Osprey - Duel 31 - British Dreadnought vs. German Dreadnought, Jutland 1916

ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND ILLUSTRATORS MARK STILLE (Command er, United States Navy, retired) received his BAin history fro m the University of Mary land and also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked in the int elligence community for 30 years , including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior ana lyst working in the Washington DC area. He is the author of numerous Osprey t itles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific, and also of sever al wa rgames .

IAN PALMER is a high ly experienced digita l artist. A graduate in 3D des ign, he cu rrentl y works as Art Direct or for a leading UK games developer. Besides his art ist ic int erest s he is also a keen musicia n and moto rcyc list. He lives in Surre y wit h his wife and daughte r, and two cats .

RITISH DREADNOUGHT

GERMANDREADNOUGHT JUTLAND 1916

HOWARD GERRARD studied at t he Wallasey School of I freelance des igner and illustrator for over 20 years. HI of publishers and is an associate member of the Guild won both the Society of British Aerospace Companies Sword Trophy and has illustrated a number of books fe and works in Kent.

MARK STILLE

l

pub lished in C rear Britain in 20 10 by Os prey Publish ing,

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lishers. :IP catalogue record fo r this book is available from the British Library. 'I

ISBN: 9781 84908 167 2

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CONTENTS

(set in fTC Co nduit and Ado be Garamo nd )5

by Boun fo rd.com

;i nat ed by PD Q Digital Med ia Solut ions ted in C hina through Bookbui lders II 12 13 14

Introduction

4

Chro nology

8

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

rey Publ ish ing is suppo rting the Woo d land Tru st, the UK's leadin g woo dland .ervarion charity, by funding the dedicatio n o f trees.

Design and Development

10

The Strategic Situation

28

Technical Specifications

34

The Combatants

46

Combat

S3

Statistics and Analysis

71

Aftermath

76

Further Reading

78

Index

80

no wl edg em ent s

author wou ld like

10

thank th e sraff of the Naval H istory and Heritage

imand Photographi c Sect ion (forme rly the US Naval H istor ical Center) for . assistance in procuring the photographs used in this book. Special thanks go (eirh Allen and friends who graciously reviewed the (ext and clarified many nical poi n ts fo r the autho r. icat io n

boo k is ded icated to Bill Karwacki

Conqueror was a powerf ul ship

with a balanced , impressive appearance . Shown here before the war, her foremast was shortened and the torpedo nets removed before Jutl and. She served in the Grand Fleet throughout the war and was scrapped in 1923.

INTRODUCTION squad rons of eight ships each along with two fleet flagships and four reserve battle ships. T his dram atic Ge rma n decision to challenge Britain's naval supremacy Since 1805 , the Royal Navy had reigned supreme on the world's oceans. Though th is supremacy was challenged at tim es, by the turn of the 20th century the Royal Navy was f.1cing its most serious challenge in some 100 years. T his challenge came in th e form of a united Germa ny and its growin g industrial strength. As the two most powerful industrial powers in Euro pe, Germany and Britain were engaged in trade com petition; by the turn of the century thi s com petition was beginning to take a more alarmi ng turn in the form of a naval rivalry. With its global empire and worldwide tradin g int erests, Britain needed a large navy to maintain its position and power. What concerned the British was the developm ent of a sizeable navy by a continental power with no naval tradition and, seemingly, no need for such a force. T he reasons why Germany became a mar itime power remain controversial even tod ay. Many in Germany felt that a great power, as German y was becomi ng, had to possess a stro ng navy to bolster its statu s and to support and defend its trading int erests. T here is also evidence that the drive for a powerful navy had its root s in Ge rma n internal politics. When the Stat e Secretary of the Im perial Naval Offic e, Admiral Alfred von Tirpirz, began to agitate for a large navy he found fertile ground and a large degree of support.

not only put the Royal Navy on noti ce, but changed the direction of British foreign policy. In order to maintain its com mandi ng naval position and contai n Germany, the British abando ned th eir po licy of isolation. From 190 2 to 1907 , agreeme nts were reached with Japan, France and Russia. T hus, when an event in Euro pe set off the powder keg between the two opposing power blocks, the British were virtually ensured of being dragged in against Ger ma ny.T his consequence was the tru e legacy of T irpirz's desire to build a large fleer. As T irpirz's dr eam of a large Ger man Navy was gaining favour in his homel and , the Royal Navy was undergoing a transform ation , led by the cont roversial First Sea Lord , Admiral of th e Fleet Sir John Fisher. As the Royal Navy's leader from 1904 to 1910 , Fisher oversaw its transfo rm at ion from the com placency of the world's dominant peacetime navy, to a force ready to conduct mod ern war. He dir ected that large numbers of obsolete warships be scrapped and that the fleet be concentrated in home waters to oppose the growing German fleet. T he most dramatic of Fisher's plans was the int roduction of a new type of warsh ip based on his conc epts of an all-big-g un warship. T his ship, nam ed Dreadnought, was so revolut ion ary that Bell erophon wa s a virt ual

repeat of Dreod nought. Armour wa s act ually weaker,

In 1897, Tirpitz outlined a plan to increase the size of the German Navy to provide political and military leverage against Ge rmany's most dangerou s enem y, Britain. The goal for 1905 was to possess a fleet of 19 battleship s. T his force was the so-called 'risk fleet' - a fleet powerful eno ugh to act as a deter rent against a Briti sh attack, by threatening the Royal Navy with such severe losses that it wo uld lose its maritime supremacy. If the British were allayed by Germa n promises that this fleet was purely defensive, there was no doubt about th e purpose of the Second Ger man Naval Law of June 1900. T he law pro vid ed for a fleet of 38 battl eships, organized into four

but one impro vement was to move the for emast in front of th e forw ard smokestack, reducing smoke interference in th e gunn ery control posit ion. She ser ved the ~l

ent ire war ass igned to the Grand Fleet and was sold for scrap in 1922 .

5

Naval balanc e, August 1914 Britain

Germany

Dreadnoughts

it m ad e ever y o the r battl esh ip obsolete. II was also a

cha nces th at an enemy would be b rou ght to battle. By th e 20 th century, however,

controversial mo ve in Britain, as it wip ed awa y the Royal

new naval technologies had m ad e a close blockad e too da ngerous. T he introduction

Navy's existi n g adva ntage in battl eships and levelled th e

of m in es an d to rpedoes aboard submarines , to rpe do boats and destroyers m ade it too

playing field , th us providing th e

erma ns with a chance to

dangero us to m aintain large units close to ene my nava l bases. Briefly, the Royal Navy co nsidere d th e use of an 'observational blockade' centred on a point in th e No rt h Sea

In s ervice:

22

15

catch up . T he advent of Dreadnought was followed by Fisher's

Under construction:

13

5

pet project, the bartl ecru iser, whi ch co m b ine d th e hitt ing

halfway between Ge rmany and Britain , b ut even th is was d ismisse d as im practical.

power of a bat tleship and the spee d of a cru iser. T he cos t of

W hen th e Brit ish d eclared war o n Germa ny in Aug ust 191 4, th ey put in p lace a

thi s com bination was a relative lack of armou red p rot ection ,

distant blockade w ith th e aim of co ntrolling th e exits from the North Sea. T he G rand

Battlecruisers In ser vice:

9

3

Under constru ction:

1

3

Pre-dreadnoughts

40

22

wh ich Fisher, in co rrectly, believed cou ld be com pensated for

Fleet was cha rged to co nduct freq ue nt sweeps in to the No rt h Sea to keep the Germa n

with superior speed . T he result of Fisher's revolu tio n was that

fleet in port an d to assert co ntro l of th e wa te rs. T he C ha n nel Fleet , based aro und a

th e stre ng th of any navy was now m easured in te rm s of the

number of p re-dread nou ghts, bloc ked th e English C ha n ne l. C ru isers pat roll ed th e

number of dr eadnou gh ts it po ssessed . All battl eships des igned

area fro m th e She tlands to th e N o rwegian coas t.

befo re Dreadnought we re consid ered as 'pre- dread n ough ts' and we re no lon ger fit for duties wi th th e m ain battle fleet.

T he G erm an s were co unting o n th e British to try to impose a close block ad e of th e Heli goland Bight. T he intention was that if the Royal N avy app eared close to Ge rma n

Fishe r was willing to take th e risk of radi cally changing th e naval balance with the

bases, U-boats, torped o craft and extens ive m in e ba rra ges wou ld infli ct losses on th e

introduction of Dreadnought because he calculated th at British sh ipyards could out-

numerically superior Briti sh unti l the Germa n heavy uni ts co uld engage th e G rand

build any rival. Fishe r was cor rect in thi s belief. By th e start of th e wa r in August 191 4 ,

Fleet at equal streng th. Even if th e Royal N avy did not atte m p t a close blo ckad e, th e

th e Royal N avy had established a firm su per ior ity, as dem on strated by th e table above.

Ge rmans bel ieved tha t th e British wo u ld still co m m it light forces to wa tch th e Hel igoland Bight, and tha t th e Royal N avy wo uld be forced to sup po rt these forces. T h is situation wo u ld still offer the Ge rma ns ample opport u nity to arrrite the Gra nd Fleet unti l th e od ds had been evened . In the event th at th e battleshi ps of th e Gra nd

NAVAL STRATEGY IN 1914

Fleet remai ned n ear Scapa Flow (their ma in naval base) on di sta nt blockad e, th e Ge rmans felt th ey did no t have su fficient strength to attack them at that locatio n.

For both Britain and Germa ny, co ntro l of the North Sea was vital. After all th e d rama

T h is outcome is actually what happen ed whe n wa r began - the Grand Fleet went to

an d expense of th e great naval race between the two countries, the co mmanders of

its blockade sta tion at Scapa Flow and no ligh t un its were commi tted to watch the

both navies expec te d a t itan ic naval clash shortly afte r war was de clared. Yet the

Germa n bases o n th e Hel igoland Bight. T he German naval staff had no pla ns to deal

strategies on bot h sides ensure d th at such a clash between dread nough ts would not

with thi s eventua lity.

occ ur for two years, and th en by accide nt.

T he co m ma nde r of th e G rand Fleet, Admi ral Sir John je llicoe, realized tha t he had

Traditionally, th e Royal N avy preferred to in st itute a close blocka de of its

a signi ficant ad vantage in d read n ou ghts over th e Ge rmans, but was wo rrie d abo ut

o ppo ne nts to ensure that Brit ish sh ip ping was undisturbed , and to ma ximi ze the

wha t he perceived as a critical Ge rma n adva ntage in destroyers, as well as th e mine and U-boat threat . T hese dan gers reinforced his determination not to take th e Grand Fleet too close to Ge rm any's North Sea bases. T he com m ande r o f th e Ge rma n Hi gh Seas

Rheinl and ente red serv ice

in April 1910 and is pict ured

Fleet was under orders from th e Kaiser not to risk th e fleet un less there was th e likelihood of victo ry. Such an op po rt u n ity could on ly exist if the G rand Fleet had

here soon afterwards.

already su ffered attrition o r if th e Ge rma ns found an o pportu n ity to en gage ju st a

At Jut land, she was hit by a

portion of th e Briti sh warsh ips. W ith both sides relu ctant to co m mit thei r m ain fleets

sing le secondary gun round

in any th ing bu t favoura ble circu ms tances, and both sides unli kely to bel ieve th at a

and repa ired in under two weeks. She was later heavily damaged afte r running

given sit ua tion was favo urable anyway, a majo r clash between fleets was go ing to be a m atter of accide nt, not design.

aground off the Finn ish coast in April 1918. The vessel was laid up as an accommodat ion sh ip before being turn ed over to th e Allies in 1920 and

6

scrapped in 1921.

?

DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT ADVENT OF THE DREADNOUGHT O n 2 October 190 5, a revolutionary new wars h ip was laid down in Po rts m outh, England . T he ship was launched in an incre dible fo ur months an d was com pleted and ready to com mence sea tr ials in an eq ually remarkable spa n of 365 days. T he ship, name d H MS Dreadnought, was so advanced th at she immediately rendered every \

o the r existing battl eship obso lete. W hat mad e th is shi p so rema rka ble? Most significant, Dreadnoughtwas th e first 'all-big-gun' ship. Previou s battl eships carried an

Accompanying th e advent of the Dreadnoughtwas the introduc tion of Fisher's pet

array of weapons, usua lly a m ain battery of 12in guns supported by several ot her

project, th e battl eship- cru iser. These ship s, eventually know n as bartlecru isers, also

The 13.5in guns aboard

Emperor of Indio, shown here. were formidable weapons.

batteries of lesser size. Because actio ns were conducte d at fairly short ran ges, th e

feat ure d an all-big-g un arm ament and the new steam turb ines. T he princi pal

sma ller guns sup po rt ing th e slow- firing main guns were pe rfectly ade quate for

diffe rence between th em an d a drea dno ught was the provision of a lighter scale of

penetrati ng th e more lightl y armo ured areas of an enemy battleship. Yet as improved

armour pro tection . This red uced weight burden , combined wi th the tur bi nes, gave

a maximum of 23,800 yards.

fire-control proce dures pu shed engageme nt ranges out farther, th e effectiveness of the

t he new ba tt lecruisers a several kno t speed advantage ove r dre ad nought s and all

Awell-trained gun crew could

sma ller guns began to di m in ish . Additiona lly, fire control was actua lly made more

armo ured cru isers of the day. The extra speed, Fisher believed , wo uld act as a measure

fire almost two rounds per

difficult by the imp ossibility of distinguishing th e splashes of th e 12in gun s fro m any

of prot ection . T he batrlecru isers possessed the pace and armament to hunt down

of the ship's othe r guns.

an d destroy the most powerful armo ured cru isers of th e period, whi le their speed

T he mer its of th e all-big-gun ship were obvious not only to th e British. T he Italians

gave them the o ption of wit hdrawing from action against a d read nou gh t with

and th e Ame ricans were also exploring this concept, and th e US Navy had already

superior armame nt . This premise, however, was forgo tte n by bo th sides during the

design ed and been autho rized two all-big-gun battleships earlier in 1905. However,

war, when the bat tlecru iser was for ced to engage ship s eq uipped with heavy

th e Royal Navy under the energetic an d far-sighted Fisher was the first to take action

armament. Give n th e bartlecruiser's inferio r pro tec tion , the results were predictable.

At 20 degreeselevation. they could th row a 1,4001b shell

minute.

with th e constructio n of Dreadnought. Fishe r orde red that the new stea m turbi ne powerplant, still not per fected, was also placed on Dreadnought, giving her a speed of 10

2 1 knots an d making her the fastest battleship in th e wo rld at th e rime,

11

The main st ay German

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

1 ,

dreadnou ght weapon was the 12in gun mounted in double turret s, as seen here on

Dreadnought designs are a fine balance between several competing factors. The

Kaiser before t he out break of

foremo st of these are firepower, protection and propulsion . Each facto r carries with

wa r. The max imum elevation

it weight and cost considerations. In general, British d readno ught designs tended to

of the t urret was 13.5 degrees , whic h gave a

stress firepower. British bat tleships carried larger guns than their German counterparts,

maximum range of 21,0 00

giving th em grea ter firepower. Conversely, Ge rma n battl eship design ers tended to

yards. Aft er Dogger Bank , th e

em phasize protection at th e expense of firepower. A major facto r in the competing

Germans began a progr amm e of inc reasin g the elevat ion of

efforts to provide adequate protection was that after a certa in point in the dreadnought

the ir 12in t urrets to 16

race it was dictated to Royal Navy designers th at an inc rease in beam was not possible

degrees , which tr anslated to

due to the size of existing dry docks to accommod ate the ship s. The Germans had no

a maximum range of 22,300

such restr ictions. T heir battl eship s possessed a greater beam th at in turn allowed for

yards. By Jut land, however,

increased pro tect ive measures, which included greater subd ivision and the inclusion of tor pedo bulkh eads.

only Prinzregent Luitp old had been so modifi ed. The hoists in Germa n tu rret s were fast er than th ose in Brit is h turr ets, so th e rate of fire for German

FIREPOWER

turrets appro ached th ree rounds per m inute.

The mainstay British naval weapon at the start of the dreadno ught era was th e 12in gun, dating back to 1893. In orde r to improve the mu zzle veloc ity, range and penetration of th is weapon , its barrel length had been expanded from 35 calibre to 50

advoca ted tha t cap ital ships sho uld mou nt an all-big-gun arma ment. T he Iro n D uke

calibre. At longer ranges, however, it was found that the latest versions had accura cy

class was th e first to use a Gin gun secon dary armament, and this weapo n becam e

problems. T he high mu zzle velocity also had the effect of increasing wear and tear on

standard on all subsequent design s. The G erm an Navy adopted th e 5.9in gun as their d read no ught secondary arm ament from the start.

the barrel, thus reducing gun life. To solve this problem, the Royal Navy went to the 13.5 in gun beginning with the O rio n class of d readn ou ghts. Most imp ortantl y, this gun provided for a much larger shell with imp roved penetration. The larger shell and increase in bore also permi tt ed a lower m uzzle velocity, which made for much greater accuracy and less barrel wear. T he fin al developm ent of Royal Na vy pre-w ar dreadnought arma ment was the prod uction of a 15in gun. Its combination of reliability and accuracy made it on e of th e best large guns ever developed by the Royal Navy. Because the m uzzle velocity was compara tively low, the barrel life was also o utstanding. T he Ger ma n Navy's first d readn ou ghts used an 11in gun th at possessed a high mu zzle velocity and thu s outstan ding range. It fired a relatively sma ll shell, however,

and part of her 5.9in

introd uced a slightly larger 12in gun. They clung to the 12in shell even as the British

casemate-moun ted second ary

moved on to th e 13.5in and fina lly a 15in shell, preferring the greater rang e and

armame nt . Ostjriesland was

pen etr ation against the higher barrel wear and red uced accuracy.

perhaps th e most well-known

oppo nents, this was not the case for the seconda ry armament. T he Royal Navy used

1-

overhead shot present s a fine view of her main armam ent

which limited its pe netration. In their seco nd class of dreadno ughts, the Germans

Altho ugh Briti sh dr eadnou ghts carried a larger main gun th an th eir Ge rma n

14

OSlfrie sl and in 1920 under American cont rol. This

German dreadnought because of th e series of test s she endured in 1921. After being

4in guns from Dreadnought up through the King George V class. These were m uch

hit by 80 bombs of var ious

criticized for being inadeq uate to dea l with th e growi ng size of torpedo boats and

sizes and 24 she lls, she was

destroyers. T he Royal Navy was un able to get a larger seconda ry armament due to the increased costs of mounting a Gin gun battery, and th e views of Fisher who had

finall y sunk by Colonel Billy Mitchell on 21 July 19 21 by six large bombs.

15

officer provided better solutions. A much superior system, the Argo Clock, was available

FIRE CONTROL

before the war, but was rejected. Event ually, th e Argo system did find its way aboard a

The true measure of a battl eship's effectiveness is not the size and number of its gun s, but its ability to hit its target. At short rang e, a shell follows a flat trajectory, wh ich

few dreadnoughts, and at least four ships were fitted with it at Jutland . T he Royal Navy used a system of centralized fire cont rol, whi ch relied on a cent ral

redu ces the fire-control problem of co mpe nsa ting for th e roll of th e ship while

director, usually fitted in th e fo retop , that enabled all th e ship's guns to be trained, laid

po inting th e gun at th e ta rget. As th e ran ge of guns continued

increase, th e

and fired from a single position. T he training angle and elevation for th e guns were

importance of effective fire co nt rol over great er distan ces was magnified. At lon ger

tran smitted electronically from th e director to each of th e turrets, where th e desired

ranges, the trajectory of the shell increases and a nu mber of factors affect the accuracy

settings were laid automatically by th e control systems in th e turret.

to

of gunnery. By the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy had devised a very elaborate

The Germ an s did not develop such a so phisticated approach to fire control, a

system of fire co nt rol. The basis for long-rang e fire was th e use of a rangefinder to

situa tio n easily explained by the Ge rmans' int ention to fight at relatively sho rt ranges.

measure th e d istanc e from a gun to its target. The sta ndard Briti sh battl eship

H owever, at Jutl and, the German fire control system proved at least as effective as th e

rangefinder was th e 9ft-l on g coinc ide nce rangefinder developed by Barr and Stro ud.

British system. T he Germa ns relied on 9ft lOin range finde rs, which like th ose of th e

It was technicall y capable of providing ranges within 85 yards at 10,000 yards. As was later evidenced at Jutland, however, the accuracy of the rangefinder was much reduced

ad opted a ste reoscopic ran gefinder and introduced a Dumaresq eq u ivalent that

in service due to light refraction and the heating of the rangefinder tube.

British , were mounted on each turret and in th e bridgewo rk. In 190 8, th e Ge rma ns provid ed target deflection. The Ge rma n fire control system was very dependent on

A rangefinder pro vided onl y th e tru e ran ge, howeve r, not the gun ran ge, which

the skill of th e arti llery officer to estim ate range rate. O n Ge rman battl eship s, fire was

need ed to include the distance s of target m ovement and ow n ship's mov em ent.

co ntrolled from the armo ured co nn ing towe r, where th e art illery office r took orde rs

Factoring in all these variables provid ed what is known as the range rate. To do this, the

from th e ship's commanding officer and spo tted th e fall of shot. T he director-po inte r

Royal Navy adopted an analogue computing device (known more commonly as the

system in th e gunne ry co nt rol tower genera ted a training angle for th e turrets, but each turret was laid and fired individually.

Dumaresq, after its inventor) , which helped compute and check the range rate against other data. The range rate information was tran smitted to guns electromechanically by means of a Vickers receiver-transmitter, which eq uipped all ships after Dreadnought. In 1912, th e Admiralty adopted the Dreyer Table to pro vide a fairly com prehe nsive

PR OTECTION

approach to fire control, allowing operators to visually compare ranges reported by

By 1905 , th e state-of-the-a rt battl eship armo ur was Krupp cemente d plate armo ur.

rangefind ers to a continuously evolving estim ate of the range bein g sent to the gun s.

At this tim e, norm al battl e ranges were assessed to be at 6,000 yards, and lon g-ran ge

Unfortunately for the Royal Navy, the Dreyer Tab le was unable to contend with rapid

engagements maybe o ut to 10,000 yards. At both th ese ranges, th e shell of a high-

changes of range rates, and pre-war exercises had demonstrated that a skilled gunnery

velocity gun would strike its target's sides. For this reason, a dreadn ou ght 's arm our was con centrated on its main belt on th e hull. Weight pen alties made it imp ossible to

Collingwood under const ruction befor e her launch on November 1908. She was part of the thi rd 8riti sh class of dreadnoughts, but off ered lit tl e impro vement over

16

Orion show ing her two

Dreodnought. This view

forward 13.Sin gun turrets.

shows her stern torpedo tub e.

Jus t aft of these is t he heavi ly

Both th e Brit ish and Germans

armoured conning tower fr om

thought th at batt leship -

whi ch the ship would fight

launched torpedoes would

and navigate in batt le. The

be pote nt weapons in a

foremast is pos iti oned aft

dreadnought duel, and both

of the smokes tack, showing

retained t hem throughout the

t he obvi ous problems its

war. In practi ce, th ey proved

occupants wou ld enco unte r

utterly ineffective. Also not e

fr om smo ke in many wind

th e recess in th e hull where th e

condit ions.

belt armour would be fitted .

17

extend the main belt over the ship's entire length or up the entire heigh t of the hull,

to overheat when run at high speeds over a sustained period, primarily because of

so it was situa ted along the waterline to guard th e shi p's vital areas. In practice, thi s

difficulties with effective lubricati on. Additionally, vibration at high speeds was a real

di stribution meant that it exte nded from the forward-most turret to th e m ost aft

probl em. T he stea m turbine offered many pot enti al adva ntages (see below), but in

turret, providing protection for the magazine s and propulsion spaces. T he armo ur

1905 it remain ed an unproven technology, o nly being first used o n a ship in 1897. T he Royal Navy's decision to use turbi nes on D readnought was a bold on e.

above th e main belt was tapered and was prim arily int ended to prov ide protection against high-exp losive shells - th e effect of these shells against unarmoured parts of the ship was shown to be devastating in th e Russo-Japanese wa r of 190 4-05. Both British and Ge rma n battl eship s were well protected from heavy shell imp acts

T he introduction of turbines offered consid erab le weight advantages . For example, o n Dreadnoughtthe weight savings amo unte d to some 1,000 ton s d irectl y and indi rectly, we ight th at could be devoted to add it io nal arm ou r or guns. In

at what was con sidered normal battle ranges, but as a matter of course German main

service, th e turbine proved more reliable th an reciprocating machinery and gave th e

belts were thicker tha n British one s. Since it was believed tha t heavy shells wou ld not

ship the abi lity to stea m at higher speeds for lon ger distances. Yet early turbines had

have th e trajectory to strike the ship's hori zontal areas, deck armour was comparatively

problem s du e to th e different ro ta tiona l speed requirem ents of th e turbines and th e

light, sufficient to pro vide prot ectio n against splinte r damage from shells bursting

prop ellers. Tur bines wo rk mo st efficiently at high er rot at ion al speeds co ntrasted to

above. Later, wh en better fire control allowed for great er engagement ranges (10,000

prop eller s th at work better at lower rotati on al spee ds . When th e turb in es we re

yards and beyond) , the trajectory of shells was steeper, wh ich meant that it was the

attached to the propellers by direct drive, th is resu lted in lower top spe ed s and

deck s of the ships being stru ck, not th e sides. Both British and Ge rm an ships lacked

in creased fuel consumption. The introd uction of gear ed turb in es solved th ese

adeq uate deck armo ur against heavy shells. The adve nt of reliabl e tor pedoes and th e threat of m ine s dem anded th at early

problems, but th is solutio n was not used o n dr eadnou ghts until afte r t he wa r. Ano ther problem was appare nt only after the sta rt of th e war, whe n d read no ugh ts

dr eadnought design s provide ade q uate protection below the waterline . For th e tru e

were more frequently run at high speeds. Such usage caused the brass seawa ter pip es

vulnerability of early dread no ughts was not again st she llfire, but against underwater

in the condenser to leak, th us allowing saltwate r int o the feed water. This effect was

dam age. T his was especially tru e with British dr eadnoughts, which lacked ad eq uate

kn own as 'im pingem ent' and remained a problem th rou gh out th e wa r - during th e

protecti on from torpedoes, a fact th at helped shape British tacti cs at Jutl and .

first part of th e wa r, d readn ou ghts of both sides were placed out of action by thi s

D readnought was de signed with o n ly a thin pro tective screen covering her magazines and shell rooms. The first Germ an dr eadnoughts, in contrast, were fitt ed

m ech ani cal failure. In co nt rast to Briti sh sh ips, Ge rma n ships used sma ll-t ube

wit h a co ntin uo us 1.25in anti-torpedo bu lkhead that protected all her vita l belowdeck spaces. In th eir seco nd class of d readnought, th e British enhanced underwater

to extra protection , but Briti sh tur bin es and large-tube boilers proved to be very reliable in serv ice.

protection by extendi ng the screen over all vit al spaces in a com para ble manner to

D ur ing th e war, th e design of later dr eadn ou ghts featured the use of oil fuel in

boil ers and lighter materials. The extra space and weigh t savings cou ld be devot ed

the Germans. Yet from the Co lossus to Iron Duke classes, th e British reverted to

preference to coal. The advantages of oil were obvious. Wh en burned fully, oil provides

the use of screens covering on ly the magazine spaces. T he Queen Elizabeth and

30 per cent more heat per pound tha n coal. Operat ion ally, the use of oil suspended

Februar y 190 6, Dreodnoug ht

Revenge classes we re fitted wit h anti-to rpe do bulges, which were design ed to

th e need to re-coal every few days, a messy pro cedure. Refuellin g with oil, by

revoluti onized naval warfar e.

detonat e th e to rp ed o as far as possibl e from th e sh ip's internal bulkhead s wh ile

com parison, was mu ch faster and easier. Beginning with th e Queen Elizabeth class,

also pro viding protecti on from splinte r dam age. The provision of a bul ge, whe n

all British dreadnou ghts were oil-fired . T he Ge rma ns d id not int rodu ce th eir first oilfired dreadn ought until th e Bayern class.

properly designed, provided a h igh level of protection again st the small torpedo

When launched on 10

There were several weakn esses to her design, but her overall capabilities made previous batt leship s obsolete.

warheads of th e day, and was the equal of German underwater protection. Both the Royal Na vy and the G erma n N avy also atte m p ted to provid e underwat er prot ection with elaborat e subdivision sche mes . In th is area the Ge rma ns were more successful, since their sh ips had wid er beam s and closer subd ivisio n requirem ents. Even subdivision, however, had its limi ts, as the pum p ing and d rainage systems that passed tho ugh bu lkh ead s still permitted the ent ry of floodwater when th ey wer e broken.

•

PROPULSION Prior to D readnought, th e ma in propulsion systems in battleships involved 18

recipro cating machinery. T he issue with reciproc ating machin ery was th at it tended

19

r

Temeraire pict ured before th e war. Built to a modif ied

+

Dreadn ought design, she sti ll employ ed an awkward main battery layout , using wing turrets. Present at Jutl and, she played only a minor part. She was later sent to Turkish waters in 1918, before being

Following th e completion of D readnought in Octo ber 190 6, the ship ran trials for ano ther six months. H er design, and her un proven steam turb ines, proved to be a comp lete success. Now th e Royal Navy q uickly had to build a lead in d read no ught nu mbers. Fisher incl ude d plans for four sister ships for Dreadnought in the 1906 budget, but onl y three were approved . T hese shi ps, kno wn as th e Belleroph on class, had less main belt armo ur th an Dreadnought, but had bett er subdivision. In addition, th e more effective 4in gu n replaced the 3in gun as the ship s' secon dary battery. The Admiralty again asked for four dreadnough ts in 1907 , but once more on ly three were

scrapped in 1922 after a brief

approved . T hese becam e th e St Vincent class, but th ey were essent ially repeats of th e

period as a cadet ship.

D readnought design . The o nly significan t differen ce was th e provision of a new develop ment of the 12in gun with bett er per forma nce . The fourth ship req uested in 1907 was act ually postpon ed to 1908 and was completed to a mo dified design . T his ship, N eptune, featured a new layout for its ten 12in guns, designed to imp rove the broadside firepower. Instead of the wing tur rets on Dreadnought, Nep tune was fitte d with th e two m iddl e turrets in a stagge red arrangement that permitted each to fire crossdeck in a broadsi de. Neptunealso featured th e first use ofsuperfiring turrets. The two additiona l d read nou gh ts approved in 1909 were built to a simi lar desig n to N eptune an d featured the use of the staggered or

ROYAL NAVY DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS

'echelon' turret arra ngeme nt ami dshi ps. In service, however, thi s design was not practical and was not repeated. T hese ships also carr ied a heavier main armour belt,

In gene ral, it is accurate to say th at the Royal Navy placed more im po rt ance on

but underwater protection was infer ior beca use of the deletion of torpedo bu lkheads.

re-building a commandi ng nu merical lead over its nearest dr eadn ought competitor

Also approved in 1909 was the first of the 'super- dreadnough ts', so called because of

Thunderer was th e last ship

th an o n producin g ships of great qu alit y. W he n co m pa red with Germa n

th e move up to a 13-5in gun. Orion was th e first ship to car ry the new weapo n. Also

laid down of the Orion class of

dr eadn ou ghts, British shi ps did not compa re well ind ividually, but any q ualitative

for th e first tim e, all five main batt ery tur rets were mounted on the cent re line, thu s ensuring maxi m um broa dside firepower.

th at all her 13.5in tur rets are

advantage the Germans may have possessed was overshadowed by the product ivity of British sh ipyards.

In 1909, the naval race betwee n Brita in an d Germany was in full swing. After the

super-dreadnoughts. Note located on t he centre line with clear arcs of fi re. At Jut land,

Brit ish govern me nt learned of th e provisio ns of th e Ger man Supplementary Nava l

she fir ed only 37 main gun

Law of 1908 , the usual pace of th ree dreadn ou ghts per year was abando ned in favour

round s. After t he war, she

of six battl eships and four battlecrui sers. The ot her three bat tleships approved in 1909 were also built to the Orion design, and were laid down in 19 10. The next two classes,

served as a cadet ship from 1921 to 19 26, before being broken up.

Hercules pictured before t he war. The booms locat ed along th e hull are for torpedo nets, but were removed in 1915 -

16. Hercules was the fir st atte mpt to break away from the basic Dreadnought desig n by abandoning the use of wing tu rrets in favour of an arra ngement where all five t urrets could fir e broadside. This layout proved a failur e in servi ce. Hercules survive d the war to go int o reserve in 1919 20

and was scrapped in 192 2.

21

l __.

.: _ ..::.::..•-:.=:-.-.

J

_ o_ _

totalling eight ships, were little mod ified from the design of Orion. Four ships of the King George V class were approved in 1910 followed by four ships of the Iron Duke class in 1911 . The Iron Dukes were fitted with th e larger 6in-gun seconda ry batt ery made essentia l by the increasing size of torpedo boats and destroyers.

Queen Elizabeth was

T he next big step in Royal Navy dreadnought design was already in the works . Approval for the Q ueen Elizabeth class was given in 191 2, and by 1913 wo rk was

Elizobeth mis sed Jutland.

begun on all five un its. All were commissioned after the sta rt of the war, yet all bu t one were present at Jutl and. W hen launched the y were beyond qu estion the most powerful ships in the world . T hey were the first British dreadn ought s to move to an oil-fired propul sion system, and with th eir more powerful machin ery they were the

serve in World War II.

t he epitome of Brit ish dreadnoug ht des ign during the war. Of the five ship s in the class, only Queen All five were modernized to

fastest battleship s of the day. Armour was also increased. Most impo rtan tly, the new 15in gun was fitted; because the weight of shell was so m uch greater than the 13.5in gun, her designers were able to move to an eight-gun batt ery instead of the custo mary ten guns. The last class of British battl eship s completed during the war were the five units of the Revenge class. T hese were plann ed to be heavily armed and armo ured 2 1-knot ships suitable for work in the North Sea. As such, they were essentially a 15in gun version of the Iron Duke class. T his intent, however, was thrown into confusion whe n Fisher retu rned as First Sea Lord in October 1914. He sto pped the construct ion of the class and decided to fit oil-fired boilers to all five ships for a maximum speed of 23 knots . T he ships were never able to achieve thi s speed , but essent ially becam e slower versions of th e Queen Elizabeth class. Three of the five ships were fitted with ant itorpe do bulges and it was found that the provision of these 6ft bu lges redu ced top speed by only less th an half a kno t. Finally, in August 1914, four dreadn ou gh ts were under construct ion in British yards for foreign navies. Two were earma rked for th e Turkish Navy and were already

23

complete. T hese were quickl y imp ounded and renamed Erin and Agincourt in British service. Chile had also ordered rwo ships and one was almos t com plete. As British relation s with Ch ile were much better than with Turk ey, these rwo Chilean ships were purchased in Septem ber 1914. T he lead ship ente red Royal Navy service in O ctob er and was nam ed Canada. T he second was completed in 1918 as an aircraft carrier.

GERMAN DREADNOUGHT DESIGN From the very start, th e Ge rma ns employed different dreadnought design prin ciples from the British. G erma n naval designers conside red th at protection was most imp ortant and th e main German naval archi tect placed em phasis on an exte nsive system of underwater protection by dividing the ship's hull into a large number of narrow, watertight compartment s. T his co nfigura tion was made possible by a large beam, which also provided a very stable gun platfo rm . T he Ge rma ns usually devoted a larger proporti on of a ship's displacement to armo ur, allowing for thicker main belts and for more of th e ship to be given some degree of prot ection . Conversely, German ships were usually less well armed than their British counterparts, partly due to weight considerations, which precluded the selection of large main guns on a design already devoting considerable weight to armour prot ection. Another reason was the German assessment that since the main battle area for their dreadn oughts was the

T he Ger mans were also slow to ado pt the steam tur bine. Because of manu factu ring difficulties and th eir un fam iliarity with the steam tu rbine, th e first rwo classes of Ger ma n dreadn ough ts retained reciprocat ing machinery. No t until 1909 were new

North Sea, where poor visibility was the norm, guns larger than 12in were unn ecessary. T hus, after the first class of dreadn ought was fitted with 11in guns, the Ger mans settled on the 12in gun for all remaining classes, until finally adapting the 15in gun for their last

German dreadn oughts fitted with turbines, but once in service such ships were easily

class built during the war.T he German 12in gun was clearly the equal to the early British 12in guns, but the Germans failed to respond in a timely mann er as the British opened the firepower gap by adopting the 13.5in and finally the 15in guns.

Deutsch land was the lead

ship in th e fin al class of German pre-dreadnoughts . Though the ir top speed was

able to meet their design speeds. Before the war, the Germans explored the possibility of fitting a 2-str oke 12,000hp di esel eng ine to d rive the cent ral shaft and thereby increase cru ising rang e, but afte r bein g tested on a single dr eadn ou gh t thi s develop ment was not pursued furt her. In general, since Ge rma n battleships were expected to operate onl y in the North Sea, endura nce was not a design emphasis. H abitabili ty was also no t em phasized, since ships wo uld not be deployed for lon g periods and crews lived in barracks ashore wh en the ship was in port.

Nassau was t he first German dreadnou ght to ente r service , in October 1909 . This starboard view shows the ship's basic layout . Designed hurr iedly as a counter to Dreadnoug ht, she mounted

two more main gun s and was slight ly bett er prot ected.

The first Germa n dreadn oughts were the four ships of the Nassau class, which were designed in 190 6 by imp roving the last of the pre-dreadn ought designs. Because of probl ems with lengthenin g shipyard slipways to build the larger ships, construction did not begin until 1907. Co mpared with Dreadnought, the first Ger man dreadn ought s possessed greater protection, but were armed with smaller guns (11in compared with l Zin) and were slower.

only 18 knot s, Scheer decided to inclu de the entire class wit h the High Seas Fleet in th e Jutl and operation. The weak underwa ter protect ion of the class was amply demonstr ated when Pommern was blown up by

124

?

sing le torpedo hit, wit h

th e loss of her ent ire crew.

The next four ships were author ized in the 1908-09 bud get, and were all laid down in 1908. T he four ships of the Helgoland class were slightly improved versions of the

Nassau with armo ur protection being increased and a larger 12in gun fitted. However, the main batt ery layout still employed the use ofwing tur rets arranged in a mann er that only eight of the 12 guns could be brought to bear broadside. T his class also retained reciprocatin g steam engines, meanin g that it was still slower than British dreadn oughts.

Kaiser, th e lead ship of the next class, was laid down in 1909 with the remaining four ships of the class laid down in 1910 . T hese were the first Germa n dreadn oughts

2S

,: /ir. ~

ABOVE The four uni ts of t he Helgoland

experime nta l d iesel engine o n o ne shaft, exceeded th eir design speed of 2 1 knot s.

class continued the German

Arm our protection was again improved until total armour reached 40 per cenr of th e

emphas is on protec tion over

ship's normal dis placeme nt. T he main battery was red uced to ten 12in guns in five

fi repower, thou gh t his class did int roduce the 12i n gun,

turrets, but th e two middle turrets were arranged in echelo n to allow them to fire

wh ich was superior to its

bro adside in eith er di rection. This layout, theoretically, increased the broadside to ten

Brit ish counter part.

BELOW

gun s, bur in pr actice it was no t a success and it was not used again. T he last dread nou ght s laid down before th e war were th e four ships of th e Konig

A Konig class unit in the perio d

class. T he first three sh ips were autho rized as parr of th e 1911 -1 2 budget, and the last

before Jutland. This class was

ship in the 191 2-1 3 budget. All were completed in 19 14 and all saw actio n at Jutland .

the first German dreadnought

to place all main batt ery turrets on t he cent re line.

26

to use stea m turbines, and all five ships of th e class, including o ne fitt ed with an

T hey possessed th e same superio r level of pro tection found on th e Kaiser class. T he main differen ce was th e placem ent of all five turrets on th e ship's centre line.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION Wi th both fleets determin ed to accept action on ly und er £wourab le circumstances, the openi ng of the war did not bri ng th e major fleet engagement expected by many on both sides. T he Gra nd Fleet conducted regular sweeps into the North Sea, but in the absence of oppos itio n from th e High Seas Fleet, th e main enemies of British dreadn oughts becam e min es and submarines instead of Ge rma n dreadnought s. T he first action between British and Ge rma n naval forces did not occur until 28 August, when th e Royal Navy made plans to attack the Ge rma n pat rollers off H eligoland. In an actio n con ducte d in fog and haze, the Ge rmans were ini tially surprised. The commander of the Gra nd Fleet's Battle C ruiser Force, Vice-Adm iral Sir David Beatty bravely rushed in to the fight in the face of a mine and to rpedo thre at in bad weather. T he final result was the first British naval victory of the war, with three Ger ma n light cruisers sunk. The larger effect was to make th e Germans even more cautio us, and the Kaiser went as far as order ing that the commander of the Hi gh Seas Fleet gain his person al approval before committing to an ope ration that might result in a fleet engagement. Despite the Germans' reluctance to comm it the Hi gh Seas Fleet to action , they in creased submarine and minelaying operations. These paid divid ends wh en on 5 Septem ber a U-boat sank a Briti sh sco ut cru iser, and on 22 Septem ber th e old subma rine U-9 sank three armo ured cruisers in succession off the Dutch coast, with a roral loss of more th an 1,40 0 men . The power of th e subma rine was now fully evident to the Royal Navy. Furthermore, on 27 October the dread nought Audacious, out on firing practice, hit a mine off the coast of northern Ireland . T he ship sank , 28

more du e to poor dam age control than any design flaw.

T he inactivity of the Hi gh Seas Fleet did not sit well with many, amo ngst them T irpitz. H e pressed for offensive operations. T ho ugh the comma nder of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Fried rich von Ingenohl , declined to comm it his ships to combat, for reasons of mora le, some offensive action was desired. According ly, the H igh Seas Fleet's Scouting Force of bartlecruisers and light cru isers un der Rear Admiral Franz Hipper conducted a bomb ardm ent ofYarmouth on the east coast of England on 3 November. T hro ugho ut the early part of the naval war in the North Sea, the British had the benefit of a high level of insight int o Germa n naval opera tions. T he int elligence was provided by Room 40, the Royal Navy's code-breaki ng organization, named after its residence on the first floor of the old Admira lty Buildi ng. After an uncertai n start, but bolstered by int elligence windfalls (including obtaini ng the current signal book from a German ligh t cruiser that ran agro und in the Baltic), Room 40 was invariab ly able

Audacious shown sinking

on 27 October 1914, t he first British dreadnought loss of the war. The loss of th is vess el to a small min e was very unsett lin g to th e Royal Navy . Her sinki ng was due more to t he immat ure state of damage contr ol in th e Royal Navy at th e tim e, rath er than any design weakness .

to provide the Admiralty with advance warn ing of all pending major Ger ma n naval operations. Room 40 did not always know the object of a Ge rman naval sort ie, but it d id develop reliable means to predict when the H igh Seas Fleet was at sea, often allowing the Gra nd Fleet to leave port before a German opera tion had even begun. T he Germans planned another bombardment raid on the English coast, th is time against Scarboro ugh and H artl epool. On this occasio n, Hi pper's bartlecruisers were suppo rted by the Hi gh Seas Fleet itself, which came out as far as the Dogger Bank, abo ut halfway across the North Sea. Room 40 was able to p rovide warn ing th at ano ther raid was imminent . In respo nse, the Ad mira lty ordered Beatty's bartlecruisers to a point where they could intercep t the Ger man s on their way home. ]ellicoe wanted to support the ope rat ion with the enti re Grand Fleet, bu t was refused by the Adm iralty, who tho ught that th e 2nd Battle Squadro n wit h six dreadno ughts was sufficient. T he decision was a recipe for pot enti al disaster, as Room 40 had not been

29

was not wo rking. In order to hurt the British, another method had to be found. T he only alterna tive was to utilize submarines. O n 4 Februa ry 19 15, the Germans declared th e waters around Britain and Ireland a military zone in which merchant ships were liable for destru ction . T he first unrestricted submarine cam paign ran from February to October 19 15. T he Ge rma ns lacked sufficient sub ma rines to make a blockade effective, but early results were enco uraging and British ant i-subma rine efforts were inade quate. T he real prob lem for the Germans was dealing with the diplom atic fallout of attacking neutral shipping, particularly th at of the United Sta tes. In thi s environme n t, an in cident involving Amer ican ships or American casualties was inevitable, and it came on 7 May 191 5, whe n a Ge rma n subma rine sank the C unard liner Lusitania with the loss of 1,201 lives, 128 of them American. T he Ger mans avoided an American ent ry into the war with some concessions to their submar ine blockade, but by Septe m ber sub marine att acks had reverte d to the restricti ve prize ru les. The first unrestr icted submar ine cam paign had failed, but the potent ial of the subma rine had been fully dem on strated while the Hi gh Seas Fleet sat idly in port. able to discern that the ent ire Hi gh Seas Fleet was also at sea and that they would be operati ng close by the six British dreadn ou ght s. It loo ked as if the Ge rmans would get

Following the failure of the unr estricted submarine campaign, events moved in a direc tion tha t wo uld finally result in a clash at sea between the great dreadn ou ght fleets. The first of these was the death of Pohl in February 1916 from cance r. Hi s

to engage a portion of the Grand Fleet with overwhelming force. T he events of the Ger ma n raid on 16 December ended up being indecisive du e to poor weath er and comm and probl ems. The Germa n warshi ps co nducted th eir

rep laceme nt was Vice Admiral Reinh ard Schee r, who was mu ch more offensively minded . He was also an advoc ate of a renewed subma rine campaign. T he Kaiser, however, could not brin g himself to approve ano ther rou nd of unrestricted submari ne

and the third is a ship of

bo mbardment and successfully avoided int ercept ion by Beatty's battl ecruisers desp ite

the Bellerophon class .

being spotted by Beatty's light cruiser scouts and later by elements of the 2nd Battl e Squad ron. Before th e escape of the Ger man bartlecruiscrs, the Hi gh Seas Fleet had com e into contact with the destroyer screen of the 2nd Battl e Squad ron. Instead of pressing the attac k with his 14 dreadn oughts and eight pre-dreadnought s, Ingenohl turned away when only 10 miles from th e British force, fearful tha t he had co me

warfare until some type of understand ing had been reached with the Ame ricans. What resulted was a restricted U-boa t offensive that qu ickly ran into diplomat ic troubles.

Elements of the 4th Battle Squadron in a line-abreast form ation in t he North Sea in 1915. The nearest ship is an Iron Duke class ship , the second ship is Agincourt

Co mplementi ng the U-boat campaign was a nu mber ofother measures intended to put constant pressure on the British and force them to take actions that might bring the Germans the oppo rtunity of an engagement on f.'lvo urable terms. Amongst these

In one of th e most iconic maritim e photo s of all tim e, German armoured cruis er

BlOcher is shown capsizing on 24 January 1915, duri ng the batt le of Dogger Bank. This battle marked the end of a series of German raids on the English coast during th e early part of th e war. It was not until Jut land that the opposing batt lecr uiser forces wou ld meet again.

across the ent ire G rand Fleet and knowi ng he did not have the Kaiser's permission to engage in such a battl e. In Janu ary 1915 , the Germans plan ned anot her raid into the Dogge r Bank area to clear out fishing trawlers suspected of acting as British surveillance unit s, and to engage British light forces th ought to be in the area. Hipper wanted suppo rt from the Hi gh Seas Fleet, bu t Ingenohl could not gain the Kaiser's permission to sail the fleet that far into the North Sea. Unfortunately for the Ge rma ns, Room 40 had deciphered orders for the operatio n and the British had prepared an amb ush. O n 24 Jan uary 191 5, the thr ee battl ecru isers and one armo ured cruiser under H ipp er were spo tted and were soon being pursued by Beatt y's five battl ecrui sers. In a confused action marked by British signalling probl ems, th e five British batt lecruisers were able to sink onl y the armo ured cruiser Blucher, while allowing th e th ree barrlecruisers to escape. T he battl e of Dogger Ban k had severe repercussion s for the Ge rma ns. Ingenohl was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Poh l and the Kaiser inst ruc ted von Pohl th at

30

he could not seek battl e beyon d the m inefields of the Heli goland Bight. Most imp ortantl y, it was ob vious that the Ge rma n strategy of attri tion in the No rth Sea

31

measures were intensified sweeps by the High Seas Fleet, including the ren ewed

submarines and a mi nelayer to attack the H igh Seas Fleet if it emerge d. Concurrently,

bom bard ment of Brit ish coastal towns. The first of Scheer's fleet movements occurred

Scheer was making plans for a bombardment of Sunde rlan d by his battlecr uisers, to

on 5-6 M arch 1916, when he sortied to a point sout h of Dogge r Bank to int ercept

again atte mpt to dr aw out a portion of the Gra nd Fleet. T he bombardment wo uld be

British light units on patrol. Thou gh th e Gra nd Fleet tried to interce pt, th ere was no

suppo rted by th e H igh Seas Fleet position ed sout h of the Dogger Ban k. A force of 18

action. On 25 March, the British mo unted an opera tion to launch an aircraft raid from

U-boats was stationed off British naval bases to attack British capital ships. German

a seaplane carrier against German Zeppelin statio ns on the Schleswig coast. T he five

Navy Ze ppelins wo uld overwarch the entire operation to prov ide scouting reports

aircraft th at were launched inflicted no damage, but did prompt th e Hi gh Seas Fleet

and make sure th e Gra nd Fleet was not intervening. Hipper wo uld dr aw any

to put to sea. The seaplane carrier was being covered by Beatty's Battle Cruiser Force,

inte rcepting Brit ish force onto the Hig h Seas Fleet fo r it to deliver a crushi ng blow.

bu t was ordered to withdraw when the German sortie was discovered. The Gra nd Fleet

Yet because of maint enance issues with key units, Scheer had to push the planned

was ordered to a position off the Scott ish coast, but bad weather prevented the Ge rmans

opera tion back to th e end of May. Poor weather prevented ade q ua te Zeppelin

from advancin g farther int o th e No rth Sea and both sides retu rned to base.

coverage, and th e end urance of th e U- boa ts already stationed off British naval bases

Jellicoe resisted mo unting pressure from the Admi ralty to be mo re aggressive. The

was reaching its lim its. Schee r therefore decided to abandon the planned

Admiralty supported the notion that furt her air raids wo uld force the Ge rmans out to

bo mbardment in favour of an operation targeted against British light un its and

figh t. Jellicoe did not th ink this o utcome was as likely, and worried th at even if the

shipping in the Skaggerak . T he Ge rma n battl ecrui ser force was o rdere d to show itself off th e No rwegian coast to dr aw th e Brit ish out.

Germans did emerge it would be late in the day before they wo uld be in a position clear

Benbow , an Iron Duke class

super-dreadnought, leading other ships of the 4th Batt le

of the rninefields, leaving insufficient time for the Grand Fleet to engage them decisively.

At 0 1OOhrs on 3 1 May 1916, the Ge rman barrlecruisers left port, followed by the

Jellicoe also worried abo ut the fuel consu mption of his destroyers and ligh t cruisers,

mai n body of th e H igh Seas Fleet. As usual, Roo m 40 informed Jellicoe that

potent ial for th e smoke

whi ch would prevent him from lingerin g lon g off th e Ge rma n coast waiting for the

some thi ng was up, and th e Gra nd Fleet was already at sea whe n th e Ge rma ns departed. T he great clash was finally at hand .

dreadnought s to affect

High Seas Fleet to emerge. In jellicoe's mi nd, he was unable to force the Germans out,

Squadron in 1915. The produ ced by a group of visibility is readily apparent.

so any engagement wou ld result from a German attempt to seize the initiative. O n 20 April, the British mo unted an o peratio n into the Kattega t to attack German shipping. In respo nse to int elligen ce th at th e H igh Seas Fleet was at sea, the Grand Fleet rushed to intercept, bu t were frustrated by heavy fog. Scheer took the initiative on 24 Apr il, when he sortied his ba rtlecruisers, supported by th e High Seas Fleet, to cond uct a bombard ment of Lowestofr. T he British, again advised by Room 40 th at an operation was under way, sort ied th e Grand Fleet an d th e Battle C ruiser Fleet. T he Germans bartlecruisers encountered British light forces and then pressed on to shell Lowesroft, followed by Yarmouth. Declining an op portunity to press an attack on th e British naval units, th e battl ecrui sers, accom pa nied by th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, headed west to their bases. The Grand Fleet, impe ded by heavy seas, was not able to intercept. In the series of raids and counter-raids, the next move was the Royal Navy's. On 4 May, two British seap lane carriers moved into pos it ion off th e Schleswig coas t to mo unt ano the r attack on Ze ppelin sheds. O nly one of the 11 aircraft intend ed to take part in the raid actua lly bombed its target, but the sheds were not the real ta rget. Je llicoe ho ped that th is action wo uld entice the High Seas Fleet to sortie; in preparation th e British had mi ned th e Ge rman chan nels and moved submarines int o the area . After lin gerin g wi th the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe de parted. By the time the Germans did come out later in the day, the British were gone. G iven the heighte ned activity by the German and British navies, it was becoming more likely th at a clash between fleets wo uld occ ur. But as both sides still sought to engage on favourab le terms, any such clash wou ld still be the result of accident . Jellicoe decided to keep the pressure up with a planned ope ration into the Karregar wit h light fo rces on 2 June, suppo rted by a battl e sq uadro n position ed in the Skaggerak an d the

32

enti re G ran d Fleet fart her to th e north-west. T his o pe ration was supported by

33

Bellerophon class Ships in class

Bellerophon,Superb, Temeroire

Displacement (normal)

18,596 tons

Dimensions

lengt h 526 ft; beam 82ft 6in; draught 31ft

Armament

10 x 12in/45ca l guns; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tub es

Protection

main belt 1O-5in; deck 3-1.5in; tu rr ets 12in; connin g tow er llin; barbett es lD -5in; torp edo bulkh ead 3- l in; weight of armour 5,430 tons (2 8.7 per cent of normal displacement)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Machinery

4-shaft Parsons tu rbines and 18 boilers creati ng 23,000hp; top speed 20.75 knots

Range

5,720 nautic al miles [nrn] at 10 knots

Crew

840 (1914)

Neptune class, ther e were significant modifi cations between the first ship of the class and the other two. Overall, th e design proved un satisfactory and was not repeated. While several navies, prin cipally th e US Navy, had already moved to placin g all

war. Before th e sta rt of the

the design of its turrets. T he probl em was th at the sigh ting hoo ds at th e front of th e

war, the height of her top mas ts

turrets mad e th e occ upants inside susceptible to being conc ussed if a superim posed turret fired over th em . Royal Navy design ers sti ll co nside red it essential th at its

BRITISH BATTL ESHIPS Following th e successful tria ls of Dreadnought, the British moved quickly to bu ild a

Superb pictur ed before th e

main gun turrets o n th e centre line, th e Royal Navy was reluctant to do so because of

battl eships carry ten main guns and it was intended to ena ble all of th ese to fire

was reduced and the 4 in guns remove d from the top of the 12in main batt ery . Superb was present at Jut land, but played

broadside. Neptune introduced echeloned gun s arnidship, which in theor y en abled all

a minor role. In 1918, she was

ten gun s to be brought to bear broadside. This was th e same layo ut explored on the

sent to Turkish waters as th e

first bat tlecrui ser design , and as on Invincible it was found to be im practical in service

flagsh ip of Brit ish naval forces. After being used as a target

numerical dr eadnought superiority over any potential rival. T he lead ship of the

du e to the blast effect and strain on the hull when th e guns were fired crossdec k. O n

ship in 192 2, she was broken

Bellerophon class was laid down in Decemb er 1906 and all three un its were completed

top of this, th e Number 4 turret was supe rimposed over the Number 5 tur ret, which

up in 1923.

by M ay 190 9. T he Belleroph on vessels were a virtual repeat of Dreadnought. The main battery of ten 12in gun s was mounted in five tur rets, three placed o n th e centreline. T he other two turrets were wing turrets, so th at an eight-gun bro adside was possible. T he secondary armament was deficient, with onl y 16 4in gun s, which were inad equ ate to sto p a destro yer attack. In addition , th e guns were badl y placed , with eight being located on th e top of the main turrets . By 191 6, all 4 in guns were moved to more workable positions in the superstru cture. On the heels of th e Bellerophon class, the first ship of the St Vincent class was laid down in Febru ary 1907. The three ships of thi s class were essentiall y a repeat of the previou s design, but did inco rpo rate slight improvem ents. T he layout of the main batt ery remain ed th e same, but th e main weapo n was a more powerful version of the 12in gun . The 4i n gun was retained as th e seconda ry arma ment. Arm our prote ction was largely th e sam e as in th e prec eding class. The power of the machinery was incre ased to compensate for a slightly larger displacement. Combined with a more efficient longer hu ll, th e class easily reached its design speed of 21 knots. Not unti l the programme of 1909 did th e Royal Navy attempt to depart from the basic design of Dreadnought. T he three ships of the Neptune class attempted to add ress 34

the prin cipal flaw in th e layout of th e main battery of Dreadnought. Within the

3S

Collingwood retained t he

Colossus pictu red befor e th e

ineff icient wing -tu rret

wa r. Her design was deficient

arra ngements of early Brit ish

in terms of tu rret and

dreadnough ts . Present at

smokes tack placement ,

-.1

Jut land, she was undamaged,

and her protec t ion showed

but barely missed being

no improvement over

torpedoed. She went into

Dreodnought launched

reserve in 1919 and was

four years earl ier. Colossus

scrapped in 19 23.

survived th e war and serve d in var ious training capaciti es before being broken up in 19 28.

meant that the Number 4 could not be fired astern. To clear the decks for crossdeck firing , the ship's boats were placed on a flying bridge between the smokestacks. This awkward arrangement was an obvious so urce of trouble in battl e if dama ged , so it was removed just after th e outbreak of war. T he same 12in/50 gun was used as on the St Vincent class, and armo ur protection was on a sim ilar scale. T he later two ships of th e class, Colossus and Hercules, were not laid down until July

was now dropped to save weight. At the same time, th ou gh , the forwar d smo kestack

190 9 and we re able to incorporate several m odifications. T he prin cipal differen ce

and making th e ship's only rema ining fire-co ntrol station virt ually unusable.

was placed in front of the forward mast, introducing th e same problems with smoke

was in armo ur prot ecti on. As a weight-saving measur e, th e scale of protect ion on

In late 190 9, th e first ship of th e four-sh ip O rion class was laid down . All four had

Dreadnought had been red uced on subseq uent classes. Prot ecti on on Colossus and Hercules was im proved to 11in on th e main belt and th e barb et res, returning protection to that of Dreadnought. T he Royal Navy still believed th at torpedoes were

ente red service by 19 12. T hese ships displayed the best Brit ish battleship design to

imp ortant weapons in a battl eship duel , and now the longer-ran ged 21 in torpedo was

still ten gun s, but for th e first tim e all five tu rrets were mounted on the centre line,

int rod uced on battleship s. T he appearance of the later two ships was also altered . On

allowing for a ten-gun bro adside. T he decision to place superfiring turrets fore and aft

date, and represente d a significant increase in capabilities over previou s designs. T he pr incipal differenc e was th e decision to move to a 13.5in gun . T he main batt ery was

previou s British drea dnought designs, the placement of th e smokestacks mad e the aft cont rol position on the rear mast practically unusable due to smoke. The after mast

St Vincent class Ships in class

Collingwood, St Vincent, Vanguard

Displacement (normal]

19,700 tons

Dimensions

length 536 ft ; beam 84ft; draught 27-31ft

Armament

10 x 12in/5 0cal gun; 18 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tubes

Protection

36

Neptune class Ships in class

Neptun e, Colossus, Hercules

Displacement [ norma l]

19,680 tons [Colossus and Hercules 20,03 0 tons]

Dimensions

lengt h 546ft; beam 85f t; draught 28ft 6in [Co lossus and Hercules 29ft Sin]

Armament

10 x 12in/50cal guns; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 21in torp edo tub es main belt 1O-2. 5in (Colossus and Hercules 11-7in]; deck 3- 1.5in (Colossus and Hercules

Protection

4-1.5in]; t urrets llin; conning tower llin; barbett es 1O- 5in [Colossus and Hercules

main belt 1O- 8in ; deck 3- 1.5in; tu rrets l l in; conning tower llin; barbett es 9-5 in; torpedo

11-4in ]; weight of armour [Colossus and Hercules] 5,562 tons ( 27.3 per cent of normal

bulkhead 3-1.5in; weight of armour 5,590 tons (28 per cent of normal displacement]

displacement]

Machinery

4 -shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 24,5oohp; top speed 21 knots

Machinery

4-shaft Parsons tu rbines and 18 boilers creati ng 25,000h p; top speed 21 knots

Range

6,9oonm at 10 knots

Range

6,62onm at 10 knots (Colossus and Hercules 6,68 onm]

Crew

823 (1915]

Crew

813 [Colossus and Hercules 791 in 1916]

37

King Geo rge V class

Orion class Ships in class Displacement [normal] Dimensions Arm ament Protection

Conqueror, Monarch, Orion, Thunderer

Ships in class

Ajax, Audacious, Centurion, King George V

22,200 tons

Displacement [normal)

25,420 tons

length 581ft; beam 88ft 6in; draught 31ft 3in

Dimensions

length 597ft 6in; beam 89ft; draught 28ft 8in

10 x 13.5in/45cal guns ; 16 x 4in guns; 3 x 18in torpedo tubes

Armament

10 x 13.5in /45cal guns ; 16 x 4i n guns ; 3 x 21in torpedo tu bes

main belt 12-8in; deck 4 -1in; turrets 11in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 1O-3in; weight of armour 6,560 tons [29 per cent of normal displacement)

Protection

main belt 12-8in; deck 4-1 in; t urrets 11in; conn ing tower 11in; barbettes 1O-3 in; weight of armour 7,080 tons [30.2 per cent of normal displacement )

Machinery

4-shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 27,OOOhp; top speed 21 knots

Machinery

4-shaft Parsons turb ines and 18 boilers creating 27,000hp ; top speed 21 knots

Range

6,730nm at 10 knots

Range

6,31Onm at 10 knots

Crew

754 (1914)

Crew

1,114 (1916)

included the restriction not to fire directly fore and aft, because of the concussion

include the fitting of four guns forward below the ma in deck level. It proved

problem to personnel in the lower turret. Yet this arrangement was thought to be

im possible to use these guns in any kind of sea, and all were remo ved during the war.

tactically insignific ant com pared with the advant age of being able to fire a full ten-gun

At the start of the Great War, two of the four ship s of the Iron D uke class were

broadside. In addition to the inc rease in firepower, protection was also increased on

already in service, with the other two due to co mm ission before the end of th e year.

the main belt and the turret barb ertes, giving the class a fine balan ce of offensive and

Thus, at the start of the war these were the most powerful battle ship s in the Royal

defen sive qu alities. A continu ing design flaw was th e placem ent of th e for ward

Navy.The principal difference between these ships and those of the very sim ilar Ori on

sm okestack in front of th e mainmast, which created problems with smo ke in th e fire-

and King George V classes was th e overdu e provision of a secondary battery of Gi n

dir ection cent re.

guns. Ten of th e 12 gun s, however, were placed in single casema tes for ward and close

The four ships of th e King Geo rge V class were all laid down in 1911 and had all

to the waterline, mak ing them subject to interference from heavy seas and spray. T he

ent ered service by 1913. T hese were essent ially repeats of th e Orion s. T he layout of

last two guns were mounted even lower in th e area of th e Number 5 turret. T his

th e main battery was retained, but an improved model of th e 13.5in gun was fitted ,

placement proved so troublesome that the gun s were removed and mounted in th e

whi ch fired a heavier shell. T he seco nda ry arm ament was still inadequate to deal with

forward supe rstruc tu re before th e battl e of Jutl and . T hese ships were th e first Royal Navy battleship s to mount anti-aircraft guns.

to rpedo boats and destroyers, and the layout of the IG 4 in gun s was modified to

The five ships of th e Queen Elizabeth class were the most successful of any British battleship design of World War 1. Laid down in 191 2-1 3, non e were available by th e start of the war, but all had been completed and were in service for th e battl e of Jutland. The lead ship of th e class was in refit during Jutl and , but the remaining four ships all saw act ion against the High Seas Fleet.

Iron Ouke class

Dreadnou ght began th e wa r

as flags hip of th e 4t h Batt le Squadron, but in May 1916 she was tempora rily

Ships in class

Benbow, Emperorof India, Iron Duke, Marlborough

Displacement [normal)

26,100 tons

Dimensions

length 623ft; beam 90ft; draught 32ft 9in

Armament

10 x 13.5in /45cal guns; 12 x 6in guns ; 3 x 3in ant i-aircraft guns; 4 x 21in torp edo tubes

transferred to the 3rd Batt le Squadron when it was

Protection

main belt 12-8in ; deck 2.5-lin; turrets 11in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 11in; weight of armour 7,925 tons [ 31.2 per cent of normal displacement)

transferred from the Grand Fleet to Sheerness to boost defences against further German raids. As a result,

38

Dreadnough t missed Jut land.

Machinery

4-shaft Parsons turbines and 18 boilers creating 29,000hp ; top speed 21 knots

Range

8,100nm at 12 knots

Crew

1,102 (1914)

39

T he design incorp orated several significant improvements. T he most impo rta nt of

Royal Sove reign class

these was the decision to abando n the mixed coal and oil fuel system on previous British dr eadn ou ghts in favou r of an all-oil fuel sysrem. This move was dr iven by the

Ships in class

req uireme nt to create a mu ch higher output to meet th e design speed of25 kno ts with no extra weight in mac hinery. T he decision to go to oil also saved eno ugh weight that the scale of armo ur protection could actually be increased in some key areas. T he result was a squadron offast battl eships with excellent protection . T he Admi ralty envisioned tha t the 'Fast Squadron' wo uld be used to bring a reluctant enemy force to battl e, and

Prot ect ion

it possessed th e speed to operate with the G rand Fleet's battl ecrui ser squadro n. T he other majo r im provem ent on th e Q ueen Elizabeth class was the decisio n to

Machinery

move up to a 15in gun. T he larger gun was imp ortant for a number of reason s. T he

Range

requi rem ent to fit additional boilers to meet th e 25-knot speed requ irement meant th at a tur ret amidships could not be fitt ed, but th e British were reluctant to abandon

Crew

909 (1916

--------------------_-1

the hitting power presen ted by a ten-gun battl eship . If a 15in gun was fitted, how ever, the to tal broadside weight of an eight-gun 15in broadside wo uld actu ally be greater than ten I3.5in guns .

battles hip s, but compensated for th is with enormo us firepower. Her main battery was 14 14in guns (largest of any World War I dr eadn ou ght) mo unte d in seven cent re lin e

A follow-up to th e Queen Elizabet h class was the eigh t planned ships of th e

turrets, perm itting all 14 guns to fire broadside. Canada was laid down in 1911 for

Revenge class. O f th ese, only five were com pleted, and of th ose o nly two (Revenge

Chile, and completed in late 191 5. T he Royal Navy pur chased the ship and she proved

and Royal Oak) participated in Jutl and . T he Revenge class maintained the same scale

to be a welcome additio n to the G rand Fleet. T he design was based on Iron Duke, but

of protection and th e same 15in-gun main battery, but were no t design ed to have the

since th e sh ip was lon ger and mou nt ed mo re powerfu l mach inery, her top speed

same high speed. Addi tionally, the re were several battl eshi ps intend ed for foreign governments th at

was almost 23 kno ts. Armament was an im pressive ten 14in guns (all centre line) and

the Royal Navy expropriated at the start of th e war. All of th ese participated in the

to earlier British dreadn ou ght s. In service, she was co nsidered one of the Grand Fleet's best ships.

clash at Jutland . Erin was laid down in 19 11 for Turkey, but was take n into British

18 6in gu ns. Her level of protection was not equa l to the Iron Duke's, but was sim ilar

service in 19 14 . She gave the Royal Navy a un it possessing the same capabi lities as an Iron D uke-class ship, with the same main and secondary arma ment and a simi lar scale of pro tection. Agincourt was or igina lly or dere d by Brazil, but was sold in Jan uary 1914 , un compl eted , to Turkey. Along with Erin, she was destin ed never to fly th e

GERMAN BATTLESHIPS

Turkish flag, being confiscated by th e Royal N avy in 1914. Agincourt was not a wellbalan ced design . She did not possess the level of armour protection of other Brit ish

T he Ge rman Navy was never able to maint ain the Royal Navy's pace of dreadn ought construction. There were fewer yards in Germany capable of building large ships. T hose that could do so were mu ch less efficient than their British counterparts, which could

Oueen Elizabeth class

complete a dreadn ou ght in a year. In cont rast, Ger man yards took typically from two to Ships in class Displacem ent (normal)

Barham, Malaya, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite ----------------{ 32, 590 to ns

Navy was able to complete four classes of d readn ou ghts for a tota l of 17 units. To

Dimensions

lengt h 639ft 9in (Barham and Warspite 643 ft 9in]; beam 90ft r in; draught 33ft

compensate, the Ge rmans augmented the Hi gh Seas Fleet with the most modern of their

Armament

8 x 15in/4 2cal guns; 14 x 6in guns; 4 x 21in torpedo tube s

Prot ecti on Machine ry Range 40 -~.---

Crew

----------------{

main belt 13-8 in; deck 3-1 in; t urr ets 13in; conning tower 11in; barbettes 1O - 4i n; weight of

armour 8,900 to ns ( 30 per cent of normal displacement ] ----------------{ 4-shaft Parsons tu rbines (Brown-Curtis in Barham and Valiant ] ; 24 boilers creat ing r5 ,000hp ; to p speed 24 knots 5,000nm at 12 knots 1,016 (1916)

three years. By the opening of the war, and up unti l the time of Jutland , the Ge rman

pre-drea d noughts. In additio n to the 17 dreadn ou ghts comp leted before Ju tland, six batrlecruisers were also in service. O ne of these, however, was caught in the Mediterranean at the war's begin ning and by 1916 was nom inally part of the Turkish Navy. T he Nassau class was the Ge rman Navy's respo nse to Dreadnought. Caught un prepared, German naval designers took six months after the comp letion of Dreadnought to set tle on the design, and th e first ship of the class was not laid down

unt il Ju ne 1907 . The four ships of the class were comp leted betwee n October 1909 and May 191 0, each having take n between two and thr ee years to com plete.

41

Posen entered service in May

t

1910 and was photogr aphed here short ly thereafter. The arrangement of her main armament is evident. The ship st ressed protect ion over firepower and her eight llin-gun broadsid e delivered a weight of only 6,OBOlb - far less th an her Briti sh rivals.

T he design of thi s first German d readnought set th e pattern for future co nstruc tio n. Yet the Ge rma ns were forced to use th e triple-expansion mach inery from their pre-dreadnought designs, as there was no tim e to develop turbines without

Because of th e req uireme nt to begin construction as soon as possibl e, th e

suffering an even greater delay. With improved horsepower from earlier designs, the

autho rities again decided not to wait for turbines. Speed was increased increm entally by the provision of greater power and a lon ger hull. A wider beam was provided , and

burn fuel oil whi ch was sprayed on th e coal. T he strength of the class was its protection, particularly below the waterline. The

this was used to provide a better intern al arrangement . T he magazines for th e win g

her prom inent radio gaffs .

12in turrets were provided with improved underwat er protection and were less

5he fir ed 53 l l in rounds at

main batt ery was mounted in six tur rets, each with two 11in guns. T he layout of th ese

crowded . All of the bo ilers were also gro uped together, which allowed the ship's th ree

each side of th e ship, making th e broadside onl y eight guns firing a compa ratively

smokestacks to be placed together am idship s. T he next class of dr eadn ou ghts was laid down in 1910. This class, named for th e

light shell weight of 6,080Ib. The seco ndary battery comprised 12 5.9in guns,

Kaiser, included several im po rta nt developments. T he Ge rma ns had successfully

arranged in single casemates six per side. W ith the naval race with the Royal Navy heat ing up , th e Ge rma ns laid down four

incorporated turb ines int o th eir ba ttlecru isers, and now they were fitted o n a class of revised . T hree of the five turrets were fitted on the cent re line (one fo rward and two

based on the Nassau class with onl y minor improvements. The biggest chan ge was th e

aft), and th e rem ain ing two were fitt ed am idships in a staggered arrangement th at

shift to a 12in gun in an attempt to match th e Royal Navy's adva ntage in bro adside

th eo retically allowed both tur rets to fire broadside. In reality, this arrangeme nt proved

shell weight. T he layout of th e main batt ery was a repeat of th e Nassau class, so that

impractical. T he am idships turrets were too close to th e fore and aft superstructures

onl y eight guns cou ld be brought to bear broadside. The secondary battery comprised

to permit them to fire fore and aft with out creating blast damage. C rossdeck fire o n

14 single 5.9in guns mounted in casemates.

the broadside was also difficul t, as it placed great stresses on th e hull.

Ships in class

Rheinland , Posen , Nassau , Westfalen

Displacement [no rm al)

18,900 ton s

Dimensions

length 478ft; beam 89ft; draught 27ft 6in

Armament

12 x l1in/45cal guns; 12 x 5.9in /45ca l guns; 16 x 3.4in guns; 6 x 17.7into rpedo tu bes main belt 11.5-4in; deck 4in; turrets l l in: conning tower 12in; weight of armou r 6,640 tons [35 .2 per cent of normal disp lacement]

t he removal of some of

Jutlan d and was undamaged. After the war, she was handed over to Great Britain and scrapped in 19 21.

d read no ughts. T he 12in gun was retained , but th e layout of the mai n battery was

ships of th e Hel goland class in 1908. Because speed was of th e essence, thi s class was

Helgoland class

Nassau class

42

of th e war, essent ially uncha nged apart from

sh ips could just make 20 kn ots. In 1915 , all four ships in th e class were modified to

turrets allowed for only two on th e centre lin e, with th e other four placed two on

Protection

Posen shown after t he sta rt

Ships in class

Ostfriesland , Thuringen , Helgola nd , Oldenburg

Displacement [no rmal)

22 ,800 tons

Dimensions

lengt h 546ft; beam 93ft 6in; draught 27ft 6in

Arm ament Protection

12 x 12in/50 cal guns; 14 x 5.9in/ 45 cal guns; 14 [red uced to 12 in 1913) x 3.4in guns ; 6 x 19.7in torpedo tubes main belt 11.75-4in; deck 3in; turrets l l in: conning tower 12in; weight of armour 8,350 ton s [36 .6 per cent of norma l displacement]

Machinery

3-shaft verti cal tr iple-expansion and 12 boilers creating 22 ,000h p; top speed 19.5 knot s

Machin ery

3-shaft vert ical tripl e-expansion and 15 boilers creatin g 28,0 00hp ; top speed 20 knots

Range

9,400nm at 10 knots

Range

9,400nm at 10 knot s

Crew

1,130 [wartime)

Crew

1,300 [w artime]

43

Konig class

Ostfries/and shawn in 19 20

Prot ection was incr eased over previous dr eadnought classes, and was superior to

after being handed aver to

comparable British classes. The shi ps developed more th an th eir designed pow er, in

th e US Navy . As a member of dreadnoughts, she retained

th e case of Kaiser up to 55 ,OOOhp, so were able to make up to 23.4 knots. Friedrich der Grosse was selected in 1914 to be refitted as th e fleet flagship and was fitt ed with

t he awkward wi ng·t urre t

a heavy foremast which gave her a different app earan ce from her sister ships.

th e second class of German

config uratio n, but feat ured an improved interior arra ngement th at allowed all th e boilers to be grouped

Displacement [norm al)

25,800 ton s

Dimensions

lengt h 580ft; beam 97ft ; draught 28ft 6in

Armament

10 x 12in/50ca l gun s; 14 x 5.9i n/45 cal guns; 6 x 3Ain guns ; 2 x 3A in anti -aircraft guns ; 5 x 19.7in torpedo tubes

Protection

mai n belt 14-lOin; deck 4.5in; turrets 14in; connin g tower 14in; weight of arm our 10,440 tons [40 A per cent of norm al displacement )

Machinery

3-shaft Parsons tu rbin es and 12 boilers creati ng 31,OOOhp; t op speed 21 knots

Range

lO,OOOn m at 10 kn ots

Crew

1,300 [wartime]

T he four ships of the Kon ig class were laid down in 1911 and at th e tim e of Jutl and gun s as its main armament , which were mounted in five turrets. Howeve r, the awkward

together. This layout resu lted in a t hr ee-smokestac k

all turrets being fitted on the cent re line. The centre line turret between th e stacks gave

a German dreadnought .

Konig , Grosser KurfOrst , Markgraf and Kronprinz

were th e most mod ern dreadnoughts in the Hi gh Seas Fleet. T he class retained ten 12in arrangement of th e two amidships turrets from the Kaiser class was altered in favour of

arrangement , unique for

Ships in class

these ships a ten-gun broadside, the first ever for a Germ an dreadnought. The secondary armament remained at 14 5.9in guns, each mounted singly in casemates. Wi th an increased beam , a high level of subdivision was again in evidence. As in th e Kaiser class, the boiler roo ms and machinery were gro uped fore and aft of the amidships turret , wh ich created th e wid ely spaced smokestacks. Unlike previou s classes, a heavy tubular foremast was fitt ed with a contro l to p.

Prinzregen r Lui tpold

photographed immed iatel y before the outb reak of war. As a membe r of th e Kaiser class, she cont inued the t rend of emphasizi ng protec tion over fi repower, but was a more effec t ive fighting un it than

Kaiser class

her Britis h contemporaries. Undamaged at Jut land, she

Friedr ich der Grosse, Kaiserin, Konig Albert , Prinz regent Luitpold , Kaiser

was scutt led at Scapa Flow

Displac ement [norm al)

24,720 tons

in June 1919.

Dimensions

lengt h 564ft; beam 95ft 3in; draught 27ft 3in

Ships in class

Armament Prot ect ion

Machinery

10 x 12in/50cal guns; 14 x 5.9in /45cal guns ; 12 [re duced to 10 by 1915J x 3Ai n guns; 5 x 19.?i n torpedo t ubes mai n belt 13.75-7.75in ; deck 3in; tu rrets 11.75in; conning tower 13.?5in ; weight of armour 10,100 tons [ 40 .1 per cent of norm al dis placement) 3·shaft Parsons tu rbines and 16 boilers creatin g 31,OOOhp; to p speed 21 knot s. Prinzregent

The Konig class comprised

Luitpold equipped with 2-shaft Parson s tu rbines and 14 boilers creating 26,OOOhp; top speed

t he elite V Divi sion of III

20 knots .

44

Range

9,50 0nm at 10 knots

Crew

1,250 [wartime)

Squadron. All fought at Jutl and and after the war all were surrendered in November 191B, and scu tt led in Jun e 1919.

45

compa red favoura bly wi th his ot her career opt ions. Before the o utbreak of the wa r, th e Royal Navy was able to take its pick of available applicants . T hose th at were accepted could join as early as 15 o r 16 years old, and co m mi tte d th em selves to a 12-year hitch. Tra ining began wit h a six-week stint of seama nship and basic schooli ng, followed by spec ialized tra ini ng . Life aboard a capital ship was crowded, given the large size of a d readn ough t crew. T he lower

THE COMBATANTS

deck was divided into a separate mess for each division or specialization. W hen not on watch or perform ing their specific tasks, ratings had to eat, sleep and spend off-duty tim e in the same crowded space. Meals were collected from the galley and bro ught to th e messing area. Food was plent iful but generally unimaginative, since refrigerated storage was not available. Once the

ROYAL NAVY DREADNOUGHT CREWS

meal was finished , th e same area was used

The Royal Navy went to war with a foundati on of highly trained and motivated crews

hammocks. O ne of the traditi on al benefits was

for its dr eadnoughts. All personnel were volun teers, and , in add ition to being

a daily rum ration , usually served at lunch .

for sleeping, with ratings accom modated in

committed to long service careers, th e same personnel were assigned to a single ship for extended period s, makin g for cohesive crews. For generatio ns, entry int o the Royal Navy as an officer was based far more on

th e base at Scapa Flow was not develop ed at

class status an d the abi lity of the app licant 's pare nts to support the prospective officer,

the sta rt of th e war, and was not judged to be safe from U- boat attack, th e Grand

Admir al Sir David Beatty

rather than raw talent. In 19 16, almost all of a British d read nou ght 's officers wou ld

Fleet spent the first few mo nt hs of the war contin ually at sea. W hen not at sea, the

shown in 19 1B wit h King

have come through th e Brita nnia Royal Naval Co llege. An app licant typically joi ned

crew was coaling or replenishi ng stores . Even when Scapa Flow was finished in 191 5,

George V afte r Beatty

at 13 an d was sent to college fo r four years, followed by six months on a train ing

it offered a cold and dreary alternative to life at sea, with very lim ited distractio ns

assum ed comma nd of the Grand Fleet . His perf orm ance

cru iser. At th at point, th e asp irant jo ined th e fleet as a midshipman. W he n

ashore. M ost men remained on the ship, spend ing th e tim e engaged in spo rts, movies

commission ed , almos t all new officers selected navigation and gunnery career path s;

or ed ucation. Jellicoe designed an extensive programme of fleet exercises to counte ract

over-aggr essiveness and

th e bo redom . T he G rand Fleet went to sea often for train ing. While insid e Scapa Flow, th ere was adeq uate space for daily (except Sunday) gun nery and torp edo d rills.

a series of com ma nd and

engineering was not viewed as a suitable career for a gentleman. Prom ot ion from the lower deck was very rare and a point of conte ntio n until 191 2, when First Lord of the Ad miralty W inston Ch urchill devised the Mate Scheme, whereby

G unnery exercises were conducted at regular int ervals to th e west of Pentla nd Firth,

petty officers and above could atta in commissioned sta tus with the rank of mate

and involved a squadron of d read no ugh ts engaging towed targets. Even in the bays of

(equivalent to lieutenant). The option was later extended to engineers in 19 14. In 19 13,

Scapa Flow, sh ips wou ld shoot at ta rgets towed by picket boats . Shi ps wo uld also engage in gu nnery p ractice at nigh t, with searchlights providing illumi natio n .

Churchill introduced a special entry scheme whereby cadets from publi c schoo ls could join the Royal Navy at 18, take two cruises, and then be sent to the fleet as midshipmen. T his measure did mu ch to provide the Royal Navy with most of its engineers.

46

Life on a Briti sh dr eadnou ght was mo re abo ut monoton y th an anything else. Becau se

contro l difficult ies. His Battl e Cruiser Fleet came off second best to Hipper's battl ecruisers.

W ha t is hard to q uantify is the Royal Navy's psycho logical edge created by th e Royal Navy 's tradition of victo ry and dom in an ce. T he up start Ge rma n Navy went

There was strict segregation between th e upper deck (officers) and th e lower deck

into the battl e with an inferiority complex. In th e wo rds of Scheer h imself: 'T he

(ratings). T he bulk of a d read no ugh t's crew was com posed of enlisted personnel.

English Fleet has th e advantage of loo king back on a hundred years of proud

Young wo rking-class men were d rawn to th e Royal Navy fo r security and adve nt ure.

tradition which m ust have given every man a sense of superiority based o n the grea t deeds of th e past. '

D espite th e lo ng hours and severe d iscip lin e, wo rk ing co nditions in th e Navy

at Jut land was marked by

47

German offi cers and men

GERMAN BATTLESHIP CREWS

were as well tra ined as t heir Royal Navy counte rparts , but operated under a series of

In 1897, th e entire Ge rma n N avy had o nly 1,000 officers and a to tal personnel

rest rict ive orders from the

streng th of abo ut 26 ,000. By 1914, personnel str ength had swollen to 80,000,

Kaiser thro ughout the war.

including 3,6 12 officers. In ord er to suppo rt th e inc reasing complexity of the Kaiser's

In th e end, th e Kaiser's prized

navy, many technical skills were required, hen ce there were several branches of th e

surface fle et disintegrated

officer corps - marine infantry, engineer, torpedo engineer, ordnance , ordnanc e artificer, torpedo and medical. T he premier bran ch , however, was the execut ive

into chaos and mut iny.

bran ch , as o nly its personnel were enti tled to co mma nd a ship. T he German Navy's officers were d rawn to naval service for a nu mb er of reason s, including a sense of adve nt ure, desire for travel and not least th e desire for soc ial

48

prestige and qui ck prom otion (at least co mpa red with th e army). Each year, about 200 candidates were accepted as officers, a fraction of tho se who applied. The cost of training put a career as a naval officer out of reach of the lower strata of society. C riteria for selection was at th e discretion of th e Ed uca tio n D epartment, and thi s can be described only as arbitrary. T he basic require me nts were parental support for th e cost of trainin g and mainten an ce upon com m issioning , good social standing, th e ability to pass an ent rance exam and high- school atte nda nce (although a high-scho ol cert ificate wasn't required) . A cons ervative upbringing in a middle- or upper-class home was preferred over a form al ed ucation. The result was a largely homogeneous officer corp s. M ost were from northern Germ any and , not un surp risingly, most were from coastal areas. Only some 10- 15 per cent were from th e nobili ty, and on ly 14 per cent were Ca tho lic. Jews were th e rare exceptio n, and the sons of social dem ocrats and trade uni onists fam ilies were excluded . Upon selection, th e candidate was sent to th e Navy School for 12 months, followed by exams for executive officer. Next, the candida te undertook anothe r six weeks of specialized training. N ow he went to sea for 12 months. If successful, he was com m issioned as an ensign. In th e final step, the candida te had to be elected to th e officer corps by secret ballot by the memb ers of his ward room . T his proce ss offered a last cha nce to weed out any undesirables. The system was remarkably successful in keeping the officer corp s homogen eous. Even under th e strains of war, not a single non-commissioned officer was promoted to officer. In the years before th e G reat War, and co nt inui ng in to th e war, Ge rma n naval leadership was never able to solve th e grow ing friction between engineer officers and execut ive officers. Eng ineer officers, despite th eir obvious and growi ng imp ortance in a mod ern navy, were treated as second-class citizens, bein g forced to wear different uniforms and even m aintain separa te messing from execut ive officers. By 1917-1 8, the situation had disintegrated int o passive resistance by th e engineers. While th e com positio n of the Royal Na vy and German Navy's officer corp s was broadly sim ilar, th e make-up of th e enlisted ranks was vastly different. The Royal Navy relied on voluntee rs, but th e Ge rma n Navy depended on conscripts to fill th e majorit y of its enlisted ranks. A con script was o bligated for th ree years' service, followed by another four years in the active reserves. Petty officers were recru ited from

the most talented seame n. Another di fference from th e Royal Navy was th e creatio n of a class of ratin g kn own as a deck officer. T his had no equivalent in the Royal Navy and was required in th e Ge rman Navy because of the lack of conti nuity in a conscript force. Despite the title, deck officers were conside red rat ings, not officers, but to add mo re co nfusion th ey were more like execu tive officers th an senior petty officers in their responsibilities and d ress. Adva nceme nt to deck officer from petty officer was dependent o n technical skill; advance me nt to co m m issioned sta tus was ext remely remote, and was ano ther source of friction in th e personnel rank s. In 1914, th ere were 2,977 deck officers. T he crew of a Ge rman wa rtime dr eadn ou ght was large; fo r exam ple the crew of Prinzregent Luitpold includ ed 22 execut ive officers, six engineers, two paymasters,

27 deck officers and 1,020 petty officers and ratings. A dreadn ou ght was comma nded by an officer of captain rank. T he actual running of the ship was perform ed by the first

49

officer, who was responsibl e for all disciplin e, maintenan ce and train ing. T hird in com ma nd was th e navigation officer. Ano ther key figur e was the art illery officer, who was responsible for trainin g all gun crews, maintainin g all guns and directing the ship's fire in action. By the time of]utland, it can be said that massive boredom had begun to affect the High Seas Fleet, but that none of the disciplinary problems which were later to cripple the fleet were yet evident. D uring the tenure of Admiral von Pohl, wh ich included almost all of 191 5, the fleet had gone to sea only five times, and never more th an 120 miles from hom e base. Ma ny of the mo re adven turesome and am bitious sailors and officers had applied for transfers to th e U-boa t bra nch, th e air branch or even th e army, where they were assured of action. Nevertheless, by all accounts overall morale at Jutl and was still high. After Jutl and , this would cha nge drast ically. By 1917, morale was deplorable; in 191 8, the crews of the dread nought s went int o open m ut iny. Before the war, Ger man dreadn ought crews were extrem ely well drilled and trained, but this fine edge had been tem pered by th e 22 mo nt hs leadi ng up to Jutland . T hro ugho ut 191 5, th e Ger man dreadn ou ght s ma inta ined a du lling schedule: a week on patro l behind th e defensive min efield s of th e Heligoland Bight; ano ther week anchore d in th e Schilling Roads near W ilhelmshaven , on alert to respon d to a British incursion; then a period of gunnery dr ills in the Kiel Bay, followed by a period of at least two weeks pierside at W ilhelmshaven , where the crews lived ashore . Yet despite the fact that the crews spent less time at sea than British dreadn ought crews, in May 1916 the gunnery skills of the Germans remain ed high, with gun crews able to get the range quickly and ma intai n a high rate of fire.

COMBAT BRITISH AND GERMAN TACTICS It is im po rta nt to review the genera l tactics of each side before beginning an account of the battle itself. T he tactics of the Grand Fleet were developed entirely by Jellicoe and were bu ilt on th ree p recep ts. T he first, and mos t important, was a defe nsive emphasis. Jellicoe was determ ined not to risk his dreadn oughts to und erwater threats. He was convinced that the Ger ma ns would operate their submarines in conj unction with th eir battl e fleet and th at a German tactic wo uld be to lay mines and then attem pt to dr aw the British across them. Jellicoe also gave the Ger mans credit for a formidable destroyer force equippe d wit h supe rior torpedoes. T hus, he intended to engage th e Germans with gunfi re at long ranges, beyond the effective range of to rpedoes. To keep his fleet together and to bring the greatest number of heavy guns to bear on the enemy, Jellicoe was also determ ined to fight in a line-ahead formation on a

A G·3?·c1ass German destroyer cutt ing th rough a line of High Seas Fleet dreadnoughts. The Briti sh overestimated th e t orpedo thr eat posed by Germ an light units dur ing t he war and th is perception affect ed the ir

152

tactic s at Jut land. During the battl e, Germ an torpedo boats played only a mino r role.

53

para llel course to the enemy. H e rejected mo re flexible tactics du e to his concern that

Despite jellicoe's concerns, Ge rma n tactics were also dedicated to a decisive

a squad ron of the Grand Fleet might be isolated and dest royed, and his doubt th at

gun nery engage me nt . Yet Scheer, being a to rpedo expert , did see a role for a massed

'divided' tactics could be em ployed successfully. Because th e threat of torpedoes made

destroyer attack under some circ um sta nces. Scheer planned to isolate an d destroy a

it too dangero us to stea m in a line ahead during the approach ph ase, Jellicoe ordered

small portion of th e Gr and Fleet; under no circumstances did he want to be dr awn

th at th e Grand Fleet approac h th e enemy in columns. He wo uld order the fleet to

int o a decisive engagement with th e main body of the enemy fleet. Sho uld this appear

de ploy into a lin e ahead ju st before th e battl e was join ed . H e desired th at the

to be happen ing, Scheer planned to resort to an evasive turn away covered by smoke an d a torpedo attack.

engage ment begin at long range (I8,000 yards) and th at in the early stages he wo uld not close insid e 14 ,000 yards . Once th e weigh t of gunfire had red uced Ge rman

Scheer's tactics in the battl e itse lf were dri ven by the fact th at he was heavily

streng th, he wo uld close to 10,000 yards to finish th e enemy. British destroyers were

o utn um bere d; in d readn ou gh ts th e edge was 28 to 16 an d 9 to 5 in battlecr uise rs,

to be emp loyed in an entirely defensive role. j ellicoe's third precept was sim ple - the Gran d Fleet wo uld rely on centralized control: him.

favo uring the Brit ish . This translat ed into a sign ificant Britis h adv antage in

Opening mov ement s of the battle of Jut land , 31 May 1916

,

" ~;f

o

40 mites

~

0300 hrs

o

I

4Qkm

Pent land

Firth

NORWAY

MorayFirth

The Naze 1430hrs

•

OOOOhrs

· Cromarty

Grand Fleet Rendezvous

HighSeas Fleet

•

Rendezvous

1430hr s

JutlandBank 1200 hrs

JUTLAND 1430hr s

\ Horns Reef

Dogger Bank

-----u-s2z---1 \

J ----------- 1

.

UB21 Humber

I J

r------~~;- -----r I :

I 1

1

L_ l l- - ~-l I_I I U46 I

-- "t==__

~. )0

R. [lb.

Wilhelmshaven• .

J

ENGLAND

, i

HOLLAND ) i

i

!

r- ......J I

\'-

----

German submarine areas

-\ j

/i

54

,.'

\,

N

A 55

firepower as well. T he Briti sh dre adnoughts carri ed a total of 272 heavy guns, while th e Ge rma n dr eadnoughts bro ught 200 he avy guns to th e fight. Battlecrui ser firepower was also stacke d in favo ur of th e British, with 7 2 heavy gu ns against

THE BATTLECRUISER PHASE

44 for th e Ge rma ns . To top off Schee r's ch alle nge , th e British had a gene ra l

Hipper spotted the British battlecruisers first. He reversed his course to th e so uth to

speed ad van ta ge. Becau se Sche er had relented and decid ed to brin g th e pr e-

draw the un wary British upon Scheer's dreadnought s. Beatty was mo re th an willing to

d readnoughts of II Battle Squadron with th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, he was restricted to

give chase. By his observations, his force faced onl y five Ge rman battlecrui sers, With

a maximum speed of 18 kn ots, whi ch was 2-3 knots slowe r th an the Grand Fleet .

a 10-5 advantage in capital ships and superior speed, he was sure that a decisive victory

Lik ewise, the newest of Beatty's battlecruisers po ssessed a 3-knot adva ntage over Hipper's form ation .

was at hand. For th e next hour, from 1545 until 1640hrs, th e battle crui sers would slug it out suppo rted by th e four super-d read no ughts of the 5th Battl e Squadron. When th e rang e reached 16,500 yards, Beatty swung his six battlecru isers into line to engage th e Ge rma ns. The 5th Battl e Squadron was now some 7 miles behind.

FIRST CONTACT

Hipper's battlecruisers were on a parallel course to th e sout h-east, and they op ened fire at about the sam e time . From the start, Ge rma n gunnery was excellent. T he first salvo was 200 yards sho rt , but the next st raddled its tar gets , gain ing early hits. Within

By 28 May 1916, Room 40 had provided ample evidence th at so meth ing unusual

minutes, three of th e Brit ish battlecruis ers had been hit multiple times. The British ,

was stirring in th e N orth Sea. On 30 M ay, it appeared th at a major operation by the

facin g un favourable light co nd itio ns, and handicapped by smoke, overshot consistently. By 1555hrs, the ran ge was down to 13,000 yards.

Hi gh Seas Fleet was imminent. In reaction, the Admiralty brought the G rand Fleet to readiness th at afternoon . That evening, ] ellicoe led th e bulk of the G rand Fleet

T he excellent Ge rma n shoo ting was soo n rewarded. At 1603h rs, after bein g str uck

(16 dr eadnoughts and three battlecrui sers) out fro m Scapa Flow, soon to be join ed

by two salvoes from the bartlecrui ser Von der limn, Indefiztigable blew up, killing 1,0 17

by ano th er eight dr eadnoughts from C ro ma rty. Beatty's Battle C ru iser Fleet

of her crew. Beatty's flagship Lion was hit multiple times and avo ided the fat e of

departed the Firth of Forth with six battlecruisers and th e four fast dreadnou ghts of th e 5th Battle Squadron.

Indefiuigable by flooding th e m agazine of her am idships 13.5in turret. T he accur ate G erman fire forced Beat ty to op en th e rang e to 18,000 yards.

Since th e H igh Seas Fleet did not leave until early on th e morning of 31 M ay, the

M akin g 24 .5 knots, th e four ships of th e 5th Battl e Squ adron strugg led to get into

British had beaten th e Germa ns to sea, but th eir departure was far from incident free.

range. Finally, at 1610hrs, they brought th eir 15in guns to bear and gained qui ck hits

As th e G rand Fleet steam ed at an econo mical 15 knots, zigzagging due to the threat

on two G erman battlecrui sers. Yet thi s fire d id not stop barrlecrui sers Derfflinger and

of su bmarines, ]e llicoe received a signal from the Admiralty at 1248hrs incorrectly

Seydlitz from concent rating a bombardment on th e bart lecrui ser Queen Mary. Hit in

informing him th at th e Germans were not at sea. This gross error was the result of

her amidships ma gazine , she blew up at 1626hrs with th e loss of all but eight of her

poor judgem ent from th e Director of th e Operations D ivision at the Admiralty. It

crew of 1,274 . Her destruction was witn essed by th e navigat ing offic er o n th e battlecrui ser New Zealand:

was also a cru cial error; had ] ellicoe been informed th at th e Ge rma ns were at sea, he could have increased his speed to enga ge th e Ge rmans earlier in the day. Perhap s more importantly, when ]ellico e received subseq uent information from th e Admi ralty on the Germans' locatio n, he tended to ignore it. The greatest clash of dre adnoughts in history began inn ocentl y enough . T he light cruiser Galatea on Beatty's port wing spo tted a plume of smoke 8 mi les away - thi s was a Danish freighter blowing off steam . Upon investigating the contact, Galatea reported two Germ an warships, wh ich were also investigating the smoke, and sen t a report to Beatty at 1420hrs. Beatty reacted quickly and ord ered his fleet to go to battle

56

Seyd li tz was t ypi cal of

the German approac h to battl ecrui ser design, wit h

stations, increase speed to 22 kn ots and head to th e sout h-east to cur the Germa ns off

an emphasis on prot ecti on.

from their bases. A communications Iailurc, however, separated th e four d readnoughts of the 5th Battle Squadron from Beatty's battlecrui sers.

Her l l in main belt armour made her as well protec ted as most Brit ish battl eship s.

As the respectiv e battl ecruise r fleets joined for battle, the opposing dre adnought forces were hours away. ]ellicoe was some 65 mi les to the north, at least three hours'

Accordi ngly, th e Germans

stea m ing tim e. In respon se to Galatea's messages that th e Germa n forc e included

a squadron of fast battl eship s

battlecruisers, he increased speed to 19 kn ots. Scheer was some 50 mi les to the sout h .

never felt t he need to design like th e Roya l Navy 's Queen Elizabe th class.

57

Malaya was assigned to t he 5t h Batt le Squadron and was

•

in t he th ick of the fig hting at

ID German flagship

Germanship

•

British ship

N

ID British flagship

A

Jutl and. She fired 215 rounds at the Germans, wit h good resu lts. In ret urn, she received eight hits by heavy

GRAND FLEET

she lls, but suffe red no major damage. However, 63 of her crew were ki lled and another

1st Battle Squad ron

68 wou nded.

1st Light

Morlborough

Cruiser

,

,,*", "

Squadron ,," ""

"

/ '

~,

/ ..

./

, ' 2nd Light ....

Cruiser

::.~.:

...................

2nd Battle Squadron

4th Battle

',.,.sqU. dron

..

....

Colossus

. . -..

SqU.•.

,

Barham

'..

, ' .~ 5th Battle Squadron

Iron Duke

' 1D• • • • • • • ~lng George v

·

.....

1st 8: 2nd Battle Cruiser

. . . sudden ly I saw a salvo hit Queen Maryo n her porr side. A sma ll cloud of what looked like coal-d ust came our from where she was hit, bur nothing more unt il several moments later, when a terrific yellow flam e with a heavy and very dense mass of black smoke

~- \ Worsplre

showed ahead, and the Queen Mary herself was no lo nger visible.

OPPOS ITE: Fleet Action

In an effort to bring relief to his heavy shi ps, Beatty ordered 12 destroyers to deliver tor pedo attacks on the German battlecr uisers. T hese attacks were co untered by

1830 -1835h rs

H ipper, who ordered a light cruiser and 15 destroyers to attack the British heavy ships.

.~ Lion

.......•.•.•..

InVinc;~':'

Squadron

" Inflexible

[sunk) 3rd Battle Cruis er Squadron

t

TorpedoBoat Flotilla

.:..

..A.

Defence

.

........

...........................

..

.

3rdllght Cruiser Squadron

.:..•. IIISquadron

........:._•..::.;_....~ ...•~...}

. ..,.:<..:.:. ::;::.:... ~olser ISquadron

'

. .~.:« . .~ ,

,

./:•...•,

~), \, ~"

.•..:::~...::_........ ttJ Friedrich der Grosse

....,-:::.

/ ....

-,

Konig

asrJrlestond

l Sccutlng

•

\'"

Posen

TorpedoBoat

.•/ .... , West/olen Flotillas

: j

f

• •

Ji~:":/

1 w rzow

'Ji

.../ :.!aeursChlond II Squadron /

;

./~;t

:

.,

.....

.,./,,::~"I V

Hannover

/

, :

/

) ....

......." TorpedoBoat Flotilla

.J , ....

II Scouting Group [Light Cruisers]

Torpedo Boat

Flotilla

HIGH SEAS FLEET

Scou ting Group

[light Cruisers]

.....

58

2m iles

~~==JI I 2km

59

Barham shown in Scapa Flow.

Iron Duke was acti ve at

She was heavi ly engaged at

Jutla nd, engaging two

Jut land and fired the most

German Konig-class

heavy shells of any Brit ish

dreadnoughts and a

dreadnought ( 337], and also

batt lecru iser wit h 90 rounds

cont ribu ted to t he damage

of 13.5in shells. She was

in flicted on several German

undama ged.

batt lecrui sers. She was st ruck by six Germa n heavy shells , but none of th ese affected her combat capabilit ies. They did, however, kill 26 of her crew and wound ed 46 .

In th e ensuing melee, two destroyers on each side were sun k and one Brit ish tor pedo found its m ark on Seydlitz, but her effective anti-to rpedo defe nces allowed her to maintain speed and stay in line. As bad as Beatty's pro blems appeared to be, th ey got worse at I 638hrs when he

his apparent victory, he ordered 'Give C hase' at 1720hrs. T his purs uit had th e effect

received a signal from one of his light cru iser squadrons tha t it had sighte d th e Hi gh

of stri nging out the High Seas Fleet. T he 'Run to th e North' ended at 174 5h rs, when

Seas Fleet. Now Beatty faced th e stre ngt h of bo th H ipp er and Scheer, and j ellicoe's

Beatty spo tted the advance unit s of the Grand Fleer. Beatty now changed course to

battl eships were still 50 m iles away. He cha nged course to the north at 1640hrs to

the east to disguise the arrival of ]ellicoe's force for as long as possible. At 1755h rs,

draw th e Germans into th e Gra n d Fleet . At thi s poin t, more signalling pro blems

however, a Ger ma n light cruiser reported British battleships to the east. Mi n utes later,

bed evilled the British . T he 5th Battle Squadron m issed th e or igina l order to turn

the leading Ger ma n dread nou gh ts sighted 24 British dreadnou ghts spread o ut across

north , and it was not repea ted and acknow ledged for another 14 m inutes. All this

the no rthern horizon. Scheer's worst nightmare had been realized - the ent ire streng th of the Gra nd Fleet was on ly 16,000 yards away an d closing.

tim e, th e 5th Battle Squa dron contin ued towards th e 16 d readn ou ghts of th e H igh Seas Fleet. A turret officer on board Malaya recalled the spectacle: I saw, just distinguishable in the mist, a warship of sorts coming from the S.E... We

werenot long kept in suspense as to what this newship was, for veryshortlyafter sighting her, I saw following her a long line of others, which we soon recognized as German

THE BATTLELINES ENGAGE

Dreadnought Battleships of the Konig and Kaiser classes.

After ]ellicoe dispa tched Rear Admira l Sir Horace H ood 's 3rd Battle Cruise r Squadron

When th e turn was made in full view of th e German batt leline, both Barham and

was engaging the H igh Seas Fleet and that the actio n was moving north to his position,

to support Beatty at I605 hrs, he went int o an infor mation void. He knew tha t Beatty

Warspite were hit. Beatty's battl ecrui sers were severely battered , but none had any dam age to their engineer ing plants so were able to use th eir super ior speed to pull

but Beatty had utterly failed to keep him informed of the de tails of the bat tlecrui ser action and did not inform ]ellicoe of the location an d movement of the German fleer.

away. Left behind, the four ships of th e 5th Battle Squadro n faced the conce ntrated

From 1645h rs until ju st after 180 0h rs, Beatty sent ] ellicoe no comm un ications.

fire of Hi pper's five batt lecrui sers and th e lead ships of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, th e four

] ellicoe was forced to rely on what littl e he could see from his flagship Iron Duke. An

act ion was und er way.

intermitte nt h aze persisted thro ugho ut the day, wh ich created variable visibility sometimes up to 16,000 yards, other times down to a mere 2,000 yards.

The 6th Division of th e

Konig class drea dno ughts. Both Malaya and Barham were hit ano ther five tim es. T his was the tim e of maxim um peril for the finest of th e Royal Navy's d readn ough ts, as this account from Warspites executive officer affirms:

By 1800 hrs , ]ellicoe could fin ally see Beatty's flagship, bu t it was obvious th at the pursuing Germans were closer tha n he anticipate d. Now he had a difficult decision

Very soon after the ru m I suddenly sawon the starboard quarter the whole of the High

colum ns, each with four dr eadn ou gh ts. ] ellicoe needed to direct his fleet into a line-

the line, how many I didn't try to count, as we weregetting well strafed at this time, bur

ahead formation to bring his big guns to bear on the Ger mans. Deployment int o a line

I remembercounting up to eight. The noise of their shells over and short was deafening...

Schee r still had no idea tha t th e G rand Fleet was at sea an d was just over th e

60

to make on how to deploy his force . T he G ran d Fleet was steam ing sout h in six

Seas Fleet; at least I saw masts, funnels, and an endless ripple of orange flashes all down

horizon . In response to what appeared to be a British flight and eager to con solid ate

OVERLEAF By l B30hr s, th e main fleet

1st Batt le Squadron was heavi ly engaged. Shown here are t he four ships of t he division with th eir guns tr ained to sta rboard. The leadin g ship is Marlb arough [ Iron Duke class with 13.5in gun s) followed by Revenge

ahead wo uld take 20 min utes, and once begun it could not be stopped. If ]ellicoe

[with 15in guns ), then

deployed his ships to starboard (to the west), he wo uld place his dread no ughts closer

Hercules (12in gun s] and

to where he thought th e Ger mans were, thus allowing him to open fire sooner. O n the other hand, such a deployment also ran the risk of bri nging his fleet immediately into

finally Agin caurt (th e only Brit ish dreadnought with 14in guns ) .

61

This dramat ic photog raph

Oldenburg pictured during

shows the explosion aboard

the batt le of Jutland firing

Invincible follow ing a German

her main armament . She fired

shell hitting her amidships

only 53 main battery rounds

['0 ') turret. The explosion

durin g th e battle and was hit

resu lted in flames reaching

by a single secondary round,

400ft high , and when the

wh ich killed eight and

smoke cleared some 20 minutes later, only her bow and stern sectio ns remained.

wounded 14.

Ge rman torpedo ran ge. If Jellicoe deployed to po rt (to th e east), he wo uld en d up some 4, 000 yards fart her away from th e Germans. T h is m an oeuvre wo u ld also have th e effect of crossing Schee r's 'T', an d place the Briti sh in a favo ura ble light situa tio n whe re th ey wo uld be hidden in th e m ists to th e east an d the Germa ns silho ue tte d aga ins t th e sunse t in th e wes t. Hi sto rian s have deb at ed thi s cho ice ever sin ce, but Jellicoe had o nly m inutes to decid e. H e chose to go to port. While j ellicoe's 24 dreadnoughts began to deploy into th eir fighting form ation, Beatty's for ce steamed acros s j elli coe's to take up its position at th e front o f th e form ati on. The co m ma nde r of th e 5th Battle Sq uad ro n decid ed to move his sh ips to

with Hipper's batrl ecrui sers at abo ut 9 ,000 yards. H avin g ju st returned from gu nne ry

th e rear of th e Brit ish line. During this man oeuvre, Warspite suffered a jammed rudder

p racti ce at Sca pa Flow, th e British batrlecru isers o pe ne d an impressive fire o n the

th at fo rced her to m ak e two co mp lete circl es with in 8 ,0 00 yards o f th e Ge rma n

leadin g two German bartlecruisers. After sco ring heavily against Lutz oio. Invincible

d read nough ts. The Ge rma ns conce ntrated a fur iou s fire on th e British ship; du e to her

was engage d by Derfflinger. On th e thi rd salvo, th e British bartlecrui ser was struck

heavy armo ur, however, an d good fort u ne, n on e of th e 13 h its in flicte d serious

ami ds h ips and for a thi rd time the horribl e scene of a British bartlecruiser blow ing up

dam age. Una ble to m an oeuvre, Warspitewas

of th e fight and was ordere d to return

was rep eated . T he 12in Germa n she ll ignited the powd er in the ho ist, which travelled

In th e van of th e Grand Fleet's fo rmation were two squadro ns of armoured cru isers.

down th e tru nk to the magazines. Invincible exploded; on ly six men were rescued of a crew of 1,032.

Ollt

to Rosyrh . Now, half of the l st Bat tle C ru iser Squadro n fou nd itself within 8,000 yards of th e

Screened by the 3 rd Battle C ru iser Sq uadron, the G rand Fleet was deploying into

Ge rman dread no ug hts. T he Germans m ad e qu ick wo rk of the ar mo ured cruiser

its lin e-ah ead formatio n, crossi ng the 'T' of the German dread no ug hts. This

Defence, wh ich blew up an d sank ar I 820h rs together with her crew of 900; a seco nd armo red cruiser, Warrior, was also taken unde r fire and m ortally dam aged . She sank th e followin g m orning. An observer aboard Colossus described the demi se of Defence:

allowi ng the Ge rma ns to em ploy only th ose heavy guns that co uld be brou gh t to bear forwards. H ere was the mo me nt the Royal Navy had been plan ni ng for since the wa r

At about 6.15p.m. we witnessed the action of the l st Cruiser Squadron and the blowing

Com ing into the lin e ahea d, no organ ized fire d istr ibution was possibl e. T he first

positio ni ng wo uld allow the Brit ish dread noughts to use the ir entire broadside , whi le

began. Yet it did not tu rn o ut to be th e crush ing blow for which th e British had hoped. up of Defence. We thought she had gone about a minut e before she finally blew up, as

dr eadnou gh t, Marlborough, ope ne d fire at 181 7hrs, but most sh ips did not even ope n

she completely disappeared in a mass of spray, smoke, and flame. But she came through

fire until 1830hrs. Even th en , onl y ten , ma ybe 12 , of th e 24 dr eadnoughts fired on

it apparently still intact, only to disappear later in a tremendous belch of vivid flame and

th e Ge rma ns. Visibi lity was poor and correcti on of fire d ifficult. T he target for thi s

dense black smoke, from which some dark object, possibly a boat or a funnel, was hurled through space, twirling like a gigantic Catherine-wheel.

onslaugh t was H ipp er's bartlecruis ers and th e dreadn ou ghts of III Squad ron. Konigwas espec ially hard h it by eight heavy she lls.

As th e Germa n battleships were pum me lling the armo ure d cru isers, the 3 rd Battle

th e poor light to hit back effectively. Schee r was now in a critical situa tio n. Jellicoe had

Cruiser Squadro n jo ine d th e fray. T he th ree battlecru isers were on a parallel co urse

crosse d his 'T' and th e British dread nough ts we re deliveri ng a withering fire. H e was

As the volume of British fire inc reased, th e Germans were un able to find targets in One of the most remarkable sights of t he battle was the upright bow and stern

150 mil es from h ome with the British fleet between hi m and safety, and his fleet was

sections of batt lecruiser

inferior in speed to the British. To stay and slug it out with the Grand Fleet would only

Invincible vis ible well after

invite disaster. The captain of barrlecru iser SeydLitz described the situation:

she exploded at 1831hrs. The two sections remained afloat 64

during the battle , and fina lly

Visibility had graduallybecome very unfavourable.T herewasa dense mist, so that as a rule

sank during the night.

only the flashes of the enemy's guns, bur not the ships themselves, could be seen. From

65

north west to northeast we had before us a hostile line firing its guns, though in the mist we could only glimpse the flashes from tim e to time. It was a m ighty and terrible spectacle.

N

A

At I 833hrs, Scheer ordered a mano euvre practised for just such an occasion . Called the 'battle about-tu rn', it required each ship to make a sim ultaneous I 80-degree turn . On th is occasion , the High Seas Fleet executed th e manoeuvre sma rtly; all 22

I ! // !/!

InvlnClbl.

2nd li ght Cndse rS quadron

!! /

,

\

•,,,

dre adno ughts and pre-d readnoughts turned away from the Gra nd Fleet and disapp eared, aided by a smokescreen laid by Germa n destroyers and favourable wind s. Scheer's turn had been executed even before the Grand Fleet could deploy all its

5th Batt l1l5quadron

, Barham

Uorlborough

hI BatUe Squadr on

dreadnought s into a line ahead. Thus, the long-awaited main action had lasted onl y some 20 minutes from 1815 until 1835hrs. ]ellicoe decided not to follow the Germans into th e mist , and by 1855hrs was still un sure what had happ ened. At 1857hrs a torpedo struck Marlborough, an incident th at probably served to reinfor ce ]ellico e's

Torpedo Boat Flotilla

GRAND FLEET

•,

/ \ ,

,

Colossus '

,

;i

~ ~

Benbow'

,

4tllBatt le Squadron , l,on Duk.. ~ III Squadron

••

Frledrlchd ffGro sslI

.......:: ::~: i.D

reluctance to chase the Germans. He maintained cour se to the south-east and then to th e south to keep the Grand Fleet between th e Germa ns and their bases. Eventually, th e Germans would have to com e to him.

I

/....... ..

: ,_:I!!lnyftr I Scout lnSGroup

~onlg

sq"~:,~: : .';",;:::'';;''iio

r/.:;,~. ;\ , \ \, \

.

, Cruiu r5 quadton

, Orlan '

,

\

j

"

IISqul dron

llt ll ght

f::': ~ \:\

,

2nd

Cruin r

, •i

,;' I

' King Georg, V

..

4th L1ahl • crulaerSo,Uld ron/

..

;

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\ Squadron

1118: 2nd

,

,/

,

eanleC rulur , .... Squadron ' , .

,...,::::

..•.::::.

,/

,/

; Squl dron\

....'

Wesrjo !en

...·'~'on

Torpedo BODt

TorpedoBoat

~ ,

Flotil las

Flot illa

" "

Torpedo Bo,'

Jrd Llght Cruiser Squadron

Flotilla

.... / Lu tz ow

THE SECOND ENGAGEMENT

HIGH SEAS FLEET

, ..•..

.. .. .: ~

At 1855hrs Sch eer inexplicably ord ered a second battl e about-turn at 1855hrs. T hough he had broken contact with the British, he ordered the H igh Seas Fleet right back into th e massed fire of the Grand Fleet. T he reason s for this orde r have never been adequately explained, even by Scheer himself. Perhaps he hoped to surprise the

.

IIScouling Group (li ght CrUiser s)

•

German ship

German flag ship

•

Brit ish ship

IE> Briti sh flag ship

hz;::q o

lmiles

I

l km

British or break through to the east and head for home. None of this happ ened . When the Germa n fleet reappe ared out of the mist, the British quickl y responded.

Fleet Action 191D-191Shrs

By 19 15hrs, the enti re Grand Fleet was pouring fire on the H igh Seas Fleet from a range of betwe en 11,000 an d 14,000 yard s. Again the van of Schee r's fleet was hammered and was un able to respond effectively. T he onl y damage suffered by the British was two hits on the battleship Colossus that caused minor damage and wounded five men. Of note, these were th e only gunfire casualties suffered by any Gra nd Fleet dreadnought during th e ent ire battle . In cont rast, during this phase in the clash the British hit the Ge rma ns with 37 large-calibre shells. For a second tim e, Scheer was faced with an im mediate decision to save his fleet. He ord ered the fleet to prepa re to execute another battl e about-turn . T his was to be covered by an advance by Hipper's battlecruisers to cover the withdrawal and by a massed destro yer attac k. At 1913hrs, Hipper's battered battlecruisers began th eir charge against the Grand Fleet. Though it lasted for only four minutes, this 'death ride' constituted on e of the most dramatic and controversial mom ent s of the battle. The death ride was followed by an att ack by 14 destro yers, aimed at th e G rand Fleet's dreadnoughts. T he destroyers came to with in 8,000 yards of the British battleline 66

before launching 3 1 torp edoes. An observer abo ard Conquerordescribed the action:

6i

At 7. 14 observed enemydestroyers attacking, and fired on them for eight minutes.T hey

T here were several potenti al rou tes for Schee r to take thro ugh th e Ge rma n and

weremaking a veryheavysmokescreen, and were never on the samecoursefor more than

British min efields to get home. O ne was the long route aro und Den mark to the Baltic.

a minute at a time, turning, twisting, wriggling, and disappearing into their own smoke,

T his option was im med iately dismi ssed as too long, especia lly given th at ma ny

only to reappear again almost immediately at a different place.

Ge rman ships were dam aged. T he closest route to the curre nt location of the German

Now Jellicoe was forced to ma ke an instant decision that wo uld have great im pact

of the Am rum Bank. T his was th e ro ure Schee r had taken en route to battl e on

on th e course of the battl e. In orde r to present a m uc h sma ller target to th e

3 1 May. T he other possibilities called for the Ger mans to steer sout h-west towa rds th e

fleet was south-east to th e H orn s Reeflights hip an d then south behin d the minefields

approac hing tor pedoes , he could either tu rn his dreadn ou gh ts into th em or turn away

Ems River and then head east to Wi lhelms haven, or to steer sout h towards Hel igoland

fro m th em. If he turned into th em , th e speed of th e advancing to rpedoes combined

and the n hom e. For his parr, Jellicoe doub ted th at th e Ge rma ns wo uld attemp t to

with th e speed of his own ships wo uld leave litt le m argin for erro r in executi ng evasive

break th rou gh the British fleet again to reach Horns Reef, so he decided to head sout h.

ma noe uvres . It wo uld, however, place him in an excellent position to resum e the

Scheer knew that the Gra nd Fleet was located to his south-east, so an escape to the

pursuit of th e now disorgan ized Ger man fleet. If he turned away, th e closing speed of

sout h seemed out of the qu estion. H e decided to take the sho rtest way hom e via H orns Reef, now only 85 m iles away, by passing astern of the Gra nd Fleet. At 2 110hrs he

th e to rpedoes would be m uch reduced and ma ny wo uld pro bably run ou t of fuel before reachi ng their intended targets. While preservi ng th e G rand Fleet's

gave orders to steer to the south-east at 16 kno ts, stop ping at nothin g until H o rns Reef

d readno ugh ts fro m und erwater damage, th e eventuality most feared by Jellicoe, it wo uld allow th e Ger ma n fleet to get away.

was reached. He asked for airship reconnaissa nce of the H orns Reef area at daybreak.

In the most single controversial decision of th e battle, Jellicoe chose to turn away fro m th e Ge rmans. T he ma noe uvre was successful in defea ting the Ge rman to rpedo

T he un dam aged dread nou gh ts Westfizlen, Nassau, Rheinland and Posen moved into the van to lead the breakth rou gh.

attac k - only 2 1 torpedoes reached the British dread no ughts, and, despite several close

W hat transpired on the night on 3 1 May to 1 June was a series of confusing an d savage clashes between the British destroyer flotillas and the heavy units of the Hig h

calls, non e hi t the ir target. T he tactical cost, however, was high; Scheer's desperat e

Seas Fleet. T he Ge rma n destroyers, feared by Jellicoe, played no role in the com bat.

cou nterattacks allowed him to disengage just as it appeared th at the H igh Seas Fleet was abo ut to be smas hed by the G rand Fleet's overwhelming gun powe r. Again,

show n by the dr ead nou ghts of the Grand Fleet and the critical lack of profession alism

followi ng th is turn away, Jellicoe did not know where Scheer was. In fact, he had broken contact and was 15 m iles away. Yet as night fell, the British were still between the H igh Seas Fleet and hom e. Jellicoe had every expecta tion th at th e next morning wo uld see the destru ction of the German fleet.

T he mos t rem arkable aspect of the night battl e was the un iversal lack of initiative exhibited by th e Admiralty in passing inte lligence to Jellicoe, inte lligence tha t could have cha nged th e battl e.

As the two fleets converged, with the Grand Fleet heading sout h at 17 knots and the High Seas Fleet heading south-east at 16 knots, the first elements to make contact were the fleet's respective scouting forces oflight cruisers. In a clash at less than 1,000 yards, an old German light cruiser was sunk and a British light cruiser was heavily damaged.

THE HIGH SEAS FLEET BREAKS THROUGH

Jellicoe still had no reason to believe th at th e Ger mans were no t headi ng south. He int erpreted th e sound of com bat to his rear as the expected clash between destroyers. Even at 2241 hrs, a message from the Admira lty that contai ned the contents of Scheer's

Given what he perceived as Ger man advantages in both train ing an d equipment for

2 110hrs orde rs failed to change his plans. By this time, after a series of m isleading or

night com bat, Jellicoe had no desire to seek an engagement with th e Ger ma ns unt il

simply incor rect reports, j ellicoe's confidence in intelligence provided by the Admira lty

dayligh t. Afte r 2 1OOhrs, he returne d th e Gra nd Fleet to cru ising form ation . Since he

had reached its nadir. Inexplicably, the Adm iralty failed to forward to Jellicoe Scheer's

still believed th e German fleet to be located to his no rth-wes t, Jellicoe deployed all of

request for airship reconnaissance of Horns Reef. Ha d this been don e, Jellicoe wo uld

his destroyers behind his dread no ugh ts to deal with any German night to rpedo attac k

have been in no doubt about the Germans' inten ded escape route. Even more inexcusable

against his vulnera ble heavy ships. Jellicoe had reason to be conce rned about a night actio n. In addition to the German superiority in to rpedoes, th e Ge rmans had trained heavily for n igh t engage me nts.

68

was the fact that th e airship message was on ly one of seven messages int ercepted and deciphered by Room 40 which gave the Hi gh Seas Fleet's course or positio n between 1043 and 01 OOhrs. No ne of these were passed by th e Admi ralty to Jellicoe.

T hey possessed larger and better searchlights and had incorporated th em into th eir

By 223 0hrs, Scheer's dreadnoughts began encountering the British destroyers in the

nigh t gun nery techniques. T ho ugh confident of th e night-figh ting capabilities of his ships, howev er, Scheer had only one th ou gh t in m ind - escape. H e wo uld have to act

rear of th e Gra nd Fleet's formation . In a series of close-range clashes, the 4th Destroyer

quickly, as dawn wou ld break at 0200 hrs and full dayligh t wo uld be reach ed an hour later.

Flotilla was batt ered by th e leadi ng Ger man battl eship s. Four British destroyers were sunk o r left sinking, and ano the r th ree were heavily dam aged. One of th ese was rammed by th e dr ead nou ght Nassau, but was able to retu rn home desp ite losing 60ft /

of plat ing from th e side of her hull. In return, th e Briti sh destroyers to rpedoed a Germa n light crui ser, whic h was later abando ned . Ano the r German light cru iser collided with th e dreadnought Posen and was later abandoned . T he sacrifice of the destroyers was in vain ; non e mad e a contac t report to Jellicoe. More inexplicable was th e fact that th e several British dreadn ough ts that identi fied the Ge rman battl eship s moving east neither engaged them nor made a contact report. Later, the armoured cru iser Black Prince came across thr ee dreadn ought s of Scheer's I Squadron, including his flagship Friedrich der Grosse. T he dreadnought s engaged the poorly armoured cruiser at po int-blank range. Black Prince blew up with the loss of her enti re crew of 900 . At about 0 145hrs, th e G ermans encountered another group of British destroyers from the 12th Flotilla. T hese were able to fire 17 torp edoes at the Germa n heavy ships at a range of only 2,000-3,000 yards. Non e of the dreadn oughts were hi t, but pre-dreadnought Pommern was struck by a single to rpedo, causing a catastrophic explo sion th at destro yed th e ship and killed all 844 aboard. T his is how the actio n looked from on e of the British destroyers: At 2 minures past 2 the

Faulknor fired her first torp edo, which probably passed ahead of

STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS

the second enemy ship.. . About two minu tes later the secon d torped o was fired, bu t almost simultaneo usly with this the Ger mans sighted our flotilla, and all their battleships opened fire, together with the light cru isers astern of their line who po ured a partic ularly heavy fire on us. T he sea seemed to be alive with bursting shells and the air with the whistle of passing projectiles. T he range was if anything und er 1,500 yards, and 'overs' mu ch predominated. noise and shock she seemed first of all to open our, then to close together, then to go.

Most analysis of the battle of Jutl and starts with the numbers of ships and men lost by each side. Yetstrategically, this misses the point . T he battle changed nothing with regards to the overall situation at sea. Wh atever tactical success the Ger mans could claim , the

With th is final action, Scheer had broken through the Gra nd Fleet. At no tim e

blockade of Germany remained intact. T he most succinct comm ent ary about the battle was attr ibuted to a journalist who offered, 'The German fleet had assaulted its jailer and

Sud denly a hu ge explosion too k place on the third Ger ma n ship, and with a deafenin g

did Jellicoe receive a report of Ge rman dreadn oughts being engaged. All present on Iron Duke's bridge conti nued to believe th at the sounds of com bat and period ic flash of searchlights to the north was nothing more than a series of destroyer actions. Finally at 0230hrs, Jellicoe moved his fleet toward s Horn s Reef, but it was too late to catch th e G ermans outside of thei r protective minefields. By 1300hrs on 1 June, leading element s of the Hi gh Seas Fleet reached the mouth

Dirf~ iiiein gt~mtT (.1;rgmftanb im S innt N~ § ( :'tts <1WftJjfS

4t9m

~

~imn ifft

m. D.

Dural ml1ifdrifd]trCSt. ccm .) ~ JURi I(jU,

81. 19H, Stil t 2
of th e Jad e and Elbe. T he dreadnought Ostfriesland str uck a mine at 05 20hrs, but continued south and reached home. Even four of Hipper's battl ecru isers were able to penetrate the British form ation and reach safety.T he exception was Lutzow, which was finally abando ned and scut tled. Seydlitz was spotted and ident ified by no less than four British dreadnoughts, but non e engaged the helpless battl ecruiser, which had to be eventually towed stern- first int o harbour with thou sands of ton s of water aboard . At abo ut 0400hrs, Jellicoe received a message from the Admiralty th at conta ined Scheer's 0230hrs position only 16 miles from Horns Reef light ship . T his message confirmed what Jellicoe already suspected - he had lost his oppo rtunity to finish off the Germans. All th at was left was to sweep north looking for stragglers (none was found) and th en head back to Scapa Flow where the G rand Fleet arrived at noon on

70

2 June.

Konig was t he most heavily damaged German dreadnought dur ing th e batt le. This view shows damage from a Britis h heavy shell, which has penet rated the deck armo ur in th e area of t he forwar d tu rret.

was back in jail.' T his strategic result was not lost on Scheer,

Losses at Jutland

Batt lecr uise rs

British

German

Queen Mary Invincibl e Indef atigable

Lutzow Pommern

Pre-dreadnought

Armou red cruisers

Defence Warrior Back Prince

Destroy ers

Simply tallying up losses also misses the point. T he High Seas Fleet did not gain a victory as mu ch as it had avoided annihilation. Wh ile the Gra nd Fleet reported itself ready for sea

15

Malaya

7

Colossus

2

Konig

10

Black Prince included. T his d isparity was du e in large

Grosser KurfOrst

8

measure to the fact that the batt lecruisers were heavily engaged earlier in th e battl e when light cond itio ns favour ed the Germans and overall visibility was better.

Markgraf

5

Kaiser

2

Helgoland

1

accuracy of 3 .89 per cent (65 out of 1,670 ). The German dreadn oughts scored a less impressive 2.96 per cent (57 of 1,927), even with the estimate d 12 hi ts on

gunnery was also mediocre. T he heavily engaged 5t h Battl e Squa dro n scored an overall accuracy of2 .64 per cent (29 out of 1,099) while th e dreadno ughts of the Grand Fleet com bined for a 3.7 0 per cent accuracy rate

674

507

Prisoner

177

0

6,945

3,058

In addition, several ot her Ge rman dreadn ought s were damaged but did not require dry -docking. T hese included Rheinland (damage completed by 10 June), Westfizlen (com pleted 17 June ) and Nassau (com pleted 10 July). T he edge in gun nery accuracy, statistica lly, goes to th e Ge rma ns. A Battleship and battlecruisers damaged, with repair tot al of abo ut 85 heavy shells fired by completion dates Ger man battl eships and battl ecruisers German Completiondate British Completiondate str uck th eir British oppon ents. In Helgoland 16 June Tiger 1 July co nt rast, 102 heavy British shells Grosser KurfOrst

16 July

Barham

4July

Markgraf

20 Ju ly

Malaya

10 July

Konig

21 Ju ly

Wa rspit e

20 Ju ly

Dstfriesland

26 Ju ly

Princess Royal

21 Ju ly

Moltke

39 Ju ly

Marlborough

2 August

Von der Tann

2 August

Lion

13 Septe mber

Seydlitz

16 Septe mber

Derfflin ger

15 Octo ber

struck Ge rma n dreadn ou ghts or battl ecruisers. T he most thoro ugh analysis of the battl e indicates th at gun nery on neither side was outstanding. After hits to smaller ships are facto red in, the tot al accuracy for th e British heavy guns was 2.75 per cent (123 hits out of 4,48 0 rounds fired). For the Ger ma ns,

Total hits by heavy shells

Warspite

operations some two months later. T he vast majority of the damage to the Grand Fleet was suffered by the battlecruiser force and its attached 5th Battle Squadron . Moreover, any losses that the Grand Fleet suffered were made up by the retu rn of the dreadnoughts Queen ELizabeth and Emperor ofIndia from refit, and the addition of the three last un its of the Revenge class.

Woun ded

Battleships

6

gun nery practice imm ediately before the battl e, scored a more im pressive 4.29 per cent . British battl eship

2,55 1

Hits on battleships and battlecruisers

Barham

dreadnoughts that participated, only eight were fit for action after the battle. Of the five battlecruisers, on ly two remained ready for

6,094

T he extent of dam age suffered by the principal units of both sides, damage th at required dry-d ockin g to be repaired, can be gauged by the table below.

72

cru iser Black Prince are discount ed (these were scored at point-bl ank range), the overall accuracy drops to 3.08 per cent . For th e Hi gh Seas Fleet, the most accurate ships were the well-drilled bartlecruisers, with an overall

on the evening of 2 Jun e with 22 of its 24 dreadn oughts, the High Seas Fleet limp ed back to W ilhelmshaven. Of the 16

5

Total casualties

was m uch different . T he Ge rma ns had mo re than held their own, and a sim ple tally of losses suggested that they co uld claim victory.

the to tal accuracy was a bit better at 3.39 per cent (122 hits out of3, 597 fired). If the 12 hits on the armo ured

For the British, the battl ecrui sers of the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadro ns exhibited an overall dismal accuracy rate of 1.43 per cen t of the 1,469 heavy ro unds fired. T he 3r d Battl e C ru iser Squadro n, th e beneficiary of

8

Kill ed

dreadnought superiority of the British and Ger many's unfavourable geographic position, resump tion of the U- boat cam paign against British shipp ing was the only way to victory. Nevertheless, on a tactical level, the outco me of the battl e

Wiesbaden Frauenlob Elbing Rostock

Light cruisers

who delivered a repo rt to the Kaiser on 4 July 1916. W hile laudatory on the achievements of the H igh Seas Fleet, the report made the cent ral assertion that victo ry was not possible at sea against the Grand Fleet. In his view, given the numerical

(57 of 1,593). O f no te, several divisions of d readn ou ghts were hardly able to engage at all. T he division , com posed of King George V, Ajax, Centurion and Erin, fired a to tal of on ly 34 rounds in the entire battl e, with Erin firing non e. Ano ther division of four O rion-c lass units fired just less than 200 rounds. T he British system of cent ral direction proved its

8riti sh

German

Battlecruisers British

Germ an

Lion

13

Princess Royal

9

Queen Mary

7

Tiger

15

New Zealand

1

Indefatig able

5

Invincible

5

Lutzow

24

Derfflinger

21

Seydlitz

22

Moltk e

5

Von der Tann

4

wort h, but the standard 9ft rangefinder was generally inadequate and the rapid changes in range, combined with poor visibility, were too much for the Dreyer Table plottin g system. T he relatively prim itive Ger ma n fire-control system worked well und er the cond itions , and the Ger man stereoscopic rangefind er proved better than the British coincidence instruments. T he real lesson of the battl e was the fact that it was extremely difficul t to sink a dreadn ou ght by gun fire. Even th e less-arm oured battl ecruisers were heavily resistant to gunfire. T he ability of the German battlecruisers to receive damage was outstan ding, for they were armo ured about as well as some British dreadn ought s. It was no t their poor armo ur that doom ed the th ree British bartlecruisers lost at Jutl and , but rath er the cha racter of British ammu nition powd er. Unlike Germa n powd er, when Briti sh powd er was ignited it burn ed quickly and created int ense over-pressures. To complete the potential for d isaster, British flash doors fitted to protect powder in th e magazine and in the hoist to the turret were not adequately tested before the war, and proved

Seydlitz was hit by an amaz ing t otal of 21 heavy

tI/'-,1, ~eiM 'alle

~ elun

shells and one to rpedo dur ing

.i. ': - /f/If. . iWf.k,,!&+<. I'. ,ft,,- ,.'fa,_,,,,,,,4'aa,,,,,··

.b

th e battl e of Jut land, but

Despit e t he ten hit s fr om Brit ish heavy shells, Konig

J!1. t.i,Ia/"d'~ ,

was never in any danger of sink ing. Repairs took unt il

su rv ived to return home,

21 July 1916 to complete.

although as shown here she was barely afloat.

Some of t he int ernal damage ii

is shown here, but casualt ies

She survived th e war only

were relati vely light at 4S

to be scutt led in June 1919.

dead and 27 wou nded.

un able to withstand the violent reaction of the powder when ignited. When th e flash of ignited powd er reached th e shi p's magazine, it produ ced complete destruction. All th ree battlecru isers, as well as the rwo armo ured cruisers th at blew up , were lost in th e same way. It is true th at British gun nery pract ices at Jutland kept a greater number of powder charges out of the magazine at any given time to increase th e rate of fire, bu t thi s was only a cont ributing facto r. In 1914, the Germa ns generally took less care than th e British with precau tions for flash protection . Such was shown during th e battl e of D ogger Bank, when a 13. 5in shell hit and penetrated the aft turr et barbette of Seydlitz. A total of 62 charges totalling more th an six ton s of powd er ignited and burned, but d id no t explode like British 74

powder wou ld have. The Ger mans did not introduce flash precauti on s because of this

incident before Jutl and . They did limit the nu mb er of charges out of the magazine at anyone time, but overall their magazines were not flash tight. T he saving grace for th e Germans was that their powder charges bu rned relatively slowly when ignited, and did not cause the dangero us pressure rise created by British powder. Another facto r redu cing the effectiveness of British gunnery was the performance of its shells. British shells tend ed to break up when striking heavy armo ur at an oblique angle, and detonated before penetrati ng deep int o th e plate. T he defects of British armo ur-piercing shells ranged from th e use of Iyddire as a bursting agen t to shells being too brittl e and fuses that had no delay. Of the 13 heavy shells that hit German armo ur 10in thi ck or more, only six were effective. British shells also performed poorly against armo ur of only 6-9in.

Fleet put to sea to int ercept. T he actua l event was anti- climactic. T he dreadn ou ght

Westftlen was tor pedoe d by a British sub marine on 19 Aug ust and a variety of repo ns fro m submarines and Ze ppeli ns, co m bined with radi o intelligenc e, co nfirmed to Scheer that the Grand Fleet was at sea. A sim ilar op eration planned for Septem ber was cancelled du e to poor weath er. In Octo ber, the U-boats were pu lled away to participate in the latest round of on again, off-again com merce raiding. T heir absence mad e Scheer even more caut ious by limiting ope rations to th e cent ral and eastern pans of th e No rth Sea. W he n th e Hi gh Seas Fleet sortied on 10 and 19 October, these opera tio ns did not even draw a reactio n from the British. Ironically, the greatest success of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet afte r Jutl and wo uld be in th e

AFTERMATH

Baltic Sea, lon g a naval backwate r. By late 191 7, th e Russian Army was cracki ng apa rt and th e Ge rma ns advanc ing up th e Baltic coast. To use th e port of Riga as a supply base, th e Germans had to take th e Russian-held islands in th e G ulf of Riga. In ord er

operat ional at th e ti me of Jutl and. but was left behin d

cleared th e Russian s fro m th e Gulf of Riga and esta blished Ge rma n maritime dominance in th e Baltic.

stern on 21 Jun e 1919. when

when H ipp er led his bartlecrui sers, suppo rted

gear to paint th e engagement as a Ge rma n victo ry. On 5 June, only fo ur days after th e

by the dr eadn ou ghts, on a raid against one of

return of the High Seas Fleet to Wi lhelm shaven, the Kaiser made an appearance at th e

the No rway-to-B ritain convoys. T he operatio n

naval base to award decorati on s and to promot e Scheer to fleet ad miral. Given th e

ended in a fiasco wh en a Briti sh submarine

high expectations created by the High Seas Fleet's performance, the Ge rma ns cou ld

torpedoed a battl ecrui ser already crippled by

not give up on future operations in the No rth Sea. D espit e popular belief, th e High

engineering probl ems. In the last weeks of th e

Seas Fleet cont inued to challenge th e Royal Navy in th e N ort h Sea after Jutl and.

war, Hipper, now commande r of the H igh Seas

As soon as th e fleet was ready for action, Scheer planned ano ther bombardment of

Fleet, was prep ar ing a major fleet sor tie int o

the English coast. Learn ing from th e lesso ns of Jutland, Schee r paid particular

the North Sea th at had all the earmarks of a

atte nt ion to the co-ordina tion of his Ze ppelin and U-boa t arms to avoid bein g

death ride. O n 27 October, units of the H igh

sur prised again . The slow pre-dreadnou ghts were left behind and Hip per's

Seas Fleet, lon g suffering fro m bad mo rale

battl ecrui sers were aug men ted by th ree dreadn ou ghts.

brought on primarily by inactivity, refused to accept o rde rs. Within days, th e mutiny had spread throughout the fleet.

th e Hi gh Seas Fleet was to be intern ed at Scapa Flow. Accor di ngly, on 2 1 November, nine of th e most mod ern Ge rman dr eadn ou ghts, five battlecruisers, seven ligh t cru isers and 49

76

Revenge class. Bayern was

because her crew was not

Acco rd ing to the term s of th e Armis tice

Flagship of the Grand Fleet

dest royers were esco rted by th e Grand Fleet

Oueen Elizabeth picture d on

into custo dy. In M ay 191 9, th e once-pro ud

off Scapa Flow as th e High

guns. A lack of speed made her the equiva lent of t he Brit ish

considered fu lly t rained . Here

effective o n 11 Nove m ber 191 8, th e cream of

21 Novemb er 1918, stea ming

and was armed with 15in

Fleet were com mi tted to suppo rt the operation. From 12 to 20 October, th e Ge rma ns

In th e afterma th of th e great battl e, the German propagan da machin e went into high

The H igh Seas Fleet so rtied on the night of 18 Augu st. Just as in th e hours before

versi on of th e Konig class ,

to accomplish th is objective, one battl ecrui ser and ten dreadn ou ghts of th e Hi gh Seas

T he last majo r Ger ma n surface ope ration of the war was cond ucted in Apri l 19 18,

Jutland, British inte lligence had alert ed Jellicoe to the Ge rman sort ie and the Grand

The Bayern class was a larger

German dreadn ou ghts and the rest of th e fleet

Seas Fleet is about to be

scuttled th emselves in Scapa Flow, marking th e

interned.

end of th e Hi gh Seas Fleet.

she is shown sink ing by the

th e Germans scutt led the un its surre ndered at Scapa Flow.

H erwig, Holger H ., 'Luxury Fleet; The Ashfield Press, London (1991) Hodges, Peter, The Big Gun, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (198 1) Ireland , Bernard, j ane's Battleships ofthe 20th Century, H arperCollin s, NY (1996) London, Charles, jutland 1916, Osprey Publishing, Oxford (2000) Marder, Arthur, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. III, j utland and After, Oxford University Press, London (1966) Massie, Robert, Castles ofSteel Random House, NY (2003) McCallum, lain, 'T he Riddle of the Shells, 1914-1 8: Disappointment in the North Sea' in Warship 2005, Co nway Maritime Press, London (2005) Philbin, Tobias III, SMS Konig (Warship Profile 37), Profile Publications Limited, Windsor (1973)

FURTHER READING

Preston , Antony, BattleshipsofWorld WarJ, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA (1972) Scheer, Reinhard, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War, The Battery Press, Nashville, TN (2002) Tarrant, V E., jutland: The German Perspective, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (1995 ) Wingate, John , 'H MS Dreadnought' in Warships in Profile, Vol. 1, Profile Publication s Limited, Windsor (1971)

78

Bonney, George, The Battle ofjutland 1916, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill (2002) Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, NY (1973) Brooks, John, 'T he Mast and Funnel Question: Fire-control Positions in British Dreadnoughts 1905-1915 ' in Warship 1995, Conway Maritim e Press, London (1995) Burt, R. A., British Battleships ofWorld War One, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis, MD (1986) Campbell, John, jutland:An Analysis ofthe Fighting, Lyons Press, NY (1998) Campbell, John , 'German Dread noughts and their Protection' in Warship, Vol. I, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (1977) Corbett, Julian S., Naval Operations, Vol. III, The Naval and Milit ary Press, Uckfield, nd Fawcett, H.W and G.W W Hooper, The Fighting at jutland, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2001) Friedman, Norman, Naval Firepower, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2008) Friedman , Norman, Battleship: Design and Development 1905-1 945, Mayflower Books, NY (1978) Gardiner, Robert (ed.), The Eclipse ofthe Big Gun, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (1992 ) Gordon, Andrew, The Rules ofthe Game, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2000) Gregor, Rene, Battleships ofthe World, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis, MD (1997) Halp ern, Paul G ., A Naval History ofWorld War J, Naval Institute Press, Ann apolis, MD (1994) Hart, Nigel and Peter, jutland 1916, Cassell, London (2003)

Wragg, David, Royal Navy Handbook 1914-1918, Sutton Publishin g, Phoenix Mill (2006) Yates, Keith, Flawed Victory, Naval Institu te Press, Annapolis, MD (2000)

RELATED TITLES

INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations aircraft, British 32 Argo Clock 17 armour 11, 17, 17-1 8, 2 1, 26 Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David 28,30, 47, 50,57,58, 60-6 1 blockades 7, 3 I chronology 8- 9 Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston 46, 50 crews

British 46-47 German 48-4 9, 52 design and development British 10-1 1,1 3,14-19, 20- 24 German 12,1 4- 19,24-27 Dogger Bank, Battle of(l91 5) 30, 3 1 Dreyer Table 16, 73 Dum aresq 16, 17 engines 10-1 1, 19, 25, 26 Fisher, Admiral Sir John 5, 6, 10-1 1, 14-15, 21,23, 50 German Navy 4-5 seeafro ships, German after the battle 76-78 Battle of Jutland (1916) 56- 70 chronology 8-9 crews 48-49, 52 design and development 12,1 4-19, 24-27 Ord er of Battle 54 statistics and analysis 7 1- 75 strategic situatio n 28-33 racti cs 53-56 technical specifications 4 1-45 guns British 10, 11,1 3, 14-1 7, 16,21 ,23 German 12, 14-1 7,15, 24, 26 Heligoland Bight 7, 28, 30 Hipp er, Vice Adiniral Franz 29, 30,5 1, 57, 58, 77 Hood , Rear Admiral Sir Horace 61 Ingenohl, Admiral Friedrich von 29,30 intelligence, British 29-30, 32 Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John 7,32,33, 50,53- 55,56, 6 1, 64, 65, 66, 68- 69, 70, 76 Jutland, Barrlc of (I 9 16) 9,56-70 statistics and analysis 7 1- 75

7E

80

line-ahead formations 53- 54 Lusitanin, RMS 3 1

Jutland 19 16

Mate Scheme 46 Mitchell, Colonel Billy 15 Nassau, SMS 8, 24, 25, 41-42,69, 72

oil, as fuel 19 Ord er of Battle 54

Pohl, Admiral Hugo von 30, 3 1 propu lsion 10-1 1, 18-19 protection seear mo ur

rangefinders 16, 17 Room 40 (British intelligence) 29-3 0, 32 Royal Navy (RN) 5-6 seealsoships, British after the battle 76-78 Battle of Jutland (1916) 56-70 chronology 8- 9 design and development 10- 11, 13, 14-1 9, 20- 24 dreadnought crews 46-47 O rder of Battle 54 statistics and analysis 7 1-75 strategic situation 28-33 tactics 53-56 technical specifications 34-4 1 Scheer, Vice Admiral Reinhard 24, 3 1, 32, 33, 51, 5 1, 55-56, 60-6 1, 66-67, 69, 70, 76, 77 ships, British Agincourt, H MS 30,6 1 Ajax, HMS 38-39,73 Audacious, HM S 28, 29, 38-39 Barham, HM S 39-40, 60, 60 , 72, 73 Bellerophon, HM S 5,8, 13, 34, 35 Benbow, HM S 33, 39 Black Prince, HMS 9, 70, 72, 73 Centu rion, HMS 38-39, 73 Collingwood, HMS 17, 34, 36,36 Colossus, HM S 18, 36- 37,37,67, 73 Conqueror, HMS 5, 37- 38 Dejmce, HM S 9, 64, 72 Dreadnought, HMS 5- 6,8, 10- 11, 13, 14,1 8-1 9,19, 2 1, 38 Emperor ofIndia, HM S 11, 39, 72 Hercules, HM S 20, 36- 37, 61 Indefiltigable, HM S 9,57,72,73 Invincible, HMS 8, 9,64, 65, 72, 73 Iron Duke, HM S 8, 15, 18, 22, 23, 39, 6 1, 6 1 King George V, HMS 8, 14, 23, 38- 39 , 73 Malaya, HM S 39-40, 58, 60 , 72, 73 Marlborough, HM S 39, 6 1, 65, 66,72 Monarch, HM S 37-38 Neptune, HMS 8, 2 1, 34-36, 37 Orion, HM S 8,1 4, 16, 21, 37- 38 Queen Elizabeth, HM S 8, 13, 18, 19, 23, 23,39-40,72, 76 Queen M ary, HM S 9,57-58,72, 73

Ramillie s, HMS 41 Resolution, HMS 4 1 Revenge, HM S 13,1 8, 23, 41, 61 Royal Oak, HMS 9, 4 1 Royal Sovereign, HM S 4 1 St Vincent, HM S 8, 2 1, 34, 36 Superb, HMS 35, 35 Temeraire, HMS 20, 35 Thunderer, HM S 2 1, 37- 38 Valiant, HMS 39-40 Vanguard, HM S 34, 36 Warspite, HMS 39-4 0, 60, 64, 72, 73 ships, German Bayern, SMS 9, 19,77 Blucher, SMS 3 1 DerfJli nger, SMS 65, 72 , 73 Deutschland, SMS 24 Friedrichdel' Grosse, SMS 43-44, 70 Grosser Kurfiirst, SMS 45,72, 73 Helgoland, SMS 8, 25, 26, 42-43, 72, 73 Kaiser, SMS 8, 15, 25- 26, 43-44, 73 Kaiserin, SMS 43-44 Konig, SMS 8, 26,26, 27, 45,65, 7 1, 72, 73, 75 Konig Albert, SMS 43-44 Kronprinz; SMS 45 Lutzoto, SMS 9,70,72,73 Markgraf SMS 45,72, 73 Nassau, SMS 8, 24, 25, 4 1-42, 69,72 Oldenburg, SMS 42-43, 65 Ostfriesland, SMS 9, 15, 42- 43, 44, 70, 72 Pomm ern, SMS 9, 24, 70, 72 Posen, SMS 4 1-4 2, 42, 43,70 l'rinz regent Luitpold. SMS 15, 43-44, 45,49 Rheinland, SMS 6, 4 1-4 2, 72 Seydlitz, SMS 57, 60, 65- 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 74 Tb uringen, SMS 42-43 U7esqak n, SM S 9, 4 1-42, 72, 77 statistics and analysis 7 1-7 5 srearn rurbine engines 10-11 , 19, 25, 26 strategic situation 28-33 submarines 28, 3 1, 77

tactics 53-5 6 technical specifications British 34-4 1 German 41-4 5 T irpirz, Admiral Alfred von 4, 5,29 torpedoes 17,1 8,53 weapons

British 10, 11,1 3, 14-1 7, 16,2 1, 23 German 12, 14-1 7, 15, 24, 26 Zeppelins 32, 33, 77

DUE 003 • 978 184603 133 5

DUE 015 • 978 1846033 308

U-boa ts of th e Kai se r's Navy

CAM 072 • 978 1 85532 992 8

Bri t ish Batt lc cru isers 191 4 -1 8

NVG 050 • 978 1 84176 362 0

NVG 124 • 978 1 84603 009 3

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, BRITI SH BATTL ESHIPS 19 39-45 (1)

; If

BRITISH BATTL ESHIPS 193 9-45 (2) Nt'l s(m and I\j " g G.."rg<' V Cl.\~,<,s

NVG 154 • 978 1 84603 3889

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BRITI SH DESTRO YERS

1892- 1918

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This is the account of machines of war pitted against each ot her and the combatants who operated them . St ep ont o the batt lefield and immerse yourself in the experience of real historic combat .

BRITISH DREADNOUGHT vs GERMAN DREADNOUGHT Jutland 1916 In 1916, in th e seas near Jutland, two fleets of armoured d readnought s met in op en battle. This book tells th e story of th e Briti sh and Ge rma n battl eship s of th ese two great fleets - from their development as th e first generation of fully-armoured warships

to

their combat experiences.

T he differing weapon systems and crew training of the British and Ge rma n fleets are examined in detail, as is the titanic str uggle of Jutland itself, through an hour-b y-hour, shot-by-shot recon struction. Finally, it ana lyzes the outcome of th e strugg le, explaining th e successes and failures of these great battleship s.

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