I "
ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATORS TONY HOLMES has worked as Osprey's aviation editor since 1989, having previously served as an author/photographer for this publishing house in Australasia. He established the critically acclaimed and hugely popular Aircraft of the Aces series in 1994.
JIM LAURIER is a native of New England and lives in New Hampshire. He attended Paier School of Art in Hamden, Connecticut, from 1974-78, and since graduating with Honors, he has been working professionally in the field of Fine Art and Illustration. He has been commissioned to paint for the US Air Force and has aviation paintings on permanent display at the Pentagon.
HURRICANE I
Bfll0 1940
GARETH HECTOR is a digital artist of international standing as well as an aviation history enthusiast. Gareth completed the battlescene art
TONY HOLMES
INTRODUCTION Ir was nor all doom and gloom for Zerstorer crews in 1940, rhough. The Bf 110 ea ily ourgunned rhe Hurricane - and rhe Spirflre, for rhar marrer. Beflrring irs original role as a bomber-dew-oyer, rhe Mes erschmirr was armed wirh four 7.9mm MG 17
One in a sequence of pictures taken by legendary aviation photographer Charles E. Brown during a visit to
was
machine guns, wirh 1,000 rounds per weapon, in rhe nose, plus rwo 20mm MG FF
predominanrly rhe domain of single-sear rype such as rhe Spirflre lIlI, Hurricane I
cannon, each wirh 180 rounds per gun, in rhe lower forward fuselage_ A flexibly
and Bf 109E. However, flying alongside rhe larrer during much of rhe acrion over
mounred 7.9mm MG 15 machine gun was also provided for rhe rearward-facing
No. 601 Sqn Hurricane Is
wesrern Europe was rhe rwin-engined Bf I 10 Zerstorer. The Bf 1 10 was designed as a
navigarorlradio-operaror. [n conrra r, rhe Hurricane I was equipped wirh eighr rifle-
being fuelled [the aircraft
'bomber-dew'oyer' in rhe 1930s; however, during World War II irs primary rask was
calibre 0.303-in. Browning machine guns, and rhese ofren proved ro lack rhe
clearing a parh rhrough rhe enemy's defensive flghrer screen for Lufrwaffe bomber
desrrucrive punch of rhe cannon flrred ro rhe Bf 11 0 and Bf 109E.
Figh rer-versus-flgh rer
com bar
berween
March
and
ovem ber
1940
everrheless, rhanks ro rhe Hurricane 1's agiliry in com bar, berrer racrics and
Bf 110 'rwin' following irs successes over Poland and during rhe Phoney War had
evenrual srrengrh in numbers, by rhe early aurumn of 1940 rhe Hawker flghrer would
given rhe aircrafr almosr myrhical srarus wirhin rhe Lufrwaffe. However, in rhe Barrie
prevail in rhe skies over sourhern England. By rhis rime rhe inadequacy of rhe Bf 1I0's
of France rhe Zerstorer legend would be quickly sharrered by Allied single-sear fighrers.
defensive firepower - rhe single rear-facing gun - and of ir manoeuvrabiliry had been
opponenT. The Hurricane enrered ervice wirh rhe RAF in December 1937 as irs
cruelly exposed by RAF Fighrer
ommand, as had rhe aircrafr's poor a celerarion and
unsarisfacrory rop speed in combar condirions, parricularly ar low level.
this view shows a section of
to the left also appears to be having its magazines reloaded J before undertaking
formarions. By rhe spring of 1940 rhe propaganda surrounding rhe Messerschmirr
This volume considers rhe Hawker Hurricane I as rhe Bf II O's principal
Tangmere in early July 1940,
hampioned
a convoy protection patrol off the south coast of England. The unit seems to be relying on a towable bowser rather than the usually ubiquitous Albion three-point truck. Note also the belts of 0.303-in ammunition draped over the
flrsr monoplane flghrer. The Hurricane and rhe Zerstorer flrsr rraded blows during rhe
by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring before rhe war, rhe Bf 1 10 rook a rerrible bearing
final weeks of rhe Phoney War, before engaging in bloody dogflghrs over France as
rhroughour rhe larrer half of 1940: rhe Zestorergruppen based in France and Norway
rhe Lufrwaffe supporred rhe Wehrmachr during rhe BLitzkrieg in rhe wesr from
losr an asronishing 223 examples during rhe Barrie ofBrirain. A good number of rhese
extinguisher just forward
10 May 1940.
aircrafr were claimed by Hurricane squadrons. The larrer did rhemselves suffer 10 ses
of the bowser and the fitter
The Hurricane I formed rhe backbone of RAF Fighrer Command for rhe flrsr
caused by Bf 110 unirs, bur in a far more favourable rario of four-ro-one. How rhe
18 monrhs ofrhe war, wirh no fewer rhan 1,715 examples equipping 36 squadrons
Brirish flghrer ramed rhe much-vaunred bomber-desrroyer, and rherefore helped rhe
during rhe Barrie of Brirain - only half rhis number of unirs flew Spirflres. Half rhe
RAF achieve masrery of rhe skies over sourhern England, is revealed in rhis volume.
weighr of rhe Bf 110 and highly manoeuvrable, rhe Hurricane 1 al
0
flat-loader trolley marked '601', the solitary fire
holding the radio access panel for the Hurricane I parked to the right of the phOto.
boasred a rop
speed of more rhan 300m ph and sound high-alrirude performance. However, rhe
Zerstorer wa no slouch eirher: ir was fasrer rhan rhe Hurricane I in level flighr in cerrain condirions.
everrheless, rhe big, heavy bomber-desrroyer was blighred by
sluggish accelerarion and poor manoeuvrabiliry, which made ir highly vulnerable when 4
'bounced' by single-sear flghrers such as rhe Hurricane I.
5
,. ... Directorate oHfechnical I
-.
- ...
.
.
.
evaluation by RLM r.ilots. aircraft is subse~uently. di the Zerstorer role after
.
HI re~uirements for
•
..
interim Junkers Jumo -
:
~.
.
.
:
-
.
secure official suppore for his proposal. Regardless, Hawker's board backed irs chief designer, giving him approval co press on wirh rhe aircrafr - dubbed rhe 'Fury Monoplane' - as a private venture. This did present Camm wirh some problems, as Hawker designer Dr Percy Walker recalled: As a private venrurc, the design from the beginning was subject to certain limitations, mainly owing to the need to concrol COSts. The firm was compelled to apply existing design techniques to their monoplane, and make use of existing machine tools and workshop methods. This meanr a structure composed mainly ofsteel tubes covered with fabric. The use oHabric for wing-covering produced a problem which was far from easy to resolve. By the standards of the time, the speed of the Hurricane was very high indeed,
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT HURRICANE The unsung hero of the Barrie of Brirain, rhe Hurricane could rrace irs lineage back ro 1912 and the esrablishmenr of the Sopwirh Aviarion ompany by leading pioneer aviacor Thomas Sopwirh. The firm soon esrablished an enviable repurarion for irself rhrough rhe producrion of aeroplanes such as rhe Tabloid, Pup, Camel, Dolphin and Snipe. However, Sopwirh was badly affecred by rhe massive reducrion in defence spending immediately following World War I, and rhe company was forced inco liquidarion. Determined co rare again, Thomas Sopwirh re-formed rhe company under the name of H. G. Hawker Engineering in recognirion of the work done by his Australian chief resr pilor Harry Hawker during World War 1. Hawker was killed pracrising for rhe Hendon Air Display in July 1921. In 1923 Sydney Camm joined Hawker a a senior draughrsman. During a relarionship spanning 43 years, amm would work on 52 differenr aircrafr rypes wirh producrion (Qralling 26,000 airframes. [n 1925 Camm replaced George Career as Hawker's chief designer; after this rime Camm concentrared on nearing milirary aircrafr for rhe RAF. Undoubredly his mosr famous products during rhe interwar period were rhe srunningly beauriful Hare rwo- ear bomber and Fury single-seat fighter, borh of which were powered by rhe Rolls-Royce Kesrrel inline engine.
8
In early 1933 amm began looking ar rhe feasibiliry of producing a monoplane fighrer. He believed rhe biplane formula adhered co by rhe RAF since World War 1 was deadlocked, and he hoped co break thar deadlock. Neverrheless, despire discussions wirh rhe Air Minisrry's Direccorare ofTechnical Developmenr ar this rime he failed co
much faster than any of its biplane predecessors. ever before had fabric wing-covering been subjecr to such speeds and loading for any lengrh of rime. Work on rhe Fury Monoplane scarred in earnesr in the spring of 1933, wirh Camm and his ream inirially producing a design rhar essenrially paired a Fury fuselage wirh a single low wing of 38ft span. The aircraft, fined with a fixed, sparred undercarriage, was powered by a 660hp Rolls-Royce Goshawk engine. Ir was esrimared rhar rhis engine would give rhe fighrer a cop speed of 280m ph. By com pari on, rhe Fury I biplane could achieve 207mph in level Aighc. In early 1934 Rolls-Royce announced rhar ir was developing a 12-cylinder, liquidcooled engine, designated rhe PV 12. The power-co-weighr rario of this powerplanr was significanrly bener than rhar of rhe Goshawk engine, and Rolls-Royce believed the PV 12 would produce ar leasr 1,000hp. Camm quickly realised rhar the PV 12 had co be incorporared inco his monoplane fighrer. This move meane significanr changes co rhe design were necessary, co rhe poine where rhe new aircraft's link co rhe Fury became renuous. Accordingly, rhe new aircraft was renanled the 'Hawker Inee rcepcor Monoplane'. In Occober 1934 Air Minisrry officials examined the Hawker design. They were so impressed wirh whar rhey saw rhar rhey in rurn issued Specification F.36/34 for a monoplane fighrer based on rhe company's projecc. The nexr month Hawker's Inrercepcor Monoplane, powered by the Rolls-Royce PV 12, became rhe Air Minisrry's 'F.36/34 Single-Sear Fighrer - High Speed Monoplane'. The PV 12 would eventually marure inco rhe mighry Merlin.
No.1 Sqn Fury lis cruise along in Aircraft Close Vic, Sections Close VIC formation for the benefit of the visiting Flight photographer in autumn 1938. At this time the unit was in the process of converting to the Hurricane I at RAF Tangmere, Sussex. Before the war, Fighter Command squadrons spent much of their time practising this kind of formation flying rather than focusing on modern fighter tactics and aerial gunnery.
On 21 February 1935 rhe Air Minisrry placed an order with Hawker derailing rhe crearion of the firsr procorype of rhe F.36/34 Single-Sear Fighrer - High Speed Monoplane. Although when building the new monoplane fighrer Hawker's designers were rempred co embrace such curring-edge rechniques as SCJ·essed-skin consrrucrion, rhe designers realised rhar rhe need co rapidly mass-produce rhe aircrafr would mean rhey would have co
9
OPPOSITE
rely on methods that had served them well since World War 1. More modern
This aircraft, part of the first
construction techniques would have required creating new jigs and tools for use on the factory floor, as well as retraining\he Hawker workforce. Consequently, the SingleSeat Fighter - High Speed Monoplane design was constructed using established concepts, modified to suit the requirements of the more modern aircraft.
production batch of 500 aircraft built Aircraft
b~
Gloster
Compan~
at its
Brockworth plant in Gloucestershire, was delivered new to No. 56 Sqn in
earl~
1940. Passed on
to No. 601 Sqn in
Ma~,
it was regularl~ flown b~ Pit Off J. C. U. B. McGrath from RAF Tangmere during the earl~
phase of the Battle of
Britain. Indeed, McGrath claimed ten victories with this aircraft between 11 Jul~ and 13 August, including three Bf 110s. However, P2690 was one of two No. 601 Sqn Hurricane Is lost on the latter date over Portland Bill, fellow ace Pit Off H. C. Ma~ers being forced to take to his parachute over We~mouth Ba~
b~
after his aircraft was hit
fire from a Bf 110 of
I.lZG 2. Ma~ers had claimed a Zersrorer probabl~ destro~ed
moments earlier.
The Hurricane fighter and Henley dive-bomber prototypes await their next flights at Brooklands [note the banked racing track in he background) in the summer of 1937. The powered
b~
Henle~
was also
a Merlin I engine
and featured Hurricane I outer wing panels. Just 200 of the type would be built and 10
used for target towing.
For example, the steel-tube longerons that provided the main support for the fuselage were surrounded by a secondary structure of wooden formers and stringers that was in turn covered with fabric along the length of the fuselage from the tail to the cockpit. From the cockpit forward the fuselage was covered with light metal panels_ The fighter's ailerons were fabric-covered, but its split-edge trailing flaps boasted duralumin covering. The PV 12 - soon to be named the Merlin - was mounted on steel tubes. Initially, this state-of-the-art engine was used to drive a simple wooden two-bladed Warts propeller, as fitted to the biplane Fury 1. As with most monoplane fighter designs of this period, the Hawker aircraft featured a retractable undercarriage. Crucially, this retracted inwards, giving the undercarriage a wider stance when extended and making the fighter better suited to operations from rough fields. By October 1935 the prototype, bearing the serial number K5083, was nearing completion at Hawker's Kingston plant. In due course the airframe was delivered by road to the company's assembly shed at nearby Brooklands, and at month's end the complete aeroplane was rolled out. On 6 November Hawker's chief test pilot, FIt Lt P. W. S. 'George' Bulman, took K5083 on its maiden flight from Brooldands. Three more flights quickly followed. Fellow Hawker test pilot Philip Lucas made one of these early hops, later commenting: 'We found the aeroplane easy to fly, stable in flight and on the ground, and with a much better view than anything we had flown before.' Following three months of company flight trials, during which the aeroplane attained a speed of 325mph at 16,500ft, in February 1936 prototype K5083 was transferred to the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Martlesham Heath for evaluation by RAF test pilots. The report issued at the end of these trials noted among other things that the aeroplane had a service ceiling of35,400ft. It also confirmed that K5083 was the world's first fighter capable of exceeding 300mph in level flight. In the wake of the favourable A&AEE report, Hawker's management became aware
\
of rumours that the Air Ministry was likely co recommend that the company's design be pUt imo volume production. Ben Tagg, a member of Hawker's production staff from I93S, recalled:
Another feature of early-production Hurricane Is was fabric-covered wings. This caused some problems for the fighter.
o. 11 1 Sqn in it early days with
nit pilot and future 1940 ace Pit Off Roy Dutton recalled
that 'at high speed the wing gun panels sometimes partially blew out and The Hawker directors demonstrated their confidence in the aeroplane by agreeing in
the wing fabric diStended like sausages between the ribs'. By 1939 stressed-
March 1936 that production should be initiated ahead or contract, with a policy to plan
skin metal wings were being manufactured, and these were considerably
tooling and racilities ror 1,000 aeroplanes. This early board de ision gave a lead or
lighter, stronger and stiffer in terms of bOth bending and torsion. Heating
considerable importance in the light or subsequent events.
units for the guns were also fitted within the wings themselves: at the time of the Munich Crisis in
Hiscorians have since argued that committing the aircraft co production at such an early stage in it developmem had the effeCt of disallowing further improvemems co
eptember 1938 it had been revealed that
Hurricane pilOtS were unable to fire their weapons at heights above IS,OOOft due to the guns' mechanisms being frozen.
the design that could have given the fighter a level of performance comparable with
By the time Germany invaded Poland on the morning of I September
that of itS fu tu re adversary, the Bf 109E. However, it is eSti mated that if the Hawker
1939, some 497 Hurricane [ had been delivered co 18 squadrons within
fighter had indeed been delayed so as co allow for future developmem - a fate which
RAF Fighter Command.
initially befell the Spitfire - then during the Battle of Britain 600 fewet examples would have been deliveted co the RAE This in turn would have almost certainly
Pilot had found the new machine a joy to Ay, as 19-year-old future ace Pit Off Roland Beamont fNo. 87 Sqn remembered:
allowed the Luftwaffe co achieve aerial supremacy on the Western From, arguably facilitating the invasion of Britain.
To a newcomer, rhe Hurricane was an immensely powerrul bur nor very
On 3 June 1936 the Air Mini try issued a contract co Hawker co build 600 examples
demanding aeroplane. Irs wide-track undercarriage, srable and responsive Aying
of the F.36/34 Single-Seat Fighter - High Speed Monoplane; later that same month the
characreristics and reliable engine and hydraulic system resulted in a general
design was officially named the 'Hurricane'. In July KS083 provided the public debut
atmosphere orconfidence on rhe squadron,
fot the new Hawker fighter when it panicipated in the Hendon Air Display.
to become apprehensive.
0
rhat the newcomer had no reason
Hawker's Kingscon and BrookJands facilities would not be able co cope with production on the scale requested by the Air Ministry. Fortunately, however, in 1934
The young men of Fighter Command, confident in the ability of their Hurricanes
the company had acquired the Gloster Aircraft Company, and this was charged with
to take the fight to Germany, would find themselves embroiled in a bitter struggle for
based at RAF Biggin Hill, Kent, fly over the North Downs at
volume Hurricane production from 1938. That same year, Hawker's brand-new
aerial supremacy initially over western France and then over southern England for
Langley plant also began delivering Hurricanes, which was JUSt as well considering that
much of 1940. Proving that both they and their aircraft were more than up to this
the company received a follow-on comract for 1,000 aeroplanes in
task, Hurricane pilots would emerge at year's end with four-fifths of the aerial kills
for press photographers aloft
credited to the RAF in 1940.
in an RAF Anson. This
ovember 1938.
By this time the problems KS083 had experienced with the Merlin 1 powerplant had been well and truly cured. This was also JUSt as well, for the issues of reliability
From 1941 the Spitfire began to dominate the ranks of Fighter
ommand.
medium altitude in Aircraft Close Line Abreast formation
particular shot was taken on B August 1939 during one of
regarding the Rolls-Royce engine had been so concerning that bOth Hawker and the
Nevertheless, the Hurricane remained in prodUCtion until eptember 1944, by which
Air Ministry had decided to wait for the improved 1,030hp Merlin Il before
time 12,780 examples had been built in the
commencing production of the Hurricane 1. The firSt example of the Hurricane 1,
The aircraft's appearance and performance altered remarkably little over seven years,
Messenger photographer.
LlS47, made its maiden Aight on 12 October 1937. This machine differed from
yet the soundness of Sydney Camm's original design had allowed the Hurricane to
Exactly 12 months later
KS083 not only in having the more powerful Merlin II, but it also had a revised and
remain a viable weapon of war right through to VJ-Day.
K and I,4S
J
under licence in Canada.
strengthened canopy, ejector exhaUSt stubs, and revised undercarriage doors. December 1937 it was delivered to
o. III Sqn at RAF
the last RAF peacetime Air Defence Exercises by a Kent
fighter pilots would be repeating the self-same routine several times a day,
LlS48 became the first Hurricane 1 to be issued to Fighter Command when on IS
although now they would be intercepting real Luftwaffe
ortholt, which had previou Iy
Sf 110
rather than a handful of
pitch Watts wooden propellers, but these were subsequently replaced by de Havilland
As this book will demonstrate, the Bf J 10 was thoroughly unsuited to dogfighting
with white crosses.
two-position three-bladed propellers and, finally, de Havilland or Rotol constant-speed
with the Hurricane, which it was called upon to do during the spring and summer of
been equipped with Gloster Gauntlet IIll biplane fighter. The unit was fully equipped by early 1938. Like tile prototype, the firSt Hurricane Is in service had two-bladed fLXed-
12
Hurricane Is of No. 79 Sqn,
aircraft in their hundreds,
Blenheim Is hastily repainted
units. However, aircraft equipped with Watts propellers did see combat in France in
1940. For a fighter to be successful in aerial combat, speed, acceleration and
May-June 1940; the final examples were not replaced until after Dunkirk.
mano uvrability were all required. The Bf I 10 possessed the first of these, but sorely
13
OPPOSITE
lacked the latter two. In its defence, the aircraft was never designed for a dogfighting
Ranking Zerstorer ace
role. Bayerische Flugzeugwerke AG (BFW) had created the Bf 110 as a long-range strategic Zerstiirerwhose primary job was to clear a path through the enemy's defensive fighter screen for Luftwaffe bomber formations. Such a concept was not new: in World War I the most successful aircraft of this rype had been the British Bristol F2 Fighter
Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Jabs flew several Bf 110[s marked 'MS+NP' during 1940. All wore ZG 76's fearsome 'shark's mouth' on the nose, and this particular aircraft, seen here in the markings worn in June 1940, bore six kill symbols on its fin to denote Jabs's successes during the Battle of France. The ultimate fate of this aircraft is unknown. Four Sf 110s pictured at
flown by the Royal Flying Corps and the RAE However, interwar fighter designers generally stuck with what they knew: singleseat biplanes with a high power-to-weight ratio and modest wing-loading. In the early 1930s the status quo was shattered. The monoplane revolution was made possible by the advent of monocoque fuselages, cantilever tail units, retractable undercarriages and stressed-skin single- or double-spar wings. The new breed of interceptors, like the biplane fighters before them, were still only modestly armed and equipped with barely adequate fuel tankage so as not to erode their speed and manoeuvrabiliry. Limited range was the order of the day. However, now air forces were demanding
the German civil registration
fighters with combat endurance that could accompany bombers on missions deep into enemy territory. The technology available to designers in the 1930s did not allow the production of a single-engined machine that could perform this role, hence the resurrection of the concept of the twin-engine strategic fighter. According to pre-
O·AISY. The remaining three
eminent Luftwaffe historian William Green:
Messerschmitt's Augsburg plant in spring, 1938. The third aircraft in line is the Bf 110 V4 prototype; it wears
aircraft are factory·fresh Bf 110Bs without armament. The V4 has been painted in
In essence, the strategic fighter was envisaged as a warplane embodying high performance
the light colour scheme
and heavy armamenr, coupled wirh sufficienr endurance to permit the escort of bombers,
synonymous with prototype
deep-penetration offensive sorties over enemy territory and the mainrenance of standing
machines of this period.
patrols at substantial distances from its base. Time was to prove that no enrirely successful
All aircraft also carry the
strategic fighter would emerge from the considerable effort devoted to the evolution of
pre-war red tailfin bands with a swastika in a white circle. The three Bf 110Bs were
this category of warplane in the years preceding World War II. Few less enviable tasks could have faced the combat aircraft designer of the 1930s
subsequently transferred to a
than that of evolving a satisfactory strategic fighter. Such a warplane had, of necessity, to
schwere Jagdgruppe in Barth,
be a compromise, and compromises are rarely good enough. Conflicting requiremenrs
on the Baltic coast, during the summer, while the V4 was
were inherenr in the concept, and one could only be fulfilled at the expense of another.
sent to the Rechlin test
The strategic fighter had to possess a performance higher than, or at least comparable
centre.
with that of the more specialised defensive fighters by which it was likely to find itself opposed, and if it was to succeed in fending off determined atracks on the bomber formations, which one of its primary
tasks
was
ro
protect,
manoeuvrability was a prime requIsite. Yet firepower, the fuel necessary ro arrain the desired range and suitability for a mulriplicity of auxiliary roles dreamed up by planning Staff, dictated a relarively large aircraft of twin-engined configuration. In 14
.
consequence,
some
sacrifice
manoeuvrability had to be accepted.
of
/
:
The
srraregic
flghrer
requiremenr
HI' J 10 ourperformed borh irs rivals, rhe Fw 57 and
formulared in Germany in 1934 called for rhe
lIs 124, in rhe Zerstiirer role, as rhe larrer aircrafr had
crearion of a Kampfterstorer - a mulri-role
brrn builr more as Kampfterstiirer rhan bomber-
aircrm whose primary mission was as a long-
drsrroyers.
range flghrer sweeping ahead of bomber
drmanded rhar BFW commence producrion wirhour
formarions. Many senior figures wirhin rhe
dday - rhe long-range heavy flghrer had srarred ro
hearing
rhis
news,
Goring
Lu frwaffe's Tech n ical Deparrmen r oppo ed rhe
figure mosr prominendy in rhe Luftwaffe's advanced
concepr on rhe grounds rhar rhe resulring
war planning.
aircrafr would be roo large and heavy, and
The flrsr producrion model, rhe Bf I lOA, was ro
rherefore slow and unwieldy, ro perform any
have been powered by rhe 986hp DB 600Aa.
On the outbreak of war, two of
one rask effecrively. However, rhe Lufrwaffe's commander-in-chief Hermann Goring
Ilowever, persisrenr problem wirh rhis powerplanr
the three Zerstdrergruppen
was convinced rhar Germany needed a long-range fighrer, and a direcrive was duly given
kd ro irs abandonment in favour of rhe uprared
with Bf 110s still had
ro me cffccr rhar dcvelopmcnr of rhc Kampfterstorer should proceed wirh grear hasre.
I)B 60], and cancellation of rhe Bf I lOA. The new engine also suffered a rroublesome
Jumo·powered B-models
The first Grllppe to be
The speciflcarion called for a rwin-engine all-mera] rhree-sear monoplane armed
grsrarion period, resulring in Messerschmirr being forced ro switch ro the interim
equipped with the Bf 110C,
wirh flexibly mounred cannon and fearuring an inrernal bomb-bay. Seven aircrafr
680hp Junkers Jumo 210Ga cngine for its production-series Bf I lOB. The first of
in late January 1939,
a Stukagruppe en route to
manufacrurers received rhe speciflcarion; rhey included BFW, which had jusr srarred
trn pre-production Bf I lOB-I s flcw on 19 April 1938, and production-standard
Warsaw on B September
work on rhe Bf ] 09 prororypes. Diplomingenieur ('academically qualified engineer')
machines slowly began ro reach 1.(Z)/LG I of rhe Lufrwaffc's LeIJr-Division in rhe
on strength. Here, 8ertas of
2.1ZG 1 are
1939
fl~ing
escort for
was operational trials unit I.(Z)/LG 1 based at Barth. There already appears to be a
Willy Messerschmirr and his chief engineer, Walrer Rerhel, also felr rhar rhe
.tutumn. The latrer unit was responsible for formularing tactics and techniques for rhe
problem with the port DB 601
Kampfterstiirerwould be a failure if designed according ro rhe official peciflcarion, so
projecred schwere jagdgruppen ('heavy fighter groups', redesignated Zerstiirergntppen
engine of 2. Staffel aircraft
rhey chose ro ignore many of rhe requiremenrs and focused insread on ulrimare
on I January] 939).
'11+A12' in the foreground.
performance. The proposals submirred by Focke- Wulf and Henschel followed rhe
Only 45 Bf 110Bs were built, a rhis version's performance was deemed inadequare
speciflcarions more closely, however, and rhey received rhree-prororype conrracrs from
f()[ combar tasks rhanks ro its Jumo 21 OGa engines. These aircraft did nevertheless
rhe ReichsLuftfahrtministerium (RiM). BFW appeared ro have mi sed our, bur
play an imporranr role because rhey let crews evaluate equipmcnr and armamenr and
influenrial World War I ace Ernsr
develop operarional rechniques.
der, who was a close friend of Messerschmirr,
broughr pressure ro bear on rhe RLM. Consequenrly, rhe company al
0
received a
conrracr ro build rhree examples of irs aircran, now de ignared rhe Bf I 10.
By lare 1938 the problems with the 1,100hp DB 601A-I had at lasr been ironed OUt, allowing Messerschmirr ro tart producrion of the definitive Bf I 10 -I model.
oncerns over rhe viabiliry of rhe Kampfterstiirerflnally resulred in an alrerarion ro
rhis varianr differed from the B-model not only in having new engines, bur also in
rhar a dedicared Schneffbomber
the deletion of rhe deep radiaror bath beneath each engine and rhe addition of a
('high-speed bomber') was now specified. The demand for a Zerstiirer remained,
shallow glycol radiaror ourboard of the powerplanr on the underside of each wing.
however, rhe aircrafr now being exclusively a 'bomber-desrroyer'. The proposed
Small oil coolers were also incorporated inro the lower porrion of the engine nacelles.
Bf I] 0 fighrer was well placed ro fill rhe larrer role, since irs lean, sleek design allowed
Thc Bf J 10 production programme was now running way behind schedule, but
rhe RLM requiremenr in rhe spring of 1935,
0
an impressive rop speed.
from late 1938 it was given rhc highest prioriry. Ten pre-production Bf I IOC-Os were
Following sraric resrs and raxiing rrials ar Augsburg-Haunsrerren, rhe prororype
delivered to the Lufrwaffe in January 1939 for service evaluation, and by monrh's end
Bf I. JOY J performed irs flrsr flighr - wirh RudolfOpirz ar rhe conrrols - on 12 May
the fI rst prod uction Bf J lOC-I s had reached 1. (Z)/LG I. Del iveries ro l./ZG J and
1936. The poor reliabiliry of rhe rwin Daimler-Benz 600A engines hampered flighr
l./ZG 76 also began during thc spring and early summer. By 31 August 1939 rhe
resring, bur BFW pilors were able ro reporr rhar rhe flghrer had a marginal rabiliry
Luftwaffe had received J 59 Bf 110 s, with ongoing producrion under way ar
problem ar low ro medium speeds, bur essenrially good handling ar higher speeds.
Mcsserschmitr, Focke-Wulf, Gorhaer Waggonfabrik and M[A . The Bf J lOs in
AJso nored was rhe Bf] I O's weak accelerarion and poor manoeuvrabiliry, alrhough irs
service were flown by hand-picked crews mainly drawn from Bf 109-equipped units;
rop speed of 314mph in level flighr did omewhar offser rhese drawbacks. A rendency
all this gave the Zerstiirergruppen elite sratus. The aircrafr they used was shrouded in
ro swing violenrly during rake-off and landing was also reporred. [n facr, rhe aircran
an aura ofinvincibiliry generated by rhe German propaganda machine. Keen ro prove
would suffer from poor ground handling rhroughour irs long career.
the worrh of his 'Ironsides' - so named aner Oliver Cromwell' Parliamenrary cavalry
Ongoing engine problems meanr rhar rhe econd prororype, Bf 110 V2, did nor fly
of rhe 17rh cenrury - Coring reporredly ordered rhe Luftwaffe ro throw its enrire
ub equendy delivered ro rhe Erprobungssteffe
force of Zerstiirer (jusr 90 serviceable aircrafr) inro rhe assault on Poland. Would the
unril24 Ocrober 1936. This aircran wa
16
Upon
ar Rechlin on 14 January 1937 for evaluarion by RiM pilors. Unsurprisingly, rhe
Bf 1 10 live up ro irs elire billing?
17
As well as the change in powerplant, the production aircraft had a revi ed canopy with Internal trengrhening, a bulletproof windscreen (added in early 1939), simplified undercarriage door, an aerial masr, an enlarged rudder including .t
rrim tab and formation light on the trailing edge,
I.lnding lights in the wing leading edge and kidney' exhaust tubs. The latter were in turn rcplaced from mid-1938 by 'ejecror' exhaust stubs .,fter Roll -Royce discovered that by fitting these, lhc Hurricane I's maximum
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
peed could be
boosted by 5mph. The ejector stubs vented ga es to the rear instead of at right-angles III
the slipstream, as had previously been the ca e with the 'kidney stub '. The first 60 Hurricane Is also lacked the small StI'ake b neath the rear fuselage that
I.ltcr became standard for all example built from February 1938 - none of the first lhree units co re-equip with the Hawker fighter initially received modifi d Hurricane
h. rhe trake's addition wa found to aid high-speed spin recovery. As built, early Hurricane Is had a length of 3 J fi: 5in. and a wing pan of exactly 10ft. The entire forward quarter of the fuselage was taken up by the engine lompartment, containing the l\1erlin II. fmmediately behind this was an armour-
HURRICANE I (EARLY.BUILD)
either side of the fuselage centre section, while the eight 0.303-in Browning machine
Icttisonable). Two 33gal self-sealing fuel tanks were installed in the wing roots on guns were housed in either wing in clo ely grouped banks of four each, outboard of lhe undercarriage and sited so as to let them fire ourside of the propeller arc. With
29 August 1939, when he hit
prorotype, K5083. Although the latter had initially been flown without armament,
1110st equipment and sysrems grouped around the aircraft's central fu e1age and
an airfield obstruction at RAF
eight-gun wings were fitted co the aircraft in the summer of 1936 and the
forward quarter, the fabric-covered steel-tube-and-Iongeron rear fuselage was virtually
procotype made its first flight in this configuration on 17 August that year. As
lfl1pty. Irs sole purpose was to carry the tail secrion.
Cowley [Oxford
J. where this
No. 43 Sqn, L1732 went on to serve with Nos. 7 and 6 Operational Training Units
with Sf 110s from III./ZG 26 14 May 1940.
by Fit Lt Caesar Hull on
picture was taken. From
France, in late 1939. Pyne would lose his life in combat
with bulletproof windscreen and sliding canopy (the latter was subsequently made
The first 600 Hurricane Is delivered co the RAF differed very little from the solitary
repair to the Morris Works at
starboard wing magazine of his aircraft, at Etain.Rouvres,
HURRICANE I damaged while being flown
1939 the aircraft was sent for
loading a belt of 0.303·in ammunition into the
north of Vouziers on
was issued lO No. 43 Sqn
Tangmere. On 18 September
No. 73 Sqn keeps a weather eye on the two armourers
plated firewall, then the reserve fuel tank (with 28 Imperial gallons) and rhe cockpir, Early·build Hurricane I L1732 on 6 December 1938 and
Standing up in his cockpit, Sgt T. B. G. 'Titch' Pyne of
mentioned, the first production-standard Hurricane I, L1547, was fitted with the
Production of the first barch of Hurricane Is - 600 aircraft - ran from Ocrober
more powerful and more reliable 1,030hp Merlin JI engine in place of K5083's
)937 to October 1939. These machines were issued to
1,025hp Merlin C.
I. 43, 79 and 151 Sqns in 1938, and Nos. 213, 46, 501, 504 and 605 Sqns up to
os. 111,56,87,85,73,32,
~ September 1939. By rhe end of September the firsr examples from a follow-on order
for 300 Hurricane Is had started ro roll off the Hawker pI' ducrion line at Kingston.
and finally with No. 286 Sqn. The fighter was written off on 14 May 1943, while serving with the latter unit, after it hit high·tension cables and
By rhe starr of the Battle of Britain in July 1940, Fighrer
ommand unirs were
crashed at Torcross, Devon.
receiving definitive late-build Hurricane Is a amirion replacements for aircraft written
Clearly in 1939 nobody had
offin combat or flying accidents. Many of rhe upgrades seen on these machines were
heard of health and safety
also firted to early-build Hurricane Is ar RAF maintenance unir (MU) and civilian-
in the workplace, judging by the precarious jacking and trestling methods employed 18
HURRICANE I (LATE·BUILD)
here.
run repair depots when aircraft required overhaul or bartle-damage rectification. One of the first and most obvious changes to be made was the replacement of the big Watts wooden [\Vo-blade, fixed-pitch propeller with a three-blade meral or
19
composite unir. The Wans propeller had
late 1939, earlier-built aircraft were also modified, although Wans-equipped machines
been in widespread use within the RAF since
remained in the frontline inro the early summer of 1940.
the mid-1920s, and it had been adequate for frontline types as long as speeds - particularly
se of such wings had been considered by
in the dive - did not exceed 360m ph. Above
Hawker right from the start, but the Air Mini try had been keen to get the aircraft into
that speed the 'aircrafr drove the propeller';
service as quickly as possible. This in turn meant that virrually all the 600 aircraft in
tip speeds would near compressibility (the
the first production run and the first 80 in the second batch of 300 were completed with fabric-covered wings.
speed of sound) and the propeller would overspeed
pitch,
By late 1938 Hawker designers were busy working on the all-metal Tornado and
Veteran late·build Hurricane I
potenrially cau ing serious damage ro the engine. The Wans propeller's blade pitch
Typhoon fighters intended as replacemenrs for the Hurricane. The company was keen
P3886 of No. 601 Sqn being
angle had been selected as a compromise ber-ween requiremenrs for take-ott (when a
ro gain experience with stressed-skin consrruction techniques by introducing all-metal
serviced on the perimeter
fine pitch is most efficient) and combat (when coarse senings were optimal).
Hurricane wings, but the Air Ministry was anxious nor ro slow the flow of flo-hters so
dispersal at Exeter Airport in mid·September 1940. Note
In
relatively
coarse
b
The solution ro these problems was a variable-pitch propeller: one that could have
as ro allow their introduction.
evertheless, Hawker test-flew a set of metal wings on
the aircraft's natural-metal
its blade angles changed in flight by the pilor. The first succes ful design was produced
28
cowling over its reduction
by US company Hamilron Standard in the early 1930s. A three-blade metal propeller
built en masse. Having reviewed the flight performance data for the metal-wing
gear, which had been filled in
of 11ft diameter that allowed two pitch senings - 30.5 degrees fine and 42.5 degrees
Hurricane I, the Air Ministry agreed that the company should start production
coarse - was rrialled on Hurricane I L 1562 on 29 August 1938. However, although thi
straight away. However, these wings were initially ro be fined to damaged aircraft
the wake of an engine failure suffered by the fighter on
pril 1939, after which it fabricated a production-type jig ro allow these ro be
26 July. Once repaired, this
was an improvemenr on the Watts, it was far from ideal: the fighter's take-ott run was
rerurned to Hawker for repair. Srocks of new wings were then supplied ro M Us so that
aircraft enjoyed success
greatly reduced, bur its performance at a1tirude was litrle better than when fined with
fighters in srorage awaiting delivery ro operational squadrons could also be modified.
while being flown by No. 601 Sqn aces Sgt L. N. Guy (a Ju 88 shared on August lS) and Fig Off C. R. Davis [a shared Ju 87 and a shared
the wooden propeller. The Hamilron Standard propeller also failed ro cure the problem
An individual wing change rook little more than three hours ro complete, yet there
with overspeeding in a dive. Finally, being bracket-operated, the propeller (built under
were still many fabric-wing Hurricane Is in the frontline in 1940 (the last one having
licence by de Havilland) routinely sprayed oil onro the windscreen in flighr.
been a sembled at BrookJands in March), despite there being large srocks of metal
Forrunately, by late 1938 the British company Rorol had designed a usable
wings at Kingsron, BrookJands, Hucclecote and various M s.
constanr-speed propeller. This was 10ft 6in. in diameter and had a pitch range of
Additional armour plating was also fined ro late-build Hurricane Is. Initially, the
followed by a 8f 110 probable
23 ro 53 degrees. Ir was operated by the pilot via a pitch-conrrollever located in the
aircraft boasted JUSt a single piece of plating forward of the cockpit, but with the
this photograph of the aircraft was taken, both pilots had been killed in action.
RAF pilots were plagued by poor radio communication throughout 1940, as the
8f 109E on 18 August, on 31 August). By the time
cockpit alongside the throttle. The pilot could now vary the pitch of the propeller
advenr of the cannon-armed Bf J 090 a bulletproof windscreen was installed (despite
and select the best possible blade angle according ro the fighter's speed and power
objections by Cost-conscious Air Ministry officials). Following
requiremenrs. The Rorol propeller was conrrolled using a hydraulic constanr-speed
o. 1 Sqn's early
pre·war TR 9B equipment proved anything but reliable, and the TR 90 replacement was lillie beller. Here, radio fitters [note the 'electrical'
experiences in combat during the 'Phoney War', which led ro the unit fitting steel
flash sewn onto the right
unit ( S ), which prevenred engine overspeeding in high-speed dives. According ro
plating from a wrecked Battle ro one of its Hurricane Is in the field, additional armour
sleeve of their tunics) from
leading Hurricane historian Frank Mason, 'As well as improving the Hurricane J's rate
plating was inserted aft of the pilot's seat as standard equipmenr ro all RAF fighters.
of climb, the Rorol propeller enabled the aeroplane ro fly for endurance more efficiently and was regarded by many as one of the decisive facrors conrributing ro the Hurricane's brillianr combat success during the Batrle of Britain.' The Hamilron Standard/de Havilland propeller was bracket-operared, so there was
Both these vital modifications had been added ro all production machines by the spring of 1940.
found lacking both in range and audible clarity. This change required the introduction of a new aerial mast
modification. However, the Rorol propeller relied on hydraulic power ro change the
and lead in place of the original 'pole' type. Most of these changes began ro appear on newproduction
Hurricane Is con tructed by both
Rolls-Royce produced the modified Merlin III, which had a 'universal' propeller shaft
Hawker and Gloster from late Ocrober 1939. By
catering for all currenr and future types of propeller.
then the combined output from Hawker's Kingsron
Hawker began trials with the Merlin JlI and the Rotol propeller in late January
at RAF Tangmere.
Finally, the original TR 9B radio was replaced by
no requiremenr for hydraulic powerlines running from the cenrral fu elage ro the hub
mounted at the fronr of the engine itself 1n order ro accommodate these changes
No. 601 Sqn tinker with the set fitted in Hurricane I P3886
the improved TR 90 in 1939, the former havinobeen b
via the shafr. This meant the propeller could be fined ro the Merlin 1I without blade pitch, which did require powerlines ro the hub. It also had a self-conrained CSU
20
The other major srrucrural change for the Hurricane I during this period was the introduction of stI'essed-metal wings.
and Brookland plants, as well as the
loster site at
1939, and from the second batch of Hurricane 1s onward either this combination or
Brockworrh, was five new late-build Hurricane I per
the Merlin 11I plus the de Havilland t'No-pitch propeller was fined as standard. From
day. One of the pilots ro be issued with such an
21
we still flew around at about 230mph. However, the Hurricane just did not have the legs of a Spit or its sprightly acceleration in a dive; moreover, at its best climbing speed of 140mph, though it wem up more steeply, it did so at a much slower speed. And- vety disappointingly - there was no rudder bias, which meant that on a full-throttle climb, the aircraft required a heavy right boot on the rudder and an even heavier left one when descending quickly. A thoughtless and irriraring omission, I always rhought. On rhe whole rhough, we were not disappoimed. Whilst it may not have had the refinements of a Spit, our recent acquisition was rock-solid and possessed an obvious ruggedness and strength. No shrinking violet, this! Furthermore, its reputation as a fighter was as impressive as its unbending roughness. Pit Off Neil's P36I6, then flown by Pit OffM. A. King, was subsequently shot down bya BflIO over Southampton at I355hrs on 16 August 1940. King was killed when his parachute collapsed.
aircraft was future ace Pit OffTom Neil of No. 249 Sqn, who de ribed the Hurricane I in detail in his book Gun Button to 'Fire:
Sf 110
A rare colour view of two Bf 110Cs from II.IZG 1 on patrol over the Baltic Sea in
My first Hurricane was brand-new, its number P3616 and h rdy ro bear the code
AJthough a handful of Bf 110Bs participated in the invasion of Poland from
the early spring of 1940. Note
'GN-F'. It had a constant-speed Rorol propeller, which was quite new t me. Also, it was
1 September 1939, by the time the RAF started to encounter the Zerstorergruppen
the Gruppe's unusual 'three-
tight and bouncy, like a new car, with the inrriguing smell of fre h paim. Very impressive.
in late March 1940 all units had been equipped with Bf llOCs. A small number of
wasps-above· cloud' emblem
D-models also saw action during the Battle of Britain.
on the noses of both
I was delighted. The Hurricane was little more rhan an updated version of the old Hawker Hart and Fury, with only one wing, of course. The family likene s was immediately evident, the
machines, the closest of which also features a single
Sf 11De
victory bar on its port tailfin.
and behind him. There were many more insrruments, narurally, but after my btief
This version of the Bf 110 was hastily put into mass production in late 1938 following
propeller spinner tips painted
experience with the Spitfire I the layout seemed bitty and the co kpit generally less well
the resolution of the powerplant problem that had plagued the Zerstorer for more than
finished. The thronle I especially disliked; after the Spit, a flimsy linle lever - very
a year. The construction of the Bf 110 remained the same from the prototype through
throughout the Zersrorer
the various operational variants, with some 6,170 examples being built by war's end.
force in the early war years.
cockpit being much the same with the pilot sitting in space and lot of darkness below
insignificam! The pilot sat a good deal higher in a Hurricane than in a pitflre and, through a hood that could be opened in stages, saw tathet more of what was going on. Al
0,
Both aircraft also have their in 5raffelcolours - a standard unit identification marking
there was a
feeling of solidity abom the aeroplane, the wings especially being much thicker and the wheels widely spaced so that it sat on the ground very firmly and in a no-nonsense way. Happily, roo, the radiaror was centrally placed so it caught the slipsrream when taxiing, and there was not the eternal business of couming the seconds before the engine boiled as with the Spitfire. In the air, the pilot immediately detected a feeling of steadiness. The ailerons were lighter than those of a Spit, markedly so at speed, but the elevaror was much less sensitive. The Hurricane couldn't be bem with one finger - with
twO
hands, even - but having said
that, there was no feeling of heaviness, the conrrols, if anything, being bener balanced than those of the Spitfire. If I was expecting the aircraft ro be noticeably slower than the Spit, I was ro be
22
pleasantly surprised. There was not much in it at the lower end of the speed range so that
23
This photo· reconnaissance
A head-on view of a 8f 110C-6
Bf 110C·5 of 4.(F)/14 was
fitted with 30mm MK 101
shot down by Hurricane Is
Kanonen in place of the
from Red Section of No. 238
standard 20mm MG FF
Sqn on 21 July 1940, the
weapons. Just 12 examples of
aircraft crash-landing
this 'up-gunned' variant were
virtually intact in a cabbage
built, and as this photograph
field at Home Farm near
shows, the lower forward
Goodwood, Sussex.
fuselage had to be heavily
It was quickly restored to
modified in order to
airworthiness by the RAF
accommodate the weapon.
using parts taken from a
The aircraft made its combat
Bf 110C from 9.1ZG 76 that
debut in the spring of 1940,
had been shot down by
with l.IZG 1 during the Battle
Hurricane Is ten days earlier.
Following the structural formula so successfully adopted for the Bf 109, Messerschmitt
The aircraft was then
built the Bf 11O's wing in halves. Each half was attached to the fuselage at the leading
extensively flown in a series of comparative tests against Spitfires and Hurricane Is.
of France.
edge and at the top and bottom main spar booms. The wing structure itself consisted of a single spar at 39 per cent chord, lateral stringers spaced 12in. apart and former ribs
Note the clear-view panel
at intervals of] Oin. The wing was then covered with stressed-metal skinning. Handley-
Like the Bf 1I0B before it, the C-model was armed with four 7.9mm MG 17
behind the MG FF cannon
Page automatic slots occupied 40 per cent of the outboard leading edge, while the entire
machine guns in the upper nose and cwo 20mm MG FF cannon in a weapons pack
ports for the Rb 50130
wing trailing edge was fitted with hydraulically operated slotted flaps and ailerons with
in the underside of the fuselage immediately beneath the radio operator/navigator's
camera to shoot through.
external mass balances.
position. The latter crewman could change the MG FF's ammunition drums in flight The oval-section all-metal stressed-
Hurricane I and Sf 110C-4 comparison specifications
Powerplant
three crewmen, with the pilot seated
mounting in the rear cockpit. Aside from the crucial engine change, the Bf J J OC also featured more angular
Hurricane I
Sf 110C-4
over the wing leading edge, the radio
1,130hp Merlin III
2 x 1,100hp DB 601A-1
operator/navigator immediately aft of
By the end of 1939, some 315 Bf 110C-ls had been built, allowing three
him and the rear gunner over the wing
Zerstorergruppen to be fully equipped with the aircraft. Production output surged from
trailing edge. In frontline service, a
26.25 Bf I 1OC- I s a month in 1939 to J02.6 th roughout 1940; th is in tu rn meant a
si ngle crewman usually performed both
rapid expansion of the Zerstorer component within the Lufcwaffe.
Dimensions Span
skin fuselage structure housed up to
as necessary. He also had a rearward facing 7.9mm MG J 5 machine gun on a flexible
40ft Din.
53ft 4.75in.
wingtips which resulted in a slight decrease in the fighter's wingspan and wing area.
and
In early J 940 the C-2 variant also began to reach the frontline, this version
gunner's roles in order to save weight.
featuring an improved high-frequency Lorenz FuG 10 radio in place of the original
the
radio-operator/navigator
Length
31ft Sin.
39ft 8.5in.
Height
13ft Din.
13ft 6.5in.
All cockpits were enclosed by a single
FuG lUaU. This change also prompted an overhaul of the central cockpit area
413 sq ft
large, transparent canopy. The aircraft's
occupied by the radio operator/navigator. A handful of Bf J 10C-3s appeared in the
rail
spring of J940, these aircraft being airframes that had been retrofitted with the
Wing area
258 sq ft
Weights Emptl,j
4,9821b
9,9201b
Loaded
7,4901b
15,3001b
Performance Max speed Range Rate of climb to 20,000ft Service ceiling Armament
328mph at 20,000ft 505 miles 8.1 min 34,200ft 8 x 0.303·in. Brownings
349mph at 22,960ft
t
I
530 miles 10.2 min
assembly
was
of
improved MG FF/M cannon. This let Messerschmitt remove the external breech
fins and rudd r. Both the main
fairing that protruded from the underside of the Bf 110. The C-4 was essentially a
undercarriage and tailwheel retracted
Bf 110C-2 with the improved MG FF/M fitted in place of the initial MG FE This
aft, with the former hued in the
variant also introduced nominal armour protection for both the pilot and gunner.
engine nacell . The cw
imler-Benz
The photo-teconnaissance optimised Bf 110C-5 entered service with the
DB 601 engines, driving three-bladed
Aufklarungsstaffiln in the early summer of 1940. This variant was externally identicaJ
variable-pitch prop II r , w r
to the C-4, but had the cwin MG FFs replaced by an Rb 50/30 camera mounted
by
cantilever
m uming
directly to the wing p 32,000ft 5 x ?92mm MG 17 2 x 20mm MG FF
cantilever
monoplane eype, fined with endplate
housed in four tan either side of the of the wing par.
fu
1',
,
arried attached
an I ue! was
above an aperture in the cockpit floor. The later C-5/
variant featured improved
1,200hp DB 601N engines.
pljt cwo on
The MG FF cannon were also replaced in the Bf 110C-6, but this time by a ingle
aft
30mm MG 101 weapon. Substantial reworking of the lower central forward fuselage
r and
was required to allow the Kanone to fit, and in the end only 12 aircraft were built
25
The enormous size of the
with 106 litres. This variant was issued primarily to
Bf 1100's ventral fuel tank is
view. The picture shows how drastically the Bf 110's otherwise relatively clean lines were altered by the ventral
Fuselage bomb racks had first been trialled by Messerschmitt In April 1940, and after the modification was evaluated at the Rechlin test centre the company was ordered to produce a version of the D-model fitted with ETC 250 bomb racks housed in a
fairing. It is hardly surprising that combat reports penned by RAF pilots who met these monstrosities on 15 August 1940 described them as 'Oornier bombers'! The aircraft,
rectangular fairing mounted on the centreline fuselage immediately beneath the cockpit.The Dackelbauch fairing was omitted. The first
from the Norway-based I./ZG 76, were engaged by
them were escorting bombers from Luft/atte 5, sent to attack
England. Seven Bf 1100s were lost, a number of them being claimed by Hurricane I pilots from Nos. 79,605 and 607 Sqns. In the wake of this disastrous foray across the North Sea, I./ZG 76 played no further part in the Battle of
This Bf 1100-0 of l.IErpr. Gr. 210, carrying two SC 500
examples were issued to the newly formed I./Erpr. Gr. 210 in July 1940. The Bf 110D-1 was a stillborn reconnaissance version of the D series, while the
Fighter Command when 21 of
targets in northeastern
-
I./ZG 76 in Norway in the spring of 1940, and saw limited action with the unit during the Battle of Britain. The Bf 110D-0/B was the first dedicated fighterbomber variant of the Zerstorer to reach the frontline.
well illustrated in this frontal
(utilising modified C-5 fuselages). The first examples of this variant were delivered to I./ZG 1 in the spring of 1940, and at least one was shot down while serving with I./Erpr. Gr. 210 during the Battle of Britain. The final Bf 110C variant was the C-7 fighter-bomber, which was fitted with two ETC 500 racks beneath the fuselage that allowed the aircraft to carry a pair of 500kg bombs. Powered by DB 601N engines, the Bf 110C-7 also boasted a strengthened undercarriage to allow it to cope with the increased bombload. The C-series was finally phased out of production in the spring of 1941.
bombs on ETC 500 racks housed within a rectangular
limited-run D-2 had two ETC 1000 racks fitted to allow it to carry a pair of SD 1,000kg bombs. The aircraft was also plumbed for wing-mounted auxiliary fuel tanks. Oberleutnant Victor Molders, brother of well-known ace Werner Molders, flew numerous versions of the Bf 110, and he related his feelings about the aeroplane to
fairing, is believed to be the aircraft flown by the unit's acting Gruppenkammandeur, Oberleutnant Werner Weymann, on 5 October 1940
Belgian historian Armand van Ishoven in 1979 for inclusion in the latter's book
when he and his 8ardfunker,
Messerschmitt Bf110 At war:
Unteroffizier Erwin HObner, were shot down into the Channel and killed. Although
The Bf 110 felt as if it had been tailored for me. lr was faster than any bomber, could
Britain.
only operating relatively few
stay in the air double the time of the Bf 109, and with the help of the wireless operator,
Bf 110s, Erpr. Gr. 210 achieved
one could approach one's target unseen in the clouds. It was heavily armed with its four
Sf 1100
some stunning successes-
machine guns and two cannon, and even if the wireless operator could do little harm witll
and suffered heavy losses-
The main external difference between the Bf 11OC- and D-models was the extended rear fuselage of the latter variant. This housed a dinghy and emergency supplies. The D-O
his sole machine gun, a rearward-firing observer gave a pilot a comfortable feeling.
with the aircraft during the
was initially conceived as a fighter with increased range, this being facilitated by fitting a large Dackelbauch ('dachshund-belly') fairing under the centre fuselage. Made of plywood and covered in fabric, this housed a fuel tank with 1,050 litres and an oil tank
The manoeuvrability and climbing speed of the Bf 110 compared badly with the Bf 109.
Battle of Britain.
Of course, there were drawbacks to the Bf 110 - one could not fly it like a Bf 109. Most enemy fighters were also bener suited to dogfighting - something proved beyond doubt during the Battle of Britain.
-0
.. •
-...
hiS
II
: I ·0
•
0
• ··1
......
o •
o
0·0
Iy installed into ttie
0
0
•
o -
•
..
-0
...... 0-
. ... •
too
airman's (juty
00
III
0
0-
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o·
0
The end of rhe Polish campaign was followed by an eighrmonrh period known as rhe Sitzkriegor 'Phoney War', as ir was dubbed by rhe Allies. Aircrafr from borh sides would periodically venrure across rhe respecrive defensive borders (rhe Maginor Line in France and rhe WestwalL or Siegfried Line in ',ermany) on rentarive reconnaissance flighrs. Mosr action during rhis period rook place over rhe Dreilandereck (Threearions' Corner) on rhe northernmosr secrion of rhe Franco-German border, as rhis was rhe shortesr roure for Allied reconnaissance aircraft heading for rhe Ruhr. The Lufrwaffe used rhis relarively quier period for reinforcement and rapid expansion as ir soughr ro boosr ir srrengrh along rhe Rhine. All rhree Zerstorergruppen
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
rhar had been commirred to rhe invasion of Poland were quickly transferred ro bases
applied ahead of I.(Z)/LG 1's 'woWs-head' emblem. Although the first viclOry bar
in wesrern Germany, and alrhough no new unirs were acrivared rhe opportunity was
is marked '1.9.39', none of
raken ro re-equip rhe seven original Gruppen srill flying rhe Bf 109 wirh Bf 11 Os.
the others is dated. Since no
The RAF also made rhe mosr of rhe 'Phoney \Var' ro prepare irselHor rhe inevirable onslaught. Following Brirain's declararion of war on 3 Seprember
J 939,
a long-
I.(Z)/LG 1 pilot achieved five kills in Poland, this would suggest either that one of
sranding agreemenr berween Brirain and France was invoked rhar saw rhe former
these claims was later
rapidly desparch Brirish Army and RAF unirs ro rhe Conrinent. From an RAF
disallowed or that the
srandpoint, rhis Brirish Expedirionat-y Force (BEF) comprised rwo di rincr element .
photograph was taken at
The flrsr of rhese was rhe Advanced Air Striking Force (AA F), made up of Fairey The Bf 110 was heavily involved in rhe opening acr of World War 11, reportedly on
A scoreboard in the making,
Barrie III medium bombers from Bomber Command's
o. I Group and, evenrually,
rhe direcr insrrucrions of Hermann Goring himself Keen ro see his bomber-
Blenheim IVs from
dem'oyers blooded in combar, Goring commirred all 90 of rhe Lufrwaffe's
bombing operarions, and inirially had no dedicared cover from Fighrer Command -
serviceable Zerstorer ro rhe invasion of Poland, wh ich began shortly before dawn on
rhe French Armee de L'Air was responsible for prorecring AASF assers.
a later date, on the Western Front.
o. 2 Group. These unirs were mainly rasked wirh srraregic
I Seprember 1939. The aircrafr were splir evenly berween L(Z)/LG 1, l./ZG 1 and
The second e1emenr, which was ro operare closely wirh BEF ground forces,
l./ZG 76, rhe Zerstorergruppen in rurn being deployed ar almosr equidisrant inrervals
comprised rhe whole of No. 22 ( rmy Co-operarion) Group, plus a quarter of
along Germany's common border wirh Poland. Each unir was posirioned so a ro be able ro lend maximal direcr suppOrt ro one of rhe rhree main axes of Wehrmachr advance. Providing f1ghrer escort for Heinkel He II I and Dornier Do 17 bombers, as well as Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers of rhe 1. and 2. Fliegerdivisionen and rhe Luftwaffi-
Lehrdivision, rhe Bf 110 Gmppen were rhe principal flghrer unirs involved in rhe campaign. The shorrer-ranged Bf 109 Geschwaderswere in the main held back for home defence purposes: ir was feared rhar French and Brirish bombers would arra k German iries upon rhose counrries' declararion of war in support of Poland on 3 eprember. The Zerstorergruppen claimed rheir final aerial victories of rhe Polish campaign on 15 eprember, by which rime rhe Bf 110 had indeed lived up to irs pre-war billing.
rews
Although staged for the press
enemy rerritory or providing bomber escorr, and the aircraft was also used effe rively in
corps at RAF Biggin Hill on
rhe ground-arrack role in support of rhe advancing Wehrmacht. Admirredly, the Bf 11 O's main adversaries were obsolescent Polish PZL P 11c flghrers; however, rhe PZ
28
'No. 79 Sqn, scramble!'
were credired with more than 40 aerial victories while flying independent parrol deep inro
'
B August 1939, this shOl nevertheless captures the atmosphere of the final
nimbleness came as an unpleasanr surprise to the Luftwaffe and r ulred in a number of
peacetime Air Defence
Zerstorer being 10 r in rerurn. Ground fire also inflicred some casualrie .
Exercises.
29
In May 1940, Bf 110 Zerstiirer N
units were mainly based along Germany's northwestern border with France and Belgium. From
,
DO
A
• Bf 110 Units in the West, May 1940 1. Niedermendig L/ZG 26 2. Krefeld III.1ZG 26 3. Kirchhellen I./ZG 1 4. Gelsenkirchen·Buer IL/ZG 1 5. Darmstadt·Griesheim L/ZG 2 6. Cologne·Wahn II.1ZG 76 7. Kaarst/Neuss IL/ZG 26 B. Neuhausen ob Eck I./ZG 52 9. Mannheim·Sandhofen V.(Z]/LG 1
.Duisburg
.......
L._r
...,-·....·':
• Dusseldorf
here they could range deep into the Low Countries in Kiiln
•
support of Luftwaffe bomber units charged with knocking out Allied airfields and other key military installations as part of the Blitzkrieg in the
•
Bonn
• Liege
.
West. As the Wehrmacht captured vast swathes of
Koblenz
BELGIUM
Frankfurt am Main
•
badly damaged that they subsequently crashed or crash-landed. The first clash between RAF Hurricane Is and Luftwaffe Bf 110s came shortly after noon on 26 March 1940, when three aircraft from No. 73 Sqn engaged 16 Zerstorerfrom V (Z)/LG 1 that were escorting a solitary Do 17P over the Franco-German border. Honours were shared, as a single aircraft from both sides was damaged in an inconclusive engagement. This action perfectly summed up Phoney War operations, with German reconnaissance and bomber aircraft and their fighter escorts probing Allied territory in restricted numbers, and British and French aircraft doing much the same thing in return . However, larger formations of German fighters began to appear as the weather improved in the early spring of 1940, as Fig Off Paul Richey of No. 1 Sqn recalled in his book, Fighter Pilot.
Allied territory the units would relocate to airfields in France.
of the German Bight', 11 bombers were destroyed and six more so
•
Wiesbaden
o G E R M
German fighters had previously shown reluctance to cross the Frontier or
ANY
to
.
Heidelberg Heibronn
Metz
•
•
/
j
;
,.1
Stuttgart
i
I
i ;
RAN c E
F
.) i
40miJes
-::::::c:~:r=::::I1 I 40km
Col~ar
I
./ I
(Frei~urg im Breisgau \
/
;
Hurricane I squadrons and two Blenheim I units formerly of No. 1 Group. Emphasising the air elements' designated close-support role, the bulk of No. 22 roup squadrons were equipped with Lysander lIs. The four Hurricane I units sent to France were Nos. 1,73,85 and 87 Sqns, and upon arrival between 9 and 15 September rhese became part of No. 60 (Fighter) Wing. Flying from airfields in eastern France near the borders with Belgium and ermany, aircraft from these units would be the first British fighters to encounter the Bf 110 during the laner stages of the Phoney War. By then both the Hurricane I and the Zerstorer had seen sporadic action against unescorted bombers sent t pI' be either
30
I
sides' defences. Undoubtedly the most spectacular of these inevitably one- ided lashes came on 18 December 1939, when I./ZG 76 anacked 22 RAF Wellingl n ent to anack targets in the pon ofWilhelmshaven. In what was later referred t , lh" Battle
.~
engage our fighters. They had evidently maintained a standing patrol on
their own side, only crossing to our side in small numbers and always very high. But
Fig Off Paul Richey claimed
now the German fighters came across in big formations: sometimes three squadrons of
eight and one shared victory
109s would do a sweep as Far as Metz and Nancy. The lIDs had made their first appearance at the end of March, in close squadron Formation and very high, only
during the Blitzkrieg, four of these against Bf 110s. He was also shot down twice by
engaging when pressed into it by our Hurricanes. It was obvious that the Germans were
Zerstiirer, on 11 and 15 May,
practising oFFensive tactics, and it looked as though the bust-up might come soon.
before being badly wounded
•
.,/,/ Strasbourg. ..' /
.
four days later after
Richey's reading of the situation was correct. On 10 May 1940 Germany's armed forces launched the invasion of France and the Low Countries. In a forerunner of what was to come in the Battle of Britain, practically the whole of the Luftwaffe's
Zerstorer strength was brought together for the Blitzkrieg in the west. In all, nine Zerstorergruppen flew missions from airfields scanered along the Westwall, these units being split between Luftflotten 2 and 3. More than 350 Bf 11 OCIDs and upwards of
despatching three He 111s in a matter of minutes. Richey is seen here following a spell in the American Hospital in Paris, posing with the fin of a Bf 110 at Chiiteaudun on 14 June 1940. He presented this 'trophy' to NO.1 Sqn
800 aircrew prepared themselves to gain control of the skies over western Europe.
following the unit's epic
The campaign itself had two components, code-named Operation Yellow and Operation Red. Operation Yellow would begin with an all-out attack on Holland and Belgium which, it was calculated, would cause the BEF and French northern armies to rush to the aid of the Low Counnies. With the Allies out of their prepared defensive
engagement with I.lZG 26 on 11 May. In Richey's left hand is his 'shooting' stick, with nine notches carved into it to denote his victories.
positions along the Maginot Line, the Wehrmacht would launch its primary offensive in the vulnerable rear of the Allied forces, with the main Panzer force sweeping around behind them and racing for the Channel. The Low Countries and Anglo-French divisions would be cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and quickly defeated. Operation Red would then swing into action, with German troops advancing west across the Somme into central France. During the opening round of the Blitzkrieg the Bf 11 0 units would be called upon to repeat the tactics they had employed so effectively in Poland. On the southern and central sectors of the new front, the bulk of the Zerstorergruppen flew long-range escort
31
This Sf 110C proudly
Parked in NO.1 Sqn's muddy
wears I.fZG 2's distinctive
dispersal area on the edge
blunderbuss-wielding
of Vassin court airfield,
'8ernburger Jager ['Hunter
Hurricane I N2358 is being
of Sernburg'] emblem below
refuelled from the unit's
the front cockpit. The most
Albion three-point bowser
successful fighter Gruppe
while its filler tinkers with
to emerge from the Polish
the engine. This aircraft was
campaign [where it had flown
coded 'Z' by the squadron
Sf 109s under the temporary
soon after arrival at
guise of JGr 102), I.fZG 2
Vassincourt in November
utilised the 'Phoney War' period to re-equip with the twin-engined Sf 110.
-
missions aimed at crippling enemy airpower, exactly as had been done in September
1939, and following brief '
1939. In France alone the LuFtwaFFe Struck nearly 50 Allied airfields. Taken by
Acklington it retained this
surprise, the deFenders oFFered scam resistance to the marauding German Formations.
10 May through to the start of the Dunkirk evacuation (Operation Dynamo) on
marking when it was passed
Over Belgium toO, where bombers were escorted by II. and IIl.IZG 26 during attacks
26 May, and although the Zerstorergruppen did on occasion inflict heavy losses on
on to No. 73 5qn at Rouvres
on Charleroi and Antwerp, Few Allied aircraFt were seen.
the Hurricane units, this was usually achieved through sheer weight of numbers. As the Polish P 11 cs had hown eight months earlier, in a one-versus-one dogfight a single-
sorties to soFten up Dutch airfield deFences prior to pararroop and glider landings. During
engined fighter like a Hurricane 1 could easily out-turn a cumbersome BF 110, and
or from maintenance units
these sweeps I./ G 1 claimed 26 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Those aircraft that did
as the latter rarely used the hit-and-run tactics Favoured by BF 109E units, the
and sent to Gloucester for
manage to get inro the air in a bid to oppose the German bomber Formations were quickly
Zerstorergruppen suFFered particularly heavy losse .
dealt with by the BF I09Es and BF 11 Os of the Jagd- and Zerstorergruppen (I. and III.lZG
evertheless, by the end of May the BEF was in the throes of evacuation back to
26 and I. and IUZG I) assigned to Luftlotte 2_ On 12 May, with the launching of the
England From Dunkirk, and much of northern France was in German hands. BF I 10
armoured thru t at the rear of the rretched Allied Forces, Ltifif/otte 3's units (lLlZG 26,
units had moved Forward into occupied territory to keep pace with the advancing ground
back towards the Channel coast in late May 1940.
Reacting quickly to rhe German invasion, the British governmenr ordered the
February 1940 to serve with the Finnish Air Force.
over the evacuation beaches along the Channel coast in late May and early June. The
hieF Marshal Sir
completion of Dynamo at midnight on 2-3 June signalled the end of the first part of the
Hugh Dowding, to send rhree more Hurricane units ( os. 3,79 and
campaign in the west. It had cost the ZelJtorergruppen more than 60 BF I lOs destroyed.
501 Sqns) to France immediately. Dowding had Fought Whitehall
On 21 June came the eFFective end of the RAI~'s operations in France, when the very
ommand, Air
shipped to Finland in late
Forces, leaving them ideally placed to participate in the bitter aerial battles that took place
II./ZG 76, I./ZG 52 and V(Z)/LG I) at last joined in the action too. ommander-in- hieF of Fighter
plucked out of the frontline
refurbishment before being
'Sharks mouths' revel in their as Allied forces are pushed
in early 1940. N2358 was one of 12 Hurricane Is hastily
Simultaneously, to the north over Holland, ZG I was carrying Ollt ground-attack
A Kerre of II.fZG 76 mastery of the French skies
service with No. 43 5qn at
politicians throughout the Phoney \V'ar to Stop more of his pre ious
last battle-weary fighters oFNo. 501
squadrons being dispatched to France, despite repeated reque t From
Just 66 Hurricanes returned to Britain Following the BEF's withdrawal. Fighting in
the French governmenr since September 1939. Some 452 Hurricane Is
France conrinued as parr of Operation Red unril a ceaseflre was agreed on 25 June.
qn departed the
hannel Islands For Croydon.
had been committed to the Battle of France by 21 June. Aside From the units permanently based in Fran e (more arrived as the battle progressed), Hurricane I squadrons based in southea t England also started to send large Formations of aircraFt on patrols across the Channel. They would often reFuel at airfields in France in mid-mission, continue with their patrol and then return to their ba e in the UK. Hurricane I units were quickly told to target German b mbers rather than provide fighter escorrs For the Battles and Blenheim of the AASF. The Hurricanes proved to be very successful in the b mb r-destroyer
German Armistice of 25 June 1940, and it made an ideal backdrop for this propaganda shot showing a Schwarm of V.[ZI/LG 1 machines overthe Arc de Triomphe [bottom left).
role, but this deployment also meanr that Hurricane I unit r minely ran
A wartime censor has tried to
into the LuFtwaFFe's own dedicated bomber-destroyer, th BF 110, as this
doctor this photograph, but
was heavily tasked with escorting Do 17s, He 11 I and Ju
32
Paris was declared an open city following the Franco-
8. Indeed,
despite the BF 109E being the numerically dominanr
erman fighter
throughout the Blitzkrieg, the BF 110 encounrered the
lurricane I Far
more Frequently. The types Fought each other on a near-daily basis From
has only partially obliterated the individual aircraftlellers. The Gruppe badge and otherwise full unit codes are still clearly visible.
33
OPPOSITE On 10 May 1940 the RAF had nine Hurricane I squadrons based in northeastern France supporting the BEF and AASF.
By then a number of the Bf 110 units that had played such a key part in the success
N
A
in the West had returned to Germany to rest, recuperate and refit in preparation for an all-out attack on Great Britain, while others settled into their new bases in northern France and made good their losses.
I
ENGLAND
r'
i
i i"·
'-L"..,._..
BELGIUM
Virtually all these units were attacked on their airfields
ENGLISH
during the early stages of the Battle of France, forcing them to evacuate these sites and
CHANNEL
UNIT ORGANISATION
•
Amiens
pull back to airfields further west.
As with the Blitzkrieg in the West, Luftflottenkommando 2 and 3 would again be at the forefront of the fighting during the Battle of Britain, controlling most of the Bf 110 units assigned to the offensive through the offices of Jagdfliegerflihrer 2 and 3 and VIII. Fliegerkorps. The odd unit out was I./ZG 76, assigned to Luftflottenkommando 5 in Stavanger, Norway.
• Le Havre
•
Reims
Paris
Unlike British fighter squadrons at the time, which only officially formed into wings as the RAF went on the offensive in 1941, German fighter and Zerstorerunits had been grouped together since before the war. The Jadgwaffi equivalent to a typical 12- to 16aircraft squadron in Fighter Command in 1940 was the Staffil which consisted of nine aircraft (rising to as many as 16 as the war progressed). A Staffilwas led by a Staffilkapitiin of Oberleutnant or Hauptmann rank, who in turn controlled a further 20 or more aircrew and 100 or more groundcrew. Staffiln were usually numbered 1,2,3 and so on.
•
FRANCE
o
f=&:::q
o
40 miles
I
40km
Le Mans
•
o
•
Hurricane I Units in France on May 10, 1940
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Vassincourt Rouvres/Etain Lilie/Seciin Senon Vitry·en·Artois
NO.1 Sqn No. 73 Sqn No. 8S Sqn No. 87 Sqn No. 607 Sqn
6. 7. 8. 9.
Le Touquet Abbeville Merville 8etheniville
July and early August 1940, witll some 315 Bf 110s in France by 13 August. Opposing them were 29 squadrons of Hurricanes, totalling 462 aircraft. As mentioned, the RAF units were not organised into air fleets or groups as per the Luftwaffe model. Instead, all
Gruppenkommandeurwas usually a Hauptmann or Major, and he led between 35 and 40 pilots and more than 300 groundcrew. Gruppen were usually numbered I., 11., III. and
fighters in Great Britain were centrally controlled by Fighter Command, headed by Air Marshal Dowding.
Two complete Zerstorergeschwaders flew Bf 110s during the Battle of Britain, but only ZG 26 had all of its aircraft based in France. Assigned to Luftflottenkommando 2 in the Pas-de-Calais, it operated alongside Stab, II. and III.lZG 76, with I./ZG 76 being based in Norway. Luftflottenkommando 3 in Normandy and Brittany controlled Stab, I. and II.lZG 2 (there was no III. Gruppe), as well as V(Z)/LG 1. Additionally, Bf 110C/D fighter-bombers were flown by Erpr. Gr. 210 within Luftflottenkommando 2. Assigned some 90-95 aircraft when fully equipped, a Geschwader was usually led by a Kommodore of Major, Oberstleutnant or Oberst rank. The Zerstorergeschwaders were in turn locally controlled by Jagdfliegerflihrer (those involved in the Battle of Britain were also numbered 2 and 3), which issued operational dire tives to the frontline flying units. The Jagdfliegerflihrerwere in turn part of the larger, locally based Fliegerkorps, which were ultimately subordinated to the Luftflotten ( f which the Luftwaffe had four in 1940). These were self-contained organisati n, ea h with its own fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, ground-attack and transport unit.
No. 61S Sqn (A Fit] No. 61S Sqn (8 Fit] Nos. 3 & 79 Sqns No. 501 Sqn
-------------1
In 1940, typically, three Staffiln and the Stab (headquarters flight) would be assigned to a single Gruppe, which was the Luftwaffe's basic flying unit for operational and administrative purposes. Normally, one complete Gruppe occupied a single airfield, and this was usually the case during the Battle of Britain, with linked Staffiln being spread among austere sites in the Pas-de-Calais, Normandy and Brittany. The
so on. The Geschwaderwas the largest Luftwaffe flying unit to have a ftxed strength ofaircraft.
34
•
Rauen
The Zerstorergruppen slowly began to return to the Channel coast in strength during
'~
All three Gruppen of ZG 25 were heavily involved in fighting over southern England during the Battle of Britain. Here, Hauptmann Ralph von Rettberg,
Gruppenkommandeur of
II.1ZG 25, briefs his assembled crews for the next mission. The unit's 'clog' emblem is prominently displayed on the pennant that was always 'flown' outside Gruppe HO, in this instance at Lille.
35
Fighrer Command had been Formed in L936, as one of Four commands, when rhe flying srrengrh of rhe RAP was broken up by rhe Air Minisrry, mainly in response to German rearmamenr. Wirh irs HQ ar Bendey Priory, Fighrer Command inirially
Radar of dlis period could nor rrack aircrafr overland, so once German Formarions crossed rhe Brirish coasdine rhe Observer Corps would rake over responsibiliry For rracking rhem. The observers would pass plor inFormarion via a landline to rheir
conrrolled rhree groups creared by Dowding to deFend Grear Brirain: o. L1 Group was charged wirh prorecring me Sourheasr, No. L2 Group rhe MicUands and o. 13 Group rhe orrh and Scodand. On 8 July L940, Following rhe Fall of France, o. LO Group was
own group HQ, which in rurn relayed derails to Fighrer Command's Filrer Cenrre For onward rransmis ion.
esrablished to cover porenrial German rargers in rhe Sourhwesr. Each Group was splir up inro Sectors which were given lerrers For idenrificarion purposes, alrhough ulrimarely rhey would be known by rhe name of rheir sector srarion - rhe airfield conrrolling dlem. DeFending London and rhe Sourheasr, o. 11 Group
operarions rooms, rhe fighrer conrroller guiding rhe squadron unril irs pilors visually sigh red the enemy. Ar mis poim rhe Formarion leader would call 'Tally ho!' over rhe radio, signalling to rhe comroller rhar he needed no £Urrher help From him. By rhe summer of 1940 Fighrer Command squadrons were moroughly Familiar wirh ground-based fighrer
would be rhe viral organisarion in Brirain's deFence in 1940. Irs HQ was ar Uxbridge, nor Far From Bendey Priory, and irs sectors (cenrred on London) were lerrered A, B, C, 0, E, l~ and Z, conrrolled From Tangmere, Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Norrh Weald,
Once airborne, a fighrer unir remained under me radio conrrol of one of the Secror
conuoloperarion , having regularly exercised widl rhis sysrem beFore rhe war. According ro nored Barde of Brirain historian Dr AlFred Price, 'in rhe Forrhcoming air acrions over Brirain, rhe ground comrol sysrem would be Fighrer ommand's ace of rrumps'.
Debden and orrholr, respecrively. Hurricane 1 unirs based ar rhese srarions, and nearby smaller sarellire airfields, consrirured rhe 'reerh' of Fighrer ommand in 1940. Typically, each squadron would have up to L6 aircraFr, widl a similar number of pilors, usually splir up into lWO flighrs, labelled '!\ and 'B'. Each flighr was led by a flighr commander of flighr lieurenanr rank and in overall command was a squadron leader. Large airfields such as Biggin H ill or Kenley would be home to three or Four fighrer unirs, while smaller sarellire fields could This picture of an armourer from S.lZG 26 may have been staged for the photographer's benefit, as the ammunition for the MG 17s was carried in a box in the lower nose and fed up to the gun breech.
only handle a single squadron. During rhe summer of 1940 Hurricane I pilors relied on orher assers wirhin rhe
one shared destroyed, two
For dle second and lasr rime in the warrime Luftwaffe's history, rhe Barde oFBrirain would
shared damaged). Fig Off
see virrually rhe enrire Frondine srrengrh oFBF 110s concenrrared in one area - along rhe Channel coasr. Once again, rhese aircraFr would be charged wirh achieving aerial
shared destroyed, one
pro babies and one and one
below 5,000Fr, however, so in lare 1939 rhe RAP inrroduced Chain Home Low (CHL) srarions rhar could derecr aircrafr flying ar 2,000Fr some 35 miles From rhe Brirish coasdine. HL sires were inrerspersed berween H towers. A complex nerwork of landlines linking rhese various sires wirh Fighrer
up, complere widl irs own dedicared BF I 09E escorr. Alrhough no Zerstorergruppe was
rhi order was given early enough ro allow rhe fighrers ro ger up ro rhe 36
raiders' al rirude.
D. Crowley-Milling (four and
BATTLE OF BRITAIN
Hisrorians have splir rhe Barde of Brirain into Four phase, commencing in early July widl rhe Kana/kampf During dlis period, German aircraFr arrempred to deny rhe English Channel ro Brirish shipping by arracking coasral convoys and porr Faciliries on England's sourh coasr. To rhis end, a pecial mixed-Force bardegroup of Do L7s and Ju 87s was ser
appearing on rheir siruarion maps also. The fighrer conrroller ar rhe group HQ rasked wirh deFending rhe area rhar appeared ro be threarened by rhe 'hosrile' plor rhen ordered his unirs ro 'scramble'. Ir wa crucial rhar
[note the squadron leader's pennant beneath the cockpit)
men are, from left, Pit Off
easr coa rs of England and in Scodand. Codenamed Chain Home ( H), rhe srarionsrhere were 18 bervleen Porrsmourh and Aberdeen - were able to derecr and rrack enemy air rafr approaching From medium or high level ar disrances of more rhan LOO miles. The equipmenr proved unable to rrack aircraFr flying ar alrirudes
rhe plor had been classified 'hosrile', ir was passed to rhe Operarions Room and nored as a marker on rhe siruarion map. This inn rmarion was also relayed ro relevanr fighrer groups and secror operarion rooms,
Douglas Bader's Hurricane I
at RAF Coltishall, Norfolk, in
command to effecrively rake rhe fighr to rhe Luftwaffe. Undoubredly rhe mosr imporranr of rhese was the chain of radar srarions builr during rhe lare 1930s along rhe SOUdl and
derecred by radar, rheir grid posirion, alrirude and esrimared srrengrh were passed via land line to rhe Filrer enrre ar Fighrer Command HQ. Once
flying clothing, No. 242 Sqn pilots pose in front of Sqn Ldr
late September 1940. The
supremacy as rhe German Kampf and Stukageschwaders suove to knock our Fighrer Command in prepararion For rhe seaborne invasion of sourhern England, codenamed Operarion Seewwe (' Sea/ion').
Command HQ and group and secror operarions rooms was anorher asser rhar proved viral during rhe Barrie of Brirain. When enemy aircraFr were
Exhibiting a vast array of
H. N. Tamblyn [five and one probable and two damaged; killed on 3 April 1941), Fig Off
P. 5_ Turner [ten and one shared destroyed, three unconfirmed destroyed, one probable and eight damaged). on the wing, Sgt J. E. Savill (one destroyed). Pit Off N. N. Campbell (one and two shared destroyed; killed 17 October 1940). Pit Off W. L. McKnight (17 and two shared destroyed and three unconfirmed destroyed; killed on 12 January 1941). Sqn Ldr D. R. 5. Bader (20 and four shared destroyed, six and one shared probables and 11 damaged); Fig Off G. E. Ball (six and one shared destroyed and three damaged); Pit Off M. G. Homer (one damaged; killed on 27 September 1940); and Pit Off M. K. Brown (killed on 21 February 1941). Tamblyn, Bader and McKnight claimed 13 Bf 110s destroyed between them in 1940.
37
Eight Zestiirergruppen occupied a series of sites in
•
Sf 110 Zerstorer Units, August 1940
northwestern France during
1. 2_ 3. 4. s. 6. 7_ 8.
Yvrench-st Omer Crecy-st Omer Barly-Arques Abbeville-Yvrench Laval Caen Caen-Carpiquet Guyancourt
June and July 1940 in preparation for Operation
See/owe ('Sealion'). Units based in the Normandy region primarily encountered RAF
o
G
D '------'==='--'. •
•
Pas de Calais were routinely
CHANNEL
•
•
....
:
• ....
@Filton
..
....
•••• ••••
•
....
C E
Rennes
Le Mans
•
o
40 miles
~
o
I
40km
·. ·.. . ·.·
•
~
@
.:ut •
~
~• @Warmwell
~
Bournemouth
~
S
~
'.t"@NorthWeald
..
~
hampton
Portsmouth •
@
Martlesham Heath
@ •• Kenley·..
E
@Stapleford Tawney
@Hendon·"C!t;
'. Iit:"@ Biggin Hill
A
••
-"" •• -
Heathrow@: Hornchurch; • •••••••••••••••••••• ~~ Croydon .......... ..:......@Gravesend
. •• Middle Wallop
•• .'
.... ,...
~~~
.-
••• -
/.. ..
/
.
Boscom~e Down
...."
.
, .,.,. . •••
No. 11 Group,'@'oebden
Northolt @
:
y
F
Castle Camps @
~
•
Z
•
•
.:
.Bristol
Paris
•
.
.:
•
•
.fit
@Bibury
:
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attached to this command, Bf 110 operations were often flown in conjunction with and in support of its activities_ The Zerstiirer thus spent the last three weeks ofJuly 1940 over the Channel and England's south-coast harbour towns.
RAF Fighter Command sector
The KanaLkampf would last until 12 August, and although Fighter Command
second phase of the Battle of Britain: the sustained campaign against RAF airfields, radar
and fighter airfields in
succeeded in matching the Luftwaffe in trying circumstances, it suffered significant losses
stations and other key military targets such as airctaft and aero-engine factories. The
southeast and southern
- including 48 Hurricane Is destroyed and many more damaged. A number of these
bombers sent to strike at these targets were well escorted by both Bf 109Es and Bf 110s,
aircraft had been claimed by Bf 110s conducting freie ]agd (,free-hunt') sweeps
and during 11 days ofheavy raids, which saw both sides suffer terrible losses, the Luftwaffe
combat over Portland Bill.
independently of the bombers, seeking out RAF fighters; other RAF losses had occurred
began to assert its dominance through sheer weight of numbers.
During this period the aircraft
when the Zerstiirergruppen were called on to defend bomber formations. The Bf 110 units
was used mainly by Australian-
had also suffered heavy losses during this period, with 34 aircraft downed. Most fell victim
Fighter Command airfields and aircraft factories, with growing success. The RAF would
to Hurricane Is including some of the 16 Bf 11 Os destroyed on 11 and 12 August during
later call this 'the critical period' of the Battle of Britain, as it found it ever harder to
Gloster-built Hurricane I R4218 served with No. 601 Sqn from
is August to 7 October 1940, when it was written off in a forced landing following
born ace Pit Off Howard Mayers, who used it to claim two Do 17s destroyed and one damaged on
large-scale raids on the naval base at Portland, Dorset.
and a half-share in a probable
Indeed, the Bf 110 Zerstiirergruppen had been so badly affected (with 93 aircraft destroyed
Bf 110 on 4 September and a
between 13 and 31 August) that the role they would play in the rest of the campaign would be significantly teduced.
damaged on 25 September.
On 7 September, believing Fighter Command to be finished, Reichsmarschall
R4218 when it was hit in the
Hermann Goting ordered his forces to target London instead in an effort to bring more
glycol tank by return fire from a
RAF fighters into the air. Thus, the final, critical phase of the Battle of Britain
bomber while engaging German raiders targeting the Westland aircraft factory at Yeovil on the afternoon of 7 October.
of Britain.
replace losses. Yet despite suffering serious casualties - 217 Hurricane Is were destroyed in August alone - Fighter Command was still inflicting heavy losses on German forces.
Mayers was at the controls of
England during the Battle
In phase three, between 24 August and 6 September, German bomber units targeted
31 August, a Do 17 destroyed
Bf 110 destroyed and a Do 17
38
The Luftwaffe dubbed 13 August AdLertag (,Eagle Day'). It signalled the start of the
commenced. Eventually the capital would be attacked both by day and night, culminating in two massive daylight raids on 15 September - immortalised thereafter by the British as Battle of Britain Day.
39
~ ,;
A war photographer captured the activity at a forward base occupied by I.lZG 52 as the
...
r
unit prepared to take off on
'I'
another mission during the
~
Battle of France. Here,
1. Sraffers 'A2+BH' appears to be the lead aircraft.
By now the Zerstorergruppen were forbidden to fly their favoured freie jagd sonies. Instead, Reichsmarschall Goring ordered them to provide close-formation escort for the
THE COMBATANTS
bombers, which had suffered growing losses to the seemingly indeStructible RAF. As if to prove that Fighter Command did indeed still have plenty of fight left in it, on 15 September both waves of bombers were met by close to 300 Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Bf 110 units played little part in the raids on this day, however, due to the horrendous los es they had suffered during the previous month. Indeed, only three aircraft were lost on 15 eptember. However, the month was topped and tailed by heavy casualties on 4
The vast majority of the British and German fighter pilots who faced each other in
The Bf 110 represented a huge
and 27 Septcmber when 16 and 19 Bf II Os were lost, respectively. At least 16 of these
1940 were among the best-trained aviators to see combat in World War II. This was
step up for pilots coming from
aircraft were downed by Hurricane [s.
particularly true in the case of crews within the elite Zerstorergruppen; many had served
the pedestrian Fw SB and Ju S2/3m [which was also
September had seen Fighter Command endure a similarly high ca ualty rate as the
with the Luftwaffe since its formation in the early 1930s and had been hand-picked
Battle of Britain reached its climax, with some 210 Hurricane Is being destroyed in the
to fly the new Bf 110. A number of these men came from single-seat}agdgeschwaders,
students streamed onto multi·
air during the defence of southern England.
and some had seen combat in Bf 109s during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).
engine types). Consequently,
On 30 September the last massed daylight raids on London and the Southwest were
Fighter tactics trialled and perfected in action against Spanish Republican aircraft
flown, but the battered Bf 110 ZerstorergeschUJaders were barely involved in the day's
influenced the way the German fighter and Zerstorerforces trained and fought during
activities. Fighter Command was far from beaten: it inflicted heavy losses on the Luftwaffe
the early years of World War I!.
formations, and on 12 October Operation Sea/ion was shelved. Five day earlier the
Although the pilots of RAF Fighter Command had no such combat experience to
used as a training aircraft for
this was a scene repeated with monotonous regularity at training bases across occupied Europe. Having possibly ground· looped either on take·off or landing, this
Bf I 10 had participated in their last major action over England when II. andllI.lZG 26
draw on, they were very well trained nevertheless thanks to constant drilling and
were hard-hit while escorting]u 88s that had been sent to attack the Westland aircra.ft
exercises. As detailed in the previous chapter, the ground-control ystem in place in
works in Yeovil. Seven Zerstorer were downed by a mixed fighter force of Spitfires
Britain was unmatched anywhere in the world, and fighter pilots were thoroughly
Zersrorerschule at Prague·
and Hurricanes.
trained in working with it.
Rusin, Czechoslovakia.
The Battle of Britain officially ended on 31 October, by which tim 223 Bf 11 Os had
Bf 110C·4 was damaged on 12 September 1940 at the
With respect to the quality of the aircrew reaching
been lost in combat out of the 315 that had been committed to t11e campaign. The myth
the frontline, Fighter Command - as with the
of the invincible bomber-destroyer had been graphically exposed to the point where
jagdwaffi- only really began
Zerstorerwould never again venture over Britain in such numbers.
the latter stages of the Battle of Britain. At this point,
to feel the pinch during
heavy losses forced Training Command to cut corners in order keep units operational. By late 1940 the pilot supply crisis was over within the RAF, and training schemes in the
K and overseas - in South Africa,
outhern Rhodesia, Australia, thc USA and Canadaen ured that Fighter Command would never agatn
40
suffer from a lack of personnel.
41
However, the same could not be said for the Jagdwaffe, as the war progressed, it struggled to replace lost aircrew. Although losses incurred during 1940 were swiftly made good, poor organisation of its training units eventually resulted in serious pilot shortages from 1943 onwards.
GERMAN PILOT TRAINING This rear view of the Bordfunker's position shows to good effect the centrally mounted MG 15 extended and ready for action, as well as the fully kitted-out Bordfunker. This airman would also operate the aircraft's radios, serve as navigator and change the ammunition drums for the MG FF cannon in flight_ The Bordfunker had two seating locations in the Bf 110. In the fixed position forward, he could aid the pilot during combat by informing him of the status of the ammunition in the forwardfiring guns and changing the MG FF drums when ammunition was expended. The rear seat was on a swivel, which allowed the Bordfunker to function as an all-round observer, radio operator, navigator and rear-gunner.
Prior to the official creation of the Luftwaffe, all air activity in Germany had been geared towards training due to the ban on military flying under the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Several quasi-military aviation organisations were formed in Germany during the late 1920s and early 1930s, functioning under the cover of civilian activities. Although the restrictions stalled the development of both combat aircraft and tactics, when the Luftwaffe was formed the focus on flying training provided it with plenty of military-trained aircrew. Men came from Lufthansa, gliding clubs and, until 1936, the Wehrmacht. However, the latter was expanding rapidly too, and eventually its senior officers forbade the Luftwaffe from recruiting from within the army. From then on, conscripts and volunteers would make up the numbers. In Germany, pilot recruitment and training was strongly influenced by Prussian military tradition. Initially, future officers and NCOs alike could all expect to undertake six months of labour service, organised in a paramilitary fashion, with the Reichsarbeitsdienst. Those who were particularly air-minded chose service with the Partycontrolled Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps instead, flying gliders. However, with the Luftwaffe desperately short ofpersonnel, labour service was reduced to just three months. After induction into the Luftwaffe, all recruits spent between six and 12 months undertaking basic infantry training at a Flieger-Ersatzabteilung ('airman replacement battalion', FIErsAbt). Once recruits were deemed to be effective infanttymen, all were reviewed for possible advancement as pilots. Likely candidates were sent to a FlugAnwarterkompanie ('aircrew candidate company', FlAnwKomp) for evaluation in a series of tests in basic aviation theory. For the next two months the applicants were tested on general aeronautical subjects, their instructors constantly assessing their suitability for possible advancement to a pilot training centre. Those recruits deemed unsuitable for pilot training were redirected to a FliegerAusbildungsregiment ('airman development regiment', FlAR) for selection and introductory training in a branch more suited to their skills. In the case of the Bf 110 aircrew, these men may have reached the frontline as wireless
42
operator/navigators and/or gunners. By
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One of the key training types
following this process, the prospective aircrew candidate had already experienced some
for would-be Bf 110 pilots was
eight monrhs of rraining prior ro enrering flight school.
the humble Focke-Wulf Fw 58
Those selected for further rraining as potential aircrew then underrook the standard
Weihe, which was a true workhorse for the Luftwaffe.
selection process within a FlAnwKomp, whereby the rest of their basic training,
Designed as a six-seater civil
conducted over a period of three ro four monrhs, was completed alongside aircrew
transport and flown for the
evaluation test. The tests involved a more detailed examination of the candidate's
first time in the summer of
abilities, including rigorous physical exerci es (possibly using oxygen apparatus and a
1935, it was quickly adopted
cenrrifuge) and progressively more challenging aeronautical theory. Indeed, the srudent's
by the Luftwaffe and used in
classroom work had ro be of the highest standard or he would be scrubbed from the
a variety of roles including aircrew trainer. This particular
course and tran felTed ro a FIErsAbt ro complete his basic training, after which he would be allocated ro another branch of the Luftwaffe. Having got through initial induction and assessmenr, the Flugzeugfiihrer-Anwiirter
pilots flying more advanced types. An elementary Kf Kunstjlug(,stunr-flying') aerobatics
Kampffliegerschulen 4 at
course was also included in the larrer phase ro provide all pilots with a good understanding
Thorn [Toru ), Poland, in 1940.
aeronautics in a biplane trainer such as the Bucker BLi 131, Arado Ar 66 ,Heinkel
of rudimentary evasive manoeuvres (barrel rolls, loops and formation splits). This phase
The Weihe provided pilots with
He 72 Kadett, Gorha Go 145 or Focke-Wulf FW 44 Stieglitz. Up ro 60 circuits with
also allowed insrrucrors ro identify any potential fighter pilots anlong their students;
an insrrucror was usually sufficient before the trainee was cleared ro make his first flight.
thereafter, these candidates would receive more flying time than their fellow students.
assessed for advancemenr throughout this phase, and those displaying the required
climbing aboard their machine
aptitude would then be sent ro Flugzeugfiihrerschule AlB ('flight training school NB')
using the aircraft's built-in
as soon as a space became available - typically twO months after arriving at the
retractable ladder are dressed
FlAnwKomp. Here, flight training proper would be undertal
in summer-weight
It was at this point that new aviarors would be categorised for service on single- or
At such schools studenrs passed through four principal levels of instruction, with
he would undergo intensive training for his allotted type. Tho e who showed ufficienr
The system of licences, which were earned over a period of six ro nine months, explain
mastery of twin-engined training aircraft such as the Fw 58 Weihe would be advanced
pilots wore seat-pack
the naming patterns of these flight schools. The Af-Schein ('AI licence') inrroduced
ro a ftugzeugfiihrerschule C for an additional 50-70 hour on heavy aircraft over the
Sirzfallschirm 30-15-24B
students ro basic practical flying in dual-conrrolled training aircraft, with instrucrors
next IWO ro six monrhs. Such pilots would ultimately serve with bomber, rransport,
teaching recruits how ro take off and land, recover from tall and attain a solo flight
recon naissance or heavy-figh ter ('desrroyer') un its.
here is the fact that Zerstiirer
parachutes while Bordfunker were equipped with the backpack-type
rating. Before the war and until early] 941, instrucrors would have been assigned four
Ruckenfallschirm-1Z8.
trainees each; however, the number ro e as the conflict progressed. For the A2-Schein, cadets were required ro learn flight theory, including aerodynamics, meteorology, flying procedures and aviation law, as well as the practical application of aeronautical engineering, elemenrary navigation,
Training at a Flugzeugfiihrerschule Cincluded an introduction ro instrument flying and direction-finding apparatu on aircraft such as the Ju 52/3m transport. From here, pilots were split off and ent ro appropriate specialist schools, with those selected for Bf I lOs arrending Zerstorerschule for t\l'vO ro three months of gunnery and target work. Once at
the
Zerstorerschule pilots would be paired up with wireless
wireless procedure and Morse code. In the air, they gained more flying
operaror/gunners, with whom they would continue service. This practice was
experience on larger single-engined two-seat aircraft.
maintained until the blood-letting of the Battle of Britain; at this point, a number of
The next level of training, aimed at attaining the Bf-Schein, saw pilots
Gruppen (including Ill.lZG 76) began splitting up new replacement crews upon
progress ro high-performance single- and twin-engined machine typically
arrival at the frontline so that inexperienced pilots or wirele s operaror/gunners could
fitted with a retractable undercarriage. If pilots were destined ro fly fighters,
fly their first few missions with 'old hands'. In training, Zerstorerschule crews would
at this stage older types of combat aircraft uch as early-variant Bf 109s would
attend blind-flying chool, then underTake an advanced instrument navigation course
be flown for the first time. Precision landing, night flying and night landing,
that included instrument flight, landing practice and advanced direction-finding
and cross-country flying were all tested during this phase. The studenr pilot
techniques. Finally, having flown a rotal of some 220-270 hour in a multitude
would also have ro complete at least 50 flights in a Bf-category aircraft. Upon
of aircraft types during a 20-monrh training course, the pilot and his wireless
gaining the Bf-Schein - having accumulated 100 ro 150 hours of flight time
operaror/gunner would finally join a frontline Zerstorergruppeas a reserve crew.
over the previous 14 ro 17 monrhs - studenrs would undertake training
44
Upon completion of the B2 phase, the cadet would finally be granted hi
each requiring qualification for its own licence before advancing ro the next stage.
The point of interest illustrated
aimed at acquiring the final B2- chein.
their first taste of flying a twin-engined type.
Luftwaffeflugzeugfiihrerschein ('air force pilots' licence'), accompanied by the highly prized Flugzeugfiihrerabzeichen ('pilot's badge') - his 'wings'. After an average of ten ro 13 months at a Flugzeugfiihrerschule A/B, he was now a fully qualified pilot. multi-engined aircraft, with each individual assigned ro a specialist flying school. Here,
Kombination K 50/34 overalls.
assigned to Grosse
('pilot candidate') would receive insrruction in basic flight theory and rudimenrary
Those who failed ro solo by 80 circuits were returned ro a FIAR. Candidates were These ZG 76 crewmen
example is an Fw 58B
The A-licence course generally rook three months ro complete, with the B phase seeing
By 1940 the realities of war, with escalating attrition among aircrew, had led the Luftvvaffe ro modify the final stages of the training syllabus by creating Ergiinzungs
45
(Zerstorer) Staffil (' [destroyer] operational training schools') for teaching tactics and for further familiarisation with frontline types. In the Jagdwaffi, such units were directly linked to and controlled by operational Geschwaders. The intention with these new units was to let new aircrew gain precious operational experience before being hurled into combat. Like their pilots, the wireless operator/gunners in the Zerstorergruppen in 1940 had also received exhaustive training before being sent to an operational unit. Most had failed to make the grade as pilots but had shown enough aptitude to be sent from the FlAnwKomp to a Beobachter-, Bordfunker, Bordmechanik- or Bordschiitzenschule ('observer', 'wireless-operator', 'flight-engineer' or 'air-gunner school', respectively). A Bordfunker in a Bf 110 was expected to be able to operate the radios, navigate proficiently and fire the rear-facing MG 15 machine gun effectively; he was therefore a skilled crewman. Indeed, by the time he reached the frontline he would have completed the nine-month basic wireless communication skills course at a
Luftnachrichtenschule ('air communications school') that saw students attain a Morsecode speed of 100 letters a minute (for both reception and transmission), as well as master elementary navigation. Bordfunker also attended schools for actual flight practice and navigation, map-reading, tadio-direction training and elementary aitcraft engine instruction. Finally, they joined an ait-gunnery school fot a five-month course covering ground-based machine gun and other small-arms training, camera-gun practice aboard light trainer aircraft and air-to-air gunnery. After 16 to 18 months of hard graft during this gruelling course the successful Bordfunker would graduate, then be sent to a
Zerstorerschule to team up with their new pilots and undertake two to three months of familiarisation training on the Bf 110. Only then wete they deemed ready for combat.
BRITISH PILOT TRAINING .0
Between 1919 and 1936 the RAF was blighted by a lack of funding. However, .0
eventually the overt re-arming of Germany prompted the government of the day to
0
0 •
pay for the expansion that would be required to let the air force function effectively in a modern war. Central to this process was re-equipment, including the purchase of
o
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new single-seat monoplane fighters in the shape of the Hurricane and Spitfire. A large An instructor from NO.8 EFTS ~ 0
vacates the back seat of O'
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Miles Magister I T9688 before sending a student pilot on his
. .
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first solo flight at Woodley
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airfield, Berkshire. This
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aircraft had previously served with NO.5 EFTS at Hanworth,
0.
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Middlesex, before joining NO.8 EFTS. The machine was
o
destroyed in a raid on
46
. . ~
Woodley on 10 August 1940.
Hydraulic hand RumR
•
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number of pilots would be needed on the frontline to fly these aircraft. It was obvious
caughr some pilors unaware. The Hurricane was far less rob'anr of faulry handling, and
that the omput of existing flying training schools (for short-service officers and airman
a mistake ar low alrirude could be faral. There were certain problems wirh rhe Merlin
pilots) and the RAF College at Cranwell (for permanent officers), at around 400 pilots
engines roo, as we occasionally experienced a phenomenon known as 'surging',
a year, was grossly inadequate.
accompanied by a sudden loss of power. This problem, and orhers, was quickly cured,
As part of the shake-up of the RAF instigated by the Air Ministry in 1936, which saw
however, and we soon came ro know ourselves and our Hurricanes berrer. There grew in
four specialist commands created in place of tile Al'ea Commands that had previously
us a trusr and an affecrion for them and rheir splendid Merlin engines, rhoroughbreds and
existed, Training Command was established. Three years before this the RAF had already
srayers which changed our fearful doubrs of the Munich period inro rhe certainty rhar we could bear all comers.
taken steps to improve the flow of trained pilots by setting up a handful of civilianmanned elementary and reserve flying training schools (E&RFTSs), equipped witll de
All our Aying ar rhis time was designed ro gird us for war, which was bound ro come;
Havilland Gipsy Motlls, DH Tiger Moths and Blackburn B2s. That sanle year it had
barde climbs ro 30,OOOfr, where rhe engine laboured and the controls were sluggish and we
also set up a standardised training programme for future officer pilots at the RAF College.
inhaled rhe oxygen which c..1.me hissing into our face-masks from a black steel cylinder
Coinciding with the establishment ofTraining Command, the Air Ministry created the
behind rhe armoured bulkhead; air drill and pracrice arracks and firing our guns into dle sea,
RAF Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) with the aim of training 800 pilots a year. This scheme
where dley raised a jagged plume of foam. The recoil of rhose eighr Brownings could slow
was open to aU comers, no matter what their flnallcial or social status, and it proved so
the aircraft in a climb by 40mph; cloud Aying and nighr Aying, which no one really enjoyed.
popuJal' that by 1940 a third of Fighter Com malld's pilots had originally joined as RAFVR
Quick refuelling and re-arming pracrice gave groundcrews rhe sleighr of hand which
members. A considerable number joined frontline units as sergeant pilots. Before this, all
speeded rheir rasks and gained precious seconds. Between rhem and rhe pilors exisred an
recruits would enter either as permanent or short-commission officers and
COs, or via
understanding on which our lives depended. The slighresr grumble from an engine, or any
the Auxiliary Air Force. The latter, created in 1925, mirrored the Territorial Army in that
odler fimcrionaJ defecr - ir mighr occur five miles above the ground or ren miles from d,e coasr
units consisted of groups of men from particular geographical areas who would train
- had
together at weekends. These squadrons quickly ended up being manned by wealthy
the rerms and nuances of rheir rechnicaJ language. We could provide rhe clue bur we relied
gentlemen, who set the tone for the auxiI ial·ies into the early stages of World War II.
implicitly on rheir vigilance, skill and devorion ro keep our machines free of defecrs which could cosr us our lives.
By late 1938, close to 30 E&RFTSs had been established, setting student pilots on
to
be explained
to
our firrers or riggers, or ro rhe armourers and radio mechanics, in
the path to obtaining their wings through training on Tiger Moths, Miles Magisters and Blackburn B2s. An element of advanced training had also been introduced at these schools through the provision of Harts, Battles and Avro Ansons. Pilots already serving in Fighter Command wirh operational units equipped with Gloster Gauntler, Hawker Fury or Gloster Gladiator biplanes made the switch to the
had been successfully completed, the student was accepted into the RAE Towards the
Hurricane or Spidlre at squadron level witllout tlle support of all operational conversion
end of this three-month period pilots where asked to mal
unit, since before the war such things did not exi t. Initially, replacement of biplane fighters in the frontline proceeded at a leisurely pace due to production difficulties.
Following graduation from the E&RFTS, pilots destined to be commissioned then
However, the conversion process was dramatically speeded up following the Munich
spent two weeks undergoing officer training at RAE Uxbridge, where they were fitted
Crisis of September 1938. Had the latter escaJated into war, tlle RAF's frontline fighter
wirh uniforms, before heading to a flying training school (FTS). At the FTS students
force wOLL!d have struggled to defend SOUtllerIl England from attack by the Luftwaffe. The
would rypically fly Hart biplanes in their junior term, and on completion of this phase
Air Ministry, determined to rectifY this situation as quickJy as possible, now implemented
they were awarded their pilots' 'wings'. Fury fighters - at that time still very much in
'Master Plall M', which gave top prioriry to re-equipping Fighter Command. No. 43 Sqn was one unit that made tile transition from Fury I to Hurricane I during thi period, as future ace Fig Off Peter Townsend recalled in his autobiography, DueL o/EagLes. The 'catching-up' process started on 29 November 1938 with the arrival of Hurricanes Ll725 and L1727 at Tangmere. By mid-December we had our full inirial equipment of 16 aircrafr. The Fury had been a delighrful plaything; the Hurricane was a thoroughly war-like machine, rock solid as a plarform for irs eighr Browning machine guns, highly manoeuvrable despire irs large proporrions and with an excellenr view from the cockpit. 48
For those trainee aviators who entered the RAP's revised pilot training system in
1938, the first steps on the way to achieving one's wings usually took the form of an ab initio flyi ng cou rse at an E&RFTS, wh ich rypically lasted th ree mon ths. Once th is
Ar first rhe Hurricane earned a bad repurarion. The change from rhe lighr and agile Fury
Hurricane Is of No. 8S Sqn in tight battle formation over Kent during the Battle of Britain. The rigid adherence to such unwieldy tactics by Fighter Command throughout 1940 saw Hurricane I and Spitfire units sustain heavy losses to both Bf 109Es and Bf 110s conducting their favoured ·dive·and·zoom' attacks from superior altitude.
49
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rejoined No. 43 S~n as
Born In Dundalk in what is now Eire on 8 July 1913,
He claimed his final
when Kilmartin was just nine years old, and he was duly
two victories w th this
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to the UK via the trans-Siberia Taught to fly at a civilian sc
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joined No. 43 Sqn at Tang .1
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ight of 21 February 1945, w
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. ....... •• .. . ... .. .. -. . .. .. . ... . .. .. .. .. . ..... . -. ........ ... • ... .... -. ..... ... . . . .. .
..... •
vanous p'ositions of command, including CO of No. 249 S~n
.
-. . ~
, I •
I
-
23 November 1939, a Bf 109E on 2 AfJril1940 and a Ju 88 18
.
3 in tlie aefence of Hamourg.
. ... . ... .. ....
, I •
bloody clashes of 15
months later. He claimed a half-share in a Do 17. on
.• II
-, -
. . ...
~
.,
Commander OfJs of No. 84 Wing in late 1943. Commanding
I
..
.. .
...
I
..
.,
••
-,.
.. . .. ..
504 Sqn in 1943. Promoted t led the Hornchurch Win '
,,
.- .
-
.. . . - , ..
ZG i'6, taking his tally to 20,
iginally trained to fly the " I
...
No. 136 Wing at Normandy in 1944, he finished t
•
. ... ..... ..
I. ,.
month, Kilmartin held
... ...
.- .
I'
supernumerary to help' for
I
I
FTS at Netheravon. Havin Qai
.
•
...
I
,, I
Cross the following ..
•
claim one more kill flying witli
.
...
....
.
-
: I
included serving as CO of NI .1
was accefJted into the RAF. in . ,
-,
I
-,
.. .. ..
....
:
.. ...
I
aestroying five Hurri
..
years until in 1936 he saw an advertisement fo~ short..... I . " .. .. ...
Is. P.romoted to s~uadron
•
. ... .
-. . ...... ...
-
I
..
SeRtember when he
dep'artment 0
..
.-
- ,.
Kilmartin was one of eight children. His father, a forester, died
Shanghai, Chi
.....
tne Hawker fignter. Ooerleutnant Hans-!Joachlm ~aos ana
been transferred to No. 43 S~n.
a cattle station in New South five years in the early 1930s. After joining an aunt In
..
and 5 OTUs until August 1940, when lie
'Big Brother'. Once old enoug
.. ..
.... .. .....
. . ...
the final victory coming on 6 Sep.tember after Kilmartin had
ship'p'ed to Australia under as
I
instructor with Nos. 6
Kilmartin served as an
~ I
.. ..
Only two Zerstdrerp'i1ots officially claimed enough kills in
Returning to Britain
Although ten RAF. p'ilots claimed five or more Bf 110s
•
....
.....
.
.. I I
.
.. , t .....
I .
. ......
......
~
.. -
I
.
I.
...
......
II
•
1984, Kilmartin died on
:
service with Fighter Command - awaited them in their senior term. Completing nine months of flying training, the brand-new fighter pilot was duly posted to a frontline unit within Fighter Command. For a pilot fresh from an FTS, where he had flown obsolescent biplane fighters 50
that boasted just two guns and barely reached 200mph, the step up to a monoplane
fighter such as the Hurricane I, with eight guns and a top speed of more than 300mph, was a huge one. In an effort to fill the yawning performance gap, the RAF esrablished several Group Pools in 1939 and equipped them with a handful of Hurricanes and Spitfires. Here, new pilots would be able to get a precious few flying hours on their logbooks on-type before they joined Fighter Command proper. With the declaration of war, all E&RFTSs were brought within the RAF Training Command structure as Elementary FTSs (EFTSs). Once finished at an EFTS, pupils
51
would progress
[Q
Service FrSs (SFrSs), which by early 1940 had been boosted
in number from six ro 11. The aircraft types operated at both tages in the
Fellow future ace Fit Lt Johnny Kent attended the No.7 OTU system at Hawarden in July 1940, prior ro being posted ro
o. 303 'Polish' Sqn at the end of that same
training process remained much the same during the first 18 months of the war,
montll. A pre-war fighter and test pilot and a veteran of phoro-reconnaissance
although the interwar biplane fighters encountered at the SFTSs slowly began
missions over Germany in unarmed Spitfires early in the war, Kent reinforced Drake's
ro be replaced by
incredulous views on the lack of gunnery training given ro pilots passing through the
orth American Harvard [s and the all-new Miles Master.
The Group Pool system allowed operational squadron
ro draw
OTU system in 1940 in his aurobiography,
One ojthe Few:
replacement pilots from a pool and therefore relinquish their own training responsibilities so they could concentrate on combat missions. However, in
Everything was confused during this period and the training syllabus was very sketchy
wartime the system soon starred ro show signs of strain. Indeed, literally
- it consisted mainly of formation flying and dogfighting exercises. I kept asking my
thousands of trainee pilots - many with a considerable number of flying hours
flight commander, Fit Lt Bill Kain (also a Hurricanc I veteran of France, where he served
All four of these Masters,
already in their logbooks - were transferred ro other trades in late 1939 and early 1940
with
seen performing a low-level
due ro a chronic shortage of monoplane fighter types within the Group Pools. Spitfires
wanted ro find out what they sounded like - and what effect rhey had on the aircraft.
formation f1y·by for the press at Sealand, south of Liverpool, in late 1940, are being flown by future No. 71 'Eagle' Sqn pilots. Assigned to No. S FTS, aircraft '29' [N 7760], 'lB' [N7765] and '11' [N7691] were standard unarmed two·
and Hurricanes were urgently needed on the frontline, leaving no aircraft for training purposes.
Finally, in desperation, he allowed me one shooL My target was a spit of sand in the Dee Esruary and, on my firSt attack, 1 gOt a neat group with a half-second burst, but on
In the early spring of 1940, all Group Pools were redesignated operational training
my second dive the guns failed ro fire. I tried several more times but nothing happened
units (OTUs) within Training Command, and the Air Ministry instructed Fighter
so, in a bitofa temper, I rcturned to thcairfleld and rold Bill Kain what 1 thought of an
Command ro ensure that enough a.ircraft were made available ro these units so that a
installation which could produce sroppages in all eight guns at once. Bill rhen explained
steady flow of replacement pilots could be sent through them. The OTUs eventually
that there had been no sroppage - that was all the ammunition they could spare mc!
ucceeded where the Group Pools had failed thanks ro an influx of often combat-weary
I knew that both the country and the Air Force were in a pretty bad way, bur rhis
[N7B20] was one of a small
fighter aircraft, along with equally battle-sea oned Staff for instructing would-be frontline
brought home ro me JUSt how desperatc the siruation was. It did nor matter so much in
number of Miles advanced
pilots. Among such staff was future acc Fig Off Billy Drake, who had JUSt recovered
my particular case as I had done so much front-gun firing before, although it was only
seat Master Is, while '27'
trainers fitted with six
o. 1 Sqn Hurricane I was shot down by a Bf 110 over
wirh two guns, but many of the new boys never fired their guns at all until rhey went into
converted into single-seat
France on 13 May 1940. Drake was sent ro No.6 OTU at Sutron Bridge in June 1940,
action for the first time - a sobering thought when one considers the task before rhem.
'emergency' fighters at the
as recounted in his aurobiography
0.303-in machine guns and
from wounds sustained when his
Billy Drake: Fighter Leader.
height of the Battle of Britain. Fortunately, they were never
It was a great tribure ro their grit and determination that they carried themselves inro the violent battles of rhe next few monrhs, and inflicted the damage they did, with virtually
Prior ro the war, most advanced training of fighter pilots had taken place at unit level-
no instruction or pracrice in air-firing at all. One wonders what the results might have
they were retained within
as had been my own experience. The demands of war made this difficult ro continue
been if it had been possiblc ro rhoroughly train every pilot before he wenr inro action.
Fighter Command as aerial
with, and soon after the outbreak of hostilities specialised training units had been set up
gunnery trainers well into
ro raise pilots' experience ro a point where - theoretically at least - they were ready ro
needed in the frontline, but
1942.
play their full part a soon as they joined an operational squadron. However, June 1940 found Fighter Command reeling from the losses over France
When losses began ro mount in August
J 940
, OTU courses for new pilots were
drastically shortened from several monrhs ro just four weeks, leaving squadrons ro apply the finishing rouches. As a result of this, Fighter
ommand began receiving
and the Dunkirk evacuation, facing imminent onslaught by the Luftwaffe and desperate
replacement pilots who had never even seen a Spitfire or Hurricane, let alone mastered
for additional pilots at the earliest possible date. Products of the Volunreer Reserve, partly
them in flight, and who had received little more than basic training in blind or night
trained at the ourbreak of war, were now completing a foreshortened and hasty advanced
flying, navigation or gunnery.
training, whilst the first foreign pilots who had escaped from the shambles in France were also being made ready ro join British units. For me this period at
Despite cutting corners in pilot training, still more men were needed as replacemenrs because the Luftwaffe was continuing ro exact a heavy roll on the RAE
O. 6 OTU remains in my memory as one of bloody hard
With no time ro train pilots from cratch, Fighter Command sought out men from
work. I flew my arse off, 40-50 hours a month. My job was ro firstly make certain that
other commands within the RAF, as well as the Fleet Air Arm. The best pilots from
these new pilots could acrually fly, and for this purpose I wenr aloft with them in Master
Army Cooperation, Coastal and Bomber Commands were posted in, as were 75 partly
and Harvard advanced trainers. When satisfied that this was the case, 1 would send them
trained naval pilots. Combat-seasoned fighter pilots also came from Poland,
off in Hurricanes, accompanying them in my own aircraft firstly ro see if they could fly
Czechoslovakia, Belgium and France, these men havina followina0 the o fled ro Britain .
formation, and then ro try and teach them the rudiments of dogfighting. Almost incredibly, with the benefit of hindsight, no provision existed for them ro obtain any
52
o. 73 Sqn), abour air firing, explaining that I had never fired eight guns and I
instruction or experience of aerial gunnery at this stage of the war.
azi occupation of their respective counrrie . These were the sort of men who manned the 31 Hurricane [ squadrons that helped defend Britain in the summer of 1940. Their experiences are detailed in the next chapter.
53
aircraFr in Fighrer Command had been instructed ro use the 'Dowding Spread', this merhod of gun harmonisation being officially laid down in response ro Air Mar hal
COMBAT
Dowding's conviction that his fighters would not ee, let along engage, enemy fighters. In theory, the 'spread' made en e when attacking Formations of bombers from astern, as it produced a wide enough pattern oFbullets ro compensate for aim ing error, while still leaving sufficient lethal density ro destroy targets of such ize. The harmonisation range was ser at 400yd, which also leFt rhe RAF fighrers beyond rhe eFFective rriking di tance of enemy gunners defending the bombers. However, in early 1939 the pilors of
Prior ro the launch of the Blitzkrieg in the West on 10 May 1940 Hurricane Is and BF II Os
o. I Sqn realised that rhe spread was
unsuitable For air fighring, as Fig OFF Richey explained:
had clashed on only Four occasions during the Phoney War. The first engagement, betvveen No. 73
qn and 13. and 15.(Z)/LG I on 26 March 1940, had ended
inconclusively (although three BF II OCs Force-landed with damage), but three days later
We reckoned thar even if the experrs were right and that at 400 yards' range rhe bullet velociry was still high enough
to
prevent tumble, maintain accuracy and penetrate
o. I Sqn succeeded in destroying a machine From 14.(Z)/LG I. Fig Off Paul Richey of
armour (which seemed unlikely), the spread produced by aiming, shooring and random
o. I Sqn recalled:
errors combined would be more than enough
to
drop lethal densiry below the minimum
required for a kill, especially againsr a small rarger like a fighter - which we were not at Allied fighters. With Bill Stratton
aLL convinced we would never meet. Fighter Command dismissed our theories, so during
appear over France, north of Mea.
our month's shooting practice in the spring of 1939 we secrerly harmonised all our guns
attack. Johnny stuck behind one through some violent
on a spot at 250 yards' range. We shot rhe tOwed banner clean away time and time again.
Johnny Walker gOt the first Messerschmitt 110
to
fall
and 'Darky' Clowes he sighted nine of them, the first The Hurricane climbed
to
to to
manoeuvres and first-class flying - vertical tall turns and so on. He followed it through
Our early action in France had now proved rhe point - we had shot down every aircraft
cloud, saw it catch fire and ran out of ammunition. It was later found in pieces, the pilot
we had arracked. All single-seat fighter squadrons were instructed
having bailed out - the gunner was killed.
Ir was nor a moment tOo soon.
to
Hurricane IL1679 of NO.1 Sqn was the mount of Fig Off Paul Richey for much of the 'Phoney War', although the aircraft was not one of the 16 Hurricanes originally flown by the unit from Tangmere to Octeville on the morning of 7 September 1939. However, this fabric-winged, two-bladed Hurricane variant was among the first batch of 14 Mk Is delivered to NO.1 Sqn at Tangmere from the Hawker factory at Kingston in October 1938. Richey used this aircraft to claim a third of a kill [a 00 17Z of 7./KG 3] on the opening day of the Blitzkrieg, then an unconfirmed kill [a Do 17P from 3.[F)/10] the following day. However, at the end of the final combat he was forced to recover at the bombed-out French airfield of Mezieres due to a shortage of fuel. During his landing roll he had to swerve to miss a crater and dug in L1679's port wing. Richey abandoned the machine and returned to his unit.
adopt our method.
Air Marshal 'Ugly' Barratt, who commanded the British air forces in France, had a few days previoLlsly is ued an invitation
to
dine with him in Paris to the first pilot to shoot down
Fighter Command tactics in th early stages of World War 11 have also come in For
a Messer chmitt I lOon the Western Front. The Air Marshal's per onal aircraft collected
much criticism over the years, the RAF rigidly implementing unwieldy Fighting Area
Johnny, StrattOn and Clowes the day after their successful engagement with the I lOs. The
Artacks that could trace their origin ro the early 1930s. Ar thar rime, the ole purpo e of
Air Marshal turned on a slap-up dinner at Maxim's for them - quite righcly, I thought.
the British fighter elemenr was een as ropping Formarion of enemy bombers From
This initial vicrory marked the start of
o. I Sqn's outstanding success against the
- possessed limired range, and with France as an ally it was assumed that no enemy fighters
BF 110, the unit proving ro be the nemesis of Goring's 'Ironsides' throughout the
would be able ro reach British airspace, so bombers would be Forced ro atrack unescorred.
Battle of France. The excellent results achieved in aerial combat by
The Air Staff also believed rhar with monoplane fighrer now capable of achieving speeds
attacking the
o. I Sqn borh
during the Phoney War and rhe French debacle that Followed were due in no small parr ro modified gun harmonisation and tactics that the unit had adopted unofficially. 54
With respect ro the Former, beFore the war all squadrons of single-seat eight-gun
K. The fighters built throughout this decade - both biplane and monoplane
of more than 300m ph, pilots would black our iF they atrempred ro dogfight. At this rime RAF fighters were armed exclusively with riRe-caIibre 0.303-in machine gun; rhe weight oFfire of these weapons was deemed insufficient ro bring down bomber
55
flying in tight, massed formation, when fighters
When looking for tile enemy, all the members of the
attacked independently of one another. The RAPs
looser Schwarm enjoyed d1e freedom to search the skies
Air Fighting Development Establishmem therefore
(and cover blind areas astern of the formation) without
decided that the only way to solve this problem was
fear of running into a wingman. [n the Vic, only the
to mass fighters in close formation so as to bring a
leader could search for the enemy, a his two wingmen
large number of guns to bear.
had to concentrate on remaining in tight formation.
Pilots in frontline fighter units were well drilled
This left them highly susceptible to attack from b hind
in formation flying, so a series of six basic patterns
and below, and in 1940 this blind SpOt was repeatedly
known
exploited by the jagdwa.ffe.
as
Fighting Area Attacks
were duly
Another shot of No. 85 Sqn in
formulated and published in the RAF ManuaL ofAir Tactics, released in 1938. They
Finally, if a Rotte or Schwarm was attacked from
battle formation, climbing
were at the heart of standard squadron air drills; pilots strove to achieve perfection in
behind, a quick turn by the formarion would see the
hard over Kent in the summer
formation, with a view to ensuring the uccess of the flight and squadron attacks that
attacker immediately come under threat himself. If
were so regularly practised. The order to attack was always preceded by the flight
the rear section of an RAF formation were bounced, the aircraft under attack
commander designating the number of the attack - for example, 'Fighting Area Attack
had usually been shot down well before another pilot could attempt to fend off the
of 1940. The unit's CO, Sqn Ldr Peter Townsend, described these formation tactics in his autobiography Duel of Eagles;
No.5 - go.' These attacks provided wonderful training in formation drill, but were
'I must admit I had qualms
worthless in terms of any relationship with effective shooting. Pilots complained that
about leading my little band into the midst of a vast horde of the enemy. For this is how we fought - independently in squadrons of 12 aircraft. We had often discussed among ourselves how to go about it; our job was to go for the
enemy fighters.
The 8EF has been forced into
AJthough frontline units quick.ly realised how vulnerable fighting area attacks left J 941.
them to German fighters, Vic formations would remain the norm well intO
preoccupied with keeping station with the aircraft all around them.
Indeed, officially pilot were forbidden from implementing new tactics at unit level,
been won. The Gruppe lost
The standard RAF fighter formation at the time was the V-shaped 'Vic' of three
as the RAF ManuaL ofAir Tactics of 1938 stated 'Squadron Commanders are not to
three Bf 110s to RAF fighters
aircraft. A squadron of 12 fighters would be plit into two flights, '!\ and 'B', each in
practice forms of attack other than those laid down, unless they have been specially
rurn comprising twO secrions of three fighters. \Xfhen in full-strengtll battle formation,
authorised by Headquarters, Fighter Command.' Even though in the spring of 1940 a serious flaw in RAF tactics had been cruelly
the Vic would be the squadron CO or senior flight comma.nder, with succeeding 'Vs'
exposed, there was really no time for Fighter Command to rectify this problem by issuing new tactics on the eve of the Battle of Britain. Tn a bid to improve the
fighter escort. Only if they
position his formation behind them and then lead tile attack in section after section.
operability of the Vic, Fighter Command permitted squadrons to widen OLit the
Such attacks would have worked well against German bombers had it not been for
formations, thus allowing pilots to search the skies for the enemy more freely, rather
the presence of escort fighters sweeping the skies allead of them. Jagdwa.ffe tactics, as
than concentrating on close formation-keeping with the lead aircraft. A section or
section in line astern, my own
discussed in detail later in this chapter, were far more flexible in nature, and centred
pair of aircraft would also now fly as 'weavers' some 1,000ft above and behind the
in the centre, one on each
on smaller formations engaging other fighters rather than JUSt bombers. As RAF
main formation in an effort to forestall surprise attacks from the rear. This change in
Fighter Command would soon find out to its cost, Fighting Area Attacks were useless
tactics was again prompted by the success of No. I Sqn, which was in a better position
side, one behind, and each at a comfortable distance. The squadron had a narrow front
against small formations of high-performance fighters - especially Bf 109£s. Indeed
to ignore Fighter Command directive
and was easy to manoeuvre.
when the German pilots, who invariably enjoyed a height advantage, observed the
com man d's j urisd iction in France. Fig Off Richey recalled:
Each pilot was able to search.'
of the Battle of France has
during Operation Dynamo, but claimed 28 Spitfires and two Hurricane Is destroyed in
all 12 aircraft would be tightly grouped toged1er in four sections of tllree fighters. Leading following in close line asrern. Once bombers had been spotted, d1e commander would
four sections of three, each
evacuation and the first half
there was never cnough timc to gct the gunsight on the target because they were toO
bombers. It was the Spitfires'
it with them. lied No. 85 in
overfly the smoking ruins of Dunkirk in early June 1940.
job to look for the enemy
barred the way would we mix
'Sharks mouths' of II.!ZG 76
return.
because the unit was no longer under the
British fighters flying into combat in tight, neat rows of three, they quickly gave the Vics their own name: 'Idiotenreihen' ('rows of idiots'). Those pilot who survived their initial encounters with the enemy soon came to
We all [Ook it in turns
[0
be designated 'arse-end-Charlie'. He was the chap who hung
about above and behind the Formation, which was usually in open 'Vic'. His job was
[0
realise that a combat formation had to be able to manoeuvre while maintaining
protect the Formation's tail, which was blind when Hying straight, and
cohesion. Pilot also had to be able to cover each other's blind areas so as to prevent
surprise anack. We had learned this technique From the French soon aFter our arrival in
surprise attacks on the formation. Finally, individual members of the formation had
eastern France, and usually had two 'Charlies', who proved indispensable. In Faer, not
to be able to sUppOrt each other should they corne under attack. The Luftwaffe's four-strong chwarm formation (based on the loose pair, or Rotte, which was at the heart of all jagdwa.ffe formations) met all these criteria, but Fighter
[0
prevent a
once during the entire campaign in France was our Formation surprised. We were oFten attacked From above, which is a diFFerent matter; bllt we always saw the enemy beFore he was in range and were never jumped.
Command's tight Vics did not. A Schwarm could turn as tightly as any individual aircraft within the formation, whereas the Vic's rate of turn was limited by the need
56
for it to pivot on the aircraft on the inside of the turn.
However, without anyone to protect their tails, countless 'weavers' were themselves shot down during the Battle of Britain. These modifications certainly improved the
57
RAF Fighter Command's standard formation, with three-aircraft Vics, proved inflexible when squadrons encountered the Jagdwaffe in 1940. The fighters typically flew so close together that only the lead pilot was able to search for the enemy, since the remaining 11 had to focus on formation·f1ying.
/ ~
.
f, . . ... .. ··
.·.. · ···· ·
search and mutual-support capabilities of Fighter Command's formations, but did nothing to improve their ability to perform tight turns without losing cohesion. Throughout the Battle of France, RAF Hurricane units would routinely encounter Bf 11 Os as the latter flew ahead of German bomber formations, attempting to sweep the skies clear of Allied fighters. Other Zerstorer would remain with the bombers, providing close escort. The actions on 11 May set the tone for the rest of the month
... .. .... ...
... y
.."
..................
~
The defensive circle [Abwehrkreis, in Luftwaffe parlance) was routinely adopted by Bf 110 units in combat throughout 1940. It had two potential aims. First, it was a defensive manoeuvre, with the forward guns of each aircraft protecting the tail of the aircraft ahead. Second, it allowed a formation to effectively take possession of an extensive area of sky which could then be occupied and defended for as long as necessary - when covering the approach or withdrawal of another formation, for example. When used in the latter fashion the tactic lured enemy fighters to attack a potentially lethal formation at some disadvantage.
when Nos. 73 and 501 Sqns engaged Bf 110Cs from I./ZG 2 that were escorting He IllHs from II./KG 53. No.1 Sqn's 'B' Flight was intercepted by additional
Undoubtedly the most widely recognized ZerstOrer badge of 1940 was II.1ZG 76's fearsome 'sharksmouth'. 'M8+CP', pictured here, belonged to 6. Staffel- the unit which clashed with NO.1 Sqn's Hurricanes west of Laon on 15 May 1940.
elements ofI./ZG 2 while protecting Battles. That same evening No.1 Sqn's '!\. Flight
by the original Lehrgruppe as the Bf 11 O's best means of defence against a more
took on I./ZG 26 as it escorted Do 17Zs from III./KG 76.
manoeuvrable opponent; the circle was laid down in every Zerstorer pilot's handbook.
As would be the case during the spring and summer of 1940, the Hurricane I pilots
Over the next few months references to the term 'circle' would also appear with
were heavily outnumbered on each occasion (often by as many as three-to-one), yet
increasing frequency in RAF fighter pilots' after-action combat reports, as embattled Bf 11 Os resorted to it more and more.
they used the superior manoeuvrability of their aircraft to inflict losses on both the escorts and the bombers.
The reasoning behind this manoeuvre is explained in detail by leading Luftwaffe
Two Hurricane Is were lost to the Zerstorergruppen and four Bf 110s shot down, as
historians John Vasco and Peter Cornwall in their book Zerstorer.
well as 14 German bombers. Overclaiming was rife on both sides, however, and this too became an enduring theme of the air war in 1940. Indeed, Hurricane I pilots were
The circular formation adopted by Bf I lOs and often referred to by British pilots was not
credited with the destruction of 18 Bf 110s
always an entirely defensive manoeuvre. The idea that up to 30 Zerstorers would
on 11 May! Further heavy claims were made
automatically protect themselves from attack by five Hurricanes in this way reflects the
four days later, when pilots from four units
relative naivety of some of the younger, more inexperienced, RAP pilots of the time. Yet
were credited with 13 Zerstorer destroyed,
this notion clearly improved their confidence when facing such odds. The more
and on 18 May when 21 Bf 110s were
provocative use of the defensive circle led to its being renamed the Angriffikreis
shared by nine squadrons. Zerstorergruppen
or 'attack circle' which, it was later argued, had a more confident ring to it.
losses for both days amounted to 21 aircraft.
Later, with the grim humour common in any air force, some Zerstorer pilots
From the very start of the Blitzkrieg,
came to call it the Angstkreisor 'circle offear' - their schoolgirl shrieks down the
British
fighter
pilots
reported
that
radio as they circled around prompted angry rebukes from the Kommandeur.
Zerstorergruppen would quickly form up 58
into a defensive circle as soon as they
Hurricane I pilots were dismissive of the defensive circle, as they quickly realised
spotted them. This tactic had been devised
that that they could either dive on it or break into it and use their tighter turning
5~
The AASF's most successful fighter squadron during the Battle of France [10-21 May 1940], No.1 Sqn was credited with 63 confirmed kills [29 of them Bf 110s 1and 11 pro babies, for the loss of two pilots killed, one captured and four wounded. The unit also had a whopping 21 Hurricanes destroyed, most of them abandoned on the ground. Of the 22 units to see action during the Blitzkrieg, only the Air Component's Nos. 3 and 85 Sqns, with 67 and 64.5 kills respectively, outscored No.1 Sqn. In this famous press photograph, the officers of No. 1 Sqn pose for one final group shot outside their hotel [the Mairie 1at Neuville in early 1940. They are, from left: Pit Off Billy Orake, Fig Off Les Clisby and Fig Off L. R. 'Lorry' Lorimer [both killed in action on 14 May], Fit Lt Peter Prosser Hanks, Pit Off Peter 'Boy' Mould, Sqn Ldr Patrick 'Bull' Halahan, Lt Jean 'Moses' Oemozay [French liaison officer], Fit Lt P. R. 'Johnny' Walker, 'Ooc' Brown [squadron medical officer], Fig Off Paul Richey, Fig Off John 'Killy' Kilmartin, Pit Off J. S. Mitchell [killed in action on 2 Ma rch 1940) and Fig Off Cyril 'Pussy' Palmer. Note that both Walker and Palmer are wearing carpet slippers'
Hurricane 1. And even when Spitfires were encountered for the first time over Dunkirk, certain German pilots till believed in the fighting abilities of their bomberdestroyer. As Vasco and Cornwall point out, 'Those who flew the Bf 110 with some flair and a certain elan, and in combat situations invariably flat out at full emergency boost, had no such qualms.' One of the Bf 110's great strengths was its speed when diving. Hurricane I pilots often commenting that they could not stay with the enemy aircraft when it pushed its nose down. No. 151 Sqn CO and future ace Sqn Lelr Teddy Donaldson experienced this at first hand on 18 May while attempting to engage Bf 110Cs from Il.lZG 76: I pulled the plug (engine boosr) and climbed afrer two Messerschmin lIas which were the remains ofsix rhat had jusr escorred Do 17s senr to bomb our airfield at Virry. When I climbed to 6,000fr the Messerschmim attacked. They passed verTically down behind
me and [ was able to flick-roll in behind one of rhem, which dived to ground level inro the smoke of the burning Hurricanes ar Vitry. I followed, pulled the plug, bur alrhough radius to pick off the Bf 110s from inside ir. The citcle also had to be complete for it
I was doing well over 400mph, J coulclnot gain on him.
to work at all, and if it was formed too slowly it could easily be attacked. Charles Gatdner, a BBC correspondent in France, witnessed pilots from
0.]
Sqn successfully
get inside a defensive circle during the great aerial clashes of 15 May:
Bf 1 10 pilots, like their Bf 109E brethren, had shown a liking for 'dive-and-zoom' attacks during the Battle of France, with the bomber-destroyer able to make use of its superior armament in such scenarios. This tactic worked well when the Zerstdrergruppen
There was a fight before breakfast when a secrion of Hurricanes ran into 15 Me J las, of
had a height advantage, and in May] 940 this was typically the case. For example, on
which seven or eight srraightaway adopted 'circus tacries' - rhat is, revolving on each
the last day of the month over the Dunkirk beaches, three Bf 1] OCs from 5.1ZG 26
orher's tail. This was one of rhe first indications rhar rhe J las were wary of Hurricanes,
dived at full speed on a formation of close to 50 Hurricane Is and Spitfires as it patrolled
and preferred to adopt defensive measures rarher rhan offensive ones. This characrerisric
off the French coasr. Targeting the 'weavers' at tile rear of the formation, the Zerstdrer
of lID formarions srill persisrs, and when arracked, rhey almosr always invariably form
pilots picked off two Hurricane Is from No. 229 Sqn on their first pass. The Bf 1lOs then
the old defensive ring. On rhis occasion rhe Hurricanes climbed round inro one run and
regained height using the speed built up in their dive while the British fighters milled
then broke into rhe German formarion, one afrer rhe other. Two
1] Os
wenr down - one
withour parr of irs tail and rhe other giving out smoke and sream.
around below, getting in each others' way due to the rigidity of their battle formation. Taking advantage of this, the Zerstdrer made two more passes and claimed three Spitfires destroyed before discrerion got the better of them and they made good their escape.
The Battle of France quickly revealed that the Bf 110 could not hope to 'mix it'
Missions such as this one went a long way to restOring the morale of the
with the Hurricane I in a dogflghr. This confirmed the fears of Oberleutnant Victor
Zerstdrergruppen which, despite having taken a battering From AJlied fighters, were
Molders of J./ZG 1, who commented 'The Bf 110 was not manoeuvrable. The
still confident of securing control of the skies over England following the capitulation
steering was too heavy. In tight [Urns it slid about and fell out of the sky like a leaf from
of France.
a tree. Trimming the aircraft or increasing speed didn't help.' Leutnant Richard Marchfelder ofII.IZG 1 noted gloomily "After our first encounter with British fighters it became soberly clear to us that the holidays were over and we had to use all of our wits to fight a desperate enemy.' Yet despite taking heavy losses between 1] May and 3 June (around 80 Bf 1 lOs were destroyed in combat, but not all by Hurricane Is), the Zerstdrergruppen had in
60
BATTLE OF BRITAIN The recent advance of the Zerstdrer to the Channel coast had clearly shown up chinks
the main achieved what had been demanded of them -long-range bomber escorr. The
in the Bf 110' armour, and operations over southern England during what would
Bf 110s had routinely operated from bases far behind the frontline, and their superior
become known as the Battle of Britain would shatter the reputation of Goring's
range and endurance had proven invaluable when it came to protecting vulnerable
'Ironsides'. However, the Hurricane [ units that would oppose the Zerstdrergruppen,
bomber formations from Allied fighters. When flown by an experienced pilot, the
and the rest of the all-conquering Luftwaffe, had taken a mighty beating in their ill-
Zerstdrer had shown that it could hold its own against most types, including the
fated defence of France. Some 386 aircraft had been either shot down or abandoned
OVERLEAF At 0745hrs on 15 May 1940, a large formation of Bf 110Cs [possibly from I./ZG 26) overflew Berry·au·Bac airfield at 15,000ft. They formed part of the escort for bombers sent to attack Laon. Six Hurricane Is from No.1 Sqn's 'B' Flight were scrambled, with Fit Lt Peter Prosser Hanks leading the chase in N2380. The Hurricanes were unable to catch the Bf 110 formation until the latter changed direction. Hanks later recalled: 'We got above them and Idived vertically on the leader and fired a burst, allowing deflection, and he just blew up. Nothing left of him but a few small pieces.' Hanks shot down a second Bf 110 moments later, but his own fighter was badly hit and he was forced to bail out of the blazing aircraft:
6
Epitomising the spirit of
slow-flying bombers and clear rhe skies of enemy
freie Jagd, this unidentified
machine of ZG 26 hunts
fighters through 'dive-and-zoom' attacks, using
among the scattered clouds.
superior height, rhe element of surprise and the
The crews of aircraft such
Zerstorers heavy armament to overwhelm their
as this little realised that the
opponents. These advantages were lost when
height of the Battle of France
Bf 1 J Os were 'shackled' to a formation of bombers,
also marked the apogee of the Bf 110's career as a day-
leaving flghrer crews with little choice but to adopt
fighter.
rheir by-now-infamous defensive circles. The larrer could also be used as a decoy manoeuvre for the bombers, as ir filled a large area of sky with a prom inen t
mass
of wheel ing ai rcrafr.
Such
'beehives' in turn attracred enemy fighrers, so often served rheir major purpose. One pilor who found circling Bf l10s irresistible was ace Fit Lt Adrian 'Ginger' Boyd of No. 145 Sqn, based ar Tangmere_ On 8 August
The Hurricane I quickly proved
his unit had been put on 'immediate readiness' to protecr convoy CW9, codenamed
itself capable of withstanding
Peewit, from atrack by German bombers as it sailed in a westerly direction through the
considerable battle damage once combat was joined over
Towards the end of the Battle
as unflyable on the ground, and it would take Fighter Command until early july to
Straits of Dover. The convoy was rargeted rhroughout rhe day, and No. 145 Sqn had
of Britain, Fighter Command's
make good these losses.
five pilots killed as rhey arrempted to defend the beleaguered vessels. The unit in rurn
aircraft, coded 'YB-S', clearly
As mentioned, the first task given to the Luftwaffe in the early stages of the battle
claimed more rhan a dozen Ju 87s, Bf 109s and Bf 110s desrroyed, no fewer than five
shows. The starboard wing
of lessons learned earlier in
was the denial of the English Channel to British shipping in an offensive dubbed
of which were credired to Boyd. Two of his victories were Zerstorer, possibly from
trailing edge ribs have been
the year. A clear example of
'Kanalkampf. The Do 17s and ju 87s charged with performing this mis ion would
V.(Z)/LG l. Forty-eight hours larer he described rhis engagement in a BBC broadcasr
exposed by enemy machine
this was the adoption of
need fighter protection, and the long-range Bf 110 would be heavily involved in such
aimed at boosting civilian morale.
basic combat formations began to change as a result
formations of three four-
France, as this No. 17 Sqn
gun fire, while a cannon shell has blown apart a section of
operarions, particularly over rhe sourhwest coast of England. As if a portent of things
Unable to make contact with his squadron mates due to a faulty radio, Boyd had
to come, the Zerstorergruppen lost nine aircrafr in the first 72 hours of rhe offensive.
circled with his section of three Hurricane Is at 12,000ft directly overhead two large
anonymous pilot, the
In this photograph, taken in
Among those killed was Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Goring, nephew of the
starboard wing main fuel tank
September 1940, No. B7 Sqn's
Reichsmarschall. His 9.1ZG 76 machine had been downed by Hurricane Is of No.
formations ofBf 110s that were wheeling around over the Channel 30 miles south of the Isle of Wight:
aircraft sections, instead of four three-aircraft Vies.
'A' Flight illustrates the new tactical formation, with Fit Lt Ian 'Widge' Gleed leading his cha rges on a patrol between
87 Sqn on 11 july, during an attack on Portland harbour.
[located immediately in front of the area of battle damage] appears to have escaped
As rhese losses clearly showed, the Bf 110 was nor well suited to the role of close
I was curious ro know why they were circling round like that, and we decided ro have a
bomber escorr. Unirs equipped with the aircrafr had been rrained to sweep ahead of
crack. We went down on them. The Messerschmitt which was at the end of the circling line
Exeter and Bibury. This
of fighters was shot down into the sea immediately. Well, we broke up the happy litrle
'finger-four' formation was
circle quite effectively. AJI three of us got at least one, and I think we must have taken them
favoured by the Jagdwaffe, as
flap. Fortunately for the
unscathed. The panel covering the aircraft's radios and oxygen bottles is missing. However, there is no damage in the immediate vicinity, so it
by surprise_ I was a[[acked by a Messerschmi[[ 110 which I suppose I had overlooked.
may have been removed by
to manoeuvre as required
I skidded round and climbed for him, bllt he broke away to the left. I was still turning, and
the groundcrew upon the
while still maintaining
at abollt 1,000ft I staJled. He was right in my gunsiglus. I just gave him a quick burst, he
it allowed each of the fighters
formation integrity. It also
heeled over and wem straight inro the sea and broke up. He was really a si[[ing duck.
increased the pilots' field of
magnitude usually meant the aircraft had to be taken out of
view, thus improving each man's ability to scan the
Hurricane's return to its dispersal. Damage of this
A few hours later, fellow ace Fit Lt Frank Carey of No. 43 Sqn - also based at Tangmere - almost fell victim
mates. Finally, greater
from the re t ofhis flight, he was stalking a formation of Bf 109s at around 20,000ft
awareness of the evolving
when, JUSt as he positioned himself for an attack, all hell broke loose:
to
a Bf 1] 0 whilst trying
defend Peewit. Separated
blind areas behind his section
to
the frontline and sent to a dedicated repair facility.
combat situation meant that a pilot under attack
64
could expect rapid support
A very large explosion nearly blew me upside down. A Me I 10 had seen whar was
from his squadronmates.
happening, and it had come down and was si[[ing about 30yd behind me, and its
65
explosive 20mm shots had blown up all the ammunition in my port wing, leaving a hole big enough for a man to crawl through.
. ,
Carey had fallen victim to a classic 'dive-and-zoom' attack from
Hurricane I was fi
"
,
a Bf 110 freed from protecting dive-bombers sent to attack the convoy. Despite having been wounded in the arm, Carey pressed
This unit, devised by the Barr & Stroud comp'any in
on with his mission, only
1935, featured a lens through which a large circular
to
be jumped again:
A substantial rubber Rad was fitted to Rrotect the Rilot
Barr & Stroud GM 2 reflector gunslght as standard.
,
This time they blew one elevator and the rudder off and the aircraft
"
better part of valour and slowly brought the remains back to base.
The graticule was bisected
.
did a half'bunt' before I collected my senses. Having only about threequarters of an aircraft left to control, I thought discretion was the
. ... .
0
......
the centre, with the range/base setting being determined using two knurled rings with thei~ own
0
-
0
o •
,
the RAE as its standard fixed gunsight, the GM 2 was
graticule was p'rojected onto a circular glass reflector
,.
-
0"
•
.
.- "
0-
0
.- ,
"'
1937, and the first examp'les
-,
.11
II
"
...I.
.."'
scale that turned a Rersp'ex p'ointer
Carey's aircraft was almost certainly one of 18 British fighters that the ZerstiJrergruppen were credited with having destroyed on 8 August. Yet despite these successes demonstrating that the Bf lias were at their most effective when freed to hunt for British fighters, the ZestiJrergeschwaders would continue to operate in the ABOVE Fit Lt J. B. Nicolson of No. 249
Sqn was not an ace - his solitary kill was the Bf 110 he attacked on 16 August 1940, as detailed below - yet he became the only member of Fighter Command to be awarded Britain's highest military honour, the Victoria Cross (VC). Nicolson,
close-escort role well into August, during which time the Bf 110 units became both depleted and demoralised. Things came to a head on 13 August during the delayed launch of Adlertag, when bad weather played havoc with the Luftwaffe's carefully planned assault. Recall orders were sent out, which only added to the confusion among units involved as some did not receive the message. For example, the Bf lias of V(Z)/LG I, charged with clearing the way for KG 54's]u 88s targeting Portland harbour, flew into a veritable hornets' nest of British fighters. The efforts of the
to various range settings, and an adjustable ring which turned an indicator to indicate wingsRan
In
mechanism then
. ..... ...
set the gap' according to ttie
..
.
II
added as a further aiming Roint. The Rilot first set the s an dial to the known wingsRan of his p'rosp.ective target, then the range dial to the maximum for accurate '"0
.. =.•
ZerstiJrergruppen were all in vain, however, as the bombers had remained on their
radius o~ the graticule ring gave ttie
airfields west of Paris.
deflection allowance fo~ hitting a
..
commanding 'A' Flight, was one of three pilots from his unit to engage German raiders
....
- 0
striking at Gosport. It was his first time in combat. Nicolson was bounced out of the sun
.
"'
by a Staffel of Bf 109Es just before engaging the enemy, and his Hurricane I was set alight. However, he stayed with his stricken fighter long enough to claim a Bf 110
Five Bf lias were shot down and three more damaged so badly that they had to be written off, prompting Reichmarschall Goring to furioLlsly criticise his senior commanders in the field for allowing such a serious tactical blunder to take place:
destroyed. Nicolson suffered serious burns to his hands
The incident ofY./LG I on 13 August shows that certain unit commanders have not yet
OPPOSITE
awarded the VC for his
learnt the importance of clear orders. I have repeatedly given orders that twin-engined
Bf 110C 'A2+AL: of 6.1ZG 2,
bravery in November 1940.
fighters are only to be employed where the range ofother fighters is inadequate, or where
pictured at Guyancourt,
He is pictured here playing
it is for the purpose of assisting our single-engined aircraft to break off com bar. Our
a Jew's harp while
stocks of twin-engined fighters are not great, and we must use them as economically
before bailing out. He was
66
convalescing.
provides the backdrop for a meeting of the Staffers
as possible.
aircrew as they pore over details of the next mission.
6(
Many lerstlirer were brought down over England, while others were so badly damaged that they did not make it back across the Channel. Few had their demise captured so graphically on film as this aircraft. It is apparently coded 'Yellow G', but references differ as to its exact identity. One source states that this dramatic telephoto sequence, shot from the French side of the Channel, shows the final moments of a 6.1ZG 76 machine piloted by Feldwebel Jakob Birndorfer. If this is the case, the incident must have occurred early in the Battle of Britain and the crew must have been rescued, for Birndorfer was killed on 1S August 1940, trying to crash-land on the Isle of Wight. Another source suggests the Bf 110 may have been Wk-Nr. 3263 of III.lZG 26, shot down into the Channel on 2S September. Again, the crew [pictured in the water in the final photograph) was rescued unhurt by the
For a short time Hurricane I R4224 was the mount of No. 17 sqn's newly arrived CO, sqn Ldr A. G. Miller. He was forced to crash-land the aircraft near North Weald on 3 September 1940 after being attacked by a Bf 110 flown by Leutnant Kurt Sidow of 9.1ZG 26.
T",o Bf 1 lOs were also lost by I.lZG 2 on 13 August during a late-afternoon mission escorting ]u 88s of Ill./LG I bound for Andover. Leurnanr Wolfgang MLinchmeyer was one of the pilots shot down: The bombers were diving and disappearing in the clouds
to
seek their targets. So, we were free
to
look for possible adversaries, and by chance we found them in the form of Hurricanes flying at a lower altitude. I was flying as rearguard of our formation, and as we dived on them with increasing speed I was hit from below. I received rwo gunshots in my right foot from beneath and
submission. Certainly, Fighter Command was feeling the pressure from endless raids on
another one must have set the elevator steering
its aitfields and mounting losses in the air, but it was still capable of engaging the
out of contra\. Unable to clear the situation, we
bomber formations and their eSCorts as they attacked targets primarily in Nos. 10 and
bailout. Bailing out, I hit the elevatOrs of
11 Group areas. Thanks ro the reduction in their numbers, Bf 110 losses (28 aircraft
my aeroplane with my legs and landed with both
in rotal) were bearable for the rest of August. However, the first week of September
had
to
legs fractured, suspended by my parachute in a
proved disastrous for the Zerstdrergeschwaders, as no fewer than 48 Bf I 10s were lost,
tree.
with 17 of them destroyed on 4 eptember alone - and overall Luftwaffe losses that day were 28 aircraft destroyed. Among the Hurricane 1 pilots ro engage the Bf 110 on 4
Even heavier losses followed on 15, 16 and 18 August, when a rotal of 51 Bf 110
destroyed in action or damaged beyond repair.
On 4 September we succumbed
Sixty Hurricane [s were also downed during the
a defensive circle over Beachy Head. We arracked them, hoping
pilots
temptation and went after 15 Me I lOs which formed
to
and gOt one of them in our first arrack. I was so close
break up their circle,
could see a red dragon painted on his nose. Fortunately for me, my squadron mate John
j
Parker shot another 110 off my tail while I was dealing with the Red Dragon.
Zestdrergeschwaders for the re t of the Battle of
The embattled Zerstdrergeschwaders
Britain, as they were now struggling with both
could not sustain the rate of losses
a shortage of aircraft and, more crucially,
suffered in the first week of September.
personnel to fly them. Goring, during a
Indeed, by now certain units were
conference held at his Karinhall residence on
struggling to get enough serviceable
19 August, reiterated his view on how the
aircraft and scratch crews ro man them
remaining Bf II Os had to be used:
for the next wave of sorties. Yet
be employed where the range of single-engined aircraft is
they
struggled
on,
performing valuable escort duty for
insufficient, or where they can facilitate the breaking-off from combat of single-engined
bomber
formation. The protection of returning bombers and fighters over the Channel must be
striking
assured by specially designated fighter formations.
formations key
tasked
industrial
with
targets
III
outhwest England. One such mission was flown on 25 September, when 50
68
to
him before breaking away that
either been killed, posted missing or caprured.
somehow to
to
perished. By conrrast, 87 Zerstdrer crew had These losses had a lasting effect on the
Twin-engined fighters are
o. 79 Sqn, based at Biggin Hill:
IDs were
ame period, but crucially only 21
Seenordiensr.
September was ace Pit Off Don Srones of
In effect, Goring was ordering his Zerstdrercrews even deeper inro the lion's den in
Bf 11 Os from ZG 26 covered 64
suppOrt of the hard-pressed Kampfgeschwadersas they attempted ro bomb the RAF into
He Ills of KG 55 senr ro arrack the
The 'Sharksmouths,' four leading Experren, all future Knight's Cross holders, pose for a photograph during the latter stages of the Battle of Britain. They are, from left: Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Jabs and Oberleutnant Wilhelm Herget [both of 6.1ZG 76]. Hauptmann Erich Groth [Gruppenkommandeur of II.!ZG 76) and Hauptmann Heinz Nacke (Sra((elkapitiin of 6.1ZG 76)
Ace pilot Sqn Ldr Peter
Bristol aviation works at Filton. Despite the mauling they had received at
Townsend is pictured leaning
the hands of Fighter Command over the previous two-and-half months,
heavily on his walking stick
the Zerstorerwere still highly rated as escorts by Kampfliegersuch as gunner
at Church Fenton in mid-
Robert Gotz, serving with I./KG 55:
September 1940. He was suffering from a foot wound inflicted by a Bf 110 over
We are to attack an aircrafr factory ar Filton, and rhree Me 110 fighter groups
Tunbridge Wells on 31 August.
have been announced as heavy fighter protection. Over Cherbourg, they in fact
He is flanked by No. B5 Sqn's
suddenly appear above us. It is a very reassuring feeling to see so many big twO-
sergeant pilots. Townsend
engined fighters up rhere, wirh rheir shark's teeth and similar symbols painted
would claim a solitary Bf 110
on rhem. And rhese can accompany us much further inland than the single-
on lB August.
engined Me 109, and are supposed to have rerrifying firepower. Bur rhere have
OPPOSITE
been rumours thar rhey are by no means all thar fast, as the circumsrances would
A Bf 110 is despatched by a
urgenrly require. However that may be, rhere they were as guardian angels, and
Hurricane lover the Channel
they would soon show their teerh.
during the Battle of Britain. The 'kill' was recorded by the fighter's gun·camera, which
Three Bf 1 lOs from ZG 26 and four He 1 I Is were lost during the Filton
operated automatically
mission. Given the scale of the RAF's reaction to this raid, the Zerstorercrews had done their job well. Two days later, in what would prove to be the last
whenever the pilot fired his
activity recede. The requirement for daily close-escort mis ions for large daylight
weapons. In the first frame the Bf 110 can be seen trying
large-scale encounter between the Bf 1 10 and the Hurricane over England,
bomber formations fighting their way to and from the target was over. Fighter
the Zerstorergeschwaders endured their worst losses of the Battle of Britain
Command, and in particular the Hurricane I, had prevailed in the defence of Britain.
when a staggering 19 aircraft (a number of them fighter-bombers) were
The wholesale slaughter of the Bf 110 led to the dismemberment of the Zerstorerwajfe
full throttle, as they are
downed as they attempted to arrack indusrrial targets south of London.
by the end of 1940. Perhaps the final word on the fate of the bomber-destroyer should
leaving trails of exhaust
Hurricane I pilots alone claimed 39 Bf 110s destroyed on this date. One of
go to eminent Luftwaffe historian and prolific Osprey author John Weal, who state
smoke in their wake. Tracer
these was credited to Pit OffTom Neil of No. 249 Sqn, who paid ttibute to
in Messerschmitt Bf J J 0 Zerstorer Aces ofWorld IVtzr II:
to escape by increasing
the bravery of the rear gunner of one of the Zerstorer he attacked:
rounds from the Hurricane can be seen streaming through the air in the second
In a year of hard campaigning the Bf 110 had surpassed all expectations in Poland,
As I sought to drop into line astern 400yd behind the steeply turning 110, the
speed - both DB 601s are at
excelled itself over the German Bight and Norway, fulfilled irs role in France and been
rear-gunner fired, his tracer flicking past above and to the right of my head. I
fought almost to extincrion over England. Numbers never tell the whole story, but one
fired in response, which seemed to galvanise the aircraft in front into turning
Barrie of Britain sratistic is as stark as it is sobering. The Luftwaffe had embarked upon
even more violenrly, causing - I was relieved to note - the gunfire from the rear
the Barrie in July 1940 with 237 serviceable Bf J 10 Zerstorer . .. and lost no fewer rhan
to cease. The result of 'G' forces on the gunner, I though grimly, in which case
223 in the waging of it.
and third frames, with an eventual hit on the port engine, which bursts into flames in the fourth frame.
keep the blighter turning! I fired again, this time from much closer range. The 110 dropped its nose and began to level out. Immediately, more fire from the rear cockpit, twisting and flicking in my direction so close that [ flinched, expecting the metallic thud of bullets. Wow' Even closer now, less than 50yd and fear erased by surging adrenaline. The gunner ignored - forgotten. I fired again, tracer, sparks and twinkling flashes everywhere. The rear gunner responded with another burst that whipped into my face and over my head. A brave chap, by George! Would I be doing thar in his position) J had a mental picture of the man shelrering behind the piece of armour plate, then jumping up and firing whenever the opportunity presented irself.
One of the 15 Bf 110s lost by ZG 26 on lB August 1940 the 'Hardest Day' - was Leutnant Hans-Joachim Kastner's '3U+EP', which
More Bf 110 losses occurred in early October, with seven ai rcraft from III.lZG 26 downed on 7 Ocrober while escorting a raid on the Westland aircraft works in Yeovil.
70
However, as the scale of Luftwaffe operations reduced significantly, so did Zerstorer
crash-landed near Newchurch, Kent, after being damaged by a Hurricane I from No. 56 Sqn.
?
Four of the six No. 601 Sqn pilots seen in this photograph [taken at a damp Exeter airfield in late September 1940) had 'made ace' by the end of the Battle of Britain, with a handful of Bf 110 kills included in their tallies. Fit Lt W P. 'Billy' Clyde [second from left) scored nine and one shared destroyed, two probables and one and one shared damaged; Fig Off Tom Grier (sitting on
STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS
the tailplane) claimed eight and four shared destroyed, one and one shared probable and one damaged (he was killed in action leading No. 32 Sqn over France on S December 1941; Fit Lt Sir Archibald Hope [wearing the Irvin jacket] was credited with one and one shared destroyed, two unconfirmed destroyed, three and one
Bf 110s and Hurricane Is fought each other from 26 March 1940, when No. 73 Sqn
Ten Hurricane I pilots were credited with five or more Bf 110s destroyed in 1940, and
engaged aircraft from 13./LG lover the Franco-German border, to 17 November 1940,
the two leading aces in this list (Fig Offs John Kilmartin and Leslie C1isby) claimed the
when No. 17 Sqn claimed four Bf 1] OCs from l./£rpr. Gr. 2] 0 destroyed off Harwich.
bulk of their victories in France with
In the early months of ] 941 the two types would only very occasionally engage each
initial clashes between this unit and the Zerstorergruppen in the wake of the German
other in mortal combat, as virtually all Zerstorergeschwaders had been transferred away
invasion that these men had claimed] 2.5 victories between them by 17 May. However,
from the Channel front.
by the latter date C1isby had been killed: he died on 14 May in combat against an
The Hurricane Is in France had enjoyed great success against the Bf 110s when the latter attempted to defend the Kampf and Stukageschwader bombing targets during
more for which there are no details; and to Hope's left, Fit Lt H. C. Mayers, who had scored 11 and one shared destroyed, three and one
overwhelming number of Bf 11 Os. The Australian was the only Zerstorer ace to lose his
shared probables and six
life to a bomber-destroyer in 1940.
damaged by the time he was
the BLitzkrieg in the West. As mentioned, the types fought each other on a near-daily
Despite these successes, the experience of the Hurricane I squadrons in France actually
lost in action leading No. 239 Wing in North Africa on 20
basis from 10 May through to the start of the Dunkirk evacuation (Operation Dynamo)
demonstrated how not to fight an air war. The aircraft had been sent aloft in sections of
July 1942. Note No. 601 Sqn's
on 26 May. Once Dynamo had got under way, both France-based Hurricane I units and
three or flights of six each to face vastly superior numbers of enemy machines. To make
'winged·sword' emblem on
squadrons from Fighter Command's No. 11 Group combined to take the fight to the
matters worse, the tactical formations used were totally unsuited to engaging enemy
the fin flash of this Hurricane.
Luftwaffe, as the latter tried to interfere with the evacuation.
It was at this time that the Spitfire and the Bf 110 first encountered each other, and
Zerstorercrews, like their single-seat brethren flying the Bf 109£, seemed to suffer severely from an 'afAiction' dubbed 'Spitfire snobbery' by Hurricane units in 1940, both with respect to shooting them down and falling victim to them.
72
o. 1 Sqn. Indeed, such was the ferocity of the
shared probable, four damaged, plus one or two
fighters. In fact, the training of pilots to fly in tight formations had been given priority over gunnery and tactical instruction. As a reSLUt, a significant number of downed RAF pilots never saw the aircraft that bounced tllem. Hurricane Is in France fought most of their engagements against bombers, reconnaissance aircraft or Bf I lOs. And most of the Hurricane 1's larger-sca.le combats,
By the time Dynamo was completed at midnight on 2-3 June, the Zerstorergruppen had
as well as losses, involved Bf IlOs. Although the Hawker fighter proved more than able
lost more than 60 Bf 110s in combat since 10 May. Of course, nOt all had fallen to
to hand.le tile Zerstorer in individual combat (that is, dogfighting), Hurricane I sections
Hurricane Is, but it would be fair
and flights often found themselves overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. Bf 110
to
say that the major proportion had indeed been
claimed by RAF flghter units. Some 87 Bf 110s were credited to Hurricane I pilots as
crews claimed exactly 30 Hurricane Is destroyed in France in May-June 1940, as well as
destroyed between 10 May and the start of Dynamo; a further 32 were claimed between
a similar number of Spitfires mostly during Dynamo, although some of the latter were
26 May and 22 June.
almost certainly misidentified Hurricane Is. Top Bf 110 Zerstdreraces Oberleutnant Hans-
Leading Sf 110 Hurricane I Killers, 1940 Ace
Hurricane Kills
Obit Hans-Joachim Jabs
5
Hptm Heinz Nacke
5
Obit Walter Borchers
Db" Theod" The highest-scoring Zersrorer
5.fZG 75
the south coast during the Adlertagmassacre of 13 August. Two days
5.fZG 75
later, Sgr Reg Llewellyn of
13
4+
19
4,
+
~I
II.fZG 75 5.fZG 25
22
~ZG25
Obit Wilhelm Herget
3+
72
5.fZG 75
a percenrage of these were probably in realiry Hurricane Is. Jabs and
Obstlt Johann Schalk
3+
15
8.fZG 25
counterparts were doing, witll Nacke claiming twO on 15 August and three
-
Spain, where he had flown
Uffz Walter Scherer
3+
10
long-range reconnaissance
Ltn Botho Sommer
3+
7
missions, Nacke would subsequently serve as
Ltn Eduard Tratt
3+
Kommandeurof III./NJG 2,
Ofhr Alfred Wehmeyer
3+
=R 18
II.IZG 1 and ZG 101 through to war's end.
-tf
~ZG25
111.fZG 25 I
l./ZG 1 and Erpr Gr. 210 -----ts:;ZG 25
Ace
~ Fig Off John Kilmartin
110 Kills
7
,
Fig Off Leslie Clisby Fig Off William Clyde
5.5
--
5 --
Final Score
T 13 [+ 2 sh] I
---rJ:6 [+ 1 sh]
and three in the Battle of Britain] while serving as
in 1943 and Kommodore of NJG 5 in 1944, he had taken his score to 59 victories [12 during day missions in the Zerstorer 1by the time
74
he was killed in action on 5 March 1945.
on the 30 August, and Jabs getting two on 1 September. Both pilots were then serving with 6.1ZG 76 and both canle through tlle Battle of Britain witll Knight's Crosses. At unit level, certain Hurricane I squadrons inflicted a heavy tOil on the
Zerstdmgeschwaders, with No.1 Sqnleading the way in the Battle of France by claiming
after the character from Walt Disney's film Pinocchiopose for the camera soon after Gleed's arrival as replacement commander
Units(s) In 1940
destroyed off tlle south coast, followed by 14 offPorriand Bill three days later, while
for No. B7 Sqn's 'A' Flight at
Nos. 1 and 43 Sqns
87 Sqn claimed nine Zerstdrer in the same action. Actual losses on this mission tOtalled
I
NO.1 Sqn
--+ ~[+lSh]
0 fewer than 14 of these were claimed on 11 May alone; actual
Fit It Ian 'Widge' Gleed and 'Figaro' [P2798l - named
of the Batrle of Britain too. For example, on 12 August No. 213 Sqn claimed 11 Bf lIDs o.
16 Bf lIDs, some being downed by Spitfires from Nos. 234 and 609 Sqns.
Lille/Seclin on 17 May 1940. Future ace Pit Off R. P. 'Bee' Beamont had the following to
Some overclaiming occurred within the jagdwaffi tOo, but it did not go as far as
say about Gleed's impact on
No. 501 Sqn
within Fighter Command_ Indeed, Bf 110 crews occasionally underclaimed - as on
the battle-weary unit: 'Gleed was one of our replacement
Fig Off Ian Gleed
5
13 [+ 3sh J
No. 87 Sqn
18 May, when f./ZG 26 and II.IZG 76 were credited with six Hurricane Is destroyed
Sgt Reginald Llewellyn
5
13 [+ 1 sh]
No. 213 Sqn
when in fact II aircraft from seven different squadrons had been downed by the
the UK to tell us exactly how
Pit Off Willie McKnight
5
17 [+ 2 sh]
No. 242 Sqn
Zerstdrergeschwaders. On 27 May, 8.1ZG 26 downed six Hurricane Is from
to run the war - all 5ft 6ins.
Fig Off Manfred Czemin
55
13 [+ 5 sh)
No. 17 Sqn
unit then claimed seven on 14 June when in fact only a single aircraft from No. 242
5 -5
15 [+ 3 sh]
No. 145 Sqn
Sqn was lost. During the epic clash off Portland on 15 August, V(Z)/LG 1 and
NO.1 Sqn
II.lZG 76 claimed 17 Hurricane Is between them but in fact only four were lost. The
Fit Lt Adrian Boyd Fig Off Mark Brown
Fig Off Carl O_av_is_ _ - - f - 5-
I
15 [+ 4 sh] 9 [+ 1 sh]
~ Sqn
Sraffelkapiran of 5./ZG 76. Kommandeur of III./NJG 5
Nacke claimed their Hurricane I kills in multiples, just as their RAF
losses anlounred to sO< Zerstdrer, to all causes. Similar overoptimistic claiming was a feature
Oberleutnant Walter Borchers
during the Battle of France
69 Hurricane I victOries were credited to Zerstdrer pilots during the same timeframe_ Many Spitfire victories were also claimed, and again
36 Bf lIDs destroyed.
Leading Hurricane I Sf 110 Killers, 1940
1940, being credited with four
claimed 297 Bf 110s shot down. Actual Zerstdrer combat losses
3+
Uffz Richard Heller
them. A veteran of the war in
Hurricane Is destroyed [one
Between 9 July and 17 November 1940, Hurricane I pilots
7.fZG 25
-
claimed five successes. The
also enjoyed some success in
lIDs in a single mission.
18
3+ -
Sraffelkapiran, Hauptmann
4.fZG 75
0.213 Sqn also got three off Portland
Bill. Several of the remaining pilots on the list claimed pairs ofBf
during this period tOtalled 236 aircraft to all causes (mainly being
Fw Helmut Haugk
Heinz Nacke, was one of
1
Clyde and Carl Davis of No. 601 Sqn both claimed three Bf lIDs on
shot down by Hurricane Is and Spitfires). In contrast, just
3+
Sraffel in terms of Hurricane Is
was 6./ZG 76; two of its pilots
50
8.fZG 25
Obit Sophus Baagoe
claimed destroyed in 1940
Units(s) In 1940
~
1
Ro<;'.' '-1
Final Score
59
4+
Hptm Eric Groth
I
themselves when tasked with close escort for bomber formations. Amongst the leading Hurricane I aces lisred opposire, Fig Offs William 'Billy'
o. 145
Sqn near Dunkirk, all of which match Fighter Command figures, but the German
acke claimed mainly French MS.406 fighters
during the Battle of France, although Nacke also claimed two Spitfires over Dunkirk.
into the enemy on every conceivable occasion with apparent delight and an entire lack of concern. His
(including aces
spirit was exactly what was
acke with three, Groth and Herget with twO and Jabs and Borcher
losses, however. Few large-scale claims were made by the Zerstdrergeschwaders after this date but Hurricane I squadrons, reinforcing their growing dominance in the skies
In the Batrle of Britain a number of Hurricane I pilots claimed multiple Bf 110
over southern England, continued to make significant claims for Bf lIDs intO early
victories either in an individual mission or during (\¥O or three sortie on the same day.
OctOber 1940. After t1ut, rhe number of airworthy Zerstdrer in France tailed
These successes reflected the sheer number of Zerstdrer present in the skies over southern
off dramatically.
England, particularly in the early phases of the batrle, and their inabiliry to defend
of him' He was immediately as good as his word and tore
jagdwaffes II.IZG 76 was again in the thick of the action on 30 August when its pilots with one apiece) claimed 11 Hurricane Is destroyed. Very few of these match RAF
Joachin Jabs and Hauptmann Heinz
pilots and he came out from
needed to bolster up the somewhat stunned survivors of the week following May 10.'
Europe were a rare event. However, th is was not the case in the eastern Med iterranean in the spri ng of 1941 , as 1. and II. ZG 26 supported the Wehrmacht's advance through the Balkans. In a si tuation not too far removed from the Battle of France one year earlier, a small number of Hurricane Is from the RAF's Nos. 33 and 80 Sqns fought valiantly in the face of overwhelming odds as they
AFTERMATH
attempted to defend Greece. Bf lID aces Hauptmann Theodor Rossiwall and
Devoid of any distinguishing
Oberleutnant Sophus Baagoe claimed victories during rhe campaign, and in an action
markings save its serial, this
involving both men on 20 April the RAF's ranking ace of World War II, Sqn Ldr Marmaduke 'Pat' Pattie of No. 33 Sqn, was killed when his Hurricane was downed by a Zerstorer over Eleusis Bay. By then llUZG 26 had seen plenty of action supporting the Afrika Korps in the convoy patrols, anti-shipping strikes, bomber escort and freie Jagd missions from
Having suffered horrendous losses ro Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, the
February 1941. Heavily involved in the fighting for Tobruk, the unit's crews routinely
Zerstorerwajfiwould never again be in a position ro challenge the RAF in the skies over
clashed with Hurricane Is from Nos. 73 and 274 Sqns, as well
southern England. Clearly unable to hold its own against determined single-engined
Australian Air Force. For example, on 3 April Fig Off Peter Turnbull from the latter
fighter attack, except under only the most advantageous of circumstance, the Bf 110
unit was credited with four Bf liDs destroyed when the Hurricane Is bounced a
needed new employment. Three Gruppen were duly tasked with coastal patrol and
formation of Ju 87s escorted by 7.1ZG 26.
convoy escort in the German Bight, off Norway and in the Mediterranean. Other aircraft
Bf liDs would continue to support the Afrika Korps in North Africa until the latter
and crews were transferred ro the fledgling Nachtjagd, which had begun ro receive a
finally fled Tunisia in May 1943. From mid-1941 onwards, IILlZG 26 had operated
trickle of Bf lIDs at the end of 1939. By VE-Day, the various Nachtjagdgeschwaders
more frequently as a ground attack unit, leaving much of the fighter work ro
would have flown hundreds ofBf liDs and shot down countless heavy bombers as they
Jagdgruppen equipped with Bf 109s that were now in-theatre. However, Bf liDs
attempted ro defend German cities from attack by RAF Bomber Command.
continued to clash with Hurricane JIs in North Africa well into 1942. As with virtually all other frontline Luftwaffe types, the Bf 110 was heavily involved
its role in Fighter Command began ro steadily diminish as more and more units made
in supporti ng the invasion of the Soviet Union from June 1941. Here, its long range
the switch ro the Spitfire. This meant clashes between the Hurricane (now
and heavy-hitting firepower proved great assets, as the Zerstorergeschwaders enjoyed a
predominantly in Mk II form) and the Bf 110 during daylight hours over western
return to the glory days over Poland and France. Many victories were credited to Bf liD pilots, including a number of ex-RAF Hurricanes supplied to the USSR from
9.1ZG 26 go about their
September 1941. Indeed, Feldwebel Theo Weissenberger of I.(Z)/JG 77, flying in
daily chores, patrolling
rhe far north, claimed eight Hurricanes destroyed as part of his tally of23 victories in
Mediterranean airspace in
the Bf 110.
1941. Both machines are
It is almost certainly the case that the last time the Hurricane and Bf 110 clashed
badge, while the former is
in World War II was over the frozen north of the USSR in early 1943. By then no
also wearing the 'Iadybird·in.
longer considered suitable for the day-fighter role for which they had originally been
a·diamond' emblem of III.
designed, both types nevertheless soldiered on through to war's end fulfilling other
Gruppe. The small white 'N' on the nacelle of the nearest aircraft indicates that it is
76
o. 3 Sqn Royal
Sf 1100s' 'LT' and 'MT' of
sporting 9. Staffel's 'cockerel'
powered by DB 601N engines.
missions such as nightfighting and ground attack.
conducts a training sortie with its section·mate near the Egyptian coast in late 1940.
North African campaign. Flying from bases in Libya and Sicily, the unit carried out
The Hurricane too would remain a key RAF type until 1945, although after 1940
late·build Hurricane I [Trop I
The Hurricane's 'glasshouse' did little to help stop heat buildup in the COCkpit even when aloft, so many pilots chose to fly with the canopy slid back and locked in the open position.
Kerley, Barry and Mark Rolfe, Luftwaffe Fledglings 1935-1945 (Hikoki Publications, 1996) Lake, Jon, The Battle ofBritain (Silverdale Books, 2000) eil, Wg Cdr Tom, Gun Button to 'Fire' (William Kinber, 1987) Obermaier, Ernst, Die Ritterkreuztrdger der Luftwaffe Jagdflieger 1939-1945 (Dieter Hoffmann, 1966) Price, Dr Alfred, World War II Fighter Conflict (Purnell, 1975) Ramsey, Winston (ed.), The Battle ofBritain Then and Now, Mk N (After the Batrle, 1987) Richey, W g Cdr Paul, Fighter Pilot Gane's, 1980) hores, Christopher, Aces High: Volume 2 (Grub Street, 1999) Shores, Christopher and
BIBLIOGRAPHY
live Williams, Aces High (Grub Street, 1994)
tedman, Robert E, Jagdflieger: Luftwaffe Fighter Pilot 1939-45 (Osprey Warrior 122) (Osprey 2008) Stones, Donald, Dimsie (Wingham Pre , 1991) turtivanr, Ray, The History ofBritain's Military Training Aircraft (Haynes, 1987) Thomas, Andrew, Hurricane Aces 1941-45 (Osprey Aircraft ofthe Aces 57) (Osprey, 2003) Townsend, Peter, Duel ofEagles (Weidenfeld, 1990)
BOOKS Bungay, Stephen, The Most Dangerous Enemy (Aurum, 2000) Cornwall, Peter D., The Battle ofFrance Then and Now (After the Batrle, 2007) Cull, Brian, Bruce Lander wirh Heinrich Weiss, Twelve Days in May (Grub Street, 1995) Dick, AVM Ron, Hurricane: RAE Fighter (Ai r1i fe, 2000) Drake, Billy, with Christopher Shores, Billy Drake: Fighter Leader (Grub treet, 2002)
Van Ishoven, Armand, Messerschmitt Bf110 at war (Ian Allan 1985) Vasco, John J., Luftwaffe Colours: Zerstorer. Vol. 1: Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers and
Destroyers, 1936-1940 ( lassie Publications, 2005) Vasco, John J. and Peter D. ornwall, Zerstorer: The Messerschmitt 110 and its Units in 1940 GAC Publications, 1995) Vasco, John J. and Fernando Estanislau, Messerschmitt Bf110 , D and E: An Illustrated Study ( la ic Publications, 2008) Weal, John, Messerschmitt Bf110 Zerstorer Aces ofWorld war II (Osprey Aircraft of the Aces 25) (0 prey, 1999)
Foreman, John, Battle ofBritain: The Forgotten Months (Air Research Publications, 1988) Foreman, John, 1941: The Turning Point. Part 1: The Battle ofBritain to the Blitz (Air Research Publications, 1993)
WEBSITES
Foreman, John, RAF Fighter Command Victory Claims ofWorld war Two. Part 1:
1939-1940 (Red Kite, 2003) Franks, orman, RAE Fighter Command Losses ofthe Second World War (Midland Publishing, 1997) Franks,
Kacha, Petr 2007 Aces ofthe Luftwaffe. Available online at:
Wood, Tony 2010 Combat
laims and Casualties. Available online at:
orman, Air Battle Dunkirk (Grub Street, 2000)
Franks, Richard A., The Hawker Hurricane: A Comprehensive Guide for the Modeller
(Modelfer's Datafile 2) (S M Publications, 1999) Green, William, warplanes ofthe Third Reich (Doubleday, 1972) Holmes, Tony, HurricaneAces 1939-40 (Osprey Aircraft ofthe Aces 18) (Osprey, 1998) Jefford,
78
Kent,Gp
. G., RAE Squadrons (Airlife, 2001) aptJ.A., One ofthe Few (Corgi, 1975)
7
RELATED TITLES
INDEX
~
l
,
References to illusH~Hions :lr(.' shown in boltl.
A&AEE, Martlcsham He:uh 6,10,12 Air Minislry 6,8,9,12,21. 46, 48: Specification F.36/34
6,9, 12 armamcm: Bf liD 25,25.26,27,27.36,42: Ilurric3nc 19,22,54-56
I lope, Fit II 'sir Archihald 73 Ilorner, Ph Off M. G. 37 HUbncr, Ufh Erwin 27 Hull, Fit Lt Caesar 18
Bay~;~s~Z~~~~~~%h~~i~tcAG (BFW) 6.14,16,17
Beamont, Pit OfT Roland
I~
'Bee' 13,75
g~;~I~~~~~r~h{~lll~r6~4, 75
Day (15 Sepl.) 39; firsl (Knlllllkllmpj; phase 37-38.
64~6;
fourth phase (London as target) 39-40; second and third phases (airfields, radar sl3lions and military targets) 38-39; stratcgic situation 37-40 Brilish Expcdinonary Force (BEF) 29-30,33
pZL
Kain. Fit Lt Bill 53 K/lmpjUrstiir~r concept 16. 17 Kastner, Lt Ilans.Joachim 70 Kent, Fit Lt Johnny 52-53 KiI60~t~3', Cdr John Ignatius 'Killy/lggie' 50,50,
r!
King, Pit OfT M. A. 23
Davis, Fg OfT Carl R. 20,74.75 Demo1.ay, Lt Jean 'Moses' 60 dcsir.fo~\1~~jopmcrH:HfllO 13-14.16-17; Hurricane Donaldson, Sqn Ldr lcddy 61
Dowd;ng, ACM Si, Hugh 32,34,36, 55 Dcake, I-g OfT Billy 52,60 Dunkirk evacuation (1940) 33,57,61. 72 Dulton, PIt OfT Roy 13 engines, Bf 110: Daimler-Bcm. DB 600A 16,17; DB 601 17,24; DB60IA-I 7, 17; Junkers JUIllO 210Ga 6,17 engines, Ilurricanc. Rolls-Royce: Goshawk 9; Merlin J 12; Merlin II 12,18; Merlin [II 20; PV 12 (Iatcr Merlin) 6.9, 10 Figh/~r Pilot
31 su ,dso Richcy, Fg OfT Paul J:ockc-Wulf 6,7,16,17; Fw 57: 17; Fw 58 \¥hJu 40 formations, LuftwafTe 56-57 su also tactics. l.ufrwafTe formations. RAF 9, 13,49,56,56, 57-58, 58, 64, 73
Fral~~~~ft~tt/i~t~f( tJ~~)er7~3;1~34~lg2, 33, 34, 58, 60, 60-61,61,64,64,72,73-74,75
Gardner, Charles 60
Glecd, Fit Lt Ian '\'(Iidge' 2,64,74,75 Gloster Aircraft Co. 7, 10, 12, 21; GladialOr [ 6 Goring, Obit Hans-Joachim 64 Gor~rB~6~eichsmarschaJlllcrlllann6,16,17,28.39,67, Gorz, Robcn 70 Grcen, William 14 Crier, F~ OfTTom 73
f~~~ISgt 1~~'N.E~~l
69,74.75
lucas, Philip 10 Luftwaffe airfields 30,38; Bf 110 killers of Hurricanes, leading,
FrS, 5; 49, 52
i~~~/j~:;P;i,~~ ~!2211i ~~:T.(F~'ill~2'
Marchfelder, l.t Richard 60 Mason, Frank 20 Mayers, FIt L( Iloward e. 10,38,73 McGrath, PhOffj.e. U. B. 10 McKnight, Ph O/TWillie L. 37,74
:~:~~~~rJ:l~r: 1~~~;)p~~~~;B6'~" 6~0
~fl;~~C;:,'B~r~~Stlr~~~9G~'2~~7~~'7~t l~l417i~I;:, 18;
U548 12; U562 20; U679 55; U725 48; U727 48; LJ 732 18; N2358 33; N2380 61; namc
Bf IIOB 7,14,16,17,23,23; Bf IIOB-OI 6; Bf 11011-1 7,17 IlfllOC 2,7, 17,32,61,61;'A2.AI: 67;'U.AI2· 17: 'M8+NP' 14: technical specificalions 23-26;
Bf I lOCO 7, 17;BfIIOCI 7,17,25;BfIIOC2/-3 25; Bf IIOC4 24,41; Bf IIOC5 24,25; Bf IIOC6 25,25-26; Bf IIOC7 26 Bf IIOD 26,27,76; Bf I IOD-O 27,27; Bf 1101)-0/B 27; Bf 1101)-1/-2 27 ~~ (y,;olOtype) 6,16; Bf 110 V2 6,16;
::f::Z
71
Mitchell. Pit OfT). S. 60
~~~llid.~~hr~ir~~;~~eYB~y~
60 Mlinchmeycr, Lt Wolfgang 68
~~~~i)I:1)rr~I~~ir21~ii~?o~jI74,75 Nicolson, Fh L( J. B. 66
accefted 6. 12; P2690 10; P2798 'Figaro' 2,75;
OpS:;}~: ~rJ~'8~4~~'}~~~1~13r23frd31-34:
f~~Og3?26,?0~8162,2IOS;~~~rr~d3~t;il~4212~: 169:t~~~n~,
Opitz, Rudolf 16 organisation, unit 34-37
78
80
ACE 011 • 978 1855324879
ACE 012 • 9781855326279
AC 0
. 978 1 85532 597 5
ACE 020 • 978 1 85532 696 5
• 978 1 84176610 2
AEU 009 • 978 1 841764399
No.3 Sqn 6,32,60; No. 17 Sqn 7,65,69,72;
~;:6~~ 41J'~I~J ;2rs(~; i§;S7"1l'l~18;1~'~Sq~8)~, 52; 73 Sqn 7, 19, 3~, 31,54, 58, ~2, 77; 79 Sqn
~6: ~~: ~~: ~g: ~N;; 82~ f3:\~:h~: ~4~'~d?i
II Sqn 6,12, 13.19; 1~5S(ln 65,75; 151 Sqn 19; 2[3 Sqn 19,75; 229 Sqn 61; 242 Sqn 37,75; 249 Sqn 70-71; 274 Sqn 77; 501 Sqn 19,32, 33, 58; 504 Sqn 19 Training Command 41,48 Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) 48,52 Royal Australian Air Force, 3 SCln 77 Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAA:) 48; 601 Sqn S, 10,20,
21,38; 60 I Sqn pilots 73; 605 Sqn 19,26; 607 Sqn 7,26
;1~~~\tA~;;;~~~I~:~il~:~~I:Il?~i:8~~~t~3~2~~'B~II OC 23-26; Bf IIOD 27
specifications, technical, Hurricane I 10, 24; early-build
18-19; Iatc-build 19-23 Stones, Pit OfT Don 69 Supcrmarinc Spitfire 13, 22, 72 tact;~lrighter Command 55,56, 57 su also formations,
tactics. LuftwafTc 58-60,59.61,65 LuftwafTc
Palmcr, Fig OfTC)'ril 'Pussy' 60 Paris 33
~;~h~~~;(~~al~lr2~~9~~~III:~;~.P3~. ~~ Poland, invasion of (I 939) 7,16.17,23.28 Price, Dr Alfred 37 propellers: Dc Ilavilland 12, 19-21: Hamilton Standard variable-pilCh 20; Rotol constalll-spccd 12,19-21;
Sf(
alw foonations,
~:~~I~~:tFI~frll.
N. 37 Townsend, g(Pl Ldr PCtcr 48-49,53,56 training, British I'ilot 41, 46, 48-53; aircraft 46,48, 49,49-50, 5 ,52. 52; flying training schools (FTSs) 49-50; flying training schoors, elementary (EI:TSs) 51; flying training schools. elementary and reserve (E&RF rSs) 48,49, 5 L flying training schools. servicc (SFTSs) 51: group pools 51-52; ~llnnery practice. lack of 52-53: Master Plan M'
(fain~~g~PG~~~~~;;la~ir~:n~a:~;';~t4 ~~~I;~¥416?~rcraft 40, 4 1,44; Ergiiflzlmgs (Zastiira) Staffa 45: J-1i~grr-AlIsbiIdIt1l8sr~gimmt(F1AR) 41.44; Fli~grr-ErsatZl1bmlu"g(F1ErsAbt)42,44; FlfI~-:"/i1iirUrkompIl1l1~(FIAnwKomp) 42,
o7
ACE 025 • 978 1 85532 753 5
FllIgullgfiJhraschltl~AlB 44-45: l'lugztuifiihrasclm/~ C 45; Zrrstorascl1li1~
45 training, Cerman wireless operatorslgunner 45-46 TurnblilI, Fg OfT Peler 77 Turncr, Fg OfT r. S. 37 Udct, Ernst 16
VISI THE OSPREY WEBSITE Information about forth omln book • Author information' Read extracts and see
Vasco, John 59,61
TR 8BID 21, 21; wings 13, 21 ;,YBS 65
Illlrricanc 1 (Trop) 77 Interceptor Monoplanc (I:lIer Hurricane) 6,9 KingslOn faclOry 10,12.19.21 Single-Seat Fighter - Iligh 'specd Monopbne (Iatcr Ilurricane) 6,9-10. 12 Hawker, I-larry 8 Ilenschel 6,16; lis 124: 17 Herget, Obit Wilhelm 69,74.75
DUE 005' 9781846031908
squ:drotls: No. I Sqn 7,9,19,21, .,0, 31, 33,50.54, :>5, 55 .. 58,60,61,73.75; No; 1 Sqn officers 60;
Sidow. Lt Kurt 69
45: Bordfu.lIlur's posilion 24, 25.42,46; 'M8+CP' 58; manufacturers 7, 17; groduction 23; s~ecd Bf 161~Awi;T 24; Wk-N,. 32 3 68; 'Yellow G 68
~~::~~~/];:~;:tBP)rb~~g\~:ll~716
DUE 001 • 978 1 84603 1892
groups I0 Grol~) 34; II Croup 34.36,72; 12 CrOl!? 34; 13 CrOllI' 34; 22 (Army Co-operation) Group 29-30 Ilurricane killers of Bf 110s, leading, 1940 74 Manltal ofAir Tactics 56,57
Sa"ill, Sgt J. E. 37
MCBrr~~~~'~I,(3~~3k~~~,Y6~~j'le;qlf:ElrV70~\t2~BH'
Mmrrschmitt I1f IIOZrrstiirrrAus o(WorldUlIlr II Milcs: Magistcr I 46; Mastcr 49,,2 Millcr, Sqn l..cIr A. G. 69
Fighter Command 7, 12, 13,34,39,40,41, 53, 57. 69,71; airfields 39; unit organisation 36-37
OTU. 6 and 7; 52-53
Molders, Obit Victor 27, 60 : Hawker 8-10, 12; Brooklands f.1CtOry 6, 10. 10. 12. 21; Fury 8,9,10,48,49-50; Fur)' II 9; '!-=ury Monoplane' (later Ilurricane) 9; Han 8; Ilenlc)' 10;
RLM (R~/chslllftftJmmillisuritlm) 6, 16 Rossiwal1. Hptm Theodor 74.77 Ro)'al Air Force Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) 29,60 Air Fighting DcvdopmclH Establishmcnt 56 airfields 39; Biggin Hill 29; C..ohishall 37; Exeter Airport 20,73; in France 34: Kenley 6; Nonholt 6; Tangmere 5,48-49,65; Woodley 46
~~~tf8~'6nwell 46, 48
~~~,rCe~~I:~fries~i~;~~i~:~~P('1~20)31,32
~~~~~~e~r.1~'~bW ~~~.I ~7
cockpirs: Bf 110 43; Hurricane I 47 convoy CW9 (Puwit) 65 Cornwall, Peter 59,61 Crowley-Milling, Pit OfT D. 37
7,28,33
Llewellyn, Sib Reginald 74,75
ZG I; 32; I.IZG I; 7,17,26,28,29,32; 11.IZG I; 23, 32; I.lZG I; 25; 2.1ZG I; 16 ZG 2; 34; I.IZG 2; 10,32, 58; 11.IZG 2; 7; I.lZG 2; 68; 6.1ZG 2; 67 ZG 26; 34, 35, 64, 69-70, 70; I.IZG 26; 31,61,75, 77; II.IZG 26; 32, 35. 40, 77; 11I.lZG 26; 7, 32. 40,68,71.76,77; 5.1ZG 26; 36; 8.1ZG 26; 75; 9.1ZG 26; 76 I.IZG 52; 7, 45; I.lZG 52; 45 ZG 76; 14,44; I.IZG 76; 7, 17,26,27, 28, 29, 30-31,32,34,58; 11.IZG 76; 2, 32, 34. 57, 58, 61,75; 11I.lZG 76; 2, 34. 45; 5.1ZG 76; 61; 6.1ZG 76; 2, 51,58,68,75; 9.1ZG 76; 64 l.(Z)/LG I; 7,17,17,28,29,29; 2.1(Z)/LG I; 17 V.(Z)/LG I; 2, 31. 33, 65, 66-67. 75; 13.(Z)/LG I; 7, 54,72; 14.and 15.(Z)/LG I; 54
Carey, Ht Lt hank 65-66
1~llc
R;chey,"g OfT Paul 31,31,54,55, 55, 57, 60
I./KG 55: 69-70; L~hr-Divisjon 7, 17 Lufiflottmkommalldo 2 and 3: 34; Nadu j'lgdg~scbUltldus(NJG) 76; NJG I: 51; unit organisation 34-35;
Clisby, Fg OfT Leslie 60,73,74 Clyde, Fh Lt William P 'Billy' 73,74,75
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~~l~~\:l\J;r:;:b~I(fSS1~"~6, 16 Rettbcrg, Hptm Ralph von 35
Ishoven, Armand van 27
g~~~~~: :~ft 8~~~r~.
7j7 Bulman. Fit Lt P W. S. 'George' 10
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radar stations, Chain Ilomc/Ch:lin Ilomc Low 36
Boyd. I;h Lt Adrian 'Gin.gcr' 65,74 Bnswl: F2 Figiller 14: FdlOll aviation works 69-70 Britain. B:HIIc of (1940) 7,49,61,64-71,71: Adlufflg ('E.'!gle Day') 38,66; analysis 74-75; Battle of Britain
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\Vall'> two·bladed 10,12-13,19,20,21 Prne, Sgt T B. G. 'Titch' 19
Jabs, ObIt Hans-Joachim 2, 14,51, 69. 73-74, 75
Baagoc. Obit Sophus 74,77 Bader:, Sqn Ldr Dougbs P. S. 37 Ball. I-g OfTG. E. 37
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, ' ,,-Bf 109D/E Aces
Walker, Dr Percy 9 Walker, Fit 1.( P R. 'Johnny' 54,60 Wcal. John 71
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inf rmation on Osprey Publishing, contact:
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This is the account of machines of war pitted against each other and the combatants who operated them. Step onto the battlefield and immerse yourself in the experience of real historic combat.
HURRICANE I
vs Bf 110 1940 The Hurricane was the RAP's first monoplane fighter and saw significant combat during the fight over France and the Battle of Britain. One of its principal opponents in 1940 was the Bf 110 twin-engined, two-seat heavy fighter. Following the invasion of France, these aircraft clashed regularly as the RAP's Hurricanes attacked German bomber formations defended by Bf 11 Os. Although the Hurricane had the upper hand when it came to manoeuvrability, the Bf 110 outclassed it in terms of firepower, with its mix of machine guns and cannon. This is the story of the dramatic battles in the skies over France and the Channel as Britain desperately tried to hold back the German onslaught from her shores.
Colour artwork - Photographs - Unrivalled detail - Cutaway artwork
US $17.95/ UK £12.99/ CAN $19.95
IS BN 978-1-84603-945-4
OSPREY PUBLISHING
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