Osprey, Men-at-Arms #229 Luftwaffe Field Divisions 1941-45 (1990) 02Ed OCR 8.12

Lur (lffe Field Divisions 1941-45

OSPREY

Men-at-Arms· 229

PUBLISHING

Luftwaffe Field Divisions 1941-45

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Kevin Conley Ruffner· Illustrated by Ron Volstad Senc~

editor

M~rtin

Windrow

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FIl'SI publisht-od ill c.n~al. I~rilain ill 1990 b} Ospre\ Publishing. Elms (:oun. Ch.lpcI W.I\. HOlle). Oxlilnl OX~ !JU'. lJlli(t:d Kingdom. ElI1
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Photos All ph(lto~r:lph~ unks.s otlwrwi'l' notcd appe,tr COLI I'll"} (,l'nl'(Irg-.J agolski a Ild 11lC' Tradi tiOIlSI nhan(! ckr Adln.l)ivisiull 21.Lw.FC'lddivisiun. FUll A 1:,\ ['At tI(,Ut. Of .\Ll. !lOOKS 1'1 1\I.ISIII.ll In (hl'llt\· l\tlLt JAIlY AKI1 A\ IATI()ro. l'IJ·.ASt: (.tlro. I Acr: rill' Itl.lrl.t,ting \tanager. Osplel DIlt-'<.t LlK, P() Ho" I 10. Wdlingoorough. Nonh
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AcknowledgenU:Dls and sources I ;L1I1 (kt'j)ly indebted 10 a llumb('rofpt:ople lor help durill~ tht, time thaI I spent rcseart:hilll; the LufiwalTc Fi"leI Di\'isions. Foremosl, I \\ ish 10 thank Georg Ja~ol~l..i fill' pro\ iding me \\ ith 'iO much inform,llion 01 IIII' eli\ i,iolls and photographs from his collet:lion. Willwut I !t-rr Jal,:"olski's assistancf'. il is doubtful 1\ ht't Ill' I t hi, book could ha\ I' been wrillen. Similarly, \\'ollgall~ H.If·Ii.Jurgenl !t-Ilke. Ulrich Roguer, Hans \looshruj:N('r, IIt"inrich Iiollandcl', and Wilhelm Iknl'll(·ulllelits. Readers illtcrestf'd ill furtllt'r ,nlld~ clfllil' 1.lll'twaffe ~'idd Di\"isions SllOllld eOilSult Geol"J.:J al-:"Iski,;.?! .I.w, ftlddirisioll' lUI,,' /Jil·isim/ f.fJp-I.9D \pl'i\"al,'ly published, (987), Olher importalll :>OUITCS are the captured German war rccord, and till' Foreign ~Iihary Studies at the ~atiolla[ Archi\('S, \rashinglOn, D.C. Arlist's NOle Rt'adl'n; nm) care 10 note that the origill.11 p."inlings from which the colour platcs in this hook \,,'ro' pn'pan'(l.m" ,J\'OIilablc for pri\'aH." salt>. :\11 rcproduct ion eopyrighl \\ hat.'iOCH'r is retained b) thc i'uhlishcn•. ,\11 cnquiries to Ix addn:.~'O('d 10: \Iodel Emporium 700 NorthJohnson Suitc~.

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USA The Puhlisht:n reg1'et that they Gill enter into IlO COlTl'sl>Ulldt·[}f'c lI[lOllthis mattl"r.

Lttfiwaffi Field Divisions 1941-45 IT, on

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e Luftwaffe Field Divisions firM raiset.l by l\azi rmany in 19 F wen.: dirceLly linked to the role of ri,-atc armi<.'S· in the Third Reich. Personal and rl) rivalries and rCSClluncnl of the nation's ular army and its omen corps created these n"ale armics' in Nazi Gcnnan). (The foremost mple ofllu.'sc forces. the Wam:n 55, ~TC" from oil' Hider's personal bQdy~uard ill the carl) 305 to a nominal sln:ngth of 38 didsions of over ,000 men by 19.~5. a sizeable proponion of rmany's land force,>. ).Iol"e importantl}. the Tanen-SS made up a here lI5 a Stab".. ru aDd OW'ars doLh ven;;on of the IrOd Cross "It Cla"s .... d Lhe 'rrn>idJiiunr-A b"e;chefJ sewo 00 his megerbJuS#!; this rarely Sffn in wartime photOflraphs. (Do:r Deolsche

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Luftwaffe pnrlicipatcd in all theatres 01" the war, and by 19+1 its strength had grown to nearly 1,700.000 personnel. most of whom sCf\'l'd in nonflying capacities. In fact the anti-;tircraft artillery branch hnd 35 per cent ~571.000 men) of the Luft"affe's strength ill 19P, "hilt- signal troops formed another 1 B per cent. The numocr of mcn sef\'ing in n) ing units tOlallt:d 588.000 in blc 19--1-1

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Typical unifonn and equipment worn by LuflwalT" p"rson. nelenga!5ed in anli_parti~aoop"rafion,. in Russia, 194<1. Th.,,~e 01"0 w"ar Ih" Fli"g"rb/u~"ahhough.,"om" do nOI di .. playany raok or ..al;"_1 i .. ~;~nia. Th", ai .....an in In" c"olr" has ~n award...t do., Wound Badl'"

lapproximatcl) 36 pCI' ccnt of the Luftwaffc). but most Ortlll~C mcn \\('re ground !>llpP'",rt pCrS()I11u:1 or paratl'()()llers. Alto~etlll:r, the Lufi.wafft amOUIIled to 20 per cellt ofCenl1any's total l1lanpower under arm~ lhat year, a considerable rt:S('r\'oir or trained men and \\ ameli. Dt."spiu' the not;lble :mcCt'!>s urthe Germ,11l lorec~ in thc carl) days of Operation 'Barlxlros:,'I', \ietory was not rt'alill:d in the East ill 1911. The .\rlll} gfOu lid to ,I h:llt outside the g-a te~ or:, Iuseow and Lcnill,l{rad as a ferocious \\inter ami :l reillIlllTed Red Arl11)' ovcrWhl'll'l'led tilt, extended Cnlll;;lllli'ollt. In the lew lI1unths I'rolllJulle t9.11 Ullliithc onset of wi Iller tht" \\'ehrm:leht lost O\el" 700,000 soldiers on the Ea!>tt:rn Frolll fwm de:lth. wCJund~, and (·apture. 'rIle :-\rm) alOJIt: witnessed casu:lh) r,Jlt"~ of :l~) per c:tllt on tht' Ru!>sian ~I('rpe~, I.o:,"c:. eonlinued to mount :l~ the threc' army Kroups ill thl' East sllllcred all addition:l! 33G,OUU (":lsLlalti('~ in the lirst thrcc tllOlll1l~ of 19 ~2, Less than h:llfnfthcse lossn wcre repl:lcc'd among the hard-pressed frOllt-line unilS. Gurin~ r:lised Ill(' Luliw I:lecmenl:-, Thc ,\nll) Ilroposed If) transfer 10-.!0,OOO Xa\.d and up to 50,000 Luliwanc personnel 10 :-\rlll} 1-0I11ro!. Goring, howl'\"('r, refused to permit tht' toss or his good N"ational

Sociali<;t :llrtlll'lI t<, the re:lcliIJllar} .\fIll}. \\hic :.till had chaplaill'> and olliccN imbued \\ ilil th tradition!> of the old I mperial Arm}. ','11(' Reich, marsclla II inste:ld dC'dded to raiM' his ow II divi:.ion for g-round sen'iee under the command of Ltlfl \\:lm~ officcrs. Hilkr acccpted (;;',ring's ~oIUli()n l' lhe manpower shortage, and directed (hal th IIllluher of, \ir For('c' pcrsollllel fill' these ltt'W u nil be doubled from the original fil1;ure or 50,OOC' Promim'n t .\rm} fi~tlre!>, with MJlllt.· notable f'X. made little attempt to pn'\ enl the creation " yet alwther pri\'atc arm} :lud, in the \\ords I' one i\rmy o(Jjeer, 'so the belb rang for the hirth 0 the ullluck) 'Luf'lwalli' Field lJivi~i()ns', Th is w a.~ the imllwd ia te background to G(-)ring:' ('alloll Ii Septemhn 19F:! for volunteer<; li'OlI Ihroug-hout the Luliwarrc ror comb,lt dllt) in th, East. [ H I l before Ih:ll date. hOWl'\Tr. sonw Luf, \\:lne tro(lps \\el"(, ht'a\Cil} ellg"aged ag-ain"t th cllemy ill Russia in a ~rollnd 1'011'.

Lujiw{/ffi Crolllltl Service ill RlIssia, 1941-1942 \\'hcn till' GCrll1:ltl Army llloved across till' Polis! partitiolliine to alla,k the SO\ it,t Union. they wen accompanied b~ :l number of I.ufl\\:llli: ~rollnc :,u pport uni ts. .\i r lixcc NIlJr~~lIgabc little aeriallhre:lt to th(' Cerm:lll armies. ~illC(·thl I.uftll'afll' ckstroyt:d a large part of lhe Rlls~ia) fighter alld bomber li)!"!'l' on thc g-rollnd: but Ha units quickly became valuable ill the anti-Ian role. Luft\\anC batleries. panicubrl} tlIOS. t'quipped \\ ith the 1>0\\ I'rful 88 mill l1;un, pro\ed II 1)(: the bt'Sl defence at{ainst the Sm·iet '1'-34-. B\ 1913 t\\o I.ufl\\"ane flak corps and eight di\i"ion prO\'ided ~upport for Army unit~ in Rmsia. Flak \\'a~ 1I0t the ollly Lun\\afk dnl11.'nt ill \'ul\'ed inground combat ill the Ea~t. The Fallschir mjiigtr \ ctl'raliS of CrCIC coun tcn.'d Soviet :l tl:lck along the i\ewa River ncar I.t.·nill.t:'rad, \\herc thl Russians had crossed at Petru~hino and \\'} horbrska}a in the autumn of 19+1. The para

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Iwrs 01" the 7.Fliegndivisioll, under Cenllt-utll'lIlt Petel'ilel1. lI:)lIght ill this scclOr as antry :tIId. despite severe casualtie~. forced the u .... ian!> hack. This action marked the first com"lnll'nt of Genllan l)ar.lIroopers in tht' purely ntr~ role. \\ hich would soon O\ertake nomin· } airhorne units. A" the Germall~ dron' across Russia during I the Lurtwafl\.' e~tahlished airbasn. signal liorh, and supply posts in the rear arc;!. The lIlali oflcnsi\'e isolall·tJ tnany Suviet soldit'rs inti the lines, and llH's(' united with civilians to partisan groups 10 harass German lines 01" mUllication. The sllortage or regular troop~ to c the occupied ITl{ions of Russia forct'd the twalIe to form elllt'I):t'IICy units from airba'>C.~ lWei alld other rt'ar echelon dt'1Jlt'nLs to nd . \ir Vorce iIlsiallati(llis. 'l'heS(' .l/nrmri/lhrilm illitiall~ or~ani/Td ill late 19-P 011 an ad hf)( " , ami \\ere ('mployt'd throughout tilt' war mt partisan groups. 111(' SO\·iet coulltrrollcrlsin' in De('ernhn 19'P led an eXltTllldy dangerous situation in the t. III one of Ihe worst wintcrs on f"(TortJ the k of IU fresh SUvi('l armies, aimcd:ll iso[atillg y Croup Centre Ill'ar \Ioseo\\, fl'e:lled an l:Cliate C1·isi~. The Germans were furced back hat could easil) han' become a rotll ...illlilar to of )lapoleoll's Grande Armce ill 1812: hut I' rcfuMXf to allo\\ hi~ commancle~ 10 withalld instead ordt'n'd the ,\rm~ 10 st;lIId and ( in Russia wilh ·fan,ltical resist:lIIfc'. On 19 'lnllbcr Hitler asstllllt'cl fornmand, a nd directed all a\ailabte military units througholll Ger) and the occupied ('oUlltries be stnt to Ru~sia inforce the Army. the flghl inl{ COllt i11 ued a long I he !englll or the un From, tht' Luftwaffe struggled to ~urvi\"e. .ses were sno\\cd in, and aircraft engines to start in the 10 C tempel'ature. I'arljoint'ci Ihe struggle ;Ind stru,k isolated Air units and lines of communication throughthe comhat I.one. To make matters \\orse, the Soviet oflcnsin: ,Jltemp((~1 10 seil.c . \nn)" p Celltre's m:tin supply dqx)lS and airfields, brcaklhroug-h ofll1l..' Soviet SOlh ~\rm) in midbn Ileal' K,lluga threalened to c:tpture nov, all important logistical hase and the quarJ('rs or· jagdgcschwadn ., I ;Molders'.

Troops of. L..fc ....-a1Te field bactat.;on ",njoy;"! a bre.... from

cotd ...",ather, '94'"

\kchanics, pilot.... c()(lks. and olhn Lurtwalle ground pnsonlld. ill conjullClion with unit:. 01" 19.I':tnzer Di\·isioll and 5S infantry, managed to defend the town against the Rtlssiilll~. SQvict pressun' did Ilut ab,l1e artcr llit· illitial repulse at Yukhtlov. In early Janu,try 1!J.!.2 the Germans lOok Illt'"aSlIl'eS to strengthen lhl' ti'a~ile defellces of this imponant airba~e \\hcll Gencralmajor Eugen :\Ieindl arri\ed al Yukhnov to take command of the l'i~ht flank of L \'11 .\rmy Coq>s. \kindl brought \\ith him the hC
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IVleindJ's appearance at Yukhnov brought renewed vigour to the German defence. By 21 January he commanded a hodge-podge of Lul"t.walk, Army, and S5 troops which amounted to a weak division, dubbed 'LuftwaITe-Gruppe \kindl', :\kindl and his chief medical oflicer, Dr. Heinrich !\Ieumann, also took vigorous and imaginative steps to ensure the evacuation, by aircraft or truck, of hundreds of neglected German wounded from Yukhnov, [n addition to simply defending Yukhnov, tvlcindl needed to clear the Yukhnov-Gzhatsk road of Soviet troops and to keep tht: vital airfield and supply base open for German usc. He launched several local atlacks north of Yukhnov with his SS troop~ and Luftlande Sturmregimellt and, by 30 January, the path was clear for the evacuation of Dr, !\Icumann's patients. 'I'his, however, was only a temporary measure as the Soviet bn:akthrough between the German Fourth Army and Second Panzer Army threatened to cut the Smolcnsk-tvloseow highway and isolate Army Group CcntlT. The Russians surrounded a small German garrison at Sukhinichi, and Yukhnov once again hccamc a combal zone, LuftwalleGruppc tvleindl /i.lugln in the region nonh of YukllllOv wilh Army and police units through \'larch, whcn Gen, IVleindl and his sta/rassunlcd A patrol using the waterproof Zcltbahn cape as camouflage in the area ofStaraya Rw.".., '94'1.

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command of the newly lormed Lufiwatlcnli::ld regnnell1cr In Army Group North's sector tvleindl's departure closed the lJrsl chapler in th history of the Luftwatle field units. A number of other Luftwaflc units fought i Russia in late 19'P and early 1942. Luftwafli:n Feldbrigade Schlemrn, another emergency fin malion, operated in Army Group Centre. Like wi~e, Luftwaffe Lehr-lnfantrie-Regiment ·.\tlo~ bu' fought as a ballalion or lhe 6.lllbllteri Division ncar the Soviet capital.

Ti,e Ltljtwaj/e Field Regimellts Hitler's frantic search for reinli:ncements ill Dc ,nnher 1941 revealed thilt Gennany lacked avail ahle manpO\ver for total war; as late as Octobe 1941 Hitler had planned to partially demobiliz the \Vehrmacht following lhe successful conque:,t of Russia. To raise new divisions the Army scoured Germany and ()("("upied Europe for extra troop' and spare vehicles to replace the dreadful losses in Russia. The Luliwa/lc was also involved in this search. and personnel from all branchcs of the Luftwafl\' volllJ1l('cr('d for ground service in Russia during

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y 1942. Thcsl: Lufiwaflc rcpla("(.:nH~J1tS ;Issemin E.ast Prussia and, after hasty illl:-tntry ing cOllduCh:d by parau·oop inSlrtlctfll":'i, \\('rc cd into battalions and regimcnts and sent by bus or air to Rus.<;ia. Altogether, ~nel1 Lufe fidd regimcIlL.. -Ftldugimntlu dtr /,uflu.'oife der L\\.) l. 2. 3, .... 5, 14, and II wcre ized in the first two month.. oftht") car. Each cnt had a paper strength of fOllr hattalions cadi battalion had, in turn, three light panit,s and onc heavy company. The heavy tpanyoflicially included t 'l ~o mm ealillon and 88 mm dual·purpose guns. e field regirnl'llls rare!) sCI"\"(:d togt"ther as a body and were scattered throughout the wherever lhey wr.re needed. For imtance, R del' L\\. I arrived in Russia in midary and. after a short period ofanti·panisan • was heavily cng-ag:cd with sR.lnl:Ultcrie 'on in t!le Volkhov Pocket. FR del' Lw.'ll consolidated with FR del' LW.2) s("l"vccI with r Division :lIJd Jllll) (~Iol.) during: Oper. 'Bruckcnschlag', the rdief of DCIll).lllsk, :t n·held 'fortrcss' lhat had Iwcll Clit on'by thl' . ns since 9 Fcbruar). Six di"i!'iolls with men "erl' trapped in thc city and re!il·d t cxdusi\l'ly upon supplies brought in by 'arfc transport planes. Gcneralmaj()I' \\'alter ydlilz.Kurzbach comm:l1lckd tlw Germ:JIl force which wOllld infiltratc Soviet lille~ from ya Russa to the Loval Ri\"(T. UpOll reaching point, German lroop~ insidl' Oemyallsk \\ould OUIIO mCl·t the rclierforcc.

A ro:conna;ssanco: palrol of Di"is;on M",indl eh.,.,rf"Uy r",_ t"rns 10 camp, '9411, This photograph provides a glimp"" of th., nal, swampy terra; .. where the linl L"flwaffe r,eld r"'g;m",nt .. servc:d. Th""" men wear a mislure of unif"rm,. d ... ;~ned I" I .... ve.."'" th", muddy Sround and pr"v;de SOme prOle<;I.;On again ..l mosqn;l"""".

Se}dlitz IXl{an his .soo trOOI)';, and could only maintain his po~itiOIl "ith continual ;Iil" ~ltPIXlrt; til(" Luh"anc, 11()\\e,er. could barely "upply Kholm because of poor \\cather, terrihle landing cOllditions. demands for equipment d~l'\\ here on the front. anel l'tH'llly rcsist;]l1ce, Conditions imide Kholm quickly detcriorated in tlie Ihcl' ofll·l'I.:zillg: le11lp("r;1lI[n'~ and CIIOI'1ll011S So,·i\·t prc~slln·. Rcinforcelllcnt~ slowly ;uTi, cd 10 bn'ak the siege 011 II

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Members of9.FR der L",., (later JRtJoh,.L",FD) at a ruioo point ;n the spring of '942. The UBi, has been ;ssl1ed a var;ely of headgear, including the Hi"germiitze, EinhrJtsrcJdmiitzc, and tighl fiuing ",hile hoods to provide proteetion to the head and neek from extreme eold ",eather.

ofKholrn in the weeks following the isolation of the 1Own. lll./FR del' Lw. I under :\lajor Thorns arrived by train at SlaraYil Russil on the evening of 20 February 1942. Experiencing a Russian bornbardmenl for lhe firSltimc while ~till at the railway slalion, till' unit moved to Nagowo to protect the north-\veslenl 3pproaeh to StaraYd Russa. The battalion wa~ soon involved in combat, mostly through patrol encounters and coming under fire fi'01I1 Russian 'Stalin Organs'. Thc bittcrcold tore through the ill-equipped Luftwaffc troops. who lacked proper winter clothing; and the ballalion's g.Kompanie suffered heavy losses in its rir~t pitched fight with the Soviets. The heddquanns of FR der Lw. 1 was meanwhile st;1 up Ileal' Kholm to support thc drive to relieve the town and to protect the Kholrn-Staraya Russa 'roliballll' (highway) from partis;lllS. German dlorlS to libcrale Kholm f
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fi:ver, joined his starr at his new headquarters a Bory, south of :vlorilinza, in March. \'Vith he.l\ ft~hting along the entire front, Meindl W
e Rus."ian~ at the Lo\"at Ri,·cr. Division ~\'leindl 1lIld Ihe rcmnanl:. of 55 Oi\ ision 'Totcnkopr cr()S,',t'd the Rcd~a Ri\Tr and moved eastward. ~rcing: thc ~urrt"lIdcr of the Russians between thc hlo pinccrs by 10 OClOber.

The LttJiwttffi Field Divisiolls Evell as

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i\lcindl was mopping up Russian d 11 rillg: Opera tiOIl .\ Vi n kclrit'd', [he Luft'l alli> \I'as husy organizin~ ten com pi etc new divisions for ground scl....io· on the Easlt'rn Frolll. The hca\}' lo~ses of the win IeI' and funher losses incurred during the slImmt"rcamp;:lign ill wlIthern Ru:\.~ia forn'd Germany 10 slep up the ~carch for (((',h manpower. One W'llrral carned his nicknamc of 'l1ero Sliateher' ftH· his ruthless purging of sllppl~ dcpots and hospital arcas in Gennany for fil soldiers. Under Ihese.: cirnllllSIaIlCes. Goring was forced 10 either usc hi., surplus Air Force personnel or lo."e 111t:m to the _\rmy. Gi"cn his sense ofsclf· a~l{randi/.('lIlent, pridt: in his Lurtwalle, and jeal. ous~ for his rivals, Goring: rcfused 10 allow the translCr of Air Force pnsolllld to the t\l'rlly. His derision to liJl"11l his own divisions under ail' forCt' comman(lers was a g-n..' al mislake, althoug-h it had ~me basis in the ~alisfactory performance of Di\"ision :\I('indl. Goril1~ k~ued his ('all for \OIUlltl'Cl"S 10 SCITC ill Ul(" 11CII divisions 011 17 SeptemblT, to all officers from liClIIl'lIalll to colonel, without I'e~ard 10 brallch or prcvious dUlY. His appeal to enlisted mcn loll owed two days later and had the samc general nw~sage, Slating thai 'whoen-r voluntarily joins this corps has to do it \\ ith a strong hean and v.-llhout tll'llilalion. But if couragl' is sho\\ n in fX)mbat tilt' soldier (";:1Il expect special consider· atioll rcgardillg promotion and decoration: To owrMT the raising- of the Luftwallc field divisions G('II. j\lcindl relurned from Russi
was similarl) appointed as the firsl Inspector of Luftwarrc Field Di\·isiolls. ~lcindl set up his headquarters at Gross-Born training calllp in nonhcrn Germany when: 2., :~., 'h 5., and 6, LwFD wcrc nlrcady in the pr()("ess offonnation; 7" S., 9., and 10. LwFD assembled at Mielau training ramp in East Prussia, while I. LwFD org-allizcd at Staraya Russa on the Ru'\.~ian frolll from dements of Division t>.lcindl and FR del' Lw. 5. Oi\ ision :\lcindl. 110\\ ullder the commalld ofGel1cl'allclltnnlltJob Odebrechl, remained as previou."I} organized and \1 as Ilot given a nunH::l'ical designation until early J!..J.I3 wh('-11 it becamt' '21. LwFD. XIII. Fliegerkorps dil"Cch,d on 28 Sf>plem ber thaI '2 .• 3.. and 4. LwFD complelc trainitlg by 10 October \lhile lhe remaining di\i~ions (I" and 5" to 10. L\\ FD would han' unlil I l\ovemhcr, This bardy ga\e any of the division,., time to son out tlu:ir plau in the SLImmer of 1942: '[I look a longAn 1\1G34 crew of g.FR dcr 1._.• engag;ng enemy aircraft ;n earIY'!H 2 •

9

A patrol of ,.FR dcr Lw•• prcparH to move oul during me winter of '942-.0- They are well eq"ippcd wilh revusible winler ....iform" a.od fell boots. Mo..t w.,.,.r tight fiUin!; hoods under Ihe hood ofthe reversiblejad.d while Ihe palrolleader (on lefl) hn a f ...-..covered cap. The wearing of hood .. wa~ normally prohibited on the froot bec.u"'" it restricted hear_ ing and peripheral vision. Sevenl L_FD, ;nduding 3, and '3" later formed lOki eompan;e.. io '943 and '9.... 10 perform loogrange patrolling during the winter.

time unlil I found my unit. A~ I calllc rrom a IlI'avy comp:tny [ \\:ts assigned to an 88 rnm ~celion. But what horl'or~ l\ty comrade~ had 110 idea about weapons: ('\'en some of the officers didn't ... All these people were from diOerenl assignmentscooks. armourcrs. barbers. drivcl's, supply and adminstrativc clerks, also men from the stafrofthe Luftgaukommandos. Some of them immediately requcsted 10 he returned to their original units. :\ty commander told me "I")lease takc over the lraining on the machine gun. because I ha\'c no idea aboul il!" I was able 10 train forjustthrec da)~-Ihen we were shipped to Russia.' On 12 October Goring i~ued Basic Order f\ umber 3 which stipulated that the ntw Lufiwalle units be employed in Russia with 'only defensive missions on quiet fronts,' The Reichsmarschall also called on lhe Army to accepl the fldd divisions in a 'comradely' manner and to assist wilh lraining, particularly in close combat skills and support wcaporls. 'nle LuftwafTe divisiolls wcre supposed 10 be committed to combat as a sinKlc body and nOt be separated without the approval of Army headquaners. The divisions lcliulider the tactical command of the Army while in the fidd but remained under Lufl\\aOc control lor persollnel and adrnininstrati\"e purposes. The Gemlan air minister also cstablishcd four Luftwaflc ficld corps as the higher headquarters for the di\'isions in Russia. Each corps operated under the jurisdiction of the general air force headquar'0

tcrs in conjunction wilh various Army commands. Luftnotlc I supported Army CrOllI' North with the Ill.Luftwane Feldkorps, while Luftwallc Kommando Ost had the II.LuftwaOl: Fcldkorps in Army Group Centrc's sector. Luftflouc 4-, operatinK ill southern Russia, had t\\O field corps, the I and IV to work \\ ith Ann) Groups A and B. Each corps had its o\\n units-c.g. military police. pioneers, and signals. ctC.-l0 1'1'0\ ide further support to the field divisions under its command and to provide somc rear ilrea securit). Ct'neral del' Flie~er Schlemm, a \·eternn of LuftwalTe ground combat during the previous \dnter. was a~siglled to command Ihe 1I,l.wFK. Generallelilnanl Odebrcrht len his position as commander of" Division Meindl and assumed command orlhe Ill.LwFK in Army Group North. The COlllmander or the I.Luliwane Fcldkorps remains unknown; while Gellel'allelltnant Hol1~ malln comm:ltlded the IV.LwFK. The tables of organization and equipment for the Luftwafle units emphasized the limited role of the divisions as specified by Basic Order Number 3. The strength ofa field division was about half that of an Army infantry division. While mosl Army infantr) didsions in 1942 still had Ihree infantry regiments of three battalions each and a full artillery regiment, the Luftwa(ft; field division was givcn only four infanrr)' battalions. Each field battalion, in turn, had thret: rifle companies, one heavy infantry weapons company, a headquarters company, and a signal platoon. Each infantr) ('Jager') company was equipped with 20 machine pistols, eight light machine guns, 12 heavy machine guns, nine lighl mortars, and two heavy mOl'1ars. The field di\"isions received Ihe~IIG 34 and, as it became a\ailable. the new MG 42, both of which could be u~ in a light 01" heavy mode. Some field battalion.. iniliall~ uliliLed the MG [5, an aircraft machim- ~ncoO\ertt:d for infantry use. The heavy "eap... n campan) had 24 machine pistols, four Ii ht and cirllt heavy machine guns. three light m ,na ~ fOur 20mm Flak 38 guns which could br u<.ni tor I:J ,th air and ground targets_ The Luft", .. e 6dd dl\i -un also possessed an anti-tank battahon uh n .. o companies of nine 50 mm PaL rach and one company of nine captured Ru...,j3n - 6_ an guns. The mixed nak

ltalioll of lhe division had om: heavy ballery maintenance teams and vetcrinarians took care of 'th three 20 mill flak pieces and four 88 mm unit \'ehicles and animals. Each division was ns. The twO light batteries wcre each provided aUlhorized 616 wheeled or tracked vchicles, -th 12 20mm flak guns. The flak battalion, as a although few division:;, if any, cvcr rccci\oo this ok. had four 88 mill guns and 2] 20lllm anti- much or~anie transportation: most di\isions de- raft weapons as well as other small arms, pended on horses, mules, and the eHr-important chine pistols and light machille guns. Both lhe Rus:-.ian panjt wagoll. Likewisc. while Ihe firepower nLcr-jiigcr Abtcilllng and the Flak Abteilung of the Luftwaffe field division appeal'ed si~nificant d a headquarters staff and signal support. on pit per, it too wi\softcn reduced by shortages and TIll' artillery batt;tlion was the last substantial was ncver at full stl"('lIg-th. The Lllftwaflc field mbat element of the I ,1lftwatlC field division, and divi~ioll was better equated to the strcngth of an composition varied. 1,2,]. and B.LwFD were Army brigade. as showlI in a report oj" I .LwFD on -tially issued with two baueries of four 7j mm 28 October 19'~3. The division had an dlcctivc b KI5 guns. Thes(' mountain wcapons, of stn:ngth of 6.429 (lflkers, NCOs and enlisled h origin, could be t'asily broken down and men. \dlile the 'fighting' strength 01' the unit sported by horse or mule. The 1\\0 light lotalh:d onl} 2,779. Even with atlac!led I\rmy 'Ikry batteries of 3,4-.5,6,9, and lo.LwFD units and ~astcrn \·ohllltccrs. I. LwFD could only in'd six 105 mill r\cbclwerfer 4-0 mOrlars cacho IllllSll'r a combined dlt:cti\'e strength 01"8,000. e mortars could fin: smoke. chemiC;:11. or high losive ammunitiOll at a rate of eight to tell nd .. per minute \\ itb a lIlaxilllum range 01'6,800 s. Five Sturmgcst'lllitz 75 nun assault guns, on chassis of the PzKpfw II [ tank, completed the battery in the Lllftwalle Ficld Divisions. A adquarters battery provided staf1~ mcdical. lorobservalion, alllInUllitlon, and maintellan("t: :'!O soont'r had lhe fil'Sl ten field divisions comrt for the firillg haueries of the artillery ll1enn:d organization and trailling during autUllm nalion. 19t2 thall they were lln'ded in Russia. 5.LwFD The Luftwant' field di\'isions had a minimum of monxl in December from GroB-Born to its lIew ini:;trath'e or logistical support Ix'rsollnel. area ofoperations along the Kuban River ne;tr the er. medical, and supply companies formed Black Sea. I.L\\ FD continued to organize at lhe backbone of the division's rear echelon. while front near the cit} of :':ovgorod. just north of l.ake llimen, while Division l\fcindl operated south of the lake in the vicinity ofSlaraya Russa. 9.LwFD - , . .c~n" with Leul.nanl F..chll (M!!:bl r"ar) and Unl"rofT_ . Ku~l~r (Iefl frOnl) and two lioldi"rs ofg.FR dcr Lw.• in was also dispatched to figh I ill lhe sector of Army The ..nit b .. li d"coral"d l," quarlers wilh dried flow"r", a 101.h, ""l"ndar, and a Cern.lln pin_up pollll~r. Group North. 1I.LwFK, wilh 3 and 'I.LwFD, moved to lhe nilical region around Vitcbsk in Army Group Celltre. ~.LwFD similiarly trallsfcr+ rcd 10 thi~ Arm} command to serve with e1elllt'IIL~ of]. Fliegcrdivision. As (:~1Il be readily seell, the Field Divi~ions \\el'(' immediately scattered throughollt the Russian front with little regard lO Basic Order :':umber 3. The Soviet encirclement of the German Sixth Army and part of the Fourth Panzer Arm)' al Stalingrad in mid-November posed a great risk to the entirc southern half oft he Ct:rman frail I. Once again, Hitlel" ordered all German troops to remain steadt;l.~t and fight to the dealh. The Fuhrer

Tlte Eastern Frollt

"

Troops of 'I.Kompanic, 8.L....I'D at the front, <13 Deeenlher 194<1. (Pholo eourlesy ofWahcr Neuhaus via Georg Jagolski)

rcfiN~d to permit the evacuation of the Sixth Army and org'anized a relief expedition undcr the commartd of GCIlerallCldmarschall Fritz-Erich von Mansteill. The newly-arrived 7 and S.LwFD from l'vlielau \vere among the miscellaneous troops umJcr Mallsteill's new command, Army Group Don. Both were under the command of I.LwFK. alLllOugh they did not serve IOgethcr. 3.LwFO was destined to make the first effort to relieve thc Sixth Army at SLalingrad. With that city's isolation, 8. LwFD disembarked at .\Jorozovsk on 25 :\Iovember and moved as a unit through the town ofNizhne Chirskaya. \-Vilh thc dnti-lank battalion in advance, 8.LwFD marched across the snow-swept steppes towards Stalingrad. Unfamiliar with the terrain, the division had little intelligence regarding the extent of the Russian breakthough. Expecting to find n;· treating German troops, 8.LwFD ran he,ldlong into the Soviet pincers and was scallered in a mailer of hours. The division established a collection point at Nizhne Chirskaya ncar the confluence of the Don and Chir rivers. where the survivors orthe bloody battle gathered. \Vhen only 12 men returned from the advance elements of the di visioll, the com mander of the division's all ti- ta n k battaliotl committed suicide. 7.LwFD deployed to serve as a part of Operation '\Vintergewitter' with X LV 111. Pan".crkorps. The corps tried to relieve St;dingr;ld, but failed due to lack of resources and Hitler's own obstinancy. \'Vith the news of the disasters which crippled 7 and 8.LwFD, the German Army high command ordered ~ilanstein to utilize the divisions in purely defensive capacities. ~·ranstein, in turn, consolidated both divisions with Army units. 7.LwFD fought most of the winter campaign with

336.11J while R.LwFIJ served Wilh 294.11J. i\rl1l~ Croup 1J0ll, with ib subordinate i\rmeeabteilung llollidt, was soon (orced to light (or its OWI1 sUI'\·ivaL and Stalitl,l{rad was len to ils (ate. On the same day as S.LwFD marched into the trap lIear i'\izhne Chirskaya. 2.Lw FD was crushed hy a 1l1as~ive Soviet o(]ensive ol"six armies against the Cermall :\Iinth Army in the Rzhev salient. Once again, heavy snows combined with strong Irotltal attacks and partisan raids crippled thl' uovice 2.LwFIJ at the town ofBclvy. The German, quickly rallied with rt:ln(orcements of veteran units, including Panzer Grenadier Division 'Gro~sdeutschlancr. ;\nd the threat to Arm: Croup Centre diminished by mid-December. Much of the blame for the initial dcb;lclc at Bcl\') was placed on 2.LwFD. which, no doubt, wa, totally unsuited lor its new role. The division W,l" soon removed from the salient and transferred to II.LwFK at Vitebsk. At the beginning of 19+3 the Luf1\\'a/k ficld divisions and corps were posted throughout tIl(' Eastern Front and already heavily engaged against the Soviets. FOll r divisions were COt1l1ll i(ted to Army Group North, which remained mostl) quiet with the exception offighting around Leningrad. 9 and lo.LwFD, under III.LwFK, Wt'l'l' assigned the task of maintaining a defensive watch 011 the Soviet troops isolated at OranienbaUIll. along the Gulf of Finland. I.LwFD continued to light at Novgorod, a critical rail junction andthr bulwark of the southern flank of the German Eighteenth Army. '21.LwFD, the former Division .vleindl, likewise defended the southern approadl to Staraya Russa. This division covered (he withdrawal of German troops from the Demyansk pocket between late February and mid·ivlarch. Behind the frontlincsof'2!.LwFD a Kamf!fgrufl/ie 01" regimental strcn~th under Oberstleulnanl Neudorffer bauled panisans. By early spring 12 and 13.L\\ FD arri\oo in Army Croup North and took up positions ncar the central portion of thl' Eighteenth Arm\'s sector around Lcningrad. lLLwFK, no\\ composed of 2, 3, 4, and 6.L\\ FD, \\erc the only air force ground unib serving with Army Group Centre. The corps held the German lint' in the \'icinity of Vitebsk and Nevel, a r~ion hca\'ily infcsted with Russian partisans. In lat(' February the LlIftwanc lroop~

nducted a JOInt operation with Army security it~ to climinatt· thc partisan stronghold at 7h Rayon. \\hidl 101) betwecnth<.' frOllt line of Third Pan7cr ,\rnl) and thc supply ('('litre at b~k. Opcr;uioll 'Ku~dblitz" \\;1', moderatel) ("<~li.ll, claiming the li\es ofsolllt' 3,joo I}arlm by early .\Iarch; but it also rt'vcaled the cn~e dilliculti<.':- that regular German units in actually t'llgag:ing gucrrillas in open bal. The partisam gCllcrally avoided dashing lh tllC air forCl' alLd Army units and disappeared the wooded landscape. The situiltioll cOlllinlled to look grim for the Di\'isiom in <;t)uthcrtl Russia dUl'illg the first Kith" of 19B. j and 8.LwFD had been effecy destroyed durill):t the ChiI' RinT fighting in 19F and rarly 1913 wilh their rcmnants rbed Iw the Army. This left ollly t\\O Lufde di\i~ions ~till ~er\ing in either ,\nlly Group or Army Group .\. Th<.' surr('ndc!" of the nnan Sixth Arm) at Stalingrad illlatc.Janllary iuec! the Sovi(,ts to \lIrtl their full allcl11ion 10 destnH.'tion or i\lan:-tein's troop:-. B) midruary \·Jansteill withdrew 10 tlll' MillS RiVeT , which shortetl('d his front ami w'rlllitted him utilise his arlllour(,d units 10 r<.'takt· Kharko\' close the So\'it,t \\ inter offensi\t,. The lH'wly-lormed 15.LwFO took up a position ~ til(' i\lius Riwr li·ollt in early 1913. This :isioll. also kno" 11 ,1'1 Oi\ i...ion Sodost. wa:nil.t'd at the front from .\ir Force pt.'NOIllWI ~dy '-tationed in ')(llIthern Russia and from n,lIlts of 7,L\\ FD. To command thl' lIe\\ ;isi()11 Gelleralll'lllll
M.,mb.,rs "fth., same comp"ny ,," "bove in a Ru""i ...n villag.., 15 December '942, (l'holO courtesy of Walt .. r Neuhaus vi.. GeorgJ"5"lski)

,\rmy, hdd a dimini:-hill).{ front along the Kuban Ri\cI" \\ hich shrank daily. 5.LwFO su/lercd heavy Itl"s(":- throughoul this \\ ithdrawal. The Field Division Controversy TIlt' high casllah} rates and poor performance of till" Fidd Di\·ision.~ during the first months of ('omhat service fon·ed both Luftwalle and Army authorities 10 qUl'!ition their combat value. The Army remained lllH'OJLvillCCcl thai they served any guod purpose at all, and considered these units a waste of personnel alld equipment. At least two major I\rm) figurl'~, Generalfcldmarschall .\'Ianstein and General del' Inr:'lnterie Waher \\'arlimOllt ur ,\rmy headquarters. had oppo~cd the formation of the di\'isions from lhe beginning bllt \\l're o\crrulcd by Ilitlt'r. The fact that Ihe Ol'g"ani/ation ofllw Luft\\affe units postponed the refittillA' of four or fi\e panl.er di\'i~ioll:- \\ith new \ dlide~ also \'exed .\rmy Icaders. Their frustration spread among the 100\i'r Army ranks, \dlO 'abelled the air li)fU' units "LufiwaIlCII-FehlkOllstruktions[)ivi~i()l1en'-'mistakellly constructed air force divi~i(Jtls'.

The !1lembers of the new Luftwaffe fidd unilS .wllcl'ed from low esteem. Thrown into combat without proper training or leadership. the} could Irul) remark that 'they \\'('I'e neither Oiers nor wldicrs'. The Luft\\allc di\'isions \\ere complctely unprepared for the shock of combat in Russia or I(w the rigours orib dima te. Despit<.' this u nsucecssful haptism of fir<.', ho\\c\er. se\Tr;d Luft\\aflc o/licer~ hoped to rectif) the probkm or thc field divi:-ions during the spring' and summer of 1943. Gt'lieralielltlliJlIt i\kindl \\ rotc a Icng:thy report in !llny I!J43 in which he noted the difficulties lhat

,3

(he units had experienced. The commander of X [ [I. Flicgcrkorps, which over~aw tllc organiz. aliOl1 oflhe divisions, was gravel) concerned about bOlh replacements for his divisions and the soldie~' morale. ~lcindl demonstrated that lhe original purpose of the divisions-to briefly rclie"e worn-out Army unils so as to ..lim, them 10 recuperate and then rcturn to combat-had clear!) not ocen carried out. Luflwallc divisions were IlOW responsible for sectors normally covered by regular Ann} infalllr) divh,ion:-, though wilh fewer personnel or resources, ~h'indl recognized lhat mOSI members of lhe field divisions wcrc youllg volunteers who originally joined the Luflwafle 10 scrv<.' as pilots or parntroopers. If the.<;<· InCIl felt thilt they were merely sacrificial pawns, i'.'lcilldl foresaw that they would soon leave tht' Luftwafle and transler to the \V;tll(;n SS, Army Panzcr units, or Navy. t\'1<'indl proposcd 10 wnven the Luftwalle tidd divisions illlo 'Lufllande' or 'Sturm' divi:-ion:-, to work with I")anzer units 10 surprise the enemy and accomplish the breakthrough of German forces.

\Vith regular replacemenls and thorough trainilll! four to five LuflWafle field divisions could form 1\\ assault divisions, serving in both airbornc an glider as~aull roles. :'\'Ieindl fclt that 1Ilis \\ould he do. more effeclive use of Luftwaffe pcrsollnel and lhat the assault divisions would become a valuanl offensive 1001. His idea was supported by Ceneralmajor Hermann Ramcke, the paratroop commander of z.I~D in France. Ramcke \\anted l{j build up Germany's airbomc cap;l!>ilitics, and th~ field divisions were an ob,"ious source of manpo\\er, The InsptTlOr of Lufl\\ nne Ficld Division'_ Genernl der Fliegel' Petersen, wanted to consolidalC the ';,!z field divisions into 15 and fill up the remaining units wiLlI surplus personnel. Peterscn felt that with minimal losses and fresh replacements the lise ofthesc divisions as !vleindl wanted could wail ulltil the spring of 194+ The fulure of lhe Lu/iwaffe field unils was a much discusscd issue during lhe summer of t943 among lhe Luti-walle's highest commanders. Celll'raloberSI Ilans.Jeschonnek, lhe Luftwalle chiefof stall~ brought up :'\Ieindl"s proposal to Goring jusl prior 10 Jeschonnek's suicide. The chief of slaff approved of the idea 01" establishing the ne\\ Lurliande/Sturm divisions bcC.IUSC he \\anted 10 keep air force personnel in the rank:. of the Luft\\aOc: hedid not \\ant to transfer these units 10 the Army, \\ here the 'cxcellent manpo\\ er' of the fidd divisions would be dissipated, He, too, worried about the erreet on morale of Luftwalk personnel if they were forced from the scrvice for which they had originally volunteered. Goring Slated to Jeschonnck in late .June that hc would think about the Luftwaffe field divisions and raise the topic with Hiller. [n latc September Erhard Milch, the Commi.nioned by ~n.,ral.tnajor M.,i"dl and dr,ul.,d b}' Gdre;ler Schroder or TV.FR d.,r Lw.l, .,...:h dement or th., plaque had l'J>ft'ial "ymbolism. The Ihidd wall baU'd 0" a lllth-e:UlI"ry God"., dcaip while tbe diving cagle r"pns.,n_ ted botb the Lul"twafTe origins or Ihe diviston and th., b.d'gT-...d of il nrig"'''''! m.,m ....r., moedy paral.rooPf'rs, The mo.adgrao.ade carriltd by the eagle denotltd the division's rille all iaf. .try, n.. building at tbe lower portinn of dle lihi.,kl was droc Itd domCII or Ihe .,hurch OIl Druiao, _drown-I of Stano) Ru"sa. when the divi..io.. had ils h.,.dqu.an"", ia ltfL ~ divi"i_a1 pc....... 1 and aa oakl,..,u du"IU i" ..,..,. al doe lop or tb., "hi.,ld. The ;n..-cription rf'1lds
,I

Two m",mbers or 3.Sturmg"(:hiit~Ball",ri"" 5-Lw.'1), ........ary 19-13. Ob.erl"'utnant WolIlIlanlll Bach, banuy CODI' .-aftdu (I",rl), and H ptw.chtm"';~t"'r H",rman Christ rif!:ht) wear the new)y.i ed Luftw.ffe splinter camouflage _ocl<. They "'th have Toteokopf in ..illlnia pinooo 00 the

collan of the Fli"'8",rbJuse d 0" the lell collar of Bach's camouRa!!e "mock. Ob.erl..ut t Bach hall pink p;ping .... the c..lIar ..f d .., flying jacket and wea.1"S • dvwan lIw"""ter, a popular, ;c u ..authorilr.ed, .. rtic1e .. r c1othiu!: on the Eastern Fro.. t. (Wolf!:l"'g Bach)

LurtwalTe's chid of air supply, affirmcd that date of I November 1913. While thc generals XI.Ftiegcrkorps (the headquarters for the para- argued. renewed Sovict allacks in the summer and uoop divisions in Fraru:l') could draw on pen;onncl autumn of 19'~3 on(;e again demonstrated the &om the Lufl\vallc fidd divisions for replacemcnts. ovcrall dcficiencies of these divisions. The German ~ filch staled that it wa~ 'desirable' thaI all fidd failure at Kursk during Operation 'Zitadelle' in divisions eventually regroup into Lufrlande divi- July (in which no Luftwallc fidd divisions were ·OIlS. He further nut/xl that a proposal had been involved) g;lVC the Russians the psychological made 10 dissolve five divisions and In strengthen edge to lake the offensive, and they aimed al the n::mailling-lormatiolls to 12.000 men (:aI;1I. Any destroying Army Group Sou1h. The Russians decision to convert all Ilcld divisions inlO other smashed across the l'vliliS River line on 17 July, Luftwa(Jc org-aniz
'5

received their Christmas I!.H2 gifts in tvlay 1943, and were issued their first ralions of German beer in ten months. Seven oJncers from one regiment of '5.LwFD were relieved from duty during this quiet period, their nerves shallered from dw hard fighting during the winter. The division was overstretched ;.Ind lacked secondary fighting positions when the Soviets strud in July. II. Kompanie of Jiigcr Regimenl 29 for example, held a front of 1.500 metres with only 91 mCIl, armed with nine .\'IGI5s, four .\1G42S, one heavy and three light mortars, and one 20 rnm flak cannon. The German line swayed durill~ lhe flrst days of the fighting in July, amI the bailie see-sawed into early August. The Sixth Army restored the main line of resistance along the :dius River by mid-August, but at great 'ost. The Russians ~oon recovered and nearly Irapped 15.LwFO and its corps at the mouth oflhe river ncar Taganrog on 29 August. The division managed 10 break out and \vithdrew with the main army to lite Onepr River, The survivors of 15.LwFO werc siphoned off by Army units, and Ihc division essentially ceased to exisl after Seplemher 1943. A similar fatc heidI 5.LwFIJ of Army Group.'\. After evacuating Ihe Kuban bridgchead the diviA group ofLuftwaff", offic",rs w",ar a variNy of caps. NOle that four orth", ......n do not have ranks on ,he collar although th",y do have piping.

sion struggled at Kertch in the Crimea. "1'1 divisioll thell joined the Sixth Army on the ~og( Stcppe in October, where the division's st; consolidaled with the staff of the remnants 15.LwFD. 'j'he Soviet attack in late October sliCi through lhe Sixth Army and isolatcd the Crime< peninsula. Although units of 5.LwFD lingel"l until the spring of I944 as a Kamplgruppe, tl hean 01" lite division was destroyed in the fall

1943· The grcalesl disasler 10 the Lul'twaflt· ftc divisions occurred in the sector of Il.LwFK nc Vitebsk. The Russians exploited lhe weak boun ary between the Army Groups ~orth
The Army Ttzl'es Over

The condition of the Luftwaflc field divisio varied greatly at the time of the Army's assum tion of responsibility in November 1943. Divisi( strength reflected unreplaced losses li'om comb and other causes. 3.LwFD, for example, hadS,S; officers, men, and Russian volullteers (hlWIJ) on

,6

,-\

,n

y g n

y

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December; 6.LwFD, in the same general area arotllld Vitebsk, rqX>rt(·d 7.475 soldiers and sup· rt personnel. II.LwFD, in Greece 011 occu· tion duty, had a total strength of over 10.000 lroOp~, 1101 includill~ altached units or oonlIlilitary personnel. 21.L" FD ",LS the strollgest rmation at this time. with nearly 16,000 officers d men; the division had absorbed InClllbers of 2.L\\ FD whcll it did>:\nded in early 19-1-3 prior to IS full aeti\'atiotl. 21.LwFD in fat·t ktd two tillery
ront.

'" pm

a'

The Army instituted a number of alterations en it took control. \ 'iTlually c\'ery officer in the tire chain of command of each Luft\\afTe field -isioll was replaced by an Army officcr. The ~ redesignated the formations as 'Field Di\'i· ns Lllftwaflc)' and gave thcm Army post officc mbcrs. 1\lost importantly, beginning in Novem·

Oberh,utnanl Karl s",ibod, C(lmDu.nd~r of ... rR drr Lw.,. of,. •.L ..·rO),;s see" ...itb tb~ Luflwaffe T .. cbroclr. Hi.. deconlll.iollS ind.. de Ibe army lnfalur.rie St.. rmab"eicbea, th~ I.ron Cross ...l ....d lind CJa55 (IJ.., Lauer is "'om a5 a ribbon ..';!..h Ib" War Meril Cl"O!ts), and !..he SA Sport MoecLal. s",ibod b .... rille &ree<> collar lab.. as ,.pr.cified in January 'M3 for membr.n. of L...rO .hhou!b h., ,.till ret.ins lh., army inf.ntry ...lIIa"'l bad!~ ....ic. wall suppo~ 10 be I..rned in by Air forec m~mbr..... wh~ .. Ih., Luftwaff., i"sliluled its own Gro....d c..... b.1 B.dg~ in March '!H2;. {Ial~r JR.t.

bcr 19-1-3 and continuing throug:h the summer of 19-1-4. lhe field divisiolls wcre reorganized as Army divisions under thc new 1944 infanlry division establish ment. The new field divi~ioll now had lhrt'(' Jager regiments of two battalions. each battalion Ilaving a headquarters compan). three rifle companies. and one hea\'y weapons company. The Jager regiment. likcwise. had a headquarters coml>an}, a 13.Kompanie with infalllry assault guns, and a I {.. allli-lank' Kompanie. The Army reorganized the artillery regimellts of the field divisions into three light battaliom of three baucries (still variousl)' l'qllippcd with 75 llllll or 105 mm g:un:-c.) and olle heavy artillery battalion. Each fidd division

'7

It. ~tio .. of Artill ...ri ... R~irn"'''l 22 1~ia5 al falliusbofit ...1 iu feb....a..,· '943' Weario! th ... Zdtbaltn a .... outer «...... e.lt. this ,,",w op'"-'rat..... 7smm Palo 97/j8-a f~eh 7.S<:m mod ...1 '8975"" Dllodified with the carrias... of the Ge........ SClTl Pa" ,a. Thi.. weapotl formed the backho..e or the artiUery ror mo.t LwFD.

was supposed to have a flak baltalion which, for the mQst part, was never organized. The anti-tank battalion contained three companies while the Sturmgeschiitz battery expanded into a separate battalion. The Army also formed a reconnaissance battaJion for the field division, later renamed as a Fusilier Battalion; this unit had the same general organization as a Jager battalion. Similarly, lhe new field division had both a pioneer and a signal battalion, and some divisions gained a field replacmcnt battalion. The Army intended to sl
enlisted men had a discouraging effect on the moralc of the troops that remained with thc Arm\ An example of the disruption caused by the Army's takeover in :"Jovcmber 1943 can be seen in I t.FD{L) on occupation duty in Crecce. The division lost not only its anti-aircraft anillcr~ batlalion, but also over 700 officers and men who left the division as volunteers for paratroop servi{·c. Another 4oo-odd men rcmaincd undcr Air Forre control because of lhcir specialised training. Aggravating these losses was thc addition of 1,250 new recruilS. mostly men of older age catcgorit~ with littlc training. The replacement of Luftwaffe enli..'itcd mcn and officers, from company grade up to divisional commander, with Army personnel also crcated confusion in terms of administrati\'e and trallllllg procedures. Thc situation III II .FD(L) was repeated in the otber field division<, reorKallized along Army lines during Ihe winter of 194T 1,3,4,5,6,9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, IR. 19,20, and 21.FO(L). The decision to transfer the field divisions abo impacted on the Luftwaffe field corps. II.LwFl\. transferred from Army Croup Centre to Italy ill late 1943, where it consolidated \\ith I.FJl\.. III.L" FK conHned into 11.Flak Corps; while IV_L\\FK moved to France, where it acted as the control group for ~\"eral fidd divisions. The corps thcn commanded .\rmy unilS in soulhern france at the time of the .\mencan invasion in August 1944 until it consolidated with an Army corps al tbe end of the )ear.

Har ill Tlte f{fst

kow, a former Army divi~ioll commander in Russia, assumed COll'1n'l;llld 01" J8.FO(L) in February t944; hi~ divisiotl manlH·d a delt'lIsivl" I"ront The LuftwafTe fidel divi~iollS stationed in western that stretched from DUll kirk JO Calai~. Europe did not sec COllI bat ulltil mid- J 944. Unlike During spring '9-1-4 tllc Luliwaflc fidd divi.sions lheir sister units in Russia, tIl(; divisions in Bel- in the west were still adjusling lo dIe demands gium, Denmark, France, Holland, and i\orway imposed by the Army's tak<;-Qvcr. Army officers had time loorganizc and train. although lilt.:}' were now filled about hall"lll<; slots in tllc divisions, with hindered by similar problems of obsolete equip- lhe most imporlant rom bat dutit."S under Army mCllt. lack of transponiltioll, inexperienced per- domain. The divisions also formed new units as IOllncl and poor training. The Army stripped the specified by the new Army tabks of organizalion dhisions of motorized \'('lIides, and they sen-eel and equipment. 16.FD(L), for cxample, made a primarily as Sialic lIllilS wilh a defellSive mission of new rine reRiment,.J R46. by laking one battalion rrpclling Allied seaborne and airborne assaults. eachfromJR31 and 32. Ijand 18.FD(L) followed Because of this task the LunwafTe soldiers Spelll suit and formt..-d a lhird rCl{iment. JR47 and ,~8 most of their time constructing fortifications, respectively. Thc divisions also had to organise -hieh limiled the al1l01llH of time available for ncw fusilicr battalions and ass..'lult gUll battalions U"allung. {mostly of battery strcngth), which wcrc nOI ready In June '944 five Lurtwafle field divisions for service until the sum Iller of 1944. Thc lack of manned the Allantic Wall to meet the expected tran..<;ponation \\a5 a critical worry for divisional Allied invasion of \\cstcrn Europe. 14.FD(L commanders ill the light of AlIi<..-d air superiority. cupicd thc northcrnmost rcgion of the German As late asJuly. 18.FD(L) had only onc fully mobilc fences in Trondheim. l\or\\ a). After the Nor- unit. the anti-tank battalion, and the division was mandy invasion the division shiftcd to Jutland forced 10 requisition 2,500 horst.os when ordercd to here it rcmained until the end of the war when it the inv3.<;ion front. turned to i'\orway. Thc unit surrendered in Division commanders encountcred C\'cn greater _-oma) to British and NOf\\'cgian forces without problems in maintaining unit strength and in~ battle. tg.FD(L), soon to depart for Italy, coherence. 16.FD(L) 10SI 2,000 men who rcstationcd at Thiclt, Belgium; and 16.FD(L) mained with the Air Force after the Army took d a portion of thc Dutch coast between eonlrol of the field divisiolls; this leh thc division Tymuidcll and Harlem. J j.FD(L), commanded Army Gelleralleutnalll Hans Hocker. defended Sta11' offie.,n or a Lurlwa11'., fidd b.. u.tioD. The majority of offie.,rs in th., LwFD w.,n Air Fore., pcuonnd until Ih.. French coastline from Dieppc to Le Havre; the divisions tr..n"rerr",d 10 Army control in Nov.,mber '943' 'vision was not responsible for the control of This group photograph sbow. only oDe arm.y officer .ssigned as an adviscr while the Air Jo'orce officers wear a m.iJItur.. of ·ther town. GcncralleutnantJoachim von Trcsc- Oying blouses and " .. rvic", jackllU.

'9

with only 60 per cent of its normal complement; and while it received some replacements-mostly troops ofVolksdeutsche extraction-their training was incomplete and their devotion 10 duty suspect. The averagc age of divisional personnel was ;lround 30, and the commanding general noted that 'the levcl of their training was sufficient for defensive and other minor missions. Being without combat expericnce and nOt motorized, the division was not equal to an enemy with superiority in maTeria!.' I i.FO(L) also gained new troops in the form of two ballalions of former SovieT prisoners of war who volunteered for duty in the \'Vehrmacht. One unit, J\"ordkaukasisehe Bataillon 835 from the Caucasus region, became r I r.OR::)4; the battalion did not serve exclusively with t 7.FO(L) as it also acted under the operational control of Army units

An Oberleutnant con1lnanding a bauer), of AR'l'l in Ru,.shl, '94:). This regiment, organized as part of 'l'l.Lwm, became part of'lI.Lwl'D when the deci,.ion was m.ade;n early '943 not 10 raise the 'l2.LwFD. This officer previously served;n the Oak artillery as he was awarded the Luftwaffe Flak War Badge.

in the Le Havre area. A second foreign battalioll served in t 7. FO(L) under the command of Hauptmann Keilig, a German officer; this unit assigned as the third battalion of the division·1j artillery regiment. These two Eastern units added: to the paper strength of the division but we~ untested in battle and German officers were uncertain as to their overall reliability. Throughout the first half of t944 the field divisions busily prepared defences along the coastline to meet the Allied attack. The work of I 7.FO(L) was typical of the units stationed along the Atlantic \Vall. The division had a threefold mission: to defeat an enemy invasion from the sea prior 10 landing; to defeat the enemy during landing operations; and fmaJly to drive off an~ encmy troops that managed 10 land. The division had a secondary task to move the entire division or portions of it within ,~S hours to reinforce the German line elsewhere in case of emergency. The Army's 346. I 0 acted in direct support of t 7.FO~ L to defeat a sea atlack or airborne landings. The two divisions cmplaced some 250,000 camouflaged stakes with barbed wirc in likely airdrop zones behind the coaSt, while I i.FO(L) erected similar barricrs on the beaches. The division also eonstrucled numerous bunkers and pillboxes along the coast, although the armamcnt of these posts was ofien inadequate. The division's main line ofdefcllee consisted ofa coastline of steep clilTh interspersed with small harbours. The defensive positions were conSlructed to cover these harbours, while fcw works were built along the ridges because of the lack of time or resources. .Minefields, ami-tank ditches, and barbed wire elllanglemems were scattered throughout Ihe division's seelor. Thc rear area of the division had been nooded 10 prevent air drops, and this seclor was covered by Army u"its and rear echelon lroOps of I i.FO(L). Machine gun nests and emplaced ami-tank positions were also located throughout the main line of defence and in lhe secondary zone. The depth of the main dcrcnsive positions extended about 4 to 5 kill behind the coast- Each strongpoint had enough rations to hold for Jodays. The various units could eommunicale \"ia radio and wire; land transportation was limited to lhe night-time because of the threat orAmeri ·an and British fighter-bombers.

\\1

The Normandy Campaign 17.FD:L) wellt La alert status in the C;lrly hours of 6Jurw as reports arrived in Le I-Iavl'c of large air (ormations in the Kormanely area. The Germims imnll'c1iaLcJy sllspecleelthat Le I-Iavre was it target, and 17.FD(L) llIoved illlo baLtic positions, The first Lllliwalic field eli vision 10 meet Ihe enemy, ho\\e"el". was the 16.FD(L). which mo"ed by rail &om J-Iullallello Paris in mid-June \\ithout 10.'1501' ddil) by Allied bombing" The division replaced part 01'21, Pan'l.cr Division along the Orne Riwr to nMth of Caen" The British and Canadian dfon~ to sei."e Caen bogged do\\ n in the first week July in the face of tough German opposition. The .\!Iie'! planned to smash the Cenn;ltls with a CDfnbitled artillery and aerial bombardmcnt. 1'01\\(,<1 b) an inl~lIltry and armour as.-.;lllit. The h began on the aftcmoon 01'7 Jul), \\ hcn shells III a British \\ arship from n range 01'2.').000 yards struck Point 6+, a hiflthat conlrolkd the ~enor of ,FD(L}. Lnler that evening 450 bombers ppcd 2,300 tons of high c.xplo~ive on the Tmarl ddcllCl'S ncar CaCIl, a1ld al II p.m. illery rrum two British corps 0IH:lIt'd fire. The shelling cOll1illued until dlt' mornillg when British 3rd and 59th Oivisiutl'! launched Lhe ult against 16.FD(I.), Within :"ltl hour Lhe 'ti,h had achin"Cd their ohjeniw of capturing biz.c) and Herouville, and COntinued the attack ards Point 6+ and Cacn. The British laced little position from till' Air Force ground troops of .FD L 'I, and by" the en'ning ofgJ ul~ the enetll~ ..eil.l.. .d Point 6"~ and c1ean..d the French city" e bombardment and l'nemy attacks lefi. .FD L) '"inuall)" destroyed; every battalion mandl'r had been killed, alld Lhe di\ ision as a

me

A baU~ry of ARlI2 lined up (0 .,ondu.,1 a road m.ar.,h in Mar.,h '9013' Th~ difT~r.,nl type.. of"",hiclCl; ~mployed by a motorized Luflwdr", lIrliU",ry un;1 can bf, .. ~~n in Ih.i!il pholograph.

whole kIst 75 percent of its strength in rhe few days offightillg. The remnants orlhe division retreated across Ihe Onll: River and ellcalnpcd with 21. PD. The division had a momentary rest aner the dt"b;kle at Caen, while the survivors regrouped and rdiued, On 18Jul~ the British continued their altcmpt to dear Ihe Caen area with Operation 'COO(hH)Oll'" Once again, the sector of ,6.FDfL) lay ill the middle 01" the target 'I.0I1l' designated for the .\!lied bombers and fighter-bombers. The aerial a'>.'>ault and artillery/naval gun fin' pron'l'
or

21

Thi" Leutnant of 21.LwFD has earned the Iron Cross 2nd Class and the SA Spor! Medal. He uses slip-on tabs to conceal the r .."k on the shoulder straps.

artillery regiment, at the last moment, was i~sucd with old \Vorld \Var One era 150 mm guns wilh which it had no prior training. 17. FD(L) arrived in line of battle on 17 August along the Eure River ncar Dreux, which had already been seized by Amcrican forces. The division was responsible Ii)!" a sector of 70 km with only two-thirds 01" its nonnal strength and few supporting units. The Amcrican drive from Drcux towards the Seinc threatened to cut orf 17.FD(L), and on 20 August the entire division was forced back towards Evreux. This proved short-lived, as the Americans seized the division's command post and shattered contact with higher he
units. By 25 August the division fell back to Louviers, Ileal' the junction of the Eure and Seine rivers. To remain lighting belmv the Seine
.\rnericans north-east ol"J'\'lantes and momentarily halted thelll. I-!cavy fighling drew in the rest urthe didsion. causing losses o\'er the next several days, rhe di\ isioll continued to allack and succeeded in recapturing somc territor~, although this len the di\'ision (:xhaustoo b~ '25 August. That S'-UllC da~ the division rell under the command or I.SS PalMcrkoqx, which pro\"ided some bacU) ·ncedcd reinrorccmCllL'\ in the rorm of units of I ].FD L) from the L(' I-lane garrison. The pressure of the enemy did not le~ell and on 1] .\ugust the division prepared to retire. but this \\as upset by an American attack which split 18.FD;L) from its flanking didsioll. To alleviate the pn.'~ure on the right AankJR48 launched an attack Wilh the support of armour that lIlorning. .\Il'cling initially wilh IXlnial succes~, lbe troops sulk red up lo 50 per cent casu:lll ies, which halted Ih(' drive. The division received all order 10 \\ithdraw lowards Rouell, but SOllle unils.JRs48 in parti<'ular, \\ere unable to discll~nge readily. During the withdrawal Gencralleutllant \'011 Tre'\<"ko\\ formed Ihree combat commands" ithin the di\'i~ion: Kampfgruppe Schmidt JR3S, Kampfi;Tuppe ~Iangold JR.J.8 and Kampf~rllpP(,' Koppel UR33 from 17.FD1 L . 'rhe remnants ofJ R36 \\ ere gi\'en to thcsc groul>S. and the 3nillcr) divided to suppon each l;roull equall~. The retreal of 18.FD U wns conducted in an orderly manner in the directioll or Bcall\ais. The .\nlt"ricans. howc\Tr. wen· not lar behind. and stflu'kJR 18 \\ith a penetrating armOllr attack on 30 .\ugusl. TIll' commander or the regiment was captured, and throughout the following day the Americans shifted around Beauvais. The speed of ..-\mniC;ln movement could nOI be matched by the low-moving columllS ofhurscdl'awn artillery and upply wagons or the IB.FD(L), which were alwap exposed 10 the tcrrifying attacks of 'jabos', The di\ ision moved on J Septcmber to take up a nc\\ position along the Somme Canal :\1 Ham, in rnt· \ jcinit)' of St. Quentin. This \\ as a brief halt, nd lhe di\"ision mon.-d again on l September \\ard~ Cambrai. By now the fOl'1l1ation had an lual strength ofkss than t\\o baltalions, and the dh'i"ional commander re-fonnoo the remn;llllS 10 1\\0 Kampfgruppen (Schmidt and Behrcnsi. .\t this point in early September the rapidly pproaching Americans ran into a gro\\ ing clusler

F",ldw",bel H",nile wearing ......IkirI! out ....;rorm. Gcrm:ony, '!Hber ....dio 01K.... tor duria{l; th", Battl", of Britain, H",nSae th",n served in Kholm with UI.FR der LW-4 and lat",r U lIIisnal platoon ",~",anl, III.JRtJ. H", ...·CllU th", Tu<:hrod. with I.he Somru",rruulzt:. Amons hi. decoration.. ar", the ribbon for the IrOIl Cro"" 211d CI...., th", ribbon for th", Wintu Campaign on th", usl.,rn I'-ront, lhe "-ir Force {l;Found combal badg"" and th., Wound Badge. Hi. arm-of_...,rvice colour on th., collar tab" is gold.brown. Uiirgen HenSat:)

OrCel'mnn forces trying to escape from France into Belgium on the Amiens-Camlwai .\'Iuns road. The movcmcnt or the 31'd US Al'mon:d Divi~ioll and othcr American and British lormatiOlls sealed an unexpectcd trap of three German corps in the f\lons area. Realizing lheirdilcmma, the commalldel' of L \'111 I'anzerkorps authoriud the breakout of units under hi~ command. The paratroopen; of 6. I-J 0 were placed under the tactical control of \'011 Tresckow's 18.FD(L) to execute the wilhdra\\al from .\Ions: the divis.ional commander launched this mO\Tlllent at 0'200 on 3 September. but he soon found tlte rond jnmmed with troops from other units. After man~ delays VOlt Tresckow

23

arrived at his destination 10 find that US armor and Belgian soldiers had arrived earlier that morning and now held the crossroads at GogniesChau~ce. The general immediately ordered as many troops as pos~ibk to seize the village. This proved impo~sihle as Allied planes racked the extended Gnman columns, dropping bombs and leaving a trail of destroyed vehicks. The Arnerican~ also shifted artilkry fire onlO the Cerlllan~, ami launched a cOUlltcrattack which ereated Illrther problems lor von Tresckow. The German commander no\v assumed eOlllmand of all forces on the field as the ranking officer, and ordcred that all German troops individually cut their way I,'om lhe tightelling Irap. Thl' two battle groups of 18.FD(L) had already succeeded ill tlli~ earlier whell they lound an ulloccupied routc west of 1\IOllS. Generalleutnant VOll Trc~("kow took charge of a group or 300 men and evaded the cnemy during the evening of 1 September. I.ater that llight VOll Tresckow further divided his men into smaller groups oL~o each to allow for heller COlltrol. The gelleral COlllillucd to lead a group of thrce oflicers and seven men who marclwd directly cast, avoiding large towm such as Charleroi, and cventually moving ollly at llight to avoid Allied troops and unfriendly civilians. Von Tre~ckow's small band of soldiers bced Troops of IIl.JR43 _ellrins cliRlouflase SRlock,. _jlh captured partisans and a young girl, Septetnber '943 near Kholm. (Jurgen Henke)

'4

other problems besides the enemy. They suIreI' from a lack of food and \vater, and had to fo many rivers and streams in 13clgium, illcludill,g t Sambre and 1\laas rivers, where enemy soldi( were on the lookout for escaping German trool The hand managed to cross the l\laas in a Sill boat (which sank aher the last members reach the eastern bank five kilometres south or Dinan This was accomplished witlrill yards of enel patrols during a ~tonny night. The following dz 8 September, Belgian troops surrounded t woods where the Germans were resting al opened lire. Von Tresckow received wounds both legs ii'om a hand grenade and another soldi was also injured. The group immediately SCi tered. re-assernbled a few kilometres away, ill continued the mardI. By the morning or September the handful of bedraggled surviV( entered the .\'!almedy-Eupen region of Be/giu and were greeted by German-speaking nati", They had evaded several attempts by Americ: troops to capture thcm and had crossed ;lnoth major river, the Ourthc. A last attempt to captu the group hy Belgian troops on 16 September \\ fought off. Von Tresckow's men reached t Belgian German border ilnd lay within t shadow of the \Vest \Vall; they had to be extrTm( carc/ltl to avoid being shot by their own troops well as by enemy patrols. \Vaiting until dark, t lour officers and four enlisted men made their w; through the rnineficlds and crossed into a zone

1: Gefreiter. Luftwaffe Alarmeinheit; Russia, Autumn 1941 I

2

2: Flieger, Fliegerhon;;t Yukhnov; December 1941

3: Jager. U1.Fbldregiment der Luftwaffe Nr.l; Nllgowa, February 1942

..

-

A

1: Untcroffizier, I.Feldregiment de.. Luftwaffe Nr.4;

Volkhov pocket, spring 1942 2: Funke.., II.l'eldregiment de.. Luftwaffe Nr.l; Kholm, 1942 3: Wachtmeister, II.Feldregimcnt der Luftwaffe Nr.2;

Russia, spring 1942

3

B

1: Generalmajor Meindl, Commander, Division Meindl; Staraya Russa, summer 1942 2: Major, Division Meindl; Staraya Russa, summer 1942 3: Obergefreiter, I.Feldregiment der Luftwaffe Nr.2; Staraya Russa, summer 1942

c

2

I

3

1: Oberleutnant 9 .. Russi J ,.Jager Reg; 11.'. anuary 1943 ment 43:

2: Fa

3' .

o

~:SSia Febru~r; l~~r Regiment 43; hnenJunker 9 Jli

ger, 9.Jagcr He .

Russia Feb glmeDt 43' , ruary 1943 '

1

I: Untcrorrizier,III.J/iger Regiment 43:

Russia 1943

2: Leutnant, Artillerie·Regiment 6; Vitebsk, 1943 3: Kanonier. Artillerie.Regiment 6; Vitebsk. 19.t3

E

3

1: Oberwachtmeister, Artillerie·Regiment 5; Crimea, 1943 2: Jager, 22.LwFD; Grofiborn, 1943 3: Feldwebel, l.Jliger Regiment 37; Bergen, 1943

F

1: Generalmajor Schimpf, Commander, 21.LwFD: October, 1943 2: Kanonier, 2.Artillerie.Regiment 22: Athens, August 1943 3: Reiter, I.Jager Regiment 40: Lucca, September 1944

2

G

2

I

3

I: Hauptmann, FUsilier Battalion 17; Pacy-su",Eure, August 1944 2; fusilier, FUsilier Battalion 17; Paey-sur-Eure, August 1944 3: OberstJeutnant., 14.FlXL); Norway. May I.94S

H

dragon\ lee'h. Emerging (i'om the shadows, the)' \urprised a German officer ncar f-1allsddag al aroull(!mid nigh I or I 8 Scptem ber. AfIcr man:hillg 260 km ill 17 days, the wear) ~llr\'i\'Ors or I8.FJ)lL arriH'd sarel) in Germany. For his branT)' in this action Generallclltn:llIt \'on Tresckow wa~ a\\arded the Knight's Cro~s, and later 'ommandcd a corps on the \\\'Stl'nl FrOIlt. The rcmaillder or the di\'ision labout :loo soldit'rs) was ccm:-olidatcd \\ith other units to form 18. \'olks~Tt'lladier Di\ision.

example, (ought a skirmish wilh 'bandits' near Kymi \\hich resulted in thc de:l1h of two Greeks and the capture offour guerrillas in Ortober 1943. Later th:lt Illolllh the same company t':lpturcd 60 panisans ncar Chalkis; and se\'(Tal days later apprehended a Sp) in a German uniform with a weapon and prol}aganda material. The capture orlhe island of Leros from British and Italian troops in late 19.13 in\'olved pan or I I.FD( L). Ilaly's capitulation opened much orthe ~leditt~rral1('all to the Allics and the British wcre especiall) eager to exploit this wcakness to libcrate Creece and the Aegean Islands. Hiller, likewise, refused to withdraw any troops from the overextended German positions in the l'astc·nJ ~'kdilt:r­ ranean and ordcred the cntirc rcg-iolt to he held. On ~,~ OClober t t.Kolllpanic, .JR~t li·OIll Ollly line Luftwanc fidd division W,H initially I J.LwFD boarded a tr;\11spon platlc Itlr tllt' i~lattd Ol&~i.l.{Jlt"d 10 duty in the l\lcdilnratwan basin. of Stampalia. 'l'hc unit was sent to tltis st11;tll island II.LwFD arri\'(~d in Greece in l'ady 194:l and to aS1>ist a company of paralrooper~ and a eom,$(X'nl mOSt of the \\ar on occupalioll duty in the pally of the Baltalion Brandenburg which had 'cinil) of .\thens. For the most part this was seized the island lhe day before from .-joo Italians lati\d~ casy dlily. and a good PO~t Ii)!' Luft\\affe and a handful of British troop.... The Lulh\alle NJllllcl. 'rhe division's first ("(nllmalldcr "as troops \\ere assig-ned the task or patrollill,l{ the cnrralicutn:ItH Karl Drum, lht' former chief of i~land and constructing: dcfensi\'l' work.... c I mpl'Cloratc ofAir Reconnai:-s'lIlCl' Forecs and 'I'll(' Cnman optTatioll 10 caplUl'C Leros. an pc.·rations in Bcrlin-anotlll'r example of poor i.. land in tilt" n'ntral .\e,l{ean occupied b~ the tilil.:Hion of the I.uft\\ ani"~ general officer corps. e di\i.sion phlp.·d a major r61e as an anti- A rar", phot~..... ph orLaft""..fT", troops or 'I.LwfD p",p.. riD.~ to fi..., .. 100",m N",brlw",rr",r 1<>; Lawat Riv",.., Ru....ia, ni..,an ullit in Grccn·. s.Kompanic ofJR:l.!. for Octob""" 1~3' (CourtellrorG~rI!:J..gol"kiJ

The Jl1editerralleall Theatre

33

This Germau propaganda photograph does not state the location of this swearing_in formation nor its unit or date although the caption says these are Caucasian volunteers. While uncertain, this may be 'Nordkaukas;sche Batamon 835' which becaDl.. ID.JR34 of '7.FD(L) in May '944 near Le Havn, France. Thes .. soldiers w ..ar Luftwaffe uniforms and equipmen I.. The collar tabs of the two men on the righl may be for foreign volunteers. (Library ofCongr
British 234th Infantry Brig'ade, took on great irnport~nce in late 1943- The German preparation was hindered by Allied air and n~v~l superiority, although they speedily gathered their tOITes rrom throughout southern Europe. I l.iJ R22 was among the units selcctcd ror thc invasion, and the batt~Iion departed the Greek mainland in several shipments: the first group consisted or the b~ualion's 6 ~nd 7.Kornpanie under tile COlllmand or Oberleutnant Bouchcr, while H~lIpt­ m;lnn :\Jarschall's second group h
34

Kamplgruppe would then ~ell;e the heig-h o\'erlooking i\linda Bay and Leros city. Two oth battle groups, inc1udillg- paratroopers flown li'orl lwly, would
ant op.-ratioll h) 11Y))1 L) durinK the \\'H. The dh-i~ioll participated in the \\ithdrawal from GrelTlo in t9-1-4, and fought against Yugoslav partisall1'J and r('~ular troops in :\lan-donia and Yugoslavia. The divi<;,ion still sened as a part of I. o,akkorp~ of .\rm} Group E ne;lr Zagreb when ·t surn·mlered to Yu~oslavian and Bulg-arian ITTS at the elld orthe \\ar. rwo OIhn LurtwafIe field divi<;,ions served in the JeditlTranran theatrc ill the last lllonths of the 'ar. 19 and .?O.FD L) rdnlorced German troops -D Ital) in earl} <;Ullllncr 191 ~ \\hen the Allies ptllrlod Rome alld Ilm::atetlCd to smash the entire rlllan lilll'. Tht'se 1\\0 lormations \\ere the last Id divi1'Jioll1'J rni~(·d b} lhe Lurtwallc, and had 'cd on occupation dlll) in llonh-\\eslern Eu!OpC prior to llHWill,l!; to the Italian li'ont. rg, FD(L) mH_od Ileal' i\lunich in cnrly If)l3 from the uSllal rtrnelll of Air Force personnel with additional re provided by anAir Forct' infantry regiment. hr-lnbnlCl'ie-Regill1cnl 't\loskau·, This unit scrvt·d in Ru,sia ~incc I U41 as :In independent anization uillil it merged wit 11 the new division. C di\i1'Jion movcd 10 France in lTlid~19.~3 and latrr <;Wlioncd in Holland; it was at Thiele ~iu11l. when it rcceived orders to mon; to Iialy 'th iL~ threc Jiiger regiments and divisional <"llbinJunc 19l.~. 20_ FD(I.) prcceded ib ~i~tt-r unit 10 Iialy in 3}0 to n:inforH' the Fal1s('hinllpanz(OITlivi~ion rmann Goring' \\hie-II wa~ heavily involnod in . ting the .\l1ied breakout frolll .\nzio. Thi~ fidd - ·on had also formed ill Glormany in l'ady 'n~ 19130 a majorit} of il~ Jagn and PanzlT-

The ... pid Ibrusl of AJIi~ Iroops O~-er..... stow-movinll; ~rtnan ..... il~, Here, Sib US Armor~ Div;JIIioft iJU.... lrpnen ..... mpt., wrm.ft f.r.. from .. meolll wa50n of 17.FD(L) n.,..r V,,",Oft 0 .. :113 AUKu"l, '!l+f. The !iurprised cook, weari"lI; .. ClO.mouAa.s-e smock, bas been JIIearched ....d is now .. priso...er. (Nal;onal Archivrs "I-SG-:J9O:~)

jagcr companiei> I·olnillg from personnel of Flieg-er Regiment 23. Origillall) a training unit for
35

M~m~" or AR'fi(L), ,6.1'1)(L) , .... i ..S a br~ak i .. HoUand, '!H4- Th~ n.an 00 lh~ I~r. wearli army.iss Irous.. rs. Thf!Sf! rour arlillery.....n all hav.. army_issu.. ca a.. ""'I'" 00 ,h~ir helm~'1i 10 hold c:an.ou8ag~_ (PhOIO co.. r'''''y
the divi~icmal :lnd two regimental nHlllllanders. were ('1. Ig.FD(L) was unablc' to alkr much rcsist:HH.'l' and narrowly escaped caplLlre near Piornbino. 2o.FD(L), which had slI(l'erec\ some losses during lIlt' r<'lrel l'!e1l1\'llls Ortbe lSI US Armored Division. Oll{' rq;inwllt of lhc divi!-iOll oppo;,ed Frellch coloni:d troop.~ in vigorous baIlIe lor the historic cit~ ofSkn:l illlalcJune. 19.FD(J~I, in the meantime, l'stablishcd a roadblock at Rosig'nano Soh-a) 10 ("lwer the road to Lq:~-horn, lhe large pon to\\ n on thc Li!{urian Sea. TIlt' divi!lion was prepared to ml'ct the omlaught of the 31lh US Infanlry Di\'ision, r<-inlorccd with other units including til(" Jap'llH..se·.\merican 442nd Regimental Combat T('alll, The . \mericans kicked 00' their attack 011 3 .luI}. although thcy

were ,,0011 sIO\H:-d down by lhe la~k of clearing t of thaI formalilm 10 be ah~orh{'d inJul) b~ 20.FD I.). \\hitl' other members ,\('nt 10 form 19. \·olksgrt.'naclier Di,·ision. 20.FI)(J.) continued 10 act as corps rCMTve alolll:~ the coast, and fought Italian gurrrillas hchind the GOlhic Line in Scpternbn; on th,. I ::?Ih of lhat lI10mh th... di\'isional commander \\:1.-; mortall~ \\oUIl(kd h} an ltnlian civilian. The di\·isioll IlC\'er again ~er\"cd as .1 l-omplcte formation. JR39 and +0 fought ncar Rimini \\ ith :l6.I:Jallzer Divisioll. '\ hilc olher unih serwd \\ it II 29 alld 90.Panzer Grciladicr Di\·ision". Tlw .'.!O. FD(L) was briefl) rcconstituted in Decem· bel' 1911, bUI thell comerled to 15,j.Fddausbildung Division with ~ome clClachmenb 10 other commallds,

Tile Elld ill The Eas! 'rhe bulk of the Luft\, alfe field d ivisiollS I'Ontinued toscn e in Russia after the trnlbfcr to the Army. A, in the We~t, the Luft'\aOe dhisions cXr)(:ril'n{Td llumerous administrnti\'e and pcrsonnl'l t'hall~('" \\ hen the Arm}' took chan~e. One .\ir Forn:~ oflicer noted of the Luftwaffe units ncar \'iteb~k ill ('arl~ 19-1-4 that 'the) have the best morale. Thl' :-(lldier,

ilrc g-ood, til\' weilpons and equipmelll arc exccl1"111. But the tl'ailling: is in:.uflicienl. How can Ihey ~aill expericll("t·? 'l'llc division cOllllnallders \\ere (:ornpany n)Ounanders in their last as.,ignmenl \\ ith til(: t\ I'm)'. Tile majori t}' ofofficers an' as good ,h untrained in ground combat. C.:r1ainl) the di\i~iolh \\ill hravely dcfcnd their positions. But if th{'~ ha\t'toall.u,k then it ison:r: For m:ll1Y or the field di\'i~iom the end was cl;"I"I.linly TWill'. \\'hile still li:.ted (Ill .\1"111) rolls. S and IS.FD\L) were \'irtually nOll(:xi~tellt: and 3.FD L.) di~band("d in January 19H. its soldiers joinill~ til(" t\\O f1·maining divi~iolls. 4 and 6.FD(L.). around \"itehsk. I.FD(I,). \\hieh lost 0\('1' 1.:100 ('a~ll .. lties in (\\O \\t'cks or fiQ;hting" during Ihe Iirst month of 19,4-4, d('activatcd 011 25 jallu:ll'y; the division's survivors wcre mostly as~ig-lied 10 :.!8..J;igTr Division, EI~n\'llerc a long lhe EaslCfn Frollt, lhe situation \\ClIt badly lor the remainitlg Jicld divisions, The SO\it't Army launched a mas:.ivc ollcnsi\'(: on 14 Jalluar) \\hieh smashed Arm) Grollp Aorth and fornxl the entire Germall front 10 \\ilhdraw from l.cnilll:{rad. The So\·it,t St'cond Shock Ann}. caged in till' Ol'anit'nbaum IXKkt'l, Slrud, III.SS Panzer Corp~ and its two Luftwallc di\ i~ions, 9 and lo.rDt L . These rormalil>lLS had been postt'd in lhi, relati\dy qlliet area ortlu- rl'OlIt \\ith a hodgepod~t' of foreign SS oudlts .1Il(\ were unprepared Ibr the RU'i.,iall onslaught. lo.FD, L di:.integratl.."d I the h,'~inning of the attad and a \ aluable Army \·j,ioll had to be sent 10 prn'l'lll lhe IOtal collapse the GC'rrnanline, Both 9 and lo.FOIL) lingered a~ :>llIall combat groups during- the rigorolls t;htillg' along the A'arvil rront until thc}' consolited willI Army and Ail' Force UllilS ill the spring and ~Ulli m('t' or 1 9.~'~. The sa me gt'lleral ollcnsive a Iso st rut' k IlIe ('('ntre :.ollthertt flank of' the German Eighteenth ~,\\'hert' 1. 12, and 13,FD(L.) hdd the line. Ru:.~ian assault was aimed to Sll'litsh at the k("~t Gcrm.m poinb, \\hich also happt'Ill..-d 10 the locations urthe arm} group's Luftw'illc field - ions: it alw met great success :u Nu\'gurod. fD L \,'as thrown on'guard b~ a surprise Soviet '('meltt ;lcross frozen Lake Ilmcn, and pushed or lhe \\a~, This dri\'e cleared lhe northern roach abO\T till' lake for the Russians and 'rclcd til(' Gnm
Simultallcollsl~, [:.!

and 13.FD~L) were hit in Ihe centre or the German line. wht're they were positioned aloll,\{ Ihe Volkho\' Rivt,l'. Wilhin days the Germans wtre forced to abandon thei r tcnuous hold ncar Leningrad, and progn",si\'e1y reI! back to the Panther Line-prepared work:. along 1\\0 lakl'S on the Ru~ian border \\ ith Estonia and L.atvia, Thi~ \\ ithdra\\ al cost mallY nl.~uallics in [';[ and 13.FD L) in the \icinity or I.ul:{a, and IN! to the amalg:unatioll of the latter division with I:.!.FDI I.). The"talJ'ofI3,FD LJ \\a~as...igncd later in thc sprillg as a control group for EStOllian police and auxiliaries. The Sixteenth i\rm~. as the SOil t!tel'll clement of Ar111Y Group ~Orlh, was gravel} afll:ncd b~ Ihe January oflCmivc. The SllCCl'~:>ors or lJivision j\'leindl, 2I.FD(L.), who h;ld filug-hl around Staraya Russa since 1942, Wl'lT 1I0W forced to ab;1l1dOll lilt' swampy reg'ion ,md withdraw [0 the Panther Lill(', This relreal, conducted in heavy snow and hara<;sed by Soviet ground and air pur~uit. was one of lIle mOSI dillicult opcralions of the war Itlr a division which had ptC\ iously IXl'n cnga,\{t'tl ill static dcfcnsin' fighting, The frolll Unle..offiue.. nomfohrde of 1.,LwFD we:...ing Luflwarre uopical dren and

Ttlarchin~ bools

in Greece, AUIl:"lfl 19043.

37

stabilized with the arrival of spring, and allention again focused on Army Groups Centre and South. The scene of much fighting and embarrassment lor the Luftwallc field rlivi~iolls, the German defensive position at ViTebsk posed all even greater risk in T9H. The loss of Nevel by 2.LwFD in October T9.13 and the ensuing struggle through December placed the Russians in a favourable position to isolate Vitebsk. 4 alld 6.FD(L), as a pan ofLlU.t\nneekorps, had the primary mission of" holding the southern and easTern faccs of thc eitv. The Soviet olTensivt' againsT Army Group Centre on 22 June 1944 swept soulh of" Vitebsk, and within one day the city was declared by Hitler as a 'centre of resistance'. This lied the entire corps to a useless defence of Vitcbsk under a terrible pounding by SovieT ain:rall, artillery. mortars, rockets, and diren·firc weapolls. 4.FD(L) was rendered inellcetivc by 2.').June, and its commander, Generalmajor Pi~torius, fell in action two days later when the corps attempted to break out from Vitebsk. 6.FD~L) and its commander, Generalleutnant Pesdwl, sufkred the same fate. Both divisions and the corps collapsed after the poorly co-ordinated break-out and the remnants surrendered 10 Soviet forces. The destruction oL\rmy Group Centre opelled the door for the Sovicts to enter Poland and pierce the heart of the Third Reich. After summer 1944 ollly two Luftwallc fidd divisions continued the struggle on tbe Eastcrn Front. 1'2 and '21.FD(L) fought with Army Group North as it was pu~hed from the Panther Line in Member.. OfII.LwFD in Greece, April 1943.

.July and forced back through Latvia to he bottled up in C:ourland by Octobcr. The TWO divisiom remained as part of the n('\.... ly-de~ignated i\rm~ Group Courland, and participated in six fierce ballies. Losses aillong thc uniTs took their toll and 12.FD(L) was partially cvacuated hy ship to Danzig while other units of the division consolidated with 2I.FD(L). This unit, in tum, fought uncleI' its own identity as well as with 329.ID and as a separate cOlllbat group. A testimony 10 the hard fighting- s(·en by the last Lurtwafle field units during th(' Courland siege is provided by the expericll(T of one oflicer of :2 I. FD( L). Hauptlll;Jnn Heinz Schwoppe assullled COlllmand of the division's field replacement batI3lion at the beginning of December T944. The battalion consisted of only 80 men at this time, but soon increased with thc addition orother Air Force personnel and local voluntcl'l"S. The baltalioll acted as an emergell('y uniT to plu,!{ gaps in the German line and, in thi~ ullrcwarding: role, was involved in fierce fighting Ileal' Doblcn in .\Jarch 1945. Schwoppe's batTalion delCllded the line against numerous Soviel attaeb which re
and I tal) to no a \·ail. The Lllfl wallt-- licld llni h had a~ emcrgency lroops, as \et:n in Ru,~i.t in the \\ illier of 19t I l l : bUI the) could IlOt replace regular, \nn) uni IS. 'I'll{' . \ir Forn' ground fonll.llions, \\ hile (,(Jlnposed of lIlall) good Inx)p~. \\('1'<' ~acrificed ill the name of personal q.~oti~ll1 and inter-servin' rivalries. N(J exact figllrt,~ detail the ImM's nl'the l,uOwafl;" fitld divisiom. [I is c0I11111only Iwlicvcd that about r)o.ooo airmcn :IITcpted Gi)ritl~'s call and joill('d til(" 11e\\ di\"isiom in 1912 and 1913. Of Ihat number. 160.000 lransferr('d 10 the .\rl11) in late I~H3. Gi\'en til(" d(·~truclion (If the<;c di\"isiolls ill I~H J, it is proll;lhl(' Ihat rdatiw']Y le\\ of IIJ('~e sold i('r<; slIrvi\-('d 111(" 'I ar unseat l1("d. Simila r1}. it is ullcertain as to how man} casualli.. ~ \\cre ~utl(:red by Lu[hvatTe .l:roulld Iroop~ in Russia during HI II 42 prior IU till' formatiOIl oj" the fidd di\·i"ion,. Thi~ example or the formation of 'p,.ivalc armi('s' pronxl iI disasler 10 l'\azi Gcrmany\ Will' dl()rt-a costl) ll1i~take thaI Ilitier and Coring could not aflOrd. a limilro \alu('

NOle on other Luftwaffe field units TI1("f(' \\cre a 1Il1lllber of olht'r .({round ("ornhaL units raiscd hy Iht' Luftwal1i: in thc Second "'orld War thal do nul fhll LInckI' the category or lhe Luftwaflc fidel divisions. \\'!It'lll'\,cr hard pressed fOr troops in all a('lin:' lheall'<'. ,\ir Force ('OllUllallde" (lrg:a ni:l.(·d F,ldbalaifloll, .:ur b,sondrml l'nll1~ullg _ mm Fb.k J3 p;un ere:_ of 9-L_FD ;n northe: Russia. The: ,-IIU ill the: forrfrlllli _ColI.... Lull_lTe: cllv"' Il», popular ';Ih llialic ptrt'Onne:1 for warmlh and du .... bilily. He: also eodoibilS a civilian llICl&rf and bf.h.

dtr f.uf/wa.fJe. 'Iield baltaliolls of Ihe J.llfLwal1e lor ~pccial PllfJ}()!'>I~'i', These ullit" \1 CIT ind('p('ndentl) rai!>l."(l by Ih(' .\ir Force from personnel con\'ictcd of milil.(ry. ci\·iliall, or political crimes. and org:allil.(·d into p('nal units to earn their pardon ill the hC;l\) fightill~ 011 the Ea~hTll Front. One battaliOIl sern·d at Stalingrael, and three othen; were allac!l('d 10 '2 I .LwFD. The be!'>l known Lullwafre unit 'lor special puposcs' wa, Feld RcgilnCtlt 503 \\hich rOU~hl ill Finland. In lilt' lasl wccks of the \\al' lhe Luft\\.I!R· orgallil.ed a plelhora of HnilS \Iith a \'ariCI) tilles. all or \\hieh werc SIIOrtli\'{·d. I
or

The PlrtleS .11: (;tj",ilrr.

/,IIJIrI'«.lfr .lfarmrinlt,il:

HUHia, auillmn

'9-1 J

Lult\\;'llie sllppon 1)('Nonnel \\('1'(' 1I0t usually ('ollllllitted to comhat duties at the beginl1il1~ of Ihe \\ar. but in RLls.,ia the rapid drive through the cOlllllr) isolated thousands of Soviet combatants Iwhind Gennall lillcs. To prOlect litH'S of communicalion all available German troup~, indudillg" Luftwal1l: airmen. \\('ft' h~L~til) organiYed into ell1er~ency ~('('uril) units. This corporal from it si({lIals unit i~ ~w('eping .HI important supply route and rep Gclreiter has a dt('\ron on his Id't arm. The gllid-brown 1I'(~lfm­ {ttrbr or ann-ol:!'>('f\ ice colour lor tilt' 'iignab 11Iin wilhout ad('(lualc clolhing or sllc!te!". This airman, a pri\'al(' in the (lying branch. clears II\(' I"lI1l\\ay ill Yukhnov to IX'rl1lil

39

unit's idcnlilic ~tcd ltd met, painted white to mateh lhe SIIOW suit. The dfeCliVt'ness of the camouflage is SOtl1(:\\ Ital marn'd hy slains on the trousers.

An 88 n~m flak 36 empluyed in lin anti ...ank role al the Ora.nin>baum pock~ by the' FlaI< Abteilllng of 10.LwFD. This u.nit was ~ta..ined by the Luflwaffe wb.,.. the divi,,;on tran.... fe'rr'ed to the' arlfty and became IU'laI< regimn>t (mot.h~. The loss ofthis unit left 10.Lwl'D without aoy m.ajor ~power 10 prevent the Sov;el brC'akout in January '!Hoi.

flighl opcraliollS at til(' Ihn·atc.:ned airfield. Such ground pcrsonlll'l of the J.uft\\anc fell under the command ofCellcralmajor :\kindl and wcrc used as a reaction force ill till" t'a~e of Russian breakthrough. Inadcqu:uely dressed in the freezing cold. he has an iS~lIt' O\t'rco;1I and Ihe enlisted mail's foragc cap or "fi,grrmii{~,. Air Force ovcrcoaLS still carri(:d rauk and ann·of-Sl.'l"vice collar labs, althouKh Ihey an:: hidden hen: on the upturned collars. The 1I:-(' ofci\'ilian items such as scarves was comlllOll nlllonJ; German troops in the East; civiliall rq)pard h~·lp('d 10 alleviate some of the burden illlpo~ed by tht" winter un the Gcnnnn military supply ~pleJll, hut liSt· was officially discourag-cd in ar('a"oth~'r titan 111(' linn I lines .

.'13: Jager. IIIYr/drfgimrnl rlfr 1.lIflwnjfr Xr. ,; A"flguw([, FdmUlf)'

'.C)P

A crewlllall load,~ ,I .1 cm lig'ht 11101"\ar wl:i1ring thl: two-piece SIlOW ~llil. O/li.:ring sQme concealment, this uniform wa~:l qukk tllak('shift solution 10 the lack 0l'Certn31l willter camouflage. The Scl/!/uonz.iige, wor1l by Army alld Air Force troops, consisted of a shapdes~ white jacket and trousers, To idclltif)' friclldly fhml l'llcmy forces the Germans wore cloth strip:- 1m both sleeves of the winter uniform, altt:ntated every da} according to the Luft ..... ffe' ere'w pr~paring to (ir~ " 12Om.m Il.Gr.W ... ~ a Ulorlar copied from. caplured Russian modd ... The quill pattern of the re''Versible winler uniform. is easity sC'-Cn a" are "tain". (Nadonal Are'hivC'S ~7-GAP-228-K_16)

+0

ill: L·lIltroiJi::.itr. I.F,ld"Kimml ,In 1.1if/ll'nffi Xr./: "olklwl' /Jodtf. ~/)rill,e. l,9p With the change orS('asoll~ ill RU'i.~ia. German Air Force groulld troops onn' agam lacked camouflage unilorms ill tlt(· nO\\ :,no\\ less terrain, This ser~eant US(,:> thl' :;',llh,l!m, a camouAagt'd tent-seelioll. a'l COIlC(',l1nwllI and 10 \\ ard on inclement \\eathel". l\lade of \\ater.repdlent nnton drill, the ::',[Ihol", could he \\Ont a!> a poncho or combined \\ith other capt':'! to COIIMrm'l a ~hcltt.·r. Lnder this practical garmt'nt tll(' KeO wcars tht.' Fli,gnblust and carric'" all :\1 P.~o. 82: l:jml.,r. II.Ftld"l"ItI'fI/( d,r Ltif/u-alf' .'·r. I: lawlm. t 9,p! The Luft\\affc assi~ncd a Ilurnberofparatroopen; to form Ihe (ad rc of t he Ii rst field regimen b in earl~ 19-f1. Thest: t·ombat-h.lrdenOO ,etcrans continued to wear Ihe uniforms and inSignia of the F;}lIschirmjager in their nc\\ :l.s:.ignrnent, and this signaller \\ear~ the 'second pattcrn' jump smock in splinterc;lmouflagc. Introduced in 19,P. the 'second pall('l'n' smock allo\\c
ha"t!" which accompanied the formation of the I.uftwatlc ficld regiments and, lalcr, divisions Int"ant th;)l no single unifimll 01' insignia was adopted lor dH.'se units ullIill:arly 19-13- Thus, in tile earl~ period, a \\,ide vari('I~ llfitcms from every brandl of the Luftwaffe wne seCn among the oflkersand mcn of the fidd rC'j{imcnts.

B3: II·ac!llll/~i$l~r. II.F~ldr~~i1ll~1I1 dn I"ift/calfr _Vr. :I: RII$SIa. spring '9J2 This \\'achtmcister eC]uivalent to FeJdwebd in other units is assigned 10 a he:1\) company and Ilears th(' ollc-pi("C(' Luliwaflc l:"1tigue uniform. i\lade ofcilher dark hlue-~rq or black lwill, the fatiguc unilnrm was issu~d 10 Illcchanics and other personnel who performed maintenance on airnaft, vchicks or weapons; it was commonly sccn among- n'ltrnbers or Flak companies or the Luftwalli: fidd units. The only Ilolabk reatures orlhe outfit are the collar Tre.ue lor NCOs and the single rallk slripe 011 the lefl arlll. The t937 Eltigue ullirorm had a single pockel on thc right bn."LSt, and r('plan:d lhe earlier l\\o-breast-pockt'l uniform. Crt/t'ra/major Jhind/. Co,ml/(l1ldl'r, Dil'isim, .\It'Indl.' ,S/lIf(~ra RIlJ$fl,SUflIflur 19.12 I)hotograph~ of:\II'indl ill Russia during 191'2 and in Fralin: two year; later re\eal lhat he preferrcd the Army\ five-hutton tropical field servin' unirorm. A rOrTUer moulltain anillelJ man, i\kindl retains the Bt7f(miil:;.e without the Edelwt:iss cap badge. lie "eal'l, regular Lulil\aftc rallk insignia and deviecs 011 Ihl' mountain cap and tropical jackcL Whill' his lrousers arc Lurtwatli,.', i\leindl once again wear~ mountain boots and pullces. As an inspir;ttioll to Lhe troops (and as a pr;lclical mcasure) t\leilldl carries an ;'vIP40. Thi~ general's cnergetic kadl'rship at Yukhnov aud kller at Staraya Ru.,sa motivated the Lufiwafll' firld llniL~ ,md g,l\e Ih.. division and its successor, 2 t .LwFD. a proud hnilal{t'. (;J:

.\/ajor, Dil'iJifJ1l J/rindl: S/ara)'u Runa. 5ummn Ig.J2 rhe majority of olIlcers in Di\'isioll i\leindl had prn'iuu;,ly served as paratroopers. This major. a divi~ional !italroflicer, rought in Cret(' ;lIld e;lrned the 11'011 Cr05~ 1St and 2nd Cl:J.sscs as \\e11 as the

(;2:

Crew or SoAR".. cmph,c,..t atong ,he
Fallschirmschiifl.tII·Abl.eichen. I-Ie is a \'Clerall or lhe 1941 42 'Order or Frozcn :\lcat', the winter campaign on Ihe EasLern Front. the ribbon or which is WOI"I1 below (hal or Ihe 11'011 Cross 2nd Class. The Wound Badg(' in black signifies that this oflicer ha~ ren:i\'cd either OIlC or lwo injuries ii-om enCIll) action. TIl<.' Krelll cuflband. authorized on 160('"101)('1" 1942, lor \\car by Arm)' and Air Force personnel who rought on lhc island. was \\orn on the lower It-ft slee"e of the uniform jackel. This officer'l) jacket is the fi\·e~button (only four exposed T//c!lruck sen'icc lunie Siher aluminium piping ('dgl'S til(' ('ollar forolllcers, \\ hik Ihe yellow arlll-of~SCI....icl· colour for flying f.crsonnd (paratroopers, flight ncws, and ground support is readily apparent. The Scliirmmiil:;.t' uniform cap is worn here although it wa.~ normall) "l'sern·d ror \\ alking-out uniform and nOI seen in combat. C3: Obagifreiln. I.Fddre,!!,imm[ tin- /./lftll'll'!fr Nr. 2; SllIl"a)'O HI/sm,

SUlIImer

1.9.J-2

The FIit'grrbIIlJe, with TuchhoJt! (trollscr~) ;\11(1 Mal'sells/iifel (marching b001s), \\,("1"(" the major uni/arm itcm~ fiw I.uftwant: grouncltroops in t911-4'.1. This corporal reports 10 division headquarters with a message fi-om tilt" fi-otlt lines in normal l.uftwaflC drcss, The :\ 10d(·1 1935 helmet has a sacking COWl' to reduce rdl(,.. tioll. while the Ffit'germiil<.t' is Ilicked into the Ix.'ll. OllCt' again. the \'ariel) of I' 'oJfrnfarbt' can be seell. This former Flak anillcryman carm'd the Flak specialist badge. \\ hich he wears on the cuff of his sleeve. Despite this proficiency, the Obergefreitcr is 1l0W assigned to the infantry blll cOlllilllles to \\ear the insignia of his pt"('\'ious dllty. The ('ollar rank for Obcrgefreitcr. thn't.' \\ in!-.'S on a

4'

Fo.. r !
tab oftlH.' Flak\ red arlll-(lI:~tT\ iCt: colour. is worn on the n~ing blou~(·. Tilt' \\in~ could either be SC\\11 directly 10 tilt: collar patch (If, ill this case. be metal pin-on de"ict:s. Tlw.\lall~cJ' ,,"ar 98K \\as the basic w('"'pon lor I.ufi\\afl'(· ~r01111d troops and is slung on lhis soldit"r\ back. DI:

O!Jrr/rrlll/(/l/l, fj.]iiger

Hrgill/f111

43;

Hussia,

]amHlI)' '9.1.1 Drawing 011 Ihe k~som of the pre"iou~ winter, C erma 11 [mups wcre hel tl'l' pn:pa red lor corn ba tin late 1942 alld early I~H:l. 'l'lll· 11(\\ Luftwaffe fidd divi~i01IS received :llllp!t· stocks of normal uniform items ami willt('\' gear. [11 late September 1912, XIII Fliegerknrps aUlIJol'il,(;d the issue or unirorms, equiprllt'llt, ~Itld ~pt·cial ilems such as \\ inter clothing to lhe lroop~ \\ hile sLill in training camps in German)'. \\'inh'r c1olhinj.{ "as issued to be worn oyer normal lit,lel ullilorms. and \\ inter boots. for example, wert' loo~e-fittil\1{ to allow the soldier to Wl'ar t\\O pairs or~()\ks as "ell as rags or newspapers a~ Mllflil\l~. Commallders \\cre sup-

posed to gi\e soldiers t'lloul{h timc to break in new loot\\ear prior 10 mO\'C'lllent to Russia. Divisions carried mini Illal rcsene stocks of uniform itcms in order to reduce lrallsportatioll requirements, and X III Flicgerkurp~ stront;:l> advised subordinate unils 10 prohibit troops fi'Olll taking lln:lullwrizcd clothing (or v,duabl{'~ such as rings, watches, call1era~, and l1lu~ic,,1 instruments!) 10 the fronl. Each member or the IItw lield divi~iolls received the lollowing itell1H: five pair lllldershins, five pair underpants, aile bdt, aile mountain cap (pn:cursarto the t\119+3 I:.:in!tr;l,ljeldll/ti'!?,) , two tighlfiltinj.{ hood~, une ovcn:uat (lor 20 per cent or the unil's lolal strenglh). one service tunic (for the remaining flo pCI' cenl 01" the unit). one flying blou~e. aile pair knil glo\'es. aile pair mittens (for 20 per cenl ofthc unit;, aile \\001 scarr. and thrn' blankets (four blanket:. lor 25 per cellt of the unit I. In additiotl, combal troops recei\ ed one pairoflhe Will tel' rc\'ersiblejacket alld trouscrs as \\ ell as one woollen cap, one pair j.{:Iunllets. one pair felt boots and one pair of knee protectors. For those solidicrs

assiglltx[ to ~f'lltry dut), or rear echelon jobs the LuftwaOc is~u('d fur hals, ovcrsi7ed oV('rcoalS, and felt or straw hoots. Ski equipmcnl wa~ also a\'ailable to those uniLs pcrforming rcronnaissance mi,>-siOlls. Similarly. pioneer units, motorcyclists. and horst'-moullu·t..! personnel rcceivcd ,>perialized uniform itcms. Thi:. Obcrleulllallt \\l,.'ill"i somf' of the newl~ -issm:d dothing in nonhcrn Rn~ia. D:!: F(/IIII~njullk". 9.)agrr R"gimm' ./..1: RI/Slia.

FrbTl/ory '9-13 This appointed onln;r candidate \\cars the rank of Gcli-citcl" with the addition of aluminium braid around Ihc collar and on the basc of the epalllclles. If he survives romhat, the KCO call expect to f('ceivc a field promotiotl ill his company, The mOSlllowblc item of the uniform is 1Ill' JV(!Ufll!arbr all th(' collar tab and pipinf{on the shoulder straps, The LuHwaflc adopted a Jj"{!lIoifayb/' on 4.Janu;lry t9~3 10 idelltil)' the new fidd divisions; lhe basic arlll-of-servin' colour seleCtcd was rifle green for a II ~rsollnd. Soldit'rs in other branch('S assi!{ncd 10 the fidd di\'i~ioll, such as aniUer), flak. anI i-tank. or signals. \H)uld wear rille green collar lab" with piping of their indi\'idual arm·of·sen·icc colour, such as red. pink. or gold-hrO\\ n. "'his Fah ncnjunker is an in(;lIltryman. hence hLs collar tab is riflc ~...een \\ith a thin black line separating the riAc !{rccn edge piping from the background. He wcars the Fli'gtrbluse, ineludinf{ the ribbon for Ill{" Iron Cross 2nd Class: the East Front ribbon; nnd the Lull,,"allc Ground Comhat BadW·. It was common to sec willtcr uniforms mixed \\ ith rcgular apparel: this soldier wears the he'avy winter cap with the hluc·grey (lying blouse alld rc\"er~ible winter trousers, To complete this picture, he sports the plaited straw overboots that W(T(' i"sLled 10 10 pCI' CCllt orthe unit Iflr scmry dUlY'

material. It could Iw made to fit tiglllly :lJ"Ound the neck and. in conjulH:tiOlI \\ilh the while face mask. ollercd complele prot('nion a" wcll as camouflaging the head and EICC in the SIlO\\, The hood, ho\\ el er, dcpri\"(~d Ihe wcarer of peripheral \'ision, 1\ hich could I)(~ a deadly dra\\ back in combat. Luftllaffc PCNOIIIH:I ('an'ied the st.llldard field equipmcnt of, \rnly IroOPS \\ ilh minor I'ariations; melal equipmellt, such as the cantccn cup. mess tin. and gas mask contaillt·r. wcre originally paintcd in bhu;·grq·, but later cquipml'nt hnd .\rm) pailll finishes. Similarly, .\ir Force leather f{ear 1\ as bro\\ n at the be!{illnin~ of the war and black IatCl", Variations could he St'ell in ll1elnl and leather equipmcnt throughout tlte war, The dislinClivt: Lultwart"c belt buckle fijl" ellli~tcd mcn \\as retained.

/:;1: UI/{I'roffi::.i".. III .]iigrr Rf,l;illlflll 43" NUJsia 19-13 Enjoying a break, lhi~ ~ergt·aJJt of" 2t, LwFD reads a 1f'!lcl' fi'OIn home and enjoys hi" pipe. German troops in RlI:.~ia often Sptlll the quiet hours GeneraUeul nl Rudolf-Eduard Lichl, foun.h cornmaDd~rof 21.FD{L),d_ li.. ~ ~r_.....el oChis divi~;on in '944. Even al l-hi. lain dale, Ih~ ~pit a.nd potish inla~e of wrm.aa Iroops can ..till be !feen "-S can be !he otder Iricolor d«al on I.he helmets Ofl"'O officer...

0.1: }i(fW..Q·)iiger U"gllfltfll-/3:

R,Hsia.l:'brulll)' '943 to nHl\"e throu~h hca\"} snow. this pri\ate is S('('l1 in full \\inter uiliforrn \Iorn on:r Ill(' basic uniform. The onl~ item lackin\{ from winter kit is boots: II(' wcaTS ordinnr~ black lealhn marching boots. The light-fitling \\ hile hood worn b, the airman is of panicubr interesl: it provided comiderabh: warmth and protection to the hcad .and llt·d \\ith its inlier Iilling of thick blankel Slntg~ling

+3

E2: J"'UII/'lIIf, ,ll'tillerie-Rfgimml 6: J 'itfbJk, '.9-13 Aetin~

as lorward observer, this artillery lit'uh'nalit ~POb rounds from his balll....} at the front. To reduce his 0\\11 \'isibility as a target the officer \\ear"i no rank on his collar and ha~ con:red hi:. ~holilder straps, Tile only in:.ignia \i.,ihlt- OIl the uniform is the aluminium pipin~ 011 the ('ollar of the Hi'l:erblIlJ,. Hc ha~ an ,\rm}-issuc ('amouflage ('O\er for Iti~ :\Iodel 19-~3 l>l("t.'! hC'lmcl. Despite these precautions, th(' lieutenant pe"'i:'b in displa~in!{ hi~ Luft\\aflc Flak War B,l(I~c amI ,\rm~ Infantl') ,\ssauh Badge, The Air Force Flak decoratiOI1 \\as instituted in [g.lt for illdi\'iduab in anti-aircl'
or

Photographs or LwFD perliOnnd on th" £,olltern Front are rar" after '944 because most divisions were d"..t.royf: '0, and :u.FD/(L) joined 2,,,'lak Di"';sion in Ihe spri.lls or 1944 after tl>e retr""'t to the Narwa River line. Thili pholOlraph "hows Ihe bauer), "omRlllnder of 10."lIk Re~Une"t 3:1de.:oratins "'"""Oneerl'. They e"hibil a vari"ty of foolw"ar, iodudins r,,11 boots, I"alh"r ma.r"hiJlS boots, a"d "horl ankle boots with sait"rs.

\\ hill Iing c1;lbor,lte piJX"S or \\ alking ):,{icks. known as . Jrolcholl'slock'. The si!{11 behind Ihe L" Illerofl: izier, ho\\C\'cr, warm lhe pas.~erb) to be careful: 'If }OU \\ant to ~l'C horne a~
or

IH't'ded to mo\'(.' quickly. and lighHW'ight cquipmt"lIt could make tll(' dim'rellce hC!\\'l'ell life and lkath. 1-'1: Obrrn·achlmri_fla.. lrlilfair· NrgilT/rlll j :

Crimm./Vl3 inlerl'Slin~ alld rare example of till' uniform and insignia worn by a 1);lJl.i:crjagcr crewman of .l.L\\ I'D. Thi~ Ohl'n\achtmeistcr, or hatlny ser· geant major, inspl'Cts a Stllnngcschull. III of 3.' \ R S \dlilc in transit to ~ollthern Rus:.ia. The ncwlyis~urd I.uflwaffc camouflaA"c smock is worn onT the NirgabJII.fr. This three-quai'll'!" kngth camouflage smock, splTially de~igncd for the Luft\\ane fidd di\"i~ions, hecame their mosl distincti\'(:, piece of clothing. The five-button smock was worn \\ith or without the /lying eagle on till' hr('ast. Shoulder ~traps with rank could be pinned 011 to tlJ(' smock, or leO otT The smock was i:'SllCd in '~plin,('l"' and 'water' patterns, although most pen;onncl, including- this l\CO, \\'Of(' the former. III addition to thl' ullique camoufla!{c slllo<.·k, the serge
.\11

}'':1: Ji(~rr, :!:!./.l.l'FD: (;rl!fJbom, 1!J_/3 This I'enuil "as initially as~igncd 10 2!.l.wfD al GroBbOrll trainillg camp in earl) 19~3. When the LuflwaOi.: dtTidcd 110t 10 comptelc tht· tll'gallization of Ihi~ di"ision mosl of thl' personnel in Iraining were reassigned to 21.l.wFD or to olher duties. l!cre Wt' see a recruit ullClergoing instruction in ba~i(" marksmanship. He wears a t>.lodel Ig35 ~ll't'I helmct wilh the Lufiwallt· f1yillg" cagle deeal on the len side. Undcr tlll: Zdlvallll, the recrui(~ uniform is the f)rilJirhrll/;;'lIg, a denim fatigue suit normally given 10 m'w soldicrs and useful for training, maintcnann' WOrk find f.1.tigue dutil'~. \\'hell the field divisions were first organized ill latc 19F, XIll.fliq~CTkorpsordered that the dellim latigue uniform hl' "om b) all soldiers in traillill~ in order 10 pr~nl' sl'n'ice uniform siocks for aClUal field usc. The hi~her Luft\\affe headqu:lI"tcn; also specified that the \\hite denim ratit1;ue :'Iuit \\ as to be turnl'd in and replaced \\ ilh a o;imilar suit of oli'e gn'l'n: phtlwgTaphs of Luft-

Ford M .. ult;er or 'o,Flak R~im"nt 311 tow;n.!l a lHl nun Flak dur;n.!lthe retreat through Estonia, August '944.

J8

\\nffe fidd di"i~ion trainee:. sho\\ that this order \las not implemcnted. As all ecollomy mcasure, the Luftwafk inlroduced short ankle boots and ga iters a tiel' I 94 I to replace the 111 a rcb ing bOOl s. In some caSl'S Lu/iwaflt.: units received bluc-grey ca nvas ga it l'r~, whi Ie others had i\ t'lll y-is.~uc 1a tl or grey gail('rs.

Fj: Ft.Jt/u'rh,I, I.Jii!!.t'r Rq:imm/ 37: !Jrr,t:m, '91.1 l\CO ~ulxn'iscs rille training prior to Ihe

Thi~

mm'Cllll'llI of [9.L\\ FD 10 "eSlern Europe. A veteran of l.uftwalIe Lehr-Infanterit-Regimcnt '~loskau', Ihi:. <;oldieI' fought in Ru!>sia and ri'lurned to Cit-rlllallY in J~H3 as cadn' for lht, Ilew divisiQn. 11(" wears the swndard Lufiwalle ovcrcoat and retains rank insignia on it~ collar: Ihe Air Fon't' prohibited this for l'nli:.tt'd lItell and NCOs aftt'r OClober [g.p and for onkers in the spring of 19~3. The II'nj{n!farh, Sel'll here is lor llU'ndJl'Th of lite fl ~ ing branch: the I,t'hr- I1l1;\l1 terieRcgillU'nt was orig-inally cOllceiv<.'d as a test unit for innllltt'y t"'ctics and air-ground support. The lack of l'x)l("t"icnccd ~COs in tnalty fidd llltiis proved a nitical shortcoming-, alld did nOl improve when the ArlllY assumcd ('011t1'01 of'the field divisions in autUlllll [9-1-3. (;1:

(;mrraJmajor SrhimJif. COfllmaTuJ,r.

:!I .Lu'[-,D:

Or/1)6", '.9/3 Ct'lltTalmajor Schimpf is sho'\ II Ilt're ~hortl} Ix·fort' hi~ replaccment "hen Ihl' fidd divisions tramfl'l'rcd to the .\rm~ in autumn J9-13. Ilis dress i~ of illtt'n'st lor .sc,eral uniform items, The LufIwalTl' capt'. in particular. wa~ rardy ~t'etl ill Ihe fidd alier the outbreak of the war: the commander

45

four-pocket ydlow-I,lll tUllic with open collar, exposing a Ian shirt anc! tit'. r\o in~igllia wa~ normally \\orn 011 the ('ollar although thl' Lufi.\\alle (1)ing eagle i~ localed Oil the hn';'I..Sl. Rank insignia \\a~ r('~tricted to Ihl' epallkt\(,~ or. in thl' case of el1li~h-,d mell. to (ht'\TOll~ 011 the leli. arm. The bagg) IroU~('I':>, wilh a large POC:kl'l on the upper left Ihigll. arc tucked inlo ~hon ankle hoots and gailel':>. liD\\' knO\\ II dITi:-i\'I'ly as 'retreat' gaite.....

T .....u.S .. br...... durin!! Ihr $umrnrr 1!H-t r ..treot, Geor; J ..!!olsk.i (Irfl) and nlrmbers of .0.FlaJ< R~Unrnl p. J".!I01sk.i h:ad prrviously Rn.·ed with 2 •. FD(L) unlil r1Irly '9'14 :and, followin.!l his rN:O".. ry fronl .. "'ound, _ t ; rr1lni!"ed 10 2,fl.. k Di",ision. Hr Wr"U thr Luft_IT.. Splu.lrr pau..rn eo.mouflasr smock and lralhrr m .. rchin!! boots.

of Z I, 1..\\ PO \\ C.ln. 1111: blliC-~rt·) clolh \ el""lon \\ ilh Ihe gold tagh: c1a~p~ .1\ Ihe lOp, Schimpf's cape rollars arc nOI pipcd in \\ hite .IS prescribed for offin-rs of gl'lll'ral rank and il i) llncerlai n \\ 11<."1 her the I;trge. h,lIId-embroidcrcd I{old \\ire eagle is actually \\01'11 on Ih(: uppl'r Il·n 'lrm. Hiso\ercoal also I;lck~ 1Ill' ,\hit(· lapels. bUI 11:Is piping. In accordance \,jlh I..urtwam: rtXul.ltions, no rank is WOI'll Oil tlH' nillar" oftlH' O\I'IToat -it j~ display('d only on 1Ill' epauleues. The popularit) of the :\ II 9+ ~ fidd ra p \\iI..S such Iha I il \\as \\ Ol'll by all ranks fnllll,JiiW'r I() G,'n''l"almajor. SI'himpf\\('ars a fidd rap wit h KCIll'f:d' ~ g"old pi pi 11,1{ on the (TO\\ n. G:l: I,'(II/ollier, :l.Arlillrrif-Nfgiml"llt 22: AthclIS, AII,t(IHI191J

Sl:l"\iee in Greccl' \\as perhaps the bl'~t dUI~ for LuHwidll: fidd divisioll pl'!"wnncl, During the early pilrt or the war I 1.I,wFD served as OCClIpatioll tr()op~ in thl' Balkalls,with minimal risk of (·ombat. l\lo~r ~()Iclicr~ ~pnll tlH'ir lim!' guarding railway linl'~, patrollitll-( tile cOlllllryside. and generally cnjO) in/; a Ics~ hl.'(\ie \\ar. This artillery private ha~ been po~tl.'d 10 ~eCllrl.: the ammunition dump ofhi~ rcgiment against ~al)()lagc. Clad in the I.un \\ affe t ropic.11 1I11iform ,I nd helm!.'l. he pr('senls a diSlinct i\ e figu re. ISoSued to 30 per n'llt of a unit's total strength. thl.' tropical helmel prO\ ("d cumbersome and fell out of I:l\-our \\ ilh the troops. The tropicalulliform is ~CCII here \\ith the fi\e-bUllon.

G3: Rei/tr. I. ]iigrr Ne,!!illlrnt .jO: I.u({(l. Srptember 19.J.-1 19.FO, L) \\a~ eOtl\l.'l"\ed illlo a hil')dc-moulltcd unit by the .\nny at Ihe hegillllillt{ of 19+1-. \rhilc the regiments retained tll('ir in[lIltry identification, Ihe .\nn) ga\(' th()),(' compallic~ alld hattalions equipped \\ilh hiqcks Iht' hOlloun. and tradilion~ orthe ea\ airy; tl1i~ lI11'allt lhat haltaliom changcd to '~quadrons' ami r'1l1ks 1001.:: 011 e.n-alry symbolism-e.~. Iiallpllllann Iwc;tme Rittnu.:istn alld .J:i~er hceame Reiler. ~\I til(' same lime th(' di\·isiOiI reccived Illltll('roU~ rC'plan'm('nb: mOSt. hO\\ e\ er. \\t're older ml'lI ami poorly mit(:-d to ridin~ biq c1e~ ilitO hallie. ·I·hi~ Reiter ill Italy \1 car:. a mixturt, of uniforms and in:;ignia, \\'II('n Ih(' I\rmy :L~:-lInl("d comrol of the field di\"i~joll:-\ ,..upply lunClion~ and di~tri­ butioll channels also uudenlCIH Ch'lIlgC-. IIt'llIs of Gcenn ..n cr..... b ..iting OUI 2t>mn, flak!!uo eWI'I..crlncnt in Courland, November '904<4. The Ober.....chl.meisler...nothrr form .. r m ..mb.. r of ,".t·O(L), w .... u Ihe W... r Ordrr of tbe Grnn .. n ero.... in Gotd, lind w.~ killrd in ..ction ~hordy .. nrr lhi,. pholograph w ..,. taken. "I.Flak Di",ision foughl brside lhe rCnln .. nlS of"l l.t·O(L) unlil c",..cu"led in M .. rch '945'

comnlon I.uftwatk wear, ~Ilch a~ tIl\' (I) ing' blouse, h('canH.' harder 10 oblain, and Army clothing was w,c-c! to replan' worn-out Air Forn' llllilorms. This private \\cars the Jl{'W \Iodd 19+:l ..\rIllY sen'iee IUllie.:1 cheaper \'arianl ofthet'arlil'r ~I(ldel 1936. lie has ,\rmy imi~lliil on Ihl' ("ollar and, interestill~l~, till' )dIO\\ 1l"f!/fmfarlN of the ca\alr~ mounted l><:niOllnd of zo,FD LJ were permitted thi~ pri\ilel;:c b~ tilt.' ,\rm~ ill ('Oldy JlIl~ 19+,~. Dt':o.pitc Ihe ~11913 service IUtll<' and .\rm) ";unouflag:e trousers, Ihe Luft"an(' affili;lIion i<; SLill apparellt from the;" II 9+:l fidd ca p and the ,\ir rorec Ground Combal Ihdgt,. 11i,~ equipment is ~Landafd .\rmy iSHII', with til(' helt huckle for t'lIlis!I:d Il1I'Ill bers of Ihe I.un" allt', HI:

1/(/11flllI/fII/II. Fu.~i lier

JJala ilion '7: P([(j'oW f- /<;/1 rr ,

AI/gilli 1,914

Directing- fifl' against ;Hh-allcillg: Amcrican forccs, Ihiscaptain from Fu~ilier Bataillon 17 of r 7.FD{L) is onc of tIl(" few Air Forct' orlin'r" :-,till assigned 10 the divi<;ion: Iht" majori l} of tht'lll left the ulli I prior to the Normandy ill\'asion and \\t'!"t' replaced wilh .\rmy ()ffic("~. lit, wears the normal uniform for an officer of tilt' Luft"afle at Ihi~ limt': the f\1 [9+3 field eap. f1yill~ hlou.-.e note German eros.'> ill Gold , hlut'-~n'~ trou:-,crs, and ankk 1X>Qls and ~aite~. L'ndn the s.... mt· .\rlll} nrcl,... allth(Jrizill~ tilt" ll:o.(' of the arm-of-sen:kt, colour and titlt':-, of Ihe c:\\alr~ ill .lo.fDI L .Jager and Fusilit...... orlht" remaillill,l.{ Held di\-isiOllf> adopted .\rmy illj;.llItry \\hilt' 1I"n./fnljilfbc and I1t'\\ dt':-,ignatiolls in July 19 H· Dt'~pilc Ihe lack of tillle 10 ehall,L((' 11'f!Uellfarb,. thi~ olliet'r halo managnl to obtain ('paulctlcs \\ilh while underlay to eotlronll to the Arm) elilTt"liw.

II;!: F!/,I/·Iirr. Fusilier /JalaillrJII 17: p(/(),-Sur-I:.:lIre, .11l~1I,\1

I!J././

.\ p ..i\alc of the same battalion "e[It"; Ihe unique I.ttfiwam, camouflage ~mt)("k "hilt> defending his

Staff or 'Z •• t'l}(L) in Courland, D-to:eem~r '9+1' With th.. .."c"'p';un or th", LurlwafT.. offic..r 00 Ihe ter., all m",n wear army un"ornts. C",ocralmajor H",nz.. ill in the c",nlre and Hauptmann Schwuppe, who tater ",,,n,,,,d lh", Ka.iShl's Cross in March '945> is S",.Hed 0.,,,, 10 th., LurlwafTe ufficer,

positioll wIlh an i\lG:H' The ~n[(}ek was tht' primary fidel unirorm for r 7.FD;L) and ('0015 \\Cre :-,Iill WOnt by some Luft" aile f>cr~onncl al Ihis ~Iagl' of Ihe \\ ar. ff1: Ohmllcllinalll, I.J.FDf LJ: . \onl'f!,r. ·\/(17 f9J5

Only Olll' Luli\\alle field di\'isioll still ('xi'>ted in an} fil-:"hlitl~ strcn~th \\hcn tht, Third Reich ("ollap~('d in ~la~ 1915: [1.FDl!. 'lurrendcred to .\Hied loree~ in l'\orway "ithoul (idlll;: a :-,hol in ang:n, This aniller~ staA' oAleer of lhe di\ isioll mardw:-> il1lo caplivl\)' III til(' LuI"L\\alIe t'amollflag:e ~Illock and normal Air Force uniform. By thc cnd of the W;lr lht" t'afllorrfla~,' ~tlloek had losl i\~ aflilinlion with lhe field di\'i~iolls and was worn b) I\ir FonT personnel ~("l"\'illg ill a vnriclY or scralch or,l.{anis;l1iollS. This (Jffict'r'~ ralher jaunty look is achiew'd by rnnovill,l{ lht' rigid cap wire of his Sd,irmm,il:;,-an ulI:ltho..il:cd, bUI common praeliet' a mOil,\{ Luftwalleolliecrs.

+7

INDEX (lkfereuc""" 10 illuslmtiOlls are shown ill bold. 1'1.'les an: shO)l<"n ..;(h Cd!,t;"Tl 1,C'101"'I III bI".ld.ClS,) 1..1d

1-.,., ).k1ndIl.1l. 9. II. a (til

lu.n..-.i'I"j r. '!l.I' It

~

II~of_I""I~ ...

't ld""" to.td o..-:.n 9.11. It. 16 'ldll_II_,:J7 3

rridlMnion9.1I.11i

1_.......

.,.. Il _\~I:rI.3lI .. , t1.id 1),,_... ,. II. 16 ~ 'WId 0 . . _ (Llltw>&I:r. r..IA.......... lOrId 1),,-....9. II. 13. I" 16, t1 U.'» 6. litId 0.._ (1.........137, jjo( _ _ O"_ _ '.li ~ ,...._ f-_ 0.._... 't, ..... 10. 12." ~ • ."...... f'l<'Id 0..-... 9. 12. 11. U. l'

...... 1I..

I~,

113 (471 F;,·I,llJ;,i'lOn (Luf,...",r<) 3i

(W",atk) IY• .'I
EI

1);.,;';"'" 13, 1~16 111 f'kld 1);,,\01<., (J.,h r-36 21 hoi" 1lft....., U.. d_~) '7. :lIl.~2. 43.4'.~1 21 Luf.....o" l"";,,\d I>n , 9. 12. I~. 17.~. n." 'It 1.....w-..n.. I-or\d On, 17 tel F'! H~I

d'

NugM.

.. I(:'l!l)

CI

u

,1n.-..-.....

D(~o\-oIjl

>dwtr>_p<>r'01117,19fl ~.~

\c-.drfn>«- 01. 19-11 "'I

, - ......... !t.:u

It. l.J

\<~3.6,9

»-)t".'l7,Ctl161

~

_"'II"""'.IO/l2IHI

lO.CI (ill

_

\I,ktl.GcncnI r.m..-d Iltol'!_I"7:!1 I.... I~ \Ii", Ibo.... _ 01. 191,'l 1:'-16

.... '..... 0(42)

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The uniforms, equipment. history and organisation of the world's military forces, past and present.

Luftwaffe

Field Divisions 1941-45 Hermann Goring raised the Luftwaffe Field Divisions (LwFD) during 1942, when Nazi Germany was still making spectacular gains but was first feeling the pinch of its losses on the Eastern Front. The Reichsmarschall decided to raise his own divisions for

Uniforms and insignia

ground service under the command of Luftwaffe officers.

Full colour artworic:

On 17 September 1942, Goring called for volunteers from throughout the Luftwaffe for cOmbat duty in the East. Even before that date, however, some Luftwaffe troops were heavily engaged against the enemy in Russia in a ground role. Kevin Conley Ruffner's engaging text tells the Unrivalled detail

Photographs

fascinating story of the LwFD.

ISBN 1-85532-100-9

OSPREY PUBLISHING

www.ospreypublishing.com

9

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