Osprey, Men-at-Arms #209 The War in Cambodia 1970-75 (1989) OCR 8.12

OSPREY· MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

209

-The 'YfJarin cambodia /970 -75

Published in 1989 b} o..prc} I~ublishing Ltd

59 GroS\'enor Streel, London, W,X gDA Coppight ,gBg Osprey Publishing Ltd This book is COp}'I;ghtc.,'d under the Berne Convcntion. All rights reSCfved. Ap.1.n from all} r.1.ir dealing for t1w purpose:' of pri\'ale study, research, criticism or re\'iew. as pcnnittcd under the Copyrighl Act 1956. no parI 01 this publication ma} 1)(' reproduced. SIOred in a retriC\"a1 S)'SlnfI, or lransmincd in an} form or b} an~ mcan!. dC'Ctronic, d«lrical, chemical, m«hanic--.I. optical, photocop)'ing, r('Cording or Olhel"\\;se, without Ihe prior pcmlission of the copyright 0\\ ncr. Enquiries should Ix: -.ddrt'SSl.x1 10 the Publishers.

IJrihJh Lihrary CataloKumg

In

Puhli(atioll Dala

ConIJO)', Kenneth The war in Cambodi:l, 1970 75. (:'o.len·:H·anns st:ries; 209 I. Kampuchea. ~lililary fOred, 1970-'975 I. Tille II. Bo\\r1I, Kenneth III. Seri

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filmsct in Grc.'l Britain Primed through Bookbuilders Ltd. Hong Kong

Artist's Note Readers rn:l)' care to nott' that the original paintings frolll which the colour plaIt'S in this book were prcpan'd :II'e available for private sale, All reproduction cop)rright whatsoever is rewined by the publisher. All CIU!uirics should be addrCSS('(1 to:

Mike Chappell 1;1 High Sllttt I-Ialhalcigh, Dn'On EXw llH The publishers "-ogrel lhat the) can enter into no cOlTt'Spondenc(' Upoll this matter.

The IMrin Cambodia /970-75 Tile Course ofthe IMr la 1953 the French g.-allied Camlxxtia full pendcncc, allowing the YOllthful Khmer Killg . lI"Odom Sihanouk to lead the first post-French ial sovereign government in Indochina. For ten Sihanouk (who abdicilted the throne in '955. I retained political leadership) attempted [orallow n-aligned foreign JXllicy, steering Cambodia 'Itg a neutralist tightrope which would keep it from dragged il1lo the wars in neighbouring Laos South ViclIlam. In November [963, howcvcr, uk stated that US cconomic and military aid be renounced as ofJanuary 196.~. A break in alic relations followed, and Cambodi.l"s

policy began to lean toward the left. ....om 196.. ulllil 1966 Sihanouk showed incrcas• aa:ommodalion toward the ~orth VictnamcSl: Vict Cong. In :\Iarch 1965, he hosted the xhincse People's Conference, a"ended b) L.'10 and Viet Cong representativcs, which I ed with a general condemnation of lhe US in South-East Asia. At the s......ne timc. Sovi,·t, and Czechoslovakian military aid I to filter into the eouillry. Tht Chinese even to suppOrt a 49,000-l11an Forus Arml!', Khml'l'!' FARK-19,OOO more Iroops th;lIl luntry lhen boasted. years altcr his move to the [eft, the rial Sihanouk shined again. A new con1\ National Assembly took ofllcc, prompting C'1mbodian Communist Party to launch ~r auacks against govcrnment outposts ill 7· Sihanollk sent pard troopers to quell til{' lUt the suniving Communists-now armed weapons-were able 10 escape into the to being organising a \\ider insurgenq. the bcginlung of what Sihanouk called Rouge (Red Cambodian) guerrilla forces. Ihs later, after a erisis in relations with

China, Sihanouk agreed to greater North Vietnamese usc of the Cambodian port ofSihanoukville for shipping supplies to base areas along the South Vietnamcsc border. (It was later detennincd that, at its peak, Sihan~kville handled 80 per cent of North Vietnamese supplies destined for the war in South Viclllam.) At the same time he publicly announced that the Vietnamcsc presence on Cambodian territory was ;10t sanctioned by the Phnom Penh government. He also hinted that he would not hI' opposed to US rorces entcring Cambodia in 'hOI puslIit' orCommunist units. This A FARK upla;. f ....m Ih.. lor 8 .. ,.il1o" d .. P....cI.."i6'"" 1960. H.. w"ars F.." .. ch parachut.. willS_ on a F....,..ch '95" c:amouft.aSIl'd jUtnp-_m.oek, and a US h"lm..1 liII"r. n .. blrtl budd.. bftIra th...... rat coal of an... ill sotd. Ct....,moDial _words w"...., p....,..,.. I.,.( 10 ~d.... tinS m".......... of th.. £I:OU MUi,.;.."Klem ....".

...

",.11

Gulf

01

Thailand

......

--

--

-:-~=' .~

~I-

ri~hlofpursuit,

with Sihanouk's approval, was later ll"nded to 8-5'2 strikes on North Vietnamese

.\nny (NVA) base areas.

In his attempt to appease all sides while taining a fa~adc of neutrality, Sihanouk was ling important scgments of the country. The f \ ,in particular, were frustrated by their . ity to counter the extensi\'e Vietnamese ce in the eastern border region. They were unimpressed with the small amounts of nmunist aid delivered since US military nce was cut in 1961.

1!/1O t domestic opposition in Phnom Penh growing r ingly '"ocal, Sihanouk lefl in cad) 1970 for a visit to China and Ihe So\'iet Union. During absence the i\"ational Assembly unanimously him OUi of office on 18 .\Iarch 19io. He was by Ihe commander of the FARK, Gen. 01, who immediately began to set a new for the coumry. The Kingdom ofC.tmbodia .arne a pro-\Vestcrn Republic, tbe Communist

Vietnamese were ordered to leave Cambodian territory, and an open appeal was made 10 the West for assistance in bolstering the newly rechristened Form Armits Xationo.lu Khmtre--(FA.'I"K). Within days of the change in gO\'ernment, the FAi\K went into action against the NVA. Massing elements of its airborne, armour, and artillel) forces, the FA.!'\iK dro\'e tOward the town of Baret, 90 miles south-east of I)hnom I)enh. Fighting raged for a week, after which the outnumbered and outclassed FANK were forced to withdraw from the border area. At the same time, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and US forces launched a full-scale assault all NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia. The AR VN went on to conduct scveral major ground operations against i\VA concentrations in Cambodia o\'er the following years. Bris.w... F.......OUIlfI (riAI>t: .(Me sokl .tar 0.0 bll"," dlul tal>, aad .00 Ie. . doUl sev_ pno. ia . 1 _ pocke'll). commaader of doe Finl Military ResioD ia November '970> iaspKU a FANK squad. Ullifo....... ~ b...icaU)' olive drab, wido lillI>' 00 Or ILIoaki headsur; Ihe be~,•• ~ khaki (M:flleaDt at lefl, wido 1I0id clout ch.e.,roos a.od M3 's~• .e-r.o'l Dr, ia doe se.oera.!'. ca_, .,ery liShl 00 with. ta.. luther rim. (Court")' Col. H.rry Amo.)

A

Klamer Krom

platoon, newly arrivlPd from Soulh Vietnam

\Vith assistance from the USA Phnom Penh 10 reorganise 'the in the midst orrcorganising~lhc FAN K had

;r;:hi~h~:,,~=.:::et;;tB[:~:::';:~o~,::·t~:=::~~':.~:: began I.~.reworn alU';ti.nA; on tbeJeft breast ......it ideatifi.ClllioDt

Lbo: rna .. at froat "51.1 h •• 1.1.... &.ad yellow lanel. 0" h •• MI6; Lbo: NCO al Croat., _ a d from wean On.. lold over two

"&"t,

red/y..uow

onixN clI.. vrolla. (Courtesy Col. Harry Am.... )

\J lily· . liS

expand and

FANK. In

. . .

.

.

first laste of heavy flghung. Rcactlll~ 0 a luJl In enemy activity, the FANK attempted to usc the

opportunity to rajse the morale of its troops by Soon after the FA~K suncred its first setbacks at the hands of the ~VA, the nited States began a military aid programme to the Khmer Republic. On 22 April 1970, thousands of captured Com· ~ mUllist rifles wcre sent to Phnom Penh. In tIolay the US also assembled 2,000 Khmer Krom soldiers and airlifted them to Cambodia. (The Khmer Krom, a term used to designate ethnic Khmer living in South Victn;lln. had fought lor years in units undcr the cOlltroJ urthc US Army SpeciaJ Forces.) I~y the end of 1970 eight Kinner Krom battalions wcrc deployed in Cambodia. Otllcr Free \rorld forces offered assistance to thc Khmer Republic, including the Republic of China, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. In July 1970 2,000 FANK soldiers went for 16 weeks of '" military training in Thailand. The Thais also ~ agreed 10 train 2.500 ethnic Khmer voluntcers living in Thailand; this programme wa, !:lIlT halted because of funding problems.

retaking large expanses

or rich rlce-growil'~..~_ar~.

not under government control. The plan, ,auncJic(f' in latc August, was named Operation 'Chcnla', Ten infantry banal ions supportl..'
January 1971 100 Communist Vietnamese commandos mounted a sapper attack on I>ochentong: Airbasc outside Phnom Penh. Almost the emil, Khmer Air Force was destroyed on the ground. Coinciding with this attack, other Communist units hit the capital's naval base and other villages in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. Thestrikt'S had the desired effect of forcing the FAl'K to rcc.,ll some of the 'Chenla' task force to reinforce the capital. From that time forward the FA~K General Headquarters focused on consolidating its hold over the major population ce!Hrti, lea\'ing the countryside open to Khmer Rouge recruiting drives. Following the Pochentong attack I>rcsident Lon ~ol suflcred a stroke. When he returned to office in April 1971 preparations were made for a second, more nmbitious olTensive to open all of Route 6 and to secure the fOad between Kompong Cham and the isolatcd garrison at Kompong Thorn. The opcration, codcnamed 'Chenla Two', relied heavily on air power to soften up an estimated two )IVA divisions in the region. 'Chenla Two' was launched on '20 August 1971, catching the NVA by surprise and succeeding in opening the entire highway in just over two weeks. Consolidation efforts continued ulllil '25 October, when 'Chenla 1''''0' was officially concludt'd. Celebrations had hardl)' started when the 9th NVA Division, reinforct-d b)' the '2oSth and 207th Regional Regiments, cut off and systematically eliminated the FA:'\'K task force. By early December, ten go\'ernme!H battalions plus another ten baualions·worth of equipment had been lost. 197 2

The FANK, now with many of its finest units destroyed, laullched two small operations at the beginning of 1972. The first, Operation 'Angkor Chey', was an attempt to dear enemy forces from the revered Angkor Wat temple complex. The second, Operation 'Prek Ta·, was planned ill conjunction with ARVN units south of Route I. Xeithcr initiative succeeded, and the FAl\' K was forced to pull back to Phnom I'cnh once again. In :\lareh '972 a lull in Communist activity mded when the enemy began heavy aHacks on Prey "eng City and Xeak Luong. ARVN troops crossed the border to engage the NVA tst Di\'isiQn in the rcgion. confronting the ~orth Vietnamese in three major ground assauhs around Kompong

Traeh. At the same time, Khmer insurgents hit the capital with a dcvastating rocket attack: 200 rounds .If 12'2lllm rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle fire struck, killing ovcr a hundred people. A second round of shelling and sapper attacks hit Phnom Penh in ).,Iay, killing '28 people inside the city. In response, the FANK launched sc\'cral swecps around the capital, temporarily silencing the clusi\'e rocket tcams. Not allowing the FA:'\'K to pin them down, th('" Khmer Communists shifted their attack and began a sabotage campaign against shipping along the i\lekong. On 23 )"Iarch two cargo vessels were hit by sappers ncar Phnom Penh. That same week, floatin~ mincs destroyed two POL barges. Govcrnment garrisons along the Mekong River were also hit. Reacting to tbe newest tbrent, the FANK combined with the ARVN in July to clear the enemy from the Mekong corridor. Strong NVA forces in the region intervcned, using tanks and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missilcs for the first time in Cambodia. With beavy air support, the combined task force captured the town of Kompong Trabeck in August. The garrison was turm.'d over to the FA~K, only to be lost permanently in September after renc\\cd fighting. For the remainder of '97'2 the Communist forces A fANK ~ .,., platoo. po.radn i.a $outla V ~ aft"r comptKiaI.d Cftlll'1li1li.a«; tlam tiJ_triped j....-st" bau diui.p.. h tla"m (rom ordiaary i.a.fa.atry traiD"""".

..

Septcmber an amphibious assault was made into the Communist-beld quarter of Kompong Cham, ovcrwhelming the insurgents and regaining full control of the city aftcr a month of fighting.

PaychololJic.1 w.rrar.. t...n....r ..cled billboarda d ..pictinlJ Ih .. Vi..tn.m.......n .. my raced by Cambodia,

harassed governmcllt lines of communication, impeding thl: now of supplies to Phnom Penh and causing a minor rice riot in the capital. Supply traffic along the ~Ickong River, the Republie's major lireline, was also attackcd by Commun.ist frogmen. 1973 In January l'liJ the insurgellls ignored a Republican ceascfirc. launching their df)' season oflcnsivc during the So.'\ffie momh. By ~Iarch the situation was growing critical as enemy attacks snuck llorth of Phnom Penh and along the ~Iekong corridor. After six months the enemy offensive shifted to a more direct assault on Phnom Penh. The government reactcd with mnssive air support, inflicting tremendous casualties on the Communist forces during- Aug-ust. As lhc lighting aruund l'llllUIll l'cnh bcgan 10 subside, a second Communist front 'was opened against the provincial capital of Kompong Cham. Insurgents stormed Kompong Cham in August and occupied halfof the city, capturing the hospital and brutally massacring its patienlS, At the same time, USair power was withdrawn from Cambodia on IS August, throwing the defence of Kompong Cham completely into the hands ofthe Cambodian armed forces, By means ora naval armada, reinforcemcnlS from the infantry, marines, paratroopers, and Special Forces were lifted to gO\'cnllllelll positions across the ~Iekong from the besieged city. On 10

1974 Although the FA:\"K had (Q commit over four brigades (0 the operation, the victory at Kompong Cham was So.,\\·oured by the government, It gave them nc\\ confidcncc, and generall) boosted morale in an army which had nO( sct:n a major victory in years. Their high spilits lasted until January t974, when the Communists opened their latest dry season oflcnsive with an attack on Phnom Penh. An estimated two enemy regiments moved within five kilometres north-west ofthccapital,only to lose 300 men when elemcnts of the FANK tst Division responded effectively. Alier the north-western threat was pushed back, Communist pressure mo\'('d to the south-west as an insUl'gcnt thrust broke through the lines or the FANK 3rd Division. Inexperienced units withdrew in disorder, allowing the Communisls to advance unopposed. Reinforcements from neighbouring unilS \\ ere rushed in on 20 January, slabilising the situation by the end of the month, In an attempt to break Communist momentum, the FANK moved on 10 the offcnsivc in February. Striking north-west and south of the capital, the Republican forces succeeded in driving the insurgcnlS back. The CommunislS reacted by bringing in caplured losmm artiller) pieces and shelling Phnom Penh from a distance, killing over 200 civilians on 1 J February alone. As the FANK moved against the artillery positions lhe Communists shifted their attack yet again, this time by increasing the number of strikes against Mekong supply COl1voys, By the following month the insurgents bad left the Phnom Penh region and were conccntrating their forces against two provincial capitals, Oudong and Kampo!. In Kampot the govcrnment's position had deteriorated rapidly whcn 300 troops from the isolated garrison descrted, Before the insurgents could capitalise on the opportunity. however, two FA!\"K brigades were rushed in, bolstering the town's defences and inflicting dose to 300 enemy casualties. In April Kampot once again came under attack. rt..'quiring an airmobilc rein-

forcement of two battalions. By 9 April over 4,000 FANK defenders occupied the besieged garrison. sustaining over 400 killed while inflicting an estimated 2,300 enemy casualties during the period 1\-Iarch-lvlay 1974. Thc situation at Oudong was more serious. On '2 March'a Communist assault pushed 700 govcrnment troops and 1,500 civilians ill\oa small enclave south-cast of Oudong. A FA:\TK task I()rce was ferried up the "ronle Sap to link up with the defenders, but insurgent forces were w'liting for them with 75mm recoilless rifles and B·41J rockets. Twenty·five troops were killed at debarkatilln and one UH-I H helicopter was shot down. While the remainder of the task force was linking up with the surviving lllembers of the garrison, the civilian population swelled to an unmanageable 4,000 refugees illside the tiny perimeter. The Communists hit with several ground assaults and overran the camp. Only 650 people broke through to friendly lines; the remainder were presumed dead. A susequent FANK drive succeeded in recapturing the burned-alit town." The 1974 wet season began inJulle with a period of lessened military activity. As the FANK attempted to regain lost ground around thecapital, it made the belated discovery that its superior tactical manoeuvrability made th~ slower and increasingly conventional insurgent forces vulnerable to being 'whip-sawed' Several government operations were launched. each handing the Communists a tactical setback. One notable operation conducted during this time was the relief

Cann;balised T -:J7 ligbt ground-anack aircraft edge the runway at Pocbentong Airbase, still bearing ARK ...srkings.

of the surrounded garrison at Kompong Sci la, suflering under a record eight-month siege. Radio reports from the garrison indicated that the civilian population were starving- and, in some cases, resorting tocannibalism. Complicating matters. the garrison had deviated from standard FA:\IK communications procedures, raising fears that Kompong Seila might be a Communist trap. After two unsuccessful attempts, a hcliborne Special Forces team was (Iown in at first light. After vcrification of the loyalty of the garrison, resupply operations were sanctioned, alleviating the star· vatioll and allowing Kompong Seila to hold out sllecessfully against further Communist pressure. Government successes continued throughout the rest of the year. South of Phnom Penh, a concerted etlort was made during September to clear the banks of the Bassac River using two infantry task forces with M 1[3 APC support. Heavy fighting flared along the river untit December, with heavy casualties on both sides. I Jl a final drive, the M 113 APC squadrons from four FANK divisions were combined fora sweep of the west bank of the Bassac, killing63 enemy soldiers before the operation closcd all 3 1 Decem bel'.

1975 The year [975 opened with a new, determined Communist oflcnsive. Fighting was concentrated along the ,'vlekong corridor and within t5 kilomctres of Phnom Penh. The four FANK

inrallU) dh'isions gathered around Ih(' capti:d, \\ hilt" the 1St I);trachule Iirig.ldc wasS('nl 10 hold the Inritor) across Ihe ~Ickoll~ 10 the ('ast. Air rorc(' OInd naval a IS "crt" al~ pulled bad. around the ('al)ila!. l)espilC" ,Iu;r h"1 dThns. IllI' Rq)uhlican 10ITt"'I "ere UlMbll'IO~IOI)Ihl: CommUIl13I,ld\anc('. The siluation \\orst:lI(od on I April \\ hen the commandcr or the :"\ea1. Luong garriX»l1, th~ last major gO\~mment pelSt on Ih~ l:plX'r ~1~kol1~, called ror air Irikt"S on his 0\\ n crumbling position. With the loss or Neak Luong the govel'llmcllI's Mt'kong lirdine \\las CUI. An air bridge 10 I)hnum I)('nh was cn:al('(1. onl) 10 be hahed on 14 April "h('1) Pochenlong: ,\irb
f('S('n.rs.

On '7 April. liI(' rerugn··swollcll cil) or I)hllom I'cnh g:rc\\ silent: Ihe Rcpublican Ko\{'ounem had ~urrl'ndcred. ,md lilt' Communist insu'l;l'llIs "l'rt"

I)()uring inlo the capiwl. The war \\Iall over; bUI ror Ihe people or Cambodia, Ihe nightmare had jusl 1)t1{un.

US Military Assistol/ce When the Khmer Republic entcn'd the war in Solllh-Ea~t Asia, :lllli.war o;entimcnt in Ihe niled Stal('S \\as rcachin~ a IX'.lk. As a result, Ihe Cooper. Church Amendment, proposed in J\pril 1970 and scllogoinlocn(..cl by 1971, prcvclIled US military pcrsonnd rrom ad\ising Khmcr uniu in CamlxKtia. Insl~ad, a numix'rofjX'riphttal Of1!;anLsalions \\1tf'C.' quickh assemblal 10 handl assj~lan~ 10 Cam· bodia wilhoUI violaling Ihe ruk'S laid do\\ 11 b)' lhe US Congress. J n Soulh Vietnam, Ih(' liS Ann)· Vietnam Individual Training Group, joind) ('
Group. Training camps were sct up at Long Hai, Chi Lang. PhllCTllY. and Dong Ba Thin, with a US Army Special Forces A Detachment at each location, The majority of US personnel ill UITG were Special Forces-qualified, though not assigned to a Special Forces Group. Other UITG personnel included member" of the US :\Iarine Corps. Australian Advisol) Training Team, and .\'ew Zealand Special Air Sel"\'ice. Additional US Army Special Forces tcams from the 1st SIX'cial Forces Group in Okinawa supplcmented the UITG programme on a temporary duty basis. UITC instructiun c)clt.'S lor F.\:\'K baltalion~ lasted 13 \\l-'Cks and included individual weapons training. scluad·, plalooll-, com pan} -, and baualion-Ie,·c1 training, The programme \\as vcry rigid, and conclmkd with company and battalion field operations against 1'\\'/\ \'C in areas dose to Ihe training camp, Enem) cOlHan lX'came more frequelH and resulted in some large clashes. to include two FA~K b::walions againsl the 333rd AVA :\Iain Force Regiment in April '972. FollO\\ing thc completion ofa Irainill~ cyck. the FA.\'K battalions \\cre i~ued ammunition and returned to Phnom Penh aboard C·130 aircr<.lft. On

'5 ,\Iay 1972 U1TC was redesignated the FANK Training Command, Army Advisory Croup, Vietnam. ,,~rc remained active until 30 November 1972. A total of 85 Cambodian battalions were trained. including basic light inr::lll t I')', airborne, marine, and Khmer Special Forces cadres, To co-ordinate matl-'rial deliveries to Ihe FANK, a SIX'cial Support Croupwast."Stablished in ~IACV J-4 during i\lay '970, Various staff sections of :\IACV provided individuals and groups to study the Cambodian situation, sun'e} requirements. and participatc in plans to assist the Khmer Rt.·public in mobilising and ccluipping its armt..-d forCt-'S. Onc of their first acts \\ as to ship large quantities of captured Communist and outdated US weapons 10 Phnom I)enh. In addition, ethnic Khmer units previousl) under the control of tht.· SAm1\' SIX"Cial Forces in South Vil-'lIlam, a~ well :1' , " equippt-d Khmer Bri~ade prc\'iou.sl) n·aCU<.lllti I" South Vietnam. were rushccl to Cambodia. Other forms of support, r:lIlKinl; frOI11 aerial fl-<;upply AFAl\,'K ...... OIU'flI~.tatoelbehiad •• M"J"'CIwppftlwiLh

••06Jnm recoill_. rift.. aAd ••so nl. MG turret. Th.. 1n. . . 1 lefl w_n • cloLh Annoured Bripd.. p-Id! ov..r hi. nshl b ......1 pocket; _ a d I.. ft h..• • •ilver m ....1 v.....io...

A fANK lie..le....u_lo..el---wurin' USj .....,lef.tip-. khaki ~ aad 011 • bl.ck doU-1 l&b--ta1l
no.nIo.ift,

COD>m.lldu of the MEDTC.

shipmelHs to dose air suppon, were provided throughout 1970. By the end ofthe year, howcver, it became apparent that a ~inglc group was needed to adminisler suppon for Cambodia. In December 1970 all :\1.\C\' study g-rollp advocated the establishmellt of a ~Iilitar) Equipmcnt Delivcry Team. Caml)()(lia. The ~'il EDTC was activatcd in Phnom Pcnh on 31 January 197 I. It was originally authorised at 16 personnel in Cllllbodia and 44 in Saigon. As the lempo of military shipments increased. however, Ihe ~IEOTC tontingent in Caml)()(lia could not keep abreast of determining requcsts 10 sUPIXln the FANK's mobilisation, much less execute even minimally the statutory requirements for monitoring and executing a i\IiJitary Assistance Programme. Eventually, 50 :\IEDTC members were allowed to enter Cambodia provided the majority were nuent ill French. By Dect-'mber 1971 the number had again been raised to 62. The three fold purpose of the :\IEDTC was to determine the necd~ of the FAXK: arrange for the

ckli\'('ryofcquiprncIH; and ohserve tht' utili,alil'll (Jf US matcrial and Cambodian personnel trained by the US and third countries. In this last capacity J\'IEDTC personnel often followed Cambodian units into combat, stretching at times the restraints of the Cooper-Church Amendment. No membcrs oflhe J\IEO'!'C \\ere killed in Cambodia. howe\·er. In April 1975 .\IEDTCCOlltinued to arr.lIlgc and cOlltrol acnal rcsupply missions into Phnom Penh from its rear base in Thailand. On 12 April its remaining members inside Cambodia wcre evacuated "ith the rCSt of the US :\Iission. Five davs later. the Khmer Republic fell and the .\IEDTe mission was lenninated. A third US militar) group which actively assisted the C.'unlxxlian Armed Forc(.'S was the S Army 46th Special Forces Company headquartered al Lopburi, Thailand. DClachmc"l1t A-.1-'2 from the 46th Co. \\as usc..x1 during 197' 72 in OJX'ration 'Ff(."(.x1om Runner'. the training programme for the Khmer Special Forces. Detachment A·+I IRanger was used latcr to conduct advanced ranger COUl'SCS for selected members of the Khmer Special Forces. sometimes following the C.'lmbodian studellls on training forays illto north-wcstern Camlxxlia.

Tile CombodiollAnnedForces The Cambodian Army 011 20 Novcmber 1946 a French-Khmer milit
sponsibilit)' for Cambodian national security to the FAR K. Francc, however, maintained the right to station units in north-eastern Cambodia to guard its communications links. In late .\larch [95..j., with most French resources focused on the siege of Dien Bicn Phu in 'ronkin, the fully independent FARK was forced to conduct its first solo operation when the Vict Minh 436/[01 Battalion crossed from sOllthern Laos into northeastern Cambodia and overran a company of the French-lcd 9' Ba/aiJJon d' bifa"t~rit, The insurgellts pushed south ulltil .\Iay. seizing I)rek Te and securing cOlllrol over the middle section of the .\Iekong. The FAR K sellt the 1" Ba/ailJon d~ Paradllltis/u h'hmtu to lead the coullter-attack, recapturing the lost positions by July and sllccessfully completing the first Khmcr-led operation, After thc Gcncva Convcntion was signcd in t954 the final transfer of remaining Khmer units in the French Union Arlll) waseomplcted, raising FARK ~trcngth to 45,000 men, By the end of the following yem, howe\·er. FARK manpower had been cut back to 36.00fJ.. \.s c:.lmlxxlia maintained tIll' (;H;ade of a neutral loreign policy, the FARK shifted its focus to civic action programmes. When US military aid was cut in 1954 the FARK reg]'(.:ssed into a poorly equipped, llIlCkr-sll't'llglh fonT of 18,000 men. The FAR K's l)(Xlr state of readiness became apparent in the mid-1960s when the joint threat from Khmer Communist insurgents and right wing Khmer Screi forces prcscnted the ftrst major challenges 10 the Cambodian gO\'ernment since the First Indochina War. An even bigger threat was posed by [he NVA/VC forces in eastern Cambodia, tht· target of a restrained FARK sweeping operation in November J 969. Against these, the F.\RK fielded ill January [970 somc 53 battalions and [ I regional companies. Slightly O\'cr halfofthc battalions were cksignatcd Ba/ail/ons Ii' "ifon/~ri~; the remainder were Bntail/ollS dt Chass~llrs, or light infantry battalions. Three formations-the paratrOOIX'rs, Phnom I)enh Garrison, and Royal Guard-were organised into half-brigades. Antiaircraft, artillcry, engineer, and transport groups also formcd half~brigades, while armoured units \\ere split into all independcnt battalion at Kompong Cham and a regiment at Sre Khlong. All

A US Dd",,,ce Anacbe rece;"n a ... rdaJ fro... Presid",,,c Loll Not .ad Chi",f ofScaJTSak S..cP-1<.ha..oo. Noc", ~"", ....I H"'.dq.....u ... .,o... bi"ed _nice p.c.,h on ~". S.Ir.'s sho..ld",r, Lon Not wean ....",c.1 "",...;onofthis insi!ni.on his riShc bre.sc.(Co.. rcny Col. H.rry A...os)

other battalionsactcd independent I) while assigned either 10 the General Reserve or .\lilitary Re,~ions, B} :\Iarrh [97(ltl1(' Cllllfrontalioll hc'!\\c'l.·!l ht',leI of state :\'orodom Sihanouk and the 1Jupporters of Gen. Lolll\'ol ga\'e rise to rumours ofan impending coup against Sihanouk. Anti-Communist Khmer Sel'ci rebel forces in contact with di~gl'untkd senior members of the FARK wcre aware ofthissituatioll, and had infiltrated close to thc capital. Three Khmer Screi battalions from the Oongrek Mountains, one ethnic Khmer battalion from the AR VN 25th Di\;sion, and Khmer K.rom elements from the Tien Bien '~like Force' camp in South Vietnam were ncar the outskirts of Phnom I)enh when Cen. Lon Nol assumed lX)wcr on 17 .\Iarch, Immediately following the ousting ofSihanouk, the rechristened "'oras Armtrs ,Na/ionales Klimat faced opposition from vastly superior NYA forces, Under strength and 1X)()r1y equipped, the army mounted an immediate recruitmellt drive. ByJune,

'3

0_ of Iwo AC-.tl !Wli1.1o.ipll OD Ihe eve of ;1. d .. Ii,·"')' 10 Ih.. K.ILm .. r Rtp.. blic.J_e 1,.,1. A doubl .. aad ......Sl...SOc:al. MG ...-..1 c:a.a be __ "lhe wiodo_ inlnledial.. ly forward oflh.. door. (Coun...y Blair)

Dou.

18 General Rcsen.'c infantl") brigadcs had been crealed; however, only 12 brigadcs were properly manned. thc I·cst remainin~ only on paper. Sevcral programmc!> \\erc quickl) implemcnted to help the FANK reach its July 1970 authorised tnx>p strength of206,000 men. Khmer Screi forces previoll~ly operating in the Oongrek :\lollntains were retrained in Thailand and uscd as Ihe coreofa Special Brigade in Siem Rc'q>. This brigade was later expanded into the highly-rated 9th Brigade Group. Eight Khmer Krom baualions from the South Victnamese irregular forces were also sent to Phnom Penh. In addition, the tst FANK Shock Brigade, evacuated to South Vietnam aner its garrison in RalOlnakiri province fell, was reequipped and airlifted back to Cambodi.1. A morc regimelllcd FANK training pmgramme began in 1971 in South Vietnam. As it expanded rapidly the FANK became divided into a confusing array of Frcnch and US combat organisations. The largest was the brigade group, normally composed of,wo brigadcs. Other formations included half-brigad(:s, aUlonomous regiments, independent brigades, groups, and territorial baltalions. In addition, ,I paramilitary Gendarmcrie was fonned to ('xtend the goyernmenl

'4

presence across the coulltryside. In carly 1972 the FA!'K continued toemplo) the brigade group as its largest comb.'l.t orgalli~ation. Of tilt" I j brigade grollps fielded inJanuar) 1972, however. only three wcn~ r
still rated as superior. Six montbs lalcr, following the mutiny ora Khmer Krom battalion, recruiting in Soulh ViClilam dried up and the Khmer Krom legend came to an undignified end. Denied further Khmer Krom recruits, the fANK focused on developing its own indigenous training facilities. The Officer Candidate School. CUI from a three-year 10 a six-month course, was moved from Phnom Penh to l...ong\·ck. InfalHry training centres at Kandal and Kompong Speu were opened; construction of similar centres at Ream, Sisophon and Longvck was started. In addition, a Recondo School run by the Khmer Special forces was opened in 1972 ill Battambang. The FA:\'K also bq{:In ('xpandin~ its villaKc defence programmes. In Jul) 1972 Aluo-Dcfcnce units wcre planned for each ~Iililary Region. A more ambKious project known as the Liberation and i'ation-Building Directorate was formed in :"1o\'ember, and the first Auto-Defence pilOl programme of the LNB was formed in Siem Reap during the same month. Operating closely with the LNB DireclOrate, a Political Warfare Directorate within the General Stafr was created, along with a Political Warfare Brigadr.:. To streamline the mass of combat formations within the FANK, a major reorganisation was implemented in December 1972. By the following month, all brigade group headquarters, 17 regimental headquarters, T6 brigade headquarters, and 13 battalions had been dissolved. In their place, 32 brigades, 202 infantry battalions, and 405 territOlial infantry companies were formed. Of these, 128 battalions were grouped imo the 32 brigadt..'S. Twemy of the brigades would remain independenT, with [2 being distributed among fOllr new FANK divisions. A fifth, the underslrcngth 9th Guards Division, was raised in April 1974 by the highly pol~ and militarilyincompctcllt Gen. Ith Sllong. The reorganised FAN K was soon plagued with difficulties. On 28 January 1973 all South Vietnamcsc training concluded in conjunction with the Paris Peace Accords, depriving Cambodia of vital training assistance. Two momhs later the 1St Parachute Brigade, long considered one of the best FANK units, abandoned positions along the southern Mekong when their operation extended beyond the promised conclusion date. Several other

brigades followed the example of the paras, leading to several Ullnecessary gO\'ernment reversals. To make matters worse, US air sUPPOI"l used excessively by the FANK was re\'oked in August. During the same month scven Xationalist Chincsc instructors on loan to the FA:"1K Artillery School were withdrawn. Despite thest" setbacks, the resilient optimism of the C.'llllbodiall ..oldieI' resulted in several brilliant performances in 1974. One of the most famous took place T4 kilomelres nonh·cast dthe capital on lhe morning of [0 Novt'mber, when an eSlimated [wo Khmer COlllmuni~1 regimellts stormed a govcrnlllent outpost. The inilial attack was repulsed, but twO company-sized positions were overrun lhe following day. Rushing in the 128th Infantry Battalion, the 2nd Para Ballalion, and 4th Para Battalion, the FAXK garrison withstood continuous pressure for 13 days. All enemy attacks \\ cre defeated, and the two lost I~itions were retaken by 27 ;\Iovel11l)(;r. Bycarly [975 the FANK wasexhaustcd. Medical resources were reaching the brcaking point, and foreign mililary aid, already preciously low, was cuI in early April. On I i April, lhe FANK oflered its surrender 10 the Khmer COllllllunist forces.

FANK lrooptl t....u... 010 th" .:to eal. MI,', MG tra.i..o:oiD.ll_"" South Vi"UIam., 1!f72-

.1

Loall Ha.i

\lJI

'5

Special OperatioNs The Khmer Republic raised several unconventional warf.."lre units during its brief five-year exislence. The largf.'St was the Khmcr Special Forces, organised in October 1971 under the command nflt. Col. Thach Rcng. Khmer Special Forces teams were sent for training at the Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Centre at I..opburi, Thailand, under Operation 'Freedom Runner' Additional training was conducted in South Vietnam and the United Stales. An indigenous Special Forc("S training centre was also being planned shortly before the coulllry fell. By the lime 'Freedom Runner' training was concluded in July 1973 the Khmer Special Forces had one C Detachment. three B Detachmcllls, and 18 A Detachments. Unlike a US Army Spc<:ial Forces A Team, those in the Khmer Sp<,"cial Forces had 15 men, the additional personnel being psychological warfare specialists. The missions of the Klnller Special Forces ranged from strategic and tactical reconnaissance to raids, pathfinding, and providing instructors for the FANK Recondo School in Batlambang. In a true speciallorces role, they also raised village militias behind enemy lines. One of their most famous missions was performed by two A DClachments during Ihe sicge at Kompong Cham in September t973. Spearheading the gonmment assault on the Conullunist·held southern quarter of the city, the teams were inserted by helicopter and used LA\\' rockets to neutralise an insurgent stronghold, allowing the Ff\NK to rush in amphibious reinforcements without taking excessive casualties. Despitc this success, the Special Forces rcmained tOO small to make a strategic differcnee. I Jl addition, many of the regional commanders misused them as convcntional shock troops, and a large portion of thc Special Forces remained in Phnom Penh as a deterrent against coup attempts. By April 1975 the Special Forces were massed in Phnom Penh, and planned a breakout to the south-cast toward the South Vietnamese border. They never made it, and were presumed killed in action. Thrc:..c mher special operations units were under the tacit control of the Khmer Special Forct-'S. The first consisted of repatriated clements oCthe MACV

Studies and Observation Group ;Cedar Walk' programmc. 'Cedar \Valk' teams were composed of unilatcl'ally controlkd Cambodian operativcs used against the l':VA border sanctuaries in Cambodia. Two contingents wcre turned O\'er to the Special Forces in October 1971, bUI political manoeuvring len Ihcm in the hands of the SEDOC, Cambodia's intelligence service. A second unit was composed of Khmer nationals trained in Laos under Project 'Copper' and stalioncd at Khong Island on the Mekong River. from Khong IsI;llld they were hcliborne into the COllllllunist-controllcd provinces of north·eilstern Cambodia, and used as recon teams along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A third uncOIl\'cllIional warfare unit was trained in Indonesia during 19i'2. !-Ialf of the returnees went to a fA:"K infaillry brigade; the other half were used later in the war as the cadre for a ParaCommando Battalion. In mid-19i3 Ihe Khmer ~a\"y raised its own special warfare unit, the CamlxKiian SEALs. :\Ioddledon their UScOlllltCrparts. an initial group or SEAL recruits was drawn from an existing Combat Swimmer unit and sent to the United States and the Philippines for basic training. At its

fANK ....ipi.: (lop t"n) Khmer R"p.. blic: b..rtt &..It-bl..,, .ioi"ld, whit" ","pt., ...cIS'" .ta.... whit.. IftDpl" motif _ red CUltOn.; (lOp "!Iu) FANK b..rtt badS,....."..Uow with red ouillan 0 11; (bottom I"CI) Ge."raJ HQ-bl.... diK m!m Whil", whil tar, yeUow motif; (bottom "!hl) '.1 Ann_red Squadro...--liSh.t ~ .ioi"ld, Wloil" ....... m!t:S, di..; red ',' aad di.., m!", pat" bl.... aad whit.. laft..k..

'7

~al in mid- HJ71 the unil fielded Ihf1"(' tcams IOt,tlling 90 commandos. AirlKll'lll' tr:lillillg was conductl'd al Poch('nton~, "hilt' the Ol~ mpic pool in Ilhnorn Ilcnh ",as usc.-d for di\in~ cou~, The 1:..\ prmidnl\aluablciru lIi~t'nttforlhe~tXK \\hilc acting as ft'Connaiss:lIlCt, lrams alollg the b..'lnl..soflhl' ~lckoIlK. Thc) \\rrr also uscd as hock lroops durin~ Ihr ~ at Kompon~ O'Olm and Oudon~_ .~ dcfmdni 1M na\al base' opp06ite Phnom I'('nh ullIillh(' final d'l) of Ihc \\<11'.

UllifOrJIIS ollliEq/liPJlleJlf A rarh Scptrmher H).)O.IM L'S pt'"O\i
,.fttr 1973. 'I'ht I~ANK dl'I"S unifoml ronsisl('d oran olive grC1.'njacket and I;lek! "ilh a \\hilt' hin and black tiro F.\RK ht'ad,,;.... rw eli' 1'5('. ·nl(~ most com mOil Itt'm "as ,I light khaki herl't \\om French st)k, A khaki pc;tl..l'(l cal> \\; i Uft! to offiern. UOlh "('ft' .... orn "';Ih a Il1('lal cap dnitt lx-arinll; thr 1'0)";11 O't""I, a mbodian 'hront' "'ith 1\\0 temple lions. Par.llroo~n "t'rt' issued II fl'(l bcrrl. In lhe field Frellcll hush hnu. US patrol C;lp-'l, .wd ~II led hdmru \\('rt" "orl1. Durin~ tIM Rt'pubhc UtaL, camoufb.~(', and dark grn"n lx-rt' v.crt' iSlllICd in ;lddition 10 L' p.'1trol cal ,1I1e1 ~II stl'c1 hclmcu, FOOI\\('arforlhr FARK iniliall) c;unt' from both l' anel Frt'nch sourc ; l' jun~l(' and blacL Iralh4:T boots "'(Tt' l;lndardbC'd dunn~ ttl<' Re. publ~. Ikh~"(1"(' of black I...athe-r or c.w\. with a silver 01' Stold 1OI'1al hudl.', I\rtf'r IQ]O, buckl~ solllctil1lM bolT Ihl'wmbilM'tI 'lC't"\ic("in'l'tnia oflhr f.\..'K (.t'nn-al ~I.alr

Narnetapes were commonly worn during the Republic in both sulxlued cloth and plastic versions. They were usually worn ovcr the right chest pocket, although ofTicers werc occasionally seen with nameplatcs on the lell side. FARK rank insignia closely followed the French pattcrn. Shoulder boards were worn by officers, with rank similar to the French system except that generals wore stars above gold laurel-like leafembroidery on the outer edge. Gold and siker bands were worn by other officcr ranks. FARK shoulder boards wcrc very dark bluc or black for lhe army; paratroopers wore light grccn; and medies wore maroon boards. Officers also wore rank on chest tabs or shoulder loops. A royal crown design was ineorporatf..-d on the inner end ofshoulder boards. In the FANK the basic rank system was retained except for the royal crown being eliminated from the shoulder boards; the various coloured shoulder boards were also eliminated, being replaced by a standard black. In addition, black shoulder loops and collar rank Li.ke _ost South-En' Asa.. .rm.i~ FANK pe.-.-..el on_ insignia were in use by 1972. '0011. dom fa.m.ili" wido doem oa adlve .........ce. Thi. soldi"r Collar branch insignia were popularised in the ...,las" .. s ' ...dilio....1 ReI ....:I wlt.ile _ale •• 1"001", FARK, in both bl"aSS and enamelled forms. Branch insignia were less frequently worn in the FA~K. In neutralist foreign policy, few combat missions were 1972 yellow branch insignia embroidered on green flown. There was one exception in March 1964, tabs were seen wom over the right JX>Cket. when twO Cambodian T-28 fighters penetratcd Armoured branch insignia in mew I and silk woven over twO miles into South Vietnam and shot down forms were also worn above the right JX>Ckel. an L·'9 light aircraft in retaliation for a South Because of resistance by the royal government, Vicll1amcse strike into Cambodia. the use of unit insignin was discouraged in the After 196,~ Cambodia turned to China and tbe FARK. Those that wcre allowed to wear unit crests Eastcrn Bloc for military aircraft. Five Sovict ivliGand insignia, such as the paratroopers, wore them '7 fighters Wel"C delivered on 9 April 1967. Student Freneh·style on the left breast or on tbe uppcr left pilots were also sent to the Soviel Union for sleeve. Melal and cloth parachutist wing:i wcrc training. Not to be outdone, the Chinese selll II displayed above thc right breast pocket. In thc planes to Phnom Penh in January 1968. FANK unil insignia becamc more common, bcing [n 1968 the ARK received its first sustained worn on the right chest, left chest, or left shoulder. combat experience when it was tasked with Paratroopers occasionally wore either FANK bombing Khmer Rouge torces in Battambang Rational insignia or metal wings on their berets. Province; but it was 1I0t until thc change of government in ~1arch '970 that the air force, whose The Cambodian Air Force Ilame had changed to the KllTner Air Force, was The Aviation RO)'ale KllIJll'ff was officially founded in throwll into heavy combat. KAF :\1iG jets bombed pril 1955 with a mixed inVCI1101)' of six light and strafed XVA concentrations along thc castern Ir.U1spons, four t1'ainers, and 22 light aircraft border, while T·28s wcrc used on combat sorties ·table for convcrsion to the ground attack role. ncar Kompong Cham and north of thc capital. Commanded by Prince Sihanouk's personal physi- During this perilXl, Thai T·28s also began to cian, the AR K was known sarcastically as the Royal provide air support in the wcst. Flying Club. In accordance with C.·ulllxxlia·s An initial expansion of the KAF was accom-

'9

Klunu Special forces captain at Poc::he-.IO"S Airba_, '973- He w ...... Ceomboclia.n Use.... tripe can10uflase u..ifor.... a Srff" beret pulled lefl witll tile Khmer Special fo..c.,. flash., three sold rank ban 0 .. black shoulde.. st...p slid.,., a,,~ver his riSht pockel-mela! US panchutisl willS'" prtae.>led durinS 'fr'ftdom RUOlDer' IRiDinS at Lopburi, TlIail.a.Dd. {CoU..IU)' Tbacb Sart..)

plished inlatc 1910 under US auspices, including a delivcry on 6 September of six UH-I]-I helicoplcrs with temporary South Vietnamese crews. In addition, KAF studeills wcre sent to Udorn Air Basc. Thailand, for T -28 training conducted by Dctachment I, 56th Special Operatiolls Wing-a USAF training group which had been providing support to the Thai and L·w Air Forces since 196-1. In January 1971. howe,",r, a I\orth Vietnamese sapper attack on Pochentong Airbase destroyed virtually the entire Ki\F on the ground, including all of its ~liC fightcrs. Slarting from scratch. the KAF rcreived a new 20

influx of US aircraft. Among the most eflcctive additions were two AC-47 gunships arllled with .50 cal. machine guns, turIll.'d over to Cambodia in mid-1971. By the end of 1971 the KAF numbered 161'-2&,240-1 D light aircraft, 19 C-4-7 transports, nineT-4Itrainers. II UH-IH helicopters, 16 U-IA liaison aircraft. and three AC-47 gumhips. In 1972 KAF expansion slowed slightly as organisational difficulties were encountered. Training remained a key problem: despite the loan of instruelOr pilots from !\ationalist China, insufficient numbers of Cambodian pilots were a\·ailable. KAF morale was also suflcring, due mainly to q T-28 cras!H,:s being recorded in a twelye-month period. Confidence in the 1'-28 eroded, eyell though eiglll ofthe crashes were due to pilot error. In addition, because 01" plentiful US air support, the K.AF was relegated 10 a minor role only. In March of the following year the KAF suflcred a further setback when a pro-Sihanouk T·28 pilot bombed the presidential palace, killing 43 people. A new KAF commander was appointed, who immediately began to enforce new programmes to improve the KAF before US air po"'er was withdr.1\\ n on 15 Aligusi. The most important of these plans was the establishment ofa KAF Direct Air Support Centre. Located in the FANK Combined Operations Centre, the osoe was given responsibility for gathering current targeting information rrom US aircraft and FA;'I\K units in the field. and 1><"1SSing it 011 to the KAF. This new concept was resisted by the K.AF Air ()perations Co-ordination Centre, which continued to feed the KAF with pl'e-planned strike co-ordinates. In practice, the FANK had little faith in KAF close air support, leaving the DSQC to function primarily as a relay between the rANK Headquarters and US aircraft. Despite ;In initial reluctance on the part of the ground commanders, the KAF continued to expand co-ordination with the FANK. luJuly the air force began providing forward air controllers to the new FA~K Artillery Fire Co-orclinat.ion Centre. In addition, an Air-Cround Operations School was opened to train FA~K forward air guides. During this same period the KAf broadened cOIWOY protection operations when it took delivery of 14 Helio AU-24 mini-gunships and

UH-IH helicopter gunships. The AU·24, L1sed only by the KAF in a military role, had a 20mm cannon 011 a side door mount and twO hardened wing !Xlims for bomb dispensers. By the following month two AU-2¥ and four helicopter gunships were being assigned to e\'ery com'OY tra\'elling the Mekong. On IS August 1973 the KAF assumed full rcsponsibilityforairsupport in Cambodia. Air force morale was already strained, the result of an AU-24 crash on 10 August which killed the crew and grounded the mini-gunship (leel. However, confidence improved in October following the success of Operation "fhundcrstrike', the first KAf offensive operation. For nine days, the air force struck south of Phnom Penh between Rout(.'.S '2 and 3, reaching a record 70 T·28 sorties in one day. ,\lthOllb,h the 1st and 3rd FAi\'K Divisions failed to capitilisc on 'Thunderstrike" the fA;\IK remained impn:ssed by the KAF's performance, Successor operations 10 'Thunderstrikc' were poslJXllled in :\'oHmber after a senllld renegade

T -28 pilot bombed the presidenlial palac and deserted. A new KA F commander, Col. Ea Chhong, was promoted and immediately began to impro\'e the performance of the KAF. This positive reputation continued to grow in :-'larch 1974 with a successful KAF operation against the ~VA Dambe Transshipment Poilll: SOIllC 250 trucks hidden in a plalllation were destroyed in a chain reaclion, a record for the Vietnam \\'ar. Resulting in part from the Dambe victory, FANK requests for KAF close air support increased. "rhe LIse of forward air COlllrotiers also increased, helping the KAF conserve ordnance.

fANK. MNK...et KAF ~re-..tatiV"attend a COurH 0. airr;roUDd d"livery ",mod. at Udo.... Air""", Thaila.ad, '972-

Th" Klomu SP'f'cl.aI For""". offietr (forqrou.....

NCO.

fl'Oftl

rislu).-an Thai Anny...et US .,....do.utist'. witlr;. 0. IoU l.,rl brnl.t...et Ca.mbodia..D baai" wiar;a Oil hi. ripn brnlat. Rear, third from I"fl i..... MNK offic,u .,.riar; !iSht Sr"tY _rlll:ias llIlifonn, aAd hi. peaked cap ere i. pal" kbaIU (t.be .1000e r;rey i. . . pale il .ppn" _ry .inillar 10 kbaIU); the MNK cap badsei.embroid"rect ... Sold Oil blaclL R.,.r. third from riAhl i. a KAf offieer ....,.riaS medium blue overae-a,a cap aAd trou..,ra, and lir;hl blue .hirt. (Courtesy Capt. John Koren)

--

llotNK iJuipia: (top len) MNK breast badS-ydJow o. WlUle, blado. _dian; (lop ripl) SEAL ",",Chale wUos_lUle wUoc- aad SCUBA snr, sold leaves, ~llow . .door, all OB black; (botlom lert) F,..ua-•.Mari. . _hoWdu ".ipaia-t&rk blue _hiel<&, ",·hi.., ......... whil" I..rnpl...... red __ 10" yellow rift <d UlChor; (bouorn nsht) SEAL .houlder ....ipia-recl di qeel hlack, y..llow I...",.,., Iipl bl.... di,'u a..cl . .door, blado. -m.., y..llow SCUBA u.nJ,; . .d rope, while aad black acript.

Kf\F competence continued to grow during the opening weeks of 1975. US Defence Attache rCJx>rts written at lhe timejudged the calibre ofCarnbodian pilots as fast approaching thc skilllcvcl of their Thai and Soutb Vietnamesc counterparts. In an eflort to further boost thc KAF's capabilities, Ihe US initiated three assislance programmes, (Jperation 'Rotorhead Express', started in June 1974, was a US Army programme to gi\'e a one·time repair to the KAF UI-I-IH fleet. Operation 'Flycatcher' was a similar l,;SAF cnor! direncd at the KAF 1'-28 fighter bombers: and in January 19i5 a USAF :\Iobilc Training Team worked with the KAF airlift wing 10 make il sclf·sufficiellt. During its final months of exiSlcnce Ihe KAF exeee
againsl rclativcl) light enemy anti.aircrafl cicfences, Ihe KAF launched an unprecedented number of combat sorties againsl the insurgents massing around the eapilal. During a two-month period the 35 '1'·28)) bombers in the KAF fleet logged o\'er 1,800 missions. Using all available airframes to the limit, new delivery systems were cre'itl::d. Against the firmly entrenchcd 107mm rockct positions north of Phnom Pcnh, CBU·SS lX>mblCls wcre dropped 10 great COCCI, killing an estimatcd 500 insurgents on 10 April. The smallcr CHU-25 and 250 lb bombs wcrc loaded aboard the AU·24 minigunship and also employed against thc enemy rocket sites. In the lllOSI inventivc adaption, pallets of 500 Ib bombs and 25 lb fragmclllation bombs were loaded aboard KAF C- [23 transports and dropped by night. Despite their besl efforts. the KAF alone could not stem the tide of Ihe advancing Communist forces. After expending virtually their entire ordnance resources, 9i aircraft escaped Ihe country. The ARK \\ore a while dress uniform and light blue work unifornl. A dark blue peaked cap was

worn by officers with a standard gold metal FARK badge. The KAF retained the blue peaked cap, but developed a distinctive sih'er metal KAF cap badge. A dark blue overseas cap was worn with the work uniform. KAF ground personnel were issued FAXK-st)le patrol caps and fatigues. ARK rank insi~nia were worn 011 light blue shoulder boards, with a pair of stylised wings at the inner end. After ~tarch 19io the KAF rC\'erted to black shoulder boards or shollidcr loops as worn by the FANK. ARK personnel worc gold mel'll wingssllrmolllllcd by a royal crown on the left breast. After 19iO these were replaced with yellow wings embroidered 011 a blue cloth background. Both ARK and KAF pilots wore a circular gold badge on the right breast bearing /-Iongso, a mythic.1.l Cambodian bird. Specialised support scrvict'S \\ithin the KAF \\ore insignia. on their upper left sleeve. Pilots wore squadron insignia 011 the upper left slee\'e or right pocket. The Cambodian Navy The "'Iarine Ro)'ole Klmure was established in 195+ to provide limited patrolling of the coast and major waterways of Cambodia. The riverine headqual'ten; was establishcd at Chrui Chhang War Naval Base across the ~lekong from Phnom Penh; a co<1.sml base was built at Kompong Som. Ex-Frcnch and US ships composed the bulk of its small ncct until 1964; thercafter, limited dcli\'cries of Chinese and Eastcrn Bloc rivcr and sea craft entered the

MRK inventory. The Cambodians also seized a number of US riverine craft which strayed into Khmer territory. including twO airooats captured from the US Ann) Special Forces in 1968. A ~Iarine Corps of four Ba/aillons de Fusilim-.\IarUlS BF~I was maintained for sialic defence. Aficr the 1970 change of gO\'crnment, Ihe rcchriSlen<.-d .\/anne "\'alio,,a/~ Khmer~ took on a more important role as it escorted supply convoys up Ihe J\lekong and provided logistical support for thc FANK. Assisting tile MNK in its new re· sponsibilities, the South Victnamesc Navy lent extensive convoy protection and helped patrol the coastline against encmy infiltration. By 1972 the ~jNK had gained enough experience to assume responsibilily for convoy support opcrations. The KAF contributed 10 the effectiveness oflhese operations with AC.,n cover, while Ihe 50mh Vietnamese Air Force lelll helicopler gunships 10 ovcrfly COIl\'oys along the Lower ~Iekong. The i\INK riverine forces also coordinated operations on Ihe Tonic Sap in conjunction with the FANK Lake Brigade. Along the coast, the MNK continued tordy heavily on tbe South Vietnamese Navy to assist with coastal surveillance. Patrolling at sea became more important after South Vietnamese patrols reponed in April the firsl aHcmpt h)' a North Vielllemcse MNK Mo..ilors, co..",.neel laodi..S craft a.,..eeI with IOS'"'QnU Clolla.oS War Naval BaM: _",W:l.e

p.a.., assemble a, PIuoo_ Peu.

'3

vessel to infiltrate into Cambodia. The vessel was sunk, with heavy secondarit'$. The l\INK was challenged in carl) t97Z by an increase in enemy acti\'ity against :\Iekong shipping. After one merchant \'csscl was dcstrop..-d and three others damaged at the Chrui Chhang \\'ar Naval Hase the :\1l'K fonned a Harbour Defence Unit. i\1i\K defenders wercfurther bolstcred by the naval infantry, \\110 werc used for aetivc ri\'erbank patrolling. Both :\INK performance and enemy activity increased during the following year. In January

t973 Communist frogmen attacked merchant ves.sclson the i\lekong: several ships were dcstroyed at the cost of three enemy swimmers. During the same month an enemy inliltration route was identilied from "-om pong Som Bay to illl,lnd supply bases. Countering these threats, the :\IN"- main· tained high moralc----mainly due to sufficient rice rations, good leadership, and prompt payment of wages; and because the :\I~"- "as not highly dependent on US air power, it was 1101 ad\'ersely affccled when this support was terminated in August. The :\Ii\"- increased ilSeffol'tS along the i\lckong corridor in mid-1973 as the FANK began placing a higher reliancc on the navy for logistical support and casualty evacuation. To handle these respomibilitics the i\INK ill(T('a~('d il~ ~trl'ngth to over 13,000 men by December 197~. This included an expansion of the :\!.h'" USAF 23rd T.ctieaJ Air Support: Squadroa,!.he ..... t proviclUa& OV•• o forward air COIIlrOl CO""''''!''' ov",r Cambodia.

I: Sergeant. FARK. 1969 2: Khmer Serei guerrilla. 1969 3: Private. Ie< Bn. de Parachutistes. 1971

A

1; Commando, Project 'Cedar Walk', 1971 2; Lieutenant. UlTG, 1971·72 3; FANK private, Long Hai, 1972

B

1: Khmer Rouge commander. 1975 2: Khmer Rouge guerrilla. 1974 3: Khmer Rouge guerrilla.m73

c

I: Khmer Air fbrcc UH·l. 1973·75 2: Jo'ANKMI13APC.I97I·76

o

E

I: Sergeant. Khmer SF, 1973 2: Corporal. Bn. de FUsilien-Marins. 1973 3: Captain. 1'" Bde. Parachuti8le. 1973

F

I: Captain, MEDTC. 1971·73 2: Recondo Co.. 2nd I''ANK Division, 1974 3: Lieutenant. Un. Pa...·Commando. 1973

G

I: Honour Guard, PRKAfo~ 1980 2: Khmer Rouge guerrilla. 1986 3: KPNLF g-uerrilla. 1987

H

During the Republic the MNK standardised the black shoulder boards or shoulder loops used in the FA:'l"K. The :\I:\K had sevcral unit and qualification insignia, the former worn on the left shoulder and the lalleron the right chest. An ~INK pocket bad~e in normal and sulxJut..'t1 forms was worn on the left breast. All BF:\l wore the S<'lme shoulder insignia, consistingofcrossed rifles on a shield patterned after the Republican flag.

Ti,e Commltllist Forces

Maar womnl ........"....d th" FANK recra..itiall driv..-; uad .....y, th"se two., were i.>c:orpo... ,ed "'to vinall" ... ilitia Iillhtly armed with M I carb"'".. Oliv" fatill"", Itba.lti

u.a..i,.

ml"

~p.

with the II" BFM ill training. Yet the I\hrilles werc denied hazardous duty pay comparable to that paid by the FANK, and dtscrtions incrtascd. The prohltm \\ as never rectified. As the 1974-197.5 dry season opened, the cffe<:tiH·!lt...., of the ~1;\l"K was immcdial('l~ curtaikd b} hcav), ellelll} mining of the ~Ickong. Without proper mincs\\('epin~ equipment the :\I:'-:K rt'maincd unable tOdpl'1I Ihl' .\Id.;oll~comdor. Duringthe final weeks of the war the ~INK ri"erine forces aroulld the capital wcre rendered useless. Along the coast, M;\l"K vessels lost no time in evacuating refugees 10 safety; as late as 9 May, three ships arrin:d in the Philippines with 750 passengers. Like the rcst of the Royal Armed Forct..'S, the Royal Khmere i'\avy won: a white dn'ss uniform. On other occasions a light grey work uniform was used with a matching peaked cap. Bmh of th('$(' uniform combinations \\cre maintained in the ~IXK. A \\n:athed gold anchor embroidered on black ,\as worn on the :\IN'K peaked cap. Naval infalltry wore the same r.·nigue unifonn as the FANK. Shoulder boards in the Marine ROJafe !JJmtert were identical to those or the FARK, with the add ilion of a fouled anchor on the inner end.

The amlL't1 Communist struggle against the Cambodian gO\'ernment began with the ill-fated April 1967 rebellion in Baltambang Pro\·ince. Although the revolt was quickly suppressed the Communists, called the Khmer Rouge by Prince Sihanouk, began to expand their insurgency. Following the March 1970 change ofgovcrnmetlt the Khmer Rouge expanded their most effective village ddcnce units into territorial forces, which soon gave way to main force elements. Prince Sihanouk, who had sought refuge in China after being deposed, contributed significaIHly to their growth b) lending his popular support to the Communists: his leaden.hip in the Front [,'"i Xotionaf du j,-ampuch,a, an umbrella organis.'loon seeking the armed overthrow of the Khmer Republic, gave the anti-Republican insurgency greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Cambodian peasantry. Conceived at the Canton Summit of April t970, the FUNK was envisioned to include three divisions, all to be equipped by China. Imitating the Chinese experience, the insurgents would be a 'Peoplc's Army' of popular forces, territorial units, and regulars. In effect. the first FU.:'l"K units were composed of hardline Khmer Rouge. FAi'\K deft..'Ctors, and ethnic Khmer Communists aligned with the i'\orth VietnamCSt'. Training centres \\ere established by the .:'l"VA in north-eastern Cambodia and Laos; a headquarters was cslablisht..'t1 at Kratie, a pl'Ovincial capital whose government garrison deserted soon after the change of go\·erTlmelll. From the outset the FUNK was composed of 33

,

CommaM post oCtloe 48t.b Bripd......... • CLIo.. orip.-l K.It.m",r Krom woiu., d....u.S 0p"n1lio... 011 th", BaIiAC Ri.·..r. 27

Dectrnber 19740

diverse and onen antagonisLic elements. Prominent wcre the hardlinc Khmer Rouge, who had fought Sihanouk since 1967 and advocated an extremist. agrarian, puritan form of'primitivc Communism'. Pol Pot emerged as the leader of these forces, which looked toward China as their main source of suppOrt. Also in the FUNK were a small number of illlcliccluals; FAKK defectors; pro-Sihanoukists known as the Khmer Rumdoh; and ethnic Khmer Communists who had c1osel}' aligned thcmsch"cs \\;Ih the Korth Vietnamese. The laller two insurgent faction, developed in the eastern base areas alongside the XVA., and oneil maintained North Vietnamese political advisors in their units. By the end of 1970 the FU~K numbered an estimated '5,000 Cambodi
I

climinatL-d the backbone of the Republican ann), allowing the FUNK quietI)' to build up their forces, In 1972 the KVA de<:rea.s<.-d its force pl'cscnce in Cambodia, letting the FUNK assumc€OIHrol in the battlefield. The FUNK by that timc includt:d somc 50,000 regulars and almost 100,000 irregular suppons, Throughout the year they fought a warof attrition, striking against govel'lll1lcnt lines of communication and demoralising the FANK. ByJanuary '973, the FUNK were ready for their first full-scale solo offensive; but when they struck against Phnom Penh, air lX)wer devastated their ranks. Sum~ring heav)' casualties, the orlcnsive demonstrated to the FUNK leaders the need to octter co-ordinate 01X'l
••

sorties; up to 16,000 Communists perished during theoffellsive, with SOme b~ttalions 10sing60 per cent of their manpower. Significantly, most of the 3uackers were from the pro·Vietnamesc FU~K forces, allowing the hardJine Khmer Rouge to consolidate control over the more moderate Khmer Communists. Two mOllths later. US air support was withdrawn from C"lmbodia. With the Kinner Rouge in control. the FUNK muted illlernal disscm and prepared for its 1974 dry season offensive. Communications, command and comrol, and mobility were still relatively poor, resuhing in uncoordinated, piecemeal battles, and the 60.000 FU:\K regulars scored no major victories against lhc gO\ ernment forces. On I Janual) 1975 the FlJ:\K launched its '~Iekong R..iver Offcnsi\"c·. Converging on the ~Iekong corridor, the insurgents were able to capture the important river town ofN"eak Luongon I April. ~Iarching north-wcst frOm the conquered corridor, the FU:\'K numbering some 65.000 regulars in l'l light divisions. 40 regiments, and additional smaller units began its final assault on the capital. Within two months a co-ordinated Communist offensive had smashed through the FANK outer perimeter and di,"idcd thc Rcpublican forces illlo man:lge:lble pockets of rcsistance. On 17

April the Khmer Rouge led the advance into the devastated capital. FUNK uniforms and equipment rcnccu-d lilt' various ideological backgrounds and forei~n "ourccs of support. The Kluller Rouge, which 1)\ la((' 1973 had become the unqucstioned pO\\{'r be·hind the FUNK, wore the most spartan uniform (If an\, Indo-Chincsc insurgelll group. It usually eom.i"u'd of a black shirt and pants, onen of local manufacture, the shirts often without pockets; panlS were frequently rolled to th~ knee. Women conscripted into the Khmer Rouge, such as the allfemale 122 Rine Battalion, wore black p)jamas as well. Khmer Rouge armoun..d crews depicted in a propaganda photo next to a Chinese amphibious t3nk were wearing tank coveralls and hclmets supplied b) the XVA. It must be noted, howe,·er, that the FU:,\'K never used armoured '·ehicles in combat against the Republic. I Other clements of the FUNK deliberately shunned black p)jamas, preferring green NVA fatigues, as \\orn extensively by the Khmer Rumdoh and pro- Vielllamcsc clements: others also wore it as a political statement in protcst at the extreme, anti-Buddhist ,.jews of the Khmer Rouge. L'ller in the war the Khmer Rouge, too. acquired tOuner R....I .. d"foECCora, November 1974' In_I w_r Lhe .u..e...... black pyjama ...'form .ad redlwh.lle h ........ ~1...t wieh Lh.1 «rim ot'Jll.i..tion.

35

some uniforms li·om the NVA, These were often purchased with Chinese funds: because it ;vas more economical, the Chin('se preferred to supply the Khmer Rouge with cash for buying uniforms and equipment rather than shipping supplies down the Ho Chi :\linh Trail. The most cOlllmon form ofhcadgt'ar was ,hc soft. round, oli,'c drab or khaki 'i\lao cap', Captured FA~K patrol caps wcre also \\'orn. and could be seen all Khmer RouRc fiRhtt'N on IIwir triumphant march into Ilhlllllll Penh .. \I'111"1I111I11ulIl\ \\ul"llll\ the Khmer Koug" "as the ~r(//lla, a pc;:~all1 scal:' worn around the neck or head, most oftell seen in a red chCd F.-eDdI"lyl", .houlde.- .lid", raall.iall or. llftu_looC'oloo",l

rANK Order or Sattle, August 1970 U"it Infantry Bn. I Inf.1.lllry Iklt.'.' 3 Infantry Ikk. 4 lufanu'Y Iklc. 6 Infanu'Y Bde. l 7 Infalltry Bdc. I 10 In(;lI1try Ikle. 11 In(;1I1try!.:kle, 12 Inf;lI1try Iklc.'~J 13 Infantry Ikle, t4 Infanlry Ikle. IGI 15 Infanll'Y Iklc. [6 Infantry Iklc. [7 Infantry Bdl'. 18 lnfalllry l3
:'1

Location Phnom Penh KomjXlllg Cham KomjXlng $om Prey Veng Phnom Pcnh Phnom Penh Kompong Thom Kompong 1'hom Siem Reap Phnom Penh Sre Khlong Phnom Pcuh Phnom Pcnh Long Vek Romcas SiClll Rcap Phnom Penh Long Vck Phnom Penh Phnom Penh Phnom Pcnh Phnolll Penh • Phnom Penh Phnom Penh

l'"i/

1"«11/10/1

Lake Ikte. YOIHh Silppcr Iktc. 1.\larincCoI'()SQ

TOIlIe Sill' Phnom Penh KOllll>ong $om

Notes: AI>o\'c table excludes approximately 1'20 territorial banatiOllS assigned to the four military r{'g-i()Il~ al](1 till' Special .\Iili!ary ReJ.:"ion. (t) Commanded by I\laj. lth Suong, laler commander of I Infanlry Division. ('2) Commanded by I.1.Col. Dien Del, lalcr commander of 2 I nfaHt!'y Division. (3) Commanded by LI.Col. Deng Layom, later commander or armoured 10l'ces, (4) Commanded by Maj. Un Kauv, latel'COllllllander of 7 Infan!ry Division, (5) Commanded by I\laj. Teaplkn. lalcrcommandcr of ANS resistance forces. (6) Commanded by ~bj. Lon Non, brother of Lon

1'"01. (7) Composed of former Khmer' SCl'ei resistance foret'S. (8) ~e\'cr hrouglH to strcngth; disbanded in 1973. (9) Composed of four b;tttalionsj two locatcd on the coas!. IWO ~tationcd outside Phnom Penh.

purchased from the j\VA with Chinese funds. A very common item was lhe ChiCom AK-47 chest pouch. Khmer Rouge commanders also fa\'ourcd map cast'S and holstl'rs as symbols of authority. Latcr in lhe W
The North VietnaDlese ArDlY The :\,VA WtT(' the primary 0ppoIICIllS of the Khmer Repuhlic fOI" the first two ) ears ufthe war. The) combined a conventional approach using :\Iaill Force clements to crush the FAl\"K in setpiITe batiks with derp penetration commando attacks. -like the devastating sapper raid on PochenlollR Airbaw inJanuar) 1971. By late 1971.

believing the FANK to be broken, the NVA withdrew mOSt of their Main Force clements from the heart ofCambodia and turned the figluingovcr to the FUNK. Some specialised units, such as sappers and rocket teams. I"emained: e.g, on 7 October t972 a Victnamcscsapper force attempted to destroy the FAXK APC park inside Phnom Penh. Other NVA maritime units began infiltrating ammunition along the Cambodian coast in April t972. The NVA also remained prepared to defend their base areas along the lower :\Ickong corridor, as demonstrated by the August 1972 armoured counter-olfensi\'e which they launched alf
NVA VC Order of Battle in CaD1.bodia, February .973 ['m' B-3 Front'

COS\':'" C·..o Di\lsion C-50 Division? 1:"\'.\ Di\'ision' l03 Regional Bde. lO.. Regional &Ie, 367 NVA Sapper Grollp' 115 32 6g B2 90 96

Location Rat.makiri PrO\'ince Elemellts in Kriltic Prm'ince Kompong Tholll Province Prq \'cng Province Takeo I}rovincc

Siem Reap Province Vicinit} of Tonic Sap Kompong Cilalll Pro\'illce

Regional Bn. StTUll!o: Trcng Provincc Autonomous HIl, Vicinity Kandal Heavy Hn. Kompong Cham Province l.ogistics Bil. Pre)' Veng Province Sapper Bn.? .\Iondulkiri Province Heal'y Bn. Prey Veng Provincc 100 Logistin Bn I'n'y Veng I'rm'ince 207 Rcgioll
['nit Lo(atlon 512 Autonomolls Bn. Kandal Pro\'ince S\'a} Ricng Pro\·incc 570 Regional Bn. F-44 Regional Bn, Kampol I}ro\,ince F-ol8 Regional Bn. TakCQ Province Vicini!} Kompollg Chhnang 1-10 Sapper Bn. 1-25 Sapper Un. Vicinit} Kompong Chhnang 1-40 Sapper Bn. North of Phnom Penh Vicinity Prey Vcng Z-16 Heavy Un. Vicinity SUllol ? Transit Un. ? Logistics Un, Vicinit), SnllO! ? Regional Bn. Pre)' Veng Pro\'ince

NOles: Ihsed on rANK and allied illlclligcncc sources compiled through carly 1973 (I) B-3 Front was the command structure for NVAfVC clements in lhc Second Military Rcgion of South Victnam, (2) Cellt!",,1 Office, South Vietnam \I.j~ the NVA/VC command structure fOT all forces in the Tllird :\Ii!itary Region aud most of lhe Fourth ~Iilitary Reg-ion in South Vietnam. (3) Includes thc 44 Sapper Regiment, 52 Inf,llltry Regimellt, and 10iD Infantry Regimell!. Most of lhe division withdraw'l from north of Phnom Penh in summer 1972. (4) A brigadc-sizcd unit. Incorporated into thc 5 ~VA Di\'isioll in Sepl~ber 1973 and mo\'cd to Tay Sinh, South Vietnam.

37

anti·;lircrat'l units were also thought to be responsible for heavy fire encountered around Kompong Thom and Takeo in the same month. By Deccmber 1974 the NVA prcscnce had becn reduced to 26,200 men, of whom only 12,000 werc combat troops. A chilling of relations with thc Khmer Rouge, occasionally leading 10 open connic1, had in part prompted the stecp declinc in dircct NVA participation. However, as late as the '975 offensi\,c on Phnom Penh. Poll)ot was to make note of i\VA anillel) support that contributed to the final vicwry. Because i\VA forces were well known to have operated in Cambodian s..l Ilctuaries for years, Hanoi made Iillle effort (Q conceal the idemity of i\VA soldiers participating in direct fighting against the Khmer Republic. As a result. Vietnamese casuahies encountered on the battlefield invariably wore the standard ~VA uniforms and accoutrements S('en in South Victnam.

ThePlates 2 AI: Sergrolll, FARK.

1!fi9

During the 1960s the FARK spellt mueh orits time and resources repairing roads ami building bridges as pan oran extensive civic action programme. As a result, it had lillie combat expericnce when Prince Sihanouk sanctioned anti-Khmer Rouge and limitt::d anti·Vielllaml'SC operations in the latc IgGos. 'l'he FAR K had also oc-comc thl' recipient of a confusing alTay of Western and Eastern Bloc equipment after US military aid was terminated in 1964· This NCO wcars Frellch ~11947 fatigucsand US leather boots, common issuc to lower FARK ranks b) 1969. Bush hats were also widely used. including these large-brimmed French jungle hats. The weapon is an AK •.t7 assault rifle, supplied in substantial numbers both by the Eastern Bloc and China dtlrin~ tht· mid·,g60s. Locall)-produccd

FANK Infantry Division, 1972 1975 D,',;{ ';"

HQStalf /n)IJ/lIIY

1/1)(111/1)'

Hri!!(Jd~

/Jrl!!adr

,

~

::,~,~::

Battlion

Inr.'1ntry IhttaliOll Infantry Hallalion Infantry Hallalion

/..1.18"110 /Jattalioll

l

~~'i~'"

Coy J'rans Coy Supply Co)' Kcpair Coy

!)Igllal

.lllIIln),

1~'II):uIt'er

.\1-llj

/Jattalioll

lIaltoliQII

Sl/lIod,OIl

HQ""d

~ l Service Batter} 155 mm Hattery J05nml Hallcry l05 mm

Baller)'

"Q""d Sen'ice

Co,

Engillcer CoOy Engirlecr Co)' I':ngint:er Coy

B;ljI(T~

~Iililary

t

Platoon

Post

Fon\ard Command

roo'

Troop Combat Troop Cornb;\( Troop Support Troop

I05rnm

r."m!JlIm

e,", Comm,md

~

IIQ ,md Sen',,, Coy C~lInbat

Police

.\ir Force Dcl. (allacht.-d) Intelligence Dcl. attached) Psywar Dcl. allached 1

canvilS poucht's are SlTured by shoulder straps and waist tapes, ,12: !lfl/lll' S,ui gll~rri"a, 1!fi9 The Khmer SlTci Fret' Khmer) were an antiCommunist resistance group led b} the C"lmbodian nationalist Son :\'goc Thanh. Throughout the tg60s tht) waged a simmering struggle to topple the Sihanouk government. TIl(." Khmer Screi were also loos<.'l} aligned with the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, a Cambodian faction attempting to gain autonomy for the Khmer Krom people living in South \'ietnam's :\Ickong Ddta. ,\lcmocrsofl)l'lh organisations fought on occasion in ullconventional warfare units run by the US Army Special Forces, The Khmer Serci operated from two sta",ring bases: olle in the Dongrek i\lountalllS along tht' Thai bordl:r, and one in South Vietnam's IV Corps. This gucrrilla operates from South Vietnam, as cvidcncl'd hy the identifyin,g red ,carf (kmlf/u) he

wears around his llcck: Dongrck Khmer Screi wore ydlow and blue scarfs. On his green beret he wears a metal badge borrowed from the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, depict..ing a CamlxKlian flag o\"er an outline of the AR \'1'\ IV Corps a sublle hint at their ultimate goals ofautonomy. 'I'he Khmer Serei ne\'('r de\"e1oped insignia of their own, Becausc the Khmer Screi supponed autonomy for the ethnic Khmer living in the :\Iekong Delta. they could not COUIll on assistance from the South \'ietnamese government. Commonl) worn were camounage llnifonllS from the South Vietnamese Police Ficld Force (a Saigon ruling pl'Ohibiting the sale of camouflage to non-military Camb
Serci). FoOl wear is a black-dyed pail' orBata boots. ACCOUIr<:ll1cnts used by the Khmer Serei rarely amOUllh:d to more than simple bandoliers. acquired through sympathetic ARV:\, chnnnds. Thc weapon is a CAR-IS carbine: CS \\(:apol1s were us<-d "hile.: operating out of South \'iemam to pre"ent their being mistaken for Communist insurgents. The.: Kinner Serei staging Ollt of the Dongrek ~Iountains used the AK-4i. a mon° practical "'eapon that allowed them to lISC captured FJ\RK ammunition. The Buddhist amulets hanging from a gold chain were typical of the KhmerSerci. To protect th. guerrilla during an attack, the centre amulet was pili ill the mouth. A3-" Prim/f.

I"

The Ai rhol"lU'

}jalail/on df Pamdmlir/fS, '971 Halt~Brig";I{h·. nllnpo~"d

01'111(' I"and

;/- }jnlailfollJ dr 1~(/m(h/l/islfJ, had th.. . rnmt l.:omhat MEDTe officer ;nspect;nll a FANK mortar poa;non at Svay Ri"oll larriao.., early '975- Cambodian .oldiua w...r M. h"tmeu w;lh camollflale cove.... aad M'9S6 webb;..!.

experience of any Cambodian unit before [Yio, seeing action in the initial allti-Khmcr Rouge campaign of 1967 and the s\\eeps Ratanakiri Province in :\on-mbcr 1969.. \fter ~Iarch 1970 tht' t\\'o existing airborne.: ballalions formed the core lor an clwisal;"t-'CI brigade group totalling eight battalions, Onl) seven hallalions had aCluall) Ix:cn fiddt'CI when a F.\:\K reorganisation in Fchruar) 1973 cut the paras back to a ~in~le bri'f
or

airbol"l1(' :\(;Os. He wears all .\II~H5 pi'>lOl belt, AD MNK M_i1or mownia« • O.m......n .....r palnl. th.. M ..ko"J!:; DOt..........I;,rocket «",(;"S prOIKt;"s th.....perddin'red IX'I()re the CS .\I.\.\G was \\ithdr;l\\ll in .l....ct..re•• "iSloly ,,""".....ry p...,.,... tio... Janual") 196,: hanging from th(' bdl late F3 . The \\eapOlI is a ChillC'S(' commando's camounage uniform consists of South T) pe 56 lighl machine gun, a copy of the Soviel \'ietnamNC tigcr·..tripes and a matchingjunglc hat: RI'D. captlla'd ;\,,'/\ uniforms were also worn. A thrccpocket indig('nolls rucksack is worn, with an r..l 1956 pistollx,lt. The rifleisan 1\116. Cedar Walk also had /1,.' Crdal' /fl/Il, commando, '97' In 1970 th(' i\IAC\' Studies and Ob~l...\'ation group access 10 ComBloe weaponry while 011 missions into recruited and trained sl'\Tral small learns of Camhodia. Camlxx:lialls as airborne commalldos in Projl'Cl 'Ct'dar \\"alk'. The teams wen' deployed in B:.!: l.jell/NuII/I, UITG, '97' '972 Communist-hdd regions of north-('asl('I'n Cam- Like most LilTC personnel, this lieutcnant is a bodia. Whell the Khmer Republic slancd to form a member of the CS Army Spccial Forn's: he wears a Spttial Forcb> unil, 20 'Cedar \\'alk' commandos CITG flash. based on the KI1Iner Republican flag, Wt·rt· airlifted (Q Camlxxlia in OClober 1971 10 an on his gn't'n bere!. In deference to his Cambodian as a cadre; a S<'Cond contingent arri\cd during the stmlenl.'> his rank is worn French·styleon a chest tab follo\\ing month, On papcr Ill(' '('.cdar \\"alk' and on F.\:\'K shoulder loops, ,\ UITG 'Reopf.'ratins were assigned to til(' Young Khmer publique Khmer<" title is worn on the upper right Spf:cial Forces; hecause of political pr~ure, 501('('\,c: frequentl}, a C fTC ballalion training camp how('\'('l', they fell under the aClual control of the in~ignia was worn underneath. A US f\nny Special 4'

Farces shoulder insignia and Airborne Litle are worn 'on the left shoulder. A CIB and US jump wings are O\'er the left pocket, sulxlued AR VN SjX'cial Forcl-'S wings over the right. 83: FAX/t-'Jrit'(ltt, /..ol/g /lui Training Camp, 1972 f\ young Cambodian recruit at a UITC training

basc in South Vietnam, H(' has been issucd with US DC 107 f
A KhmlT ROllKC field commander ad\'ances on

The MV T; berjlock uri~' '" P....om Penh i .. Ja.."ary '!nsth" 1.5( v .II,,1 I.. make e j .."ra"y. NOI" the Plld-ba"ed bridS". aad RPG damase 10 Ihe ."pentrucl"re.

Phnom Penh during the final oflcnsivc against the FANK. By the final year of the war cvcn the most puritanical Khmer Rougc had becn forced 10 adopt items of clothing procured through thtt NY A. The khaki ylao cap and olive drab shin wcre supplied through the NOl'lh Vietnamese, The salida Is and peasant pants, however, display an important sense of commitment 10 the spartan virtues of Khmer Rouge extremislll, A ChiColll chest pouch C;lrries four spare magazines for his AK-47l'ifle, Aswith the Pathel Lao and Vict Cong, Khmer Rouge commanders worc no rank insignia but could be distinguished by the presencc Qf coveted military equipment. This commander carries both a Chi Com leather map c
C2: hn",rr RQug' gUfrrifla. 1974 The unifonn items and accoutrements displayed by the gucrrilla hint at the various supply channels thaI wert' fct.'
Communist forces late in the war. His khaki .\Iao cap and black uniform ha\'e been procured through NVA channels. 0\'(,1' his shoulder is the locally· made grenade bandolier carrying rounds for his captuR'(! .\179 launcher. Chim'S('·made stick grenades arc carried in a locally·made pouch. The :'!>andals have been cut from a truck tyre. Around his neck is the krama, a traditional Cambodian scarf, ahel'llalivl'1y worn around the forehead by the Khmer Rouge, Gj: '" '//Illff ROlIgr gllrrrilla, 1.973 Dressed in locally-produced peasant pyjamas and a khaki i\laocap, he erects a makeshift I07mm rocket launcher out of cut branches. A mure sophisticated two-shot launcher on a simple metal tripod was also used. Rocket accuracy was poor, but ad(.'(luate for hitting-sprawlingcities like Phnom Penh. \\'eighing 19k9 and with a range in excess of 8.ooom, the I07mm rocket became the chosen projectile of the Khmer Rouge. Less frequently now, the Khmer Rouge still employ ChiCom 107mm rockets against lhe VictnamL'SC occupational forces in Cambodia. /)1: MI/wf Air Fora [///-1 l!/m.rhip, 1.1,7:) 1.?75 In i\1a~ l~,n ~ix l'II-1 Iwlicllptl'f ~llll,hip, \\l'f\' turned o\'el' 10 the KAF. ArmamClll was an ,\1\/1.

machine gun on a side-swivel mount. In all ten gunships were ddivcr(.'(1. being used extt'miv{'I) in the Mekong eon\'o), suppOrt role. Cambodian helicopter gunships all had an eagle holding a dagger painted on the nose. A red-coloured eagle indical(.'d helicopters stationed at 1)llIlom I}enh: those painted in oran~e were from Batlambang.

The same design was worn as the unit insignia by crews. The KAF national insignia, inspired by US Air Force markings, is painted on the tail boom.

D2: FtL\T j{1I3 APe. '97'-'976 In t970 Ihe FARK armoured Demi-Brigade was of vintage ~12" lanks, A.\18 Armoured cars and i\12 half-Iracks modified into wheeled vchicles. The FA_\iK increased armoured slrength lO a brigade during the following year, receiving a lotal of 202 M 113 armoured personnel carriers. including 17 examples equipped wilh a I07mm mortar. In late 1972, M 113 APC squadrons were' 10I'ln(.'(\ in each of the four FA£\K divisions. Additional APCs were kepI ill ,he armoured cavalry headquarters in Phnom Penh. localed in lhe fonner Olympic sladium. Thi:'!> FANK .\1113 is cquippt:d wilh a .50 cal. machine gun turret and a 106nun r(."Coilltss rine, capable of firing a 9.8kg ami-personnel round over an enective range of I, I 00 metres. The Cambodian numeral '13' and a FA~K armourl.x1 bribradc in.signia, copied from thedcsign used by the ARVN, arc painted on the side. COll1post..'d

EI" Khmer Air Fora IQ{fdmflSlrr, /.97/ In ~Iay 1971 six KAF transport personnel were broughl to Gdorn Air Base. Thailand. lor training in thl' AC-47 gunship. They returned to Phnom Penh inJun,' with two gunships, employing Ihem immediately in support of a KOHTnment garrison KAF T -:01 Troj... fisbt",...bomben caJci out at Pocb",,,to~ Airbase _uid", Pbnom P",1lh d .. ri"S tb", li.Ioa.J mo"tb.. or tbe

43

Intimidatcd by these statistics, this KAF flgllterbomber pilot wcars a 'blexxl-chit' bast'd on the {l(:sign or tht, Rt'publican flag, reading, 'Ir you c.apture mc, plcase treal m(' asa PO\\' according to international agrcelllentS'. Since neither the ~\'A nor the Khmer Rouge wcre know n to k('('p man~ Camhodian prisom:rs alive, such pleas \\ere almo:.t certainl~ in \ain. It is also notewonh} that the Vietnamese translation in Ihe middle contains se\'eral spdlin~ errors. Translation in Khmer and Chinese- arc also included. A Khmer flag and KAF title are worn on the lert shoulder orthc pilot's US flight suil. He \\ears a blue peaked cap \\ith silver KAF badge,

MEDTC 'no"",l1y in.ipia' mad", up for p"'non.n",1 af,,,,r tb", fall oflb", K.bm",r R"'publie. n", "0<>' r",f"'r. '0 'h", aumlxr of day. tb", MEDTC .I.y...l ... C.mbodia afl",r tbe '97S N_ Year

ofre... i"",bes-.

60km SOUlh-Wl.:st Or the capital. Ii) 1973 the K.\F was operating 1'2 gunships, using them prim'lrily ror ~lckol1g cOl1voy support and night 0pl,:ralions. This sergeant was the loadmaster in the original Vdom cOlHingelH in ;"Iay '971. He wears a Thai lear-camouflage f1ighl suit procun.:d b} the firsl crew on graduation. The black scarr around his O(:ck is decor,ned with the 'Sp(X)k) , gunship ghost insignia ('Spooky' was the radio callsign ror USAF, Laotian and South Vit'lllamese AC·47 gunships). The scarf al~o Ix-ars the word 'Lougaru', a corruption orthe Frcndl word for wcrewolr, which was the KAF AC-47 calisign. The insignia over his leti breast WaS designed and pro
t.2: J,:J"nrr ,IiI' Foru lOp/ain, '972 In 1972 ten KAFT-z8s werrdarnag(:d ordl,'Slroycd during combat opera lions, mosl due to mcrhanical r.'lilure or pilol error. At le'lsi one airman was believed caplun.'d by the Khnwr insurgents. 44

E3: FA. \'h' brigadi/'r-gmtral, '973 Thecommandcrorthe Khmer Special Forces, Brig. Cen. Thach Reng, is seen wearing lhe olive green FA~K dress unirorm. The peaked cap has the gold FA:\IK device depicting Ihe Angkor \Vat temple complex. Bultons bear the combinL'd service emblem or the FA~K General Headquarters. Brigadier-general's rank is displ:l}ed on black French-st)le shoulder baards. SJX'cial Forccs insignia with a Forus S/Naal/'s lab is .'>Cell on the upper tcrt"lce\·e. ~Ietal Cambodian basic wings are worn 011 the upper right chcst, and S basic wings, received arter his training at Long Thanh, South Vietnam, 011 tht, len. F,: S/'rgmnt, h nm/'r Sptcial Forus, 1973 In early [973 SC\'cral FA~K dt,tachmellts werescnt I..opburi Special Warfare Centre, Thailand, ror ach';Lnced ranger alld communications training; the latter was needed to provide the Khmer Special Forces with radio operators for its small-unit operations behind enemy lines. Upon their return to Cambo
FANK Signal Corps, his original unit, is on the right shoulder. The green beret bears a handwoven SF nash.

F2: Cor/Joral, Bataillon de Fusiliers.i\:lt1fills, 1973 The MNK J\'larine Corps remaincd a small static defence force during the first three years ol"the war. [n [973 the MNK was authorised to double its strength, including an expansion oCthe .\1arines to 1 [ battalions. BFM deployment paralleled the FANK, with the Marines fighting an interdiction I"orce along most ol"thc country's major watcrways. By December [973 onc BFM was patrolling the coastline, four were providing harbour security and lour were on operations along the Mekong corridor. Two additional battalions, composed of disbanded FANK territorial forces, were formed in [974. F): Captain, 1St Pararhute Brigade, 1.973 Two battalions of I Para Bde. were among the initial reinforcements sent to the besieged provincial capital of Kompong Cham 011 21 August t973. Fighting their way across the city, the paras turned back repealed Communist assaults until furthel FANK reinforcementS could be landed along the Mekong waterfront behind Communisl lines. The two lorces linked up and drove the Commullists out of Kompong Cham by 13 September. Two remaining para battalions were heliborne 011 to the

airfield nonh of"the city during the opening days of the siege, and witllstood continuous cncmy pressure until relieved lJy KAF security troops in mid· September. This captain wcars French·stylc camouflage uniform, usually limited to usc by paratroop ofJicers. His red beret bears no cap badge; FANK airborne units never created a cap badge, although a cloth version oftbe FANK national insignia (see Platc E3) or metal wings were used as such. On his left shouldcr is the insignia (or 1 Para Brigade. Above this are ballpoint pens always the symbol of authority in Indo-Chinese armed forces. On both collars arc rank insignia, generally adopted after 1972.

G,: Captain, MEDTC,

'97/~/.975

To obsel"\"1' equipment utilisation and FANK unit performance, .\1 EDTC personnel were assigned to work with specific FANK, MNK and KAF formations. The branch orientation of a l\l EDTC team member was often matched to a Cambodian counterpart: this M EDTC captain, a member of the US Army Special FOl'ce~, is assigned to thc Kinner Special Forccs and t Airborne Brigade. His lcaf camouflage uniform is or South Vietnamese 1~5' Khmer Rouge guerrillas, now wearing Chin_Dlade olive drab unifOrtn8, 80at a Chinese Type 53 heavy m.ach.iae gun across tbe TonIe Sap.

45

origin, having becll pun:hascd Ull a previous tour. He wears sulxlued Khmer inSlructor wings, awarded at Ihe Airborne Training Celllre at Pochelllong Airbase, over thl' right shirt pockel; sulxlued US ArmySpccial Forces insignia, marking his previous unit in South ViclIlam 011 the right shoulder; and a ~1 EDTC title on the left shoulder. Cambcxlian-style rank insignia arc embroidered on a Khmer Republic flash. ~l EDTC personnel remained in Ihe field for only short periods, during which times they wen' allowed 10 be lighlly armed. This captain carries a pri"ately· acquired IJZI sub-machine gull'and wears an i\156 belt with a holslcred l-li·Po\\cr Bro\\ning. G"2: FA. ,-It- ruolltlOissallu tl'am "'l'",bir. 1974

"'hen the UITC was training FAXK battalions in 1971 and 1972, reconnaissance platoons were occasionall) :;ent for additional lraining. Further FA~K reconnaissance units were Irained in carl) 197'2 al Phits."1nlllok. Thailand. Five hundred FA7\K trainees at Philsanulok were put through a Commando Raider course; upon their return to Cambodia, the} \\ere di,"idcd into teams and assigned as pathfinders for infalllr} formations. In NO\'ember 1972 a Rc.:condo School was opened in Banambang Province to further cxpand Ihe number of recOllnaissance ullilS a\'ailable to the FA\'K. By t974 most FANK brigades had a reconnaissance platoon, and cach division had a recondo company. Graduales fi'om the FANK Recondo School were issued Cambodian tiger·slripe uniforms with matching bush hat. Un: is the standard FANK M t956 pattern. He carries an ~'!::lo3 rine/grenade launcher combination one oronly 55 delivered to the F'ANK. On his shoulder is the insignia of the Recondo Company of the 2nd FANK Division. Instructors at the Recondo School wore a shoulder patch bearing an inverted black triangle with an cagle, copies from the emblem of" the Royal Thai Army LRRP School.

G3: Lim/illanl, Para-Commando lJalll/lion, 1975 Sixty FANK students attended training at the respected Airborne Commando School at Batu Djadjar, Indoncsia in mid-1972. After a six-month course two dozen 1\luslim members of the contingent ,,'erc posted to thc FANK 5th Infantry 46

Brigade, a predominantly Muslim tonnation; the remainder formed a ceremonial unit in Phnom Penh until t974. They \,·cre then Llsed as the cadre for a nl'W Para-Collllll.H1do battalion loosely a~igned to tlll' Khmer Special Forces, and sent to fight on the northern perimcter of Phnom Penh. The commandos trained at Baw Djadjar were complctely out filled by tht: Indonesians before retuming to Cambodia; thi.~ para-commando retains his IndOlll'sian camounagc uniform and jump-wings. An ,\11 steel helmet is worn; a red beret, standal'd among all Camlxxlian airbornc battalions, was also issucd to the para commandos. The ~lt6 rinc, ~1195G LBE and jungle boots arc FA:\'K i...sUl'.

HI: J-1mlQur Guard. PRA·AF. Ig/Jo Sixteen days after \'ictnam invaded Cambodia in D('(;cmber 1978 a proxy go'·ernmCllt called the People's Repuhlic of Kampuchca was installed in Phnom Penh. The IlRK Anm:d Forces have been slowly built up by thc \-ietnamc'sc, but an' rated as ollly marginally reliable. IlR KAf ckfcctions 10 the rcsiSICIlCC forces arc frequent, and, until tg88, no PRK unit:> operatt:d in contt.'Sted border regions without their Vietnamese cqlli,·alent alongside. In tg88 the PRKAF "as estimated at 35,000 troops, including fi\"(' infantl) divisions used primarily for static (kfenee. Pictured during a 1980 parade in Phnom I\:nh, this member of the PRK Honour Cuard wears a white dress uniform and peaked cap with metal PRKAF badge. A medal hOllouring the Khmer forces which helped defeat the Khmer "Rouge in t978 is worn on the right chest. The rifle is a Soviet SKS carbine, with a PR K nag sticking from the barrel. In the field, PRK forces wear Vietnamesestyle olive drab or khaki f~iligucs, Headgear is usually an olive drab J\lao cap or khaki field cap. AccoutJ"('IllCIU~ :m' of Vietnamese orig-in. 1-12: KllI1ur RO/lge gu,rrilll/, 1986 After the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978, the Khmer Rouge withdrew IOwaI'd the Thai border in an orderly fashion and created a guerrilla staging area based in the Cardamon ,\Iounlains. In 1987 they maintained all estimated 35,000 guerrillas organised into regimcnlS and light divisions. Funding comcs primarily from lhe People's Republic of China.

The Khmer Rou~e 110\\ claim tu h.l\c temlx-red their ~Atrcmist idool~, "hid r uhed in tht' dcaths of pC'rhaps t\\O million Cllnhodiam \\ hilc.' Ihc') hC'n' ill pO\\('r from 197.~) tn Ilj;H..\ .. 'pruul- of their 1I!:\\ modeTatl' oullook. h.hmcr Rou~{' rt"f{Ulars h,t\(' no\\ exchall~ed their l>.Inan bl.tck p)jamas for ~-n..e n fati~u('S shippcd dirl'Cll} from China. Xo hl"trlch or rank insignia arc \\Ol'll. A~idc from a lIll't••1 cap badge dC'iignc.·d for .l Khmer Rouge Honour Guard in IgB5. no ntht:r Khmer Rouge unil in..ignia l'xi~l. Thc\\c;:lIXlll i,an RIlG-7. Ili.. sandal~ Mt' made:1l Sill' R.lIH' Khnwr ROLlW'11111 I'd"Ug"I'I' I ,ltJlp 'III lIlt' ·1·h.li-C,II11luo(li,ln hunkr.

KPNLF rnriJ-la... ~ R_p p ~ '914· 1Hy ..... ....N wit"/Jt...t,., R.PG. M". ae.tJU..lI: i.....JK&omh:u.re .r ,.. ~ nm llal!~ aad .Ii... d ...b Item. witla ci,·i1i.... l .. rm~I"

anned tulllbat.tllt\ \u('C~lull\ dcl<-ndcd their border ('l1tla\C'\ from a \'ielll,uncsc dr) 'i(';:UOll attack, 'I'he follo\\ inK }('ar the \'ic.'tnaml'M' n'turncd in l{rC;ltl·r'lren~lh. dri\ ingalllhrl"t' of the rl...i)lance factiom .lCTfh" till' Thai borrlf'r, ~illn'lh,tl lilll(' tht' KP:"I.F h,h Inc."(( to r{'~ain mOllll'l1lum b) lidding 'mall cfllllln:llldo lInil~ in Ih(' hOl'dc'l' prm inn.... While lhl' KP~I.F rt'cci\"l~ llun-ll'thal.t.",i..I.IllCe from till' L'~.\, China .mel the ,\ ~)t:i,l\iull of South EaSI t\\i'lll :"alimh ASEA:\" . mililar) :l.:)si\lallce f/3: A~P. \ LF gu"rilla. 1!J87 coml~ primarily from China ami C:tplllrc:d sources. In OClolx'r 1979, I.,jOO anli-Communi\1 rl'si\\arl(t· This guerrilla \\c.':lrs Thai tigl'I'-'lripes and jungle fighters alollg the Caml}(Xlian bordt'r unified under bOOlS. Ol/wr uniforms include d\ ilian pC";:lS.'11l1 Ihe bann('r of the Khmer l'l'Oplc',\ :"ational c1othc'\. ,l{rt"11 fatil(ul"i and Thai If';:lf-calllouflagc. l..ibcTalioll Front. Thrce )cars lau'r Ill(" mOH'IIlCIll His \H'apOn is Ihe ChiCom T}lX' 56 rifle "ilh joined tilt' L1 X-rccogni.!lCt1 Coalition KOHrtlmelll of folding stock, Ill(' most common firt.'arm in the Democratic Kampuchca. all anli~\'il·lnamt.'S(' re- resislam:c coaiitiull. The .\K~t7 chnt pouch i.. abo siSlance umbrella org'dni alion hhich includes the ofChin(Yon~n.On his left shouldc-r i:) the KP:"LF Khmer Roulo';e ,and fOTC lo}al to Princ Sihanoul.. emblt'm. Indi\;dual KP:"LF battalion insignia are Ihe :"ational SihanOllki~1 .\nm. or .\:\"5 , TIll' \\orn 011 Ihe left shoulder or 011 b,l-M'hall-t} pt: caps. KI'i\LF pt.',tkl"fl in~trt'ngth in lyH3, \\lil'll ib lJ.UOO A blad ~arf ha5 been adopted as headgear.

47

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