Osprey, Men-at-Arms #183 Modern African Wars (1) Rhodesia 1965-80 (1986) OCR 8.12

OSPREY· MEN-AT-ARMS SERI S

c3r(0dern ~ictln 'Wars (t):

1lodesia /9 65- 80

Text by PETER BBOTT and PHILIP BO H Colour plates by IK H P

L

E -AT-AR DITOR: [ RTI

RIE \ I DRO\

c3r(0dern uffricllnmrs (r):

. . . . V1odesia 1965- 80 Te t by P T R

BB TT and PHILIP BOTH

Colour plates by

o

IKE CH PPELL

PREY P BLI HING LOt D

j

Publi hed in 1986 by prey Pu lishing Ltd ember company of th org Philip Or up J2-14 Lon r ,L orlon W 2£ LP © opyri ht I 86 pr Publi bing Ltd his book i opyr-ightcd und r the Berne onvention. JJ rights r crved. part from any fair dealing for the purpo of prival tudy r s arch, eritici m or rcvi w, a p rmill d und r the C pyright A t, J 95 no pan of this publi ti n may b reproduced, tored in a r tri val y tern or tran mined in any form or by an m an', I ctronic Ie trical. h mi al me hani al, ptical, photo opying r cording or otherwise, without the prior permission of th copyright owner. nquiri sh uld b addre cd to the Publishers.

British Library' atalogui7lg if} Publication Data bb tt, Peler Modern African wars.--( n-at-arm eri . 183) Rhod ia I 65 I. Afriea--History Military----2oth century 1. Title IT. P. Botham III eries 960'.32 D 21.5 I B

0-850 5-728-9

Acknowledge:ments pecial thanks to John Beno tt Bryan P tric, Pete Tum r, igel Thomas, John Pitta way and W. F. Wilb rfor e in all his guises. Film t in Great Britain Printed through Bookbuilder Ltd Hong Kong

Modern African !Mrs (i): Rhode. ia 1965- 80 The R/7ode it/II {fir

The tick leader of a Police Support Unit patrol moves warily through an AfriCllJ.l village. Generally Police units carried JUore .kit th1l.ll their ArJUy counterparts ar>d paid closer attention to dre regulatio •

8ush-->ith Alouetle . . • The Slarl of a ;CO"laec' i.. the na.....i...,M:orymou..1 .rtiI,

rising been quelled than the Shona in easlem '~lashonalalld' also rose, Since Ihe ShOlla weTC less cCllIraliscd Ihan the ~dcbclc. their rebellion had more of the character of 3. guerrilla war, and the Compall)-'s forces found it correspondingl)' more difficult tosuppn.'SS: but by 1897 all wasca1m again. lliis Shona rising camc to bc koo\\ n as thc 'First ChimuungQ' or Liberation Struggle murrnga meaning rebels or fighters in Chi hOlla , and was to pro\"e an inspir.uioll for the later n;uionalists. The s(:lllcrs wcrt' 110\\ fimll)' in control. Comp:lI1) rult, emkd in 1923, and a new constitution granted rcprcstnt:ni\"e go\"cmmcnt to all almost wholly whitc eI{'ctorate, Although it rcmaincd SlilllllChly Urilish in sentimclIt, thc new govrrllllu'l1l'S lIativc policy or ;paralkl devclopmClll' rt ..~t·mhl{"d lhal of South ArHca, II was enshrined in a Land ApPol'tiolllllCl1I Act, \\'hich al't'ocatcct' l'l:lf( tl'Jc rand 10 a t.urolx·an community cstimatcd at the time to be soml· rOllr IX'I' C III orlhc tota] population: and in ~ati\"c Registr'.ltion and ~ati\'C Pass('s Ac1.5 \\hich gave it the l:Mlwcr 10 enrorce st."grcgalion. ~c\'erthclt:sS, the undoubled benefils of incrca..q'(l personal seeurit) :lIld improvcd public ht'alth It'd to a rapid rise in the African population. \\ hich helped to orrset increased Europc:·an inul1igralion. 8) 1965thert" \\cre

some 2:28,000 Europeans and 1,8 H,ooo :\rricans. logelher with :l3.ooo Asians and Coloureds pc..'ople or mixed race,. The Afri ami 10\\ly began toorganisc thcmseh'cs poliliGIII). Cp 10 the 19505 thcircCforlS WCTC limited to issucs such as \\'ages and equal opporLUnitil"S: but an ill-fated British allempt to amalg-.unalc SCI t1ercontrolled Southem Rhode..ia with the more orthodox coloni;11 territories of :'\orlhcm Rhodesia and Xyasaland in the so-caU<--d Cclllral Arrican Federation led to a rise in lIlilitalll l\rrican nationalism and a call for ·onc man. onc \'otc'. The writing was 011 thc Ilali. and ill 1956 lhe Fcderatioll·s arm) was quietly rcorganised to give priorit}' to cOllllu'r.illsllI·gcnc)', Afric;lIl opposition to the Fc,'dcratioll bccallle so violcllt thaI it broke up in 196.1. Nonllel"n Rhodesia and N)'OIsal:lIId hl't·anw rully indepelldclit black stales 11lldcl' lIlt' IleW 11amt:s ofZarnbia alld i\lalawi, leaving SOllth(:rn Rhodesia slillll.'chnicall)' subject Fir,,-for"-~I wailin& for .:ok_rr. NOle n.i~lure of Rri.i'lh ,nee! parachule h...lmel", a ..d ICK:OlIlY-411:quired 'bo.. e 110m"' of eommerdal ori!ia: Ihere ...... !ood 11.....1ort•• il)' .boUI..-ucb m.ll~", wh"n 0 .. ope-ra,io.. s. The FN-)tAG li!hl m.dU.ne!u.. ea.rried by Ih~ I raopi~ in 1M (0"1!round ' - " ..... ~ COm mO_ >b.ubed wilh ,rem .Cld hrow'll paUli. The rali" "f MAG.. 10 riBes;.. comballift1...." ...... _II), _e 10 fOIlr--hilh.er IIaaa U. Europe'3" .rmiM. The 54tdirr aUT)';"! i, ""no",. o--..io,no c:II.m....fl,,!t:j..mp IiU;1. NO! mud> eq..ipme... i,.IiI ....,ouwHrw ~·e...ral ~.... pack,.ad full hallie ....,bhioo! iii "'ora: fimo~ IroctpS more 01 jumped inlO ;hOl' OZS aad w_1 iJU'a1~hl i .. I" .eI ad do.,..., .....s _ tillle for IUlpado.i.as j .....,..ba!1i .r equipm ' C1Wers.

.n

to Britain. The Rhodesian African nationalistS pressed for independence and black majority rule. The British were sympathetic, but the white Rhodesian dectorate (which had scarcely been reassured by reccm events ill the Congo) was united in its opposition under its new leader, Ian Smith. Affairs had reached an impasse. The British governmcm refused to give SOUlhcrll Rhodesia independence under the kind of constitution acceptable to the white Rhodesians. The Rho~ desians saw only one way alit of the dilemma. In May 1965 they issued their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), and renamed their coumry simply 'Rhodesia'. The British government refused to intervene miljtarily, and put its trust in economic and diplomatic sanctions. Since Rhodesia's links with the outside world ran through friendly Somh Africa and Portuguese Mozambique (where a white colonial power was fighting its own anti·guerrilla war), these sanctions proved ineffective, and the Rhodesians were able to get enough arms, equipment and fuel to sustain their forces during the now·incvitable struggle. The African nationalists were also receiving outside help. Newly independem black African states like Zambia and Tanzania felt a natural affinity for their oppressed 'brolhers' in what they called 'Zimbabwe', and did what they could to help them. Equipment and more specialised training in sabotage and the general techniques of rev'Troop;"' canu,en.'--1h;!I One al Bmdura-w.,r.. supplied and run by civilian vOlunlft'r.., and ..,.,r.. popular wal....u.g..,;tops.

6

olutionary warfare were supplied by both Russia and Communist China, who had their own reasons for wanting to embarrass the West. This Communist assistance further alarmed the white Rhodesians, and stiffened their resolve. The diplomats made a series of auempls to resolve the escalating dispute. Shorlly before the first shots were fired on what later came 10 be commemorated as 'Chimurcnga Day' (22 April 1966), Smith met Harold Wilsoll, the British Prime Minister, on board H MS Fearless. The talks proved aborrive. Two years later, in 1968, Smith and Wilson met again, this time on HMS Tiger; bllt they were still unable to bridge the gap between British insistence on majority rule, and the white settlers' relllclance to plunge Rhodesia into what lhey saw as Communist-inspired chaos. In 1970 Rhodesia declared itself to be a republic. A new British government tried yet again: this time Britain's Pearce Commission gal as far as sllb~ milling its compromise proposals to the Rhodesian Africans, only to have lhem decisively rejected. The struggle began once more. By now the guerrillas had gained in experience, and the Rhodesian forces began to be stretched. Their situation worsened dramatically when the POI'luguese withdrew from Mozambique in '974, and opened up a new and extensive frontier to guerrilla infiltration. The Rhodesians remained defiant; but in t975 joint South African/Zambian pressure forced both sides to accept a ceascflre,loUowed by a meeting between Ian Smith and the nationalist leaders on lhe railway bridge spanning Victoria Falls. This proved abortive, however, and fighting was resumed. In 1976 the Americans added their weighl to British efforts, and the hard-pressed Smith was finally persuaded to accept the principle ofmajority rule. The Rhodesians rejected the detailed AngloAmerican proposals, however, and instead began negotiations with some or the more moderate nationaHst leaders. In 1978 these led to a so-called
however' and guerrilla warfare continued d spite arnne ty offers and the a tivities of the new black government sown ecurit Force Auxiliaries, he end wa now in sight. Isolated diplomationomically its small cally and overextended white population xhau t d by the v r-incr asing demand for military s rvi e, th Rhodesian government agr d to another can titutional confer n . Th gu rrillas w r tir d, too and w e finding it incr ingly difficult to motivat th 'r men to fight what was now a black governm nt. In

1979 both sid s m t at Lancaster Hou in London. In what turned out to b a belated triumph for Briti h diplomacy an agre ment on a new constitution was ign d and a c a fir agre d. In 1980 a Cornmonw alth Monitoring For e W (compo d of men from Brilain, u u-alia, Zealand, Kenya and Fiji) arriv d in Zimbabw Rhod ia to up rvis th c as fir and th n W el ction. 0 the surprise of many of the white Rhodesian (who retained their own reserved Parliamentary eats) the militant Patriotic Front

KEY Z AN LA

Sectors and main infillralion routes

ZIPRA

"TANGENT"

Rhodesian ODerallonal Aruas

_ ... _ •.. -International Frontiers

w ;:)

o ,",ORTHERN FRONT REGION

,

co :E

« N

o :E

7

wa s colleader of

.

ount r-pr du ti," , and number of

Lh

.

lII/fOllC FOil! 'OITe. ri an n tionalist fc II \ in d tail as of

intc2Tal from t.h killed b

£/7

ZlP

Il; rniJ",,,y sleepers fonn an improvi eel bard on the worsl spots of th appro cl> rond 10 Joint lion II' OC) Rutenga.

n an lib arion

R

we

earlier ANC fillllt ,r..'luzorewa and Sitholt: (the latler recently deposed as main leader of ZANU) returned to Rhodesia and p.anicipatcd in Smith's 'internal settlcment'. Both ZIPRA and ZANLA operated in \"cry similar ways during the latc IgGos. RecruilS were smuggk-d out of the counlT)' and sem in small groups to Ghana. Tan7.ania, Cuba, Algeria. Egypt. Libya.. China or Eastern Europe for training, before returning to Zambia 10 try to re-emer Rhodesia across the inhospitable Zambcz.i Valley. The arrival of Chinese instructors at ZANL<\'s main Tan. zanian camp It: I. ODe ill coaUlCU .... cJ1 til" political meetings.', and excmplal) punishments PF. for 'cnemy collaborators'. Thc Rhodesians called this intimidation; but although some Zf NLA biquc, where it continued to enjo) Chinese and groups cerlainl)' got Olll ofeomrol, the r."lct that thcy Tanzanian support. Because its sponsors \\cn" wcrc generally knoh'l1 as lVJJ.:Onfana rlhe bo)'s') relatively poor. ZANL<\ rcmaim.'.d shon of anns suggcsu that the majority obscrvt.'d ZAN LA's thrt.'C and other ("(Iuipment as compared with ZI PRA. As rules: namely '( I) obey all orders; (2) do nOt titke so one ZANI..A guerrilla said, 'We nceded rifles: the)' much as a single necclle or piece of thread from thc wanted t<1nks'. This was onc of thc grievances behind the Nhari Rebellion. ZAN L,\ was stronger masscs; (3) turll in everything c'lJ>lUred'. Initially ZANLA cominuccl 10 operate from in manpower, howevcr. especiall)' after 1974, and Zambia, bUI aner 196B it moved closcr to mailltaincdl1lany morc gucl'rillas in the field inside FRELIMO, tIle liberation movement in POI'I- Rhodesia. ugllesc Mo.. . ambiquc. Whcn Portugucse rulc ZI PRA rem'lincd more 'rtgular' thrtu its rival. It collapsed in t974, ZAN LA was already wcll continued to be based in Zamhi:l., and 10 :I lesser cntrenchcd therc, and able to intensify its extent in Botswana, giving its guerrillas access ofX:rations in Eastern Rhodesia. ZANLA's difficul- mainly to ~Iatabclel:l.nd or Wcstcrn Rhodesia. Ii tie!i with the Zambian govcrnmclII CillllC to il head rt."Ceivcd Soviet rt."Cognitioll and support, and was in 1974 75, h'hen a series of events starting with an COI1St:qucmly mort: la\1shl) l'quippc."d. Rural Afattempu:d revolt by disaffected ZANLA members ricans in disputed are.1.S observed lhat ZI PRA (the Nhari Rebellion), and culminating in the combatants wore camouflal:;cd unifonns. and assassination of a ZAN politican. led the depcndt..-d less on the local population for supplies Zambians to dctain most of lhe ZA;.~U leaders. than the ci\"iliall
9

ZI PRA also played a rcl:tlively minor role in the figilling during the 19700. Br mid'1977 there were on I)' 100-200 ZI PRA actually operating in Rhodesia, compared with somc 3.000 ZANL!\.. This was partly because ~komo was marc committed to a negotiated settlement; but it was also suspecled that he hoped ZANLA and the Rhodesian security lon:cs would fight each other to a standstill. :-"'Iany ofthc ZI PRA combatants were held back ill Zambia, where they built up a convcmiollnl mechanised brigade with a Sovietstyle command structure nnd Soviet '1'-34 tanks, BTR-152 APC.'i, ficld guns, transpon, .Uld increasingly formidable anu-aircrnH tquipmcllt, including SA1\1-7S. Nkolllo has sincc confirmed that by 1979 ZI PRA was planning to launch a full scale assault across the Zamoczi supportcd by its own Sovieltrained air forct'-though the Rhodesians wcre prcp;u'cd fOI' (his, and conlidcllt of their superiority in convclltional wal{al·C. The Rhodesians l1l:lde much of the dillcrenccs betwccn ZANLA and ZI PRA, and there were certainly reports of fighting l>ctwL-cn rival bands. IiOWc\'cr. therc wcre also instances of one group coming to til(' aid of the othn, and there was ncver any queslion but that both saw the Rhodesians as the main CIIl'IllY, Pri",... Min;';! ... r I,", Smith ... isilinl:llhc Arn,)' ijt"nu '" 1,1,., '979 U"I"w,,)'o Tn"l" F,,;r. Th.. officl!rO;In Ih" righl is we"ring gr .. ,,,..rvice ure...., with ",in;'''''r... ,. lOf the corp" C'''P bad! on th... 1"1..,1... captain',; lilar.., a Ian),ard in corps "olonr" (h r Ih.. light and dark blut: of Ih ... Eduauional Corpfll)' and th SI Brigad... black and "carl"l should ... r pOlIch on th .. I... n 51 ,'., onl)'.

'"

ZAN LA was organised into 'theau'cs' corresponding 10 the ;o..·lozambiquc provinces Crete, Z\'lanica and Gaza) which aCled as their bases. These theatres were subdi"id(:d into sectors named after national heroes, such as the famous spiritmt:dium Nchandu. ZI PRA followed a broadly similar syslem, Tactically, guerrillas of bolh forces operated in sections ofapproximatcly lei I men, each armed with al1 R PC-] or light mortar, a lighl machine gun and halfn dozen automatic rifles. The guerrillns used a remarkable assortment of small arms. including Russian greu:ldes. Tokarov pistols, PPSh SZ\IGs and SKS carbines, Czech ~152f5i, French :-"IAS and even old Cenmm Z\lauser rifles and :\IP40 S~IGs; but AK-'17S or AK~ls from eithcr China, Russia or other E.."\st European counlries were b)' far the most common weapons. Soviet-patlern mines and some 75ml11 recoilless rifles wcrc also used, bUI the problems of transpaning them limitt.'d thcil' usc, I::ach section would have a commander and his d('puI)', a political commissar and his deput)', mt."(lie-d.1. supply and securilY special iSIs, and about tlm."C ordinary guerrillas. Reconnaissance was Ihe r(osponsibility of the mujihas, OO)'S ofschool age who hung around the- anny camps :lnd passed on detnils or what they &'1W, sometimes by the traditional drumbeat. Other servin.os were providccl by rhimbwidos, female helpers who cooked and carried supplie:.os and lllcssage:.-s for the gucrrillas. Thc Rhodesian sccurity forces did not havc a vcry high opinion of the guerrillas' combat dTectivcncss, and their 'kill ratio' seems to confirm this vic,,'. Of cOUJ'SC, like all guerrillas, the Patriotic FrOllt's aim W:IS 10 avoid regular Iroops ralhcr than fight it out with them; but even against rcl:lli\'c1y 'soft' targets such as isola led white lnrms their :1ltackli wert" seldom prcssed hOl11e. J-!owt"vcr, thcy Wert" figlllillg :1 dincrcnt kind of" war to the professionals. As onc ZA~U leader c:o.:plained in 1973, their strategic aim WilS LO attenuate thc Rhodesian forces by causing them to be deplo)'ed all ovcr the country. forcing lhe ri.·gimc to mobiLise I:lrgc numocrsofil'i whitccivilians. Thcycalclilated thaI this CUlll ulali\'e pressure would ultimately have a devastating t:rrcet on white morale. By the:.' later 1970s II was ckar (ha I alit hc cHarts of" the liU perbl)' professional Rilodcsianiorcescoilid not prcvellilhe guerrillas from achieving Lhcir aim.

The COUT. eoj/he Jlfir The yeal pr c ding I aw ZAP and Z fomenting civil disorder, trying to draw Britain attenLion to the truggle for independ nee. earl as 1962, Z P was ending m n for training in China and elsewh Te; Z followed suit in 1963, and b gao i campaign of rural intimidation in the am y ar. In 1964 b lh parti putinto effi tlonglaid plans for infiltration abotage and attacks on whit - wn d prop rty. Tb Rhod ian authoriti r sp nd d by d taining th prominent nationalist I adcrs- kom, ilhol and ugab but int·rnal . urity at this time wa till largely the responsiblLity of th Pob e who authority wa nh n d by Lh 1964 Law and rd r (Maint nan ) Act. UDl gave a fresh impetus and a colour of legitima y t guerrilla a tivity. In pril 1966 a ZAN A group wa liminat d at in ia en route to attack ariba. May saw a econd incursion, tasked with abotaging the Beira- rntali pipeline liberating ithole and attacking whit farmsteads' all but one of th group were killed or captured after murd ring a hit coupI . In late r967, ZIP guenillas crossed into northern atabeleland via th Zambezi in the i toria all area ba k d up by C. Rhode ian security for mounted Op ration i kel' and auldron , a eri of running battl tr tching over v ral weeks. he infiltrators were eliminated but 'ght m mb r of th ecurity For e wer kill d and more injur d' th alibre of the opposi ion had b en higb I' than anti ipat d. On r ult wa that outh Tican para-military units enter d Lhe fray ost n ibly to d al with gu rriUas from th ulh ri an . In arly J9 8 u rrilla ent r d tb ip lilo ar a and stabli h d ba camp' with the intention of provoking a I cal upri ing. Th group wa discov red and d tro d. t r th r rs Z nd ZIPRA would wage a more traditional, , wim in th a f th p pI' war rath r than risking onfrontation, and ould eek easi r way of eros jng undetected into Rhodesia. In 1970 FR' Ll 0 u mad vulnerabl a long tr L h f Rh d i n rlh- t rn bord r wilh ozam biq U , and FRELI gave Z

penm Slon to mou or attacks through T t province. In Dec mber 1971 with a e Ul' b outh of the Zambezi Z LA began ero sing th all and e carpment to gain acc s to the unprot cted white farmlands. The Rhode ian began operation with the ortugue e in Mozambiqu and an trik on atimb in ar h 1972 provided proofof the Z presence. l r 12 m nths of 'winning h ar and mind' and u ing I cal people 0 port r in \ eap n and uppli to ·tabli hache Z resumed opera 'on in lat 1972. Infiltrating into tb if taka area throu h Tete, th aim d to d troy lh morale of the farmers and to win 0 er local tribesmen or to tenify them loto submission b Lt.Gen. G. P. Walls GLM, DCD, MBE, wearing a camouflage shirt with black-on-khaki ranking loops on the houlder strap, and hi Dled.aJ ribbons. Peter Wall wa a veteran oftlte Second World War, and was an officer in the Black Watch in the post-war period. Resigning hi commission he joined the Southern Rhodesia Anny as a corporal; was reocomnlissioned; and fought in the Malayan EDlergency, cOlD.IDanding C (Rhodesia) Sqn., SAS. The comD1anding officer of lRLl from November 1964, be was appointed General Officer ColD.IDanding the Rhode ian Army in 1972, and in early 1977 took over a Comm.ander of CoDlbined Operations - the professional head of the Rhode ian. anned forces.

1I

atT city' D mber 1972 is generall taken a the tar of th war 'prop 1", with th attack n the Altena farm near nt nary and tb d ath of one troop r by landmin as curity orce r p nd d. T c ntain th n w threat, peration 'Hurrican' omffi ned. For thre y aI's th war was larg ly confined to !.he north- ast· in r asingly d t rmined, xp rin ed and di. ipLin d b u rrill xpl ited the authori wield d by pirit-m diums abducted hildr n [01' I' - ducati n' in ozambiqu and laid landmin. depriv th nemyofhi support and prote ti n curit orces countered with a vari ty of m asur , including th imposition of fin tb reation of buffer zones of no-man's land th manipulation of fri ndJy milium, and th tablishm nt f prate ted 'Hag s. 1974 saw an escalation as Mozambiqu and Angola fell. uerrilla c mmuru arion and upply problems w re gr atly as d and Rhodesia now bad fi ur fran IS on which to fi ht and an additional 70 mile ofbord r to d fend. uth Africa initiated a eas fir wh.i b unint ntionall allowed the guerriJla to r group and the am exercise prompt d th relea e of t11 detained nationalist leaders. In 1975 outh Africa withdr w her police from R.hod ia. H w ver, th ar low d down' during 1974 and 1975 Z and ZAP sp nt as much The impre jv inlpact of an RPG round in the wall of a concrete building at Villa Salazaar; the central crater' about 'U: incb aCrO •

time fighting each other a the ecurity or s-in th camp, in t11 field, and ev n in prison. L ad r weI' not empt, and se eral were a a mat d. Zambia, increasingly disinclined to play host imprison d orne Z LA leaders and Z tran ferred its operations to Mozambiqu . Rhod ia imposed a du k-to-dawn curfew along mu h of the Mozambiqu and Bot wana borders. In early 1976 Z LA resumed the war on the ete anica and Gaza frouts concentrating on soft targets and a aiding confrontations. To counter the growing incursions ne operational areas were et up-- Thrasher, in the Eastern Highlands' Repul , primarily to prot t the vital rail link with outh Africa' and 'Tang ot covering Vi toria Fall ankie and the Botswana border. The ecurity Forces kept up a good kill ratio -ten enemy for every own los -by early 1977-but in addition to 268 ecurity Fore casualri ,almo t 1 500 civilians bad also di d. Mozambiqu closed her border in early 1976, and ovi t arms began to flow into B ira; lat r in the year FRELI 0 and ecul;ty For e were to dash. Following the death of four outh lTican civilians in a main road ambu h Police-protected con 0 s ran b tween meYor centres' urban terrorism becam a reality with a gr nad atta k on a Sali bury l' taurant and it b am ntial to weep un urfa ed road for landmin. uri Forces ountered with hot pur uit : an atta k on the yadzonya camp in Mozambique accounted for at least go gu rrilla d ad and the ton of weaponry and intelligence brought back belied the claim of 'refugee camp. In 1977, COMOPSl was et up to streamlin the war effort, and strategy hang d: pr - mptive strike wer launch d, d ign d t crippl th gu rrilJas in th ir forward staging ar as and training amp b for they could ent r Rhod ia. But guerrillas still got through' a Z L bomb in Salisbury's Woolworth tor kill d el v n. ore pr -emp 've strike follow d this tim into Zambia in ugu t. ugu t also saw the etring up of Op rational Grapple' a tacit admi ion area (see map) that the guerrillas had tablished a presence throughout Rhode ia. co-ordinaung' mbincd c!"Viees OPCnlUons HQ, whi h prevented f dupli ulion, and n' n contradict ry Ron which had S(lml'lim arL~l'n b fore lhis dale. 1

lh· kiud

,2

In ovmb r mith conced d th principle of univer al uffr g which w uld lead to interim governm nt' at the same time to emphasise that the decisi n was not prompted by weakness some 1,200 gu rrilla were killed in strikes on the Chimoio and Tembue camp in Mozambiqueonly one Rhodesian died' and in a notabl five-day operation curity orees cleared the Mapai area. In 1978 ZIPRA began to take a more active role in the war, omo being tung b ugab accusations that Z wa doing all th fighting. Nkomo [a oured a more conv ntional Cubanassist d thru t into atab 1 land with hi fore but decid d that hi' 'n my was still t 0 trong. How v r, ZlPRA now t pp d up gueLT:illa activity: in pt mber u ing a Rus ian-supplied AM-7 th Y brought down a civilian iscount airliner and t.h n murdered en f the survivors. Overall, averag ca ualti s TO e to 30 a day and gu rriUas wer n w ro sing th 1order in larger groups than vcr. n w op rational areaplinter p 'ned to monitor Lake Kariba' and martial La wa pr claimed in sam ar as. Th probl m was tackled at ource. Zambia had hith rto be n subjected to only small-s ale Rhodesian incur ions' this tim th targ t was ZAPU 8 000 m n in tl1 hikumbi u hi and fborama camp th first nl 19km north o[ Lusaka, The Rbod ian Air For look control of Zambian ail' pac [or 48 hours (19 October) bile the Zambian Air or prud atlyob yed the broadcast advice of th Rh dian fc [ward controller nd tayed grounded; and for three days Rhode ian ground for es put in assaults whi h kill d mol' than 1,5 gu rrillas. Political nece sity again n utralis d military u c ; ad layed election allowed I' grouping and in December th guerrilla tru k th ir rna t t lling blow ofth war d straying a qual' er 0 Rh desia s fuel in a r k t attack on ali bw'y' oil storage depot. t979 p n d with h downing in F bruary oras ondcivilian icount again y -7;trus time there were 00 urvivors. week later Rhodesia exacted r v ng n ZIPR with an air attack on a ba e at Luso in gala 1 a okm from th Rhodesian bard r. R taliatory raid w r also launched int Zambia and in zambique Rhod si n-backed and -trained ationa! Resistance fighter took th war to FRELI

An. extraordinary urvivaJ, of unknown origin! Thi econd World War vintage Univer al Carrier, fitted locally with a tall armoured superstructure and two twin-MAG mon.nDngs, was used for convoy e cort in rough terrain.

In April the el tions wer mount d their validity n ur d b th deployment of 70 000 m n. Immediately befor hand an attack wa moun d on komo HQin Lusaka' th Kazenguela ferry (being u ed to arry ZIPRA uppli ), as unkand ZAP p rsonn 1 w r 'lift d from rancitown in Botswana. D pite its threats the P failed to di rupt th J tion pro and Bi hop Muzorewa cam to power on a wa [optimi m. ith mixed feeling the urity Forc took on trength large numb of auxiliarie . he war intensified and entered a n w pha , with e onomk as w II as military targ bing hir. In epternb r curity Fore launched a u ful attack against the Z LA/ RELI 10 build-up in ozambiq ue aza pro inc' in a tob r Zambia s d perately-needed maiz suppli wer cut; and in ovember key bridge weI' d tr Y d forestall a ZIPRA invasion. Tb crippling blow dealt to neighbouring econ mi and h avy 10 inffi t d on both ZIPRA and Z L wer n t n ugh. Rhod ia though far up ri I' ta ticall and und feat d in th field bad no r ali tic b.-at gi aim: h was fa ed with a futw' of alating war and dwindling resources. E terna! pressure wa br ugh t n all partie for a r turn to the conli l' n e table" a a fir agr m nt was ign d on '2 I D mb 1979; and th r ult w fugab I ti n in pril I 80 aft r a campaign not d fc r i intimidation despite the best efforts of the monitoring force.

DIe Sea/rio' FOlYes The Rhodesian Anny Rhodesia on the eve of war was a typical 'colonial' country, with a tiny regular Army, a small Air Force, a Police forcejealousofilS ability to maintain order, government depanmems reluctant to yield authority, and a population not prepared for conflict. Yel, from these unpromising beginnings, within a few short years the Rhodesian Security Forces would become the equal of any counterinsurgency force in the world. Rhodesia's most pressing problems were always lack ofmanpower, and the sheer size of the area and borders to be defended; and solutions had to be found in lerms of quality rather than quantity. Accordingly, the bonom of the pyramid was continually broadened and strengthened to push morc skilled troops towards the apex. Duplicated cOon and inter~service bloody~mindednesswere a problem at times, but generally the larger objective was kept in view. The development of t.he Army provides perhaps llle best example; 'tccth' arms were expanded, new units such a~ the Sclous SCOUls were created for specific tasks, and ule service clemenlS were kept lean to get the maximum number of bayonets inw the field. As the war escalated, conscription and A sold;er of the Rhode",;"'" A(";can Riftelil d;l>play. caplured ZlPRA dothmg and C'qwpm.... l. meludiDg '.-ice fleck' camouf1ag~p

and trousers, khaki sh.ir" and a mUllu..., of Warsaw Pact and 'Ch;Com'~,"yle personal equ;pmcnl.

:)

'4

Territorial commitmelll were extended. and units at the cutting edge expanded in proponion. The war in Rhodesia was not fought as a series of campaigns, nor did set-piece confmlltalions take place. The Security Forces evolved, rapidly, as the war progressed, and any atlempt to preselll a formal 'orderofbatlle' would be meaningless. Whal folJows is very much a skcleLOn oullineofeach major unit's history, organisalion and conuibulion, not ranked in order of importance but rather grouped according to role.

The Rhodesian Mrican Rifles The 1st Bn., Rhodesian AfI'ican Rifles was formed in Salisbury in 1940 and constituted the oldest regular battalion in the Rhodesian Army. Commilled to the war from slUrt to finish, RAR accounted for 400 guerrillas bctween 1966 and 1975 alone. Three baualions saw service. and, in conjunction with the Independent RAR Companies, were deployed all over Rhodesia. II was traditionally a white-officered unit, bUI black officers began to serve in 1979. Rhodesia Regiment and RAR integrated training began at Depot RR in late 1977. RAR establi~hed its first training depot in Salisbury in [941, and shipped out to Burma in 1944, to serve with the King's African Rines in 22 (East African) Independent Brigade; the unit first saw action in April '945, and earned lhe battle honours 'Taungup'; 'Arakan Beaches' and 'Burma'. The regiment reLUrned to Rhodesia in 1946, and was effectively disbanded. However, a nucleus was retained, and by [949 A, B, and C Coys., were again operational as demo companies; in 1951 B Coy. became suppon company. The regiment served in the Suez Canal Zone; and in [953 the Queen's Colour and Regimental Colour were presented by the Quccn MOlher. Between 1956 and January 1958 RAR were committed 1O ~'Ialaya, where they were known as RhAR to distinguish them from the Royal Australian Regiment. After Malaya came deployment in Nyasaland (1959), N. Rhodesia and the Congo Border; and finally, witllin Rhodesia in 1966. The first contact was in the Zambezi Valley in September, resulting in one guerrilJa killed; it was the first of many. (The star of one cncounter was a private who, in mid-

contact, found tim to yell I am the OC driver and if au fir that baz ka at mIll call tb h licopte and you will ur 1 die!) Recruitment was never a problem, and Coy., 2 Bn. was rai.ed on Fort ictoria in]anuary 1975 with CO drawn from 1 . It d ploy d to the bard r fI r six w k from arly D c rob r 1975. B Coy. d ploy d arly in 1976 to Tbr her and C Coy. was fl rm d [I' m the disbanding of E C y. rRAR that pri!. Training initiall six months was later reduced to thr e, and was followed by operational atta hment with [RLI or IR Depot RAR (Balla Balla) was form d in]anuar [976 to erve as th regimen t s home and main training establishm nt. Para-trainin was introduced in [978, and RAR weI' a tively involved in 'frreforce' operations gaining a r putati n for jumping from minimum heights. F r obvious r ason th r gim nt was not deploy d outsid Rbod ia but not hed up a consid rabl tally on internal operation ne of which fI atLIr d th following exchang : Alpha 2 this i Ipba 1 - top booting! That

mo emenl in front of you i only a flock of oa .' Alpha 1 thi i Alpha z-Reference that goat I just kill d it was waring he t webbing and carrying an RPK . in m t unit th standard weapon was the o 7. 2 F (or the id nti at Duth n an Rl). The 1 G LMG w carried a a e tion weapon though in a high r ratio than in Europ , and heavier support was provid b 8Imm mortars. The e t German G3 riR wa n in increasing number towards th end ofth war and r gular i u was often supplement d by I I products lib rated weapon and a variet of p onal idearm.

The Rhodesia RegiInent Th fir t unit to barth tit! Rhodesia Regim nt was raised jn 1899 and took part in the relj r of Heavy mortar crew of Support Coy. 2nd Rhodesian African Rifles deploy in the

hamva area in response to increa ed ote the latitude allowed in combat unifonn: 'canunie' shirts andjacl
attacks on local farm.

Mafcking. In 19'4 the 1St and 2nd Rhodesian Regimcnts were formed from thc SR V and voluntccrs, the original R R having been disbanded in 1goo. IRR saw service in Gcrman South-West Africa before being dispersed throughollt the British Army, willie 2RR was disbanded in 1917 after taking heavy casualties in German East Africa. In 1926, 1st and 2nd Bns. RR were formed in Salisbury and Bulawayo respectively. In 1929 the Colours and battle honours ('Great War 1914-t8', 'South 'WCSt Africa '914-15', 'Kilimanjaro, Beho Beho and East Africa 1915-17') of IRR and 2RR were transferred to the new regimcnl. Some 4,000 members of RR saw service ill the Second World War in aJl theatres, and the prefix 'Royal' was granted to the regiment in '947, being dropped only in 1970. In 1955, national service was introduced, the training depot being established at Llewcllin; I RR and 2RR saw service in the Nyasaland emergency. Between 1956 and 1964 eight morc battaljons were formed, but the grd and 7th were disbanded in 1963 on the break-up of the Federation. Throughout the war, Depot RR was the clearing house for whitc 'national scrviee' conscripts, providing basic training before recruits were posted to their particular units. By the mid-197os, however, national servicemen were being posted Reeruilll undergoing bllsi" lraining, '976; Ibey wear one-piece khaki overall" lind camouflage ""ps. The of'fieer on the righl (nme • Bde. "houldu p,ncll and eOrp'l_loured lanyard and hose-lOp flash) wearli Ihe uniform later replaced by '8IInd,,'cr. Pia"" D •.

The..... were lighler momenl.,., men ofRARal Grand R«fbrace up for ao inspecdon by lltf.;S5 South AIri<:a '977, Lynn Mauyn, who seem,. to ha.ve acquired an RLI Slable bell. NOle 'miniature' rank clIevron On shorteDed shirt sleeve or the 'lOldier lalking 10 her. RAR herels were RiRc .reen.

into Independent Companies, which operated in set areas; although never operating together, a number of these companies would officially fonn a baualion of the RR, these nominal battalions acting as holding units. Command in the Indepcndent Companies was held by regulars, NCO posts by national servicemen. In 1977, to ease demands on Territorial members', and to increase the regular component, the Independent Companies became 'I ndependent RAR Companies', their ranks swelled by newlytrained African RAR recruits, and the NS element was redeployed to the Territorial battalions; blad soldiers, still badged RAR, also began to be posted into the Territorial battalions. 1RR set up a motorcycle troop in 1977, which operated independentJy in groups seven or eight strong, and could provide mortar and MG fire support, or aCt as a mobile Stop group. The unit soon proved vulnerable on routine patrols, and concentrated instead on quick reaction or reinforcement, and recce missions, orten in support of armour. On follow-up operations, the troop would work with both dogs and human trackers. 'ThediJuinction hc..., is betw""n 'uatiQnalser"iccmen', white co"~rill\$ umJcrgoing their long initial period of tmining and service; and 'TerntonaLf - ci,'itians who had wmpletcd n.ltiona] sen'ice but ...,mainl'CIliablc for rcealltemJX'r~rily, for terms of.'lC.... ,i~" hkh varil'd widely ""the war weill on, but which bceameonerou.:; enough to elTe.::t local indu~try and cnmmCrtt through the I'I'pcal""l absence ofkeys\a![

as

rnanp

role as hang d from mm nd. n m-

out norm. hi hi d I' t d unit RLI \ \" ry mu hId from th rom b c mpan r 'ommand r , u uall their arl lhirti . Epril de corp w alway hi h and th - unit cau ht th imagination ofth pubLi'uffi icntly t am t\.... nickname: -the Inr dihl ',and th ' aint' fr m lh ir r gim mal marh. h battalion mot-a he tah-made rclativ} fI publi appc I' n RLl 'tJ'Oopi fI rm d the ba kb n f the [!ref( r efforl' and a d ploym nt thr ughout the ounlr ; firefor op rald in all p rali nal area, id ally wilh rrunimum of thr e f( ur-man h lib rn ti and 16 para. n n OJ m r bl oeCal ion I .d, fir Ii r' pal mad thr jump into c ntacts on the arne da . In addition, RLI play d a maj r r61 in t rnal op rationsin ariably ( utnumb 'red and invariall 'ucce fUl.

'\ ,IIu'II1' IIl1dc" \\ll1Ch c","p.lIli.,. ulllw RLI "nd R.\R ,,'''c,d rll\<1 Inll'" '" 'I";' k·rl"H linll "'"1 " .th Ilwi. 0\\ 11 IIdi "I'll" and fix,-d·, illl1; "i. rille and nach [(J inwn,'nr an",1u'rr, I hl' ,,·hl·m.. I~D in IIH:t .1. u 11,llt'~1( j\'rnupinl1; IIr lnlt'p' .1Ilel hclir"I'It'l', .md hrcam mol' lit ill" ,lI,d .1l:1\"l'l IH ill> II". \\ l' prul\"rr-sro,

Fireforce per DUD 1: anununition wa alway hand-checked before combat. The African oJdier wear a paintcaDlouHaged 'bone dODle' as a parachute helD1et, and standard two-piece eantouHage unifonn. The white soldicr wearS the one-piece lightweight eaJD.ouHage Hying oyerall/jump uit. Originally worn by helicopter crew it proved cOnUortabl and practical and wa oon een in use b all kinds of troop including combat infantry. The four-pocket caD10ufiagejackel of the tandard combat Un.ifOrDl came with an uneotnfortabJy stiff oyers wn reinforce on the elbow which frO p usually reJDoYcd.

h imp nane of the rAle pIa ed b the RIcan p rhap b t be eeo from fi ur : th Ii tlf ommando - \ '2 3 nd upp n-had altribul d kiU in \979 al n upp rt unting f( r 47 ' I RLf " on ofonly [\ 0 uni (th oth J"\ anh~ ) n t to b r iaIl int rat d. b unit a quir d an mriable reputation and ltra l d t ran f other arrrue maini Briti h men an and u tralian, in additi n t Rh din ar r oldi '7

The N.,w Sarum pa school pUI .nany hundrMs or Iroop" Ihrough airbo....e ' ining, and recordM .ome ~s,ooo jun.ps in all. The soldi.,r in Ihe I.,rl for"gn>und or Lbe photo or this particular , ....ining lltiCk., SO noticeably older and more Wllrworn thlln his young com....de.., was a vele.... n of Lbe French .·oreign Legion.

The Special Air Service

.Founded as C Sqn., Malayan ScoutS (SAS) in 1950, the SAS was recruited from volunteers solicited by Brig. Michael Calvert, then the driving force behind B.·itish irregular operations in Malaya. 'fhe unil's first commander was Maj. Peter Walls. The unit was re-organised on its return from Malaya and in 1961, based in Ndola in Nonhern Rhodesia, it mustered some 200 officers and men in six combat troops. As part 01" the forces oflhe Federation it was deployed on the Congo border during the troubles. The SAS provided Rhodesia's first airborne troops, beginning training in 1961 at New Sarum Para Training School, which was evclHually to process more than 4j,ooO jumps. The first operational deployment was into the eastern districts in 1962 against arsonists; and in thai year the unit trained in Aden with Britain's 22 SAS Regimenl. The collapse of Federation in 1963 meant manpower cuts, and the Squadron, now in Salisbury, was reduced to approximately 25 officers and men. But as guerrilla incursions increased the unit expanded again, recruiting men familiar with the bush. The early role emphasised recon· naissallce, but the absence of em~etive back-up to capitalise on discovery was frustrating. From 1970 the unit mounted joint operations with the Portuguese in Mozambique, and crossborder raids into Mozambique and Zambia to secure prisoners, arms and information-and to inOict casualties. From the very beginning the SAS was heavily commilled to external operations, but

,8

always tried to maintain a low and professional profile, adopting a less Oamboyant style than, for example, the Selous SCOUIS. Until 1977, the squadron was administered by the HQ of the brigade in whose area they were based l , but for operationaJ purposes by the Army Commander in Salisbury. Despite close liaison with Special Branch and CID, it was at bcst a clumsy arrangement. After the establishment of COMOPS, support and intelligence were found easier to come by. By 1978 unit strength was again up to approximately '25°, and I SAS Regimelll (Rhodesia) was created in June. Troops became Squadrons, Sections became Troops. From ex· perience, it was found that four-man teams worked ideally, although IWO- and eight-man teams were not uncommon. SAS recruits underwCllI rigorous and extensive training, and selection standards wcre exacting, including the usual ration of ·sickeners'. In addition to a high degree of competence in infantry skills, recruits were expected to masler diving, small boat handling and free-fall jumping. OperationaJ experience was a pre· requisite of 'badging'; outstanding soldiers were allowed to wear SAS wings on the chest, rather than on the right arm, as a mark of excellence. Recruits came from two sources; volulllccrs gleaned (or poached) (i·om other units and, after 1973, youngsters from the national service intake. Standards were not lowered, and it was proved that training could follow selection rathcr than the reverse. Despite misgivings, the SAS rem:lined an Clite unit-with an average age of under '21 years. The Selous Scouts The idea behind the Sclous Scouts was conceived in 1973, as it became increasingly apparem that conventional methods could not eomrol in-

~c".l:nn d;(',"I"d LIMI ,h" hrilfoldl:S ,..'IT. h<,~llfJ,mrl"rrnin lh" lug..r 10"'l.\ SalillhUlj, !l"I,,",,),,

'Rluxl,"lIi,,·s

:lnd Urnmli. ,\. Ihe w,lr prOl(TCS>I'fi. whil..."ppl). UO';I1;"8 <,\r, l"frnnillet:l lhe Rosrm,;ibil;IY ofLh,· bri~adt· rNr CklnellL, an jncn·:l.\ill,i: dcgr,,<, of COlllrtl '",,,,,,-.1 fon""rd· :111,1 dowu thl'" ,lrlih<'rlHc11' ~hol1 ch~in~ of conumond 10 Ih e brig~de·~ uniLS. ~.",milled 10 Ihe field. Th" ,·h~illlr,1 rro", CO:\10J'S '" lJriR~dr III UIl;I: Inll:ll auoprralio""l 1.......1 .Joim a cnn~i<1l'"",hk de~R"" "f :lIIl."'''tny wa. rnj")rrl Il) lhe Ur.craliolls ~tllr<:s! local hc:,d'l"'uwrs" hc~ ,\t·"'). Aitforce. 1'"li"r ami Speci"l ll,~",dl """Id all I", 'qlrl-;CIlI'·
Joe.s

I,ll>crallO"'.

A fireforce emplanes. The aged but JDarVel10usly reliable DC-:J fillration. Th n d fl r 'p ud -t provided the lift for all Rhodesian paratroop operations' after by, among other Brig. Hickman lat I' Army the shooting down of lhe civilian Viscount lhe ClUJ10uBage cheme was changed to non-reflective grey. Troop often Command r. B, A and RAR t ams arri d ut juJnped frUQ1 extremely low altitude, som.etimes right into the incon lusiv perim nt befi re Gen. all ta k d middle of a major contact'. On everal occasion coinhined ground and airborne assaults on major PF camp acros lhe Ron Rid-Daly who had rved under him as border achieved remarkable results, with almost Incredible R M in the Rhode ian Light Infantry with disparities between Rhodesian and enem.y casualties. outs. rorming th Tb unit was given high priority and barra k In 1976 a cout olumn hit yadzollya amp in weI' rapidly e tablished at Inkomo' a h couts Mozambiqu and a count d for at I t goo weI' 0 t nsibly a tracking unit, th m tracking guerrillas. Thi was th first of man u b attacks' hool at Kariba was also tak nor. Th I' aJ bri f cou olumns equipped with e thing u: m wassimpl:t uminateZA L andZIPRAinsid j p to vehi I -mounted AA guns made many and out id Rh desia by clandestine man. foray aero tb borders. olumn trength n v I' mpany- tr ngth unit as envisa d (ab ul x ded 72 m nand tb r 'ult achi d w rout 120 m n), divid dint troop ea h of three ight- ofallproponi n.1n 1976alon th outsn t h d man track I' c mbat t am' or e Lions. Each up t 257 kill only 18 of th m iut mal. 'Lion would ha a Eur p an 01 ur ergeanl as R cruitment w n v a probl Ill, d pit s tion commander, and each tro p a li ut nant e ti n te t rigorou v n by . tandard . in and a won. Ev n when the unit grew b y nd all fact, everal uni c mplained f poa bing. By xp laLi n th arne 10 tructur \ r rain d definition rh unit was full iot grat d and though th - rank. diffi r d. pI' bably 80 p I' ent black; at n time th r w r Workin cI sely with p eial Bran hand bri fI d mor than 1 0 tame t r' n th b ks. h I tr k infiJlr t r and guide-in oDventi nal dou outs were undoubt dJyan elit unit-and at acks, tb u on a hiev d result, and Ih they sho ed what auld b a hi ed in unit expand d t incJud" turo d ter' who wer warfar by a unit unhampered lyre trai.nt and I d p ak for th msel e ; paid OLit of B funds. B th d of] 974 the couts with imaginati n. Th figur had 221 kill and aptur to lh "I' I' elit (v ry few though it wa n t in the ou ts brief t ini LiaL ters 'turned a . e ond time). beir u fuln ss contacts [or fear of compromise the are r dit d proven the next tep as to expand tb unit further with involvement in nearl 70 p r nt of all and ommit it to xt rnal operati n . Para training, int rnal kill. hitherto an pI' rv wa given and attacks he outs tayed perational until early 1 8 w l' qui tly di banded. espil nearagain t Z In zambiqu w r anctioned. wb n th uieidal tacti n me asi n til unit had taken less than 40 casualties. J<}

Grey' Scou"ts h oun cd Infantry nit, on eived and formed inJul 1975 gr out of an exp rim nt with pa k animals in th Ea tern Highlands. MIU was n v I' mol' than a w rking till and 1I) unit fE iall b carne Grey s out in 1976. (Th original Gre 's cout weI' a olunt r unit rai d during tb Matab·1 I' b· ilion.) I' y" Based outside alisbury at Inkomo couts snowball d from an idea to a 1,0 -man unit in a I' laliv Iy short lim. w-pri ingly, in view o[th urnt s sizeh omrnanding offi er w onl a major. . tabli hm I t \I w d for n upp rt and lhr ombat quadr ns with tbr tr p p I' quadr nand G ur ei ht-man unit per tr op. Th supp rt qu dr n incJud dam rtar ti n ( mm and 82mm) I' and d g I ment ( ne ofse era! outs used unit, to exp dm nt with dogs th foxh und in a tracker rAI ). Til Gr ys' were mounted infantry rather than ca alr u ing b I' C 01 for tb m bility they afford d' tb unit wa u d ext nsiveJ in patrolling, rec e and follow-up 1'01 . An averag day' patrollin would cover around 4okm, th rid I' Grey' Scouts OD parade-they were eldom een in this 'DODtactical' guise. The hor e furniture was generally of local manufacture.

2

alt mating b twe n a 7km waLk and a I2km trot. occ ionally u ing an l8km cant r. 1\1 unt d on mallish mature ros br eds rath I' than th r ughbreds patrols could self- upply for up to t n cia upplementing availablft dd r with nc nlJ' 'led 'hors ube '. d antag wa tak n of th unit" unique ability to mov asily a I' t rrain when I' as i t d the impas abl to v hi I ngin r in th con lructi n of b rdeT d fences. th ir hors - r mule -being u ed a pa k animals. Troop w re drawn ii'om both Regular and our th id a being t train soldiers to b ridel mth r than vic ersa. H ighl and weight w r th only limiting fa t nr \ hile the hor e could and often did n I ad in ex of 150kg rider had LO weigh 80kg or I . Horse were untaught b for bing I' trained as gun-pr of avalr mount th n 10 p ially tran p rted to deplo m nt ar adapted trailer. b unit was larg I elf- ufficient down to it· a n 'mith , {~.Lrri I' and quipment manufaCtUf . Many of the horse were donated b outh frican ympathi ers, and hoI'S and rid r n rall stay d together through training (four nd a balfm nth) and bond. In acti n en the hal' w I' am ufla ed-after numerou ith

dy s and paints whjch pI' duced some odd results. De pite Lh ir higb profile and sheer bulk very few horses nt r d th ca 'ualty Ii t .

Working in close contact with the Engineers, Grey's Scouts provided an ideal 'labour force' for inaccessible terrain; here, they help strengthen Mozambique border defences and their haTIless has been modiDed for packing in barbed wire. Note camouflaged T-shirt.

The ArJDoured Car Regim.ent The Rhodesian R connaissan e Regiment was form d in 1941 Lben posted to East rri a and reform d a th uth rn Rhode ia Armoured Car Regim nt. Di band din 1942 it was re-e tablished in the late 19405 with the sam name, quipped wi h Staghound armoured cars. Again rusband d in th mid- 1 95 , the unit was re-form d on Fedcrati n a qo., the Rhode ian Armour d Car Rcgl. ( 'lous caul). Disbanded on break-up it was resurr cted [aT a la t Lim in July 1972. Based al King G org VI Barra k, ali bury !Tom 1973 tb Armour d ar R gt. and its depot w I' form d .s ntially as a TF unit. The first intak ompl-L d a year s training in Mar h 1974infantry kills follow d by 26 w kg of pe ial to arm instru tion. Th r gim nt was equipped primarily with Eland 9 and Ferr t armoured cars and heavi I' but th Ferr ts had updat d tUIT weap my. Th RhA R al bat d a huge coil ti n f'ruunj s'-home-made chicles tailormad to uit parti ular roles. ammon feature were min prot ti lJ and th in orporation of 'acq uired armam n t . Th r gim nt field d four op rational quadr n , with an approximat trcngth of 300-500. Eaeh brigade nominally had a squadron attached-'A Sqn. was ba d at Brady fi'om lat 1975. 1 roop I ad -r. w r r ponsible for four crews and cars and r gim ntaltraining was gi en in both onv ntional IN 1'61 s. ~he regim nt played a k y part in and ov r-th -b rder op rati n. th I' main duties, in

th· Cal role included convoy e. cart guardjng vulnerable points direct fire support road blo ks cordons and simply showing the Aag .' lassical ta ti s w I' not n gle t d P ciall tIl r was a I' al threat [rom enemy armour across the borders, and regular exercis practised the trarutionalli ht armour kills.

Field Regt., Rhodesian Artillery Tb orps' origin can b trae d to th artill I' troop that accompanied the Pion er Column and th outhern Rhodesia Volunteer organis d artiJJ ry s Lion' in Bulawayo and alisbury' during the cond World War a igbt Batt ry s nriall a tr ining unit wa t up in ali bury and provid d per onn 1 for rvic on all rronts. Whil tb unit wa dio band d durin Fed rali n a nu I us remain d in a voluntary Govern 1'-0 n ral's aluting troop. Th unit w r -form d.iu t befl r th di lulion of Fed ration and th d pot w established at Cranborne, alisbury in 1963. In October 1976 the Corps of tillery came int bing and authority was gi en to rais a r gular troop a th nuel u f a regular batt r . 1 Field Regt. Rhod ian Artill ry pro d f1 xibl nough to adapt to th Cal 1'61 demand d of it. The gun were deployed by min -prot Cl d gun tra tor, at strat gi point -Karjba Dam and Victoria Falls for xampl and w I' used to neutra1jse pre-selected targ t. ArtilJer duel, how vel' weI' un mm n mainly b au of t11 Rhod jan' ac urac and ffe ti ne . I

2 J

Equipped Wilh Mk III 25-poundcrs, with a maximum range (on supercharge) of over 13,000 yards, and a number of I05mm and 155mm howitzers, the RhA could provide formidable fire suppon. Despite the transportation problems posed by tcrrain (the '25-pdr. weighs in at 4,ooolb) and logistics, the corps acquired an enviable reputation for manoeuvrability and resupply, and provided direct support on external and internal operations. The regiment was largcly a TF unit, and Depot Artillery trained national servicemen after firstphase training at L1ewellin. Infantry skills were taught as well asgllnnery, and I FR alsoopcrated as an infantry unit. Maj. Bill Elli. of til .. Anno..recI c.r R"'fl., a YeIft1U> o£ ~ Royal Air Foree ill Ib.. Second World War. n... ~ ....Ul.I lie-bl......11 h.a.- a .il~"erecl budd.. pial" bftriD~ th.. cap bad~ motif: d. Plat.. OJ.

The Corps oC Engineers The Coq)S had a forerunner in a voluntal)' unit known as Military Enginccrs, raised within '2RR, and in 1939 a training depot was cstablishccl. In '949 the Southern Rhodesia Engineers, a Ter· ritorial unit, was formed, and by 195'2 the unit could muster three field Squadrons and a field park trooP--400 all ranks. In 1956 all Territorial specialist units were placed in suspended animation; but a year later the decision was revised, and personnel from the newly created Corps of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Engineers were attached to barracks throughout FC'dcration. In IgGl, '2 Ficld Sqn. was formccl 10 meet a need for combat engineers; and at the end of Federation the Corps (now SR Corps of Engineers) was reorganised into two engineer squadrons. The unit was finally renamed in 1965 as the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers, and by t974 couM boast a dircctorate at AHQ, a School of Military Engineering, a ationaI Scf\~ce Field Troop, three Engineer Squadrons (Iatcr expanded to six), and a complement of 30 officers and 675 ORs. In addition to standard RE duties, the Corps controlled all boat operations; 5 Engr. Spt. Unit controlled Anny and Police activity on Kariba until the foonation of Boat Squadron in 1979; vcsscls ranged from two-man boats to an armoured ferry mounting 1'2.7mm AA guns. The r.'\vouritc guerrilla weapon was the land4 mine; Rhodesia's roads wcrc particularly vulnerable, evcn the tarred surfaces having no hard shoulder, and at one stage two vchiclcs a day were being lost to minc blasts. To aid detection the engineers came up with the 'Pookie', a vehicle based on a VW chassis which coule! detect lal1dmincs at speed without triggering the mines themselves. A dog troop was introduced in '975 for mine detection. Labradors were lIsually used, working in pairs, and showed an unusual ability to detect hidden objects-although they did require retrain. ing alier fOllr- 10 six4week stims in the bush. The Engineers' biggest achicvement remains thc establishment of Corsan the 'Cordon Sanitaire' devised to inhibit movement across the border. Corsan did account for almost I,O enemy fatalities and uncounted casualties; but il proved a hindrance to movement by friendl)' forces as well, especially \\hen secondary secdings and replace·

ment d vi w add d t the general design. be 800km minefield (maioLy anti-personneL) has y t to be cleared and pI' bab!y n v r wiJl b

Reinforcetnent Holding Unit Th ar 1 7 mark d th fu tall-up ofth 3 5 age gr up and th b ginning f RH created 0 Lake n to a paper strength oLoured and i n p rsonn I wh had c mpLeted Lhcir liability for T crvice with the supply and tran 'port platoon, and older whites who had fini h d th ir , rvic with RR, me ofth latl I' w r p t d to lh Zambezi aUe to I' I a younger men for more exacting work'. mrniLm nL consi t d of rwo bri ( nonombatanl aU-up pry ar. IniLiall I and 2RH were campi t I European, gRB ompl L I OLOUT d. I nt grati 11 rapidly (oUowcd, how v \.. 2RH wa' disbanded and multiracial unit based on ali bury and Bulawayo I' Ull d. RH a laskcd wiLh the training of all ,lour d p r onncl (at Inkom arri 11) and a such was on ofth larg L units in tJ, e uri y 'or es. P 'ann 1 w re p ted to th op rational area but g n rally to taLi guard po,itioD. In Jal 1974 Lh' dut b came th

reo pon ibility of the Prot rion ompanie primarily form d to fill a mar mobile Tole' manpoweT wa drawn from .01 ur d ian and Eura ian naLi nal rvicemen and a 'mall numb r f c nLinuou.'>ly emb died volum cr' (ffcclivcl regulars). These were main! fficered b memb rs but sam regular bile offic rs at a served. B t11 unit 'pand d rapidl a m r and mar m n finish d th if iniLi I TF ommiml nt and merg d in January 1978 with l tal Lr nglh approaching 6, 0 , L be om the Rhode ian D Ii n R gim nt (RDR). Th L.O baualion ( 0.1 Mashonaland Bn. and atabcl land Bn.) ould Ii Jd 'v n a tiv mpanic, and provid d Lhcir own 'uppon I men I th am Lime, the urnL s role was formaU t nd d Lo raiJwa patrolling nvu pI' t n and a 'normal infant!' 1'61. Th unit Labl b 1L (r d G r infantr black and whit for ra ) wa uniqu all th I' I' rv I

urn

/lil/ue, a ferry boat renamed. refined and re-:lr1Ded for ervice on Lake Karma. She bore a IDodey coUectioD of weapons many of them captured. like the pair of 12.7m.m Russian beavy AA machine gun on the forward super tructure.

Land min.." w ..r .. a favouril .. guerrilla weapon, and Rhod.."ia's roads were. highly vuloe....bl." many had 00 larmac surfac.., and even Ih.. metaUN strelches had sofl shoulders. Non, th.. roll-over bars littN 10 th.. cab of th.. Polic.. Land-Rov..r; and the Hippo, one ofa number of special mine-protected vehicles devised and prodUCN locally during the. war.

clemen IS wore Rhodesia Regiment colours. The Protection Companies' stable belt had been a plain dark green. The Rhodesian Air Force The Rhodesian Ail' Force came into beingofficially-in November 1947, but could trace its origins to 1934., when an Air Unit was established on a Territorial basis as part of lhe Rhodesia Regimen!. In 1936 it became possible for airmen to join the Southern Rhodesian Defencc Force (Permanent StaIfCorps) as rcgulars, and by [937 a military airfield was laking shape at Cranborne, Salisbury. TF personnel werc callcd up for fulltimc service in August 1939, and onc month later the Air Unit officially becamc the Southern Rhodesia Air Force. The following ycar, SRAF personnel were taken under the RAF umbrclla; Rhodesia remained a primary training area, however-Thornhill, opened in 194[, trained almost 2,000 pilots during the war years. In all, Rhodesian airCl"ew saw service in thrce squadrons in the Second World War: No. 237 in Abyssinia, North Africa and Europe; No. 266 in the Ballie of Britain and Europe; and No. 4
within Bomber Command, in Europe. or slightly more than 2,300 Rhodesians who served, one in five died and one in ten was decoratcd. Nos. 237 and 266 Sqns. were disbanded at the end of the war, and No. 44 Sqn. remained as an e1ementoft.he RAF's Su;kc Command, still bearing 011 its badgc thc Rhodesian elephant; but pressure from cx*scrviccmen led directly to the establishment of the Air Force as a pcrmanCIll unit in Novcmber 1947. Expansion was rapid; the Air force moved La its permanelll base at New Sarum ill [95'2, and was renamed the Rhodesian Air Force on Federation. Shonly thereafter the prefix 'Royal' was added, and the RRAF look on an idelllity of its own, shedding Army ranks and khaki uniform and adopting one.>; similar to those borne by the RAF. The RRA F was responsible for the derenee of the Federation, and acquired a v.ariety of aircraft for the purpose, including Canberras in 1959; in addition, fighter squadrons regularly served with the RAF in the Middle East. In 1962 a squadron of Aloucl.lc helicopters came on strength, and was joined by a squadron of"Hawker Hllnterjet fighters the following year. On the breakup of Federation colllrol of the RRAF reverted to Southern Rhodesia, and a pal.lcrn ofclose lia,isotl with Police and Army was set up in anticipation of COIN operations. UDI brought sanctions which hit the R RAF harder than the other services. However, improvisation and

1: Deputy Commis ioner, British South Africa Police, 1975 2: Constable, Support Unit, BSAP, 1965 3: Constable, Sooth African Police, 1975

2

A

1: Lance-Corporal, RbodesianAfricaD Rifles, 1968 2: Lieutenant-General; No.1 Blues, 1979 3: Sergeant, Rbodesian Light Infantry; Dress Greens, 1965

3

B

1: Private, Royal Rhodesia Kegt., 1968 2: Private, Rhodesian African Rifles, 1979 3: 'n'ooper, Se)ous Scouts, 1977

c

2

1: Captain, Rhodesian Medical Corps, 1974 2: Corporal, Grey's Scouts, 1977 3: Trooper, Armoured Car Regt., 1977

o

1: Air Mars.hlll, Rhodesian Air Force, 1975 2: Private, Rhodesian Women's Service, 1977 3: District Security Assistant, Internal Affairs, 1976

E

1: Lieutenant, Special Air Service, 1976 2: Soldier, Mozambique FPLM, 1978 3: Private, Zambia Regiment, 1976

F

3

2

1

1: ZANLA guerrilla 2: Joshua N'Komo as ZlPRA C-in-C, 1979 3: ZlPllA 'regular', 1978

G

1: Security Force Auxiliary, 1979 2: Sgt., Royal Anglian Regt., Commonwealth Monitoring Force, 1980 3: Private, Zimbabwe Army, 1981

2

3

J,

H

local manu actur gradually took the place of import d kill and 'quipm m; th RAF was t maintain an 85 p r nt .erviceabilit record notably high r than thal of many European air lore s, and a hievd it with an in redibly low manla-aircraft ratio of 1 :25. In 197 th Ro aI pr fix" as dropped roundels were hang d and th Rhod ian lion tb me was incorporated in badg frank. Th Air Force was compl tely multiracial though low l' than th Army to a pt w m n; In first w man [ficel', an air sub-lieutenant was commissioned in December

1979· Th natur rap ration und rtaken b e urit Force m am that variet of air raft, eith r heli opt r r fix d-wing auld lak part in an giv n op r ti n' nr,for [or example would utili' h lie pteI" Lynx and DakOla whil A 25-pdr. of 1 st Field Re.gt., Rhodesian Artillery deployed in the neighbourhood of Villa a)a:zaar, scene of frequent border dashes between the Security Force and FRELIMO.

Hunt rs mighl provide direct fire upport. Howr th RAF command organi cd quadran mar y tematicaIly:

o. J qn. Based at Thornhill w 10 and quipped with elderly but potent Hunt r FGA.gs, u cd with deadly effect for close ground upp I' and again t tali targets. o. 2 ({n. I 0 ba cd at Thornhill equipped with v 11 mar Id rly ampir fighter bomber, vinta [956. all d upon on occasion, fi r operations; more often u d as th trainin adr for o. [ qn. Th unit al a pI' id d advan d weapon training and flying in tru tion. 0-3 qn. The tran port squadron equipped with D -3 --on ,a I ast, had een ervice in th nd World War. h Dakota w l' th hi f mean or resupply, but al 0 carri d per onnel or serv d as a vehicle for 'p ya ' ope.ration . Th -y a] a pI' vid d the lift ror all parachut operati n. n IP Dakota was equipped as a fI ing command nb'

33

The Rhodesian Defence Regin'ent---.created ;0 January '978 by the amalgamaLion of the two Reinforcement Holding Unit_ was a two-battalion nodally ;ntcgrated unit which guarded potl'DLial guerrilla targelJ/. from prepared pos;Lions. This patrol ;8 operating at RuY'" h;gh level bridge.

and served as an aerial command post on external operations. NO.4 Sqn. Equipped willI 'Lynxes'-the local cuphemism for light aircraft of many shapes and sizes, including Cessna 337s-this unit provided the Security Forces' 'eyes', being used extensively in the reconnaissance rolc; in addition, their shon landing capability made the aircraft ideal for casually evacuation. Armament, if carried, ran to a 7.6'1mm MAG and small calibre rockets. NO.5 Sqll. Equipped with Canberra B.'1S and 1'.45, this bomber squadron was used extensively on cross-border operations in cOI'Uunction with Nos. I and 2 SCJIlS.; max-imum bomb load was 10,ooolb (and the bombs were oftcn 'home-made'). In addition, Canberras served in a reconnaissance role. No.6 Sqll. Equipped with Percival Provosts, this was the basic training squadron; successful personnel proceeded to No. '2 Sqn. for jet conversion and

advanced training, and thence to operational conversion. NO.7 Sqn. Based at New Sarum and equipped wiLh 40 or so ageing but serviceable Alouette Ills ancl, after 1978, with 1'1largcr, longer-ranged Bell205s which were frequemly used on 'cxternals'. The Alouctles were the backbone of Fire Force, being used for troop deployment, fire support and command. The command chopper ('K car') generally carried '1omm cannon or quadruple MAGs, lhe accompanying 'C cars', I\\~n MACs or 50mm Brownings. Heavier armament was pre· cluded by its effects 011 the airframe. In lhe early years of the war, 40 helicopters were ;on loan' to Rhodesia from South Africa; 26 of the machines, and 40 pilots, wCIe recalled ill 1976. While Lhe RAF could and did operate independently, it was most commonly used in close support of ground forccs, either on 'externals' 01' in the lireforce rolc, a concept which provided an unusual example of Air Force/Army co· operation-there were few instances of Lhe imerservice rivalry that llsually bedevils combined operations. Fircforce was essentially a self:

contained operati n which could transfl I' its bas within -4 hour. R pan ibility fl I' uch a move [ell on to a Camp ommandant usual! a oLul1teer Reserv Officer trained p cifi all or the lask. Th amp gen rally und r n as would be prot t d by carth ramparts. LnstaD a c l any and aU refuelling 'ite allowed for ext nd d prating imultan au reru Iling ould h compLish d al an it provid d wilh bladd -I' -h avy duty rubb r fu I contain rs deliv d mpty and fill d Y b w' r. L.ubrication wa a per nnial pI' blem in hodesia' limal , and wa th re ponsibility of the te hnician. in fa t t hni ian u uaLly oun but a1wa s highly train d carried a great d at of responsibility fr m being able to instaU a repla em nt eh pper ngin in tw hour t op rating th cra t armam nt in contacts. If a 'I h uldn't r med a problem he could usually diagnose it ac ural Jy. echni ian served a fiveyar apprenticeship befor qualifying; pilo , lor thl'ir par I w r 'xp I d t hav a g n ral familiarity with th m hani of aU air raft and cl tailed knowl dge flh p cut.iariLie of the.i I' own.

um .

A rnh:ed crew of the Police Reserve, with the type of v hicIe used to head up civilian convoys; a wide variety of civilian pick-up trucks were tnodified, in this case by the addition of rear seat and a '3o-cal. Browning mounting. The 'flooded road' ahead on then> is in fact a low levet hridge over the Gwaii River.

Cr w Sp nt Up to i ht month a ar on op rati nal duty flying an a erag two mi ions a day. In the monotonous Tiean land p a urate map r adin was an e sential kill.

British South Africa Police h B dated back to 188g, when the B Company Police were raised, as mount d infantr 10 e c rt the Pioneer Column to alisbury, nd then to introduce a system of law and maintain it. Initially 500 strong the unit was I' due d in r891 and a new fore the ashonaland unt d P li . am into bing. In th years following the Matab 1 and a hona reb ilion th fI rce adap ed to an in r 'ingly ivi] 1'61 . In r 8 6 the nam changed to B P and fncan I' crnitm nl b an in I 03; alII 'al p lie [or amalgamated in £g g. emb r rv d in th East J an campaign of the First orld"\ aI', c nd d to th

5

The Police upporl Unit bad a r putation for extreme fimess and fast ero s-country movement in rough terrain. Training included firing the F -MAG from th houlder-not the easiest of skills to ala ler.

Rh d· ian Regl. and th u Lh rn Rhodesi rvi lumn. Some xpansion and r or anisaLion LO k place between the war' and in an tIel pali n f th c nd rId War th PoU R serve w s establi hed in 1 39, For many year III for . doubl as all unarm d iviJ poli for 'C and a lrain d 'tanding arm; militar rpan, i bili ties w r 11.1 r Jinq uish d in r954- on F d ati n. 1 54 sa a g n ral re .cw of u] P li e R . r e and the Rc rv was s t uP' while this was very mu h a 'pap l" unit m mb ,had l b available G r aJI- ut in an m r n nw rm a tri tly utili ty-bl u hatu ell' -typ riot Ici t or raj" I cam ufJag . All r ruit j in d Field R rvi t . In ntrasl Ul R serv nGnu d lumary month.ly Lrainin

3

and assisted Regular Poli e in

rim ur waring R guJar Poli uniform. 1957 p ning [an Air' ing (PRA ). mann d by r rvi t wnin air ran whi h w r hir d out to th Police. 1 mbers wer gen rall pilot· r w U-qualified na 'gator, and are their own distin Liv uniform. Primaril u d [or I' e radio relay observation and courieJ" du Lie the

PRA W lat

I'

xt nd d it ro} l in Iud

pOlling,

a and p rsonne! lift. In 1960 Lh rican Police Reser e \ as sel up to

aunt r jvil di turban e and the unit limited du ies ill luded patrolling and guarding intallation . Blu riot dl' S Wal W rn as in th ase of the R rv. m n i ld R rv w t up in th am y ar operating r di and ntr I I' am to rei as men for oth r duu ... 196 I aw the l' ali n fth pial R de i n d to relic" p lice [rom tatic duti uch residemiaJ r a and k p iot prot ti n. nuniformed unpaid and large! untrain d it acconunodated older men illlabl to join the other

1''

reserve forces. in 1974 it was re-organised into a Field Reserve, to perform the same duties as their properly constituted and uniformed volunteer male counterparts. Women police were completely mixed in race; three months' training formed the force. Late in 1966, as lhe Police were reluctant to hand first pan ofa two-year iniual SUIll, and training was over responsibility to the Army, PDlice Anti- identical to that given to the men except for acuve Terrorist Units were formed to combat increased combat skills. The highest ranking woman officer guerrilla activity in the border 7,ones. A normal was an inspector. European training was the responsibility of 'stick' consisted offour Europeans and Dne Mrican, all volunteers, both Reserve and Regular, self- Morris Depot, Salisbury, SCi up in 190$ African supplied fDr lip to a week or more. Primarily a recce training was the responsibility ofTomlinson Depot. unit,they generally operated on foot, alulOugh they (Perhaps inevitably, serving Africans in the early did have their own transport and prided themselves days were generally referred to as the 'Black on speed of deployment. Standard Army uniform Watch'.) Africans became eligible for the rank of was worn with the PATU emblem~leDpard'spug- patrol officer in 1976, and racially integrated mark-worn as a shoulder flash. Usually in their training began at Morris Depot in '979. thirties, personnel generally came from the same In July '973 the BSAP was om~red for the first area and were called up together for two-week stims time as a choice for nauonal servicemen, who would four to six times per year. Prior to the South African receive three months' training and a nine~month PUll-OUl, SA PATU units also operated III posting followed by commitment to the Police Rhodesia. 1Iltelligellce was provided by SB and Reserve. Referred to as patrol officers, they wore a uniform identical to that of regulars, but wilh an CID personnel attached to the JOCs. In 1971 a Women's A Reserve was established, M"n or th" 'Blackboots'-lh" Pol;«: Supporl Uwl--sweep drawn largely from volunteers from the Women's lhrough 10 kraal.

37

LJ

e

Security Forc Auxiliarie, the 'returooo' 6ghters who were o tcnsibly in orpOr3ted into the Security Force after the 'internal ellle.ment'. The peaked cap WOrD by the Dta.D inunediately lefl of the white officer wa the mark of a 'coordinator'-m effect, an SFA officer. Tbe e auxiliaries are armed with G3 rifle aod displaythesp arbadge of the SFA On their headgear: see Plat HI caption.

should r flash. reen 'hirt w I' introduced for m mbel's serving in th districts. Polic R rvi t· w r mmitl d t b tw n 42 aud Igo days' rvic pry ar. CaH-up wa' ext oded to African in tb latter day of th war but few lhe war es alat d, re ruits were a luaUy. TV d. tecr d dir tly inlo th Supp n nit whil from '979 on th ulk foati nal s r ' mow ol into the rmy. By 1975 the p ial Res r e was in rea iugly r Li d up 11 b th R guLar P Ii ow blueuniformed h Im·t d and quipp d with bat nand currs th y wcr us d [or anti-bomb patrols roadblo ks, and ommunicati n dutie within tation . m fir arm training was iven and mcn b tween 18 and 65 were a epted. This for y Pint p ial, 000was uppl m nt d by

38

uniform d and drawn from mployee at guard d 10 ation. Th pecial ReseTV wa open to olouT d but oot to [ricans th fri an Fi Jd Re TV filled th am r61 in th lOwn hip . The most overtly military unit fielded was the upp rt nit which could trac it origin to th skari troop whi h bad existed only for r monial dUlie.. (Th wh el turn d u11 irc1 wh n uppor! nit b gao t upply th c I' monial guard for Government House.) Created in the ady 1960 as a fireforce to assist Districts under pr sure [rom riot and i 11 disturbanc , it wa fir t deploy d ill Bulawayo, and was hri t n d Bla kboots' by 10 al who w rued to th ubiquilou brown Poli boot. upport nit op rat d in aU area, troop members being black and white in the ratio one to ighl. Bla k w r r cruit d at 18-plu ,train d and po t d to upport Unit· \ rute er alum r, 6:om eiLher the regulars or national ic intak. ational rvicemen erved two ars with upp rt nil t n ur continuity and ix-w k caU-up with normal' units th r afl r. Th unit was ba ed at ornlinson depot befor mavin a

custom-built ali bury HQ in 1979. Thorough training wa gi en in batt! amp, with the emphasi on aggre i n featuring a Ii ammo 'battl ina ulation , which I d to OIne ca uallj . The 12kg as arried without a sling and fired from lhe hould r. The unit earned a r putation for tracking ability and . tamina-running gokm a day was not untommon' on e i r ord d of a memb r running 40km in on day t tak part in 6ve conlacts. h unit' WD tran p rt tion in Iud d Hyena Kudu and Rhino., and lhe unit was backed by a pecial Police Reserve section working as drivers and radio p a free men for tll fi ld. The town w r not forgotten' a Police Urban Emerg ncy nit wa t up around 1975 to ounter urban t non. m. BaJ d in ali bury, Bulawayo, Gwelo and mtali, it wa cl Iy mod lied on T. los -quart r and specialist weaponry wa cani d in ddi ti n t niper weap n, zi S G nd automati shotguns. Dress induded parahelmet and ombat ap without Aap . Like h Army th Poli aw tIl potential of a mounted unit and form d th Mounted Poli fEquus) in 1977. Basd al Plumtr und r In p. Pt r mb i m in con rn w th B t ana border. rained in COl techniques it aI a adri d consid rabl sue ess against rustlers.

return d to areas th y knew during secondary allup . Intaf a divide into Echelons including an Engin ering Depar m nt· ba k-up and admiJllstration w a1mo t ntire] a TF provin . allowing the exam pIe of '1Jl and P lic a mounted unit was s t up in ]977 operating u- m aunt Darwin. Most Intafpersonnel were d ploy d in Protect d Village, which were each design d to accommodat 2 000 peop) . The in ention wa two-fold' to prate t the population from intimidation and t d pri th guerrillas ofloeal upp rt. The first P ukumbnra 1 was eL up in October 1973 at than a mile from the ozambique border at the behest of the 10 also The intention was that th villagers move ba k to their frozen' land aft r the war, but in the meantime Intaf endeavour d t The 'dress greens' unifonn, in this case worn by a senior CO of the Education Corp . The national patch in white on green, outlined red, is absent frOID the right shoulder for sOlDe reason: cC. Plate 83.

Internal Affairs The Mini try fInt mal Affair (Iura play d a vcry r al part in th batt! for h art and mind , b ing 10 l t tb rural frican throughout Lh war and b in traditionally regarded as th link betw en overnment and peopl in developing th Tribal TU·t Land. But Inta[ p rsonnel wer especially soft tar 't Lrav lling as hey did in rem te al' a and this I d to the [ormation of a para-military wing initially rc r If-pI' l tion. Th uni w· 'pand d I Y an all ti n of naLi nal 'crviccmen who w re reg uired to erv Ih ·landard 18 m nths aft which th w r ranked 'yed tt '. R ruitment f African Di tri t i\.i tants who always formed the bulk f lntaf pCI ouo I, was al tepp d up. Ea i training wa giv n at tb Chikurubi d pot and included a gr unding in I al u toms and lallguag . Iotaf r ular weI' r uir d Lo I am a local language fluently and p I nn lweI'

3.

create ncw permanent farms, water supplies, and educational and medical facilities. Platoon-strength groups of African District Assistants, under white officers, guarded the protccted villages against guerrilla allack. District Officers were generally young, often no more than a couple of years out of school. The PVs were backed by 'keeps'. earth-rampan forts, off limits to civilians. Keeps and villages were generally sited together for mUllIal protection, although some forts were strategically placed in relative isolation in the midst of existing kraal systems. The forts were frequently attacked; and on more than one occasion, fire was returned from within a PV. PVs did record some notable successes in stabilising the populauon, and in many instances slOPped the flight to the urban areas. Guard Force When it became evident that Intars role was becoming aggressively protective rather than adminiSlrauve. the decision was taken to create a new force which could assume the military role and 'Pri... te ro,"duaa', the RAR'. s_t ma_1., whMe taste fo.. cipr'f!tte bOd. was 10 be hi. uadO;IlS, pJ>OIosraPh~ d.....u.g • mshl parade w;lh hiJl ha...u..... who wean the regimeutal haad·. Yen'o" of dreu S....ell ...-ifoml. See captio... Plate 8 •.

allow IllIaf to relllnl to normal duties; accordingly. Guard Force was fielded in early 1976. The Guard Force Commander was f\laj.Gen. G. A. D. Rawlins. brought in from retirement, and indeed all officers and most instructors, initially, were ex~Army. Recruitment was aimed at ex~RAR men in particular, as the intention was to have African commanders for units within the PVs. White memben came from among national servicemen and the 0 category call·up group. The unit, while predominantly black, was completcly multi.racial. even at officer level. Training was carried out at the Guard Force Depot, Chikurubi, while HQ was in Salisbury. Guard Force was deployed throughout Rhodesia, its administration partly cased by its static role. Each area was controlled from a Group Headquarters (usually sited b)' the localJOC and DC's camp) by a commandant and assistant commandant. As the PVs and keeps were widely dispersed, Fon"'ard Command POSlS, commanded b)' junior officers, were sometimes used for local c0ordination. Indi\;dual keeps were manned by Guard UnitS, Guards and NCOs under a Keep Commander, who was eligible for a commission if he showed promise. Rank SlruClure was similar to the Army's, but the nomenclature was different; officen, for example, ranked as commander, deputy commander. com· manda.nt and assistant commandant. NCO ranks included junior corporal, keep corporal, keep or guard sergeant, keep or guard senior sergeant, keep sergeant m
1978. F 'unit' wer ith r deplo ed into the Tribal Trust Land under their own commander to pearhead r construction and development of the tribal ar as or slotted into I' training pTogramm s. Th auxiliari s w r VI wed with u pi i n, which in r as d ith vid I [fa tionfighting mUlin and poor dj cipljn . B th nd of the y ar th oro-anj ation wa regard d a Muz r wa' pr;vat army. In 1979 the unjt was renamed as Pfumo re Vanhu ( pear of the P ople), and fleshed out with new recruits. Re ruits came [rom all Rhodesia s major tribes and s rv d in th ir 10 al ar a aft r rudim ntary drill and w apon training. rtempt wer mad to instil b tt I' di ipLin and th first on; ial intak' pass d out in F bruary T980. Logi tics and om admini tration w r pr vid d by r gular for but FA were let much to their own devi . At be t an F presence in an ar a hamp red Z Land ZIPR acoVlU and re tored a m a ure of ecur;ty to i olat d tribal areas. Men ohRAR exercise their right to march through Bulawayo wilh bayonets fixed (TC Day, 1977). Tbe COJDpany-co)oured scarves (here yeUow; there were also blue and red exantples wilh a blac.k-printed regimental badge motif) were a seldomseen parade embellislunent; Support Coy. opted for the traditionaJ camouflaged face veil. Note '!LA.R.' title on upper sleeves in black on a variety of shades of drab.

Training was provided by detached regular until p iaJ For e w up to strength. C and mmand po irion w r filled in the field b vet rans of th struggl and di cipline was maintain d with a heavy hand. P r'onnel in theory, were between 18 and 45 and fit; in pr ti fi w wer turned away. Central Training ch 01 wa et up at Domboshowa near ali bur , to provid on -month training cour e in ba ic infantry skills, and wa admini t r d b F instructors and ad irs.

The PlofeA I: Deputy Commissioner, British outll Africa Police, 1975

The B AP had a distinguished militar r· ord and ranked a Rhode ia s senior corps. 0 e. toward making th for less military included t11 ab lition fth la tv ti of military rank in 1958 butit continued to provide Guard' of Honour, a well a being actively invol ed in th anti-t rrori t campaign. C remonial uniform in luded a dark blue high-collar patrol dress with gold braid and bla k leather together with th a-called 'gre'l1 . iJlu trat d here. Thjs unj[orm had been adopted in 1928 though the op 11 oUar wa not xt nd d to

areas afterwards. This para-military policeman wears the SA P's camouflaged field uniform originally dcveloped for usc in the semi-desert scrub of the Capri vi Strip rather than the greener bush of Rhodesia. South Africa continued to provide both official and unofficial help. Logistic ass.istanct during lhe 1979 elections involvcd considerable numbers of South African Poljce, Anny and Air Force personnel, all of whom wore thcir own unifonns; and many South African volunuxrs served in Rhodesian units.

M"'mbCTs of 3

1Ad~""'1

Coy. ofT-duly

al layaftp

m lh",

East"'.... H..iS.........d_':J Ittdep'.' bom", for much of lh" ....r.

other ranks until 1948. Thc ~Joulllcd Troop wore the same tunic with a while Wolseley helmet mounling a bras.'1 badge and spike, pale cord breeches, and brown leather bdt, gauntlets and gaiters.

A.2: COllStable, Support Unit, BSAP, Ig6S Like its forerunner, the Askari PlatOon, the BSAP's para-military Support Unit provided the Guard at CovcrnmcnL House (with a short break immediately aner UDI). The unit's full dress included a long·slecved vcrsion of the 1948 Rhodesian 'univcrsal tunic', together with the same goldtasselled blue fcz as the Police Band, but it was distinguished by its black leather. Black gaiters were adopted in 1969. The Lec gnficld was used for ceremonial duties until 1970. In lhe field the men carried FN rifles and wore Slandard camouflaged fatigut.'s, with 'BSAP' shoulder titles, and a drab slceve patch shov,'ing a black falling cagle with 'SLTI'1'ORT UNtT' abovc. The unit's motto Pamheri ne Gondo meant '''·orward with the Eagle'. Aj: Constable, South Afman Police. 1975

BI: Lana-Corporal, Rhodesian African Rifles, IfIjIJ Thc dark green fez, green and black stable belts and hose tops were adopted during the 19505 and worn with the 1948 patlcm Rhodesian 'universal tunic' and shorts. In the later IgOOs RAR officers began to appear on parade in greens and slouch haLS. and all ranks received these in about 1972. The Regimental Band had already adopted a grccn Wolseleypattern helmet with a black pagri and silvcr spike, together with black and white bandsmen's 'wings'. The slouch hat was green with a black pagri and black badge-backing. Officers and \V0s also had a black ox-hair hackle. (Thc black facings (:001memorated King Lobengula's Inbizo Regimcnt,) 'Private N'duna', the regimcntal mascOt, died from a surfeit of cigarettc ends: his successor, Privatc Magoda, managed to shed his coat during a parade rchearsal and was sentenced to threc weeks deprivation of sugar.

B2: Lieuinlolll-Gtneral. NO.1 SilltS, 1979 Although thc Fcderal army adoptcd a new 'tartan grecn' service dress in the early 196os, it retained the older British pattern No.1 dress as well, and this continued to be worn by senior Rhodesian officcrs IIp to 1979, with appropriate alterations to lhe insignia. No slceve titles or formation signs wcre worn with this ordcr of dress. Some field officcrs continued to wear the TerritOlial Rhodesia Regimcnt's rifle green version, adoptcd whcn thc regiment was allied with thc King's Royal Rifle Corps. This had black buttons, pouch belt and shoulder cords, and a miniature cap badgc worn Oil the traditional crimson boss.

Following an alliance between Rhooesian and South African black nationalist movements, SAP units were deployed in Rhodesia in 1967. They 8j: rgean/, Rhodesia Ligh/lnfan/ry, Dress GrtnlS, I!liS were officially withdrawn in 1975, but some are Thc RLI was the first unit to receivc the new green alJeged to have continued to operate in lhe border unifonn in 1962 (accordjng to the regimcntal

4'

history, too much ofdI green material wa ordered and it was decided to u it for tb r t of th army as w adopt d wh n th well). Th gr n b regiment beeam a' mmand unit in 1964. Th dr gr n er al i u d to flieers of the Permanent Fore and en tu all to all regulars whether white r bla k. Tb national lion-andpickax pat h wa worn on th right Ie ve and th brigad patch on th I ft. Th tradition wh r by warrant offic r' and rank devices were worn on th ri ht I e nl st mmed fr m the Briti h outh frica Police.

C/: Private Royal Rhodesia Regiment 1968 Th e ntiall Briti h drab bu h hat hirt and denim battJ dr ss trou ers of th F d ration rmy were r tained fI r om tim aft r its dissolution, parti ularly b T rritorial unit such as th Rh d sia R gim nt, th ugh th y gav way in du cours t the ne camouflag d uniforms, Th regim nt had to r linqui h the title Royal when Rh d ia be am a r publi in 1970 but it k pllh crown in it bad a a I' mind r f th honour simply moving it fr m th t P to th ntr . In rvi dr it w r black 'n d beJ and riB gr n b r ts with th badg mount dna r d diamond: orne f th lat I' baualion add d di tinction u h as 01 ur d h kl .

C2: Private RAR, /979 The Rh dian amrm inlr du d during I 65 6 w r' pI' babl. inspir d b th u e of 'milar fali u b th Portugue in n ighbouring ~fozambiqu. h w I' fir 1 i ued to tlr I' gular infant, and Poli' operating in th Zambezi ,-alley, h original ou fit m hav incJud d a plain khaki hin worn with amouAag d field ap trousers and 0111 bat ja k t ('h laU I' ft I diJcarded) but b 19 9 th hirt to was being mad G' m am ufla d mat rial. RAR oldi rs wor the full r gulation outfit hown bel' more frcqu ntl lhan m l units. h brm n ombat t and th rench OT -pau rn teel helmet w re tandard oUlh friean i u : on th field ap lh RAR \ or a gr n- v r-bla k print d pat b with th I' gim ntal b d in hit.

tions. Shirl sleeves were cut back or I' mov d altog ther and the trou ers were turn d into h I' or di arded in fa our of lighter and bri fer ci ·tian model. The camouflaged material was al 0 u d fi I' T - hir and flopp bush hats. t face veils oft n replaced the orthodox h adg ar and takki . (can as boots) or 'feWe ' (veldsh n) th r gulauon combat boots. Th c ut had n mol' latitude than the average troopie often waring th am clothing and equipment as the guerrilla. Eur p an m mbe affected piratical beard, and bla k d up for op ration. Their gr n table beJts and disrincti du ty brown bel' ts m b liz d th bu b which \'Va their cho n environment.

DJ:

aptain, Rhodesian Medical orp, /974

Tb old Federation Army gr ni h shirl and andcolour shorts remained in use as barracks and training dre s for Tcrritorials and nati nal I' 1 men until th mid-J 70 and continued to b w rn sub equentIy by man regulars tor undr h w I' w m with h top or and-col ur d rp - olour stockin the latt I' fi'equ ntI havin top. orne officers and 0 e p ciall th ofth corp and s I' ic al 0 retained th old l' Bri ti h patt rn khaki ervice dre cap luni and tr u r. or nior offi ers ontinu d t w ar a alldcoloured short-sle ed bu hjacke h rt and plain long stockings right through to J979 though aft l' 1977 undress ands more commonJ nit d fa 'hirt and lacks.

D2: Corporal Greys couts, 1977 By th later 197 • ammies w re landaI'd dr all bu t th mo t formal ofoccasion . Th y w I'

U

for d

Headgear, like footwear, was extremely diverse, but the combat cap, with its distinctive fold-....d-button necldbp, wa a consistent favourite.

C3: Trooper elous couts [977 Thl'rugg d indi iduali m ofLhe Rhodesian Idier II sb w d il If in all mann r f field modifica-

43

by all arms ne S itatin th intr du ti n Bashe in bla k on khaki" TO i th ron t th· upp r I v. Miniatur ch vr n b am common: this corporal's two white che TOns are hidden here being worn only on the right arm. Individual units wer distingui hed by their badges coloured b r t and :tabl b It . Thj mounted unit adopt d a di tin bv gr b ret (initially baring th Rb dian ervice lion-and-tusk badg ) which recruits re ci d a part of the passing-out parade. With the dress 'greens' the Greys wore a grey lauch hat with a mara 0 band and fla h (otE er al 0 had a lack ha kl ).

3

2

Rhodesian insignia, post-197°: (.) Genera! officer' cap badge

(2) Lt.Gen. rank insignia (3) WOl rank insignia (4) won rank ID

4

insignia (5) Rhodesian Arm.y right shoulder patch (6) I t Brigade (7) 2nd Bele. (8) 3rd Bdl'. (9) 4th Bde. (10) Special Forces--aD worn on left should.... of dre s green .

eventually ad pted as more uitable. R W m mbers war taff orps stable b ,Its with the 'camml '. m n m mb r of th Air Fore war a similar unifi I'm in Air F r blu.

E3: Dutricl '/lcul'il:Y Assistant, lntemal Affairs, 1976 The urity or ontain d a number of peciali cd counter-in urgenc unir. ember of the 'ms r Clot rnaJ tla er Home) airs' paramil it w rand-colour d birt khaki nc k and ejth I' [ ng tr u I' and e mbat boo h ru ith long khaki cks and veld ho n. h ir eli uncLi crim n pagri and fla h cau ed them to b nicknamed cherry-tops'. Th white national rvice I' I'm wor crim on beret'. th ar progr ss d Army-styl Ii drab or amo IAag d fatigu s b am in r a ingly common. h a ·tual def! DC til Prot cled Villa es was hand d over to th new uard Force in [975: m mb rs war amouflag d unifom1s with a baclg 'on i ·ting of a ke p sup rimpo d on an llprighl word worn on eith I' a khaki. k'pi or amouDag'd ombat cap.

r

Ft: Lieutenant,

1976

Tlli' [fie r w ar lh Rhod ian pullover whi.ch dated ba'k t th rnid-lg6os, It oft n bore cloth iO'ignia such al' 'wings and formation patches. British-pall rn', a Uy punie 'cam in aboul 1979. It got old in th bu 'h, and th mitten bala la a and ev n tight· 'uppli d b voluntar organi, ation weI' mu h appr ciated. Epaul tt lip baring printed rank in-i i and (Ii- qu ntly) Lh corps I' unit initials w rc worn by many unit, though pra tice vari d. Th sand- oJoured ber twas identi 'al to that ofth pal'ent Bri.tish regiment but Lh badg wa in gil t m 1 Ii. ke h . u tralian pallrrn. Durin th J 960 A m mb r aJ, war Brilish- tyl nison smocks and Mk2 paratroop hdm L though lat I' standard Rh desian 'cammie. b ca In univ I' aJ.

F2: SoLdier FPL if (Mo<.ambique Am9') 1978 am inL c nAj ozam big u P opl s formed in [97sf]'om FRELI 0 x-P rtu ue e olonial I:ro ps re(fW[ d under a no reprisals polic . It was trained hyTanzaru 11 V ar.aw Pa t Cub 11 and bines ill IruCLOr nd quipp d with tandard ovi tBI

"..iLh oldi rs of th

, m tim •PL or

Ores in rno t unit was governed by it effeetiveJIe5 rather than its regulation wUformity. Shop-bought or 'liberated' che 't webbing was" cornmon uppJement to regular i u' it came in two weights of which this webbing i the heavier.

arms. The u 'uaJ uniform w· a fi Id ap hirt and trous r in th East German ri A k' pall rn' plain olive gre nand ex-Portugu am uAagd fatigues were also common together with Ea t German helm ts. The original r olutionary elho was r tain·d and a formal rank structure was not inO'oduc d until Ig8l though otE rs omeLim or am Brown . B cause ofRh d ian infiltration, th Fr ddi often wore lour d br ard as identification marks.

F3: Private.

ambia Rer!iment, /976

Th Zambian Army had to mr I' 'n on more than one occa ion to top facti nal fi hting b tw n Patrioti Front in urg nt group: it aJs uffi r d ca ualti s during Rhod sian hot pursuit' operation. h arm had beenfonn d from unit ofth ill-fated entral African ederation I'm and till retained many British feature, including lhe old orth rn Rhod ia Regiment cap badg' worn by th Zam ia R gim nt and 'Commonw alth patlern rank insignia (the crowll wa' r plac d by the Zambian fi h-eagle but h 'pip r main d pra ti ally unchanged). t first troop c ntinu d to wear the old Rhode ian 'umver al tuni h rl and 'lou h hat bu this marter, Briti h tyle ervi e dr wa jotr du d in he arl, 1 7 along" 'th a camouBag d fi ld dr

G1.'

A, rLA Guerrilla

The hjn e-trained Z LA made littl -iIort t ensure unifonnit . Th commonly or . ilian clothing and were re ogni abl a guerrilla nly b

15

irtu of their ovi t blo small arm and Ch.in etyl ch t p uch s. evcrtheless ympathetic ommuni l state did suppl combat clothing of variou types and this wa ertainly worn more e pecialiy in th later lag of the truggle. However th r was no u h thing as a tandard uniform and plaiJl khaki hirrs and tr u r wer worn sid bysid with cam uflag d jt m [various patt rn rj ailS and windcbeaters with badgeless bere or plilln p aked fi ld caps. orne jterns were made of ' himur nga I th'-a mixtur of red ( ymbolizing blood) bla k (for invi bility) and whit (to int n ify lhe ar r vi ion).

G2.' Jo hua koma as ZIPRA CinC, 1979 ZIPRA were more regular than Z Land while they do not eem to ha ve developed tandard uniforms or insignia kama fl-equently wore thi military-styl outfit during th later -tages of til. conflict. His Russian-patt rn p ked ap bor a national d vi e: aril r photograph of him show th coloured wreath with ut th leftward-facing Zimbabw Bird. The Ru sian- tyl peaked ap seem to have been a hallmark of the senior ZIPRA offi rs' kom lieutenan wore a imilar model with red band and piping and gold hin cord but a plain p ak tog ther with ngolan camouflag fatigu . niform mad from aJ" a Pa t ri fleck mat rial w r al 0 common amon th ZIPRA regular forces. G3: ZIPRA 'Regular', 1978 Thi guerrilla command r wears Angolan-pall n camouflaged fatigues with a field cap of an ntir I r different pattern a type of com bination whkb app ar to ha e been quite common. n the rice fI k mat rial app ared in differ nt gill within the arne unit being mad iota either hirt or jack t, and p ak d field cap or Aopp ber ts. Oth r camouflag d fatigu were al u d in ludiog oliv' gre 0 on sand, or early oviet leaf' pattern, tog til. r with y llowi h khakj hirt and trous rs with plain bra buttons worn with a Rus ian-st le tr pica! sun hal'. ovi t b Its and canvas pouch s w re comm n am ng ZIPRA combatants. How v r, th reliable K-47 was by far the most uniform fearur ofgu rrilla quipm or.

H J .' eCllrity Force Auxiliary. 1979 Th FA were given a brown d nim uni.fi rm consisting of b It d overall and a floppy bu b hal bearing the upwaJ"d pointing p ar patch of the Rhodesian regimental and corp cap badge witb table bell colours 1979; DOle that in those units which did not have special'tribal berets, a mentioned in the te~:t and colour plat caption ,theuorm was th Briti h. lyle midnight blue general isue beret: (I) RhodesIan Arm.d. Car Regt. (2) Rhod sian Artillery (3) Rhode ian Corps of Engineers (4) Rhode "an Corp of Sig:naJ (5) Rhodesian t.aff Corp and Rhodesian Women's Corps (6) Rhodesian African RiHes (7) Rhodesian Light In&.ntry (8) Rhodesian Special Air Service Regt. (9) S lous Scouts (10) Grey's Scouts (II) Rhodesia Regi.menl (12) Rhode ian Defence Regi.me:nt (13) Rhodesian lntelligence Corps (14) Psychological Operation Unit (IS) Rhodesian Army Service Corps (16) Rhodesian Army Medical Corps (17) Rhode ian Corps ofMili ary Police (18) Rhodesian Army Pay Corps (J9) Rhodesian Army Educational Corps (20) Rhodesian Corp of Chaplains.

4

SKoorily Force AUJliJiarieli buOy....l mood, tbaak.. 10 IIltirlu.". or .. ro .....S.. cam cr.. w. cr. Pial.. HI; lhi.. ill ilHe brow.. d ....un o~.......u uD.ironn or Ih .. SfA, with fn;.-...o.. -Ith.alci Pfllmo ,., Va,,/ul spearhead badSe 0"

the th.. th .. the

"-l"eu.

PJruwJ rt Vallhu in dark brown on khaki. A T-shirt \lith the same title and device was often worn undcrneath or in lieu. In practice many comillucd to wcar their civilian clothes or ex-guerrilla out fits. Ranks above senior NCO wore green berets. They fonned panofSpecial Forces, and were supposed to wear the sleeve patch introduced for the latter laLC in the war (a black scorpion on a white shield). though it is doubtful whether many actually did. The SFA were equipped with a miscellany of \\eapons, including many AK-47S. Ill: Strgtanl, Commollwtflll/J Monilon'ng Foret, IfIJo This NCO of the Royal Anglian Regiment displays lhelightweight shirt and t!'Ouscn generally worn by British members of the force. with the regimental bn'et and stable belt (dark blue, the red central band with a narrow yellow stripe). The white ~{onitoring force brassard oore a pangolin, and a ,'t\lov.' sunrise on red, white and blue. The

pangolin was chosen because its appearance was held to bring good luck: the brassard's designers presumably did not know that the animal curled into a ball and emitted an unpleasant smell when attacked, or that the local Africans killed it on sight for their chiefs to cat.

HJ: Pn'OOlt, Zimhahwt Amry, 1.cIJJ The Patriotic Front guerrillas integrated into the new national army were initially given the same brown denim outfits as the SFAs. Later, however, they were issued with ex-Rhodesian uniforms, including camouflaged combat dress (orten worn with the old StaIT'Corps stable belt) and the 'greens' worn here. A new national pateh has replaced the old lion and pickaxe (its presence on the left sleeve indicatt"s Army HQ other troops retained the old Rhodesian brigade patches); the sleeve lOp title IlOW reads 'ZI~lHA8\\'t:', and the beret now bears the new Infantry Corps badge. Ex-RAR units cominued to wear their old regimental badge ror some time. The rank structure remained unchanged, though the insignia substituted the new state's coat of arms and Zimbabwe bird for the Rhodesian symools.

47

NOles sur les pJanches en couleur

co..,..

Farbtafeln

("'mai, des saruc. d'I",,,,,,,,, t,
"141l. A2

,rMr","~

cIc I"

Rh",Ie.i~.1r JiSA I'.

L'u";'.
pIIIicc 1","'·mJlllai".. !!ard:lij 1:0

Gmcn'mmt

Hn..... Oa,.. t. I"""",,, Ito; ,,~o!.,. IlOf1aicn' des ,",ilt. 'l""'hrd. "" 'itle d·~I..ulc 'Il.'\••\l'· r, (II' n,'>S><>n b,,", en furm" de builth.... ",'<"I: !'i..... rip'i"n ·~uI'JIQII L'nil'. c"~~,, ill'N ,,,,,,pI;u;<:I k I..... f"'llfirld f"'>U' k<"l";r~tio"s. AJ Un 'mp"'lam OOI11in~1H de fa I,../i..., .",r·.. fri,:ail..... 1"" Rh'olhi<-, cO >d ..... "'b.., «I1lt;".,..",n' do: J>C>
"i,

",.e<:..,..

8. lH> l(nue de l~lradr. dt•• ils ,..,r, r.... ld. noi.... !>la,,,,,, otl argcm. ""1'1""1:.;, l'a.."na'io" a""" 10. Ir~d;l;"" do 'Riflco' bri,allniqUOl. \Ie'" '!l7~, I" ··< l'~dOf",nn d" 1101"",,1 "n,form" de ... ,,~ec .~t ~" dtb,,' If"';"... '''liric"... c(W,lin,,~ml1 d·"tiliser Lo. 'CDII(' bri,a""i'/lle hie" "',Id N". , D,,,",,- 113 'I"" {", a dll NCO fie por'.,e"" ko sig"n du,in",if, de g-r.>dt q"e II' hr:u droi ••

"ou.....

C-"", "" '96-,

s",

C. Tn'"e de ""III.., 'mpt"ale en g..;u>
",It

qud,!u' 'e"'IlS. "";<1n d't"e """plad pM 'en"e de c~rn(>ullag<: ,,,,,,dam dll""III Irs a,,,lk> ~';~.II'e·dia. ('~lle u""t Jtf>f,ail <'i!al",,,en' dH be,...., "Cf'I /i"",,;, I'i"';g"", "lam p14O:«SU' 'III """"ge 'lc " .." en '('",,,,,,,,,,,' OI""dard. q 1Ii.·i ",pirell' pr<.>b:o b!",,,,,, Ide ""11" ..1,,," Ill "'" pnfl ug~"'" ",juno; dluo fum" imrod",'t'S,; pan,r de ,gl).~!1t6. I..,. 00l ma.illCl; k "o",-~heflc pi", "",,"'''' ;,lai, Ie kq,; ri:alisi: da'" Ie ",,,,,,e Ii"" 'I"' In """e ,k ra",,,,,lla~e. In RAR p''''u", leur i''''~l''' hI.""he A"r "" ,cr,n,,~le .·"rt .", f",,<1 ""i" C:J Un gn",><1 rdii"heme'" n'gn.a.il da,.. In 'I:n,,,, d"" "i1A=",. "''''''b.... dl: "elll: "n;';; de 1'eW01Ila.W->""" dandes,i,,,,. I.e Itfn::' de t. ICnll~ d~ scrv;"" i:I~it roul<"r dl: po""'~r<,

''''!g<.

DI 1.·"nifc, "n" '"""" de h"'1IM<: It mant"'" "<>uti,,, e, hom de OOI,I."r sable di/ltrr",... co"'loi"a......... In .... t t ",,,,n..,,.li. I pI"l",n d.. 1>Cl'lIOIlIIeI ~,ai, "" ""i(on"" d~ ...,,,,,,,n"ll". de 1I0n,,'I'" dts i''lig,!C> d",;n""" ,..;".,..u'o al'id,,,,ific"a'it>n: I""",u ,leto"I.", (sri.'dallJ ce rigimm' d'infa",crici rh"''3II, ',n,I>3, r""ruult.r'; •., pMlX"' It· ,.W•• " '1"; lill'"e da'"Ie I''''c). A",,~" ."r Ie 1<;1,," d.la """lOhe....... Ilel .h",·""" ,Ie IlC';'e ,..ilk i"di.j"ni"'" _".."" It "r.adt D3 Dall' La ,,.,.d',ion bri'''''''''I'"', ,... por,ai' I.l.>bOil ""i.... toil~" " ..u d.' ,·;""""lIage. r, '''' In ponai' ""'" di"ill"i.", dc j(l'Olde,

"rc:n, ""••

..,k>c,

"'ks .

E. As:lc",blag. n'ali>(, ~ I",";r d'"" U/"forme cn gr:",,11: p;ortk d. I.. RAF. ""C'<. a" col, I'imill"" d'o/1irir, "'I"'ne"r
d<6d"" iii'"

.', L·illli~n"." ''''''' cl I", ':"'''SIn'15 d"" f",,,,k't<,. a'..,., n",i~"t d" grade r, I.. ",il'alO'll ,Ic ru""f in,)"i",<"O< h,;"", roll,...~""n.", Ie pull...,.."... I... IX"'1 rlMldbi.lI SAS ~,a;, Mk'''',!ue il. 'fln ",,,del,, bri,a""iq"e. maio il b~'l cd'ric aU Ii"" d'",,,, in";gr... rn Fa S.~d'" d" ~I
I",rt"""

,iss"

""i

"'' ' 1>0.'' '

G. In l.A~J.A J",na,en, II" ')'1'" panir"lil'r do t"n",,: del "w\d"~,. bli. "erts, d"" tu>"f de eam(>uA~lt".' de ""l11h",,,x ,i'ern"".. c"illl1a'.'" Ie; I"',i,,,an,,,,d,,p""" d" Van",;., ,.... fml"""l..... ell'/oq"il'"me'" 'e""". an'" "'" kepi """"." poi",,,. ptr'i<'"'ltl. GIl N'k<>r,", alf""';.''''''4i, a,ticl. J)()I'"lain:: parmi SI::l oIl,ci"ra, G3 Crl ""ifo,,,,,, d" e~m""A3l(C anJ{Ulai. "" 1I1<)1"'e 'Ill. I'lln dl$ II\l",b,,~,~ Ol)Ir;s dc ,"n"" 'I"r I~'''aie", 1,:1 ,",·",1""" de: I" g,,"';lIa de Ja l',i'II.;I'"I< f""... an,,""

pun"""""

..,,,e

,=

HI L... a".ir". ""'lIlbrtsd<' la g".nJln rtn"4ic", 'IU"I1I:\ """.",,,bin.alS<>n 1:" !kllim btlll'e, "" """'I'eau d" b"" ..... "'rltpl.""", d'u'lt' i"";g",, "run fill""; .u, kaki r" f"'lfIr ,Ir r•• ,1" la''''r, Viii, 1'1"'1"". J.... "ffici"n. 1>O"8io'" tics be,,,u ......". II. cn,c "n l"'"g.<>1i" e' "" l"'ndr 00101,., dum I", """Ie",,,""'" Ie ro"ge, Ie "I~"".'I" 1M". H3l.n ~nrk,,, '".""h.... d.l~ gtJI:rill~ i"'C'"' ~"'oC ... l d" I'",,;r,.nn" ...., l<>r!io"r:> I,· "'"m·.

A, Rh",leIia,,' fiih,""d"" e,,'1"" G",... ~l.......,. 1", """,,,Id (r"ge" die ~la"'...... die IllJii"h.r ....'bci"""l· kid""g mi' I:i"e", 'BSAl" Sch"l:"i<-hc" mi, ..",,,,, ""h...."~"." A
m",.'"

""rdr

B, Die I'ora','ails eri"n.n" "" die Vrrl,j"du,,! mi, drr bri,is<:hr" 'RiJ"''' T",dil;'on. l'm '97" ",,,«Ie die K"plh",kd""g grander!: .ill K...."'P.'''h,,' lI1i, 'P',I(fi' ",>........ ei" 1.ci.h.n fiir Camma"do-Sl"'u<, ...-",de '!Ii-l rirtg<"r"h". DU1dl

",1,,,,,,,,,,,,"

g"''''''

'N\,,",,""

Otxon.;~",Jd bri'iKl... Kamplhckkid""1l "'link ci,... ZeiI:r-i, ";'1< H:rbr-ci'o'crc KQJ>fbcdcrk""1l ....-ar die KlIpl'e all. T"n1l1.a,.rial. "-nb.-i di<' R,\K A~hc" a"f g","e" R""h... k ....... ",h""r"", Hinl«'!(",,><1 1"'11. C3 00" Mil~lkdr", d""'" hr-imlid"," AuJld.m'''lI''''i"l",i, "'ar I"'; d.. i"di"
C,

;"'I,i';"". ""nl."

.i" ".......

.i""",

gl'lI''''I<'.

D, Ka.scn....",,,,,f(>T11lell IIi, /(ti",em I-l"md uIIeh 'I""~' ab "'.....rdi.,,"lirhc llo;kkid""1l Da"ach frJil;t,,,,, ",,,,If.,h.,,,,, Ht",de". la"ge II<""n. k"..." di" ,,,.,i".n Sold""'n T",n"t1ifurmc". dal...r "",,,,,, AlNrirh.n ."r Id""ti',';"",ng 'K,l'g fnl~lle 1lam:1le (grau 1m FaU d...... h in.......' lr,fatllr,;",'¥i"It''''': "lid 'S,aIlR"ncl' wellll a ,hall, d." Gd<'<"h'Sl rd"n a" a,>h". Rikbkh' a"f d"" jcwcilillm Kallg 1l.1""~~'"

l>o:".'' '

",,',,"C
E, .:i,... I':"mbi"a';,," der RAF.(.,,,,,,lunifunll 1111' Ka''Il"bir<''lcl",,, 1",1...", On,.ie,c im .."I
""Ie"'"

·...""n'..·.

F. S,,,n',,b«.-id,.." ",>M,·8.>""" "•., idc~,'i"'h ",i, de'" b,il;,d~'" ~Ioddl. hUll.. ~I"" rill .'tl):.c" h.".. F2 Salda,~... ~lr"",",hik "'" II.r"""",..r:[':n'II""!t a der IlDR: ei"fache gri".... UOOI""l"llioi."he Tar'llun\( "arc" rl>c"falb ,,111;"11. F. Ocr bri'ischc 5,;1 .... hier sehr d.",lot:lI, G, Di" ZANI.I\ ",,~en"'htn c~leidll"lI mi' 801"ge'''lkh'''' kki"r" \\'"II~" und Aum",' ""K'!i''l!,~..'a"e v, tkr IVaroclla""," l'nk"S",aT11l aus '\"SUI. ,,-:or "liT "''' lIeiopiel mr n.'r'O\:I,i<0,k9. S'i!c ""lcr d~" !.[I'RA C"erilla:>,

ri",·"

ri"""

III Eh",n"ligc C"mU.. .,,-hirll"l cn<: Grund ,'- Fukl,,,,, der ·S,,,,';al F"",,,, ''''~on, lla llri,;"cher Un,..,uffi..o, ring ru...... ei" I'a"g<>lill ""d .i" SoIl,W'"""f~.nl d..., Farl",,, ro', "eu. und lJia". H3 Ilk chcmalige" G""rill"" ""n i" dl< lItO ,\,mce """ IJ",,,,,I,we ,mcrgri.rl. largo:" ",,"...- ~nd...., In';.o;,,;e,,. abff" UDif(lf"m i., in, lfI'-:" ""d ga ......... n "n" ......Kle"