The American Experience in Vietnam

nftKiN

COUNTY FREE LIBRARY

31111010840302

Clark Dougan Si Stephen Weiss

The complete history with eye-witness accounts by Walter Cronkite, Al Santoli. and others

—— FPT

ISBN D-3T3-D25=ifi->5

>$3T.TS

n in AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN

VIETNAM

CLARK DOUGAN. STEPHEN WEISS, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company Illustrations selected

by Kathleen

Reidy

A.

This most thorough volume recounts America's experience in Vietnam from the

commitment of U.S.

the French defeat at Dien Bien

Phu

hrst

wake of

advisers in the

to the

dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in

Washington, D.C. Dramatically

illustrated

with the war's most stunning photography

some

ot

it

rarely or

never published before

The American Experience

in

Vietnam

presents an unflinching view of men at war.

Written and edited by the same team that produced The Vietnam Experience, the landmark twenty-five-volume

The

illustrated history of the war,

American Experience balanced look

The Gulf

of

in

Vietnam takes

at the war's

Tonkin incident in 1964, American forces that

the "big buildup" of

followed, the Tet offensive o\ 1968, the

war

at

home, the Cambodian

the Easter offensive, the all

fall

invasion,

of Saigtm

made combined and writing

are placed in a perspective

possible only by the authors'

decade of

researcfi, analysis,

on the war. Including first-person testimony by key witnesses to the war and unique "focus" sections that take readers to the battlefield

with

tht)se

who

fought,

American Experience in Vietnam single book before it presents the Vietnam War in its entirety.

G)ver piR

'^! .

ii

'(igraph reprinted wirh permisMon, L

— LIPE

Burrows

a

key events.

M
©

1966,

Time

Iru

,

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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM

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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM CLARK DOUGAN

STEPHEN WEISS

AND THE EDITORS OF BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY

PICTURES SELECTED

W-W-NORTON

&

BY

COMPANY

KATHLEEN

A.

REIDY

NEW YORK LONDON

BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY

BOSTON

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In the

M.^./r

Mekong Delta

in early I

Vietnamese marines

in seai

cong fan out from an

Am

BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY Publisher: Robert

George

Editor-in-Chief: Robert

Managing

Manning

Editor: Paul Dreyfus

Marketing Director: Jeanne Gibson Design Director: Lisa Bogle

Wendy Johnson

Picture Editor:

Senior Editor: Samuel Lipsman Senior Writer: Denis Kennedy

Research Assistant: Michael Hathaway Picture Researchers: Jennifer Atkins, Lauren

Chapin

Assistant Designer: Sherry Fatla

Design Assistants: Emily Betsch, Lynne Weygint Business Staff:

Anna

Amy

Cheshire,

Pelletier,

Amy

Wilson

Frontispiece:

A

Marine wades through

The

a stream just south of the demilitarized zone,

text of this

by

book was composed

Waldman

in

Goudy Old

1966.

Style

Graphics, Inc.

Color separations by Colotone

Manufactured by

W.

A. Krueger Company

Printed in the United States of America

First

©

Copyright reserved.

No

Edition

1988 by Boston Publishing Company,

part of this publication

Inc. All rights

may be reproduced

or transmitted

any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, in

without permission

in writing

from the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card

Number: 88-70320

ISBN: 0-393-02598-5

W-W-Norton 500

Fifth

Avenue,

W'W-Norton 37 Great Russell

&

New

Company, York,

New

Inc.,

York lOIlO

&

Company, Ltd, Street, London WCIB

1098 76 54

3

2

1

3NU

CONTENTS Introduction:

The Roots

of

Involvement

10

1

THE ROAD TO WAR Focus: Training /Witness: Morris Udal!/ Focus:

16

ARVN and Its

2 AMERICA TAKES OVER Focus:

Masher / White Wing /Focus:

56 Mary

Prairie/ Witness:

Advisers

Reis Stout

3

STALEMATE Sam

Witness:

98 Con Thien/ Focus:

Davis /Focus:

Hill

875

4 THE TET OFFENSIVE

Witness:

142 Ron Harper / Focus: Hue /Focus: Khe Sanh / Witness: Walter Cronkite

5 THE HOME FRONT Witness: Jim

192 Quay /Focus: Chicago

6 NIXON'S Focus:

WAR

228

The Cambodian Incursion / Witness: Al Santoli

7

THE LONG GOOD-BYE Focus:

The

Easter Offensive / Focus:

262

POW / Witness:

8 THE END AND AFTERMATH Focus:

The

Fall

of Saigon

/ Focus:

Coming Home/

Bibliography arid Credits

Index

348

Everett Alvarez

306

Witness: Jan Scruggs

344

A

phosphorus

Skyraider

falls

bomb dropped by an A- IE on a

village in the central

highlands, 1966.

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THE ROOTS OF INVOLVEMENT

In Bien Hoa, South Vietnam,

not worry too

Absorbed

much about

in the

black-clad figures

not see them ready

reel of

first

who a

on

a

hot July night

an old movie, the

French submachine gun

turned on the lights to change the

Suddenly, automatic-weapons

not hear the shadowy,

six advisers did

in the rear

seats before the lights

window

or push

anything was wrong at

realize

They

two

all

rifle

until

did

muzzles

someone

reel.

fire

exploded through the room.

into the startled Americans, spinning

from their

of 1959, Americans did

crept out of the darkness surrounding their mess hall.

through the pantry screens. They did not

slammed

summer

in the

death.

one

The

high-caliber shells

man around and knocking two

others

Behind them

in the

snapped off and the gunmen

fled.

bloody confusion lay Captain Howard Boston. Badly wounded, he would survive. But for

Major Dale Buis and Master Sergeant Chester Ovnand the night would go on

The 2,

deaths of the two Americans were both tragic and bitterly ironic.

1945, other U.S.

Army

officers

had stood on

a reviewing stand in

On

forever.

September

Hanoi and

listened

to a band playing the "Star-Spangled Banner." President Franklin Roosevelt's opposition

to

French colonialism

in

Indochina and U.S. collaboration with the Nationalist Vietminh

army of Ho Chi Minh during World War the two peoples.

As Ho proclaimed

seemed

II

his country's

to

promise a lasting friendship between

freedom

the American Declaration of Independence and U.S.

was unthinkable that fourteen years

later

in

words borrowed directly from

aircraft flew

overhead

in salute,

it

Americans and Vietnamese would be dying

at

each others hands. But the death of Roosevelt and the onset of the Cold

War

left

a

new American

president facing larger problems than Vietnamese independence. Alarmed by the threat of Soviet expansionism, determined to maintain cordial relations with a key European partner,

In

May

and persuaded that

1954 near Hanoi, a

Ho Chi Minh

woman

was

a creature of

Moscow, Harry Truman did

nunirns her husband, a victim ot the French hiJtK'hina War.

not oppose the restoration ot French sovereij^nty in Indochina.

When

nam

1946, the United States adopted a decidedly

in

war broke out between France and Viet-

pro-French "neutrality," declining requests

for

direct

military aid but providing France with sufficient eco-

nomic of

assistance that Paris was able to fund the

own

its

little

success in subduing the Viet-

"critical

consequences"

when

the

fall

of

Na-

precipitated a crucial change in U.S.

another Communist success would

strategy. Fearing that

have

a peripheral issue for the

administration until 1949,

China

psychological, for the

doned American

Western

neutrality

and economic

political,

alliance,

Truman aban-

and committed the United

States to a French victory. In early 1950 a U.S. Military

Assistance Advisory

nam

Meanwhile, the United States prepared

to take over the

South Vietnam, which few observers expected

to survive

the year.

The new

nation'? leader was widely respected as an

experienced administrator and ardent Nationalist. But

The French had

tionalist

with elections to reunify the country in two years.

defense of Laos, Cambodia, and the nascent state of

war out

pocket.

minh. But Indochina remained

Truman

allel

Group

(MAAG)

arrived in Viet-

Ngo Dinh Diem

faced a devastated economy, a lack of

trained civil servants, hundreds of thousands of refugees,

and dozens of armed

sects hostile to his

With U.S. help and

stubborn persistence

Diem not only

a

government. all his

own.

survived but triumphed. In September

1955, in a declaration that reflected both his internal strength and the backing of his American patrons, he

denounced the Geneva accords and

refused to partici-

pate in the reunification elections scheduled for the

fol-

lowing year.

Once Diem had

to funnel military aid to France's expeditionary

consolidated his regime, Washington

army. By 1952 the United States was paying more than

launched an experiment

one-third of the cost of the war.

the atmosphere of a crusade. From 1955 to 1961 the

Truman's Indochina policy was adopted by President Dwight Eisenhower,

who

in

its

entirety

believed his pred-

much

ecessor had erred only in allowing France too

lee-

way. Using more than $1 billion of increased funding as

French make greater

leverage,

Washington

efforts to

win Nationalist support and adopt

gressive strategy.

insisted the

a

more

ag-

But nothing could arrest the steady

deterioration of the military situation. In

March 1954,

the Vietminh surrounded 12,000 French troops at Dien

Bien Phu.

When

France requested American help,

Eisenhower warned that the chain reaction

off a

"like a

loss of

Indochina would

set

not prepared to act alone and found no support in Congress for intervention. siege,

On May

7,

after a fifty-five-day

the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu finally

surrendered.

had

just

dochina problem. Buoyed by

begun

a

comprehensive

to discuss the In-

their victory, the

demanded an immediate withdrawal and

Vietminh

of foreign troops

political settlement.

But China

and the Soviet Union persuaded

Ho Chi Minh

temporary partition of Vietnam

at the

u

$2 billion

in aid.

to accept

seventeenth par-

Along with the

money came American alists, social scientists,

flood of

American

engineers, doctors, agricultur-

and public ad-

military advisers,

ministrators to rebuild the South Vietnamese forces, reshape the

armed

South Vietnamese economy, and

re-

organize the South Vietnamese government. By the late

1950s more than 1,500 Americans were building roads, planting crops,

medicine

all

training

across

bureaucrats,

and dispensing

South Vietnam under the supervi-

sion of the largest U.S. Mission anywhere in the world.

U.S.

officials called

outstripped reality.

it

a "miracle," but their rhetoric

Although the United States was

spending $85 million a year on training and equipment, the

Army

of the Republic of (South) Vietnam

suffered from serious deficiencies.

Attention immediately shifted to Geneva, where an East- West conference

United States provided South Vietnam with more than

other nations in the region

felling

row of dominoes." But the administration was

took on

in nation-building that

nomic on

shortages and

Although American

collapse

industrial

manpower

and gilded

life

development or used

And

ARVN)

prevented eco-

in Saigon, little

conditions of the rural peasants

cent of the population.

aid

(

command was spent

to

improve the living

who

constituted 90 per-

although American advisers

clothed South Vietnam in the trappings of democracy.

Diem

presided over a ruthless, authoritarian regime that

steadily alienated popular support for his

government.

Diem where

government

American men and weapons took the

influx of

Vietcong by

surprise, but the

continuing disabilities of

the South Vietnamese army enabled the insurgents to

audience for revolutionary alternatives. In 1957

regain the initiative. Washington's attempts to change

ineffectual land-reform

program created

Vietminh cadres who remained tition

resumed

efforts

soon escalating into

South

in the

after par-

political agitation in the villages, their a systematic

and assassination against

ror

The

the countryside,

in

a recep-

and an tive

ground particularly

lost

his suppression ot traditional village

In January 1959,

local

campaign of

government

in the

South and soon

began constructing the network of roads and

Ho Chi Minh

would become the

Hanoi sent weapons and in

officials.

North Vietnam formally endorsed the

resumption of armed struggle

who,

ter-

Over

Trail.

trails

after

that

this route,

advisers to assist the insurgents

December 1960, coalesced under the banner of

the direction of the Saigon government also met with

Diem

failure.

erupted in the

on the

the young

American

importance of Southeast Asia to

vital

crisis

militant Buddhists

months of

Diem and

with the

Ngo Dinh Nhu were

brother

his

1

Diem government. During

the overthrow of the

Although Washington had approved Diem's removal,

crisis,

president had inherited a national commitment. By insisting

new

upheaval a group of South Vietnamese army generals

critical.

Along with the immediate

when

of 1963

began preparations that culminated on November

assassinated.

beginning of 1961, the military

summer

onstrations and fiery self-immolations. After

the National Liberation Front. By the time John Kenoffice at the

to ap-

challenged the government with massive street dem-

nedy took

had become

economic reforms

measures of political repression. The inevitable

coup

situation

instituted token

pease the Americans while simultaneously enacting

murder shocked Kennedy and brought

his

the president's growing doubts

When

taken.

he assumed

abt:)ut

office there

Now

to the surface

the course he had

were 875 U.S.

more than

America's security. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower

servicemen in Vietnam.

had made

16,000. Since 1961, millions of dollars had been spent

it

virtually impossible to retreat

from the

gion. Moreover, Soviet threats to blockade Berlin

the failure of an American-sponsored invasion of

made

it

imperative in Kennedy's

States demonstrate time,

its

mind

and

Cuba

that the United

resolve in Vietnam.

the experience of the Korean

re-

At

the same

War made him

and 109 Americans had

independent South Vietnam.

view" of American policy

Kennedy could have

ment

depended ultimately on social

Diem government

survival of the its

its

Yet the United

goal of a secure

and

mid-November the

In

president ordered a "complete and very profound re-

Asian mainland. Nor would their presence alone guar-

The

lost their lives.

States was further than ever from

deeply reluctant to deploy American troops on the

antee victory.

there were

in

Vietnam. Whether or not

reversed a

momentum

of involve-

nearly two decades in the making, he never got

the chance.

One week

later

John

F.

Kennedy was dead.

willingness to address the

and economic needs of South Vietnam's peasant

majority, something

it

had so

far refused to do.

Yet with-

out a credible threat of withdrawal, Washington had no leverage to enforce

Confident of

its

demands

his ability to

for reform.

maintain control of U.S.

involvement and unwilling to accept the costs of pulling out,

Kennedy opted

for a

middle course between retreat

and direct military intervention. Warding to introduce

combat

increased the

American

amount of U.S.

advisers.

off pressure

troops, the president substantially

Any

aid

and the number of

consideration of a larger U.S.

Following page. as a

on

A peasant plows his paddy m

French convoy

May

25, 1954,

that the

depended on evidence from Saigon

government intended

to put

its

house

in order.

came the

first

two weeks

who

the

Red River Delta

hecause of a Vietminh amhush ahead

Bien Phu. The picture was rapher Robert Capa,

military presence

stalls

after the

among

French sunender at Dien

the last taken by war photog-

within hours of taking this picture he-

American correspondent

killed covering fighting in

Indochina.

13

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— —

1

THE ROAD TO WAR

Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed power on November

22, 1963, in the

wake of the most

shocking national event since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. "Everything was in chaos," Johnson would later

come

to grips with

recall.

"We

were

all

spinning around and around, trying to

what had happened, but the more we

tried to

understand

the more

it,

confused we got." Uncertain of his legitimacy in the eyes of the American people, the

new

president clothed himself in Kennedy's mantle, vowing to carry forward the

martyred predecessor had

left

undone

—protecting the

civil rights of

work

his

black Americans,

ameliorating the hardships of the poor, and defending South Vietnam from the threat of

Communist

aggression.

Johnson's rhetoric reflected his shrewd appreciation of the national

math of John Kennedy's

death, but his

commitment

to

mood

in the after-

Vietnam had deeper and more

important roots. There were, to begin with, the lessons of Munich and the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. Like

many

of his generation,

Lyndon Johnson remembered

too vividly what appeasement of Hitler had purchased in 1940. Behind Hanoi's bel-

all

licosity

Johnson saw the aggressive hand of

a

Communist China

the entire Southeast Asian peninsula. Should the United States lenge,

it

If

Vietnam was

all his

a trial of U.S. credibility

made

politics, the

am

and

new

resolve,

affairs.

this chal-

was also a personal challenge. little

who doubted

experience in foreign

his capacity to

am

Southeast Asia go the way China went."

also led

hums, Special

Fitrces

It

handle

His sensitivity on this issue hardened John-

not going to lose Vietnam," he told Henry Cabot Lodge

forty-eight hours after Kennedy's death. "1

VC camp

it

president had

repeatedly by those in the press

the complex problems of international son's resolve. "I

a

on dominating meet

would not only cost the South Vietnamese their freedom but

mastery of domestic

policy, a point

As

to

have "profound consequences everywhere."

also

For

Johnson believed,

intent fail

not going to be the president

him

Captain Vernon Gillespie

to retain

raJiits

less

than

who saw

Kennedy's top foreign

nearby patrols, September 1964-

policy advisers

— men

like Secretary of State

and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara their

own

Dean Rusk

American combat

— who had

American assumption

stake in South Vietnam's survival.

Compounding

matters was the sense of

oping Southeast Asia

at the

seriously undercut

envel-

crisis

end of 1963. In Indonesia,

forces

Any

American

Asia.

called for

an

inter-

significant

November. Johnson

was not only unwilling

happen, he saw no

to let this

Preoccupied with establishing his leader-

The same theme was trumpeted by French

ship and taking advantage of the

president

challenged American influence

program and jeop-

ardize Johnson's bid for election in

reason for

who

it.

civil rights

and antipoverty

bills

moment

to push major

through Congress, the

commitment with

in southern Asia with a proposal for the neutralization

president balanced

of South Vietnam.

off difficult decisions for as long as possible.

Meanwhile, the military junta that took power Saigon was able neither to

fill

the political

vacuum

in left

by Diem's death nor to cope with the upsurge of fighting

On

December

re-

escalation would en-

legislative

national conference to guarantee his nation's neutrality.

Charles de Gaulle

itself.

percussions of greater U.S. involvement in Southeast

danger the administration's

had renounced American aid and

war might

defend

will to

Even more important were the potential domestic

king to open war against the pro-Western government

Norodom Sihanouk

Moreover,

region.

South Vietnam's

the mercurial Sukarno had gone from flirtation with Pe-

of Malaysia. In Cambodia, Prince

the

in

ot responsibility for the

Thus,

for

all

caution, putting

upheavals of the

the

months, the spring of 1964 witnessed

change

in the course of

previous

little

six

apparent

U.S. policy. After a review of

21, Robert

the options available to him, Johnson authorized the

returned to Washington after a brief inspec-

deployment of additional U.S. military advisers and an

tion tour with a grim report of political turmoil, admin-

enlargement of the economic assistance package to Sai-

that wracked the countryside.

McNamara

and

istrative paralysis,

military reverses at every hand.

gon.

The

emphasis, however, remained squarely on the

Unless the situation was stabilized immediately, warned

South Vietnamese, with new plans

the secretary of defense, the fate of South Vietnam

the

would be "neutralization

at best

and more

likely a

Com-

Concerned

show

he could deal with the

Johnson responded

government's

intention

He

Southeast Asia.

American

political standing

and the

America around the world, determined

his critics

inherited,

own

for his

on

to

he had

crisis

by vigorously affirming his

of resisting

communism

in

expressed his resolve in terms of

responsibilities

strength imposes

us

of the

ARVN,

around

the

world.

"Our

an obligation to assure that

this

for

an increase

in

intensification of the pacification

program, and stepped-up military operations against the Vietcong. "The only thing

munist-controlled state."

credibility of

size

Senator William Fulbright

same and do

it

more

I

know

to do,"

March,

in

efficiently

and

"is

Johnson told

more of the

effectively."

Yet, hidden from public view were important changes that, like the

contained a

heightened rhetoric of U.S. commitment,

momentum

of their own. Concerned over

reports of increased infiltration of

ing south,

men and

supplies flow-

the administration approved a program of

clandestine operations into Laos and North Vietnam.

McNamara

concrete steps to counter the

type of aggression does not succeed," Johnson wrote in

Pressed by

February 1964- Neutralization was unworkable, with-

continuing military decline on the ground, the president authorized

drawal unthinkable. For

all

that,

new

the

straint during his

first

president proceeded with re-

year in office.

One

reason for the

measured pace was Johnson's reluctance to employ

American home.

military

No more

power on a

large scale so far

from

than Kennedy or Eisenhower did he

relish the prospect of

the Asian mainland.

U.S. troops engaged

Nor was Johnson

in battle

certain

how

on the

Soviets or Chinese would react to the appearance of

18

strikes

contingency

north of the

American

for

resolve,

continued support

planning

for

DMZ. Determined

retaliatory

air

to demonstrate

Johnson privately warned Hanoi that for the insurgency

"greatest devastation" to

could bring the

North Vietnam. Taken

whole, these measures revealed a fundamental perspective, a growing belief in

Washington that

action against North Vietnam could

what U.S. policy had

failed to

as a

shift in

direct

somehow achieve

accomplish in the South.

In an act that

shocked the world, Buddhist monk Quang Due immolates himself on

Ngo Dinh Diem's

a

Saigon street on June

11, 1963, to protest President

persecution of Buddhists.

For the time being the counterinsurgency war in the

but also making them more vulnerable to

South continued, with the United States more deeply

attack.

From 1960 through 1962, 32 U.S.

involved than ever. Over the next nine months the

sonnel

lost their lives in

number

that figure climbed to 77, and in

of

American

military advisers increased

16,000 to 23,000, among them naval

from

working

hostile action totaled 137.

with the fledgling Vietnamese navy and nearly 100 U.S.

the trend was disquieting.

Air Force

ARVN

pilots

combat-support missions for

flying

offensives as well as training

The army was

also

officers

Vietnamese

struggling to contain the

in the

late spring

shooting war. By the end of 1964 American Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense

had established

forty-four

Group (CIDG) teams

camps throughout South Viet-

nam. Many of them were located along the Laotian border, enabling the allies to

monitor

Green traffic

Berets and their

along the

montagnard

Ho Chi Minh

Trail

South Vietnam. During 1963

If

1964, deaths from

the numbers were

still

low,

But U.S. servicemen were not the only Americans

pilots.

becoming increasingly engaged

Communist military per-

Communist

Frank Scotton, a junior

guerrillas. In the

field

operator with

the United States Information Service, unveiled the

—six-man teams

People's Special Forces group

Vietnamese

civilians

first

of armed

trained to fight local insurgent

bands on their own terms. By August the program had

been taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which also provided arms and funding

for Viet-

19

Srecinl Forces

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CHXj

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Ixittle.

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namese Counter-Terror Teams and sponsored Radio

Hue

Freedom, a 10,000-watt station based in

that sent

was an expanding

activities

program of U.S. -directed covert operations. Some were

Command,

run by the U.S. Military Assistance

nam (MACV),

Viet-

such as Project Leaping Lena, which

commandos on

sent eight-man squads of Vietnamese

long-range reconnaissance patrols into Laos, or Project Delta, in

new

up of American and Vietnamese Special Forces

soldiers

within

South

enemy-controlled

territory

Vietnam. The most dramatic covert

activities,

however,

in

Hanoi

strategy for the southern insurgency.

North

government.

Vietnam

amounts of war materiel to take to the field

and

to

its

to approve a

Hoping

the Saigon

funneled

increasing

southern

who began

allies,

armed with mortars, machine guns,

recoilless rifles.

A

wave of

American colony

terrorist attacks hit the

in Saigon, but the

main

new campaign was

thrust of the

to destroy Saigon's strategic reserves already

by spiraling desertion

rates.

weakened

Striking repeatedly at iso-

ARVN

were carried out by the innocuously named Studies and

lated posts, the Vietcong lured

Observation Group (SOG),

bases into carefully concealed ambushes. By late

a highly classified unit

trolled directly by the Pentagon.

SOG

Cambodia, Laos, and even North Vietnam

on enemy

intelligence

interrogation,

Vietnamese

and

PT

activities,

con-

teams entered to gather

snatch prisoners for

SOG

interdict infiltration.

also sent

and the nation's confidence

into small enclaves,

multiplied d'etat

on Saigon's

streets,

while an attempted

from within was aborted only when U.S.

warned

officials

Maxwell Taylor,

off the conspirators.

who succeeded Henry Cabot Lodge

as

American am-

bassador in midsummer, estimated that the

Khanh

crease of $125 million in aid were able to arrest the

ernment had no more than "a 50-50 chance of

steady decline of Saigon's military and political fortunes.

out the year."

The

junta that had deposed

two months

lent

Khanh

in

extending

its

its

1

new

predecessor

authority into the countryside.

on April

under

officers

Nguyen Khanh. Although

successful than

A

U.S.

estimated that the Vietcong

controlled between 40 and 60 percent of the rural population.

Even

in areas

Saigon could claim as

its

lack of trained officials, bureaucratic lethargy,

own

a

insuffi-

cient resources, pervasive corruption, and the sometimes brutal behavior of

new

government

pacification program

soldiers

undermined the

and prevented the implemen-

tation of ambitious development plans drafted by the

Americans.

main problem was the

itary situation.

22

Khanh a

cr^'

In

at rallying public sup-

steadily

December 1963,

as

to solve the problems that surrounded him,

upon

called

his

countrymen

The flamboyant young commander air force publicly

been training

Ky

gov-

lasting

to

"March North,"

echoed immediately by General Nguyen Cao Ky.

announced

of the Vietnamese

that his pilots

had already

"We

are ready,"

such a mission.

for just

told the press, resplendent in a black flight suit

lavender

scarf.

assure that

all

"We

could go this afternoon.

I

and

cannot

of North Vietnam would be destroyed,

but Hanoi would certainly be destroyed." Although Tay-

reprimanded both South Vietnamese lead-

lor privately

ficials

many Washington

provocative remarks,

ers for their

had by

this

time

come

to

much

of-

the same point of

view.

Indeed,

Although Khanh proved inept port, his

Unable

overthrown

vocal public support, the

government was no more

report issued

itself

by a group of younger

later

the leadership of General

Washington

Diem was

vir-

tually spent. Public demonstrations against the govern-

ment

the expansion of covert operations, nor an in-

summer

the territory held by Saigon fragmented

annihilated,

coup

Unfortunately, neither the dispatch of additional ad-

units from their

of South Vietnam's military reserves had been

named Operation

34-Alpha.

visers,

much

boats against North Vietnamese coastal

installations in a series of raids code

to dis-

down

courage the United States and bring

which ten-man "Hunter-Killer Teams" made

penetrated

over large sections of the South Viet-

at will

namese Communist party met

propaganda broadcasts to North Vietnam. Alongside these "public"

roamed

namese countryside, the central committee of the Viet-

against the

pressure

for

direct

North was coming

As

U.S. at

military

Johnson from

action all di-

early as January the Joint Chiefs of Staff

worsening mil-

rections.

Vietcong units

had urged the president

to "take bolder actions

which

may embody restrictions

greater risks." Deploring the self-imposed

under which the war was being fought, the

recommended the commitment

generals forces to

infiltration,

and the bombing of key

and President Johnson's

capability,

air

reluc-

tance to risk American ground combat units had fash-

combat

ioned a growing consensus within the administration for

to hinder

the application of air power against North Vietnam. By

of U.S.

South Vietnam, an invasion of Laos

unused

targets in

North

midsummer, planning

for a

program of "graduated overt

Vietnam. In March, the interagency Vietnam Working

pressure" against the North was well advanced, along

Group, chaired by the State Department's Robert John-

with drafts of a Congressional resolution supporting

JCS recommendations,

son, endorsed the

particular a blockade of

suggesting in

Haiphong Harbor and

air strikes

against military training camps, transportation arteries,

and petroleum storage

McNamara

Defense

facilities.

Although Secretary of time

rejected escalation for the

being, he persuaded the president to authorize planning for a

bombing campaign

against the North. By June, as

the situation in Vietnam worsened, both outgoing

bassador Lodge and the newly appointed

MACV,

General William C. Westmoreland, were

American

ing for vigorous

air strikes against

Those

in

of

their proposals

Washington who dissented from the new

Among them

was Roger Hilsman, assistant sec-

retary of state for Far Eastern affairs.

Kennedy

years

and

a

A

might deem necessary.

veteran of the

proponent of patient counterin-

effort.

role in

I

continued to hope that we could keep our

Vietnam

limited." Events in the Gulf of

istration the

momentum

ment was almost

toward

Among

during the spring were electronic surveillance missions

off the coast of

North Vietnam. The.se

on

months without incident when, on the

for several

night of August three

Me

2,

the U.S.S.

in the

Gulf of Tonkin. After

nam

Ticonderoga.

Assuming

that the

Charged by Johnson with

disloyalty

and

pressured to resign, Hilsman warned in a letter to Secretary of State

Rusk that

in

action against

Hon Me two

with the

aircraft carrier

U.S.S.

North Vietnamese had

34-A

raid

days earlier, Johnson declined to

retaliate. Lest his restraint

be misinterpreted by Hanoi,

with the addition of a second destroyer, the U.S.S.

is

Communists

as

an act of desperation, and

not be effective in persuading the North

Vietnamese to cease and

Operations against

desist."

North Vietnam, he concluded, "may

at a certain stage

be a useful supplement to an effective counterinsurgency

program, but cannot be an effective

insis-

tence on the priority of political over military solutions

Vietnamese problem and

tenacity.

However,

own house

his

judgment of Hanoi's

frustration over Saigon's inability to in order,

Turner ]oy, the provision of

air cover,

and

explicit au-

thorization to respond with force to any attack in inter-

national waters.

On

the night of August 4, as the two ships plowed

through heavy seas sixty miles from the North Vietna-

mese mainland, the Maddox radioed that the destroyers

substitute."

Subsequent events would vindicate Hilsman's

its

off the attackers

confused the Maddox with an unrelated against

Hon

our counterinsurgency program will be inter-

will, therefore,

put

island of

twenty-minute en-

however, the president ordered the patrols to continue

preted by the

to the

a

taken before we demonstrate suc-

North Vietnam that cess

"significant

had gone

Maddox was attacked by

from the

civic action" as

patrols

North Vietnamese PT boats near the

jet fighters

military effort.

military involve-

the covert operations approved by the president

help of four

and

full

irresistible.

gagement the Maddox drove

political

Tonkin

in August, however, suggested that within the admin-

"over-Americanization" of the war, arguing that Viet-

much

a reso-

lution was simply "part of the normal contingency plan-

ning

surgency, Hilsman had cautioned in early 1963 against

required "as

mind such

In Johnson's

code named DeSoto and conducted by U.S. destroyers

Laos or North Vietnam.

administration's emerging policy were few and far be-

tween.

Southeast Asia and providing authori-

in

call-

military action to bolster

South Vietnamese morale. Chief among were

Am-

commander

U.S. policy

zation to the president for whatever military action he

the existence of a major

were under attack by North Vietnamese gunboats. In fact,

on an "inky black night" one seaman described

as

"darker than the hubs of Hell," no one aboard either ship actually saw the

enemy

craft, firing their

guns

in-

stead at sonar and radar contacts of questionable relia-

23

After a brief engagement, the destroyers reported

bility.

they had repulsed the North Vietnamese without sustaining any casualties or damage. But several hours later

commander

the

Maddox

of the

reassessed the situation,

may have accounted

parent torpedo attacks and that there

enemy

had been "no actual

cluded that the entire action

for the ap-

contacts. Emphasizing

he con-

visual sightings,"

many doubts" and

"left

of

Oregon warned

his

colleagues they were circumventing the Constitution,

the Senate overrode their objections by a vote of 88-2.

The margin The

indicating that "freak weather effects" as well as an

"overeager" sonarman

Wayne Morse

war," and Senator

in the

House was 466-0.

events in the Tonkin Gulf proved to be a wa-

tershed of vast proportions. By seizing the opportunity

won

afforded him, Johnson

endorsement

a resounding Congressional

His firm but restrained

for his policies.

handling of the

crisis

earned him broad popular support,

suggested a complete evaluation before any further ac-

neutralized the hawkish Republican presidential nomi-

tion was taken.

nee. Senator Barry Goldwater, and paved the

By the time these second thoughts reached Washington, however,

Johnson had already decided on

retaliatory strike.

men on

ambush was bona

fide,"

McNamara recommended At

engagement and

on assurances by Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp,

commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet "the

(CINCPAC),

that

Secretary of Defense

that the air raids go ahead.

11:37 P.M. on the evening of August 4, some thir-

teen hours after the

first

Washington,

reports reached

Johnson went on television to inform the American people that U.S. jets were already in the

air.

The

carrier-

launched attacks, code named Pierce Arrow, struck patrol

boat bases and

Vinh, Phuoc Loi,

oil

Hon

sinking twenty-five

storage depots at

Gai, and the Lach

PT

Quang Khe,

Chao

Estuary,

boats and destroying an esti-

mated 10 percent of North Vietnam's

total

petroleum

way

November.

both he and the nation would pay

a

for

Yet,

heavy price

The Southeast Asia commitment,

U.S.

Resolution raised the level of

linked

American

firmly than ever with the fate of virtually

had shattered the

to the North,

that

more

South Vietnam, and

compelled Washington to respond to future

North Vietnamese provocations. The selves

prestige

much

making

them-

war

further escalation of the conflict

And

easier.

air attacks

barrier against taking the

if

the administration had pun-

ished the North Vietnamese, America had also paid a price.

Antiaircraft

two U.S.

aircraft

fire

during the raids brought

and damaged two more. One of the

pilots ditched his plane in the

ocean and died. The

other. Lieutenant Everett Alvarez of nia,

became the

down

first

American

pilot

San

Jose, Califor-

taken prisoner by

the North Vietnamese. Although Alvarez would languish in a Hanoi prison for the next eight years, he was

storage capacity.

The

in time,

electoral victory in

for his victory.

the scene in favor of North Vietnamese radio

intercepts that appeared to confirm an relying

a swift

Discounting the uncertainty of the

overwhelming

his

following day the president submitted to

gress a resolution authorizing

him

Con-

to take "all necessary

not alone.

The United

States, too,

had become

a hos-

tage of the war.

measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

During the

Asserting that the peace and security of the region were

tions of various sorts enforced restraint.

"vital"

to

the national interest,

committed the U.S., take

all

to assist

the measure further

"as the president determines, to

necessary steps, including the use of armed force,

any member or protocol

state of the

Southeast

Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance defense of

its

freedom."

On

August

7,

after less

in

than

fall

of 1964, however, political considera-

idential election fast approaching, his desire to limit

With

the pres-

Johnson emphasized

American involvement.

"We

seek no

wider war," he declared repeatedly, assuring campaign audiences that American boys would not be sent to do the fighting that Asian boys should be doing for themselves. In

South Vietnam, meanwhile, a clumsy attempt

Khanh

ten hours of debate, Congress delivered the mandate the

by

president wanted. Although Alaska's Ernest Gruening

antigovemment

attacked the resolution as a "predated declaration of

while warring Buddhist and Catholic mobs rampaged

24

to seize dictatorial riots that

power provoked violent

drove the general from Saigon

^Xa--^''N-

.-^^,-^4

^-'>-f'
-.i«fc,.

.»

'^'^^^ii

»-',>'*^.

!4^;fJ:-r^^v^v-^:*;^>..-^

>J^:*»# #r:;<**«-.«tT/*^

A photograph

taken from aboard the U.S.S.

destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin on August

through the

streets.

Khanh

Maddox shows one 2,

ot the three

returned to power a week

but the fragility of his government seemed to

later,

Washington

to preclude any military initiatives against

Nonetheless, the pressure on Johnson to expand the

air force

steadily. In

mid-September, with both the

and Marine Corps urging extended

air attacks

By the end of the month

icy review.

emerged on the need "carefully

Vietnam,

North Vietnam.

war mounted

North Vietnamese torpedo boats that attacked the American

1964-

orchestrated" a

left

With

a

consensus had

what Taylor described

air

as a

campaign against North

conviction hardened by the bombing of a

U.S. bachelor that

for

officers' billet in

Saigon on December 25

two Americans dead and

fifty-eight

bellicose statements issuing from

wounded.

Moscow and

Pe-

to the

king and Sukarno pulling Indonesia out of the United

president that sharp increases in hard-core Vietcong

Nations, the need for decisive U.S. action in the region

strength had reduced the area of government control in

seemed compelling.

against the North,

Ambassador Taylor reported

the South to no more than 30 percent of the country.

Two

weeks

later that figure

ing an uprising of

When

lands. at

Bien

montagnard

tribes in the central high-

the Vietcong attacked the U.S.

Hoa on November

damaging

shrank even further follow-

five aircraft,

1,

killing four

air

base

Americans and

Johnson ordered a wholesale pol-

More than anything

else,

however, what propelled

the United States toward war in the spring of 1965 was the continued disintegration oi the Saigon government

and the threatened defeat of the South Vietnamese army at the

that

hands of the Vietcong. Combined with reports

North Vietnamese

regular units

had entered the

25

A

IJQi

^^.

™-f-*

?- jr J^K

i^%.


>.

'?v '.'J'A-

r?^i.!iia^

-4» 77ie remains

bomber

of a U.S. Air Force Canfcena

litter

the tarmac ofBien

field following a

'November

H

*"^

'<;

rf*

4

'

>w.>- "^'^-

1,

Hoa

air-

Vietcong mortar attack on

1964.

ML:

country, the political instability that had once been the

now became

principal obstacle to escalation

persuasive argument for

the most

Without the psychological

it.

shot in the arm that a strike against the North would

no anti-Communist

provide, argued Johnson's advisers,

South Vietnamese government could

On

February

it

sought.

mantel and our

"We

have kept our guns over the

shells in the

cupboard

for a

long time

now," exclaimed an angry President Johnson. ask

American

instal-

handing the administration the op-

lations at Pleiku,

portunity

"I can't

soldiers out there to continue to fight

one hand behind

their backs."

One

day

with

after the Pleiku

U.S. planes struck North Vietnamese targets

attacks,

When

Operation Flaming Dart.

the

Communists

an American enlisted men's quarters

in

raids.

"They woke

and we woke them up

night,

said a grim-faced president.

did

it

us

up

in the

in

Qui Nhon on

in the

middle of the

middle of the night,"

"They did

it

again and

we

again." But the time for "tit-for-tat" reprisals had

On

ended.

"moving

13,

convinced that Hanoi was

in for the kill,"

Johnson approved a program

February

a staunch advocate of

Da Nang.

bombing. Maxwell Tay-

expressed grave reservations about the dispatch of

lor

ground

forces, questioning the suitability of

combat troops

for

an Asian

guerrilla

ahead. Preoccupied with the

paign against the North,

Westmoreland's request affair to

March

8,

meet the

as a

diffi-

had been

stages of the air

minor

detail, a

On

a specific situation." first

step

first

the administration

cam-

treated

"one-shot

the morning of

wave of the 9th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade splashed ashore near sitions

first

American

war and the

Washington went

Despite Taylor's warnings,

taken.

Da Nang and took up

on the edge of the sprawling

po-

air base.

For Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, however, the

struck

February 10, Johnson ordered an even heavier series of

bombing

Although

culty of "holding the line" once the

survive.

Vietcong units attacked U.S.

6,

talions to defend the vital U.S. air base at

deployment of the Marines was only the troop buildup of

much

to the conclusion by

first

stage in a

Having come

vaster proportions.

mid-March that the only way

for

the United States to avert disaster in South Vietnam

was "to put our

own

finger in the dike," the

commander recommended

Army

divisions.

the

Westmoreland

American troops not be

MACV

commitment of two U.S. proposed

also

that

limited to defensive coastal en-

of graduated, sustained air attacks against North Viet-

claves, as Taylor wanted, but engage in offensive oper-

nam code named

ations against

Rolling Thunder.

After a series of delays the operation finally got under

way on March struck an

2

when U.S. Air

ammunition depot

miles north of the sire for

DMZ.

at

Force fighter-bombers

Xom

Bang, thirty-five

In keeping with Johnson's de-

a "limited air action," the second Rolling

Thun-

der mission did not take place for nearly two weeks. But the meager results of these

first strikes,

plus pressure from

the Joint Chiefs for more substantial blows and ominous

South

reports of a worsening military situation within

Vietnam, induced the president

panded

effort against

munication April,

as far

to

authorize an ex-

North Vietnamese

north as the twentieth

parallel.

American and South Vietnamese

total of

3,600 sorties

in

lines of

com-

During

pilots flew a

what had become

a sustained

bombing campaign.

Although

enemy

units in the central highlands.

frustrated

by the limited results of the

bombing campaign and angry over

a

VC

attack

on the

U.S. Embassy in Saigon on March 29, Johnson was reluctant to war.

He was

become too deeply embroiled

in the

still

ground

concerned, however, that a lack of decisive

action might precipitate the long-feared South Vietna-

mese

collapse.

Johnson forged

a

compromise between

Taylor and the Joint Chiefs formalized in a national security action

memorandum

dated April

policy called for a continuation of the

6.

The new

bombing cam-

paign against the North, the deployment of two additional

Marine combat battalions

an increase of some 20,000 men forces.

to in

South Vietnam, and U.S. military support

Although the new troops would continue

to be

confined to enclaves around major U.S. bases, the pres-

TTie initiation of regular air operations against North

Vietnam produced

a

concomitant deployment of ground

forces to the South. Fearing Vietcong retaliation. eral

28

Westmoreland requested two Marine

Gen-

infantry bat-

Nguyen Cao Ky

(right),

South Vietnam's flamboyant

air vice

marshal, chats with fellow officers before leading his country's first

air strike

over North Vietnam, February 1965.

T^r

V

V ^

v'k

f,-^

:|^^^^

ident also approved a "change of mission" for battalions deployed to Vietnam,

operations within

weeks

later,

fifty

Marine

all

permitting oiYensive

miles of their base areas. Three

under continued prodding from Westmore-

land and the Joint Chiefs, Johnson approved the de-

ployment of nine more

battalions, bringing total

U.S.

troop strength in Vietnam to 82,000 men.

The

of

implications

full

which

decisions,

these

marked a major step toward large-scale involvement

in

the ground war, were carefully concealed from the pub-

During the deliberations that produced the new pol-

lic.

icy directives

Johnson told

reaching strategy that gated."

When

the Marines'

mentioned

tally

months

reporters, "1

in

a

know

new

no

far-

mission was acciden-

government

"credibility gap" that

two

release

press

later the administration issued a

opening a

of

being suggested or promul-

is

heated denial,

would torment Johnson

remainder of his presidency. The obvious expan-

for the

sion of the war, however, was protest, including a

enough

to

provoke vocal

march on Washington that

attracted

12,000 college students. Johnson attempted to disarm his critics

by sending spokesmen to university campuses

bombing pause

and authorizing

a five-day

The temporary

halt produced

in early

May.

no response from Hanoi

but did help the administration push through Congress a $700-million appropriation to support military opera-

tions in Vietnam.

To

the president's dismay, however, neither the

new

deployments nor the additional funding were enough to

At

reverse the deteriorating military situation.

of

May

the end

the Vietcong launched their spring-summer of-

fensive with regiment-size attacks in

ince that within a

week had

killed

Quang Ngai

Prov-

more than 1,000 of

the government's best troops. In mid-June the offensive

moved

into

War Zone C

tactical ineptitude

and

to the savage mauling of units. By the end of the five

ARVN

still

more South Vietnamese

month

MACV

estimated that

ineffective" as a result of the

The new American commitment

also

seemed

After a successful landing, Marines of the 9th Expeditionary

gade

30

rest

#l»-^i

regiments and nine separate battalions had

been rendered "combat fighting.

northwest of Saigon where

a lack of leadership contributed

on Da Nang's Red Beach Two on March

8,

Bri-

1965.

^

u

mm \

v^

> y

i

-?*v

p^

to

have

little

Vietnamese

effect

had been ousted ernment,

young

on

South

stabilizing the chaotic

political scene

from which General Khanh

in February in favor of a civilian gov-

overthrown on June 12 by a group of

itself

officers under the leadership of

and the staggering Vietnamese

Vietnam, in

led

air

war against North

and the adoption of

new

a

offensive

request in early June for an additional a

month

Washington, constituting the

U.S. policy on Vietnam

The

to

expansion of American ground forces

MACV's men precipitated

150,000 in

a drastic

the South,

strategy.

South

casualties sustained by the

Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs

propose an intensification of the

of intense discussion last

major review of

until the spring of 1967.

military was convinced that the size

of U.S. forces in

Vietnam were not

"You must take the war

ever

won

a battle sitting

entreaties were seconded by

on

Their

his ass."

Ambassador Taylor, whose

reluctance to use American ground forces in general

combat had been overcome by the strength of the offensive and by presidential assistant

urged a full-scale trial

air assault

infrastructure.

Johnson's

Undersecretary of State George

about the impact of

air

mitment of U.S. ground about Washington's

VC

Walt Rostow, who

on North Vietnam's

Among

With

these July decisions Johnson had fully commit-

Yet the president had not authorized a mobilization of

indus-

He had

the Reserves as sought by the Joint Chiefs.

not

declared a state of national emergency or asked Congress for

an increase in taxes

as

McNamara

He had

urged.

not informed the nation that he had privately authorized the incremental dispatch of an additional 100,000 men,

U.S. troop strength

raising

225,000.

And he had the

subdued

in

Vietnam

to

more than

known

not made his decisions

American people

to the

choosing

in a formal address,

forum

an

of

afternoon

press

conference.

Unwilling to face the consequences of withdrawal yet

getting the job done.

Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"No one

he

military appropriation to fund the increases.

instead

and posture

enemy," argued General

to the

Finally,

later.

ted the United States to the defense of South Vietnam.

Vietcong offensive

ferocity of the

50,000 men, with more to be sent

would seek from Congress an additional $1.7-billion

Nguyen Cao Ky

and another general, Nguyen Van Thieu.

The unexpected

and publicly announced the immediate deployment of

fearful that the

war would destroy the domestic reforms

of his "Great Society," the president determined to do

"what

will

be enough, but not too much."

States would fight in Vietnam, but a

minimum

in the

it

would do so with

of domestic disruption. Thus,

summer

The United

on

hot day

a

of 1965, without fanfare or declaration,

Lyndon Johnson

led the

American people

into

what

would become the nation's longest war.

only

advisers

Ball, already skeptical

power, opposed this

new com-

forces, expressing grave

ability to force

Hanoi

doubts

to the bar-

gaining table and profound concerns over the eventual costs of escalation. Secretary of Defense

McNamara

also

warned the president that the war would be protracted and as

costly, testing the

endurance of Americans

Vietnamese. Nonetheless,

early July,

after a visit to

McNamara recommended

as

much

Saigon

in

the deployment of

an additional 100,000 men.

By the end of the month Johnson had reached cision.

The

a de-

enclave strategy was scrapped in favor of

aggressive operations aimed at the gradual attrition of

the enemy.

The

president approved Westmoreland's re-

American quest for the use of B-52s in South Vietnam, agreed to a gradual intensification of the

32

bombing

in the

North,

in

Saigon

military police stand guard outside the U.S. Embassy in July 1965.

was built following a

The

harrier surrounding the

terrorist attack in

March.

compound

Whether they signed DD Form 4— ENLISTMENT CONTRACT: ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED

Focus: Training

STATES

—

or received a letter headed "Greetings," the

beginnings were to a place like

Carolina, or one oFthe lively

A bus or a train took them

the same.

all

Marine boot camp

at Parris Island,

many army

young men growing strangely

South

training centers, the silent as they

neared

"There was no conversation now, no

their destination.

sound but the mechanical grate and whine of the bus

remembered one

itself,"

—raw

anticipation

Then

impossible."

Communist

July 28, 1965, as a

to split

South Vietnam

in two. President

Lyndon John-

son told the American people that their sons and daughters

were going to war.

"We

did not choose to be the

guardians at the gate, hut there the president.

"We

no one

is

else," declared

Ordering the immediate deployment of the

and

alry Division

a

doubling of draft

Congressional authorization tor in all

U.S. armed

forces.

a

calls,

1st

Johnson asked

340,000-man increase

His request initiated the largest

months

military buildup in U.S. peacetime history. Six after the president's

announcement the number of U.S.

military personnel in

South Vietnam had jumped from

81,000 to 250,000. Within two years that doubled. but

the

Some

of the increase

majority

Cav-

of those

figure

came from

sent

to

almost

volunteers,

Vietnam flowed

through some 4,000 draft boards that by December 1965

were already processing more than 40,000

To handle

the sudden

demand

for fighting

air force,

navy, and Marines

all

facilities.

But the president's

call to

est

men

a

month.

men, the

increased their training

arms had the great-

impact on the army. Ordered by the Pentagon to

create three

new 7,500-man

infantry brigades

and more

than 700 smaller units, the army expanded half a dozen bases and

opened new

By the end of the year

facilities all

six

around the country.

army basic-training centers

New

Fort Ord, California; Fort Dix,

Jersey; Fort Jack-

son, South Carolina; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Gordon,

Georgia;

and

Fort

Leonard

teaching nearly 13,000 recruits in the jungles of

34

Wood,

how

Southeast Asia.

Missouri

to fight

—were

and survive

The next

by brass bands. to be a

good deal

man

large

was

title

in a

—made thought new

world.

arrivals

were met

greeting they received was apt

less friendly.

usually

It

came from

whose

face

was scowling, and

when

carried unmistakable conviction

growled, "You're

all

few days varied from place to place but everywhere

blood

forms to

tests,

in-

fill

lec-

out, talks by chaplains

and Red Cross representatives, more orientation sions,

fingerprinting,

home, and

it

mine now!" The routine of the next

cluded orientation lectures, haircuts, shots, more tures,

a

wide-brimmed, forest-ranger hat whose

sergeant,

drill

a

new

reception centers the

whose voice

Vietnam."

will stand in

At some

offensive threatened

unknown

the bus stopped, the train coasted to

and the doors folded open on

a halt,

On

"Nervous

recruit years later.

fear of the

TB

form

tests,

a small reference booklet that

ses-

write

to

letters

covered every-

thing a soldier needed to know, including "Pay due a

serviceman recruits

at

time of death." Along the way the

were issued boots, uniforms,

and bedding. They learned how a

cotton ball tor their blood

field gear,

to salute,

how

and how

test,

to

new

rifles,

to

hold

make

a

bed to military specifications. In the

mid-1960s the army was undergoing

sance in the ranks led by army chief of

staff

a renais-

General

Harold K. Johnson. Convinced that modern warfare

re-

men

to

quired a modern soldier, Johnson wanted his

think for themselves. "You can't just stand there and up,' "

yell

'Hurry

tor.

"The American

it

he once admonished a

The Marines remained wedded

to

however. Like thousands of others, sight of a

Marine

he recounted

in

Memoir. "The DI

drill instruc-

soldier has to be led, not pushed."

drill

W.D.

Ehrhart's

first

instructor was unforgettable, as

Vietnam-Perkasie:

who

an older tradition,

got

A

Comhal Marine

on that bus was eight-and-

a-half-feet

And

tall.

hands tm

his

ho was

Standing there with

iiKly.

he looked

his hips,

hetween

like a cross

Paul Biinyan, Babe the Blue Ox, and Godzilla." The

came from

ear-shattering bellow that

mouth, recalled

his

the suddenly terrified recruit, sounded like the voice of "

Ood.

painted on the deck

have three seconds

on one of those

not

talk.

You

times.

fucks

do everything you're told

will

You

up.

it

Not

else.

I'll

kill

the

that the

much

army had

Do

it!

at all

instantly,

and

cocksucker that

first

scuzzy shitbirds are mine, ladies!

Now, MOVE! Do

don't like you.

into the

and plant your-

yellow footprints. You will

sets o(

keep your head and eyes front

will

do nothing

will

those steps over there,'

And

I

"

ersacks.

K.P.

,

it

struction given during to

in

weeks

World War

Vietnam underwent

a

minimum

II,

on

it

soldiers

heading

months of

of four

processing was completed, the

initial

the army provided of

new

lectured

Over the next

eight weeks

them with 352 hours of

instruction.

on

military courtesy

and sanitation. But the

trainees spent most of the time preparing their

and bodies

morning, they drill,

minds

of their

bunks

at 5:15 or 5:30 in the

the days with calisthenics, close-

filled

and marching, always marching, whether

they were Marines or army soldiers.

"Whenever

I

think

back to those days at Basic School," wrote former Marine Philip

mind

is

Caputo, "the recollection that

always the same: a double

file

A a

remorseless sun

is

first

comes

of green-clad

bent beneath their packs, are tramping

down

to

men,

a dirt road.

beating dt)wn. Raised by our Kxits,

cloud o{ red dust powders the trees alongside the road,

making them look

sickly

our uniforms, runs

in

and ashen. The dust clings

muddy

streaks

the weight of steel hel-

echoing up and down the long ct)lumn."

When

they dropped their packs the young recruits

were introduced to their

"A

rifles.

soldier's

their charges not only could shoot their

knew how

them

to take

weapon

who made

his best friend," intoned the instructors

but also

rifles

them back

apart and put

is

sure

to-

gether again. There were classes in grenade throwing

and hand-to-hand combat,

pugil-stick fights

net training. There were exercises in real bullets whizzing a

and bayo-

mock combat with

few inches over

a

man's head as

were taken out on bivouac to learn how to

down

to

our sweating

live in

the field and eat C-rations.

Through

it

the veterans with the stripes on their

all

sleeves tried to teach the in

new

how

recruits

to get

one piece from "the boonies." Never stand

Do

not give officers.

all.

or return salutes

—

When

a loud nt)ise, hit the deck,

you hear

can, under the ground

summarized

all

back

in groups,

Charlie likes to shoot the

or one incoming round could get you

if

possible.

And

do not

ground

as

try

you

the one rule that

the rules for survival in a war zone: "Keep

your ass down." Slowly, steadily, the regimen of training began to

change the former

civilians:

It

toughened them physi-

cally, disciplined their reactions,

reality of

and taught them the

interdependence and the necessity of team-

work. Those

for war.

Crawling out

order

re-

took place in classrooms where instructors

it

our hav-

up, keep your interval, close

to run for a bunker. Sleep as close to the

were divided into 250-man companies and shipped

off to basic-training centers.

Some

some

subjects unimaginable only a decade earlier.

Once cruits

ever.

of military in-

training divided into basic and advanced courses,

of

is

in

men

many ways tougher than

to the eight to twelve

up'

it

and bayonet scab-

bouncing

men welcomed

number

Despite such novelties as

was

their training

slings

rifle

Our heads ache from

mets, and the cry 'Close

automatic dishwashers and potato-peeling machines in

Compared

the rattle of

he crawled through the mud. Near the end of basic the

easy.

of

is

it!'

larger

it

There

bards, the clattering of mess kits

footprints

give the word, you filthy pigs

I

to get outta this bus

self

you

in front ot

'When

roared the DI.

You

columns of yellow

four

'There's

faces.

who

failed

any portion of the course "re-

cycled" that segment until they got

it

When

right.

everything worked, a group of .individuals became a ma-

chine that theoretically would respond

as a single unit

in the face of danger. Finally, after passing the army's

exhaustive Physical

Combat

Proficiency Test, recruits

graduated from basic training. After a well-deserved leave, army recruits went on to

Advanced

Individual

learned additional interests.

Some

Training

skills

(AIT).

There

they

based on their aptitudes and

received further training as clerks or

cooks, typists or truck drivers. Others underwent a nine-

week course

in

one

of a variety of

combat arms

special-

35

These

tics.

riinged from artillery to tanks to helicopters

hut also included the most basic specialty of

all

—

infan-

AIT was

designed

in basic training.

in part to refine skills

mastered

first

Already exposed to living in the open,

future infantrymen

now

how

learned

wounds, select food

prevent malaria or treat

it

if

to sterilize water,

bull's-eyes painted

Vietnam-bound

foot soldiers were

their uniforms,

taught "instant reaction" and "quick

They

learned to shoot at sound and

kill"

techniques.

movement without

consciously aiming, practicing on multiple targets that

popped up

random from behind bushes and

at

Meanwhile, the aggressive psychology necessary was fostered through everything from signs shouting

combat

The

"Bong the Cong"

for

war

painted

to hard-bitten instruc-

primary goal of AIT, however, was to give novexperience of Vietnam before they had

to face the real thing. replicas of

To do

the

so,

army constructed

VC hamlets— "staffed" with "enemy" soldiers

and complete

— then

in detail

set

down

to the last tunnel

combat "problems"

and punji

for the trainees to

At

into

more exotic

men

"slept four

methods used by the

hidden soldier carrying

a

VC

to conceal themselves,

machine gun jumped from

a

"Everything

men were fare in

system

taught the nuances of counterinsurgency war-

Vietnam. They discovered the need

—one

man

walking

down

a

glued to the ground in search of

buddy kept detect

how

a lookout for snipers.

enemy booby

to set

traps

how

36

while his

They learned how

to

listening posts outside

to

into predesignated "killing zones." recruits learned by

with his eyes

trip wires

jump from hovering

helicopters into "hot" LZs and flush

sas, all

buddy

and place claymore mines,

ambushes and establish

night defensive perimeters,

trail

for the

enemy

Much

making mistakes. At

guerrillas

of the time the

Fort Riley,

Kan-

vehicles and personnel in the training sector were

cht)se to

specialties.

and

— home,

five

in

extend their training

There was airborne, where

hours a night and then got up

letters,

concerns, friends

—

every-

jumps from 250-foot towers and the

rigors of practice

fear of their

they were.

schedule

pound cliffs,

first real

Then

made

jumps made them

forget

how

tired

there was Ranger training, where the

airborne look like a piece of cake: 3:30

wake-ups,

twelve-minute-mile

runs

down

field packs, perilous descents

100-

with

ice-covered

low-level night parachute jumps into impenetrable

cypress swamps.

There was

limit to

a

what even the most

realistic

"No

training

instruction could accomplish, of course.

could convey the reality of war or the reality of Viet-

one former platoon fresh

leader,

and newcom-

from "The World" were routinely

advised to forget everything they had already learned.

If

there was no substitute for war, however, the training

had hardly been wasted.

The

acclimated to the "enemy" environment, the

Hoa" found the

of tunnels.

thing faded under the weight of exhaustion" until the

hole only a few feet in front of the startled recruits.

Once

maze

a

and ran everywhere," remembered one parachutist.

insisted

a

they were

if

combat, and many soon found themselves

ified for

Vietnam

class in

would mean

the recruits were considered qual-

Vietnam. But some men

nam,"

one

AIT

the end of

ers to

officer lectured

it

Vietnam-

tacking the fortified village of "Vinh

enemy had escaped through

and ambush and counterambush techniques, along with

As an

what

trainers gave

captured, while at Fort Gordon, Georgia, trainees at-

deal with. Particular attention was devoted to patrolling

the intricacies of camouflage.

At

"aggressor" forces at any hour.

soldiers a taste of

A.M.

to kill!"

is

ice soldiers the

stick

luridly

trees.

reminding the young trainees, "The essence

tors grimly

of

Oklahoma, veteran

and

for jungle survival,

necessary. Since the Viet-

cong would not stand around with

on

ambush by

Fort Sill,

bound

try tactics.

self-treat

subject to

long weeks of preparation gave young

endurance they would need to searing, a

mind-numbing

map, how

someone shot

to at

fire

heat.

a

It

hump

men

the

mile after mile in

taught them

how

mortar, and what to do

to read

when

them. Their training nurtured pride

in

themselves and loyalty to their comrades. Equally important,

it

transformed the way they looked at the world

around them. Landscape was no longer scenery, terrain.

The

little

man

in

longer quaint, he was the enemy.

had come

a

long way.

"When

said a training officer at Fort Polk's

are ready to fight."

was

no

They might not be

finished with their military education, but the cruits

it

the black pajamas was

new

re-

they leave here,"

AIT

center, "they

"You're all mine

mnv!"

A

drill .scTi/cinr

,it

Fort Knox, Kentucky, welcomo-

.1

i;rt'up ol

aniiy

recruits.

37

Above. At thenrmy's training center the tnippings of civilian

lite.

Right, clockwise from top

left.

()/

in Fort Dix,

Boys become

New Jersey, an

soldiers:

inductee loses some

uniform measurement at Fort

Dix; being fitted for boots, Fort Knox; trying on a garrison hat; the receiving end of

an inoculation gun.

38

39

Recruits receive pu^il-sttck tniinin)^, which prcfxiro rhem

40

ti>r

hayoner h^htm^^

New

M'lJicr.-^

Ic.irncJ

lum

h> (/i/cu

i;R7),K/i',s

Irom lour

f\»itioih^: sr.inJin^,

kneeling, crouLliui^. .inj supine.

Hciv

i:;^:

.'

I\>IL

Louisiana}, ;nv,i/f their insrrticror's coium.inJ fd hurl their ^rcnuJcs.

41

m mmsm

"'newly trained soldiers make a call

home.

last /'/lo/ic

With

Witness: Morris Udall

the United States began a tortured

this vote,

and calamitous period

in

which the government and the

would be subjected

military

of competency and

to tests

would not and could not

integrity that they

On

pass.

that day in 1964, the Congress of the United States did

not see what horrors were about Less than a year later

I

voiced

come. Nor did

to

my

my

direction of the war in a newsletter to stituents, but

I.

misgivings over the

Arizona con-

was willing to give the president the

I still

benefit of the doubt.

"The United

fact

is,

" I

States, unlike the rulers

Union, has fo operate that

President

Lyndon Johnson once

kin Resolution that

could

yt)u

it

American men and amount to the

hard

of

war by mid- 1965 proved

it,"

and the number

U.S. dollars committed this

was no boast.

It

he explain

vance,

we make

When we demand

move, and preferably

his every

in ad-

his position increasingly difficult in re-

The president may not always be president,

In

is

and he deserves our

right

.

.

but he

.

and

loyalty

is

our

(uir support.

"

1967 1 would withdraw that support and be accused White House. More on that

of disloyalty by the

later.

minds of the U.S. senators and congressmen who

nearly unanimously approved the measure

1964. Yet

on August

7,

was not without trepidation that the Con-

it

gress voted

it

into law, as

Congressman Morris K. Udall

of Arizona, then in his second term, remembers.

The hows and whys

August

7,

films, televisicm series,

to

1964, in response to a plea by the presi-

dent and the leadership of both

parties,

the

House

of

Representatives passed House Joint Resolution 1145, ironically entitled

"A Resolution

to

Promote the Main-

tenance ot International Peace and Security east Asia. " It

is

in

better kninvn as the Gulf of

shed more

light

it

voted for H. First of all,

state

J.

it is

and

elections.

on the abstract

1

will

issues,

not attempt

but

I

can

tell

of mind of the Congress and why

Res. 1145.

important to remember that the

bers of the 88th Congress were

still

mem-

heavily influenced

by their own experiences of World War

II.

The signing

had taken place

South-

of the Japanese surrender

Tonkin

twenty years prior to the attack by North Vietnamese

less

than

patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf. Like me, most of the

Resolution.

The vote was

Tonkin resolution and the

of the

ensuing catastrophe have been the subjects of books,

something of the

On

of China and the Soviet

in a fishbowl.

lation to these other participants in the world struggle. of

whether such grandiose military plans were

to knt)w

in the

Gulf ot Ton-

was "like grandma's nightshirt

everything under

fit

said of the

"that the president of the

wrote,

a badly

needed mandate

for

Lyndon

members

of the Hiiuse

and Senate had served

in

the

They had grown

up,

Johnson, endorsing his decision to launch U.S. carrier

armed

planes to hit targets in North Vietnam following re-

fought fascism, and were elected during a period of total

ported attacks on American warships. Passage of the

and uncomplaining

resolution gave the president the authority to conduct

World War

foreign policy without the Congress. It was a historic

tremely popular and powerful Franklin Delano Roose-

and

velt.

tragic occasion. It was, in fact, wholly unnecessary,

the product of an Atnerica that "had never lost a war"

War

forces during that

II

war.

fealty

to

the president.

the Congress abdicated

its ri^le

to

During an ex-

That abdication continued through the Korean years

and the Cold War

era

of Truman and Eisen-

now

ques-

hower, the Berlin

ticmable thesis, "Support the president; he knows

more

the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia during the

and

a foreign policy that

than we do.

44

was built on the

Kennedy-Johnson

crisis,

the

years to

Cuban

missile crisis,

August of 1964-

and

'

On

August

?

:ind 4 the cliKikrooins ot the U.S.

House

and

ruimyr,

Representatives, m^rmally scenes

i)t

hterally huzzed with

i)f

gossip

news of the foolhardy attack hy

small i^unhoats ot

the North X'ietnamese navy on the

The debate continued, House

citing the

need

American

threat ro

with senior

members of the

to be unified in opposition to the

The

warships.

right-wingers, such

and John .Ashbrook

as H. R. Gross ot Iowa

ot ()/)/o,

bashed the United Nations and the secretary of

American destroyer MaJdox. The next day hemusement

lustily

turned to anger as other naval units ot the United States

state for, respectively, "token opposition to the halting

came under hostile

reportedly

fire in

the Gulfot Tonkin.

And in

This was, ot anirse, an election year. tion

an elec-

year events can often be magnified by political

My

and bombast.

rhetoric

on the Maddox. President Johnon

son, not anyone's idea ot a dove, ordered air strikes

the North Vietnamese mainland, but this did not calm

down a

the hawks.

show

To cover his political

LB] wanted

base,

of support from the entire Congress,

short of a formal declaration of war, to give

something

him

man-

a

The

floor debate in

marked by thunderous condemnation

"

has followed.

As

the debate continued, tew uor/.s of caution or

moderation were heard until shortly before the vote. clutch of liberals huddled listening to the righteous

A

of the resolution.

fiery rhetoric in

few ot us worried ahtud

1 recall

of the

it,

president to use

was

North Viet-

support fo

each

about setting an unhappy precedent allowing the

of/ier

lives

and

A

chamber

in the rear of the

necessary to protect American

all force

without our knowing anything other than what the

Pentagon and the White House were feeding

date for his unilateral military response. the House, as

Department

vacillating course of events which our State

Arizona colleague Barry

Goldwater, for example, was urging massive retaliation after the initial attack

of the Communist world conspiracy" and "the no-win

Finally,

Henry Reuss,

waukee, took to the

floor.

us.

a scholarly lawyer from Mil-

Allowing that he would sup-

the heartier the

port the resolution, Henry said he was "somewhat in the

cheers from Democrats and Republicans alike. Sitting

position of the proprietor of the saloon whose bartender

namese.

in the in

The

stronger the language,

back of the House,

I

could not imagine the House

calls

higher dudgeon at the news ot the sinking ot the

Maine

in

Havana Bay

'Is

on the

speech

made

tack: "Let

that this

a

a nation divided in this election year.

is

our

full

and

free

The majority

leader

Our

debate are America's

strength, not America's weakness.

"

had nothing

lican counterpart, Charles Halleck

to fear.

His Repub-

of Indiana, took to

White

called the Congressional leadership to a spe-

on the

crisis.

Though the

retaliatory attack

witlnKit Congressional advice

and

consent, Halleck said he agreed with this decision

and

had been ordered

he supported

'

That pretty much summed up the befallen

"this resolution as a

One

situation that

had

us.

of the

clear indication on

the part (4 the Congress of our determination to be a

united people in the face ot any threats to

" oi/r liberty.

last

speakers before the roll-call vote was

Congressman George Brown, spoken Asia,

the floor and advised his colleagues that the

cial briefing

is.

at Syracuse University after the initial at-

not friend needlessly fear nor toe vainly hope

free election,

House had

in

tor a drink!'

itl'

"

'He

resolution. Carl Albert, then

debate and quoted President Johnson

had

to ask:

'He has.

Democratic majority leader of the House, urged against partisan

Casey good

'Has he

or the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Leaders from the Democrats and Republicans joined to urge quick action

him on the intercom

lution.

critic ot

who

He

a Calitornian

and an out-

the administration's policy in Southeast

nonetheless was going to vote for the reso-

spoke for

many of us when he

said,

"I

am of

the very firm conviction that the peace and freedom

which

this CiHintry

Vietnam of

this

will

is

dedicated to achieve in South

not be attained bv the gradual escalation

unfortunate war.

"

In listening to George's speech,

accuracy of his warning: forces,

".4,s

1

was chilled by the

long as the

Communist

seeking to gain control of South Vietnam, can

ccmtinually replenish

and strengthen

from the mass ot unhappy peasants

their guerrilla units

in this

land and can

45

arm these

units with

American weapi)ns

seized tri)m the

frequently cooperative government forces

— there

no

is

"

House had no

In those days the

We

had the

roll called

quietly listening to the vote " "Burton. "

"Aye.

"Aye.

"

answered

I

sat

I

resc^hition. "Abbitt.

"Dingell.

"

"

"Aye.

On

went

it

was nof happy with the way

things were going in Southeast Asia,

had

I

my

trust in

The

South

casualties increased, the corruption ot the

Vietnamese government and military was further exposed,

and the

dissent from the nation rose.

I

increas-

doubted our policy and the mandate the Congress

ingly

had given President Johnson with the Tonkin

resolu-

October 1967,

In

it

was time to face

reality. I

hometown. The audience was made up establishment.

I

loyal

wonder:

It

re-

" / said,

"I

want

about war and

to talk

peace, about presidents, dominoes, commitments, mistakes.

.

and doubt grown

.

.

I

involvement

as the limited

I

support has

American troops scattered

fighting an

enemy who

is

in jungles

and ham-

everywhere and nowhere,

seeking to save a country which apparently to be saved, with casualties

not

d(.K's

mounting and no end

"Many

of the wise old heads in Congress say privately

that the best politics in this situation

is

to

remain

silent,

to fuzz your views, to await developments. I

simply as

have come here tonight I

can that

I

was wrong

.

.

to say as plainly .

and

I

President Johnson's advisers are wrong today.

went on

troops,

to outline a proposal to

to continue to fund the

after ensuring reforms

we were wrong creasing the

and

and

firmly believe "

withdraw American

Vietnamese but only

political stability. I said that

to continue

bombing the North and

American presence

in the

in-

South. Because

frustra-

of his presidency^

felt

he was right and that

ciirrect course. Later, I

phantom

contrasted LBJ's

end the war with Richard Nix-

"secret plan" fo

end the war

in

Vietnam.

and

resulted in

disaster for the

United States and South

Vietnam.

Nixon,

used the Tonkin resolution ro justify

cost tens of thousands of American lives

like LBJ,

and the

killing.

we who voted

We

American

Tonkin resoluticm were

for the

were desperately wrong. More than 52,000

lives

were

lost.

We

set in

destroyed a nation's trust in those military institutions.

motion forces that

who govern and

A decade

later

re-

we had

deserted hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese to

an uncertain

fate.

Our Vietnam

We

had

tragedy

lost the war.

had forever changed the way

the administration and the Congress conduct foreign policy. I

doubt that there ever again

of mindless obeisance to a president.

will

be that kind

The Congress and

the nation will rally around our president in times of

grave national be.

crisis,

but

it

will

That may be the only good

nof be

to

like

it

used to

have come from pas-

sage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

in sight.

"But

final year

Nixon's secret plan was an escalation of the war that

have thought with increasing dismay

into a very large Asian land war with a halt-

million

want

and

only more of us had questioned them

forthright efforts to

spect for our

"Tonight,

Democrat was questioning his policies.

marked the

he was on the

on's

the

to under-

have often thought about Lyndon Johnson's per-

Yes,

my

If

sonal tragedy. I really think he

wrong.

of the business

was not entirely receptive to

member of

would he have been spared the pain and

tion that

my

marks.

46

earlier,

chose

to speak to a large gathering in Tucson, Arizona,

I

now

in Presi-

remarks got more attention

given a rather juniiir

is

his escalation

f/on.

lets,

I

more

president and in our military leaders.

why a

stand

"

As my name was called,

my

House. LBJ, of course, was enraged, unable

but not without a sense

in the affirmative,

of foreboding. Though

electronic voting

name by name.

on the

without a single dissenting vote. I

brother Stew was secretary of the interior

dent Johnson's cabinet, than usually

victory possible.

device.

my

forced to take upon themselves the burden oi leadership

ARVN and Its Advisers

Focus:

when

faltering soldiers threatened to panic.

To

the Vietnamese they

these

tall,

bush

made

striking

a

their sweat-soaked uniforms

in

World War

baseball caps, carrying

hands and .45-caliber advisers were the

II

and faded green carbines in their

pistols strapped to their sides, the

combat pioneers of the American en-

men who

Vietnam, the handful of

terprise in

picture,

confident Americans. Striding through the

blazed the

path that thousands would soon follow.

Many

new

of the

advisers

part of the buildup of the in

who

arrived in-country as

American

1962 were assigned to the 7th

assistance

ARVN

whose

Mekong

Delta.

troops patrolled the watery world of the

After the departure of French troops in April 1956, the

United

Mihtary

States

(MAAG)

assumed

full

responsibility for rebuilding the

South Vietnamese army. Over the next four the U.S. provided equipment, streamlined

MAAG

of

armed insurgency and the

arrival

of a

new

idly

transformed this relatively low-key effort into a

able

administration in Washington, however, rap-

commitment. Alarmed by the deteriorating of the

pects

Diem government,

sharply increased

gon.

At

2,067.

ar-

advisory corps from 350 to nearly

its

The outbreak

700.

years, as

command

rangements, and conducted training programs, slowly increased

Group

Advisory

Assistance

all

Twelve months

MAAG

later

several thousand

advisers to every level of the

strength stood at

in

Vietnam.

American

Among

soldiers acting as

Vietnamese army. Working

with their Vietnamese counterparts,

the advisers re-

reports, helped plan operations, set

up communications, and arranged

— the

strange language, the alien culture, the ripe smell ot

nuoc nam

fish

sauce (which the Vietnamese seemed to

pour on everything they But the job at

itself

ate), the

mind-numbing

heat.

was even more demanding, especially

the lower levels where advisers accompanied the

ARVN

into the field to coordinate artillery and air sup-

pon and

assure medical assistance.

no command

authority, the

shimmering plain stretching south from Saigon

Ca Mau

Peninsula, the delta was 26,000 square

miles of rich, alluvial rice lands crisscrossed by irrigation

canals and the tributaries of the

Mekong

River.

The

region had been under the influence of the Vietminh since before

World War

II.

Their Vietcong successors

operated out of the hundreds of villages that clustered along the canal banks and from bases concealed in the

impenetrable swamps and thick forests that dotted the

Hunting them down, discovered one

coast.

was

adviser,

"like trying to identify tears in a bucket of water." After

three years of mounting violence, the contest in the

ARVN

was not

Like their adversaries, the vast majority of

ARVN

delta

between the Communists and the

being

won

soldiers

by the government troops.

grew up

in rural villages,

farmers. Like their opponents they

mal education, and

had

little if

like the guerrillas they

for the duration or until they fight.

the sons of peasant

any

for-

would serve

were no longer able to

Unlike the Vietcong, however, they were usually

assigned to a unit far from home. Although some wives

for supplies.

Getting used to Vietnam was tough enough

vast,

to the

were more than

there

11,000 U.S. military personnel

viewed intelligence

pros-

Kennedy

forms of military assistance to Sai-

the end of 1961

them were

President

siz-

A

program

Division,

Although they had

Americans were sometimes

followed their husbands and settled near

most enlisted men saw a year.

cation est

their families

ARVN

camps,

no more than once

Also unlike the Communists, their lack of edu-

meant they had

rungs of army

a salary of $11 a

life,

little

chance

of escaping the low-

surviving as well as they could

on

month.

Extended absences without leave and outright desertion were their

common. But

circumstances

for the

most part they accepted

philosophically.

Generally

ne-

47

glcctcd by rhcir t)thccrs, ^iven

were fighting a

the i)fdinary

ior,

idea ot

little

ARVN

what they

soldiers displayed

courage and endurance that won the respect of the

Americans.

When

asked what had been his most lasting

impression of Vietnam, one U.S. adviser replied: think

would be the almost

it

limitless ability ot the Viet-

namese

soldier to bear suffering

plaint.

I've

never heard a wounded Vietnamese

Americans

ot food,

cigarettes,

skill ot

favors.

when

ot

also

decent

the Americans were around than they

own commanders.

did from their

As

the ad-

They

understood that they had a better chance treatment

part,

an endless source

as

and other small

cry,

their

Ft)r

troops admired the bravery and

visers, prizing individual

a group, the

men

they

led.

The

well-educated

sons ot wealthy, urban Vietnamese families, most had

beneticiaries ot family or political connections, they

used their positions to line their pt)ckets with

money

siphoned from unit budgets or extorted from local farmers.

The

ultimate products of a traditional, class-hound

they

society,

looked down on

manded and on

the peasants they

the young Americans

whom

irritating tor

its

enemy open

advisers

much

ot the

ARVN

all

find that

many

the

all,

the Americans were dismayed to

men

officers

What

had no more enthusiasm

tor the dithcult task ot

subduing

characterized the government side ot the war

large the

and the

army kept

When

this discouraging situation

the vulnerable outposts they nicknamed Vietcong

PXs, and take the war to the enemy. They devised tacrefinements such as the tlare-and-strike technique

tical

to permit night operatitms

gle Flights,

and the highly

cong

units trying to escape.

equipment

successful Ea-

which helicopters loaded with

in

tor their units

ARVN

down on

They helped

get

Viet-

needed

and applied innovative ap-

proaches to counterguerrilla warfare.

Month

month American men and machines

by

changed the

face of

war

in the delta.

Caught

off guard,

the Vietcong suffered one stunning defeat after another.

As

the government extended

Communist

areas,

its

control into insurgent

defections grew while the rate of

recruitment dropped sharply. So grave were the

new new

problems facing their armed forces that the National Front

Liberation

even considered abandoning delta

Diem made

a considerable

By the end

ot the year

out of the delta entirely. initiative there ful

were

and population.

in

1962."

many Americans were enthu-

about the prospects

siastic

comeback

for driving the

Communists

With American hardware and

possibilities for "all sorts of delight-

operations," chortled Lieutenant Colonel Frank B.

all

at 7th Division headquarters.

It

Vietnamese needed was

a

the

seemed little

one

operations were

win

a

adviser, "but they're

war

if

though

leadership.

"These people may not be the world's greatest said

as

fighters,"

good people, and they can

someone shows them how."

to take place in areas ot little

activity or were so large

and noisy that the guer-

had ample opportunity

An Americnn

adviser

tlies

Farmgate mission

There

could

fly

interest in patrols

along

in

to get out ot the way.

were no nighttime operations, scant

48

met

counterparts to abandon their fortress mentality, close

down

turn rillas

advisers

with determination and ingenuity. They urged their

towns

to the safety of district

security of the roads.

mounted, they tended

enemy

hot.

The U.S.

Clay

the delta was a pervasive lack ot aggressiveness. By

and

escape routes

left

should an engagement

to the Vietcong, "In terms of territory

the Vietcong.

in

flee

keep the

Wilfred Burchett, an Australian journalist sympathetic

wondered whether the Vietnamese

ARVN

than the enlisted

artillery to

colonel archly, "but

are too

burden had been placed on them to "get

along." Most ot

on

and regularly

the Vietcong to

become too

wanted American advice and complained that too

really

relied

strongholds they had held tor thirty years. Concluded

"They

they can learn."

The

commanders

at arm's length

tor

to pursue Viet-

did blunder into government forces. In-

new

partial validity.

game," observed one

at the

com-

they some-

times treated with an obsequious condescension

more

who

stead, local

received their appointment as the result of patronage.

The

units

troops circled battle areas, ready to swoop

ARVN ofticer corps differed in almost

every respect from the

cong

and pain without com-

never heard a tired one complain."

ARVN

"I

and no attempt whatever

or ambushes,

in

combat missions the back seat.

a twin-seated

1962.

T-28 during an Opera-

Under Farmgate, U.S.

as long as a

pilots

Vietnamese trainee rode

^4»

disembark from

South Vietnamese

soldiers

a helicopter in the

Mekong River

August 1962 looks on.

50

as

Delta in

an American crewman

i,

J

^%^-

i

•viir

>

.!?

Mm

.ly,

II,

,,

,

On

52

a mission in the delta,

ARVN soldiers

move

past a hut they set ahre after discovering Vietci.>ng propaganda inside

it.

An ARVN

solJicr uses torcetul

means while

questionini;

,i

V

/eacn^' suspecr .nrested in a Je/fj

\///;i^e in

early

1963.

53

With lying

iit

hast a dozen of their comrades

dead

tack, a

in the

wake of an

await interrogation. ers

ARVN

group of Vietcong prisoners

look on from the

Two American

at-

(left)

advis-

rear.

55

)

::*«flr

k.'

r#*>'^^ rv-'^?^';!"'^ '^-^L*-- ^v'r, ^>*r«

'^"S^-'^a''"

-

^

v-->^ :^-*>-'>t-

^

«r.

-»

AMERICA TAKES OVER

When

"we marched

into the rice paddies

tenant PhiUp Caputo

later wrote,

conviction that the Viet

"we

on

Cong would be

enemy from

the

field,

damp March

afternoon," Marine Lieu-

and

American

military

the implicit

rifles,

quickly beaten." Certain that

legitimate, confident that the application of

the

that

carried, along with our packs

goals were

its

power would

swiftly drive

the United States went to war in 1965 with an almost casual

assumption of victory.

So pervasive was

this

optimism that

to the realities oi the situation in

little

attempt was made to tailor American strategy

Vietnam. As a

The

uncertainties and questionable assumptions.

Communist onslaught and compel serious attempt to determine just

result,

negotiations, but

what

U.S. policy was

dispatch of troops was

level of force

no one

in

filled

meant

with

to halt the

Washington made any

would be necessary

accomplish

to

those ends. Meanwhile, the introduction of large numbers of American units pushed the

indigenous military into the background, steadily diminishing

ARVN's

shoulder

ability to

the burden of their nation's defense. Further confusing matters was Johnson's sensitivity to adverse public reaction. Fearful of domestic unrest,

he sought a quick end to the war.

Yet, equally concerned that an overly aggressive pursuit of victory wcuild

or the Soviet Union, he imposed limitations

on

his military

commanders

draw that

in

China

made

their

missions more difficult to achieve.

For

Nor

its

part, the military

did U.S.

commanders

victories were always

never

fully

accommodated

itself

to

Washington's

adjust their vision to a revolutionary struggle in

more important than

military triumphs. Instead,

MACV

regular forces in a conventional war of attrition against an unconventional

unfamiliar setting.

more men were

When

that strategy failed to produce adequate results,

political

employed

enemy

in

an

when more and

sent to hold the line, the early optimism of 1965 degenerated \nto a bitter

frustration that threatened to tear the nation apart.

First

restrictions.

which

Cavalry Division soldiers heaJ into the hush on

;i

pafro/ in

Nmemher l%5.

Exemplifying

The

paign against North Vietnam.

were designed to meet the

Vietnamese

initial

cam-

bombing

raids

need

political

negotiated settlement of the war.

was confident that U.S.

air

confusion was the

this strategic

The

for a quick,

administration

power would force the North

air

to cease their support of the southern in-

surgency and that this could be achieved without

American

nificant loss of failed to

cow Hanoi, however,

The

shifted.

lives.

When

sig-

the initial attacks

the goal of the air assault

primary task became a military one

—

to halt

the flow of reinforcements and supplies to the South

where U.S. ground troops were engaged

Communist

Whether

forces.

air

with

in battle

power was

suitable for

either task would remain a subject of debate long after

The tempo

of air raids over the North increased stead-

during the

ily

summer

sure from the military,

After the fruitless five-day bombing pause in mid-

May, Rolling Thunder resumed

in earnest, long-range

under continuing pres-

later,

Johnson enlarged the

even further to include key

target

on the

railroad yards

list

out-

of Hanoi. By the end of 1966 the United States

skirts

had flown more than 105,000

The 165,000

tons of

over the North.

sorties

bombs delivered by American war-

planes since the beginning of 1965 had destroyed nearly

350 fixed structures and thousands of railroad tor vehicles,

and water

craft.

and military damage done

$200

cars,

mo-

Estimates of the economic

to

North Vietnam exceeded

million.

Yet the

air attacks cost the

$1.5 billion and the

the war was over.

to a peak of 12,000 sorties in

Two months

September.

bombing appreciably

Much

loss

United States more than

Nor had

of 489 aircraft.

the

affected the course of the war.

that had been destroyed was replaced by increased

China and the Soviet Union. What could not

U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers striking inland targets

aid from

while carrier-based navy aircraft operated along the

be replaced was rebuilt by armies of civilian workers. In

coast.

By September, American warplanes were

almost 4,000 sorties a ply depots,

and

month

infiltration routes in the

of North Vietnam.

At Johnson's

southern half

insistence major targets

within the Hanoi-Haiphong restricted zone

caped the

As

aerial onslaught.

demilitarized

zone

(DMZ)

flying

against military bases, sup-

initially es-

the ground war below the

intensified,

however,

the

Joint Chiefs argued that air power could not prevent the

flow of

men and

materiel south as long as these areas

remained

off-limits. In

approved

a full-scale assault against the

petroleum,

oil,

June 1966, the president

finally

North's vital

and lubricants (POL) storage

facilities

and transportation network.

While American

aircraft blasted

tank farms and

rail-

American

Hound,

pilots flew interdiction strikes along the

Trail in southern Laos.

connaissance

War

II,

and

leftover attack aircraft from

re-

World

propeller-driven observation airplanes and high-

flying B-52s.

Hound

jets

modem

During the

first five

months of 1966, Tiger

attacks destroyed thousands of structures and

trucks, dozens of bridges,

and hundreds of

analysis concluded that Rolling to cripple the

namese economy, weaken the North's

North Viet-

military estab-

lishment, or significantly impede the flow of supplies to the South.

The U.S. command

argued that the disap-

pointing figures were the direct result of Washington's

graduated

and

limited

power. Others,

like Secretary of

Namara, had begun ing

to believe that

would break the

Whatever the meant

causes,

will

of the

in

American

American

of

air

Defense Robert Mc-

no amount of bombNorth Vietnamese.

the failure of the air campaign

that U.S. troops would play far

role.

ground

application

more than

a stop-

By the beginning of 1967 the war on the

South Vietnam had long since become an fight.

Ho

Code named Tiger

this multiservice operation utilized

CIA

Thunder had been unable

gap

road yards on the northern outskirts of Hanoi, other

Chi Minh

January 1967, a

antiaircraft

When

the Marines landed at

there were slightly

Da Nang

in

more than 29,000 U.S.

March 1965, military per-

sonnel in Vietnam. During the next twenty-one months

U.S.

soldiers, sailors, air

crewmen, and Marines poured

into the country in ever increasing numbers.

Most came

courtesy of the Selective Service, which by the end of

1965 was processing up to ^0,000

men

a

month.

Pri-

positions along the major enemy infiltration route into

marily the sons of lower-middle-class or working-class

South Vietnam.

families unable to get the still-liberal college deferments.

58

show

Streaks of light

the path of a navy Skyraider that

night mission over North Vietnam in

men

these all

summer

moments

were funneled into expanded training bases

launched

air attacks

on the North from Yankee

Station,

100 miles off the coast of South Vietnam, southeast of

Cam Ranh

the heels of the 3d Marine Division, which set at

Da Nang

May

in

1st

Cam Ranh

arrival at

Bien

Bay on July

Hoa

of the 2d Battalion of the 1st Infan-

Within

try Division.

29. July also witnessed the

a

month advance elements

of the

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were building their

camp

at

An

1st Infantry

grow

soldiers

and Marines comprising twenty-two army and

thirteen Marine infantry and tank battalions. But the

pace of deployment scarcely slackened Division went to Division to

Chu

Cu Chi

Division deployed to

Phuoc Vinh and Ben

Ninh

more than 500

aircraft

air bases in

more men and machines

in

also

saw the

and 21,000

air

per-

South Vietnam, plus

Thailand. Offshore, the Sev-

Fleet's Cruiser-Destroyer

Group

patrolled the coast

gunfire support duty, while the navy's

Task Force 77

to

in

Marine

196th Infantry Brigade to Tay

in August; the 11th

Long Binh

1st

March; the 4th Infantry Division

in

to Pleiku in July; the

to

—the

Lai in January; the 25th Infantry

the remainder of the

sonnel at eight major

enth

nam

in Viet-

had grown to 250,000, including nearly 160,000

fall

Khe. During the

Cat northwest of Saigon. These months force

Bay.

By the beginning of 1966 U.S. troop strength

1965, came the army's 173d

Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, which landed

on

route to a

over the country, then rapidly shipped to Vietnam.

Airborne Brigade, assigned to Bien Hoa, and the

1st

Midway en

On

up shop

at

before took off from the deck of the U.S.S.

1965.

Armored Cavalry Regiment

September; the 9th Infantry Division,

slated for duty in the

Mekong

Delta, in December; the

199th Infantry Brigade to Long Binh, also in December.

At

year's

end U.S. ground combat strength had grown

to fifty-nine

army and twenty-four Marine infantry and

tank battalions.

59

i>

So rapid was the buildup

American troops

oi

MACV's

almost immediately outstripped

modern

their logistical needs. This huge,

that they

ability to

meet

military force

heat, a

ports, terminals, warehouses, or

Nor was

load.

highways to handle the

the army prepared to field combat support

units without the activation of the National

Army out.

Guard and

Reserve, something President Johnson had ruled

The

was temporary chaos marked by ammu-

result

nition shortages and delayed unit deployments.

To remedy

that took a man's breath

Almost

as

impenetrable as the heat was the peasant

population of the Vietnamese countryside.

Vietnam," recalled one infantryman, ignorance.

I

know

didn't

the language.

about the village community. aims of the people

—whether they were

difference

enemy, no way of

transport facilities. Meanwhile, the 1st Logistical

air

Com-

headquartered in Saigon became one of the largest in the world.

But there was more to

they wore until

surpluses.

Vietnam than

it

who was

was too

pected.

by

telling

for the

the

war or

in-

a farmer

friend

how

and who was

they acted or what

and who was a

guerrilla

late.

The people were

By the end of 1966

had turned shortages into

their joint efforts

knew nothing

and suspicion. Even worse, there was often

no way of distinguishing who was

expanded that nation's

of

against the war." Instead of grateful "natives" eager to

highway system, and

army organizations

I

time in

memory

knew nothing about

I

four major deep-water ports, rebuilt South Vietnam's

mand

"My

the

"is

be "liberated," U.S. troops frequently encountered

the situation army engineers constructed

greatly

into clouds of gritty

red dust.

required a continuous flow of supplies, equipment, and

manpower. But South Vietnam did not have enough

mind-numbing furnace

away and turned the winter mud

what the GIs ex-

different from

So was the war

itself.

Large units were broken

military

up and scattered across the country, major engagements

that the maintenance of morale was

with the enemy were rare and, when they did occur,

of prime importance, Westmoreland not only limited

usually lasted only a short time. For most "grunts," as

supplies.

each

Convinced

soldier's tour of

men

to provide his

Even the troops meals with For

all

ice

logistics in

duty to 365 days, he also attempted

with

"all

in

hot

by helicopter for dessert.

Vietnam remained an

alien place for

most of the young Americans who served there, tiful

home."

in the field could expect regular

cream flown

that,

the comforts of

a beau-

but strange land of shifting topography, climatic

extremes, and enigmatic people. In the south was the delta,

a watery world of

mangrove swamps, and

flat

rice fields,

isolated forests.

impenetrable

North of Saigon

the emerald green fields dwindled to a narrow strip along

the infantrymen called themselves, the war became an

to exploit specific intelligence of

mountain

forests of the central high-

lands. Still farther north the high plateau gave

way

to

designed

enemy concentrations,

but most had no specific goal. Contact was sporadic, often limited to sniper brief,

savage

and booby

In

many

enemy

the

traps

but occasionally erupting into

fire

firefights.

came not from

he

areas the gravest threat

himself, but from the mines

behind. Sweltering under sev-

left

enty pounds of equipment and ammunition, soldiers

"humped"

across

the

enduring days

countryside

boredom punctuated by

split

seconds of sheer

terror.

had

in

raw firepower, the Vietcong and North Vietna-

mese Army (NVA) proved

elusive

and deadly adversar-

the rugged peaks and plunging waterfalls of the Truong

ies.

Son Mountains,

a steep wilderness of dense rain forests

solidate only for carefully planned attacks, the

rising as high as

8,000

feet

above sea

Less varied than the land, the weather of

Dispersed into platoon-size units that would con-

avoided contact except

level.

Vietnam

was dominated by the annual cycle of monsoons. During

of

Despite the overwhelming advantage the Americans

the rocky coast, the area of cultivation limited by the sparsely populated

Some were

endless round of small-unit patrols.

elaborate preparations

at

their

own

made by U.S.

enemy

initiative.

The

units prior to an

operation and the effectiveness of the

Communist

in-

the summer, drenching torrents of rain created a perpetual humidity that rotted clothing, mired everything

on the ground the winter

62

in

mud, and made

months the

rain

flying treacherous. In

was replaced by scorching

The Seventh the

first

Fleet's

U.S.S.

time since World

dump hidden

Oklahoma City unleashes

War

II

on

a

its

guns for

Vietcong ammunition

along the South China Sea coast

in late 1965.

iH^^lk. I

B

made

telligence network

When enemy

troops were

cornered, they fought stubbornly, standing their ground

even under the most punishing Vietcong

hi populated areas

turn

fire

that rarely found

and

and

artillery

air strikes,

guerrillas frequently fired

on American troops from within

civilian property

prompting

villages,

re-

target but often destroyed

its

wounded innocent

killed or

vil-

In the uninhabited border regions well-trained,

lagers.

Westmoreland's willingness

surprise almost impossible for

the Americans to achieve.

send his green troops

to

against the Vietcong was also a reflection of the deteriorating position of the

summer

early

ARVN

South Vietnamese army

in the

o{ 1965. Anxious to strike back before

collapsed

MACV

the

entirely,

commander

urged Washington to abandon the defensive enclaves to

which U.S.

forces

On June

had been deployed.

moreland was given permission

to

26 West-

commit U.S. combat

trcwps at his discretion. Within twenty-four hours the

heavily armed regular troops of the North Vietnamese

173d Airborne Brigade began a search-and-destroy op-

Army

eration into

challenged the Americans in an escalating series

The

of ferocious encounters that by the end of 1965 were already claiming heavy casualties

on both

first

War Zone D

northeast of Saigon.

major American ground combat action of

the war proved anticlimactic, the paratroopers encoun-

sides.

tering only scattered resistance during their four days in

While the White House maintained

tight control over

the

But the die had been

field.

cast.

Eight weeks later,

Westmoreland was

when elements

of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions cor-

given considerable freedom to develop and execute the

nered an entire

VC

the bombing of North Vietnam,

ground war

in

South Vietnam. The

strategy he formu-

U.S. combat

lated

was divided into three

units

would search out and destroy enemy Main-Force

units

and base

areas.

Next,

parts.

First,

ARVN

the area of Vietcong guerrillas

troops would clear

the large-scale

left after

search-and-destroy operations had ended. Finally, local

South Vietnamese units ular Forces (PFs)

—

— the Regitmal (RFs) and Pop-

would secure the area by providing a

permanent defense against

Although

his plan

Lai,

the Americans dealt the

enemy

a stunning

blow.

A

multipronged land, caught the

Starlite,

air,

VC

and sea

their entrenched positions the furiously but could not

assault.

Operation

completely by surprise. From

Communists fought back

contend with the Americans'

mobility and firepower. Using helicopter-borne troops to block avenues of escape,

Marme

infantrymen sup-

ported by tanks and amphibious tractors trapped the

future attacks.

was designed

Chu

regiment fifteen kilometers south of

in part to protect the

enemy regiment

against the sea, where

it

was torn to

population of the countryside, Westmoreland's primary

pieces by Marine air and naval gunfire. In less than a

goal was the attrition of the enemy's Main-Force units.

week of

Once

that

was achieved, reasoned the general, the

Communists would have no choice but

to sue for peace.

have bled

their country to the point

Westmoreland's strategy of

attrition relied

increasing pool of U.S. manpower,

tit)n of

American technology

enemy, and on the ready

power

to destroy

ter gunships,

him

—

on

on the

As

availability oi

air bases in

rillas in

fire-

awesome

and Thailand. So

confident was he in the impact of such weapons that

even before he had at

64

significant

years,

were destroyed.

numbers of combat troops

hand the American commander took the

highlands around Kontum, and grappled with guer-

tral

naval gunfire, helicop-

Guam

many

the intensity of combat increased. American units pene-

a stead-

American

fixed-wing attack aircraft, and

B-52 bombers from

700 men. Their

the year wore on and U.S. troop strength grew,

applica-

to the task of locating the

artillery,

lost nearly

trated Vietcong base areas near Saigon, swept the cen-

of national disaster for generations."

ily

VC

extensive tunnel and cave complexes, laboriously carved

out over

"We'll just go on bleeding them until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that they

fighting the

offensive.

as

the villages along the central coast. But even

U.S. soldiers and Marines poured into South Viet-

nam, the Communists more than matched the American buildup. By November,

total

VC/NVA strength was

estimated at 140,000 men. Early that

month

troops of

1st

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) met North Viet-

namese

regulars in a bloody battle that demonstrated

the

both the advantages and limitations of the American

way

of

war

in

Vietnam.

A M:mnc

medic amies

during [he (opening

;j

>r,(t,'c'>

5()i(f/i

Vietn,iinc:^c int.inr rn s.iferv-

of Openirion Pir.inh.i

en Oipe

The chiU

ir.i.s

woundeJ hy U.S.

jets in

September 1965

/iirany.in.

65

The

Cavalry Division (Airmohile), or

1st

warfare: airmohility.

on

sistence

Air its

in

Cav had

new

in

new

Team"

"First

Within

few minutes

a

wildly into their icans

NVA

some of the

panies,

fell

own

back into

fire

had decimated two com-

terrorized green

a

coherent perimeter. Helicopter

gunships raked the enemy positions, followed by

machine. The

1st

force fighter-bombers discharging loads of

flexible military

helicopters before

it

became the

division

first lull

When Communist troops attacked the Forces camp at Plei Me on October 19, elements

with the aerial support, enemy

fire

Special

morning the

1st

Brigade helped

process they discovered that two

were roaming the frontier

W. O.

UH-1

1st

full

after the

NVA

Kinnard declared that the 2d Battalion had "won the

Air Cav's commander.

Kinnard. Eager to

out his

try

Kinnard the order

enemy

Me

Plei

and destroy" every

fix,

and the Cambodian

aerial

Drang Valley. After

la

during the

reconnais-

Kinnard's helicopter pilots began sighting

fire,

an increasing number of North Vietnamese

weeks

first

G. Moore's

1st

several small

of the operation.

engagements

Colonel Harry

7th Cavalry,

Battalion,

soldiers in

set

down

at

Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray on the morning of November 14, virtually

on top

of

two

NVA

full

by rocket and grenade

sides by

By

enemy

regiments. Pinned

attacked on several

fire,

Moore

infantry,

called in air

and

artillery

within 150 meters of the battalion's perimeter.

nightfall reinforcements from the 2d Battalion

had

but the morning of the fifteenth

arrived at the LZ,

brought renewed assaults that were only beaten off fierce

hand-to-hand

finally retreated the

fighting.

When

next day, they

the

left

NVA

artillery

and

air strikes,

Stratofortresses, the ers

were used

The 2d heading

for

first

behind 834 con-

KIA

including several by B-52

time in the war the giant bomb-

had been

killed

set

out from

the

LZ X-Ray, 150

and another 250 wounded.

After the battles at LZs X-Ray and Albany, the

month-long campaign the entire battalions by

air,

1st

NVA

Air Cavalry had moved

dropped

artillery batteries into

Battalion

moved out on

LZ Albany

7,500 tons of supplies to the

more important,

the

in

field.

foot

November

17

ten kilometers away. Discovered straight into

an ambush.

Even

some 50,000 individual

during the operation, only fifty-nine helicopters

flights

were

men

in the course of

by enemy

hit

aircraft lost.

fire,

tour shot

The concept

down, and but

of airmohility

a single

had been

fully

vindicated. It

was

a sobering defeat tor the

Communists, who

1,500 dead scattered on the battlefield and lost as

the

many

as

2,000 more to

Communists had

air

and

left

may have But

artillery fire.

also gained important information

from the battle of thela Drang Valley. They discovered that they could neutralize the worst ot

American

fire-

by fighting at close range, and they learned not

p(.)wer

to reveal their positions by firing at low-flying recon-

naissance helicopters. losses

Moreover, the extent

their

ot

convinced the North Vietnamese to adopt

a

more

cautious approach that kept the initiative in their hands

and made U.S.

casualties their primary objective.

the end of 1965 Hanoi had adopted

its

own

By

strategy of

attrition, confident that eventually the bill ot

for tactical support.

en route, the troopers marched

66

in

soldiers

firmed dead plus an estimated several hundred more

from

500 men who had

the middle of the jungle sixty-seven times, and ferried

sance by

strikes

original

withdrew across the border into Cambodia. During the

"find,

to

Employing the new technique of

down

Of

day." But the price of victory had been steep.

staged one more attack against an artillery firebase, then

to

border.

the

General

go

between

soldier

littering the battleground.

October 27 Westmoreland gave

Kinnard sought permission

On

enemy.

wounded. By next

Counting the more than

400 enemy bodies

regiments

Hueys over the trackless mountain jungle of the

western highlands,

fled.

the siege. In the

That knowledge only

area.

whetted the appetite of the

lift

had

Even

fire.

remained too intense

to land reinforcements or evacuate

NVA

air

napalm that

seared the jungle in orange sheets of jellied

sent to Vietnam.

General Harry

Amer-

in-

staged only two full-scale maneuvers with

of the division's

troops shooting

ranks. Slowly the surviving

1963 as part of President Kennedy's

more

a

Cav

roots stretching hack to the old

Its

horse cavalry o( the Civil War, the

was initiated

Air

1st

new concept

as the troopers preferred, represented a

war would

be greater than the Americans were willing to pay.

The

idea

that

the

Communists could

outlast

the

United States was one General Westmoreland was de-

termined to

resist.

Yet as the new year he^an

commander had

ican

some

faced

serious

rlie

Amer-

prohlems.

Despite the rapid deployment of U.S. troops, the pres-

up the Reserves created

ident's decision not to call

manpower needed field

crisis

a

that delayed the dispatch of critically

logistical units, sent infantry platoons into the

with as few as half their authorized complement of

men, and threatened

to neutralize the promise of air-

mohility because of an acute shortage of helicopter pilots.

Westmoreland

also

had to contend with the

experience of his young soldiers, to

maneuver

safely, react to

the firepower at their

The most

difficult

who had

to learn

in-

how

ambush, and make use of

command.

prt^blem for

MACV,

however, was

security for the nation's 12,000 hamlets.

The poncho-covered bodies of

1st

Although West-

Cavalry Division soldiers killed

tor

American troops

most of

sparsely inhabited border regions,

during the

first

against the

and

to seek

The

his attention

half of the year was devoted to operations

VC/NVA

in the

populated coastal lowlands

in the strategically vital region

surrounding Saigon.

task of guarding the capital

fell

in part to the

173d Airborne Brigade and the 25th Infantry Division. During the

first

three

months of the

ments repeatedly penetrated

VC

year, airborne ele-

strongholds north and

west of Saigon in operations such as Marauder, Crimp,

and Mallet, provoking sharp contact.

the inability of the South Vietnamese army to provide

gathered

moreland's strategy called

out and destroy the enemy's Main-Force units in the

tioned at

For the

men

firelights

but no sustained

now

sta-

they threatened a prime

VC

of the 25th Division,

Cu Chi where

supply route to Cambodia, simply clearing the area im-

mediately around their base

in the bitter battle

of the

la

camp proved an arduous

Drang Valley

in

November 1965

are

in a clearing for evacuation.

67

M.innc medial

Lorf\sm:in Josi.ih Liicicr

;s

ocurrc'J h\ rhrcc Vietnamese children, inehiJini: one h.hlly hunieJ

by napalm, as he conduces his rounds south of

68

Da Nang.

Withsrandinj^

priKcss.

Vietcong

stubborn

amounts their

defenders,

against

captured

they

large

working

of materiel hut only after deliberately

way through enemy bunker and tunnel complexes.

The American the

engagements

intense

unit most active in

half of the year

first

Ranging north,

was the

and west

east,

That month the

other

men

of the "Big

deep

mud

in

the region

then worked their way

Special

sweep

Red One"

Zone southeast

in

E.

struggled through hip-

division

DePuy pushed

II.

commander

men

enemy

Vietnam, the

1st

tactics out of the

lands of Binh

from the

at

Dong Ha,

ward

Cam

the Marines attacked north and west to-

Lo and "Helicopter Valley," where the 3d

human-

Battalion of the 4th Marines endured a massed

wave

assault by 1,000

NVA

Only

soldiers.

after

napalm

were the Marines

strikes within fifty feet of their position

For the next three weeks

more than 8,000 Marines and 3,000 South Vietnamese

After several sharp

soldiers fought a savage conventional battle against as

enemy

Cam-

into

South

political center of

Cavalry Division brought

airmobile

its

mountain jungles and onto the low-

Dinh Province 400 kilometers north. Be-

ginning with Operation Masher/White

Wing

January

in

and continuing through the remainder of the

year, the

Air Cav combed the Bong Son Plain and the moun-

1st

battal-

able to drive the attackers

Infantry Division struggled to keep the

at arm's length

ARVN

VC

his

bodia, forestalling a threatened offensive against Saigon. 1st

ernmost provinces. Six Marine and hve

into

encounters, the Americans drove the

While the

and headed toward Quang Tri City with the ap-

operation of the war to date. Establishing a forward base

during June, where they met the 9th

Division in Operation El Paso

Division crossed the

two battalions

of the capital. After a fruitless

Major General William

NVA

the 324B

ions struck back in Operation Hastings, the largest allied

swamps of the Rung Sat

May around Loc Ninh,

War Zone C

when

in

Operation Birmingham, while

the mangrove

Marines would

a lesson that the rest of the

learn in July

DMZ

division also sent

in

was

It

fight."

parent intention of annexing South Vietnam's north-

in February,

north to Tay Ninh

one survivor, "but they can

Ma-

supermen," observed

rines killed in actit)n. "They're not

Woods and

through the jungles of coastal Phuoc Tuy Province April.

strength

its

of Saigon, elements of

the division swept the Boi Loi

around Long Thanh

oi

lost a third

but inflicted more than 500 casualties, including 98

Corps during

III

Infantry Division.

1st

North Vietnamese regiment

many

off.

12,000 enemy troops.

as

By August

when

3,

Hastings came to an end, the North Vietnamese had

been sent reeling back across the

DMZ

with more than

800 dead.

When later,

the

NVA

resumed the attack several weeks

the Marines met

them again

employing helicopter

assaults,

gunfire, air support,

and tanks

saults against

enemy

in

massed

Operation

Prairie,

naval

artillery fire,

in a series of costly as-

strongpoints.

The

operation,

which

continued into January 1967, netted more than 1,000

Communist stronghold

since

own

heli-

air

force

arms, the fighting since July had claimed 365 Marine

fighter-bombers, and the guns of the Seventh Fleet, the

dead with another 1,662 wounded. Forced to counter

tain valleys to the west, a

World War

II.

Making

effective use of their

copters and the added firepower of B-52s,

Cav decimated merous

VC

three

1st

regiments, capturing nu-

Quang Ngai

Province, the

Marine Division pushed out from

their

men

Chu

o{

Lai

enclave into the Vietcong-dominated villages that sur-

rounded them. Between February and early April they battled the

enemy and

the

rate excursions into the

monsoon

An Hoa

tion Utah, a joint ciiort with South

the Marines encountered

NVA

rains in four sepa-

basin.

the defense of the northern border cost

the Marines as well. Despite lavish use of supporting

this

new

threat, the

Marine command

shifted 3d Divi-

sion headquarters plus two regiments and most of a

suspects and tons of war materiel.

Farther north, in the

enemy

enemy KIA. But

During Opera-

Vietnamese

forces,

regulars for the

time. In three days of fierce battle the heavily

first

armed

Ma-

rine helicopter group to

Quang

a severely stretched 1st

Marine Division with responsi-

bility for the three

The C(,)me.

Tri in October, leaving

southern provinces of

I

Corps.

fighting in the north was a sign of things to

So was Operation Attleboro,

a massive search-

and-destroy sweep through the heart of the enemy's

Zone C. The

initial

penetration was

made

in

War

September

by the newly arrived 196th Light Infantry Brigade. For several

weeks contact with the enemy was sporadic, but

69

by mid-October the 196th was beginning to uncover

When

considerable quantities of rice and documents. the brigade ing the

9th

VC

moved

first

closer to the

Cambodian border

days of November,

it

ran

severely shaken by their rough initiation to combat. But

June battles

its

MACV

of the 196th, plus re-

hurled the

1st

173d Airborne Battalion, and

the Michelin

troops,

backed by B-52

rounds of diers

force of

artillery,

and more than 10,000

drove the twice-beaten enemy

back into Cambodia. They

and tons of

left

ations against

in

Communist

would bring the enemy

base areas and supply routes

to battle

and destroy him.

Much

of 1967 would be spent testing that belief.

By the time Operation Attleboro came

February l%6.

(left)

to

an end the

military dimension of the Vietnamese conflict overshad-

owed

all

other aspects of U.S. involvement in that trou-

bled country. But alongside the cries of battle were the voices of other Americans

— men and women,

and

official,

civilian,

Vietnam

supplies.

turned) at the Honohiiu summit

sol-

behind 1,100 dead

Souch Vietnamese prime minister Nf^uyen Cao Ky

70

each

battle.

more than 22,000 American

strikes

American

that multidivisional search-and-destroy oper-

Infantry Di-

a brigade

from the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions into the

The concentrated

Attleboro's resounding success convinced the

command

their survival in the tangled jungle west of

vision, the

Amer-

disablement of the 196th, whose novice troops had been

inforcements from the 25th Infantry Division, fought for

rubber plantation,

1,000

KIA, and the temporary

dur-

1st Infantry Division.

While the outnumbered men

MACV were the nearly

smack into the

Division, returning to the site of

with the

Less pleasing to

ican casualties, including 155

private

and

—who attempted

and president Nguyen Van Thieu

(right)

in

military

Washington and

in the midst of

war to con-

meet with President Johnson (back

—

tinue the

nation-building that had hrst brought

jt)b of

the United States to Vietnam. view, the key to South

Vietnam's survival was the creation of

government

The

in Saigon.

and

a popular

first

requirement

of any South Vietnamese regime, however, was stability. In February

made eral

clear

months

Cao Ky

its

elite

after

to the former air force gen-

To South

women

this signal of

American

who

No

domination by the

sooner had the premier

re-

turned from Honolulu than the Buddhists took to the streets of

Hue

in a series of

anti-American demonstra-

tions that quickly escalated into

two months the

crisis

of negotiation

open

rebellion. After

and confrontation Ky ended

with a show of force that cowed the Buddhists

and gave South Vietnam

measure of

at last a

political

solidify Ky's position but also to

fight

crops,

of the

official

and Marines dug

soldiers

farms, distributed food cine,

and

trained

auspices of

own

MACV's U.S.

initiative,

wells, built bridges, stocked pig

and clothing, dispensed medi-

local

volunteers

rudimentary

in

health-care techniques.

sweating over their civic action projects were

part of a long-standing U.S. effort to plant "rice roots

win

democracy"

what Johnson

his support for a in

called "the other

social services

who

villages to build popular support

government. Unfortunately, Saigon's

interest in

the program turned out to be largely rhetorical. Poorly

RD

cadres accomplished

The fundamental problem, however, was

the lack

in a

country that had only the mt)st limited

experience with democratic government. But democracy

meant more than

military

propaganda and

trained and ill-supported, the

new

Some

clinics.

Civic Action Program and on their

velopment (RD) Program featuring teams of young Viet-

would go out into the

young men and

to the

most meaningful work was undertaken by American servicemen. Both under the

lages.

in

peasants,

operated schools, experimented with

war," the two nations devised an ambitious Rural De-

namese trained

rural

designed not only to

sweeping agenda of social and economic reforms

little.

to

The GIs

The Honolulu conference was

South Vietnam. To

la-

of the private International Voluntary Service,

and conducted family-planning

stability.

for the

comfort to the war-torn villages where they

democracy

Honolulu.

in

their continued

Catholic minority.

wht) provided food, clothing, and medicine as well as spiritual

bored; from agents with the United States Information

commitment

Ky meant

land reform, local government, and public health, to

workers with the Christian and Missionary Alliance,

Service (USIS), wht) showed films on sanitation and

Vietnamese Buddhists, however, support for

in

the coup that

summit conference

at a

for International

to power, the administration

1966, eight

brought Nguyen

United States Agency

of the

Development (USAID), who sponsored programs

From Washington's point of

effective

employees

tions.

also

It

self-sufficient, self-governing local vil-

meant the replacement of authoritarian

government with democratic

At

political institu-

the Honolulu conference the United States

and South Vietnam pledged themselves

Seven months

later,

to

both

goals.

amid threats of Vietcong violence,

81 percent of the nation's registered voters turned out to select draft a

members

new

of a constituent assembly that

would

constitution and formulate procedures for a

some observ-

of security in the villages. Preoccupied with defeating

presidential election the following year.

the enemy's Main-Force units and hampered by limited

ers

manpower

gested that democracy would hardly solve South Viet-

resources,

Westmoreland

left

pacification

the job of destroying Vietcong political and military organizations at the

ARVN,

local

which had even

level

—

in

the hands of the

If

questioned the sincerity of the government or sug-

nam's problems, country

still

very

it

was nonetheless a notable step

much

in a

at war.

less interest in rural security

than the Americans. Thus, even by the suspect methods

Unfortunately, by the end of 1966 the constantly grow-

used to measure progress, the number of "pacified"

ing

vil-

lages increased only 5 percent during the hrst year of

the

new program.

Far

more

conflict threatened to

overwhelm everything

the United States was trying to achieve for South Viet-

nam: deim)cracy, development, independence. At the

successful were the thousands of individual

Americans working

armed

in the

Vietnamese countryside: from

same time the war rained down destruction on North Vietnam, eroded the

prestige

of the

United States

71

around the world, and jeopardized Johnson's Great SoYet neither side was ready

ciety.

own

for

its

perspectives with which they viewed the events of the

previous eighteen months.

Hanoi's

terms.

North Vietnam, which refused til

peace except on

the

bombing stopped,

remove

its

to negotiate at

insisted that the

all

un-

United States

troops from South Vietnam, withdraw sup-

port from the existing Saigon regime, recognize the tional Liberation Front

(NLF)

Na-

as a legitimate partner in

a coalition government, and accept the eventual unifi-

cation of North and South as mandated by the

Geneva

agreements. But the Johnson administration would not stop the

bombing

until

Hanoi ceased

its

support of the

southern insurgency, and the U.S. refused to accept any

South Vietnamese government

in

which the Vietcong

played a role, implicitly denying the possibility oi uni-

to

crush

the

ARVN

had

thwarted and U.S. troop strength in Vietnam 385,000.

taled

ft)rces to

The

tt)

their

take the«~offensive in 1966 and

superior

Communist

a year of

now

mobility

make the

base areas.

and firepower,

troops had yet to suffer a significant defeat.

than

been to-

buildup had enabled American

serious forays into major

first

Thanks

American

With more

combat experience behind them, with

base areas and lines of communication secured, with logistical

problems well on the way

to resolution,

and

with most of the restrictions on the bombing campaign lifted,

both Washington and

MACV

looked forward to

1967 with confidence. Yet Washington's swift victory had been denied, and

fication.

The

attempt

failure of a late-1965

"peace offensive" that sent

the gains

made had not come

cheaply. During the year

U.S. representatives to foreign capitals around the world

U.S. forces had suffered more than 35,000

casualties,

with offers to negotiate had hardened Johnson's attitude

including 5,008 dead. By December, U.S.

KIA were

toward the North Vietnamese. But mounting interna-

averaging nearly 500 a month. At the same time, the

tional

criticism persuaded

and domestic

another

effort.

In

November 1966

him

make

to

the administration

reluctantly accepted a ten-point peace plan put forward

by the Polish the

new

diplomat Januscz Lewandowski. As

part of

code named Marigold, Washington

initiative,

offered to halt the air strikes over

return for Hanoi's promise that

within a reasonable time.

it

Once

North Vietnam

would stop

ratio of idly,

1965.

infiltration

enemy

to

American

infiltration

of time, place, type,

and duration."

ditional 45,000

men, Westmoreland was even now de-

veloping requests for a force level of 542,000 troops.

was rapidly becoming apparent the war had just begun.

And

tion persisted because

it

before the

Warsaw

5.

Then, three days

meeting, U.S. warplanes struck

rail-

road yards within eight kilometers of the center of Hanoi.

The North Vietnamese immediately broke

Staff,

Although the president had already approved an ad-

through the Poles and an opening round of scheduled in Warsaw for December

was dropping rap-

Moreover, reported the Joint Chiefs of

peace talks could begin. Contact was made with Hanoi talks actually

losses

was up 250 percent over

"three-fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice

in

the infiltration ceased,

VC/NVA

while

if

at the

the Johnson administra-

believed the United States

would win, the North Vietnamese believed they could not

end

It

of 1966 that

persisted because they

lose.

off the

contact and Marigold was aborted.

Whether Johnson his critics

deliberately scuttled the talks, as

have charged, or simply

fell

victim to poor

coordination within the government, as the administration claimed,

made

little

difference. Neither

Washing-

ton nor Hanoi was ready to concede defeat or compro-

mise

on the

central

political future of

issue

that

divided

South Vietnam. The

them

— the

futility of

the

Marigold initiative simply underscored the enormous "ulf that lav

72

between the two countries and the

different

A

niJiu operator from the 1st Cavalry Division watches for any-

suspicious moven-ient near a burning Vietnamese farmhouse in

Binh Dinh Province

m

1965.

'/ --C :^

T.t

I

"fc^-

^^

NVA

Regiment. Together they comprised the 3d

Focus: Masher/White Wing

known

vision, also

Sao Vang, or Yellow

as the

Di-

Star,

Division.

Kinnard divided the

target area into four sectors, then

devised a plan of attack that

made

Amer-

the most of the

ican advantages ih^firepower and mobility. Operating

out of Bong Son, a small airstrip and Special Forces

camp, the Air Cav would mount "hammer-and-anvil" operations troopers flushed the

would he supported by

When

Major General Harry W.O. Kinnard brought

1st Cavalry Division (Airnn)hile) to

An Khe

ber 1965, his mission was clear: to stop the

driving to the coast and cutting South

Within weeks

in

his

enemy from

Vietnam

in two.

men

of their arrival in-country Kinnard's

rose to that challenge in a series of violent battles along

the of

Cambodian

The bloody

border.

November 1965 blunted

the

la

Drang campaign

Communist

offensive in

the central highlands and validated the concept of

air-

mobility in land warfare. Heartened by the division's

Kinnard immediately shifted

success,

his attention to

another Communist stronghold, the northeastern corner of Binh

and

Designated by the Saigon

a "national priority area," the region

ARVN

Division,

was

which had more

could handle trying to keep Highway

1

dominated by the Communists

open and for

more

Geneva accords

artillery

commander Colonel Harold G.

Brigade

3d

Moore, a tough, hard-driving

officer

who had

"Hal" recently

received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions

during the

Drang campaign.

la

first

days ot the operation were bedeviled by bad

But when fighting resumed

renew family

ties,

and re-create the forces.

18th and 22d

to

in 1960,

carrying

forty-two cavalrymen crashed into a fog-shrouded tain killing everyone

launched days

its initial

rain

later,

and

When

on board.

assault into the

and low

Bong Son

Plain three

ceilings restricted helicopter

virtually

eliminated

These problems had

little effect

flights

moun-

the 3d Brigade

tactical

on the

support.

air

Battalion,

1st

resistance. For the

2d Battalion, however, D-day almost turned into aster

North Vietnam.

many

returned to

re-establish a political organization,

infrastructure necessary to sustain regu-

By 1966 these forces consisted of the

NVA

toward

With the

signing

Regiments plus the 2d Vietcong

and

aviation units. Directing the 5,700-man task force was

the province had

45,000 Vietminh

in 1954, nearly

Dinh "regrouped"

cadres from Binh

74

War

center of insurgent resistance.

and aug-

and 2d Battalions, 12th Cavalry, the

which encountered only mild enemy

During the French Indochina

armed

1st

Squadron, 9th Cavalry, plus assorted

1st

1st

now

2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, the brigade was

C-123

moun-

than two decades.

lar

Cav's 3d Brigade to

1st

forward staging areas on January 25, a

pacify villages

of the

general dubbed his conception Oper-

tree lines along the thickly populated coastal

protected by the 22d

a

to another.

spearhead the attack. Normally consisting of the

mented by the

artil-

helicopter

An Khe

government

been

and

moved forward by

weather and bad luck. Moving out from

t)f

tain valleys farther inland.

it

the ground

operations ranged from rice

area

plain to steep, bamboo-forested slopes and rugged

than

The men on

Masher and selected the

The

Dinh Province.

The intended fields

The American ation

friendly units

tactical air, gunships,

continuously

from one emplacement

Septem-

which some of the

enemy toward other

waiting in blocking positions.

lery batteries

a series of fast-moving in

when Company

C dropped right on

battalion at a village called

Enemy they

ever

fire

touched down,

Phung Du.

scattering

When

regroup,

NVA

cally cut

them down. Attempting

A

dis-

NVA

ripped through their helicopters before

across a kilometer of rice fields.

Company

top of an

the

the

machine guns and mortar to

come

Americans

men fire

tried to

methodi-

to the rescue,

ran into heavy resistance just south of the

only barely making

village,

it

into a nearby cemetery,

where the troopers found what shelter they could behind

mounds

waist-high

marked the grave

that

During

sites.

the results of a week's worth of fighting were

verses,

1

19

American

the afternoon helicopters repeatedly attempted to land

crash. U.S.

reinforcements but could not penetrate

of the

enemy

down, and cut

divided, pinneci

Under

the

intense

By the end of the day the 2d Battalion was

fire.

to

lift,

and

to consolidate their positions

A-1

allowing

berra bombers to

Skyraiders and

pummel enemy

B-57 Can-

positions with

napalm

and high explosives. In midmorning two companies 12th Cavalry, arrived on the

from the 2d Battalion,

Even

guidance to

move them

men and

concluded

11

supplies were

name

in the

— the addition of Colo-

2d Brigade, and a change

jr.'s,

from Masher to White

of the operation

Wing. The former

reflected the division's

for mt)re

own

his

Washington's desire to

reflected

latter

avoid overly aggressive connotations

in its

ongoing bat-

public opinion back home.

tle for

out of there." Moore provided

need

power before tackling the enemy on

The

had

got under way, however, there

been two notable developments

hitting

men. The biggest thing they needed was leadership and

I

nel William A. Lynch,

ground.

around and talked to the

Phase

as

By the time Phase

Old Man was not pleased," remembered Sergeant Major

"We moved

22d Regiment had been put out of action,

equipment, personnel, and prestige," said the

being readied for an immediate resumption of activity.

scene accompanied by a furious Colonel Moore. "The

Basil Plumley.

C-123

two battalions

division report, that "will be difficult to overcome."

oft.

tend their wounded. Shortly after daybreak the clouds

began

at a cost of

lives, including those killed in the

intelligence estimated that

NVA

a "loss of

the cover of darkness and a heavy rain, the

Americans managed

enemy dead

impressive: an estimated 1,358

Delayed

for

what turned out

to be three crucial days

both, ordering preparatory artillery strikes and tear-gas

by more bad weather, the assault into the rugged moun-

barrages, then directing an assault by the 2/12 against

tain valley

the

enemy

Once move

battalions were lifted

fortifications.

the village had been cleared. Masher began to

forward as planned. Over the next two days the

and 2/12 swept past Phung Du while the

2/7

ion

explored

the

intricate

1st Battal-

network of hamlets and

hedgerows farther north. The two groups acted giant vise, using their airmobility to trap

between them while constantly ies to

enemy

like a

units

shifting artillery batter-

maintain an umbrella of protection. The swiftly

moving

troopers provoked several sharp encounters

Tan Thanh, where entrenched

in

the 2/12 battled an

what Col. Moore

bunkers and spider holes," and 1/7 lost thirteen

men

in a contest fought at artillery

nor

air strikes

During the

first

North Vietnamese

killed

at

—

at

Luong Tho, where the

and thirty-three wounded

enemy

flights.

As

decreased, the cavalrymen re-

turned to their forward bases and the

Masher came

traps.

to a close.

first

phase oi Op-

Despite the early

re-

floor.

fierce resistance to their

Communist

pen-

base area, and U.S. troopers

But their tardy

had given the enemy time

arrival

to escape. After three days of fruitless searching, dis-

appointed division commanders closed out Phase

II

and

turned their attention to the southwest sector of the operational area.

The

third phase of

Masher/White Wing was directed

toward another mountain valley, called also

known

as the Eagle's

Claw because of

Kim Son its

shape. Reversing the tactics used in Phase

down on

American

four cavalry

did find an elaborate system of fortifications and booby

could be brought in for support.

weather that hampered U.S. reconnaissance

eration

etration of the

Moore put

units slipped through the

when

then swept down the mountain slopes to the valley

such close quarters that neither

few days of February the remaining

February 7

by helicopter onto high ground,

The Americans expected

enemy company

called "a rat's nest of

net and withdrew to the west, their escape aided by bad

contact with the

commenced on

the 3d Brigade and

its

but

distinctive II,

Colonel

supporting artillery

the bottom of the valley, then sent patrols into

subsidiary canyons to flush out the Vietcong. After sub-

duing a

VC

the valley pital, a

tant, in

company, the

floor.

The

2/7 Cavalry

began scouring

trotipers discovered a

Communist weapons

documents pinpointing

a

factory,

Vietcong hos-

and most impor-

VC Main-Force battalion

nearby Son Long Valley. Mtxirc immediately dispatched Captain Myron Di-

75

—

duryk's

Company

which

B,

just as quickly ran into

two

Mot. Diduryk hlasted the well-camouflaged defensive works with

his

own

Meanwhile, he prepared

raiders.

Kim

mortars, hattalion artillery from

Son, and cluster homhs delivered hy

classic infantry assault.

As soon

air force

A-1 Sky-

3d Platoon for a

his

as the last

homb had

fallen the GIs, bayonets fixed, leaped to their feet

raced forward screaming "like the sudden attack, terrified

murderous

crossfire

The

toon.

and

mad men." Unnerved

enemy

at

soldiers fled into a

from Diduryk's well-placed 2d Pla-

battle left fifty-seven

VC

and captured

Hon

entrenched enemy companies near the village of

dead and scores

wounded, including an enemy battalion commander.

thirty of the demoralized

March

The

6.

bility

and demonstrating anew the might

3d

through four Communist base

redoubt north of Saigon.

earned

rest,

1st

12th Cavalry

The ensuing and

B. Roberts's 1st

sent his 2d Brigade

—

against the

enemy

battle raged for four days.

air support,

labyrinth of their

Claw and

for a well-

and 2d Battalions, 5th Cavalry, and the 2d Bat-

talion,

lery

An Khe

Kinnard put Colonel Elvy

Brigade into the Eagle's the

to

VC

own. More

stronghold.

Backed by

artil-

the cavalrymen blasted through a

defenses killing 313 and losing 23 of

anyone had anticipated,

successful than

the two-week Phase

campaign claimed

III

in all

more

than 700 enemy KIA, plus a substantial quantity of

final

phase of Masher/White

foray into the

Son

Cay Giep Mountains

— began on

air force

March

1

Wing

—

a lightning

southeast of

in spectacular fashion.

bombers blasted holes

in the layered

CH-47 Chinook the

1

,

342 enemy

VC

"at least 50 percent better" than the 38-day in the la

Drang, claimed the

Cav had

1st

campaign

driven

of the enemy's nine battalions unfit for combat, and

The

VC

Vietnamese "from

domination."

violence the Americans visited upon the enemy,

however, also proved devastating to the people

Bong Son

district.

The

ing

lavish use of fire-

— more than 140,000 rounds the six-week operation— ravaged

power

who

of artillery alone dur-

the villages in

which the Communists entrenched themselves and drove more than 16,000 civilians from their homes.

Nor were

refugees the only problem.

Smashing the

enemy's military units was one thing, breaking up

Swarming down the thick for

18th

his

was quite another. Unless there was

political apparatus

continuity between the military and pacification efforts, unless the

the

Communist

villages

infrastructure

was rooted out o(

once the enemy's base areas had been

cleared, his military forces were sure to return. But the to carry

out the security and pacification programs necessary to take advantage of the 1st Cav's battlefield victories.

green can-

NVA

Com-

munist military forces from the coastal plain, rendered

a result,

cavalrymen braced themselves

heavy fighting with the 6th Battalion of the

sus-

judged the division's performance

Bong

helicopters to hack out land-

ing zones for the 2d Brigade.

jungle slopes

NVA

After

opy, engineer teams descended on rope ladders from

hovering

areas, killing

South Vietnamese authorities were not prepared

arms, ammunition, and materiel.

The

who

pects. Kinnard,

lived in the

Ordering the 3d Brigade back

American

capturing 633, and detaining 1,087

soldiers,

five

Communist

of

cavalrymen had slashed their way

the

Division,

freed 140,000

the "iron triangle" after the famous

operation had been an outstanding mil-

firepower. During 41 days of fighting against the

During interrogation he volunteered information that

named

troops.

proving again the effectiveness of airmo-

itary success,

revealed the location of a Vietcong regimental headquarters a few kilometers to the south in an area nick-

enemy

Masher/White Wing was formally closed down on

region

Wing,

enemy

less

than

soldiers

began

week

after the

a

prompting new

filtering

As

back into the

end of Masher/White

operations

with

names

like

Thayer and Irving and Crazy Horse and Davy Crockett. But the of the

results

war the

were always the same. Over the course

men

of the 1st Cavalry Division would

return to the area again and again as they struggled in

Regiment. For the second time during the operation,

vain to transfer control of Binh Dinh Province from the

however, the troopers discovered that the enemy they

Communists

expected to meet had gone. Fleeing south, the North

they would learn to their bitter dismay what American

Vietnamese collided with units of the vision.

76

The South Vietnamese

ARVN 22d DiNVA soldiers

killed fifty

to the

Saigon government. In the process

arms and ingenuity could accomplish

what they could not.

in

Vietnam, and

With intense enemy

tire

having stalled the American assault on Landing Zone

Masher/White Wing, Captain Joel Sugdinis (squatting

in

foreground) and his

Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, take shelter in a ditch and call in

4, an LZ used during the opening phase of Operation command group from Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th

artillery, late

January 1966.

77

I

.4,s

solJicrs of the

nlrv.

hxtk on.

napalm

o/i

,)

2d Bunnlion,

7th

Cav-

B-57 Canberra unloads

its

nearby North Vietnamese po-

sitions siirroundim: Landini;

Zone

4.

79

li

Under withering

tire

from North Viernnmese

near the landing zone, January 28.

80

units,

men

from the 2J fint.ihon. 7th C^nvulry. cnnvl torw.nd through

,i

flooded nee field

^•''^

Having reached che other

side at the held,

one

of the tntopers helps a

wounded

I.

soldier to higher grtnind.

81

"

f'

^^mr' ^^^

/

^^*^'€fo

Ss

/^i

M^^Bys-' -.

i.

•li

,-*^^

/ *»

fv

^PflB^'"

^ Caviilrymcn puss by the wreckage of an

army helicopter shot down by Vietcong ground fire as it attempted to resupply units fighting near

'ti^^m>s^

LZ

4 on January 28.

a

^ S()/t/;ers

84

at r/ie 1st Cavalry Division guard

VieKimg

soldiers aipnircd in the

first

two days of

battle,

January 28 and 29.

Despite his i)wn wounJy., I'nwne First Class

Thomas

Cole, a medic with the 1st Cavalry

Division, tends to Staff Sergeant Harrison Pell, another cavalryman injured at

LZ

4-

85

snipers,

Focus: Prairie

company

a

Vietnamese

of Marines was trapped by

North

dug into

a slope

soldiers concealed in caves

called Razorback Ridge.

two-day

The ambush

initiated a vicious

through the cave complex that killed 21

fight

Americans and up

to 170

NVA. The

repulse of a mul-

ticompany enemy attack against Marine

Cam

Lo

in the early

month

the bloody

morning hours of August 26 brought

Con Thien

was no longer enough

area of operations

region, but the 2/4 alone

to deal with the

decided to meet the

new

expanding num-

DMZ. The Marine

ber of Communist troops south of the

command

near

to a close.

At the beginning of September the shifted into the

artillery

threat with an

am-

phibious assault from the coast. Called Deck House IV,

During the

first

NVA

Di-

the maneuver was carried out by the

Quang

Tri

Marines, in

days of July 1966, the 324B

vision crossed the demiUtarized zone into

its

Battalion, 26th

1st

capacity as Seventh Fleet Special Land-

Province. Within three weeks 8,000 Marines drove the

ing Force. Initial sea

invaders back into North Vietnam after some of the

ber 15 met

toughest fighting of the war. Yet even then U.S. intel-

was heavily engaged. The Marines discovered that the

Hgence was reporting evidence of cursion.

To meet

this

launched Operation

tack was to go after the

the Marine

threat,

Prairie.

new Communist

a

The American

enemy and go

command plan of at-

after

him

hard.

Five-man Stingray reconnaissance teams would be serted near the border to explore suspected

nues of approach for signs of reinfiltration.

was made, the recon teams would

Cam

enemy

in-

ave-

Once contact

call in artillery

Lo or helicopter gunships and

Da Nang. Meanwhile, Marine

in-

strike aircraft

infantry units

and helicopter

enemy had constructed plexes in the

assaults

on Septem-

resistance, but within hours the 1/26

little

battalion attacked,

it

and bunker com-

large tunnel

Con Thien-Gio Linh

area.

ran into heavy

fire

Each time the from concealed

positions that were reduced only by a combination of assaults, air strikes, artillery, naval gunfire,

and

tanks. For ten days the battalion doggedly swept the

Cua

ground

NVA

Viet River Valley, killing 254

from

casualties of

from

across the border.

Even

would wait

its

while suffering 203

own, before driving the

enemy back

the North Vietnamese retreated from the

as

nearby to relieve, reinforce, or exploit offensive oppor-

coastal plain, they were trading savage blows with the

tunities.

4th Marines for control of key

Starting in early August, the 2d Battalion clashed

with North Vietnamese units over twenty square miles

On

of mountain jungle.

pointblank tank

fire

252 along Route

9.

An

18,

NVA

initial assault

on

the Marines used

enemy

The next day

elements of the 803d north.

August

to dislodge

troops from Hill

the battalion ran into

Regiment two miles a pair of

farther

enemy bunkers was

infiltration routes

had

most elaborate

built his

ticular

on two

dense jungle.

made by

hills rising

The

first

the 1/4 Marines,

fortifications,

who

battered

ments on the southern slope

for

men.

— including B-52s—

gan

man

86

against

NVA troop concentra-

Meanwhile, an enemy 12.7mm machine gun be-

firing

on

helicopters resupplying the critical eleven-

outpost on the Rockpile. Trying to silence the

When

it

became

from the south was J.

and

enemy entrench-

two-and-a-half days

efforts

but nine dead

clear that attacking the ridge

futile.

Lieutenant Colonel William

Masterpool's 3d Battalion was ordered to

assault

On

in par-

attempt to take the ridge was

which the Americans repeatedly

tions.

battle

400 and 480 meters out of the

with nothing to show for their

arms

The

the mountain valleys north of the Rockpile.

centered on the Nui Cay Tre ridge line where the enemy

followed by four days of heavy engagements, during called in supporting

through

from the east and turn the enemy's

mount an

flank.

the morning of September 22 helicopters carried

At 10:00

the battalion into the jungle three miles from the ridge

Each Marine

line.

carried his

rifle,

ammunition, two

canteens, a poncho, and two socks stuffed with C-ra-

Resupply would have to come through landing

tions.

At

zones hacked out of the undergrowth. talion it

first

the bat-

had more trouble with the dense vegetation than

NVA.

did with the

For three days the Marines strug-

gled in the tangled green darkness, sometimes halting

bombs

entirely until

What

the jungle.

napalm blasted

or

a path through

they saw as they approached Hill 400

this

enough huts piles

and

more enemy

harbor a regiment, and

in the ravines to

piles of

positions, including

ammunition."

the summit.

moving tance.

on August 26

uphill

"The

against determined resis-

piece of terrain, where

maneuver on the

it

was so narrow that we couldn't

and they'd dig

flanks,

us in the bottleneck." For

bounced down the

and wait

artillery barrages.

of the twenty-eighth, the

Without

terattacked.

in

warning,

dozens

of

tell

who was

fighting the

and

platoon

"The Char-

mines, and

ladders in the trees for

direct fire." After

enemy backed

A

firing,

—mortars,

— and they had

spotters to climb up

grenades

the battle:

They had everything

or us.

lie

Company K remembered

heavy weapons

coun-

the Marine lines ahead of

hill into

was so thick you couldn't

stuff

Then,

NVA

screaming North Vietnamese infantrymen. sergeant from

for

two days the Marines slowly

gained ground behind periodic

on the morning

the right

just

an hour of

By the end of the day

off.

the Marines controlled Hill 400 and prepared to advance

With Company

M

in

advance, the battalion spent

days covering the 3,000 meters separating the two

hills,

then launched an all-out assault on October 4 into

the teeth of the a hail of

NVA defenses.

automatic-weapons

the terrain

made

it

The

hre,

attack stalled under

and the steepness

of

impossible to call in artillery without

risking the Marines themselves.

North Vietnamese from

tried again,

NVA

won

The

Unable

to drive the

and

a

broke contact, leaving behind ten leading into the thick

trails

long battle was finally over, but the hard-

victory was not soon forgotten. Hereafter

Tre would be known

as

Mutter Ridge,

Nui Cay

after the radio

call sign of the 3d Battalion.

Although

Prairie

continued through January 1967,

the battle for Mutter Ridge was the turning point. After several

more skirmishes

monsoon

October the

in

By the end of the year

sides.

much an At

its

arrival oi the

greatly restricted activity Prairie

on both

was no longer so

operation as a far-flung area of operations.

gunships,

and Marine

killed nearly 1,400

enemy date,

tactical

aircraft.

NVA soldiers,

casualties in a single

and

Ma-

height, Operation Prairie involved eight

navy

rine infantry battalions supported by artillery units,

The

the largest

seriously degraded the

324B

fighting

number of

Marine operation Division.

to that

"At the

beginning of Prairie we were fighting well-trained and well-equipped

soldiers,"

4th

testified

com-

Marines

mander Colonel Cereghino. "At the end we were running into poorly equipped young soldiers and frustrated

commanders." Their heavy from establishing

a

demilitarized zone,

prevented the

losses

NVA

major operating base south of the forced

the

North Vietnamese

to

postpone their invasion of Quang Tri Province for another year, and convinced the

from Main-Force to

ily

enemy

to shift temporar-

guerrilla tactics.

Yet the operation had also cost the Marines

than 200 dead plus more than 1,200 wounded.

to their final objective, Hill 484.

five

M

fighting raged for another hour

bodies and a score of bloody jungle.

NVA was damn clever," recounted Captain

Roger Ryman. "Invariably they'd pick

The

half before the

northeast

Led by Companies L and K, the 3d Battalion began

Company

from tanks on prearranged

fire

concentration points. By noon the 2d Platoon gained

did not improve morale, either. Recalled one officer, there were "more and

the next morning

time using direct

the

enemy was badly

en back across the

—more And

if

hurt, he was far from beaten. Driv-

DMZ

for the

second time in

six

months by the overwhelming weight of American men and machines, the enemy had again retreated to havens over the border to repair for a fresh assault.

One

Marine commander

his kisses

safe

and prepare

thing for sure, concluded a senior

at year's end,

"they haven't quit."

their fortifications, the infantry

pulled back while Marine air and artillery pounded the

enemy

posititms.

87

/n che early stages

October 1966,

of Operation

U.S.

mark

./

their position ntoj-

smoke grenade

to

the Rockpile,

a strategic

DMZ.

Prairie in

Marines set off

peak near the

Their mission was to block

efforts

by invading North Vietnamese tmops to capture the

hill.

Marines cake

a break

destroy units from the

90

and share

324B

a

NVA

meal of C-rations during Operation

Prairie.

Division that had recently infiltrated into

Marine reconnaissance teams

Quang

Tri Province.

tried to track

down and

Two

soldiers

early

Oetoher resulted

from the hi Murine Division hre upon Norrh Viernnmese troops Jetendini: Hill 484- The Khnine in

one

of the fiercest

flights

of the operation, the kittle for

.issaiik i^n this hill in

Mutter Rid^e.

91

92

Ignorint;

his

reaches tor

,\

(ivvn

wcHinJs.

buddy injured

srruogle for Hill 484-

NVA

a

Murine

durint;

the

troops repelled

the initial attack on the hill on October 4,

so the Marines pulled back

in artillery

and

and

called

air strikes.

93

Marines carry one of their wounJeJ 5,

94

to an air evacuation

bringing to an end the struggle for Mutter Ridge.

tyite

near Hill 484- They captured the

hill

on October

An

abanJoneJ

Operation

hc-lmct

dnJ

ntic

.sf.i/iJ

tribute

ft)

the

200 Americans

killed

Junng

Prairie.

95

Mary

Witness:

Vietnam; he was with the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infan-

Reis Stout

and we were

try Division,

We

each other.

usually within

so that was kind of a bonus for both of I

guess the things that

miles of

six weeks,

us.

remember most

I

primarily shrapnel wounds

wounds,

fifty

saw each other about every

are massive

had

that

be

to

opened. Most people don't understand that the way you treat these

war wounds

out

damaged

all

the

to

is

open them even more, take

and

tissue,

them open so that

leave

they can be cleaned, so that they don't get infected.

Large chunks of people's bodies, particularly muscle,

were gone. There were a

lot

of amputations, multiple

amputations, because there was so

As

the war heated up in 1966 and 1967,

diers all across casualties,

American

sol-

South Vietnam took greater numbers of

and the

American

role of the thousands of

medical prt^fessionals in Vietnam became even more important. Reis, an at

One

of this group was

army nurse

An Khe

at the

vember 1967.

2d Surgical Hospital

(MASH) to

No-

1987, nearly twenty years after her

In

Mary Reis Stout was elected

pres-

Vietnam Veterans of America.

ident of the

lot

seemed

as

When I graduated from high schi)ol in Columbus, Ohio, my class had a prophecy. Their prophecy for me was ended up being

I

need

A

field hospitals there. I

called

my

corps.

volunteer. in the

He

army

for

medical people to go to the

lot of

my

friends volunteered,

parents and talked to them about what

My

was going on.

me not to my being

father specifically asked

wasn't particularly crazy about

to begin with.

The thing

that finally got

me

to

orders to go.

We

met

at

my

put

first

in the

my

is

paperwork

husband now,

duty assignment at

Fort Ord, California, where he was a field artilleryman

working with basic

army now, needed. for

And

"I'm in the

my

services are

war going on, and

if Carl's

our future that

going through.

96

trainees. I just decided,

there's a

"

We

I

going

to he there

it's

important

understand somewhat what he's

ended up pretty

close together in

comparison

it

just dis-

Our major job people

in

alive;

happened.

it

was to keep these

in field hospitals

we didn 't deal with the long-term psycho-

logical effect, like the medical people at the hospitals

back

We

in the States did.

were just part of the chain.

We

never knew what happened to anybody when they

left

our hospital.

this

person made

We

never got word back that "yeah, or "that person didn't

it"

That was something that bothered

me

make

it."

for a long time;

whatever happened to those people.^ Boy, too

I

got tough really

much about

it all,

and get through each I

came

The

fast.

just

day.

I

We

really

not think

all tried to

do what needed

to be

blocked out a

done

when

lot

Chu

back, but there were a couple of cases at

Lai that

named

I still

remember. Both of them happened

Steve, but

first

I

can't

remember

Steve had a gunshot wound

He seemed stabilize

was the fact that Carl Stout, who

had

war

volunteered to go to Vietnam. In basic training they

told us there was a

and

a nurse in the

much mining. There

though there were so many more of the

enemy when

with the

that I was going to be a nurse in the Peace Corps. I've often said I

of gunshot wounds, but

tance kind of injuries, where you weren't face to face

Lieutenant Mary

1st

and Chu Lai from November 1966

return from the war,

were a

to be

doing OK, and

you kind of

let

yi)u

your guard

yourself get close to them.

He

to

be

their last names. in the

abdomen.

know, once people

down about

just got very

letting

bad

(yne

night, with a lot of breathing problems. His doctor said, "Just

keep suctioning him out and don't

he gets worse.

call

me

unless

"

Well, he basically didn't get any worse, but he just all of a

bring

We

couldn't

back. That was unusual, because if

we were

sudden went into cardiac

him

right there with

arrest.

them normally we could get them back.

His death was very traumatic for me.

On

top of that,

the hospital commander,

when he went

had

of guilt about that

a lot

responsibility

took

me

to be there

me

told

it

and understand why

that happened, but

it

he begged them not

wound. Nor-

leg

When

to.

—

and got processed out

get right back to work. the hospital where

adrenaline going. But

you're getting married in a

"Please don't take

to

my

on him, but

it

concerns that

real

check on him very

he wasn't bleeding around

In fact,

nam.

and moving

my

opened

into surgery. leg. "

They did an-

other graft and that held for a couple of days.

Then one evening

and saw he was having some

nurses' station

When

blood.

wound

pulled the dressing off his

I

I

could

see his artery pumping. His pulse was getting thready

and he was perspiring and going put

my hand into

technique

when

it's

his leg

something

is

somebody's

So

I

just

artery. Sterile

ingrained in you,

that's

life

into shock.

and grabbed the

the most important thing

but is

to

and on the way

in

They took him back he was saying

into surgery,

"Take

to the doctors,

it off,

1

don't want

"

We

had him

talking

for a while after surgery,

and wondering what

without his

We

leg.

were

and he

started

his life was going to be like

all trying to

be positive, saying

you can ski and you can ride horses, you're not going fo

have any problem. But is

my

girlfriend

it

going to

something we had tients,

was tough.

feel

He

"How

to deal with very often in our pa-

because they usually

and confident about that later in

asked,

about thisT' That wasn't

left

so soon after surgery.

You don't have the answers. You can be

It's

would go back. But

I

it,

but

I

really positive

wonder how he dealt with

amazing

how

adrenaline keeps you going in

from month to month.

When

I

got back

home

camp it

was

after I

kept

went

to

new world

up. I spent time as a volunteer for the

all I

USO,

my daughters. Then

could think of was Vietnam.

had thought about

I

become very good

much

it

before, of course, but I

at deciding not to think about

or really deal with

it.

our marriage,

in

and a

lot

reason,

more

had too

for the first time

took over a lot of the responsibility

I

When

stress.

very

it's

it

But when Carl was sent to

Korea in 1981 and we were separated

common

whatever

stress increases for

that post-traumatic stress

and

memories of Vietnam have an impact along with the For some reason,

stress.

I

Maybe

thought,

if I

could talk to some other Vietnam veterans they'd help

me

understand why

this

involved.

is

happening. Soon after that

I

VVA

I

and got more

became national membership

director in

1983, then national secretary, then, in 1987, president. In

many

what I'm doing now encompasses the

ways,

best aspects of

what

I

—

cared about in nursing

especially

the holistic approach of caring for people. Recently

met

Lillian

chief of the told her

I

Dunlap, a retired brigadier general

army nurse corps when

I

I

who was

was in Vietnam.

I

haven 't done any nursing since Vietnam. She

said,

"You do

you. "

And

it

it

every day, dear.

struck

mc

nursing as working in a

life.

wife. I

in social welfare, a

joined the Columbus chapter of the

to die.

to work.

to nursing after Viet-

Germany, even Girl Scouts with

other

stop the bleeding.

went back

and got my degree

suddenly,

difficulty. I

pulled back the sheet and he was lying in a pool of

month, why don't you

go back

school programs, an outreach program for military wives in

looked over at him from the

I

keep that

to

over with Carl as a military

all

the thought that

He

my

really

need

nursing registration current until 1982, always with

college

begged them again, "Don't take

didn't

1

to

spent several years raising our three daughters

I

the graft. Within a few hours he started leaking around

and they took him back

never

I

So

off.

wanted

parents said no, you need to

some time

would not hold. So we had

the graft,

my

take

leg,

I

to volunteer in the

trained,

really felt the

1

they brought him in he

Instead, they did an arterial graft

sure that

roi)m.

hours from the

thought about going back to

I

had

I

thirty-six

my parents' kitchen.

intensive-care ward to

rest,

was such a large graft that they had

make

got off the plane at Seattle, went to Fort

difficult. 1

but

just kept pleading with them,

regularly to

very

Lewis,

emergency

a long time.

mally the doctors would have just amputated his

it

my

for years. I've taken that

The other Steve had an enormous

leg. "

was

should have done a tracheotomy on him.

fault because I I

who just happened

into cardiac arrest,

We're very proud of

that she was right. h(^spital,

You picture

but nursing

is

really

caring for people. That's what I'm about, and that's what

VVA

is

about.

So

I

guess I'm in the right place.

97

••••fi'^l^ljv^,,

^

STALEMATE

General Westmoreland's strategy large

enough

enemy

for defeating the

to protect the populated areas of

Communists required

South Vietnam and

a military force

to take the

war to the

remote jungles along the border. Despite the increasing tempo of fighting

in the

during 1966, the

first

eighteen months of active U.S. involvement had been devoted

primarily to building up that military machine.

By the beginning of 1967 Westmoreland had

namese

at his disposal substantial

South Viet-

including eleven army divisions, two independent regiments, a marine

assets,

brigade, ten armored cavalry groups, twenty Ranger battalions, six artillery battalions, plus a host of territorial

and police units scattered about the country. In addition, the

American commander could Korean marine brigade, and Westmoreland's plans

U.S.

soldiers

call

a

upon the

new

year,

task force.

however, depended chiefly on the 430,000

and Marines who now called South Vietnam

one armored cavalry regiment, and

battle

two Korean infantry divisions, a

combined Australian-New Zealand

for the

ganized into seven infantry divisions,

who would

services of

their temporary

two paratrooper brigades, two

home. Or-

light infantry brigades,

a reinforced Special Forces group,

it

was these

men

bear the primary responsibility for meeting the enemy's Main-Force units in

and defeating him.

Or, rather,

it

would be the 20 percent of these men who comprised American combat

units in Vietnam.

Although

television

news reports suggested that U.S. troops spent their

time leaping from helicopters into hot LZs or hacking their way up jungle hillsides in search of their elusive quarry, most Americans

who

support personnel. For every mud-coated soldier

humping through the rain there were a

half-dozen mail clerks, typists, maintenance men, air

served in

traffic

Vietnam were

staff

and

controllers, briefing officers,

military policemen, transport pilots, supply sergeants, nurses, chaplains, or truck drivers.

And

for all the

newspaper photos o( mortar-blasted

Marines herd Vietcong suspects aiptured

in the MekiHit;

fire

support bases carved out of the

River Delta o/iro n hehcopter.

most Americans who served

jungle,

in

Vietnam spent

their tours of duty at sprawling rear-echelon hases like

Bien Hoa, Bai,

Tan Son Nhut, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Phu

Da Nang,

or

Cam Ranh

VC terrorism,

life

in the rear

could he quite agreeable.

Living accommodations were comfortable, rious.

The menus

steaks

and

at

if

not luxu-

messes and snack bars featured

cream, while nearby

ice

was from these outlying hases and strongpoints that

Westmoreland tion

initiated Phase

— moving out from

officers'

men's clubs served liquor and cold beer prices. Off-duty soldiers could read a

at

and enlisted rock-bottom

book

in air-con-

oi his strategy of

II

attri-

the populated areas into the ene-

my's sanctuaries where the

Bay.

Aside from an occasional rocket attack and the threat of

It

Communist Main-Force

units

could be located and destroyed. With Operation Attle-

boro as

command launched

model, the American

its

Communist

series of multibattalion thrusts against

areas

and supply

These huge search-and-de-

corridors.

stroy operations utilized superior

and technology

American firepower

to reap a punishing harvest of

dead. But they also

left

a

base

behind

growing

a

toll

of

enemy Amer-

ditioned libraries, play volleyball, go water-skiing on the

ican casualties while steadily drawing more and more

Saigon River, or catch their favorite television shows

U.S. forces farther and farther from South Vietnam's

on the Armed

cities

at the larger

Forces Television Network. GIs stationed

U.S. installations could choose from two

or three different first-run films a

week

at base

movie

theaters or pick up anything from potato chips to port-

stateside food

ational facilities

and drink, the elaborate

recre-

and bountiful consumer goods were

deliberate effort by

villages.

During the second week of January, elements of the 1st,

25th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, the 196th Infantry

Brigade, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Ar-

— some —joined an equal number

mored Cavalry Regiment

able stereos at the local PX.

The

and

MACV to maintain morale.

a

Coupled

can soldiers in

of

Operation Cedar

stroy

Falls,

sweep directed against

from the surrounding Vietnamese community, however,

angle. Preceded by

the material abundance had a disorienting effect on

leaflets

who found

soldiers

it

difficult to reconcile their

relatively plush existence with the death

and destruction

troops

known

as the Iron Tri-

and 20,000 airdropped

strikes

warning inhabitants

Communist

long-time

a

stronghold northwest of Saigon

B-52

ARVN

an enormous search-and-de-

with tight restrictions that isolated most servicemen

many

16,000 Ameri-

in all,

to leave the area,

twenty

battalions crashed into the sixty-square-mile triangle

January 8 in search of the 9th

VC

Division. By the

on

end

day the Americans had cordoned off the

that surrounded them. Critics charged that the profusion

of the

of clubs, slot machines, steam baths, luxury purchases,

fortified village of

and other "nonessentials" overtaxed the U.S.

refugee camps, bulldozed the town's dwellings, and de-

logistical

system and created endless oppt)rtunities for corruption. It

also exacerbated the division

between rear-echelon

personnel and those assigned to combat units. For the

men who a

a huge, dusty

compound

at

An

good deal

less

comfortable.

like the 1st

It

"home" might be

Cav's headquarters

Khe, which lacked many of the amenities of Sai-

gon but

still

boasted

its

own

twenty-five-acre "enter-

tainment area" complete with bars and brothels. Or

might be the much smaller and starker confines of support base. There a soldier could

meal,

a

drink

—sometimes

change of clothes, but to protect

attacks.

100

him from

little

even

still

a

count on

cold one

a

hot

—and

enemy

it

a fire

more than sandbags and

either the weather or

Ben Sue, removed 6,000

villagers to

elaborate network of tunnels and supply

stroyed an

caches that honeycombed the ground beneath the surface.

actually fought the war,

was apt to be

first

a

dirt

sapper

Over the next eighteen days American and South Vietnamese

soldiers evacuated the region's four

villages as air strikes, artillery,

and

giant

Rome

main plows

demolished the surrounding jungle. Meanwhile, 6-10-

man teams

of "tunnel rats" crawled through

nearly

twelve miles of underground corridors unearthing tons of supplies

and thousands

of

enemy documents. By the

time the operation ended, the Vietcong had suffered the discovery and seizure of a key headquarters complex, the destruction of twenty years' worth of tunnels and fications,

and the

rate operation

loss

forti-

of nearly 800 men. But the elabo-

had not been able

to trap the

main body

American servicemen sunbathe on (he deck Vietnam,

iti

of the

swimmim; pool

at the U.S.

Armv'> cvKirnidus

iK'aJqtiarters at

Umg

Binh. South

September 1969.

101

In January 1967, U.S. forces attacked

the ''^

Vietcong stronghold northwest of Saigon called the Iron Triangle, focusing on the village

of Ben Sue. Here some of Ben

»,

Suc'S^t**,

3,800 inhabitants, headed for a refugee"^"

camp,

sit in

an evacuation helicopter with

their belongings; their village will soon be

razed so

it

can no longer be used by the

Communists.

«

'm^^'

'''^^

^^j"""^^:^'

%0^

A

of

enemy

who

soldiers,

filtered

through allied lines

to-

ward the Camhodian border. Four weeks

later

Americans

Westmoreland took up the

pursuit,

sending twenty-two American battalions northwest of

War Zone C

— $25 — some

pursuit of an elusive quarry at a cost

1,576 wounded

killed,

282

million,

that

thought

well out of proportion to the results.

Two

hundred miles north,

in the

western reaches of

Operation

the central highlands, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division

Junction City. Spearheaded by the 503d Airborne Bri-

fought a different kind of border campaign during 1967.

the Iron Triangle into

as part of

which on February 22 conducted the

gade,

combat parachute

assault since the

U.S.

first

Korean War, Junc-

maneuver

tion City was a classic "cordon and sweep"

designed to trap the Vietcong division with speed and

hammer

numbers, then

it

overwhelming

to pieces with

paratroopers formed the eastern side

tif

an enor-

mous horseshoe. To the west were the 196th Light

To

the north were eight battalions of the 1st

some 250

Infantry Division, carried into battle by icopters in

one of the

11th

as the

blocking forces were

terrain while

Rome

men had

Peers's

the job of guarding the

proved an arduous

It

NVA

and 10th

1st

an endless round

task,

of patrols through steep rain forests in temperatures that

Communists

of

concealment.

troops collided with

enemy

When

So

period.

umn had been

advancing

concentrations, the

icans called in prodigious quantities of artillery

Amerand

air

was

cut

down

in a hail of

So thick was

fire.

leaguered American units.

Between January and ments known

River in

the

his presence

the jungle that aircraft frequently could not locate be-

the thickly

to deprive the

was the enemy that

skilled

often never suspected until the lead elements of a col-

devoted

plows and heavy bulldozers

away great chunks of jungle

stripped

Divisions.

and the

units of the 25th Infantry Division

Armored Cavalry swept north through

wooded

hel-

largest air assaults in the history

As soon

of army aviation. in place,

In-

and the 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry

fantry Brigade

Division.

William R.

rugged frontier region against the

could fluctuate sixty degrees during a twenty-four-hour

firepower.

The

Operating out of its base camp near Pleiku City, General

its

as

in a series of

April,

Operation

Sam Houston,

attention to the area west of the

Kontum

countered only

Province.

At

first

Sathay

light resistance as they systematically

un-

fortifications.

mid-February the North Vietnamese began to

in

strike back.

and

the division

Nam

the infantrymen en-

covered and destroyed enemy tunnels and

But

engage-

trail

Shadowed by

watchers,

NVA

reconnaissance teams

harassed by daytime snipers and

power, including airdropped cluster bombs (CBUs) that

nighttime mortar attacks, the GIs endured a growing

ripped through the tangled foliage with devastating re-

number

sults.

bers

Such

collisions

were

rare.

When

they did take place

the Vietcong were handled severely. But the large

of vicious ambushes that sapped both their

and

their morale.

The North Vietnamese

to position themselves so close to the

num-

learned

Americans that

was impossible. Counterattacks

size

effective supporting

fire

of the operational zone, the ruggedness of the terrain,

typically resulted in

heavy casualties from carefully pre-

and the noise generated by

made

units

most of der.

it

large,

mechanized American

almost impossible to surprise the enemy,

whom

The high

scattered west across the

Cambodian

point of the allied effort in

during 1967, Junction City demonstrated ity

to

swiftly

penetrate

III

Corps

MACV's

heretofore- inviolable

bor-

abil-

enemy

sanctuaries in force, but the massive shock

power of the

multidivisional operation had largely spent

itself in futile

pared

enemy

firefights

could

enemy had

one

of [he

few combat jumps made

last

And

although such

well into the night, by daylight the

invariably disappeared, taking his dead

and

wounded with him.

With

the beginning of the

summer monsoon

April, the 4th Division shifted

its

in early

energies south into

western Pleiku Province. For this new operation, code

named

Francis

greater success In

flanking positions.

Marion,

the

on supporting

Americans firepower,

relied

with

including in-

digenous armored personnel carriers and the tanks of the in the war, paratroopers

of the 17 k] Airborne Brigade parachute into Tay Ninh Province

10th Cavalry in a series of violent encounters that raged

on March

across the rolling hills south of the Se

i,

1967, during Operation Junction City.

San River. For

105

months the

three

NVA

attempted without success to

drive the division away from

on

battles culminating

tierce

border sanctuaries, the

its

23

July

hghter-bombers annihilated an entire it

when

NVA

American

The

first

Khe Sanh had

battle of

all its difficulties

and dangers, however, the contest

against the

NVA

compare

scope or savagery to the continuing battles

in

in the

western highlands could not

waged by the U.S. Marines along the shattered

hills

rine Division

had established

a series of

strung out between Route 9 and the isolated strongpoints bristling

with

of

Ma-

the demilitarized zone. By the end of 1966 the 3d

combat bases

DMZ. From

these

and barbed

artillery

Itlxury of rear bases in

simply regrouped,

midsummer

NVA

the

anti-infiltration barrier.

chief proponent.

McNamara, sors,

this

Heavy

fighting broke out

on February 27 when

Cam

regiment near

relief force that left

one Marine battalion commander and dozens of

The same

dead.

scale in April at

pattern was repeated on a

Khe Sanh when

B, 9th Marines, ran into

NVA

Division.

a

in the hills

men

larger

Company

advance elements of the 325C

As reinforcements poured

that the

his

much

squad from

western outpost over the next three days,

came apparent

NVA

Lo, precipitating a series of am-

bushes against a hastily dispatched

enemy was

surrounding the base.

It

into the small it

quickly he-

casualties to drive the

back across the

guard towers, and physical obstacles was an attempt

May

North Vietnamese

to press their hard-

marked the

first

time

that U.S. forces had penetrated the demilitarized zone.

The complex scheme

of

terminus

maneuver

— the combat base

focal point of

NVA artillery,

Attempting

with the 90th

NVA

intense

enemy

combat

utilized the full range

base.

battalions fought a furious

Regiment

early July.

in

of

artillery,

air,

and naval lives

but

Throughout August and September

arms that drove

Con

Thien's defenders burrowing into

the ground for protection and

mese

NVA bunker complexes all

the

River, then wheeled soufh to sweep

left

the tortured landscape

with the bodies of thousands of North Vietna-

soldiers (see page 120).

Only under the devastating

impact of nearly 800 B-52 bombing runs did the enemy finally retreat in early

October.

Driven back along the northern

frontier, the

munists struck farther south, attacking an

assaults

sualties.

the

Com-

ARVN

out-

Phuoc Long Province on October 27 and the

Both

106

attacks.

growing pressure

the two sides engaged in a fearful contest of supporting

Cambodian border town

to

and ground

more than 1,300 enemy

gunfire that claimed

by a cascade of supporting arms the Americans smashed

way

initial

the Americans directed a

artillery fire,

thunderous bombardment

post in

fortified

its

— became the

Against waves of North Vietnamese infantry backed by

fighter-bombers, and amphibious landing craft. Backed

the Ben Hai

rocket,

on Con Thien, three Marine battle

Con Thien

to relieve the steadily

of Marine combat assets, including helicopter gunships,

through heavily

at

sieged

Hickory. Launched on

18, this multibattalion strike

dubious value and

vive the year. Nonetheless, the barrier and

littered

won advantage with Operation

Of

failed to do.

took twelve days of

DMZ.

The Marines immediately sought

after

Secretary of Defense Robert S.

did nothing to stop the steady encirclement of the be-

helicopter gunships, attack aircraft, and nearly

600 American

stage of a massive

first

Dubbed McNamara's Line

heavily entrenched

continuous battle, a relentless bombardment by Marine artillery,

in

Ma-

inordinate expense, the grandiose project did not sur-

Ma-

a

By

accomplish by other means what the bombing of

North Vietnam had

attrition.

rine reconnaissance patrol intercepted an entire

units

combination of mines, electronic sen-

during 1967, as heavily armed Communist regulars tested

bloody war of

enemy

to battle.

was threatening U.S. defenses

rines labored to construct the

to

own

and returned

the eastern part of the demilitarized zone where the

its

on

effect

Laos and North

attack, battered

refitted,

wire, the Marines fought a succession of costly battles

the Americans in their

at least as

many. But neither defeat had any appreciable

Vietnam secure from U.S. For

North Viet-

cost the

namese an estimated 1,000 KIA, Hickory

Hanoi. With the

company.

light-

ning assault.

force

air

regiment as

vainly attempted to overrun an isolated

up the remnants of enemy units scattered by the

of Loc

Then on November

NVA

Ninh two

days

later.

were thrown back with heavy enemy ca-

1st Division, after

3 a defector revealed that

months of elaborate prep-

While one Marine checks during tierce lighting near

aration,

a fallen hiiJJv, others charge

Khe Sanh

Coward North Vietnamese positions on the ravaged slopes ot Hill 881 North

in spring 1967.

was poised to attack the highlands town of Dak

To. Seizing the opportunity to engage the enemy force, the

American command deployed

talions of the 4th Infantry Division,

Airborne Brigade,

ARVN

a brigade

from the

all

in

sixteen bat-

the entire 173d 1st

Air Cavalry,

ously carved out of the steep hillsides, the

took a steady

toll

of

American

counters, including a Veterans

borne task

force.

Four days

battalions into the narrow valleys

and

mortar attack on the Dak

sur-

C-130

six

rounded the remote

As first

allied units

probed south from Dak

To

during the

two weeks of November they clashed repeatedly

with well-armed

NVA

regulars.

Day ambush

transports

later a

From the labyrinth of

tunnels and camouflaged fortifications they had labori-

that

left

To

20

air-

North Vietnamese

airfield

destroyed two

and blew up an ammunition dump

an explosion that sent an enormous

district capital.

during these en-

dead, 154 wounded, and 2 missing from a 200-man

onto the precipitous, jungle-canopied ridges that

and

lives

Communists

fireball

in

shooting

thousands of feet into the night sky.

The the

blazing airfield proved the high-water

Communist attempt

oi the

month

to take

the weight of

Dak To. By

mark of

the middle

men and machines

that

107

American Mass.

108

soldiers stationed at the rcniutv

(_

->

Anii) tdiup at

Dak To near

the

Cambodian

bi>rdcr fjAc tunc out to attend

Sunday

—

MACV

had hurled into

battle

began to

units southwest toward their

enemy

As they

tuaries.

retreated the

pushing

tell,

Cambodian

sanc-

North Vietnamese fought

tenacious rear-guard actions, forcing the Americans to

whole

literally obliterate

on the ground could claw

before units in

hilltops with supporting fire

hand-to-hand

vicious

their

engagements.

During

tensively

the

mounted

enemy

positions. Fi-

nally, after a savage five-day battle tor Hill

875 (see page

many

132) in which 158 Americans and at least twice as

NVA

were

killed.

North Vietnamese

resistance

came

to

A-6A

— and close

for

— the

Intruder

air

Vietnam's main

the battered 1st

yet subjected to

and Guam.

Stratofortresses based in Thailand

American warplanes were

far

outnumbered, however,

by the thousands of observation, reconnaissance, cargo,

command

tanker, transport, and

aircraft that daily filled

NVA

Division limped into

Cam-

every kind and description flying cargo, troop gunship,

transport,

dous

that had transported 16,000

allied troops into

sponsible

South Vietnam,

ments"

effort

some of the most

hostile territory in

maintained an astonishing level of logistical and

fire

sup-

— changes—

The bulk

of

in every

enemy

casualties at

Dak To,

as they

had

other major battle during the year, were

the result of air strikes.

The expansion

of

American

this

growing

on Lyndon Johnson

to

namese weakened the hand of those argued for caution ruary 1967

when

more than 60,000 personnel organized

one

into

air

com-

wing, nine tactical fighter wings, three strategic

bombardment wings, and one wing,

erations

air

commando/special op-

communications groups,

plus

tactical

control groups, and a welter of subsidiary units operating

out of sixteen major

air

carrier-based

U.S. Navy

Yankee Station some 100 miles of South

Vietnam and the

air

force

aircraft

off the

six air

flying

bombing pause

of the

1st

I

aircraft used to

wage the in-country war over light

bombers,

Washington who

rate. Just as

im-

number of U.S.

cain

The

result

was

a

hawks

led by

John C. Stennis whose August hearair

war sharply challenged

air

campaign.

continuing escalation of the bombing

throughout Indochina. American

pilots

on Tiger Hound

missions over the Laotian panhandle flew more than sorties during the

end the

air force

first

four

months

of 1967.

By

recorded 1,718 B-52 raids alone.

Ho Chi Minh

Trail paled

beside what was happening over North Vietnam, where total sorties increased

South Vietnam included B-57 Canberra

without

undermine public confidence

But the activity along the

Corps.

The

to

White House control over the

year's

aircraft

it

to resupply their forces in

an unprecedented

conduct of the

ings into the

— representing throughout

had begun

Mississippi senator

12,000

groups

scattered

from

at

in

to Johnson, however, were Congressional

northern coast

approximately 500 helicopter and fixed-wing

Marine Air Wing

were the

employ

the president's handling of the war. Most troublesome

bases in South Vietnam, Thai-

and Guam. Alongside the

70-100

sualties

single day.

they took advantage of a Feb-

portant, the steady increase in the

had

pattern

against the enemy's heartland. The North Viet-

more than matched by the increase of U.S.

air assets in

flight

re-

"move-

armada came mount-

aerial

South Vietnam

air force

traffic

and major

ground forces during the previous two years had been

Southeast Asia. By the end of 1967 the

air

South Vietnam alone every

in

ing pressure restraint

action.

53,000

missions

armada was

this aerial

landings,

takeoffs,

Along with

and driven one of the enemy's best divisions from

the field with losses estimated as high as 1,600 killed in

more than

for

medevac

and

rescue,

around the clock. By 1967

land,

North

defense system were the giant B-52

air

American command celebrated the tremen-

mand

all-weather at-

first

Corsair. Utilized ex-

support and interdiction over

bodia, the

been

A-7

later the

South Vietnam and Laos but not

ters of

port,

on

Laos the air force relied heavily

the skies over Southeast Asia, not to mention helicop-

an end.

As

Above

Skyraiders.

the F-105 Thunderchief, while navy pilots flew the F-8

Crusader, the tack aircraft

of artillery, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and strikes against

North Vietnam and

supersonic F-4

air support,

and prop-driven A-1

Phantoms,

way forward

course of the operation U.S. forces fired 151,000 rounds

257 B-52 bombing

F-1 00 Supersabres for close

in 1

1967, the

amount

from 79,000 oi

in

1966 to 108,000

bombs dropped climbing from

36,000 to 226,000 tons of high explosives.

109

the number and type of

targets authorized hy

Johnson met Hanoi's

ton.

expansion in both

figures lay a steady

Behind these

Washing-

increased infiltration ot Feb-

North Vietnamese

ruary with mine-laying operations in

south of the twentieth parallel and strikes against

rivers

manufacturing targets near Hanoi and Haiphong. In

March, American warplanes

thirty-five miles

and chemical plant

Thai Nguyen

hit the

steel

north of the capital.

During April they struck power plants, ammunition

dumps, cement

Haiphong

within the Hanoi-

airfields

The most important

restricted zone.

month was

that

plant in

and

factories,

target

32,000-kilowatt thermal power

the

downtown Hanoi, which U.S. Navy

pilots

knocked out with television-guided "Walleye" bombs. Eight weeks later Johnson approved attacks against pe-

troleum storage

sites

near Hanoi and Haiphong. In July

new

the president added forty

transportation and mili-

tary installations to the Rolling

cluding the crucial Paul

Thunder

Doumer

of Hanoi, which

air force

time on August

2.

Bridge

target

on the

list,

fighter-bombers hit for the

That same month

in-

outskirts first

were made

strikes

against previously prohibited regions within the city limits

of Hanoi and along the buffer zone near the Chinese

border, a series of raids culminating

U.S.

aircraft flew

more than 200

Vietnam, the greatest

on August 20 when sorties

over North

single day's effort since the

bomb-

ing began. During the remainder of the year American

on

virtually every military, indus-

pilots

were

trial,

and transportation

let

loose

target

recommended by the

Stennis committee.

By December 1967 the United States had delivered a total of

namese

864,000 tons of bombs on the North Viet-

— 70 percent more than had been dropped

entire Pacific theater during

ing

had

inflicted

World War

an estimated $300 million

on North Vietnam,

seriously disrupted

its

in the

The bomb-

II.

in

damage

agricultural

fragile industrial base.

Al-

production, and crippled

its

though

had generally been kept low,

some

civilian casualties

cities

were severely damaged; others were almost

entirely destroyed.

Soldiers in an

AC-47 gunship

guns into the twilight

named

sky,

fire its electrically

showing why the

"Puff the Magic Dragon.

driven Gatling

aircraft

was nick-

"

no

^M

Z^:^W^'

A

Nnrrh

\

icrnamese transport truck crosses a pontoon bridge that was built to replace the one dcstrtiycd earlier outside

U.S. bombers.

112

Nam

Dinh by

The

actual dollar cost ot the air war to the LInited

States,

—some $900 million

however, was

far greater

in

mention enormous operating

lost aircraft alone, not to

and munitions expenditures. Had the bombing been successful

such

deficit

spending might have been accepted

with equanimity. But the hard

fact

was that the

air

cam-

paign against North Vietnam had failed utterly to meet its

States constructed

its

military strategy in

Southeast Asia around the assumption that

air

power

dis-

army of

and keep

By

the world,

i>n

the United States pay a heavy

North Vietnamese survival and technical assistance they

aid

Communist

allies, especially

Union and China. Hanoi's

tage of Sino-Soviet rivalry, skillfully playing

were no closer to giving up than they had been

power against the other

one super-

in their quest for increased aid.

beginning of 1965. Despite the destruction, the econ-

The

omy

quantities of rice, small arms, ammunition,

there was

And

no evidence of

a significant loss of morale.

despite everything that

do to stop

American

the infiltration of

it,

The

it

air

that their allies supplied. This cumulative contribution,

reasons for these failures were many.

on Europe

their doctrine

for

triple-

terrain. After focusing

two decades, they had to

adapt aircraft designed primarily for strategic nuclear warfare to the

had

to

niques.

demands

retrain pilots

Beyond

this,

of a limited political conflict in

cc)nventional

To

American

power posed by Vietnam's monsoon climate,

made up

1968, more than

and

bombing tech-

the air war was saddled from the

Defense Secretary Robert

McNamara

in

much bombing we

proposed an uncon-

ditional ics

bombing

do,"

McNamara

halt in hopes of appeasing antiwar crit-

negotiations.

He

American ground

also

urged the president to revise

strategy

and place

a

hope

of victory.

its

economic

assets

away from urban

selection resulted in unwieldy chains of

command. Even

a ceiling

ican troop levels. Although he did not put

been

centers, while the administration's tight control of target

"no matter how

within the United States and prodding Hanoi toward

words, by the middle of 1967 the

Washington's gradualist approach gave Ha-

the figures

North Vietnamese would not give

and

noi time to disperse

inflicted

Convinced that the

called for a reassessment of strategy.

beginning with shortages of equipment, ammunition, pilots.

damage

for all the

by the bombing.

had underestimated the limitations on

canopy jungle, and mountainous

vehicles,

(SAMs), and tanks

estimated to be in excess of $2 billion between 1965 and

had been before the bombing began.

military planners

fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles

power could

southern battlefields during 1967 was nearly three times greater than

success of their efforts was measured in the vast

supplies to the

air

men and

the So-

leaders took full advan-

onslaught unparalleled in history the North Vietnamese

functioned. Despite the shortages and dislocations,

an

by creating one of

defense systems

however.

on the material

viet

at the

raising

air offensive.

its

the end,

In

rested

air

make

they were able to price for

And

roadways open.

vital

received from their

aerial

air raids.

they were able to effect repairs with remarkable speed

have no choice but to sue

an

that

armed with picks and shovels,

civilian workers

courage the people of North Vietnam that Hanoi would for peace. Yet, after

targets

could not be moved, they were able to minimize the

damage done by the American

would so devastate the North Vietnamese economy, so impede the flow of men and materiel south, and so

the coun-

facilities acrt)ss

and cleverly camouflaging those

tryside,

the most sophisticated

original objectives.

The United

petroleum and other storage

For their

it

on Amer-

in so

many

man who had once

major proponent of escalation no longer had any

if

air

power had not brought the Communists

knees,

neither

had

General

to

Westmoreland's

worse, from the pilots' point of view, were the plethora

strategy of attrition.

of prohibited zones and restrictive rules of engagement

million troops had saved South

that diminished both the effectiveness and the safety of

taken a heavy

many

fought well under adverse conditions, utilizing an enor-

missions.

Compounding

these problems were the ingenuity and

resourcefulness of the civilians

from the

North Vietnamese. By evacuating

cities,

dispersing industries, scattering

toll

mous advantage

of

The commitment enemy

casualties.

in mobility

oi nearly half a

Vietnam from defeat and U.S. soldiers had

and firepower to drive the

Vietcong from even their most secure strongholds. deed, whenever American

forces actually

engaged

In-

VC //J

NVA

or

they almost always prevailed. But the

units,

down

primary goal of grinding

the

enemy

until

he hol-

lered "uncle" was not happening. Despite official esti-

mates ot

many

as

as

220,000 enemy

soldiers killed since

Com-

the deployment o( U.S. citmhat forces, overall

munist strength

in

South Vietnam stood

at approxi-

mately 350,000 troops, compared to some 200,000

in

June 1%5.

titmed the accuracy of little

MACV's enemy

command

dinary peasants, of junior officers

"body count"

affairs

some

at least

battle, the

Vietcong

guerrillas

pressure,

and the ambitions

from

or-

manpower pool

far in excess

fact that

some

each year,

draft age

of the

number of enemy

KIA, even when estimated by the most

optimistic meth-

Moreover, the Communists had time and terrain

By

their side.

fighting only

when and where

they

chose, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese were largely able to control

how many

became too

When

casualties they suffered.

high, they simply scattered into the

jungle or crossed the border into sanctuaries

immune

In

Westmoreland's

short,

—when

number of

enemy

soldiers

the

through recruitment or

infiltration

Along with

On

toll

compared

replace

— was never reached.

rates steadily increased, av-

mtmth during

the

first

477 per month during 1966.

swelling draft calls, the mounting

American

further eroded domestic support for the war.

the other hand.

despite

to

"cross-over

would exceed the

Communists could

eraging 816 killed in action per half of 1967,

vaunted

casualty rates

Meanwhile, U.S. casualty

death

formidable

Communist morale remained losses

and

staggering

intact

hardships,

thanks to an effective system of internal discipline and a firm conviction that they

were defending their country

Neither the Americans nor their

had been able

114

to the

rural population

ineffectiveness and, otten,

arrogance and brutality.

to the

its

with

its

U.S. military command. The massive search-and-

much

destroy operations that occupied so

MACV's

of

time and resources diverted attention from the social

and

They

political roots of the insurgency.

havoc among the

wreaked

job ot the combat officer in Vietnam, wrote one

commander, was

a millionaire

to "spend firepower as

and husband

pauper," and so he did.

his

men's

upon

lives as

if

if

he

he

is

is

a

Armed with automatic weapons, and machine guns,

recoilless rifles, grenades, mortars,

able to call ships,

also

civilian population of the countryside.

naval gunfire, helicopter gun-

artillery,

and supersonic fighter-bombers carrying every-

thing from high explosives to cluster bombs, defoliants,

and napalm, American commanders

Since

it

common

was

on American

let

loose a storm ot

enemy whenever he appeared.

shot and shell against the

practice for the Vietcong to

fire

troops from within villages, the reliance

on firepower contributed

to inspire the

The widespread

to a soaring rate of

use of "free

and interdiction"

fire as

own

same

the people of St)uth Vietnam.

political leaders

a

damage and

fire

zones" and "harassment

means o( controlling enemy

movements only made matters

worse.

So did the

cal-

culated attempt to discourage villagers from aiding the

VC

by burning their homes and evacuating them to

crude refugee camps that eventually housed more than

20 percent of South Vietnam's population.

The

results,

observed one

official pacification report,

were highly counterproductive: easy for the sentful

VC

to replace losses

and disgruntled

and property and therefore

ernment of Vietnam] and

trict

behind 365

"It

becomes

relatively

from a population

re-

at the destruction of their lives

briefing that U.S. forces

against foreign invaders.

among

ARVN,

death among the civilian population of the countryside.

from U.S. attack.

point"

onus rested on the

ot the

Vietcong while alienating the

The

200,000 North Vietnamese reached

losses

pockets

which ceded de facto control of whole provinces

brigade

ever, Westmoreland's strategy ignored the

on

namese people. Some

the notoriously unreliable

Defense Department analysis. Far more important, how-

ods.

own

than improving the living standards of the South Viet-

30 percent according to one

all inflated

—by

ques-

casualty figures.

douht that the contusions of

difficulty of distinguishing

a

with the Saigon government, whose corrupt

agents were more intent upon lining their

But an important measure of responsibility also belonged

In trying to account for this state of

There was

for this lay

hostile to the

CVN

IGov-

Informed

at a press

had moved into one

rural dis-

its

allies."

tactical air strikes,

30 B-52

sorties,

spirit

of resistance

a barrage of more than a million artillery shells,

Much

of the blame

American correspondent had

and an

a similar reaction. "It ap-

American

metal detectors to examine a South Vietnamese farmer's harvest ot dried

soldiers use

rice plants tor

any hidden weapons or

ammunition, 1966.

pears you [have] leveled virtually every village and let,

killed or driven

more than 50,000 peasants

land with your firepower.

My

question

is,

ham-

off the

how do you

won.

It

largely

was not being won because

on the enemy's

assets to the pursuit of

enemy Main-Force

intend to go about winning the hearts and minds of

mote war zones and base

these people?" "I'm afraid you'll have to take that up

was losing

with Civic Affairs, a real

sir," replied

the briefing officer, "but,

areas, the

men and machines

it's

What

the United States had achieved in Vietnam after

nearly three years of war was stalemate, but stalemate

higher level of commitment.

In the air

and on the ground American

with no commensurate

increase in security for the bulk of the South Vietnamese

Communist

supplies

and tem-

units from the area,

once the

"successful" in capturing

much

units in re-

American command

population. Although most of the giant operations were

good question."

jeeze,

at a

was being fought

it

terms. By devoting U.S. military

porarily clearing

Americans

left in

enemy

search of

new

targets the

returned. After }0,000 U.S. and forces

were

scoring ever greater victories. But the war was not being

ARVN

Communists troops spent

three weeks blasting their way through the Iron Triangle in

Operation Cedar

Falls,

1st

Division

commander Ma-

115

jor

General William nePiiy called the destruction of the

Communist stronghold this area

may never

an American

later

"a blow trom

VC

which the

recover." Yet scarcely two weeks

by hel-

officer reconnoiterinf^ the area

icopter reported that "the iron Triangle was again

with what appeared to be Viet

erally crawling

on

riding bicycles or wandering around

The Ktrder

0)ng

want

to get out," explained

want

to give up."

Lyndon Johnson might

limit,

enabled the Communists to regain the military

expand the war any

yet reluctant to

some

McNamar^'s

of

and

initia-

units lured into large frontier

once more sought

middle ground.

a

he gave Westmoreland only

men

additional

open he placed no

he began to consider ways

casualties was

he was not prepared

one Giap was more than willing to pay

as

long as sufficient replacements were available and sub-

As one out, in

it

on

his adversary.

authority on North Vietnamese strategy pointed

was not by battles won or

homebound American

lost

coffins that

but "by the

traffic

Giap measures

his

In

that regard the

North Vietnamese general was

most

astute, for by the

end of 1967 the war had produced

sharp divisions

among

the American people. Believing

that the strategy of attrition was bearing

solution in

fruit,

that the

Vietnam was "more bombs, more

more napalm

.

.

.

till

shells,

the other side cracks and gives

tt)

not ready to retreat.

Having made

his decision to stay the course,

last

month

war to the enemy

in

to

Washington

to reassure the natitm with

an

"We are not going "We are not going to

optimistic speech before Congress. to yield," declared the president.

shimmy.

We

honor which spoke.

are going to all

wind up with

peace with

a

Americans seek." Yet, even

Communist

as

he

troops in unprecedented numbers

were marshaling their forces

all

across

South Vietnam.

they were about to deliver would

American determination.

many

to take the

Laos and Cambodia. At the same

time, the growing antiwar

movement

castigated the gov-

ernment

for

manding

that the administration end the bombing of

its

Johnson

teams" around the country and recalling General West-

take the true measure of

200,000 men, and permit Westmoreland

to

of the year, dispatching government "truth

The stunning blow

as

If

go further, Johnson surely was

mcuinted a frenzied public relations campaign during the

the president to remove remaining restrictions on the as

but

levels,

of transferring greater respon-

The American commitment

up," military leaders and Congressional hawks pushed

bombing, increase American troop strength by

his options

Vietnam would continue.

moreland

success."

To keep

but

list,

200,000

the ground war to the South Vietnamese.

sibility for

The heavy

stantial losses could also be inflicted

sharing

appease the

target

on American troop

ceiling

"isolated islands in

cost in

To

a quarter of the

the general sought.

Da

the coast such as

become

Vietnam

further,

hawks he enlarged the Rolling Thunder

Vo

Lai would

same

reservations aK)ut the likelihood

Nguyen Giap, strongholds along

the open sea of the people's war."

don't

I

well have said the very

thing. Discouraged by the lack of progress in

engagements, prophesied North Vietnam's General

Nang and Chu

one housewife, "but

of military victory yet unwilling to concede defeat, he

1967 exacerbated the security

battles of

With major U.S.

lit-

foot."

problem, stretched American forces to the

tive.

in

involvement

in

Southeast Asia,

North Vietnam and cease propping up the Saigon

de-

re-

gime.

Meanwhile, opinion

polls charted a steady decline in

public support for the war and an equally steady rise in

the

number of Americans who disapproved of the way

the president was handling the situation in Vietnam.

What

the polls revealed more than anything else was a

profound confusion and uncertainty about the war.

116

"1

One of the

1,500 Murines defending

Con Thien

near the

DMZ

hraces for an incoming mortar round during a four-day battle with

North Vietnamese troops

in late

September 1967.

4^

^K»

out so

Sam Davis

Witness:

many more

The reason was

than the average

rount/.s

that the unit

was used to working together as a crew. first

replacements to join

and

it,

artillery crew.

had trained together and

I

I

was one of the

learned

how

work

to

with them.

On

November 17 we were

the night df

Mekong

Base Cudgel, right on the

at Forward

River, south of

My

Tho. Just before dark the major came to the camp

and

his helicopter

"The probability

said,

getting mortared tonight

is

anything about a ground

assault.

very good."

of you guys

He

didn't say

So we prepared

our-

of the water table you

selves as well as possible. Because

could dig down only about fourteen inches, then

From

murky paddies oi the Mekong Delta

the

skies over

to the

Hanoi, Vietnam was the scene oi countless

acts of bravery. For their intrepidity in the face of battle

and valor

in

Vietnam "above and beyond the

call of

duty," 238 Americans received their country's highest

One

award, the Medal o( Honor. L. Davis, a

of

sandbags to put around

beehive rounds

first

class in

vember 1967, when

his 9th Infantry Division base

under attack

in the

Mekong

Looking back

I

No-

came

difficult

n believe that )

I

or anyone

was cited for individual heroism. The situation that

else I

it

faced (m the night of the acticm was difficult and dan-

gerous, to be sure, but difficult

and dangerous

that address all the experiences that

As honored

as

I

am

Medal of Honor, to

honor

all

it

to

made up Vietnam.

have been chosen

to receive the

seems that there should be some way

the rest of the

men

in

my

unit

the other units that served in Vietnam. indiscriminate in

are words

its

selecti(m of

whom

and

Vietnam was it

called

when, and once called there was no refusing mands. The overwhelming majority of test

and met the challenge

—not

in all

men

and

its

de-

passed the

medals

for politics or

or any high sense of righteousness, since those things

little

At

2:00 on the button we heard the

tar slide if

down

a mortar attack lasts

at 2:30 fast

So when

this

one

And sure

enough,

and run

They were coming en masse from im-

us.

mediately across the river and from

my

NVA

majority of the

were coming from

and started firing.

I

C Battery, hard-working fact,

our

2d

When

the one firing the piece. the third round, the

NVA

unit.

call sign

was a statement

118

We

terrific,

did our jobs very, very well. In

was 'Automatic Five-Niner,

in itself

"

which

because we were able to put

direction.

the tube beehive,

nade right at our muzzle

I

pulled the lanyard on

fired a rocket-propelled gre-

blast.

It

hit the shield that 1

was hiding behind and the shield kind of exploded. got thousands of

little bitty

and was knocked unconscious,

my

foxhole.

They thought

Our guys

I

The other guys

and woke me

and half

lying half in

just gathered

make

my

it

guys

1

right

up the

and left

fell

me.

was dead.

fired

and when they

my

pieces of steel in

back to the next piece. That's why

Battalion, 4th Artillery, was a

had

and the

was the assistant gunner of our crew,

out of

all in it together.

my

We jumped up from our fi)xhi)les, dropped on the 105 MM gun for direct fire, loaded up a

guys they thought were alive and would

were

We

right.

four guns, each covering a different direction,

side

a

starting to yell

big was coming.

NVA

it's

lasted half an hcnir,

can't be felt by people covered with mud. Things hap-

we

enemy mor-

more than 6ve minutes,

we could hear the

toward

first

the tube. They were very close. Usually

pened because men made them happen,

just because

arrows ahnit

very devastating; high-

rounds, filled with chieu hoi ni)tes for the enemy.

we knew something find

with tlechettes,

white phosphorus; and propaganda

explosive rounds;

really long one.

Delta.

fill

We also stocked our artillery:

it.

an inch and a quarter long,

them was Sammy

twenty-one-year-old private

filled

in

beehive to keep the

fired the

up.

1

NVA

round some of the

had

a

off

the gun,

darts hit

tremendous buzzing

in

me my

hend, :inJ

took a

it

ing it

and what

until

my

I

had

to do.

Then

quit.

it

foxhole until

I

to

So

tired up.

My

head was

and

what, but

in

didn't have anything

I

The only I

if

alter-

could get

but

tired quite a

I

tell

few

what round was

more beehives and some

The

were

hadn 't

tired that

when

the howitzer, so

hit the recoil

jumping back and back.

but

it

went

After

I

had

It

It

would just suck

I tired it,

ended up

to load the last

of the guys I

gun

I

across the river. I

bad and couldn't get mattress and made

it

to

him by

One

and the

was shot

my

back,

I

tirst.

took the guy

me

On

was hurting

I I

took an air

the other side,

another

in the

head,

guy who had been

and the two other guys each river.

don't think they thought

who was wounded

the river so they

had more problems when

One of the

carried us through the experience

that everyone needed everyone

me

today

that time the

I

other men, and

I

the other

riverbank because of what

my

This

turn. is

We

a trait

all

— the building

and ceremonies

of events

my

kidney

We're just

Most

came out that

what

of

of the sense

if

We

the war

you helped

would both

would never have made for the efforts

it

of the

men came away

from the

did there, then

it

simply

us as well.

coming out over the

last

The few

of the Wall in Washington, the pa-

NVA

was medevacked the next

the heat,

looked out for each other.

movies, with the more

—

I

one who

made by

we brought home with

that have been

signs

in various cities, realistic

the books, the

understanding and view

are largely the product of our efforts, because

we're the ones

beehive darts had penetrated

if

I

No

task.

else,

had not been

to that riverbank if it

of the guys

had

— which

terror,

"

would help you tomorrow.

help a third the next day.

rades

some

man

you're only forty. But I'm hang-

simply by applying himself to the

guys. I spent the rest of the time

I

been pretty well whipped. I

when

Because

to dioxin.

internal organs work at the

or the tremendous physical demaiids

years

just tending to business, taking care of

day.

my

it,

don't think that a person can be honest and say, "I

went across

who had been wounded. By

exposure to

Most

delta.

today, except for

ing in there.

was

the worst across

get him up on the bank. Then

and got the other two

me

served there could escape or endure the

Our guys saw me swimming across

helped

throughout the

all

back problem, can be attributed

really confusing

when they

that's

knew

there would be anybody on their side of the river. I

Orange that was sprayed

is

was (me of

I

was exposed to dioxin from the Agent

rate of a seventy- or seventy-tive-year-old

We all kind of leaned on

NVA ran right past us;

I

just kept

other and helped each other back toward the

Some

and

in its original studies,

to take

hallway

Agent Orange

it

in a little creek

them

in the

Jersey

only took care of myself in Vietnam.

third in the foot. I threw the

leaned on each shoulder.

New

used by the

Then one

I lived.

saw one of our guys

across that way.

shot in the head over

down

and

of the things that are wrong with

my

They gave up die.

had more health problems.

men

Commission

lay

a

my body

hiuirs

of

round underwater,

myself, so

in the back,

I

us up,

blood

They would give me

probably

reached the wounded guy and found two more with

him.

He

my

where

across the river for told

They hooked

determined that

my

blood anyway, and

out in the hallway to

swam

Years later

temperature for

the moisture back out.

all

body just

vv/io/c

to the point

blood out of his arm for me.

I

tinished with the

lost a lot of

me

to buttermilk.

me and put me

the point

my

and within twenty-four

transfusion,

beside me.

thai

a 106-degree

it

off.

wounded

lying

if

broke some vertebrae in

killed me. Every time

eight feet away. I

guess

mechanism on

back. If it hadn't been for the soft mud,

would have

I

the gun went crazy.

I tired it

me and

just rolled over onto

I

side of the

gun we would have been overrun from

The grenade had

that side.

my

on the other

still

about twenty-tive to thirty meters away.

river, I

NVA

had

had

I

had almost turned

white phosphorus rounds and even some propaganda rounds.

a week.

I

the fever dehydrated

on

couldn't

four

I tired at least

iritcctioii,

more than

machine gun

I did.

I

got a kidticy

my M16 and tired

M60

the

ringing,

still

rounds. It was dark,

I

picked up

Then

what

and

kind of deteriorated.

just kept coming.

that's

together.

what was happen-

native was to get hold of the 105 and see it

it

/,'c'f

realized

1

I tired

quit.

it

and they

else to tire

mc

rime tor

lon
After maybe a tew minutes

who understand what

t.iking care of

each

of/ior.

has to be done. It's

what we do

best.

119

Focus:

back again, the guns were frequently shifted

to

prevent U.S. spotters from hxing their locations for

air

rolled

Con Thien

Although the Americans

force bombers. artillery

and

hundreds

to stop the

Con

of

toll

The

air strikes

men from

ing, the

1967 than the struKKle over

oi

DMZ

and the

battle for Hill

875

Con Thien

near the

in the central high-

lands. Both were long and hard fought, with each side

taking heavy casualties.

And

who occupied

piece of hell, just two miles from the

The cramped

outpost, barely big

was

it

An-

a little

160 meters

dirt

enough

trenches and sandbag-covered bunkers.

to hold

To

the

east

stretched the Trace, the 600-meter-wide firebreak the

Marines had cleared

for the

McNamara

Line. Equally

important, the hilltop strongpoint overlooked one of the principal

enemy

routes into South

the vast U.S. logistics complex at

away.

If

the

rines,

Vietnam

as well as

Dong Ha

ten miles

enemy ever occupied Con

Colonel Richard

Thien, observed

Smith, commander ot the 9th Ma-

B.

"he would be looking down our throats."

The men

of the

1st

Battalion, 9th Marines,

risoned the outpost, suffered from blazing heat

Con Thien and Gio

Linh, while American air

rain ot artillery

northern not

Con Thien

from

hills ot

t)nly well

at

the

who

gar-

and chok-

NVA

a .special misery

batteries tucked

was the

away

DMZ. The Communist

in

the

guns were

camouflaged but also sheltered

and other protected

120

artillery

punished the North Vietnamese with more

bush

set oft a

week

ot violent

when American

July 6,

encounters climaxing on

units hacked by tanks, naval

The

carnage,

behind

battle left

with some 800 enemy bodies and tons of

denn)lished

equipment scattered over the smoking,

blasted landscape. By the time the across the

DMZ

had been

diers

in

in

caves

positions. Rolled out to hre, then

NVA

had retreated

midmonth, nearly 1,300 enemy and

killed

Vietnamese regiment

at least

one

first-line

virtually destroyed.

on the North Vietnamese.

enemy returned

when

little

August the

In late

the attack and by early September,

tt)

the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, took over from the

ground

1/9,

sol-

North

Yet their horrendous casualties seemed to have effect

at-

a scene of indescribable

had erupted south of the

assaults

September 10 the 3/26 Marines engaged an

base.

On

NVA

entire

regiment tour miles from Ci)n Thien, which

itself

was

hit three days later.

Meanwhile, the Marines were experiencing one the heaviest shellings ot the war.

ing dust, from snipers and threats of ground attack. But

what made duty

fight-

1,000 artillery and mortar

Communist ground

revetments, and crisscrc^sed with

artillery

nearly

U.S. company. During the

a single

and helicopter gunships

an understrength battalion, was ringed by barbed wire, studded with

On July

wounded

fought off a ferocious nighttime

DMZ, Con Thien

was a barren, bulldozed plateau of red high.

it,

killed or

Thien.

gunfire, artillery, attack aircraft,

to local missionaries as the Hill ot

but to the Marines

gels,

Con

than 100 tons of napalm and high explosives. The am-

tack.

was known

noose around

exercises in

futility. It

a

at least to

both seemed,

the American troops wht) Kiught them,

and

a steady

NVA fired more than

rounds at

end

draw

North Vietnamese ambush

275

each day took

Marine battalions clashed with enemy

as other

units trying to

Nothing' better symbolized the stalemate reached by the

ot shells that

ThieiT's defenders.

heaviest fighting took place outside the wire,

however,

2 a

retaliated with

of their tiwn, they were not able

rit)d

Con Thien

Over one

ot

six-day pe-

endured twenty-four separate bombard-

ments, during which a total of more than 3,000 rounds ot artillery, rockets,

guered garrison. 1,200 rounds

and mortars crashed into the belea-

On

fell

September 25 alone, more than

within the perimeter.

thunderous cascade of

shells the

out the sounds that could life

and death

mean

— the "whump"

Marines

Under

that

tried to pick

the difference between

of mortars that

gave

a

man

ten seconds to seek cover, the whine ot artillery

five to

shells that could he heard three seconds hetore impact,

and

the terrible

whisper of enemy rockets that gave no

more than

a second's warning. But the

combined

ume

from U.S. and enemy guns

left

of

fire

even when the shelling stopped

porarily deaf, so that

men

the

make themselves

had to shout to

Adding

m^mth

early in September, tkx)ding trench

bunkers, and washing out land lines ot

lines, collapsing

communication. The

muddy quagmire

rain turned the laterite soil into a

some

that absorbed

frt)m high-explosive artillery shells, but it

heard.

was the nt)rtheast monsoon

to their misery

that arrived a

of the shrapnel

which

also

made

run for cover and eventually concealed so

difficult to

many dud rounds

Con Thien became

that

of unexploded ordnance.

At

a minefield

night, fog shrouded the

creating an even greater sense of isolation and

base,

When

magnifying every sound into an enemy attack.

was not raining

it

was

agony and

sodden that skin

feet so

sloughed off in long

They

mere touch was

a

a pale

shade of green

strips.

shared with

—

dank,

in

on resupply choppers

ammo

for

and

placement troops, carrying wounded men through of mud, and

all

men

bunkers they

filthy

eating only one or two C-rations a day

rats,

to save space

living

re-

a sea

the while listening for the constant cry

of "Incoming!" In addition to the

deadly barrages that

Duncan

|vvho took

—came

to record

what was happening

made

random pattern way

superstition a

there were also recoilless-rifle

of

of

life,

and rocket-propelled-

fire

grenade (RPG) sniping to contend with,

full-scale at-

at

Con

at

Dien Bien Phu. Westmorel.ind scoffed

fight,

he sent four Marine battalions circling the combat

ba.se to

keep enemy units

NVA

at the

have the North Vietnamese stand and

to

with "one

of

at

arm's length and

firepower in the history of the Vietnam War."

was called Operation Neutralize,

It

campaign

porting arms

—

control pilots

who

artillery

—along with forward

special long-range reconnaissance patrols that

locate additional targets.

pummeled an

The

was a growing anger and confusion among the Marines

concentrated, seven-week

They were and

bitter

frustrated with having to

and take

about being asked to die for "a

place," as one oi to

sit

measure up

them put

it,

to that of the

shit

it

l'n)le

wh(xse value did not seem

men

being wounded and crippled and

beside killed.

ards of the journey, reporters and

them who were Despite the haz-

cameramen

— uiclud-

Manhattan with

nearly 20,000 rounds from land artillery and naval gun-

and more than 40,000 tons of bombs. Together,

force, navy,

and Marine

pilots flew

5,200

sorties

air

during

the siege, including 820 B-52 Arc Light missions. Like the torrent of firepower furrowed the

a terrible plow,

earth for mile upon mile, saturating

NVA

troop

sites,

demolishing more than 200 enemy gun positions, and leaving the land a desolate moonscape of water-filled craters devoid of

The

fearful

life.

onslaught

North Vietnamese

finally

offensive.

broke the back of the

Although willing

more than 2,000 dead and many times

NVA

October 4 siege of

to accept

that

number

units were never able to concentrate

an all-out attack. Toward the end of

MACV

Con Thien

to taper off,

and on

headquarters announced that the

was over. As North Vietnamese

troops staggered back across the

about their predicament.

infil-

bomb damage and

area the size of

September enemy shelling began

Thien; nor

air

pinpointed targets for aerial strikes

trated the demilitarized zone to assess

assault

sup-

bombers, offshore

strike aircraft, strategic

naval guns, and heavy

and

a ft)rty-nine-day

invt)lving the entire spectrum of U.S.

sufficient forces for

Con

hammered

the greatest concentrations of

breaking point. Shell shock, relatively unheard of elseat

warn-

at their

Happy

along the wire that stretched a man's nerves to the

Vietnam, was not unusual

isolated base, por-

ings.

wounded,

in

of them, too,

traying a grim siege they likened to the French disaster

tacks that sent the adrenaline surging, and small probes

where

Some

Thien.

wisdom of holding the

(.|uestioned the

fire

called themselves "the walking dead," the

Con Thien

it

moisture

drizzling, the perpetual

producing skin rashes so painful that

of

vol-

many tem-

ing the great war photogr.ipher David

the pictures on the following pages]

DMZ,

the 1/9 Marines

relieved the battered 3d BattalitMi. But the ctimbat base itself

remained, a grim, depressing place of danger and

misery.

Thien

From t)r

no escape

—not

at

Con

anywhere along South Vietnam's northern

frontier in the

where

that there was

thiri.1

year of a war

whose end was no-

in sight.

121

122

.4r nii^hr inside the c:ir:K\>mh-like

iinJcr Ca)ii

(center)

hunkers

Tlucn, Ciprjin Frank Breth

briefs

platoon lieutenants from

Mike Company of the 3d Marines, wiiose

men

Battalion,

9th

were amon^; the oc-

cup.mts of the Hill of Angels during; a twonicinr/)

/on.i,'

siege in

September and Oc-

r,'bcr h>67.

123

^a^-^H :j*A^~

A

moment of

relative relaxation at the

landing zone in the rear of the Marine base.

J^

126

P/i()f(>t,'r;ip/H'r

PiiviJ

Diincnn's

caption CO this picture, his

tirst

ori^irnil

published

in

book War Without Heroes; "One man

WHS black

and stant £,'n;ii

days,

—one

enemv lite

white; the endless nights

con-

the rain-flooded trench, shelling, cigarettes,

and the

thcv shared were the sanie.

"

127

Opposite and above. M;irines dive tor cover as enemy gunners "walk" their

on the landing zone

LZ

in the rear

of the base,

tiring

artillery in

each volley progressively closer to the

until they tinally score a direct hit.

129

/ V

Sunset

.)f

(on

Thien.

131

the several months since they had been built and pro-

Focus: Hill 875

tected from air and artillery

bombardment by up

twelve feet of overhead cover.

The

underground bunkers commanded excellent

of

fields

from one bunker

to the

out exposing them to danger. Six days

fire,

enemy

while the interconnecting tunnels enabled the to shift troops rapidly

to

gun ports of the

slit

next with-

men

earlier,

of

the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, had been badly mauled

NVA

trying to take out a pair of

nearby

As

hill.

morning

early

bunkers on another

the Gls checked their weapons in the

had few

mist, they

about what

illusions

lay ahead.

At By the time of the "horder

which Con Thien was the

1967, of

battles" in late

the war had

first,

become

a

bloody contest of regular armies and conventional arms.

Nowhere was

this

more evident than

at

beginning in early November 16,000

on the

1st

of western

engagements

battlefield.

1

NVA

Regiment.

units fought

until the incessant

pound-

North Vietnamese

73d Airborne Brigade, the their

On November

Cambo-

18 a Special

ran into the heavily

The next day

to take the hill.

was one oi the most savage

bamboo

battles of the

closely spaced trees,

thickets. Hill

brigade

What

field

comBat-

followed

Vietnam War.

at the top into a

the

hill

dense brush, and

875 rose gradually from the

rounding jungle toward two ridge broad "saddle."

sur-

lines that leveled off

The enemy had turned

into a fortress, lacing the slopes with bunkers

and trenches linked by tunnels and well-constructed trails

cut into the sides of the

fications spiraling

hill.

downward from

The

elaborate forti-

the summit were cam-

ouflaged with natural vegetation that had grown up in

132

of the

lead companies advanced slowly over the tangled trees

bunker only fell

five

Suddenly, the

The

rest of

As

logs.

came forward the enemy added

and grenades

Two men

the squad dropped their

packs and spread out behind fallen icans

hill.

the

Amer-

recoilless-rifle fire

to the withering barrage, then

launched from farther up the

NVA

concealed

a

meters from the point squad.

within seconds.

When

B40 rockets

the firing eased

momentarily, the paratroopers resumed their advance, tossing grenades into the bunker as they passed. But

sooner had

it

stopped than the shooting resumed

from above and from the bunker where those the grenades had been replaced by other

no

— both

killed by

NVA

soldiers

scrambling through hidden tunnels. Artillery

and

by pounding

But the

Covered with

began cutting

The men

ridge.

mander General Leo H. Schweiter ordered the 2d 503d Infantry,

A

by the bombing until they

entrenched enemy on Hill 875, ten miles from 173d

talion,

a landing zone out of the thick jungle.

left

Communist

company

headquarters at Ben Het.

Company

hill

air

up the northern

first

dian sanctuaries. Left behind to guard their retreat was

Forces mobile reaction

the base of the

and

artillery

started

neared the crest of the

Communists withdrew southwest toward

the 174th

D

jungle wilderness

Pursued by elements of the 4th In-

and the

fantry Division

At

preparatory

and

opened up with automatic weapons from

ing of U.S. air and artillery drove the

from the

C

and splintered bamboo

Province.

Feu two weeks American and a series of costly

after

Companies

took

allied troops

NVA Division in the steep, Kontum

Dak To, where

slope.

A.M.,

9:43

strikes.

tactical air tried to take the pressure off

enemy

men on

positions above the line of advance.

the ground were being hit by machine

guns, mortars, and sniper

fire.

Then

NVA

helmets camouflaged, faces painted black, in burlap, rushed the

"Jesus, they

were

all

attackers,

rifles

Americans from every

direction.

over the place," remembered one

Gl. "The noncoms kept shouting, 'Get up the

up the goddam

hill.'

wrapped

hill,

bogged down and casualties mounting, Company

commander Captain Harold

men

to pull back.

get

But we couldn't." With the assault

J.

C

Kaufman ordered the

The headlong withdrawal was

so pre-

Kaufman had

cipitous that

to

his pistol in the air to

tire

Their panic averted, the paratroopers

K)restall a rout.

estahhshed a perimeter within a few meters of where the battle

that

had begun, then dug

came

At

in furiously

with anything

the bottom of the

A

Company

hill,

meanwhile,

just collecting

firefight

soldiers tore

squad trt)m

a

some power saws and

when North

other equipment dropped by helicopter

Vietnamese

through the clearing.

drove the squad up the

toward

hill

A

brief

Company

A's main position, the GIs dropping fragmentation gre-

nades back

enemy

down

the

trail in a futile

As they reached

assault.

attempt to slow the

the rest of the company,

mortar shells erupted around the Americans followed by

waves of screaming

NVA

infantrymen. Defense lines

disintegrated under the impact of the mass attack that

bers of the

Company

A command

within

meters of U.S.

fifty

dropped

a

One

lines.

more

ing forty-five

and pieces o{ charred

limbs, bloody bandages,

uniforms hurtling through the night. "Heaps of dead after that

didn't

You

bomb,"

know where

D,

men

know where

slept with the corpses."

With most

company commanders

of the battalion's

dead or wounded,

junit)r t)tficers

NCOs

and

the mistaken bombing, U.S. artillery rounds started to

toward Companies

C and

the carnage by firing

on the

until cries of "Friendly! Friendly!" ena-

to

The

battalion was

300 North Vietnamese

men

until a platoon sergeant crawling frantically

now

soldiers,

and B40

rockets.

One

soldier

surrounded by up

who continued

had

to

his

was dragged to a

tree for cover by a

was shot through the head. shouted warnings, a lieutenant

still

sergeant

medic who himself

Despite

the

sergeant's

tried three times to

new wound with each

sergeant finally died,

M60 machine

hand. Nearby a wounded

gun blown out of

him, suffering a

his

As

the ninety-degree daytime temperature

the troopers cursed the

attempt.

tion from

down

six ot the

choppers. Just before dusk helicopter crews dcxlging snipers in trees dropped two pallets of

ammunition

American perimeter. The beleaguered

man and

toward

left in

fifty,

rucksacks

nature by burrowing into the earth

splintered

ammo

and worse.

weapons,

Said

boxes,

one survivor,

"Every time you tried to dig you put your shovel in

somebody."

AC-47

All during the hours of darkness

over the flares.

hill,

perimeter, exist,

gunships flew

illuminating the eerie scene with brilliant

But nothing could abate the terror of that night:

The

pleading with the officer not

that brought

clothing

fell

found their task complicated by discarded

GIs hollering

soldiers

fire

warm

wounded men begging

during the afternoon, but relief helicopters were driven

the

the

sporadic mortar and recoilless-rifle

Supplies of water and ammunition dwindled steadily

heavy enemy

finally raised

direction center and adjusted the errant guns.

reach

to try to rescue him.

off by

fire

scattered across the battlefield. Soldiers seeking protec-

attack the paratroopers with mortars, automatic weapons,

took charge

group. After fifteen

other

Together, the Americans temporarily halted the main assault.

to hide.

of the situation, which ct)ntinued to deteriorate. After

five

bled the survivors to gain the perimeter.

NVA

"You

recalled a stunned defender. to go, you didn't

from one shattered radio to another

retreating

men and wound-

concussion that sent

in a gigantic

geant Jack Siggers collected what remained of the com-

whose men compounded

The

target.

on the battalion command

fell

post and aid station, killing forty-two

human

fighter-bomber,

500-pound bomb short of the

high-explosive canister

hit the

hill

Skyraid-

300 miles an hour,

at

minutes of vicious hand-to-hand combat, platoon Ser-

pany and staggered up the

A-1

F-lOOs, pn)peller-driven

and helicopter gunships bombarded enemy positions

mem-

Captain Michael Kiley and

also killed

ers,

they had rested largely with air support.

fell

screaming toward the enemy

to hand.

was

What hopes As darkness

who

Meanwhile,

in

frustration

ripping across the

water that did not

and rage

at

enemy

taunted them with threats of destruction. at the

bottom of the

checked their weapons and

ammunition

fire

for

as

filled

hill,

reinforcements

their packs with extra

they prepared to relieve their tclKnv

paratroopers.

inside

paratr(.)opers

On

the morning ot

November 20 Lieutenant Colonel

reloaded their weapons, but few believed they would

James H. Johnson's 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, moved

make

up the

it

through the night.

hill

through a

litter

of smashed vegetation, aban-

133

doned

and

gear,

battalion spent

lifeless

Climbing cautiously, the

bodies.

day negotiating the 7,000 yards to

all

many

the 2d Battalion. Along the way they passed so

dead Americans they began

was

to

As

rimeter remained precarious.

the Associated Press's

Arnett reported from the

Peter

wounded cracked under " 'It's a

in his eyes early

He had been

on the

wound. All around him see

who had

other

lay scores of

lain there the longest.

they had ceased

Blood had clotted their bandages, their eyes

hours with a

tor fifty

hill

were glazed." Enemy snipers

firing

automatic weapons from treetops continued to drive relief helicopters. Just before

managed

to land

and carry out

men, but dozens more were

As

night.

wounded

tive critically

left to suffer

through another

the clatter ot helicopter blades faded in the

early evening darkness, the 4th Battalion's Bravo

pany

ott

dark one medevac chopper

finally

reached the

men

ot the 2d,

at the sight ot their rescuers.

who

Com-

cried openly

By 10:00 the remainder

ot

Early the next morning, the

newed with

re-

died together.

A

as the

day wore on.

dog handler and

Men who

his

were joking

with you and ottering cigarettes would be writhing on

wounded and pleading

There was no water

That

a ravine

rage crashed

and started

down on

uphill

when

a

mortar bar-

the head ot the column, killing

wounding dozens of men. While medics tended the

casualties, the battalion grimly

pushed forward. Crawl-

ing up the steep slope, the soldiers found themselves

under intense

fire

Not

managed

until they

from mutually supporting bunkers. to pull themselves within a few

meters of the concealed fortifications, however, could

enemy

they locate the bunkers by the muzzle smoke of rifles.

when

NVA

Their ranks had been steadily thinned by

machine-gun

fire

and grenades during the climb. Now,

enemy entrenchments,

they finally found the

weapons proved

Part of the problem was that

been trained

their

useless.

none of the men had

to use flame throwers.

More

to the point

was the care the North Vietnamese had devoted to their fortifications. dirt

Mortar

shells failed to penetrate the thick

covering that protected the bunkers, while rockets

narrow bunker

rec]uired a direct hit into

firing holes.

the results were not always satisfactory.

to

One

do

so,

group of

troopers fired a dozen rockets directly into a bunker

Cerman shepherd

later.

through

porthole, only to be met with grenades and machine-

after foxhole took hits.

the ground

with flame throwers, shoulder-hred antitank

and 81 MM mortars, the troopers had moved out

pounding the Americans

wrote that "the foxholes got deeper

Fc«hole

Armed rockets,

mortars throughout the day. Peter Arnett

their furious attack,

82mm

North Vietnamese

4th Battalion resumed the

of artillery, the

Even when marksmen occasionally managed

the 4th Battalion had arrived at the U.S. perimeter.

last-

assault.

or

that they haven't gotten us

afternoon Tuesday Ithe twenty-first].

lying

wounded. You could

moaning,

the

ot

gasped one paratroop sergeant with tears

t)ut ot here,'

painful groin

"Some

hill,

the strain.

goddam shame

minute wall

wonder whether anyone

alive to save. In fact, the situation at the pe-

left

high explosives. At 3:00 in the afternoon, behind a

for

them

for

or

water minutes

anyone

gun

fire

from enemy soldiers who had taken refuge

commanders

tried

day, however, the paratroopers cut a hillside

sending

individuals

with

satchel

charges or napalm and grenades against the bunkers, but the intensity of

fire

Making matters

else."

in a

connecting tunnel during the barrage. Some platoon

of their

own

that

made

it

difficult to get close

worse, the

NVA

began

enough.

tiring rockets

bounced down the slope and exploded

landing zone out of the bullet-scarred trees surrounding

among

their position. Helicopters were finally able to bring in

the paratroopers.

desperately needed food and water and evacuate the 2d

infantrymen using prepared avenues of entry and with-

Battalion's for

wounded. The dead would remain on the

another day. While these tasks were going on

way up the north

ter.

For seven hours

air strikes

and

II

half-

of dirt that sheltered to falter,

enemy

drawal from the battlefield attacked the battalion's flanks

and

rear, isolating small units

and wiping them out one

they had done to the 2d Battalion two days

by one

as

Corps could mus-

earlier.

By sheer determination the Americans captured

artillery battered

the

summit with more than 15,000 pounds of napalm and

134

mounds

As the advance began

was being

slope, the top of the hill

pounded with every supporting arm

hill

the fallen logs and

a pair of trench lines within

250

feet ot the

summit, but

the gains could not be consolidated and the assault

ground U)

Attcr dark the 'battered trtxipers gath-

a halt.

ered their casualties and pulled back to the original pe-

more than

rimeter,

half their

number

November

Since the beginning ot the battle on

Major General William R.

Peers,

commander

had promised reporters

Infantry Division,

wounded.

killed or

19,

ot the 4th

head-

at his

resistance in the area disappeared as the 1st

vision withdrew into

Cambodia. The

battle

NVA

had

ct)st

North Vietnamese an estimated 325 dead and ciently

damaged the 174th

NVA

Regiment

out of action during the next phase ot the

to

Di-

the

suffi-

keep

it

Communist

winter-spring offensive. General Westmoreland lauded

enemy the

quarters that Hill 875 would soon be in U.S. hands.

the paratroopers for their part in denying the

Now,

spectacular victory he sought, and the 173d received a

to

after

two attempts

to

do so had

end North Vietnamese resistance once and

November

All day and into the night of aircraft blasted Hill

and rockets

enemy

for

all.

American

22,

Presidential Unit Citation for

on

875 with tons of bombs, napalm, up the

a thunderous effort to soften

in

vowed

failed, Peers

by the airborne troopers.

before a final assault

Simultaneously, Peers placed the fresh

Battalion,

1st

12th Infantry, in a supporting position south of the

hill.

what

it

had accomplished

Hill 875.

men

of the 2d and 4th Battalions, 503d In-

had paid

a stiff price tor their heroism; 158 dead

But the fantry,

and 402 wounded strength.

"With

correspondent

—

nearly 15 percent of the brigade's

victories like this,"

watching

the

wondered

By 11:00 A.M. on November 23, Thanksgiving Day,

from helicopters, "who needs defeats?"

everything was ready.

was being asked more and more

Led by Bravo Company, the 4th Battalion scrambled back up the

behind

hill

though they encountered some sniper bered over the horrific landscape fighting, there later,

was

little

MM

a shield of 81

resistance.

mortars. Al-

fire as

left

by

they clam-

five

days of

Twenty-two minutes

shouting "Geronimo!" and "Airborne!" the troop-

was not a question

nalists

men

and

U.S.

as

It

that question

1967 came to a close,

for soldiers to answer.

While

jour-

politicians debated the course of the war, the

of the 173d held a service for the dead, laying out

the boots of their fallen comrades in simple tribute to those

whc^i

hill in

had perished

in a terrible battle

on

a

nameless

the middle of a jungle half a world from home.

ravaged summit. But their cries echoed

ers scaled the

hollowly in the smoke that

and clung

craters

it

a

wounded disembarking

NVA

during the previous night the

bomb

swirled around the

still

to the charred tree stumps.

Sometime

had slipped away,

taking most of their dead along with their weapons. All that remained of the a

enemy presence atop

NVA's

few blackened bodies and the

To

bunkers.

from

fire

ended. Said

After

nearby ridge-top, but their

1st

Lieutenant Alfred Lindseth oi

no

left

all

was

all

the blood there vvttuld be

simply sat

remained of the

down enemy

in

the

fortifi-

Later that afternoon helicopters carried in a

Thanksgiving dinner

The

soon

happy day when we found

The weary Gls

dust and surveyed what

sauce,

a

fire

Company

the hill."

the sweat and

final battle.

cations.

were

on the summit with mor-

a

B, 4th Battalion, "It

they had

hill

cover their retreat, the Communists ha-

rassed the paratroopers arriving tar

the

trench-works and

of

hot sliced turkey,

cranberry

and potatoes. battle of Hill

875 was the climax of the Dak

To

campaign. During the remainder of November enemy

135

lr#SS^

''^. Kfr%

w^

A

paratrooper rushes past his buddies

to-

ward a more secure position farther up Hill 875. Although stripped of

its

vegetation

by napalm and bombs dropped by U.S. craft,

air-

the hill was covered with triple-can-

opy jungle at the beginning of the

making

it

difficult for

•-^

battle,

the paratroopers to

detect North Vietnamese bunkers. \,>

*ifi^* 136

''« '

'

II

jixn

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.

^Jafc''*'^^

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i

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ife^

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Sfij^^'

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"

;

Ji

li^^^^^:ijffl

g|

J

A

trooper tags one of the fatalities tor

moval from the the contest's tire

hill

first

on November

2i.

re-

In

two days, intense enemy

prevented U.S. helicopters trom land-

ing to evacuate casualties.

Fcillowing page.

Thanksi:i\ing

Day l%7.

on Hill 875.

ry9

m "X..

-J^:.

•4.

f^.

y -.•*••

ir*%

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-NTOS -T'^*-

"t.

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4r>'*'r

'.•^I

/TV,

4

THE TET OFFENSIVE

At

10:30 P.M. on January

in northwestern

someone

Quang

Khe Sanh Comhat Base

1968, the hark of a sentry dog at

2,

Tri Province alerted U.S. Marine lookouts to the presence of

just outside the defensive wire.

scopes, the Marines could see six

men,

all

Peering through their night-vision Starlight dressed in

walking along. Since no friendly patrols were reported

American uniforms, nonchalantly squad led hy Second

in the area, a

Lieutenant Nile B. Buffington was sent to investigate. As he approached the perimeter, Butfington called out to the

men

to identify themselves.

There was no

tenant repeated the challenge. At that point one of the strangers as

if

fell

reaching for a weapon or grenade.

The Marines opened

made

fire.

The

lieu-

movement,

Five of the intruders

dead, while the sixth escaped into the darkness carrying what was believed to he a

case of maps. Intelligence later identified three ot those killed as the ations officer,

When

and communications

news

officer of a

of the incident reached

moreland was not 1

reply.

a quick

surprised. In recent

Corps had increased dramatically,

outpost at

Khe Sanh. American

North Vietnamese sions

divisions

had been sighted

Convinced

that the

Vietminh had

commander, oper-

North Vietnamese regiment.

MACV

headquarters in Saigon, General West-

weeks the pace of

NVA

northern

infiltration into

Marine

particularly in the vicinity of the isolated

two

intelligence analysts believed that one, perhaps

had moved into the

area, while

full

elements of two other divi-

inside the demilitarized zone within striking distance o{ the base.

enemy intended

to "restage

Dien Bien Phu," where

decisively beaten the French fourteen years before,

ordered the Marines to reinforce Khe Sanh in mid-December.

evidence of the enemy's presence, the American

commmandcr

Ho Chi

Minh's

Westmoreland had

Now,

faced with fresh

decided to meet the

Com-

munist challenge head-on.

To

bolster allied

maneuver

A

manpower

battalions to

1

in the north,

C'orps,

Viercon^ rocket cxpLkIcs inrc Lh

Westmoreland

shifted

more than half of

beginning with the redeployment of the

N.i/it,'

Air Base

in rhc c.irlv im>rnini:

/icxyr.s

1st

ot l.ininiry

his

Cavalry

iC.

1968.

Division (Airmobile) on January

two more battalions a battalion of

MACV

time

of

He

9.

also dispatched

Marines to Khe Sanh, alon^ with

South Vietnamese Rangers. began laying plans

officials

concentrated application of tory of warfare.

mean-

In the

most

for the

aerial firepower in the his-

Called Niagara, a

name chosen

evoke the image of cascading bombs and

"to

shells," the

operation called for the use of some 3,000 strike aircraft to

pound suspected enemy

positions around the clock,

2,000 helicopters and cargo planes to keep the

as well as

Washington, President Johnson closely mon-

in

impending

the

itored

with

confrontation

growing

unease. Haunted by the specter of the massive French defeat fourteen years before,

the commander-in-chief

began making nightly

the

tion

Room, where

model

of the

request.

As

visits to

a large

Khe Sanh

White Ht^use

area had been installed at his

more

the prospect of a major attack grew

his ad-

about the wisdom of holding the base and

ulti-

when

a result,

North Vietna-

the

midnight on January

Hill 861 at half past

21, the Marines were waiting for them. After turning

NVA's

back the

initial

men

charge, the

of

Company down

3d Battalion, 26th Marines, counterattacked

and overrate the enemy

hill

No

combat.

savage hand-to-hand

in

artillery

and rocket

the main base, blasting holes in the

slammed

It

for cover,

never came. For reasons that

clear only later, the

not to exploit their advantage,

NVA

had decided

at least for the

moment.

Khe Sanh had begun.

siege of

While Westmoreland and the president focused on the showdown

attention

American

in

northern

military officials were

South Vietnam.

in

their

Corps, some

I

becoming equally con-

cerned about the pattern of Communist activity

where

into

destroying

The Marines scrambled

expecting a mass assault.

would become

fire

airstrip,

and detonating some 1,500 tons of

several helicopters,

The

K,

the

sooner had the fighting subsided than a

heavy barrage of

Situa-

photomural and sand table

imminent, the president repeatedly questioned visers

mese assaulted

stored ammunition.

base resupplied.

Back

As

the intelligence.

In Saigon,

II

Field Force

else-

com-

mander Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand was

mately took the unprecedented step of requiring a writ-

troubled by reports that several Main-Force Vietcong

ten endorsement of General Westmoreland's decision

units

from each member of the Joint Chiefs of

to the capital. Uncertain

The

Staff.

Khe

high-level debate over the investment of

Sanh was

still

going on when, on the afternoon of Jan-

uary 20, a North Vietnamese officer holding a white flag

suddenly materialized at the eastern end of the combat base.

Identifying himself as First Lieutenant Le

Tone, the

wanted

soldier

to defect.

Marine interrogators that he

told

He

Than

then proceeded to provide a wealth

had

and

ARVN

enemy

NVA

Division and the 304th

were preparing to overrun Khe Sanh, then sweep

east-

ward across Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces ward Hue. The campaign was

to-

to begin that very night

with attacks on the main base and two outlying

hills

Though Tone seemed

to

know more "than would be

officer in his position,"

Rathvon McC. Thompson decided ing to lose

144

and stood

of

it

but assum-

American

in

battalions back

meanwhile uncovered

forces

centers.

On

January

4, soldiers of the

vision captured Operation Order

on

ARVN

later.

Qui Nhon

in

of

4th Infantry Di1

calling for

On

an

January

Thuot, capital of Darlac Province.

South Vietnamese military

security agents

broke into a meeting of Vietcong cadres

and seized two prerecorded tapes declaring the

town and

tion" of the port lation to rise

series

Division discovered similar plans for

Me

an attack on Ban

A week

No.

the provincial capital of Pleiku.

23d

a

on other population

up against the

calling

on the

"libera-

local

popu-

GVN.

Aside from the redeployment recommended by Gen-

occupied by the Marines.

expected of an

make

orders calling for attacks

20, the

325C

to

closer

from border assignments to the outskirts of Saigon. U.S.

assault

Division, an elite home-guard unit from Hanoi,

what

camps and moved

Weyand convinced Westmoreland

early January to pull fifteen

firmed what the Americans already suspected. According to Tone, the

their jungle base

ing the worst,

of information about the enemy's intentions that con-

NVA

left

Marine General

that

"we had noth-

to gain a great deal," by acting

on

eral little

into

Weyand, however, heed its

to the

the

American command paid

accumulated evidence that had

hands. Believing the

ing serious attacks

on the

enemy incapable

cities,

fallen

of mount-

most U.S. intelligence

—

A

B-52 Stratofonress

the

Communist Tet

leaves

Guam

heading

for a mission in support of the beleaguered

lift

flagging

Communist

empty boasts

with a wave of simultaneous attacks on virtually every population center in South Vietnam. By taking the war

concluded that the documents represented an

ers

tempt

to divert attention

battlefield to the north.

As one high-ranking

exactly what was to take place, I

at-

and resources from the main

intelligence officer later conceded,

that

it

"Even

if

1

MACV

had known

was so preposterous

probably would have been unable to

sell

it

to

anybody."

The

plan that defied the credulity of the Americans in

Hanoi

in the spring of 1967, the product

of a major strategic reappraisal by the North Vietnamese leadership.

to the cities, the

Under

pressure from the southern

nists to accelerate the

Commu-

timetable for "liberation," yet

Communist

several purposes at once.

shatter any illusions of

At

refugees

At

who had

best, they

tied

to achieve

invulnerability as well

by hundreds of thousands of

from the war

would break the back

overthrow

hoped

leaders

the very least, they would

American

as the sense of security felt

a popular

was hatched

1968 during

in early

troop morale. Oth-

specialists dismissed the captured orders as

designed to

Marine outpost at Khe Sanh

offensive.

ot the

GVN,

in the countryside.

ot

ARVN,

instigate

and torce the Amer-

icans to accept a negotiated settlement.

Responsibility for planning the campaign was placed in the

hands of General

North Vietnamese defense

Now

Vo Nguyen

Giap.

minister, he

had orchestrated

the Vietminh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu.

unable to break the military stalemate brought on by the

Although Giap had personally opposed the

introduction of U.S. troops, the Politburo decided to

launching a general offensive, considering

inaugurate the third and final stage of the revolutionary struggle

— the

General Offensive, General Uprising

the

mature,

tt)o risky,

and potentially too

costly,

carried out the Politburo's will. During the

it

idea

ot

too pre-

he dutifully fall

of 1967,

145

an

in

etturt

Americans away from the

lure the

ti)

and screen the

Thien along the DMZ, Loc Ninh

lands, at

of major confron-

a series

South Vietnamese

tations alonfi the

Cambodian

and supplies

infiltration of fresh troops

from the North, he initiated

Dak To

at

sumed they would,

frontier

—

in the central high-

Khe Sanh.

Americans responded

as

Giap

munists a crushing blow. In the meantime the to lay the

pre-

diverting large numbers of troops to

groundwork

To undermine

activity in urban areas.

Com-

NLF

at-

for a general uprising of

the people of South Vietnam by stepping up

vincial capitals, five of six major cities, sixty-four district

towns, and

hamlets across the length and breadth

fifty

The

of South Vietnam.

be

Field Force, was the

I

on January

shortly after midnight

hit,

town of Nha Trang,

coastal

headquarters of the U.S.

on other towns within the

Corps area

II

first

its

political

the Thieu gov-

lowed

The next

in rapid succession.

to

30. Assaults

— Ban Me —

Thuot, Kontum, Hoi An, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku

the remote battle zones in the hope of dealing the

tempted

Con

at

Fishhook region along the

in the

border, and finally at

In each case the

cities

fol-

Com-

night the

munists expanded the scope of the offensive, penetrating in strength into I

Corps,

ital

Quang

Tri City,

Tam

Tuy Hoa and Phan Thiet

in

II

Hue

Ky, and

in

Corps, the Cap-

Military District of Saigon, and every provincial and

Mekong

district capital in the

Not

the

surprisingly,

Delta.

Communists

directed

their

ernment and sow discord between the Americans and

heaviest blow against Saigon and

South Vietnamese, Vietcong agents established clan-

environs, hurling thirty-five battalions into the battle

destine contacts with U.S. Embassy

mors of imminent peace ists

to

form

talks,

new "popular

a

officials,

spread ru-

and encouraged neutral-

front" in anticipation of a

In January 1968 Vietcong guerrillas began infiltrating

the cities disguised as civilians or

turning

home

also

predetermined

at

during the

last

manders learned

New

headquarters,

on January

mark the advent

and

memorably

if

the

ARVN

the

palace,

national

radio

most

and,

station

Embassy compound.

A

19-man sapper squad occupied

while a small contingent of Marine guards held the con-

29, the eve of Tet, it

came

ers relieved

them and

took

Some 4,000

to 5,000

Ho Chi

Year of the Monkey.

killed or captured the sappers.

Vietcong

local troops struck other

key targets simultaneously, including the airfield,

Tan Son Nhut

while small squads of armed political cadres city's residential districts

and ex-

outshines rise

up against "the dictatorial

the previous springs

Thieu-Ky regime." Outside the Main-Force units

victories throughout the land

come happy

on the

Joint General Staff

part of the embassy grounds for six hours that night

horted the Saigonese to

Oi

men and

Battalion spear-

not most successfully, the United States

fanned out into the far

the highly trained

C-10 Sapper

sulate building, until an assault force of U.S. paratroop-

of the

This Spring

effort,

com-

as unit

the form of a poetic exhortation written by to

in,

war

time what their missions

the order to attack. Brt)adcast by Radio Hanoi,

Minh

Year)

smuggled

of North Vietnamese General Tran

assault with a series of daring raids

presidential

Preparations inten-

week of the month

for the first

be. Finally,

sites.

headed the

densely populated

the task of paralyzing the "nerve cen-

of the Vietcong

soldiers re-

in false-bottom trucks or vegetable carts

then buried

would

upcoming Tet (Lunar

Weapons and munitions were

concealed

sified

for the

ARVN

command

ters" of the allied

women

negotiated settlement.

holiday.

under the

Van Do. Assigned

its

tried to pin

capital,

down

Khe, and

Cu

and

VC

allied reaction forces

by assaulting the U.S. military bases

tidings

NVA

at

Bien Hoa, Lai

Chi.

Forward!

much

the

Although caught by

sur-

Elsewhere the enemy's plan of attack was Total Victory will be ours.

same, and so were the

results.

During the next twenty-four hours more than 70,000 soldiers of the

People's

—backed by

cong

Army launched

146

Liberation

regular units of the

attacks

on

Army

— the

Viet-

North Vietnamese

thirty-six of fofy-four pro-

One of the

few survivors from the Communist sapper team that

penetrated the U.S. Embassy military poUce.

compound

in

Saigon

is

led

away by

is

jm-

* -.~v*

••fe

-

«^

r^^^^

South Vietnamese and American

prise,

forces reacted

using their superior mobility and firepower to

swiftly,

maximum

advantage and with devastating

Poor

effect.

timing and faulty execution also undermined the

Com-

munists' efforts, as did the unwillingness of most civilians to take up arms in support of their would-be "lib-

Only

erators."

district of

on

to hold

dozen places, such

in a

Cholon

more than

for

as the

populous

in Saigon, did the invaders a

manage

few days, and even then

only at staggeringly high cost. U.S. estimates of

Com-

munist casualties during the Tet campaign ranged high as ^0,000

as

whom came units. The NLF

killed, the vast majority of

from the ranks of Vietcong Main-Force

political infrastructure also suffered crippling losses, as

many

previously unidentified local cadres exposed them-

selves in

an attempt to foment a general uprising.

The exception

was the brutal battle of

to the pattern

Hue. After storming the

city

and

seizing the imperial

Citadel on the night of January 31, 7,500

NVA regulars

held out for more than three weeks in the face of an increasingly furious counterattack. raged, the

Communists

set

up their

While the

own

fighting

"revolutionary

government" and began rounding up alleged "collaborators,"

more than 2,000 of

whom

ecuted. By the time the ordeal

were summarily ex-

came

to an end,

much

of the once beautiful city had been reduced to ruins, streets

choked with rubble and

Years ficials

later, a

number

"its

rotting bodies."

of high-ranking

Communist

of-

candidly admitted their disappointment at the

outcome of the Tet wrote General Tran

mander

in the

offensive.

Van

South

"During Tet of 1968,"

Tra, a senior

at the time,

Communist com-

"we did not correctly

evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves

and the enemy" and

As

actual strength."

set goals "that

a result,

"we

were beyond our

suffered large losses in

materiel and men, especially at various echelons, which clearly

weakened

us."

General Tran

cinctly: "In all honesty,"

viewer in 1982, "we didn't achieve

which was

to spur uprisings

South Vietnamese

on January

soldiers drag

31, during the

Do

put

it

more

he told an American cnir

maui

suc-

inter-

iib|cctive,

throughout the Siuith."

away

a Vietcong guerrilla killed

enemy's surprise attack on government

buildings in Saition.

149

Yet

Communists

the

if

failed to

achieve their ultimate

objectives, they succeeded nonetheless in altering irrev-

ocably the course of the Vietnam War.

The unprece-

base must be held and that Westmoreland be given

whatever reinforcements he needed, Johnson told senior advisers to "review

his

options," including an ex-

all

dented magnitude and intensity of the offensive stunned

tension of enlistments, a call-up of the Reserves, a troop

the South Vietnamese and sent shock waves across the

increase in Vietnam, even a declaration of war.

United

Though

States.

initial

news reports tended

to

To

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General

new mood

exaggerate the enemy's military successes, the sense of

Earle Wheeler,

pervasive confusion that they conveyed was not

far off

offered an opportunity to resolve fundamental issues that

recent

had been deferred too long. Since 1965 Wheeler and

making "steady progress,"

the other Joint Chiefs had urged Johnson to mobilize

Having been repeatedly assured

the mark.

months

that the allies were

in

that "the light at the end of the tunnel" had at last

come of

many Americans

into view,

venerable

"What

newsman Walter Cronkite.

television

the hell

exclaimed soon

is

shared the reaction

going on

here.''"

the president's

the Reserves, not only to meet the demands of the escalating

Vietnam War

mitments. But LBJ, remembering the public outcry that

1961 Berlin

had repeatedly vetoed the

crisis,

downplay the

in the

wake of Tet,

might

at last

General Westmoreland's attempts

to

over Khe Sanh, did

to lessen the widening credibility gap

between

of-

pronouncements and popular perceptions. Dra-

ficial

matic videotape footage of the bloody fighting in Saigon

and Hue, the

stark

photograph of the South Vietnamese

police chief, General Loan, executing a Vietcong pris-

oner

at

major

pointblank range, the offhand remark of an army

at

Ben Tre

the town to save

became necessary

that "it

it"

—

all

seemed

to destroy

to confirm the

growing

conviction, as the editors of the Cleveland Press put

it,

Wheeler decided

tough. 2

At

a

White House

press conference

he described the offensive

have known

as a

some time

for

on February

"complete failure." that

this

offensive

planned by the enemy," the president declared. ability to

prepared

and met." For

all

a

he sent Westmoreland

3,

strongly suggesting that the field

request for more troops.

I

Corps and

commander

"The United

States

is

put in a

not pre-

pared to accept a defeat in South Vietnam," Wheeler

summary,

if

you need more troops, ask

a further enticement,

White House was

for

Wheeler indicated that

actively considering

an expansion

of the ground war into eastern Laos, or perhaps even into

North Vietnamese

to relieve pressure

staging areas across the

on Khe Sanh.

When

DMZ,

Westmoreland

"We

replied that another division might be needed later in

was

the year "if operations in Laos are authorized," Wheeler

"The

do what they have done has been anticipated, for,

making

into

tinuing alarm over the threat in northern

the

sponse to the mounting chorus of criticism was to hang

to

for mobilization directly,

coax Westmoreland

back-channel cables conveying Johnson's con-

them." As

re-

mobilization, provided that

Beginning on February

a series of

given so far." initial

full

troop request that would force a decision on the Reserves.

be shrugged off with the kind of flimsy explanations

Johnson's

Now,

his cards right.

Rather than press the case

asserted. "In

President

it

idea.

suddenly seemed that the president

accede to a

Wheeler played

"that something enormous has gone wrong [that] cannot

Characteristically,

other global military com-

greeted President Kennedy's Reserve call-up during the

significance of the attacks, including his claim that they

little

its

thought we

were winning the war!"

fight

meet

tion continued to

but to insure that the na-

effort

Cronkite reportedly

after the fighting erupted, "I

were "diversionary" from the

of urgency

his apparent confidence,

prompted him again, explaining that been "interpreted"

mand"

as

something

less

his

message had

than a "firm de-

tor reinforcements.

however, Johnson was deeply troubled by the unex-

This time Westmoreland took the hint. The "signals

pected turn of events. Although Westmoreland contin-

from Washington" had become so strong, the general

ued to assure him that the situation was "well in hand,"

later recalled,

the president

still

itary setback at

152

feared the possibility of a major mil-

Khe Sanh.

Insisting that the

combat

that "it

seemed

to

me

that for political

reasons or otherwise, the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anxious to send

me

reinforcements." Ac-

In a shocking episode that later appeared on

Vietcong

officer

on a Saigon

street

American

on February

television,

em February 12 Westmoreland submitted

cordingly,

South Vietnam's General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executes a suspected

1.

a

to

make

a firm decision

formal request for additional troops, couched in lan-

dered an

guage that contrasted sharply with his previous

troops to

ments of the post-Tet situation setback

is

fully possible

desperately

"I

if

1

am

in

assess-

South Vietnam. "A

not reinforced," he wrote.

need reinforcements.

Time

is

of the

was then that Wheeler,

a skilled military bureau-

crat, tried to force the president's

Westmoreland's request the

hand. In forwarding

of

mo-

refusal to settle the

Re-

bilization to further study.

Undeterred by the president's serve issue,

Wheeler

flew to Saigon

on February 23

Westmoreland

later put

it,

the chairman of the

was about to authorize

change

to

Johnson, he emphasized that

istration

the deployment of additional

Pointing out that Secretary of Defense

troops to

service.

Vietnam Reservists

As

unless

were

in the past,

more than 100,000 army and concomitantly

recalled

to

however, the president declined

to

visit, as

JCS

"conned" him into believing that the Johnson admin-

JCS could not endorse

Marine

or-

"emergency" deployment of 10,500 more

Vietnam while consigning the question

confer with Westmoreland. During his two-day

essence." It

on the matter. Instead he

a

of strategy-

McNamara was

about to be replaced by the hawkish Clark Clifford,

Wheeler intimated

that the president at last

ready to relax long-standing constraints

t)n

seemed

ground op-

153

—

"

Cambodia. The two generals then

erations in Laos and

immediately ftirthcoming, Clifford demanded that the

how

discussed the forces that would he required to carry out

JCS

such operations

troops might be used and instructed officials at the De-

serve

major troop increase were approved. In the

a

it

as well as to replenish the strategic re-

end they

settled

Deployment

approval ot

would be sent

Vietnam by May

to

aggressive ground strategy; otherwise

they would be added to the strategic reserve.

When

fense,

Wheeler returned

to

Washington

the additional

and Treasury Departments

State,

to study the

implications ot the troop request and review possible alternatives.

was to be contingent upon

ot the rest

more

a

hgure of 206,000 men, approxi-

a

whom

mately half of 1.

on

provide precise information on

Seizing the opportunity to express views that had long

been ignored or suppressed, senior

civilians at the Pen-

tagon responded with a thoroughgoing indictment oi the

to lobby tor

prevailing policy.

"Our

has not

strategy of attrition

the gigantic troop increase, however, he said nothing

worked,"

about contingencies or new

challenging the argument that a large troop increase

strategies. Instead,

he por-

commander

trayed

Westmoreland

in dire

need of immediate reinforcement. Describing the

Tet offensive

means run

as a

as "a very

its

beleaguered

near thing

.

field

.

.

that has by

course," he told Johnson that

no

"MACV

be hard pressed" to meet the continuing threat in

will

northern

"We

1

must

Corps and be

to restore security in the cities.

prepared

Wheeler concluded,

some

accept

to

reverses,"

unless the troop increase was ap-

proved. Left unspoken, but nonetheless clear, was that

any

sizable

deployment would require

a mobilization of

the Reserves.

For

Wheeler's

Johnson,

somber report

posed an agonizing dilemma. Acceptance

ot the gener-

recommendations meant putting the nation on

al's

war footing

virtual

criticism ot his

a

an election year amid growing

in

management

of the conflict. Yet to deny

al-

to reach a decision without a full-scale review

"intensive triend

working group" headed by

and newly appointed secretary

his

ot defense,

Cliftord.

"Give me the

Clifford.

"Give me your recommendations."

Although Clifford

long-time

Clark

lesser of evils," the president told

initially

would somehow break Hanoi's

nam's "ruling its

war while

new

in

to raise for years.

fundamental questions that had been

"How

long would

it

take.'

Were 100,000

plan to win the war.'"

154

When

enough.'

Other De-

the U.S. will continue to fight

engages in back-room politics and per-

would

It

also "entail sub-

including higher American casualties,

even a wage-price

freeze, thus risking

"a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions."

As an

alternative to the search-and-destroy tactics

employed

in the past, the

that U.S. forces in South a

Pentagon

Vietnam

new "population opposed the

bitterly

civilians

pull

control strategy."

idea,

proposed

back to the

cities

The

mil-

however, contending

that such a strategy would lead to increased civilian casualties

and concede the

In the end,

president

tactical initiative to the

enemy.

the report that Clifford submitted to the

on March 4 contained elements of both views

but few specific recommendations. "Big questions re-

state tor Far Eastern attairs.

.

.

.

—

all

over the

assistant secretary of

"There were stop signs draft.

Anybody could

no president would decide on the

see

basis of these

recommendations.

take to succeed

Vietnam?" Clifford asked. "How many more troops it

it

taxes, possibly

that

would

elite that

mits widespread corruption."

caution signs

him

will to fight.

mained," recalled William Bundy,

believed his charge was to

own, there was no

sion of troops would reinforce the belief of South Viet-

met, the sheer magnitude of the proposed deployment led

its

fense Department officials contended that a fresh infu-

determine how, not whether, the troop request could be

avoided

ability to

reason to believe that 206,000 more American soldiers

itary

Unable

its

calation with an escalation of

and adopt

of the options, Johnson turned the matter over to an

Enthoven,

es-

tion of the war

to risk military defeat.

Alain

match each U.S.

ready demonstrated

the troop request was to invite an indefinite continua-

and perhaps even

analyst

could shorten the war. Since North Vietnam had

stantial costs,"

President

systems

reported

What was

the

clear answers were not

Children try to extinguish the

fire

that engulfed their father's

machine shop on February 6 when U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft

bombed

tour blocks of Saigon's

Cholon

District.

r

'^--W'-^

i1 p IMM

i'

-^

1

H'l 'a

V 1

0^a^

if

1

5-' -.Tsr."

^^^i

1

c^^^. *

.X^I^C^^

Though

the findings of the Chftord task force effec-

any chance

tively killed

of a

major troop increase, news

of the proposed escalation soon filtered back to the press,

March

eventually producing a front-page story in the edition of the

New

10

York Times. "Westmoreland Requests

206,000 More Men," the three-column headline blared, "Stirring Debate in Administration." For the

at a

worse time. In recent weeks public opinion had begun

hawks and

to shift decisively against the president, as

doves alike registered their dissatisfaction with prevailing

Vietnam

in late

policy.

A

series of

opinion surveys taken

February 1968, for example, revealed that only

26 percent ot the American people approved of the president's

handling oi the war and that a near majority

involvement

considered U.S. take." Perhaps fluential

drawn Wall

more

the conflict a "mis-

in

significant,

many

of the

more

in-

members of the national news media had with-

On

their support.

Street Journal ran

February 23, the prestigious

an editorial declaring that "the

American people should be

getting ready to accept,

if

they haven't already, the prospect that the whole Viet-

nam

may be doomed." Four

effort

days

chorman Walter Cronkite rendered

later,

CBS

an-

a similarly bleak

judgment, telling an estimated audience of 9 million

Americans that "the only

rational

tary of State

way out ...

is

to

up

lived

to their pledge to defend

democracy,

and did the best they could."

The expansion

sored a resolution calling for a

on Capitol ership

where the challenge

Hill,

to Johnson's lead-

had become increasingly open and

wake of the Tet count 10 doves

offensive.

in the

"A

year ago one couldn't

Senate," observed Senator Thur-

ston Morton, a Kentucky Republican

national notoriety late 1967.

By

late

direct in the

when he

who had

gained

turned against the war in

February 1968, however, Morton

es-

The most dramatic

1 1

and 12

came on March

12,

of Minnesota

came

New

Hampshire primary

election.

An

McCarthy had been given

date,

avowed peace candi-

little

ing a serious challenge to Johnson

chance of mount-

when he announced

Democratic nomination the pre-

his candidacy for the

ceding December. But after Tet the senator's quixotic

momentum,

crusade had steadily gained

in part

due to

the efforts of several thousand student volunteers. Since the president's

name

did not appear

on the

son supporters responded by organizing

campaign, implying

in

vote for

McCarthy was

a

ballot,

nam

are

ically,

watching the

in their advertisements that a a vote for the

New

enemy. Read one

tor

McCarthy,

so deep

disenchantment with Johnson's management

Kennedy of

New

A

late

New

Sen-

a platform of

oppo-

convert to the antiwar camp,

his hat in the ring.

the adminis-

critic of

tration in the weeks after Tet but

throw

16,

York announced that he,

would run against Johnson on

Kennedy had been an outspoken

the

was their

president barely had time to absorb the shock of

sition to the war.

to

Iron-

ot the war.

McCarthy's stunning showing when, on March

too,

in Viet-

Hampshire primary."

subsequent studies found that more self-described

hawks than doves voted

The

John-

vigorous write-

Johnson campaign slogan, "The Communists

had

resisted appeals

By hesitating

until after

Hampshire primary, he opened himself up

charges of opportunism. Nevertheless,

knew, with

his

name and

scholarly maverick

on March

later

within 300 votes of defeating Johnson in the

Senate and another 16 "leaning to the doves." Reflecin Congress,

week

indication of the president's grow-

when Senator Eugene McCarthy

Kennedy made

new mood

A

review of American

full

ing political vulnerability, however,

timated there were 25 outright antiwar senators in the

tive of the

grilled Secre-

eleven hours over

policy in Southeast Asia.

ator Robert

of antiwar sentiment was also evident

Committee

for a total of

139 members of the House of Representatives cospon-

negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people

who had

Dean Rusk

the possibility of another troop increase.

Johnson

come

administration, the leak could hardly have

the Senate Foreign Relations

a tar

Instinctively,

if

as

Johnson

his powerful party

to

well

connections

more formidable opponent than the

McCarthy. imprudently, Johnson decided to fight

back by taking his case to the country and demanding "a total national effort to win the war."

The Imperial Palace

at

Hue

lies in

ruins following the

long drive by allied troops to clear North Vietnamese invaders

from the city

in

February 1968.

"We

must meet

month-

our commitments in the world and in Vietnam," he told a business group in

Chicago on March

17.

"We

shall

157

and we are going

win the war!" The next day

to

his

tone became even more strident during an address to a

convention of farmers crisis of

Pearl

in

MinneapoUs. RecaUing every

the century from the sinking of the Lusitania to

Harbor and the BcrHn blockade, the president de-

"The time has come when we ought

clared,

and be counted, when we ought

our government, our men, and our is

stopped, wherever

When

it

to stand

up

to support our leaders,

aggression

allies until

to Johnson's

speeches

proved overwhelmingly negative, the president's advis-

became deeply worried. Pointing out

ers

and Kennedy are the candidates ident L.

is

of

that

Jr.,

peace and the pres-

strongly urged Johnson to "do something

exciting and dramatic to recapture the peace issue" be-

Wisconsin primary. "Hardly anyone

fore the April 2

today

is

interested in winning the war,"

in a blunt

Rowe

memorandum. "Everyone wants

and the only question

is

asserted

to get out,

how." The message sank

The next morning Johnson telephoned Defense tary Clifford: "I've got to get

On March

me

a

in.

Secre-

20 and again on March 22, Johnson con-

While most agreed

new peace

that the president should

propose to limit in some way the bombing of North

Vietnam, fundamental differences of opinion over the purpose of such a gesture undermined any firm consensus.

Convinced

that the

North Vietnamese would

reject

the offer, Secretary of State Rusk and national security adviser

Walt Rostow hoped

to placate public

opinion

long enough to allow for U.S. participation in the war to continue. In

Clark Clifford's view, however, the task

was not simply to

stabilize the

home

way out o( the "hopeless bog" States had partial

become mired. He

bombing

in a series of

halt should be

in

front but to find a

which the United

for the

tions persuaded

U.S. war

effort

moment

bombing

him

chief of

planned long

staff.

assume the position

to

Whether

move had been

the

advance, as the general himself

in

the president

made no

de-

halt proposal, the delibera-

that any further expansion of the

was no longer an option. At the March

later

claimed, or rather resulted from Westmoreland's failure

Tet offensive,

not clear.

is

seemed

It

nevertheless to signify that the Johnson administration

had decided upon

change of course.

a

Clifford, however,

son

was

still

not convinced that John-

appreciated the need to take bold and decisive

fully

action toward an acceptable peace. Concluding that the president required "some

home

medicine to bring

stiff

what was happening

to [him]

he pro-

in the country,"

posed that the president reconvene a group of elder statesmen

—the

Vietnam

his

ber

1967.

many

men

so-called wise

policy in April 1965

The

of the

group,

—who had endorsed

and again

Novem-

more prominent members of the post-

II

American

foreign policy establishment,

Dean Acheson,

including former Secretary of State

George

in

numbering fourteen, included

Ball,

McGeorge

Arthur

Bundy,

Goldberg,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and Generals Omar

Matthew Ridgway, and Maxwell

Bradley,

Taylor.

Before meeting with the president, the wise

sembled on the evening of March 25

men

ings from officials of the State Department, the

and the JCS. Many

what they

learned.

of those present

Asked how long

as-

for a series of brief-

it

CIA,

were shaken by

would take

to

win

the war at the current level of commitment. Deputy Assistant

"Maybe

Secretary

five years,

of

State

maybe

Philip

ten."

A

Habib

replied:

dramatic exchange

between United Nations ambassador Arthur Goldberg

After

a

also

West-

recall

and General William DePuy proved equally

as the first

22 meeting he formally rejected the Wheeler- West-

158

army

of

He

March.

in

therefore argued that a

negotiated settlement and total American withdrawal.

Though

moreland from South Vietnam

modest

a

augment the

implemented

concrete "de-escalatory steps" leading to

cision about the

to

informed his advisers that he had decided to

World War

peace proposal."

ferred with his senior advisers about a possible initiative.

emergency reinforcements dispatched

"McCarthy

the war candidate," campaign strategist James

Rowe,

deployment of 13,500 support troops

to anticipate the

has occurred."

the public response

moreland troop request, instead approving tmly

DePuy

asserted that the

enemy had

80,000 troops since the beginning inquired about

the

unsettling.

lost

of the year,

more than Goldberg

number of wounded. DePuy

re-

sponded that standard military estimates were based on a ratio of three to one.

many

effectives

field?"

DePuy

Then Goldberg

asked,

do you think they have operating cited

the

official

MACV

230,000. "Well, General," Goldberg

"How in the

estimate of

said, "I

am

not

a

who

man

great mathematician, but with 80,000 killed and with a

Johnson,

wounded

pressed his views, later complained bitterly about the

ratio of three to one, or 240,000, for a total

of 320,000,

The

who

McGeorge Bundy, set

outcome

fighting?"

out to do

begin to

move

"The majority

"is that

we can no we have

in the time

to disengage."

feeling,"

and others

a shift in

Five days

Although they disagreed

ground

strategy, all

curred with Cyrus Vance's view that "unless

thing quick, the country

A

may

bastards

his aides. In the end,

later,

on the evening of March

3

1

Lyndon

,

Johnson addressed the nation. Accepting Rusk's proposal,

he annt)unccd

in the televised

speech that the

bombing of North Vietnam would henceforth be

con-

we do some-

to the area just north of the demilitarized zone

limited

and held

out the possibility of a "complete bombing halt"

lead us to withdrawal."

weary President Johnson reworks the text of his March 31 speech

"The establishment

their collective judgment.

and we must

over the next step to take, with some favoring a bombing halt

of the meeting.

ex-

however, he knew that he had no choice but to accept

said

longer do the job left

impassively as each

have bailed out," he told one of

following day the group met with Johnson and

rendered their verdict.

we

we

the hell are

listened

in

it

the

which he stunned a nanonu/cie television audience hy announcing

that he would not seek re-election.

159

160

North Vietnamese responded favorably. Emphasizing^ CMfford's concerns, he characterized the unilateral

"the

as

what

first in

peace" and made

hope

I

clear that the

it

move

he a series of steps toward

will

United States was

prepared to hefjin talks at any rime and any place.

When

he reached the end

briefly

of his speech,

Johnson paused

before reading words that he had appended at the

moment.

have concluded that

"I

the presidency to

last

1

should not permit

become involved

in the partisan di-

visions that are developing,' this political year," he said.

"Accordingly,

I

not seek, and

shall

the nomination of

my

1

will

not accept,

party for another term as ye)ur

president."

Johnson's concluding statement electrified the nation

and the world. But perhaps end

The war

in

should not have. By the

Vietnam had taken

had cost him litical

it

March 1968, Lyndon Johnson was

of

his credibility,

a

and

heavy it

a

toll

weary man.

on him.

had eroded

authority to the point where he could no longer

govern

effectively. All that

what mattered most

to

remained to be salvaged was

him

— the

respect of his "fellow

Americans." By withdrawing from the presidential

Johnson hoped

that,

a nation divided by a

On

April

to

the

1

,

he sought to restore unity to

war he had chosen to hght.

1968, the day after President Johnson spoke

nation,

totaling

race,

to underscore the sincerity of his desire

More than

for peace.

Quang

It

his po-

a

combined U.S.-ARVN

some 30,000 troops

set

task

force

out along Route 9 in

Tri Province to relieve the Marine garrison at

Khe Sanh.

In a spectacular display of airmobility, sol-

diers of the

U.S.

1st

Air Cavalry Divisit)n spearheaded

the drive, leapfrogging ahead of a seemingly endless col-

umn

of tanks, trucks, and troops on foot. Meeting with

only token resistance along the way, the

cavalrymen

finally linked

the base on the morning of April after

A

it

first

ot

8.

Seventy-seven days

began, the siege of Khe Sanh was over.

SiHirb Vietn
civilinn Jiinni: ' e:irly

wave

up with the Marines outside

second u.irc

c/

Chmiminisr attacks

in

wounded Sanson in

Mny.

161

Witness:

on that

Ron Harper

I

night, Sergeant

went next door

Rudy

At about 2:30

Soto.

to the consulate

A.M.

compound, on the

other side of an eight-foot wall from the embassy.

I

talking to the two guards over there at about 2:45,

when

1

was

heard a big explosion. Sappers had blown out part of

the front wall of the embassy complex.

My first

thought was that

embassy, that Zach was

key to use

had the master key

I

to the

new and might not know which

to lock the door.

So

I left

the consulate, went

through the gate, and scooted to the back door of the

embassy lobby.

On

way I ran

the

right past a Vietnamese

guy just wandering around by the consulate

He

working there that night.

he was actually one morning hours of January

In the early

Vietcong attacked the U.S. Embassy

31, in

As

1968, the

As

Saigon.

I

chine-gun

waited in uncertainty, nineteen enemy sappers roamed

down

the courtyard of the embassy complex and tried, unsuc-

dirt,

embassy building. More than

any other incident of the Tet offensive, the attack sug-

American people, who awoke

gested to the ing

that

morn-

U.S. was

raid, that the

tar

from victory. The sole Amer-

ican defending the front lobby was twenty-year-old Ser-

W.

geant Ronald

Harper

ot the

Marine Security Guards.

war was sort ot

As

mand

said

too—

and no people.

and

it

—

in

—myself and Corporal

in addition to the

was going to

two army

start putting extra

seriously because we'd

oft.

And

MPs

162

so

went

and

pulled the big teak doors shut.

pushed the old man into an

I

the rear doors, too. on. All

I still

knew was

I

crap was flying

Zach

As

had

in the

these alerts before,

upstairs

lobby and

and talked

I

's

I

all

office

and ran

to lock

know what was going

didn't

that there was machine-gun

fire,

over the place, and there were flashes

was running to the armory, right near the

me on my

rear

end and blowing

eardrums out and hitting him with shrapnel.

exploded

in the wall right

over

my

It

head, ripping apart

the seal of the United States.

When

on

I

head

his

I

got up, there were dust and smoke

was the "roving

to the third

man

I

all

over

dragged him into the armory and bandaged

to stop the bleeding, but

kept making

noise. I said,

knew someone was

outside.

he was

in

shock and

"Zach, be quiet!" because

But

I

didn

't

know

if we

I

were

being attacked by one person or ten people. I

I

ran out

the place. Zach was moaning and groaning and couldn't

happen.

"

I

hear me.

one

don 't think anyone thought that anything big was going

guard,

So

No

they couldn't have been too serious be-

Zach was posted

and Zach was

calling for help.

men on

cause they put only one more person at the embassy.

to

ran into the lobby

I

wall near us, knocking

until Tet.

posts because something might he going on.

took

and they were apparently

could see was a cloud of dust, flying

to the front door, got the old Vietnamese guard,

always at the gate. But that night the comit

I

through the side windows at the front door and hit the

a very peaceful town.

the embassy building that night

who were

at those guys

desk where Zach was standing, an antitank rocket came

was

were two guards scheduled to work

George Zachuranic

looked over at the side

There

quiet,

usual, there

fire

I

on, considering the time. But the

It

much going

wasn't

didn't realize until later that

The Vietcong had shot heavy ma-

already. All

outside.

Saigon was quiet.

I

on the phone, apparently

screaming headlines announcing the embassy

tt)

shock.

of the Vietcong.

got to the back door

gate for the MPs.

American mihtary commanders and the news media

cessfully, to penetrate the

in

wasn't one of the local guards, because they weren't

grabbed a Beretta machine gun along with

pistol

and went back

to the

desk was right in the line of

armory fire.

I

my

.38

area,

because the

didn't

know where

MPs

the

were.

1

JiJn

thought

for help. I guess I

The phone Wendt, out

if

was going to

I

on duty

a civilian

him

told

in the elevator

on

The phone kept

crawl out to the desk and answer thing ringing because

me

believe

Of

the people

that the Vietcong weren

"My God,

Make

sure there's

down and check

When Vd

are you sure the

positive^

no one

I

a

him

There was enemy

The

He

fire

him back

left to

shoot

At

—

first

cameras on me, but they

moreland when he

all

of the enemy had been

there were a few television

General West-

all shifted to

it

was

get to bed tor another forty-eight hours.

No

arrived. After

about

six hours,

I didn't

one got city,

We

a lot of sleep.

There was

and we were under

still

fighting in the

martial law for several weeks.

were looking for another attack the following night,

We

called

getting rocket attacks into the city every morning, big

in the

six-

to run

't

to the ar-

a gun, be-

speak English,

the Vietcong

it it

waited with

inside

it

me

lived

on our

toes tor quite a while.

were

or eight-foot- long rockets a foot around. All of a

sudden we were before.

1

in a war,

and we hadn 't been

think the whole country

felt

in a

war

the same way.

couldn't see them.

But

still

little

I

I

moved

Harper was

later

awarded the Bronze

Star.

He

was hon-

orably discharged from the Marines in 1969.)

came

and outside the lobby

me when

(For his actions during the attack on the embassy, Sgt.

all night.

got heavy. The lobby was always

anyone outside could see

all

and

lit

so

around, but

could even hear them chattering

no one came

in.

things that night, stupid

little

happened that probably saved everyone. later that

't

bullets ricocheted off the granite walls

occasionally

was

was no one

killed by this time.

in the

't

had

I

others broke through the front gate in a jeep. But there

There was no one who wasn't vulnerable anymore.

He didn

throw

to

through the tront doors.

It

So

platoon from the 101st Air-

and we

that bottom floor.

smoke grenade—not

didn 't exactly trust him.

outside.

no

to,

staft

VC aren

else in there. "

a

ran back I found the old Vietnamese guard.

I

so I motioned to

night.

to

the rear doors.

mory and gave him

I

Check

forgotten all about him. I took

cause

had

I

talked

I

about 8:00

all over.

so I hated that

it,

Some major on Westmoreland's Are you

anyone

it

was tipping off someone

it

embassy.

building:'

he

upstairs. I

rang

it

and

said,

to find

hurt,

upstairs.

ringing. Every time

outside that I was there.

down

his floor so

ing. Finally at

borne came down into the lobby from the roof and some

him Zach was

and hrought him

to lock the elevator

one would

wniteJ

I

die.

upstairs, called I

broke into the lobby they couldn't get

damn

was.

started ringing almost immediately. Allan

we were OK. When

came down told

know where Rudy

't

Rudy was on

the root.

He

things that

I

tound out

fired

down and

probably killed one ot them and slowed them down. The

embassy was supposed

to be completely dark, but there

were a few lights

on

left

upstairs.

So

after

the Vietcong started shooting into those

Rudy

offices,

fired,

think-

ing more people were up there guarding the place than there actually were.

taken

us,

They could have walked

in

and

but they thought we were a lot more heavily

manned and armed. These

things slowed

them down

long enough for us to get help. I felt

I

better

when

it

got light at about 5:30 or 6:00.

could see outside, but there wasn't anything happen-

163

Focus: The Battle for

The 802d

residential sections of the Citadel.

Hue

ARVN

penetrated the

compound

initially

but was also driven

back by the Black Panthers. Elsewhere

though, defense was scattered,

in the city,

and waves of enemy troops continued

As

the streets.

daylight broke and the chilly fog lifted,

the gold-starred, red-and-blue

NLF

of the

flag

Hue was

the old emperor's palace.

The

to fan out into

in

flew over

Communist hands.

only significant pockets of resistance were

ARVN

and

MACV compounds,

cupants could only wait

NVA

watched the

and

where the besieged oc-

reinforcements as they

for

VC

the

dig in.

For General Westmoreland and the American and

South Vietnamese command, the Like most of the larger

cities of

South Vietnam, Hue

had been spared from extensive damage

in the

few

first

years of the war. Refugees fled there from the surround-

ing countryside of

Thua Thien

Province, and South

Vietnamese and American military authorities had

es-

tablished headquarters there, but there was relative calm

Although Hue

in the city.

in recent years

had been the

scene of protest by both Buddhists and students against

Nguyen

the Saigon government, the former seat of the

emperors was the South Vietnamese

social

and

Some

center and a virtual oasis from war.

religious

called the

shattered in the early morning

hours of January 31, 1968, the second day of Tet,

Communist 122MM fog

and exploded

a fortress

when

rockets screamed through the low

in the center of the ancient Citadel,

on the north hank of the Perfume River

rounded by

moat and

a

zigzag stone walls.

sur-

Almost

si-

multaneously soldiers of the 800th and 802d Battalions

NVA

Regiment stormed through the

lightly

defended western gates of the Citadel and made

for the

of the 6th

headquarters of the

corner of the II

ARVN

fortress.

1st

Division in the northeast

Attacks on Da

Nang and

cities in

Corps the night before had put some of them on

guard, and Brigadier General

ARVN

mander

of the

men on

alert that night.

ion arrived at the Citadel,

Panther

164

1st

Ngo Quang Truong, com-

Division in Hue, had placed

Thus, when the 800th Battal-

Tay Loc

airfield in

they were met by the

Company and

the middle of the

elite

disaster.

wrote

"would have

later,

"Taking

pact

on the Vietnamese

and

in the process the

the

it,"

Hue would

American general

a

profound psychological im-

in

both the North and South,

North Vietnamese might

seize

the two north provinces as bargaining points in any negotiations." For

all

its

strategic significance,

the initial efforts to retake

Marine command

at

Phu

Hue were

however,

unsuccessful.

ARVN

Black

forced to turn south into the

The

Bai, eight miles to the south,

believed that the attacking force was small and dis-

patched

a single

company

Company A,

unit,

1st

Hue. Along the way the

to

Battalion, 1st Marines,

met up

A NVA

with four American tanks and headed up Highway

beautiful city "a lotus in a sea of fire."

The calm had been

have meant

of

loss

sudden barrage of intense

fire

from one of the two

1.

battalions blocking the approaches to the city pinned

down

the Marines, and the call went out for reinforce-

A

ments.

American

second company arrived and the combined

MACV

force broke through to

headquarters,

but only after taking forty casualties, including ten dead.

The

fight for

Hue would demand more manpower: over

the next three days three more companies, three com-

mand in all

groups, and a tank platoon

—

—about 1,000 Marines

arrived to join in the fight. After a tailed

ican attempt to cross the river,

it

was decided that the

Marines would concentrate on the south river,

and

while

VC

ARVN

forces

worked

side of the

to dislodge the

NVA

from the Citadel.

The South Vietnamese had

a

General Truong had been able to to consolidate defense of the

enemy

Amer-

more pull

ARVN

difficult

back

task.

his troops

compound, but

control over the two square miles inside the Cit-

NVA

adel was strong.

troops and supplies continued to

rtow into the old fortress through the well'defended west gates; over the next

week ten

The

Hue.

now

twenty-foot-thick,

thirty-foot-high

walls,

defend the old emperors from ancient enemies,

provided the modern-day attackers a virtually im-

pregnable In the

On

week

American and South

of February,

Vietnamese troops locked themselves

cess of

rines attacked house by house,

in violent

street

gloomy and almost constant cold

in

at

many

seesaw

The

turns.

by

drizzle,

street,

in a

taking sniper

younger troops had fought only

the countryside and were unaccustomed to street

To some

fighting.

older Marines, the scene harked back

to a city battle in the previous war; "Seoul said

the

NVA

still

one commander, "but

this

—

well,

was tough,"

something

it's

buildings, supported by

fire

from tanks,

and machine guns. Howitzers

tired

huge

recoilless rifles,

shells at

pound bombs and navy

ships oft the coast hurled shells

several miles from five-, six-,

villas all

Americans,

and sprawling

crumbled under the rain of firepower

enemy

became

safety or

and eight-inch guns. Beau-

modest stucco houses,

pagodas,

French

enemy

and 750-

positions, while fighter-bombers dropped 500-

troops,

and

civilians

scurried

on.

it

The

NVA contested

grip-.

NLF

cadres quickly established a revolution-

ary government,

headed by

and the principal of

a local

each

of the

Perfume

damp weather

the

stench from the dead soldiers and civilians became un-

and the almost constant cloudiness

lent a fu-

By February 10 the area on the south bank of the declared secure, and most of

the fighting there abated, though there were sional mortar explosions patrols.

Hue

girls'

University professor

high school.

became the new mayor.

police chief

A

former

In the streets, sol-

and sympathizers hoisted banners denouncing the

diers

South Vietnamese and Americans and exhorting the people to join them.

methods

employed more heavy-handed

also

Using

to try to control the population.

ct)mpiled by local agents, small bands

who had been deemed

of those

actionary elements"

moved

ofticials,

marched, hands

lists

in .search

"cruel tyrants

—government

and anyone who was considered sympathetic gon government.

was

It

ple

and

re-

foreigners, to the Sai-

Hundreds of these detainees were

tied

behind their backs, to what their

shot on the spot

when

they resisted. Most

still

occa-

and sniper attacks on Marine

Exhausted and chilled, the Americans looked

later

estimated that approximately 3,000 peo-

were systematically executed by the Communists

during their occupation of Hue.

months

after the battle for

Hue

Many were found

in shallow,

mass graves;

others were never recovered and were presumed dead.

Later

American

would point

and

South

Vietnamese

authorities

to the massacre ot these civilians as evi-

dence of the ruthlessness of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and a ghastly hint ensue

nereal dankness to the city.

finally

a

Some were

was estimated that the Americans

while incurring 250 casualties. In the

Perfume River was

Communists tightened

In the heart ot the city, the their

were taken away and never heard from again.

had not yet taken half of the south bank

bearable,

The North Vietna-

post in the middle of

to

step the Marines took and often carried the day. By the

week

command

captors claimed were political reorientation sessions.

casualties.

enemy held

first

around their base, but

as

south bank of the Perfume, the well-entrenched and

end oi the

territory

this territory, in the Imperial Palace.

Despite the best efforts of the Americans to clear the

well-supplied

ARVN

The South Vietnamese had

allies.

their

The Communists

For several days Marines surrounded and stormed

1st

held 60 percent of the Citadel, including

mese established

else."

tiful

American

its

been able to regain .some

combat with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Ma-

fire

the north side of the Perfume, the

Division had not been able to match the apparent suc-

the southern sector of the fortress.

fortress. first

next objective: the

at their

Citadel.

more

battalions totaling

than a division would he committed to the battle for

built to

through the tog and smoke

it

they

won

ot the

massacre that would

the war.

While the Communists rounded up

their enemies,

the Americans on the .south bank ot the Perfume pre-

pared to

cro.ss

the river to the walls ot the Citadel.

the evening of February

1

armored vehicles of the

1,

the men, tanks, and

1st

Battalion,

On

Ontos

5th Marines,

165

crossed the Perfume. In their

first

and

forty

wounded; the

men

killed

fighting at the ramparts promised

even bloodier than the clashes on the south hank

to he

oi the Perfume.

The Saigon government

Americans that they

told the

Only the sacred Imperial Palace was

be spared. less

Once

again the barrage

the Americans

homes, only of a

firefight.

the

Confused

back

to their

Hundreds of homes were destroyed around

them, but the Communist soldiers continued to

fire

from

"A woman

littered the streets.

roof.

Many

child lay

knelt in death

Many

on

stairs

crushed by a fallen

of the bodies had turned black and begun

decompose, and

to

it

"A

rats

gnawed

at the

first

week

was estimated that the Marines took one casualty

The

every meter of ground gained.

for

wounded

scores of

were carried out on top of tanks or on the backs of fellow

who had been

began to show the

spared physical injury

strain, bursting into tears or

simply

staring blankly into the distance, victims of a form of

NVA

February 16, an

enemy commander had been had asked permission

denied by

NVA

enemy morale was

radio transmission from

killed

and that

to withdraw.

but

superiors,

dissipating.

it

The

his succes-

request was

was evidence that

The end was near

for the

Heartened by the new intelligence, the Americans

and South Vietnamese

soldiers fi)ught their

the 101st Airborne

namese supply

way

to

moved

its

units

in to close the

had

1st

the

Air Cav

northwest corner, and

lines in the west wall.

The two army

As

intensified their efforts.

Marines continued to work the Citadel, the

The

lost as

North Viet-

price

with the South

Rangers stormed

empty.

it

The enemy

battle for

Hue was

had emerged the

over, but

it

was unclear who

For their part, the Amer-

real victor.

commands pointed

ican and South Vietnamese

to the

Enemy

losses

were estimated

and 89 captured. American

at

ARVN

1,364 seriously wounded, and

KIA and

more than 5,000

losses totaled

216

figures

killed

killed

1,830 wounded.

But while the Americans and South Vietnamese gained the

city,

the jarring fact was that the

had been able

nists

in fact,

to seize

and hold

its

it

it

re-

Commu-

for three weeks;

North Vietnamese commanders claimed

the original plan had been to hold In

and

were 384

for just

later,

seven days.

length and severity the occupation contributed to

the devastating psychological impact of Tet upon the

Americans and South Vietnamese,

setting in

motion

Communists than

a military victory.

Whatever standards of

victory were applied, the cer-

The war

tain losers were the people of Hue. far

away had erupted

homes

in their

that

seemed

midst and destroyed half

in the city, leaving

116,000 homeless from

a total population of 140,000.

Another 5,800 people

the

killed in the crossfire or

munists. The war had

South Vietnam. But as the nation's ful,

fire"

in

Hue

city

seemed

What had been

had been engulfed

in a

Com-

to the cities all

over

there was a unique agony,

most beautiful

lingering death.

executed by the

come

finally

to die a pain-

"a lotus in a sea of

storm of death.

had been

many men

days as the Marines had in the past three weeks.

166

where they tore

fled in the night.

The

had been

occupiers.

high:

had

it

ARVN

The next day

flag.

the Imperial Palace, only to find

was intercepted, disclosing that the

inside the Citadel

sor

banner and replaced

events that ultimately proved more advantageous to the

shell shock.

On

Vietnamese

exposed flesh."

of the dead were Americans: In the

Marines. Those

NLF

favorable casualty figures as an indicator of their success.

by a wall in the corner of her garden," wrote one correspondent.

Division arrived at the

1st

flagpole at the Imperial Palace,

their entrenched positions.

Corpses

ARVN

Regiment, of the

main

to house.

for-

where they were scattered or destroyed. In the

down

streets, trying to get

Division

1st

morning hours of February 24 the 2d Battalion, 3d

early

shooed away by Marines in the thick

to be

ARVN

pushed the remaining enemy up against the south

to

moved from house

wandered the

resistance inside the Citadel crumbled,

and Vietnamese marines and the

commenced. Count-

buildings were pockmarked or reduced to rubble as

civilians

of the three-week battle proved to be anti-

NVA

climactic.

tress wall

could use whatever weapons were necessary to dislodge the occupiers.

The end

on the smith

assault

wall the next day, the battalion lost fifteen

in five

During the battle shelter against

for

Hue

incoming

in

February 1968, two Marines take

shells.

—

*«.. ^i*'-

:^*^^---—

.

v^i395f

,^^iii??:

•^in^-

-^.

L

3^

I-.'

»

Z

..:

..AiU.4l«

,-'^

•f"'"'5^1,-

r* 'f

1

1^

•

:

,

r

>

'I,''ll_ '^^r^-

."^ lyi^^^

1L

-

iSS ^>l^^ ""^^ 3^E

L-J^

.1

•J-'

-»

1

L ^^

^-

.^J

^

•'

^1

'^"^

3S

^: M^ ^S^^-l

Behind

168

^j

homhed-mit schoolhiHisc, Murines take

;i

moincnr out tnnn the

hiihtinii in

Hiu

Moments

after

throwing a grenade,

this

Marine was

killed

when another grenade exploded

in his

hand.

169

/\

170

\/;efC()n^'

suspect cowers before bis Ameriain capfors ;n

r/)t'

embnttled

city.

:jun /^

Wounded Marines

are rushed Co a held hospital.

171

s

'^

..^

H

c.

»sr**'

^#*^?5»i

^F':

> si^<-'*-f-

V

A

incJic c.irncs fo sutcrv

;i

Wrn.i/iR'.sv

chilj \\\HinJcJ in crosshrc.

173

^^^

.<

—^

i

I

-^f

^

^

*CS,

Above. Shell-shocked Marine, Hue, Fehnniry 1968.

Left.

Marines pull one ot Hue's CAHumunist defenders from

American

a tosliole.

\\(.niiu!ed

hv

tire.

175

So vulnerable was Khe Sanh,

Focus: The Siege of Khe Sanh

in fact, that the

Ma-

rines initially balked at the idea of defending the site.

Former JCS chairman General Maxwell Taylor,

Presi-

dent Jt)hnson's chief military adviser, believed that the base was simply too isolated to be adequately defended.

Noting the

parallels

between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien

Phu, pointing out further the problems of resupplying the base, and emphasizing that any defensive position

can be taken

if

the

enemy

is

willing to pay the price,

Taylor urged the president to consider ordering a withdrawal.

Such concerns, however,

did not deter General Wil-

liam Westmoreland from pressing ahead with plans to

defend Khe Sanh "at

enemy intended It

remains one of the most memorable engagements of

the Vietnam War, a contest of nerves as well as arms

Marines against an estimated

that pitted 6,000 U.S.

NVA

20,000-40,000

no one outside ers

is

certain

siege of

Giap at

a small circle of

what

Khe Sanh

it

meant.

a failed

Yet twenty years

later,

North Vietnamese

lead-

Was

the seventy-seven-day

attempt on the part of General

to re-enact his dramatic victory over the

Dien Bien Phu,

at the time?

rians

regulars.

as

Or was

many American it

officials

many

instead, as

have since concluded, part of

French

believed

military histo-

a clever "feint" that

succeeded in luring American forces away from the

on the eve of the cataclysmic 1968 Tet

northern

American

I

military officials

Corps

in

knew

that the

troops began

regiment strength,

Communists

were preparing to launch a major new offensive campaign.

They were

rine outpost at target. Situated

on

ulated northwest

combat base

also well

Khe Sanh

lay

aware that the remote Ma-

offered an especially inviting

pop-

a small plateau in the sparsely

comer of Quang

Tri Province,

within easy striking distance of

the

NVA

base areas across the Laotian border and inside the

DMZ.

Moreover,

it

was surrounded by dense

fog-shrouded valleys that made

it

difficult to

presence of even large numbers of troops.

be reinforced and resupplied only by cipal overland road into the base.

air,

forests

And

it

could

since the prin-

Route

9,

had been

cut off by the North Vietnamese in August 1967.

176

and

detect the

Quang

all-out drive to seize

Tri and

step in

first

Thua Thien

Provinces, he reinforced the outpost with three additional battalions of Marines

of

and deployed more than half

U.S. maneuver battalions to northern

all

To

I

Corps.

ease the fears of his jittery commander-in-chief,

Westmoreland dismissed

as groundless

any comparison

between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu. Though both outposts were isolated, he pointed out, Dien Bien

had been located a plateau.

in a valley

The French had

the U.S. Marines hills

while

Khe Sanh

support, while

commanded most

rested

Nor were

at

on

of the important

and only moderate

aircraft

American firepower

magnitude over that

Phu

held no high ground, while

surrounding their base. Most important of

French had had few

offensive?

when North Vietnamese

In late 1967, infiltrating into

cities

an

Convinced that the

costs."

all

to overrun the base as the

all,

the

artillery

"differed by orders of

Dien Bien Phu."

these the only considerations behind West-

moreland's resolve to hold the line at Khe Sanh. After years of chasing an elusive

mountains, and

enemy through

rice fields of

to fight a set-piece battle

the jungles,

South Vietnam, he longed

where the

full

weight of the

Americans' vastly superior firepower could be brought to bear. In a

war of attrition

in

which enemy "body counts"

represented the chief yardstick of battlefield success, a

major confrontation

in the barren reaches of

Corps afforded an opportunity

northern

I

to score a victory of un-

precedented proportions.

To meet

the threat of a massed

enemy

assault,

West-

moreland assembled an awesome armada of more than 2,000 strike

aircraft for

what he personally dubbed Op-

on January

eration Niagara. Beginning

22,

U.S.

aircraft

flew an average of

300

dropping

35,000 tons of bombs on suspected

enemy

a total of

sorties per

day over the base,

Giant B-52 Stratofortresses based

positions.

Guam, Thailand, and Okinawa emptied

in

support was provided by the behemoth

guns at the Rockpile and

tillery

Khe Sanh,

teen miles east of

105mm and 155mm

Camp

as well as

175mm

ar-

Carroll, seven-

some two dozen

howitzers inside the base.

NVA ground assault on one of the outlying hills

on the night of February

The next moment when

ruary 7, at

5,

Khe Sanh remained

ensure that the Marines remained adequately sup-

plied,

3,000 transport planes and helicopters were com-

Khe Sanh. Although hampered

by poor weather, exposed to heavy antiaircraft

fire

as

quiet

immediate aftermath of Tet.

in the

of crisis

came on the night

of Feb-

camp

the North Vietnamese attacked a

Lang Vei manned by U.S. Special Forces and

talion-size force of

locally

Group (CIDG)

recruited Civilian Irregular Defense diers seven miles southwest of

Khe Sanh.

three directions behind Soviet-made

To

mitted to the defense of

an assault on the Marine base. In any case, aside

from an

their payloads

every three hours, twenty-four hours a day. Additional fire

stalled

NVA sappers and

sol-

Striking from

PT76

tanks, a bat-

infantrymen, some

armed with flame throwers, smashed through the perimand quickly overran the

eter

CIDG

morning 200 of the 500

compound. By

fortified

troops at

Lang Vei were

they approached the base, and even more vulnerable to

dead or missing, along with 10 of the 24 Americans,

enemy

while the

450

guns and rockets

artillery

C-130 and

smaller

C-123 cargo

Khe Sanh during

flights into

wing

they landed,

made more than

fire.

When

"zero-zero"

took the place of the fixed-

set in, helicopters

In other instances, supplies and am-

transports.

Yet, for

all

the measures and countermeasures that

Westmoreland took

to protect

rines stationed there

knew

enemy

the brunt of a full-scale

had

to

Khe Sanh,

the 6,000

that they alone

Ma-

would bear

Every day they

assault.

The

random

terror that

one Marine com-

fall

deep-seated

of Lang Vei had a profound psychological

fear.

the

had

who was

Herr,

Now, observed

tanks.

present at the time,

a

few more sandbags to add to their bunkers.

And

every

day they stared into the opaque gray mists surrounding their base

and wondered, Are they coming tonight?

Tension ran especially high following the outbreak of the country-wide Tet offensive on the nights of January

30 and 31. Even though the

NVA

had

failed to exploit

the dire ammunition shortage caused by their opening rocket attack ten days before,

enemy would

Khe Sanh

seemed

likely that the

take advantage of the Tet attacks and hit

hard.

Convinced that

Giap's intention that a massive quarters

it

all

B-52

complex

along, raid

that had been General

Westmoreland

on

a

inside Laos

later

claimed

The ebb and

to believe

—

that

Michael

"how could you look

flow of anxiety and adrenaline took a

on the Marines, many of whom developed

toll

relieve the stress

often do:

known

and

They played

as the

that

"10,000-yard stare."

what

fatigue, they did

cards and exchanged

home, sang songs and

listened to music.

soldiers

news from

They accu-

mulated omens of good fortune and displayed them prominently

—

helmet

a lucky playing card stuck in a

band, a soldier's cross or even a peace symbol chained

around the neck.

On

Hill 881 South, the

200

men

of

I

Company, 3d

Battalion, 26th Marines, began each day with a cere-

monial

flag raising.

As

the

company

bugler belted out a

choppy version of "To the Colors," the sound day's

first

Knowing

North Vietnamese head-

fore the

on January 30 had

the

fore-

no one

area,

journalist

most

enemy

coming?"

To

their holes a little deeper, filling

stirring their

out of your perimeter at night without hearing the treads

someone

—digging

Khe Sanh,

—perhaps because no one wanted

NVA

blank look in the eyes

to pull the switch." Every day they reinforced

at

Despite recent reports that the

pared to "sitting in an electric chair and waiting for

their positions

had been reduced to bleak, smol-

was moving armored vehicles into the

endure the shocks of 50, or 200, or 500 incoming

rounds, a form of

itself

impact on the Marines

knew

munition were delivered by parachute.

camp

dering ruins.

the course of the siege.

Only 4 were destroyed by enemy weather

when

planes

incoming

shells

ot the

could be heard in the distance.

that they had exactly twenty-one seconds be-

rounds

hit,

the Marines stayed at attention until

last possible instant,

then dove

for

cover as

artillery

177

erupted

fire

all

Moments

around.

ascended their makeshift flagpole, called "Maggie's Drawers"

miss

on the

— the

camp

training

another banner

later,

a pair of red panties

traditional

symbol of

a

E.

Lownds, had other ways of keeping siege

of the

The

doned.

1st

trenches had long since been aban-

siege of 8,

Khe Sanh was

when

a relief

Why

the North Vietnamese decided to withdraw

from Khe Sanh remains one the many unsolved riddles of the war. In the view of

ence, a practice that some Marines openly questioned.

it

patrol, to

do what

don't know,

1

and they were promptly slaughtered," recalled medical corpsman

Richard

Heath.

But

Lownds's

superiors

thought otherwise. Resentful of their defensive posture,

which they considered contrary

to the heritage

of the Corps, they wanted the

maintain the rine

that the

at

and

spirit

Khe Sanh

For the record, in

initiative.

command

men

fact,

the

to

Ma-

repeatedly cited the patrols as evidence

combat base was not

By mid-February,

under

officially

the Tet offensive ran out of

as

steam, fighting in and around

Khe Sanh

also abated.

Although the NVA's long-range 130MM and 152MM tillery

guns continued to

no major ground

there were positions.

At

attacks

ar-

regularity,

on outlying U.S.

the end of the month, however, a Marine

patrol discovered a

more than

pound the base with

maze of enemy trench

a mile long, leading toward the

lines,

combat

General Westmoreland immediately dispatched

as they

contend that the abandonment

hold

Hue and

from the

at

which soon began dropping

cities.

some

of the trenches extended to within 100 yards of the

American

positions. Others

"Ts," signaling the sault

to

branch out into

of preparation before as-

ramps were put into place. With March

anniversary of the

approaching,

it

about to repeat

first

attacks

13,

the

on Dien Bien Phu,

fast

suddenly began to look as itself.

Once

Sanh prepared themselves again nothing happened.

ued, toward the end oi

history was

if

again the defenders of

for the big attack.

Not on March

o( the days that followed.

178

began

final stage

Though

March

Once

13.

Khe

And once

Not on any

the shelling contin-

patrols were finding that

directly

Quang

Sanh received on June as their

Thua

Tri and

to overrun the

combat base

allies'

attention

that had been accomplished, they

Two months after the

to maintain the siege.

siege

ended the Marines

at

17, they

blew up the bunkers that had served

homes and carted away what remained of

why

Khe

orders to dismantle their base. Beginning

When

supplies.

journalists

the "western anchor" of the

allies'

were told that the they had carved

NVA had changed

new

northern

"We

officer.

got to keep moving."

and that

Tri Province was

don't want any more

"To

they

their tactics, that

infiltration routes,

comer of Quang

their

began to

defense line had suddenly become expendable,

one Marine junior

nevertheless kept on digging, until

Khe Sanh was

others have concluded that the

no longer had any reason

inquire

just outside the perimeter.

NVA

Still

Communists never intended

necessary.

bombs

of

gain control of

Thien Provinces.

base.

had

materiel would

related to the collapse of North Vietnamese efforts to

He

The

men and

any additional expenditure o{

ammunition and

a seis-

NVA could not

be pointless. Others, including General Westmoreland,

base in the

their

military analysts, since

that the

overrun the base, General Giap probably concluded that

Dien Bien Phu and dynamite the Marines from below. also called in the B-52s,

some

March

clear by early

some

mographic team to determine whether the enemy was attempting to tunnel under Khe Sanh

became

but instead sought only to divert the

siege.

declared

Air Cavalry Division reached the Marine

side the perimeter to look for signs of the enemy's pres-

"They would go out on

officially

column made up of men

outpost.

men occupied.

his

he continued to send patrols out-

enemy

ended on April from the

firing range.

The base commander, Marine Corps Colonel David Throughout the

many

a fixed

no longer

Khe Sanhs,"

said

defeat an enemy, you've

Food and weapons drop by parachute

March

1968.

With an estimated 15,000

to

Marines at the besieged Khe Sanh base

NVA

regulars surrounding the base,

in

northwestern South

Khe Sanh amid be

resupplied

\'ieto.:ni.

onh

h\ an.

179

While some Marines relax during in

enemy shelling,

a

break

others go about the Sis-

yphean task of improving their bunker defenses by filling sandbags their

180

revetment

walls.

and adding

to

.s '*;'S?^#

™

\

-^-^Jl^r^v.

Inured Co the chaos outside, two soldiers bur^ker.

Meanwhile, others curl uf

incoming enemy shelling. In

of enemy

artillery.

one day alone

(Ictt)

in their

The Marines

at the

in late February,

c7i,if

inside their

hiri;e.

ivell-tortihed

trench (above) and await the impact ot

Khe Sanh

base faced around-the-ckKk

the base received

more than

I.

iOO rtninds

fire.

183

»* .

J%^^

i| As an enemy round

explodes in the back-

ground, a U.S. Marine crawls over crates

of ammunition to check for any burning debris that might ignite them.

The survnors

186

ot

,)

thirtv-nhin p.nrol

./;ii/ii/.s/ifj

hy Nurth Vietnamese soldiers dran their

wounded back

to the base.

An

American tank

leads the

way down Route 9 toward Khe Sank, part

reheve the Marines as part of Operation Pegasus

in early

of the joint U.S.

and South Vietnamese

task force sent to

April 1968.

187

-'.r£i

A

LLS.

Army

nitiitn to

wvstwiiiJ.

hclicnprcr delivers

l\\i::isiis ( );i

units

.4/v;7

7.

HI,

lia^htiiii: tl

the

1st

.'J Ixiit.tliiU}.

7th

u/i i\/(/i

the M.inne-'.

fllieii

eihl to the se\ei)i\ sevei,

(

{

\7s/<)/)',s

",

'M'

My private

Witness: Walter Cronkite

some

which

feelings,

I

believe I disguised with

success, probably reflected the opinion

jority.

of a ma-

approved of President Kennedy's dispatch of

I

military advisers to try to help preserve a corner of

Southeast Asia from the Communists.

when

became alarmed

I

the advisers began taking an active role in the

and

fighting

numbers grew.

their

along with those numbers and as through

my

My

alarm escalated

began to understand,

that they were in fact part of a

visits there,

"numbers game";

I

incredibly,

that,

being told the truth about

its

America was not

commitment

Vietnam;

in

that while the public was told that Congressionally ap-

proved

figures defined the limits

of our participation, the

military was filling the pipeline with the

much

teriel for a

In February 1968 Walter Cronkite of

CBS

one of America's most popular and respected traveled to

Vietnam

journalists,

for a firsthand look at the war.

Cronkite reported to the American people on February 27 that,

"It

now more

seems

certain than ever that the

bloody experience of Vietnam

The

is

to

end

On

News, then

in a stalemate."

only viable way out of the war, he concluded, "will

in

the

keeping with the

upon

editorialize is

too

much

to be true

on the

was viewed lic

as a

conflict by a

watershed

first

network anchor and

in the turn of

American pub-

opinion against the war. Twenty years

after the

fluential

Vietnam

visit

and

and

still feel,

what

to believe

it is

A

member of

more

may not have been much

surprised about our editorial conclusions

Tet offensive than

When

I

went

to

I was.

background knowledge of

sonal views must affect

When

how

commentary on

journalists work, could

of his reporting.

all

the North Vietnamese

their Tet offensive

and Vietcong launched

and within days had swept and through many

Vietnam soon

I

did not

know what

I

would

after the

dimensions

my mind find or

was wide

what

I

would

conclude from those findings. Throughout the long war I

had

I

had done what

I

and balanced

be.

uncertainty,

seemed

all

Were

Vietnam were

as accurate, fair,

claims

I

began to

With the offensive that had

and predictions of our military and

and confusion.

the feeling of a majority of

ance.

as first-person, risk-of-life, on-the-battle-

scene reports can

190

in

many

political leaders, I suffered a nauseous

good journalism

the reports of our extraordinarily talented and coura-

geous correspondents

tion to that philosophy.

could to be certain that

tried to report as impartially as

demanded.

into the

areas that

believe there perhaps should be an extraordinary excep-

upset so

of the offensive became obvious, open.

on the

it

know

the audience, lacking

our military had long claimed as pacified, President Lyndon Johnson

that I

or

possible to prepare,

at the next deliver an impassioned

very outskirts of Saigon

report.

felt,

conviction

comment

not be blamed for believing that the broadcaster's per-

Tet

offensive, Cronkite recalled the circumstances of his in-

maintain objectivity

— that a good journalist can at one point de-

the same event.

editorial stand

always

an audience

liver as objective a report as

who

did the best they could." Cronkite's report was the

I

it.

to ask

and

democracy and

I tried to

CBS credo and my own

that those delivering the news should not

be to negotiate, not as victors, but as honorable people lived up to their pledge to defend

larger involvement.

however,

air,

men and ma-

the

to be searching

What could we

I felt certain

my

some guid-

What was

the truth/

and nearing

end of the Vietnam nightmare/ Or did the Tet

tory, years that

wanted

we were

We

for

and hoping

believed

that this was

fellow Americans.

we, as our leaders claimed, winning

fensive indicate that

I

wave of doubt,

still

years

would be spent bridging

away from

ofvic-

rivers ofblood.^

to get the answers to those questions,

if I

could,

on the ground

in

Vietnam where the authoritn-

and where

tive sources were

I

eyes the statements versus the

The question

News

Would

strict impartiality

of our

in guiding at least a portion

maze of confusion I

if I

Richard Salant. Dick and

up to

now

listeners

on the Vietnam

issue,

future objectivity in the eyes

would

this fallout

itself!

was eternally

issue as large as

agreed that the answers,

my

studied

compromise

I

of our viewers, and

We

the entire

my

best to get

conclusions.

When I arrived, the battle for the once beautiful old of Hue was still raging, and I huddled with civilians

city

and American Marines seeking shelter from

artillery

us.

In Saigon I drove not far from the center of the city

beyond which the crunch

and the staccato pop of automatic stone and the tinkling of glass,

rifles,

of mortars

the crash of

testified to the incursion

and Seoul,

I

saw refugees from the

crowd toward the

brightly at the

To me

city's heart,

Paris

and

city's out-

pushing their

bi-

and

of the

enemy hot I

officers

villages

we needed

end

replacement

in

to secure the victory that

watched the helicopter

I

spots scarcely blocks away.

And at

heard angry, frustrated American

who had been

and who

we were winning

a

in

civil-

charge of pacification

few days before had claimed

the hearts

and minds

of the people

shone

light still

of the tunnel.

The reporting and the

tion.

We

not.

The

though

We

I

broadcasts themselves are,

had anticipated some public

would have been unique broadcasters reaction

if

we had

was generally favorable, and,

have no doubt that we

lost

some

I

reac-

al-

viewers, there

was no discernible drop in our audience.

What we had not later,

expected, and only learned

much

was that the president himself would react as he

did [that March

do not

31].

believe,

about anything.

No one has claimed, and I certainly

that our broadcast I

do believe

it

changed

may have been

his

mind

the back-

breaking piece of straw that was heaped on the heavy

he had been getting on alleged military success

reports in Viet-

nam, concern that the military was now asking other considerable increase

for an-

in troop strength to finish

and increasing public outcry

as

the nation

a presidential election.

Despite a considerable rewriting, or at least refine-

night, from the roof of the Caravelle Hotel, cor-

respondents' headquarters,

ians

all

gather, history.

the job,

gunships circling the city unload their hail of death on

now

that

trary.

headed into

the bar below

me

the

"

the evidence was overwhelmingly to the con-

belongings.

suspected

top officers told

had long eluded them. For them the

cycles laden with their impossible pyramids of precious

At

open.

in the

—doubt about the

Out of the pages of memory of Warsaw and

skirts

—out

one of

now have

"we

load he already was carrying

of the enemy.

Brussels

to recall that

few score more millions of dollars

equipment were

and

mortar shells as the ancient structures tumbled about

to the roadblocks

a

in

was

It

seem

I

only a few score thousand more young Americans and

decided in the end

to split the nation.

and broadcast my

and

to suggest that

At military headquarters

should go to Vietnam, do

I

half-full,

Their glass

grossly understated.

most important

any that had faced our nation —

one that threatened

fact,

wrong or

them even dared

that this was too parochial a consideration in regard to

an

minishing enemy strength of previous days had been

through the

be so severe as to jeopardize the stand-

CBS News

acknowledged that the optimistic reports of di-

enemy where we want him

would

the spokesmen

the "Five O'Clock Follies"),

it

either grossly

"CBS Evening News" and even

ing of the

reputation of

called

scarcely

CBS News president,

raised the

I

the daily press briefing (skeptical correspondents

be helpful

question with each other: By abandoning

my

who had

which we stumbled!

in

discussed the matter with our

neutrality

CBS my

broadcast

the opinion of one reporter

maintain

tried to

had welcomed the returning Vietcong.

At

asked myself was: Would we at

I

report with bitter cynicism that their villages apparently

tacts.

be performing a public service

findings!

my own

could check with

ment, of history

in the light of later

evidence and the

claim today, supported in some degree by statements of

North Vietnamese military

leaders, that

North Vietnam

actually suffered a battlefield defeat in the Tet offensive, I

have found no reason

to revise

the time that Tet proved

and

cast

doubt that

it

how

mv

far

belief expressed at

we were from

victory

ever was attainable.

191

THE HOME FRONT

"President Johnson's decision to sacrifice himself on the altar of peace and national unity is

an act of statesmanship which

and sympathy." So wrote the

many

in the

entitles

him

American

to the

people's deepest respect

immediate aftermath of Johnson's historic speech of March 31, 1968. Praise

of the president's actions was even more widespread after Hanoi that

it

fresh

view shared by

editors of the Los Angeles Times, voicing a

would accept the American

exhiliration temporarily gripped the

at last

be brought to an end, a

American people.

wishers cheered the president during a

3

begin preliminary peace talks. Infused with

offer to

hope that the Vietnam War might

announced on April

visit for

In

New

mood

ot

near

York throngs of well-

the investiture of Archbishop Terence

Cardinal Cooke, while on Wall Street the stock market recorded

its

greatest single-day

gain to that date.

For Lyndon Johnson there must have been more than a touch of irony in that transitory

moment

of renewed popularity. Barely three years had passed since he stood at the apex

of power and prestige, after scoring the mt)st lopsided electoral victory in the history of

With

the presidency.

the Demt)cratic party in firm control of both houses of Congress

and the economy booming, of John Kennedy's

Union

address

Johnson

laid

New

his

dream oi creating the Great Society on the foundations

Frontier had

on January

4,

seemed well within reach. During

1965, the House

out his agenda for the future:

aid to the elderly, to eradicate poverty

and insure equal

rights for

concluded, "tree, growing,

all.

tt)

and

is

"damn

cities,

and

to cut excise taxes

the State ot the Union," the president had

tull ot

Only one major problem confronted Johnson into reality: the war in that

as

extend federal aid to education and medical

and refurbish the

"This, then,

restless,

his State of the

chamber had thundered with applause

hope." as

he

little piss ant

set

out to transform his social vision

country," as he privately reterred to

Vietnam. Despite the commitment of more than 22,000 American military advisers, the The

tuncnil ot Private Robert

Ihmuin Wucrt:

ot M:is>ilh>n.

Ohio. killcJ

in \'wtnjin.

miqht of some 12,000 American bombing missions, and the influx of thousands of tons of American war mate-

the struggle against the

riel,

Communists

in

Southeast

Asia was going badly. Even more disquieting from Johnson's point of view,

it

was becoming

a political liability.

Public opinion polls taken at the end of 1964 revealed that fully 50 percent oi the public was dissatisfied with

the administration's handling of the war, though the

same surveys

aLso

indicated sharp disagreement over

what course the president should

follow.

During the

election campaign Johnson himself had seemed undecided, promising not to widen the war or "send

ican boys to do

what Asian boys ought

selves," while at the to

Communist By

to

do

Amer-

for

them-

same time vowing never "to

yield

aggression."

early 1965, however,

it

had become clear that the

time for such ambivalence had passed. With the threat

Communist

of a decisive

victory

in

South Vietnam

growing more imminent with each passing day, Johnson

would have

to

make "harder

McGeorge Bundy

choices," special assistant

advised him.

He would have

to

choose

between "escalation and withdrawal," between using "our military power to force a change in

Communist

policy" and applying "all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what

little

can be pre-

served." Fearful that he would be vilified by the Republican right nists

war

if

he "lost" South Vietnam to the

and confident that the nation wt)uld

as long as

son opted to

its

costs

raise the

remained

American

Commu-

tolerate the

relatively modest,

John-

stakes in Southeast Asia

by stepping up the bombing of North Vietnam and send-

combat troops

ing U.S. set in

motion

forces that

ter his plans for the

prive

him

From the eminent

to the South. In so doing,

Great Society, and ultimately de-

of the presidency itself.

outset there had been dissenting voices. journalist

conflict,

The

Walter Lippmann, who repeatedly

warned that there could be "no

Vietnam

he

would divide the nation, shat-

military solution" to the

was one. Senators

Wayne Morse

of

In an curly i}nnw,)r Jenwnstratum, 20,000 students from across

the country gather on the Mall in Washington, D.C., on April 17.

194

1965.

.;?r'A-

•ftS'

;

Oregon and Ernest Grucning of Alaska, rhe only memTonkin

hers of Congress to vote against the 1964 Gulf ot

With the

Resolution, were others. in the spring oi 1965,

escalation ot the war

however, public opposition to the

deepening American involvement

expanded and

Vietnam

in

rapidly

University students were

among

the hrst to register

March

at the University

of Michigan, activists at more than 100 colleges and

boycotted classes and staged

"teach-ins" to discuss the war and ers,

its

series

a

campuses

to participate in the

that took place in

New

York

ington, D.C., two days

t)n

later.

mass antiwar

April

1

and

5

the newly ftirmed Vietnam Day

to block troop trains

rallies

Wash-

tions

(SANE) and

A

the

ft)r

many

Viet-

liberal,

for

a

middle-class organiza-

Sane Nuclear Policy

American Friends Service Committee.

product of the earlier "ban the bomb" movement,

SANE year

mounted the

when

it

largest single antiwar protest of the

attracted 30,000 marchers to

Washington,

D.C., on November 27. Led by pediatrician Dr. Ben-

jamin Spock,

.socialist

Norman Thomas, and

Coretta

Scott King, the wife of Dr. Martin Luther King,

Jr.,

the

demonstrators carried placards demanding an end to

U.S. bombing In

in

as

to question the

nam. In

a supervised cease-fire.

more and more ordinary American commitment

late January, a

servists to

House

Vietnam and

1966 the antiwar movement continued to gain

momentum,

End the War

Several days

in

them former Nobel

to

began

South Viet-

Vietnam picketed the White U.S.

after a thirty-seven-day

later,

citizens

group of 100 Veterans and Re-

to protest the resumption of

North Vietnam

5,000 American

air strikes

over

bombing pause.

.scientists,

17

196

of

Prize winners, petitioned the presi-

dent to review U.S. chemical and biological warfare Southeast Asia.

Under the dis-

to find answers

tt)

basic questions surrounding military

bombing

A

negotiations.

policy,

and peace

long-time friend and legislative ally of

Johnson, Fulbright had been instrumental through Congress the August

1964

in steering

Southeast

Asia

(Tonkin GulO Resolution, empowering the president "to take

all

necessary steps, including the use of armed

force," to defend the freedom of

many

of his ct)lleagues,

South Vietnam. Like

however, Fulbright had become

that authority to escalate the war without consulting the

heading into the Oakland

educators, and civil rights leaders, as

Committee

the

policy.

William Fulbright, the

J.

strategy, troop deployments,

branch.

legislative

in

Althtiugh

Secretary

of

Defense

McNamara and JCS chairman General Wheeler to testify before the

members of such

as

chairmanship of Senator

Vietnam

increasingly irritated by Johnson's highhanded use of

later at-

Swelling the ranks of the student protesters were

well as

tion" of the administration's

and

GIs.

many clergymen,

Com-

Services

Committee organized

army terminal, the point of departure

nam-bound

left

In Berkeley, California,

similar demonstrations during the spring

tempted

in

of

Oth-

implications.

seeking to express their dissent more directly,

their

Armed

mittee to initiate in early February 1966 an "investiga-

tinguished Arkan'^as Democrat, the committee set out

intensified.

their protest. Beginning in late

universities

Serious doubts about the war also began to surface in

Congress, prompting the Senate

with the inquiry, calling on

government

refused

committee, Fulbright pressed on

officials to

a

parade of high-ranking

defend the administration's po-

sition.

In the end, the

any concrete

month-long hearings

results,

failed to

produce

since few congressmen were pre-

pared to challenge the president directly or to cut off funds for the war. Nevertheless, by providing an open

forum

for a debate over

American

policy objectives in

Vietnam, the nationally televised proceedings made sent

more

of nearly

respectable, thus paving the

fifty

for a flurry

"peace candidates" in the November 1966

Congressional elections. Though

drew

way

dis-

were defeated some

all

significant support, including Robert Scheer, the

editor of the radical journal Ramparts,

who

received 45

percent of the Democratic primary vote in California's

Seventh

District.

Moreover,

New

kind observed in the

war could

find a

as journalist

Republic,

"measure of hope"

Andrew Kop-

opponents

of the

in the election of a

"miniblock" of dovish Republicans, including Senators

Mark

Hatfield of Oregon, Charles Percy of Illinois, and

Edward Brooke In the

war continued antiwar

of Massachusetts.

meantime,

rally

ma.ss

demonstrations against the

to proliferate, culminating in the largest in

LI.S.

history

—

a

march by 300,000

A

demonstrator

inserts

pink c:nn
rifle

barrels

of military policemen during the heated confrontation outside the Pentagon

on October 21, 1967.

Americans

months

in

later,

New

York City on April

on October

21, a

much

15,

1967. Six

smaller but equally

determined group

ot protesters gathered in front ot the

Lincoln Memorial

in

ers

condemn

Washington, D.C.,

to hear speak-

strators fell

back and held a nightlong candlelight

By the time the protest came

to

vigil.

an end the following

afternoon, 700 people had been arrested and twice that

number reported

as casualties.

the war amid signs demanding that Presi-

dent Johnson "Bring

Home

the GIs

Now!" As

the

last

speeches came to an end, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators linked arms,

crossed the Arlington Memorial

Bridge, and marched on the Pentagon. Met by

a line ot

military police as the protesters approached the

main

entrance to what they called "the center of the American war machine," several hundred of

them attempted

Although the motives of the

protesters varied, from the

ideological radicalism oi the student

"New

Left" to the

religious pacifism of the Quakers, the principal target of

much

early antiwar dissent

draft calls sht)t

was the same. As monthly

up to meet the demands

U.S. war effort— from 13,700 30,000

in

August 1967

—

in

oi the

expanding

April 1965 to nearly

protest against administration

troops re-

policy increasingly took the form of protest against the

dozens

Selective Service System (SSS). In addition ro coun-

of injuries as they drove the surging crowd back. After

seling potential inductees to resist conscription, antiwar

demon-

activists picketed IcKal draft boards, staged "sit-ins" at

to break

through and race up the

sponded with

a

tear gas

steps.

and truncheons,

second charge met with the same

The

inflicting

result,

the

197

and publicly burned their

military induction centers,

own

draft cards.

Congress

swiftly retaliated by stittening

the penalties for such acts and extending the range ot

punishable offenses. But even the vigort)us enforcement of the

new

laws could not curtail the steady growth ot

the antidraft movement.

For

who

all

the publicity they generated, however, those

actively resisted the draft remained a small,

vocal,

if

minority. Faced with the prospect of conscription, most draft-age males either accepted their lot or found other

Many

ways to avoid military service.

took advantage of

the long-standing system of exemptions and deferments instituted by the

SSS

to

"channel" the nation's youth

in "socially desirable" ways. Local draft boards

powered,

example,

for

grant

to

grounds of "family hardship" or skills"

and

were em-

exemptions on the occupational

"critical

to issue deferments to ministers, farmers,

and

college students "making satisfactory progress toward a

degree." Other young

men

drawing on the expertise of

took their cases to court, a

growing number of

draft-

law specialists to establish their credentials as conscientious objectors or to challenge the procedures

by their local boards.

Still

others contrived to

preinduction physical exams by

artificially

employed fail

their

elevating

their blood pressure, aggravating old sports injuries, or

simulating more serious di,sorders.

Though

the military did

tween legitimate and than one-quarter

its

of all prt)spective conscripts

from military service

qualified

best to discriminate be-

illegitimate cases, in the

for

end more were

dis-

medical reasons. Each

year another third obtained exemptions or deferments,

while 5 percent avoided serving in Vietnam by enlisting in the

National Guard or the Reserves. Since the

sification system by design allowed the better

and better

off

less

educated

not to serve, those actually inducted into

the military tended to

earning

clas-

come irom

working-class families

than $10,000 a year. Inductees typically

lived in cities or small towns rather than suburbs

and

had no education beyond high school. According

one

1968 study,

A

dropout from

a

low-income

draft-age youth from Hanford, California, appears before his

draft is

a high-school

to

board to learn that he

married.

198

will receive a

deferment because he

199

serving in Vietnam,

family faced a 70 percent chance

tif

whereas the corresponding odds

for a college graduate

were only 42 percent. Once draftees were tar roles

than those

more

who

in

likely to

Vietnam, moreover,

be assigned to combat

enlisted voluntarily,

and conse-

quently they suffered a significantly higher casualty

The

social imbalances of the Vietnam army

even more glaring following the introduction 100,000

in

rate.

became

ot Project

1966. Heralded as a Great Society program

designed to "rehabilitate the subterranean poor," especially

young

blacks, the project quickly evolved into a

vehicle for tunneling underprivileged and unemployed

youths from the streets of America to the battlefields of

minimum

Indochina. By lowering the

intellectual

and

physical standards tor induction, recruiters eventually

brought more than 350,000

men

Civil righcs leader Dr. Martin Lather California in January 1968, three

200

into the military under

A';n^', Jr.,

months heh>re

an oiitspc^ken

critic of

his assassination.

the program.

Of

that total, 41 percent were black,

40 percent served later

in the

infantry.

A

and

Pentagon study

determined that the "attrition-by-death" rate of

Project 100,000 soldiers was nearly twice as high as that

of Vietnam-era veterans as a whole.

The

racial inequities of the draft explain in part

why

antiwar sentiment consistently ran higher among black

Americans than among whites. Already engaged domestic struggle to end

legal

South and de facto segregation of the civil rights

in a

discrimination in the

in the

movement had

North, the leaders

retrained trom chal-

lenging U.S. foreign policy goals throughout the late

1950s and early 1960s. But as the Vietnam to take a

heavy

toll

on black youth,

War began

as well as

on the

antipoverty programs of Johnson's Great Society, blacks

came

many

to regard the ctmtlict as an obstacle to fur-

the war in Vietnam, addresses a caucus ot liberal Democrats in

The more

ther social progress.

radical

activists,

SNCC

"black power" advocate Stokely Carmichael ot (the Student Nttnvioient Coordinating

Huey Newton

ot the Black

Committee) and

Panther party, were

the

in

By early 1967 even the moderate leaders

movement had

comes when

silence

in relation to

4,

"A

time

betrayed," proclaimed the Rev-

erend Martin Luther King,

Church on April

ot the civil

turned against the war.

is

Jr., in a

sermon

1967. "That time has

Vietnam." Reminding

course of his

war

in

own

Vietnam.

eviscerated as

if it

home, he traced the

gone mad on war," King could never again raise

my

idle plaything of a society

"and

asserted,

1

knew

that

I

first

spoken

clearly to the greatest purveyor ot violence in the world

today

too

too

far,

— my own government."

— they

fought back by resisting desegregation of

and ctimmunities and by withdrawing their

support from liberal politicians whose social programs rarely addressed their

—by

own

More complicated were

needs.

the attitudes of working-class

American economy was

On

whites toward the war in Vietnam. blue-collar workers were

70,000 longshoremen,

among

May

1967.

effort, as

Fifth

the one hand,

more

the

evidenced by the

Avenue

in

and me-

New

Bless

Us

Patriots,"

York

"Down

Carrying banners reading

"God

and

visible

seamen,

carpenters,

who marched down

with the Reds,"

home and ct)mmu-

—crime,

neighbor-

their schools

hoods

the nation was "rich enough and strong enough" to hght

nism abroad

and disintegrating

taxes,

rising

City in

against poverty at

Forced to endure

the dislocations ot a rapidly changing society inflation,

of

system that

as victims of a

else's interests at heart.

out foundation. Despite President Johnson's belief that

—

remedy long-standing

so-called white backlash was espe-

themselves

to see

had someone

chanics

war

some

pronounced among blue-collar workers, many

promised the dream of the Great Society was not with-

a two-front

The

vocal supporters of the war

com-

King's claim that the rising costs oi the war had

the growth of

many white Americans

fast in its efforts to

social problems.

voice against the violence of

the oppressed in the ghettos without having

riots,

had become convinced that the government was moving

whom came

tor us

watched the program broken and

were some

the recurrent outbreak ot urban

come

his audience that

Troubled by

steadily since 1965.

black radicalism, and the perceived excesses of

cially

disillusionment with the undeclared "I

mounted

fact,

at Riverside

only a few years betore the Jt)hnson administration had declared a "war on poverty" at

had, in

federal antipoverty programs,

forefront of the opposition by early 1966.

rights

Opposition to the adnunistration's domestic policies

like

and "Support

the antiwar protesters and

Our Boys," they denounced called

upon the government

beginning to show signs ot strain. Faced with the threat

late."

On

the other hand, they were well aware that

of runaway inflation, which had been triggered by the

their

own

sons were bearing a disproportionate burden

sharp and unanticipated increase in military expendi-

of the fighting and dying in Southeast Asia.

early 1967 the

tures over the previous eighteen

mtmths, Johnst)n was

forced to choose between raising taxes and cutting do-

they deeply resented those they regarded

much

to "escalate,

who avoided

time went on and casualties multiplied

natives were, in August 1967 the president put betore

class parents

Congress a request charge.

for a

10 percent income-tax sur-

By that point, however,

with

dissatisfaction

war was

many working-

to share the dissenters'

a mistake.

Though

the draft and

antiwar protest as treasonous, as

mestic spending. Politically unpalatable as both alter-

came

not capitu-

view that the

Unlike the organized peace move-

ment, however, their tipposition was not so much

ide-

on the convictit^n

Johnson's social retorm agenda had become so wide-

ological or moral as pragmatic, based

spread that Congressional conservatives were in a posi-

that the price they were paying was simply too high.

tion to

demand

a quid pro quo.

a tax hike, they insisted,

deep cuts

It

the president wanted

he would

in social spending.

first

have

mately agreed, by then even the combination creased

federal

could not cool

make

to

Although Johnson

ulti-

oi

in-

revenues and decreased expenditures

down

the overheated U.S. economy.

one Long

Island construction wtirker put

it

after

As

watch-

ing the funeral procession of a local boy killed in Viet-

nam: "The whole damn country not

vvt)rth

the

lite

ot

the hell our politicians ot

oi

South Vietnam

is

one American boy, no matter what tell us.

watching these funerals

gi)

I'm

damn

sick

and

tired

by."

201

Si St'

^ 5?

lijg

^^x

A

r.. t'f^,] >^

^

t

-:'\F'.'''^

9HH

^H

|«p ^ M r ,

«»-

"

#^*.t k. itac^s^^rJd^ ^-

m

y

1^ 4i

The

pattern of gradual disillusionment with the war was

the late Peter Lisagor, then Washington bureau chief of

most Americans,

the Chicago Daily News. "There was a tendency to be-

also evident in the popular press. Like

the journalists

who covered

the war initially hacked the

U.S. commitment to Vietnam, helieving that

was

it

in

the nation's interest to "contain" the spread of com-

munism Sheehan in

in

when he

arrived in Saigon

first

1962 he was convinced that the U.S. was helping

the South Vietnamese "to huild a viahle and inde-

pendent nation-state and defeat a Communist

insur-

gency that would subject them to a dour tyranny."

According

to

the correspondents

American government was dermining

effort.

themselves,

the

In their zeal to put

the best face on

all political

U.S.

Washington and Saigon repeatedly pro-

officials in

an

to

have the

official's

and military developments,

however,

the flood of pessimistic dis-

patches from the war zone became too overwhelming to ignore.

Though few correspondents went

so far as to

challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. presence in Viet-

nam, by the summer of 1967 many had come

state.

still

far

from becoming a viable nation-

"Everyone thought

who

Charles Mohr,

was against the war," recalled

1

resigned his post as Time's Saigon

correspondent after his managing editor ordered him to rewrite a story claiming that the war was being

own

just

intelligence

gleaned from

other sources. Early on, for example, correspondents

were told that American forces were only "advising" the

South Vietnamese, even though the reporters saw them fighting

and dying.

Similarly, battles in

which

ARVN

forces were routed by the Vietcong were described as victories in official briefings. ficial in

"No

responsible U.S. of-

Saigon ever told a newsman

a really big false-

hood," recalled John Mecklin, chief of the U.S.

mation

Service.

"Instead

there

were

Infor-

endless

little

falsehoods."

As

of

it

thought as

it

wasn't working.

immoral

emerged between

campaign

get the message out" that

who was

"we

also chief of the

"I

are

1967 "to

winning." Under the

Walt W. Rostow,

White House Psychological

Strategy Committee, government officials inundated the

major news media with an endless stream of charts,

and previously

classified

showing "steady progress" on every front

Hubert H.

of the cor-

lost.

to think

in the fall of

direction of national security adviser

gap would widen over time. The skepticism

increasingly critical ac-

come

Johnson administration launched an

all-out public relations

against the Vietnamese

itself in

didn't

Troubled by the growing perception that the war was a "stalemate," the

the U.S. government and the Saigon press corps. That

respondents manifested

I

until the very end."

graphs, statistics,

a result, a "credibility gap" soon

to the

that the pacification program was failing, and that South

Vietnam was

vided information that was at odds with the reporters' observations or with

word

cosmic as war."

as

Eventually,

to accept

conclusion that the war was not being fought effectively,

largely responsible for un-

war

faith in the

and we were inclined

on something

Southeast Asia. As UPl correspondent Neil

later recalled,

them more because they were supposed

lieve facts,

documents

in the struggle

Communists. Vice President

Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara, and

Secretary of State

Dean Rusk

offered

counts of the war effort that often directly contradicted

equally optimistic appraisals in televised appearances

on

what the Johnson administration was saying back

weekly news shows

fa-

Washington. In many instances, however, tive accounts

their nega-

were either buried on the back pages or

revised by editors

who

preferred to rely

on

tagon assessments, frequently expressed quantitative language of

enemy K)dy

official

in

counts,

weapons captured, and hamlets pacihed. largely at the

in

Pen-

the hard, kill ratios,

"We

were

mercy of the administration then,"

said

vored reporters.

as well as in private chats

The campaign reached

its

high point in

mid-November, when the president summoned General William Westmoreland, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,

and pacification chief Robert

W. Komer

from Saigon

confirm the administration's assessment.

whereas

ning, today he

certainly losing,"

is

am

City

nctivists .sm^v

in early

;i

Jemonsrr.ition on the streets o/

April 1967-

New

York

November

when

21.

"We

tii

abso-

1965 the enemy was win-

lutely certain that

in

"1

Westmoreland

serted in an address before the Natittnal Press

Prowar

with

as-

Club on

have reached an important point

the end begins to

come

into view."

203

As Johnson had hoped,

the administration's "success

Although President Jiihnson

initially resisted the press'

offensive" brought to a halt the steady erosion of popular

assessment, in the end he had

support for the war. Opinion polls conducted toward the

it.

end of the year showed

he always called them, he knew that he could no longer

a 7 percent increase in approval

of the president's handling of the war since the preced-

Even more

ing August.

public's perception ot U.S. "progress" in

who

to

Johnson could ncU even count on the continuing support

of people

plummeted, while those who thought that the rose from 34 percent

more than 50 percent.

Then came Tet

own

of his

showing

startling

the outbreak of the

Com-

Senator Eugene McCarthy's

political party.

New

in the

Hampshire primary and

Senator Robert Kennedy's subsequent entrance into the presidential race

on March 31

made

clear that

it

Johnson faced

a bit-

Democratic nomination. By announcing

ter fight for the

With

1968.

a majority of the public

Vietnam. Be-

thought the U.S. was "losing ground" or "standing

Americans were "making progress"

Not only had

effectively.

repudiated his Vietnam policies, but by mid-March 1968

shift

tween July and December 1967 the percentage

still"

govern

choice but to accept

nt)

the trust of his "fellow Americans," as

k)st

in the

was the

striking

Having

his intention to relinquish the presidency,

own

munists' cataclysmic, country-wide offensive in late Jan-

Johnson hoped

uary 1968, public confidence in the American war effort

personal authority and to restore a semblance of unity

and ultimately

suffered a grievous,

fatal,

Con-

blow.

coordinated, surprise attacks on a massive scale,

Americans found

it

tion's claims that the

could they place

many

the administra-

difficult to believe

U.S. was "winning" the war. Nor

much

General Westmoreland's

faith in

to salvage a

measure of his

to a nation increasingly divided against

mount

fronted with evidence of the enemy's capacity to

once

at

Yet such was not to be.

On

itself.

April 4, 1968, the day

North Vietnamese rekindled hopes

after the

for

peace

by accepting Johnson's offer to begin negotiations, Dr.

Martin Luther King, in

Jr.

,

was killed by an

Memphis, Tennessee. For

sanguine prediction that "the end" had "come into

matic leader of the black

view." By mid-February, two weeks after the offensive

of the

Nobel Peace

civil rights

Prize,

assassin's bullet

thirteen years the charis-

movement, winner

eloquent speaker and moral

began, popular disapproval of the president's Vietnam

teacher, King had long stood as a symbol of nonviolent

policy had reached an all-time high of 50 percent; by

social reform.

month

the end of the telling

the figure was 58 percent.

More

only one out of three Americans

still,

now

thought that the United States was "making progress" in

Vietnam, and nearly one

allies

the

in four believed that

The judgments rendered organizations polls.

reinforced

by the nation's leading news

the

verdict

reflected

by the

"After three years of gradual escalation. President

tragic

irony,

murder by

his

white ex-convict James Earl Ray became the occasion for the

most widespread

racial violence in the nation's

history.

Within minutes

after learning of King's death,

crowds of angry blacks began roaming the

many major

were "losing ground."

Now, with

and setting

breaking windt)ws, looting stores,

cities, fire

to

streets of

white-owned businesses. Black

col-

leges seethed with rage while urban high schools across

the country closed

down

in the face o{ violent racial

Johnson's strategy of gradual escalation has run into a

confrontations. In Baltimore, Detroit, and 4 southern

dead end," wrote the editors of Newsweek, expressing

cities,

view held by many Americans offensive.

Vietnam

Not

t)nly

in the

had the U.S. military buildup

failed to quell the

a

wake of the Tet

Communist

in

insurgency, but

overwhelmed

regular

army troops had

West Side ghetto went up

169

morass," riddled with corruption and unable to earn the

wake of the King

its

own

people.

What was

"the courage to face the truth" be

won by

whole

204

military

—

life

cities

to be called in after entire blocks in flames.

All told,

reported incidents of racial violence in the assassination, resulting in

some $130

was

that "the war cannot

means without

fabric of natit)nal

required

were forced to request

of the

the government of South Vietnam remained a "political

allegiance of

local officials

the assistance of the National Guard, while in Chicago

Residents in Washington, D.C., stand by as a local store goes up

tearing apart the

and international relations."

in flames

during one of the

riots that

the death ot Martin Luther King,

Jr.

enipted nationwide after

»

i Ll^^^^ •BnPl^5L^

million in property damage, nearly 24,000 arrests, and forty-three deaths, thirty-six of

them

blacks.

King's death was not the only reason for violence that

Three weeks

spring.

radical white in

New

on April

later,

and black students

York City seized

23, a coalition of

Columbia University

at

number of administration

a

new phase

buildings, signaling the advent of a

At

politics of student protest.

decision to construct a

issue

new gymnasium

in

Morningside

Harlem

Park, a city-owned plot of land in the adjacent

neighborhood, and

its

the

in

were the university's

with the Institute for

affiliation

Defense Analysis (ID.A), a multimillion-dollar consor-

tium founded strategy.

1955 to

in

weapons and military

test

Led by members of the

local chapter of the

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and in loose alliance

with

Afro-American Society

Students'

the

(SAS), the protesters demanded that the administration

abandon its

its

officials failed

Low

occupied at

and end

allegedly racist "land-grab" policies

When

"complicity" in the Vietnam War. to comply,

the students

university

moved

and

in

Library, the main administration offices

Hamilton Hall, and

campus

several other

buildings.

After a week of inconclusive negotiations, punctuated

by a

series of violent clashes

Kirk called in the buildings.

New

cades, the police stormed fists

them downstairs

as

amounted

oppt)-

to clear the

a set of makeshift barri-

Low

to waiting

Library,

bludgeoned the

paddy wagons.

later

and

students to

and

and nightsticks, and then dragged

occupation several weeks results,

allies

York City police

Crashing through

students with

between

on April 29 President Grayson

nents of the occupiers,

A

second

produced even bloodier

engaged

police

hand-to-hand combat

what

in

the

throughcuit

campus.

By the time at

juries It

it

Columbia had

had

ended

(34 to police), also

in late

May

resulted in nearly

spawned

1968, the rebellion

900

arrests,

180

in-

and the suspension of 73 students. similar demonstrations at hundreds

of other campuses, including forty major confrontations,

and provoked

a torrent ot criticism against the

David Shapiro, one of the isrrative huildings at

behind the desk ot President Grayson

206

pol-

who occupied admin-

stiidenr radicals

Cohimhia University

new

in late

April 1968,

sits

Kirk.

V

*

— of "direct action." While President Johnson con-

itics

demned

the Columbia militants as "young totalitarians,"

the editors of Fortune warned

new

readers that the

its

gencnititm oi student activists sought to instigate a rev-

"not a protest

olution

tit)ns

.

doned

Johnson administration's polls 7;

The

policies.

were equally dramatic: victory

victory in Nebraska

on May

14-

nothing

less."

all" rules, the

June 4 California primary loomed

militant blacks and student radicals had aban-

crucial test of

who would

and

"Liberal

political revolution,

committed

still

its

phrey forces

working

to

With

May

28,

McCarthy by

six per-

Kennedy moved on

to Cali-

large bloc of delegates

Kennedy won.

told cheering

withdrawal from the presidential race had opened possibilities.

Suddenly

achieved through the

in the streets

our society,

New

come. Then,

Wis-

ence

performance

and

to steal the thunder

Although

from McCarthy's

his tardy

entrance into

and the

extended

far

as

among

oratory,

Kennedy had an appeal

disptissessed,

any

of

who had

among urban

that

t)ther national political

served under his brother,

He

enjoyed

blacks and also, remarkably,

working-class whites. in

as

he

left

the dais to hold a press confer-

another part of the building, Sirhan Bishara

in

port for Israel, suddenly raised a revolver and fired at

the senator's head.

The

following day Robert

Kennedy

was dead. His candidacy had for a time brought together

many

of the disparate elements of a perilously fragmented na-

An

tion.

gift for stirring

former members of the SDS.

end the war

between blacks and

national reconciliation shared by Kennedy's followers.

Eastern establishment as well

.

because of his

beyond that

strong support

.

be reckoned with. In part because of

His campaign entourage included members of the

figure.

to

a

because of his capacity to reach the disaf-

in part

fected

.

Sirhan, a Palestinian Arab angered over Kennedy's sup-

enemies within the party could deny that he was

in part

divisions

age groups or on the war in Vietnam" could be over-

the race had produced charges of opportunism, not even

name,

the

in

single-issue candidacy.

his

had

their success

Senator

But the other Democratic antiwar candidate, Robert

political force to

campaign workers that

whites, between the poor and the affluent, or between

consin primary.

Kennedy, was

Am-

York senator

might be

ballot, particularly after

his astonishing

New

proved that "the violence, the disenchantments with

a decisive victory in the April 2

McCarthy followed Hampshire with

new

seemed that what had

it

not been gained through protest

a

August.

in

In his victory statement at the

nam War

an end, President Johnson's unexpected

as the

challenge the Johnson-Hum-

bassador Hotel in Los Angeles, the

to

and "winner take

Democratic convention

at the

May

after losing

fornia.

agree.

within the system. For those seeking to bring the Viet-

his

Then,

the

at tin

"We

are not allowed

majority ot Americans were

F.

results

Indiana

anymore," he declared.

only

their taith in peaceful pt)litical change, the vast

range of

in

the Oregon primary to Senator

the leader of the Columbia

his

impassioned indictments of the

his

centage points on

.

if

hut an honest-to-God rev-

he delivered

as

SDS

arc out tor social

Yet

.

could

faction," .

.

name

solu-

Mark Rudd,

olution."

"action

.

he moved through ghetto neighborhoods, chanting

And

Vietnam, but

he promised not only

to heal the

wounds

that

the war had inflicted on the American nation.

Recognizing that he would have to "win through the

One

had destroyed the hope

assassin's bullet

for

them, speech writer Jack Newfield, fttrmerly a

oi

member

of

SDS, put

it

way:

this

"We had

already

glimpsed the most compassionate leaders our nation could produce, and they had

from

this

political leaders

Although

it is

been assassinated.

And

were part of memory now, not hope."

impossible to

pened had Kennedy deepened

divisions

all

time forward, things would get worse: Our best

lived,

know what might have hap-

it

is

certain that the natit)n's

after his death. Later that

summer,

the Democratic Convention in Chicago was to dramatize just

how

A

busboy cnniches beside presidential candidate Ritbert

divided America had already become.

people," Kennedy launched his campaign with an ex-

hausting whirlwind tour of sixteen states in twenty-one days.

one

Everywhere he went the people responded, wrote

reporter, with "an intensity

st)me and frightening"

208

and scope that was awe-

— clutching

at his

coat sleeves as

/lore/

Kennedy, who moments before had been

gunman

at

fatally

shot by a h>nc

Los Angeles' Ambassadin Hotel on June

4.

I%8.

my mind

Quay

Witness: Jim

before the selection was made, because the

only degree offered at West Point was a bachelor's in

and

science

I

want

didn't

had an inkling

that

other ways, but

I

to limit

My

options. I already

West Point might be confining

don't

in

remember having any moral ob-

As

jection to entering the military. to decide:

my

it

was, I never

me

congressman named

only

had

first alter'

nate.

What

turned a candidate to West Point

a conscientious objector

in

1963 into

My growing awareness

by 196V.

during those years of the enormous destruction being

upon the people of North and South Vietnam by

visited

the American military. I

knew

there was plenty of suf-

fering caused by "the other side, " but because of the

technological resources America

massive

Rather than answer the ican

men

call to arms,

refused to go to war.

Some

even went

to avoid the draft or

Selective Service laws.

fled

the country

to prison for violating

More than 170,000 won

sification of conscientious objector

their moral opposition to service.

James Quay

thousands of Amer-

(CO)

One

after

had

age far beyond anything available to

Ho Chi Minh

gressor or a popular Nationalist, I

was

Tet offensive, an American /

don 'r

my

when

recall exactly

full attention. I

remember

early years: a Buddhist

monk

namese government, seated

Ngo Dinh Diem

Kennedy was

in order to save

South Viet-

I felt

about the war.

all

and

assassination ot

on U.S.

August 1964. But

in

removed from my

far

eastern Pennsylvania. I was supposed to register at

when

local Selective Service board

September weeks.

It

istering,

thing.

26,

—but

1964

was no big deal.

and they didn

't

That wouldn't be

My family

I forgot. I

years later. In

my

to

210

That phrase

we were

Everything

my

violated

I

left to

killing

1960 election and

junior year in high school,

the necessary

tests.

I

applied

Academy I

crystallized

changed

what

Vietnamese and

name of freedom, who and

be free!

read and heard about the war continually

deepest patriotism,

my

pride in what this

country stood for in the world, until as an American

I

couldn't stand to be part of my country's war anymore.

that

my parents

1967

I

told

my parents

that

time,

I

noted

War a

II.

man

He

I

I

was plan-

remember

were concerned but not opposed;

they were mostly baffled. In a journal that in particular

my

could not help me.

I

I

He

think

kept at the

father's silence.

rejecting the course of action he I fa-

say about Barry Goldwater four

all

"

of the

to destroy the

In the spring of

true later.

a candidate to the U.S. Military

and took and passed

what would be

Vietnam. During the

ning to become a conscientious objector.

being late meant any-

in the

it.

It

in

artillery officer said

—

Didn't go for three

were middle-of-the-road Republicans.

found good things

become

my

to feel that the

my

turned eighteen

never considered not reg-

think

vored Nixon over Kennedy

to

I

in

life

came

became necessary

destroying Vietnam in the

three weeks before President

Gulf of Tonkin

of these events were

and

in the lotus position

assassinated; the alleged attack

destroyers in the

"It

town

burning like a torch; the overthrow President

of Ben Tre,

village

a few snapshots from the

protestinf^ the

in Viet-

destruction America was causing was incompatible with

any proper American objective

the war in Vietnam attracted

enemies

was a Communist ag-

or one or whether

showing

ot Pennsylvania.

its

dam-

nam. Regardless of whether Vietnam was two countries

the clas-

COs

of the

sessed, the U.S.

alone pos-

the capacity to inflict horrific

had taken

in

could show

I

was

World

me how

does what his government asks of him; he could

me how to oppose that government. But my father did me a very great kindness: He knew a member not show

of the local

draft

board from

belonged

From

that day in 1967 until the board

to.

a service organization

he

made

its

to

decision a year later,

a choice to

my

mention

decision

he gave

a result,

learning

made

father

who

I

me

and

a point rn)t

wi)uld rise up

I

was making

the war.

felt I

to face

its

a very great

was and what

it

Though

he would not have made, he

make my own

As

my

case to his friend.

had the

consequences. the gift of

gift:

valued on

I

right

my

ou'n

and

for myself.

My

very

May

In

1967, an official from the South

Vietnamese embassy came to speak at a hall at Lafayette College, where

stood I

in front

I

A

was a junior.

dozen people

knew

I

with signs that read "Stop the Bombing.

was not one of them. For

"

they were surrounded

this,

by hundreds of fraternity boys and subjected to hours of

The campus po-

water-and'ink bombs and verbal abuse.

were strangely absent.

lice

A

rally

my

port the right of free speech;

I

first

antiwar demon-

Amendment.

stration was really for the First

that

was organized to sup-

the country,

we should support the president.

I

my

my name opponent of my editorials for my

We

a democracy.

have

to support the president.

me and for all

Fortunately for

The

making objection

how fortunate

war

to

scientious objection

in

is

as

wrote

1

and took part

in

antiwar demonstra-

Looking back now, you see pictures of

tions.

of major

cities

was

and chanting and

it

and

members would go down

different. I

a

But

slogans.

in the

dozen other students

beginning, faculty

dem-

mighty throngs of people choking the

onstrations, streets

large

to the

town square

of Easton, Pennsylvania, population 30,000, and stand for

one hour

people

who

in silent witness, protesting the war.

reminding them of unpleasant events

many mistook our to

the country.

I

Methodist Church service. I

"foo/

()/

The

passed us were not always friendly; we were away,

far

I was. I

Vietnam secure

in the

it

handed out

leaflets at

the

Second

and then attended the worship

heard myself denounced from the pulpit as a

Moscow

the

beginning of

my

line" by the minister.

It

was the

education into the nature and power

You

see, in the beginning, I

thought

Americans were being misled by

we had what

to

their

it

would be

government. All

do was give them more information,

really

was going on

in

easy.

tell

them

Vietnam, and .Americans

You

knowledge that It

I

was uphold-

was not

who was

I

was Lyndon Johnson and his gov-

ernment.

My

claim to conscientious-objector status was not

example of an

my

agnostic.

In fact,

beliefs.

college's

I

Supreme Court had ruled

to

CO status

an orthodox

an

you could demon-

if

by reason of "religious training or belief the

in-

as

Until 1965, you could be re-

strate that your opposition to participation in

be denied

was

alumni magazine

leased from military service only

"

But

war was in

1965

that a person could not

simply because he did not belong

religious sect. It

was enough, the high

court ruled, if the belief that prompted your decision

occupied the same place

in

your

traditional deity occupied in the I

knew

I

that the belief in a

life

of a believer.

life

objected to the war in Vietnam.

What I had

to discover was the ultimate source of that objection and

describe

it

for myself

who comprised

draft

and for the

five

board no. 90

sylvania, in the space provided

The a

first

ordinary .Americans

Allentown, Penn-

in

on Special Form 150.

"Do you

question on that form was,

believe in

Supreme Being!" There were two boxes:

checked

of authority.

Con-

as cherry pie.

could oppose American policy

ing the finest American ideals.

and

opposition to the war as opposition

even older,

is

James Madison,

a constitutional right.

American

terviewed earlier by

college newspaper

in 1635.

of the architects of the U.S. Constitution, proposed

one

see

Quakers

first

on record at the United Nations government's war in Vietnam.

antiwar protesters, this

tradition of conscientious objection

arriving with the

based on traditional religious

an

"

country has a long tradition of resistance to authority.

mittee Against the Crime of Silence and put as

over

all

met with

the reply, "The president knows more than we do. This

Com-

joined the

citizens the issue

objections to the war were

betraying America,

wrote to congressmen and received polite replies

many

arguments repeated in homes

to authority. In

demonstration could not have been

first

that their governinent stop

to see that for

was not truth or falsehood but obedience or resistance

is

more American.

and demand

came

I

belief

YES.

which

Second is

)'f5.VO.

/

item: "Describe the nature of your

the basis of your claim

and

state

whether

or not your belief in a Supreme Being involves duties

which

man

fo yiHi are superior fo those arising

rclatitm. "

Here

is

part o/ what

I

from any hu-

\\Ti)re;

211

Because I believe that from man all awareness and order come, because I believe that each man is a divine beinf^

become more

striving to

and because

divine,

relationships, I believe that

human

and

me

justice

relationships

are the highest relationships. Therefore there arc

which to

I

did not want to avoid service.

no duties

human

are superior to those arising from

my

children asked what

War,

on

I

mnJc

a

who

of support not only from

point to get

letters

agreed with

my position

I

my

who

college,

who

hut from those

surely didn't appreciate the trouhle

was causing them hut who could confirm that

sincere. I

telling if

is

had done during the Vietnam

tell

now

son knows that hfS father

was

I

them that

I

had gotten out

fwenfy years

later,

and my

was lucky, of course. Lucky to have heard of

one of 170,000 who were

is

CO status during the

Vietnam War and one of

96,000 who completed the two years of alternative service.

The war

disagreed as well, including the dean and the president

of

I

did not want to

a technicality. It

granted I

remember

re-

lations.

people

I

believe that

I

divinity manifests itself only through the love

of human

and

people at the time that twenty years into the future,

Vietnam and the

in

that war forced

young men

me and

to ask themselves

and

willing to suffer

draft of

men who

fought

hundreds of thousands of other

what values they were

die for, at an age

when we were

conscientious objection, no doubt thanks to the influ-

just learning to think for ourselves about such questions.

ence of Quakers and small peace churches

One way

of Pennsylvania where

I

grew

nessed Martin Luther King, civil

in the section

Lucky

up.

disobedience to gain basic American

were able to go to college

and once

m

there, lucky to read authors like

on what

might mean

it

me

kids like

uiiprecedented numbers,

Thoreau and Albert Camus and reflect

wit-

Lucky

rights.

when lowcr-middle-class

to live at a time

have

to

lead black people in

Jr.,

Henry David

have the time

to

to

to he a conscientious

objector to war. conscientious-objector status (m the

I filed for

I

did not

know what

the draft board refused

my

not enter the

I felt I

military.

claim.

I

I

know

did

first

would do I

never had to find

On June

out.

me

that

I

if

would

was prepared to go to

prison rather than flee to Canada, but, fortunately,

board informed

14, Flag

had been

my

Day,

I

draft

l-O, a

classified

conscientious objector.

Three days

later I

began working for the

New

York

City Department of Social Services, where a conscientious objector I

and

service,

My

Harlem.

I

knew was performing

was given

draft

a case load

board informed

his alternative

of families

me

in central

that they did not

expect to receive a call for draftees until the

fall,

which

meant

I

could

stead,

I

volunteered for two years' alternative service.

When

I

was called for a physical examination

tember,

I

around

212

sit it

informed

which meant

I

be

out and possibly not be called. In-

my

draft

board

I

in

would not appear,

uou/J be passed automatically.

me young men

Sep-

All

were going to war or to prison.

it

who had

For many,

lucky ones; I

I

have no

regrets.

And

a

common ground too well that

we make matter.

I

am one

of the

though two decades

took a stand different from those

or consented to fight the war, we the

make

the consequences of their

choices have been harsh and lasting.

ago

to

we were willing to obey,

the authority of family, public opinion, country,

or conscience.

all

day of spring 1968.

or another, those of us

choice revealed what authority

who volunteered

now stand

together on

of grief as people who understand

life is

morally serious, that the choices

convention, culminating

Focus: Chicago

the nomination at "Piga-

in

more

sus," a live pig, as their party standard bearer. Far

serious were the intentions

and objectives of the Rev-

erend Ralph Abernathy, the

man who had succeeded

Dr. Martin Luther King,

as

Jr.,

head of the Southern

Christian Leadership Conference.

mind the Democratic

Determined

to

re-

party of the broken promise of the

Great Society, Abernathy had decided

to bring a

group

of poverty-stricken Americans to the doors of the con-

vention hall ple's

launched Poor Peo-

as part of his recently

Campaign.

Fearing the worst.

Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago

prepared for the onslaught by placing the entire metropolitan police force of 12,000 on week-long, twelve-

nominated

In the words oi the presidential candidate

the 1968 Democratic Convention, "Chicago was tastrophe.

tered in a

My

wife

and beaten.

and

told her

I

shipwreck." While

its

would be

it

tor the

bat-

we had been

felt just like

1

knew

participants

the con-

vention would be a struggle, none could predict disastrous

a ca-

went home heartbroken,

I

at

just

how

Democratic party and,

hour

hour

nomination would go

but assured that the

Vice President Humphrey, hut

to

his accession to the party's leadership

would not be un-

opposed. In the weeks that followed the assassination,

Senator McCarthy's campaign gained fresh propelling

him

money.

A

a substantial influx of

York

pri-

much-needed

small boomlet of support also began to gather

around Senator George McGovern after family

him

momentum,

New

to victory in the June 18

mary and bringing

alert.

members and

their endorsement.

of

South Dakota,

aides of Robert

There was even

Kennedy gave talk in

some

deployed to the

The convention

fortified, its

while an additional

city,

site itself

was especially well

main entrance barricaded with barbed wire

and cham-link fence and

its

approaches guarded by some

2,000 police.

As all

also

National Guards-

Illinois

7,500 regular army troops were placed on twenty-four-

indeed, for the nation.

Robert Kennedy's death had

More than 5,000

shifts.

men were

it

turned out,

Daley's

well-publicized security

measures, together with his refusal to grant marching permits, dissuaded large strators

protesters

among

numbers of would-be demon-

from going to Chicago. The 10,000 youthful

who

however, were

did eventually arrive,

the more committed apostles of the antiwar

movement. Though most had no intention of provoking violence,

some

remain passive is

foolish

clearly expected a confrontation.

and degrading," one young

us," said another.

And

party circles of a possible convention draft for Senator

activist told a re-

"We're going to march and they're going

porter.

"How

to stop

can you avoid violence?"

violence there was.

On

Sunday, August 25, the

Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Bobby's younger

eve of the convention, and again the next night,

brother.

police

Nor were

the politicians the only ones planning to

exert their influence tion.

Under the

Committee

to

leadership of the National Mobilization

End the War,

were hoping to in

on the proceedings of the conven-

rally as

many

a

number of antiwar groups

as half a million protesters

Chicago while the delegates met. Members

oi the

outlandish Youth International Party, or Yippics, also

planned

to be in

attendance and hold their

own mock

moved

in

demonstrators

to

to

riot

with nightsticks and tear gas to disperse

who had encamped

defiance oi an 11:00 P.M. curfew.

moved on

"To

in the face of escalating police brutality

in

Lincoln Park

The

in

protesters then

Grant Park, where they began laying plans

march on the amphitheater. As darkness

Wednesday evening, August more gathered

in the

28, a

park across from the

ton Hotel on Michigan Avenue, the

fell

on

crowd of 5,000 or

Conrad

Hil-

city's central thor-

oughfare. There they remained until some caught sight

213

— of Rev. Abernathy and his supporters from the Poor People's Campaign,

the

only

group

had been

that

taken place more than two hours before. Ordered to halt

and disperse the demonstrators who had

set

out from

had

granted a legal permit to march. Beckoned by shouts ot

Grant Park,

"Join us!" several thousand antiwar prt)testers surged for-

tercepted the marchers at the corner ot Michigan Ave-

ward, crossed a small bridge to Michigan Avenue, and

nue and Balbo shortly before 8:00.

behind Abernathy's motley

in

fell

refused to

train.

Inside the convention hall, meanwhile, a bitter battle

a

move, the police

then charged

arrests,

over the Vietnam plank of the Democratic party plat-

sticks flailing.

form was coming to a head. Although by that point

back,

many

Senator McCarthy had

hut conceded the nomination

world

is

a large bloc of antiwar delegates from

As

Humphrey,

to

all

phalanx of helmeted

intt)

first

riot police

When

made

in-

the protesters

a series of peaceful

the crowd with their night-

While some of the demonstrators fought

fell

limp and began screaming "The whole

watching!

The whole world

is

watching!"

scenes of the violence appeared on television sets

New

York, California, Wisconsin, and several other

throughout the convention

hall, the

nominating process

states

were determined to put their stamp on the

was soon overwhelmed by a

series ot

angry denunciations

Based on a minority report hammered out

official policy.

at

party's

the platform committee hearings the previous week,

the dissidents' position called for "an unconditional end to all

bombing of North Vietnam," the mutual with-

drawal ot

all

U.S. and North Vietnamese forces from

South Vietnam, and

"political

a

reconciliation" be-

tween the Saigon government and the Vietcong leading to a coalition

government. By contrast, the majority

of

Mayor Daley and

the Chicago police.

ot criticism reached

its

The crescendo

peak when Senator Abraham

Ribicoff of Connecticut rose to deplore the "Gestapo tactics in the streets of

Chicago,"

a choice of

words that

brought a stream of obscenities from the mayor himself.

"How

hard

staring it

it

down

is

at

to accept the truth," Ribicott replied,

Daley from the podium.

"How

hard

is."

plank recommended a gradual reduction of the U.S.

The

troop presence "as the South Vietnamese are able to

mactic, as

take over larger responsibilities" and a cessation of

lenger, Senator

bombing only "when the action would not endanger

For Humphrey, the nomination was a bitter prize in-

U.S.

lives."

As speaker

after speaker rose to

defend his

deed.

formal balloting that followed proved anticli-

Humphrey

outdistanced his only serious chal-

McCarthy, by more than 1,000

The tumultuous Chicago convention had

votes.

lett

the

respective position, the debate turned increasingly ac-

party he proposed to lead deeply, perhaps hopelessly di-

— 1,567

vided, with only eight weeks to go before the general

rimonious. Even before the

final tally

was read

in favor of the majority plank, 1,041 tor the minority

the

New York delegation

began singing

come," while spectators the

"We

in the gallery

Shall Over-

chanted "Stop

War! Stop the War!"

As

was nearly 11:00 P.M.,

when Mayor

as the

Demo-

Barely had Alioto begun

when CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite

re-

onstrators outside the convention hall. "There has been a display of

naked violence as

in the streets of

Chicago,"

he interrupted the convention

proceedings to show a tape of events that had actually

2M

point lead in the polls, he would have to use that time

Democrats back together.

In the process,

could restore unity to America by bringing peace to

in fact,

ceived news of a bloody clash between police and dem-

Cronkite declared,

formidable Republican chal-

he would also have to convince the electorate that he

vention to nominate Hubert Humphrey

to speak

his

Nixon, who held a tifteen-percentage-

Vietnam plank, the

Joseph Alioto ot San Francisco stood betore the con-

cratic presidential candidate.

deteat

until late in the eve-

a result of the tight over the

It

To

lenger, Richard

to bring the

nomination balloting was delayed ning.

election.

Vietnam.

Inside the convention hall, luemhen, of the

New

)'ork

JelemUion to the

1

968 Democratic National Convention demonstrate their

backing of the minority plank on the Vietnam War.

215

t_^^^

1

v-^&ji«^^^^^^^^^ ^^HAi^MH f^^Kgf^-'^l^EwK^^Bm^

^^h31r^ K. ^^^^^^^k^li^^Ktar /

1

3l»^

^

A y

After sevenil violent confrontations with police, demonstrati)rs feather at Cbicaf^o's

Ch:uit r.irk to

on August

28, I96S, to prepare

march on the Demoi mic Convention.

217

\M:

^

Jl ^BS^ii '^'^


N.

Above.

,4 p.iir of hippies kiss

Left. Police

m

Lincoln Purk.

grab an antiwar demonstrator from the Logan

monument

in

Grant Park August .

26.

219

V,(,/ence

m Gnmr P,nk on A.^'u.sf 28.

The

has ;.srrerneveJ. Je™>mrrar..r .reenter rear-gas

the am,srcr,nJrhro.'nn backer

fK)lice.

220

'.KiiL

U«l

Police he^n l\>ck the iutrivvar protesters

;jr

(/r.inr Park.

223

ALxnc. i\dnui)jl

Right.

224

On

LiLhtrJ^nicn line f/ic .^frccf

Michiffin

Avenue near

ournJc the L'onniJ Hikon Horcl

the amvention, protesters taunt police.

f
keep

Jenurs out.

^m^ v
&*

*

.m^^^tf'^

Chicago

whom

mayor

Richard

law enforcement

Daley

(left),

officials later ac-

cused of presiding over a "police riot" during the convention,

sits

by the DemiKratic

presidential candidate, Vice President bert

Humphrey,

vention

rally.

as

he addresses

The

what turned out

vice president faced

to he

an insurmountable

task after the disaster at Chicago.

226

Hu-

a postcon-

/

/

:s.

n

y

^3

-a

^/ \

si/

'PT

r -7 ,1^^^^

^y^

^ /

/—

^

I

ml

>-'^

v/.

r / /

f^-^ ''^

NIXON'S WAR

He began

his

1968 campaign

for the presidency with a

promise "to end the war and win

the peace," intimating that he had a "secret plan." Shedding the "loser" image that had

plagued him since he

won

the primaries and

the 1960 presidential race to John Kennedy, he stormed through

lost

the Republican nomination with ease.

1968, Richard Milhous

Nixon

at last

seemed poised

Now,

in the early fall of

had so

to capture the prize that

narrowly eluded him eight years before.

The tumultuous Chicago convention had liberals

had

all

left

the Dem.ocratic party in a shambles.

The

but abandoned Vice President Humphrey, and a sizable segment of the

white working class had defected to the camp of populist third-party candidate George Wallace, the once and future Alabama governor to a nation in turmoil.

As Humphrey

set

who vowed

out on the campaign

with catcalls of "Fascist," "Warmonger," and

"Dump

the

and order"

to restore "law trail,

hecklers greeted

Hump," while

party leaders, wrote veteran political journalist Theodore White, "fled

state

him

as

and if

him local

he were

the bearer of contagion."

Deprived of the funding and organizational support he needed to mount a successful

campaign, Humphrey soon concluded that he had no choice but to distance himself from the president's discredited Vietnam policy.

On

September 30 he unveiled

a

new

three-

point peace initiative calling for a U.S. bombing halt, a turnover ot the fighting to the

South Vietnamese, and the withdrawal of

UN

Though

supervision.

official position,

it

all

"foreign forces" from South

convinced many disaffected Democrats that the vice president was not

simply "Johnson's boy." In the days that followed, treasury, volunteers joined

bring the rank and polls

had

fallen

Lett. Rich:ird

file

from

Nixon

Vietnam under

the proposal differed only slightly from the administration's

up

in droves,

back to the

fold.

into the

and the labor unions redoubled their

campaign efforts to

By the middle of October Nixon's lead

fifteen points to twelve; a

thisbes his

money poured

rrndemark victory sign

week ;ir

r/ie

later

it

in the

was down to eight.

l%(^ Repuhlicnn N^uiomil Convcnrion.

— Although Humphrey's sudden resurgence gave Nixon cause for concern,

it

did not induce

him

As

to panic.

the past, the Rcpuhlican challenger refused to be

in

pinned down on

own

his

end the war,

secret plan to

wants to go," South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van

Thieu

flatly

refused to join in any negotiations that in-

cluded the Vietcong. As a

nounced the new peace

when Johnson

result,

initiative

an-

on the night of Oc-

preferring instead to address the issue only in vague,

tober 31, he could only say that the South Vietnamese

general terms. Having observed Johnson's futile escala-

were "free to participate"

tions,

he ruled out a military victory

Vietnam and

in

favored a "de-Americanization" of the war

But

effort.

expanded

in the

talks sched-

uled to follow.

Despite Thieu's intransigence, news of the bombing

he also opposed an unconditional U.S. bombing halt

halt provided an

and warned of the dangers of "precipitate withdrawal."

campaign. Opinion surveys taken

To

president's speech revealed that Nixon's lead

Nixon claimed

justify his evasiveness,

that he did

immediate boost

Humphrey

the

to

in the

wake oi the had dwin-

not want to undermine the Johnson administration's ne-

dled to an insignificant two percentage points with only

gotiations with Hanoi, even though his entire campaign

a

few days to go before the general election. Just when

it

seemed that Humphrey might overtake

strategy

was predicated on the assumption that there

would be no peace agreement

Unknown

prior to the election.

Nixon, however, by mid-October 1968

to

his

accusing the Johnson administration of "betrayal of an

the prospects of a breakthrough in Paris seemed brighter

ally"

than ever before. In

agreed to negotiate directly with Saigon.

moving, the American negotiating team led by

talks

W.

a last-ditch effort to get the stalled

hammered out

Averell Harriman had

a secret "un-

Republican

however. President Thieu intensified his protests,

rival,

and vowing

to boycott the Paris talks until

On

Hanoi

Tuesday,

November

5, as

faded,

million Americans went to the polls and

73

hopes of an imminent peace settlement

derstanding" with the North Vietnamese that called for

elected Richard

a series of concrete, de-escalatory steps by both sides.

the United States.

Under the terms

of the informal agreement, the U.S.

500,000 votes, or

bombing

hardly amounted to a mandate. Nevertheless, the

offered to stop a

its

Vietnamese

cities

and

a limitation of

DMZ. More

follow, based

on

exchange

for

and mortar attacks on St)uth

cessation of rocket

across the

unilaterally in

NVA

infiltration

substantive peace talks would

a subtle "our side, your side"

that would permit the

inclusion ot both

Vietnamese government and the

NLF

formula

the South

without requiring

Nixon the

thirty-seventh president of

The margin .7

of victory

—fewer than

percent of the total electorate

new

president-elect fully understood the task that lay before

To

avoid the fate of his predecessor, he would have

fulfill

the promise that launched his election cam-

him. to

He would have

paign.

"to

end the war and win the

peace," and he would have to do to a nation increasingly at

it

war with

in a

way acceptable

itself.

the formal recognition of either party.

Ever skeptical of Hanoi's intentions, President John-

son

initially

opposed Harriman's ingeniously devised

proposal. But after General a

bombing

halt

would not jeopardize U.S. troops

field,

he reluctantly gave

have

it

said of

Abrams convinced him

me

his assent.

man

that one

"I

that

in the

don't want to

died tomorrow

who

As many in fact

of his critics had suspected

had no "secret plan"

did have a

number of

No

sooner had the president reached that decision,

however, than the South Vietnamese balked. Declaring that his

government was not

to a locomotive

230

after taking office in

1953, "Eisenhower to

North Koreans that we would not

a chance. We'll try it."

a "car that

can be hitched

and taken anywhere the locomotive

first

and

Eisenhower's quick resolution of the Korean conflict.

word go out diplomatically

is

end the war, though he

to

informed his approach to the problem. Perhaps

his advisers. "1 don't think

happen, but there

Nixon

foremost, he had been deeply influenced by President

Soon

will

along,

strong ideas and impulses that

could have been saved by this plan," the president told it

all

war of

attrition,"

"and within

a

Nixon believed as a hard-line

let

the

the Chinese and the tolerate this continual

the former vice president recalled,

matter of months,

they negotiated."

that he could exploit his

anti-Communist

own

reputation

to similar advantage. "I

call

it

the

advisers.

Madman

Theory," he explained to one

"We'll just

let

of his

the wtird slip to |the North

Vietnamese] that, 'For God's sake, you know Nixon obsessed

when

about Communists.

he's angry

— and he has

We his

can't

restrain

is

him

hand on the nuclear

In addition to threatening

Nixon thought he could

Hanoi with annihilation,

cajt)le

the Soviet

perhaps even China into serving U.S. a concept

Union and

interests.

Relying

he called "linkage," he planned to use the

lure of arms control and expanded trade to win Soviet

cooperation

field

in

moving the North Vietnamese toward

a

of foreign

affairs,

he

still

as

an expert

in

needed someone ca-

pable of translating his grand geopolitical designs into reality.

The man he

Henry A. choice.

button.'

on

Even though Nixon regarded himself the

A

selected, national security adviser

Kissinger, was in

some

respects an unlikely

senior professor of government at Harvard

University, a frequent contributor to the Council of For-

eign Relations, and a former adviser to

New

York gov-

ernor Nelson Rt)ckefeller, the erudite Kissinger seemed to personify the Eastern liberal establishment that

had battled throughout differences

in

his political

background

and

Yet for

Nixon

all

their

temperament,

the

life.

peaceful settlement of the war. In the case of China, he

German-born academician and the Middle-American

speculated that the offer of a rapprochement with the

politician also

United States might induce

Mao

Tse-tung to put

in-

in

common. Both

the conduct of foreign policy ought

tt^

believed that

be centrally di-

rected and tightly controlled, bold in conception but

creased pressure on Hanoi.

PresiJenr Nixim's national securicy adviser, Henry Kissinger,

had much

h'/i
was ro play a major n>le in Viernam's

fiicure.

231

pragmatic

in

execution. Both shared a contempt for ca-

and bureaucrats

reer diplomats

And

secrecy and intrigue.

as well as a

penchant

for

both were fascinated by,

it

not wholly obsessed with, the uses of power.

no

Kissinger wasted

time. Shortly after

noon on

auguration day, January 20, 1969, he ordered his

American

to canvass

officials in

in-

staff

Washington and Saigon

for their appraisals of the situation in

To

Vietnam.

in-

sure against the usual bureaucratic collusion, Kissinger insisted that

each agency respond independently to

a

detailed questionnaire covering virtually every aspect of

The bundle

the war.

known

as

of confidential reports, collectively

National Security Study Memorandum-1,

vealed sharply divergent views. Senior military at

MACV, CINCPAC,

re-

officials

and the JCS, along with the

Saigon embassy, tended to be optimistic about current

and future prospects, while tagon, the

cidedly

civilian analysts at the Pen-

CIA, and the State Department were

more

"de-

skeptical," Kissinger informed the presi-

dent. Neither group foresaw a rapid conclusion to the

The

war, however.

"bulls" estimated that

at least eight years, the "bears"

for the

GVN

it

would take

more than thirteen

years,

to gain sufficient popular support to crush

the Vietcong insurgency. If

nothing

else,

the findings of

NSSM-1

Kissinger's conviction that the U.S.

gotiate

its

way out of the

war.

The

reaffirmed

would have

to ne-

only question was

how. Like Nixon, Kissinger believed that the war had to be

ended honorably

prestige. Like

Nixon,

for the sake of

too,

America's global

he was willing

to use force to

wrest concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table.

Where he

differed

from the president, however, was

his assessment of overall

in

U.S. objectives. While Nixon

envisioned a durable peace agreement that would preserve a

non-Communist regime

in

South Vietnam,

Kis-

singer was far less concerned about the ultimate fate of

America's

ally.

"However we

singer observed, "the

cans has settled the issue of involved

now

is

got into Vietnam," Kis-

commitment of 500,000 Ameri-

confidence

in

[its]

importance.

What

is

American promises." For

Their patrol of seven Americans and twenty-five South Vietna-

mese ambushed near Dak To, an as

an American

232

calls for help,

ARVN soldier dives

1969.

for cover

233

Kissinger, a settlement that gave

South Vietnam a "rea-

sonable" chance to survive would

suffice, as

United States was perceived to have

long as the

up to

lived

com-

its

Within

their initial negotiating position

failed,

was essentially

Em-

the same as that of the Johnson administration.

ploying a two-tiered approach,

they sought to reach

agreement with Hanoi on the mutual withdrawal of "external" forces, leaving to resolve their

own

it

to the

GVN

NLF

and the

"internal" political dispute.

all

As

in

no

fighting slackened con-

discernible change in the overall

military balance of power.

mitment. Though Nixon and Kissinger were confidenr that they could succeed where their predecessors had

week the pace of the

a

siderably, leaving

Although preparations fensive

took

spring of

had begun long before the Nixon administration

office,

the timing of the attacks, according to Kis-

"humiliated the

singer,

Communist

for the

new

president." Already frus-

trated by Hanoi's intransigence at the negotiating table,

an enraged Nixon decided "to do something

[the

Com-

munists] will understand." Against the advice of Kissinger,

who

worried about the long-range diplomatic con-

the past, however, the North Vietnamese resisted any

sequences of any impulsive action, but with the

attempt to separate military and political

endorsement of the JCS, on March 16 Nixon ordered

issues,

while

the South Vietnamese remained adamantly opposed to talks with the

NLF. Early

efforts to

apply Nixon's link-

full

the bombing of North Vietnamese base camps in neutral

Cambodia. He assumed,

correctly as

it

turned out, that

age strategy proved equally unsuccessful. After Kissinger

the North Vietnamese would not protest any such raids,

informed Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the

since their objection would indirectly confirm the long-

U.S. was eager first

needed to

made

to negotiate

what happened

gardless of

a variety of topics but

wanted improved

clear that they

it

on

settle the issue of the war, the

Russians

relations re-

Vietnam.

in

denied presence of

NVA

troops inside Cambodia. But

the president thought that disclosure of the

might have severe repercussions

at

a large extent, the stalemate in negotiations reflection

direct

strategy

while

"fighting

of

negotiating," to

if

Communist their

to underscore that point,

forces throughout

the

to a

North

make concessions

so long as they retained the capacity to

As

a

of the continuing stalemate on the

Vietnamese lacked any incentive

tively.

was

Having already committed themselves

battlefield.

wage war

effec-

on February 23

South Vietnam launched

1969 post-Tet offensive,

a coordinated series of

attacks directed primarily against allied logistical and

support installations. guerrilla

forces

As

in

1968, Vietcong local and

spearheaded the assaults while

Main-Force units held back

in reserve.

abroad.

Accordingly, elaborate precautions were taken to shroud the operation in near total secrecy.

To

bombing

home and

NVA

But otherwise

Not only were

withheld from most government

details

officials,

the

includ-

ing the secretary of the air force and the air force chief

of

but an intricate dual reporting system was intro-

staff,

duced strikes

air

from normal channels. Under the code name

Menu, the 18,

Pentagon to divert information on the

at the

began the following day, March

air strikes

unbeknown

American people. Though

to the

origi-

nally intended to be of short duration, the operation

continued

for the

next fourteen months. All told, 3,630

B-52 Arc Light missions were than 100,000 tons

of

fltiwn,

drt)pping

bombs on Cambodian

Nixon had good reason

to be

public's reaction to his policies.

more

territory.

concerned about the

Though opinion

polls

the country-wide offensive bore scant resemblance to

taken in the early spring of 1969 suggested that most

the previous year's cataclysmic wave of attacks. Aided

Americans had adopted

by an improved intelligence network and redeployed to

the

form a screen around the major population centers,

that criticism

lied forces intercepted

their base

groups.

As

many enemy

camps and forced them a result, only in a

to break into small

few places were the

munists able to mount large-scale ground

nowhere did they succeed

234

in

al-

units as they left

Com-

assaults,

penetrating the

and

cities.

new

a wait-and-see attitude

president's handling of the war,

would mount quickly

progress toward peace.

He

if

he

toward

Nixon knew

failed to

therefore decided to

public the proposals he had already

make make

communicated

vately to Hanoi. In a major address to the nation

May

14,

cease-fire,

he

set forth

an eight-point plan calling

a pullout of all

pri-

on

for a

American and North Viet-

namese troops over of prisoners of war.

a

one-year

At

and an exchange

perit)d,

the urging ot Secretary of Defense

2.

Hanoi did

American proposal

agree, however, to an

to h(jld secret peace talks outside the Paris

framework.

Melvin

Laird, a staunch advocate of "Vietnamization,"

On

that

turning the fighting over to the South Vietna-

encounters between Kissinger and North Vietnamese

is,

mese, Nixon also initiated planning

phased with-

tor a

August

the

4,

diplomat Xuan Thuy took place

drawal of U.S. combat forces. In June, after conferring

former French colonial

with President Thieu on Midway Island, he announced

diately

the immediate redeployment of the

would prove no more

increment of

first

25,000 U.S. troops.

tions

Neither the peace initiative of

May

in a long series of clandestine

tirst

official

became apparent

at the

apartment of a

outside Paris.

It

imme-

that these informal exchanges

than the formal negotia-

fruitful

taking place only a few miles away.

Kissinger

14 nor the pros-

merely reiterated the same proposals and ultimatum that

pect of GIs coming home, however, was enough to curb

Hanoi had already spurned, while Xuan Thuy parroted

growing opposition to Nixon's Vietnam policy. After

the standard North Vietnamese

the North Vietnamese publicly denounced the presi-

eral

dent's latest offer as a "farce," indicating they were pre-

and the establishment

became

included the Vietcong.

pared to

sit

in Paris "until the chairs rot,"

clear that there

it

would be no diplomatic breakthrough

near future. And, while most Americans favored

in the

a shift ot the burden of fighting to the South Vietna-

mese, the absence of any

set timetable

diminished the

withdrawal ot

all

to decide

war or

ization plan he

troop puUout by the end of 1970, while hawks rallied

urged Nixon to

"meaningful move" against North Vietnam. More omi-

nous

still,

from Nixon's point ot view, the organized peace

government that

whether

to carry out his threat

back entirely on the Vietnam-

fall

had inherited from the Johnson admin-

like

for a

of a coalition

to escalate the

istration. Kissinger,

demand

U.S. troops, the ouster ot Thieu,

who now had

mer, Congressional doves were calling for a total U.S.

Russell's

for the unilat-

Hanoi's continuing intransigence infuriated Nixon,

appeal of Nixon's phased withdrawal plan. By midsum-

behind Georgia senator Richard

demand

convinced that "a fourth-rate power

North Vietnam" had

North Vietnam. "At

a

to

have "a breaking point,"

"savage, punishing blow"

inflict a

minimum,"

recalled

a Kissinger aide at the time, "the attack plan

ris,

on

Roger Morwould

include the mining of the port of Haiphong and inland

movement, dormant since the previous fall, began stirring

waterways, a naval blockade, and intensive bombing

again with plans for large demonstrations in the

strikes at military targets

In response to the

July

Nixon

hastily

designed, as he put

other

—

mounting chorus of

adopted a new "go it,

for

fall.

criticism, in

broke" strategy

end the war one way or the

"to

and population centers." More

extreme options included the bombing

of the

Red River

dikes to flood North Vietnam's vital farmland and the closing ot

supply lines at the Chinese border.

rail

Defense Secretary Laird and Secretary ot State Wil-

either by negotiated agreement or by force."

sent a personal mes-

liam Rogers vehemently opposed Kissinger's recommen-

expressing his sincere desire for

dation, imploring the president not to take any action

a "just peace" but also threatening to resort "to measures

that would incite further domestic protest. Laird, in par-

of great consequence and force"

ticular,

Through French intermediaries he sage to

did not

Ho Chi Minh,

move

forward by

if

the Paris negotiations

November

versary of President Johnson's

1

— the

bombing

halt.

score the gravity ot the message, Kissinger

first

To

anni-

under-

met again

with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, warning him that "as far as

Vietnam

station

and

is

is

concerned, the train has

now heading down

Nixon's ultimatum drew ing

Ho Chi Minh, whose

a

just left the

rcbutt^'

from the

would "not be

satisfied

with

less"

than "the eventual

disengagement of American men from combat." His belief

that the South Vietnamese were approaching the

point where they could defend themselves found confir-

mation

in the

sanguine appraisal of Sir Robert

Thomp-

who

told the

son, the British counterinsurgency expert,

the track."

"cold

lic

had long been persuaded that the American pub-

ail-

written reply reached 'Wash-

ington only a few days before his death on September

president in October that, with continued .American aid, the

Saigon government might be strong enough to

ht)ld

own

its

within two years.

235

After the post-Tet 1969 offensive, a nun returns to her village

Vietnam Saigon.

home

in

Dong

Lach, a small

of Catholic refugees from North thirty

kilometers northeast of

The town's

cluster

of sheet-metal

shacks, occupied by the Communists, were virtually destroyed

explosive

by napalm and high-

bombs dropped by U.S. and

South Vietnamese

NVA

aircraft.

At

left is

body

of an

dry

out and reduce putrefaction.

it

soldier,

the

quick-limed to

ismimmm^^-

^^^^^.J

In rhc end,

Nixon

reluctantly shelved the Kissinger

plan, at least tor the time being. "I'm not sure we're

ready for this," he told his aides.

Whether he had

ac-

tually become convinced that Vietnamization would

military

move remains

any bold

public's reaction to

work or simply feared the

unclear.

At

the time of his de-

an

cision, Nixon's approval rating in the polls stood at

extraordinary 71 percent, largely as a result of his Sep-

tember announcement of a second troop withdrawal

as

well as a reduction in draft calls. Yet despite consider-

able public support, he had not been able to stop the

spread of antiwar sentiment

the more vocal and

among

elements of the population

influential

—

labor leaders,

educators, press commentators, clergy, and even cor-

porate executives.

The extent

to

which antiwar

had become

protest

re-

spectable was demonstrated dramatically on October 15,

when hundreds heeded the observe a

of thousands of middle-class Americans

call of the

movement

organized peace

to

national "Moratorium Day." Across the na-

tion church bells tolled in

remembrance of the Ameri-

can war dead, the names of those

killed

were read

at

candlelight services, and peaceful marchers sang the antiwar chant "Give Peace a Chance." Outside the United Stares,

don,

moratorium demonstrations were held

in

Lon-

Copenhagen, Tokyo, and Sydney, while

Paris,

Vietnam some American servicemen joined

in

in the ob-

servance by wearing black arm bands on patrol.

Though he

feigned indifference, the president was

deeply angered and alarmed by the mass protests.

Not

only did such demonstrations encourage North Viet-

namese

more important

intractability, but, perhaps

his view,

they also threatened to undermine

credibility.

As

a result,

when antiwar

leaders

plans to hold a second moratorium on

Nixon went on the counterattack. address to the nation

his

in

own

announced

November

15,

In a shrewdly crafted

on November

3,

he staunchly de-

fended the American commitment to Saigon, warning that an abrupt puUout would lead to a "bloodbath" in

Vietnam and ership.

He

Training the

a loss of faith

then proceeded to

ARVN.

soldiers as they take

238

abroad in American leadlay out his

Vietnamization

U.S. Marines supervise South Vietnamese

aim with their

M16

rifles.

r^

I

{.

plan in some detail, saying that

American

casualties

gardless of

promised to reduce

it

and bring the war

an end

to

what the North Vietnamese

did.

re-

Finally,

Nixon entered

Nevertheless, by early 1970, as

second year

in office,

looked

it

as

might actually work. Supplied with huge quantities of

American weaponry and expanded

against the advice of his entire cabinet, the president

the latest

attacked the antiwar protesters as "irresponsible" and

level of

accused them of sabotaging his quest for an honorable

become one

peace. Appealing to what he called "the great silent

world.

majority," he asked for "united" support and concluded

could fight aggressively and effectively

with a melodramatic admonition: "North Vietnam can-

and

not defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Amer-

formance

icans can do that."

Much

majority" speech was overwhelmingly positive,

once

again boosting his standing in the polls and bringing a

"We've got

bipartisan vote of confidence from Congress.

those liberal bastards on the run now," the president

"and we're going

to

keep them on the

run." Entrusted with the job of keeping up the pursuit.

Vice President Spiro

Agnew broadened and

the administration's attacks on

its

intensified

domestic "enemies."

Having already dismissed the antiwar effete corps of

protesters as "an

impudent snobs who characterize them-

selves as intellectuals," he

now

took on the "liberal es-

tablishment press," which he described as "a small and unelected elite" that "do not

—

repeat not

I

—represent

if

moment

to a force

had already

of the largest, best-equipped armies in the

Many

of

some

in

ARVN

million men,

1

units

its

had shown, moreover, that they

when

well led,

had even improved

cases they

after supporting

ment control over to bear fruit. In

their per-

U.S. forces were withdrawn.

the countryside were at

the president and his

men

in putting their critics

on the defensive, they

succeeded for the

soon learned that they could not silence them. The No-

vember 15 moratorium drew even more than the October demonstrations,

adopted by General Abrams

South Vietnamese

forces

a

in

1969,

had shifted

their

American and emphasis from

large-scale search-and-destroy missions to smaller "clear-

ing" operations designed to protect the rural population.

Under the new

pacification-oriented plan, elected vil-

lage councils were entrusted with responsibility for local security,

training

territorial

defense forces were given formal

Ml 6s,

and equipped with

and

a variety of "civic

action" programs were reintroduced to promote eco-

nomic development.

In conjunction with these self-help

measures, the CIA's controversial Phoenix Program suc-

ceeded

20,000

in inflicting severe

VC

damage

to the Vietcong.

figures,

in

Ac-

1969 alone nearly

cadres were "neutralized" through arrest or

assassination under the auspices of Phoenix, sharply re-

ducing the enemy's Yet for

participants

more than

as

beginning

last

accordance with the "one war" strategy

cording to U.S. Embassy

the view of America."

Yet

more than

Equally encouraging, allied efforts to extend govern-

to Nixon's delight, the response to his "silent

told his aides,

his

though Vietnamization

all

the

ability to tax

new

and

recruit.

gains that had been made,

of the same old problems persisted. Despite

and modern

ARVN

its

many

increased

quarter-million protesters converged on Washington,

size

D.C., alone. Carrying placards bearing the names of

age of competent officers and

U.S. war dead and describing themselves

as the "Silent

corruption at almost every level, and a seemingly un-

Majority for Peace," they served notice to the Nixon

shakable reliance on American advice and firepower.

administration that there would be no lasting peace in

Despite improved security and increased democracy in

America

until there

was peace

Thus,

as the year

drew

self

engaged

talks

in

Nixon found him-

in a stalemate at every turn.

remained deadlocked,

South Vietnam

virtually

the

The

military

Paris peace

balance

ing matters worse, the

242

in

unchanged, and the American

public polarized over the proper course to pursue.

running out of options.

suffered from a short-

still

NCOs, an abundance

of

the villages, signs of genuine enthusiasm for the Thieu

Vietnam.

to a close,

look,

American president was

Mak-

rapidly

government were

scarce.

still

And

despite the inroads

of Phoenix, the Vietcong infrastructure remained intact, its

relative inactivity in large part reflecting Hanoi's de-

cision to wait until the

In the opinion of

Americans

many

the South Vietnamese needed, time. General

Abrams,

left for

good.

senior U.S. officials, what

above

all,

was more

for one, strongly believed that

the American pullout was proceedinj^ too quickly, and

he therefore urged the president

to defer plans tor an-

other major troop withdrawal. But Nixon, under unre-

home,"

lenting domestic pressure to "bring the boys

overruled his commander. Hoping to "drop a bombshell

on the gathering spring storm of antiwar put

it,

in

late April

protest," as he

Nixon announced

that

150,000

more troops would be redeployed from Vietnam by the end

of

1970.

At the same

time, however, he acceded

to the military's long-standing request that allied

forces be allowed to attack aries inside

ground

North Vietnamese sanctu-

Cambodia.

ations.

To

such a

move would

ing Saigon

As

a variety of consider-

begin with, he accepted the judgment of

Abrams and other high-ranking

abandoned

that he could bludgeon the

North Vietnamese into

compromise settlement through

military

relieve pressure

and buy valuable time

on U.S. for

officials

that

forces guard-

Vietnami:ation.

An

force.

to take

conviction a

unexpected thrust into theoretically neutral that he was willing

more extreme measures than had President John-

son, compelling

take us

his

dramatic show o{

a

Cambodia would prove once again

on

all

Hanoi

to decide

"whether they want

to

over again." Finally, the recent overthrow

of Cambodia's neutralist leader. Prince

Norodom

nouk, by the pro-American Lon Nol prt)vidcd

Siha-

a previ-

ously lacking rationale for widening the war. By mid-

Cambodia was

in a state

of near anarchy. North

Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge

forces were pushing the

April

Nixon's decision to authorize a cross-border invasion

seems to have been motivated by

In addition, he h.id not yet

Cambodian army back

into the interior,

and Lon Nol,

with American encouragement, was openly calling outside help.

"We

need

a

bold

move ...

to

we stand with Lon Nol," Nixon informed April 26. Even though he might

fall

enemy

rear bases there in

for

that

Kissinger

on

anyway, "we must

men of May 1970.

the war progressed, nonstandard dress became standard tor the increasingh' ambivalent tightmg force. Here,

Division (Airmobile) pause in Cambodia's Fishhook region during the invasion of

show

the 1st Cavalry

243

Death

at

Kent

State.

Guardsmen on May

A

4,

young woman screams

in

anguish as she kneels over the body ot Jeffrey Glen Miller, felled in hre by National

1970.

do something symbolic"

for the

in the last twenty-five years

only

Cambodian

leader

"with the guts to take a pro-

Western and pro- American stand."

The

Nixon." Rather than

selling his action simply as a matter of as the military tify

the

"good

"incursion"

in

soft-

tactics,"

had recommended, he attempted

Cambodian

global terms.

on the evening

1970, in a televised speech that was, in

Kissinger's words, "vintage

to jus-

hyperbolic,

even

The North Vietnamese, he contended,

were preparing "to launch massive attacks on our forces

and those of the South Vietnamese" from tuaries in

Cambodia. Hanoi was

their sanc-

testing the "will

and

character" of the United States in an effort to expose

244

"pitiful, helpless

lenge" would only encourage "the forces of totalitari-

president revealed his decision

of April 30,

"the world's most powerful nation" as a

giant." Failure to respond to the enemy's "direct chal-

anism and anarchy

Ito]

threaten free nations and free

institutions throughout the world." ical

considerations,"

Nixon

Spuming

declared, he

"all polit-

had decided

to

follow his conscience rather than be "a two-term president at the cost of seeing defeat in

Even

its

as

sound

Nixon

America

.

.

.

accept the

first

190-years' history."

spoke. South Vietnamese forces were

already operating inside the Parrot's Beak, a narrow protrusion of

having later,

first

Cambodian

territory

crossed the border

on the morning of May

northwest of Saigon,

on April 1,

a

29.

Two

days

combined U.S.-

ARVN

men

force o( 15,000

region farther north. artillery fire

and

mored personnel Regiment

plunged into the Fishhook

Moving behind columns

air strikes,

and

of tanks

led the way, followed by troop-laden helicop-

Though

the invading troops expected to meet with heavy tance,

fled

of

in

advance, leaving behind vast store-

ammunition,

weapons,

The

materiel.

cover

COSVN

allied

command had

and also

war

other

hoped

to dis-

(Central Office for South Vietnam), the

alleged headquarters for

all

Communist

forces operating

found only "a scattering of

in the South. Instead they

empty huts" that bore

little

resemblance to the minia-

Pentagon they had imagined.

ture

resis-

soon became apparent that the North Vietna-

it

mese had houses

ar-

Armored Cavalry

carriers of the 11th

of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

ters

heavy

a shield of

The Americans

Mark

of South Dakota and

Hatfield of

U.S. pullout from Vietnam by the end of 1971.

Nixon immediately launched

Characteristically,

The time had come

counterattack.

around" with

his Congressional opponents,

sword, don't take

strict

out

it

Warning

the gut."

—

that

me. Congress

if

will

stick

it

in hard.

credi-bility

domestic ical

critics

and

verify suspected links

one of the most

project represented

it

tors

war and

campuses across the country erupted instances with tragic results.

in protest, in

On May

State students were shot, four of

university

them

4,

fatally,

were

still

because Nixon stole the opposition's

thunder by removing before June 30. Yet

all

U.S. troops from Cambodia

the president had survived the

if

with his authority intact, his options for

latest crisis

more

than ever. The

National Guardsmen sent in to maintain "law and or-

future action were

der." Several days later, two

bodian venture may have bought time

at

more students were

killed

Jackson State College in Mississippi during an angry

tion,

but

first

capacity to

week

and

gotiations.

May, hundreds of thousands

in

had gone on

strike

of students

to protest the shootings,

prompting more than 400 colleges and universities shut

down

to

had

Vietnamiza-

seriously diminished Hanoi's

make war nor broken It

for

Cam-

the deadlock in ne-

provoked the most violent out-

also

burst of antiwar protest since the war began, intensifying

pressure to speed up the pace of the

American with-

drawal and imposing clear limits on the future use of

entirely.

The expansion

restricted

had neither

it

confrontation with local police. By the end of the

faculty

won

unwilling to accept responsibility for the

in part

Kent

by Ohio

later

investigation during the 1973 Watergate

some

thirteen

and would

the approval of Congress, in part because most legisla-

commentators lashed out

the president,

The

serious abuses of

nor the more extreme McGovern-Hatfield proposal

exceeded his worst expectations. As prominent media at

between rad-

end neither the Cooper-Church amendment

In the

Cambodian invasion

also ordered

groups in the U.S. and foreign governments.

hearings.

the military benefits of the

undermining

the formation of a special covert team to monitor his

come under

short of Nixon's hopes, the domestic reaction to

for

and prolonging the war. He

immediate threat to the heavily populated Saigon-Bien

If

re-

have to assume the conse-

quences," he blamed his adversaries

U.S.

Hit 'em in

"Congress undertakes to

the destruction of the enemy's base camps relieved any

fell

he told his

"Don't worry about divisiveness. Having drawn the

staff.

presidential authority in U.S. history

corridor.

a

to stop "screwing

nevertheless pronounced the operation a success, since

Hoa

Oregon cospon-

sored an even more restrictive proposal requiring a total

of the war into

Cambodia

voked an angry response from Congress.

also pro-

In the

first

di-

U.S. combat troops.

Nixon assumed the

rect challenge to presidential authority since the begin-

pledged to end was

ning of the war, the Senate voted overwhelmingly in

promised to win was

A

year and a half after Richard

presidency,

still

the war that he had

going on, and the peace that ho

still

not

in sight.

June to rescind the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964Senators John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Frank

Church

of Idaho dratted a resolution setting a June 30

deadline for the termination of ations in

all

U.S. military oper-

Cambodia, while Senators George McGovern

245

Ar

Fire

Support Base

most U.S. busc

in

Fuller, the

northern-

South Vietnnm, Januiuy

1970.

'^-

'

f

^%

I,;

=v

afternoon the tanks collided with an entrenched North

Focus: The Cambodian Incursion

Vietnamese battalion. The ensuing the Fourth of July," recalled

Donn

adier General

with tactical

dead

By and

like

Brig-

minutes the Amer-

the ground with tank-

and pounded them from the sky

fire

When

air strikes.

the stubborn defenders

driven from their fortifications, fifty-two

finally

NVA

"looked

Cav commander

Starry. For sixty

enemy bunkers from

icans blasted

mounted cannon

were

1th

1

fight

lay sprawled across the

smoking

battlefield.

however, the Americans encountered

large,

only scattered resistance. Well aware of the armored

might being readied across the border, most enemy units

had chosen discretion over valor and withdrawn to the

From the

Vietnam War the Communists

outset of the

west ahead of the American advance.

enjoyed one enormous advantage over their American

network of secure bases and staging areas

adversaries: the just

beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam. American

intelligence eventually located fourteen major

bases inside Cambodia,

Saigon.

MACV

some only

enemy

thirty-five miles

from

repeatedly sought permission to launch

Most, but not

located supply depot force.

7 at speeds of

noon of the

tral" states, just as regularly refused.

Johnson's prohibi-

American troops who believed

tions frustrated

that

if

they were allowed to pursue the North Vietnamese across the frontier, they could hurt the

months

lived. Fifteen

Nixon gave them

On May

1

after

enemy where he

he came to

office,

1th

1

raced north along

fifth.

thousands of

Once

outskirts of

Snuol by the

using canisters

airstrip,

steel pellets to silence

carriers

Armored Cavalry Regiment churned

enemy

concentrated rocket and automatic-weapons

wave of CH-47 Chinook

helicopters carried troop-

Air Cavalry Division into landing zones

1st

by gigantic

bombs. "This Cambodian operation

one senior U.S. from a World

While

1st

Cav

and fanned out

II

pure blitzkrieg,"

something

Panzer division's book of tactics."

troopers consolidated their positions

in search of the

brushed through scattered

then rolled north across

248

is

15,000-pound

officer told a reporter, "like

War

enemy, the

RPG

flat,

fire.

For the rest of the day and through the night

town with napalm and high

air force

explosives. Periodically the

tanks returned to the task, firing volley after volley of

cannon

fire

into the crumbling, burning buildings, while

enemy

tance and mortars crashed into the rubble.

from the

positions.

ward the central marketplace where they were met by

land jutting into Binh Long Province. Overhead, wave

blasted out of the jungle

with

filled

the airstrip was secured, the tanks advanced to-

helicopter gunships rocketed pockets of

ers

after-

Immediately the tanks formed up and

across the border into the Fishhook, a narrow swath of

after

Highway throwing

fighter-bombers screamed through the sky plastering the

bombardment, tanks and armored personnel

(APCs) of the

occupied by a large enemy

sixty-five miles per hour,

stormed the town's

Richard

the chance.

1970, following a predawn air and artillery

,

up to

and reaching the

rivers

political repercussions of violating the territory of "neu-

4 the 11th Cavalry was

armored-vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs) across three

who wanted

ground war and feared the

still

The 100-tank column

operations against these sanctuaries; President Johnson, to contain the

On May

all.

ordered to proceed to the town of Snuol, a strategically

fire

open

1

1th Cavalry

along the frontier, terrain. Late in the

1

1th Cavalry entered the city on the morning of

there was nothing

during the night. civilians.

"We

one senior

didn't

officer,

troops coined a

meaning

left

The

but ruins.

for

NVA

the

May

had

6

fled

only bodies were those of four

want

to

blow

this

town away,"

said

"but we had no choice." American

new word

after the battle

—

to "snuol,"

to obliterate.

Yet the fighting of the

way

The

resis-

When

what turned out

operation.

Hoping

to bag

first

few days only cleared the

to be the real

enemy

work of the

troops the Americans

found

themselves

the

instead

treasure, for the fleeing

NVA

heir

had

left

the

to

ing quantity of equipment and supplies.

from the

around

1st

enemy's

behind a staggerInfantrymen

Cavalry Division organized the search

support bases established throughout the

fire

American commanders did not have was the same

dom

free-

enjoyed by their South Vietnamese counterparts.

Responding

storm of domestic protest, President

to a

Nixon announced no deeper than

that the incursion would penetrate

and conclude by

thirty-four kilometers

Fishhook. Working in tandem with teams of light ob-

June iO. Although U.S. gunships, fighter-bombers, and

servation helicopters and Cobra gunships, the troopers

B-52s continued

immediately began locating enormous hoards of enemy

and special land-clearing units slashed through the dense

arms and ammunition.

forest

One

"The City,"

of the most remarkable finds was

a

two-square-mile complex buried deep in the jungle south of Snuol complete with street signs, barracks, mess halls,

classrooms,

swimming age

recreation hall,

and pig farm. Inside the 400

pool,

and

sheds,

lumberyard,

range,

firing

bunkers

linked

by

huts, stor-

rice,

16,000 pounds of corn, 58,000 pounds

of plastic explosives, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition,

300

more than 200 crew-served weapons, and

trucks,

enough small arms later

and

for fifty-five battalions.

forty kilometers northeast,

another

discovered

NVA

dubbed Rock Island East in Illinois.

of

enemy

tained in

The

1st

Rock

Two

Cav the

installation

after the

The Cambodian

days

soldiers

troopers

Island Arsenal

some

329 tons of munitions.

spectacular booty uncovered in the Fishhook

ARVN

Parrot's Beak, the principal

to

task force scoured the

enemy

Rome

enemy

positions

American ground troops

plows,

to content themselves with the backbreaking

emptying the enemy sanctuaries. Engineers

much

to haul out as

work

built roads

and smaller caches were

as possible,

discovered faster than they could be destroyed. In saults

mid-May the Communists launched on American

scattered as-

what appeared

firebases in

to be the

prelude to a concerted counterattack. But the arrival of the

monsoon

sides to a halt.

On

June 28, two days before the

dent's deadline, the last

left

of the

presi-

American tanks rumbled back

across the border while U.S. air and artillery

what was

on both

rains in early June brought fighting

enemy

hammered

sanctuaries with a farewell

bombardment.

When

they

learned they would be going into

first

Cambodia, many GIs had reacted with helicopter pilot put

overshadowed what was happening 100 kilometers the south, where an elite

with giant

suspected

simply put to the torch. But supplies continued to be

version, the largest cache

materiel ever captured during the war, conall

of

three-foot-deep

trenches and miles of tunnels the troopers found 60,000

pounds of

had

pummel

to

it,

bat assaults near the

"We

had

In

staging area for the

we were

all

pleasure.

many men

As one in

com-

Cambodia border while the gooks

would go back into Cambodia, us, so

lost

and laugh

there,

sit

at

together for going in."

American terms they

what

got

largely

they

1968 Tet offensive. Driving into Cambodia two days

wanted. The incursion dealt the enemy a significant

before U.S. forces kicked off their part of the operation,

back, killing an estimated 4,776 men, destroying nearly

the South Vietnamese had to blast their way through

12,000 bunkers, capturing enough

enemy

Communist

ital

rear-guard units before seizing the provincial cap-

of Svay Rieng. But here, too, the bulk of North

Vietnamese troops had disappeared. Nonetheless,

rein-

unit in

enough ammunition

rice

South Vietnam for ten

to feed every

for four

months, and enough

activity sharply reduced

forcements poured across the border, eventually bringing

resulting decline in

ARVN

casualties during the remainder of the year.

strength in

Cambodia

to 18,000

men. Some de-

voted their attention to enemy base areas and supply caches.

Others launched wide-ranging mobile forays

deep inside Cambodian

territory.

By the second week oi the operation the U.S. had 30,000 troops of

its

own

in

Cambodia, including

ele-

ments of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions. What

months,

vidual weapons to equip seventy-four battalions.

enemy

indi-

The U.S.

That cnemv

Main-Ft)rce units had largely escaped intact, that <.)f

set-

much

the supplies would be replaced within a few months,

and that the boundaries

of the

widened were

South Vietnamese and Cambo-

facts the

war

h
been

irreversibly

dians wt)uld ultimately have to face. U.S. ground troops

had delivered

their last

major bknv of the war.

249

linear

Neak Luong dur-

Han incursion,

May

;se units initiated

vasion

on April 29 with an

Parrot's

1970.

the in-

assault into the

Beak section ofCatnhodia Jutting

into Soutli Vietnam.

f'

t^

*f^ •

•^-

While

252

his

hudJy keeps watch,

a soldier

from the

I

Jth

Armored Cavalry checks an enemy bunker

in the Parrot's

Beak,

May

2.

A

trooper troni the 1st Cav:ilry Division examines one of the hundreds o/ 5/CS

this

Communist hunker

bor.

American combat troops spent most of their two months

in

CamhoJia's Fishhook, another area reaching in

//iro its

ritles

/onnJ

in

eastern neif^h-

Cambodia removing; captured

suppUes and destroying abandimed enemy sanctuaries.

253

Men

of the 3d Battalion, 23d

Infantry.

25th Infantry Division, take up positions outside the village of Ph Tasuos just south

of the Fishhook,

Cambodia,

254

in early

five

kilometers

May.

inside

?fr

iBbtifmmmti^immammi

Above.

i^olJiers

tram the 25th

Irttantry Division drag

away

a

buddy

killed by sniper tire

coming

from Ph Tasuos.

Right. village.

256

As other men of the 25th

Infantry

move

to a safer position, a

Cobra gunship

strikes the

*

-^'^^

-

.

.

w

wred

CuvAlry, ruinhles rbraugh the Fish- 'H^

fheadini^ toward South Vietnam. 28,

Qn

4

'"^"^ '

the last American amiored ve-

hides made their way out of'^amhodia.

Jtlj^

'^'

^

'i^l^l'^* ,

'•**

..i'*^^**

>^^^9^':'li^'

H»

namese and

Al

Witness:

Santoli

North Vietnamese invasion

lived along the

route to the capital, independent of American forces.

headquarters was a small fortified village in the

Our

Kiem Hanh

near the city of Tay Ninh and a

District,

short hike from North Vietnamese Army sanctuaries in Cambodia. We were told that the area's tunnels housed Vietcong's

the

COSVN

elusive

Our small group was

from

headquarters,

where their leaders coordinated the war

in the

South.

of America: Mike

a cross section

Andrews, our leader, was a West Point graduate from

North Carolina; Steve Zontek was from California

or-

ange country; "Tree" Maples was a small-town philoso-

pher from Michigan; "Frenchy" was

and In the wake of the Tet offensive, American and South to regain

Vietnamese units struggled

had been contested or even

that

and control areas

lost in

the attack. Par-

I

own

then slipped

forces,

One

of the

members

Cam-

to the sanctuary of

of a

combined U.S. /ARVN

reconnaissance team in this area was Al Santoli, a

ser-

geant with the 25th Infantry Division from March 1968 to

March

and our own destiny,

American brella

of

from

MACV,

and we were very

were able to chart our lucky.

um-

infantry units operated under a tactical

artillery support.

removed from American on the

We

sources.

But our

tire

CRIP

platoon, far

support bases, had to rely

who

loyalty of the black-pajama-clad villagers,

were as fearful and suspicious of us as we were of them.

Although the twenty GIs

1969.

us

to

Vietnamese Province Command, the U.S. 25th Divi-

tween Saigon and the Cambodian border, where North Vietnamese and Vietcong units attacked U.S. and

bodia.

and assignments came

reports

sion,

ARVN

Cajun;

learning to think one step ahead of the VC. Intelligence

important was the populated countryside be-

ticularly

a Louisiana

was a street kid from Cleveland. All of us were

in

our platoon had only lim-

ited knowledge of the Vietnamese language and culture,

In

my

time in Vietnam,

I

came

to

understand that there

were actually two wars going on simultaneously, each important as the other. The

first

was the conventional

war against regular North Vietnamese

units; the

was for the support of the population, "hearts

as

and minds" of the people, who

second

winning the

for the

most part

simply wanted both sides of the war to stop disrupting their lives. It was in this

that

I

had my most

that gave

me

nature— my

As an Division,

second aspect of the conflict

valuable experience in Vietnam, one

a unique view

role in a

had fought along the Cambodian border west fierce

counteroffensive,

I

an area notorious

Our

to learn to coexist with villagers

for

Vietcong

objective was to monitor

out of Cambodia.

If

we could

activity.

NVA

locate

troop

them

movement

in the forests

of Tay Ninh and pinpoint

their bases for air strikes,

countless South Vietnamese

and American

be saved.

Communist

offensive was

to turn

strategy during

and

to "destroy villages in

order to save them" and to create unintentional civilian

Such destruction would cause

bitter feelings

toward American and South Vietnamese soldiers among a traditionally

xenophobic population and produce news

was wounded three different times.

national community.

1969

I

served

Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon

(CRIP) with twenty Americans and twenty South

Viet-

Tet

battletields.

photos and television images that horritied the

to February

would

after the

populated areas into

They wanted American tirepower

lives

encounters during the 1968 post-Tet

Then from October 1968

260

in

casualties.

CRIP platoon.

eighteen-year-old infantryman with the 25th I

of Saigon. In

in a

of the war and of human

we had no choice but

During Tet the Main-Force Vietcong been decimated, but surviving important roles as

spies,

VC

inter-

guerrillas

cadres

still

had

served

tax collectors, saboteurs,

and

We

guides for the North Vietnamese forces. In the villages

along the Cambodian border they dealt swift and brutal

who showed

"justice" to peasants

government or refused was hard tor

It

loyalty to the Saigon

to contribute support.

a regular infantry soldier to

the pressure the people lived under. Their silence lack of cooperation earned

sympathizer. " After a few

we came

them the

and

months of living among them,

to understand that thirty years of continuous

war and their precarious location near Communist base areas

had taught them

hope

that silence was their only

many of these

for survival. In discussions with

farmers

I

learned that they had no interest in politics, taxes, or armies.

They wished only

heritage

and work

continue their ancestral

to

their land in peace. 1 think they

to understand that

we were

risking our lives for

have the peace they desperately hoped

came

them

We

for.

to

awk-

wardly tried to understand their ways, ate their food,

and attended

An

local ceremonies.

veloped between

us.

We

became

And

con-

in a

COSVN we

campsite,

left a

We

us.

VC agents

learned that whenever

would come

through garbage and to plant booby to return.

We

began surprising them by leaving behind

an ambush team of three to the tables on later,

the saboteurs.

of our people who turned

six

But they kept

after us; years

COSVN security chief, now a map where the VC had sent

in Europe, a former

a refugee,

showed me on

out teams to hunt for

We

rarely

placent or

tired,

village.

on her

nights.

bicycle, giving us a

a little girl

warm

explosion rocked our camp.

a little

com-

grin.

We

would

ride by us

One morning

ran to the road

an

and

found a huge mine crater and a crumpled bicycle blown fifty

meters away. The

was gone. Her parents

little girl

were walking circles around the searching.

mained

We

tic

bag.

crater,

weeping and

tried to find the child, but all that re-

of her was a handful of pieces of flesh.

mother used chopsticks

NVA

And we

learned to look for signs like

base camps or supply caches.

One day we

received

North Vietnamese

from what seemed to be a

fire

We

outpost.

found what turned out Because of the small

probed the area and

to be a regimental headquarters.

of our patrol and teamwork we

size

were able to maneuver quickly as we drew

on our the

fire.

Luck was

Though we had underestimated the

side.

enemy camp,

size

of

they too were taken by surprise. Four

or five armored personnel carriers attached to our team

came

our rescue with .50-caliber machine guns pro-

to

viding a fierce base of

we were

much

a

fire,

which gave the

We

larger force.

illusion that

were able to withdraw

quickly with only one casualty.

By

living with the people

no matter how

realized that

tion's

in

and sharing

valiantly

their fears I

American

soldiers

combat, the key to winning the popula-

support was respect for their traditions. Through

our Vietnamese platoon members we had prolonged

who

cussions with villagers better

and

life

cong and North Vietnamese their rice

and

their sons.

and

soldiers

At the same

that there was a very effective

made them

dis-

expressed their hopes for a

their desire just to be left alone.

creetly, they confided their distrust

fear

Dis-

of the Viet-

who took both

time

it

was obvious

VC shadow presence

that

reluctant to cooperate with the South Viet-

to place

Through

particular location for

Once we got

though, and stayed almost a week near

Every morning

clearings.

We

or exposing ourselves

trails

namese government.

us.

camped near any

more than one or two

one

in to search

expecting us

traps,

open

on

risk traveling

performed

did not take kindly to our success and was

thick under-

footprints or broken foliage that would often lead to

unusual bond de-

friends.

tested area, friendship can have a heavy price.

always seeking to destroy

could not

"VC" or "VC

label

silently through

brush, using the cover of trees to our advantage.

in

understand

move

learned to

them tenderly

The bomb had been meant

The

my

relationship with these

learned that regardless of our a lot in

to

common. To me

many

of them,

many

proud people

differences,

they weren't just "gooks.

the soldiers in the

CRIP

I

we had

"And

were no

longer "long nose" barbarians, as Americans were often

With the passive support of the

disrespectfully called. villagers

we were able

namese on ability to

At

their

own

to beat the

turf,

VC and

North

Viet-

and we helped deny them the

launch surprise attacks on outposts or towns.

the same time

for the people

we gained

we were

respect

and understanding

protecting.

in a plas-

for us.

261

THE LONG GOOD-BYE

There was no longer any

The primary U.S. forces

and the

Cambodian

incursion.

Vietnam had become the rapid withdrawal of American

transfer of military responsibility to the

Nixon administration casualties,

talk of victory in the aftermath of the

objectives in

insisted that this

South Vietnamese. Because the

must be accomplished with

minimum

a

American combat operations would be permitted only

tor the

U.S.

ot

purposes of

defense or to "stimulate a negotiated settlement" with the Communists.

At in

the beginning of 1970 the United States had an estimated 450,000 troops stationed

South Vietnam. By the end

units assembled their

men

tor

One

184,000 remained.

ot 1971 only

by one American

stand-down ceremonies replete with speeches and

ritual tlag

lowerings, withdrew from outlying bases into coastal enclaves or populated areas,

prepared to return home. left

Vietnam

Division,

in the last

which

The 9th months

Infantry Division

ot 1969,

December the bulk of the 4th and 25th 1st

later the

of service, followed in

middle of 1971, the

and other

home

in

August by the

November by two

ARVN

1st

Infantry

1st

home. April 1971

Cavalry Division, and 1st

1

1th Ar-

Brigade of the 5th Infantry

173d Airborne Brigade quit Vietnam

after six

kmg

years

brigades of the 23d Infantry Division. By the

had taken over nearly two hundred and

titty

American bases

installations.

As more and more American

soldiers lett

Vietnam, those who remained tound their Since General Oeighton

role increasingly limited to protective security

and

Abrams succeeded William Westmoreland

MACV chief in June

steadily

by the

Infantry Divisions headed

Marine Division,

mored Cavalry Regiment, followed

One month

were soon followed

April 1970, and in October by the 199th Infantry Brigade. During

left in

witnessed the departure of the

Division.

and

and 3d Marine Division, which had

abandoned multibattalion

as

forays into

static detense.

ued to mount sweep operations and mobile reconnaissance During Operacion

Lam Son

719, a

UH-l

"slick"

1968, U.S. forces had

remote frontier regions.

lifts

a hclicoprer

efforts.

JmrneJ

/i)-

Some

units contin-

By the end Communist

ot

hrc.

1970,

though, most of the Americans' time was devoted to shielding the lowland population from attack through

constant patrolling and the destruction of supply caches, without which the tain offensive operations. lier

The

Communist

enemy could not

sus-

away from the

ear-

shift

search-and-destroy operations and General

large

Ahrams's insistence that the enemy he fought on

own

made

terms

his

the war more than ever a contest in

which platoons, even squads, became major

actors in

the military drama.

The change

placed enormous responsibility on the

NCOs,

shoulders of inexperienced junior officers and

whose jobs were made more power shortages that toons into the

If

or

men who

some commanders were

still

troops to effective, aggressive action, less

tical

interested in hunting the

enemy

objective than in seeing to

turned

home

little

of the

served before

able to inspire

many

others were

or capturing a tac-

men

that their

re-

safely.

In any case, the ficult to find.

it

pla-

Moreover,

less.

available exhibited

discipline or enthusiasm of the

them.

by serious man-

companies and

regularly sent

field at half-strength

who were

those troops

difficult

The

enemy was making himself

very dif-

staggering losses suffered by the

Com-

munists during the Tet offensive of 1968 and the year-

American

long

Hanoi and

to break

curtail

counterattack

up most of

followed

in favor of guerrilla ac-

Meanwhile, the Politburo

forces in preparation for the day

Americans

forced

local units

maintained military pressure without risking

large additional casualties. its

that

Main-Force and

conventional attacks

tivities that

built

its

left

when

re-

the

South Vietnam.

The Cambodian

incursion and the overthrow of the

Sihanouk government by pro-American General Lon

Nol

in the spring of

much more

difficult.

1970 made the Communist task

Not only

did these events set back

Hanoi's schedule, they also forced the redeployment of four divisions from to protect vital

In

November

1971,

chat will carry

Vietnam and the border sanctuaries

North Vietnamese

American

them back

airfield outside Saigon.

reduced from

264

its

By

soldiers

to the

lines of supply in the

board the "freedom bird"

United States from Bien Hoa

then, U.S. troop strength

1969 high of more than 500,000

had been

to 180,000.

^

IV*^

* *»-J?

,>

eastern halt

mained

Cambodia. Those enemy

t)f

South Vietnam continued

in

and rocket attacks and occa-

installations with mortar

mount ground

sionally marshaled sufficient forces to

U.S.

saults against

fire

as-

support bases. By and large, how-

Communists avoided

ever, the

units that re-

to harass allied

"Things were so

battle.

quiet during the final four

months of 1970,"

army intelligence

"we were almost tripping over

each other

The

an

in

relative

officer,

effort to find

units

— 10,000

troops,

and 600 helicopters

craft,

Canyon

II

composed of

task force

to clear

played

Route 9 and reopen Khe Sanh Com-

Lam Son

719.

ARVN

Once

penetration

the South Viet-

American

8,

Army

pi-

support and logistics role in the

a crucial air

subsequent fighting. Battling ferocious antiaircraft

U.S.

air-

— launched Operation Dewey

namese crossed the border on February lots

artil-

2,000 fixed-wing

bat Base in preparation for a major

of Laos, Operation

aviators flew

some 100,000 helicopter

critical installations.

with booby

fire,

sorties

could be a dangerous

It

traps. Indeed, these brutal devices

ing a far heavier

where

toll

enemy

of GIs than was

Communists avoided

while, the

sites

were tak-

fire.

Mean-

direct contact except

U.S.

lax security left strategically placed

instal-

lations vulnerable to attack.

Such was the

end of January

engineer, armored cavalry, infantry, and

lery, airborne,

aviation

at the

and

assignment, for the Vietcong laced their launching

something to do."

calm was shattered

when an American

1971

one

recalled

across the so-called rocket belts that encircled major cities

of

Mary Ann,

case at Fire Support Base

23d Infantry Division outpost

a

in the western highlands

Quang Tin Province manned by

a battalion of the

196th Infantry Brigade. In the early morning hours of

March 28

a

company

of

NVA

sappers cut through the

unguarded perimeter and swarmed over Mary hind a barrage of

82mm

Ann

be-

mortar rounds. In no more than

half an hour they were gone, having killed or

wounded

half of the firebase's 250 defenders, including most of

the officers, at a cost of only 10 of their

prompted

disaster

nated in disciplinary action against

them the

division

own

dead.

The

a full-scale investigation that culmi-

and

six officers,

assistant division

among

commanders,

during a seven-week operation that ultimately cost the

but did

Americans more than 1,400

deviled American forces as they waited to disengage

and missing, plus the

killed

casualties,

loss

including 253

of more than 100

air-

from

a

little

to arrest the steady deterioration that be-

war they no longer wanted

to fight.

craft.

During the remainder continued to pound the

of the year

American

Ho Chi Minh

Trail

aircraft

and provide

support to government forces in Laos and Cambodia,

while a renewed

air

campaign against North Vietnam

struck military targets in the demilitarized zone and the

Hanoi-Haiphong

area.

On

nam, however, there was Saigon

fought

the ground in South Viet-

little

occasional

enemy bunker complexes, and ical)

action. U.S. troops near

sharp

encounters

against

the 23d Infantry (Amer-

Division's 11th Infantry Brigade spent weeks in

futile pursuit of

Quang

Ngai.

the Vietcong province headquarters in

When

101st Airborne troopers completed

the construction of three firebases in coastal

Thua Thien

Province and wrapped up Operation Jefferson Glenn on

October

8,

they brought to an end the

last

major Amer-

troops remaining in

sharp decline in the number of encounters with the

enemy from mid- 1970 on meant number

was in some ways itary

a similar decline in the

of U.S. casualties. Yet, the period of withdrawal

forces

in

far

more damaging

Vietnam than the

to

American

years

mil-

of heaviest

combat.

The most

defensive posture mandated by Washington

soldiers with little sense of mission other

sonal survival. trolled

left

than per-

This situation might have been con-

had the army's

officer corps

maintained the high

standards of professionalism with which

it

entered the

war. Unfortunately, by 1970 the cumulative impact of college deferments, declining

ROTC

enrollments, ca-

reerism within the military, and the Johnson administration's decision not to call

up the Reserves had de-

graded the overall quality and competence of the junior

ican ground combat operation of the war.

Most of the American

The

Vietnam

officers sent to

Vietnam. Coupled with an uncertain

during 1971 spent their time guarding military bases,

schedule of unit withdrawals and the news of mounting

and highways or sweeping back and forth

antiwar protests back home, these conditions provoked

urban

266

areas,

Bodies of villagers gunned

March

16, 1968.

The

down by

so-called

soldiers

My Lai

of the U.S. 23d Infantry Division (Amencal) he across a road

within the disengagement army an epidemic of "shorttimer's fever" that corroded morale

ened discipline both on and

NCOs still

intent

on

and

seriously threat-

itself in

"lifers,"

fighting the

growing tension

the career officers and

war

in earnest.

It

could

he seen in the "search-and-evade" maneuvers that supplanted the aggressive tactics of earlier years. ble in the fake patrols that

when

the real thing

the village of

My Lai

4 on

some platoons

It

in the rear,

where

racial tensions suppressed during

bat added fuel to the

fires

com-

of resentment. Black soldiers

served as infantrymen and suffered battle casualties at

off the battlefield.

The contagion manifested between draftees and

in

massacre was the most publicized atrocity committed by either side during the war.

was

visi-

substituted for

they thought their assigned patrol

rates well out of proportion to their

nam. In the

rear,

numbers

whites to be assigned to low-skilled specialties.

The

dis-

was more the

crimination suggested by these figures sult of

in Viet-

black soldiers were tar more likely than

re-

socioeconomic factors than institutional racism,

but there was no denying the hostility that black soldiers frequently encountered from

men.

some white

Energized by the civil

sector was too hot for comfort, as well as in acts ot

listed

disobedience, insubordination, and outright mutiny un-

within the United States,

many

officers

rights

black soldiers

and en-

revolution

demanded

refusals,

changes, adopting a militant stance that increasingly

however, was the mounting incidence of attacks by en-

echoed black-power advocates back home. The military

der

fire.

listed

More

disturbing even than such

men on

number

unpopular

officers

combat

and noncoms. The

of these so-called fraggings more than doubled

between 1969 and 1970, spurred on by bounties as

$10,000 offered by disgruntled troops

for the

as

high

assassi-

nation of "overaggressive" commanders.

A

significant portion of fragging incidents took place

instituted a

number

ot

measures to reduce triction but

could not forestall ugly eruptions ot racial violence. Racial prejudice also contributed to a rising tide of

violence by U.S. troops against those

whom

come

and custom had

so far to help. Barriers oi language

they had

long obstructed relations between American soldiers and

267

268

rhc Vietnamese. During' the early years of the war mutual antipathies

had heen

largely held

m

check. Rut the

slow redeployment of U.S. troops provoked noisy anti-

American demonstrations and American criminal

dramatic increase in

a

Vietnamese

offenses against

These ranged from shooting water to

running

cyclists off the road,

civilians.

buffaloes for sport

from throwing C-ration

cans at Vietnamese children to using peasants tor target practice.

As

numbers of U.S. troops withdrew mto

large

heavily populated rear areas, public drunkenness, dis-

and

orderly conduct,

became more common.

theft

the countryside, a deadly combination of too

and too

tration

little

much

In

frus-

discipline led to a substantial in-

crease in formal allegations of war crimes,

including

manslaughter, rape, murder, and mutilation.

The mas-

sacre by

men

of the U.S. Americal Division ot more

than 450 Vietnamese villagers (but not discovered by the

than a year

later)

Lai in June 1968

was unprecedented

more

numbers But

were committed by American troops and

atrocities

numbers

as the

in

war went on.

While some U.S. servicemen reacted ties

until

in the

command breakdown.

involved and the extent of

greater

My

at

American public

to the difficul-

of the withdrawal years with aggressive behavior

one another or the Vietnamese, others simply

against

few through desertion, a great many

tried to escape, a

more through

drugs. Marijuana

was the most frequently

used substance, but heroin, opium, cocaine, and

phetamines were prices.

As was

readily available at

all

am-

rock-bottom

the case with racial unrest, drug use sky-

One

rocketed after 1968.

Defense Department survey in

1971 found that almost 50 percent of American troops in

Vietnam were

either occasional or habitual users o(

marijuana. Despite 20,000 arrests by the military during

1969 and 1970, the number users within the

armed

marijuana and heroin

of

forces ctmtinued to increase, as

did a host of drug-related crimes from petty theft to

murder.

And

areas, tales ot

though most drug use took place

in rear

combat troops smoking pot before going

out on patrol were too numerous to discount entirely.

.4 si)Llicr i>t

iihtrcJ

rhe U.S.

5ch Mcch.inizcd

personnel cirncr

,

It

L.im:

/Kixnon ,iU>n^ the DKIZ, April

\'ci.

4,

Di\isum

sl[s

arop his

iir-

the western most American

I'-Kl.

269

So

serious

was the

crisis

of discipline that afflicted the

disengagement army that some feared catastrophe. "By every conceivable indicator,"

Marine

officer

commented one

and military analyst

army that now remains

June 1971, "our

in

Vietnam

in

retired

in a state ap-

is

M16

armed with an

rifle.

M60 machine

12,000

The

guns,

ARVN

boasted

also

M79

^0,000

grenade

launchers, 2,000 heavy mortars and howitzers, plus an

armada of new

and

ships, airplanes, helicopters, tanks,

armored personnel

carriers.

Expanded

military schools

men welcomed

proaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or

bolstered the office? corps, while enlisted

having refused combat, murdering their

increased pay, enlarged benefits, and improved housing

noncommissioned

and

drug-ridden,

officers,

and

officers

dispirited

where not near mutinous." Although that sweeping dictment was overdrawn, there was no doubt

in-

in the

themselves and their families. Similar strides were

for

taken in other branches of the South Vietnamese armed forces:

the navy, which increased from a strength of

minds of most professional military men that the health

19,000 to 43,000

and effectiveness of the U.S. Army required that the

craft;

war be turned over

during these years; and the

to

the Vietnamese as swiftly as

sailors operating nearly

1,700 coastal

the Vietnamese air force, which more than tripled territorial

militias,

The new men and new weapons, however, In September

brought

down

1963,

at

the height of the

crisis

Ngo Dinh Diem,

the regime of

John Kennedy observed that there were

that

President

limits to

what

inspired troops,

staggering rates of desertion,

ment supplied by the U.S., enced junior

They

are the ones that

have

to

win

it

is

their

or lose it."

un-

as

lack of

trained personnel to maintain the sophisticated equip-

the Americans could do to help the South Vietnamese. "it

could not

themselves correct such fundamental problems

"In the final analysis," warned the president, war.

which

increased by 200,000.

possible.

among

officers,

severe shortages of experi-

corruption

and incompetence

the senior officer corps, heavy dependence

on

Almost forgotten by the Johnson administration during

the U.S. logistics system, and a continuing overreliance

the years of American military buildup, Kennedy's ad-

on American

monition reverberated through Washington of the 1968 Tet offensive. Unwilling to substantial

new

wake

commit the

the military wanted, Johnson

forces

upon the South Vietnamese army

called

in the

greater burden of the fighting.

One

to

assume a

year later,

after

initial

attempts at negotiation and mil-

itary pressure failed to

wring a settlement from Hanoi,

Richard Nixon's

the

new

president

made Vietnamization

the cornerstone

of his efforts to extricate the U.S. from Vietnam.

The

job

was entrusted to General Abrams,

had been

level of fighting the

MACV

missioning experienced

designed programs for com-

NCOs. To

firepower and mobility, the U.S. latest

hands.

American equipment

And

ations with

American

By 1971 these

South

Vietnamese

into

ARVN

to use the

new

on combined oper-

efforts

had resulted 1

in a

test

South Viet-

million soldiers, each one

with a pre-emptive strike

In conception, the Laotian incursion was similar to

the foray into

Cambodia nine months

to capture

still

in general create as

for support.

Lam Son was an

The

cut infiltration

and

Beyond these

pur-

719, was

much havoc

as possible while U.S. aviation

remained

tives.

earlier.

named Lam Son

NVA equipment and supplies,

and

for the

artillery assets

specific objec-

opportunity to demonstrate that

Vietnamization was working, to show the Communists that the South Vietnamese armed forces had age.

Although U.S.

ployed, no

aircraft

and

pilots

American ground troops or

accompany the

units.

namese army of more than

270

funneled the

knew how

to ensure they

hardware, Abrams sent the

provide the necessary

command

com-

the results were disastrous.

To improve

combat leadership

successful

remainder of 1970. But when Viet-

pose of the operation, code

who

These weaknesses

air support.

into the Laotian panhandle at the beginning of 1971,

enemy

their training programs.

and

namization was put to the

routes,

and expand

artillery

some extent obscured by the

bined operation into Cambodia and the relatively low

helped his South Vietnamese counterparts build up their forces

to

ARVN

of

would be emadvisers

would

beyond the border.

The 16,000-man South Vietnamese into Laos

come

on February 8

task force crossed

against minimal resistance.

Lam Son

719. Inside Ltos, woiinJcJ

Snurh Vietnamese

soldiers alxinJon chcir nrm^^rcd

personnel

c.irncr,

which

hit a mine.

271

f

.

1

SB W4« i

/"^'^'iju

^^^*^^~^

'

i_

1]

Jl

Li^

/^^.jM

/^

\

Wl^KtKr' ^ u<^^aBlH^^H^^H

..aiil

~j

«

..

« ^

^^ A.

H^Hpr''

Kj^r^^

"j

\

\

\\

VNS

\

V

u.

1^^t-

jHH^^ ><;

«*

"<

'« 1

i//^

'

V

TTie

main ammunition dump

became

at

TT

.^.

Khe Sank

.-

V-'.

- -sr

erupts after being blown up by

NVA

sappers on

a focus of activity as South Vietnamese soldiers driven from Laos at the

Americans stationed

ARVN

Airborne Division,

1st

Infantry Division, and a Ranger group established bases to the north

and south of Route

the

9,

1st

Armored

Brigade advanced along the highway hampered only by

and mud. At the end of the

third day the

main

South Vietnamese thrust was only twenty miles from

Tchepone,

a

main hub of the

Ho Chi Minh

Trail. Be-

ginning on February 12, however, the outlying firebases

The former Marine base

but almost immediately began a general withdrawal to-

ward the South Vietnamese border. Pursued by enemy forces

now

became

totaling 34,000

a disorganized retreat

ment and fought each other Despite

copters.

tirely annihilated.

through withering antiaircraft

fire in

support of

and

finally disintegrated

thousands

abandoned equip-

to reach evacuation heli-

of sorties

by

American

fighter-bombers and B-52s, some units were almost en-

soldiers

American gunships and supply helicop-

men, the withdrawal quickly

into a total rout as panicked soldiers

NVA

ters flew

23, 1971.

end of Lam Son 719 sought the protection of the

began to come under heavy attack from tank-supported infantry.

March

>—

there.

While troops from the

rain

i~"

who

Thousands more South Vietnamese

were saved only by American helicopter crews

braved intense

fire

to rescue them.

the entire

Although many South Vietnamese troops performed

northern flank was collapsing under the weight of three

well in individual battles during the course of the op-

enemy

eration. President Thieu's

the beleaguered defenders, but by

battle, the

NVA

rushed more and more troops into

armored column

ing for orders from higher

hind B-52

272

1

divisions.

While the

ble,

March

raids that

helicopter-borne

stalled along

command.

Route 9 wait-

On March

6, be-

reduced the Laotian town to rub-

ARVN

troops seized

Tchepone

announcement

that

Lam Son

719 was "the biggest victory ever" struck many

nam and

the United States as ludicrous.

had destroyed several enemy stockpiles and tent interrupted the

Communist

The to

in Viet-

ARVN

some ex-

logistical buildup.

But

the delay at best amounted to no more than a few

—

mmiths. Against

Vietnamese

had

this

soldiers

wounded, or captured

killed,

to the invasion.

every

command

level, the elite troops of the

taken a terrible beating.

ARVN

not for U.S.

it

had sup-

air

the outcome could well have been catastrophic.

port,

As

Were

at

the

American ground combat

last

new

units prepared to

Communists resumed

leave the country, and the

preparations for a

offensive,

it

their

appeared that Amer-

ican air power might be the only sure defense that South

Vietnam

still

possessed.

(SAM)

One

would again be called upon

weapon

year later that

to prevent disaster.

SA-7 SAMs

But they also discovered

An

Tri,

the

30, 1972,

two months

concentrations and cut

North Vietnamese troops backed by tanks and mobile armor units smashed across the provincial capital of

the

NVA

Quang

DMZ

Tri City.

had opened two more

heading

for the

Within two weeks

fronts in a stunning

Easter offensive that everywhere sent

ARVN

ing backward in disarray. By mid-April

all

American

resistance

and

a greatly

to battered

and naval support

to halt the

South Vietnamese defenders. By the end

diminished

remaining

before.

Compelled

to

draw down

their

numbers over the

previous twelve months, the air force had fewer than 90

combat

aircraft left in

Communist airplanes

on

South Vietnam navy only two

assault, the

at the

time of the

carriers

station in the Gulf of Tonkin.

with

1

70

Even with

the addition of air force B-52s and F-4 Phantoms diverted to the

Da Nang and Bien Hoa from Thailand,

American nor the

enough firepower lines.

Within

neither

St)uth Vietnamese air force

to stabilize the disintegrating

had

ARVN

six weeks, however, the call for reinforce-

ments brought U.S. strength

in

Southeast Asia up to

twenty American cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers,

70,000

1,000 U.S. warplanes.

air force

a

and self-propelled

tanks, trucks,

halt-dozen

personnel, and nearly

ar-

tillery pieces.

Long before

that

of the invasion

—

less

than sixty hours after the

—American

as soldiers

under

and refugees

a merciless

were hitting

aircraft

munist staging areas north of the 8,

DMZ. Then on May

from Quang Tri City

fled

Communist

start

Com-

artillery barrage, President

of full-scale

bombing

North Vietnam. The operatitm was code named

Linebacker.

It

would be

saults against the

of

North

new weapons,

different

from previous

air as-

key ways: the employ-

in three

the inclusion of

new

targets,

and

the absence of tight civilian oversight.

Because Washington

air

keep than ever

of

Communist

amid the smoking wreckage of thousands o(

against

enemy advance. The

difficult to

Amer-

that stood

U.S. ground troops, President Nixon instead pledged

promise of help was more

supply lines while

June the aerial onslaught had stalled the

ment of the

enemy

Nixon authorized the resumption

military presence.

Unwilling to delay the withdrawal

gunships blasted

units reel-

between the Communists and victory were pockets of

South Vietnamese

enemy

At

to air attack.

American B-52s,

ican transports delivered thousands of tons of equipment

major American ground contingent, ^^0,000

last

mechanized North

a heavily

AC-47

and

fighter-bombers,

offensive

after the departure of

and the small, shoulder-hred

Loc, and Kontum,

North Vietnamese

On March

sites,

that were particularly deadly to helicopters.

Vietnamese Army highly vulnerable

Quang

new (Commu-

ever, thanks to

including large-caliber guns, surface-

nist air defenses,

to-air missile

Plagued by faulty planning and poor leadership

found the skies over South Vietnam

pilots

more dangerous than

far

nearly 50 percent of the 20,000-man torce ultimately

committed

American

he placed the 9,000 South

ti)

felt

it

could

now

discount the

prospect of Chinese or Soviet intervention, target selection

tactical control in the

commanders, providing them with

field

flexibility

10,

and

they utilized to the

fullest.

Linebacker missions struck

fuel

Nixon

left

hands of

his

a long-awaited

Beginning on

May

dumps, warehouses,

railroad marshaling yards, rolling stock, trucks, petro-

leum pipelines, and power plants

—from SAM

all

across

DMZ

North Viet-

MiG

air bases

within ten miles of the center of Hanoi to

railri>ad

nam

sites

along the

bridges near the Chinese border.

The

to

president also gave

navy leaders something they had long sought sion to coast.

mine North Vietnam's harbors and blockade the Using airdropped magnetic-acoustic mines, the

navy seeded coastal approaches and major so effectively that left a

—permis-

no ship

North Vietnamese

of

any

river estuaries

size either

entered or

port for the rest of the war.

73

it/'

¥ '^

i i

The

new

air raids

were enormously successful, thanks to a

family of laser-guided and electro-optically guided

"smart" bombs that offered unprecedented accuracy and to such

improved electronic countermeasures equipment

as radar-detection

and jamming devices. These tech-

nological developments

made

targets with fewer sorties

and

it

possible to destroy

less

a lower rate of aircraft losses, than

bomb

more

tonnage, and at

fact,

the damage inflicted by American bombers from April

October 1972 exceeded

all

that had been

accom-

Communist

icans to leave. Eager to

Nixon was

willing to

Even before the viser

to remain in the

through Haiphong and other ports virtually eliminated,

of neutralists,

and the flow of war materiel

government

50 percent.

for

massive damage and staggering casualties endured

by Vietnamese on both sides during the summer of 1972

marked

new

a

level of violence in

would bring the Formal

talks

fighting to at least a temporary halt.

between the United States and North

Vietnam had begun ately

became

away toward an agreement that

in Paris in

deadlocked.

May 1968 and immedi-

When Lyndon

Johnson

turned over the presidency to his successor eight months later, all

that had been determined was the shape of the

after a cease-hre.

commitment

—

Vietcong, and members of the Saigon

In return,

the Nt)rth dropped

upon the departure of Thieu

as a

On

this

negotiations between Kissinger and

basis

North Vietnam's Le Due Tho moved October a provisional

early

agreement had

been reached. The tentative accord provided

of

American POWs, followed by

worked out through

a

tripartite

a political settlement

National Council of

Reconciliation and Concord. Infiltration of troops

into

the South would end,

and-a-half more years of public and secret meetings did

October 22 President Nixon suspended

tinued to founder on two key sistence that

NVA

issues:

Washington's

in-

troops withdraw from the South and

rebuild

north of the twentieth Kissinger

jeopardy. Thieu,

the negotiations,

of 1972,

however, Washington's de-

detente with China and the Soviet Union gave

both sides reason

for

compromise. Hanoi's

fears of dip-

lomatic isolation, the fearful pounding North Vietnam

had undergone from the

latest

round of U.S. bombing.

all

Four days

announced that "peace was

namese government involving Nguyen Van Thieu. By the summer

parallel.

to

help

infrastructure.

at

On

bombing

later

Henry

hand."

In fact, the painfully garnered accord was in grave

Hanoi's refusal to accept any provisional South Viet-

sire for

assistance

economic

its

NVA

new

and Washington

North Vietnam

talks con-

for the

simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. troops and the return

would extend postwar economic

The

By

into high gear.

cease-fire

people he had a "secret plan" to end the war, but three-

in Paris.

its

precondition

cease-fire so long as the National Liberation

conference table. Richard Nixon told the American

nothing to break the stalemate

to

— made up

that would supervise a political settlement

South Vietnam.

any

commission

electoral

Front was granted political status in the South.

what already had been

a costly war. But the bloodletting finally prodded negotiators 6,000 miles

for

South

Kissinger hedged Washington's

insistence

The

private assurances that

the United States was willing to permit North Vietna-

mese troops

Thieu by accepting an

as

to his

Vietnam

to put

resumed, national security ad-

Henry Kissinger gave Hanoi

portation system was crippled, the shipment of goods

much

and anxious

meet them halfway.

talks

Now

by as

Amer-

behind him before the upcoming presidential election,

plished between 1965 and 1968: North Vietnam's trans-

to southern battlefields cut

for the

remove the chief obstacle

larger foreign policy designs

in-

what they

leadership to take

could get at the negotiating table and wait

had been experienced

during the earlier Rolling Thunder campaign. In

to

and the prospect of complete American withdrawal clined the

who had

noi would never accept. early

November

not been consulted during

demanded wholesale changes

When

that

Ha-

the talks resumed in

the U.S., at Thieu's insistence, pro-

posed sixty-nine amendments to the agreement. The

North Vietnamese responded with dozens their

own.

After

weeks

of

changes, the twci sides broke

Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese diplomat Le Due Tin

Caught between

leave a heavily charged negotiating session in Neiiilly, France.

sary,

of

increasingly off talks

a truculent ally

demands heated

on December

of

ex13.

and a stubborn adver-

Richard Nixon determined to teach both a lesson.

275

To

the South Vietnamese the president extended weap-

ons, promises, and threats.

he authorized the im-

First,

mediate dehvery of more than $1 hiUion

in

equipment and suppMes, including enough

make South Vietnam's

military

aircraft to

the fourth largest in the

air force

Vietnamese

supported by hundreds of fighters,

skies

fighter-bombers, tankers, radar-jamming EA-6s, F-105

Wild Weasels crammed with

electronic countermeasures

equipment, F-4 Phantoms laying down corridors of chaff to confuse

enemy

and the newly deployed, super-

radar,

world. At the same time, Nixon gave Saigon "absolute

sonic F-llls the Worth Vietnamese called "whispering

should North Vietnam violate any

death." During twelve days of intensive bombing the

assurances"

that

peace agreement signed with the United States,

he

and severe

But

would order

"swift

retaliatory action."

the president also warned Thieu that

ernment did not accept the

the Saigon gov-

if

cease-fire terms ultimately

worked out between Washington and Hanoi, South

Vietnam would be on

its

ultimatum

Communists, demanding that Hanoi return

Thomas Moorer, him

of Staff, and told

any more of

war.

is

if

you don't,

concentrated

I'll

Nixon

told the admiral.

the night of

December

in the largest

II,

were

targets

18, 1972,

129 B-52 Strat-

heavily first

MiG

defended

War

airfields

wave approached the North

enemy

rushed

past. In all, the

at the

B-52s that night, forcing

surface-to-air missiles fly

their targets

among

II

aircraft

1

down

3

SAMs

back to base, of the giant

of the heavily loaded aircraft hit

and returned

Linebacker

more than 200

fired

more, and bringing rest

safely to

276

Day

after

campaign and the concentration

indiscriminate destruction and even geno-

The most

civilian deaths.

notable case was

the destruction of the Bach Mai Hospital outside a mil-

Hanoi. Accusations of terror bombing

itary airstrip in

on

or deliberate attacks

unfounded.

Indeed,

—approximately

falling

the

number

of civilian

own

count,

North Vietnamese

missiles

1,400 by Hanoi's

killed by

back to earth

however, were

civilian targets,

— was remarkably

low considering

the weight of bombs dropped and the experience of com-

bombing operations during World War

parable

On

December 26 Hanoi

willingness to talk once the later

icans

Linebacker

II

came

had exhausted

final

Linebacker

cut

its

an end. By then the Amerand the North Viet-

missiles.

American blow of II

II.

Washington

bombing stopped. Four days

their targets,

namese had run out of

The

to

signaled to

a long

North Vietnamese

and

terrible war.

rail lines at

more

than 500 points, demolished nearly 400 pieces of rolling stock, heavily air defenses,

damaged ten

and

left

airfields,

shattered Hanoi's

some 1,600 separate

military struc-

tures in ruins. In two short weeks 25 percent of

North

Guam.

continued day and night

for

almost two

weeks, interrupted only by a thirty-six-hour Christmas truce.

Ha-

"spillage" from the target areas did result in residential

II.

read by the light of the rocket engines as the missiles

bombers. But the

in the

the contrary, most of the bombing was con-

damage and

the American planes, said one pilot, that he could have

2

of the air

some of whom were

up the sky around them. So thickly did they

damaging

To

cide.

totally

Andersen Air Force Base on

Vietnamese capital salvos of SA-2 lit

Nixon with

deaths

heavy bomber operation mounted

around Hanoi. As the

power plants

corridor.

targets in heavily populated areas led critics to charge

The

by the United States Air Force since World

Their

on

was the most

hold you responsible."

air offensive of the war.

ofortresses took off from

Guam

don't want

about the fact that we couldn't

resulting operation, called Linebacker

On

"I

your chance to use military power to win this

And

noi-Haiphong

onboard radar systems and laser-guided bombs. Some

hit this target or that one,"

"This

farms, factories, airfields, and

and gas tank

ducted with extraordinary precision, thanks to advanced

to prepare a massive air attack

this crap

yards, warehouses, military barracks, oil

summoned Ad-

North Vietnamese heartland.

against the

and delivered

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

reply was forthcoming, the president

miral

to

When

the bargaining table within seventy-two hours.

no

rail

The scope

different kind of

flew nearly 2,000 sorties

35,000 tons of bombs against transportation terminals,

own.

Meanwhile, Nixon sent a to the

American planes

day the giant bombers took to the North

A

win^ of the Bach Mai Hospital

an errant II,

bomb dropped

the Christmas

lies in

ruins after being hit by

by a B-52 during Operation Linebacker

bombing

of Hanoi.

W^' .'^w.

'-V

y-i^

-

V

.

-

^»T ,-jrL

TSfk'^

^l«i#^

-\

\

n^ ^-

Vietnam's petroleum reserves and 80 percent of generating capacity

trical

its

elec-

The

had been destroyed.

United States had by no means escaped unscathed from battle,

losing twenty-six aircraft,

among them

fifteen

between government

had no

tr(K)ps

and the Pathet Lao

Cambodia, where the Vietnam

subsided. In

effect whatsoever,

finally

cease-fire

American bombers remained

the principal defense of the embattled

Phnom Penh

gov-

B-52s, along with ninety-three pilots and crew

mem-

ernment. In the

bers, including thirty-three taken prisoner by the

North

dropped more than 250,000 tons of explosives on Cam-

Vietnamese.

When

bodia, an

peace talks resumed

in

Paris

on January

The

1973, both sides sought a quick settlement.

8,

leaders

Japan

first

amount

half of 1973 the United States

American

off all funds for

had been dropped on

greater than

World War

in all ot

Not

II.

Congress cut

until

military operations in Indo-

of North Vietnam were not willing to endure more pun-

china, mandating an August 15 end to the air raids, did

ishment to no purpose. Richard Nixon was not prepared

the

to wait until after his inauguration to a

second term or

of military aid for South Vietnam threat-

risk the loss

ened by the new, dovish Congress. After

six days of

marathon negotiations an agreement was reached that scarcely differed from

The United

what had been drafted

October.

States would complete the withdrawal of

from South Vietnam, the

forces

in

POWs

home, the Thieu government would be

its

would come

left intact.

At

the same time. North Vietnamese troops would remain in

the South, and the

PRG

(Provisional Revolutionary

last

U.S. military forces leave Southeast Asia.

For most Americans, however, the war ended on the

Lam

gray tarmac of Hanoi's Gia ruary 12 the

Airport, where

on Feb-

116 U.S. prisoners of war crossed an

first

imaginary line to freedom.

Once

in

American hands,

the former captives were taken to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for medical examinations before flying

home

some had not seen

to families

for as long as eight-

and-a-half years. Minor problems and delays disturbed the repatriation process, but on last

prisoners were freed.

At

March

29,

1973, the

the same time, the final

Government, the government of the National Libera-

contingent of American combat troops withdrew from

tion Front) would be provided status as a legal organi-

South Vietnam. With

zation.

The

military cease-fire

would be administered by

in

an International Commission of Control and Supervision

(ICCS) composed of representatives from Poland,

Hungary, Canada, and Indonesia. The ultimate future of

— the central

South Vietnam^

the war had been fought

—was

issue

political

over which

to be resolved later by

the amorphous reconciliation council.

loss

of U.S. aid, he decided he could not allow

himself the luxury of resisting any further.

On

January

21 he grudgingly acceded to the treaty after receiving

assurances of continued American assistance. later

Henry Kissinger and Le Due Tho

"Paris in

Two

days

initialed the

Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace

Vietnam." With the formal signing of the document

at the

Hotel Majestic on January 27, 1973, America's

American war

their departure the

at last to

an end.

During more than a decade of

political

and military

involvement, the United States had spent almost $200 billion to fight the

war and improve the

lives of the

people of South Vietnam. Over that period more than 3

million

American men and women had served

Southeast Asia.

Thieu, for one, was not reconciled. But, threatened

with the

Vietnam came

Of

those,

wounded and 57,000

in

nearly 304,000 had been

killed in action.

More than 100

Americans died

in captivity during the course of the

war, with 1,284

still

the

last

costly

POWs

listed as

missing in action

returned home.

Whether

commitment had been worth

tion that

still

lay in the

this

long and

the price was a ques-

balance in the spring of 1973.

But the Americans would no longer have a hand answer.

The

future of

when

in the

Vietnam was now something the

Vietnamese alone would decide.

longest war was officially over.

TTie peace agreement did not bring an immmediate end to

American

strikes

278

military involvement in the region.

B-52

continued over Laos into April before fighting

Ac Bien Hoa

in 1971,

South Vietnamese who

an American has will

left

soon take over the

a greeting to the air base.

— Camp

west near

Focus: The Easter Offensive

Cam

the

enemy

Carroll,

tanks rumbled across

ARVN

Lo Bridge when the 56th

Regiment

surrendered en masse. Along with the firebase, which

occupied

key strategic position

a

mese defense the

NVA

in the

South Vietna-

Colonel Dinh also turned over to

lines,

the largest concentration of artillery in the

175MM

northern provinces, including four huge

guns,

the only weapons capable of responding to the enemy's

long-range

artillery.

As northern

through the gap

soldiers raced

South Vietnamese

lines,

ARVN

Camp Carroll staggered eastward Noon, March

30, 1972.

With

crashed into the Ai

The

Tri City.

long-range

Tu Combat

first

and

a sharp crack

130MM

a

thun-

howitzer shell

Base just north of Quang

round was followed by a barrage of

Communist

artillery shells that

blanketed the

to

NVA

advance and

Cua

of the

enemy breakthrough

ARVN

stabilized a defensive line south

Viet River. But unfounded rumors of an

Quang

by thousands of frightened refugees.

troops supported by

—some

30,000

more than 200 Soviet T54 tanks

poured across the border.

The

Easter offensive

along Highway vilians

who

ners

had begun. Before

it

North Vietnam would commit 200,000 men

was over.

in fourteen

irresistible target for

new

them

Chinese crossed the Yalu River into Korea twenty-one

bodies, broken vehicles, and

With American combat

ARVN

While

troops almost

smoking

try reeled

namese troops opened two more

ing the South Vietnamese army and forcing a negotiated

offensive.

regret that the

ARVN

terms.

would

They learned

to their

back and that Wash-

fight

ington was not yet prepared to abandon South Vietnam to defeat.

ever,

During the

first

Hanoi had reason

The green

weeks of the invasion, how-

to celebrate.

recruits of the

3d

Division, de-

debris.

under the shock of the invasion, North Viet-

On

April

5,

fronts in their far-flung

NVA/VC

the 5th

Division, sup-

ported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, rolled out of

Cambodia base

its

outpost at Loc Ninh. garrison a

ARVN

My Chanh

units in the northern part of the coun-

discarded a strategy of protracted war in hopes of crush-

own

fire.

finally estab-

twenty kilometers of smashed

lay

completely withdrawn from the South, the Communists

settlement on their

ci-

Communist gun-

defensive line south of the

River. Behind

earlier.

fled

together

column with 130MM

lashed the confused

divisions to the greatest military operation since the

years

Crammed

Those troops who survived the carnage lished a

and

Tri City, where they were joined

the mass of soldiers, trucks, and

1,

proved an

April 27,

their fortifications

below the demilitarized zone. Behind the three North Vietnamese divisions

On

precipitated a panic.

abandoned

troops

south through

fire

Us-

1.

weapons (LAWs)

good advantage, the 3d Division temporarily halted

the

thirty-kilometer-long South Vietnamese defensive line lethal rain of

in the

either side of

toward Highway

ing American-supplied light antitank

derous explosion, a high-velocity

on

units

area and attacked the

ARVN

The outgunned and outnumbered

— 2,000 men of the 9th ARVN Regiment and

South Vietnamese Ranger

American

advisers

battalion, plus a handful of

—held out

for

two days against

five

ployed along the northern frontier precisely because no

separate tank assaults. But by the morning of April 7

one expected an overt breach of the DMZ, buckled un-

those defenders not dead or captured had

der the pressure of the mechanized

raced for the protection of the

Cua

enemy columns and Viet River.

Ha, South Vietnamese marines held

At Dong

off the invaders

long enough for a pair of American army advisers to

blow up

280

a crucial bridge along

Highway

1.

But farther

ward

An

The

political

Province,

south to-

An

and commercial center of Binh Long

Loc stood

astride

Highway

kilometers from Saigon. Fearing

way

fled

Loc.

for a drive

on the

its loss

1

3

only ninety

would open the

nation's capital. President

Thieu

dispatched the 5th "held at

moved

all

ARVN

Division and ordered the city

Even

costs."

South Vietnamese troops

as

Ninh were

divisions

moving out

rounded

An

of

arrival.

joined hy two more

NVA

down Highway

Camhodia. Tt)gether they

Navy

sur-

Loc, blocking further overland reinforce-

U.S. Army Cobra

ARVN

artillery cap-

soldiers

enemy

and armored personnel

backed by

But

positions.

tanks,

artillery,

ground forward relent-

carriers

and

lessly, smashing into the city, seizing the airfield,

reducing the South Vietnamese perimeter to a square

On

kilometer.

April 20, the senior U.S. adviser on the

scene reported a desperate situation: "Supplies minimal, casualties

continue to mount, medical supplies low.

Wounded

a major problem, mass burials for military

and

low ebb." Most discouraging of

all,

civilian,

morale

at

"In spite of incurring heavy losses from U.S.

enemy continues

the

With An Loc

air strikes,

invested, three

more Communist

di-

town of Dak To on

April 12, opening the third phase of the North Vietoffensive. After capturing the high

enemy

the west,

of the 22d

ARVN

ground

to

units encircled the outlying military

camps of Tan Canh and Dak To

II

held by two regiments

Division, the only South Vietnamese

forces in the region.

On

The

April 24,

NVA

tanks blasted

AT-3

Russian

morning hours o( May

hanging over the

diers

limped

down Highway

twenty-five miles away and Inexplicably, the

NVA

14 toward

Kontum

now completely

sol-

—only

the province capital. "It was the dumbest possible thing

Pizzi,

"and I'm very

nobody

to stop

pistols."

moved

Given the

Army Colonel

Joseph

grateful they did because there

them except

a

reprieve,

few people hke the

absorbing

Then,

in the

forces lo-

enemy regiment>

when

out of the smoke

two U.S. helicopters carrying

TOW

By day's end the

missiles.

"tube-launched, optically tracked, ifire-guided" rockets

had destroyed ten enemy

namese attempted

When

tanks.

the North Viet-

they were blasted by

to withdraw,

fighter-bombers and B-52s. Their fuel running out, their

reaching

the

critical prop(.)rtions,

NVA

had no

option but to retreat.

Everywhere across the country the

American

air

lethal

impact of

power, the mistakes of Communist com-

manders, and the stubborn courage of South Vietnamese soldiers

more

were having the same

An

true than at

Lt)c,

effect.

Nowhere was

this

where government troops

held out for ninety-five days under constant shelling and

ground attacks. By the middle of June the enemy's

had been exhausted. Communist

bombardments continued

infantry units

to

make

Loc, but decimated

had already begun

sanctuary of their bases in

to

Now

it

artil-

life

difficult at

NVA

armor and

withdraw toward the

Cambodia and

North Vietnamese invasion had reached mark.

of-

its

Laos.

The

high-water

was Saigon's turn.

defenseless.

waited three weeks to attack

they could have done," said U.S.

city flew

experimental airborne

Kontum and An

ARVN

assault.

Communist

27,

fought their way into Kontum,

disin-

Scattered into small groups, the surviving

new

lines,

ing behind a spearhead of armor, three

an ambush and

that included

attempted without

ARVN

cated a gap in the South Vietnamese defenses. Advanc-

lery

fire

with each

horrific casualties

early

come

enemy

NVA

success to smash through the

to

radio-controlled Sagger antitank rockets.

swung

tank-supported assault made an ideal target for

fensive potential

tegrated under concentrated

finally

defenses.

through minimal resistance to overrun both outposts.

to the rescue drove straight into

Communists

14, they attacked right into the teeth of

An

armored column from Ben Het attempting

the

B-52 bombers, which pounded the enemy column with-

losses

to persist."

visions struck the central highlands

namese

ARVN

the

the enemy's inevitable

beft)re

when

16,

out mercy. For ten days the

invasion of Laos.

gunships and U.S. Air Force and

fighter-bombers pounded

North Vietnamese

fortifications

On May

forces

ments, and began shelling the city with tured during the 1971

and other

Communist

into position, however, the

that overran Loc

the city where they raced to construct trenches, dugouts,

me

was with

ARVN command

the 23d Division and several Ranger groups into

The

loss of

Quang

ARVN

of the 3d

Tri Province and the near collapse

Division had precipitated a change in

personnel and approach on the northern front. Taking

over ct)mmand of

1

Corps on May \ Lieutenant General

Ngo Quang Truong tation as

wasted no time

South Vietnam's

discipline,

Truong

in

proving his repu-

best general officer.

To

restore

issued orders for the execution of de-

281

and

setters

looters.

To

And

he sent

regain the initiative,

South Vietnamese marines on

NVA

hehind

raids

Truong

to recapture the territory lost in April,

new

gathered offensive.

and supplies

troops

By the

major counter-

tor a

week of June, he was

last

Hnes.

for

With

multaneous

Hue and north

ARVN

assaults, the

etly crossed the

of the

Communists preoccupied by

the

My Chanh

Viet

these

si-

Airborne Division qui-

on the night

of

June 27 and

upon unsuspecting North Vietnamese troops along

fell

The stunned enemy

the north side of the river. tried to

and marme battalions blocking

NVA

Within hours the unraveled

as

itive supply

soldiers

their

path.

defensive line had completely

Communist

accustomed to a prim-

officers

system and light arms struggled to protect

the vulnerable logistical network of their nized army. By the end of the

first

way back

July, the

rolled the

Quang

to the outskirts of

new mecha-

week of

South Vietnamese counterattack had the

Communists had

laced the city and

its

NVA it,

suburbs with a

formidable network of bunkers, strongpoints, trenches,

and observation

Any

posts.

would have to cross

assault

pretargeted fields of artillery, mortar, and machine-gun

Even when these

Truong's

men would

own

defenses,

On

September

for

and

finally

asked for

behind

9,

units, realigned his

full

American fighter-bombers and B-52s, marines began another

U.S.

tember

16, the bloodied victors raised the flag

survived

South Viet-

fortress.

By then, observed Major John Howard,

who had

of

noon on Sep-

assault. Finally, at

over the walled

from

five battalions

namese

adviser

air support.

a cascade of explosives

An

Army

U.S.

a

Loc and witnessed the

costly northern counterattack, the opposing armies were like

"two

fighters in the fourteenth or fifteenth round;

they could hardly do anything but hold on to each

With

other."

the recapture of Quang Tri City the Easter

came

offensive

to

an end, the existing battle

lines trans-

formed into de facto boundaries of occupation.

ARVN

offensive had killed }0,000

duced three province

Hanoi

narrow

a

strip of

for

land along the northern and

western borders of South Vietnam.

The new

helped safeguard Communist base areas

Cambodia,

soldiers, re-

and gained

capitals to rubble,

in

territory

Laos and

simplified the task of supplying troops in the

had been overcome,

South, and permitted political cadres to renew organi-

enemy

troops barricaded be-

zational

face

Tri's central citadel,

a miniature version of the fortress at

had held

new

battered Airborne Division with

obstacles

hind the thick stone walls of Quang

NVA

more

disaster stalled the counteroffensive for

than a month. During the interval Truong replaced the

The the

and wounding twenty.

survivors stumbled back through the gap in

the wall, their dead comrades in their arms.

Tri City.

During the two months since they occupied

fire.

The dazed

withdraw to new positions, only to discover four

ARVN

all

Cua

di-

dropped three 500-pound bombs

air strike

troopers, killing forty-five

The

South

Vietnamese operations, Truong's attack began with

River.

on the

ready.

Marked hy boldness and audacity unusual

versionary feints west of

Vietnamese

more than

a

Hue which

month during

the

the 1968

North Vietnamese

Tet

offensive. Moreover, since the

still

controlled two sides of the city, they were able to

work among the

The

rural farmers.

these modest gains was an estimated

Vietnamese dead. The staggering casualty due

in part to the failure of the

command

to concentrate

field officers in

price for

100,000 North figures

Communist

were

military

forces, the inexperience of

its

coordinating infantry and armor, and an

funnel supplies and reinforcements to defend their cap-

overreliance on shock assaults into heavily defended po-

tured prize.

sitions

Truong gave the job of regaining Quang Tri

The

Airborne Division.

paratroopers

house at a time, enduring

130mm

howitzer

until

fire

a

to the

advanced one

continuous barrage of

they clawed their way to

within 100 meters of the citadel. After U.S. aircraft carrying laser-guided east wall,

bombs

blasted a hole in the north-

three airborne companies

swarmed through

the breach. Then, with victory at hand, an errant South

282

to

—

good For

all

use in the future.

all

the

played hy the

nam

Communists would put

valuable lessons the

NVA ARVN,

in the spring

tating weight of

mistakes and

all

the tenacity dis-

what ultimately saved South Viet-

and summer

American

air

of

1972 was the devas-

power.

If

that could be

removed, concluded Hanoi, nothing would stand

way of

in the

victory but time. In the final analysis, that was

the most important lesson of

all.

North Vietnamese

soldiers

advance over

a bridge in

South Vietnam's northernmost province, Quang Tn,

as thev

move

to capture the

provincial capital during the early phases of their Easter 1972 otfensive.

283

Above. With their U.S.

adviser,

South Vietnamese Rangers

North Vietnamese onslaught. Minutes

284

later,

in

Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, plot enemy troops and had to draw a

they were mortared hy

their next

move

hasty retreat.

in

the face of the

Alonj^ Ronrc

I

north o/Z/uc,

ARVN

troops re^nnip utter

.1

skirmish with

NVA

forces,

two ot

whom

lie

Jod

.ir

their teet.

285

Just south of

by the

An

Loc, a key city encircled

Communists

as they

opened the

of-

second front just 100 kilometers north of Saigon, the ARVN ammunition

fensive's

dump

at Lai

Khe

N

goes up after being bit by

an enemy round.

^ -

Im

•

•

\

•«*«•

Above. After depositing

An

Lac

Left.

On

as

tresh reintorcciuents

South Vietnamese

their

way

to

troops,

some

of

on April

overrunning several of the key

North Vietnamese capture an

ARVN

29, a hclidiptcr t.ikcs ott

them wounded,

Si >iith

tirebase outside ot

try desperately to

from besieged

climb aboard.

Vietnamese central highlands

Pak

i


To.

2S9

b**.

Above.

In response to the

full-scale aerial

Communists' threc-pron^ed Easter

offensive, the U.S.

hiimhing of North Vietnam with Operation Linebacker, hef^un

resumed in

April

1972. Here, civil defense forces in IHon Gai, on the Tonkin Gulf east of tLaniti, prepare a litter to carry

Right. Pyrrhic victory.

A

ruins of the citadel in

Quang

city

end.

292

out the body of a

woman

killed in a

September bombini^

South Vietnamese marine with Tri City.

Although

it

was

a captured

raid.

AK47 stands

virtually destroyed

by

atop the

battle,

the

was retaken from the Communists in mid-September to mark the Easter offensive's

.^^

Focus:

POW

with widespread internatit)nal protest, Hanoi abandoned plans for war crimes

its

public of

trials,

but the Democratic Re-

Vietnam (DRV) continued

to

whip up internal

support for the war effort by constant condemnation of the

American POWs.

At

the same time, the North Vietnamese trumpeted

the compassionate care they provided the prisoners.

Staged photos released to the press showed apparently well-fed

men housed

in clean

sympathetic journalists

compounds, while such

as Australian

assured the world that the

POWs

Wilfred Burchett

were receiving decent

treatment. Hanoi invited American antiwar activists to

meet with the prisoners and

periodically released small

groups of prisoners to U.S. antiwar groups. These media events not only displayed North Vietnam in a favorable

During the course of the war some 700 U.S. mihtary

light,

and civihan personnel were taken prisoner hy the Com-

figures like

Among them

munists.

were soldiers and Marines, de-

velopment workers and missionaries captured

in

Vietnam. But the vast majority were

and navy

pilots shot

air force

down over North Vietnam and

taken to one of

a

downtown Hanoi, nicknamed

POWs

had names

tation,

the Zoo,

came

tor the

the Hanoi Hilton.

closer to conveying

in deadly earnest.

To

pawns

to be used without

t)f

that

ran them

war but valuable

compunction

for

whatever

advantage Hanoi could derive.

From the moment of

their capture the

targets

and domestic public opinion.

denounced the

POWs

as

of fingernails, being infected

arm almost

Americans

in a cynical propa-

were both international

On

the one hand, Hanoi

heinous criminals. Handcuffed

together, captured aviators were paraded through the

mane." Some

For

much

U.S. prisoners to the

in

American

activists criticized

fact,

he had

and

Vietnam remained generally unknown public.

Geneva convention

U.S. protests were met with threats that military personnel

tried tor unspecified "crimes against

would be

humanity." Faced

North Vietnam had

ratified the

regulating the treatment of

in 1957. But, since there

POWs

was no formal declaration of

war between the United States and the Democratic Re-

Americans were not

294

and antiwar

of the war the conditions of captivity for

threw rocks, and spat on the helpless

American

having an

told only part of a long tale of brutality, abuse,

insults,

as sixty

ceiling,

without medical care, and being

Frishman's grim portrayal as a serious misrepresentation

screamed

many

don't think

"I

of prison conditions in North Vietnam. In

public of Vietnam,

as

hung from the

lost

journalists

Hanoi before mobs of angry Vietnamese who

Official

unequivocally chal-

dragged along the ground with a broken leg are hu-

streets of

men.

POW

lenged Hanoi's claims of benevolence.

mistreatment.

found themselves on center stage

ganda campaign whose

held

Bethesda Naval Hos-

put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal

the North Vietnamese, the

were not untortunate victims

which the former

flier

at

bed

The

what went on behind the

POWs

in

his

forced statements, living in a cage for three years, being

— the Plan—names who

Frishman had another point of

view. Released in September 1969, the navy

pital

its

POWs.

F.

news conference from

for

in

other camps, too

the Rockpile, Alcatraz

prison wire. For both the camps and those

were

or

halt-dozen prison camps scattered

North Vietnam. The most famous was Hoa Lo

across

Lieutenant Robert

a

Wherever they were captured, most were sooner later

DRV

Rennie Davis, who lauded the

enlightened care of the

South

Laos.

they also gave considerable coverage to antiwar

Hant)i

maintained that captured

entitled to

POW status.

Nor would

the North Vietnamese or Vietcong allow representatives

from the International Red Cross to

The

handful of Americans

who

visit

the camps.

escaped or were released

North Vietnamese government. As

from Communist captivity were constrained from public

levels of the

description ot their treatment hy fears of retaliation

of the savage treatment they received,

against the remaining

POWs. What

glimpses Americans

did get of North Vietnamese prisons were carefully se-

Communists themselves and

lected hy the

veyed the

scarcely con-

a result

prisoners

signed statements or taped radio broadcasts condemning the war and asking for forgiveness. Stratton, paraded a

much

officer's

gaunt

made

before the press in the spring of 1967, publicized confession oi guilt.

reality of the prisoners' existence.

many

The navy

monotone voice

Those Americans captured hy the Vietcong were held

features, striped prison garb,

and

South Vietnam or Cambodia under

shocked Americans who saw

films of his appearance.

camps

in jungle

in

the most primitive conditions; the

POWs better.

of

life

North Vietnamese prisons was only

in

Most

sometimes with another prisoner,

cells that

provided

a bucket in the

little

way

watery soup and a

POWs

relatively

prisoners spent years confined by them-

selves, or

the

American

more than

narrow

in

a concrete

bed and

of amenities. Fed twice a day with

slice

of moldy bread or a bowl of rice,

only occasionally were allowed from their

cells for exercise or

the use of common showers. Medical

Others recognized

made

in the

dull,

had been coerced. For despite ness, the

Stratton

American

their apparent helpless-

prisoners found courageous and in-

genious ways of misleading their to their to

bow

exaggerated

before his captors a signal that his "confession"

own

sanity.

keep their

and ht)lding on

men

trivial

tried

responding to pressure with

stories simple,

information of only

jailers

During interrogation the

importance.

Some confused

the North Vietnamese with fanciful tales of farms on

and antiwar

named Clark Kent

or

care was minimal, mail privileges nonexistent. During

aircraft carriers

the Christmas season of 1966, 457 packages sent to the

Casey Jones. At the same time, the prisoners created an

POWs

elaborate system of clandestine ccmimunications using

sage:

by their families were returned bearing the mes-

"Refused by the Postal Authorities of Vietnam."

The months and

years of isolation were

difficult

tap codes,

hand

spitting noises

—

signals

fliers

—even coughing,

to break

down

hacking, and

their physical isolation

enough. But worse than that, worse than the inadequate

from one another. By such means they were able to

food and squalid living conditions, was the fear and pain

establish a secret organization they called the 4th Allied

of torture

—systematic and — which the majority

purposeful, physical

chological

to

subjected.

The

confinement rubber hoses.

and psy-

of the prisoners were

pattern of abuse ranged from solitary

to vicious beatings with leather straps

The POWs were denied

and

tormented

sleep,

with ropes that forced their bodies into excruciating poby

sitions, or lacerated

around their

wrists.

steel

One

manacles slowly tightened

prisoner was

hung from

a rafter

by his broken arm. Another collapsed into unconsciousness after a beating that

left his

nose broken, his teeth

cracked, and his buttocks a mass of bloody

Fred V. Cherry, the senior black

ninety-two days his country. tors stuffed

POW,

flesh.

was tortured

row when he refused

in a

Commander the navy

I

to

for

denounce

Richard Stratton's interroga-

flier's

mouth with urine-soaked

sand, then burned his body with cigarettes.

believe

Colonel

"You

better

talked," Stratton later admitted.

That was the

pt)int of

prisoners of war was sadistic guards.

It

it all.

The

torture of

American

more than the perverted pastime

was

a policy dictated

oi

from the highest

POW

Wing

that provided the structure and discipline

necessary to maintain morale and continue resistance.

As

the war went on, support from back

became more

Hoping

vigorous.

mese cooperation and

to gain

home

North Vietna-

endangering the

fearful of

also

pris-

oners further, the Johnson administration refrained from

POWs.

publicizing abusive treatment of the restraint

much

Since this

produced nothing. President Nixon adopted a

tougher policy. Beginning

made formal complaints publicly pressing

Hanoi

change prisoners

of war.

to the

in

1969 U.S.

officials

United Nations while

to cease

its

Meanwhile,

brutality

POW

and ex-

wives and

other family members mobilized for action, dispatching representatives to

demand

informatitin from the Camh-

munist delegation to the Paris peace

talks

and

establish-

ing the National League of Families of

American

oners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The mounting

pressure

on Hanoi produced some improvement

m

Pris-

li\ing

conditions at the prisons, including the initiation of limited mail privileges.

295

change occurred

iRinically, the greatest

as the result

On

of a spectacularly unsuccessful rescue mission.

vember

20, 1970, a select group of air force

Son Tay

Forces volunteers hit the miles from

NVA

Within minutes the commandos

Hanoi.

The

juries.

one

The Americans

suffered only 2

minor

in-

daring raid had gone like clockwork, with

single exception:

moved out

and

into the cells,

leaving up to 200 dead

their helicopters,

in

behind.

and Special

Prison twenty-three

knocked out the guard towers, broke escaped

No-

The

months

four

prisoners at

Son Tay had been

While recriminations

flew thick

and

fast in

outlying camps and brought the

POWs

all

into Hanoi.

fifty

men

POWs

each, the

were able to meet,

effective

much

were

in isolation, they

command and

greater support.

now

and

"The

raid

would be two more

POWs

American once more

itary action.

On

President

on

failed in

wrote,

"but

its it

however, before the

again had cause for celebration.

Even

as cracks

sent 126

December

1972, in an

18,

B-52 bombers

against Hanoi.

appeared in the walls of their

dust swirled around them, the

POWs

rejoiced.

Jon A. Reynolds, a long-time prisoner,

noted the guards.

effect of the

raid

cells

and pulled the

immediately

on the prison

They simply headed

time, the United States

the guards

knew

it,

of North Vietnam

Within

a

nam's Le Due

and

knew

meant it

29, only twenty-four hours behind schedule,

of the 591 American

American

296

in

Hanoi.

As they were

released,

the former in the Phil-

for years.

ippines.

Greeted by cheering crowds and specially

business.

We

first

knew

it,

se-

lected escort officers, they were given medical exami-

nations, outfitted with

new

on personal family news

uniforms, brought up to date

world events,

as well as recent

down hamburgers and banana from schoolchildren each

man was

home and

est to his

and received

Once

certified

gifts

to

fit

reunited with his family. officially

regarded the status of

htmorable nor dishonorable but

neither

as

gobbled

flown to the military hospital clos-

Altht)ugh the military prisoner

splits

at the base.

salary, pro-

men

rather as an accident of war, the

comed home

the former

homecomings

all

POWs

across the

American people welas heroes.

In personal

men were

United States the

surrounded by joyous neighbors, feted with parades and

and showered with

special

ceremonies,

months

that followed, the former captives found

had changed during it

their impristmment,

wt)uld be easy to get used

to

"normal"

life

the

more

and

the

much

nt)t all

of

For some the transition

would be long and

American people, the last,

to.

In

gifts.

difficult.

return of the

POWs

But to the

marked

certainly than any other event, the

at

end of

Vietnam War.

seems clear that the leaders

Kissinger and

North Viet-

initialed a cease-fire

agreement.

provided for the repatriation of

POWs

left

were flown to Clark Air Force Base

Captain Charles Boyd, a captured U.S. Air Force pilot,

591

four increments over a period of

is

paraded

before Vietnamese villagers as part of an anti-American propa-

ganda campaign

The document

POWs

it."

month Henry

Tho had

acts of

for their shel-

over their heads. For the

lids

and

Colonel

"There was no joking, no laughing, no

defiance or reprisal. ters

bombing

March

last

The Pentagon had been planning Operation Home-

And

peace agreement with the United States,

a

Nixon

but on

motions, and decorations. In between, the

later

called

Minor prob-

across the line to freedom.

with

attempt to force the North Vietnamese to complete negotiations

name was

lems and delays affected each of the subsequent releases,

travel,

years,

the night oi

man walked

his

men

wt)uld be the result of dramatic U.S. mil-

it

each

As

military personnel.

and provided with information on accrued

boosted our morale sky-high!" It

boundary between the

more

may have

POW

Airport and marched up to

line serving as a

able to exert

provide the younger

primary objectives," one

American

POWs

talk,

Lam

On

South Vietnam.

in

group of prisoners was

first

U.S. and North Vietnam. Waiting to receive them were

The

organize as never before. Although senior officers re-

mained

brought to Hanoi's Gia

coming

Placed in large, open rooms housing twenty to

the

1973,

12,

an imaginary

their

consolidation had a prt)found impact on the prisoners' lives.

February

Washing-

North Vietnamese evacuated

ton, the startled

remaining U.S. combat forces

the

earlier.

their release tied to the withdrawal of the

sixty days,

the

POWs

in 1966.

North Vietnam frequently

to strengthen support for the

undermine the U.S. position abroad.

tried to use

war at home and

to

J^

>

A

view inside

after

298

f/ie

compound

ot Ihyj

North Vietnam released the

last

L>

Prison, hcrrcr

American

known

[irisoners

as the

Hanoi Hilton,

held there, March

18,

j ten

I97h

Jj}^

Apprentice Senmnn Douglas HegJahl at the

Hamu

(left) .uiJ

Licucenunt Comniant/t-r Richard Srrarron (nghc) sweep the prison yard

Hilton. Such chores provided the prisoners

some

rehet from the

boredom

ot captivity.

29^)

Navy and

300

LiL'incrhinr

bread.

i

.mi

{

i.ii,inri

s/r> in.siJc

,i

harrcn pri^an cell .inJ

.ni',i/f> /)/>

nc\r maimer

me.tl. usually norhin;^ innrc rh.in wiJtery

soup

Li^i^uii.iiii

^

.liiiiLinJcr

Stnnton Ixnvs nt

a press conference

Stratton's v.ionr expression .inJ submissive

North Viernnmese were

demeanor

m

m

this

Norr/i \'iern,iin in A/.ia/i

meennu

einployini; inennil .ukI pbysicnl pressure

m

l'->07.

led m.inv fo believe

riie

bie.ik iheir prisoners.

k'l

Above. Free

handmade

at

Right. Captain

Vietnam,

is

Returning prisoner Captain Galand Kramer of the U.S. Air Force holds up a

Air Base

in the

Philippmes, February 12, 197^.

James StcKkdale, the highest-ranking naval

officer

held as

a prisoner of

war

in

North

reunited with his wife, Sybil, and three of his sons at Miramar Naval Air Station near San

Diego, February

302

last.

sign after arriving at Clark

15,

1973.

A

Witness: Everett Alvarez

week

when they put me

later,

somewhere,

thought

/

United States was

think

I

mean, the

saw

I

a

road sign that

Prison.

and

thought, Well,

I

I

me

they were going to try

guess

for

week

a

They

will.

I

didn't

I

was going^to be there very long, until

I

passed,

me

But then

fast.

"Hanoi" and we went into Hoa Lo

said

told

war crimes. But there

was no state of war or declaration of war. Not only as far as I in

What

the hell do

/

and

August

5,

American

1964, during

on North Vietnam

A-4 Skyhawk Irom down over Hon Gai, Everett Alvarez,

Gull ol Tonkin incident,

alter the

an

and

as

pilot,

its

Lieutenant

ejected into the water.

Jr.,

(j.g.)

He was

the

North Vietnam. Alvarez

would spend more than eight years

one

in captivity,

do now

to

I

I

and

back.

I

interrogation, but nothing too

them anything.

tell

was showing a "good attitude.

know

"

but

off,

I

;7j;}c/e

pi^pcorn.

They

weeks.

They

ot

let

me

and

receive

write letters until the

tory.

back with equipment from planes that were shot that they wanted

I

mind.

do!

My

flouted in the water, nil sorts of things ran throui^h I

My poor

thiui^ht,

wife.

feel.' I

me, hanging

me

had

also

hy

my

even remembered that

and

about thirty niinutes, I

looked behind

I felt

rels.

They could have

were that I

skinriing

first

abuse me. hurting.

my

I

I

alive.

I

me

a fishing

if

as I

my

elbow.

boat with guns

drifting from the bar-

they wanted to

— they

I

bad

that

I

couple of days they didn't

a farmhouse.

try to harass

or

I

attitude, cut off

Then

I

my

debated what

is it.

my

We're

tactics

should be and what

expected to do. But after the bombing

From now on we don't help our

it

capfors or answer ques-

tions.

From then (m wolfed down, and years

I

I I

got very meager rations, lost quite a lot of weight.

which

was down by about 50 pounds to between 100

and 105 pounds. in,

we worked

to maintain

munications. Messages were dropped at certain places,

We

was

Words were scratched

used a tap code and hand code, especially for the

I

was

ture from the ejection that

after

a hairline frac-

had eventually

healed.

com-

such as where you would clean out your latrine can.

had

later,

I

For a few

I

found evidence of

was

I

was very clear:

I

back during ejection. Years

mail,

really in a war. Before

could hardly walk, and

stiff that I

do

found out they

was sleeping most of the time because

got so

d<.nvn

refused to

second American, Bob Shumaker. Then

thought. Well, this

As more men came

was captured.

released, the doctors

304

me

my mind

was taken to a nearby prison, then to

In the

hurt

close. I

hit

a

a

seat pan. Finally, after

and smoke

sticking over the side

had

had captured

something graze

me and saw

I

do! How's

to

of them capturing

night on the ship. All this went through

my

they said

in a very small cell.

was going to miss roast beef

was trying to swim, dragging

5()

bomb-

Then they came

to explain to them.

and stuck me

visions

feet, I

that,

me

What's she going to

poor mother. What's she going

she going to

the

ofi

quit after ahnit six

ing started again, in February 1965.

my

and

was telling them such things

the longest terms as a prisoner of war in American his-

As

They

things like the layout of a carrier

was in charge of the popcorn machine /lou- /

We

thought.

/

talked to them but didn't

a plane took

how

ship

I

went through some

wanted

how

and hadn't come

struck

They thought

the carrier Constellation was shot

pilot taken prisoner by

first

retaliatory raids

that,

there weren't any other prisoners.

came

difficult. I

On

knew

go

in a jeep fo

gomg home.

world power. They were going to

a

things up really

fix

was

I

who

at the

didn't have nxymmates.

bottom o/ bowls.

We

keep the lines open. That was very ior officers

always

managed

//Jiporfanr.

were able fo pass along orders to

also

men

all

The

to

sen-

the pns-

and we

oners,

I

kinds of information back and

sent: all

mostly just anecdotes and sea

forth,

When

it

was

best to keep

him

pumped you

up.

You had

went down you'd do your

a person's morale up,

and when you were down they

when we had roommates.

Especially

to develop a real sense

were living

in very close,

of consideration; you

cramped quarters. Twenty-four

hours a day, every day, you'd sleep together, exercise together, eat together,

my

or had diarrhea, I

and

if

Harris,

how

Son Tay camp. That showed they

hadn 't forgotten and were 1972 elections

terrible.

Smitty

his cell-mate,

to play the piano by using a "keyboard"

in the

Vietnamese

the

knew

it

guns anymore. Those people were

They would show

movement

in the

United

us

movies of the an-

States, like Berkeley

and

the march on Washington, and ask us if we would also

They got many of us

protest. Hell, no, we'd say.

to sign

who

"confessions" stating that we were war criminals

A

few weeks

We

later, in

and

all just sat

long overdue.

the

end

buses

and went

fear,

and not only

that,

you off the ground or

That was tough. There was

strip.

there was punishment.

They

were very brutal at times. There was no lying back.

mean, they actually

killed guys.

Others got sick from

the diet or the treatment. In late 1969, the

was really physically abused,

I

I

time

last

I

got sick with jaundice and

From 1970 in

to

1973 we began

to see a gradual im-

our diet and treatment. By the summer of

1972 they were bringing

and canned

fish,

in

wagonloads of canned meat

even bread,

to fatten us up.

get a lot more exercise and recreation. cards, packages,

to-date

was so

It

I

was emotionally

wasn't sure that this was

it,

12, Lincoln's birthday, the first group

field, still

to the airport.

wondering

if

it

We

would

sat

fall

"Just a

said,

just stepped over the line

the wheels were in the well that

through when, sure

its

way of taking

I'm very lucky to be alive.

We

A

colonel

came

and

"

into the hands

we had taken

I felt elated

off and

and

every-

crazy.

Life has

at a time.

at the

few more minutes, guys, hang on.

of the Americans. It wasn't until

one went

on the bus

We

had

its

turns and, you

We had

also learned the value

to face

We

to be positive.

know,

each day one

couldn't give up.

of having each other. You

gain individual strength through the chain; each link

hepatitis.

provement

I still

enough, an American C-141 landed.

Then we

beat you with a rubber

cheered.

We just went back and finished our bridge

But on February

They'd

your arms

Nobody

listened.

of forty prisoners, the ones there the longest, got on

we agreed only after days of

tie

We knew

tired.

of the war.

up and

lift

man

January 1973, they marched us

was sort of anticlimactic.

It

things like that, but

torture.

to

out into the yard and read us the peace agreement.

all

had attacked innocent civilians and

together at the shoulders and

We

for joy.

was close to the end.

drained by that time.

tiwar

that

bombing

the

where the Vietnamese wouldn't even bother their

games.

for propaganda.

When

we were cheering

tell

wouldn't stop. The bombing got to the point

it

written on contraband rice paper. Things like that kept

trying to use us

concerned. Then by the

were hurting.

us going.

The North Vietnamese were always

still

United States we could

started after the election,

your roommate was sick

God, the stench would be

remember Bob Shumaker taught

was because there had been a raid by Amer-

it

ican forces on the

stories.

think everyone always shared the sense that

their responsibility to contribute to keeping the others up.

found out

could

ered his

own

strength.

I

and through

was there with gath-

We had won. We had maintained

our strength.

got playing

and letters from home and got more up-

on what had happened

been shot down.

We

We

contributes to the strength of the chain,

group unity each individual that

We

in the years since

we had

were getting the royal treatment

/ guess in preparation for

—

eventual release.

During the whole time we never thought that our

government would

forget us or just drop

were put together at the Hanoi Hilton

us.

When we

in late 1970,

we

305

'

i»ii-iiiuiBT-"H'»nii

,

^^

4§

^

'S

*-

-^

f

8

THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM

To

many

the disappointment of

but to the surprise of no one, the Paris accords did not

bring peace to Vietnam. Even as the mutually proclaimed cease-fire went into effect at

ARVN

8:00 A.M. on January 28, 1973, fighting between to rage across the length

much

and Communist forces continued

and breadth of South Vietnam. Hoping

territory as possible before the International

Commission

to gain control of as

of Control

and Supervision

overseeing the cease-fire certified their claims, both sides took to the offensive in what

came

to be

known

Vietnamese

as "the

war of

days leading up to the cease-fire, South

flags." In the

forces hastily established forward outposts

and

resettled refugees in

Commu-

nist-dominated areas, while Communist cadres slipped into countless villages and hamlets

When

to proclaim their "liberation."

charged

that their "legitimate" claims

Efforts to affix

blame

counterattacks followed, Hanoi and Saigon both

had been "violated" by the enemy.

its

long-range goals and each seemed willing to observe the

accords only to the extent that suited

from the outset

as

if

proclaimed in 1969

its

oi territory,

no

Revolutionary Government

down on

all

Still

wedded

— no negotiating with the enemy, coalition

possibility of a political solution by

visional

For his part, President Thieu acted

interests.

the accords did not exist.

Vietnam, no surrender any

peace agreement proved pointless, since

for the failure of the

neither party had abandoned

set

to the "tour no's"

no Communist

government

he had

South

activity in

— he systematically undercut

denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the Pro-

up by the National Liberation Front, by cracking

domestic political opponents, and by refusing to cooperate with the

and Joint Military Commission. Nor did he make any

Even though the

GVN

first

ICCS

effort to curtail offensive operations.

controlled approximately 80 percent ot the land and 90 percent

of the people at the time of the cease-fire, Thieu immediately tirdered his military torces to attack

NVA

military bases

and PRG-held

and the environs of Saigon. As In April 1975 with Sc^urh

Viecnam

villages in the delta, the coastal lowlands,

a result, during the

falling ro the

NVA,

first

three nnniths of "peace"

residents of rlie delta

head

tor Saigon.

ARVN

lost

more than 6,000 men, among the highest quarterly

totals of the war.

Thieu drew en-

In adopting his belligerent stance,

couragement from the promises he had received of con-

Though Henry

tinuing U.S. support.

have sought nothing more than

tween the signing of the in

Kissinger seems to

"decent interval" be-

a

and

Paris pact

a final settlement

Vietnam, Richard Nixon remained

ever not to be the

first

as

determined

American president

as

to lose a war.

in addition to supplying the South Vietnamese with vast stores of fire,

war materiel

Nixon

would ct)ntinue aid"

in the

secretly assured

months preceding the ceaseThieu that the United States

economic and military

to provide "full

and would "respond with

force"

full

Vietnamese violated the agreements. meeting with Thieu

at

the Western

the North

it

1973

In an April

White House

Clemente, California, Nixon reiterated

in

his pledge.

can count on us," he told the Vietnamese

San

"You

leader.

For a variety of reasons, the Communists approached the "postwar war"

much mcue

South Vietnamese

adversaries. Still suffering the effects

cautiously than did their

of the bloody campaigns of 1972, forced to accept cut-

backs in Russian and Chinese the complete withdrawal of

all

Vietnamese leadership decided itary action

its

During the

first

military forces in the

U.S.

as

it

To

came

and

political

organiza-

Communist

South were ordered to assume a

PRG

concentrated

territories

under

its

the creation of this Third Vietnam,

to be called, as

headed south

any major mil-

year of the cease-fire

on consolidating the newly gained control.

North

on economic recon-

primarily defensive posture while the

assist in

to ensure

forces, the

to avoid

energies

military regrouping,

struction, tion.

and focus

and eager

aid,

many

as

5,000 political cadres

to establish local administrative offices, set

up new schools, and organize collective farms among the peasantry.

Although the United States formally protested the continued

infiltration of

North Vietnamese troops into

South Vietnam, President Nixon coukl do it.

Already reeling from the

An NVA

political

sitlJicr sr.ircs innv.s r/ic

o/i hiitu.uv 28,

ro stop

of the

un-

Tlmcl) H.in River scpnninni^

Norf/i V'R-rn.un troni Smith \'ictn.ini ;iic'.')r

lirrlc

shock

.tttcr

rhc caisc-tire

.i.tTec-

l'-)7h

)\^iP

foldinf^

Watergate scandal, Nixon tounJ

his ability to

take unilateral military action sharply limited by the assertive

93d Congress. As soon

POWs

and

were

home,

safely

moved

legislators alike

American troops

as all

liberal

and conservative

swiftly to halt

any further U.S.

ever possible and to initiate strategic raids that would

bleed

ARVN

Thieu regime. Rather than an

for the

the

new campaign would

military operations "in or over or from the shores of

and complex"

South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia." Several months

tween "anti-nibbling

November

in

later,

War

Powers Act, which required the president to

inform the legislative branch within forty-eight hours of the deployment of U.S. troops abroad and obligated to

withdraw them within

him

absence of

sixty days in the

explicit Congressional approval.

take the form of a "protracted

General Dung observed, be-

struggle.

President Thieu refused to scale back either his

For the Saigon government, the escalation of the ing could hardly have

come

1974 the South Vietnamese economy was teetering on

withdrawal and partly

ican

in

American

and

broke off in late

at political settlement formally

1973, South Vietnamese forces stepped up ground and base camps and launched a

series of land-grabbing operations in

along the eastern seaboard, in Tay of Saigon, and in the

Communists

the

areas from

Mekong

PRG

new

strongholds

Ninh Province north

"We

losses

The economic

impact on Saigon's

crisis

had an

especially profound

-million-man army, causing chronic

and promoting further corruption. The payment of

command

will harass us,"

Thieu

told officers

in early January 1974, as

surprise,

the

NVA

he pro-

and

PRG

heavy

suffered

bribes for air

and

artillery

support became commonplace,

and desertion reached epidemic proportions.

Com-

pounding the government's problems, the Buddhist opposition began agitating during the late

summer

for

however, the Communists went on the

Catholics, Thieu's principal base of support, launched a

units in the Iron Triangle, recapturing

of the territory they had

lost,

and

The fledged,

willingness of the

open warfare

Yielding to the hawks

Communists

reflected a

withm

major

GVN.

to

nationwide anticorruption campaign aimed

full-

shift in strategy.

Vo Nguyen Giap and

Van Tien Dung,

munist party central committee had passed

the a

Com-

compro-

As

the situation steadily deteriorated,

Defense

Attache's

failure of the

when-

the

Saigon

in military aid. Secretary of

United States

to

uphold

its

"moral obli-

gation" to the South Vietnamese would have "a corrosive effect

on our

interests

beyond Indochina." But Con-

mood

of a war-weary nation, refused

to be swayed.

Armed

in

State Kissinger echoed their entreaties, warning that the

of reconstruction in the North but also authorizing a

GVN

officials at

(DAO)

pleaded with Washington to find some way to provide

gress, reflecting the

return to "revolutionary violence" in the South.

Office

an additional $500 million

mise resolution in October 1973 reaffirming the priority

forces were henceforth to strike back at the

at the pres-

ident himself.

U.S.

resume

the Hanoi Politburo, no-

tably Defense Minister General

chief of staff General

much

seizing additional

lands previously under the control of the

310

1

inflation,

in corruption at every level of

peace and accommodation with the PRG, while the

ARVN

NVA

and a marked increase society.

had combined

unemployment, soaring

to produce massive

to enjoy stable security in their staging

will

counteroffensive and scored success after success, mauling

a sharp rise in worldwide oil prices

rice harvests,

during the early stages of the campaign. In the

spring,

late

poor

shortages of vital military necessities, sapping morale,

Delta.

claimed the advent of the "Third Indochina War."

Taken by

series of

not allow

which they

of the delta

oi President

result

military aid from $2.3 billion in 1973 to

aimed

NVA

a

as

Amer-

the United States annually spent in Vietnam, a cutback

about $1 billion in 1974, a

on

fight-

worse time. By mid-

at a

the brink of total collapse, partly as a result of the

political ambitions or his military offensives. After talks

air attacks

and the nibblers."

forces

Thieu's aggressive policies. Loss of the $400 million that

Despite these clear signals of flagging American support.

all-out offensive,

1973, Congress raised the "Indo-

china Prohibition" to the level of principle by passing the

NVA

allow further expansion of

units,

base areas and supply corridors, and undermine support

at

Faced with the threat of runaway inflation

home, angered by

South Vietnam, and

reports of tired of

rampant corruption

in

underwriting what one leg-

islatDr described

many

as

"self-perpetuating dictatorship,"

a

with Senator Edward Kennedy

visions

come

to terminate America's "endless

up positions

that the time had

Some even

support for an endless war."

believed that a

had been mobilired

new

piled,

by forcing President Thieu to negotiate

logistical

tlement of the conflict. As a

result, in

Congress voted to cut military aid fiscal

for

1975 to $700 million, half of which would be con-

sumed

A

September 1974

South Vietnam

to

ended

before, the

in President

DMZ.

the

just across

Watergate scandal had

finally

Nixon's forced resignation. That and

reserve di-

the North, several taking

Vast quantities of

all

and hospital

training

and the

facilities built,

network under construction since early 1973

but completed. "It was a picture to be proud of,"

North Vietnamese chief of staff General Van Tien LXmg "In that region of our Fatherland were

later recalled.

more than 20,000 kilometers of

in shipping costs alone.

month

in

weapons, ammunition, and supplies had been stock-

reduction in aid would enhance the prospects for peace a fX)litical set-

Another seven

Strela surface-to-air missiles.

legislators agreed

running

strategic roads

north and south, with campaign roads running east and west

—strong

inching

ropes

day

gradually,

by

demon, awaiting

the vote reducing aid together had a devastating impact

around the neck, arms, and

on the South Vietnamese,

the order to jerk tight and bring the creature's

intensifying Thieu's political

and economic problems and encouraging what one torian has called "a psychology of retreat that ably,

his-

sometimes approached despair." Unaccount-

made any

Joint General Staff

effort to adjust to their

Though

country's radically altered strategic situation.

ARVN

outposts continued to

fall

to the

enemy with

alarming regularity, no attempt was made to concentrate scattered lines.

South Vietnamese

forces along

Nor were any contingency

ticipation of a major

more defensible

plans drawn up in an-

North Vietnamese

"Our

offensive.

leaders continued to believe in U.S. air intervention

even it,"

after the

U.S. Congress had expressly forbidden

ARVN

one high-ranking

general later

wrote. "They

deluded themselves into thinking that perhaps ply

meant

this sim-

that U.S. intervention would take a longer

time to come because of the complex procedures

in-

While the their

leaders of the

GVN

waited and hoped,

North Vietnamese counterparts

carefully reassessed

the shifting military balance in the South.

meeting of the Politburo and

At

a joint

the central military

com-

to

Before that tirder could be given, however, the North

Vietnamese

first

had

Amer-

to consider the likelihood of

Though even Dung

ican intervention.

agreed that cau-

tion was in order, the consensus of the conference was

summed up

"Now

general.

Communist

by Le Duan,

in.

And no

party

matter

how

"it will

they

may

What

lapse."

1975,

a

finally

be hard to jump back

two-year plan

to

year of the campaign.

move

its

disastrous col-

emerged from the October

document known

through negotiations, but by first

secretary-

intervene, they cannot

rescue the Saigon administration from

erations was a

first

that the United States has pulled out of

the South," he declared,

as

"liberate" fc:)rce

delib-

the Resolution for

South mit

the

of arms. During the

Communist

would

forces

out oi their jungle base camps and systematically

eliminate exposed .A.RVN outposts, further extend supply corridors,

volved."

life

an end."

accommodation and

however, neither Thieu nor the members of his

legs of a

day,

and

force

ARVN

to retreat to

urban areas.

Large-scale attacks against the cities and major garrisons were to be launched

1976,

culminating

in

a

m

ARVN

the following year,

"General Offensive, General

Uprising" that would topple the Saigon regime

or,

at

mittee in early October 1974, the hawks once again

the very least, force acceptance of a coalition govern-

pressed their case for all-out war, arguing that the grow-

ment.

ing vulnerability of

ARVN

availed

only waiting to be grasped.

Vietnamese had already the South

troops

artillery

antiaircraft regiments

By that point the

North

infiltrated ten full divisions into

—some 200,000

and 450 long-range

"new opportunities"

— backed by 700 tanks

pieces as well as twenty

armed with sophisticated

SA-7

As outlined by General Dung, 1975 offensive would be

the centerpiece of the

a thrust into the vast,

defended region that the X'lctnaincsc yen,

known

In early

c.illed

lightly

Tan Ngu-

bv the .Amenc.uis as the central highlands.

December, however. Dung was forced

his plans after Lieutenant

to

modify

General Tran Van Tra, the

311

f«JW^

Wirh porr/ons of South Vietnam along the Cambodian border already having try to

312

hold positions west of Saigon on March

12.

fallen to the Ni>rth

—

-T-iry

'J

—r-

\

Vietnamese, South Vietnamese troops

ct)mmanJer

Communist

of

lands-Mekong Delta political officer of

low-

the

in

and Pham Hung, the chief

region,

COSVN,

forces

the Central Office for South

Vietnam, convinced the Politburo

cam-

to begin the

paign with a major assault on Phuoc Long Province northeast of Saigon.

Not only would

Phuoc Long make

mockery of Thieu's "no

a

concession" policy, the two

down ARVN's mobile

tie

way

men

the liberation of

argued,

reserves

territorial

would

it

also

and thus prepare the

for a bold strike against the capital in 1976.

As

shorten their defense lines and stitute a national

at the

same time recon-

mobile reserve capable of rapid de-

ployment. As in the

however, President Thieu

past,

refused even to consider a strategic withdrawal since

it

violated his policy of "no retreat." Instead he continued to cling to the

hope that somehow,

Americans would eventually come faith derived in part

some way, the

in

His

to his rescue.

from the secret assurances given by

the past president, in part from his calculation ui U.S.

and

geopolitical interests,

in part

from his ignorance of

turned out, the attack on Phuoc Long proved

the American political system. In South Vietnam Ngu-

even more successful than Tra had anticipated. Begin-

yen Van Thieu was the government; he seems never

ning on December

fully to

NVA

it

13,

the 7th and newly formed 3d

Divisions quickly captured a series of key outposts,

surrounded the garrison town of

Don

and the province

also cut off

brought under

siege.

As

ARVN

garrisons were

Phuoc Binh

capital of

Communists bombarded the

the

town with long-range 130MM

artillery shells,

two com-

panies of highly trained Rangers were dispatched to bolster

ARVN's

defenses. But

it

gunned and outnumbered

was hardly enough. Out-

nearly

four

one,

to

the

defenders of Phuoc Binh finally succumbed on January 6,

ease with

which Phuoc Long had

the Hanoi Politburo immediately di-

liberated,

rected the

NVA

Campaign

275, the previously planned drive into the

General Staff to revise

its

plans for

central highlands. Scrapping the conservative objectives initially

series

outlined by General Dung, which called tor a

of attacks on exposed outposts, new orders were

now drawn up

for a surprise attack

capital of Darlac Province

ARVN litical

on Ban

Me

Thuot,

and headquarters of the 23d

"Never have we had

we have now," Le Duan

told

Dung,

as

he

dis-

ot the

a

rising inflation

In Saigon, meanwhile, the South Vietnamese Joint

General Staff scrambled to cope with the unfolding milcrisis.

Uncertam where

the

enemy might

strike

next and lacking the manpower to defend every front,

ARVN

commanders began

fleshing out plans to

Phuoc Long reached Wash-

months. Al-

in office only five

CIA

and widespread unemployment

to

wiretapping scandal, further preoccupied by the

threat of renewed war between Egypt and Israel in the

Middle

he was hardly inclined to

East,

risk his political

capital by taking forceful military action in Southeast

Even

if

he had been willing to do

War

china Prohibition of 1973 and the

1974 sharply limited gress,

to the coast of

much

his options.

As

less

Vietnam without

unleash thundering

Con-

legislative approval,

fleets

He

there-

was to seek

a sup-

of B-52s.

plemental appropriation ot $300 million

in military aid

South Vietnam and an additional $222 million

Cambodia, where Khmer

on the

R(,)uge forces

Phnom

capital city of

were rapidlv clos-

Penh.

South Vietnam and Cam-

bodia for an on-the-spot apptcUsal

Though

but one ot the legislators

New

York

— returned

voring some addition. il

ot rhc

—Congresswoman to

dctcnoraring

skeptical at the outset, Bella

all

Ab:ug

Washington on March

2 fa-

tnilitarv
both countries. But their recttmmendations had effect.

for

Ford's urging, in late February a special Congres-

sional delegation traveled to

of

the Indo-

interpreted by

fore decided that the only alternative

for

so,

Powers Act of

Ford could not even send a U.S. naval task force

military situation.

highlands offensive.

the

from

At

patched the general south to take personal charge

of the fall ot

ready burdened by a host of domestic problems ranging

conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage so

military

news

ington in early January 1975, Richard Nixon's successor,

ing in

Division.

the United States,

nt)t.

Gerald Ford, had been

and po-

great as

itary

When

Asia.

1975.

Emboldened by the been

the president was

in

Luan, and severed

the main road leading through the province. During the

next two weeks the remaining

have comprehended that

little

Most members of Congress, and with them the

313

majority of Americans, rhoufjiht S'ving South Vietnam

more

would be throwing good money

aid

While the

As

after bad.

president's supplemental-aid request lan-

guished on Capitol Hill, the North Vietnamese

Army

Combat Engineer Group

with the 20th

leading the way.

the engineers repaired the road, built fords, and re-

placed bridges

—

process that,

a

Phu's estimation,

in

would take no more than two days

in total

—

infantry,

In

accordance with the Politbu-

armor, and medical units would follow. Crack South

ro's latest directive, early

on the morning of March 10

Vietnamese Ranger groups would act

resumed the offensive.

NVA Divisions surged out the ARVN garrison at Ban

the 320th, 316th, and 10th of the jungle and attacked

Me

Thuot. Employing a

movement

to screen the

General Dung called the

tactic

Even before the

first

"blossoming lotus," a single regiment of infantrymen

ous problems arose.

and sappers spearheaded the

for

Nha

was

in

the government

command

assault, striking quickly at

centers inside the

then turning outward, "like

a flower

town and

bud slowly opening

the petals." In the meantime, columns of tanks and

armored personnel

carriers closed in

from the north and

south behind a shield of long-range the

trapping

artillery,

ARVN defenders between the claws of an ever tight-

ening pincer. Although the South Vietnamese troops fought bravely,

at

times savagely, to hold their ground,

within two days only a few pockets of organized

resis-

The

ot

fall

Ban

In order to prevent the

President

to start trading land for time.

North Vietnamese from march-

ing to the sea and cutting the country in two, he decided to

withdraw

and Pleiku there to

his

remaining highland forces from

to the coastal

mount

Kontum

town of Tuy Hoa and from

a counterattack

on Ban

Me Thuot.

Since

the main road leading to the coast. Route 19, had

ready been cut by the

NVA,

al-

retreating forces were to

descend along interprovincial Route 7B, an old logging road that snaked

its

way from the

outskirts of Pleiku

through Phu Bon Province. Though the road had rarely

been used

in recent years

be heavily mined,

it

and

parts of

it

were

known

many

the past.

With

careful planning

and any

in

luck, the force

would be gone before the North Vietnamese

realized

soon

as

15

seri-

Phu himself departed as to

who

without alerting the Territorial

As

a

began moving out,

as the regular units

Regional- and Popular-Force troops gathered their

families

and joined the mass exodus. So did thousands

As

of other civilians.

the military convoys headed south

kicking up clouds of red dust, unbroken lines of refugees

on

foot paralleled the path of the

army on each

side of

the road.

As the South Vietnamese had hoped. General Dung his staff

retreat.

But

were

initially fooled

after receiving

ARVN's

by

strategic

both Western news reports

of civilians fleeing the highlands and radio intercepts of flights

from Pleiku to the coast, the North Vietnamese

general became convinced that the

move. Seizing the opportunity

enemy was on the major

to destroy a

command. Dung immediately ordered

ARVN

the 320th

NVA

Division to drive northeast, attack the flank o( the col-

umn, and

stall

the retreat long enough to allow the

968th Regiment to close

in

from the

rear.

Other

forces

along the coast were to cut 7B in advance of the with-

drawing South Vietnamese refuge at

when

as they

falling

on the evening of March 18

the lead elements of the

with the

headed toward their

Tuy Hoa.

Darkness was

to

had the advantage of passing

through territory that the enemy had largely ignored

On March

Forces of their assigned role in the withdrawal.

and

Me Thuot finally convinced

Thieu that he would have

of the column.

convoy departed, however,

Trang, leaving contradictory orders

command and

result,

tance remained. By March 15, the battle for the Darlac

Province capital was over.

as a rear guard,

while the Territorial Forces at Pleiku remained behind

II

Corps column

where engineers had been days to construct a

at

NVA

320th caught up

Cheo Reo (Hau Bon),

frantically

working

for

two

pontoon bridge

across the Ea Pa

ARVN

veteran leads a group

what was happening.

Once

the order was given,

II

Corps commander Major

General Pham Van Phu immediately began planning the

On March

21,

1975, a one-legged

of refugees from

Ban

evacuation. Thinking only of speed, he decided that the

12,

withdrawal would begin within two days, on March

125-kilometer march.

314

16,

Me

Thuot, taken by the

into the outskirts of the coastal town of

NVA

on March

Nha Trang

after a

«4

*

i

'"tr.:

f?**

River. Just as they CDmpleted their work, a shower of

heavy

artillery shells,

down on

mortar rounds, and rockets rained

the throngs of soldiers and refugees

converged on the riverbank, waiting to

same time, other Communist tail

end

ot the ct)lumn,

which

who had

cross.

At

the

units began hitting the still

stretched back to the

outskirts ot Pleiku.

Nevertheless, the next day the column pushed on, as helicopters darted in to evacuate the sick and

and

VNAF aircraft

bombed

The convoy continued March

21,

when

the advancing

wounded

NVA

troops.

Cheo Reo

to flow through

until

the North Vietnamese finally broke

On

through the Ranger rear guard and seized the town. orders from General Phu,

doned

their

the trapped Rangers aban-

heavy weapons and

fled

into the jungle.

Elsewhere along the column panic dissolved into chaos as roving

bands of leaderless soldiers fought with

ians over dwindling supplies of food priest later reported seeing people so

civil-

and water.

One

weak and exhausted

they could "barely climb onto helicopters" and children

dying of starvation.

By the time the lead elements of what had come

to

be called the Convoy of Tears fought through the

last

NVA

25,

roadblocks and reached

the losses were staggering.

who began

vilian refugees

were accounted tually

made

quarters

20,000

at

it

for.

Nha

logistics

estimated 180,000

Rangers, only 900 even-

newly established

Trang,

ci-

the journey, only one-third

Of 7,000

to the

Tuy Hoa on March

Of an

II

Corps head-

while about one-quarter ot

and support troops completed the with-

drawal. All told,

JGS chairman General Cao Van Vien

later reported, "Seventy-five percent of

II

Corps combat

strength, to include the 23d Infantry Division as well as

Ranger, armor

artillery,

been

expended."

tragically

The

engineer, and signal units, had

morale-shattering defeat in the central highlands

was soon followed by an equally disastrous collapse ot

ARVN

forces in the northern provinces. There, too, a

decision to pull back to move detcnsible positions pre-

— the column of

The Convoy of Tears

soldiers

and

civilians re-

creating ro the coast from the hard-pressed highland citv ot Pleiku

along disused R(^ute 7Bhv

%%

l^'-^^^

^

NVA

—/irfwc-

through smoke and debris

left

shellhre.

317

among

cipitated a mass panic

elite

ARVN

the civilian population

Thieu ordered the redeployment of the

after President

Airborne Division to Saigon and the with-

ground tual

downtown

in the

the main airport frenzied

complicating matters, Thieu repeatedly failed to

craft shuttling in

his

commands,

at

first

held "at

all

meantime, the

costs." In the

and 325C Divisions army, cut Route

from

isolated the city

it

be

324B

I

on March 24

flotilla

to

The

to

hastily

head

where

for the shore,

a

and third-country nation-

officials,

were among the

als

to leave, flying out in aircraft

first

provided by Air Vietnam, World Airways, Air America,

and the Vietnamese

air force.

But

as the

backlog of

passengers grew and the crowds at the airfield became increasingly unruly, the

airlift

had

to be

suspended and

an American

scrambled to locate their families and

NVA,

Behind them the

with their

to-

own

entering Hue, trained their artillery guns on

the principal embarkation point,

inflicting

heavy casualties and feeding panic among those waiting

When

to be evacuated.

the promised naval fleet at

appeared, a combination of low increasingly accurate

enemy

drowned

rough

tides,

shellftre

from reaching the shore. Dozens of refugees

seas,

last

and

prevented the ships soldiers

and

civilian

attempted to swim to the 100

as they

DAO

official,

it

was decided that a small

of tugs and barges assigned to

fleet

would instead be used

move

military supplies

to transport people. In the

mean-

time, several large cargo ships were dispatched from Sai-

gon

to assist in the evacuation.

As rumors

of the impending sealift spread through

the city, thousands of civilians and renegade soldiers

rushed the docks, overwhelmed a cordon of

and

curity guards,

Many

barges.

civilians

ARVN

drowned

or were trampled to

death in the crush. Others were shot by South Vietna-

mese

soldiers

determined to make room

for themselves.

others waded into the sea, hoping to be picked up

Still

by one of the boats already making their way out to

namese navy had brought from Da Nang.

"Vietnamese mothers saved

most of one regiment of the single boatload of cessfully

1st

ARVN

In the end,

Division and a

South Vietnamese marines were suc-

evacuated to Da Nang, along with 7,700 people Island.

Thousands of others were

left

on

the beach to await the arrival of the conquerors of Hue.

Although President Thieu holding the line at

Da Nang,

still it

entertained hopes of

soon became apparent

that any attempt to resist the advancing North Viet-

namese Army would be terrified refugees

futile.

As

poured into the

tens of thousands of

city during the last days

of March, doubling the population to

some

2 million,

any semblance of order or discipline evaporated. By

March 27 crowds

318

of Vietnamese occupied every inch of

se-

board the waiting boats and

tried to

or so junks, river craft, and barges that the South Viet-

on Vinh Loc

Cam

planned evacuation soon turned into a

the ten-mile stretch of road leading to the port town of

Tan My,

as possible to

some other means of escape found. At the suggestion of

coast.

now

ahead with

pressed

frantically

many people

Saigon. Nonessential U.S. consular per-

then dissolved into the civilian throngs streaming

troops

authorities

plans to evacuate as

Da Nang.

rout, as soldiers

ward the

the mounting anarchy South Vietnamese and

American

GVN

of South Vietnamese naval vessels was to carry

them south

air-

city.

Ranh Bay and

Corps commander General Truong ordered

rior force,

and out of the

sonnel, senior

he could not possibly hold out against the enemy's supe-

his troops

mobs converged on every

retreating

on the

overland access. Realizing that

all

no

soldiers,

and south of Hue, and

rapidly closed

to the north

1

NVA

Amid

Hue

indicating that the city of

should be abandoned and then demanding that

armed

streets

longer under any control, wandered aimlessly, while at

drawal ot other units to enclaves along the coast. Further clarify

area, bringing traffic to a vir-

Along the

standstill.

them

to British girls, Aussies

bies," recalled

sea.

their children by throwing

—everybody grabbing

ba-

one American.

The North Vietnamese 2d Army Corps Easter morning,

March

waited until

30, before entering

Da Nang.

By that point much of the madness that had gripped the city

had already burnt

itself out,

50,000 civilians and 16,000

no

resistance as the

had managed

to

who remained

of-

soldiers

escape. Resigned to their fate, those fered

even though only

Communists

over South Vietnam's second-largest years before the

first

raised their flag city,

where ten

contingent of American combat

troops had splashed ashore.

The

following day,

March

31, a flash telegram arrived

at

General Dung's

command

post near

Ban

Me

Thuot,

to serve as

supreme commander and

litical

decision." Abandoning the two-year plan outlined the

northerner, their deputies.

preceding

fall,

the North Vietnamese leadership had de-

cided to seize the "once-in-a-thousand-years opportunity" that lay before

them and

"liberate Saigon before

was to be launched no

mitted at once to the southern front, while

Dung himself Loc

later

a

offensive against Saigon

than the

last

week of

later wrote,

April.

"we were

racing against the clock." In the

tinued

Along

meantime, the North Vietnamese Army con-

its

seemingly

coastal

Route

inexorable

1

southward advance.

and the newly paved roads of the

COSVN

political

central highlands, long convoys of trucks, armored per-

to begin

sonnel to

nam War.

April.

Tho

Le Due

South

joined

them

to apprise

resolutions

and to monitor the

been designated the

Nha Trang

Dung and

offered

pth^r ft the

no

l:i-it

his

comrades

in the

in detail of the Politburo's latest final

phase of what had

Ho Chi Minh Campaign. Dung safe

haven

for

iircrifr (vit of

was

highland refugees; they arrived

Nha Trang

uses his

fists

to

carriers,

tanks,

and

artillery pieces ran

bumper, day and night, throughout the

preparations for the "final decisive battle" of the Viet-

rhi'

lung as chief po-

Pham Hung and General Tran Van Tra

Ninh. There he would be joined by chief

at

The

"From then on," General Tra

the rainy season." All available units were to be com-

was to proceed to the regional military base camp

officer,

1

with Generals Tra and Le Due Anh,

informing him that the Politburo had reached a "historic

As

the

NVA juggernaut

cipal population centers of sion.

On

April

1

II

first

bumper week

of

rolled forward, the prin-

Corps

fell in

the coastal city o(

rapid succes-

Nha

Trang, the

northernmost point on

ARVN's

without a

Corps commander General Phu

to find the

fight after

II

latest

defense line,

fell

people of the coastal town fleeing south to Saigon. Here,

keep more people

off

the already overloaded plane. April

I.

?/^

panicked and

fled to

installation at

Cam Ranh

as the lOth

NVA

In Saigon,

Two

Saigon.

Bay was

Division closed

news of the

days later the huge similarly

abandoned

in.

latest territorial losses raised

tensions to the brink of panic, sparking a run

on the

banks

Thieu's

widespread

as well as

resignation.

calls for President

In characteristic fashion, the

South Viet-

namese leader lashed back by censoring opposition newspapers, arresting alleged "plotters," and authorizing

and

local police to "shoot

on the spot" anyone who

kill

violated a 9:00 P.M. curfew. Yet aside from promising to

form a new "fighting cabinet," he made no

rally

the nation behind

him

effort to

or to provide any real lead-

ership to the government or armed forces. Plans to re-

organize and re-equip the troops that had straggled back

South were

to the

in disarray,

one American reporter noted,

bureaucracy,

GVN

while inside the

"officials

either stopped working altogether or kept mindlessly

suing instructions that could not he carried out." President had

all

is-

"The

the power in his hands and could easily

impose his policy," recalled Bui Diem, former South

Vietnamese ambassador there

the U.S.,

to

somehow

"but

was no sense of purpose or direction among

the high

enough

.

of the government," nor "strangely

officials .

.

any sense of urgency about the situation."

Convinced

an

that

South Vietnam might

independent,

if

"truncated,"

be salvaged from the wreck-

still

age of the current military campaign, U.S. ambassador

Graham Martin and

other American

officials

eventually

persuaded Thieu to organize a new defense line centered

around the garrison town of Xuan Loc,

thirty-five miles

northeast of the capital along strategically vital Route 1.

At

the same time, however, Martin authorized U.S.

defense attache General

Homer Smith

to

update con-

tingency plans for a full-scale U.S. evacuation in the

event

that

ARVN

promptly ordered

failed

his

to

staff

processing center adjacent to to

draw up

lists

to

hold set

the

line.

Smith

up an evacuation

Tan Son Nhut Air

of nonessential U.S.

Base,

personnel and

"high-risk" Vietnamese, and to identify and locate any

BoJiea at refugees rnunpleJ in (he rush tu escape

Trang dock on April

1,

us a

lie

on the Nba

crowded barge headed

for

Saigon

approaches.

321

other Americans

still

living in Saigon. Yet

Ambassador

Martin wanted to proceed slowly, since he feared that any

visible sign of a

U.S. pullout might precipitate the

same kind of mass panic

Nha

Trang. As a

lation of

result,

that had engulfed

out of a total American popu-

more than 6,000, only 1,285

during the

first

Da Nang and

left

the country

two weeks of April.

ital

down on

from three directions

area surrounding

1

.

Only

at

began

to arrive

North Vietnamese ad-

week. Yet once fresh

from the coast on April

clear that the defenders of

running

NVA

15,

it

forces

became

Xuan Loc could not hold out a twenty-mile race

with one

the South Vietnamese cap-

four-man relay," one Western military analyst lamented.

the northwest in the

did General Dung's army meet with

There the 18th

what would prove

ARVN

ARVN

Di-

to be a desperate last

Division's heroic last stand at

drop off supplies and pick up civilians on April 20.

322

for nearly a

contestant going the distance while the other runs a

—from

resistance.

In the midst of the 18th to

vance

"There's simply no way

As

Tay Ninh, from the south along Route

Xuan Loc

vision dug in for

after counterattack, stalling the

divi-

4 leading from the delta, and from the east along Route

more than token

heavily outnumbered and outgunned,

the South Vietnamese troops launched counterattack

for long. "It's like

By that point twelve Communist Main-Force sions were bearing

Though

stand.

ARVN

the North Vietnamese

can win."

Army

tightened

its

noose

around Saigon, Ambassador Martin came under increasing pressure to accelerate the pace of the U.S. with-

drawal.

Services

Xuan Loc

On

April 19, two days after the Senate

Committee formally

Armed

rejected President Ford's

seventy-five kilometers northeast of Saigon, helicopters land

Admiral Noel Gayler,

request,

aid

com-

U.S.

the

mander-in-chief, Pacific, was dispatched to inform Mar-

Washington wanted the American presence

tin that

no more than 1,100

duced to

GVN

as possible.

re-

debate to

To

of our soldiers.

"The United Thieu declared.

Gayler devised

scheme

a

rules,

that broadly

while Martin and

expanded the

def-

inition of "dependent." In the days that followed, the

of evacuees leaving the

Tan Son Nhut

airfield

on outbound C-130 and C-141 cargo planes grew

dra-

matically from an average of 200 to more than 3,000

DAO officials organized a

per day. In addition,

series of

ultrasecret "black flights" to insure that especially "sensitive"

Vietnamese, many of them former U.S.

intelli-

gence operatives, could get out of the country without

GVN.

the knowledge of the

The American tion

came

no

as

surprise to President Thieu.

Having

would be no eleventh-hour

finally realized that there

U.S. rescue, he knew that the end was drawing near.

The government he

ruled

no longer supported him,

his

once loyal generals were threatening to depose him, and his

army was collapsing on every

group of leading ures

political

to

On

front.

April 18, a

moderates and opposition

fig-

had informed him that they would publicly demand

his resignation in six days

days

later.

It

is

he did not step down.

if

Ambassador Martin

Two

.

.

North Vietnam renewed

if

.

.

its

over the bodies

.

States has not respected "It

is

irresponsible."

tirade did

inhumane.

Only

Thieu unveil

after

today," he announced.

It

its

promises,"

not trustworthy.

is

he had concluded his

his decision to yield his tattered

authority to Vice President Tran "I

am

Van Huong.

resigning, but

"I I

depart

am

not

deserting." In the

wake of Thieu's resignation

that the aged and enfeebled transfer

power

to a coalition

styled "neutralist" General

ing the

way

ever a time

decision to begin a full-scale evacua-

.

market bargaining

"fish

Vietnamese nationals, U.S.

immigration and emigration

number

force

full

aggression" and comparing the recent Congressional aid

authorities agreed to relax their respective

facilitate the departure of

and

soon

as

spond with

it

was widely hoped

Huong would immediately government headed by

Duong Van Minh,

for a negotiated settlement.

when such

a

there were

bargain might have been ac-

ceptable to the Communists, however, passed.

If

self-

thus pav-

By April 26, when Huong

had long since

it

finally

agreed to put

the question of Minh's accession before the National

Assembly, General Dung and his

staff

had already put

the finishing touches on their plan for the of the

Ho Chi Minh

for attack"

last

offensive

Campaign. The formal "resolution

had been approved and signed. At precisely

5:00 P.M. on April 27, the "final decisive battle" of the

Vietnam

War

— the

"liberation"

of

Saigon

—would

begin.

carried a similar message

Independence Palace. Emphasizing that he was speak-

and not

ing "only as an individual,"

as a representative

of the United States government, Martin told Thieu that "almost

all

of his generals" considered the military

and that most Vietnamese believed

situation hopeless his departure

with

the

thought

it

facilitate a

Communists.

Though

Martin

personally

GVN

ofes-

commodity

The next

negotiated settlement

might buy time, which was now the

would make

ficials "felt it

sential

would

for

little

many

difference,

South Vietnam."

day, April 21,

Thieu announced

his resig-

nation in a ninety-minute televised address to the National Assembly.

with

tears,

Often rambling and

at

times choked

the South Vietnamese leader devoted most

Following page. Their city sunounJeJ and under rocAer

.)ff;tci:

of his speech to a bitter attack on the United States,

by the Communists, residents of Saifion clear rubble and search

recounting President Nixon's "solemn pledge" to "re-

for survivors

of the

latest volley

of tire on April

27.

323

d

>ie"'"

MUlfmilt^^

%

Mm

"

y

--^/

4i**ii«.

«*•»*-.»

^^^

y^,mm ffy"^

gon and the Tan Son Nhut

Focus: The Fall of Saigon

seemed

airfield

no im-

in

minent danger, Martin was confident that he "could a

maximum number

get

of Vietnamese and Americans out

by the thirtieth" by means of the ongoing fixed-wing Deferring to their

airlift.

men

ident and his

7,500 evacuees

"man on

Saigon on outbound cargo planes

left

destined for the Philippines or daily

the scene," the pres-

agreed to delay. That day more than

exodus since the

airlift

Guam,

the largest single

began. Only 219 of those

departing, however, were Americans.

Among

the

new

leaders of the

South Vietnamese gov-

ernment, the accelerated pace of the U.S. withdrawal

During the predawn hours of April 27, 1975, four heavy rockets

slammed

South Vietnamese

into the

naling the onset of the Communists'

from the

fires

ital

on

blasts raged out of control,

went on the

soldiers

NVA

attack, pressing in toward the cap-

later wrote, his

ricane" and

made

NVA

own

chief of staff General

troops "attacked like a hur-

To

rapid progress.

in

on Bien Hoa

a wall of long-range artillery fire, while

Army Corps

cut off coastal Route 15 and sur-

rounded the port town of Vung Tau. To the south,

VC/NVA

combined delta

tactical force

a

pushed up from the

and permanently severed Route 4 nineteen miles

from the the 3d

evening of the twenty-seventh, the 125 members

Throughout the afternoon and

of the National Assembly engaged in a meaningless con-

city's edge.

Army Corps

from President Tran Van Huong to General Duong

Minh. Not

P.M. did the legislature finally

Minh

to the presidency to "carry out

agree to elevate

And

to the north

blocked Route

1

and northwest,

at several points

South Vietnam." Minh,

to

postponed his

in turn,

have time

to interview candidates for his

artillery

fire

as

Minh

rose

of the latest

Communist advances reached

Washington, President Gerald Ford and visers quickly

total

his senior ad-

determined that the time had come

U.S. puUout. While some administration

for a

officials

advocated the immediate implementation of Option IV, a worst-case

emergency plan

Americans by helicopter bassador

Graham Martin

to

to

remove

all

an offshore U.S.

assured the

remaining fleet,

White House

Amthat

the

an immediate

for

cease-fire

tions

and

on the

acceptable to

press,

a

all political

and form

all parties,

and

ing of a

As

called

resumption of formal

prisoners,

a coalition

if

all

restric-

lift

government

Minh concluded with an

appeal

"remain here to

those with good will to join in the build-

new South

for

our future generations."

Minh's eleventh-

to underscore the futility of

hour plea, no sooner had he finished

Communists launched

their

first

his address

and only

had defected

to the

of five captured

enemy

A-37

earlier in the

Dragonfly

Son Nhut Air Base and bombed

jets

month,

several aircraft were destroyed

Tan

Vietnamese

planes parked along the main runway.

Since no more than 1,000 Americans remained

who

a group

streaked over

a line of

than

air strike

of the war. Led by a former South Vietnamese pilot

air force

326

convinced that

Still

accordance with the 1973 Paris agreement. Fur-

talks in

ther pledging to free

the

distant

Communists would negotiate with him, he

such "extraordinary measures" were not yet required. in Sai-

cabinet.

deliver his acceptance

to

speech at 5:30 P.M. on April 28.

to those attempting to flee abroad to

Chi.

new

Loud thunderclaps mingled with the boom of

join us

Cu

in-

auguration until the following evening so that he might

ARVN

As news

Van

until 8:15

between Saigon and Tay Ninh and encircled the 25th Division at

power

stitutional debate over the prospective transfer of

the east, the 4th

North Vietnamese Army Corps closed Air Base behind

virtually unnoticed.

early

the mission of seeking ways and means to restore peace

the South Vietnamese forces defending the

city fought "stubbornly,"

the 2d

130,000

As

five fronts.

Though

Dung

capital, sig-

final offensive.

went

Though

and others badly dam-

aged, the runway

itself

did not

130mm base.

artillery

come under

when an

early the next morning,

shells crashed

Pandemonium broke

aircraft in a desperate

into the sprawling air

out

fuel tanks,

airlift

fired

them Vietnamese, had been

Marine

up their

awaiting evacuation from the U.S. Embassy.

abandoned

and other pieces of

trucks,

dis-

carded equipment littered the runways, while rampaging still

chased any

aircraft that

moved.

of

With

American and Vietnamese

now more than

the operation

visibility steadily

"damn

want

well didn't

called

for

remained

in the

compound. Unaware

tape of Bing Crosby's "White Christmas," a prearranged

traction plan called for

had begun.

all

remaining Americans and

Defense Attache's Office

(DAO) compound

Tan Son

helicopters

when

than 400 people were Several hours President

on

called

the

last vestiges

and awaited the

and kick them back." Unable

to bulldoze their way through the growing throngs, many

abandoned hope of reaching Tan Son Nhut and

a result,

U.S. Embassy com-

by the time the

copters arrived at the

airfield,

first

wave of

heli-

between 2,000 and 3,000

people slated for evacuation were

still

inside the city.

Despite rapidly deteriorating weather conditions, the

evacuation from the

DAO

compound proceeded

like

clockwork. Beginning at 3:00 in the afternoon, an average of thirty-six helicopters per hour landed at

Tan Son

Nhut, boarded up more than 50 passengers each, and whisked them away

to the

10:24 A.M. on April 30, 1975, national radio and

remain calm, to stop

fighting,

Throughout the environs of Saigon,

of resistance wilted and the

armada of ships anchored

arrival of their conquerors.

convoy of tanks and

a

off their passengers at the

contingent of helicopters

embassy compound, more

Army

of

the Republic of Vietnam began to disappear as thou-

Tu

pound. As

a figure

sands of soldiers discarded their weapons and uniforms

Beech of the Chicago Daily Nevus. "Every time we opened

dropped

him

"At

pleading to be taken inside," recalled journalist Keyes

to beat

that the admin-

on the

city.

every stop Vietnamese beat on the doors and windows

we had

still

behind.

left

his soldiers "to

however, the operation ran into unanticipated

the door

last

Duong Van Minh went on

to stay put."

designated assembly points throughout the

the

later, at

and

fleet.

delays, as large crowds of Saigonese converged

drivers

a result,

From the very

dispatched from the offshore U.S. outset,

at

CH-53

CH-53s

"Seven hundred twenty-six," he

finally arrived to clear the

certain select Vietnamese to be shuttled by bus to the

Nhut, where they would board huge

thirty

of helicopters required, Martin gave

As

said.

the worst-case ex-

need

istration intended to use his estimate to calculate the

number

officials,

"1

and asked the ambassador how many people

off the top of his head.

As conceived by U.S.

clear that he

need them now." Secretary of State Kissinger then

I

the American radio station in Saigon began playing a

signal that the final evacuation

it

spend another night here,"

to

10:51 A.M. Saigon time. President Ford gave the exe-

name

hours old and

five

But Ambassador Martin balked. Making

and

short time later, operators at

still

the president to suspend the operation until morning.

Ambassador Martin telephoned the White House. At

A

civilians

diminishing in the deepening twilight.

he cabled the White House that

the emergency puUout.

a

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger strongly urged

Realizing he had no choice but to go to Option IV,

cute order for Operation Frequent Wind, code

Only

undetermined

security force remained, plus an

number

was clear that the

it

safely extracted.

soldiers

could no longer continue. Jettisoned

Vietnamese troops

the coast. By 8:00 P.M. more than 6,000 people, 5,000 of

attempt to get out of the country.

By midmorning on April 29 fixed-wing

ARVN

as

VNAF pilots

swarmed onto the tarmac and

attack until

intense barrage of

Street and turned

trucks rumbled

At midday,

down Hong Thap

onto Thong Nhut Boulevard

left

to face the presidential palace.

Without slowing down,

the lead tank crashed through the high, steel front gate

and coughed

to a halt inside the spacious courtyard.

Other tanks followed, forming the main entrance. steps

and unfurled

As one a

a

of the

huge semicircle before

crewmen raced up

huge gold-starred liberation

the

flag,

the ranking North Vietnamese officer entered the palace

and confronted President Minh. "You have nothing fear," the officer declared.

are

no

victors

and no vanquished. Only the Americans

have been beaten.

moment

to

"Between Vietnamese, there

of joy.

If

you are

The war

for

patriots, consider this a

our country

is

over."

off

327

With the to let

fall

at Saigon

sanctuary, April 1975.

328

—sixteen NVA

imminent

— Vietnamese

divisions surround the capital

them into the U.S. Embassy while others

(right)

citizens plead with a

crowd toward the compound's outer

walls,

Marine guard (above)

hoping to enter the American

A

few hours after South Vietnam's uncon-

ditional

surrender,

flying the

NLF

flag

a

Communist tank

smashes through the

gates of the presidential palace in Saigon,

April

330

30.

A

South Vietndmese police coktnel

30.

Unable

to accept the defeat

lies

dead

at the k>ot ot S,ii^on\ w,ii nicinonul statue

of his country, he had walked up

to the statue, saluted,

on April

and shot

himself

Evacuees hoard an Air America helicopter

in

downtown Saigon on April

29.

In the nineteen

hours before the collapse of the capital, U.S. helicopters evacuated more than 7,000 U.S. per-

sonnel and selected South Vietnamese citizens to ships of the Seventh Fleet waiting offshore.

332

—

Focus: Coming

if

Home

they had slapped

Cav platoon

1st

me

leader.

in the face," recalled a

former

Others recoiled from movies and

television shows that depicted

Vietnam veterans

as psy-

chotic killers or freaked-out drug abusers. In fact, the vast majority of veterans readjusted well to civilian

Sbme became

life.

successful businessmen,

professional athletes, actors, and elected officials (in-

cluding within a decade of the war's end two governors

and three U.S.

senators).

Most simply

settled

down

like

others of their generation. "We're just ordinary guys," said

one veteran.

"We

and kids and ordinary hear about

us.

live ordinary lives;

jobs.

You only hear about

messed up." In a country unwilling

With

the

fall

of Saigon the people of the United States

began a headlong rush into the post-Vietnam

Americans had not even waited that before the

the U.S.

last

Marine helicopter

long.

lifted off

Some

era.

Five days the roof of

Embassy, President Gerald Ford announced

that the evacuation of Saigon "closes a chapter in the

American experience." By and

large his

seemed

hitter conflict

to agree.

palled at

its

Wearied of the

it is

sisted. It

and ap-

almost as though

became

easier for

Vietnam. Said one

in

go out

for jobs,

I

think you're a time

Those

fears,

bomb

to face

some men

New

don't put

the guys its

who

are

own

re-

the "taint" of Vietnam per-

and disdain by simply hiding the

countrymen

conclusion, the American people began a

period of national denial. "Today,

sponsibility for the past,

we have wives

We're OK. But you never

to avoid the insults

fact that they

had been

York City native,

down

that

I

was a

"When

vet.

or an addict."

however compounded by

guilt or igno-

rance, also reflected the very real problems of a minority

of

Vietnam

veterans. In most cases these afflictions tor-

mented only the

and

individual; occasionally, the pain

the war had never happened," wrote newspaper col-

anger turned outward in violence toward others.

umnist Joseph Harsch

either case, veterans initially found

somehow blocked Ironically,

government

out of their consciousness."

it

many

1975. "Americans have

in late

of those

who

served in

Vietnam

ac-

I

People

in

little

whose name they had

Nearly 100,000 Americans

left

In

help from the

served.

Vietnam with acute

— not out of shame

physical disabilities, ranging from amputated limbs to

hut out of bitter experience with the indifference and

shattered spines to blindness. Thousands more returned

quiesced in this conspiracy of silence

hostility

of their countrymen.

World War

II

Unlike servicemen

who came home with

in

their units to formal

United States addicted

to the

to drugs or alcohol.

A

1971 Harris survey indicated that 26 percent of Vietnam

re-

veterans took drugs, including at least 7 percent

who

turned by themselves to the emptiness of an airport wait-

were addicted to heroin or cocaine. Seven years

later

most Vietnam veterans

ceremonies of welcome,

ing lounge. Transported hack to the United States with

no time

for readjustment,

devices in a nation

they were

to their

left

increasingly uncomfortable

problem drinkers accounted

with

hospital population.

ical

veterans discovered that both ends of the polit-

spectrum had rejected them.

To

the war they were losers.

war they were either in

L.A. the

gave

334

me

first

a look of

for 31 percent of the

VA

Less well recognized was a collection of infirmities

their presence.

The

the Veterans Administration reported that alcoholics or

own

To

those

those

who

fools or criminals.

people

I

who backed

protested the

"When arrived my own age I

saw who were

such overwhelming contempt

I

felt as

chronic skin rashes, respiratory problems, impaired hearing

and

vision, violent headaches, loss of sex drive,

cancer

—

called

Agent Orange. Widely used

and

resulting from exposure to a chemical defoliant in

Vietnam

to

deny

cover to the enemy and to clear friendly perimeters, the herbicide not only produced a multitude of problems for

original victims hut also was suspected of causing

its

higher rates of

stillbirths

and hirth defects among

their

nam

children.

Even more

wounds

Seemingly rejected by the

insidious were the hidden, psychological

some veterans

unable to

larger society,

needed from the government, Viet-

find the help they

veterans broke through their self-imposed isolation

and banded together

own

in their

The

defense.

first self-

These disorders

help efforts began in the mid-1970s with discussion

took the form of extreme restlessness, depression, sleep

groups and vocational training programs in California

disturbance, and paranoia. Such problems were partic-

and

that

suffered.

whom

wres-

tled for years to suppress a nameless anger they

were

"No

able

ularly acute for

combat

barely able to contain. to

keep a

lid

on

it," said

veterans,

matter

many

of

how much was I

one former infantryman,

"I

was

always aware that just beneath the surface there was this rage, this

that

tremendous, almost uncontrollable volatility

somehow had

I

to absorb." Others

became victims

of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), in which the

employment

a successful

Then,

1978,

in

a

referral service in Detroit.

named Robert

disabled ex-Marine

Muller founded the Vietnam Veterans of America, the

most

Vietnam veterans

visible of several national

ganizations.

campaign

Jimmy

VVA

The

in

initiated

Washington, finding an

who upgraded

Carter,

or-

vigorous lobbying

a

ally in

President

veterans' services across

the board and appointed a former Vietnam combat of-

Max

ficer.

Cleland, as director of the Veterans

VVA went on

The

Admin-

up the cause of the

individual actually re-experienced traumatic incidents

istration.

often as recurring nightmares, sometimes in the form of

MIAs,

psychotic hallucinations.

victims of Agent Orange, help form the Vietnam Vet-

The

terror,

guilt,

and rage that frequently accom-

to take

fight for official recognition of

PTSD,

erans in Congress caucus, and shepherd two job-training

VVA's

panied such episodes contributed to a suicide rate among

acts

veterans substantially higher than that for nonveterans

accomplishment was Operation Outreach,

of their generation.

Psychological disorders and sub-

stance abuse also played a large role in the disturbing

number

of violent crimes

committed by men who had

through Capitol

Vietnam

veterans. By 1983

more than 200,000

The

But

members and

tional recognition for the

Vietnam and

Once

men and women who

selves for the answer. In 1979, the

clinics

the

hospitals

and

were overcrowded, unsanitary, and understaffed,

VA blamed Congress for insufficient funds.

officials

But

VA

could not escape responsibility for a lack of com-

Muller began the

named Jan

nam

VVA,

all

a

served

who had not

for the sacrifices of those

again, the veterans

with the manifold problems encountered by Vietnam its

were

lacking was any larger na-

still

returned.

In response to complaints that

for

137 centers had assisted

its

ther the facilities, resources, nor understanding to cope

vets.

greatest

Congres-

veterans.

vitally necessary.

in

a

legislation, the rehabilitation programs,

of unprovoked violence that claimed the lives of family

Unfortunately, the Veterans Administration had nei-

Perhaps the

Hill.

independent counseling program

sionally funded,

experienced heavy combat and in occasional outbursts

total strangers.

support

had to look

to

them-

same year that Robert

former army infantryman

Scruggs started raising

money

to build a Viet-

veterans memorial in Washington, D.C.

Over the

next three years Scruggs and many others labored to

munication with the veteran population and an unwill-

make

ingness to confront the unconventional ailments of a

passions that had once divided the nation. But this time

new

the storm acted as a catharsis:

generation of servicemen. Despite additional funds,

new programs, and of

Vietnam veterans employed by the agency,

vets

complained that the bureaucracy remained

number

many

a concerted effort to increase the

VA

unresponsive and insensitive.

The

PTSD

treatment until 1981 and

as a diagnosis meriting

continued to

insist

refused to accept

there was no proof that exposure to

Agent Orange could cause

his

dream

a reality. In the process, they ignited

On

the dedication ot the memorial

national reconciliation. here,

man,"

said

"We

one former

Veterans Day 1982,

became

a

celebratum

ot

waited fifteen years to get soldier, still

wearing the

patch of the 101st Airborne Division on his faded green fatigues.

We

"But

made

it.

it's

It's

not too like

late.

I'm just proud to be here.

coming home."

serious illness or death.

335

and

built,

Witness: Jan Scruggs

if indeed

had given

their lives,

and the

erans

had the names on

it

came back

it

country.

it

of those who

would be unifying

for both vet-

would give the veterans who

It

of welcome, because

a kind

and supported by everyone

regardless

it

would be

Amer-

the war. In terms of the collective psychology of ica,

would give the country

it

everyone could

and absolve

one way or another,

in

amount of guilt

war

terness about the

a shrine, a place that

good about,

feel

a certain

in

built

how they felt about

and

feelings

bit-

both participants and nonpar-

tic ipants.

kept

I

my head

this idea in

March 1979

people in the movie were very Jan C. Scruggs served with the 199th Light Infantry

you ended up with

Brigade near Saigon in 1969 and 1970. Years after his

who go

became obsessed with the

nated his

life

for several years: a national

Vietnam me-

morial.

a

I first

got home,

Vietnam veteran.

to he a

should have bought really

thought

amazed

letter

went

me

a

new

didn't think

chology.

somebody

one had

for being a

my

I

I

was

and the kind

Vietnam veteran.

to college, then enrolled at to get

but

suit or anything,

deserved some appreciation.

1

Washington

versity in

American Uni-

master's degree in psy-

did research on Vietnam veterans' readjust-

I

ment and even

testified

Senate subcommittee things.

I really

at the fervent antiwar sentiment

of scarlet I

wasn 't such a neat thing

just

it

One

of

about

in 1977. 1

my

Then, in

years.

war

the type of guys that

real,

The Deer Hunter,

After seeing

first.

The more

was that

it

I

thought about

be built not by the government but by the

people of the country giving a few bucks apiece. That

would I

really

make

a

it

symbol of reconciliation.

announced the fund

Washington, but at

From May 28

first

we

1979,

to July 4,

Then the campaign

drive at a press conference in

the donations just trickled

started gaining

joined the campaign, people

momentum

like Jack

as

people

Wheeler and Dick

Radez, both West Point graduates with Harvard

who had

assembling a team of good minds and organizers and

found out some amazing

putting together a plan to accomplish the objective of

them was that the divorce

rate of the

building a national memorial by Veterans

There were a

lot

Day

of obstacles ahead. In order

1982. to build

a national memorial you

era veteran. Also,

combat veterans were

by the House and the Senate and signed by the

memorial.

I

significantly

of people and authority. that research

read

all

came the

dent. idea for a

Vietnam

kinds of books on psychiatry and

the psychology of trauma, from Carl Jung, the Austrian psychiatrist

Jay Lifton,

and one of Freud's

early students, to

the contemporary

Robert

Yale psychiatrist

wrote about veterans. From them

I

who

got the idea of col-

lective states of mind: collective guilt, collective shame,

collective pride.

336

I

thought that

MBAs

served in Vietnam. That was a turning point:

noncombat veteran or the Vietnam-

all

in.

raised only $144.50.

that of the Vietnam

From

fur-

more important

the

it,

data before a U.S.

Vietnam combat veteran was three times higher than

less trustful

/

idea of the memorial. I took

few weeks off from work and developed the idea

ther. it

When

two

Vietnam, the sons of steelworkers,

in

return to the United States he had a vision that domi-

to

for

saw the movie The Deer Hunter. The

I

if a

memorial could be

So we went

need

to see

to

have

legislation passed

presi-

Senator Charles Mathias of

Maryland. Once we explained the idea he agreed to sponsor the legislation.

Mac

Mathias and Senator John

Warner of Virginia were the two people who with us through thick tional

commitment

100 sponsors bers. It

and

thin.

They both had an emo-

to the project.

for the bill in the

really stuck

We

Senate

eventually got

—

all

the

mem-

passed in both the Senate and the House, and

President Reagan signed

it

on July

1,

1980.

Meanwhile, more unJ more people were joining

us.

General Westmoreland was intensely mvolved from day one.

Others,

James

like

Kilpatrick,

J.

the columnist,

George McGovem, and people from both the

left

and

the right helped us as well. By the time the fund drive

ended

we had

in 1982,

The next

big hurdle was the design of the memorial.

In the spring ot 1981

we staged the

com-

largest design

and the winner

was Maya Ying Lin's design of a wall bearing the names

Over the next

ot the dead.

it,

saying

nam

several

against

was a black gash of shame, asking why Viet-

it

The

veterans should be honored with a black ditch.

opposition tried to turn the whole thing into an ideo-

Their point was that

logical issue.

war was something nally,

at a

hidden and ashamed of

Fi-

meeting with the opposition. General Mi-

USA

chael Davison,

came up with flag,

to be

this design said the

(Ret.), a supporter ot the design,

the idea of adding a statue, along with a

to the memorial, at a location to be decided. Every-

body agreed

to the

On March

compromise.

11, 1982,

we got

from the Interior Department. But there was no time to sit

back and congratulate ourselves. As soon as was pos-

sible

we had a fence put

and construction equipment

up,

started tearing up the ground.

We

were

't

seen each other for years

the people there had never met.

still

atraid

it

of emo-

— though most of

At

the reunions an

awful lot of people ran into guys thev were

then with

and the

all

in the service

who had been

And

killed.

the emotion in the parade, the dedication,

sea of people touching the Wall,

weekend had

a quality to

it

the entire

that was extraordinary

and

spontaneous, like a Woodstock for veterans.

home

think this really began a process of welcoming

I

the Vietnam veterans recognition

and

and giving them

their just

due

—

respect for the sacrifices they made.

Since then, there has been the dedication of the statue at the

memorial

in cities like

in

New

1984 and other parades York and Chicago.

I

for veterans

think because

the Vietnam veteran had been kind of freeze-dried for so

many

years

it ti)ok

a lot longer to

I've always detected

veterans,

and

some

I still do,

but

welcome him home.

bitterness I

among Vietnam

think the real cold edge

has been taken off by the memorial and other positive things.

the construction permit

lot

hugging each other as though they were old friends

who hadn

months there were

and emotional arguments

extraordinarily heated

tion,

with and the parents of guys

raised $8.4 million.

petition ever held in the United States,

acted spontaneously, with guys showing a

By and

large,

young people today who know

anything about Vietnam, as well

own it's

as older

people and our

generation, are very respectful of what

good

to be a

Vietnam

Vietnam veterans are going

veteran. to

do a

And lot of

we I

did.

Now

think that

good

for this

country in the years ahead.

would be held up somehow. For the same reason we needed to kick up some earth,

we

also

some

needed

to

put a panel of names

we

progress. In July

the site

and

in place to

show

called a press conference at

we had

called in the relatives of people

identified from the panels. After the little

ceremony we

noticed the way people reacted to the memorial: They

wanted there,

to touch the

and

names, leave flowers and things

see their reflection in

came obvious the back of

it.

That's

when

I

had been thinking

that

maybe

now we

that the memorial would be a success.

The 1982 Veterans Day weekend seemed a life

be-

that the memorial was going to work. In

my mind

the opponents of the design were right. But

knew

it

of its own.

It

fo take

on

was a big word-of-mouth event, and

once some publicity started, word came

in

from veterans

all around the country that they were coming. People

337

From atop Wright

III

his

father's

shoulders,

Gary

from northern Virginia peers at

the inscription on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial of his grandfather's name, Gary Wright, Sr., a colonel in Vietnam listed as missing

338

m

action.

aiOjs:-fc*-« jr.:--'-

^l

-'•'

,_,.,

a*»

>^

^^

'miSS^'

Above.

Left.

.4

Two

couple mourns tor

visitors

ex.uninc

.1

,(

lovcJ one

n.iinc

lo>r in \ lern.im.

on rhc

incnH>n
Frederick Hurt statue /n Noveinher I^S4- Hurt's tmJinonjI

tii:ure

was placed near the wall to accommodate those veterans who was an inappropriate commemoration for those who fought

(>/

three Americjii si'lJiers

lelt

the

iir/i,'/n,i/

menu'rial

in liKh'china.

341

vv

^-iOs.

yA\

W-'

'

jvj.

^TlilwLr .y-v-.-

.

,

'-

.-^^

Three Vietnam veterans share r/iefr^Hiof/'ons

before the memor/ij/.

people

file

past

its

each day, making quently visited ton.

D.C.

Thousams

ptilished f^r^tr^ it

one

monum -aJ

ot

ctf

\i'ills

—-

'-

•

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©

1966 Time Inc.

of Involvement

—

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p.

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War

—

Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 19, AP/Wide World, pp. 20-21, Larry Burrows— LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 25, AP/Wide World, pp. 26-27, Jerry Rose— LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 29, James Pickerell Black Star. pp. 30-31, © Larry Burrows Collection, p. 33, Bill Eppridge LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc.

—

Training p.

Summers, Harry G.,

to

16, Larry

—

Presidio Press, 1985. .

The Road p.

1976.

Vietnam War Almanac. Facts on

37,

Mark Kauffman

38, 39 top

©

left,

bottom

1965 Time Inc.

p.

— LIFE Magazine, left

& right,

39 top

right,

© 1965 Time Inc. pp. Boh Gomel LIFE Magazine, Mark Kauffman LIFE Maga-

—

—

©

zine, p.

1965 Time Inc.

Army.

41, U.S.

ARVN

and

pp. 49-51,

Its

©

p.

pp. 42-43,

40, Richard Stack— Black Star, David Lomax Camera Press Ltd.

—

— LIFE Magazine,

America Takes Over

215, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 216-217, Fred W. McDarrah. p. 218, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 219, Roger Malloch Magnum, pp. 220-223, Jeffrey Blankfort Jeroboam, Archive, p. 225, Perry C. Riddle, pp. p. 224, Mark Godfrey 226-227, Hiroji Kubota Magnum.

p.

—

Advisers

Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 52-55, Larry Bur-

rows

Chicago

©

1963 Time Inc.

—

War

Nixon's

—

— —

Rentmeester LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. pp. 60-61, LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 63, Bill Larry Burrows Ray LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 65, Paul Schutzer LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 67, AP/Wide World, p. LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 70, 68, Paul Schutzer Y.R. Okamoto, Courtesy LBJ Library, p. 73, Bunyo Ishikawa.

240-241, Charles Phillips— LIFE Magazine, © 1969 Time Inc. p. 243, Mark Jury. p. 245, John Filo, Courtesy Valley News Dispatch, pp. 246-247, Mark Jury.

MasherAVhite Wing

The Cambodian

p. p.

Co

56,

Ray— LIFE

59, Bill

—

—

—

77, Henri Huet— AP/Wide World, pp. 78-79, Henri Huet— Hal Moore Collection, pp. 8CU85, Henri Huet— AP/Wide World. p.

Alfred Eisenstaedt Larry Burrows

Tim

— LIFE Magazine, © Time — LIFE Magazine, © Time

Vernon Merritt

228,

p.

Page.

Inc. p. 231,

Inc. pp.

— LIFE

232-233,

Magazine, © Time Inc. pp. 236-237, © 238-239, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp.

pp.

Incursion 250-251, Bunyo Ishikawa. pp. 252-257, © Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 258-259, Philip Jones Griffiths Magnum. pp.

—

The Long Good-bye Prairie

—

Rentmeester LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. pp. 90-91, © Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 92-94, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 95, © Larry Burrows

Co

pp. 88-89,

—

nett

—

©

LIFE Magazine, © 1969 Time Inc. pp. 268-269, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 271, Akihiko Okamura. p. 272, Mark Godfrey Archive, p. 274, Henri Bureau SYGMA, p. 277, Roger Pic/Gamma-Liaison, p. 279, Christine Spengler/Gamma-Liaison.

—

Collection.

Stalemate

—

LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Time Inc. p. 101, 102-103, Richard Swanson LIFE Magazine, © LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Inc. p. 104, Co Rentmeester Inc. p. 107, Catherine Leroy/Gamma-Liaison. p. 108, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Time Inc. pp. 110-111, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 112, Lee Lock-

p. 98,

262, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 264-265, David BurLIFE Magazine, 1971 Time Inc. p. 267, Ron Haeberle

p.

Larry Burrows

Mark Time Time

Jury. pp.

wood,

p. 115,

—

—

— —

Bunyo Ishikawa.

p.

117,

Dana Stone

—UPI/Bett-

The

Easter Offensive

Agence France

283,

p.

1983—Contact, Ngo Vinh Long pp. 290-291, Billhardt,

Presse. pp.

Collection,

©

GDR.

p.

©

David Burnett p.

288,

289, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

p.

David Burnett

Berlin,

284-285,

Mark Godfrey— Archive,

pp. 286-287,

1987—Contact,

293,

p.

292,

Thomas

Claude La Fontan/Gamma-

Liaison.

mann Newsphotos.

POW Con Thien pp. 122-131,

Hill

297, Thomas AP/Wide World, p.

David Douglas Duncan.

875

136-137, Gilles Caron/Gamma-Liaison. pp. 138-139, U.S. Army. pp. 140-141, Bunyo Ishikawa.

The Tet

Offensive

142, U.S.

©

Time

Inc.

Army pp.

p.

Co

145,

147-149,

— LIFE

Rentmeester

Magazine,

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

pp.

150-151, U.S. Air Force, p. 153, Eddie Adams— AP/Wide World, p. 155, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 156, Ghislain Bellorget. p. 159, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 160-161, Philip Jones Griffiths

— Magnum.

Hue pp. 167-175,

Don McCullin

— Magnum.

GDR.

Thomas

p.

298, Horst

Billhardt, Berlin,

Faas—

GDR.

The End and Aftermath A. Pavlovsky— SYGMA, pp. 308-309, Bunyo Ishikawa. 315, AP/Wide World, pp. 316-317, Jean-Claude Francolon/Gamma-Liaison. p. 319, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 320-321, Jean-Claude Francolon/Gamma-Liaison. pp. 322, 324-325, Hiroji Kubota Magnum. p.

306,

J.

312,

pp.

p.

Berlin,

pp. 299-300,

301, Lee Lockwood. pp. 302-303, APA)C'ide World.

p.

pp.

Billhardt,

—

The

Fall of

Saigon

©

Nik Wheeler, p. 329, Nik Wheeler— Black Star. pp. 330-331, Fran^oise Demulder/Gamma-Liaison. p. 332, J. A. Pavlovsky— SYGMA, p. 333, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p.

328,

Coming Home pp.

Khe Sanh

338-339, Seny Norasingh. p. 340, © 1984 Patricia FisherJohn Ficara— Woodhn Camp. pp. 342-343, Peter

Folio, p. 341,

Robert Ellison— Black Star. pp. 180-181, Richard Swanson Black Star. p. 182, Richard Swanson LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. pp. 183-186, Robert Ellison— Black Star, pp. 187-189, Larry Burrows— LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. p. 179,

—

—

Marlow

— Magnum.

The Home Front 192, Bill Ray— LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. pp. 194-195, Charles Harbutt— Archive, p. 197, Bernard Boston, pp. 198-199, Co Rentmeester— LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 200, William James Warren, pp. 202, 205, Burt Glinn— Magnum, pp. 206-207, Gerry Uphan LIFE Magazine, © Time Inc. p. 209. Bill Eppridge— LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. p.

—

347

1

1

,

INDEX

Chicago Democratic Convention and, 213-14, 215-27, 229; Moratorium Day and, 238-42; Kent State University

Abemathy, Ralph, 213, 214, 263, 264 Abrams, General Creighton, 230, 242, 270 Abzug, Bella, 313 Acheson, Dean, 158

Advanced Individual Training (AIT), 35-36 Agent Orange, 119, 334, 335 Agnew, Spiro, 242 Aid from U. S., Diem and, 12, 13, 47; Johnson and, 30, 32; American advisers and, 47-48, 49-55; Paris talks and, 275, 278; withdrawal and, 310-11,

313-14, 323 Air Force (U.S.), 58, 150-51 Air power. 29, 109-14, 281, 282;

American

advisers to

ARVN

and, 244, 245;

Armed

reactions to

reconnaissance and, 66, 75; aircraft used in, 109; military strategy in,

113-14; Khe Sanh and, 177, 178, 179; end of war and, 264-65; fall of Saigon and, 318, 326-27, 332

Vietnam and, 1

Alvarez, Lieutenant Everett,

Jr.,

24,

304-5 American Friends Service Committee, 196

Andrews, Mike, 260 An Hoa, 69 An Khe, 59, 74, 76, 96, 100 An Loc, 273, 280-81, 286-87, 289, 290-91, 293 Antiwar movement, 116, 194-95; Columbia University and, 206-8; conscientious objectors and, 210-12;

348

14;

71; nurses and,

64; villages and, 67, 71,

Operation Cedar

115; battle for

Hue

Falls

and, 100,

and, 164-66;

training of, 238-39; Laos and, 266,

270-73; fall of Saigon and, 318-19, 321-23, 326, 327 Ashbrook, John, 45

B Bach Mai Hospital, 276, 277 Ball,

George, 32, 158

BanMeThuot,

Albert, Carl, 45

of,

of, 62; civic

96-97; rear-echelon bases and, 99-100, 101; discipline of, 266-70; fragging incidents and, 267 Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (ARVN): U.S. assistance to, 12, 30, 32; Johnson and, 18, 22; American advisers to, 47-48, 49-55, 203; air campaign against North

and, 48,

66, 69, 74;

logistics and, 62;

Vietnam

action projects

campaign against North Vietnam and, 58, 64-66, 109, in,

and, 294, 305

forces (U.S.): training of, 34-36,

37-43, 58-59, 96;

49, 50-51, 203;

276; airmobile tactics

POWs

144. 146, 313, 314, 315,

319

273, 276, 278, 281, 282, 313 Bien Hoa, 11, 25, 26-27, 59, 100, 146,

264-65, 273, 279, 326 Binh Dinh Province, 69, 73, 74, 76 Binh Long Province, 248, 280 Black Panther party, 201 Blacks: draft and, 200-1; King's death

and, 204-6; held conditions and,

267-69 Boi Loi Woods, 69

Bong Son, 74, 76 Bong Son Plain, 69, 74 Boston, Captain Howard, 1 Boyd, Captain Charles, 297 Bradley, General Omar, 158 Breth, Captain Frank, 122-23

Brooke, Edward. 196

Brown. George, 45 Buddhists, 13, 19, 25. 71. 164, 210. 310 Buffington.

Major Dale, 1 Bundy, McGeorge, 158, 159, 194 Bundy. William. 154 Bunker defenses. 180-81. 182, 252, 253 Bunker, Ellsworth, 203 Burchett. Wilfred. 48. 294 Buis,

C

Bayonet fighting, 40 Beech, Keyes, 327 Ben Cat, 59 Ben Hai River, 106

Cambodia,

13, 44,

12, 18, 22;

Vietcong

in,

66,

67, 69, 70, 105, 109, 264-66; U.S.

Ben Het, 281 Ben Sue, 100 Ben Tre, 152 crisis,

B.

Bui Diem, 321

Basic-training centers, 34-35, 59

Berlin

Second Lieutenant Nile

143

152

B-52 bombers, 32, 58, 64, 69, 70, 86, 100, 109, 121, 145, 111, 178, 234,

incursion into, 234, 243-49. 250-59, 260-61, 263, 264, 270. 278; ARVN in. 281. 282 Cam Lo. 69, 86, 106, 280 Camp Carroll, 177, 280 Campaign 275, 313 Cam Ranh Bay, 59, 60-61, 100. 318,

321

Ca Mau

Peninsula, 47 Canberra bombers, 26-21, 75, 78-19,

109

Davis, Private First Class

(COSVN), 245, 260, Cheo Reo, 314, 317

IV, 86 Defense Attache's Office (DAO), 310, 318, 323, 327 Defense Department, 154, 269 de Gaulle, Charles, 18

Demilitarized zone 106, 273, 19,

261, 313

Cherry, Colonel Fred V., 295

Chicago demonstrations, 208, 213-14, 215-21, 119 Children, South Vietnamese, 65, 68, 155, 112-13, 261, 317, 318 China: Vietnam War and, 17, 57; aid from, 58, 113, 309;

18, 25,

Nixon and,

231, 235, 273, 275

116

Civic Action Program, 71 Civilian Irregular Defense Groups

(CIDGs),

19,

Civil rights

177

movement, 200-1, 267

Clay, Lieutenant Colonel Frank B.

48

,

Cleland, Max, 335

bombs (CBUs), 105 Cold War, 11, 17, 44 Cole, Private First Class Thomas, 85 Columbia University, 206-8 Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), 196 Cluster

Congress: Johnson and, 23, 30, 32, 34, 109, 193, 201;

86, 88-89,

238-42 DePuy, Major General William

Gulf of Tonkin

178 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 234, 235 Dong Ha, 69, 120, 280, 284 Dong Lach, 236-31 Don Luan, 313 Draft, 34, 58-59, 197-200, 210 Drill sergeants, 34-35, 31 Drug use among troops, 269, 334

Dunlap,

Lillian,

and, 245;

and, 310,

Eisenhower, President Dwight,

49,

,

Averell, 230

American

332 Highway Highway Highway

13,

280 280

14,

281

1,

74,

86 400, 87

Hill 484, 91, Hill 861, 144

258-59

Ford, President Gerald, 313, 322, 326 Jersey, 34, 38,

Gordon, Georgia,

39

34, 36

Knox, Kentucky, 31 Missouri, 34

Fort Lewis, Washington, 97 Fort Ord, California, 34, 96 Fort Polk, Louisiana, 34, 36, 41 Fort Riley, Kansas, 36

Oklahoma, 36

Darlac Province, 144, 313, 314

Fort Sill,

Davis, Rennie, 294

Fragging incidents, 267

advisers and, 48,

50-51; evacuation and, 322, 327,

246-41; Mary Ann, 266 Fishhook region, 146, 243, 245, 248,

Da Nang,

100, 116, 142, 164, 273, 318, 322

289, 317;

Hill

Wood,

296

W. 162-63

Mark, 196, 245 Heath, Richard, 178 Hegdahl, Apprentice Seaman, 299 Helicopter Valley, 69 Helicopters, 4-5. 64, 76, 82-83, 133, 140-41, 188-89, 250-51, 262, 266,

Fire support bases, 266, 280, 288; Fuller,

New

110, 235, 266, 275

Hatfield,

Field hospitals, 96-97, 111

Daley, Richard, 213, 214, 226 28, 30-31, 58, 59, 68, 86,

W.

Hill 252,

Fort Dix,

58,

11, 58, 110, 266, 278, 294,

F

Fort Leonard

288

13,

230 Enthoven, Alain, 154

Fort

146, 232-33, 281,

12,

Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 34

D Dak To, 107-9,

283-93

18, 44,

Fort

Chi, 59, 67, 146, 326

Great Society programs, 32, 72, 193, 194, 200, 201, 213 Green Berets (See Special Forces [U.S.]) Gross, H.R., 45 Gruening, Ernest, 24, 196 Guam, 64, 109, 177, 326 Gulf of Tonkin incident, 23-24, 25, 45, 210 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 24, 44-46, 196, 245

Harris, Smitty, 305

W.D., 34

249, 253, 256, 251,

280, 282

213, 214, 216-11, 218, 220-21,

222-23

Harriman,

Claw, 75 Ea Pa River, 314-17 Ehrhart.

Cronkite, Walter, 157, 190-91, 214

Gia Lam Airport, 278, 296 Gillespie, Captain Vernon, 16 GioLinh, 86, 120 Goldberg, Arthur, 158-59 Goldwater, Barry, 24, 45, 210 Grant Park, Chicago, demonstration,

Harper, Sergeant Ronald

E

Easter offensive, 273, 280-82,

Cua Viet River Valley, 86, Cuban missile crisis, 13, 44

accords: of 1954, 12, 72, 74; of

1957. 294

Hanoi,

327

incursion

platoon, 260-61

Geneva

Hart, Frederick, 341

235, 242, 278;

122-31, 132, 146 of Tears, 314 Cooper, John Sherman, 245 Counterinsurgency, 19-22, 23

Gayler, Admiral Noel, 323

Halleck, Charles, 45

323, 326,

Tet offensive and, 157; Nixon and,

Convoy

G Galanti, Lieutenant Paul, 300

Haiphong, 23,

97

Duong Van Minh, General,

Eagle's

and, 335 Conscientious objectors (COs), 210-12 ConThien, 86, 106, 111, 120-21,

294

Habih, Philip, 158

Eagle Flights, 48

313; withdrawal and, 310-11; veterans

,

H

Duncan, David, 121, 126-21

Resolution and, 24, 44-46, 196, 245; bombing of North Vietnam and, 116;

Cambodian War Powers Act

E., 69,

116, 158

Diduryk, Captain Myron, 75-76 Dien Bien Phu, 12, 121, 143, 145, 176,

Church, Frank, 245 Lai, 59, 64, 69, 96,

(DMZ),

280

Democratic National Convention, 208, 213-14, 215-21, 229 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (See North Vietnam) Demonstrations: Buddhist, 19, 25, 71, 164, 210, 310; South Vietnamese, 22; students and, 30, 206-8, 244, 245; antiwar movement and, 116, 194-97; prowar, 202; King's death and, 205; Democratic Convention and, 213-14, 215-21, 229; Moratorium Day and,

Christian and Missionary Alliance, 71

Cu

Frishman, Lieutenant Robert F. Fulbright, J. William, 18, 196

Deck House

Capa, Robert, 14-15 Cape Batangan, 65 Caputo, Lieutenant Philip, 35, 57 Carmichael, Stokely, 201 Carter, President Jimmy, 335 Cay Giep Mountains, 76 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 58, 158, 242 Central Office for South Vietnam

CRIP

France, 10, 12, /'^15, 18, 47, 74, 76

L.

Davison, General Michael, 337

Cao Van Vien, General, 317

Chu

Sammy

118-19

92-91 94

875 (Hill of Angels), 109, 120, 122-23, 132-35, 136-41

Hill

Hill 881 North,

101

Hill 881 South, 177

Hilsman, Roger, 23 Prison ("Hanoi Hilton"), 294,

Hoa Lo

298. 299, 304-5

Ho Chi Minh, 11, 12, 143, 146, 235 Ho Chi Minh Campaign. 319, 323 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 13. 19. 58. 109. 266. 272 Hoi An. 146

Hon Gai. Hon Me,

24,

292

23

349

,

Honolulu conference, 70, 71 Hue, 22, 71, 146, 149, 156, 164-66, 167-75, 191, 282, 318 Humphrey, Hubert H., 203, 213, 214, 226-27, 229, 230 I

la

Drang Valley, 66, 67,

74, 76

Indochina Prohibition of 1973, 310, 313 Indochina War, 10, 12, 14-15, 47, 74 Indonesia, 18, 25 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), 278, 307 International

Red

Cross, 294

International Voluntary Service, 71 Iron Triangle, 100, 105, 115-16, 310 J

Jackson State College, 245 Johnson, General Harold K., 34 Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel James H., 133

Johnson, President Lyndon Baines, 203, 204, 208, 229, 230, 248, 295; road to war and, 17-18, 22-32; air strikes against 32, 58,

North Vietnam and, 24, 28, 109, 159-61; Gulf of Tonkm

Kirk, Grayson, 206 Kissinger,

Henry A., 231-34, 235, 238,

Mecklin, John, 203 Medical personnel, 65, 68, 96-97,

172-73

243, 274, 275, 278, 296, 309, 327

Komer, Robert W., 203

Kontum

Mekong

Province, 64, 105, 146, 273,

Mekong River, 47 Midway (USNS), 59

281, 314 Kopkind, Andrew, 196 Korean War, 13, 44, 230 Kramer, Captain Galand, 302

Military Assistance Advisory

(MAAG), (MACV),

Lach Chao Estuary, 24 Lai Khe, 146, 256-57 Laird, Melvin, 235 Landing zone (LZ), 99, 124-25, 128, 129; Albany, 66; Four, 77, 78-79, 80, 82-83; X-Ray, 66 Lang Vei, 177, 268-69 Laos, 12, 18, 22, 23, 177; air strikes 58, 109, 152, 278;

ARVN

in,

266,

in,

270-73, 281, 282 Le Duan, 311, 313 Le Due Anh, General, 319 Le Due Tho, 274, 275, 278, 296, 319 Lewandowski, Januscz, 72 Lincoln Park, Chicago, demonstration,

145, 158, 232, 248, 270 Miller, Jeffrey Glen,

244 Mohr, Charles, 203 Montagnard troops, 20-21 Moore, Colonel Harry G.("HaI"), Moratorium Day, 238-42 Morse, Wayne, 24, 194 Morton, Thurston, 157 Muller, Robert, 335

Mutter Ridge, 87, 91, 94 My Chanh River, 280, 282 My Lai massacre, 267, 269 My Tho, 118

N

deployment and, 62, 67, 116, 152; Honolulu conference and, 70, 71; Tet

Loc Ninh, 69, 106, 146, 280, 281, 319 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 17, 22, 23, 158

Nam Nam

offensive and, 144, 152, 153, 154, 157,

Long Binh, 59, 101 Long Than, 69 Lon Nol, 243, 264

campaign and,

58, 72;

Tet offensive

and, 144, 152, 153, 159; Nixon and, 232, 234

K Kaufman, Captain Harold J., 132-33 Kennedy, Edward, 213, 311 Kennedy, President John, 13, 17, 18, 44, 47, 66, 90, 193, 210, 229, 270 Kennedy, Robert, 157, 204, 208, 209, 213

Kent State University, 244, 245 Khe Sanh, 106, 107, 143, 144, 146, 152, 161, 176-78, 179-89, 266, 272

Khmer Rouge, 243, 313 Kiem Hanh District, 260 Captain Michael, 133 Killed in action (KIA): U.S., 19, 67, 69, 70, 72, 87, 95, 96-97, 107, 114, 135, 138-39, 165-66, 256, 266, 278; NVA, 72, 87, 106, 114, 148-49, 236, 242, 282; civilian, 276; ARVN, 309, 332 Kilpatrick, James J., 337 Kim Son, 75, 76 King, Coretta Scott, 196 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 200, 201, 204-6, 212 Kinnard, Major General Harry W.O. 66, 74, 76 Kiley,

350

Lucier, Josiah,

E.

,

178

66,

74, 75

Lisagor, Peter, 203

Lownds, Colonel David

Command, Vietnam

22, 30, 32, 57, 62, 64, 67,

70, 72, 100, 105, 114, 121, 143, 144,

213, 219 Lippmann, Walter, 194

159, 161, 193-94, 204, 208 Johnson, Robert, 23 Joint Chiefs of Staff: Johnson and, 22-23, 28, 30, 32; North Vietnam

Group

12

Military Assistance

L

Resolution and, 24, 44-46; Great Society programs of, 32, 72, 193, 201; public opinion and, 57, 157; troop

190; election withdrawal by, 157-58,

Delta, 4-5, 47, 50-51, 52, 59,

98, 118-19, 146, 306, 310, 313

Dinh, 10 Sathay River, 105

Napalm

strikes, 69, 75, 78-79, 114, 134, 136-37, 236-37 National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, 275 National Liberation Front (NLF), 13, 48,

72, 146, 149, 164, 165, 234, 275, 278,

68

330-31

Luong Tho, 75 Lynch, Colonel William A.,

Jr.,

75

National Mobilization Committee to End the War, 213

M

National security action memorandum,

McCarthy, Eugene, 157, 158, 204, 208, 213, 214 McGovem, George, 213, 245, 337

28 National Security Study Memorandum-1, 232

McNamara, Robert,

Navy

18, 23, 24, 32, 58,

106, 113, 116, 196, 203

McNamara's

MACV

(U.S.): training

of, 34; aircraft of,

59, 75, 76, 109

Neak Luong, 250-51

Line, 107, 120

Newfield, Jack, 208

(See Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam [MACV]) Maddox (USNS), 23-24, 25, 45 Malaysia, 18

Newton, Huey, 201 York City demonstrations, 196-97, 201, 202

Mao

Nha

New

Tse-tung, 231

Marine Corps, 64, 69, 106, 263; Johnson and, 28-30, 30-31; training of, 34-35;

Da Nang

and, 58, 59; medics

in, 65,

68; Operation Prairie and, 86-87,

88-95; Con Thien and, 120-21, 122-31; Tet offensive and, 143, 144; battle for Hue and, 164-66, 167-75; Khe Sanh and, 176-78, 179-89;

Cambodia and, 250-51 Marines (South Vietnam), 4-5

Martm, Graham, 321, 322, 323,

326,

327 Masterpool, Lieutenant Colonel William J.,

86

Mathias, Charles, 336

Trang, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320-21,

322

Ngo Dinh Diem,

President, 12-13, 18,

22, 47, 48, 210,

270

Ngo Dinh Nhu, 13 Ngo Quang Truong,

Brigadier General,

164, 281-82, 318

Nguyen Nguyen Nguyen Nguyen

Cao

Ky, General, 22, 29,

Khanh, General,

70, 71

22, 24-25, 32

Ngoc Loan, General, 152, 153 Van Thieu, President, 70, 146,

230, 235, 242, 272; Paris peace talks

and, 275, 278;

fall

of South Vietnam

and, 307, 309, 310, 311, 313, 318, 321, 323

Nha

Trang, 100, 146

Nixon, President Richard M., 46, 210; election of, 228, 119-^0; Vietnam War and, 230-32, 235-43, 270; Kissinger and, 231-34; antiwar movement and, 238-42; Cambodian incursion and, 234, 243-45, 249; withdrawal from

Vietnam and, 264, 273; bombing of North Vietnam and, 273-75; Paris peace talks and, 275-76, 278; POWs and, 295, 296, 310; end of the war and, 309-10; Watergate and, 310, 311

Norodom Sihanouk,

Pathet Lao, 278

Reconnaissance, 66, 75, 86, 90, 105,

Peers,

Major General William R., 134 Pell, Staff Sergeant Harrison, 85 People's Republic of China (See China)

121, 260-61 Red Beach Two, 30-31 Red River Delta, 14-15

Percy, Charles, 196

Refugees, 76, 191, 236-37, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320-21

Perfume River, 164, 165, 166 Pham Hung, 313, 319 Pham Van Phu, Major General, 314, 317, 321

Phan Thiet, 146

Phnom Penh,

Regional Forces (RFs), 64, 314 Resolution for 1975, 311-13 Reuss, Henry, 45

Reynolds, Colonel Jon A., 296 Ridgway, General Matthew, 158

278, 313

Phoenix Program, 242

Roberts, Colonel Elvy B., 76

Rock

American involvement and, 11-13; Johnson and, 18, 24, 28, 32; Gulf of Tonkin incident and, 23-24, 25\ air campaign against, 58, 59, 194; Cambodia and, 66; air power of, 109, 113-14; POWs and,

Phu Bai, 100 Phu Bon Province, 314 Phung Du, 74, 75 Phuoc Binh, 313 Phuoc Loi, 24 Phuoc Long Province, 106, 313 Phuoc Vinh, 59

294-96;

Pilots, 19, 48, 49,

Prince, 18, 243,

264

North Vietnam:

fall

roots ot

of Saigon and, 326

North Vietnamese Army (NVA): U.S. air

Hue

Pleiku Province, 28, 59, 105, 314,

316-17 Me, 66

incursion and, 234,

243-49, 250-59, 260-61; Nixon and bombing of, 273-75; Paris peace talks and, 275-78; Easter offensive and, 273, 280-82, 283-93

Plumley, Sergeant Major Basil, 75 Popular Forces (PFs), 64, 314 Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 97, 335,

294

(POWs), 294-96,

297-303, 310;

first,

24;

Pans peace

talks and, 275, 278, 295, 296; personal of,

Oklahoma City (USNS), 63

115-16; Crazy Horse, 76; Crimp, 67;

Dewey Canyon

Davy Crockett,

76;

266; El Paso

69; Farmgate, 49;

II,

266; Junction City, 104, 105; 719, 262, 270-72; Linebacker

(PRG), 278, 307, 309

276,

277, 292; Mallet, 67; Marauder, 67;

Marigold, 72; Masher/White Wing, 69,

74-76, 77-85; Menu, 234; Neutralize, 121; Niagara, 144, 176-77; Pegasus, 187, 188-89; Pierce Arrow, 24; Piranha, 65; Prairie, 69, 86-87, 88-95; Rolling Thunder, 58, 116;

Sam

1

P Pacification programs, 18, 71, 114

Parachute assaults, 104, 105, 179 Paris peace accords, 193, 230, 234, 235, 242, 275-78, 295, 296, 307 Parrot's

252

movement

and, 201, 203, 204; Nixon

234, 238

Q Quang Quang Quang Quang Quang

Due, 19 Khe, 24 Ngai Province, 30, 69, 266 Tin Province, 266 Tri City, 69, 146, 273, 280, 282,

283

Quang

Tri Province, 86, 87, 143, 144,

283 Quay, James, 210-12 Qui Nhon, 28, 100, 144, 146 161, 176, 178, 281,

Houston, 105; Starlite, 64; 34-Alpha, 22, 23; Thayer, 76; Tiger Hound, 58, 109; Utah, 69 Ovnand, Master Sergeant Chester,

South Carolina, 34 Beak region, 244, 249, 250-51,

Parris Island,

Government

Public opinion, 116, 157, 194; antiwar

in,

235

Russia {See Soviet Union)

Ryman, Captain Roger, 87

Saigon: terrorist attacks on, 22, 25, 28;

U.S. Embassy

in, 28, 33,

147, 162-63,

327, 328, 329; U.S. armed forces

in.

148-49, 155, 160-61, 162-63, 191; 318-19, 321-23, 324-25, 326-n, 328-33, 334

Salant, Richard, 191

100,000, 200 Protests (See Demonstrations)

Provisional Revolutionary

Lam Son 11,

Projects: Delta, 22; Leaping Lena, 22;

II,

Flaming Dart, 28; Francis Marion, 105-6; Hastings, 69; Hickory, 106; Homecoming, 296; Jefferson Glenn,

Russell, Richard,

fall of,

170

Operations: Attleboro, 69-70, 100; Birmingham, 69; Cedar Falls, 100-5,

Rudd, Mar, 208 Rung Sat, 69

62, 100, 266; Tet offensive and, 147,

304-5

Prisoners, Vietcong, 54-55, 84. 99, 153,

O

Rostow, Walt W., 32, 158, 203 Route 1, 285, 319, 321, 322, 326 Route 7B, 314, 316-17 Route 9, 86, 106, 161, 187 Route 19, 314

S

Prisoners of war

account

Roosevelt, President Franklin, 11, 44

336

Press, 203, 204,

Nui Cay Tre, 86, 87 Nurses, 96-97

249

Rural Development (RD) Program, 71 Rusk, Dean, 18, 23, 157, 158, 159, 203

Plei

and,

164-66; Khe Sanh and, 176-78, 179-89; post-Tet offensive and, 234;

Cambodian

60-61, 273 Colonel Joseph, 281

Pleiku City, 105, 144, 146

operations and, 62-66, 114;

Cambodia and, 66, 67, 69, 70, 105, 109; Dak To and, 107-9; Tet offensive and, 143-61; battle for

Pizzi,

Island East,

Rockpile, 86, 88-89, 177, 294 Rogers, William, 235

R

Santoli, AI,

260-61

Scheer, Robert, 196 Schlesinger, James, 327

Scotton, Frank, 19 Scruggs, Jan

C,

335, 336-37

Selective Service System (SSS), 58,

197-200, 210 Se San River, 105 Shapiro, David, 206-7 Sharp, Admiral U.S. Grant, 24

Sheehan, Neil, 203 Shumaker, Lieutenant Commander Robert H., 304, 305 Simons, Colonel Arthur D. ("Bull"), 296 Skyraider aircraft, 8-9, 59, 75, 76, 109, 133

Smith, General Homer, 321 Smith, Colonel Richard B., 120 Snuol, 248, 249

King's death and, 204-6; troops and,

Son Long Valley, 75 Son Tay Prison, 296, 305

267-69

Soto, Sergeant Rudy, 162, 163

Racial issues, 127: draft and, 200-1;

Radio Freedom, 22 Radio Hanoi, 146 Ranger forces, 36, 144, 160-61, 281, 314. 317 Razorback Ridge, 86 Reagan, President Ronald, 336

South China Sea, 62 Southeast Asia Collective Defen.^e Treaty, 24 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 213 South Vietnam: Indochina War and,

12;

351

,

,

disintegration of

government

nation-huilding efforts

in,

of,

25-28;

70-71;

Honolulu conference and, 70, 71; Paris peace talks and, 230, 275-78; U.S. evacuation and, 323 Soviet Union: Indochina 12;

U.S. involvement

War

in

and,

1 1

Vietnam and,

25, 57; aid from, 58, 113, 177, 281,

Nixon and. 230, 234, 235,

309;

273,

275

Truman. President Harry. 11. Truong Son Mountains, 62

Special Forces (U.S.), 16, 19, 20-21,

99 Spock, Benjamin, 196 Starry, Brigadier General Donn, 248 Stennis, John C, 109 Stingray reconnaissance teams, 86 Stockdale, Captain James, 303 Stout, Carl, 96. 97

13,

44

Tunnels, 64, 69, 107 Turner ;oK (USNS), 23 Tuy Hoa, 146, 314. 317

World War

Wounded

Mary

Reis,

United Nations, 25, 45, 295 United States Agency for International

return

Committee (SNCC), 201

54-55;

(SDS), 206, 208 Studies and Observation Group (SOG).

170;

Sukarno. 18, 25 Svay Rieng, 249

T Ky. 146

Cambodia and,

54-55, 99, 153, 66, 67, 69, 70.

105. 109, 116; post-Tet offensive of,

96. 97. 335 100, 146, 150-51, 321.

323. 326. 327

South Vietnamese government and, 114-15;

,

Cambodian 22, 25. 28.

32, 158, 176

Tay Ninh Province,

incursion and. 256, 257,

260-61 Vinh. 24

Vo Nguyen 59, 69, 104, 260,

310, 322, 326 Tchepone, 272

Giap. General. 116. 145-46.

176. 177. 310

Vung Tau. 326

Television, 152, 153, 157, 159, 190-91

314 Tet offensive, 143-61. 178. 190-91, 204, 260, 264, 270 Territorial Forces,

River.

Vietnam Working Group. 23 Villages: bombing of. 8-9; Vietcong and, 67; pacification and, 71, 114;

75

Task Force 11 59 Tay Loc, 164 Taylor, General Maxwell,

Thach Han

and, 47, 48, 52.

as prisoners,

Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA).

Tan Canh, 281 Tan My, 318

Tan Thanh.

and. 196;

234; Phoenix Program and, 242 Vietminh, 11, 12, 13, 14-15, 47, 143 Vietnamization policy, 235, 238-42, 243, 245, 270 Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 119, 335, 336-37. 338-43

22 Sugdinis, Captain Joe. 77

TanSonNhut,

movement

and. 334-35; memorial

ARVN

advisers to

308-9

Thailand, 59. 64, 109, 177, 273 Thomas, Norman, 196

W Wallace. George. 229

Warner. John. 336 War Powers Act, 310, 313 War zones: C, 30, 69, 105; D, 64 Washington, D.C., demonstrations, 194-95, 204, 240-41

Thompson, General Rathvon McC. 144 Thompson, Sir Robert, 235 Thua Thien Province, 144, 164, 176, ,

178, 266

Watergate. 310, 311 Wendt, Allan, 163

Westmoreland, General William C. 121, 135, 163, 164, 337; Johnson and,

Ticonderoga (USNS), 23

23. 28. 30, 32; strategy of, 62, 64,

Training, 34-36. 37-43, 58-59. 96.

66-67, 71, 99. 100. 105, 113, 114; troop levels and. 72. 116; Tet offensive and. 143. 144. 152-54. 157. 158; Khe Sanh and. 176. 177. 178; end of war

238-39 Tran Van Do. General. 146, 149 Tran Van Huong, 323, 326 Tran Van Tra. General. 149, 311, 313. 319

352

and. 203, 204, 263

Weyand,

Lt.

,

Xom

and. 335. 336-37. 342-43 Veterans Administration (VA). 334. 335 Vietcong. 4-5, 16, 36; roots of American involvement and. 13. 25; U.S. aircraft attacked by, 26-27, 64, 82-83; Johnson and, 30-32; American

Students for a Democratic Society

Tam

home

of.

118-19; South Vietnamese. 271, 289 Wright, Colonel Gary, Sr. 338-39 Wuertz, Private Robert Damian, 192

X

United States Information Service (USIS), 19, 71. 203

Veterans: antiwar

Richard, 295, 299, 301 Student demonstrations. 30. 196. 206-8. 211, 244, 245 Student Nonviolent Coordinating

58

71

Vance, Cyrus. 158, 159 Van Tien Dung, General, 310, 311, 313, 314. 319. 322. 323. 326

Commander

11. 35. 44. 47,

and. 96-97; soldier's account

44-46

V

96-97

Stratton, Lieutenant

II.

troops: U.S., 69, 81, 87,

92-93, 94, 135, 171, 186, 278; nurses

Udall, Morris K.,

66,

Stout,

Wheeler, General Earle, 32, 152, 153-54. 158. 196 White. Theodore, 229

U

Development (USAID),

Special Forces (South Vietnam), 19

12,

General Frederick

C,

144

Bang, 28

Xuan Loc. 321. 322 Xuan Thuy. 235

Z Zachuranic. Corporal George, 162. 163

Zontek, Steve, 260

Chrk Dougan and Stephen

Weiss are co-

aiithors of ten volumes of The Vietnam j'.:;i:,r:u:'i'vence, including Nineteen SixtyEight and A Wur Remembered. Longi^>rar -collaborators,

they attended Yale

University, where each received

M.A.

and M.Phil, degrees. Mr. Dougan resides in the Amherst, Massachusetts, area, Mr. Weiss

in Boston.

Picture editor Kathleen A. Reidy spent six years researching

and editing pictures

to

Vietnam War while contributing The Vietnam Experience. She resides

in

Washington, D.C.

of the

Puhhshini; CA^mpanv

is

with Time-Life Books ot the acclaimed twenty-hvc'volumc

lisher illy

ited history oi I

im ExpcnciKC.

Vietnam, The

W-W- NORTON & COMPANY BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY ISBN

D-3T3-D25Ta-S