Osprey, Men-at-Arms #171 Saladin and the Saracens (1986) 96Ed OCR 8.12

11};1Q;JiI MILITARY

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

SALADIN AND THE SARACENS

DAVID NICOLLE Ph.D, ANGUS McBRIDE

171

EDITOPc MARTIN WINDROW

r:m:m

MIUT"R.Y

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

SALADIN AND

THE SARACENS Text by DAVID NICOLLE Ph.D Colour plates by ANGUS McBRIDE

171

Dedication For Tinette, for whom the Karak and rwi . at jiun.

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Fir.t pllbli hed in I' at Britain in '9 6 by -pI' 'y, an impril1l oCRe d Consumer Bo k Ltd. l\[ich -lin HOll", HI f'lIlham Road, London W RB and All kland, l\lclbollrll " ingctp rc and Toronto

9 Copyright 'g1:lG ReC'd 1111 rmllional 80 k' Lid. Reprinted' 8" I 87,lg8 . 199 1, ' 9 2 . 199 ,I -, (99) \D righ~ I' clved.•\pan from tUl. fajr dealiJl~ for Lhc I uq 0 ('of'priv I.e sLUcly, l' ' ar h, rili j m or ,"view a p'rmiLled under I he Copyright D . 'igns and Pat -Ills \ ( I 88. no part oflhis pubucation mao be repr dured. SlO1' d in a rcu;eval ') _lem, or lnn:milled in any 10 I'm or by any lllran , c1enrolllc, electrical. chcmicaJ, mechanJcal. opo at. ph t opying, l' orcling or otherwi e, withoul the prior p rmil'siOI1 of the cop)Tight OW11l'r. Enquiri·.· 'houle! b adeLr·. I'd t tht" Publi:h 1'••

British Library Cataloguing in PubticaliOlI Dala NicolJe, David a1adin & th araccns: rmi of'the idclJe Ea~t 'J 130o.-(Men-at- I'm cri ; (71) I. rmie car Ea L-Rislor 2. Islam.i Empir Hi l ry 75 - 1258 1. Tid II. en 355'·0095 830

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il1lill1l1iltioll and. pl'cial of1i'rs, To join liTt, o[ char,!!;!' pleas<' Wrill' tn:

Artist's Note Read I' may car to n te that th original painting from whj h lh colour plales in his book w I' pI' par d ar availabl for pri ate ale. U r produ rion copyri hl wbatsoe r is relained b the publi h r. II enquil;e h uld b addrc cd to: orpio Gall I' P.O. Bo- r HaiJsham E. lIssex B 27 25L The publishers regret that they can enter into no carl' pond n e upon lhi. matter.

Saladin and the SaraCetlS

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1102

alah al Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, known to hi a iI', The j t· otious' and to an admiring Europe as aladin, is the mo, t famous singl figure in the histor of th Crusad , being ev n better known outside the English- p aking world than hi Chri Lian foe Richard the Lionh 'art. \ hile it is natural that 'aladin should be w II rem mb r d on thc rab and I lamie ide, it says a lot about th man and about the entire Crusading enterprise tl1at a Muslim Kurd should be p reei ed as th chi r'hero of the e vel1l yen in Europe. Traditionally aladin i portrayed a a qui t d ply religious and . v n humble man thru t into promin n bye ent , In r ality h wa typical r his day and his culture though standing h ad and hould r, ab ve most of his ont mporaries in determination per anal morality politi a! judg mCl1[ and lead r hip, Like Saladin himself the societies and military ystem. that he and hi sue s or' 1· d from deli at t v D tua! triumph w'r far more sophisticated than is generally r ali, d, Thi book i an alt mpl to identify and to brieOy de ribe the main strand in a period of military hi tory whi h to often confi'ont" West rn ,tudents with a dauntingl tangled and obs Ul' kein.

Mu lim ont mporari s a al

Chronology: The Middle East, AD 107 1

1092

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lIog 1115-6

1119 1122

rusad 1'" capture J crllsaJem aljuq civil war Fatimids clef! at ru ad rs at Ramlah rusad r, apturc Tripoli Crll acler oc 'upy Tran!Jordan tab g fore defeats rusad 1'S at 'Field of Blood' bbasid aJiph r rujt a n army for fir t Lime in many years Zangi made gov rnor of osul

1071-1300

aljuq defea" Byzantines at Manzik rt Death of Great 'aljuq ultan alii< hah First Crusade; ru aders defeat aljug" orRum at Dorylaeum Crusaders capture Anti ch; Falimid seize Jerusalem

13th-century ceraJ:nic bottle top in the forln of a warrior wearing a conical hehnet, His shield, now broken, is decorated with a boss and crudely represented studs. (Mus, fiir Islam Kunst, Berlin)

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Probable birth of aladin Zangi aptUl"eS TU ader-held •de a a ination [Za.llgi man Crn ad d feat d b aljuq orRum econd rusade d f; at d out ide Dama eus ru 'aders captUl'e f qalao, last atimid trongh Id in Pal, tin 'ur al Din eizes Dama u D ath of injar 1 t ffi tiv reat aljuq wtan aljuq of Rum a kn wi dg Byzantine suzerainty ru ader ofJeru alem un uc e full invad Egypt three tim aladin ,e'ize'. E,gypt Ikalh lJr :'\1I1' ;11 Dill: Saladil\ ,('i/,\'~ Damascu aljuqs of Rum d II at Byzantin' at M riokephalon R naud d hatiU n ravag R d ea coa ts aladin eize Al ppo aladin d fi ats Cru ad r tate at Hattin; captllr J ru al m but fail to take Tyre iege and aptur 0 re by hird ru ade ru ader d feat aladin al suI' Ri hard the Lionh art leav Paletine D alb of aladin Khwarazm hah defeats la t aljuq ullan of Iran Fourth Crusad captur '00lantinopl (I tanbul) Fifth rusade invades gypt· death of yyubid ultanal dil'defi atofFifh rusade longol invade astern I lam Emp ro1' Fr d ri k II r ach s Pal tine, igns treaty with yyubid ultan al Kamil Fragmentation of y ubid Empire aljuq f Rum d II at d ongol Al alih reunites ubid mpire l L ui I of Fran in ad Egypt· d atb of al alih; MamJuk r luti n

1258 1260 [26] 1268 128g 129]

m gypt; urr nder f L ui IX M ngols ack Baghdad ongols occupy ria aT d uat d b iamluk at n Jalut B zantine recaptur on. tanlinopl (1 tanbul) Mamluk aptur Jam and ntio h Mamluks de 'troy Tlipoli MamJuk capture A T and all oth r ru ad r p i n n ynanPal linian mainland

ftll iddl Ea l th' Fir t rusad truck ria and Pal tin al a mom nt of a ute luslim weakn ' s, Following th ru hing Turki h vi tor r lh B zanlrne Empir at anzikert in 107 J the aljuq of Rum (Anatolia) had yet to fully establish themse1 in what i n w th hartland or Turk y. Th· r at The Kiz;1 Kule (Red Tower) at Alanya i.n southern Turkey was designed by a Syrian architect in 1224 for the Saljuq Sultan of Rum, It forms the focus of a defensive y tern. for a major naval ba e.

5

aljuq Empire centred upon Iraq and Iran was cone ntrated n rebuilcling Egypt's commercial crumbling fasl. It had alread lost effective control wealth by .ontrol of th R d a and th trading v rmu h f outh-east rnTurk·yand yria.Here ports or the yrian coasl. Palestine was simply a a variety of urki h, rmenian Kurcli hand rab defen 'ive bulft r against [utur Turkish aggr ·ssion. These circumstances would ne er return, and 1 rds truggl d for th posscs ion f iti sand astles. In th' d sert and the Eupbrate all y future Crusades achi ved nothing like the ue ess of b douin Arab tribes retain d their independen e th Fir. t; th ir story was by contrast one of and joined in a neral scrambl for con r 1 of the growing uslim strength and unity. This pro es fl rtil r gion . saw fal. e start and tba ks, but culminated in th The Fatimicl aLiphate of Egypt was also in expulsion of the Crusader from th Middl ast aw the decLin , though les. obviou Iy o. Fatim.id dreams of two centuries later. Th. c y ar als conqu ring all Islam ha 1b 'n ab,U1don d a pow r gr wing militarisation of the I' gion' Muslim states; Lipped from the hands of hi ite Caliphs into those increasing conservatism in culture; and a sad of mol' realisb vizi TS ( hi [minist 1 ). This post d clin in that tol ration of non-Muslim min rities wru h had been chara t ristic of earli r p riod wa now heJd b a [amil of Arm man origin which having re-establi hed ord r in Cairo following a (MAA 125, The Almies of Islam 7th-11th Centuries). rics of ivil wars and pol:i ti al uph a al , now How far such negative factors can b blamed on he ru ad is. till holly debated. The cohesion and Ajlun castle was built by one of Saladin's governors to defend str ngth built up in the face o1'a Christian European the fertile highlands of north-west Jordan. The first small fortress was in traditiooaJ Arab style with four corner towers. threat nOl only nabled th latcr Mamluk. ultanat Later towers and galleries date from. early Ayyubid times. to check angolan laught in the lat 13th century, but also to d clop an a ·toni 'rungl eIT! cbve military system. Thi was of ourse ubsequently imitated with ven gr ater u cess b th Otioman Turk: (5 e A J 40 Armies of the

Ottoman Turks

130

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The Saljuqs of Rum

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Th Grst Muslim arm to lac Ll1 Christian invader. was thal fthe aljuqs of Rum ( natolia). Although defeated by Ll1c Fir l Crusade mes natolian urks ub equcntly blocked lh· ov rland rout to Palestine and thus tanted th rusader tat of large-scale reinforcemen l. nlik pI' vious onqu rars, th aljuqs brou ht Wilh them from Central sia entir Tur oman nomaclic trib'S who became a n'w and sclfsuf'ficien ethnic group within the usUm world. Tb· trib'm n form d t11 bulk of arly aljuq armies, and the e(fe tiveness of their tactics is well record d. Th ir arr w could arry a great di lane , but also had exceptional pen trating power at shorter range. nlike th lat I' Europ an longbow th Turkish ompo it pro ably reli d for its 1ft t on more powerful and regular ten ion rather than

the weight of its arrow. The newer all-curve form of aljuq weapon also gradually replaced the previous an led form of compo ite bow in most Muslim regions during the 12th century. PI' 6 s ional rath I' than tribal warriors play dan increasingly important part in subsequeIll aJjuq armie. but th 'ir archery t hniqu s w I' in some I' spects difrerent and more varied. For xampJe, such troops were trained in zon shooting or the dropping ofarrows within a designat d area su has the interior of a castle. Their rate of shooting was al 0 noted by all obs rvers. Anow r feature of aljuq archery in the late Ilth and 12th centuries wa the widespr ad u.se of a nawak or majra arrowguid which sho high-velocit hort arrows. Thewere possibly the darts recorded at the battle of Dorylaeurn in the G'esta Fmncorum. Although hoI'S -arch ry wa, v ry effe ti it rarely brought victory on it. own. A final harr and close combat weI' normally ne ded as would also b th ~' if th Turks w· re them Ives The Citadel of Damascus (with sectional views of square and rectangular towers) was based 00 Roman and early Islamic foundations. This great fortress was rebuilt by the Ayyubid aI Malik aJ 'Adil around 1209. It is entered through a massive barbican in the middle of the north waIl, overlooking the Harada river.

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Turcoman weapons: (A-O) 12th-century Pecheneg sabre, spearheads and bun, arrowheads, part of sword belt, whipheads and knives; (p. 13th 14th-century sabres, quiver and daggers from Kazakhstan; (V) lOth l3th-cenmry Bashkir wood-framed saddle from southern Urals.

defeated or trapped. Bows were th n put aside and rna e: words or 'pear were L1sed. By the time the First rusad reach d th Mlddl Ea t th - nomadi Turcoman tribes had mostly be n relegated to frontier zones by tbe I' at aljuq ultans of Iran because of their politi al uur liability. In L1'h regions, which originally included Rum ( natolia) and the Tauru ~Mountain, they continued to use their martial energies as gha?;is, a name giv n to fronti rsm n who fought to maintain or xtend Muslim ·ontrol. This th y did with or without authorisation from a central governm nt, in a lif of raid and OUTIt r-raid omparabl ~ to that of Am rica fran tiersm'n in th 18th and 19 th centuries. The states established by th aljuq of Rum and th ir rivals, the Danisbmandid . ofeast rn Anatolia weI' originally Tur oman ghazi provinces. oon, however th SaJjuqs of Rum threw o(I"aJlegian t the Gr at aljuq and established a dynasty of their own whi h outliv d that of th -ir Iranian cousin. The in turn tben tried to push th Turcoman into

7

a troubl d fronti I' belt between themselves and Byzantine territory meanwhile building a profl . ional army similar to that of other Middle Eastern states. In lat I' y aI's th ljuq of Rum fielded an army onsistingo[two parts one ofwhi h was known as th' Old Army. Thj wa in fa l, the traditional or original army which itself had two main part, th warrior shepherds from the Turcoman tribes and the profes ional ghulam. of lave rigin. Unlike the situatiol in other Middle Eastern armic the Tur omans remained the more imp rtant eI m nt through ut the 12th cntury. Hemets: (A) ,oth-,1th-century (roll1 southern Urals, perhaps of Muslim origin; (8) 12th-Century Pecheneg; (C) 13th-14thcentury Kuban from northern Caucasus (State Hist. Mus., Moscow); (D) 12th-13th-century Khirgiz Turkish; (£ & F) 12th '3th-centu,ry Q.ipchaq with detachable visor (State Hist. Mus., Moscow); (G) late 13th arly 14th-century MamJuk (Porte de Hal Mus., Brussels); (N) 12th-century Kuman, of Musli= origin (Archaeol. Mus., Budapest).

8

Fi r and skilful as th y w re, they la k d discipline and w re bard to control. Th ir contingents appear 10 have be n rganis d on a tTibaJ basis, individual warriors being r ward d by booty and money from th ir tribal begs who in turn expected giCts and pa ment directly [rom the ultan. Theghulams formed a ruler s standing army and lik arli T Mu lim ohulam. for s, were I' crw d from pur ha d lave or pri on r of war. Su h a manpower pool was natural I abundant in Anatolia as B zantiurn retreated Greek ghulams being parti uLarly num -rous in th ond half of the [2th century after the battle fMyriokephaJon. A small eJit force of court ghulams acted as the ruler s bodyguard and trusted aides, whit the normal ghutaman-i khass b long d either to th rul r or to senior military leaders prill 'es and general'. Th ir numb I' reached a maximum of. om 10,000 b the close of the 12th century. A third clement orth army was more varied and in tb ['2th c new-y, f 1 ss r importance. Thi in ludcd igdish [or I' emit d fi'om th olE prin of mixed urki b and Christian marriages who under their igdishbashis, often a t d as a kind ofpoil force in the major town. Then there wer mer enarie', local militia. and the remnanu of a Byzantine military aristocra y which had deft ct d to the aljuqs following the Byzantine collapse. Infantry skilled in the gu rrilla and siege warfare ofBithynia and th oth r mountainou frontiers were probably a edy recruited. Gr ek m r 'enaries wer also appar'ntly mplo d a were G orgians. orne of these weI' infantry using heavy javelins. Other were hoI' emen arm d wi th bo\; and las in urkish style" but most eem to ha c b 'en armour d 'p 'ar- and word-armed b rsemcn fighting in the sam M.iddle Eastern tradition a Lh ir Iranian Kurdish and Arab n 'O'hbour . fter th on fusion caus d by the First Cru. adc and th sub. eq uel1l establishment. of relatively [lXed frontiers betw en Lh aljuq of Rum and th ir Christian neighbours estern European cavalr and infantry soon appeared in aljuq servi e. nlike Europ am fighting for Mu lim rul r. in YTia or Egypt thes men wer not normally r gard d a r n gad s by lh ir hristian c religionists. Included among tllem were Crusader PoWs, man having b n T J as d from Syrian

impri onm nt during imer- iu lim war, Italian crossbowmen.

and

Saljuqs and Atabegs The Tur omans of Iran and th F nil, Cr s TIL njoy d an e en briefer ra of military upremacy than tho of natolia. Th Gr at a1juq. hug realm started to fragment well before the Crusaders app ared, and although thi dyna ty retain d on rol of part ofIran and Iraq until the lat 12th cntury most areas fell to su cessor dynasties. Thes , how r gen rally continued in the aljuq military tradition by dividing th ir armed force into a profcs:ional askar of uhulams plus mercenaries and a b-ibaL mostly Turcoman auxiliary lement. U nd rthi. tcrn tb askarforrned a mall tanding army of avalry and infantry, O'arrison troops and per anal guards, '\I hile th auxiliaries were summon d only for pe iflc ·ampaign.. Th b st de cription oflate T J th or early 12th century aljuq quipment is to be found in the f.1 arqa wa Gul.l'hah romance. Here w apons in 'Iud jay lin p ar sword bow mace and lasso. -mour is relatively heavy comprising h '1m 't, coif or avcntaiJ and full hauberk. It probabl required five hoI'S s per warrior to maintain prolonged hit-and-run tactic in Turcoman tribal fashion. Glm/am tactic n dd [, wer horss as w II as less effort from each mount whi h could thus carry a In I' heavily armoured rid r. This made the ghul(/rn a mol' versatil' warrior than th Turcoman whil al'o imposing fewer logistical d mands during long-distance campaigns in ariel regions. C'ltu/am ould of cours sho t on th rna e but they normally shot while their horses LOod still drawn up in disciplined ranks. A fully train d man was e, pe t d to loose a handful ofup to five arrows in two and a half econd.. A fIrth r handful of five would tben be snatched from an open-topp d q uiv r. An '11 my hoI" 'man approaching al 35 kph would therefor fa e fi arrows during th final 30 yards of his hap-'. An unpracticed but trained glmlam could probably 100 one or two arrows in a imilar time (wh r as the En Ijsh longbowman at gincourt is estimated to bay shot only 12 times per minute). uch skills required constant praclice and physi al fitness. g/zulam was, of course also expcClcdLOb ·kilfulwith·p aran l.wordormac.

mler th refore preil rr d professional re ruits of Jav rigin cv n a 0 fr -bom pr fes ionals. Once uch gltulams became a politicall powerful 'praetorian guard' th y probably negl ted their training and, wh n tandin 0 fae a Crusad r harg, w r consequ ntly ridd n down. As Turkish arrows normally penetrated existing armour aL ev n mod rat - range an inad quate rate of sbootin s ms th m . t b ious reason for th ir failur against th I'irsl Crusade. or all thos' alabeg or 'senior offic r' stat s which inheri ed 0 mueh f the crumbling Great 'aljuq m pire U1a t of the 12 th and [ th en tury Zangid. in yria and the jazirah was perhaps th most a tiv . In th bistor orth rusades names uch as Imad al Din Zang1 and ur al Din Mahmud loom large. But these Zaogid rul 'rs had to recruit fi-om a morC limi ed ar-a than had Lh ir pred cessor.. Th arne may be aid of tbe Burid and Artuqid rul r5 of Damascus and the Diyarbakr r gion. Thi\ s cenainly r Ae ted in their armies. In I J 2 a lorce from Damas u· u 'cd tbe old bbasid tactic of ha ing ach ca alryman any a foot soldier into battle on hi' horse s crupp r. 'ome Weapons and other eqwpment &om late loth early IIthcentury Muslim shipwreck: (A-C) spears; (0) glaive(?); (1:) heavy pole-weapon, perhaps for CUlting rigging; (F) boathook; (G) ."pear buu(?h (1/ IV) javelins. It hould be emphasised that no arrowheads were found in this probably Fatimid ship. (Castle Mus., Bodrum)

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decades later the army r UT al Din s ems largely C rtain Turcoman tactics persisted even in the to hav consisted of Turcomans and Kurds horse- millor aska.rs of the ertile Crescent. When facing archers and spear-armed cavalry respectively, plus I' gular armi s not omparably trained to u e traditionally trained ghulams. Large numbers or nomadi hor e-archery techniques, tbis meant auxiliary ca aIry wer al are ruit d [rom the Arab harassm' nt f th fa until he was so disorganised bedouin. rallY Turcomans such as those of' the that a decisive charge could conclude the struggle. Yaru'li trib who w r invit d La the Aleppo region The Zangid and othe u ed thi ta ti against the in the mid- I I '20S ouJd imilarly be regarded as Crusader though they were al a pr par d t m t auxiliaries. At thi. time mo t Tur oman tribe w re their foe. in a set-piece batt! of organis d ranks to a large degree outsid iuslim civilisation and, of ourse to engage in siege warfare. Another th u h livil g within th world of I lam. Th y .ta ti aI hang·· that might b tray Turkish inftuen retained a separat I gal system the yasa. based was th placing ofcavalr ahead ofinIantry instead upon tribal ustom-whi h wa not officially of b hind it, as an army marched through hos(iJ abandoned until ur al Din obliged his military t rritory. wte to adhere to Muslim law. u h a situation As far as th gcn ral quipment of alabeg avalry naturall helped to maintain the 1 urcomans was can erned literary sources tend to emphasise surviving Arab and p rhaps Kurdi 'h fashion. s 'paratc id ntity n in military matters. (A) Sword of unnouned Abbasid Caliph, 13th-century Iraq Or Egypt (Topkapi Armoury, Istanbul); (B-C) swords ofCaUph al Mustasitn, 1242-1258 (Topkapi ArDloury, IstanbuJ); (D) sword of unna.n>.ed [3th-early 14th-century Egyptian ruJer, probably captured from Europeans (Askeri Mus., IstanbuJ); (£) supposed sword of Saladin, late 13th-century Egypt (Askeri Mus., IstanbuJ); (f) late 13th 14th-century Mamluk sabre (Topkapi Armoury, IstanbuJ); (G) late 13th-century Iranian sword (Topkapi Armoury, Istanbul). Note that al>nost all these

10

Istanbul swords have later Mamluk hilts. (H) 12th-13thcentury Ar:menian sabre found in northern Urals (Arcltaeol. Inst. Acad. of Sciences, Leningrad); (/-1) late J3th-early 14tb. century Turkisll sabres (Bey Koyunoglu CoU. Konya); (ill 12th-13th-century Iranian mace-head (Heeramaneek Gall., ew York)' (L-M) 11th-13th-century Iranian bronze warhammers (Keir Col!., London); (IV) 13th 14th-century Iranian gilded quillons (City Art Mus., St Louis).

There is greater mention of swords, turbans, helmets and spears than of bows. Such a traditional character was certainty true of Arab-dominated areas like Shay'"l.ar in the early and mid-12th century. In his memoirs, centred upon Ihe castle of Shayzar, Usalllah ibn Munqidh lisled a horseman's equipment as a kazaglumd fabric-covered and padded mail hauberk, a heavy helmet, sword, spear and large round shield. The primary importance of the spear is constantly emphasised, with several pages being devoted to notable lance-thrusts. Usamah also slated that a horseman particularly feared 10 turn his back on a foc armed with a spear, while cavalry armed only with swords preferred not to engage those bearing lances. He further indicated Ihal the European couched lance technique was known, though not widely used, by the :\lluslims. During this same period there was a revival of infantry in those ~Iuslim stales opposing the Crusadcs; yet this was not a result of European influence. Rather was it a rC\'ersion to Abbasid, Fatimid and Byzantinc tradition as the nomadic

Hual"m..n 00 Ih,. r.... nti"pi..« of a mid-'3Ib-C,,0IU.-y maou_ -..:ripl from Mo"ul. The h..lm,.l,.d <:.. nl",1 rid,.r orrin ;0 qui~·..r 00 his I..fl hip, Ib .. rider on Ihe lefl carries ;0 bo....<:asc. ("itilh llll>irJ·"q, Cod. A.F.• o, Nat. Bib., Vi.......)

tribes of Turcoman horse-archers were relegated to Anatolia and other northern frontiers. The Zangids of the Jazirah employed large numbers of inr.1.ntry archers, crossbowmen, siege engineers, rwffillirl flrethrowcrs, and heavy infimtry armed with long shields, spears or pikes. Among those specialising in sicgc warfare Khurasanis from north-eastern Iran and mcn from Aleppo were particularly renowned. Whcn Nur al Din chose to face his enemies in open SCi-piece battle, foot soldiers seem to have fought in a traditional manner, co-operating with their ca\'alry as in earlier centuries. Illlanlry armed with cither swords, large round shields, heavy spears, naptha g"enades, daggers, mail hauberks and helmcts, often with face-prOlecti ng a\"emails, arc all mentioned in Usamah's memoirs. In fact such troops probably servcd in most armil'S of the area. J\"ot all paid warriors were. of course, Muslims. Armenians seemed prepared to fight for anyblxly.

"

and Icachers, judges, scribes, interprcters and surgeons. In addition to auxiliary tribal cavalry, the irregular troops included large numbers of mu//.awi'all shorl-term voluntccrs and full· time gllazir, both motivatcd by religious enthusiasm. Thc taclics ofNur al Din's army were similar to those of the Creat Saljuqs but were normaJly more caulious, often rel};ng on long·range skirmishing archery because of the lack ofsufficient fully trained ghulams. On the march the army was preceded by a screen of SCOUlS. 'ext came an advance guard, which was also responsible for finding suitable camp-sites. The baggage·u-ain normally marched Carved ....ood"'n pa.a",1 from the falimid Caliph'" pala~ ahead of the main force, while any animal herds 11th 12rn .,.,nlury. (Mus. of Islamic An, Cairo) would follow; a rearguard was rarely considered necessary. The anny was expected to cover some 30 serving Nur al Din in Syria, the Munqidhites of km in a day. Camps were based upon a circular Shay'.tar, the Crusader states, Fatimid Egypl and pattern with the commander's tenl at the centre. the Saljuqs of Rum. Their equipmellt rcflected the Either a trench would be dug around the camp, or influence of these varied emplo)'ers as well as spiked 'crow's feet' would be scattered to hamper an traditional B)r.taminc and earlier Islamic styles. enemy attack. Advance posts called )'Ozak took up Sword, mace, spear ,and above all the javelin were positions further out, and if a foe was nearby a unit the prefercd weapons, particularly of Armenian of karari)'oh (shock-u-oops) would stand ready in horsemen. that direction. Nur al Din's army may be laken as a typical This basic system was not only used by Saladin alaheg force. It was not large, the ruler's askar but was subscquelllly refined and developed by all ranging from 1,000 men whcn the young N ur al Din his successors. eomrolled only Aleppo, to 3,000 by the end of his reign. By then some 10,000 to 15,000 warriors from The Later Fatimids regional forces could also be added. The askar was The size ofFalimid armies in the late 11th and 12th divided into /ulbs (scclions) of 70 LO 200 men whose cenluries remained relatively small. A loss of8crber heavier weapons, stored In the governmelll territories in North Africa and the drying up of ?ardk!/{wah (arsenal), were only distributed at the eastern recruitment following the Saljuq conquests start ofa campaign. Many regional troops held an mcant a serious decrease in availablc military iq/a (ficl), the size of which could vary considerably. manpower. This could not easily be overcome by These were not owned by the holder bUI could be increased enlistment of Armenians and black issued and recalled al government discretion via lhe African slaves, nor by the encouragement of a!lda/h diwall al jtV's" (army ministry). Olhcr professional urban militias or the militarisation of the Egyptian cavalry, Turk or Kurd, received salaries und were !wwwalall labour corps. Itwas panly this shortage expected to appeal' wilh ,I certain minimum of that led the Fatimids to rely so heavily 011 naval I..·quipment, horses, mules or camels for transport, power. Such a strategy enabled them to transfer and a squire. Proli..'ssional inlillltry were similarly small numbers of weU-equipped Iroops to threatpaid by the government. ened areas al relatively shon notice. Their empire, A trusted amir (officer) was placed in charge of unlike that of the Creat Saljuqs, consisted largely of theal/abal mira (supply train), though in general the provinces with lengthy coastlincs. soldiers were expected 10 look aftcr themselves, Fatimid palace troops, equivalent to a Saljuq assisted by merchants who habitually followed the asknr, were said 10 lotal 30,000 to 50,000 Armenians anny with their mobile market, the suq al askar. and Sudanese at Ihe time of Saladin's takeover, but Other camp followers includl..-d religious leaders in reality the numbers were probably far smaller. '2

Evcn at the height of Fatimid power in the loth century it never weill above 50,000 including fulltime troops in all garrisons. A major expedition might be expected to number around 10,000 regulars plus a few thousand auxiliaries. A more reliable source dating from around the year 1000 refers to 300 black slaves with sih-ered wcapons of the Caliph's personal bodyguanl, some 500 amloured warriors attcnding the chief \;zier, followed by around 4,000 infantry of various nationalities and 3,000 equally mixed horsemen. These soldiers were taking part in an important Cairo parade, and probably represented the bulk of the palace troops, SmaJler forces would havc been stationed in all major cities and frontier regions, Faumid armies always contained a high proportion ofinfanlry. In battle these were arrayed by nauonaJ origin, with annoured men in the front rank, In defence they would make a shield-wall and usc their spears as pikes while archers and ja"e1inthrowers supported them. In attack the infantry would either advance en maSSt: or send forward selected sections of the line, cavalry covering the

flanks of such moves. In other words, Fatimid tactics were thos<: of earlier pre-Turkish lvluslim armies. Their equipment was similarly traditional, consisting of large round 01" kite·shaped and flatha.<;ed shields, javelins, bows, swords, pikes, and various obscure hafted weapons whidl might have approximated to later Europc;:lll glaivt."S or bills. Daylamitc infantl')', originally from northern Iran, had longscrved the Falil1lids. Their weapons were dwpin double-ended javelins, battle-axes and tall kite-shaped lariqah shields. Some were also employed as fire-grenade throwers, while in the 12th CCl1lury Iheir officers appear to havc carried curved swords ofTurt:o-lranian form. More numerous were black African troops of both fret: and slave origin. Their loyahy and spectacular appearance probably led thc Fatimids to choose them as guard units, as others had done before. Whether or not the dark·skinncd infal1lry M;....2Ih-..lury p;lp"r rrasmenl from Cairo .howi.D.lI: F.. lim.id _rrion emeT"JI:inll:, tw-r.... ps rrom ~ .. lan, to lill:ht European ;......d.,..... The ho......meo or hoLh annies ...·ear I...!: mail .... uberk.. (Dept. or 0"""101.1 Antiq., B....I;.... Mus., London)

'3

lnIaid bnIJ'" pritin~ too.. IIhowi ..S 'Scoppio' weari.D~ a m.w hauberk" rrom M_.. I oW 1_ 1ll,SO- (F.... ntu: ~ ..fl>I, British

M ..s.. LondOIl)

archers and javelin men met by the Crusaders outside Asqalan ill 1099 were Sudancsc slavc troops. Nubians or Ethiopian mercenarics is unclear. InfornulliOIl aboul such warriors in their original homelands indicates that most fought with large leather shields, shol"l spears. javelins or long pikes, and wore protecli\'e, perhaps quilted. garment.". Those close to the Red Sea and 10 Asiatic influence included archers with simple longbows. Armenians also pla)'ed a prominent role in Egypt. Following the B)'Z:llllille occupalion of Armenia carl)' in Ihe I I th century a great many soldiers, probably including members of the military aristocr
Fatimid forces. They included the saq(llibah (slaves of supposed Slav anccstry) as well as mercenaries, most of whom seem 10 have been Italian infanlry or mannes, E",'yplian militia forct's art' mure obscure. The JUIIJ misr or 'Cairo army' re-appeared at the end of ,h(" Fatimid period, and mig-hi have n:ferred either to a city militia, to retired troops, or 10 the civilianiscd dcsct'ndants of carlier military familics, Properly organised and armed aMath militias, perhaps also remnants of earlicr Arab jUlIJ structures, had prcviously been cncourag(;d by the Fatimids in Syria, and these continued to play an important role in defending their cities against Crusader attack, AJlhough the aMath does not appear in Egypt. unpaid religiously motiviated mutltm:i'ah volunteers did. Fatimid cavalry were as mixt'Ci as thc infanlf)" Berbers had originally been numerous, but by the 12th century only the Barqi)'ah from what is now eastern Libya still had promincnce, A small force of Turkish ghulams of Central Asian origin probably formed an Clite cavalry unit, whereas the bulk of Fatimid 'Turks' seem 10 havc been the freeborn descendant" of earlier ghlliams, These wen- most cfH..c uvc in co-opcration \~th Armenian infantry. The 11th century had St.-en a general increase ill Fatimid cavalry armour, and even the adoption of horse-armour. This prohnbly contributed (Q the abandonment of thc ja\'clin as a cavalry weapon. The equipment of the Inst, and perhaps most Ihoroughly armoured, falimid cavalry was listed in a poem by lhe vizier al Tal'ai as mail hauberks, quilted or fabric-covered mail juhballs, swords and long lances. Bedouin warriors had long been enlisted by the fatimids as fast-moving lighl cavalry auxiliaries, Arabs SeeTllIO have been eflcclive and welliraincd, though lightly armed with spears, and were used to garrison whole provinces in sub-desert regions. Nevertheless, their llumbel"S always appcar to have been small. The training of Fatimid regular troops was as traditional as their tactics, hut largely seems 10 havc involved the cavalry, II was basl'Ci Upoll hujras, military schools in or around Ihe palace, Here recruits were placed under lhe authority ofan ustaJh in Olle ora series ofdormitories, each of which had a suitabl)' warlike name. Training in archery,

lanccplay, swordsmanship, horsemanship and other military ans took IrOlllthrcc to seven years. In the 11th century administrative skills still loomed largc but, ancr a series ofdefeats at the hands of the Crusaders, the vizier al Afdal placed greater cmphasis on purely military training. He also open<.'O men. Mosl Fatimid troops wcre paid monthly in cash by the diwan rau:atib, a department of the army ministry. But the iqra s)'stem of land grants was increasingly used during the 12th century, these bcing allocated by anmher section of the ministry. Large iqJas often went to tribal magnates who were in turn expected to supply a certain number of troops, while iqlas of lesser value along the desen fringe went to bedouin tribes. The series of appaJling plagues which greatly reduced Egypt'S population in the 11th centu!")' had forced many land-holding soldiers to till their own fields, thus effectively removing them from the country's fighting strength. Economic crises also forced the government to increase taxation to pay for the army, which still periodically rebelled over arrears of pay. Pay naturally reflected rank, and Fatimid forces had four main grades of seniority. Qaids and three ranks of amir all worc distinctive uniforms and were headed by the amir aljll)'ush or commandcr-in-chid: Before the alTivnl of the Crusades this officcr had also been personally responsible for the Syrian garrison.~. Aftcr the Saljuqs seized Damascus the bulk of the Fatimid armies was stationed in tile Syrian pons, and t hcse remai ned vi tal even after the establishment of lhe Crusader states. Asqalan, lhe last to remain under Fatimid comrol, was always strongly garrisoned, being the key to tile defence of Egypt. Aswan in southern Egypt was important for similar reasons. On the march a Fatimid army resembled those of the Saljuq or Atabeg states, with scouts and raiders preceding the main body and trenches being dug to protect a camp. Mules and Bukhti camels served as beasts of burden, the latter being a cross between the Arabian and Khurasani breeds.

'ChriSI b..,(o", tJo", "iSh Pries I', Syriac Go""",,' from tJo"'Jazira.b ~o ... <".AD .~ 1lt", IU"rds wear bolh m:liJ and Jam",lIar arm.Our. (Ms. Add. 7'70> Brilish Ub., Londo.. )

Saladin first became prominent as Nur al Din's governor in Egypt. With the death of the last Fatimid Caliph in 1171 he not only changed the official faith ofthe country from Shi'a 10 Sunlli Islam, bUI also set about recruiting a new army loyal to himself ralher than to the memory of the Fatimids or to Nur al Din. Such considerations led 10 Saladin recruiting fi'om an even wider speclrum than was normal. He had inherited a Fatimid force that included several thousand Armcnians, Sudanese and Arabs, both regular and auxiliary, plus the Kurdish cavalry glwlams and Turcomans brought 10 Eb'l'PI by Saladin's uncle during the initial Zangid occupation. As his power grew, howevcr, Saladin downgraded, disbanded or simply destroyed most of the Falimid forces, while retaining those Zangid troops who were willing to be loyal to him rather than Nul' al Din. He also continued to recruit increasing numbers of free Kurdish heavy cavalry, Turcoman

'5

horse-archers and Turkish gill/lams. As Saladin subscqucmly seized control of most ofSYl'ia and the Jazirah he also incorporated the mixed forces of these areas illlo his own loosely knit army, to which ahdalh militias, mutfaw;'ah volunteers and Arab bedouin auxiliaries could also be addl.'d. Crusader chroniclers tem!l.-d to ovcremphasisc the admittedly picturescluc role ofTurcoman horsearchers in the armies of Saladin and his Ayyubid successors. These troops seem, howc\'er, to havc played a relatively minor role ill the warfarc of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent in the lale t2th and early 13th celllurics; in fact, they appe'lr 10 ha\"c degenerated ilHo one of two sources of auxiliary Earl)' 'Jth-
16

cavalry, the other being the bl.'douin. The most successful role for such Tureomans may now have been as raiding troops, riding ahead oran invasion force as they did during the reconquest of Palestine following the battle of H<'lltin in 1187. The most effective horse-archers in Saladin's army were as always the more disciplined ghuloms or, as they were now more commonly called, momluks. They seem to have us<..'d their bows in much the same way as had long been traditional in the ;\Iiddlc East, though perhaps with a greater tendency to shoot on the move Ihan at rest. This more cautious, skirmishing slyle of warfare was in line with a trend seen after the frdgmentalion of the Creat Saljuq empire. Ayyubid rule was, however, 10 bring back a larger degree of stability 10 the region. Partly as a consequence ghulom training

steadily improved, until by late Ayyubid times disciplined ranks of mamluks could halt a Crusader charge by archery alonc, This happened at the battle of COlza ill 1244, and was a feat which had never before been achieved since the arrival of the first Crusade, Armcd hcad to foot, such mamluks could be sent ahead of each battalion as an advance guard of horse-archers. Others werc trained LO dismount and shoot at a foc while drawn up in ranks, to achieve greater range, concelllralion and accuracy. If unhorsed in baule they would continue to fight, first with bows and at the last with swords. Such behaviour would be in line with training reflected in the Ayyubid military treatise of al Tarsusi and in later ~1amluk JurusiJ'O cavalry manuals. Al Tarsusi, for example, advised a horsearcher to aim at the horse ofan annoured foe, but to 'Baplisli..... d .. 51 Lou,,,', Man,luk inlaid b ....li,. baliin, <'.All lJOOwait until an enemy cavalryman with a sword got Th.. Mn'din8 fi8u.... W...."li Iam..Uar •.rn\our. {Lou,""" Pari } \'ery close before shooting, as one could not afford to miss with one's first sho!. If, however, this mounted been numberc.:d among those cOlltingents drawn foe was charging with a lance or with a nawak from the Jazirah area. This was close to the arrow-guide and shon arrow, the horse-archer homeland of the frcc Kurdish professional cavalry. should mailllain his distance, or at least ha\'e sword During the siege of Acre, Mu'izz a.1 Din of Sinjar, and shield ready to defend himself. Generally one of the surviving Zangid rulers of this region, led speaking the foeman with a lance was considcred a cavalry force arm(.'
~~ .:t

'The Be,,,,,)"',)', l"le l::tth-enllury Coptic Go5pel. Some or the soldiu," .,.rry f1l1,·baHd ...._oriJ·u "hiel..... (Ms. Copt,. ,,, Bib. Nat., Pari.)

who, nOted for their speed and manoeuvrability, were also very efloctive at ambushing enemy convo)'s. These warriors wen: described by their perhaps with mail 3vcllIaiis across their faces, Crusader foc'S as d<:spising armour on the grounds fought outside Acre with swords, maces and spears, that it was an attempt to escape one's predestined and were clearly quite capable of unhorsing heavily day of death. Other comparable troops, Arab or amlourc
or

,8

highly regarded siege cnbrineers of Aleppo and i\40sul, plus some comparable specialisLS {l·om Khurasan, arc all recorded. Open baltIc with infantry facing infantry and cavalry facing cavalry was an issue that both Crusaders and Ayyubids now tcnd<.'pcralion between horse and foot remained as it had been for centuries, except that the infantry could now add crossbows to their c.xisling arsenal. Such tactics were clearly marc than merely theoretical, and seem to have been used by Saladin's garrison at Acre during one major sortie. Those !\'Iuslim archers andjave.lin-throwers who opened the baltic of Arsuf in 1191 may havc included trained professional infantry. Generally, however, the role of A)')'ubid foot soldiers was limited to siege warfare. This could, ofcourse, mcan open battle during the siegc or blockade of a fortified place. Eastern and western sources agree that the Muslim troops ilwolvcd in such fighting varied gready in their anns and armour, from lightly equipped jaridah warriors to hea\·ily protected Ihaqloh infantry and dismounted, but sull armoured, horsemen. Among the itcms of weaponry mcntioned arc swords, daggers, long. bladed axes, maces, javelins, crossbows, naptha grenades, naptha 'tubes' or Aame-throwers, long and short spears, large round wooden shields, large and small leather shields and mail hauberks of various sizes. Large shields plus specialised mantlets were oftell used to build semi-permanent shieldwalls in whal virtually became trench walfare. Many of these same troops, including lhe exFalimid Kinanah, cominued to serve Saladin's Ayyubid successors. Their equipment and taclic.~ undenvent no radical change. The armies of Islam also attracted troops from Chl'istendolll, both Orthodox and Catholic. Much the larger proponion would seem to have been infantry, and most would probably have been spccialists-siege engineers, crossbowmen and lhe like. European cavalry also served in Ayyubid Syria, though they were regarded as renegades by the Crusaders. More study has been made of the sizes of

Saladin's armies lhan of most olher medieval ~\'luslim forces. Saladin apparently started with a personal askar of about 500 men, plus 3,000 Turcoman auxiliaries. By IlGg he could boast 8,640 regulars in his land forces. Sir Hamilton Gibb, analysing a review held in I 171 for visiting BY"l.:antine and Crusader envo)'s, noted thai by then '74 cavalry units (tllths) were PI'CSClll while 20 were absent, perhaps on dUly elsewhere. This could provide a total of some 14,000 professional cavalry plus a further 700 Arab horsemen of theJudham tribe. It is, however, 110t clear whether a lulh was a permanent or ad hor unil, used in war or only on p.."1rade. This number was later cut down as exFatimid trool>S were disbanded. At least halfofsuch a force always remained in Egypt bceauscof\'arious invasion threats, even when Saladin led a major expedilion out of the country. Contingents from Ayyubid or allied areas in Syria and the Jazirah tended 10 be small. Estimates indicate that Damascus support<.'C! 1,000 troops: Hims. 500; Hantah. plus subordinate castles such as Shayzar, 1,000; Aleppo, 1,000; i\losul and the Jazirah together, from 2,000 to 4,000. These. similarly, 'Joseph of Anmathu a.sllll for the body of Juu.s', from the same Coptic: Goiipel. The ..,Idiu i, probably based 0" a blr Fat;m;d warrior, perh.p" of Armenian .. rigin. (Ms. c..pte ,,), Bib. Na'., Pari,,).

•

could 110t all be sent on campaign at one time. At thc battle of Hattin, for example, Saladin apparently led an army of ollly 12,000, mostly light cavalry, against a Crusader force of up to t8,000, mostly infantry. The payment of Ayyubid troops was quite complicated. Among those with cash salaries Kurds, mllmluKs and frcc Turkish regulars received the maximum rate. Arabs of the Kinanah 'Soldien of .h., Caliph of Bap;hdad', in .... _rly '3th-<:il'ntury .......ufiCript from Ba&bdad. It ~bows Arabs, Xllll!anu d a _riil'ty of typ
584,.

federation, who were originally from southern Palestine, tbe asaqilalJ and other formt'r Fatimid Iroops received half this; naval troops, probably one quarter; and the remaining Arab auxiliaries, one eighth. Others were rewarded with an iqlo or governmelll fier: Saladin greatly extended the somewhat rudimentary Fatimid system of iqtas, firstly by transferring them from Falimid troops 10 his own men, and then by creating more in otller parts of the country. Some iqlas were also pUI aside to maintain Ihe flCCI and its personnel. The Ayyubid ranking systcm was a quilc simple three tier system of amirs, amir kabirs and amir al isfahsalar.

bov these field ranks were fi e or o. pecial~. d ernor posts from garrison ommander l army crucf. had be n th cas in 'aljuq, Cllaheg and Fatimid armie yyubid reguJar were onJy issued with arm and armour from th <;ardkhonah (aI's 'nal) wh n an expediGon wa being prepared. Pay La cover th ir other campaign n ed was issu d al lhe same time. On the march heavy armour was normally kept with. the baggage ani being pUl on wh n fighting wa exp cted. During Ion '1' war', particularly those campaigns exl ndir g over more than one season, a ompli at d and xp n ive rotation y tern between the forces of E ypt, yria and the]azirah was intended to keep one army in the field at all time. aladin also found that (h old Arab ra«ici tradition of Lightning raid deep into en my territory in earch of plunder was a useful mean." of upplementing military resow' e . Retaliatory raid into Nubia ([ [72-3) Libya and Tunisia (1173) against Jordanian bedouin (J 173) and La cmen (I 174) w I' all in tlu tradi tion. The exp dition to Yem n alo had trategi and conomic signifiance reviving and trengthelung an EgypGan iuAu n e that had be n v ry cia e in Fatimid time. Yemen became part of the yyubid confed· ration, though the ountry's direct contribution to aladin' military strength i not immediately ob ious. Th period of Ayyubid domination did leav it mark on Yemen militar organi alion and th l' ar many ref! ren S to prof! ssional ca alry in 12th century Yem n but m st 1 cal forces were till based upon tribes and citi . A 'mall Turki h or Turci11 ,d elit ems to have. etlled in the countr and mar ophi ·ticated quipm nt al a appeared. Far more important might hay b n Y m n contribution to aladin s naval strength in Lhe R d ea. au th"rn and a tern Arabia had long be n important centres of maritime tTad with India, Ea t frica Indonesia and even China. ow L11 l'e were l' ferenc . to a pow IfuJ clas' of galley carrying marine and possibly prop lied by 140 oar or rower. which wa known a a hayani. The naval threat posed by the Cru ader tates, and en ultimately the danger of European penetration into Indian Ocean trade was clear! demon trat d by Renaud de Cha.tillon's daring Red ea raid of I 182.

{;

,

~~~~\J~;L==:>IJS~ 1--->)j.G..~;-:?JI~.A.Y6~1E. 1'. ,. •

~1~JYOj)L-A'

The ziYOI' and its loading mechanism. This was a large mounted crossbow reinfurced by a wooden frame with taut ropes giving added strength to the arms of the bow. The bolt emerged from a small 'gateway' in the centre of the weapon. From al Tarsusi's late 12th-century military treatise (Ms. Hunt. 26'1, Bodleian Lib., Oxford) See Plate CI.

~:>(.-'0'-,j~-;cI~~-,

IJy~~b~~-,~'p-'6;JL

...:.r

~v~~ 21

Dis({ster (wr! ThlffUP/{ The Khwarazl11shahs Events in the eastern provinCl..-s of Islam had their impact on the Micldlc East evell before the Mongols erupted onto the scene. This area saw a comparable decline in the importance of nomadic Turcoman horse-archery, panicularly artcr the fragmclllalion aCme Great Saljuq empire in the mid-l ~llh ccntury. In the Chaznawid Slate of Afghanistan such troops had never bccn more than one c1CIllClll in a mixed army. The Ghurids who o'"crthrcw this latter dynasty in the second half of the 121h cemury were always famed more for their infamry than their cavalry. Their most original piece ofcquipmclll was the Korwah, which seems 10 have been a very large shield of bullock hide SlUm.-d wilh cotlon which was carried into b."mlc by the fr0l11 rank of troops. It 'IsraAdi)... r <2pt.. ru G................ on., or 'h" -.called Smou ~ thill sro.. p or P.,rsia.. m lICripUl i" ..ow tho.. p, '0 h.,-., 1>«:.. m.d., iD Bas:hd.d .ro d ,Y) '.]00- Som., or th., warrio......·,...r dillti..«i.·.,ly Mo"sol eq..ipm""l, i..dudi"l '!IOrt' armour or hell"" r.,lt. and h...I...."" ..·ith circular earp;"" (Ms. '9-48-,2, Dept. or Ori"",al ADtOq.., British. MIlS, Lend )

22

could also act like a shield·wall to surround an enemy who broke the Churid line. Infantry continucd to playa promincllt role in Afghanistan and the ~'I uslim part of northern India during the 13th century. Ex-Churid infantry were also recorded in the service of the Khwarazmshahs of Transoxania, appearing in the garrison of Samarqand when this city fell to the ~l'Iongols in I '2'20. The core of the Khwarazmshah's army was, however, formed of Turkish mam/Ilks and nomadic but only superficially Muslim Tureoman warriors from the Qjpchaq and Qanqali peoples. The Khwarazmian mam/uks were notably more heavily armoured and rode equally prot<.'Cted horses, which is hardly surprising given the mineral \\'ealth and long-standing arms-manufacluring fame oITransoxania. These warriors, plus their Qjpehaq and Qanqali auxiliaries, were soon to fail against the :\olongols; bUI in 1212 they succeeded in deslroying the Buddhist Q.'\ra Khitai dynasty which had long been occupying much of ~Iuslim Turkistan. The Qara Khitai, though Turks, have been regarded as a Chincsc-inAuenced vanguard of the .:\Iongol hordes that were soon to follow.

The art of post-Mongol 13th-ceIHUI)' Iran generally illustrated the traditional military equipment of this region. Only occa~ionally arc the very different styles of the rccem.ly arrived Mongols portrayed. Warriors arc generally shown within the Saljuq tradition, while more heavily armoured troops, particularly those wearing extensive mail hauberks, probably throw light on Khwarazmian equipment. lfso, then one might say that the arms and armour of Islam's 13th-century central Asian frontier was a development of both Saljuq and earlier styles, grown heavier through long c.,.perience of warfare against increasingly powerful nomadic horse-archers. In Iran and Iraq the long established local armaments industries did not learn to make new forms of Mongol-style arms and armour umil the 14th ceIHury. Even when they did so, they also continued to manufacture traditional shields and other items of equipment for those local dynasties which survived under i\'iongol suzerainty. :--'le"er_ theless, in north-western Iran the prcscnce of a new Mongol capital soon encouraged the expansion of an existing local industry. Sword-making became quite important, though it had been rudimentary prior to 13°0. 13th-century Anatolia and the Caucasus The Qj.pchaq nation which supplied so Illany troops to the Khwarazmshahs dominated the weSH'rn Asian and Russian steppes from the mid-I nh century until the .Mongol conquest. During this period they sometimes seem to have been allied to the Christian kingdom of Georgia. The Qjpehaqs were themselves very mixed, many being Muslim, some Christian and others still Shamanist. Perhaps this alliance lay behind the name 'Khwarazmian' that was given to the finest armours for man and horse in the late 12th- or cady 13th-celltut"y Georgian epic, The Man in the Panthers Skill. This epic tale dates from the time of Queen Tamara, when Georgia grew into a significant power directly involved in Middle Eastern military affairs. It describes a warrior elite that seems to have been equipped and to have fought in a traditional pre-Turkish fashion like that of the country's Iranian, Kurdish, Byzantinc and Arab neighbours. Archery was a princely pastime and was more commonly used in hunting than in wal'. Armour

12th..,,,,,tury Fatimid plate ~huwing a hunts...an wilh a ..tnight sword hanging r.... m a belt wif.h d"corat;'·" p"ndants. (Freer Gall., Washinglon)

consisted of both mail and lamellar, the lamellar tijaushall dearly being comparable to the Muslim jaws/will. Flexible shoulder and upper arm defences called kap'hi again corresponded to the Muslim kaJ!. Some warriors also wore helmcts, coifs and leg defences. The most important weapons appear to have been lance and sword, with occasional mention of mace and lasso. The other Christian nation to be directly involved in 13th-century Middle Eastern wal{are was, of course, that of the Armenians. During the 12th and 13th centuries the heartland of Greater Armenia was under the domination of others, but the new kingdom of Lesser Armcnia in Cilicia and the Taurus !vlountains was at first organised along traditional lines. These were esselltially feudal, as was the army or Lesser Armenia. A highcr nobility of nacltararks wielded an authority almost equal to that of the king, and their military obligations were

12th centuries, the most active migrating to Cilicia and bcyond. Traditional Armenian arms and armour scem to be reflected in the great naLional epic, David rif SaSSOl/lI. Here the warrior wears a padded helmet, a shirt of mail and a lamellar cuirass plus metal leg defences and a large shield, His weapons include sword. spear, bow and arrows, but primary importance goes 10 the mace. Constant reference to such weapons being thrown by horsemen, and even ofa mace pinning a rider's leg 10 his saddle, seem 1'0 suggCSt thai later transmitters of this oral talc might have been confusing the mace gUT,? with a heavy ja\'e1in known in Iran as a gu.<.aT. Ja\"e1in-eombat between horsemen with blullH:d wcapons is still 3 popular game in eastern Turkey, where it is known as un·l.

A list oflt'ading barons attending the coronation of Leon II in 1I g8 mentioned 45 separate holdings. Others were absent from the ceremony, while further areas wcre part oCthe royal desmesne. ~'Iost of the same centres of feudal authority were still memioned in lisls from the early 14th century; ne\'crthe!css. u:on II was to introduce fundamental changes in Lesser Armenian military organisation. The IIachararks lost much oCtheir old autonomy. the Early .2lb-cenlury la,"!euramicfi«ureoh boneman fipting names and functions ofleaders were Latiniscd, and • d"'lI:oo, from Raqqa, S),ria, Note his litrajgbt $word, sq;mentHl hebnel, and Ibe deeo",';on" on bj" a;h.ieJd probably many aspeets of the amlY structure were copied ind.icating a li"piral can_nd,thread "ODstruction.(Nat. Mus., from the Crusader states, particularly from the Oamascu,,) principality of Antioch. not c1carly ddincd. Bencath thcm came the a,?atk, The old system might have been based upon an who held land in return for military scrvice to a archaic warrior societ)', but lhe Armenians had nacharark. Lowcst of all werc the serfs. who toiled in clearly not been backwar'd where the technical hereditary bondage and had 110 military obligation. aspects of warr... rc were concerned. Thcir forIn Cilida this lowest c1aS1l wel'c not necessarily all tifications \I!ere large and imprcssive, if less Armenian. scicmifically planned than those of the Saljuqs and The massive migration fi'OIn Cappadocia and other j'"luslims, Thc Crusaders certainly employed Greater Armenia [0 Cilicia began in the early Armenian siege engineers, one spccinlisl named 1080s, and probably involved privileged classes 'Havedic' (in Latiniscd form) designing machines who had lost status due to thc Turkish conqucst of \ISt"d to attack Tyre in 1124-. By 1296, however, Anatolia. They 1;1I'gely scttled in the eitit-s, while. ivlarco Polo suggested that Armenian PI"OWCSS had their military elite was also strong enough to seize sadlydcdincd. stating that whereas at one Lime they many Taurus castlcs. ~'Iuch of the previous Crcek- wcre worth live of any other nation they were now Byzantinc population oflhe nrea was then expelled. slavish men given to gluttony and drinking. Armenians had, ofcourse, long served in the amlics I'e\"crthelcss, the Cilician kingdom of Lesser of BY'L.3ntium, where they were regarded as good Armenia outlived the Crusader stales in Palestine soldiers but politically unreliable. ~Iany still served and Syria by 72 years. Byzantium. though their status and numbers The main military power in this region before the slc...dily decrcaSt.'d throughout the late I I th and comingofthe l\longols was Ihe Saljuqs of Rum. But

24

The Great Saijuqa (late 11th-early 12th C): 1: Dnunmer 2: Tureom8JIleader 3: Weat iranian Ghulam

A

Th.e Fatimid8(l2th C): 1: Jarw';araya infantryman 2: Arab cavalryman 3: Sibyan aI Rikab

B

3

...-,'.,."

The Atabeg. (12th-early 13th C): 1: Garrison infantryman 2: Tribal hone-archer 3: Ghulam cavalryman

c

The Ayyubids (late 12th- early 13th C): 1: Salab al Din ('Saladin') 2: TawlUIhi cavalryman 3: Guardsman

o

3

Th.e Saljuq. orRum (13th C):

1: AnatolilUl infantryman 2: Hone-archer 3: Ghulam heavy cavalryman

E

2

.

--'

'1

Khwarazmians and Abbaaidl (13th C):

1: Bedouin warrior 2: Iraqi infantryman 3: Khwarazmian cavalryman

F

"

1

AnnenianB and GeorgianB (18th C): 1: Cilician Annenian infantryman 2: Georgian hone-archer 3: Mwdim peasant

G

2

The Mamluks (late 13th-early 14th C): 1: Junior Mamluk horse-archer 2: Mamluk heavy cavalryman 8: Mongolrerugee

H

Saljuq military organisation in Ihe 13th century was dificrcnt fl'om that of the 12th, The Crusaders' capturc of Constantinople and the conccntration of Byzantinc resistance at Iznik (l'icea) in Anatolia led to a strengthening and clarification of the Byzantine-Saljuq frontier. It was also followl.'({ by incrcasl.'d mutual military inOuenccs between the Byzantine 'Empire of Nicea' and the Saljuqs of Rum, Large numbers of alljed and \'assal troops .~ from l\"icea itself, from Annenian Cilicia, Antioch and perhaps Byzantine Trabzon often fought for --• the Saljuqs, The Saljuq ann)' now S(.:cms to ha\·e made extensive usc offield fortifications, and in such a forcr.: nomadic Turcoman warriors would have had only a marginal role. Saljuq militar)' forces were now dearly divided into two parts, an 'Ancient' and a 'New' anny, The former was the traditional structure as seen in Lhe 12th century, and consisted mainly of ghulams and Turcomans, The supply of Greek ghlllatnS greatly • decreased after the consolidation of BY'Lantine Nicl.'a, But an iqla system ofgovcrnmellt fiefs similar to that seen in Ayyubid regions developed, and was subsequently to inAucnce the Olloman timOf structure, "'hese iqlas were offered to leading ghlliams Copy of aJ Sufi'l BooJ.' '" Stllr) m.de in Iraq Or EJypc, AD "3'. and even to defeated foes to gain their loyalty. n" COSt"m" and e.quipmcnl .n ;n Ihl' p.....s.ljuq lraditioa.. The 'New' army largely consisted ofp..'lid or hired fTopk.pi Lib., b;tanbul) soldiers, somc recruited individually, others in groups, Almost all, except for the European Fral!m"ot of a Fatimid ma.u.scripl from FU.lilal, lal" mercenaries, seem 10 have becn known asjira-khuaTs 'lIh "arly ' c",Uury, .ho_inll an infantry ...... rrior with t ....o ja,-e1ins, (Mul. of Islamic Art, Cairo) or ·wage receivers', .\
.

., •

,

..

33

lnr.nlry .... .-rion on lh~ BJUNl!i t:tn'r', (Bril;"h Mu..... Lend...)

m.d~

ill Mosu.l iIl,u)'2J2-

between 300 and 1,000, according 10 differelll sources, and included men from Gemm.lly and Gascony, Normans from soulhern Italy, nonhero Italians, troops from Cyprus and from various Veneuan coastal posst.'SSiolls. Other Europeans scrvcd as pan ofva5S."l1 eonungents. indudingsome 200 from Trab:r.on (r.1240); 1,000 cavalry and 500 crossbowmen from Cilician .Armenia (c. 1225); 300 ·lanccs·. each perhaps a small cavalry unit, from Cilicia plus a furl her 29 lances from Ihe Armenian leader Constamineofl.ampron (c. 1240); 400 lances from By·.t.antine Nieca (c. 1240); and 1,000 supI>oscdly European lances from Aleppo (C.1240). Following their crushing dt:fe'H by the r..fongols, Ihe SaljuCJs of Rum dedined slowly bUI sleadily. Their army remained much as before, although ,Ilere werc dJallges in the rdativc importallcc of its pans. Clltlltmu, though fewcr in number, remained the core of Ihe 'Ancient' army; but the iq(o structure collapsed, to bc I'cplaced by a more strictly feudal systcm. Land was now usually owned by military families and could he pas.'~('d li'om father to son. Turcoman auxiliaries arc rately mentioned, but TUJ'coman jira-klwors or mercenaries became increasingly imporlant. )'1
34

appeared under various names: fi9'01/ 01 'brothedlOods', iJwolls, or in Persian jmlo1/s, which simply meant 'bl'Others'. All S(.'Cm to have been based upon a loosely organised code of religious., civil and military ethics called theJitluwa. l\'lost or such forcc-'S were infantry and almost aU were based upon towns, where they supplemented or even supplanted exisung militias. In Ihcconfusion oflh( Saljuq decline such troops normally found themscl\'es defending their cities againsl the surrounding and barely cOlllrolkd Turcoman tribes. The Tureom:ms had themsch'es previously been concentrated in the no-man's-Iancl het\\'('f'n Saljuq and BY'"L3lltine authorily. Here they had extended ~Iuslim power by dominating the coumryside, leaving towns like islands of By·"..1.ntine lerrilory which, when unsupported by the cemral government, e\,enluall), came to terms with the Saljuq ruler. ::\"ow, benefiting from ~Iongol victories, the Turcoman.s used the same taeuc against Saljuq cilies. which thus had to accept Turcoman o\'erlordship. )'Iuch of the old urban gka;zi class of Ihe fromier regions dcscrtt"d the Saljuqs for the rising power of \'arious Turcoman dynasties, as did warrior refugees from the cast. many religious teachers, dervishes, and e\'en columns of dispossessed peasants. Additional Turkish tribes. some superficially convened 10 Christianity but oth,,!'S still pagan, had also been invited from ....lllhern Russia to wCSlern Anatolia by thc Byzantincs to strenglhen the Empire's own defenel'S. This happened soon after the rulers of Nicea recaptured Constantinople from the Crusaders. By and large, however, the B}"l.antine government nO\", ignored its Anatolian provinces to such an cxtent lhat frontier governors and even emire garrisons, as well as the neglectcd warrior-peasantry, incrc;:L'!.ingly deserted to new M Llslilll gllfl4,i statCS of TUl'coman origin. Traditional .~Iylcs of combat and arms had per.'iislcd among TUl'coman tribes in many parts of Anatolia, and these arc wcJl described in the (probably) laiC 13th-century Book oj Dede Korkul, a Turkish national epic comparable to the Armenian Dmlid lifS'assoltn. Here equipment included coloured shields, swords, long lances, long mail hauberks, helmets, bows, arrows. quivers, daggers and lamellar cuirasses of il'On or hardened lealher. Olher sources confirm thai the lribal Turcomans

werc oftcn well equippcd, up to 20,000 of them supposedly Ix:sic&ring Konya in r262, all wearing jou'sholl cuirasses. Nevertheless, it also seems clear th:ll til(' weight and quality of Anatolian armour had declined since thc great days of lhe Saljuqs of Rum, juSt as the importance of horse-archery had correspondingly increased. Assassins and Caliphs A group of warriors who took part in the tangled military struggles of the ~liddle East in their own pt.'Culiar manner were the so-called Assassins. This name is misleading in its modern connotations, and is also inaccurate in its original derivation. The Isma'ilis of Syria and Iran were originally closely allied to the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt. Both belonged to the 'hi'a branch of Islam and both originally relied as much on missionaries as on soldiers to propagate their beliefs. But the)' also had their differences. The worst of these dcveloped ancr the death of the Fatimid Caliph al ~Iustansir in 109+ His eldcst son Nizar was disposscsst..-d and subsequently murdered in favour of a younger son, a.l ~lusta·li. The Fatimid Caliphate had already largely abandoned auempts at expansionism and had set about rebuilding its prosperity under the guidance of cautious Armenian viziers (see above). Yet the murder of ~izar caused horror among '!iany eastern Isma'ili minOlitics. i\lany now shunned the Fatimids, and bt.-came known as Nizaris. It was they who began the campaign of political and religiolls murder for which they arc chiefly remembered. They wcre also, it should be notcd, greal patrons of literature, theology. poetry ami mystical philosophy. Their first military base was lhe great castle of Alamut in northcrn Iran, The Nizaris of Syria were closely linked to those of Iran and usually lltCcplt'd lhe authority of the Imam
A..... _red an'al.ryn'." 00 • bu, '3(h early '4lh~.uury Ma.rnIu.r. iolaid hroau basi.... ..._.....11: • ~hort lanu,llar CIlira".... (V;C10rd. aDd Albert Mu.... London)

and administrators sUPIX>rtt'd by secondary tia·is. Below these were the rofiqs or 'comradcs', who owed total olx.-diencc to their tia'i. t'\ext came thcfitiQ.'is who WCI'C thc aClivc arm of thc mO\'ement but who had only been initiated inlO the Nizari religious mysteries up to a cel'lain point. They wcre trained Ilot only in combat skills but also in foreign languages and other religions. This enabled them to merge into most cultural backgrounds. a skill that sent ripplcs of lear across the cntire ~'Iiddle East. The Story thaI thc)' fortified their couragc with hashish. thus being termed Iwsltisllill and by derivation 'assassins', is a myth. The lowest rank of active Nizaris werc til<' laJi(/s 01' 'bl'ginners', and below thcm came the l1on·participaling remainder of the community, After Sillan'~ death tile Syrian Nizaris de\'eloped an ('\'ell more sophisticated Strllcture, probably concentrating their training in the castle ofal Kahf, and sub-dividing the tia'; rank into flo'lib (officer), jnllah (wing), flazir (inspector) and waf; (commander of a castle). It is also intercsting LO note the number ofsimilaritics betwccn I\izari organisation and that or the Crusader Templers, Rafiqs wore white tunics with red fillishings. caps and girdles

35

structured Jutuwa was not designed to stop the Crusader advance, ror the Caliphs of Baghdad had little interest in Syrian affairs: AI Nasir's mo....e was simply an attcmpt to eOlllrol powerful and quarreLsomc associations which thrcatcned his that seem astonishingly simila.r to the red and white control of Baghdad. His leadership rna)'. howc,·er, uniforms of the Temple. have lent prestige to the jUlllu·o movemcnt cven Another minor but important participant in the beyond Iraq. struggle for the ~'liddle East was the Abbasid, Sunni The Caliph imposed a degree of ordcr, and ~lusljm, Caliphate of Baghdad. The Abbasids had encouraged practicc with the crossbow (while for centuries been mere puppets in thc hands of trying to ensure that possession or this newly conquerors somc of whom. like the Saljuqs, treated popular weapon depended upon his personal thcm with respect, while somc did not, In the 12th permission). He similarly controlled the use of and early 13th cCllluries, howc....cr, the Abbasid carrier pigeons, which for somc reason wcre also Caliphs gradually regail1t.."(! thcir indcpendence- associated wilh thejidllwo. Finally he tried to ensure though never bccoming morc than thc rulcrs of lhat only he, Ihe Caliph, had thc righl to donate a Baghdad and CClllral Iraq. Thcir small army was particular slyle or trousers called Jarawil of Jutuwo structurcd like thai of otller peuy rulcrs, with which had becomc the mark of such associations. ghllfams, Turkish, Arab and Dlher mcrccnarics and a i\4cmbers ofjillulI:a groups wcrc, like their sworn perhaps larger than normal clcmcnt of ....olunteers. cnemies the !'1izaris, calledfilj'an or rafiqs and were Baghdad, like other cities, had its militia, but led by their kabir 01' 'big onc', Jcws and Christians from this there sprang in the late 12th and 13th could be receivcd as provisional members, but centuries a ncw and rather mystcrious forcc called would only become full mcmbers if they accepted thejililiwa (sec above), The namc had been known Islam. Full members wCl'e then given cloth girdles, for centuries, originally referring to ideals of tribal an initiatory salted drink, and the ceremonial rather than religiolls solidarit)'. Next it was trousers, though weapons were somctimcs subassociatcd with glwzi groups and mystical associa- stituted for these, After the fall of Baghdad to the tions on thc ~Iuslim frontiers. In llth- and 12th- Mongols, Ihe Mamllik Sultans of Egypt continued ccntury Aleppo the term was sometimes syn· thc tradition inlO the carl)' 14th CCIlIUr)'. onymous with lhe alldallt militia, Then, at Ihe end of the 12th century. theAbbasid The MamJuks Caliph al Nasir lOok over Icadership of theJlIluwo The :\1amllik arm)' inlatc 13th·ccntury Egypt and groups in Iraq. Hut he did not turn them inlO a kind Syria dcveloped out of previous Ayyubid forces, It of Islamic reflection or European chivalry, as has was not, however, identical. Although late Ayyubid sometimes been claimed: nor did he make thcm part strength was fonnidable it was also fragmented, the of lhe cx:islillg adminislrati,·c systcm. The ncwly stale being more ora family coalition than a unitary IHtaib from a lal'J:'" I............ ",arly '31-h-«luury cc:nunic dish.

II probably ilIulil.nolH .. ,...,.1 ""',ml, wil-h lb", m.ain chanofters IH:i.DII: D&lDm. 00 th", rill:be, I-h", anaclo.ia& ..--y induct.,. toorHardon'S a.rodja,·",lin ;..c.""ry. O .. I-h", '",fe, a fonrtu is d",fftlded. by .. si"'ll:~p"'" Op"'l'1ued. by .... Arab or P",rsi.an.. Th", casd", .... co........ a "tore of w",apo"s, Iibi",1ds and annours, (F..-r GaIl., Wash;rtJlooj

36

structure. Egypt could field from 10,000 to 12,000 Sh.i,.ld.. .,.....Ofli on Lhe lue 'Uh-ee..lury Bab.t N ....'r pl,. ... Cairo probably "Y'.. boliJle s.eccion" of Lh,. F.titnKl army. The ca"alry under the Ayyubid Sultans al Salih and al kil~"aped "h.i,.ld" ..... jo_oriJ",Ji •• ..sed by i ..f,... n·)". wbile pJa.i1f round IOhield. oniSht be caV1llry d_qds. ~ratN Kamil. Damascus maintained up to 3.000 cavalry >ihiddlO ..·ilb IOtraJSbl li_rds y be lO)"mbols of po"'U, a" under al-~Iu'azzam, but this number included not tailOr _If Olf Lhe pi" of Salad '. aosde at Q.alaal at Jiadi. only the city garrison but also troops from Ilalcstinc, Jordan and southern Syria. Aleppo and northern Jamdari)'}'a regiments. H{" then separated these Syria probably fielded a further 3,000, although a troops from the rest of his arilly on the fortified high proportion of these were auxiliaries. Smaller island of R
37

enemies, the Mongols, as an ideal. When Baybars took control of Egypt the country was host to numerous refugees who had fled the Mongol advance illlo Syria..\·Iost of these, including the mamlltks and free-born troops of the local Ayyubid principalities, later seem to have turned into the Iwlqa or provincial forces of Egypt and Syria. Baybars also inherited the existing mnmluk forces of Egypt and the rcgi menu of previous sultans. So one of his firsl tasks was to formalise the Mamluk army, turning it into one of the most coherent forces in medieval history. He did the same with the state·s fortifications, greatly improving the defences of many cities. There was no purge of previous Ayyubid officers. and additional free-born warriors were still enlisted, though no longer into the elite regimcnts. Kurdish and Turcoman officers continued, for examplc, to pl.ay an important rolc in Syria; but the main source of frcc·born troops was now Turco-!\Iongol rcfugces who, for yarious reasons, flcd from Mongoltcrritory. These warriors, known as wafidiyJVl, already had their own techniques and mctics, and somc 3,000 arriyed in The Bab T"..... pIe or O".....K""" b"ill in AD '227.

Syria during the rcign of Baybars. They were not, however, permitted to retain a separate idenrity but were generally attachl...d to the royal mamlltk regimcllls or those of the amirs. Thc central army ofthc Mamluk state, based in Egypt, was now divided il1\o thrcc parts; the sultan's nmmluJ,:s, the mamlltks of the amirs (officers), and the Iwlqa. These latter were mostly free-born cavalry on lower pay than the mamlulu and were, in effect, an Egyptian 'provincial' army. Comparable halqa troops were stationed in Syria. The)' were commanded by officers who normally also held iqla fiefs, the sizesofwhich corresponded to their ranks. Such officers were amir mi'a (Ilominall)', leader of 100) or muqaddam aif. who in reality commanded 1,000 troopers in battle, perhaps because these men were subdivided under junior officers. Ne.xt came the amir arba'in, sometimes called amir tablkhanah or amir kabir, who led 100; and the amir 'Qsluzra who k-d len. Temporary field units of about 40 men were commanded by muqaddamu al llalqa. Vcr)' senior officers held iqtas which could support up to 250 men. This sYSlem was, howeYcr, by no means rigid. and yaned according to circumstances. The sultan's personal mam/Ilks, the backbone of

his army, (Olalled around 2,000 men under some 40 officers in the early Mamluk period, but rose to ahnost 10,000 by the end of the 13th CClltlll)'. Almost all senior officers and leaders of expeditions were drawn from this elite force. \Vhen a new sultan came to power the momlllks of the previous ruler lost prestige but were not necessarily purged. Generally they were transferred to the service ofother officers as on/ir's momlllks. While the new ruler built up Ius own momlllk following, a few older mamlub would generally be retained bcc..'l.use of their experience. But these SO)jiya, as they were known, now served as individuals in the highlycompetitin MamJuk court h. AD. '3:1lbe bu~e Temple e>rBeI i.. Tudmir W>I~ luraed iDle>. and consequently posed no political threat. fe>rt~s lodd'end tbis Slral~icall)'";Ia.! oal>;5. lis ......... doc>r;¥ Finally there was the khassa},:iya, lhe ruling pl"Olened by a s;mple macbicolation.. sultan's personal bod)'guard of between 400 and 1,200 men. Only they carried swords at all times. the Crusaders, and being in the process ofconfining Their dutit'S werc also ccremonial and political, the ~Iongols and overcoming various lesser foes scnior officers and ambassadors nann ally being within the J\liddlc East, the .\Iamluks were among chosen from their ranks. Naturally there was great tJle most successful troops of tJleir day. Their rivalry between such mamlllk units. but this did not superior paLterns of logistics, annaments and reach the murderous intensity of latcr years. discipline were to provide the foundation of a Thc role ofsurviving Ayyubid pett y principalities military tradition ul>on which latcr ~Iamluk and in S)'Tla and thcJazirah cannot be ignored. J\'!any OHoman successes wcre to be built. Kurdish troops left Egypt after the initial Mamluk I n this constantly refining tradition the role of takeover in 1250 and transferred their allegiance to cavalry was clearly paramount. Although infantr)' lhesc Ayyubid rulers. Smaller numbers of these were still considert"<1 important, horsemen borc the princes returned to S)'ria under Mamluk suzeraillly brunt of oflcnsive warfare and large·scale manfollowing the Mongol defeat at AynJalut in 1260. oeuvre in which their speed, striking I>ower and the The princes of Hims retained their own army until weight of their wealxHls were considered superior. 1263, of Karak until 1286 and of Hama until 1341. Since offencc was their primary role it is not Such forces were, however, never as powerful as the surprising to find that mosl late 13th- or early t4thmain Mamluk units garrisoned at Damascus and CC!Hury i\4amlukJiml~V!{/ training manuals laid as Aleppo. much emphasis on lbe usc of the lallcc as on the The overall size orthe Mamluk army is hard to bow. SuchJlirusO'(/ manual.~ also show thaI archery determine. I t might have becn as great as 16,000 was nOI in the nomadic Turcoman slyle, but was mamfllks and 24,000 !In/qu. Their level of training again a development or earlicr Byzantine and tendcd to be very high, improving steadily from the Abbasid tradilions. late Ayyubid period into the carly [4th century. Mamluk mOllllled archers w(~re trainl..'(] to shoot The revival, to a high standard, of traditional fi'om hOl'Seback, if need be in all directions. "'''hen archery tcchniques was central to Mamluk this was donc on lhe move it generally secms to havc successes over the Mongols at Ayn Jalut (1260), been Irol11 dose rauge, as dcmonstrated in an Hims (1281) and Shaqhab (1303). This was exercise known as the qabaq in which the targcl was refil.."Cted in Mamluk tactics, which nonnally placed placed on topofa pole. An even doser-range type of mom/uk archers at tJ1e centre with bedouin horse·archcry was practised in lIle qighoj exercise: auxiliaries on one wing and Turcomans 011 the herc a targct lay 011 the ground. and was apparcntly Olher. Mamluk tactics and technology Kere shot at as the ridcr almost rode over it. These were essentially a refinement of those of the Ayyubids. By clearly not harassment techniquc:s, but shock the end of the 13th century, having finally defeated tactics. 39

Of' course, the Mamluk Siale also cmploycd light cavalry. The majority of such troops would havc bccntribal allxiliaric'i. Herc onc might find thc only rcal survival of Central Asian nomadic archcry tcchniques, for many Turcoman as well as Kurdish tribes werc paid 10 protect Ihe frontiers of Syria, Paleslincand Lebanon. Compa.rableArab bedouin tribes were cngab"Cd to watch the borders of Syria, Sinai and EK)'pl. The true infantry of the \'Iamluk Slate seem 10 have 1x."Cn either locally recruiled or drawn from the ranks of junior momluJcs. Unlike their aristocratic European foes, or even Ihe \-Iongols, all rntlmluks were also trained to fight on fool. A great variety of equipment was listed as being used by such infantry, many of the nOIHnomluk clements of which seem to ha\'c been archers drawn from the settJed communities of Syria, Palcstine and Lebanon, One area of warfare that was clearly the business of infantry was pyrotochnics, The \Iuslims had greally expanded the Q1;ginal oil-based Byzantine firc wcapons, and habitually made use of nofl'Grock Fire' which was often projected through a copper tube. Other variations included largc or small qaru1Q fire-pots full of Rofl, which were either thrown by hand or shot out of sicge-cngines; and sihnm khita'i;'O or 'Chinese arrows', which had cartridges of nofl attached to them. A major devclopmclII camc around 1230 whcll knowledge of saltpetre reached the Nliddle East from Central Asia. !\ primiLivc form of gunpowder was soon in lise, combining ten parts of saltpctre, two of charcoal and onc and a half of sulphur. This was, confusingl)' enough, still rdcrrcd to as 1/afl; and was incorporated into inccndiary weapons based upon previous devices, Whethcr or not this primitive gunpowdcr \"'as used as COlrly ali 1300 to propel a projcclilc, 01' (more probably) to spray a form of grapeshot from a fixcd position, remains a hotly debatl.."d qllcSlion.

MOSI o( lbe >Iurvhi.aft de(~e6 al S"'rz-r ("'ft) dale fro_ Za.nSid or lalU umu. This room (1'((..,) i .. abo"e the msi.. pn and ..h ...... pan o( lbe pori cum.. m~sm.

which came to predominate from the late 13th century. The Is.lamic sword had always been considered a cutting rather than a thrusting weapon, J n earlier celHuncs most had been relatively shon, straight and nOIHapering, except in eastern Iran and Transoxania where an almost straight, single-edged longsword sccms to ha\'c been popular. The date of the first appearance of the disLincuy curved sabre in Islam is debatable. The \,'eapon had its origins in Turkish Central Asia but was IlOt widespread in Islam until after the Saljuq eonqucst. Yet a few such weapons had clearly been imported into thc M lIslim area prior to lhis date; onc has recently been excavated at Nishapur. From the early 12th century onwards the sabre was the most popular form of sword in caMcrn and central regions, although sLraight swords did lIot disappear. The mace was primarily all annoUl'·breaking weapon, and its gl."Ographical spread may Lhus be significant. II was, in fact, most common in lhe Iranian and Turkish provinces, and Irolll there it spread westwards, rcaching Christian Europc via Byzalllium and Islam. The lance was traditionally regarded illlhe Arab world as a walTior's most reliable weapon. Its slatus was almost as high among Iranians, and it was nOI (!IIf! neglected b)' nomadic Turks despite their primary reliance on horse-archery. All these peoples used the Central Asian influences had the most imponant weapon in a variety of ways on horseback, being effects Oil \'Iiddlc Eastern anns and armour from more \'ersatile than their European foes. Cavalry the II th to 14th centuries. These most obviously spears were normall)' shorter Ulan those of lhe showl..-d themselves in the sabre or curved sword, infantry, which probably indicalCS that the laller

Arms

Arlllolir

It was recorded in Iraq and IraIl as early as tbe loth century but, after a lapse of some 400 years, it had also reappeared in EUl"Ope at around the same lime. There is liltle evidencc to suggest that this later crossbow reached Chrislendom via Islam, or vice \'crsa. From the I llh to 13lh centuries flexible annours were regarded as the best proteclion, This was a response to existing mililary circumstances and was nOI a result of technological decline. Muslim annourers could dearly work with large pieces of metal plate, as is shown in Ihe design ofhelmets. Nor were flexible mail or metal lamellar annours necessarily light, though leather lamellar and 'soft' annours sudl as quilted gannel1ls were clearly lighter. The popularity of lhese latter slyles of defence could also betray a local povcrt)' in metal resources, bUl generally indicated a lactical emphasis on speed of manoeuvre. Leather lamellar was also often worn in conjullction with mail. Lamellar offered a graduated shock-absorbing prolcction against arrows and would, under most circumstances, bc morc effective than plate annour of comparable weight, Nevertheless, hauberks of mail and, more rarely, of scales remained lhe most widespread fonn of protl."Clion in lhe ccnlral used such wcapons as pikes. Thc qanah, forex:ample, :\'Iuslim lands until the 12th centul)'. \Vhen padded was lhe longest t\luslim spear and it firsl appeared by a soft armour, mail remained lhe besl weight-forasan infanlry weapon. Only later was il adopted by weight prOlcclion against a sword·cUl and cven, horsemen, in whose hands il was COnlrasted wilh perhaps, against a hand-held spear, the shoner and stouler qlllllarv'a)1 of RomanoUmillhe 14lh cemury Islam might have been in Byl.ant.inc origiu. advance of Europe where protection for arms and, Polearms for cut and thrusl are the least clear to a lesser degree, legs was concerned. This was form of weapons in medieval Islam, but their usc is particularly true in easlern regions, and probably funhcr evidence for the continued importance of rcnccted the grcater limb·sevcl'ing capabililies ofa infantry. A clearly documented reliance on infantry cLllved sabre compared with the bludgeoning javelins in many arcas may renect a limited impact of a E.uropean hroaclswOI·d, development of infantry archery, allhough lhis The variety of terms relating to Muslim helmets seems to be contradicted by olher evidence. StOCl1l to reflect a genuine variclY of forms and Altcrnatively it could suggest the continuing methods of construclion. Thcse ranged from Ihe exislence of disciplincd infantry forces who uscd one·piece iron b(1)'doh of oval form, through the such weapons against both cavalry and Dlher segmented lark, to the kJllld (which seems to have infantry. consisted at least in part of hardened leather). The The arrow-guide, lIawak or majra. might be mighfar was a mail coif: regarded as a precursor of the crossbow, at least in 1\1051 Muslim shields were round, but kite· the Middlc East. Its origins arc unclear, and shaped vatielies were known in lhe :\Iiddle East aJlhough il spread from lhe cast it reached no from Ihe late I I th to cMly t4th centurics. Their further lhan Egypt. The Irue crossbow also came origins are disputed: and while the small hand-held from lhe cast, from China, but in pre-Islamic timcs. loriqah vanety might have shown Byzantine

4'

helmet, the mail aventail, the COt lon-padded (lke/Oll, hardened leather and later IUbular metal limbdefences, the jaterall! (from k~ogllalltl), various scale-lined chest and abdomen defences worn beneath a hauberk, horse-armour, the winged (i.e. flanged) mace, the light horseman's axe, and the counterweight mangone! known as a trtbralltl. This lalter siege engine emerged in the ""Iiddle East during the 12th century as a development of the widespread man-powered mangonel, but it is as yet impossible to say whether it was a B)'7.antine or a Muslim invention. Further Reading A huge number of books have been written about the Crusades. Far fewer concentrate on the Muslim side of the struggle while fewer still focus on military mailers. The following is a selection of specialisl works, some of them obscure and difficult to find but ncyerthclcss cxtremely useful.

Saladia'. «real ..._alAin-top ca.tle of Qala.al a1 Ju.di o~·.. rlook"lh........i .. piIS';'" roul .. ac..-.Sin.lU. This sho_oa.. of.1 leallt three u..d .. ~round wal ..r lIlono!!,. ml ..ra,., vila) in lIud> • dese.rt ........

influence, thejallllwi.J·a/l, a tall infantry shield with a f1atlened base, might have stemmed from Italy and more pal'licularly from Cenoa. This city was certainly a major exporter of military hardware to the Middle East. \Vritlen sources show lhat the usc of horsearmour never died oul in Islam, bUl it is almost entirely abscnt li'om the pictorial record until the 13th celltury. Some bards wcrc quilled or of felt, others being oftllc same doth-covered and padded mail construction as the man-covering ktu.aglul1ld. Lamellm· horse·annonr was, ulllil the latc 13th century an eastern fashion. ~lal\Y of the developments seen in EUfOpean weaponry during this period seem to follow those of Islam after a gap of one or two generatiOiu. This is not to say thaI all had Muslim origins, though some dearly did so. The most obvious ca.ndidates for some degree of Islamic influence are the bascintl

D. Ayalon, 'Studies in the Structure of the Ma.mluk Anny'. Bulldin of tilt School of Orimtal olld AJri€on Stru!iu XV1'2 (1953). pp. '203--'228 A. Rombaci, 'The Army of the Saljuqs of Rum', Istituto orimta/~ di ..Napoli: !hmali ns XXVIII ('978 ). pp. 343-:169 A. Boudot- Lamotte, Contribution Ii l' Etllde de l'Archtrie Musulmone (Damascus 1968) C. Cahen, ·Un Traite d'armureric compose pour Saladin·, Bulldin d' Etudu Orimtalts X II (1947-48), pp. 10 3- 1 '26 M. Canard, ·La Procession du Nouvel An chez Its Fatimidcs', Allllo/es dt I'lnstilu! du til/des Orienta/u de 10 Faeull! diS ullres d'Alger X (1952), pp. 3 64-398 A. S. Ehrcnkreutz, Saladill (Albany (972) R. Elgood (cdil.), Is/m"i. !lrlllS01ul AnI/our (London '979) N. Elissedf, Nllr a/ Din: U1I Grand Prince Musu/mall de Spie au Ttmps du Croisades (Damascus (967) H. A. R. Gibb, 'The Al'mit'S of Saladin', Colliers d' His!oirt I::c.,/Itinmt III (195 I), pp. 304-320 P. H. Hitti (trans.), Mtmoires of an Arab-S)'rio1/ Gmt/allan (Usama/l ibn Munqidll) (reprim Beirut

'9(4) R. S. Humphreys, 'The Emergence of the Mamluk Anny', Studio Islamico XLV (1977)) pp. 67""'99 &

147- 182

E. McEwen, 'Persian Archery Texts: Chaptcr Eleven of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's Adab al Harb (Early Thirteenth Century)', Th~ Islamic Quart"!}> XVIII (1974), PI'· 76-99 D. C. Nicolle, 'The Impact of the European Couched Lance on Muslim Military Tradition', ]oul7UJl oJlh~ Anns01l(} Armour Socielj' X (1g80), pp. 6-40 V.J. Parry & M. E. Yapp (edits.), War, Taluwlof!.)' and Socid)' in th~ Middle East (London 1975)

J.

Sourdel-Thominc, 'Les Conscils du Sayh al· Harawi a un prince Ayyubide', Bulletin dEludes Orimtoles XV11 (lgGt--62)

Tile Plales J111r-~orly 12th cmJury) A,: Drumm" AILhough war-drums played a major role in Saljuq and other Muslim annics, drummers do not appear to havc been distinctively dressed. This unamlOured man wears simplc Turco-Iranian costumc with a felt cap and a heavy woollen coat. (Lustre tile,latc t2th-carly 13th C Iran-Mus. of fine Arts, Boston; lustrc tile, late 12th C Iranfreer Gall., II .319, Washington; A1aqamal, AD 1237 Baghdad-Bib. Nat., ~'ls. Ar. 5847, Paris; Automnla, '.AI) 1206 Jazirah-Topkapi Lib., Ms. Ahmad 111.2115, Istanbul.)

A: The Creal So.ljuqs (10k

A2: Tur(o(noll {tader This Illan is shown in the costullle of the nomadic regions ofTurkcswn, and represents a newcomer to the Muslim world. His helmct is made of directly riveted segments, and hc wears a light form of leather lamellar cuirass covering only the front of his alxlolllen. His weapons arc based on examples found in pagan Turkish graves. (Also, Pecheneg 'balbal' memorial statucs, I Ith-12th e-ill situ Dneiper region.)

I.. 1216 th.. d ..rr:Dr:.... or Ajtua castl.. Wr:r.. !~t1y nn:DKw"...... Maay or tt>... Dew d.,ambe ... had arrow..lits ill rec:u.aplar r""..SM:S hiK cnouKh 10 hou_ .. =i)'IU or r.... mc-mounted erO>lsbow.

coif and an iron cuirass which is half-way between scale and lamellar construction. (Helmct of probablc Islamic origin, 11th-12th C IranArchacolog. Mus., Blidapest; armour fragments, 9th-12th C Khirgiz-presclll location unknown; fi·csco rragments, loth-II th C Nishapur---i\'lel. Mus. of Art, Ncw York; bronze inlaid mirror, 11th-12th C Iran-Louvre, Paris; wall paintings, AI) 1096 Georgian-ill si/II Iprari, Georgia; carved relier, mid-I Ith C G<..'Orgian-ill situ Nicorl.minda, Georgia.)

.43: West Irallion Chulam B: Th~ Fatimids (12111 unJury) This professional warrior of slave ongm dcm- B,: ]orwajara]o inJalltIJ7nall onstrates the contrast between the ghulams and the This man, as a volunteer, hassimplecquipment and tribal Turcomans within Saljuq annics. Hc is his costume is that of a civilian. Most such heavily annoured in the best avaiJable equipment: volunteers would not evcn carry swords. One of his a decorated one·piecc helmet, a face·co\·cring mail javelins is clearly designed to pcnetratcarmour; and

43

Mus., Boch'um; lustre plates and fragments, I nh-12th C Egypt-Mus. of Islamic Art, Cairo; fragment of cnamelled glass, lOth-11th C EgyptBcnaki Mus., Athcns.) B3: Sib)'fw at Rikab This splendidly dressed soldier, whosc title means 'young man of the (ruler's) stirrup', was one of the Fatimid Caliph's closest bodyguards. He carries a parasol, long a symbol of authority in the Middle East, which is based upon a detailed description of one carried in Fatimid parades. nder his embroidered tunic he wears a mail hauberk, and tinder his IUrban an iron helmet with a shagrecncovered aventail. (Painted wooden ceilhlg, CAl) 1140, Siculo-Islamic--in situ Cappella Palatina, Palenno; can'ed wooden panels from Caliph's Palace, 11th C Fatimid-~Ius. of Islamic Art, Cairo; reliefcan'ing, C.,\ll 1087 Fatimid-in silu Bab al Nasr, Cairo; painted paper fragmenlS, II th~12th C Fatimid-Mus. of Islamic Art, Cairo; carved i\'ory plaque, toth-I Ith C Fatimid-Louvre, Paris; embroidered garment, Fatimid-Coptic Mus., Cairo.)

Tb~

Bab ZlIwayLa gal~ i .. Syriao ;nfluences, and "';II" part of new ,non~ defence.. thai r~placed nrlicr brick walb. intuior of tile

Cairo. II

lal~ 11t"-e~..tllry

r~O~lI Arn,~.. i.a.....d

his shield is of lhe tall f1at·based jaTluwari.J>ah type. (Relief carvings, C.,\I) 1087, Fatimid-ill situ Bab al Nasr, Cairo; Coptic Gospel, AI) 1179-80, Egyptian-Bib. NUl. Ms. Copt. 13, Paris; javelins from Serce Liman wreck, loth-carly I I th C lslamic-Castle jV' tis., I~rum; cotton tunic, Faumid Coptic rvlus., Cairo.) B2: limb callalT)'fflt/1/ This mailed horseman, perhaps from the Asqalan garrison, shows the degree of similarity betwecn Fatimid and southenl European warriors. His shield and gaiters seem almost BY.lantinc, while his decorated belt shows a long-standing Turkish influcnce. The leather chamfron on his horse's head may be more dt..'Corativc than protcctive. (Painted paper fragment from Fustat, early 12th C EgyptDept. ofOriellt. Amiq., Brit. Mus., London; sword from SCTCe Liman shipwft..'Ck, 10th-II th C-Castle

c: The Atab~gs (121h-~ar'.J 13th ((nturies) CI .. Garrisoll infalllr;'n/tln Once again this mall shows the similarity between East and West, almost all his equipment mirroring that of ncighboul'ing Byzantium. The long scarf across his chest appears in many pictorial sources and may represent an ullwollnd tllrhan. The large framc·mountcd cros.<;oow or z!yar is shooting firepots. (Carved relief, AI) 1233-59 Iraq-in situ Al Han,Jabal Sinjar; carved relicf, ,\0 1233-59 Iraqnow destroyed, Amadiyah; Syriac Gospels, early 13th Cjazira-V,ltican Lib. Ms. Syr. 559, Rome & Brit. Lib. i','Is. Add 7170, London; Warf/a ILIa Gil/shah, laLC 12th-early 13th C AzarbayjanTopkapi Lib. Ms. Haz. 84,1, Istanbul.) C2: Triha/lwrse.auhtr This dismounted Turcoman wears a typically Turkish doublc·brcastcd coat over a mail hauberk; his fur-lined hat was a mark of the warrior aristocracy. His bow includes a majra arrow-guide to shoot short dans. This is bast.-d on written descriptions, as no pictures seem to cxisl. (Kilab at Dil)'aq, mid-13th C i\losul-Nal. Bib. AF.IO.

Vienna); ceramic figure, 12th C Raqqa-Nat. Mus., Damascus; ceramic bowl, £"A]) 1228 IranFreer Gall, no, 43.3, Washingtoll; Matm'a Mtdica, ...D 1224 Iraq-Freer Gall. no. 575121, Washington.)

Cj'- Chula1Tl clII:alr;WIlIn Beneath his amlOur, this warrior's costume is essentially in the same Turco-Iranian f:-.shion as the Turcoman's. His painu.-. d one-piece iron helmet has a gilded le,ather neck-guard. His leather lamellar cuirass is still relatively light, but he carries both an animal-headed iron mace and a curVl.-d sabre. A heavier straight-bladed sword is also thrust beneath his saddle. (Kilab al Aglumi, ... Il 121 7118 lraq--j\,·at. Lib. ~Is. 579, Cairo; shield-boss, late 12th C Khurasan-Lou\'re, Paris; ceramic bowl and tile, late 12th--carly 13th C Iran-Mus. of Fine Arts, Boston; lI'arqa wa Culs},ah, late 12th-carly 13th C Azarbayjan-Topkapi Lib. ~Is. Haz. 8.p. Istanbul.) D.- The Ay)'Ubids (late 121h tar'.1ljth centuries) DI: Saladin

Here the great ~Iuslim leader has the yellow cap, white shawl, mail coifand mail-lined J.·a~aghafld that he was onen described as wearing. The ka~aghand looked like a civilian garment but still ga\"C discrcct protection from an Assassin's knife. In the background is a mangonel of so-called Arab style. (Ceramic di~h, 12th C Egypt-Freer Gall. no. 4-1. I '2, \Va~hington; ceramic dish, C.An 1228 IranFreer Gall. no. 43.3, Washington; Maqamat, AD 1242-58 Iraq-Sulcymaniye Lib., Ms. l::sad Effendi 2916, Istanbul; so-callcd 'Sword ofSaladin'Askeri Ylus., Istanbul.)

London; sword-bell, mid-13th C Syria-Bcnaki Mus. inv. 1900-44, Athens.)

D3: G'uardsman There was much similarity in the ceremonial of eastern Islamic palace troops, this being a mixture of Ir.illian and later Turkish I::lShions. It spread to Egypt after the Ayyubid takcover. This man wears no armour, although his headgear rna)' have been a fonn ofhc1met. Ceramic figure, 12th C RaqqaNat. ),Ius., Damascus; lI"arQlld Mtdicilltl11anuscript fragment, An 1'1'2 Iraq-Royal Asiatic Soc., London; Maqamat, AI) 1242 58lraq-Suleymaniye Lib. ~Is. £sad Effendi 2916,lstanbul; inlaid bronze bowl, mid-13th C Syria V & A ~Ius. no. 74018gB, London; bronze war-hammer, 11th-13th C lran-Keir Coli. nos. 105 & loG, London.)

£: Thr Saljuqs rif Rum (Ijth crnlury) £1.- AnQlolian i,!fanlr;71ultl This man is probabl}' of Greek origin. His armour looks Bp!:antine, though such styles were also popular in the Balkans and southern Russia. His mail shirt, with an extension to protect the bUllOCks, would seem to ha\'e been originally made for a horseman. His double-cnded spenr is. howevcr. an Iranian-style {/lupin. (Carved relief from Konya, 13th C Saljuq-~llIs. of Turkish Art, Istanbul; bronze candlestick, late 13th C inlaid

The Bab Qinillrin ill the belle preserved noedieval gale iD Aleppo'l; w_II". Unlike lhe gill.,.,. ofCai..... llnd Baghdad ie hali;ll 'ben!' "nlran,,,,,, whkb mighl indkllle ehe grelll"r Ihrt:1l1 of Crusllder lIu_d. f"l1 by Aleppn in Nur.1 DiD'.. lim".

/)2: Toltloslti cavalrynan A minority of Ayyubid u'oops were equipped as heavily armOUl'l.-d horsemen for close combat. This man's helmct may be of European oribrin, His mail a\'entail is covered with silk and O\'er his mail haul>crk he wears a relatively large iron lamellar cuirass. His horse wears a bard of doubled felt, giving some protcclion from arrows. (Ceramic fragment, 12th C Egypt-lk.naki Mus., Athens; inlaid bronze bottle, cady 13th C Jazira-Freer Gall. 110. 41.10, \\'ashinglon; inlaid bronze bowl, mid-13th C Syria-V & A ~tus. no. 740- 18gB,

45

The Bab al Waliuoni ;5 lhe only liurv1vinlll lIlate or medie'..... Ba«bdad. II """'Ii buill or brick in lraditiona.lmqi .Iyle by lhe Calipll al MlI.. t ...... h.id in At) I'~

Nat., Paris; Gospel, mid-13th C AmlcnianMatenadaran J\1s. i651, Yerevan.)

Azarba)jan-Louvrc, Kocchlin Coli. no. 3436, Paris; wall-painungs, laic 1'llh and early 131h C Christian an under Saljuq rult..~in Rlu Chapels 19, 22 & 23, Gorcmc.)

F.-

£2: Horse-arc"" This warrior is probabl)' rrom the beuer-equipped aristocracy or an C;lstern Anatolian Tureoman lIibc. His weaponry shows inAuCIlCC rrom both the Caucasus and the Pcchcncg tribes to the north. 1\losl sueh tribal warriors would nOI have possessed mail hauOCI·ks. (FI'agmcllI or gilded glass, 12th C Anatolia-Brit. Mus., London; carved relier, Ilth~13th C Daghcslan-Mct. t\lus. or An, New York; embossed silver bowls, late 12lh-eaJ'ly t3th C Byzantinc or Ccorgian-Hcnllitagc, Leningrad.)

E3: Gllllililll healD' c(lI!alrym(]1I Although Ihis trooper seems to bemly Byzantine slyles, the Byzantine regions were Lhemselves now under strong Saljuq influence. His lall shield is dearlyorWcslcrn inspiration, but his simplclcathcr cuirass is purely Turkish. His tall scgmenled helmel is in Central Asian style. (Helmet, 131h-141h C Kuban Stale Hist. J\lus.. in\'. 343/33, l\'loscow; ceramic bowl, late 12th C Raqqa-Dahlem Mus., Berlin; Syriae Gospel, ,\I) 1226 Jazirah-Bishop's Lib., ~Iidyat; Bor/f/om and Joasnph, 13th C BY-Lantium-King's Coil. Lib., 1\ Is. 338, Cambridge; coin. latc- 12th early 13lh C Anuqid-Bib. 46

Khwar~m"ans

and Ahhasids (13th untury) warrior Arab tribesmen rarely adopled Irani an or Turkish styles. Simple mail hauberks seem to have been Ihe prcferno--d protcction, long spears and swords hung rrom baldrics the most common weapons. (Maqamar, AD 122:)-50 1\losul-Bib. NOlL, Mss. Arabc 3929, 5847 & Gog4, Paris; Chronic/to!Ancit1lt NaliollS, ,0.0 1307/8 Tabriz Uni\'el':l:ifY Lib., Edinburgh; Univnsal History, ,\n 1306--14 Tabriz (ex-Royal Asiatic Soc., London.)

/0',.-

B~douill

f2: Iraqi i'!fa"tr)'lllan 'rhis warrior, probably or Arab origin, carries two Abbasid banners saved li'om a dereat althe hands or the Mongols. He wears a short kilt over his hauberk and has a bag or provisions over his shoulder. (Maqalllal, An 1237 Baghdad-Bib. Nat., Ms. Arabc 5847, Paris; Ki!ab (II S/ljar, All 1130 Iran or EgyptSuleymaniyc Lib., Ms. Ahillct III 3493, Istanbul; swords, mid-13lh \?) C Iraq Topkapi Armoury, Istanbul.) F3: KI,waraz",t"fm r(fvahylllill

The horsemen or Transoxania seem to have been th(' most thoroughly armoured in eastern Islam. This man we.ars 11 helmet with a hinged visor or Central Asian origin, a mail hauberk and a large iron lamellar cuirass wilh hardened lea meT lassets. His sword is of a straight 1rani an form, while his

horse is fully protccted by an iron chamfi'on and lcather bare!. (Gildcd quillons, t3th-14th C IfanCity An Mus., 5t Louis; iron chamfron, helmct, \·isor and hauberk, 12th-13th C south RussiaState Historical ~"uscum, Moscow; carv(:d stucco panel, 12th-13th C Imll Art Mus., Sealtle: ceramic plate, late nnh early 13th C Iran-~Ius. of Art, Toledo, Ohio; car\'ed stucco plaque, 13th C Iran-Art Insl. ni\'crsil)'. Chicago; S!uJhnamah, (..-\D 1300 Iraq-Mel. ~Ius., Rogers Fund Gg.74.8, New York.) G: AnnO/ions and CeorgiQIU (131h unlury) GI: Cilician AnnOlion inJanlrytllOl1 The kingdom of Lesser Armenia was. by the 13th century, virtually one of the Crus...der States, and its warriors were under strong \Vestcrl1 influcnce. Only this man'sslightly cun'cd sabre sets him apart from his European contemporaries. (Sabrc, 12th-13th C Armcnia-Archaeolog. Inst. Acad. of Sciences, Leningrad; Gospels, A1) 1318 ArmeniaMatenadamn Ms. 206. Yerevan; Gospels, C.,\\) 1270 Amlenia-Fn:er Gall. M. 32-18, Washington; Gospels, AI> 1262 Armenia-Walters An Gall. ~·ls. \OJ 539, Baltimore; Histoirt Unil.'erselle, C.,\I) 1286 Acre-Bril. Lib., Ms. Add 15268, London.) C2: Georgia" Iw,se-areher Georgia had long been under Irani an and Islamic in(luence. but by the 13th century Turkish styles werc dominant. This is shown in .a lightly l..'<)uipped horseman who is virtually indistinguishable from his Muslim neighbours. (Coin of Quccn Turakina, late 13th C Gcorgia-Ray Gardner Coil., London; carvcd n:licfs on stone crosses, liD 1233 and IIIl 1279 Anncnia-Mus. of Armenian Art, Etchmiadzin; manuscript ofal Siwasi, ,\D 1272, Saljllq AnatoliaBib. Nat., Ms. Anc. Fonds Pel's. 174, Paris.) G3: Muslim juos",,1

The costume of the Arab peasantry of the Middle East has barel)' changed to this day, except that the basic JisMashah tunic appears to havc varied in length. (Ki/ah 01 IJiry'aq, ,\Ill I99Jazirah-Bib. Nat., to.'ls. Arabc 2964, Paris; Maqamal, AI) 1237 Baghdad-Bib. Nat., ~h. Arabe 5847, Paris; Arabic Gospel, AO 1299 Jazirah-Bib. Laur., Ms. OriCIll 387. Florence; Kiloh 01 Diry'llq, mid-13th C Jazirah-Nal. Bib., Ms. AF 10, Vienna.)

H: ThL Itt/am/uks (Ialil 13th-carl)' 14th ettl/llly) HI: Junior maml/lk horst-archer This young warrior, wearing no armour while in lraining, would probably look much the same on campaign if he was acting as a lightly l'Quipp<:d skirmisher. He would thcn wcar some kind of mail beneath his co.'1l. His quiver has an opening in the side, perhaps for short arrows used wilh a mojra arrow-guide. (Inlaid bronze basin, mid-13th C Syria-V & A to.lus., no. 74o-18gB, London; 'Baptistcre de St Louis', C.AI) 1300 Egypt-Louvre, I}aris; Kilnh 01 SuJar, early 14th C Egypt Brit. Lib., ~Is. 01'. 5323, London.) 112: Mamluk h,avy eaM/ry'T1la1l The heavily armoured elite of the l\lamluk army was strongly in(luCllced by ~Iollgol and eastern Islamic fashions. This is particularly noticeable in this man's heavy lamcllar cuirass. Some pictorial sources show what might be (Ioppy fclt hats (as here) bUI which could also be intcrpreted as ehnJxIdL-:!er helmcts of European form. Note the Mamluk heraldic devicc all thc man's gaiters. ('Baptistcre de St Louis', c....1) 1300 Egypt-Louvre, Paris; inlaid brass tray, carly 14th C Egypt Mus. of Islamic Art. Cairo; inlaid brass bowl, late 13th C EgyptStaatliche ~I usccn. Berlin; Coptic Gospel, An 1249/59 EgYPI-JllSt. Catholique, Ms. CopteArabe I, Paris; cnamelled glass (Iask, mid·13th C Egypt Brit. Mus., no. Gg.I·20.3, London; inlaid bronze pcn-c.tSC, ,\I) 1304 Syria-Louvre, Paris. H3: Mongol rifllgu A heavily laycrcd fclt coat was the most common Mongol protection, but this man also wcars a scalc cuirass. The hooked spearhead only seems to have been used by these pcople; and the round pendant car-defences werc similarly typically Mongol. (World History, M) 13°6-14 Tabriz-Univcrsity Lib., Ms. 20, Edinburgh; .S1/(1luI(IIIIOh, C.,\ll 1300 Baghdad-Brit. Mus. Dcpl. of Oricll1. Antiq., London; helmct, cady 14th C J\-Iongol-Biyskiy Kl'aevedcski Muscum; anllOUr fragments. 131h-14th C MOllgol-Abakan Mus. & Minusinsk Mus.; Mongol Courl &m" carl)' 14th C lranTopkapi Lib., Ms. Haz. 2153, Istanbul.)

Masyaf iD the Syrian coastal JDOUDtaiDs was the centre of a tiny Nizari ('Assass;n') state. The existing castle largely dates

from the 13th ceDtury aDd overlooks a village still inhabited h) Nizar;s,

Notes sur les planches en couleur

Farbtafeln

OShu"t' lLirtoalrllnicn simple, ~l\'cr coifl"r en It-litre' cl malllcall ell lainc fp.li~C'. A2 NOlnlidC" palf'll rill THl'kt"wl1, nmlVI',all Vt'rlll dans Ie IfJOTldc de n IHnI. IlI:>nI'tl' Uti ca.'S(!llc il ri\'Cl:H"l UTll: nlirus:".('l'n I.II1H.:lIl~ d... uir fjLli nr COUVIT (jLi I, de\'"nl de 1nbdoml'lI, A3 Sold"l-l",d,,'" p'ok'iOllllrl.lourdrmr"ll)l'Olcgc )Rr (10 ('a5
I~inr;-ll:hcs d.irkis h-iranischrs Jos.unl mit Fdlka~pc unci sd1\\'l'f( \Vollrnallltl. A2 Ill"Jdnischcr l'\olTmdf' aus lllrki."1~1I1. (,in nt·W'IT.'i ~Iilgli('d f t."lll. km-\Vdt, Er Irngt rincn venlif'U;I(;'11 I-(("Im unll Itdnllt'll l.ame.ll("up:UM d,'" nu, drll Vorde,leib hedeckl, A3 Ilcrur.~""ld:ll "Oil .Iawi,ehrr I krkulln, sd", Uewam ... t mil drLlcili~('m rIdmund l'iSC'rnt'1l1 1):lI1:1.rr jillS dlllpp"ll lJ l.umrllrm,

BI , imllr CO:Hum(' o'un \,olonl;lir"t' ch i.1. Un tit·:'} d 11;( j;w -lin... ·~t rUl1f\1I (lour IJC'rtCI"" orn1ure~. I...· b
81 Eil1farh . KU:-.tl11l1 filr<'irwl1/j"rjlt'n Fn·iwillig;t"n. Eirlt'r< u kll'u Ja kt' gttrage,," Kelll'llhell1d lIIId ,lru H'lm Ull'« d,

AI

I

L.'iam:~i, um·w.uu.lt·I'anicdct.clll·I(·J1l1Cn....-.t·mIJh·o In Int,dc·cI.· H.....;Inet-.. Jl '""!)'ill J;"ranclc arhalclC' IIIOIII',C' chms UI1 rh..L4rjl'!i~ t$1 utiliscc pour tirer tit'S pUb inc ·lIdiaires. C2 COMUOll' lun'ornall ImaJt'l11i'lll typiqut", L':lrc POSS('CIC' un "u!Jra ou goidr pou, ,i,,', df; fled, II,' ,C:l "~'
C.

OJ Le.o grand hefi lamiqul' (~t soU\'CnI dt'Cril u,mml' porlalll cell coi(fc tn reulrc jaune, UII chalc blanc ct une lllniqllC' ~a.;:a~bo7ld duubltc dC' maiUr.. '0(' i'pee flu'on elit i'lrr la ..,ic'nnr ('~t pr~n dan- Ir ~'Iusi'l' J\~k('ri cristunhnili. I'.n al1;Cfl,',lan. une ~ rlnt" ;l r., he c1t'lIumgIJlltl, D2 •or 'uhid. :'1\(" UII llMluc' qui t". I 1K'1Il-i'lrl~ l'urnph·It, UI1(' :mnurt" to maillc parlicll('mcnl nT u\('ru' de Jic.· ('( unt' nlir.l'\,\(,:i lamrlll'~ ch' frr; ('armur du h val ''8\ en kutre, 03 :r m 'Ia,,~e du <,"',ume IU' ,', du co ,umr iratuen ('tail porh; par Ic.~ lrOUpt"'~ <1("' paJai\
rr

1

E. Prnbabll'lI1l'nl cl'nrigil1t: gn'f'quI'l" lafRl'm.:nll'Cluipl· d'IO) Ie 'it>J~ b~7.atlunl ~l1{ji£lU~ In lancc':1 douhle eXlr'mite SOil UII :.JwIJ/lI iranit'lI E2 Ap\lar1rUallt a I aristocrali(, llIrcomrin CrAnaloli on'iel m.lle. mit~lIs t:fluipc:e, i JX'n4" del'! ('lel11 n\ ,."u 'asien. fI ",'ch,""'!!" E3 i\INn",I{e lyp;'l'lt' tI,> ,Iyk", IJ),nllum ..I ru ialiquM, par

(~Xtll1pll'

Ir IX")llC.·lit:r t'l III tuil as, (' th· t uir flOSllCl"li\,c'm nL

F. I.e..; homllll'S dt,S lriblls aralx"S adOpW1Cl1ll'al'l'lllrl11 INSlylc) II1loirn" Oll tUI'CS it srmbl(' que l'anlluft'I'I'i-ft·rt t" p..lrt·u i"tail llllC,lll1plt' dl 'lIlh.c tic OIuillt .; dt,'s Inl1~oC"' lam:1 c'l dc."cIr ('pi"t'S porl<.'C't c1:Il13 d(,~ lJmldrit'r, halnH Ie. amwl<. hahilllt'lIc'i. F2 11 poor,,' dl,'UX Imllnicrl'S .\ltl):l.liiiel. OILIVt'('1iIi ItH~d?ulI '(li,rait.."dt'\'aut lcs ~\'Inugnls. cl un !il;}t" dl' l'ruvisiolts 4,'11 lJalldlluW.'n·, F3 La <:avali'"1 trallsnx:lIIiCIl!i ('wjl"m C'~IX qlll Hva.it~nt l'nrlllurc la I'IIIS romplctc' dl'~ pOlys i.:o.lnllliqu{':!) OriCIll
GI EI:lm d,'\t'llli fll'cPIXlll' pl'atiqm'f1H'rll I'un dt'S (lnl!\ dt'o;.rroisacll"S. r nnl:llit' IJlilisail prillt'lpaJl'IIH"1I1 dCli (-quipcnU'rll"l" eJ.' gucTrt'lK: idt'lIluux: IIUlt..~ fl'I~lIdi.lnl

rcpi'c It.ltt·n:ml'nl l.OlltH",". G2 L'inllucllci' IllflJUl' tt.lil ~i dOlllill~Ulll' [(lil' (', georgi'll 'p'" que idclIliCfLie • 'O;S;I1' Illil ulman" G3 ,\ I,.m I~ " hanltcmcnllil, dttl'l~ la lonA'ut'ur'd("I:t ch{"lniM',;a .. cxc"mp](', Ii· ("('Sill Ill!' (k~ pays='Il'~ ar..tht.:s t~1 pr~tjquCIl'l('rH It- m",mc uujouru·hui. HI 1111(" I>oru' p".:.d'armun' (Iuram sa IX'r1tKIt'd(' ",rmatlon, mai.. . iJ porle'mil unc l"CHt(" de OlailkMlus 'i(1Il nmnh:au :i'i) (-tail rn C'ampagll(, rc mmt' tirailltur leger, & ~OlC'"L les Ion iullucnu-:-. '" I~ ruiss.1ldcs ponl'n! it'S nMrlJu hi'raldiqul' lI1allldouks, II ~ a frrlnine IIldic'H.iOI1~ du port dl' chapeau dt' suh·il C'I1 Irulrc.. fUnis c·ct.ul'TlI Pl·ul..cln: .t1I~i I ;rn d"" ',l<;(jU' 'l'hard-cl~-r",' europern., H3 (~lum, monR,,1 I)l';qlll man'cau I'n ft'lIiTT Inurd. cuiral . (I"anllurf" t'U kailiK prOll"(IHlfl d·orrilh·.

AI

Tw'han ~11"""11 reil d", b) "nnun;"ch Fa uug. ~lfl1t bt.-achl(' tin -!rar. cingr(l.S.,--r. in ('irwn R.thm("n g pallnlcr Bogl drr FeLic'niJpti' am, hir,,,, C2 'all] l) pi,.h,' lurkom,";,r1w BeklrirluD~, I: Bog~n h.l"ilU'n ,\lu)ro "d,'r t,riI kiirpc·r. ,It'r kur,o pr,'il" .~h;, I. C:l Bemall Ei.scllhrlm mil \'cr~oldcu'm ledrmt'fl Iial hut.z ultd It-dc...m·1TI I.am Ilt'npauz, l;:(,lr;l~t'll mit cinrO! H1rki~h·lralli chcll K~tum.

C, Di,,,,,' All:S1allung ahneh rbrnrall 1-UIll

'g'''' '

D. D ~1""lcm·Fuh"... "ird hauflg mil die-,.. grille" FiI,k"ppc. "j", \\cis: t'll. rlMI unci ('il1l'l ~('panz ru'n G'a.:aAltnntl'J~Hkt· br"'rhrichclI, J)a~, <'11\'101 \\ irrt illl A,kfri· IUSt.'UIlI in I.sl;lrllbuJ auO)('wahrt. 1m Hilllt.'rl..r rund line ~u1\bisc Fonn dr's ~laMf~ont·1. In Eiu \'CrlrCICr dcr h\\'crlJt;\V. (fnclcll A}~lIhi Ka\ullrrit,. mit "incr m()~lichc·rwc'i~..~ am: Ellrorm 5.,. Illllwncl('n J\.opn)('drckul h,'ih\ "j!le mil. ,-ide- bcdl'Cku~m KC.'ltCl1panzcr und riul'rTl ri'>l.'l'lll'll L.J111dlcnp:a 1,cr; die J>an~crllnR fUr Uib Pfcrd i'll aus Filz~ D3 DiC'\('" ~tischung ,lUS lUrkischt. und irani:-.clwll1 K(~lUlll w\lrc((- W)I1 P3huusoldntC'1l uhc.'rall in dc'r j.;1.lmisch \\'dl g"""f(en, bis hi" lUIoh ''(yple",

E. \'\'nnullirh g-rirchh:dwr Ilerkuuft 11lld KJ"'lls..,u'lHcils illl 1'}'Z:1lltl11iM.:hco c·klcidc\.; d ... dUppl'lt'ndigc lX'l'I' iM allc.'rdings- ill irani'dll"r "hu/Jin" E2 r:: '('rlrclC'r d r b W't ntlSR lall h'll ()Sl •..,llltili IHllrknmanj, 11('1' l'i IOkr:1 mil k~IUka.liis(hrll ulid Pt'("lh'ueg-AlI,,;ru ·lllllg~RcKl·lIst~'Ul(kn. £3 1'ypisc .\Iischung a", h)'1-ami"i hem 'lI1d nsi"lisrhell1 .',il. >..fl, dc, S hild IlZ". d t ~~dt.'rp:,n/.c·r, Fl l\ralJist. he '~tmnH:sangt.'ht;rigc uhcrnahmcn nur 01,;(.,11(:,11 iralll'llcht .XI ltlrkischt' F:kmtlllc, und dn lclw KCll<'nhcll1de WUI'C'II olrcnbal' die !J('V01-/,lIjZ Au, 'l.1twug;: I:mgt' Spt.'f.Tt' ullll III I Gc,lwnkt"n ~Wlr;lg("IH' Sellw{'I'''''' war!'11 ( uhlkhcll \VlIlfell, F2 Z\\ri Ill.'i ci"cr :\icdcrlagc ulllt:r die.' ~lon~"(lll'll Krrt."U( ,\bh.J},id-lbnlU'r uAd t'i1H' ilbl'rgl'\\'4trl('n" Pro\'i:~iomta. h " F3"J lusoxani.S\. Rdll:'r \Val'l'n die am 1I11"lra&'l\.'lldsltl'l hC\,o.'aflilclcn Krieger des ristlithen lsl~1J rnan Ix'aduc dell ll1iut'la~hHis hen I-Iclrn mit ~t'h",cnkban'l11 Visicr" d KC'lh'nhc'md. c!rn ,'is«'Tn~'lI 1...:Hlwlh-npnnzrr unci cli(' Irc!rnlf'n &hrnketschuuc D4.~ ~' hW"r1 L'101 il''Uui Iu-Il r prulIgs, .. Gf Annl'l'Ijt'I1, 1n/l",'i."dICl1 t!"'radezu C'intr dlT Kr('U1./.UK~laalt'li. Vl"fWt"l1t.1t' ulxrwic~clld Wt"l'ltlkht· AusnLSlung; man bcaduc alh.:rdillJ.;:s das Iridu g4,'kriirnm ~ r1l\vcn. ~ D'r lurkisclw Einflu \",al SO ~lal'k, da..;"s eli . tr (;('urgit'l mil sciru 1!I00lnni\Chcll Nachbarn f.til idclllisth iM. G] AbA"t.~·hrli \'011 klein! And"rungcll, z.B, der Hcmdlange, hal sich d;C'i'''' "",hisch,' Bnu"",koSHlIll 1 he'll Ie kaum \'('mndrrt,

H. Dc, ,,, .. It m dc, Au,bildung be ,"dl; hl' Kllmpln lrllg! keill" "-uJl"'n. en" aher al Idrhler, dlUIZC '\patcr Kelt 'IlPaJ1ZC'I'UII~ unH-r nel1'l ).Iallld H2. ~11 I,,'aehll' ellI' 1!,'ulliriwll m""~Qli""hrll lind i,lami h 'II Einfhc "", Dc,' Ildnschu is, nut :-'Jal11€"luckcn-\,'appt:n ge hmi.lckl. "'as \"';t ('ill filott'ucr SonncnlJ au.5lie·hl. i:l II1c)~lkJwrwC'i$r rin rump~li~chcr 't!lap"."':!'r'. "3 Ein I)'pisch mllnguljM"h('~ Kostum: mrhrsdlirhdg-cr "'il/lnaJllc~l.: huppt:npan/.("1 und nllK Ohrrllwhulzl'r

ContinuNl (rom bock c... ~r

160 Nap'SGwrdIMll'try{2) 44

~'s~nAlJes(I)

4) Na".Germin Alhes (2) 90 Nap'sGemlanAloesIJ) 106 Nap'. Gerrmo AA.es ,4) 121 ~'sGe
199 r'Jalfs~ stTroops N.l.p·S~A=1 221~'s"""~

11'

18 176 III 221

Nap·s~~.."Tmop>

..., <>rvs_LoehI:r.bnuy ~Reserve&~~

'61/'ruswnUvUy 1m '007 J12 "rvsw<>V.#118J7 '5 lIS

~

Arrrry • I): Warltty

"'~~m~ .... Wdngron's~s 114 Wtof"t'''''''sln'.mry \')

I"

~"'iIon's~t2)

c....,.

25] W6"'ilDr... H ~ 116 WeIlo·>gto••• lJgt>t

130 W6"f1on'sl-lulyu--ilry 1O
"7

Ilr\InswO; T"OOPS 18O'J-15 9I~TtOOP'S

206 116 "

71

11 t IS

~Nrny

1792·1816 1811-'0(

The~War

~ fq.;.prne>tS

Flicsdw~w~("

A¢;o'w~WM.(2) FbIH"'the~w..r.(3)

19TH CENTURY 211 80lrIIar and Si-n I1artJo 211 US~ 1833-35 17) AIirno& TeanW.... I83s.6 56 l"'Ie:loa"l-ArrentMI w. 1lHb-a 171 T'>eMexanAdver:urel86:-61 6] AmenurMnc.¥lW.iI> 186Q.90 110 Atnenun CMI WiT Arm>es; (I)oCol'l~:e

171 119 190 101

n

31 252 258 265

163

(2rUnl()l'\ (3) SUI'. Sp«Q!,m. MarrtJme ("~ State "troops (S);Vok.m.....-f'1;hto.lo AmryofNor1.~nV''i'" .. Army 01 tI'M! Po!omac FI;lgsoi"theAmerta..,C.v>IWar (1 ~ Conledernte (l):U.,O/1 ()~ SUte& Volunteer Amenan Pbmslr>doans

I86TheA~

168 215 241 It] 196 198 201 212

215 219 224 249 67 268 91 91

2]) 2]7 277

THE WORLD WARS

ao

T.-..eGt!rMllrl A..... y 1914_18 al TI'll!Br
loa

u~ll'ld·r.eA·ll:l~'t'

182

llnl~ Bll!1-": ""'lft
la7

m1939..<15

1)191418

~Artry(l~ .,'¥ltry ""-tn¥lA","y(2)~ M~.,Specc~"tTroops

I 51 Pn.SS'Jfl Une Irf.-ntry

.91

59 Su
no

USCavalry ISSQ.-90 Thc!TapmgRtbelhon 1851-66 Ru,.. ~n ATmy of lhe Cnmean W~r Bnl'''' Army on Umpa,gn 1},1816-1853 2): TheCnmea 1~-56 (3~ 1857-81 (4).1882-1902 Voct.or,a',Enem"" (I); Southem Afro

1

(2~NorthemAfnu

74 117 111 110 225 10 216 146

fl>e5pi~""c.. W. 'ref'b;o$IIArmy 19)9..<15

Br-:'~Blln'ecnnI937-41 AI ~ Car-1nll"lle<1 d WW'1 T~Ilof~ ....... f.otc:e

USAnry 1<>41 "5 T'Wfl.edArTny 191'-45 T'lefl.otl'o_A....., 210 T~So' 1911 <6 24 TheP""\le"D~o$oIOn:S

U,

T'leA.l~eSS

14 I'"oeW4!'en$

11' LJfr...-oIfieFoeIclD..-r, 114 III Il' III 10J 147 1S4 HI 141

Gerrnro~dWW2 GenN~ MP....,

ts

~ A.rtxlMe TO"OlX'S c..em..n,,~ frontAl.es ~·sScwllih'Jok.ll.ee
wet'no"lldlc ~ Yal"rneers WeMr«ht/4...,>l;...,.,FO'U'i A.Ioed~~

P¥\Iir W..-f¥e 1941-45 '"~ ~Wirl¥e 19o1O-45 112 AoiFOI'C:Ci'" Y~\i 1941..<15 170 Flili 01 the Tlwcl Reoc'I (t)'Neto~1

IHf1,~-SS 178 (J~POIII'ty&f'clou!Ur>~.s

MODERN WARFARE III ,.,.~ Cllmp.o an 1948-(,(l 174 The KotwnWllr 1950-5J II' The Speco¥lw ServJte 15' ~ ~"""roes 1950-84 I)) Battle Iorll>eFllll
150

~ntlne FOI'C:n.n

117 118 194 165 104 14)

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MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

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MILITARY

An unrivalled source ofinfonnation on the uniforms, insignia lind appearance oflhe world's fighting men ofpasf and present. The Men-Dt-Amu titles cover subjects as diverse as the Imperial Roman army. the Napoleonic wars and German airborne troops in II popular 48-page format including some 40 photographs lind diagrams, and eight full~lour plates.

COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY ELITE Detailed information on the unifonns and insignia of the world's mOSt famous military forces. Each 64-page book contains some SO photographs and diagrams, and 12 pages of full-colour artWork. WARRIOR

Defmitive analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation oflhe fighting men of his lOry. Each 6+-page book contains cutaways and expl.oded artwork o(lhe warrior's weapons and armour. NEW VANGUARD Comprehensive histories of the design, development lind operational use of the world's annoured vehiclesand artillery. Each 48-page book contains eight pages offull-colour artwork including a detailed cutaway of the vehicle's incerior. CAMPAIGN Concise, authoritative accounts of decisive encounters in military history. Each %-page book contains more than 90 illustrations including maps, orders of batde and colour plates, plus a series of three-dimensional battle maps that mark the critical stages of the campaign.

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