[Stackpole] The Breaking Point - Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940

THE BREAKING POINT

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THE BREAKING POINT Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940

Robert A. Doughty

STACKPOLE BOOKS

Copyright © 1990 by Robert A. Doughty Published by STACKPOLE BOOKS 5067 Ritter Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 www.stackpolebooks.com All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Stackpole Books. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 STACKPOLE FIRST EDITION Cover design by Wendy A. Reynolds Front and back cover photos from Blitzkrieg France 1940

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Doughty, Robert A. The breaking point : Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 / Robert A. Doughty. pages cm. — (Stackpole military history series) Originally published: Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1990. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8117-1459-4 1. Meuse, Battle of the, 1940. 2. Sedan (France)—History. I. Title. D756.5.M4D68 2014 940.54'214312—dc23 2014012870 eBook ISBN: 978-0-8117-6070-6

For Georgia Hanes Doughty and John Lee Doughty, Sr.

Contents

List of Maps Foreword Preface Introduction Chapter 1. Strategy and Doctrine Chapter 2. The German Fight in the Ardennes Chapter 3. The French Fight in the Ardennes Chapter 4. French Defenses Along the Meuse Chapter 5. The German Attack Across the Meuse Chapter 6. The French Fight Along the Meuse Chapter 7. The German Pivot and Breakout Chapter 8. The “Counterattack” by the 55th Division Chapter 9. The Second Army and XXIst Corps Chapter 10. The Failure of the French Sixth Army Chapter 11. Conclusion Notes Select Bibliography Index

Maps

Dispositions of Forces and Plans, 10 May 1940 The Fight in Belgium, 10–12 May 1940 Bodange, 10 May 1940 French Positions on the Meuse, 13 May 1940 1st Panzer Division, Crossing of the Meuse, 13 May 1940 Pivot and Breakout, 13–15 May 1940 Situation Morning, 15 May 1940 Battle of the Meuse, 10–15 May 1940

Foreword

W

illiam Faulkner once wisely observed that truly great literature invariably plumbs the “old verities of the heart.” Great military history achieves a similarly lofty standard. It probes the timeless, often grisly truths of bloody battle. Judged on that scale, Colonel Robert Doughty's The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 has much to offer its readers. Colonel Doughty paints a striking picture of the remarkable events of mid-May 1940 when General Heinz Guderian's superbly trained XIXth Panzer Corps traversed the tortuous terrain of the Ardennes, punched across the Meuse, and quickly unhinged the entire strategic design of the French Army. Viewed from the comfortable perspective of 1990, the determination and vigor of the German campaign and the contrasting doctrinal inertia and leader languor of the French appear all too obvious. But these are not the timeless truths of great military history. The truly valuable lessons which Doughty draws from the Wehrmacht's decisive victory affirm the critical importance of surprise, deception and, above all else, small-unit preparation and tactical acumen. He reminds us that company actions win battles. Guderian's so-called miracle on the Meuse proves, in reality, to have been no miracle at all. As battles throughout the ages always have, this fight confirmed that the best-prepared companies of warriors with the sharpest short swords ultimately carry the day by defeating their opponents’ will. Moreover, the fight around Sedan once again demonstrated the inviolable axiom that the victory invariably goes to the dynamic frontline leader who exploits maneuver to focus combat power on his enemy's weaknesses, who uses terrain as a lever not as a solution, and who personally intervenes when decisive action is required but does not exercise overriding, oppressive control of his subordinates. I am convinced that in this fine volume Robert Doughty has achieved something beyond a highly informative battle narrative and an incisive assessment of the fascinating pantheon of characters who achieved victory and suffered defeat along the Meuse. He has shown us the face of battle and underscored many of the ageless truths of armed conflict. In doing so, he has given us some great military history.

—Crosbie E. Saint General, U.S. Army Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army

Preface

F

ifty years after the fall of France, an investigation of the 1940 campaign seems in order. The timing is particularly opportune, for the French have made available their rather extensive archives relating to the fighting in 1940. Though a great deal of important material was destroyed in the chaotic days of the six-week campaign, the French made an intensive effort in subsequent years to collect materials relating to the campaign. As a result of these efforts, they now have more than 2,000 cartons of documents relating to 1939–40. Perhaps more importantly, the French made an intensive effort shortly after 16 May 1940 to accumulate personal statements and after-action reports from individuals involved in the fighting around Sedan. Some were completed as early as 18 May; others were completed much later. The reports include statements from most of the battalion, regimental, and division commanders involved in the fighting around Sedan. They also include reports from many platoon and company commanders, as well as key staff officers. Altogether, these reports provide a wealth of information—sometimes contradictory, sometimes obviously false, but always useful—about the fighting around Sedan and permit an unusually detailed analysis of the battle. Additionally, a remarkable amount of material about the campaign is available in German archives. Shortly after the May–June campaign, the German Army collected after-action reports from commanders at all levels in the XIXth Panzer Corps. While these reports are less detailed and emotional than the French reports, they also provide a wealth of information about the battle. The existence of the German after-action reports for the 1940 campaign is fortunate, for many of the archives for the army were destroyed in a bombing raid and ensuing fire on 27–28 February 1942. Some of those remaining from the 1940 campaign were singed or partially destroyed in the fire. When the French reports are combined with the German reports, they agree to a surprising extent. Despite the chaos and misconceptions that usually exist on battlefields, the most important differences pertain to time. In short, the combination of the French and German reports permits an almost unique opportunity to examine this important campaign in detail. And the

campaign itself offers numerous examples of the complexities of modern warfare. During the course of my research and writing, I have benefited from the assistance of a number of friends and colleagues. Among those who have provided encouragement and insights during my sabbatical in Pennsylvania were Robert F. Frank, Harold Nelson, Ted Crackel, Jay Luvaas, Charles R. Shrader, Rod Paschall, and Roger Spiller. At West Point, my debts are too numerous to list, but I am particularly appreciative for the support and advice of Colonel Paul Miles. I am also grateful for the confidence and friendship of Brigadier Generals Roy K. Flint and William A. Stofft. General Robert Bassac graciously allowed me to conduct research at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre in Paris. Key assistance with German materials came from Major (Dr.) Karl Frieser of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Without Dr. Frieser's generous suggestions, my discussion of the Germans in the 1940 campaign would have suffered significantly. Captain Robert J. Edwards willingly assisted me with the translation of German materials. Special thanks are due to Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski of the Department of History at West Point for having completed the maps. As usual, however, my greatest debt is to my family—Diane, Mike, and Kevin —for their patience and toleration. While it is difficult to exaggerate the value of the assistance of those I have mentioned and others, I alone am responsible for the text. The opinions expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Military Academy. Any errors in fact or interpretation are solely my own.

Introduction

O

n 14 May 1940, the day after the Germans crossed the Meuse River at Sedan and while heavy fighting was still ongoing to the south, General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Panzer Corps, visited some of the high ground overlooking the area where his soldiers had crossed the Meuse. As he surveyed the strongly defensible terrain, the remarkable success of the German attack struck him “almost as a miracle.”1 The advance across the forests and hills of the Ardennes, the crossing of the Meuse, and the seizure of high ground on the far side of the river had occurred so rapidly and so smoothly that its stunning success seemed almost miraculous to Guderian. The German “miracle,” however, was based less on supernatural forces than it was on sound military preparation. Ultimately, Germany won the campaign because her military forces were better led, had a sounder strategy, and had developed more viable tactical and operational-level doctrines. And France lost because her leaders tried to manage rather than lead, her strategy was ill conceived and based on fallacious assumptions, and her tactical and operationallevel doctrines were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her. What seemed to be “almost a miracle” at the time in fact came from a better prepared force rapidly overwhelming an inadequately prepared force. Although the fighting around Sedan had an enormous and immediate effect on the history of the world because of the fall of France, it has continued to affect world history because of the myths that surround it. One of the most important of these myths pertains to the nature of the blitzkrieg, or lightning warfare. Immediately after the unexpected collapse of France, military leaders and analysts tended to portray the campaign as the classic example of the blitzkrieg. They marveled at how effortlessly German tanks moved through the dense forests of the Ardennes, punched through the decadent French defenders, and rolled almost unopposed toward the English Channel. Almost in unison, they declared that the main feature of this new mode of warfare was the shock action of devastatingly effective tanks and airplanes—aided by mobility, speed, and surprise. Perhaps the earliest example of portraying the 1940 campaign as something fundamentally new came from President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an address to a

joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives on 16 May 1940. In his remarks, the president said: Motorized armies can now sweep through enemy territories at the rate of 200 miles a day. Parachute troops are dropped from airplanes in large numbers behind enemy lines. Troops are landed from planes in open fields, on wide highways, and at local civil airports. We have seen the treacherous use of the “fifth column” by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of an enemy unit of occupation. Lightning attacks, capable of destroying airplane factories and munition works hundreds of miles behind the lines, are part of the new technique of modern war. The element of surprise which has ever been an important tactic in warfare has become the more dangerous because of the amazing speed with which modern equipment can reach and attack the enemy's country.2 By emphasizing the revolutionary nature of blitzkrieg warfare, President Roosevelt sought to alert Americans to the threat emerging in Europe, but he unwittingly cooperated with German propagandists in distorting the actual nature of the fighting in 1940. In fact, the blitzkrieg and its success in 1940 rested upon techniques and procedures as old as warfare. A key component of the myth surrounding the blitzkrieg pertains to the role and dominance of the tank, for most military observers saw the campaign of 1940 in terms of its having decisively demonstrated the importance of the tank. This assessment came partially from the feeble attempts by some of the French participants to explain the swift collapse of France, but it also came from the conscious efforts of the Germans after June 1940 to portray their army as invincible and thus as an army to avoid. The polished propaganda machine of Nazi Germany energetically publicized the rapid sweep of the tanks across France and the terrible offensive power possessed by them. Although one must acknowledge the important role played by the tanks, their contributions would have been significantly less without the remarkable performance of the German infantry. In fact, the fighting around Sedan was more a victory for the German infantryman than for the tanker. To add to the misunderstanding of the campaign, French veterans of the 1940 campaign frequently complained of the supposed superiority of German weapons and equipment. Though deficiencies in weapons and equipment did affect France's performance, her army possessed materiel that was roughly equivalent to Germany's in quantity and in quality. The Allies and Germany had about the same

number of tanks, and France probably had the best tank with her SOMUA S-35. Similarly, France had excellent antitank weapons. Her 25mm gun, which was her main antitank weapon, could penetrate the main armor plating on all German tanks except for a few Mark IVs that had additional armor plating added to their front slope. The only area of the army in which France had a distinct deficiency was in her woefully small number of antitank mines. The main area in which Germany had a clear advantage was in the superiority of the Luftwaffe, but she also had advantages in her more extensive use of radios, in her longer-range 105mm howitzers, and in her excellent 88mm antiaircraft weapon, which could double as an antitank gun. Nevertheless, Germany's small advantages in materiel did not provide the margin that assured her victory.3 The key difference between the two countries was not the weapons themselves, but how the weapons were employed. Another myth to emerge from the battle was the importance of the dive bomber for providing close support to ground forces. For those British and American leaders who recognized the superiority of the German Luftwaffe, the specter of diving airplanes with screaming, howling noises exercised a remarkable influence over their development of aircraft in the period immediately following the battle. For reasons that are more psychological and emotional than scientific, the Allies were captivated by the specter of aircraft unleashing bombs on point targets and providing support to mobile forces that artillery could not provide. In fact, the dive bombers did have a powerful effect on poorly armed and inadequately prepared troops who were vulnerable to their psychological effects, but they rarely destroyed an armored vehicle or a bunker. More importantly, the overwhelming German advantage in the air failed to isolate the Sedan battlefield and prevent the French from reinforcing the threatened sector. Then too, the collapse of the French defensive effort at Sedan convinced many military observers that the French soldiers of 1940 were not worthy sons of their fathers who had died willingly and by the thousands in the infernos of World War I. The panic of the 55th Division and the subsequent collapse of its defensive efforts seemed to come from a rotten core of French will and morale that somehow was linked to the contradictions and cracks in French society, decaying aspects that later became so apparent under the Vichy Regime. In fact, the failure of the 55th Division came from its poor training, its poor preparation for battle, and its poor leadership. The problems of units who suffered from a lack of cohesion were magnified by an inadequate doctrine that encouraged the sort of leadership habits that contributed to the collapse in 1940. By emphasizing numbers and combat-power ratios and paying insufficient attention to cohesion and small-unit leadership, French military leaders in the Sedan region weakened their units rather than strengthening them. Burdened by the task of digging trenches

and building bunkers, they neglected to train their soldiers adequately and to inculcate in them a will to fight. Despite the pervasiveness of the myths surrounding the defeat of France, the reasons for her failure are to be found elsewhere. As can be seen in the 10–16 May campaign that culminated in the breakout of the XIXth Panzer Corps southwest of Sedan, France's failures stem partially from her own inadequacies and partially from the ability of the Germans to concentrate overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. As I have previously written, the Germans “outfought the French tactically and outsmarted them strategically.”4 French Army doctrine was unsuited and inadequate for the war Germany was prepared to fight in 1940, and the strategy of rushing forward into Belgium was particularly vulnerable to the German attack through the Ardennes. Adding to France's difficulties, her army and its leaders lacked the proper flexibility and responsiveness to reply to the unexpected. Whatever the advantages for the Germans, however, the campaign was not “a walk through the sun” for them. General Guderian acknowledged this when he described the German success as “almost a miracle.” By focusing on the battles fought by the German XIXth Panzer Corps between 10 and 16 May, this book seeks to investigate the inadequacy of the French military response and the superiority of the German response. Also, the book seeks to investigate the battle of 10–16 May 1940 as a complete campaign, from beginning to end with all its turns and twists. For modern mechanized warfare, a study of the deep attack of the German XIXth Panzer Corps and the attempts by the French to defend against it offers one of the finest opportunities available to study the operational level of war and to analyze a deep attack by a corps, as well as a prepared defense by a corps. Because the terrain remains relatively undeveloped and remarkably unchanged, the battlefield also provides a marvelous opportunity for detailed analysis on the ground, or for what the U.S. Army now calls a “staff ride.” Thus, by focusing on the XIXth Panzer Corps and its opponents, this book examines the experience of a finite number of French and German units and analyzes a single campaign in detail. Such an analysis should provide insights into the different approaches of the two countries toward leadership, tactics, operations, and strategy. The reader, however, should not forget that the XIXth Panzer Corps was only one of three Panzer corps that crossed the Meuse in the Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan areas. To enable the reader to follow the intricacies of the campaign, I have chosen to separate the German actions from the French reactions. While I present both sides, to include aspects of the Belgian experience, I devote greater attention to the French than to the Germans. The reasons for this reside partially in my greater

interest in the French, but it is also influenced by the nature of the campaign. Since the Germans have the initiative, the French must react to their actions. Therefore, the “French” chapters delve deeper into issues relating to the operational and strategic levels of war.

CHAPTER 1

Strategy and Doctrine

T

he fighting that occurred near Sedan between 10–16 May 1940 was shaped by the competing strategies of France and Germany. To halt the Germans, France relied on a defensive strategy. While holding along the fortifications of the Maginot Line on the northeastern frontier, and while placing a minimum number of forces along the Ardennes, she planned on rushing forward into northern and central Belgium and occupying strong defensive positions. By fighting from prepared, entrenched positions, she thought she could halt the main German attack, which—she believed—would come through the broad avenue of approach extending from Maastricht, to Gembloux, to Mons. After weakening the enemy and building up her own and her allies’ forces, she intended to resume the offensive and achieve victory. To concentrate her forces against France's weakest point, Germany relied on a daring offensive strategy. By attacking northern Belgium and the Netherlands with a minimum number of forces, she sought to deceive the French and convince them that the main attack was coming à la Schlieffen in 1914 through northern and central Belgium. When France moved into northern and central Belgium, Germany intended to deliver the decisive blow with a heavy Panzer force through the center of the French forces along the Ardennes. The distinguished British historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, has aptly described the operations against northern Belgium and the Netherlands as serving, like a “matador's cloak,” to distract the attention of the French from the deadly thrust that was coming through the Ardennes.1 Tragically for France and her allies, her strategy played directly into the hands of the Germans. After pushing some of her most modern and mobile forces forward into northern and central Belgium, she could not respond adequately to the gaping hole ripped in her lines between Dinant and Sedan by three German corps. The result was a disaster for France and her allies. FRENCH STRATEGY

The goal of France's strategy was the avoidance of defeat, rather than the immediate gaining of victory. She believed victory could be hers only if she first managed to defend herself successfully against a German attack. When France developed her military strategy after World War I, almost all her senior military leaders agreed on the necessity to defend the national territory by placing fortifications along the northeastern frontier and by establishing a forward defense in Belgium. While the experiences of World War I and the terrible damages to France's countryside had a significant effect on her decisions, the realities of geography and the possibility of an attaque brusquée (surprise attack) from Germany dominated her thinking. France's approach to protecting her frontiers was greatly influenced by her misfortune of having a major portion of her natural resources and industrial capacity near her frontiers and thus within easy striking distance of the Germans. This vulnerability contributed to her adoption of a strategy emphasizing defense of this crucial war-making capability. To defeat the more heavily industrialized and populated German state, she accepted the requirement for a total war and the complete mobilization of all the nation's resources. If the area along her frontiers, which contained a large portion of her industry, natural resources, and population, were lost to an invading enemy, her mobilization would be seriously disrupted and her ability to wage a total war would be eliminated. French military strategy had to be functional within this important constraint. Clearly, misfortune had placed a significant portion of French economic wealth and potential dangerously close to the German threat. Within a triangle formed by Dunkirk, Strasbourg, and Paris, France had about 75 percent of her coal and 95 percent of her iron-ore production. And most of her heavy industry lay within that same triangle. Drawing another triangle between Paris, Lille, and Rouen would encompass nine-tenths of the factories producing French cloth in the 1930s and four-fifths of the factories producing woolen goods. In that same area France manufactured most of her chemical products, all her automobiles, and all her aircraft. France recognized that coal, iron, and factories are the basis for the materiel side of total warfare. She also knew that her war-making capability would be seriously weakened even if she managed to hold the enemy along the same lines where the Germans had been halted in 1914. If the Germans launched an unexpected attack and seized a significant portion of the territory containing the bulk of her natural resources, the war could be lost in a matter of days.2

At the same time a major portion of France's population resided near the natural resource and industrial centers. The problem of manpower for the French armed forces had long been a source of gloom. From the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, the ratio of Frenchmen to Germans progressively declined. In the late 1860s the Germans slightly outnumbered the French in numbers of men aged twenty to thirty-four who were in the prime period of their lives for military service. By 1910 the Germans had increased their advantage to a ratio of 1.6 to 1. By 1939 the Germans had more than twice as many men of military age.3 For manpower reasons as well as patriotic ones the Frenchmen living along the frontiers could not be relinquished to the enemy. The most important discussions over the strategy for defending France's frontiers occurred in the 1920s in the Superior Council of War, which was composed primarily of the senior generals in the army. The council exercised a

remarkable influence over the construction of the Maginot Line and the decision to establish a forward defense in northern and central Belgium. As did much of the political leadership, members of the council also believed that France had to be on the defensive initially and that fortifications would strengthen her defenses and enable her to overcome the manpower advantages of Germany. Fortifications would enable the comparatively smaller number of France's soldiers to fight more effectively. France and her allies would go on the offensive as soon as they had amassed sufficient forces and resources to defeat Germany. Such a military strategy, in the council's view, enabled France to overcome the significant disadvantages she had relative to Germany. In its May 1920 meeting, the first deliberations after the war on the problem of the frontiers, the Superior Council of War concluded that northern and central Belgium remained the major route of invasion.4 The French assumed that construction of fortifications in the northeast would encourage the Germans to divert their attack toward Belgium, and thus to attempt another version of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan. The likelihood of that occurring was heightened by the previous German violation of Belgian neutrality, the absence of geographic obstacles, and the location of a large network of roads and railways running directly toward Paris. Throughout the interwar period, the High Command did not deviate from this perception and demonstrated an unswerving preference to fight on Belgian soil in the north, rather than on French. The French leaders vividly remembered the disastrous destruction of precious agricultural, industrial, and mining resources in the World War I fighting. None wished for that to occur again. When the Superior Council of War met in May 1920, it also addressed the question of fortifications on the frontiers. While the session demonstrated a lack of consensus among the army's leaders about the function, form, and location of fortifications for defending the frontier, almost all agreed that some type of fortifications was needed. By mid-1922, the council was split between those who wanted a continuous line of defensive works along the frontier, reminiscent of the trench and barbed wire system of World War I, and those who wanted fortified regions that could act as centers of resistance to facilitate offensive actions or defensive maneuvers. Following five years of debate and discussions, the council adopted on 12 October 1927 the concept of deep underground fortresses in key parts of the terrain with smaller blockhouses and other obstacles along other parts of the frontier.5 Shortly thereafter, the French began building the massive fortifications on the northeastern frontier that became known as the Maginot Line. As they constructed the massive fortifications, the French decided not to extend them west across the face of the Ardennes. Throughout the interwar period, the

French perception of the Ardennes remained unchanged. With its heavy forests and steep hills, particularly in Luxembourg and along the Semois River in Belgium, the Ardennes was a significant obstacle to the rapid movement of large forces, particularly motorized and mechanized ones. When Marshal Philippe Pétain appeared before the Senate Army commission in March 1934, he reflected the views of the military when he emphasized that this sector was “not dangerous.”6 In comparison to the vulnerable resources on the northeastern frontiers and the absence of easily defensible terrain on the northern frontier, the Ardennes seemed to require less defensive preparation. From beginning to end, the French High Command treated the Ardennes sector as simply the connecting sector between the northeastern and northern frontiers. By September 1939 the broad outlines of France's military strategy had been drawn and had been decisively influenced by geographic, resource, and manpower considerations. While holding on the right, she would move into Belgium and establish a forward defense. How far she would push forward, however, depended upon luck and circumstances beyond her control. Those circumstances became particularly problematic in 1936 following Belgium's renouncing of her alliance with France. When Belgium assumed her neutral status, she was reluctant to enter into open agreements or arrangements with France, but she nevertheless permitted an extremely limited amount of cooperation to occur. Unfortunately, this limited cooperation pertained primarily to providing France information about her fortifications. By May 1940 France and Belgium had secretly exchanged information about the basic outlines of their war plans, but they had done very little to coordinate the details of these plans, particularly if Germany moved west through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium.7 Despite her grave concerns about her neutral neighbor, France planned on rushing forward and establishing a defensive position in northern and central Belgium. She assumed that Germany would violate Belgium's neutrality first and thus provide a basis for her entry into Belgium, or that the neutral nation would appeal for aid shortly before a German invasion. Therefore, she concentrated her most mobile forces along the border of western Belgium and prepared them to move forward rapidly. After these forces entered Belgium, France wanted them to avoid an encounter battle. That is, she wanted them to occupy a defensive position that could halt the German advance, and she wanted them to occupy this position before the Germans arrived. If Belgium appealed for aid prior to an enemy invasion, French forces could possibly join the Belgians in defending their border with Germany. If not, the French had three other lines along which they could defend. The first of these,

which was the farthest forward, ran from the French border at Givet along the Namur-Dyle, River-Antwerp line. The plan for placing troops along this line eventually became known as Plan D, or the Dyle Plan. The second alternative was to defend farther to the rear along the French frontier to Condé, through Tournai along the Escaut River to Ghent, and then either directly to the North Sea at Zeebrugge, or alternatively along the Scheldt (Escaut) River to Antwerp. The plan for placing troops farther to the rear along the Tournai-Escaut River-Antwerp line eventually became known as Plan E, or the Escaut Plan. The final alternative was to defend along the entire French border to Dunkirk. Of these three alternatives, a defense along the Namur-Dyle River-Antwerp line would be about seventy or eighty kilometers shorter than the other two.8 During the first weeks of the war, General Maurice Gamelin (the commander of French forces) preferred to be cautious and prepared to implement the Escaut Plan. Following the rapid and deep thrusts of German forces into Poland in September 1939, France's military leaders were deeply concerned about whether her mobile forces could reach and occupy their designated defensive positions in Belgium before the arrival of highly mobile German mechanized forces. Less than a month after the beginning of the war in 1939, the French High Command issued a directive to the commander of Army Group 1 that specified his mission and that placed the first priority on “assuring the integrity of the national territory and defending without withdrawing the position of resistance organized along the frontier….” The directive also noted that Army Group 1 could be authorized to enter into Belgium and to occupy a defensive position along the Escaut River.9 On 24 October a directive from Gamelin described the two main alternatives for occupying positions in Belgium, one along the Escaut and the other along the Dyle River. The directive explained that an advance beyond the Escaut could be considered only if French forces had time to reach prepared positions before coming under attack or if they arrived in time to prepare positions before a German attack.10 Thus, for the first weeks of the war, France favored moving no farther than the Escaut line. Only after it became apparent that the Belgians were strengthening their defenses along the Ardennes Canal and were improving the readiness of their forces did Gamelin become more optimistic about being able to send French forces farther into Belgium.11 During late October and early November, Gamelin concluded that the Allied forces could move forward successfully to the Dyle line. He favored the more ambitious strategy despite the suggestion of caution from General Alphonse Georges, the commander of the northern and northeastern frontiers, about the difficulties of reaching the Dyle line before the Germans

attacked. Georges’ concerns were not new, since the High Command had discussed the point on several occasions in peacetime. While the British initially expressed reservations about any move into Belgium, Gamelin discussed his plan with their top-ranking officers and managed to gain their consent. After detailed analysis and discussions, formal adoption of Plan D occurred on 9 November during a meeting of the Allied generals at Vincennes. In its meeting on 17 November, the Supreme War Council concluded that it was “essential” to hold the Dyle line. On that same day, Gamelin sent out a directive that provided details about the occupation of the Dyle line from Antwerp, to Louvain, to Wavre, across the Gembloux Gap to Namur, to Givet.12 Thus, by the middle of November, the Allies considered the Dyle line to be the most likely position to be occupied by their forces in Belgium. During the next four months, as the Dutch and Belgians improved their defenses, as the British Expeditionary Force slowly increased in size, and as the French forces became better equipped and trained and gained confidence in themselves, Gamelin's eyes began to look farther toward Holland. While adoption of Plan D was still being discussed by Allied officials, Gamelin began considering the possibility of moving into the Netherlands toward Breda. His concerns revolved around the strategic importance of the Netherlands. By sparing the Dutch from German conquest, the Allies could retain the ten Dutch divisions, secure North Sea communications, and deny the Germans an easy staging area for the launching of an offensive against Great Britain.13 By securing the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Allies could also move supplies by ship into Antwerp. The possibility of linking up with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River, or pushing across the river into Dutch territory, however, was an extreme variation of Plan D. On 8 November Gamelin sent out a directive that for the first time mentioned the possibility of a German invasion of the Netherlands. The directive emphasized the importance of preventing the bypassing of Antwerp on the west by pushing forces to the south bank of the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut). To accomplish this, Gamelin strengthened the left wing of Army Group 1 with the Seventh Army, which apparently moved into position in December. Prior to its being placed on the far left flank of the Allied forces, the Seventh Army—which included some of France's most mobile and capable divisions—had served as part of the General Reserve behind the forces designated to move forward into Belgium. According to its new mission, in addition to occupying the south bank of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Seventh Army would—after receiving orders to do so—move into Holland and secure the mouth of the river by occupying the peninsula on the northern bank

of its mouth.14 This was the first formal indication that the “Holland Hypothesis” was a possibility. Despite concerns in the High Command, Gamelin decided about two months before the German attack that the Dyle Plan and the “Holland Hypothesis” would include the advance of French troops toward Breda, which was soon known as the “Breda Variant.” He wanted French forces to linkup with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River or to make the linkup by pushing across the river into Dutch territory. On 12 March 1940 he issued a directive to Georges that coupled the Seventh Army's mission on the left flank with the Dyle maneuver and made the move into the Netherlands almost automatic. Georges, in turn, issued a directive to General Gaston Billotte, the Army Group 1 commander, which explained that if the order were given to move into Holland, the left flank of Army Group 1 would move into Holland as far as Tilburg, or as a minimum, as far as Breda.15 Thus, on order, the French Seventh Army was supposed to occupy a bridgehead between the Belgians in the south and the Dutch in the north. To reach this position, the Seventh Army would have to move past the Belgians along the Albert Canal and then pivot east. While carrying out the risky Breda maneuver, the Seventh Army would have to travel about 175 kilometers; the Germans would have to travel about 90 kilometers to reach Breda. During the last two months before the German invasion, the only modification to this plan came on 16 April when another directive addressed the question of the Germans attacking the Netherlands and leaving Belgium alone. The major substantive change was a modification of the area to be occupied by the Seventh Army, but the directive noted, “In this case, the Belgians may be hostile or passive.” The key point, however, had been included in Georges’ directive on 20 March. It explained, “If circumstances are favorable, our positions will be pushed to the Albert Canal. It is only in the case where the enemy has largely preceded us in Belgium that the Escaut hypothesis will be followed.”16 In making the decision about the Breda Variant and concomitantly weakening his reserves and his ability to concentrate forces elsewhere, Gamelin personally took the final step in the long evolutionary process in which the military hierarchy decided how to defend France's frontiers. Studies by the French military about sending forces toward Breda elicited strong objections from several high-ranking officers, but none were as prophetic as those voiced by General Georges. He emphasized the danger of committing most of France's mobile forces against a “diversion” when the main German attack could come through the French center. He also asked that the Seventh Army be replaced by a corps with two divisions and that the field army be returned to the General Reserve.17

As Gamelin's confidence in his forces had increased, he had allowed himself to be seduced by a grand strategic design of questionable value despite the objections of several of France's most senior and important generals. In return for the possible addition of ten Dutch divisions to the Allied cause and for the possible denial of the Scheldt (Escaut) estuary to the Germans, Gamelin sacrificed a significant portion of his strategic reserve and severely weakened the French ability to reply to an unexpected German move. That he would take such a risk must be attributed to his confidence in the ability of the French and Allied forces to halt the Germans. Additionally, Gamelin committed himself to the Breda Variant, even though staff talks were not conducted between France and the two neutral countries of Belgium and Holland, and even though Gamelin was uncertain of the response of the two countries. Neither country was willing to enter into detailed military cooperation with the Allies until Germany actually entered their territory. Because of his having designed the Breda Variant, Gamelin must personally bear responsibility for the riskiest aspects of the ultimately disastrous French strategy. Though he had made his way to the highest echelons of the French Army by being cautious and rarely taking chances, he chose a highly risky alternative when the destiny of his country and its allies depended on his judgment. The irony is that the French strategy was a conservative strategy, except for the Breda Variant. Had the Germans known that Gamelin was going to squander a significant portion of his reserves, they would have entered the campaign with greater confidence. By May 1940 the French and British were poised to carry out the Allied strategy. Army Group 1 had responsibility for the area between the English Channel and the western edge of the Maginot Line. The Seventh Army, B.E.F., First Army, and Ninth Army prepared to move forward and occupy the Dyle line, while the Second Army remained in position. After arriving at the Dyle line, the Seventh Army would occupy the area west of Antwerp and, if ordered, would move into Holland. After resisting a German attack, the Belgians were expected to fall back from the Albert Canal and occupy the river line between Antwerp and Louvain. To their right, the B.E.F. would have the most favorable situation, for the British were supposed to defend the river line between Louvain and Wavre, a distance of about twenty kilometers, with nine divisions. To their right, the First Army occupied what the French considered the most dangerous avenue of approach: the Gembloux Gap. This ancient invasion route included the area between the Dyle River and Namur. The avenue of approach through the Gembloux Gap ran along the northern bank of the Sambre River between Masstricht and Mons, had few natural obstacles, and aimed directly at Paris. The

First Army had ten divisions to defend its front of about thirty-five kilometers between Wavre and Namur. To its right, the Ninth Army was supposed to move forward between the First Army and the Second Army and occupy positions south of Namur along the Meuse River. To the right of the Ninth Army, the Second Army was the easternmost field army in Army Group 1 and had responsibility for the area between Pont à Bar (six kilometers west of Sedan) and Longuyon. Its eastern sector included a portion of the Maginot Line. The western boundary of the Second Army served as the hinge for the advance of the other field armies in Army Group 1 into Belgium. French military leaders believed the Second and Ninth armies occupied the “least dangerous” sectors in Army Group 1. Both armies had ideal defensive terrain to occupy along the left bank of the Meuse River. To their front was difficult terrain that would require substantial effort and time—the French assumed—for an invading force to cross. Behind Army Group 1, French reserves were relatively small. After committing the seven divisions in the Seventh Army (one light mechanized division, two motorized divisions, and four infantry divisions) to the extreme left flank of Army Group 1, the French had seven divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies that could be used as reserves for that sector of the front. Others, such as the 14th Infantry Division, could also be moved west from behind the Maginot Line. Except for the 53rd Infantry Division, however, the divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies tended to be south or north of the hinge between the armies. The placement of the reserves demonstrates the lack of concern by the High Command for the “hinge” between the Second and Ninth armies. It also demonstrates the concern of the High Command with the possibility of a German attack coming around the flank of the Maginot Line and turning southeast through the so-called Stenay Gap. Most of the reserves behind the Second Army were located so they could respond to this possibility. Much to the surprise of the French High Command, the German XIXth Panzer Corps turned west on 14 May in the area behind the hinge after crossing the Meuse River at Sedan on the 13th. If the seven divisions of the Seventh Army had been available on the 13th and 14th and had been committed in front of the German forces, the entire course of the war may have been different. On the morning of the 13th, however, the Seventh Army pushed the main body of its forces into Holland, the 1st Light Mechanized Division having established a screening force at Tilburg on the 11th. The main body did not reach Breda, for the Germans quickly pushed back the French covering force and attacked the French as they attempted to move northeast toward Breda. By the end of the day, the Seventh Army managed to hold a line between Bergen op Zoom (thirty kilometers

northwest of Antwerp) and Turnhout (thirty-five kilometers northeast of Antwerp) and thereby protected the estuary of the Scheldt (Escaut).18 However, the French never really established contact with the Dutch, for by the end of the 13th, the Dutch had been overwhelmed and had pulled back into Fortress Holland, the large peninsula that includes Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam. Unfortunately for France, she had wasted a significant portion of her mobile reserves by sending them toward Holland. With minimum reserves behind her long line of defenses between the English Channel and the Rhine River, and with her most capable forces being located behind the Maginot Line or being pushed forward into Belgium and Holland, her strategy proved to be particularly vulnerable to a German attack through the Ardennes. While General Georges played the primary role in placing individual divisions behind the main line of French defenses, General Gamelin personally devised the Breda Variant and forced his subordinates to accept it. Consequently, the responsibility for the primary weakness of that strategy must be borne by him. GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY In sharp contrast to the French, the German strategy in May 1940 sought a swift, decisive victory by the launching of a massive attack through the Ardennes. The initial plans for the war against the Allies, however, differed dramatically from the final plan that ultimately yielded victory in 1940. During the fight against Poland in September 1939, the Germans assumed a defensive position along the French and Belgian borders in the west to permit the concentration of forces in the east. After the swift victory, however, much of the military hierarchy preferred to remain on the defensive in the west. In particular, the senior leaders of the Army believed their forces were not ready for a difficult campaign against the Allies. The possibility of remaining on the defensive and seeking a diplomatic solution to the war appealed to the military hierarchy, which had a high estimate of the military capabilities of the Allies, particularly of the French. General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, noted in his diaries: “Techniques of Polish campaign no recipe for the West. No good against a well-knit Army.”19 Despite the reservations of German military leaders, the quick victory over Poland convinced Hitler that a similar campaign could yield victory in the west. On 10 October, Hitler met with his generals and read them a memorandum, a copy of which was given to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and to the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The memorandum is remarkable, for it is a clear statement of Hitler's aims and his views on military strategy. In the

document Hitler stated, “The German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the…consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.”20 According to Hitler, the main danger to Germany was a war of long duration, because neutral or even friendly states could eventually side with the Allies for economic or political reasons. A long war would also be difficult because of Germany's limited food and raw materials. The “essential factor” in the “victorious” conduct of a long war, Hitler said, was to safeguard industrial production in the Ruhr. Since the primary danger to the Ruhr was aerial attacks, Germany had to possess strong antiaircraft capabilities and excellent fighter aircraft. The control of the Low Countries was also important. Hitler explained, “If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces would be able to strike at the industrial heart of Germany and would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bombers to reach really important targets.” For Germany, her main military arms for waging a long war, Hitler believed, were her Air Force and her U-boats. Both could be “ruthlessly employed” against France and Great Britain.21 Throughout his memorandum, Hitler emphasized preference for a short war and the importance of annihilating the Anglo-French forces. He also said that the passing of every month enabled the Allies to increase their power. He added, “At present the German soldier is again the best in the world. His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others. Six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.”22 To avoid a decline in the readiness of the German military, Hitler wanted an attack to be launched in the immediate future. To his audience of the most powerful and seasoned generals in Germany, many of whom preferred to remain on the defensive in the west, he stated, “Attack is to be preferred to defense as the decisive war-winning method.”23 Though he said he did not have a detailed plan of operations, he wanted the operation to “concentrate solely on the annihilation of the…enemy resources.” If this attack failed for some reason, then the secondary objective would be to “secure an area possessing favorable conditions for the successful conduct of a long drawn-out war.” This area was obviously the Netherlands and Belgium, which could be used by German aircraft and U-boats. The occupation of the Low Countries would also deny their use to the Allies.24 Hitler then described the major outlines of German military strategy.

The German attack is to be mounted with the object of destroying the French army; but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the war. In these circumstances the only possible area of attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and Nijmegen in the north, excluding the Liège fortress. The objective of the two attacking groups thus formed is to attempt to penetrate the area of Luxembourg-Belgium-Holland in the shortest possible time, and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces…. An offensive which does not aim at the destruction of the enemy forces from the start is senseless and leads to useless waste of human life.25 Hitler's vision of appropriate strategy then was of an attack west on a broad front into Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. Though the attack aimed at destroying the French and British armies, its chances of success were small, but an attack on a broad front into the Low Countries would also seize a large portion of the Channel coast for the launching of operations against Great Britain and prevent the Allies from using the Low Countries for aerial attacks into the Ruhr. To ensure his reluctant military leaders complied with his directions, Hitler issued “Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War,” which ordered his generals to give him detailed reports and to keep him informed about the status of preparations.26 From the beginning, German military leaders recognized the improbability of “annihilating” the British and French forces with an attack into the Low Countries. On 14 October a careful examination by General Halder and General Walther von Brauchitsch (the Commander-in-Chief of the Army) of three possible alternatives pertaining to the overall situation yielded the conclusion, “None…offers prospects of decisive success.”27 After becoming convinced that his military leaders were dragging their feet on preparations for an attack against the west, Hitler became more insistent and then announced his “irrevocable decision” to launch an offensive against the west. He also fixed 12 November as the beginning date of the offensive.28 German military leaders continued to have reservations about the wisdom of attacking in the west. To emphasize the unpreparedness of the army, General von Brauchitsch and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of the German Armed Forces, met with Hitler on 5 November, the predetermined date for the issuance of the attack order for 12 November. Brauchitsch expressed concerns about the aggressiveness and training of the infantry, the adequacy of noncommissioned officers, and the status of discipline. After emphasizing his having discussed the

problems with subordinate commanders and of their having concurred with his views, he concluded by saying that the army needed intensive training before engaging in another campaign. Indignant, Hitler rudely dismissed him.29 The scheduled date for the attack was soon changed. In coming months, scheduled attacks were delayed twenty-eight additional times. Despite the reservations of German military leaders, the first plan for an attack on the west, which was given the code name “Yellow,” was issued on 19 October 1939, and it closely followed the ideas outlined in Hitler's memorandum of 9 October. Though the plan did not call for a repetition of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan, a strong north wing (Army Group B) would attack in a westerly direction through Belgium, while a weaker southern wing (Army Group A) protected its flank. Army Group B had responsibility for the main attack. Instead of seeking a decisive victory by driving into France, capturing Paris, and crushing the French Army, the objective of the first Plan Yellow was limited.30 On 25 October Hitler met with some of his leading generals, including Brauchitsch and Halder, to discuss the new plan. During the discussion, Hitler suddenly questioned whether it would be possible to attack west through the Ardennes and then turn northwest, thus enveloping the Belgian fortresses from the south.31 Strangely enough, this was apparently the first suggestion from anyone about making the main attack through the Ardennes and then enveloping the Allied left flank. While Hitler's idea did not include crossings of the Meuse as far south as Sedan, he soon became extremely interested in the possibility of placing the main weight of a German offensive to the south of Liège. On 29 October the High Command finished the second draft of Plan Yellow. Though the new draft strongly resembled the earlier draft, and though Army Group B retained responsibility for the main attack, it envisaged a deeper thrust by Army Group A, including a move toward Laon in France.32 While Hitler's heightened interest in the Ardennes may have influenced the General Staff, the plan still did little more than call for a broad attack that would push the Allies toward the English Channel. The plan stated, “All available forces will be employed…with the aim to engage in battle forces as large as possible from the French Army and their Allies on Northern French and Belgian territory and to defeat them, creating thereby favorable conditions for carrying on the war on land and in the air against England and France.”33 Unlike Schlieffen's plan, the 29 October plan promised a drawn-out war, an alternative that disturbed Hitler even though the plan closely adhered to his guidance of 9 October. Over the next two months the General Staff continued to work on its plans for an attack against the west, and some modifications occurred in the basic thrust of

the plan. Meanwhile, Hitler became interested in employing mechanized forces in the Ardennes. At the end of October he suggested using motorized forces for an attack in the direction of Sedan. On 12 November Hitler directed that the XIXth Panzer Corps (with two Panzer divisions and one motorized division) attack through southern Belgium and seize the southern bank of the Meuse near Sedan. Though Hitler directed that the XIXth Corps be attached to Army Group A for the attack, he did not direct the moving of the responsibility of the main attack from Army Group B in the north to Army Group A in the center. At the end of November the Army's High Command moved the XIVth Motorized Corps into the assembly area of Army Group A but retained the corps as part of the General Reserve.34 While none of the changes signified a shifting of the main attack, they permitted —after the campaign began—the shifting of the main effort from Army Group B to Army Group A. On 20 November Directive No. 8 from the High Command of the German Armed Forces formally authorized such a switch and ordered preparations for such a switch to be made.35 Thus, in a slight alteration of Army Group B having sole responsibility for the main attack, the Germans were prepared to reinforce any success achieved by Army Group A. After World War II, General Halder explained the rationale for retaining the flexibility to shift the responsibility for the main attack from one Army Group to another. He pointed out that the most important unknown in German planning was information about how far the Allies would advance in Belgium before they made contact with German forces. It was clear from the beginning, according to Halder, that if the Allies moved deep into central Belgium and the Netherlands, Army Group A in the German center could probably “force a decision by an encircling attack from the south.” Since the Germans could not predict how far the Allies would advance, they had to retain the flexibility of making either Army Group B in the north or Army Group A in the center the main attack. In summarizing “the fundamental idea” of the first plan, Halder wrote, “Decision as to where main efforts were to be formed was reserved until attack began.”36 Despite several changes, the plan provided the Germans little or no chance of annihilating the Allied forces. One critic later explained that the plan sought only “partial victory…and territorial gains.”37 Though criticisms and efforts for improvement continued, German military leaders recognized that the plan offered little more than a chance of seizing the Channel coast in Belgium and subsequently launching air and sea attacks on the Allies. Except for a few dreamers, virtually no one, including Hitler, expected a swift victory. In an unlikely sequence of events, the necessity to make fundamental changes

forced itself on the Germans when information about the plan fell into the hands of the Allies. A Luftwaffe major carrying a briefcase full of secret documents relating to Plan Yellow strayed in a light airplane across the Belgian border and crash-landed near Mechelen-sur-Meuse on 10 January 1940. Though the documents carried by the German officer primarily concerned the operations of the Luftwaffe, they contained enough information to reveal the outlines of the German plan if they were obtained by the Allies. As the major attempted to burn the documents, a Belgian patrol happened to come by and captured him. When the major was later being interrogated, he somehow managed to thrust the documents into a stove, but a Belgian officer shoved his hands in the stove and retrieved some of the burning documents. Extracts of the documents were provided to the French military attaché in Brussels that afternoon.38 Believing he was successful in destroying the papers, the Luftwaffe major later informed the German military attaché in Brussels that except for a few fragments, they had been burned. For a short period, Berlin was relieved, but soon after receiving this information, the monitoring of Belgian radio traffic revealed that the Mechelen documents had divulged critical information about Plan Yellow.39 At a time when Hitler was deeply displeased with the Allies’ having learned of Plan Yellow, he remained concerned about the improbability of a rapid defeat of the Allies if the old plan were followed. The idea of possibly making the main German attack south of Liège also intrigued him. Then one of his military assistants informed him about General Erich von Manstein's opposition to the existing plan and of his advocating a radically different alternative that called for a decisive defeat of the Allies. Beginning at the end of October, Manstein had completed six memoranda on his concept for launching the main German attack through the Ardennes south of Namur and for cutting off the Allied forces sent into Belgium. In contrast to the existing plan, which called for the main attack to come from Army Group B in the north, Manstein—who was the chief of staff of Army Group A—called for the main attack to come from Army Group A in the center. Under his concept, Army Group C remained east of Luxembourg, in front of the Maginot Line.40 On 17 February Manstein had the opportunity to present his ideas personally to Hitler. The following day Hitler summoned Brauchitsch and Halder and directed them to come up with a new plan in which the aim was to get “behind the fortifications line in Northern France at the very start.”41 Although the evidence is not completely clear, Halder had apparently begun working in November on a thorough analysis of Manstein's suggestion. A war game on 27 December 1939 examined Manstein's concept against three French

options: defending along the Franco-Belgian border, advancing into Belgium to the Dyle line, or advancing into Belgium to the Albert Canal. Though the war game demonstrated that Manstein's concept had merit in each case, the possibility of the French launching an attack from the vicinity of Verdun into the flank of the Germans created great concern, especially since the Germans could not foresee where the French reserves would be located.42 Despite these concerns, Manstein noticed in another war game on 7 February that Halder was “beginning” to recognize the potential of his suggestion. Perhaps more importantly, the map exercises in February demonstrated that shifting the responsibility for the main attack from one army group to another after the battle began could lead to confusion and loss of time. During this same period, the German General Staff concluded that while the Allies would not move forward into Belgium until the Belgian or Dutch borders were crossed by the Germans, they would definitely move forward. Halder later explained, “Clearly defined focal points could now be formed from the very outset, with corresponding alterations in the assigned missions.”43 In other words, after the Germans discerned the intent of the Allies to move forward into Belgium, the advantages of launching the main attack through the Ardennes and enveloping the Allied left flank became apparent. Thus Hitler and the military's senior leadership apparently came to the same conclusion independently but almost simultaneously about the merits of making the main attack through the Ardennes with Army Group A. The new concept, however, was not fundamentally new, for in reality the German High Command had toyed with its most important part when it established in November the possibility of reinforcing the success of Army Group A in the center. On 24 February 1940 the Germans published another plan. In addition to calling for the main attack to be launched by Army Group A through the Ardennes, the plan rested on a strategy seeking a decisive and swift victory over the Allies. To accomplish its mission, Army Group A in the German center had five field armies —three forward on line and two following in reserve. From north to south, the field armies were the Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth. Panzer Group von Kleist, which contained the XIXth and XLIst Panzer Corps and the XIVth Motorized Infantry Corps, moved ahead of the Twelfth and Sixteenth armies. When the XLIst Corps moved through the Ardennes, it would follow the XIXth Corps. To their north, the XVth Panzer Corps was attached to the Fourth Army and marched to its front. Thus the XIXth Corps and the XVth Corps acted as the spearheads for a massive phalanx of troops that included five field armies. If either of the two leading corps were halted, a gigantic and vulnerable traffic jam would occur to

their rear. In addition to having the mission of seizing the Netherlands, Army Group B, in the north, had the very important responsibility of ensuring the Allies believed the main attack was coming through northern and central Belgium. The Army Group's forces included the Eighteenth Army and the Sixth Army with a total of twentynine divisions, but the two field armies had only three Panzer divisions and two motorized divisions. To deceive the Allies as to the location of the main German attack, Army Group B would launch glider troops against the key bridges over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht and against the fortress at Eben Emael. It also would spread out its tanks in Holland and in Belgium along the Albert Canal near Maastricht. The mission of these forces, however, was not to drive deep into Belgium; rather, it was to draw the French and British into Belgium. In sharp contrast to the first plan, the second German plan sought a decisive victory over France and her allies. By rapidly moving through the Ardennes and crossing the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan, the Germans could break through to the rear of the French and British advancing into Belgium and cut them off. After destroying these forces, the German forces would march to the south and complete their victory with an enveloping maneuver. Despite the great success later achieved by the strategy, one should not forget the significant risks surrounding it. If the main German attack were identified early by the Allies, if Allied bombers caught German columns moving through the Ardennes, or if the French managed to hold along the Meuse long enough for reinforcements to arrive, the strategy may have resulted in disaster, rather than victory. In other words, German strategy was riskier than French strategy. Yet, it sought a swift victory, while the French strategy initially sought only to avoid defeat. FRENCH DOCTRINE Though the development of doctrine in both countries was influenced by numerous factors other than strategy, both the French and the Germans formulated doctrines that accorded with their strategies. While French doctrine strongly emphasized the defensive and the strength of firepower, German doctrine emphasized the offensive and the importance of mobility and flexibility. Although the development of their doctrines will not be discussed, it is important to recognize that in both countries, but particularly in France, the strategies were greatly influenced by doctrinal considerations.44 In formulating its doctrine, the French Army placed the greatest emphasis on the requirements for firepower. From their perspective, advances in weaponry after

1918 had increased the importance of firepower and made the possibility of maneuver less likely. Both the 1921 and the 1936 field service regulations stressed the importance of firepower. In its description of firepower as “the preponderant factor of combat,” the 1936 field service regulations repeated another sentence that had appeared in the 1921 edition: “The attack is the fire that advances, the defense is the fire that halts [the enemy].”45 Fire permitted the maneuver or movement of the infantry, which remained the “queen of battle.” The perception of an immense amount of fire being available on the battlefield contributed to the French belief that the defense was stronger than the offense. The employment of automatic weapons, antitank weapons, and artillery permitted the establishment of “curtains” of fire that would extract a terrible toll from any attacker. For an attack to succeed, France believed a larger number of troops and materiel were required than for the defense. The 1921 field service regulations argued that the offense was favored only after the “massing of powerful materiel means, artillery, combat tanks, munitions, etc.”46 A hasty attack against a wellprepared position would probably lead to failure, since the defender had the advantage and could inflict heavy casualties on an attacker. The only way an attacker could penetrate a deadly curtain of defensive fire would be to create a much greater concentration of fire with “three times as much infantry, six times the artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition.”47 Obviously the complexity of such an effort limited the possibility of maneuver dramatically, and its coordination could most effectively be done through the use of what the French called the “methodical battle.” The step-by-step approach to battle became a vital part of French doctrine. By the term “methodical battle,” the French meant a tightly controlled battle in which all units and weapons were carefully marshaled and then employed in combat. The French preferred to have a step-by-step battle in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly scheduled timetables, since they believed such methods were essential for the coherent employment of enormous amounts of men and materiel. They preferred a time-consuming, intricate process that prized preparation rather than improvisation and that made great allowances for the extreme complexity of massing large amounts of weapons and materiel. If the French had their way, they would weaken an attacker with their deadly defensive fires, and then destroy him by a massive, but tightly controlled, “battering ram” attack. Within the methodical battle, the artillery provided the momentum and the rhythm for the attack. When an attack began, according to French doctrine, the infantry advanced 2,000 to 2,000 meters before halting in order to readjust the

artillery fire. The attack again commenced, and after advancing 2,000 to 2,000 meters, another readjustment of fire was necessary. To control the advance of the infantry and to ensure artillery support, a number of intermediate objectives were established that corresponded to these advances of 1,000 to 2,000 meters. After a total advance of about 4,000 to 5,000 meters, a displacement of artillery was required. This displacement ensured that the infantry remained under the cover of the artillery and did not go beyond its maximum effective range. For control purposes, the maximum advance was sometimes limited to 3,000 to 4,000 meters before the 75mm artillery began its displacement by increments. One rule of thumb was given by an instructor at the French staff college when he stated the distance of the advance ought to be half the maximum range of the artillery supporting the attack (usually no more than 7,500 meters).48 Hence the French believed the infantry had to remain under the umbrella of artillery protection, and only the methodical battle could ensure the maximum possible coordination and integration of the artillery and the infantry. The methodical battle resembled the methods used in World War I, but it represented an intensification of those methods. According to the French, the new firepower that had become available after 1918 made centralized control much more important than ever before and made the methodical battle more essential in an offensive. For the defense, the French emphasized the need for depth. When a French unit (from battalion to corps-sized) occupied a defensive sector, it organized its forces into three parts: an advance post line, a principal position of resistance, and a stopping line. The principal position of resistance was the most important and heavily defended portion of the French defenses. Theoretically, it could be located along an easily protected front, preferably in an area where the enemy could be channeled into carefully selected zones or fields of fire between natural and manmade obstacles. Because of the requirement for depth, the principal position of resistance rarely resembled a line. To its rear was the stopping line, which was supposed to halt an attacking enemy force after it had been weakened by forward defenders.49 If an enemy managed to penetrate a stopping line, French doctrine called for a process known as colmater, or filling. A commander expected to meet a penetration by having his reserves, as well as the reserves of larger units, move in front of attacking enemy troops and gradually slow them down until they were halted. By shifting additional infantry, armor, and artillery units laterally into a threatened sector or forward from the reserves, an attacker could be slowed and eventually halted. After sealing off an enemy penetration, a counterattack would

follow, but this counterattack would usually rely on the use of artillery and infantry fire rather than the charge of infantry or tanks. To halt an enemy using this procedure, the defender had to be able to move units in front of a penetration faster than an enemy attacker could advance. The emphasis on the methodical battle and the process of colmater resulted in a dangerous degree of rigidity within the French system for command and control. Centralization became the primary concern of higher commanders, especially as they considered how to shift units about the battlefield. The French believed the locus of decision making had to remain at the higher level, because a higher command had to have greater control for coordinating the actions of numerous subordinate units. The army's doctrinal and organizational system stressed the power and authority of army group, field army, and corps commanders and left little flexibility or room for initiative to lower-level commanders. Each lower level had less room for maneuver than the level immediately above it. The entire system was designed to be propelled forward by pressure from above, rather than being pulled from below. In contrast to a decentralized battle in which officers were expected to show initiative and flexibility, the French preferred rigid centralization and strict obedience. Unfortunately, this resulted in a fatal flaw; the French military establishment could not respond flexibly to unanticipated demands and could hardly capitalize upon an important gain made by a lower-level unit. The French also encouraged commanders to remain in their command posts, rather than moving forward and being drawn into the fighting. A commander, in their view, should remain in his command post, being constantly updated on the status of the ongoing battle and frequently making decisions about the movement and commitment of units and supplies. By keeping their hands “on the handle of a fan,” and by managing units and materiel, commanders were not available to lead by personal example, but they could theoretically ensure the entire operation proceeded smoothly and efficiently. GERMAN DOCTRINE German doctrine contrasted sharply with French doctrine. During the interwar period, the Germans published two field service regulations, one in 1921 and the other in 1933, which strongly emphasized the concept of a continuous battle. Both the 1921 and the 1933 German field service regulations stressed the importance of the penetration, which was based upon infiltration-type tactics and which could be developed into a complete breakthrough of enemy lines. If a breakthrough were made, the attacking troops would push as far forward as possible, leaving the widening of the shoulder of the breakthrough to the reserves.50 The 1933 German

regulations observed: “The objective of the combined arms in an attack is to bring the infantry into decisive action against the enemy, with sufficient fire power and shock action so that it is possible to drive through deeply and break down the final hostile resistance.”51 Such a doctrine assumes that continuous pressure and a deep attack would prevent the reestablishing of strong defensive positions. Infiltration tactics were an important part of German doctrine and contributed significantly to the German ability to make a penetration. The essence of these tactics, which were developed in 1917, was rapid advancement and infiltration by small infantry groups, but the main concepts also applied to larger units. The tactics emphasized maneuver more than fire. The objective of leading elements was not destruction of enemy soldiers; rather, it was to seek penetration by attacking the weak spots of the enemy's resistance. If an enemy strong point were encountered, German infantrymen usually bypassed it, leaving its destruction to follow-on forces.52 Thus the main point of the tactics was the effort to “drive through deeply.” The 1921 German field service regulations emphasized the need to prevent the enemy from reestablishing successive positions and the need for immediate pursuit. The 1933 manual also emphasized the need to follow the enemy closely. Should the attack halt, the Germans foresaw the commitment of reserves to continue the momentum of the attack and the formation of new reserves from those units that had been bypassed by the forward-moving old reserves.53 Similarly, they foresaw the commitment of reserves to reinforce success and to accelerate gains before the defender could react. They did not automatically assume the defender's mobility exceeded that of the attacker. The breakthrough, however, was only a “preparatory move,” which would ultimately lead to “subsequent operations of encirclement.”54 German doctrine, in short, emphasized the advantages of one continuous battle, ultimately leading to the complete rupture of the hostile defenses and the defeat of the enemy, while French doctrine accepted the possibility of a successive series of methodical battles. The Germans believed this continuous battle enabled them to retain the initiative and to achieve victory. German doctrine also emphasized decentralization and initiative. The 1933 German field service regulations stated, “Simplicity of conduct, logically carried through, will most surely attain the objective.” The regulations also said, “Independence of action of the lower commanders…is of decisive importance at all times.”55 While the French doctrine emphasized pushing from above, German doctrine emphasized pulling from below. The Germans recognized that while strategic or operational-level concepts had to be formulated by higher-level

commanders, the success of those concepts depended upon the lower-level commanders having the flexibility and freedom to capitalize upon any momentary advantages they might gain. Because of the emphasis on flexibility and initiative, the Germans relied strongly on counterattacks while they were on the defensive. Since the Germans remained on the offensive during the 1940 campaign, they did not capitalize upon counterattacks, but they did use them frequently during later campaigns in the war. The German emphasis on decentralization and initiative came from their tradition of auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics. The success of auftragstaktik rested on subordinate commanders understanding the intent of their commander and acting to achieve his goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. According to this concept, which was deeply ingrained in the German officer corps and essentially acted as a philosophy of command, a commander could act according to the circumstances of the moment and perhaps ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary if his actions contributed to the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Though an officer did this at his own risk, the results could be astounding, for the concept of auftragstaktik permitted, if not encouraged, an officer to use his initiative to solve a tactical problem. On the negative side, however, the tradition of auftragstaktik sometimes enabled commanders, particularly headstrong ones, to act independently and for personal reasons to ignore directives from higher headquarters. The actions of such individuals could disrupt carefully planned, complex operations and could place an entire operation in jeopardy. In a profession in which victory was everything, the degree of success attained was the most important measure of whether an officer had acted for selfish reasons or had acted to achieve the intent of his commander. As German doctrine evolved, the introduction of the tank and the development of Panzer divisions reinforced many of its major themes. In 1935 the German Army approved the organization of its first three Panzer divisions. During the next five years, armored commanders capitalized upon the fundamental precepts of German doctrine and carried them to their most extreme point in the 1940 campaign. French and German doctrine thus differed sharply on several key points. While one emphasized methodical battles, firepower, centralization, and obedience, the other emphasized continuous battles, mobility, decentralization, and initiative. During the fighting around Sedan, the doctrine of the Germans provided them a distinct advantage over the French.

CHAPTER 2

The German Fight in the Ardennes

A

ccording to Plan Yellow, Army Group A had responsibility for the main German attack against the Allies. The commanding general of Army Group A, Colonel-General K. R. Gerd von Rundstedt, placed three field armies on line (Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth, from north to south). With forty-four divisions, including seven Panzer and three motorized, their fronts stretched about ninety kilometers from a point south of Aachen to a point along the Franco-German border just east of Luxembourg. To the front of this vast phalanx of forces the Germans placed the XVth Panzer Corps and Panzer Group von Kleist, which consisted of the XIXth Panzer Corps, XLIst Panzer Corps, and XIVth Motorized Infantry Corps. Group von Kleist planned on moving through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium with its three corps following each other. The order of march was the XIXth, XLIst, and XIVth corps. After the XIXth Panzer Corps turned south toward Bouillon, the XLIst Corps was supposed to pass on its right and advance toward Monthermé on the Meuse River. As Group von Kleist moved west, follow-on infantry units were supposed to fill in on their left and secure the flank. The XIXth Corps wanted to cross the Meuse near Sedan, and the XLIst Corps near Monthermé. The XVth Corps, which was not part of Group von Kleist, wanted to cross the Meuse near Dinant. PLANNING AND PREPARATION The mission for the XIXth Panzer Corps, which was commanded by General Heinz Guderian, was given in the operations order published by Group von Kleist on 21 March 1940. The order stated: XIXth [Panzer] Corps—leading element of Group von Kleist—crosses the Luxembourg border together with Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies on A-day at Y-hour…. It rushes through the Luxembourg area and on the first day pushes through the Belgian border fortifications between Bastogne (excluding) and

Arlon (excluding) and [next] pushes through the fortifications line LibramontNeufchâteau-Hachy [sic]. Therefore it is important to take Libramont as quickly as possible and to clear the entire length of Panzer Routes 1 and 2 through Neufchâteau to free [the routes] for the use of the XLIst Corps [which follows XIXth Corps]. Immediately after this, the XIXth Corps crosses over the Semois between Alle (including) and Bouillon (including)—passing the latter by encircling around the south—and reaches the Meuse for a surprise crossing between Nouvion (including) and Sedan (including). It is critically important to get the leading units across the Meuse on the first attack. After crossing the Meuse, the operational direction for the XIXth Corps is [toward] Rethel. Under no circumstances should the corps be drawn to the south.1 In a daring maneuver, the Germans intended to rush the XIXth Panzer Corps through the Ardennes and make a hasty crossing of the Meuse River before continuing west. Except for a few light forces scattered along the vulnerable left flank of the corps, the main protection against a French attack into the flank came from the rapid advance across Luxembourg and Belgium, as well as the action of close follow-on forces. If the German forces could reach the Sedan area before the French identified their main attack, they could seize the initiative and never permit the French to regain it. One of the most complex aspects of the 1940 campaign was the movement through the Ardennes by the XIXth Panzer Corps and follow-on units. The complexity of this task is perhaps best illustrated by Group von Kleist, with three corps, having 134,000 soldiers, 41,000 motor vehicles, and more than 1,600 tanks and reconnaissance vehicles.2 General Ewald von Kleist later explained that if the Panzer forces that moved through the Ardennes had advanced on a single road, they would have extended from Trier to Königsberg in East Prussia, a distance of more than 1,000 kilometers.3 Getting this large force through the Ardennes would not be a simple or easy task. Moreover, if the Germans were to make their attack successfully, units had to move through Luxembourg and Belgium in a sequence and according to a timetable that enabled them to arrive at a point when they were needed. For example, ammunition supplies had to be moved early, so they would be available when needed. Also, during the move across Belgium, materials had to be available for constructing bridges across streams and rivers where bridges had been destroyed; bridging materials could not arrive late. Once the Germans reached Sedan, they also had to have bridging materials to cross the Meuse River.

If a single unit got out of sequence, the entire maneuver could be placed in jeopardy. Thus traffic control emerged as an extremely important factor in the preparation for and conduct of the campaign. To the rear of the XIXth Panzer Corps, a huge mass of troops that extended beyond Frankfurt stood in line impatiently awaiting their turn to pass across the fragile and limited road network in the Ardennes. To move the huge phalanx of forces through Luxembourg and Belgium, the German General Staff—adhering to its tradition of technical excellence—produced an extremely detailed plan and timetable. In many ways the complexity of this plan exceeded that of the Schlieffen Plan, for a major portion of the German Army had to move through the bottleneck formed by the rough terrain and limited road network of Luxembourg and Belgium. Nothing could be left to chance if the German forces were to make their way successfully into France. The first step in the deep attack of the XIXth Panzer Corps was a rapid advance across Luxembourg with its three divisions on line. The 1st Panzer Division, which was under the command of Major General Friedrich Kirchner, moved in the center and crossed into Luxembourg at Wallendorf. To its north was the 2nd Panzer Division, which was commanded by Major General Rudolf Veiel, and which crossed into Luxembourg at Vianden. To the south of the 1st Division, the 10th Panzer Division, which was commanded by Major General Ferdinand Schaal, crossed into Luxembourg at Bollendorf and Echternach. The crossing points into Luxembourg for the two flank divisions of the corps were only twenty kilometers apart. The XIXth Panzer Corps had a detailed march plan that included routes and priorities for their use. For its move from its assembly areas in Germany to the Luxembourg border and then to the Belgian border, the XIXth Panzer Corps was assigned four “Panzer Routes.” In Luxembourg, these four routes extended from Vianden to Harlange, Wallendorf to Martelange, Bollendorf to Attert, and Echternach to Arlon.4 Group von Kleist and the XIXth Corps spent a great deal of time studying the routes through the rough terrain of Luxembourg and Belgium. Detailed analyses were made using maps, aerial photographs, and—on at least one occasion—photographs taken by German officers. Photographs and sketches of bridges and potential obstacles were also used.5 Judging from the amount of surviving materials, the headquarters of Group von Kleist and the XIXth Panzer Corps probably spent more time planning for the move across the Ardennes than for any other aspect of the operation. Despite this intense effort, and despite routes and priorities for their use being designated and closely controlled, problems did appear during the attack. On

several occasions during the move through the Ardennes, units moved out of their sector and disrupted the movement of units to their flanks. For example, the 2nd Panzer Division's forward movement was interrupted first by the 1st Panzer and then by the 6th Panzer Division. At other times, the desire of units to move forward as rapidly as possible caused them to ignore traffic control measures and created enormous traffic jams in Luxembourg. This lack of discipline threatened the success of the entire operation. On the morning of the second day of the campaign, von Kleist sent out a message to his subordinate commanders that said the problems encountered during the move through Luxembourg were caused primarily by independent decisions being made by lower-level leaders and by a “lack of energy and interest” among some officers. He announced that he had punished two military policemen for allowing some vehicles to pass that did not belong to Group von Kleist and that if conditions worsened, offenders would be punished with the death penalty.6 While this threat did not end the problems with march discipline, the 1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer divisions did manage to make their way through the difficult terrain of Luxembourg. The second step in the deep attack of the XIXth Panzer Corps was the movement across Belgium. For this part of the operation, each of the three divisions placed an advance covering force to its front. To control the movement of the divisions, the Germans identified march routes and priorities for their use, but they also used terrain features or cities as daily objectives and expected units to reach these objectives. If a unit did not attain its objective, a new objective based on the new circumstances was provided for the following day. The use of daily orders that included daily objectives continued throughout the campaign.

Shortly before the operation began on 10 May, each division completed an operations order covering the move through Luxembourg and the advance into Belgium. The divisions focused their planning and preparation on the initial part of the operation. The 10th Panzer Division, for example, broke down the operation into three parts: the march through Luxembourg, the attack through Belgian defenses along the border, and the penetration of the enemy's second line of defenses west of the border. Except for mentioning that the XIXth Corps had the mission of crossing the Meuse near Sedan, the division did not provide information in its plan about the crossing of the river.7 Guderian expected the divisions to break through the enemy's second line of defenses on the first day of the operation, and the divisions’ plans did not go beyond the first day. The plans, nevertheless, were fairly lengthy; the plan for the 10th Panzer Division, for example, consisted of twelve pages, not including information about the engineers, communications, and logistics, which were dealt with separately. The third and most important step, however, in the operation was the crossing of the Meuse River. An extremely significant question that affected the details of the move across Belgium was determining where the XIXth Panzer Corps would cross the Meuse. General von Kleist wanted the corps to cross the river west of

Sedan and to make the main effort west of the Ardennes Canal and Bar River (six kilometers west of Sedan). Such a move would enable the Panzer corps to continue attacking west without having to make a difficult and dangerous pivot to the west and without having to fight its way across the Ardennes Canal and Bar River. Locating the crossing point west of Sedan also placed it closer to the designated crossing site of the XLIst Corps and thereby ensured the massing of five Panzer divisions along a relatively narrow segment of the Meuse. Apparently concerned that the headstrong XIXth Corps commander would ignore his order to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, von Kleist repeated his order on several occasions. The operations order that was published on 21 March ordered Guderian to cross between Sedan and Nouvion (ten kilometers to the west of Sedan). On 18 April von Kleist sent a message to Guderian that explicitly outlined the advantages of crossing west of the Ardennes Canal. The message also included the anticipated boundary between the XIXth and XLIst corps.8 During the first days of the campaign, daily orders from von Kleist to Guderian also directed the corps to cross west of the Ardennes Canal. Guderian, however, preferred to make his main attack east of the Ardennes Canal and prepared his divisions to cross the Meuse on both sides of Sedan. In essence, he ignored the directives from von Kleist. Though the German philosophy of command gave commanders the freedom to use their judgment in the execution of their orders and encouraged them to make decisions based on the situation facing them, Guderian's decision to attack east of the Ardennes Canal was a startling act of independence and led to an intense confrontation with von Kleist on 12 May. A proud, egotistical officer, Guderian believed he knew best how to employ his tanks and was unwilling to accept guidance from anyone—even his immediate commander—who did not have as much experience in armored operations as he. As for plans for crossing of the Meuse River, Guderian recognized the difficulties of predicting the situation to be confronted by his corps after marching about 120 kilometers through the Ardennes. Like most German staff officers, he had been thoroughly schooled in Moltke's dictum about no operation plan extending “with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy.” Knowing that he could not predict the enemy's actions precisely, Guderian did not complete a formal plan for crossing the Meuse but did use war games to test different courses of action and to develop a better understanding among his officers of his intentions. At the end of March the XIXth Panzer Corps conducted an exercise in which it wrote an order for three divisions to make an assault across the Meuse River at Sedan, to continue the attack to the south, and then to pivot west. Using divisions

designated as the 22nd, 21st, and 210th Panzer divisions and using the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment to reinforce the center division, the corps rehearsed crossing the Meuse at three points: Donchery, between Gaulier and Torcy, and east of Sedan.9 In a lucky break for the Germans, this war game turned out to be very similar to the actual crossing. On 13 May the corps staff changed unit designations and several small aspects of the plan and issued it to subordinate commands. Nevertheless, its utility on 13 May came from much careful thought and analysis, not from an inflexible adherence to a previously composed plan. Hard work, detailed analyses, and rehearsals left little to chance. After the XIXth Panzer Corps established a bridgehead across the Meuse, the next operational decision concerned whether Guderian's forces would consolidate the bridgehead and enable additional forces to cross or would exploit its success by heading west. Although Moltke's dictum about the dangers of making an operation plan for actions beyond the first battle with the enemy's main forces influenced German thinking, it is clear that Guderian wanted his armored forces to continue attacking and drive deeply into the French positions. During a briefing on 15 March at the headquarters of Army Group A, Hitler asked Guderian what his corps was going to do after establishing a bridgehead across the Meuse. Guderian responded to what he called “this vital question” by saying that he intended to continue his westward advance unless he received orders to halt.10 Although Hitler did not reply, Halder wrote in his diary that the briefing “produced no new viewpoints.” He added, “Decision reserved on further moves after the crossing of the Meuse.”11 In his memoirs, Guderian wrote that he never received any orders from his superiors about what to do after crossing the Meuse. This is not completely correct, for on several occasions von Kleist warned him not to be drawn toward the south. He frequently emphasized that the operational direction for Guderian's corps was toward the southwest or toward Rethel. Von Kleist made this point in the operations order, in the letter of 18 April on the “use of the XIXth Corps,” and on other occasions. One of the main reasons for his concern about Guderian's desire to cross east of the Ardennes Canal, head south, and then pivot west was his belief that this would disperse the forces of the Panzer group and decrease the chances of a rapid move deep into and through the French positions. For reasons that are not completely clear, the three divisions under Guderian apparently expected to halt after establishing the bridgehead over the Meuse. In an entry in its daily journal for 9 May, the 1st Panzer Division included a statement of its mission. A staff officer wrote: “After the breakthrough [at the Meuse], a bridgehead is supposed to be built immediately to permit the crossing of further

forces that are supposed to roll up the enemy's fortifications lines while turning towards the west.”12 Thus by 9 May the Germans had carefully analyzed all aspects of the upcoming operation, but they had completed detailed plans only for the first phase of the battle. Although neither Guderian nor von Kleist mindlessly became slaves to a written plan, both had carefully thought through the entire campaign and had chosen different points for the XIXth Corps to cross the Meuse. Both recognized the unpredictability of the first battles and the necessity to modify objectives, task organizations, and timing according to the circumstances. The most important unknown, nevertheless, was the outcome of the battle of wills between von Kleist and Guderian over the location and direction of attack across the Meuse. CROSSING LUXEMBOURG Though the Germans expected a relatively short campaign, they did not anticipate an easy campaign and devoted considerable time to ensuring that their units were ready. In March 1940 the 1st Panzer Division moved into an assembly area near Cochem (forty kilometers southwest of Koblenz and along the Moselle River) and began special training for the coming campaign. The main components of the division were an armor brigade and an infantry brigade. Two Panzer regiments were in the armor brigade, but only one infantry regiment was in the infantry brigade. While each Panzer regiment had two battalions of tanks, the infantry regiment had three battalions. For artillery support, the division had two 105mm battalions and one 150mm battalion. Among its other units were an armored engineer battalion and a motorcycle battalion. After arriving at Cochem and beginning training, officers concentrated on war games and classes that would familiarize them with the mission of the division and that would enable them to work jointly with the Air Force, while soldiers received special training in fighting against bunkers and crossing water obstacles. During this rigorous training, Guderian had some concerns about the “lighthearted” approach of some of his junior officers and drove them hard to ensure they would be ready for the demands of the campaign. Amidst this training and with no special warning, the German forces were alerted on 9 May and moved with short notice into battle. They had expected little or no notice. In the middle of January, Hitler had become concerned about the Allies’ possibly observing the German forces entering a heightened state of alert before an attack and had decided to reduce the amount of time required for their deployment. In November and December, he had reduced the deployment time to seven days and then to five days. After indications that the Allies had received

warnings from someone in Berlin shortly before the previously selected attack dates, he decided in January to maintain his armed forces at a state of alert that permitted them to commence operations with less than twenty-four hours’ notice.13 If the Allies received warnings, they would have significantly less time to react. After Hitler changed the date of attack twenty-nine times during the fall and winter, General Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, learned on 30 April that the next target date was 5 May. On 4 May he was told the attack would be delayed until 6 May, perhaps 7 May. Because of poor weather, the attack was again delayed. Hitler wanted to attack immediately, but concerns about the weather hampering Luftwaffe flights continued to delay the attack. Finally, on 9 May, after receiving a forecast for good weather on the 10th, Hitler ordered the launching of the attack,14 but he established a code word system to enable him, if necessary, to halt the attack at the last possible minute. Around midday on the 9th, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, signed the order specifying “A-Day” as 10 May and “Xhour” as 0435 hours (0535 hours German time). The code words “Danzig” or “Augsburg” were supposed to reach the branches of the armed services by 2035 hours at the latest. While the code word “Danzig” would unleash the attack, “Augsburg” would halt it. Much depended on the weather forecast scheduled for around 2000 hours on the 9th.15 Hitler did not wait for the weather forecast to make his own move. In the middle of the afternoon on the 9th, he departed Berlin by automobile with a few close assistants. Their destination was a railroad station outside the city of Berlin. There they boarded Hitler's special train that departed for the north at 1600 hours. Most of those on the train thought they were heading toward Hamburg, but after darkness fell, the train turned toward the southwest. At a small station near Hanover, a staff officer established contact by telephone with Berlin, and Hitler learned that the weather forecast for the following day was for beautiful weather. At 2130 hours the code word “Danzig” arrived at the XIXth Panzer Corps.16 A member of the 1st Panzer Division's staff has described the sequence of events leading up to the division's attack into Belgium. In a May 1941 article in Die Wehrmacht, Major von Kielmansegg wrote: Lunch had hardly been served when a telephone call summoned the general. He began to listen, and after a pause said, “I repeat.” The Chief of Staff of the division and I looked at one another. We were the only ones other than the general to understand the meaning of his words. I checked the time: 1215 hours, Thursday, 9 May 1940, a date that I would

always remember. At 1220 hours, the telephones commenced to ring, and the liaison officers left to transmit the orders [to subordinate units]. This was sufficient for…the division to be prepared to move toward the frontier. I quickly finished my dinner so I could move with the command group at the head of the division…. The timetable functioned regularly and punctually. The fuel trucks, liaison vehicles, and radio cars waited in front of the hotel, next to the Moselle, ready to depart toward the west. The departure [of the advanced elements of the General Staff] took place at 1630 hours. At 1700 hours, the division departed…. The long columns of Panzer Group Kleist moved forward on three large routes, with the infantry primarily using trucks. The night enveloped us; not a single light could be seen. The march was slow and difficult. It was also very difficult to establish an itinerary permitting the forward movement of the column and the simultaneous joining of it by small detachments coming from all directions. The turns in the steep roads of the Eifel mountains and of the Kyll region, and the successive descents required special attention from the drivers. Even though several small difficulties inevitably appeared, they were taken care of, [and] the main column was not affected. The movement continued. In the “Eichelhutte,” a small inn on a fork in the road, the advanced echelons of the General Staff halted for the first time to await orders. We had been instructed not to proceed without proper orders…. After the leading elements of the division had long since passed the Eichelhutte…, a vehicle covered with dust approached; it stopped. The Ia [operations officer] had arrived. [Having been on a pass,] he had traveled to our location in record time, arriving before nightfall even though we did not expect him until the following morning…. He was warmly welcomed. It was the morning of 10 May. The hands of the watch approached 0435 hours. Exactly at the prescribed minute, the engineers began to place a ramp across the obstacles [on the bridge] at the Luxembourg frontier. The obstacles were made of thick concrete, were as high as a man, and were trimmed with pieces of [steel] rails. It would have taken much too long to destroy them. A hastily constituted detachment of cyclists crossed a ford on the river at the frontier, the Our. Its mission was to seize the next obstacle [at Moestroff], a large steel gate controlled electrically, before it could be closed. The group succeeded. Part of the concrete barrier was destroyed, and the route was entirely clear. Before [the ramp over] the bridge was completed, the

motorcycle battalion also crossed the Our at the ford. Without encountering other obstacles, the reconnaissance elements of the division raced across the Luxembourg territory, greater than 50 kilometers at this spot, and passed through before the inhabitants were even awake. At 0745 hours, the Belgian frontier was reached at Martelange.17 Kielmansegg's account of the crossing is essentially correct except for his assertion about the engineers starting to place the ramp across the bridge at the Our River “exactly at the prescribed minute.” In fact, engineers began their work twenty minutes late and did not finish the ramp until 0615 hours. Shortly after the Germans arrived at the Our River, a screening force forded the river and quickly moved west. These forces consisted of a motorcycle company, three reconnaissance platoons, and engineer support. Their mission was to check the route and clear it of any small obstacles. At 0620 hours the advanced guard began crossing the completed ramp over the bridge on the Our and entered into Belgium. The advanced guard consisted of a variety of elements, including the remainder of the motorcycle battalion, two companies of infantry from the 1st Infantry Regiment, an engineer company, an antiaircraft battery, two companies of antitank weapons, and artillery from the 73rd Artillery Regiment. With its greater combat power, the advanced guard could overcome any unexpected resistance in Luxembourg and clear the route of obstacles too large for the screening force to remove.18 As the center division in the XIXth Corps’ advance, the 1st Panzer Division made the main attack for the corps and acted as its spearhead.19 After receiving the code word indicating the beginning of the campaign, the division was supposed to cross the border into Luxembourg at Wallendorf, penetrate the Belgian defenses at Martelange and Bodange, and move west as rapidly as possible. On the first day of the attack, the division was supposed to reach the high ground west of Neufchâteau, a straight-line distance of about sixty kilometers from the German border. The Germans expected the Belgians to establish their first line of resistance near Martelange and their second line of resistance near Neufchâteau. As mentioned previously, Guderian's mission was to penetrate this second line of resistance on the first day of the campaign. As the XIXth Corps raced across Luxembourg, special operations were launched to ensure its successful passage of the difficult terrain in the Grand Duchy. In one of these operations, about 125 commandos under the command of Lieutenant Werner Hedderich seized five crossroads on Guderian's southern flank (Bomicht, Soleuvre, Foetz, Bettembourg, Frisange), which controlled the major routes going from France into Luxembourg. The objective of the operation was to

provide some protection to the flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps as it moved through Luxembourg until additional forces arrived to establish stronger defenses. The Germans recognized that a minor raid or attack from France into Luxembourg could close one of the march routes and cause colossal traffic jams. The volunteers from the 34th Infantry Division were flown into position using twenty-five tiny Fieseler-Storch aircraft that could carry only three men (including the pilot and their equipment). Since the planes needed only a small area for a landing, the passengers could be dropped off very close to their designated fighting positions. Except for Frisange, Hedderich's men successfully seized the key road junctions, and after being rapidly reinforced by infantry riding motorcycles, prevented enemy forces from attacking into the German flank.20 The first engagement between the French and Germans occurred on 10 May when elements of the 3rd French Light Cavalry Division moved north into Luxembourg and encountered the commandos. In another special operation, tiny Fieseler-Storch aircraft carried an infantry battalion to the front of Guderian's corps along the frontier between Belgium and Luxembourg. In his diary, General Halder noted, “350 to 400 men are standing by in two groups at Crailsheim. Will go to Bitburg on A day. Their mission is to open the way for XIX Corps west of Bastogne. Fieseler-Storch planes.”21 This specially trained unit was the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Its soldiers were to be landed in an area just west of Bodange where they could cut off any Belgian defenders and prevent their being reinforced. With its code name being derived from a contraction of the two towns to be seized by the soldiers (Nives, Witry), the effort became known as Operation Niwi. Additionally, commandos were sent into Luxembourg to seize several key passage points along the XIXth Corps’ march route. In some cases, these men crossed the frontier before the German divisions began their attack. Among the key points seized was a bridge in Diekirch, along the 1st Panzer Division's route. Though the Germans knew that Luxembourg had no intentions of destroying the bridge, they wanted to take no chances. Shortly after midnight, Germans dressed in civilian clothes seized the two policemen guarding the vital bridge and thereby ensured the safe passage of German columns.22 Everything about the attack across Luxembourg thus emphasized surprise and speed. Around 0745 hours, the screening forces of the 1st Panzer Division encountered the Belgians at Martelange. THE FIGHT AT MARTELANGE AND BODANGE The Belgian forces in the Ardennes were light forces under the command of

General Maurice Keyaerts. Known as “Group K,” after their commander, the Belgian forces included two light infantry divisions, one of which included three Chasseurs Ardennais regiments. Group K's mission in eastern Belgium was to conduct a “delaying action which would hinder the advance of an invader toward the Meuse…”23 Instead of offering a tough defense along the Luxembourg border, the Belgian Army planned on offering its strongest resistance along the Meuse River between Namur and Maastricht and along the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Antwerp. Although the French secretly requested the Belgians to reinforce their forces in the Ardennes and thereby to prolong their delaying action against an invader, the Belgians insisted they did not have the forces to strengthen Group K sufficiently for it to offer a high degree of resistance along its eightyfive-kilometer front. Because the main Belgian defensive lines were to the rear of Group K, the defenders along the Luxembourg frontier were not expected to establish a strong defense even if the terrain favored such an action. They intended to delay an enemy through the use of “obstacles and long range fires.”24 Though they planned on destroying many bridges and roads, they did not intend to cover all the obstacles by fire. To accomplish his mission, General Keyaerts dispersed his forces across a wide front and did not attempt to establish a continuous line of defenses. In eastern Belgium, the Chasseurs Ardennais established two main “lines” of resistance, which were lines only in the sense of placement of strong points. One ran north– south from Bastogne, to Martelange, to Arlon, and the other ran north–south from Libin, to Libramont, to Neufchâteau, to Etalle. After creating obstacles along these two lines and hindering the advance of the Germans, Keyaerts planned on withdrawing his forces toward the northwest to Huy, near Liège. The Germans knew about the two lines of defenses and in their planning prepared to penetrate both of them on the first day of their offensive.

Though not exactly the same, the two Belgian lines also generally followed two lines that were identified by France for occupation by her cavalry forces. Unfortunately, because Belgium maintained her status as a neutral nation until she was invaded, very little coordination was actually accomplished between the security forces of the two nations. Later both sides criticized the other. On the one hand, France complained that the Belgian obstacles delayed the advance of her cavalry and that the Chasseurs Ardennais withdrew through the French cavalry without making any attempt to fight in a combined fashion. On the other hand, the Belgians complained that the French did not move forward fast enough to reinforce the vastly outnumbered Chasseurs Ardennais. The primary onus for the failure of the two forces to work together must be given to Belgium since she feared compromising her neutrality and thus accepted only limited cooperation with France. Nevertheless, neither side expected much help from the other. And both sides received almost none. Directly in the path of the 1st Panzer Division, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of the Chasseurs Ardennais occupied the area around Martelange and Bodange with its 4th and 5th companies. In a valiant and unexpected battle, this doughty little force almost entirely derailed on 10 May the carefully choreographed advance of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Their valiant struggle is particularly interesting, for the Belgians did not intend for them to fight. They nevertheless put up one of the hardest fights the 1st Panzer Division encountered during the entire campaign. The Chasseurs Ardennais were an extremely light infantry force that used bicycles as their main means of transportation and that had only four machine guns and twelve submachine guns in a company. The heaviest weapon available to them was the T-13 armored (and tracked) vehicle, which was armed with a 47mm gun and weighed only five tons. The T-13 was not organic to an individual company but could be sent forward as a reinforcement.25 Around 0100 hours on 10 May the Chasseurs Ardennais, who were already near their wartime positions, were alerted. The 4th Company occupied its main position at Martelange, and to its rear, the 5th Company occupied defensive positions at Bodange. Both companies had chosen their positions carefully and occupied extremely strong terrain, but the position of the 5th Company at Bodange was particularly strong. To reach Neufchâteau, the German 1st Panzer Division had to follow the route from Martelange, to Bodange, to Fauvillers, but the narrow route followed the Sûre River and was filled with numerous curves and defiles. To bar the enemy's progress, the Belgians placed eight demolitions in the roads in 4th Company's area (Martelange) and six in the 5th Company's (Bodange); they also installed one minefield at Martelange, one at Strainchamps (three kilometers

north of Bodange), and three at Bodange.26 After the Germans crossed into Luxembourg on 10 May, Group K authorized the blowing of those demolitions that would not impede rearward movement. Unfortunately, one of the explosions cut the 4th Company's communication line with its battalion headquarters and with 5th Company, and it had to rely on a motorcyclist to carry messages. After the first German motorcyclist appeared around 0745 hours, the company came under strong attack from the Germans around 0930–0945, and at 1030 hours, it received an order from the 2nd Battalion to withdraw west to Fauvillers (two kilometers west of Bodange). At 1115 hours the 4th Company passed through the 5th Company at Bodange.27 The 5th Company, which was under the command of Major Bricart, had also blown some of its demolitions early in the morning. Around 0800 hours Bricart learned that German soldiers had landed by aircraft at the rear of his company, and he soon received orders from his regimental headquarters to send his T-13 armored vehicle, which carried the only antitank weapon in his company, to the rear to be used against the Germans. After the 4th Company passed through his position, Bricart gave the order to explode the demolitions to his company's front. He had to rely on these obstacles to halt enemy armored vehicles. Throughout the fight at Bodange, Bricart expected to receive orders telling him to withdraw. Sometime around 1230 a written order arrived for the 5th Company to defend in place as long as possible. This was the last message received by Bricart. Unfortunately, the explosion of one of the company's demolition charges soon severed his contact with the commander of the 2nd Battalion, and he never received an order to withdraw. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion lost contact with its regimental headquarters after Germans in its rear cut the communication line. Having nothing else but a weak radio (E.R.P. 36) to assure contact with higher headquarters, the battalion commander, Major Agon, had extremely tenuous contact with his superiors and never received orders for his battalion to withdraw. The regimental headquarters of the 1st Chasseurs Ardennais sent orders at 1320 hours for the 2nd Battalion to withdraw, but Agon did not receive the message. A long encrypted radio message arrived at 1640 hours, but Agon could not decipher it.28 Ironically, were it not for the cutting of communications with higher headquarters, the 2nd Battalion probably would have withdrawn early in the afternoon and opened the way for the 1st Panzer Division. Though it faced a formidable force, the 5th Company occupied an extremely strong position at Bodange. As one travels along the winding road that connects Bodange to Martelange, one rounds a curve and can see a small hill to the left front (known as Stein) and a larger hill to its right rear. Bodange, which included

at least nine thick masonry buildings in 1940, sits halfway up the larger hill. Bricart placed his 2nd Platoon (minus a squad) on Stein hill and his 3rd Platoon in Bodange. During the battle, the 3rd Platoon moved up the hill into the houses along the highest street in the village. He placed a squad from the 2nd Platoon on the high ground above Wisembach (one kilometer southeast of Bodange). As the Germans moved along the road from Martelange, they first encountered this squad. Later in the battle, the squad moved by bicycle into Bodange and reinforced the 3rd Platoon, which had already shifted into the houses further up the hill. Bricart's 1st Platoon occupied a defensive position overlooking the destroyed bridge over the small stream at Strainchamps (three kilometers to the north). He located his command post to the west of Bodange on the route to Fauvillers. Since the small Sûre River, which was in actuality a large stream, ran alongside the road toward Bodange, Bricart's 2nd and 3rd platoons easily blocked the road with a barricade and a crater from a demolition charge. From their positions on the two hills, the 2nd and 3rd platoons could cover the obstacles to their front, which would strip the Germans of any protection they could get from armored vehicles. After some adjustment of their positions, the two platoons could also cover one another. If the Germans were to move through Bodange, they would have to push the Belgians off Stein hill and then root out the defenders in Bodange.29 As for the 1st Panzer Division, Major Kielmansegg explained, “[T]he attack was halted before Bodange, where the bridge over the Sûre was…destroyed. The enemy had installed here his first line of resistance. Established in wellcamouflaged and carefully fortified positions of fire, the defense was strong. Everywhere there were dense and deep rolls of barbed wire; the roads and trails were all blocked. It was not possible to go around them; that would accomplish nothing. It was necessary that we go directly over them.”30 The first Germans to encounter the Belgians at Martelange were from the 3rd Company of the 1st Motorcycle Battalion. Arriving at the Belgian border around 0745 hours, the point of the company halted when it reached the destroyed bridge across the Sûre River and then attacked the Belgian positions’ bunkers to the northwest of Martelange. Other elements from the advanced guard, including another motorcycle company and an armored reconnaissance troop, soon arrived, and when the commander of the advanced guard, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck, who commanded the 1st Infantry Regiment, appeared on the scene, he sent them into the village. Balck remained in charge of the initial fighting until Colonel Walter Krüger, who commanded the 1st Infantry Brigade but who had been on pass when the operation began, arrived and took command of the leading elements of

his brigade.31 With cover being provided by a heavy machine gun section and three reconnaissance vehicles, the German soldiers fought their way through the streets and quickly crossed the stream, whose waters reached to their waists. After crossing the Sûre, the Germans moved north and northwest for about three kilometers along the road toward Bodange. Except for some of them stumbling into a minefield near Wisembach, the move went smoothly. With supporting fires coming from the 4th Company (a heavy machine gun unit), the 3rd Company and then the 1st Company of the 1st Motorcycle Battalion seized the high ground to the northeast of Bodange around 1100 hours. Around 1400 hours the 3/1st Infantry received orders to assume responsibility for taking Bodange. At the same time, the motorcycle battalion received orders to attack toward Fauvillers (three kilometers west of Bodange) and to make contact with the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which had flown into the area and landed near Witry (six kilometers west of Bodange) in Operation Niwi. To get to Fauvillers, the motorcycle companies pulled back and moved to their left, around the southern flank of the Belgian defenders.32 Around 1400 hours pressure from the Germans (probably from the 1st and 3rd Motorcycle companies) forced the 2nd Platoon of the 5th Belgian Company to abandon Stein hill, the southern flank of its position. Because of enemy fire coming from the hill to the northeast, the survivors of that platoon moved to the rear and did not reinforce the 3rd Platoon in Bodange. The 3rd Platoon's plunging fire from Bodange to the top of Stein hill, however, prevented the Germans from occupying their newly won position. Thus, by mid-afternoon, the small Belgian force still prevented the Germans from moving through Bodange, even though the 1st Motorcycle Battalion had circled around its southern flank on foot and was now heading west. Since they had not received permission to withdraw and still hoped the French would reinforce them, the 3rd Platoon continued fighting. To avoid further losses and to blast out the Belgians from their holes, the Germans tried to concentrate the fires of three artillery battalions on their positions, but only one battery managed to push its way through the tangle of German forces now concentrating near Martelange. The Germans also managed to push forward four 88mm antitank guns so they could engage the Belgians. At 1600 hours Major Bricart's last message reported his position was under artillery fire. At about the same time, the German 3/1st Infantry made its final assault on the village. Though the thick walls of the buildings provided some protection from the massive German fire, the Belgians began taking more casualties and soon expended almost all their ammunition.33 Around 1800 hours the Germans finally succeeded in reaching the street next to

the buildings, and the Belgians recognized the end was at hand. The twenty-six remaining soldiers of the 3rd Platoon surrendered. The small group of determined men at Bodange had single-handedly delayed the advance of the 1st Panzer Division. Major Bricart died fleeing toward Fauvillers while trying to avoid capture.34 The Germans, nevertheless, still could not pass through Bodange. As they tried to ford the river near the destroyed bridge over the Sûre River, they discovered a Belgian minefield at the crossing site. After carefully clearing the mines, they opened a safe route around 2015 hours.35 The 1st Panzer Division had spent from around 0745 to 2015 hours trying to push through the two light infantry companies, who had delayed the main body of the division from about 1200 to 2015 hours. To the north at Strainchamps, the 1st Platoon of Major Bricart's 5th Company slowed the advance of the 2nd Panzer Division, which also had not encountered any opposing forces in Luxembourg. After the platoon received orders around 0900 hours to hold as long as possible, the first Germans—according to the Belgians—appeared around 0900 hours but did not unleash a violent attack until around 1400 hours. After the Belgians withdrew around 1700 hours, the 2nd Panzer Division energetically worked on building a bridge across the Sûre River. This bridge, however, was not finished until 0100 hours the next morning.36 OPERATION NIWI Operation Niwi had the purpose of airlifting infantry from the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment to positions behind the Belgian defenses along the Luxembourg border. By seizing Witry (six kilometers west of Bodange) and Nives (six kilometers north of Witry), the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions could break through the first line of Belgian defenses more easily. Belgian and French movement between Neufchâteau and Bastogne could also be halted. The commander of the 3rd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Eugen Garski, divided his forces into two groups for the operation. One under the command of Captain Krüger was supposed to land at Nives; the other under the command of Garski was supposed to land at Witry. Garski's task force was larger than Krüger's (who was the commander of the 11th Company) and was transported by fifty-six Fieseler-Storch aircraft while Krüger's was carried by forty-two. To move the entire force of four hundred men, the aircraft had to make two round trips. Garski planned on the second group arriving about two hours after the first. After the Germans arrived at their designated points, three Junker-52 were to be used for resupply.37 When the first wave of Garski's force flew across the Belgian frontier, the

lieutenant colonel was confident that his force could accomplish their mission, for they were highly talented and well trained. The Gross Deutschland Regiment was truly an elite force, composed of volunteers from each province of the Third Reich. During the Christmas holidays, Hitler had personally visited the regiment and had assured them of his faith in their abilities. Additionally, the 3rd Battalion had undergone several months of hard training in preparation for its challenging mission. As the German aircraft flew across the Belgian frontier, however, they received enemy fire and became dispersed. Five minutes later Garski's pilot recognized Witry and landed around 0500 hours about one kilometer to its northwest. After Garski and his adjutant climbed out of their aircraft, they were joined by eight other men from four aircraft. This was his entire force at Witry! The other fiftyone planes that were supposed to land at Witry had gotten lost.38 Captain Krüger's force also had bad luck. After receiving enemy fire, Krüger's pilot lost sight of the route he was following and drifted far south. Instead of landing at Nives, he landed nine kilometers to the southwest of Witry at Léglise (about fifteen kilometers south of his designated landing point). Krüger did not know where he was until he stopped two Belgians on bicycles, and they told him. Meanwhile, after establishing a hasty perimeter, Krüger's men began stopping and seizing all vehicles passing through the area. In addition to a number of civilians, they picked up about forty Belgian soldiers who were on leave and trying to return to their units on the frontier. After a French cavalry unit discovered them and began trying to encircle them, Krüger and his men took their prisoners and fled to the north, toward Witry.39 Most of the men who were supposed to be with Captain Krüger had landed successfully near Nives but, when they could not locate their company commander, believed they were lost. After asking a villager where they were and being told they were at Nives, they learned it was Krüger who was lost, not them. Despite the absence of their company commander, the two officers present, Lieutenants Obermeier and von Blankenburg, quickly prepared to accomplish their mission. Obermeier grabbed a Belgian motorbike and set out on a reconnaissance. About two kilometers away, he was shot at by a French cavalry unit that had just arrived in the area. The lieutenant hurried back to the other Germans and prepared for a French attack. Thinking quickly, the small German force stretched some barbed wire across the road and created a false minefield by burying some pieces of slate in the ground. The trick apparently worked, for the French did not attack.40 Meanwhile, Garski's small force had grown in size as his scattered soldiers began assembling at Witry. Then the second part of his force arrived in their

Fieseler-Storch aircraft without difficulty. Garski began organizing a strong defensive position in Traimont, just to the west of Witry. By occupying the road junction in that small village, he blocked French access to Martelange and to Strainchamps and the north.41 Around noon, Krüger and his men arrived from Léglise. With their arrival, Garski had more than enough men to accomplish his mission. Despite an unlucky beginning, the 3rd Battalion was in place. With Obermeier's force at Nives and Garski's at Witry, French forces were prevented from moving toward Neufchâteau and Bastogne. However, Operation Niwi had resulted in the Belgians offering a stronger defense at Martelange and Bodange than otherwise may have occurred. When Garski's men cut telephone lines throughout the area, they severed links between the 1st Regiment of the Chasseurs Ardennais and its 2nd Battalion. The subsequent heroic fight of the 4th and 5th companies at Martelange, Bodange, and Strainchamps kept the XIXth Panzer Corps from reaching Neufchâteau on 10 May. Thus the unintended result of the special operation was a strengthening of the resistance in front of the Germans, not a weakening. After the 1st Motorcycle Battalion moved around the southern flank of the Belgian defenders at Bodange, it moved directly west toward Fauvillers. With Garski's force pushing east from Witry and the two companies from the motorcycle battalion pushing west, the two German forces met at Fauvillers around 1630 hours on the 10th. Between 1800 and 1830 hours, the remainder of the motorcycle battalion, including the motorcycles, reached Fauvillers, and shortly thereafter the battalion moved west to secure Witry.42 DELAYS AT BODANGE After the 3/1st Infantry cleared Bodange and after the 1st Motorcycle Battalion reached Witry, the 1st Panzer Division's route of march to its front was clear of enemy forces for at least the next ten kilometers. Moving the heavy elements of the division beyond Bodange, however, proved to be extremely difficult. As the Germans worked diligently to clear the minefield restricting their movement across the Sure River and to repair the roads through Martelange, Radelange, and Bodange, General Kirchner issued orders for the division to prepare to continue the attack. During the day-long battle on the Belgian border, the division's march columns had continued moving forward through Luxembourg and slowly had closed into Martelange. But the division was not massed at the frontier ready to spring forward when the route through Bodange was opened. Even though the light elements on the point of the division's advance moved

quickly through Luxembourg, the march columns to their rear (tanks, artillery, and heavy trucks, especially) experienced numerous delays. By 2015 hours, when the crossing site at Bodange was opened, some elements were still far to the rear. And before the entire division could advance along the narrow road between Bodange and Martelange, numerous road and bridge repairs had to be completed in the tightly restricted terrain. These difficulties prevented the division from immediately unleashing its forces toward the west. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division concluded: The division must therefore give up its intention to break through the second resistance line. The units of the advanced guard organize themselves in a line from Volaiville to Witry and rest for the night while covered by security forces. Thus the first day for the 1st Panzer Division did not end on a completely satisfactory note. The circumstances which caused that lay less in the energetic defense of the Belgians—the resistance of the Belgians was weaker than had been assumed—but above all in the great difficulties which occurred when all usable crossing points and pathways were completely destroyed. Detours were usually not to be found….”43 The assertion about the resistance of the Belgians being “weaker” than had been “assumed” is probably not true, but even if it were, the companies of the Chasseurs Ardennais accomplished their mission in a distinguished fashion. The greatest restriction of German mobility occurred at Bodange where the Belgian obstacles were covered by fire. The willingness of the small Belgian force to fight and the destruction of the road network on the Luxembourg frontier clearly affected the ability of the 1st Panzer Division to move forward rapidly. THE ADVANCE OF THE 10TH PANZER DIVISION To the left of the 1st Panzer Division and on the left flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps was the 10th Panzer Division. Evidently because of the threat of a French attack into the southern flank of the corps, Guderian attached the Gross Deutschland Regiment (minus two of its four battalions) to the division. This made it the largest of Guderian's three Panzer divisions. With elements crossing at Bollendorf and Echternach, the division's role in the 1940 campaign began somewhat inauspiciously when the engineer company charged with assisting the crossing of the advanced guard over the Our River at Bollendorf got lost and arrived at the crossing site late. Without the engineers’ assault boats, the leading elements of the division did not cross the river until the

ramp over the concrete obstacles on the bridge was in place. At 0535 hours, almost an hour late, the first Germans finally crossed the river.44 Despite this awkward beginning, the 10th Panzer Division subsequently performed superbly and initially moved far ahead of the other two divisions. With screening forces consisting of motorcycle, engineer, and reconnaissance elements and advanced guards consisting of air-defense, engineer, and reconnaissance elements, the division moved through Luxembourg along two march routes. The two battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment and a tank company were in the right column, and the 69th Infantry Regiment and the two tank regiments were on the left. Other units were, of course, mixed in the two columns.45 Around 0915 hours the screening forces on the right entered Belgium near Attert and found no opposition. In their quick move through Luxembourg, they had encountered no obstacles. The left column moved somewhat slower. The 10th Panzer Division was supposed to advance in two columns through the wide valley between Arlon and Florenville (thirty-five kilometers west of Arlon) and did not expect strong resistance from the Belgians. However, they did expect to meet French forces moving north into Belgium or moving east from Florenville.46 The division's prediction came true, for at 1230 hours, they made contact with French forces east of Etalle. In Etalle the 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment became involved in heavy house-to-house fighting in which the battalion commander was killed. Shortly before the French fled Etalle, a few tanks from the 10th Panzer Division finally arrived to reinforce the German infantry. Outside Etalle, the Gross Deutschland Regiment attacked with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2nd Battalion on the left, and the 43rd Engineer Battalion in the center. Since the artillery had not yet arrived, the infantry and engineers fought without its support, but did receive support from the heavy assault guns of the 16th Company of the Gross Deutschland Regiment.47 In subsequent battles, the use of the engineers as infantry remained a common practice. For the rest of the afternoon, the Germans fought against a “toughly defending enemy,” and by 1900 hours managed to reach the railway line that runs north-south about three kilometers west of Etalle. In this first day's fighting, the 69th Infantry Regiment and the Gross Deutschland Regiment began attacking along the southern and center parts, respectively, of the valley. As the battle progressed on the first day, the Gross Deutschland Regiment began attacking in a northwesterly direction toward Villers-sur-Semois (five kilometers northwest of Etalle). During the sharp fighting, the commander of the 69th Infantry Regiment was killed about three

kilometers west of Etalle.48 Thus, in the initial hours of combat, the Germans lost the commanders of an infantry regiment and a battalion. These and subsequent losses of key personnel clearly demonstrated the willingness of German commanders to lead by example and to be at the forefront of the fighting. As will subsequently be shown, the French suffered far fewer losses of senior officers. Despite the willingness of the division's senior officers to lead from the front, the strong French defenses prevented the division from seizing its first day's objective, which was the Rossignol-Bellefontaine line (seven kilometers west of Etalle). The 10th Panzer Division continued to try to break through the French defenses, and at 2100 hours received an order telephonically from corps to continue the attack on 11 May toward Florenville. At 0200 hours, however, it received a written order, which had been completed by corps headquarters at 2150, to shift toward the northwest and seize a crossing over the Semois River near Mortehan (ten kilometers east of Bouillon). In his account of the battle, Guderian explained that Group von Kleist had become concerned about French cavalry advancing from the south and had ordered the 10th Panzer Division to turn toward the direction from which they were supposedly coming. According to Guderian, he recognized the diversion of one-third of his force would threaten the success of the Meuse crossing and therefore the entire operation. To avoid having to send the division south, Guderian changed its route of march and ordered it to move through Suxy (eight kilometers south of Neufchâteau) toward Mortehan (sixteen kilometers westsouthwest of Neufchâteau).49 As he considered his alternatives and then issued orders changing the division's route of march, he ignored a message from von Kleist that arrived shortly before midnight on the 10–11th and that ordered the 10th Panzer Division to halt and secure the Panzer group's left flank.50 Guderian strongly believed that flank protection was the responsibility of follow-on divisions and that turning the 10th Division to the northwest defused the threat to the corps’ flank. He also believed that the success of the entire operation depended upon all three of his divisions being available for the attack across the Meuse. After conversations between the XIXth Corps and the Panzer group around 0330 hours, in which Guderian emphasized the advantages of protecting the corps’ flank by advancing rapidly, von Kleist finally rescinded the order.51 Thus Guderian bullheadedly ignored von Kleist's order and then had the audacity to debate its merits. If von Kleist had later insisted on turning the division to the south, or if the French had in fact attacked north, the difficulties of turning the division around would have been

insurmountable. Unfortunately, the shift of the 10th Division to the north forced it to pass through some of the worst terrain in the entire area. The daily log of the 10th Panzer Division explained: The division had focused entirely on the continuation of the attack against Florenville and believed itself to be able to realize rapid success. It foresaw a delay in attaining the larger objective of Sedan through the difficult shift and the transfer of the march columns through the barely passable Anlier Forest and the forcing of the Semois River. In contrast to that, corps appears to have reports of strong forces advancing from the south which call into question the rapid advance of the division through Florenville. Moreover, the shifting of the division was supposed to help the advance of the 1st Panzer Division which was still hanging back….52 Despite the short time involved, the division managed to inform all its units and shift its direction of march toward the northwest. While leaving two battalions of the 69th Infantry Regiment and an artillery battalion at Etalle to cover the shift, the 10th Division moved along three routes toward the northwest, including one group that moved north almost to Neufchâteau and passed through Grapfontaine (three kilometers to its southwest). The division's objective was Mortehan, which lay fifteen kilometers to its front on the Semois River.53 In the movement toward the northwest, the Gross Deutschland Regiment encountered “obstinately fighting enemy” in the heavily forested area around Suxy but managed to push the “very tough fighting horse-mounted reconnaissance battalion” back. Farther to the north, the 86th Infantry Regiment encountered weak resistance near Straimont. An unexpected problem appeared when elements from the 1st Panzer Division moved south of Neufchâteau onto the march route of the 86th Regiment. This caused delays. Nevertheless, leading elements of the division's infantry were about five kilometers east of Mortehan when darkness fell on the 11th.54 As the division moved northwest, the Germans learned that the reports about French cavalry elements moving from Florenville east toward Etalle were false, and von Kleist became concerned about the wisdom of diverting the 10th Division to the northwest. If the 10th Division advanced toward the west through Florenville, according to von Kleist, it could roll up the French positions along the Semois by attacking them from the south. During a visit to the corps’ command post on the afternoon of the 11th, von Kleist discussed the possibility of sending

the division toward Florenville, rather than toward the northwest, but Guderian's Chief of Staff emphasized that turning the division toward Florenville could result in “intolerable” delays. Von Kleist departed without having ordered the corps to divert the division again.55 About two hours later, XIXth Corps received an order from the Panzer group to move forces toward Florenville. The operations officer of the group suggested sending the Armor Brigade from the 10th Panzer Division. He also explained that the High Command in Berlin wanted stronger forces sent toward Florenville. Recognizing the inevitable, the XIXth Corps radioed the division at 1745 hours and ordered it to send a battalion task force through Florenville toward the Semois River. This time objections came from the commanding general of the 10th Division.56 During a meeting with Guderian that night at Neufchâteau, General Schaal argued that his division should not send a battalion toward Florenville. Pointing out that a battalion could not be moved in a timely manner and that sufficient protection would come from the advanced elements of the VIIth Corps, he emphasized the importance of continuing toward Mortehan. To protect the flank of the XIXth Corps, according to the original plan, advance elements of the VIIth Corps were supposed to move into position south of Etalle.57 When the VIIth Corps continued moving west, its units were supposed to be replaced by units from the XIIIth Corps, which followed the VIIth Corps. Just as von Kleist had backed down before Guderian's objections on the previous day, Guderian soon backed down before Schaal's. The mission of the division remained that of crossing the Semois near Mortehan and thrusting forward in the direction of Sedan. But to respond to the High Command's concern about the group's flank, Guderian called the 29th Infantry Division (Motorized), which was part of the XIVth Motorized Corps and was following the 10th Panzer Division, and asked if it could send forces toward Florenville. After other delays, von Kleist finally recognized the difficulty of turning the 10th Panzer Division and ordered the 29th Division to move toward Florenville.58 Guderian's actions had left him little choice. Throughout the 11th, the bulk of the Panzers from the 10th Division followed far behind the infantry, though a few accompanied them. Shortly before midnight on 11–12 May, the corps commander withdrew the Gross Deutschland Regiment from the control of the 10th Division and placed it under the control of corps headquarters. Shortly after midnight, the two Panzer regiments closed into an assembly area about five kilometers south of Neufchâteau.59 The infantry was about sixteen kilometers ahead of the main body of the tanks. The time gap

between the infantry and the tanks, however, was much greater, for the tanks had to traverse some extremely winding roads through very difficult terrain. At 0200 hours on the 12th, the division's infantry reached the Semois River and shortly thereafter, seized a crossing site at Mortehan. The daily log notes simply, “Weak enemy, bridge destroyed.” After the bridge was repaired, vehicles could pass over by driving very slowly.60 Despite the extremely difficult terrain and the tortuous path to the Semois, the division seized a crossing site over the river at about the same time as the 1st Panzer Division, which had moved forward under much more advantageous circumstances. After crossing the heavily forested area east of Mortehan and the difficult terrain near the Semois, the 10th Panzer Division did not have a simple move to the banks of the Meuse. Only a few roads passed through the dense forest to their front, and no more than one or two went in the direction of Sedan. To reach the point on the Meuse where it was supposed to cross, the division had to move about five kilometers south of Mortehan to Maison Blanche, turn west for about twelve kilometers, and then move toward La Chapelle (five kilometers northeast of Sedan), Givonne (three kilometers northeast of Sedan), and Sedan. For obvious reasons, the attack south of the Semois proceeded slowly. The 86th Infantry Regiment reached La Chapelle at 1300 hours on the 12th; Givonne fell around 1900 hours.61 Though little or no enemy resistance remained on the northern bank of the Meuse, artillery fires on demolition sites, craters, and obstacles, as well as on La Chapelle, caused long delays in the division's efforts to push men and materiel forward. As the division began to prepare to cross the Meuse, it faced a formidable challenge. Much of its equipment and many of its units were scattered throughout the heavy forests and tiny roads through which it had passed. Though the actual crossing of the Meuse would be a complex, dangerous operation, it probably seemed simple in comparison to the task of assembling the division for the crossing. THE ADVANCE OF THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION THROUGH BELGIUM The 2nd Panzer Division moved on the right flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps and thus was the northernmost unit in Guderian's force. The initial part of the 1940 campaign was a challenge for the division, for it had to move through some of the most difficult terrain in the Ardennes. Though the road network through northern Luxembourg favored a north-south move, the division had to wind its way through the sharp curves and steep hills. After entering Belgium on 10 May, the division continued to move forward slowly, eventually reaching the Semois River later

than the other divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps. As with the 1st and 10th Panzer divisions, the 2nd Panzer Division encountered no opposition in Luxembourg. Its crossing near Vianden went smoothly, especially since it used a special commando unit at midnight on the 9–10th to seize the bridge and obstacles at the Our River. The division moved with an advanced guard to its front, followed by infantry that crossed the Luxembourg border at 0831 hours.62 Passing through Luxembourg proved to be difficult, for the division's march route included several sharp S turns that could not be negotiated by large trucks without their pulling back and forth several times. The march groups also became separated when several broken down vehicles blocked the road. The division finally had to change its march route and shift farther to the north before turning back to the south. At 1030 the leading elements of the division reached the Belgian border near Surré. Scouting elements reported that the Belgians were not defending Tintange (immediately adjacent to the frontier and six kilometers north of Martelange) and that the defenses near Strainchamps (five kilometers to the west of Tintange) were “without movement.”63 Some time after 1330 hours, a scout troop from the division's armored reconnaissance battalion passed through Tintange and attacked the Belgians at Strainchamps. Before the attack began, the division tried to move the 74th Artillery Regiment forward, despite the narrow roads and difficult terrain, so it could provide support. Around 1700 hours, the Germans seized Strainchamps but discovered the bridge to the west was destroyed. Infantry waded across the Sûre River and minutes later captured Hotte (two kilometers to the west of Strainchamps). The 38th Engineer Battalion immediately began building a tactical bridge over the small river, which was hardly more than a stream.64 The division commander wanted to bring his tanks forward at this point, but they were still deep in Luxembourg. In addition to constraints posed by the difficult roads, the 1st Panzer Division had brashly pushed forward onto one of the roads on which the 2nd Division had priority and had thereby disrupted the movement of the division. It was clear that the Panzer brigade could not reach the Belgian border until the following morning. Though its tanks were far behind, the 2nd Panzer Division pushed its infantry aggressively forward. The soldiers of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 2nd Infantry Regiment quickly reached Winville (ten kilometers west of Tintange) and continued moving west. After the engineers completed the bridge at Strainchamps around 0100 hours on the 11th, the 74th Artillery Regiment and the vehicles of the 2nd Infantry Regiment hurried forward. The division began preparing for an attack against Libramont on the following morning.65

To deliver the attack on the 11th, the division commander moved his forces forward in two columns. While one advanced via Widemont, Ste. Marie, and Libramont, the other advanced via Bernimont, Sberchamps, and Recogne. Problems with rear units marching through Luxembourg continued to plague the division as elements from the 6th Panzer Division also began to push onto some of the routes used by the 2nd Panzers. A few tanks, nevertheless, managed to cross the Luxembourg border, and at 0900 the 2nd Company, 4th Panzer Regiment was rushed forward to support the attack on Libramont. Reports from reconnaissance aircraft indicated that the French had concentrated their forces in the southern part of Libramont and were not defending the road between Libramont and Neufchâteau. After some hard house-to-house fighting against a French horse cavalry unit, the Germans gained control of Libramont at 1445 on the 11th. Because the division's tanks were still far to the rear, it was unable to send a large armored force around the city, as the 1st Panzer Division was able to do at Neufchâteau. After clearing Libramont, the division pushed west in two columns against continued French resistance. Comprised mostly of infantry, both columns moved slowly toward the Semois, one toward Membre and the other toward Mouzaive (ten kilometers northwest of Bouillon). After the Germans seized Ochamps (eight kilometers west of Libramont) at 2000 hours, the enemy ceased defending to the front of the 2nd Panzer Division, and the division moved forward more easily.66 Not until 1900 hours on the 11th, however, did the tanks of the 2nd Panzer Brigade reach Ste. Marie (three kilometers east of Libramont). Traffic problems in Luxembourg had seriously delayed the tanks’ advance and thereby had slowed the advance of the division. After a three-hour rest from 0115 to 0400 on the 12th, the 2nd Infantry Brigade reached the Semois River at 0700 hours. It immediately reported that the south bank was not occupied by the enemy but that the bridges at Membre and Vresse (thirteen kilometers northwest of Bouillon) were destroyed. The brigade also discovered that the 1st Panzer Division had seized the crossing site at Mouzaive and was busy rushing troops across it. The 2nd Panzer Division had no choice but to erect its own bridging near Vresse.67 As it struggled to bring the bridging materials forward, some of its infantry crossed the Semois and moved toward Sugny. Since the French had already withdrawn west, the Germans encountered no opposition. After completing the bridge over the Semois at 1500 hours on the 12th, the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion crossed and moved toward Sugny, Bosseval, Vrigne-auxBois, and Donchery (four kilometers west of Sedan). Several hours later,

destroyed roads and obstacles forced the right march column to give up trying to reach Membre, and the division commander ordered it to cross at Vresse with the left march column. Problems with march routes continued to be the main factor in the slow move of the division and ultimately caused the division to attack across the Meuse later than the other two Panzer divisions. THE ADVANCE OF THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION TO THE SEMOIS RIVER Guderian's objective for the XIXth Panzer Corps on the first day of the campaign had been to break through the enemy's second line of defenses near Neufchâteau. The combination of unanticipated difficulties in moving ponderous columns through Luxembourg and the spirited defense of the Belgians at Bodange, however, had prevented him from attaining his first day's objective. None of his three divisions seized its first day's objectives. As the new day began, he recognized the importance of pushing forward as rapidly as possible, particularly with the 1st Panzer Division, so he would not fall far behind his time table and allow the French time to reinforce their defenses at Sedan. Despite being behind schedule, he did not change the objective for the second day. Guderian wanted to reach the Semois River. Early on the morning of 11 May, the screening forces of the 1st Panzer Division were about ten kilometers east of Neufchâteau. While the light units in the screening force from the 1st Panzer Division pushed west of Witry during the night of 10–11 May and early morning of 11 May, the main body of the division continued to encounter difficulties moving through the bottleneck of Martelange and Bodange, but these difficulties were not as great as those encountered by the 2nd Panzer Division. The most important bottleneck for the 1st Panzer Division continued to be Bodange. When road conditions stopped the 1/73rd Artillery at Bodange, the entire 1st Panzer Regiment was behind it, but fortunately for the Germans, the 2nd Panzer Regiment had already crossed.68 Because of the delays at Bodange, the 1st Panzer Division attacked early on the 11th with only one of its Panzer regiments and with little or no artillery support. The presence of the tanks, however, proved to be extremely important to the division and enabled it to move much more rapidly beyond the Belgian defenses along the Luxembourg border than the 2nd Panzer Division to the north. When the division pushed west toward Neufchâteau, the 2nd Panzer Regiment became its leading element. At 0145 hours on the 11th, the regiment reached Witry, and after resupplying and resting for a short period, moved west at 0430 hours. At 0645 hours the regiment reached the woods east of Namoussart (five

kilometers east of Neufchâteau).69 Rather than attack the built-up area without infantry, the 2nd Panzer Regiment moved to the south, bypassing the city of Neufchâteau. After passing through Namoussart, Marbay, and Grapfontaine, the regiment turned north and approached Petitvoir (four kilometers west of Neufchâteau). As the Panzer regiment attacked toward the road leading out of Neufchâteau, the French tried to stop them. The sudden appearance of the tank regiment created the danger of their forward defenders being cut off and encircled from the rear. The German division's daily log explained: “The opponent puts up a strong defense here. The most important thing for him is to hold open the roads leading to the west from Neufchâteau.” During what the Panzer brigade called “a hard fight,” the 2nd Panzer Regiment destroyed a French artillery battery and a motorized column.70 To the rear of the 2nd Panzer Regiment, the 1st Panzer Regiment moved “slowly” and reached Namoussart about the time the leading tanks of the 2nd Regiment attacked Petitvoir. The 3/1st Infantry followed the 1st Panzer Regiment, while the 37th Armored Engineer Battalion acted as a flank guard against an attack emanating from Neufchâteau. After reaching Le Sart just south of Neufchâteau, the 3/1st Infantry turned north and attacked the city. The infantry discovered that the city was not strongly defended, and after moving quickly to its center, broke the enemy's defenses. By 1330 the town was under German control.71 To continue the advance toward the west, the 1st Panzer Division moved the 1st Panzer Regiment around and ahead of the 2nd Panzer Regiment. While the 2nd Panzers continued pressing against Petitvoir, the 1st Panzer Regiment attacked on its left and captured Biourge (half way between Petitvoir and Bertrix). This deep thrust enabled the 2nd Panzer Regiment to take Petitvoir “after a short period of time.” The daily log of the division notes, “The breakthrough of the second resistance line has finally succeeded.” This breakthrough apparently occurred around 1400 hours.72 The division's next objective was to reach the Semois River. The 1st Panzer Regiment received the order to seize a crossing in Bouillon, and the 2nd Panzer Regiment received the order to seize a crossing near Rochehaut (seven kilometers northwest of Bouillon). The division did not intend to allow the French time to regroup. After capturing Biourge, the 1st Panzer Regiment quickly seized Bertrix around 1515 hours. Aggressively continuing the attack, the regiment finally was halted around 1715 hours at Fays-les-Veneurs (six kilometers west of Bertrix) by a blown bridge. After easily finding a bypass, the Panzers continued attacking west,

but were held up again about two kilometers west of the town when they encountered another blown bridge. This time, a detour could be found only after a long search.73 As elements of the 1st Panzer Division raced forward, halting only for obstacles, the division headquarters hoped to seize an intact bridge across the Semois. The leading element of the division—the 1/1st Panzers—received the order to advance rapidly toward Bouillon, seize a bridge across the Semois, and hold it until infantry arrived. As the battalion drove forward, it exchanged fire with several French tanks and on a couple of occasions pushed forward even though the enemy held both sides of the road. After receiving a report from a reconnaissance aircraft about enemy tanks fleeing toward the west, the battalion began moving forward even more rapidly. Around 1730 hours the battalion reached the outskirts of Bouillon. The 2nd Company, which was the lead company, heard the detonation of an explosion destroying a bridge as it raced into the city. When it approached the Semois River, it observed that one bridge had not been destroyed and fired its machine guns into the area around the bridge in an attempt to keep the French from destroying it. At the same time, the 4th Company received orders to move through the streets and take the bridge. Just before its tanks reached the bridge, an explosion destroyed it. Almost simultaneously, the company commander's vehicle was hit by an antitank round, and the gunner killed. Since the tank was no longer useable, the crew abandoned it. Meanwhile the 2nd Company crossed the Semois using a nearby fording site it had located. After the company seized a position on the opposite bank of the river, the battalion commander pulled it back across the Semois. Although the German commander did not state his reasons in his after-action report, the absence of infantry to protect the tanks in the thick woods probably convinced him to withdraw.74 In the middle of all this action, German aircraft suddenly began bombarding Bouillon and dropping bombs around the tanks. Exploding bombs wounded at least one soldier. Even though the 1st Battalion fired white flares, the attacks continued. Then heavy enemy artillery fire began falling on the city. Without infantry support and under enemy artillery fire, the battalion commander decided to pull his tanks out of Bouillon to a position near Noirefontaine (three kilometers north of Bouillon).75 The opportunity to push rapidly across the Semois at Bouillon on the evening of 11 May had failed. With due pride in its accomplishments during the day, however, the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division noted:

Despite all the difficulties which have surfaced through battles, obstacles, detours, blockages, and intermingling of march columns, this day has been the day of the first successes for the 1st Panzer Division. A feeling of superiority over the western opponents arose in the division on this day—a day in which it encountered for the first time French forces along the second Belgian resistance line. The division has reached the goals planned for it on the second day—far in advance of its sister divisions—without regard for its flanks and in spite of the slow progress of the first day.76 THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION CROSSES THE SEMOIS RIVER Fortunately for the Germans, the aggressive advance of the 1st Panzer Division disrupted the defensive efforts of the French along the Semois. Even though the Semois could be forded in numerous places, the thick woods and high hills strongly favored the defender. But the French had pulled back so quickly under such heavy German pressure that their defenses simply did not come together as strongly as they should have. After backing out of Bouillon, the commanding general of the 1st Panzer Division reorganized his forces into two battle groups. Under Colonel Keltsch, who commanded the Panzer Brigade, were the 2/2nd Panzer, 2/1st Infantry, 1/73rd Artillery, and an antitank company. Under Colonel Krüger, who commanded the infantry brigade, were most of the other maneuver elements in the division. While Battle Group Keltsch had the objective of seizing a crossing site farther north, Battle Group Krüger had the objective of seizing a crossing site over the Semois at Bouillon. The main attack of the division was directed at Bouillon by Krüger's battle group. At 0220 hours on the 12th, the 1/1st Infantry received orders to attack and seize Bouillon and the hill across the Semois to its south. Support would come from two tank platoons attached to the battalion from the 1st Panzer Regiment and by the 2/73rd Artillery, which would provide direct support. If the French attacked, the battalion was supposed to hold the hills to the north of Bouillon. After the time for the attack was changed from 0300 to 0500 hours, the infantry moved into Bouillon and quickly reached the main street. They found no enemy. The 3rd Company, which was the lead company, attacked across the Semois and seized a bridgehead, and the 2nd Company and an engineer platoon followed. The 1st Company remained behind to secure Bouillon. After the two companies crossed the Semois, the 3rd Battalion of the regiment and a platoon of tanks moved into and expanded the bridgehead.77 Colonel Keltsch's battle group, however, made the most important crossing for

the 1st Panzer Division. Though their fighting skills and combat leadership were important, luck was clearly on their side. During the afternoon of the 11th, the 1st Motorcycle Battalion, the 2/2nd Panzer Battalion, and an artillery battery from the 73rd Regiment received orders from Colonel Keltsch to move from Fays-lesVeneurs (six kilometers west of Bertrix) toward Cornimont (nine kilometers northwest of Bouillon). The 2/1st Infantry received orders to move toward Poupehan (five kilometers northwest of Bouillon) and seize a crossing site over the Semois. Around 1915 hours on the 11th, the 3rd Company of the motorcycle battalion received orders to advance toward Mouzaive (ten kilometers northwest of Bouillon). Reinforced by a tank platoon, the motorcyclists were supposed to seize the bridge across the Semois if it were intact. If the bridge had been destroyed, they were to take the northern part of the small village (Alle) to its south and establish a bridgehead.78 Although the source of the orders to take the bridge at Mouzaive is not clear, they probably came from Colonel Keltsch, who had the mission of seizing a crossing site west of Bouillon. They evidently did not come from division headquarters, or at least the division staff did not claim credit for the order in the daily log. Mouzaive lay outside the 1st Panzer Division's area and was supposed to be a crossing site for the 2nd Panzer Division. Thus the explanation for the seizure of a crossing site in another division's area probably resides in the aggressiveness of a subordinate commander, rather than in the eagerness of the division's headquarters to push aside a sister division. Nonetheless, shortly before dark on the 11th, about thirty minutes after receiving the order, the motorcyclists raced toward Mouzaive. As they passed through the woods to the northeast of the bridge, fallen trees across the road forced them to dismount from their motorcycles and move forward on foot. When they emerged from the woods, they came under machine gun fire from across the river in the vicinity of Mouzaive. During this firefight, a French horse cavalry patrol appeared and managed to pass by the Germans and cross over the bridge into Mouzaive. A hasty attack from the 3rd Company succeeded in securing the bridge around 2335 hours.79 Even though the area was outside the division's zone, the motorcyclists cleared out the northern part of Alle and began expanding the bridgehead. Division headquarters immediately requested permission from corps headquarters to use the crossing site, and since the 2nd Panzer Division was far to the rear, soon received permission. Around 0500 hours elements of the 2nd Panzer reached Mouzaive, expecting to seize a crossing site.80 The area, however, clearly was

under the control of the 1st Panzer Division. At 0200 hours on the 12th, the 1st Company of the 1st Motorcycle Battalion arrived to reinforce the 3rd Company. Then at 0700 a tank company, evidently from the 2/2nd Panzers, arrived and crossed the river at a fording site alongside the bridge. At 0800 hours a company from the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion also arrived to strengthen the defenses at the crossing site. The 2/1st Infantry, which had attempted to force a crossing at Poupehan and failed, received orders to move to Mouzaive, and it too quickly crossed the Semois. By 0730 hours German tanks and motorcycles were moving south from Mouzaive and headed toward Alle and eventually St. Menges (three kilometers northwest of Sedan). The 2/1st Infantry followed behind them.81 While Keltsch's battle group seized the crossing site at Mouzaive, Krüger's battle group pushed across the Semois at Bouillon. After Krüger's forces reached Bouillon and pushed units toward the south, they did not move directly toward Sedan. Even though an awkward change in directions was required, the division had to move west toward Corbion and then turn south toward Sedan. The reason for this awkward change in direction was an order from corps headquarters that gave the 10th Panzer Division priority in the use of the road that ran south of Bouillon toward Sedan and directed the 1st Panzer Division to use routes farther to the west. The 10th Panzer Division had to move ten kilometers to the west from its crossing site at Mortehan, because the road south of Bouillon was one of the few routes it could use to move toward the eastern side of Sedan where it was supposed to cross the Meuse. Before the engineers arrived on the morning of the 12th and began building a bridge across the Semois at Bouillon, as mentioned earlier, elements of the 1st Panzer Division that were already across the river began expanding the bridgehead seized on the morning of the 12th. The 3/1st Infantry moved into this bridgehead and then quickly advanced toward Corbion (four kilometers west of Bouillon). Although French demolitions had created a large crater and had partially destroyed the road along which they marched, the German infantry passed around the obstacle with no difficulty. In Corbion the infantry battalion encountered very little resistance and cleared out the enemy with only one company.82 Behind them, however, the staff of the 1st Regiment tried to move in vehicles along the road from Bouillon and Corbion but were halted by the crater. As they awaited the arrival of engineers to take care of the crater and enable their vehicles to cross, the staff came under heavy enemy artillery fire that had apparently been registered on the site. The after-action report on the event noted that the staff

suffered “heavy losses.”83 The crater on the road and the artillery fire that protected it thus created major problems for the division. After clearing Corbion, the 3/1st Infantry moved south from Corbion and then turned west for about three kilometers. Before reaching the road from Alle to St. Menges, the battalion turned south toward Fleigneux, but as it marched forward, it received heavy fire from a “harmless looking house.” This fire apparently came from what the French called a “fortified house.” Using covering fires from a Mark IV tank, a lieutenant assembled an attack squad and soon captured the French position. The narrow trails, however, prevented the German vehicles from dispersing, and French artillery fire began landing at the front of the column.84 When other units moved forward, they too came under the heavy artillery fire. The result was that the German forces moving west toward Corbion and then south toward Sedan did not advance as rapidly as the forces that had crossed at Mouzaive. The 1st Panzer Division had reacted rapidly to the fortuitous seizure of the crossing site at Mouzaive and had opened a large hole in French defenses along the Semois. Though initially stymied in the attempt to shift forces west from Bouillon to Corbion, the rapid advance to the south from Mouzaive enabled German forces to reach the edge of the woods near Fleigneux (three kilometers north of Sedan) around 1010 hours. The 2/1st Infantry, however, did not attack the French village of St. Menges (two kilometers to the southwest of Fleigneux) until around 1300 hours. To the north, the 1/1st Infantry received orders at 1300 hours to move south toward Sedan. Pressure from the 1st Panzer Division against the last French defenders north of the Meuse thus initially came from Mouzaive in the northwest and Bouillon in the north, but Germans soon began moving forward in the center. When the first German elements broke out of the heavy woods north of Fleigneux around 1010 hours and entered the rolling, open terrain north of the Meuse River, their presence signaled the successful crossing of the Ardennes by the Germans and the opening of a new phase of the campaign. The first Germans reached the Meuse around 1400 hours. It had taken them about fifty-seven hours. THE FINAL PUSH TO THE MEUSE RIVER The three divisions of the XIXth Panzer Corps thus crossed the Semois River along a front of about twenty kilometers. Though the 2nd Panzer Division on the corps’ right flank crossed later than the other two divisions, the concentration of overwhelming force along the narrow front enabled the Germans to brush the last

French defenders aside easily. As tanks from the 1st Panzer Division poured across at Mouzaive and as the infantry from the 10th Panzer raced south from Mortehan, the Germans threatened to encircle the French defenders along the Semois. This danger hastened the collapse of an already fragile defensive effort.

CHAPTER 3

The French Fight in the Ardennes

W

hen Germany launched its attack on 10 May, the French sent cavalry forces into the Ardennes. The cavalry from the Second and Ninth armies expected to meet some Germans, but they did not expect to meet the main enemy attack. Hence they were neither structured nor prepared to offer strong resistance, particularly in the area forward of the Semois River. Because of Belgium's sensitivity about remaining neutral, little or no coordination had been accomplished between the French and Belgian forces. The lack of coordination and the unexpected encountering of the main enemy attack ensured the two forces did not operate in a combined fashion to delay or defeat the Germans. The result was a somewhat disorganized fight in the Ardennes during which the French cavalry failed to recognize and report the significance of the large German forces they encountered. FRENCH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE Before 1940 the French devoted considerable effort to develop as much and as accurate intelligence as possible about Germany. The Second Bureau of the Army's High Command had primary responsibility for the collection and analysis of data concerning foreign military forces. Another important part of the French intelligence community was known in peacetime as the Service de Renseignements and in wartime as the Fifth Bureau. This office had responsibility for all of France's clandestine intelligence collection operations, including counter-espionage, agents, secret listening posts, and so on. The information it gathered was forwarded to the Second Bureau, which combined it with information received from other sources.1 As part of their effort to monitor German radio traffic and break their codes, the French developed close relations with the Poles as they worked to duplicate the principal German cipher machine, Enigma, which was used for encrypting and

decrypting messages. During this sensitive endeavor, a French agent who was involved in the German communications-intelligence system supplied critical information that enabled the Poles to break the German code with their duplicate of an Enigma machine. At the end of July 1939, the Poles sent one of the recently fabricated machines to London and the other to Paris, and French intelligence specialists quickly asked a firm in which they had great confidence to manufacture forty duplicates.2 After the fall of Poland and the escape of some Polish communications specialists to France, a small cipher section in the Fifth Bureau of the French Army's General Staff, which had been known in peacetime as the Service de Renseignements, used the duplicate Enigma machines to decipher much of the high-level telegraphic traffic of the German Army and Air Force. Since the German Army relied primarily on Teletype machines linked with communications wire, most of the traffic monitored and decrypted by the French came for the Luftwaffe. Between 28 October 1939 and 14 June 1940, the French decrypted 4,789 messages. With the cipher section providing the messages to the Fifth Bureau of the army and the Second Bureau of the High Command, which analyzed the decrypted messages, the French acquired a great deal of information about the German order of battle, but the information pertained primarily to the enemy air force.3 The flow of information continued essentially uninterrupted from 28 October 1939 until 12 May 1940, when the Germans changed their codes. After working night and day, the French broke this code, and beginning on 20 May once again began decrypting German radio traffic.4 Thus the only interruption in the French reading of German encrypted message traffic occurred during the crucial period when the Germans crossed the Meuse River and turned west. From the beginning, decoded messages contributed to the French understanding of the German order of battle. Using information from a variety of sources, including Enigma intercepts, the Second Bureau of the High Command had located by April 1940 about 110 to 120 German divisions along the Dutch, Belgian, and French frontiers. It also had concluded that the Germans possessed 10 to 12 armored divisions and that these divisions could be used in a blitzkrieg attack similar to the one used against Poland.5 Between 1 May and 10 May, French intelligence received a large number of reports from agents indicating a German attack was imminent and would probably be concentrated north of the Moselle River. One report also said the Germans intended to occupy all of France after only a month of fighting.6 As more and more indicators suggested an imminent German attack, one of the

most important questions for the intelligence community pertained to the location of the main attack. From September 1939 until 10 May 1940, detailed analyses of information pertaining to the locations of German units suggested that attack would come “north of the Moselle.” However, locating the most probable German zone of attack north of the Moselle did not specify whether the main enemy attack would come through Holland, through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, or through the Ardennes in eastern Belgium. To French intelligence specialists, the German forces that could be employed through the Netherlands or through eastern Belgium seemed to be “secondary concentrations.”7 Sufficient forces for the main attack were apparently located where they could attack through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, much as the Germans had done in 1914. Even though most of the intelligence community believed the Germans would probably come through the Low Countries, the French became more concerned on the eve of the German attack about the possibility of an attack through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. In early March 1940, the Belgians observed a strengthening of German forces south of Liège, but after warning Gamelin, neither the Belgians nor the French saw a need to change their strategy. In the middle of March, aerial reconnaissance identified large German armored and motorized forces east of Luxembourg, which suggested some shifting of enemy forces for possible moves through Luxembourg or against the Maginot Line. Other reconnaissance flights, however, did not identify a major shift in German forces,8 even though several Panzer divisions had moved into the area southwest of Koblenz along the Moselle River. In the middle of April, a reliable agent informed the French about the Germans’ gathering information about terrain and roads along the axis SedanCharleville-St. Quentin. The agent also said the Germans would attack in the early days of May and intended to reach the Seine River in less than a month.9 Coupled with these reports were analyses of Enigma intercepts that suggested a higher probability of an attack through the Ardennes. Most of the increased concern about the Ardennes apparently came from the Fifth Bureau of the French Army. In mid-April, two intelligence officers from the Fifth Bureau, including Colonel Rivet who was its head, tried to meet with General Gamelin to express their heightened concern, but his executive officer said that Gamelin was too involved with ongoing events in Norway and told them to meet instead with General Georges. At his headquarters at La Ferté-sousJouarre, they met with Georges to discuss a possible German move through the Ardennes. After a detailed examination of the new assessment, Georges thanked them and departed. His attitude was probably best reflected by his operations officer, who explained to Colonel Rivet that the new information contradicted

other intelligence suggesting the main enemy effort would be aimed farther west, toward the Netherlands and northern Belgium.10 Though Georges’ intelligence officer, Colonel Baril, may have accepted the possibility of the German main attack coming through the Ardennes, the overall assessment of the French intelligence system did not change. The assessment by the Second Bureau of the High Command (under Colonel Gauché) about the most likely “zone of action” by the Germans basically remained the same from November 1939 until 10 May 1940. The last formal intelligence assessment, which was presented to the French High Command on 5 May, emphasized the absence of any major changes for about two months in the German distribution and location of forces. Though he may have had some personal reservations about the subject, Georges’ intelligence officer, Colonel Baril, gave the briefing on the German order of battle and noted that no important indicators suggested a move directly against the Maginot Line or through Switzerland. According to the briefing, the most likely zone of action for the Germans remained the area “north of the Moselle.”11 Since the Moselle River flowed from the southeastern corner of Luxembourg northeast to the Rhine River, this assessment—in a practical sense—did little more than rule out the possibilities of an attack through Switzerland or directly against the Maginot Line. Thus the large amount of new intelligence did little to shift the gaze of the French High Command from Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap toward the Ardennes. Despite an overriding concern with the northern avenue of invasion, some doubts clearly existed in the hierarchy of the Army. Georges and Gamelin exchanged some correspondence in the middle of April about whether it was “ipso facto” necessary to give orders for Franco-British troops to penetrate into Belgium and about whether it would be better to remain on the Escaut line, rather than move forward to the Dyle line.12 Georges’ meeting with the intelligence specialists from the Fifth Bureau occurred after his correspondence with Gamelin began. Despite Georges’ concerns about the Germans possibly coming through the Ardennes, his thinking evidently did not differ dramatically from that of other members of the French High Command. Very few doubts existed among the French about the Ardennes being a difficult obstacle. Though the Ardennes was not considered impenetrable, the combination of natural and man-made obstacles would—in the French view—make any penetration a slow and arduous operation. Most of the Ardennes west of Luxembourg is fairly open and consists of rolling countryside, but the areas around the Semois River and along the Meuse between Mézières and Dinant have

narrow winding roads and heavily forested, rugged hills. Felled trees, minefields, and roadblocks could theoretically prevent a large force, especially a mechanized one, from crossing rapidly. Additionally, if an enemy successfully made his way through the Ardennes, he still had to cross the Meuse River, whose depth, width, and surrounding terrain made it a reasonably strong obstacle. Even if the Germans did pass through the Ardennes and cross the Meuse, such an operation required such extensive resources and preparation that the French were confident they could reinforce the threatened area before a major penetration occurred. For planning purposes, they assumed the Germans would require nine days to cross the Ardennes and amass sufficient units and materiel to cross the Meuse River. If necessary, the French believed they had plenty of time to reinforce the threatened sector. As with other issues, some officers within the French High Command had doubts about the Ardennes delaying a German advance for an extended period. In the spring of 1938, the French conducted a map exercise in which German armored and motorized forces moved from east of Luxembourg across the Ardennes toward Sedan. In this exercise, German divisions reached the Meuse in sixty hours, a time that corresponded closely to the actual movement time in May 1940.13 Despite the results of this map exercise, the French remained confident in the Ardennes being an obstacle to the rapid movement of large numbers of troops. Ironically, the Germans also believed the terrain of the Ardennes would hamper the movement of troops. General Franz Halder, Chief of the German Army's General Staff, participated in a map exercise on 7 February 1940, which analyzed the possibility of a battle along the Meuse River. He concluded, “A concerted attack across the Meuse would be impossible before the ninth or tenth day of the offensive.” In this same map exercise, General Guderian proposed crossing the Meuse River with the XIXth Panzer and XIVth Corps on the fourth day of the offensive, but the Army Group A commander for the map exercise, General Günther Blumentritt, rejected this proposal, suggesting instead that the crossing begin on the eighth day of the offensive. Another map exercise on 14 February 1940 achieved the same results. In his diary, General Halder described Guderian's dissatisfaction with the relatively slow movement of mechanized forces across the Ardennes and Meuse River in the map exercise. He noted that Guderian “plainly show[s] lack of confidence in success…. Has lost confidence.” Guderian complained, Halder wrote, “The whole tank operation is planned wrong.” Despite the strong reservations of Guderian, Halder concluded, “A plus 8 is the earliest possible date for the front-wide attack. Technically it will not be possible before A plus 9.”14

Thus, as late as February, both the Germans and the French used the same planning figures about the length of time required to cross the Ardennes. Both assumed an attacking force could not cross Luxembourg and eastern Belgium and attack across the Meuse until nine days after the beginning of an offensive. In both armies, only a few officers believed a more rapid advance could be made across Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. Subsequent developments would lead the Germans to accept and the French again to reject the possibility of making a more rapid advance. By deciding to risk a more rapid advance across the Ardennes, however, the Germans dramatically changed the strategic situation. Despite some reservations in the intelligence community and despite the results of the 1938 map exercise, the French maintained their confidence in the Ardennes as an obstacle and in the likelihood of the Germans moving through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap. And in May 1940 the army executed almost flawlessly the plan for occupying the Dyle line. An extremely important part of that plan was the sending of cavalry forward into Belgium. MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY During the period before the German attack in May 1940, the key question pertaining to the French cavalry in the Second and Ninth armies was how far it would move into Belgium. The answer to this question depended on whether the French would move only to the Escaut River or whether they would move farther to the Dyle River. If they moved only as far as the Escaut River, the Ninth Army would remain in place and would not require time for movement to and occupation of a new position. If they moved as far as the Dyle River, however, the Ninth Army would swing into Belgium and occupy new positions along the Meuse River. Consequently, additional time had to be provided for its units to move forward and occupy their new positions before being attacked by the enemy. Probably the best way of delaying German forces to the front of the Ninth Army and providing the additional time was to employ a cavalry covering force in Belgium.15 As the French and British forces increased their combat readiness and as the Dutch and Belgians improved their defensive positions and posture (particularly along the Albert Canal), the French became more convinced that their forces would most likely be employed along the Dyle, rather than the Escaut line. At the same time, they began preparations and planning for sending the cavalry of the Ninth and Second armies deeper into Belgium. Until March 1940, the French did not intend to send their cavalry far beyond

their own lines. Instead, they planned on sending the cavalry about twenty kilometers forward of their principal line of resistance. In the sector of the Second Army, the cavalry operations would have taken place primarily from the Semois River south to the Meuse River. On 15 March, the Second Army issued a written order that included two possible alternatives for the employment of its cavalry. In the first alternative, the cavalry would move to the Semois River and only send light elements forward. In the second, the cavalry would move beyond the Semois River and send light elements almost to the Luxembourg border. By the end of March, the Second Army expected its cavalry to move beyond the Semois River. Though two choices continued to exist, the alternative of only defending along the Semois no longer appeared to be the most likely method of employment.16 The mission for the cavalry in the Second Army appeared in the 15 March 1940 order: In case of the violation by the enemy of the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers, the cavalry of the Second Army, in liaison to the left with that of Ninth Army, with the advanced elements and the cavalry of the Third Army to the right, will accomplish the following missions: —determine the axis and the zone of application of the principal enemy effort; —enter into liaison with the Belgian forces; —provide time to the command to put in place all the means necessary to halt the enemy attack.17 The assistant chief of staff of the Second Army later explained that since the bulk of the Second Army's units were already in position on the principal line of resistance, additional time was not required for them to occupy their positions. Instead, a delaying action to their front provided time for the French to execute their demolition plans and enabled them to extend the demolition zone forward of their main position of resistance.18 The real reason for the Second Army's cavalry moving deep into Belgium, however, was to ensure the Ninth Army to its left had time to move forward into its new position along the Meuse River. Cavalry action forward of the principal line of resistance was conducted under the general control of the field armies. The cavalry did not come under the control of a corps headquarters until it was three to five kilometers from the principal line of resistance. The Ninth Army had the 1st and 4th Light Cavalry divisions, as well as the 3rd Brigade of Spahis, under its control, while the Second Army had the 2nd and 5th Light Cavalry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Added to these cavalry forces were the reconnaissance squadrons of each of the divisions and

corps in the two field armies. With a total strength of about 10,000 men and 2,200 horses, the light cavalry division included one cavalry brigade with two horse-mounted regiments, one light motorized brigade with one regiment of armored vehicles and one regiment of motorized infantry, one regiment of artillery with two battalions (one 75mm, the other 105mm), one divisional antitank troop armed with twelve 25mm cannon, and one divisional antitank battery armed with eight 47mm cannon. In May 1940 the antitank troop in the 5th Light Cavalry Division had been reinforced and included twenty-eight 25mm cannon. The regiment of armored vehicles in a light cavalry division theoretically included fifteen A.M.D. Panhard vehicles, twenty-two A.M.R. Renault (Model 1935) light machine-gun vehicles, and fourteen H-35 tanks; the actual number and type of armored vehicles varied slightly from division to division. The regiment of motorized infantry in the light motorized brigade consisted of two battalions, each with a mixed troop of reconnaissance vehicles, a truck-mounted infantry troop, and a heavy weapons troop.19 To strengthen the cavalry forward of the Xth Corps sector, an infantry battalion from the 55th Division and another from the 3rd North African Division had the mission of occupying key passage points along the Semois River. From the 55th Division, the 1/295th Infantry had the mission of moving forward. To the right of the 1/295th, in the sector for the XVIIIth Corps, the 3/12th Zouaves—which was from the 3rd North African Division—occupied a position along the Semois River. As a reserve for the cavalry, the Second Army identified the 4th Tank Battalion, which had forty-five F.C.M. tanks.20 With the 3rd Brigade of Spahis from the Ninth Army on its left flank, the 5th Light Cavalry Division had the mission of covering three avenues of approach: Houffalize to St. Hubert, Bastogne to Libramont, and Bodange to Neufchâteau. Its main concern was the avenue of approach leading from Bastogne to Libramont. Farther to the south, the 2nd Light Cavalry had the mission of covering the avenues of approach from Arlon to Florenville and from Arlon to Virton. In the center, the 1st Cavalry Brigade covered the heavily forested area between the two divisions. While the French cavalry had a mission that corresponds to what is known in U.S. Army doctrine as an “advance covering force,” it was not expected to offer a high degree of resistance forward of the Semois River. In the 2,300 square kilometers between Mouzaive, Bastogne, Arlon, and Florenville, the area was too large and the number of troops available too small to enable the troops to conduct an energetic defense. Additionally, this large area had few natural obstacles and was too rolling and open for the cavalry to halt the Germans for any length of time. Consequently, the Second Army expected the cavalry to do little forward of the

Semois River other than delay the Germans and locate their main body of troops. The cavalry was expected to offer its highest level of resistance along the Semois River just forward of the main line of resistance. Though the river itself was not much of an obstacle, since it could be forded in numerous places, the addition of several infantry battalions in the rough terrain and the availability of a tank battalion could enable the cavalry to conduct a much stronger defense on the high ground overlooking the river. Before the cavalry units moved into the Ardennes, the French had great confidence in them, but they did not expect them to face Germany's main attack. While the proud, well-trained cavalrymen did not shrink before the possibility of facing larger forces than themselves, most did not expect to be overwhelmingly outnumbered by a significantly larger armored force. Their expectations are perhaps best represented in the attitude of General Huntziger, the Second Army commander. At 1400 hours on the 10th, he wrote General Gaston H. Billotte, Army Group 1 commander, and suggested that if the operations commencing that morning resulted in the cavalry holding along the Bastogne-Longwy line and in the Belgians holding along the Albert Canal-Liège line to the north, the cavalry should attempt to defend the terrain it occupied in Belgium. Such a defense would probably succeed, according to Huntziger, since the German forces opposing the cavalry could only be “the covering force or the flank guard of a strong action being executed in another region.”21 These optimistic hopes were quickly dashed when the cavalry encountered Germany's main attack moving rapidly and with great force through the Ardennes. FRENCH CAVALRY IN BELGIUM At 0540 hours on 10 May, the 5th Light Cavalry received the code word “Tilsitt,” which instructed it to assume alert status number three. With number four being the highest stage of alert, the cavalry began recalling its soldiers and preparing to move into Belgium. At 0720 hours another telephone call passed the code word “Wagram,” which informed the cavalry division to assume the highest state of alert and move into Belgium. At 0750 hours the division received orders to move into Belgium immediately, and at 0830 hours it received orders to move forward of the Semois River. The first elements from the division crossed into Belgium at 0810 hours, en route to positions close to the Luxembourg border.22 To control the operations of its cavalry in Belgium, the French Second Army had established a series of phase lines. Number 01 ran generally along the Semois River. Number 02 extended from the northwest to the southeast through Bertrix, Straimont, and a point east of Jamoigne; number 03 extended through Libramont,

east of Neufchâteau, and Etalle; and number 05 extended through Morhet and Bodange. Under the command of General Chanoine, the 5th Light Cavalry moved toward these phase lines with its units divided into three groups: distant security, advance guards, and main body. At 1455 hours the distant security elements of the division reached phase line 03. The advance guard reached the same line at 1600 hours and the main body at 1800 hours.23 A few distant security elements moved forward to phase line 05. Elements of the division were also supposed to reach Bastogne, but when a mechanized detachment encountered German infantry from the 3rd Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, near Nives, the French gave up any chances of reaching the key city. Unknown to them, the German infantry blocking their advance was a very small force that could have been easily bypassed.24 To the south of the 5th Division, the 2nd Light Cavalry Division became involved in the first heavy engagements between the Second Army's cavalry and the Germans. This fight occurred in the Arlon-Florenville avenue of approach, which consists primarily of a large, open valley between the two towns. The 2nd Division had responsibility for this valley and established its main position several kilometers west of Etalle (along phase line 03) early in the afternoon of the 10th. For security and early warning, the division moved several company-sized units forward of its main position. These units consisted primarily of a troop of light machine-gun vehicles and a troop of motorized infantry at Etalle. Forward of them, a motorcycle troop acted as a screening force. Around 1230 hours the motorcyclists reached Arlon (about fifteen kilometers east of Etalle), but they were easily overrun by a large enemy force from the 10th Panzer Division. The same enemy force next attacked the two troops at Etalle and easily pushed them back. For the next several hours, the Germans attacked the main position of the 2nd Cavalry Division, but the pressure of their attacks decreased late that afternoon. The French managed to hold their positions, but when darkness came their division commander ordered them to fall back on Jamoigne (about ten kilometers to the rear and behind phase line 02).25 After the 2nd Cavalry pulled back to Jamoigne, Huntziger issued an order at 2200 hours for the 5th Light Cavalry and 1st Cavalry Brigade to adjust their positions. The 5th Cavalry folded back its right flank to a point just outside Straimont. The 1st Cavalry Brigade occupied a defensive position along a small stream between Straimont, Suxy, and Jamoigne and placed a horse cavalry troop in the small but key town of Suxy. The 5th Cavalry thus had most of its forces

along phase line 03, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Cavalry had most of their forces farther to the rear along phase line 02.26 From their new positions near Jamoigne, the 2nd Cavalry awaited another attack, but the 10th Panzer Division unexpectedly turned to the north. Its new route took it toward Suxy and its eventual crossing point over the Semois at Mortehan. The French remained unaware of this move even though it had great significance for them. With the shift of the 10th Panzer Division to the north, the 5th Light Cavalry Division soon had all three divisions of the XIXth Panzer Corps in its sector. Subsequent events dramatically revealed that the cavalry division was incapable of handling such a large enemy force. As the 10th Panzer Division shifted north, it encountered elements of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. On the morning of the 11th, French cavalry elements in Suxy fought a sharp battle against the infantry of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Not until the arrival of assault guns from the 16th Assault Gun Company did the Germans manage to gain control of the key road junction in Suxy.27 To the north, the 5th Light Cavalry Division had had only light contact with the enemy on the 10th, but the 11th was to be one of its most difficult days in the campaign. The division concentrated its attention on two main avenues of approach, which generally ran from the northeast to the southwest. On its left, the division concentrated on the axis Houffalize, Libramont, Bouillon; and on its right on the axis Bastogne, Neufchâteau, Herbeumont. The French considered the left (or northern) approach more dangerous and placed more of their forces there than on the right (south). The 1/78th Artillery provided fire support for the left (northern) axis, while the 2/78th Artillery provided support for the right axis.28 Clearly, the French distributed their forces based on the assumption that an enemy coming through the Ardennes would more likely be moving along an axis parallel to the one running through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, rather than one running east-west through Luxembourg. In other words, the position occupied by the cavalry division made it particularly vulnerable to a thrust coming from the center of Luxembourg, particularly since the division's weakest flank was on its right. At 0300 hours a motorized cavalry squadron, which had spent the night at Bercheux (seven kilometers northeast of Neufchâteau), moved northeast toward Bastogne, but after moving about a kilometer encountered Germans and was forced to withdraw. Several hours later, another cavalry unit moved east toward Witry but came into heavy contact with the enemy. Beginning at dawn, the division's security elements began coming under heavy pressure and soon had to withdraw. As the cavalry pulled back toward Neufchâteau, they occasionally

occupied a strong point and attempted to halt the Germans. But the Germans attacked with their tanks in the lead, and there was little the cavalrymen could do to slow or stop them. By 1000 hours French security elements had withdrawn to a line just forward of phase line 03 between Libramont, Neufchâteau, and Straimont, which was occupied by the main forces of the cavalry.29 Anticipating that the enemy would come from the northeast, the French were prepared to offer a strong defense along phase line 03. They nevertheless were not well prepared for an attack by a large armored force on their right, and thus the Germans made easy work of them, particularly those around Neufchâteau. Since the Germans attacked toward Libramont with an infantry-heavy force from the 2nd Panzer Division and toward Neufchâteau with a regiment of tanks, the French found themselves thrown completely off balance by the rapid, deep thrust into their right flank. The terrain around Neufchâteau is predominantly open and rolling, but it also has numerous small forests and wooded valleys that limit the vision of a defender. Skillfully using the terrain to their advantage, tanks from the 1st Panzer Division advanced in a wide left hook south of Neufchâteau toward the small village of Petitvoir (about five kilometers west of Neufchâteau). They soon were pressing hard against Petitvoir, which sat astride the route between Neufchâteau and Bertrix. Though the Germans may not have foreseen the results, this move turned the defenses at Neufchâteau, placed a tank regiment in the center of the 5th Light Cavalry Division's zone, and threatened to cut off the French defenders in Neufchâteau. Recognizing they were in danger of being outflanked and encircled, the French cavalry began pulling out of the town about the time German infantry moved against it from the south.30 Though the French fought valiantly to halt the German tanks at Petitvoir, time and firepower were on the side of the Germans. Among those elements destroyed at Petitvoir was the 4th Battery, 2/78th Artillery. Emerging unexpectedly behind the right flank of the cavalry division, the German tanks quickly overran the 105mm battery, which was providing support to the units pulling back. The surprising and devastating German attack against the road to Bertrix transformed the withdrawal of the cavalry from Neufchâteau into chaos and caused some elements to withdraw beyond Bertrix. The French cavalry on the BastogneNeufchâteau-Herbeumont axis had apparently anticipated withdrawing from Neufchâteau toward Herbeumont (twelve kilometers east of Bouillon), but as the German tanks continued west beyond Petitvoir, they decisively cut off the road leading from Neufchâteau to Herbeumont, leaving the French cavalry no choice but to head farther west.

To the north of Neufchâteau, the left flank of the cavalry division came under heavy pressure at Libramont about the same that some of the units on the right flank pulled back behind Bertrix. Since the 2nd Panzer Division's tanks had not yet cleared Luxembourg, its infantry moved more slowly against Libramont than did the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division against Neufchâteau. When the defenders at Neufchâteau fled west toward Bertrix, the right flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division collapsed onto the rear of the left flank, and the Germans suddenly threatened to cut off the left flank, just as it had done to the right. In its after-action report, the French division explained its subsequent withdrawal beyond Bertrix and phase line 02 when it said, “Our elements were disorganized…. The situation…on [phase line] 02 became critical so quickly that the commander… was obliged to withdraw to the Semois….”31 Though its after-action report did not use the word “rout,” the division obviously was not completely under control as it rushed back to the west. The situation was not made any better by the cavalry on the right axis having been cut off from its route of egress. According to the Second Army, the cavalry began withdrawing toward the Semois around 1500 hours.32 Instead of being pushed back from their position, the French had been the victims of a brilliant envelopment. Farther to the north, the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was the far-right unit of the Ninth Army's cavalry, pulled back to the phase line 02 and then the Semois at about the same time as the 5th Light Cavalry on its right. Though the brigade commander, Colonel Marc, later complained about the 5th Cavalry's withdrawing without informing the Spahis, the main body of the brigade closed in along the Semois between 1900 and 2030 hours. He explained, “The Semois was thus held initially with insufficient forces, stretched out along the large bends of the river, [which was] fordable almost everywhere.”33 In reality, however, the Spahis brigade failed to occupy all its designated position along the Semois, including the important fording site at Mouzaive. This failure, as will subsequently be explained, contributed significantly to the French eventually losing control of the Semois River. To the south of the 5th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Brigade came under attack on the route west of Suxy at 0750 hours. After pushing the French defenders back about three kilometers, the 10th Panzer Division opened the route to Mortehan through St. Médard and began moving in a counter-clockwise circle around them to its designated crossing site on the Semois. This movement resulted in very little pressure being placed against the cavalry brigade, which eventually withdrew “in liaison with the 5th Light Cavalry Division toward the Semois.”34

As the French cavalry pulled back from phase line 02 to the Semois between Bertrix and Bouillon, the Germans aggressively charged ahead. This made the French withdrawal particularly difficult, especially since some of the cavalrymen could not move as quickly as the Germans on their heels. Some of the slowermoving elements were forced to leave the roads and retreat through the woods, thus permitting a few German elements to reach the Semois before all the French cavalry had crossed. Throughout the day, the operations of the French cavalry were hampered by a flood of refugees. Coming from Luxembourg and Belgium, many walked or rode bicycles. Others pushed carts carrying many of their precious belongings. Some of the more fortunate rode in automobiles. Those who were farmers could easily be recognized by the strong farm horse that pulled their wagon or by the cow that followed in tether. Despite the best efforts of the French cavalrymen to convince them to return east, the discouraged and frightened refugees became ever larger in numbers and occasionally delayed the movement of French forces. The poor performance of the French cavalry, however, cannot be blamed on the refugees. Though the Second Army did not expect its cavalry to halt a German advance, it expected it to delay an advance. Despite these expectations, the German 1st Panzer Division moved about fifty kilometers on the 11th. All things considered, the best explanation for the cavalry's failure is probably found in its being unprepared for a thrust from Witry to the rear of Neufchâteau. The unexpected German thrust caught it completely by surprise. Additionally, its chances for successfully delaying the Germans were reduced by the extremely large frontage it occupied, its relatively small number of tanks and antitank weapons, and the overwhelming size of the force it encountered. The relatively greater mobility of the Germans also provided them important advantages. Nevertheless, the French cavalry force that was sent into Belgium and charged with identifying the main attack of the enemy had almost completely collapsed under the unexpected pressure of large numbers of tanks on its right. Of great significance is the failure of the 5th Light Cavalry Division to recognize it was facing the main German attack and then to communicate this information to the Second Army. This failure provided the Germans an important advantage in time. Everyone, including the cavalrymen, expected the French to achieve better results along the rugged terrain of the Semois River. Additionally, the ease with which the Germans swept aside the 5th Light Cavalry Division increased their confidence and weakened the resolve of the French. ON THE SEMOIS Fortunately for the French, several infantry battalions occupied key passage points

along the Semois River. Since they were already in place, they assisted the relatively disorganized cavalry units to get across the river and halted the rapid advance of the Germans. The 1/295th Infantry occupied positions through which most of the 5th Light Cavalry passed. As an organic battalion in the 55th Division, the 1/295th had the mission of reinforcing and strengthening the cavalry's defenses along the Semois. The battalion had arrived on the banks of the river around 1800–1900 hours on the 10th, having departed Sedan around noon. The 1/295th occupied a position between Mouzaive (ten kilometers northwest of Bouillon) and a bend in the river known as Han-du-Han (three kilometers east of Bouillon). Though the straight-line distance between the boundaries on its two flanks was about thirteen kilometers, the twists and turns in the river made the actual frontage for the battalion almost three times larger. To its right was the 3/12th Zouaves, an infantry battalion from the 3rd North African Division. To defend its extended front and the difficult terrain along it, the commander of the 1/295th, Captain Clausener, placed his three companies on line, with the 1st Company on the right, 2nd Company in the center, and 3rd Company on the left. On the right, the 1st Company had responsibility for Bouillon, and on the left, the 3rd was just beyond eyesight of the footbridge and ford at Mouzaive, which lay outside its sector and in that of the 3rd Brigade of Spahis (part of the Ninth Army).35 Since the principal route through the Semois region passed through Bouillon, that city quickly became the scene of a major effort by the Germans. The city itself is located in a large bend in the river that protrudes, almost like a fist at the end of a muscular arm, from the south to the north. With the river flowing around the arm and fist and the ancient fortress sitting atop the fist, the city had grown up around the fortress in centuries past and had expanded across the river to the east. Two bridges extended from the “arm” of the city to the bank on the right. According to Captain Picault, who commanded the infantry company whose sector included Bouillon, the bridges in the city were destroyed shortly before the Germans arrived in the eastern part of the city around 1730 hours. One of the most difficult problems his men faced was clearing the bridges of the “numerous and disorderly” refugees, so the explosives could be detonated. Immediately following the destruction of the bridges, the company came under fire from German infantry and tanks, as well as dive bombers, but it managed to destroy at least one German tank. After a short delay, the Germans quickly gained control of the eastern part of Bouillon and soon—Picault said—began infiltrating to the west of the fortress and north of the river. The German accounts indicate no infantry was in the first troops arriving in Bouillon. According to Captain Picault, the French cavalry withdrew after enemy

machine gun fire began pouring in from the eastern part of the city. He explained that his company had only one machine gun and was threatened with encirclement. After supposedly trying to reach the battalion commander twice, Picault pulled his company back from the river at 2030 hours.36 Thus, after little or no fighting, he abandoned the defense of Bouillon and opened the route through the city. Fortunately for the French, the Germans were unaware of the withdrawal and pulled back out of the city because of heavy artillery fire. After withdrawing from Bouillon, Captain Picault and his men occupied a position about two kilometers to the south of Bouillon at the road junction known as Moulin à Vent. The roads from Bouillon and Corbion merge here and become a single route to Sedan. Though the reasons for his stopping are not clear, the captain may have halted there because he had orders to occupy the position after pulling back from Bouillon, or he may have halted because a commander of one of the motorized battalions in the cavalry division directed him to defend the important road junction. Whatever his reasons for finally halting, the most important point is that he and his company abandoned the defense of Bullion after offering half-hearted resistance at best. Around 0800 hours on the next morning, just as the motorized battalion with Picault was preparing to move forward and reoccupy positions along the Semois, the Germans attacked with a force that included three tanks.37 Any advantage that could have been gained by a tough defense along the Semois had been lost. After resisting for “perhaps an hour,” Picault's company and the motorized battalion withdrew south, moving through La Chapelle and halting north of Givonne. He soon received orders to withdraw further, so he marched his company back to an area on the edge of Sedan known as Vieux Camp. Since the enemy placed very little pressure on his company in its new position, Captain Picault held this position and began sending portions of his company across the Meuse. The last elements crossed around 1900 hours.38 Picault's company and the cavalry had performed poorly at Bouillon, but as far as the Second Army and the 5th Light Cavalry were concerned, the gravest mistake in the defense of the Semois was committed by the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was on the extreme right of the Ninth Army and thus on the extreme left of the Second Army. Though some of the dissatisfaction with the Spahis brigade probably came from the age-old tendency of soldiers to doubt the will to fight and capabilities of units to their flanks, most criticisms were based on a single, unfortunate event. For reasons having more to do with luck than incompetence, the Spahis brigade never actually occupied the area of the Semois River that includes the crossing site at Mouzaive. This mistake permitted the Germans to seize a

crossing site over the Semois and eventually to turn the flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division. While the bridge at this point was nothing more than a footbridge, the river could be forded easily, and large bodies of troops were soon rushed down the road from Mouzaive and Alle toward Sedan. According to the commander of the 3rd Spahis Brigade, Colonel Marc, when the 1st Troop, 1/2nd Spahis Regiment (Moroccan) withdrew west toward the crossing site at Mouzaive, it unexpectedly encountered German elements who had already seized the site. After a sharp battle, the French cavalrymen managed to fight their way across the river, but they continued south and left the Germans in control of Mouzaive and the crossing site. This unfortunate event occurred shortly after nightfall, and in the dark the Spahis were unable to make contact with the 5th Light Cavalry on their right.39 Shortly after midnight on the 11–12th, Colonel Marc called the Ninth Army and informed the duty officer of the situation. Because of the obvious buildup of forces on his right flank at Mouzaive, he explained that he wanted to withdraw toward the Meuse at 0200 hours. Even though he had not heard from the Ninth Army, Marc gave the order at 0230 for his brigade to withdraw, and most of it crossed the river between 0600 and 0900 hours.40 According to the assistant Chief of Staff of the Second Army, Army Group 1 called at 0400 hours on the 12th and stated that the 3rd Spahis Brigade was withdrawing toward the Meuse with the intention of crossing the river south of Mézières. This information obviously caused great concern for the Second Army, for it indicated the opening of the left flank of the 5th Light Cavalry Division to the enemy. After a staff officer from the Second Army frantically called the Ninth Army, he received a promise that the Spahis brigade would do what they could. But he received no promises that the Spahis would fight their way back to the Semois. Not until 0900 hours did Colonel Marc receive orders to move back to the Semois, but by then it was too late to roll back the Germans.41 At 0800 hours the 5th Light Cavalry Division learned that enemy armored vehicles had appeared on the northern bank of the river near Mouzaive. At 0900 hours the division received reports of enemy tanks south of Mouzaive. At about the same time, reports arrived of German infantry having reached the road junction at Maison Blanche (eleven kilometers east-southeast of Bouillon); the enemy apparently had crossed the Semois near Mortehan (ten kilometers east of Bouillon).42 The cavalry division faced the extremely unfavorable situation of having enemy forces to the rear of both its flanks. After reporting the rapidly deteriorating situation to General Huntziger, the commander of the 5th Light Cavalry, General Chanoine, was promised

reinforcements consisting of another divisional reconnaissance squadron. As German pressure on the axis Mouzaive-Sedan increased and as the number of enemy tanks multiplied, however, Chanoine again reported to Huntziger and received permission to withdraw to the line of “fortified houses” (maisons fortes) that lay about halfway between the Semois and the Meuse and that were essentially strong points. At 1100 hours he gave the order to withdraw and to explode all the demolitions between the Semois and the line of fortified houses.43 As the cavalry pulled back, its withdrawal proceeded more smoothly than that of the 1/295th. Though the 1st Company under Captain Picault on the right of the battalion withdrew in order, the other two companies were almost cut off by the rapid German push beyond Mouzaive. Many of the infantrymen in the 2nd Company in the battalion's center and the 3rd Company on the left were captured and made prisoners. The remainder moved through the woods, closely pursued by enemy infantry and armored vehicles. The remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Companies crossed the Meuse around 1430–1500 hours.44 As mentioned earlier, the 1st Company crossed around 1900 hours. Hardly more than two hundred soldiers in the battalion managed to return from the Semois; among those killed was the battalion commander. The 5th Light Cavalry Division managed to hold along the line of fortified houses for only a short period. It pulled back to the edge of Sedan at 1400 hours and remained there until its last elements crossed the river between 1700 and 1800 hours. Much to the disappointment of the French High Command, the performance of the cavalry had not been any better between the Semois and the Meuse than it had been forward of the Meuse. The cavalrymen had done little to delay the Germans, and they had not discerned the location of the main enemy attack. Perhaps more importantly, their bedraggled appearance and chaotic withdrawal across the Meuse proved to be unsettling to many of the inexperienced French troops and may have created the first significant dent in their will to fight. IDENTIFYING THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK By the evening of 12 May, the French High Command in Paris still did not understand that the main German attack was coming through the Ardennes.45 This failure to comprehend the strategic design of the Germans occurred despite the existence of a significant amount of information suggesting a major move through the Ardennes. After the Germans crossed into Luxembourg at 0435 hours on 10 May, the French received a number of intelligence reports indicating the presence of enemy

forces in Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. As the reports arrived, the French intelligence community recognized the presence of enemy forces in those two countries, but they did not believe the enemy forces comprised the main German attack. For almost two decades the French had expected the Germans essentially to follow the same strategic plan that had been used in 1914. That is, they expected the main attack to come across the Albert Canal and Meuse River and then to move through the Gembloux Gap toward Paris. When reports arrived early on 10 May of the Germans having gotten across the Albert Canal and Meuse River near Maastricht and having attacked the fortress at Eben Emael, French military leaders immediately assumed their previous assessments had been correct. As they concentrated on the reports coming in from the Netherlands and northern Belgium, they did not recognize the threat coming through the Ardennes until it was too late to respond adequately. Reports began arriving very early about the Germans moving through Luxembourg. As early as 0120 hours on the 10th, France received reports from her ambassador in Luxembourg that German civilians living in the Grand Duchy had assembled with arms. The same report noted, “There are movements this evening that sound like artillery, especially along the German border.” At 0615 hours the Third Army reported that Germans had entered Luxembourg and at 0720 hours signaled the presence of motorized elements. At 0745 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission from the Third Army spotted a “large motorized column” about ten kilometers long approaching the city of Luxembourg.46 Several other reports appeared concerning German activity in Luxembourg. At 0730 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission from the Second Army spotted an enemy “motorized column” entering Luxembourg. At 0900 hours another reconnaissance mission spotted a motorized column consisting of about fifty vehicles moving from Luxembourg into Belgium toward Bastogne. At 1012 hours elements of the 3rd French Light Cavalry Division from the Third Army made contact with “enemy armored elements” in the southwest corner of Luxembourg.47 Reports also appeared about German forces being in Belgium. At 1300 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission spotted about forty motorized vehicles moving from Arlon toward Virton. At 1810 hours the Second Army reported that elements of the 2nd Light Cavalry Division had been engaged during the day by twenty armored vehicles near Arlon. A later report from the Second Army indicated that the French cavalry had withdrawn under heavy pressure and had moved west from Arlon toward Etalle. More threatening to the French strategic plan, however, was a report received at 2335 hours about the Germans having successfully crossed the Albert Canal west of Maastricht.48

That same day, the Second Army provided a summary of intelligence reports and concluded, “[E]nemy motorized elements have pushed back the [Belgian] Chasseurs Ardennais…and have come in contact with our covering [force] elements. Belgian obstacles seem to have been sufficient to halt the progression of the enemy. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES ON THE ARMY'S FRONT.”49 Given the strong pressure that the 10th Panzer Division had exerted against the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, the statement about the absence of enemy armored vehicles to the Second Army's front and the use of capital letters to emphasize it is inexplicable. This is particularly so, since the daily report rendered by the operations section of the Second Army for 10 May included the following statement, “[I]n the region of Etalle, our cavalry was struck by solid elements (tanks), [and] suffered losses….”50 The intelligence section's strong statement about tanks not being in front of the Second Army clearly demonstrates it was either not talking to or lacked confidence in the field army's operations section. Better communications or relations between the two sections may have permitted the Second Army to have a much better assessment of what was happening to its front. A summary of intelligence gathered by the Air Force between 1700 hours on the 10th and 0600 hours on the 11th concluded, “In summary, the general impression drawn from intelligence received seems to be: a)—principal enemy effort in the region between Maastricht and Nijmegen; b)—secondary effort but extremely strong to the west of Luxembourg [through the Ardennes]; c)—very moderate advance in the region of Liège.”51 Thus the first day of the campaign passed with no solid information refuting the notion of the Germans making their main attack through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap. If anything, reports on the first day of the German attack supported the preconceptions of the French High Command. Since the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions spent much of the day trying to get through Bodange, Martelange, and Strainchamps, Allied aerial reconnaissance did not locate the spearhead division of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Instead, the French intelligence community received reports about an enemy force moving west of Arlon and another moving toward Bastogne. With thirty-five kilometers separating the two movements (probably of the 10th Panzer Division in the south and the 7th Panzer Division in the north), the data obviously did not suggest the presence of extremely large enemy forces or the location of a massive main attack. Additionally, as the commander of the aerial elements supporting the Second Army later reported, heavy antiaircraft fire prevented aerial observers from observing enemy movements and from

“identifying in which region the [principal] enemy effort was developing.”52 As in 1914, the French expected some German forces to move through the Ardennes, and from their perspective, reported contacts and aerial observations did not suggest that the forces in the Ardennes comprised the main enemy attack. Interestingly enough, at least one French aircraft did fly over the spearhead of the XIXth Panzer Corps on the first day of the campaign. Around 1000 hours on the 10th, as German forces began moving into Martelange, a French fighter shot down a German reconnaissance aircraft flying above them. The pilot of the French airplane noticed the German troops below him and reported the German advance in the Ardennes.53 Since the German advance guard in front of the 1st Panzer Division did not include any tanks, the pilot observed only a few enemy vehicles and troops. In this instance, luck was on the side of the Germans. On the 11th some reports appeared that suggested a large German presence in the Ardennes. At 0730 hours aerial reconnaissance by the Second Army reported, “Heavy road activity in Luxembourg. Movement oriented from east to west toward Diekirch….” At 0845 General Billotte, the Army Group 1 commander, called General Georges’ office and reported, “An important German column is reported going from Prum toward Bastogne.” He added that the situation to the west of Arlon was “delicate” and that the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, after suffering “serious losses,” had withdrawn to Jamoigne (thirty kilometers west of Arlon). At 1200 hours General André G. Prételat, the Army Group 2 commander, reported that the Third Army had not encountered strong forces on its left. He added, “The enemy's movements are going from east to west.”54 On the 11th reports also began appearing about enemy tanks being in the Ardennes. At 1230 hours the Second Army reported a column of thirty tanks about ten kilometers southwest of Neufchâteau. Other reports from the Second Army indicated sizable enemy forces to the front of its cavalry. At 1625 hours the field army reported that its cavalry was withdrawing “under pressure” from Neufchâteau toward Bertrix (fifteen kilometers to the west). At 2015 hours a more extensive report was dispatched by the Second Army. It said, “To the left, the 5th Light Cavalry Division, strongly pressed at Neufchâteau by heavy tanks in the beginning of the afternoon and then at Bertrix, has been forced to withdraw to the Semois [River]…. Very heavy combat near Neufchâteau. Lost one [artillery] battery which destroyed 3 tanks armed with large cannons.”55 Earlier, Army Group 1 had reported at 1835 hours to Georges’ office about developments in Belgium. This report indicated that pressure coming from Arlon, to Etalle, to Jamoigne had decreased but that pressure somewhat farther to the north coming from Bodange, to Neufchâteau, to Bertrix had increased. French

cavalry in the latter avenue of approach had moved behind the Semois River and had earlier encountered tanks carrying large-caliber cannons. To add to the amount of information about the enemy in Belgium, an aerial reconnaissance mission identified at 2300 hours on the 11th four enemy columns in Belgium, each having a length of about five kilometers.56 At 2345 hours on 11 May, the Second Army reported the identification of several enemy units in the Ardennes. Papers on a dead German soldier in Bertrix revealed that he was from the Gross Deutschland Regiment. At 1600 hours on the 11th, a radio intercept unit also had monitored a message directed to the 1st Panzer Division.57 Despite strong evidence of sizable German forces in the Ardennes, and despite the 5th Light Cavalry Division's having been almost routed in its withdrawal to the Semois, the summary of intelligence gathered by the aerial unit supporting the Second Army for the 11th did not include any alarming observations. The report included the following comments: The action of heavy enemy tanks appearing at Libramont and at Neufchâteau forced [the French cavalry in Belgium] to withdraw…. At the end of the day, the delaying action continued…according to the established plan, our troops having the mission of occupying [positions] behind the Semois and here achieving the maximum delaying effect. Through the interrogation of prisoners, three active [enemy] divisions have been identified to the front of the [Second] Army. The report concluded, “The enemy seems to be presenting himself in force in front of the Second Army. As a consequence, our light divisions have accomplished the prescribed delaying action in a rhythm that appears normal.”58 This matter-of-fact report, which did not evince special concern, serves as a good representation of the general attitude of the French. Unlike the previous day, the operations section of the Second Army did not offer any information substantially different from the intelligence section, except for the note that the enemy tanks at Neufchâteau were probably from the 1st Panzer Division.59 Though the enemy seemed to have significant forces in the Ardennes, nothing had occurred on the 11th that suggested to the Second Army, Army Group 1, or Georges’ headquarters the possibility of an unexpected move from the Germans. The French infantry and cavalry that were struggling to maintain their grip on the Semois would undoubtedly have had a different opinion. Even if the French High Command had devoted special attention to the German forces in the Ardennes, other reports on the 11th served to maintain its primary

focus on Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap. At 1320 hours on the l1th, Army Group 1 reported that the forts at Liège were still holding but that two blockhouses at Eben Emael had been neutralized by the enemy with flame throwers. Two hours later, Army Group 1 reported the enemy's seizure of the interior of Eben Emael. At 1700 hours General Gamelin informed Georges about the 1st Belgian Corps’ being in a “bad situation” and German tanks arriving southwest of Maastricht.60 These developments evidently created great concern among the French military hierarchy. Because of its primary concern with Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, the French High Command responded cautiously to increasing evidence about a sizable German force being in the Ardennes. At 0815 hours on the 12th, General Georges met with key members of his staff and decided to send the 53rd Division to the Ninth Army and the 1st Colonial Infantry Division to the Second Army. He also directed the 14th Infantry Division to move into the area southwest of Mézières.61 These decisions occurred about the time the 5th Light Cavalry Division received reports of heavy enemy tanks having crossed the Semois at Mouzaive. Nevertheless, the French High Command maintained its primary focus on events occurring near Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, even though it did take the precaution of reinforcing the Second and Ninth armies in the Ardennes sector. On the 12th the enemy's effort to move toward the Semois River became more apparent. At 0700 hours the Air Force reported “unconfirmed” sightings of the “enemy advancing in a southwesterly direction toward the Semois River.” At 0730 hours the Second Army reported that its cavalry had been pushed to the southern bank of the Semois River by units that were probably from the 1st Panzer Division.62 Strong pressure continued against the cavalry to the front of the Second Army. At 1025 hours Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, reported, “In spite of the demolitions which were exploded along Semois, the cavalry of the Second Army is receiving very heavy pressure (tanks-infantry) which is being exerted in the direction of Sedan.” Another telephone call at 1330 hours from the Second Army to General Georges’ headquarters requested additional aviation support and the commitment of an armored division to strengthen the sector. At 1515 Colonel Lacaille reported, “Situation on the left of the Second Army (Sedan) very serious. Heavy losses…. The cavalry is crossing the Meuse.” At 2200 hours Lacaille called again, this time to report, “Front momentarily returned to calm.”63 That same day the Ninth Army reported seeing four German divisions in the Ardennes around 1130 hours; two of these were Panzer divisions. One Panzer

division was reported to be at Marche and another at Neufchâteau. Two other divisions of an unknown type were near Arlon.64 Unbeknownst to the French, the division at Neufchâteau was the 1st Panzer Division, and the supposed two divisions at Arlon were probably the 10th Panzer Division or other follow-on divisions. The summary of intelligence gathered by aerial forces supporting the Second Army on the 12th still did not raise any alarms. In its conclusion the report stated, “The enemy faces the Second Army in force and attacks with vigor. Our light divisions accomplish their delaying action with a rhythm that appears normal, except perhaps on the extreme left. The rhythm has increased a little.”65 Had an aerial observer watched the action from the ground, he may have noticed a much faster rhythm! In its daily summary for the 12th, the Second Army concluded that the main enemy pressure seemed to be oriented on the axis from Bouillon to Sedan. The report added, “It seems that the enemy is moving the mass of its armored forces in this direction.”66 The daily report from the operations section of the Second Army, which was signed by Huntziger, was surprisingly positive. The report stated, “In spite of pressure from the enemy and the presence of tanks, our front has not been ruptured at any point, and the delaying action occurred under satisfactory conditions.” He added, “During these three days, the morale, the spirit of the troops has been excellent despite the obvious losses and fatigue suffered.”67 Gamelin's headquarters also described the events of the 12th in confident terms. A report signed by Gamelin's Chief of Staff for operations stated, “Throughout the day of the 12th, the enemy increased his movement in the Belgian Ardennes where our delaying elements have been forced to withdraw. He is making contact in some places with forward elements of our fortified line. In contrast, to the west of Maastricht, his advance has noticeably decreased….”68 At 0945 hours on the 13th, the Air Force indicated, “The [enemy] movements reported during the night in the region from Neufchâteau-Bastogne toward Bouillon-Sedan have been confirmed by reports rendered by bombing missions during the night.” The report added that the roads along this axis were illuminated during the night by moving vehicles. At 1045 hours the same report arrived at Georges’ headquarters. The report concluded, “Everything confirms a large German effort on the Bouillon-Sedan axis.”69 According to André Beaufre, who was an operations officer in the French High Command in May 1940, he assembled information early on the 13th that had come in during the night and early morning and posted it on a map. This information demonstrated that the main German attack was not coming through the Gembloux

Gap but was coming instead through the Ardennes. According to Beaufre, General Georges’ headquarters had reached the same conclusion at about the same time. Ironically, the new assessment was considered “particularly favorable” by the French,70 for they remained confident of the complexities of moving through the Ardennes and of the strength of their defenses along the Meuse. At 1600 hours, an hour after the Germans crossed the Meuse at Sedan, the Second Army reported to Georges’ office that “enemy infiltrations” continued to the north of Sedan and that the enemy's artillery had “made its appearance.” Despite the Germans’ having been across the river for an hour, the report concluded, “No contact yet on the [principal] position of resistance.” A report later that evening from the Second Army provided a more accurate portrayal of the German assault across the Meuse, but it did not mention the panic of the 55th Division. Instead, it said, “The day was very hard for the division on the left….”71 Even though the Germans crossed the Meuse in three locations on the 13th, Gamelin's headquarters did not mention the crossings when it completed its summary of the day's activities. The report noted the presence of significant armored forces in Holland, near Maastricht and Liège, and near Bouillon-Sedan. After observing that the great majority of Allied units would be in place on the Dyle River on the morning of the 14th, the report concluded, “It is not yet possible to determine the zone in which the enemy will make his main attack.” The final line of the report was added by hand, probably by General Koeltz, the head of Gamelin's operations bureau: “[Overall] impression [is] very good.”72 Rarely has any assessment by a military command been so wrong.

CHAPTER 4

French Defenses Along the Meuse

A

fter the French cavalry withdrew across the Meuse, the XIXth Panzer Corps faced the Second Army, commanded by General Charles Huntziger, who had the reputation of being one of France's most capable military leaders. A popular and intelligent officer, Huntziger had served with distinction in the French colonial army and was promoted rapidly. Following an assignment as commander of French troops in Syria, he was named to the Superior Council of War in 1938. After being named commander of the Second Army at a very young age, he was frequently mentioned as a future commander of the French Army. One of his loyal subordinates later wrote, “The Second Army could not have been in better hands.”1 Despite Huntziger's many talents, his field army was not a well-trained, highly capable force. THE SECOND ARMY The Second Army occupied defensive positions that extended from west of Sedan to Longuyon, a straight-line distance of about sixty-five kilometers but actually about seventy-five kilometers because of the tying of the defense to favorable terrain. Its defensive sector included portions of the Maginot Line and the area to its left, which had relatively few fortifications. Unlike the other field armies to the west, which planned on moving into Belgium when the Germans attacked, the Second Army did not have to move forward and occupy new positions. While it remained in place, its western boundary served as a hinge for the Ninth Army on its left and the other field armies of Army Group 2, which prepared to rush forward. In the broadest sense, the mission of Second Army was to cover the left flank of the Maginot Line and to anchor the right of Army Group 1, for which it was the easternmost element. To accomplish this, the Second Army had not only to defend along the line assigned to it, but also to prevent the Germans from entering the socalled Stenay Gap. A quick move through this gap offered the possibility of

turning the flank of the Maginot Line by thrusting west toward Reims or east toward Verdun. While the Second Army had an important responsibility in its task of defending the flank of the Maginot Line and acting as the hinge for the mobile armies to the west, it essentially performed an economy of force operation. Because of the difficult terrain to the Second Army's front, the French assumed a higher degree of risk in this area so they could maintain higher force levels in what they considered to be more critical areas. By giving the area a low priority in units and equipment, the French could concentrate larger forces for the establishment of forward defenses in Belgium and Holland. Of the five divisions in the Second Army on 10 May, two were series B divisions, one was North African, and one was a colonial unit from Senegal. The series B units had an extremely small component of active duty soldiers and officers, most of their forces coming from the oldest conscription classes. As the Second Army prepared to organize and defend its position, it divided its front into four major sectors: Sedan, Mouzon, Montmédy, and Marville, from left to right. The Sedan sector extended from the left boundary of the army to a point east of Pont Maugis, with the Mouzon sector stretching from there to about one kilometer west of La Ferté-sur-Chiers. Next came the Montmédy sector, which extended from La Ferté to a few kilometers east of Velosnes. The final sector, Marville, ended at Longuyon, the eastern boundary of the Second Army. Beginning at La Ferté, the main fortifications of the Maginot Line extended east through the entire Montmédy and Marville sectors. Half the position of resistance for the Second Army was thus anchored in the Maginot Line, while half stretched across a front with a comparatively small number of blockhouses.2 The main area of concern for the Second Army remained the sectors on its right flank, not Sedan. From the time work began on the fortifications on the northeastern frontier, the High Command in Paris was extremely concerned about the possibility of the Germans launching a surprise attack around the flank of the Maginot Line. By rushing through the southern part of Belgium in the large open valley between Arlon, Etalle, Tintigny, Jamoigne, and Florenville, the Germans did not have to make a difficult crossing of the Semois River and could move quickly toward Carignan and Mouzon. For more than fifty years, this avenue of approach had been known as the Stenay Gap, the town of Stenay being about fifteen kilometers southeast of Mouzon. As a consequence of its assessment of the terrain and enemy capabilities, the Second Army saw the major threat coming from the east toward Carignan and Mouzon, rather than toward Sedan. The headquarters knew that for the Germans to attack Sedan after crossing through some of the most treacherous terrain in the

Ardennes would be a much more difficult operation than attacking farther east. Throughout the Ardennes, the only area between Sedan and Germany that approached being as good an obstacle as the Semois was the area around Martelange and Bodange in Belgium on the Luxembourg frontier. Ironically, the XIXth Panzer Corps passed through both these areas. One only has to visit portions of the Semois that are east and west of Bouillon to understand why the French considered it such a strong obstacle. Though beautiful and now covered with tourists, the Semois area is one of the most rugged in all of western Europe with banks on the sides of the river sometimes being more than 200 meters higher than the shallow waters below. The defensive strength of the area came from its broken terrain, not from the easily forded river. Filled with thick forests and cut up with many steep embankments, the area offered an even more extensive and difficult obstacle than the meandering Meuse. By contrast, the avenue of approach from Florenville to Carignan seemed an easier and more suitable area for rapidly moving motorized and mechanized forces. By blocking this eastern avenue of approach, the Second Army could cover the flank of the Maginot Line, bar the Stenay Gap, and prevent German forces from moving toward Verdun or Reims. The analysis of possible approaches into the French defenses led the Second Army to believe that the best units had to be on its right flank. Although the composition of the Second Army changed several times after mobilization, the army had two corps headquarters and five infantry divisions under its command by the spring of 1940. Huntziger placed the XVIIIth Corps on the right and the Xth Corps on the left. For a reserve, he maintained control over one division and four independent tank battalions, as well as the air forces in its sector. He placed his best division (the 41st Infantry Division) on the far right in the Marville sector and then a colonial division (the 3rd Infantry) in the Montmédy sector. These two divisions became part of the XVIIIth Corps. For the remaining part of the front, which was under the Xth Corps, Huntziger believed the Mouzon sector to be more difficult to defend than the Sedan sector. Though Sedan had fewer blockhouses, he believed it had excellent defensive positions in the high ground overlooking the Meuse and had the advantage of having the river as an antitank obstacle. Consequently, he assigned his next best division to the Mouzon sector. For several months, the 71st Division occupied the sector but weaknesses in its leadership and training soon convinced the Second Army that it had to be replaced. Huntziger wanted a stronger division occupying the key Mouzon sector. In April he moved the 3rd North African Division from the army reserve into the front line of the Mouzon sector and placed it under the Xth Corps.

In his analysis of the campaign, General Ruby, who served on the staff of the Second Army, emphasized the strengths of the 3rd North African Division: “The two north African regiments, well encadred including a large number of career military, were solid and disciplined….” He also referred to it as the “last good division.”3 Because of its apparent weaknesses, the 71st Division reverted to being reserve for the army and began a period of training.4 Army Group 1 identified the 1st Light Mechanized Division (division légère mécanique), which was located farther to the rear as part of the army group's reserve, as possibly reinforcing the Second Army, but deleted this mission when the division became part of the 7th Army on the far left flank of the French Army. Though not considered as strong as the 41st 1nfantry, the 3rd Colonial, or the 3rd North African divisions, the 55th Division appeared reasonably strong in comparison to the 71st. This was particularly true of the division commander, for the commander of the 71st apparently lacked physical stamina, did not inspire confidence in his men, and was on the verge of being relieved. According to Ruby, General Lafontaine, who succeeded General Britsch as commander of the 55th on 1 March 1940, appeared energetic and seemed to have “heart” or a will to fight. He understood his men and his area of responsibility, and he worked hard to strengthen the division.5 Thus, in May 1940, the Second Army had its strongest divisions forward and was working energetically to improve the quality of the 71st. As it prepared to meet a possible German attack, the Second Army occupied itself with two separate and frequently conflicting tasks; while trying to conduct training, the field army devoted a great deal of time and effort to building fortifications and obstacles. Huntziger was particularly concerned about fortifications. One can understand his concern, since his army was the only French army that did not have fortifications to its front and was not scheduled to leave its positions and move into Belgium. By comparison to positions further east, the sector seemed almost bare. Throughout the period of the phony war, the French made numerous improvements in the defenses around Sedan. By May the density of blockhouses in the Second Army area had increased from 2.5 to 5 per kilometer. To attain this figure, the army poured more than 52,000 cubic meters of cement.6 It also worked on the preparation of a second line of defenses about fifteen kilometers behind the principal line of resistance. This effort included some extremely large blockhouses that were larger than most of the ones in the Sedan sector. The fruits of these efforts were evident to Huntziger, who appreciated the enormous effort to achieve them.

The Second Army also attempted to improve the training of its soldiers. Recognizing that many of them had had little or no formal training except for what they had received during a year's active duty, army headquarters encouraged the two corps to establish training areas and schools and to rotate units and men through them. Ideally, entire divisions would have been rotated through training cycles, but the requirement to keep four divisions in the main line rendered this almost impossible to accomplish. Huntziger also encouraged the playing of sports to improve the agility of many of the older soldiers, who had become somewhat flabby and sluggish as they reached the age of thirty. Despite the best of intentions, the first priority of the army remained focused on improving fighting positions. Ruby noted that less than half a day a week was devoted to training. Considering the obvious deficiencies of the units in the Second Army, particularly the 55th and 71st, much more was needed, and the events of May 1940 soon demonstrated that the men needed better skills and higher discipline more than they needed additional fortifications. Even though the Second Army considered Sedan to be the least vulnerable of its four sectors, the defense of Sedan caused several difficult problems for the army's headquarters. The first problem concerned the location of the principal line of resistance. The city sprawled out on the northern bank of the Meuse River and had little or no natural defensive terrain to its north. Since the city was only ten kilometers from the frontier and was at the bottom of a long slope beginning in Belgium, the military believed it had no choice but to relinquish the city to an invading force. They preferred to locate the position of resistance along the Meuse just south of the city and thereby to gain not only the advantage of the river as a natural obstacle but also the high ground on the left bank. In November 1939 the High Command in Paris responded to the concerns of local civilian leaders, who did not wish to see their city abandoned to an invading force, and ordered the Second Army to study the possibility of moving the defensive line forward a few kilometers to protect the city. But the response of the Second Army was a firm recommendation to leave the position of resistance along the Meuse behind the city. Moving the line forward, according to the Second Army, forced the building of a continuous line of antitank obstacles around the city and the construction of at least a dozen blockhouses, as well as barbed wire entanglements. Erecting a new line also required at least a regiment of infantry to man it and created severe problems for the artillery. If artillery support had to be provided, artillery units would have to move to the forward slope of the hills to the south of Sedan and thus expose themselves to enemy observation and fire. The logic for making no changes seemed compelling, and the High Command acquiesced in the plan to abandon the city of Sedan.7

Another major concern was the bend in the river on the southern edge of Sedan. The French recognized the vulnerability of this salient, which was known as the “mushroom of Glaire” because of its shape. To complicate matters further, another large bend in the river, known as the “buckle,” was on top of the “mushroom.” Because of the difficulties of defending the meandering route of the river, they analyzed the possibility of moving the principal line of resistance a few kilometers south from the edge of the river and thereby creating another line of defense that ran between Bellevue (at Frénois) and Wadelincourt. The shorter line had the advantage of being on higher terrain and of economizing forces, but it suffered from the absence of a natural obstacle for tanks. According to General Ruby, who was on the staff of the Second Army, the French worked on both lines but “wavered” about actually moving the principal line of resistance to the rear. The corps commander in the area saw the situation somewhat differently. According to him, the decision on moving the line was made in November 1939. But by May 1940, work on the new blockhouses and obstacles had not been finished and the principal line of resistance remained along the Meuse.8 Clearly, some confusion existed in the minds of battalion commanders in the area. Some referred to the line of fortifications between Frénois and Wadelincourt as the “second principal line of resistance” (ligne principale de résistance bis); others referred to it as the second line (ligne de doublement). The question of how best to defend Sedan became an extremely controversial issue in March and April 1940. Pierre Taittinger, a deputy from Paris who served as a member of the Chamber of Deputy's Commission on the Army, submitted a report that contained severe criticisms of the defenses at Sedan. Following a visit in which he inspected Maubeuge, Givet, Mézières, Sedan, Carignan, and Montmédy, he wrote Edouard Daladier (the Premier of France) and Gamelin about “grave insufficiencies” at Sedan and about “urgent measures” being necessary to improve its “rudimentary” defenses. He was not impressed by the quality of the series B divisions in the sector and emphasized their almost complete lack of air defense weapons. Taittinger explained that the Germans had demonstrated in 1914 that they could move easily through broken terrain and woods. If they wanted to bypass the strong defenses at Montmédy, they could move in the direction of Sedan, which he called a “particularly weak point” in the defensive system. He “trembled” at the thought of what would happen if the Germans attacked through Sedan.9 Taittinger mailed the letter on 21 March to Daladier (whose government had just fallen but who continued as Minister of National Defense) and Gamelin, who asked General Georges, commander of the northern and northeastern front, to

prepare a response. Georges in turn asked General Huntziger, the Second Army commander, to prepare a response. In a word, Huntziger was furious. In a sharply worded response, he strongly emphasized the numerous improvements that had been made in the fortifications and obstacles in the Sedan sector since mobilization. He rejected the doubts of Taittinger about the degree of Belgian resistance, the difficulties of crossing the Ardennes, and the value of the Meuse as an obstacle. Reflecting more confidence than was due, he stated that measures taken to hamper a German move across the Ardennes would “seriously” delay an attack and would enable the French to reinforce their position before an enemy attack could be launched across the river. Huntziger concluded sharply, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector.”10 Consequently, the Second Army did not increase the level of its effort, which also appeared suitable to the High Command. Huntziger was unwilling to accept criticisms about his army not doing its duty. The Second Army remained satisfied with its mission and with its ability to accomplish that mission. Such satisfaction—as demonstrated by subsequent events —was clearly not merited. THE XTH CORPS As part of the Second Army, the Xth Corps had the mission of ensuring “the integrity of a position of resistance” that extended some thirty-seven kilometers along the Meuse and Chiers rivers. The Chiers River was little more than a large stream that flowed into the Meuse about six kilometers southeast of Sedan. The left boundary of the corps coincided with the boundary between the Second and Ninth armies and ran along a line between Vrigne-aux-Bois, Vrigne-Meuse, Hannogne, Omont, and east of Chagny. The right boundary ran along a line between Williers (south of Florenville), Puilly-et-Charbeaux, Villy, Malandry, Inor, and west of Luzy-St. Martin. The corps’ position of resistance followed the Meuse River to Petit-Remilly and then ran northeast to Brévilly across the high ground between the Meuse and the Chiers. It then followed a line formed by the meeting of the plain of the Chiers River and the high ground between the Chiers and the Meuse until it reached Villy.11 One kilometer southeast of Villy, on the right boundary of the corps, the French had placed two casemates at La Ferté-sur-Chiers; these were the westernmost fortifications of the Maginot Line. As part of the fortified sector of Montmédy, a line of casemates followed a circular line from La Ferté and eventually reached Thonnelle and Montmédy. The line of casemates between La Ferté and Montmédy was not constructed as part of the original building of the Maginot Line but was

added in the late 1930s. Though weaker and generally smaller than the larger and more extensive fortifications beginning at Montmédy, the casemates between La Ferté and Montmédy (in the sector of the XVIIIth Corps) seemed larger and stronger than the ones in the Mouzon and Sedan sectors (in the sector of the Xth Corps). Such a contrast obviously increased the Second Army and Xth Corps’ interest in improving the fortifications on the left of the field army. From September until May, the Xth Corps had two divisions along the position of resistance, with the 55th Division in the Sedan sector in the west and the 71st Division, later the 3rd North African Division, in the Mouzon sector in the east. In early April the 3rd Division replaced the 71st, which became the reserve for the Second Army and began additional training. The Sedan sector had a front of about seventeen kilometers, while that of Mouzon had twenty kilometers. The boundaries between the two divisions ran along a line between Rubecourt-etLamecourt (northwest of Douzy), Petit-Remilly (on the Meuse), and Raucourt-etFlaba.12 The Xth Corps was prepared to send units forward of the position of resistance, but except for one lone infantry battalion, all the units to be sent forward were cavalry squadrons. This included the cavalry squadron that was organic to corps headquarters, as well as the cavalry squadrons from the two infantry divisions. In the event of a German attack, the cavalry squadrons went forward with the other cavalry forces from the Second Army. On the northern bank of the Meuse, the Xth Corps placed a number of fortified houses (maisons fortes) along avenues of approach leading from Belgium toward Sedan. With eight of them in the Sedan sector and seven in the Mouzon sector, the fortified houses provided a security line forward of the principal line of resistance and guarded against a surprise attack. With the Belgian frontier being only ten, and sometimes fewer, kilometers away, the French wanted something between the frontier and their main position of resistance. In the vicinity of Sedan, a company of border guards manned four fortified houses at Bellevue (not the Chateau but near Hill 242 northwest of St. Menges), at the woodline on the road between St. Menges and Mouzaive, at La Hatrelle northeast of Fleigneux, and at Olly northeast of Illy. After delaying an attacking enemy, the border guards were supposed to pass through French lines and revert to the control of one of the infantry battalions. The fortified houses were little more than reinforced fighting positions with a bunker surrounded by barbed wire. They did not have antitank weapons and in fact constituted only advanced posts. After the war, one of the battalion commanders in the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment explained that the fortified houses were placed on the principal axes of penetration but were “easily

overrun.” According to him, their main weakness was the inability of the artillery, which was on the left bank, to provide support.13 Nevertheless, after passing through this line of fortified houses, the cavalry that had been in Belgium reverted from the control of the Second Army to the control of the Xth Corps. Behind the two divisions on the position of resistance, the Xth Corps kept an infantry regiment as a reserve. In May 1940 the 213th Infantry acted as this reserve. After the cavalry returned from Belgium and passed through the position of resistance, it also became part of the reserve for the corps. In his work published after the war, General Grandsard explained that the reserves were not as large as they should have been for the length of front defended by the Xth Corps.14 Though his comments reflect his knowledge of what happened in May 1940, he apparently did not vigorously demand additional reserves before the German attack. He understood his corps was part of an economy of force operation, and he evidently knew other sectors had a higher priority for receiving additional units. In short, he was prepared to fight with the units he had, and he did not expect to need a large reserve. He did, however, expect to receive assistance from the Second Army. In April 1940 the corps conducted an exercise on the employment of a counterattack in the Sedan area. In this exercise, the attack was conducted by an armored division and two infantry divisions who moved forward only after enemy armored elements had been halted south of Sedan. According to Grandsard, General Huntziger participated in this exercise and approved of the manner in which the counterattack was conducted. The Second Army and the Xth Corps intended for units assigned to the Xth Corps to delay or halt an attack and then for units from the Second Army to halt the enemy forces completely and to drive them back across the Meuse.15 The Xth Corps thus had two divisions on line, an infantry regiment in reserve, a light screening force to its front in fifteen strong points, and various cavalry units scheduled to revert to its control after returning from Belgium. The Xth Corps also had a number of units organic to it, including combat engineers, construction engineers, signal units, and others. Its reconnaissance squadron had two of its four troops still mounted on horses, but according to General Grandsard, it was the “best” organic unit in the corps. He did not have the same favorable view of the artillery. He explained, “With the cadre coming from colonial [units], it was mediocre. The reserve officers who constituted almost the entire cadre had not maintained in peacetime their knowledge of the artillery, the active duty officers being hardly better. The cadre of noncommissioned officers was poor, without the capacity and without the will for command.” He added that more than 110 of the

280 noncommissioned officers had to be relieved.16 The aerial observation battalion also suffered from serious deficiencies. With eight ancient aircraft, it was not permitted to fly beyond friendly lines. The battalion turned in its eight aircraft in November and did not receive replacements until April when the corps received three aircraft, only one of which was “modern.” In his assessment of the battle, Grandsard complained that the organic elements of the corps had an “unequal” value: “mediocre” for the artillery, “worthless” for the aviation. In general, they lacked sufficient training to undertake operations immediately, with serious deficiencies existing in the cadre as well as the soldiers.17 Shortly after mobilization, the corps began emphasizing the conduct of training. The goal was to devote two-thirds of the time to building fortifications and obstacles and one-third to training. Ideally, a unit devoted an entire day to training or to work. Because of the effects of the bad winter of 1939–40 and because of the huge amount of work to be done, devoting an entire day to training became unproductive, and corps headquarters soon directed that half a day a week be devoted to training.18 Some specialists, such as machine gunners, mortarmen, and so on, initially underwent training at Verdun. After this proved inefficient, corps headquarters organized two regimental-sized training areas in the corps’ rear. Among other facilities, these included rifle and grenade ranges. But the bitter cold of winter interrupted this training, and it was not until the beginning of March that two regiments—one from the 55th and the other from the 71st—began a three-week training session in the new sites. When they finished, a third regiment—the 213th —moved to the training site. Since the 71st Division reverted to Second Army control in early April, it did not send a regiment to the new site but began training on its own in the army's rear. Thus only one of the regiments in the 55th Division that faced the German attack on the Meuse on 13 May had undergone special training. The regiments and divisions in the Xth Corps spent most of the period from October through April improving their positions. Evidently concerned about the effect of the bad winter on the work, Grandsard asked the corps engineer in March 1940 to determine the number of man-days of work required to complete the ongoing projects in the corps sector. His answer was an astonishing 90,500 mandays and did not include much of the work being done by the divisions.19 For months, corps headquarters had required the divisions to provide weekly reports on progress in building fortifications. Requiring such reports obviously sent important messages to all subordinate commanders about priorities within the

corps. General Grandsard strongly supported the building of as many bunkers as possible and obviously did not support the need for training as strongly. Tragically for France, a corps in a position that turned out to be critical in the fight against the Germans, with troops that desperately needed additional training, focused most of its energies and resources on improving and building fortifications rather than improving the fighting skills of its units and men. THE 55TH INFANTRY DIVISION In October 1939 the 55th Infantry Division occupied a defensive position along the Meuse that included the Sedan area. Its mission was to defend the “position of resistance,” which extended seventeen kilometers from a point near where the Canal des Ardennes runs into the Meuse River to a point near the town of PetitRemilly. As it prepared its defensive position, it divided its front into three subsectors: Villers-sur-Bar, which extended from the division's left boundary to the crossroads near the Chateau of Bellevue; Frénois, which extended from Bellevue to a point east of Pont Maugis; and Angecourt, which extended from Pont Maugis to the division's right boundary at Petit-Remilly. To defend the river line, the division commander left the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment in the position it occupied when France mobilized. This regiment, which was organized to occupy the blockhouses and centers of resistance along the Meuse, manned the defensive positions along the entire front of the division, with the 3/147th, 2/147th, and 1/147th corresponding, respectively, to the subsectors from left to right. The individual battalions were attached to the regimental headquarters that had responsibility for each subsector. In the subsector of Villers-sur-Bar on the division's left, Lieutenant Colonel Lafont, who was commander of the 331st Infantry Regiment, had the 3/147th Fortress Infantry, the 1/331st Infantry, and one company from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. In the subsector of Frénois in the division's center, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, who was commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, had the 2/331st, the 2/147th, and the 2/295th Infantry. In the subsector of Angecourt on the division's right, Lieutenant Colonel Demay, who was commander of the 295th Infantry, had the 1/147th, the 3/295th, and two companies from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. Thus the division had two battalions (plus one machine gun company) in the left, three battalions in the center, and two battalions (plus two machine gun companies) in the right subsector.20 For artillery support, the left sector had two battalions in direct support, the center three, and the right sector two. The 55th Division also had four battalions, plus two additional batteries, from the Xth Corps artillery in its sector to support

the division. With four tubes in each battery or twelve tubes in each battalion, the division had 140 artillery tubes in its sector at the beginning of May.21 Since the standard allocation of tubes to an infantry division was sixty (thirty-six 75mm, twenty-four 155mm), the division had more than double the normal allocation of artillery. The number of artillery tubes increased after the Germans entered Luxembourg on 10 May. Corps headquarters ordered three additional artillery battalions on 12 May to move into the Sedan sector. Though one of the battalions never arrived, two did, one of which particularly impressed the divisions’ leaders with its expertise and its accurate firing.22 The addition of these two battalions meant that the 55th had 174 artillery tubes available for support on 13–14 May. Except for one battalion in reserve, another battalion committed to moving forward and defending the Semois River in Belgium, and the reconnaissance squadron committed to going into Belgium with the 5th Light Cavalry Division, every battalion in the division prepared to defend the position of resistance that had been designated by the Second Army. Though the position of resistance varied across the division front, it ranged in depth from one to four kilometers. Because of the bend in the river at Sedan, the deepest positions were in the Bellevue and Torcy areas and were, respectively, 4.0 and 3.5 kilometers deep. The shallowest two were at Donchery and Wadelincourt, which were, respectively, 1.1 and 2.0 kilometers deep.23 The 55th Division maintained control over only one battalion as its reserve (the 3/331st Infantry on 10 May). The battalion that was scheduled to move to the Semois (1/295th) also became part of the reserve after its return, as did the reconnaissance squadron after being released by the 5th Light Cavalry Division. Having such a small reserve accorded with French doctrine, which emphasized the placement of units in the position of resistance. By a process called colmater, or filling, the division expected to meet a penetration by having its reserve, as well as corps and army units, move in front of attacking enemy troops and gradually slowing them down until they were halted. In the division's analysis of counterattacks, it focused on three major locations and directions for corps units to roll back an enemy thrust. These were east of Wadelincourt, east of Frénois in a northwesterly direction, and between Donchery and Villers-sur-Bar.24 But the real focus of the division was not on counterattacks but on holding the ground it was assigned. In accord with French doctrine, the operations orders from the Xth Corps described explicitly the proper way to conduct a defense: In all the depth of the position on the principal line [of resistance], as well as

the stopping line or between these lines, the defense will be organized into circular fighting positions [points d'appui] or centers of resistance, capable of defending themselves when isolated, even if bypassed by enemy infantry and tanks. As a consequence the fighting positions or centers of resistance will be interlocked with obstacles of terrain, woods, villages, etc.25 By holding the centers of resistance, the French expected to break up or disrupt an enemy attack, which would eventually halt under concentrated artillery fire and against newly established defensive positions to its front. According to French doctrine, counterattacks could roll back an enemy penetration but halting the enemy's forward movement was the first priority. As a consequence of this doctrine, the 55th Division's reserves did not prepare to come to the aid of a particular regiment but were placed in a central position, so they could be moved quickly into a threatened area. Once moved, they were not to charge into an exposed enemy flank but to retard the enemy attack and then eventually to assist in a larger counterattack.26 All in all, the 55th Division—despite its panic and collapse on the evening of 13 May—was not an exceptionally bad division. Like the other 18 series B divisions in the French Army in May 1940, which were numbered from 51 to 71, the 55th Division consisted primarily of older reservists who had performed their military service as many as twenty years before. Though some may have previously served in the navy or in the air force, the overwhelming majority had previously served in the army. Upon its mobilization, the division was not designated “for battle” as were some of the series B divisions, which consequently received a slightly larger active duty contingent as a cadre. Of its officers, only 4 percent were regulars, including the commander of each infantry regiment. Though small, this number was larger than that of the 71st Division, which received only two of its major commanders from the active Army and in which the majority of its active officers were recently commissioned lieutenants from military schools.27 On 10 May the 55th Division had only 80 to 85 percent of its prescribed strength present for duty, a significant number of the men having departed on pass because of the Pentecost holiday. Although the prescribed strength of an infantry division was 16,110 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, plus 500 officers, the division's situation report on 21 April reflected the assignment of an estimated 15,053 men (93.4 percent) and 442 officers (88.4 percent). Assuming 80 percent of those assigned were present for duty on 10 May, the division may have had as few as 12,429 men and 359 officers available when the alert occurred early that morning.

The actual number of men present for duty on 13 May was possibly somewhat larger. By the time the Germans attacked, many of the men undoubtedly had returned from pass, giving the division a strength on 13 May closer to its assigned strength on 21 April. More importantly, the strengths cited do not include the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment and the 11th Machine Gun Battalion, which had, respectively, 71 officers and 2,898 men and 28 officers and 927 men, and which reinforced the division on 10 May.28 Also, General Grandsard, the corps commander, later asserted that the 55th's shortages in personnel had been filled with replacements at the beginning of May. Thus the figures given earlier for 10 May may be smaller than the actual assigned strength.29 Even though the men may have been lacking in training and motivation, the 55th was almost completely up to strength in infantrymen. With an authorized strength in an infantry regiment of 80 officers and 3,000 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, the 295th, 213th, and 331st infantry regiments had 222 officers (92.5 percent) and 8,829 noncommissioned officers and soldiers (98 percent) assigned for duty on 21 April. Similarly, with an authorized strength of 120 officers and 3,750 noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the two organic artillery regiments in an infantry division, the 55th Division had 113 officers (94.1 percent) and 3,552 noncommissioned officers and soldiers (94.7 percent).30 The major personnel shortages came from the absence of organic antitank and engineer units. Nevertheless, on 10 May the 55th Division was reinforced with additional antitank and engineer units, thereby diminishing significantly this shortage. Clearly, if the division had severe personnel problems, it was not with the number of men assigned. In his postwar book on the battle, the commander of the Xth Corps offered harsh criticisms of the men of the 55th and 71st divisions. Grandsard said, “All the officers, except for the higher commanders, were reservists [and]…not really capable of command.” He added, “The noncommissioned officers…were promoted in the reserves without having exercised in the active army a command higher than that of a corporal…. Hardly knowing their duties, they neither dared nor wanted to command. They were incapable of imposing [their will] on the men who were their comrades, sometimes their bosses, in civilian life.” He also criticized the soldiers. “Instances of disobedience were rare, but an ardour for work, for training, and a desire to fight were even rarer.”31 Despite his postwar criticisms, Grandsard did not express such harsh views before the German attack. His prewar views filtered through his book when he described the building of fortifications and entrenchments in the Sedan sector. He later explained that “it was impossible to obtain better [results] in the 55th

Infantry Division, energetically led by its commanders, Generals Britsch, then Lafontaine….”32 Unless they were cleverly concealed, his negative views also did not percolate up to the Second Army before May 1940. In fact, the severest criticisms of the men came from the commander of the Second Army, General Huntziger, in a sharp message to his division commanders on 1 March 1940, but they did not concern training and a will to fight. It has certainly not escaped you, nor me, that an important part of the personnel under our orders, and in particular numerous officers, even those in a higher grade, seem to believe that work on the organization of the terrain or in the preparation of rear areas constitutes an inferior form of military activity. This is a false and dangerous notion…. [Physical] work is a procedure of combat, the same as fire and movement which it augments….33 The 55th Division devoted a great deal of time and effort to improving the training of its units and men. By rotating two regiments through training sessions in the rear of the corps, some improvement occurred. Great progress probably came from the division's own efforts. Because of its program for rotating company-sized units through training sessions in the division rear, many companies received instruction and gained skills that otherwise would not have been available to them. The events of May 1940, however, demonstrated that the additional training probably had not been sufficient. In early 1940, perceptions of the attitudes and abilities of the 55th Division sharply differed from those that emerged after the war. For example, a January 1940 report to corps headquarters from the division explained that when it was mobilized, the division suffered from many deficiencies that affected its discipline and its morale. The report noted that morale was improving, but observed, “It is indispensable that shortages [of 25mm and 37mm guns] be made up as quickly as possible.”34 Only a few days before the Germans crossed the Meuse, General Lafontaine sent an urgent message to all officers and noncommissioned officers of the division. Instead of emphasizing discipline, obedience, and willingness to fight, the general again stressed the need for them “personally to direct the work” going on under them and to check such items as communications, barbed wire entanglements, and fields of fire.35 His comments indicate his main concerns, as well as those of his corps and army commander. Some of the most severe weaknesses of the 55th Division became apparent to the chain of command only after the Germans attacked.

French military leaders were aware of severe problems with materiel and frequently mentioned these problems after 1940. One clear weakness was an inadequate number of antitank weapons. The division had only fifty-six modern antitank weapons along its front of seventeen kilometers, giving it a linear density of 3.3 weapons per kilometer. This differed dramatically from the theoretical distribution of 10 weapons per kilometer, which was the basis of French antitank doctrine. Even though the number of antitank weapons was close to the figure of fifty-eight, which was the normal complement in an infantry division, the 55th had only one antitank company for its regiments and thus was short two antitank companies. Yet, it did have a divisional antitank battery with eight 47mm weapons and had been reinforced with an antitank battery of eight 47mm weapons from the army's General Reserve. More importantly, it also had twenty-two 25mm weapons from the 147th Fortress Infantry, three 25mm weapons from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion, and three 47mm naval guns. Though they were not very effective, the division also had nine of the older model 37mm cannon.36 Thus, despite the shortage of two antitank companies in the regiments, the division had essentially the number of modern antitank weapons in the Sedan sector that it was authorized. In the final analysis, the question of the number of antitank weapons is probably insignificant, since the division collapsed before an appreciable number of German tanks crossed the Meuse River. The success of the Germans against the 55th, particularly in the successful crossing of the Meuse, came more from the excellent performance of its infantry than its tanks. The division's major deficiency was in antiaircraft weapons. Unfortunately, this deficiency existed throughout the French Army. In its 1938 program, the Army sought to create 923 antiaircraft batteries with a total of 6,739 weapons, 90 percent of which were 25mm guns. But this huge number exceeded the production capacity of French industry, annual production being about 300 weapons per year, and the Army decided to give priority to other weapons. Though it wanted large numbers of 75mm weapons capable of destroying aircraft at high altitudes, it soon began accepting 90mm naval guns in their place.37 In 1939–40, the area along the Ardennes had a low priority for receiving antiaircraft weapons. The Second Army had two 75mm antiaircraft battalions in its sector, one of which was near Sedan. The 3/404 Air Defense Artillery Battalion moved into the Sedan sector in November and on 10 May had its 9th Battery near Noyers-Pont Maugis, its 8th Battery near Raucourt, and its 7th Battery near Beaumont. Although the 3/404th claimed it shot down nine German aircraft between 10 and 15 May, the 9th Battery near Noyers-Pont Maugis (which moved to Bulson on 12 May) claimed only one downed enemy aircraft during this

period. The entire battalion claimed only one downed aircraft on 13 May (the day of heaviest enemy aerial activity), and pulled out of the area at 1945 hours when it received the false report that the Germans had tanks in the Bois de la Marfée.38 Other air defense units provided support on the outskirts of the Sedan sector. The 3rd North African Division on the corps’ right flank had a battery of 25mm antiaircraft weapons that shot down at least one plane.39 The battery organic to the 1st Colonial Infantry Division was ordered to move into the Sedan sector sometime after 10 May, but the battery apparently never left the Montmédy area.40 Thus, when waves of German aircraft struck the Sedan sector on 13 May, the soldiers of the 55th Division had only one antiaircraft battery in their immediate area, and it performed poorly. They had little more than their organic rifles and machine guns to combat the enemy aircraft. The division also suffered from a lack of mines. Apparently the Second Army had no more than 16,000 mines for its entire area. It directed that 7,000 of these be given to the cavalry for use in Belgium and another 7,000 be placed on the right (east) bank of the Meuse. This left only 2,000 mines for use in the position of resistance.41 According to an inventory dated 23 April 1940, the Xth Corps headquarters had only 1,972 antitank mines. Of these mines, 472 were given to its cavalry squadron and 1,500 to the fortified houses for use on the Belgian side of the Meuse. Out of a theoretical allocation of 6,722 mines, the 55th Division received only 422 antitank mines.42 By the time the meager numbers were allocated to battalions, they received virtually no mines. For example, the 2/331st Infantry, which was in the area of Bellevue, put in a minefield in its sector near Frénois, but it had only 19 mines.43 Since most of the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division crossed through this area on 13–14 May, even the smallest increase in numbers may have made an important difference. Though French military leaders planned on issuing mines to the cavalry forces entering Belgium, they did not pay significant attention to the question of antitank mines, particularly to the employment of antitank mines in the main battle area. Despite numerous analyses of antitank operations, they placed the greatest emphasis on antitank weapons and on the use of natural obstacles (such as rivers) to the front of French units, rather than on the use of antitank mines. Little or no thought was apparently given to using mines in the main battle area or to laying minefields in front of an enemy penetration. This myopia caused the French to overlook an inexpensive weapon that could have yielded important results in May 1940.44 Although the 55th Division had numerous deficiencies and problems, the

commanding general of the division devoted considerable time and resources to the construction of a large concrete bunker for his headquarters. This bunker, which still exists at Fond Dagot, had several rooms for the staff and an attractive stone exterior. A commander who was expecting to move or who was truly concerned with the condition of his division would not have devoted such an extensive effort to build what can only be described as a luxurious headquarters. THE 147TH FORTRESS INFANTRY REGIMENT During the fighting around Sedan, perhaps no single unit played as key a role as the three battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Occupying the sector of Frénois, which included defenses along the Meuse River between the eastern part of Donchery and a point east of Pont Maugis, this regimental-sized unit received the brunt of the attack from the XIXth Panzer Corps, including the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division, the Gross Deutschland Regiment, and the 10th Panzer Division. Important German crossings of the Meuse River were made in its area between Glaire and Torcy and at Wadelincourt. Also, after elements of the 147th were pushed out of Bellevue, the 2nd Panzer Division finally was able to cross at Donchery, which was to the west of Bellevue in another French regiment's area. Of the four major crossings made by the XIXth Panzer Corps, three were made in the 147th's sector, and the fourth was made possible after it pulled back. The 147th Fortress Regiment was a type B regiment and was formed between 23 and 27 August 1939, primarily from the 3/155th Fortress Regiment at Sedan. As with the formation of other French regiments, the 3/155th was split up with most of its men being used to form three new battalions. The 9th Company provided the cadre for the 3/147th, the 10th Company for the 2/147th, and the 11th Company for the 1/147th.45 Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, a reserve officer, commanded the 3/155th and was made commander of the 147th Regiment. When formed, the 147th Regiment included fifteen officers, eighty noncommissioned officers, and 600 soldiers from the 3/155th. The reservists who filled the regiment to almost full strength (seventy-one officers, 2,898 soldiers present for duty on 21 April)46 came primarily from the Ardennes and the regions of Aisne and Paris. A third of them had been conscripted initially from 1918 to 1925, another third from 1926 to 1930, and the final third from 1931 to 1935. Thus the average age of a soldier was thirty-one, a lieutenant thirty-three, and a captain forty-two. The average age of more senior officers was fifty-one years.47 According to Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, the regimental commander, the training level of the reservists was not very high. Though his assessment of their training

was made after the bleak events of 10–15 May, he clearly had reservations before 10 May about his men being completely trained. When the regiment was formed, he tried to make each soldier a marksman, but he never received sufficient ammunition to train them thoroughly. In other portions of the regiment's training, he tried to emphasize the execution of final protective fires on the northern bank of the Meuse and on the river itself, but “these exercises were never accomplished.” The major reason for the inadequate training was the requirement to perform other duties. Until 1 December 1939, training normally occupied two days a week and was conducted by each company under the supervision of the battalion commander. From December until 1 April 1940, the regiment spent a considerable part of its time building concrete blockhouses and performing other duties such as providing guards or fatigue details. Beginning on the first of April, a few companies underwent fifteen days of training at the rear of the regimental area. By 10 May, approximately half the regiment had received this training. But according to Pinaud, the training did little more than “verify” the inadequate preparation of the soldiers.48 Whether this failure was his fault or was due to other factors is not completely clear, but the regiment obviously was not as well trained as it could have been. THE 147TH'S DEFENSIVE POSITION As commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud was responsible for the subsector of Frénois, which included a defensive front of about 8.5 kilometers along the Meuse from the crossroads at Bellevue to a point east of Pont Maugis. Two of the three organic battalions of the 147th occupied other areas along the Meuse, so Pinaud had a fortress and two regular infantry battalions under his command. These were: the 2/331st Infantry; the 2/147th Fortress Infantry; and the 2/295th Infantry. Pinaud divided his subsector into three areas (Bellevue, Torcy, and Wadelincourt) and placed one battalion in each area. From left to right, he had the 2/331st, the 2/147th, and the 2/295th. The 2/331st and the 2/147th occupied the area that was known as the “mushroom of Glaire.” The commanders of each battalion had responsibility for a large center of resistance, which extended from the Meuse to the rear of the regimental sector. Each commander further divided his subsector into three smaller centers of resistance. The 2/331st and the 2/147th, which were the left and the center battalions, placed one center of resistance along the principal line of resistance bordering the Canal de l'Est and the Meuse; one along the second line

encompassing the blockhouses on the high ground between Frénois, west of Wadelincourt, and west of Pont Maugis; and one along the stopping line that followed dominating terrain between La Boulette, the Bois de la Marfée, the French military cemetery, and Noyers. In addition to the company along the Meuse, the commanders of the 2/331st and the 2/147th thus placed one company along the second line and another along the stopping line. The company from the 2/331st that was on the second line occupied the first four blockhouses along the line between Frénois and Wadelincourt.49 Their intention was to force an attacker to break through three successive lines, each of which was linked to key terrain features and blockhouses. To strengthen defenses along the river, several platoons from infantry companies along the second line or stopping line were moved forward into the principal line of resistance along the river. The commander of the 2/295th, which was the battalion on the right, also divided his area into three centers of resistance, but he did organize them into three successive lines. Taking care to place his companies so they could use the terrain to their advantage, he placed one company along the principal line of resistance but to its rear placed his remaining two companies side-by-side and arranged in depth. Each rear company occupied the stopping line, as well as the second line. Such an arrangement simplified fire control procedures and enabled troops pulling back from the second line to reinforce their own company at the stopping line. The two companies placed their stopping line along the French military cemetery and the small village of Noyers.50 On 13 May, the day the Germans crossed the Meuse, the Bellevue area was under the commander of the 2/331st Infantry, who had the 7th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry, and the 5th and 7th companies of the 2/331st Infantry. The Torcy area was under the commander of the 2/147th, who had the 5th Company of the 2/147th, the 6th Company of the 2/295th, and the 6th Company of the 2/331st. The commander of the 2/147th also had a fourth company, a combination infantry and heavy weapons company that was organic to a fortress battalion. The Wadelincourt area was under the commander of the 2/295th Infantry, who had the 6th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry and the 5th and 7th companies of the 2/295th.51 On the left with the 2/331st and on the right with the 2/295th, the 7th and 6th Fortress Infantry companies of the 2/147th—respectively—occupied positions along the river. The 5th Company of the 2/147th also initially occupied a position along the river and was under the control of the commander of the 2/147th, but when it departed for training, it was replaced by the 6th Company, 2/295th. Thus

only two of the three companies along the river in Pinaud's subsector were fortress infantry companies. Throughout Pinaud's subsector, the company-sized centers of resistance were further broken down into three, four, or five fighting positions (point d'appui). For example, five fighting positions were created in the center of resistance at Torcy and occupied by the 6th Company, 2/295th. Four were along the Meuse: one extending about 600 meters southeast from the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire, which is midway between Torcy and Glaire; one around Pont Neuf, the northernmost bridge in Sedan; one around Pont de l'Ecluse, the bridge leading to the center of Sedan; and one around Pont de la Gare, the bridge leading to the railroad station. The fifth fighting position was to the rear of the other four positions and encompassed the area between the railroad station and the cemetery in the northwest corner of Torcy.52

Similarly, the center of resistance at Bellevue included four fighting positions, which were occupied by the 7th Company, 2/147th. Three of these bordered the Meuse: one around the Chateau of Bellevue with fields of fire extending into Donchery; one around the bridge over the Canal de l'Est leading into Villette; and one that stretched from the town of Glaire to the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire. The fourth fighting position was to their rear and extended from the point where route D-29 crosses the railroad to the Les Forges factory.53 The French apparently placed almost no troops across the Canal de l'Est into the “buckle” of the Meuse. Despite the neatness of this placement, a great deal of turbulence occurred— beginning in April—in the placement of companies and platoons. Since the division wanted to provide special training to the battalions and companies, it rotated them through training sessions, but did not always return them to their original centers of resistance. As a consequence of this rotation, even though the 55th Division had been in the Sedan region for months, most of the infantry under Pinaud's command in the Frénois subsector had been in the positions they occupied on 13 May for less than a month. In fact, only one company—the 7th Company, 2/147th Fortress Infantry—was in the same position at Wadelincourt on 13 May that it had occupied in March. Two of the three infantry battalions in the Frénois subsector were new to the area and to Pinaud's command. At the beginning of April, the 2/295th Infantry relieved at Wadelincourt the 1/331st Infantry, which had been under Pinaud's command for some time and which departed for training. The 2/331st Infantry assumed control of the Bellevue area at the beginning of May. It relieved the 3/213th Infantry, which had also been under Pinaud's command and which departed for training. The arrival of these two battalions greatly affected the remaining battalion, the 2/147th Fortress Infantry. This battalion, which was responsible for the center part of the regiment's area, had only two of its organic companies (its weapons company and one of its regular fortress companies), for it had given up the two other fortress companies to occupy the blockhouses in the battalions’ areas to its left and right. In turn, it had received one company from the 2/295th and another company from the 2/331st, leaving those two battalions with their remaining two organic infantry companies. Changing the other two battalions in the regiment thus provided the 2/147th two new infantry companies for its area. The movement of the infantry from the positions with which they were extremely familiar also affected the individual companies of the fortress infantry. The positions occupied by two of the three fortress companies on 13 May were not the same ones they had been occupying in the regimental sector early in March.

To replace a fortress infantry company that was scheduled to receive training, division headquarters formed a provisional company from the 213th Infantry at the beginning of March by taking an infantry company and reinforcing it with machine guns. This company then replaced the 6th Company of the 2/147th Fortress Infantry along the Meuse at Torcy. When the 6th Company finished its training, it did not return to Torcy, but instead replaced the 5th Company, 2/147th, at Wadelincourt on 25 April. The 5th Company then began training. The 6th Company from the 2/295th, plus a machine gun platoon, was moved into the Torcy sector on 5 May and occupied the center of resistance and blockhouses along the Meuse. This company relieved the company from the 213th Infantry, which had been at Torcy but which departed for training on 5 May. When the Germans entered Luxembourg on 10 May, the 5th Company, 2/147th, did not move back into the principal line of resistance, but occupied the La Prayelle center of resistance, which included the high ground near Hill 247. The 6th Company of the 2/295th remained in the center of resistance at Torcy along the Meuse. Thus, on 10 May, two of the three fortress companies of the 2/147th were in new positions. Perhaps more importantly, a new company to the Sedan area—the 6th Company, 2/295th—occupied a key position between Glaire and Torcy, while a fortress company that had trained in that position for about six months remained to its rear.54 As a consequence of all these changes, only one company—the 7th Company, 2/147th—of the nine companies under Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's command had been in its position on 10 May for more than forty-five days. Of the other two companies along the river, one moved into position on 25 April, and the other on 5 May. Most of the companies under Pinaud's command had been in position for less than a month. Even though the 55th Division had occupied the left bank of the Meuse near Sedan since 20 October 1939, its individual companies in the critical area under Pinaud's command had spent relatively little time getting to know their defensive positions intimately. Tragically for France, these companies received the major part of the German attack across the Meuse from the XIXth Panzer Corps. Ironically, the 7th Company, 2/147th, which had been in position longer than the other two companies along the river, performed more poorly than either of them. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE 147TH REGIMENT The battalion task forces also were not as cohesive as they could have been. Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th, strongly emphasized this lack of cohesion. In his report completed after the collapse of France, he said that the

147th Regiment had “total” cohesion shortly after it was formed. He explained, “The 147th had one ‘spirit’; it was ready.” This cohesion came from the familiarity of the men with each other, particularly after the special training received following their mobilization, and by the excellent preparation received in peacetime by the men of the 3/155th, which had provided the nucleus for the forming of the 147th. Although veterans of the 3/155th provided a valuable infrastructure for the 147th, the cohesion of the regiment was weakened by the introduction of older reservists as replacements. Coming from the 55th Division, these older men were apparently not as well trained and may have lacked the same level of spirit as the younger men. The commander of the 3/147th, who occupied defenses south of Donchery, complained bitterly about the exchange of personnel between the 147th Regiment and the 55th Division. In his report written after the battle, he said: “[A]ll the units of the 147th Regiment lost by successive exchanges their young soldiers…, [who were] emptied into the units of the 55th I[nfantry] D[ivision]…in exchange for older soldiers…. The patient work of four years [training in peacetime]…was brutally wiped out….” Many of the soldiers in the 147th knew their responsibilities in the smallest detail, but their skills for defending fortresses or firing machine guns were useless in regular infantry units.55 Additionally, the confidence and interrelationships of the infantry units were somewhat diluted at the beginning of May with the addition of another group of replacements, which brought their strength closer to its authorized levels. In units that had already experienced the exchange of personnel between the 55th Division and the 147th Regiment, another wave of soldiers moved into the 55th Division. Clearly, the French High Command was far more interested in numbers than it was in cohesion or skills gained through special training, and General Lafontaine later admitted that the cohesion of the division was “compromised” by personnel turbulence.56 The cohesion of the 147th Regiment was also weakened by the mixing of companies from other battalions and regiments. As companies returned from training, they usually did not return to their original position or battalion. On 10 May Captain Carribou's 2/147th battalion task force consisted of two companies from the 2/147th, one from the 2/295th, and one from the 2/331st. Arguing that the mixing of companies led to “incoherence,” he sharply criticized some of the reservists from the 6th Company, 2/331st, who fled under German fire before he could do anything about their panic. Other members of the fortress units severely criticized the tendency of the infantry units, which should have provided protective fires for the blockhouses, to run. Carribou concluded, “A man holds

[ground] because he knows that his neighbor at his side will hold.”57 The price paid for the assignment of companies to battalions without regard to previous service was the loss of familiarity among the soldiers and a lessening of confidence. The French obviously believed that additional fortifications could make up for personnel and materiel weaknesses. The interest of the Second Army, Xth Corps, and 55th Division commanders in fortifications obviously stemmed from their belief that concrete could provide protection and could increase the staying power of the infantry. As mentioned earlier, the contrast between the Sedan sector and the Maginot Line to the east evidently increased their interest in fortifications. Unfortunately, the French placed an inadequate emphasis on training and devoted most of their time to the physical labor of improving their defensive positions. For the 147th Regiment, most of the fortifications in the Frénois subsector were located along the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt, but a few blockhouses were located at bridges across the Meuse, such as the one leading into Villette and the three crossing into Sedan. Two blockhouses located immediately to the west of Pont Neuf were the only strong fortifications in the vicinity of where the German 1st Infantry and Gross Deutschland regiments crossed. Because of the blockhouses’ strength and fortunate location, their occupants inflicted many casualties on the infantry in the Gross Deutschland Regiment before they were finally silenced. Along the river between Glaire and Torcy, where the German 1st Infantry Regiment crossed, there were only three small bunkers, and they were designated as “simple to construct.” The “simple” bunkers were usually built of concrete, but logs were apparently used in the three bunkers between Glaire and Torcy, making them weaker than the blockhouses by the bridges or on the second line. One of the small bunkers was on the edge of Glaire and two were side-by-side but facing opposite directions where the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire ran into the Meuse. Once the Germans passed these bunkers, the next blockhouses were at Les Forges and near the Chateau of Bellevue. Farther to the Germans’ front was the line of blockhouses between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. The French carefully placed their 25mm and 47mm antitank weapons. They did not expect the Germans to use tanks while crossing the river but did expect them to use tanks to attempt a breakthrough of the French defenses if they crossed in the Bellevue-Glaire-Torcy area. Consequently, antitank weapons were needed primarily along the regiment's second line to prevent a breakthrough.58 Unfortunately, they placed the antitank weapons inside the blockhouses to give them protection from enemy fire and did not provide for removing them and using

them elsewhere. This meant that the weapons could only fire into designated zones and could not be moved to more critical zones. The French thus sacrificed the mobility of the weapons for protection. This weakness proved to be much more important than the relatively small number of weapons. After the collapse, the debate over the causes of France's defeat often touched upon the inadequate number of blockhouses in the Sedan area and their often lacking metal protective shields to cover firing ports. In some ways, the intensity of this debate suggests that the participants had not learned an important lesson about the weaknesses of fortifications in modern warfare. Nevertheless, most of the bunkers that were being built or being planned to be built were located along the line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. While a few were planned for the river's edge, the main concern of French commanders during the phony war was the requirement to add depth with more blockhouses and to strengthen the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. Though they would have liked to increase the number of blockhouses along the principal line of resistance, they gave a higher priority to strengthening the second line and preparing to move the principal line of resistance from the river's edge to the rear. In trying to do too much, the French ended up doing too little in what proved to be a very critical area. THE LACK OF COHESION AND TRAINING Thus, despite having occupied the Sedan sector from October to May, the 55th Division suffered from a lack of cohesion and training. With Generals Huntziger and Grandsard being more interested in the building of fortifications than in the conduct of hard, demanding training, the division had little or no opportunity to make much-needed improvements. Consequently, after replacing General Britsch as commander of the 55th on 1 March, General Lafontaine did not make substantial improvements in the division. Unfortunately for France, the lack of cohesion and the inadequate training of the division affected its combat performance far more than the missing or incomplete bunkers. The problems with cohesion and training are particularly noticeable when compared with the Germans. After having previously experienced combat in Poland and after a long period of intense training, the German units were models of preparedness. The irony is that Lafontaine, Grandsard, and Huntziger were reasonably satisfied before May 1940 with the preparedness of their troops. General Huntziger's response to Pierre Taittinger's report of significant weaknesses around Sedan stands as a startlingly clear statement of their satisfaction with ongoing programs. He wrote, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce

the Sedan sector….”59 On 13 May the forces of General Guderian demonstrated the glaring error of this statement.

CHAPTER 5

The German Attack Across the Meuse

T

he question of how the XIXth Panzer Corps would cross the Meuse had concerned Guderian and von Kleist since their commands had received the mission of attacking across the river. The two leaders had differed about the location of the crossing, for von Kleist wanted the majority of the corps to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, while Guderian preferred to have the entire corps cross east of the canal. On 11 May the operations order from Panzer Group von Kleist for the 12th specifically ordered the XIXth Corps to “place its main thrust…west of the Ardennes Canal.”1 On 12 May the operations order from Panzer Group von Kleist for the 13th ordered Guderian to make the “Meuse crossing around 1500 hours between Flize and Sedan.”2 (Flize was twelve kilometers west of Sedan and five kilometers west of the Ardennes Canal.) Von Kleist's directives to the XIXth Corps could not have been clearer. Stretching to the limit the operational freedom provided him by the German philosophy of command, however, the strong-willed Guderian nevertheless prepared to cross east of the Ardennes Canal. During the preparation of the XIXth Panzer Corps to cross on both sides of Sedan, two important questions appeared that dramatically affected the conduct of the river crossing. The first concerned the timing of the attack; the second concerned air support. While Guderian successfully ignored von Kleist's orders about where to make the crossing, he soon discovered that his commander would not yield on the important questions of time and air support. THE GERMAN PLAN When the XIXth Panzer Corps approached Sedan, its units were scattered along the many roads used by the corps to move west. The units of the 1st Panzer Division were closer to Sedan than those of the other two divisions, for the

division had been blessed with the best marching route and had preempted the 2nd Panzer Division at Mouzaive. To the east, the 10th Panzer Division was experiencing some difficulty reaching the Meuse because of the tortuous route it followed to Mortehan. To the west, some of the advance elements of the 2nd Panzer Division were approaching the river, but the bulk of the division was still far behind the Semois. Guderian was particularly concerned because much of the corps’ artillery was far to the rear. Late in the afternoon of the 12th, a Fieseler-Storch aircraft arrived at Guderian's headquarters to transport him to von Kleist's command post. There von Kleist ordered him to attack across the Meuse at 1500 hours on the 13th and emphasized his concerns about the XIXth Panzer Corps preparing to cross east of the Ardennes Canal. Guderian expressed strong reservations about making the crossing on the following day because the 2nd Panzer Division probably could not arrive on the Meuse in time, but he acknowledged the advantages of making a hasty river crossing before the French could strengthen their defenses. He then shrewdly pointed out that if his corps had to shift west so it could cross west of the Ardennes Canal, it would not be ready until the 14th. Trapped by time and space constraints, von Kleist had no choice but to accept a crossing east of the Canal. However, von Kleist then gave another order that, in Guderian's words, was “far less pleasant.” In early May, Guderian had coordinated with the Luftwaffe for support during the Meuse crossing. He and General Lörzer of the Second Air Corps had agreed that Luftwaffe aircraft would provide continuous support to the ground forces when the river crossing and assault were made. Instead of making a massive attack with bombers and dive bombers during a short period, German aircraft would maintain a continuous but relatively low level of attacks, particularly against the exposed enemy artillery. This would force the enemy to seek cover and would affect his ability to continue firing, as well as his will to fight. Much to Guderian's dismay, von Kleist had arranged for a short but massive bombing attack, which would be coordinated with German artillery preparation. Guderian considered his entire attack plan to be in “jeopardy,” for he believed a massive bombing attack would not substantially affect the enemy's artillery. Recognizing the increased importance of German artillery in silencing or disrupting the enemy's artillery, Guderian demanded a delay in the crossing until the 14th to be certain the artillery had sufficient time to occupy its designated positions and provide supporting and counter-battery fires. Despite Guderian's strongest efforts, von Kleist refused to change his orders. If his Panzer group were to cross the Meuse successfully, the XLIst and the XIXth corps had to attack at the

same time, and delays by one corps or both could place the entire campaign in jeopardy. The same reasons that forced von Kleist to accept the XIXth Corps’ new crossing site forced Guderian to accept the change in plans for air support. Guderian departed for Bouillon, obviously upset about the turn of events.3 After returning to his command post, Guderian decided to modify and issue the order that had been used in the war game for the crossing of the Meuse. As he noted in his memoirs, the major change was in the timing of the attack. To break through the French defenses, he planned on having the XIXth Panzer Corps cross the Meuse River with its three divisions abreast: the 2nd Panzer in the west at Donchery, the 1st Panzer with the main attack in the center at Sedan, and the 10th Panzer in the east at Wadelincourt. In the west, the 2nd Panzer Division was supposed to cross the Meuse and occupy Croix Piot, the high ground overlooking the Meuse. In the center, the 1st Panzer Division was supposed to seize the heights of La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée and then push south to a line running between Chehéry and Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). To ensure the success of the main attack, the 1st Division was reinforced by the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment and by the heavy artillery battalions from the two divisions on its flank. In the east, the 10th Panzer Division was supposed to cross at Wadelincourt and Bazeilles and then push south toward Bulson. After successfully crossing the Meuse and seizing the high ground to its south, Guderian apparently planned on pivoting to the west toward Rethel and punching through the last French defenses. The bridgehead in which the corps would turn to the west would be no deeper than about fifteen kilometers. To protect the flank of the corps, he planned on using the Gross Deutschland Regiment or the 10th Panzer Division, or both units, to occupy the heights around Mont Dieu and Stonne. Because he could not predict the enemy's response, however, he delayed making a decision about the exact details of the pivot to the west until after the crossing. Nevertheless, he obviously preferred to have the 10th Panzer Division pivot and accompany the other two Panzer divisions in the corps. If it had to remain behind to protect the bridgehead by defending along the heights of Stonne-Mont Dieu, or even worse, if that division, the Gross Deutschland Regiment, and additional units from the 1st Panzer Division had to remain behind to protect the bridgehead, the capability of the corps to move deep into French defenses would be dramatically curbed. Much depended on how rapidly the Germans could push units across the Meuse and on how rapidly the French could bring reinforcements into the Sedan area. After von Kleist had forced the XIXth Corps to attack on the afternoon of the 13th with major modifications in the planned methods for employing the air force,

Guderian evidently had serious doubts about the potential success of the river crossing. The daily log of the XIXth Panzer Corps includes a lengthy analysis of Guderian's concerns about the width, depth, and timing of the attack. The log notes, “The order of the Group…is completely different from the conception of the commanding general [of the XIXth Corps]….”4 Almost as if a court case were being readied, the extent and nature of the comments suggest that Guderian was fully prepared to blame von Kleist if the crossing failed. GERMAN AERIAL OPERATIONS OVER SEDAN To coordinate aerial attacks in support of the Meuse crossing by the XIXth and XLIst Corps, Panzer Group von Kleist broke down the projected crossing zones into six large areas, with two being north of Charleville, two between Flize and the Ardennes Canal, and two between the Canal and Pont Maugis. In each case, one area lay alongside the river, while another lay deeper in the French defenses.5 The XIXth Panzer Corps also broke down its zone into large areas and then further subdivided the areas into small area targets. Most targets included an area of about a quarter to half a square kilometer. For example, the Germans designated the area in the “mushroom of Glaire” as area “K” and drew circles or ovals around ten different numbered targets: the “buckle” of the Meuse, Glaire, the road between Glaire and Torcy, the northwestern part of Torcy, the southwestern part of Torcy, the area west of the junction of the railway and the Bellevue-Torcy road, Les Forges, the extreme western part of the railway in the mushroom, the area northeast of the road junction at Bellevue, and the area north of the same junction. The area south of the mushroom was designated as area “L,” and targets were circled and numbered within it. Other areas were also marked in the same manner.6 The identification of preplanned targets facilitated coordination between the air and the ground forces. Use of the preplanned targets had been practiced during war games preceding the attack, and only slight modifications to the targets used in the most recent war game had to be made for the 13 May 1940 aerial attacks around Sedan. From Guderian's perspective, however, much of the work in coordinating the air attacks with the ground operation was negated by von Kleist's decision to have a short, rather than a drawn-out bombing attack.7 On the 13th, before the attack across the Meuse began, Guderian waited anxiously for the scheduled air attack. To his surprise, only a few bombers and dive bombers (with the protection of fighters) appeared over Sedan and began an extended wave of attacks. Guderian was elated, for he was convinced a drawn-out bombing attack would disrupt the French artillery. Later that night, he telephoned

Lörzer to thank him for the excellent air support. During that conversation, he learned that the request from von Kleist for a massive attack had arrived too late to be implemented and consequently Lörzer had continued with the previously agreed upon approach.8 As it had been for much of the campaign, luck was again on Guderian's side. About one thousand aircraft supported Group von Kleist on the 13th, most of which operated around Sedan. As hundreds of German aircraft circled above them and launched their attacks, the French 55th Division had little or no defenses. The Second Army had only two battalions of 75mm air defense for its entire front, but placed one near Sedan. Despite the massive number of enemy aircraft, the battalion (the 3/404th) claimed only one downed aircraft on the 13th. A battery of 25mm antiaircraft weapons from the 1st Colonial Infantry Division was ordered to move into the Sedan sector sometime after 10 May, but the battery apparently never arrived.9 Thus when wave after wave of German aircraft struck the Sedan sector on the 13th, the 55th Division had little more than its organic rifles and machine guns to combat them. The daily log of the French Xth Corps emphasized the importance of the German aerial attacks. One entry stated: “German aviation played a preponderant role, even a decisive [one]. Its incessant attacks were launched against the [principal] line of resistance…[and] on the rear areas…. Its action was continuous and massive.”10 Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, who commanded the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment at Sedan, described the attacks. He wrote: Beginning at 0500 hours, numerous enemy aerial reconnaissance [aircraft] flew over the sub-sector…. Around 0930 hours, German aviation began to bombard the position. The bombardment was especially heavy on the principal line of resistance, on the train station in Sedan, and on Torcy where numerous fires were started…. After 1100 hours, the aerial bombardment became more intense and was mixed with lulls until 1700 hours…. [T]he entire position but especially the principal line of resistance was covered by a thick cloud of smoke. The attacks were executed by successive waves, each including around 40 bombers; fighters participated in the action by firing their machine guns.11 Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th Fortress Infantry Battalion, also described the aerial attacks. In his report, he said, The pounding of the position began around 1100 hours by around 40 bombers

and continued until approximately 1700 hours under the form of five successive waves, each with an approximate duration of one hour. The telephonic communications [that were] regularly interrupted under each bombardment were reestablished during the lulls as best we could, but communications proved to be more and more difficult. Every individual seen was followed and machine gunned by the enemy fighters who defiantly confirmed their absolute mastery of the air. I requested authorization to use the radio. Permission was refused.12 Despite the length and intensity of the attacks, very little damage—except to communications—actually occurred. The real damage inflicted by the aircraft came to the will of the defenders to fight. Captain Foucault, who commanded the 2/331st Infantry at Bellevue, noted that the effect on the morale of the French defenders was much greater than any actual physical destruction by the planes.13 Although the infantry was affected, the effect on the French artillery was particularly important. Even though many of the tubes were not deeply dug in and well protected, very few were actually destroyed. But their firing against the massed and exposed Germans on the northern bank of the Meuse ceased almost completely as the crews sought cover against the air attacks. Additionally, the constant attacks increased their nervousness and contributed significantly to the enormously disruptive panic that swept the 55th Division and the artillery in its rear on the evening of the 13th. As the attacking German infantry moved beyond the river line, aircraft provided immediate and usually effective support. The use of numbered targets continued, and dive bombers rattled the occupants of several bunkers, enabling the Germans to move more closely to them and ultimately to destroy them. The machine gun fire and bombs from aircraft also had an important effect as the 1st Infantry Regiment swept through the French defenders and raced toward La Boulette. Without aerial support, the infantry would have had little more than their mortars and their accompanying small arms to use against the entrenched French. Thus, by sapping the will of the French defenders to fight, by disrupting the fire of the numerous artillery batteries, and by providing immediate fire support, German aircraft made an important contribution to the land battle on the afternoon of the 13th. Without excellent support from the Luftwaffe, the XIXth Panzer Corps’ mission would have been significantly more difficult. WITH THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION AT GAULIER At the 1st Panzer Division, the headquarters did not have time to complete a detailed plan for the attack on the 13th, so it ordered its subordinate units to

implement the plan that had been prepared for a map exercise in Koblenz, Germany, on 21 March. As with the corps’ plan, the division's plan had not been intended for wartime use, but it did provide the basic concept for identifying and occupying assembly areas and for executing the attack over the Meuse. Though the modification of an existing plan reduced substantially the amount of effort needed to issue precise orders, subordinate units did not receive orders until very late at night. The 2/1st Infantry, for example, did not receive the regimental order until 0130 hours on 13 May.14 This left it very little time to conduct last-minute planning and preparation even though it was supposed to be one of the first units to cross the Meuse. Confusion also existed about when the attack would begin. Even though Guderian returned to his command post about 1700 hours on the 12th with orders for the attack to begin at 1500 hours on the following day, the divisions received a warning order that told them the attack would occur on the morning of the 13th. The corps’ plan with the correct time for the attack was not completed until 0715 hours on the 13th.15 Until early on the morning of the 13th, the 1st Panzer Division thought it was supposed to launch its attack at 0900 hours. Subsequent changes altered the attack time to 1415 hours and then later to 1500 hours. The division did not learn until 0700 hours that the attack scheduled at 0900 hours had been delayed. The 2/1st Infantry evidently did not learn of the change until the last minute.16 The 1st Panzer Division used the evening of the 12th and the night of the 12– 13th to push units into their forward assembly areas. The rough terrain along the Semois River near Bouillon made this movement particularly difficult. Amidst the narrow, winding roads, long lines of marching troops and moving vehicles slowly made their way toward Sedan. In their comments after the battle, the German soldiers noted the effect of the “clogged streets,” the burning and destroyed buildings, the bomb craters, and the “stinking corpses of horses.”17 Getting sufficient artillery forward became especially difficult and thus important. Final preparations for the attack, particularly those relating to units moving into assembly areas or attack positions, were difficult to accomplish because of the open terrain on the eastern bank of the Meuse. From the high ground on the western bank of the Meuse, French forward observers could see six to eight kilometers to their front and could place massive concentrations of artillery against any exposed troops or equipment. Even individual guns or artillery tubes received fire when they were carelessly exposed. The leaders of the 1st Panzer Division remained extremely worried about their ability to bring everything forward in time for the attack. Though their task remained difficult, delaying the

attack from 0900 until 1500 hours served slightly to lessen their worries. The massive concentration of forces on the eastern bank of the Meuse created good targets for the French. In the 2/1st Infantry Battalion, the 6th and 9th companies suffered particularly high casualties during the night of 12–13 May even though they had dug entrenchments.18 However, the following day saw the effectiveness of the artillery decrease significantly. The heavy attacks by German aircraft against the French artillery almost completely silenced its firing during the crucial period when German troops moved to and then crossed the Meuse. The Germans also used the terrain to their advantage by skillfully moving troops so the folds in the ground partially concealed and covered their advance. Most of the artillery support for the attack of the 1st Panzer Division came from the 73rd Artillery Regiment and the 2/56th Artillery, which were organic to the division. Since the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions each gave up an artillery battalion to support the division, which had responsibility for the corps’ main attack, the 2/45th Artillery and the 1/105th Artillery moved into the division's sector. Later, after the Germans had crossed the river successfully, a small part of the artillery crossed the Meuse using two rafts the Germans had placed in the river. When the bridge was finally completed, the remainder moved across more easily and quickly. Because of the small amount of time available for planning, no detailed fire plan was completed. Nevertheless, the Germans had identified exactly the direction they wanted the infantry units to go, and they planned on using artillery fires to help the infantry maintain their direction of attack. By 1300 hours most of the firing batteries had occupied their positions and were prepared to fire, and some artillerymen prepared to move forward with the infantry. The battery commander of the 6th Battery, 73rd Artillery, for example, prepared to accompany the 3/1st Infantry across the Meuse and thereby provide especially effective support.19 THE 1ST INFANTRY REGIMENT CROSSES THE MEUSE The 1st Infantry Regiment led the main attack by the 1st Panzer Division across the Meuse River. From the crossing of the Meuse on the 13th to the breakout on the 16th, the 1st Infantry Regiment performed superbly. Among the most important reasons for its remarkable success was the outstanding leadership of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck. A highly decorated veteran of World War I who engendered a great deal of respect from those under his command, Balck was one of Germany's best combat leaders. Though only a lieutenant colonel in 1940, he eventually commanded Army Group G in western

Europe in 1945. Over the course of the war, he was subsequently promoted higher and faster than either his brigade or division commander in the 1st Panzer Division. On 13 May 1940 it was the misfortune of the 55th French Infantry Division and the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment to be facing a regiment commanded by him. The 1st Infantry Regiment—reinforced by the 8th Company of the 2/1st Panzers, 1st Company of the 8th Heavy Antitank Battalion, 660th Assault Gun Battery, and the 702nd Heavy Infantry Weapons Company—had the mission of attacking across the Meuse near Gaulier. To the west was the Gross Deutschland Regiment. The boundary between the two regiments initially followed the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire and then ran along a line that extended from a point 400 meters east of Frénois to the farm of St. Quentin, about one kilometer southwest of Chaumont.20 The 1st Regiment planned on attacking across the Meuse with two of its battalions, while the Gross Deutschland Regiment planned on crossing with one battalion and then having its other battalions follow. Since the Gross Deutschland Regiment had an organic combat support battalion, the XIXth Panzer Corps did not reinforce it, but the 1st Infantry Regiment was provided tanks and assault guns. While the two armored regiments of the division remained in assembly areas near Corbion, one tank company (with Mark IV tanks armed with 75mm cannon) came forward to accompany the 1st Regiment as it moved to the river and to support the crossing of the infantry. Additionally, the 660th Assault Gun Battery, which had 75mm cannons similar to that on the Mark IV, also supported the regiment. When the 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse, the accurate and powerful fire of the 75mm guns proved to be very effective in silencing the French bunkers. The regiment also had 150mm cannons, mounted on the chassis of a Mark I, from the 702nd Heavy Infantry Weapons Company supporting its attack. While the 150mm cannon did not have the accuracy of a 75mm gun, it could provide close, accurate, and devastatingly powerful fire support.

Engineer units provided crucial support for the crossing. The 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion controlled the movement of the regiment across the Meuse, while the 37th Armored Engineer Battalion began establishing a ferry to move troops and equipment across the river. At the same time, the 505th Engineer Battalion began preparations for the construction of a sixteen-ton bridge.21 The 43rd Assault Engineers had a particularly challenging task. The battalion had received special training in the destruction of enemy bunkers and played a key role in the attack against several bunkers near the crossing site. The 37th Engineers also played a key role. Though it arrived late, the battalion assisted in the movement of troops and equipment across the river, which was about sixty to seventy meters wide at the crossing point. The complexity of their task is suggested by the number of rubber boats used in the crossing. For transportation across the Meuse, the 1st Panzer Division was furnished forty-two large and sixtysix small rubber boats and nine assault boats, some of which were carried forward on motorcycles because of French artillery fire. About a third of the boats were to be used by assault engineers, the remainder by the infantry.22 Despite intense preparation and efforts, the engineers who were supposed to operate the rubber boats for the 1st Infantry Regiment did not arrive at the crossing site in time. Lieutenant Colonel Balck grabbed the commander of the engineer battalion in the Gross Deutschland Regiment and ordered him to have his men operate the boats, but the engineer officer refused, saying his men had been trained as assault engineers, not boat operators. Balck had no choice but to use his infantrymen to operate the boats.23 Around 1500 hours on the 13th, the 1st Infantry Regiment began the assault across the Meuse River. Using direct fire from tanks, antitank guns, and assault guns against bunkers and using indirect fire from artillery against less-protected positions, the Germans first silenced several key emplacements. Then almost precisely at 1500 hours, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse at Gaulier, the 2nd Battalion on the right (in the west) and the 3rd Battalion on the left (in the east). The 1st Battalion followed the two lead battalions. Despite the silencing of several French positions, the crossing engineers and infantrymen came under heavy machine gun fire. A few artillery rounds fell, but the enemy's guns were almost silent in comparison to the rate of fire before the sustained aerial attack. The 7th and 8th companies led the 2nd Battalion across the river and lost several men. One large rubber boat was damaged by a grenade. Another large rubber boat of the 8th Company was also damaged badly by heavy fire. When they reached the far side, the infantry hesitated for a moment under the

heavy enemy fire, but the battalion commander had crossed the Meuse with the 7th Company, and by his personal actions propelled the 7th Company forward.24 During this momentary crisis and others to come, the personal courage and close proximity to the fighting of the German leaders proved to be one of the most important elements in the eventual German success. The wartime journal of the 1st Panzer Division described the initial fighting. The first obstacles are overcome in a rapid advance, and the first bunkers rolled up. Despite this, French resistance comes back to life. Enemy artillery begins to shoot at the crossing point. The crews in the bunkers desperately defend against the advancing infantrymen. One bunker after the other, antitank guns, machine guns, and field fortifications are taken in individual combat and through the personal example of all the leaders who advance in front of their men. Antitank and antiaircraft [weapons] also play a tremendous role in the reduction of the enemy, and they destroy the French in relentless actions, sometimes at point-blank range.25 Though their eyes remained fixed on the high ground of La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée, the leading German elements drifted toward the right where they eventually entered the small wooded area north of the Chateau of Bellevue and found some cover along the slope of the river bank. The 7th Company moved directly toward the woods of Bellevue while the 8th Company moved through Claire and the area just south of Villette. The after-action report for the 2/1st Battalion described the “heavy flanking fire” that poured into the advancing Germans from French defensive positions.26 Though some enemy artillery rounds exploded nearby, the chief danger came from small-arms fire, much of it coming from the heights of Hill 247 to their left-front. More than any other factor, the rapid advance of the 1st Infantry Regiment enabled the 1st Panzer Division and the XIXth Panzer Corps to break through the French defenses. Assisted by Stuka attacks against French positions, the regiment pushed forward rapidly toward Bellevue and Frénois. Charging forward aggressively through the small woods around Bellevue and sometimes disregarding the heavy French fire coming from the heights to their front, the 1st Infantry Regiment advanced more rapidly than the Gross Deutschland Regiment to its left (east). While the Gross Deutschland Regiment continued to cross the river and remained on both banks of the Meuse, the 1st Infantry Regiment quickly became embroiled in sharp fighting against several bunkers near the Chateau of Bellevue. To the west of the 1st Infantry Regiment came the 1st Motorcycle Battalion.

With the explosion of the last aerial bomb, the 1st Motorcycle Battalion moved forward southwest of St. Menges and carried their assault boats toward the Meuse. Crossing at a point on the northeast edge of the buckle of the Meuse where a small island splits the current of the flowing water, the first motorcyclists moved quickly across the Meuse at 1500 hours, but it took almost an hour for the entire unit to cross the sluggish river. The 1st Company, 37th Armored Engineer Battalion assisted them in the crossing. Preferring to defend along the Canal de l'Est at the base of the buckle, the French had little or no defenses in the buckle, but German accounts suggest the presence of at least one strong point. The commander of the 1st Company (Captain von Bothmer) and several other soldiers lost their lives in the crossing. Von Bothmer died from shell fragments. The absence of, or at least the presence of only a few, French infantry in the buckle ensured that there was little small-arms fire except for that which came from the bunkers around Glaire about two and a half kilometers to the south. But when they selected the crossing point by the island, the Germans chose a point that was readily identifiable on the map and that probably had several preplanned artillery concentrations marked for it.27 The motorcycle battalion moved slowly on foot across the three kilometers between Iges and Villette, and finally around 1800 hours crossed the Canal de l'Est into the mushroom of Glaire.28 By the time the motorcyclists crossed the small canal, the 1st Infantry Regiment had already cleared out almost all the opposition along the Canal de l'Est and had moved into the edge of Frénois. Thus their crossing of the canal was essentially unopposed. As the 1st Infantry Regiment moved forward, it encountered the key French defenses located around Bellevue. Directly behind Bellevue lay the French principal line of resistance, which consisted of two lines of bunkers from Frénois to Wadelincourt. The first line consisted of only three large bunkers. Near the river, number 103 was located about 200 meters to the north of the road junction and slightly west of the road from Glaire. About 700 meters to the east lay bunker 104. The final bunker in this line, number 105, lay another kilometer to the east of 104 but had not yet been completed and may not have been occupied by the French. A second line of bunkers was to the rear of these three forward bunkers. Just to the east of the road junction at Bellevue lay bunker number 7; 500 meters farther to the east was bunker 7 bis; and another 500 meters to the east was bunker 7 ter. Other bunkers occupied the area between bunker 7 ter and Wadelincourt. To add to the strength of the sector, the French had placed two bunkers forward of the first line of bunkers and closer to the river. Bunker number 43 bis was in Les Forges. Bunker number 42 lay between bunkers 43 bis and 103, about 300 meters

north of bunker 103 and just east of the road to Glaire.29 This bunker provided covering fire to bunker 43 bis. Thus as the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed forward from the river bank, they had four bunkers directly in their path (numbers 43 bis, 42, 103, and 7, from north to south). After initially bypassing bunker 43 bis in Les Forges, the Germans attacked bunkers 42 and 103, which were located near the chateau, around 1730–1745 hours. What happened at the first bunker they encountered (number 42) is not clear, but the bunker may have been abandoned by its occupants with little or no fighting. Continuing to advance, the Germans attacked and quickly captured the next large bunker (number 103, which was commanded by Lieutenant Verron). While bunker number 103 fell relatively easily, number 104 continued fighting. Since this bunker lay about 700 meters to the east of bunker 103, it did not block the advance of the 1st Infantry Regiment, though its occupants did continue firing into the regiment's flank. After firing about 10,000 rounds and suffering more than 50 percent casualties, bunker 104 did not succumb until some time around 1700 hours, according to the Germans, or after 1845 hours, according to the French.30 Since the 1st Infantry Regiment reached the BellevueTorcy road around 1730 hours, bunker 104 probably fell around 1800 hours. As early as 1815 hours, elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed beyond Bellevue and used flame throwers to attack from the rear the first bunkers to the west of the road leading south from Bellevue. In essence, the Germans moved south to Bellevue where some continued forward and others turned right (west). The attack did not halt even though isolated bunkers around Bellevue and in the mushroom of Glaire continued fighting and even though the Gross Deutschland Regiment had advanced only a few hundred meters across the Meuse River. Details on the attack deep into the French positions are provided in the following, but the move by the 1st Infantry Regiment beyond Bellevue was the beginning of the important breakthrough at Frénois. Adding to the significance of that regiment's advance, the 2nd Panzer Division had failed to make a successful crossing at Donchery and the 10th Panzer Division had been able to cross only a handful of soldiers near Wadelincourt. WITH THE GROSS DEUTSCHLAND REGIMENT To the east of the 1st Infantry Regiment was the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which barely reached the crossing point on time. At 1600 hours on 12 May, the regiment rode in trucks toward Sedan from an assembly area near Orgeo, about five kilometers southeast of Bertrix, Belgium. The distance was twenty-five kilometers in a straight line but much longer through the twisting, hilly, heavily

forested roads of the region around the Semois River. During the middle of the night of 12–13 May, the regiment had still not reached the Semois and stopped for some rest. Around 0200 hours on 13 May, the battalions began moving in the direction of Bouillon. This extremely early departure had not been anticipated, and many of the soldiers received less than an hour's sleep during the entire night.31 After passing through Bouillon, the regiment rode forward through Corbion into the Bois de Sedan and Bois d'Illy. Here they dismounted and occupied their designated assembly areas. At 1300 hours the battalions departed for the Meuse. Marching quickly across the ten kilometers between their assembly areas and their crossing point in two hours, they passed through Fleigneux, St. Menges, and Floing. They carried their heavy machine guns, mortars, and ammunition on their backs and were undoubtedly exhausted from the effort, particularly since they had received such little sleep and had moved so far during the previous three and a half days. As the Gross Deutschland Regiment marched toward the Meuse, the column halted for a short while in Floing, causing the narrow streets of the town to overflow with troops. Fortunately for the Germans, the French artillery fired very little during the most intense period of the aerial attack against them. Though bottlenecks caused dangerous bunching to occur, few rounds fell amongst the groups of infantrymen. Some of the German soldiers noted the silence of the French guns and wondered whether the absence of French fire came from their being hit so strongly by German aircraft or from their waiting and hiding until the best moment to deliver deadly fire.32 Subsequent events demonstrated the important effects of the aerial bombardment. When the Gross Deutschland Regiment reached the Meuse, it attempted to cross the river with its 2nd Battalion and have the other battalions follow.33 The regiment's crossing point was between the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire and the bend in the Meuse about 400 meters to the southeast. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Major Fost, had been killed by the French at Etalle in Belgium, and Major Greim now commanded the battalion. Assault boats for the regiment did not arrive until the last possible moment. Riding a motorcycle, a sergeant from the 37th Engineer Battalion was supposed to meet the trucks carrying the rubber boats at 1415 hours at a point along the French border. Because the route was so congested, only part of the river-crossing materials arrived. At 1435, after only five trucks had arrived, the sergeant started toward the Meuse with the much-needed boats. Because French artillery fell continually along the road, he instructed the drivers to go as fast as possible.

Luckily, none of them were hit, and thus sufficient boats were available.34 At the crossing point for the 2nd Battalion, the engineers carried the boats near to the eastern bank of the river, but massed enemy fire prevented them from placing the boats in the water. The 15th Heavy Weapons Company of the 4th Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, provided support with its 150mm cannon, but its fire did not silence the French bunkers.35 Protected by the buildings and stone walls in Sedan, the Germans moved assault cannon forward, but the small shells could not penetrate the concrete and steel of the bunkers. Precious time was lost until a heavy 88mm gun came forward to fire directly into the apertures of two bunkers near the bridge known as Pont Neuf just to the east of the regiment's crossing point. Though this powerful, high-velocity gun soon earned a reputation as a superb antitank weapon, it made its most important contribution in the early phases of this battle as a destroyer of French bunkers. With its highly accurate fire, it could place rounds directly in the apertures of the bunkers. After several direct hits with the 88mm guns, the engineers attempted to place the assault boats in the river, but again the French fire halted them. A young German lieutenant and two engineers attempted to move forward despite the enemy fire and paid for their courage with their lives. The heavy 88mm gun opened fire again, and under its protection the 7th Company of the 2nd Battalion finally crossed in assault boats. A platoon from the 6th Company with its platoon leader in front moved across with the 7th Company and was followed immediately by another platoon and a machine gun section from the 6th Company. Soon the Germans had elements of two companies from the 2nd Battalion on the western bank.36 After it finally managed to get two platoons across the river, the 6th Company moved to the east (left) of 7th Company, and both companies moved forward into the French positions. Despite the presence of some Germans on the southern bank, the determined French defenders in the two bunkers near Pont Neuf managed to prevent other German infantry from crossing. Even though the two companies from the 2nd Battalion had worked hard in their training on attacking deep into an enemy's defenses and breaking through his positions, they did not initially move forward as rapidly as the soldiers in the 1st Infantry Regiment to their right (west). Since their objective was Hill 247, about three kilometers to their front, they wanted to go around Torcy without becoming embroiled in house-to-house fighting in its outskirts, but heavy fire from their flanks and from Hill 247 to their front delayed their advance. They moved straight ahead into some small orchards and the outskirts of Torcy, which provided them some concealment and thus protection from the heavy French fire. As a result of the difficulties encountered in crossing the river and the delay in advancing

rapidly, they remained a significant distance behind the leading elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment. They also had fewer reinforcements and less support following them. Elements from the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment eventually crossed the Meuse behind the 2nd Battalion, but only part of the battalion managed to get across the river. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Garski, initially remained on the eastern bank of the river, marshaling and hurrying his men forward. The first company across was the 11th Company, which was commanded by Captain Krüger. He and his officers were the first from the 3rd Battalion to cross the river; part of his company followed. Without waiting for the other companies, he and his men moved to their left (east) around the outskirts of Torcy and attacked the French positions in the city from the rear. When they reached the Torcy-Bellevue road, a messenger from the battalion commander told them to hold in place until a Stuka attacked the bunkers to their front.37 By the time Garski made his way across the river, Krüger and his men had seized positions on the edge of Torcy. Crossing the remainder of the battalion, however, was extremely difficult because of continued machine gun and sniper fire against the crossing point. The battalion also remained embroiled in close-in, house-to-house fighting in the outskirts of Torcy. Only half the battalion crossed in the afternoon; the final two companies crossed after dark. Despite their desire to move forward rapidly, the Gross Deutschland Regiment had crossed the river after the 1st Infantry Regiment with less than half of its infantry and moved forward more slowly. The continued resistance of a few French defenders in Torcy also delayed their advance. The 6th and 7th companies of the 2nd Battalion, nevertheless, soon began advancing very rapidly. After crossing the Meuse, the 6th and 7th companies of the 2nd Battalion momentarily became enmeshed in the fighting on the outskirts of Torcy, but they soon reached the Sedan-Mézières railway line and the Bellevue-Torcy road. A brief communication enabled the two company commanders to coordinate their actions. With the 6th Company under Lieutenant de Courbière on the left (east) and the 7th Company on the right (west), the commanders agreed that the 7th Company would concentrate its fire on the bunkers to their front, while the 6th Company attacked. Though both companies eventually moved slightly outside and west of the Gross Deutschland Regiment's attack zone, they were about to launch an extremely important attack. Their moving outside the regiment's boundary was clearly in the tradition of German auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics, and in this case it produced extremely favorable results for the effort to penetrate the French defenses. According to this concept, a commander could act according to the

circumstances of the moment and perhaps ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary if his actions contributed to the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Lieutenant de Courbière, the commander of the 6th Company, described the situation confronting his company. “A quick terrain reconnaissance reveals the location of a large bunker with six firing ports 200 meters south of the road at the edge of an orchard, offering good possibilities for an approach, and another one, a bit smaller, 250 meters half-right behind the first.”38 Since the large bunker was the closest, his 1st Platoon attacked through the orchard that bordered it, while the 2nd Platoon moved on its eastern flank and worked its way forward out of a clump of trees. Because of the excellent placement of the bunker, the men moved forward with great difficulty, but after a short fight, a sergeant and two men reached the bunker. Using hand grenades, they quickly flushed out the occupants of blockhouse 104. As the French soldiers emerged with their hands raised, several of them called out, “Shoot!” Surprised at this, one of the officers asked the prisoners why they did this. The soldier answered that they had been told the Germans would kill any prisoners captured in a bunker.39 Despite the importance of the bunker and their fear of being shot if taken prisoner, the men inside had not offered extremely strong resistance. Nevertheless, the bunker did not fall until some time around 1800 hours.40 The 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, had captured an extremely important bunker that was part of the French center of resistance known as Frénois, which was just west of the La Prayelle center of resistance, and which had continued to fire into the flank of the 1st Infantry Regiment. Though they had widened the crack in the line of bunkers between Bellevue and Wadelincourt by capturing bunker number 104, the attacking German infantrymen of the 6th and 7th companies from the Gross Deutschland Regiment did not get a chance to rest. Heavy machine gun fire from the vicinity of the park and castle in Frénois began pouring into their position. A small-caliber cannon also fired, but the Germans could not identify its location. Pushing forward with their attack, they quickly captured the second bunker (number 7 bis), which was located behind the large bunker. While bunker 104 had been almost on the boundary between the two regiments, bunker 7 bis was clearly outside the Gross Deutschland Regiment's sector. Since the Germans still were receiving fire from the unidentified cannon, they began trying to locate it. They soon noticed a barn about halfway up the slope, which had a suspicious gray base. Looking more carefully, they identified a small

embrasure through which a cannon fired. The Germans attacked quickly even though they crossed the boundary between the two regiments. They used a machine gun section to suppress enemy fire from their eastern flank and moments later captured the bunker (probably number 7 ter). Much to their delight, they discovered about twenty bottles of drinking water in the bunker.41 Since it was so late in the afternoon, the 6th Company chose to rest for a few minutes. In an unusually hot day for May, the soldiers had been under heavy fire and in an attack for about three hours. During this pause, the 2nd Battalion established contact with the 1st Infantry Regiment to its right (west). But they soon moved forward again and returned to their own sector. Their objective was the top of Hill 247, which included the La Prayelle center of resistance. They did not want to provide the French a chance to rest or to regroup; they had to push forward and take advantage of the crumbling defenses. While moving up the final rise of Hill 247 and passing through wire entanglements and deep bomb craters, they came under heavy defensive fire from a rear slope position. Attacking in small groups under the protective fire of mortars, the Germans moved forward firing their machine guns and automatic pistols and throwing grenades. In close hand-to-hand combat, they finally overcame the last French defenders.42 Thus Hill 247 fell around 1900 hours. The 2nd Battalion had accomplished its mission. Because of the fighting skills and courage of the 6th Company, the Germans had widened the crack in French defensive lines. In an area barely larger than a square kilometer, the 1st Infantry Regiment captured the bunkers at Bellevue while the Gross Deutschland Regiment captured the three bunkers and positions northwest of Hill 247 from which French fire could be placed on the route between Claire, Bellevue, and points south. Though the French continued fighting, this broke the back of their main defenses in the Frénois area. Despite this success, French defenders continued to resist in the Bois de la Marfée behind Hill 247. The remainder of the Gross Deutschland Regiment did not cross the Meuse and the 3rd Battalion did not reach Hill 247 until later that night. The 3rd Battalion finally managed to get its last two companies across the river and used the darkness to provide cover against continued small-arms fire from a few French soldiers. As will be explained, the 10th Panzer Division may have contributed to the capture of Hill 247. Though exact details are unclear, elements from that division may have moved up from the vicinity of Wadelincourt and attacked the hill from its flank. Nevertheless, Lieutenant de Courbière's company apparently made the

largest contribution by successfully capturing the three bunkers on its northwest slope. BRIDGING THE MEUSE By 1930 hours the Germans had crossed most of the elements of five infantry battalions and one motorcycle battalion using boats. To the rear of these infantrymen, efforts intensified to hurry additional troops and equipment across the river. Shortly after the 1st Infantry Regiment first crossed the Meuse, the 2nd Company, 505th Engineer Battalion and an engineer company from the 37th Engineer Battalion began unloading bridging materials at the designated crossing site about 200 meters west of Gaulier and began constructing a raft. Even before the 6th Company captured the first large bunker in the French second line of resistance, the engineers began assembling two rafts for crossing the Meuse. To protect themselves, they worked behind the walls of a large factory that was between them and the river. By 1920 hours the first raft was operating and by 1940 the second. To decrease the amount of time it took to ferry men and equipment across the river, the engineers hooked the two rafts together. Among the units crossed first were elements from the 73rd Artillery Regiment. By 1930 hours the engineers were working hard on the construction of a bridge just to the west of Gaulier.43 Shortly after 2300 hours the engineers completed the sixteen-ton bridge. When they had finished, the engineers had almost no bridging materials remaining. If the Allies somehow had managed to destroy the bridge, the 1st Panzer Division would have been in a precarious situation. Though the Germans could have moved some of their light tanks across on the ferries, they decided to leave the tanks on the northern bank. Instead of ferrying tanks, they moved artillery, armored reconnaissance vehicles, self-propelled guns, antiaircraft guns, and half-tracked vehicles across the Meuse. In an article published in Militär Wochenblatt in 1941, Lieutenant Grübnau from the 2nd Company, 505th Engineers, said that the Germans used the rafts to transport tanks across the Riven.44 Despite Grübnau's claim, and despite numerous French reports of German tanks being across the Meuse very early, the German after-action reports do not mention the movement of tanks on rafts. In fact, the first tanks did not cross until after the bridge was finished around 2300 hours. Guderian personally decided to delay the movement of the tanks across the river.45 As Major General F. W. von Mellenthin later pointed out, this engagement proved to be an important turning point in the development of armored warfare. Though the Germans initially kept infantry units separated from armor units,

subsequent events demonstrated the importance of mixing armor and infantry in combined arms units. Balck and his men crossed the river by themselves, and tanks were not sent across immediately even though the rafts were available and could have carried a few across. Guderian preferred to keep the tanks together so they could be used for the decisive thrust. In the fighting after the tanks crossed the Meuse and in the rest of the campaign, the need to support armor with infantry, and infantry with armor, became readily apparent.46 The division's daily log summarized the day's events: The 13th of May 1940 has been…the best day for the 1st Panzer Division. The division succeeded in being the first to cross the Meuse, to punch a hole in the defensive line of the French, and to force a penetration through a defensive zone considered by the French as impenetrable. Every soldier of the division was completely aware of the importance of the mission of the day. The decisiveness of this penetration at Sedan had been hammered into every single person from the moment the division was attached to the XIXth Army Corps in Cochem.47 The daily log also included General Kirchner's message of congratulations to the division for performing so well: “You are the spear point for the German attack. The eyes of all of Germany are focused upon you!”48 WITH THE 10TH PANZER DIVISION AT WADELINCOURT At the 10th Panzer Division, the headquarters did not have time to complete a detailed plan for the attack on the 13th, so it issued an oral order at 0130 hours. This order corresponded to the organization and approach used in the last map exercise conducted on 8 May at Bernkastel. At 1200 hours the headquarters issued a written order very similar to the one used during the map exercise.49 As with the 1st Panzer Division, using the plan that had been written for the earlier map exercise saved valuable time and enabled subordinate units to receive information about their mission faster than otherwise would have been possible. Unfortunately, a written order from corps headquarters arrived at 1100 hours and changed the entire scheme of maneuver for the division. Instead of the 10th Panzer Division establishing two bridgeheads, the new plan called for the division to establish only one bridgehead in the Noyers-Pont Maugis area. Because of the late arrival of the written plan for corps, the division had little time to react and apparently chose to ignore the latest change. The division commander decided to make two crossings of the river, one between the southern

edge of Sedan and Pont Maugis, the other between Pont Maugis and RemillyAillicourt. The main effort would be made by the 86th Infantry Regiment in the area between Sedan and Pont Maugis. To the southeast, the second attack would be made by the 69th Infantry Regiment. Fire support for the attack would come from the 90th Artillery Regiment, since the heavy artillery of the 1/105th Artillery had been attached to the 1st Panzer Division for the river crossing. As with other units, the 10th Panzer Division came under heavy artillery fire during the night of 12–13 May. Shortly after midnight the division command post had to move to escape the artillery fire. In midmorning on the 13th, it had to make another move.50 Its units also suffered from the fire. During the move to the river, obstacles along the route of advance caused great concern, as did blockages caused by the cramming of too many troops onto the approach route. Because of terrain constrictions, the division had to use a single route to move forward from its crossing point at Mortehan on the Semois. The route had been badly damaged, and the wreckage of buildings in several villages, particularly in Givonne, had to be cleared.51 Despite their high priority and urgent task, engineer units had severe problems bringing forward the boats for the assault across the Meuse. Two hours before the attack, the commander of the 41st Engineer Battalion reported personally to the division headquarters and assured the staff that the boats would arrive in time. Unfortunately, delays occurred, and the engineers with the boats linked up too late with the attacking troops from the 86th Infantry Regiment. Consequently, the attack northwest of Pont Maugis started late, after the shock of the aerial attack on the French defenders had subsided. More importantly, as the engineers rushed to unload the crossing equipment for the 69th Regiment, which was supposed to cross near Pont Maugis, artillery fire smashed it to pieces.52 In the haste to get the equipment to the river, the Germans apparently exposed it to enemy fire. The result was that the regiment had practically no boats to carry it across the Meuse, placing the easternmost crossing in jeopardy. But there was more bad news. The aerial attacks had not affected the capability of the French artillery to fire into the area around Bazeilles, and surprisingly effective concentrations disrupted the German forward movement across the open pastures. At 1600 hours the commander of the 69th Regiment reported to the division commander that his unit could not start the attack from Bazeilles and complained that the enemy artillery was not being engaged by German artillery or air assets. For a moment, it appeared the attack by the 10th Panzer Division was doomed to failure.53

Unfortunately for the French, a remarkable performance by a few German soldiers opened a path for the division. Staff Sergeant Rubarth and his squad of assault engineers from the 49th Engineer Battalion gave one of the most astonishing performances of the entire campaign. In brief, they successfully crossed the Meuse just north of the bridge known as Pont du Bouillonais, moved forward and destroyed seven bunkers, and thus broke through the main French defenses along the river. Staff Sergeant Rubarth later described the actions of himself and his men on 13 May. After marching about five kilometers to their attack position, he met the infantry his unit was to accompany, and he moved forward to make a reconnaissance of the crossing point. He said: Before us is open terrain that is easily seen. The Meuse flows through the middle of an open meadow 400 to 500 meters to the front and left. Directly behind the river and at the foot of heights to its rear, enemy bunkers can clearly be recognized. Half-right and right before us is the part of the city [of Sedan] the enemy occupies. For an attack the terrain is very unfavorable. A cannon is brought forward to support us. I give directions to the gun's commander concerning the bunkers threatening to stop us short [of our objective]. In a violent Stuka attack, the enemy's defensive line is bombarded. With the dropping of the last bomb at 1500 hours, we move forward and attack with the infantry. We immediately receive strong machine gun fire. There are casualties. With my section I reach the bank of the Meuse in a rush through a woodline and a sports field. Enemy machine guns fire from the right flank across the Meuse. Once again all the forces assemble. The rubber boat moves across the water, and I reach with my men, together with an infantry squad, the bank on the other side of the Meuse. During the crossing, constant fires from our machine guns suppress the enemy, and thus not one casualty occurs. I land with my rubber boat near a strong, small bunker and together with Lance Corporal Podszus put it out of action. The enemy's artillery places heavy fires on our crossing point. I cut through a wire entanglement, and we overcome a wire obstacle to the front of the infantry…. We seize the next bunker from the rear. I use an explosive charge. In a moment, the force of the detonation tears off the rear part of the bunker. We use the opportunity and attack the occupants with hand grenades. After a short fight, a white flag appears, and over the bunker [moments] later waves our flag with a swastika. From the other bank, the sound of loud cheers from our

comrades comes across to us. Encouraged by this, we fling ourselves against two additional small bunkers, which we know are around 100 meters to our half left. In doing so, we [move] through a swampy area, so that we temporarily must stand in water up to our hips. With reckless daring, Lance Corporal Brautigam attacks the left bunker alone and through skillful action captures the occupants. The second bunker I take together with Sergeant Theophil and with Lance Corporals Podszus and Monk. Thus the first line of bunkers immediately behind the Meuse is broken through with a breach of around 300 meters. We go forward again and reach the road, behind which a railway embankment passes. Here we come under such heavy fire that we must go running forward under cover. For the first time I recognize that I am alone on the far bank [of the Meuse] with a sergeant, four men and an infantry squad which secures our left flank. Unfortunately, our ammunition is expended, so we cannot continue our attack immediately. To bring up reinforcements and ammunition, I go back to our crossing point and discover that the crossing operation has been interrupted by very heavy enemy fire. The rubber boats are deflated or shot to pieces. Four men from my platoon were killed there. My company commander, who is on the other bank and who has followed the course of the fighting, immediately orders the bringing up of new rubber boats and forms new crews from my platoon. With four men as reinforcements, I set out again for Sergeant Theophil with whom I had left three men behind at the railway embankment. In the meantime, according to Sergeant Schildert, the following had occurred: the enemy had in the pause [in the attack] reassembled and attacked us from the right flank. After a hard fight, our few men silenced the enemy fire. Lance Corporal Brautigam, who was a close friend of all of us, sacrificed his young life in this fight. Lance Corporals Monk and Podszus were wounded. Meanwhile, joining the infantry squad, our attack moves further forward toward the left in the direction of the railway line. From the railway embankment I and my men attack an enemy machine gun, whose position in open terrain has covered the fighting. The enemy next concentrates his artillery along the railway embankment, and we quickly attack the second bunker line with a few people. We must cross over about 150 meters of open terrain and a wire entanglement at the foot of the heights before us. The enemy's artillery follows each step. Then we stop before a bunker with two firing ports. We attack it from two sides. One Frenchman, who had left the bunker and aimed [his weapon] directly at me, was rendered harmless with a

hand grenade. We press forward toward the bunker, moving through fieldworks and do battle with the enemy. Lance Corporal Hose has meanwhile blasted open the entrance. The crew, which recognizes the uselessness of further resistance, surrenders. A French machine gun [from this bunker] becomes a valuable weapon for us in another fight. We widen the breakthrough point when we take out of the fight two bunkers to the left of us. The second, of which the crew had covered the firing ports, surrenders without resistance. The breakthrough of the second bunker line was thereby completely accomplished. One man who was injured is taken back by prisoners. In the meantime, an infantry platoon moves past us. Once again the enemy artillery covers us with a barrage for a quarter of an hour. We must take cover in a trench. The enemy fire ceases, and we launch an attack forward in unison with the infantry against the heights before us. By the fall of darkness, we reach our objective, the heights situated before us, two kilometers south of Sedan. Thus our mission is fulfilled.54 Sergeant Rubarth and his men made their crossing just north of the destroyed railroad bridge known as Pont du Bouillonais. He and his men initially destroyed four bunkers along the Meuse and then moved forward and destroyed three more. By an immensely lucky stroke, they had managed to cross the Meuse near the junction where the line of bunkers extending from Bellevue (along the French second line) connected to the line of bunkers extending along the river. This extremely small group of men almost single-handedly punched through the major part of the French defenses. For his remarkable achievements, Rubarth later received a commission as a lieutenant and was awarded the Knighthood of the Iron Cross. Shortly after Rubarth's successful crossing, another small German force from the 1/86th Infantry crossed the Meuse closer to Wadelincourt. According to French reports, they crossed the river near the small island just east of Wadelincourt. In an action similar to Sergeant Rubarth's and his men, the small group of infantry, which was led by Lieutenant Hanbauer, fought their way through the French defenses near Wadelincourt. They were apparently followed by the 2/69th Infantry.55 An after-action report written by one of the participants described the deep penetration made by the German infantry at Wadelincourt. The report explains: The first boat has already reached the other side. Some engineers jump into the third boat and cross the Meuse without losses. The last two boats are hit

by machine gun fire from a bunker and sink. Except for two men, the occupants are able to rescue themselves. The group [that crossed the river] is small, but all [are] determined. Our lieutenant starts to roll up the trenches on the right and left. An engineer sergeant advances to a bunker and puts it out of action by himself.56 A wire entanglement, which could impede our forward movement, is cut quickly. Though the last wires are not yet cut, the lieutenant jumps over them, disregarding the very heavy fire he receives. Sergeant W. sets out with two comrades toward a bunker situated on the right, sneaks up to it, and finishes the occupants with a pair of hand grenades. The others immediately follow the lieutenant over the wire entanglement…. Even though some of the enemy have raised their hands [to surrender], hand grenades are again thrown and silence returns. A black [Frenchman] is quickly cut down with two wellaimed shots. Our lieutenant will not rest. With a few people, he slips toward a slope, recovers his breath for a moment, and waits for his [other] comrades to follow. Seconds, then minutes pass without anyone following…. Should the lieutenant venture forward with his tiny group to force his way through [the enemy's position]? Quickly he glances back at his companions who would go through thick and thin with him. We must go forward over the road using the cover of a railway embankment. A quick summons is sufficient and a small streambed brings us welcome cover. Using the railway embankment we slip forward. Suddenly the lieutenant discovers a large bunker on the opposite side of the road. We are not very far from it…. Cautiously we all crawl along the edge of the road. Then some rifle rounds land in our area. Luckily, no one is hit. Soon we discover the dangerous sharpshooter who is well hidden in a tree. Despite the fact that he is well hidden, a sergeant shoots him down from his high position with a well-aimed shot. Meanwhile, under our protective fire, our lieutenant moves closer to the bunker. The occupants fire with all their weapons. The sweltering heat is so bad that the French have left open the rear door to the bunker. Our heavy weapons [from across the river] also take the bunker under fire. During a short pause in the firing, our lieutenant prepares himself by reconnoitering toward the bunker. The German weapons begin to shoot again but stop suddenly. This is the moment our lieutenant was waiting for. With a powerful leap, he springs over the road, raises his pistol high, and shouts his first French words in this campaign: “A bas les armes!” As if bitten by a spider, the Frenchmen in the bunker turn around. They stare at the lieutenant as if they can not believe what is happening. With

flashing eyes, the lieutenant looks into the eyes of the French, who lift their hands. Seeing the lieutenant makes them lose their self-control. One after another they come out and pass the lieutenant. At this moment, one of the French jumps onto the back of the lieutenant. He grabs him at the throat and, pushing him down, tries to grab his pistol. A fight starts. Sometimes the lieutenant is down and sometimes the Frenchman. When the other French see what is happening, they try to help their comrade. At that moment, there is the sound of several shots, and the Frenchmen fall down, mortally wounded. This moment is a moment of destiny for the Frenchman who is fighting the lieutenant. He stops fighting for a second when he hears the shots, and the lieutenant is able to grab the pistol and fire a few times. Hit by these shots, the last Frenchman dies. Because of their negligence, the occupants [of the bunker] lost their lives. It is not far to Wadelincourt. Still, the rest of the company cannot be seen. Let's go! We are near the village already. Again we hear the barking of machine guns. The sound comes from the bend of the river. Is not everything done yet? What is happening there? Three men go back with the lieutenant. At the railway embankment, they find an [enemy] field position that is firing. The lieutenant sneaks up to it, holding his pistol again. He charges it. The bolt goes forward. A click! The magazine is empty. Damnit! Those in the bunker have already heard the click. They turn around, are astonished, realize quickly what is happening, and start shooting. The lieutenant runs for cover. A hand grenade explodes just in front of the bunker. Another man had recognized the situation immediately and wisely had thrown a grenade. Almost miraculously, our lieutenant was not hurt. He is lying three meters away and in the meantime has loaded his pistol. The rest of the uninjured Frenchmen surrender. There are three men, and they are taken to the entrance of Wadelincourt. The village [of Wadelincourt] seems to be occupied by the enemy. Some gunfire again whistles over us. Everyone seeks cover behind a road barrier. Before us is a park. We must move further forward. One man stays with the captured Frenchmen. Another is sent back to the company by the lieutenant to request assistance. One after another, [the soldiers] move through a small opening into the park. Suddenly, our own artillery starts to fire. The explosions are not far ahead of us. Should we move farther? We are running directly into our own fire. We also do not have a flare pistol with us. Our sole machine gun has already fired almost all its ammunition. There are only 50 rounds. How can we get into contact with our own weapons? Don't we have any alternatives?

Security is carefully set up on all sides. We are moving forward toward the church of Wadelincourt. Everywhere there are trenches and foxholes. Again some salvos from our artillery land close to our front. If those rounds could only be used [by us]! However, we move on. We cross the park and approach the cemetery wall, which is not very far from the church. Behind a large knoll, we take cover. Suddenly [there are] more explosions. Were they ours or French shells? It is difficult to determine. Two comrades are badly wounded. We carefully place them in a trench. Suddenly a group of Frenchmen appear behind the rear of the cemetery wall. Some well-aimed shots quickly hit around them. Without firing any rounds, the Frenchmen pull back quickly. A few minutes pass. We recognize we cannot remain there any longer. Reinforcements have not yet arrived. After a quick decision, our lieutenant ascends a small hill with a companion and places a signal panel to enable our comrades to see us. But that does not work either. There remains nothing else [for him to do] but to go back [to the river] with two companions. He leaves the remaining men under the experienced hands of a sergeant, and he returns on the quickest route to the river's bank. When he tries to pass the house of the railroad signalman, he hears French sounds. Ah ha! The house has been converted into a bunker. Quickly the lieutenant approaches it from the side, his pistol ready to fire. He puts the pistol into one of the apertures and fires. One of his companions throws a hand grenade into it. They quickly climb on the railway again with the signaling panels. Far behind the Meuse, they see the [German] companies lying in a field. But no one comes forward. That means [they must go all the way] back to the crossing site. What does it look like there now? Halfway there, Sergeant G. meets him with 20 [soldiers]. The lieutenant immediately turns around, places himself at the head of the group, and leads them toward the cemetery. On the way they meet the soldier with the French prisoners. Three Frenchmen try to flee, and to prevent this, the sergeant shoots them. Soon we reach the soldiers who had been left behind at the church. Now, nothing will stop the lieutenant. A machine gun provides security while the lieutenant with his men moves farther ahead. No one is shooting…. Cautiously he moves forward step by step. At an intersection in the road sits a cannon. Some rifle fire drives off the entire crew. One of them lies dead before it. Sergeant G. rushes forward and takes 40 prisoners. At the same time, the lieutenant with the largest part of his group has chosen the middle path, seizing a machine gun position, passing alongside a

water pumping station, moving ahead more and more. To the right is a large bunker which is put out of action by an engineer sergeant. Everywhere the effects of our Stukas can be seen—crater after crater. We pass through a small clump of trees. Another group goes right. On the other side 30 prisoners are taken. They are led away. It is now not much further to the top of the hill, which we absolutely must reach and clear of enemy. Everywhere small groups of French appear. They are disarmed and led back to the rear. Thus was trench after trench rolled up, machine gun nest after machine gun nest taken. Just before the last few meters, a short rest is taken, and then we move forward with renewed energy and courage toward the top of the hill. Foxhole after foxhole appears before our eyes. Bewildered Frenchmen are crouched everywhere, pleased to be away from the terrible noise [of the fighting]. They all enter into captivity happily. They will no longer have to be part of the war. More and more prisoners are taken. They are collected in a large bomb crater…. Only seven of us find ourselves on the hill, all sides of which are now defended to ward off a French counterattack.57 The heights immediately above Wadelincourt were thus under German control. Despite some initial rough going, the small group of soldiers on the western bank never lost sight of the importance of moving forward toward the heights to their front. According to the after-action report of the 10th Infantry Brigade, the 1/86th Infantry captured the French fighting position known as Etadan that was around Hill 246.58 Their exact objective, however, is not clear, for the after-action report from the 2nd Company just quoted concludes with the statement that Hill 326 had been seized. Since there is no Hill 326 in the Sedan area, the company may have been moving west toward Hill 247 or south toward Hill 246. By using the Ruisseau du Moulin, one group of German soldiers with Lieutenant Hanbauer may have moved to the rear and flank of Hill 246 and another group may have moved toward Hill 247, thereby assisting Lieutenant de Courbière's company in forcing the French to withdraw. French reports support the idea of the Germans moving along the Ruisseau du Moulin to capture Hill 246 and to put pressure on Hill 247. According to them, one group of Germans moved southwest under cover along the streambed of the Ruisseau du Moulin and then turned west toward Hill 247, while another pushed directly ahead from Wadelincourt toward Hill 246 to the south. In any case, the French abandoned Hill 246 around 1800 hours, and the Germans overran Hill 247

around 1900 hours. Four hours after the beginning of the river crossing, the Germans had broken through the toughest part of the French defenses immediately adjacent to the river. The commander of the infantry in the 10th Panzer Division reported at 1730 hours that the western bank of the Meuse southwest of Sedan was firmly in the hands of the attacking infantry. Reacting swiftly to the successful penetration of the French defenses, the division pushed infantry from the 69th and 86th regiments forward, but the rate of advance on the southern bank of the Meuse remained extremely slow. French defenders at Noyers and the French military cemetery could not be silenced or dislodged easily from their positions. As its infantry advanced slowly, the 10th Panzer Division also began constructing a bridge west of Wadelincourt, about 100 meters south of the destroyed bridge known as Pont de la Gare. The division completed building the bridge at 0545 hours on the 14th.59 Eventually the Germans completed a footbridge, as well as a bridge capable of carrying tanks.60 THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION AT DONCHERY Of the three divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps, the 2nd Panzer Division encountered the greatest difficulty in its efforts to cross the Meuse River and in fact failed to make a successful crossing on its own. After the 1st Panzer Division cleared out the bunkers on the southern bank across from Donchery, Guderian's old division finally made it across the river around 2200 hours on the 13th. From the beginning of the campaign, the 2nd Division had operated at a disadvantage. During the rush through Luxembourg, when it had to pass through some of the most difficult terrain in western Europe, its Armor Brigade had become entangled with other German units and had moved forward very slowly. With its tanks far to the rear, the division had advanced with its infantry leading. Consequently, the division had reached the Semois River later than the other two divisions. At the Semois, the bridges at Membre and Vresse had been destroyed by the French, and the bridge at Mouzaive was being used by the 1st Panzer Division. So, before it could cross the river, it had to construct a bridge at Vresse. Leading elements of the division's infantry brigade, which was supposed to make a two-pronged attack across the Meuse, did not reach the Semois until 12 May at 0930 hours. With the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion leading, the infantry brigade passed through Sugny and reached Bosseval (six kilometers north of Donchery) at 2145 hours that day. Because of the darkness, the 3rd Panzer Regiment did not cross the bridge over the Semois River at Vresse until dawn on the 13th.61 On the morning of 13 May at 0645 hours, the infantry brigade of the 2nd

Division received a telephonic message informing it of its mission. The brigade was to seize the northern bank of the Meuse on both sides of Donchery and was then to attack across the river. The brigade organized itself into two attack groups. In the west were the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and the 2/74th Artillery; in the east were the 2/2nd Infantry, the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion, and the 1/74th Artillery. Throughout the morning, elements of these battalions continued closing into the area of Bosseval.62 To accomplish its mission, the infantry brigade prepared to move forward in three phases. First, with two attack groups moving forward side-by-side, it would seize the high ground east of Vrigne-aux-Bois (west of the buckle in the Meuse), then it would capture the east bank of the Meuse around Donchery, and finally it would cross the river. The phases were used simply to facilitate the forward move of the division, and the operation was envisaged as one continuous move. Unlike the French method, the phases were not separate and distinct moves. At 1100 hours, two hours before the attack toward Vrigne-aux-Bois, the brigade received the formal plan for the attack, which indicated the 1/3rd Panzers, the 38th Antitank Company, the 38th Armored Engineer Battalion, and the 70th Engineer Battalion would support its attack. The plan also indicated that aerial attacks would support the river crossing.63 The attack began as planned, but did not advance quickly because of heavy French fire. At 1300 hours small elements from the 3/2nd Infantry moved into Donchery. As they moved forward across the open and flat field that bordered the river, the two attacking groups from the infantry brigade came under small-arms fire from the east, and after reaching the railway line received heavy artillery fire. Throughout the afternoon, the 2nd Division apparently received more French artillery fire than did either of the other two divisions. Consequently, the main part of the eastern attack group did not reach the outskirts of Donchery until 1630 hours. A short time later, the western attack group also reached Donchery. Both groups were led by tanks, which moved into defilade positions along the railway line. The after-action report of the 2nd Infantry Brigade noted that the attack seemed “impossible” given the strong French position on the heights overlooking the river.64 The effective French fire continued to disrupt the offensive efforts of the 2nd Division. To the east of Donchery, the 2/2nd Infantry, supported by engineers, sent six to eight rubber boats across the Meuse, but almost all of them were destroyed by French fire. Only one boat managed to reach the southern bank. To the west of Donchery, intense French fire also disrupted German attempts to cross the river. Only one officer and one man managed to get across the river, but they soon swam

back. The first attack across the Meuse had failed.65 For the next several hours, the 2nd Panzer Division used tanks, 88mm guns, and 37mm guns to fire at the French bunkers. Though some damage occurred, the division still could not cross the Meuse. Not until leading elements of the 1st Panzer Division moved around to the rear of the bunkers could the 2nd Panzer Division get significant forces across the river. After elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment destroyed the bunkers by placing fire on the river near Donchery, the 2/2nd Infantry brought rubber boats forward and successfully crossed the Meuse east of Donchery around 2200 hours. Other forces followed, and the division immediately moved against the second line of French defenses.66 Without the assistance of the 1st Panzer Division, crossing at Donchery may indeed have been “impossible.” At 0900 hours on 14 May, the 2nd Panzer Division began constructing a bridge across the Meuse southeast of Donchery. Continued French artillery fire, however, prevented the division from completing a bridge until 0400 hours on 15 May,67 about thirty hours after the division had moved significant elements across the river. THE CROSSING The three divisions of the XIXth Panzer Corps thus encountered varying degrees of resistance and achieved different levels of success. Of the six major crossings attempted by the XIXth Panzer Corps, only three initially succeeded, two by the 1st Panzer Division (1st Infantry Regiment and Gross Deutschland Regiment) and one by the 10th Panzer (which succeeded only because of the remarkable achievements of two small groups of men). This does not include the successful crossing by the motorcycle battalion of the 1st Panzer Division. The three failures, two by the 2nd Panzer and one by the 10th Panzer Division, were repulsed handily by French defenders who suffered few casualties. Placed within the context of three of the six main crossings having failed, the successful crossing of the Meuse by the Germans clearly was not as easily accomplished as it may have appeared to the French High Command. If the defenders had repulsed another of the attempted crossings (other than that of the motorcycle battalion in the 1st Panzer Division), the Germans may have lost many more lives before the XIXth Panzer Corps successfully carved out a sufficiently large bridgehead.

CHAPTER 6

The French Fight Along the Meuse

T

he decisive action in the crossing of the Meuse occurred along a small portion of the front that was manned primarily by the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Including the 3/147th (which was part of the 331st Infantry Regiment) on the left of the 147th, the three divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps concentrated their attack against a front defended by four battalions. Though some of the companies in these four battalions panicked and ran, others fought fiercely. Fortunately for the Germans, many of those who chose to run rather than fight were located along the axis of advance for Balck's 1st Infantry Regiment. THE FIRST DAYS OF THE BATTLE During the first two days of the war, it was relatively quiet around Sedan. Around 0400 hours on 10 May, German aircraft flew over Sedan and headed southwest. Between 0700 and 0800 hours, the battalions in the 55th Division received the code words indicating changes in alert status and quickly moved into their defensive positions. For protection against air strikes, the soldiers marched forward in small groups in daylight; vehicles did not move forward until after darkness. A few enemy air strikes hit the Sedan area, but nothing suggested the approach of the main German attack.1 On the 10th and 11th, soldiers assisted with the evacuation of the civilian populace from the Sedan area. Some of the inhabitants refused to leave their homes, but after the arrival of the gendarmerie, most departed quietly.2 Units in forward positions spent the first two days of the war working on their positions and ensuring all their supplies were complete. The work of improving trenches and strengthening defensive positions evidently did not appear as burdensome as it had for the previous seven months. Around noon on the 12th, the defenders along the Meuse began to sight German motorcyclists and vehicles. As French artillery began to fire, the threat of a major German attack became more and more apparent. After the last Frenchmen crossed

over the Meuse, all the bridges in the Second Army sector were destroyed. Contrary to some later reports that the Germans crossed the Meuse using bridges that had not been destroyed, the demolition of the bridges occurred smoothly and professionally. If every other aspect of the campaign had gone as well for the French, the Germans would have been in trouble. During the night of 12–13 May, elements on the right of the 55th Division in the Angecourt sector were relieved by elements from the 71st Division. Despite this relief, only one battalion from the 295th Infantry Regiment (less one company) and part of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion moved out of the Angecourt sector into the Frénois subsector. After being relieved by battalions from the 71st Division, those elements of the 55th Division were moved by General Lafontaine, the 55th Division's commander, into the region south of Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). He planned on placing them in the principal line of resistance during the night of 13–14 May.3 The unleashing of the German attack, however, prevented him from integrating them into the forward defenses of the division. In his report written shortly after the battle, General Lafontaine provided a summary of the first phase of the fighting on the afternoon of the 13th: Enemy aviation bombed in an intensive fashion the principal position along Croix Piot, Torcy, Wadelincourt, the area of Noyers-Pont Maugis, and the Bois de la Vache. Reports indicated the blockhouses [were] completely destroyed or covered with dirt. The Command Posts, including that of the division, were also bombarded…. At the beginning of the afternoon, the enemy crossed the Meuse protected by aerial bombardments of an extreme violence (particularly in the area of Donchery and in that of Wadelincourt) and by the fire (machine guns and 105[mm] cannons) from numerous tanks along the right bank of the Meuse. The [enemy's] forward movement in the interior of the defensive position was particularly strong in the region of La Marfée and toward La Boulette where it used cover to infiltrate rapidly, bypassing and taking from the rear our strong points…. At this moment, the commanding general of the division had no reserves…. Telephone communications were cut in the forward zone and between the command posts of the division (the [radio] antenna of the division was destroyed very early by a bomb). Because of alarmist information coming from the front and rear, because of orders given verbally or by telephone from unqualified cadres or coming from an unknown source, some infantry units withdrew in disorder [on the evening of the 13th], some [artillery] batteries put their cannons out of

service, [and] some artillery resupply units and columns—in convoys— withdrew far to the rear, creating bottlenecks on the roads and a feeling of panic in the rear.4 WITH THE 2/331ST INFANTRY AT FRÉNOIS Occupying the left of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's regiment, the 2/331st had responsibility for the defensive area between Glaire and the heights of La Boulette. When the German assault began, none of the French suspected that the key enemy penetration would occur in this battalion's sector. In fact, the deep push by the German 1st Infantry Regiment through the 2/331st opened the door for the rest of the XIXth Panzer Corps. The battalion commander of the 2/331st, Captain Foucault, had three centers of resistance: one extending along the Meuse River and the Canal de l'Est from Glaire to Bellevue; another along the line of bunkers at Frénois that formed the second line; and a third called “Col de la Boulette” that extended along the stopping line. He thus had three companies arranged in depth with one of these companies (7th Company, 2/147th) occupying the western half of the mushroom of Glaire. The 5th Company, 2/331st, occupied the second line, and the 7th Company, 2/331st, occupied the stopping line. On the 7th Company's right along the battalion's stopping line was the 6th Company, 331st, which was attached to the 2/147th. In the approaching fight, both the 6th Company and 7th Company performed disgracefully by doing very little to hold the stopping line for the two battalions under whose control they operated. As part of the relief of the 213th Regiment by the 331st, the 2/331st had occupied the area around Frénois on Monday, 6 May, after conducting a thorough reconnaissance on 4 and 5 May. Hence it was new to the area, and its men were not completely familiar with their positions. Only the 7th Company, 2/147th, along the Meuse River had been in the area for any appreciable time. Thus many of the advantages the French could have had by having occupied the position since October were dissipated by an unfortunate shifting of units on the eve of the German attack. Early in the morning on the 13th, the French witnessed a great deal of activity occurring on the German side of the Meuse. After 0800 hours enemy movements increased, especially at St. Menges, Fleigneux, and Floing. Several subordinate elements reported this activity to the headquarters of the 147th.5 The commander of the 2/331st noted that little action occurred in the buckle of the Meuse, the area forward of the Canal de l'Est and toward which most of his elements along the principal line of resistance had been oriented. The company along the Meuse and

canal from Glaire to Bellevue had organized most of its men and equipment to oppose a crossing coming from the direction of the buckle.6 Around 1200 hours the German aerial bombardment intensified, with some of the heaviest bombing occurring on Glaire. A machine gun position near the canal was destroyed by a bomb. Tanks firing from Gaulier destroyed a small bunker near the bridge leading from Glaire toward Iges. They also destroyed the two small bunkers located where the Ruisseau de Glaire flows into the Meuse; the two bunkers were armed with submachine guns and covered the central sector of the river between Torcy and Glaire. Artillery fires destroyed another nearby machine gun position. The destruction of these positions prevented the French at Glaire from interlocking their fire with the strong points in Torcy, and this opened up a small but important hole for the Germans.7 At 1500 hours elements of the German 1st Infantry Regiment crossed the Meuse at Glaire, and elements from the Gross Deutschland Regiment attempted to cross east of Gaulier. The boundary between the two crossings was the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire, which was also the boundary between the 7th Company, 2/147th, and the company to its right (the 6th Company, 2/295th). The first crossing occurred near the right boundary of the 7th Company, 2/147th, across from the Gaulier factory. The sergeant in charge of the strong point in Glaire watched “large numbers” of Germans cross over the river and move forward. He fired at them with his machine gun, which jammed, and he grabbed another weapon. He also requested an artillery barrage on the crossing point, but he received no response. The Germans who crossed the Meuse at Gaulier soon moved toward the strong point in Glaire. Forced to pull back, the French sergeant and the men in the strong point fled toward the bunkers at Bellevue, where they again opened fire.8 Advancing rapidly, the attackers rushed past Glaire, destroying some bunkers as they moved but leaving others behind. Their purpose was to destroy the strong points to their front that provided covering fire for the defensive positions near the river. As they moved south from Gaulier, they moved perpendicular to the direction the French in Gaulier had expected them to come, and by doing so, they swept through the flank of the defending company. The French had expected the attack against the positions along the Canal de l'Est to come from the direction of the buckle. Being one of the few positions that could face the attacking Germans directly, the strong point at Les Forges, which was to their direct front, continued to place effective small-arms fire on them. The strong point continued fighting until some time after 1630 hours when elements from the German 2/1st Infantry moved

around its left flank. Apparently, the defenders at Les Forges held up the Germans along the railroad track in front of Les Forges and then withdrew toward Frénois. But their withdrawal enabled the Germans to destroy the remaining bunkers along the river one by one. The strong point at Les Forges was commanded by Lieutenant Lamay, who withdrew to Bellevue. As he withdrew, he discovered that bunker number 42 near Bellevue was silent.9 With its occupants having departed without fighting, this bunker was about 600 meters to his rear in a southwesterly direction. Thus as early as an hour and a half after the Germans crossed the river, an ominous indicator suggested what would happen to other key bunkers. As the German infantry pushed forward, they bypassed the defenders in the strong point across the canal from Gillette. The commander of the 7th Company, 2/147th, sent a runner to tell them to withdraw, but the runner could not reach them to deliver the message. The Germans had already reached the railway to their rear and cut them off.10 Despite the gravity of the situation, the battalion commander of the 2/331st encountered severe difficulties in his efforts to ascertain what was happening. Captain Foucault explained: All the telephone lines were strung in the open and were placed hastily. Contact with the company from the 147th F[ortress] I[nfantry] R[egiment] was cut on 13 May around 0900 hours, with the subsector [battalion commander] around 1100 hours, with the unit to the right around 1200 hours, with the 5th and 6th companies [of the 2/331st] around 1500 hours until 1630. [Contact]…with the artillery [observer] functioned normally until 2100 hours. As for the artillery, telephonic contact was cut around 1030 hours.11 The stringing of wire across the open probably occurred because the battalion had been in the position for less than a week and was more concerned with fortifications, entrenchments, barbed wire entanglements, and so on. Nevertheless, the failure to bury the wire and thereby protect it was inexcusable. Though the Germans were expanding their breach rapidly after 1500 hours, the French chain of command had little information about exactly what was taking place. After turning the flank of the defenders at Les Forges, the Germans entered the woods of Bellevue, continuing to hit the defenders in their flank.12 The fleeing of much of the infantry from the intervals between bunkers made the fortifications much more vulnerable and enabled the Germans to move forward rapidly. After bypassing the bunkers at Les Forges and Glaire, the Germans quickly moved past

bunker 42, which was evidently unoccupied, and then encountered bunker 103 near the Chateau of Bellevue. Elements from the 7th Company, 2/147th, in the Bellevue area occupied bunker number 103 and were under the command of Second Lieutenant Verron. Defenders in the two bunkers near Bellevue, which were under the command of Verron, could see in their assigned direction, which was toward Donchery in the west, but trees and an orchard limited the vision of the largest bunker (number 103) in other directions. The two bunkers had no communications between them, other than a runner on foot, and were several kilometers from their headquarters in Frénois. The occupants of the bunkers knew little about what was happening in the fighting, for since the Germans had crossed the Luxembourg border on 10 May, their only contact with the outside had been someone bringing them soup.13 The safety of the bunkers greatly depended on infantry, which provided local security. Many areas could not be covered by fire from the bunkers, particularly if the enemy moved west of the road from Glaire to Bellevue. An enemy moving from the north to the south through the flank of the defending company could use the slope of the river bank and the orchard for cover, particularly from fire coming from the heights to their front. Infantry in the interval between Glaire and Bellevue thus had to prevent an enemy from using the river bank for cover and attacking the blind sides of the bunkers. During a lull in the aerial bombardment on the morning of the 13th, Lieutenant Verron saw a mass of French soldiers fleeing to the rear without their weapons. One of the fleeing soldiers stopped long enough to explain to him that the German aircraft had destroyed everything and that there was no one left to defend the bunkers. Verron recognized the great danger to which his men were exposed.14 Without infantry to prevent the enemy from using the riverbank, the bunkers were an easy target for the Germans. Before the German infantry from the 1st Regiment reached the two bunkers near Bellevue, they had disrupted attempts by the Germans to cross at Donchery. The Germans tried to move troops between 1330 and 1400 hours to a position behind the railway tracks in Donchery, but the French soldiers in Bellevue and Villette placed deadly fire into their flanks. Each time the Germans tried to move forward and make a reconnaissance of the area around Donchery or occupy a position, the bunkers on their flanks forced them to flee.15 Soon the Germans brought tanks forward to soften the French defenses. The tanks arrived, according to German reports, about an hour later than the French reported. The French commander at Donchery later described the action in his area: Our artillery and mortars fired…very effectively. But the enemy did not stop

bringing tanks—about 60 came from Montimont between 1300 and 1430 hours—and placed his armored vehicles under the protection of the railway [embankment] so well that at 1500 hours, he…was able to fire simultaneously at our blockhouses with four tanks at a time. Having thus “treated” each blockhouse, he continued his fire on the other machine gun and submachine gun emplacements….16 The systematic firing at protected positions weakened the French defenders and enabled the Germans to place troops along the railway, but it did not stop French fire from coming into their flank from Villette, Glaire, and Bellevue. When the Germans tried to launch their assault from Donchery across the Meuse, the bunkers at Bellevue and Glaire delivered deadly fire into the flank of the exposed infantry units and stopped their movement. Encouraged by this result, the men in the bunkers were elated, but they soon came under heavy aerial bombardment again. Around 1645 to 1700 hours, German dive bombers concentrated their attacks primarily against the bunkers along the second line between Bellevue and Wadelincourt. The largest bunker at Bellevue (number 103, the one occupied by Verron) received a direct hit by a bomb but was not heavily damaged, though the explosion injured some of its occupants. Despite numerous sorties, a direct hit on at least one bunker, and the burning of the houses next to the bunkers, the wellprotected defenders remained capable of resistance, but the absence of infantry to protect them made them extremely vulnerable. The occupants of bunker 42, which was several hundred meters north of the Chateau at Bellevue and almost directly in the path of the Germans, apparently recognized their vulnerability and chose to flee rather than fight. Moving in the ditch along the road from Glaire and through the woods along the river bank near Bellevue and initially bypassing bunker 42 bis in Les Forges, infantry from the German 1st Infantry Regiment moved past bunker 42 and made contact with Verron's bunker about 1745 hours. The bunker was located about 100 meters south of the chateau. The first indication Lieutenant Verron had of their presence was the exploding of a grenade in an air vent of his bunker. In furious close-in fighting, the defenders’ machine gun was put out of action, and Verron soon concluded he had no choice but to surrender. After he and his men left the bunker one by one, they watched helplessly as the Germans launched an attack on other bunkers.17 While some of the German infantry continued moving south, others eventually attacked another bunker (number 104), which lay about a kilometer to the east of Verron's bunker. This was a key bunker, for it could fire in all directions,

including in the direction of Verron's bunker. As long as the French in this bunker continued to resist, the Germans could not widen their penetration or move large numbers of troops forward. This bunker fought longer and much more desperately than Verron's. Around 1845 hours, according to French reports, but at least an hour earlier according to German reports, the other bunker fell, having fired more than 10,000 cartridges and having more than 50 percent of its personnel killed or wounded.18 Despite this spirited resistance, the Germans controlled the important crossroads at Bellevue by 1800 hours. They had already begun moving beyond Bellevue and into the rear of the defenders just west of the road junction. Thus while some attackers concentrated on bunker 104 and the widening of the breach, others moved west parallel to the river and south toward La Boulette. According to a staff officer of the 1st Panzer Division, Major von Kielmansegg, the Germans considered the defenses to their front (which included bunkers 103 and 104) to be the French principal line of resistance. This defensive line extended along the line of bunkers from Frénois toward Wadelincourt.19 They did not realize that the French had failed to finish this line and convert it into an extremely powerful principal line of resistance. By punching through the defenses along the Meuse and pushing forward to the crossroads at Bellevue, they had already fought through much of the strongest defenses. When von Kielmansegg rode across the battle area on the morning after the Germans had captured Bellevue and Frénois, he noted the damage to the chateau, and in his written account stated that the “first infiltrations” through the principal line of resistance had occurred here.20 Shortly after his capture and still some minutes before the fall of bunker 104 at Bellevue, his captors ordered Lieutenant Verron to follow a German sergeant. Moments later, he arrived before a German general who was peering over a map and talking into a radio to a small aircraft that circled above Frénois. The general looked him over from head to foot, and after having apparently satisfied his curiosity, issued an order. Verron was returned to his men, never understanding why a German general wanted to see a captured French officer but not to talk with or interrogate him.21 Nonetheless, the German general was located only a few hundred meters from the decisive action that was now taking place around Frénois. In contrast, the French generals remained far to the rear. General Lafontaine, commander of the 55th Division, operated out of his command post at Fond Dagot, about eight kilometers from the bunker line at Frénois. General Grandsard, commander of the Xth Corps, operated out of his command post at La Berlière, twenty kilometers

south behind the heights of Mont Dieu. General Huntziger, commander of the Second Army, operated out of his command post at Senuc, forty-five kilometers to the south. Over the next two days, all the generals came forward at one time or the other to get a first-hand account of the ongoing action, but none approached the fighting as close as the German general who wanted to see Verron. In their after-action reports, none of the French battalion commanders on the main line of resistance mentioned having received a visit during the fighting from their regimental commander. Similarly, the regimental commander never saw the division commander or the assistant division commander until he was forced completely out of his position. Likewise, the division commander never met with the corps commander. At each echelon, the French commanders remained rooted to their command posts. While the German generals rode armored vehicles, used powerful and effective mobile radios, and surveyed the battle area in small aircraft, the French generals remained comfortably to the rear. The French generals were by no means cowards, but the style of leadership that had been imbued in them since 1914 emphasized the necessity of their remaining at their headquarters, sitting before large maps showing the entire battle. With their hands “on the handle of a fan,” as the French described this style of leadership, the generals made decisions, dispatched troops, contemplated actions, but did not move forward and inspire their soldiers. The French general was one who made decisions and managed the allocation of resources, not one who personally led his troops in battle. Unfortunately, the decisions made by French generals in May 1940 were often made too late, for changing circumstances in the rapidly flowing battle were more quickly recognized by German generals who were forward than by French generals who were in the rear. While one would expect a commander who is fighting a defensive battle usually to be farther to the rear than one who is leading an attack, the French generals were positioned so they could fight a methodical, not a highly mobile battle. WITH THE 2/147TH BEHIND TORCY With responsibility for the center position in Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's regiment, the 2/147th occupied the defensive area between Torcy and the Bois de la Marfée. The battalion commander, Captain Carribou, had three centers of resistance: one at Torcy along the Meuse River; another called “La Prayelle” that included Hill 247 and extended along the second line; and a third called “Prés des Queues” that extended along the stopping line in the woods of the Bois de la Marfée. Carribou placed the 6th Company, 2/295th, in Torcy; the 5th Company, 2/147th, in La Prayelle; and the 6th Company, 2/331st, in Prés des Queues. He

thus had three companies arranged in depth, one along each line. He also had a fourth company. As a fortress infantry battalion, the 2/147th had a fourth organic company that included infantry and heavy weapons. He split this fourth company, which had two platoons of infantrymen, a mortar platoon, and an antitank section. One infantry platoon, the mortar platoon, and the antitank section moved forward and reinforced the Torcy center of resistance with the 6th Company, 2/295th Infantry. The other infantry platoon moved to the rear to provide security for the headquarters of the 147th Regiment. The remnants of the company, which were little more than the command group and the communications section, occupied a strong point on the right flank of Prés des Queues.22 The 6th Company, 2/295th, located in the Torcy center of resistance, was larger than most companies, but Captain Carribou decided to strengthen it even further on the 12th when he detached a platoon from the 5th Company, 2/147th, at La Prayelle and sent it to reinforce Captain Auzas’ company, The 6th Company had earlier been reinforced by a machine gun platoon from the 2/331st. Including elements from the fourth company of the 2/147th, Auzas commanded elements from three different battalions and four different companies. His company defended the Meuse where the Gross Deutschland Regiment attempted to cross. Around 0500 hours on the 13th, Auzas’ company saw enemy patrols that had crossed over from Sedan and had entered the large island between Sedan and Torcy. At 0700 hours the infantry in Torcy opened fire on and knocked down a German soldier near the destroyed bridge that led from Torcy into the island. Throughout the morning, artillery observers called in fire on German activity on the right bank of the Meuse. Beginning at 1400 hours, the bunkers near several of the destroyed bridges, particularly those near Pont Neuf, the northernmost bridge in Sedan, came under intense direct fire. Without steel covers over the firing ports, which could thus not be closed, many of the men inside the bunkers were quickly wounded by splinters, and several of the bunkers were put out of action.23 Some time after 1500 hours, the Gross Deutschland Regiment crossed the Meuse between Torcy and the Ruisseau de Glaire. Attacking with the 2nd Battalion in the first wave and other battalions following, their assault went against the French strong points on the west of Torcy that included only two machine guns and one submachine gun. Located in a small bunker where the Ruisseau de Glaire enters the Meuse, the submachine gun had been knocked out earlier, and the machine guns may also have been destroyed by artillery fire. Intense fire still came from the bunkers near Pont Neuf, however, and the first attempt by the 7th Company to cross failed. Minutes later the Germans poured more direct fire into the bunkers, which soon

ceased firing. Under this cover the 7th Company quickly crossed the river, accompanied by elements from the 6th Company. After crossing successfully, their objective became Hill 247, about three kilometers south between Frénois and Wadelincourt. Once the infantry from the 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment overcame the defenses along the river, the French positions immediately confronting them were on the outskirts of Torcy, and they attempted to avoid getting drawn into a fight in the city's buildings. While the 2nd Battalion tried to continue moving forward, elements of the 3rd Battalion crossed the Meuse and fought to clear Torcy. Nevertheless, French fire from Torcy on the flank of the 2nd Battalion and then fire from Les Forges and from the vicinity of Hill 247 (the La Prayelle center of resistance) hampered their forward movement. The German 1st Infantry Regiment had already reached Bellevue before the 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment advanced a significant distance away from the river line. Around 1700 hours the French defenders in Torcy received word to pull back to La Prayelle. With the Germans having partially moved around the city, the Frenchmen came under small-arms and artillery fire as they withdrew, but most made it safely back to the rear position of the second line. The leaders of the 55th Division believed the defenders in Torcy had fought well, probably better than any of the other companies along the river. Colonel Chaligne, the commander of the infantry in the division, later identified the men under Captain Auzas in Torcy as deserving special praise.24 If the men of Captain Auzas’ company performed well in Torcy, they did not strengthen the defenses of the second line. Despite the strong pressure already being exerted against Hill 247 and along the edge of the Bois de la Marfée, many did not remain to strengthen the defenses but continued to move to the rear. One lieutenant later offered an explanation for being far from the fighting. He claimed that his unit received orders in the middle of the night to occupy a position to the left of the 3/295th at Cheveuges, but enemy fire forced him and his men to pull back farther to the south.25 Considering the soon-to-be-desperate situation that Captain Carribou's battalion faced, this officer's explanation is probably little more than a cover for the panic felt by him and his men. Throughout the fighting, Captain Carribou felt extremely isolated and did not know what was happening on the right and left flanks of his battalion. During the heavy bombardment by German aircraft, telephonic communications with regimental headquarters were regularly interrupted. As with the 2/331st, the telephone wires had been strung in the open and were frequently cut. Repairs

became more and more difficult as German aircraft attempted to machine gun soldiers in the open who were trying to repair telephone wires. Carribou requested authorization to use his radio, but regimental headquarters refused to give him permission.26 Around 1630 hours Captain Carribou discovered that his battalion's left flank was completely uncovered. The infantry in the center of resistance to his left had disappeared, as had some of the 6th Company, 2/331st, which had been attached to him and which was supposed to occupy the Prés des Queues center of resistance. Half an hour after discovering the gap on his left, he moved some of the engineers with his battalion into the breach and then went personally to his left flank to check on the “very grave” situation. In his report written two weeks later, Carribou explained that the 6th Company, 2/331st, had been in Prés des Queues for only three days and had not completely settled into its position.27 The 6th Company was supposed to hold the stopping line at the rear of the 2/147th, but the soldiers seemed to be more interested in fleeing than fighting. Even though Carribou had to intervene personally to keep them in their positions, many still disappeared. Over the next two hours, officers and soldiers fleeing from the Germans found their way back to the battalion's headquarters. One of these was Second Lieutenant Loritte who had been captured at Wadelincourt but had managed to escape despite being badly wounded. He told Carribou that everyone else in the bunker that he commanded had been killed or wounded.28 In an effort to strengthen his position, Carribou took Captain Vitte (who commanded in the 2/147 the combination infantry and heavy weapons company whose combat platoons had been attached to other companies) and put him in charge of the soldiers who had fled from the principal line of resistance. He ordered Vitte to occupy a line that extended across the battalion's sector from the center of resistance on the left known as Col de la Boulette to the right edge of Prés des Queues. He thus tried to reestablish another line of resistance along the edge of the woods of Bois de la Marfée.29 Carribou then returned to his battalion command post and ordered the destruction of all papers and classified materials. He wanted to use the men in the battalion headquarters to establish a second line behind Captain Vitte's position. As he worked to provide depth to his positions, the Germans continued to advance. The attack against Hill 247 (La Prayelle) came from two different directions. To the northwest, elements of the Gross Deutschland Regiment captured around 1800 hours the large bunker (number 104) about 700 meters northeast of Frénois and the smaller bunker (number 7 bis) about 400 meters

northeast of Frénois. To the east, elements of the 10th Panzer Division captured the bunker (number 8 ter) about 700 meters southwest of the railroad station. Subsequent attacks brought pressure against Hill 247 from the northwest and the northeast. Around 1840 hours Vitte saw some German infantry moving toward the crest of Hill 247, the strongest point in La Prayelle. These attacking German soldiers were probably from the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. As the Germans pressed forward, a French officer ran toward Vitte, yelling: “Send us reinforcements. The Boches are near. They are going to break through. Send us a platoon immediately. There is still time.” Vitte jumped up and yelled, “Forward,” but the moment he stepped from the woods, he came under heavy enemy fire. He fell to the ground and crawled back into the woods. No reinforcements went to the men at La Prayelle,30 and shortly thereafter the final bunker fell. The capture of La Prayelle around 1900 hours was one of the most important achievements of the Germans at this point in the battle. By occupying this key part of the second line of resistance for the French and ending their covering fire for units forward of the line, they provided important assistance to the units of the 1st Infantry Regiment moving into the breakthrough at Bellevue. Their seizure of Hill 247 also permitted the Germans to accelerate their work on bridging the Meuse at Gaulier. After moving his command group forward into the woods south of Prés des Queues, Captain Carribou discovered that the rest of the 6th Company, 2/331st, on the stopping line at his battalion's rear had abandoned their positions. There was little he could do, other than send a messenger to regimental headquarters at 1915 hours to inform Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud of the desperate situation.31 Hill 247 and La Prayelle had fallen, he had no contact with units to his right or left, and he did not know what was happening in the rest of the regiment's area. Perhaps even more ominously, soldiers continued to flee from the front. The S-2 of the 2/147th helped stop some of the panicked soldiers and move them into new defensive positions.32 But many of them simply faded away as soon as no one was watching. Around 2045 hours the men under Captain Vitte withdrew in haste toward the line held by Captain Carribou and his few men. They were being pushed hard by the Germans, who in some cases were even ahead of them. Carribou's position included two submachine guns and a machine gun, and fires from the French halted the Germans about two hundred meters from them. Almost immediately, artillery fire began falling on the French position, killing one soldier and wounding another. At the same time, Carribou could tell from the fire to his flanks that his

position was being bypassed and that he would soon be encircled. Having no reserves, he decided to withdraw. At 2145 hours he and his men arrived at the house of the local forester in the middle of the Bois de la Marfée. Already at the crossroads by the house were three 25mm cannon and some personnel from the antitank company of the division, but they were prepared to depart. Lieutenant Marchand, the battalion S-2, tried to convince them to stay, but the platoon sergeant responded that division headquarters had ordered him not to allow his weapons to fall in the hands of the enemy.33 Carribou apparently ordered them to remain and reinforce his dwindling group of soldiers. The captain placed sentinels around the crossroads and prepared to defend the position. He sent three officers to make contact with the defenders still continuing to fight at the French military cemetery (one kilometer northwest of Noyers and one kilometer east of Carribou's position). The officers managed to reach the command post of Captain Gabel (of the 2/295th Battalion) at the cemetery and discovered that a gap of about 800 meters existed between the two locations. After reporting to the battalion, they began making their way back to Carribou location. Less than 200 meters from Gabel's locations, a German machine gun fired at them, but they made their way back safely to the crossroads at 0200 hours.34 Though Carribou had only fifty men, nine of whom were officers, he received an order from regiment around 0200 hours to abandon his position in the Bois de la Marfée, move south, and reinforce the resistance around Chaumont. Bedraggled and exhausted, he and his men arrived at Chaumont at 0400 hours. WITH THE 2/295TH BEHIND WADELINCOURT Occupying positions on the right of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's regiment, the 2/295th had divided its area into three centers of resistance: one along the river, another in the west from Hill 246 to the French cemetery, and the third in the east from Mont Fournay to Noyers. It thus had one company forward and two companies side by side to its rear. The commander, Captain Gabel, placed the 6th Company, 2/147th, in the center of resistance along the river, the 7th Company, 2/295th, in the center of resistance on the western side of his area, and the 5th Company, 2/295th, in the center of resistance on the eastern side. The two rear companies shared a second line along the high ground between Hill 246 and Mont Fournay and a stopping line between the French cemetery and Noyers. The battalion's position was rather awkwardly organized. The northern part of the center of resistance along the river (between the Ruisseau du Moulin and the

railroad bridge known as Pont du Bouillonnais) did not have elements from the 2/295th behind it. Instead, the second line in that area came under the control of the 2/147th, the battalion to the west of the 2/295th. Men withdrawing from the northern part of the center of resistance along the river would have to move into another battalion's area. Within the area of the 2/295th, the battalion and company commanders divided the centers of resistance into smaller strong points. Perhaps the most important of these was Etadan, the strong point around Hill 246 that lay behind the southern part of Wadelincourt. Of the thirteen bunkers in the battalion's sector, four were located at Etadan. Of the thirteen, however, only the three along the river had been finished; the other ten lacked weapons, steel covers for firing ports, or other necessary materiel.35 Captain Leflon commanded the 6th Company, 2/147th, which occupied the center of resistance at Wadelincourt. He had divided the center of resistance into four strong points: three on the river (from north to south, Passage, Voie Ferrée, and Héron), and one near the large church in the northern part of Wadelincourt that was called Eglise. He had only one bridge in his area, the Pont du Bouillonnais, which no longer exists but which was approximately midway between the bridge in Sedan leading to the railroad station and the small island in the Meuse directly east of Wadelincourt. He located one strong point (Passage) behind this bridge and had no difficulty destroying the bridge on 12 May at 1700 hours. The morning of the 13th proceeded smoothly despite four or five aerial attacks, and Leflon devoted most of his time to visiting the strong points. Telephonic links to battalion headquarters remained open, and courier liaison with the strong points functioned well. Nothing suggested things would not continue to go well. When aerial attacks increased to an “extraordinary intensity,” difficulties began to appear. Around 1430 hours telephonic communications with battalion were cut, but Leflon did not send a courier to its headquarters. He later explained that it took a courier at least an hour to reach the headquarters and that a round trip took about two to three hours. Leflon tried to visit the strong points along the river, but as he moved forward, he came under small-arms fire. Though he initially tried to move behind the houses in the village, he soon abandoned his attempt to visit the strong points and returned to his command post. He immediately sent a courier to battalion headquarters and dispatched a lieutenant to the La Prayelle center of resistance. But the lieutenant failed to establish contact.36 Meanwhile fighting along the river intensified. General Grandsard later explained that the Germans crossed the Meuse in the southern part of Wadelincourt

at 1500 hours, then the northern part at 1545 hours.37 Personal accounts of German and French participants, however, suggest that they crossed in the north and then later in the south. When the Germans attacked at 1500 hours, fire from the Voie Ferrée strong point stopped them initially from crossing in the middle of Wadelincourt and forced them to seek protection. When Staff Sergeant Rubarth's men started crossing the Meuse slightly north of the Pont du Bouillonnais (which was located about 500 meters southeast of the bridge at the railroad station), the battalion commander of the 2/295th, Captain Gabel, sighted them and requested fire from a forward observer from the 45th Artillery Regiment. He was told, however, that communication links with the artillery had been cut. Gabel hurried to two other observers in the immediate area and requested fires from them. Both replied that their lines had also been cut. The battalion commander finally had to fire flares to request artillery support.38 The loss of communications with the artillery had severely handicapped the French defensive effort. Though the results of the artillery fire are not known, Sergeant Rubarth and the other men of the 10th Panzer Division crossed the river successfully slightly north of Pont du Bouillonnais, and others crossed later at the island in the Meuse near Wadelincourt. Defenders near the bridge at Pont du Bouillonais came under heavy pressure very early. Lieutenant Thirache, who commanded the Eglise strong point southeast of the bridge, explained that during the heaviest bombardment from the aircraft, he and several of his men pulled back toward the south and sought shelter in the park around the house of the village mayor. When the bombardment let up around 1530, he and his men started to return to their positions but immediately came under German fire from one of the walls of the park. They moved to another position but again came under fire from their front.39 Their pulling back had undoubtedly facilitated Lieutenant Hanbauer's successful crossing of the Meuse. Along the river, the commander of the 6th Company felt the strongest and earliest pressure against his company's left flank. Though the Héron strong point on Captain Leflon's right (south) continued to fight energetically, only one bunker on his left (northern) flank continued firing. In the center, across from the island in the Meuse, the strong point of the Voie Ferrée soon stopped firing and was apparently captured by the Germans. When fire began pouring into the company's command post, Leflon concluded that his position was about to be surrounded. At 1730 hours he decided to withdraw his company to the battalion's stopping line. Pulling back under fire, he and his men moved toward the next line, probably in the 2/147th's, rather than the 2/295th's area. Lieutenant Thirache and his men also pulled back at 1730 hours from their position near the church in

Wadelincourt. Receiving fire from their right and left, they followed the streambed of the Ruisseau du Moulin to the rear. But they did not find what they expected. Leflon explained, “To my astonishment, the stopping line was not occupied. I encountered no one.” He and his company continued moving to the rear, halting only after they encountered Captain Carribou and his men deep in the Bois de la Marfée.40 Though the positions along the river were abandoned, the strong point of Etadan around Hill 246 continued to hold. Beginning about 1730 hours, enemy fire increased, especially direct fire from tanks against the firing ports of the bunkers. Pressure against the strong point came from two directions. German infantry infiltrated north of Etadan along the Ruisseau du Moulin, the same route used by Lieutenant Thirache's men. They also attacked directly against the strong point in a southwesterly direction, threatening to cut the position into two parts, but they were stopped by effective French fire. Finally, at 1800 hours, having exhausted his ammunition and receiving strong pressure on his left and left-rear, the commander of the strong point ordered his men to fall back on the stopping line.41 The German infantry that infiltrated along the Ruisseau du Moulin also helped place heavy pressure against the La Prayelle strong point near Hill 247 in the 2/147th's area. The defenders at La Prayelle had stopped the German attack for a time around 1700 hours, but according to General Grandsard, the Germans moving along the Ruisseau du Moulin went around the strong point from the east and attacked its flank and rear.42 The personal account of the commander of the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, however, states that his company seized Hill 247 by attacking from the northwest. What probably happened was that elements from the 10th Panzer Division conducted a successful attack against the bunkers just to the northeast of Hill 247, thereby giving the French the impression that the main attack came from the northeast. In any case, after overrunning La Prayelle and Etadan, the Germans now faced another line of resistance between the French cemetery and Noyers. At 2000 hours Captain Gabel received a telephone call from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud telling him that a counterattack would take place in his sector. A company from the 3/295th would attack from the French cemetery and retake Wadelincourt. A little while later, another call from Pinaud changed this order. Units from the 3/295th would seal the gap between the 2/147th and the 2/295th. At 2200 hours the 10th Company of the 3/295th arrived at Gabel's command post. Shortly thereafter, the battalion commander of the 3/295th arrived, as did two infantry platoons and three machine gun sections from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion. Gabel immediately placed these units on the left of his battalion. The

substantial strength at the cemetery and at Noyers, however, was not matched farther to his left. Gabel was appalled to discover that Captain Carribou of the 2/147th only had about fifty men and three 25mm antitank guns.43 The reinforcement of the regiment's right flank strengthened Gabel's battalion. In some of the day's most desperate fighting, the French finally managed to stop the Germans along the line between the cemetery and Noyers. In the area around La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée, however, the Germans continued to press forward. THE BREAKTHROUGH AT FRÉNOIS The left flank of the 147th Regiment became the seam through which the German infantry cut easily and quickly. While Balck's 1st Infantry Regiment moved across the two and a half kilometers from the Meuse to Bellevue in about three hours, it moved across the three kilometers from Bellevue to Cheveuges in about four hours. The speed of the penetration along the boundary between the 147th and the 331st regiments came partially from the Germans’ exploiting the failure of neighboring French units to work together closely. But their rapid progress also came from the poor fighting performance of the units along this seam, particularly the companies from the 331st Regiment, including those that were attached to the 147th Regiment. The beginning of the German breakthrough came not only from the capture of the key bunkers near the Chateau of Bellevue area but also from the capture or abandonment without fighting of several bunkers in the Frénois center of resistance. In the 2/331st's area at Bellevue, the 5th Company, 2/331st Infantry, occupied the line of bunkers that comprised the battalion's second line. These bunkers extended from the north-northwestern slope of Hill 247 to the road junction at Bellevue. Between 1700 and 1800 hours, the 5th Company came under heavy pressure on their right and left flanks from the Germans. The 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, captured the large bunker (number 103, commanded by Lieutenant Verron) 200 meters south of the road between Bellevue and Torcy shortly after 1745 hours, and elements of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed through the woods just east of the road junction at Bellevue around 1800 hours. In war, one can never predict the effect of luck, but for the 55th Division, an unlucky break for the 5th Company had a profound effect throughout her defenses. During the intense aerial bombardment, a lucky bomb had hit the command post of the 5th Company, killing twelve soldiers.44 While other factors may have been influential, the fighting spirit of the 5th Company thereafter seemed to be less than

other companies in Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's sector. The company offered some resistance to the Germans, but its willingness to fight was far less than what the safety of France required. Unfortunately, it occupied a critically important center of resistance in the direct path of elements of the 1st Panzer Division, and its weak defense did little to slow the German advance. Lieutenant Charita, commander of the 5th Company, desperately attempted to strengthen his defenses by integrating the men of the 7th Company, 2/147th, into them, as they fled south from the fighting around Glaire and Villette, but he had little success. His left flank came under attack from the 1st Infantry Regiment around 1700 hours, and his right flank came under pressure from the Gross Deutschland Regiment around 1700 hours. One of the key bunkers on his left was number 7, which had two machine guns and which was slightly forward of Frénois and east of the crossroads at Bellevue. This bunker exists today, and it shows no damage. The soldiers in it apparently fled without having received German fire. With this position abandoned, or at least having offered little resistance, the infantry of the 1st Regiment could push forward almost another two kilometers before encountering the defenses on La Boulette. On the 5th Company's right, infantry from the Gross Deutschland Regiment captured bunkers 7 bis, 7 ter, and 104. Perhaps the best thing that can be said about this company is that it did perform better than some of the other companies of the 331st Regiment in the Sedan sector. Against the wavering and crumbling French resistance, the Germans pushed forward relentlessly. The 1st Battalion of the German 1st Regiment concentrated their efforts in the area west of Bellevue toward Croix Piot. The 2nd Battalion moved west of Frénois and along the road toward La Boulette. The 3/1st Infantry pushed forward just to the east of Frénois, securing the flank of the forces moving toward La Boulette. The entire French line between Wadelincourt and Bellevue collapsed between 1700 and 1900 hours. To the east of Frénois, the defenders at La Prayelle around Hill 247 initially halted the attack of the elite Gross Deutschland Regiment.45 But pressure from the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 10th Panzer Division enabled the Germans to overcome the French resistance at La Prayelle and to capture the remainder of Hill 247 around 1900 hours. Clearly, the remarkable attack by Staff Sergeant Rubarth and his handful of men played a significant role in the capture of this critical terrain. When the fortifications fell east of Frénois and at La Prayelle, the Germans moved swiftly to reinforce their success at Frénois and Bellevue. With the fortifications of the French second line of resistance behind them, they moved forward rapidly. To enlarge the narrow breakthrough at Frénois, the Germans hooked around

behind the defenders west of Bellevue. As mentioned previously, the 2/331st occupied the left side of the 147th Regiment's defensive front in the GlaireBellevue-Frénois area. To its left, the 331st Regiment defended the area between Bellevue and Villers-sur-Bar, which was known as the Villers-sur-Bar subsector. The 3/147th occupied the right side of the 331st Regiment's defensive front, and thus was on the left of the 147th Regiment and the 2/331st. Captain B. Crousse commanded the 3/147th in the Donchery area. The 3/147th had four companies assigned or attached to it: the 9th and 10th companies of the 3/147th and the 1st and 3rd companies of the 1/331st. With a third of his mortars, two 25mm cannon, and two infantry platoons of the 3/147th organic infantry and heavy weapons company attached to another battalion, Captain Crousse retained control of only two-thirds of the mortars and five 25mm cannon from that company. Crousse, nevertheless, had a slightly larger unit (four companies plus) than any of the battalions in the 147th to his right. Crousse organized his position into four centers of resistance, two along the river and two to the rear (on line but arranged in depth). The two centers of resistance on the river were La Crête on the right, occupied by the 9th Company, 3/147th, and Faubourg on the left, occupied by the 10th Company, 3/147th. The two in the rear were La Boulette, occupied by the 3rd Company, 1/331st, and Croix Piot, occupied by the 1st Company, 1/331st. Each company commander further divided his area into smaller strong points.46 The battalion prepared itself for an attack from its front across the Meuse and did not expect its greatest danger to appear on its right flank and rear. Of Crousse's four companies, the 9th Company, 2/147th, occupied a particularly crucial position—as subsequent events unfolded—at the La Crête center of resistance, just west of Bellevue. The 9th Company had been pulled from its position along the principal line of resistance for training and was finishing up its last day of training when the German attack through Luxembourg brought it back into the position of resistance. It was initially placed in the second line behind the Meuse until French commanders became concerned about the weakness of the company from the 331st Infantry that had replaced it along the Meuse. It was then moved back into its center of resistance in front of Donchery but did not arrive until 0700 hours, 12 May.47 The 3rd Company, 1/331st, commanded by Captain Litalien, also occupied a crucial position in the center of resistance at La Boulette, and it too had only been in place for a few days when the Germans attacked across the Meuse. Most of the trenches in the company's area were too shallow and lacked cover, and Litalien later noted, “No work had been done for several months on the position.” On the

morning of the 10th, despite the alert, the majority of his men were sent to work with the engineers on completing a large concrete bunker and were gone for much of the day. Then on the 12th, Litalien was told to prepare to be relieved by a company from the 11th Machine Gun Battalion and to move to a new position about four kilometers to the west. During a time when every moment was precious, Litalien spent the day searching for the commander of the company to be relieved and then discovering the order was incorrect. Not until the morning of the 13th did he receive word to continue his work at La Boulette.48 That evening the withdrawal of his company opened the way for the Germans to move forward toward Cheveuges and Chehéry. On the right of the 9th Company and the 3/147th, French defenses began to collapse around 1800 hours on the 13th. When the Germans began attacking Lieutenant Verron's bunker near Bellevue around 1745 hours, they also continued pushing forward. The thrust of their attack was simultaneously around both sides of Frénois and into the flank of the La Crête center of resistance west of Bellevue. Instead of hitting the first two bunkers in La Crête along the Meuse, they hit the two bunkers directly to their rear. Then they moved against the two forward bunkers by attacking them from the rear. The German tanks that were from the 2nd Panzer Division and arranged along the railway north of Donchery greatly assisted the infantry as it moved against the bunkers. When the infantry moved into the rear of the bunkers, the tanks had already severely damaged several of them and, perhaps more importantly, kept the others from firing to protect nearby bunkers from infantry attacks. Several were silenced by highly effective fire pouring into their firing ports. Of the two bunkers first captured by the Germans in Crousse's area, one had been badly damaged by tanks around 1630 hours. As the Germans moved parallel to the river, they ended the last resistance in the La Crête center of resistance by 1915 and in the Faubourg center of resistance by 2230 hours.49 While the strong points in La Crête were still under heavy attack and after those in Bellevue had fallen, the Germans pushed through the woods of Frénois. Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Regiment infiltrated along the streambed of the Ruisseau des Boucs to the west of Frénois. With machine guns firing from the corner of Bellevue and providing them cover, they came in behind the strong point just south of Hill 196 (about one kilometer northwest of the heights of La Boulette) and assaulted it from the rear.50 The French soldiers in this position were from Captain Litalien's 3rd Company, 1/331st. At the same time the Germans continued to push along both sides of the road running south from Bellevue, the main route from Sedan to Vouziers. The attack

along the route initially progressed quickly. One kilometer south of Frénois, however, the high terrain to their front dominated the Germans’ movement, and their forward movement soon slowed. Suddenly the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balck, appeared with his adjutant and pushed the soldiers forward. The 2nd Battalion moved forward with the 8th Company on the right and the 6th Company on the left. The 9th Company prepared to move against any surprise enemy attack.51 As they moved forward toward La Boulette, the Germans fought against the left flank of the 2/331st. At 1900 hours they captured a lieutenant west of Frénois. At 1930 they threw grenades toward the French platoon of Lieutenant Langrenay of the 7th Company, 2/331st, on the northern slope of La Boulette. After pulling back and occupying another position that was tied in on the west with a unit from the next battalion and on the east with a platoon from the 5th Company, 2/331st, Langrenay withdrew, this time because Germans were bypassing his platoon on the right. The Germans on the right of his platoon probably came from the 3/1st Regiment. By 1930 his platoon had been pushed back near the top of La Boulette along the edge of the wood line of Bois de la Marfée.52 To the left of Langrenay's platoon was the 3rd Company of the 1/331st Infantry under the command of Captain Litalien. This company occupied the La Boulette center of resistance in the 3/147th's area. Litalien, who was later warmly praised by his battalion commander and by the commander of the infantry for the 55th Division, described what happened to his company: The [enemy's] fires progressively increased in intensity, and we had great difficulty containing the German advance, [which was] very superior in numbers, and which finally progressed even more rapidly despite the unleashing of final protective fire by every automatic weapon. At 2130 hours the Germans were thirty meters from the center of resistance…[and] completely overran the left and began to move on the right with infiltrations along the route to Vouziers.53 Because of overwhelming pressure from the enemy, Litalien requested and received permission from his battalion commander, Captain Crousse, to withdraw. The subsequent movement of his company opened a wide hole for the Germans. In a remarkably short time, the German 2/1st Battalion reached the heights of La Boulette where they captured forty soldiers and one officer. Then they again moved forward and by 2200 hours seized the village of Cheveuges.54 Their struggle had been a sharp one, as demonstrated by the key intervention of the regimental commander to keep the attack going, but by capturing La Boulette and

rushing forward to Cheveuges, they had opened the way for the rest of the German forces. Some resistance continued in the area east of La Boulette. Around 2100 hours remnants of the 2/331st, which were mixed with men gathered from the 147th and the 295th, occupied a tenuous line along the wooded front of the Bois de la Marfée. With hardly more than a hundred men, the battalion commander, Captain Foucault, attempted to occupy the center of resistance east of La Boulette, which included terrain east of the highest point of La Boulette. At the same time he tried to stretch his men across the entire front of his sector, but “contact with the right and the left was practically nonexistent.” He could not extend farther to the west, because the Germans had a strong hold on the area around the road between Bellevue and La Boulette. The battalion commander had heard nothing from the platoons in Frénois and the 7th Company, 2/147th, since 1800 hours. He said, “We still held the top [of La Boulette], but the Germans were infiltrating through our left.” At the same time, the enemy had moved past his right flank, and he concluded, “We were thus in a salient in the enemy's lines.”55 The Germans on his left were apparently from the 1st and 2nd Battalions and those on his right from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment. Foucault had little or no knowledge about what was happening to other battalions. Between 1500 and 2030 hours, he sent four different soldiers to the regimental command post in an attempt to reestablish contact. The first two disappeared, and the third returned after being unable to locate the headquarters of the regiment. The fourth departed at 2030 and returned at 2300 hours with orders for the battalion to occupy a position along the wood line east of Cheveuges. At 0300 hours the battalion received orders to occupy positions along the route between Cheveuges and Bulson and to make contact with the 11th Machine Gun battalion on its right. By the time the order arrived, the battalion had no more than sixty men.56 The withdrawal of the remnants of Foucault's battalion left the Germans in control of all the high ground surrounding Sedan and in possession of the key town of Cheveuges. The German 1st Infantry Regiment had achieved a breakthrough at Frénois. In the German rear, at Gaulier, engineers began erecting a tactical bridge over which tanks and artillery could move. At Donchery, infantry from the 2nd Panzer Division finally made their way across the Meuse around 2200 hours. Their success came only because the French defenders on the Meuse had been pushed back by the infantry of the 1st Panzer Division. Without this assistance, Guderian's old division may never have been able to make their way across the Meuse.

With support from artillery, tanks, and aviation, German infantry had opened the way for the XIXth Panzer Corps. THE PANIC OF THE 55TH DIVISION Even before the Germans crossed the Meuse, a few French soldiers fled the fighting around Sedan. As the aerial strikes increased during the afternoon of 13 May, the surge of runaways increased dramatically. Despite these instances of cowardice, the 55th Division still could function and could have offered significant resistance to the Germans. Not until the appearance of a widespread panic on the evening of the 13th and the subsequent disintegration of the division did the combat effectiveness of the division decline precipitously. The first indication that division headquarters had of something being dreadfully wrong occurred around 1800 hours. The command post at Fond Dagot had dispatched an officer to go forward toward Bulson and to gather some information, but shortly after leaving, he returned with some alarming news. He reported that a mass of fleeing soldiers was moving south along the road by the command post. Five minutes earlier, Colonel Chaligne had been on this road and had seen nothing abnormal. Hurrying to the road, General Lafontaine, Colonel Chaligne, and other members of the staff were confronted by the sight of numerous soldiers running away from the fighting. The runaways included infantry and engineers but above all artillerymen. The 1/78th Artillery, whose commander insisted that he had received an order to withdraw, was moving in a convoy with its cannon and vehicles. But there were also artillerymen from other battalions and regiments who were fleeing without their weapons; officers sometimes moved alone with their men without attempting to control them or to get them to return to their artillery pieces. Colonel Chaligne explained, “All the panicked men said that the enemy was in Bulson with tanks and that he would break out at any moment.”57 To halt the fleeing soldiers, Lafontaine had several trucks placed across the road between two quarry pits. He then stood in the middle of the road, halting soldiers with his revolver in his hand. Fearing that the Germans had in fact broken through at Bulson, he and Chaligne used an engineer company, the infantry company that was charged with securing the division command post, and the staff of the headquarters to establish a hasty defensive line north of the command post. Meanwhile, they attempted to gain control over the fleeing soldiers and to get them formed into units again. By 1900 hours the enemy had not appeared, and the division's leaders knew that the rumor about Germans breaking out at Bulson were false. The damage,

however, had been done, and the specter of fleeing soldiers continued, though at a lower scale, throughout the evening. Though Lafontaine had little to say in detail about the incident around the division's command post between 1800 and 1900 hours, Chaligne later insisted that the men who attempted to flee past Fond Dagot were regrouped into units, placed under the control of officers and noncommissioned officers, and returned to the front. He also said that the artillerymen returned to their batteries.58 The panic on the evening of 13 May would not have been so embarrassing or devastating to the combat effectiveness of the Xth Corps had it happened as Colonel Chaligne described it. However, incidents of individual men and units fleeing from the fighting occurred throughout most of the 13th and 14th. Despite the best efforts of Lafontaine and Chaligne, the terribly disruptive and negative effects of the panic were not curtailed. They may have momentarily turned the tide of soldiers fleeing past Fond Dagot, but the men did not return to their weapons and units. Nevertheless, Chaligne's testimony is supported by other officers present at Fond Dagot around 1900 hours. For example, one officer who insisted that the runaways were not significant was Captain Boyer, who commanded a section of gendarmerie in the Sedan sector. In a report written after the battle, he said that all the artillerymen moving along the road were under the control of their commanders and that the infantry consisted of no more than two or three platoons that were gathered up and regrouped into new units. In a most illuminating addition, however, Boyer explained, “Around 2000 hours, the mobile platoon commanded by Lieutenant Liègeois could not be located. I learned later that the officer had withdrawn with his personnel toward Vouziers without having received an order from me.”59 In reality, many soldiers followed the same path as Lieutenant Liègeois. Some of the strongest evidence against Chaligne's assertion that the artillerymen returned to their guns comes from the Germans. For the 14th, the 1st Panzer Division reported capturing twenty-eight artillery tubes, while the 10th Panzer Division reported “more than 40.”60 Most of the tubes had apparently been abandoned. Lafontaine and Chaligne may have stemmed the tide of runaways for a short period, but soldiers and units continued to flee to the rear. By 1900 hours the village of Chémery was crammed with soldiers fleeing from the areas of Bulson and the Bois de la Marfée. Though individual infantrymen started fleeing during the afternoon, subsequent investigations suggested that the panic around 1800 hours began in the artillery. Also, it was the fleeing of entire artillery units that gutted the fighting capability of

the division and left it far less capable of resisting the Germans. Much of the Xth Corps’ artillery was located on the high ground southeast of Sedan and north of Fond Dagot, and almost all of it was affected by the panic during the evening of the 13th. While the French artillery units had not panicked under the German aerial attacks that occurred throughout the morning and afternoon of the 13th, the incessant bombing clearly had unsettled them and had sapped their courage. Their subsequent panic came more from a failure of will than from damage done by the enemy. The scale and nature of the panic during the evening of the 13th was greatly affected by the locating of headquarters for corps and division artillery around Bulson. These headquarters included the command posts of the heavy artillery of the Xth Corps, Artillery Group B of the heavy artillery of the Xth Corps, and the division artillery of the 55th. Colonel Poncelet, who commanded the heavy artillery of the Xth Corps, had his command post at Flaba, which is about three kilometers southeast of Bulson, and Lieutenant Colonel Dourzal, who commanded Artillery Group B under Poncelet, had his command post at Bulson. Colonel Baudet, who commanded the artillery of the 55th Division, had his command post just south of Bulson.61 Though these headquarters were not the first to flee, they were eventually overcome with fear and panic. When they fled south and west, the artillery batteries and infantry companies around them that were already nervous simply followed their example of moving quickly away from the German onslaught. In other words, their move turned a trickle of runaways into a torrent. The clearest statement of the causes of the panic and sequence of events came from Brigadier General Duhautois, who commanded the artillery of the Xth Corps. According to General Duhautois, an infantryman on a motorcycle reported to Lieutenant Colonel Dourzal's command post at 1815 hours and informed the artillerymen that German tanks were near Bulson and that it was necessary for them to move. No one could later recall the unit or name of this messenger, though some implied that he was a German who delivered false messages. At 1830 hours Captain Fouques, who commanded batteries B-7 and B-8 of the 169th Artillery Regiment, which was part of corps artillery, informed his battalion commander that “intense small-arms fire” was occurring about four or five hundred meters from his batteries. Without being able to confirm it, he said that the firing “could be coming from tanks.”62 At about the same time, Colonel Baudet, who commanded the artillery of the 55th Division, heard firing around his command post. The officers on the staff rushed outside, prepared to defend the headquarters with their pistols. While awaiting an attack, fleeing soldiers reported to them that enemy tanks had been

sighted just south of Bulson. Reports from Fouques and Baudet undoubtedly found their way to Dourzal's command post.63 At 1845 hours Dourzal called the commander of the Xth Corps artillery, Colonel Poncelet, and informed him that a fight was taking place around four or five hundred meters from his command post and requested permission to withdraw. Poncelet asked Dourzal to determine if the firing was coming from German weapons. Shortly thereafter, Dourzal called and confirmed that the firing was coming from the enemy. Moments later, a panicked call came from the adjutant to Dourzal, who informed the artillery commander that the command post would be encircled in five minutes. Poncelet then gave permission for Dourzal to move his command post and reported his having given permission to the corps commander.64 Needless to say, none of the artillery battalions or batteries was directly threatened by German infantrymen. Except for the 2/99th Artillery near Cheveuges, all were to the rear of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's command post for the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Pinaud did not have to move his command post until midmorning on the 14th. Nevertheless, the panic continued to spread to units that were safely away from the German threat. Around 2000 hours the commander of the 1/110th Artillery, northwest of Haraucourt and about five kilometers from Noyers, told the commander of the 120th Infantry Regiment, 71st Division, that he was preparing to defend his command post. He issued ammunition to his men and placed them about one hundred meters away toward the west.65 Around 1945 hours Poncelet's command post at Flaba for the heavy artillery in the Xth Corps moved. While Colonel Poncelet was away visiting a subordinate unit, the men in the command post responded to the panicked reports from units to his front by hastily moving. All the officers and men departed except for two liaison officers who were not present when the move occurred. The two men had left the command post en route to the alternate command post, and upon returning discovered the main command post had moved without telling them. Discovering that a great deal of equipment had been left, they destroyed the central telephone system, burned maps and other documents, and carried away telephones and “dossiers.” They then reported to the command post of Artillery Group A.66 Colonel Poncelet did not take long to discover that the move had been premature. After receiving an order from corps headquarters to reestablish his command post, he and his men returned. Unfortunately, much of their communications equipment had been damaged or destroyed. Disgraced by the precipitous move of his command post and recognizing the terrible effect of the

panic, Colonel Poncelet committed suicide on 24 May.67 By taking his own life, the commander of the heavy artillery in the Xth Corps acknowledged the role of his headquarters in spreading the panic on the evening of the 13th. The cowardly performance of the artillery around Sedan cannot be defended and can only partially be explained. One surprising reason for the panic of so many units was the effective communications between artillery forward observers and units. The artillery units did not suffer as many communications lapses as did the infantry units, for most of their communication wires were apparently buried and thereby protected. While breaks in lines did occur, reports that were sometimes extremely alarming somehow managed to find their way to superior and subordinate units. As forward observers called in fires, they relayed information that was sometimes inaccurate and other times extremely surprising. In short, the artillery may have been better informed about what was happening to the division than was the division headquarters, and the spreading of information may have sapped their will to fight. At the same time, the artillery communications links may have been used to repeat unfounded rumors, for erroneous information did get passed from artillery units to their higher headquarters. The best example is the report of German tanks at Bulson. No good explanation exists for this destructive rumor, other than perhaps an artillery forward observer having sighted and mistakenly identified a French armored vehicle. In fact, the Germans reported destroying nine French armored vehicles around the Bois de la Marfée by midnight.68 Though the 55th Division did not have any tanks around the Bois de la Marfée, the vehicles were probably lightly armored and tracked vehicles used by the French to ferry troops and resupplies. The irony is that a French forward observer, as well as the Germans, may have mistakenly identified them as tanks. Moreover, the Germans did not have tanks across the Meuse at 1800 hours on the 13th, but they did have a few self-propelled guns. The bridge at Gaulier was not completed until around 2300 hours, and the first German tanks crossed sometime thereafter. The truth appears to be a false report that soon became gospel and that spread like wildfire through the artillery units. As for the small-arms fire that was reported close to several artillery elements, one experienced infantry battalion commander who was in the Bulson area explained, “The panic was caused by an isolated parachutist who fired at vehicles and autos passing along the route from Cheveuges to Bulson.”69 All in all, the panic on the evening of 13 May had a devastating effect on the fighting capability of the 55th Division. In an army that placed special value on fire support and that had inculcated into the very soul of its officers and men the

requirement to have effective fire support, the loss of almost all the artillery in the 55th Division's sector was a staggering blow. Instead of having 174 artillery tubes available, the division had almost none. And instead of blanketing the enemy's crossing sites with massive amounts of artillery, the division did little more than harass the vulnerable and massed Germans. A significant amount of combat power had been lost needlessly and foolishly. The panic on the 13th may also not have been so embarrassing had it been confined only to the artillery. Unfortunately, virtually every type of unit was affected by men being overwhelmed by fear and fleeing to the south. THE WEAKNESS OF THE FRENCH INFANTRY Of all the units engaged in the Sedan area, perhaps none performed as poorly as the 331st Infantry Regiment, which had arrived at Sedan on 6 May. When the 213th Infantry Regiment departed for training, the 331st replaced it. Thus, by the 13th, the regiment had occupied positions along the Meuse for a week. While a week is certainly long enough to prepare reasonably strong defenses, many of the advantages of having the same unit in a position from October through May were lost when the 213th Regiment departed. Five companies from the regiment occupied key positions along the second line or the stopping line, but only one or two managed to offer any real resistance against the Germans. Captain Carribou, commander of the 2/144th, had terrible problems with the 6th Company, 2/331st, which occupied his battalion's rearmost line in the Bois de la Marfée. He had to intervene personally to keep its soldiers from withdrawing precipitously through the woods, but his efforts were futile. As soon as he left them, they disappeared and left a huge hole on his left flank. Captain Foucault, commander of the 2/331st to the left (west) of Carribou's unit, also had problems with the 7th Company, 2/331st, which occupied his battalion's rearmost position in the Bois de la Marfée and near the top of La Boulette. Except for Lieutenant Langrenay's platoon, this company disappeared about the same time as the 6th Company faded away into the darkness. To the left (west) of 7th Company was the 3rd Company, 1/331st, which performed slightly better. Though this company pulled back without offering extremely spirited opposition to the Germans attempting to push through La Boulette toward Cheveuges, it was later cited by the battalion commander and by Colonel Chaligne for having fought well. The 1st Company, 1/331st, occupied the stopping line to the left (west) of the 3rd Company, 1/331st, and did not come under as much pressure as that placed against the 3rd Company. Yet it withdrew about the same time as its sister company. Of the companies in the 331st Regiment that had the opportunity to participate

in the hard fighting around Sedan, the 5th Company, 2/331st, occupied the most critical position. Inserted into the defenses between Bellevue and a point east of Frénois as part of the second line of resistance, the 5th Company performed poorly, but it performed far better than the 6th Company or the 7th Company, which fled without offering any significant resistance to the Germans. Its performance may have been somewhat better had twelve men from the company's headquarters not been lost to an aerial attack and had its position not come under assault on the left by the 1st Infantry Regiment and on the right by the Gross Deutschland Regiment. In the final analysis, it too seemed to lack the will to fight that is essential for a strong defense. Any criticism of the 331st Regiment, however, must be tempered by an acknowledgment of other units having panicked or having had soldiers flee. The problem was far too widespread to blame one regiment, but the cowardly performance of so many soldiers in the 331st severely crippled French defensive efforts. In their explanations for the panic or for the failure to resist the Germans strongly, several officers later criticized the reservists at Sedan. One officer, Lieutenant Drapier, who commanded the 9th Company, 3/147th, west of Bellevue and south of Donchery, was particularly blunt. Having commanded the company for about four months, the officer witnessed the baptism of fire of his unit under what he called “less than brilliant conditions.” In a report written in May 1941, he described incidents during the fighting of dirty and malfunctioning weapons that suggested the men were not familiar with their equipment. He complained that the cadre was “worthless,” his unit having only two noncommissioned officers who were effective. In his opinion, “Only the elements with active [rather than reserve] cadres fought.”70 Captain Carribou, who commanded the 2/147th, which was a reserve unit, also complained about some of the reservists, but he was far more critical of the personnel policies of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps that weakened the cohesion of front-line units. In particular, he lamented the gradual loss of cohesion in his battalion in the spring of 1940. As part of the covering force on the frontier, his unit had trained and operated together for several months and had developed a very high esprit and sense of camaraderie. Nevertheless, the creation of temporary company teams by mixing companies and platoons from different battalions and the mindless swapping of personnel from one unit to another seriously weakened the cohesion of the battalion. He later complained bitterly about the “incoherence” that came from the haphazard mixing of personnel and units, and he sharply criticized the fleeing of the 6th Company, 2/331st Infantry, a reserve unit that lacked any sort of identification with his battalion even though it was attached to

him.71 Though the insertion of the 71st Infantry Division into a position along the Meuse on the night of the 12–13th was not mentioned frequently in after-action reports as significantly disrupting French defenses, the hustle and bustle associated with a relief in place had to be unsettling to many of the inexperienced soldiers. These soldiers already had grave apprehensions about what was going to happen on the 13th, and the sudden shifting of units probably weakened their confidence. It may also have contributed to the green soldiers’ uncertainty and fears of being abandoned. In his explanation for the poor performance of the 55th Division, General Lafontaine later mentioned many of the same points as other officers. He particularly lamented the “small number” of active officers and experienced sergeants. He also complained about the personnel policies that had forced the mixing of soldiers between the 55th Division and 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment and remarked that the “cohesion” of the division “was momentarily compromised….” Regarding the will to fight of his men, he added, “Without combat experience, they were surprised by the violence of fire and by the use of new combat procedures. They did not strictly follow their mission of defending without withdrawing, and numerous units abandoned their position in disorder under the menace of tanks.”72 Many of the men who fled evidently believed they were being abandoned by the French Army. While under constant aerial assault on the 13th, they saw little or no effort by the French aerial forces to defend them. They concluded, “We have been betrayed.” Moreover, they often said, “Our officers have abandoned us.”73 These perceptions at least partially stemmed from the movement of several command posts out of the Bulson area. The sense of betrayal was undoubtedly accentuated by the subsequent movement of the command post of the 55th Division around 1900 hours on the 13th from Fond Dagot to Chémery. Though the reason for the move was ostensibly to enable the headquarters to control a counterattack more effectively, the command post obviously moved out in haste, leaving vehicles, equipment, and disrupted communications in its wake. Possibly without complete regard for the truth, General Lafontaine later explained that the staff of the Xth Corps had ordered the division to move its command post to Chèmery.74 Regardless of the reasons for the moves, the hasty packing up and moving out of several command posts clearly increased the fears of the individual soldiers and heightened their sense of abandonment. And the panic that swept through the 55th Division on the evening of the 13th provided the Germans an easy opportunity to capitalize upon their initial gains. Beyond a doubt, the fleeing of the artillery in the

Sedan sector seriously weakened French defenses and enabled the Germans to move south without enduring heavy concentrations of artillery fire and suffering high casualties in the narrow bridgehead around Wadelincourt, Torcy, Frénois, and La Boulette. Even without the panic, the Germans eventually may have broken through the French positions, but they would have paid a much higher price. AWAITING THE MORNING Both the French and the Germans used the night of the 13–14th to prepare for subsequent operations. Despite the depth of the German penetration into the French lines, almost ten kilometers, the German bridgehead remained small and extremely vulnerable. By comparison, however, the French immediately along the edge of the bridgehead were in a desperate situation. Captain Foucault and Carribou's battalions had only a few men and could not offer serious resistance to the Germans. Captain Gabel at the French military cemetery and Noyers was in better condition. Though he received some reinforcements, his position came under increasing pressure from the 10th Panzer Division. Throughout the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud and Lieutenant Colonel Lafont, who commanded the 331st Regiment to the west, attempted to put together another defensive line along a line that ran from Cheveuges to Bulson. Sometime after midnight, the 55th Division's headquarters gained a better appreciation of the situation of its front-line units, which was fragile at best. If the Germans were to be halted, additional reinforcements and a counterattack were required.

CHAPTER 7

The German Pivot and Breakout

A

fter carving out a small bridgehead over the Meuse River, the XIXth Panzer Corps began pushing units across the river and expanding the area under its control. With his objective being a penetration and breakout, Guderian did not want to use valuable time building up a large force before he pushed his men forward. In the race against time with the French, who were moving forces forward to seal off the breach, he wanted to keep advancing and prevent his opponents from establishing solid defenses to his front. As he pushed forward, however, the German High Command became concerned about the corps’ advancing too rapidly. On 17 May, General Halder noted in his diary, “Rather unpleasant day. The Führer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he's afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us.”1 THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION'S PUSH TOWARD THE SOUTH Despite sporadic artillery fire, the German engineers finished the bridge at Gaulier around 2300 hours on the 13th. In preparation for crossing, the 1st Panzer Division ordered the Armor Brigade to assemble and prepare to move its two regiments across the bridge. Both regiments occupied assembly areas southwest of Corbion (four kilometers west of Bouillon). As the Panzer brigade marched south toward the Meuse, the 1/73rd Artillery became the first heavy unit to cross the river. It had moved close to the river so it could provide support to the rapidly advancing infantry, and portions of the battalion had already crossed the river using the two rafts. Thus it could move the remainder of its elements over the bridge quickly. After the artillery battalion crossed, the tanks followed. The crossing proceeded slowly. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division recorded the events: Delays in road marches north of the Meuse manifested themselves during the night. The delays were caused on the one hand by the desire of every

organization to get forward and on the other hand by the continuous firing of enemy artillery along the approach routes. A smooth crossing did not occur until the beginning of daylight.2 Getting several hundred vehicles across a single bridge can be extremely complex, but the Germans’ task was made more difficult by their having to work throughout the night. The fatigue of the soldiers, who had been on the attack for almost four days, obviously compounded the problem. As the Panzers began crossing the Meuse, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division decided to take advantage of the penetration that had been made by the 1st Infantry Regiment and to move the Gross Deutschland Regiment around and into the rear of the enemy at the French cemetery and Noyers. While a portion of the regiment moved to their front directly through the Bois de la Marfée, the others moved through Frénois and La Boulette toward Bulson and Stonne (about eight kilometers south of Bulson). After bypassing the persistent French defenders east of Hill 247 and then attacking them from the rear, elements of the Gross Deutschland Regiment could continue moving south toward Bulson and Maisoncelle. At the same time, the 1st Infantry Regiment could continue attacking south toward Chémery. As the two infantry regiments pushed out of the bridgehead and toward Chémery and Bulson, they did not fight alone. Two companies of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion accompanied the 1st Infantry Regiment, and the 1/73rd Artillery provided it fire support. The 2/73rd Artillery supported the Gross Deutsch/and Regiment. However, only the 1/73rd Artillery moved across the Meuse early enough to provide fire support against the French counterattack on the morning of the 14th. Before the Germans pushed the 1st Infantry Regiment toward Chémery and the Gross Deutschland Regiment around to the rear of the French defenders at Noyers and the French cemetery, they continued to expand the bridgehead at its shoulders and south of Wadelincourt. The bridgehead remained hardly more than a kilometer wide between La Boulette and Chehéry. At 0130 hours on the 14th, elements of the 1st Infantry reached a point just north of Chehéry; two hours later they were just south of Chehéry. For the remainder of the night, the 1st Infantry Regiment apparently consolidated its position and rested. The 1st Battalion secured La Boulette, the 2nd Battalion remained near Chehéry, and the 3rd Battalion remained near the St. Quentin farm about two kilometers northwest of Bulson.3 By occupying these positions, the battalions of the 1st Regiment protected the vulnerable flanks of the important but narrow penetration made by the regiment. With its narrow width and length of about four kilometers, however, the

penetration by the 1st Regiment resembled an extended and exposed neck, which could have been severed by an aggressive French counterattack.

To enlarge and also protect the bridgehead, the Gross Deutschland Regiment moved its units around 0545 hours toward Cheveuges, Bulson, and Maisoncelle.4 Though many of its units passed through the Bois de la Marfée, the movement pattern of the regiment resembled a large hook that turned in a counterclockwise direction. After reaching Bulson and thereby bypassing the French defenders near Noyers and the French cemetery, the two regiments would be on line and the shoulders of the penetration could be greatly expanded. Around 0430 hours reports reached XIXth Panzer Corps headquarters about French armored forces moving up from the southwest near Rethel and from south of Mont Dieu for a counterattack. These evidently were elements of the French 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions. Instead of digging in where they were and waiting to fight the French from strong defensive positions, the Germans attempted to move more forces on line with the 1st Infantry Regiment, to push the 1st

Regiment farther forward, and to get more tanks across the Meuse. The audacious decision to continue the attack rather than defend what had been seized contrasted sharply with the more conservative methods used by the French. Even though Guderian's actions increased the traffic and congestion problems at the single crossing site, he ordered the 1st Panzer Division to permit the 2nd Panzer Brigade of the 2nd Panzer Division to cross the Meuse using the 1st Panzer Division's bridge at Gaulier.5 Though attempting to make room for the tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 1st Panzer Division tried to hurry its forces even more. While the Gross Deutschland Regiment was moving forward and while the Germans were desperately hurrying tanks across the river, the first reports of enemy reinforcements arrived. General Kirchner's decision was to give “absolute right of way to the Armor Brigade.”6 Over the next hour, the division received additional reports of French tanks at Chémery, the Bois de la Marfée, and Connage. At the same time the Allies began strong air attacks against the bridge at Gaulier, but the bridge almost miraculously remained undamaged. Had the bridge been damaged even slightly, the Germans’ situation would have been precarious, for most of their bridging had been used in the move through the Ardennes. It would have taken hours to bring additional materials forward if a lucky Allied hit had destroyed the bridge. In a reversal of the previous day's experience, the Germans initially had almost no fighter cover to protect themselves or the bridge from heavy Allied aerial attacks, which began early in the morning of the 14th, but the massive Allied air threat against the bridge soon resulted in the air being filled with German fighters. As the Germans rushed tanks across the single bridge, and as Allied aerial attacks continued, they had to be extremely nervous about their vulnerable position. But the presence of many fighters overhead and about 200 air defense guns around the bridge served to reassure them. On the morning following its deep penetration, the 1st Infantry Regiment did little except adjust its positions for the anticipated French counterattack. As the Gross Deutschland Regiment moved to the east into the Bulson area, the 3/1st Infantry moved from the vicinity of the St. Quentin farm around 0800 hours and placed one company at Connage, another at Omicourt, and another at Chehéry.7 By placing the companies in these positions, the Germans protected themselves against the possibility of a French counterattack from the southwest, which would have to come from Chémery toward Connage or from the southwest through Omicourt. The regiment also placed itself in a strong position for turning west when the 1st Division and the XIXth Panzer Corps began to pivot to the west. The adjustments by the 3/1st Infantry apparently occurred as the 43rd Assault

Engineer Battalion, the 14th Antitank Company, and elements from the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion moved south along the road leading to Chémery. The division commander had organized this unusual task force and ordered it to move to Chémery, seize the bridge across the Ardennes Canal, and prevent French reinforcements from moving across it. Around 0800 hours these elements reported that they were being attacked near Connage by fifty French tanks coming from the direction of Chémery,8 though in fact they were being attacked by no more than a tank company. As will be explained the solid performance of this task force enabled the Germans to turn aside the French counterattack. Meanwhile, the division continued to rush as many elements as it could across the river. The 2/56th Artillery, a heavy artillery battalion, moved to the southern bank around 0800 hours, as did the 2/73rd Artillery around 1100 hours.9 The 1/73rd Artillery had crossed earlier. The 37th Antitank Battalion, which had been in the St. Menges area, also hurried across the river. After one and a half antitank companies had crossed, General Guderian personally intervened and gave priority to some tank units that were waiting to cross. Without waiting for the rest of the battalion, the commander of the antitank company that was across the river located the Gross Deutschland Regiment and accompanied it.10 Despite these reinforcements, the number of units that had crossed the single German bridge at Gaulier remained small, particularly early in the morning of the 14th. THE ATTACK TOWARD BULSON AND MAISONCELLE As the Germans rushed forces south, the 1st Panzer Division sent units in two directions. While one group moved toward the south from La Boulette, to Chehéry, to Chémery, the other moved toward the east from La Boulette, to Bulson, to Maisoncelle. The 1st Infantry Regiment provided most of the infantry in the west, and the Gross Deutschland Regiment provided the infantry in the east. Before the Gross Deutschland Regiment reached the area south of the Bois de la Marfée, reconnaissance patrols from the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion encountered the French at Chaumont (two kilometers north of Bulson). The German patrols probably had moved along the road from Cheveuges toward Bulson. After a sharp fight, they captured numerous artillery pieces and took a “large number” of prisoners.11 To the west, other elements from the reconnaissance battalion apparently moved south along the route from La Boulette toward Chémery. Though it began moving toward Gaulier around 0200 hours, the 2nd Panzer Regiment did not completely cross the Meuse with its 1st Battalion until around

0800 hours. It was the first German tank regiment across the Meuse. Recognizing the grave danger of a French counterattack, the regimental commander began sending individual companies forward as they crossed the river. He sent the 1st Battalion toward Bulson. After the 2nd Battalion crossed the Meuse, he sent it toward Chémery. By 0830 hours German tanks were engaged in heavy combat with the French near Connage, and at about the same time they were fighting French forces around Bulson.12 The arrival of the tanks came just in the nick of time for the Germans. As the French 213th Infantry Regiment and 7th Tank Battalion attacked north from Chémery, the Panzers arrived about the time they reached a line between Connage and Bulson. The attacking Frenchmen had pushed back only a few light German elements, but the tanks arrived and strengthened their fighting power only moments before the French brought their power to bear directly against the main German position. The propitious appearance of tanks had to be an extremely welcome sight to the German infantry. After the 2nd Panzer Regiment crossed the Meuse and moved south, the 1st Regiment followed quickly with the 1/1st Panzers moving toward Chémery and the 2/1st Panzers moving toward Bulson.13 This placed a battalion from each of the Panzer regiments along the roads to Bulson and Chémery. The 2/1st Panzers made their way across the bridge at Gaulier around 0900 hours. While still at the crossing site, the battalion commander learned that the 2nd Panzer Regiment was already in contact with French tanks. The battalion moved south along the road from Glaire, and when it reached Frénois, received the mission of attacking on the left or eastern wing of the 2nd Panzer Regiment. Moving from Cheveuges toward Bulson, the battalion commander placed his 8th and 5th companies on the western side of the road and his 7th Company on the eastern side. When the tanks approached Bulson, they became intermingled with elements of the 2nd Panzer Regiment that were already heavily engaged. During the intense fighting, the 7th Company moved into a very favorable defensive position just as eight French tanks appeared south of Bulson. The company destroyed seven of the tanks, permitting only one to withdraw safely.14 More French tanks were destroyed by the other companies. After the French began withdrawing from around Bulson, the German tank battalion and accompanying infantry moved closely behind the fleeing Frenchmen and attacked south toward the road between Chémery and Maisoncelle. Some of the Germans moved southwest from Bulson toward Chémery while others moved directly south toward Maisoncelle. As they approached Maisoncelle, they met additional French tanks and infantry from the 205th Infantry Regiment and 4th Tank

Battalion. One of the German armor commanders described the actions of his company: The Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment closely followed the tanks in an excellent manner. Suddenly, reconnaissance revealed an enemy counterattack with tank support. The enemy's infantry were operating as if they were on a training exercise, and they were running directly into the fire of the company. Three enemy tanks were knocked out. The [German tank] company crossed over the road and continued attacking further toward the south. Close to the Chémery-Raucourt road east of Maisoncelle, the company occupied its position and secured the continued movement of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Suddenly, 10 French R-35 tanks [sic], grouped together closely in a column, appeared on the edge of Maisoncelle on the road to Raucourt. In a flash the [German tank] company opened fire with every gun tube. The enemy was completely surprised. He did not fire a single round. Three vehicles turned toward the south and, although hit, managed to escape. Four tanks remained in place, one of them burning in a fiery blaze. The last three vehicles could turn and drive back into the village. They were nevertheless so badly damaged that their crews abandoned them.15 Though the German account of the fighting against the 205th Infantry Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion differs somewhat from that of the French, the Germans had repulsed the counterattack by the French infantry regiment and tank battalion. In about four or five hours, German tanks had moved from Gaulier to Maisoncelle, apparently in one continuous movement but in reality in piecemeal fashion. In the fifteen kilometers of movement, the sharpest contacts had occurred at Chaumont, Bulson, and Maisoncelle. The Germans also captured a great deal of equipment and a large number of prisoners, including about 100 soldiers around Maisoncelle. At the same time, their confidence and will to fight sometimes contrasted sharply with that of the French. The sharpest contrast, however, was the German willingness to attack in such a hasty and improvised manner. Their rapid advance bears little or no resemblance to the methodical technique used by the French. Trained to think in terms of a distant hasty attack, they easily overwhelmed the French, who had been trained to think only in careful, methodical terms. THE GERMAN ATTACK TOWARD CHÉMERY To the west of the attack toward Maisoncelle, the Germans also mounted an attack

south toward Chémery. As they gathered forces together for an attack, the 1st Panzer Division kept the battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment along the narrow neck of the penetration between La Boulette and Connage. The 1st Battalion secured La Boulette, the 2nd Battalion held Chehéry, and the companies of the 3rd Battalion spread out at Connage, Omicourt, and Chehéry. For the attack south of Connage, the division used the 14th Antitank Company and the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, which were later reinforced by tanks. These forces also received the brunt of the French attack, which came out of Chémery toward Chehéry. The 14th Antitank Company of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which was equipped with 37mm guns, crossed the Meuse during the night of 13 May with only two platoons and moved into Glaire and Villette. Though they came under heavy artillery fire during the night, they suffered little or no damage. At dawn on the 14th, the two platoons marched to Frénois, where they were supposed to be met either by members of the regimental staff or officers from one of the battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. The commander, Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter, did not know what his mission would be, but about two kilometers south of Frénois in the curve of the road, he met the acting regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Schwerin, who told him his company was to assist the 1st Battalion of the regiment in seizing Bulson.16 While moving forward, however, and while only a few kilometers from where the company commander had met with the regimental commander, the company encountered General Kirchner, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division. He told Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter that the village of Chémery was lightly defended and ordered him to take the village with his six weapons and to seize the bridge to its west. Though Beck-Broichsitter was diverting his antitank unit from a mission assigned it personally by the acting commander of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, he accepted the mission and ordered his company to move south. A reconnaissance unit accompanied them. The 14th Antitank Company moved forward slowly. In Chehéry, aerial attacks and fighting had badly damaged the streets, and rubble from destroyed buildings partially blocked the road. While the reconnaissance vehicles easily crossed the obstacles, the antitank company experienced some difficulty and soon lost contact with the reconnaissance unit. As soon as all vehicles had crossed the obstacles, the company moved forward again. Between 0700 and 0800 hours the company reached a point east of Connage near the location of the forwardmost company of the 3/1st Infantry. Almost immediately it came under fire from its left flank. At the same time a single French tank appeared suddenly on the unit's right in the west. Both platoons immediately

went from march formation into fighting positions and quickly destroyed the enemy tank. A French horse cavalry unit—probably from the 5th Light Cavalry Division—also appeared on its eastern (left) flank from the Bois des Côtes and charged toward the antitank unit, but a single machine gun threw them into “disorder.” Moments later, more French tanks came from the south and southwest of Connage. The German 37mm antitank guns could penetrate the French tanks’ armor plating only after several hits at the same point, and a few of the tanks came within 200 meters of the Germans’ fighting position before they were halted by highly accurate fire. Other French tanks attempted to go around the Germans’ flanks and attack them from the flanks and rear, but they were halted when the six guns formed a circular hedgehog position.17 Sometime around 0800 hours, a very excited German lieutenant entered the defensive position and explained that the reconnaissance unit that had been with them had come under heavy fire in Chémery and had several badly wounded men. He asked the antitank unit to move forward immediately, but the commander of the 14th Company refused his request. Beck-Broichsitter recognized that moving the antitank platoons toward Chémery placed them in danger of being destroyed and thereby opening a path directly into Bellevue and the German bridgehead. He decided that the two platoons would remain in position east of Connage. The arrival of elements from the 2nd Panzer Regiment between 0830 and 1000 hours provided much-needed relief. With the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion acting as infantry, the Germans soon moved forward of the antitank company's position and attacked toward Chémery. The antitank company supported the attacking force by destroying French tanks and machine guns. When the Germans entered the village, according to the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division, “Both sides fought tenaciously.”18 Despite strong French resistance and a counterattack, the Germans drove them out of Chémery around 1100 hours. Though German tanks provided much-needed assistance, the key effort had come from an antitank company and an assault engineer battalion. The 14th Antitank Company later reported that it had destroyed forty-four French tanks in the fighting around Connage and Chémery and had not lost a single soldier. While the reported number of tanks destroyed is probably double the actual number, the performance of the antitank unit had been superb. After the seizure of Chémery, the 14th Company assembled north of the village and then moved east toward Maisoncelle. As the company began moving, a German Stuka aircraft attacked Chémery, wounding several soldiers of the antitank company and killing the battalion commander of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion. The aerial attack also killed several officers from the 2nd

Panzer Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division and seriously wounded the commander of the Armor Brigade.19 The German Air Force had evidently not been informed about the seizure of Chémery. The loss of these key leaders, however, did not immediately affect the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Nedtwig, who had commanded the 1st Panzer Regiment, replaced Colonel Keltsch as the commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Dittman assumed command of Nedtwig's old unit, the 1st Panzer Regiment. Even before the decision was made about pivoting the XIXth Corps to the west, the 1st Panzer Division prepared to move west. On the morning of the 14th the objective of the day for the 1st Infantry Brigade was Singly, about twelve kilometers west-northwest of Chémery. After capturing Chémery around 1100 hours, the 1/2nd Panzers sent its 2nd Company toward the bridge across the Ardennes Canal at Malmy around 1130 hours. The Germans recognized the importance of the bridge across the Ardennes Canal between Chémery and Malmy if they were to move west and quickly secured it. They also sent a small force toward Vendresse (five kilometers west of Chémery), but it did not succeed in capturing the town. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division concisely summarized the action: “An advance against Vendresse is beaten back by the enemy. Strong antitank and enemy tank forces there.”20 Almost simultaneously, the division began moving units from the Maisoncelle area toward the west. At Maisoncelle the 2/1st Panzers remained in position for some time, but early in the afternoon the battalion received orders to move west and reached Malmy (one kilometer west of Chémery) around 1400 hours. At 1500 hours it received orders to attack north of the road from Malmy to Vendresse.21 There it encountered strong French resistance. If the division was going to continue west, it would have to fight its way through this new line of French defenders. THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION MOVES WEST Elements from the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions moved much more slowly toward the south than the 1st Panzer Division. Most especially, the 2nd Panzer Division continued to have difficulties getting troops and equipment across the river near Donchery. When General Guderian, the XIXth Corps commander, learned early on the 14th that the French were sending reinforcements toward Sedan, he ordered the 2nd Panzer Brigade of the 2nd Panzer Division to follow the tanks of the 1st Panzer Division across the bridge at Gaulier. He later explained that he wanted to provide “sufficient armor” to meet the anticipated French attack.22

After crossing the Meuse at 1013 hours, the tanks of the 2nd Division moved west along the Meuse River. Assisted by infantry, the 2/4th Panzers seized the bridge over the Ardennes Canal at Pont à Bar at 1135 hours.23 As the bridge was being repaired by engineers from the 38th Armored Engineer Battalion, the tanks crossed over the canal and then turned south, clearing Hannogne (two kilometers south of the Pont à Bar bridge) two hours later. After moving quickly through Hannogne, the tanks continued southwest several kilometers along the road and moved northwest, one column turning midway between Hannogne and Sapogne and another turning at Sapogne. They continued northwest until they reached Boutancourt (about three kilometers northwest of Sapogne). Then they turned east and cleared Dom-le-Mesnil (about two kilometers west of Pont à Bar) around 1800 hours.24 In short, the tanks headed south from the bridge at Pont à Bar and then turned in a wide circle until they cleared a wide area south of the Meuse River and west of the Ardennes Canal. Other tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division turned south before they reached the bridge over the Ardennes Canal and headed toward St. Aignan (five kilometers south of Pont à Bar). On the afternoon of the 14th, the 2nd Panzer Division thus cleared an area about six kilometers wide and five kilometers deep on the southern bank of the Meuse. By gaining control over this terrain, the Panzer division protected the western flank of the penetration made by the 1st Infantry Regiment at La Boulette and facilitated the crossing of the remainder of the division at Donchery. The main difference between the French and German accounts of the attack was that the French claimed the Germans had moved west toward Dom-le-Mesnil at the same time that they headed south toward Hannogne. As the area on the southern bank of the Meuse over which the 2nd Division had control expanded, the effectiveness of French artillery decreased. At 0900 hours on the 14th (before its tanks crossed the Meuse), the division finally was able to begin construction of a bridge at Donchery, but French artillery fire from Mézières and aerial attacks continued to disrupt work at the crossing site.25 As night fell on the 14th, the 2nd Panzer Division occupied a line running between Flize (five kilometers west of Pont à Bar), Boutancourt, Sapogne, and St. Aignan. The successful crossing of the river and the establishment of a bridgehead, however, was tempered by the division's not having moved as far south and west as initially planned for that day. The day's objective had been for the division to occupy Boulzicourt (ten kilometers west of Pont à Bar) and Singly (eleven kilometers southwest of Pont à Bar).26 Though not meeting the expectations of Guderian, the division had at least gotten across the Meuse. How far it would move on the 15th greatly depended on when the bridge at Donchery

could be completed. THE 10TH PANZER DIVISION MOVES SOUTH Though the 10th Panzer Division had crossed the Meuse on the afternoon of the 13th with the 1/86th Infantry crossing near the Pont du Bouillonais and the 2/69th Infantry crossing near Wadelincourt, it encountered great difficulty breaking through the enemy's defenses at Noyers and the French cemetery. The terrain occupied by the French dominated the surrounding area, and their defense was much stronger and more spirited than that in other centers of resistance. Throughout the night, the 10th Division channeled small forces forward and tried to expand its two bridgeheads, but the French could not be forced out of their strong position overlooking the crossing sites. The efforts of the German division were partially hampered by its having only two light artillery battalions to provide fire support,27 its heavy artillery battalion having been attached to the 1st Panzer Division. While pushing hard against Noyers and the French cemetery, the 10th Panzer Division continued its efforts to construct a bridge at Wadelincourt. Finally, around 0545 hours on the 14th, the bridge was completed, but traffic did not flow smoothly. From their position on the heights of Noyers and the French cemetery, the French could place small-arms fire into the area around the crossing site. Also, several times in the morning, “technical difficulties” of an unknown nature but perhaps caused by Allied aerial attacks forced the Germans to suspend using the bridge.28 Because of these “technical difficulties,” only one Panzer regiment got across the Meuse on the 14th; the 7th Panzer Regiment did not finish crossing until the early morning hours of the 15th. After the bridge was completed at 0545 hours on the 14th, the Germans moved more forces across the river and began making stronger attacks against the entrenched French positions. But they still had relatively few forces across the river. The attacking forces consisted primarily of the 2/69th Infantry and the 1/86th Infantry, as well as an attached company from the 8th Panzer Regiment. Because of the strong French resistance at Noyers, however, they did not capture the high ground overlooking the Meuse until around 1300 hours.29 Among other reasons for their having finally surrendered, the movement of the Gross Deutschland Regiment to the rear of the French defenders at Noyers apparently weakened their will to fight. After capturing the high ground overlooking Wadelincourt, the 10th Panzer Division continued its attack south, but it still had only two infantry battalions across the Meuse. The XIXth Corps had not provided guidance about subsequent

operations, but had assigned the 10th Panzer the initial objective of capturing the high ground east of Bulson around the Beau Ménil farm at Hill 257. This high ground lay about three kilometers south of Noyers and two kilometers northeast of Bulson. By late afternoon on the 14th and after much hard fighting, the division captured this high ground.30 The forward elements of the 8th Panzer Regiment moved as far south as Hill 320, about 500 meters southeast of Bulson. Major General Schaal, the division commander, moved forward in his radio command car to the position of his leading armored elements, and had the 8th Panzer Regiment continue the attack toward an objective southeast of Maisoncelle. Since he had not received instructions about objectives beyond Maisoncelle, he requested additional instructions at 1700 hours by radio from corps headquarters. After receiving no further instructions by 1800 hours, he again requested information from the XIXth Corps but still received no additional instructions.31 As darkness approached, the division commander did not know whether his division would be moving south toward Stonne or pivoting to the west. The two alternatives of either moving south or pivoting to the west were given to General Schaal long before the German attack into Luxembourg. The reasoning underlying the choices was obvious. If a significant threat against the bridgehead appeared from the south, the 10th Division would defend along the high ground, which included Stonne and Mont Dieu. If not, the division would pivot west with the two other Panzer divisions in the corps, and follow-on forces would secure the high ground. As Schaal sought additional information late on the 14th, his division continued to experience grave difficulties in crossing the Meuse. Beginning around 0800 hours on that day, the Allies had launched eight waves of aerial attacks against the bridge at Wadelincourt. One German antiaircraft battery claimed it shot down twenty-one enemy aircraft. Though delaying some crossings, the attacks did not halt movement across the bridge. Nevertheless, German troops and vehicles moved extremely slowly across the bridge, which continued to experience “technical difficulties” of an unknown nature. For most of the day, the 10th Panzer Division had only two infantry battalions and the 8th Panzer Regiment available on the west bank of the river. The arrival of the 7th Panzer Regiment was delayed even more because technical difficulties with bridging caused the regiment to take from 1500 hours on the 14th until 0200 hours on the 15th to cross the Meuse. Despite these difficulties, General Schaal apparently received an order from XIXth Corps headquarters sometime late on the 14th for his division to move west with the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions.32

Around 1800 hours on the 14th, the division operations officer arrived unexpectedly from the division command post in eastern Sedan. He flew to Maisoncelle in a light Fieseler-Storch aircraft and met with the division commander, who immediately sent him to corps headquarters to obtain additional information about the subsequent direction of attack for the division. The rest of the division staff did not enter Bulson until much later that night, around 0230 hours. When the operations officer arrived at the corps command post, he received instructions for the 10th Panzer Division to capture the heights of Stonne by attacking southeast toward La Besace (six kilometers southeast of Maisoncelle) and then attacking southwest toward Stonne (five kilometers south of Maisoncelle). Around midnight, he returned to the division command post at Bulson with the new order. The Gross Deutschland Regiment, which was supposedly attacking toward Mont Dieu (seven kilometers southwest of Maisoncelle) but whose situation and exact location were unknown to the 10th Panzers, was attached to the division for the operation, as was the 1/37th Artillery. Though the information received by the operations officer differed from what the division commander had earlier been told, it clearly was what the XIXth Corps wanted the division to accomplish. In the early morning hours of the 15th, General Schaal tried to communicate by radio with the Gross Deutschland Regiment but could not make contact. Lacking any knowledge about the situation of that regiment, he ordered the Armor Brigade to advance at night with weak elements toward La Besace and Stonne.33 He saw no reason to rush forward brashly with his entire division when the situation to his front and west remained unclear. As it began moving forward cautiously, the 10th Panzer Division recognized that significant French forces still remained to its rear. Its daily log notes, “The line of bunkers on the south bank of the Meuse from Pont Maugis to the southeast has not yet been attacked and is still capable of fighting. However, the division is counting on the defenders surrendering to an attack by relatively weak forces in light of the successful breakthrough.”34 In truth, the 10th Division still had little more than “relatively weak forces” across the Meuse. Thus neither the 2nd nor the 10th Panzer Division had encountered the same degree of success as the 1st Panzer Division. Both divisions still had significant forces on the northern bank of the Meuse, and the 2nd Division had failed to reach the day's objective assigned it by corps headquarters. The change in mission from pivoting to the west with the other divisions to moving south and occupying the heights around Mont Dieu-Stonne probably occurred because the 2nd and 10th

divisions had failed to get the bulk of their forces across the Meuse quickly. As will be explained, the decision also was influenced by discussions between Panzer Group von Kleist and the Twelfth Army about halting the XIXth Corps and consolidating the bridgehead until additional follow-on forces were on hand. TURNING THE XIXTH CORPS TO THE WEST After the 1st and 10th Panzer divisions reached Chémery and Maisoncelle, the German commanders had to make a difficult decision about pivoting toward the west. Beginning with initial discussions before 10 May about the operation, the Germans had recognized the difficulty of turning to the west, but they had not been able to complete detailed planning about the turn, because they knew they could not anticipate the precise timing or conditions for the pivot. The general concept, however, was to use the Gross Deutschland Regiment and/or the 10th Panzer Division to protect the flank of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions as the corps turned west. Though there were some doubts in the minds of his superiors, Guderian clearly was prepared to pivot his corps to the west and continue to advance. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division included the order given by corps to the division for the 14th: “Attack to Chémery—Maisoncelle…. Pivot at Vendresse toward Rethel while being covered along the southern flank by the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Stonne.”35 On the afternoon of the 14th, however, doubts began to appear about the ability of the corps to pivot without leaving additional infantry to cover its flank. The doubts came from a series of reports about the enemy situation and about the condition of subordinate units in the division. Among these reports was one from the Armor Brigade of the 1st Panzer Division informing the headquarters that the French were attacking the crossing site at Malmy on the Ardennes Canal and that it could not hold the crossing site at Malmy without additional infantry support. The daily log of the division includes the following entry: Vendresse is bitterly contested. Because the enemy is reinforcing the forces at Vendresse more and more, and [because] he is apparently getting ready to conduct a counterattack, the 2/1st Infantry is attached to the [Armor] Brigade. The Armor Brigade reports that it is practically out of ammunition and fuel. Reconnaissance employed against the Bois du Mont Dieu [to the south of Chémery] encounters strong enemy forces along the northern edge of the woods and reports that advance into the woods is not possible.36

A later report added: The Armor Brigade reports heavy casualties and losses in personnel and materiel. Many officers have been killed or wounded. Only a quarter of the tanks can still be counted on to be combat ready. The lack of ammunition and fuel makes itself particularly noticeable.37 Considering the condition of the 1st Panzer Division, it is indeed remarkable that the division could even conceive of possibly pivoting toward the west, but its daily log included an analysis of the problem. The leadership of the division is faced with the problem of whether to remain with the mission and pivot to the west without regard to the threat from the woods north and west of Stonne, or whether the enemy should first be beaten there before pivoting toward the west. The decision is difficult. If the division pivots immediately, it would offer its flank and rear to the enemy. Relief by the 10th Panzer Division…could not be expected. Is the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment strong enough to defend against the expected attack of the French in the coming night and in the next few days? At this moment, the [Gross Deutschland] Regiment is heavily engaged, has attacked the entire day, and had been involved in the previous night in heavy combat for bunkers. Thrown forward after a long march to Sedan, it has not had any rest, and its losses are considerable. On the other hand, the entire plan is at stake. Looking at it from the larger perspective, the division has to pivot to the west whenever any opportunity to do that presents itself. The enemy is beaten. He has withdrawn, sometimes almost in a rout. The counterattacks which have been conducted at different places in a disorganized manner—even though bitterly contested—prove that we still are not dealing with a unified counter-action of any great design. A new operation plan is necessary for the French. Whenever one considers the methodical slowness in the execution of their plans, the possibility exists that the Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment could hold out [in Stonne and Mont Dieu] against the present pressure as long as necessary until our leadership or the neighboring division brings forward new forces to strengthen the sector. It remains clear, however, that whenever the thrust to the west is executed, it must be with the bulk of the division. Despite the threat to the flank, there must be no frittering away of forces by [taking] strong action in the south and at the same time [conducting] an attack to the west with portions of the forces.

Based on the overall situation and trusting in the slowness of the French movements, the division therefore decides to pivot to the west with the bulk of its forces in order to initiate a further advance the next morning.38 Thus the division believed that despite its precarious position, the best course of action was to pivot and to move toward the west without leaving significant forces on its flank. Although entries in the daily log of the 1st Panzer Division suggest that the decision about the pivot essentially was made by the division with little or no influence from the XIXth Corps, General Guderian played the most important role in the decision about making the pivot to the west. In his memoirs, he explained that he met with the division commander (General Kirchner) and the operations officer (Major Wenck) of the division and asked them whether the entire division could be turned to the west or whether a force had to be left facing south to protect the flank of the division. During their discussion in Chémery, only a few kilometers from the heavy fighting at Vendresse, Major Wenck used Guderian's own expressions about the proper way to employ armored forces to argue that the division should remain concentrated and should not be split into smaller groupings. Guderian apparently recognized the logic of the argument presented to him and issued orders immediately for the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to change directions. The XIXth Panzer Corps was going to move west and break through the remaining French defenses.39 The second part of Guderian's decision concerned protection of the corps’ flank. Could the Gross Deutschland Regiment accomplish this mission alone, or did both the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 10th Panzer Division, as well as elements from the 1st Panzer Division, have to be used in the mission? Apparently being concerned about the slowness of the 10th Panzer Division's crossing of the Meuse and of the movement toward Mont Dieu and Stonne by a French armored division and motorized division, Guderian decided a single regiment could not protect his corps’ flank. The Gross Deutschland Regiment was released from the 1st Panzer Division and attached to the 10th Panzer Division, which was charged with holding the corps’ flank until relieved by follow-on forces. Additionally, the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion from the 1st Panzer Division remained behind. The decision to pivot with the bulk of the German forces signaled the beginning of a new phase in the campaign. Because of the growing threat against its flank, the XIXth Corps would leave one division and a regiment to protect the bridgehead, but it would move west as far and as fast as it could with the remainder of its forces. While the 1st Panzer Division supported the concept of

pivoting with virtually all its forces, corps headquarters pushed the division to move deep into the enemy's position—perhaps more deeply and quickly than the division preferred. For the 14th, the XIXth Corps wanted the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to reach Singly (thirteen kilometers west of Chémery), and for the 15th, it wanted them to reach a point north of Rethel (thirty kilometers southwest of Singly). To the exhausted soldiers of the 1st Panzer Division, this distance must have appeared phenomenally far. Considering the corps’ overall situation, the decision by Guderian to continue as planned was indeed remarkable. From the moment when three of the six main crossings failed, to the moment when corps headquarters recognized that neither the 2nd nor the 10th divisions had gotten most of their forces across the Meuse and that the 2nd Division had failed to seize the day's objective for the 14th, Guderian had to be especially nervous about the risk he was taking in charging full speed ahead toward the west. Despite the successes of the day, the corps was not in as strong a position as expected by Guderian and continued reports about the French massing troops to the south of the German forces had to increase his anxiety. The delay in providing a subsequent mission to the 10th Panzer Division and then the changing of this mission highlight the perplexity of the problem facing German leaders. To complicate matters further, Guderian became embroiled in a debate late on the 14th with von Kleist about continuing the attack on the 15th. Von Kleist's primary concern was securing the bridgehead over the Meuse against an expected French counterattack. Part of his concern may have stemmed from his awareness that his superiors at the Twelfth Army and Army Group A were not fully informed about the difficulty of the crossing. At 2040 hours on the 13th, he confidently reported to Army Group A that all three of the divisions in the XIXth Panzer Corps had crossed the Meuse River and that on the 14th stronger forces would be pushed across the Ardennes Canal. Since his message did not mention the desperate struggles of the 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions to cross the river, his superiors initially may not have understood how vulnerable the bridgehead was.40 With reports coming in on the night of the 14–15th about French tanks moving up from the south, von Kleist wanted the XIXth Panzer Corps to delay pivoting to the west until after follow-on infantry arrived to reinforce the bridgehead. He wanted the corps to halt along a line between Poix-Terron and Bouvellemont, which was about ten kilometers west of Vendresse. Guderian was incensed and believed his commander was forfeiting his corps’ hard-won gains. In perhaps the sharpest exchange of the entire campaign, Guderian called von Kleist and argued that the time was ripe to strike deep into French positions. Von Kleist finally relented and granted Guderian permission to continue westward. Later that night,

Guderian called again and complained about “faint-hearted higher headquarters.”41 From their positions far in the rear, the Twelfth Army and Army Group A were thinking in more conservative terms than Guderian or von Kleist. Lacking the same degree of confidence as Guderian and the 1st Panzer Division in the “slowness” of French movements, they considered the primary task of the XIXth Corps to be the securing of the heights around Stonne and the forest of the Bois du Mont Dieu, and thereby protecting the bridgehead that had been seized at Sedan. After learning that only five battalions from the XIXth Corps were across the river, the Twelfth Army wanted additional forces to cross the river and consolidate the German gains before the leading elements plunged ahead. In its order of the day for the 14th, the Twelfth Army commander explained the intentions of the German High Command; Group von Kleist was supposed “to move strong forces over the Meuse and then to execute an attack in a westerly direction.”42 The desire of German Army leaders to build up forces on the French side of the Meuse before another attack began could not have been clearer. With little regard for the reservations of his superiors, Guderian sent out a message to his subordinate commanders confirming the following day's objectives. For the 15th, he wanted the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to move about thirty kilometers toward the southwest and reach Rethel. Around midnight, von Kleist sent a message formally approving the XIXth Panzer Corps’ moving toward Rethel.43 Guderian was thinking in far broader and deeper terms than anyone in the chain of command above him, and his decision—with von Kleist's reluctant concurrence —to leave large but nevertheless minimum forces on the southern flank, pivot west, and then drive deep into French territory included a degree of risk that was undoubtedly unsettling to higher-level German commanders. In reality, they probably did not know a great deal about the detailed situation of the corps. If the Twelfth Army, Army Group A, or the High Command in Berlin had been better informed, particularly about the condition of the 1st Panzer Division and the degree of risk involved, their fears would have been much greater, and they undoubtedly would have ordered Guderian to halt. Because of the debate over the XIXth Corps’ continuing westward, some confusion existed in corps headquarters and in the subordinate divisions on the night of the 14–15th. Consequently, the 10th Panzer Division did not immediately get the word about holding Mont Dieu and Stonne while the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions pivoted to the west. As mentioned earlier, the commanding general of the 10th Panzer Division radioed the corps headquarters at 1700 and again at

1800 for additional instructions. Eventually he received a message indicating the division would pivot west, but this mission was later changed. Not until the division operations officer visited corps headquarters and received orders for the division to continue toward Stonne and Mont Dieu, did the 10th Division learn what it was actually supposed to do on the 15th. At 0300 hours on the 15th, the 2nd Panzer Division received a message from corps about that day's operations. The objective of the corps for the new day was the line between Rethel and Wasigny (thirteen kilometers north of Rethel). The division was to move forward, maintaining a strong force on its left flank, pass through Boulzicourt (ten kilometers west of Pont à Bar) and Poix-Terron (fifteen kilometers west-southwest of Pont à Bar), and seize the terrain along the line between Wasigny and Séry (eight kilometers north of Rethel).44 With the 2nd Panzer Division having responsibility for the northern half of the line and the 1st Panzer Division for the southern half, the next day's objective was more than thirty kilometers southwest of the circular bridgehead around Sapogne, Boutancourt, and Flize that the 2nd Division had carved out the previous evening. Placed within the context of the division's having had difficulty getting across the river during the previous day and not having completed the bridge across the Meuse at Donchery until 0400 hours, Guderian's expectations were remarkably high. That they could be so high amidst the concerns of von Kleist and others is even more remarkable. In the broadest sense, it was thus Guderian's vision and insistence that propelled his corps forward, and he therefore deserves much of the credit for the subsequent success of his corps when it rolled up the flank of the French Ninth Army to the west and raced toward the coast. His decision to press forward with less than two-thirds of his forces and almost without regard for enemy actions against his flanks, however, was clearly a risk—if not a gamble. Any credit given to Guderian, however, should be balanced by an acknowledgment of von Kleist's role. Although Guderian did not believe the conservative cavalryman recognized the potential of his Panzers, von Kleist managed until the 17th to keep his higher-level commanders from halting the XIXth Panzer Corps.45 Despite Guderian's lack of caution and occasional bullheadedness, von Kleist shielded him from more conservative German commanders and reluctantly gave him the leeway to succeed. After the campaign, Guderian, and not von Kleist, received much of the credit for its success; had the XIXth Corps failed, Guderian and von Kleist would have received the blame. SECURING THE FLANK FOR GUDERIAN'S ADVANCE When the 1st Panzer Division began moving most of its tanks toward Vendresse

and its infantry toward Omicourt and the Forêt de Mazarin, it began changing the direction of its attack toward the west. The 10th Panzer Division, Gross Deutschland Regiment, and the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion from the 1st Panzer Division moved south to protect its flank. As mentioned earlier, the 10th Panzer Division did not learn until some time around midnight on the 14–15th that it had the mission of capturing the heights around Stonne. When the division operations officer flew to corps headquarters, he learned about the mission and finally was able to inform the division commander in the early morning hours of the 15th. The Gross Deutschland Regiment was attached to the division for the attack, but the division commander could not make radio contact with the regiment and knew little or nothing about its situation. Consequently, the division advanced toward Stonne in the early morning hours of the 15th with only small elements. Around 0400 hours on the 15th, the written corps operations order arrived at the command post of the 10th Division. With the attachment of the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 1/37th Artillery, the division's mission was to seize a line running from the Ardennes Canal in the west, across the heights of Mont Dieu and Stonne, to a bend in the Meuse River south of Villemontry (twelve kilometers east-northeast of Stonne). After seizing this line, the division had the mission of defending it and thereby protecting the bridgehead at Sedan and the flank of the XIXth Corps.46 A battalion from the 29th Motorized Division, which had just arrived at Bulson, moved forward and was attached to the Infantry Brigade for the operation. Some time after the arrival of the corps order, the 10th Division learned that the Gross Deutschland Regiment was located about three kilometers south of Maisoncelle. The 3rd Battalion occupied an area west of the village of Artaise-leVivier (two kilometers southwest of Maisoncelle), the 1st Battalion and elements from the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion occupied an area just northwest of Stonne, and the 2nd Battalion was attacking the southern edge of the Bois de Raucourt (two kilometers northeast of Stonne, and three kilometers southeast of Maisoncelle). Artillery support came from the 1/37th Artillery, which was located just north of Maisoncelle. The division commander ordered the Gross Deutschland Regiment to continue moving through the woods of Bois du Mont Dieu, seize the southern woodline on the far side, and secure the heights around Stonne.47 At the same time, the division launched two other attacks. The Armor Brigade (which was reinforced by two infantry companies, an engineer company, an antiaircraft company, and an antitank battalion) moved forward to seize the heights

southeast of Yoncq (seven kilometers east of Stonne). The 1/90th Artillery provided fire support. Continuing the attack that had begun on the previous evening, the 2/8th Panzers advanced via La Besace toward Stonne and reached the town around 0700 hours. Around 1100 hours, however, a French counterattack drove them from the town and destroyed four heavy tanks. Not being able to hold the hotly contested village, the battalion withdrew north toward the Bois de Raucourt. Unfortunately, the headquarters of the 10th Division did not know that Stonne had been captured around 0700 hours and lost at 1100 hours. The Armor Brigade had reported at 1015 that Stonne had been captured at 0700 hours but failed to report its subsequent loss.48 This mistake caused the 10th Division to underestimate the difficulty of the task confronting it. At 0900 hours on the 15th, the commanders of the XIXth Panzer Corps and the XIVth Army Corps met at the 10th Division's command post. Effective around 1100 hours, the XIVth Corps assumed control of the bridgehead south of Sedan, as well as control over the 10th Panzer Division and the Gross Deutschland Regiment.49 The generals met to discuss the attachment of the 10th Division to the XIVth Corps. During discussions about the attachment of the 10th Panzer Division, the commanding general of the XIVth Corps did not modify substantially the mission for the division. He ordered the division to protect the Sedan bridgehead by securing the heights along Mont Dieu, Stonne, and southeast of Yoncq. He informed the division commander that the 29th Motorized Division would operate on his eastern flank, and that if need be, an additional battalion from the 29th Division could be attached to the 10th Panzer Division.50 Since the division headquarters was not aware that the French had recaptured Stonne, it did not believe it required additional forces to accomplish its mission. It could not have been more wrong. The division was about to enter some of the deadliest fighting of the entire campaign. The first indication of things going wrong came from the Gross Deutschland Regiment at 1030 hours on the 15th. It reported an armor attack from the vicinity of Mont Dieu toward the north, and shortly thereafter the commander of the 90th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion reported that the enemy attack had reached a point just south of Maisoncelle. Reacting quickly, the 10th Division employed the Antitank Instructional Battalion of the division with its two immediately available companies and an antitank company from the 86th Infantry Regiment to seal off the attack south of Maisoncelle and then to repulse it.51 For the next day and a half, the division waged a seesaw battle with the French, both sides alternately attacking and defending.

After the French counterattacked from Mont Dieu toward Chémery around 1030 hours and then recaptured Stonne around 1100 hours, the 10th Division continued to believe the 1015 report about Stonne being captured and rearranged its forces based on the false assumption that the critical heights around Stonne were in German hands. Believing that the most threatened areas were the heights southeast of Yoncq and the northern edge of the woods of the Bois du Mont Dieu to the south of Chémery, it directed the reinforced Armor Brigade to attack the heights southeast of Yoncq. Almost simultaneously, a small French armored counterattack from Mont Dieu toward Chémery was beaten back by one of the antitank companies. Throughout much of the afternoon, however, two battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which were located northeast and northwest of Stonne, came under strong enemy pressure.52 After the 10th Panzer Division finally learned about the French continuing to hold Stonne, the daily log notes: [T]he incoming reports from the Gross Deutschland infantry Regiment become ever more serious about the situation of the regiment and the continuous attacks of smaller enemy armored groups, despite the fact that the regiment has been reinforced by an antitank company…. The regiment no longer appears to be in the position to be able to hold its sector in its entire breadth.53 The 14th Antitank Company became deeply embroiled in the intense fighting. In contrast to its light casualties in the fighting around Connage, it suffered thirteen killed and sixty-five wounded in the fighting around Stonne. Also, twelve of its vehicles and six out of twelve of its guns were destroyed. Yet, Lieutenant BeckBroichsitter claimed his company destroyed thirty-three French tanks.54 To buttress the Gross Deutschland Regiment, the division sent the 69th Infantry Regiment (minus its 2nd Battalion) forward to occupy a sector between Stonne and La Besace (about three kilometers northeast of Stonne). The 2/90th Artillery provided fire support. The 10th Division told the Gross Deutschland Regiment to move its battalion that had been in the woods northwest of La Besace and employ it as a reserve. Even though the German infantry frequently came under French artillery fire, it managed to push the French from the heights on the northern edge of Stonne around 1700 hours. When the commander of the Gross Deutschland had proposed the counterattack against the heights, he had cautiously explained in his proposal that his regiment was “physically completely exhausted and only marginally combat capable.”55 Despite the exhaustion of the regiment, the Germans launched their

counterattack. The heights around Stonne, however, were recaptured around 1700 hours by the 1/69th Infantry, not the Gross Deutschland Regiment. Because of its exhaustion and losses, the elite infantry regiment had been reduced to playing a supporting role. During the course of the afternoon, the French counterattacked in the Yoncq sector (east of Stonne) with the 1st Colonial Infantry Division and the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, but the reinforced Armor Brigade from the 10th Panzer Division met their thrust with heavy fire. Though the French were strongly supported by artillery fire, they soon had to withdraw toward the east. The German armor commander did not pursue the withdrawing French tanks, because he had recently been informed that the VIIth German Corps was moving up on his left (eastern) flank. He expected elements of the VIIth Corps to engage the French units that had pulled back. Leaving the 2/71st Infantry on the edge of the Yoncq sector, he withdrew his brigade, as ordered by division, to a position northeast of the Bois de Raucourt.56 From this position, the Armor Brigade could counterattack against any sizable French thrust. Late in the afternoon of the 15th, the French attacked again, this time from the Bois du Mont Dieu toward Chémery. The division considered this attack to be particularly dangerous, for it threatened to cut the important road from Chémery to Malmy to Vendresse, and to hit the XIXth Panzer Corps in the flank. Fortunately for the Germans, the significant antitank assets that had been placed south of the Chémery-Maisoncelle road managed to halt the French but only after they had been reinforced. Meanwhile, the division had ordered the Armor Brigade to counterattack, but the withdrawal of the French made this unnecessary.57 According to French records, the attack came from a lone B-I bis tank company with about ten tanks, which had not received word about the cancellation of a division-sized attack. Though the French company lost only two tanks, the Germans reported having destroyed four or five heavy and five medium tanks out of approximately ninety heavy and twenty medium tanks.58 As with the French, reports of combat actions often inflated the size of the enemy force and the number of casualties inflicted. By nightfall the 10th Panzer Division had almost all its infantry forward and its tanks in reserve. From west to east, the three battalions of the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 1/69th Infantry occupied the heights southwest of Stonne, the village of Stonne, and the southern edge of the Bois de Raucourt. To the east of these battalions, the 2/69th Infantry (minus one company) occupied a large sector extending from the Bois de Raucourt to the Bois d'Yoncq; and the 2/71st Infantry occupied the Bois d'Yoncq. The 1/86th Infantry acted as a reserve for the forward

infantry units, while the 2/86th Infantry cleared the enemy out of the area north and east of Raucourt. To the rear of the infantry, the division had three antitank companies between the Bois du Mont Dieu and Chémery and the entire Armor Brigade northwest and northeast of Maisoncelle. The 90th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the 49th Armored Engineer Battalion remained north of Bulson. In short, the division had six infantry battalions along a line between Mont Dieu and Yoncq, one infantry battalion in reserve, and one infantry battalion operating north and east of Yoncq. It also had four tank battalions and at least three antitank companies to the rear of the line of infantry and had its armored engineer battalion and armored reconnaissance battalion farther to the rear near Bulson.59 On the morning of the 16th, the French counterattacked, again hitting the Gross Deutschland Regiment and the 1/69th Infantry near Stonne. According to the Germans, the attack consisted of twelve tanks and heavy artillery fire. Though the 1/69th Infantry was forced from its position on the heights near Stonne and had to pull back toward the Bois de Raucourt, the Germans claimed the attackers soon had to withdraw. The French, however, claimed to hold the town from 0555 to 1500 hours on the 16th.60 In reality, amidst the bitter fighting, the area was likely held by neither side. Unfortunately for the Germans, their own artillery fire landed during the fighting in the collocated command posts of the 69th Infantry Regiment and the Gross Deutschland Regiment and wounded “numerous” officers.61 But this did not cause subordinate battalions to lose effectiveness. After the French counterattack failed to push the Germans completely out of Stonne, additional units, including artillery, arrived to reinforce the German defenders, and the level of French activity seemed to wane. The 10th Division worked to “create clearer command relationships and to shorten the defensive sector” by identifying clearer boundaries between the infantry regiments and by relocating some of the units. The division also attacked and seized La Besace. Clearly, the danger posed by the French was decreasing. At noon on the 16th, the XIVth Corps informed the 10th Division that the 24th and 16th Infantry divisions would assume responsibility for the entire sector at 2300 hours, evidently in a night relief. When representatives of these two divisions arrived at the command post of the 10th Division, they objected strenuously to having to conduct a nighttime relief-in-place operation. Recognizing the complexity and difficulty of such an operation, they had concerns about the French possibly launching an attack during the middle of the relief in place, and they wanted the 10th Panzer Division to remain in the area. Their objections offer

an interesting contrast to the relative absence of objectives when the French 71st Division moved forward to relieve part of the 55th Division shortly before the Germans attacked across the Meuse. The relief in place went as scheduled, and fortunately for the Germans, it was conducted under more favorable conditions than the one conducted by the French. As a final footnote to the fighting around Mont Dieu and Stonne, the 1/69th Infantry retook the heights around Stonne in the early evening hours of the 16th. That night the 10th Division turned over the heights to the 16th Infantry Division. The daily log for the 10th Division concludes, “With that, the casualty-heavy and difficult battles to cover the Sedan bridgehead have ended for the division and its attached troops.”62 On orders from the XIXth Panzer Corps, the Gross Deutschland Regiment remained near Bulson to reorganize and rest its units. On the morning of 17 May, the 10th Division moved west to join the other two divisions in the XIXth Corps. Though the division had secured the flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps and had protected the bridgehead around Sedan, the fighting in the Stonne area had been extremely costly to the Germans. For example, the 14th Antitank Company of the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which had not had any casualties during the sharp fighting around Connage, suffered a total of thirteen killed during the heavy fighting around the heights of Stonne.63 By contrast, the fighting associated with subsequent operations in the push toward the west must have seemed easy. MAKING THE PIVOT: THE ATTACK TOWARD SINGLY Returning to the fighting west of Chémery on the 14th, the main axis of advance to the west for the 1st Panzer Division was along the broad valley that extends westnorthwest of Chémery. To the south of Chémery, Vendresse, and Singly is a long, relatively narrow band of hills that includes the high ground of Stonne and Mont Dieu and that extends toward the northwest. Before turning south toward Bethel, the axis of advance for the XIXth Panzer Corps ran just north of and parallel to this band of hills through the broad valley west of Chémery. But the valley was not open. As one moves along the road west of Chémery, one encounters Vendresse about five kilometers west of Chémery. To the rear of the village is a small wooded hill mass through which the road passes before reaching the large open valley around Singly. To the north of this valley is a very thick forest, the Forêt de Mazarin, which has a few logging trails through it and whose highest point is Hill 303. Another road leads west from Vendresse and, after turning southwest, passes through the line of hills by way of Omont and Chagny. The German tactic was to use the band of hills to the south to protect their flank

but at the same time to break through the hills and continue moving west. To accomplish this, the 1st Panzer Division organized its forces into two battle groups. With most of its forces already being located near Omicourt, Battle Group Krüger, which was commanded by the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, was supposed to move from Omicourt, through the Forêt de Mazarin, to Singly, a straight-line advance of about nine kilometers. Battle Group Nedtwig, which was commanded by the newly installed commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, was supposed to move from Chémery, through Vendresse and the hill mass to its rear, to Singly, which is about seven kilometers northwest of Vendresse. Battle Group Krüger had the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment, reinforced by at least one Panzer company, while Battle Group Nedtwig had the four battalions of the two Panzer regiments, plus the 2/1st Infantry, which was attached later to the Armor Brigade. Battle Group Nedtwig (1st Armor Brigade) encountered heavy resistance around Vendresse. The first advance early in the afternoon toward the village by the tank-heavy force was “beaten back” by “strong antitank and enemy tank forces.” During the intense fighting around Vendresse the armored battalions used up most of their ammunition. In the middle of the afternoon, the French again attacked the crossing site at Malmy, and subsequent intelligence reports convinced the Germans that they were preparing to launch a counterattack against Vendresse. As mentioned earlier, the possibility of another French counterattack led the 1st Panzer Division to attach the 2/1st Infantry to Battle Group Nedtwig.64 Using the infantry battalion on its northern flank near the Forêt de Mazarin, the battle group fought for control of the village. At 1700 hours division headquarters received a report saying that the enemy resistance at Vendresse had been broken and that an advance was possible.65 At 1930 hours, however, the Panzers had advanced no further than the outskirts of Vendresse. Losing “many officers” and having only a quarter of its tanks “combat ready” clearly weakened the ability and will of the armor forces to move forward aggressively. Losses of senior personnel had been particularly severe in the 2nd Panzer Regiment, and these losses clearly affected its combat effectiveness. At the same time, some confusion existed at higher headquarters about the situation west of Chémery. Around 1830 hours the division received a message from corps prohibiting the crossing of the Ardennes Canal until 2030 hours because of a planned air attack against Vendresse and Omont.66 By the time the order arrived, the division had had forces across the Ardennes Canal for about six hours. Fortunately, the Germans managed to prevent the Stukas from attacking their

own armored forces and again inflicting significant damage on the Armor Brigade. To the north of Vendresse, Battle Group Krüger (1st Infantry Brigade), which included the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment and perhaps a few tanks from the 2nd Panzer Regiment, advanced quickly and easily through the Forêt de Mazarin. By 2200 hours the advance guard of the German infantry reached Singly, even though Battle Group Nedtwig had not advanced beyond Vendresse. With Colonel Balck (the commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment) accompanying them, the 3/1st Infantry and elements from the 37th Antitank Battalion occupied Singly at 2300 hours. Shortly thereafter, the 1/1st Infantry occupied Villers-le-Tilleul (two kilometers east of Singly).67 With apparently very little artillery and armor support, the infantry had moved seven kilometers ahead of the tanks and had bypassed the French defenders west of Vendresse. The daily log for the 1st Panzer Division includes the following entry: “If May 13, 1940, were to be considered the main fighting day for the infantry, then the 14th of May was the main day for the tanks. Despite considerable and unbroken counterattacks by the French, relentlessly led by infantry and tanks, the division was successful in not only maintaining the area reached on the 13th, but also in expanding it.”68 While one cannot denigrate the important contribution made by the tanks in repulsing the French counterattacks north of Chémery and Maisoncelle, one also cannot overlook the vital role played by the 14th Antitank Company, the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, and the 1st Infantry Regiment. The combined forces of the antitank company and the engineers blocked the French advance north of Connage until the tanks arrived, and with armor support, they led the attack against Chémery. Similarly, the 1st Infantry Regiment permitted the division to pivot successfully to the west when it moved through the Forêt de Mazarin and seized Singly. This deep thrust bypassed the French resistance and greatly enlarged the penetration made by the Germans. Without the seizure of Singly, the attack by the 1st Panzer Division may have faltered at this crucially important moment. The 14th of May may have been the day of the tanks, but it was also the day of the tanks operating in close combination with the infantry, engineers, and antitank forces. Without the contributions of all these arms, the Germans may have been halted by the bitter opposition around Chémery and Vendresse and may not have made the pivot successfully. Success had come from the use of combined arms, not simply from the tanks. THE BREAKOUT: ADVANCING TOWARD RETHEL After Battle Group Krüger reached Singly, the night of the 14–15th passed quietly.

Some time during the night, corps headquarters decided that the day's objective for the 1st Panzer Division on the 15th would be just north of Rethel (eighteen kilometers southwest of Singly). To get to Rethel, the division had to cross the line of hills running south of Chémery, Vendresse, and Singly. On the morning of the 15th, the Germans planned on attacking at 0445 hours, but corps headquarters delayed the attack until 0545 hours. Continued difficulties with the bringing forward of heavy weapons and artillery delayed the attack further. When the attacks finally began, the main thrust of Battle Group Krüger went against La Horgne (three kilometers southwest of Singly), and the main thrust of Battle Group Nedtwig went against Chagny (seven kilometers southwest of Vendresse). The Germans had to break through the line of hills to their front if they were to reach Rethel by the end of the day. Despite the gains made by the Germans on the 13th and 14th, the 15th included some of the heaviest fighting of the entire campaign for the 1st Panzer Division. Among the key events of the day, the infantry with Battle Group Krüger struggled to force its way through determined French resistance at La Horgne. If the 1st Panzer Division was going to open a way for itself through the hills south of Singly, it had to defeat the French at La Horgne. When the German infantry initially moved against La Horgne, the attack encountered fortified French positions, and German leaders shifted the attack toward the north, evidently intending to bypass the strong enemy defenses. There they found less resistance, but they drifted into the zone of the 2nd Panzer Division. With elements from this division, they managed to push aside the French, but they were soon ordered back to the south. During the subsequent fighting at La Horgne, the 1st Infantry Regiment was stopped by enemy fire for the first time in the campaign. After the attack halted, Lieutenant Colonel Balck moved forward to survey the situation and to encourage his men. When he appeared at the entrance to the village on the front line, his soldiers renewed their attack and managed to enter the first few houses in the village. Then they were pinned down again.69 According to Balck's regimental adjutant, the second halting of the attack provoked a “crisis,” but Balck restored calm and morale with his personal presence. Determined not to let the attack halt completely, he sent a battalion around the rear of the defenders and, accompanying it, managed finally to enter the village and capture its defenders. Balck's personal courage and example had been the key to his regiment's success.70 After the resistance in La Horgne collapsed late in the afternoon, Battle Group Krüger (1st Infantry Brigade) concentrated on forcing its way through the hills

south of Singly by attacking along the road from Villers-le-Tilleul (two kilometers east of Singly), to Baâlons, to Bouvellemont. The soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment soon encountered enemy resistance in the heights alongside the road that leads to Baâlons, but overcame the small French forces fairly quickly. As they moved down the slope of the hills, Lieutenant Colonel Balck ordered his 3rd Battalion to clean out Baâlons, while the 1st Battalion bypassed that small village and attacked Bouvellemont about one kilometer to the south. Having received intelligence reports saying that Bouvellemont was occupied by strong French forces, the brigade commander placed artillery and heavy weapons in support of the 1st Battalion and ordered the attack to begin. After days of hard fighting, however, the German soldiers were exhausted. The infantry companies had lost many men, including most of their officers. Despite the exhaustion of his men, Balck's personal example again propelled his soldiers forward.71 While daylight was still available, the 1st Battalion fought its way through the French village. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division notes, “After an hour and a half of fighting by companies leapfrogging through its houses and gardens, Bouvellemont was taken.”72 In the meantime, the Panzer forces under Battle Group Nedtwig had not met success. With Battle Group Krüger on its right (west), the armor-heavy forces moved southwest along the road from Vendresse, to Omont, to Chagny. If they reached Chagny, they could break through the line of hills southwest of Vendresse. But they could not force the French out of Chagny and the high ground to its rear. Because of intelligence reports about enemy forces massing to the south, Lieutenant Colonel Nedtwig retained large reserves and did not commit all his forces, which as mentioned earlier had been seriously weakened by the fighting on the 14th. The reports of enemy activity also led division headquarters to move two engineer companies to the south of Vendresse for securing the division's flank. With significant forces remaining uncommitted and perhaps weakened from the previous day's losses, the tanks could not fight their way through the rugged terrain south of Omont. Recognizing that the tanks could not punch their way through the French defenses, Nedtwig attempted to bypass the enemy's positions by moving his infantry around their flank, but when an enemy counterattack threatened to envelop the 2/1st Infantry, he withdrew his entire force to the southern edge of Omont. There he established a defensive position oriented toward the southwest for the night.73 In contrast to the success of the infantry of the 1st Panzer Division on the 15th, the tanks had achieved very little. They had moved only a few kilometers on the 15th and were far from the day's objective.

As had occurred on the Meuse and at Vendresse, however, the infantry opened the way for the tanks. By capturing Baâlons and Bouvellemont, the 1st Infantry Regiment broke through the hill line to the front of the 1st Panzer Division and enabled the Armor Brigade to advance. By breaking through at Bouvellemont, the German infantry convinced the French to withdraw and occupy another position in the rear. This withdrawal permitted the German tanks to resume their advance. Guderian appreciated the superb performance of the German infantry and visited the 1st Infantry Regiment early on the morning of the 16th. He described his meeting with the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balck, who later assumed command of the Armor Brigade after Colonel Nedtwig collapsed from exhaustion. The troops were over-tired, having had no real rest since the 9th of May. Ammunition was running low. The men in the front line were falling asleep in their slit trenches. Balck himself, in wind jacket and with a knotty stick in his hand, told me that the capture of the village [of Bouvellemont] had only succeeded because, when his officers complained against the continuation of the attack, he had replied: “In that case I'll take the place on my own!” and had moved off. His men had thereupon followed him. His dirty face and his red-rimmed eyes showed that he had spent a hard day and a sleepless night. For his doings on that day he was to receive the Knight's Cross. His opponents…had fought bravely.74 Though events on the 15th suggest that the French may have had an opportunity on the 16th to slow the advance of the 1st Panzer Division, an important opening for German forces appeared on the morning of 16 May after the French pulled back from their defensive position along the hill line south of Vendresse. The French had been able to halt the armor-heavy forces of Battle Group Nedtwig, but they had not been successful in halting the infantry-heavy forces of Battle Group Krüger or in delaying the advance of the 2nd Panzer Division, which was farther to the north and west. The daily log of the 1st Panzer Division described the events of the night of 15– 16 and the morning of 16 May. The battle groups established contact with one another during the night, reorganized and set up security. Reconnaissance troops from Battle Group Krüger stayed with the enemy; Battle Group Nedtwig reported no contact. The order to move out onto the dictated avenues of advance at 0700 hours arrived early by radio. According to reports by the battle groups, the soldiers

are extremely tired. The day and the night were very difficult. The French fought bravely and toughly. Reconnaissance initiated during the night report Louvergny and Sauville along the southern flank free of the enemy. Reconnaissance carried out in the early morning hours at Chagny reports this village unoccupied. The penetration of Battle Group Krüger and the capture of Bouvellemont appear to have had their effect. Now it is important to thrust forward without consideration of casualties and exhaustion before the French have had the opportunity to set up again. There is no time for half-stepping now.75 THE EXPLOITATION Army commanders above Guderian remained concerned about sustaining the breakthrough and parrying an anticipated French counterattack. Late on the 15th, the Twelfth Army completed its order giving missions for the 16th. The order directed Panzer Group von Kleist to “expand” the bridgehead and then “under all circumstances to halt.” The Twelfth Army wanted von Kleist to “arrange” his forces to “counter an eventual counterattack by strong enemy forces.”76 In his order for the 16th, however, von Kleist said, “Group von Kleist continues advancing in a westerly direction.”77 According to Guderian, von Kleist approved continuing the advance only after a “heated” conversation. But the approval late on the 15th was only for another twenty-four hours so additional space could be acquired for the infantry units following the XIXth Panzer Corps.78 As he had done throughout the campaign, Guderian moved as far forward on the 16th as he could. He, too, was convinced that there was no need for “halfstepping.” Better than the commanders above him, he sensed the end was near. But he also ignored the directive from von Kleist about moving forward for only twenty-four hours. Late on the 16th, he sent out orders by radio to continue the advance on the following day, and his orders were monitored by a German radio intercept unit and reported to von Kleist. The XIXth Corps immediately received the order to halt in place and for Guderian to meet with the Panzer Group commander on the following morning.79 According to Guderian, he met General von Kleist at an airstrip very early on the following morning. When Guderian's boss arrived, he sharply reprimanded the impetuous corps commander for having disobeyed orders on several occasions. Refusing to accept the reprimand docilely, an angry Guderian immediately submitted his resignation. Much to Guderian's staff's surprise, von Kleist accepted it.80

Though Guderian assumed his corps had been halted so he could be reprimanded by von Kleist, commanders above von Kleist had ordered the halt. During an interview by B. H. Liddell Hart after the war, von Kleist observed that his forces were halted on the 17th for a day, apparently because Hitler feared an attack into the corps’ left flank.81 Time was also needed to move forward the field armies to the rear of the Panzer Group and to strengthen the extended flank that had opened up between Guderian's leading elements and the bridgehead at Sedan. The commander of Army Group A, General von Rundstedt, was particularly concerned about threats to this weakly defended flank.82 Immediately after Guderian's rash resignation, the commander of the Twelfth Army traveled to the XIXth Corps and informed the angry corps commander that his resignation would not be accepted. He also informed him that Army Group A had approved the launching of a “reconnaissance in force.” Guderian recognized that this approval could be manipulated and used to enable him to do as he wished, and his Panzers were soon advancing aggressively toward the west. To prevent other interference from his superiors, however, Guderian had a communications line laid from his main corps headquarters to his advanced command post.83 His orders would no longer be monitored by higher headquarters.

CHAPTER 8

The “Counterattack” by the 55th Division

A

s the Germans poured forces across the Meuse River and energetically expanded their bridgehead, the French sought to slow or halt the enemy's advance and then to counterattack. The first of these counterattacks came under the control of the 55th Division and included two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. ASSESSING THE SITUATION As the Germans fought their way through the 55th Division on the evening of the 13th, General Lafontaine had some information about developments in the Sedan sector, but all in all, he was poorly informed. Part of the problem of inadequate information stemmed from the lack of information being provided to the regimental commanders. With many of the communications lines broken, company and battalion commanders encountered significant difficulties sending information to their higher headquarters and had to rely on runners. The destruction of the division headquarters’ radio antenna by an aerial attack further crippled communications within the division, but the problem was exacerbated by a steadfast refusal to permit use of the few radios that were functioning and available. The reason for this refusal is not at all clear, except for an excessive concern about the German ability to monitor radio transmissions. But the coup de grace to tight control over the division came from the panicked actions of a switchboard operator in the division command post. Around 1900 hours on the 13th, after the Xth Corps gave the 55th Division responsibility for conducting a counterattack with an infantry regiment and a tank battalion, General Lafontaine moved his command post from the large bunker at Fond Dagot to a private home in Chémery where it would be in a better position to control the counterattack. Though it is not clear whether Lafontaine requested permission to

move his command post or was ordered to move it by the corps commander, individual soldiers around the headquarters apparently perceived the move occurring because of the imminent arrival of German tanks and troops. In preparation for the move, the soldiers began burning secret documents and codes. Amidst the bustle of loading and moving, a nervous switchboard operator destroyed the central switchboard for the division. The division had been ill informed up to this point; now it had almost no communications with anyone, including only limited links to corps headquarters.1 Leaving Colonel Chaligne, who was the commander of the infantry in the division, behind with a skeleton staff, General Lafontaine moved with the major part of his headquarters toward Chémery. At a time when the German threat was intensifying, Chaligne was left with little or no ability to control the actions of the division. Ignorant of the details about what was happening and lacking any communications except for messengers, he was almost helpless, but he had more control over the division than did the division commander. The course of subsequent events suggests that Lafontaine and his headquarters were ill prepared to move from their comfortable and relatively attractive bunker at Fond Dagot. The little information received at the skeleton command post at Fond Dagot was alarming. Around 2100 hours Colonel Lafont of the 331st Regiment reported, “The enemy has crossed the Meuse at Donchery and is moving into the principal line of resistance with strong forces.” Around 2300 hours the intelligence officer from the 331st Regiment appeared at the division command post at Fond Dagot and provided a fuller picture to Colonel Chaligne about what was happening. He reported: The enemy is in Croix Piot. Infiltrations are occurring along the route to Cheveuges and particularly to the east of this route. The [regimental] command post at Moulin Mauru risks being encircled at any moment. Reports have been received about the noise of armored vehicles on the left bank of the Meuse and in the small valley leading to La Boulette.2 Although no German tanks had yet crossed the Meuse, the French thought they had and were deeply disturbed. Chaligne recognized that if the Germans moved beyond La Boulette and entered the valley of the Bar River, they could sever the division into two parts. Consequently, he began desperately trying to send forces toward the 147th Regiment to halt the German movement. The forces he sent forward, however, moved toward the right (east) of the division, rather than toward the left (west) where Balck's regiment had made significant gains.

USING THE RESERVES OF THE 55TH DIVISION Unfortunately, the division had very few forces available. Theoretically, the division had two battalions in reserve, the 1/295th and the 3/331st. The 1/295th was the battalion that had been sent forward to the Semois River in Belgium, and casualties had reduced it to being little more than a large company. Furthermore, the loss of its battalion commander and other key leaders had weakened its leadership. As for the 3/331st, this battalion had been ordered to send one company to provide security for rear elements at Haraucourt and another company, plus a machine gun section, to provide security for the division's headquarters. Consequently, it too was reduced to being hardly more than a company.3 The largest number of troops made available to the division commander for use as reserves came from the relief and movement of the 71st Division into the Angecourt subsector. The 3/295th Infantry and part of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion pulled back from their positions along the Meuse and moved to the area south of Chaumont. On the morning of the 13th, the 506th Antitank Company, a colonial infantry unit, also arrived to reinforce the division. Since all the division's reserves were located in the general area of BulsonChaumont, some of them were affected by the panic that swept that area around 1800 hours on the 13th, but they were not as severely affected as the artillery. Nevertheless, the division had relatively small reserves even though it theoretically had three infantry battalions and part of a machine gun battalion as a reserve. Perhaps more importantly, the division chose to employ most of its small reserves on its right flank near the French cemetery and on its center, north of Bulson, rather than against the rapidly expanding penetration from Bellevue, to La Boulette, to Chehéry. As the German advance moved forward on the evening of the 13th, the situation became particularly desperate for Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud and remnants of the three battalions operating under the control of the 147th Regiment. Division headquarters, however, initially did not recognize the extent of the damage inflicted by the Germans. At 1745 hours on the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud had requested reinforcements. He was given an infantry company and a machine gun section from the 3/295th, and at 1815 hours he was given the remainder of the battalion. Though it was getting late in the day, Pinaud later insisted that he wanted to counterattack with the battalion, but the slow movement of the 3/295th forced him to relinquish any idea of a counterattack. He finally decided to send the battalion to the region of Noyers, where it was to link up with the 2/295th at the French military cemetery. Unfortunately, the 3/295th was unable to accomplish its mission completely and did not link up with the 2/295th until around 2200 hours on the 13th. According to Pinaud, many of its men fled before it reached its

designated position.4 At 2000 hours Colonel Chaligne sent elements of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion to reinforce the 147th Regiment. Led by the battalion commander, the elements consisted of two infantry platoons, a mortar platoon, and three 25mm cannon. While moving forward, the battalion commander encountered the 1st Machine Gun Company, which had been in the Angecourt subsector until the 71st Division had moved forward and occupied that portion of the line. The 1st Machine Gun Company rejoined its battalion, and the size of the force effectively doubled. When they arrived at Chaumont, Pinaud ordered the battalion to occupy a position extending about one kilometer from Chaumont toward the St. Quentin farm (one kilometer to the west). Around midnight, the machine gun unit moved into position.5 Buttressed by the new reinforcements and promised others, Pinaud worked desperately to establish a new line of resistance in front of the Germans, but for inexplicable reasons he remained primarily concerned about his center and right flank. Though he may have had some information about reinforcements arriving in the division, he probably did not learn until later in the evening of the Xth Corps’ plans to move an infantry regiment toward his left into the area between Bulson and Chehéry. Around 2200 hours Colonel Chaligne ordered other forces forward. The 3/331st Infantry, which was located in the Bois du Roi midway between Chaumont and Bulson and consisted of little more than a company, was ordered to organize an antitank position and prevent the movement of any German tanks from Cheveuges to Bulson. The 506th Antitank Company, a colonial infantry unit that had arrived in the area on the morning of the 13th, received orders to place an antitank section on Hill 298 (midway between Cheveuges and Bulson) and to place another section at Bulson. The 1st Company, 11th Machine Gun Battalion, also received orders to move northwest along the route between Bulson and Cheveuges and assist in the halting of any German armored attack. Colonel Chaligne was unaware that this machine gun company had linked up with the commander of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion and had moved with him to Chaumont.6 By 2400 hours the 55th Division had reestablished a thin and shaky line of defenders around the southern and eastern edges of the German penetration. Very little strengthening occurred on the western edge, and no concerted action came against the German seizure of Cheveuges and their preparations for moving farther south. In fact, the route from Bellevue, to Cheveuges, to Chehéry, to Chémery proved to be the major avenue of approach used by the Germans. Instead of rushing reinforcements into this ever-widening penetration, the 55th Division

moved its meager reinforcements toward Bulson, Chaumont, and Noyers. The explanation for this strengthening of what proved to be the less important sector and the failure to strengthen the decisive sector may reside partially in the movement of the 213th Infantry Regiment from the south toward Chémery. But it may also reside in the apparent perception that if the Germans broke through at Sedan, they would probably turn east and seek to turn the flank of the Maginot Line, rather than turn west. The failure to halt the move toward Chémery may also have been rooted in the perception that if the division could hold the shoulders of the penetration, the Germans could not break out of the Sedan area, particularly since they obviously had very little artillery support. Unfortunately for France, this perception of the limited threat of a penetration failed to take into account the great mobility of armored vehicles and the replacement of traditional artillery support by aviation. Despite the depth of the German move into French lines, almost ten kilometers, their bridgehead remained small and extremely vulnerable. By comparison, however, the French immediately along the edge of the bridgehead were in a desperate situation. At 0130 hours on the 14th, Colonel Chaligne received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud outlining the precarious position of his regiment. According to the report, Captain Foucault occupied a position along the road between Cheveuges and Bulson with no more than forty men. Captain Carribou held Chaumont with only twenty men. Captain Gabel had two companies and had been reinforced by the 3/295th. Elements of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion had arrived, but the final company did not appear until 0200 hours. Pinaud emphasized the urgency of the situation by asking, “Am I going to receive reinforcements?” Earlier, he had been promised a reinforcing regiment and a battalion of tanks.7 Hours later, his entire force probably added up to less than a normal infantry battalion. In a short written order completed at 0200 hours, Pinaud told the elements of the five battalions that were now under him to “hold the line” between Noyers, Chaumont, and the St. Quentin farm (one kilometer west of Chaumont). His order did not mention the 3/331st Infantry, which was supposedly in the Chaumont area. In his order, he told Captain Carribou and his meager forces to move out of the line and become the reserve for the regiment.8 On Pinaud's right flank, Captain Gabel's forces at the French military cemetery and Noyers remained in good condition and continued to offer strong resistance to the Germans. Elements from the 3/295th had reinforced his battalion, which had taken fewer casualties than the other two battalions originally assigned to the

147th Regiment. But as the 10th Panzer Division moved more and more troops across the Meuse, Gabel's task force came under increasing pressure. Fresh attacks on the regiment's right flank pushed the French defenders out of the French military cemetery until they held only the German cemetery and the high ground at Noyers.9 The French tried to resupply the fighting units during the night, but neither food nor munitions made their way forward. In one of those lunatic actions that sometimes occur in desperate moments, the supply depot at Bulson refused to provide supplies without a written order from the commanding general of the division. The supply depot one kilometer southeast of Cheveuges was burned by the Germans. Apparently, only the 11th Machine Gun Battalion received some supplies. Under the personal command of the battalion commander, a column moved to the rear and obtained ammunition.10 Both the French and the Germans used the early hours of the morning to prepare for subsequent operations. For the French, it was apparent that the position of the defenders around the German penetration was tenuous and that reinforcements were required. Though the situation required an extraordinary performance from the units of the Xth Corps and 55th Division, subsequent events proved they could not provide it. THE 55TH DIVISION: PREPARATION FOR COUNTERATTACK Before the Germans crossed the Meuse on the 13th, the Second Army and Xth Corps commanders became concerned about the possibility of a crossing and a penetration into their sectors and decided to take precautions. Grandsard decided to move the reserves of his corps to the rear of the position of resistance along the Meuse. From west to east, the line went from Chehéry, to Hill 311, to Bulson, to Haraucourt. During a tactical exercise in April, corps headquarters had considered the best place to locate a second line of defenses and had decided that the line between Chehéry and Haraucourt was the best location.11 The exercise at the end of April had occurred because General Huntziger, the commanding general of the Second Army, wanted a special exercise on the conduct of a counterattack against a “rupture” in the Sedan area. Initially scheduled for 25 March, the exercise was delayed until the end of April. It studied the possibility of an enemy armored division crossing the Meuse in the region of Sedan, penetrating the line of defenses between Frénois and Wadelincourt, and then moving south along the axis Bulson-Maisoncelle-Stonne. The exercise also studied the possibility of a counterattack by a French armored division against this penetration.12

Evidently because of their having recently examined a scenario close to what appeared to be happening on 13–14 May, the initial response by the Second Army and the Xth Corps essentially followed the procedures that had been worked out and tested in April. In a clear colmater fashion of pushing units forward toward the penetration until the enemy was halted, the key steps in this response included the movement of additional infantry and tank forces into the threatened sector. These forces included two infantry regiments and two tank battalions, all of which had been at least partially under the control of the Second Army but which were released to the Xth Corps on the 13th. Beyond simply halting the Germans, however, the Xth Corps wanted to launch a counterattack that would upset their timetable and perhaps disrupt their forward movement. Under the best circumstances, it might also hurl the Germans back across the Meuse. Between 1445 and 1515 hours on the 13th, about the time of the German attack across the Meuse, the Xth Corps directed the 205th and 213th regiments, supported by two tank battalions, to occupy the line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt that had been used in the April exercise. The Second Army had released the two tank battalions that morning to the Xth Corps but did not want them to move during daylight hours because of the threat of enemy air strikes. According to General Grandsard, the 213th Regiment could march to this line in two hours, the 4th Tank Battalion in one hour fifteen minutes, and the 7th Tank Battalion in one hour fifty minutes.13 Subsequent events proved him to be grossly in error. On 10 May the 213th Regiment was located in the area around the small village of Boult au Bois, which is thirty kilometers south of Sedan and ten kilometers east-northeast of Vouziers. From 23 October 1939 until 6 May, the regiment had occupied the Villers-sur-Bar subsector west of Bellevue, but had been relieved by the 331st Infantry for three weeks of training. On 9 May the regiment closed in at Boult au Bois and was scheduled to begin its training on 13 May. During its period of training, the regiment also functioned as a reserve for the Xth Corps but could be committed only with the approval of the Second Army. After the Germans attacked into Luxembourg on 10 May, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Labarthe, the commander of the regiment, reported to the headquarters of the Xth Corps. He was ordered to move his regiment on the night of 10–11 May toward the north. Beginning its road march at 2300 hours, the regiment moved its headquarters into Chémery, one battalion two kilometers south of Chémery and two battalions on the other side of Mont Dieu ten to fifteen kilometers south of Chémery. The move went smoothly even though the roads were filled with refugees moving south.14

After establishing his command post at Chémery on the 11th, Labarthe was visited at different times by Generals Grandsard and Lafontaine. The corps commander informed him that the tactical situation north of the Meuse was developing “normally.” Except for several aerial attacks that caused only slight damage and the continued movement of the civilian population, the day was quiet. On the 12th around 1400 hours, the Xth Corps ordered Labarthe to move his regiment on the night of 12–13 May to the northern woodline of the Bois du Mont Dieu. That night, while the 3rd Battalion remained in place two kilometers south of Chémery, the 2nd Battalion moved to the vicinity of Artaise-le-Vivier (three kilometers southeast of Chémery), and the 1st Battalion moved into the northern woodline of Bois du Mont Dieu (five kilometers south of Chémery and one kilometer east). Again, the move went very smoothly. On the morning of the 13th, the regiment came under aerial bombardment, but only one company suffered significant losses (two killed, twelve wounded). That afternoon the intensity of the air strikes increased, but according to the regimental commander, the units did not suffer significant losses. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe explained that many of the men had dug entrenchments after moving into their new positions during the night and had improved their protection during the air strikes in the morning.15 A more telling comment came from a platoon leader in the 2nd Company, 1/213th. He said, “During the entire day, enemy squadrons followed each other, launching their bombs at the top of the trees without being bothered by a single friendly aircraft. Alone, an antiaircraft battery reacted weakly. This was the baptism of fire for the 213th Infantry Regiment. The men were very affected by the whistling of the bombs and by the sight of the dead and wounded.”16 At 1630 hours the regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move forward along the line between Chehéry and Bulson. After issuing a warning order at 1650 hours, Labarthe met with his battalion commanders at 1730 and provided them more detailed information. On the left the 3rd Battalion would secure Chehéry, in the center the 1st Battalion would secure Hill 311 and ensure contact with the battalions on the right and left, and on the right the 2nd Battalion would secure Bulson. Had everything gone well, the regiment probably could have marched to its new position in about two hours. But hardly had the commanders departed when calamity struck. Subsequent events demonstrated that friction (in the Clausewitzean sense) is a more common feature of war than crisply executed plans. A panicked staff officer from the 55th Division came running into the command post of the 213th Regiment and exclaimed that German armored vehicles had broken through at Chaumont. He

cried out, “What is the division going to do?” Labarthe tried to calm him and moments later walked out of his command post into the streets of Chémery. He later explained, “A veritable panic reigned in the village.” The street was filled with soldiers, vehicles, and convoys, all heading south. He stopped several officers with convoys behind them, and each insisted that they had received orders to withdraw toward Tannay (eight kilometers south of Chémery).17 Though Labarthe was generally regarded as perhaps the best regimental commander in the 55th Division, the sight of the fleeing soldiers, the continued reports of “tanks at Bulson,” and the environment of chaos clearly affected his judgment and subsequent actions. The exact sequence of events over the next few hours is not clear, for the accounts and times given by the participants do not completely agree. Each offers a sequence, a time, and a description of events to accord with his own interpretation and perhaps with an attempt to absolve himself of blame. The general sequence is as follows: 1900 hours: Telephone discussion between Grandsard and Lafontaine about attachment of additional infantry and tanks for a counterattack. 1930 hours: Telephone discussion between Grandsard and Lafontaine about moving command post of 55th Division. After 1930 hours: Movement of 55th's command post. Lafontaine meets Labarthe in Chémery. After 1930 hours: Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, who was the deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, meets Labarthe in Chémery. Approves Labarthe's decision not to move north. After 1930 hours: Cachou meets Lafontaine east of Chémery. Informs him of Labarthe's decision. After 1930 hours: Lafontaine calls Grandsard to discuss counterattack. 2200–2300 hours: Lafontaine definitely learns of the 205th Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion's being attached to 55th Division. 2400 hours: Lafontaine departs for Xth Corps command post. 0130 hours: Chaligne learns that counterattack would consist of two infantry

regiments and two tank battalions. 0300 hours: Lafontaine returns to Chémery without having reached Xth Corps. 0345 hours: Written order arrives from corps. 0415 hours: Lafontaine issues order for counterattack. 0630–0645 hours: Counterattack by 213th Regiment begins. 0945 hours: 205th Regiment reaches Maisoncelle and begins counterattack. According to General Grandsard, the corps commander, he called General Lafontaine at Fond Dagot around 1900 hours and told him that the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments, as well as the 4th Tank and 7th Tank battalions were now placed under his command. His mission was to use these forces to establish a defensive line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt. If this line could not be established, Lafontaine would establish a line between Chémery, Maisoncelle, and Raucourt.18 The important point is Grandsard's insistence that he told Lafontaine around 1900 hours of his having control of the two infantry regiments and two tank battalions that were moving into his division's sector. Lafontaine later offered different information about when he learned of his having control of the two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. He said he did not learn until around 2200 or 2300 hours from a liaison officer from the Xth Corps that he had control of two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. He insisted that Grandsard told him around 1900 hours only of his having control of one infantry regiment and one tank battalion.19 He also implied that the exact circumstances of the commitment of the 205th Infantry Regiment and the second battalion of tanks were not known until the arrival of the written order around 0345 hours on the morning of the 14th.20 Shortly after the conversation between the two generals had ended around 1900–1930 hours, Lafontaine made a return telephone call. He called the corps commander and either requested permission to move his command post from Fond Dagot to Chémery or was told by Grandsard to move. According to Grandsard, Lafontaine explained that he could best accomplish his new mission if his command post were at Chémery. Grandsard concurred in the move, later explaining that the division commander was better placed than he to determine the best location for his command post. According to Lafontaine, however, he was

ordered to move his command post.21 Unfortunately, movement of the 55th Division's command post accelerated the negative effects of the panic that began around 1800 hours. The fears of the soldiers who were fleeing could only have been reinforced by the sight of the division command post hastily moving to the rear. Shortly after departing Fond Dagot, General Lafontaine arrived at Chémery with his staff sometime after 1930 hours. To Labarthe's amazement, he assisted in marshaling the soldiers and units toward the south. Labarthe informed the general officer what the 213th Regiment was doing but received no orders; Lafontaine apparently neglected to tell him that he was now under the control of the 55th Division. Concerned about his ability to move forward in the crush of men and vehicles, Labarthe made a fateful decision; he sent his intelligence officer to tell the battalions to remain in place and not move forward.22 In essence, his decision —which was made without consulting Lafontaine—nullified the attempt by the corps commander to create a second defensive line near Bulson. Around 1930 hours the deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, arrived at Chémery. Lafontaine could not be located. Labarthe gave the staff officer a quick rundown of events and informed him of his having ordered the battalions to remain in place momentarily. Recognizing that the regimental commander's decision could probably not be reversed, Cachou approved the decision and told Labarthe not to attempt to establish a defensive line between Chehéry and Bulson. Instead, the regiment would establish a defensive line that extended east and north of Chémery to the woods northeast of Maisoncelle-et-Villers. The exchange between Cachou and Labarthe later became extremely controversial, because Cachou essentially approved Labarthe's nullifying Grandsard's order. Cachou explained, “I began by expressing my astonishment to learn that the corps order was not even in the course of being executed…. I could only approve this decision by the responsible commander, believed by my corps commander and myself to be an excellent leader of men.”23 Labarthe reacted to Cachou's having approved his orders by telling the 2nd Battalion to occupy Chémery, the 3rd Battalion to hold the woods to the east and northeast of Chémery, and the 1st Battalion to occupy Maisoncelle-et-Villers. By 2200 hours the battalion commanders reported that they were in position.24 During the remainder of the night the regiment remained in place. Following his exchange with Labarthe, Cachou went in search of General Lafontaine and finally located him on the road about two kilometers east of Chémery. The division commander was involved in selecting a site for a battery

from the 78th Artillery Regiment. In a short meeting, Cachou informed him of Labarthe's decision to halt his regiment and then told him that he would receive orders from General Grandsard for a counterattack on the following morning.25 But he could not provide him any details about the counterattack. As Cachou pointed out in his description of the events on the night of 13 May, General Lafontaine did not intervene or modify the decision made by the 213th regimental commander. The passive manner in which he accepted Labarthe's decision is astonishing, but his failure to act or react is perhaps indicative of his actions in this entire battle. In contrast to the German generals who undoubtedly would never have accepted Labarthe's decision, Lafontaine accepted an action by a lieutenant colonel that ended the attempt to establish a second line near Bulson. Nevertheless, Lafontaine did return to his command post at Fond Dagot and called General Grandsard. Though Grandsard does not mention this telephone call in his memoirs, Lafontaine later wrote that the two generals discussed the counterattack by the 213th Regiment. While the conversation did not alter the course of events, Lafontaine's description of his discussion with Grandsard is remarkable, for it clearly demonstrates his reservations about launching a counterattack with infantry against the German penetration. After explaining the objections of Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, he posed the question to his commander as to whether the counterattack should consist of an attack by the infantry or an attack by artillery and infantry fire.26 Though his explanation is not completely clear, Lafontaine obviously did not believe the 213th Regiment should be pushed forward rapidly. Having studied and practiced for years the doctrinal procedures of colmater for sealing off an enemy penetration and for using artillery and infantry fire in a counterattack, he saw no real advantage in hurling the infantry forward. He preferred to await the arrival of the Germans. Separated from the comfort of his concrete bunker, Lafontaine seemed indecisive and unable to assert himself. Neither Labarthe nor Cachou was impressed with Lafontaine's efforts to regain control over his division or to prepare for a counterattack. Nevertheless, Lafontaine later insisted he did not know if his corps commander had decided to counterattack until the written order arrived in the early hours of the 14th. Meanwhile, the units fleeing south affected the battle not only by reducing the number of rifles and artillery tubes that could be used against the Germans but also by hampering the forward movement of other units. When Lieutenant Colonel Cachou left General Lafontaine and attempted to return to Xth Corps headquarters, he could barely move along the road because of the large number of soldiers and vehicles. He made his way south using small roads and trails, but he finally had to

abandon his vehicle near Tannay and walk about one or two kilometers before a gendarmerie vehicle took him the remainder of the way. The 7th Tank Battalion, which was supposed to accompany the 213th Regiment in the counterattack, also encountered problems with movement on the road as it attempted to make its way north to Chémery after dark. Leaving its assembly area south of Mont Dieu around 2030 hours to avoid aerial attack, the battalion moved slowly. Numerous trucks and vehicles moving south filled the road. At one point the battalion commander, Major Giordani, and his intelligence officer moved ahead of the column and halted at the edge of a small village, awaiting the arrival of the column. After waiting half an hour and not seeing the column, the two returned south. They discovered that the tanks were barely moving at the pace of a walking man because of the heavy traffic heading south. Around 2300 hours Giordani received notice of a meeting at Chémery with the commanding general of the 55th Division. He left his slowly moving battalion and drove north immediately.27 Around midnight Colonel Chaligne, having made his way safely from the old command post at Fond Dagot, arrived at the division's new command post, which was now functioning in a villa on the edge of Chémery, and reported to the commanding general. Lafontaine explained that the division had to push the 213th Infantry forward to strengthen the French defenders north of Chaumont or it had to withdraw them toward the south but not as far as the line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt. Considering subsequent events, this was an astonishing discussion. Apparently neither Lafontaine nor Chaligne understood the growing strength of the Germans, the increasingly desperate situation of the few defenders north of Chaumont, or the requirement for decisive and rapid action. In Chaligne's words, “The general hesitated [and] then decided to report to the commanding general of the [Xth] Corps to receive orders.”28 Though he did have communications with corps headquarters, he apparently believed he had to make personal contact with Grandsard. After Lafontaine departed his command post, a messenger arrived at 0130 hours with a report from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud that spelled out the dangerous situation facing his regiment, as well as the division. In an effort to inform the division commander, Chaligne called the Xth Corps and asked for Lafontaine, but he had not yet arrived. In this telephonic communication, first with Lieutenant Colonel Cachou and then with General Grandsard, Chaligne learned the details of the corps’ plan for a counterattack. He also learned that Cachou would be departing shortly with a written order for the attack. Lafontaine had apparently not told him about the corps commander's desire to counterattack, having only

explained the requirement to seal off the German penetration.29 Around 0300 hours Lafontaine returned to the division command post without having reached corps headquarters. The roads were too filled with troops and convoys for him to make the trip. At a time when France's safety depended on his action, he had wasted three hours trying to reach corps headquarters. Between 0300 and 0400 hours a meeting was held in the command post of the division in Chémery. Among those attending were General Lafontaine, Colonel Chaligne, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, and Major Giordani (commander of the 7th Tank Battalion). Other officers from the division also jammed into the room. The meeting could not begin until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, who was bringing the written order for the counterattack. Until Cachou arrived, General Lafontaine sat at a table with his Chief of Staff and two officers from his operations bureau. Working at a map that was lit by an oil lamp, they attempted to mark the location of the front line, using information that had been provided to the command post. In reality, they knew very little about what was happening to their north. They also studied the possible direction and objective for a counterattack. Because of Cachou's having provided Lafontaine additional information around 2200–2300 hours and because of Chaligne's discussion with General Grandsard on the telephone around 0130 hours, they must have known the division was supposed to conduct a counterattack with two regiments (the 205th and the 213th) and two tank battalions (the 4th and 7th). Nevertheless, no firm plans were made or orders issued until the written order arrived. The commanders of the 213th Regiment and the 7th Tank Battalion were present at the command post, but no one knew the exact location of the 205th Regiment or the 4th Tank Battalion. They also knew nothing about their condition or their preparation to fight. An officer departed the command post to search for the 205th Regiment. The other officers in the room attempted to learn as much as possible about what was happening. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe later described the discussions as “confused.” Although the headquarters knew correctly that Bulson was still occupied by the French, Labarthe was told incorrectly that Cheveuges and portions of the Bois de la Marfée were in friendly hands.30 At 0345 hours Lieutenant Colonel Cachou arrived carrying the order for the attack, which was supposed to begin at dawn. The decision of the corps commander was clear: the 213th Regiment would attack. According to Lafontaine, the order also provided him the first clear indication of how the 205th Regiment

and 4th Tank Battalion were to be used. At 0415 hours, or about half an hour before dawn, General Lafontaine issued the order for the attack, which would begin as soon as the units were ready to move. This was about nine hours after Grandsard had first talked to him about the counterattack. Unfortunately, almost the entire night had been wasted, for the division commander had taken no prior actions indicating the regiment was under his control or could be launched on a counterattack. In fact, not until 0530 hours on the 14th did the 55th Division formally state, “The 213th Infantry Regiment is placed at the division of the 55th I.D.”31 Thus one of the most important reasons for the failure of the subsequent counterattack by the 213th Regiment and the 7th Tank Battalion was the lack of decisive action by the division commander. Instead of exerting a superhuman effort to push the 213th forward or to restore discipline and return the runaways and panicked units to the defensive effort, Lafontaine nervously awaited the decision of his corps commander. Tragically for France, every minute he waited was a minute given to the Germans to transport their forces across the Meuse River and to prepare for an assault against the next line of French defenders. Though Grandsard can be criticized for failing to move forward and exert personal control over the rapidly disintegrating situation, his failure is minor in comparison to the lack of decisive action from Lafontaine. By not acting quickly and decisively, General Lafontaine had missed an opportunity to strike at the Germans when they were at their most vulnerable point. Apparently not knowing that the Germans had already moved south of Cheveuges but believing that they would do so quickly, the French decided to attack with the 213th even if all the tanks from the 7th Battalion were not able to join it. As the division commander issued his order, however, the first tanks from the 7th Tank Battalion began arriving in Chémery. With the division more confident about the presence of French tanks but still not certain that the entire battalion would be present, the regiment was ordered to attack north on three axes: the 2nd Battalion (under Major Couturier) from Chémery to Chehéry, the 3rd Battalion (under Major Gauvain) from east of Chémery to west of Bulson, and the 1st Battalion (under Major Desgranges) from Maisoncelle to Bulson. A company of tanks provided support to each battalion. Except for four 25mm antitank weapons, the regiment had no antitank weapons. The 2nd Battalion on the left had two, and the 1st Battalion on the right had two from the 506th Antitank Company (colonial infantry). The only means of communication between the battalions and regimental headquarters or between companies and battalion headquarters were through runners or motorcyclists. A single battalion of 75mm artillery from the 78th Artillery Regiment was

available to provide fire support for the counterattack. Though 174 French artillery tubes should have been available for support on the morning of 14 May, no more than 12 were actually available. The panic on the evening of the 13th had an extraordinarily negative effect on the French ability to resist the Germans, but the weak artillery support for the counterattack was one of the most important effects. Colonel Chaligne explained: “The batteries had suffered a great deal the previous evening, and numerous tubes were destroyed. Communications could not be assured with the remaining battalions…. The necessity to act quickly compelled us to do without organized [fire] support.”32 COUNTERATTACK BY THE 55TH DIVISION: THE 213TH REGIMENT AND 7TH TANK BATTALION Despite his reputation as a strong regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe did not relish the prospect of attacking the Germans. After receiving the order and shortly before departing the division's command post, he said, “This is a mission of sacrifice that you ask of my regiment.”33 With Labarthe lacking enthusiasm for the mission, the counterattack began about an hour after the battalion commanders received the attack order from their regimental commander. To the north, the situation of Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud's force became even more desperate early on the morning of the 14th. Pinaud had lost telephonic communications with division headquarters during the night and had been reduced to sending messages by runners. Around 0500 hours the French north of Chaumont were attacked by a strong enemy force, and half an hour later the forces west of Chaumont also were attacked, apparently by elements of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. At 0600 hours Pinaud gave the order to withdraw, and his few remaining men moved in the direction of Haraucourt. By 0645 hours the Germans had occupied Chaumont. Pinaud then moved south to the command post of the 55th Division at Fond Dagot, intending to report to the division commander and inform him of his order to withdraw. To his surprise, he found the command post unoccupied, and only later did he learn of the soon-to-be-unleashed counterattack. After establishing a thin line of defenders near the old division command post, Pinaud moved toward Maisoncelle. About 500 meters north of the town he encountered Colonel Chaligne first and then General Lafontaine and provided them a full report of what had happened in his subsector. About the time he met his commanding general, the counterattack by the 213th Regiment began.34 The progress of the 1st Battalion on the regiment's right has been described by Second Lieutenant Penissou from the 2nd Company, 1/213th. Shortly after the

battle, he reported: The tanks lead the attack. The company moves at 0645 hours, the sections and platoons in perfect order. The men are calm and disciplined. The company arrives at Hill 278 [one kilometer north of Maisoncelle]; it is 0700 hours. Several bursts of machine gun fire pass over our heads. Then the left of the company receives enemy automatic weapons fire. I push my platoon toward [Hill] 261 [about one and a half kilometers north of Maisoncelle], then into the woods of Rond Caillou [to the northeast] where I move around the western edge. The woods seem to be empty…. The French tanks move toward Bulson…. I send a runner to the captain to tell him that since I am not being stopped by fire, I will continue to move forward. At the edge of a small strip of woods that borders the road, the platoon receives bursts of machine gun fire that seem to come from Hill 320 [500 meters southeast of Bulson]. A 25mm cannon, served by elements of the colonial infantry, is in position and pointed toward Hill 320. It is around 0715 hours. The French tanks are at the forward edge of the woodline. I move to Hill 320 with a squad…to see what is happening behind the crests of Hills 320 and 322 [500 meters southwest of Bulson]. An enemy aircraft fires its machine guns at us several times, then the bursts of machine gun fire become heavier and heavier. At [Hill] 320, one cannot see what is happening at Bulson. I move forward to the edge of Bulson, and I see at a distance of 300 meters large Germans tanks that are moving slowly toward [Hill] 322. The [enemy] aircraft continues to fire its machine guns at us, and from the northwestern edge of [the woods of] Rond Caillou, the small arms fire is very heavy. It is necessary to prevent the imminent attack of the tanks. I send a runner to my captain, and I rejoin the 25mm cannon. It is 0800 hours. I give a report to Captain Boury of the 295th Infantry Regiment who has pulled back from Bulson and is next to the 25mm cannon. Believing that the attack would go toward [Hill] 322, we rapidly maneuver the cannon, and the German attack begins. The French tanks that are not destroyed go back down the slope and withdraw in the direction of Maisoncelle. Immediately thereafter, 3 German tanks cross [Hill] 322 and move toward Fond Dagot. They are taken under fire by the 25mm at around 500 meters. The first is hit and bursts into flames; the second in turn is hit and bursts into flames; the third is immobilized and is hit with about fifteen 25mm shells.

The other tanks remain in turret defilade and cover us with bursts of machine gun fire. With the German tanks immobilized, the soldiers exit with automatic weapons and fire at the 25mm [gun]. They are fired at immediately with submachine guns and rifles, and at the end of a few minutes, the enemy fire ceases. It is around 0900 hours. But the enemy moves forward on the [left]…through the woods of Réserve, Blanche Maison, and Pré de Mars, and on the [right]…infiltrates through the ravine in [the woods of] Rond Caillou. We fire on all sides against the enemy that surrounds us. The small arms fire is heavy. The crew of the 25mm [gun]…is killed or wounded at their weapon. The telescope on the cannon is broken. We are completely encircled, and the ammunition is almost gone. It is around 1100 hours.35 As the Germans continued south, they moved directly toward Maisoncelle. In the center of the 213th, the 3rd Battalion was not attacked as strongly as either of the battalions on its flanks. One company commander from the 3rd Battalion watched about twenty-five German tanks move toward Maisoncelle and said, “The 1st Battalion seemed to be volatilized in an instant.”36 As the Germans overran the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion began moving rapidly toward the rear. To the west, the 2nd Battalion began moving at 0630 hours from Chémery toward Chehéry with one company moving along the road in the valley north of Chémery and another company moving along the heights just to its east. The regimental commander kept the remaining company (7th Company) of the battalion at Chémery to act as a reserve for the regiment. Much as the 55th Division commander had done, he did little to strengthen his left flank and in reality weakened the battalion that soon received the heaviest attack from the Germans (from Cheveuges and Chehéry toward Chémery). Very little coordination occurred between the tanks and the infantry before the attack. The commander of the 213th Regiment later stated that the 3rd Tank Company, which had the mission of supporting the 2nd Battalion, did not arrive at Chémery until 0645 hours and hurried forward in front of the infantry without receiving instructions from the commander of the 2nd Battalion. The commander of the 7th Tank Battalion, however, later argued that the 3rd Company was the last tank company to arrive at Chémery, but that it passed through the central part of Chémery at 0600 and attacked with the 2nd Battalion at 0630.37 Despite the disagreement between the two commanders about arrival time for the tanks, the key point is that the tanks and the infantry in this important area had little or no

time for coordination and familiarization. At 0715 hours the 2nd Battalion received small-arms, machine gun, and antitank fire from small German elements to its front. The battalion pushed forward, however, and at 0800 hours the commander reported that his unit had reached the intermediate objective along the line between Connage and Bulson. For the next hour the regiment seemed to be doing well, the only difficulty being to fulfill a request from the 2nd Battalion for a resupply of ammunition. At 0830 hours Labarthe moved his reserve, the 7th Company, about 300 meters outside Chémery on the heights overlooking the road to Chehéry. Then suddenly the situation changed dramatically. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe has described the action: 0900 hours: New report from the 2/213th, “being attacked by heavy tanks.” I hear a cannonade coming from the direction of Connage. I am surprised to see…three friendly tanks pulling back into Chémery. Is the situation being modified drastically? Small-arms fire from Bulson indicates a brief engagement in front of the 3rd and 1st battalions. I decide to organize a defensive line on the heights of Chémery with the uncommitted elements. The 7th Company is next to me. I give the order to hold the woodline northeast of the village. [I give the] order to the commander of the [troops in the village] to occupy with the engineers the southwest corner of Chémery [and] to watch the right bank of the Bar [River]. I report the situation to the commander [of the 55th Division] with the chief of my motorcycle section who has come to me with information. He confirms that the 1st and 3rd battalions are progressing toward the north. 0930 hours: I attempt to establish contact with the commander of the 2/213th. The messenger cannot find his command post on the route toward Sedan. 1000 hours: A wave of enemy tanks breaks out in front of the 7th Company [which is] installed at the northeastern edge of Chémery. This company, having not a single antitank weapon, can do nothing against these vehicles. Under enemy fire, I attempt to rally them…. The enemy tanks quickly move down the main street [of the village], blasting and machine gunning the few defenders who are there. I pull back to the eastern edge. An enemy tank, sitting sideways on a corner of the road, machine guns us at point blank range; my assistant and I fall. I have a bullet in my thigh. The tank fires its cannon again. He misses us and sets on fire several cans of gasoline against which we had fallen. Taking advantage of the smoke that is produced, I escape.38

A few minutes later Labarthe found the commander of the 2/213th. The captain reported that his battalion had been attacked by tanks, accompanied by 88mm guns. Though several of the German tanks had been destroyed by 25mm antitank fire, they had “annihilated” the French tanks. Around 1600 hours Labarthe was captured by the Germans. As a prisoner and helpless bystander, he watched numerous armored vehicles move through Chémery and thereby witnessed the German exploitation of the failure of his regiment's counterattack. In summary, the 213th Infantry had attacked at 0630 hours with the support of three tank companies from the 7th Tank Battalion. The battalions had moved forward two or three kilometers when they came under heavy attack by tanks around Bulson and Connage. In the ensuing fighting, the 7th Tank Battalion lost 50 percent of its personnel engaged and 70 percent of its vehicles in only a few minutes. The entire staff of the 213th Regiment was captured, and the 1st and 2nd battalions suffered extremely high casualties. In his report, which was written after he returned from captivity, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe described the major reasons for his regiment's failure and in doing so wrote the epithet for his unit. He stated, “From information later collected from captured officers of my regiment, it appears the 1st and 3rd battalions moved forward confidently and resolutely, pushing back enemy elements to the dominant terrain south of Bulson. There, they received an enemy attack composed of tanks accompanied by 105mm [sic] cannons. Our tanks, poorly armed, could not protect our infantry, devoid of antitank weapons and forced to fight in open terrain. The success of the enemy could only have followed.”39 A group of French general officers and colonels that had gathered north of Maisoncelle to watch the attack quickly disappeared as the Germans approached their location. Colonel Chaligne moved toward the 205th Regiment, where he informed them—as will be explained—of the German thrust toward Maisoncelle from Bulson and from Chémery. COUNTERATTACK BY THE 55TH DIVISION: THE 205TH REGIMENT AND 4TH TANK BATTALION On 10 May the 205th Infantry Regiment, which was organic to the 71st Division, was the reserve for the Xth Corps and was working on a defensive line between Omont and Sapogne. Sapogne is about ten kilometers southwest of Sedan, and Omont is about ten kilometers to its south. The line was evidently designed to strengthen the defenses in the sector should the Germans cross the Meuse to the west of the Maginot Line and then attempt to turn west. Late on the 11th, the 205th Regiment received orders to move southeast of

Sedan. After two night marches, it occupied a position south of Raucourt (six kilometers east of Chémery) and east of Stonne. One battalion was in the Bois d'Yoncq (four kilometers southeast of Raucourt), another in the Bois de Franclieu (three kilometers east of Stonne), and another in the Bois de Raucourt (three kilometers south of Raucourt). Late on the 13th, a captain from the staff of the 71st Division delivered a verbal order to Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, who commanded the regiment, to occupy a defensive position between Raucourt and Maisoncelle-et-Villers (three kilometers east of Chémery). The regimental commander moved the 3rd Battalion into a small wooded area west of Raucourt and the other two battalions into the woods of the Bois de Raucourt. He intended to move the 1st Battalion from these woods into a position along the line between Raucourt and Maisoncelle-et-Villers. He placed one of the companies of the 4th Tank Battalion in the open north of the woods without infantry support.40 As the 3rd Battalion was moving forward and before the 1st Battalion began moving, a motorcyclist arrived at regimental headquarters and delivered an order for the regiment to await further orders. Unbeknownst to the regimental commander, the Xth Corps had decided to use the regiment in a counterattack under the control of the 55th Division. The poor communications of the 55th Division greatly affected subsequent events. Since the division did not know the location of the 205th Regiment or of the 4th Tank Battalion, which would support the attack, an officer departed the command post around 0330 hours in search of the regiment, and at 0500 hours Colonel Chaligne departed to conduct his own search. Around 0530 hours Chaligne arrived at the command post of the 71st Division along the route between Raucourt and Autrecourt about ten kilometers east of Chémery. He met with the division commander, General Baudet, and after explaining the situation to him, asked if he could talk with the colonel who commanded the 205th Regiment. Baudet answered that the 71st Division had no telephonic communications with the regiment but that the commander of the regiment was located in the Bois de Raucourt about five kilometers east-southeast of Chémery. Chaligne had driven by these woods en route to Baudet's command post. Around 0615 hours he arrived at the Huttes de Raucourt on the northern edge of the Bois de Raucourt, where he first encountered the battalion commander of the 4th Tank Battalion, Major de Saint Cernin. The two officers then met with the commander of the 205th Regiment. According to Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, he received the following order:

The 205th Infantry Regiment will counterattack in the direction of Bulson. Objective: Bois de Thelonne [three kilometers northeast of Bulson]. The counterattack will be supported by the battalion of tanks of Major de Saint Cernin. Departure from the Bois de Raucourt: 0800 hours.41 After Chaligne departed, the regimental commander asked the tank battalion commander about the employment of the tanks, and the armored officer expressed a desire to move as a separate and distinct unit. In doctrinal terms, the tanks expected to be used as “tanks for a mass maneuver.” That is, they would operate as a battalion and would not be split up amongst the infantry.42 With less than an hour to prepare before the regiment was supposed to move, the regimental commander decided to attack with two battalions, one battalion following the other, in the general direction from Maisoncelle-et-Villers (three kilometers east of Chémery), toward Bulson, and then toward the Bois de Thelonne. Though it had only two companies, one having been detached, the 2nd Battalion under Captain Auffret would lead and would move through the intermediate objective of Maisoncelle-et-Villers toward the woods north of this village. The 1st Battalion would follow behind the 2nd Battalion and would abide by orders from the regimental commander, who apparently intended to use the battalion to attack to the right or left flank of the lead battalion or to reinforce it. The 3rd Battalion would remain in its position west of the village of Raucourt and await orders. At 0800 hours the 2nd Battalion departed from the Bois de Raucourt, moving north toward Terres de la Malmaison and then turning northwest. The 4th Tank Battalion followed, 2nd Company on the left, 1st Company in the center, 3rd Company on the right.43 The units moved extremely slowly. As the soldiers marched forward, they received small-arms fire from an unknown direction, and several soldiers were wounded. The regimental commander later asserted that this fire came from the 4th Tank Battalion, but the commander of the 2nd Battalion thought the fire may have come from German “parachutists or spies.”44 Continuing forward, the battalion spied about sixty infantry to its front but could not tell if they were German or French. Not taking any chances, the men opened fire. The sixty or so men to their front immediately displayed several white flags and then disappeared behind the crest of a hill. They probably were the few brave souls who had fought with Pinaud to the last possible moment. The 2nd Battalion entered Maisoncelle-et-Villers at 0945 hours; the soldiers

had moved about three and a half kilometers in one hour forty-five minutes. As they entered the village, French soldiers fleeing from the north and probably from the 1/213th passed through them. Continuing to move north, the battalion was barely out of the village when its northwest flank came under heavy enemy fire, including an air strike. The tanks on the northwest edge of the village also came under enemy tank fire, several of them having their armor punctured by enemy rounds. After a short, intense fight, the tanks quickly withdrew at full speed along the route to Raucourt. Having no 25mm antitank guns and having only a single low-velocity 37mm gun and a few mortars, the 2nd Battalion was left in the open with no defense against the tanks.45 At this moment Colonel Chaligne appeared and supposedly told the battalion commander that the attack was “going well” but that it was being threatened on the left by a strong German attack and by the yielding of the 213th Regiment on the left. General Lafontaine had decided that given the collapse of the 213th Regiment, an attack by the 205th would be useless. Chaligne told the French captain to withdraw his battalion “immediately.”46 At about the same time, around 1000 hours, a motorcyclist gave the regimental commander a written order telling him to withdraw south and defend the edge of the Bois de Raucourt. The 4th Tank Battalion was already withdrawing, and the two infantry battalions quickly followed, moving toward the Bois de Raucourt again. The 3rd Battalion remained in the small wooded area west of Raucourt.47 Unfortunately, the withdrawal became a rout. The commander of the 2nd Battalion tried to move his companies back in a controlled fashion under the cover of machine gun fire from the 1st Battalion, which was still to the rear. Despite the best efforts of him and his company commanders, they lost control of the movement, and the battalion raced back in uncoordinated pieces through German artillery and aerial fire. Part of the battalion continued to fight, mingling with the 1st Battalion south of Maisoncelle. As they entered the woods, the commander of the 2nd Battalion attempted to rally his battalion by getting them to move to the southern edge of the Bois de Raucourt. He thought he and his cadre could regain control of the soldiers and then lead them forward to the northern edge of the woods. At the same time he wanted to save some vehicles and machine guns that had been left on the northern edge of the woods. But his efforts were futile, for his battalion was out of control and German elements had already reached the western edge of the Bois de Raucourt. In a report written less than a week later, the battalion commander argued that his unit had attacked as ordered and had withdrawn only after being told to do so by Colonel Chaligne. Offering a partial defense of his unit, he insisted it had

withdrawn under fire only after elements on the left had yielded. He offered no excuses for its collapse and disintegration other than the cadre and the men being “discouraged” from having to withdraw under fire.48 Except for the 3rd Battalion, which continued fighting around Raucourt, the remnants of the 205th Regiment collected in the woods of the Bois de Raucourt. The Germans continued to fire at them, and a few enemy elements moved around their rear. In midafternoon the 1st Battalion and elements of the 2nd Battalion fought their way south into French lines. But the worst indignity for the regimental commander had not yet occurred. As his regiment moved south, Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet moved ahead of them, supposedly searching for a higher headquarters from which he could receive additional orders. A gendarmerie post picked him up, initially accusing him of being a German parachutist and then of having abandoned his regiment. A local official finally took him to the headquarters of the 71st Division where he met with General Baudet who apparently accepted his explanation of why he was not with his regiment. However, Montvignier Monnet later had to appear before another general officer who accused him formally of having abandoned his regiment in combat and then confined him to a room in the Hotel Vauban at Verdun. Though he later was released and allowed to fight against the Germans, he eventually lost his rank as a lieutenant colonel and simultaneously lost the Legion of Honor, which he had held since 1920.49 Regardless of whether or not he deserved this treatment, his regiment had failed completely to deliver the important counterattack. THE COLLAPSE OF THE 55TH DIVISION With the failure of the counterattack by the 205th and 213th regiments, General Lafontaine decided to pull his forces back to the edge of the woods of Mont Dieu and Raucourt to the south.50 Colonel Chaligne made his way to the 71st Division to inform General Baudet about what had happened on his left flank. After completing his report, Chaligne drove back to the area of Stonne where General Lafontaine had indicated the division would withdraw. Arriving there he found “only a few isolated [soldiers], without ammunition, without leaders, completely exhausted and asking to eat. It was around 1330 hours [on the 14th]. The division no longer existed.”51 According to Lafontaine, Having reported to the command post of the corps at Berlière at 1400 hours, I received the order from corps to move to Bayonville where I could regroup

as many as I could of my troops. The morning of the 15th, I moved southwest of Machault where I endeavored to complete this regroupment. During the night of 16–17, the division was sent to the area of SaintSoupplet (C.P.) and then in the night of 17–18, to that of Mancre (C.P.). On the morning of the 18th I received notification from the commander of Second Army that by order of the Commander-in-Chief on the Northeastern Front [General Georges] I was placed at the disposition of the Minister of National Defense and War and my division would be dissolved.52

CHAPTER 9

The Second Army and XXIst Corps

T

he French did not rely solely on the 55th Division and the Xth Corps to halt the XIXth Panzer Corps. They began to transport other forces into the area of the German penetration and to concentrate massive amounts of air power against the vulnerable German bridgehead. Until the Germans actually crossed the Meuse on 13 May, however, the units along the Ardennes had a very low priority for the allocation of air power. ALLIED AERIAL OPERATIONS With the opening of the campaign in the west, the Luftwaffe concentrated on destroying the opposing air forces and then providing support to operations on the ground. A significant number of its aircraft supported airborne and commando operations in Belgium and Holland. When the Germans crossed into Luxembourg on the morning of 10 May, their planes crossed the French border almost immediately and began bombing airfields and key installations. The Luftwaffe's targets ranged across Holland, Belgium, and France. The attacks against Belgian and Dutch airfields yielded significant results, since the small countries lacked the space for alternative fields where aircraft could be dispersed. During the first morning, the Belgians lost fifty-three aircraft, and the Dutch sixty-two. Against France, the Germans focused on airfields, railways, and military facilities, but their attacks ranged across northern France. By scattering their bombing across a broad area, they hoped to conceal their intentions to make their main attack across eastern Belgium and toward Sedan and to make the French think the main effort was taking place in northern and central Belgium. The spreading of the attacks, however, resulted in the French having only four aircraft destroyed and thirty damaged on the ground.1 From the beginning of these attacks, French fighters rose to combat the German planes and to protect the ground forces below them. The French concentrated their aerial resources above the units marching into Belgium. Air Group 23, which was

supposed to protect the Second Army near Sedan, received orders to reinforce Air Group 25, which provided cover for the Seventh Army on the extreme left of the French. The initial actions thus coincided with the preconceived notions of the French about the main effort eventually coming through the Gembloux Gap. Though the Germans crossed into Luxembourg at 0435 hours, Allied aviation did not receive orders until 0800 hours, when it was told to limit its activity to fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Bombers had to remain on the ground until Allied reconnaissance identified enemy columns moving toward the French frontier.2 Gamelin evidently remained extremely sensitive to the possibility of initiating bombing attacks in which civilians could become casualties and probably feared the likelihood of German reprisals if France initiated such attacks. Despite the requests of the aviators, the French and British air forces did not receive permission from the High Command until 1100 hours to bombard enemy columns as first priority and occupied positions (including airfields) as second priority. The commander of the French Air Force added further limitations. The bombers could not attack industrial centers and had to avoid “at all costs” the bombardment of built-up areas. While these extra precautions underlined the French concern about German reprisals, they severely limited the potential striking power of the bombers. The advancing German columns often had to weave their way through the narrow streets of villages, and the entire plan for interdicting an enemy advance focused primarily on the vulnerability of the columns in these numerous choke points. Permission to bomb villages did not come until around 1600 hours on the following day.3 Air Marshal A. S. Barratt, who was commander of the British air forces in France, felt particularly constrained by Gamelin's unwillingness to unleash his bombers against the advancing Germans. While fighters rose to combat the attacking Germans, long-range fighters from England protected the seaward flank of the French Seventh Army, and reconnaissance aircraft sought out the invading columns, the medium-range bombers sat on their airfields awaiting orders to attack. Barratt finally lost his patience and on his own ordered Air Vice Marshal P.H.L. Playfair, commander of the British Advanced Air Striking Force, to attack the enemy with his medium bombers. Interestingly, the first target attacked was a German column that had been spotted by French reconnaissance aircraft several hours earlier while advancing through Luxembourg. Eight British Battle bombers (a single-engine aircraft that was slow, shortranged, and poorly defended) soon attacked the enemy column in the Ardennes. The Germans met them with a hail of machine gun and small-arms fire and shot

down three of the eight aircraft. Of the thirty-two Battles used that day, thirteen were lost and the rest damaged.4 Despite the heavy losses, they apparently had little or no effect on the German column. Around noon on the 11th, General François d'Astier de la Vigerie (the commander of the Northern Zone of Aerial Operations, which corresponded with Army Group 1) received an order from General Georges. The general wanted him to attack the bridges over the Meuse River near Maastricht that were being used by the Germans. Not having much faith in the ability of the Belgians to hold on long enough for the Allies to reach the Dyle River, Georges hoped the aerial forces could delay the move of the Germans against the Belgians and thereby provide the Allies more time to reach their designated defensive positions in Belgium. At 1630 hours on the 11th, General Gamelin telephoned d'Astier and told him to “do everything [you can] to slow the German columns coming from Maastricht, to Tongeren, to Gembloux and do not hesitate to bomb towns and villages to obtain the desired results.”5 The order annulled the earlier directive about avoiding built-up areas and resulted in the French daytime bombers carrying out their first mission. Around 1800 hours the bombers departed to attack the bridges but damaged only one of them. This was the first daylight attack by the bombers.6 Nighttime bombers had launched attacks the night before. Since Gamelin was not yet aware of the Germans’ having launched their main attack through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium, he did not recognize the vulnerability of the massed enemy columns along the narrow roads in those areas. One can only surmise how devastating massed Allied aerial attacks would have been on the march routes of the cumbersome and tangled German columns. On the night of the 11th, the commander of Army Group 1 indicated the priority for the employment of aircraft on the 12th would be, first, to the First Army along the axis Maastricht-Tongeren and, second, to the Seventh Army and the B.E.F. This decision about priority for air support continuing to go to northern Belgium occurred about the time the XIXth Panzer Corps reached the Semois River. At 0600 hours on the 12th, the commander of Army Group 1 confirmed the priorities issued on the previous evening for the use of air power but added the area north of Mézières to the list of second-priority targets. Finally, at 1600 hours, General Georges reversed the priorities completely. He ordered that first priority go to the Second Army and second priority to the cavalry forces fighting southwest of Tongeren in front of the First Army near Maastricht.7 General Billotte, the commander of Army Group 1, ignored this order. He directed that two-thirds of the aerial effort be used in support of the First Army

and one-third in support of the Second Army. Unfortunately, he had recently moved his command post nearer to the First Army and was evidently unaware of some of the recent communiqués identifying the increasing danger on the right flank of his army group. Not until the morning of the 13th, when his army group occupied the defensive line designated in the Dyle Plan, did Billotte finally begin to understand what the Germans were doing. Aerial reconnaissance on the night of 12–13 May confirmed the existence of the threat on the right flank of Army Group 1. Acknowledging that the French had discovered their trick, the Germans turned on their vehicles’ lights and increased their rate of march across eastern Belgium. After being informed of the results of the reconnaissance, Billotte directed the aerial forces at 0940 hours on the 13th to give first priority to the Second Army. His order, however, indicated that he expected the Germans to build up their forces for several days before attempting a deliberate river crossing.8 Later on the afternoon of the 13th Billotte again modified the priorities for the allocation of aerial resources from the Second Army to the Ninth Army. Before daybreak on 13 May, elements from General Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division had successfully crossed the Meuse at Houx, just north of Dinant in the Ninth Army's area, but the crossing was not confirmed by Army Group 1 until almost noon.9 Explaining his altering of priorities, Billotte said that the front of the Second Army still had the protection of its artillery but that the Ninth Army's front had been “broken.”10 Unfortunately, this change in priorities changed about the same time the German XIXth Panzer Corps began to cross the Meuse at Sedan. For hours before the German infantry crossed the Meuse at 1500 hours, German aircraft flew numerous sorties against the poorly protected French defenders and were hardly bothered by opposing fighters. They massed more than 310 medium bombers, 200 dive bombers, and 200 fighters over Sedan. Throughout the 13th, the French launched only one attack against the concentration of Germans at Sedan. The seven bombers that made the attack returned, but most were badly damaged.11 They apparently inflicted very little damage on the Germans and were hardly noticed by the nervous ground troops. Because of heavy losses, Air Marshal Barratt decided to rest and repair his bombers on the 13th. On 10 May the British had had 135 bombers in Playfair's force, but by the end of the 12th, they had only 72. Throughout the 13th, the British bombers launched only one small mission, a strike against a target in the Netherlands. The attack sought to help the Seventh Army on the left flank of Army Group 1, which was now withdrawing more quickly than it had advanced. Sensing the unraveling of the Allies’ defenses, Barratt also ordered Playfair to begin

planning for a withdrawal.12 During the night of 13 May, Georges and Billotte ordered a massive aerial attack at dawn against the German bridges over the Meuse at Sedan. Billotte said, “Victory or defeat depends on those bridges.” On the morning of the 14th, the Allies launched their desperate aerial attack. According to General d'Astier, more than 152 bombers and 250 fighters concentrated over Sedan and completed more than 550 flying hours, while suffering 11 percent losses. To oppose them, the Germans flew more than 800 sorties.13 Unfortunately for the Allies, they committed their aircraft in about 27 piecemeal attacks, usually consisting of no more than 10 or 20 aircraft. And they were met by more than 200 antiaircraft guns located around the single crossing site at Gaulier. In the early morning, ten British bombers attacked the German bridges near Sedan and did not encounter enemy fighters. About 0900 hours the French launched their first attack against the concentrated enemy. Around noon the few remaining French bombers (only thirteen) attacked the same area, but they suffered such severe losses that they cancelled operations for the remainder of the day. Between 1500 and 1600 Playfair's entire force of bombers, supported by twentyseven French fighters, struck at Sedan, but of the seventy-two bombers participating only forty returned. The official British history notes, “No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the Royal Air Force.”14 That evening long-range bombers from Bomber Command made another strike. Though they encountered fewer enemy fighters than the earlier strike, they suffered 25 percent losses. Conflicting orders to the French air forces began to appear. On the evening of the 14th, Georges ordered d'Astier to maintain fighter cover over Sedan on the 15th even if it were extremely weak. He hoped the sight of some aerial support would buttress the morale of the troops on the ground.15 The following morning around 1100 hours, d'Astier received different instructions through Air Force channels. He was told that the first priority of his bombers should go to the area around Mézières. As for his fighters, first priority (50 percent of his assets) should be Mézières, second priority (30 percent) Sedan, and third priority (20 percent) Dinant. At about the same time, General Billotte compounded the confusion by also giving different instructions for the employment of French fighters. He said that 60 percent of d'Astier's assets should support the newly formed Army Detachment under General Robert Touchon, 30 percent should support the Second Army, and 10 percent should be divided between the Ninth and First armies.16 Amidst these conflicting orders, d'Astier's actual allocation is not completely clear, but the soldiers who continued fighting around Sedan hardly

mention the presence of French aircraft on the 15th. On the morning of the 6th, General d'Astier withdrew his headquarters to Chantilly and lost contact with Barratt and Billotte. The responsibility for coordinating the air battle fell largely into the hands of his superiors. At about the same time, the British Advanced Air Striking Force stopped participating in much of the fighting, taking only a minor part in further bombing missions, primarily at night. Despite heavy losses, Allied air operations had not significantly delayed or affected the German attack. COLMATER: GENERAL HUNTZIGER AND THE SECOND ARMY As the Germans moved through the Ardennes on the 10th and 11th, General Georges (who commanded the French forces along the northern and northeastern frontiers) and General Billotte (who commanded Army Group 1, which included the Second Army plus other field armies west to the English Channel) began taking actions to strengthen the Second Army. Neither Georges nor Billotte believed the Germans would make their main attack through the area of Sedan; both apparently considered the German forces in the Ardennes to be part of a secondary effort aiming farther north and contributing to the main German effort through the Gembloux Gap. Nevertheless, the possibility existed of a German thrust moving around the left wing of the Maginot Line and then circling behind the important fortifications through the Stenay Gap. Consequently, in a classic colmater operation, the high-level commanders began moving units toward Sedan to reinforce the sector west of the Maginot Line. General Huntziger, who commanded the Second Army, began the process of reinforcement. On the night of 11 May at 2220 hours, a staff officer from the Second Army called the Xth Corps and said, “The 71st Infantry Division is at this moment placed at the disposition of Xth Corps. This unit has been alerted with a warning order. She should enter the [front] line during the nights of 11–12 and 12– 13.”17 A written order followed that confirmed the telephone call. In his headquarters, General Grandsard began making preparations for the entry of the 71st Division between the 55th and 3rd North African divisions. Although the operation entailed a lengthy night road march by the 71st Division and the conduct of a complex night relief-in-place, no one apparently questioned whether the insertion of the division could be accomplished. The following morning, 12 May, the Second Army began reinforcing the artillery of the Xth Corps. With a warning order issued at 0730 hours and formal orders issued at 0935 and 1120 hours, the Second Army placed two artillery

regiments, which were already in the vicinity of Sedan, under the control of the Xth Corps.18 Increasing the artillery support for a threatened sector accorded completely with French doctrine, for such an action added to the defensive capability of the sector while placing sufficient forces on hand to conduct a counterattack with fire, rather than troops. As explained in the previous chapter, the Second Army also began moving additional infantry and tank forces into the sector. On 11 May at 2300 hours, it ordered the 4th Tank Battalion, which had operated under the control of the 1st Cavalry Brigade in Belgium, to pull back from its position near Carignan and move to Beaumont, which is about nine kilometers east of Stonne. On 12 May at 1105 hours, it sent out a warning order that said that the 4th and 7th Tank battalions could come under the control of the Xth Corps. The message ordered the Xth Corps to consider using the 7th Tank Battalion in a counterattack on the western flank of the corps and the 4th Tank Battalion in a counterattack between the Chiers and Meuse rivers in the direction of Douzy (about ten kilometers southeast of Sedan). The latter was an area on the western edge of the 3rd North African Division's sector before the entry of the 71st Division. The two tank battalions, however, were not yet released from the Second Army to the Xth Corps. They came under the Xth Corps’ control at 1430 hours on 13 May, about half an hour before the Germans attacked across the Meuse.19 The Xth Corps also sent infantry forward. As previously explained, the commander of the 213th Infantry Regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move his regiment forward on the night of 10–11 May. On the 12th around 1400 hours, the Xth Corps ordered the 213th Regiment to move forward on the night of 12–13 May to the northern woodline of the Bois de Mont Dieu. Also, late on the 11th, the 205th Regiment received orders from the Xth Corps to move to a position east of Stonne. By the morning of 13 May, both regiments occupied positions south of Sedan near the high ground between Mont Dieu and Stonne. On the morning of the 14th, the 4th and 7th Tank battalions combined awkwardly with the 213th and 205th Infantry regiments to deliver the ill-fated and poorly executed counterattacks of that day. Meanwhile, the XXIst Corps, which was under the command of General J.A.L.R. Flavigny and part of the General Reserve, received a warning order on the evening of 11 May. Up to this point, the corps had the mission of preparing to be committed in either the Second or Ninth Army's sector, but the warning order advised Flavigny that his corps would “probably” be committed in the Second Army's sector.20 Since his corps had no combat divisions and consisted only of a corps headquarters and organic support units, he expected to assume control of

two to three divisions after being committed. At 0815 hours on 12 May, General Georges met with key members of his staff and decided to retain control over the XXIst Corps. Though he did decide in this meeting to give the 53rd Infantry Division to the Ninth Army and the 1st Colonial Infantry Division to the Second Army and to move the 14th Infantry Division to the vicinity of the hinge between the two field armies, he was not yet willing to relinquish control of Flavigny's corps headquarters.21 On 13 May at 1330 hours, the Second Army issued an order to the Xth, XVIIIth, and XXIst Corps; this was a contingency plan for the use of the XXIst Corps if it came under Huntziger's control. If the Second Army were attacked, the XXIst Corps would move into line between the Xth and XVIIIth corps. From left to right, the Xth Corps would command the 55th and 71st divisions, the XXIst Corps the 3rd North African and 3rd Colonial divisions, and the XVIIIth the 1st Colonial (which would move forward into line) and the 41st Infantry divisions. The order from the Second Army on 13 May also addressed the possible employment of the XXIst Corps on the western edge of the field army's sector. If the Germans crossed the Meuse successfully and ruptured French defensive lines west of Sedan, the XXIst Corps would occupy a position to the left of the Xth Corps and receive control of divisions in that area.22 Despite this possibility, the primary concern of the contingency plan was for the center and right of the Second Army, not the left. The contingency plan from the Second Army of 13 May also mentioned the commitment of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and “eventually” the 3rd Armored Division. While serving as part of the General Reserve, the 3rd Motorized Division received orders at 2000 hours on the 12th to move toward Stonne. With the first group departing at midnight, the bulk of the division moved on the 13th, and the final group closed in on the morning of the 14th.23 At midnight on 12–13 May, the Second Army told the Xth Corps to select the exact position of the motorized division but restricted the Xth Corps’ options by saying the motorized division had to be employed in the vicinity of Stonne and the woods to its east. The 3rd Armored Division also began moving toward the Second Army's sector. After receiving a warning order issued around 1430–1445 hours on 12 May, the division received an order around 1500 hours to move northeast as quickly as possible. Although the division initially expected to move only one demi-brigade, the division commander was soon told to move his entire division. He did not learn the final destination of the division until 1700 hours but began moving most of his combat elements forward on the night of 12–13 May and the

remaining elements on the following night.24 Thus, before the Germans crossed the Meuse at Sedan, significant preparations had occurred for strengthening the Second Army. With plans being completed for the employment of the 71st Infantry, 1st Colonial, 3rd Motorized, and 3rd Armored divisions, plus two regiments of artillery and a corps headquarters as well as the 2nd and 5th Light Cavalry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and with all units already moving and soon to be in place, the French seemed well prepared for an enemy thrust from Sedan into the rear of the Maginot Line. Significantly, however, the major focus of the preparation had been to prevent a counterclockwise encirclement coming from east of Sedan toward the southeast. That the Germans would cross the Meuse and then pivot to the west was apparently given little or no thought by the Second Army before the afternoon of the 14th, which was about the time the Germans began turning toward the west. Before he gained control of the 3rd Motorized Infantry and 3rd Armored divisions, General Huntziger expressed some concern to General Georges’ headquarters about the need to strengthen the left of the Second Army. At 1025 hours on 12 May, Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, called Georges’ office and explained why Huntziger wanted a supplementary division for his left flank. With the 1st Colonial Division available on the field army's right, the general believed another division was needed behind his left. At 1330 hours the Second Army called again, this time explaining that Huntziger was “very desirous of having an armored division moved into the region of Attigny.” At 1515 Colonel Lacaille called again. The entry in the log for General Georges’ office summarized his points: “Situation on the left of the Second Army (Sedan) is very urgent. Heavy losses. Request an infantry division to strengthen the left which would not affect the movement toward the north of the armored units.”25 Since Georges had departed his command post at 0935 hours to meet in Mons with the King of Belgium, his staff decided at 1520 hours to order the 3rd Motorized and one demi-brigade of the 3rd Armored Division to move forward on the left of the Second Army. At 1530 hours Georges’ office called and informed the Second Army of this decision. Forty-five minutes later, the Second Army requested that the 3rd Motorized Division be moved to Vouziers, which was in its left rear, but was told that the division would be moved in its center to a position southeast of Stonne. Despite Colonel Lacaille's strong insistence on its being moved farther west, the headquarters of the northeastern front refused to alter its order.26 As far as the higher headquarters was concerned, the two divisions were moving to the left flank of the Second Army, but Lacaille and Huntziger wanted

them farther west. Georges’ headquarters evidently believed the greatest threat was of a German breakthrough into the Stenay Gap and the rear of the Maginot Line from the right of the Second Army, but Huntziger had become increasingly concerned about his left flank. For months Huntziger's main concern had been with his right, a concern leading him to place his best divisions in his right and his weakest (the 55th Division) on his left.27 The arrival of the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions behind his left flank, however, served to quiet most of his fears. Despite Huntziger's concern with his left flank, he apparently did not believe the Germans would push across the Meuse and then pivot to the west. From his perspective, the threat seemed to be a push through the left of the Second Army and then a push forward or a turn toward the rear of the Maginot Line, not a pivot west into the right flank of the Ninth Army. Nevertheless, about the time the Germans reached La Boulette, he did order the 5th Light Cavalry to move forward and occupy positions along the Canal des Ardennes and the Bar River. Though, by facing east, the cavalry could plug any gap that emerged between the Second and Ninth armies, Huntziger's main concern apparently was not the possibility of the Germans’ pivoting to the west. An operations order published by the Second Army on 14 May at 1300 hours, which was about the time the first elements of the 1st Panzer Division were pivoting west, explained that German tanks were “progressing toward the south and the southeast.”28 By continuing in this direction, according to Huntziger's expectations, the Germans would meet the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions. In his report written on 10 August 1940, General Georges portrayed the decisions of 12 May as intending to reinforce the area west of Sedan. From his report, one can infer that he anticipated the Germans moving west from Monthermé and pivoting west at Sedan,29 but the record of decisions and movements made by subordinate units suggests otherwise. Though Georges was actually away from his headquarters for most of the 12th, being in Mons to meet the King of Belgium, the debate between the Second Army and his headquarters clearly shows the concern of his headquarters with a turning movement behind the Maginot Line. Thus neither Georges nor Huntziger (nor their headquarters) divined the intentions of the Germans. In other words, decisions made on 12 May about the reinforcement of the Second Army increased its defenses against an enemy move in a southeasterly direction but did little to prevent a German pivot to the west. In fact, as will be explained in the next chapter, Georges gave little or no thought to the possibility of a German move toward the west until the night of 13–14 May when he formed a

special Army Detachment under General Robert Touchon to close the rapidly expanding gap between the Second and Ninth armies. Unfortunately for France, the strengthening of the Second Army occurred without any significant reinforcement of the Ninth Army's right except for decisions on the 12th concerning the insertion of the 53rd Division on its right flank and the movement of the 14th Infantry Division toward the hinge between the two field armies. This resulted in very few units being available to halt the Germans once their move toward the west began in earnest. These actions played directly into German hands and made the effects of their breakout even more destructive than they otherwise may have been. Throughout the preparatory phase of reinforcing the Second Army, time—in the eyes of the French—seemed to be on their side. Although they expected the Germans to halt on the north bank of the Meuse, perhaps for a few days, and concentrate forces and materiel for a deliberate river crossing, they did not rule out the possibility of a hasty crossing. If a hasty crossing were made, however, significant forces were being massed to halt it and perhaps throw it back across the river. Except for the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized divisions, which would close in on the morning of the 14th, most of the other units would be in place on the 13th. Given the complexity of a river crossing under fire and given the difficulty and bottlenecks inherent in moving units across a river, the French confidently believed sufficient forces could be in place on the 13th and 14th of May to halt the Germans. In many ways, the smoothness and efficiency of the French units moving toward the Meuse must have lulled General Huntziger and his superiors into being optimistic about the results. THE MOVEMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY'S COMMAND POST Another indication of the optimism of the French concerned the planned movement of the Second Army's command post. On 7 February 1940 the Chief of Staff of the Second Army approved the movement of the field army's headquarters about fortyfive kilometers from Senuc southeast to Verdun.30 The movement was supposed to commence at some undetermined future time, shortly after an alert that would accompany the launching of a German attack. From February until May, soldiers worked on preparing the new headquarters at Forts Regret, Landrecourt, and Dugny, which were part of the circle of forts around Verdun and which lay south and southwest of the city. For this complicated move, preparations included the laying of at least 117 communication lines and the emplacing of 186 telephones. About 38 tons of communications wire were used, as well as 9 tons of leadencased wire with 56 lines.31 One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if this wire and effort had been made available to front-line units

instead of being used in establishing a new headquarters. The first increment of people and equipment from the headquarters began moving at 2100 hours on 13 May, about the time the Germans reached the heights of La Boulette south of Sedan. The second increment followed the next day. Over 2,683 people were moved, including 1,281 in the headquarters and 1,402 from its supporting communications unit.32 During subsequent weeks, other field armies had no choice but to move their headquarters, but the transfer of the Second Army's command post from Senuc to Verdun occurred at an extremely awkward moment when the efficiency of the headquarters needed to be at its peak. Though Huntziger and a small staff remained at Senuc, and though surviving files suggest the command post continued to function, some disruption and decline in performance clearly occurred. That General Huntziger would even consider such a move during the crucial night of the 13th, when the Germans were rushing forces across the river, must be considered clear evidence of his confidence in his field army and of his believing he had plenty of time to react to German actions. Subsequent events demonstrated his error in judgment. He soon learned that the friction of war and enemy actions often lay waste to the most perfectly designed plans. COUNTERATTACK BY THE XXIST CORPS Among the preparatory steps made by the French to respond to the German move toward Sedan, the decisions concerning the XXIst Corps assume prime importance. At 1900 hours on the 13th, the Second Army issued a written order to the XXIst Corps to prepare for a counterattack with the 3rd Motorized, 3rd Armored, and 5th Light Cavalry divisions. At midnight on the 13–14th, it issued another written order for the XXIst Corps to halt the enemy along the field army's second position (Mont Dieu–Stonne) and then to counterattack toward Sedan.33 In essence, the flow of the battle had risen out of the Xth Corps’ control and was now in the hands of the Second Army. As one considers the possibility of a counterattack against the vulnerable flank of the pivoting XIXth Panzer Corps, it is important to recognize that the Second Army had approximately 280 modern tanks assigned to it. This includes 132 tanks in the 3rd Armored Division, approximately 120 tanks in three independent tank battalions, and 28 tanks in two light cavalry divisions. Additionally, the two light cavalry divisions had a total of 58 lightly armed machine-gun vehicles that compared favorably to the Mark I's of Germany.34 The Second Army thus had approximately 338 armored vehicles to the organic 876 (including 200 Mark I's) of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Considering losses between 10 and 15 May, the

Germans may have had no more than twice as many tanks as the French Second Army in the area of Sedan. Most of the tanks in the Second Army eventually came under the control of the XXIst Corps, which was placed at the disposition of the Second Army by the High Command on 13 May. Except for the tanks in the three independent tank battalions and one of the light cavalry divisions, the rest of the armored vehicles in the Second Army (146, plus 29 machine-gun vehicles) eventually came under the control of General J.A.L.R. Flavigny, who commanded this corps. Of all the French general officers on active duty in May 1940, none had as much experience with armored operations as Flavigny. As director of the Department of Cavalry in 1933, he had proposed to General Maxime Weygand (who was VicePresident of the Superior Council of War for the French Army and thus its designated commander in the event of war) the formation of a mechanized cavalry division and later the development of a cavalry tank. The tank he helped develop was the SOMUA S-35 tank, the best tank France had in 1940. When the first light mechanized division (division légère mécanique) was formed in 1935, General Flavigny became its first commander. Throughout the 1930s the French Army recognized him as its foremost proponent and authority on mechanized operations, even though he concentrated on cavalry rather than tank-heavy forces.35 As early as 1935, if France could have chosen an officer to lead a mechanized attack against the vulnerable flank of a German salient, Flavigny would have been the officer chosen. Hardnosed, decisive, and experienced, he was as close to being the Guderian of the French army as anyone. When the High Command attached his XXIst Corps to the Second Army on 13 May, General Huntziger must have been relieved to have a man of his abilities and experience available at such a crucial moment. The XXIst Corps, however, did not have any organic divisions already attached to it, for the corps consisted of little more than a headquarters. The corps had spent the winter occupying a sector along the Luxembourg-Belgian frontier in the vicinity of Longuyon, Longwy, and Ottange, being initially part of the Second Army and later of the Third Army. At the beginning of May, another corps headquarters replaced it on the border, and the headquarters of the XXIst Corps (without its attached divisions) moved to the vicinity of Reims as part of the General Reserve for the French Army. During the evening of 11 May, Flavigny learned that the XXIst Corps would possibly be placed under the control of General Huntziger, the Second Army's commanding general. To learn as much as possible about the rapidly developing situation, Flavigny traveled to Huntziger's command post. After Flavigny arrived around noon on the 12th at Senuc, he learned that

Huntziger intended to insert the XXIst Corps—if it came under his control—either between the two corps in the Second Army (the Xth on the left and the XVIIIth on the right) or to the left of the Xth Corps, depending on the circumstances. Flavigny later wrote, “The general viewed the situation very calmly.”36 Late in the afternoon of the 13th, after having departed Senuc, Flavigny learned that his corps headquarters would be placed at the disposition of the Second Army. He departed immediately for Huntziger's command post, arriving around 1600–1700 hours.37 In his meeting with Flavigny, which occurred about the time the German 1st Infantry Regiment reached the Chateau of Bellevue, Huntziger seemed confident about the possibility of halting the Germans in the Second Army's sector and did not seem concerned about a lack of time. After informing the corps commander of “small German patrols having crossed the Meuse” and of “heavy aerial attacks” along the river, he told him that the divisions under his control would be arriving “successively during the week.” At 1900 hours the Second Army published the written order for the XXIst Corps to prepare to seal off the front in the Xth Corps’ area and then to counterattack toward Sedan.38 With orders to move his headquarters to Vouziers, about a dozen kilometers northwest of Senuc, Flavigny left for the small town and after arriving there, went to sleep in a small office where he could be near a telephone. Around 2200 hours a sergeant awoke Flavigny and told him that an artillery sergeant from the front lines had arrived and had requested to meet with him. He wanted to provide him “important information.” Moments later the sergeant, who had fled from his unit after his “colonel had departed the C.P. in a vehicle,” told him that German tanks had overrun the batteries of his unit and were moving toward Flavigny's headquarters. When Flavigny called the Second Army commanding general to gain more information, he found Huntziger “up to date” on the situation and received orders to come to the Second Army's command post with his staff. There he was given the order for a counterattack with three divisions under his corps: one armored division, one motorized division, and one light cavalry division.39 The XXIst Corps had the mission of moving to the northern edge of the woods of Mont Dieu-Stonne and attacking as soon as possible in the direction of Sedan. If the attack failed or was canceled for some unforeseen reason, the corps had to hold along the line of hills running between Mont Dieu and Stonne, the second defensive line for the Second Army. Operations Order Number 1, which was issued by the XXIst Corps at 0400 hours on the 14th, clearly stated Flavigny's understanding of his mission. The corps would occupy a position in the woods of Mont Dieu and seal off the penetration made by the Germans; then it would attack toward Sedan.40 The

sequence of first sealing off the penetration and then counterattacking is extremely important, for it meant Flavigny's corps would move forward methodically and halt the attacking Germans before risking a headlong charge into their position. As mentioned earlier, subsequent events demonstrated that the mission played into the hands of the Germans. When the XXIst Corps eventually ceased trying to attack and reverted to holding along the hill line that runs through Mont Dieu and Stonne, the French did not pose a grave threat to the German flank. In fact, the French left the Germans free to turn toward the west as long as the Germans continued putting some pressure against Mont Dieu and Stonne. On the morning of the 14th, neither the Second Army nor the XXIst Corps had precisely fixed the hour of attack toward Sedan, but they envisaged the attack beginning around 1200 hours on that day. By attacking at this hour, the XXIst Corps could follow the counterattacks of the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments and the two tank battalions (which were scheduled for the early morning) and could take advantage of any gains made by them. The rapid succession of two major counterattacks would clearly deal a significant blow to the German forces that had crossed the Meuse. Thus on the evening of the 13th, the prognosis for halting the German forces and throwing them back across the Meuse still seemed favorable. With General Flavigny in charge of the Second Army's attack and with his having an armored division and motorized division, as well as a cavalry division under his control, the chances for a dramatic and successful counterattack appeared high. Significant difficulties, however, soon appeared, and these difficulties did not pertain solely to the performance of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps. The three divisions attached to the XXIst Corps were the 3rd Armored Division, the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, and the 5th Light Cavalry Division, which was further reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Of the three divisions, only the motorized division was fully up to combat standards. The cavalry division had fought in Belgium and had suffered significant losses in men and materiel. The armored division was hardly ready for combat and suffered from shortages or insufficiencies in almost every area. Of the three divisions, the performance by the 3rd Armored Division was the most disappointing and in the broadest terms the most significant for France. THE FAILURE OF THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION The French did not create the 3rd Armored Division until 20 March 1940. After assembling the division's various components near Reims, the division commander, Brigadier General Antoine Brocard, discovered that the new division lacked numerous key personnel and important pieces of equipment. In the broadest

sense the division consisted of little more than four tank battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and two towed artillery battalions. Two of the tank battalions had B-1 bis tanks, and the other two had H-39 tanks. Many key elements of an armored division were missing. For example, while the division had a commander for its artillery, it had no staff. Moreover, the division had almost no maintenance capability and no resupply capability in the field. The absence of an engineer company also reduced the ability of the division to clear roads or remove obstacles. Other major deficiencies included the absence of an antitank battery and a shortage of liaison vehicles (motorcycles and trucks).41 The division also suffered from inadequate communications equipment. Despite the requirement for excellent communications if it were to function as part of the General Reserve of the French Army, it was not issued command vehicles with sophisticated communications. It had a few of the newer model E.R. 30 radios, but most of its radios consisted of the older E.R. 26 ter model, which were mounted in trucks. The shortage of radios was so critical that the tank battalions did not have sufficient radios for internal nets, particularly in the two H-39 tank battalions.42 Later events demonstrated that the division lacked sufficient radios to be as mobile or as responsive as it had to be in the fighting around Mont Dieu. While the division did not have all its authorized tanks, the shortage was not of the same magnitude as other deficiencies. Theoretically consisting of a brigade with 68 B-1 bis and 90 H-39 tanks, the division had 62 B-1 bis and 73 H-39 tanks. Out of an authorized strength of 158 tanks, the 3rd Armored Division thus had 135 available at Reims. If one company of H-39 tanks had not been sent to Norway, the division would have had on hand almost all the tanks it was authorized to have. While the two B-1 bis battalions had only 31 tanks each, instead of the authorized 34, the shortage in tanks occurred because each battalion lacked the 3 replacement tanks it was authorized. Of the two H-39 battalions, one battalion had almost all its authorized tanks, and except for a company that had been dispatched to Norway, the other battalion had almost all its authorized tanks.43 Nevertheless, the division did not take all of its tanks to Sedan, since a few were left behind because of maintenance problems. One important deficiency of the tanks centered around the armament on the H39 tanks. While the 42nd Tank Battalion had tanks armed with the low-velocity Model 1916 37mm cannon, which had been the main gun of the FT-17, a small World War I tank, the 45th Battalion had tanks armed with the higher-velocity Model 1938 cannon, which was much more effective against enemy tanks. Fortunately for the 3rd Armored Division, the company of tanks sent to Norway

was armed with the older model cannon.44 Thus, for all its significant shortages, the division did not suffer seriously from a lack of tanks. Nevertheless, the 3rd Armored Division did suffer significantly from being formed so late in the war. After being formed on 20 March, the division was not even alerted on 10 May. The French High Command believed it required additional time for training and did not wish to disrupt its ongoing training. When it finally received orders to join the fight, it had never maneuvered as a division and had only conducted battalion-level training, since it lacked the supply and command vehicles necessary for a large-scale maneuver. The decision to commit the newly formed division occurred on 12 May. Around 1430–1445 hours, the division received a warning order to prepare to send its mixed demi-brigades (one battalion of B-1 bis and one battalion of H-39 tanks) forward to two different locations. Fifteen minutes later, another order arrived ordering the entire division to move northeast as quickly as possible. The division's commanding general, General Brocard, sent his subordinate units a warning message and scheduled a meeting of his commanders for 1800 hours, but at 1700 hours the Inspector General of tanks, General Marie J. P Keller, arrived and ordered the division to move as quickly as possible to an area five or ten kilometers southwest of Mont Dieu. Using a Michelin road map, Keller marked the route for the division to take and explained that the division remained part of the High Command's General Reserve in the zone of the Second Army. It could be committed in either the Second or Ninth armies’ areas.45 Because the division was scattered across a wide area, General Brocard proposed, and General Keller approved, having the division conduct a two-stage move with part of the division moving on the night of 12–13 May and the other part on the next night. The division had to move about sixty kilometers, but some of its battalions were as much as thirty kilometers away from its center of mass. Beginning at 2000 hours on the 12th, the move of the first increment went without incident. On the following night, the second move encountered numerous refugees and fleeing troops and moved more slowly. Although German aerial attacks did not delay the move substantially, their bombs caused sufficient damage (particularly in villages) to hamper the move of the second increment. On the morning of the 13th, General Brocard met with General Huntziger, who seemed “anxious” but did not suggest that the division would be committed immediately. That night between 2000 and 2100 hours, a message that had been completed at 1700 hours arrived from the Second Army. This message warned of the possibility of the enemy's attacking the Second Army's main position of resistance in the region west of Sedan.46 The message, of course, arrived much too

late, for the XIXth Panzer Corps had crossed at Sedan at 1500 hours and was pressing against La Boulette by 2100 hours. The message also said nothing about committing the 3rd Armored Division. To counter any push by the enemy to the south of Sedan, the Second Army received control over the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and ordered it to occupy a nine-kilometer front from the Ardennes Canal, east across the woods of Mont Dieu, to La Berlière (three kilometers south of Stonne). With the 5th Light Cavalry Division protecting and extending the flanks of the 3rd Motorized Division, the 3rd Armored Division was told to occupy an area to the rear of the 3rd Motorized Division about a dozen kilometers southwest of Stonne. A message from the Second Army told the armored division to prepare for a counterattack either toward Sedan in the north or toward Poix-Terron in the northwest.47 General Huntziger's headquarters apparently ignored the fact that the High Command in Paris, as represented by General Keller, had told the division to occupy a position ten kilometers northwest of the position identified by the Second Army and that half the division was already in this position. In any case, at 0230 hours on the 14th, a liaison officer from the Second Army summoned General Brocard to a meeting at the field army's command post in Senuc, about twenty-five kilometers south of Brocard's command post. Arriving around 0400 hours, he met General Flavigny and learned that his division had been attached to the XXIst Corps. He also learned that the corps had the mission of occupying a defensive position in the woods of Mont Dieu, sealing off the penetration made by the Germans, and then attacking toward Sedan. Recognizing the complexity of the mission, Brocard stated, as later reported by Flavigny, “The counterattack should take place tomorrow the 15th.” Flavigny explained, “No, this morning [the 14th] as early as possible.” “We are not ready,” said Brocard. “We came to this area to continue the training of the division.” “It is not a question of training; it is necessary to fight. This is urgent. Can you be at your departure position by 1100 hours?” “That is impossible. I am not resupplied with fuel,” answered Brocard. “What?” asked Flavigny. “If you were an infantryman, your men would have eaten. If you were a cavalryman, your horses would have received their oats…in the vicinity of the enemy. Your fuel tanks are not empty. How much time will it take to complete your refueling?” “Four hours.” “That's impossible.”48 Despite Flavigny's insistence on beginning the attack as quickly as possible, he

finally agreed to delay the attack until 1100 hours. This gave the division about four hours to refuel and two hours to march to its departure position. To capitalize upon a massive Allied aerial bombardment scheduled for the morning of the 14th, the attack had to begin before noon.49 Brocard remained pessimistic about the 3rd Armored Division's being able to attack toward Sedan with the 3rd Motorized Division. With only six hours scheduled for the armored division to refuel and move to its departure position, he again warned Flavigny that his division had not yet completed its move from the vicinity of Reims. With only rudimentary fuel resupply equipment, the attack could begin no earlier than 1600 hours, he believed, not 1100 hours. He had strong reservations about the ability of the division to perform a fifty- to fifty-fivekilometer march, then to resupply with fuel, and finally to move fifteen to eighteen kilometers to the area of Mont Dieu from which the attack would begin. Despite Brocard's having underlined the deficiencies of the division, Flavigny disregarded the warnings and told him to execute his orders.50 Nevertheless, the corps commander did eventually agree to delay the attack until 1300 hours. The problem with fuel centered on the B-1 bis tank. Because of its relatively great weight (approximately thirty-five tons), the tank consumed enormous amounts of fuel and had a maximum range of only five to five and a half hours, but under some conditions this range could be reduced to as little as three and a half hours.51 During its development, its designers had anticipated problems with fuel consumption and had included an extra fuel tank in its design, but this had been eliminated because of cost restrictions. Fuel consumption increased when the French added radios, which quickly depleted the electric charge of the tank's batteries. Since electricity to run the radios and charge the batteries came from a generator attached to the engine, the engine could be turned off only when the radio was not being used. The requirement for the tank to burn high-grade aviation fuel rather than gasoline compounded the challenges of successfully resupplying an armored unit. Separate fuel containers and transfer pumps had to be provided, but they were not always readily available.52 With time and additional training, the armored units could have limited the effect of these problems, but the inexperienced, newly formed 3rd Armored Division found them to be extremely disruptive. Perhaps more importantly, Flavigny and Huntziger did not completely understand the limitations of the B-1 bis tank and had no sympathy for the challenges faced by the armored division commander. Following a painfully slow refueling and unfortunate delays in the transmission

of orders, the division commenced its movement toward Mont Dieu around 1200– 1230 hours on the 14th, but its two columns moved very slowly. Because of the possibility of German tanks appearing without warning, the division headquarters told the battalions to remain on guard during the displacement. The march was also disrupted by numerous elements that were fleeing in disorder and delayed by roads that had been heavily bombed. Since the armored division had no engineers, and the Xth Corps had neglected to have engineers keep the roads clear, the tank crews had to clear the roads for themselves. To explain the slow movement, General Brocard later emphasized the fatigue of his men who had made a long road march and who had refueled three or four times.53 Nevertheless, the caution displayed by the division as it moved forward clearly seems out of accord with the picture of a confident, eager-to-fight unit that some historians have occasionally painted.54 Regardless of causes, the combination of the late departure and the slow forward movement ensured that the division would attack extremely late, if it attacked at all on the 14th. The French units showed neither the ability nor the willingness to move forward as fast as elements of the 1st Panzer Division had moved from Gaulier toward Bulson and Chémery. While their exact arrival time is not certain, the tanks may have arrived at the southern edge of the woods of Mont Dieu around 1600 hours but were still two to three kilometers from the northern edge of the woods. Though the generals differed by as much as two hours on the timing of events, Brocard met Flavigny at Alleux (about fifteen kilometers southwest of Mont Dieu) between 1400 and 1630 hours on the 14th. The conversation started off awkwardly because Brocard did not know how far the two columns in his division had moved. He had received a message about the progress of the division but had not been able to decipher it. After receiving an update on the situation of the division, particularly its problems with communications, the corps commander criticized the division for moving too slowly and demanded to know why it was late. The division commander explained that the reasons were the same ones he had given that morning. He added that the division could still launch the attack, even though it was late, since the days were long in May and since the motorized division was not yet ready to attack. Flavigny rejected these arguments, probably angrily, and stated that it was necessary to do something. About an hour later, he ordered Brocard to place his tanks along likely avenues of enemy approach through the woods of Mont Dieu and La Cassine and to form blocking positions with mixed groups of heavy and light tanks. To comply with these orders, the division clumsily spread its tanks across a broad front on both

sides of the Ardennes Canal. While Brocard later insisted the tanks were dispersed across twenty kilometers, Flavigny insisted the distance was no more than six or seven kilometers with excellent lateral routes of communication to the rear. Whatever its width, the division spread individual companies across the front and split up some of the platoons and companies so strong points could be occupied with two or three vehicles. The different times given by the two generals in their postbattle description of events is significant, for Brocard provided the earlier times and Flavigny the later times. Obviously, if the earlier times were correct, the attack could have been continued, but if the later times were correct, the attack probably could not have continued. Conclusive proof about the exact time, however, may never be available. Suffice it to say, the XXIst Corps commander decided that the risks were too high for unleashing the attack late in the afternoon of the 14th. The key decision, nevertheless, was the halting of the attack. In his postwar letter to the National Assembly, General Flavigny explained why he halted it. The general situation had completely changed. The 55th Division which could have supported my units in the morning no longer existed as a fighting unit. The 5th Light Cavalry Division held the woods of Mazarin [to the northwest of Mont Dieu] with difficulty. The enemy had had the entire morning to cross the Meuse and to send reinforcements to the south of the river. It seemed impossible to make the counterattack…before night…. An attack led by weak, poorly trained troops seemed to me to be doomed to a failure that could have compromised the defense of Mont Dieu.55 General Flavigny also had been alarmed by the “nervousness” of the troops he encountered. In each of his later statements about events surrounding his decision to halt the attack on the 14th, he described meeting several soldiers who were fearful of facing a Panzer division and who repeated false rumors of German tanks’ having advanced much farther than they actually had moved. He also mentioned the armored crewmen's lack of confidence in their weapons. On top of this, Flavigny's discussions and meetings with General Brocard apparently created serious doubts in his own mind about the capabilities of the 3rd Armored Division and its commander. In a letter in August 1946 explaining his decision, he strongly emphasized the fragility of the B-1 tank and its many problems. He also stressed the inadequate training of the men in the armored division.56 Another important factor was Flavigny's lack of confidence in the French armored divisions. In a long account of his experience in the campaign, he described an exercise of the recently formed 2nd Armored Division on 8 May

1940, in which it had been ordered to conduct a counterattack that, according to General Flavigny, did “not correspond to the employment of a mechanized force in a rapid engagement.” In other words, the division received a fairly simply mission to accomplish, but it took more than four hours to move four kilometers and arrived “completely” disorganized. Flavigny concluded, “I had doubts about having to employ a unit so poorly trained.”57 Less than a week later, he faced exactly that decision and clearly was influenced on 14 May by his memories of the poor performance of the armored unit in the training exercise. In short, Flavigny saw little possibility of an effective counterattack's being delivered on the 14th. Faced with the possibility of wasting precious lives and materiel, he chose to cancel the attack of the 3rd Armored Division. Fate, chance, friction, and inexperience had caused France to miss a fleeting but important opportunity. By the morning of the 15th, the Germans had significantly strengthened their forces across the Meuse and thereby decreased the vulnerability of their rapidly expanding bridgehead. The events of the 14th also demonstrated an important difference between French and German armored units. Specifically, the French tanks were about as far from Mont Dieu at 0600 hours as the German tanks were from Chémery. However, the German tanks made the move successfully on the morning of the 14th; the French tanks did not finish the move until about 1600 hours. Leadership, experience, training, and doctrine account for the differences. Nevertheless, the French did not abandon the possibility of counterattacking. During the night of 14–15 May, the armored division had two tank battalions west and two east of the Ardennes Canal. The division was already experiencing numerous difficulties with refueling, resupply, and maintenance; its dispersion across the broad front made its logistical problems even more onerous. Because of several tanks’ having been left at Reims and because of a limited ability to repair inoperable vehicles, the division had only forty-one of its sixty-two B-1 tanks operational on the morning of the 15th.58 It probably had a slightly higher percentage of H-39 tanks available. On the morning of the 15th, the Second Army became concerned about holding the high ground running through Mont Dieu and Stonne, especially as enemy attacks against Stonne began to increase. For the next two days, some of the hardest fighting of the campaign occurred around Stonne. Around 0700 hours the Germans captured Stonne with a combined infantry, tank, and aviation attack. By concentrating dive bombers and tanks against the town's defenders and using infantry to infiltrate around them, the Germans forced the French to withdraw. The French immediately launched a counterattack with a company of B-1 bis tanks,

another company of H-39 tanks, and infantry from the 67th Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division.59 After some hard fighting, they recaptured the important town around 1100 hours, but the 3rd Company, 49th Tank Battalion, lost eight of its ten B-1 bis tanks during the fighting.60 Late that afternoon, the Germans launched another attack and recaptured the village. On the following morning, the French again attacked with the 67th Regiment, reinforced by a battalion from the 57th Infantry Regiment, and recaptured Stonne. As on the previous day, however, the Germans counterattacked and recaptured the town around 1500 hours. Thus, on the 15th and 16th, Stonne changed hands frequently. As mentioned earlier, both sides claimed to hold Stonne from 0700 to 1500 hours on the 15th. In reality, the area was likely held by neither side. Having become increasingly concerned about the German crossing of the Meuse, General Georges insisted that a counterattack be conducted at Sedan on the 15th. He had authorized the release of the 3rd Armored Division from the French Army's General Reserve and wanted it used in an attack toward the Meuse. At 0630 hours on the 15th, he formally ordered the Second Army to make the attack on Sedan. After receiving the order around 0800 hours, General Flavigny met at 0900 hours in Senuc with the commanding generals of the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized Infantry divisions. Since the combat units of these divisions were located near the line of departure, he believed an attack could be launched relatively easily by 1300 hours. With the 5th Light Cavalry Division attacking on the left, he ordered the armored division to lead the corps’ attack with the bulk of its heavy tanks moving through Bulson toward Wadelincourt. The motorized division would follow the armored division and seize three successive objectives: Chémery-Maisoncelle, Connage-Bulson, and La Boulette-Noyers.61 To ensure the attack proceeded smoothly, he placed the armored division under the control of the motorized division. Flavigny later explained, “The 3rd Armored Division appeared incapable of performing as an armored division; its tanks would be used to accompany the infantry, a method that all its cadre and crews understood.”62 During the meeting, the two generals informed Flavigny about the loss and subsequent recapture of Stonne and the use of French tanks in the successful operation. However, the commander of the armored division also reported that he could not attack immediately, for the movement on the previous evening and the fighting in the morning had exhausted his fuel supplies. He also had to reassemble his tanks from their dispersed positions. Flavigny had no choice but to delay the attack until 1500 hours. At 1430 hours the commander of the motorized division (General Bertin-Bossu)

and the commander of the brigade of tanks in the armored division returned to the XXIst Corps’ command post. They reported that the attack was “impossible,” for the tanks had not been refueled. The armored brigade commander explained that only eight of the B-1 tanks would be available for an attack at 1500 hours. Evidently furious about his orders being countermanded, Flavigny ordered them to return immediately to their units and to launch the attack. He caustically told them that even if a unit were unprepared to begin an attack, a subordinate commander had no authority to change the time of attack for his unit, especially when other units were prepared to attack on the specified time. Since they had Hotchkiss H39 tanks, he told them to lead with the smaller tanks and to have the B-1 tanks follow.63 Later the commander of the motorized division met with the commander of the armored division at their collocated command posts and learned that the tanks still were not ready to attack. Seeing himself with no alternatives, General BertinBossu told Flavigny the attack had to be delayed. Apparently somewhat more than half of the 132 B-1 bis and H-39 tanks were operable, but units were still being assembled and refueled. Bowing to the inevitable, the corps commander authorized the motorized division commander to delay the attack until the tanks were assembled. The attack was soon postponed until 1730 hours. Not relishing the prospect of fighting outnumbered, Brocard remained concerned about the small number of tanks available and noted that the scheduled attack could not reach the deep objectives originally identified. Meanwhile an unfortunate incident reduced the number of tanks. One of the B-1 bis companies did not receive word about the attack being delayed and moved out at 1500 hours. After moving less than one kilometer, it encountered heavy antitank fire from the area south of Maisoncelle and Chémery and lost two tanks, as well as the company commander. Almost every tank was hit. By the end of the day on the 15th, one of the B-1 bis battalions had only twenty-one tanks, the other eight.64 Since the percentage of H-39 tanks that were available was probably about the same, the division had about 40 percent of its authorized strength in tanks. By the end of the day, the French had also lost Stonne again. Throughout this ordeal, General Bertin-Bossu of the 3rd Motorized Division performed extremely well. While he nominally had an armored division under his control and was receiving much pressure from Flavigny to get the tanks moving, his division was engaged in bitter fighting around Stonne. Given these demands on Bertin-Bossu, one wonders why Flavigny did not personally assume control of the counterattack. As other French commanders had done, he remained insulated from the decisive point in the battle in his sector. The sharp contrast between this style

of command and that of the Germans was clearly an important advantage for the Germans. Around 1715 hours on the 15th, corps headquarters—according to the commander of the motorized division—canceled the scheduled attack. General Flavigny, however, denied having canceled it and thought it had been launched. After a pilot reported seeing French tanks fighting north of the woods of Mont Dieu, he telephoned the Second Army's command post and informed it that the attack had begun. The truth became apparent later, and he said, “In fact, the tanks had moved barely a hundred meters and the infantry had not followed.”65 Thus a strong attack by the 3rd Armored Division and 3rd Motorized Division never took place. Except for a limited attack launched by the 1st Colonial Infantry Division and the 2nd Light Cavalry Division to the east of Mont Dieu and Stonne, the French XXIst Corps failed to launch a counterattack into the vulnerable flank of the XIXth Panzer Corps. In December 1939, when the Germans used a war game to test General Manstein's concept of a thrust through the Ardennes, their greatest concern had been the possibility of an attack on the German flank. Fortunately for the Germans, the object of their greatest fears was not realized.

CHAPTER 10

The Failure of The French Sixth Army

D

uring the 1940 campaign, some of the most confusing yet important actions occurred on the western shoulder of the German penetration at Sedan. In the area of the Bar River and the Ardennes Canal between Dom-le-Mesnil (on the Meuse River) and La Cassine (southwest of Chémery), the French committed several units in piecemeal fashion in a desperate attempt to halt the rapid German advance. While the High Command wanted the XXIst Corps to halt Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and then counterattack, the main purpose of the units subsequently thrown in front of the Germans’ westward advance was to contain the enemy and prevent Guderian from making even larger advances. To halt the XIXth Panzer Corps’ move toward the west, the French threw in the 3rd Spahis Brigade, the 5th Light Cavalry Division, the 53rd Infantry Division, the 14th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Armored Division. These units soon became embroiled in an extremely fluid battle in the region of Vendresse, Singly, and Poix-Terron. Farther to the north of Mézières, the 61st Infantry and 102nd Infantry divisions fought to retain control of the Meuse River against the advances of Reinhardt's XLIst Panzer Corps. As for the headquarters above the divisions, the French XXIIIrd and XLIst corps attempted to control units in the area where Guderian's corps was advancing, while the Ninth and Second armies, as well as a special field army headquarters under General Robert A. Touchon, attempted to exercise higher-level command. Because of the fluid nature of the fighting, the battle against the Germans became almost a confusing sequence of oftentimes disconnected actions. Since the XIXth Panzer Corps maintained the initiative through an energetic and hard push west toward Poix-Terron and Singly and then Rethel, the French could do little more than react. And usually their reactions occurred too late.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: GENERAL TOUCHON AND THE SIXTH ARMY Shortly after the war began in September 1939, the French carefully analyzed possible areas in which the Germans could penetrate or bypass their defenses in eastern and northeastern France. Two scenarios seemed to demand special preparations, the first being a German move through Switzerland, and the second a penetration between the Second and Third armies in the vicinity of Longwy. To prepare for these contingencies, the French formed a new field army, the Sixth Army, and charged it with the responsibility of preparing for the contingency of German attacks through these areas. In February 1940 General Georges gave specific directions to the Sixth Army commander, General Touchon, to prepare his field army to move in between the Second and Third armies if a rupture of French defenses occurred.1 Of course, the Germans did not make a penetration in May 1940 between the Second and Third armies but instead created a large gap farther to the west between the Second and Ninth armies. Nevertheless, the French High Command responded to the unexpected penetration by using the command structure that had been created for the possibility of a penetration between the Second and Third armies.2 By charging General Touchon with sealing the rupture created between the Second and Ninth armies, General Georges simply modified the contingency plan and response that had already been carefully studied and designed. The one important change he made was that he did not place the entire Sixth Army headquarters in charge of the French riposte. Instead, in an awkward arrangement, he brought the Second Army under his own control at midnight on 13–14 May3 and at 1530 hours on the 14th initially placed Touchon's newly renamed “Army Detachment” at the “disposition” of General Huntziger.4 Supply and services, however, came from the Ninth Army. Touchon was a gifted and effective leader who had made his reputation as a younger office while teaching at the Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre in the mid1920s. A forceful and confident speaker, he gave frequent lectures on the infantry. More than anything else, these lectures revealed a faith in the “preponderant importance of fire” and a lack of faith in mobility and mechanization. In several of his lectures he was particularly critical of French thinkers before World War I who had misunderstood the effects of enemy fire. In other lectures, he also rejected the methods that later became the heart of German infiltration tactics. Amidst the security and quiet of the lecture hall, he questioned the possibility of driving deeply into or completely through an enemy's defenses, for such attacks would be limited by the complexity of coordinating the infantry and the artillery

and by the difficulty of maintaining the rhythm of a deep attack. Little did he realize how extensively such an operation would later affect his life. In 1931 Colonel Touchon became the commandant of the School of Application for Infantry and Tanks and soon suggested the conduct of a special exercise to experiment with “modern” methods of combat. The tests he suggested were conducted in September 1932 at the Camp de Mailly and were one of the most important endeavors in the attempt by France to develop modern armored forces. As chief umpire of the exercises, Touchon questioned the potential of mechanized units. Among his criticisms was the inability of armored forces to attack a strongly defended position. According to General Weygand, the negative report on the 1932 exercises virtually halted the movement toward independent armored forces. The French Army noticed Touchon's talents and liked his ideas, and in 1936 made him a member of the commission that wrote a new version of the French equivalent of the field service regulations. In 1938 he served as the president of the commission that wrote the new infantry regulations. By 1940 he was clearly acknowledged to be one of France's brightest and most capable leaders.5 Thus it was most ironic that General Touchon—an officer who had played such a key role in France's failure to develop mobile armored forces—was placed in charge of sealing the gap made by the German armored forces. The requirement to create a special force for insertion between the Second and Ninth armies appeared because of the advance of the German XIXth Panzer Corps on 13–14 May. As the Germans pushed back the French 55th Division toward Mont Dieu, they separated the Second and Ninth armies and soon opened a large gap between them. With the right of the Ninth Army touching Dom-le-Mesnil along the Meuse (five kilometers west of Donchery) and the left of the Second Army touching Omont (ten kilometers west of Chémery), an opening of about twelve kilometers existed between the two armies. After the collapse of the 55th Division and the insertion of the 3rd Motorized and the 3rd Armored divisions by the Second Army into positions along Mont Dieu, elements of the hard-pressed and tired 5th Light Cavalry Division and 3rd Brigade of Spahis attempted to fill the gap between the 3rd Motorized Division and the 53rd Infantry Division, which was on the extreme right of the Ninth Army. Yet, even before Guderian pivoted west, it was clear that additional forces had to be moved forward to strengthen the two sorely pressed cavalry units. Though he did not yet know the results of the anticipated counterattacks on the 14th by the Xth Corps (with two infantry regiments and two tank battalions) and on the 15th by the XXIst Corps (with the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions), General Georges began planning on the night of 13–14 May for the possibility of a German penetration between the Second and Ninth armies. In the

middle of the night, General Touchon, who commanded the Sixth Army, received a telephone call ordering him to report to Georges’ office the following morning. During a meeting at 0800 hours on the 14th, Georges informed Touchon of his intention to place him in charge of the forces that would “colmater the breach [in the] vicinity of Sedan.” Revealing a late-blooming concern with the possibility of the Germans’ heading west, Georges wanted Touchon's forces to be employed so the direction between Sedan and Laon could be “interdicted.”6 This discussion is the first indication of a high-level French concern with a German move or pivot to the west. It may have come from the recognition that the Germans crossing the Meuse near Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan could combine their forces and pose a serious threat to the French center. Following his attendance at a long briefing, which was also attended by General Gamelin, Touchon left the headquarters at 1100 hours. Before he departed Georges’ headquarters, Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, described the situation at Sedan and provided an unnecessarily optimistic report. He said, “We have the situation in hand. We have created a field of battle where we will encounter the enemy with equal if not superior forces.”7 The reasons for this optimism are inexplicable, for by this time the counterattack by the Xth Corps with two infantry regiments and two tank battalions had failed and the Germans had moved through Chémery. Lacaille's report to Georges is clear evidence of the French High Command's failure early on the 14th to appreciate what the Germans were doing. Shortly after arriving at Soissons, Touchon was recalled to Georges’ headquarters. At 1140 hours Colonel Lacaille had provided another report, but this one gave a more realistic assessment of the deteriorating situation at Sedan.8 After arriving at Georges’ headquarters, Touchon learned that the German “pocket” had become much larger and was continuing to expand at an alarming rate. Georges told him that he must act quickly and “assist General Huntziger in sealing the breach.”9 At 1500 hours on the 14th, General Touchon arrived at Senuc where he met with Huntziger and learned more about the gravity of the situation. At 1530 hours he received a written order, which provided him his mission: “General Touchon is placed temporarily at the disposition of General Huntziger to reestablish the situation at the boundary between the Second and Ninth armies. His mission specifically will be to coordinate the actions of large units operating at the junction of the Second and Ninth armies.”10 Though the order was signed by Georges, it initially provided him only a provisional cavalry squadron and six training battalions. Other units would later be placed under his control. Rarely has

the destiny of a nation ridden on the back of such a relatively small force. After leaving Senuc, Touchon drove about sixty-five kilometers along a circuitous route toward the northwest from Vouziers, to Mazagran, to Machault, to Rethel. At Mazagran he encountered the colonel who commanded the 57th Infantry Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division. This division was moving north into position along the Aisne River, which ran roughly parallel to and about fifteen kilometers south of the line of hills near Singly and Vendresse. Since Touchon was unable to establish contact with the commanding general of the 36th Division, he ordered the commander of the 57th Regiment to defend the area around Vouziers. He wanted the 36th Division to defend along the Aisne River between Vouziers and Attigny.11 At Machault he expected to meet with General Grandsard of the Xth Corps, but he was nowhere to be found. The only personnel Touchon could locate were three communications officers from the Xth Corps who were ignorant of Grandsard's location. He drove on to Rethel. Between 2300 and 2400 hours on that same day, Touchon met with General de Lattre de Tassigny, who commanded the 14th Infantry Division but who had only one regiment in the area. As will be explained, he ordered de Lattre to “hold” Rethel and to establish contact with the 36th Division at Attigny. More importantly, he ordered the division to defend along a twenty-kilometer front between Poix-Terron and Signy-l'Abbaye.12 These two towns lay northwest of Vendresse and Singly and were on the northern edge of the long line of hills that extended northwest from Stonne and Mont Dieu. Only two hours before, de Lattre had met with General André G. Corap (to whom his division had been attached up to that point) and received orders from the Ninth Army's commander to occupy the Poix-Terron to Signy-l'Abbaye line. Sometime around midnight of the 14–15th, General Germain, who commanded the XXIIIrd Corps, arrived at Touchon's headquarters. Touchon placed the 14th Infantry Division under his command and ordered him to establish contact with the Second Army on his right. An hour later, General Keller, the Inspector General of tanks, arrived to inform him that the 2nd Armored Division was placed at his disposition and would be disembarking near his headquarters.13 Shortly after the meeting with Keller, de Lattre learned that the 2nd Armored Division would move into the area to the left of the 14th Division near Launois (eight kilometers west of Poix-Terron). On 14 May several decisions had increased the number of units under Touchon's control, and at 0715 hours on the 15th, Georges’ headquarters published an order placing Touchon's field army directly under his control rather

than Huntziger's and identifying the units under Touchon's control. These were the XXIIIrd Corps, which had the 14th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division, and a number of training battalions; and the XLIst Corps, which had the 53rd Infantry Division, 61st Infantry Division, 102nd Infantry Division, and 3rd Brigade of Spahis.14 While the order did not change Touchon's mission, it did specify the line along which he was supposed to halt the Germans. The line was shaped roughly like a giant V leaning on its side with the point aiming west toward Montcornet and the top center on Mézières. The bottom part of the V extended about thirty-five kilometers northwest from Omont to Liart (about ten kilometers northwest of Signy-l'Abbaye), while the top part extended about twenty-five kilometers northeast from Liart to Rocroi. Based on orders given by Touchon on the 14th, the 36th Infantry and 14th Infantry divisions would hold the bottom part of the V, while the 2nd Armored Division would occupy part of the line and then attack directly into the V. Georges’ order also indicated that three additional infantry divisions would disembark between 16–18 May just beyond the point of the V, about twenty kilometers west and northwest of Liart. Thus, around midnight of the 14–15th, the situation probably did not appear impossible to Touchon. Though the Germans had penetrated through the French defenses and had advanced much more rapidly than expected, the experience of World War I suggested that their rapid advance soon had to halt. Major advances in that war had rarely lasted longer than a week before physical exhaustion, dwindling supplies, and heavy logistical tails usually forced an attacker to halt. More importantly, significant forces were assembling near the Sedan breakthrough and would soon enter the fight against the XIXth Panzer Corps. However, if these forces were to occupy the positions designated by Touchon, much depended on the front units’ delaying the advance of the Germans. If Touchon were optimistic, his views undoubtedly became less optimistic on the following morning when he again tried to visit with General Grandsard. On the route, there was an uninterrupted stream of deserters, the majority in automobiles and impossible to halt…. In the village of Rozoy he found numerous military [personnel], almost all without arms and panicked…. The general continued on and loaded in his vehicle at the edge of the village a military policeman wounded by a bullet in his shoulder.15 Such a demoralizing spectacle had to affect even the most optimistic and capable French leader. What Touchon actually thought is unknown.

THE CAVALRY AT VENDRESSE AND LA HORGNE In the effort to prevent the XIXth Panzer Corps from heading west, French cavalry initially played the most important role. On 13 May the cavalry units of the 5th Light Cavalry Division rested in the area around Le Chesne (twelve kilometers southwest of Chémery). After its hard fight in Belgium, the division used the time to rest its personnel, to repair its equipment, and to resupply its units. Throughout this period, German aerial attacks continued “incessantly.”16 After the Germans crossed the Meuse on the 13th, General Huntziger called the division commander, General Chanoine, to his headquarters late that afternoon and briefed him on the situation. Because of the Germans’ having pushed beyond Sedan, Huntziger told Chanoine to prepare his division to be employed at a yet-tobe-determined location; he also attached the 1st Cavalry Brigade to his division. At 2200 hours a liaison officer arrived at Chanoine's headquarters and relayed an order from Huntziger for the employment of the cavalry division. Since the Germans had crossed at Sedan and reached La Boulette, the 5th Light Cavalry Division was to move that night and occupy positions along the Canal des Ardennes and the Bar River. Extending from north to south and facing east, the division was to defend passage points over the canal and river from the Meuse to a point south of Chémery and was to maintain contact in the north with the Ninth Army.17 On its right in the Second Army would be the 3rd Motorized and 3rd Armored divisions. In addition to the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was a horse-mounted unit, the 3rd Spahis Brigade, which was also horse-mounted, operated in the same area as the 5th Light Cavalry Division. The brigade included a Moroccan and an Algerian regiment. After its fight in Belgium, the Spahis Brigade withdrew across the Meuse and through the Ninth Army and then moved to Poix-Terron during the afternoon of 13 May. At 0130 hours on the 14th, the brigade received orders to cover the right flank of the 53rd Division (which was moving to the extreme right of the Ninth Army) and to assure “effective” liaison with the Second Army. The brigade commander immediately ordered his two regiments to move east from Poix-Terron toward Vendresse.18 At a meeting between the commanders of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and the 5th Light Cavalry Division at 0700 hours on the 14th, General Chanoine and Colonel Marc agreed on the procedures for maintaining contact between the Ninth and Second armies. Colonel Marc agreed to occupy the area between Sapogne (three kilometers south of Dom-le-Mesnil) and St. Aignan (four kilometers south of Pont à Bar). The cavalry division assumed responsibility for the sector from St. Aignan to an area south of Chémery.19

Thus, assuming all units managed to reach their assigned locations, the arrangement of units from left to right would have been 53rd Division, 3rd Brigade de Spahis, 5th Light Cavalry Division, and 3rd Motorized Division. By occupying these areas, defensive lines along the western edge of the German penetration could be reestablished and effective liaison between the Ninth and Second armies maintained. Before the 3rd Brigade de Spahis and the 5th Light Cavalry Division fully occupied their assigned positions, however, German forces began to infiltrate across the canal and river line to their front. The 2nd Troop, 12th Chasseurs à Cheval from the horse cavalry brigade of the 5th Light Cavalry Division held Malmy (one kilometer west of Chémery) and was reinforced by two motorized platoons from the cavalry division. Unlike many other French units, it had placed mines around the bridge over the canal and had thereby blocked passage into Malmy. According to German reports, however, the mines were not buried. From behind the water obstacle and minefield, the commander of the horse cavalry troop, Captain Ethuin, watched German tanks move south from Chehéry toward Chémery. At 1015 hours a badly wounded motorcyclist arrived and informed him that the Germans had crossed the bridge at Omicourt (three kilometers north of

Malmy).20 After receiving this alarming news, Ethuin placed a hasty minefield (but did not bury it) to the north of Malmy toward Omicourt, and a short time later received an order from his colonel to withdraw. Unfortunately, one of his subordinate elements pulled back too early and failed to cover with fire the mines near the bridge over the canal. The Germans took advantage of this mistake and quickly located and disarmed the mines. Moments later, they sent two tanks into Malmy. Busily engaged in preparing his cavalry troop to withdraw, Captain Ethuin did not realize the route from Chémery to Malmy was open and was extremely surprised to see these two tanks emerge from Malmy, only 500 to 600 meters from his position. Since the cavalrymen had no antitank weapons, most of them dashed to the west on their horses or hid in the scanty cover to the west of Malmy. They were lucky momentarily, for the German tanks pulled back toward Malmy a few minutes later. Unfortunately, the tanks and others soon returned and attacked the troop. Though one platoon was almost completely wiped out, strong antitank fire from near Vendresse and behind the unlucky cavalrymen forced the Germans to withdraw again.21 Beginning around 1400 hours, the Germans launched an armor-heavy attack against Vendresse and an infantry attack supported by tanks from Omicourt through the Forêt de Mazarin. Though the French units were jumbled together in Vendresse and the high ground to its north, the cavalry units managed to delay the German advance. As enemy pressure increased against Vendresse and as the enemy moved around Vendresse through the woods to the north, General Chanoine decided to pull the cavalry back toward the west and southwest, but not to break contact with the Germans. Elements of the cavalry division withdrew toward Bouvellemont, Baâlons, and Chagny, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which retained control of all armored vehicles, covered the withdrawal by occupying and defending the high ground near Omont (four kilometers west of Vendresse). After the other cavalry units had withdrawn safely, the 1st Brigade withdrew south toward Chagny.22 As for the 3rd Spahis Brigade, this cavalry unit never actually occupied the area between Hannogne and St. Aignan. After Colonel Marc met with General Chanoine at 0700 hours, the regiment was supposed to move about six kilometers north of Vendresse toward its designed position between Sapogne and St. Aignan. This position extended generally along the northern edge of the Forêt de Mazarin. At 0830 hours the brigade was moving toward its position, with most of its units still in the Vendresse area, when Marc received an erroneous report that German armored elements had seized Omicourt. Because of the confusing situation east of Vendresse, he prepared his units to block the route that runs northwest from

Vendresse toward Singly. By 1130 hours, according to Marc, “The menace against Vendresse momentarily appeared to dissipate.” The two regiments again began moving toward the woodline between Sapogne and St. Aignan. The German attack in the middle of the afternoon, however, caught the brigade in the middle of its move, and it quickly became deeply engaged in the fighting near Omicourt and Vendresse.23 When the 5th Light Cavalry Division began withdrawing around 1700 hours, the 3rd Spahis Brigade pulled back with it and occupied a position on its left that extended northwest from Bouvellemont. The two cavalry units thus occupied the high ground and key routes through the line of hills south of Vendresse and Singly. At 1900 hours a liaison officer from the XLIst Corps informed Colonel Marc of the withdrawal of the 53rd Infantry Division west toward the Vence River. The liaison officer returned at 2330 hours and passed the corps commander's order to the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 3rd Spahis Brigade to organize “centers of resistance to contain the enemy advance for 24 hours.” While the 5th Light Cavalry blocked the routes running through Omont-Chagny and BaâlonsBouvellemont, the 3rd Brigade would block the route running through La Horgne.24 At 0430 hours on the 15th, elements of the 3rd Brigade arrived at La Horgne. Of all the battles fought during the 1940 campaign, none subsequently was as revered or commemorated by the French as the valiant struggle by the two Moroccan and Algerian regiments at La Horgne.25 Using barricades and trenches along the small roads leading into the village, the cavalrymen fiercely resisted the German attacks from 0900 to 1700 hours. Though the 3rd Brigade did not fulfill its mission of holding La Horgne for twenty-four hours, it significantly delayed the advance of the 1st Panzer Division. But this was not accomplished without significant losses. More than half of the Algerians and Moroccans who fought at La Horgne died there. And among the dead were twelve of the thirty-seven French officers who fought there, including the commander of one of the regiments and his successor.26 Although the cavalry fought bravely at Vendresse, La Horgne, and other areas, it nevertheless failed to halt the Germans. With the 2nd Panzer Division on the north beginning to advance more rapidly than the 1st Panzer Division to the south, the French sought desperately to throw other units into the gap. THE COLLAPSE OF THE 53RD INFANTRY DIVISION In their attempt to seal the breach made by the Germans, the French relied heavily on the 53rd Infantry Division.27 The process by which the series “B” division was

thrown into the maelstrom began at 0815 hours on the 12th when General Georges decided to assign it to the Ninth Army.28 As with other divisions in the General Reserve, the 53rd Division had earlier been identified as probably being employed by the Ninth Army, and its leaders had studied the possibility of being employed on the Ninth Army's right and left flanks. After receiving the order attaching his division to the Ninth Army and meeting with General Julien F. R. Martin, who commanded the XIth Corps on the field army's right flank, the division commander, General Etcheberrigaray, received the mission of occupying a position south of Mézières along the Meuse River. The division was supposed to occupy the same area as the 148th Fortress Infantry Regiment between the Vence and Bar rivers. Since the 148th Regiment had three battalions on line, Etcheberrigaray decided to have each of his three regiments occupy the same sector as a fortress battalion. A battalion from each regiment was supposed to remain slightly to the rear of the remainder of the regiment; these three battalions were to become part of the corps reserve. According to the plan approved by the XIth Corps, which was the higher headquarters of the 53rd Division and which had responsibility for the sector on the extreme right of the Ninth Army, the division's artillery would move into line during the night of 12–13 May and the three infantry regiments during the night of 13–14 May. On the afternoon of the 13th, before his regiments started moving toward the Meuse, General Etcheberrigaray set out to visit the headquarters of the units to the right and left of his new position. Beginning his visits on his right, he arrived at the command post of General Lafontaine of the 55th Division around 1700 hours, about two hours after the Germans had crossed the Meuse. In their discussions, Lafontaine informed him of the presence of two massive groups of tanks, each having at least 100 tanks, north of the Meuse. As Etcheberrigaray monitored the rapidly deteriorating situation from the 55th Division's command post, an officer arrived and reported that the Germans had taken Wadelincourt. Etcheberrigaray departed immediately. It was around 1800 hours, and his return was delayed by elements of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps that were already fleeing. He reported, “I personally made two artillery battalions from the Xth Corps which had left their positions on the Bar [River] make an about-face….”29 That night at 2300 hours, while its regiments were still moving toward their designated positions on the Meuse, the division received a new mission from the XIth Corps. This order resulted in the division's being placed directly in front of Guderian's corps. Because of the rapid German advance on the right, according to the new mission, the 148th Regiment would remain alone along the Meuse, while

the 53rd Division marched south and faced east along the Bar River and Ardennes Canal. The 3rd Spahis Brigade and the division's reconnaissance squadron were ordered to cover the right flank of the division in the vicinity of Omicourt and Vendresse. Because of his fears that a change of mission and direction in the middle of the night would cause disorder, Etcheberrigaray delayed issuing a new order until around 0330–0400 hours on the 14th.30 Unfortunately, some of the battalions did not receive the new order until several hours later, and the division commander had to resort to sending a member of his staff to verify their location and activity. Etcheberrigaray also sent the staff officer to Vendresse to verify that it was not occupied by the Germans. For several hours early on the 14th, the 53rd Division struggled to move south and face east. Etcheberrigaray attempted to organize his defenses with two regiments facing east and one regiment in a second position to their rear just east of the Vence River. To ensure good control of his regiments, he placed Colonel Rivet, who commanded the infantry in the division, in charge of organizing the new defenses, which were to the west of the Bar River and Ardennes Canal. Though the river and canal offered some potential as an obstacle to hinder a German move toward the west, he elected not to defend along them. He apparently expected the cavalry to defend the water obstacles to his division's front.31 Before the 53rd Division's battalions were in place, the 2nd Panzer Division moved west along the Meuse and crossed the Bar River and Ardennes Canal at Pont à Bar around 1200 hours on the 14th. The Panzer division advanced rapidly in a counterclockwise direction through Hannogne, Sapogne, and Boutancourt. According to the reports of the 148th Fortress Infantry, the Germans also moved directly west toward Dom-le-Mesnil and cleared that sector completely by 1530 hours. Around 1700 hours the Germans reached Boutancourt as part of their counterclockwise movement, hitting only one battalion of the 53rd Division during their circular journey. In fact, until around 1700 hours, no unit of the 53rd Division had made contact with the Germans.32 Beginning around 1500 hours, the 1st Panzer Division began pressing hard against Vendresse, which was on the division's right flank but which was being defended by the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Some of the 53rd Division's battalions were still moving into their new positions at this time, particularly those of the 208th Infantry Regiment on the division's second line along the Vence River. As mentioned earlier, these positions were behind the line occupied by the cavalry. That evening, the Germans managed to get beyond Vendresse and appeared to fan out in two directions, one column moving northwest toward Villers-le-Tilleul and Singly, and the other moving west toward

Omont and then southwest toward Chagny. Before the fall of Vendresse, General Etcheberrigaray received an order around 1530 hours from the XLIst Corps, his new superior headquarters, that revealed their complete lack of understanding about what was happening to the 53rd Division. The liaison officer carrying the order acknowledged that his headquarters had told him to obtain information about the 53rd Division, since they were “ignorant” of its situation, but the new order nevertheless directed the division to counterattack. The corps headquarters ordered, “Seal the gap between Second and Ninth armies by counterattacking with the aid of an armored division which will intervene on the left of the Second Army…[at] 1600 hours.”33 After learning of the order, Etcheberrigaray recognized it was “impossible” to launch a counterattack at 1600 hours (about thirty minutes after his being notified of the mission) and refused to do so. He also knew nothing about the armored division that was supposed to participate in the counterattack. At the moment he refused to counterattack, it is very possible that no element of his division had yet made contact with the Germans. Fearing the imminent collapse of Vendresse, but apparently having little or no contact with the 5th Light Cavalry Division, Etcheberrigaray wanted to pull back his division by holding firm on the left flank and then rotating the right flank in a counterclockwise direction. Before he could give the orders for this withdrawal, however, he learned of the German attack on Sapogne and Dom-le-Mesnil, and then the Germans began pressing against both flanks of his division between 1600 and 1700 hours on the 14th. Ignoring the order from the XLIst Corps, he decided to withdraw the forward regiments behind the Vence River, about a dozen kilometers to the rear and along the division's second line.34 His decision was eased by the 5th Light Cavalry Division's, which had been defending Vendresse, receiving orders to fall back about the same time the 53rd Division began to receive pressure on both flanks. Around 1800–1830 hours, Etcheberrigaray sent a message to Colonel Rivet ordering him to move the infantry to the rear, behind the Vence River. He sent this order, even though his division had thus far experienced only moderate pressure from the Germans. About the time Etcheberrigaray sent out the order to pull back the infantry, the Germans began pressing hard against his left flank. Before the 329th Infantry Regiment on the division's left flank received the order to withdraw, the colonel commanding the regiment reported at 1830 hours that he was “encircled” by enemy tanks.35 Despite this heavy pressure, the regiment somehow managed that night to make its way back to the Vence River. In essence, the division moved in a giant circle on the 13th and 14th. After

spending the previous night marching northeast toward the Meuse and the entire day on the 14th shifting toward the south, the division began another move. This time it marched toward the west. The decision to withdraw weakened the French position significantly and enabled the German XIXth Panzer Corps to advance more rapidly, for it had just fought its way through the 5th Light Cavalry Division. With the withdrawal of the 53rd Division, the Germans had very few French units to their front. Perhaps more importantly, the decision to withdraw came even though the 53rd Division was not involved in extremely heavy fighting and had not offered significant resistance to the Germans. The soldiers of the division had been constantly on the move, but most had had little or no contact with the Germans when they began moving toward the rear. Nevertheless, they were exhausted, and their morale had been substantially affected by the continuous flow of deserters through their positions and their constant shifting of positions. Obviously the division commander's will to fight had also been affected. Most of the battalions managed to make their way back to the Vence River, but several encountered major problems. Exhausted from the marching, the 3/239th Infantry stopped to rest on the grounds of the large castle in Singly, and around 2230–2245 hours on the 14th was surprised by elements of the German 1st Infantry Regiment. Half of it was captured.36 Throughout the night, a significant portion of the division's strength—particularly in the 329th Regiment—slowly began melting away into the darkness. Nevertheless, the division received another modification to its order around 2330 hours on the 14th. Instead of generally facing east along the Vence River, it was to move south and face northeast along a line between Barbaise (five kilometers west of Poix-Terron) and Bouvellemont (five kilometers west of Omont). The modification to the order required the sending of troops forward on the right of the division. Etcheberrigaray later wrote, “For all practical purposes, I could not count on the two regiments on the left, [which were] very weak and badly commanded; the 208th [Regiment] was in place and commanded by a fiery leader….”37 Consequently, he moved the 208th Regiment forward on his right, where it soon became intermingled with elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade at La Horgne and the 14th Infantry Division at Baâlons and Bouvellemont. By midmorning on the 15th, the 53rd Division had the much-reduced 329th Regiment in the Jandun-Barbaise-Rallicourt area west of Poix-Terron. The 239th Regiment, which had been ordered to occupy the center of the division's new position, had lost so many men through desertions that it never reached its position. Hence the 208th Regiment extended itself into the division's center and

soon occupied a front beginning at a point southwest of Poix-Terron and stretching to Bouvellemont.38 In the hard fighting that occurred on the 15th, actions by the 53rd Division became almost indistinguishable from those of the 14th Infantry Division, which occupied much of the same sector. THE 14TH INFANTRY DIVISION: SEALING THE GAPS AT OMONT AND POIX-TERRON Of all the French units in the vicinity of the German penetrations at Sedan and Monthermé, the 14th Infantry Division had perhaps the best reputation. Part of this reputation came from the abundant abilities of its commander, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, who later became one of the most important leaders of the Free French in the continued fight against the Germans after 1940. In addition to having excellent leadership, the division was a unit that was well trained and well equipped. When Touchon met with de Lattre about 2300–2400 hours on the 14th, the 14th Division was in the process of moving forward into the gap between the Second and Ninth armies. At 0800 and 1200 hours on the 12th, it had received a warning order and a formal order, respectively, to move toward the Second and Ninth armies. Some combat elements of the division departed at 0700 on the 13th, and the last ones left at 0200 hours on the 15th.39 As the division moved forward, General de Lattre received orders attaching his unit to the Ninth Army and giving it the mission of covering the right of the Ninth Army. The division was supposed to occupy the heights around Omont (west of Vendresse) and establish contact with the left of the Second Army. Acting quickly, General de Lattre responded on the 14th around 1600 hours by ordering the 1/152nd Infantry to move immediately by truck to Omont and by preparing the remainder of the division to follow. Not until 2200 hours that night, however, when he met with the commander of the Ninth Army, General Corap, did he gain a full appreciation of the confused situation existing in the vicinity of the Ardennes Canal between Dom-le-Mesnil and Mont Dieu. At the same time he learned that the 5th Light Cavalry Division had been engaged in bitter fighting at Vendresse, which was about five kilometers east of Omont where his division was supposed to move. During the meeting with Corap, de Lattre received the mission of occupying a position farther to the rear (west) than he had originally been told. The division was supposed to occupy a line from Poix-Terron to Signy-l'Abbaye (about eighteen kilometers to the northwest). Unfortunately, elements of the 152nd Regiment had already arrived west and south of Omont and had moved into position when de Lattre received the new mission. These elements soon became deeply involved in the fighting north of

the Aisne River, more than twenty-five kilometers from Signy-l'Abbaye.40 Between 2300 and 2400 hours on the 14th, General de Lattre met with General Touchon and learned that his division had been placed under Touchon's command. According to an official report written after the war, Touchon supposedly preferred to place the entire 14th Division along the Aisne and not move it forward, but de Lattre convinced him to leave some elements of the division forward of the Aisne so they could slow the enemy's advance and provide time for elements withdrawing across the Aisne.41 Though the exact instructions given by Touchon are not clear, de Lattre's new commander did not modify substantially the mission previously given him. While the 14th Division continued to defend Rethel, de Lattre was to strengthen his forces near Omont and establish additional defenses between Signy-l'Abbaye and Poix-Terron. In other words, the division was to defend a front of more than twenty-five kilometers, but unfortunately it hardly had the equivalent of three battalions in the area.42 Whether Touchon or de Lattre knew anything about the 53rd Division is not clear. As the battle unfolded, much of the division did not move forward into the defensive sector assigned it. The explanation for the delay comes partially from aerial attacks’ having restricted forward movement and from fleeing troops’ having jammed and restricted movement on the main roads. Since most of the division—except for the 152nd Regiment—was in the process of being transported forward on the night of the 14th, problems with railway and road communications delayed their movement and prevented them from arriving early enough to participate in the battle. Thus elements of the 152nd Regiment, which had begun moving around 1600 hours on the 14th, were thrown into heavy fighting in an area assigned to the entire division. Nevertheless, the remainder of the division moved successfully to the Aisne River and established a bridgehead around Rethel. Colonel Trinquand, who commanded the infantry in the 14th Division, had been ordered by de Lattre to supervise the advance elements as they moved into the vicinity of Tourteron, which lay about ten kilometers southwest of Omont. Around 1800 hours on the 14th, Trinquand ordered the 1/152nd Infantry to move to Chagny and Bouvellemont with the division antitank company. These two small villages lay about halfway between Tourteron and Omont. As the 1st Battalion marched forward, it moved in behind elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and the 5th Light Cavalry Division. After learning of the order from Touchon to occupy a position farther west, Trinquand decided to leave the 1st Battalion in place to cover the right flank of the division. Around 0230 hours on the 15th, he sent the motorized company of the

division's reconnaissance squadron to the right (east) of the 1st Battalion, seeking contact with the Second Army. He also sent the 2/152nd Infantry north toward Poix-Terron. He soon discovered that infantry of the 208th Infantry Regiment from the 53rd Division was between the two battalions of the 152nd Regiment and that elements of the 3rd Spahis Brigade and 5th Light Cavalry Division were to their front.43 A horse cavalry unit, the 3rd Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs, occupied a position to the west of the 2nd Battalion. Trinquand dispatched the horse cavalry elements of the division's reconnaissance squadron to the left flank of this unit. These thin elements stretched almost from Signy-l'Abbaye to south of Vendresse, a distance of about thirty kilometers. By sending units forward to defend in the Poix-Terron–Bouvellemont–Chagny region, however, Trinquand chose to occupy ideal defensive terrain that lay in the line of hills running south of Singly and Vendresse. He also had placed his thin line of two battalions and a demi-brigade of horse cavalrymen directly in front of the 1st Panzer Division and the southern part of the 2nd Panzer Division. Though outnumbered and facing relatively large enemy armored forces, many of his men occupied strong positions with choke points where the German advantage in tanks was partially nullified by their having to pass through broken terrain and narrow roads. The French soldiers near Chagny on his right flank occupied a particularly strong position. Moreover, Trinquand eventually had three antitank companies to support the equivalent of three battalions that were under his control. When Lieutenant Colonel Bailly, commander of the 1/152nd Infantry, arrived at his designated position between Bouvellemont and Chagny on the 14th, he placed his 1st and 3rd companies near Bouvellemont and Baâlons, respectively, and at noon on the 15th (as ordered by Trinquand) sent his 2nd Company northeast toward Chagny. He apparently told the 2nd Company to send a patrol into Omont, if possible. Around 1300 hours when the 2nd Company reached Hill 250 along the road that ran east-west from Bouvellemont to Chagny, it came under heavy enemy fire and quickly dug in atop the hill. As the infantrymen placed accurate fire into the attacking Germans, elements of the 11th Cuirassiers of the 5th Light Cavalry Division, which had been engaging the German 1st and 2nd Panzer regiments at Chagny, withdrew to their strong position. A horse cavalry troop from the 1st Cavalry Brigade had also participated in the defense of Chagny, and after suffering particularly heavy losses, it too withdrew toward Hill 250.44 The intermingled units soon turned aside an attempt by the Germans to move forward along the single narrow road that ran from Chagny to the heights that included Hill 250. They also blocked an attempt by enemy infantry to bypass the village on the west.

Toward the west-northwest, the 2/152nd Infantry came under heavy attack about the same time on the 15th from elements of the 2nd Panzer Division. Before the battalion reached Poix-Terron, German tanks came from the direction of that village around 1230 hours and assaulted its 5th and 7th companies. The 7th Company had reached the banks of the Vence River near Montigny-sur-Vence (three kilometers west of Poix-Terron) and watched helplessly as a company of French FT-17 tanks of World War I vintage charged gallantly forward along the road toward Poix-Terron and was decimated. Despite the sacrifice of the ancient tanks, the Germans forced the 5th and 7th companies to withdraw. Some of the withdrawing soldiers moved into La Bascule, a small village at the road junction about three kilometers south of Poix-Terron, where they fought alongside elements of the 208th Regiment from the 53rd Division. When German tanks attacked La Bascule, French 25mm antitank guns turned them back momentarily, but after being encircled, the defenders again withdrew around 1500 hours on the 15th.45 This withdrawal enabled elements of the 2nd Panzer Division to move beyond the line of hills through which the 1st Panzer Division was still trying to pass. Around 1800 hours the remnants of the 2/152nd Infantry halted at Wignicourt, about six kilometers south of La Bascule. Farther to the west, elements of the 3rd Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs came under heavy pressure around 1900 hours in the town of Faissault (ten kilometers southwest of Poix-Terron), probably from German elements that had previously moved through La Bascule and continued moving toward Rethel. Using six guns from a newly arrived antitank company extremely effectively, the French cavalrymen halted about a dozen German tanks. After pulling back beyond the effective range of the French antitank guns, the Germans used the longer range of their main guns, however, to destroy the French antitank guns. After the tanks destroyed all the guns and set the village on fire, the French quickly withdrew.46 Earlier, around 1730 hours, the German 1st Infantry Regiment and a few supporting tanks from the 1st Panzer Division began pressing against Bouvellemont and Baâlons. The two villages sat astride routes through the line of hills in front of the Panzer division. As the French cavalry pulled back, elements of the 15th Regiment of Dragons Portés withdrew into the two towns and became intermingled with the 3rd Company, 1/152nd Infantry, at Baâlons and the 1st Company at Bouvellemont. The defenders at Bouvellemont managed to hold out longer than those at Baâlons, but after 1800 hours heavy artillery fire wracked the village of Bouvellemont. At 2000 hours the commander of the cavalry elements received word to evacuate the village, and the French pulled out at 2115 hours, about the time the Germans launched their final assault.47 Both companies from the

1/152nd Infantry withdrew a few kilometers south toward Jonval and then about ten kilometers south to the Aisne River. The 2nd Company and elements of the 11th Cuirassiers remained on Hill 250 near Chagny for the remainder of the night. At 0500 hours on the 16th, they received orders to withdraw and soon joined the rest of the 14th Division along the Aisne River.48 Despite heavy losses, the two battalions had done more than the entire 53rd Division to delay the Germans. Although Colonel Trinquand later claimed the two battalions of the 152nd Regiment had destroyed “about thirty” tanks,49 filling the gap between the Second and Ninth armies had been an impossible task. The Germans were pushing hard toward the southwest to reach Rethel, and even though the French halted them at Chagny, they eventually pushed around and through the defenders at Baâlons, Bouvellemont, Poix-Terron, La Bascule, and Faissault. Though the 14th Division had performed fairly well with only one regiment on line, it too had failed to halt the Germans, and its successes came as much from its having occupied favorable terrain and having had an unusually large number of antitank weapons as from other qualities. Even if it had succeeded, the entire front to its north was crumbling, and the division did not have the strength to keep the Germans from going around their left flank. THE 2ND ARMORED DIVISION As events west of Sedan reached the crisis point, much depended on the 2nd Armored Division.50 As part of the General Reserve, the division did not receive a warning order to leave its position near Châlons until the evening of the 11th. Along with the 1st Armored Division, it was to act as a reserve for the forces rushing into Belgium. Because of the French preference for using their highly developed railway network for moving heavy equipment, rather than using tank transporters, the tanks and other heavy vehicles moved by railway flatcars, while wheeled vehicles moved by roads. The move of the 2nd Armored Division to the north was supposed to begin on the evening of the 13th, but the railway flatcars used to transport tanks and heavy artillery pieces did not arrive on time. They had been used to transport the 1st Armored Division to the north, and until they returned, the 2nd Division's heavy vehicles had to wait. Meanwhile, the wheeled elements, comprising most of the division's supply and service units, proceeded separately at 2200 hours. Unexpected actions by the Germans, however, soon forced the French High Command to reconsider the planned use of its three armored divisions and resulted in a new mission's being given to the 2nd Division. The crossing of the

Meuse by the Germans on the 13th forced the French to counter the surprise move. Shortly before 0900 hours on the 14th, General Georges’ headquarters gave Army Group 1 control of the armored division so it could conduct a counterattack against the German crossing made at Houx (just north of Dinant and about forty kilometers east-southeast of Charleroi). The division would supposedly disembark at Charleroi beginning at 1000 hours on the 14th and close in by noon on the 15th. Assuming the move occurred as planned, the attack would begin on the morning of the 15th. Because the division could not be transported to Charleroi on time, the commander of the division, General Bruché, informed Army Group I at 1050 hours on the 14th that the division would not be ready to attack on the 15th. Believing an attack against Houx had to be made quickly, Army Group 1 switched the counterattack mission from the 2nd Armored to the 1st Armored Division. The 2nd Armored Division became available for another mission, and notes of actions taken in the headquarters of Army Group 1 indicate that it was slated to reinforce the First Army.51 While General Bruché was visiting the command post of the First Army, his Chief of Staff learned—much to his surprise—that the division would be placed under the control of the Ninth Army. Instead of being informed of this by the commanding generals of Army Group 1 or the northeastern forces, the armored division was told by transportation authorities in Valenciennes. Without telling General Billotte in Army Group 1, Georges or his headquarters apparently decided to place the division under the Ninth Army. At 1400 hours on the 14th, the division was sent a telegram informing it (but not yet formally ordering it) of the possibility of being employed in the area of Signy-l'Abbaye. The formal order was sent at 1720 hours.52 Army Group I apparently did not learn of the new mission for the armored division until it received a copy of the order from Georges’ headquarters, which formed Touchon's field army. The railway movement of the division began around 1400 hours on the 14th, even though its final destination was not known until after the arrival of the telegram, which was dispatched at about the same time. Though the loading and departure of some twenty-nine trains was scheduled to end around midnight, difficulties continued to increase for movements by railway. As trains arrived sporadically and departed quickly after loading, the train that was slated to carry the last element in the division had not arrived by nightfall on the 16th, so the commander of this echelon (a battery of artillery) decided to make a road march to Signy-l'Abbaye (a distance of about seventy kilometers). While continued aerial bombardment by the Germans did not halt railway movement, it did force delays.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Armored Division's wheeled vehicles had departed for Charleroi on the 13th at 2200 hours, but were halted at 0900 hours the following morning. That afternoon around 1700 hours, the commander of the wheeledvehicle column received word to move to Signy-l'Abbaye and departed at 1900 hours on the 14th. The wheeled vehicles actually moved toward Rocquigny (about twelve kilometers west of Signy-l'Abbaye), which was the designated location of the support units and command post of the division. The panic and fleeing of troops from the Xth Corps and 55th Division soon affected this move. As one of the convoys moved forward, it encountered some of the numerous troops fleeing from the east. Because of the panicked soldiers’ warnings about the imminent arrival of German tanks, the convoy commander decided to move his convoy—which did not have combat elements—to the south of the Aisne River. Though other convoys followed him, a few continued on to Rocquigny.53 With the division's wheeled units thus widely scattered, tanks and heavy artillery pieces began arriving late on the 14th. By 0630 hours on the 15th, six trains had arrived. Half the remaining twenty-three were en route, but the other half had not yet departed. By 1900 hours eight more trains had arrived.54 As trains continued to bring elements of the 2nd Armored Division into the area, they began unloading at diverse and sometimes widely separated locations. To compound the division's difficulties, the unexpected advance of Reinhardt's XLIst Panzer Corps passed through the center of the large area in which the trains were being unloaded. This advance split the combat elements of the division into two halves, one of which was above the Liart-Montcornet line and the other below. With some of the wheeled vehicles still south of the Aisne River near Rethel, the division in fact was split into thirds, with the combat elements bearing no resemblance to two groups and being in fact scattered on both sides of the Liart-Montcornet line. Around 0100 hours on the 16th, General Keller arrived at the command post of the division and stated that Touchon had ordered forces in his field army to withdraw toward the Aisne River. Since the 2nd Armored Division had become part of Touchon's army around noon on the 15th, Keller ordered the division to move as many elements as possible in the same direction. By the morning of the 16th, on the south side of the Aisne, the division had its headquarters, most of its support elements, one company of tanks, three B-1 tanks, a battery of artillery, two companies of infantry, and the headquarters of both demi-brigades. On the northern flank of the German advance, the division had five tank companies and one infantry company. The other companies were either en route or had not

managed to link up with the remainder of the division.55 The attempt to use the 2nd Armored Division in an attack against the flank of the German advance had failed miserably. Much of the responsibility for the failure belongs to the numerous changes in mission and destination for the armored division. Between the 11th and the 15th, General Bruché had been ordered first to act as a reserve for the advance into Belgium, then to support the First Army, next to counterattack toward Dinant as part of the Ninth Army, then to assemble at Signy-l'Abbaye as part of the Ninth Army, and finally to become part of Touchon's army.56 Because of the rapid changes in orders, without any attention being paid to space and time factors, and because of the complexities of moving troops separately by railway and road, the 2nd Armored Division never fulfilled any of the orders it received. A precious and strategically important unit had been wasted. If the division had moved by road from Châlons to Dinant (about 165 kilometers) or to Signyl'Abbaye (about 90 kilometers), the chances of it arriving intact, earlier, and combat ready were excellent. Despite this possibility, the French High Command preferred to move the tanks by rail. With the tanks’ reputation for being fragile and for consuming large quantities of fuel, railway transportation seemed the better alternative. The experience of the 2nd Armored Division, however, clearly demonstrates that luck, friction, and the actions of an enemy often make the most appealing alternative the worst choice. At 0800 hours on the 16th, a report to General Georges’ office informed him of the status of the 2nd Armored Division. The report provided the location of seven out of the twelve tank companies in the division. The seven companies were scattered on the perimeter of an area that resembled an oval with a height of about sixty kilometers and a width of about eighty. The original move to Signy-l'Abbaye had only been about seventy kilometers. While the report did not indicate how long it would take to assemble the scattered elements of the division, it did end on an unnecessarily positive note: “Good morale.”57 OPENING THE ROAD TO THE ENGLISH CHANNEL During the evening of 15 May, General Touchon concluded that his meager forces could not halt the Germans north of the Aisne River. This fact had been made unmistakably clear to him during the day when he had tried to drive around to Rocroi on the northern flank of the German penetration. Just outside the village of Rozoy (ten kilometers east of Montcornet), a French sergeant halted his vehicle and warned him that German armored reconnaissance vehicles were several hundred meters west of his position. As he turned his staff car south toward

Rethel, the Germans noticed him, and he fled under their machine gun fire.58 This spot was slightly less than twenty kilometers west of where his forces were supposed to halt the Germans and almost beyond the area in which three additional infantry divisions were supposed to begin disembarking on the following day. Touchon's coming under unexpected enemy fire undoubtedly affected his confidence in his ability to halt the Germans. The incident provided concrete evidence that the enemy was moving much more rapidly than anyone thought possible. When he arrived at his headquarters around 1900 hours on the 15th, Touchon received a message dated 1800 hours from General de Lattre, which said the Germans held Poix-Terron and the 53rd Division had “disintegrated.” Recognizing the inevitable, Touchon telephoned Georges’ headquarters and obtained approval for his forces to withdraw south to the Aisne. At 2300 hours he sent a message by telephone to de Lattre ordering him to place his division along the Aisne but to retain a bridgehead at Rethel.59 About the same time, the 36th Infantry Division began moving into position on the right of the 14th Division. When the remnants of the 53rd Division reached the Aisne River, General Etcheberrigaray placed all the elements of his division that were able to fight at the disposition of the 14th Infantry Division. In fact, this was little more than a portion of the division's artillery and its engineers.60 As de Lattre had reported, the division had “disintegrated.” During the night of 15–16 and the morning of the 16th, the French established a new defensive line running east-west along the Aisne River, and little or nothing stood in front of the Germans as they raced west toward the English Channel and into the rear of most of Army Group 1. On 16 May at 1800 hours, General Georges issued new orders to General Touchon and General Henri Giraud (who had replaced General Corap as commander of the Ninth Army). The order directed that a counterattack be conducted on the following morning with the 1st and 2nd Armored divisions.61 Since the order did not correspond with reality, the counterattack never occurred. Georges’ reasons for issuing an order that could not be implemented remain unclear.62 Despite Georges’ having issued orders that indicated a misunderstanding of the strategic situation, he did issue several orders on 16 May that accurately described the situation. One of these stated, “As a result of events occurring on 16 May in the region of Mézières, an enemy exploitation relying on mechanized vehicles appears to be taking place between the Aisne and Oise [rivers].”63 Another message explained, “It is important to slow down as soon as possible all

exploitation of this first [sic] success and prevent the enemy [from moving] in the general direction of Givet-Paris.”64 Unfortunately, the French could not move sufficient forces in time from its left flank in Belgium to the area of the German exploitation. In a desperate attempt to respond to the unexpected German thrust through the French center, Army Group 1 with the concurrence of the High Command ordered the First Army and the B.E.F. to pull back on the 16th from the Dyle toward the Escaut River.65 Tragically for the Allies, the distance from the Dyle River to Abbeville, where the Germans soon cut off communications between the Allied left and right, was much farther than the distance from Montcornet to Abbeville. Thus, on the morning of the 16th, the Germans were closer to Abbeville than the Allies. No matter how grand the effort from the Allies, they could not move faster than the Germans. Only the almost quixotic attacks by the newly formed 4th Armored Division under Colonel Charles de Gaulle at Montcornet on 17 May and then at Crécy-surSerre (fifteen kilometers north of Laon) on 19 May served to delay the Germans. The counterattack on 21 May by the small British “Frankforce” also managed to gain the attention of the German High Command. Nevertheless, little or nothing lay between the Germans and the English Channel on the morning of 16 May. Except for some final desperate struggles, the battle was lost.

CHAPTER 11

Conclusion

W

ithin the broader context of the battle, the breakthrough by the XIXth Panzer Corps at Sedan and its subsequent pivot to the west did not by itself lead directly to the defeat and collapse of the French Army. The German forces that moved through the Ardennes made three major penetrations of French defenses along the Meuse: Sedan, Houx, and Monthermé. When coupled with the penetration at Sedan, the crossings of the Meuse by the XVth Panzer Corps near Dinant and by the XLIst Panzer Corps near Monthermé occurred on a broad front and opened a huge hole in French defenses. Without the two other crossings, the penetration made by the XIXth Panzer Corps would have been extremely vulnerable and would probably not have had the strategic effect the three crossings had. In particular, the crossing at Monthermé on 13 May and the subsequent exploitation that occurred when the 6th Panzer Division moved to Montcornet on the evening of 15 May demolished any chances of the French sealing the breach in the Charleville-Mézières area. When General Touchon's army pulled back to the Aisne River on the morning of the 16th, the Germans continued to advance. Unlike Napoleon in Russia, the Germans did not head toward the capital, but concentrated on destroying the Allied armies by severing the left wing of their forces from the right. As the cutting edge of the kesselschlacht strategy of encirclement and annihilation, the Panzer divisions of the XVth, XLIst, and XIXth corps raced west and then turned northwest, enveloping the right flank of Army Group 1 (and the B.E.F) and separating it from the rest of the French Army. During the unfolding of the Dunkirk saga, the remnants of the French army continued to fight, but the final scene had already been written.

THE BLITZKRIEG The noted military theorist Major General J.F.C. Fuller acknowledged the importance of the fighting around Sedan and the decisive nature of the campaign when he referred to the fighting in 1940 as “The Second Battle of Sedan.”1 In his classic study of military history, Fuller argued that the basis of the blitzkrieg was the “attack by paralyzation,” which he had conceived in May 1918 and developed in his famous “Plan 1919.” Although the Germans may have been seeking a “sharp, rapid, and short war,” as Fuller asserted, there is little to suggest that the German High Command was purposefully adhering to his ideas for an “attack by paralyzation.” Similarly, if concepts later associated by some analysts with the blitzkrieg circulated among the members of the German military hierarchy, only a few officers such as Guderian and perhaps Manstein accepted them completely. The sharp struggle between von Kleist and Guderian that resulted in Guderian's resignation on the 17th clearly demonstrates the concerns of the German High Command about the pace and vulnerability of the XIXth Panzer Corps. At the same time, the evolution of the German plan suggests that the purpose of the phalanx of forces moving through the Ardennes was the traditional kesselschlacht strategy of encirclement and annihilation. Although the weapons were significantly different, the fundamental methods were not dramatically different from those used at Ulm in 1805, Sedan in 1870, or Tannenberg in 1914. When the Germans broke through the French defenses on the morning of the 16th, their objective was not to “make straight,” as Fuller said, for divisional, corps, and army headquarters; instead, they headed west toward the English Channel in an exploitation strongly resembling similar operations conducted on numerous occasions in the past by horse-mounted cavalrymen. As for the campaign itself, Fuller argued that the German Army “was fashioned into an armour-headed battering ram which, under cover of fighter aircraft and dive-bombers—operating as flying field artillery—could break through its enemy's continuous front at selected points.”2 While the XIXth, XLIst, and XVth Panzer corps did function as the leading force through the Ardennes, the strongest Allied resistance (Bodange, the “mushroom” of Glaire, Vendresse, La Horgne, Bouvellement) was overcome by hard infantry fighting, supported by artillery and tanks. The only time the tanks of the XIXth Corps functioned as a “battering ram” was when they overran the relatively weak French covering forces in Belgium. Not until long after 1940 did the important contributions of the infantry and the reliance on combined infantry-armor actions south and southwest of Sedan become evident. Fuller's comments about the German Luftwaffe also are not completely correct.

Although German aircraft did provide some support, they did not function as “flying field artillery.” The continued reliance on the “ground” artillery is obvious in the Germans’ having crossed elements of the 73rd Artillery Regiment at Gaulier as soon as the two rafts were completed. The most important contribution of the Luftwaffe in the area of Sedan was the prolonged bombardment on the 13th, which significantly weakened the will to fight of the 55th Division. While German air strikes did assist the forward movement of the ground forces, aerial attacks did not destroy significant numbers of tanks or bunkers. In fact, the Second Army reported only two tanks being destroyed by aircraft.3 Similarly, French bunkers were seized through the skilled fighting of German infantry, sometimes assisted by highly accurate firing from antitank guns, accompanying weapons, and a few tanks —not by their being knocked out by aircraft. The accidental wounding of the 1st Armor Brigade commander and the killing of the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion commander by an errant Luftwaffe air strike on the 14th demonstrate the tenuous links between the ground and aerial forces. Thus Fuller's assessment of the blitzkrieg may accord with many of the initial reports of the campaign, but newly available information suggests a much more complicated and sometimes chaotic campaign. In particular, the campaign consisted of something far more complex than a rapid rush of tanks through the heavy forests of the Ardennes and across the wheat fields of northern France. German tanks and aircraft may have received the lion's share of the credit for the success of the German blitzkrieg, but the tough, well-trained infantry deserve at least the same amount of credit. One should also give substantial credit to the assault engineers and the artillery. Without the important role played by these two, the XIXth Panzer Corps would not have crossed the Meuse successfully. THE FRENCH COLLAPSE To explain the military reasons for the defeat of France, one cannot avoid evidence of significant failures occurring throughout her system. France's strategy proved to be particularly vulnerable to a thrust through the Ardennes. At the operational level, her commanders could not react adequately to the challenge of the German breakthrough and the massing of her Panzers. At the tactical level, German infantry and tanks fought their way through French defenses that were occasionally strong but usually were weak. Compounding the problem, France's intelligence system failed to identify the main enemy thrust, and as late as the morning of the 13th, only hours before the XIXth Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse, French commanders and analysts continued to believe the main attack was coming through central Belgium. They

made the worst mistake one can make in intelligence estimates; they focused primarily on the information supporting their preconceived notions about the Germans’ intentions and placed less emphasis on their capabilities and on reports that the enemy was doing something else. In short, a sound military system may fail because of failure at a single level, but the French system failed because it was fundamentally inadequate. These failures have as much to do with the startling German success as do actions by Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rubarth, and others. At the root of many of the French failures is the startling contrast between two modes of warfare that were based on completely different doctrines. While the French prepared to fight a carefully controlled, methodical battle that stressed firepower, the Germans prepared to fight a highly mobile battle that stressed surprise and speed. Since the French expected to fight a carefully controlled, highly centralized battle, their soldiers and units were not prepared for hasty counterattacks or audacious maneuvers. In comparison to the Germans, they seemed at times to be moving in slow motion. General Lafontaine's delay of almost nine hours and his preference for counterattacking with fire rather than soldiers amply illustrate the French approach and its significant weaknesses. The technique of the methodical battle may have succeeded against an enemy who was a mirror image of the French, but it was completely inadequate against the much more mobile and aggressive Germans. With the French desperately trying to respond, the Germans gained and maintained the initiative with swift attacks against their opponent's weak points. By being stronger at the decisive points at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the Germans overwhelmed the French, who could not react in an appropriate and timely fashion. The German practice of attacking deeply without excessive concern for flanks further disrupted French reactions. The recent combat experience of the Germans in Poland provided them an important advantage. After encountering numerous difficulties in the September 1939 campaign, the Germans worked diligently to improve their system and to make their officers and units more responsive. As Williamson Murray has noted, the willingness and ability to identify problems and then to correct them enabled the Germans to make important adjustments.4 Though some significant weaknesses remained, the fruits of this effort were readily apparent in the 1940 campaign. In marked contrast, the French had what proved to be unwarranted confidence in their doctrine and were unwilling to acknowledge possible weaknesses. After the fall of Poland, the French accelerated their development of large armored formations but failed to reconsider their doctrine. Additionally, the angry response of General Huntziger to Pierre Taittinger's pointed criticisms of defenses in the

Sedan area perhaps provides the epithet of the French Army. He wrote, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector.”5 Consequently, the Second Army did not modify the level or focus of its effort, which also appeared suitable to the High Command. AUFTRAGSTAKTIK AND COMMAND STYLE Another important advantage possessed by the Germans was their tradition of auftragstaktik (mission-oriented tactics), which contrasted sharply with the more doctrinaire approach of the French. While the Germans taught their leaders to take the initiative and to make decisions that would contribute to the accomplishment of the mission, the French emphasized the following of orders, the application of doctrine, and the suppression of innovation. The actions of Captain de Courbière and the capture of bunkers number 104 and 7 bis stand as a fine example of the German adherence to mission-oriented tactics. Similarly, the failure of General Lafontaine to act decisively and launch a counterattack until he received written orders from the Xth Corps stands as an example of the French adherence to plans and formulas. Clearly, not all aspects of auftragstaktik were positive. The conflict between von Kleist and Guderian stemmed from the German tradition of providing leeway to subordinate commanders and in other circumstances may have had disastrous consequences. Interestingly enough, having a corps commander frequently disregard the orders of his superior, such as in Guderian's steadfast refusal to cross west of the Ardennes Canal, simply would not have been tolerated in the French Army. While French soldiers may have gained the reputation of often being unkempt and undisciplined, French officers obeyed their superiors to a far greater degree than did the Germans. About the only clear disobedience of an order by a French division commander came with the refusal of General Etcheberrigaray on 14 May to counterattack with the 53rd Division. He recognized that he simply did not have time to carry out the order. One could also cite General Brocard of the 3rd Armored Division for having disobeyed the orders of General Flavigny to counterattack, but Brocard's failure was linked more to his inability to resupply and move his division than to his having willfully disobeyed an order. Flavigny relieved Brocard for his failures, not for his disobedience. Nevertheless, the German emphasis on having leaders forward and making decisions according to the circumstances gave them a distinct advantage. Other than the practical necessity for commanders to be farther forward during an offensive, one of the most important reasons for German commanders’ being able to be away from their command posts revolves around their tradition of giving

chiefs of staff at division, corps, and field army level a high degree of authority. While French leaders remained in the rear and attempted to manage the flow of resources and units, German division and corps commanders moved forward and relied on their chiefs of staff to make management decisions in the rear. Because of their tradition of a strong General Staff, the Germans believed a commander should inform his subordinate commanders and his chief of staff of his intent and then provide his chief of staff the authority to ensure his intentions were followed. This left the chief of staff in charge of the detailed workings of the headquarters and permitted the commander to move forward where he could influence the battle personally. If problems arose or additional guidance were needed, the chief of staff would communicate with his commander, but he would not burden him with administrative minutiae. Also, since the Germans believed in giving subordinate commanders the freedom to act in accordance with their understanding of the mission and their commander's intentions, they recognized the chief of staff sometimes had to address important command issues when the commander was temporarily not available. The French method was very different, for they believed the commander should remain at his command post “on the handle of a fan” and control the movement and allocation of men and materiel. The weakness of this system can be seen in the role played by General Lafontaine in the 55th Division. As the commanding general of the division, Lafontaine rarely left his command post and made no attempt to go forward where the decisive fighting was occurring. The role of his chief of staff was little more than that of a senior staff officer. When the 55th Division's command post moved from Fond Dagot to Chémery, Lafontaine left Colonel Chaligne, who was the commander of the division's infantry, in charge of the old command post, while he moved to Chémery. Chaligne later went to the command post of the 71st Division and searched for the 205th Regiment, but he too remained tethered to the command post. Additionally, while Lafontaine and Chaligne supposedly helped to stem the flight of panicked soldiers past Fond Dagot, Lafontaine meekly accepted the chaos and jumble of units fleeing through Chémery. He found time to assist in the siting of an artillery unit, but he did not find time to halt the expanding panic. Apparently schooled in playing his role at “the handle of a fan,” he was unequal to the larger task of sustaining the fighting spirit of his division. The different roles played by the German and French commanders can also be seen by comparing the actions of Guderian to those of Grandsard and Huntziger. While Guderian moved forward and personally intervened to hurry tanks across the bridge at Gaulier, Grandsard and Huntziger remained tied to their command posts. Grandsard passed on the responsibility to the 55th Division for leading the

counterattacks by the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments and the two tank battalions. Huntziger also remained in his command post at Senuc and did little to ensure the energetic entry of the 3rd Armored Division into the battle. Others aspects of the French style of command seem curious in retrospect, but they harmonized with the doctrine of the methodical battle. In particular, General Flavigny's giving General Bertin-Bossu, commander of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, control over the 3rd Armored Division and responsibility for the conduct of the counterattack on the 15th seems inappropriate. This delegation of authority served primarily to insulate Flavigny from the battle and to increase pressure on Bertin-Bossu. In fact, Flavigny was so insulated from the actual fighting that he had no reports about the launching of the much-desired counterattack by the 3rd Armored Division except for the report of a pilot who happened to see some French tanks advancing. LEADERSHIP Though General Kirchner of the 1st Panzer Division was extremely successful, the ability of Lieutenant Colonel Balck to maintain the will to fight of his regiment stands as the best example of the German style of leadership on the battlefield. Because of his great energy, determination, and charisma, the 1st Infantry Regiment almost single-handedly punched through the French defenses at Sedan and moved to Cheveuges. Not one to lead from the rear, Balck's personal example maintained the momentum of the attack when some of the German soldiers faltered between Bellevue and La Boulette. Farther southwest, his leadership at Baâlons and Bouvellement also convinced the German infantry to make another assault, even though they were exhausted and had lost many small-unit leaders. During these crucial instances, his will and character instilled in his soldiers the conviction that they had to continue and had to carry out their mission. Balck's contribution as a leader, plus those of other German leaders who were closer to the fighting than their French counterparts, was one of the most important edges possessed by the Germans at Sedan. That his talents were extraordinary, however, is perhaps best demonstrated by his subsequent commands in the German Army: 1st Armor Brigade in the 1st Panzer Division, 11th Panzer Division, XLVIIIth Panzer Corps, Fourth Panzer Army, and Army Group G. The only French officer in the Sedan region who was as talented as Balck may have been General de Lattre de Tassigny, who commanded the 14th Infantry Division. Beyond a doubt, France's military leaders seemed unable to provide a spark of leadership that could motivate the French soldiers and turn aside the Germans. And the collapse and disintegration of the 55th, 53rd, and 71st Infantry divisions —usually with little or no enemy contact—opened huge areas to the Germans. The

collapse of these divisions did not occur because of the decadence of French society. In combat, soldiers fight as individuals within a unit according to the rhythm established by doctrine and strategy and according to the spirit engendered by leaders. They are not puppets performing intricate tasks in a mechanical or rote fashion; they are human beings surrounded by chaos and smothered by fear. Their success or failure comes not from vast, impersonal forces, but from cohesion, sound doctrine, demanding training, solid leadership, and confidence in their weapons. Many French units lacked these important qualities, and their collapse should not be surprising. A comparison of the casualties between the two participants suggests a great deal about the campaign. German casualties in the XIXth Panzer Corps during the entire battle from Luxembourg through Dunkirk were 3,845 (6.99 percent) killed (640, or 1.16 percent) or wounded (3,205, or 5.83 percent) out of a strength of about 55,000. Of these casualties, a significant portion came from officers. Out of a total strength of about 1,500 officers, 241 (16.07 percent) were wounded, and 53 (3.53 percent) killed.6 Because of the nature of the fighting, most of the casualties among the officers undoubtedly came from the infantry and armor regiments. The French suffered a higher rate of casualties. A breakdown of figures for all units is not available, but in 1947 the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre estimated that the Second Army suffered about 12 percent casualties, with 3–4 percent being killed and 8–9 percent being wounded.7 The losses of the 55th Division were probably significantly higher than the overall losses for the Second Army. On the morning of 16 May, the division could only account for 38 officers and 1,600 men in its four infantry regiments, which had had 293 officers and 11,727 men present for duty on 21 April. The overwhelming majority of these men were missing in action.8 The most important difference between the casualties of France and Germany concerns the loss of key leaders. Of the four French battalions in the area between Donchery and Pont Maugis, none lost its commander. Of the four regiments involved in the fighting at Sedan, none lost its commander. Only one, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe of the 213th Infantry Regiment, was wounded, but his wound came from German forces’ having broken through French defenses between Chehéry and Chémery, not from his being far forward. An important exception to this occurred at La Horgne. There, the brigade commander participated in the fighting, and the commander of one of the regiments and his successor lost their lives.9 In contrast to the French, the Germans lost a number of their key leaders,

including the commanders of the Armor Brigade and the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion in the 1st Panzer Division. While some of the casualties occurred because of friendly fire, German officers were forward leading their men, and as a consequence suffered higher casualties. French commanders, however, remained in the rear, attempting to manage the battle and rarely moving forward to decisive points in the fighting. A French general would never have been as far forward as the one Lieutenant Verron was taken to see after he was captured. The Germans also demonstrated an ability to continue fighting despite the loss of key leaders. Instead of permitting units to collapse because of an unfamiliarity with the mission or with what was happening, officers stepped forward and successfully assumed the responsibility of leadership. This success probably came from the German Army's recognition that perfectly organized and manned units exist only up to the first battle. After the losses of the first and subsequent battles, leaders must be replaced, and the unit must continue to function. That difficulties could still emerge, however, is apparent from the poor performance of the 1st Armored Brigade near Chagny after the loss of the brigade commander and other key officers in the 2nd Panzer Regiment. Both the French and German styles of leadership came from the two armies’ doctrines. While one emphasized the management of men and materiel in methodical battles, the other emphasized rapid decisions and personal influence at decisive points in highly mobile battles. In other circumstances, the French approach of having commanders “on the handle of a fan” may have been appropriate, but in the dynamic battles of 1940, the approach appeared completely out of place. By the morning of 16 May, the French Army teetered on the edge of collapse, and in subsequent days the Germans won one of the most decisive victories in military history. The shocking collapse of France captured the attention of most of the world's military leaders. That such a powerful nation could be so swiftly defeated seemed almost beyond comprehension, and a flurry of explanations soon generated a curtain of myths that obscured the reality of what had happened in May 1940. Neither France nor Germany sought to dispel these myths, for both were more comfortable with the myth than with the less-flattering reality. For those in the French Army, admissions of inadequate doctrine, poor leadership, and an illconceived strategy (as well as inappropriate training methods and personnel policies) shifted the onus of defeat onto their already over-burdened shoulders. Similarly, for those in the Germany Army, acknowledgements of the important role played by the infantry and of the confusion and difficulties encountered in the campaign served only to deflate the reputation of Germany's armored forces and

thereby to encourage potential enemies. As the sweep of events changed directions, the myths assumed a life of their own. Fifty years after the shattering events of 1940, the bunkers occupied by General Lafontaine, Lieutenant Verron, and others still stand at Sedan. Though overgrown with weeds and occasionally filled with trash, they are the only physical relics— except for the headstones in the cemetery at Noyers—left by the men of the Xth Corps and 55th Division. The myths, however, that grew out of the experience of these men continue to exist today. Such myths become particularly dangerous when they are used by theorists or military organizations and portrayed as historical fact. If concepts and doctrine are to have any utility, they must be based upon accurate assessments of events as they actually occurred. Otherwise, decisions about strategy, tactics, organizations, and equipment may be as specious or deplorable as General Huntziger's assertion when he said, “I believe that no urgent measures are necessary to reinforce the Sedan sector.” As the French cavalry learned at La Horgne, heroism and sacrifice in combat cannot always make up for mistakes or negligence that occurred before a battle.

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957), p. 84. 2. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess., vol. 86, no. 97 (May 16, 1940), pp. 9534–9535. 3. R.H.S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940,” History, no. 55 (February 1970), pp. 1–20. 4. Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985), p. 189. CHAPTER 1 1. B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: Morrow & Co., 1948). 2. See Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, pp. 41–71. 3. Dudley Kirk, “Population and Population Trends in Modern France,” in Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 317. 4. Procès-verbaux des réunions du conseil supérieure de la guerre (Hereafter P.V., C.S.G.), 17 May 1920, Service historique de l'armée de terre (hereafter S.H.A.T.) carton 50. 5. P.V., C.S.G., 12 October 1927, S.H.A.T. 50 bis. 6. Pétain's comments are included in Général Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1946), p. 128. 7. Pierre Renouvin and Jacques Willequet, Les relations militaires franco-belges de mars 1936 au 10 mai 1940 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968), passim. 8. Gamelin, Servir 1:84–88. For a fuller discussion of the plans, see: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dutailly, Les problèmes de l'Armée de Terre française (1935–1939) (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1980), pp. 91–114. 9. G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 0264 3/FT, 26 September 1939, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 10. G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 0559 3/N.E., 24 October 1939, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 11. Pierre Le Goyet, Le mystère Gamelin (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1975), pp. 281–83. 12. François Bédarida, La Stratégie Secrète de la Drôle de Guerre (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979), pp. 149–50, 179; G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 0773 3/N.E., 17 November 1939, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 13. Le Goyet, Gamelin, p. 284; D. W. Alexander, “Repercussions of the Breda Variant,” French Historical Studies 8, no. 3 (1974): 481. 14. G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 0682 3/N.E., 8 November 1939, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 15. Gamelin, Servir 1:82–83; 3:176–77; G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 790 3/Op, 20 March 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 16. G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 1122 3/Op, 16 April 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155; G. Q. G., E.-M. Général, 3ème Bureau, No. 790 3/Op, 20 March 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 17. Quoted in Pierre Lyet, La Bataille de France (Mai–Juin 1940) (Paris: Payot, 1947), p. 22; Le Goyet, Gamelin, pp. 295–96. 18. “Historique des opérations du G.A. 1 entre 10 Mai et le 1er Juin 1940 par le Général Blanchard” (typescript, n.d.), S.H.A.T. 28N1, pp. 18, 28, 30; Journal des Marches et Opérations du Group d'Armées No. 1, 12 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 28N2. 19. Generaloberst Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), 29 September 1939, vol. 2, p. 18. 20. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 7, “Memorandum and Directives for Conduct of the War in the West,” 9 October 1939,

Document L-52, p. 801. 21. Ibid., pp. 804–6. 22. Ibid., p. 809. 23. Ibid., p. 809. 24. Ibid., p. 811. 25. Ibid., pp. 810, 814. 26. “Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War,” Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 6, Doc. C-62, 9 October 1939, pp. 880–81. 27. Halder Diaries 2, 14 October 1939, p. 30. 28. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Dunkirk 1940,” in H. A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer, eds., Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1965), p. 33. 29. Walter Görlitz, ed., The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, trans. David Irving (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), pp. 101–2; Helmuth Greiner, “The Campaigns in the West and North,” in Donald S. Detwiler, ed., World War II German Military Studies, Document MS # C-065d, vol. 7 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), pp. 10–11. 30. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den Deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1957), pp. 25–31. 31. Ibid., pp. 39–40. 32. Ibid., pp. 36–43. 33. Deployment Directive Yellow, 29 October 1939, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. 10, Doc. NOKW-2586, p. 812; Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, pp. 25–31. 34. Notes to the War Diary, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 4, Document 1796-PS, p. 372; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans. Anthony G. Powell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1958), pp. 108, 110; Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, p. 53. 35. Directive No. 8 for the Conduct of the War, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 3, Doc. 440-PS, pp. 397–99. 36. General Franz Halder, “Operational Basis for the First Phase of the French Campaign in 1940,” Document MS # P-151, World War II German Military Studies, vol. 12, pp. 10–13. 37. Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 99. 38. Le Goyet, Gamelin, pp. 286–88. 39. David Irving, Hitler's War, vol. 1 (New York: Viking Press, 1977), pp. 85–86. 40. Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 103–5. 41. Halder Diaries, 3, 18 February 1940, p. 81. 42. Ulrich Liss, Westfront 1939/40: Erinnerungen des Feindbearbeiters im O.K.H. (Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1959), pp. 106–7. 43. Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 119; Halder, “Operational Basis,” p. 15. 44. For a detailed examination of the development of French doctrine, see: Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, passim. 45. France, M. G., E. M. A., Instruction sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1937), pp. 68–69; France, M. G., E. M. A., Instruction provisoire sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1922), p. 61. 46. Instruction (1921), pp. 11–12. 47. Général Narcisse Chauvineau, Une invasion: est-elle encore possible? (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939), p. 101. 48. France, E. S. G., Colonel Lemoine, Cours de tactique Générale et d’état-major, Tactique générale (Rambouillet: Pierre Leroy, 1922), pp. 66, 78. 49. Major Robert A. Doughty, “French Antitank Doctrine: The Antidote that Failed,” Military Review, 56, no. 5 (May 1976): 15–19. 50. Germany, Reichswehrministerium, Chef der Heeresleitung, Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen, vol. 1, pp. 140–42; Germany, Chef der Heeresleitung, Truppenführung, vol. 1 (Berlin: E. G. Mittler & Sohn, 1933), pp. 145–48, 158–59. 51. Chef der Heeresleitung, Truppenführung 1: 127.

52. General Wilhelm Balck, Entwicklung der Taktik im Weltkriege (2d ed.; Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1922), pp. 352–54; Georg Bruchmüller, Die deutsche Artillerie in den Durschschlachten des Weltkriege (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1922); Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, Die Durchbruch (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanslatt, 1937); and Captain Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War, Leavenworth Papers No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1981). 53. Chef der Heeresleitung, Führung und Gefecht 1: 53–54; Truppenführung 1: 146–48. 54. Dellmensingen, Der Durchbruch, p. 405. 55. Chef der Heeresleitung, Truppenführung (1933) 1: 1, 121–22, 127, 142–43. CHAPTER 2 1. Gruppe von Kleist, No. 217/40, 21-3-1940, Befehl für den Durchbruch bis zur Maas, p. 3, T314/615/193. 2. Hans von Dach, “Panzer durchbrechen eine Armeestellung,” Schweizer Soldat 47, no. 2 (1972): 58. Cited in Major Florian K. Rothbrust, “The Cut of the Scythe” (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1988), p. 51. 3. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 125. 4. XIX. A.K., No. 83/40, n.d., Studie für Korpsbefehl Nr. 1 für den Fall “Gelb,” Annex No. 1, T314/615/903; XIX. A.K., No. 0812/40, 9-4-1940, p. 2, T314/615/232. 5. For example, see: Panzergruppe von Kleist, No. 1695/40, 10 April 1940, T314/615/779. 6. Der Kommandierende General, Der Gruppe von Kleist, 11 May 1940, T314/615/1030. 7. 10 Panzer Division, Ia Op. Nr. 1, 9 May 1940, Divisionsbefehl für den Angriff, pp. 1–2, 7, 10, T314/615/1372. 8. Gruppe von Kleist, Ia Nr. 253/40, Ansatz des XIX. A.K., 18.4.40, T314/667/615. 9. I Mot. A.K., No. 330/40, 31-3-1940, Studie (Planubung) für Korpsbefehl zum planmassigen Angriff über die Maas im Abschnitt Sedan, T314/615/978. 10. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 70. 11. Halder Diaries 3: 125. 12. Bundesarchiv-militärarchiv (hereafter BA-MA), RH 27-1/4, 1 Panzer Division, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, 9.5.1940–2.6.1940 (hereafter 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B.), p. 5. 13. Halder Diaries 3, 18 January 1940, pp. 30–31. 14. Ibid., 30 April 1940, p. 184; 4 May 1940, p. 189; 7 May 1940, p. 193; 9 May 1940, p. 196. 15. Keitel, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, 9 May 1940, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 6, Doc. C-72, p. 905. 16. Oberkommando des Heeres, Kriegstagebuch des XIX. A.K. vom 14–29.5.1940 (hereafter XIX. A.K., K.T.B.), 9.5.1940, p. 2, T314/612/164. 17. Major von Kielmansegg, “Scharnier Sedan,” Die Wehrmacht 5, no. 11 (21 May 1941): 11. 18. BA-MA, RH 27-1/14, 1 Panzer Division-Ia, Anl. d z.K.T.B. Nr. 3, May–June 1940 (hereafter 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B.), Kraftradschützen Battalion 1, p. 174. 19. The actual route used by the 1st Panzer Division across Luxembourg was Wallendorf, Diekirch, Ettelbrück, Niederfaulen, Merzig, Grosbous, Grevels, and Martelange. In Belgium, the division moved through Bodange, Witry, south of Neufchâteau, Bertrix, Fays-les-Veneurs, Bellevaux, and Bouillon. In France, the division crossed the Meuse River at Sedan, moved south to Chémery, and turned west toward Vendresse. 20. Roger Bruge, Histoire de la Ligne Maginot, vol. 1, Faites sauter la Ligne Maginot (Paris: Fayard, 1973), pp. 147–60. 21. Halder Diaries 3, 26 February 1940, p. 95. 22. Rothbrust, “Cut of the Scythe,” pp. 83–84. 23. Commandement de l'Armée Belge, G. Q. G., 1ère Section, No. 41/34, 12 February 1940. Reproduced in Belgique, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, E.-M. Général—Force Terrestre, Commandant Georges Hautecler, Le Combat de Chabrehez, 10 mai 1940 (Brussels: Imprimerie des F.B.A., 1957), p. 69. 24. Commandement de l'Armée Belge, G. Q. G., 1ère Section, No. 41/34, 12 February 1940. 25. Belgique, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, E.-M. Général-Force Terrestre, Commandant Georges

Hautecler, Le Combat de Bodange, 10 Mai 1940 (Brussels: Imprimerie des F.B.A., 1957), pp. 9, 11–12. 26. Ibid., pp. 13–14. 27. Ibid., pp. 16–17. 28. Ibid., p. 32. 29. Ibid., pp. 19–24. 30. Major von Kielmansegg, “Scharnier Sedan,” Die Wehrmacht 5, no. 12 (4 June 1941): 11. 31. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 201; General Hermann Balck, Ordnung im Chaos: Erinnerungen 1893– 1948 (2nd ed.; Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1981), p. 268. 32. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 174–75, 201. 33. Ibid., pp. 105, 196. 34. Hautecler, Combat de Bodange, pp. 24–28. 35. Kielmansegg, “Scharnier Sedan,” 21 May 1941, p. 12. 36. Hautecler, Combat de Bodange, p. 30; BA-MA, RH 27–2/1, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2 der 2 Panzer Division (6.11.39–5.6.40) (hereafter 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B.), p. 12. 37. I.R. Grossdeutschland, Zusammenfassender Bericht über das Unternehmen “Niwi,” 19 May 1940, pp. 1– 2, T3I4/612/1014–1016. 38. Oberstleutnant Garski, Bericht, 19 May 1940, p. 1, T314/612/1017–1019. 39. Hauptmann Krüger, Bericht über das Unternehmen an 10.5.40, 19 May 1940, pp. 1–2, T3I4/612/1022– 1023. 40. Leutnant Obermeier, Bericht über das Unternehmen am 10.5.40, n.d., pp. 1–2, T314/ 612/1020–1021. 41. Garski, Bericht, pp. 2–3. 42. Ibid., p. 3; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 177. 43. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 13. 44. BA-MA, RH 27–10/9, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3 der 10 Panzer Division vom 9.5–29.6.40 (hereafter 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B.), p. 2. 45. 10 Panzer Division, Ia Op. Nr. 1, 9 May 1940, Divisionsbefehl für den Angriff, pp. 2–6, T314/615/1372– 1384. 46. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 4. 47. Helmuth Spaeter, Die geschichte des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland (Duisburg: Selbstverlag Hilfswerk ehem Soldaten, 1958), pp. 96–100. 48. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 5. 49. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 77. 50. Gruppe v. Kleist an XIX. A.K., 11.5.40, 0030 hours, T314/667/701; XIX. A.K., K.T.B., XIX. A.K., 11 May 1940, p. 10, T314/612/172. 51. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 11 May 1940, p. 10, T314/612/172. 52. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 6–7. 53. Ibid., p. 7. 54. Ibid., pp. 8–10. 55. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 11 May 1940, pp. 11–12, T314/612/173–174. 56. Ibid. 57. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 7–9. 58. Gen. Kdo. XXII. A.K. (Gruppe v. Kleist), Kriegstagebuch (10.5–11.7.1940) (hereafter Gruppe v. Kleist, K.T.B.), 11 May 1940, pp. 5–6, T314/666/1243; XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 11 May 1940, pp. 12–13, T314/612/174–175. 59. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 10–11. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., p. 13. 62. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 10. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., p. 11. 65. Ibid., p. 12. 66. Ibid., p. 14.

67. Ibid., p. 15. 68. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 15; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 5. 69. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 99. 70. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 15; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 99. 71. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 15; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 20–21, 106. 72. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 15. 73. Ibid. 74. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 72; BA-MA, RH 27–1/14, p. 72. 75. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 72–73. 76. 1 Pz, Div., K.T.B., p. 27. 77. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 109–10. 78. Ibid., pp. 113, 178–79. 79. Ibid., p. 179. 80. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 19; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 179. 81. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 22, 113, 179. 82. Ibid., pp. 23, 112. 83. Ibid., p. 23. 84. Ibid., p. 112. CHAPTER 3 1. On the general subject of French military intelligence, see: Ernest R. May, “The Intelligence Process: The Fall of France, 1940” (Unpublished paper, Kennedy School of Government, n.d.); Robert J. Young, “French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938–1939,” in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 271–309; Douglas Porch, “French Intelligence and the Fall of France, 1930–40,” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (January 1989): 28–58. 2. Gustave Bertrand, Enigma, ou la plus grande énigme de la guerre, 1939–1945 (Paris: Plon, 1973), pp. 56–63, 76–77. 3. Ibid., pp. 56, 59–60, 69–70, 79, 86–88. 4. Ibid., pp. 88–89. 5. Général Maurice Gauché, Le deuxième bureau au travail (1935–1940) (Paris: Amiot–Dumont, 1953), pp. 177, 183–89. 6. Ibid., p. 211; Paul Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler (Paris: Laffont, 1985), p. 179; Henri Navarre, Le Service de Renseignements, 1871–1944 (Paris: Plon, 1978), p. 109–11; Paul Paillole, Services Spéciaux, 1935–1945 (Paris: Laffont, 1975), p. 186. 7. Gauché, Deuxième Bureau, p. 223. 8. Jeffery A. Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 146–47; Gauché, Deuxième Bureau, p. 206. 9. Paillole, Services Spéciaux, pp. 185–86. 10. Ibid. 11. Gauché, Deuxième Bureau, pp. 213–14. 12. Le Général Commandant en Chef Gamelin, No. 800, 15 April 1940; No. 799, 15 April 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N3. 13. Général Prételat, Le destin tragique de la ligne Maginot (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1950), pp. 13–14; Général Edmond Ruby, Sedan: Terre d'Epreuve (Paris: Flammarion, 1948), pp. 30–31. 14. Halder Diaries 3, 7 February 1940, pp. 62–63; 14 February 1940, pp. 74–75. 15. Ruby, Sedan, p. 69. 16. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 3665/3, 15 March 1940, S.H.A.T. 30N92; Général C. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée dans la Bataille, 1939–1940 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949), pp. 78–79. 17. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 3665/3, 15 March 1940. 18. Ruby, Sedan, pp. 69–70. 19. Grandsard, 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 78; Charles Leon Menu, Lumière sur les ruines (Paris: Plon, 1953),

p. 182. An antitank company armed with the 25mm cannon usually was issued twelve weapons. The words “troop” and “squadron” are used to mean company- and battalion-sized units, respectively. 20. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Demay (295th I.R.), n.d., S.H.A.T. 34N174; Commandement des Chars, Comptes-Rendus Journaliers du 18 septembre 1939 au 9 mai 1940, passim, S.H.A.T. 29N86. 21. IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4638/3–Op, 10 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 29N49. 22. 5ème D.L.C., E. M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4105/3S, 13 May 1940, Compte Rendu Chronologique, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 32N489. 23. Ibid., p. 2. 24. Claude Gounelle, Sedan: Mai 1940 (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1965), pp. 55–56. 25. Menu, Lumière sur les ruines, pp. 183–84. 26. Journal des Marches et Opérations du 10ème C.A. (hereafter 10ème C.A., J.M.O.), 11 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 30N82. 27. Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin, Les Panzers passent la Meuse (13 mai 1940) (Paris: Laffont, 1967), pp. 103–4. 28. “Histoire de la 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie” (n.p., n.d.), p. 8, S.H.A.T. 32N489. 29. Ibid., p. 11; 5ème D.L.C., E. M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4105/3S, 13 May 1940, Compte Rendu Chronologique, pp. 3–4; 10ème C.A., J.M.O., 11 May 1940. 30. 10ème C.A., J.M.O., 11 May 1940; “Histoire de la 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie,” p. 12. 31. 5ème D.L.C., E. M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4105/3S, 13 May 1940, Compte Rendu Chronologique, p. 4. 32. IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, Compte-Rendu de situation du 11 May 1940, 23 heures, No. 4664/3–Op, S.H.A.T. 29N51. 33. Rapport du Colonel Marc (3ème Brigade de Spahis), 11 May 1942, pp. 7–9, S.H.A.T. 34N456. 34. 10ème C.A., J.M.O., 11 May 1940. 35. Rapport du Capitaine Spaletta (3/1–295 Inf.), 18 October 1941, pp. 2, 6, S.H.A.T. 34N174; Rapport du Capitaine Paul Picault (1/1–295 Inf.), 8 November 1941, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N174. 36. Rapport du Capitaine Picault, p. 3. 37. Ibid., pp. 3–4. 38. Ibid., p. 5. 39. Rapport du Colonel Marc, pp. 9–10; 2e Régiment Spahis Marocains, Evénements vus par le Chef d'Escadrons Guignal, Cdt. le 1e Groupe d'Escadrons, S.H.A.T. 34N456. 40. Rapport du Colonel Marc, pp. 10–11. 41. Ruby, Sedan, pp. 87–88; Rapport du Colonel Marc, p. 11. 42. 5ème D.L.C., E. M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4105/3S, 13 May 1940, Compte Rendu Chronologique, p. 6. 43. Ibid., p. 6; “Histoire de la 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie,” p. 14. 44. Rapport du Capitaine Spaletta, p. 2. 45. The head of the Second Bureau later claimed that French intelligence identified the main attack on 12 May as coming along the axis Bouillon-Sedan. Gauché, Deuxième Bureau, p. 223. 46. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 9 May–17 June, 10 May 1940, pp. 1, 3, 5–6, S.H.A.T. 27N148. 47. G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, 10h15, Renseignements transmis par la IIe Armée, S.H.A.T. 28N3; IIe Armée, Renseignements ou Ordres données, 10 May 1940, 9h., S.H.A.T. 29N103; Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 10 May, p. 8. 48. IIe Armée, Renseignements ou Ordres données, 10 May, 13h.; Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 10 May, pp. 15, 17, 18. 49. IIe Armée, E. M., No. 835/2.R., Synthèse des Renseignements, 10 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 29N103. 50. IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, Compte-Rendu de Fin de Journée, 10 May, 20h30, No. 4645/3–Op, S.H.A.T. 29N51. 51. Synthèse des renseignements recueillis du 10 à 17h au 11 à 6 heures, 11 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 28N3. 52. Rapport du Général Rocques, 30 June 1941, pp. 10–11, S.H.A.T. 29N103. 53. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 74, 105; Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered, p. 175. 54. G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, Renseignements transmis par la IIe Armée, 11 May, 7h30, S.H.A.T. 28N3; Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 11 May, pp. 3, 5. 55. G.A. 1, E. M., 3ème Bureau, 11 May 1940, Messages Téléphonés: Départ, Nos. 6, 4, 7, S.H.A.T. 28N2.

56. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 11 May, p. 11; G.A. 1, E. M., 3ème Bureau, 12 May 1940, Messages Téléphonés: Arrivée, No. 8, S.H.A.T. 28N2. 57. G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, Renseignements transmis par la IIe Armée, 12 May 1940, 0h10. 58. IIe Armée, Forces Aériennes, E. M., 11 May 1940, Synthèse de Renseignements, S.H.A.T. 29N103. 59. IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, Compte-Rendu de situation du 11 Mai 1940, 23h., No. 4664/3–Op, S.H.A.T. 29N51. 60. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 11 May 1940, pp. 7–9. 61. Ibid., 12 May 1940, p. 2. 62. G.A. 1, E. M., 3ème Bureau, 12 May 1940, Messages Téléphonés. Arrivée, 7h.; G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, 12 May, Renseignements transmis par la IIe Armée, 07h30. 63. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 12 May 1940, pp. 4, 9, 10, 13. 64. G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, Aristote, 12 May, 17h50, S.H.A.T. 28N3. 65. IIe Armée, Forces Aériennes, E. M., No. 864/E.M., Synthèse de Renseignements, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 29N103. 66. G.A. 1, E. M., 2ème Bureau, Renseignements transmis par la IIe Armée, 12 May 1940, No. 1880/2. 67. IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, Compte Rendu de la Journée du 12 Mai 1940, 23h., No. 4686/3–Op, S.H.A.T. 29N51. 68. Général Koeltz, No. 979/3.FT, 12 May 1940, Arcole à Aiglon, S.H.A.T. 27N73. 69. G.A. 1, E. M., 13 May 1940, No. 1890/S-2, S.H.A.T. 28N3; Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 13 May 1940, p. 3. 70. Général André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France, trans. Desmond Flower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 181–82. 71. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 13 May 1940, p. 5; IIe Armée, E. M., 3ème Bureau, Compte Rendu des Evénements de la Journée du 13 Mai, 23 heures, S.H.A.T. 29N51. 72. Général Koeltz, No. 988/3.FT, 13 May 1940, Arcole à Aiglon, S.H.A.T. 27N73. CHAPTER 4 1. Ruby, Sedan, p. 39. 2. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 634/S, 14 October 1939, Ordre Général d'opérations No. 6, Plan de Défense, S.H.A.T. 30N92; IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 3,665/3, 15 March 1940, Instruction Particulière No. 14, S.H.A.T. 30N92. 3. Ruby, Sedan, pp. 95, 105. 4. IIe Armée, 10ème C.A., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1009/3, 2 April 1940, S.H.A.T. 30N92. 5. Ruby, Sedan, p. 94. 6. Ibid., p. 49. 7. Ibid., pp. 29–30, 30n. 8. Ibid., p. 29; Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 11, 40. 9. Rapport de M. Taittinger sur la visite effectuée dans la 2ème, 9ème, et 1ère Armée 8 Mars et jours suivants, S.H.A.T. 29N27. 10. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, 8 April 1940, No. 4042/3–Op, S.H.A.T. 29N27. For information on the Taittinger controversy, see Claude Paillat, La guerre immobile (Avril 1939–10 Mai 1940) (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1984), pp. 329–32. 11. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 9. 12. Ibid., p. 10. 13. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou (2/147 Fort. Inf.), n. d., II, pp. 2–3, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 14. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 31, 37. 15. Ibid., p. 38. 16. Ibid., p. 5. 17. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 18. Ibid., p. 57. 19. IIe Armée, 10ème C.A., Génie, E.-M., No. 3122, 16 March 1940, Travaux, S.H.A.T. 30N100. 20. 55ème D.I., I. D., Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations pour les journées des 10 au 14 Mai 1940, 2 June 1940, S.H.A.T. 32N254; Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 94–95.

21. 55ème D.I., 1882/S, 30 April 1940, Organisation du Commandement de l'Artillerie dans le secteur de Sedan, S.H.A.T. 32N253; Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, pp. 1–3; Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 94–95. 22. Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, pp. 5, 11. 23. Ibid., pp. 1–3. 24. 55ème D.I., No. 737/3-S, 14 January 1940, Contre-Attaque, S.H.A.T. 32N253. 25. IIe Armée, 10ème C.A., No. 121/3, 14 January 1940, Ordre Général d'opérations, No. 17, Plan de Défense, S.H.A.T. 30N92. 26. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 21–22. 27. Général Baudet, Rapport concernant la 71ème Division d'Infanterie, 31 May 1940, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 32N318. 28. Computed from: 55ème D.I., E.-M., 1re Bureau, No. 6/1EM, 16 May 1940, Situation des effectifs le 16 Mai à midi, S.H.A.T. 32N251; and Dutailly, Les problèmes de l'Armée de Terre, p. 145. 29. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 62. 30. 55ème D. I., E.-M., 1re Bureau, No. 6/1EM, 16 May 1940, Situation des effectifs le 16 Mai à midi. 31. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 24–25. 32. Ibid., p. 53. 33. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 3437/3, 1 March 1940, S.H.A.T. 30N100. 34. 55ème D.I., E.-M., 2ème Bureau, No. G-4/2-S, 7 January 1940, Rapport sur le Moral, S.H.A.T. 32N253. 35. 55ème D.I., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 2102/3-E, 11 May 1940, Devoirs des Cadres, S.H.A.T. 32N253. 36. Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, pp. 1–3; Rapport du Capitaine Foucault (2/331 Inf), S.H.A.T. 34N178. The corps commander gave different figures. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 26–27. 37. Dutailly, Les problèmes de l'Armée de Terre, p. 161. 38. IIe Armée, F.T.A., E.-M., No. 2286, 31 May 1940, Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pierry, Commandant du F.T.A. de la IIe Armée, S.H.A.T. 29N103. 39. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pierry, Tableau des Avions Abattus. 40. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 30, 64, 88. 41. Ruby, Sedan, pp. 49–50. 42. IIe Armée, E.-M., 4ème Bureau, 23 April 1940, Situation des mines anti-chars, S.H.A.T. 29N53. 43. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 3. 44. For an example of the omission of mines, see: G.A. 1, E.M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1714 S/3, 25 October 1939, Défense anti-chars, S.H.A.T. 29N53. 45. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou 1:2. 46. 55ème D. I., E.-M., 1re Bureau, No. 6/1EM, 16 May 1940, Situation des effectifs le 16 Mai à midi. 47. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud (147 Inf.), 14 August 1941, p. 6, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 48. Ibid., pp. 6–7. 49. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 1. 50. Rapport du Capitaine Gabel (2/295 Inf.), 20 December 1941, pp. 3–4, S.H.A.T. 34N174. 51. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, 24 May 1940, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N145; Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 1; Rapport du Capitaine Carribou 2:1–2, 4–6. 52. Capitaine Auzas, Centre de Résistance de Torcy, Calque No. 2, n.d., S.H.A.T. 32N253. 53. Capitaine Auzas, Calque No. 1, n.d., S.H.A.T. 32N253. 54. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou 2:5–6. 55. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Crousse (3/147 Fort. Inf.), 12 August 1941, p. 3, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 56. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 62; 55ème D.I., E.M., 3ème Bureau, No. 33/S-5, 18 May 1940, Rapport du Général Lafontaine, Commandant p.i. la 55ème D.I. sur la Bataille de 13 & 14 Mai 1940 dans le secteur de Sedan, pp. 6–7, S.H.A.T. 32N251. 57. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou 1:8–10. 58. 55ème, D. I., Section Topographique, Liste des Blockhaus, 8 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 32N253; 55ème D.I., I.D., No. 229/Op, Colonel Chaligne, Calque, Sous Secteur de Frénois, 6 December 1939, S.H.A.T. 32N253. 59. IIe Armee, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, 8 April 1940, No. 4042/3–Op.

CHAPTER 5 1. Gruppe von Kleist, 11.5.1940, Gruppenbefehl Nr. 2 für den 12.5.1940, T314/667/764. 2. Gruppe von Kleist, Gruppenbefehl Nr. 3 für. den Angriff über die Maas am 13.5.1940, 12.5.1940, T314/667/802. 3. Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 78–79; Gruppe von Kleist, K.T.B., 12.5.1940, pp. 7–9, T314/666/1245–47; XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 12.5.1940, pp. 18–19, T314/612/180–81. 4. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 13.5.1940, p. 23, T314/612/185. 5. Gruppe von Kleist, Gruppenbefehl Nr. 3, 12.5.1940, T314/667/805–6. 6. BA-MA, RH 27–1/14, Zielkarte zum Feuerplan. 7. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 79. 8. Ibid., p. 82. 9. Général d'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’ était pas vide, 1940 (Paris: René Julliard, 1952), p. 64n; Grandsard, Le 10éme Corps d'Armée, pp. 30, 64, 88. 10. 10ème C. A., J.M.O., 13 May 1940. 11. Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Pinaud, Commandant du Sous-Secteur de Frénois, 24 May 1940, p. 3. 12. Rapport de Capitaine Carribou (2/147 Fort. Inf.), 21 May 1940, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 13. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, pp. 12–13. 14. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 116–1 15. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 12.5.1940, p. 19, T314/612/181; Generalkommando XIX. A.K., Vorbefehl für Angriff über die Maas, 12.5.1940, T314/612/693; Generalkommando XIX. A.K., Korpsbefehl Nr. 3 für den Angriff über die Maas am 13.5.40, 13.5.1940, T314/612/694–705. 16. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 21; 1 Pz., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 116–2. 17. Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 112. 18. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 116–1. 19. Ibid., p. 199. 20. Ibid., pp. 25, 74. 21. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z. K.T.B., pp. 268–70. 22. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 27. 23. Balck, Ordnung im Chaos, p. 220. 24. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 117–3. 25. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23. 26. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 117–3. 27. Ibid., p. 182; Rolf O. G. Stoves, 1. Panzer Division, 1935–1945 (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1961), p. 90. 28. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 182; Stoves, 1. Panzer Division, p. 93. 29. 55ème D.I., Section Topographique, Secteur de Sedan, Liste des Blockhaus, 8 May 1940; 55ème D.I., 3ème Bureau, Calque, S.H.A.T. 32N253. 30. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 14. 31. Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 112. 32. BA-MA, RH 37/6391, Oblt. René de l'homme de Courbière: Von der Mosel zur Höhe 247, p. 2; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 116. 33. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 2; BA-MA, RH 37/6327, 11 Kp./III Btl. Inf. Rgt. Grossdeutschland, p. 5. 34. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 271. 35. BA-MA, RH 37/6335, Kriegschronik der 15 I.R. Grossdeutschland, pp. 16–17. 36. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 3; BA-MA, RH 37/6328, Westfeldzug des II Btl. GD., pp. 2–3; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 117. 37. RH 37/6327, 11 Kp./III Btl. I.R.G.D., p. 5. 38. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 4. 39. Ibid., p. 4. 40. German and French accounts differ substantially on the time bunker 104 fell. While the Germans say the bunker fell at 1700, the French say it fell at 1845. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 4; Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 14.

41. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 4; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 119. 42. RH 37/6391, de Courbière, p. 5; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 119–20. 43. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 269. 44. Oberleutnant Grübnau, “Brückenschlag über die Maas westlich Sedan für den Übergang einer PanzerDivision,” Militär-Wochenblatt, No. 27 (January 1941), pp. 1291–93. Grübnau says the first ferry was completed around 1815–1830 hours, instead of 1920 hours. 45. Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, trans. H. Betzler (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 19. 46. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 20; Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, German Generals of World War II As I Saw Them (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977), p. 196. 47. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 27. 48. Ibid. 49. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 14–15. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., p. 15. 52. BA-MA, RH 46/743, Kriegstagebuch Panzer-Pionier Batl. 49, 10.5–25.6.1940, pp. 5–6. 53. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 16–17. 54. Erhard Wittek, ed., Die soldatische Tat: Berichte von Mitkämpfern des Heeres im Westfeldzug 1940 (Berlin: Im Deutschen Verlag, 1941), pp. 22–25. 55. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 18; BA-MA, RH 37/1910, 10 Schützen Brigade, p. 8. 56. This is not Sergeant Rubarth; his group was about one kilometer to the north. 57. BA-MA, RH 37/138, Aus dem Kriegstagebuch der 2. Kompanie, pp. 24–26. 58. RH 37/1910, 10 Schützen Brigade, p. 8. 59. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 19. 60. Renseignements rapportés par M. Michard, p. 3, S.H.A.T. 34N145. Michard served as the intelligence officer for the 2/147th Fortress Infantry and visited the battlefield on 28 January 1941 and 20 May 1941. His account includes information about crossing sites and damage to bunkers. 61. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 15–17. 62. Oberkommando des Heeres, Denkschrift über die franzosische Landesbefestigung (Berlin: Reichsdrückerei, 1941), p. 260; 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 18. 63. Oberkommando des Heeres, Denkschrift, pp. 260–61; 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 18. 64. Oberkommando des Heeres, Denkschrift, p. 260. 65. Ibid., p. 261. 66. Ibid., p. 262. 67. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23. CHAPTER 6 1. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, pp. 8–9. 2. Ibid., p. 9. 3. Rapport du Général Lafontaine, p. 2. 4. Ibid. 5. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 11. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., p. 12. 8. Compte-Rendu du Sergent-Chef Geantry, Commandant la Section de Glaire, n.d., S.H.A.T. 34N145; Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 13. 9. Compte-Rendu du Sous-Lieutenant Lamay, Chef de Section du P.A. des Forges, n.d., S.H.A.T. 34N145. 10. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 13. 11. Ibid., p. 5. 12. Gounelle, Sedan, pp. 177–79. 13. Ibid., p. 145. 14. Ibid., p. 180.

15. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Crousse, p. 10. 16. Ibid. 17. Gounelle, Sedan, p. 182. 18. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 14. 19. Von Kielmansegg, “Scharnier Sedan,” 21 May 1941, p. 14. 20. Ibid., 4 June 1941, pp. 15–16. 21. Gounelle, Sedan, pp. 182–83. 22. Rapport du Capitaine Vitte, 19 May 1940, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 23. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 6: 11. 24. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport sommaire sur les opérations, 25 April 1942, p. 5, S.H.A.T. 32N254. 25. Rapport du Lieutenant Lasson, Commandant le Point d'appui de l'Ecluse (2/147 Fort. Inf.), 19 May 1940, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 26. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 21 May 1940, p. 1. 27. Ibid., p. 2; Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 6: 12. 28. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 21 May 1940, p. 2. 29. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 6: 12–13; Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 21 May 1940, p. 2. 30. Rapport du Capitaine Vitte, p. 2. 31. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 21 May 1940, p. 2. 32. Compte-Rendu du Lieutenant Michard, 22 May 1940, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Rapport du Capitaine Gabel (2/295 Inf.), 20 December 1941, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 34N174. 36. Rapport du Capitaine Leflon, 19 May 1940, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 37. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 155. 38. Rapport du Capitaine Gabel, p. 4. 39. Rapport du Lieutenant Thirache (6/2–147 Fort. Inf.), n.d., p. 1, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 40. Rapport du Capitaine Leflon. 41. Rapport du Capitaine Gabel, p. 4. 42. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 155–56. 43. Rapport du Capitaine Gabel, p. 5. 44. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 14. 45. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 27, 29. 46. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Crousse, pp. 2–5. 47. Extraits d'une lettre du Lieutenant Drapier (9/2–147 Fort. Inf.), 27 May 1941, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 48. Rapport du Capitaine Litalien (3/1–331 Inf.), n.d., pp. 1–3, S.H.A.T. 34N178. 49. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Crousse, pp. 13–15; Extraits d'une lettre du Lieutenant Drapier, p. 4. 50. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Crousse, p. 16. 51. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 117–4. 52. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 15. 53. Rapport du Capitaine Litalien, p. 3. 54. 1 Pz, Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 117–4; Stoves, 1. Panzer Division, 1935–1945, p. 88. 55. Rapport du Capitaine Foucault, p. 15. 56. Ibid., p. 16. 57. Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 16. 58. Ibid.; Rapport du Général Lafontaine, p. 7; Général Lafontaine, Renseignements sur la 55ème Division, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 32N251. 59. Rapport du Capitaine Royer, Commandant la Section de Gendarmerie de Saumur, 12 November 1941, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 32N254. 60. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 35; 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23. 61. Rapport du Général de Brigade Duhautois, 29 April 1941, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 30N82. 62. Ibid., p. 3. 63. Ibid., p. 4.

64. Ibid., pp. 3, 8. 65. Ibid., p. 4. 66. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 67. Ibid., p. 6. 68. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 29. 69. Rapport du Capitaine Spaletta (1/295 Inf.), p. 3. 70. Fiche No. 340, Lieutenant Drapier, n.d., p. 3, S.H.A.T. 34N145. 71. Rapport du Capitaine Carribou, 1: 9–10. 72. Rapport du Général Lafontaine, pp. 6–7. 73. See: Rapport du Colonel Serin, in Claude Paillat, La guerre éclair (10 mai–24 juin 1940) (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1985), pp. 271–77. 74. Lettre, Général Lafontaine, 13 September 1941, p. 1, S.H.A.T. 32N251. CHAPTER 7 1. Halder Diaries 4, 17 May 1940, p. 17. 2. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 29. 3. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 118–19. 4. Ibid., pp. 29–30. 5. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 20. 6. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 29. 7. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., pp. 118–19. 8. Ibid., p. 30. 9. Ibid., p. 200. 10. Ibid., p. 241. 11. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 29. 12. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 99. 13. Ibid., p. 71. 14. Ibid., p. 79. 15. Ibid., p. 81. The tanks were actually F.C.M. models. 16. RH 37/6332, Pz. Jäg. Kp./IRGD–14 Mai 1940, Panzerschlacht südlich Sedan, p. 1; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 121. 17. Pz. Jäg. Kp./IRGD, Panzerschlacht südlich Sedan, p. 2; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 122. 18. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 31. 19. Ibid.; Pz. Jäg. Kp./IRGD, Panzerschlacht südlich Sedan, p. 4; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 124. 20. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 31; 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 75. 21. 1 Pz. Div., Anl. d z.K.T.B., p. 86. 22. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 20; Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 83. 23. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 21. 24. Franz Josef Strauss, Geschichte der 2 (Wiener) Panzer Division (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1987), pp. 292–94; 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., pp. 21–22. 25. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 21. 26. Ibid., p. 23. 27. Général Schaal, “Les combat de la 10ème Division dans la région de Stonne les 14, 15 et 16 mai 1940” (typescript, n.d.), p. 1, S.H.A.T. 32N8. 28. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 19. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., pp. 23, 20. 31. Ibid., p. 21. 32. Schaal, “10ème Division,” pp. 2–3. 33. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23. 34. Ibid. 35. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 27.

36. Ibid., p. 31. 37. Ibid., p. 35. 38. Ibid. 39. Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 83–84. 40. (Message) von Gruppe von Kleist an Heeresgruppe A, Tagesabschlüssmeldung, 13.5.1940, 2040 hours, T314/667/815. 41. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 14.5.1940, pp. 4–5, T314/612/005–006; Gruppe von Kleist, K.T.B., 14.5.1940, pp. 11– 13, T314/666/1249–1251. 42. Armeeoberkommando 12, Ia Nr. 542/40, 13.5.1940, Armeetagesbefehl Nr. 6, T314/667/854. 43. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 14.5.1940, pp. 4–5, T314/612/005–006. 44. 2 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 23. 45. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 129; Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 87. 46. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 24. 47. Ibid.; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 129–30. 48. Schaal, “10ème Division,” p. 4; 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 25. 49. Gruppe von Kleist, Gruppenbefehl Nr. 5 für den 15.5.1940, 14.5.1940, T314/667/889. 50. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 26. 51. Ibid.; French records do not mention this attack. 52. Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 130–36. 53. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 28. 54. Pz. Jäg. Kp./IRGD, pp. 12–13; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 136. 55. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 29. 56. Ibid., p. 30. 57. Ibid., p. 31. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid., p. 32. 60. Rapport du Général Bertin Bossu, March 1941, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 32N8; Infanterie de la 3ème Division, E.M., No. 3873, Colonel Lespinasse Fonsegrive, Résumé des opérations du 12 au 25 Mai, pp. 13–14, S.H.A.T. 32N8. 61. 10 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 33. 62. Ibid., p. 35. 63. Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 136, 141. 64. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 31. 65. Ibid., p. 33. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid., p. 35; Stoves, 1. Panzer Division, pp. 100, 103. 68. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 35. 69. Ibid., p. 37. 70. Von Mellenthin, World War II Generals, pp. 196–97. 71. Ibid., p. 197. 72. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 37. 73. Ibid. 74. Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 85–86. 75. 1 Pz. Div., K.T.B., p. 37. 76. Armeeoberkommando 12, Ia Nr. 543/40, 15.5.1940, Armeebefehl Nr. 7, T314/667/ 963. 77. Gruppe von Kleist, Gruppenbefehl Nr. 6 für den 16.5, 15.5.1940, T315/667/968. 78. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 85. 79. Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), p. 138. 80. XIX. A.K., K.T.B., 17.5.1940, p. 3, T314/612/031. 81. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 129; Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 87. 82. Macksey, Guderian, p. 139. 83. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 88.

CHAPTER 8 1. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 16. 2. Ibid., p. 17. 3. Rapport du Général Lafontaine, p. 6. 4. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, pp. 5–6; Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 16. 5. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, p. 5. 6. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 18. 7. Ibid., p. 20. 8. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, Ordre pour le 14 Mai. 9. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, p. 6; Rapport du Capitaine Gabel, pp. 5–6. 10. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 22. 11. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 134. 12. Lettre, Général Bourgignon, December 1941, pp. 3–4, S.H.A.T. 29N84. 13. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 135. 14. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel P. Labarthe, n.d., pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N165. 15. Ibid., p. 3. 16. Rapport de l'Aspirant Penissou (2–1/213 Inf.), n.d., p. 1, S.H.A.T. 34N165. 17. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 4. 18. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, pp. 143–44. 19. Letter, Général Lafontaine, 13 September 1941, p. 2; Letter, Général Lafontaine, 14 October 1941, p. 3, S.H.A.T. 32N251. 20. Général Lafontaine, Renseignements sur la 55ème Division, p. 2. 21. Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 144; Général Lafontaine, Renseignements sur la 55ème Division, p. 2. 22. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 4. 23. Letter, Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, 4 March 1942, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 30N82. 24. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, P. 5. 25. Letter, Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, 4 March 1942, p. 4. 26. Letter, Général Lafontaine, 13 November 1941, p. 3, S.H.A.T. 32N251. 27. Gounelle, Sedan, p. 215. 28. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 20. 29. Ibid.; Grandsard, Le 10ème Corps d'Armée, p. 148. 30. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 5. 31. Ibid. 32. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 23. 33. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 24. 34. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud, pp. 6–7. 35. Rapport de l'Aspirant Penissou, pp. 1–2. For the report of the 1/213th Infantry commander, see: Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Georges Desgranges, 18 March 1941, S.H.A.T. 34N164. 36. Carnet de Route du Capitaine Megrot, n.d., p. 4, S.H.A.T. 34N165. 37. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 6; Letter, Chef de Bataillon Giordani (7th Tank Bn.), 23 June 1941, p. 2, S.H.A.T. 34N165. 38. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, p. 7. 39. Ibid., p. 8. 40. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, 27 December 1941, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N164; Letter, Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, 5 November 1941, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N164; Letter, Chef d'Escadrons Honoraire de l'A.B.C. Dayras, 30 November 1962, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N164. 41. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, p. 2. 42. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Auffret (2/205 Inf.), 20 May 1940, p. 3, S.H.A.T. 34N164. 43. Letter, M. Dayras, p. 2. 44. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, p. 2; Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Auffret, p. 4. 45. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Auffret, p. 6.

46. Ibid., p. 7. 47. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, p. 2; Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Chatelard (3/205 Inf.), 21 May 1940, pp. 1–2, S.H.A.T. 34N164. 48. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Auffret, p. 10. 49. Rapport du Lieutenant Colonel Montvignier Monnet, Annexe. 50. Rapport du Général Lafontaine, p. 3. 51. Colonel Chaligne, Rapport d'opérations, p. 28. 52. Général Lafontaine, Renseignements sur la 55ème Division, p. 3. CHAPTER 9 1. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, p. 83. 2. Ibid., p. 87. 3. Ibid., pp. 87–88; Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 11 May 1940, p. 9. 4. Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, vol. 1, The Fight at Odds (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), p. 114. 5. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, p. 90. 6. Robert Jackson, Air War Over France, May–June 1940 (London: Ian Allen LTD., 1974), pp. 53, 60. 7. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, p. 97. 8. Ibid., p. 104. 9. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 13 May 1940, p. 3. 10. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, pp. 109–10. 11. Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered, p. 193; Jackson, Air War Over France, p. 62. 12. Richards, Royal Air Force, pp. 119–20. 13. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, pp. 107, 109; Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered, p. 201. 14. Richards, Royal Air Force, p. 120. 15. Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered, p. 195. 16. D'Astier de la Vigerie, Le ciel n’était pas vide, p. 131. 17. Angora à 10ème C.A., 11 May 1940, 22h.20, S.H.A.T. 29N49; IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4662/3–Op, 11 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 29N49. 18. IIe Armée, 3ème Bureau, E.-M., No. 4665/3–Op, 12 May 1940, 7h30; IIe Armée, 3ème Bureau, E.-M., No. 4668/3–Op, 12 May 1940, 9h35; IIe Armée, 3ème Bureau, E.-M., No. 4674/3–Op, 12 May 1940, 11h20. All are in S.H.A.T. 29N49. 19. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4663/3–Op, 11 May 1940, 23h., S.H.A.T. 29N49; IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4672/3–Op, 12 May 1940, 11h05, S.H.A.T. 29N85; IIe Armée, E.M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4669/3–Op, 13 May 1940, 14h30, S.H.A.T. 29N85. 20. Journal des Marches et Opérations du 21ème C.A. par le Général Flavigny du 3 Mai au 24 Juin 1940 (hereafter Général Flavigny, 21ème C.A., J.M.O.), n.d., pp. 6–8, S.H.A.T. 30N225. 21. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 12 May 1940, p. 2. 22. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4697/3–Op, 13h30, S.H.A.T. 29N49. 23. Chef de Bataillon Ragot, Compte-Rendu sur les opérations de la 3ème D.I.M., n.d., p. 8, S.H.A.T. 32N8. 24. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission d'enquête sur les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945, Annexes, Témoignages et documents recueillis par la commission d'enquête parlementaire (hereafter Commission…Témoignages), Testimony of Général Devaux 5: 1334. Devaux served as Chief of Staff of the 3rd Armored Division. 25. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 12 May 1940, pp. 4, 9, 10. 26. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 12 May 1940, pp. 10–12. 27. Testimony of Général Lacaille, Commission…Témoignages 4: 927. 28. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4713/3–Op, 14 May 1940, 13h., S.H.A.T. 29N49; “Histoire de la 5ème Division Légère de Cavalerie,” pp. 18–19. 29. Rapport du Général Georges sur les Opérations du Théâtre Nord-Est du 10 Mai au 24 Juin 1940, 10 August 1940, Croquis A, Intentions du Commandement le 12 Mai. 30. IIe Armée, Le Chef d'Etat-Major, 7 February 1940, No. 1685 G.S/A, S.H.A.T. 29N28.

31. IIe Armée, Transmissions, n.d., Déplacement Eventuel du Q.G. dans la région Sud de Verdun, p. 2; IIe Armée, Transmissions, Etude au point de vue transmissions sur le déplacement éventuel du Q.G. dans la région de Verdun, 9 March 1940, p. 2. Both are in S.H.A.T. 29N28. 32. IIe Armée, Plan d'enlèvement du Quartier Général, S.H.A.T. 29N28. 33. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4709/3–Op, 13 May 1940, 19h.; IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4710/3–Op, 14 May 1940, 0h. Both are in S.H.A.T. 29N49. 34. For a discussion of the number of tanks in French units, see: Testimony of Général Lacaille, Commission…Témoignages 4: 922; Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1327. 35. Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, pp. 170–72. 36. Général Flavigny, 21ème C.A., J.M.O., p. 7. 37. Ibid., pp. 6–8. 38. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, p. 7, S.H.A.T. 30N225; IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4709/3–Op, 13 May 1940, 19h. 39. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, pp. 7–8. 40. 21ème C.A., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 2/3, 14 May 1940, 04h00, S.H.A.T. 30N226; Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5, Annexe No. 5, pp. 1348–49. 41. Général Brocard, Le 3ème Division Cuirassée dans la Bataille des Ardennes, n.d., passim, S.H.A.T. 32N470. 42. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1329–30. 43. These figures come from the reports of Général Brocard and Colonel Devaux. On 12 May the 3rd Armored Division reported to the XXIst Corps that it was authorized seventy B-I and ninety-three H-39 tanks and had sixty B-1 and sixty-six H-39 tanks. 3ème Division Cuirassée, E.-M., 4ème Bureau, 12 May 1940, Situation des véhicules, S.H.A.T. 32N470. 44. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1330. 45. Ibid., p. 1334. 46. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4704/3–Op, 13 May 1940, 17h., S.H.A.T. 29N49. 47. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5, Annexe No. 2, p. 1347. 48. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, p. 9. 49. Général Brocard, Le 3ème Division Cuirassée, pp. 31–32. 50. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 51. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, p. 3. 52. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1327. 53. Général Brocard, Le 3ème Division Cuirassée, pp. 38–40. 54. Compare: Colonel A. Goutard, The Battle of France, 1940, trans. A.R.P. Burgess (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1959), pp. 140–41. 55. Note du Général Flavigny, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1254. 56. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, pp. 2–5. 57. Général Flavigny, 21ème C.A., J.M.O., pp. 3–5. 58. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1342n. 59. Rapport du Général Bertin-Bossu, pp. 1–2. 60. Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1344n. 61. 21ème C.A., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 6/3, 15 May 1940, 11h.30, S.H.A.T. 30N226. 62. Note du Général Flavigny, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1255. 63. Ibid. 64. Général Brocard, Le 3ème Division Cuirassée, pp. 58–60; Testimony of Général Devaux, Commission… Témoignages 5, Annexe No. 12, p. 1356. 65. Letter, Général Flavigny, 6 August 1946, p. 16; Note du Général Flavigny, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1255. CHAPTER 10 1. Période Antérieure au 14 Mai 1940 (typescript, n.d.), pp. 1–4, S.H.A.T. 29N321; Commandement en Chef du Front Nord-Est (hereafter C.C.F.N.E.), E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 497 3/Op, 28 February 1940;

C.C.F.N.E., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1217 3/Op, 27 April 1940. The latter two documents are in S.H.A.T. 27N155. 2. In January 1940 the Second Army did a detailed study on the possibility of a rupture of its front and forwarded a copy to the army's High Command. Testimony of Général Lacaille, Commission… Témoignages 4: 929. 3. C.C.F.N.E., 3ème Bureau, No. 1451 3/Op, 13 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 4. G.Q.G., No. 1477 3/Op, 14 May 1940, 15h30. Reproduced in: Détachement d'Armée, Journal des Marches et Opérations du 6-12-39 au 1er Juin 1939 (hereafter Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O.), n.d., 14 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 29N321. 5. Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, pp. 79, 107, 145, 154. 6. Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O., 14 May 1940. 7. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 14 May 1940, p. 6. 8. Ibid., pp. 6–7. 9. Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O., 14 May 1940. 10. G.Q.G., No. 1477 3/Op, 14 May 1940, 15h30. 11. Général Aublet, Le 36ème D. I. pendant la campagne 1939–1940, December 1940, S.H.A.T. 32N204. 12. Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O., 14 May 1940; 14ème D. I., Journal des Marches et Opérations du 24 Août 1939 au 24 Juin 1940 (hereafter 14ème D.I., J.M.O.) (typescript, n.d.), pp. 9–11. 13. Historique de la 6ème Armée, 1ère Partie, du 14 Mai au 5 Juin 1940 (typescript, n.d.), p. 3, S.H.A.T. 29N321. 14. C.C.F.N.E., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1495 3/Op, 15 May 1940, 7h15, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 15. Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O., 15 May 1940. 16. “Histoire de la 5ème Division Légère de Cavalerie,” p. 18. 17. Ibid., pp. 18–19. 18. Rapport du Colonel Marc, p. 15. 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. Capitaine Ethuin, Journal de Marche du 2ème Escadron, p. 6. 21. Ibid., p. 7. 22. “Histoire de la 5ème Division Légère Cavalerie,” p. 21. 23. Rapport du Colonel Marc, p. 18. 24. Ibid., p. 20. 25. See: Gounelle, Sedan, pp. 337–52. 26. Rapport du Colonel Marc, p. 27. 27. In a letter written on 27 July 1943 to the head of the Service Historique, General Etcheberrigaray mentioned several after-action reports that are no longer in the files of the S.H.A.T. Letter, Général Etcheberrigaray, 27 July 1943, S.H.A.T. 32N248. 28. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, 12 May 1940, p. 2. 29. Rapport du Général Etcheberrigaray (53ème D.I.), 11 July 1941, Part II, pp. 2–3, S.H.A.T. 32N248. 30. 53ème D.I., E.-M., Commandant Andoni, Journées du 10 au 15 Mai 1940 (typescript, n.d.), p. 7, S.H.A.T. 32N248. 31. Commandant Andoni, Journées du 10 au 15 Mai 1940, Croquis No. 3; Rapport du Capitaine Fonlupt, 10 February 1941, pp. 6, 9, S.H.A.T. 32N248. Commandant Andoni served in the 329th Infantry Regiment, and Captain Fonlupt served on the staff of the 53rd Division. 32. Commandant Andoni, Journées du 10 au 15 Mai 1940, pp. 15, 14. 33. Ibid., p. 13. 34. Ibid., pp. 13–14, 16. 35. Rapport du Capitaine Fonlupt, p. 8; Commandant Andoni, Journées du 10 au 15 Mai 1940, p. 16. 36. Commandant Andoni, Journées du 10 au 15 Mai 1940, p. 17. 37. Rapport du Général Etcheberrigaray, p. 5. The commander of the 208th Regiment later committed suicide. Letter, Général Etcheberrigaray, 27 July 1943, p. 2. 38. Rapport du Capitaine Fonlupt, pp. 9–10. 39. 14ème D.I., J.M.O., pp. 2–3.

40. Ibid., pp. 5–7. 41. Ibid., pp. 9–10. 42. Ibid., pp. 11–12. 43. Rapport du Colonel Trinquand, Commandant p.i. l'I.D. 14, 29 May 1940, pp. 2–3, S.H.A.T. 32N83. 44. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Bailly (1/152 Inf.), 24 July 1940, pp. 3–5, S.H.A.T. 32N83; “Histoire de la 5ème Division Légère Cavalerie,” p. 21. 45. Extraits du Journal de Marche du 152ème Régiment d'Infanterie, n.d., pp. 2–3, S.H.A.T. 32N83. 46. 14ème D.I., J.M.O., pp. 20–21. 47. Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Bailly, pp. 5–7. 48. Ibid., p. 6. 49. Rapport du Colonel Trinquand, p. 3. 50. Testimony of Général Bruché, Commission…Témoignages 5: 1213–52. 51. Journal des Marches et Opérations du Groupe d'Armées No. 1, 14 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 28N2. 52. Commandant Chazalmartin, “La 2ème Division Cuirassée à la Bataille (10 Mai–25 Juin 1940)” (n.p., n.d.), p. 12. 53. Ibid., p. 15. 54. Ibid., p. 17. 55. Ibid., p. 24. 56. 2ème Division Cuirassée, No. 45/5–CD, 5 July 1940, S.H.A.T. 32N461. Rapport d'Opérations de la 2ème Division Cuirassée (13–21 Mai 1940), 16 June 1941, S.H.A.T. 32N462. 57. Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, p. 7. 58. Détachement d'Armée, J.M.O., 15 May 1940. 59. 14ème D.I., J.M.O., p. 23. 60. Rapport du Général Etcheberrigaray, p. 6. 61. C.C.F.N.E., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1537 3/Op, 16 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 62. Rapport du Général Georges, Titre IV, pp. 7–9 (pp. 138–40). 63. C.C.F.N.E., E.-M., 3ème Bureau (no number), 16 May 1940, Ordre Particulière, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 64. C.C.F.N.E., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 1507 3/Op, 16 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 27N155. 65. G. A. 1, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4252/S-3, 16 May 1940, S.H.A.T. 28N1. CHAPTER 11 1. Major General J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 3 (New York: Minerva Press, 1956), pp. 377–412. 2. Fuller, Military History, p. 382. 3. IIe Armée, Commandement des Chars, E.-M., No. 1279/S, 18 May 1940, Situation des Bataillons des chars de la 2ème Armée le 17 Mai—au soir, S.H.A.T. 29N85. 4. Williamson Murray, “The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism,” Armed Forces and Society 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 285–98. 5. IIe Armée, E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 4042/3–Op, 8 April 1940. 6. Ubersicht über die Gesamtverluste wahrend der Schlacht in Frankreich, n.d., T314/ 612/503. 7. Ministère de la Guerre, E.-M. de l'Armée, Service Historique à M. le Général, Attaché Militaire de France à Londres, 10 March 1947, S.H.A.T. 29N27. 8. 55ème D.I., E.-M., 3ème Bureau, No. 6/1E, 16 May 1940. 9. Rapport du Colonel Marc, pp. 23–27.

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Jackson, Robert. Air War over France, May–June 1940. London: Ian Allen Ltd., 1974. Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. “Dunkirk 1940.” In H. A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer, eds., Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View. Trans. Edward Fitzgerald. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1965. Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den Deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1957. Laubier, Philippe de. “Le bombardement français sur la Meuse: Le 14 mai 1940.” Revue historique des armées, no. 160 (October 1985): 96–109. Lewis, S. J. Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy, 1918–1941. New York: Praeger, 1985. Liddell Hart, B. H. The German Generals Talk. New York: Morrow & Co., 1948. Lyet, Commandant Pierre. La Bataille de France (Mai–Juin 1940). Paris: Payot, 1947. Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. Mary, Jean-Yves. La Ligne Maginot: ce qu’ elle était, ce qu'il en reste. San Dalmazzo, Italy: L'Istituto Grafico Bertello, 1980. Mellenthin, Major Gen. F. W. von. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Trans. H. Betzler. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. Menu, Charles Léon. Lumière sur les ruines. Paris: Plon, 1953. Messenger, Charles. The Blitzkrieg Story. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976. Murray, Williamson. “The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism.” Armed Forces and Society 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 285–98. ———. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945. Maxwell A.F.B., Ala.: Air University Press, 1983. Paillat, Claude. La guerre éclair (10 mai–24 juin 1940). Paris: Laffont, 1985. Paillole, Paul. Services Spéciaux, 1935–1945. Paris: Laffont, 1975. Porch, Douglas. “French Intelligence and the Fall of France, 1930–40.” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (January 1989): 28–58. Renouvin, Pierre, and Jacques Willequet. Les relations militaires franco-belges de mars 1936 au 10 mai 1940. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968. Richards, Denis. Royal Air Force, vol. 1, The Fight at Odds. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953. Riebenstahl, Horst. Die 1. Panzer Division im Bild. Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1986. Rothbrust, Florian K. “The Cut of the Scythe.” Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1988. Royaume de Belgique. Ministère de la Défense Nationale. Service Historique de l'Armée. La Campagne de mai 1940. Brussels: Presses de l'Institut Cartographique Militaire, 1945. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. Spaeter, Helmuth. Die geschichte des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland. Duisburg: Selbstverlag Hilfswerk ehem Soldaten, 1958. Stoves, Rolf O. G. 1. Panzer-Division, 1935–1945: Chronik einer der drei Stamm-Divisionen der deutschen Panzerwaffe. Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1961. Strauss, Franz Josef. Geschichte der 2. (Wiener) Panzer Division. Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1987. Taylor, Telford. The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. Trevor-Roper, H. R., ed. Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. Vidalenc, Jean. “Les divisions de série ‘B’ dans l'armée française pendant la campagne de France 1939– 1940.” Revue historique des armées, no. 4 (1980): 106–26. Volker, Karl-Heinz. Die Deutsche Luftwaffe, 1919–1939. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. Welkenhuyzen, Jean Van. Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin, 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940. Paris: Duculot, 1982. Young, Robert J. “French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938–1939.” In Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the two World Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Index

Page numbers in italics indicates maps.

aerial operations, Allied, 281–86 first daylight attack, 283 in Netherlands, 285 at Sedan, 285–86 Air Force, intelligence reports, 96–97, 99, 101 Ardennes, French in, 73 cavalry in Belgium, 83–89 identifying location of main German attack, 94–102 intelligence assessments of German order of battle, 73–79 mission and organization of cavalry, 79–83 on the Semois River, 89–94 Ardennes, Germans in, 29 Bodange, 43–50, 44 crossing Luxembourg, 37–43 delays at Bodange, 52–54 final push to Meuse River, 71 1st Panzer Division advance, 63–70 Martelange, 43–50 Operation Niwi, 50–52 planning and preparation, 29–37 2nd Panzer Division advance, 60–62 10th Panzer Division advance, 54–60 Army Group I, 284 Balck, Hermann, 48, 144, 197, 245, 347 1st Infantry Regiment crossing Meuse and, 144–50 Barratt, Air Marshal A. S., 282–83, 285 Baudet, Colonel, 203 Beaufre, André, 101 Beck-Broichsitter, Lieutenant, 219–20 Belgian forces, in the Ardennes, 43–50 Bertin-Bossu, General, 308 Billotte, General, 284–85 blitzkrieg, xv–xvi, 341–42 Blumentritt, Günther, 78 Bodange, 43–50, 44 Chasseurs Ardennais at, 45–48 delays at, 52–54 Boutancourt, 2nd Panzer Division at, 324–25 Boyer, Captain, 201–2 Breda Variant, 9–13

Brocard, Antoine, failure of 3rd Armored Division and, 298–309 Bruché, General, as 2nd Armored Division commander, 333–36 Bulson, attack toward, 216–19 bunkers, at Sedan, 350 Cachou, Lieutenant Colonel, preparation for counterattack and, 263–68 Campaign of 1940, xiii–xiv Bodange, 44 dispositions of forces and plans, 3 fight in Belgium, 33 French strategy in, 2–13 German fight in the Ardennes, 28–71 German strategy in, 13–22 myths surrounding, xv–xvii, 350 special operations, 41–42 see also Meuse, Battle of the Carribou, Captain on aerial attacks, 140 behind Torcy, 183–89 on French Infantry personnel policies, 208 casualties comparison between French and German, 348–49 Connage, 241 cavalry, French, see French cavalry Chaligne, Colonel at Chémery, 264–65 collapse of 55th Division and, 278–79 counterattack and, 275–78 at Fond Dagot, 252–53 learning the details of plan for counterattack, 265–66 panic of the 55th Division and, 200–6 Chanoine, General, 83, 318–22 Charita, Lieutenant, 194 Chasseurs Ardennais, at Martelange and Bodange, 45–48 Chémery 55th Infantry Division failure to halt move toward, 255 German attack toward, 219–22 7th Tank Battalion action around, 272–73 Clausener, Captain, Semois River action and, 89–94 colmater process, 24, 116 Connage action, 220–21 casualties, 241 counterattack, French, by the 55th Division, 251–79 Crousse, Captain, 195–96 d'Astier, General, 286 de Gaulle, Charles, 338 de Lattre, General, mission, 327–33 de Saint Cernin, Major, counterattack and, 275–78 Demay, Lieutenant Colonel, 115 Directive No. 6, 15–16

Directive No. 8, 18 Dittman, Lieutenant Colonel, 222 doctrine, French, see French doctrine doctrine, German, see German doctrine Donchery, 2nd Panzer Division at, 169–71 Drapier, Lieutenant, 207 Duhautois, Brigadier General, on 55th Division panic, 203 Dyle Plan, 7–9 Enigma machines, 74 Escaut Plan, 7 Etcheberrigaray, General, mission, 323–27 Faissault, action at, 331–32 5th Light Cavalry Division, at Vendresse and La Horgne, 318–22 XVth Panzer Corps, 21 53rd Infantry Division collapse of, 322–27 mission, 324 orders to seal gap, 325 withdrawal to Vence River, 326–27 55th Infantry Division, 106 assessing the situation around Sedan, 251–53 bunker construction, 123 causes of panic and sequence of events, 203 collapse of, 278–79 communications of, 275 coordination between tanks and infantry of, 271–72 counterattack by, 268–78 cowardly performance of artillery, 204–5 criticisms of men of the, 119 effect of panic on fighting capability of, 205–6 explanation for poor performance of, 208–9 failure to halt move toward Chémery, 255 holding ground, 117 lack of cohesion and training within, 133 lack of mines, 122–23 máteriél shortages, 120–22 mission, 115 officers, 117–18 panic of the, 200–6 panic spread to other units of, 204 perceptions of attitudes and abilities of, 120 personnel and personnel shortages, 117, 118–19 preparation for counterattack, 257–68 reserve battalion, 116 scale and nature of panic of, 202–3 strength of, 118 success of Germans against, 121 training, 120 units of, 115–16 using the reserves of, 253–57

1st Battalion, counterattack progress of, 269–71 1st Cavalry Brigade, 318–22 1st Infantry Regiment Chémery action, 219–22 Connage action, 220–21 crossing the Meuse, 144–50 engineer units providing support for, 146 fighting near Chateau of Bellevue, 148 French principal line of resistance and, 149–50 Guderian visit, 246–47 objective of, 222 rapid advance of, 148 reasons for success of, 144 reinforcements, 144–46 1st Motorcycle Battalion, southwest of St. Menges action, 148–49 1st Panzer Division Allied aerial attacks and, 215 artillery support for attack, 143 Biourge capture, 64–65 at Bouillon, 67–69 at Bulson, 216–19 at Chémery, 219–22 Connage action, 217 daily log records of Meuse River crossing, 211–12 final preparations for attack, 142–43 at Gaulier, 141–43 at Maisoncelle, 216–19 Meuse River crossing, 145 at Mouzaive, 68–70 objective, 64 plan, 142 positions, 212–13 push toward south, 211–16 Rethel advance, 244–47 screening forces, 63 Semois River advance and crossing, 63–70 at Singly, 241–44 at Vendresse, 325 wartime journal on initial fighting of, 147 Flavigny, General, 288, 295 halting attack, 304–5, 309 Huntziger meeting, 296 fortified houses, 111–12 4th Tank Battalion, counterattack by, 274–78 14th Infantry Division mission, 327–33 position, 330–31 reputation of, 327–28 sealing gaps at Omont and Poix-Terron, 327–33 43rd Assault Engineers, provided support for crossing Meuse, 146 49th Engineer Battalion, breaking through main French defenses, 160–63 Foucault, Captain, at Frénois, 175–83

French cavalry Arlon-Florenville action, 84 establishing series of phase lines, 83 explanation for failure of, 88–89 hampered by refugees, 88 mission and organization of, 79–83 at Mouzaive, 87 performance of, 93–94 Petitvoir action, 86 preparing to move in Belgium, 83–89 strength of, 81 at Vendresse and La Horgne, 318–22 see also individual divisions French doctrine, 22–25 colmater process, 24, 116 commanders post, 25 decision makers, 25 formulating, 22–24 German doctrine differences, 28 leadership style, 348, 349–50 methodical battle, 23–24 French infantry malfunctioning weapons of, 207 performance of, 206–7 personnel policies, 208 weakness of the, 206–9 see also individual divisions French intelligence Air Force reports, 96–97, 99, 101 Army Group 1 reports, 97–98 assessments of German order of battle, 73–79 cipher section, 74 Ninth Army reports, 100 Second Army reports, 94–96, 97, 98–99, 100, 101 French strategy, 2–13 approach to protecting frontiers, 2 Breda Variant, 9–13 carrying out, 11–13 considerations that influenced, 6 defensive positions, 6–7 Dyle Plan (Plan D), 7–9 economic wealth and, 2–4 Escaut Plan, 7 fortifications, 5 goal of, 2 Frénois breakthrough at, 193–200 2/331st Infantry Regiment at, 175–83 Fuller, Major General, on importance of the fighting around Sedan, 341–42 Gabel, Captain, 190–91, 192–93 Gamelin, Maurice, 101–2, 283

French strategy and, 7–13 Garski, Eugen, Operation Niwi and, 50–52 Gaulier, 1st Panzer Division at, 141–43 Georges, General, 76–77, 283, 284, 292, 314, 323, 337 counterattack at Sedan, 307–8 French strategy and, 10 German doctrine, 25–28 concept of continuous battle, 25–26 decentralization and initiative, 26–27 development of Panzer divisions, 27–28 French doctrine differences, 28 infiltration tactics, 26 introduction of tanks, 27–28 leadership style, 347, 349–50 mission-oriented tactics, 344–47 mobility, 26 tradition of auftragstaktik, 27 German strategy, 1, 13–22 encirclement and annihilation, 339 Hitler's statement on, 14–15 Plan Yellow, 16–22 shifting main effort from one Army Group to another, 18 Giordani, Major, 264 Giraud, Henri, 337 Grand Duchy, special operations in, 41–42 Grandsard, General, 112, 114, 261 Greim, Major, as Gross Deutschand Regiment commander, 151–56 Gross Deutschland Regiment, 51, 150–56, 214–15 attached to 10th Panzer Division, 54–60 capture of French center of resistance bunker, 155 crossing points, 152–53 in Floing, 151 French defenders in Torcy delayed advance of, 153–54 Hill 247 objective, 153, 155–56 Guderian, Heinz, 78, 214, 222 account of battle near Etalle, 56–60 aerial operations over Sedan and, 138–41 on crossing the Meuse, 135–38 decision about making pivot to the west, 230–31 1st Infantry Regiment visit, 246–47 German fight in the Ardennes and, 29–71 propelled his corps forward, 234 resignation of, 248–49 securing flank for advance of, 234–41 von Kleist debate, 231–32 Halder, Franz, 20, 38, 78 German strategy and, 13, 16 Hanbauer, Lieutenant, crossing Meuse River near Wadelincourt, 163–68 Hart, B. H. Liddell, 1, 248 Hedderich, Werner, special operations in Grand Duchy, 41–42 Hill 246, 168–69, 192

Hill 247, 153, 155–56, 168–69, 192 Hitler, Adolf, 38–39 Directive No. 6, 15–16 statement of aims and views on military strategy, 14–15 Huntziger, Charles, 82–83, 100, 103, 318–22 Flavigny meeting, 296 as Second Army commander, 103–10, 287–93 special exercise on conduct of counterattack, 257 infantry, French, see French infantry Keitel, Wilhelm, 38 German strategy and, 16 Keller, Marie J. P., 300, 335 Keltsch, Colonel, 66–70 Keyaerts, Maurice, in the Ardennes, 43–50 Kirchner, General, 220, 347 Koeltz, General, 102 Krüger, Walter, 48, 66–70 Operation Niwi and, 50–52 La Horgne, cavalry at, 318–22, 319 La Prayella, German capture of, 187 Labarthe, Pierre capture of, 273 on Chémery action, 272–73 55th Division counterattack and, 268–74 preparation for counterattack and, 258–68 Lacaille, Colonel, 100, 290–91 Lafont, Lieutenant Colonel, 115 Lafontaine, General, 106–7, 323 assessing the situation around Sedan, 251–53 collapse of 55th Division and, 278–79 counterattack and, 277–78 explanation for poor performance of 55th Division, 208–9 panic of the 55th Division and, 200–6 preparation for counterattack and, 257–68 summary of first phase of battle along Meuse, 174–75 Lamay, Lieutenant, 177 Leflon, Captain, at Wadelincourt, 189–90 Litalien, Captain, 196, 197, 198 Loritte, Second Lieutenant, 186 Luxembourg, XIXth Panzer Corps crossing, 37–43 Maginot Line, 5 Maisoncelle, attack toward, 216–19 map exercises, French and German, 78 Marc, Colonel, 87, 92 Martelange, 43–50 Chasseurs Ardennais at, 45–48 first encounter at, 48–50 methodical battle, 23–24

Meuse, Battle of the, 340 blitzkrieg, 341–42 casualties, 348–49 conclusion, 339–50 French counterattacks, 251–79 French defenses, 103–33, 127 French fight, 173–210 German attack, 135–72, 145, 209–10 German command style, 344–47 German pivot and breakout, 211–49 German river crossings, 176–77 German style of leadership, 347 myths about, 350 reasons for the defeat of France at, 343–44 Monnet, Montvignier, counterattack and, 274–78 Nedtwig, Lieutenant Colonel, 221–22 1940 Campaign, see Campaign of 1940 XIXth Panzer Corps, xix, 17 daily log entries on turning to the west, 228–30 degrees of success in crossing Meuse River, 172 Luxembourg crossing, 37–43 Meuse crossing, 135 movement through the Ardennes, 30–37 plan for, 136–38 push toward Poix-Terron, 311–12 Singly attack, 241–44 training, 37 turns to the west, 227–34 see also individual divisions Ninth Army, intelligence reports, 100 Omont, 14th Infantry Division sealing gap at, 327–33 1/86th Infantry, crossing Meuse River near Wadelincourt, 163–68 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, 123–24 exchange of personnel, 130 formation of, 123–24 fortifications, 131–33 mission, 124–25 mixing of companies, 131 mobility of weapons, 132 problems within the, 130–33 replacements, 130–31 training, 124, 128–30, 131 units, 123–24 Operation Niwi, 50–52 purpose of, 50 Operations Order Number 1, 297 Penissou, Second Lieutenant, on progress of 1st Battalion, 269–71 Pétain, Philippe, 5 Picault, Captain, 90, 91

Pinaud, Lieutenant Colonel, 115, 123, 189, 269 147th's defensive position and, 124–30 pivot and breakout, 211–49, 213 Plan Yellow, 16–22 information in hands of Allies, 18–19 Playfair, Air Vice Marshal P. H. L., 283 Poix-Terron, 14th Infantry Division sealing gap at, 327–33 Poncelet, Colonel, 203–4 Rethel, advancing toward, 244–47 Rivet, Colonel, 76 Roosevelt, Franklin D., xvi Rubarth, Staff Sergeant, 195 on breaking through main French defenses, 160–63 Ruby, General, 106 Saint, Crosbie E., foreword by, xi–xii 2nd Armored Division, 333–36 failure of, 336 mission, 333–35 railway movement, 334–35 withdrawal toward Aisne River, 335 Second Army, 287–93 armored vehicles assigned to, 294–95 contingency plan, 289 defensive line, 108–9 divisions in, 104 intelligence reports, 97, 98–99, 100, 101 mission, 103–4 movement of command post, 293–94 positioning of, 105–6 preparations for strengthening, 287–93 process of reinforcements, 287–88 training, 107–8 see also individual divisions 2nd Panzer Division Ardennes advance, 60–62 Belgium advance, 60–62 at Boutancourt, 324–25 bridge construction over Meuse near Donchery, 171 at Donchery, 169–71 first tank regiment to cross the Meuse, 217 formal plan of attack, 170 mission, 170 moves west, 222–24 objective, 233–34 operating at a disadvantage, 169 Sedan bunkers at, 350 counterattack conducted at, 307–8 defending, 109–10 German aerial operations over, 138–41

Semois, terrain of the, 105 Semois River, French defense of the, 89–94 7th Tank Battalion Chémery action, 272–73 counterattack by, 268–74 problems with movement toward Chémery, 264–65 reasons for failure of, 267–68, 273–74 71st Division, as reserve, 106–7 Singly, attack toward, 241–44 Sixth Army, 311–12 cavalry at Vendresse and La Horgne, 318–22 53rd Infantry Division collapse, 322–27 14th Infantry Division sealing the gaps, 327–33 General Touchon as commander of the, 312–17 mission, 315 opening road to English Channel, 336–38 2nd Armored Division, 333–36 situation morning, 319 see also individual divisions Stonne, fighting around, 306, 308 strategy, French, see French strategy strategy, German, see German strategy Taittinger, Pierre, 109–10 tanks B-1 bis, limitations of, 302–3 losses, 308 Xth Corps, 288 building fortifications, 114 counterattack exercise in Sedan area, 112–13 fortified houses, 111–12 on importance of German aerial attacks, 140 mission, 110–11 other units of, 113 positions, 111 reserve infantry regiment of, 112 training, 113–14 see also individual divisions 10th Panzer Division assembling for crossing the Meuse, 59–60 attached to XIV Corps, 236 French counterattacks and, 238–40 initial hours of combat losses, 55 makes contact with French forces near Etalle, 55 missions, 58–59, 159, 234–35 move to the river, 159 move toward Florenville, 58 moves south, 224–27 other attacks launched by, 235–36 Pont Maugis attack, 159–60 role, 54 screening forces, 54

shift to the north, 56–57 Stonne action, 236–38 at Wadelincourt, 158–69 Thirache, Lieutenant, 191 3rd Armored Division, 289–90 counterattack at Sedan, 307–8 failure of, 298–309 inadequate communications equipment, 298 lack of key personnel and equipment, 298 late departure and slow forward movement of, 303–4 performance of, 298 shortage in tanks, 299 southwest of Stonne, 301 tank losses, 308 training, 299 3rd North African Division, 106 3rd Spahis Brigade, 318–22 at La Horgne, 322 mistake made by, in defense of Semois, 91–92 Omicourt and Vendresse action, 321 331st Infantry Regiment, performance of, 206–7 Torcy, 2/147th Infantry Regiment behind, 183–89 Touchon, General, 336 military career, 312–13 mission, 315 as Sixth Army commander, 312–17 under unexpected enemy fire, 337 Trinquand, Colonel, 329–33 XXIst Corps counterattack by, 294–98 divisions attached to, 298 failure to launch counterattack, 309 missions, 288, 296–97, 301 Operations Order Number 1 issued to, 297 orders, 294 see also individual divisions 2/147th Infantry Regiment and attack against Hill 247, 187 behind Torcy, 183–89 at Col de la Boulette, 186 fourth organic company of, 183 German capture of La Prayelle, 187 mission, 184 pull back to La Prayelle, 185 three centers of resistance, 183 2/295th Infantry Regiment behind Wadelincourt, 189–93 at Etadan around Hill 246, 192 near bridge at Pont du Bouillonais, 191 three centers of resistance, 189 2/331st Infantry Regiment defenders in bunkers near Bellevue, 179

disrupted Germans crossing at Doncery, 179–80 at Frénois, 175–83 at Les Forges, 177 mission, 175 three centers of resistance, 175–76 205th Infantry Regiment, counterattack by, 274–78 213th Infantry Regiment Boult au Bois action, 258–68 capture of, 273 counterattack by, 268–74 reasons for failure of, 267–68, 273–74 as Xth Corps reserve, 112 Vendresse cavalry at, 318–22, 319 1st Panzer Division at, 325 German armor-heavy attack against, 321 Verron, Second Lieutenant, 178–79, 181, 182 Vitte, Captain, 186, 188 von Bothmer, Captain, death of, 148 von Brauchitisch, Walther, German strategy and, 16 von Kielmansegg, Major account of crossing Luxembourg, 39–40 on French line of resistance, 181–82 von Kleist, Ewald aerial operations over Sedan and, 138–41 on crossing the Meuse, 135 German fight in the Ardennes and, 29–71 Guderian debate, 231–32 Guderian meeting, 248–49 von Mainstein, Erich, German strategy and, 19–20 von Rundstedt, K. R. Gerd, 249 fight in the Ardennes and, 29–71 von Schwerin, Lieutenant Colonel, 220 Wadelincourt 1/86th Infantry crossing Meuse River near, 163–68 10th Panzer Division at, 158–69 2/295th Infantry Regiment behind, 189–93

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