austerlitz, Eylau and Jena. Having fought in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808 to 1811, he was recalled for the invasion of Russia. At Leipzig he commanded a division of cavalry, and his leadership during the engagement at Zeitz won the admiration of his superiors. He was also among the first to support Napoleon following his return from Elba. The IV Cavalry Corps was formed from two strong divisions of cuirassiers. The 13th Cavalry Division was under the command of Wathier, Comte de Saint-Alphonse; the 14th Cavalry Division was led by Baron Jacques-Antoine Delort. These were supported by batteries of horse artillery. Napoleon left Paris on 12 June and travelled via Soissons to Laon, where he spent the night. The following morning he continued to Avesnes and breakfasted with Maréchal Ney, who had been instructed to join the army by the Minister of War. On the 14th, Napoleon arrived at Beaumont. The Imperial Headquarters were established at the Château des Caraman-Chimay, and he was given the latest intelligence. The force at his disposal was in cantonments around Beaumont. It was approaching 130,000 men of all arms, with 358 guns. Unfortunately, Maréchal Mortier had suffered a severe attack of sciatica and asked to be excused service in the campaign. The final preparations having been made, Napoleon dictated elaborate orders for the movement of the various army corps. He also composed a passionate address to the soldiers, in the form of an order of the day, which heralded the start of the war.
Dominique-René, Comte Vandamme was appointed commander of III Corps and led his troops during the campaign with his customary vigour. He was a notorious looter and had a reputation for insubordination. Coloured engraving after Rouillard. (Author’s collection)
Édouard, Comte Milhaud was recognized as one of the finest cavalry commanders in France and a loyal supporter of the emperor. He was appointed to the head of IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. Painting by CharlesPierre Verhulst. (Musée d’Art et d’Archéologie, Aurillac)
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THE COMMAND AND COMPOSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
On 3 May Feldmarschall Blücher and members of the Prussian high command met the Duke of Wellington at Tirlemont to discuss the cooperation between the two armies during the advance into France, and the defence of the Low Countries prior to this occurrence. Painting by Robert Hillingford. (Private collection)
King Friedrich Wilhelm III appointed Feldmarschall Gebhard Lebrecht, Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt to lead the Prussian Army in the forthcoming campaign, along with his trusted Chief of Staff, Generallieutenant August, Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau. The two had combined extremely well during the campaigns against the French in 1813 and 1814. The elderly commander nominally made decisions following consultation with his deputy and Generalmajor Karl Wilhelm von Grolman, who was charged with command of the staff within the general headquarters. Under the terms agreed by the Treaty of Chaumont the Prussians were to raise an army of 150,000 men on the lower Rhine. However, during the lengthy discussions which ensued at the Congress of Vienna many of the troops from the smaller German states which the Prussians petitioned to be placed under their command, like the Brunswick and Nassau, were instead allocated to the Allied Army under the Duke of Wellington. The Prussians believed that this decision was due to British political machinations, and members of the high command, particularly Gneisenau, subsequently viewed the duke with deep suspicion. A substantial part of the Prussian Army was composed of inexperienced and poorly equipped Landwehr (militia) troops, a large proportion of which came from provinces that had only recently come under Prussian control. A number of these territories had been ruled by the French and had supplied conscripts to their armies for almost two decades, so there were concerns about the allegiance of these young soldiers. This was manifest with the Saxon contingent, and at the end of April orders were issued for the troops to be divided. The Saxons considered this an insult, as they did not wish to be part of the Prussian Army and had still to be released from their oath of allegiance to their king. During the night of 2 May the men attacked the Prussian headquarters. The act of mutiny was severely punished by Blücher and his fellow commanders. Seven soldiers were executed and the entire contingent disarmed. Orders were issued for a set of Colours to be burned, but Generallieutenant Karl Leopold von Borstell, the commander of II Korps given this task, refused. He was subsequently removed from his position and court-martialled. The following day, 3 May, Blücher met Wellington at Tirlemont to agree upon a plan of cooperation in the event of a French attack. The two commanders made arrangements for the rapid concentration of their respective armies, and the Prussians moved forward, in order to guard the eastern half of the Low Countries. To ensure that the armies continued to act in concert, military commissioners were sent to the opposite headquarters. Generalmajor Karl, Freiherr von Müffling joined the duke and his staff in Brussels, while Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge joined the Prussian high command at their new general headquarters in Namur.
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The Prussian Army comprised I Korps, commanded by Generallieutenant Hans Ernst von Zieten, which watched the border close to the Sambre River, with its headquarters at Charleroi; II Korps, under Generalmajor Georg Dubislav von Pirch I, occupied an area from Wavre to Hannut, and had its headquarters in Namur; III Korps, under the command of Generallieutenant Johann Adolf, Freiherr von Thielmann, was further south at Ciney, within the Ardennes forest; IV Korps, commanded by General Friedrich Wilhelm, Freiherr von Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz, was at Liège. Blücher could also call upon a further 15,000 troops deployed along the Elbe River, under General Friedrich, Graf Kleist von Nollendorf. Hans Ernst von Zieten commanded I Korps. He was an outstanding cavalry commander who had fought against the French on numerous occasions, including Auerstädt. As a member of the commission responsible for the reorganization of the cavalry he introduced major revisions. He was a recipient of the Iron Cross for his conduct during the withdrawal from Bautzen in 1813, and fought at Leipzig. During the campaign in France the cavalry squadrons under his command succeeded in capturing a large number of cannon and ammunition at Laon. The I Korps contained four infantry brigades. The 1st was led by Generalmajor Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz; the 2nd by Generalmajor Otto Karl von Pirch II; the 3rd was commanded by Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Jagow; the 4th by Generalmajor Wilhelm Ludwig, Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck. These were joined by the Reserve Cavalry under the command of Generallieutenant Friedrich Erhard von Roeder, and the Reserve Artillery under Oberstlieutenant Gottlieb Peter Lehmann. This structure was reproduced across each of the Prussian army Korps, making them independent fighting forces, with a component of infantry, cavalry and artillery. Feldmarschall Blücher and his staff worked tirelessly to forge an army ready to take the field, but they had to overcome a variety of problems, particularly in relation to the supply of food, clothing and equipment. Unlike the Allied Army under the Duke of Wellington, the Prussians had no gold and relied on the requisition of materials from their hosts in the Low Countries. This proved divisive, and so the fiery marshal was anxious to commence hostilities and to obtain items from the enemy. By the evening of 14 June the intelligence gathered by Zieten and his units at the border confirmed that the French had concentrated a massive strike force around Beaumont and were preparing to launch an attack. Towards 9:00pm Gneisenau wrote to both Graf von Dennewitz and Freiherr von Thielmann from the headquarters in Namur, requesting that they hold their troops in readiness to move at a moment’s notice. But towards midnight further orders were issued. Pirch I was to concentrate II Korps between Mazy and Onoz; Thielmann was ordered to assemble his troops in Namur while Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz was to move to Hannut. This information was forwarded to Freiherr von Müffling in Brussels.
Karl von Grolman was charged with command of the Prussian staff and played an important role in the tactical decisionmaking together with Feldmarschall Blücher and Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau. Painting by unknown artist. (Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin) Hans Ernst von Zieten commanded I Korps. He was an outstanding cavalry commander who had fought against the French on numerous occasions. The four brigades were deployed close to the border with France. Painting by Franz Krüger. (The Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg)
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Situation with the Prussian I Korps during the night of 14/15 June 1815 Allied Army (under Willem, the Hereditary Prince of Orange-Nassau, commanding the 1st Corps) 1. Dutch Horse Artillery (Bijleveld) 2. 2nd Battalion 2nd Nassau-Usingen Regiment (Normann)
Gembloux
X
Tilly
A
Marbais Frasnes
N
II
I
2
1
Sombreffe
Villers Perwin X
B
Ligny
Mellet
Mazy
Heppignies X
Fleurus C
Gosselies
Ransart
Sa
mb
Jumet General Headquarters of I Korps at Charleroi.
X
Fontaine l’Evêque
G
Gilly
re
Riv
er
XXX
E
X
F
Charleroi Châtelet
Marchienneau-Pont Marcinelles
X
D
Fosses-la-Ville Montigny-le-Tilleul
Outpost from the 1st Brigade stationed at Lobbes.
Prussian I Korps (under Generallieutenant Hans Ernst von Zieten) A. Reserve Artillery (Lehmann) B. Reserve Cavalry (Roeder) C. 3rd Brigade (Jagow) D. 4th Brigade (Henckel von Donnersmarck) E. Headquarters (Zieten) F. 2nd Brigade (Pirch II) G. 1st Brigade (Steinmetz)
Lobbes Thuin
Outpost from the 2nd Brigade deployed at Thuin.
A large proportion of the Prussian Army were inexperienced and poorly equipped Landwehr (militia) troops. A substantial number of these came from provinces that had supplied conscripts to France. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
0 0
3 miles
Gerpinnes
3km
At Charleroi, Generallieutenant von Zieten was prepared. He had sent word to the various brigade commanders within I Korps to inform him of any activity. The 1st Brigade, under Generalmajor von Steinmetz, which had its headquarters in Fontaine l’Evêque, and the 2nd Brigade under Generalmajor von Pirch II, at Marchienne-au-Pont, deployed outposts close to the border. The alarm, which was primarily orientated to the firing of cannon shots, would be sounded by their respective artillery batteries. The Prussians were right to make these arrangements with the French Army concentrating around Beaumont, as the campaign was about to begin.
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ORDERS OF BATTLE FRENCH FORCES AT LIGNY
2e Compagnie, 5e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
5e Compagnie, 5e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie 3rd Cavalry Division
Commander-in-Chief: Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte Chief of Staff: Maréchal Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult, Duc de Dalmatie
III CORPS
91 officers and 1,106 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Dominique-René, Comte Vandamme
Baron Jean-Siméon Domon
8th Infantry Division
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Dommanget
I CORPS
230 officers and 4,989 men
4e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval
4th Infantry Division
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
9e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval
Baron Étienne-Nicolas Lefol
168 officers and 3,939 men
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Vinot
1st Brigade: Colonel Vernier
12e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval
15e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
Divisional Artillery
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Pégot
23e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
4e Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à
8e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Corsin
29e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
37e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Garoutier
64e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
85e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Divisional Artillery
Reserve Artillery
95e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
7e Compagnie, 6e Régiment d’Artillerie à
8 officers and 192 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Pierre-Joseph, Comte Durutte
Pied
Divisional Artillery 9e Compagnie, 6e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied 3e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
1er Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie 10th Infantry Division
1st Cavalry Division
243 officers and 5,522 men
54 officers and 806 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Baron Charles-Claude Jacquinot
Baron Pierre-Joseph Habert 1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Gengoult
Cheval 3e Compagnie, 5e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
1e Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied 6e Compagnie, 5e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
IV CORPS Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Maurice-Étienne, Comte Gérard
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Gobrecht
34e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
12th Infantry Division
3e Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers
88e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
193 officers and 5,342 men
4e Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Divisional Artillery 2e Compagnie, 1er Régiment d’Artillerie à Cheval 4e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
II CORPS 7th Infantry Division 185 officers and 4,572 men Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Baron Jean-Baptiste Girard 1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp de Villiers 11e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
Dupeyroux
Baron Marc-Nicolas Pécheux
22e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Rome
70e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
30e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
2e Régiment d’Infanterie Étranger
96e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Divisional Artillery
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Schaeffer
18e Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à
6e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
Pied 4e Compagnie, 5e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie 11th Infantry Division 173 officers and 4,603 men Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Baron Pierre Berthézène
63e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne Divisional Artillery 2e Compagnie, 5e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied 6e Compagnie, 2e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie 13th Infantry Division
82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Dufour
175 officers and 4,198 men
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Piat
12e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
12e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
56e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
4e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Largarde
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Le Capitaine
Divisional Artillery
33e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
59e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
3e Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à
86e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
76e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Divisional Artillery
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Desprez
17e Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à
48e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
Pied 10e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
Pied
Baron Louis-Joseph Vichery
69e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
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Divisional Artillery
1er Compagnie, 8e Régiment d’Artillerie à
1er Compagnie, 5e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
Pied 1er Compagnie, 7e Escadron du Train
2e Compagnie, 2e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
5e Régiment de Hussards Divisional Artillery 1er Compagnie, 1er Régiment d’Artillerie à
d’Artillerie 4e Compagnie, 8e Escadron du Train
14th Infantry Division
Cheval 3e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
d’Artillerie
177 officers and 4,293 men
20th Infantry Division
5th Cavalry Division
Commanding Officer: Maréchal-de-camp
153 officers and 3,094 men
112 officers and 1,375 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Baron Étienne Hulot 1st Brigade: Colonel Baume
Baron Jean-Baptiste Jeanin
Baron Jacques-Gervais Subervie
9e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Bony
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Colbert
111e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
5e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
1er Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Toussaint
10e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
2e Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers
44e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Tromelin
2nd Brigade : Maréchal-de-camp de Douai
50e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
107e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
11e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval
Divisional Artillery
Divisional Artillery
Divisional Artillery
3e Compagnie, 5e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
2e Compagnie, 8e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
3e Compagnie, 1er Régiment d’Artillerie à
6e Compagnie, 2e Escadron du Train
3e Compagnie, 8e Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
d’Artillerie
6th Cavalry Division
21st Infantry Division
115 officers and 1,684 men
114 officers and 2,584 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Baron Antoine Maurin
Baron François-Antoine Teste
Cheval 4e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
II RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Vallin
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Laffite
6e Régiment de Hussards
8e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger
9th Cavalry Division
8e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Penne
147 officers and 1,396 men
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Berruyer
65e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
6e Régiment de Dragons
75e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
16e Régiment de Dragons
Divisional Artillery
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Burthe
Divisional Artillery
3e Compagnie, 8e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
5e Régiment de Dragons
1er Compagnie, 2e Régiment d’Artillerie à
4e Compagnie, 6e Escadron du Train
13e Régiment de Dragons
Cheval 5e Compagnie, 2e Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
Rémi-Isidore, Comte Exelmans
Baron Jean-Baptiste Strolz
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Vincent
15e Régiment de Dragons
Reserve Artillery
20e Régiment de Dragons
Reserve Artillery
5 officers and 219 men
Divisional Artillery
8 officers and 193 men
4e Compagnie, 8e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
4e Compagnie, 1er Régiment d’Artillerie à
5e Compagnie, 5e Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied
5e Compagnie, 8e Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
7e Compagnie, 2e Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
Cheval 6e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train
d’Artillerie
VI CORPS Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
d’Artillerie
RESERVE CAVALRY
10th Cavalry Division
Commanding Officer: Maréchal Emmanuel-
142 officers and 1,407 men
Henri, Marquis de Grouchy
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Baron Louis-Pierre Chastel
Georges Mouton, Comte Lobau 19th Infantry Division
I RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Bonnemains
198 officers and 3,985 men
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
4e Régiment de Dragons
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Pierre-Claude, Comte Pajol
12e Régiment de Dragons
4th Cavalry Division
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Berton
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp de Bellair
61 officers and 899 men
14e Régiment de Dragons
5e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
17e Régiment de Dragons
Baron François-Martin Simmer
11e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne 2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Thévenet 27e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
Baron Pierre-Benoît Soult 1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp de Sainte-
Divisional Artillery 4e Compagnie, 4e Régiment d’Artillerie à Cheval
Laurent
84e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne
4e Régiment de Hussards
Divisional Artillery
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Ameil
1er Compagnie, 8e Escadron du Train
26 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
d’Artillerie
IV RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS
3e Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied
I KORPS
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
4e Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied
Commanding Officer: Generallieutenant
Divisional Artillery
Édouard, Comte Milhaud
6e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à
13th Cavalry Division
Pied de la Garde
124 officers and 1,252 men Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
Hans Ernst von Zieten 1st Brigade 8,557 officers and men Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Karl
CORPS DE LA JEUNE GARDE
Wathier, Comte de Saint-Alphonse 1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Dubois
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
1er Régiment de Cuirassiers
Philibert-Guillaume, Comte Duhesme
Friedrich von Steinmetz Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Hoffmann
4e Régiment de Cuirassiers
1st Division
2. Brandenburgisches Infanterie-Regiment
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Travers
119 officers and 4,375 men
24. Infanterie-Regiment
7e Régiment de Cuirassiers
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
12e Régiment de Cuirassiers
Pierre, Comte Barrois
Regiment
Divisional Artillery
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Chartrand
Schlesisches Schützen-Bataillon
5e Compagnie, 1er Régiment d’Artillerie à
1er Régiment de Tirailleurs
1. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment
1er Régiment de Voltigeurs
7. Fußbatterie
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Guye
2nd Brigade
3e Régiment de Tirailleurs
7,697 officers and men
14th Cavalry Division
3e Régiment de Voltigeurs
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Otto
132 officers and 1,607 men
Divisional Artillery
Lieutenant-général Baron Jacques-Antoine
7e Compagnie Auxillaire d'Artillerie à Pied
Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Carnall
Cheval 8e Compagnie, 1er Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
Delort
Karl von Pirch II
8e Compagnie Auxillaire d'Artillerie à Pied
1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment
1st Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Farine
Heavy Cavalry Division de la Garde
28. Infanterie-Regiment
5e Régiment de Cuirassiers
Impériale
2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
10e Régiment de Cuirassiers
108 officers and 1808 men
2nd Brigade: Maréchal-de-camp Vial
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général
6e Régiment de Cuirassiers
Claude-Étienne, Comte Guyot
Regiment Westphälisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment
9e Régiment de Cuirassiers
Régiment de Grenadiers à Cheval
3. Fußbatterie
Divisional Artillery
Régiment de Dragons de l’Impératrice
3rd Brigade
4e Compagnie, 3e Régiment d’Artillerie à
Gendarmerie d'Elite
8,036 officers and men
Divisional Artillery
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor
Cheval 6e Compagnie, 3e Escadron du Train d’Artillerie
3e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Cheval de la Garde 4e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à
GARDE IMPÉRIALE Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Antoine-Alexandre, Comte Drouot Grenadiers à Pied de la Vieille Garde 127 officers and 4,039 men Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Louis, Comte Friant 1er Régiment de Grenadiers 2e Régiment de Grenadiers 3e Régiment de Grenadiers 4e Régiment de Grenadiers
Cheval de la Garde
29. Infanterie-Regiment
20 officers and 470 men
3. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
1er Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied de la Garde 2e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied de la Garde 3e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied de la Garde 4e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied de la Garde
Chasseurs à Pied de la Vieille Garde 135 officers and 4,749 men
Commander-in-Chief: Feldmarschall
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-général Baron Charles-Antoine Morand
Regiment Schlesisches Schützen-Bataillon 8. Fußbatterie 4th Brigade 4,970 officers and men Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Wilhelm, Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Schutter
PRUSSIAN FORCES AT LIGNY
Pied de la Garde
von Rüchel-Kleist 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment
Reserve Artillery
Divisional Artillery 5e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à
Friedrich Wilhelm von Jagow Commanding Infantry: Oberstlieutenant
19. Infanterie-Regiment 4. Westphälisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment 15. Fußbatterie
Gebhard Lebrecht, Fürst Blücher von
Reserve Cavalry
Wahlstadt
Commanding Officer: Generallieutenant
1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied
Chief of Staff: Generallieutenant August,
2e Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied
Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau
Friedrich Erhard von Roeder 1st Brigade:
27 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
August von Borcke
1,368 officers and men
14. Infanterie-Regiment
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor von
22. Infanterie-Regiment
8. Infanterie-Regiment
2. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment
30. Infanterie-Regiment
Brandenburgisches Uhlanen-Regiment
34. Fußbatterie
1. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
Brandenburgisches Dragoner-Regiment
8th Brigade
1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment
6,987 officers and men
18. Fußbatterie
2nd Brigade
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Karl
10th Brigade
Treskow
1,041 officers and men Commanding Officer: Oberstlieutenant von
August von Böse Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Langen
Regiment
4,585 officers and men Commanding Officer: Oberst Johann Karl
21. Infanterie-Regiment
von Kemphen
6. Uhlanen-Regiment
23. Infanterie-Regiment
27. Infanterie-Regiment
1. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Kavallerie-
3. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment
2. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
Lützow
Regiment 2. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment Reserve Artillery
Reserve Cavalry
35. Fußbatterie
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor
11th Brigade
Alexander Georg von Wahlen-Jürgass
1,345 officers and men
1st Brigade
Commanding Officer: Oberstlieutenant
1,724 officers and men
Lehmann
Regiment
12. Fußbatterie
Commanding Officer: Oberst von Thümen
4,643 officers and men Commanding Officer: Oberst Hans Philipp von Luck und Witten 3. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment
2. Schwere Batterie
1. Dragoner-Regiment
6. Schwere Batterie
Neumärkisches Dragoner-Regiment
1. Fußbatterie
Schlesisches Uhlanen-Regiment
2. Reitende Batterie
2nd Brigade
12th Brigade
7. Reitende Batterie
1,661 officers and men
6,345 officers and men
10. Reitende Batterie
Commanding Officer: Oberstlieutenant von
Commanding Officer: Oberst Wolf Wilhelm
1. Haubitzen Batterie
4. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment
von Stülpnagel
Sohr Brandenburgisches Husaren-Regiment
31. Infanterie-Regiment
II KORPS
Pommersches Husaren-Regiment
5. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Georg
Bergsche Husaren-Regiment
Dubislav von Pirch I
3rd Brigade
5th Brigade
1,497 officers and men
8,047 officers and men
Commanding Officer: Oberstlieutenant von
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Ernst Ludwig von Tippelskirch 1. Pommersches Infanterie-Regiment 25. Infanterie-Regiment 5. Westphälisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment
der Schulenburg Elb Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment
Regiment Reserve Cavalry 1,144 officers and men Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Karl Friedrich von Hobe
4. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment 5. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment
Feldjäger-Kompanie
Reserve Artillery
10. Fußbatterie
995 officers and men
6th Brigade
Commanding Officer: Oberstlieutenant von
8,155 officers and men
Regiment 6. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie-
Röhl
1st Brigade: Oberst von der Marwitz 9. Husaren-Regiment 3. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment 6. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment 2nd Brigade: Oberst von Wylich und Lottum
4. Schwere Batterie
1,878 officers and men
8. Schwere Batterie
7. Dragoner-Regiment
Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Zastrow
37. Fußbatterie
5. Uhlanen-Regiment
Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment
5. Reitende Batterie
7. Uhlanen-Regiment
26. Infanterie-Regiment
6. Reitende Batterie
8. Uhlanen-Regiment
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Karl August von Krafft
Reserve Artillery
1. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 5. Fußbatterie
III KORPS
764 officers and men
7th Brigade
Commanding Officer: Generallieutenant
Commanding Officer: Oberst von Monhaupt
7,261 officers and men Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Friedrich August von Brause Commanding Infantry: Oberst von Schon
Johann Adolf, Freiherr von Thielmann
7. Schwere Batterie
9th Brigade
18. Reitende Batterie
7,597 officers and men
19. Reitende Batterie
Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Karl
20. Reitende Batterie
28 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
OPPOSING PLANS Having decided to adopt the bold course and attack the Allied and Prussian armies stationed in the Low Countries, Napoleon studied the positions of his adversaries. He determined that by advancing rapidly and interposing the French Army between the two forces he could separate and then defeat each in detail, despite their numerical superiority. Napoleon had employed this strategy with great success during a number of previous campaigns, and had no reason to doubt its validity. In order to execute his plans Napoleon divided the French Army into two wings and a reserve. The left column was composed of I and II Corps, which were positioned around Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers et Fosteau; the centre consisted of III and VI Corps, the cavalry and artillery reserves, and the Garde Impériale, all of whom were concentrated around Beaumont; while IV Corps at Philippeville formed the right column. He then issued detailed orders specifying the coordinated advance of the three columns towards Charleroi. Napoleon believed that if these movements were undertaken the two coalition armies would retire along their lines of communication and thereby expose key positions to his advance. Quatre Bras and Sombreffe were identified as targets, while Brussels was the principle objective. Feldmarschall Blücher and the Duke of Wellington had considered the possibility of a French attack, but they believed the combined strength of their armies was sufficient to repel any such eventuality. The duke in particular reasoned that Napoleon would strike at Mons, and planned to assemble his forces around Nivelles. In this way he could communicate directly with the Prussian headquarters at Namur by sending a rider along the high road, via the crossroads at Quatre Bras. Blücher and Gneisenau had surveyed the area around Sombreffe, which encompassed the villages of Ligny and St Amand, and Fleurus to the south, and agreed that it was an excellent position in which to deploy for an engagement. Therefore, in the event of a French attack the headquarters would move forward to Sombreffe, and the army would concentrate at this point. The various commanders were aware of this plan. The most important aspect was to ensure that the two coalition armies continued to maintain a line of communication. Freiherr von Müffling and Sir Henry Hardinge were charged with this responsibility. They had to ensure that information was passed efficiently between the commanders, and that a clear understanding of the situation resulted. If they failed, and the link between the high commands was severed, then both armies were in danger of being isolated against the French. 29 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
THE CAMPAIGN OPENS
The 1er Régiment de Hussards from I Reserve Cavalry Corps formed part of the vanguard that advanced along the right bank of the Sambre River in the early hours of 15 June. Print by Martinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
Generallieutenant von Zieten had embraced several hours of precious sleep at his headquarters in Charleroi. But realizing an attack was imminent he rose before first light on 15 June. Shortly thereafter, cannon and musket fire could be heard emanating from the direction of Lobbes and Thuin, and he immediately ordered the guns to sound the alarm. At 4:30am he wrote a report to Feldmarschall Blücher, informing him of the activity and his intention to withdraw to Fleurus should it be necessary. It was approaching 6:30am when he received word from the commander of the 1st Brigade, Generalmajor Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz, which confirmed the French had captured Lobbes and were engaged with the Prussian troops at Thuin. Zieten wrote a second report to Blücher, outlining the attack upon the outposts and the fact that Napoleon had arrived from Paris and joined the French Army. Further reports were written and dispatched amidst a flurry of activity. The first to Steinmetz ordered him to withdraw slowly from his positions and to evacuate Fontaine l’Evêque without becoming embroiled in full-scale engagements with the enemy. He was to join with the 2nd Brigade at Marchienne-au-Pont, and thereafter to retire upon Gosselies. The commander of the 2nd Brigade, Generalmajor Otto Karl von Pirch II, was ordered to operate with the 1st Brigade and to maintain the brigades at Marchienne-au-Pont, Charleroi and Châtelet for as long as possible. Should the enemy force the positions he was to fall back towards Gilly. The commanders of the 3rd and 4th Brigades were ordered to withdraw to Fleurus. At 9:00am Zieten wrote to the Duke of Wellington in Brussels, informing him of the French advance and the presence of Napoleon. He requested the duke collect his army at Nivelles, in accordance with the agreement he had made with Feldmarschall Blücher, and notified him that he was withdrawing towards Fleurus. Once these tasks had been accomplished, Zieten left Charleroi for Gilly. The bridges across the Sambre River at Marchienne-auPont, Charleroi and Châtelet formed part of a natural defence, and so the coordinated withdrawal of the Prussian outposts to these positions had been planned in minute detail. The outpost at Lobbes comprised the 2nd Battalion of the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment and two squadrons from the 6. Uhlanen-Regiment. Having been confronted by the French
30 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
vanguard, they were compelled to retire into the woods to the north of the village where the commanding officer, Capitaine Friedrich von Gillhausen, wrote a short report outlining the situation at Lobbes and the perceived enemy movement against Thuin. This was sent to Steinmetz in Fontaine l’Evêque, who immediately forwarded the information to Zieten at Charleroi. Steinmetz then sent his Chief of Staff, Major August Arnauld de la Perière, to St Symphorien to inform Baron Jean-Baptiste van Merlen, who commanded the Netherlands cavalry stationed close to the border, of the engagement at Lobbes and to ascertain the situation at this point. When confirmation of the attack upon Thuin was received, Steinmetz ordered the outposts to withdraw upon Fontaine l’Evêque. The Füsilier Battalion of the 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie was stationed at Thuin, and they bore the brunt of the assault. Major Friedrich von Monsterberg, who commanded the garrison, ordered the three companies on outpost duty to fall back when French cavalry threatened their positions. But having reached the haven of the village the battalion was assailed by artillery and infantry. The troops retired in good order under a hail of fire towards Montigny-le-Tilleul, where they were joined by the Füsilier Battalion of the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie, and two squadrons of the 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment under Oberstlieutenant Ferdinand von Woisky. The three units collected behind the town and prepared to engage the French cavalry. The infantry formed in square while Woisky charged at the head of the two squadrons. This attack met with initial success, but, as enemy reinforcements approached in greater number, the Prussians were forced to retire. The French now unlimbered two howitzers and bombarded the vulnerable squares. That formed by the 4th Company of the 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie disintegrated under the ferocious assault. The French cavalry charged and during the ensuing slaughter almost 100 officers and men were cut down, and another 100 taken prisoner. The remaining companies of the regiment fled from the scene and retired in the direction of Charleroi. By the time Steinmetz received Zieten’s order to retire upon Marchienneau-Pont and to act with the 2nd Brigade, the French had already captured Montigny-le-Tilleul and were marching towards this position. Realizing the danger, and without waiting for his brigade to be formed, Steinmetz instructed
At first light the French Army advanced in three columns and at 3:30am the vanguard of the left column came into contact with the Prussian outposts in front of Lobbes and Thuin. Coloured engraving after Istall. (Author’s collection)
31 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
the units under his command to fall back towards Gosselies. This decision meant the 2nd Brigade would have to defend the bridge at Marchienne-au-Pont without his support. The 800 men of the 2nd Battalion 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment, under the command of Capitaine Michael von Krentzki, defended the narrow bridge. They were joined by the troops from Montigny-le-Tilleul. Detachments had been positioned at the entrances of the town on the south bank of the river, but as the French advanced and bombarded the positions with howitzer fire, the Prussians were forced to fall back towards the bridge. Both ends of the bridge were barricaded and the defenders fortified themselves in positions on the north bank of the Sambre River. Despite being subjected to intense artillery and musket fire, they resisted the onslaught and repelled three attempts to storm the barricades. Eventually, the sheer weight of numbers told. The French infantry charged across the narrow bridge and the defenders fell back and abandoned the town. Louis de Ghaisnes, Comte Bourmont was a staunch royalist whose appointment to the command of the 14th Division had been contested by Maréchal Davout. On the morning of 15 June Bourmont and a number of his staff officers betrayed the army. Having furnished the Prussians with all of the information at his disposal, he was taken to Ghent and presented to King Louis XVIII. Painting by Auguste Chabaud. (Musée National, Château de Versailles)
THE FRENCH ADVANCE AND THE CAPTURE OF CHARLEROI In accordance with Napoleon’s orders II Corps had moved from its position at Leers et Fosteau at first light. It crossed the frontier and at 3:30am the vanguard came into contact with the Prussian outposts. Lobbes and Thuin were captured, while the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval charged at Montigny-le-Tilleul. A passage was secured across the Sambre River at Marchienne-au-Pont, and the French troops filed through the town. Comte Reille, who commanded II Corps, ordered the cavalry at his disposal to ride forward and establish contact with the vanguard of the central column, which should have been approaching Charleroi. The central column consisted of the four reserve cavalry corps, III and VI Corps and the Garde Impériale. Each of these encountered obstacles which meant their planned movements were subject to considerable delay. The reserve cavalry corps left their cantonments around Beaumont before dawn in conformity with their orders. I Reserve Cavalry Corps under Lieutenantgénéral Claude-Pierre, Comte Pajol advanced in three columns so as to converge upon Charleroi. Towards 9:00am the first of these reached Couillet, where it discovered a company of Prussian infantrymen retiring through the open fields. Such was their surprise at the sudden appearance of the cavalry that the 300 officers and men surrendered without an engagement taking place. However, this early success was countered by the reversal the French cavalry sustained at Marcinelles. Comte Pajol’s Corps was joined by the 3rd Cavalry Division from III Corps, which was commanded by Baron Jean-Siméon Domon. At 8:00am Domon ordered the 4e and 9e Chasseurs à Cheval to attack Marcinelles. They captured the small village and attempted to carry the long dyke which connected it to Charleroi. However, the French horsemen were driven back
32 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
by the fire of the Prussian Schützen, who lined the hedge and ditches along the slope of the embankment. Despite the chasseurs dismounting and engaging the defenders, they were unable to make any further progress without infantry support. Indeed, such was the determination of the Prussian troops that they pushed the cavalry out of the village completely. News of this misfortune was delivered to Comte Pajol, who immediately sent word to Napoleon at Jamignon. The emperor was displeased, and ordered the attack upon the position to be renewed with support from two batteries of horse artillery and the marins and sapeurs of the Garde Impériale. Their intervention proved decisive. The Prussians were thrown back and the French vanguard occupied the approaches to Charleroi. They were now in a position to attack the bridge. Napoleon had called on the troops of the Garde Impériale to participate in the attack upon the dyke at Marcinelles, because at the time they had advanced further than those of III and VI Corps. The poor marching discipline of III Corps resulted in it leaving Beaumont three hours later than specified. This delay had a detrimental effect on VI Corps. Napoleon had expected to advance with Comte Vandamme and his corps behind the cavalry. But instead he joined the vanguard of the Garde Impériale, along with the duty squadrons in his service. Unfortunately for Napoleon another incident created greater consternation within the French Army. The right column was composed of IV Corps under the command of Comte Gérard, and a division of cavalry from IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. They were to support the movement upon Charleroi by marching via Florennes towards the bridge at Châtelet. This circumstance afforded Louis de Ghaisnes, Comte Bourmont, an ardent royalist, the opportunity to defect. Having led the 14th Division across the border Bourmont and five officers who shared his sympathies rode forward under the pretext of making a reconnaissance of the area. The group dismissed their escort with a letter for the corps commander, then donned white Bourbon cockades and continued into the Prussian lines. They were taken to Fossesla-Ville, where they furnished the enemy with all of the information at their disposal. When the men of the 14th Division learned of Bourmont’s defection they were enraged and vented their fury towards their superiors. This situation prevailed until Comte Gérard personally intervened and assured them of the officers’ fidelity. Despite the various problems they had encountered, by 11:00am the French vanguard had reached Charleroi. Both Marchienne-au-Pont and Marcinelles were in their possession and the marins and sapeurs of the Garde Impériale had driven the Prussian Schützen defending the dyke from their positions and cleared the barricade which had been erected on the stone bridge. Comte Pajol’s cavalry now clattered into the city. As the French
The marins and sapeurs of the Garde Impériale were ordered to storm the bridge at Charleroi and to remove the barricade which had been erected. Coloured engraving after Augé. (Author’s collection)
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Napoleon sat outside the Bellevue Inn on the high road to the north of Charleroi, and dozed while receiving the acclamations of the troops. Coloured engraving after Thiriar. (Author’s collection) Among the cavalry of the Garde Impériale at the emperor’s disposal for the campaign were the 800 officers and men of the Régiment de Dragons de l’Impératrice or Empresses Dragoons. Print by Martinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
cavalry trotted through the streets, the garrison withdrew without attempting to destroy the bridge, or endeavouring to continue the fight. They retreated in good order on the road towards Gilly. Shortly before midday Napoleon entered Charleroi to the acclamations of the troops and the people. He established his headquarters at the Château de Puissant in the lower part of the city, and sent orders to Comte Pajol to pursue the Prussians with his cavalry and that under Baron Domon, in the direction of Fleurus. Towards 1:30pm Napoleon removed to the upper part of the city, where he studied the ramparts and then rode north. Having reached the Bellevue Inn he took a seat by the side of the high road and dozed, despite the enthusiastic cheers of the officers and men as they marched past. It was a little after 2:00pm when the French Army received a reinforcement in the form of Maréchal Michel Ney. Ney had remained in Beaumont that morning and visited Maréchal Mortier, who was incapacitated following a severe attack of sciatica. Ney purchased two horses from his comrade-in-arms, and then accompanied by his Aide-de-camp, Colonel Pierre-Agathe Heymès, followed the army to Charleroi. On the road north of the city he happened across the emperor. Napoleon was cordial, and immediately gave Ney the command of the left column, with the promise that it would be enhanced in the morning by the two divisions of cavalry under Comte Valmy. He explained that the vanguard was advancing on Gosselies and instructed the marshal to seize the town and pursue the enemy. Ney rode on accordingly.
THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE COMBAT AT GILLY By 11:00am Feldmarschall Blücher had received both of the messages sent by Generallieutenant von Zieten from Charleroi that morning. He subsequently issued instructions for the Prussian Army to concentrate at Sombreffe and for the general headquarters to move from Namur to this point. A letter was sent to Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz and IV Korps, announcing the outbreak of hostilities and ordering him to march with his troops from Hannut to Sombreffe. At midday Gneisenau sent two of his adjutants to Brussels with a letter for Freiherr von Müffling. This contained details of the French advance. It also confirmed that the general headquarters were moving to Sombreffe and that the army was concentrating at this position. Gneisenau requested that the Duke of Wellington assemble the 34 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Allied Army in the vicinity of Genappe to support this movement. Thereafter, the Prussian high command rode to Sombreffe and at 6:00pm established themselves at the presbytery. The 1st and 2nd Brigades of I Korps had executed their withdrawal from the front line in reasonable order. The troops under Generalmajor von Steinmetz had retired in two columns via Courcelles and Roux, and towards 2:30pm they had reached Gosselies. Steinmetz remained in this position as the French vanguard slowly approached, but as soon as he saw the enemy deploy in force, with the intention of attacking, he withdrew through Ransart to Heppignies. While this was occurring the majority of the 2nd Brigade commanded by Generalmajor von Pirch II had fallen back to the village of Gilly, in accordance with their orders. Generallieutenant von Zieten established his headquarters at Gilly, and at 1:30pm he wrote to Blücher confirming the evacuation of Charleroi and the occupation of the village by the 2nd Brigade. He enclosed the details of the French Army he had received from Comte Bourmont following his defection, and requested further orders. Zieten had almost 6,500 officers and men within the environs of Gilly, and he therefore determined to repel the French for as long as possible. Instead of posting troops within the village, the Prussians were deployed across a wide frontage. By 3:00pm they were ensconced before the height running from Châtelineau towards the abbey at Soleilmont. Close to the abbey was the Bois de Trichehève, through which a cobbled road led from Gilly to Fleurus. Troops were positioned in the wood and an abatis placed across the road. Four guns from number 3. Fußbatterie commanded by Premier-Lieutenant Karl von Neander were positioned so as to sweep the ground in front of the infantry, while the remaining four guns were unlimbered next to the road leading to Fleurus. The cavalry covered the flanks and endeavoured to screen the position against enemy reconnaissance. This was imperative, as the vanguard of the French Army approached Gilly. Comte Pajol had advanced towards Fleurus in accordance with the orders he had received from the emperor. When the head of the cavalry arrived at the junction of the road leading to Jumet, Gosselies and Frasnes, he detached the 1er Régiment de Hussards while the remainder of his corps, along with the cavalry commanded by Baron Domon, continued in the direction of Gilly and Fleurus. As the French cavalry approached Gilly the regiments formed in columns and Comte Pajol ordered the 5e Régiment de Hussards to ride forward and reconnoitre the area. Having reached the far end of the village the cavalry were met by artillery and musket fire, and so no further advance was attempted.
The French soldiers found many sympathizers in the Low Countries, but they took everything of value they found in the villages through which they passed on 15 June. Coloured engraving by Matthew Dubourg. (The Stapleton Collection / Bridgeman Images)
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During the engagement at Gilly Napoleon launched the four duty squadrons against the Prussian formations. The cavalry charged and the infantry withdrew. However, Louis-Michel Letort, Comte de Lorville, who commanded the Régiment de Dragons de l’Impératrice, was mortally wounded in the contest. Coloured engraving after Jumot. (Author’s collection)
Maréchal Emmanuel-Henri, Marquis de Grouchy arrived shortly thereafter. He had accompanied II Reserve Cavalry Corps under Lieutenantgénéral Rémi-Isidore, Comte Exelmans to Charleroi, but had left the dragons in the city and ridden on to Gilly. Grouchy and Pajol surveyed the Prussian positions. They estimated the enemy force to be in excess of 20,000 men, so Grouchy decided to send his aide-de-camp Charles-Félix, Comte de Pontbellanger back to Charleroi to obtain further orders from the emperor. The young officer found him outside the Bellevue Inn, on the high road to Gilly. Consequently, Napoleon chose to join the vanguard. The emperor and his entourage reached Gilly shortly after 4:00pm, whereupon a detailed study of the position was undertaken. The number of Prussian troops in the area was estimated at half that Grouchy and Pajol believed, and a plan of attack was devised. Pajol’s cavalry and a division of infantry from III Corps were to launch a frontal assault, while Comte Exelmans would approached the flank from a position south-west of Châtelineau. However, it was 6:00pm before the vanguard of III Corps arrived. A battery of horse artillery was manoeuvred into position by the last house at the end of the village to cover the infantry as it moved forward, and Comte Vandamme ordered the 1st Brigade of the 8th Division to form in two columns ready to attack. The troops awaited the signal with the greatest anticipation, being animated by the presence of the emperor. The action commenced with an artillery barrage from 16 of the guns attached to III Corps, and a cloud of skirmishers were thrown out towards the enemy by the 15e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger. As the French columns approached, the Prussian troops received the order to retire into the Bois de Trichehève. This movement was covered by the 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment and the Füsilier Battalion of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment. Upon seeing the enemy withdraw, Napoleon ordered a third infantry column, comprising two battalions of the Jeune Garde, to advance towards the height. He also ordered the four duty squadrons to support this attack. The Prussian infantry formed compact squares to counter the threat posed by the French cavalry, who in their enthusiasm passed the columns and threw themselves upon the 28. InfanterieRegiment. Some of the cavalry penetrated into two of the squares, but the riders were pulled from their horses and bayoneted. In the attack the commander of the Régiment de Dragons de l’Impératrice ( E m p r e s s ’s Dragoons), Lieutenant-général Louis-Michel Letort, Comte de Lorville, was wounded. He received a musket ball in the abdomen and fell from his horse. Letort was taken to the house owned by Monsieur Delbruyère in Charleroi and was tended by the regimental surgeon. But the wound proved fatal.
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Combat at Gilly, 6:00pm on 15 June 1815 N
French Army (under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte) 1. 12e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (three squadrons) 2. 86e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (two battalions) 3. 33e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (two battalions) 4. Artillery attached to 11th Division (one battery) 5. 56e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (two battalions) 6. 12e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (two battalions) 7. Artillery attached to 8th Division (one battery) 8. 64e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (two battalions) 9. 37e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (three battalions) 10. 23e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (three battalions) 11. 15e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger (three battalions) 12. 9e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (three squadrons) 13. 4e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (three squadrons) 14. Duty Cavalry of the Garde Impériale (four squadrons) 15. 5e Régiment de Hussards (three squadrons) 16. 4e Régiment de Hussards (four squadrons) 17. Artillery attached to 4th Cavalry Division (one battery) 18. 11e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (three squadrons) 19. 2e Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers (four squadrons) 20. 1er Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers (four squadrons) 21. 12e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 22. 4e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons)
500 yds
0
500m
B oi s de Fl eur us
A
B II
0
Prussian I Korps (under Generallieutenant Hans Ernst von Zieten) A. Detachment of 30 men from 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment B. 2nd Battalion 28. Infanterie-Regiment C. 2nd Battalion 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment D. 1st Battalion 28. Infanterie-Regiment E. 1st Battalion 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment F. 2nd Battalion 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment G. Füsilier Battalion 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment H. Two guns from 3. Fußbatterie I. Two guns from 3. Fußbatterie J. Four guns from 3. Fußbatterie K. Füsilier Battalion 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment L. Detachment of 30 men from 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment M. Füsilier Battalion 28. InfanterieRegiment N. 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment (two squadrons)
Fleurus
Abbey de Soleilmont
Abatis
B oi s de Tr i c hehève
Bois de Lobbes
II
E
II
D
II
F
Jeune Garde held in reserve to the west of Gilly.
Pironchamps
G
II
H I
II
4
I
II
6
II
5
II
J
8 I
7
II
II
Gilly
Initial attack was made by two columns of infantry.
II II
K II
II
II
3
II
2
II
II
I
I
I
1
C
L
II
II
II
II II
10
M
II
11
Windmill of Vent des Corvees
II
9
II
I
I
I
13
I
I
I
N
12
I
Napoleon was stationed at the farm of Trieu Kaisin.
I I
I
Charleroi
I I
Farm of Trieu Kaisin
14
I
17
I
I
I
I
I I
I
I
I
18
I
I
I I
16
I
I
I
15
I
19
Comte Exelmans advanced from the south-west.
I
I
20
I
I I
I
21
Châtelineau
I
22
Châtelet
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Napoleon was deeply upset by the loss of this favoured officer, and a state of frenzy gripped the French cavalry, who were eager to gain retribution. An opportunity arose when the 10th Company of the Füsilier Battalion failed to retire into the wood with the other squares of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment, and they received the full force of the subsequent cavalry charge. Within minutes 120 officers and men were lying dead or wounded on the field of battle. Part of the company rallied around its officers, kneeling and delivering a lively fire by sections. Their escape was gained by the brave actions of the 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment and the Füsilier Battalion of the 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment, while the remainder of the Prussian force fell back on the road towards Fleurus. The rearguard action by I Korps at Gilly ensured that the French could not occupy Fleurus and the area around Sombreffe on 15 June as Napoleon had intended. It provided sufficient time for most of the Prussian Army to concentrate in accordance with the orders Blücher and his subordinates had issued, and therefore proved to be one of the defining moments in the campaign. Maréchal Grouchy undertook a skilful pursuit of the Prussian troops with the French cavalry, but the onset of night and the lack of infantry support resulted in his having to desist. Comtes Pajol and Exelmans instructed their corps to move into bivouacs in front of Fleurus, along the edge of the woods at Lambusart and Campinaire. In this way they covered III Corps, which camped at Winage and in a position close to the Bois de Soleilmont. The IV Corps was at Châtelet, while VI Corps and the two reserve cavalry corps commanded by comtes Valmy and Milhaud were still to cross the Sambre River. On the left, Maréchal Ney was established at Gosselies, while the vanguard of II Corps was at Frasnes. The divisions were in the immediate vicinity with the 7th Division detached to Wangenies in order to maintain communication with the right wing. I Corps was still close to the Sambre. Napoleon retired to Charleroi and his headquarters at the Château de Puissant which was protected by the Garde Impériale. From here he could receive intelligence from the two wings and act accordingly the following morning.
MOVEMENTS ON THE MORNING OF 16 JUNE Napoleon rose before daybreak and studied the reports which had arrived during the course of the night from the various corps commanders with Maréchal Soult. Shortly before 6:00am a report arrived from Maréchal Grouchy stating that the Prussians were deploying at Fleurus. Consequently, the emperor determined the dispositions of the French army corps and directed Maréchal Soult to inform Grouchy that he was to command the right wing. Towards 9:00am Napoleon dictated a letter to his aide-de-camp Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère. In this he explained that Grouchy was to collect III and IV Infantry Corps, and the Reserve Cavalry Corps commanded by Exelmans, Milhaud and Pajol at Sombreffe, and that he would follow with the Garde Impériale and establish his headquarters at Fleurus. Grouchy was to attack any enemy troops he found at this point, as the emperor intended to move towards Gembloux, and to maintain communication with Maréchal Ney, who commanded the left wing which was moving against the Allied Army. 38 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
The letter continued by explaining the plan he had devised to exploit the advantage they had gained over their opponents. As a general principle Napoleon would divide the army into two wings and a reserve. The Garde Impériale would form the reserve and he would join with either wing, depending on the circumstances. The right wing would total between 40,000 and 50,000 men. Ney would have a force of similar strength, containing I and II Corps, and the two divisions of cavalry commanded by Comte Valmy. The light cavalry of the Garde Impériale, which had operated on the left wing on 15 June, was to rejoin the emperor. Maréchal Ney was also sent a letter with orders for the left wing. Once the couriers had departed Napoleon moved with the headquarters to Fleurus. He did not believe that the Prussians could oppose the right wing with more than 40,000 men. Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command left their headquarters at the presbytery in Sombreffe towards 6:00am. The sun was already high in the sky and it was going to be another sweltering day. They rode forward to an observation post near Ligny to study the French cavalry south of Fleurus, and thereafter, the group rode north-east to the heights between Ligny and Brye, on which stood the windmill of Bussy. This would become their command post. Before leaving Sombreffe, Blücher and Gneisenau had received confirmation from Freiherr von Müffling that the Allied Army would be set in motion at daybreak and would concentrate at Nivelles, and that a sizeable force would also be assembled at Quatre Bras. They learned that II Korps, commanded by Generalmajor von Pirch I, had assembled between Mazy and Onoz as ordered, and that after a lengthy delay III Korps, under the command of Generallieutenant von Thielmann, was at Namur and the brigades were established in the immediate vicinity in accordance with the orders they had received. Pirch I was subsequently instructed to concentrate II Korps at Sombreffe, while Thielmann was ordered to march from Mazy to Point du Jour, the crossroads to the north of the village at Tongrinne. Instructions were also sent to IV Korps, commanded by General Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz, for it to march from its position at Hannut to Gembloux. However, IV Korps had not reached Hannut and would therefore not be at Gembloux before nightfall. This misunderstanding had arisen from the manner in which Gneisenau had written to the commander of IV Korps, who was his senior in the army, and the time at which the orders were delivered. The order Gneisenau had sent towards 9:00pm on the 14th, requesting the troops to be held in readiness to move at a moment’s notice, was delivered at 5:00am on the 15th. Having received this order Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz issued corresponding orders to the brigade commanders. But later that morning the order sent by the Prussian high command towards midnight on the 14th, specifying the movement of IV Korps from Liège to Hannut, arrived. Neither of these orders emphasized the urgency of the situation, so Bülow decided to postpone the departure of the troops until 4:00am the following morning. In this way a single march could be completed, placing the entire force within the vicinity of Hannut as requested. The absence of IV Korps compromised the Prussians and placed much greater emphasis on the support they received from the Allied Army commanded by the Duke of Wellington. Gneisenau was aware of this fact, and so he sent Major Friedrich von Brünneck to Quatre Bras to ascertain the situation and the strength of the Allied force at the crossroads. Brünneck reached Quatre Bras shortly after 6:00am, where he was told by the Hereditary 39 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington commanded a polyglot army composed of contingents from Britain, Hanover and the Netherlands. He had represented British interests at the Congress of Vienna, and his actions led several members of the Prussian high command to view him with the utmost suspicion. Painting by Francisco Jose de Goya. (National Gallery, London, UK / Bridgeman Images)
Prince of Orange-Nassau, who commanded the troops at this point, that within three hours the entire Netherlands Army and most of the British would be at Nivelles. The prince also stated that the army reserve, which comprised 17 battalions, had left Brussels and was marching towards Quatre Bras. This information was sent in a short report by Brünneck to the Prussian high command at Sombreffe. Shortly before 11:00am he wrote a second report, with details of the skirmishing he had witnessed between the outposts. Wellington and his entourage reached Quatre Bras shortly after 10:00am, at which time Freiherr von Müffling, who had accompanied the duke, introduced his grace to Major von Brünneck. A polite discussion ensued, and thereafter Wellington wrote a short letter to Feldmarschall Blücher outlining the situation with the Allied Army. Brünneck carried this to the heights at Bussy, where he found the Prussian high command towards midday. He informed Feldmarschall Blücher that Wellington was at Quatre Bras, and, having appraised the marshal and Gneisenau of the situation at the crossroads, handed them the letter from the duke. The enemy force to the south of Fleurus had steadily increased in size, and as the various reports suggested that the greater part of the French Army was massing at this point, Feldmarschall Blücher asked Sir Henry Hardinge, the British liaison officer attached to the Prussian headquarters, to ride to Quatre Bras and inform the Duke of Wellington. Hardinge had ridden some distance along the road to Namur when he encountered the duke, who had resolved to ride to the heights of Brye and verbally agree decisive measures with the Prussian leaders.
IMPORTANT DECISIONS FOR THE THREE COMMANDERS It was approaching 1:00pm when Wellington arrived at the windmill of Bussy on the heights at Brye. He was accompanied by the liaison officers attached to the two headquarters, Hardinge and Müffling, as well as Lord Fitzroy Somerset his military secretary, and Major-General Sir Wilhelm von Dörnberg, the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade who had ridden from Mons. A small party of cavalry escorted the group. The duke, Hardinge, Müffling and Dörnberg dismounted from their horses and climbed the stairs of the windmill in order to join Blücher, Gneisenau and Grolman, who were on the platform observing the movements of the enemy to the south of Fleurus. It was apparent to all concerned that the main body of the French army was concentrating at this point for an attack.
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Wellington, Müffling, Gneisenau and Grolman began a lengthy conversation which was conducted in French. Blücher did not contribute, as he despised the language. It was evident that despite the absence of IV Korps, the Prussians were determined to accept battle, and the conversation was orientated to how best the duke and the Allied Army could support them in the forthcoming action. The group discussed two proposals. The first was ventured by the duke, whereby he would advance with the troops at Quatre Bras through Frasnes as far as Gosselies, driving the enemy at these points towards Charleroi. The result of this would be an attack on the rear of the French Army concentrated at Fleurus. Of course, this was based on Allied superiority at Quatre Bras. However, Gneisenau and Grolman discounted this, as in the current circumstances the movement would take too long to execute. They wanted a more direct approach. Gneisenau suggested the Allied Army should march along the Namur road to the intersection of the old Roman road, and from there attack the French left wing. The Duke of Wellington favoured his proposal, but agreed to comply with the march on the Namur road, subject to the situation at Quatre Bras being favourable. The conversation ended towards 2:00pm, at which time the duke and his party left for the crossroads. The Prussian high command discussed the situation, and despite their receiving only a conditional promise of support from Wellington, they accepted battle with the French force that had assembled before them at Fleurus. Blücher gave the order to fire the cannon three times, which was the signal to the Prussian Army that they were going to engage the enemy. Napoleon reached Fleurus before midday and was greeted by the acclamations of the troops. Accompanied by Soult, Grouchy and his imperial suite, he arrived at the windmill at Naveau from where he made a detailed reconnaissance of the Prussian positions. He was convinced that he merely faced a single corps, which he believed was the rearguard preparing to make a stand, while the majority of the Prussian Army retired towards Liège. Upon returning to his headquarters at Fleurus the emperor instructed Maréchal Soult to send orders to the various corps commanders and to deploy the army for an attack upon Sombreffe. In the letter he had received from the emperor that morning, Maréchal Grouchy had been instructed to assemble the three reserve cavalry corps at Sombreffe and to ensure that III and IV Corps remained in close proximity, so that they could participate in any action at this point, if necessary. Soult wrote to comtes Vandamme and Gérard confirming this movement and the fact that they were to operate under Maréchal Grouchy as part of the right wing. Soult also wrote to Comte Drouot at the head of the Garde Impériale, ordering him to move upon Fleurus with the troops, except for the light cavalry which was still with Ney at Frasnes. The VI Corps under Comte Lobau was ordered to move halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus, while maintaining a presence within Charleroi to safeguard the city and the hospitals established there.
Sir Henry Hardinge was the British military commissioner attached to Prussian general headquarters. He was severely wounded, losing his left hand, during the latter stages of the fighting around Ligny. Painting by Sir Francis Grant (© National Portrait Gallery, London)
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4 3
1
5
2
THE MEETING AT THE WINDMILL OF BUSSY ON THE HEIGHTS AT BRYE (PP. 42–43) Towards 1:00pm the Duke of Wellington and his entourage arrived at the windmill of Bussy at Brye. The duke was accompanied by the liaison officers attached to the two headquarters, Sir Henry Hardinge and Freiherr von Müffling, as well as Lord Fitzroy Somerset and Major-General Sir Wilhelm von Dörnberg, and was escorted by a small party of cavalry. Wellington, Hardinge, Müffling and Dörnberg dismounted from their horses and climbed the wooden stairs of the windmill in order to join the various members of the Prussian high command who were on the platform observing the movements of the enemy forces to the south of Fleurus. It was apparent to all concerned that the main body of the French Army was concentrating for an attack upon this point. In the presence of Feldmarschall Blücher (1), Wellington (4) and Müffling (5) began a lengthy conversation, which was conducted in French, with Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau (3) and Karl von Grolman (2). Despite the absence of IV Korps, the Prussians were determined to accept battle, and the conversation was subsequently orientated to the manner in which the duke and the Allied Army should support the Prussian Army in the forthcoming action. Two proposals were discussed. The first was ventured by the duke, whereby he would
advance with the troops at Quatre Bras through Frasnes as far as Gosselies, driving the enemy at these points towards Charleroi. The result of this would be an attack on the rear of the French Army concentrated at Fleurus. This was based on Allied superiority at Quatre Bras. However, Gneisenau and Grolman discounted this approach, as they believed that it would take too long to execute. They wanted a more direct approach. Gneisenau suggested the Allied Army march along the Namur road to the intersection of the old Roman road, and from there attack the French left wing. Wellington favoured his proposal, but agreed to undertake the march on the Namur road, subject to the situation at Quatre Bras being favourable. The conversation ended towards 2:00pm, at which time the duke and his party left for the crossroads. The Prussian high command discussed the situation, and, despite their having received only a conditional promise of support from the Allied commander, they accepted battle with the French formations which had assembled before them at Fleurus. Blücher gave the order to fire the cannon three times, which was the signal to the Prussian Army that they were going to engage the enemy in battle.
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Maréchal Soult had written to Ney at 10:00am, informing him of the movements on the right wing towards Sombreffe. Soult also instructed Ney to unite the two corps under his command, and, together with the cavalry commanded by Comte Valmy, drive the Allied troops from the crossroads and to occupy this position. At 2:00pm he wrote another order to the commander of the left wing, telling him that at 2:30pm Maréchal Grouchy was going to attack the positions the Prussian Army had taken between Brye and Sombreffe with III and IV Corps, and that the emperor wanted Ney to act in concert with this movement. The left wing at Quatre Bras was to gain the crossroads and then manoeuvre with all haste in such a way from this position as to fall upon the right-rear of the Prussian Army. Soult requested an immediate report from Ney on the situation at Quatre Bras.
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CROSSROADS COMMENCES Comte de Flahaut reached Frasnes with the letter dictated earlier that morning by Napoleon towards 11:00am. He had passed through Gosselies and informed Comte Reille of the order, so as to hasten the concentration of II Corps, and also to ensure that Comte d’Erlon was acquainted with the proposed movement. Upon receipt of the message Ney sent word to the respective officers to march with their corps and occupy the crossroads at Quatre Bras, while the cavalry of the Garde Impériale were directed to remain in their position at Frasnes until relieved by the divisions under Comte Valmy. The 1er Régiment de Hussards, which had remained with the left wing, was detached on patrol between Quatre Bras and Nivelles prior to the commencement of hostilities. A considerable time was required before the various divisions could execute the orders. The 9th Division left Gosselies towards midday, followed by the two heavy cavalry divisions and the 6th Division commanded by Jérôme Bonaparte, and it was 1:00pm before the first of these troops reached Frasnes. Shortly thereafter, Ney received the order from Maréchal Soult timed at 10:00am. Without waiting for the entire force at his disposal to be united, he ordered Comte Piré and Baron Bachelu to deploy their divisions between the high road and the Bois de l’Hutte, and Comte Foy to form his troops on their left, in readiness to advance. Unbeknown to Ney and his subordinates, only a small Allied force was assembled at Quatre Bras. This was composed of the Dutch, Belgian and Nassau troops of the 2nd Netherlands Division, who had been quartered between Nivelles and Frasnes and who had opposed the French cavalry on the evening of the 15th when they had advanced towards the crossroads. The Hereditary Prince of Orange-Nassau, who commanded the 1st Corps within the Allied Army, had arrived shortly after 6:00am to assume command, and dispersed the troops across a wide frontage to give the impression of greater numbers. A battalion of Dutch Jäger formed the front line, while the wood on the right of the Allied position, the Bois de Bossu, was occupied by the Nassau troops. The large farm complex of Gémioncourt, which was adjacent
Karl, Freiherr von Müffling was the Prussian military commissioner attached to the Allied headquarters in Brussels. It was his responsibility to ensure that the two armies acted in concert. Painting by Edward Czarnikow. (Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin / A. Psille)
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to the high road, forward of the centre, was occupied and the hamlet of Piraumont, on the extreme left, thinly guarded. The remainder of the Allied troops were held in reserve. The prince expected reinforcements to arrive, in accordance with the information he had given to Major von Brünneck that morning, but he was determined to defend Quatre Bras with the force at his disposal for as long as possible. Towards 2:00pm the French launched their attack upon Quatre Bras by shelling the Bois de Bossu on their left. Screened by the artillery fire, and flanked by the Chasseurs à Cheval and Chevau-Léger-Lanciers from Comte Piré’s 2nd Cavalry Division, the French advanced in two columns to the east of the high road. The sheer weight of numbers drove the Allied skirmishers back and a cloud of tirailleurs moved rapidly against the troops defending the buildings to the south of the wood. While the 1st Brigade of Comte Foy’s Division remained on the plateau, the 2nd Brigade marched across the valley towards the farm of Gémioncourt. On the right flank the head of the 5th Division, commanded by Baron Bachelu, engaged those defending the hamlet of Piraumont and threw them back. The Allied troops were charged by the chasseurs and lanciers in the open ground before they had re-formed, and large numbers were cut down or taken prisoner. The French infantry now advanced rapidly and took possession of the hamlet and the ground immediately in front. The success on the right flank enabled them to attack the centre. Gémioncourt was occupied by the 4e Régiment Léger, while the 100e Régiment de Ligne took a position immediately to the rear of the farm complex. Together the two battalions covered the movements of the 5th Division, which formed in columns by battalion and advanced towards the crossroads. The 6e Chasseurs à Cheval and 5e Lanciers supported this movement, and the vigour of the attack brought the cavalry into the path of a Dutch militia battalion. The French horsemen caused disorder in the ranks and reaped havoc among the Allied troops. The Prince of Orange-Nassau, who had advanced with the militiamen, was fortunate to escape being taken prisoner by the cavalry, having ridden to an adjacent battalion. It was approaching 3:00pm when the Duke of Wellington and his party returned to Quatre Bras. The situation was perilous, but reinforcements had begun to arrive as the duke reached the crossroads, and he was able to order these troops into the fields to the north of Piraumont to prevent the French from making any further progress in this direction. Moreover, the duke had to protect the line of communication with the Prussians along the Namur road, which was in danger of being severed. Wellington ordered additional troops to march along the road and to lie in the ditches, where they were sheltered from the enemy artillery fire emanating from the guns posted at Gémioncourt and Piraumont. It was apparent to the duke that a Herculean effort would be required if the Allies were to retain the field of battle, and this became his primary concern, in accordance with the conditional promise of support he had given to the Prussian high command during their meeting.
FINAL PREPARATIONS AT FLEURUS AND SOMBREFFE The long paved road from Nivelles to Namur, along which it had been proposed the Duke of Wellington march with his army, was the artery that 46 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
connected the two fields of battle. The undulating meadows which stretched south from Sombreffe to Fleurus were traversed by a brook, known as the Ligne, and this dominated the terrain. The banks of the Ligne were steep and lined with thick bushes and trees. At its widest point it was only possible to cross the brook by bridge. It therefore formed a natural barrier with the hamlets and villages which were dotted along the landscape. To the west was Wagnelée. This village was connected to St Amand by the hamlets of St Amand le Hameau and St Amand la Haie. Further east was the village of Ligny, through which the Ligne passed. A church surrounded by a churchyard was at the heart of the village. To the south of the church was the farm of d’en Haut, and to the north the farm of d’en Bas. The heights of Brye, upon which was located the windmill at Bussy, were immediately north of these villages. To the east of Ligny, and of the road which ran from Fleurus to the junction of that from Nivelles to Namur, the ground was considerably lower. The villages of Boignée, Tongrinne and Tongrenelle were in this area. The open pastures either side of the Ligne brook, and the stone-built dwellings of the various hamlets and villages, meant the Prussians were blessed with a formidable arena from which to confront the French. From their position at the windmill of Bussy, on the heights at Brye, the Prussian high command dispatched orders for the deployment of the army. The I Korps under Generallieutenant von Zieten was placed in the front line. On the right, to the north of Wagnelée, were the guns of number 7. Reitende Batterie. The four squadrons of the 1. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment covered the battery. The village was unoccupied. This was also the situation at St Amand le Hameau. But St Amand la Haie was fortified, and the fields to the north were occupied by two companies of Schlesische Schützen under the command of Major August von Neumann, as well as troops from the 3rd Battalion of the 24. Infanterie-Regiment. The hamlet was held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment commanded by Major Franz von Hymmen. Both battalions were deployed immediately in front of the first houses, and sent companies into the fields to the south in extended order to skirmish. They were supported by a detachment of Jäger, and troops from the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Battalion of the 3. Westphälisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment occupied the large château on the eastern side of the hamlet. At St Amand, towards the centre of the line, companies of skirmishers lined the thick hedges and stone walls. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 2. Brandenburgisches Infanterie-Regiment were stationed on the heights in rear, and to the right of the village. On the left stood the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24. Infanterie-Regiment, while acting as a reserve were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment. Between St Amand and Ligny were the squadrons of the Westphälisches Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment.
The Prussian II Korps assemble in the immediate vicinity of the windmill of Bussy at Brye. Feldmarschall Blücher and his staff used this as a vantage point from which to view the field of battle. Coloured engraving after Huenten. (Author’s collection)
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A romantic depiction of the French troops arriving at the windmill of Naveau prior to the start of the battle. Napoleon can be seen viewing the field with his suite. Painting by Ernest Crofts. (Private collection)
In the centre at Ligny, the Füsilier Battalions of the 29. InfanterieRegiment and the 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment were sent to positions south-west of the village to cover the two artillery batteries which had unlimbered there. Skirmishers were extended into the fields to link with those protecting St Amand on the right. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 3. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment, as well as two companies of Schlesische Schützen were deployed between Ligny and the Bois du Loup. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 19. Infanterie-Regiment occupied the west half of the village, including the château, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment covered the eastern half, including the square. The remaining battalions from these two regiments stood to the north of Ligny, along with number 15. Fußbatterie, which was on their left. Most of the cavalry belonging to I Korps was in column behind the village, while the reserve artillery was on the heights overlooking St Amand and Ligny. On the heights to the north of the windmill at Bussy was the 2nd Brigade under Pirch II. The five battalions of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment and 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment, their two Füsilier Battalions having been merged into a single battalion because of the losses they sustained on 15 June, formed the first line. These were supported by the three battalions of the 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment. At Brye several companies from the 1st Brigade were deployed in extended order, while in rear of the village, as a reserve, was the 2nd Battalion of the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment. The II Korps occupied positions north of Brye, along the line of the road leading from Nivelles to Namur, around Sombreffe. In this way reinforcements could be sent into the front line from the heights above. The 9th Brigade belonging to III Korps was also located in this area, to the north of the road leading to Namur. However, the vast majority of the troops within III Korps were deployed further to the east. The 10th Brigade was at Boignée, Tongrinne and Tongrenelle. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 27. Infanterie-Regiment were deployed to the south-east of Tongrinne, with the Füsilier Battalion occupying the village and the large château at Tongrenelle. The 2nd Battalion of the 2. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment stood in the front line, while the 3rd Battalion formed the reserve. The artillery attached to the brigade was unlimbered adjacent to Tongrenelle, where it was joined by number 18. Reitende Batterie. The 11th and 12th Brigades, with most of the cavalry, were held in positions to the north, close to the Namur road. The artillery was unlimbered along the line of the road, from the heights at Pont du Jour to Bothey in the east. The cavalry under Graf von Wylich und Lottum were east of Tongrinne. With the losses they had sustained on 15 June, along with the units that were detached and the absence of IV Korps, the Prussians had approaching 84,000 men and 216 guns.
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At Fleurus, Napoleon was confident of victory. The field of battle had been the scene of previous French triumphs, and he expected the Prussians maintaining the hamlets and villages to be overwhelmed by the force at his disposal. In accordance with his orders, III Corps was deployed directly opposite St Amand, with the artillery in front of the various divisions. The 7th Division, from II Corps, under the command of Baron Jean-Baptiste Girard, was on the left, opposite St Amand le Hameau, and the extreme left wing was covered by the 3rd Cavalry Division commanded by Baron Jean-Siméon Domon. The IV Corps was positioned opposite Ligny, to the west of the road leading from Fleurus to Gembloux. The 14th Division, led by Baron Étienne Hulot, was on the right of the other infantry divisions, and further to the right was the 6th Cavalry Division. The II Reserve Cavalry Corps was opposite Tongrinelle, and on the right flank was Comte Pajol with his corps. The IV Reserve Cavalry Corps stood 300 paces to the north-west of Fleurus. The Garde Impériale was with the emperor and his headquarters by the windmill at Naveau. The Jeune Garde was to the left of the high road, with the artillery deployed with the brigades. The Chasseurs à Pied were stationed on the right of the high road, in front of the windmill. They were formed in columns by regiment, and deployed at half distance. On their right, slightly to the rear, were the Grenadiers à Pied, and the accompanying artillery was positioned further to the rear. The heavy cavalry, under the command of ClaudeÉtienne, Comte Guyot, stood on the right, and in rear of the Grenadiers, in two columns deployed in squadrons. At the beginning of the contest, Napoleon had approaching 66,000 men and 232 guns. However, these would be enhanced during the course of the action. The battle was about to begin.
Napoleon and his staff observe the Prussian Army from their position at the windmill of Naveau. This depiction also shows the local guide. Coloured engraving after Weiss. (Author’s collection)
This engraving provides an accurate depiction of the windmill at Naveau, from where Napoleon and his suite observed the field of battle. Coloured engraving after Sotain. (Author’s collection)
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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km
PRUSSIAN FORMATIONS (GEBHARD LEBRECHT, FÜRST BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT) A. 5th Brigade (Tippelskirch) B. Reserve Cavalry II Korps (Wahlen-Jürgass) C. Reserve Artillery II Korps (Röhl) D. 9th Brigade (Borcke) E. 12th Brigade (Stülpnagel) F. 6th Brigade (Krafft) G. 7th Brigade (Brause) H. 8th Brigade (Böse) I. 11th Brigade (Luck und Witten) J. 10th Brigade (Kemphen) K. Reserve Cavalry III Korps (Hobe) L. 2nd Brigade (Pirch II) M. 3rd Brigade (Jagow) N. Reserve Cavalry I Korps (Roeder) O. Reserve Artillery I Korps (Lehmann) P. 1st Brigade (Steinmetz)
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BLÜCHER
ROMAN ROAD
C
B HIGH ROAD FROM NIVELLES TO NAMUR MARBAIS
A
H G M
F L N
BRYE
LIGNY
O
WAGNELÉE ST AMAND LA HAIE
ST AMAND LE HAMEAU
P
TOMBE DE LIGNY
ST. AMAND 1 2 5 3 3 4
FLEURUS 13
HIGH ROAD FROM FLEURUS TO MELLET
THE ARMIES DEPLOY Situation at Ligny, 3:00pm on 16 June 1815 50 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
FRENCH FORMATIONS (EMPEROR NAPOLEON BONAPARTE) 1. 3rd Cavalry Division (Domon) 2. 7th Infantry Division (Girard) 3. 11th Infantry Division (Berthézène) 4. 8th Infantry Division (Lefol) 5. 10th Infantry Division (Habert) 6. 13th Infantry Division (Vichery) 7. 12th Infantry Division (Pécheux) 8. 14th Infantry Division (Hulot) 9. 6th Cavalry Division (Maurin) 10. II Reserve Cavalry Corps (Exelmans) 11. I Reserve Cavalry Corps (Pajol) 12. IV Reserve Cavalry Corps (Milhaud) 13. Garde Impériale (Drouot)
HIGH ROAD FROM FLEURUS TO CHARLEROI
POINT DU JOUR E
1
BOTHEY K
D J SOMBREFFE I
LIGNE BROOK TONGRINNE
BALÂTRE
TONGRENELLE
BOIGNÉE
11
7 8
10 9
6 2
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NAPOLEON
EVENTS 1. Between 2:00pm and 2:30pm orders were issued to the Prussian Army for the deployment of the various formations in the forthcoming battle. The I Korps under the command of Generallieutenant Zieten was stationed in the front line, with detachments in the villages of St Amand and Ligny. A line of artillery was positioned between the two villages, and in rear of these batteries was a reserve formed of both cavalry and infantry. The troops belonging to II Korps were deployed to the north of Brye, between Les Trois Burettes and Sombreffe, along the road leading to Namur. Those of III Korps were deployed further to the east, with the vast majority stationed to the north of Sombreffe. Strong detachments of Schützen were in the fields to the north of Boignée. Formations were also deployed at Tongrinne, Tongrenelle and the heights south of Bothey.
2. By 2:45pm the majority of the French right wing and reserve had arrived at Fleurus and deployed for battle. The III Corps commanded by Comte Vandamme was positioned in front of St Amand. The artillery attached to the corps had not entirely arrived, but those batteries in the field were unlimbered into front of the divisions. The 7th Division under the command of Baron Girard, which belonged to II Corps, was opposite St Amand le Hameau, en potence to III Corps. The IV Corps under the command of Comte Gérard stood to the west of the road from Fleurus to the Point du Jour, opposite Ligny, with the 14th Division under Baron Hulot to the east of the road. To the right of these troops were the 6th Cavalry Division, and the regiments of II Reserve Cavalry Corps led by Comte Exelmans. The extreme right wing was formed by I Reserve Cavalry Corps commanded by Comte Pajol. Further south, to the right of Fleurus, were the regiments belonging to IV Reserve Cavalry Corps under Comte Milhaud. The entire cavalry was provisionally led by Maréchal Grouchy. The Garde Impériale was positioned close to the mill of Naveau. The infantry regiments were in front with columns at half battalion distance, together with the cavalry and those artillery batteries which had reached the field of battle. 3. Towards 3:00pm Comte Vandamme received the order to commence the attack upon St Amand with III Corps. He subsequently ordered Baron Lefol, who commanded the 8th Division, to advance and to occupy the village. The troops attacked behind a swarm of tirailleurs and under the cover of an artillery barrage.
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VANDAMME ATTACKS THE VILLAGE OF ST AMAND
The 7th Division attacks St Amand la Haie. The hamlet was fortified and the position occupied by troops from the 3rd Brigade. Coloured engraving after Lacoste. (Author’s collection)
Shortly before 3:00pm Comte Vandamme received the order to commence the attack with III Corps. Accordingly, he sent word to Baron Étienne-Nicolas Lefol to move against St Amand with the 8th Division. Lefol formed his troops into a single square and read the proclamation the emperor had addressed to the army at the start of the campaign. Having exhorted the troops to display courage and to vanquish their enemies, Lefol ordered the division to advance in column. The musicians played and the men sang as they marched through the fields, despite the terrible heat. A swarm of tirailleurs from the 15e Régiment Léger swept towards the enemy occupying the wood which concealed St Amand from the attackers. Suddenly, the Prussian cannon on the heights awoke to the danger of the attack and began to spit venom. The French guns answered, and soon the thunderous booming drowned the sound of the music and singing. Shots rained down on the formations, inflicting death and misery, and this checked the ardour of the soldiers. The Prussian skirmishers defending St Amand had taken positions behind the walls and thickset hedges which surrounded the buildings, and now they opened fire on the leading French column. The front files were decimated, but the troops continued to advance with shouldered arms. As they reached the outskirts of the village Baron Jean-Honoré Vernier, who commanded the 1st Brigade, shouted the order to charge with fixed bayonets. The Prussians behind the fences fell back or perished beneath the furious assault. But the attackers were prevented from penetrating any further into the village by a deadly shower of musketry which rained down from the doors and windows of the stone houses. The 2nd Brigade moved forward to support the attack. The buildings were stormed and the defenders were shot or speared with the bayonet. No quarter was given by either side. Having gained a foothold in the village, the 15e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger and 23e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne were ordered to advance by Baron Lefol, while the 2nd Brigade was held in reserve. The Prussian skirmishers retired, and the French troops were now assailed by artillery fire from the batteries deployed on the heights behind the village. This set many of the thatched roofs on the houses alight. Despite the difficulties, the attackers reached the northern edge of the village and the hollow ground that marked the path of the Ligne brook. Both banks were lined with willow trees, and beyond these the French could see the lines of Prussian infantrymen that were preparing to advance against them. While the 8th Division had been engaged at St Amand, the 7th Division received the order to advance against St Amand le Hameau and St Amand la Haie. Baron Girard immediately called his orderly to remove his blue cloak, and then rode
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to the head of the troops wearing the full dress uniform of a lieutenant-général. The artillery moved forward and deployed in two lines as the infantry advanced. The 1st Brigade was led by Baron Claude-Germain de Villiers, and took a position on the right, while the 2nd Brigade commanded by Baron Jean-Pierre Piat was on the left. Both brigades were formed in closed columns, with a vast number of tirailleurs thrown forward into the fields of tall rye through which they marched. The first salvos from the Prussian artillery tore through the ranks, dealing death and destruction. Amidst the slaughter, the troops were ordered to close up and march at the double. The 1st Battalion of the 11e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger moved forward to support the tirailleurs, and the skirmish fire increased. Gradually, the sheer weight of numbers forced the Prussians to retire. The French passed through the hamlet of St Amand le Hameau, which was unoccupied, but were confronted by the formations stationed in front of St Amand la Haie. A severe contest ensued. The 82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne entered the fray, but they suffered from the galling musket fire that was directed against them. The defenders were determined to hold the outskirts of the hamlet for as long as possible. Major August de la Chevallerie had been charged with the defence of the left flank of St Amand la Haie, and he led the 2nd Battalion of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment and the various detachments engaged in this part of the hamlet with the utmost courage and skill. However, as the skirmishers were pushed back from their positions in the fields to the south, he had no alternative but to order the 2nd Battalion to retire. This movement was covered by two companies from the 1st Battalion commanded by Capitaine Carl von Bismarck, which maintained an accurate fire from the buildings along the edge of the small village. The French appeared reluctant to advance into the fusillade, and this afforded Major Chevallerie and his men sufficient time to withdraw. They entrenched themselves behind the stone walls in the churchyard and cemetery and were reinforced by two companies belonging to the 2nd Battalion of the 3. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment. At this time Major Wilhelm von Kleist, who held the right flank of St Amand la Haie with the 1st Battalion of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment, eventually succumbed to the French pressure and ordered his men to retire. They fell back in good order towards the churchyard and cemetery, and their retreat was covered by the troops from the 2nd Battalion situated there. However, the overwhelming fire from the tirailleurs dislodged the Prussians from their positions. The order to evacuate St Amand la Haie was given, and the defenders moved to the rear.
LEFT This contemporary illustration is one of a number undertaken during the occupation of Paris in the immediate aftermath of the campaign. It shows a Prussian infantryman clad in the newly issued uniform. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris) RIGHT The French infantry battalions comprised a variety of different troops that performed distinct tasks. The carabiniers had traditionally been employed as grenadiers, but by 1815 they were also trained to act as skirmishers in extended order. Print by Martinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
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GÉRARD BEGINS THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST LIGNY
The château to the south-west of Ligny was a huge complex, complete with moat and drawbridge. The Prussians defended the buildings despite their being set alight by the French artillery. Coloured engraving by James Rouse. (Private collection / The Stapleton Collection / Bridgeman Images)
Shortly after the fighting had commenced at St Amand, Comte Gérard ordered IV Corps to storm Ligny. The honour of leading the assault was bestowed upon the 12th Infantry Division, under the command of Baron Marc-Nicolas Pécheux. The 1st Brigade, consisting of the 30e and 96e Régiments de Ligne, formed in three columns and marched with shouldered arms towards the village. The columns advanced en echelon, with the right column in front, and the three formations were protected by a veil of tirailleurs who moved swiftly through the fields. The French infantry had only covered a short distance when they came within range of the Prussian batteries deployed to the south-west of the village. The artillerymen operated the guns with a manic fervour, and the constant barrage reaped havoc on the columns. Yet the soldiers pressed on to the beat of the drums. A fierce contest raged between the Prussian skirmishers, who lined the hedges and ditches along the edge of the village, and French tirailleurs. As the right-hand column, which led the attack, moved to within 200 paces of the buildings, the troops were ordered to deploy in line. The order was obeyed and the French advanced with bayonets fixed. The Prussian troops were driven back towards the wooden bridges over the Ligne, which passed through Ligny and divided it into two halves. But having reached the opposite side of the wide brook the skirmishers opened a withering fire, and were reinforced significantly. The momentum of the attack was lost, and the French were forced to seek cover amidst the buildings. At the head of the centre column was the 30e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne, who now reached the outskirts of the village and threw back the line of defenders. They broke through the hedges into the street beyond. The left half of the 1st Battalion arrived at a barricade which had been placed across the narrow street. The French began to drag the mass of harrows and ploughs which formed the barrier from their path, but they were immediately subjected to intense musket fire from the Prussian skirmishers. Within minutes the ground was littered with bodies. Officers and men suffered alike. Having cleared the obstacle, the attackers poured into Ligny, where the fighting escalated. The Prussians had taken positions adjacent to the square, close to the church, and from here they were able to pour a destructive fire on the infantry as it advanced. The losses the French sustained were so severe that they recoiled, and the remnants of the 30e Régiment de Ligne withdrew to the sunken road at the entrance of Ligny. The Prussian troops moved forward and resumed their positions in the houses and behind the thickset hedges.
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The troops of the 12th Division advance to attack Ligny. The tall tower of the château can be seen on the left of the picture. Coloured engraving after Gudin. (Author’s collection)
Baron Jean-François Rome commanded the 1st Brigade of the 12th Division, and he helped to rally the troops. When they had re-formed, he gave the order to storm the Prussian positions once more, despite the failure of their previous attack. The French soldiers answered his call with shouts of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’, and they marched to the front. However, this attack was also repulsed. Baron Rome instructed the battery attached to the 12th Division to deliver supporting fire, and gathered 100 volunteers under the command of Capitaine Charles François to advance. The men moved forward towards the square in the centre of the village. The fire from the Prussian skirmishers was greatly diminished, and this time the French burst upon their enemy. The square became the scene of a ferocious contest, where hand-tohand struggles to the death ensued. The combatants shot one another at point-blank range and thrust and stabbed with their bayonets. Muskets were swung like clubs and fists were thrown in the mêlée. Baron Rome, who was mounted on his horse in the thick of the action, ordered the 96e Régiment de Ligne to advance and the Prussians defending the square at last gave way. They abandoned the houses and fled from the churchyard and cemetery across the two wooden bridges. The conquest of the square in the centre of Ligny allowed the French to extend their positions and to move against the troops defending the château to the south-west. This was a huge building complete with moat and bridge. The Prussian skirmishers withdrew into the courtyard and fired upon the troops who attempted to gain entry through the wooden gate on the eastern side of the complex. But when this proved difficult the French artillery moved forward and bombarded the building. The situation for those inside the château was critical.
This rendition of the combat close to the farm d’En Bas provides an indication of the confused nature of the struggle. Contemporary descriptions of the scene around the narrow wooden bridges testify to the vast number of dead and wounded that littered the ground. Coloured engraving after Knötel. (Author’s collection)
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ORDERS TO ENVELOP BRYE AND ST AMAND
Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère demonstrated his loyalty to Napoleon before the gates of Grenoble with the 7e Régiment de Ligne. He was subsequently appointed aide-de-camp to the emperor and undertook a number of important tasks during the campaign. Painting by Jean-Urbain Géurin. (Photo © RMN-Grand Palais (musée des châteaux de Malmaison et de Bois-Préau) / Gérard Blot)
Napoleon witnessed the bitter struggle in the village of St Amand and the adjacent hamlets, and to his great surprise realized that the Prussian force was considerably stronger than the single corps he had expected to encounter. He believed that the entire Prussian Army was assembled at Sombreffe. Consequently, at 3:15pm he dictated an order to Maréchal Soult, directing Ney to manoeuvre without delay to the heights of Brye and St Amand, and to envelop the right wing of the Prussian Army in accordance with the order he had issued one hour before. The intensity of the fighting at Ligny confirmed the emperor’s diagnosis, and so the order was dispatched with all due haste to Frasnes. As the battle intensified at St Amand and Ligny, it became clear to Napoleon that the forward deployment of the Prussian right wing meant that their army was vulnerable to envelopment, and therefore he determined to execute this movement at all costs. At 3:45pm he dictated another order to Soult. This was for Comte d’Erlon, the commander of I Corps, whose divisions were en route to join Ney at Frasnes and Quatre Bras. The order instructed d’Erlon to bring his four infantry divisions, his cavalry and artillery to the heights of St Amand at once, and by doing so he would save France and cover himself with glory. This order was given to Charles, Comte de la Bédoyère, Napoleon’s aide-de-camp. He was informed that I Corps was north of Gosselies and that the order was imperative. The young officer, who had rallied to the emperor at Grenoble, set out immediately. Comte d’Erlon had spent the night at Jumet, to the north of Charleroi, and at first light had endeavoured to collect the various divisions belonging to his corps on the north bank of the Sambre River. The 4th Division, commanded by Joseph-François, Comte Durutte, which formed the vanguard of the corps, bivouacked bivouack between Gosselies and Jumet. The 2nd Division, under the command co of Baron François-Xavier Donzelot, was in front of Jumet, along with the 2nd Brigade from the 1st Cavalr Cavalry Division. But the 1st and 3rd Divisions, led by baro barons Quiot du Passage and Pierre-Louis Marcognet, wer were still at Thuin and Marchienne-au-Pont, close to the bo border with France, while the 1st Brigade of cavalry fr from Baron Charles-Claude Jacquinot’s Division was ffurther to the rear at Solre-sur-Sambre. By 1:00pm Comte Durutte had reached Gosselies with the 4th Division, and as it was impossible to advance any further on the high road, due to the fact that the 6th Division under Prince Jérôme Bonaparte was moving from its bivouac through the ttown, he awaited the arrival of the remaining d divisions of I Corps. Shortly before 3:00pm the 4th D Division resumed its march. Comte d’Erlon and his Ch Chief of Staff, Baron Victor-Joseph Delcambre, who had sent cavalry patrols forward on the high road, rode ahea ahead of the division with the intention of meeting Maréc Maréchal Ney at Frasnes and announcing the arrival of I Corps to the commander of the left wing. However, events were set to determine otherwise.
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Situation at Quatre Bras and Ligny, 4:00pm on 16 June 1815 Allied Army at Quatre Bras (under Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington) A. 1st Corps (Orange) B. Brunswick Corps (Brunswick) C. Reserve (Picton)
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A Quatre Bras XXX
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Prussian Army at Ligny (under Gebhard, Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt) D. II Korps (Pirch I) E. III Korps (Thielmann) F. I Korps (Zieten)
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Marbais The Prussians expected support from Wellington at Quatre Bras.
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Ney had been ordered to envelop the Prussians at Sombreffe.
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Ligny
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The 4th Division of the I Corps was north of Gosselies. XXX
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French Army at Quatre Bras (under Maréchal Michel Ney) 1. II Corps (Reille) 2. III Reserve Cavalry Corps (Valmy) 3. Light Cavalry of the Garde Impériale (Lefèbvre-Desnouettes) 4. I Corps (d’Erlon)
French Army at Ligny (under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte) 5. 7th Division (Girard) 6. III Corps (Vandamme) 7. IV Corps (Gérard) 8. II Reserve Cavalry Corps (Exelmans) 9. I Reserve Cavalry Corps (Pajol) 10. IV Reserve Cavalry Corps (Milhaud) 11. Garde Impériale (Drouot)
ZIETEN LAUNCHES A COUNTERATTACK AT LIGNY It was approaching 4:00pm, and despite the obstinate resistance from the troops defending Ligny, the French had gained control of the village on the right bank of the Ligne. They had also captured the grounds of the château and were bombarding the complex with artillery. On the left of the Prussian line, Major Heinrich von Bünau had taken a position with the 1st Battalion of the 19. Infanterie-Regiment, from where the troops contested the wooden bridges which passed over the brook. In the centre, the Füsilier Battalion was extended along the edge of the Ligne, behind the natural cover afforded by the hedges and trees. Two companies of skirmishers from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment had become intermixed with the men holding these positions, while the remaining companies were held in reserve, a short distance to the rear. Generallieutenant von Zieten, the commander of I Korps, was informed of the critical situation at Ligny and determined to reinforce the troops of the 4th Brigade, who were already engaged in the village, with those from the 3rd Brigade. Generalmajor Friedrich von Jagow was instructed to advance 57 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
The brutal close-quarter fighting at Ligny epitomized the fierce rivalry between the French and Prussian armies during the campaign. Coloured engraving after Worms. (Author’s collection)
with the battalions under his command that were stationed between Ligny and the Bois du Loup. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment marched in column towards the village. The 2nd Battalion, led by Generalmajor von Jagow in person, moved towards the centre of Ligny, while the 1st Battalion was directed to the south. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 3. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment followed this movement, but they were not committed to the contest. On the right, the two companies of Schlesische Schützen commanded by Capitaine Karl von Rudorff attacked the French and established themselves in and around the château, which was on fire due to the artillery bombardment. At this moment the two battalions of the 2. Westpreußisches InfanterieRegiment entered that part of Ligny situated on the left bank of the Ligne. They advanced through the village with the colours at their head, drums beating. The 2nd Battalion poured across the bridges and through the square as the French troops fell back, but having entered the narrow streets beyond, the Prussians were subjected to enfilading fire from the enemy tirailleurs on both flanks. The French charged and the 2nd Battalion retreated. The 1st Battalion, which had moved forward in support, was also compelled to retire, but as the French did not pursue, Generalmajor von Jagow was able to collect his men close to the churchyard and cemetery. The two battalions re-formed in close columns and counterattacked, forcing their way back into the square. However, they suffered terribly during the advance, so the order was given to secure the enclosure before attempting to make any further progress. Despite being expelled from the centre of Ligny, the French still occupied the main road and entrances on the right bank of the brook. The officers and men of the 30e and 96e Régiments de Ligne, who held the area to the east of the square, were now joined by the 1st Brigade of the 13th Division under the command of Baron Jacques Le Capitaine. The two battalions of the 59e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne marched along the narrow streets, while those of the 76e Régiment de Ligne supported this movement. The artillery attached to the division was manoeuvred through the fields of rye and rumbled slowly into the village. The French advance was stopped by accurate fire from the two battalions of the 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment deployed in the square. The exchange was protracted and the adversaries refused to yield. Baron Le Capitaine was killed and the 59e Régiment de Ligne sustained heavy casualties. The Prussians also suffered from the close-range canister fire of the French artillery, and the situation became critical for the defenders when the tirailleurs broke through on the left flank of the 2nd Battalion. This success was immediately followed by a bayonet charge from the 1st Battalion of the 96e Régiment de Ligne. The colour carried by the 2nd Battalion of the 2.
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Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment was almost captured in the ensuing mêlée. Seconde-Lieutenant Karl Schulze, in whose care it was placed, managed to retain possession of the cherished emblem with the help of several men, who rallied to his side and fought courageously. Realizing that the French had gained the advantage, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 3. Westphälisches LandwehrInfanterie-Regiment were ordered to advance from their positions into the village. But they were pushed back. As they retired, their comrades in the farm of d’en Bas fired upon the French through the loop-holed walls. The two forces exchanged shots amidst the dense clouds of smoke which hung in the air and which along with the sweltering heat and flames from the falling shells turned the centre of Ligny into a fiery furnace.
BLÜCHER INTERVENES IN THE FIGHTING AT ST AMAND
A Prussian officer courageously defends one of the narrow wooden bridges across the brook within Ligny. Coloured engraving after Nössler. (Author’s collection)
Within the confines of St Amand the French assembled along the northern perimeter and prepared to advance. Having repelled an attempt by the Prussian skirmishers to re-enter the village, the 15e Régiment Léger and 23e Régiment de Ligne crossed the brook, but when they debouched into the fields to the south of the road leading to Brye they were pounded by the Prussian artillery posted on the heights above and assailed by close-range canister fire from number 7. Fußbatterie. Two battalions, one each from the 2. Brandenburgisches and 24. Infanterie-Regiment, were led forward by Oberst Georg von Hoffmann, and these pushed the French back into the village. With support from the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment, the Prussians continued into St Amand, and recaptured most of the streets. As a result of this reversal Comte Vandamme ordered Baron Pierre Berthézène to advance with the 11th Division. Both regiments within the 1st Brigade, commanded by Baron François-Bertrand Dufour, marched directly towards St Amand, on the left of their comrades in the 8th Division, while the 86e Régiment de Ligne from the 2nd Brigade, under the command of Baron Henri-Jacques Largarde, moved further to the left, in the direction of St Amand la Haie. The 56e Régiment de Ligne was held in reserve. The artillery attached to the 11th Division was ordered to move forward so as to support the attack upon St Amand. The French moved against the village, and, despite being reinforced by two battalions of the 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment, the Prussian garrison was ejected. The defenders re-formed on the slopes to the north of St Amand, from where Generalmajor von Steinmetz, the commander of the 1st Brigade, sent word to Generallieutenant Zieten and the Prussian high command, stating that the French had driven the last of his reserves from their positions. By now the guns belonging to Comte Vandamme’s III Corps had begun to find their range, and the bombardment of the Prussian troops stationed 59 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
on the heights at Brye was intense. It was clear to the Prussian leaders that an attack through St Amand would endanger their line of communication with the Allied Army at Quatre Bras, and so Feldmarschall Blücher decided to act. The order to advance was sent to the 2nd Brigade of I Korps, under the command of Generalmajor von Pirch II, which was deployed close to the windmill of Bussy, where the high command was situated. The elderly marshal could not resist the temptation of addressing the men before they entered the battle. He rode across to the columns and raising himself in his saddle shouted: ‘Children, do not allow the great nation to rule over you again. Forwards, in God’s name.’ The soldiers answered his rallying call with cheers, and they marched with vigour towards the enemy. The brigade advanced in eight columns, by battalion, which were in two lines. The first line comprised the two battalions of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment, and the three of the 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment. The second was formed by the three battalions of the 1. Westpreußisches InfanterieRegiment. These were followed by number 3. Fußbatterie, which was ordered to unlimber on the extreme right of the Prussian line. The Westphälisches LandwehrKavallerie-Regiment remained on the heights at Bussy, close to the windmill.
Baron Jean-Baptiste Girard rallied to the emperor in March 1815 and for his loyalty was appointed to the command of the 7th Division. Painting by unknown artist. (Private collection)
THE CONTEST ESCALATES AT ST AMAND LA HAIE Before the columns reached the outskirts of St Amand, they were ordered to move to the right and St Amand la Haie. The 1st Battalion of the 28. InfanterieRegiment advanced along the sunken road which ran into the hamlet from the north-east, while the 2nd Battalion marched directly towards the buildings. The French tirailleurs were driven back and both battalions of the 28. InfanterieRegiment entered the narrow streets. The three battalions of the 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment moved up in support, but did not enter the village. However, the attack was joined by the troops that had been expelled earlier. Major Franz von Hymmen ordered the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment, together with the two companies of Schlesische Schützen commanded by Major August von Neumann, to advance on the left of the line and deliver enfilading fire. The farm of la Haie was occupied by the 1st Brigade of the 7th Division, commanded by Baron Claude-Germain de Villiers. The officers and men of the 11e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger, and the 82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne, were entrenched within the buildings and behind the high stone walls which surrounded the farm complex. As the Prussian infantry advanced along the narrow streets the French unleashed a devastating series of volleys which left the ground littered with dead and wounded. The attackers were unable to form because of the limited space, and so they suffered in the engagement. The 2nd Brigade of the 7th Division, commanded by Baron Jean-Pierre
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Piat, now joined the contest and inflicted further losses on the Prussians. Major Philipp von Brockhausen, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment, was killed in the exchange. Orders were sent for the 1st Battalion of the 1. Westpreußisches InfanterieRegiment to advance from the second line and to storm the complex. Once again, the troops behind the walls fired upon the Prussians as they charged along the adjacent street and attempted to force their way into the farm. But the musket fire from the Prussian units which moved up to support this attack drove the 12e Régiment Léger and 4e Régiment de Ligne, which comprised the 2nd Brigade, back in disorder. Baron Piat was wounded, and confusion prevailed. Bravely, Baron Girard rode into the midst of the fighting and tried to rally his men. His horse was struck in the head and reared violently, and at this moment the Frenchman was struck by several shots, one of which passed through his right arm, penetrated his lung and lodged in his spine. Girard was thrown to the ground and did not move. Four grenadiers belonging to the 82e Régiment de Ligne rushed to the scene and managed to carry the gallant officer to the rear. But the wound proved fatal. Despite the ferocity of the Prussian attack, it failed to dislodge the troops from within the farm. Indeed, the continuous musket fire from the defenders pushed the various Prussian battalions back, towards the edge of the hamlet. Generalmajor von Pirch II collected the 2nd Battalion of the 28. InfanterieRegiment, which had suffered less than their comrades, and with support from two platoons of skirmishers from the 1st Battalion of the 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment, they moved towards the wood between St Amand la Haie and St Amand. This attack was crowned with success. The tirailleurs were driven back and the Prussians debouched on the far side of the wood, in rear of the French troops belonging to the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Division, who were holding the southern half of St Amand la Haie. The 2nd Battalion of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment now moved into the hamlet. Realising that they were about to be enveloped, the troops within the farm of la Haie began to withdraw. While doing so they came under heavy fire, and Baron de Villiers was severely wounded. The command of the 7th Division devolved upon Colonel Jean-François de Sales Matis, who led the officers and men of the 1st Brigade back to St Amand le Hameau, where they joined with those of the 2nd Brigade. The withdrawal from St Amand la Haie uncovered the left flank of the French troops at St Amand, exposing them to a possible attack. Subsequently, Comte Vandamme instructed Baron Pierre-Joseph Habert to advance upon St Amand le Hameau with the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Division. They were expected to regain the ground which had been lost, while the 1st Brigade would move forward and support the divisions already engaged in the fighting at St Amand.
During the struggle at St Amand la Haie Baron JeanBaptiste Girard was mortally wounded. He was taken to Paris, but died on 21 June. One of Napoleon’s last acts was to bestow the title of Duc de Ligny upon Girard. However, King Louis XVIII revoked this following his return to France. Coloured engraving after Lacoste. (Author’s collection)
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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km
PRUSSIAN FORMATIONS (GEBHARD LEBRECHT, FÜRST BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT) A. 5th Brigade (Tippelskirch) B. Reserve Cavalry II Korps (Wahlen-Jürgass) C. Reserve Artillery II Korps (Röhl) D. 9th Brigade (Borcke) E. 12th Brigade (Stülpnagel) F. 6th Brigade (Krafft) G. 7th Brigade (Brause) H. 8th Brigade (Böse) I. 11th Brigade (Luck und Witten) J. 10th Brigade (Kemphen) K. Reserve Cavalry III Korps (Hobe) L. 2nd Brigade (Pirch II) M. 3rd Brigade (Jagow) N. Reserve Cavalry I Korps (Roeder) O. Reserve Artillery I Korps (Lehmann) P. 1st Brigade (Steinmetz)
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THE FIGHTING ESCALATES Situation at Ligny, 5:00pm on 16 June 1815 62 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
FRENCH FORMATIONS (EMPEROR NAPOLEON BONAPARTE) 1. 3rd Cavalry Division (Domon) 2. 7th Infantry Division (Girard) 3. 11th Infantry Division (Berthézène) 4. 8th Infantry Division (Lefol) 5. 10th Infantry Division (Habert) 6. 13th Infantry Division (Vichery) 7. 12th Infantry Division (Pécheux) 8. 6th Cavalry Division (Maurin) 9. 14th Infantry Division (Hulot) 10. II Reserve Cavalry Corps (Exelmans) 11. I Reserve Cavalry Corps (Pajol) 12. IV Reserve Cavalry Corps (Milhaud) 13. Garde Impériale (Drouot)
HIGH ROAD FROM FLEURUS TO CHARLEROI
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EVENTS 1. By 5:00pm the 1st Brigade of the 7th Division commanded by Baron Girard had captured the hamlets of St Amand le Hameau and St Amand la Haie, threatening the right flank of the Prussian line. In the centre the 1st Brigade of the 8th Division under Baron Lefol had made inroads into the village of St Amand. With support from the 11th Division of Baron Berthézène, the French had eventually driven the defenders out of the streets and into the fields beyond, to positions adjacent to the Prussian artillery.
2. At this time the 1st Brigade of the 12th Division under Baron Pécheux occupied the eastern half of Ligny. The six battalions had been engaged in a desperate struggle for this part of the village, and had yet to launch an assault upon the bridges which crossed the brook The 2nd Brigade was drawn in column to the north-east of the village as a reserve, so as to support the attack. Further to the south the 13th Division commanded by Baron Vichery was held in readiness to advance. 3. Having been driven from St Amand the various battalions belonging to the 1st Brigade under the command of Generalmajor von Steinmetz formed on the slope to the north of the village and sent word to Generallieutenant von Zieten and the Prussian high command. Consequently, the 2nd Brigade led by Generalmajor von Pirch II was ordered to form in column and advance into the front line towards St Amand and St Amand la Haie.
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THE ATTACK BY THE 28. INFANTERIE-REGIMENT UPON THE FARM OF LA HAIE (PP. 64–65) By 5:30pm the farm of La Haie was occupied by the officers and men of the 11e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger and the 82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne. The troops were entrenched behind the walls of the complex or deployed in the adjacent street, and they awaited the Prussian attack. This was led by the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment. They had been engaged in the fighting at Gilly on the 15th, where the Füsilier Battalion had sustained heavy losses, especially among the officers. This was in part due to the vastly different uniforms worn by the officers and men. The latter had formerly served with the 1st Berg Regiment and retained their distinctive white uniforms, while the officers wore the normal dark blue coatees. The French tirailleurs had been able to target the officers at Gilly. Consequently, the men had been ordered to wear their thick greycoats, despite the heat. As the 2nd Battalion of the 28. Infanterie-Regiment, which numbered 680 officers and men (1), advanced along the narrow street the French unleashed a devastating series of volleys which left the ground littered with dead and wounded. The attackers were unable to form because of the limited space, and so they suffered severely in the engagement. Major von Brockhausen,
who commanded the 2nd Battalion, was killed in the exchange. On seeing that the Prussians had been thrown into confusion the grenadiers of the 82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne (2) charged. The two battalions of the 82e Régiment numbered 40 officers and 1,110 men, and were composed of seasoned troops. They drove the enemy back. Orders were sent for the 1st Battalion of the 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment to advance from the second line and to storm the complex. But once again the troops behind the walls fired upon the Prussians as they charged along the adjacent street and attempted to force their way into the farm. This attack was crowned with partial success, for the 12e Régiment Léger and 4e Régiment de Ligne, who had moved forward to support their comrades at La Haie, were pushed back. Baron Girard, who commanded the 7th Division, was mortally wounded during the fighting. Having fallen from his horse, he was carried to the rear by four grenadiers belonging to the 82e Régiment de Ligne. Despite the ferocity of the Prussian attack, it failed to dislodge the troops from within the farm. Indeed, the continuous musket fire from the defenders pushed the various Prussian battalions back towards the edge of the hamlet.
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URGENT REINFORCEMENTS BOLSTER THE ATTACKS Napoleon watched intently from his position at the windmill of Naveau, as the balance of power swung between the rival armies. The protracted struggle at Ligny and St Amand persuaded him to send an order to Comte Lobau, the commander of VI Corps, which was stationed north of Charleroi, to join the army at Fleurus. By doing this the emperor was calling upon the last of his reserves, and would not be able to direct these troops to support Maréchal Ney and the left wing at Quatre Bras. This was in addition to ordering I Corps, which was part of the left wing under Ney’s command, to move upon Brye and St Amand. Comte de la Bédoyère found Comte d’Erlon and his suite at the junction of the roads close to Villers Perwin towards 5:00pm. The commander of I Corps was given the order with the prescribed movement upon Brye and the envelopment of the right wing of the Prussian Army. Comte d’Erlon immediately sent Baron Delcambre, his Chief of Staff, forward to inform Maréchal Ney that in accordance with the emperor’s order the entire corps was moving upon Sombreffe. It was approaching 5:30pm when Baron Delcambre found Maréchal Ney mounted on his charger on the heights at La Balcan. Ney was astonished when he learned that I Corps had been ordered to Brye, but realized that d’Erlon may have some part to play in the outcome of the day, and so he instructed Baron Delcambre to return to the corps and explain the critical situation facing the French at Quatre Bras at that moment, so that d’Erlon himself could judge how best to serve the nation. Throughout this period Maréchal Grouchy and the cavalry under his command had been mere spectators, as the 14th Division skirmished with the Prussians. On the extreme right flank was the 1st Battalion of the 50e Régiment de Ligne. Opposite Tongrinelle were the 44e Régiment de Ligne and a battalion from the 9e Régiment Léger. The remaining troops from the division were positioned opposite Sombreffe along with the artillery, to the west of the road to Fleurus. But shortly after 5:30pm Grouchy received an order to send the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded by Baron Jacques-Gervais Subervie, to support III Corps, which was attempting to conquer the hamlet of St Amand la Haie. As soon as the cavalry arrived on the left of the line, the 1er and 2e Régiments de Chevau-LégersLanciers formed immediately behind the remaining battalions of III Corps, which had been held in reserve opposite St Amand, and the 11e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval moved in rear of the remnants of the 7th Division, which were to the south-west of Wagnelée. The left wing was covered by the 3rd Cavalry Division commanded by Baron Jean-Siméon Domon.
Rémi-Isidore, Comte Exelmans was a cavalry officer of the highest calibre, having served under Maréchal Joachim Murat for many years. He led II Reserve Cavalry Corps during the campaign. Painting by Charles-Philippe Larivère. (Photo © RMN-Grand Palais (Château de Versailles) / Gérard Blot)
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II KORPS ENTERS THE FRAY AT WAGNELÉE During the action at St Amand la Haie, the order was sent to Generalmajor Ernst von Tippelskirch to advance with the 5th Brigade and take a position in rear of Wagnelée so as to attack the left flank of the French force at St Amand la Haie. This was to be supported by the 7th Brigade and the Reserve Cavalry. The nine battalions, plus the artillery, moved from their positions at Les Trois Burettes, and manoeuvred so that the battalions in the centre and on the right passed through Wagnelée, while those on the left, along with the artillery, moved around the small village. The movement on the left was led by the Füsilier Battalion of the 25. Infanterie-Regiment, and that in the centre by the Füsilier Battalion of the 1. Pommersches Infanterie-Regiment. But due to the difficult terrain and the speed of the advance, it proved impossible to launch a simultaneous attack by the two forces against the enemy at St Amand la Haie. This afforded the French the opportunity to counter. The 1st Brigade of the 10th Division, under Baron Pierre-Joseph Habert, formed en potence, on the left of the 11th Division. Two battalions moved into the fields of high corn to act as tirailleurs, and the divisional artillery unlimbered and was loaded with canister. The guns opened upon the head of the 25. Infanterie-Regiment, and were joined by musket fire from the tirailleurs. The Prussians attempted to deploy, but at this moment the French charged with the bayonet. Panic gripped the young soldiers and each of the Prussian units began to retreat, despite the strenuous efforts of their officers. They fell back through Wagnelée, although the company of Feldjäger led by Premier-Lieutenant Johann Müller and a sizeable detachment of skirmishers from the 25. Infanterie-Regiment managed to maintain the small village, and drove off the French tirailleurs who pursued. The 7th Brigade and Reserve Cavalry, which were meant to support the flank attack upon St Amand la Haie, now moved forward and took positions to the north and west respectively. Additional troops from II Korps were committed to the fighting. The commander of the 6th Brigade, Generalmajor Karl von Krafft, had already sent two of his battalions to cover the artillery on the heights to the east of the windmill of Bussy, and he was now ordered by Feldmarschall Blücher to send five battalions to Ligny. The remaining battalions moved upon St Amand la Haie to reinforce the garrison, which at this time was composed of troops from 2nd and 3rd Brigades. During the advance upon Ligny the 3rd Battalion of the 1. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment extended to the left, forward of the other battalions, and threw out a large number of skirmishers. They managed to gain favourable positions along the edge of the Ligne brook, from where they subjected the French to steady musket fire. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment, along with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1. Elb Landwehr-InfanterieRegiment, marched from Brye towards Ligny under heavy artillery fire. The troops halted before reaching the village in order to deploy for the attack, and a detachment of volunteers advanced, followed by the 1st Battalion of the Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment. The French were driven back across the Ligne into the eastern half of Ligny. But as with the previous assaults upon the village the attackers were unable to progress beyond this point, as the defenders made a tenacious stand on the opposite side of the brook. 68 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
A COLUMN APPROACHES FROM VILLERS PERWIN It was approaching 6:00pm and the battle raged in the hamlets and villages. The Feldjäger and a detachment of skirmishers from the 5th Brigade, which belonged to II Korps, held Wagnelée. The remainder of the infantry within the brigade was behind the village along with the number 10. Fußbatterie. Immediately to the west of Wagnelée was the cavalry under Generalmajor Alexander von Wahlen-Jürgass, who was charged with the command of all arms from the Prussian Army deployed at this point. The 7th Brigade stood in column to the north of the village. Directly opposed to these troops was the 10th Division from III Corps. The 1st Brigade was positioned between, and to the south of, Wagnelée and St Amand la Haie, with the divisional artillery, while the 2nd Brigade was further south at St Amand le Hameau. In rear of these troops were the 11e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval, and to the south-west the 3rd Cavalry Division, which covered the left flank. St Amand la Haie was occupied by troops from the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, both of which belonged to I Korps commanded by 6th Cavalry Division (Maurin) von Zieten. They were supported by two strong battalions from the 6th Brigade, which were deployed in the streets to the north of the hamlet. Further north was number 37. Fußbatterie, which had moved forward from its position on the heights. The guns were trained on the French units at St Amand le Hameau. The remnants of the 7th Division, now under the command of Colonel Jean-François de Sales Matis, were ensconced in the buildings, while the 2nd Brigade of 10th Division, commanded by Baron René-Joseph Dupeyroux, was to the south of the tiny hamlet, ready to advance. In the centre, St Amand was in French hands. The troops of the 8th Division, along with the 1st Brigade of the 11th Division, occupied the village. The two battalions of the 86e Régiment de Ligne protected the left flank and communicated with the 1st Brigade of the 10th Division, from a position on the outside and to the west of St Amand, while the 56e Régiment de Ligne was drawn up in column immediately south of the village, covering the artillery from the 11th Division. Some 500 paces in rear of these troops, within range of the Prussian artillery stationed on the heights above, were the 1er and 2e Régiments de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers. Further south were the guns attached to the 8th Division. At Ligny, the French held the right bank of the brook, while the Prussians possessed the left bank and the château to the south-west. To maintain his grip on the ferocious contest, Comte Gérard was forced to commit the battalions which had been held in reserve. He sent word to the emperor, informing him of the critical situation in the village. Unbeknown to the commander of IV Corps, the Prussians had also been forced to commit their reserve to the struggle. Troops from the brigades commanded by Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Jagow and Krafft had been thrown into Ligny in a desperate attempt to retain the bastion, while a number of artillery batteries fired upon the French from their position on the heights. Two of the 12-pdr batteries, numbers 4. and 8.
Towards 6:30pm Napoleon deployed eight battalions of the Jeune Garde close to St Amand la Haie, to cover the left flank and to support the attacks upon the hamlet. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
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Three regiments of Chasseurs à Pied of the Garde Impériale moved into positions on the left of the French line, in the rear of III Corps. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
Schwere Batterie, were moved into positions between St Amand and Ligny. To the west was number 5. Fußbatterie, and east of the road leading from Ligny to Sombreffe was number 12. Fußbatterie. Napoleon and his suite were observing the fighting in the centre and on the left of the French line, when they noticed a dense column appear on the horizon close to the Bois de la Hutte, to the north-east of Villers Perwin. A patrol was sent to the extreme left flank to identify the mysterious body. In the meantime news of the column had reached Comte Vandamme and the troops under his command engaged in this part of the battlefield. The battalions at St Amand le Hameau began to withdraw, and fear spread rapidly through the units within St Amand, causing an immediate suspension of the attack in this quarter. The Prussians took full advantage of this hesitation and swept through the village, as well as strengthening their positions around Wagnelée and pushing the French back from St Amand la Haie. Towards 6:30pm Napoleon received a message from Comte Vandamme stating that an unidentified column had appeared a league to his left and was turning the French flank. The cavalry patrol had not returned to the windmill of Naveau, and so, as a precaution, the emperor sent reinforcements from the Garde Impériale to protect the left wing. The eight battalions of the Jeune Garde, supported by the two auxiliary batteries of artillery, marched towards St Amand la Haie, while the 2e, 3e and 4e Régiments de Chasseurs à Pied moved to positions on the left, and in rear, of III Corps. They were subsequently joined by the 3e Compagnie de Régiment d’Artillerie à Cheval de la Garde. Furthermore, the emperor ordered the three battalions of the 3e and 4e Régiments de Grenadiers à Pied to support IV Corps at Ligny, where they acted as a reserve. The remaining battalions of the Garde Impériale, including the various cavalry regiments, together with IV Reserve Cavalry Corps, moved forward and stood in column to the west of the windmill at Naveau.
GNEISENAU SENDS A MESSENGER TO QUATRE BRAS The Prussian high command also noticed the dense column approaching from Villers Perwin, and so August, Graf von Nostitz, adjutant to Feldmarschall Blücher, was sent with a small detachment of cavalry from the 9. Husaren-Regiment to investigate. As soon as he was able to determine the size and strength of the force, Graf von Nostitz returned to the windmill of Bussy, leaving the cavalry with instructions to remain and observe, and to send regular reports to the headquarters. At this time, another patrol from the 8. Uhlanen-Regiment captured a French officer and his attendant close to Mellet. The officer confirmed that I Corps, commanded by Comte d’Erlon, formed the column moving towards the field of battle. When the intelligence was given to Feldmarschall Blücher and the general staff they immediately realized the consequence. The losses they had already sustained and the absence of IV Korps meant that without support from the Allied Army they would have no choice but to temper their hopes of victory and endeavour to maintain the positions they currently held. The French hesitation had allowed the various brigades on the right flank to attack St 70 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Amand and St Amand le Hameau, and to strengthen their positions in and around Wagnelée and St Amand la Haie. But the outcome at Ligny was still in the balance. Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau determined to send Seconde-Lieutenant Johann von Wussow to Quatre Bras, to clarify the situation at the crossroads. The Prussians had received a message from Freiherr von Müffling stating that the Allied Army was hard pressed, and the Duke of Wellington was unable to send reinforcements along the road to Namur. Gneisenau instructed Wussow to inform the duke that despite the determined French attacks the Prussian Army occupied most of the villages. But the losses had been very severe and as the prospect of support from IV Korps had completely disappeared, the best they hoped to achieve was maintenance of their current positions until the onset of night. Gneisenau asked the officer to request the duke to undertake a strong offensive, which would prevent the enemy from making any further attacks on the Prussian positions. Having received these instructions Seconde-Lieutenant von Wussow set off along the Namur road towards Quatre Bras. He had ridden some way when he encountered a patrol from the 2. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment. They warned him that the French were established in the Bois de la Hutte, and that he would need to continue via Thyle if he wished to reach the crossroads. The young officer rode swiftly through the hamlet on the right of the high road and eventually found Freiherr von Müffling, who introduced him to the Duke of Wellington.
Towards 8:00pm Napoleon ordered an attack upon the village of Ligny. Nine battalions of the Garde Impériale advanced towards the village, together with the four duty squadrons and a division of cuirassiers. Coloured engraving after Grenier. (Author’s collection)
FATEFUL DECISIONS IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE Comte d’Erlon had followed the order he received from the emperor to forsake his role at Quatre Bras and to march with his entire corps to the heights at Brye and St Amand. Having sent his Chief of Staff, Baron Victor-Joseph Delcambre, to inform Maréchal Ney of his movements, the corps had marched towards the battlefield at Sombreffe. As before, the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Joseph-François, Comte Durutte formed the vanguard, along with the horsemen of the 2nd Brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division under Baron Charles-Claude Jacquinot. These were followed by the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions of barons François-Xavier Donzelot and Pierre-Louis Marcognet, while the 1st Division under the command of Quiot du Passage and the 1st Brigade of cavalry brought up the rear. The leading elements of Comte Durutte’s 71 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
A superbly emotive painting of the Grenadiers à Pied of the Vieille Garde advancing under heavy artillery fire towards Ligny. Painting by Hippolyte Bellangé. (Art Institute, Chicago)
Division reached the outskirts of the battlefield, to the south-west of Wagnelée, towards 6:30pm, and it was their arrival, in rear of III Corps, which caused consternation on the left of the French line. Napoleon was surprised by the intelligence, as he had expected Comte d’Erlon to arrive from the direction of the Namur road. But after a delay of more than half an hour the French were ready to renew the attack upon the hamlets and villages. The vanguard of I Corps was in the process of deploying when Baron Delcambre returned. He informed Comte d’Erlon of the desperate situation at Quatre Bras and gave him the message from Maréchal Ney, which allowed him to decide upon the appropriate course of action. Comte d’Erlon sought the views of his staff officers, and based upon these he sent orders to Comte Durutte and Baron Jacquinot to remain in their current positions and to display the utmost caution, while he marched back to Frasnes with the remaining divisions of the corps. Shortly before 7:00pm Philibert-Guillaume, Comte Duhesme, the commander of the Jeune Garde, ordered the two brigades and the artillery to attack the hamlets and villages on the extreme left of the French line. The 1st Brigade, consisting of the 1er Régiment de Tirailleurs and the 1er Régiment de Voltigeurs, advanced at the pas de charge, covered by a tremendous cannonade. The Prussian troops belonging to the 5th Brigade withdrew under heavy fire from St Amand le Hameau, and fell back to Wagnelée. Their retreat was covered by the cavalry commanded by Generalmajor von Wahlen-Jürgass, which had been enhanced by the addition of the cavalry under Oberst Friedrich von der Marwitz from III Korps. But they were also subjected to a violent artillery bombardment and suffered heavily. Oberst Heinrich von Thümen, who commanded the 1st Brigade of Reserve Cavalry, was decapitated by a roundshot in the midst of the action as the Prussians retired. The attack by the Jeune Garde was supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division from III Corps. Baron Domon ordered the 1st Brigade to advance and threaten the right flank of the Prussian infantry as it fell back upon Wagnelée. Encouraged by the success of their comrades, the 7th Division, which had sustained severe losses in the various actions, moved forward and was joined by the 4th Division, commanded by Comte Durutte, and the cavalry under Baron Jacquinot from I Corps, who deployed in order to attack the Prussian troops at Wagnelée. Although the situation was unfavourable at St Amand le Hameau and Wagnelée, the Prussians still held St Amand la Haie and the majority of St Amand. Feldmarschall Blücher and the high command knew the importance of maintaining these points, and subsequently orders were sent to reinforce the
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Deployment of d’Erlon’s I Corps, 6:30pm on 16 June 1815
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garrison at St Amand la Haie with the final reserves from the 6th Brigade, and to support them further with battalions from the 7th Brigade commanded by Generalmajor Friedrich von Brause. The 1st Battalion of the 26. InfanterieRegiment entered the streets to the north of the hamlet, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 14. Infanterie-Regiment took positions immediately in rear of St Amand la Haie. In addition, the 3rd Battalion of the 14. InfanterieRegiment along with the 3rd Battalion of the 22. Infanterie-Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 2. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment moved forward to positions on the slope in front of Brye. The remaining four battalions of the brigade were posted close to the Namur road, to act as a final reserve. The Prussians now had 30 infantry battalions and in excess of 50 cavalry squadrons deployed on the right wing. By massing their troops in this way, they had exposed the centre. Fortunately for the Prussian high command the battle on the left wing and the area south-east of Sombreffe was dominated by skirmishing and exchanges of artillery fire. When the French tirailleurs from the 14th Division succeeded in gaining ground, detachments from the various battalions deployed on the heights descended into the valley and pushed them back. Towards 7:30pm Generallieutenant Johann, Freiherr von Thielmann, who commanded III Korps, ordered number 7. Schwere Batterie, composed of six 12-pdr guns and two 10-pdr howitzers, and number 19. Reitende Batterie to move across the road to Fleurus. This movement was covered by two squadrons from the 7. Dragoner-Regiment and supported by the remainder of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under the command of Oberst Heinrich, Graf von Wylich und Lottum. The artillery commenced a strong cannonade against the cavalry belonging to II Reserve Cavalry Corps, but was assailed by the French guns attached to this formation. The two squadrons from the 7. Dragoner-Regiment charged the guns, only to be met by squadrons from the 5e and 13e Régiments de Dragons. The Prussian cavalry was thrown back in disorder and the French pursued. They rode towards the two batteries positioned in front of the road and captured five of the guns from number 19. Reitende Batterie. The remaining guns retreated in some confusion towards their previous positions, and their movement was covered by the 3rd Battalion of the 1. Kurmärkisches LandwehrInfanterie-Regiment, which had taken post to the south-east of Sombreffe.
DETERMINED RESISTANCE AT ST AMAND AND LIGNY Napoleon had manoeuvred his troops with masterly precision to gain an advantage over his opponents in the centre of the line. The emperor could see the Prussians had committed almost all of their reserves to the contest around St Amand la Haie and Wagnelée, and determined to increase the pressure on his adversaries at these points by directing Édouard, Comte Milhaud to send the 13th Cavalry Division to the left wing. Their arrival immediately led to the 1. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment and the Westphälisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment, which were attached to the 1st and 2nd Brigades under Steinmetz and Pirch II, as well as the 6. Uhlanen-Regiment and the 2. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment from the cavalry brigade commanded by Oberstlieutenant Adolph von Lützow, to move from their positions in rear of St Amand and Ligny to the Prussian right, thereby weakening the centre and the 74 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
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French Army (under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte) 1. 44e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger (two battalions) 2. 50e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger (two battalions) 3. 8e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (three squadrons) 4. 6e Régiment de Hussards (three squadrons) 5. Artillery attached to 10th Cavalry Division (one battery) 6. 9e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger (three battalions) 7. Artillery attached to 9th Cavalry Division (one battery) 8. Artillery attached to 4th Cavalry Division (one battery) 9. 20e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 10. 15e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 11. 13e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 12. 5e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 13. 5e Régiment de Hussards (three squadrons) 14. 4e Régiment de Hussards (four squadrons) 15. 17e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 16. 14e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 17. 12e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons) 18. 4e Régiment de Dragons (three squadrons)
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A contemporary depiction of the brutal hand-to-hand fighting between the rival forces engaged at Ligny. Accounts of the action suggest that the contest was at its height earlier in the day. Coloured engraving by Theodor G. Böttger. (Musée de l’Armée, Brussels) Claude-Étienne, Comte Guyot commanded the heavy cavalry of the Garde Impériale during the campaign. He was one of the outstanding horsemen the emperor could call upon at Ligny. Painting by Antoine-Jean Gros. (Private collection)
defence of the two villages further still. By 7:00pm the Prussian troops defending St Amand were desperately short of ammunition and exhausted by the long struggle. The officers and men from the 1st Brigade under Generalmajor von Steinmetz had been joined by the 1st Battalion of the 26. InfanterieRegiment from the 6th Brigade, but their ability to resist the attacks upon the village was greatly diminished. Their courage however was not, and they displayed the utmost determination to maintain their positions in the face of renewed attacks from the front and right flank. The brutal fighting at Ligny had taken its toll and the wounded from both sides were streaming to the rear. The attack by the five battalions from Generalmajor von Krafft’s brigade, in concert with those commanded by Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck and Jagow, had succeeded in pushing the French back beyond the brook. Following a protracted engagement along both banks, the Prussians crossed the wooden bridges and occupied a number of the buildings on the right bank. However, the French still occupied the churchyard and unlimbered two artillery pieces here. A low wall lined the side of the churchyard opposite the brook, and this provided cover to the French troops. Subsequently, the numerous attempts by the Prussians to storm the position were greeted by a deadly hail of fire. To the west the roof of the château was ablaze, and the fire became so pronounced that part of the Prussian garrison was forced to jump from the first-floor windows and over the high walls into the surrounding fields to escape. Ligny was filled with choking black smoke, as a number of the buildings had been set alight, and a dark plume rose into the air above the village. The artillery of the Garde Impériale had commenced a ferocious bombardment of the positions held by the Prussians on the left bank at Ligny, which had begun to take effect. The 5e Compagnie du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied, which was attached to the 1er Régiment de Grenadiers à Pied, together with the 6e Compagnie de Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied, which was attached to the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied, had unlimbered between Ligny and St Amand and were dealing death and destruction on the units from the 3rd and 4th Brigades which were stationed in the streets to the west. Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck received the order to evacuate the village and to assemble the remnants of his brigade near the Bois du Loup, and to ensure that the troops replenished their ammunition. This was a difficult manoeuvre as part of the 4. Westphälisches Landwehr-
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Infanterie-Regiment was still involved in the battle. The withdrawal of the 4th Brigade, and several other battalions which automatically fell back at this time to seek more ammunition, placed greater burden on the 3rd and 6th Brigades. Shortly before 7:30pm Generalmajor von Krafft sent his adjutant, Capitaine Heinrich von Stülpnagel, to Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command to inform them that Ligny could only be held by an extraordinary effort. He was told that the village must be retained.
NAPOLEON ORDERS THE GARDE IMPÉRIALE TO ATTACK The situation at Ligny was precarious for the Prussians and, realizing this, Napoleon decided to make a final decisive effort. As a thunderstorm shrouded the battlefield in darkness, he launched the Garde Impériale. Six infantry battalions advanced towards the village to join with the three battalions of the 3e and 4e Régiments de Grenadiers à Pied. On the left, the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Pied marched in column by divisions. Two hundred paces to their right were the 2e Régiment de Grenadiers à Pied. They were followed by the 1er Régiment de Grenadiers à Pied. These troops marched in columns by divisions at half battalion distance. A third column comprised the artillery, which supported this movement. Napoleon left the windmill at Naveau and mounted his horse. He accompanied the veterans most of the way to Ligny, together with the four duty squadrons. Napoleon hoped that by capturing the village he would isolate the formations on the Prussian right wing from the rest of their army. The 1er, 2e and 3e Compagnies du Régiment d’Artillerie à Pied, each armed with six 12-pdr guns and two 6in. howitzers, formed a massed battery to cannonade the defenders prior to the attack. At the same time the cuirassiers belonging to the 14th Cavalry Division under Baron Jacques-Antoine Delort, which was part of IV Reserve Cavalry Corps, took a position immediately behind the infantry of the Garde Impériale. It was almost 8:00pm when the attack commenced. The 3e and 4e Régiments de Grenadiers à Pied loaded their weapons and advanced in dense columns. Behind them and to the right was the heavy cavalry of the Garde Impériale commanded by Claude-Étienne, Comte Guyot while to the left were the cuirassiers. As the infantry marched towards Ligny they were assailed by the guns posted on the heights in rear of the village and those to the southwest. But the troops
LEFT The duty squadron of the Grenadiers à Cheval, gallantly charged the 2nd Battalion of the 21. Infanterie-Regiment. They succeeded in driving the Prussian infantry back towards Brye. Print by Martinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris) RIGHT The French cuirassiers had gained a reputation as fierce men mounted on very large horses. Those of the 14th Cavalry Division commanded by Baron Jacques-Antoine Delort were involved in the final moments of the battle. Print by Martinet. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
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Napoleon had ridden forward with the troops prior to the final attack upon Ligny, and he observed the dying embers of the battle from a position adjacent to the high road leading from Fleurus to Sombreffe. Coloured engraving after Gudin. (Author’s collection)
The village of St Amand can be seen in flames on the right of the illustration, as the troops of III Corps advance during the closing stages of the battle. Coloured engraving by Thomas Yung. (McGill University, Montréal)
quickened their step and advanced at the double. As they reached the outskirts of Ligny the French artillery suspended its bombardment, and the grenadiers were joined by elements of Comte Gérard’s IV Corps. The leading files formed into sections or half-sections and entered the streets without encountering any resistance. The 3e and 4e Régiments de Grenadiers à Pied crossed Ligny and approached the wooden bridges across the brook, the banks of which were piled with bodies. Once they had formed on the left bank of the Ligne they continued their march, although subject to a torrent of musket fire from the Prussian troops who had taken cover within the buildings. But this was insufficient to stop the progress of the veterans. Having driven the defenders from their positions by a savage bayonet charge, the three battalions reached the northern perimeter of the village and prepared to debouch into the fields beyond and to attack the enemy on the heights. While the vanguard moved rapidly through the streets of Ligny, the two battalions of the 2e Régiment de Grenadiers à Pied followed in their wake, together with the duty squadrons. The entire body now exited the village. Because of the close proximity of the Prussian cavalry, the infantry formed in battalion squares at the foot of the slope and started to advance towards Brye. Shortly thereafter, both battalions of the 1er Régiment de Grenadiers à Pied, along with the two battalions of the 1er Chasseurs à Pied, exited the village on the right, and began to advance towards Sombreffe. The troops from IV Corps remained within Ligny. As the infantry of the Garde Impériale began to ascend the declivity, the cuirassiers commanded by Baron Delort moved into the fields to the north of Ligny, followed by the 3e and 4e Compagnies du Régiment d’Artillerie à Cheval, which had moved with the cavalry around the eastern side of the village. The guns unlimbered and within minutes were exchanging fire with the Prussian artillery stationed on the heights in front of Brye. As the cuirassiers trotted forward the guns were repositioned so that the formations on the crest of the ridge came within their range. The barrage from the opposing artillery resembled peals of thunder.
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CAVALRY CHARGES IN THE FIELDS BEFORE BRYE Feldmarschall Blücher observed the French emerging from Ligny and immediately sent his adjutant, Graf von Nostitz, to ascertain the situation of the troops which had been expelled from the village. But as soon as the staff officer mounted his horse the Prussian high command were the subject of intense cannon fire from the artillery which had appeared to the east of Ligny. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Hardinge, the British military commissioner attached to the Prussian headquarters, was severely wounded by a ball that pitched in front of the group of horsemen and bounced on the hard ground, before striking him violently on the left hand. He was taken to the rear where the wounded hand was amputated. When Graf von Nostitz reached the scene he found that Generalmajor von Krafft was collecting a number of his units in rear of Ligny. The infantry were afforded the time to reassemble because Major Wilhelm von Wulffen led a gallant charge at the head of the Westphälisches Landwehr-KavallerieRegiment against the Garde Impériale. But despite repeated efforts to breach the squares the veterans stood firm and the attack was repelled. The two cavalry squadrons retired. Generalmajor von Krafft now hastily formed the troops under his command into squares as the cuirassiers advanced. It was a harrowing ordeal for many of the young Prussian soldiers, but both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment distinguished themselves in the encounter. Oberstlieutenant Leopold von Reckow, who commanded the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 21. Infanterie-Regiment, ordered them to move forward into the front line to cover the withdrawal of their comrades. They were joined by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment from the 3rd Brigade in attempting to prevent the French from reaching the heights. Each of these battalions came under heavy artillery fire and was charged by the enemy cavalry. Yet they managed to hold their ground in the face of the onslaught. The charge against the 2nd Battalion of the 21. Infanterie-Regiment was executed by a squadron of Grenadiers à Cheval, one of Dragons de l’Impératrice and a company of Gendarmerie d’Elite. They succeeded in driving the Prussian troops back towards Brye. The Prussian leaders were now confronted by the decisive moment of the battle and had little alternative but to throw the remaining cavalry into the fray. Feldmarschall Blücher ordered three of the regiments commanded by Generallieutenant Friedrich von Roeder to charge. The 6. Uhlanen-Regiment, led by Oberstlieutenant Adolph von Lützow, moved to the front, followed by the 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner-Regiment, who were led by Generallieutenant von Roeder in person. These were supported by the 2. Kurmärkisches LandwehrKavallerie-Regiment. The Uhlans charged downhill towards the duty squadrons, forcing them to retire and re-form behind the infantry squares. However, the
Feldmarschall Blücher and several members of the high command joined the charge by the 6. Uhlanen-Regiment in a desperate attempt to cover the Prussian infantry as the battalions retreated. Painting by Ludwig Elsholtz. (Pushkin Museum, Moscow)
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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km
PRUSSIAN FORMATIONS (GEBHARD LEBRECHT, FÜRST BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT) A. 1st Brigade Reserve Cavalry III Korps (Marwitz) B. 7th Brigade (Brause) C. 2nd Brigade Reserve Cavalry I Korps (Lützow) D. 12th Brigade (Stülpnagel) E. 9th Brigade (Borcke) F. 11th Brigade (Luck und Witten) G. 10th Brigade (Kemphen) H. Reserve Cavalry III Korps (Hobe) I. 1st Brigade Rserve Cavalry II Korps (Thümen) J. 2nd Brigade Reserve Cavalry II Korps (Sohr) K. 2nd Brigade (Pirch II) L. 3rd Brigade (Jagow) M. 5th Brigade (Tippelskirch) N. 6th Brigade (Krafft) O. Reserve Artillery I Korps (Lehmann) P. 1st Brigade Reserve Cavalry I Korps (Treskow) Q. 4th Brigade (Henckel von Donnersmarck) R. 1st Brigade (Steinmetz)
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BLÜCHER
ROMAN ROAD
D HIGH ROAD FROM NIVELLES TO NAMUR
MARBAIS M
C
2
B A
L 1
LIGNY
J
1
Q
BRYE I 2
K
N
M
P O
WAGNELÉE
4
R
7
3
TOMBE DE LIGNY
ST. AMAND
8 5
11
ST AMAND LA HAIE
ST AMAND LE HAMEAU
9 10 18
6
FLEURUS
HIGH ROAD FROM FLEURUS TO MELLET
THE FINAL ASSAULT Situation at Ligny, 8:00pm on 16 June 1815 80 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
FRENCH FORMATIONS (EMPEROR NAPOLEON BONAPARTE) HIGH ROAD FROM FLEURUS TO CHARLEROI
POINT DU JOUR BOTHEY H F SOMBREFFE G
E
LIGNE BROOK TONGRINNE
1. 1st Cavalry Division (Jacquinot) 2. 5th Cavalry Division (Subervie) 3. 4th Infantry Division (Durutte) 4. 7th Infantry Division (Girard) 5. 3rd Cavalry Division (Domon) 6. Chasseurs à Pied of the Garde Impériale (Morand) 7. Corps of the Jeune Garde (Duhesme) 8. 11th Infantry Division (Berthézène) 9. 8th Infantry Division (Lefol) 10. 10th Infantry Division (Habert) 11. 13th Infantry Division (Vichery) 12. 12th Infantry Division (Pécheux) 13. Grenadiers à Pied of the Garde Impériale (Friant) 14. 14th Infantry Division (Hulot) 15. 6th Cavalry Division (Maurin) 16. II Reserve Cavalry Corps (Exelmans) 17. I Reserve Cavalry Corps (Pajol) 18. Garde Impériale (Drouot) 19. IV Reserve Cavalry Corps (Milhaud)
BALÂTRE
TONGRENELLE
15 14
12
BOIGNÉE
17 13
16
3 XXXX
NAPOLEON
19
EVENTS 1. By 7:30pm the Prussian high command had been compelled to commit a substantial number of infantry and cavalry formations to the contest raging around Wagnelée and St Amand le Hameau on the right of the line, as well as St Amand la Haie and St Amand towards the centre. The commitment of the infantry brigades and the reserve cavalry from II Korps commanded by Generalmajor von Pirch I to this point meant that some 30 infantry battalions and in excess of 50 cavalry squadrons were embroiled in the struggle for these hamlets and villages. At this time the fighting around Tongrinne and Tongrenelle intensified as the artillery and cavalry attached to III Korps attempted to gain ground on the left of the Prussian line.
2. The French artillery had maintained a fierce bombardment of the positions held by the Prussians on the left bank at Ligny, and this had begun to take effect. The village was filled with choking black smoke, as a number of the buildings had been set alight, and a dark plume rose into the air. Generalmajor Henckel von Donnersmarck received the order to evacuate the village and to assemble the remnants of the 4th Brigade near the Bois du Loup. The withdrawal of these troops, with several other battalions that automatically fell back at this time to seek more ammunition, placed greater burden on the 3rd and 6th Brigades. Shortly thereafter, Generalmajor von Krafft sent his adjutant to Feldmarschall Blücher and the Prussian high command to inform them that Ligny could only be held by an extraordinary effort. 3. Towards 8:00pm Napoleon gave the order for the Garde Impériale to enter the fray at Ligny, and rode to the head of the troops, accompanied by the four duty squadrons. Six battalions of the Vieille Garde advanced through the fields towards the village, before joining with the three battalions already at Ligny. The infantry columns were supported by the heavy cavalry and the artillery of the Garde Impériale. These were followed by the cuirassiers of the 14th Cavalry Division commanded by Baron Delort.
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LEFT An officer of the Schlesisches Uhlanen-Regiment. The Prussian high command was unable to call upon their heavy cavalry regiments during the campaign, and so the task of stemming the French tide was left to the light regiments. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris) RIGHT An Uhlan from the Brandenburgisches UhlanenRegiment. The Prussian Uhlans were armed with lances together with sabres, which they carried in metal scabbards, as shown in this contemporary illustration. Print by Genty. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris)
Uhlans pursued them. They passed between the intervals close to the square formed by the 4e Régiment de Grenadiers, and by doing so were not assailed by musket fire because the French troops were fearful of shooting their countrymen in the adjacent formation. The impetus of the charge prevented some of the horsemen from clearing a hollow ditch, and several riders were unseated. At this moment the cuirassiers advanced in overwhelming numbers. Many Uhlans were cut down and taken prisoner. Among those captured was Oberstlieutenant von Lützow. The remainder fled towards the heights. Seeing that the situation was desperate, Feldmarschall Blücher and several of his staff officers joined the charge by the 1. Westpreußisches DragonerRegiment. But the cavalry were taken in flank by the cuirassiers and went about. The only body not to withdraw in disorder was the 2. Kurmärkisches LandwehrKavallerie-Regiment. It launched two unsuccessful charges against the infantry squares before being forced to disengage. As Blücher retired, his horse was struck by a musket ball behind the girths on the left side. The elderly Hussar called to Graf von Nostitz as the horse fell to the right, pinning him to the ground. Nostitz dismounted, his horse also having been wounded, and rushed to his commander’s side. The cuirassiers had pursued on the heels of the Prussian cavalry, but amidst the confusion they passed over Blücher and his adjutant. Fortunately for the two men, several Prussian cavalry squadrons had re-formed and charged, together with reinforcements from the brigade commanded by Generalmajor Karl von Treskow. They drove the cuirassiers back and came upon the leader of the army in the gathering darkness. Feldmarschall Blücher was pulled from beneath the stricken animal by several Uhlans, and hoisted onto the horse belonging to Unteroffizier Gottfried Schneider. He was led to safety by Graf von Nostitz, Major Karl, Freiherr von dem Bussche-Ippenburg and the men, and taken to the village of Mellery, 3 miles to the rear.
During the final stages of the battle Feldmarschall Blücher was thrown to the ground and pinned beneath his stricken horse. Fortunately, Graf von Nostitz had witnessed the fall and immediately rushed to the elderly commander’s aid. Painting by Abraham Cooper. (© National Trust Images)
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THE PRUSSIANS RETREAT NORTH TOWARDS TILLY With Feldmarschall Blücher dazed and removed from the field of battle, the burden of saving the Prussian Army fell upon Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau and Generalmajor von Grolman. Amidst the confusion Gneisenau decided to retreat to Tilly, a small village 2 miles to the north of Brye. An order was sent to Generallieutenant von Roeder to cover the retreat with the remaining cavalry under his command, while officers rode to the various brigade commanders with instructions. However, many of the infantry battalions had become separated from their brigades, as they attempted to replenish their ammunition, and because of this the situation was impossible to manage in the normal way. The staff officers subsequently rode between the groups of men that were clustered together and told them to make their way back towards Tilly where the brigades would be re-formed. The majority of the 1st Brigade under Generalmajor von Steinmetz had already been withdrawn to a position to the south-west of Sombreffe, and from here the various battalions withdrew through the fields towards Tilly. The troops belonging to the 4th Brigade under Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck did likewise, while those from the 3rd Brigade which had been engaged at Ligny retired via Brye. A rearguard was formed by the 2nd Brigade close to the windmill of Bussy. The brigade was joined by number 6. Schwere Batterie, containing six 12-pdr guns and two 10-pdr howitzers, and number 34. Fußbatterie. The Westphälisches Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment were also present and covered the artillery. But when the order was finally given for the brigade to fall back, number 3. Fußbatterie, from the 2nd Brigade, was overtaken and a gun was lost to the Dragons de l’Impératrice. Further to the west, at St Amand la Haie and Wagnelée, the Prussians fell back in good order. Generalmajor von Krafft ordered the 6th Brigade to retire from the hamlet and farm of la Haie towards the heights of Brye. This movement was covered by the 3rd Battalion of the 26. Infanterie-Regiment. But when they had expended all of their ammunition the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment took their place. The troops belonging to the 5th Brigade deployed at Wagnelée, together with those of the 7th Brigade which had been fighting at St Amand la Haie, were covered by the cavalry under Oberst von der Marwitz. They retreated slowly to the Namur road and marched from there in the direction of Tilly, although menaced by the 3e and 4e Régiments de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers from the 1st Cavalry Division commanded by Baron Charles-Claude Jacquinot. While the right wing of the Prussian Army abandoned the field of battle and moved to the rear, the left wing made every effort to maintain the ground it occupied, and by so doing assist in the general withdrawal. When the Garde Impériale conquered Ligny, Baron Étienne Hulot advanced with the 14th Division and seized the bridge over the Ligne brook on the Sombreffe road. This movement was supported by the 1st Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division,
The French cavalry rode past the prone commander on several occasions without recognizing his person. He was eventually pulled from beneath his dead horse and taken to safety. Coloured aquatint by Charles Warren. (Anne SK Brown Military Collection, Rhode Island)
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1
2
THE CHARGE BY THE GRENADIERS À CHEVAL OF THE GARDE IMPÉRIALE (PP. 84–85) It was approaching 8:00pm in the evening when Napoleon ordered the attack upon Ligny to commence. Having given the order the emperor left his position at the windmill of Naveau and mounted his horse, then accompanied the veterans of the Garde Impériale most of the way to Ligny. The sky was dark, as a rain storm had briefly enveloped the battlefield. The four duty squadrons of cavalry, which were designated to the emperor’s personal service, also trotted forward. The 3e and 4e Régiments de Grenadiers à Pied loaded their weapons and advanced in dense columns. Behind them and to the right was the heavy cavalry of the Garde Impériale commanded by Comte Guyot, while to the left were the cuirassiers of the 14th Cavalry Division under Baron Delort. The Grenadiers, with troops from IV Corps, passed through Ligny and debouched into the fields beyond. Because of the close proximity of the Prussian cavalry the infantry formed in battalion squares at the foot of the slope and began to advance towards Brye. This movement was covered by the cuirassiers and the duty squadrons. The Prussian cavalry now launched several charges against the French infantry squares, but these were repulsed. Generalmajor von Krafft formed the troops under his command into squares as the sizeable body of
cuirassiers advanced. This was a harrowing ordeal for the young Prussian soldiers, but both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kolbergsches Infanterie-Regiment distinguished themselves in the encounter. Nonetheless, the Prussian infantry was compelled to fall back. Oberstlieutenant von Reckow, who commanded the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 21. Infanterie-Regiment, ordered them to move into the front line to cover the withdrawal of their comrades. The 2nd Battalion was commanded by Major von Platen and comprised 857 officers and men (2). It was a strong battalion. They were joined by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29. Infanterie-Regiment from the 3rd Brigade in attempting to prevent the French from reaching the heights. They managed to hold their ground in the face of the onslaught, but were now charged by the various duty squadrons. The squadron of Grenadiers à Cheval (1) were followed by the Dragons de l’Impératrice and then a company of Gendarmerie d’Elite. These fearsome horsemen, who represented the very best of the French Army and who had charged at Gilly during the fighting on the 15th, when Lieutenant-général Letort, Comte de Lorville had been mortally wounded, succeeded in driving the young Prussian troops back towards Brye.
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which threatened to encroach further. Freiherr von Thielmann, who commanded III Korps deployed in this sector, established a strong defensive line through Sombreffe and ordered his brigade commanders to hold the village while the bodies retired on the right wing. Boignée, Tongrinne and Tongrenelle were gradually relinquished due to the pressure from the French cavalry against the left wing. Two guns from number 12. Fußbatterie were lost during the engagement around Sombreffe, but in the main the Prussians troops were able to fall back in good order under the cover of darkness. The French possessed the battlefield. The Jeune Garde, together with the remnants of the 7th Division and the various units from III Corps, emerged from Wagnelée, St Amand la Haie and St Amand, and took positions in the fields to the north. Comte Vandamme established his headquarters in St Amand, while Comte Gérard moved to Ligny. The battalions of the Vieille Garde which led the attack occupied Brye and Sombreffe. Meanwhile, VI Corps under Comte Lobau arrived. It passed through Fleurus and took a position between Sombreffe and Tongrinnes. Maréchal Grouchy and the various cavalry corps were on the right wing. But the onset of night prevented them from pursuing beyond the Namur road.
In the immediate aftermath of the defeat at Sombreffe, Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau decided to re-form the Prussian Army at Tilly, 2 miles to the north of Brye. This was later altered, and Wavre became the point of concentration. Painting by Richard Knötel. (Mary Evans Picture Library)
WELLINGTON HOLDS THE FRENCH AT QUATRE BRAS Having received the message from Seconde-Lieutenant von Wussow towards 7:00pm, the Duke of Wellington launched an offensive against the French at Quatre Bras. The Brunswick troops, who had lost their beloved duke earlier in the contest, were moved forward between the Bois de Bossu and the high road from Brussels to Charleroi. In the centre the Allies seized the initiative and the French infantry were compelled to retire. The Light Companies of the 2nd Guards Brigade pursued them across the field, but the French cavalry opposed their advance. To counter this, oblique artillery fire poured upon the various French formations in column to the south of Gémioncourt, which forced them to withdraw. On the left of the Allied line at Piraumont, the Hanoverian troops from Count Friedrich von Kielmansegge’s Brigade attacked the enemy holding the Bois de l’Hutte. Comte Piré, who commanded the cavalry within II Corps, had observed the Allied attacks and ordered his lanciers to charge. They were joined by the dragons from III Reserve Cavalry Corps and the Lanciers Rouges of the Garde Impériale. The horsemen burst upon the two battalions of 1st Foot Guards who had exited the Bois de Bossu and inflicted severe casualties. 87 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Retreat of the Prussian Army to Wavre, 9:00pm on 16 June 1815 XXX
N
Prussian Army (under Gebhard, Fürst Blücher von Wahlstadt) A. III Korps (Thielmann) B. General Headquarters (Grolman) C. I Korps (Zieten) D. II Korps (Pirch I)
A
Grolman establishes the Prussian headquarters in Wavre. XXXX
Wavre
B
XXX
XXX
C
D
Bierges
Dion-le-Mont
Limal
La Baraque
Corbais Nil St Vincent Mont St Guibert Walhain
r
ive
eR
Dyl
Sart-à-Walhain
Baudeset Blücher and Gneisenau spend the night in Mellery.
Gentinnes
Mellery
Villeroux
Gembloux
Tilly oad
an R
Rom
Marbais
Sombreffe XX
1
XXX
2
XX
6
3 8
XX
Napoleon retires to the Château de la Paix in Fleurus.
9
0
XXXX
Fleurus
3 miles 3km
XXX
4 XXX
XXX
7
0
XXX
XXX
11
XXX
10
5
French Army (under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte) 1. 7th Division (Matis) 2. Garde Impériale (Drouot) 3. VI Corps (Lobau) 4. II Reserve Cavalry Corps (Exelmans) 5. I Reserve Cavalry Corps (Pajol) 6. 1st Cavalry Division (Jacquinot) 7. 4th Division (Durutte) 8. III Corps (Vandamme) 9. IV Corps (Gérard) 10. IV Reserve Cavalry Corps (Milhaud) 11. Imperial Headquarters (Soult)
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Instinctively, the British troops sought protection in the hollow track along the edge of the wood, and with supporting fire from the Brunswick Avantgarde they succeeded in driving the French cavalry back. The frantic engagement momentarily threatened to stop the Allied advance, but the sheer weight of numbers Wellington could call upon, aligned with the length of time the French had been in the field, had begun to tell. Shortly after 8:00pm the first of the British cavalry reached the crossroads at Quatre Bras. This was the 23rd Light Dragoons, which formed part of the brigade commanded by Major-General Wilhelm von Dörnberg stationed at Mons. The cavalry had ridden from the frontier where they had been on outpost duty, and immediately upon their arrival a detachment was sent forward to reconnoitre the enemy and their movements to the south of the Bois de Bossu. Further reinforcements arrived in the form of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Nassau-Usingen Regiment. They took a position on the right of the high road, close to the crossroads, where they awaited the arrival of their comrades in the 3rd Battalion. Gémioncourt had been the point from where the French had launched their attacks against the Allied centre, and now it became the focus of the Allied commander’s attention. With support from the Lüneburg Landwehr Battalion, Sir Colin Halkett ordered the composite Light Infantry Battalion from the 5th British Brigade to advance towards the farm. This movement was also supported by the 30th Regiment of Foot and two horse artillery pieces. The French infantry to the west of Gémioncourt, between the high road and the Bois de Bossu, retired slowly towards the farm complex to gain support on their right flank. This movement enabled the remainder of the 5th Brigade, together with the Brunswick troops, to advance steadily. The French were disinclined to continue the contest. They withdrew slowly from the buildings and the immediate vicinity, back towards the positions they had occupied around Frasnes at the beginning of the day. The battle was over. The Allied troops had maintained their ground, albeit with a degree of good fortune and without being able to render any direct assistance to the Prussian Army. Towards 9:00pm the Duke of Wellington and his sizeable entourage retired to Genappe where his headquarters were established at the Hôtel du Roi d’Espagne. Here, he dictated several orders concerning the deployment of outposts and communication between the two wings of the Allied Army during the night. The Hereditary Prince of Orange-Nassau left the battlefield at the same time as the duke, and rode with his Chief of Staff to the headquarters of the 2nd Netherlands Division in Nivelles, before retiring to the residence of Madame de Robin. As the veil of darkness slowly enveloped the battlefield, Maréchal Ney ordered the entire force at his disposal to withdraw to the heights of Frasnes and to establish a strong line of outposts in front of this point. Thereafter, he retired to his headquarters at the Maison Dumont in Gosselies, where at 10:00pm he wrote a short account of the events to Maréchal Soult. Ney praised the valour of the troops under the command of Comte Reille and the cuirassiers led by Comte Valmy, but he declared that he had been deprived of a fine victory by the order which summoned Comte d’Erlon and I Corps to St Amand. The weary commander of the left wing dined with Comte de Flahaut, the emperor’s aide-de-camp, who had remained with him at Quatre Bras throughout the day. They awaited their instructions from the imperial headquarters at Fleurus, and details of the outcome of the fighting with the Prussians. 89 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
AFTERMATH
The village of Ligny as it appeared in the aftermath of the battle. The château can be seen on the right of the illustration, with the village on the left. Coloured engraving by James Rouse. (Private collection / The Stapleton Collection / Bridgeman Images)
By 11:00pm the fighting had stopped and the field of battle was shrouded in darkness. The silence of the night was broken only by the groans of the dying and the calls for water from the wounded, who covered the fields and littered the streets of the hamlets and villages in vast numbers. Napoleon was exhausted. The tension of the battle aligned with the heat of the day had taken their toll. He retired to Fleurus where he spent the night at the Château de la Paix. The imperial headquarters were established in the immediate vicinity at the Château de Zualart, and the two premises were guarded by several pieces of field artillery and the 2e, 3e and 4e Régiments de Chasseurs à Pied de la Garde Impériale. No orders or instructions were issued to the army. However, in the small hours Soult wrote to Maréchal Davout in Paris, informing him of the victory which had been gained. Towards midnight Gneisenau arrived in Mellery to meet with Feldmarschall Blücher, who had been taken to one of the houses in the
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village. The elderly commander was badly bruised on his right side and shoulder. Gneisenau explained the situation as best he could, based upon the information at his disposal, and the two agreed on a course of action to reassemble the army at Wavre. Graf von Nostitz and several staff officers were dispatched to inform the troops that, contrary to the rumours which had spread, Blücher had not been captured. In addition, a number of the remaining staff officers were sent out on various missions. Seconde-Lieutenant von Wussow was instructed to establish order in the retreating columns. He rode along the crowded roads to the wood at Lauzelle, where together with some officers and men he erected an abatis. As the mass of troops approached on the road, they were slowly collected and then redirected to Wavre. While this was being undertaken, Generalmajor von Grolman arrived at the inn on the marketplace in Wavre, which he selected as a suitable venue for the headquarters. From here he wrote to the various brigade commanders. Gneisenau also sent Major Karl von Weyrach with a message for the commander of IV Korps at Hannut, Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz. He was informed of the loss at Sombreffe and told to collect his troops at Dion-leMont, to the south-east of Wavre. It was now that Major Friedrich von Massow was also dispatched with a message for the Duke of Wellington, who was believed to be at Quatre Bras. The Prussian high command wished to know his intentions. From their different headquarters in Mellery and Wavre, Gneisenau, Grolman and the various staff officers worked feverishly through the night writing letters and attempting to restore order in the army. They prepared for the remainder of the campaign. This was in stark contrast to their adversaries.
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THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
The farm of la Haye (formerly la Haie), which the French 7th Division held gallantly during the course of the battle and where Baron Jean-Baptiste Girard received his mortal wound. (Photograph by JeanFrançois Schmitz)
One of the principal characteristics that immediately strike visitors to the battlefield is the vast area over which the fighting took place on 16 June 1815. Unlike the fields at Quatre Bras and Mont St Jean, scene of the battle of Waterloo, which were extremely small, the hamlets and villages in which the contest raged were spread over 20 square miles. Each of these locations has changed considerably since the day of the battle, but there are many landmarks to enjoy that evoke memories of the men who fought and died so courageously. In the heart of Ligny is a Napoleon-themed museum that recalls the emperor’s final victory. It is housed within an old farm which served as a hospital after the battle. The collection contains artefacts found in the fields, and these are supplemented by old photographs and maps, dioramas and mannequins in period costume. Another relic of the battle is the farm of d’En Haut. The Prussians defended the site with great tenacity during the afternoon and evening, and a large plaque on the exterior wall records the attack by two divisions from IV Corps. To the west are the villages of St Amand, La Haye (formerly St Amand la Haie) and Wagnelée. A gentle stroll through the streets will enable those with a fertile mind to imagine the scenes, as there are an abundance of contemporary houses still in existence. The most engaging property is the farm of La Haye. During the battle the French 7th Division met waves of attacks from behind the whitewashed walls. It was here that Baron Jean-Baptiste Girard received his mortal wound. A small plaque was erected in 1990 to commemorate the bitter struggle. The presbytery in Sombreffe, where Blücher established his headquarters on the eve of the battle, is extant. However, the windmill on the heights of Bussy at Brye, from where the Prussian high command
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Despite changes to the terrain the battlefield is still defined by the Ligne brook, which meanders across the meadows and through Ligny, as it did during the height of the battle. (Photograph by Jean-François Schmitz)
observed the battle, and where they met with the Duke of Wellington, was destroyed in 1895. Fortunately, the locations associated with Napoleon’s residence are in good order. The windmill at Naveau has become the site of a large monument commemorating three French victories around Fleurus in 1690, 1794 and of course, in 1815. The windmill served as the emperor’s observation point and although the top and sails are no longer present, the general elevation can be seen from the street below. The Château de la Paix, where Napoleon spent the night following the battle, remains. This is no longer a private residence as it was in 1815, but is the town hall and civic centre. A metal plaque in the courtyard celebrates the fact that Napoleon was present during the campaign. Yet of all the things which define the battlefield, none is more relevant than the Ligne brook. It still meanders through the centre of Ligny and across the meadows as it did during the height of the battle on that momentous day.
The farm of d’en Haut at Ligny is a relic of the battle. It was defended resolutely by the Prussian troops during the late afternoon against attacks from two divisions of IV Corps. (Photograph by Jean-François Schmitz)
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FURTHER READING Aerts, W., Waterloo, opérations de l’armée prussienne du Bas-Rhin pendant la campagne de Belgique en 1815, depuis, la bataille de Ligny jusqu’a l’entrée en France des troupes prussiennes Brussels, 1908 Arcq, A., Ligny, 16 Juin 1815 – La dernière victoire de l’Empereur Annecy-le-Vieux, 2006 Bas, F. de and T’Serclaes de Wommersom, J. de., La campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas, d’après les rapports official Néerlandais Brussels, 1908 Beraud, A., Histoire de Napoléon Paris, 1829 Bowden, S., Armies at Waterloo Arlington, 1983 Britten Austin, P., 1815: The Return of Napoleon London, 2002 Chesney, C., Waterloo Lectures London, 1868 Clausewitz, C. von, Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich Berlin, 1835 Conrady, E. von, Leben und Wirkung von Carl von Grolman Berlin, 1895 Damitz, C. von, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 in den Niederlanden und Frankreich Berlin, 1837–38 Delbrüch, H., Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau Berlin, 1894 Drouet d’Erlon, J. B., Le maréchal Drouet Comte d’Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire écrite par lui-même et dédiée à ses amis Paris, 1844 Duthilt, P., Les mémoires du capitaine Duthilt Lille, 1909 d’Elchingen, Duc, Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815 Paris, 1840 Fantin des Odoards, G., Journal du général Fantin des Odoards. Etapes d’un officier de la grande armée, 1800–1830 Paris, 1895 François, C., Journal du capitaine François 1793–1830 Paris, 1903 Gardner, D., Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo London, 1882 Gérard, E. M., Derniers observations sur les operations de l’ail droite de l’armee français da bataille de Waterloo Paris, 1830 Grouchy, Marquis de, Mémoires de maréchal Grouchy Paris, 1873 Hofschröer, P., The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras London, 1998 Houssaye, H., 1815 Paris, 1914 Jomini, A. de, Atlas portatif pour servir à l’explorateur des champs de bataille de Waterloo et de Ligny Paris, 1848 Lefol, M., Souvenirs sur le prytanée de Saint-Cyr, sur la campagne de 1814, le retour de l’empereur Napoléon de l’île d’Elbe et la campagne de 1815, pendant les cent-jours Versaille, 1854 Lettow-Vorbeck, O. von, Napoleons Untergang 1815 Berlin, 1904 Mauduit, H. de, Derniers Jours de la Grande Armée Paris, 1848 Müffling, C. von, Aus meinem Leben Berlin, 1851 Nofi, A., The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815 Conshohocken, 1993 Ollech, K. von, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 Berlin, 1876 Pétiet, A., Souvenirs militaires de l’histoire contemporaine Paris, 1844 Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, Die Schlacht bei Ligny. Ein Manuscript des Generals Hans von Zieten Berlin, 1902 Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, Die Preussische Berichterstattung an Wellington vor der Schlacht bei Ligny Berlin, 1903 Plotho C. von, Der Krieg des verbundeten Europa gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1815 Berlin, 1818 Pontécoulant, F. de, Napoleon à Waterloo our précis rectifié de la campagne de 1815. Avec des documents nouveaux et des pièces inédites Paris, 1866 Quinet, E., Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Paris, 1861 Reiche, L. von, Memoiren des königlich preussichen Generals der Infanterie Ludwig von Reiche, Herausgegeben von seinen Neffen Louis von Weltzien, grossherzoglich oldenburgischem Hauptmann und Brigademajor Leipzig, 1857 Répécaud, C. M., Napoléon à Ligny et le maréchal Ney à Quatre Bras. Notice historique et critique Arras, 1849 Sellentin, B., Die Tagebücher des Grafen von Nostitz, des Adjudanten Blüchers 1813–1815 Greifswald, 1908 Sénécal, C., Général Le Sénécal campagne de Waterloo Philadelphia, 1818 Thurn und Taxis, Prinz A. von, Aus drei Feldzügen 1812 bis 1815 Leipzig, 1912 Uffindell, A., The Eagle’s Last Triumph: Napoleon’s Victory at Ligny London, 1994 Unger, W. von, Blücher in Briefen aus den Feldzügen 1813–1815 Stuttgart, 1876
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INDEX References to illustrations are in bold.
Dufour, Baron François-Bertrand 59 Duhesme, Philibert-Guillaume, Comte 72 Dupeyroux, Baron René-Joseph 69 Durutte, Joseph-François, Comte 56, 71–72
Alexander I, Tsar of Russia 4, 19 Allied Army 18, 19, 22, 23, 39, 39–40, 41, 70 1st Corps 45, 46 1st Nassau-Usingen Regiment 89 2nd Guards Brigade 87 23rd Light Dragoons 89 Armée d’Italie 13, 15 Artois, Charles, Comte d’ 4, 6 Augereau, Maréchal Pierre 7 Austerlitz, battle of (1805) 19, 20, 21 Austria 13, 14, 17
Elba 4–6, 14 Erlon, Jean-Baptiste, Comte d’ 6, 7, 19, 45, 56, 67, 89 and Sombreffe 71, 72 Exelmans, Lt. gén. Rémi-Isidore, Comte 6, 20–21, 36, 38, 67 Eylau, battle of (1807) 15, 20, 21
Bachelu, Baron Gilbert 45, 46 Bautzen, battle of (1813) 23 Beaumont 32, 33 Bédoyère, Charles, Comte de la 8, 38, 56, 67 Berry, Charles Ferdinand, Duc de 6 Berthézène, Baron Pierre 19, 59 Bertrand, Henri-Gatien, Comte 7 Bismarck, Capt. Carl von 53 Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von, Fürst von Wahlstatt 13, 15–16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 39, 70, 90–91 and Gilly 35 and Ligny 79, 82, 83 and Sombreffe 34 and St Amand 60, 72, 74 and strategy 29, 40, 41, 42–43, 44 Boignée 47, 48, 87 Bonaparte, Jérôme 45, 56 Borodino, battle of (1812) 21 Borstell, Gen.Lt. Karl Leopold von 22 Bourmont, Louis de Ghaisnes, Comte 32, 33, 35 Brause, Gen.Maj. Friedrich von 74 Brockhausen, Maj. Philipp von 61 Brumaire, Coup d’ (1799) 13–14 Brünneck, Maj. Friedrich von 39–40, 46 Brussels 29 Brye 39, 40, 42–43, 44, 47, 56 Bülow, Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von 23, 34, 39, 91 Bünau, Maj. Heinrich von 57 Bussche-Ippenburg, Maj. Karl von dem 82 Bussy windmill 39, 40, 42–43, 44, 47, 48, 60, 83, 92–93 Campbell, Col. Sir Neil 4–6 Champ de Mai 18, 20 Charleroi 23, 24, 29, 30, 36, 41 and battle 32–33, 34 Chastel, Baron Pierre-Louis 21 Château de la Paix 90, 93 Châtelet 30, 33 Chevallerie, Maj. August de la 53 Congress of Vienna (1814–15) 18, 22 conscription 18 Davout, Maréchal Louis-Nicolas 19, 20, 90 Delcambre, Baron Victor-Joseph 56, 67, 71, 72 Delort, Baron Jacques-Antoine 21 Domon, Baron Jean-Siméon 19, 32, 34, 35, 49, 67, 72 Donnersmarck, Gen.Maj. Wilhelm Ludwig Henckel von 23, 69, 76–77, 83 Donzelot, Baron François-Xavier 56, 71 Dörnberg, Maj. Gen. Sir Wilhelm von 40, 42–43, 44, 89
Flahaut, Charles-Joseph, Comte de 45, 89 Fleurus 29, 30, 35, 38, 39, 41, 47, 49, 90 Fontaine l’Evêque 30, 31 Foy, Maximilien-Sébastien, Comte 45, 46 François, Capt. Charles 55 Frasnes 41, 45, 56 French Army 4, 14, 18–19, 31 1er Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers 67, 69 1er Régiment de Hussards 35, 45 2e Régiment de Chevau-Légers-Lanciers 67, 69, 83 4e Régiment de Ligne 61 4e Régiment Léger 46 5e Lanciers 46 5e Régiment de Hussards 35 5e Régiment de Ligne 7 7e Régiment de Ligne 8 9e Régiment Léger 67 11e Régiment d’Infanterie Léger 53, 60 12e Régiment Léger 61 15e Régiment Léger 52, 59 23e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne 52, 59 30e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne 54, 58 44e Régiment de Ligne 67 50e Régiment de Ligne 67 56e Régiment de Ligne 59, 69 59e Régiment de Ligne 58 76e Régiment de Ligne 58 82e Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne 53, 60, 61, 64–65, 66 86e Régiment de Ligne 59 96e Régiment de Ligne 55, 58 100e Régiment de Ligne 46 I Corps 19, 25, 29, 38, 39, 56, 67, 70, 72, 73, 89 I Reserve Cavalry Corps 26, 30, 32 II Corps 19, 25, 29, 32, 38, 39, 45, 49 II Reserve Cavalry Corps 20, 21, 26, 36, 49, 74 III Cavalry Corps 15 III Corps 19, 25, 29, 32–33, 36, 38, 41, 45, 49, 52, 67, 69, 72, 87 III Reserve Cavalry Corps 87 IV Cavalry Corps 21 IV Corps 19, 25–26, 29, 33, 38, 41, 45, 49, 54 IV Reserve Cavalry Corps 21, 27, 33, 49, 70 VI Corps 19, 26, 29, 32, 33, 38, 41, 87 see also Garde Impériale French Revolution 4, 14 Friedrich Wilhelm II, King of Prussia 16 Friedrich Wilhelm III, King of Prussia 17, 22 Fuentes d’Onoro, battle of (1811) 19 Garde du Corps 14 Garde Impériale 4, 7, 8, 15, 20, 27, 29, 32, 33, 39, 45, 49, 77–78
Artillerie à Pied 76 Chasseurs à Cheval 32, 46, 67, 69 Chasseurs à Pied 20, 49, 70, 76, 90 Empresses Dragoons 34, 36 Grenadiers à Cheval 79, 84–85, 86 Grenadiers à Pied 20, 49, 70, 72 Jeune Garde 27, 36, 49, 69, 70, 72, 87 Lanciers Rouges 87, 89 Garde Nationale 8, 18 Gembloux 39 Gémioncourt 45–46, 89 Genappe 89 Gendarmes 18 Gérard, Maurice-Étienne, Comte 19, 20, 33, 41 and Ligny 54, 87 Gillhausen, Capt. Friedrich von 31 Gilly 30, 35–36, 38 map 37 Girard, Baron Jean-Baptiste 49, 52–53, 60, 61, 92 Gneisenau, August, Graf Neidhardt von 17, 22, 23, 34–35, 39 and Blücher 90–91 and Quatre Bras 71 and retreat 83, 87 and strategy 29, 40, 41, 42–43, 44 Golfe Juan 5, 6 Gosselies 34, 35, 38, 41, 89 Grande Armée 14, 15 Great Britain 17; see also Allied Army Grenoble 7–8 Grolman, Gen.Maj. Karl Wilhelm von 22, 23, 40, 41, 42–43, 44, 91 Grouchy, Emmanuel-Henri, Marquis de 14–15, 20, 36, 38, 41, 45, 67, 87 Guyot, Claude-Étienne, Comte 49, 76, 77 Habert, Baron Pierre-Joseph 19, 61, 68 Halkett, Sir Colin 89 Hannut 39 Hardinge, Lt. Col. Sir Henry 22, 29, 40, 41, 42–43, 44, 79 Heymès, Col. Pierre-Agathe 34 Hoffmann, Oberst Georg von 59 Hulot, Baron Étienne 19, 83 Hymmen, Maj. Franz von 47, 60 Jacquinot, Baron Charles-Claude 56, 71, 72, 83 Jagow, Genmaj Friedrich Wilhelm von 23, 57–58, 69, 76 Jena-Auerstedt, battle of (1806) 14, 16, 17, 19, 21 Kielmansegge, Count Friedrich von 87 Kleist, Maj. Wilhelm von 53 Krafft, Gen.Maj. Karl von 68, 69, 76, 77, 79, 83 Krentzki, Capt. Michael von 32 La Haye 92 Lagarde, Baron Henri-Jacques 59 Lallemand, François-Antoine 6 Lallemand, Henri-Dominique 6 Landwehr (militia) troops 17, 22, 24 Le Capitaine, Baron Jacques 58 Lefèbvre-Desnouettes, Charles, Comte 6 Lefol, Baron Étienne-Nicolas 19, 52 Lehmann, Oblt. Gottlieb Peter 23 Leipzig, battle of (1813) 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23
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Lemarque, Lt. gén. Jean-Maximilien 19 Letort, Lt. gén. Louis-Michel 36, 38 Ligne, the 47, 57, 83, 93 Ligny 29, 39, 47, 48, 90–91, 92, 93 and battle 50–51, 54–55, 56, 57–59, 62–63, 69–70, 71, 76–79, 80–81, 82, 84–85, 86 Lobau, Georges-Mouton, Comte de 19, 41, 67, 87 Lobbes 30–31, 32 Louis XVIII, King of France 4, 6, 8 Low Countries 8, 14, 19, 22, 29 Lützow, Oblt. Adolph von 74, 79 Macdonald, Maréchal Jacques 8, 16 Maison du Roi 4 Marchand, Lt. gén. Jean-Gabriel 7 Marchienne-au-Pont 30, 31, 32, 33 Marcinelles 32, 33 Marcognet, Baron Pierre-Louis 56, 71 Marines 18 Marmont, Maréchal Auguste de 7 Marwitz, Oberst Friedrich von der 72, 83 Masséna, Maréchal André 6 Massow, Maj. Friedrich von 91 Maurin, Baron Antoine 19 Merlen, Baron Jean-Baptiste van 31 Milhaud, Édouard, Comte 20, 21, 38, 74 Mons 29 Monsterberg, Maj. Friedrich von 31 Montigny-le-Tilleul 31, 32 Mortier, Maréchal Adolphe-Édouard 4, 6, 15, 19, 21, 34 Müffling, Gen.Maj. Karl von 22, 23, 29, 34, 39, 45 and Quatre Bras 71 and strategy 40, 41, 42–43, 44 Müller, Prem-Lt. Johann 68 Murat, Joachim 5, 21 Naples 5 Napoleon Bonaparte 4–8, 13–14, 90 and the army 18–19, 20, 21 and Blücher 16 and Charleroi 33, 34 and Fleurus 49 and Gilly 36, 38 and Grouchy 15 and Ligny 77–78 and St Amand 70, 74 and strategy 29, 30, 38–39, 41, 56, 67 Naveau 48, 49, 67, 93 Neander, Prem-Lt. Karl von 35 Netherlands Army 40 2nd Division 45–46 Neumann, Maj. August von 47, 60 Ney, Maréchal Michel 4, 8, 21, 38, 39, 41, 45, 67 and Charleroi 34 and retreat 89 and St Amand 56 Nivelles 29, 30, 39, 40 Nollendorf, Gen. Friedrich Kleist von 23 Nostitz, August, Graf von 70, 79, 82, 91
Piat, Baron Jean-Pierre 60–61 Piraumont 46, 87 Pirch I, Genmaj Georg Dubislav von 23, 39 Pirch II, Gen.Maj. Otto Karl von 23, 24, 30, 35, 48, 60, 61, 74 Piré, Hippolyte-Marie-Guillaume, Comte 45, 46, 87 Pius VII, Pope 14 Pontbellanger, Charles-Félix, Comte de 36 Prussia 14, 15 Prussian Army 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 33, 88 1. Elb Landwehr-Infanterie 68, 74 1. Kolbergsches Infanterie 68 1. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Infanterie 74 1. Pommersches Infanterie 68 1. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment 74 1. Westphälisches Dragoner-Regiment 79 1. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie 30, 31, 48, 59 1. Westpreußisches Dragoner 31, 36, 38, 82 1. Westpreußisches Infanterie 32, 38, 48, 60, 61 2. Brandenburgisches Infanterie 47, 59 2. Kurmärkisches Landwehr-Kavallerie 74, 79, 82 2. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment 71 2. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie 31, 48, 60 2. Westpreußisches Infanterie 48, 58–59 3. Fußbatterie 60, 83 3. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie 47, 48, 53, 58, 59 4. Westphälisches Landwehr-Infanterie 48, 57, 76–77 5. Fußbatterie 70 6. Schwere Batterie 83 6. Uhlanen-Regiment 30, 74, 79, 82 7. Dragoner-Regiment 74 7. Fußbatterie 59 8. Uhlanen-Regiment 70 9. Husaren-Regiment 70 10. Fußbatterie 69 12. Fußbatterie 70, 87 14. Infanterie-Regiment 74 18. Reitende Batterie 48 19. Infanterie-Regiment 48, 57 21. Infanterie-Regiment 79 22. Infanterie-Regiment 74 24. Infanterie-Regiment 47, 59 25. Infanterie-Regiment 68 26. Infanterie-Regiment 76, 83 27. Infanterie-Regiment 48 28. Infanterie-Regiment 36, 38, 48, 60, 61, 64–65, 66 29. Infanterie-Regiment 48, 53, 60, 79 37. Fußbatterie 69 I Korps 23, 24, 27–28, 35, 38, 47, 48, 60, 69 II Korps 23, 28, 39, 47, 48, 68, 69 III Korps 23, 28, 39, 48 IV Korps 23, 34, 39, 41, 48, 71
Orléans, Louis-Philippe III, Duc d’ 6, 8
Quatre Bras 29, 39, 39–40, 41, 45, 46, 56, 71 and battle 87, 89 map 57 Quiot du Passage, Baron Joachim 56, 71
Pajol, Lt. gén. Claude-Pierre, Comte 20, 32, 33, 34, 49 and Gilly 35, 36, 38 Paris 4, 8, 14, 16 Pécheux, Baron Marc-Nicolas 19, 54 Perière, Maj. August Arnauld de la 31
Reckow, Oblt. Leopold von 79 Reille, Honoré-Charles, Comte 19, 32, 45, 89 Roeder, Gen.Lt. Friedrich Erhard von 23, 79, 83 Rome, Baron Jean-François 55 Rüchel, Gen. Wilhelm von 17 Rudorff, Capt. Karl von 58
Russia 14, 17, 19, 21 Saint-Alphonse, Wathier, Comte de 21 St Amand 29, 47, 48, 49, 83, 92 and battle 52–53, 56, 59–61, 64–65, 66, 68, 69, 70–71, 72, 74, 76, 78 Sales Matis, Col. Jean-François de 61, 69 Sambre River 19, 23, 30, 32, 38 Saxon troops 13, 17, 22 Scharnhorst, Gen.Maj. Gerhard von 17 Schulze, 2Lt. Karl 59 Sixth Coalition 16, 17 Sombreffe 29, 34–35, 38, 39, 41, 45, 47, 67, 71, 87, 92 Somerset, Fitzroy, Lord 40, 42–43, 44 Soult, Maréchal Nicolas-Jean de Dieu, Duc de Dalmatie 4, 6, 8, 19, 20, 38, 41, 45, 56, 90 Steinmetz, Gen.Maj. Karl Friedrich von 23, 24, 30, 31–32, 35, 59 and retreat 83 and St Amand 74, 76 Strolz, Baron Jean-Baptiste 21 Stülpnagel, Capt. Heinrich von 77 Subervie, Baron Jacques-Gervais 67 supplies 23 Sweden 17 Thielmann, Gen.Lt. Johann Adolf von 23, 39, 74, 87 Thuin 30, 31, 32 Thümen, Oberst Heinrich von 72 Tilly 83, 87 Tippleskirch, Gen.Maj. Ernst von 68 Tongrenelle 47, 48, 87 Tongrinne 39, 47, 48, 75, 87 Treaty of Chaumont (1814) 18, 22 Treskow, Gen.Maj. Karl von 82 uniforms 53 Valmy, François-Christophe, Comte 20, 34, 38, 39, 45, 89 Vandamme, Dominique-René, Comte de 19, 21, 33, 36, 41 and St Amand 52, 59, 61, 70, 87 Vernier, Baron Jean-Honoré 52 Vichery, Baron Louis-Joseph 19 Villiers, Baron Claude-Germain de 53, 60, 61 Villiers Perwin 70 Wagnelée 47, 68, 69, 72, 74, 83, 92 Wagram, battle of (1809) 15, 19 Wahlen-Jürgass, Gen.Maj. Alexander von 69, 72 Wavre 88, 91 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of 17, 18, 22, 30, 34–35, 91 and Quatre Bras 46, 71, 87, 89 and strategy 29, 40–41, 42–43, 44 Weyrach, Maj. Karl von 91 William, Hereditary Prince of Orange-Nassau 39–40, 45, 46, 89 Woisky, Oblt. Ferdinand von 31 Wulffen, Maj. Wilhelm von 79 Wussow, 2Lt. Johann von 71, 87, 91 Wylich und Lottum, Oberst Heinrich, Graf von 48, 74 Zieten, Gen.Lt. Hans Ernst von 23, 24, 30, 31, 34, 47 and Gilly 35 and Ligny 57–58 and St Amand 59, 69
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AUTHOR’S NOTE
First published in Great Britain in 2015 by Osprey Publishing, PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK PO Box 3985, New York, NY 10185-3985, USA E-mail:
[email protected] © 2015 Osprey Publishing Ltd
French was the international language in 1815. To ensure that the narrative within this publication retains a contemporary quality, a number of conventions have been adopted. This is especially relevant to the French and Prussian ranks and regimental designations. Wherever possible the original terminology has been employed, while that used for the Allied Army is exclusively British.
OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF THE OSPREY GROUP. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. ISBN: 978 1 4728 0366 5 E-book ISBN: 978 1 4728 0367 2 E-pub ISBN: 978 1 4728 0368 9 Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Index by Zoe Ross Typeset in Myriad Pro and Sabon Maps by Bounford.com 3D bird’s-eye view by The Black Spot Battlescene illustrations by Gerry Embleton Originated by PDQ Media, Bungay, UK © Osprey Publishing. Access to this book is not digitally restricted. In return, we ask you that you use it for personal, non-commercial purposes only. Please don’t upload this ebook to a peer-to-peer site, email it to everyone you know, or resell it. Osprey Publishing reserves all rights to its digital content and no part of these products may be copied, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise (except as permitted here), without the written permission of the publisher. Please support our continuing book publishing programme by using this e-book responsibly. Every effort has been made by the Publisher to secure permissions to use the images in this publication. If there has been any oversight we would be happy to rectify the situation and written submission should be made to Osprey Publishing.
Regiment
Corps
Battalion
Brigade
Division
Company (squadron)
Detachment
Formations
Column
ARTIST’S NOTE Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should be addressed to: www.gerryembleton.com
Square
Enlarged Square
Line
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.
THE WOODLAND TRUST
Type
Infantry
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT It would not have been possible to produce this volume without the assistance of a considerable number of individuals who, over many years, have made important new material on the campaign available to my study. I would especially like to thank Hans Kolmsee and Oliver Schmidt, David Humair and Paul Meganck for their invaluable contributions to my understanding of the events at Ligny.
Key to military symbols
Army
French terminology includes: Maréchal Field Marshal Lieutenant-général Lieutenant-General Maréchal-de-camp Major-General Chef-de-bataillon Infantry Major Chef d’escadron Cavalry Major Garde Impériale Imperial Guard Vieille Garde Old Guard Jeune Garde Young Guard d’Infanterie de Ligne Line Infantry d’Infanterie Léger Light Infantry Artillerie à Pied Foot Artillery Artillerie à Cheval Horse Artillery Lanciers Lancers Sapeurs Engineers Tirailleurs Skirmishers Prussian terminology includes: Feldmarschall Field Marshal Generallieutnant Lieutenant-General Generalmajor Major-General Oberst Colonel Oberstlieutnant Lieutenant-Colonel Rittmeister Cavalry Captain Kurmärkisches Kurmark Neumärkisches Neumark Schlesisches Silesian Westphälisches Westphalian Westpreußisches West Prussian Fußbatterie Foot Artillery Reitende Batterie Horse Artillery Schützen Riflemen Uhlan Lancer
Osprey Publishing are supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees. Cavalry
Skirmishers
Artillery
Detached guns
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