The historyofPoland was a historyofa people whoindomitably struggledtopreservetheirnationalidentityand cultureunderan to regain theirfull alien rule and yet soughtevery opportunity independence.7
The unequalled historicalcoincidence of 1918,which saw all powers (Germany,Austria,and Russia) threeofthepartitioning defeatedpoliticallyand militarily,enabled thePolish nationthat had successfully preserved its identity to grasp for full sovereignty;butduringthenextyears Poland had toundertakea series of heroic militaryeffortsto preserve this independence, and the Polish particularlythe Polish-RussianWar of 1919-1920 uprisingsin the Silesian and Poznan regions. This inter-war period in Poland was not one of peace, as experienced by the citizens of France or of Britain,but a state of siege. It was a periodofconstantpolitical,military,and economictension,with intensitiesof anti-Polishguerrillaactivitypromoted fluctuating by the Soviet Union. It was a period of diplomatic stress; the FrenchAlliance was notalways dependable,and Britainshowed its outrightand consistenthostilityto Poland.8 Germanynever at any time hid its intentions.Following the signingofthe Locarno Treaty in 1925,Stresemann,the German Foreign Minister,stated, I turntospeak ofourEastern frontiers.BoththeCzech and the Polish Foreign Minister,M. Benes and M. Skrzynski, wishedto collaboratein preparingthe TreatyofLocarno, and broughtwiththemplans fortreatyofarbitrationwith theircountries,which we did not accept for discussion. They were chiefly anxious to obtain a pact of nonaggression,that is to say, a pact whichwould have seriously engaged us to abstain fromall initiative.That engagement we have undertakenin the West,but we have refusedit forthe East. Mr. Stresemannreceived the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925! A hostile Germany,by concludingthe Rapallo Treaty with Russia, presentedPoland withthespecter of a fourthpartition, whilethecustomswar (1925-1933)waged by Germanyadversely affectedPolish economy.10The 1933non-aggressionpact with Germanywas an attemptto regularizerelationswitha neighbor, but Poland had few illusionsabout ultimateGerman intentions and strovetobuttressFrenchresolutionand to alert and interest Britain in the affairs of Eastern Europe and challenge Germany's expansion. In Aprilof 1939,as a resultof Germanyannexingthe Czech State, the BritishGovernment,formanycomplex reasons, offeredPoland an alliance to protectRumania. This developed into a United Kingdom-Polishmutual security alliance, whichled directlyto Germanyrenouncingthe PolishGerman non-aggressiontreaty. But only in May of 1939 did negotiationsbetweenPoland and Germanyover the Polish Corridor and Danzig break down. The apparent strengthof the Polish,French,and UnitedKingdomalliance stillgave hopethat Hitler's bluffwould be called and the general war and minor bordercorrectionsmuchfeared by the Poles would be avoided. From 1920to 1926,the Ministerof MilitaryAffairs(Minister Spraw Wojskowych)was in charge of the Polish Armed Forces (Wojsko Polskie). He was appointedby and accountable to the PresidentoftheRepublicand thegovernment.The General Staff was appointedby and accountable to the Minister.The Polish Constitution providedthatin the event of war the Commanderin-Chief(Naczelny Wodz) would be appointedby the President withtheadvice and consentofthegovernment.In 1925,following Pilsudski's coup d' etat, the command structureof the Polish
warArmedForceswasdividedintoa peacetimeanda potential timetrack.The positionof InspectorGeneral(GeneralnyInspektor)was createdwiththeGeneralStaffplacedunderhis and led bypassedthegovernment jurisdiction; accountability
directlyto thePresident.In theeventofwar, theInspectorGeneral was automatically to become the Commander-in-Chief. Under the InspectorGeneral were a numberof senior officers whowere delegated officersoftheInspectorateand whohad the titleof"ArmyInspectors." The ArmyInspectorateswere designated as potentialarmy commandersto facilitatethe greatest flexibilityin planning militaryoperations either in the East (Soviet Union) or the West (Germany). The rationale forthismove was to freethefuturearmy commandersfrompeacetime administrativeduties and to enhance theirabilityto concentrateon monitoringand advising on the combat proficiencyof futuresubordinateunits. There was a political and ideological component attributed to this (Pilsudski's) decision. Pilsudski himselfstated his wish to remove and keep theArmyfreeofpoliticsas an embodimentofnational prideand consciousness.Pilsudski's criticsargue thathe wanted to keep exclusive hegemonyover the Army. The Ministerof MilitaryAffairs remainedresponsibleforthe day-to-dayrunningof the peacetime army and for executive implementationof such tactics and training norms as were suggested by the Inspector General. From 1925 to his death, Pilsudski occupied both the positionof Inspector General and thatofMinisterof MilitaryAffairs,butdelegated therunningof the ministryto two vice ministers.FollowingPilsudski's death (1935),thepositionsofMinisterofMilitaryAffairsand Inspector individuals.In 1935,the ConGeneral were assigned to different stitutionwas changedtoreflecttherealityofthepast tenyears. The State of the Polish Army FollowingthevictoryofthePolish Armyover theSovietUnion in 1920,rankedbymanyeminentmilitaryhistoriansas one ofthe decisive battlesoftheWesternworld,thePolish Armyenteredan era ofcomparativestagnation.1IDuringthefirstdecade ofindependence, generouslyequipped with French World War One to vintageequipment,it presenteda formidableforce,sufficient deter the Weimar German Republic from unilateral military action. The Polish-Frenchalliance of 1921had sufficientcredibilityto give furtherpause to German revisionistpolicies. Duringthatperiodlittleoriginalmilitaryequipmentwas conceived or producedin Poland. The exceptionwas the Polish Air embarkedon Force, whichunderRayski's command (1926-1939) a very ambitious (thoughdebatable) policy of becoming selfsustainingwithPolish designed and builtfighterplanes. These began to enterservice intheearly 19309s.12The main effectofthe wentintothebuildingofthenew portof Gdynia period 1925-1936 on the Baltic and the developmentof a new industrialcenterin Central Poland (C.O.P.-Centralny Okreg PrzemyslowyCentralIndustrialComplex.) The deathofMarshal Pilsudski,themarchoftheGermansinto the Rhine Province, and Hitler's open renunciationof the Versailles Treaty limitingGerman militaryforces all occurred in 1935. This became a watershed year for Europe and Poland, confrontedwith the inevitable,had to modernizeits Army.A special committeewas appointed(K.S.U.S.-Komitet do Spraw Uzbrojenia i Sprzetu-Committee for Armament and Equipment)and began to studytheneeds and make recommendations about modernizingthe Polish ArmedForces. An heroic proportionofthe Polish nationalproductand ofPolish taxes was channeled intoa Six Year Plan forthe build-upof the Polish Armed Forces. This budget was in excess of 5 percentof the national productand more than33 percentof state taxation.13 The major thrustofthemodernizationprogramwas inthearea of motorization, communications, the strengtheningof en-
and gineering forces,andthecreationofadequateanti-aircraft ofmajorcavalryunitswas anti-tank defenses.The usefulness debated,and a decisionto abolishcavalrydivisionswas imthoughlLlcavalrybrigadeswereto remain.These plemented, 19
were to be strengthenedby motorizedinfantryand tank reconnaissance units and become the nuclei forfast, lightstrategic units.Infantrydivisionswere to gain increased mobilitywhile heavy and medium artilleryand the engineeringsupportunits were to be completelymotorized. Specificationsforthenecessary equipmentwere detailed,and Polish industry,which had been laboriously and painfully created over the past ten years, began to produce equipment eitherof its own design or under license fromsuch reputable firmsas BoforsofSweden (artillery),VickersofBritain(tanks), and Browning of the U.S.A. (machine guns). The effortat motorizationof the ArmedForces was being implementedin a countrywhichin 1936,accordingtoa reporttothePolish Chiefsof Staff,showed a total of 24,000motorizedvehicles of all kinds, shapes, and sizes inthewholeofPoland. Thisshouldbe compared to 112,000motorvehicles in Czechoslovakia,nearlya millionin Germany,and over two millionin France.14 StrategicDoctrinein Polish Army One ofthecriticismsdirectedat thePolish MilitaryCommand is thatit was boggeddownin an archaic (1918)doctrineoftrench warfare.The paradox ofthiscriticismis its incompatibility with its alleged cavalry mentality.Credence has been given to both argumentseven thoughan elementaryanalysis ofthe situation showsthemto be notonlyincompatiblewitheach other,butalso doubly inaccurate. Polish militarydoctrinewas a product of experiences gained in the Polish-Russian War of 1920. That year-and-a-half longwar,foughtovervast terrain,was primarily one of fluid strategy and of constant maneuver. Tactical achievement was measured not as in France (1914-1918)by numberofmiles gained,but in the capture ofessential railroad junctionsand theout-maneuvering ofenemyarmies.15 In theWar of 1914-1918 hundredsof thousandsof lives were at times sacrificedforthe illusoryadvantage of a fewmiles gained or a few miles defended,as in the case of Verdun.In 1920,however,the expenditureof100lives gained wholeprovincesand also affected significantinternationaland diplomatic consequences and repercussions.This experienceof defensein depthby maneuver, ratherthanofa staticsystem,heavilyinfluencedthewholeoperational doctrinein the Polish Army.One ofthe veryfirstexamples ofa blitzkriegactionwas theraid on Kowel carried outby a mobile Polish columnin 1920.16 A WarCollege was formedin 1918,and formanyyears General Faury of the French Armypresided over this College. It was clear fromthe beginningthatwhile French militaryprinciples could be and were transplanted,the methodologycould not. Many of the basic premises available to a French ArmyCommander, e.g. in the logistical supply of ammunitionor in the densityofartilleryfire,were simplynotavailable to the Polish equivalent.17 After Pilsudski's return from his political moratorium,General Faury was replaced by a Polish officer. There were manypoliticaldifferencesbetweenFrance and Poland,particularlyovertheLocarno Treaty,whichcontributedto the situation,but undoubtedlyPilsudski was also influencedby his perceptionof the unrealityof much that was being transplantedto the Polish scene. The Polish War College continued, however,to be botha creative settingwhereideas were studied and analyzed, and an academic institutionwhere officerswere educated in staffwork. In retrospect,it appears that to some extentit was an "ivorytower" situation,and the analogy ofan academic institution and the "real world" holdsfortherelationship of the War College to the actual command structureand problemsofthe Polish ArmedForces.
Muchhas beenmadeoftheallegedfactthatthePoles hadan irrational optimistic attitudethat,givena war withGermany, theywould"watertheirhorsesintheOder."Undoubtedly, official propaganda was optimistic, as official propagandais inevit20
ably in any country.There is no indicationfromthe officialrecordsthatanypersoninthegovernmentor intheseniorpositions oftheArmedForces had anythingbutthemostrealisticperceptionoftheproblemsfacingPoland. In 1936,as partofa theoretical exercise, the War College was asked to explorean offensiveand defensivewar against Germany,with or withoutthe military cooperation of France. This theoretical exercise again emphasized and postulateda war of maneuver and a defense in depth. The conclusionswere extremelyprecise, accurate, and notat all grandioseabout theabilityofthePolish ArmedForces to carry out a defensivewar against Germanywithoutactive French intervention. The assessment made was thatthe Polish ArmedForces had a maximumofsix weeks to holdoutbeforeits ultimate destructionby the German Army."8Had the Soviet UnionnotattackedPoland on September1939,itis likelythatthis estimate would have held. It has been alleged that Smigly-Rydzwas an inexperienced general who was unable to lead theoreticalmap exercises or discussionsat thelevel oftheWar College. Kopanski,w'howas a seniorstaffofficerin 1939(head oftheOperationsSection) and in 1943-1946 chiefofthe Polish General Staffin London,thuswrote aboutSmigly-Rydz:.. ."a soldierwitha splendidwar recordand experience,perhaps too quicklywentthroughthevarious levels ofcommand,and did nothave higherstaffor War College training."19 It is unlikelythatSmigly-Rydzwas that ineffectual.His background as an Army Commander in 1920,and his efforts during1936-1939 to upgrade the qualityof the Armyand ofstaff inputdo notallow such easy condemnationor generalizations. KnowingtherealisticsituationofthePolish Armyand knowing the theoretical level of knowledge which was accessible to itis muchmorelikelythatthisapparentignorance Smigly-Rydz, was due tothefactthathe couldnotreconcilerealitywiththeory. Smigly-Rydzknewthe theoreticalmaximumlimitsfora defensive parameterofan infantrydivisionwhichwere accepted and taughtat the War College, but was confrontedwiththe reality that eitherthe numberof such divisionshad to be doubled (an impossibility)or thatlarger areas had to be defended.SmiglyRydz was disgustedwiththe political inspiredmove of a twodivisionCorpsintothePolish Corridorin thesummerof infantry 1939to protectPolish interestsin Danzig. This was insistedon by Beck (Foreign Secretary) but was a militarydisaster. In 1938,aftertheoreticalexercises held underthe auspices of the War College, it became obvious to the participantsthat a 24-hoursuccessful counter-offensive carried out by an armystrengthforce(in Poland, 3-6divisions)woulduse theequivalent ofa month'sproductionofammunition.Afteranalyzingthepossibilities,Smigly-Rydzstated,"Whateverhappens,withor without ammunition,fightwe must and fightwe shall." The commentator,Litynski,writes,"These wordsheld a deep impacton the audience. This was an expressionofthe real Polish Military Doctrine- the doctrineof poverty."20 The InspectorGeneralfaced manyobviouspracticalproblems such as lack ofsufficient men,an armywhichwas tecnologically backward, particularlywhen compared to Germany, and extremelylong indefensiblefrontiers.These were furthuraggravated by thelocationofmostofPoland's heavy industryin very close proximityto the German border and, to all intentsand purposes,indefensiblefromaerial attack. In manycases it was withinshellingdistance ofheavy artillery.In some oftheseregions fortifications were planned, and some were constructed. Some of the riversystemsconnectedby lakes and canals were
also viewedas strategicand as gooddefensive positions. Plans weremadefortheconcentration ofa reservearmy(Prusy)tobe in sucha strategicpositionas to givea severeand potentially knockout blowto thoseGermanarmieswhichmightbreakthe perimeters butwhichwouldpresumably be wearyandbloodied. MILITARY AFFAIRS
Modernization A frequentcriticismof the Polish militaryleadership is that theywerepreoccupiedwitha conceptofhorsedarmies and had a cavalry mentality.A cursorylook at the budgetfiguresforthe cavalry or thetotalnumberofofficersand otherrankin cavalry service does notsupportthiscontention.The growthbudgetfor cavalry was only14 millionzloty(0.29percentoftotal), and the actual numbersofofficersand menincavalryservicewere35,434 or 8.1 percentof the totalforce.21 The questionofthe Cavalry cannotbe separated fromthe developmentof the Polish ArmoredForce. Until 1930,very much along thelines advocated by French militarydoctrine,armored unitswere an integralpart of the infantry.Tanks were seen as slow movingvehicles whichcould provide infantrysupportby destroyingenemy emplacements. By 1930,this doctrine was questionedin Poland, and tank units were integratedwiththe existingmotorizedunitstoformtheArmoredCorps.The creation ofan independentArmoredCorpsin Poland may be comparedin timeto thecreationofthismodernbranchofland forcesin other countries.It occurred in 1933in Germany, 1939in the United Kingdom,and in 1940in the United States afterthe events of September 1939.There was no independentArmoredCorps in France priorto 1940.The comparisonofdates does notsuggesta lack of appreciationforthis technologicaladvance.22In 1936,a separate OfficersCadet School for the Armored Corps was created followingthe precedentsofthe cadet academies forthe Artillery,Infantry,Cavalry, Air Force, etc. The polemics dealing with the problem of motorizationof Polish Armed Forces prior to 1939,continueto this date. That therewere strongregressivetendenciesamong manyseniorofficers in the Polish Armed Forces and in othercountrieswho looked askance at "new fangled" notionsis, undoubtedly,true. the British Army estimates Dixon describes how in 1935-1936 called foran increase in forageexpensesforhorsesfrom44,000to 400,000pounds sterlingto meet Hitler's announced 36 division 23Ontheotherhand,itwas realized thatthestrength Wehrmacht. and technologicalskillsoftheArmywouldbe onlyas functional as the backgroundof the populationand the national economy; toupgradethequalityoftheArmedForces and muchoftheeffort was directlyrelatedtoattemptstoupgradethegeneraleconomic and technologicallevel of the country. One ofthe methodsofimplementingmotorizationwas forthe Armybudgetto be used to assist civilians in purchasingtrucks. Such civilianpurchases wouldpromotetheeconomyofthecountry,serve to develop a technologicalsophisticationin the community,and in the event of war the truckswould be subject to militaryrequisition.It was plannedto allow fora mobilizationof 9,100 trucks, which would have substantially motorized the horsedrawnsupply columns (an Achilles heel of the Army in September1939)and allow forlimitedmotorizedmovementofup to one regimentat thedivisionlevel and one divisionat thearmy level.24The problemspertainingto theformationofarmoredor motorizedunits were related to economic issues. It has been argued out thatto transport20 troopersin a truckwas cheaper thanto purchase,stable, and feed20horses.This is an appealing numberof argument,exceptthatPoland didnothave a sufficient trucks; in fact,truckswere in shortsupplyforcrucial areas of supportingservices in 1939,reachinga totalof 11,000in military and civilian use in Poland. Due to the small numberof motor vehicles in prewar Poland, few (even among the educated) had the basic drivingskills,let alone mechanical skills. In 1936,thefollowingdoctrineemerged. Motorizedunitswere
capableof infunction, tobe ofbrigadesizeandwouldbe flexible Theywouldbe selfsupoperations. instrategic support infantry Tank enemyarmoredthrusts. andcapableofopposing porting withmotorized abletointegrate wouldbeindependent, battalions 1939,theArmored or cavalrybrigades.On September infantry FEBRUARY 1979
Corpswas able to musterthefollowingnumberoftanksofPolish production:light (TK and TKS) - 574; medium (7TP) - 161; FrenchRenaultR35-49 whicharrivedin Poland inthesummer of 1939.25Thirteenlighttanks were distributedto each of the eleven cavalry brigades and eleven lighttanksto eighteenfront divisions.The mediumtankswere groupedin indeline infantry pendenttank battalions of 49 each and were to be assigned to divisions,or cavalry supporteithermotorizedbrigades,infantry brigades as strategicneed dictated.They were thuskept in the dispositionalreserve of the Commander-in-Chief.26 The Polish High Command may indeed have been guiltyof havingbrokenup its tank unitsintotoo manyand insignificantsized units.It has been argued withobviousmeritthathad all the lighttanks dispersed among the infantrydivisionsand cavalry brigades been centralized, then on 1 September 1939,Poland wouldhave had at least twomoremodernmotorizedunits.Much is made of the fact, and withreason, that the 10thMotorized Cavalry Brigade (one of Poland's two fullymodernbrigades) superiorGermanunitsand did notsufferthe heldoffconsistently loss ofmanpowerand materialthatwas thefateofall otherunits, and cavalry alike. Thereis one furtherpointthathas not infantry namelytheoil been addressed at all in muchofthiscontroversy, and gasoline requirementsand supply.Prior to September1939, Poland did have oil fields (Boryslaw), but the exploitationwas limited, both in total amount obtained and the refinery capacities. Motorizationhad to develop in a systemic and sequential fashion and again demanded a civilian capacity for economicdevelopment.Also it raised the spectreoflack ofselfsufficiencyin event of hostilities. The Air Force Contraryto much popular writing,the Polish Air Force was neitherthe Cinderella of the Polish ArmedForces, nor was the High Command as ignorantof its potentialas has oftenbeen averred. A look at the typical annual budget is essential. The annual Polish MilitaryBudget was approximately760 million zloty,and theAir Force share was 76 millionzloty.The six-year postulateda total of 4,759million rearmamentplan, 1936-1942, zlotyto be spent on modernizingand buildingup the military industrialbase. This was the growthbudget.Ofthis,860million zloty(18 percent)was set aside fortheAirForce; 668million(14 percent) foranti-aircraftdefenses; 574million(12 percent) for artillery; 548 million (11.5 percent) for armored forces and anti-tankdefenses; and, please note,20 million(0.4 percent)and 14 million(0.29 percent) forinfantryand cavalry respectively! defensesbudgetwas 32 The combinedAirForce and anti-aircraft percent of the whole, hardly evidence of underestimatingthe importanceof the Air Force.27 The problemofdevelopmentand doctrinehas also come infor question and criticism.The fledglingAir Force played an imin providing portantpart in the Polish-SovietWar of 1919-1920 Armycommandersreconnaissance and frontline groundsupport.In the firstdecade of independence,the main operational doctrineswere based on that early experience with some enthusiasticair advocates imbuedwiththetheoriesofDouhetproposing a large independentstrategicbomberforce. By 1931,the High Commandhad settledon the Air Force as being a ground supportand reconnaissancearm witha fighterAirForce component.This RegulaminLotnictwa(AirForce Regulation)became the basis for the growthof the Air Force and thus led to the The limitaissuance ofplane specificationsand factoryorders.28 tionsimposedon theoperationaldoctrinewere due to a realistic appraisal of the capacity of the Polish State to supportsuch an
specialty. military demanding expensiveandtechnologically Thegoallaidoutin1935wasthatthePolishAirForcewastobe by1941,andwas toconsistofa totalof78 reequipped completely squadrons;of these,21 wereto be bomber,10 pursuit(two21
and"Przyczynki dohistorii materialowych przygotowan obrony Polskiw latach 1921-1939" [Background to the historyof the economic ofPolandbetween1921and1939]Bellona, preparations 3 (1959),235-256. GeneralWiatrwas chiefoftheFirstSectionof theGeneralStaff(i.e. dealingwithmattersoforganization and mobilization) andQuarter-master GeneralofthePolishArmed Forcesin theSeptemberCampaign. 211. 14. Kozlowski, 15. Davies,235.Davies impliesthat,as a resultofthiscampaign,Sikowski wrotehisclassicPrzyszla Wojna [ModernWarfare],(N.Y.: RoyPublishers, 1943).A youngFrenchsubaltern, de Gaulle,was in Polandin 1920andsubsequently advocateda technological professional armyforFranceinhis Vers l'armee de metier. Davies writes,"His (de Gaulle's) lecturesat Rembertow provided thefirstoccasionwhentheconceptsofLe Fil de l'Epee tookseed.His mindwas originalenoughtograspthe truth,whichnowadaysseems obvious,thattechnological deficiencies presented theonlyseriousimpediment to a marriage betweenthehighlydesirablemobility ofthePolishcampaigns (1919-1920) and thefirepower oftheFirstWorldWar" (269). 16. C. R. Kutz,"Pilsudskiand theRussianBear," War on Wheels,The Evolutionof an Idea, Ch. 8 (Harrisburg:Military ServicePublishing Co., 1940).
terattacks wassought. TheFrenchSomua wasnegotiated forbut couldnotbe obtainedin viewofFrance'sownneeds. 23. N. T. Dixon,On the PsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence (N.Y.: Basic Books,1976). 24. Kozlowski, 218. 25. E. Grove,WorldWar Two Tanks (N.Y.: ExcaliburBooks, 1976)."The 7TP anditspredecessors weregoodtanksfortheir time.Theirfirepower, at least in thejw was stillgoodby 1939 standards,but theycould notcompensatefornumericalin" Grovefurther feriority. wroteabouttheperformance ofPolish tanksincombatduring theSeptember Campaign:"Onthefourth ofSeptember, theSecondBattalion(PolishArmored)destroyed six Germantanksandtwoarmoredcarsforthelossofone7TP, andthenextdaywipedoutan entiremechanized column.Onthe samedayina majorarmoredbattle,elevenGermantankswere destroyed fortheloss oftwo7TP's." 26. The 10thMotorizedCavalryBrigade consistedof two motorized cavalryregiments (each approximately equivalent of a Britishbattalion)plusfullsupporting motorized unitssuchas reconnaissance, artillery,anti-tank batteries,engineers,and logisticalsupport.The BrigadecrossedtheHungarianborder, wasreconstituted inFrancein1940, andagaininScotlandin1941. It participated intheBattleofFalaise Gap andfinished thewar 17. W 50-lecie Powstania Wyzszej Szkoly Wojennej w as partoftheAlliedArmyofOccupation inCuxhaven. It was the Warszawie[Onthe50thAnniversary onlyPolishArmyunittogothrough oftheCreationoftheWar thewarwiththesameofficer Collegein Warsaw],ed. W. Chocianowicz cadre! (London:Poets' and Painters'Press,1969). 27. Kozlowski, 63-73. 18. The Reportof GeneralT. Kutrzeba,in Wojna Obronma 28. M. Peszke,"The OperationalDoctrineof thePolishAir Polski 1939,WyborZrodel [Poland'sDefensiveWar1939,SelecForceinWorldWarII; A Thirty Year Perspective," Aerospace tionsofSourceMaterial],(Warsaw:M. 0. N., 1968),33-34. Historian,23 (1976),140-147. 19. S. Kopanski,WspomnieniaWojenne1939-1946 29. Kozlowski, [Memoirsof 356. theWar1939-1946], (London:Veritas,1961). 30 W.Kozaczuk,Bitwa o Tajemnice [TheBattleforSecrets], 20. S. Litynski, 3rded. (Warsaw:Ksiazkai Wiedza,1975;M. CieplewiczandM. "UdzialWyzszejSzkolyWojennej przedR. 1939 wksztaltowaniu PolskiejDoktryny Wojennej"[Thecontribution Zgorniak, Przygotowanianiemieckiedo agresji na Polskie w 1939 oftheWarCollegebefore1939inthedevelopment ofPolishMilitroku,w swietle sprawozdan oddzialu II sztabu glownegoW. P. aryDoctrine], Bellona (March1955),30-38. Dokumenty[Germanpreparations foraggressionagainstPo21. Kozlowski, 34-38. landin1939as documented ofSectionII oftheGeneral byreports 22. Kozlowski,185-220; M. W. Zebrowski, StaffofthePolishArmedForces.Documents]. Polska Bron PanThisstudygives cerna [PolishArmoredForce], (London:WhiteEagle Press, theactualword-for-word fromAprilto25August reports, weekly 1971).For an EnglishlanguageaccountofPolishtankdevelopand subsequently daily of intelligence reportsaboutGerman ment,see P. Chamberlain andC. Ellis,Tanks ofthe World1915preparations fortheinvasionofPoland.Thisis an Englishlan1945(N.Y.: GalahadBooks,1972),149-156; J.Wiatr,"Wsprawie guagesummary. rozwojubronipancernejprzed1939r"[On thedevelopment of 31. W. Iwanowski,Kampania Wrzesniowa,1939[September armoredforcespriorto 1939]Bellona, 3 (1956),31-37.General Campaign,1939],(Warsaw:Pax, 1961),507. WiatrwrotethatsincePolandhad noplansforwarsofaggres32. R. Kennedy,The German Campaign in Poland, 1939 sion,a tankwhichwouldsupportinfantry in defensivecoun(Washington: GPO, 1955),120.
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