Special Forces Camps in Vietnam 1961- 70 ~ --- - - ------------------------------------------------ GORDON L ROTTMAN entered the US Army in 1967 , vo ...
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Special Forces Camps in Vietnam 1961- 70
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GORDON L ROTTMAN
entered the US Army in 1967 , vo lunt e e re d for Special Forces and c o m p le t e d training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam from 1969-70 a nd subsequently in ai rborne infantry, long-range patrol, and intellige nce assignments until retiring after 26 ye a rs. He w as a s pecia l operat ions force s scenario wri t er a t the Joint Readiness Training Cent er for 12 years , and is no w a fre elance writer.
CHRIS TAYLOR was born
in Ne wcastle, UK , but now live s in London . After attending art coll e ge in his home t own, he graduat ed in 1995 fr om Bourn emouth Uni ve rsi ty wit h a degree in compute r graphics. Sin ce then he has worked in the graphics industry a n d is currently a freelan ce illustra tor for va r io us publishing co m pa nie s. H e has a ke en interest in filmmakin g and is c ur re ntl y co-producing a movie .
Fort ress· 33
OSPREY PUBLI SHIN G
Special Forces Camps in Vietnam 1961-70
Go rd on L Rottm an· Illustrate d by Chri s Tayl or Ser ies edito r s Marcus Cowp er and N ikol ai Bogdanov ic
Fir st published in 200S by O sprey Publishing, Midla nd H ouse.
Aut h or 's a ck nowled gment s
West W rry, Botley, Oxfor d OX2 OPH, UK 443 Par k Avenue Sout h, New York, N Y 100 16, USA E-mail: info@ ospreypublishing.com
© 200S Osprey Publishing Ltd. A ll r ights reserved.Apart from any fair dealing for tile purpose 01 private study, research, cr it icism or review, as permitted under the Co pyr ight, D esigns and Patents Act, 1988. no part of t his publicati on may be rep rod uced, sto red in a retrieval system,
The author is indeb ted to Colonel Roger H. C. Donlon, for mer com mander of Detachment A~726, for his insight o n the layout of Camp Nam Dong and the July 1964 attack.The author is also very gratefu l to Steve Sherman of RADIX Press for the research materials, photographs, and advice he provide d, Frank M.Tho mas, a former combat artist, was kind eno ugh to provide two of his prints to illustr ate this book.
or t ransmitte d in any form or by any means, elect ro nic, electrical, chemi cal, mechanical, o pt ical, photocopy ing. recording or otherw ise, without the pr io r wri tten permis sion of t he co pyright ow ner. Enquiries should be addressed to th e Publishers.
ISBN I 84176 El39 I
D esign: Ken Vail Graphi c D esign, Cambridge, UK
Im age c redits Unless otherwise indicated, t he photographic images and line draw ings that appear in this work are from the aut hor's collection and US Government sources.
Index by Bob Munro Originated by The Elect ronic Page Co mpany,C wmb ran. UK Pri nted in China t hrough Bookbu ilde r s 05 06 07 OB 09
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
A CI P catalog reco rd for this boo k is available from t he Bri t ish Libra ry.
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NORTH A MERICA O sprey D irect, 2427 Bond Street, Un iver sity Par k, IL 6046 6, USA
Mea s urem e nt s Distances, ranges, and dime nsions of mate rials and constructions are given in inches , feet , yards, and statute miles rather than met ric: inches to centimeters feet to meters yards to meters miles to kilometers
multiply inches by 2.540 multiply feet by 0.3048 multiply yards by 0,9144 multiply miles by 1.6093
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Readers may car e to note that prints of Nom Dong Standoff (pA7) and ClDG Hunter-Killers (p. 5) are available for private sale.All enqu ires shou ld be addressed to: Frank M.Tho mas Wi ld Goose Creek Studios 210 North 100 East Ho lden, Utah 85636
USA http: //www.w ildgoosecreekstudio.co m/ The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upo n th is matter.
T h e F o rt r e s s St u dy Grou p (FSG) The object of th e FSG is to advance th e education of the public in the study of all aspects of fortifications and their armam ents, especially works con str ucted to mount or res ist artillery.The FSG holds an annual co nference in Sept ember ove r a lo ng wee kend with visits and evening lect ures. an annua l tour abroad lasting abou t eight days. and an annual Members' Day. The FSG journal FORT is published an nually, and its newsl etter Casema te is published three times a year. Membe rship is international. For furthe r details. please contact: The Secretary, c/o 6 lanark Place. London W9 IBS,UK
Contents Introduction
4
The threat
7
Camp design
II
Camp construction
23
Construction materials • Construction principles
Camp defense
35
The defenders • Co nduct of the defense
The test of battle
47
Attack o n Nam Dong • Battle for Lac Ninh • Fall of Lang Vei
Aftermath
61
Glossary
63
Bibliography
63
Index
64
Introd uction
A ClOG Camp Strike Force company departs for a patro l. In th e background is a typica l camp wood-frame adm inistrative building. Such buildings w ere
not provided with protect ion. An ou td oor m ovie scre en is mounted
on t he bu ilding's side .
4
US Army Special Forces (USSF) was organized in 1952 and trained to infiltrate behind en emy lines during a conventional or n uclear war, make con tact with indigenou s resistance forces, develop a rapport with the partisans , an d organize, train and supply them to conduct a guerrilla war in the ene my's rear areas. It was originally envisaged to estab lish partisan forces in Eastern Europe in the event of a Soviet in vasion of th e West. USSF soo n expanded, with n ew respon sibilities assigned for Asia an d Latin America . USSF also had oth er missions. Its personnel were able to tr ain special operation s forces of friendly countr ies along th eir ow n lin es, recover personnel from beh ind enemy lin es, and collect strategic intelligen ce information during missions deep wit hi n en em y te rritory. In 1961, in a country that few ha d h eard of, USSF was tasked with a differ ent mission; one that was essen tiall y th e opposite of its pr ima ry mi ssion. The Republic of Vietnam (Sout h Vietnam) was im mersed in a wide -ranging gue rrilla war th at was supported by the com m un ist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). USSF elem ents were first sent there in 1959 to assist in train ing South Vietnamese Special Forces. Th e war contin ued to escalate and by 1961 it h ad spread into remo te areas, ove r which th e gove rnment h ad little control. Although South Viet nam was a compara tively sma ll country, the extremely rugged land in cluded vast remote areas in the n orthern moun ta ins , the rolling and foreste d Central Highlan ds, th e de nse jungles in the southcentral area, and th e en dless marshe s of the Mekong Delta in the south. The re were few roads, ma ny area s being accessible only by air. Th ese remote area s were inhabited by a vari ety of ethnic m inority groups that the Vietna mes e usua lly ign ored. The Viet Cong, however, did not ign ore th em . They not only explo ited th ese primitive peoples, but also converted them to th eir cause as a result of the South Vietnamese Governme nt's indifference or mistreatment. It soon became apparen t th at the Viet Cong (VC) were establishing major base areas in these remote regions and enlisting th e support of the local mi norities. The locals had little choice in the matter and any resistance on their part was dealt with brut ally. If help had been provided, they would rather have sided with the indifferent government of South Vietnam. Communism was no t to their likin g.
USSF was assigned th e miSSIOn of estab lish in g th emselves in the se areas, tr aini ng local secu rity fo rces to protect villages from t he VC, and even tu ally formi ng coun ter guerrilla forces to hara ss an d destroy th e Vc. In orde r to cond uct this m ission, USSF had to h ave base s from which to o perate. To this end, the first crude cam ps were establish ed in th e Cen tral Highl ands in 1961. They were simple, austere, unsophisticated in design, and buil t from lo cally available materials. The local fo rces we re recruited un der a n um ber of differen t CIA-spo n sore d prog ra ms (Bo rder Surveillance, Trail Watchers, Mountain Commandos), but in 196 2 th ey were co nso lida ted into th e Civilian Irregul ar Defe nse Gro up (ClOG). Th e ClOG were no t part of the Army of the Republic of Vietn am (ARVN), but were essen ti ally m ercena ries organ ized, t rain ed, clothed, fed, eq uipped, and paid by th e US Go vern m en t . Over the years the program grew and the cam ps evolved. By 1970 the re were over 80 cam ps, each h om e to a batt alio n-size strike force tasked with co nd uctin g aggressive cou nt er-guerrilla operati on s through ou t South Vietnam . A 12- 14-ma n Special Fo rces A-team advised each camp alongside a South Vietnamese Special Forces coun terpart team . Th e cam ps were locate d in some of the most rem ote area s of South Vietnam an d on Wide ly varied terrain . Cut off from civilizat ion, they were more akin to Old West frontier army posts within Indian Territory an d sur rounded by h ostile an d capable foes. Many were beyond friendly ar tillery range and very much on th eir own . As th e cap abiliti es of the VC increased, the war escalated, North Vietn amese Army (NVA) regulars moved south , and the cam ps evolved too. Camp defen ses were im proved and hard ened to resist large-scale an d in creasingl y aggressive attacks. In 1966 "fighting cam ps" were developed. All new cam ps were built under th is con cept and existing cam ps were u pgrad ed. [f th ey were too small or h ad deteriorated from use over a long period of time, they were relocated and new camps bu ilt. The fighting cam ps had in creased defen ses and an in ner perimeter capabl e of holding out even if th e ou ter perimeter ha d been penetrated . In th e flood-prone Mekong Delta "floating camps" were co nstructed. Team houses, barracks, supp ly roo ms, am munition bunkers, and other support facilities were built on floatin g platforms design ed to rise with th e floodwaters. Another type was the "subsurface camp," built in som e areas adjace n t to the borde r cam ps tha t received heavy an d freq uent she lling. In these location s it made sen se that all facilities and qu arters were com pletely buried. No two cam ps were alike. They were built to co nform to th e terrain an d th e ideas of the USSF tea m . They may have been square, recta ngular, triangu lar, fivepo in ted stars , five-, six- o r eight-sided, o r irregu larly shaped. The defen ses included mortar and artillery positio n s, recoilless rifle positio ns (whe n the North Vietname se bega n using tanks), and mac hine gu n bun kers and towers. Extremely dense and elaborate barbed wire barrier systems surroun ded th e cam ps, as did scores of Claymore mi nes, trip flares, plmji stakes, an d moats in some cases. The cam ps were self-contai ned. Besides housing th e strik e force, th eir families often lived in th e cam ps. Power generators provid ed electri city. There were water wells an d reserve rations were sufficient for a 30-day Siege. Each cam p had a fully equipped dispen sary for both th e troops and the ir de pendents, a school for the ch ildren, ba rber and tailor shops, a motor pool an d veh icle maintenance shop, even a cafe. Many cam ps possessed an airstrip and helicop ter pad ; others in th e mo untains d id not and had to be resupplied by parach ut e drop.
C1DG Hunter Killers. USSF adviso rs and CIDG ro und up Viet Cong suspects in a t-lon ragnard village in no rth ern South Vietn am.Thatch and rattan -built Montagnard lon g houses (as pictu red he re) were constructed in the early camps for use as team houses. supply roo ms, and barracks. (Frank M.Thomas ®)
5
The first camp was built at Buon Enao, a Mon tag na rd tribal village in the remote Cen tral Highl ands. In 1961 the VC we re explo iti ng the
OU.. NG Til l
LOCATION OF 5th SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENTS
I'" '2
43 44 45 46 47 4ll 49 50 51
52 53 54 55 56 57 sa
59 60 6 I 62 63 64 65 66 67 6B 69 10 71 72 73 74
75 76 17 18 79 80 81 62 83 B4
~
THUA THIEN
31 Augusl 1967 Lon 9 vei 00 'la"'J QOOll!j Nom 'ne n Phuoe I( ~ o", Due Tm Bong 110 Thanh M\nh L on9 Bo To 10 G;o Vue II Pol oi I(I on9 12 O o ~ Po ~ 13 Dok Soon9 14 00. To 15 Moog aok i 6 f{onlum 11 Plol oou Gi 16 Pl oi Mm n'] 19 Plei Ojcr en9 20 Due Go 21 PI.l ku 2 2 Plel M. 23 Moi Li nh 24 Vinh Thanh 2 5 Du; Nilan 26 VOnConll 21 Pho tee 2B C" n9 Son '29 Oonq Tro 30 Buon Bl och 3 1 Troo9 Phoa 3'2 BoO Me Thuol 33 l aC TIl ,on 3 4 ftn Loc 35 Trang Don9 36 Nho 1 '0 09 37 00ll!j 8 0 n ;n 36 Due L Op 39 Nh"" Co 40 Ton 1'0; 4 1 Luo"'l 5 0<1 4 2 Tanh Lin h I 2 3 4 5 6 1 6 9
-j
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81
surroun ding region of some 200 villages. Working from th is little Village with a popul ation of 200, USSF establishe d an expa n ding system of camps and trained local self-defense forces. By 1962, when the ClOG Program was launched, all 200 villages we re protected from the V'C. Th is simple progra m involved only a few d ozen USSF soldi ers, b ut it m ad e higher commands realize that large areas could b e secured an d bro ugh t under government con trol by employing well-led local forces. Th is allowed conventiona l comb at forces to conduct offens ive operations to search ou t an d destroy th e elusive Ve. Th ey n eed n ot b e tied down protecting populations in remote areas from exploitation. ." In iti ally USSF teams were d epl oye d to Vietnam and attached to US Mili tary Adv isory Gro u p, Vietnam. In 19 62 US Army Special For ces, Vietn am (Provis ional) was for m ed to control all in -cou ntry USSF elemen ts. The Lst, Sth, an d 7th Spec ial Forces Gro u ps (Airborne) (SFGA) provided the team s on six-mon th tem po rary duty tours. In 1964 th is pro vi sional structure was replace d by p hasing-in th e 5th SFGA, which was directly sub or dinate to US Military Assistance Command, Viet n am (MACV); USSF personnel were rotat ed for one-yea r ® HQ 5 1h SFGA • A tou rs. Vie tnam was d ivid ed into * Company Hq four corps tactical zo nes (CTZ), with c as 50 15 I I' i a USSF company bein g res ponsib le " I o l5 50 75 'OOK 'LO"E TER S for team s in each CTZ. A USSF "company" is really a mis n o mer. It consis ted of a Special For ces ope ration al detach me n t C (C-tea m) com m an de d by a lieuten an t colon el wi th ov er 70 USSF personn el, a complete comma nd staff, communications, an d lo gistical support activ it ies wi th indigenou s personn el provid ing th e ma n p ower. It controlled several B-teams (some 30 USSF personnel) located in provi nc ial capita ls, wh ich in tu rn co n trolled severa l 12- 14-m an A-teams respo ns ib le for t h e strike forc e ca m ps. Each team at all echelons h ad a counterpart Vietnamese Spec ial Forces te am , the Luc-Iucng DacBiet (LLDB). Spe cial For ces' involvement in Vietn am was a co mplex an d multi -facetted affai r. Th is b ook d iscusses the strike camps, wh ich pla yed a key role. For fu rther information on Specia l Forces in Vietnam the reade r is referr ed to th e followin g Osprey bo oks: Elite 4 US Arm y Special Forces 1952-84; Elite 29 Vietn am A irborne; and Warr ior 28 Green Beret ill Vietnam 1957-73. d~ l o ch m . n l ~
!
Locatio n of 5th Special Forces Grou p detachm ents, August 1,1967.
6
The threat The design, construct ion, and materials used for strike camps, as with any fortificat ion, were based on th e na ture of th e th reat. Th e prim ary threat was cons idered to be a night assault by light in fan try supported by comparatively ligh t crew-served weapo ns. In th e early days of the war a rein forced VC battalion m ight be em ployed again st the lightly defen ded cam ps . Reinforcem en ts might include sappers en d addi tional crew-served weapo ns. In later atta cks a rein forced VC or NVA regi m ent wo uld condu ct th e assau lt . These lat er attacks someti m es involved a
siege an d part of th e regim ent or ot he r units would be requi red to secure do minating terrain features such as hillto ps, block gro und rein fo rcement routes, an d secu re nearby helicop ter land in g zones. A camp siege req uired signi fican t support from anti-aircraft weapo ns, as Free World Forces' air power would ente r th e picture in the form of close air support, airdrop of supplies, and he lico pte r insertion of reinforcement s and relief forces, not just in the ca mp, bu t also in adjace nt areas. Extensive use was made of tr an spo rt troo ps to ma n-pack am munition and sup plies to the vicinity of the target camp. An attack was preceded by a thorough recon naissance of t he cam p and the surro unding area. Targets for crew-served weapons would be selected and speci fic weap o n s assign ed to these targets. Key targets were perimeter machine gun bunkers, mo rtar positions, o th er crew-served weapo ns, USSF and LLDB team houses, the ta ctical operat io ns center, and the co m m unications bunker. Informers in side the camp were sometimes availab le to provide informati on . It was n ot un common for at least some VC to have infiltrated a strike force by sign ing up as ClOG. There were also a few in stances where VC sympa thizers actively sUPP\Hted th e attack from with in the camp by kn ocking out key facilit ies, weapons, o r ind ividuals. The Ve/NVA would also determ ine th e sym pat h ies of local villagers. While most were loyal to the South Vietnamese Govern me nt, th ey co uld be in tim idated to provid e in formati on or to coo pe rate by providing information, food, supp lies, gu ides , man -packing sup plies, o r sim ply keeping th eir mou th s sh ut. Freq uently loca l village rs provid ed wo rd of an im pending attack, h aving bee n approached by the VC o r witnessed their activi ties. Th e VC/NVA also sought inform ation about local patrol routes and schedules, ou tposts, guard pos t location s, camp routine, the constru cti on and patt ern of barbed wire barriers and other obstacles, mine locations, numbers and ty pes of crew-served weapon s, and th e lo cati ons, possible routes and land ing zo nes that relief forces might ut ilize. The attackers wo uld stoc kpile am m uni tion and su pplies (pa rtic ularly ratio ns, medical suppli es, and water) in the area in hidden cache s. Movemen t rou te s, assem bly area s, attack position s, su p portin g crew-served weapo ns locati on s, an d attack po in ts would be reconnoitered and selected. The bul k of th e actual att ack force wou ld arrive in th e area o nly a short time before the attack in ord er to redu ce th e cha nces of detection . A scale model of the cam p was usually prepared to brief the leader s. Reh earsals were conduct ed, usually in an area a considerab le distance fro m the cam p itself. Defen ses against infantry and sapper att acks required mu ltiple den se barb ed wire ba rriers and othe r obstacles. The effect ive de ployme nt of mach ine guns and mo rtars in mutu ally su ppo rti ng positio ns was essen tial. While it was necessary to cover all approach es, multiple weapo ns were also required to cove r each sector or approach in the even t on e or m ore were kn ocked out. Regardless
7
A camp could lo ok ext remely rundown and battered.They were never finished. being co nstantly rebuilt. rep aired. and upgraded .
8
of th e density of barriers, the effectiv e emplacem ent of weap on s, fire coordinatio n, and the use of mines and trip flares, the most effective mean s of defense was constan t vigilance. Th e design and constructio n of camps took in to consideration the types of weapons the attackers would employ. These '....ere gene rally relatively light an d were seldo m employed in large numbers, altho ugh there were exceptions when signi ficant numbers of mortars or mach in e guns, for exa mple, were employed. The suppo rti ng weapons em ployed by the attackers could be divided into five broad catego ries: • Mach ine guns and small arms: these were direct-fire weapons, usually of 7.62mm caliber, but they offered o nly limited penetration of fortification materials. Th ey were employed for suppressive fire on th e perimeter and of course were used in th e assault. Protection from snip er fire was a concern at some camp s. Machine guns of 12.7mm caliber were also employed and were excellent for providing supp ressive fire owing to their great er pen etratio n . However, most of these were reserved for use as anti-aircraft weapo ns. • Recoilless rifles and RPGs (rocket -prop elled grena des): th e most commo n recoilless rifles ,..'ere the 57m m and 7Sm m, eithe r US-mad e or Chin ese copies, alo ng wit h the Soviet -made 73mm recoilless gu n . Th ese weapo ns achi eved relatively light penetration of fo rtificati on materials and their terminal effects (inside th e fortificatio n) were nom inal as th eir shapedcha rge warhea ds were designed to defeat ta nks. Th e 73m m recoilless gun achieved better penetration, as did the shoulder-fired RPG-2s and RPG-7s, but th ese were short-range weapo ns.
• Mortars: 60 m m, 82m m, an d 120mm mortars were ex tremely effective fire su pport weapons and could cause a great deal of dam age, especia lly if delay fuses were ava ilab le to perm it high explosive rounds to penetrate bu nker roofs . Mor ta rs were in effect th e VC/K VA's artillery. In m ost in stances, prolon ged co ncent rated mortar fire caus ed the most damage and the ma jority of casua lties within camps, • Free-fligh t rockets: l 07m m, 122m m , and 140m m unguided rockets were often less than effective wh en fired at camps; as a resu lt, th ey were seldo m used. Because of the crude expedient launchers from wh ich th ey were fired th ey we re notoriou sly inaccurate, and so it was d ifficult to hit sma ll cam ps. They proved to be more effecti ve again st air bases and larger Free World bases. • Grenade s and dem olitions: hand-delivered explosives were carried by sappers and assau lt tro ops to enable them to breech obstacles and destroy bunkers and ot her facilities . Satchel charges, po le cha rges, and bangalore torpedoes were the typ es mos t co m mo n ly employed,
/
/ ,I
II II I
The VC/KVA lacked conventional field artillery until near th e war's end, so this was not a ma jor
concern; nor was air attack. Some consideration was given to the th reat of tank att ack d epending
on the camp's location . This was not a major co nc ern in much of the mountainous n ort h or the
sout hern wate rlogged Mekong Delta, nor for cam ps located far from th e bord er. Cam ps close to the border and on tank-accessible terrain d id ta ke precau tions and positioned reco illess rifles for antita nk defen se. From 1967, cam ps in particularly da ngerous loca tions were prov ided wit h jeepmounted l 06mm recoill ess ritles and ad ditional d isposable , sho ulder-fired M72 ligh t anti-armor weapon s (LAW). In 1968 and 1969 two border camps were atta cked by PT-76 light ta nks, with one of the camps being overrun . Most attacks o ccu rred at night, aft er the inhabitants had turned in . Att acks were seldo m launched just before dawn , but aro und m idnight, beca use th e attackers need ed t h e m aximu m amount of darkness to co m plete th e assault, co nsolida te , and wit h d raw fro m th e area . A daylight withdrawal under air att ack could be as costly as th e attack on the cam p itself. It was a mistake to consider certain areas as unlikely attack routes in the co nven tion al sens e. The VC/NVA were just as likely - or even mo re likely - to attack acro ss an airfield or ot her open area, from an ad jacent river, out of a swam p, or t hrough a shallow flooded area. Some cam ps made th e mi stak e of assumin g tha t the enemy would not atta ck from a secto r between th e cam p and a nearb y village,
T he 7 1ft radio ante nna tower was critical to a camp's survival, linking it with adjace nt camps, fire suppo rt bases, and its contro lling B-t eam.
9
Even if a self-defens e force protect ed the village, the en em y would q uietly infiltrate th e narrow area between the camp an d village and attack from tha t direction. The design of Special Fo rces camps evolved as th e ClOG Program grew, th e camps were dee med more permane nt rather than temporary defen sive measures, th e VC/KVA becam e mo re aggressive, addition al resources beca me available to USSF, and ene my capabilities and tactics cha nged. Facto rs affect ing the design of camps included th e nature of the terra in on wh ich they were buil t, local weather conditio ns, th e availability of local materials, const ruct ion reso urces, and th e degree and nature of the threat s faced by speci fic camp s. The early camps in th e Central Highla nds \....ere con side red te m pora ry in na ture. It was hoped th at an area could be pacified (rid of VC), o r at least th e local VC capabilities could be sufficien tly degraded so that o nly m inimal village self-defen se forces were necessary. Tha t is how the early cam ps were viewed: defensive outposts from wh ich to guard local villages. The early cam ps initially possessed very light fortificatio ns an d min im al obstacles. In man y areas th e on ly threat s were probes and ha rassing sniper fire. Ofte n the local VC did not possess th e strength or wherewitha l to mou nt an ou tright att ack on even these m ini mall y defen ded outposts. In many areas VC capabilities increased as weapo ns, equipment , and supplies flowed into South Vietna m fro m Nor th Vietnam via th e Ho Ch i Minh Trail. wtth increased capabilities and the fielding of bet ter-train ed and more h eavily armed VC Main Force units, the enemy grew bolder and atta cks o n camps became more frequen t. In some in stances camps were o verrun. In response, camps were hard en ed, den ser defen ses and inne r perim eters were built, strike forces were inc reased in size, training became mor e form alized, and additional crew-served weapons were provided. A significa nt threat existed in th e form of the Bo Til Lints Da c C61lg, o r Spec ial Attack Cor ps . Th ese "sappers" were specially trained assault and reconnaissan ce tro op s. They were tra ine d to infiltrat e through barb ed wire barriers, cut and mark assault rou tes, neutra lize Claymore mines and trip flares, and att ack ta rgets within th e cam p with demo lition charges. Sapp ers also oft en conducte d much of th e pre-assault reconnaissance of cam ps.
10
Camp design Th e up graded and hard en ed cam ps were termed "figh ting cam ps," the first being Plei Djereng under A-2SI located in th e Centr al Highl ands. Fighting cam ps were more than just a base of operation s from which to co nduct local pat rols and protect nearb y villa ges. They were design ed to withstand major det ermined assaults and prolonged sieges, an d to provide a lau nch site for aggre ssive co mba t operations in each camp's tactical area of respon sibility (fAOR). Ideally, strike co m panies would oper ate up to six m iles from thei r camp. This mean t tha t th e border camps would, if possible, be positioned 12 mil es apar t . Because of terrain restric tio ns and insufficient fo rces to man all the camps necessary, the ave rage distan ce betw een border cam ps was actua lly 17 mil es, even furth er in more rugged areas. It is often said th at th e best defen se is a good offense, and this is no less tru e for the secur ity of a Specia l Forces camp. An aggressive plan of com bat and reconnaissan ce operatio ns throughout a ca m p's TAOR, frequ en t secu rity patrols aro und the cam p, outpos ts pos itioned o n key terrain, am bushes established at nigh t on ap proach es, an d favora ble relatio ns and a goo d intelligence net established in local villages d id as much to prot ect the cam ps . as th e most fo rmidab le defen ses. Th e co nce pt of the harden ed figh ting cam p came about as a result of a determined VC attack on Cam p Nam Dong in I e TZ in July 1964. After a heavy m ortar barr age, mu ltiple attacks struc k the cam p and overran th e o ute r perim eter. The cam p held ou t because it h ad an inner perimeter con ta ining key faciliti es and m ort ar po siti on s. The con cept of a well-fort ified in n er perimet er capable of holding out even if th e rest of the camp was overwhelme d became mandatory practice . The Fren ch had bu ilt h undreds of small concrete squad pillboxes all over th e country to control and secure roads, railroads, int ersections, and bridges. Of cou rse, this sort of Widely scatt ered static defen se relying on mobile reaction forces failed. Th ey co ntro lled nothing except that which was within ran ge of th eir ma chine guns. At night th ey were on th eir own as relief forces were easily am bushed and delayed lon g enough for the little pillb oxes to be overrun . Strike cam ps encountered a similar problem as th ey were usually locat ed in even more remote areas and night time relief was impracticaL The cam ps though were usually of sufficient streng th to en able the m to hol d out unt il daylight . The pillboxes differed in design , but typ ically co ns isted of a circular machine gun pillbox wit h m ultipl e firing po rts and a rectangular com partment for troo p qu arters. Actually, onl y a sm all n umber of cam ps used an existing pillbox; most were built in more remote areas, or th e posit ion of a pillbox was co ns ide red unsuit able fo r a mu ch larger camp's area . The designs of th e French pillboxes were co n sta nt ly revised, and design at ed as Forces de Terre Sud viet-Nom (Ground Forces, South Vietnam - FRSV), followed by th e year in wh ich t hey were in troduced. Th ey wer e individual ly identified by th eir peste kttometrtque
Camp An Diem was opened in March 1963 and operate d by th ree different A·tea ms ro tating o n six-month tem porary duty to urs . It was clos ed in July 1964. The ear ly camps we re very weakly fortified. often lacking a defined per imeter and even wire barriers. except perhaps for one or two 4-6-strand cattle fences .
II
Thie n Ngo n,A-323.1I1CTZ, open ed February I968.This was in the shape of a five-pointed sta r with broad arms (part of which are cut off) surrounding a large five-sided inner perimeter.The o ute r perimeter is a high earth berm lined with covered fighting positio ns and backed by C lOG and dependents' quarters.A circular road surrounds the inner per imete r, with a wire barrier on both sides.The IOSmm howitze r platoo n positio n is in the lower right arm. Camp Prek Klok, A-322. was of similar cons truction. RIGHT
Camp Do ng XOai, A-342, III CTZ, opened May 1965.T he irregular rectangular area to the right contains the IOSmm howitzers and was prob ably an exist ing govemment co mpound. The exte nsive trench syste m on the out er and inner per imeters was added in 1966.The small barrac ks were replaced by a smaller number of larger barracks situated pe rpendicular to the per imeter.W hile under co nstr uctio n by Seabees the o uter perimet er was overrun, but the inner perimete r held.
FAR RIGHT
12
Camp Gia Vuc,A-I03. 1CTZ. o pened February 1962. Its five-sided perim ete r is a raggedly aligned trench with covered fighting positio ns.The inner perimet er is sprawling and irregularly shaped, as was the case in many of the early camps. It appears that o ne IOSmm howitzer position has been completed and the other (above it) is still under co nstruction.The four wire barriers are completely d ear of vegetation.An internet virtu al tour of Gia Vuc can be fo und at: http ://www.gia-vuc.co m/GIA-VUCCAMP.htm.
(kilo meter po st number - PK) alo ng provincial routes. Littl e has been docume nted regarding th eir design , but Bernard Fall briefly described th em in Street without loy (Stackpo le Books, 1964): "Th ere was th e mu lti-chamb ered block wh ich appeared in the spr ing of 1951, foll owed by t he [30ft x 30ft] three-cham bered block of th e midd le of 1951. The n cam e th e round block of the end of 1951, co ntaining a specially prot ected command chamber in the middle; and the easier-to-buil d hexagonal block of 1952. In 1953 came th e hexagon with a sma ll squ are attachm ent, and finally there was the small, sq uarish block of 1954, with a sq uare attachme n t ... with its armor plate door an d port hole covers ; its centra l rad io room, measuring 6ft by 4ft (aptly kn ow n as 'the tomb')." "Subsurface fighting cam ps" were built in areas adjacent to the border as they received such heavy and freq uen t mortar fire. Katum Cam p (kn own as "Kaboom ") in III CTZ was actually used as the training ta rget for an NVA mortar schoo l acro ss th e border in Cam bo dia. AU critical facilit ies and q uarters were at least 3ft below ground, wit h a mi ni m um of Sft of ov erhead cove r top ped by heavily sand bagge d fighting bunkers. Heavy revetting a nd
Basic Camp Design S hapes
some times overh ead cover was provided for facilities not normally provided with this pro tection, such as the camp's truc k park. "Surface fight in g camp s" were built using sandbags , timber, logs, and some CON EX conta in ers. Another design used 86 CONEX co ntainers for bunkers and quarters. "Floating fightin g cam ps" were first built in ea rly 196 7 in the flood -prone Meko ng Delta, the wate rs of which could rise by 10ft during the wet or mo nsoon seaso n from April to November. Co mbat opera tions wer e cond ucted using airboa ts an d sampans , but VC activity was often light dur ing th e floods. Facilit ies were bu ilt on pilin gs, sandbagged berms , or on floating platforms o n sealed d ru ms th at rose and fell with the wat er level. Over 500 em pty fuel d rums were requ ired for each camp. Floating platforms were anchored to pilings by cable loop s; whe n th e wate r leve l subsided the platfor m sett led on the ground. Mortar po sitio n s were bu ilt in to th e top s of hig h mounds and sandbagged to pr event erosi on, o r atop flood ed-out concrete ma chine gun bunkers. On ce the flood wat ers had reced ed a great dea l of ma intena nce wor k ha d to be undertaken to make the camp suitable for dry operatio ns. In additi on to the Strike Force camps, numerou s oth er USSF bases were built along th e same line s. These in clud ed th e B- and Cteam camps, defend ed by a single ClOG compa ny and located in provincial cap ita ls along with oth er Free w orld compounds and un its. The re were also ClOG trai ning camps, MIKE Force bases, special reconnaissance proj ect bases an d forward operating bases (FOB), and com munication replay sites: all specialized facilities, but defen ded in much the same way as th e strike camps. Many of th e early camps were merely a collection of thatc hedroof bu ildings, some mortar posi tions, a few perim ete r bunkers, some en tren ch ments, and barely any pe rimet er obsta cles. Some hardly had a defin ed perimeter; it was often sim ply a line of ligh tly constructed bunkers and fighting positions with out a con necti ng tren ch . Th e ClOG lived in ten ts and huts built in the local style. Th e site of the village or villages they were prot ecting determined each camp 's location. Camps could be built atop hill s, on the sides of mountain s, on flat pla teaus, in a jun gle clearing, in valleys (to
Square
Rectangle
Triangle
Concave sides
Star
Pentagon (Scstded)
Hexagon (6-sided)
Octagon (S·sided)
Machine gun bunkers were located at each corner o r angle and one or more on each straight section of the walls, the total number depending on the length of the wall.All four sides of square or rectangular camps could have concave sides.The inner perimeter was located roughly in the camp's center and could be of any shape. but was usually square or triangular.The equ ilateral u iangular camp has a counter-posed triangular inner perimeter.Triangular camps were so metimes elongate d, Le. an isosceles u iangle.
Non-standard Concertina W ir e Barriers
c
B
A
D
E
Cross-sect ion examples of no n-standard concertina wire barr iers. Horizontal stran ds on pickets (indicated by vertical lines) and guy wires anchore d to short pickets support all examples. A conce rtina coil is 3ft 4in. in diamete r, making B,for example, almost 13ft high.The twO addition base co ils in A could reinfo rce any oth er type of bar rier, B or E for example, but might be found only on one side o r bot h.A variatio n of B was a third row of thr ee stacked coils. C is typical of conce rtina emplaced on the face of an inner per imete r berm. D was comparatively low, but its width made sapper penetration or bridging by scaling ladder difficult. Both the base and second -layer coils cou ld be made wider: E cou ld also be made wider by adding more base. second- and even third-layer coils.
13
Conceptual figh ting ca m p layout This ill ust ratio n provides a basic co ncept ual layo ut of a triangularshaped st rike fo rce camp with a co unte r-posed inner perimeter. Regard less of a given camp's shape , t he same facilities and defensive considerations wo uld be inco rporated . Key: A. Concertina and barbed wire barriers. B. Area sewn w ith tanglefoot wire, C laymore mines, and trip flares. C. Open area wide r t han gre nade range betwee n inner wire barrier and o uter peri meter. D. G uard hut. E. Gates. Additional co nce rti na coi ls block the ro ad between gates. F. Fuel dump (protected by berm) .
Camp Phu Quoc,A-427, IV CTZ, o pened February 1965.This little camp was built at the base of a small kno ll o n its upper side. It has no inne r perimeter as such, but th e knoll was developed as a stronghold.The outer pe rimeter is a low sandbag wa ll wit h ope n fighting positions.
14
G. Tren ch line wit h fight ing position,
H. I.
J. K.
L.
M. N.
O.
P.
eit her at ground level or atop an earth berm. He licopter pad. Parade gro und. Outer peri meter wa ll .3D-cal. M1919A6 machine gun bunkers (o ne gun). Outer perimeter co rner .3D-cal. M1919A6 machine gun bunkers (two guns). Inner pe rimete r .3D-cal. M1919A6 machine gun bunkers (one gun). Inner pe rimete r berm faced w it h concertina wire. Lateral co mpartmentalization wire barriers. 6Dm m M19 mortar pos itions . 81 mm M29 mortar positions.
Q . .50-cal. M2 mach ine gun positio ns (atop bunker). R. 57m m M18A I recoi lless rifle pos ition (atop bunker). S. Schoo lho use. T. Vehicle maintenance shop. U. Dispensary. V. Co Lac Bo. W Strikers' and depe ndents' quarters . I. USSF team ho use . 2. USSF q uarters. 3. LLDB team ho use and quarters . 4. Supply and arms rooms with interpreters' quarters attached . 5. Co mmunications bunke r with ra dio antenna tower. 6. Power generators. 7. Emergen cy medica l bun ker. 8. Amm unit ion bunkers.
block in filtrat ion), or on delta swamps edging a canal or river. Soil condition s, drainage, nearby key terra in features which could be occupied by the ene my, fields of observation and fire, SUitability for an airfield, road acce ss, and even the desires of local gov ernmen t officials and in habitan ts were tak en into con sideration wh en ch oosing a site. Occasionally som e government officials directed cam ps to be built on less-than-favorable sites. By 1968, more-or-less standard design s of build ings were available to include: 20ft x 60ft wood-frame barracks and dependents' qu arters; 20ft x 40f t frame buil din gs for rice storage; supply rooms and other adm in istrative buildings (supply room, arm s room, dispens ary, school, ma in tenan ce building, workshop, me ss hall s, and others in which perso nnel were not quarter ed; their sizes varied); 16ft x 20ft am munition bunkers; 8ft x 12ft latr in es; 8ft x 8ft mach in e gun bu nkers; and 8ft x 12ft fighting and livin g bunkers. No n-standard designs contin ued to be constructed tho ugh. The sh ape of camps varied greatly: square, rectangular, triangular, fivepoi nted star s, five-, six- or eight -sided, or irregu larly shaped to follow terra in contours. One camp was an interconnected series of fortre sses buil t on eight closely spaced hills. Some square, rectangular, or diamond-shaped camps had in dented (re-entran t) sides. Some rect angular camps had on ly the two lon g sides indented; a polygon -shape. Re-entrant sides allowed defensive fire anywhere along the wall s to be easily directed at attackers, even from the far end of the sidewall on attackers at the other en d. So me camps had odd-shaped ext en sions for expansion. Circular or other freeform or irregularly shaped cam ps were d ifficu lt to defend, and these de sign s were late r avoided. A circula r or ro ughly ova l-sh ap ed camp pr ecluded the conce ntration of defen siv e fire and forc ed
j
15
Cam p Tong La Ch o n. A-334. III CTZ. o pe ned March 1967. Most of t he late r camps were larger. but To ng La C hon was sm all and cramped. It was late r enlarged.When attacked and almo st over run frve months aft.er its opening. co ndit ions were so poor only 50 assigned CIDG rem ained (oth ers had quit ). It had t o be defe nded by a company rotate d from another camp plus almo st 600 MIKE Force. The earth berm outer per imet er is defended by almost 40 fighting and living bunke rs. eac h with its own wellreve rt ed e ntry trench.Two 105mm howitz er s are positioned in th e right arm ; two 8 1mm mortars are in th e inner perimeter and tw o in th e left.ar m.
ma chine gun pos itions to cover wider sector s of fire. Th e size of a camp varied depending on its shape, th e facilities it would enclose, the size of the Strike Force, th e number of dependents it hou sed, and terrain restrictions, bu t 490- 820ft across was typicaL Some cam ps were muc h smaller with th eir facilities and structures tightl y packed. Co n sequen tly, a mo rtar round d ropped into such camps wou ld hit something. Some camps were so small that there was not enough space for an intern al helicopter pad . The obstacle belt could be 330ft or mo re acro ss. Most camps housed Strike Force depe ndents. On th e surface this sounds like a less-than-desirable opt ion, but it was bett er than the altern ative of housing fam ilies in a nearby village. This led to many Strikers spending nights at home rather than in th e camp when attacks were likely and there was a great deal of in-and-a ut traffic. The increased traffic made it difficu lt to control exactly who entered the camp, and there were in stan ces whe re th e VC held dep endents hostage. Strikers could not be expected to defend th e camp with thei r fam ilies in danger. The concept of the ClOG was to recruit loca lly to defend villages and it was not always an op tion to separate Striker s from their families. Striker s fought ha rder and deserted th eir posts less often when th ey were defen ding not only the camp, but also the ir famili es. In most cases, depend ents living inside th e camps posed few problem s. A camp typ ically was home to som e 1,000 Strikers and th eir dependents, making it a small com mun ity with all th e associat ed problems and infrastructu re required of a sma ll town. Th e core of the fighting camp was th e inner perimeter, designed to hold o ut if the o uter perimeter collapsed. It contained command and control facilities as well as secured ammunition and suppli es, an d was the camp's day-to-day nerve cen ter. The USSF and LLDB team houses were here. Th e USSF tea m hou se typ ically consisted of a common room th at served as the radi o, meeting and recreation room, and as a genera l admini strat ive work area. It often contained a ba r an d a large table. The re wou ld be an office or two for t he team CO and tea m
----~~ :"". ~'"
'~,
16
Cam p Dan Thanh. A-423 . IV CTZ, o pened April 1964.This rectangular camp was built at the base of Ap An Nong Hill ( 115ft. above sea level). w hich was incorporated into the camp.Th er e is bo th an inne r perim et er in the lower camp and a stron ghold atop t he hill.T he o ut e r pe rimet er is an earth berm wit h individual fighting positions.
-..:
.-
M ISA I Claymore Ant i-pe rso nne l Mine
Scores and even hundr eds of co mmand-deto nated Claymo re mines surro unded strike camps.The Claymore was a 3J{ Ib directio nal mine comprised of a recta ngular, slightlycurved fiber glass box with IJ{ Ibs of C4 plastic explosive backing an epoxy matrix in which were embedded 704 steel ball bearings ~l i n . (approximately 6mm) in diamete r. It was electrically deto nated by comma nd or it co uld be rigged with a tr ipwire to be activated by an intr uder. When detonated th e ball bearings were blasted o ut in a 60-degree fan with an o ptimum range of 165ft. but they were dangero us o ut to 820ft. Blast and secondary fragmentatio n was dangero us with in 330ft in all direct io ns. Claymor es were devastating to assault tro o ps. Nume rous method s wer e used to prevent infiltrator s fro m removing or turning Claymor es to ward the defenders.They cou ld be secured to pairs of short barbed w ire pickets driven into the gro und, wr apped with barbed wire, set in concrete bases poured into shallo w ho les, boo by-tr apped with grenades or trip flares, or th e backs could be painted white to help the mine be dete cted if moved by an infiltrat or.
-~_
.......
~ .. .."._
" ,' ....' 0.,.
sergeant. A dining area and kitche n were also part of the team house. Team quarters migh t be a single building or they could be separated, wit h two- and three-man quarters scatte red about th e in ner perim eter. Officers had th eir own quarters. The communicat ion sergeants commonly slept in the communi cations bunker an d one or two of th e medics might sleep in the emergency medical bu nker. The interpreters' an d nurses' quarters v...ere also located with in the inner perimeter. The TOe and comma bu nkers, often combined, were heavily bun kered. The comma bunker or room was air-conditione d to pro tect the equipment from heat and humidity. A radio antenna tow er, as h igh as 71ft, was moun ted beside the co mma bu nker/TOe. The emergency medical bun ker was a prot ected treatment facility for use if the camp was att acked. Th e supply room was essentially a sma ll wareho use hold ing Striker u niforms, web gear, gene ralsupplies. and the CIDG rice supply. Th ere was an arm s room whe re weapons .repairs were undertaken and spa re weapo ns stored. A washroom with showers was here as were latrine facilities. In terco nnected 55-gallon dru ms were mo unted on the roof to sto re shower water, though some camps had more elabo rate plumbin g, even flush to ilets an d hot water. Two or more ammun ition bunkers were with in th e in ne r perime ter. Th is is also where the Slmm and 4.2in mo rtars were usually position ed. The camp's few vehicles were parked with in, typically com prising two 2 ~-t on ~BS cargo trucks, a *-ton ?\B 7Bl cargo tru ck, and a x-ro n Ml Sj Al utility tru ck (jeep). One or two 400-gaUon M149 water tra ilers (vwater bu ffaloes") were available along with some form of emerge ncy water storage. The trailers were kept filled and were ofte n parked in revetments. Early camps lacked electrical power except for a small 1.5kW gene rator for minimal ligh ti ng in th e inner perim eter, critical ligh tin g in the medical bun ker, and to run movie projectors for morale purposes, etc. Gaso line -bur n in g refrigerat or s were provided for med ical supplies and to sto re radio batt eries. Later, most camps had two lOkW gen erator s to supply sufficient power for minimal light ing
..
"
~':'=:;:~L---
Camp Vinh Gia.A-422. IV CTZ. o pened August 1964.The outer perimete r was a high tre nchtopped berm with covered fighting positions and machine gun bunkers.The wide moat was kept filled wit h wate r from th e canal. The inner perimeter is at the end adjace nt to the canal as it was believed th at any penetrati o ns wou ld be on th e landward side, so it was backed up against the canal. Across the canal is a government built res ettlement village.
17
Cam p Bu Dop,A-34 I. III CTZ,
opened No vember 1963.This camp o riginally had a mo at. It was exten sively rebuilt after attacks in 1967 .T he zigzag trench has ove r 20 fighting positions and two machine gun bu nkers on each
concave wall plus co rner bun kers. Most of th e barra cks and other buildings are sunk to almost gro und leve l. No less tha n 18 mo rtar pits can be see n. Severa l machine gun andlo r rec oilless rifle positions are inside the upper wall.Two I05mm howitzers occupy the right side w hile a composit e ARYN battery of four I05mm and two 155mm
howitzers occupy the left side. Rows of CONEXs are near the inner perimeter gate fo r additional bun kers.
M4 9A I Trip Flare
C,Jl 'N~~
TRI~ I:.::. NAILING HOUS
W ING NUT
eccrs
~ I
I
'I
~
1f!!;:. tu "
The o live drab-painted M49A I trip flare was I Min. in diamet er,
almost Sin. long. and weighed ISoz.They were attached to barbed wire pickets or sta kes by a mounting bracket, or simply wired to a stake without the brac ket, several inches above the grou nd within barrier wire entanglements and rigged to be activated by a tripwire up to 40ft in length.When activated the magnesium flare ignited immediately. burning for 55-70 seco nds (60 seconds o n average ) at 50.000 candlepower at 4,200 OF and illuminating an area up to 985ft in rad ius.
18
purposes througho ut the camp. Refrigerator s; che st-type freezers, an d even television sets were available, tho ugh progra mmi ng was limited to th e Armed Forces Radio an d Television Service (AFRTS) and a couple of Vietna mese stations. A l. SkW generator was availabl e for eme rgency back-up purposes. On e of th e two big diesel lOkW generat ors ran 24 hours a day; t he ot he r "rested" for servicin g. San dbag revetments prot ected the generators whil e affording sufficient space around th em for servicing and ven tilation purp oses. Each revetme nt h ad a sandbag-covered roo f, but wit h a wide gap in t he wall under the eves all around for ventilation. The revetmen t muffled th e noise, but th e hum of th e gen erato r was constant, eventu ally becoming an unnoti ced background noise. The inner perimet er wall was usually a berm (the term mea ns th e lip or she lf betw een a parapet and th e edge of a tren ch or moat, but in Vietna m it was th e common term for a ta mped eart h dike used as a pro tective wall or revetment), sometimes with a trench system o r fighting positions. Usually a multiple-coil concerti na wire barrier pro tected the inner perim eter on the berm 's face. Machine gun bunkers were positio ned at the comers and on each wall, and sometimes the bunkered buildings were incorporated into the inner perimeter walls. The in ner perimeter could be square, rectangu lar, triangular, o r of another sha pe. The triangular-shaped inner perim eter of a triangular-shaped camp was often positioned co unter-posed to the outer perim eter, i.e. it pointed the other way. Th e Strike Force barracks an d dependents' quarters, locat ed in the oute r perimet er area, were usually even ly spaced around th e perim et er, but in som e in stan ces barracks were con cen trated in o ne or two areas. Each company was assigned a perimeter sector. Wh en a company was in th e field , eleme nts of another co mpany wou ld take over its perimeter sector. Each company had a sm all head quarters and in some cases a bu nkered com ma nd post . Mortar positions (60 mm) were spaced aro und the perimeter. Numerous faciliti es were scatte red abo ut th e o uter perim eter: the veh icle mainten an ce buildin g, dispen sary, depende nts' school, ta ilor shop, barber shop, Co Lac 80 (co mbined recreati on room and cafe), and a para de ground whic h dou bled as a h elicopter pad if there was no separate pad. In camps too sma ll for an in terna l helicopter pad, one was usua lly situa ted within the barrier wire beside the en try road.
Co mmunication s trenches con ne cted certa in areas of the cam p wit h the in ne r perimeter, though so me camps lacked th ese. Besides allowing pro tected movem ent about -;. the cam p, they were used as lateral defen se lines to seal off a portion of th e camp that t he enemy h ad pen etrated. Latera l barb ed wire ba rriers some times div ided the outer perim eter area into segme nts to compartmentalize t he cam p if penetrated. Latrines were scattered about the camp, as were 55-gallon water drums for bath ing water and firefighting along with sand buckets. Most camps had a water-well, but ot hers requir ed water to be hauled from a nearby source and so possessed additiona l water sto rage for em ergencies. Burnou ttype latrines were employed. These were outhou ses with a 55-gallon drum cut down to one-third its heigh t and placed under each toilet seat. When full they were pull ed o ut, diesel fuel was mixed with th e waste, an d bur n ed. This may sound disagreeable, but it was efficien t and sanitary. Urina l tub es ("piss tubes") were situ ated about the camp. Th ese were 4- 6in.-diameter pipes embed ded in gravel-filled holes and angled upward, pro jecting abo ut 2ft out of th e ground. From 1968 on ward , man y cam ps were prov ided ,,·..ith a I05mm howitzer platoon manned either by ClDG o r ARVN (sector artillery platoo ns) gu n ners, to provide artillery suppo rt to Strike Force field operation s an d to cover areas that were beyo nd the ran ge of fire suppo rt bases. They were emplaced in a small compo und of their own ad jacent to the inner perime te r. In sma ller cam ps an exten sion to th e out er perime ter had to be add ed as sufficient intern al space for th e artillery position did not exist. The artillery area mig ht h ave its own berm or defen ses, but som etimes th e position was simply built wit h in the camp with no defined separation. It includ ed two circular sandbagged howitzer positions wit h att ache d ammuni tion bunkers, a separate main ammunition bunker, a small fire dire cti on center bunker, and crew quarters. If manned by ARVN troops, they h ad th eir own 2M-to n tru cks. In 1969, becau se of the availability of "bee h ive" Oeche tt e rou nd s, it was dir ected th at the howitzers be po sitio ned wh ere th ey could deliver direct fire into at least part of the out er barr ier. The guns, however, were em placed and the effort to reposition th em and const ruc t new emplacemen ts was considered to be not worth the effort. Some camps had a separate administrative area outside the outer perimeter thro ugh which the en try road passed, but within the barrier wire. Th is was common in remote areas wh ere camps ,...'ere relied upo n for govern ment services, the district headquarters being too distan t. The position of thi s separate
Punji St ake s
Pun]; stakes were used ext ensively as an obstacle at ea rly camps.The bamboo o r hardwo od stakes were set in t he gro und at an angle in dense fields between wire belts , in low gro und. moats, drainage ditches. and o n t he fro nt of berm s. Punji stakes were 12- 18in. long and sharpe ned on both ends. allowing the m to be pushed 5--6 in. into the gro und.The en d was char-hardened to increase th e chance of it penetrating a boot sole.
Ideally they were pla ced in clusters o f
three, one angled fo rward abo ut 45 degrees and the ot her two angled at abo ut 30 degrees to the right and left. The ir manufacture was ti me-co nsuming, especially if char-hardened.Th ey
dete riorated over time, were dest royed when brush was burned . and as more con ce rti na became available t hey were seldo m re placed . Punji stakes (and th e name) originated in th e Punjab region of northwest India. and are of anc ient origin.T heir use in
Camp Mang Bak,A-246. IV CTZ, ope ned July 1964 .This small camp, like so many of the early o nes, follows the conto urs of a ridge. T here is no inner perimeter as such. In th e upper po rtio n a large below-gro und co mbined TOC is under co nst ruct io n.The outer perimeter is a high wall with firing ports and machine gun bunkers at key points backed by livingbunker s and barra cks.A C-7A Caribou transport sits o n the partly planked ru nway. If the runway's soil was sufficiently com pacted, o nly the landing portio n required planking.
jungle wa rfare was discussed in a British intelligence re port in 1944, re pr inted in a US intelligence publication later that same year.These traps eventually appea red in US Army Special Fo rces manuals in the 1950s and the South Vietnamese used them ea rly in t he con flict to defen d camps and villages as a subst itute fo r then scarce barbed wire .The VC subsequently used th em as we ll. especially along side trails on which ambu she s we re established. in con cealed small punji trap holes on trai ls. and to defend base camps.
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Kinh Qu an II,A-4 12,I V CTZ, opened O ctober 1965. KQ II is still under con stru cuo n in this pho to . The outer berm is lined with tem porary fighting and living bunkers, but wit h few on the river side. Buildings inside t he inne r per imeter are still unde r construction.The inne r per imeter is unique in that it posses ses a moa t- It appea rs the camp was built over an ex isting fortification. Camp Chi Linh,A-333, o pened January 1967, was originally know n as Cau Song Ba. Com pare this photo to the camp diagram on page 2 1.T he USSF tea m ho use (the Vshaped building) had its tea m quarters (the upper arm) dest royed by fire.The drainage ditches o uts ide th e outer perim eter are actually shallower and narrower than they appear and choked with co nce rtina wire.This was the author's camp.
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admi nist rative area, wh ich contained the dispen sary for local civilians and Vietnamese gover nme nt agency assistance offices, prevented un auth orized civilians from entering th e camp prop er. These facilities were occu pied on ly during daylight and were closed off from th e camp at n ight. The fuel dump was located ou tside the ou ter pe rimeter, but inside the barrier wire near th e road. The gasolin e and diesel fuel drums an d oil drums were prot ected by an earth berm or barrier ma de of soilfilled drums with out overhe ad cover. There might be a similar, but mu ch sma ller an d well-protected dump inside the camp with a few fuel drums for ready use by trucks and generators . The outer barrier could be up to 330ft or more across . This band of barbed wire obstacles was referred to sim ply as "the wire" and consisted of multiple belts of different types of concertin a and barbed wire obstacles. A "belt" was a lin e of any type of wire. A "ba nd" consisted of two or mo re belts emplaced in depth with no signifi can t distance be tween the belts . Patterns and the types of barriers employed varied greatly. Tangl efoot, a Zigzag line of loose or taut ba rbed wire on sta kes about 1ft high , was ofte n placed between belts. Th e idea was to trip attackers as they rushed forward and to h inder in filtrat o rs. U-shaped, olive d rab-painted steel barbed wire pickets were available in 24, 36, 60, an d 96in. len gt hs, generally called 2, 3, 5, and 8ft pic kets. The open "V " side of the pic ket shou ld face the enemy. Wooden posts were of te n used in the earl y da ys, but th ey det erio rat ed rapid ly and were easier to breach wit h exp losives. Standard barbed wire was issued in reels weighing 91J.f lbs and me asuring 1,312ft. Concertina wire is a coiled spool of barbed wire th at can be stretche d out or collapsed ba ck into a roll for recovery and reuse. Prefab spring-steel concert ina wire wit h ~H n . - Io ng barbs was introd uced at the end of World war II. Prefab concertina rolls were 3ft 4in. in diameter, about 50ft long when extended, and weighed 55 lbs. Barbed tape concertina was ado pted in the early 1960s and was increasingly issued as the old concertina wire was used up . Although its dim en sions were the same , a roll weighed on ly 31 lbs. It was also sharper and mo re difficult to cut. Barbed tape was also issued on variou s-sized spools in lieu of standa rd barbed wire. The most basic wire fence was the four-ormore strand "cattle fence" on 4-6ft pickets. Th e cattle fence was the basis for more elaborate enta ng lements . The do ub le-ap ron fence, fo r exa mple, was a cattle-fence wit h an ch or wires in a "V" pattern on bo th sides. Across th e anchor wires on both sides were placed horizontal stran ds th at formed a slopi ng barrier, the aprons. A high wire entang lement is two parallel "ca tt le fences" about 10ft apar t with the pickets stagge red . A Zigzag fence of four or more strands connects t he two rows of alte rna ting pic kets . Any combination of t hese enta ngleme nts, usua lly reinfo rced with co ncertina wire, could be used to construct bands of barbed wire obstacles. Because of the need for higher an d den ser barri ers, non-standard entan glements were
common. These includ ed multipl e rows and layers of conce rtina wire stac ked thr ee or four coils hig h, supported by horizontal stra nds on pickets and barbed wire guy lines. Two to six belts of wire were erected around camps in geomet ric patterns. Wh ile th e main belt s cou ld be suppleme n ted by int erm ediat e belt s, the spaces between belt s would have ta ngle foot, punii stakes, sma ll barbed wire ma ts to discourage craw ling infilt rators, tripwired Claymore mines, trip flares, an d grena des fitted with t ripwires. Besides tripwire-activated Claymores, comma nddeto nated Claymores were em placed, often in ban ks of 4- 6 mines at 33ft in tervals. Th e electric firing devices were located in th e trenches, ofte n with several firing lines run to o ne poin t with the firing devic es hanging in clusters. The firing wire wo uld run to one mine, the rest being connect ed by detonating cord (detcord) . when one mine was electrically fired the othe rs would detonate instantly - a "wave-breaker." Th e use of tripwir e-activated Claymores and grenades o r o the r types of booby-t rapping devices gradually fell from use. All too often they were deto nat ed by animals, hard rains an d Winds, or acciden tally by work crews. Tripwired Claymores, grenades, and trip flares ha d to be deactivat ed to allow crews to repa ir an d im prove wire and cut weeds and brush . Thi s was a hazardou s undertak ing in its own righ t, as was reactivating them. They had to be rem oved ent irely, inspected, and rep laced whe n brush withi n the wire was burn ed. Buried anti-personne l land mi nes saw very littl e use for the same reason s. Sma ll M14 "toe- po pper" an ti-pe rsonnel min es were em placed in th e wire of so me ea rly cam ps. Thi s proved impractical: vegeta tion would soo n take over the wire, bu t the mines them selves made it alm ost im possible to clear-cut or burn th e vegeta tio n an d make repairs to th e wire. Th ey also req uired peri od ic replacemen t because of weather deterioratio n and washo uts afte r h eavy rain s. It was a consta nt batt le to co ntrol veget ati on in th e wire, which was difficult to cut because of the den sity of the barriers, guy wires, ta ng lefoot, tripwires, and othe r obstacles. Because of th e country's tro pical climate, vegeta tion grew startlin gly fast an d th e lush green grow th was very difficult to burn, even wh en soaked with gaso line .
A plan of Camp Chi Linh.A-333. 11l CTZ, Septe mber 1969. BUildings marked A are troop and depe ndents ' quarters , sunk about 2ft below groun d with two-layer-thick sandbag walls and roofs of two layers of sandbags topped by corrugated sheet metal. Buildings marked with an aste risk (*) are also sunken. Arrows at the perimeter bunkers indicate the principal directio n of fire and number of machine guns. The per imet er was a concretecapped parape t with firing ports backed by a shallow t re nch. T he camp's inner perimet er was defined by an ea rt h ber m fronted with fo ur co ils of conce rtina wire. The inter ior face was revetted by corrugate d sheet metal. Buildings mar ked wit h an asterisk are eithe r sunken o r co mpletely undergro und. The USSF quarters had burned down in Feb ruar y 1969 and were in the pro cess of being rebuilt.A large TO e was also under co nst ruction. The corner bunker s housed one or two machine guns. Bunkers 2, 4, and 6 had a 57mm recoi lless rifle on top; bunker 3 had a ro of-mo unted . SO-cal.machine gun. (Richard Hook)
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Camp Sinh Thanh Tho n, A-4 13, IV CTZ, open ed May 1965. T his small camp is still under construction in this photo.W hile twO ClOG barracks have been co mpleted most of the troops are still housed in tents.All mortars are con tained in the comparatively large inner perimeter. Its design tsless than desirable as it has four very wide openings in its berm.T his was prob ably co rrected at a later dat e. The wire barriers are still being installed. ABOVE LEFT
Camp Cat Cai,A-4 12. IV CT Z, o pened April 1965.The ear ly camp had barracks on each wall and a large administr ative building between th e combined team house co mplex.T he 1965 flood serio usly da maged t he original barracks and smaller barracks on 4ft concrete block stilts rep laced these.The o ld administr ative building was rom dow n and re placed by a two-story fortified TOC in the open end of the ce ntral comp lex. One of its wings was provided with a second sto ry for occupatio n durin g flood ing. During the 1966 flood. with the river 12ft above norm al level. tempo rary hoochs were built atop the barracks. It was soon afte r th is t hat th e camp was mod ified as a float ing camp.The tea m's designat ion was chan ged to A-431 in June 1967. ABOVE RIGHT
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Camps did not possess perimeter ligh ti ng systems becau se t hey requ ired too much electrical power, excessive system ma in tena nce, and wou ld have benefited the attacker by allowin g him to see perim eter positio ns and target them as well as clearly see the barriers and obstacles. It was better to keep th em in th e dark, so to speak. Moats were utili zed at som e early camps. They required a goo d deal of effort thou gh , were difficult to maintain over a prol on ged period , an d gen erally fell from use in lat er camps. Th ey could have a triangular or squa re cro ss-section. Dimen sio ns varied, but an 8ft depth and wid th was cons ide red idea l; many were smaller. Usuall y, moats o nly conta ined water during th e wet season. As attackers could shelter in moa ts, it was essential that they be filled with concertina wire and/o r punit stakes. To ham per the use of scaling ladders, de nse wire entanglem en ts were erected o n bo th sides . Moats were crossable, but the attacker h ad to make extensive provisions. Cam ps h ad only one gat e, usually o n the side facing th e airfield. Th e en try road was not necess arily a weak point an d attackers more often than not avoid ed it , Most roads ran straigh t through th e barrie r belts and into t he camp . Ot he rs had o ne or more sha rp turns, th is bein g a more desirab le alternative. Mu ltiple mach ine guns, Claymores, and often at least o ne recoilless rifle provided covering fire on th e road . Th ere were thr ee o r mo re gates constructed of timber o r steel frami ng, den sely woven with barbed wlre. The se were chained shut an d tripwired with grena des, Claymo res, and trip flares. Barbed wire kn ife rests (Spanish riders) and multiple coils of concertina wire were pulled across the road between the gates when closed at n ight and likewise wired to Claymores. Often the road en tered the cam p o nto a parade ground o r oth er open area devoid of cover and covered by inner perimet er ma chine gu ns. So me cam ps had a few narrow Zigzag lanes through obsta cle belts to allow patrols passage and work parties access to the barriers, Th ese too were blocked wit h concerti na and wired with Claymores and trip flares. Most camps possesse d an airfield, but some in the moun tai ns an d the Mekong Delta lacked this facility. They did possess a helicopter pad th ough. Some were reacha ble by road, but many in the rem ot e mounta ins lacked even this an d in th e Delta the wet season inundated th em . Som e mo untain cam ps received th eir supplies routin ely by para ch ute drop . Most airfields coul d accept a four -eng ine C-130 tran sport, requiring them to be 2,500-3,SOOft long. One or two turnarou nd an d un load ing pad s were provided . A fixtur e at many cam ps was at least o ne aircraft hulk restin g beside the ru nway. Th ere was usually a n earb y rifle ran ge for the zeroi ng of weap ons and a dem olition pit wh ere captured and det eriora ting munitions were destroyed . Occasion ally a US fire suppo rt base was t empo rally establishe d near a cam p, either at one end of the airfield or adjacent to the cam p wire. Defen sive fire and local secu rity pat rols would be coordinated between th e cam p and th e firebase.
Camp construction A variet y of units and organizations built the stri ke camps, depending on th eir location and when they were built. An enginee r detachment (S39t h Engineer Detac h ment from 1962 -67, 31st Engineer Detachment from 196 7- 70) was assigned to Special Forces to perform technical and service support with four civic acti on advi sor y teams (KB teams) and tw o well-drill ing teams (GJ tea-ms). Additional and more technical construction tasks, especia lly th ose inv olvi ng utilities (electrical, water, sewage, drainage) were carried out by civilian engineers and co nst ruct ion crews of Eastern Con structio n Company, Inc., a co ntracte d Filipino firm. Vietnamese constructio n firm s were contracted if the
work was near urban areas. The eng inee r detachment pro vide d th e 5th SFGA Staff Eng in eer and assista nt staff engineers assigned to each Special Fo rces company. plu s a works and utility sectio n at t he group headquarters. The detachment, with 50 or fevv·er Americans, was involved in th e co nstruc tion and maint en ance of the 125 cam ps co nstructed from 1962 o nw ard. Th e five-m an KB tea ms, each of wh ich possessed so me heavy eq uipmen t, wou ld stay at a new cam p site lo ng enough to train the Strikers to co nstruct at least one of eac h ty pe of building, barracks, bu nk er, mo rtar and mach ine gun po sition, tr en ch sect ion , and the different typ es of wire obstacle s. The str ike force would co mplete mu ch of the task while wor king in rotation, some co m pan ies working while ot he rs conducted local securi ty. The A-team assigne d to the camp learned how to opera te th e heavy equipment under th e tutorage of the KB team and its ow n enginee rs, and lent a hand as well as supervised. MIKE Force co m pan ies were ofte n dep loyed to provide ad dit io na l security, but not labo r. KB team s also assisted with rebuildin g destroyed stru ctures afte r attacks and u pgrading camps. Three-man well-drilling team s could drill and case wat er wells u p to I,SOOft deep . Naval construction battalion Seabee tech n ical assistan ce team s (STAT) were also em ployed. Th ese l Scma n team s performed sim ilar jobs to th e KB tea m s, but co uld also d rill wells and possessed addition al heavy eq uipment. US Arm y
A Navy Seabee offloads a light bulldozer (rom a tilt-bed traile r. Seabee tec hnical assistance teams (STAT) con stru cted a number of Special For ces camps in the mtd1960s.A 400-gallon MI49 water trailer (camps usually had two) is in t he background.
BROW LEFT
A 3 Ist Engineer Detachment KB team member excavates a weapon positio n with a Jo hn Deer e bulldozer mounting a backhoe . BELOW RIGH T
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Not o nly local materials were emp loyed. but local transport systems as we ll. It was th e free hand given by Spec tal Fo rces and the initiative and imaginatio n of SF so ldiers that made it all wo rk.
Members of the 5th Special Fo rce s Gro up Comm and Readiness Team inspect t he condition of a fighting/living bun ker.T he CRT visited every camp abo ut tw ice a year to ensu re standards were being met and to recommend impro vements from lesso ns learned visiting othe r camps.
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" .P lA '.
S-IHH
comba t en gineer companies were som etimes assign ed constru ction missions , particularl y if rapid com pletion was necessary. The Strikers still pr ovided mos t of th e un skilled labor, while the KB and G) team s assisted . It usually required 4-6 months to complete a camp, alth ough for all practi cal purpos es th ey were never completed. New constructio n , up gradi ng, and repairs were continuou s. \Vh ile considerable resources we re expen ded to build a camp, th ere were never enoug h ma terials, especially dimen sioned lumber, plywood, ceme n t, and chain-link fen cin g. It was even more difficult to obtain additiona l materials for subsequent expansion , im provem en ts, and repairs. Wh en camps were close d they were not simply abandoned or razed, but disman tled, even to th e point of emptyin g thousands of san dbags. As mu ch of the buil ding materials as poss ible was recovered and airlifted out by helicopters or cargo trans ports, carried by t ru cks to a ne w camp sit e, or d istr ibu ted to ot he r ca m ps n eedi n g improvem ents , repairs, or expansion . Conseq uen tly many substi tu te and expedien t materials and methods were em ployed. Scrounging and what was called "mid night req uisition" were co mmo n, but th ere was a distin ct difference between th ese two Wides pread and essen tial practices. Scroun ging was a form of barter, so to spea k. Items and ma teria ls were usua lly traded - supp ly and dema nd - for goo ds o r services in kin d or, some times, simply given if th ere was a surplus. Suc h exc h an ges were usually of expendable goods such as construc tion materials. Accoun table items, that is, any t hing with a serial number, were seldom traded ; but it cou ld happen as accountability in Vietnam was some times haphazard. Even weapon s and vehicl es we re occasion ally traded. Every A-team ha d one or two indiv id ua ls who excelled at scrounging. It was even informally tau ght du rin g Speci al Forces tr ain in g. In fact, Spec ial Forces had a well-earne d rep uta tio n for scro unging and a rath er cavalier attitude with regard to property
acco untab ility and mid nigh t req uisition, the latt er ofte n bein g co nd ucted in broad daylight. Midnight requisitio n mig ht be considered outright theft, bu t it was seldo m th e case that the offende rs, it they were pursued at all, suffered tor their tran sgressions. It was, after all, a unit's responsibility to safeguard its equ ipm ent and materi el. If it was "harrowed " without permission by an other unit, it was th e unit's fault for failing to properly secu re it . Many felt that the US Army procured on ly 80 -90 percent of wha t it needed in equipment, repair pa rts, and materi el and that what it h ad was co ns tantly shi fted about betwee n units attempting to make up for Shortages . The difference between una uthorized requ isition and theft was actually not so fine a lin e. Mid nig ht req uisitio n was for th e ben efit of th e unit and thus th e Army. Th e materiel remained withi n the Army and was not for personal use or gain . Th eft, the subsequent black market sale, and th e lin ing of o ne's poc kets with ill-gotten money from th e sale of government property were entirely different matt ers an d would be severely punishe d. Most co nstru cti on materials were req uisiti on ed th rou gh normal supp ly cha nnels, pu rchased locally from Vietnamese vendors (em phasis was placed on im provin g the Vietnam ese eco nom y through local purchases), or by ut ilizing available natu ral resources.
C on stru ction m aterials Ceme n t was issued in 94 Ib pape r sacks. 1.-10st wa s procured from othe r Asian co untries while some wa s produced in Vietnam's Delt a region. Sand and gravel had to be acquired locally in most cases; it wa s seldo m tran spo rted in to rem ote locat ion s. Sand was gen era lly only available in t he coas ta l areas and loose gravel too was scarce, so substitutes often had to be found. Sometimes, if areas of suitable rock existed, co nstruction units set up portab le grave l crus hers. If suitable rock was not available, laterite was ofte n used as a subst itut e for bo th sand an d grave l. Very co m mo n in the Tropics and found in many area s of Vietnam , lat erite is a red dis h-b row n har d clay soil with a hi gh content of iron ox ide. It is created from weat hered rock with the silica leach ed out by water pass ing through where goo d d rain age co ndit ion s exist. On ce broken up , laterite has a coa rse, grav el-like texture. When used in the production of concrete in Vietnam, laterite required a high er percentage of ceme nt tha n normal sand and aggregate mixtu res an d was less resistant to weatheri ng an d wear. However, whe n sprayed with water and rolled it com pacted well and was very durab le, so it was also used for surfadng airfields,
Camp Plet Do Urn, 11 CTZ, opened April 1962. Because of difficulties with the LLDB, the new commander of A-334 named it Camp Hardy after CPT Herbert F. Hardy,Jr., killed in action during April 1964. Naming strike camps after Americans was extreme ly rare and this may have been the on ly instance. C-team camps , t ho ugh, we re so metimes named in ho no r of an Amer ican. This view displays t he o uter perimeter sandbag wall faced wit h PSP and various types of firing po rts .Th e wire barrier co mprises tw o rows of do uble-stacked concertina.A six-strand cattle fence is set 2ft outside th e wall.
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Cutaway view of a .30-cal. M 19 19A6 m ac h ine gu n bunker o n t he o uter pe r imete r The design and dimension s of
pe rimete r machine gun bunkers we re as varied as th o se of the camps th ey protected .Th is example represen ts a ty pical design dug into the ground and co nnected to th e peri meter t rench by
a nar row ent ryway.The inte rior sides may or may not have been revetted by sandbags, dependin g on the stability of t he soil.The sandbag wa lls ar e two laye rs th ick. In th is exam ple o nly sandbags suppo rt the roof; it wo uld have bee n bette r t o prov ide vertical sup port beam s. Hardened lat erit e o r ce me nt-sta bilize d sand-filled bags could pro vide sufficien t suppo rt t ho ugh.Th e firing po rt is co nstructe d
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of 2in. x I Din. planks. Seldom w er e
Side-tir ing ports provided exce pt in large r mu lti-gun co rner bunkers.The speed pallet roof (PSP and corr ugated st eel we re also used) is supported by 4 in. x 4in. st ringers and topped by at least two.laye rs of sandbags.The who le of the ext e rior is capped with 1- 2in. of co ncret e to protect th e sand bags from weat he r and wear.Th e guard post is simp ly construct ed of sandbags wit h a co rr ugated steel ro of to pro tect th e sentry from sun and rain. The machine gun platfo rm is built of sandba gs; much mo re du rable and sta ble t han on e built of planks.Th e sta nda rd pe rimet er defense machine gun was the Browning .30-ca t. M19 19A6 mounted on an M2 t ripo d.
Th e gun weighed 32M lbs. t he tripo d 14 1bs. Its rate o f fire was 450 rou nds pe r minute .A few M19 19A4s were also used.The M19 19A6 differe d in the additio n of a flash suppresso r, blpo d, carr ying handle , light er barrel. and metal shou lder stock (freq uentl y removed).Although th e bipod was not used o n this bunk er gun, it was reta ined as it he lped radiate heat t hat built up from prolo nged firing.Th e 20-30 amm unitio n cans typ ically stowed in the bunker each held a 250-ro und disintegrating me tallic linked belt wit h o ne t racer to four ball rounds.Th e gun was no rmally protected from the effects of dust by a canvas cove r draped over it.
helicopter pads, and roads . Care had to be taken when anal yzing laterite because wha t loo ked like laterite gravel might simply have been hard, broken -up laterite soil pellets. Mistakenly judging it to be gravel and using it as a roadbed could lead to disaster. A heavy rain could dissolve th e pellets, wh ich were not gravel, an d tum th e road into a sea of mud. Because of its weigh t and t he amount requir ed for large construction pro jects, and th e limi ted space available on tran sport aircraft , ceme nt was used in relatively limited qu antities in remo te camps. Reinforcing rods (rebar) were seldo m used, although Sft-wide, 150ft-lo ng ro lls of steel rein forcin g mesh (remesh) with 6in .-squa re " in .dia meter mesh were sometimes used. Scrap metal, h eavy gauge wire, an d steel barbed wire pickets were sometim es used as reinforcin g, as was barbed wire wov en int o mesh -like mats. Much of t he dimensioned lumber in Vietnam was cut locally and pur ch ased from the Vietnamese, o r came from elsewhere in Sout hea st Asia o r the Ph ilippines . Rough- cut (un planed) hardwoods an d softwoods were cut in standard plan k an d timber sizes suc h as lin . x 4in ., li n x 6in ., l in . x 4in ., l in . x Bin ., l in . x lOin ., 4in . x 4in ., Bin. x 8in ., etc. Dimen sioned lumber was a valuab le comm odity in Vietnam , as was plywood . The latte r, in ~ and Min .th ick sheets mea sur in g 4ft x 8ft, was mo stly used for buildin g interior walls an d as hi nged dro p-type win do w covers. Wood , h owever, dete riorat es rap idly in tropical clim ates, whi ch is why the Fren ch installed con crete powe r and telephon e poles and used conc rete railroad ties. Locally cut logs were used to som e extent, especially in early camp construc tion , but becau se they were n ot d ried they deteriorated even more rap idly. A problem encount ered in areas that saw heavy combat was tha t the trees were riddled with artillery fragments, whi ch damaged saws. Rubber trees were poor for construction purposes. If cut du ring th e dry seaso n, th ey were dry and brittle; during th e wet season the sap was a mess an d stank. Tough and resilient bamboo was some times used as a construc tio n ma terial , especially in the early days.
The outer per imeter sandbag para pet is faced with co rrugated sheet metal held in place by steel pipes anchored with barbed wire . Small wood-framed firing ports are provided and each firing ste p has overh ead cove r.
Camp Bu Do p. A US 175mm gun battery esta blished in an adjacent temporary fire suppo rt base open s fire . In t he foreground is t he camp's co ncrete-capped. sandbag-revetred perimeter tr ench with sandbagcovered individual fighting positions .
27
Speed Pallets
TheAir Force 463L "speed pallet" was an 88in. x 108in. platform weighing 290 lbs on which four wooden pallets, nine 55-gallon drums. or other cargo could be secured with nylon cargo nets or tie-down straps. They were made of a 2l:!in. layer of balsawood sandwiched between two alum inu m sheets with an aluminum frame with 22 fastening O-rings around the edges.These were designed to be loaded in cargo aircraft. rolled over the floor on rollers. and slid out of the aircraft via the ramp and onto the ground. allowing the aircraft to be unloaded quickly. (The pictured speed pallet rests on 4in. x 4in. timbers. Below it is a standard 40in. x 48in. wooden cargo pallet, four of which could be placed on a speed pallet. Both were used for construction purposes.)
28
Logs o f ~l n . diamet er were extens ively used to revet wall s and tren ch es. Th ey co ul d be placed vertically or horizo n tally, b ut in the latt er case vertical support post s were necessary and stee l barbed wire p ickets were o ften u sed . An ch or wires hel ped suppo rt tim ber revetment wall s. Log cri b wall s, co n structed fro m h ori zontall y laid logs, were built ,..-ith 2-3ft of soil between the parallel retain in g walls that varied in heigh t. Th ese were used as reve tme nts an d a nti~ ' sn iper wall s. Vietnam had po ssessed a well-deve loped rail system in the more popu lated areas, mainly to serve the rubber in dustry, bu t the VC h ad cu t most of th e lines and b lown the brid ges. If a Specia l Forces cam p was anywhere n ear a rail line some o f th e rail was recov ered and used as st rin gers for bunker roofs. In 1969, when the US was m akin g m ajor effo rts to reo pen so m e of the rail lin es, a d irective was sen t down to A-teams instructing them to cease the practi ce. The longer U-shaped b arbed wire pi ckets were so m etimes used as closely sp aced roof stringers, if they were n ot bearin g h eavy loads. Gal vani zed or zinc-coated cor rug ated sheet metal was exte n sively used for roofi n g; in fact it was just about the on ly roo fing m aterial available. Locally ma de palm thatch ing was used in some in stances, espec ially in th e early cam ps, but it was ve ry pron e to catch in g fire. Standard cor ru gated m etal h ad ;iin .-dee p co rru gation s with 2l:!in . spacing between th e "h ills and va lle ys." The sheets were usually 2 6in . wide and 8ft lon g, but lo ng er lengt h s we re also used . Width-wise, cor ru gated m etal was consid ered too flexible to be used to su ppor t revetted walls. It occasio na lly was, but it required a large number of closely sp aced su ppo rt stakes. Sandbags wer e of course exten sively use d for fortificat ions. They were ma de of either light olive green, bro wn or tan (faded to o ff-wh ite ) burlap, o r dull green woven plastic whi ch be gan to app ea r in about 1968. The p lasti c bags we re much more durab le than the cloth san d bags, wh ich bega n to deterio rate after a m onth bu t whi ch were still issue d . Emp ty sandbags m easured l 4in . x 26;':in. and ha d a len gth of tie-cord ta cked 3in. fro m the ope ning. San dbags were three-quarters filled and ti ed clo se with a squ ar e kn ot. A filled bag weighed 40-75 lbs de pending on the soil and m o istu re co n tent. Average weigh t with dr y san d was 65 lbs. A filled bag m ea sured approximately 4:Xin . x lOin. x 19in. Two layers o f san db ags provided protecti on from small arms fire and fragm entation. G ravel-filled sa ndbags p ro vided al most twice the protection offe red by sand-filled sandbags an d three times that of sandbags filled with soil. San dbags were so m etimes filled 'w ith stabi lized san d (two-th irds sand , one-th ird cem en t), a mix that solid ified after wetting and which was m or e durab le. A great deal of use was made of va rio us Sh ipp in g m aterials and co n taine rs for constructi on. In pea cet ime, sh ipping con tain ers wer e usua lly required to b e tur ned in for reuse as they we re expen sive bu t durable enou gh for rep eated use. In Vietnam, they were seldo m returned b ecau se of the di fficu lties of ba ck-ha ul, transpo rtati on shortages, and the urgen t need for co nstructio n m at erials. Occ asionally directives would be issued requiring that ce rtain contain ers be return ed beca use of shortages, but these were frequently ign ored or just enoug h we re returned to keep higher head q uarters happy, the bulk be ing retai ned for co ns truction purposes. wooden am m u ni tio n boxes, especially larger boxes fo r m ortar and artille ry rounds, were di sassembled fo r their hinges, latch es, and pinewood pl ank s. The p lanks we re useful for sh elves, furn iture, an d o ther fixt ures. Ammun itio n boxes we re also filled with soil an d stacked brick-like for reverting, m u ch like san dbags, though the boxes were m or e dur ab le. Th ey had to be b raced by pi cket posts as a heavy ex plo sion could collapse an ammunitio n box wall; they did n ot have th e fricti o n o f stacked san d bags to h old them in place. 'Wood en sh ippin g pallet s were also d isassembled for their hardwood pl anks, or we re used as flooring in b un kers. A stan d ard pall et measu red 40in. x 48in.
and includ ed Sin .-h igh wooden skids to allow t hem to be lifted by for klifts. Ammunition bo xes and o the r materials were secured to pallets by steel strapping an d delive red to ca m ps. To deliver m iscell an eous supplies in cardboard box es and ot her sma ll co ntai ne rs, a pa llet box mad e of framed plywoo d was used. Thi s was t he len gth of 1\\'0 pallets: -tutn. wide x 40in. deep . These too were di sassembled for reu se. "Spee d pa llet s" (see page 28 box) were supposed to be returned on a later outbo un d cargo tran sp ort, bu t m or e ofte n th ey bec ame a roof for bunkers covered by san dbags. Wh ile the pa llets could bear a heavy load when supported, th ey offered poor resista nc e to highim pact blows such as mo rtar roun ds and had to be well supported by stringers. Th e mo st-freque nt calls for return conce rne d speed pa llet s, which were costly and often in short supply. Steel drums for SS gallons of gasoline o r diesel were extensively used to construct anti-sniper walls, bunkers, and revetments. Th e top s were cut off and th e 3Sin. -high , 23in .-diam eter drums filled with earth, preferab ly tamped solid in layers. The dru ms were typically painted olive green or black, but o the r colors were used . Anoth er use fo r drums involved bot h ends being cut out, the dru m cut length wise, and flatt en ed out to provide a 3Sin . x 72in. steel shee t for revett ing walls. Powd er bag shipping contain ers for l SSmm, 175mm, and Sin . artillery pieces were olive green heavy gauge steel tubes with an interrupted-tread cap o n o ne end. Th ey were some tim es filled with tamped soil and em placed ver tically; wit h th e bottom en ds dug several inc hes int o th e grou nd, to face t ren ch parapets as bull et de flecto rs. Th ey were also used as dra ina ge pipes wit h th e bottom en ds cut out or numerous holes pun ched in th e bottom and th e tu bes welded end-to-end. The two most com mon sizes for l SSm m cans were 6 ~ i n . d iam eter, 28 in . long and Sin . diam et er, 42 in . lo ng. Pierced steel plan ks (PSP; also known as "Marsto n matting," th ou gh thi s ter m h ad fallen from general use by th e time of Vietnam) and M8A1 ligh tweight steel lan ding matting were used as revetting and sometimes as bun ker roofing. Korean War PSP was repla ced by M8Al pla nking as rem ain ing stoc ks were used up. As wit h th e speed pallets, sufficient strin gers were necessary to suppo rt sand bag-covered matting. PSP measured l Sin . x 10ft; :M8A 1 ma tting was 17Min . x 11ft 9Xin . wit h fo ur reinforci ng ribs runni ng its len gth. Both types had tabs and slots to allow them to be fasten ed together and were painted olive dra b. Unless a cam p's airfield was built on very un stable or soft soil, matting was not used . Rolled and compa cted lat erite was preferred. CONEX shi pping con tainers were used as storage lockers and all sorts of bu nkers ran gin g from ammuniti on storage to quarters to ma chine gun emplaceme nts. CONEXs were often used as A-team qu arters, being just the righ t size for a two-man room. They were du g in an d bun kered, often in tw o parallel rows wit h a corridor ru nning do wn the cen ter and an en tranc e at both ends. Co rrugated metal pipe (CMP) h alves m easurin g I- 6ft in width and 2ft in lengt h were Wide ly used. The half- section s had a flange alo ng each edge and bolt holes to fasten two ha lves toget he r; an d th ey were ne stabl e to redu ce sh ipping space. Th e wider heavy gauge steel halves (arches) were used for bun ker and sh elter roofs and covered with sandbags as well as drainage and cu lvert pipes.
An especially dense razor-wire co ncertina belt.Wh ile providing a fo rmidable o bstacle, the difficulties involved in co ntrolling the growth of vegetation can be see n. Some camps sprayed mot or oil or asphaltic cutback in an effor t to reduce growth . but over time the weeds would st ill take root.W ire tended to ensnare a lot of blowing waste paper.
CONEX Co nt aine rs
CON EX (CONtainer EXpress) containers were large, heavy gauge steel boxes for shipping bulk supplies aboard ships and cargo aircraft.The most commonly seen CONEX was a8in. wide, 108in. lo ng (the same dimensions as a speed pallet) and 90in. high with double doors on one end.The o live drabpainte d containers were waterproof and ext remely robust with ribbed walls.
29
Two- and three-cell cinder blocks as well as solid concrete blocks were used for some construction, especially team ho uses, quarters, and other aboveground structures. They were also used extensively for all types of construction in the Delta, as the perpetually wet environment was particularly hard on woo d . "\101ds were available to make the blocks on-site . Standard two-cell blocks measured Sin. x 8in. x 16in. Once the wall was constructed the cells cou ld be filled with sand for increased ballistic protection. Chain-link fenc ing (hurricane or cyclone fence) provided protecti on from RPG fire. It was erected vertically 20 -25ft in front of a bunker on pickets; sometimes much closer because of unfamiliarity with the nec essary standoff distance. Approximately half of the rockets fired during tests directly struck a fence strand and detonated, causing only superficial blast and fragmentation damage to the bu nker's exterior. With the ot her rockets th e nose entered a gap in the strands, th e warhead 's body made contact wit h th e fence, the piezoelectric fuse shorted out and failed to detonate, and the war head broke up. Half-inch wire mesh and chicken wire were sometimes used to cover machine gun firing ports to prevent hand grenades and satchel charges from being thrown in.
Construction principles Moats protected some early camps, but they proved to be ineffective given the effort expended to build and mainta in them. They could be easily crossed by scaling ladders and even prov ided attackers with a degree of cover.
30
Construction and th e degree of protec tion applied to different bu ildings varied greatly from camp to camp. In dividual initiative an d pre ferences, th e degree of th e th reat , available m aterials, terrain conditions, who built the cam p, and practices in use at the time of construction determ ined a given camp's design and construction. Th e various adminis trative buildings were usually ... of wood-frame construction: concrete slabs or woo d-deck floors , horizontal plank walls supported by 2in. x 4in. framing, and corrugated steel roo fs supported by 2in. x 6in. stringers. Occasio nally the wa lls might be made of corruga ted steel. Team houses and most administrative build ings had exterior waist- or chest-high protec ted walls made up of sandbags or soil -filled 55-gallon drums. Team , troop, and dependents' quarters might be wood frame as well, but were more often constructed as bunkers either above ground, semi-sunk (2-4ft below ground), or completely below ground and provided with two - to fourlayer sandbag roofs . Roof supports and beams were usually Sin. x Sin. tim bers wa lled with Zin.. th in k planks. lt was essential that all personnel slept under at least two layers of sandbags for mortar protection. Some camps, however, only had wood-frame Irving quarters or split ba mboo (rattan ) and thatched-roof houses based on Montagnard lon g houses for dependents, but they also provided large bunker she lters . Others we re built in the style of log cabins wit h horizontal logs. Some de pendents would even shel ter in ammunition bunkers if the camp was attacked. Dependents' h ou sin g was often inadequate in the early camps. Whether bunkered faci liti es we re located above ground, sem i-sunk, or below ground depended on the water ta ble, seasonal flood ing,
·- . .
-'
:: .~
.-
~_. ",:
co ns tructio n resources, hardness of the soil, and th e indirect fire thr eat . Belowground struct ures were seldo m completely bu ried , the ir over head cov er being flush with th e ground. Co m mon ly th e ceiling woul d be flush ,,,vit h gro und level, with th e overhead co ver above ground. Belo w-ground or sem i-sunken bu nk ers were oft en pro vided with a corrugated stee l roof positioned inches above th e overhea d cove r and extending at least a foo t beyond. Thi s det on ated mortar rou nd s, prevented rain leakage, and prolon ged the life of th e sandbags.
Th e tacti cal operations cen ter (TOe), com muni cati on s bun ker, and
A USSF officer walks the o ute r perimet er roa d (few camps had this feature) between the o ute r perimeter and wire be lts.About 3ft in front of the co ncretecapped parapet is a five-st rand cattle fence backed by a co il of concertina. Covered fighting positio ns top the parapet .
eme rgency medical bunker (sometimes the first two were combined ) were ty pically complet ely underground and heavily protected . The two or th ree ammunitio n bunkers were sim ilarly protect ed. In more develop ed cam ps there mi gh t be an inner perimete r complex wit h USSF and LLDB team ho uses, TOe, main dispensa ry, and other facilities in a sin gle co mpartmentalized building. Th e design and size of perim eter machine gun bunkers varied grea tly. Th ey were usually sem i-sun k, although some were positioned abov e gro und for the reasons noted above or to obtain a bett er spread of fire by mounting the weapon higher. There was usua lly on ly one firin g port per machine gun; seldom were alte rnate po rts prov ided . Most bun kers m ounted a sing le mach in e gun, but tv.. ro or thr ee might be mounted in large corn er bu nkers to cover multiple sectors of fire. An attached sleeping compartmen t migh t be co nnected to o r be part of t he bu nker. Often a guard post wa s bu ilt atop the bu n ker, co m prising a low sand bag wall wit h a co rrugated steel roof on posts for sun protectio n .
The Cam p (Troi) Tinh Bien gate in IV CTZ. The guard hut is to t he left.At night the gates we re closed and multiple co nce rtina co ils blocked the road.
31
Strikers are taught how to o perate a Cinva-Ram conc rete-brick-making machine.The simple machine was invented in Colombia in th e 1950s and int rod uced into Vietnam by the Seabees.T he ram co mpres sed th e ceme nt with 1.800 Ibs per squar e inch. precluding t he need for gravel aggregate.
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The most common type of ma ch ine gun bunker consisted of a chest-deep rectangular hole revetted with sandbags and an above-ground sandbag wall at least two layers th ick. They could be of any size, with interior dim ensions of Sft x Sft or larger. The firing port was no rma lly framed with Zin. x lOin . or similar-sized lumber, bu t sometime s the po rt was merely faced with sandbags wit h planks, M8A1 matting, or a speed pallet suppo rting th e overhea d sandbags. A sta cked sandbag or timbe r platfo rm was provided for th e tripod-mounted mach ine gun . A na rrow door opened directly in to t he perimeter trench and was usually covered only by a can vas curtain . This was a common weakness of bunkers of all types. They also sometim es lacked protective walls outside the entrance or had entry trenches leading straight into the bunker without a 90-degree tu rn. A major problem experienced with bunkers was the failur e to support th e roof with vertical beams embedded in the ground . If the on ly form of support was pro vided by laying stringers across the top of the sand bag walls, the roof wou ld eventually settl e o r colla pse. This was som eti me blamed o n plastic san dbags as they were "slippery," bu t in fact it was simply because earth-filled sandbags sh ifted and sett led and could collapse v,vith age o r the effects of water absorption. Roofs were supported by 4in . x 4in . timber or log stringers o n whi ch was laid co rrugated steel, PSP or M8A1 matti ng, wood planks , or a speed pallet . Tarpap er or plastic sheeting might be used for water proofing, follmv-ed by th e desired layers of sandbags. Ideally the whol e of the bun ker would be capp ed with a l -2in . layer of concrete, as applied to man y o ther bunkers and weap o n posi tio ns . This thin laye r of non-rein forced conc rete add ed little ba llistic prot ection , but served to pro tect th e sandbags from wear, weathe ring , and water abso rpti on. Repeated wat er absorpti on an d the sub sequent drying of a sandbag structu re led to its eventu al deteriorat ion and th e necessity to rebuild it . By cont rast, a co nc rete-capped stru cture could last for several years. Sandb ags were sometimes coated with asphaltic cutback oil to pro tect th em from wear an d to make plastic bags less slippery. Machi ne gu n an d other bunkers were also built of soil-filled 55-gallon d rums. Since d ru ms set side-by-side h ad wea k po in ts that were easily pen etrated by gunfire, th e front and preferably the in terior had to be faced with sandbags or two layers of d rum s used. Sandbags offered protection from metal fragm ents when struck by gun fire. C O~EX ma chine gun bu nkers had a firing po rt cut into th e en d opposite th e door and the CO:--JEX em placed at gro und level o r semi-sunk. It was then faced an d roofed with sandbags an d a firing port was made using 2in. x lOin . plan ks. Sometim es o ne of the doo rs would be rem oved and a smaller entry provided by sandbagging it in . Mo rtar positions were usually circular (60mm - 6ft; 8lmm - 8ft; 4.2in . 12ft) but sometimes square, with an attach ed am m unition bu nker. They too could be built above ground, sem i-sunk, o r below ground . The parap et was at least two layers of sandbags th ick. Sometime s a parape t of packed earth was built and covered with a shel ved layer of sandbags. Soil-filled d rums and am mu nition boxes also revett ed mortar pits . If the sandbag parapet was con crete-capp ed so was th e pit's inside face. Thi s allowed a black ban d with
white de gree or m il m arks to be pain ted around the in side and m arked to indicat e the directio n s for defense concen tratio ns (DEFCO!'). Ammunition ready racks were sometimes em placed in the sidewalls for DEFCO N rounds, with p re-cut charges and illu m inat io n rounds wit h thei r time fuses p re-set . The floor rem ain ed eart h to facilitate dr ainage. Reco illess rifle po siti ons were required to have an o pen rear and were ill suited to h aving a roof becau se of back blast over-pressure. A large area behin d the rifle had to be kep t clea r of obstru ctions and debri s, t his being a tr ian gul ar area ab out 100 ft deep and 65ft wid e for a 57 m m reco illess rifle. Th e l 0 6mm recoill ess rifle was m ou n ted o n an M15 1A1C jeep . when issued with thi s wea po n, A-tea ms wer e dir ect ed that it was to remain mounted on the jeep , wh ich could not be used as a separate ve hicle. Thi s was freq ue n tly ignored and th e weapon mounted as the team deemed ne cessary. Ofte n severa l sligh tly elevated revetted position s were p repared aro u nd th e per im eter to allow the rifle to be moved. Camps had mostly been constr ucted before th ey received a l06mm recoilless rifle, so sufficien t space to accommodate its considerabl e back blast was scarce, thus restricting where they co uld be emplaced. Occasio na lly, 16- 20ft -hi gh watc h towers and m achine gun towers were built from logs, tim bers, or stee l fram ing. A po pular type used a speed pall et as a floor with soil-filled l05mm how itzer am m u ni tio n boxes as protective wa lls. Th e boxes were held in place by stee l frameworks mad e from barbed wire pickets. Suc h a tower inside the inner pe rimeter allowed a .50-cal. ma chine gu n to be fired over ot her buildings into the ou ter barbed wire barriers. Th is was ca lled a "Medal of Honor tower" as all one had to do to be awarde d the Meda l was cli mb th e to wer during an attack! while ma nuals Specified standard trench d imen sions, in pract ice they va ried greatly. They were co m mo nly 2Mto 3ft across and com paratively shallow, bu t the depth depended on the type of parapet. Trench dep th and parapet height together was usually at least ches t-h igh. Parapets were robustly constructed and m ore perma ne nt than m erely piling up a soil parapet . Th ey were usua lly made up of two layers of san dbags oft en capped with concrete. In the early or developing cam ps, piled earth parapets were some times used . These were usually thi ck, neat, well tamped, and often capped with a she lved layer o f sandbags to prevent rain erosio n. Another form was a sha llow trenc h fronted by a 3ft-high, 2-3ft-wid e soilfilled wall reverted on bo th sides by MBA! plan ks or corrugated sheet m etal, ofte n with ind ivid ual firin g po rts. Firin g steps or slots were cu t in to the trenc h side at in tervals with firin g po rts. ln m an y insta nces firing steps had ligh t overhead cove r. Rather than ha ving simp le firing steps, some camps ha d 2-3-ma n bunkers for riflem en . Some perime ter trench es were built atop high earth berms. Perimeter tren ch es cou ld be Zigzag in form or bu ilt with right-ang le turns. Zigzag com m un ications trenches connectin g different areas wit h in the cam p some times lacked parapets. The pe rim eter ber m s were bulldozed in to pla ce by sta rting the bulld ozer 300ft or m ore ou t and runni ng in tow ard the perimeter, scrapin g a few in ch es off the surface to pu sh it into a ber m . This also had the effect o f clea ring th e grou nd for t he wire barriers. The bulldozer woul d then
It was co mmon pract ice for USSF NC Os to give a crew of Striker s a few hours' head sta rt filling sandbags.Th en one or t wo NCOs wou ld begin placing sandbags for a bunker as the Strikers raced to keep up t he supply.All of them would expend mighty effort just to avoid th e 20 push-ups the losers would have to knock o ut.
33
Constr uction COSts were kept down by th e use of lo cal materials.These also substit ute d for standard materials th at were frequently in sho rt supp ly. Here a woo dcutting crew delivers hardwood logs to be used fo r anti-sniper walls.
34
work the berm to dress it up, as would shovel-welding troops. Dependi ng on th e terrain an d vegetatio n , the grou nd m igh t be cleared another 300 - 1,(X)()ft further out from th e ou ter wire belt . Sandbags we re to b e stacked with the ru nner (the edge witho ut a sea m) facing outward an d seams facin g inward , as were the chokes (t he open ing in each b ag). Id eally they wo uld be sta cked with we t soil fill and po unded in to a squared, bri ck-like sha pe with pieces of 4in . x 4in . lumber wielded by Strikers. Besides giving a neat appearan ce, thi s provided a m ore solid struc tu re whe n th e filler dried . American t roop s tended not to bot her with th is professional tou ch . All weapon positions were provided with stor age spac e for a considerable am ount of ammunition. In th e early day s of the war it was quickly learn ed tha t once an at ta ck commenced, ammunition resu pp ly from central bun kers was Virtually impossible. Weap on positions had to hold sufficien t ammunition and additional stocks were somet ime s sto red nearby. Crew-served wea po n positions were usually provided wit h a supply of small arms ammunition, grenades, and water. Even rations and LAWs were stock ed in some . Camps genera lly had a rundown and sha bby appearan ce mix ed with new construction . Th ere were always n ew defen ses an d facil it ies un der construct ion, being replaced or rebuilt, or repaired . Spoil fro m excavations, stacked const ruction materials, and debris from to rn -down st ructures was apparent. Aerial ph oto s of a given camp taken a few month s apart revealed drastic changes, while photos of a camp ta ken a year or so apart were alm ost unreconcilable. Th e style in wh ich structu res were bu ilt co uld vary. For example, in th e aut hor's camp the thr ee Sl mm mortar pits were each of entirely differen t design, being built or rebuilt at different tim es under the supervision of different weapons NCOs. Some wood- frame and corrugated metal buildings, especially in th e inner perimete r, were painted, usually green . Meta l roo fs were seldo m painted, as per most other buildings. Th e camp name was u sually painted in large block letters at op the LLDB team house, usually in yellow, as this was more visible at nigh t. Th e USSF's team number may have bee n painted atop their team hou se. A number was pain ted atop differen t main buildings in remote sett ings to enable the crews of sup porti ng aircraft to iden ti fy th em . A Vietna me se flag flev..' in the inne r perimeter. Th e US flag could not be flown ; th ese were Vietna mese bases. The US flag usually adorned th e wall inside the USSF team hou se.
Camp defense Camps could be overru n if the enemy was determined eno ug h, possessed th e st rength and firepower, was able to obtain good intelligen ce, and was willing to pay the price in casualties. Even if a camp was completely overrun the VC/N VA usually su ffered more casualties than th e defenders.
The d efen ders A Cam p Strike Force (CSF) was a battalion-size unit cons isting of t hree or four rifle com panies, o ne or two combat recon naissance platoons (e RP), and a political warfare team . Actua l stren gth varied greatl y, from 250- 550, with th e average somew here in between . Th e troops at a particular camp could be of a single et hn ic group o r from two o r three di fferent groups. For exa mple, in I and II CTZ th ey were mostly Mon tagn erd. in III an d IV CTZ th ey were Cambodian (bo rn and raised in Vietnam) an d Vietnamese, th ou gh some Montagnard Strikers were found in III Cl'Z . Com panies co mprised tro ops from a single eth nic gro up. A CSF co mpa ny co nsisted of some 130-1 50 tro op s o rganized into a headqu arters, a weapons platoon and th ree rifle platoo ns with th ree ten- ma n sq uad s. Th e weap ons platoon h ad two machine guns and two 60mm mortars. Ofte n it was not organized as suc h, with the mach ine gun s assigned to rifle plat oons and the morta rs retain ed in the camp. The CRP (a seco nd one was authorized in lat e 1969) cou ld con duct both reco nn aissance and sma ll-scale combat op erations either in depen dently or while accom pan ying a company. The 16-man politica l warfare team provi ded civic act ion and mora le services. Th e USS F A-tea m was aut h orized 12- 14 m en , alth ou gh th ey were typ ically understren gt h . Th e A-te am officially served as advisors to th e LLDB and the CSF, but in reality th ey oversaw comba t operations and th e op eratio n of the camp. Th e similar-sized LLDB team officially commanded th e camp an d CSF, bu t often concer ned themselves with the day-to-day runni ng of the camp. In so me camps, especially in th e early days and when th ere was a th reat of infilt rat io n of the CSF by VC, a 20-60-man det achment of Nungs was provided as bodygua rds for t he A-team , un der whose direct com mand they served . Nungs were eth nic Chinese who had fled Kort h Vietnam after th e co mmun ist \ takeover. They were fierce figh ters and \ com plete ly loya l to the Ame ricans. Life in a ca mp was not undul y ha rsh I and could even be described as relaxed if ene my activity was light. Typ ically one • i company co nducted a five-day combat operation, o ne or two othe rs undertook training and extern al camp security, and anothe r provided ca mp suppo rt on a rotati onal basis. Camp suppo rt included • work det ails building, repa iring, an d ma intaining bunkers, other stru ctures and the wire; filling water trailers and di stributin g th em abo ut the ca mp, latrin e bu rno ut , tra sh collectio n and burn in g, grass cutt ing in the wire, checking th e runway for deb ris, general
This obs ervat ion post, atop one of t he inner per imet er buildings, has a para pet built o f soil-filled IOSmm ammunit ion boxes.They are held in place by wo od framing.
\
'I
35
,
•
:.:::..::- . .
. , ': :::"i : "-'-: r
-e: .'.
. ~.#':~. .-:."';-: . .-
-- . :.i" ;:\ - :..~:
e,
The wood-frame building is protecte d from mo rta r fragments and sniper fire by soilfilled steel Bin. howitzer prop ellant charge tubes. AB OV E LEFT
A BOVE RIG H T O ne loo p of detonating cord is placed around the inside lip of a 155mm propellant tube and camped with mud.Th is cuts out the bottom end. allowing the tu bes to be we lded together end-to-end fo r a dra inage pipe.
36
Co ncrete foot ings and plumbing have already been installed for this below-ground dispensary. Locally hired labore rs dump roc k fill before the concrete slab is poured .
."
.'~;;~';:;;1'.;.,,::'.ii,.~
camp clear-up , cleaning crew-served weapo ns, u nloading aircraft de livering supplies, cleaning out d rain age dit ch es, etc. Strikers would escor t Medical-Civic Action Pro gram (MEDCAP) teams comprising USSF, LLD B, and political warfare team me mbe rs visiting local villages. Th is was an essent ial activity as it assisted the loca ls, won suppo rt for th e South Vietname se governm ent, kept th e villager s on frien dly terms, and provided an opportu n ity to gather information from villagers . Children attended th e camp school, USSF and LLDB medics treat ed dependents and villagers in the dispen sary (from minor illn esses to delivering
babies), dependents visited the local villa ge market , famil y disputes were settled, and life wen t on. There were few distraction s. Volleyba ll and socce r were th e main spo rts. Card playing, a few televisio n sets, and outdoor movies two to four times a week filled the eveni ngs. The re was no sta ndard allocation of crew-served weapons for a strike cam p. Equipment authorization tab les allocated weapo ns o n the basis of avenues of approach. For mortars and reco illess rifles th e tabl es autho rized one per main aven ue of ap proach, and one ma chine gun was autho rized for each ma in and secondary avenue of approach . Thi s led to a broad interpretatio n based o n th e A-team's assessment of ap proaches. Most cam ps could be attacked from any dir ect ion and unless o ne side of a camp was edged by a wide, deep river, th e dist ribution of crew-served weapons generally had to cover a 360-degree perim eter. Camps built on rugged terrain in the mountains might allocat e add itional weapons to cover nea rby draws and ravines from which an attack might be launch ed . Some weapo ns would be assign ed to fire on h ills, ridges, and woo ded areas on whi ch th e attacker's supporting weapons mi gh t be positi on ed . Th e shape and size of th e cam p h ad much to do with th e n um bers of crewserved weapons, especia lly ma chine guns on th e perimeter. One to three .30-cal. M1919A6 ma chine guns were mounted in co rne r bu nkers; especially if the cam p's design had "sha rp" poi nted corners as o n triangular or five-pointed sta r-sha ped designs . Such co rne r bunkers had to co ver the two side walls and a direct approach to th e co rn er. Corn er bu nke rs were key targets as th ey co vered tvv·o walls as well as any attack aim ed at the corner itself. For th is reason th ey were larger and more heavily cons tru cted than o the r perimeter bunkers. With six- and eight-sided cam ps, th e co rner bu nkers were usuall y th e same as the wall bunkers and had on ly o ne o r two machine guns. wall bunkers were equ ally spaced with o ne or two pe r wall, more if th e cam p was large o r the bunkers were o n the lo ng sides of rect an gular-shaped cam ps. Some times .SO-cal. M2 machine guns were mounted in key outer perimeter bu nk ers (usually centered on a wall), or atop inn er perimeter bunkers or towers to allow the m to fire over buildings in t he outer perimete r an d into th e wire . Cam ps might po ssess o ne to four .SO-cal. machine guns; they could be mounted on an ~B tripod o r M31 pede stal m ount. (The story that it is illegal to fire .50-cal. ma ch ine guns at personnel, but th at it is perm itt ed to "fire at th eir eq uipmen t," is a m yth. Th ere is no such restriction in th e Hagu e o r Geneva Co nventio ns.) One to four 57m m M18Al recoilless rifles were provi ded and perhaps a single 106mm M40Al. Some cam ps, h owever, had no recoilless rifles. These weapons could be mounted o n the oute r perimete r to cove r the main approach es o r domin atin g terrain features, o r ato p inner perimet er bunkers to
Stri ke Fo rce W e ap ons
In the early days. the CIDG was issued with a variety of ob solescent and fo reign weapons: .3D-cal. M19D3A3 rifle
(Springfield) .Hl -cal. MI rifle (Garand) .3D-cal. MI and M2 carbines .3D-cal. M1918A2 Browning automat ic rifle (BAR) A5-cal. M3AI submach ine gun ("grease gun 9m m m/45b submachine gun (Swe dish Car t Gustaf) 9mm M/50 submachine gun (Danish Madsen) .30-ca1. MI919A6 light machine gun (Browning) M8 grenade launcher (for carbine) The sem i- and full-automatic M2 carbine was declared th e sta ndard C IDG sho ulder weapon in 1962. along wit h th e BAR; some MI rifles we re retained.The 40mm M79 grenade launcher and 7.62mm M60 machine gun began to be issued in I967 .The MI9 19A6 re mained the main perimete r defense machine gun. In early 1969 the 5.56mm M16AI rifle replac ed the M2 car bine. MI rifle, and BAR. OO
)
USSF officers exa mine the sealed 55-gallon dru ms at tac hed to a floating barra cks at Camp MyAn. IV CTZ. Floa ting buildings were pro vided with porches. which served as boa t docks when the camp flooded.Travel between buildings was accom plishe d by using native dugouts. t 6ft fiberglass assau lt boats. or simply swimming.
37
RIG-iT Interior view of an 81 mm M29 mortar position an d am m unit io n bunker Camps genera lly had three or four 81mm mortar " pits," usually located within the inner perimeter.This helped ensure the ir protection and being deep within the camp the ir 230ft minimum range allowed the m to fire into the o uter wire barriers. In the eve nt of an attack they we re operat ed by USSF with the help of tra ined Strikers.The 8 1mm morta r (I ) was a devastating weapon capable of delivering up to 30 ro unds pe r minute for a sho rt time. The HE round had a 130ft casualty radius.To fire a DEFCON the mortar would be oriente d in the designated direction , a common DEFCO N elevation set, the first round fired, the traversing hand turned once followed
by anothe r ro und, another tum until 4-6 rounds we re dro pped, and then repeated to create a curtain of steel. Sandbags (2) revet the belowground inte rior sides in this insta nce. The revetment walls he re are two sandbag layers t hick, but could be considerably thicker. It is furth er strengthened by soil-filled 155mm howitzer propellant bag steel shipping tubes (3) partl y buried in the gro und. The ready rack (4) holds HE roun ds with the charges cut for pre-planned DEFCONs and illumination round s with the time-delay fuse pre-set and the charges cut.The end cap from a fiberboard ammunitio n tube protects the Blm m M29AI mor tar's muzzle. A
po ncho or canvas trap normally protected the weapo n, which was typically cleaned eve ry othe r day. Several hundred HE (5) and illumination (6) rounds are stacked in the ammunition bunker (7) on pallets along with W P (8). Numerous mode ls of ammunition were used.W P rou nds were stowed vertically to prevent the gooey WP from sett ling o n one side, which would th row the ro unds off balance and off line when fired . On e of the .50-cal. ammunition cans (9) holds cleaning gear and the othe r is for unused propellant bags (charges) "cut" (removed) from round s. Canvas curtai ns would no rmally cover the bunker doo r and ready racks.
allow th em to fire over buildings in the outer perim eter and into the wire. The 57m m was prov ided with ca nister rounds and th e I06m m wit h flechett e rou nds for anti-perso n ne l use. Both had high explosive sha ped-ch arge (HEAT) rounds for anti-tank use and white phosphoru s (WP) smoke for screenin g and anti-personnel fire. Th e 57m m ha d a hig h explosive (HE) rou nd whil e the 106mm had a high explo sive, plastic (HEP) round for both anti-person ne l and anti-tank use. Both had an effective range of up to 6,560f t for area target s o n dominating terrain featur es th e enemy might occupy. Mortars were critical to the defense of the camps and large numb ers were used. Each CSF company had two 60mm MI 9 mortars, normally left in the camp . Th is auto matically gave th e camp six or eight mortars. Several addi tiona l MI9s might be provided, giving a cam p te n or more. Three or fou r 8 1mm M29AI mo rtars were also provided to place a curtain of steel aro und a camp. The 600101 mortars were pos itioned at rou gh ly equal in tervals in side the o uter
38
T his new ly co nst ructed sandbag bunke r at My An is built on an earth mo und above flo od level. The barbe d wire pickets help retai n t he sandbags and will be reinfo rced w ith barbed wire st rands, th en co ncrete-capped.
ABOVE This log and earth bunker was typical in early camps when sandbags were in short supply.Split logs are used for firing ports, as dimensio ned lumber was scarce. The guard hut, protecte d from snipers by sandbags and from the sun by a thatch or co rrugated ste el ro of, was a standard fixture .
40
A camp's USSF and l lDB officers inspect a recendy completed concrete bunker.The roof is several layers of sandbags contained by a conc rete wall. covered by corrugate d sheet meta l for waterproo fing, and topped by a burste r layer of co ncrete blocks and rubble.
perime ter. While th eir 165ft mi nimu m range allowed them to fire into the wire, they were often sited to fire int o the wire on the opposite side of the camp , th us allowin g the m to make bett er use of their minimum range. A m ortar firing into the wire on th e side of th e camp on wh ich it was emplaced could not bring the rounds in close enough . Mortar pits on the side of the camp un der att ack mig h t receive dire ct fire and be unable to op erate whil e mortars on the opposi te were n ot under fire and could op erate. The 81mm mortars in th e inner perimeter, with a mini mum range of 230ft, could fire into the outer wire. One to four 4.2in . M30 mortars might be available . Camps usually had o nly on e or two M30s, but those without 105mm howitzers might have ad ditiona l
"four-deuces." The M30 had a minimum range of 2,525ft. It was ill-suited for direc t camp defe nse , as rounds fell well outside the wire. It was usefu l for firing on ene my suppo rting weapons posi tio ns, dominated terrai n, an d suspec ted enemy assem bly areas, as well as firing illumina tio n. The 8tmm an d 4.2in. mortars could also provide fire support to local secur ity patrols operating within some 2- 3 miles of th e camp, respectively. All three types of mortar were provid ed with HE, WP, and illuminati on rounds. One of th e most valuable ro les of mor tars was illu minati on. Con tinuo us illumination by pa rachute-suspen ded flares was invalu able to illumin ate the wire and attackers. A very sma ll number of camps du g-in disabled t anks, eit he r a US 90m m M48A3 or an ARVN 76mm M41 A3.
This bunker is beyond the norm, but Cai Cai was a freque nt ta rget fo r attacks. It is built with dou ble walls of concrete-filled cinder block with packed earth between the walls. It fought off tw o major assaults in 1965.Th is bunker is on the riverside corner (see page 22 Ca i Ca i photo). Note the sloped barbed wire apron to hampe r de molitio n charge-wielding sapper s. A Claymo re mine can be seen wired to a If-shape d picket below t he bunker 's right co r ner.
Conduct- of the defense
ABOVE RIGHT
ABOVE LEFT
A typical machine gun
bunke r being cons tructed around The defense of a strike camp was a multi -layered exercise that required numerous a CONEX at Camp My Phuoc Tr y, proactive measures if it was to be successful. Aggressive search-and-clear A-41 I. IV CTZ. It will be t opped operations conducted by the CSF in its TAORkept the enemy off balance. A camp by sandba gs and a revert ed entr y cond ucting successful operations ma de itself a candidate for attack though, so passage built.A rifle firing port can maintaining good relation s with nearby villages and establishing agents inside be seen in the s ide. A large r and them provided early warn ing of any attack in the planning. Platoo n-size dayligh t lowe r machine gun port is in the front. security patrols wou ld be conducted out to roug hly two-thirds of a mile from the camp as well as close in, on the lookout for signs of ene my pre parations. While a camp butt oned up for the n ight, ambush patrols establish ed on likely avenues of approach mean t tha t it was not blind to th e outside world. To att ack a camp req uired tha t VC Main Force or NVA un its be bro ug h t in to th e area, and signs of this build-up were often detected. The VC migh t att empt to gain suppo rt from villag ers and even direct propaganda at th e Strikers. It was seldom th e case that a camp was tot ally Crew-served W eapons sur prised by an attack. Wh en it was evident that an attack was Weapon Weight Range pen ding MIKE Force, ARV)J', or US units were often bro ught in .30-caI.MI9 19A6 MG J2 ~ lbs 1.090yds to secure dominating terr ain and conduc t offensive operatio ns .SO-cal.M2 MG 126 1bs 2.00 0 yds to thwart t he enemy's pla ns. 60mm M19 mo r ta r 45 .2 Ibs 2,200 yds Groun d at tacks were typi cally laun ch ed with a m ain att ack 8 1mm M29A I mortar 1321b, 3,990 yds and on e or two suppo rting att acks, maki ng it difficult to 6,000 yds 4.2 in. M30 mortar 672 lbs determ ine which was the main attack. Th e sup por tin g attack s 57mm MI8AI RR 40 .21 bs 1.300 yds 460 lbs 106mm M40AI RR 1.090 yds held the defenders in th eir sectors rather th an allow them to 105mm M10 1A 1 how itzer 4.980lbs 12.00 0 yds be moved to meet the main attack. Sup porting weapo ns were to the flanks of th e attack o r on h igh ground, enabling them
41
Exterior view of a 57mm MI8AI recoill e ss rifle position atop a m ac hin e gu n bunker. The 57mm MI8A I reco illess rifle ( I )
was developed at the end of World War II, but was no lo nge r in use by conventio nal US force s. It had an effective range of 1,400 yards for point targets whe n fired fro m the M1917A I tripod using its M86F telescopic sight. It co uld also be fired from the sho ulder or on a folding biped and monopod from the grou nd.The M302A I H E and
M30aA I W P wer e slightly less potent t han 60mm mortar round s and t he
Fire Arrow
A fire arrow was position ed on a pivoting mou nt near the cente r of a camp and usually shielded by a wall o r fence to conceal it from enemy view. W hen a camp was attacked at night and supporting aircraft arrived o n-station, the ar row was pointed in the direct ion of the main attack.All of the fuelfill ed cans o n the arrowhead were lit and then the number of cans o n the arrow shaft, indicating the distance from the camp's perimeter to the enemy. Each lit can repre sented 330ft dista nce. An 8-12ft arrow- shaped woo den steel barbed wire picket frame had one-gallon (No. 10) cans fastened to the broad arrowhead in a V-patt ern and in a single line down the ar row's shaft.The cans were half-filled with sand and gasoline was po ured in before use .The fire arrow was covered with a trap when not in use.
42
USSF and l lDB weapon s NCO s check a .30-cal. M19 19A6 machine gun position at an outlying outpost. The hastily constructe d position is made from a half-section of 4ft-diameter corrugated metal pipe and covered with plast ic sandbags.
M307A I HEAT achieved extremely poor penetration against armor. It was valuable in that long-range point targets could be easily hit owing to its high degree of accuracy. Even more valuable was the T25E5 canister round (2). Filled wit h IS4 o r 176 stacked cylindrical steel slugs ( I.a lbs}, th is shotgun-typ e round was effective to 170 yards.At 25 yards it had a 9-yard spread . A 57mm recoilless rifle was often mo unted atop inner perimeter machine
gun bunkers (3), allowing them to fire over outer perim et er buildings and into the wire.This position is ato p a machine gun bunker built arou nd a steel CON EX containe r (4).A pair of 3ft-diameter CMP halves filled with sandbags provides th e firing platform. The weapon's con siderab le back blast required an open rear.A ready rack (5) holds HE and canister rounds . Additio nal ammunitio n is stowed inside the machine gun bunker.
to engage target s on the perim eter an d inside the ca mp . Int ens e mort ar barrages usually preceded att acks. Sappe rs, though , were already in the wire, cutt in g lan es and deactivatin g Claymo re min es and trip flares. Some may hav e pene trated th e camp 's interior to attack th e TOC /co mmo bun ker, team hou ses, gene rators, mortar positions, etc . Thi s was seldom successful, but VC sym path izers in th e Strike Force were some times more effectiv e. When an attack was susp ected the peri meter guard was increased and a heightened state of alert main tained . \Vhen the attack was initiated or detected by sentries virtually all perim eter weapons opene d fire, even if no movem en t was detected in the ir sector s. Th is was in case supporti ng att acks or infilt rato rs were elsewhe re in the wire. Designat ed mortars began firing illumination all around th e perim eter. As soo n as th e location of th e attacks was determ ined th e mortar defen sive conc en tratio ns (DEFCOK) were fired int o th e wire. The I05m m howi tzers and 4.2in . mort ars would open fire on pre-planned target s such as possible assembly areas and supporting weapon positions. Squads or platoons from othe r com panies were some times dispatch ed from secto rs not unde r attack to reinforce th e endangered sector. Strength was not redu ced to the poi nt th at othe r sectors were underma nne d, in case oth er attac ks developed. Th e first ho ur or so was utter co nfusio n . No matter how well a camp pre pared, its de fense could still be co n fused and disorgan ized, as is any com bat action . Often a flare ship, a mod ified C--1 7 trans port, arrived o n-sta tion and
43
A USSF NCO watches W P bursts fro m his camp's 4.2in. mo rtar.The e nt ire trench and
ABOVE LEFT
bunker complex is complete ly
concrete-capped. Barbed wire pickets hold t he co rr ugate d t ren ch reverting in place and are reinforced by plank spreaders jammed bet ween the m.
ABOVE RIGHT A USSF weapons NCO plots DEFCON sight elevation data on a mortar pit's firing data board . O n the ground is an Bl mm M374 HE ro und. Most of th e charge bags on the fins will be removed beca use
of the DEFCO N's short range.
RIGHT T his is an exam pl e of a very
early camp's 8 1mm mortar pit: mer ely a pit dug in the gro und
with a low sandbag para pet.The hooch behind it is constru cted of
44
thatch and bamboo rattan; typ ical local materials.
began dropping illumination, partly relieving mortars of that n ecessity. If th e camp was within arti llery range of other cam ps o r fireba ses, and most were, pre-coordinat ed DEFCONs wou ld be fired. Because of the mod erate accur acy of artillery, these were plo tted outside th e wire and on possible assembly areas an d nearby hill s. Th e A-team would ad just artillery fire closer in once the situatio n stabilized.
If th e peri meter was penet rated , close-ran ge fight s amon g th e buildings ens ued, with even morta rs being fired into th e overrun area . Troop s would be moved into th e lat eral communication trench es an d took position in ad jacen t buildings in an effort to contain the pen et ration. This became ext reme ly co nfused} as it was very difficult to coordin ate th e positioning of troops, con duct coun terattacks, control pa nic ked depen dents, and determi ne exactly whe re the enemy was. Enem y individ ual s and sm all groups cou ld easily spread th rough th e cam p amidst the darkness, con fusion , and fires. Even if mo st of a camp was ove rrun, the inner perime ter and other pockets often held out unt il relief arrived or th e attackers withdrew before first light. If an attack did no t overrun a cam p within an hour or two, it usually failed. However, some successful att acks develop ed into all-night battles. At first light, close air support aircraft and attack helicopters arrived. Their support was critical, but as with artillery th ey could deliver th eir ordn ance only so close to th e camp.
ABOVE More elaborate BImm mortar pits are see n here .These have broa d earth parapets covered with step ped sandbags to prevent ero sion. An ammunition bunker is inco rpo rate d into th e wide parapets. A seldo m-issued 75mm M20 re coilless rifle is mo unted in a co ncrete-capped firing position. Judging by the pe rspective of the background this posi tion is mounted atop ano the r bun ker to allow it to fire into t he o ute r barrier a comm on pract ice when mou nt ing a recoilless rifle. BELOW
45
A 57mm MI8A I recoi lless rifle is inspected. It is mounted on an M191 7A I t ripod, o riginally designed for the Browning water-cooled machine gun. This pos ition has a low sandbag par apet.
46
Strikers whee l a IOSmm MIOIAI howitzer into a newly co mpleted firing posit ion revetted by vertical stakes and sandbags. One or two ammun ition bunkers were attac hed to eac h "gun pit."
Because of the art illery and air superiority the attackers wo uld "hug" the camp's defenses, that is, get in as close as possible, penetrate into the camp, and in termingle to negate the heavy defen sive firepowe r. An overrun camp degenerated into a sta te of pandemonium and mass co nfusio n. At some poi n t the Strikers m ight break and run ; ot hers wou ld continue to fight. Panic among th e h undreds of dep en d en ts caused m ore p rob lem s, especially since the VC/NVA would shoot indiscrim in ately. While they sought to take Amer ican p risoners, they considered the CIDG traitor s an d seldom took p risoners. They executed the LLDB and their fam ilies. Relief forces wou ld be dispatched at first light as well. Un fortunately this did not always work because po litical conflicts, excessive caution, interservice rivalries, differing agendas, and poor coordination sometimes delayed or even prevented relief from being sent. AU too often, relief forces were no t dispatch ed for fear of headin g into an amb ush . For this and other reasons, Special Forces established MIKE Forces, their task being to provide reliable reaction forces u nder its own control. Th is, however, was of no conseque nce for cam ps that were overrun qu ickly, ~ Most relief forces were delivered by helicopter onto landing zo nes some distance from th e camp. They h ad to figh t the ir way in to the camp, attack the attackers outsi de the camp, and seize dom inating terrain aro und the camp. If the camp had been overrun, relief forces seldo m foun d any live enemy; they had withdrawn in to the mountains or ju n gle, ta king as many of th eir dea d as possible. The enemy would also recover wea po ns and m unitions from the camp; surp rising ly, they of ten left m uch behind. Th eir main goals in m ou n ti ng an attack were to destroy a cam p t ha t ha d been caus ing them difficulties, de monstrate their supe riority to local villages, an d achieve a po litica l and psychological Victory.
The test of battle Scores of camps, in fact m ost, were att acked at one tim e or ano the r, but o nly seven cam ps actua lly fell. Attacks ranged from sim ple h arassment while the camps were under cons truc tion to major assaults an d sieges. Som e camps were all but ove rru n before co unt erattacks or rein fo rcem en ts d rove o ut th e att ackers. No two battles were th e same and on ly exam ples can be given. The se examples describe a cam p wh ich alm ost fell, but held out, a co m plete ly successful defen se, and a cam p which fell to overwhe lm ing od ds. The first CIDG cam p to be overrun was Hiep Hoa o n th e Plain of Reed s northwest of Saigo n, in th e early mo rning hours of Novem ber 24, 1963. Th e camp was poo rly prepa red to repel an attac k, morale was low, and VC who had infiltrate d the CSF co n tributed to its down fall. Of the five USSF in th e cam p, four were capt ure d.
Attack on Nam Dong The Camp Nam Dong attack is an exam ple of a vicio us close-quarters batt le to preve nt a cam p from bein g co m pletely ove rrun . The cam p, in the n orthern portion of I crz in a rem ote area, was located at the intersectio n of two valleys used by the VC as infiltrati on routes, some 15 mile s from Laos. It was also responsible fo r protecting nine Montagnard villages and their 5,000 inhabitants, but it had been decided to turn the camp over to th e Vietnamese and co nv ert it to Civil Guard use (predecesso r of th e Regio nal Forces) because of th e area 's poor recru iting pot ential. The th ree CIDG com pan ies each n umbered 80-plus me n ra th er than 154 . Two compan ies ,...'ere Montagn ard and o ne Vietnamese. The situ ation ~a t Nam Dong was perilous. The cam p was situate d on less-th andesirable defen sive terrain, the Vietname se d istri ct chief was uncoop erative, relat ions with the LLDB were strained, and there were fight s between th e Vietna me se co m pan y and th e USSF team 's Chinese Nung bod yguards. Thi s
Nom Dong Standoff. Members of A·726 fight off the attackers from an 8 1mm mo rtar po sitio n in the early morni ng of July 6, 1964. (Frank
M.T ho mas ®)
47
RIGHT Attack on C amp Nam Dong. 02 .26 hours, July 6, 1964.
E. Nung quar ters .
Key: I. Main VC attack. 2. Seco ndary VC attacks. 3. VC suppor ting fire.
F.
G.
H. I.
A. USSF team hou se (co mma nd post,
ope rations ce nter, USSF quarters, civilian emp loyee quarters). B. N ung quarters. supply room, com municatio ns room .
C. LLDB team hou se (ca mp HO. LLDB q uarte rs). D. Dispen sar y.
48
J. K. L.
M. N. O.
C o mmu nication s bunker. USSF mess hall. Helico pter pad. TOe pit (" sw imming poo l") and spoil pile. Stacked con crete blocks (for TOC). Fire arrow. 81 mm M I mo rtar posit ion (x 3). 60mm M2 mo rtar pos ition (x2). Nun g mess hall. Ammun ition bun ker (x 3).
P.
.30-cal. M 1919A 6 machine gun
Q. R. S. T. U. V.
bunker (x3). Gate. Entry road . Outer wire barrie r. Outer perimeter trench. Communication s trench. Inner perimeter wire barrier.
Unlettered buildings arou nd the o ute r perimeter are Stri ker bar ra cks.The view of th e camp is looki ng towards the north .
degenerated into a shootout ben . . een the Nungs and Vietn ame se th e day befo re the atta ck, but th e Americans put a halt to it before there were casualties. Some 100 miles to the south, un derm anned camp Polei Krong in II crz ha d been overru n on Jul y 4, 1964 . Seven USSF were wou nded in the atta ck, but all SF personnel escaped. Unfortunate ly th e USSF at Nam Don g had not been informed of Polei Kron g's fall, whi ch occurred two days before th e attack on their camp. Deta chmen t A-726, deta ched from the 7th SFGA in th e Un ited States, arrived for a six-mo nth tour at th e en d of May to relieve th e in-p lace team . A-726 would co ntinue ma king improv ements to the camp, turn it over to the Civil Guard, th en establish a new camp closer to the bord er at Ta Co. As soo n as the ne w team arrived the VC increased its propaganda effort and ha rassm ent of local villages. In th e days before the att ack, patrol s reported th e villagers to be n ervo us and refusin g to provide infor ma tion. About 20 VC sym pat h izers were suspected in th e Vietn amese company. Th ese un stable co nditio ns were exacerbated by th e fact that alm ost 300 sur plus weapons were in the camp awaiting sh ipme n t out , making an att ack o n the camp all the more desirabl e to th e vc. The 12-ma n USSF tea m with an att ach ed Australi an Speci al Air Service adv isor, 60 Nungs, seven LLDB, and 38 1 Strikers defended th e ca mp. ClOG dependents lived in Nam Don g Village a few hundred yards to th e northeast. A Seabee-built no rth -south gravel airstri p was situa ted a couple of hundred yards to th e east, and a small river flowed pa rallel with th e airfield about SSO yards further east. A small outpost was located 165 yards to th e south-southe ast on a ridge. Forested 10\"" ridges several hundred yards away surrounded th e camp. Further off, mou nt ain s rose over th e camp. The camp was a freeform , rough ly ov al shape, as was common fo r early camps, and measured abo ut 820ft x l ,150ft. Th e per imeter trench relied o n firing steps ,,,..ith a few o pen ma chine gu n position s. Th ere were mach ine gun bu nkers at th e main gate and in the southeast and southwest co rn ers. The o nly barrier was a 4ft-high five-strand ba rbed wire fen ce wit h plmii stakes. Becau se of the cam p's sche duled conversion, grass had been allowed to grow high in the wire. Striker barr acks were positi on ed around the perime ter. Th e ent ry road ran north from t he n ort hea st corne r, with a gate in both th e outer and in ner wire barriers. The gates, wood-frame with interwoven barbed ,...'ire, were kept locked at night an d were not opene d under an y circumstances. A ma n-sized gate beside th e main gate allowed access to th e inner perim eter. It could only be op en ed at night wit h an American pr esent an d covered by a Nung. A helico pter pad was located on the west side of the road just outside th e oute r peri meter. The inner perim eter was larger than usual : 260ft x 395ft, oval, and sur rounded by a sim ilar wire fen ce on ly 1OO-13Oft inside t he o uter perimeter.
49
50
There was no perim eter berm or tren ch. The inner buildings were partl y protected by 3ft-thick, 4ft-hi gh log crib an ti-sniper walls. Th e buildings themselves were buil t in t he local Montagnard-style with th at ch roofs and ratt an walls. Besides severa l small buildings, t here were 24ft x 60ft and 24ft x 40ft longh ouses con ta ini ng th e USSF team h ouse and o the r facilit ies. Some references suggest th at the inner perim eter was built around a form er Frenc h outpos t, but thi s was no t th e case. On th e in ner perim eter's east side was a large pit, kn own as the "swimming pool," the future TOe, and a 7ft-h igh mound of earth and rocks plus th ree stacks of concrete blocks. On the east side, bu t outside t he in ner perim eter 's wire, were thr ee sand bag ammunition bunkers encl osed in their own wire. Inside the in ner perimeter were thr ee Slmm and two 60mm mortar pits man ned by USSF and Nungs, The mortar pits were sem i-sun k with the below-ground sides revetted wit h smooth rounded rocks and low sandbag para pets. Each m ort ar pit had 350 rounds with m ore in the main ammuni tion bunkers. Som e of the pits had recent ly had concrete ammu niti on bunkers added. Th e morta r pits were to bec ome individual st rong point s that held o ut through t he assau lt. A sing le 57m m recoilless rifle was to be carried by th e tea m sergeant to wh ere it was needed . The strike companies each had only o ne 60mm ha ndhe ld mo rtar with 12 rounds, and two ma chi ne guns. The USSF and Nungs were on full alert o n th e mornin g of th e attack, July 6. The Strikers were lackadaisical, with most turning in . Years later it was found that some 100 St rikers were VC with orders to slit the th roat s of th ose sleeping nearby, remove thei r own uniforms, and join th e assau lt weari ng loinclot hs as did other attackers. Th e 800 -900-man assault fo rce - two VC Main Force battalions (these un its were never ide ntified) - pos itioned one 8 1m m an d th ree 60mm mortars, a S7mm recoilless rifle, and ma chine gun s on ridges to th e n ort h , northwest, and southwest of the cam p. The six-man outpost outside th e camp had their throat s cut in th eir sleep . Th e first m orta r rounds impact ed at 02.26 h ours, h itt ing th e USSF m ess ha ll and team house and setting them on fire. Rounds were landin g co ntin uously and grenades were bein g thr own fro m the "..vire. Th e American s at first th ou ght an oth er figh t had bro ken ou t between th e Nungs an d Vietnam ese. Th e tea m commun icati ons NCO imme diate ly alerted the B-team by radio and called for a flare ship, but it was unable to take off because the airfield from whic h it operated had no run way lights. Th e communicati ons roo m was hit as the comma man darted o ut and soo n th e supply room and most of th e inner perim eter buildings were ablaze. Camp Nam Dong now h ad no mean s of communicat ion with the o utsi de world. Ame ricans and Nungs were manning the mortar pit s whil e o the r Nungs were firing from the inner perime ter. Some VC sappers were shot inside th e in ner perimeter. Mortar an d 57mm rou nds were lan di ng ins ide th e inner perime ter and most of the Americans were soon wounded . The Austra lian SAS warrant officer was killed . To make ma tters worse, th e US 57 mm recoilless rifle proved to be defective. (From the descri pt ion of the 57mm's loadin g problem, the author beli eves the fiberboard can ister rounds ma y h ave swo llen in the hum idity, preven ting th em from being cha mbered.) A dem olition team was killed attempting to blow the main gat e. Small in filtration attacks came from the sou th, southeast, west, and north, but th e main atta ck struck from th e south east. Over 100 VC attacked in waves, their progress bei ng halted by th ree Americans and a few Nungs wh ose efforts ensured that no ne of the attackers made it over the fen ce. On the east side, CSF Company 122 was com pletely ove rru n . The assista nt communications i'J'CO was killed figh ting off VC who had pen et rated near the "swimm ing pool." Th e American and Nung defen se was centered o n their mortar pits, continuously firin g two HE, th en two WP, then o ne illumination round. Individual VC and sympa th izers were maki ng it through from all dir ecti ons
an d being shot at th e edge of the pits . Th e defen ders of th e 60mm mo rtar pit by th e main gate were fo rced to withdraw under a co n tin uous ba rrage of grenades, th eir team sergeant ha vin g bee n killed and the team com mander left for dead . In fact th e team com mander regain ed consciou sne ss and vacated th e mortar pit, tak in g the mo rtar wit h hi m . Despite having been wounded several times, he set up the mortar behin d a sta ck of blocks and directed a grou p of wounded Nungs to fire it wh ile he contin ued to rally o the r defenders. Th e figh t co n tin ued at close ran ge, but the mort ar position s were now dow n to less than a dozen rounds. By 06.00 hours th e VC fire was dwi ndling and the flare shi p finally arrived , allowing the mortars to concen trate on firing HE. Th e VC began wit hd rawing and a tr an sport aird rop ped am m un ition, radi os, batteries, and me d ical sup plie s by parach ut e to the defenders. Pre-packaged emergency resu ppl y bu ndles were kept o n hand by B-team s for such conti ngenci es. VC sni pe rs and rear gua rds co ntinued to harass the smolde ring camp as the main body withdrew to Laos. A Civil Guard co mpa ny arrived at 08.00 hou rs, havin g bee n ambushed twice en rou te. Two hours later, a ton-ma n relief fo rce of USSF and ClOG arrived in US Marine Co rps helicopters from the B-team . Two USSF and th e Australian SAS warrant officer were dead and seven American s wounded. The Strike Force lost SS dead and 65 wo unded; many others had fled o r joined with the vc. The LLDB ha d done littl e if anythi ng to defend the cam p, adding weight to th e belief that th e LLDB com mande r was in league with th e VC. The bodies of 62 VC attackers were left beh ind, but as many as three tim es that number were believed killed and a large number of others wounded. Virtually every build ing in the camp was bu rn ed and the VC managed to make off with over 13,000 carbine rounds from one of th e ammunition bunk ers. A crater ana lysis team coun ted approximately 1,000 mortar craters. Th e tw o dead Ameri cans were each awarded the Distinguished Servi ce Cross, the second high est Amer ican award. Th e other team mem bers received Silver and Bronze Star s. Capt. Roger H. C. Don lon, co mmanding A-726 beca me th e first soldier to be awar ded the Medal of Honor in Vietnam. Deta chment A-224, arrived from Cam p An Diem , whi ch was closed, replaced A-726 and com pletely rebuil t Cam p Nam Dong in a tr iangular sha pe prior to turn ing it over to th e Civil Gua rd in Septem ber 1964. The reco ns tituted A-72 6, with five original me mb ers, ope ned Cam p Ta Co in Septe mber 1964 as pla nned . Cam p Nam Dong had held ou t despite its poor defenses, th e large number of turncoats, and the poor performan ce of the rema in ing Strikers and LLDB. It held becau se of the Vigilance and loyalty of the Nungs, a strong centralized inner perim ete r capable of holding out wh en the rest of th e cam p was overru n, sufficien t am m unitio n stowed in the mortar po sitio ns, and th e resolu teness and cohes io n of th e USSF team.
Battle fo r Loc Ninh Locat ed in th e northern part of III crz eight miles from the Cambodia n border and o n th e east edge of war Zone C, a largely VC-controll ed area, Camp Lac Nin h ex perience d repea ted attacks over several days, and defe ndi ng against th em invo lved co nven tio na l US forces . In late 1967 the camp became a focus of VC attacks as pa rt of a larger cam paign , the timing of the att acks coinci ding wit h th e ina uguratio n of President Nguy en Van Th ieu . Provincial Route 13 ("Th under Road" ) was th e main road th rough the area and led to Saigon 62 miles to th e sout h. Lac Xln h District Town (vdtstn ct" equates to a US county) was one mile northeast of th e cam p. Regional Force and Popular Force units secu red the to wn from the Lac Nin h Su bsecto r co m po un d. Some 650 yards to th e west was a village for rubberplantation work ers. Civilians in the area were mostl y pro-govern me n t. An earlier camp had been opened 650 yards southeast of th e new site in September 1962. The new Cam p Loe Nin h was established in December 1966 by
51
Cam p P1ei Me.A-255. II CTZ endured a grueling siege from October 19- 27. 1965 req uiring reinforce me nt by Pro ject Delta and MIKE Force troo ps.The co mmit ment of US troo ps to th e batt le saw t heir first majo r co mbat in Viet nam.The camp is a classic tria ngular shape. but with t he inner perimeter abutting th e right wall. Both perimet er s co nsist of zigzag t renches with firing pan-pierced parapets . Note the co rner machine gun bunkers extending beyond the per imeter and backed by a large fighting bun ker. In t he center of th e inner perimeter is the heavily sandbagged TOC .
A-331 for bo rder surveillance . Route 13, wh ich continued o n into Cambod ia, for all practical pur poses ended at Lac Ninh, xo effort was mad e to secure th e neglected road beyond th e town , but US and AR\1)l unit s kept th e road open, d uring dayligh t, all the way to Saigon . A-331 was under the command of Capt. Florencio Beru men . The camp was unusually, bu t efficien tly sh aped. It was an elonga te d dia mon d shape orie nted from southwest to n orth east, but its four sides were ind ented with shallow "vs," in effect giving it eight walls. The perimeter was a h igh berm topped with a zigzag tren ch and two-ma n fighting pos itions. These were constru cted of sandbags with a speed pallet roof topped by o ne or two layers of san dbags. A firing port was provid ed in the front. Th e tren ch was unrevetted with a one -layer-th ick san dbag parapet. Several coils of razor concertina wire fron ted the berm . At the in ner point of th e inden ted "Vs" was a mach in e gun bu nker with o the rs o n th e corne rs. The southwest en d was blunt an d ha d two mach ine gun bunkers several yards apa rt. The ent rance road ran from th e airfield, wh ich ran from southeast to northwest just outs ide th e wire, cur ving through th e wire barriers to en ter the camp at th e so utheast wall's "V," Any att acker attemptin g to use the road would be exposed to short-range flanking fire from th eir right for the ent ire len gth of th e wall. Above-gro und Striker barracks were spo tte d at irregu lar intervals around the perimeter. A to tal of 530 Cambodians, Vietnamese, Montagnard s, and tcungs manned four compan ies and a e RP. One compa ny was assigned to eac h of the four walls. Th e inner perime ter was six-sided and surro unded by a concerti na wirefronted low ber m. The re were mac hine gun o r fightin g bunkers at each corner, bu t no trench line. The inner berm was revetted on th e inside and served o n ly as a wall from wh ich to fire from beh ind, bu t with no rear protection. Six woodfram e, co rruga ted meta l-roo fed buildings were in side the inner perimete r, each
RIGHT Battle for Loc Ninh, October 29 t o N ov ember 3, 196 7. Key: A. USSF te am hou se .
B. Co mmun ication s bun ker.
52
C. USSF quar t ers. D. Supply ro o m. E. LLDB team ho use and quarters. F. 81 rom M29 mortar pos itions. G. .30-cal. M19 19A6 machine gun bunkers (x 9). H. Gat e. I. O ut er perimeter be rm with trench and fighting po sit ion s.
J.
Inner wire barri er. O ut er wire barrier. L. Ent r y ro ad. M. Airfield. N . Turn around pad. o. Fire suppo rt base . ~ Lo c Ninh Dist rict To wn.
K.
I. VC attack La c Ninh District Town , 0 1. 15 ho urs. O ct o be r 29. 2. VC attac k Cam p Loc Ninh. 0 1.20 , O ct ober 29.
3. Two ClDG co mpanies re lieve Lo c
Ninh Distri ctTown , O ctober 29. 4. 2d Battalion , 28th Infant ry
airmo biles in and establishes flreba se, 06.30 hou rs, O ctober 29. 5. VC attack La c N inh District Tow n. 00.55 ho urs. O ct o be r 3 1. 6. VC attack Camp Lo c Ninh . 00.55 ho urs. O ctober 31. 7. VC attack Camp Lo c Ntnh. 00.50 ho urs. Novembe r 2.
53
54
ru nning pa rallel to a wall. Most were con nected by covered walkways. Most of the 60mm and 8 1mm mortar pit s were built above ground with vertical sandbag parapets. A ha stily bu ilt second trapezoid-shaped strong hold was loca ted in the northeast arm of th e diamond with a low berm, mortar positio ns, and CIDG qu art ers. The cam p was built in a rubber plantation and as few of th e trees as poss ible were cut down in orde r to preserve them for cultivation. For thi s reason th e cleared area around th e camp was 100 yards o r less in width. The plantation was devoid of underbru sh and the trees were planted in neat rovv·s, providing good visibility. Two wire barriers surrounded the camp with tanglefoot stru ng between them . On th e airfield side th e barri ers were ligh t, consisting of 6fth igh seven-stra nd ba rbed wire on U-shaped pickets with two stac ked coils of concertina. On t he sides facing the rubb er plantation it was conside rab ly den ser, the inner belt consisti ng of th ree back-to-back coils of concertina stacked tw o-high with an additional coil at op the th ird in ner row. The ou ter belt was a large dia mond while th e inner belt followed the outline of the outer berm about 100ft out, beyon d hand grenade range. Th e en em y bega n prepara tio ns for the bat tle in early Octob er 1967 when th e headquarters of the 9t h VC Division located it self north of Loc Ninh . Th e division 's 27 2d and 273d VC Regim ents were positioned near the Cambodian border to the nort h an d th e 271st to the south. The latter was driven o ut of th e area by en gagem ents with th e 1st US Infan try Division in late October, suffering heavy losses in th e process, an d would not parti cipat e in th e forthcoming battle. The 165th VC Regiment, wh ich had participated in an almost success ful Augu st attack on Camp Tong Le Chon to the southeas t, provided one or two batt alions to reinforce the remaining regim ents. Th ese were all-VC Main Force units heavily augmented by :t\"VA. Th ey were wellarmed light infantry units, not guerrillas. Each of th e battalions had a stren gth of 300- 400 men. The 84A NVA Artillery Regiment, equipped with 122mm ro ckets and 120mm mortars, supported the attack. Num erous 12.7mm anti aircraft machine guns were employed and the assaul t force h ad Soviet-made flam ethrowers. US intelligen ce was aware of the se enemy movements and an at tack o n Lac Ninh was expec ted, but not of the feroci ty an d the ten acity actually experien ced . Th e 1st Infantry Division 's plan was to airmobile in four US batt alions and positio n th em in a box aro und Loc Nin h, leaving th e attackers trapped within . Prio r to th e attack, o ne Lac Ninh company was pat rolling five mile s north of th e camp. The Stri kers in th e camp were fully alert and all positions were manned. The VC ob jective was to seize both the camp and the town . To this end th e 272d Regim ent approache d from th e northeast an d the 273d from the west o n the ni gh t of Octobe r 28. Th e attack was launched at 01 .15 hours o n Octobe r 29 whe n mortars were fired at the subs ector com pound n ortheast of th e camp. Th e first mortar rounds struck La c Nin h minutes later as a 273d Regiment battalion attac ked fro m the west. VC sappers managed to penetrate th e subsector co mpound. Flare ships an d AC·4 7D "Spoo ky" gunships were q uickly dispatch ed . Mortar fire on the cam p (82mm and 120m m) was heavy until 02.50 hours, then sporadic until it ceased alt ogether at 05.30 hours. The VC withdrew leavi ng 149 dead in the camp's v...rire. Few of the mortar rounds fired had actually landed inside the camp. At da wn, two ClOG companies from the camp, led by USSF, moved into th e town and cleared the subsec to r compo un d of VC, rescuing the US adviso r and Vietna mese district ch ief holed up in the TOC. At 06.30 hours part of 2d Battalion, 28th Infa nt ry and two artillery batteries airmobil ed on to the La c Nin h Airfield and esta blishe d a firebase at the field's southwest end. Ot he r American battalion s were helicoptered in to the area to begin establishing the "bo x," wh ile addition al units were positioned along po ssible VC withdrawal
routes between Loc Nin h and the border. Throu ghout the day, Americ an un its mad e sporadic cont act wit h the VC fighte rs. At 00.55 hour s on Octob er 31, two batt alion s of th e 272 d Regim en t struc k the cam p and subsecto r from th e northeast and east, attacking the cam p from acro ss the airfield. An estimated 200 rou nds of 82mm and 120 mm mort ar and 18 122mm rockets hit the camp along with RPGs and recoilless rifles. The assau lt was pinned down and devastated by coordin at ed fire from th e camp, the fireba se, d ose air suppo rt, and attack h elicop ters. Some American troops from th e firebase rein forced th e camp. Th e VC withd rew at 09.15 hours leaving 110 dead aro und th e airfield. More American un its were inserted aro und the area to block the withdrawing vc. Th ere was no attack in th e morning of Nov ember l ather tha n a few morta r rounds at 02.00 hour s, believed to be covering fire while the VC recovered weapons and wounded fro m th e wire. A final attack \....as lau nched at Loc Nin h at 00 .50 hours on November 2, but this was easily repu lsed as the VC were complete ly demora lized and seen to be dropping thei r weapons an d fleeing after losing ove r 100 dead. Ame rican units in the area killed even more VC in a series of scatte red conta cts. Through it all, on e ClOG company with two USSF rem ain ed in the field from October 28, ambushing VC patrols and calling in air strikes. Firefights and ambushes co ntinued around Loc Ninh until Novembe r 7. In all, over 1,000 VC were killed an d a great number of weapo ns, in duding ma ny crew-serv ed, were captu red by CIDG an d US troo ps. Th e defen se of La c Ninh was extremely succ essful. Th e ClOG were well trained, mo tivated, and morale was high . Camp alert an d defen se plan s were well develo ped and reh earsals ha d been conducted. Intern al communications were excellen t and remained intact throughou t the assault . Th e radio tower was destro yed , but communication s were imm ediately re-establi sh ed usin g an underground antenna system . Th e camp was well built and the defen ses were in goo d sha pe. The only weak poin t in th e defenses was the light wire barriers on the airfield side. Too much relian ce was placed on th e breadth of the airfield acting as a hi ndra nc e to attack, when in fact the VC took a gamble and atte mpted to assaul t across the open to more easily penetrate the lighter wire. Neverthe less th e ma ssive firepo wer bro ught to bear from th e camp, firebase, and air devastated them . The barrages of mas sed Claymo re mines were par ticul arly effective in brea king up their assault s. The camp easily withstood the heavy barr ages of mortars, roc kets, and direct -fire weapo ns, th ough the 122mm rocket s and 120m m mort ars did destroy some of th e north east berm 's trench line. Th e ma jo r reason for the success of the defen se was the close coordination and coopera tion between USSF, LLOB, Vietna mese subsecto r, an d US Army units. Lac Nin h's defenders suffered light casua lties: four USSF slightly wounded, six CIDG dead, an d 39 wounded. Camp Lac Ninh was further developed and it s defen ses stre ng thened . In August 1968 an NVA attack was beaten back even thou gh bad weathe r den ied th e de fenders any ai r suppo rt. By 1969, when th e aut hor visited th e camp, its perimet er trenc h para pets and upgraded machin e gun bunkers were concre tecapped. Th e CSF was converted to t he 74th Border Ranger Batta lion in August 1970. In April 1972, during the open ing of the NVA offensive to seize An Loc to th e south, Lac Ninh, defended by ARVN in fant ry and bo rder range rs, fell to the 5th VC Divisio n afte r a four-day battle.
Fall of Lang Vei Special Forces first came to the Khe San h valley in th e ext reme nort hwest corner of Vietna m in Ju ly 1962, wh en they established a camp north of Khe San h Village utili zin g some former French pillbox es. Route 9 ran east-to -west th rough th e valley from th e coast an d in to Laos. wher, th e Marines established a base at Khe San h Airfield in lat e Decem ber 1966, Detachment A-101 moved its bo rder surveillance camp eigh t m iles west and doser to th e Laotia n border,
55
T he fa ll of Lan g vel, 00 .50 hours, Fe bruary 7. 1968. This view of LangVei is look ing sou th . O nly th e ce nt ral pos ition and the so uth east po rt ion of the camp are depicted : insert (i) show s the co mplete camp layout and unit posit ions. Som e of the I I attacking PT-76 ta nks (in red o ut line) have penet rated th e cam p and are being engaged by tank -hunte r team s armed with LAWs. Seven PT·76s were kno cked out, two by th e so uth I06 mm recoilless rifle and five by LAW s. O ne of tho se destro yed by a LAW be side th e TO e had its t ur ret blown off. Four of those kno cked o ut by LAWs were recovered by t he NVA who left behind only th e one hit beside t he TOC and th e tw o hit o n the so uth appro ach by the I06mm reco illess rifle .The des ign of the unde rgro und co mmand bunker is shown in inset (ii). de picting the steel drumpro tec te d entrance and t he above-gro und OP bunker. Key : A. Undergro und ta ct ical operat ions
B. C.
D. E. F. G. H. I.
J.
cente r wit h abo ve-grou nd bunker and o bse rvat ion post. Ro ck-filled drum strongpoint . USSF team ho use. Dispensar y. Emer gency medical bunker. Supply bunke r. Ammu nition bunker (x2). 4.2in. M30 mo rta r. 81mm M29 mort ars (xS). I06mm M40A I recoilles s rifles. 57mm MI8A I re coilless rifle . Pro vincial Route 9. Company 101 Company 102 Company 103 Company I04
K. L. M. N. O. P Q . 1st CPPl3d CRP R. 2d CRP
S6
l. Main attac k co nducted by five PT·76 tanks . infant ry batta lio n. and two sapper co mpanies. 2. Seco ndary attack by fo ur PT·76 tank s and infantry bat tal io n. 3. Supporting attac k by two PT·76 tanks and infant ry batta lion .
58
reopening on December 8 as Cam p Lang Vei. The Hill Fights north of th e Marines' Khe San h Co m bat Base raged throughout April and May 196 7 as th e NVA ma n euvered in the area . Th e camp, still unfinished, was attacked by a tank- and mor tar-suppor ted NVA co m pa ny o n May 4. The tan ks did not penetrate th e camp, but provid ed fire support. This harassing attack was repe lled with the aid of Marin e artillery from Khe Sanh. Two USSF were killed, including the A-team co m ma nder, and five wounded along with 17 dead, 3S wounded, and 38 missin g (most likely desert ers) in the two CIDG compani es. Old Lang Vei lacked good fields of observat ion and fire, d id not have a stro ng inner perimeter, and could hold only two co m panies. The new A-team co m mander had just arrive d in-country and had never seen ano ther Special Forces cam p . He had the authority to relocate the camp an ywhe re within its TAOR so long as it was capable of reinforcement an d bu ilt as a fighting cam p with an in ner perim eter. With these requirem ents in mind, he select ed a site 1Mmiles further west on an east- west ridge th at pro vided excellent fields of ob servation and fire. He was not aware of the earlier use of tanks. Th e ne w cam p was dog -bane-sh aped and built along th e south side of Route 9. Its design was unusual in th at the re was no inner perim eter as such , but rather an irregular rectangular cent ral position with two sepa rate triangular o r four-sided compounds on either end. This ap pears to have been bec ause of th e ne w co m mander's in terpretation of the in ne r perimeter concept as well as terrain co nsi derations. Built by Seabees, several of the key facilities were under ground co nc rete struc tu res. Dur ing co ns truction it was d iscove red th at some 1,400 Fren ch and Japanese min es covered the ar ea, all of wh ich had to be rem oved. 'Wo rk was com pleted on Septe mber 27, 196 7 and th e cam p formally opened. Th e cen tral positio n held a co mbin ed team house, TOC, medi cal and supply bunkers, two ammunition bun kers, and other support facilities, mostly be low groun d. Th ese were built with 8in.-thick reinf orced co ncr et e walls bec ause of the artillery threat. The TOC's 9in. -thick interlock in g roof section s were pre fabricat ed and he licoptered in . They were to be supported by 12in . x 12in . joists, but th ese were not provided . Surro unding the TOC was its own concerti na ba rrier. There was one 4.2in., five 81mm, and 16 60 m m mortar pits, two .SO-cal. machine guns, and tw o fixed 106mm recoill ess rifle positions, one covering Route 9 to the east and th e othe r the southern approach . It had been assessed that if the I'\VA used tan ks th ey ,"...'ould on ly provide suppo rt ing fire and wo uld not en te r the camp itself. The NVA, it was felt, would no t squa nder armor on th e camp, but save it for an attack o n Khe San h . As a co ns equence of this assessm ent only 20 rounds of HEAT am muni tio n were available for th e l06mm recoill ess rifles. The S7m m reco illess rifles were in effective as ant i-ta nk weapons and no anti-tank mines were available. One hundred LAWs were delivered on Decem ber 29. The four CSF co m pany positions o n th e ends of the dog-bone each he ld an 8 lmm mortar and a 57m m recoill ess rifle. There were no per im eter trenches or berms. Defenses were multi-m an, sem i-sunk figh ting and Iivtng bunkers at closely spa ced intervals. Th ese vari ed in size and design and were buil t of san dbags, timbers, an d speed pallet s. A dou ble-stacked concertina wire ba rrier beyond gren ade range surrou nd ed each company positi on, incl uding the central. A similar outer barri er surro unded the whole in an irregular recta ngle. The in tervening groun d was bulldozed clean an d scores of Clay more mines emplaced . Th ere were forty-seven M1919A6 and two M60 machine guns plu s 39 Brown in g automat ic rifles ava ilable, an inord ina tely high number of auto mat ic weapons. MIKE Fo rce Co m pa ny 12 wit h six USSF reinforced th e cam p on December 22. Th e NVA occupied Khe Sanh Village on Jan uary 2 1, 1968, cu tting off the ground rei nforce me nt route from Khe Sanh Base. Th e Mari nes ha d co m mi tted
two compa n ies for reinforcem ent, bu t no w they could o n ly arriv e by helicopter. Tha t same day the siege of Khe Sanh commenced with four NVA divisions: 40,000 troops. Relations betwee n USSF an d th e Marines were strained as the Marin es did not understand the Special Forces mission, nor did they want to have to suppo rt the expos ed camp. On Jan uary 24 the NVA routed the 33d Royal Laotian Battalion (BV33) just over the border, using tanks in th e process. Seven of th e tanks were detected by aircra ft and o ne was destroyed . BV33 fled an d arrive d at Lang Vei with 500 troops an d 2,200 dep en dents and refugees. The USSF positioned them in Old Lang Vei an d arrange d for food and supplies to be delivered. Four USSF were plac ed there to aid th em . Field grade USSF officers were rot at ed th rough th e camp, as th e BV33 com ma n der would not take orders from a juni or USSF officer. On January 2S-26 additio na l USSF aug me n ted A-101. On January 30 a USSF acco mpanying a Laotian patro l was captured by the NVA outside Khe Sanh Village. The next day a MIKE Force pa trol en gaged an l\'VA batt alion ou tside Khe San h Village and killed 54 of th e fighters. Patrols aro und th e ca mp continued and the i"NA occas iona lly registered mor ta r hits on it . On Febru ary 6 Lt.Col. Dani el F. Schun gel, com man ding Company C, 5th SFGA, arrived to ta ke his turn as the senior officer pr esent. That evening, 50 rounds of 152mm fired from within Laos rocked the cam p. Th ere were now 24 USSF, 14 LLDB, 282 CSF, and 161 MIKE Force. The three Vietna mese and one Montagnard CSF companies were small, num bering fewe r than 60 m en . One Vietna mese and two Montagn ard 20-man CRPs defended the central position. One MIKE Force platoon was placed in eac h company pos ition except the southwest and a fourth in the central position . At night these platoons wou ld rota te occupation of an o utpost just to the northwest. At 00 .50 hours on February 7, the defenders discover ed tanks in the " ire and th e assau lt commenced. Th e main attac k was from th e south into the cent ral positio n by 3d Battalion, 1st Regime nt, 325th NVA Division; two sappe r companies, and 9th Company, 198th Tan k Battalion. Th e 5th Batta lion, 24th Regim en t, 304th NVA Division an d 3d Company, 198th Tank Batt alion laun ch ed the secondary attack from the west along Route 9. Th e 4th Battalion, 24th NVA Regim en t conducted a sup porting attack from th e northeast. A 152mm battalion of th e 675th Artillery Regim en t an d t he 7th En gineer Regiment provided support. Each tank compa ny had eigh t PT-76s, but only 11 were committed with the rest h eld in reserve. The infantry battalions were great ly understrength and it is estima ted that 400-p lus troops participated in the assault. The 8th Batt alion, 66t h Regimen t, 325 th NVA Division attac ked Old Lang Vel. Th e first ta nk penetration was made in th e southeast co mpo un d by four of t he PT-76 amph ibious tanks approaching from the sout h. The PT-76 was armed with a 76.2mm main gun and ?62mm coaxial mach ine gu n , had a 3-4-man crew, weighed in at 14 ton s, and was protected by 11-14mm armor. A USSF KCO destroyed two of th e tanks outside the wire with a 106mm recoilless rifle. Five more IT-?6s came down Route 9 from the west and another two alon g Route 9 from th e east. Th e USSF called Khe San h for artill er y suppo rt, arg uing with the
A burn ed-out PT-76 tank res ts beside t he co llapsed LangVie under gro und TO C's roof. O n t he
right-h and end is t he concret e observation bu nker. Its roof and observation cupola were collapsed and the exte rior sandbag reverting blown from the walls by the force of satchel charges. On the left end is the rock -filled dru m barricade protecting the entrance to the TOe.
.. , 59
-<
Marines tha t the y were indeed u nd er tan " attac k. Air strikes were also called for. Th e USSF in the old ca m p wit h BV:n d irect ed air strikes when aircraft arr ived . Th e CSSF co m ma nd grou p organized ant i-tank team'), but most of the LA\V') eit he r m isfired or were du ds. On e rrf-76 was dest royed and its crew shot as th ey ex ited , hut othe r') crushed defe n sive position s while sappers blasted hun kers with satchel ch arges and fla me thro wers as th e i cam p was over run. Ano ther PT76 had its tu rret blown off wh en its am m uni tio n exp loded afte r a LA\V h it it beside the TOe. Seven of t he USSF an d so me LLDB an d C IDG were trapped in th e TOC. The NVA made rep ea ted atte m pts to flush the m o u t wit h flam eth rowers, satchel ch arges, and tear gas grena d es, but th ey wo uld no t surren der. Som e ind igenous pe rsonnel su rren de red an d we re execut ed after exiting. Th e America ns co nti nued to h o ld ou t even after m assive de molition cha rges blew in th e bu n ker before dawn . USSf and CID(; perso nn el were still h o lding o ut in ot her parts o f th e cam p. Th e t hree USS F wit h Bv:·n co n vi nced so m e of the Lao tian s to co u nt eratt ac k. Th e th ree co n ti n ued to di rect a ir st rikes an d led five co u nte rattacks unt il two of them we re killed. Some USSF an d C IDG managed to cx filtrate from th e overru n cam p. Th e Marin es wo u ld 110t sen d a relief fo rce. b ut a uS Sr -ted tvli\CV-Stud ies an d Observat ion Gro up UvlACV-SOG) Co m m an d an d Cont ro l No rth reactio n force was h elicop tered in from its FOB at Khc San h Comb at Base. Some 20 SOG USSF and :~ O Str ikers were delivered to Old Lang Vei at 17.15 ho u rs to aid in t he recovery o f sur vivor s. O n ce th e USSF survivors ha d been Fl own ou t, so me of th e recov ery force h ad to fight th eir vv ay back to Khc San h o n foot. CIDG and Laot ian sur vivors who ma de it to Kh e Sanh vv ere d isarmed hy the Mari n es and hel d in a secure area un til ide nt ified as frien dly
..
A PT·76 tank memori alized at Lang Vei.The legend reads: "T he cadre [crew] of th is tank inspired the peo ple to rise up and fight to victory." All that remains of the camp is som e bro ken conc re te walls that were pan of a bunker. (Danny W right, Australian Army Training Team.Vietnam. attached to II Corps MIKE Force)
b y USSF.
60
Fourteen USSF m ade it o ut ; o n ly o ne was un wo u nd ed and a fur the r ten were m issin g. Th ree o f t he tell were relea sed from ca pt ivity in 19 73 along wit h the one cap tured ea rlier. All of the ot he rs were verified killed or presumed d ead . Of t he C IDG, 117 of th e CSF (29 wou n d ed] we re recovered an d 12 7 o f the ~fl KE For ce (32 wou nde d}. Th e ClOG we re cred ited wit h reso lutely defe nd in g th e ca m p, at least half o f th ose killed d yin g at thei r positions. Nine LLDB su rvived (th ree wo u nded). ;'\JVA losses were estim ated at 250 dead an d seve n PT-76 tan ks kn ocked o ut. All of th e Ame rica ns involved in the defen se we re decor ated. Sgt . 1st Class Eugt'Jlt' Ash ley, Jr. was po sth umous ly award ed th e Medal of Hon or for his repeated cou nte rattacks fro m th e o ld cam p . Th e Mari n es aw arded A-I OJ th e I'rcstd cn tt u! Un it Citat io n . Th e presenc e of tan ks and th e po ssibi lity o f the ir use in a di rect assau lt ha d bee n un derestim at ed . Beca use of its exposed pos itio n, in com p let e defen ses, sm all defen se force, an d th e p rese nce o f ma ssive arti llery-suppo rted NVA forces, Lang Vel p rob ab ly sh ou ld han' bee n aband o ned ea rlier. Tan ks att ack ed on ly o ne ot he r ra m p: Ben Het in CTZ II 0 11 Marc h 3, 1969. 1\ \'0 of the ten PT-76s in vol ved were knocked o ut by US Arm y rvI-lHA:1s; the ot hers wit hdrew. Th ey were never used again st Khe San h beca use o f the p resen ce of heavier Mari ne tan ks, large num ber s o f 106mm recoilless rifles, an d ma ssed artil lery and air su pport .
Aftermath With the withdrawal of US force s from Viet nam the CIDG Prog ram was terminated o n December 3 1, 1970. The LLDB was dissolved t he next da y. Between May 1970 and Jan uary 1971 , some 14,000 ClOG personne l with th e LLDB were tra n sferred to the ARVN and convert ed to Bord er Ran gers. This new o rgan ization cont inued th e former border interdict ion mission from existin g camps. Other CSFs wer e converte d to Regio nal Fo rces (a local militia security force), a process beg un in 1969. The 5th SFGA was gradually phased out and th e Group col ors left Vietna m o n March 3, 19 71. Some cam ps in stable area s were clo sed in 1969. Most of th e B- and C-tea m cam ps were close d at the end of 19 70, thou gh som e were co n ve rted for use by Borde r Rang ers. Most of the clos ed camps were turned over to US or ARVN forces , after m an y of the buildin gs had been di sman tled and used to upgrad e and repai r other cam ps. Man y of the old CSF camps, wh ether occ u pied by Border Rang ers, Regional Forces, or ARVN troop s, saw acti on in the rem ain ing years of the war and played a part in th e fina l battles as the NVAove rran Sout h Vietn am in 19 75 . So m e o f the o ld cam ps along the bord er with Cambod ia subseq uen tly rem aine d in use by the new regim e. Regard less o f th eir eventual fate , the CIDG cam ps h ad largely acco m plished their goal. Th ey ha d esta blis hed a gove rn ment pres ence in remote areas wh ere it was impossibl e to keep co nven tio nal units on a permanen t basis; protected villages fro m explo itation by the VC; in terdicted and hara ssed ene my infiltration and activiti es in th e border an d o the r areas ; and allo wed US, ARVN, and other Free World Forces to ope rate in m ore critical areas. The CSFs were low-cost , economy-of-force u nits. It would have required another seven m ore costly ARVN divisions to occ u py the rem o te areas if the ClOG Progr am had not been establish ed. At a u n it cost of S20 - 30,000 the camps proved to be co m pa ratively cheap to build and m aintain , thou gh the co st ro se as newer camps were bu ilt m o re stoutly. Some h ave questio ned the lack of standardi zation in the cam ps' desig n s. This was ofte n d ictated by the availability of ma teria ls, the na tur e o f the terrain , and o ther factor s. The lack of a sta ndard design also made pla n ni ng each attack a new challenge to the en em y. The re was no textbook solution; each pla n of att ack had to take into account the de sign and circumstances unique to eac h cam p. The d egree of im agin ation appar ent in the ir design and defen ses clearly de m o ns trated the initiative and p racticali ty of Special Forces. Design of the cam ps wa s co nstan tly refin ed as a result of lessons learn ed and existing cam ps were upgrad ed . Given the many d esign s tha t were tr ied, it is unusua l that a cam p in the sha pe of a six-po in ted star was never built, for suc h a d esign wo uld have provided m o re interior space than the five-poi n ted star or tr ian gle. An attacker wo uld have had two choices for poi n ts o f attack: either the stro ngly fo rt ified poi nt, which would rece ive su pporting fire from its neighborin g points; or into a re-entrant between two poin ts, which they had to figh t past and then take fire fro m both flanks from the arms of the star. Th e inner pe rim eter m igh t be a hexagon with a co rne r b unker coverin g each arm. In the fin al days of US in volvemen t in th e war, B-52 bombers cratered som e of th e camps aba n done d by the ARVN. The new regim e recovered concert ina wire and o ther materia ls from som e camps and u sed them elsewh ere. Local in habitants st ripped the aba nd oned cam ps of useable ma terials. Littl e rem ains o f the cam ps today, those in the m ost remote locations havin g been aba ndo ned and reclaimed by the jun gle. As time has passed ,
61
O verrun Ca mps Camp Hiep Hoa Polei Krcng Dong Xoai Oak Sut A Shau LangVel Kham Duc* * Evacuated while
62
Date 24 N ov 63 4 Jul 64 9 Jun 65 18 Aug 65 I I Mar 66
7 Feb 68 10 May 68 under attac k.
CTZ IV II III II I I I
A-Team A·2 1 A·122 A·H2 A·2 IB A·I 02 A·IO I A· IOS
bunkers have collapsed and berms an d trenches have eroded away. In a few instan ces, villages grew out of aba nd on ed camps, the local inhabitants m oving in to th e stouter structures and conven tion al h uts buil t aro und th em . Others were bu lldozed over to make way for cultivation or simply to erase an y remi nd ers of the war. Special Forces still operates camps in remo te lands, Honduras and Colombia for example, and th ey are not unlike their Vietnam predecessors.
Glossary A-team
Special Forces operat ional detachment A
ARVN ClOG
Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CM P
C ivilian Irregular De fense G ro up (pron o unced "sldge") Corrugated Metal Pipe
CONEX
CONtainer EXpre ss shipping box
CRP
C omb at Reconna issance Platoo n
CSF
Camp Strike Force Co rps Tactical Zo ne DEFens ive C O Nc e ntratio n LightAnti-armo r Weapon Luc-luc ng Dac-Blet (Vietnames e Airbo rne Special Force s)
CTZ
DE FCON LAW lLDB MIKE Force
Mob ile striK E Fo rce
NVA
North Vietnamese Army Pierced Steel Plan k
PSP RPG Seab ees
Ro cket Pro pelled Grenade
SFGA
Spe cial Fo rces Group (Airborne)
TAO R TOC
Tactical Operatio ns Ce nter
USSF VC
Viet C o ng
Na val C onstru ction Battalion (fro m the abbreviatio n "C S") Tact ical A rea Of Responsibility
U nite d States Special Fo rces
Bibliography Don lon , Roger H., Beyond Nam Dong, Leavenworth, KS: R&I'\ Publishers, 1998 (expa nded edition of Outpost o(Freedom , New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) Fall, Bern ard B., Street wttnout Joy, Mecha n icsbu rg, PA: Stackpo le Books, 1964 Kelly, Francis ) ., US Anny Special Forces, 196 1- 19 71 (Vietnam Studies series), Wash in gton, DC: Dep artment of the Army, 19 73 Phillip s, w tlltam L, Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 199 7 Simpson, Charles M., Inside the Green Berets, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983 Stanto n, Shelby, Green Berets at ~Var: US Army Special Forces ill Southeast Asia 1956-1 975, Novato , CA: Presidio Press, 1985 Stanton, Shelby. Special Forces at tVa r: An Illustrated History, Sout heast Asia 1957-1 9 75, Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1990 Stockwell, David B., Tallks in the wrre- The First Use of Enemy Ann or in Vietnam, Canto n, OH: Daring Books, 1989 5th 5FGA, Th e Green Beret Magazine Vol. I-V (5th SFGA month ly publi cation, 1966- 70). Co m plete reprint set available from RADIX Associat es, 23 14 Ch esh ire Ln., Hou ston, TX 770 18- 4023, USA Field Fortificati o ns, FM 5-1S, Augu st 17, 1968. Copies of thi s and ot her field manuals may be purchased from Military/In fo Publishin g: http ://www.military-info.com /In dex .htm
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Index Figures in bold refer to illust rat io ns
Gia v ue (A-I 03) 12 GJ/KB teams 23. 23 . 24 grenades 8,9,21,22.34,37,50,5 1, 55, 60 guard huts /pam 26 , 3 I, 3 1, 40
A Shau (A- I02) 62 administrative buildings 4, 14, 19-20, 30 airfields/helipads 5,7, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19,22,25, 27,48,49,52, 5 3,54, SS Har dy (A-334) 25 ammu nition bunkers 14, 15,17, 19,30,3 1, ]8, Hiep Hoa (A-2 1) 47,62 hoochs 22 , 44 39, 45, 46,48, 49,50,56, 57,58 howitzers 19,27,40. 4 1.42.46 An Diem (A-224) I 1,51 positions 12, 13, 16, 18, 46 ARVN 5, 18,19,41,61 barracks 5, 13,1 4, 18, 18, 19, 2 2,23, 37. 48,49, Kham Duc (A- lOS) 62 52, 53 Kin Quan II (A-412) 20 berms (earth) 12, 14, IS, 16, 17, IS, 20 , 21 ,22, Khe Sanh 55,58, 59,60
33--4,5 2, 53,5 4 LangVei (A-IO I) 56, 56- 7,58,59-60, 59. 6 0.62 latrines/urinal t ubes 19,35 LAWs 9,34.56,58,60 lac Ninh (A-33 I) 5 1-2,53, 5 3,54--5, 54 local labo r/t ranspo rt 24 ,36 Cai Cai (A-4I 2/A-43 I ) 22, 41 Camp Strike Forces 35-6,41 , 47,52,58-9,60 Luc-Iuong Doc-Biet(LlDB) 6,7,35, 36-7, 47 , 48, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61 camps 8,34 casualties 46, 60 closure/remains 24,61 -2 team ho uses/quarters 14, 15, 16, 3 1, 34, 48, construction 23-34, 23. 24, 26, 27, 32, 33, 49 , 52,53 34, 36 defens ive consi derations 7,8, 10, 14, 15, 16, lumbe rftimb e r/logs 24, 26,27-8,30, 32, 33, 34, 3 4,3 5, 4 0,58 3 1, 37, 4 2, 44-6 evolution 5, 6, 10, 13 location 5,10, I I , 12-14, 17,4 7,49, 5 1- 2,5 3, machine gun posit ions 5,7,8, ' 3. 14, 15, 17. 18, 18, 19, 2 1,22.23,29,42,43,48,49,52, 52, 53,54 53 ,54, 55, 58 shapesflayouts 5,8, II , 12, 13 . 14, 14, 15, 16, construction/design 26,3 1-2,33,41, 4 2 16,17, IB, 19 , 20, 2 1, 2 2, 2 5, 37, 48, 4 9, machine guns 14, 15,21 , 22, 26,26 , 32,3 3, 35, 50,51 ,52, 52, 53 ,56, 56- 7,6 1 37, 37,4 1,42,48, SO, 52, 58 Chi Linh (A-333) 20 , 2 1 Mang Bak (A-246) 19 Civilian Irregular Defense Group 37,37 medical bunkers 17. 3 1, 56, 57 , 58 barracks/quarters 12, 22 , 54 MIKE Force 13,1 6, 52, 58, 59, 60 casualt ies 46.60 dut ies/operations 23, 41,46,59 ClOG Program 4 , 5,5, 6,1 0,6 1 forces 7, 16, 19,47,48,50, 51,60 mines (Claymores) 5,7,8, 10, 14, 15, 17. 2 1, 22, 4 1, 42, 55, 58 operations/patrols 13,5 2, 53,54,55 moats 5, 17, 18, 20.22, 30 comman d bunkers/postS 18, 56,5 6 Mo ntagnards 5, 5,6,35,47,52,59 commu nications bunkers/rooms 7, 14,1 5,17. mo rtars/mortar pits 7,9, I I, 13, 14, 15, 18,22, 3 1,42,48, 4 9,50,52, 53 23.42, 44,45,54,55,58,59 CONEX containers 13. 18,29, 29,32, 41,42, 4.2in 17, 40-1 , 4 2. 44 . 56, 57 , 58 43 60mm 14,1 5.1 8. 35, 38-9, 40, 4 1. 4 8,49, 50, corner bunkers 18, 26, 3 1, 37, 52,52,5 3 cor rugated steel/sheet metal 26 ,27, 28, 29, 30, 5 1,5 4,58 81mm 14, I S, 16, 17, 38, 39 , 40, 41, 44 , 4 7, 3 1,32,33, 40 , 4 2,52 48, 4 9,50,52, 5 3, 54,56, 5 7, 58 Oak Sut (A-218) 62 construction/design 32- 3, 34.38. 3 9,44,45, Dan T hanh (A-42 3) 16 45 dependents' quarters 12, 14, 15, I6, 18, 21 , 30 My An 37 , 38 My Phuoc Try (A-4 11) 4 1 Dong Xoal (A-342) 13. 62
SinhThanh Than (A- 4 13) 22 Bu Dop (A-34 I ) 18, 27 bulldozers 23 , 33-4
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engineer companies/detachments 23---4, 23 entry roads 22, 3 1,48, 49,52, 53
Nam Dong(A-726) 11,47-8. 4 7, 49,50-1 Nu ng bodyguards 35,47-8, S0, 51,52
"fighting camps" 5, II, 14, 15 fire arrows 42, 42 , 48.49 fire support bases 22, 27, 44.52. 5 3,54 firing ports 19,26, 27 , 31. 32, 33.40.4 1. 52 "floating fighting camps" 5, 13,22, 37,37 fuel drumsfdumps 20,29,30,32, 37, 5 9
parapets/walls 26 .2 7, 30, 3 1, 31 , 32, 33,34, 35, 38, 39, 44,45, 4 6. 50,52,54,5 5 perimeters (inner/outer) I I, 12, 13, 14 , 16, 17, 19, 20, 20, 22 , 48, 4 9, SO, 5 1,52, 53,58 defenses 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 18 , 19 , 2 1, 22, 25 , 26 ,27, 31,31 , 32- 3, 37-8,39 ,40,42, 45,52, 5 2. 53 facilities/features 16- 17,18. 19,20
gates 22,3 1,48, 49.5 1.52, 53
Phu Q uoc (A-427) 14 pillboxes (French) 11- 12. 55 Plei Do Lim (A-334) 2 5 Plei Me (A-255) 52 Po lei Kro ng (A- 122) 48,62 Prek Klo k (A-322) 12 propellant cha rge tubes 20, 36, 38, 39 PSP/M8A I matting 26,29,32,33 power generators 17-18,42 PT-76 tanks 9,56,58,59, 59,60,6 0 punjistakes 5,19,21,22.48 radio antenna towers 9, 14, 15, 17,55 reco illess rifles 8,9,33,37,4 1, 42,43,45,46, 50, 55,56,58.59,60 pos itions 5, 14, 15, 18,21 ,22,33,37-8, 42, 4 3, 4 5,46,56, 56, 57,58 sandbags 18,26, 2 7,28,30,3 1,32,33, 33 ,34,38, 38 ,39, 40 , 4 1, 42 ,44,45 ,46, SO, 52, 52 , 54, 58, 59 Seabees 13, 23, 2 3, 32, 48, 58 speed pallets 26 ,28, 29,3 2, 33, 52, 58 steel drums 29,30,32, 37,56, 56 "subsurface fighting camps" 5, 12- 13 supply bunkersfrooms 5,14, 17,48,49,50,52, 53, 56.57,58 Ta Co (A,726) 48, 51 TO C s 7,17, 19,2 1, 2 2,31,42,48,49,50, 52,54, 56, 57,58, 59,60 T hie n Ngon (A-323) 12 Tinh Bie n 3 1 Tong La Chon (A-334) 16, 16,54 trenc h systems 12 , 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 18, 19, 23, 26, 27 , 28,32,3 3,44,45, 48, 49 ,5 2, 5 2, 53, 55 tr ip flares 5,8,10,1 4, 15.17, 18, 18,2 1,22, 42
USSF 4,5,6,6,1 1,24,47, 48,5 1,59-60 NB/C-t eams 5,6,9, II, 13,23,29,33,35,37, 44, 44, 48,50,5 I, 58, 61 casualties 48,58,60 operations 4,5, 6, 36- 7, 54, 55 team houses/quarters 14, 15, 16- 17, 20,21 , 29,3 1,48,49,50,52, 5 3,56, 57 VC/NVA 4,5, 6,10, 16 attacks 7,8, 9, 10, 11, 35, 4 1- 2,44, 45- 6, 47- 8, 4 7, 49 , 50- 1, 52, 53,53, 54--5, 56, 56-7, 58, 59,59 , 60 casualt ies 35. 54, 55, 59, 60 forc es 7, 12,50,5 1, 52,54,55,58,59,60 infiltrato rs/info rmants 7,47,48, SO, 5 1 treatment of enemy 16, 46, 60 weapons 7,8-9,42, S0, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 59, 60,60 villages, protection of 6, 13,36,4 1,47 Vinh G ia (A-422) 17 water storage/trailers 17, 19.23,35 wire barriers/fencesfpickets 5, 7, 8, 10, I I, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17,18, 19, 20-1, 2 0, 21,22, 2 2,23, 25 , 27,27, 28,29, 3 1, 33, 38 , 41 ,42, 44 , 48, 49 , 52,53 , 54, 55, 58, 6 1
FEB
De sign, t echnology and history of key fortresses, st rategic po sit ions an d defens ive systems
2006
. Camps in Vietnam '.'
1961-70 In 1961, US Specia l Forces units
began entering remote areas of Vietn am domin ated by the Viet Con g. Th eir ta sk was to organ ize local defen se an d strike forces aime d at stopping the en emy from gaini ng further control of such areas. The Green Beret s set up fortified camp s akin to forts of th e old Ame rican Frontier, but adapted to m od ern warfare, from w h ich in digenous Cutaway artwork
tro ops defen ded local villages and attacked and h arassed the en emy. How these camps were constructed, developed, and defended is do cumen ted h ere for the first time. Th is book
also covers the weapons, barriers, and obstacles used in th ese camps, providing specific examp les of camp design , an d det ails h ow they withstood th e test of battle again st a determined and Photographs
OSPREY PUBLI SH ING
Fu ll color artwork
resourceful enemy.
Jill~tl~Jll \ \ ~wl~\l\~\ \ IlIliilliitlllll IS B N
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