128
PREY· MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES
rob rmies () the iddleeost 1948-73 COIOUT plates
Text by JOHN LAFFIN
by
MIKE CHAPPELL
:\lE:'\-.-\T-.\R:\IS EDITOR
ERIES
\I \R 11'\ \II,DRC)\\
rab rmies () the idd/eeas! /948-73 Tell by jOH:\' L;\FF[:\ Colour !ilales ~)' l\IIKE CHAPPELL
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Publi . . lH'd III 1qR1 b\. . Osprr\ Pubh~hlng Lid i\lrmhn comp.lI1) of the (,eorge Philip Group 1:2- q Long .\nc. London \,"elE gLP © COP\ right 198.1 ()...prc·\ Publishing- Ltd Repnlllt'd 198~{. H)8S rhl~
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nghted under the Berne Conn:llIion, All ri'tht: r~er"\'t'd" ,\part from an~ fair dealing for 11ll" puqx....t' of pri\'atc tudy. n:search, nitici.. m or re\ \('\\, as permitted under the COP) ri~ht Act. 1956. no part of this puhlication may h(' reproduced, "tored III a retne\"al y tel11. or transmitted in any form or b~ am' mran.... dtTtronit, dntricaJ. dwmit"al. mt'( h,lIliral. optical. photocopy in~. recordin~ or othen\ i"e, without the prior p
COP\
rilm"et in Grcat Britain Print<,'d in Ilung Kong' Publisher's note: The cololll platt·.. III till" book arc the fruits of research carr-it'd oUljoilHh b} author. editor and artist; Osprq arc 1{ratcful to \\'illiam FO\.. lcr. I., .\Wner and Claudt, .\Iorin for Iheir a...... i... lana. and acknowledgr Ihrir del)! to the publi . . hed work of Peter Abbott. The difficulties of publishing hard information about the .\Iidelle East \'"ars are well known; many Arab.. ("onsidtT tht'nl\cht"S to be Slill at war. and tht· rt'(lulremenl.. of hath security and propa'tanda pre"ent major ob tadr to th(' objecti\"e writer. This fOfl11rf limi tation applil' p.lrti(·ularh to the identification of 'p('('ifir unih and thcir in i~nia" "'hill" O"Pf(,~ are confIdent that thi~ book rl"prcsclHS a con..iderable ad\ance 0\"('1' pre\"iou<;l~ publi<;,lu:d matt'rial. it ~ ine\"itablt' that -.omr arril arc till ob cure, Tht' tables of unib in\"01\"00 III the \"ariou, ('ampaigns ha\'e be{'n compilt-d from a number of "ource:--, and cr~s-checking- has not alwa\ o("('n po...... ihlr, Ill1t'rested rt'adep;, \\ ill find the ljtl~ li"ted on p, 39 of \-alue. The major work by Brigadier EI-Edroos is particularly rele\"ant: although a 'commi
A !:Jtud)' ill .I.11artia/Deve/oplllellt nll'
major .\rab armie... in\oh"ed in tht., ~Iiddk East wars arc thost' of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, while those of Lebanon, Iraq. Saudi ;\.rahia. Iran and .\Igeria ha\"e played smaller rtlle~. The Palestine Liberation ,\rmy, for a long time under Egyptian control and later under the Syrians, \"as also in action; but theftda.'t'ffn or guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ha\"(~ seen much more combat than the regular soldiers ol"the PLA. The enemy in nearly all cases has been Israel. Exceptions wcrc the civil war in Yemen, in which an Egyptian Army fought the Yemeni royalists; and the Jordanian ci"il war of 197071, whcn King Hussein dro\'c the PLO forces from Jordan in fiercr and bloody fighting. The modern wars of the ~liddle East befl:an in 19..\-7, when the yrians, E~yptians, Jordanians and Lebanese were unofficially at war with the Jewish selliers of Palestine. On 15 ~la). the da) after Israel was declared a sO\"ereig-n state, the Arab in,"asion began. Between then and Iqi3 (In· wars occurred: those of 1948; 1956 the Sinal \\'ar : Ig6i the ix-Day \\'ar ; Ig68-io the \\'ar of AlIri,ion and Igi3 the OClober \\'ar. beller know n to the Egyptians as The Great Crossing. There has also been an intermittent terrorist war, with certain peak periods 1955 56, Ig64 6g. 19i8 81. The 1956 war was wholl~ between Israel and Egypt: the 1968 iOwaf\\asmainlyfou~ht between Israel and Egypt, but Syria was also in\'oln·d. ~I uch forei~n military influence as well a.. political interference is e\"ident in the ~Iiddl('
E~l~t
\\ar," For m~tance, the Egyptian .\rm~ of 1948 was largel~ British-equipped and fought b~ Briti... h methods; many officer~ had ~ef\ t.°d with Eg~ ptian units attached LO the Briti...h .\rnl' during the de, ert campaign~ of 1940 .n. The Syrian and Lehane...e forces \\ere equipped in t94i +8 with the weapons of their fomer colonial ma~tel., the rrench, and they used I" rench taUKS. The teeth of the Jordanian Arm~ were tht: .\rab Legion, British-led, trained and armed, B) 1967 the Egyptians and Syrians '\t'H' Russian-equipped and So\·iet military do('trine increasingl) made it~elf felt, partirularh in the pre-19i3 period. During the \"ar of .\ltfltion the Egyptian .\rmy was largely a Russian creation, and for the Russian ... the \\ar was an opportunit\
Men of Egypt' 6r&t paratroop baltalioa.. photographed in Cairo du.ring the firSt anniversary celebrations of the revolu· tion.a..,. r~irne, 1953- One man. holds up a portrait of Gen, Na~b. Note la~e beretS, light khaki driU bauJedre uniform., and cbevrons in arm--of••ervice colour. The belmet. and barnes. are British. (BBC HuJton Picture Library)
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The EgyptillD Camel Corps take part in a parade through Cairo in 1953. Mosl of these soldiers were Nubians or Sudllnese, and they provided contingenls whjch saw action in both 1948 49 and 1956. (DDC Hulton Picture Library)
to cxpCnmCnL wiLh l1e\\ weapons, armour and
equipmcnL. The t~)73 war was foug-hL basically between ;\merican equipment used by the Israeli... and Soviet equipmelll used by the Egyptians and SYrians. The great tank banles of the Sinai Desert and the Golan Hrig'hts were super-powt"r balLles b) prox\. Con,iderin~ thaL their aim has ah\ay~ h{'en to crush Israel, the .\rabs ha\'e, collecti\"eh. suffl'rcd from lack of unified command. Generally the\ haH" nOl e\'rn co-operated with one another but haH~' sim pl\ fou~ht separa te war~ a t the same time A central command has been attempted. In IQ,)fj E,(\·pt. ~audi Arabia and yria planned 'united defence' and proposed \\ar against hrael aL a summit meeting in Cairo. K.ing Hussein refused to ~i\'c up his British subsidy. and the idea collapsed. In Ig641eadersofthc 13 Arab League nations 22 111 1981 met in Cairo and formed the Cni(jed \rab High Command. This collapsed under the
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Israeli on\!au/>:ht on 5 June 1967, but "asser re\'in'd i Lin April Ig68 when h(' appointed LLGell. Tala' Hassan as Chief-of-Staff of the L: .. \.H.C., freshly dl"si~ncd to mobilise, co-ordinate and direct the efforts of the 115 million Arabs a~ainst Israel. However, V.A.H.C. nc\'cr did function aL more than theoretical le\'el. ,\s national armies the Arab forces ha\"l" had other built-in handicaps. At roOl is the psychoreli'(iou\ Islamic belief of Bismillah 'If ,\lIah wills', fhis makes training in leadership praClicall\ irrele\ant and, until the 1970s, it undermined plannin~, As late as the Ig60:-- some general.. rejected ,eriou... planning- a:-- irrclig-iou .... on the ~round... that such acth"it\ questioned \Hah's oml1l potel1ce. Two other shortcoming~ are the g-reat g-ulf st"parating- the officers from the troop.... and the lack of a sound .:\CO strUClure, The two are rdated. rhe officer~. particularh in E~ypt. ('Olll(' from the upper classes and did not. until the 197°:--. ('onsider it pan of their duty to train with the troop'. This placed on the "CO, a r("ponsibility be\"ond their education and status.
Illitai\cy is ~mothcr handicap: the majorit) of E~nptlan and Sy rian soldiers. until recently. could not read simple instructions. This presented ~r("at difficulties in the training: of tank crews. for instance Fictitious operational reponing. from the field to HQ: and from therc to the Executiyc is a standard problem for Arab armies. Commanders
in the field either fabricatc successes or, to justif\ failure, exag-g-erate the size of enemy forn's. Each day a war goes on the worse the confusion hecomes. Field commanders do not obey order bec<1u.c the~ kno\\ that they arc based on fanciful misInformation which they themseh"es originall\ sent in. Other officers a\"oid carrying- out ordcr~ and try to aet indeprndently according to information
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thtm. rhe Arab force~ also use French. Briti... h. German, Italian, Bel~ian and ("\'en S\\ i,s eqUip· mene ~Iore recently the Egyptians andJordanian.. ha\"(" acquired American material. that . . t't·m ... to them to bf' corrf'ct. \\'hen HH~"h l'ntil the 1973 \\ar Israel enjoyed a qualitatin COinmand ~eb any sort of~ldH'r... r repon it dela, . . ad\"anta~e O\"er its Arab enemies, while the ,\rab.. passing' it on to the Executi\T. In June 1967, the had a g-reater manpower. In that ' ...· ar the qualiE!(I ptian Ceneeal Slaff did nOI lell Presid('lll tilt in' difference narrowed, not onl) in \\capons :'\a...ser 111(' terrible results of the Israrli air altilrk and equipment but also in the competence of for eig-ht hour.... senior commanders and the prow(""is of 11ll' .\ morale probkm is that Egyptians and fi\rian" ordinary soldiers. Their potential as soldiers \.. . a.... haH' had no inrenti\'t' to join the sen·ices. and lor until the 1973 war, often under-estimated. Tht, most lamilies a rail-up \\as a calamit\. Pay was Russians made it clear, when they wnc cremin~ minimal and there was no allowance for families, the modern Egyptian Army, that they considered who were left destitute if the soldier was killed. that Egyptian soldiers were untrainahlr.•\rab The situation in Jordan was different; here military courage, too, has been derided. But e\Tn soldierin~ was a genuine profession from the time \\hen ...oldier:-; ha\'{' run away their night has been of King Abdullah, father of King Hussein. I he more an indictment of cra,"en leadership than a Jordanian .-\rl11\ was the mast professional .\ral> confession of cowardice. Egyptian.jellalut'1l and arm\' in 1948 and remains so in J 98:2. thou~h S\"rian pe-asants make ~ood soldiers wh('n comnumerically it is one of the smallest. petent), led and adequately encouraged. The inct' 194-8 the armies of the confrontation Bedouin Jordanian is a natural warrior. \\ hile tht ... tate those posse sing borders with hrael Palestinian 'commando' has been indoctrinated han' IIlcreas('d dramaticalh- in sizl'. In 19-1-i with a fanatical bra\"ery. Egypt could . . end an arm, of only 10,000 again...t For the \\'e...tern student of war and armie.. Iht Israel; in 1973 100,000 men were committed and .\rab forces \\ hich ha,e foughl Israel prO\ide a E!(ypt still had another +00.000. including r"erYes. fascinating 'Hud) in martial de\"elopment, from imultaneously the armament of the Arab armies the relati\"eJy primili\'e in 19..H -4.8 to the ultraincrealed so dramatically thaI Syria and Egypt. as ad,·anced of t973. Since the end of the Second allies. were able 10 fi!(htlhe greal"! tank bailIe, in "'orld \\'ar onh the Israelis themseh-es ha\'e had his ton during the- 1973 war. The So,'iets and the as much si~nificant combat experience as the \\"arsaw Pact count ric... pro\'ide their Arab clients Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians. with the mo...t ...ophisticated weapons of war and The Americans learnt much in Korea 1950 13 they. through oil wealth. ha\"e been able to pay for and in Yielnam 1965 73 as did lhe British in E8Yptian a.rtillerymen man Soviet • 22m..m I"n!li, u5N in 1!}of8 49 .nd 1956: with. 5ix-rnan crew, this weapon had a. range of '1.800m. Author'~ colleclion"
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Cypru'. Kenya. ~Ialaya. Korea. the Gulf and ~L.l.la~~ia. BUllhcsc combat t'xperi('nct.'~ il1\ 01\ l'd a type orfi~htin~ which the British and Americans are unlikely to see in a European conAice The Arab armies. kept to a ,harp fi~hting pitch by their unceasing perception of enmity with Israel, strive harder to impro\'c their standard than do the :\ATO and \,'an"a\\ Pan nations. locked in a stand-off melltalit\.
Tile EfO'Pfiftll Ev\periellce fhe Egyptian forces ha\'c been subject to ,",("\,eraJ different influences since the 19405. Originall~ established, armed and trained by the British. lhe~
we[e later equipped with Eastern-bloc weapons. influenced b) German military principles. and finally equipped with So\'iet weapons and adyised by Sm"jet experts. These sometimes conOicLing influences were not conduciye to an eyen dc\'e1opment. The Ee;\ptian .\rm) began the 1948 war \"ith a
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Egyptian infantry opera ling Czech Oatnethrowen: normally two tnen work as a team, and the large unidentified artn· patch worn by t.he tnan on the right suggests that he is the section NCO. Respirators are carried. The weapon, which has a range of ..om, is ignited by ten phosphoru bullets filted into the rim of the munle. (Author'. collection)
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paper strcn~th of 50,000, although the actual number of eHeetin's was much lown. For tlw inyasion ofIsrael in ~lay that year the Army (,Quid put logether only 10,000 men, lhough they \\ere well armed. B) late 19....8 lhe field arl1l~ was -to,ooo-slrong, including "o!untccrs from Sudan, Tunisia and Lib)a" But to European eyes the Egyptian .\rm~ \\as a rabble. It could hard" ha,"e been ansthin~ else when army policy was lhat officcl' must be looked after first and then the horse. "'hat bt'came of the soldiers ,\-as irrele,"ant. Often thrir \\ capons would not fire. and shells either exploded at the wrong lime or did not explode at all. "'eight of numbers ga,"e lhe Eg~plians some 1000"al ,"ictorie" against the 'scratch' Israeli .\rmy. but ('\t'n a few score determined derende~ on a kibbutz sometimes held up for days an Eg~ ptian bri~adc supported b, tanks. After the di'baclc of defeat King Farouk's army commandcr; 'iought foreign military experts who could make the Egyptian soldien into an arm, The\ {"hose
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pushed out ~aguib and became Prime :\linister: two ye~lf', later he was Pre.,ident. Up to lhis lime Britain had been the major military influence in Egypt and the army was built \'ery much on British lines. \\"hen the Brith.h e\~lcuated the Canal Zone, in 195-1- 55, ~as')er turned to Cze("hos!O\"akia to replace Britain as Eg-ypt's arms supplier,
Esyptian infantrytnan with Rus iaa-made 82m.m recoilless SUn, effective up to 800m; note ight box and oil can on srou.nd beneath t.ripod. On the sotdier's back can be . _ hi. stung Kala hnikov, and an entrenching tool handle; and note panern of hebnet cover. (Author's collection)
Germans: the German reputation' for milita~ abilit\ had not suffered from the defeat of '9+5 and officers were readil) 3\'ailable. C ndf'T3 former artille~ ~eneral. "'ilhelm Fahrmbachcr. German experts worked in E~ypt between 1950 and '957, but their number ne\'er exceeded 60. The parachute and commando units were trained in the 1950S by Gerhard :\Iertins. who became nOlOriou~ for the command with which he would conclude a march through the desert. On the way back to barracks, nrar the Pyramids of Giza, he would shout: 'O\"er lhe pyramids! Quick march!' ,\nd he meant it; the alread\' exhau.,ted soldiers had to scramble up one side of the ~reat pyramid of Cheop~ and do\\ n the other. The modern Egyptian Army reall\ dates from Jul) t95', when the so-called Free Officers seized power in a coup and set up the Rc\'olution Command Council. 'fhe nominal head was Gen. :\Iuhammed ~ag-uib. but the effecti\'e leader W3.l.i Col. Gamal .\bdel :'s:asser. In April '95+ :\asser
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1956 Egypt's next war the' 'ucz Campaign' to the British \\a') ag-ain')t hrad. Britain and France, though tht, Anglo-French ill\ olvement i., irrel('\am hne. E~ypt, with S) ria and Jordan, planned a war against Israel to suppon the intcnsi\"C' terrorist operations bein~ moulllcd from Gaza. then pan of Egypt. The proposed war was a f()olish n'lllure because the army ~till did not kno\\ how to u.,e it., newl) arri\'ing- SO\'iet arms and equipment. and the chan~e-o\"er from British to ~O\'iet militaq doctrine confused all rank'i. Israel struck first, on 29 October. and by I '\"o\"ember the war was practically decided. One of the bloodiest actions took place at :\litla Pass, which the Israelis attacked with paratroops. The El(yptians fought well and killed +0 Israelis beforr th(')' lost their hold on the Pass. ;..Jasser ord('l"('d his forccs in Sinai to \\ithdr
\'assrr's ambition was to lead the African. ,Arab and Islamic world, and he pro\"idcd the resourcl'~ for revolution in Other countries. In Fcbruan 1958 Syria and E~ypt combined in the "Cnitcd .\rab Re.'pllblir· evensharingArmycommand for a timc. fhe Kingdom of Yemen also joincd. but the alliance collapsed in October 1961. E~yptian intri~ue caused the fall of the.> ro\a) hou~e of Yemen in eptember 196:2" and .:\a~~('r selll an army of :20.000 there to support the ne\\ republican re~ime. audi Arabia backed the Yemem ro\-alists ilnd the re~uh was a ferociou~ and CO'ltly (he-year war in which. incidentally. the E~yptians used gas. By ;"larch t965 Egypt had 6'.000 troop' holdin~ the coastal plain. but ~cnerally failing to take the inniath'e from thl" royalisLs. Often they were besieged and had to be: supplied by air. Throu~h air superiority the E~yptians caused immense damage to ro\ali~t bases; but the:- E~yptian Arm) was l'\-enlUally wilhdraH n in tht" \\<1(.;e of the Six-Day "'ar and in
return for great subsidies a form of bribl' from Saudi .\rabia and KlI\\ail. 1967 I"he Ig6j war lhe Six-Day \\'ar was the pnn' President :\a"'ler paid for his o\"n rhclOric .\t the peak ofhi, popularity. "asser beliewd that he had irresistibl) po\\ erfut forces: the Rus"ian~. \\ ho had equipped the E~yptians. as'lured him that this was o. rhey believed that by bringin~ E~ypt into confrontation with Israel they would make. 'a,,,er ('n"n more dependent on his o\"iet alh The .\rm~ was indeed strong 100.000 men or~aniscd in five infantrv di\·isions. ('ach with it-. 0\\ n tank unit. as well as two addilional armoured Russian Zyl truck with:)o x 130rnm rocket tube. mountedthe entire al"o can be 6red in eight second•. The truck is camou.oaged in sand and green, with a red trianK"war markinK" on the door. Thi type of equipment ha. bftcn in senr1ce with the EKYplian Army since t.he bepning of the 1970•. Those with a taste for minutiae of uniform will note the double..-buckle boots worn by the co-dri"er. (Author'. collection)
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di\"isions. Concentratin~ his armour on the border, . ·a"...er bclie\"ed, would strain J...rael"s defencl" capacities. If the J...ral'1i" did attack they would ha\'e to restrict themseh-es to small-scale operations, and Eg-ypt could react in force and pro\"(' LO thl' doubtin~ Arab nations that the E~yptian Arm) l'Oltid beat Israel. It has been sugg-esLed that .\'asser did not want war: but he started an irre\"CTsible chain ofe\"enh when he c1os('d the Straits ofTiran and demanded the withdrawal of the t' . Emer~fnn Force in the inai" Also. he oH'r-e... timated the ability of his Hi~h Command. notabh- that of ~lahmoud Fa\\zi. the Chief-of-Staff, and Gen. ~Iunaim Husseini, the commander in Gaza. The Israelis launched their pre-emptiu:, strike on sJunr '967, and in six days thr Egyptians Irft 15,000 dead soldiers and almost all of their equipment in the sands of the Sinai; another 12,000 men. including nine generals. we're taken OD~
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historic hr~c.hC's hosC'd in the sa ad ramparts of of th~ Sue~ Canal-the tactical basis for th~ of October 1!J7]. (Author'. coHeelion
th~ east~rn bank 'Gr~at CrO!iisinS'
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prisoner. The remainder or the arm\" were permitted. as an act of grace, to eros.. the canal bark to E~ypt. A ~reat many soldie", took off their boots so that they could run faster a fact admitted b) the Egyptians themseh-es. After the disaster the Army tried to re-organise itself but was handicapped by purges morc than 800 senior officers were arrested or dismissed: some were gaoled for life. :\f\"CTtheless, b, the end of 1967 the scattered formations of the Egyptian .\rmy had been put together again and largely re-equipped \\ ith modern So\"iet arms and equipment, B~ the beKinning of 1969 th<, emire command structure of the armed force~ \\as reorganised on So\"iet lines, and the combatant element of the Army grouped into three armies the So,"iet 'army' was roughly the equi\"aknt ofa \\'estern 'corps' Each army had two infanlry and one armoured dinsion. rhe So,"iet instrucLOrs found the EKyptians 'difficult' because by nature they were too impatient to be able to follO\\ . oyiet methods. \\ hich \\ nl' methodi<.:al. thorough and nece......arily slow.
Egyptian Unit DeployD1ent Sinai, June '96, ddt'nu.' Iinl': i1h Il/j.DII. indo appro\.. 70 'I-:H & IS-3 tank... :.!Olh Pain/lilian DII inl"! approx. 50 Sht'rman tank Fir
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.!IId II/I J)w
Gal-a. Rafah. £1 Ari!<.h, Bir Lahl~tn sector
.\bu .\~eila. em Katl·[ Ku"seima "e(·tor
indo appro:\.. 90 tanks
Sh.tzli Forn' ,\I((hal/ufd T mk Fora inel approx. 120 T-54 55 tank 61h .\It halllud V,I Illd. appro:\.. 90 I-54 55 and onH-' IS-3 l.1I1k...
Sl'('(lIld dl'fenct" lint'" Jrd b!/. Du'. inc!. appro:\.. go tank...
Ith AmId.
nil'.
inc!. appro\..
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Jrbrl Libni, Bir Ha .lIla, Jrbd Harim "('{'lor
Bir Gar~ara. Bir'l"hamad ,('(tor
"1"-5+ 55 tank...
:\"a'...er. (onsiderin~ the E~yptian officer ('orp'" "lug-g-i... h, asked the Ru!<.sian ... to take a larg-er pan in their training-. ,\11 E~yptian officers \'Tn' ordered to obey So\'iet ad\'isers, even though they mi~ht bc junior in rank. The Russian!'! insisted that the Egyptian officers work harder and longer with their men, and many Eg-yptian officers discovered for the first time that the Egyptian Jellalutl! could be good soldiers if properly led. The Russians also insisted that many officers from wealthy families, accustomed to 'upper class' pri\'ileg-es, be replaced with young-er men who understood SO\·iet ideals. The Eg-yptian commandos were tough and well trained. and their operations worried the Israelis mort' than they ha\'e e\'er admitted. During- the "-ar of Attrition t968 70 the Israelis raided across the canal. but the traffic was not all oneway Egyptian commandos repeatedly cros~ed. laid small ambushes_ killed perhaps two Israeli, in a jeep, and then returned to base..\n ambitious raid \\ as the' ~I itia Pass Operation', though it was smaller than this title su~g-eSL'i. Cnder COH'r of a barra~e the commando team penetrated ~ome distance along the road to ~litla. ambushed two Israeli jeeps and wounded one soldier. During- the latter part of 1969 the commandos raided practically e\'cry night. .\nother major commando raid occurred on 10
Kuntilla area
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1969. when the E~Dptians penetrated )..,raeti positions opposite Port Tewfik. causing- {o casualties for no loss. Commando actiyit) became increa!'ingly intense, and on I 9 ~lay 1970 a raiding pan) of 90 allacked an Israeli unit, in daylig-ht, ncar Shalloufa in the southern sector. On 30 ~Ia) commandos ambushed a truck con\'o)' SC\'en miles ,outh of Port Fuad, killing t 7 Israelis and destroyin~ the COI1\"O). The ERyptian .\rmy was eventually outfought in the \\'ar of Allrition: but it was an important connict, for it pro\"ided the opportunity to train a lar~e number of soldiers for an in\'asion at some future point.
The Great Crossillg J om II the day 01 attack ("arne on (j Onober t973 the da\ of The Great Crossing_ a the Eg-yptians call it. Seen from the Eg-yptian" ide, the fascination of the October conRict to the student of\\ar is not the war itself the Arab armies lost that but the way in which the Suez crossin~ was achie\·ed. The Eg-yptian •\rmy commanders had more martial {{uile than the Israelis g-a\'e thelll credit 1I
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Ecstatic E~pt.iaD soldiers raise their own flag over a captured Israeli 8trongpoint in the 'Bar_Lev Line', and burl the Israeli Oag away. The Egyptian victory cost fOaay c••ualties, but wa. of enormous psychological value. (Author'. collcction)
for. Their deceptive manoeU\Tes before the OCLObcr \\'ar had a long history, beginning with the sand walls ,,,hich the Egyptian" built lip on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The 1sra('li~ illlerpreted these earthworks as 'occupational thnapy' for the E~yplian". bored with ... illin~ by the Canal. The) saw no ...ignificance in the faCl that these walls were always a fraction hi~her than those built by the Israelis themseh'es on the east bank. ~obo{h expected an 3n3ck in the ~I uslim month offastin~, Ramadan. As part of the deception the Cairo papers reported that officers were to be ~i\"en lea\"e for the Omrah the 'little pilgrimage of Ramadan. In lhe weeks before lhe in\'asion troops in brig-ade streng-th openly mo\'ed out to the Canal on maI10eU\TCS but in the e\'enin~ onh a battalion returned. The brid~C"S and pontoons for the cros.sing were mo\"cd at nig-ht. oldiers at the Canal were not allowed to \\ear steel helmets until the moment of attack.
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But long before this the Engineer Corps, commapded by Gen. Carnal :\1 uhammad Ali, had artificially created Suez Canal conditions in lhe :-;ile Della. Sappers praclised lhe Canal crossing there 300 times from 1968 onwards, using full-scale reproductions of the Israrlis' 'Bar-Ley Line'. The idea of using water-cannon to break through the sand ramparts was not so rC\'oltllionary: during the buildin~ of the .\swal1 Hig-h Dam they were used to bore holes to takl' explosi\·es. The standard pontoon bridge of the time could be assembled at the rate of four feet a minute two hours for lhe width of lhe Canal. With the lalesl Russian bridge a rate of 15 feet a minute was possible. Artillery officers spent a lon~ time rxprrimrnting- to find the best way of clearing- a palh two metres wide lhrough the Israeli minefields; lhey decided to use 50mm mortars. Durinl{ fi"e "ears of exercises the artiller~ used 87 time the normal annual scale ofli\"e ammunition; f3ch gun cre\\, the Egyptians say. fired 6,000 rounds in praclice. The Egyptian Armed Forces, accordin~ to one of their manuals. '\"iew trainin~ as a battle more
ferocious than the actual fi~hti'H( There is some.: Egyptian Forces truth in this: in one war game in upper Eg~ pt in October 1973 preparation for the Canal [rossing, more than .md .Im!) 300 soldiers were killed. 2nd J nL Di\ t\\Cl Infbdes.. on(" mt'("h.bdt:. On b Ollober 1973 al '-.05 hl"'. the arliller~ ont: lank lxie-. commander of the ERyptian econd Arm~, Brig. 16th I nf. Oi, Abu Ghasala. in his command post near Ismailia, 18th Int: Oi\. :2 I fot Armd Diy. t\\O tank bdN., om' mC'ch. ~a\"e the order, ·Fire'. According to Egyptian bde. fi~ures, >,000 guns fired 100,500 shells in the t\\>'o mech, bdes, , one lank first 53 minutes to destroy the Bar-Le\- strongbde. points, artillery batteries, command posts, reservc 3rd .I",V' concclllration areas and warning stations. During 7th Inr.Oiv. the whole operation, say the Egyptians, they fired 19th InC Diy. aboul one million shells and rockets. The Eg~ plian 4th Armd. DJ\6th ~le('h, Oi\. En~ineer Corps opened 77 gaps and path, through the sand rampart, mO\'ing 64-°,000 tons of sand. (,HQ. Rtl"lt Then they built ten heavy bridges and operated a 3rd ~h·ch.Oi, large number of ferrieo;;_ Ind("p("nd("Tlt Tk.BdC'. rhl' III .. t d.... dUIt \\d\e Jlung rope and bamboo Two Paratroop Bel laddel". against the ramparts and ...cramhled up. ~larine Belt incl. 1 30th .\n obsen·er \\ ould lla\"e noticed tha t tht~ . . oldier.. 28 Commando 8m;_ were carn ing unusuall v-sha perl eq ui pmelll '>Olllt' had tube... over their shoulder~, others can\-a",cO\·ered cases in their hands or strapped to their established twO bridl>;eheads. fhe Israelis failed in backs. The tubes were laul1cher~ of an ad\anced a counter-attack on 8 October, and the E~)ptians Russian-built 'bazooka' the Rockel Propelled then had time to rest and regroup and this was Grrnade, RPG-7. Thecasccontained a much more their downfall. For more lhan 25 years the sophisticated device a Russian wire-guided anti- Egyptians had failed to make a denl in lhe tank missile codenamed ISagger'. These soldiers Israeli defences. ~ow that they had made a great did not try to cap lUre the Bar-I.e\" bunkers: that hole they did not know how to handle their \\ as the task of the second wa\·e. The fir" t \\ ~l\"e ad\'anta~e_ Sonet doctrine. in which the Egyptians \\as to de.. troy the Israeli tanks and artiller) were steeped, called lor Egyptian armour to drive behind the line. rapidly east and take the real objeetin's, the ,·ital In small 'bug~ie' ferried across. the mis...ile passes. Instead, the~ tried to impro\-e on the troops fanned into the desert for ten mile.... Herr bridgehead b~ 'mall local actions, read, for the they dug in and brought into action the third of next thrust. their new infantry weapons, the portable Russian The .\Iinister of \Var and COlllmander-inanti-aircraft Illi....·.ile. SA~I 7 Their order.. were Chief, Gen. Ismail, was ultra-cautiou"i and wanted now to hold their ground against counter-attacks to mo,"e step b~ Slep. His Chief-ole 'alf ~laj. Gen. Saad Shazli, the Arik Sharon of Egypt and by tanks and aircraft for 24 hours. The assault across the Suez Canal was one of the an advenlUrous, ambitious and dynamic paramOSt impressive wa tel' crossings in mili tar) his tor) , trooper wanted an all-out attack. His plan was It follO\ved Soviet methods, taking place accordin~ for a two-pronged attack plus an amphibious to a strict timetable. \\'ithin ten hours E~ypt landing behind the Israeli lines on the mo\'ed nearly fi,-e com pi etc infantr) di\·isions .\Ieditcrranean coast. into Sinai, then quickly reinforced them with 800 Egyptian chances waned as one indecisiH.· day tanks and a remarkable array of anti-tank and followed another. President Sadat decided to anti-aircraft weapons. make a limited attack as planned b) Ismail, and Follo\\'in~ the Canal cro......ing- the Egyptians on '3 October E~yptian armour mo\·ed into the <
'3
already packed bridgeheads. As earlier. lhe mon'mCI"ll was well or~anised far beller sO than rorei~n obsrrn'fs could bclic\'c. COl1\'oys ron\'{'r~'("d from senora I directions and \'('\ were nen'!" cOIl'{csted, as military policemen with coloured li'l;hlS directed them to their crossing- bridges and then (0 assembly .ueas. The Israelis smashed the second offen.. in·. then crossed the Canal inlO E~Ypl and encircled the Third .\rmy: and on('(" again super-pm, cr intt'r,"clltion in the l'''\ . . a\'cd the E~yplians from disaster. rhe October \\'ar is imponalll becau..,l' of the changed perceptions, within Eg\ pt. of the Eg~ ptian soldier. The greate",t surpri,e. the
ThrH of the five-man
E~t:ian
crew of • Soviet 82mm
mortar we.rins the special load-carryins ...ault jerkin which was issued to .fDost of the first wave across the Canal in 1973. and which wa sOIDeth.i.ng ofa 'secret weapoD' at that tilDe. It is illustrated and discull5ed. in detail ullder Plate B. The total weight of an infaDtryID&JI's kit i5 :Jokg-around 6olb-without hi. weapon, but the weight i. well distributed by thi jerkin. (Author's collection)
•
.~
•
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...
4
:
...-
E!iDptian military histOrians say, \\as not so much the attack itself as the 'creation of the Ill'\\- J\rab fig:htrr', This is a description of the 'n('\\ fi~hl("r' Ii·om an Egy ptian book, On th, Fourth .Ieab-brad; Round: 'He is a courag:eolls g-iam, who is honest in rig:htin~, who does not molest the wounded or prisoner.., of war: who is courag:eous and darin'{ and self-confident. with confidence in his weapon, in his commanders, , , The strong: combatant \\ hose ance..,tors c3n"ed the g:ranite and made man"cllous statues out of it. The obstinate, stubborn combatant ... who looks forward to the attaining of martyrdom in battlC' \\ jth unparalleled bra\ en and incredible self:'~acrifice rhe wholr world recognised the skilfulne s of the E!!;yplian soldier and admilted lhat he had changed the theories of the an of war. It \\:as a magnificent performance to see the heroism of the infantr) while opening gaps in the enemy minefields with their bodies, which were torn to pie('('s
:'"
•
•
•
by the explosions. This neither ~cared nor stopped Egyptians crew a 7.62mm Soviet Goryunov machine gun, licence-built in Egypt, in an emplacement overlooking ODe lhl' following- waH' . . . the L~yplian soldier of the passes in the sout.bern Sinai recaptured in 1973. cOlllinucd advancing u mil gap~ \\ efe opened ill the (Author's collection) defences ... Great soldiers oner their li\'cs cheap for Egypt.' The Army credits its Commandos and .\ir Ca\'aln of the Egyptian Special Troops \,ilh great heroism and effecli,'eness. Landed by In OClOber 1973 a British diplomat in Amman, the helicopters in the depths of the Si nai they a nacked Jordanian capital. studied a report about the Israeli reSCf\"CS, and in delaying them inflicted Syrian Army's successes in the first da\ of the he,,·) losses. Brig. :\abil Shukri. who founded and Yom Kippur \\ar. 'Good starters, til(' Syrian~: he led the Commandos. claims-that his men killed said, 'but bad finishers.' And in hrael tlw more than 1,000 Israelis and destroyed :200 tanh Jauralem Po.\l quOted an Israeli officer on the and armoured "chicles. The most succ('!\sful Golan Heigllls a:-. saying-, '1n the last anah ...i:-. the soldier of the anti-lank troops was Sgt. Ibrahim "\Tians are chicken.' Abdel .\Ionein eI .\Iasri. \\ho is credited with ~Iany Israelis deride the Syrians a:-. ...oldil"fs, ha\'in't blown up 26 tanks: he was awarded the though with little cause; they were much more highc·t Egyptian award for bra\'ery, the Star of determined than the Egyptians, and from 194-8 Sinai. until the present they ha\T been Israel's most The October \\Oar certainlY showed that per. istem and ferocious enemies. The Sy nan Egyptian soldier~ can be determined and success- ..-\rm~ as an organiJallOn, before the 19io~, could not lui fi!;hters, and lhat the Army is capable of be taken seriously because the command structure ophisticated military planning. It still has a long \\a~ seriou:-.I~ dama~ed from within by political way to g:o, ho\,,·c\"er, in the de\elopment ofa good differences. Durin!?; the 1967 war most officeI' had officrr corp~ and an .. CO force of ini tia li\"C. come from the Alawite ~Iuslim sect, and under
SJlliallS 011 theHeights
'5
" the end o[th(' 1939 4-5 war, "ith Syria in British hands. a British military mission re~truclllred the Syrian forces and sent Syrian officers to E~ypt for training in British establishment.... \\'hen Syria became independent in 194-6 tht' Army still numbered 8.000 men. many of whom took part in the itw
"itish j tho H for
rtlll loftono d by al'{n ~hey
'nch op" 10nwar :s of 'ach lber SSIS.
ette Son
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1960:-; 1he SO\'iets replaced France and lhe equipment became more formidable. including T -3485" Syria usod tho,o tanks in the '\\'ator \\'ar' a~ainst Israel, which began in :'\oyember 196+. The yrian... "taned thi\;, war by di,"ening the Jordan and Yarmouk rh,er.... thu~ disruptin~ l"iraeli a'{riculture. Israeli guns and planes hil the S~ rian rn~inerrin'{ works and the yrians. in turn. attacked Israeli farms wilh tanks. The Israelis ent in thC'ir major tank unit. jth .\rmoured Bri~ade, and their I05mm Cellturion.s fri~hlened off the Syrians. Thi re"erse brou'{ht the yrians better equipmont from tho C SR, indudin\( T-5.J.S. Tho S, rian 14th and Hth Armoured Brigades wero ,upplied with '1'-5+', '1'-55' and some '1'-3+ 85S. Eight tank battalion... were formed. with T-34-"i and old Panzer..., 10 be a1l3ched to infantry bri~ades III wartime. L'-I DO self-propelled guns were allached 10 anti-tank companies in the armoured and mechanised brigades, and the newly formed 17th \Icchilni...ed Bri~ade wa5. gin'n BTR-I.i1 .\pes. Passing in parade before E8Ypt's monument to the 'Unknown Soldier', built after the 1973 war, Soviet-supplied BTR·so amphibious APes. Theile carry 15 infantry: three battalions with a mixed equipmenl of PT-J6 amphibious tanks and BTR-sos-the 130th Marine Bde.-were among the first units across the Canal, bUI their light armour proved 100 vulnerable when they attempled an immediate a ..auh on the Mida and Jidi Passes. (Author's collection)
Esyptian parades have featured some liSbl vehicl" which lead ODe to.-u peel that crowd-pleasinS ha. played a Ireater part than tactical reafum. Thi. jeep mOWltlnS for four Malyutka (4Sallu ') wire-guided ATGMs is a case in point. The 'SaSler' was certainly effective when operated by darins Iwo-man infantry tea..m.5. Whether this high a..nd viJible vehicle could live 10DS eDoush in the thick of an armoured baule for the three-man crew to fire their missiles and pide them to the larsel seems highly Wllikely. (Author's collection)
By Ig6i the Syrian .-\rmy had about 7.10 tank... and 585 .\PC.....\ di... tincli,·e dark green in colour, lhe tanks frequenll~ had names painted on lUrrCt sides in white ,\rabic script, often rererrin~ to heroes of past wars, includin~ the 19,~8 campaign. .\ thick whitc ring was painted 011 turret roo[s for air identification. Bctween 194-8 and 1967 the Syrians established their great '~Ia~illot Line' along the horder \vith Israel. C nder~round bunkers, tank-pit... and ~Ull emplacements cO\'ned the ridge that runs northwards from the Sea of Galilee and dominates the 10\\ -lying' plains of Israel to the west. This fortified belt ,,,'as infinitel) stronger Ihan an,other of the Arab-Israeli wars. The S~Tian border ran aloll~ the edge of the Golan Hei'{IH', 'l.ooo fCft abo\"(' Israeli territory. The steep, bare slopes. a superb natural glacis, joined at the other end the Sea of Galilee, which protected the S~ rinn left flank. In all the defences were more than ten miles deep. row upon row of emplacement.. and guns. The~ could fire ten toIlS of shells a minute from the 265 guns in the first line, apart from the Russian-made "chicle-launched Kat~ u... ha missile". In June 1967 the fighting between I... rael and ", ria lasted less than 30 hOUN and was confined to a narrow sector only 50 kilometrB. lon~. The J7
drcisl\"{' slag-e of the Israeli oAensi'"e wali <:oncentrated on a still narrower front. and SI1'\ onh two brig-ades fully ('ommined for a single day. Yet the yrian campaign of Ig6i is one of the most intercstin't episodes in modern military history. becausr it prO\"ided a much more ,·alid test of Rus ian tanics in action than the Egyptian campaie;n. I n Sinai the Soviet 'sword and shield' doctrine the shield blocks the enem)" offensi", while the ~mord strikes was improperly applied becam,e- £'typtian forceo;, were too thinly spread o,"er a ,"a-;t area: the ...hields were o'·erstretched. and their flank.. . were unco'"ered. In S, ria the front to be defended was shoner and the flanks were fulls se('ured, The \Tian...1'.... emhled an assault force tonsistine; of se'"eral infantry bri~ades. an armoured and a mechanised brie;ade and a special commando force opposite the Israeli bastion at .\Iishmar Hayarden..\dditional armoured units took up positions on the road from Kuneitra lO the assembh- point of the assault force. Deeper in th(' T-55 tanks, their loomm tnain guns fitted with British.made Xenon infra-red projec::tors. Egypt used large numbers of the T·54 55 scries in both 1967 and 1973. and apparently finds them satisfac::tory. Desert fighting requires quick and accurate ranging, however, and in this respect the T·54 55 was at a disadvantage c::ompared with the more sophisticated equipment fitted to tanks of Western design_a disadvantage which could rnake tbe difference of half a .mile's range in battle. Russian tanks abo tend to overheat in the desert, and tropical conditions aggravate the already severe problem. of c::rew discomfort and fatigue. (Author's collection)
rear two infantry brigades were placed south and north of Kuneitra. Three more brigades manned the fortified positions along the frontier. In all the Syrians had 65.000 men, 350 tanks, 300 artillery piec~ and 200 anti-aircraft g-uns on the frontier. \\'ith four reinforced infantry bri~ad("S in th(' flr"'t lin(', the shield was thick enoug-h to conform to the Russian doctrine. Should the Israelis ~et through the 'shield' of fortifications, the~ faced the main SYrian '",word' three bri~ade", inlillllr~ armour mechanised ready to counter-anack. B\ 8June. with Egypt and Jordan knocked out ofthe war. the Syrians wcre maintainin~a constant shellin't of Israel. Israel. for political as well as milllary reasons. did not attack. The ~ rian Hi~h Command was hopin~ to cause as much damag-e as possible before the C:'\ imposed a (·ease-firc. But early on gJ une the Israeli offensiw began, The SYrians held grimly to their positions of Tel .\zazi\at, Tel Faq'r and Bourj Bra\i!. The bailie ofTrl Faq'r showed the Syrian soldier at his best: here the officers stood firm. rallied their men and really led, They cut dOl'" the first wa\'e ofallackiog Israeli infantry and only a few men of the second wa\"c got through the barbed wire and the minefield. The third wave reached the trenches, \... here the Syrians mel them with riOe butts, kni,-cs. fists and teeth; only after a three-hour fighl did the Syrian~ succumb. I n other sectors a panic fii~ht tOward.. Damascus
d d y
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dCH'!oprd. This was not the result of cO\vardicc, T-62 crew of Egyptian 3rd Army photographed during the disengagement of Fehruary 1974. Pale khaki drill and olive as has been suggested; it was the backfire of inept drab field uniforms are both visible; the hehnets are the black canvaa Runian type; and note the pulJ.over hooded propaganda. The Syrian Government walllcd to anoraks, which are light brown drab in colour. (United induce the super-powers to impose an immediate Nations Y. Nagata. courtesy S. Zaloga) cease-fire, so it announced that Kuneitra the 'capital' of the Golan had fanen to the Israelis, for re\'eng-e, the generals fought sen-ral battles of In faci the Israelis were sc\"cral hours away from attrition against the Israelis, and constantly scm capture, but the Syrian soldiers, hearing the shells and rockets crashing into the scttlemenb of broadcast, knew that with Kuneitra gone their the Huleh \"alley. After the Air Force Comline of retreat was cut Improperly led. the troops mander. Hafiz al .-\ssad, seized power in the tenth headed for home, coup since 194-8 the intensity of Syrian a~g-ression The yrians' gunnery was particularly poor increased. yria also became the main departure and the Russian instructors wefe aOg'rY and point for Palestine Liberalion Or~anisation tercritIcal. sc\"cral times during the fighting the~ rorist raids into Israel after PLO arrog-ancr led senl radio messages saying 'Stop firing on the to their costh' rxpulsion from Jordan coem\' settlements Shool at the troops.' The Bs '973" \I ith top-leYeI ,eeret planning for th, SHian Army 10SI 1,000 men killed, 600 captured October ""ar in progress, the 'yrian .\rm\ and many thousands wounded in their anemptto pre,ented a completeh' different picturt from hold the Golan Heights. But the Israelis lost more that which had heen ...o <;,oundly beaten in the Sixtanks 160 of them on the Golan Hei~hlS in twO Da\ \\"ar. larg-rh hecause of the work of thou"and . . days of fighting than in either of the other twO of RUSSian instructors. They taug-ht the ~y nan main theatres. The Syrians lost about 80. soldiers hO\\ to operate the sc\"eral hundred T-62 \\·ith much O\"iet help the Syrian Army \\ as tanks. B\IP-I .\PCs, and quantities of 'Sagger' rrconstructed, re-armed and retrained. Thirstin~ ATG\\\. The combat org-anisation was ... tfirth 19
accordin~
to Sm"iet pattern. In position alon~ the cease-fire line were three infantry di,"isions, staggered in depth to a three-line defence system. Each of these di,"isions had two infantry bri"~ades with their own tank battalions, and a mechanised brig-ade of .\PCs reinforced b~ an attached tank brigade In each of the three di,"isions were :230 tanks 700 in the first echelon. Behind the first line was an en'n more powerful force 3rd Armoured Division and south of this was the 1st Armoured Di,"ision. These powerful units '\ ere held ready to exploit an~ local success with a mao.;si,"e breakthrou~h. The Assad Republican Guard a brigade equipped with T-6:2s and two other independent tank brigades made up the third line: the Army had a LOtal of "500 tanks. In conformitv with Soviet doctrine. the Syrians planned to take the Golan Heights with a threeechelon attack: the first and second as,aults would be made b\" the threc reinforced infantry di"isions. the third by two di,"ision-size 'exploitation forces'. I'he assault timetable demanded that the Jordan Riwr brid~es at Benot YaakO\ and .\rik be taken within :24 hours. The Arm\" commander in Igi3 was Gen. ~Ioustafa Tlas, probabl) the mos' able S'rian general in 30 years. He had joined the .\rmy 111
Syrian aDd Allied Forces Golan Heights, October ~973 ilh In/DIl, t\\'o m[bdc.· ., one nll.'ch.bde . one tank bdr. 681h) 9th In/VIV. two inrbdes.• ol1e mrch.bde.. 471h Tank Bde. 5th Inj.Dlt t\\o inrlxk". 13:2nd ~1c.'dl"Bde., +6,h Tank Bde 1\1 Jrmd.Dit 40th ~lech.Bde.. t\\O lank Ixit' " of \\ hich Ol1t' \\ as 51 'it 3rd Armd.Dn·. 15th ~lech.Bde., two tank bde~. .\ssad Republi<:an Guard Bde. lank bde.,
1'-6" 78th. 81s(. ql t In(lt'prndt·nt rank Belt> 6th & 11th Tank Bde Rdl ~Inh" Belt· }urdatllan .'I,d .lrmd, Dll'. Sl't' srparah' table iraqi yd .(nnd.Du
~Ioroccan ~lcch.Bde.
PL\ two Commando Bdes" Kuwaiti InfBn.Grp. Saudi .\rabian loth ~lech"R('~t.
'20
1904 and had seen no action in Ig6i. but was promoted to Chief-of-Stalfin 1968. His 0\\11 Chiefof~Stalf in t973 was Yusif Shakkour. :"cither enjoyed the popular 'do-and·dare' image common among Israeli generals. and the Israeli Command under-estimated them. Tlas and Shakkour planned an aggressi'"e air attack, and a carpet of artillery fire 10 precede the armour-infantry assault. Using hundreds of tracks and roads. the Syrians would reach the edge of the plateau o\erlookin~ the Sea of Galilee before the Israelis could brin~ up their resen"e armour. The S\riam. '\ould rcturn to thrir pre-lg6i po-;ilions. encircle the Sea of Galilee, capture Tiberias on the western shore, and CUl off the whole of northern Israel. The Golan prt·,ented ~reat difficulties lor the Israelis. but it al"'O ga'"c the Syrians a major problem and. in the end. a fatal one. To -;ucceed on the Golan the Syrians had to fi~ht a war of continuing mO\-ement and unceasing- assault But this was the warfare at which the Israeli tankeN excelled as yria learned to its terrible cost. The S~ rian oll4.:n"'I\"e. co-ordlllated \\ nh their allies. came in with the ad\"alllage ofsurprise. and wnh an explosi'"e dri'"e thai shook the Israelis. l"he Golan plateau seemed massed with tanks in the Syrian camoufla~e of oli,-e green and sand ~dIO\\. BUI Ihe S~nans had not made a.:kqualc plans for crossin~ the anti-tank ditch which the Israelis had dug- for the cntire length of the di\idin~ 'Purple Line. They brought up many ~ITlJ tracked bridge-layers to span the anti-tank ditch. but these Iumberin~ monsters ,\-'ere primary targets lor the Isradi ~ullller~; fc\\ sun"i\"ed to lay their brid~es. and the attack was delayed. ~e\·ertheless. the outnumbered Israeli 188 .\1'. moured Brigade were c,"cntually unable to 'hold thcir line, and the 'yrians pushed on to within a ten-minute dri,·e from the cliff overlooking the Sea of Galilee. They were ten minutes too late. The Israeli reScn"e armour. grindin~ up from the ,·alleys. stopped the Syrians dead. Syrian heIi-borne paratroopers achie"cd a ~reat success on the first day when they captured the Israeli outpost on the crest of ~lount Hermon. They held it a~ainst the first counter-attack, killin~ 30 Israeli . IIlciudin~ the commander. with sniper and mortar fire. Thc) lost their positions
I t (
I t
(
c o
• k
11
,
and the mOlllllains \\hen the Israeli 1st Infantn 'Golani' Brigade allacked by night. The Sy rians are not natural night-fighters. and are gi\"cn liltle training in this mo~t difficult form of warl~\n'. On the northern part of the Golan the Syrians, despite great losses, fought fiercely to achien' a breakthrough. Reinforcemenb were pushed in. together with a heli-borne commando baltalion wnh 'Sagger' mi..siles, in an effon to take the blocking hrarli tanks from the rear. One hdicopter \\ a... dl'... troyed by a tank shell. and the other commando.. were rounded up. In this intense battle ofdestruction in 'the \' alln of Tears' 160 tanks of the yrian ith Di\"ision and ;\ ad Republican Guard. togt,ther with \\dl on"r 200 brid~e-Ia}el'i. B-'l p, and BRD-'Is, were knockt.·d out. rhe IHaeli 7th .\rmoured Brigade had only sc\-cn runners left of their original . . trength of 105. The baltle ended with ..hockt'd and confused \'fliln soldiers franticalh seeking
Syrian troop. in DlIma!lCU5 during a period of tension beIween Syria and E~I in 1961. They were poorly armed and equipped al the timej lnaDy unilS were withoulseeel helrneca. NOle FN rifles, In 1967 many Syrian troops seem to have worn a basically silnilar outfie of khaki drill uniforms and ,hrmQ(h headdress. (Author'. collection)
sheller from the Israeli guns among their wrecked armour, rhe baule raged on eastwards to\\ .ud:-. the S\ rian capital but the war wa:-. decided when the hradi armoured resen"es arrived. Tht' Syrian t"ommand ...un" of \"icton-. had no real plan:-. for thC'lr re en-C'o in the case of a withdrawal. The S\ rian GOH'rnmem did not puhli..h ca... ualt\ hlture.. after the October \\' ar. but it is certain that "omt' 7.000 troop were killed, that l'nUft' formations were destroyed, and that 600 tank... \\C'rr lost.
21
A Syrian tank cornmandu photographed duri0S the .g61 crisis, when tbe 'union' with Egypt broke down and Egyptian troop. litationN in Syria atlernpted to take over the country, leadinK to 5ev~ral inconclusive ski..m.isbes. The tank i. the Russian T-34/Bs, fitled h~re with the heavy DSbK anti..ircraft machine pn. The cOlD..IQ.ander wea..s khaki hattledre.. of British appearance, and the black CUlVU Soviet helmet. (Author'. collection)
There were also l:ie\'en second-line Independent Com pa nies. The Leg'ion anillery had had \'inuallv no experience, Otherwise Ihe Legion, Ihoug'h small, "as professionally formidable and King Abdullah of Jordan expecled il lO be able to defeal any opposition in the ~Iiddle East. On the day on which Israel was to become a state. 15 ~Ia\', he proposed to occup~ those pans of Palestine on Jordan's frontiers; the military operations were to be direcled by L!.Gen. John Glubb Glubb Pasha and the field command was to be in the hands of Brig. :\orman Lash. On 15 ~L.\\' th(' Arab Leg-ion cros ed into Israel. the lSI Bde. lSI and 3rd RegIS. going lO :\'ablus and lhe 3rd Bde. 2nd and flh RegIS. to Ramallah. Clubb was reluctant to mo\'e into Jerusalem. which \\ as supposed 1\'- international. bUI he sent his ...h Reg!. 10 Lalrun lO block Jewish reinforcements being' sent to Jerusalem from Tel .hi\. On 17 ~la) King Abdullah ordered Glubb into Jerusalem and he sent the 1st Independent Company lO man Ihe Old Cily" ails. These Iroops were 100 few to resist the Israeli aIlacks, and on 19 ~Ia~ a 'scratch' force of infantry, armoured cars and artillery tOlalling some 500 men were commiIled to the action. Two days later the fight for Jerusalem had become a baIlie. wilh the Legion"s 3rd Reg!. commilled. The allempl 10 "'hen lhe ~I iddle I:.a" "al~ began in 19..8 the lake and hold Ihe key area of :\olre Dame lasted most professional army was the Arab Legion of incessantly for four days; in the end the Legion, Transjordan, il colourful formation which orten exhausted and depleted, withdrew, bUI the Old captured the attention oftht> world's Press_ It was Cit) was held. particularly well known in Britain because it \,-a"-l After this the main action moved to Latrun, trained and led by British oflieer and it used where Ihe ..th Reg!. and pan of lhe 2nd held out British equipment. "'hen founded in 1920 it had tenaciously a'tainst repeated Israeli assaults. Anconsisted of officers. 75 cayalry and 25 other notable action was the capture and holding mounted machine gunners. By ~Ia~ 194-8 the of Radar Hill by a company of Ihe lSI Regl. on Legion \ ~trenglh was about .hiDD all ranh and 26 ~la\. B\ . 'O\'ember 19..8 only lhe Arab Legion ilS strike units were four sinlz;le-battalion lorried and the Iraqi contingent remained in action infantry re~imellls each of which had an against the generally \'ictorious Israelis, By the .tl"molll"t'd car !\quadron org-anis('d in two brig- time the Israeli-Transjordan Armistice was si~ned ade.... and t\VO fOUf-e;un batteries of :ls-poundcrs. on :l April 19..9 lhe Lel(ion held a fronl of 100
The Hard-HittiNg JordaNialls
n,"c
22
miles with 10,000 men, and when the Iraqis withdrc\\ this front grew to 400 miles. The enlarged Legion of 12,000 needed senior officers, support services, technical equipment and modern arms and most of this arri\'cd through lhe British subsidy of £ I 0,000,000 a year. The Legion rapidly expanded. A full infantry di\ision of nine baualions was formed: the dispersed armoured car squadrons became a re~imcnt. and a second began formin~: each infantry bri~ade of three battalions was gi\"f:n a field artillery regiment: and an anti-tank and a ligh t anti-aircraft regiment were formed. En~ineers Two interestins photos showing President Assad of Syria vi itins tnncb_ on the Golan Heishts racing brael. A. ad we.... Keneral'. rankiaS on his shoulder strap loopsj behind him in the la.rger photo is the Minister of Defence wearinC m.ajor.gUleral'15 sboulder board., and the ~ seneral'. Mret. All ~r.onnel bere wear the olive drab Caripes, and many of them the casual field cap worn by all ...... in the 6eld-thoug-b not in action. The sergeant m.ajor (right fore.ground) wears the Soviet helmet. Tbe second lieutenant OD the rigbt in the slnaUer photo wears. British.style belt; and one officer in the group Mbind A...d wea.rs a beret with what appears to be an ornate wir~D1broideredversion of the bra .. eagle badge worn by other ra.n.ks. (Author's collection)
•
'..,
."
'~~-.,-'-
and si~naller· were trained to support the assault troops. A battalion, usuall\' well o\"(:,r 800 stron~, consisted of battalion HQ, four rifle companies each of three platoons, a support company and a headquarters company, The basic sub-unit was the section of nine men under a corporal. The support company consisted of a mortar platoon, machine gun platoon, ami-tank platoon and pioneer platoon, Thou~h established and trained on British lines, the Le~ion had two distinct faces that of the desert Btdouin and of the town Hadtri, The two were ne,"er mixed as they had differem temperaments, Generally, the Bedouin ''''ere ,"olatile and cheerful men, excellent in attack but not inclined 1O endure the 'boredom' of static defence, The Haderi ' ...ere more stable, dependable people, not noted for their rashness in the attack, ]n ,'arious actions a~ainst the Israelis after the official end of the 1948 49 war the Le~ion gained battle experience, and notably held their own in an encounter at Beit Liqya in September 1954, The performance in this action of elements of the new :\ational Guard was particularl~ encouraging: this was a ,'illage defence 'home guard' of indifferently armed and trained men under regular Legion :\COs, of which not much had been expected, "'ith the growing demand for Jordanisation' of the arms, Glubb and the other Briti h officers were dismissed on I :\larch 1956, and on that da~ the Legion became the 'jordan ,\rab Army'. An army unique in Arab military history disappeared as modernisation took o,'er. By 1956 the Army's strength was 27,000 with a large number ofyoung, trained Jordanian officers; with the depanure of the British some quickl\' became senior officers. They were anxiou ... for ,\ a,.. but durin'{ the Suez War of t956 jordan, despite its defence treal\ with E'{ypt, kept quiet. Possibly King Hussein realised that his army, in the throes of transition, was in no state for a major war, Between t960 and t967 jordan added '5,000 men to its armed forces, reachin~ a tOlal of 55,000; tank strength was up to about 90 Ceoturions and 300 1\14] and ~148 Pallons. Even so the Israelis launched their pre-empti,"c war in June 1967 confident that King Hussein would
'4
remain on the sideline~, E,-en when Jordanian artillery be~an shellin~ Jewish Jerw,alem on ~Ionday 5 June the Israelis ,.,,-ere nOt unduh worried, "'hen the Jordanian shelling intensified. not just in Jerusalem but along' the entire border, with 155mm 'Long Toms' coming into action, and when Jordanian troops occupied the ex-V:\" Headquarters, the Israelis knew that the," had a war on their hands, The war for the \\'est Bank was conducted b~ much smaller units than those engaged in the Sinai: the Jordanians and I raelis committed on" about a di\"ision and a half each, The jordanians deplo\'ed nine brigades on the West Bank see accompanyin~ Order of Battle-, The ·I\.in~ TalaI' Bdc. "as stationed in jerusalem. the 'Hashimi' Bde, wa... in the hills west ofJcru...alem, the 'Hattin' Bde, was south of the cit\' and the 'Imam Ali' Ede" in resen"e, was half\'~:ay between jerusalem and jericho. The main strength on the Jordanian front ,\ a"i to ha\'{" been the Iraqi force, but the strong Iraqi columns ne,'er reached their destination; repeated air strikes so held them up that by the time they reached the Jordan River the entire \\'cst Bank was in hraeli hands, Inside Jerusalem itself occurred the most dramatic encounler or the 1967 war. Israeli paratroopers and' Etzioni' Bde, infantry fought ,'eteran Jordanian troops of the 4th and 2nd Bns, in a pitched ballle for 30 hours. I n the fightin~ for the suburb of Sheikh jarrah, the Police School and ,\mmunition Hill the Jordanians resisted bunker by bunker, to the last man, Israeli air-strik~ supported the capture of the final jordanian stron~point north of the :\Iount ofOli\·es; and the few encircled sun-i,'ors in the \\'alled Cit) were only saved by the U~ cease-fire at 2200hrs on 7 June. Harried from the air, the meagre forces a,'ailable for counter-attack \...ere fought to a standstill around Jenin and :'\ablus; and the last of the jordan bridges fell on Thursday mornin~. 8june. Obseryers were puzzled that the Jordaniall~ eauld ha\"e fought so Stoutly for 24 hour.... and thell crumbled. One reason was King Hussein's hesitancy and lack of decision. "'ithin 24 hours he three time countermanded orders to retreal rrom the \\'est Bank after the withdrawal had started. These (lI"der.., and cou n ter-orders created great confusion
I
rdanian lern on unduly ~nsified.
border. action. ex-C:\ , had a
.Cled 1)\ . in the nmined
·h. The le \\'est :Ie. The lcm. the ·w.alem. and the ::>etween :1 on the Ii force.... ed their hem up _n Ri\'er
'\
.
dra,Ii para\,eleran ns. JO a g for thel 1001 and I bunker ir-strikes Irdanian ,and the ity wcre hrs on 7 'e forces :ht to a the last
.0Sl
norn1l1~,
rdanians :lIld then hesitanhe three rom the d. These Infusion.
I: Egyptian infantr~.. corporal, 1948-49 2: EiO"ptian infantry captain, 1956 3: Egyptian infantryman, Sinai, 1967
A
1,2: Egyptian assault infantry, 1973 3: Egyptian Commando. 1973
B
2
1
1: Sergeant. 4th Regl., Jordan Arab Legion. 1948 2: Ueutentant-('olonel, 2nd RegL. Jordan Arab Legion. 1955 3: Corporal. 'King Talal' Bde.• Jordan Arab Anny, 1007
c
I: 1st Lt., 1st Mech.lnr. Bn.,Jordanian 40th Armd.Bde., late 1970s 2: Lance-corporal. Supply&: Transport, Jordanian 4th Mech.Div., late 19705 3: Brigadier, Jordanian 40th Armd. Bde.. 1973
3 1
o
2
1,2: Syrian inrantry, winter combatdres , 1970s 3: Syrian infantry, summercombatdreu, 1970s? 4: SpeciaJist sergeant, S)-rian infantry, 19708
E
1. 4: Palestine l.iberation Anny soldiers. 1970s 2: Palestine l.iberation Organisation guerilla. 1970s 3: Palestine Liberation Anny recruit, 1970s
F
1: Sergeanl.Jordanian Special Sen-;ce Group. 19708 2: Trooper. Jordanian 2nd Annoured Car Regl.• 1955 3: Syrian lieulenanl-general. 19708
4: Slall'sergeanl, Jordanian Royal Armoured Corp.. 1970. 5: Egyplian m.,jo....general, 1967
G
Insignia - see Plates commentaries rordetaiJ8
2:1
H
27
23
29
31
..,omc units had reached the Jordan Riycr only to necessary to defend c\'cry inch ofJordanian ...oil; be told to return to the posts many miles awa). the main strene;th \vas thus committed in the first rhe king's inconsistency was the result of hi.., lint' of defence with \'ery fe\\ units i.l\-ailable to nalUral desire both to defend the West Bank, and countcr an encmy breakthrough into the rt"ar area.....\fter the disbandment of thc ~ational to sa\'e his army for another day. Another reason for the quick final collapse of Guard. for political reasons. in 1965. theJordanian the Jordanian Army was its poor deployment. In HI~h Command had decided to form fiye ne\\ the dal' of Glubb, the British conception of a Jordanian brig-ades. but they had not been built in proper defence deploymcnt was to keep the main Junt' Iq6j Tht' \rm\ was spread ""0 thinh that one battalion. tht' loth 'Ziad bin '1 arik' \\as forcc~ in the hill re~jon with the outlying \'illagc!ol in the frontier area only spar~e1y defended. Clubb spread out in platoons and ~ections alon~ mort' argued that the Israelis could be blocked from than ten miles of the border. •\nother rea on for the collapse of the Jordanian gaining a foothold in the hill- of Judea and amaria. while reinforcements would always be front may ha\'e lain in the somewhat chan~('d ready to send to any of the frontier \"iIlages. This character of the Jordanian Army. L'nder Glubh Jordanian defence concept was scrapped in 1961, and British command the soldicrs, semi·!Jlrralr For ps\"cholo~ical and political rl?asonS it wa... fell Bedouin on lon~-t<'rrn contracts. \\('n" tough.
Jordan Arab Anny Dispositions, 1 June 1967 Western Cotn.nland :\ablus Seelor: khalid bm 01 lI'alid Bdr.. Jrnin-Xablu . . 19th ~Itl . . a bin :\usareh Bn., 20th Ziad bin I"arik Bn,. 21 ...t Oukha bin ~area Bn.; I :zth Armoured Regl. in suppon .\1.-1-7 Pat tons .l/~)'a Bdt" Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Xablus jth KinK Ali 8n., 7th King Abdullah Bn.. qth KlIlg ~lohammad \' Bn. QpdiJ~):a Bd", Damiya ,pst Omar Ibn Al Khaltab 8n., 43rd Saad Ibn .\hhi \\aqas 8n., 45th I-lamzah bin Abdul ~Iullalih 8n. loth . Jrmourrd Bdt'., Damiya 2nd Armour<'d Re~t., 4th Armoured Regt., ,,,t ~Il'chanis('d Bn \1 1M Pattons. .\1113 APC" Jl'rulialem-Ilebron Sectors: lalal Bdt'.. ,jeru<;alrm :znd Kin~ Hu"sein Bn .. 4th Prince Ha..~san Bn,,8th Imam .\Ii O,ama 8n. lIalhum IJdt'., Qalqiliya-L3trun-Ramallah 6th King Ghazi 8n.. 9th Prince ~Iohammad 8n., loth Ha,himi Bn. Hawn Bd,., Hebron 3jth .\bdullah bin Roahaa 8n.• 39th Jaf~tr hin .\bu I alih Bn.. 49th Salahudin .\~~ubi Bn.: loth Armoured Rt'gt. III "uppon C('nturioJ1', Imam .lIi Bdt.. •\in Qilt-Jericho 31st \bdul Rehman Ghaffik\- Bn., 33rd Zt'Td bin H.lritha Bn., :nth 0 ama bin Zc'id 8n. 60th . lit" ,ultd Bdt_. \In Qilt-.JlTlCho ,lrd _\rmoured Rt'gl.. 3th .-\rmoun·d Rt-g-t., 3rd Royal Guard... ~I('chanised 8n. ~148 Patton.
,_
\ltt3 ,\PC, Eastern Cotn.nland }armuA Bdt.. Jordan \' alley, Beisan-Irbid ,;qth .\bu Oheida Bn.. :z6th Shurabee! bill Ha na Bn., :z8th Amer bin .-\1 Aas Bn. lIulI(/l/ bUi "" Bdt.. . \qaba jrd Pnnce Ba,ma Bn.. 15th Khalid bill d \\',did Bn .. Thth KlIlg Ft" al Bn.
>.1
armoured brigade of Ihe Israeli 'L: gda Peled' di\"isional force of mixed tanks and mechanised infantry on 5 June. The fighting- weill on throughoul Ihe night of 5 6 June, and Israeli casualties were significant. At one point the attackers exposed their ri~ht flank to a counterattack by two companies of the undel'treng'th Jordanian 12th Armd. Regt.; in a brisk action some 17 or 18 uper-Shermans were knork("d out b, tht'scarcel\ less '"enerable .\1.1-]"0. and sporadic tank fighting continued during the ni~ht. in the COliNe of which theJordanian unit was reduced to four ·runners'. At first li~ht the suryi\'ors were rell1forced by some S0 .\1.;.8 Patlon.. of the -loth Armd.Bde., in what the Israelis admit was 'the most eA'ecti\'e counter-attack launched by an .\rab army durin~ the war', which inflicted h("a\,\" 10"", on the Israeli rear and flank. The 40th and 60lh Armd, Bdes" bOlh wilh .\ 148s, had been Jordan's only important r('sel"\"e units, posted initially at Damiya in the north and .Jericho in the south. On 5 June in re!oipon!oie to a IOlall, false claim Ihat an Egyptian armoured thrust was nearin~ Hebron, the 60th Armd.Bde. was ordered in the dir('ction of that city to link with their allies. To cover the rear oftheJerusalem President Assad invests an officer of the Syrian Armoured sector, Col. Rakan Jazy's 40th Armd.Bde. was Corps with a decoration. He wears the khaki cloth battledreu ordered 25 miles south to replace the 60th a uniform worn as service dress in winter-the reproduction of the photo has made it seem darker than its true tone. The journey made by day, under skies ruled b, beret is light grey, as are the shoulder boards, and the Corps badge is worn on the collar. An interenidg death's.head IsraelijelS. The formalion completed Ihejourney, badge is pinned to the pocket, and this i. believed to indicate only to receive new orders to return to Damiya. participation in some 'forlorn hope' type of action, (Author's collection) Both Jordan's armoured reserve formations thus spenl the whole of the 5th wandering poinllessly around the rear areas and suffering hea\"y air independent, well ,-ersed in fieldcraft and descrt attacks. \\'arfare, \\'ith 'Jordanisation' and mechanisation ~e\'ertheless, the 4-01h sent strong units into the the arm) had to exchange the camel for the tank. attack on the Kabatiyajunction south ofJenin at The Bedouin, naturally enou~h in a way. tended fin" li~ht on the 61h. In Ihe words of an Israeli to b(' pas",ed on'r for promotion, in f~l\"our of account: 'In a deliberate shoOl-and-mO\"e attack. better educated groups considered to b(' more Jordanian Pattons shot up the scattered Israeli suitable for the needs of the modern ann, but mechanised forces which had been left behind at who lacked Ihe special qualities" hieh had made the junction when [Bar Koch,a's] bri~ade looped the Bedouin such a fine soldier. round to attack Jenin, Al this poinl the bulk of There were other moments of ~Iory for the [the] brigade was still embattled in Jenin town. Jordanians, howen'r, apart from the 'TalaI' "'hen the Israelis started to pull out their tanks to Bri~ade's epic defence of Jerusalem. At Jenin in counter-attack at the junction, the Jordanian the northern hills the 'Khalid bin al "'alid' troops in Jenin began to fight with renewed Infantry Bri~ade conducted a skilled and deter- intensity, holdin~ up the extrication of Col mined defen('ea~ainstattacks by Col. Bar Korh\"a 's ~Ioshe's IBar Koch,a"] tanks. The di,isional
16
artillery stcmmed lilt" Jordanian assault at the Syrian infantry on the march, wearing khaki drill hirt.Ieeve uniform of severat varying tone., and green berets. junction ... but could not rescue the forces Their drill leaves much to be desired; but when well led they trapped in the area, When [Bar Koehs'a's] lanks are formidable fighting troops. (Author'. collection) finally reached the scene, the Jordanians attacked them in turn, and the Israelis came near to defeat to the intl'l~Tity of King Hussein's gOHTIHnl'llt. as the)' both attracted Israeli retaliation, and direrlly . . It was thc israeli .\ir Force that sayed the da) forthe Israelis: itsairstrikesstopped theJordanians Oouted the g-o\'l'rnment's authority. 11 \\a . . in and forrrd them to withdraw.' In fact the +olh I"t."... isting a major Israeli reprisal, howe\'cr, that the ,\rmd.Bde, Wo.1'" subjened to a l;,erie:-. ofde\·a... talin~ Jordanian Arm\ won a local but pS\"chologi<.-all~ air strikes throughout the 6th, while it fought Ih important \-ictory at Karama on:21 .\Iarch 1968. \'~ay back to the Jcnin-:\ablus road under attack Jordanian and Israeli accounts \'ar~ \\ildh in the b\ Centurions of Col. l.) ri Ram's brigade B\ numbt"rs innlked and the casualties infiit,tt.'d. mIdday on 7 June the 1nd and ~lh Armd,Re~l , Ba...icalh. a helicopter-borne Israeli paratroop and ht .\Iechanised Re~t. had \·irtualh cea...ed to force landed allhe EI Falah camp al Karama and eXl.. t: onl~ eighl Patton... manaQ;ed to withdra\\ St'\'frfh mauled the Palestinians. while armoured aero'" the Jordan. fhe 60th ,\rmd.Bdc. \\0.1'" abo Umb reporledl~ oflhe 7lh Armd,Bde. and 80lh \\ iped out~ fi~htinQ; the' Harer Bde. under constant ~Iech,Bde ad,'anced across the Jordan to link up with the paratroopers. cO\'ering their withair attack in the Ramallah-Jerusalem sector, drawal. Thr Jordanian artillerY. l"1eme-nl of thf Tht destruction of a large part of tl1<" Jordan Arab Army III Ig6j. lO~ether with the 10 ... of the 'Hallin' and ',\Ii~a' Bde.... of the newlv-forll1l'd 1...( mO:-ot pro"'perous half of the country. forced InfDi"., and lanks of the 60th Armd,Bde. Jordan lO keep .l 10\\ prohle in the year thal en~aged the Israelis and seriously hara"''il~d their followed. The Pale... tinian 'commando' organ- withdrawal. inflicting casualti(·... in men and lank.... l'atlOlb based in Jordan pre-sented a real danger \\'hatc\er the true fi~ure-.... theJordanian plTl<)rm17
Syrian officer cadets take an oath of allegiance to president and nation at their passing-out parade at Damascus j these youn~ men are as carefully chosen for political reliabiliey as for leadership potential. The uniform. is a four-pocket tunic and slack. in lighe khaki drill with ~t buttons, adorned with blue epaulenes with gold crescenU and yellow frinses. The peaked shako is of white fleece with blue feathers, a blue panel with sold stars and trUn, and sold false ch.in cords. Note in foresround the su.e and placiDS of the type of round shoulder patch illustrated on Plate H. (Author's coUectioa)
ance impressed Ihe Israelis and hearlened Ihe Jordanians. In 19io 71 dnually the whole of the Army. no\\ painfully rebuilt with the aid of \\estern supplit"'s, was engaged in the final rt"'ckoning with the o\t"'rconfident Pal~tinian 'commandos', The ta ... k was undertaken with relish; the traditional loyalt\ of the Army to the Ha hemite royal house IS as much reli~ious as political in character, and the .\rmy had been infuriated by a lon!{ series of slights to Hussein's authority on the part of the Palestinians. \\'hen strong Syrian armoured forces crosst"'d into northt'rn Jordan on 11 Scplcmher 1970 to ,upport the PLO. the Jordanian +oth and bOlh Armd.Bdes. repulsed the in,"asion \\ Ith hea,-) loss. In the 1973 war King Hussein waited umilthe ...ccond week to intervene militarily, and then only with great caution. The 186-mile Jordan-Israel front was so quiet that bOlh sides allowed civilian traffic across the Jordan River 1O continue. The king moved two brigades to Syria, where the)' held part of the line in the southern sector, but their in\'oh"ement in the Golan fighling was obviously a token gesture on behalf of the Arab cause. The Jordanian 3rd Armd.Di\'. did not try \'ery hard to ,eek combat, and the Israelis full) occupied with their dri"e against the Syrians to the north almost a\'oided contact altogether. Ironically, it was the +oth Armd.Bde. which had fought so stoutly against Syrian inyadel' duer Y('ar, earlier which now fou~ht in support of yria on the Golan. :\lovinl( north on the left Rank (lIthe Iraqi 3rd Armd. Di\., the Jordanians were ambushed b, hull-dow n (... raeli tanks of Gen. I.~1I1('f'\; 2.}OIh Armd. Ll(da in the Tel el :\Ial Tel:\laschera senor on 16 October 19i3: and LOok further caliOuahic.., among- their Centurions on tht' 18th. At
Syrian sir'" training as 'corn.rnandos'; they are Dot likely to .ee action, bUI all fit young people lDuse underso rniJita,.,. erainins. (Author's collectioa)
least 20Jordanian tanks '\t're lost. and no further .n,tin' operations were attempted. The Palestine Liberation Organisation Since the mid-1950S and especially since 1967 the 'army' most frequentl) in action against Israel has been that of the PLO. In fact there are several 'armies', since most of the various factions Illakin~ up the PLO ha'"e their O\...-n armed [orces. The largest is El Fa/ah. the so-called 'Strike Terror' unit created by Vasser Arafal. "'hether one labels thelll guerrillas. commandos or terrorists. the Palestian irregulars are well-trained and wellarmed fi~hter"i. :\lost of their equipmcnt is Russian, but some comes from other \\"ar-;a\\ Pact countries. (n that the PLO attacks arc almost exclusi\'el) directed against civilian targets, the Palestinians are not 'soldiers' in the cQl1\"entional \\'('stcrn cnse. But their trainin~ is of hig-h standard, and mast of their instructors ha\·e been trained in the "m"iet C"nion. Principal "capons are the So\"iet .\K-~n a""'ault riAe series and a ran~e of ,",uppon weapons,ii'om the RPG-7 to the 'Katyusha' hea\y rocket launcher. They are perhaps the most experienced users of ami-personnel mines and explosi\"es generally. ~lost training takes place in the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria. PLO raiders often wear a form of uniform camouAa~e trousers and jacket of a \'ariely of patterns in the hope that they will be accorded prisoner-of-war status if captured by thc Israelis. The PLO forces were in\"oh'ed in much more conn'nrional military action during; the Lebanese Ci\il \\'ar of '975 77. and since than against the Israelis. \\'ith some anillery and armour support they fought the Lebanese Army, the Christian 'pri\'ate armies' and, at times, the Syrian Army. .\fter 1977 they fought se\"eral actions ag-ainst Israeli columns sent againsl the PLO strone;holds in "iouthern Lebanon.
Splendid portrait study of a Jordanian Arab Army soldier pbotographed on guard at the Damascus Gate of the Old City of Jerusale.m in the 1960s. Note detail of _sgn, s~(,u. and cap badle. IAuthor's collection
CollectiYeh, the PLO factions ha\"e aboUl 30,000 full-time fie;hting mcn but many others ha\·c had military training. The PLO could arm and cquipabout 100,000 in an all-out mobilisation. The Palestine Liberation Army Thi"i is a reg-ular arm~ formation and has no connection "ith the PLO. Created by Pre"iidem :"a<.;ser as an auxiliary formation, the PLA has ne\"er been stron~er Ihan three under-strength brigades, which ha\"e been shuttled between Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, Though reasonably well trained and equipped, and including- some armour, the PLA was ne\"cr cntrusted with more than support duties during the ~Iiddle East wars. After 1973 the PLA brigades became, in eAcct, part of the SYrian Army, and e1emeng h.1ye sen"ed in the Lebanon,
Jordanian 3rd Annoured Division Golan Front, October 1973 -loth .lrmourtd Bd,.: 2nd Armoured Re~t : 4th ,\rmourl'd Regl.: 1st .\Inhani-;ed Bn .. 7th SP Artillef\ Rl'g"l.: 5th EngineC'f Regl. 9;lnd . Jrmoured Bdl'" : 12lh Armoured Rrg-I : 13lh ,\rnlolllTd Regt.: 3rd .\lct"haniSl'd Un.: 17lh SP .\rtiller\ Rt'gt : hlh Engint't'r Regt.
corporals. Loose berets were the normal s('[\"Ire headgear, normal Iy in khaki, bu t blac kfor artillerYmen, red ror military police and green for c~\\aln, enlisted ranks wore no cap badge. . b : Caplalll. Eg>PllQlI IlIjil/ll'.l. /956 In 19-1-8 49 most officers worr a Sl'[\"1('("' dn' Imilar to the British officer's pattnn, in \\ intt'f khaki barathea and summer khaki drill: In prat.,ticc a bush jacket \\ith integral ('loth belt \\ .IS more usualh worn in hot weather. There \\ ..i s al 0 omc use of a two-piece denim battledre s ft)r field sen"ice. Thi British-.. t,-Ic khaki serge bauledn' ... wa... introduced for all ranks from about 1951, ahhou~h some officers had been u..ing prh-atrh tailored \"ersions of this as early as 19-1-8 -1-9. In 195:2 the re'"olutionary re~ime introdu(,l'd n('\\ insi~nia. The cap bad~e became a sih-er eagle, and it is worn here on the dark blue befet introduced for the inf~\ntr" in that \"ear. The collar bear ~ilt arm-of-scn"ice badg-es see Plate H 3 for this "xamplr. Shouldrr strap rankin~ followrd thr basic Bri Ii.. h sequence, bu t fh"e-poin t stars replaced ·pips'. The Egyptian crown wOfn in the rankingof field officers before 195:2 was replaced at Lhat time by the re"olutionary eag-Ie. Bedouin camel trooper of the Desert Patrol-Bl3duh-photographed in 1956, Thi. crack desert gendartnerie force, raised in 193°/31 by the young Maj. John Glubb, was the 6rst to recruit the fiercely independent Bedouin-a. opposed to the urban Haderi-into the Jordanian forces of law and order. It symbolises the type of soldier upon whom the Ha.bemire monarchy ha. always been able to depend for courage, re ource and complete loyalty, (AuthorJIi collection)
ThePlafes A/: Corporal. E./iJPllQlI bYill/l'.r. /948 49 ..-\ one-picce flY-fronted denim o'"erall in 1i~11t khaki was normal wear for fatig-u~, trainin~, and combat: artillerymen wore distincti'"e ox-blood red o'"eralls, British 1937 web equipment and small arm" were issued. In"i~nia were limitt.~d to rank de,"icc!'l; for enlisted ranks the!'le were Britishstde che,-rons on the right slee'"e. in branch t.'olours dark blue for infantry, red for artillery, and "dlm\ for ca'"aln. Differences from the British sequenee were four che'Tons beneath a bras crown for serqeant major. and hrass stal' aboH' Cht.~'Tons fOf staff sef~eants and tafr
.13: t.:~>pliall lIIJanl~rll/all, SlIIQ/, /967 .\ new sand-coloured held scn"ice outfit '\ as introduced in about 1955, and is still worn; It IS the only uniform most Eg-yptian soldiers are i..sucd. The use of the beret seems to ha\"c lapsed with its appearancc, except in special units such a.. paratfoop and commando battalions and the Pre idential Guard. The new head~ear \\ as this simple field cap. worn without insignia: officers h..\\"e a stirTened '"ersion with a flat top and with two \"entilating- eyelets each ..ide Insig-nia on th" umrorm are still limited to ranking-, \\ hich ,s unchanged in form: Egyptian tfOOPS ne,-er eem to ha'"c worn formation si~ns. Personal equipment is minimal: the British \\cb belt and anklets were retained for some time and ma~ still be seen on occasion. but the large Sm"iet Army pattern ha'"ersack is the limit afmo t soldiers' equipment. with a white pia tic ("op' of the CS Army canteen carried either clipped to it Of slung- on the belt. The So,"jet helmet, oftt'n painted sand 'ellow or camouflaged, was issued
from about 1955, along with the full ranKc of
So,iet small arms. This soldier has an RPD:-t light machine gun. For the cold desert nights and for winter \...ear a khaki wool sweater is worn beneath the uniform. and the British-st\le khaki serge g-reatcoat remains in use today. An ahernatiye often seen in 1967 was the natiyejtllaba robe in a \"ariety of striped pallerns. 81. 82 Er:.rptiall assault IIlJalll~r. 1973 Ire belie,·e this to be the first detailed reconstruction in a \\'estern publication of the.' interesting a~sault jerkin issued to the Egyptian trOOps who carried out 'The Great Crossing'; a ~rcat deal of research and experiment went into the kit issued to the first, \·ita) assault wa\"e. \\'{" take the details from comparison of a number of photos, many rather distant and unclear; but we belic\"e this painting to be accurate in essential,"
The frontal pouches comprise two matchin~ pockets at the front of the hips; a pair of lon~ porkets on the left breast: and one lon~ and t\,"O hal1clength pocket> on the right breast There appear to b{" two large pouches. 'sta~~ered' in hei~ht, on the upper back: and two large matrllln~ pockets on the rear of the hips. with a sli~hth shorter central pouch between them in which the canteen seems normalh to be stowed. The.- box and mask of the ~as-mask are stowed 111 twO separate pockets. sometimes with the pipe p,lssin~ 0\"('1' tht" "houldt"f. The to~glt" fastener... or tilt' rear Kins Hu Sf'in ofJordan, wearing Arab Anny field marshal's summer shirt-sleeve unifonn with the Royal Jordanian Annoured Corps bf'ret, inspects cadets of the Royal Military Collese near Am1Dan. Nearly all hU officers an of Bedouin tock; bf'fore 1967 S()lne 78 per Cf'DI of his people were Pale tinian. The cadets wear the ltda,. in brown, piped red; white sorcel patcbes; and a purple sboulder patch edSed red, bearinS a yf'UOW crown and scroll and a red-Bamed wbile torch risinS frODl three yeUow rinl_' (Author's coUectioa)
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Jordanian troops with Britisb-!ltyle bactledreu and ~uip ment manning a 3m. mortar, 1956. The shoulder palchcrossed white sabres on a red square outlined dark blue-i. believed to be that of the NCO School. (Author'. collection)
pockcts may, perhaps, be felt easier LO operate b~ louch alone than the press-slud!i on the front pouches? The purpose of the apparent" folded-up skirts is unknown. A vcry ,vide variety of kit can be carried in this simple bUI highly practical item. ran~in~ from small arms ma~azine~. g-fcnades and firM aid kit, to anti-personnel mines and rounds for upporl ,...-eapons. The jerkin is claimed to be partially? inflatable for use as a life jacket~ it is nOt easy to see how this works. :\. ,"ariely of camouAaged helmet <,'on'r~ in apparentl) random ~Teen and brown patterns are seen in colour photos of this campai~n. The So\'iet helmet is often worn o'"er the re"ersed field <:ap, and the field uniform is exactl) as in Plate A3. The weapon of BI is the locally-made 'POrl aid' ,"ersion of the Carl Gusta," sub-machine ~un The soldier with the ..lung ,\K i3 unreelin~ the" irt' and carryin~ the ~uidance sight of the 'Sagger' :'.lalyulka ATG:'.!, which is sel up for firino; on half of its carryin~ case.
B3." Egyptiall Commalldo, Silla,. '973 It is hard to be specific about E~yptian special forces units, who are referred to b, sli~lllh different names in different sources. There wen' cerlainly many Commando Battalions a'"ailable as spearhead troops in 1973: bu t at some date the' seem to ha'oe been di"idcd into Commando .\Tld ',\ir Cavalry' units, The camouflaged H'Nion of the field uniform and helmet co,'er ..hown here \\l'f(' certainh used b\' Commando Battalions 111 1973 note larlte, rather spar eareasof mid-~r('en, The Commandos wear an emerald ~reen berel. and Paratroop Battalions the <.'on,"elllional maroon, Another type of camoufla~e uniform ha been photographed during Ihe '970, \\orn b, troops on abseiling exercises with heli<:opten; ',\ir Ca,·alry·. This is in sand yellO\\ wuh lan?;e. rather widel) separated areas of green spattin!:?; reminiscent of German \\'affen-SS patterns. The weapon illustrated is the RPG-7, with its O\'jetmade ammunition and accessory back-pack. C,." Sergeallt, ~/h Regimm/. Jordall .lrab Legioll; La/rull •. \Iql '9~8 This single-battalion unit held out against repeated Israeli attacks on the old Latrun police Ion in :'.Iay-Junc 1948, and inOicted 0'·('1" 1,000 casualties. The Arab Legion nag may be seen in the background. The sergealll ~aib wea~ regulation Arab Legion uniform and equipment. The red-and-white shemagh is worn with the sih'er Legion badge pinned 10 Ihe black o;oalSkin agal cords. The British khaki serge baIlie-dress was wimer uniform; an almost identical summer ,·ersion in pale khaki drill lacked Ihe laro;e map poekel on the left thigh. The 'iker Arab Legion shoulder title is pinned to the strap throu~h a coloured loop identifyjn~ the rcltimt'lll for tht· 4th, red and ~reen. Rank che\Tons, ilnd 193/ webbing-, are British. The weapon is the Thompson , ~IC with 30-round box magazine ('("ond \,"odd \\'ar ribbons are WOfn by this ,"eteran of the 'g,p An1tlo-Auslralian campai~n in Syria. LUlIlmanl-Cololltl (o11lmandl1l"~ 2nd In/alltn Rfgl1llwl. Jordan ,Irab U,J!,IOIl, mld- J .9j(H The pale khaki drill summer seryiee dre' of officer, and warrant officers is worn here with the Ifdara cap of dark blue and red as an 11l1dre (.'.1
•
a!ternatin' to the J/umagh. The insignia arc ..till in ..iker: the .\n.\b Leg-ion cap bad~c, the crO\\ nand ..('yen-point star of the Qaid's shoulder ranking-. tht' buttons, the \\Tcathed bayonet infantry armor.... en·ice collar bad~cs, and the .\rab Legion houlder titlC' pinned throu~h this battalion'. green loop. The 1St wore red. the 3rd blue. rhe ~reen lanyard is also a una insignia. worn b\ all rank. The am Browne and brogue' shm'" an' black.
(.3' Co,poral . . Al/I~ Talar Injalll~l· Brlgadt. Jordall Arab ,Ir"'l·: JauJaltm, JUllf /96; rhis brigades 2nd 'King Hussein' and ~th 'PrincC' Hassan' Inf.Bns. resisted the Israeli a.. ault on the Old City with great gallalllr~: during a fiC'rce night battleon 5 6June a compan\ of the ~lh Bn. defended the Police School and Ammunition Hill literally to the last man, onl~ three wounded suryi\·in~ to be captured by tht Jordan Arab Army personnel on aecurity duty in Jeruaalem during the viait of Pope Paul VI in January 1964. The visible .houlder patch ia unidentified; it a_ttl. to feature white .abrea on a red shield under a yellow crown on a black or dark blue square. Winte.r serge battledress is worn with Briti.h '37 webbing-but note, at right in la.rge photo, maf\:azine pouchea for the Carl Guatav sub-machine gun (probably the Egyptian-made Port Said version) carried by two soldiers. (Author'. collection)
l
....
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IsraC'li 66th Parachute Bn.. whirh iht'lf 10';( half its strenl{th. Photo" sho\, Jordanian infantr) in Jerusalem wearine; a light khaki denim uniform of British appearance, but apparentlY of a much darker shade than the khaki drill summer battlcdress of the late 19+os. The webbing is basicall~ British '37 pattern; but note the t\.. . o sets of triple clip pouches on thc belt, which appear to be ofsoft fabric. and were locally made to accommodate the clips (or the .30 Garand :\1 I, which was now Ihe main infantry weapon. By Ihe early 1960, the shoulder
34
ders and forearms. applied shoulder straps in shin fabric. and internal pockets with eXlernal knit Raps. The khaki l!;eneral sen·ice beret bear> the national cap badge in gold. The shoulder strap' of all ranks bear the national shoulder title in gold. At the lOp of the slecws are dark-blue-onyellow branch-or-service titles. As a member of di\'isional troops, this Jundi .\\Val wears the 4th ~lech.Di\'. patch abo\'e his single rank chc\"ron Rreen square. yello\\ border: red shield, \ello\\ border and crown: \'ello\\ lion mask BClwern 1968 and 19;.1 the Jordan Arab Arm' "'a, reorganised from the old brig-ade structure Into fi\'(" dh"ision... 1St and 2nd Infantn. 3rd Armoured. 4-lh ~Iechanised, and 5th Armoured. ".oc are unable to give brigade allocation \\ilhin these divisions in most cases, and a good deal of mO\'ement between formations seems loha\"c taken place. D3: Brrgadia commanding -loth .-trmourtd Bfll~adt. Jordall Arab Ar~r, 1973 cen here conducting a 'sand table exerdse', the commander ofJordan 's elite lank formation wears the interim spring and autumn sen'icc dress as winter, but without the sweater. 1n summer a short-sleevcd pale khaki drill shinslee\"{' uniform of similar design is "om. The Royal Jordanian Armoured Corps beret bears the usual badge: Zaim's ranking- is in yello\\ ernbroider~ on sliA' applied shoulder straps, \.."ith the usual national title. Gorget patches are worn on the collar. a name tab in black and ,.. hite plastic on the right breast, and medal ribbons on the left. On both upper sleen's is the formation sign of 4-0th Armoured: a yellow square, bordered red, bearing a red Hashemite crown over a green wreath tied with red ribbons, around a black fist holding a black spiked mace. £1, £2: ~}'rlall mjant,.}', U'l1lltr combat dun, 19705
Both figures are taken from colour phOlOl!;raphs of Syrian troops in the mountainous border countr) behind the Golan Heights: giwn the Syrian passion for security, rigid even by Arab standards, there is little we can add to what is shown here. Both figures wear rubber winter boots. The olive uniform has an obviously 'So\'iel bloc' fla\"our to it. The interesting snow-suit has
zippers down the outside of both legs, and lour pockets; a fly covers the front zipper, and the furlined hood can be unzipped dO\.. . n the middle, as here. to lie flat on the shoulders in a 'butterfly' ..-.hape. Equipment is limited to web belts usualh of British 1937 pattern, but sometimes of L'S Army type and the ubiquitous So\"iet ha\'cr.-ack and helmet. £3· ~}rzan mlant~}·, summer combat drtss, 1970s'> There is a per'istem written repon that Syrian troop..-. ha\'e recei\'{',d this de..-.en \'er--ion of 11)(' Brili,h DP~I ramouflal(e lillil(ues: and il ha, crrtalllly been supplied to Saudi Arabia. \\'IH'tlwr it has been purcha~ed b~, or passed from the ori~illal customer to S\Tia cannot, at the time of writing, be confirmed b~ photo~raphs, but it IS IOcluded on this undenilanding.
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E.J: Spuiali.\t Sergeant. s..}·rian i'ifant~}·. summer combat drtJJ, 1970J In 1967 Syrian troops seem to ha\'e worn khaki drill c10lhinl(, bUl by lhe 19705 lhe oli,e drab l~lli~ue suit and visored field cap seem to have been ~eneral issue. :"evenheless, colour photos shO\\ mfalltry identifiable by the green beret. with the brass eal(le cap badl(e of all enlisted ranks weann~ bOth oli\'c and dark khaki drill falt~ue", ometime in the ,ame unit. Belt are u,ualh of British '3; pattern: ha\'e~ack~, helmet~ and small ..H ill" are So\'iet. Some sources ha\"e de rribed _'CO dle\TOIlS as being white or sih'er. but here we 10110\\ a S\Tian Army colour chart. ate stiffened backing in arm-of-service colour Royal Jorda.n.ia..n Annoured Corps cnw with their ~7 Patton of the newly-fonned 40th Annd.Bde. early in the IpS. They wear drab khaki denim ove:ra11s with Briti h webbing a..nd revolversj one ha. a Sten pn. Tb.U unit., equipped with the later M48, fought weD in 1967- Re.equipped with Centurions, it won a decisive victory over Syria..n in. vaders during tbe 1970 71 civil war, a..nd fouShl brieRy on the Gola..n Height. in 1973. (Christopher F. Fon)
Jordanian infantryman of die 196050 wearins a lightweight denim combat unifornl, basically Briti.h webbing, and carrying die US 3.5in. rocket launcher. (Author'. collection)
an article in LIFE ma~azine or 12June 1970. The shemagh patterned in dark blue, black, or less commonly red. is thr usual headgear; \"arious oli\'e drab, khaki drill or camouflaged visored field caps are aho worn. The typical equipment rig or classic Communist design ha~ three largr frontal pouches. and t\\ 0 smaller pouches on each triangular side-piece see small rear \"ie\\. This PLO man has stripped his Kalashniko\, and, holding the c1eaning--rod withjag in his rie;ht hand, is rorcing the return spring assembly back into the bolt/piston group.
FI: PL.l bagpiper, 1970' An odd reminder that the PLA is struflUred in a con'"entional military wa~, with such adornment!'l as bands and colour-partie"; this musician is taken rrom a colour photo in an Italian magazine article The ba~pipes, streamer and cords are in Palestinian colours. The PLA's scarlet beret bears a brass badge \inually identical 10 the eagle orthe Syrian Army. This camouflage pattern is one or three main types in PLA use; it somewhat F.1: Palestinian ramit. /97°.1 resembles the Egyptian type, with large, rather Taken rrom a PLO-issued picture, this figure widely spaced areas or mid-green and light sho\\s a PLA recruit in trainin~ in Lebanon or chocolate brown on a sand yellow ~round" The Syria under PLA II1struclOP.;. .:\Ole bad~e on belt is British, scrubbed pale khaki; the trousers camouAaged cap; ,"ef) second-hand oli\"e drab are gathered at the ankle oser black boots. fatigues, or uncertain origin; and boots of cam"as and rubber, like those or F+, with a doublebuckle ankle flap obscured here by the trousers. F2: PLO guerrilla. 1970\ A very wide "ariety 01' camouflag-ed and oli\"c The weapon is the Simono\' semi-automatic drab ratigue garments ormany different origins is carbine, and the recruit holds a ten-round worn by the PLO alongside ci\"ilian c1othin~. This charger for it. pattern is seen in seH'ral colour photos. including
F4: PLA soldier, 19705 The appearance of this man is a reminder that the PLA is now '"irtually pan oCthe yrian Army The camouna~esuit is not French-made but is ofa pattern strongly recalling the French 1950S 6m combat fatigues. GI: ~erg(Qlll. ~pecial Serna Group 'SOIqa, Jordall Arllb Am!}', lalt /9705 The first of two baltalions of this crack airborne.' unit was raised in the aftermath of the Ig6j disaster, and sen"cd with distinction in the 19io 7' civil waf against the PLO. :"ote national cap badge on maroon beret; maroon backin~ for cloth parachute win~s and white ChC\TOns:
maroon shield, yeBow wings and crown, and white bayonet of Group patch this, like the chevrons. is worn on the right slee'"e only. The uniform is the CArmy leaf-panern camouflage suit. A light khaki-brown scarf is sometimes \\-'orn by Special Scn'ice Group personnel.
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G2: .\/ascol hal/dler, 211d Armoured Car Regl, , Jordal/ .1mb L'g;ol/, 1955 After the concentration ofthe previously dispersed armoured car companies into the 1St Arrnd. Car Regl. in the aftermath or the t948 49 war a second regiment was formed. Like the firSt, its org-anisation was based on r('connaissance troops each of tWO ~larmon-HerringlOn ~Ik IVF ar· moured cars and tWO short-wheelbase Land Rovers with Bren guns mounted, The 3rd Tank Rc~l.. formed gradually in 195'55, e\'entually had two squadrons of 20pdr. Charioteer and one squadron of 17pdr. Archer SP guns. These units wore the type of )'ello\\ shoulder patch illustrated. with different regimental motif'i: crossed lances for the 1St, the hawk's head for the :2nd, and a "corplon for the 3rd. The con\-entional winter hattlt'drr , and British '3i webbin~ are worn with the shfma~h. agal, siln'r cap badge and sih"er ,houldrr title" :\ote regimental yellow lanyard \"isible on left shoulder and pocket. and pistol lanyard carried across to right shoulder.
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d
G3: ~lTlan luuJtnanJ-gtntral. /970S The infantry-green beret is no\\' worn by all SHian ~eneral ofTi.cer", with this ornate \\ ire c.:ap badge. The uniform in wimer is a lightweight
khaki ballie-dress blouse and slacks, illustrated in a photo elsewhere in this book, with stifr Frenchtype "houlder boards in arm-of-sen"in' colour with applied ~old metal rankin~; ag-ain. generals 'ieem to wear green boards. The red "tripe is unexplained but i" worn by all officers in the~roup photo frolll which we take this figure. (;1' Staff .'Jcr,~ralli. R~lOl .lrmoured Corp,•. .lordal/ .lrob .I,"!.). /9iOJ
Pallon tank commander in L'S .-\rn1\-paltern 'bone dome' C\'C helmet and L' olise drab fatigucs ~\I1d \\ebbin~. ~o formation ,i~n an' worn with com bat dress; officers wearem broidered rankin~ on shoulder strap slip-o\"er loop, and :\COs w("ar Che\TOnS on the ri~ht onh here, thf three chf\"rons and yello\\ -and-green H~\slH'll1it{' crown of a ~ aqib. ('5: E,~)'plillll major-gmrral. /967 Khaki barathea sen"ice dress cap with red band.
PLO perrilla in 'Fatahland'-the southera Lebanon refusep«rinS across the border into Israeli territory. The camou· aase fatipe ,ofFrenc.b appearaaee. are in fact made ill Ea t Germany; thi man hu a Palestinian sboulder title temporarily attacbed. The ubiquitouli Kalasbnikov series i. tbe main personal weapon of most PLO Sroups; Destyarev liSbt machine pn and RPG-7 rocket launchers are the most common upport weapoDJi. DurinS their Ions and ruthlu campaip .pinst Israeli settlemenu the PLO baw become .killed at field craft, but their losses have b«n biSb. (Author's c:oUection)
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brO\\O leather peak
and
strap,
and !(old-
embroidered wire badge on rich grcen patch; the peak has two rows ofgold IOIUS-nower embroidery.
which also ed~('s the badge of an cagle O\Tf crossed sabre and baton. The four-bulton "bush jacket' in li!(h t khaki drill has lon~ slee,es bu ttoned at the wrist and four p)t'3ted patch pockeh; the IOlUs-flower motif is repeated on the gon~(,l
patches. The shoulder boards are 'en like Ihe Syrian ~eneral\ pattern, but the crossed sabres are replaced in Egypt by crossed sabre and balon. The jacket has an integral cloth belt with a
elaw
~old
1\\'0-
!i'ame buckle.
H: Insi,/(nia:
(I) L~\pI: lieutenant-colonel's rankin~, embroidered houlder strap loop for khaki drill field Me:n of the PaJestine Liberation Anny-a regular tnilitary force, Dot to be confused with the PLO ftti~"HnJ. Armed and equipped lar~ely from Soviet sources, the PLA bripd_ were attached to E«yptian and Syrian divisions duriDS tbe .967 and 1973 wars. (Author's coUection)
uniform. The equenee is one, two and three Slar
for lieutenant and captain: an ea1Sle, and an ea.glr with one, two and three star.. for major. lieutenant-colonel. colonel and brigadier; and an ca~le and cro......ed ...abre and baton with one. two and tluct' 'itar... between them for the ~cnt'ral ofTicn rank.... (2) Egypl: armoured troop'" collar badge worn by officers on batlledres~ blouse and
ersin' dre , tunic from 1951. (3) Egypt. inlantn collar bad~e, \\om as abo,e. from 1952. (4) E~ypt: Pre idential Guard: helmet ofSo\"iet manufacture painted in blue and red of thi... unit. which wrar blue berrh \\ith red band..... and with bra . . unit
cap bad~e \\dded in place. (5) S,ria' collar bad~e 'mm by officer on battledre , blouse. pinned throu~h patch of armof-...er\'ice colour
here infantry. on dark 'treen
(6) S'Tia· armoured troops omcer's BD blou'e collar bad~e, \\om on ~re) patch. (7) Syria lieulcnan t-general·... 'ihouldef board. ...ho\\ ing ranking motif... used throughout ...equence: "ub-
alterm, one to three "Itar~; field officers, an eagle. and an ea~le with onc and two stars; brigadier, an eagle and three star'i; major-general, eagle and cro"sed sabres: lieu tenant-general, as here; i!;eneral. a.. here but two star.. side by ~ide: field mar'ihal. as ~eneral but \\ reath round ~abre.... (8,9,10) yria: Iefl 'houlder palche, of Commando.... Frontier Guard~ and Paratrooper'i. The'ie are taken frolll a Syrian Army colour chan. but no photog;raphs 'ihowing; them being- worn ha\"e been found as yet. (II) Syria: infantry di\"isional flag; (12) 'Tia: armoured di,-i,ional flag_ (13) yria. Corporal.... clU'\TOns. infantry. both arms. Backing i in arm-of-~en'ice colour other example.. are dark blue for anillery. light brown for engineers. yellow for frontier e;uard. A Syrian Army colour chan . . ho\\ . . yello\\ braid. for infantry at least other written sourfe......pecify general use ofwhite. One and two down-pain tine; che\Tons identify pri\"ate fir.. t cla.. s and corporal: twO upwardpoiming, serReant: three, three o\"er a bar. and three 0\'('1' one and two star~ identify the \"arious ~rades of 'enior and specialist sergeants. (Iol) Syria: senior warrant officer, worn on left ,;houlder on arrn-of-serdce backing; junior and intermediate grades have one and two stars. (IS) jordan Arab Legion: shoulder 'trap loop of 5th Inf.Regt. (16) 71h Inf.Regt. (I7) 81h Inf. Regt. (I8) 91h Inf.Regt. (19) 15th Inf.Regt. (20) jordan: cap badge worn in ,ilver unlil 1956, gold Ihereafler (21) jordan: sen-ice,. as opposed 10 combat anTIS, wear shoulder titles here, eo~ineers. (22) jordan: signals shoulder lille. (23) Jordan: officer's shoulder ';trap insignia. here lieutenant-colonel. Sequence is one. two and three ..tar.. for subalterns: crown for major. crown and one, twO and three star.. for lieutenam-colonel. colonel and brig;adier: star abo\"c crossed sabn.·'i for major-general, crO\\ n abo\'e sabre... for lieutenant-e;eneral. crown and star abo\"c sabre.. for l{encral; (1'0\\ n abo\"e wreathed "abrc and \\llhoUl shoulder litle, field ma....hal. (2ol)Jordan di\"isional patches were introduced (. 1968 iO. and arc worn b~ dh'i"ional staff and sen·ice.... bn~adc patche.. being- retained by combat unit... \\ithin divisions. Thi, is IS! Inf.Di,. (2s)Jordan: 2nd Inf.Di, (26) jordan: Royal Guard,. (27) jordan Inf. brigade \\ ilhin "llnf.Di,. helieved ,ilher ·Qadisiva' .. Hallin' or' .\Iiya'. (28)Jordan.
PLA aoldieJ' wearing that fOJ'ce'. J'ed MJ'et (aee: Plate F) and a khaki battledJ'en, pJ'obably fJ'orn Syrian aurplua. The ribbon -blue, with tJ'iple white J'ed white atJ'ipea-i. that of the SYJ'ian Medal of Cour-age. Note Paleatinian ahouldeJ' patch, and RPD seriea light machine gun. (AutboJ". coUection)
Special Security lroops maroon berets. (2:9) jordan: 60lh .\rmd.Bde. \\ilhin 3rd .\rmd.Di\. (30) jordan: unidentified lank bde. within 41h ~lech.Di\'.: incorporation of ribbon of Order of Kawkah "lI.~g-{"Sh fine com hat record. "0 prl\\ib(l' bde. expanded from 1967 independent 12th Armd. Regt. (31) jordan: 3rd Armd.Di,.
Further reading: [hi hratli .lm~) In lhi .\f,ddlt !'.alt lJ'an 1948-i3.John LafTin, 0 prt.'\, London \ anguard 19• • lmlOur of tht J/iddlt EaJt Il"ars '!J4R-j8. I.){("\,(."n j. Zalog-a: ()..,prt·~. London .\lw: 7ht 1I'llhrm,t, lrab .I,"~)' '90R-If/it/. Brie;. S. \. [1I::.droo ; 1'h(" Puhli.. hin~ Committee. Amman. Jordan "I hi Irar 01 .lto1/.rmmt. Chaim Herzog; \\L·jcknkld & \;Il'obon. I~(mdon \0 r,ctor. \u I'anquuhl'd. E. O'Ballanc<>; Barnt· & Jenkins. London \'arioll~ i ~u~. Born In Baltlt senc."s; E lu."I-Dramit Ltd, Hod Ha'iharon, brad .\!l·lhtl-.\rnh 12j.
39
Notet> sur les planches eo couleur
Farbtafeln
AI C."rnl" '.II III I"" 1<' d'hahllutll" I"n "mila!, a"" itjuipmrnl .ln~lal h run ell- ~radl", loll" puur !'in/antnir A~ 1.1" r<'a;lmt r<.'\f.lnti"nn.li,r nlrouu II lIl.lill:ltd'a. rnllOmDIl"in Rnt(ll"iacoillurtt'lll"bbclhll"uf,m, i ,nf
AI EllllcihlC Anlull:t, nfltt1l,lltrwti tim K,unpf ,a;.. traa;tn, mil brili"h Au tU lunill:. RanK"lllkd in hJau fur dil" Infanll"rir A~ D;u rl"\l/IU1i"n"rr R<"lI:iml" fuhrll" dallilbl"r1'lt ,\dln-:IolUlzl"nabld.hrn und dun.tlblau" Brrtl imJah. l'15~ rin bauledn-u 1m bri!l",hl"n Sill fUI aUt R"OKt .. on 1.1 1054 an Offll.1t'IT lru en Wafl"t'fttl...trulllr;.kracrnabuKhm aID :Iolt'Sllnl[ Rilnlab ZCI' hf'nfol~ .Ilohnlll b dtr de: hrili..: ht'n Armr-r ;rdoch mil S,rrnt'n ... n Itllr wm 'pIps und dc:m .-\dlff " ... n dtr Kront A3 F"flfa. ht' land(... rbrflt' Fddun IOrm fur alit Ranj(t , ... HI'1$ nngl"fuhn, mil nnl"rn :Iolinimum aD ,-\t1orl1slunlf lttral[tn Jrt.. Ihnh, hl"no,rl<,C' nul" tll\l"m OJ i" hl"n Ru<"-....., k und IItlm "''''t' I","tr '\;I.( hahmunl I"IOt'r l'S fl"ldfiaocht" RanRowinktl ind dit 1"1II11a;l"n RtlraJrtntn Abl.tlchtn
O';IIpr" pholos 1('0, rutru£lion d'un IIlrl d'iU$;IIUI ulil~ pour 1.1 II .lnal ck ,",un t"n '9"}.l\ Ik ftOIIIblT oMs poe,," 1'0'11 Irar unlt".n I Ktt"nadn., Ie m;uq r 1ru. dn mus UD Il
lift I" l;a It"n dc ..mpqnl" pori"' r In comm.ln~ n I'fn RPl;-1
BI,
B~
CI Saulttl.c tl e''l"ipllltnl cit 01)11- allll'lai., la h.mllr d'c'paull" idl"nli/ll' I'unitt, ;ol\rr!'in i~nr ,Hj(l"ll1 dt 1.1 I.<'j(ion\r;ahe <'pin~I,' d uo C2 l nil(" It t'rle' d'nllklU ao(", II' cak>! sed.ua la rnukur dt 1.1 bnudl" de pallr d't il" Ia lOurrq:kl" idt"nllM I unlle' CJ l.qulpmml MI-allll.al5 ml-amc'ricalll arDan I uQlformt I UQr" o~ MI loik pJual ,,~rt dr I.. ba ..n aUf: m..,. app;orl"mml"n, ~mbl" C(lllllnt lot <.: ,rnbinaison I If'V~1" ck 10 pi" anl{bll 'Ill a .... ub '1U1i1na )OI"lb;ll' comb"l. 01 \, .., tnl amhitallls t'quipml"nl tl "1111" dl tnhub.uan I -lnn..n n'rl"lmarrundl"l'inf;anlrril"a\1"1 I'in i!l;ntn.lll(lna1.dor~dC'JJUI 19~t, I'in Itn.. dt lI:radl" tl 1'111 ill:nt nalional d'{'paull", I"n Iii Jaunl" brodr u.lt:"'1 p;a'IMo II' c'paull" . ,and r'"-I ur 1.1 ttllllf'rt" puur la I..nllf' hahill.... 0. Tl"nllt hahi1lff d'h!Vc-r BC-rtl khaki pour I" Irnupes da trOll" gtn<.'rault In"a;nll: dl dl\l>ion Ihl" dt Illln Jaunt sur un bollflirr mugl" • ourunne jaurw am V("f1 pone'!IOus Ie- IlIrt "'tnlihanl r.nnr I"n bini t'l jaunt' rn hatll dl" m
0
Bl, B~ ,-\n' Iff Ii :101 t' I .II n ft1d"n,
Rtloro.uult,unl{ na~b F,)ul5 0 Il t'int! inlt'Naanlrn bdadharm " It benulll fur dlf: "'uuubnqunllnl[ io 191). mil \WMI 8f'lIlt'1l1 .' IJQ, (.rADalltll, (.urnaskt \lllltrt. Enlt' IIt1rtpa,klloJ Fddlb.ocbr \ ordf'rJrund :Io1 ...I)"ulka' P-lnl.l"rab.. ~h .. kl"lt RUDlVh~ H.-!ml" rt", IIDlen, hicdlkh~ Tambt'drrkunl1-m .3 Gf'tatt\lt \'t~n d rm oon '(;',mmande» gl"lraa;l"n, RP(.-, Raktltnabv-huUll;tral
CI Ibllltdrt"5S' und .\u,ru'tun,a; im brill\':1 Winlrnhrnslun,fotl Khakl(arbtnrs 8f'rn dn .-\lll[l"nwindil"n In Dioisionubznchm I.......rnrnultt In relb uf mlt"m ~ hild. ¢bc- Krone, (runn Quadrat t1nltrhalh drs \\ affeaj(alu,Ill "ds In blau und ~Ib ohm am Armd ,l{f'lral[M1 0, !kT1"1 drs Panl"" lO'I I ruhjabn Ilnhsl Htrnd rrndunilnrm mil dm Slh"l" .ab,nt hI"li d 40 P"'lurhnj;\adr !:l"lbcs Q'l&dral, Mh.. ant fall l. dit drn Slftilk(.lIl<'n ,m j;\runcn Kran1 hah und n",mllll" Sthuhl"rldapp"nran,a;ordnunll:, K,al["I1' pil"ktllur (;l"nl"r;\lr und Slah...)ht"nlcn EI, E2 1... 6 Wmll"runilnrm\r",,,ntn fur dit (."lan-Hohtn. \on farhfn I"nlnomm", EJ bn .. hriflh htl Brri. hI bl"hilUpl"I, d . . d,tw wGslrnf;ubI"nr \'tI'5lOD dt' bntu.chnr Tal1lUC1dung von Sorit"n rhUrl "uTdt Jtdoch aDd , t bc:hnnl E.t \ 011 totO(Tafil"n Infanlf"l'1l"(runes Bnt1 DIll dl"m ,\dln, \1 ulzt'nabal"ltlll"n, oli\1"arbl"Dts Iltmd ubld 11'_0, rulllSC \\ n a .\uu1aslunl[ nllt~ alt~ hrillll< ht (.urld no
FI, F4 I:ALP tsl unl" umk' riRulihc: dunl In bri,a;adn I",nl allachm ~ l'arml'l" )ril"nnl". L1k~ utili tnl tt. dcu>, m"dtl('O dt umoufi;l.kl" ;a\I"' d .. b<'rt!J 1',.11"1,,1('0 1"1 d 111 i~nt:"'l Irk ililairC'J;Ii t I"Ult dl" l'armk' 'yril"nnr F2 On pont dn. I~PI"\ Irk \;lrie's dt' umouflal["- ) compri rl"lui.(:i, (lUI rappe'l tlui dr la "alftn-SS t.quipmt'nl l)"piq
Fl, F4 I)i PI \ 1 I"int rC'1lIlL:ur Strtilma.h!, dMwn Bri~adl"n dn Hl,hrn \rmr,· ana;ru-hlc tn 'Illd Dint '''I"i TarntnU_ll"l' .. ndrn, mil I harIa, hTtllrn B.rrl"l' un
Gl \"tltl mlS amrn
GI l·~ Blalln t"1 arnkleldun la.._lan,rnbra"nn 1.llfllandl'lrup~nbrtl"l S,hlll!l"t;ab'ri,hl"n dl"r Sp<'lIal Srnitt' (;rr>up. G'1 RI"a;imtnlalt"1 $rhuh("l",hlcilhtll tinn Ilahichtl"pfM .Iud d .. to ubhchcn /l:tllX'n Quadral dr, tilt', h,lIIi irntn I"ruPIX'n. am ahtn hri'i, htn 'ballll"drC"S' a;tlralttn ,I,., I[rll... rf'1[,ml"ntak 1.1111"'1"1"1'"1 1I;I"radr n," h OIn drr IInktn S, huhlT zu rh n G3 I)K' (.rntr.l'" lIallrn da.> Inlanl..tll"!l:rilnr Ik-rf'l mil SPf'lla!abz~.. brn I h bankdr' 101 ,:hI" \\ ,:plrnhl"Q$lumform fur Off,nert PIli ,huh a &;&,Q4CiuKbna " t I G4 l ... oIl\fOlrbnlr-\fbtu nlue" (.uTlf'1 II: I' IInsch.a.fuhdn Ranplnktl im bnllsctll"n S(il am .rchlrn \rmrl GS :IoIUl nach bnllS< ht"m \1.x:Id in khaki mil mll"m &nd fu' {.tn("l,I~ mil hrlltr anrlfarbl"nc: \'irrla hrn-BuKhla( kt 1I;tlral[tn
H In-illo("$ 'OUt n'.oun malhturl"ml"ml"nt pat 1.1 plaft dl" In traduirt tou 1.('0 lt1l;tndN tn Anll;lai ..lnl fa, iln ;Ii cnmprrndrt, car I. pluparl l
H .\lll("irhtn Ikdautrli, hl"(\"" I" i_I nil 111 ,a;tnu,a; Plalz \orhalldrn, 11m ;aliI" dit' P, trn LU uh..r.turn I)i~ l'nll"nitd in I"n~li chtr Spra.h.. s"llIl"I1 11 Ink tl"nd sc:in th n "lIlrn. tinl;l.' h Einh("lh- ndtr Ranl:U1d sind
.-.-q..,..
-
Men-at-Arms Series Titles in Print ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL log A:\CIE:\! ARMIES Of' THE MIDDLE F.AST '~ THE SCY'THIA. S 700-300 Be. THE GREEK A. O PERSIA=" \,'ARS 500-323 B C. , THE ARMY OF ALEXA......OER THE GREAT I'll ....RMIES OF THE CARTHAGl;"I ....' WARS 265--146 BC 46 THE ROMA" AR~fY FRO~t CAESAR TO TR.'\JA.' REVISED Q3 12Q
1')4
u.s
I~
THE KOMA" ARM'" rRO~1 HADRIA." TO CO:"STA.VTI:\[ ROME'S E;''liEMIES (;ERMA:-.iICS A......O DACIA.......S .",RTHLR AXDTHE ..\ .......ClO-SAXQ:'Ii "ARS
THE AR.\1IES OF
ISL\~t
71h Il1h CE.'TCRIES
THE AGE 010' CHARLEMAC:'\E
8g 8YZA:--"'E AR\t1ES 88b-1I18
85 . AXQ', VIKI".;G A'ljD =""ORM......' 75 ARMIES 010' THE CRl'SADES 1"1'\ THE K'ljIGHT'S OF CHRIST 105 THE MO:-iGOLS 50 MEDIEVAL [CROPEA:, ARMIES 1~i1
THE SOOlTlSH A:\O \\£1.5H "AKS 1250-1400
9i THE SWISS AT WAR 1300--1500
130 ITAUA." MEDIEVAL ARMIES 1300-1500 140 ARMIES or THE OlTOMA", Tt:RKS 1300--1774 "I ARMIES or CREey A.'D POITIERS l+i ARMIES OF MEDIEVAL 8lRGl:l\DY 1364....-1477 ' I ] THE ARMIES Of AGI ....COLRT 14.s THE WARS or THE ROSES 99 MEDIEVAL HERALDRY 16TH A1'II1> 1Tnt CENJ'UJUES THE LANDSKNECHl S 101 THE CO~QUISTAOORES 14 L'iGLlSH CIVIL WAR ARMIES 1101 NE\.... MODEL ARMY 1&4)--60 861 SAMLRAI ARMIES 1.s.so-161.s
.sa
11TH CENnJRY 118, THE JACOBITE REBELLIONS 1689 1145 102 THEWILD GEESE
NAPOLEONIC WARS ,8,! NAPOLEOS'S MARSHALS ,Got NAPOLEON'S CUIRASSIERS A.'JD CARABINIERS .s.s NAPOLEQ:'oI'S DRAGOONS AND LANCERS ti8 NAPOLEON'S LINE CHASSEURS 16, NAPOLEON'S HUSSARS 81 ~APOLEO"'S GUARD CAVALRY 141 'JAPOLEO:\'S L1~E INFAl\'TRY 146 NAPOLEQ:-;'S LIGHT INFM'TRY 1.s3 NAPOLEO~·S CL'ARD I/'IiFA~TRY 90 NAPOLEO:-"'S GERMA~ ALLIES 3 106 NAPOLEON'S GERMA.'l' AWES 4 12:l NAPOLEON'S GER~tAN ALLIES .s 88 SAPOLEOX'S ITALIAN A1IiD NEAPOLlTA.' TROOPS l.s:l pRVSSIA.'J L111iE I:'IiFA.'TRY 1792 181.s 149 PRl:SSIA.'IJ LICHT INFANTRY 1192 181S 114 WELLI~GTON'S INFA.'iRY I 119 WELLINGTON'S INFA.''TR\: 2 126 WELLINGTO:-';' LIGHT CAVALRY 130 WELlI?'oiGTOS'S HEAVY CAVALRY 96 ,\RTlLLERY EQl:1PM EI\1S OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
085045451 4
1!JTIf CENTURY AND COLONIAL 31 THE AR\IY OF ....ORTHER' VIRGI'I:\ ]8 THE AR\fY QFTHE POTO\tAC h7 fI-IL 1'01.\.' \Il TI .... " "'1 1I1f./l"Ll" \\:\R 11If. Sl"D:\:\ C \\lp.-\IG:\S 1881 9a '4S lilt. BOXf.R Rf.BELLJO' THE WORLD WAllS IIIf.GER\t:\.....\R\t\ 191"" 18 81 rt-u. BRI II~H ,\R\t" fQI+TlU. p()L1~1I \R\I\ 1'119- ... :10 \u.n.» (:()\f\I.\'DE-RS O~ \\ORI.O \\ \R II IJ BRIIl"1I B,\rTI.FJ)RF5'S 19,· hi 7'1 l't \R\IY 1941 ··n RLnSED l4 TlU: I' "n.R J)I\'I~I()"S RL\ I~LD ~. rHf. \\\H •. '-S-.'1 RE"ISEJ) ]"1 (;t.R\I" "ROOR'E TR.OO~ I
941 H
MODERN WAllFAJlE 13:l THE MALAYAN CAMPAIC:,,/ 1948-60 71 THE BRITISH ARMY 1~80 116 THE SPECIAL AIR SERnCE 1"i6 THE ROYAL MARI~ES 1956 8.{ 133 8AlTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS I L-\:\O FORCES 1]4 BA'ITLE "'OR THE FALKI..i\;'JD~ 2 NAVAL "OReES 135, BAlTLE "'OR THE FALKLA.'oIDS 3 AIR FORCE..! 1111) THE ISRAELI ARMY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WARS 1948 13 1118, ARAB ARMIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WARS 194&- 73 lOot ARMIES 0"- THE VIETNAM WAR 1962-75 143' ARMIES 0'" THE VIETNAM WAR 2 GENERAL (5111 THE ROYAL GREEN JACKETS 107) BRITISH INFANTRYEQUIPMENTS 1808 1908 108, BRITISH IN""ANTRY EQUIPMESTS 19l'J8.80 138' BRITISH CAVALRY EQUlpML....l 1800-IQ41 1."i1 FLAK JACKETS 12] THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AT \\AR 189IJ. 1915
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