Osprey - Elite 179 - Pike and Shot Tactics 1590-1660

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR KEITH ROBERTS was born in 1955 and was educated at Highgate School. He graduated in History from Leicester University in 1977 and is currently employed by one of the major clearing banks. He is a military analyst and lecturer on the theory and practice of war in Europe and England between 1590 and 1660 and has published widely in this field.

ADAM HOOK studied graphic design, and began his work as an illustrator in 1983. He specializes in detailed historical reconstructions, and has illustrated Osprey titles on the Aztecs, the Greeks, several 19th century American subjects, and a number of books in the Fortress series. His work features in exhibitions and publications throughout the world.

Elite • 179

Pike and Shot Tactics 1590-1660

KEITH R O B E R T S

I L L U S T R A T E D BY A D A M H O O K Consultant

editor

Martin

Windrow

First published in Great Britain in 2010 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, UK 44-02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101 Email: [email protected] © 2010 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my friends for their support in my research over the years. This is a large group, but I owe particular thanks to Richard Brzezinski, Neal Gray, Dave Ryan and John Tincey.

ARTIST'S NOTE

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

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The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

Editor: Martin Windrow Design: Ken Vail Graphic Design, Cambridge, UK (kvgd.com) Typeset in Sabon and Myriad Pro Index by Alison Worthington Originated by PPS Grasmere, Leeds, UK Printed in China through World Print Ltd. 10 11 12 13 14

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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

4

THE CONTEMPORARY GENERAL'S PERSPECTIVE

7

Sieges a n d field a r m i e s - C a m p a i g n p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d rehearsal . T h e d e c i s i v e b a t t l e - D u t c h c a u t i o n a n d S w e d i s h a g g r e s s i v e n e s s . T h e G e r m a n d o c t r i n e - m u l t i p l e b a t t l e lines - field artillery - t e r r a i n . Cavalry . T h e infantry c o n f r o n t a t i o n - c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l - b r o k e n - c o u n t r y fighting . Outpost warfare

THE SPANISH A R M Y

26

Infantry f o r m a t i o n s . Cavalry: S p a n i s h a n d G e r m a n - F r e n c h H u g u e n o t d e v e l o p m e n t s

THE DUTCH REFORMS

32

The Dutch battalion - the distinction b e t w e e n administrative and tactical organization - the D u t c h c o m p a n y . T h e D u t c h firing s y s t e m • B a t t l e plans - t h e D u t c h b r i g a d e - C a v a l r y a n d artillery

THE T H I R T Y YEARS' WAR

43

D i s s e m i n a t i o n of P r i n c e M a u r i c e ' s reforms to b e l l i g e r e n t s , by v e t e r a n s , i n s t r u c t o r s a n d t r a n s l a t i o n s . S p a n i s h c o n s e r v a t i s m - F r o m D e n m a r k to S w e d e n

THE SWEDISH INTERVENTION

46

The army of G u s t a v u s A d o l p h u s : unit o r g a n i z a t i o n - firing s y s t e m s - c a v a l r y a n d artillery . S w e d i s h b r i g a d e d e p l o y m e n t . T h e S w e d i s h a r m y in b a t t l e : B r e i t e n f e l d , 1631

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS

56

D u t c h , S w e d i s h a n d G e r m a n i n f l u e n c e s . M o n k , Barriffe, E l t o n a n d W a t t s . P r i n c e R u p e r t at E d g e h i l l , 1642 . M a r s t o n M o o r , D o n n i n g t o n a n d N a s e b y , 1644-45 . T h e last w o r d

INDEX

64

PIKE AND SHOT TACTICS 1590-1660

I N T R O D U C T I O N For I rest out of doubt of this, if the ancient were joyned to these our new found armes, and with all the true marshalling of Bands and kinde of embattailing used, the old and new World would shortly be subject to one man. ( F r o m De Militia Romana by Justus Lipsius, professor at the University o f Leiden, translated by Captain J o h n B i n g h a m , 1 6 2 3 ) T h e 'pike and shot' era in European warfare, which may be taken to run from the end of the 1 5 t h century through to the beginning of the 1 8 t h century, is the period when infantry were armed with a combination of pikes and gunpowder firearms, it this covers t o o many years and t o o many changes in military technology and tactics to cover in a single book. This study describes the tactics of a distinct period within that era: specifically, from the military reforms of the Dutch leader Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, in the 1 5 9 0 s , to the conclusion of the European wars of the first half of the 1 7 t h century, with the Peace of the Pyrenees between France and Spain in 1 6 5 9 and the disbanding of the English army after the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1 6 6 0 . O u r starting point, Prince Maurice's reforms, represents a distinct advance, but not a complete break with existing military practice. Maurice's reforms worked because they combined the successful evolutionary developments of the Spanish army during the 1 6 t h century with revolutionary new ideas that reinterpreted classical R o m a n , Hellenistic and Byzantine military theory and practice in a practical way for a modern age and modern armies. 4

T h e r e was a long history o f debate in Western E u r o p e over the potential opportunities that a revival o f the skills o f the legendary armies o f M a c e d o n or R o m e could offer, and this had intensified during the revival o f interest in the classical past during the R e n a i s s a n c e . A military prince or an a m b i t i o u s condottiere could easily imagine the advantages, and dream of being a n e w Alexander or Julius Caesar. F r o m a m o r e practical perspective, the increasing impact on the battlefield o f m o d e r n Swiss, G e r m a n and Spanish i n f a n t r y armed with pikes made c o m p a r i s o n s with the classical M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x more relevant to c o n t e m p o r a r y w a r f a r e . T h e problem facing both military theorists and professional officers in the 16th century was not that they were ignorant o f the classical past or that they lacked the vision to understand classical ideas in a modern c o n t e x t . T h e texts that they read certainly provided the c o r e principles o f classical infantry training; but most did not include the practical detail they needed to rediscover exactly h o w it actually w o r k e d . W h a t they needed was a b o o k that did n o t assume a detailed level o f knowledge o f the m e c h a n i c s o f classical military practice - basic drill and unit manoeuvre - and at first they did not have access to such a source. T h e key texts that provided this practical information were translations o f t w o less w e l l - k n o w n titles: Claudius A e l i a n u s ' Tactica, and the B y z a n t i n e Emperor L e o VPs Tactica which drew upon it. C o m b i n e d with descriptions of R o m a n R e p u b l i c a n practice f r o m Titus Livy's Historia and Julius Caesar's Gallic War, these w o r k s - with their p r a c t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f unit drill provided the basis for the new D u t c h battalion (whose size was based on that of the R o m a n c o h o r t ) , and for the a d a p t a t i o n o f the R o m a n triplex acies battle order o f three supporting lines o f infantry units. T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n of ideas led M a u r i c e to reform the D u t c h a r m y into smaller, m o r e flexible

ABOVE I n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n , c. 1 5 7 2 : detail from a c o n t e m p o r a r y illustration of infantry at t h e c a p t u r e o f Brill b y D u t c h r e b e l s , from the manuscript account

The Expedition

in Holland

by the

W e l s h officer W a l t e r M o r g a n . T h i s t y p e o f f o r m a t i o n w a s in g e n e r a l u s e in t h e 1 5 7 0 s ; n o t e t h e d e p t h of t h e central pike body, and the advanced wings of arquebusiers. (By permission of t h e W a r d e n a n d Fellows of All S o u l s C o l l e g e , O x f o r d )

OPPOSITE Maurice, Prince of O r a n g e a n d C o u n t of Nassau (1567-1625). A n e n g r a v e d portrait of t h e leader of t h e D u t c h revolt against S p a i n , w h o s e military reforms introduced smaller infantry units a n d formations a n d n e w , m o r e flexible battlefield d e p l o y m e n t s , consciously modelled on the p r o v e n superiority of t h e R o m a n m a n i p u l a r battle line over the massive Macedonian phalanx. (Author's collection, a s a r e all o t h e r i m a g e s n o t specifically credited otherwise)

5

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tactical units with new styles o f tactical deployment, employing the new firing systems that he introduced to better exploit the potential of infantry firearms. Spanish and Italian c o m m a n d e r s - and G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s w h o copied the Spanish practice, or used similar models - were n o t initially convinced by the new D u t c h tactics, but the D u t c h victory over the Spanish at Nieupoort in 1 6 0 0 was a clear d e m o n s t r a t i o n that they actually w o r k e d . T h e Swedish military system, which expanded upon the Dutch battalion system for its own unique brigade structure, provided another conclusive example by its victory at Breitenfeld in 1 6 3 1 , and by the following year the Imperial c o m m a n d e r Albrecht von Wallenstein had adopted a linear army deployment based on the D u t c h m o d e l . T h e end result w a s a n e w G e r m a n doctrine that was a composite o f the D u t c h and Swedish, and by the 1 6 4 0 s this had been adopted by all sides in the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r ( 1 6 1 8 - 4 8 ) . A series o f wars involving E n g l a n d , S c o t l a n d a n d Ireland - the B i s h o p s ' W a r s between E n g l a n d and Scotland ( 1 6 3 9 - 4 0 ) , the Irish R e v o l t against English rule ( 1 6 4 1 - 5 3 ) , and the English Civil W a r s ( 1 6 4 2 - 5 1 ) - s h o w the same process o f change, as D u t c h , Swedish a n d G e r m a n styles o f w a r f a r e interacted over a shorter period. By 1 6 4 3 the c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style had b e c o m e the model used by all sides in the English Civil W a r s . T h e perspective o f c o n t e m p o r a r y generals on the theory and practice o f the c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style b o r n during the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r is described in the n e x t chapter. T h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s then describe the sequence of

change and continuity through the Spanish and the French H u g u e n o t systems in the 1 5 9 0 s , and the D u t c h and Swedish military r e f o r m s , that gave birth t o that G e r m a n composite system Classical i n f l u e n c e : t h e f r o n t i s p i e c e o f Pallas

Armata

(1683 edition) b y t h e Scottish

T H E

C O N T E M P O R A R Y

m e r c e n a r y Sir J a m e s T u r n e r .

G E N E R A L ' S

T h e potential military advantage to be gained from

P E R S P E C T I V E

a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of classical military t h e o r y a n d practice

In the late 1 6 t h century the w a r in the L o w Countries (modern H o l l a n d and Belgium) between the Spanish and the D u t c h rebels was dominated by siege warfare rather than open-field battles. However, both sides recognized that despite the i m p o r t a n c e o f sieges it w a s also necessary t o have an effective manoeuvre force that could credibly challenge its opponents in the open field. Credibility was the key point: if it w a s to raise a siege, the relieving army must represent a credible threat to the besiegers. T h e English officer J o h n Bingham, w h o had served in the D u t c h army, summarized this with the c o m m e n t that 'he w h o is master o f the field, m a y dispose o f his affaires as he listeth, hee may spoyle the Enemies Country at his pleasure, he m a y m a r c h where he thinketh best, he m a y lay siege to w h a t Towne he is disposed, he m a y raise any siege that the Enemy hath layed against him. N o r c a n any M a n be M a s t e r o f field without Battaile.' Although m o s t o f the victories that he w o n during the D u t c h w a r of independence f r o m Spain actually involved sieges, the greatest impact on his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s achieved by the D u t c h c o m m a n d e r Prince M a u r i c e o f Orange, Count o f Nassau ( 1 5 6 7 - 1 6 2 5 ) , lay in his reforms in battlefield deployment, which offered an alternative t o the d o m i n a n c e o f the established practice o f the Spanish army. M a u r i c e ' s victory over the Spanish at N i e u p o o r t in 1 6 0 0 w a s the p r o o f that his reforms had created a successful battlefield army, and the credibility this provided w a s the f o u n d a t i o n o f his success in siege w a r f a r e . M a u r i c e was a cautious c o m m a n d e r , w h o w a s concerned that a single battlefield defeat could decimate his carefully trained army and lead t o Spanish victory in the w a r as a w h o l e . His perspective was recorded by the English officer Sir Edward Cecil, w h o served with the Dutch army at N i e u p o o r t :

P A L L A S

h a d b e e n discussed for c e n t u r i e s , b u t it w a s M a u r i c e o f N a s s a u ' s r e f o r m s t h a t first successfully c o m b i n e d classical doctrines w i t h m o d e r n military realities, a n d his s u c c e s s c o l o u r e d military thinking t h r o u g h o u t t h e 17th century.

ARM

Military Effayes Of the A N C I E N T

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Militaires.

First p u b l i s h e d in P a r i s in 1 6 1 2 , this b o o k w a s t h e best of t h e early c o m m e n t a r i e s o n Prince Maurice's n e w b o d y of military theory and the ancient models t h a t i n f l u e n c e d it.

This caused the late Prince of Orange (in m y hearing) when hee had fought the Battel o f N i e u p o r t : to this purpose, to direct speech unto some Hottspurrs of the French nation, that had often pressed him to give Battell. Messirs (saith hee) n o w you have had your desires & n o w you have fought a Battell, nay more, you have gained [i.e. won] a Battell. But lett mee tell you herewithall that the State hath not gotten so much as a Q u a r t d'escu [small coin] by it; and had wee lost the Day, wee had lost all by it: Even all that m y self and my Ancestors have been these three score and ten yeares a getting and preserving. And therefore Messirs, trouble mee no more hereafter, with talking to mee of Battells.

Prince M a u r i c e ' s reformed D u t c h army had a larger n u m b e r o f units, both infantry and cavalry, and the battle f o r m a t i o n s themselves were more complicated than those o f the Spanish. In order to m a n a g e them successfully, M a u r i c e brought a far higher degree o f standardization and preparation to his battle planning. T h i s provided a model that was studied and followed by o t h e r 1 7 t h - c e n t u r y Western E u r o p e a n c o m m a n d e r s , in both Protestant and C a t h o l i c armies - even d o w n to using the same symbols as the key to a n n o t a t e infantry and cavalry units on their drawn battle plans.

G e r m a n mercenary infantry a n d c a v a l r y in t h e e m p l o y o f the Dutch rebel leader William of O r a n g e , outside R o e r m o n d e o n 2 3 J u l y 1 5 7 2 . N o t e a t t o p left the d e e p infantry c o l u m n s s t o r m i n g t h e b r e a c h in t h e city walls.

8

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Dutch preparations A D u t c h c o m m a n d e r , and others in this p e r i o d , c o m m o n l y held a p a r a d e (paradoe) of his army before m a r c h i n g out on c a m p a i g n , with the practical objective o f drawing his regiments t o g e t h e r a n d observing their ability t o deploy into battle formation and manoeuvre in open ground. T h e c o m m a n d e r could then assess w h a t his men were c a p a b l e of, and adjust the c o m p l e x i t y of his preferred battle f o r m a t i o n accordingly. H e w o u l d keep the f o r m a t i o n simple for inexperienced soldiers, but c o u l d e x p e c t m o r e flexibility f r o m veteran officers and men. Before marching a D u t c h c o m m a n d e r w o u l d decide upon his preferred f o r m a t i o n either through discussion with his senior officers a n d staff, o r simply by imposing it upon t h e m . O n c e the decision h a d been m a d e the chosen plan would be sketched out on paper by the general. T h e Sieur du Praissac, w h o s e b o o k Discours Militaries f o l l o w e d the D u t c h p r a c t i c e , described this process in detail; the e x t r a c t b e l o w is taken f r o m the English edition translated by J o h n C r u s o and published in C a m b r i d g e in 1 6 3 9 :

S p a n i s h or Italian h e a v y a r m o u r e d l a n c e r s (left foreground) o p p o s e d to pistoliers, at H a r d e n b e r g o n 16 J u n e 1 5 8 0 .

T h e Sergeant m a j o r Generall receiveth f r o m the Generall a plat [plan] o f the f o r m s w h i c h he will give to his A r m i e , the disposition and placing o f the m e m b e r s o f it, Cavallrie, Infanterie, Artillerie; the order which they should observe in fight, with c o m m i s s i o n signed by the Generall to dispose it in that manner. T o this c o m m i s s i o n the w h o l e 9

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Armie must yield o b e d i e n c e , and the Sergeant m a j o r G e n e r a l l w i t h M a r s h a l s o f the field shall dispose thereof, according to the f o r m and place which the Generall shall have prescribed. Several copies of the plan would be m a d e , and officers down to the level o f brigade c o m m a n d e r (of infantry or cavalry) w o u l d receive a c o p y either in person at the general's council of w a r or via the sergeant-major general. Since an army deployed f r o m line o f m a r c h into its fighting f o r m a t i o n brigade by brigade, every brigade c o m m a n d e r h a d to understand his place in the deployment. George M o n k described the objective as 'if so be your Divisions of Horse and F o o t , when they m a r c h , be o f the same strength as you desire to have them when they imbattelled to fight, and that you m a r c h your Divisions of Horse and F o o t by Brigades as you do intend to fight them', then the army would be 'always in a readiness to receive your E n e m y ' . T h e plan could then be amended during the campaign if events - such as reinforcements arriving, or the despatch o f a large c o n t i n g e n t on s o m e o t h e r service - affected the composition of the army, though such a variation on the original plan was usually limited in scope. Before and during the march the Dutch commander would practice full field exercises to rehearse his preferred battlefield deployments. C o n t e m p o r a r y accounts record this practice; a g o o d e x a m p l e is that o f an English officer, George Waymouth, w h o served in the Dutch army in the expedition to Julich in 1 6 1 0 , and w h o included in his a c c o u n t m a p s o f the battle f o r m a t i o n s practiced on different days. Waymouth shows that in 1 6 1 0 Prince M a u r i c e had chosen to use the deployment style that placed infantry brigades in a diamond pattern, but carried out field exercises in several variations o f it, so that if he adapted his plan on the day o f battle his officers and men would be prepared and confident. T h e Scottish professional soldier Sir J a m e s Turner wrote: In the marshalling of Regiments, Brigades, Companies, and Troops either of Horse or Foot, Commanders, must be very cautious when they have to do with an enemy, not to change the ordinary forms, for if at that time you offer to introduce any new form wherewith your men are not acquainted, you shall not fail to put them in some confusion, than which an enemy cannot desire a greater advantage. If you have a new figure of Battel in your head, be sure to accustom your Companies and Regiments very often by exercise to the practice of it, before you m a k e use of it in earnest.

•

THE DUTCH BATTALION A N D FIRING

SYSTEM

1 : T o his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , o n e o f t h e m o s t v i s i b l e o f

Prince

T h e next tactical obstacle w a s t h e search for a firing s y s t e m t o m a k e best use of this f i r e p o w e r by e n a b l i n g t h e

musketeers

Maurice of Orange's reforms w a s t h e n e w D u t c h tactical unit

t o fire q u i c k l y in s u c c e s s i v e r a n k s . T h e first m e t h o d

for infantry, w h i c h w a s b o t h smaller a n d s h a l l o w e r t h a n t h o s e

in t h e late 1590s, w a s a f o r m o f c o u n t e r m a r c h , w h e r e b y

u s e d in t h e S p a n i s h a r m y . T h e s e s m a l l e r D u t c h u n i t s , c a l l e d

m e n in e a c h r a n k f i r e d a n d t h e n r e t i r e d d o w n t h e

b e t w e e n a d j a c e n t files t o r e l o a d at t h e rear; t h e n e x t

R o m a n cohorts, a n d D u t c h p r o p a g a n d i s t s explicitly u n d e r l i n e d

would

t h e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e c l a s s i c a l R o m a n a r m y a n d its s u c c e s s e s .

be seen, the

B y 1610, D u t c h

battalions n u m b e r e d

a b o u t 500 m e n ,

and

u s u a l l y f o u g h t in pairs a s s h o w n in t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n . 2: The n e w

D u t c h battalion offered flexibility a n d

fire, a n d primary

so o n . A l t h o u g h Dutch

the

intervals

'battalions' a m o n g s t o t h e r t e r m s , w e r e s e e n as c o m p a r a b l e t o

then

used,

rank

this c o n t i n u e d

firing s y s t e m f r o m t h e

to

early

17th c e n t u r y s a w m u s k e t e e r s f o r m e d into lateral blocks of t h r e e t o six f i l e s , c a l l e d ' d i v i s i o n s ' ; a f t e r f i r i n g e a c h r a n k r e t i r e d

mutual

as s h o w n , d o w n t h e interval b e t w e e n divisions, rather t h a n

s u p p o r t i n its b a t t l e f i e l d d e p l o y m e n t , a n d its s h a l l o w e r d e p t h

b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l files.

o f t e n r a n k s m e a n t t h a t it c o u l d b r i n g a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e o f

3 : T h i s s h o w s D u t c h m u s k e t e e r s c. 1 6 2 6 i n t w o

its m u s k e t e e r s i n t o t h e f i r i n g l i n e t h a n a d e e p e r f o r m a t i o n .

ranks, in t h e ' r e a d y ' a n d 'firing' s t a n c e s .

successive

Swedish aggressiveness

II

1 a 0 a o u

• a

0 •

• a n a

a •

P •

0 • a a

•

pattern deployments (white blocks) practised by t h e D u t c h a r m y o n its m a r c h t o t h e s i e g e o f J u l i c h in 1 6 1 0 . T h i s is f r o m t h e English edition of Praissac's

Militaries;the

English

translator, J o h n Cruso, also w r o t e a cavalry manual, h e n c e the marginal note.

1

•a •0 an DO oo do od an on D DO DO

on

DO DO

nn DD •a DO

•

T w o of several d i a m o n d -

Discours

i DODO

If

Ton may fee this figure more largely and more exattly in my boo\ of Cavallry in figure

%

i6.

Prince M a u r i c e clearly understood the c o n c e p t and the consequences of decisive battle, but preferred to avoid the risk if he could. T h e military theory and practice arising during the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' War, w h i c h s a w the i m p a c t o f the Swedish t a c t i c a l style and f o r m e d the c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style, was characterized by an equally clear view o f the potential for seeking c a m p a i g n solutions through decisive battles, but also by a greater appetite for risk. Gustavus A d o l p h u s ' victory at Breitenfeld, and the consequent r e p u t a t i o n t h a t a t t r a c t e d allies for his campaigns in Germany, was an example t h a t inspired a g e n e r a t i o n o f generals. T h e s e included several o f those w h o fought in the English Civil War, such as the R o y a l i s t Prince R u p e r t and the N e w M o d e l Army's cavalry commander, Oliver C r o m w e l l . J e a n t'Serclaes, C o u n t Tilly, had previously d e m o n s t r a t e d the advantages o f battlefield solutions by his victories at the battle of W h i t e M o u n t a i n in 1 6 2 0 , w h i c h b r o u g h t B o h e m i a under his c o n t r o l , and at Lutter in 1 6 2 6 , which b r o k e the Danish army o f King Christian IV. But Gustavus Adolphus was an a l t o g e t h e r m o r e inspiring figure; he defeated C o u n t Tilly, and w h e n he was killed at the battle o f Liitzen in 1 6 3 2 he was at the height of his fame. T h e Earl o f Orrery, writing after the English Civil War, summarized the c o n t e m p o r a r y perspective on the impact o f decisive battles:

All w h o have c o m m a n d e d Armies, or written on the Military Art have universally agreed, T h a t n o one Act o f War, is so great in itself, or in the C o n s e q u e n c e s o f it, as Fighting a Battel; since the winning o f one, has n o t only been the cause o f taking a Place besieged, (if the Army is defeated w h i c h c o m e s to relieve it) but also by the gaining o f the Victory, a Province, nay a K i n g d o m has often been the R e w a r d of the V i c t o r i o u s . But, as the advantages are eminent to him w h o wins it; so the Prejudices are n o less to him w h o loses it; and therefore nothing ought to be m o r e exactly consider'd and weigh'd in War, than whether a decisive Battel shall be given, before the resolution to fight is taken. T h e potential risk of battle was self-evident, but, compared with Prince Maurice, leading generals in the Thirty Years' W a r and the English Civil Wars were more willing to take that risk.

12

The German doctrine of the 1640s T h e c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style w a s described by the Imperialist officer R a i m o n d o M o n t e c u c c o l i in his manuscript Sulle Battaglie, written while he was a prisoner o f w a r and completed by 1 6 4 2 ( M o n t e c u c c o l i had fought at Breitenfeld as a cavalry officer):

Infantry distances: t h e uniformity introduced by the

Nowadayes all captain are accustomed to arraying their troops in m o r e than one line, a tactic which the G e r m a n s call treyfach. T h i s is w h a t the Imperials did at Lutzen, Soultz, Nordlingen W i t t s t o c k , Freburg and everywhere else except for Tilly in the battle o f Breitenfeld-Leipzig. T h e latter placed his w h o l e a r m y a l o n g a single f r o n t a n d f o u n d himself in a bad w a y as a result.

D u t c h set s p e c i f i c f r o n t a g e s f o r e a c h i n f a n t r y m a n , a n d specific m e t h o d s t o c h a n g e t h e m . This illustration f r o m J o h n B i n g h a m ' s

TheTactiksofAelian,

published

in L o n d o n in 1616, s h o w s t w o m e t h o d s of reducing t h e frontages - 'Closing to t h e middell' a n d 'Closing to y e

T h e Earl of Orrery, whose service had been in Ireland, described this model

r i g h t h a n d / left h a n d ' .

in more detail: A General must never bring all his T r o o p s to fight at once; and therefore is still to draw up his Army in t w o Lines or orders of Battel, and three in case the G r o u n d , and the N u m b e r of his Forces, allow it. F o r those Lines are in effect, so many Armies; and the second Line being intire, though the first should be broken, often recovers the day; especially if the second line be at so just a distance behind the first, as if the first be overthrown, it does not disorder the second; and also so near that some Squadrons of the second Line, can c o m e up timely enough to redress any beginning o f a breach in the first, without too much discomposing itself.

Caff XX

W h i l e the e x a m p l e s in Orrery's A Treatise of the Art of War divided infantry into t w o or three lines, Sir J a m e s Turner, w h o served extensively in Germany, w r o t e that although ' T h e manner was in many places, and still is in some, to marshal Armies in three distinct Bodies, one behind another, the 13

H e a v y c a v a l r y , c. 1 6 1 6 : an a r m o u r e d cuirassier or

Reiter, a r m e d w i t h t w o l a r g e wheel-lock horse pistols a n d c a r r y i n g a s w o r d a s his secondary w e a p o n .

first was called the Vanguard, the second the Battel, the third the Reere-guard', it was becoming m o r e c o m m o n to use t w o lines: 'Armies for the most part n o w are marshal'd in t w o distinct Bodies the Van-guard and the Arreer-guard which are c o m m o n l y called Battel and Reserve'. T h e examples which Turner uses also treat brigades differently. W h e r e a s previously an army formed on the D u t c h m o d e l fought in three large brigades, it was becoming m o r e 14

c o m m o n to c o m b i n e several w e a k regiments into battlefield units that were essentially b a t t a l i o n s , but were often referred to as ' b r i g a d e s ' . Using this model, Turner's examples of deployments in t w o lines were based on a first line of four brigades and a second line o f three. T h e origin of this revised use of the term 'brigade' and their use as distinct battlefield units is p r o b a b l y the result of Swedish influence. T h e supporting field artillery was typically placed in pairs o f guns along the front o f the army, with lighter pieces associated m o r e closely with the infantry, since these 'regimental guns' could n o w keep pace with advancing infantry. This was not an absolute rule, however, and larger battery groups could be formed. T h e same principles and f o r m a t i o n s that were used for large armies in the field were used in miniature by smaller forces, by reducing the numbers o f men in the b a t t a l i o n s o f infantry or s q u a d r o n s o f cavalry. T h e battlefield formation was based on the flexibility o f a n u m b e r o f units deployed so that they could support one another, and the officers and soldiers had been trained to fight in that way. In order to maintain that flexibility, the general required a certain m i n i m u m n u m b e r o f units; t o achieve this with a small force he needed to reduce the number of men in each unit rather than having a smaller number of stronger units. (An e x a m p l e o f an English army fighting in Ireland in 1 6 4 2 and deployed in this w a y with a n u m b e r o f small units is illustrated on page 5 6 . )

D u t c h h e a v y cavalry at Tournhout, w h e r e Prince Maurice defeated a Spanish, Walloon and German army o n 24 J a n u a r y 1597; this detail is f r o m a n e n g r a v i n g in The

Commentaries

of Sir Francis

Vere

p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n in 1657, b u t is b a s e d o n a n e a r l i e r D u t c h e n g r a v i n g . It s h o w s d e e p formations of D u t c h cavalry, in s e v e n files a n d e i g h t r a n k s ; M a u r i c e later r e d u c e d t h e d e p t h t o five ranks, g i v i n g a f r o n t a g e i n c r e a s e d t o as m a n y a s 15 files. E a c h s u b - u n i t is s h o w n as b e i n g led b y a n officer followed by t w o trumpeters, with t w o cornets carrying s t a n d a r d s in t h e f r o n t r a n k .

15

B a t t l e o f N i e u p o o r t , 2 J u l y 1600, in a n e n g r a v i n g f r o m The

Commentaries

of Sir Francis

Vere.

Prince Maurice's victory over a Spanish army w a s seen throughout Protestant Europe a s p r o o f t h a t his m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s w o r k e d . C o m p a r e t h e smaller D u t c h u n i t s a t u p p e r left w i t h t h e larger S p a n i s h infantry f o r m a t i o n s at c e n t r e right.

16

The choice of terrain H a v i n g decided to take the risk o f battle, professional c o m p e t e n c e in deployment was seen as critical, and this was based on an understanding of the advantages of the ground as well as the battle formation selected: 'the Ranging o f an A r m y in Battel t o the very best advantage, is a great furtherence to the winning o f the Victory, but the doing o f it depends m u c h , not only on the W i s d o m and Skill o f the General, the N a t u r e of the G r o u n d , and the Quality o f his o w n F o r c e s , but also on those o f his Enemies, and o f the disposition of him w h o c o m m a n d s t h e m . ' T h e battle f o r m a t i o n s which a general had decided upon were likely to be adapted by c i r c u m s t a n c e , but n o t fundamentally altered, provided he could find the ground he needed on which to use them. T h e D u k e o f Y o r k recorded in his m e m o i r s o f service in the French army at M o n t St Quentin that 'there [ M a r e c h a l Turenne] resolv'd to expect the Enemy, w h o c a m e on with great joy, as k n o w i n g the a d v a n t a g e they h a d over us, b o t h in n u m b e r s and by getting us into a plaine feild, where wee could neither retreat from them, nor avoid fighting, if they pleas'd to engage us'. In looking for a place to c o m m i t his a r m y to battle the c o m m a n d e r w o u l d t a k e care to ensure that he or a trusted officer viewed the ground he would fight over or actively looked for the ground he wanted - 'with great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in, as when you have drawn up your A r m y on it, you may not afterward alter the O r d e r o f it or change your G r o u n d ; for all such M u t a t i o n s in the F a c e o f your E n e m y are very d a n g e r o u s ' .

W h e r e possible a c o m m a n d e r w h o chose to wait on the defensive would seek to secure one or both his flanks with some obstacle, as Sir J a m e s Turner commented: 'in time of Battel it is almost impossible for a Battalion or B o d y of either Horse or F o o t to stand when it is charg'd both in front and flank, and this is ordinarily done by overwinging, so that the strongest in n u m b e r has the advantage, which the weaker should endeavour to counterbalance by art, policy, and stratagem'. W h e r e a c o m m a n d e r was advancing upon his opponent 'drawn up in Battel [formation], ready to receive him, he will do himself an injury to march forward, for it is not to be fancied, that his adversary will be so courteous as to permit him to marshal his army, but will take his advantage and fall upon him before he can draw up his V a n ' . In these circumstances the commander would draw up his army into its battle f o r m a t i o n at a distance from his o p p o n e n t , and only then m a r c h it f o r w a r d . T h i s p r e c a u t i o n w a s practiced by the Dutch in their field exercises and during their marches so that they could easily and quickly undertake it on campaign.

C a v a l r y a n d d r a g o o n s , c. 1 6 1 6 , f r o m a 1635 e d i t i o n of J o h a n n Jacobi von Walhausen's

Kunstzu

Kriegs-

Pferd ( T h e A r t o f W a r

on Horseback'). From top to b o t t o m : lancers, pistoliers, arquebusiers, and m o u n t e d infantry - d r a g o o n s .

CAVALRY While the main cavalry was positioned on the wings o f the infantry, in t w o or three lines, there was a strong contemporary preference to c o m b i n e the effects of cavalry and infantry, and there were two main ways to achieve this. T h e first was the Swedish tactic of adding detachments of ' c o m m a n d e d ' musketeers - typically in plottons of 5 0 men, but sometimes stronger - and light artillery to support the cavalry wings. This slowed down the cavalry to the pace of their infantry support; as George M o n k wrote, 'if you fight [deploy] F o o t amongst your H o r s e , your F o o t must advance with your Horse, and your Horse by no means to advance before your F o o t , until your Enemies Horse be put to flight'. However, these infantry detachments provided a deadly counter to the caracole of pistol-armed cavalry cavalrymen firing by successive ranks since the musket had a longer range. T h e second method was to place cavalry squadrons behind the infantry lines. This was originally a Dutch tactic, with cavalry deployed behind the first line of infantry; but the Swedish t o o k it a stage further at Breitenfeld in 1 6 3 1 , placing supporting cavalry squadrons behind both the first and second of their two lines of infantry. German Imperial armies later copied this tactic. 17

T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y view w a s that small squadrons o f cavalry could have an impact out o f all proportion to the numbers deployed; Montecuccoli wrote that 'a small s q u a d r o n o f cavalry, acting p r o m p t l y c a n w r e a k great havoc a m o n g s t large infantry battle lines'. T h e advantage this gave was that the infantry f o r m a t i o n adopted for fighting other infantry - a centre of pikemen with wings o f musketeers - was vulnerable to cavalry attack, while the square o r o b l o n g f o r m a t i o n s t h a t infantry a d o p t e d t o defend themselves against c a v a l r y m a d e c o m p a c t targets for e n e m y musketeers and light artillery. T h e usefulness o f small supporting cavalry squadrons amongst the infantry was such that c o m m a n d e r s o f the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r would deploy some of their best cavalry in this role. T h e general w o u l d typically place his cavalry with one wing stronger than the other, a n d m i g h t see this as the m e a n s t o deliver a decisive blow. As G e o r g e M o n k w r o t e , 'if y o u have one wing o f H o r s e that are m o r e confident in their Valour and Resolution than you are o f the other, let that wing o f H o r s e charge first (for as m a n y hands m a k e light w o r k , so the best hands m a k e surest w o r k ) and the other wing o f H o r s e kept even with the main body o f F o o t until the Enemies Horse c o m e up to charge them'. T h e key to success then lay in the ability o f the cavalry to exploit their victory and not w a s t e it. M o n k again: '[If] either o f y o u r wings o f H o r s e do put to flight either o f your Enemies wings o f H o r s e , to send three divisions o f H o r s e after t h e m . . . a n d all o t h e r H o r s e t h a t have put the E n e m i e s wing o f H o r s e to flight, ought t o charge the Enemies F o o t with as m u c h speed as they can'. T h e pursuing cavalry kept their defeated opponents f r o m rallying, and the reserve cavalry o f the victorious wing would n o w co-operate with their own infantry by attacking the opposing infantry line in the flank. T h e size and depth o f cavalry s q u a d r o n s differed, and M o n t e c u c c o l i , writing c. 1 6 4 2 , described the different armies' cavalry units thus: 'Nowadays [the F r e n c h ] f o r m large s q u a d r o n s 7 to 8 m e n deep, the D u t c h give their squadrons a depth o f 5 so that the front turns out to have 1 5 . In the Imperial a r m y the squadrons are 2 0 0 - 2 5 0 horse or 3 0 0 h o r s e ' , with a depth of 'five and sometimes f o u r ' . T h e Swedish 'also f o r m squadrons of 2 0 0 to 3 0 0 , the depth is but three'.

BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT: DANISH ARMY,

1625

N o t e : I n t h i s s c h e m a t i c d i a g r a m u n i t s a r e c o l o u r - c o d e d green p i k e , yellow

for

f o r s h o t a n d red f o r c a v a l r y . O u t l i n e d w h i t e b l o c k s

wing

cavalry

led, followed

by the infantry brigades,

b y t h e c a v a l r y t h a t w o u l d f o r m t h e left w i n g . T h e

then

cavalry

indicate t h e previous positions of battalions that h a v e d e p l o y e d

marching

o u t w a r d s to f o r m their brigade into a d i a m o n d pattern.

s u p p o r t f o r t h e i n f a n t r y c e n t r e . E a c h i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e is i n

The

Dutch

developed

practical

processes

in o r d e r

to

a

between

column, with

one

the

infantry

complete

brigades tactical

would

formation

provide of

two

d e p l o y their larger n u m b e r of tactical units quickly a n d e n a b l e

b a t t a l i o n s s i d e b y s i d e ; e a c h b a t t a l i o n is i n t w o b l o c k s , w i t h

t h e m to co-operate effectively. This plate s h o w s t h e three-

t h e p i k e m e n in f r o n t o f t h e m u s k e t e e r s . E a c h b r i g a d e

stage process d e v e l o p e d b y t h e D u t c h for o n e of their

three of these formations, marching o n e behind the other.

common

most

battlefield d e p l o y m e n t s , from the march, of

has

the

2 : In t h e s e c o n d s t a g e , t h e c a v a l r y w i n g s a n d i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s

t h r e e i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s t h a t f o r m e d a f i e l d a r m y . It is t a k e n

w h e e l t o t h e i r left, p i v o t t i n g - as w a s u s u a l - o n t h e right w i n g .

from a Danish

3 : In t h e t h i r d s t a g e t h e c e n t r a l b a t t a l i o n s of e a c h

m a n u s c r i p t of 1625, as t h e m o s t

complete

contemporary example, but the Danish followed the

Dutch

infantry

brigade d e p l o y o u t w a r d s to f o r m e a c h brigade into a d i a m o n d

m i l i t a r y s y s t e m c l o s e l y . In t h i s e x a m p l e t h e b r i g a d e s h a v e a

pattern,

s m a l l e r n u m b e r o f b a t t a l i o n s t h a n w o u l d b e u s u a l in a D u t c h

battalions. The

thus

creating

three

b r i g a d e , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e is t h e s a m e .

forward to d e p l o y o n either side of their pike blocks.

musketeers

successive will

then

lines

divide,

of and

infantry march

1 : T h e first s t a g e w a s t o m a r c h t h e a r m y , b r i g a d e b y b r i g a d e ,

I n s e t : Cuirassier//?e/fer h e a v y c a v a l r y , w h o s e p r i m a r y w e a p o n

across t h e f r o n t o v e r w h i c h t h e a r m y w o u l d d e p l o y . T h e right-

is t h e p i s t o l .

T H E INFANTRY CONFRONTATION Sir J a m e s T u r n e r - w h o h a d f o u g h t in several - described an infantry advance thus: Y o u r advance upon an Enemy, in w h a t posture soever he be, should be with a c o n s t a n t , firm and steady p a c e ; the M u s k e t e e r s (whether they be on the Flanks or interlin'd with either the H o r s e or the Pikes) firing all the w h i l e ; but w h e n y o u c o m e within Pistol-shot [the term used here as a measure o f distance], you should double your pace, till your Pikes closely serr'd together, c h a r g e these, w h e t h e r H o r s e or F o o t , w h o m you find before t h e m . It is true, the business very oft comes not to push o f Pike, but it hath and m a y c o m e oft to it, and then Pikemen are very serviceable. Although Turner favoured a steady advance with musketeers firing as they c a m e (which w o u l d have required them to employ the practice o f firing by successive r a n k s ) , other c o m m a n d e r s preferred the Swedish tactic of reserving their fire until very close range, firing one or t w o massive volleys, and then 'falling o n ' opposing infantry while they were still reeling f r o m the shock. T h i s reserving o f fire could be employed both offensively and defensively. A g o o d c o n t e m p o r a r y description of Scottish infantry fighting in the Swedish army at Breitenfeld was given by L t C o l M u s c h a m p to D r William Watts: 'First (saith he), giving fire unto three little Field-pieces that I had before me, I suffered not m y muskettiers to give their volleyes till I came within Pistollshot o f the enemy, at which time I gave order to the first [three] rancks to discharge at once, and after them the other three: which done we fell pell mell into their ranckes, knocking them downe with the stocke of the Musket and our swords.' Sir J a m e s Turner - w h o was not present at this battle - wrote of the use o f the 'Salvee' (volley) that he thought that it was used 'when either the business seems to be desparate, or that the Bodies are so near, that the Pikemen are almost c o m e to push o f Pike, and then no other use can be made of the M u s q u e t but of the Butt-end of it'. M u s c h a m p also described an occasion when opposing pikemen were less enthusiastic to advance, and a 'brave commander of theirs all in scarlet and gold lace there was right before us; w h o m we might discerne to lay upon his own mens pates [heads] and shoulders; to cut and slash divers of them, with his sword, because they would not c o m e upon us. This gentleman maintained the fight a full houre, and more against us; but he being slaine, wee might perceive their pikes and colours [flags] to topple downe, to tumble and fall crosse one over another; whereupon all his men beginning to flee, wee had the pursuit o f them until the night parted us.' W h e r e the battalions in the first line of an army - or part of them - are f o r c e d b a c k , 'then the Reserve behind should be order'd immediately to a d v a n c e , and e n c o u n t e r the V i c t o r i o u s Enemy, w h o will hardly be able to withstand that fresh charge, for it m a y be almost received as a M a x i m , T h a t a T r o o p , Regiment or Brigade, h o w strong so-ever it be, which hath fought with and beaten that Body of equal number that stood against it, may be easily routed by a T r o o p , R e g i m e n t o r Brigade t h a t has n o t fought, though far inferior in number. If any part o f an A r m y get the Victory o f those w h o stand against it, he w h o c o m m a n d s that part ought to send some T r o o p s in pursuit o f the routed Enemy, and with the rest fall on the flank of the Battallion which stands next him, and yet keeps ground. T h e neglect of this duty lost the famous General, C o u n t Tili, the Battel o f Leipsick [Breitenfeld-Leipzig].'

T w o e x a m p l e s during the English Civil W a r - at Edgehill in 1 6 4 2 a n d Naseby in 1 6 4 5 - show this in practice, where the second lines advanced after parts of the first line were overwhelmed. W h e n the battalions o f the first line were defeated but relieved by the advance o f the second line, the former's officers were expected to try to rally their men behind the second line; 'though rallying at so near a distance is not frequently seen, yet it is n o t banish'd out of the M o d e r n W a r s , or A r m i e s ' .

Command and control C o m m u n i c a t i o n s in this period were t o o slow t o be effective on a battlefield where each c o m m a n d e r sought a possibly fleeting opportunity to exploit the w e a k points in his o p p o n e n t ' s d e p l o y m e n t . T h u s c o n s t r a i n e d , the a r m y c o m m a n d e r had to build his tactical tricks into his initial deployment, so that he could bring his subordinates into play as the o c c a s i o n arose. T h e position of the general himself was at his o w n discretion. Sir J a m e s Turner w r o t e that ' M a n y have reason enough to think that the General himself should stand in the middle o f the Infantry o f the Battel, where he useth t o m a r c h , but that is not constantly p r a c t i s ' d , yea and but seldome in o u r late W a r s , for m a n y times he w h o c o m m a n d s in chief takes his station in the right W i n g o f the

D e f e n c e by infantry against cavalry. F o r m e d infantry armed with a combination of pike a n d musket could w i t h s t a n d cavalry, as t h e pike c o u l d k e e p riders at a d i s t a n c e , and the musket had a longer range and greater penetration t h a n a c a v a l r y m a n ' s pistol. T h e length of t h e cavalryman's l a n c e is e x a g g e r a t e d in t h i s e n g r a v i n g , in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h that of t h e pike.

21

Cavalry; so did the Great King o f Sweden [Gustavus Adolphus] at the first battle o f Leipsick [Breitenfeld], and so did he at Lutzen likewise: So did count Tilly at that same Battel at Leipsick, and so did Banier at W o o d s t o c k [ W i t t s t o c k ] ' . By the second quarter o f the 1 7 t h century a c o m m o n choice for a general w h o did n o t w a n t t o c o m m a n d one o f his cavalry wings w a s t o position himself between his right wing cavalry and his infantry. Apart f r o m the difficulty o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a lengthy battle m e a n t a battlefield shrouded in s m o k e f r o m musketry and artillery. H e r e the general's skill lay in the m a n a g e m e n t o f c h a o s through the tactical possibilities that he had built into his d e p l o y m e n t , the training a n d field m a n o e u v r e s he h a d practised with his army, and his ability to a p p o i n t s u b o r d i n a t e officers t o w h o m he could safely delegate local battlefield authority. T h e impact o f the s m o k e o f battle c a n be seen in a c c o u n t s f r o m b o t h sides at the battle o f Breitenfeld. An Imperialist c o m m a n d e r w r o t e that 'I verily believed that I had defeated my enemy, and that victory w a s o u r s : I n o t k n o w i n g that our left wing was so miserably defeated. And this m i s t a k e was by reason o f the great s m o a k e ; for we could not possibly see a b o u t four paces before us'. O n the Swedish side, the Scottish officer R o b e r t M u n r o wrote that the ' s m o a k e being great, the dust being raised, we were as in a darke cloude, not seeing the halfe o f our actions, much lesse discerning, either the w a y o f our enemies, or yet the rest o f our Briggads: whereupon, having a d r u m m e r by m e , I caused him beate the Scots m a r c h , till it cleared up, w h i c h collected our friends unto us, and dispersed our enemies being o v e r c o m e ' . T h e perspective on the general's position was summarized by O r r e r y : I am fully of the opinion that the greatest Captain that ever was, or will be, is not, or can be, of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders, and lay hold of all Advantages, in an instant, when Armies are once engaged. T h e utmost he can do is choose well the Field of Battel; to draw up his Army according thereunto, to m o s t A d v a n t a g e ; t o give his General Orders, and to give the best Orders wherever he is in Person. But he cannot be Ubiquitary [everywhere at once] n o r send Orders to every place enough to have them obey'd successfully. A n d therefore it is indisputably necessary, that he have under him, expert Chief Officers, at the Head of all Gross Bodies w h o may supply w h a t is impossible for him singly to c o m m a n d ; soe he can be well obey'd but to the time he

THE SWEDISH BRIGADE,

1630

Each s q u a d r o n consisted of a b o u t 500 m e n , t h e

same

T h e S w e d i s h b r i g a d e s y s t e m w a s b a s e d u p o n t h e D u t c h , b u t its

n u m b e r as a D u t c h b a t t a l i o n . In t h e o r y e a c h s q u a d r o n

battlefield d e p l o y m e n t w a s different. This illustration s h o w s t h e

f o r m e d o u t of four infantry c o m p a n i e s , so a four-squadron

similarity w i t h a D u t c h or D a n i s h

brigade deployed

d i a m o n d p a t t e r n s h o w n i n P l a t e B; b u t w h i l e D u t c h

in

the

brigades

was

brigade could be formed from two complete regiments

-

here, a blue-uniformed a n d a yellow-uniformed regiment -

d e p l o y e d their battalions so that e a c h f o r m e d part of t h e t h r e e

since

lines o f infantry, S w e d i s h b r i g a d e s f o u g h t as c o m p l e t e units, a n d

however, some regiments had more than eight companies,

e a c h of their t w o b a t t l e lines w a s f o r m e d f r o m c o m p l e t e s e p a r a t e

and most companies were understrength w h e n on campaign.

brigades. T h e S w e d i s h brigade m i g h t consist of either t h r e e or

Brigades w e r e not permanent formations, and the general's

four

'squadrons'

(battalions); t h e

four-squadron

version

i l l u s t r a t e d h e r e , a f t e r a n e x a m p l e in D r W i l l i a m W a t t s ' The

Discipline

is

Swedish

each

regiment

had

eight

companies.

In

practice,

p r i m a r y c o n c e r n w a s t o f o r m his b a t t l e line w i t h t a c t i c a l units of approximately equal strength.

p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n in 1 6 3 2 . D r W a t t s r e c o r d e d t h a t h e

o b t a i n e d his i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m l o r d R h e e s ' ( D o n a l d M a c K a y , L o r d

I n s e t 1 : M u s k e t e e r s d e p l o y e d in t h r e e r a n k s t o d e l i v e r

R e a y ) , w h o r a i s e d a S c o t s r e g i m e n t w h i c h s e r v e d first in t h e

S w e d i s h 'salvee'.

Danish a r m y a n d w a s t h e n re-trained for S w e d i s h service.

Inset 2: Ensign and pikemen.

the

sends his Troops to the charge: after that, those only w h o lead them, and are with them, can actuate them according to the General Orders, or as the o c c a s i o n requires, which those under him must have the judgement to lay hold of, as it were in the twinkling o f an Eye; so short are the moments to acquire the victory.

Broken-ground fighting

M o u n t e d infantry or d r a g o o n s , c. 1 6 1 6 . D r a g o o n s w e r e u s u a l l y musketeers, and Walhausen's idea of m o u n t i n g p i k e m e n w a s n o t g e n e r a l l y f o l l o w e d . In t h e central detail of w e a p o n s , n o t e t h a t t h e m u s k e t has a sling a t t a c h e d t o t h e left s i d e . T h e o r i g i n o f t h e t e r m d r a g o o n is t r a c e d t o t h e D u t c h dragen

tragen,

or

w h i c h translates as 'to

c a r r y ' . T h e left m a n in t h e b o t t o m p a i r is a d r a g o o n ; t h e o t h e r , w i t h t h e s a d d l e p i s t o l s , is

T h e r e were also occasions when the nature o f the ground was so difficult that the general's plan was inoperable, an example being the first battle of Newbury in 1 6 4 3 during the English Civil War. In this case the Parliament army was intercepted as it marched back to London after relieving the siege of Gloucester, and had no choice over the ground it had to fight over. T h e southern sector of the battlefield was open enough to allow the deployment of infantry and cavalry in the usual way; but the central and northern sectors were broken by enclosures and hedgerows, and the Parliament colonels w h o w r o t e a report on the battle c o m m e n t e d that in the northern sector cavalry 'could not be engaged but in small parties by reason of the hedges'. T h e infantry fighting over enclosed ground fenced by hedgerows were usually musketeers, and one tactic was to take one enclosure that could then be occupied and used to flank the opposing musketeers fighting in the other fields. T h e advantage in this form of fighting (with its pre-echoes of the N o r m a n d y bocage in 1 9 4 4 ) belonged to the more experienced musketeers. Sir J a m e s Turner commented that in 1 6 4 8 , when the Scots army invaded England, he favoured the route through Yorkshire rather than Lancashire 'and for this reason only, that I understood Lancashire was a close country, full o f ditches and hedges, which was a great advantage the English would have over our raw and undisciplined musketeers, the Parliament's army consisting of experienced and well trained sojers and excellent firemen; on the other hand Yorkshire being a more open country and full of heaths, where we might make use of our horse, and c o m e sooner to push of pike'.

an arquebusier.

OUTPOST WARFARE F o r m a l battles, large or small, were only an infrequent part o f campaigning, and the m o s t c o m m o n activity was raiding the quarters o f opposing troops, particularly cavalry - described as 'Beating up Quarters'. George M o n k wrote that 'It is very fit a General should often c o m m a n d his H o r s e and D r a g o o n s 24

to fall upon his Enemies o u t e r m o s t H o r s e - Q u a r t e r s . T h e which is one o f the readiest, easiest and securest ways that I k n o w to break an Enemies Army.' This type o f action was carried out at night or in the early hours o f the morning, and could sometimes involve large n u m b e r s o f m e n ; one such w a s the Parliament c o m m a n d e r Sir W i l l i a m Waller's successful a t t a c k on the winter quarters of a Royalist brigade at A l t o n on 1 3 D e c e m b e r 1 6 4 3 , and another was the unsuccessful a t t a c k on the overnight quarters o f M a j G e n J o h n Lambert's cavalry brigade by Scots cavalry and d r a g o o n s at H a m i l t o n on 3 0 N o v e m b e r 1 6 5 0 . Usually, however, these missions were smaller raids by a few troops of cavalry on a static garrison, or the outlying quarters o f a marching army as it advanced or retreated. T h i s w a s an everyday feature o f military activity, and the o p t i m u m w a y o f carrying out this type o f raid was included in cavalry training m a n u a l s . T h e description in J o h n Cruso's, and that in J o h n Vernon's (which is based on C r u s o ) , described the use o f cavalry only, but it was c o m m o n to support the a t t a c k with musketeers - provided either by d r a g o o n s or by infantry t e m p o r a r i l y m o u n t e d o r riding d o u b l e behind cavalrymen. D r a g o o n s or other musketeers w o u l d be useful in houset o - h o u s e fighting in the e n e m y quarters t h e m s e l v e s , as well as providing firepower support for cavalry actions. Essentially, the a t t a c k e r s ' objective was to cut d o w n the enemy sentries before an alarm could be given and then overrun the corps de gard, w h o 'must be armed all night, and have their horses at hand, readie and bridled'. T h e y would then seek to take control of the 'alarme point' (the area designated for troops in quarters to muster in the case of an a l a r m ) , and any other large open space where the enemy garrison might gather to organize themselves, such as the 'market place'. Cruso described the alarm point as 'that place without [i.e. outside] the village, where the souldiers are t o assemble t o withstand an assailing enemie, being a place of great consequence'. T h e c o m m a n d e r o f the quarter would have given advance instructions in case o f an a t t a c k , and 'appointeth a certain place for every t r o o p , where they shall stand, which w a y faced'. By sending a troop to ride through the streets the attacking cavalry kept

Field artillery p i e c e , 1612: a n illustration f r o m Praissac's

Discours

Militaires.

The Dutch

i n t r o d u c e d l i g h t e r 3-pdr c a n n o n c a l l e d ' d r a k e s ' in t h e 1 6 2 0 s , b u t it w a s t h e S w e d i s h w h o m a d e best use of light guns to a c c o m p a n y their infantry. So-called 'leather' c a n n o n w e r e u s e d briefly during Gustavus Adolphus' c a m p a i g n s in P o l a n d in 1 6 2 7 29; t h e barrel w a s actually m a d e of thin c o p p e r , b o u n d with wire and covered with l e a t h e r , b u t it c o u l d o n l y t a k e a relatively light c h a r g e d u e to t h e risk o f b u r s t i n g . T h e y w e r e soon replaced with more c o n v e n t i o n a l cast-bronze 3-pdr r e g i m e n t a l g u n s .

25

their opponents in small groups, which could then be killed or captured while isolated. Lastly, when the surprised occupiers gave up the struggle and sought to escape, a t r o o p waiting outside the quarters would intercept them. T h e objective of the defending c o m m a n d e r was to slow down the attack at all costs with his corps de gard and any other men he could get together quickly, in order to give the bulk of his force a chance to arm and organize themselves to resist the attack en masse rather than in isolated handfuls.

T H E

SPANISH

A R M Y

In the 1 5 9 0 s the Spanish had the leading army of their day, feared for its proven competence in a wide range of military theatres. T h e Spanish army saw service in Italy against the French and their Swiss mercenaries and Italian allies; in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , against the O t t o m a n Turkish empire and N o r t h African corsairs; in the L o w Countries against Protestant rebels; in France in support of the Catholic League, and in the Americas. T h e army was Spanish in the sense that it was the army of the King of Spain, but was multinational in composition and was f o r m e d o f national contingents. Its strength was in its infantry Spanish or Italian tercios, and G e r m a n regiments. Infantry formations had evolved during the 15th and 16th centuries into an effective and aggressive force on the battlefield, and they were the key tactical component during the Eighty Years' W a r in the L o w Countries. Whilst any Renaissance c o m m a n d e r was naturally interested in the classics, and m a n y were well-educated men w h o would be flattered to be compared with the great generals o f antiquity, m o s t felt that they had a w o r k a b l e system already, and it would take something exceptional to persuade them to change. T h e body o f Spanish military literature of the 1 5 8 0 s - 9 0 s shows an evolving system o f b o t h t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e , respectful o f classical precedent but confident in its fitness for m o d e r n w a r f a r e . Renaissance c o m m a n d e r s also saw themselves as being at the cutting edge of modern ideas through their use of arithmetic and, to some extent, geometry in the f o r m a t i o n o f their tactical units. T h e 1 6 t h century saw advances in f o r m s o f fortification using m a t h e m a t i c s to calculate frontages and angles of fire; to an extent this spilt over into tactical infantry f o r m a t i o n s , through a view that a large infantry f o r m a t i o n was c o m p a r a b l e to a moving fortress, with walls o f m e n instead o f stone and with outlying bodies of shot in place o f bastions. T h i s interest in m a t h e m a t i c s led to the inclusion of mathematical tables in military b o o k s , to enable the officer to calculate the frontage which particular numbers and depths o f soldiers would require and thus the ground t h a t they c o u l d h o l d . In their simplest f o r m these are genuinely useful; at w o r s t , the tables b e c o m e an end in themselves and the calculations become overly c o m p l e x and impractical. T h e key officer responsible for c o m b i n i n g companies and tercios into tactical units was the Sergento Mayor or sergeant-major, in our period a senior commissioned officer and second in c o m m a n d in a tercio after the Maestre de Campo, whose role was particularly described in Francisco de Valdes' work 1

OPPOSITE TOP S p a n i s h infantry of t h e 1570s: detail f r o m a collection of engravings of t h e D u t c h revolt p u b l i s h e d in A m s t e r d a m in 1 6 2 2 . OPPOSITE

BOTTOM

Don Fernando Alvarez d e Toledo, D u k e of Alva (1510-82), t h e first C a p t a i n - G e n e r a l o f t h e S p a n i s h A r m y o f F l a n d e r s in 1567-73. A n extremely able a n d d e t e r m i n e d g e n e r a l in Germany under the Emperor C h a r l e s V a n d in Italy u n d e r his s o n P h i l i p II o f S p a i n , h e b e c a m e i n f a m o u s for t h e b r u t a l i t y o f his s u p p r e s s i o n o f t h e D u t c h rebels, b u t w a s finally unable to quell the coastal raiding of t h e 'Sea Beggars'.

26

1 Key works were Francisco de Valdes' Espeio, y deceplina militar (Brussels, 1589); Sancho Londono's El discurso sobre la forma de redvzir la disciplina military (Brussels, 1589); Marcos Isaba's Cuerpo enfermo de la milicia Espanola (Madrid, 1 5 9 4 ) ; and Bernardino de Mendoza's Theorica y practica de Guerra (Madrid, 1 5 9 5 ) .

Espeio, y deceplena militar. This was a technically difficult exercise; R o b e r t Barret, an English officer w h o had served in the Spanish army, wrote in his b o o k The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres ( 1 5 9 8 ) that this task required an officer w h o was 'very skilfull in Arithmetike, for without the same, 1 could hardly perform his office: and n o t onely to k n o w h o w embattle the c o m p a n i e s o f his o w n e Regiment, but of many Regiments together and of any n u m b e r : for that m a n y times the Generall doth c o m m a n d to frame a battell [single formation] of sundry Regiments together'. T h e Spanish tactical unit for infantry was a large, deep body o f pikemen with 'sleeves' o f musketeers on each side, which could include advanced horns on either side or separate bodies of shot at all four corners. During the later 1 6 t h century the introduction o f a heavy musket temporarily reduced the overall number of shot, as it was a far deadlier w e a p o n ; but the overall trend was for a steady increase in the number of shot, so by 1 6 0 1 a muster o f Spanish tercios in the Army of Flanders listed 1 , 2 3 7 musketeers and 2 , 1 1 7 arquebusiers [men with lighter firearms] 1 , 0 4 7 armoured pikemen and 9 5 4 other pikemen. 27

ABOVE Spanish a r m y at t h e taking of M e c h l i n o n 17 S e p t e m b e r 1 5 7 2 , t h e occasion of infamous atrocities against t h e townspeople. Note the s q u a d r o n s o f c a v a l r y ( l o w left, high centre, l o w right); a n d (far r i g h t ) , t h e a r q u e b u s i e r s / c a l i v e r m e n s k i r m i s h i n g in loose formation. (By permission of t h e W a r d e n a n d Fellows of All S o u l s C o l l e g e , O x f o r d )

OPPOSITE TOP A n o t h e r rare i m a g e of infantry d e p l o y e d in l o o s e f o r m a t i o n - a

la disbandada.

The engraving

s e e m s to give an impression of u n e v e n g r o u n d rolling u p into w o o d l a n d , w h i c h is l o g i c a l : t h e w e a k n e s s of such skirmishers was that they had no defence against cavalry, a n d t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y v i e w t h a t m e n in such loose order could be cut t o p i e c e s if c a u g h t o n o p e n g r o u n d w a s entirely accurate.

28

G e r m a n infantry in Spanish service were f o r m e d in regiments with a theoretical strength o f ten c o m p a n i e s o f 3 0 0 m e n each, half pike and half shot. Spanish c o m m a n d e r s n o w considered that firepower from infantry shot and artillery was the battle-winning w e a p o n . D o n Bernardino de M e n d o z a w r o t e in his Theortica y Practica de Guerra (published in M a d r i d in 1 5 9 5 , and translated into English in 1 5 9 7 ) that 'the greatest parte of victories which is gained at this time, is by having obteyned them with artillerie or readiness o f harquebuserie by their livelie voleyes, disorderinge the squadrons of the enimie in such m a n n e r as they put them in r o w t e ' . However, the Spanish still considered that a c o m b i n a t i o n o f shot and pike was necessary for an effective battlefield unit; G e r a t Barry, an Irish officer in Spanish service, wrote in the 1 6 3 0 s that 'the armed [armoured] pike is the strength o f the battell [battle f o r m a t i o n ] , so w i t h o u t question, is the shot the furie o f the field: but the one w i t h o u t the other is w e a k e n e d , the better halfe o f their strength'.

The infantry formation By the 1 5 9 0 s t w o main types o f tactical infantry formation were in use: the square, and the oblong with a broader front than its depth, sometimes called a bastard square. T h e selection of one or the other depended upon circumstance; they were 'both sufficient strong, but the difference which may happen, is to be judged according to the situation and disposition of the ground, and occasions to fight'. It was believed that the 'square of men would be best, as in open field, without advantage of hedge, ditch, water, marsh or wood, or whether the enemie is strong in horse, to charge on every side: the which the just square of men, in everie part is found to be equally strong, and apt every way to receive the charge'. W h e r e the natural advantages of the ground favoured the Spanish,

'it were better to fight in broad front, for that thereby, many hands do c o m e to fight at once'. W h e n attacked by cavalry, the intention was for the shot to be protected by the length of the pikes, and 'the right and natural girdelinge of shott indeede ought to be no m o r e shott in r a n k e , then that the pike may well cover and defende', this being 'three or four shott at the m o s t ' . W h e r e the n u m b e r o f shot was greater than could easily be protected by the pike the tactic was t o form a h o l l o w square or o b l o n g , with three or four ranks of shot outside and protected by the pike and the surplus shot brought inside the square.

S Q U

A R E

M_l

i

it

$

M

i

i

M

i

fen r •p

i

p u b l i s h e d in B r u s s e l s

in 1634. N o t e t h e d e e p f o r m a t i o n s . ( B y p e r m i s s i o n T h e British L i b r a r y )

4

F r o n t e o f t h e t h i r d e Battell.

in a n i l l u s t r a t i o n f r o m t h e Irish c a p t a i n G e r a t B a r r y ' s

Discipline

M

\1£

D e p l o y m e n t of t h r e e S p a n i s h infantry 'battells',

of Military

M E N . F r o n t e o f t h e fidle Battel!.

An infantry battle f o r m a t i o n w a s formed out o f several c o m p a n i e s which could be f r o m one or f r o m

A Discourse

O F

F r o n t e o f the feconde Battel],

'4

> *

it 29

several tercios - by first deciding upon the depth o f the f o r m a t i o n , then separating the companies into Frontt ofthefirfitBattell. Front e ofthefeconde Battell. c o n t i n g e n t s o f shot and pikemen. •MimiOTamnrnmmrammiii m mmmro mmmmmmm HimmmninunnuTuJimiimiminmmmninimmiruraruiim T h e central b o d y w a s created by inmaimirmunmnunninuninnunmnr.njmnimiinTuiunm mmm p p p p p p . p P P P P P P p P P P P P P P mmm «r.mm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P P P mmm forming up the pikemen o f the first -mmt» p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P p p p p p p mram mmm p p p p p p p P P P P P P P P P P P P P P mmm tnaim ppi'KK r r ffYfvrr r r r r r i mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P P P P mmm c o m p a n y t o the required depth, mmm P P P P P P P p p P P P P P P P P P P P mrmr p p p p p p p P P P P P P P P P P P P P P mmm m m m p p P P p P P P P P P PPP P P P P P P mmm p p p p p p P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P mmm rammPppPPP P P P P P PPP P P P P P P P """"* and then f o r m i n g each successive mmm p p p p p p p P P P P P P P P P P P P P P mmm m i n m P p p P P P P PPPP PPP P P P P P P P mmm p p p p p p p P P P P P P P P P P P P P P mmm n m u n p r F P f P P P P P P P P P P P P P P PP M m tnmmm m n w ir m ai mmtr mmm mmmmmmtnm mnimiinnmmmmni mmmmnimminnunmmn Jrurinim c o m p a n y alongside it; this ensured mmm.nmmmn mmm arainmmmn mluunmnimmm ijiromnunmmnuwnrruramwmunniininfmiimininnMn t h a t m e n o f the same c o m p a n y Frontt ofthe th'trdt Battell. c o n t i n u e d t o serve together, with mmmmiruTi^mmmmmirm nm m Wtanunm m mmma the best-equipped men in each vsxca fntiiiiinininAnif niunti m miv ?nrnrrirnnifnxiin>iru] *.mit PPPPPPP PPPPPPP PPPPPPpmmn « PPPPPP P P P P P P P P pppppppmmir. c o m p a n y a t the head o f the files, mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P pp"mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm P p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P ps> mmm and it p r o b a b l y h a d its origins mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P P P mmm in Swiss p r a c t i c e . T h e Spanish mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmmmmmrammminiwmimnmmniuumursnmmri developed w o r k a b l e processes t o mmmmmmmmmmmaiinm deliver infantry firepower, although Frontt ofthefifiheBattell. Fronte ofthefourth Battell. the depth o f the 'sleeves' o f shot minnuiuniTimmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmrammrnir alongside their pike w a s still rtuTttiTOmiimTmifmimmmnTminmmiJui mmmmiiimm rommpppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm m m m p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mam p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm w a s t e f u l . O n e t a c t i c described by mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm rommppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm nunra p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm m*m p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mirm the English officer R o b e r t Barret rommppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm rommppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm was t o use small d e t a c h m e n t s o r mmmp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm rommppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm mmm p p p p p p p p p p p P P P P P PPPPP mmm m m m p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p mmm 'sundrie troupes o f 3 0 , 4 0 or 5 0 in twvmun trunnii^mjrinuiminiraimimimmmmmmmnun mmn tnrmiwMTUtwiHnnunnioMiiiutttnnuiunmmmmm mmimjmmaimmmmmmmmmmmmmmfnmm^mn^ a t r o u p e , the one t o second the other,' and to fire volleys - 'another Table of thefive Batteles. order o f discharging o f troupes o f Divifiones of the firfte Batteli: Firfte divifion is 9 . r. of 7 . pikes. — — £ 3 pikes. Seconde divifion. Idem. —• »• • • 63 pikes. M u s k e t s in vollie, the which I have 1 hethirdedivifion. Al(be. ,, ..i. . , 63 pikes. seen used b y the Italian and the 1 8 5 pikes. Multiplied by five. Spaniard'. Sir J o h n Smythe, another 9 4 $ pikes. 1 0 8 0 musk.

, n m m

m r o t n

n

,

m

m

n m n l

Pi kes of the five Bat teles. — Limnge shottof the nghte flankeohhe firfte battell of pikes, y. rankes of rausketesin i . i ; h i r . i n k 3 , * — — — . Lininge shot of the licft flank 9-r.of ^.musketes— Liningh shot of the front zS.r.of 3.01.111 each ranke. Guarnifionof shot of the reregarde 2 8.r-of j.musketes; —

9 4 r pikes. zy musk. 2 7 musk" 9 4 f 1 8 t m u s k . > i o 8 o pikes. 8imusk.S

2

0

Z

A n o t h e r illustration f r o m Barry's book, s h o w i n g five S p a n i s h 'battells'. N o t e t h e shallower

jmen.

f o r m a t i o n s h e r e ; t h e m u s k e t e e r s are in three-deep d e p l o y m e n t , a n d t h e central pike

ri
Multiplied by

b l o c k o f e a c h ' b a t t e l l ' is m a d e u p o f t h r e e

Lininge shottof the j-, battelles.

' d i v i s i o n s ' e a c h of s e v e n files o f n i n e ranks o f p i k e m e n , t o t a l l i n g 189 p i k e t o 2 1 6 s h o t .

Advertiiinge that no pikes nor shot did rernaine oute of the divifiones to guarnishe the culoures, tothatoncrankeofpikesandshottmaybycuKaiUlongcfte, thefronteor flanks o f each c a d battel/ to

S W E D I S H F O R M A T I O N AT P F A F F E N H O F E N , 1 6 3 3 T h i s p l a t e is b a s e d o n a c o n t e m p o r a r y e n g r a v i n g f r o m

Europaeum,

Theatrum

s h o w i n g t h e d e p l o y m e n t of a mainly G e r m a n a r m y

( B y p e r m i s s i o n T h e British Library)

f o r w a r d i n t o t h e s e i n t e r v a l s (C); all t h r e e o f t h e m i l i t a r y styles of t h e d a y - D u t c h , S w e d i s h , a n d t h e later c o m p o s i t e -

German

included the option o f placing s o m e cavalry t o provide

c o m m a n d e d by t h e S w e d i s h general Gustav Horn at t h e battle

direct

o f P f a f f e n h o f e n o n 10 A u g u s t 1 6 3 3 , d u r i n g t h e T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r ,

d e p l o y m e n t s h o w s five s q u a d r o n s o n t h e right w i n g of t h e

support

t o t h e infantry

lines.

T h e main

cavalry

against a n Imperialist a r m y c o m m a n d e d by Charles of Lorraine.

infantry

T h e d e p l o y m e n t s h o w s t h a t in 1633, t h e y e a r after t h e d e a t h o f

cavalry, w i t h t h o s e in t h e s e c o n d line c o v e r i n g t h e intervals.

Gustavus Adolphus atLutzen, Swedish commanders

retained

t h e S w e d i s h b r i g a d e f o r m a t i o n for their infantry.

his

and

four

N o t e t h e plottons

o n the

left; e a c h

wing

has t w o

lines o f

of ' c o m m a n d e d musketeers', detached from

the infantry brigades t o provide the troopers with

firepower

H o r n d r e w u p his infantry in five b r i g a d e s , w i t h t h r e e in

s u p p o r t (c, m , c, m , c ) - a S w e d i s h t a c t i c t h a t later f i g u r e d i n

first

t h e c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style of d e p l o y m e n t .

line, a n d

two

in t h es e c o n d

placed

to cover t h e

i n t e r v a l s b e t w e e n t h o s e in t h e first. T w o s q u a d r o n s o f c a v a l r y

Inset 1 :German mercenary

d e p l o y e d in d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f t h e i n f a n t r y h a v e b e e n

Inset 2: Swedish

brought

field

cavalry.

artillery c r e w .

E n g l i s h m a n w h o h a d served with the Spanish army, recorded the Spanish practice o f sending out skirmishing musketeers to draw enemy fire, the main body 'keeping the force o f their shot, m a y give their whole volleys at their enemies a p p r o a c h i n g within 1 0 , 1 5 or 2 0 paces'.

Cavalry Spanish c a v a l r y were n o t e x c e p t i o n a l , and G e r m a n m e r c e n a r y horse pistol-armed heavy cavalry Reiters - were hired to strengthen this arm. T h e m a i n battle cavalry in the 1 5 9 0 s were lancers and pistoliers, both wearing heavy defensive armour, the latter having originated in G e r m a n y through the availability o f effective wheel-lock pistols. T h e tactical formations of the t w o types were different. Like their medieval predecessors the lancers charged in line - en haye - while pistoliers, w h o s e tactic was to deliver successive volleys o f fire r a n k by r a n k , were f o r m e d in deeper c o l u m n s . However, experiments to develop the potential of cavalry in the 1 5 9 0 s were led by the French Huguenot (Protestant) armies, w h o used a combination of heavy pistoliers with lighter mounted arquebusiers to provide firepower support. By the battle o f Ivry in 1 5 9 0 the Huguenot army - n o w the royal army of King Henri I V - had abandoned the lance. T h e lighter-armed Huguenot cavalry were the result of a comparative lack of funds; since many of his supporters came from amongst the impoverished lesser French nobility, Henri of Navarre had been forced to wage war - as he said - a la Huguenotte - on the cheap'. An example was Jacques Pape, Sieur de Saint-Aubin, w h o wrote in his memoirs that 'I had in truth a good Arabian horse that served me very well, but I was much at a disadvantage in my weapons, having only a mere cuirass'. Huguenot armies were also particularly noted for the strategic use they made of the mobility o f their cavalry forces, including the mounted arquebusiers w h o fought in support of the main battle cavalry, both on horseback and dismounted to provide infantry firepower support. In Henri's armies there were more mounted arquebusiers - sometimes referred to as carabins - than heavy battle cavalry.

T H E

D U T C H

R E F O R M S

Prince M a u r i c e ' s reform o f the D u t c h army represented a radical change in terms o f the deployment of an army as a whole; in the structuring of tactical formations from a larger number of co-ordinated units; and in the introduction o f m o r e effective infantry firing systems. There was no change in the nature of the weapons and a r m o u r used to equip infantry - as pikemen, arquebusiers and musketeers - but new, standardized patterns were introduced for the Dutch army in 1 5 9 9 . T h e concept o f increased standardization or uniformity runs right through the D u t c h reforms, whether for military equipment or the orders given for unit manoeuvres - thus Henry H e x h a m , an English officer in Dutch service: ' H o w carefull and industrious Prince M a u r i c e was of famous memory (the Father of Souldiers) to establish an uniforme order and Discipline amongst us'. F o r admirers like H e x h a m , Prince M a u r i c e was the author of significant change, and his victory over the Spanish A r m y o f Flanders at Nieupoort in 1 6 0 0 provided the p r o o f that the new Dutch system could n o w contend against the leading army its day, and win. Maurice's reforms were not limited to his field army and its tactics, but also focused on siege warfare. His contribution here, t o o , was to bring a greater degree o f pragmatism, organization and uniformity to the whole exercise.

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M a u r i c e was n o t the sole author o f the military changes he introduced, but his position as Stadtholder and military leader o f the rebel United Provinces provided the authority for the systematic introduction and practice of new ideas. As already stated, there had been increased interest throughout the 16th century in the potential offered by the R o m a n art o f w a r described in translations of surviving texts, particularly Flavius Vegetius' De re Militari and Sextus Julius Frontinus' Strategemata, as well as R o m a n histories such as those by Julius Caesar, Livy and Polybius. N i c c o l o Macchiavelli, in particular, had taken this a step further by linking classical examples with his o w n ideas on c o n t e m p o r a r y w a r f a r e and politics in his Libra della arte della Guerra (Florence, 1 5 2 1 ) . T h e increased effectiveness o f infantry firepower m a d e the 1 5 9 0 s a very different w o r l d f r o m M a c h i a v e l l i ' s o f 7 0 years b e f o r e , but Machiavelli remained p o p u l a r reading and h a d a p r o f o u n d influence on another philosopher, Justus Lipsius, professor at the University o f Leiden between 1 5 7 9 and 1 5 9 1 . Lipsius' perspective on R o m a n e x a m p l e s w a s published in his De Militia Romana libri quinque, Commentarius ad Polybium (Antwerp, 1 5 9 5 ) , but they would already have been familiar to his students and his correspondents. T h e r e are strong c o m p a r i s o n s between the positions o f M a c h i a v e l l i and Justus Lipsius, b o t h o f w h o m were writing at times w h e n the security o f their states was threatened by w a r with Spain. B o t h see parallels between the massive infantry f o r m a t i o n s o f their day and the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x o f the classical past, and their reading o f Livy suggested the opportunities that more manoeuvrable R o m a n maniples might offer. J o h n B i n g h a m translates Justus Lipsius as writing 'for as Livy saith, the Phalange is u n m o v a b l e and o f

Dutch battle plans: t h e t w o t y p e s of a r m y d e p l o y m e n t often used by Prince

most

Maurice

f r o m c. 1610 - t h e V a n g u a r d , B a t t l e a n d R e a r g u a r d in l i n e o f diamond-shaped

brigades

(top);

a n d in t h e w e d g e . The most c o m m o n of 17th-century

form

battlefield

notation of units w a s a blank o b l o n g for infantry a n d

one

s h a d e d w i t h vertical lines for cavalry. Originally a D u t c h n o t a t i o n , its u s e

spread

throughout Western

Europe,

t o C a t h o l i c as w e l l as

Protestant

a r m i e s . ( T h e r e is a n e x a m p l e the Scottish

G e n e r a l , Sir J a m e s

Lumsden,

using this notation

during

t h e English Civil W a r . ) c o n s i s t e n c y , all

For

re-drawn

black a n d w h i t e battle in t h i s b o o k u s e t h i s w i t h 'P' a n d ' M ' for and

of

Sergeant-Major

plans

notation, pikemen

musketeers.

33

one kinde, the R o m a n battell consisting o f m a n y parts, easie to be divided, easie to be joined and knit together, if use require'. Justus Lipsius recommended the triplex acies formation of three lines o f infantry units as his model, using either cohorts or maniples as the units 'so placed one to second a n o t h e r ' . But like Machiavelli before him, Justus Lipsius failed to include the basic operating instructions necessary to bring the theory into practice, and neither did he fully appreciate the difference in firepower i m p a c t between classical slingers or archers and modern firearms. However, Prince M a u r i c e and his circle were very much aware o f the value o f infantry firepower, and the D u t c h a r m y reforms introduced a series of new firing systems. 2

The Dutch battalion T h e cornerstone of the new Dutch tactical formation was its infantry battalion, with a reduced depth of ten ranks. T h e Dutch used the terms 'battalion' and 'division' to refer to a battalion at this time, but 'division' was used by different military writers of the period to refer to different types and sizes of units. T h e term battalion had been in use since the early 16th century - for example, in 1 5 2 1 Macchiavelli had described ten sub-units of 4 5 0 men each as battagloni. For the sake of clarity, 'battalion' is used in this present b o o k to refer to a battlefield unit, and the term 'division' is used for a sub-unit within an infantry company consisting of three to six files all armed alike as pikemen or musketeers. As in the Spanish army, the D u t c h battlefield units consisted o f infantrymen armed either as pike or shot - the latter either arquebusiers/calivermen, or musketeers with heavier weapons requiring a musket-rest to prop them in the aiming position; the caliver was withdrawn from Dutch service in 1 6 0 9 , and thereafter the Dutch shot were all musketeers. The first formal demonstration of the Dutch battalions deployed in a tactical formation was at Steenwijk following the capture of that city in 1 5 9 2 , but since this was a very public demonstration the training and practice to achieve it must have been carried out over several previous years. O n that occasion seven battalions of Dutch infantry were deployed for a parade in a c h e q u e r b o a r d formation, with the units in the second line covering the spaces between the units in the first. By 1 6 1 0 (when the Dutch army's practice deployments during the Julich campaign were widely publicized), its battalions c o m m o n l y served in 2 See Elite 172: Roman

Battle Tactics 390-110

ENGLISH ROYALIST FORMATION EDGEHILL,

BC

AT

battalions, rather t h a n t h e three w h i c h King Gustavus A d o l p h u s

1642

u s e d at t h e battles of Breitenfeld a n d Liitzen a n d w h i c h

Horn

T h i s p l a t e is b a s e d o n a m a n u s c r i p t d r a w i n g b y S i r B e r n a r d d e

used at Pfaffenhofen (see Plate D). Dr W i l l i a m W a t t s illustrated

G o m m e , a W a l l o o n e n g i n e e r o f f i c e r o n P r i n c e R u p e r t ' s staff,

t h i s f o u r - s q u a d r o n v e r s i o n i n h i s b o o k The Swedish

which

in 1 6 4 2 h e w a s P r i n c e R u p e r t ' s c h a p l a i n , a c c o m p a n y i n g

is a

more

carefully

drawn

version

of t h e

original

Discipline; him

' h e a d q u a r t e r s plan' for t h e a r m y ' s d e p l o y m e n t . T h e original

i n 'all t h e b a t t l e s w h i c h h e f o u g h t w i t h t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ' .

version w o u l d have b e e n the rough sketch circulated a m o n g s t

T h e c o m m a n d e d musketeers w h i c h f o r m part of this b r i g a d e

senior officers d o w n t o b r i g a d e level b e f o r e t h e battle

structure h a v e b e e n d e t a c h e d for service o n t h e flanks of t h e

on

a r m y , a n d a r e n o t s h o w n . T h e c a v a l r y ( c ) is d e p l o y e d i n t w o

22 O c t o b e r 1642. T h e R o y a l i s t i n f a n t r y h a d o r i g i n a l l y b e e n t r a i n e d in t h e

lines, w i t h s q u a d r o n s in t h e s e c o n d r a n k c o v e r i n g t h e s p a c e s

D u t c h style, b u t P r i n c e R u p e r t p e r s u a d e d his u n c l e K i n g C h a r l e s

between

I to

m u s k e t e e r s in i m m e d i a t e s u p p o r t o f t h e c a v a l r y s q u a d r o n s .

adopt

the

Swedish

deployment

illustrated

here.

The

those

in t h e first, b u t t h e r e a r e

no

commanded

i n f a n t r y h a v e b e e n d e p l o y e d in f i v e b r i g a d e s , t h r e e in t h e first

N o t e the vestigal 'reserve' of horse a n d shot.

l i n e a n d t w o i n t h e s e c o n d l i n e c o v e r i n g t h e i n t e r v a l s i n t h e first.

T o p : Royalist c a v a l r y , d r a w n u p in t h r e e ranks; t h e riders w i t h t h e

The

b e s t e q u i p m e n t w o u l d t a k e t h e i r p l a c e s in t h e first t w o r a n k s .

brigades themselves

each

consist of four

squadrons/

pairs, each battalion having an optimum strength of 5 0 0 men, half pikemen and half musketeers. T h e rationale of the Dutch system was set out in Hexham's The Principles of the Art Militarie as 'the ordering of a R e g i m e n t . . . namely, that Companies being made into even files, & ten deepe, foure or five Companies, ioyned together m a k e a division . . . . N o w the fittest number of men to make a division of, is accounted to be 5 0 0 . Pikes, & Musketteires, that is, 2 5 files of Pikes, and 2 5 files of Musketteires, or more, or lesse of the one or o f the other, as they fall out.' It must be understood that the Dutch battalion was a tactical battlefield formation, not an administrative element o f a regiment. In his optimum example, Hexham's Dutch regiment would provide the men for both of a pair of battalions. In practice, however, Dutch regiments did not all have the same strength either in terms of the number of companies in a regiment or the number o f men in a company, and under campaign conditions strengths would vary still further. O n campaign weaker regiments might only have sufficient men to form one of the paired tactical battalions, or in extreme cases it might be necessary to form two or m o r e weak regiments into a single battalion. T h e concept of paired battalions was retained for the battle formation, since it was the requirements of the overall formation that were dominant.

The company T h e unit of administrative organization was a regiment, comprising several companies; the c o m p a n y was purely an administrative entity, since it was t o o small to fight independently. A single regiment might be deployed as a single fighting battalion or divided into t w o battalions, but the d o m i n a n t battlefield f o r m a t i o n was the battalion n o t the regiment. However, it w a s recognized that the sense o f distinct identity that b o n d e d soldiers serving together in a particular c o m p a n y and living alongside one a n o t h e r in c a m p and on campaign was a valuable quality that should be preserved. T h e relationship between companies and battlefield units in the D u t c h army w o r k e d on the same principle as in the Spanish, although D u t c h companies and tactical units were smaller. In each case, the pike and shot o f each c o m p a n y were separated, and then collectively formed into the battlefield units - battalions in the D u t c h army - which would fight with a centre o f pikemen flanked by shot on both sides. T h e sub-unit of a D u t c h c o m p a n y was a 'division' o f three to six files, armed alike as either pike or shot, with each file being ten deep, and even a w e a k c o m p a n y could usually muster this m a n y soldiers. T h e s e divisions remained intact when they were c o m b i n e d to f o r m the tactical battalion, thus ensuring that men from the same c o m p a n y fought alongside one another. Where a strong regiment was divided into t w o battalions, companies were allocated to one battalion or a n o t h e r on the basis o f the seniority o f the company c o m m a n d e r - so the colonel's and the sergeant-major's companies would be included in the right-hand battalion of the t w o , and the lieutenantcolonel's and first (senior) captain's companies would be amongst those forming the left-hand battalion. T h e allocation of the other captains' companies to the different battalions varied, but the overall principle was to spread the m o r e senior - and thus probably more experienced - officers between both battalions rather than concentrating them in one or the other. T h e actual process of forming a battalion out o f several c o m p a n i e s was straightforward, and would be carried out by the regiment's s e r g e a n t - m a j o r or, if m o r e than one regiment was to f o r m a single battalion, by the sergeantm a j o r appointed by the officer c o m m a n d i n g the b a t t a l i o n . T h e S c o t t i s h mercenary officer Turner w r o t e that this process ' m a y be done with m u c h ease, and a few w o r d s , if the M a j o r please; but some have the vanity to m a k e themselves and their soldiers m o r e business than they need to by crying this and that, riding here and there, m a k i n g w o r k for themselves, and sometimes sport to the Beholders'. Essentially, the s e r g e a n t - m a j o r w o u l d use one o f t w o methods, both beginning with drawing up the c o m p a n i e s that were t o f o r m the battalion in a single line alongside one another. T h e first m e t h o d was to order all the groups o f pikemen to advance a b o u t 2 0 p a c e s , and then join them together to form the centre o f the battalion, the musketeers then being divided to form the t w o wings. T h e second m e t h o d w o u l d be used if there was no r o o m to advance the p i k e m e n , in w h i c h case the pike f r o m the companies would turn to face t o w a r d s the centre and then m a r c h t o w a r d s that central point to f o r m the pike body, and the shot w o u l d face outwards t o w a r d s the right or left flank to w h i c h they w e r e a l l o c a t e d , a n d m a r c h outwards to form the musketeer wings o f the battalion. In describing the advantages o f the D u t c h b a t t a l i o n s over the larger Spanish infantry f o r m a t i o n s , H e x h a m w r o t e that ' T h i s n u m b e r [ 5 0 0 men t o a battalion] being so e m b a t t a i l e d m a k e s an Agile b o d i e , & the best to be brought to fight, and t w o o f them being ioyned neere one an other, c a n best second, and releive each other, better then your great Phalanges, which are

OPPOSITE Musketeer a n d pike postures f r o m t h e 1608 s e c o n d e d i t i o n of J a c o b d e G h e y n ' s influential a n d w i d e l y c o p i e d The

ofArmes

Exercise

- t h e first i l l u s t r a t e d

weapons-training manual, published t h e previous year. T h e purpose w a s to establish a u n i f o r m set of m o v e m e n t s or 'postures' for l o a d i n g a n d firing a m u s k e t or h a n d l i n g a pike, so that speed would improve t h r o u g h constant practice of t h e s a m e drills.

D u t c h s y s t e m for t w o 'divisions' of m u s k e t e e r s firing by successive ranks. T h e practice w a s to s e n d f o r w a r d t w o ranks, h a v e t h e m fire o n e after t h e other, a n d retire t o t h e rear d o w n the lane b e t w e e n the five-file d i v i s i o n s t o r e j o i n t h e back of t h e formation to reload, w h i l e t h e next t w o m a r c h e d f o r w a r d . ( S e e a l s o P l a t e A.)

* » * * *

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37

French infantry formation, 1628: detail f r o m J a c q u e s Callot's e n g r a v i n g of t h e siege o f La R o c h e l l e . T h i s s h o w s t w o b o d i e s o f F r e n c h i n f a n t r y in diamond-pattern formations an indication of D u t c h influence. (By permission T h e British Library)

38

unweeldy bodies, the experience whereof was seene in the Battell of Nieuport: for being once b r o k e n , & routed, they can hardly be reallyed [rallied] againe, a n d c a n n o t bring so m a n y m e n t o Fight, as the Lesser Bodies d o e . ' T h e c o m p a r i s o n w h i c h H e x h a m drew had a direct relation to Livy's description o f the defeat o f the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x by smaller R o m a n units at the battle o f Pydna, and this was intended to be evident to any c o n t e m p o r a r y reader. T h i s type o f parallel was deliberately and extensively publicized by the Dutch, including by their parades o f battalions in battle f o r m a t i o n . T h e intention w a s t o underline the c o m p a r i s o n o f D u t c h battalions with R o m a n cohorts and the D u t c h a r m y deployments with the R o m a n triplex acies, in order to reinforce the view that the Prince Maurice's army had successfully cracked the p r o b l e m o f interpreting classical military practice for a modern world, and was therefore a dangerous o p p o n e n t and a useful ally.

French musketeer, from t h e S i e u r d e L o s t e l n a u ' s Le

Marechal

de Bataille

published

in P a r i s in 1 6 4 7 . T h e p o s t u r e s are based on J a c o b d e Gheyn's m u c h earlier m a n u a l , b u t t h e soldiers w e a r current F r e n c h military c o s t u m e .

The Dutch firing system T h e D u t c h were able to use m u c h m o r e effective firing systems t h a t the Spanish for t w o r e a s o n s . Firstly, the m a i n b o d y o f their shot, f o r m e d o n the wings of their central pike b l o c k , was drawn up in a broader, shallower formation than their opponents, so if equal numbers of shot were opposed the D u t c h could bring m o r e m e n i n t o the firing line. Secondly, the D u t c h developed a much better organized firing system, w h e r e b y each r a n k fired successively and then retired to the rear o f the musketeer body to reload; by the time all ten ranks had fired the men w h o had originally been in the first rank had reloaded and were ready to fire again. This rank-firing system could be used while holding ground, advancing, or retiring in the face o f the enemy. Although a m u s k e t ball w o u l d c a r r y a lot further, the effective killing range for musket fire w a s considered to be a r o u n d 1 0 0 to 1 2 0 yards, and 39

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Port of the Principles Art Militarie Wanes

Practised

of the United

Second

of the in the Provinces;

t h e e n g r a v e r ' s s i g n a t u r e is d a t e d 1 6 3 8 . T h e p l a n is f o r a n a r m y of 24,000 infantry d e p l o y e d in t h r e e b r i g a d e s , a n d 6,000 c a v a l r y . T h i s formation places each of three infantry brigades in a s e p a r a t e b a t t l e l i n e .

c o n c e n t r a t e d fire w o u l d begin at this range. T h e D u t c h firing system used t w o main patterns, b o t h providing fire rank by r a n k . O n e o f these employed the c o u n t e r m a r c h , whereby each musketeer fired, then turned to his right and m a r c h e d d o w n the interval b e t w e e n the files to the rear o f the c o l u m n . A l t h o u g h this classical drill, modified f r o m Aelian's Tactica, was certainly practiced, the D u t c h preferred an alternative system based on the divisions of the c o m p a n y - groups o f three t o six files. T h i s involved the first rank firing, then facing right a n d m a r c h i n g t o the rear d o w n the intervals between divisions instead o f the intervals between individual files (see Plate A ) . Based partly upon the existing cavalry practice of firing by caracole, this had the advantage that the width o f the frontage remained the same, whereas in order t o c o u n t e r m a r c h by files the f r o n t a g e h a d t o be doubled t o provide lanes between individual files. T h i s second system was certainly in use by 1 6 1 7 , as it is s h o w n in the m a n u a l Low-Countrie Trayning by C a p t J o h n W a y m o u t h (brother o f G e o r g e ) , an English officer in D u t c h service.

BATTLE PLANS - T H E DUTCH BRIGADE T o form a marching army for a campaign, the Dutch allocated their battalions into 'three parts called Brigadoes, or Tercias\ referred to as the Vanguard, the Battle and the R e a r g u a r d . T h e s e were not the titles of permanent groupings; typically the position at the head o f a D u t c h army was allocated by rotation each day, and whichever brigade marched at the head of the column that day was called the Vanguard brigade. W h e n a Dutch c o m m a n d e r (or another, such as the D a n i s h , w h o used the D u t c h model) prepared for battle, he would typically deploy his army f r o m right to left. T h e right-wing cavalry deployed first, and then the Vanguard infantry brigade. If the brigades were drawn up one alongside one another then the Vanguard would be the right-hand infantry brigade, with the Battle in the middle and the Rearguard on the left, and the left-wing cavalry drawn up alongside the Rearguard (see page 3 3 , t o p ) . W h e r e a pitched battle - called a 'sett battle' by contemporaries - was expected, regimental precedence b e c a m e i m p o r t a n t for the positioning of regiments in each of the three brigades. Professional soldiers, both officers and m e n , placed great value on military customs and traditions, and adherence to these supported their morale on the day of battle. In the Dutch army the position of precedence - where the senior regiment was to be found - might be 40

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in either the Vanguard or the Battle. W h e n battle was anticipated the army c o m m a n d e r would arrange his order o f m a r c h to suit his requirements for the coming action and to keep his regiments and their officers happy over precedence. If the commander was surprised, however, he might have to ignore precedence and m a r c h out and deploy quickly f r o m wherever his men h a d camped or whatever his order of march had been. Prince M a u r i c e ' s a r m y used three distinct types o f battle f o r m a t i o n , all o f w h i c h were designed t o be used offensively o r defensively, a n d w i t h the object that the battalions that f o r m e d t h e m c o u l d m a n e u v e r within the f o r m a t i o n . W i t h i n each o f the three types, the a r m y c o m m a n d e r retained the option for some variation to t a k e a c c o u n t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s - such as the size of his army, or some particular tactical trick that he favoured - while maintaining the principle o f that type o f deployment. F o r e x a m p l e , he might m a k e the i n f a n t r y brigade t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o p l a c e in the c e n t r e o f his d e p l o y m e n t stronger t h a n the o t h e r t w o b r i g a d e s ; o r he m i g h t h a v e the cavalry squadrons o f the t w o flanks o f his f o r m a t i o n in three r a t h e r t h a n t w o lines, or might c h o o s e to place squadrons o f cavalry as a support behind his first line o f infantry b a t t a l i o n s . O f the three D u t c h battle f o r m a t i o n s , the m o s t c o m m o n l y used before the late 1 6 3 0 s was a model that deployed each o f three brigades as a d i a m o n d , with infantry battalions forming the points o f the d i a m o n d ; the battalions o f each brigade were thus divided between three lines o f battle. (A D a n i s h example using this model is illustrated on Plate B.) T h e distance between the first and second lines should be sufficient for a battalion in the second line t o maneuver by wheeling to the right or left. T h e distance between the second and third lines should be twice the distance b e t w e e n the first and s e c o n d . T h e diamond-pattern brigades ensured that the battalions in the second line covered the spaces between those in the first.

D u t c h f o r m a t i o n , as d e m o n s t r a t e d in f r o n t o f the Dutch Stadtholder and the visiting Q u e e n of England, Henrietta Maria, at a p a r a d e o n 4 J u n e 1 6 4 2 . (1) s h o w s t h e u n i t s d r a w n u p in a s i n g l e l i n e f o r t h e initial p a r a d e ; in (2) t h e t h r e e infantry brigades are d r a w n u p in t h r e e s e p a r a t e b a t t l e l i n e s .

T h e second pattern deployed the i n f a n t r y t o f o r m a flattened wedge formation. This f o r m a t i o n was created by deploying all the infantry units in a single line, then advancing central units to f o r m a wedge facing the enemy. 41

Recruitment of infantry during t h e Thirty Years' W a r . M o s t of t h e s o l d i e r s w h o f o u g h t in t h e s e w a r s enlisted for pay; the English a n d the S w e d i s h w e r e e x c e p t i o n a l in l e v y i n g conscripting - soldiers. Detail from an engraving by Jacques C a l l o t in t h e s e r i e s Les

et les Malheurs

de la

Miseres

Guerre,

p r i n t e d in P a r i s in 1 6 3 3 .

T h e head o f the wedge would provide a fighting formation in two lines, where the second could support the first (as s h o w n in the e x a m p l e illustrated on page 3 3 , lower) and the remaining battalions were held b a c k on each flank. T h e third D u t c h f o r m a t i o n w a s added to the other t w o in the late 1 6 3 0 s . T h i s w a s the closest t o the R o m a n triplex acies, and h a d certainly been discussed for some time between Prince M a u r i c e and his cousins - there is an earlier e x a m p l e in the surviving papers o f J o h a n n o f N a s s a u . This pattern consisted o f three lines o f infantry, with the first t w o lines drawn up in a c h e q u e r b o a r d f o r m a t i o n so that the spaces between the battalions in the first line w e r e c o v e r e d by t h o s e in the s e c o n d . As with the first type o f D u t c h deployment, the third line was the reserve, and the space between the second and third lines was twice that between the first and second lines. H e x h a m gave a t h e o r e t i c a l e x a m p l e o f this f o r m a t i o n in the second part o f his Principles of the Art Militarie, and the edition printed in 1 6 4 2 included a demonstration parade o f the Dutch army in the presence of the English Queen Henrietta M a r i a ; this placed the battalions o f each infantry brigade in its own s e p a r a t e line, t h o s e o f the V a n g u a r d f o r m i n g the first line, the Battle the second and the R e a r g u a r d the third (see page 4 1 , upper).

The cavalry and artillery In each o f the three D u t c h styles o f deployment, the majority of the cavalry w e r e f o r m e d on the flanks o f the infantry, as H e x h a m w r o t e : T h e H o r s e Troupes are c o m m o n l y ordered, the one halfe on the right, the other halfe on the left f l a n k e o f the divisions a n d B a t t a i l l o n s o f f o o t e ' . A p a r t f r o m the tactical possibilities that were inherent to the f o r m a t i o n itself - the structure 42

that allowed successive lines t o s u p p o r t o n e a n o t h e r - others c o u l d be achieved by specific decisions, such as the relative size a n d strength o f different infantry brigades, or the inclusion o f cavalry squadrons to support the first infantry line. T h e advantage o f the latter choice was that the retreat of beaten infantry could be covered by their o w n supporting cavalry, while a successful infantry attack could be exploited by a cavalry pursuit. T h e tactic was described by H e x h a m as placing 'Battaillions o f H o r s e interlaced, and placed betwixt the intervals, and distances o f the F o o t e , as the ground and necessity may require. For, if an Enemies H o r s e should be ranged betweene his Battaillions of foote, it is needefull then, that the other side should observe the same forme likewise, and have horse to encounter horse, least they should breake in upon the foote divisions.' As with the infantry, Dutch cavalry were armed and equipped on the usual Western European model, as pistol-armed heavy Reiters with lighter m o u n t e d arquebusiers for support. T h e m o u n t e d infantry role o f a r q u e b u s i e r s w a s assumed in the early 1 7 t h century by dragoons - essentially mounted infantry armed with short-barrelled muskets. T h e papers o f Prince M a u r i c e ' s cousin J o h a n n o f N a s s a u f r o m c. 1 6 0 9 - 1 0 refer t o these soldiers as 'tragons' or trachonz oder musqutirer zu perdt ('dragoons or musketeers on h o r s e b a c k ' ) . Prince M a u r i c e followed the Spanish example in standardizing his artillery with pieces classed by weight o f shot as 4 8 - , 2 4 - , 1 2 - and 6-pdrs, the first two for siege warfare and the latter t w o for battlefield use. T h e English officer Sir E d w a r d Cecil observed t h a t M a u r i c e d e m o n s t r a t e d lighter artillery in 1 6 2 2 , when 'His E x c e l l e n c y ] drewe out in B a t t a l i a ' for a parade deployment at Rozendale near B e r g e n - o p - Z o o m , where 'to every M a n i p a l l or B a t t a l i o n there was allowed t w o o f his E x c newe devised peeces called D r a k e s ' . H e x h a m described four types o f drakes, this being a lighter type o f artillery with shorter barrels firing 2 4 - p o u n d , 1 2 - p o u n d , 6 - p o u n d and 3 - p o u n d shot. T h e drakes w h i c h Cecil s a w in 1 6 2 2 were p r o b a b l y the light 3-pdrs - he brought ten o f this type b a c k to L o n d o n in 1 6 2 5 .

T H E

T H I R T Y

Y E A R S '

W A R

Prince Maurice's publicity for his reforms, spread by reports o f his victory at Nieupoort and through a series of public demonstrations and parades, had a strong influence on opinion in Western E u r o p e , particularly in Protestant countries that shared his need to counter the threat of the veteran Spanish army. T h e dissemination of the new theory and practice was also assisted by the fact that the rebel Dutch army included regiments of G e r m a n s , French, English and Scots, and M a u r i c e ' s training manuals included versions in the languages spoken in the various regiments (the infantry instructions for basic orders in 1 5 9 7 were recorded in Dutch, G e r m a n , French, English, Scots and Latin). T h e Dutch also directly provided training officers to G e r m a n states including Brandenburg, the Palatinate, Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse, Brunswick, S a x o n y and Holstein; and Prince M a u r i c e sent a Dutch captain, A b r a h a m van Nyevelt, to assist in the military education of the then-heir to the English throne, King James Fs short-lived eldest son Henry Stuart. D u t c h influence extended as far as Switzerland, where in 1 6 1 5 the Republic of Berne published instructions on arms-handling and basic drill for its militia based on the Dutch model, as Brief Recueil de Milice ... conforme a celoy de tres illustre & Tres baut Prince, Maurice Prince d'Orange.

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T w o Danish battle plans, J u l y 1 6 2 5 ; s e e a l s o P l a t e B. T h e a r m y o f K i n g C h r i s t i a n IV o f D e n m a r k , w h i c h t o o k p a r t in t h e Thirty Years' W a r b e t w e e n 1625 a n d 1629, w a s s t r o n g l y influenced by Dutch theories, a n d these t w o formations are clearly m o d e l l e d o n t h e D u t c h diamond-pattern brigade and w e d g e - s h a p e d battle line.

T h e ideas behind Prince Maurice's reforms had been strongly influenced by his cousin Prince J o h a n n , whose reputation extended well outside the United Provinces. N o t a b l e examples o f J o h a n n ' s influence (and that of his son-in-law, the L a n d g r a f M o r i t z von Hessen) amongst military c o m m e n t a t o r s were Wilhelm Dillich and J o h a n n J a c o b i von Walhausen. Dillich's Kriegsbuch was published in Kassel in 1 6 0 7 , and Walhausen produced a series of works on the art o f w a r between 1 6 1 5 and 1 6 2 1 . Walhausen was also involved with Prince J o h a n n in setting up a military academy - the Ritterliche Kriegschule - at Siegen in 1 6 1 6 , and b e c a m e its director. T h e curriculum included 'the handling of w e a p o n s , including the pike, drill in the D u t c h style', marching and battle f o r m a t i o n s , their variation under battle conditions, and the besieging and defence of fortifications. 3

In F r a n c e , the influence o f n e w D u t c h theories can be seen in texts from a group o f predominantly Protestant authors. After meeting Prince M a u r i c e in 1 6 0 0 , in 1 6 0 3 L o u i s de M o n t g o m e r y , Sieur de C o u r b o u z o n devoted a chapter in his b o o k on tactics to the 'evolutions and exercises that are used in the D u t c h a r m y ' . B o t h J e a n de Billon - a u t h o r o f Les Principes de VArt Militaire (Paris, 1 6 1 2 ) and Instructions Militaires (Lyon, 1 6 1 7 ) - and Henri, D u e de R o h a n , w h o s e The Parfaict Capitaine was published in Paris in 1 6 3 6 , had served with the D u t c h army. T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f the Sieur du Praissac, w h o s e Discours Militaires w a s published in Paris in 1 6 1 2 , is n o t k n o w n , but his w o r k refers directly t o Prince M a u r i c e ' s c a m p a i g n s ; it illustrates t w o versions o f the D u t c h practice deployments on their m a r c h to Julich in 1 6 1 0 , a n d the illustrations o f a r m s drill are based on J a c o b de Gheyn's w e a p o n s - h a n d l i n g m a n u a l . L a n g u a g e was n o barrier to the dissemination o f these ideas; W a l h a u s e n ' s w o r k s on infantry and cavalry were printed in G e r m a n and French when first published, and were frequently reprinted in b o t h languages. W a l h a u s e n himself translated Billon's Instructions Militaires i n t o G e r m a n ; Praissac's Discours Militaires w a s translated into G e r m a n in F r a n k f u r t in 1 6 1 6 , into D u t c h in A m s t e r d a m in 1 6 2 7 , and into English in C a m b r i d g e in 1 6 3 9 . French officers also served in C a t h o l i c armies; some in the Spanish Army o f Flanders would have fought against their fellow countrymen serving in the D u t c h army, a n d by the late 1 6 2 0 s there are clear indications o f D u t c h

3 Kriegskunst zu Fuss (Openheim, 1 6 1 5 ) ; Kriegskunst zu Pferd (Frankfurt, 1 6 1 6 ) ; the arms-drill manuals Alpbabetum pro tyrone pedestri (Frankfurt, 1615) and Kunstlichen Piquen-Handling (Hanau, 1 6 1 7 ) ; and Defensio Patriae oder Landrettung (Frankfurt, 1621), Landrettung being the idea of a local militia trained on Dutch lines. 44

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influence on French deployments. T h e detail o f a F r e n c h deployment during the siege o f La R o c h e l l e by J a c q u e s C a l l o t (illustrated on page 3 8 ) s h o w s two diamond-pattern f o r m a t i o n s on the D u t c h m o d e l . Cardinal Richelieu's description o f the d e p l o y m e n t o f the F r e n c h a r m y at C a s a l e in 1 6 3 0 also shows clear similarities with D u t c h practice. Although Spanish military literature s h o w s a k n o w l e d g e o f M a u r i c e ' s reforms, the Spanish saw few battlefield examples o f the new D u t c h style and retained confidence in the value o f large individual f o r m a t i o n s . An e x a m p l e is the Discourse ofMilitarie Discipline by the Irish officer G e r a t Barry, which was published in Brussels in 1 6 3 4 . Barry had spent 'thirty-three yeares in this my present profession of armes, in his C a t h o l i c k e M a j e s t i e s service a m o n g s t the Spaniard, Italian and Irish,' including ' 2 9 yeares in the w a r r e s , and brave expolites in the lowe countries, and G e r m a n y ' . Barry's b o o k has elements o f earlier w o r k s , but provides a useful indication that Spanish military theory and practice retained its trust in large f o r m a t i o n s , while considering the value o f smaller units. T h e r e are also indications o f d e v e l o p m e n t s in Spanish thinking a b o u t infantry firing systems, as Barry also describes a f o r m o f firing while retreating as 'retiring b a c k e upon a c o u n t e r m a r c h e each feele [file] or r a n k e , c o n s e q u e n t l y ' ; the use o f the w o r d ' c o u n t e r m a r c h ' is a clear e c h o of one of Prince M a u r i c e ' s D u t c h firing systems.

Battle plan for a G e r m a n Imperialist a r m y , 1632. T h e S w e d i s h victory at Breitenfeld the previous year shattered C o u n t T i l l y ' s a r m y , a n d his replacement, Albrecht von Wallenstein, introduced a different tactical m o d e l for t h e 1632 c a m p a i g n . This re-drawn c o p y has t h e s a m e u n i t s y m b o l s a s in t h e o r i g i n a l . Note the chequerboard d e p l o y m e n t of infantry units, and supporting cavalry behind t h e first a n d t h i r d l i n e s .

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45

The early campaigns T h e deployment style o f Protestant armies at the outbreak o f the Thirty Years' W a r in 1 6 1 8 w a s certainly influenced by D u t c h theories. Contemporary plans of deployments o f the Danish army in 1 6 2 5 (see pages 4 4 - 4 5 ) are close copies o f the D u t c h d i a m o n d - and wedge-pattern deployments. Danish infantry and cavalry were equipped in the same m a n n e r as the D u t c h , and Danish artillery w a s standardized by King Christian I V on five calibres - 4 8 - , 2 4 - , 1 2 - , 6- and 3-pdrs, the latter three being field pieces. Nevertheless, the armies o f the G e r m a n Protestant commanders and o f the D a n e s suffered a series o f defeats by o p p o n e n t s w h o s e military thinking f o l l o w e d Spanish a n d C a t h o l i c G e r m a n models rather than D u t c h . King Christian I V ended his support o f the Protestant cause in Germany at the Peace o f L u b e c k in 1 6 2 9 , a n d disbanded the m a j o r i t y o f his army. Officers and soldiers from the Danish army - some o f w h o m had served with the Protestant general Ernst, C o u n t Mansfeld's army before joining Danish service - n o w joined the army o f Gustavus Adolphus o f Sweden, as he recruited men during 1 6 2 9 - 3 0 in p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a landing in Germany. In some cases entire regiments - such as M a c - K e y s (Mackay's) Scottish infantry regiment, and t w o c o m p l e t e G e r m a n arquebusier cavalry regiments - were recruited from the Danish to the Swedish service.

T H E

S W E D I S H

I N T E R V E N T I O N

T h e r e f o r m s o f the Swedish a r m y under King Gustavus Adolphus were shaped b o t h by his wars with P o l a n d , w h o s e cavalry were superior, and by the debate a r o u n d military ideas current in the United Provinces a n d , with variations, t h r o u g h o u t northern E u r o p e - particularly through the published w o r k s o f Walhausen. Gustavus Adolphus w a s studying military theory at the time w h e n W a l h a u s e n ' s b o o k s were appearing, and during his tour o f G e r m a n y in 1 6 2 0 he m e t Prince M a u r i c e ' s cousin J o h a n n o f N a s s a u . This military debate t o o k place during the period following the first impact o f M a u r i c e ' s r e f o r m s , at a time w h e n further options arising out o f these were

SPANISH A N D F R E N C H F O R M A T I O N S AT

w a s p l a c e d in t h e w o o d o n t h e left o f t h e line, b u t t h e r e a r e

ROCROI, 1643

n o n e d e p l o y e d in s u p p o r t o f t h e c a v a l r y w i n g s .

T h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n is a l s o b a s e d o n a c o n t e m p o r a r y f r o m Theatrum

Europaeum;

engraving

T h e French a r m y also s h o w s a c o m p o s i t e

German-style

it w a s c o p i e d a s p a r t o f t h e l a t e r

d e p l o y m e n t b u t in a far m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d v a r i a t i o n , u s i n g

e n g r a v i n g b y t h e e n g i n e e r officer S e b a s t i e n d e Pontault, Sieur

t h r e e lines o f infantry w i t h t h e b a t t a l i o n s in t h e third, reserve

d e B e a u l i e u , w h o w a s p r e s e n t a t t h e b a t t l e o n 19 M a y 1 6 4 3 .

line alternating

The Spanish army ( t o p ) w a s c o m m a n d e d by D o n Francisco d e

a r m o u r e d gensdarmes).

with

cavalry

squadrons

(including

heavy

Bodies of c o m m a n d e d musketeers are

M e l o , a n d t h e F r e n c h a r m y ( b o t t o m ) b y t h e 22-year-old Louis,

d e p l o y e d in t h e S w e d i s h s t y l e , h e r e in f r o n t o f t h e c a v a l r y

D u e d ' E n g h i e n , b e t t e r k n o w n b y his f u t u r e title o f P r i n c e d e

s q u a d r o n s in t h e first line o n e a c h w i n g ( m & c ) .

C o n d e - w h o w o n a decisive victory at Rocroi. S p a n i s h v e t e r a n tercios

probably retained d e e p formations,

This plate r e p r o d u c e s t h e spacings b e t w e e n units as s h o w n in t h e o r i g i n a l

engraving. This m a y accurately

represent

a

but their d e p l o y m e n t s h o w e d that t h e Spanish a r m y h a d n o w

d e c i s i o n b y e a c h side t o r e d u c e t h e intervals in r e s p o n s e t o t h e

a d o p t e d t h e G e r m a n style w h i c h e v o l v e d during t h e Thirty

g r o u n d o v e r w h i c h t h e y d e p l o y e d ; h o w e v e r , it m a y a l s o b e t h e

Years' W a r as a c o m p o s i t e of t h e D u t c h a n d S w e d i s h doctrines.

result o f a c o m m o n c o n v e n t i o n a m o n g s t e n g r a v e r s t o r e d u c e t h e

T h e Spanish army, b o t h infantry centre a n d cavalry w i n g s , are

intervals in o r d e r t o m a k e a m o r e d r a m a t i c a l l y c o m p a c t i m a g e .

d e p l o y e d in t w o - l i n e c h e q u e r b o a r d ; t h e o n l y c a v a l r y s u p p o r t

I n s e t 1 : F r e n c h carabins

f o r t h e i n f a n t r y c e n t r e is a s m a l l r e s e r v e p l a c e d b e h i n d t h e

I n s e t 2 : C r o a t irregular c a v a l r y in I m p e r i a l / S p a n i s h

s e c o n d line. A b o d y of c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r s ( n o t s h o w n )

d r a w n u p in l o o s e ranks.

cavalry, in five ranks. service,

Swedish/North German musketeer and pikeman on t h e frontispiece of Laurentius a T r o u p i t z e n ' s Kriegs

Koniglicher

Kunstnach

Schwedischer

Manier

. . . ( T h e A r t o f W a r in t h e R o y a l S w e d i s h S t y l e ' ) p u b l i s h e d in F r a n k f u r t in 1 6 3 3 . T h i s is a training m a n u a l for a c o m p a n y , not a battalion or a brigade, a n d its c o n t e n t is s i m i l a r t o a Dutch company manual. (By p e r m i s s i o n T h e British Library)

being considered. G u s t a v u s ' Polish experience had taught him that since he had inferior cavalry he had to f a c t o r in ways o f providing infantry firepower support for them, as well as infantry formations with the capability to survive cavalry a t t a c k w i t h o u t being immobilized. T h e theoretical model for Swedish infantry was set in 1 6 2 1 as a regiment o f eight c o m p a n i e s , each o f 1 6 officers and non-commissioned officers and 1 2 6 corporals and men - 5 4 pikemen and 7 2 musketeers. A regiment would thus consist of 1 , 0 0 8 men, the same number as the theoretical Dutch regiment described by Henry H e x h a m . As with the Dutch battalions, a Swedish regiment would be divided to form t w o units (called 'squadrons' in Swedish usage), each of about 5 0 0 rankers plus N C O s and officers. T h e Swedish 'squadron', like the Dutch 'battalion' of similar size, was formed from groups of files into sub-units armed alike, although the Swedish system used a higher number of corporals six in the Swedish company, rather than three in the Dutch. T h e depth of the file was reduced from the ten of the Dutch file to six men. In the Swedish system, each of the six sub-units equivalent to the Dutch 'divisions' - three of pikemen 48

(each of three rots or files) and three of musketeers (each of four rots) - had its own corporal, and these sub-units were called 'corporalships'. O n e of the three musketeer corporalships from any c o m p a n y could be withdrawn for special duties, including supporting the cavalry wings or forming a 'Forlorn H o p e ' ahead of the army. As with the D u t c h regiment or the large Spanish f o r m a t i o n s , the Swedish object was to form their soldiers into their general's preferred fighting units. T h e Swedish battlefield f o r m a t i o n - the Swedish brigade - w a s f o r m e d o f s q u a d r o n s , each s q u a d r o n theoretically c o m p o s e d o f f o u r full-strength c o m p a n i e s or m o r e if they were w e a k . (In p r a c t i c e the regiments o f the Swedish army, whether raised in Sweden or f r o m foreign mercenaries, h a d different n u m b e r s o f c o m p a n i e s , and c a m p a i g n c o n d i t i o n s reduced the n u m b e r o f men per c o m p a n y . ) T h i s w a s a flexible system, as the English officer William Barriffe c o m m e n t e d : 'By the standing o f this S q u a d r o n , or third part o f a Brigade, you m a y easily perceive h o w apt and ready they are to be imbattelled into any f o r m , either offensive or defensive'. T h e Swedish brigades themselves were f o r m e d o f either three squadrons to form an arrowhead f o r m a t i o n , or four squadrons to f o r m a d i a m o n d ; the t h r e e - s q u a d r o n version w a s the m o r e c o m m o n l y used, the f o u r - s q u a d r o n brigade (see Plate C) being employed only briefly between 1 6 2 8 and 1 6 3 1 . Like the D u t c h , the Swedish brigade was designed t o be flexible, and in this respect the structure o f these f o r m a t i o n s surpassed the D u t c h . O n the practical realities of composition, Barriffe c o m m e n t e d that 'one regiment and a half, o f w h o l e and full c o m p a n i e s , w o u l d perfect a B r i g a d e : or t w o regiments of torne and b r o k e n c o m p a n i e s , the overplus being always added to the Reserve. Notwithstanding it so happened at the Battell o f Lutzen, that Miezlaff, Gerstorfs, and R o s s e s , 3 . crazed [broken] Regiments m a d e up but one Brigade, being the o u t m o s t Brigade to the left o f the second R a n g e . A n d towards night in the same forenamed Battell, going to rally up the t w o broken and shattered brigades o f yellow and blew, belonging to Grave Neeles, and Colonel Winkle, there were not men enough left unhurt and killed, wherewith to m a k e one S q u a d r o n . '

Firing systems Swedish musketeers could be drawn up for firing in corporalships (4 rots) o r plottons (8 rots). T h e y were trained to fire b o t h in the D u t c h style and in the distinctive Swedish 'salvee' or volley. T h e Swedish variation of the Dutch style was to fire rank by rank, but while the Dutch musketeers fired and retired one rank at a time the Swedes fired t w o ranks together. T h e Scottish officer R o b e r t M u n r o w r o t e that the Swedish salvee was 'ordinarie in Battell, before an enemy joyne, or against H o r s e m e n ' , and it was achieved by three ranks firing together in one volley. T h e r e were two methods to achieve this. T h e first was by bringing forward the rear three ranks - the rear half of the six-deep f o r m a t i o n - alongside the front three. T h e officer was to ' c o m m a n d the bringers up or R e a r e to double the F r o n t t o the right hand [i.e. the rear three ranks of each file to march up on the right alongside the front three ranks], and to m a k e readie, having the match cocked and their panes [priming pans] well guarded, having closed the three R a n c k s but not the Files, the Officers standing in equall F r o n t with the F o r e m o s t R a n c k e , betwixt t w o Divisions, he c o m m a n d s to give fire'. A c o n t e m p o r a r y description of Swedish musketeers at Breitenfeld records the way three ranks could fire together as 'the first r a n c k falling upon their knees, the second

stooping forward, and the third standing upright and all giving fire together'. T h e second method was to fire the first three ranks in volley, then m a r c h the rear three ranks forwards in front of the first and fire a second volley.

Cavalry and artillery T h e theoretical model for Swedish cavalry in 1 6 2 1 was the D u t c h arquebusier, but without the arquebus. T h e Swedish also hired G e r m a n mercenary cavalry, some cuirassiers but mostly arquebusiers, and G e r m a n arquebusiers p r o b a b l y retained their carbines. As with the lighter-armed Huguenot cavalry in the late 16th century, circumstances obliged the Swedish to use light horse as battle cavalry rather than simply in support. C o u n t Tilly, w h o c o m m a n d e d the Imperial army at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1 6 3 1 , had been recorded as saying that 'he never seriously considered the using arquebusiers in a military engagement', so the Swedish cavalry must have c o m e as an unpleasant surprise. Certainly Tilly underestimated them, as he did the rest o f the Swedish army that day. By 1 6 3 2 Swedish cavalry were drawn up three deep rather than the five-deep o f the D u t c h army. Gustavus A d o l p h u s ' instructions for their attack were that 'only the first or at m o s t the first t w o r a n k s , w h e n near enough, to see the whites of the enemy's eyes, were to give fire, then to reach for their swords; the last rank however was to attack without shooting but with swords drawn, and to keep both pistols (or in the front r a n k s , one) for the melee'. As with the Spanish and the D u t c h , G u s t a v u s ' r e f o r m s standardized artillery calibres, but he w e n t further, reducing the n u m b e r t o three a n d employing only the 2 4 - p d r s for siege w o r k and the 1 2 - and 3-pdrs for field artillery. T h e use of light 3-pdr guns was n o t new, as the D u t c h already used 3-pdr drakes, but the overall weight o f the gun was reduced to m a k e it m o r e mobile and capable of keeping pace with advancing infantry.

SWEDISH BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT T h e Swedish battle f o r m a t i o n used its brigades as individual tactical units, and drew them up one alongside another in t w o lines o f infantry brigades. At Breitenfeld ( 1 6 3 1 ) there were seven infantry brigades, with four in the first

•

ENGLISH ROYALIST A N D

PARLIAMENTARIAN

F O R M A T I O N S AT NASEBY,

1645

reserve line b e i n g c o m p o s e d of a l t e r n a t i n g infantry a n d cavalry units. Prince

T h i s p l a t e is b a s e d o n a m a n u s c r i p t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f

Rupert

placed

supporting

cavalry

squadrons

the

b e h i n d b o t h t h e first a n d s e c o n d i n f a n t r y l i n e s , a n d d e p l o y e d

R o y a l i s t f o r m a t i o n b y Sir B e r n a r d d e G o m m e . T h e r e a r e t w o

c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r s t o s u p p o r t t h e s q u a d r o n s in b o t h o f

detailed c o n t e m p o r a r y illustrations of this battle, t h e o t h e r

his t w o lines o f c a v a l r y - (c & m ) .

being an engraving by Robert Streeter w h i c h w a s bound

with Joshua

S p r i g g e ' s Anglia

Rediviva

published

in

1647.

De

G o m m e ' s plan s h o w s the o p t i m u m spacings b e t w e e n units, while Streeter's engraving reduces t h e m . As t h e Royalist formation at Edgehill

T h e o p p o s i n g formation of t h e Parliament's N e w Army (top) c o m m a n d e d simpler, with t w o

b y Sir T h o m a s Fairfax w a s

lines of infantry, a n d t h e only

Model much

infantry

reserve w a s a single battalion f o r m e d f r o m half a regiment. in 1 6 4 2

showed

The

cavalry w e r e

formed

in t w o

lines o n t h e army's

S w e d i s h i n f l u e n c e , s o t h a t a t N a s e b y o n 14 J u n e 1645 ( b o t t o m )

flank a n d t h r e e lines o n t h e stronger right, c o m m a n d e d

shows

Oliver

the

influence

of t h e

Due

d'Enghien's

deployment

Cromwell.

No

supporting

cavalry

were

at Rocroi (see P l a t e F). S i n c e t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r m i e s r e f u s e d t o

b e h i n d t h e infantry lines or c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r s the cavalry wings. The

O c t o b e r 1644, N a s e b y w a s R u p e r t ' s first o p p o r t u n i t y t o u s e t h i s

victory at Naseby.

Model

Army

won

by

deployed

fight P r i n c e R u p e r t d u r i n g his relief of D o n n i n g t o n C a s t l e in

New

left

a

among decisive

f o r m a t i o n in p r a c t i c e . H e d e p l o y e d t h r e e lines o f i n f a n t r y w i t h

I n s e t : N e w M o d e l A r m y m u s k e t e e r s d r a w n u p for firing in t h e

similar s p a c i n g b e t w e e n t h e lines t o d ' E n g h i e n ' s , t h e third or

S w e d i s h three-rank style.

line and three in the second; at Lutzen the following year there were eight brigades, four in each line (see page 5 4 ) . T h e formation was based on the Dutch d i a m o n d - p a t t e r n wedge, but was significantly different from the original models. Dutch infantry deployments relied on the integrity of the formation as a whole, and could be used flexibly to sustain it by bringing forward successive lines. T h e Swedish brigades were designed to fight temporarily as separate entities, making them more resistant to cavalry attack. Soldiers w h o were already experienced in D u t c h and Danish tactics could quickly be re-trained in the basics o f the Swedish practice, since the drills were the same. However, the Swedish tactical formation was more complex than the D u t c h , and only veteran soldiers could achieve c o m p e t e n c e in it quickly. R o b e r t M u n r o recorded that at a parade in Sweden in 1 6 3 0 , Gustavus A d o l p h u s c o m m e n d e d M c K a y ' s R e g i m e n t , w h i c h had recently transferred f r o m the Danish army to the Swedish, on their ability to deploy 'after his new order o f Discipline o f Briggads', and said that he wished 'all his F o o t were so well disciplined' [well trained, in this c o n t e x t ] . M u n r o ' s a c c o u n t o f the Swedish a r m y at Breitenfeld provides a good example of the Swedish army in operation. T h e Swedes and their S a x o n allies formed up side by side but as t w o separate armies, with each using its own f o r m of deployment; the S a x o n s used a version of the Dutch wedge formation, while the Swedes deployed in their distinctive brigades. M u n r o described the Swedish army drawing up in battle formation and then marching forward to the battlefield, which was consistent with Dutch practice. O n the battlefield itself, Gustavus Adolphus personally c h e c k e d the positions o f his infantry and cavalry. T h e Swedes deployed supporting cavalry squadrons behind both the first and second lines o f infantry, as distinct f r o m the D u t c h practice which placed t h e m behind the first line only. T h e cavalry wings were reinforced with ' c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r s ' - a Swedish innovation that differed from Dutch practice. At Lutzen in 1 6 3 2 the Swedes added light artillery to support their cavalry wings as well as c o m m a n d e d musketeers. T h e reason for this tactic is likely to be that the fact that the Swedish battle cavalry w o r e less armour and were at a disadvantage against the opposing cuirassiers, so needed the e x t r a fire support. T h e lines o f Swedish infantry brigades at Breitenfeld were drawn up in a c h e q u e r b o a r d pattern. Barriffe described this as 'the usuall & accustomed m a n n e r o f Imbattelling by that invinceable King o f Sweden, o f never dying m e m o r y ; w h o placed t h e m as in this Figure m a y be seen. T h e Battell of the f o l l o w i n g Brigade [i.e. the brigade in the second line] being alwayes placed directly behind the Intervall Division, or space o f ground between the t w o wings o f the f o r m e r Brigades' [this means that the distance between two brigades in the front line was the frontage of the pike without their musketeer wings in the second line]. M u n r o described h o w 'the whole Armie: both the D u k e s , and O u r s were put in g o o d order; our Armie marching on the right h a n d , and the D u k e s on the left, our c o m m a n d e d Musketeres marching in the V a n - G u a r d e , being in one bodie before the Armie . . . . We marched thus, both the A r m i e s in B a t t a i l e , H o r s e , F o o t e , and Artillerie, till a b o u t nine o f the C l o c k e in the m o r n i n g ' . O n the deployment itself, M u n r o wrote that Gustavus Adolphus 'appointed Plottons of musketiers by fifties [a plotton was formed of two corporalships, so comprised eight files each o f six men, 4 8 musketeers in all], which were c o m m a n d e d by sufficient Officers to attend on severall regiments of horse . . .

LI.

i L JL L

which orderly done, the c o m m a n d e d Musketiers were directed to their stand where to fight; his Majestie then led up the foure Briggads o f F o o t e , which were appointed to be the Battaile of the Armie [first line of infantry units], with a distance between each Briggad, that a Regiment of horse might march out in grosse betwixt the Briggads, all four being in one Front, having their O r d n a n c e [artillery] planted before every Briggad.' F o r the second infantry line, 'Behinde these foure Briggads were drawne up the three Briggads o f Reserve with their artillery before them standing at a proportionable distance behinde the other four Briggads, with like distance betwixt them, as was betwixt the Briggads o f the Battaile. T h e Briggads o f Horse which had Plottons o f M u s k e t i e r s to attend them were placed on the right and left wings of the f o o t e , and some were placed b e t w i x t the Battaile of foote and the Reserve, to second the f o o t e as neede were: other Briggads of horse were drawne up behinde the Reserve o f foote Briggads'.

A ' p l o t t o n ' of t w o m u s k e t e e r 'divisions' or 'corporalships' side by side, totalling 48 m e n , from Troupitzen's Swedish c o m p a n y manual. Each corporalship comprises four f i l e s o f six m e n , t h e r i g h t - h a n d file l e d b y t h e c o r p o r a l . N o t e t h e s e r g e a n t , i d e n t i f i e d b y his halberd, outside t h e ranks to t h e right. (By permission T h e British Library)

The Swedish army in battle In his a c c o u n t o f the battle itself M u n r o describes the advance o f pike and shot together, as 'our small O r d i n a n c e [light artillery] being twice discharged a m o n g s t t h e m , and before we stirred, we c h a r g e d t h e m with a salvee o f muskets, which was repaied, and i n c o n t i n e n t o u r Briggad advancing u n t o them with push of pike, putting one o f their battailes in disorder, fell on the execution, so that they were put to the route'. In describing the cavalry action, M u n r o wrote that: By halfe three, our C a n n o n a little ceasing, the Horsemen on both wings charged furiously one another, our Horsemen with a resolution, abiding 53

Battle of Lutzen, 6 N o v e m b e r 1 6 3 2 , in a n e n g r a v i n g f r o m t h e E n g l i s h n e w s b o o k The

Intelligencer.

Swedish

This s h o w s only

t h e front line of t h e Imperialist army (top); but note the characteristic a p p e a r a n c e of t h e S w e d i s h b r i g a d e s in t h e foreground - compare with P l a t e s C & D. ( B y p e r m i s s i o n

unloosing a Pistoll, till the enemy had discharged first, and then at a neere distance our Musketiers meeting them with a Salve; then our horsemen discharged their Pistolls, and then charged through them with swords; and at theire returne the Musketiers were ready againe to give the second Salve of M u s k e t amongst them: the enemy thus valiantly resisted by our Horsemen, and cruelly plagued by our plottons of Musketiers: you may imagine, howe soone he would be discouraged from charging twice in this manner, and repulsed.

T h e British Library)

T h e advantage o f the Swedish brigade system for 'all-round defence' was famously demonstrated at this battle, since the Imperial army broke the Saxon f o r m a t i o n that formed the left o f the allied army, but failed to m a k e headway against the Swedish on the right. T h e second line of Swedish brigades then wheeled to their left and fell upon the Imperial infantry, which was probably reforming after scattering the S a x o n s . T o move an entire second infantry line across the battlefield was highly unusual, and the Swedish brigade structure w h e r e each brigade f o r m e d part o f the line but could operate with some independence - made it far easier to carry out that would have been possible with the D u t c h linear formations, which were far more dependent on the units on either side of them. William W a t t s ' account of the Swedish victory at Breitenfeld referred to the value of smaller, more flexible tactical units in the same terms as Henry H e x h a m had used to describe Prince Maurice's victory at Nieupoort. H e described the Swedish as using 'a new kind of marshalling was this unto Tilly, which as much helped to beate him, as the valoour of the men did, that fought in it. Every part o f it consisted of several Maniples and small bodyes of men; of which if any one were overthrowne, there was nothing so much hurt done, as when one of Tilly's greater battaglons were b r o k e n ' 54

The Imperial response Imperial and Catholic League armies had also been influenced by the changes introduced into the D u t c h army, and the military literature and experiments in G e r m a n y and D e n m a r k that h a d followed it. T h e influential De Militia Equestri by H e r m a n n H u g o , published in A n t w e r p in 1 6 3 0 a n d dedicated to King Philip I V o f Spain, drew on developing Spanish and Imperial theories as well as those o f northern E u r o p e . It referred t o b o t h the Italian L u d o v i c o Melzo's Regole Militari sopra il governo e servitio particulate della cavelleria, and the dragoon and cavalry formations from the Protestant G e r m a n J o h a n n J a c o b i von Walhausen's Kriegskunst zu Pferd. Imperial c o m m a n d e r s h a d begun to m a k e changes in the size and depth o f their infantry f o r m a t i o n s , and to introduce lighter regimental artillery. T h e defeat at Breitenfeld was catastrophic in terms both o f casualties among veteran soldiers and o f the reputation o f Imperial arms, and accelerated the rate of change. Under its new commander, Albrecht von Wallenstein, the Imperial army drawn up at the battle o f Lutzen in 1 6 3 2 adopted a field deployment o f three lines of infantry battalions. T h e battalions (sometimes termed 'brigades') had around 1 , 0 0 0 men drawn up with a reduced depth; Monteccuoli referred to a file of seven men for the pike block in 1 6 3 2 (when the horse included both full cuirassiers and lighter-armed battle cavalry). This formation, influenced by the Dutch but also using the Swedish model o f forming small infantry brigades as fighting units rather than simply a deployment tool, was the foundation of the composite G e r m a n style. T h e Swedish brigade formation itself did n o t long survive its creator, and defeat at Nordlingen in 1 6 3 4 forced change on the Swedish army. By the later 1 6 3 0 s , armies on both sides were using versions o f the composite German tactical style.

T h r e e S w e d i s h b r i g a d e s in t w o lines, t h a t in t h e s e c o n d covering the gap between t h e t w o i n t h e first l i n e . U n d e r magnification, t h e annotations o n this illustration - f r o m W i l l i a m Barriffe's

Discipline

or the

Artilleryman

Military Young

- identify e a c h of

t h e three o b l o n g blocks with f l a g s in a b r i g a d e a s 3 6 rotts o r s i x - m a n files o f p i k e ( 2 1 6 m e n ) , a n d e a c h o f its six s m a l l s q u a r e s a s a plotton

o f e i g h t rotts o f

m u s k e t e e r s (48 m e n ) . H e r e , t w o o f t h e s e plottons

of shot

are d e t a c h e d from each of a brigade's three 'squadrons' (battalions) a n d are lined u p in t h e r e a r , b u t t h e y m i g h t w e l l be sent further a w a y to provide fire s u p p o r t for t h e cavalry w i n g s as ' c o m m a n d e d musketeers'. Note that t h e interval b e t w e e n t h e t w o f r o n t - l i n e b r i g a d e s is t h e s a m e as t h e frontage of t h e front pike block of t h e brigade behind them.


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T H E

English d e p l o y m e n t in t h e D u t c h d i a m o n d pattern, 1639. T h e c o r e of professional officers w h o s e r v e d in t h e s e B i s h o p s ' Wars against Scotland had o b t a i n e d their military experience during service in t h e D u t c h a r m y .

E N G L I S H

CIVIL

W A R S

M o s t Englishmen with any professional experience before 1 6 4 2 had served in the D u t c h army, a n d the English militia at h o m e w a s trained using an E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e version o f D u t c h m a n u a l s . H o w e v e r , although military t h i n k i n g w a s solidly based o n the D u t c h m o d e l , professional officers and other Englishmen with an interest in military affairs - typically gentlemen, officers in the militia and m e m b e r s o f the urban voluntary companies - were influenced t o varying e x t e n t s by the Swedish a n d G e r m a n styles o f which they h a d read or been told by friends. Engravings o f the English army during the Bishops' Wars of 1 6 3 9 - 4 0 show a d e m o n s t r a t i o n deployment clearly based on the classic D u t c h diamond pattern, but this does n o t m e a n that Englishmen with a background in either professional service a b r o a d o r the Trained Bands in England were ignorant o f the changes arising f r o m the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' War. George M o n k ' s c o m m e n t s in his Observations on Military and Political Affairs (c. 1 6 4 6 ) provide an example o f a professional officer w h o had served in the Dutch army but whose ideas were influenced by Swedish practices; he r e c o m m e n d e d infantry files six deep, and the use o f a version o f the Swedish salvee. B o o k s by William Barriffe (Military Discipline, or the Young Artilleryman) and R o b e r t Elton (The Compleat Body of the Art Militarie) provide examples o f the views of influential militia officers, both o f w h o m later fought in the Civil Wars; and

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Swedish practice was also disseminated by b o o k s such as William W a t t s ' The Swedish Discipline and C o l R o b e r t M u n r o ' s Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-Key es). M a n y English professional officers w h o h a d returned t o serve in K i n g Charles I's army in the Bishops' Wars went on to serve during the Irish R e v o l t in the regiments raised in E n g l a n d or a m o n g s t English settlers in I r e l a n d . A key indication o f the i m p a c t o f c h a n g i n g military ideas is an engraving by Wenceslaus H o l l a r (see above) o f an English a r m y deployed for battle in Ireland in 1 6 4 2 - one o f the English officers present was George M o n k . T h i s is the closest c o n t e m p o r a r y illustration o f English military p r a c t i c e t o the o u t b r e a k o f the Civil W a r later t h a t year, and s h o w s the d e p l o y m e n t o f a small English army with around 2 , 4 0 0 infantry. T h e Earl o f O r m o n d e , w h o commanded it, employed the same principles of deployment as he would have used for a main field army. H e needed to retain the flexibility o f the battle formations in which his men had been trained to fight, but to achieve this with so few men he reduced the number o f soldiers in his battalions to around 3 0 0 in each, dividing each o f his t w o largest regiments into t w o battalions which would fight as separate units. H e also deployed his 4 0 0 - o d d cavalry into troop-sized bodies o f around 3 0 troopers each.

E n g l i s h d e p l o y m e n t in I r e l a n d , 1642. This detail f r o m a n engraving by Wenceslaus Hollar s h o w s an English a r m y in a m o r e m o d e r n d e p l o y m e n t of t w o lines, w i t h cavalry units o n t h e flanks, a n d a single i n f a n t r y u n i t in r e s e r v e . (In t h i s plan, confusingly, the engraver changed the notation: here a single block indicates cavalry, a n d t h r e e side-by-side a n i n f a n t r y unit.) A f t e r t h e B i s h o p s ' Wars many unemployed professional officers j o i n e d the English regiments sent to Ireland. (By permission T h e British Library)

This army was on the m a r c h in enemy territory w h e n O r m o n d e ' s 'scouts came in, and brought in intelligence'. H e then brought f o r w a r d and deployed his leading units according to his c h o s e n c a m p a i g n plan, m a k i n g a 'stand with the first four divisions of F o o t , drew them up in order to F i g h t . . . leaving r o o m for the other T r o o p s o f H o r s e and F o o t according to the g r o u n d , and 57

Deployments and frontages: both examples show the d e p l o y m e n t o f i n f a n t r y in chequerboard pattern with u n i t s in o n e l i n e c o v e r i n g g a p s in t h e o t h e r . T h i s w a s a c h i e v e d b y f o r m i n g u n i t s u p in a s i n g l e line, a n d t h e n m o v i n g s o m e out to form a second. (1) D e p l o y m e n t a s d e s c r i b e d b y R o g e r B o y l e , Earl of Orrery, in his A Treatise

of the Art of

War

( L o n d o n , 1677). (2) & (3) D e p l o y m e n t o f L o n d o n Militia, T r a i n e d B a n d s a n d

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to be observed Imbatelling,

in the

Fighting

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Marching, and

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the order he h a d designed to d r a w t h e m up in,' while the second infantry brigade c a m e up behind. T h i s army was drawn up in t w o lines and, despite its small size, a single battalion o f 3 0 0 men was held b a c k as a final reserve. At the battle o f N a s e b y in 1 6 4 5 the m u c h larger N e w M o d e l A r m y used a similar infantry deployment, with t w o infantry lines and half a regiment held b a c k as a final reserve behind t h e m (see Plate G ) .

CAVALRY These

DEPLOYMENT

illustrations

show

two

tactical e l e m e n t s

of

cavalry

deployment.

r o u n d t o a f l a n k ; if t h e t w o l i n e s a r e d r a w n u p c h e q u e r b o a r d fashion t h e n t h e r o u t e d cavalry will ride into their supports.

1 : T h e f i r s t is t h e t a c t i c o f a t t a c h i n g plottons

o f m u s k e t e e r s in

If t h e s e c o n d - l i n e u n i t s a r e d i r e c t l y b e h i n d t h e first l i n e , t h e n t h e

s u p p o r t o f t h e c a v a l r y o n t h e w i n g s of a n a r m y . In t h e a p p r o a c h

f l e e i n g t r o o p e r s f r o m t h e front line will a v o i d their supports. T h e

these ' c o m m a n d e d musketeers' m a r c h b e h i n d t h e cavalry, but

Imperialist c o m m a n d e r R a i m o n d o M o n t e c c u o l i d e s c r i b e d this

in a c t i o n t h e y a r e d e p l o y e d a l o n g s i d e t h e c a v a l r y s q u a d r o n s .

t a c t i c w h e n w r i t i n g i n c. 1 6 4 2 . S o m e 1 7 t h - c e n t u r y c o m m a n d e r s

2a &

followed

this

had met

I m p e r i a l i s t o f f i c e r s , u s e d it f o r h i s d e p l o y m e n t

2b: The second

chequerboard

pattern

shows the differences b e t w e e n of

deploying

cavalry

the

squadrons

w h e r e t h e s q u a d r o n s in t h e s e c o n d l i n e c o v e r g a p s

-

between

logic, others

disagreed; Prince

Rupert,

who at

D o n n i n g t o n Castle a n d at t h e battle of Naseby.

s q u a d r o n s in t h e first - a n d a n a l t e r n a t i v e , w h e r e t h e s e c o n d -

3 : T h e r i g h t f l a n k o f a N e w M o d e l A r m y c a v a l r y u n i t in t h r e e -

line s q u a d r o n s are p l a c e d i m m e d i a t e l y b e h i n d t h e front-line

rank f o r m a t i o n ; t h e c o r n e t rides at t h e right e n d of t h e front

squadrons. T h e logic w a s that w h e r e a s a routed infantry unit

rank, w i t h t h e c o m m a n d e r a n d his t r u m p e t e r slightly o u t t o

can

t h e flank.

run straight backwards, a routed cavalry

unit

wheels

I|I

(1) R o y a l i s t d e p l o y m e n t a t M a r s t o n M o o r , 2 J u l y 1644,

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of infantry, cavalry s q u a d r o n s in d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f t h e i n f a n t r y centre, a n d t h e S w e d i s h tactic of placing ' c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r ' plottons

to

support the cavalry wings. (2) P a r t o f t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e allied Parliament a n d Scots armies at Marston M o o r , from De G o m m e ' s plan. Note the infantry brigades e a c h f o r m e d in t w o b o d i e s . (3) F r a g m e n t o f t h e p l a n b y t h e Scots Sergeant-Major General, James Lumsden. Note the placing of musketeer d e t a c h m e n t s (flagged) a m o n g t h e cavalry; L u m s d e n h a d s e r v e d in t h e S w e d i s h army. T h e shading for cavalry u n i t s is i n c o m p l e t e in t h i s paper; only the blank oblongs in t h e c e n t r e r e p r e s e n t i n f a n t r y bodies of both pike a n d shot.

60

Prince Rupert at Edgehill, 1642 A t the o u t b r e a k o f the English Civil W a r s b o t h armies, Royalist and Parliamentarian, were initially trained on the D u t c h model, and indeed the t w o c o m m a n d i n g generals - R o b e r t Bertie, Earl of Lindsey for the Royalists, and R o b e r t D e v e r e u x , Earl o f Essex for the Parliament - had served together as colonels in the D u t c h army. However, Lindsey gave up his c o m m a n d after a series of quarrels with King C h a r l e s ' nephew, Prince Rupert. Prince Rupert had limited practical experience but an unusually broad exposure to theory, since he grew up in exile in H o l l a n d , served briefly in Germany, and met H a b s b u r g officers while he was a prisoner o f war. His chaplain in England was the same D r William Watts w h o had written both The Swedish Discipline, and a series o f n e w s b o o k s published as The Swedish Intelligencer which described the Swedish campaigns in Germany. Like m a n y young officers w h o sought a quick military reputation, Prince R u p e r t was inspired by the aggressive tactical approach and decisive victories o f G u s t a v u s A d o l p h u s , and t h r o u g h his influence the R o y a l i s t army was deployed at Edgehill - the first battle of the Civil W a r - with its infantry in the Swedish brigade pattern, and b o t h cavalry and infantry in the Swedish unit depths o f six-deep and three-deep respectively. T h e Royalist battle plan survives as a m o r e carefully d r a w n c o p y by one o f Prince Rupert's staff officers, Sir B e r n a r d de G o m m e , and it shows five Royalist infantry brigades in t w o lines, each brigade in the Swedish ' f o u r - s q u a d r o n ' f o r m a t i o n . T h e model he used was p r o b a b l y that described by Lord Rhees and illustrated by D r W a t t s . W h i l e this w a s certainly an effective tactical style, it was more c o m p l i c a t e d to operate than either the D u t c h or G e r m a n equivalents, and to w o r k successfully it required veteran officers and N C O s and a cadre o f veteran soldiers. T h e R o y a l i s t infantry was only recently raised and had few veterans; the practical effect was that while they could be drawn up in the Swedish style this was simply a fagade, since they lacked the experience to use it to advantage. T h e r e is n o surviving battle plan for the Parliament army at Edgehill, but c o n t e m p o r a r y a c c o u n t s s h o w that its infantry were drawn up in t w o lines of

battalions - as O r m o n d e ' s army had been in Ireland earlier that year - with each regiment f o r m i n g either o n e or t w o b a t t a l i o n s . T h e depth for the Parliament army followed an English variation on the D u t c h model current since the m i d - 1 6 3 0 s , with infantry drawn up eight deep rather than the D u t c h ten, and the cavalry fighting six deep. T h e d e p l o y m e n t o f the P a r l i a m e n t cavalry on its left wing included b o t h c o m m a n d e d m u s k e t e e r plottons of a b o u t 5 0 men e a c h , d r a w n up six deep, a n d light artillery in the m o d e l originated by the Swedes and n o w forming part o f the c o m p o s i t e G e r m a n style. O f the t w o a r m i e s , t h a t o f P a r l i a m e n t thus h a d the m o r e m o d e r n deployment f o r m a t i o n . O n the day, Prince Rupert chose to m a k e an aggressive attack intended to sweep everything before him, while his Parliament opponents stood to receive his attack. T h e Royalist cavalry swept a w a y the cavalry on the Parliament left wing and pursued them off the field, and at this sight one o f the three Parliamentary infantry brigades broke up. However, the surviving Parliament cavalry remained on the battlefield, and the Parliament infantry and cavalry acting together had the advantage over Royalist infantry which the impetuosity of Rupert's cavalry had left without support.

Marston Moor, Donnington and Naseby, 1644-45 After 1 6 4 2 the Royalists made n o further use o f the Swedish tactical style. Prince Rupert's campaign plans for 1 6 4 3 and the early part o f his 1 6 4 4 campaign in the North have not survived, but Gomme's papers include redrawn copies of three other battle plans drawn up by his patron the prince. Together these form a unique insight into the development o f the tactical ideas of this Royalist commander, and the European influences which shaped them. T h e three plans are for the deployment of Royalist armies at the battle o f M a r s t o n M o o r on 2 July 1 6 4 4 ; for the army drawn up to offer battle in O c t o b e r the same year while recovering the artillery it had left at Donnington Castle after the second battle of N e w b u r y (though on that occasion the Parliament army refused battle); and for the battle of N a s e b y on 1 4 J u n e 1 6 4 5 . T h e Royalist battle plan for M a r s t o n M o o r (see page 6 0 , '1') shows changes in Prince Rupert's tactical approach, which was n o w much more G e r m a n in style. T h e infantry are drawn up in three lines, with cavalry squadrons placed

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P r i n c e R u p e r t ' s last b a t t l e plans for t h e Royalist army, a s r e c o r d e d b y Sir B e r n a r d de Gomme. (1) T h e p l a n p r e p a r e d f o r t h e relief of D o n n i n g t o n Castle, 9 N o v e m b e r 1644; t h e a c t i o n never took place, d u e to the failure of t h e Parliamentary c o m m a n d e r s to a g r e e to fight. (2) T h e v e r y s i m i l a r p l a n e m p l o y e d by Prince Rupert at t h e decisive battle of Naseby, 14 J u n e 1 6 4 5 - w h i c h h e lost.

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in support behind the second infantry line and a cavalry reserve behind the third or reserve infantry line. T h e intervals between the infantry lines follow the originally Dutch model, with the distance between the second and third lines being twice that between the first and second, leaving the third line as a final reserve. T h e cavalry on the wings are deployed in t w o lines in a chequerboard pattern, with musketeer plottons in support of the cavalry in the first line, and in each case a flanking regiment has been deployed to the far side of and slightly behind the first line. T h e Royalist deployment also shows that some of the cavalry squadrons were smaller than usual, recalling the c o n t e m p o r a r y debate as to whether large squadrons or a higher number of smaller squadrons represented the optimum deployment.

B a t t l e o f N a s e b y , 14 J u n e 1 6 4 5 : t h e c o p y of Robert Streeter's p l a n t h a t w a s p r i n t e d in J o h n Rushworth's

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in L o n d o n in 1 6 4 7 . T h e r e d u c t i o n of s p a c e b e t w e e n t h e units m a y b e artistic l i c e n c e - s e e P l a t e G . T h i s is t h e v i e w f r o m b e h i n d Fairfax's N e w M o d e l A r m y ; see Plate G for the opposite viewpoint from b e h i n d Rupert's line.

62

Prince Rupert's tactical ideas developed further after his defeat at M a r s t o n M o o r , and his final battle plan, used for deployment at D o n n i n g t o n Castle and for battle at Naseby, shows further variations on the G e r m a n style (see page 6 1 ) . T h e infantry are drawn up in three lines with cavalry support, and the reserve is c o m p o s e d o f alternating cavalry and infantry in a style very similar to that used successfully by the D u e d'Enghien at R o c r o i in 1 6 4 3 (see Plate F ) . In both the D o n n i n g t o n Castle and N a s e b y examples, Prince Rupert had infantry units f r o m each o f his brigades split between both his first and second lines, with separate units in his reserve. T h e cavalry squadrons are n o w deployed directly behind one a n o t h e r in a style used by some G e r m a n Imperialist officers, rather than in c h e q u e r b o a r d fashion (see Plates G & H ) . T h e only surviving plans for the Parliament armies are for M a r s t o n M o o r and Naseby. M a r s t o n M o o r is not typical, as three armies were combined - the t w o Parliament armies of the Eastern Association and the Northern Association and an allied Scottish army. T h e Parliamentary and Scottish deployment at M a r s t o n M o o r showed the influence of Scottish generals w h o had served in the Thirty Years' War. T h e best surviving plan is a sketch drawn by the Scottish M a j G e n J a m e s Lumsden; this shows the combined army with three infantry

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lines, and an unusually strong cavalry f o r m a t i o n . This latter has three lines, each of them - and not only the first - supported with sub-units of c o m m a n d e d musketeers (see page 6 0 , ' 3 ' ) . T h e infantry are formed into tactical brigades each comprising several regiments. This G e r m a n practice was described by Sir James Turner, whose examples of deployments in his b o o k Pallas Armata show infantry in two lines with complete brigades in each line. T h e deployment of the Parliament's N e w M o d e l Army at Naseby is simpler than the opposing Royalist formation, having no musketeer support for its cavalry wings or cavalry support for its infantry. T h e impact of civil w a r changed tactical thinking in England very rapidly, from the Dutch style that was conventional at the beginning o f the w a r to the latest G e r m a n composite style born o f the T h i r t y Y e a r s ' War.

N e w M o d e l A r m y infantry: d e p l o y m e n t of Col T h o m a s R a i n s b o r o u g h ' s r e g i m e n t for its m a r c h t h r o u g h t h e C i t y o f L o n d o n o n 7 A u g u s t 1647, f r o m R i c h a r d E l t o n ' s The

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T h e five

blocks e a c h displaying t w o of t h e ten c o m p a n y colours are e a c h a n n o t a t e d ' 1 0 files o f Pikes', a n d t h e eight flanking blocks alternate b e t w e e n ' 1 3 ' a n d ' 1 2 files o f M u s k e t t i ' , g i v i n g a ratio of t w o musketeers to each pikeman. T h e original a c c o m p a n y i n g

The last word For a c o m m a n d e r in the 1 7 t h century, battle was the riskiest activity o f his c a m p a i g n and his career, offering o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r b o t h o v e r w h e l m i n g success and absolute disaster. H e trained and prepared his troops accordingly, and deployed his army on the battlefield according to the tactical style that he preferred. In terms o f which c a m e first - the general's battle plan or the ground he w o u l d fight over - the answer in this period is the battle plan. Typically, the preferred d e p l o y m e n t w a s t h o u g h t t h r o u g h at the outset o f the campaign, and then amended to suit changing strengths in his army and the nature o f the ground he encountered. C o n t e m p o r a r y evidence f o r any battle in this period is f r a g m e n t a r y , whether from surviving a c c o u n t s , f r o m records o f pay, muster or supply, or from battlefield archaeology. Essentially, we have pieces o f a puzzle but will never have all o f them. O n e advantage in understanding battlefield tactics from the c o n t e m p o r a r y c o m m a n d e r ' s perspective is t h a t it is possible t o understand w h a t he intended to do on the battlefield and w h a t he had trained his men to d o , and to use this to e x p a n d our interpretation o f other records and evidence.

c a p t i o n r e a d s : 'This R e g i m e n t being thus drawn up they s t a n d in t h e l e n g t h o f t h e i r F r o n t o r B a t t a l i a , 150 a b r e s t , a n d six in t h e i r d e p t h , h a v i n g t w o thirds of Musketiers, a n d o n e of Pikes, their n u m b e r a m o u n t i n g in all t o 9 0 0 m e n , e a c h particular c o m p a n y c o n s i s t i n g o f 15 files, a n d c o n t a i n i n g in e a c h o f t h e m 90 m e n a p i e c e , b u t t h e Field-Officers C o m p a n i e s a r e m a n y t i m e s larger.' Again, w e must remember that t h e b l o c k s s h o w n in t h e p l a n are not 'companies', w h i c h w e r e administrative entities that w e r e divided to form the tactical blocks of pike a n d shot.

63

INDEX References to illustrations are shown in bold. Aelian 5 , 4 0 Alton raid ( 1 6 4 3 ) 2 5 Alva, Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of 2 7 arquebusiers 5, 2 4 , 2 7 , 2 8 , 3 2 , 4 3 , 51 artillery Danish 4 6 Dutch 2 5 , 4 3 English 61 German 15 Swedish 2 5 , D (31), 5 1 , 52 Barret, Robert 2 7 , 3 0 Barriffe, William, 4 9 , 52 books by 5 5 , 5 6 Barry, Gerat: books by 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 4 5 Billon, Jean de 4 4 Bingham, John 4 , 7, 1 3 , 3 3 - 3 5 Bishops'War ( 1 6 3 9 - 4 0 ) 5 6 - 5 7 , 5 6 Breitenfeld, battle of ( 1 6 3 1 ) 17, 2 0 , 2 3 , 4 5 , 49-51, 52-54 Brill, capture of 5 Caesar, Julius 5, 33 cavalry 1 7 - 1 8 , 17 Croat F (47) Danish B (19) Dutch 1 5 , 17, 1 8 , 4 2 - 4 3 English E (34), H (59), 6 0 , 6 1 - 6 3 French 3 2 , F (47) heavy 14, 15 infantry defence against 2 1 Spanish 2 8 , 32 Swedish 1 8 , 5 1 , 5 2 Cecil, Sir Edward 7 - 8 , 4 3 command and control 2 1 - 2 4 Conde, Prince de (Due d'Enghien) 4 6 confrontation tactics 2 0 - 2 4 , 2 1 , 5 3 - 5 4 Courbouzon, Louis de Montgomery, Sieur de 44 Cromwell, Oliver 12, 51 Cruso, John 12, 2 5 Danish armies B (19), 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 6 Dillich, Wilhelm 4 4 Donnington Castle, relief of ( 1 6 4 4 ) , 6 1 , 6 1 , 62 dragoons 17, 2 4 , 2 5 , 4 3 Dunes, Battle of the ( 1 6 5 8 ) 6 Dutch armies artillery 2 5 , 4 3 battalions A ( 1 0 ) , 3 5 - 3 6 brigades 4 0 - 4 2 cavalry 1 5 , 17, 1 8 , 4 2 - 4 3 companies 3 7 - 3 8 formations 5, 9 - 1 1 , 12, 1 3 , 1 5 , 16, 1 8 , B (19), 3 2 - 4 3 , 3 3 , 4 0 , 4 1 reforms 4 - 6 , 7 - 8 , A (10), 1 1 , 3 2 - 4 3 shot and firing systems A (10), 3 5 , 3 9 - 4 0 Dutch Revolt 5 , 7 - 1 1 , 16, 2 7 , 2 8 Edgehill, battle of ( 1 6 4 2 ) 2 1 , E ( 3 4 ) , 6 0 - 6 1 English armies artillery 61 cavalry E (34), H ( 5 9 ) , 6 0 , 6 1 - 6 3 confrontation tactics 2 1 , 2 4 formations E ( 3 4 ) , G (50), 5 6 - 6 3 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 58,60-63

64

musketeers G ( 5 0 ) , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 6 3 pikemen 6 3 English Civil Wars ( 1 6 4 2 - 5 1 ) 2 1 , 2 4 , 2 5 , E (34), G (50), 5 6 - 6 3 Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of 6 0 Fairfax, Sir Thomas 51 French armies 18, 3 2 , 3 9 , 4 4 - 4 5 , F (47) Frontinus, Sextus Julius 33 German armies 1 3 - 1 5 , 17, 4 5 , 5 5 German mercenaries D (31), 3 2 , 51 Gheyn, J a c o b de: books by 3 6 , 4 4 Gomme, Sir Bernard de: plans by E (34), G ( 5 0 ) , 60, 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 1 Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden 12, 2 3 , 4 6 - 4 8 , 51, 5 2 - 5 3 , 60 Hamilton raid ( 1 6 5 0 ) 2 5 Hardenberg, battle of ( 1 5 8 0 ) 9 Henri IV, king of France 32 Henri, Due de Rohan 4 4 Hexham, Henry 3 2 , 3 6 , 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 2 - 4 3 books by 4 0 Horn, Gustav 3 0 Hugo, Hermann 5 5 Irish Revolt ( 1 6 4 2 )

57-58,57

James II, king of England, Scotland and Ireland (formerly Duke of York) 16 Johann of Nassau 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 4 , 4 6 Julich, siege of 12 La Rochelle, siege Lambert, Maj Gen Leo VI, Byzantine Lipsius, Justus 4 , Livy 5 , 3 3 , 38

of ( 1 6 2 8 ) 3 8 , 4 5 John 2 5 emperor 5 33-35

London, march through ( 1 6 4 7 ) 63 Lumsden, MajGen Sir James: plans by 33,60,62-63 Lutter, battle of ( 1 6 2 6 ) 12 Ltitzen, battle of ( 1 6 3 2 ) 12, 2 3 , 4 9 , 52, 54 Macchiavelli, Niccolo 3 3 , 35 Mackay's Regiment 4 6 , 52 Marston Moor, battle of ( 1 6 4 4 ) 6 0 , 61-62 Maurice, Prince of Orange and Count of Nassau 4 as commander 7 - 8 , 12, 15 influence 4 3 - 4 6 reforms 4 - 6 , 7 - 8 , A (10), 1 1 , 3 2 - 4 3 Mechlin, siege of ( 1 5 7 2 ) 2 8 Melzo, Ludovico 5 5 Mendoza, Bernardino de 2 8 M o n k , George 1 1 , 17, 18, 2 4 - 2 5 , 5 6 , 5 7 Montecuccoli, Raimondo 13, 18, 5 5 , 58 Munro, Robert 2 3 , 4 9 , 5 2 - 5 4 , 5 7 musketeers 3 6 Danish B (19) Dutch A (10), B (19) English G (50), 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 6 3 French 3 9 and raids 2 5 Spanish 2 7 , 3 0 Swedish 17, C ( 2 2 ) , 4 8 , 5 2 , 5 3 , 5 4

Naseby, battle of (1645) 2 1 , G (50), 5 8 , 6 1 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 62 Newbury, first battle of (1643) 24 Nieupoort, battle of (1600) 6, 7 - 8 , 16 Ormonde, Earl of 5 7 - 5 8 Orrery, Earl of 12, 1 3 , 2 3 - 2 4 Pfaffenhofen, battle of (1633) D (31) pikemen 3 6 Dutch 5 English 63 Spanish 2 7 , 2 8 , 2 9 - 3 0 , 30 Swedish C (22), 48 Praissac, Sieur du: books by 8, 9 - 1 1 , 2 5 , 4 4 raids 2 4 - 2 6 recruitment 4 2 Rocroi, battle of (1643) F (47) Roermonde, siege of (1572) 8 Rupert, Prince 12, 3 5 , 5 1 , 5 8 , 6 0 - 6 2 shot and firing systems Dutch A (10), 3 5 , 3 9 - 4 0 Spanish 2 8 , 2 9 - 3 2 , 3 0 Swedish 4 9 - 5 1 , 5 5 Spanish army 2 6 - 3 2 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 30, 4 5 , F (47) Steenwijk 35 Swedish army aggressiveness 12 artillery 2 5 , D (31), 5 1 , 52 cavalry 1 8 , 5 1 , 5 2 confrontation tactics 20 formations C (22), D (31), 4 6 - 5 5 , 53, 5 4 , 55 musketeers 17, C (22), 4 8 , 52, 5 3 , 5 4 pikemen C (22), 4 8 shot and firing systems 4 9 - 5 1 , 55 Swiss militia 43 terrain broken 2 4 choice of 1 6 - 1 7 Thirty Years' War ( 1 6 1 8 - 4 8 ) 12, 2 3 , D ( 3 1 ) , 43-55 see also Breitenfeld, battle of Tilly, Jean t'Serclaes, Count 12, 2 0 , 2 3 , 4 5 , 51,54 Tournhout, battle of (1597) 15 triplex acies 8, 35 Troupitzen, Laurentius a: books by 4 8 , 53 Turenne, Marechal 16 Turner, Sir James books by 7 on English Civil War 24 general advice 1 1 , 17, 2 0 , 2 1 - 2 3 , 37 on German practice 1 3 - 1 5 , 6 3 Valdes, Francisco de 2 6 - 2 7 Vegetius, Flavius 33 Vernon, John 25 Walhausen, Johann Jacobi von 4 4 , 4 6 , 55 Wallenstein, Albrecht von 6, 4 5 , 55 Waller, Sir William 25 Watts, Dr William 2 0 , 2 3 , 3 5 , 54, 57, 60 Waymouth, George 11 Waymouth, John 4 0 weapons 14, 2 4 White Mountain, battle of (1620) 12

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The history of military forces, artefacts,

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Pike and Shot Tactics 1590-1660 Drawing upon years of research into period documents, this book explains and illustrates one of the key turning points in military history, when the potential of gunpowder infantry weapons was first fully exploited. At the turn of the 17th century the Dutch, revolting against Spain, pioneered this great step forwards, harnessing disciplined mixed formations of musketeers and pikemen to the rediscovered tactical skills of ancient Rome. This doctrine was developed during the Thirty Years'War, and came to dominate the battlefields of the English Civil War. Illustrated with contemporary engravings and original colour plates, this book reveals how armies of pike and shot, cavalry and artillery were deployed by Dutch, Swedish, German and English generals, and how they ruled European battlefields for a century. Full colour artwork • Unrivalled detail • Engravings from period manuals

US $18.95 UK £11.99

CAN $22.00 IS B N 978-1-84603-469-5

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