Osprey - Campaign - 300 - Malaya and Singapore 1941-1942

MALAYA AND SINGAPORE 1941–42 The fall of Britain’s empire in the East

Patani

XX

N

5

Khlaung Ngae X

Johore Bahru X

0 0

50 miles 50km

1 Malaya X

Singapore

2 Malaya

MARK STILLE

ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS

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Author

Illustrator

Mark E. Stille (Commander, United States Navy, retired) received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked in the intelligence community for 35 years including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior analyst working in the Washington DC area. He is the author of numerous Osprey titles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific.

Peter Dennis was born in 1950. Inspired by contemporary magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including many Osprey titles. A keen wargamer and modelmaker, he is based in Nottinghamshire, UK.

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CAMPAIGN 300

MALAYA AND SINGAPORE 1941–42 The fall of Britain’s empire in the East

MARK STILLE

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ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS  Series editor Marcus Cowper

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ARTIST’S NOTE

This electronic edition published in 2016 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should be addressed to:

First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Osprey Publishing, PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK 1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA E-mail: [email protected]

Peter Dennis, Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT, UK [email protected]

© 2016 Osprey Publishing Ltd OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

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THE WOODLAND TRUST Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity. Between 2014 and 2018 our donations are beingspent on their Centenary Woods project in the UK.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 9781472811226 PDF e-book ISBN: 9781472811233 e-Pub ISBN: 9781472811240 To find out more about our authors and books visit www.ospreypublishing.com. Here you will find our full range of publications, as well as exclusive online content, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters. You can also sign up for Osprey membership, which entitles you to a discount on purchases made through the Osprey site and access to our extensive online image archive.

Key to military symbols

Army Group

Army

Corps

Division

Brigade

Regiment

Battalion

Company/Battery

Platoon

Section

Squad

Infantry

Artillery

Cavalry

Air defence

Air Force

Air mobile

Air transportable

Amphibious

Headquarters

Maintenance

Airborne

Unit HQ

Anti-tank

Armour

Air aviation

Bridging

Engineer

Medical

Missile

Mountain

Navy

Nuclear, biological, Ordnance chemical

Reconnaissance

Signal

Supply

Transport movement

Rocket artillery

Parachute

Air defence artillery

Key to unit identification Unit identifier

Parent unit Commander

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(+) with added elements (–) less elements

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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 The rise of Singapore n The British defence dilemma n Japan on the march

CHRONOLOGY 8 OPPOSING COMMANDERS

11

British commanders n Japanese commanders

OPPOSING FORCES

17

The British Empire n The Japanese Empire

OPPOSING PLANS

31

The strategic environment n British defence plans n The Japanese Plan

THE BATTLE

37

The Japanese landings n The fight for Kota Bharu n The landings in southern Thailand n The saga of Force Z n Force Z – an assessment n The action off Endau n Debacle at Jitra n Jitra – the impact n The battle of Kampar n The battle of Slim River n British reinforcements n The loss of Johore n The air battle n The final air battles n The attack on Singapore n The Japanese attack n Battle for the Jurong Line n The final battles n Capitulation

THE AFTERMATH

90

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

93

BIBLIOGRAPHY 94 INDEX 95  

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The Malaya and Singapore theatre XX

Patani

N

5

Khlaung Ngae X

6 Ind

III

56

X

15 Ind

Jitra

Tumpat

Alor Star

11 Ind

Sungei Patani

Kota Bharu X

KEDDAH XX

18

8 Ind

II

Betong Kroh

Gong Kedah

Machang

Kuala Krai

Krohcol

Butterworth

Grik

Penang

Kuala Trengganu

KELANTAN Port Weld

TRENGGANU

Taiping Kuala Kangasar X

28 Ind

Ipoh

Kampar Tapah Bidor

Kuala Lipis

Telok Anson

Jerantur

X

22 Ind

Slim River

Kuantan

Raub Bentong

SELANGOR Kuala Selangor

Maran

PAHANG

XX

9 Ind

Kuala Lumpur XXX

Port Swettenham

III Ind

NEGRI Bahau

Seremban

Morib Port Dickson

SEMBILAN

Endau

Gemas

12 Ind

MALACCA

X

Segamat

Tampin

X

22 Aus

Mersing

Labis Malacca

Kahang

JOHORE Muar

Yong Peng

Batu Pahat

SUMATRA

Kuala Dungun

Jemaluang

XX

8 Aus

Kluang

X

27 Aus

Ayer Hitam

Rengani Kota Tinggi Johore Bahru X

0 0

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50 miles 50km

1 Malaya X

Singapore

2 Malaya

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INTRODUCTION THE RISE OF SINGAPORE Coming out of World War I, the British Government marked Japan as a future potential threat to the British Empire and its interests in the Far East. Since the size of the Royal Navy was much reduced after the war, it was not large enough to commit powerful forces to the Far East on a permanent basis. This led to the strategy that called for the British to send a powerful fleet to the Far East in times of crisis. To execute this strategy, a large naval base would have to be available. The Admiralty considered several possibilities for such a base. Among the choices were Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. Hong Kong was ruled out because it was too close to Japan and could not be properly defended; Australia, particularly Sydney, was ideal from several perspectives, but was simply too far from the interests that it was supposed to be protecting. The only remaining option was Singapore. It was ideally located at the strategic chokepoint from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and was far enough from the nearest Japanese bases to offer it strategic depth from attack. Most of all, it was immediately accessible to the areas needing defence. The British government announced its decision to build a new naval base at Singapore in 1921. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its associated agreements increased the importance of Singapore since the construction of additional naval bases was prohibited. The treaty reduced the size of the Royal Navy and made it unlikely that it would be big enough to meet requirements in both Europe and the Far East. Part of the 1922 agreements was a treaty to restrict the construction of fortifications near Japan. However, this excluded Singapore, which now became the most visible symbol of British might in the Far East.

THE BRITISH DEFENCE DILEMMA The rise of Japanese militarism resulted in the seizure and annexation of Manchuria by Japan in 1931–32. In 1934, Japan renounced the Washington agreements. This was followed by the invasion of China in July 1937. Concurrent with Japanese expansion in China, tensions in Europe dramatically rose. In 1938, Germany pressured Czechoslovakia for territorial concessions in the Sudetenland. The British policy of appeasement meant 5

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This view of the naval base at Singapore was taken in March 1941. This facility was the focus of the entire campaign from the British perspective, though the Royal Navy was unable to devote adequate forces to use it. It fell into Japanese hands after only moderate damage and served as a major IJN base throughout the war. (AWM)

war was averted, but it was soon apparent that continued German demands would lead to war. Great Britain began to re-arm. Work continued on the Singapore naval base. It was officially opened in February 1938, though not actually completed. As war loomed in Europe, the British plan to deploy a large fleet to Singapore during a crisis began to look even more hollow. In July 1939, the period required to deploy a large force to Singapore was extended to 90 days from the 70 days set in March 1938. Until the arrival of the fleet, Singapore would have to hold out with whatever means were available. When war did come in September 1939, only Germany entered the conflict. Italy and Japan remained on the sidelines, but still had to be watched. The period for getting a fleet to the Far East was extended to 180 days. The British situation worsened when France fell to the Germans in June 1940, which prompted the entry of Italy into the war that same month. The British had already decided that the Mediterranean would have priority over the Far East and, of course, both were secondary to the security of Great Britain itself, which was under the threat of invasion. The worsening situation forced the British to suspend their plan to send a large fleet to the Far East in a crisis. When war came between Great Britain and Japan it would be centred on Singapore and Malaya. This was the strategic centre of gravity for the British in the Far East. The two areas held not just the naval base and a number of airbases, but were strategically positioned to dominate Southeast Asia. Although the British were stretched to the limit by the war, they still believed that Singapore could be defended. Even though it was third in priority for allocation of forces, behind the defence of Great Britain and the Mediterranean, much had been done to bolster the fortress defences. According to British calculations, it was unlikely that the Japanese Army, still tied down by the conflict in China, would be bold enough and have the logistical capabilities to attempt to launch an attack on the heart of British power in the Far East. Therefore, depending on the state of the conflict in northern Europe and the Mediterranean, the British would still have adequate time to reinforce the fortress. However, no British plan foresaw the direction the war would take in 1940–41. The British had suffered defeat after defeat, and were being pressed to maintain the security of the sea lanes in the Atlantic, defend the home islands from attack, and protect their key position in Egypt. This undermined any real hope of providing significant reinforcement to the Far East when the Japanese attacked.

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JAPAN ON THE MARCH The crumbling of the Allied position in Europe directly affected the strategic situation in Southeast Asia. The fall of France meant that French possessions in Indo-China came under the control of the Vichy Government. The Japanese were soon able to gain approval from Vichy French authorities to occupy first northern Indo-China and, later in July 1941, southern Indo-China. This greatly increased the threat to Singapore since it placed Japanese air and naval bases within easy range of the fortress. Allied weakness in the Far East created a window of opportunity for the Japanese that they were determined to exploit. This determination was fed by the strong American reaction to Japanese expansionism that created a situation in which the Japanese could not afford to give in to American demands, therefore making war their only choice. The Japanese move into northern Indo-China prompted the United States to retaliate in September 1940 by placing an embargo on scrap metal to Japan. In November, the Japanese received a secret British report captured by the Germans, which stated that Britain was unable to send strong reinforcements to Singapore in the event of war. The Allied position in Southeast Asia looked weaker then ever. In June 1941, the entire war changed when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This gave the Japanese an opportunity to join the Germans against the Russians, Japan’s traditional enemy in the Far East. However, a choice had to be made since Japan did not possess the capability to attack both Russia and Great Britain. In order to gain the resources needed to support its war economy, the choice was made to attack south and seize Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. A vital prerequisite was realized in July 1941 when the Japanese pressured the Vichy French into allowing them to occupy southern Indo-China. This directly threatened Malaya and Singapore. This move cost the Japanese dearly since it resulted in a total embargo of all materials from the United States to Japan. The British and Dutch also slapped an embargo on Japan. With no access to oil, and current stocks limited, and Japan unwilling to accede to American demands for withdrawal from China, the path to war was inevitable. Both sides prepared for war, which would decide the fate of Malaya and Singapore.

A key part of the Singapore fortress was a strong battery of coastal defence artillery. Shown here is one of Singapore’s five 15in. guns. None was used to engage Japanese ships during the campaign. Four of the weapons were actually able to engage land targets to the north, but none was used in this role because of a lack of high-explosive shells. (USAMHI)

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CHRONOLOGY 1941 4 December

Japanese invasion convoys depart from Hainan Island.

6 December

British receive first reports of Japanese convoys; British forces are placed on alert, but a move into Thailand (Operation Matador) is placed on hold.

7 December

Brooke-Popham again hesitates over Operation Matador. 

8 December

Japanese troops make coordinated landings at Singora and Patani in southern Thailand, where token Thai resistance is quickly overcome, and at Kota Bharu, where resistance from Indian troops is heavy.



Japanese bombers make first raid on Singapore, and begin a series of raids against British airfields in northern Malaya in order to seize air superiority.

9 December

Japanese seize Kota Bharu airfield and town; forces driving from Singora cross the border into Malaya by midnight.

10 December

Battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse are sunk by Japanese air attack off Kuantan.

11 December

British fighters withdrawn to defend Singapore and supply convoys, giving the Japanese air superiority over northern Malaya.



Battle for Jitra results in a major British defeat and decides the fate of northern Malaya.

14 December

Japanese capture Alor Star airfield virtually intact.

16 December

British evacuate Penang Island which is occupied by the Japanese the following day.

18 December

Percival and Heath decide to give up northern Malaya.

21 December

British forces ordered to retreat behind the Perak River.

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22 December

Lead units of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division join the attack.

29 December

Four-day battle for Kampar begins as Percival intends to make a stand to defend central Malaya.

31 December

Percival orders Heath to hold the airfields in central Malaya long enough to allow the arrival of several critical reinforcement convoys.

1942 2 January

Battle of Kampar is lost when British forces retreat to avoid encirclement.

3 January

British retreat from Kuantan on the east coast.

4 January

British forces retreat to defences anchored on Slim River.

7 January

In the battle of Slim River, a Japanese tank attack destroys two Indian brigades with the loss of 3,200 prisoners and huge amounts of equipment; central Malaya is lost.

8 January

In a battlefield inspection, Wavell approves plans to withdraw to Johore.

11 January

Japanese occupy Kuala Lumpur.

13 January

First brigade of British 18th Infantry Division arrives.

14 January

Bennett assumes command of the Malayan front as commander of ‘Westforce’.



At a point some 10 miles north of Gemas, Australian forces ambush a Japanese force and cause a brief delay.

15 January

Indian 45th Brigade is routed by Imperial Guards Division in the vicinity of Muar.



Japanese forces continue their seaborne infiltration along the east coast of Malaya and land at Parit Jawa.

18 January

Percival agrees with Bennett to withdraw behind Segamat River to avoid encirclement.

24 January

An Australian machine-gun battalion and 2,000 replacements arrive in Singapore.

25 January

British commanders decide to retreat onto Singapore Island.

26 January

Japanese conduct a logistical landing at Endau on the south-eastern coast of Malaya; British air and naval attacks to disrupt the landing fail.

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28 January

22nd Indian Brigade is cut off and destroyed.

31 January

Final British troops cross the Causeway from Johore into Singapore Island.

4 February

Japanese begin artillery bombardment of British defences.

5 February

Last reinforcement convoy reaches Singapore.

6 February

Japanese artillery fire intensifies along the north-eastern part of the Strait of Johore to deceive Percival about the location of the Japanese assault.

8 February

At 1000hrs, Japanese begin an intensive artillery barrage that reaches a peak by 1900hrs. At 2000hrs, the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions begin their attack across the strait.

9 February

The Japanese gain a foothold on the island and a planned British counter-attack fails to materialize.

10 February

Imperial Guards Division begins its attack in the area of the Causeway; after heavy losses, it secures a lodgement.



Japanese pressure and British command confusion prompt British troops to withdraw from the Jurong Line, the best defensive position outside Singapore.

11 February

Japanese occupy Bukit Timah village, and the Imperial Guards Division drives from the north into a gap in the British lines. British morale begins to crack.

12 February

Japanese forces drive down the Bukit Timah road and approach the outskirts of the city. Percival orders a retreat into a final defence perimeter around the city.

13 February

Yamashita plans an attack into the city before British defences can consolidate. Percival announces his decision to fight on to his staff, which largely advocates surrender.

14 February

Japanese forces attack along two axes into the city while air raids and artillery barrages pummel the defenceless city and its population. Percival learns of the growing crisis of a water shortage in the city.

15 February

In a morning conference with his commanders, Percival decides to surrender. That afternoon, he meets with Yamashita and signs the documents of surrender.

 

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OPPOSING COMMANDERS BRITISH COMMANDERS During the campaign for Malaya and Singapore, British commanders and their staffs proved universally unable to cope with the speed and tenacity of the Japanese assault. This was bad enough, but perhaps paled in comparison with the lack of realistic planning before the campaign that was built on grossly erroneous assumptions regarding the capabilities of the Japanese. No British commander emerged from the battle with his reputation untarnished. Post-war critiques of British commanders tend to blame key individuals for the unprecedented disaster, but such a defeat cannot be traced to a few individuals, but rather reflects a combination of factors. The one individual not usually held to account is Prime Minister and Defence Minister Winston Churchill who, despite the advice of his senior military advisers, starved Malaya of resources that were readily available because of his false assumption that Japan would not attack Great Britain in 1941. The British command structure for the Far East was ill considered and impeded efforts to build a coherent defence plan. The commander-in-chief was a Royal Air Force (RAF) officer, the first time an RAF officer had held such an appointment. As could be expected, he had major differences with the head of RN forces in the Far East about defence planning since RN forces reported to their own operational commander in London. Meanwhile, the civil authorities in the Far East also reported to their ministers in London. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert BrookePopham. He was responsible for defending not just Malaya and Singapore, but also Burma and Hong Kong. He received his commission in 1898 and fought in the Second Boer War before transferring to the Royal Flying Corps in 1912. Quickly rising through the ranks, he was knighted in 1927 and given a series of important commands. When the war began he was Governor and Commander-inChief Kenya, but soon returned to England to establish training commands in Canada and South Africa. On 18 November 1940, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham (left) in discussion with General Sir Archibald Wavell. As Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Brooke-Popham was denied the resources he and his subordinate service chiefs assessed were necessary to defend Malaya and Singapore. He was sacked after the disastrous start of the campaign. (RAAF)

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Lieutenant-General Arthur A. E. Percival pictured in June 1941. Even this well-known picture of him suggests he would be better suited for duty as a staff college instructor than as commander of a force committed to a desperate fight against a ruthless enemy. Though faced with a difficult, and probably ultimately impossible situation, his weak performance guaranteed a quick and cheap Japanese victory. (AWM)

of British Far East Command. Upon his arrival, Brooke-Popham realized that his command would be unable to withstand a Japanese attack, but his pleas for reinforcements went largely ignored. After the initial disasters of the campaign, he was relieved on 27 December. He returned to England, but his reputation was destroyed. He held non-operational commands for the remainder of the war before his death in 1953. Brooke-Popham was replaced briefly by General Sir Henry Pownall until Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell assumed the role of Supreme Commander of ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) on 30 December. Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Malaya and chief architect of the defence of Malaya and Singapore. He began his army career during World War I, and saw action on the Somme and in northern Russia. His first exposure to the Far East was in 1936 when he was posted to Malaya as Chief of Staff to the army commander where he studied the vulnerability of Singapore to an attack down the Malayan Peninsula. In April 1941, he was appointed as GOC Malaya. Up until this point, he was considered a brilliant staff officer but was untried as a commander. His handling of the campaign has been roundly criticized. Most observers from the campaign commented that while he clearly possessed the mental capacity, he was not a strong leader and failed to inspire his officers and men. He clearly lacked the required ruthlessness to fight the Japanese and was more often than not indecisive in command. He quickly lost the initiative to the Japanese and was forced into a reactive mode for the duration of the campaign. He worked long hours and was quickly worn out. After surrendering to the Japanese, he was held as a prisoner of war until the end of the conflict. After the war, he wrote a book, The War in Malaya, about the campaign in which he took some responsibility for the defeat. He died in 1966.

Wavell (left) in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the ABDACOM became Percival’s boss on 30 December 1941. Pownall (right) held the post of Commander-in-Chief, Far East, for a few days, and then became Wavell’s chief of staff. Though he was one of Britain’s greatest field commanders, Wavell was unable to infuse determination into the defence of Malaya and Singapore. (AWM)

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Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival, General Officer Commanding Malaya, and Major-General H. G. Bennett, General Officer Commanding 8th Australian Division, in Malaya before the start of the war. The two formed a very unsuccessful command relationship with Bennett correctly assessing that Percival was not up to a hard fight with the Japanese. Unfortunately, Bennett was unaware of his own shortcomings as a commander. (AWM)

Percival’s primary field formation was the Indian III Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Heath. At the outbreak of war, he was appointed commander of the Indian 5th Infantry Division and played a key role in the successful East African campaign, which expelled the Italians from Ethiopia. Heath was then sent to Malaya as commander of the Indian III Corps which appeared to be an excellent choice. He and Percival were constantly clashing over strategy during the campaign, with Heath continually advocating retreat. After the war, Percival admitted that he had lost confidence in Heath yet did not replace him. Heath went into captivity after Singapore’s surrender and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner of war. One of Heath’s divisional commanders was Major-General Arthur Barstow. He joined the British Indian Army in 1908 and was a veteran of several campaigns in World War I. During the Malaya campaign, he was the commander of the 9th Indian Division until he was killed by a Japanese ambush on 28 January 1942. The other divisional commander in Indian III Corps was Major-General David M. Murray-Lyon. He was wounded in World War I and did not transfer to the British Indian Army until 1927. He assumed command of the newly formed 11th Indian Division and took it to Malaya. Both Barstow and Murray-Lyon were qualified division commanders, but neither had experience in this capacity before the campaign. The Australian Imperial Force was commanded by Major-General H. Gordon Bennett. He also was a veteran of World War I, having seen action at Gallipoli and on the Western Front, but was not a professional soldier. After being passed over for command of three Australian divisions sent to the Middle East, he was given command of the 8th Australian Division and sent to Malaya in February 1941. He proved to be a disruptive presence, creating disharmony within his division and quarrelling with Percival. He was aggressive and driven by a feeling of self-importance. He had difficulty getting along with other British commanders during the campaign, as indicated by

This shot from February 1941 shows Bennett with MurrayLyon, General Officer Commanding 11th Indian Division (right). The 11th Indian Division was twice routed by a small force of Japanese tanks after the British failed to ensure proper anti-tank defences were in place. Murray-Lyon was relieved after these debacles. (AWM)

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Major-General Simmons (left) confers with Brooke-Popham before the war. As commander of the Singapore Fortress Command, Simmons failed to prepare the city for a siege. (AWM)

his criticism of British and Indian troops, which were the first to be defeated by the Japanese. His Australian troops fared little better except for a successful engagement at Gemas on 14 January. Given a central role in defending central and southern Malaya, Bennett seemed overwhelmed by the requirements of commanding a force larger than a division over an extended area. Bennett’s final actions during the campaign remain extremely controversial. As the British were surrendering, Bennett turned over his command and went with two other officers to the waterfront at Singapore. They found a sampan and made their escape, returning to Melbourne on 2 March 1942. Later, a commission of enquiry did not provide the justification for his actions that he sought. The other major component of Percival’s command was the independent Fortress Singapore. The command was held by Major-General F. Keith Simmons, who had been in the Far East since 1939, first as commander of British forces in China, then as GOC Fortress Singapore. He was another officer with a controversial influence during the campaign. He argued against the construction of landward defences for Singapore since he believed it would adversely impact morale. Charged with preparing Singapore for attack when the campaign began, he accomplished little. When Percival was considering surrender, he turned to his confidant Simmons for advice; Simmons agreed that an orderly turnover to the Japanese was more important than further, pointless resistance. The principal RN command figure in the defence of Singapore was Acting Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. He joined the RN at the age of 15 and served at Gallipoli in World War I. He was recognized as an officer of outstanding intelligence. He was also short (5ft 4in.), but possessed supreme confidence. Going into World War II, he had the reputation of a fine staff officer, but was also seen as a ‘desk admiral’. As the protégé of the then First Sea Lord, he was

Then Vice-Admiral Tom Phillips with his mentor Winston Churchill in February 1940. Phillips was selected to lead Churchill’s naval deterrence force to the Far East in late 1941. When deterrence failed, he was left with an unbalanced force to accomplish an impossible mission. (NARA)

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Vice Chief of the Naval Staff until October 1941. As early as May, he was the candidate to command the RN’s Far Eastern force when it was formed. As war in the Far East became likely, Phillips was appointed acting admiral on 25 October and commander of the British Far Eastern Fleet. Subsequent events have propagated several myths about Phillips. He had seen no action to date, but he did have a keen knowledge of naval matters. This included the effect of air power against ships. He understood the difficulty of the mission he was being sent to carry out and the inadequacies of his force. More than anything, he was aware of the importance of naval power to the defence of Singapore. However, with the traditions of the Royal Navy demanding aggressive action, there was no doubt what Phillips would do with his small force (later named ‘Force Z’) when he had the opportunity.

JAPANESE COMMANDERS Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of the 25th Army, was the most compelling and important command figure of the campaign. The decisive Japanese victory has led many to assess Yamashita to be a brilliant commander, but this is an overstatement. He did possess many essential attributes of a successful commander including charisma, audacity, decisiveness and command intuition. He went into the campaign with combat experience, having led a division in China. Not until 6 November was he appointed commander of the 25th Army. This appointment was in line with his reputation as one of the best operational commanders in the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). He was charismatic and bold, was known as a thoughtful commander and made decisions intuitively. He was also impatient, which prompted frequent changes in orders at points in the campaign. Somewhat unusually for an IJA officer, he worked well with the IJN and with the IJA’s air force. Most importantly for the conduct of the campaign, he assessed that the British troops, especially Indian forces, were grossly inferior to Japanese troops in fighting spirit. In addition, the Japanese also grossly underestimated the strength of British forces in Malaya, which led Yamashita to build his campaign plan around a ‘driving strategy’ against the British. This assessment ultimately proved correct, and Yamashita remarked after the battle that ‘our battle for Malaya was successful because we took the enemy lightly’. After the campaign, the IJA sent him into exile in Manchuria. With the Americans rolling across the Pacific, he was brought back into active service as the commander of Japanese ground forces on Luzon in the Philippines. Here he fought a prolonged battle against the American invasion in January 1945 until he surrendered in September. After the war, he was placed on trial for the atrocity-ridden defence of Manila. He was found guilty of war crimes by ‘command responsibility’ and hanged on 23 February 1946. Even if the trial for his lack of control in the Philippines was dubious on legal grounds, he was complicit in the screening and execution of ethnic Chinese in Singapore after the British surrender.

The victor of Singapore campaign, Lieutenant-General Yamashita, commander of the 25th Army. (AWM)

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Yamashita, the famed Tiger of Malay, surrenders to American forces on Luzon in the Philippines. Within months, he would be hanged for war crimes. (USAMHI)

One of Yamashita’s staff officers deserves mention: Colonel Tsuji Masanobu who served as the 25th Army’s chief operations planner. He played a key role in the campaign planning, turned up at several key points during the campaign and then was involved in the massacre of thousands of Chinese in Singapore after the British surrender. After the war, he escaped justice and eventually returned to Japan where he became a politician. He was the author of Singapore: The Japanese Version, which was translated into English. Fearing prosecution, he disappeared again in 1961 and is presumed to have died soon thereafter. Two of Yamashita’s three divisional commanders were combat veterans from the war in China and performed well during the campaign. The commander of the 5th Division was Lieutenant-General Matsui Takuro. He took command of the 5th Division in 1940 and participated in the planning for the campaign. His division was the most important IJA unit in the battle. In 1942, after the campaign, he returned to China and held a number of posts, ending up as commander of the 13th Army. He died in 1969. Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya, commander of the 18th Infantry Division, was also a militarist, but a capable divisional commander. He was wounded in the final battle for Singapore. After the fall of Singapore, he went on to have a busy combat career, serving on Bataan against the Americans and in Burma and India against the British. Mutaguchi was arrested after the war and placed on trial for war crimes. Though found guilty, he was released in 1948 and returned to Japan where he died in 1966. Yamashita got along well with the commanders of the 5th and 18th divisions, but this was not the case with the commander of his final division. The Imperial Guards Division was commanded by Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma. He was an artillery officer by training and during the 1930s became known as an ardent militarist. In 1940, he was sent to Saigon as the commander of the Indo-China Expeditionary Army. In 1941, he assumed command of the Imperial Guards Division. The performance of Nishimura and his division was uneven during the campaign, which prompted a loss of confidence by Yamashita. Yamashita spent considerable time during the campaign dealing with this troublesome subordinate and often had to issue the same orders twice to get the Imperial Guards Division to move. At the end of the campaign, Nishimura was involved in the massacre of Chinese citizens in Singapore. He retired later in 1942, but turned up again as Governor of Sumatra in 1944–45. After the war, he was put on trial for his activities in Singapore and for atrocities against Australian troops, found guilty, and hanged in 1951.

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OPPOSING FORCES THE BRITISH EMPIRE Malaya Command

With British air and naval forces so weak, the primary responsibility for the defence of Malaya and Singapore fell to the ground forces under the control of Percival’s Malaya Command. Despite efforts to strengthen the Malaya Command since the beginning of the war, Percival had a force of only 31 infantry battalions to defend Malaya and Singapore and no armour. Percival thought he needed 48 battalions and two armoured regiments to accomplish his mission. Percival’s force was organized into three divisions, two of which were Indian and one Australian. These were all under strength with two brigades each and did not possess their full complement of artillery. Two more brigades were in reserve, and two fortress brigades were in Singapore. The fortress was also manned by coastal artillery units and anti-aircraft units. Rounding out the forces in Malaya was a small garrison at Penang fortress and an assortment of airfield and local defence units. The total strength was approximately 88,600 personnel of which 19,600 were British, 15,200 Australian, 37,000 Indian and 16,800 local troops. This was a collection of units from all over the Empire. They had no time to train together, no combat experience and most had not been in Malaya long enough to become acclimated to local conditions. They had not been trained how to fight in the jungle and in the massive rubber plantations. Unlike the Japanese, they looked on the jungle with fear.

Australian troops conduct bayonet practice. By the start of the campaign, the two Australian brigades were the best units in Percival’s command. They proved able to better the Japanese on most occasions but were let down by poor command decisions. (AWM)

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LEFT Gurkhas training before the war. The overall standard of training in Indian units was below average. (AWM) RIGHT Australians of the 27th Brigade arrive in Singapore in August 1941. Later during the campaign, 1,900 Australian replacements arrived, but these had to re-train before being assigned to units. (AWM)

Most of the Indian units were manned by poorly trained recruits mobilized in the 1940 expansion of the Indian Army. There was also a shortage of experienced leaders. The combat effectiveness of these units depended on a small number of British and Indian non-commissioned and commissioned officers. If these officers were unable to command, the effectiveness of the unit declined rapidly. Some Indian units had been trained for service in the desert in expectation of being sent to the Middle East. None of the units had trained with tanks or received training on anti-tank defence. Much of the potential training time before the war was spent building fortifications, since there was no civilian labour available to perform this task. These problems were not just evident in Indian units. British battalions had not had sufficient opportunities to conduct field training and had had some of their most experienced personnel drawn off to replace losses in other theatres. Once in combat, for both Indian and British units, personnel losses could not be replaced. A similar situation existed in the command staffs which were manned predominantly by British officers. Specialists were also short; for example, Indian III Corps did not possess adequate numbers of communications personnel and had to rely on civil communication during the campaign. There was also no utilization of combat experience from other theatres. The overall state of training in British units was therefore a real factor in the outcome of the campaign. Training was deficient both at the individual and unit level. Units were not able to train effectively for jungle conditions and were not trained to deal with tank attacks. They had no appreciation of the type of enemy they were going to meet and were simply not combatready. Some units acquired the necessary skills in action; others disintegrated the first time they were exposed to combat.

The units

The 11th Indian Infantry Division with the 6th and 8th Indian Infantry Brigades was sent to Malaya in October–November 1940. The 9th Indian Infantry Division with the 15th and 22nd Indian Infantry Brigades arrived in Malaya in March–April 1941. The third brigade from this division was diverted to Iraq to deal with an April rebellion. Neither of these was a fully trained formation. The Australian Government authorized the formation of the 8th Australian Infantry Division on 22 May 1940. The headquarters and three brigades were 18

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actually formed in July. Bennett took over in August. In October 1941, the division’s other brigade, the 23rd, was taken from it, so the division fought the entire Malaya campaign one brigade short. Training was generally up to standard, but the infantry battalions did not get a chance to train with their supporting arms. Training of officers and non-commissioned officers was uneven and was not helped by command issues generated by the abrasive Bennett. The 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade arrived in Malaya in February 1941 and the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade followed in August. Both brigades initially lacked a full complement of weapons and other equipment. The division’s two artillery battalions were a hotchpotch – one had 3in. mortars and the other 18-pdrs from World War I. One got its standard 25pdr guns in November 1941 and the other in January 1942. By the start of the campaign, many of the division’s problems had been rectified, and it was Percival’s most capable division. Later in the campaign, it received 2,000 replacements, but these were raw recruits with little training.

British reinforcements

The British defence plan rested on the arrival of reinforcements. During the campaign, reinforcements did arrive, but these were too late and too little to stem the Japanese advance. The primary reinforcement was the 18th Infantry Division, which was the only British division to fight in the campaign. This unit had an illustrious history in World War I, and was re-raised in 1939. By September 1941, when the decision was made to send it to the Middle East, the division was well trained and equipped. While at sea, the Japanese opened the war and the decision was made to re-route the division to Malaya by way of India. The lead elements, the 53rd Infantry Brigade Group, arrived in Singapore on 13 January 1942.

LEFT Australians of the 22nd Brigade arrive in Singapore in February 1942. (AWM) RIGHT Indian reinforcements arrive in Singapore. The state of training of these troops was incomplete, but they would soon be thrown against a highly trained enemy. (Library of Congress) BELOW Australian troops rush to set up a 3in. mortar. Six of these were allocated to each battalion, and the Japanese had nothing comparable at the battalion level. It had a range out to 2,725 yards. (AWM)

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LEFT British soldiers with a Vickers Mk 1 machine gun. This watercooled weapon was extremely reliable. However, its weight made it difficult to move. (Library of Congress) RIGHT The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield rifle was one of the outstanding infantry rifles of the war and equipped all British units in Malaya. Its main strengths were firing accuracy, rugged construction and the ability to operate under extreme conditions. It had a ten-round detachable magazine and was bolt-operated. (Author’s collection)

LEFT The most numerous British armoured vehicle in Malaya was the armoured carrier, Universal No. 1, more often known as the Bren gun carrier. Each infantry battalion was supposed to have 13 in its carrier platoon, but few had the full number. This vehicle was used for a variety of tasks, including reconnaissance, towing guns, and as troop carriers. They were unsuitable as an armoured personnel carrier since their armour was only 10mm at the most, and, in spite of an armament of a Bren light machine gun and a Boys anti-tank rifle, they were also unsuitable as improvised armoured fighting vehicles. (AWM)

The remainder of the division arrived on 5 February. One of the four ships carrying the bulk of the division was sunk by Japanese aircraft, which accounted for the equipment of the reconnaissance and anti-tank battalions. The division was engaged during the final battle for Singapore, but saw only a few days of action. The division went into captivity having never fought a major action. The 44th Indian Infantry Brigade was formed on 1 June 1941. Its training was poor, and what training did occur was based on the assumption that the brigade would be deployed to the Western Desert. The unit arrived in Singapore on 22 January 1942 in its poorly trained and poorly equipped status and with an insufficient number of officers. The 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was also created on 1 June 1941 and trained for desert combat. It arrived in Singapore on 3 January 1942 and was immediately sent into action upon arrival, despite its weak training and inadequate leadership, and found itself in the path of the Imperial Guards Division on 10 January. In only three days of fighting, its infantry strength was reduced to 1,000 men. On 20 January, the unit’s commander was killed at a Japanese roadblock and the brigade routed over the course of the next three days. The brigade was officially disbanded on 1 February 1942.

British unit organization and weapons

The standard British ground combat unit was the infantry battalion. This was composed of four infantry companies and a headquarters company with mortar, machine-gun and anti-tank platoons for a total strength of just over 800 men. Heavy weapons were plentiful with some 40 Bren light machine guns and six 3in. mortars. The standard infantry rifle was the excellent Lee-

RIGHT The other main British armoured vehicle used during the campaign was the armoured carrier vehicle, Indian Pattern (ACV-IP). This was produced in India from 1940– 44, and was issued to the 9th and 11th Indian divisions, with the 8th Australian Division also acquiring some. It used a standard Ford of GMC truck chassis, but was protected by only 14mm of armour. (AWM)

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Enfield. This organization was the same for British, Indian and Australian battalions with only minor differences. Three battalions made up a brigade, which when it was full strength totalled 2,500 men. Brigades usually fought as brigade groups with the addition of divisional artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft elements. British and Australian brigades were composed entirely of personnel from their respective nationalities, but Indian brigades were usually composed of two battalions of Indian troops and the third of British. Its officers were mostly British, with some Indians at the lower levels. Despite Percival’s assessment that two armoured regiments were needed for the defence of Malaya, the British forces had no tanks during the campaign. Available armoured vehicles included Bren carriers, an improvised armoured personnel carrier made in India, and various armoured cars. None of these was suited to taking on Japanese tanks. However, the British were fairly well equipped with anti-tank weapons to counter an armoured threat. The standard 2-pdr anti-tank gun fired a shell that could penetrate up to 49mm of armour at 100 yards, enough to kill any Japanese tank on the peninsula. A divisional anti-tank regiment contained 48 2-pdrs in four batteries. British artillery was very good, and the standard divisional 25-pdr gun with its 13,400yd range was better than any Japanese divisional gun and could be used successfully in an anti-tank role. Overall, British units possessed a firepower advantage, but correspondingly were heavier than their Japanese counterparts and thus could not move as quickly.

LEFT From an ambush position, the 2-pdr (40mm) anti-tank was able to deal with any Japanese tank in Malaya. Later in the campaign, these guns took a high toll on Japanese armour. (AWM) RIGHT These are 25-pdr guns loaded on railcars in Singapore for transport to units in Malaya. Each field regiment was supposed to be equipped with 24 of these guns, and, with three field regiments assigned to a full-strength division, British divisions had a considerable firepower advantage over their Japanese counterparts. (Library of Congress)

Royal Air Force

The Chiefs of Staff in London estimated that a successful defence of Malaya would require 336 modern aircraft in 22 squadrons. This was in great contrast to the thinking of the service commanders in Malaya who recommended in October 1940 a force of 566 aircraft in 31 squadrons to contend with simultaneous attacks from the north through Thailand and amphibious attacks farther south. Air power was key to a successful defence since the working premise for planning was that a Japanese invasion force would be reduced by 40 per cent before getting ashore. In response to persistent pleas to augment British air power in the Far East, 1941 did see a real increase in the RAF’s presence in Malaya. The command went from four squadrons to 12 with another two being organized. There was also one squadron from Burma present in Malaya for target practice 21

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The Brewster Buffalo Mk 1 (Model 339) was the mainstay British fighter in the Far East until the arrival of the Hurricane later in the campaign. It was inferior to Japanese fighters in speed, climbing ability and manoeuvrability. Its weight did allow it to outdive the lighter Japanese fighters. (Author’s collection)

when the campaign began. When war broke out there were 14 squadrons with 215 aircraft. The four fighter squadrons had only arrived in 1941 and only three were considered fully trained. They were equipped with the American-built Buffalo fighter, which was judged to be unsuited to European combat and was therefore relegated to the Far East. It was slow and unmanoeuvrable, and compared very unfavourably with the fighters in use by both the IJA and IJN. There was a squadron of night fighters equipped with Blenheim aircraft. Two light bomber squadrons were equipped with the fairly modern Blenheim I and IV aircraft. Two reconnaissance squadrons had the Hudson II, which was also reasonably modern. These four squadrons were a remarkably small force to cover both strike and reconnaissance roles in and around Malaya. For

These are Buffalos of RAAF 453 Squadron on Sembawang airfield in November 1941. In addition to flying an outclassed aircraft, Buffalo pilots also lacked combat experience. (AWM)

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A Blenheim IV light bomber arrives in Singapore before the war for assembly. This was an improved version with added armour and an upgraded engine. The aircraft could carry 1,000lb of internal stores. Designed as a fast bomber in 1935, its speed provided insufficient protection in 1941 over Malaya. (Library of Congress)

maritime strikes, there were two squadrons of Vildebeest torpedo bombers. These were also relegated to the Far East since they were declared obsolete in 1940. However, their crews were among the most experienced in Malaya. In addition to the shortage of modern aircraft, there was a shortage of fully trained and experienced aircrew. Whatever the shortcoming of his command, the commanding RAF officer in Malaya, Air Vice-Marshal C. W. H. Pulford, who arrived in April 1941, was determined to fight an aggressive campaign. There was also a dedicated air defence command to defend Singapore. This included a network of six early-warning radars situated in southern Malaya. However, there was no similar early-warning network set up to defend the airfields in northern and central Malaya where the majority of the aircraft were based at the start of the war.

Royal Navy

Though naval power was seen as the key to the defence of Singapore, and the primary mission of the ground and air forces in the theatre was to defend the naval base at Singapore, the RN was unable to station significant forces at Singapore in the period leading up to war. The only naval units present were three light cruisers dating from World War I for convoy escort duties and some gunboats for local defence. In addition, there were several ships (one modern light cruiser and five destroyers) present at the naval base undergoing repair or refit. The arrival of ‘Force Z’ days before the start of the war gave the British a force capable of disrupting Japanese naval communications in the South China Sea, but this threat was short lived as will soon be detailed. Once Force Z was eliminated, the RN ceased to be a factor in the campaign.

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Order of battle

THE BRITISH EMPIRE MALAYA COMMAND (LT. GEN. PERCIVAL) Indian III Corps (Lt. Gen. Heath) 9th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Barstow) 5th Field Regiment (16 4.5in. howitzers) 88th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 80th Anti-tank Regiment (two batteries) (about 18 2-pdr guns) 8th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions; two Indian State Forces infantry battalions attached for airfield defence) 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 11th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen Murray-Lyon) 3rd Cavalry (-) 137th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 155th Field Regiment (eight 18-pdr guns, eight 4.5in. howitzers) 80th Anti-tank Regiment (less two batteries; about 18 2-pdr guns) 6th Indian Infantry Brigade (22nd Mountain Regiment (three 18-pdr guns, ten 3.7in. howitzers) plus three infantry battalions) 15th Indian Infantry Brigade (four infantry battalions) 28th Indian Infantry Brigade (corps reserve) (three infantry battalions) Penang Fortress 11th Coastal Regiment (four 6in. guns) One infantry battalion Airfield Defence Troops Four Malay States Volunteer Force infantry battalions 8th Australian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Bennett) 2/10th Field Regiment (12 18-pdr guns, six 4.5in. howitzers) 2/15th Field Regiment (3in. mortars; equipping with 18- and 25-pdr guns) 2/4th Anti-tank Regiment (12 2-pdr and 24 75mm guns) 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 27th Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) Singapore Fortress (Maj. Gen. Simmons) 1st Malaya Infantry Brigade (two infantry battalions) 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 7th Coastal Regiment (two 15in. guns, three 9.2in. guns, ten 6in. guns, one 18-pdr gun, six 12-pdr, two twin 6-pdr) 9th Coastal Regiment (three 15in., two 9.2in., eight 6in., two 18pdr, three 12-pdr, six twin 6-pdr guns) 16th Defence Regiment (two batteries 18-pdr and one battery 2-pdr coastal defence guns) 1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery) (eight 3.7in., two 3in., eight 40mm guns)

2nd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) (11 3.7in., four 3in. guns) 3rd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Royal Artillery) (nine 3.7in. guns) 1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Indian Army) (16 3in., 26 40mm guns) 3rd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment HKSRA seven 40mm guns Three battalions Straits Settlement Volunteer Force 12th Indian Infantry Brigade (122nd Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) and three infantry battalions) Major Reinforcements 45th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 44th Indian Infantry Brigade (5th Field Regiment (about ten 4.5in. howitzers), one anti-tank battery (about ten 2-pdr guns), one company machine gun, three infantry battalions) 18th Infantry Division 53rd Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 54th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 55th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 118th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 135th Field Regiment (ten 25-pdr guns, eight 18-pdr guns) 148th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 125th Anti-tank Regiment (36 2-pdr guns) One reconnaissance battalion Divisional engineers 2/4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion

ROYAL AIR FORCE (AIR VICE-MARSHAL CONWAY WALTER HEATH PULFORD) The following squadrons were assigned to RAF Far East Command. 60 Squadron was on detachment from Burma for target practice. Total operational strength was 155 aircraft with 88 aircraft in reserve.

Squadron

Airfield

Aircraft type and number

1 (Australian)

Kota Bharu

Ten Hudson II reconnaissance/bombers

8 (Australian)

Kuantan

12 Hudson II reconnaissance/bombers

21 (Australian) Sungei Patani

12 Buffalo fighters

27

Sungei Patani

2 Blenheim IF night fighters

34

Tengah

17 Blenheim IV bombers

36

Gong Kedah

12 Vildebeest torpedo bombers

60

Kuantan

Eight Blenheim I bombers

62

Alor Star

18 Blenheim I bombers

100

Seletar

14 Vildebeest and six Beaufort torpedo bombers

205

Seletar

Five Catalina flying boats

243 (New Zealand)

Kallang

17 Buffalo fighters

453 (Australian)

Sembawang

18 Buffalo fighters

488 (New Zealand)

Kallang

17 Buffalo fighters

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ROYAL NAVY Eastern Fleet (Admiral Sir Tom Phillips; succeeded by ViceAdmiral Sir Geoffrey Layton on 10 December 1941) Battleship: Prince of Wales  Battlecruiser: Repulse 

Light cruisers: Danae, Dragon, Durban  Destroyers: Electra, Express, Tenedos, Vampire (Royal Australian Navy (RAN)); Scout and Thanet from Hong Kong Armed merchant cruisers: Manoora (RAN), Kanimbla (Royal New Zealand Navy)

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE The Imperial Japanese Army

Of the Japanese forces, the force that the IJA fielded to execute the Malaya campaign was the best led, among the best trained and certainly the best equipped and supported of the entire Pacific War. Though outnumbered by the British forces, the IJA fielded a large force supported by what was in Japanese terms a lavish amount of armour, artillery and engineer support. Additionally, the IJA’s doctrinal emphasis on attack made it well matched for Yamashita’s plans for the Malaya operation. The ability of the IJA to operate with minimal logistical support was also on display during the campaign. It was also a supremely confident force since it rated the fighting capabilities of the British units to be very poor, particularly the Indian units. Just like in China where IJA units routinely routed much larger Chinese forces, the IJA expected the Malaya campaign to display again how a smaller force endowed with superior morale and tactics could defeat a larger force with inferior battle instincts. The IJA was built around its highly trained and motivated infantry. Essentially, the IJA substituted fighting spirit for firepower. This had worked well against the Chinese since 1937, but the Japanese expected that it would be severely tested against British forces. Against the British, the IJA’s highly developed infantry tactics were key since they emphasized the importance of spirit and its ability to defeat lesser-motivated Allied forces. Night tactics were especially important, as this would magnify the Japanese desire to fight at close quarters and the IJA’s morale advantage. The IJA did possess major weaknesses, particularly in logistics and intelligence, but these could be minimized if the Japanese were able to maintain the initiative and not allow British forces to establish a firm defence.

Japanese tactics

The IJA’s lack of firepower was reflected in its amphibious doctrine. Substituting firepower were surprise and concealment. If possible, the IJA preferred to launch landings in darkness. Unlike the common practice in Allied landings, the Japanese did not rely on prolonged bombardment of enemy shore defences. Instead of landing into the teeth of a defence, the Japanese emphasized landings to outflank enemy defences. If defences were strong, commanders were encouraged to seek another landing site. To confuse the enemy, landings could be conducted at widely separated sites. Once ashore, forces were expected to press inland as quickly as possible rather than consolidate the beachhead. Between 1937 and 1941 in China, the Japanese conducted 16 multibattalion landings, so the IJA had considerable experience in such operations and had trained units for them. The 5th and 18th Divisions were among the units amphibiously trained. In spite of these successful experiences, the conduct of an amphibious operation on Malaya was expected to be difficult. On the operational level, this explains the Japanese plan to land on uncontested 25

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sites in southern Thailand instead of locations along the eastern coast of Malaya, which the Japanese believed were fortified. Had the British executed Operation Matador and beaten the Japanese to the landing sites in southern Thailand, the Japanese would have had problems overcoming the defences, especially since rough weather made even the unopposed landings difficult. Once ashore, IJA tactics emphasized speed and the power of the attack. The IJA preferred to close with its enemy as quickly as possible since close combat maximized the impact of superior Japanese fighting spirit and minimized Allied firepower. The preferred type of attack was either a single envelopment to one flank, or a double envelopment to both flanks in concert with pressure on the enemy’s front. This tactic, and the tactic of encirclement that called for a deeper thrust to cut the enemy off from his rear, worked well against the road-bound British forces in Malaya. During the campaign, the Japanese would conduct enveloping movement several miles deep and then establish battalion-sized roadblocks. When a frontal attack was necessary, infiltration would locate weak spots that the main attack could exploit. If available, tanks were brought up. The goal was to penetrate the enemy’s rear to attack his command facilities, artillery and reserves. Usually, artillery preparation and support were minimal, so the attack was supported by battalion and regimental weapons. As a matter of course, the Japanese preferred hasty attacks, even against larger enemy forces in defensive positions. This reflected a combination of wanting to annihilate the enemy as quickly as possible, overconfidence, and lack of time or desire to perform full reconnaissance. Against poorly trained or ill-prepared troops, these tactics often succeeded. The traditional IJA reliance on an infantry-heavy force was modified for the Malaya campaign. In order for the campaign to be quickly and successfully completed, given the distance from the main landing areas to the ultimate objective of Singapore, the 25th Army received extensive supporting units. The 5th Division was motorized with 860 trucks and the Imperial Guards Division received 660. The 18th Division still relied on horse-drawn transport. Most impressively, the 25th Army received three tank regiments with a total of 160 light and medium tanks. These were important to enable the pace of the advance to be maintained and were to be employed against British defences that could not be readily outflanked. Several independent artillery units were also allocated to the 25th Army. It was expected that these would be crucial when the Japanese attempted to make the assault on Singapore. Engineering support was also provided in the form of several independent engineer regiments and units equipped to repair bridges and conduct assault landings. These were expected to play a key role since they were responsible for building or repairing bridges over the many rivers on the road to Singapore.

Japanese weapons

IJA weapons were of mixed quality. Individual weapons were rugged and were comparable with those used by the British. The Arisaka 6.5mm Type 38 and 7.7mm Type 99 rifles were reliable bolt-action rifles. The infantry squad was built around the 6.5mm Type 96 light machine gun, which was supported at the battalion level by the 7.7mm Type 92 machine gun. It could maintain a high rate of fire and proved reliable in service. Present in every IJA company were nine 5cm Type 89 heavy grenade dischargers. These were effectively employed on the attack or defence and took the place of mortars. Providing 26

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direct or indirect fire support was the Type 92 70mm battalion gun. The field artillery regiment of an IJA infantry division consisted of 2,100 men and 36 guns. The 18th Division was equipped with 36 75mm mountain guns. The 5th Division was equipped with two battalions of 24 75mm field guns and a single 12-gun battalion of 100mm weapons. This was also the organization of the Imperial Guards Division artillery regiment. Unlike most campaigns against the Allies during the Pacific War, Japanese artillery was well supplied with ammunition and was able to play a significant role during the campaign. 

Japanese tanks

The IJA did not have a well-developed doctrine on the use of tanks. They were viewed as infantry support weapons, and not a weapon to be employed in mass. In spite of this, the finest moments of the IJA’s tank arm were recorded during the Malaya campaign. The 25th Army received a large armour contingent. Unlike the British, who believed that the many bridges in Malaya would not support the weight of tanks, the Japanese correctly assessed that tanks would be valuable in Malaya. Three tank regiments were assigned to the 3rd Tank Group. The 1st and 6th Regiments each had 20 Type 95 light tanks and 37 Type 97 medium tanks. The 14th Tank Regiment had 45 Type 95 light tanks for a total of 85 light and 74 medium tanks. In addition, there were small numbers of tankettes assigned to the reconnaissance regiments of the infantry divisions. By the standards of 1941, the IJA’s medium tank, the Type 97, compared well with Western designs. It mounted a low-velocity 57mm gun and two machine guns but had only 28mm of frontal hull armour and 50mm on the gun mantlet. This meant that the British 2-pdr anti-tank gun could penetrate it at normal battle ranges displayed during the campaign. However, the tank was reliable and weighed only 15 tons, which meant that it could cross available bridges. The Type 95 light tank weighed 10 tons, and carried a 3.7cm gun and two machine guns. The tankettes were the Type 92, which weighed 3.4 tons and mounted a single machine gun. They were suitable for reconnaissance, but not for combat.

The units

The 25th Army had four divisions assigned to undertake the conquest of Malaya and Singapore. Since this was a high percentage of the 11 divisions the IJA dedicated to operations in the southern areas, this was indicative of the importance attached to taking Singapore. However, Yamashita decided to leave one of his divisions, the 56th, in Japan so he could better support his other three divisions. The 56th Division was later assigned to operations in Burma. The 5th Division was to act as the main force for the initial phase of the campaign. This was one of the oldest units in the IJA, having been established in 1873. At the start of the Pacific War, it retained its ‘square’ organization, meaning that it had two infantry brigade group headquarters (the 9th and 21st), each with two regiments (the 11th and 41st assigned to the 9th Brigade and the 21st and 42nd assigned to the 21st Brigade). The Japanese preferred these large units because of the flexibility provided by the command staffs of the brigades, particularly if the unit was tasked with operating in disparate areas. Another key unit was the division reconnaissance unit, which had a small number of tankettes. The 5th Division was tailored for the Malaya operation since it was motorized and trained for amphibious operations. It also had a considerable degree of combat experience as it had fought in 27

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China from 1937 until September 1940 when it was moved to Hainan Island where it conducted training for operations in Malaya. The 18th Division dated back to 1905 and also had extensive combat experience from November 1937 until 1941. It was also a square division, but one of its brigade headquarters, the 35th, was detached along with the 124th Infantry Regiment to conduct the invasion of northern Borneo. This brigade went on to fight on Mindanao and was then sent to Guadalcanal to launch the September offensive there against US Marine defenders. This left the 23rd Infantry Brigade with the 55th and 56th Infantry Regiments and the 114th Infantry Regiment for operations in Malaya. The division also possessed a reconnaissance unit with small amounts of armour and an artillery regiment with 36 75mm mountain guns. The last unit to join the 25th Army was the Guards Division. This division had an infantry and artillery group headquarters which controlled the three infantry regiments (3rd, 4th and 5th Guards) and the 2nd Guards Field Artillery Regiment with 24 75mm field guns and a battalion of 12 105mm howitzers. There was also an organic reconnaissance regiment with 600 men. In 1940, elements of the division were sent to China where they gained combat experience. The division was re-formed in China and then sent to Indo-China in 1941 and later Thailand to enforce Japanese rule in those areas. Despite the fact that the division was manned by conscripts selected from all over Japan to meet high physical standards, the division was trained for ceremonial duties and had no real combat experience. Tsuji went as far as to call the division unsuited to field operations. During the battle, the unit performed well enough, but it was the least effective of Yamashita’s divisions. 

Imperial Japanese Army Air Force

The attack on Singapore was supported by the IJA’s 3rd Air Division. This formation was broken down into three air brigades each with two to four air regiments with a mix of fighter and bomber units. Fighter regiments were up to 48 aircraft organized into three squadrons of 16 aircraft. These included the Ki-27 ‘Nate’ with its fixed landing gear, which was highly manoeuvrable but lightly armed, and the Ki-43 ‘Oscar’, which followed in the same vein, being extremely manoeuvrable but armed with only two 12.7mm machine guns. The Oscar was superior to the Buffalo and comparable with the Hurricane, which arrived later in the campaign. Bomber regiments were normally composed of 27 aircraft divided into three squadrons of nine aircraft. The Ki-48 ‘Lily’ was a mediocre light bomber with a payload of only 880lb, a poor defensive armament and above-average speed. It was comparable with the British Blenheim. The Ki-21 ‘Sally’ was a heavy bomber with the range to strike Singapore from bases in southern Indo-China with its 2,200lb payload. Japanese air power played a major role in the battle, but not a decisive one. Once the Japanese air force gained air superiority, it turned its attention to supporting the ground offensive. The IJA Air Force did not conduct true ground support in the immediate proximity of its own troops, but its constant pre-planned raids against British headquarters, artillery positions and along roads contributed greatly to demoralizing British troops. With a total of 350 aircraft, it could have had a greater impact on the campaign than it did. For example, interdiction of the main road in eastern Malaya was ineffectual and allowed the British to conduct a retreat largely unmolested. 28

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Imperial Japanese Navy

For the First Stage Operations of the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was responsible for conducting operations over a vast area of the Pacific Ocean. The southern thrust was a very high priority so it was allocated a sizeable chunk of the IJN’s most powerful units. The carrier force was required for the Hawaiian operation, so in its place the Southern Force received a large land-based air force. Based in southern Indo-China, these aircraft had the range to hit Singapore and to cover the South China Sea. After the British sent a naval force to Singapore, the importance of the IJN’s land-based air force was magnified. These aircraft were drawn from the 21st and 22nd Air Flotillas and totalled 99 bombers. These were the long-range G3M ‘Nell’ and G4M ‘Betty’ bombers, which were capable of level bombing of land and naval targets and conducting torpedo attacks against naval units. The aircrews of these units were very proficient in attacks against naval units as would be quickly shown in the campaign. In addition to the bombers, there were 25 A6M Mitsubishi ‘Zero’ fighters, which were superior to any fighter aircraft available to the British. The IJN’s surface force for the southern area offensive was built around its force of powerful heavy cruisers. The IJN’s battleships were mostly retained in home waters for the anticipated decisive battle against the US Navy. The exception was the four fast battleships of the Kongo class; two were assigned to the carrier force and the other two were assigned to the southern operation to support either the attack on Malaya or the Philippines. These had been modernized before the war, but were inferior to Prince of Wales. If forced to engage an RN force with capital ships, the IJN preferred to do so at night. This was when the Japanese could employ a large force of heavy cruisers and almost 30 fleet destroyers, which embarked a large number of torpedoes. The seven heavy cruisers assigned to the southern operation were probably the most powerful in the world in 1941. Japanese destroyers were also formidable offensive platforms with many carrying nine torpedo tubes with reloads. During the campaign, the IJN successfully performed its mission of escorting convoys to Malaya and Thailand, and was never seriously challenged by Allied forces.

The Mitsubishi G4M1 Navy Type 1 Attack Bomber (later in the war given the Allied codename ‘Betty’) was a long-range bomber capable of level or torpedo bombing. It had no counterpart in the RN, and its capabilities were unknown to the British at the start of the war. These aircraft sank Repulse and gave the coup de grâce to Prince of Wales on 10 December. (NARA)

Order of battle IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY 25th Army (Lt. Gen. Yamashita) 5th Division (Mechanized) (Lt. Gen. Matsui Takuro) 9th Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Kawamura Saburo) 11th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 41st Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 21st Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Sugiura Eikichi) 21st Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 42nd Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 5th Reconnaissance Regiment 5th Field Artillery Regiment

5th Engineer Regiment 5th Transport Regiment Signal, ordnance and medical units Total: 15, 342 men and 1,008 vehicles 18th Division (Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya) 35th Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyotaki) (detached) 114th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 124th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) (detached) 23rd Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Takumi Hiroshi) 55th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 56th Infantry Regiment (three battalions)

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22nd Reconnaissance Regiment 18th Mountain Artillery Regiment 12th Engineer Regiment 12th Transport Regiment Signal, ordnance and medical units Total: 22,206 men, 33 vehicles and 5,707 horses Imperial Guards Division (Mechanized) (Lt. Gen. Nishimura Takuma) Guards Infantry Group Headquarters 3rd Guards Regiment (three battalions) 4th Guards Regiment (three battalions) 5th Guards Regiment (three battalions; only one was employed in Malaya) Guards Reconnaissance Regiment Guards Field Artillery Regiment Guards Engineer Regiment Guards Transport Regiment Signal, ordnance and medical units Total: 12,649 men and 914 vehicles Army troops 3rd Tank Group 1st Tank Regiment 6th Tank Regiment 14th Tank Regiment 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion Eight independent anti-tank companies 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment 3rd Heavy Field Artillery Regiment 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment 21st Heavy Field Artillery Battalion 3rd Trench Mortar Battalion 5th Trench Mortar Battalion 14th Independent Mortar Battalion 17th Field Air Defence Unit (four battalions) Three independent anti-aircraft companies 4th Independent Engineer Regiment 15th Independent Engineer Regiment 23rd Independent Engineer Regiment 5th Independent Heavy Bridging Company 21st Bridging Material Company 22nd Bridging Material Company 27th Bridging Material Company 10th River Crossing Material Company 15th River Crossing Material Company 21st River Crossing Company 2nd Field Military Police Unit 2nd Railway Unit 25th Army Signal Units Total 88,689 men, 4,325 vehicles and 10,442 horses Various lines of communications, transport, construction and medical units totalling 36,719 men, 2,995 vehicles and 1,740 horses

IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE 3rd Air Division (Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiyo) 3rd Air Brigade 59th Regiment (fighters) 21 Ki-43, 3 Ki-27 27th Regiment (reconnaissance) 28 Ki-51 75th Regiment (light bombers) 25 Ki-48 90th Regiment (light bombers) 23 Ki-48 7th Air Brigade 64th Regiment (fighters) 35 Ki-43, 6 Ki-27 12th Regiment (heavy bombers) 21 Ki-21 60th Regiment (heavy bombers) 39 Ki-21 98th Regiment (heavy bombers) 42 Ki-21 10th Air Brigade 77th Regiment (fighters) 27 Ki-27 31st Regiment (reconnaissance) 24 Ki-30 62nd Regiment (heavy bombers) 22 Ki-21 Eight Ki-15 70th Independent Squadron (reconnaissance) 12th Air Brigade 42 Ki-27 1st Regiment (fighters) 39 Ki-27 11th Regiment (fighters) 11 Ki-15/Ki-46 15th Independent Squadron (reconnaissance) Seven Ki-46, nine Ki-15 81st Regiment (reconnaissance)

IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY Southern Force (Vice-Admiral Kondo Nobutake) Main Body (Kondo) Squadron 3, Section 2 Battleships Kongo and Haruna  Squadron 4, Section 1 Heavy Cruisers Atago (flagship) and Takao  Destroyer Divisions 4, 6 and 8 Ten destroyers Malaya Seizure Force (Vice-Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo) Main Body Heavy cruiser Chokai (flagship) One destroyer Escort Force Squadron 7 Heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mogami, Mikuma  Destroyer Squadron 3 Light cruiser Sendai  16 destroyers Air Forces 22nd Air Flotilla Mihoro Air Group 36 G3M Genzan Air Group 36 G3M Kanoya Air Group (detachment) 27 G4M Attached: 25 A6M fighters 12 A5M fighters 6 C5M reconnaissance aircraft Totals: 37 fighters, 99 bombers, 6 reconnaissance aircraft

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OPPOSING PLANS THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Both the British and Japanese considered Malaya and Singapore as strategically inseparable. Singapore could not be held if Malaya was lost. Both also agreed that the only viable method of capturing Singapore was overland. This meant an advance down the length of Malaya. Both also saw the role of air power as potentially decisive. The area that the campaign was fought over was expansive. The Malayan Peninsula is over 400 miles long from southern Thailand where the Japanese initially landed to the southern tip of the peninsula where Singapore is separated from the mainland by the narrow Strait of Johore. The peninsula varies in width from 60 to 200 miles. Actual operations were restricted to the coastal plains since the centre of the peninsula was covered by a mountain range, which starts at 7,000ft in the north and runs down to 3,000ft in the south.

Australian troops moving along a road in Malaya. British formations were motorized which made them road bound. In some areas of Malaya, as shown here, it is easy to see how adjoining jungle or plantation could dominate the roads. (AWM)

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The coastal areas were also subject to considerable terrain difficulties. North–south movement was impeded by many fast-flowing rivers and streams, which run from the central mountains into the sea. On the west coast, the coastal plain included mudflats and mangrove swamps; on the east coast, mangrove swamps populated the mouths of the rivers. The most significant factor was the dense jungle, which originally covered the entire peninsula. On the west coast and in the southern part of the peninsula called Johore, this jungle had been partly cleared for cultivation. The east coast was covered by primeval jungle. Ameliorating the terrain conditions was an extensive road system. These were concentrated on the west coast and in Johore. Roads on the east coast were few, and there were only two roads connecting the east and west coasts. Weather conditions were also a factor. Being near the equator, the climate was and still is hot and humid. Typically, new troops needed a period of adjustment to be fully effective. Rainfall was heavy and often included violent afternoon thunderstorms with heavy clouds that extended from 300ft up to as far as 30,000ft and were a serious impediment to flying. The biggest factors were the two monsoon seasons per year. The worst of the two ran from November to March, which created winds and a swell along the east coast of Malaya. The accompanying rains made off-road movement on the eastern part of the peninsula difficult.

BRITISH DEFENCE PLANS British strategic planners were facing difficulties on every front in 1941. The German invasion of Russia in June and the resulting decision to send large numbers of tanks and aircraft to Britain’s newest ally meant there was even less available for Malaya. In addition to the sheer unavailability of enough troops and weapons to cover all of Britain’s defence requirements, there were further problems, which lessened the prospect for a successful defence of Malaya. The British, as forcefully advocated by Churchill, believed that the Japanese would not attack in the Far East since it would mean going to war with the United States. As we have already seen, the Japanese were determined to go to war, even if this meant attacking both Britain and the United States. This rendered Churchill’s assessment that it was more important to send forces to the Mediterranean instead of sending them to the Far East, where they would sit idle, totally inaccurate. Finally, Churchill believed that as long as the fortress of Singapore and its immediate approaches were held that this would be sufficient. This rested on the assumption that Singapore was in fact a fortress and overlooked the vulnerability of the naval base and any fleet based there to air attack. The British Chiefs of Staff concurred with the pre-war assessment that the only way to hold Singapore was to hold Malaya. All plans to defend Singapore depended on keeping the naval base open for the arrival of the fleet. In order to do this, Malaya had to be held to provide the required strategic depth. To hold Malaya, much larger ground and naval forces had to be allocated to the Far East. Not only were these unavailable, but it was also impossible for the Royal Navy to assemble a large, balanced force in late 1941 for operations in the Far East. Thus, the entire British defence scheme was nothing but a house of cards. 32

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This disconnect had implications for all aspects of British defence planning. A further problem was the inability of the services to coordinate their planning properly. For example, the RAF had built its primary bases in northern Malaya and along the east coast in order to extend its range against a Japanese invasion force. The problem was that these were the most likely areas for a Japanese invasion and that the army did not possess the means to defend them. In 1937–38, then Lt. Col. Percival revised the plan to defend Singapore. His goal was to keep the Japanese as far as possible from the naval base for as long as possible. The real fear was that the Japanese could establish airbases in Malaya and then use them to isolate Singapore. At a minimum, Percival wanted to establish a defensive line some 30 miles north of the naval base to keep it out of artillery range. Given what was available to the army, this was all that could be readily achieved. But the RAF demanded that their airbases in the northern and eastern parts of Malaya be defended. The RAF got its way; if the fleet would not arrive in a timely manner, then air power seemed the best way to defeat a Japanese landing force. The expansion of Malaya Command gave Percival a chance to implement the plan to defend forward. In May 1941, Indian III Corps was established and given the mission to defend northern and central Malaya. To do this, it had five Indian infantry brigades. The defence of Johore was given to 8th Australian Infantry Division. Two brigades were assigned to the Singapore Fortress. A single Indian brigade was held in reserve.

Operation Matador

In an effort to defeat a Japanese invasion before it could get established, the Commander-in-Chief Far East proposed a plan to move into southern Thailand to establish defensive positions at Singora and Patani before the Japanese could land. This ambitious plan was codenamed Operation Matador. This offered real prospects to disrupt the Japanese plan since the only port of any consequence in the area was Singora and without it the Japanese would have to advance south from Bangkok or conduct a riskier amphibious attack at Kota Bharu. The plan was sent to London in August 1941 for approval. The problem was that it violated the territory of a neutral country, and London did not want to approve it for fear it would present the Americans with political problems that might reduce the possibility of their coming to the aid of Britain in the Far East. For the plan to have a chance of being successful, the local commander had to have authority to initiate the operation as soon as the Japanese invasion force was spotted at sea. There would be no time to get approval from London. The plan was not approved until 5 December 1941, but only with important conditions attached. Since these did not grant automatic approval for Brooke-Popham, the plan was essentially dead. The 11th Indian Infantry Division was charged with the execution of Matador, and consequently did not finish preparing defensive positions at Jitra. These had immediate consequences in the first few days of the campaign. Percival was forced to spread his forces out. The 11th Indian Infantry Division was positioned in north-western Malaya, which contained the roads leading from the likely invasion points in Thailand. This division had only two brigades, meaning it had no reserves. The Indian III Corps’s other division, the 9th Indian Infantry Division, also had only two brigades. These were deployed on the east coast to defend the airfields at Kota Bharu and Kuantan. Neither of the brigades could support the other, and neither of 33

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Indian troops marching along a road in western Malaya. As can be seen in this photo, the conditions of the roads were excellent. (Author’s collection)

the divisions could support the other. The only corps reserve was a single brigade. This deployment opened the units of Indian III Corps to defeat in detail. Adding to the danger was the fact that no defensive positions existed, Percival having rejected a proposal from his chief engineer, Brig. Ivan Simson, to build a countrywide system of defences.

British plans – an evaluation

The British were not unaware of the threat posed by the Japanese and had deduced the broad outlines of the Japanese plan. Nevertheless, they were surprised by the timing and intent of the Japanese plan. They did not believe that the Japanese would attack during monsoon season and hoped that the arrival of Force Z would give the Japanese additional reason for pause. To execute the type of offensive required to clear Malaya quickly and capture Singapore, the British believed the Japanese needed a force much larger than what was available. Most of all, the British failed to foresee the kind of campaign the Japanese were planning to fight. The Japanese ‘driving strategy’ was predicated on running a major offensive on a logistical shoestring, something the British were unprepared to do and could not see the Japanese risking. At worst, if the Japanese did attack and get a major force ashore, it could not advance far and fast enough to threaten Singapore before the British could bring in reinforcements. To say the British plan to defend Malaya was unrealistic would be charitable. The basic premise was to defend the naval base, but the RN did not have the ships to send there and did not plan to use it. In order to defend the navy base, the RAF had built airbases in northern and eastern Malaya, but these were equipped with few aircraft with marginal capabilities. The army was forced to defend these bases, but in so doing became overstretched and open to defeat in detail. The notion of a fortress which could be held in spite of all difficulties was impossible against an enemy with control of the air and sea. The stage was set for Britain’s greatest military disaster. 34

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THE JAPANESE PLAN The attack into Malaya was one aspect of a much larger Japanese offensive to open the war. The most important operation in the first phase was the attack on the United States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Another critical requirement was the capture of Singapore before the British could reinforce it. Once captured, the entire Allied defence of Southeast Asia would be fatally compromised. The IJN devoted large escort forces to support the invasion convoys bound for Malaya. Most of the air power for the Malaya operation was provided by the IJA. Ground troops were limited since only 11 divisions could be allocated to the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies invasions. This meant that the Japanese were actually outnumbered on the ground, and that the operations had to be conducted with speed before Allied reinforcements could arrive. One of the myths of the campaign is that the Japanese had planned and trained extensively for the attack. Though contingency plans against the British had been prepared as early as 1936, serious planning began only in 1941. Preceding attack planning was the IJA’s establishment of a unit on Taiwan in December 1940 to work on a doctrine for jungle warfare. The work of this 30-man unit was later published as a 70-page manual called Read This Alone – And the War Can Be Won and issued to all members of the invasion force. The new doctrine went far in making the jungle an asset for the Japanese. It was also the basis for a series of exercises on Taiwan and Hainan Island in southern China which tested problems like transporting units in as few ships as possible, making an opposed beach landing in difficult weather, the use of bicycles to speed the advance, and employing combined arms in jungle terrain. Not until 25 August was the 25th Army ordered to prepare a campaign plan for the attack on Malaya. As was usual for the IJA, the plan depended on the enemy acting according to the Japanese script and showed an utter contempt for his capabilities. Fortunately for the Japanese, both were accurate assessments. The 25th Army completed its Operational Outline on 3 November. Yamashita was appointed to command the operation on 6 November, and on 10 November an agreement was reached between the army and the navy for the conduct of the campaign. In broad terms, the plan called for a landing at several points in northern Malaya and southern Thailand, followed by an advance through Malaya along the western coastal plain until the final assault across the Strait of Johore onto Singapore Island. The 5th Division was slated to make the initial attack by seizing Singora and Patani in southern Thailand. The problems of landing in Thailand were lessened since the Japanese knew the Thais would not put up a defence and that the British would not advance into Thailand. The quick seizure of the ports would allow the Japanese to get ashore quickly and nearby airfields would allow the 3rd Air Division to establish bases. Once ashore, the 5th Division would advance into Malaya with the 9th Infantry Brigade using the Singora–Alor Star road and the 42nd Infantry Regiment assigned to the Patani–Kroh road. The initial objective was the line of the Perak River where additional airfields were to be captured. After 23 December, the advance on Kuala Lumpur would begin.  More risky was the planned attack at Kota Bharu just south of the Thai border in north-eastern Malaya. This landing was assigned to the 56th 35

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Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division. It offered the benefit of protecting the main landing from air attack by seizing three nearby airfields. The other elements of the 18th Division, less one regiment and a brigade headquarters, which were allocated to attack northern Borneo, were to land at Singora and Patani early in January with the rest of the 25th Army to reinforce the attack on Singapore. The Imperial Guards Division was ordered to move into Bangkok from Cambodia to establish Japanese control, and then join the advance through Malaya. The lead unit of the division, the 4th Guards Regiment, was to move by rail and arrive in the Taiping–Ipoh area by 23 December. The rest of the division would follow as soon as possible. Yamashita’s last division, the 56th, was not even included in the operation. Yamashita decided to leave it in Japan so he could use his available shipping to move supplies to keep his advance going. Thus, of the 42 infantry battalions in the 25th Army, only 28 were actually used during the campaign. The final plan was approved on 23 November. Yamashita had been convinced, if he needed convincing, that it was better to risk supply problems rather than to pause after landing to build up his forces. Now, the 5th Division would advance to the left bank of the Perak River as quickly as possible to create conditions for the continued advance into Malaya. The Imperial Guards Division would be employed as a follow-up force, and brought into action in an amphibious landing on the east coast of Malaya. This ‘driving strategy’ as coined by Yamashita would result in the destruction of British forces in Malaya before they could retreat to Singapore. To maintain the speed of the advance, the infantry would advance along the roads until contact was made, then the Japanese would move through the adjoining jungle or plantations to encircle the enemy. Once the enemy was flanked, the Japanese would set up roadblocks to complete the encirclement. Only if an enemy position could not be flanked would a frontal assault be attempted. This is where the tanks would come in, which the 25th Army had a plentiful supply of.

Japanese plans – an evaluation

The Japanese plan to invade Malaya and seize Singapore was audacious, almost to the point of recklessness. Yamashita was faced with taking a fairly small force, with an overstretched shipping capacity, to advance down 400 miles of jungle road against a larger force which had had time to prepare formidable defences. At the end of this advance, the Japanese were still faced with the problem of attacking across a major water obstacle to seize a well-defended fortress. Yet, this plan was a brilliant success. Both at an operational and tactical level, the Japanese were continually able to gain surprise. Their ‘driving strategy’ kept the British off balance and kept the initiative in Japanese hands. It worked primarily because the British thought it impossible even to attempt. Under the bold leadership of Yamashita, it was a formula for victory.  

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THE BATTLE THE JAPANESE LANDINGS A 19-ship convoy carrying elements of the 5th Division departed Hainan Island early on 4 December. Another convoy with seven ships left Saigon on the afternoon of the 5th. These convoys were ordered to join in the Gulf of Thailand on the morning of 7 December while transiting as close to the coast as possible to avoid detection by British aircraft. Since 3 December, the British had been flying search missions over the South China Sea, but not in the Gulf of Thailand. About midday on 6 December, a Hudson aircraft spotted what was reported as three convoys 80 miles south-east of Cape Cambodia. The British were unsure if the convoys were headed to Bangkok or to make a landing on Malaya or southern Thailand. This was sufficient to prompt Brooke-Popham to order all British forces on alert, but he did not order Operation Matador activated since the British could not be seen to make the first move. Because of bad weather on 7 December and the fact that the Japanese convoys had turned to the north-west into the Gulf of Thailand out of the range of British searches, no further information was gained on Japanese intentions until later in the day. At 1730hrs, Japanese ships were spotted 110 miles north of Kota Bharu headed toward Singora. Another group was spotted north of Patani. This information did not reach Far East Command until 2100hrs, but it was insufficient to confirm that the Japanese were intent on invading southern Thailand. Any uncertainty regarding Japanese intentions was dispelled soon enough. According to plan, the landing at Kota Bharu began at about 0045hrs on 8 December. Reports soon arrived from the defending 8th Indian Infantry Brigade and the RAF airfield at Kota Bharu that the Japanese were landing. In response, the Hudsons at Kota Bharu conducted moonlight attacks on the ships off the coast, sinking one and damaging two.

A Japanese landing barge loading troops off the coast of southern Thailand. Japanese amphibious doctrine would have had trouble conducting an opposed landing, as was demonstrated at Kota Bharu, but the main landings at Singora and Patani were uncontested. (NARA)

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1

2

RAF ATTACK ON SINGORA (PP. 38–39) The first couple of days of the campaign included intense air activity by both sides as each struck the other’s airfields to gain air superiority. The scale of the RAF’s attacks was much smaller, and usually these did not have the benefit of fighter protection. One of the main attacks of 9 December was mounted by a group of Blenheim IV bombers from 34 and 60 Squadrons (1). Of the 14 Mark IVs and four Mark Is available, six Mark IVs were ordered to attack Singora airfield in southern Thailand, which had just been captured by the Japanese and was already being heavily used. No fighter escort was available, but the small strike group was not intercepted on its way to the target. Once over the target area, they were swarmed by Ki-27 ‘Nates’ from the 1st Sentai (2). The

Ki-27 began development in 1934 and looked antiquated with its fixed landing gear, but was extremely manoeuvrable. It was the most numerous fighter used by the IJA Air Force during the campaign. The Japanese claimed to have shot down five of the British bombers, but only three were lost. A 60 Squadron aircraft got separated from the formation, bombed Japanese ships in the harbour, and was shot down. Another 60 Squadron bomber was also lost, and a 34 Squadron aircraft was damaged over the target, and crashed on the return flight. The other three survived and claimed to have hit the congested airfield. For the loss of half the strike, several Japanese aircraft might have been destroyed, but the RAF could not afford this kind of attrition.

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THE FIGHT FOR KOTA BHARU A heavy swell made the Japanese landings at Kota Bharu difficult. On top of this, the Japanese ran into prepared beach defences held by a battalion of Indian troops. It took three trips by the landing craft to get the Japanese force ashore, with the first coming under artillery and air attack. After heavy combat, by 0345hrs, the Japanese penetrated the centre of the Indian line and threatened the airfield located only two miles inland. An attack by two Malayan battalions later in the morning was unsuccessful. The confused situation was made worse by a premature order to destroy the airfield at about 1600hrs. With the sighting of additional Japanese transports, the British brigade commander gave the order to fall back from the beach defences to cover Kota Bharu at about 2000hrs. By 2200hrs, the Japanese occupied the airfield. Next morning, the Japanese pressed their attack on the disorganized British troops and began to infiltrate around the British strongpoints. On the 10th, the British broke contact, and surrendered the airfields at Gong Kedah and Machang. Demolitions were carried out on the facilities and fuel, but all three of the airfields were seized by the Japanese with their runways intact. The defeat of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade had given the 3rd Air Division an important toehold.

A British soldier surrenders to the Japanese during the early fighting in Malaya. He faces an uncertain future, even if he survives to go into a prisoner of war camp. (Author’s collection)

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Machang Airfield

4/19 Hyderabad

er

To Kuala Krai

Riv

42

HQ

tan

Tanah Merah

Pasir Mas

8 Ind

X

11 Dec

Sabak

III

Mulong

II

II

Bachok

II

Pasir Puteh

2/10 Baluch

2/12 Frontier Forces Rifles

18

Afternoon 9 Dec

2200hrs, 8 Dec

3/17 Dogras

56

Peringat

8 Dec

9 Dec– Morning 11 Dec

Chondong

Machang

II

Ketereh

Kota Bharu

II

Badang 1/13 Frontier Forces Rifles

Tumpat

Kota Bharu Airfield

The landing at Kota Bharu on 8 December

an Kel

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Gong Kedah Airfield

0

0

K. Besut

5km

5 miles

British blocking positions

N

THE LANDINGS IN SOUTHERN THAILAND The 5th Division convoys reached their landing areas at about 0220hrs and by 0400hrs began landing. The Thais offered little resistance. Meanwhile, confusion reigned in Indian III Corps whether to conduct Matador, and, more importantly, whether to order a force named ‘Krohcol’ (one battalion) into Thailand to act as a delaying force, by occupying the easily defended Ledge position on the Patani road. The Ledge position was a defile that constituted the only good defensive position north of Kroh. Not until 1500hrs did Krohcol cross the frontier into Thailand, but Thai resistance and roadblocks resulted in only a three-mile advance by dusk. By the morning of 10 December, the British were still six miles short of the Ledge position, and when they tried to advance the last leg on foot they were stopped cold by Japanese forces. The Japanese had won the race to the Ledge, advancing 75 miles in 60 hours over bad roads after coming ashore, before the British could advance 30 miles. It was an impressive performance and a portent of things to come.

THE SAGA OF FORCE Z As the outbreak of war in the Far East looked more likely, the RN was making plans to send a large, balanced fleet to Singapore. In August 1941, the RN was proposing to send seven capital ships (all older ships), one aircraft carrier, ten cruisers and 24 destroyers to the Far East. However, it would take until March 1942 to assemble and dispatch such a fleet. Also in August, the Australian government requested the early dispatch of some capital ships to act as a deterrent to Japanese ambitions. This prompted Churchill to consider sending a smaller force to Singapore in October built around a modern battleship, a battlecruiser and an aircraft carrier. This resulted in a standoff between Churchill and the Admiralty which favoured sending a larger, balanced fleet. Nothing was resolved until a meeting on 20 October when it was agreed that battleship Prince of Wales would begin a transit to Cape Town, South Africa with a final decision to be made when it arrived there.

HMS Prince of Wales entering Singapore naval base on 2 December. It was the second ship of the King George V class, veteran of the Bismarck chase in May 1941 and the most modern battleship in the Royal Navy. More than a match for the two IJN battleships then in the South China Sea, it was not a match for large-scale air attack. (NARA)

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HMS Repulse was the second capital ship in Phillips’ unbalanced Force Z. It was a battlecruiser completed in 1916, and, like almost all Royal Navy battlecruisers of its day, was weakly protected, especially against air attack. Its anti-aircraft armament was also totally deficient. (NARA)

Prince of Wales steamed from the Clyde on 25 October with three destroyers. On 16 November, the battleship arrived in Cape Town. This stop was heralded in the press and no attempt was made by the Admiralty to change its destination. When Prince of Wales reached Colombo on Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), it was joined by battlecruiser Repulse and two destroyers. On the late afternoon of 2 December, Force Z with its two capital ships and four destroyers arrived at Singapore. The sighting of three large convoys of Japanese transports south of IndoChina on 6 December suggested that Force Z would soon be tested. On the 8th, reports came in of Japanese landings at three points in Thailand and Malaya. That same day, IJN aircraft bombed Singapore where Prince of Wales was at anchor. By the morning of 8 December, when the scale of Japanese attacks across the Pacific had become obvious, and the Admiralty had given orders to commence hostilities, it was also obvious that the primary mission of Force Z, to act as a deterrent, had failed. With this realization, London pondered what to do with Force Z. Before it could decide, Phillips had already acted. He had returned to Singapore on the morning of 7 December from a conference with the Americans at Manila. Following an early-morning conference with British commanders at the naval base on 8 December, Phillips determined he would

Prince of Wales leaving Singapore on the evening of 8 December. Phillips’ plan for Force Z was a calculated risk, but was not reckless as is often portrayed. (AWM)

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have to act quickly with his small but powerful force if there was any hope of defeating the Japanese invasion. The operation was highly dependent on surprise, but with the monsoon weather providing cover, he rated his chances of reaching Singora as 50-50. Later, in the morning, he changed his target to Kota Bharu with the intent of arriving there on the morning of 10 December. The Prince of Wales was the second ship of the King George V class – the most modern class of British battleships to see action during the war. The ship was heavily armoured, carried an impressive main armament of ten 14in. guns, and possessed a top speed of 28.5 knots. Its principal weakness was a limited capability for engaging modern aircraft, especially low-flying ones. Repulse was a battlecruiser that had not been modernized since its completion in 1916. As would be expected of a battlecruiser, the ship was fast, carried a strong armament built on six 15in. guns, but did not possess strong protective armour against bombs or torpedoes. Its anti-aircraft battery was totally inadequate. Despite these shortcomings, the two capital ships constituted a real threat to Japanese sea lines of communications through the South China Sea. The true nature of the Japanese air threat was unknown to Phillips and the RN in general. The capabilities of Japanese aircraft and aviators were judged to be unimpressive, and probably not as developed as the threats that the RN had faced in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Just before it departed for the Far East, Prince of Wales was exposed to Italian air attacks, which were repulsed (though another battleship, Nelson, was hit by a torpedo and severely damaged). Using the range of present British torpedo bombers as a basis for comparison, the general belief was that if Force Z stayed 400 miles from Japanese bases on southern Indo-China the threat would be minimal. Prince of Wales and Repulse, escorted by a mere four destroyers departed Singapore naval base after dusk on 8 December. It soon became apparent that the prospects for air cover were nil, so surprise was now even more critical. The target of the Japanese landing site at Kota Bharu would lessen the time under threat of air attack from bases in Indo-China. At 0400hrs on the 9th, Phillips changed course to the north under heavy weather, which brought promise of no detection. Unbeknown to the British, Force Z was spotted by Japanese submarine I-65 at 1345hrs. Then, an hour before sunset, the skies cleared and at 1740hrs the first of three Japanese aircraft was spotted tailing the force. Phillips continued north then changed course to the north-west at 1855hrs and then

Repulse departing Singapore on 8 December. The battlecruiser was well handled during the initial phases of the attack before finally succumbing to overwhelming torpedo attack. (AWM)

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1

2 3

4

THE DEATH OF PRINCE OF WALES (PP. 46–47) The key blow against Prince of Wales came early in the action. This was landed by the second group of aircraft to attack, 17 torpedocarrying G3M2 Navy Type 96 attack bombers (later given the Allied codename of ‘Nell’) from the Genzan Air Group (1). This aircraft began development in 1933 and was the IJN’s first longrange land-based bomber. It was replaced early in the war by the G4M ‘Betty’, so remains much less well known. For 1941, it was a formidable weapon and could carry one Type 91 aerial torpedo to a maximum range of 2,365nm. The Nells carried the Type 91 Mod 1, which was a reliable weapon with a range of 2,200 yards at 41–43 knots with a warhead of 331lb. As the Nells closed in to commence their attack, the 5.25in. guns on Prince of Wales opened up with a deafening roar, and were soon joined by the six eight-barrel 2-pdr (pom-pom) mounts, and finally by the single 40mm mount on the stern and the seven single 20mm mounts (2). The battleship is in the striking six-colour First Admiralty

Disruptive camouflage (3). The 17 planes of the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the Genzan Air Group attacked in waves of two or three aircraft abreast. The 1st Squadron selected Prince of Wales as its target and dropped eight torpedoes between 1144 and 1146hrs from 650–1,600 yards. The anti-aircraft fire was intense, and one aircraft was shot down and three more damaged. The Japanese claimed three hits, but only two hit the battleship. However, these two hits, both at 1144hrs and both in the same area of the port side aft, were sufficient to doom the ship (4). The torpedoes struck abaft the rear 14in. turret, which buckled the outer propeller shaft and flooded several compartments. The ship’s speed dropped from 25 to 15 knots and within minutes flooding caused an 11.5-degree list. Prince of Wales was left a sitting duck unable to manoeuvre and with its main anti-aircraft battery out of commission.

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The destruction of Force Z 0

100 miles

0

100km

FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Soc Trang

N

Main Body

Escort Force

1345hrs 9 Dec

2015hrs 9 Dec

0230hrs 10 Dec

1930hrs 1920hrs 9 Dec 9 Dec 1855hrs 9 Dec 1930hrs 9 Dec 1740hrs Sighted by aircraft 9 Dec

2355hrs 9 Dec 0052hrs 10 Dec 1345hrs Sighted by I-65 9 Dec

0210hrs 10 Dec

Sighted by I-58

Kuantan

1015hrs 10 Dec 1115hrs Air attack begins 10 Dec

0800hrs 10 Dec

1233hrs 10 Dec

Repulse sunk

Natuna Island

1320hrs Prince of Wales sunk 10 Dec

Anambas Island

MALAYA P. Tioman

Djemadja 1044hrs 10 Dec

Tenedos attacked

Johore Strait Strait of Malacca

Singapore Singapore Strait

17 35 8 Dec

0400hrs 9 Dec

Track of Force Z Imperial Japanese Navy Task Groups Track of IJN aircraft

Borneo

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to the west at 1930hrs as if going to Singora. It was at this point that the British force was only some 22 miles from the IJN task force searching for it. At about 2000hrs Phillips conferred with his senior staff on whether to continue the operation. It was quickly decided to abort it and head south to Singapore, 275 miles away. Then, at 2355hrs, fate intervened. A report reached Prince of Wales that a Japanese landing had occurred at Kuantan, which was only 120 miles from Force Z’s current position. The report was completely false, but, as Kuantan was a critical location, Phillips decided that it should be investigated. Accordingly, Force Z changed course at 0052hrs on 10 December to the south-west. Critically, Phillips did not request air support for this change of plan, thinking that his Chief of Staff in Singapore, in receipt of the same report, would know he was headed there and arrange fighter cover. Besides, Kuantan was some 450 miles from the nearest IJN airbase and thus probably beyond the range of effective air attack. By 0800hrs next morning, Force Z was located off Kuantan and sent an aircraft from Prince of Wales and a destroyer to investigate inshore. Nothing was found. Instead of making directly for Singapore, Phillips lingered for some 90 minutes off Kuantan to investigate an earlier report of some barges and a tug. This delay proved fatal. At about 1015hrs, a lookout on Prince of Wales spotted a Japanese aircraft. Even at this point, Phillips did not send a signal for fighter cover. Just after 1100hrs, the first wave of attacking aircraft was spotted and the action began. Following the failure of the Japanese surface forces to make contact with Force Z on the night of 9/10 December, it was left to the IJN’s landbased air forces to attack the British force before a planned day engagement on the 10th. At 0455hrs, nine bombers from the Genzan Air Corps took off, followed by two reconnaissance planes at 0530hrs to find Force Z. The attack aircraft from the Genzan, Mihoro and Kanoya Air Corps were ordered to take off as soon as ready. A total of 85 twin-engined G3M ‘Nell’ and G4M ‘Betty’ aircraft took off between 0625 and 0800hrs. Among these were 26 Bettys armed with torpedoes, and 59 Nells (25 with torpedoes, the rest with bombs). The lead aircraft flew south to a point just 80 miles north of Singapore without finding the British ships. They turned north to continue the search. At 1013hrs, they spotted the destroyer Tenedos, which had been detached from Force Z because of fuel issues. Nine Nells attacked it with bombs, but all missed. As the fuel levels of the Japanese aircraft were becoming a concern, one of the reconnaissance aircraft spotted Force Z off Kuantan at 1015hrs. At about 1100hrs, the strike force spotted Force Z and began its attacks. Because the Japanese aircraft were not launched together, and because they were spread out in search lines, the battle developed into a series of attacks. The British ships opened fire on the Japanese bombers at 1113hrs. The first group to attack was composed of the eight Nells from the Mihoro Air Group at 1115hrs against Repulse. Each aircraft dropped two 550lb bombs from just under 10,000ft. Of these, all were close, but only a single hit was scored on a hangar, which wrecked a seaplane and started a fire; this was quickly put out. British anti-aircraft fire was heavy, and, against level bombers on a constant course and speed, fairly effective. Five of the eight planes were damaged. 50

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The second attack was made by 17 torpedo-carrying Nells from the Genzan Air Group. Eight planes dropped on Prince of Wales from 650–1,600 yards. The Japanese claimed three hits, but only two were confirmed by the British. But these two hits, both at 1144hrs, doomed the ‘unsinkable’ Prince of Wales. The torpedoes struck the port side abaft the rear 14in. turret, which buckled the outer propeller shaft and flooded several compartments. The flooding caused an 11.5-degree list, cut speed to 15 knots, and placed the main anti-aircraft guns out of action. Meanwhile, nine aircraft attacked Repulse with torpedoes, but no hits were recorded, despite Japanese claims of four hits. About this same time, six aircraft from the Mihoro Air Group attacked Repulse with bombs, but all missed. The third attack from 1157–1202hrs featured eight torpedo-carrying Nells from the Mihoro Air Group, which launched their weapons against Repulse. The well-handled battlecruiser again avoided all these. The following wave, which was composed of the 26 Bettys from the Kanoya Air Group, took place from 1220–1232hrs. Six attacked the crippled Prince of Wales and 20 went after the still-nimble Repulse. The battleship was unable to manoeuvre, and was hit by four torpedoes on its starboard side. A well-executed pincer attack on Repulse presented its captain with an impossible situation. Five torpedoes hit the ship and it listed rapidly to port. The ship sank at 1233hrs. The next wave of attack was conducted by nine bomb-carrying aircraft of the Mihoro Air Group against the escorting destroyers. No hits were scored. The final attack by Mihoro Air Group Nells focused on Prince of Wales with seven planes dropping 1,100lb bombs. One hit was scored, which struck the upper deck by the catapult and penetrated to the main deck where it exploded and caused severe casualties. At this point, it was simply a matter of time until the battleship sank. Speed was reduced to six knots, and the list to port increased as the ship settled quickly. The order to abandon ship was given at 1315hrs. Five minutes later, Prince of Wales heeled over to port. All that was left were the three destroyers, which went about the business of rescuing the men in the water unmolested by the Japanese. From Repulse, 513 men were lost and 796 rescued; Prince of Wales lost 327 men and had 1,285 rescued. Japanese losses totalled three aircraft and 21 airmen and 27 other aircraft damaged. The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse marked not only the end of the dreadnought era but also the end of British sea power in the Far East. Since the RAF was also crippled early in the campaign, the fate of Singapore would be decided by the British Army.

Force Z under attack with Prince of Wales manoeuvring in the upper right of the photo and Repulse on the lower left. Repulse is under attack by horizontal bombers as seen by the bomb splashes. Based on the Royal Navy’s European experiences of German and Italian air attacks, Phillips did not fear horizontal bombing since it was inaccurate and lacked the power to cripple a heavily armoured capital ship. He had no concept of the scope and capabilities of Japanese torpedo bombers, and this is what sank both British ships. (NARA)

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FORCE Z – AN ASSESSMENT The loss of Force Z was met with great shock in Britain. But was it inevitable? As Phillips saw it, he had three choices: stay in Singapore and be bombed, move to a safer position and maintain his fleet for later action, or attack the Japanese invasion knowing that only naval power could defeat the Japanese. Not surprisingly, he chose the last of these. When his plan was discussed with his staff on 8 December, nobody dissented. Phillips was aware of the risks, but was confident he could deal with any Japanese surface forces in the area (he counted on only a single Kongo-class battlecruiser and a few cruisers), and did not understand the scope of the air threat. With the element of surprise, he thought he could deliver a serious blow to the Japanese invasion force on the morning of 10 December. With the nearest IJN bomber base 400 miles from Singora and 370 miles from Kota Bharu, Phillips believed the threat from torpedo planes to be minimal. High-level attacks did not concern him. After the fact, there does appear to be a sense of inevitably about the pointless loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse. The force sent to the Far East was inadequate to act as a deterrent, and it was equally inadequate as a balanced force to disrupt the Japanese invasion. There is little doubt that Phillips or any other RN admiral would have chosen to take a calculated risk to attack the Japanese invasion force. There is also no doubt that no British admiral understood the power and range of the IJN’s land-based air groups. And the failure to provide fighter cover to Force Z misses the point – even if a squadron of poorly armed and short-endurance Buffalo fighters had been present to defend the force, the result would not have changed, just the cost to the Japanese. In the final analysis, the decision to send a totally inadequate and unbalanced force to an insecure base was fatally flawed. The premise for the entire operation, that a force of two capital ships could act as a deterrent to Japan, which was going to war for national survival, had no basis in reality. The responsibility for the loss of Force Z was Churchill’s alone.

THE ACTION OFF ENDAU The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse effectively brought the naval portion of the campaign to a close. Light RN units did remain in Singapore, but these were focused on escorting convoys into the fortress and did not look to contest control of the South China Sea with the IJN. The British did continue to build up naval forces in the theatre, but this was done using Ceylon as a base where they were largely immune from Japanese attack. There was one exception to the Royal Navy’s reluctance to use naval forces to defend Singapore. This came in the later part of the campaign when the British were retreating toward Singapore. This small engagement has been largely forgotten. It should be recalled that the original Japanese plans called for landings on the south-eastern coast of Malaya to complement the drive down the western part of the peninsula. This originally was to be a four-battalion assault, but was changed to a logistics operation because of concern over British naval and air intervention against an operation so close to Singapore. 52

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In fact, such an operation so close to Singapore did prompt a British response. To Percival, the Japanese assault on Endau had the potential of cutting off the retreating British force heading into the fortress. To forestall this, the Royal Navy determined to attack the Japanese assault force with whatever was available. The actual Japanese landing was conducted by two IJA transports carrying construction stores, ordnance and personnel to set up an airfield. These two transports were escorted by the 3rd Destroyer Squadron with a light cruiser and six Fubuki-class destroyers and five large minesweepers. On the morning of 26 January, the IJN force was sighted north-east of Endau. The RAF threw all available aircraft at the transports with the utmost gallantry. For the loss of 15 aircraft, only near misses were scored. To conduct a follow-up naval attack, the only units available were the 23-year-old S-class destroyer Thanet and the 25-year-old Australian V-class destroyer Vampire. These two obsolete destroyers carried only 4in. guns and a total of seven torpedoes. The small Royal Navy force departed Singapore on the afternoon of 26 January and headed north with the intention of making a night attack. The two destroyers transited close inshore, which meant they were not intercepted by the Japanese destroyers patrolling the outer ring in defence of the transports. The first Japanese ship to spot the British force was large minesweeper W-4. Vampire fired two torpedoes at the minesweeper at 0242hrs on 27 January, but both missed. After steaming around for another 30 minutes unsuccessfully looking for the transports, the British commander decided to call off the operation and return to Singapore. The two destroyers fired all their remaining torpedoes at a Japanese destroyer then headed south-east at high speed. Finally, the Japanese responded to the presence of two enemy destroyers in their heavily defended anchorage. Within minutes, a Japanese 5in. shell hit Thanet in the engine room, which severed both main and auxiliary steam lines. This quickly left it dead in the water and it was sunk by Japanese gunfire. Of its crew, 65 were able to evade capture and return to Singapore; 12 were killed in action, and 32 were rescued by the Japanese. Of these, a single officer was spared; the rest were turned over to the IJA and executed. Vampire made good its escape with the help of a smokescreen and suffered no damage or casualties.

DEBACLE AT JITRA The 5th Division moved south from its landing areas at Singora and Patani as quickly as possible. The main drive was mounted down the road from Singora to Alor Star. This was assigned to the 9th Infantry Brigade, composed of the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments, supported by a tank battalion and a battalion of artillery. The supporting drive from Patani down the road to Kroh was assigned to the 42nd Infantry Regiment supported by two light tank companies and a battery of artillery. Preparing to meet the main Japanese thrust was the 11th Indian Infantry Division. After the decision to cancel Matador, this unit moved into defensive positions at the road junction of Jitra. This was not a strong position, but it was the best available north of the airfield at Alor Star, which had to be defended. Unknown to Heath was that the RAF decided to abandon the airfield on 9 December and he was thus preparing to conduct a forward defence against the Japanese for no purpose. 53

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Japanese infantry crossing a stream in Malaya. Their path of advance was crossed by many water features, and the British engineers did a good job destroying bridges, so these kinds of detours were often required. (USAMHI)

The troops of 11th Indian Division had done some work on improving the position, but this had taken a lower priority than preparing for Matador. The defence was mounted by two brigades forward. The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade held a front of 6,000 yards including the road, and the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade held a sector of 18,000 yards extending to the coast. The position was supported by artillery and anti-tank units. The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was held in reserve. The advance guard of the 5th Division made contact with the Indian covering troops on the morning of 11 December. This covering force slowly withdrew and was reinforced by another battalion to hold the Japanese north of Jitra until the 12th. While manning an intermediate position north of Jitra, the 1/14th Punjab Battalion was overrun by Japanese tanks and motorized infantry during a period of heavy rain and low visibility. The unit was scattered, with only 200 men being accounted for the next day. The reinforcing 2/1st Gurkha Rifles Battalion was also attacked frontally and from the flanks, and also scattered with heavy losses. The Japanese column proceeded down the road toward the main position of the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade. The Japanese force responsible for this rout was under the command of Lt. Col. Saeki Shizuo, commander of the 5th Division’s reconnaissance regiment. His force was led by two Type 95 light and ten Type 97 medium tanks from the 1st Tank Regiment, and Type 97 tankettes and other elements from the 5th Reconnaissance Regiment. This seemingly minor skirmish set the stage for a full disaster the following day. Two battalions of Indian troops had been rendered combat ineffective, lowering the already questionable morale of the 11th Indian Division. The division commander ordered the reserve 28th Indian Infantry Brigade up to Jitra and the brigade commander took over the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade since that unit’s commander had gone missing the previous day. The 2/2nd Gurkha Battalion from the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of the 15th Brigade. With the third battalion of the 28th Brigade assigned to protect the Alor Star airfield, this meant that the 11th Indian Infantry Division had no reserve. During the night, the Japanese reached the main British position north of Jitra. At about 2030hrs, a tank probe down the road was repulsed with the loss of two tanks. The battalion on the right, the 2/9th Jats, received false reports that it had already been flanked by the Japanese, which prompted the commander of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade to request help from the 6th Brigade. In response, the 6th Brigade sent the bulk of two battalions to reinforce the right flank of the 15th Brigade.

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The Japanese resumed the attack down the road at about 0300hrs on 12 December. A British counter-attack restored the position by dawn. More serious was an attack at 0600hrs in heavy rain by Japanese tanks and infantry east of the main road between the junction of two battalions – the 1st Leicester and 2/9th Jats. This attack achieved a penetration and prompted a counterattack. This counter-attack by the 1/8th Punjab Battalion was ill-coordinated and was repulsed with heavy losses including its commanding officer. Around noon, the Japanese attacked again east of the road and overran one company of the 2/9th Jats while penetrating as far as the position of the reserve 2/2nd Gurkhas along a water feature called the Sungei Bata. The increasing Japanese pressure made the divisional commander, Murray-Lyon, request a withdrawal to the previously selected defensive position at Gurun 30 miles south. He feared that his dispirited division, the only division in northern Malaya, was exposed to tank attack, which he had no reserves to contend with. His lines of communications were threatened by the advance of the Japanese force down the road to Kroh. Percival initially refused to approve this withdrawal and sent orders for him to remain at Jitra. Meanwhile, Murray-Lyon’s brigade commanders decided to order a withdrawal to the Sungei Bata. The 1st Leicesters began a retreat at 1600hrs and were joined by the 2/9th Jats. This withdrawal resulted in panic, fed by false reports that Japanese tanks were already behind the main British force. This underlined Murray-Lyon’s fears that his division could be destroyed and at 1930hrs again asked for permission to withdraw. This time it was approved, but now Murray-Lyon was faced with executing a withdrawal over a single road with poorly trained troops in the pounding rain. In the midst of great confusion, the 11th Indian Infantry Division was able to break contact, but only with the loss of considerable amounts of men and material.

Japanese infantry, mounted on bicycles, roll down the road in western Malaya. In some 54 days before they reached the Strait of Johore, the Japanese covered over 400 miles. (Author’s collection)

Australian troops man a communications station in the jungle. Command and control of British units proved a daunting challenge throughout the battle. (AWM)

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BRITISH FORCES 1. 1/14th Punjab Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade 2. 2/1st Gurkha Rifles Battalion, 28th Indian Brigade 3. 2/9th Jats Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade 4. 1st Leicestershire Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade 5. 2/2nd Gurkha Battalion, 28th Indian Brigade (placed under command of 15th Indian Brigade) 6. 2nd East Surrey Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade 7. 2/16th Punjab Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade 8. 2/16th Punjab Battalion (2 companies) 9. 1/8th Punjab Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade reserve (1 company) 10. 155th Field Regiment (2 batteries) 11. 22nd Mountain Regiment (less 2 batteries) 12. 80th Anti-tank Regiment (less 1 battery)

XX

II IND

MURRAY-LYON

6

7

EVENTS 11 December 1. 1630hrs – Japanese advance guard overruns 1/14th Punjab Battalion in conditions of poor visibility and then continues down the road to scatter the 2/1st Gurkha Battalion. 2. General Murray-Lyon moves 2/2nd Gurkha Battalion under 15th Indian Brigade as brigade reserve. 3. 2030hrs – Japanese attack stopped in front of main position of 1st Leicestershire Battalion; two tanks destroyed by anti-tank gunfire. 4. Night – Japanese elements probe right flank of 2/9th Jats Battalion. 12 December 5. 0300hrs – Japanese attack down main road; British counter-attacks restore the line by dawn. 6. 0600hrs – Japanese tanks and infantry attack east of the road between junction of 1st Leicester and 2/9th Jats Battalions and make a penetration. 7. 1000hrs – British attempt to counter-attack with 1/8 Punjab Battalion; the planned artillery support does not materialize and the attack is repulsed with heavy losses.

8. About 1200hrs – Japanese renew their attack east of the road, overrunning one company of the 2/9th Jats and reaching the position of the 2/2nd Gurkhas along a stream. 9. 1600hrs – 1st Leicesters ordered to withdraw, followed by 2/9th Jats. 10. 2200hrs – Murray-Lyon orders general withdrawal; confusion reigns with many units not receiving orders and much equipment and weapons are lost. 11. Around 2400hrs – Japanese attempt to seize bridge over Sungei Bata stream but are repulsed by 2/2nd Gurkhas. The bridge is destroyed two hours later and the British break contact.

THE BATTLE OF JITRA On 12 December, one battalion of Japanese troops supported by tanks shattered two brigades of Indian troops and penetrated the best-prepared British defences in Malaya. 56

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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km

JAPANESE FORCES A. 3rd Company, 1st Tank Regiment B. Eight Type 97 tankettes, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment C. Two motorized infantry companies, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment D. One artillery battery, 5th Artillery Regiment E. One machine-gun company, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment

A 1 1 NANGKA

A

B

2 ASUN

D

3 C 4

5 A 6

9

4

C 3

12 XX

JITRA

KAPUR

5 7 A

C

TAKURO

E

8 11

5

9

2 SUNGEI BATA STREAM

8

10 KELUBI

10

11

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JITRA – THE IMPACT

British engineers prepare a bridge in Malaya for demolition. Such operations were key to slowing the Japanese advance, and were one of the few bright areas for the British during the campaign. (AWM)

The defeat of the 11th Indian Infantry Division was one of the British Army’s most unlikely and complete defeats during the entire war. A force of one Japanese battalion, supported by a company of tanks, had defeated an entire division in prepared positions in little more than a day. Japanese losses were minor; the 11th Indian Division was shattered. The 15th Brigade suffered worst, being reduced to a quarter of its pre-battle strength; the 6th Brigade suffered heavily, and the 28th Brigade had one of its battalions reduced to a company. Many vehicles and guns were lost and morale took a serious hit. The boldness of the Japanese had proved decisive, in no small measure aided by the employment of tanks against which the ill-trained Indian troops seemed helpless. An entire division had been routed, primarily by its poor deployment, which allowed it to be defeated in detail, and a general low level of training. After breaking contact with the Japanese, the 11th Indian Infantry Division reached the Sengei Kedah on the morning of 13 December. A Japanese attempt to cross the river failed that day. Murray-Lyon ordered the retreat to continue to Gurun some 20 miles south. Nothing had been done to prepare any defensive positions, so the tired troops were expected to prepare their own. The 6th Indian Brigade was placed on the right, the 28th Indian Brigade on the left, and the 600-man strong 15th Indian Brigade was designated as a reserve. The Japanese were not going to give the British any opportunity to catch their breath. A probe into the British defences on the afternoon of the 14th was stopped. Early on the 15th, the Japanese attacked again down the road and penetrated deep into the 6th Indian Brigade’s defences. This prompted Murray-Lyon to order a complete withdrawal, and, by the morning of the 16th, his division was south of the Muda River. That same day, Heath decided to withdraw the division a further 30 miles south to a position on the Krian River. It was hoped this would be a sufficient tank obstacle to allow a solid defence. Percival assessed that a further retreat would undermine his objective of holding the naval base. The only way the fortress could be saved was by reinforcement, and the only way he could guarantee its arrival was by reducing the air threats to the convoys, which were set to arrive in the first part of January. Accordingly, he had to hold as far north as possible to keep Japanese air power out of range of Singapore. This was a tall order since the ground troops would have no air cover as a result of the RAF

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deciding to keep its remaining aircraft in Singapore to defend the fortress and the reinforcement convoys. Because of the threat of Japanese landings, Percival declined to send the 8th Australian Infantry Division from its positions in Johore. This left Indian III Corps by itself to bear the brunt of the Japanese offensive. By 17 December, Percival decided to withdraw his forces behind the Perak River. The 9th Indian Infantry Division was ordered to defend the Kuantan airfield and protect the 11th Indian Infantry Division’s eastern flank. The battered 11th Indian Division was reorganized with the 6th and 15th Indian Brigades formed into a single brigade named the 15th, and then reinforced by the 12th Indian Brigade. The 28th Indian Brigade also remained assigned, giving the division three brigades for the first time. After the division’s disastrous early performance, Murray-Lyon was replaced by Brigadier Paris on 24 December.

THE BATTLE OF KAMPAR The next serious action was fought in the area of Kampar from 30 December until 2 January 1942. The Japanese believed that the British would defend the Perak River since it was a serious anti-tank obstacle, but were able to cross it unopposed on 26 January after Heath moved his forces south. The Japanese continued to press the British rearguard, the 12th Indian Brigade, and, on the 28th and 29th, the unit came under heavy air and artillery attack, followed by a ground assault led by tanks. By this time, the Japanese 5th Division had been joined by the Imperial Guards Division’s 4th Guards Regiment, which was supporting the main Japanese drive along the main road. Heath hoped to hold the Kampar position since it could not easily be outflanked inland, but only along the coast. The Japanese came into contact with the British defences on the 30th, but not until 1 January were they able to make a strong attack supported by artillery. The attack was conducted by the 41st Infantry Regiment using the road, while the 42nd Infantry Regiment attempted to outflank the position through the swamps along the coast. The Japanese made limited progress in heavy fighting along the road and British artillery played a key role in repulsing several attacks with heavy losses. That morning, the 11th Infantry Regiment landed at Utan Melintang, south of the Kampar position. The following day, this force was reinforced by the 3rd Battalion, 4th Guards Regiment, and began to move inland by boat up the Perak River. This gave Brigadier Paris little choice but to withdraw, starting on the night of the 2nd.

Japanese gunners manhandle a 75mm field gun in the Labis area in Johore on 22 January. The 25th Army had a reinforced artillery park for the campaign, but the full weight of Japanese artillery was not felt until the assault crossing of the Strait of Johore. (AWM)

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2

1

JAPANESE TANK ATTACK AT SLIM RIVER (PP. 60–61) The single most disastrous engagement of the entire Malaya campaign for the British came on 7 January 1942 along the Slim River. A force of 30 Japanese tanks went on a six-hour rampage against the 11th Indian Division and destroyed the better part of two brigades. The Indians had ample anti-tank guns, artillery, mines and pre-constructed roadblocks to contend with a tank attack, but were caught by surprise and poorly deployed. The attack began at 0330hrs and two hours later the Japanese had routed two Indian infantry battalions. A British infantry battalion, supported by armoured cars, was also unable to stop the

Japanese armour. This scene shows the engagement at approximately 0730hrs when Type 97 medium tanks from the 6th Tank Regiment (1) caught the 5/14th Punjabs moving up without anti-tank support (2). The infantry was scattered by the tanks’ 57mm cannons and machine guns. The Japanese advance was not stopped until two hours later when 25-pdrs engaged the tanks at point-blank range. By then, some 3,000 British and Indian prisoners had been taken and the 11th Indian Division rendered temporarily combat ineffective.

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In eastern Malaya, the Japanese 55th Infantry Regiment landed at Kota Bharu on 30 December and moved down the coast behind the 56th Infantry Regiment toward Kuantan. The airfield was defended by the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade. After heavy fighting on 2–3 January, the airfield and the town fell to the Japanese.

THE BATTLE OF SLIM RIVER The withdrawal of the 11th Indian Infantry Division from Kampar brought it to the Sungkai–Slim confluence area by 4 January. Heath was told by Percival to hold this area at least until the 14th so that the Japanese could not use the airfields at Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham to attack the reinforcement convoys. The Japanese were intent on not allowing the British any time to create a firm defence. Yamashita ordered the 5th Division, supported by armour, to continue its advance down the main road straight for Kuala Lumpur. The spearhead was 42nd Infantry Regiment and a battalion of tanks with the 11th Infantry Regiment as an exploitation force. The 5th Division’s 41st Infantry Regiment was in reserve. Supporting this main drive was 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment and the 4th Guards Regiment advancing down the coast by land and sea in order to be in a position to attack Kuala Lumpur from the west. The 11th Indian Infantry Division selected a defensive position that was assessed to be tank proof and that covered the Slim River crossings. Along the main road, Brigadier Paris deployed the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade; the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was assigned the Slim River sector. The 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed in depth along the road. The jungle next to the road was so thick that the British believed that Japanese outflanking tactics would be impossible. Tanks could use only the road and so the main defences in the 5/2nd Punjab Battalion area were provided with anti-tank guns, mines and concrete blocks to stop tanks. Though the British were ready, the brigade was tired, morale was low, and the units were all well under strength. The Japanese made first contact with the covering force of the 4/19th Hyderabad Battalion on 5 January. After being repulsed, they began to flank the position the next day. At about 0330hrs on the 7th, the Japanese launched an attack down the road and the adjacent rail line led by tanks with motorized infantry. The leading Indian company was overrun, and the 4/19th Hyderabads withdrew. When the Japanese got to the main British defences at Milestone 61, the column was temporarily stopped when one tank hit a mine and three others were destroyed in fierce close-in fighting. However, when the Japanese discovered an unused but passable loop road, they were able to bypass this resistance and then overran the next position at Milestone 61.5, which had no anti-tank defences. The advance was temporarily stopped again when the lead tank struck a mine in front of the position at Milestone 62. The Indians held out for about an hour, but when another loop road was discovered the Japanese were able to surround the defenders again. Because phone lines had been cut and the 11th Indian Infantry Division was short of communications gear, the full extent of the growing disaster and the pace of the Japanese advance was not apparent to the remainder of 63

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C

D

1

BRITISH FORCES 1. 4/19th Hyderabad Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade 2. 5/2nd Punjab Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade 3. One troop, 215th Anti-tank Battery 4. 2nd Argyll and SH Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade 5. 2 Batteries, 137th Field Regiment 6. 5/14th Punjab Battalion (reserve), 12th Brigade 7. 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 8. 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 9. 2/1st Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 10. One troop, 215th Anti-tank Battery 11. One troop, 16th Light Anti-aircraft Battery HKSRA 12. 155th Field Regiment

A

1

A

2

2

B

B

3

A 3

4

B A

B 4

TROLAK

XX

5

TAKURO A 6

5

6

A 8 SLIM RIVER

7

A

7 10

KAMPONG SLIM

EVENTS 7 January 1942 1. At about 0330hrs, the Japanese launch an attack with tanks and motorized infantry against the 4/19th Hyderabads. The lead Indian company is overrun and the Hyderabads retreat. 2. When the Japanese reach Milestone 61 at 0430hrs, the lead tank hits a mine and a fierce firefight develops which destroys three tanks. The Japanese discover a loop road, which enables them to surround and destroy Indian resistance. Another roadblock at Milestone 61.5, which has no anti-tank defences, is quickly removed. 3. 0530hrs – at Milestone 62, the lead tank again hits a mine in a position held by the reserve company of the 5/2 Punjabs. The Indians hold out for about an hour, but the Japanese find another undefended loop road, which enables them to surround the defenders by 0630hrs.

7. The 2/9th Gurkha Rifles of 28th Indian Infantry Brigade watches as Japanese tanks drive by their positions at 0800hrs and head east down the trunk road. 8. Just after 0800hrs, Japanese tanks encounter the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles on the road in close formation. The entire battalion is quickly scattered.

4. 2nd Argylls is ordered to construct roadblocks north of Trolak and the 5/14th Punjab Battalion is ordered to move up.

9. Two parked batteries of the 137th Field Regiment are briefly engaged by tank guns and machine guns.

5. First British roadblock fails to stop the Japanese and is crushed at 0630hrs. At 0700hrs a roadblock manned by armoured cars with anti-tank rifles stops the Japanese briefly. The planned demolition of the bridge at Trolak fails.

10. 0840hrs – Japanese tanks reach the Slim River Bridge, which they seize after a troop of light anti-aircraft guns unsuccessfully engages them. After leaving one tank to guard the bridge, the Japanese continue south.

6. 0730hrs: Japanese tanks, now without infantry support, hit the 5/14th Punjabs north of Kampong Slim. The Indians are unable to mount an effective defence and the battalion is scattered.

11. After continuing another two miles, the Japanese surprise the 155th Field Regiment, which is moving up the road. After the unit’s headquarters is overrun, a 25pdr knocks out the lead tank at short range, stopping the Japanese attack at 0930hrs.

THE BATTLE OF SLIM RIVER In the battle of Slim River on 7 January 1942, some 30 Japanese tanks and a motorized infantry battalion completed the virtual destruction of the 11th Indian Infantry Division. 64

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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km

JAPANESE FORCES A. Three tank companies with 30 medium tanks from the 6th Tank Regiment B. One battalion motorized infantry, 42nd Infantry Regiment C. Two platoons of engineers D. One battery of artillery

5 9

8

9

A

A

XX

10

II IND

MURRAY-LYON

11 SLIM RIVER BRIDGE

A

11

12

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Indian troops practising with an 18-pdr dating from World War I. Some field regiments in Indian units did not receive their 25pdrs before the war and had to make do with this gun which could still fire an 18.5lb shell out to 9,300 yards. (Library of Congress)

the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. The brigade commander ordered the 2nd Argyll Battalion to construct roadblocks and for the 5/14th Punjab Battalion in reserve to move up. The improvised British roadblock was attacked at 0630hrs and quickly brushed aside. The Japanese continued down the road and hit another roadblock at 0700hrs manned by armoured cars with antitank rifles. These presented only a short delay, and the survivors decided to set off through the jungle for the Slim River bridges. After the demolition of the bridge at Trolak failed, the Japanese tanks resumed their advance. The next battalion to meet the Japanese armour, now on its own with no infantry support, was the 5/14th Punjabs. In an encounter at 0730hrs about one mile north of Kampong Slim, two companies were quickly shattered and the Indians were unable to bring their troop of attached anti-tank guns into action. The marauding Japanese tanks reached the area of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade and caught this unit totally by surprise. The first battalion encountered was the 2/9th Gurkhas, which were moving into position at Kampong Slim. The Japanese tanks passed by their positions and then contacted the 2/1st Gurkha Battalion on the road in close formation. The entire battalion was scattered. Next up were two batteries of the 137th Field Regiment parked in the Cluny Estate. The tanks did not stop to engage them but pressed on to the Slim River Bridge, arriving at 0840hrs. The bridge was seized after a troop of light anti-aircraft was destroyed when its guns failed to stop the Japanese tanks.

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After crossing the bridge, the tanks continued another two miles down the road where they met the 155th Field Regiment. Though caught totally by surprise, this unit managed to get one of its 25-pdr guns into action and engaged and destroyed the lead tank at some 30 yards range. This took place at 0930hrs and concluded the rampage of the Japanese tanks. This ended one of the most dramatic and significant actions of the entire Pacific War. For six hours, a small group of Japanese tanks had rumbled down a single road machine-gunning and shooting up everything in their path. Despite possessing abundant anti-tank guns, mines, and artillery, which could have been employed in an anti-tank role, one Indian brigade had been smashed and a second routed. In the process, five battalions had been destroyed or dispersed. The two remaining battalions of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade retreated, but suffered heavy losses in the process. The net effect was that the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was destroyed and the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade reduced to about a third of its prebattle strength. All transport and supporting anti-tank and artillery of these brigades were lost. More than 3,000 men were taken prisoner; total Japanese casualties were 150. From the operational standpoint, the Slim River engagement was a disaster. It ensured the loss of central Malaya and reduced the chances of holding southern Malaya long enough to enable the reinforcements flowing into Singapore to become fully effective.

BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS The reinforcements that Percival was counting on were finally arriving. The most important reinforcement was the 18th Infantry Division, which was at sea headed for the Middle East. On 11 December, it was decided to reassign the division to the Far East. Along with the division was the 82nd Anti-tank Regiment (personnel only). Once the division landed in India, the 53rd Brigade Group was sent ahead, but did not arrive in Singapore until 13 January. The rest of the division arrived on 5 February, just in time to surrender to the Japanese when the fortress fell. The 85th Anti-tank Regiment (48 guns) and the 6th Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (16 guns) and the 35th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment (24 guns) were also routed to India for subsequent movement to Singapore. These formations arrived on 13 January. More immediate reinforcements were available in the form of two Indian brigade groups from the still-forming 17th Indian Infantry Division. On

Australian troops on the move through thick jungle before the war. In spite of this photo, no Australian or Indian units, and only a few British units conducted serious jungle training. Few British commanders understood that the jungle offered huge advantages to the attacker since it could be used for infiltration movement to cut off British units. (AWM)

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3 January, the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived, and the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in late January. Plans were also made for the delivery of armour from the Middle East. A brigade headquarters and two regiments of tanks (US M3 light tanks) were allocated to the Far East. This unit became the 7th Armoured Brigade, but never arrived in Malaya. Overall, the flow of reinforcements to the Far East was grossly inadequate. It was a case of too little, too late. The Indian units were only semi-trained, and even the 18th Infantry Division had still to complete training and had received no jungle training. The British defence was built on the premise that reinforcements would be forthcoming in a timely manner, and now this was shown to be a false hope. 

THE LOSS OF JOHORE On his first trip to Singapore, beginning on 7 January, Wavell took stock of the British defence so far. He attributed Japanese successes to mistakes by the British and took immediate steps to stop the Japanese in Johore. He sided with Bennett who days earlier had demanded of Percival that the Australians be moved from the east coast to stop the Japanese in western Malaya. The defeat of the 11th Indian Infantry Division at Slim River underlined that fact that Indian III Corps was no longer capable of mounting an effective defence, especially in the fairly open country south of Kuala Lumpur. On 9 January, following Wavell’s intervention, Percival issued new orders. Indian III Corps was to withdraw into Johore with only demolition actions to delay the Japanese. This would allow Indian III Corps to be rested and reconstituted. The 8th Australian Infantry Division would be moved to the area around Segamat in western Johore to stop the Japanese. The 9th Indian Infantry Division and the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade would be placed under the command of General Bennett and form ‘Westforce’. Now Wavell’s ‘main battle’ would be left in the hands of Bennett and his two Australian brigades. The Japanese were also reinforcing their drive. The 5th Division’s 21st Infantry Regiment arrived at Singora on 8 January, and the 5th Guards

Australian troops on patrol searching for the enemy before their first contact on 14 January. The Australians were very sure of their capabilities against the Japanese, but, in spite of tough resistance, would soon join the pattern of British troops always looking to retreat. (AWM)

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0

0

N

Malacca

Alor Gajah

XX

20km

Imperial Guards

British positions

Tampin

5

XX

III

27 Aus

5

20 miles

5

Muar

X

Simpang Jeram

2/29 Aus

II

X

45 Ind

2/19 Aus

Bakri II

5

III

I

4

II

III

4 Gds

Gds

Bt. Banang

Gds

Lenga

15 Ind

53

Parit Sulong

X

X

21

X

Labis

II

17–24 January

4 Gds

X

24 January 21–23 January

Senggarang

I

Batu Pahat

9

21–23 January

Yong Peng

5

Bekok

21 January

Bt. Pelandok

23 January

20–22 January

Segamat

20 January

19 January

Pagoh

20 January

X

Grisek

18–19 January

Jorak

Panchor

Mt. Ophir

22 Ind

Batu Anam

18 January

16–17 January

Jementah

15 January

Gemas

8 Ind

Parit Jawa

Gds

X

Kesang

III

Ayer Kuning

Gds

5

X

16 January

15 January

4

Jasin

21

X

9

14 January

27 Aus

5

22 Ind

8 Ind

X

Kluang

S. Sayong Halt

X

Nyor

24 January

22–23 January

Ayer Hitam

X

Palor

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The battle for Northern Johore 14–24 January 1941

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Australian gunners in action with a 25-pdr gun in January 1942. Bennett hoped to apply firepower to stop the Japanese, but the Japanese were successful in keeping the campaign a war of manoeuvre. (AWM)

Regiment reached central Malaya on 10 January. To threaten the British defence of Johore, it was planned in late January to land the 18th Division’s 114th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of the 55th Infantry Regiment at Endau on the southeastern coast of Malaya. For the drive through Johore, Yamashita planned to give the 5th Division a few days’ rest in the area of Seremban and keep the Imperial Guards Division moving along the coast. The 18th Division advanced down the east coast, and had occupied Kuantan on 3 January. Since the requisite air superiority over Singapore was not gained in mid-January, the planned landing at Endau was scrapped, but a landing on 26 January with logistical units was conducted. Kuala Lumpur was occupied by the Japanese on the evening of 11 January. On the night of 13/14 January, Indian III Corps withdrew through Westforce. Bennett had his two Australian brigade groups deployed along the expected main area of Japanese advance supported by anti-tank units and four artillery regiments. The 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed along the coast. To stop the momentum of the Japanese advance, Bennett planned an ambush and chose an area to the west of Gemas to execute it. On the afternoon of 14 January, an advance detachment of the 5th Division fell into the trap.

Japanese infantry and a Type 97 medium tank advance through Kuala Lumpur. The Type 97 with its 57mm main gun and two machine guns could be devastating against troops unprepared and untrained to meet a tank attack, as was shown twice against the 11th Indian Division. Later in the campaign against properly prepared Australian troops, Japanese armour was less effective. (Author’s collection)

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Japanese infantry advance through Kuala Lumpur on 11 January. Yamashita stated that once this city was captured, he knew he would win the campaign. (AWM)

For a cost of only one dead and nine wounded, the Australians claimed to have inflicted 1,000 casualties on the Japanese on the carefully selected stretch of road. In fact, Japanese records indicated only 70 dead and 57 wounded. By dawn the next day, the Japanese had put tanks across the bridge destroyed during the ambush and had resumed their advance. On 15 February the first major clash between the Australians and the Japanese took place and during this an Australian battalion from the 27th Brigade repulsed three Japanese attacks before being flanked and forced to withdraw. Despite a brave showing, the Australians had been forced to retreat with the loss of much equipment after only five hours in action against a single Japanese battalion. The ‘main battle’ was off to an uncertain start. Bennett had deployed nine battalions in the area of the Gemas–Jementah– Segamat triangle but, of these, only two were heavily engaged through 20 January before Bennett was forced to withdraw. This was primarily because of Bennett’s reliance on the badly deployed and supported 45th Indian Brigade to hold Westforce’s western flank along the coast. The Indians were forced off the Sungei Muar, which endangered Westforce’s communications. Percival decided to commit the newly arrived British 53rd Infantry Brigade, but with pressure mounting along the trunk road from the recommitted 5th Division and along the coast from the Imperial Guards Division, Percival decided to withdraw Westforce. The ‘main battle’ had lasted a mere five days. The order to retreat came too

Bennett briefs war correspondents about the initial clash between Australian and Japanese troops in January 1942. Despite his criticism of the inability of Indian and British troops to stand and fight, Bennett fared no better in stopping the Japanese advance. (AWM)

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late for the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade, which was forced to break out on 20 January through the Imperial Guards Division. From the 16th to the 22nd, the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was annihilated save for 400 men. The surviving wounded were massacred by the victorious Japanese, and the 45th Indian Brigade ceased to exist. Meanwhile, Westforce was able to pull back to the road junctions of Lapis and Yong Peng. As early as 18 January, Percival was already thinking of pulling out of Johore entirely and retreating to Singapore to prolong the defence of the island. On the evening of 20 January, Westforce was ordered to pull back to a final defence line stretching from Mersing on the east coast, through Kluang and then to Batu Pahat on the west coast. Wavell was concerned enough to pay a second visit to Singapore on 20 January to instruct Percival to defend Johore for as long as possible to allow additional reinforcements to arrive. On 21 January, the Chiefs of Staff weighed in from London with instruction to Wavell to prepare for a prolonged defence of the island. Churchill too provided inspiration on the 20th as only he could: LEFT This is a 2-pdr anti-tank gun of the Australian 2/4th Anti-tank Regiment. On 18 January, the Japanese 4th Guards Regiment supported by the Gotunda Tank Company attacked down the road to Bakri in a reckless manner. On this occasion, two anti-tank guns, one of which is shown here with its crew, supported by infantry, knocked out eight tanks and stopped the Japanese advance. (AWM) RIGHT The first Japanese tank in the column was a Type 95 light tank, shown here. It was destroyed and its crew did not survive. (AWM)

I want to make it absolutely clear that I expect every inch of ground to be defended, every scrap of material or defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy, and no question of surrender to be entertained until protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore city.

At this point, it was inevitable that a withdrawal to Singapore would be conducted. On 24 January, Percival issued an outline plan for such a withdrawal. Between 24 and 31 January, the units of Westforce retreated through Johore under Japanese pressure. The 11th Indian Infantry Division withdrew along the coast, pursued by the Imperial Guards Division. The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade was cut off by a Japanese roadblock in the area of Rengit, but escaped by being evacuated by sea between 28 January and 1 February. The other two brigades assigned to the division, the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 53rd British Infantry Brigade, reached Singapore Island by way of the bridge at Johore Bahru on the night of 30/31 January. In the centre, the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade withdrew down the main trunk road under pressure from the 21st Infantry Brigade from the 5th Division. After a well-conducted rearguard action, the Australians crossed

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over onto Singapore on the night of 30/31 January. The right flank of Indian III Corps fared worst. This was manned by the 9th Indian Infantry Division with the 8th and 22nd Indian Infantry brigades. Facing it was the 9th Infantry Brigade from the 5th Division. On the 28th, the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade encountered a Japanese roadblock obstructing its retreat path. The brigade commander elected to try to move through the jungle instead of mounting an attack to clear the Japanese from the road. This led to a four-day march through trackless jungle, which ended on 1 February when the brigade’s remaining 350 troops encountered another Japanese force and surrendered. The only road and rail lines linking Malaya and Singapore Island were across a 1,100yd-long and 70ft-wide bridge called the Causeway at Johore Bahru. By 0815hrs on 31 January, the last British unit crossed the Causeway. There was no panic or congestion; the withdrawal was certainly Percival’s best-conducted operation of the campaign and thwarted Yamashita’s plans to destroy British forces before they could reach Singapore. Inexplicably, the 3rd Air Division had ignored the Causeway and the continual movement of vehicles over it. With assistance from RN engineers using depth charges, the Causeway was blown up. The Japanese had reached the Strait of Johore in only 55 days, which put them well ahead of schedule. The battle for Malaya was over.

An Australian 25-pdr gun in action in Johore. It was hoped that firepower such as this would be more effective in the open country of Johore, but it was insufficient to stop the Japanese. (AWM)

LEFT Well-camouflaged Japanese infantry cross a stream in Johore on 26 January. The ability of the Japanese to operate off-road gave them an enduring advantage against the mostly road-bound British forces. (AWM) RIGHT This photo shows Japanese troops in Johore on 31 January, the day the British forces completed their withdrawal onto Singapore Island. After a few days’ rest, these troops would begin the final battle of the campaign. (AWM)

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THE AIR BATTLE

Hudsons of RAAF 1 Squadron pictured over Singapore before the war. These were the first Allied aircraft to go into action during the campaign when they attacked Japanese invasion shipping off Kota Bharu in the early hours of 8 December 1941. (AWM)

The battle for control of the air over Malaya was decided within days. Given the disparity between the IJA and IJN air forces and the RAF in terms of the numbers and quality of aircraft, and aircrew training, the outcome was never in doubt. The IJN Air Force opened the air campaign by going after targets on Singapore Island. A total of 17 bombers were directed at Tengah and Selatar airfields, but caused little damage. Another 48 bombers were forced to abort because of bad weather. British reaction was limited to ineffective anti-aircraft fire. The fact that Japanese bombers could range as far south as Singapore was a disconcerting surprise to the British, and there was no mistaking that the war had come to Singapore. The IJA Air Force opened its air campaign with a series of concerted attacks on British airfields in northern Malaya beginning at 0730hrs on 8 December. These featured several waves of attacks by Ki-21 heavy bombers against the airfield at Sungei Patani, 27 Ki-21 bombers from the 60th Sentai against Alor Star and Ki-43 fighters strafing airfields as far south as Butterworth. On several occasions, British aircraft were caught on the ground and destroyed. The RAF was not passive in the face of the Japanese onslaught. The discovery of the Japanese landing force off Kota Bharu during the early hours of 8 December prompted an all-out air assault. Throughout the night and following day, the RAF mounted a series of attacks on the Japanese invasion force, which was composed of three transports and their escorts. The attacks began during the night with No. 1 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Squadron flying Hudsons out of Kota Bharu. These first attacks were successful in damaging all three transports, one of which later sank. This was followed by attacks throughout the day by Blenheims of 27, 34, 60 and 62 Squadrons, Vildebeests from 36 and 100 Squadrons, and more RAAF Hudsons from 8 Squadron. Altogether, some 86 aircraft conducted attacks that were pressed home bravely against the transports or the Japanese beachhead at Kota Bharu; in spite of this maximum effort, the results were comparatively meagre. One transport was sunk, and the other two forced to depart the invasion area, but this did not stop the Japanese from getting a force ashore strong enough to defeat the Indian infantry brigade defending Kota Bharu. Meanwhile, the main Japanese invasion force off Singora and Patani was unmolested. A key part of the Japanese plan to gain air superiority was to base fighters on the Malayan Peninsula as soon as possible. On 8 December, Ki-27 fighters were moved to Singora airfield, quickly followed by other elements of the 3rd Air Division. Air Marshal Pulford was determined to attack the Japanese bases at Singora

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and Patani even with his totally inadequate forces. On 9 December, the first raid was conducted with six Blenheim bombers from Tengah airfield. The bombers were to meet up with fighters from Butterworth airfield, but the fighters did not appear and the bombers went to their target unescorted. Once over the target, they met heavy anti-aircraft fire and were intercepted by some 30 Japanese fighters. Incredibly, only three bombers were shot down. Another attack was planned for later in the day, but the Blenheims of 34 and 62 Squadrons which had staged to Butterworth were attacked on the ground before they could take off. All were destroyed or damaged, except a single bomber, which proceeded by itself to Singora. This aircraft bombed the target, but was shot down. The battle for air superiority over northern Malaya was over in two days. The Japanese effort to destroy British air power on the ground on 8 December, combined with the losses suffered during the British air attacks, meant that of the 110 British aircraft stationed on airfields in northern Malaya, only 50 remained operational by the end of the day. The reasons for this were clear – British fighters were few and overmatched, but, more importantly, the warning system covering northern Malaya was totally inadequate. The level of anti-aircraft protection for each airfield was set at four heavy and 12 light anti-aircraft guns, but this was not provided, which allowed Japanese aircraft often to bomb and strafe at will. The net effect was that the RAF was broken within the first few days of the campaign, and the Japanese gained air superiority. By 9 December, Pulford withdrew all but two squadrons to Singapore. Before this occurred, congested Kuantan airfield was attacked and seven more British aircraft destroyed on the ground. By the evening of the 9th, the number of operational British aircraft in northern Malaya totalled ten, concentrated at Butterworth airfield. Alor Star, Sungei Patani, Kota Bharu, Machang and Gong Kedah had all been abandoned, often hurriedly with much useful material being left for the Japanese. The RAF was forced to fall back to airfields in central and southern Malaya, which the ground staffs had to hurriedly prepare. After the RAF’s defeat in northern Malaya, its new priority was to provide air defence for the naval base and the convoys bringing reinforcements into the fortress. Thus, most fighters were based in Singapore. On 12 December, Pulford decided to provide some measure of air defence to the ground troops and sent a single squadron of Buffalos to Butterworth. The final British air attack on Singora was mounted on 12 December by three Blenheims, but was ineffective. Further air attacks were abandoned since fighter cover was no longer available. With almost all fighters retained in Singapore, the few remaining strike aircraft were withheld to oppose a potential Japanese invasion on the east coast of Malaya. No attempt was made to support British ground troops directly, but night attacks were made on the major road running down eastern Malaya. By 22 December, 453 Squadron, operating out of central Malaya with its outclassed Buffalo fighters, was reduced to three aircraft so it was pulled back to Singapore. On the night of 27 December, six Blenheims from 34 Squadron hit the Japanese airfield at Sungei Patani and claimed some 15 aircraft destroyed. This apparent success prompted a repeat attack the following night, but it did nothing to stop the relentless pressure on British ground forces from Japanese aircraft. In early January, the retreating Indian III Corps offered a wonderful target for Japanese air power, which had air superiority in central 75

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RAF deployment, 8 December 1941 Singora

Occupied airfield Unoccupied airfield Landing ground

Patani Khlaung Ngae

N

Sadao

Jitra

Kota Bharu

Tumpat

62 Sqn

Alor Star

1 (RAAF) Sqn, Det 243 Sqn

KEDDAH Sungei Patani Butterworth Penang

Det 36 Sqn

21 (RAAF), 27 Sqns

Gong Kedah Machang

Betong Kroh

Kuala Krai

Ka Ketil Grik

Sungei Bakap

Kuala Trengganu

Lubok Kiap

KELANTAN

Malakoff

Port Weld

TRENGGANU

Taiping Kuala Kangasar

Kuala Dungun

Ipoh

Kampar Tapah Bidor

Stiawan

Kuala Lipis

Telok Anson

Jerantur Slim River

Kuantan

Raub

8 (RAAF), 60 Sqns

Bentong

SELANGOR

PAHANG

Maran

Kuala Selangor Kuala Lumpur Port Swettenham

NEGRI Bahau

Seremban

Morib Port Dickson

SEMBILAN

Endau

Gemas Segamat

Tampin

453 (RAAF) Sqn

Malacca

Seletar

JOHORE

36, 100, 205 Sqns

34 Sqn

Tengah

Muar

Singapore

Kallang

0 0

50 miles 50km

Kahang

Yong Peng Batu Pahat

243 (RNZAF), 488 (RNZAF) Sqns

Mersing

Labis

MALACCA

Sembawang

Jemaluang

Kluang Ayer Hitam

Rengani Kota Tinggi Tebrau Johore Bahru Singapore

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Malaya. However, the Japanese failed to mass air power, using only small groups of bombers that did not disrupt the retreat. If the IJA Air Force did not conduct interdiction, British accounts indicate that Japanese aircraft were consistently active over the key battle areas. They caused little direct damage, but did have a discernable impact on British morale. As British ground forces were pushed out of central Malaya into Johore, the RAF’s emphasis was still on providing cover for convoys arriving in Singapore. There were small-scale attempts to mount night-time attacks on Japanese airfields at Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur and some attacks were flown against Japanese traffic on the trunk road. In addition to the British air units, several squadrons of Dutch Glenn Martin bombers briefly joined the fight, and a small number of United States Army Air Force B-24s attacked Japanese airfields in Malaya from their base in Java, using Palembang in Sumatra as a staging point. The only way for the RAF to sustain the air battle was to keep a steady flow of reinforcements coming into Singapore. This ultimately proved impossible since the air reinforcement route was long and insufficiently developed. This meant that attrition on the way was high. The reinforcements that did arrive were not complete units with their ground staffs, but small groups of aircraft, which had to be thrown into action before they were ready. For example, in mid-December, a group of 18 Blenheim IV bombers were slated to fly to Singapore, but, of these, only seven reached Singapore by 25 December; the others were lost en route. Late in the month, Hudson II bombers began to reach Singapore. The flow of shorter-ranged fighters was much more difficult to maintain, especially after the Japanese occupied a staging airfield in southern Burma. This meant that after mid-December all fighter aircraft had to be delivered by sea. A convoy with 51 Hurricane fighters in crates, along with 24 pilots, was diverted to Singapore on 17 December and arrived on 13 January. This was followed late in the month by the delivery of 48 Hurricanes from the carrier Indomitable, which were flown off to Sumatra and then proceeded to Singapore.

THE FINAL AIR BATTLES In the second week of January, the focus of the air campaign shifted to Singapore itself. The lack of early warning and the poor performance of the Buffalo fighters handicapped the British defence. In mid-January, the RAF boasted 56 serviceable fighters from five squadrons. The arrival of the crated Hurricane fighters on 13 January was seen as opportunity to regain air control over Malaya, but these fighters proved no more effective than the much-criticized Buffalos. While the Hurricanes were more capable than the Buffalos, especially at altitude, they were not superior to the IJA’s nimble Ki-43 fighters, and remained clearly inferior to the IJN’s Zero fighter. Thus, the much-anticipated debut of the Hurricane was unable to change British fortunes in the air. In the final analysis, the numerical disparity between the two sides was decisive. Between 15 and 24 January, the average strength of Allied air power was 74 bombers and 28 fighters. In comparison, the Japanese brought 250 bombers and 150 fighters to the fight. In the second half of January, the Japanese made large-scale attacks on Singapore, focusing on the naval base, the port and the airfields. These were 77

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mounted by bomber formations of 27 aircraft escorted by fighters and were a daily event. Beginning on 20 January, the RAF’s Hurricane fighters joined the battle, but the RAF continued to suffer daily losses, which the trickle of reinforcements was unable to cover. The RAF did occupy the full attention of the Japanese air forces, so they made no attempt to attack the reinforcement convoys. In addition, the RAF put up enough of a fight that the Japanese judged they did not have the absolute air superiority required to launch a major landing on south-eastern Malaya in the second half of January. The cancellation of this operation was a contributing factor to the successful withdrawal of Percival’s forces from Johore onto Singapore Island. When a Japanese convoy did appear off Endau on 26 January, the British did not know it was only a logistical support landing for the 3rd Air Division. The RAF committed its remaining strike aircraft against this threat, but it was not until the afternoon of the 26th that the first British aircraft were dispatched to attack the apparent landing force. The strike force consisted of nine Hudson bombers and 12 Vildebeests armed with bombs instead of torpedoes. A strong escort was provided in the form of 15 Buffalos and eight Hurricanes. Against heavy fighter opposition, the British attack was pressed home and hits claimed on both transports anchored offshore. The price was five Vildebeests shot down. Another wave with nine Vildebeests, three Albacores and 12 fighters reached the target area at about 1730hrs and, in the face of fierce fighter resistance, pressed home its attack. This attack achieved little, but suffered five Vildebeests, two Albacores and a fighter shot down. Following the demolition of the last two airfields in Malaya at Kahang and Kluang beginning on 21 January, all Allied air forces had to fly from the four airfields on Singapore. To reduce the congestion, arrangements were made to fly from airfields on southern Sumatra. By 28 January, all the bomber units were based outside Singapore. Of the airfields on Singapore, Tengah, Sembawang and Seletar were located on the northern part of the island, which would soon be in range of Japanese artillery from across the Strait of Johore. The fourth airfield, at Kallang, was located on the south coast. This was the former civil airfield and since it was on a salt marsh at sea level, it proved difficult to repair the holes made by Japanese bombing. A plan to create dispersal strips was rendered impractical after it was realized that there were no troops to guard them against possible Japanese airborne attack. This situation forced the withdrawal of all remaining aircraft to bases in southern Sumatra, with the exception of eight Hurricanes and eight Buffalos. This withdrawal made provision of air defence for the front-line troops even more problematic and further lowered morale in the fortress. During the first week of February the British maintained a small force of fighters on the island, while a bomber force averaging 20 Hudsons and 15 Blenheims operated from southern Sumatra. These conducted ineffective night attacks to disrupt Japanese attack preparations. In return, the Japanese made constant bombing attacks on Singapore’s dock area, which were largely unchallenged since there was inadequate warning to get defending fighters airborne to meet the high-altitude formations. This inability to counter the weight of Japanese air power over a defenceless city contributed to the sense of the futility of prolonging resistance. By the time of the British surrender on 15 February, Japanese air forces based in Malaya were already conducting operations to support the upcoming invasion of Sumatra and Java. Air power was not a decisive factor during the campaign, but it did contribute to the speed of the Japanese conquest. 78

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THE ATTACK ON SINGAPORE The island of Singapore is separated from Malaya by the Strait of Johore. This is between 600 and 5,000 yards wide with the shortest distance being in the northern part where the Causeway was located. The coast was marked by many small rivers and creeks, and these were covered by mangrove swamps, which became a series of islands at high tide. The rest of the island, which is 27 miles at its widest and 13 miles deep, is fairly flat. The highest points, some 600 feet high, are at Bukit Mandai and Bukit Timah in the centre of the island. The terrain was mainly covered in jungle, but there were several good roads, which led to Singapore city in the southern part of the island. One factor which would become key was the existence of three water reservoirs in the centre of the island, providing 17 million gallons daily for the population, which had swelled from the pre-war 550,000 to almost twice that by late January.

The British defences

The British plan to defend the island was based on pre-war concepts, which were focused on defending the naval base from seaward attack. It is unfair to say that there were no preparations made to defend the island from an attack from the north, since the entire campaign in Malaya was conducted for this purpose. When it came to improving defences along the Strait of Johore to defend the island, it is fair to say nothing was done to create any fortifications. There were some scattered beach defences constructed, and two defensive lines had been surveyed in the interior of the island to stop landings from the east or west. The line in the west was called the Jurong Line and limited preliminary work on it had begun in January. Singapore was a fortress in name only. While the troops expected to hold the fortress were impressive on paper, with a total combat strength of 70,000 men, they were in fact a demoralized, under-trained, and poorly equipped force. Of the 38 infantry battalions, only 13 were British battalions. These were largely from the 18th Division, two brigades of which had not yet seen any action and were thus at full strength. The remaining seven were all under strength. The six Australian battalions

The view from Singapore, near the Causeway, across to Johore Bahru and the Sultan’s Palace. Yamashita chose this structure to view the attack across the strait. (AWM)

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had been brought up to full strength, but only by using the recently arrived untrained replacements. Of the 17 Indian battalions, only one was at full strength. The others included three battalions of the just-arrived 44th Infantry Brigade which was semi-trained and 13 battalions which were either hastily reorganized or still in the process of reorganization. There were also two Malay battalions of unknown value and three volunteer battalions suitable only for guarding static positions. Those units which had returned from the mainland were short of weapons. Morale of these troops had been shaken by the long retreat, and the recent withdrawal of naval and air forces from the island. Percival was convinced that the most likely place for a Japanese assault was on the north-east part of the strait. At the same time, he did not rule out an assault from the sea or from airborne troops, so he was faced with the requirement to defend all 70 miles of coast. He decided to fight a forward battle in which the defenders would try to prevent a Japanese landing, and then counter-attack any Japanese lodgement. He recognized that this had inherent disadvantages given the lack of depth of the defence and the terrain which precluded any coherent beach defence, but felt this was better than allowing the Japanese to land and fight a battle inland. Key to the defence was the employment of Percival’s considerable artillery strength, which totalled 226 guns of all calibres against the Japanese while they were struggling to get ashore. Despite myth, this included most of the coastal artillery (four of five 15in. guns, all six 9.2in. guns and most of the 18 6in. guns), which could engage at least some targets to the north. This firepower was never fully brought to bear because of a lack of a central fire-control plan and failure to coordinate fire at every level. The defence was broken down into three sectors. In the north-east, the 11th Indian Infantry Division and the 18th Division were placed. The western sector was the responsibility of the 8th Australian Infantry Division and the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade. The southern sector was guarded by Malay and volunteer troops. None of Percival’s commanders had confidence in his plan, especially the Australians who were soon to bear the brunt of the Japanese assault.

The Japanese plan

The Japanese reached the Strait of Johore on 31 January. The 5th and 18th Divisions were concentrated west of the Causeway and the Imperial Guards Division to the east. Yamashita assessed that the British defences were more formidable in the north-eastern part of the strait, which was true since that is where Percival had placed his best unit (the 18th Division). Instead of attacking into the teeth of the best British defences, he determined to attack in the sector between Tanjong Buloh and Tanjong Murai, the area held by the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade. The Japanese attack would go in with the 18th Division on the right with two regiments and a battalion in the first wave and two more battalions in reserve. The 5th Division was on the left with three regiments in the first wave and another in reserve. Altogether, Yamashita massed a main attack with 16 battalions in the first wave and another five in reserve on an attack sector of only 4.5 miles. Facing this onslaught were three Australian battalions. Also supporting the attack was the 1st Tank Regiment assigned to the 5th Division. The attack was scheduled to begin between 2000 and 2400hrs on the night of 8/9 February. To mount this attack across the strait, the Japanese were well equipped with assault craft. The 5th Division was allocated 30 collapsible boats, 30 small 80

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Part of the Japanese preparatory artillery campaign before the assault crossing of the Strait of Johore was to destroy the naval base fuel tanks. The Japanese feared that the British would empty the fuel into the strait and set it on fire. The British had no such plans, but ironically such an unplanned incident did incinerate boats of the Imperial Guards Division when it made its crossing. (AWM)

landing craft, 30 pontoons, and seven heavy pontoons. The neighbouring 18th Division had to make do with 140 collapsible boats and 30 pontoons. After the main attack had been delivered, a supporting attack would be conducted by the Imperial Guards Division in the area west of the Causeway, which was held by the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade. This attack included a total of seven battalions supported by the 14th Tank Regiment. The Imperial Guards Division was allocated only 30 collapsible boats, but was to be augmented by craft from the other divisions that had already made their assault crossing. This attack was hastily planned and approved by Yamashita only after Nishimura complained that his Guards were being sidelined. Yamashita went to great efforts to hide the location of his main thrust. The Imperial Guards Division built dummy camps in the north-east sector, conducted a demonstration attack on Ubin Island, and Japanese pre-attack artillery preparations with the 168 available medium and heavy guns focused on this area. The assault troops were not moved forward until the day before the attack. Australian patrols did detect the extensive Japanese activity opposite the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade on the night of 7/8 February, but it was too late for Percival to react.

The Type 96 150mm howitzer was the most modern IJA gun used in the campaign. One is seen here firing on British positions in February 1942. One heavy artillery regiment was equipped with this gun, which had a range of over 13,000 yards. (Author’s collection)

THE JAPANESE ATTACK Beginning on the morning of 8 February, Japanese air and artillery opened up on the sector of the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade. After sunset, the barrage intensified. The Australians prepared themselves for the 81

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JAPANESE FORCES A. 18th Division, Right Wing (55th Infantry Regiment, I Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment; elements of 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion, elements 12th Engineer Regiment) B. 18th Division, Left Wing (114th Infantry Regiment; elements of 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion, elements of 12th Engineer Regiment) C. Engineers (12th Engineers Regiment, Elements, of 21st Independent Brigade, 23rd Independent Engineer Regiment, 15th River Crossing Material Company, 22nd Bridge Building Material Company) D. 18th Division Reserves (2nd and 3rd Battalions, 56th Infantry Regiment) E. 5th Division, Right Wing (21st and 42nd Infantry Regiments; one medium tank company, 1st Tank Regiment, 5th Engineer Regiment (minus one company) F. 5th Division, Left Wing (11th Infantry Regiment; one company, 5th Engineer Regiment) G. Engineers (15th Independent Engineer Regiment, Engineer unit 3rd Tank Group, 5th Independent Engineer Company, 26th Independent Engineer Regiment (one company), 21st River Crossing Material Company, 27th Bridge Building Material Company) H. 5th Division Reserves (41st Infantry Regiment, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment, 1st Tank Regiment (less one company)) I. Imperial Guards Division Assault Group (4th Guards Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Guards Infantry Regiment, 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion (two companies), Guards Engineer Regiment (one company)) J. Imperial Guards Division Left Flank Guard (2nd Battalion, 5th Guards Infantry Regiment) K. Engineers (Guards Engineer Regiment (less elements with Assault Group and Left Flank Guard, 20th Independent Engineer Regiment, 26th Independent Engineer Regiment (one company))) L. Imperial Guards Division Reserve (5th Guards Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), 14th Tank Regiment)

H

D

C B A 1 1 2

2

AMA KENG 3

7

TENGAH AIRFIELD

8

BULIM

9

EVENTS 8 February 1. Japanese attacks begin at about 2030hrs with 16 infantry battalions focused on defensive areas of Australian 2/20th and 2/18th Battalions. 2. Despite losses, the Japanese soon gain a lodgement and begin to infiltrate around Australian defensive positions. 3. 2400hrs – 2/29th Battalion from the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade is attached to the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade and ordered to Tengah Airfield. 9 February 4. 0100–0300hrs – the forward troops of all three Australian battalions are ordered to fall back to battalion perimeters. The withdrawal is accomplished with heavy losses. 5. Dawn – remnants of 2/18th Battalion are attacked at Ama Keng and forced to retreat to Tengah airfield, which they reach at 0930hrs. 6. 0830hrs – Percival moves his only reserve unit, the 12th Indian Brigade, to Keat Hong; it arrives there at 1200hrs. 7. 1000hrs – isolated parties of the 2/20th and 2/19th battalions reach Tengah Airfield; the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade is now combat ineffective. 8. British forces reach area of Bulim, 1500hrs.

9. Nightfall – Jurong Line occupied with 12th Indian Brigade on right, 44th Indian Brigade on left. The 22nd Australian Brigade holds Bulim and 15th Indian Brigade is ordered to move up. 10. 2030hrs – The Imperial Guards Division makes its assault crossing and meets heavy opposition. 11. 2400hrs – 27th Australian Brigade is forced back to the vicinity of Kranji. At 0400hrs on 10 February, the brigade is ordered to retreat, giving the Japanese a firm lodgement.

THE JAPANESE ASSAULT ACROSS THE STRAIT OF JOHORE On the night of 8/9 February 1942, two Japanese divisions fall upon a single Australian brigade across the Strait of Johore. The Japanese soon establish a lodgement and create the conditions for the conquest of Fortress Singapore. 82

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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km

BRITISH FORCES

XX

18

XX

5

RENYA

XX

TAKURO IMPERIAL GUARDS

L

TAKUMA

G F E

1

1. 2/20th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade 2. 2/18th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade 3. 2/19th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade 4. 2/30th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade 5. 2/26th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade 6. 2/29th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade 7. Dalforce 8. 28th Indian Brigade 9. 12th Indian Brigade 10. 44th Indian Brigade 11. 15th Indian Brigade

JOHORE BAHRU K

1

2 I

7

JOHORE STRAIT

J

10 8 5

4

4 5 KRANJI 3 6

MANDAI VILLAGE

KEAT HONG

BULIM

9

BUKIT PANJANG

XX

II IND

6

MURRAY-LYON

9 10

XX

8 AUS

BENNETT

11

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Japanese troops, including a pontoon carrying a tank, cross the Strait of Johore. Once the Japanese secured a lodgement to bring supplies, armour and artillery across unmolested by British fire, the battle was over. (AWM)

attack they knew was coming, and at about 2030hrs landing craft were sighted approaching their positions. Despite stiff resistance, the forward Australian positions were swamped by the weight of the Japanese attack. The Australians fought without artillery support and once ashore the Japanese infiltrated between the widely separated Australian defences. Between 0100 and 0300hrs, the forward companies of all three Australian battalions were ordered to fall back to previously selected battalion perimeters. This was a difficult undertaking at night, through heavy terrain and with the Japanese pressing their attack. Only half the men from the 2/18th Battalion reached Ama Keng and the other two battalions suffered even worse with about a company escaping. This rendered the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade combat ineffective. As the focus of the Japanese attack became clear, Percival ordered his only real reserve, the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade to support the Australians, and Bennett moved the reserve 2/29th Battalion from the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade sector to the 22nd Brigade’s sector. By nightfall, the British had fallen back to the Jurong Line. The 44th Indian Infantry Brigade held the southern sector, the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade, which had been reinforced by a number of units, was established around Bulim, and the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed to their north. The first day had seen the Japanese gain their planned objectives. The British had taken a beating, but still maintained a viable defence. The next part of the Japanese attack unfolded on the night of 9/10 February. During the day, artillery fire was intensified against the sector held by the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade. At about 2030hrs, the Japanese began their assault. Australian machine-gunners took a heavy toll in the Japanese assault boats, and General Nishimura sought permission from Yamashita to call off his attack and land behind the 5th Division the following day. But by midnight, the 2/26th Battalion had been forced back 500 yards and, by 0400hrs, the commander of the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade had ordered a retreat which opened a gap with the neighbouring 11th Indian Division and allowed the Japanese the opportunity to bring up the rest of the Imperial Guards Division without interference.

BATTLE FOR THE JURONG LINE The battle for the Jurong Line was over before Percival and Bennett realized it had started. Bennett ordered the 22nd Australian Brigade to hold Bulim until early on 10 January and then to fall back to the Jurong Line between the 12th and 44th Indian Brigades. Throughout the few days of 84

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the battle for Singapore, Percival’s Malaya Command was unable to coordinate operations at any level. The events of 10 January give the best example of this. The northern part of the line was abandoned when the 12th Indian Brigade pulled back without orders to prevent the Imperial Guards Division from driving down from Kranji behind the British defences. In the southern part of the line, the 15th and 44th Indian Brigades pulled back to protect the Jurong road in response to a set of orders from Percival not even in effect. The result was that by the evening of the 10th, the Jurong Line, which had been partly surveyed and prepared, had been lost and the British forces in the west disrupted. The loss of this line was the last chance to defend Singapore city. Yamashita sensed the British confusion and ordered a major drive to seize Singapore quickly. The 18th Division massed on the Jurong road and the 5th Division, with tanks, was in the area of Tengah airfield. The Imperial Guards Division was still crossing the Strait of Johore to the west of the Causeway, but posed a threat to drive down from the north to cut off British forces in the western part of the island. To counter the later potential threat, Percival formed a three-battalion force drawing from all three brigades of the 18th British Division (named Tomforce) and sent it to cover the main road leading from the Causeway on the evening of 10 January. Under prompting from Wavell, who visited Singapore for the last time on 10 January, Percival ordered a counter-attack to regain the Jurong Line. The attack was to include four brigades. Of these, only two were actually able to follow orders. Meanwhile, infantry from the 5th Division, supported by tanks, attacked to the east from the area of Tengah airfield down the Choa Chu Kang road. The Japanese sliced through the 12th Indian Brigade and an Australian battalion until reaching the main road and turning south. In spite of three roadblocks, which accounted for several Japanese tanks, the Japanese reached the vital road junction and depots at Bukit Timah at about midnight on the night of 10/11 February. The British counter-attack never got going. At 0300hrs on 11 February, the Japanese 18th Division attacked down the Jurong road into the positions of the British units preparing for the attack. This attack was held, but it forced the counter-attack to be cancelled. Another Japanese attack at 0730hrs smashed through the 15th Indian Brigade and sent the survivors reeling back to the position of the 22nd Australian Brigade.

Japanese infantry advance up the high ground near Bukit Timah on 11 February. Not only was this the highest ground on the island, which had a commanding view of the city, but it was the location of important supply depots for the garrison. (AWM)

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The battle of Bukit Timah and the loss of the Jurong Line N

British positions 10 February British positions 11 February

0

2 miles

0

Johore Bahru

2km

Naval Base Area X

28 Ind

Imperial Guards

X

53

XX

8 Ind

X

X

53

Sembawang Airfield

Imperial Guards

Mandai Village 1. 2. 3. 4.

Bt. Mandai

0600hrs, 10 Febuary 0800hrs, 10 Febuary 1800hrs, 10 Febuary 2400hrs, 10 Febuary

Tengah Airfield XX

5

27 Aus

12 Ind

Nee Soon

Seletar Reservoir

28 Ind

3

X

Bukit Panjang Village

Keat Hong Bulim 22 Aus

X

8 Ind

X

2

1

X

XX

Pierce Reservoir

X

15 Ind

XX

18

X

27 Aus

4

Jurong Line

(-)

Thomson Village

MacRitchie Reservoir

XX

5 44 Ind

X

X

Bt. Timah XX

Sleepy Valley Kg Jawa

1 Malaya

X

X

18

Tomforce

Massy Force

X

18

Race Course Village X

22 Aus

44 Ind

X

1 Malaya

Tanglin X

Pasir Panjang

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The failure of the Japanese to press their advantage because of ammunition shortages, gave the British a chance to recover and organize another counter-attack. Bennett ordered three battalions to re-take Bukit Timah, but, in the face of two Japanese divisions, this counter-attack stalled by early afternoon. Meanwhile, Percival was assembling another brigadesized force from the British 18th Infantry Division to cover the left flank of the 11th Indian Division and protect the reservoirs in the centre of the island. This did nothing to lessen the pressure on the 11th Indian Division, which came under attack on the 11th from the Imperial Guards Division. Japanese pressure and continued British command and control issues prompted the 27th Australian Brigade to move south to the Race Course, which left the left flank of the 11th Indian Division entirely exposed. The commander of the 11th Indian Division ordered a withdrawal to protect his left, which meant abandoning the naval base. By 1800hrs, the base was abandoned and final demolitions conducted. By the evening of the 11th, the British had been forced back to the area of the MacRitchie reservoir and the Race Course. South of these defences was the reinforced 22nd Australian Brigade, which withstood attacks throughout the day by the 18th Division’s 56th and 114th Infantry regiments.

THE FINAL BATTLES The Japanese kept the pressure up on 12 February. The 5th Division, supported by tanks, continued to attack down the Bukit Timah road toward Singapore city. This sector was held by the scratch brigade from the 18th British Division, which was named Massy Force. On the left of the 5th Division, the Imperial Guards Division occupied all three reservoirs in the centre of the island and began to pressure the perimeter around Singapore from the north and north-east. The 18th Division continued to press along the Holland road and along the southern coast of the island against the defences of the 22nd Australian Brigade, the 44th Indian Brigade, and on the coast against the 1st Malaya Brigade, which was in combat for the first time. Against this pressure, Percival decided to withdraw to a final perimeter around the city itself. This withdrawal commenced at about noon on the 12th and was accomplished by evening. By the morning of the 13th, the British held a perimeter stretching 28 miles around Singapore. The fighting strengths of the British brigades had been greatly reduced; the 22nd Australian Brigade was down to 800 men and the 44th Indian Brigade was down to 1,200 men. By this time, British morale was unravelling. There was clearly no chance of defending the city and calls for resistance to the last round were having no effect. Though there were instances of the British troops holding their ground, such as the 22nd Australian Brigade along the Holland road, the most obvious manifestation of broken morale was a continual propensity to withdraw. On the 12th, the Governor gave orders that the Singapore broadcasting station be blown up and the contents of the treasury burned. With no confidence in their leadership, troops in the rear began to desert, and armed deserters were even reported to be looting. Others seized small boats to escape or attempted to board ships leaving the port area.

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CAPITULATION

Yamashita (top left) discusses the terms of the surrender with Percival (bottom right). After an hour, Percival agreed to surrender unconditionally, having received assurances from Yamashita for the safety of the civilians and soldiers in the city. (AWM)

The scale of the British demolition programme increased as the fall of the island looked to be imminent. The stocks of rubber were burned, and the tinsmelting plants and a number of factories destroyed. However, the demolition was actually handicapped by the staff and owners of some plants. Some facilities were given exemptions for morale purposes, so the overall scale of denial of useful military equipment and industrial facilities was incomplete. On the early afternoon of 13 February, Percival held a conference with his principal staff and unit commanders. All present concurred that a counterattack had no hope of success, and Heath and Bennett both advocated surrender. Percival resisted this, but later admitted to Wavell that resistance would likely last only another day or two. On the night of 13/14 February, the last ships and seagoing craft in the port were ordered to leave for Java and Sumatra with 3,000 evacuees on board. The scale of Japanese attacks was reduced on the 13th, with the exception of the sector held by the 1st Malaya Brigade. The Japanese pressure on the western part of the perimeter increased on 14 February. By the end of the day, the Japanese 18th Division was some 3,000 yards from the southern outskirts of the city. In the centre, attacks by the 5th Division, supported by tanks, made progress down the Bukit

The most iconic photo of the campaign – Percival and several of his staff officers march to the Ford Factory at Bukit Timah to surrender the Singapore garrison. (Author’s collection)

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Timah road and reached a residential area on the outskirts of the city. In the east, minor Japanese penetrations were cleared up by the end of the day. Adding to Percival's troubles, on the morning of the 14th, he was informed by the Director General of Civil Defence that the collapse of the water supply in the city was imminent. Another meeting with municipal authorities later in the day indicated that the water supply situation was slightly improved. Percival indicated to Wavell that the water situation did not change his intent to fight on. Despite encouragement from Wavell to fight on, Percival’s situation was becoming increasingly perilous. There were now about one million people crowded into the city, and with the remaining troops of the garrison also spread out in every part of the city, the Japanese continued widespread shelling and aerial bombing. This created severe casualties on the undefended civilians and crowded hospitals and other temporary facilities used as hospitals with wounded. The following day, Percival was forced to bow to the inevitable. At a 0930hrs staff meeting, the water situation was reported to be dire, with a total failure expected within 24 hours. Food was adequate, as was small-arms ammunition, but shortages in fuel and heavier ammunition were already evident. Percival painted the situation as a choice between a counter-attack to regain control of the water reservoirs or an immediate surrender. With a counter-attack clearly impossible, this left capitulation. When Wavell gave Percival discretion in a morning telegram to surrender if he felt it was no longer possible to continue fighting, Percival made plans to end resistance. Accordingly, at 1715hrs on 15 February, Percival and his chief of staff followed Japanese instructions to proceed to the Ford Factory at Bukit Timah to meet his Japanese counterpart. Yamashita demanded an unconditional surrender from the reluctant Percival, and under threat of renewed Japanese attacks, Percival agreed after a 55-minute discussion. The surrender was signed at 1810hrs and was effective as of 2030hrs that evening. The 70day campaign for Malaya and Singapore was over, and the greatest military defeat in British history complete.

British soldiers have thrown their rifles on the ground and surrender to the Japanese soldiers – 16 February 1942. (AWM)

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THE AFTERMATH

Japanese soldiers in Fullerton Square, Singapore on 17 February 1942. Yamashita never let his main combat troops into the city since he did not trust them not to go on a rampage. The only troops sent in were military police and selected infantry companies. Percival’s surrender before the battle entered the streets of Singapore probably prevented a massacre. (AWM)

Singapore was one of the most pivotal campaigns in the Pacific War. The myth of the invincibility of the IJA was born and both Burma and India were open to invasion. The question remains: how could a larger British force be routed in a campaign which lasted only 70 days? Was such an astounding defeat inevitable? The start of the campaign was a disaster for the British. The weak British air force was crippled on the first few days, and never became a factor in the campaign. The Japanese enjoyed air superiority, and all the advantages that this confers, for virtually the entire campaign. The RN was forced to send a small force immediately to the Far East for political reasons, but in military terms it was a bluff. It did not deter the Japanese, who promptly exhibited that the day of the battleships operating in the face of air power was over. The first stage of the campaign revealed every possible British weakness. The failure to execute Operation Matador into southern Thailand, again because of political reasons, meant the Japanese were able to gain a solid foothold on the Malayan Peninsula, which they were quickly able to expand. The widely dispersed British forces were never able to concentrate against the Japanese. When the British did make a stand their poor state of training, particularly among the Indian units, resulted in a string of defeats. The battle for central Malaya was a decisive defeat for the British. This was the best opportunity Percival had to derail the Japanese plan for a quick victory. A successful stand here offered the strategic depth to create the conditions for a British counteroffensive. If driven back into southern Johore, there was no chance of a counter-offensive, which meant a withdrawal to Singapore was inevitable. Once this occurred, a British surrender was inevitable since no further reinforcements could enter the besieged fortress, and the island had not been prepared for an attack from the north and was not prepared for a siege.

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The defence of northern Johore was another disaster. Two brigades were lost, and the momentum of the Japanese attacks was not blunted. The British defence was compromised by poor planning. With a Japanese force of at least two divisions bearing down on the western side of the peninsula, this became the main threat to Singapore. Nevertheless, Percival held excessive units on the island and on the eastern coast of Malaya. This precluded him from deploying his strongest unit, the 8th Australian Division, to face the main threat. This unit could have been paired with the 9th Indian Division, with the battered 11th Indian Division and the newly arrived 53rd British Brigade in reserve. Only two axes of advance had to be covered – the trunk road and the coastal road. Making matters more doubtful for the British was the decision to form Westforce, placing Bennett in charge of the battle along two widely separated fronts without commensurate staff and communications capabilities to control them. Bennett decided to defend the trunk road with three brigades and the coastal road with a single inexperienced brigade – the 45th Indian. This was impossible, and resulted in the loss of the brigade and the near encirclement of the rest of Westforce. The Japanese never allowed Percival to gain his balance, and many defensible positions were lost as the British were forced out of Johore. After a disastrous campaign in Malaya, Percival topped that off with an equally poorly conducted defence of Singapore. He decided to base his plan on preventing the Japanese from gaining a toehold on the island. If the Japanese did manage to cross the Strait of Johore, then a timely counterattack would push them back. Success demanded two important factors.

Yamashita and his staff survey a battlefield after the fighting. On the right is his IJN liaison officer. (AWM)

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Since the entire 70 miles of coastline could not be strongly defended, Percival had to decide where to concentrate his defences. Though the north-west sector offered the Japanese several advantages, Percival could not abandon his pre-war notion that the north-east was the most likely avenue for attack. As a result, he tried to defend everywhere, with the north-west being the least well defended. Not only was this a fatal miscalculation since the main Japanese attack did come from the north-west, but such a defence left no reserve readily available for a counter-attack. Following the failure to organize a counter-attack, the Japanese gained a lodgement sufficient to start bringing tanks and artillery across the strait. In this second phase, the British again failed to organize sufficient strength for a counter-attack. The strongest unit on the island, the fresh 18th British Infantry Division, was fed into the battle piecemeal instead of being used for a major counter-attack. The failure to mount a counter-attack and ultimately to hold the Jurong Line was largely due to errors in command judgement and failures in coordinating the movements of units. The net effect was that the British forces never launched a meaningful counter-attack and were continually off balance reacting to Japanese movements. As poor as the British performance was across the board, the Japanese must be given full credit for their intelligent planning and relentless effort to keep the initiative. Of all the armies fielded by Japan during the war, the 25th Army was the best led and equipped. Not known for its prowess with armour, the IJA made effective use of its tanks in Malaya, which were key enablers of victory. But the real agent of victory was the Japanese infantry, which was better trained, more resolute, and used better tactics than its British counterpart. The final result was a disaster of unprecedented proportions for the British Empire. The defeat in Malaya and the fall of Singapore presaged the invasion of Burma and later India, and the fall of the Dutch East Indies. The considerable economic resources of Malaya fell under the control of Japan, and, with those of the Dutch East Indies, allowed the Japanese war economy to function for almost the next four years. Casualties were immense for the British – totalling 138,708 – of which more than 130,000 were prisoners of war. The breakdown of the casualties revealed 38,496 British, 67,340 Indian, 18,490 Australian and 14,382 local troops. In addition, the Japanese captured the naval base, which had been only partially destroyed, and a large booty of weapons and equipment. In comparison, Japanese casualties totalled only 9,824 for the entire campaign. For the next four years, until the return of the British in September 1945, the population had to endure a harsh occupation. The occupation began with a purge of all Chinese inhabitants, which had been planned before the start of the campaign. Between 21 February and the end of the month, Chinese males between the ages of 18 and 50 were ordered to report to screening centres. Those who were assessed to be anti-Japanese were detained, loaded into trucks, and then driven to isolated places where they were killed by machine guns or bayonets. The numbers massacred are in dispute; the usual number cited is 50,000, but there appears to be no basis for this number. The figure given by the commander of the Singapore garrison, a brigade commander from the Imperial Guards Division, gave the figure as 5,000, while a 25th Army staff report prepared right after the massacre gave a figure of over twice that many. The real figure will never be known. 92

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THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY Just as it was in 1941–42, Singapore is still one of the main transportation hubs in Asia. It is therefore easy to get flights into the city, and travel around the island or into neighbouring Malaysia is also easy. Singapore has grown into a city-state of some 5.5 million people on a land area of 277 square miles. This sprawl has covered many of the areas which saw fighting in February 1942, but there is still much to see. There are multiple tour companies offering tours on Singapore, which focus on the battles of 1942. These cater to western visitors and offer tours in English with varying levels of expertise. A must-see attraction is the Kranji War Memorial, the well-maintained Commonwealth War Grave. It is 14 miles from the city centre overlooking the Strait of Johore. The memorial honours Allied dead from the war, with a cemetery that contains 4,400 gravestones. Up a short flight of stairs is the Singapore Memorial, which bears the names of some 24,346 Allied servicemen killed in Southeast Asia who have no known grave. There are plenty of other attractions, which are in or near Singapore city. The National Museum of Singapore covers back to 1887 and includes a section on the war. Visitors can tour Fort Canning, the site of the headquarters of the British Far East Command where Percival made the decision to surrender. Alexandra Hospital where Japanese soldiers bayoneted wounded and medical staff just before the surrender can also be seen. Also downtown is a memorial to the Indian National Army, which was formed by the Japanese to enlist Indian prisoners of war to fight against British occupation. Many of the Indian soldiers who surrendered at Singapore decided to join this short-lived and ineffective army. A marker to these men was originally erected in July 1945, and then removed after the British reoccupied the city. A new version was erected in 1995. Tours of the coastal defence batteries on the island include the 6in. guns at the site of the former Fort Pasir Panjang west of the city. Just offshore from Keppel Harbour is Sentosa Island, which contains two large forts, Connaught and Siloso. At Fort Siloso, three 9.2in. guns can be seen as well as the tunnels and magazines from the former battery. An elaborate museum includes life-size dioramas of the British surrender in 1942 and the Japanese surrender in 1945. Also to the west of Singapore is the site of the former Changi prisoner of war camp, which has a museum. Nearby is a replica of one of the 15in. guns. One of the more poignant attractions is what is left of the Ford Factory on Upper Bukit Timah road, where the Japanese took Percival’s surrender. This is one of the places where the course of history changed. The factory closed in 1980, but was turned into a museum, which details the ordeal of the 93

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Singaporeans under what was almost four years of harsh Japanese occupation. The exhibits also trace the course of the Malaya campaign. The Japanese occupation is also the subject at the Civilian War Memorial, which was opened in 1962 on the site of a mass grave of civilians in the southern part of the island. On the northern part of the island are the landing sites of the Japanese assault on the night of 8/9 February 1942. When the author was there in 1990, the difficulty of mounting a defence on such terrain was readily evident. A good tour guide can trace the course of the Japanese attack across the Strait of Johore and through the south-west part of the island. Tours are available of the battlefield sites in Malaya, which is now Malaysia. There is little to see dating back to the war, but there are remnants of British fortifications at Kota Bharu and Alor Star airfields. A good tour guide is required to bring the battle to life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, Louis, Singapore 1941–1942, Frank Cass (London, 1993) Bond, Brian and Tachikawa, Kyoichi, ed., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941–1945, Frank Cass (London, 2004) Cannon, Peter, Night Action, Malaya 1942, published in Warship 2015, Conway (London, 2015) Chung, Ong Chit, Operation Matador, Times Academic Press (Singapore, 1997) Corfield, Justin and Corfield, Robin, The Fall of Singapore, Hardie Grant Books (Richmond, Victoria, 2012) Diamond, Jon, The Fall of Malaya and Singapore, Pen & Sword Military (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2015) Falk, Stanley L., Seventy Days to Singapore, Robert Hale (London, 1975) Farrell, Brian and Pratten, Garth, Malaya, Army History Unit (Canberra, Australia, 2009) Farrell, Brian P., The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940–1942, Tempus (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 2005) Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Malay Operations Record November 1941–March 1942 (Japanese Monograph 54) Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Southeast Area Air Operations Record November 1941– June 1942 (Japanese Monograph 55) Kinvig, Clifford, Scapegoat, Brassey’s (London, 1996) Kirby, S. Woodburn, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster, The MacMillan Company (New York, 1971) Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan, Volume I, The Loss of Singapore, HMSO (London, 1957) Mace, Martin and Grehan, John, Disaster in the Far East 1940–1942, Pen & Sword Military (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2015) Marder, Arthur J., Old Friends, New Enemies, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1981) Middlebrook, Martin and Mahoney, Patrick, Battleship, Allen Lane (London, 1977) Ness, Leland, Rikugun (Volume 1), Helion (Solihull, West Midlands, 2014) Nicholson, Arthur, Hostages to Fortune, Sutton Publishing (Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, 2005) Rottman, Gordon L., Japanese Army in World War II, Osprey Publishing (Botley, Oxford, 2005) Ryan, David, Hughes, David and Rothwell Steve, The British Armies in World War Two An Organizational History, Volumes Two, Three, Four, Five, Nine, Supplement Two, The Nafziger Collection, Inc (West Chester, Ohio, 2002) Shores, Christopher and Cull, Brian, Bloody Shambles (Volume One), Grub Street (London, 1992) Stephen, Martin, Scapegoat, Pen & Sword Maritime (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2014) Tsuji, Masanobu, Singapore 1941–1942, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1988) Underwood, John L., The Japanese Order of Battle in World War II, Volume I, The Nafziger Collection (1999) Warren, Alan, Singapore 1942, Hambledon and London (London, 2002) Wigmore, Lionel, The Japanese Thrust, Australian War Memorial (Canberra, 1957)

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INDEX Note: page locators in bold refer to illustrations, captions and plates. ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) 12, 12 ACV-IP Indian Pattern armoured carrier 20 air battles over Singapore 77–78 air superiority in northern Malaya 74–77 aircraft Brewster Buffalo Mk I fighter plane (US) 22, 24, 28, 52, 75, 77, 78 Bristol Blenheim IV bomber/fighter plane (UK) 22, 23, 24, 28, 38– 40(40), 74, 75, 77 Hawker Hurricane fighter plane (UK) 77, 78 Lockheed Hudson II reconnaissance/ bomber plane (US) 22, 24, 74, 74, 77, 78 Mitsubishi A6M ‘Zero’ fighter plane (Japan) 29, 77 Mitsubishi G3M ‘Nell’ bomber (Japan) 29, 46–48(48), 50, 51 Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ bomber (Japan) 29, 29, 50, 51 Mitsubishi Ki-21 ‘Sally’ bomber (Japan) 28, 74 Nakajima Ki-27 ‘Nate’ fighter plane (Japan) 28, 38–40(40) Nakajima Ki-43 ‘Oscar’ fighter plane (Japan) 28, 74, 77 Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bomber (UK) 23, 24, 74, 78 ambush near Gemas 70–71 armour protection 17, 20, 21, 23, 27, 45, 51, 70, 92 atrocities 15, 16, 90, 92 Barstow, Maj-Gen Arthur 13 battle for Kota Bharu 41, 41–42 battle for Northern Johore 68–72, 69 battle for the Jurong Line 84–85, 92 battle of Bukit Timah 85, 85–87, 86 battle of Jitra, the 54–59, 56–57 battle of Kampar, the 59–63 battle of Slim River 60–62(62), 63–67, 64–65 battlefield sites 93 Bennett, Maj-Gen H. Gordon 13, 13–14, 19, 68, 70, 70, 71, 71, 84, 87, 88, 91 Bren (Universal) No. 1 armoured carrier (UK) 20, 21 bridge demolition 54, 58 British Army 8th Australian Division 18–19, 20,

24, 33, 59, 68, 80, 91 22nd Bde 80 19, 19, 81–83, 84, 85, 87 23rd Bde 19 27th Bde 18, 19, 71, 72–73, 81, 84, 87 Indian III Corps 13, 18, 33–34, 43, 68, 75–77 6th Div 18 6th Heavy Anti-aircraft Rgt 67 9th Div 13, 18, 20, 59, 68, 73, 91 8th Bde 37, 41 22nd Bde 18, 33–34, 73 11th Div 13, 18, 20, 33, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 62, 68, 70, 72, 80, 84, 87, 91 6th Bde 54, 56, 58 15th Bde 18, 33–34, 54, 56, 58, 59, 72, 85 28th Bde 54, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, 72 17th Div 67–68 18th Div 19–20, 67, 68, 79, 80, 85, 87, 92 53rd Bde 67, 71, 72, 91 35th Light Anti-aircraft Rgt 67 85th Anti-tank Rgt 67 Brigades 1st Malaya 87, 88 12th Indian 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, 84, 85 44th Indian 20, 68, 80, 84, 85, 87 45th Indian 20, 68, 70, 71, 72, 91 Punjab battalions 54, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 66 British defence planning 6, 32–34, 90–91 British military strength 17–19 British naval strategy 5, 6, 44, 44–50, 51, 52 British POW 41 British strategy in the Far East 11 Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert 11, 11–12, 33, 37 casualties 9, 10, 18, 46–48(48), 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 67, 92 chronology of events 8–10 Churchill, Winston 11, 14, 32, 43, 52, 72 climate influences 32 consequences of the British defeat in Malaya and Singapore 92–93 critiques of British war commanders 11–15, 12

demolition programme in Singapore 87, 88 Endau assault on retreating British forces 52–53 Fortress Singapore, defence of 79, 79–89, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 91–92 Gurkhas 18, 54, 55, 56, 64-65, 66 Heath, Lt-Gen Sir Lewis 13, 53, 58, 59, 63, 88 IJA (Imperial Japanese Army) 15, 22, 25–26, 35, 40, 53, 54, 55, 73, 84, 90 3rd Tank Group 1st Rgt 27, 54, 57, 80 6th Rgt 27, 60–62(62), 65 14th Rgt 81 25th Army 15, 26, 27, 35, 59, 92 5th Div 16, 25, 26, 27–28, 35, 36, 43, 53, 54, 59, 63, 70, 71, 80–81, 85, 88–89 21st Rgt 68 5th Reconnaissance Rgt 54, 57 9th Infantry Bde 11th Rgt 53, 59, 63 41st Rgt 5, 59, 63 18th Div 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 70, 80, 81, 85, 87, 88 56th Rgt 35–36, 87 114th Rgt 70, 87 21st Infantry Bde 42nd Rgt 35, 53, 59, 63, 65 23rd Infantry Bde 63 56th Div 27, 36 Imperial Guards Division 9, 10, 16, 20, 26, 27, 36, 68-70, 71, 72, 80, 81, 81, 84, 85, 92 4th Guards 28, 36, 59, 63, 72 IJAAF (Imperial Japanese Army Air Force) 28–29, 46–48(48), 74 3rd Air Division 35, 41, 73, 74, 78 IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) 6, 22, 29–30, 35, 53 Genzan Air Corps 48, 50 Mihoro Air Group 50, 51 Japanese entry into World War II 7 Japanese militarism 5, 6, 7, 25, 32 Japanese military strategy 25–26, 27, 28, 35–37, 80–81, 92 Japanese naval strategy 29 Japanese occupation of Singapore 92 jungle warfare 17, 18, 35, 63, 67, 68

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Kota Bharu landings 37, 37, 41, 42, 74 Kuala Lumpur occupation 70, 71 Malaya and Singapore theatre 4 Malayan Peninsula topography 31, 31–32, 34, 54 massacre during Japanese occupation of Singapore 90, 92 Matsui, Lt-Gen Takuro 16 memorials and museums 93 military resources in Malaya and Singapore 11, 11, 12, 14, 17, 32, 79–80 Murray-Lyon, Maj-Gen David M. 13, 13, 55, 58, 59 Mutaguchi, Lt-Gen Renya 16

RAAF, the 22, 74 RAF, the 21–23, 24, 33, 34, 37, 51, 53, 74, 75–77, 76, 78, 90 attack on Singora 38–40(40) reconnaissance 22, 27, 28, 37 reinforcements 19, 19, 67–68, 77 Royal Navy, the 5, 6, 11, 23–24, 25, 29, 32, 52, 53, 68 Force Z 15, 23, 34, 43–52, 44, 49, 51 HMS Prince of Wales (battleship) 29, 29, 43, 43–44, 44, 45, 46–48(48), 50, 51, 51, 52 HMS Repulse (battlecruiser) 29, 44, 45, 45, 50, 52 HMS Thanet (destroyer) 53

Operation Matador (1941) 8, 26, 33–34, 37, 43, 53, 54, 90 order of battle 24, 29–30

Simmons, Maj-Gen F. Keith 14, 14 Singapore British naval base 5, 6, 6, 7 squadron requirements 21–23, 22 Strait of Johore defences 79, 79–84, 81, 82, 84 surrender to the IJA 88, 89, 89, 90

perception of Japan as a threat after World War I 5 Percival, Lt-Gen Arthur E. 12, 12–13, 13, 14, 17, 21, 33, 34, 55, 58–59, 63, 67, 68, 72, 73, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 88, 89, 90, 91–92, 93 Phillips, Acting Adm Sir Tom 14, 14–15, 44, 44–45, 50, 51, 52 Pulford, Air Marshal Conway Walter Heath 74, 75

training 17, 17–18, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 66, 67, 90, 92 Tsuji, Col Masanobu 16, 28 Type 89 heavy grenade dischargers (Japan) 26 Type 91 aerial torpedo (Japan) 48 Type 92 70mm battalion gun (Japan) 27 Type 92 tankette (Japan) 27

Nishimura, Lt-Gen Takuma 16, 81, 84

Type 95 light tank (Japan) 27, 54, 72 Type 97 medium tank (Japan) 27, 54, 60–62(62), 70 underestimation of Japanese capabilities 6, 11, 32-34, 52, 90-91 unit organization 20–21, 27–28 Vichy France and Indo-China 7 Washington Naval Treaty (1922) 5 Wavell, Gen Sir Archibald 11, 12, 12, 68, 72, 85, 88, 89 weapons 2-pdr anti-tank gun (UK) 21, 21, 27, 72 6.5mm Type 38 rifle (Japan) 26 6.5mm Type 96 light machine gun (Japan) 26 7.7mm Type 92 machine gun (Japan) 26 7.7mm Type 99 rifle (Japan) 26 25-pdr anti-tank gun (UK) 21, 21, 62, 67, 70, 73 Bren light machine gun (UK) 20 Lee-Enfield rifle (UK) 20, 20–21 Vickers Mk I machine gun 20 Westforce 68, 71, 72, 91 withdrawal to Singapore 72–73, 73 Yamashita, Lt-Gen Tomoyuki 15, 15, 16, 16, 25, 27, 35, 36, 63, 70, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91

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