nftKiN COUNTY FREE LIBRARY 31111010840302 Clark Dougan Si Stephen Weiss The complete history with eye-witness accounts by Walter Cronkite, Al Santoli...
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COUNTY FREE LIBRARY
31111010840302
Clark Dougan Si Stephen Weiss
The complete history with eye-witness accounts by Walter Cronkite, Al Santoli. and others
—— FPT
ISBN D-3T3-D25=ifi->5
>$3T.TS
n in AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN
VIETNAM
CLARK DOUGAN. STEPHEN WEISS, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company Illustrations selected
by Kathleen
Reidy
A.
This most thorough volume recounts America's experience in Vietnam from the
commitment of U.S.
the French defeat at Dien Bien
Phu
hrst
wake of
advisers in the
to the
dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Washington, D.C. Dramatically
illustrated
with the war's most stunning photography
some
ot
it
rarely or
never published before
The American Experience
in
Vietnam
presents an unflinching view of men at war.
Written and edited by the same team that produced The Vietnam Experience, the landmark twenty-five-volume
The
illustrated history of the war,
American Experience balanced look
The Gulf
of
in
Vietnam takes
at the war's
Tonkin incident in 1964, American forces that
the "big buildup" of
followed, the Tet offensive o\ 1968, the
war
at
home, the Cambodian
the Easter offensive, the all
fall
invasion,
of Saigtm
made combined and writing
are placed in a perspective
possible only by the authors'
decade of
researcfi, analysis,
on the war. Including first-person testimony by key witnesses to the war and unique "focus" sections that take readers to the battlefield
with
tht)se
who
fought,
American Experience in Vietnam single book before it presents the Vietnam War in its entirety.
G)ver piR
'^! .
ii
'(igraph reprinted wirh permisMon, L
— LIPE
Burrows
a
key events.
M
©
1966,
Time
Iru
,
BPXWBWtlOMiHW'OWW
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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM
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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM CLARK DOUGAN
STEPHEN WEISS
AND THE EDITORS OF BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY
PICTURES SELECTED
W-W-NORTON
&
BY
COMPANY
KATHLEEN
A.
REIDY
NEW YORK LONDON
BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY
BOSTON
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w^^
^
In the
M.^./r
Mekong Delta
in early I
Vietnamese marines
in seai
cong fan out from an
Am
BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY Publisher: Robert
George
Editor-in-Chief: Robert
Managing
Manning
Editor: Paul Dreyfus
Marketing Director: Jeanne Gibson Design Director: Lisa Bogle
Wendy Johnson
Picture Editor:
Senior Editor: Samuel Lipsman Senior Writer: Denis Kennedy
Research Assistant: Michael Hathaway Picture Researchers: Jennifer Atkins, Lauren
Chapin
Assistant Designer: Sherry Fatla
Design Assistants: Emily Betsch, Lynne Weygint Business Staff:
Anna
Amy
Cheshire,
Pelletier,
Amy
Wilson
Frontispiece:
A
Marine wades through
The
a stream just south of the demilitarized zone,
text of this
by
book was composed
Waldman
in
Goudy Old
1966.
Style
Graphics, Inc.
Color separations by Colotone
Manufactured by
W.
A. Krueger Company
Printed in the United States of America
First
©
Copyright reserved.
No
Edition
1988 by Boston Publishing Company,
part of this publication
Inc. All rights
may be reproduced
or transmitted
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, in
without permission
in writing
from the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card
Number: 88-70320
ISBN: 0-393-02598-5
W-W-Norton 500
Fifth
Avenue,
W'W-Norton 37 Great Russell
&
New
Company, York,
New
Inc.,
York lOIlO
&
Company, Ltd, Street, London WCIB
1098 76 54
3
2
1
3NU
CONTENTS Introduction:
The Roots
of
Involvement
10
1
THE ROAD TO WAR Focus: Training /Witness: Morris Udal!/ Focus:
16
ARVN and Its
2 AMERICA TAKES OVER Focus:
Masher / White Wing /Focus:
56 Mary
Prairie/ Witness:
Advisers
Reis Stout
3
STALEMATE Sam
Witness:
98 Con Thien/ Focus:
Davis /Focus:
Hill
875
4 THE TET OFFENSIVE
Witness:
142 Ron Harper / Focus: Hue /Focus: Khe Sanh / Witness: Walter Cronkite
5 THE HOME FRONT Witness: Jim
192 Quay /Focus: Chicago
6 NIXON'S Focus:
WAR
228
The Cambodian Incursion / Witness: Al Santoli
7
THE LONG GOOD-BYE Focus:
The
Easter Offensive / Focus:
262
POW / Witness:
8 THE END AND AFTERMATH Focus:
The
Fall
of Saigon
/ Focus:
Coming Home/
Bibliography arid Credits
Index
348
Everett Alvarez
306
Witness: Jan Scruggs
344
A
phosphorus
Skyraider
falls
bomb dropped by an A- IE on a
village in the central
highlands, 1966.
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THE ROOTS OF INVOLVEMENT
In Bien Hoa, South Vietnam,
not worry too
Absorbed
much about
in the
black-clad figures
not see them ready
reel of
first
who a
on
a
hot July night
an old movie, the
French submachine gun
turned on the lights to change the
Suddenly, automatic-weapons
not hear the shadowy,
six advisers did
in the rear
seats before the lights
window
or push
anything was wrong at
realize
They
two
all
rifle
until
did
muzzles
someone
reel.
fire
exploded through the room.
into the startled Americans, spinning
from their
of 1959, Americans did
crept out of the darkness surrounding their mess hall.
through the pantry screens. They did not
slammed
summer
in the
death.
one
The
high-caliber shells
man around and knocking two
others
Behind them
in the
snapped off and the gunmen
fled.
bloody confusion lay Captain Howard Boston. Badly wounded, he would survive. But for
Major Dale Buis and Master Sergeant Chester Ovnand the night would go on
The 2,
deaths of the two Americans were both tragic and bitterly ironic.
1945, other U.S.
Army
officers
had stood on
a reviewing stand in
On
forever.
September
Hanoi and
listened
to a band playing the "Star-Spangled Banner." President Franklin Roosevelt's opposition
to
French colonialism
in
Indochina and U.S. collaboration with the Nationalist Vietminh
army of Ho Chi Minh during World War the two peoples.
As Ho proclaimed
seemed
II
his country's
to
promise a lasting friendship between
freedom
the American Declaration of Independence and U.S.
was unthinkable that fourteen years
later
in
words borrowed directly from
aircraft flew
overhead
in salute,
it
Americans and Vietnamese would be dying
at
each others hands. But the death of Roosevelt and the onset of the Cold
War
left
a
new American
president facing larger problems than Vietnamese independence. Alarmed by the threat of Soviet expansionism, determined to maintain cordial relations with a key European partner,
In
May
and persuaded that
1954 near Hanoi, a
Ho Chi Minh
woman
was
a creature of
Moscow, Harry Truman did
nunirns her husband, a victim ot the French hiJtK'hina War.
not oppose the restoration ot French sovereij^nty in Indochina.
When
nam
1946, the United States adopted a decidedly
in
war broke out between France and Viet-
pro-French "neutrality," declining requests
for
direct
military aid but providing France with sufficient eco-
nomic of
assistance that Paris was able to fund the
own
its
little
success in subduing the Viet-
"critical
consequences"
when
the
fall
of
Na-
precipitated a crucial change in U.S.
another Communist success would
strategy. Fearing that
have
a peripheral issue for the
administration until 1949,
China
psychological, for the
doned American
Western
neutrality
and economic
political,
alliance,
Truman aban-
and committed the United
States to a French victory. In early 1950 a U.S. Military
Assistance Advisory
nam
Meanwhile, the United States prepared
to take over the
South Vietnam, which few observers expected
to survive
the year.
The new
nation'? leader was widely respected as an
experienced administrator and ardent Nationalist. But
The French had
tionalist
with elections to reunify the country in two years.
defense of Laos, Cambodia, and the nascent state of
war out
pocket.
minh. But Indochina remained
Truman
allel
Group
(MAAG)
arrived in Viet-
Ngo Dinh Diem
faced a devastated economy, a lack of
trained civil servants, hundreds of thousands of refugees,
and dozens of armed
sects hostile to his
With U.S. help and
stubborn persistence
Diem not only
a
government. all his
own.
survived but triumphed. In September
1955, in a declaration that reflected both his internal strength and the backing of his American patrons, he
denounced the Geneva accords and
refused to partici-
pate in the reunification elections scheduled for the
fol-
lowing year.
Once Diem had
to funnel military aid to France's expeditionary
consolidated his regime, Washington
army. By 1952 the United States was paying more than
launched an experiment
one-third of the cost of the war.
the atmosphere of a crusade. From 1955 to 1961 the
Truman's Indochina policy was adopted by President Dwight Eisenhower,
who
in
its
entirety
believed his pred-
much
ecessor had erred only in allowing France too
lee-
way. Using more than $1 billion of increased funding as
French make greater
leverage,
Washington
efforts to
win Nationalist support and adopt
gressive strategy.
insisted the
a
more
ag-
But nothing could arrest the steady
deterioration of the military situation. In
March 1954,
the Vietminh surrounded 12,000 French troops at Dien
Bien Phu.
When
France requested American help,
Eisenhower warned that the chain reaction
off a
"like a
loss of
Indochina would
set
not prepared to act alone and found no support in Congress for intervention. siege,
On May
7,
after a fifty-five-day
the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu finally
surrendered.
had
just
dochina problem. Buoyed by
begun
a
comprehensive
to discuss the In-
their victory, the
demanded an immediate withdrawal and
Vietminh
of foreign troops
political settlement.
But China
and the Soviet Union persuaded
Ho Chi Minh
temporary partition of Vietnam
at the
u
$2 billion
in aid.
to accept
seventeenth par-
Along with the
money came American alists, social scientists,
flood of
American
engineers, doctors, agricultur-
and public ad-
military advisers,
ministrators to rebuild the South Vietnamese forces, reshape the
armed
South Vietnamese economy, and
re-
organize the South Vietnamese government. By the late
1950s more than 1,500 Americans were building roads, planting crops,
medicine
all
training
across
bureaucrats,
and dispensing
South Vietnam under the supervi-
sion of the largest U.S. Mission anywhere in the world.
U.S.
officials called
outstripped reality.
it
a "miracle," but their rhetoric
Although the United States was
spending $85 million a year on training and equipment, the
Army
of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
suffered from serious deficiencies.
Attention immediately shifted to Geneva, where an East- West conference
United States provided South Vietnam with more than
other nations in the region
felling
row of dominoes." But the administration was
took on
in nation-building that
nomic on
shortages and
Although American
collapse
industrial
manpower
and gilded
life
development or used
And
ARVN)
prevented eco-
in Saigon, little
conditions of the rural peasants
cent of the population.
aid
(
command was spent
to
improve the living
who
constituted 90 per-
although American advisers
clothed South Vietnam in the trappings of democracy.
Diem
presided over a ruthless, authoritarian regime that
steadily alienated popular support for his
government.
Diem where
government
American men and weapons took the
influx of
Vietcong by
surprise, but the
continuing disabilities of
the South Vietnamese army enabled the insurgents to
audience for revolutionary alternatives. In 1957
regain the initiative. Washington's attempts to change
ineffectual land-reform
program created
Vietminh cadres who remained tition
resumed
efforts
soon escalating into
South
in the
after par-
political agitation in the villages, their a systematic
and assassination against
ror
The
the countryside,
in
a recep-
and an tive
ground particularly
lost
his suppression ot traditional village
In January 1959,
local
campaign of
government
in the
South and soon
began constructing the network of roads and
Ho Chi Minh
would become the
Hanoi sent weapons and in
officials.
North Vietnam formally endorsed the
resumption of armed struggle
who,
ter-
Over
Trail.
trails
after
that
this route,
advisers to assist the insurgents
December 1960, coalesced under the banner of
the direction of the Saigon government also met with
Diem
failure.
erupted in the
on the
the young
American
importance of Southeast Asia to
vital
crisis
militant Buddhists
months of
Diem and
with the
Ngo Dinh Nhu were
brother
his
1
Diem government. During
the overthrow of the
Although Washington had approved Diem's removal,
crisis,
president had inherited a national commitment. By insisting
new
upheaval a group of South Vietnamese army generals
critical.
Along with the immediate
when
of 1963
began preparations that culminated on November
assassinated.
beginning of 1961, the military
summer
onstrations and fiery self-immolations. After
the National Liberation Front. By the time John Kenoffice at the
to ap-
challenged the government with massive street dem-
nedy took
had become
economic reforms
measures of political repression. The inevitable
coup
situation
instituted token
pease the Americans while simultaneously enacting
murder shocked Kennedy and brought
his
the president's growing doubts
When
taken.
he assumed
abt:)ut
office there
Now
to the surface
the course he had
were 875 U.S.
more than
America's security. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
servicemen in Vietnam.
had made
16,000. Since 1961, millions of dollars had been spent
it
virtually impossible to retreat
from the
gion. Moreover, Soviet threats to blockade Berlin
the failure of an American-sponsored invasion of
made
it
imperative in Kennedy's
States demonstrate time,
its
mind
and
Cuba
that the United
resolve in Vietnam.
the experience of the Korean
re-
At
the same
War made him
and 109 Americans had
independent South Vietnam.
view" of American policy
Kennedy could have
ment
depended ultimately on social
Diem government
survival of the its
its
Yet the United
goal of a secure
and
mid-November the
In
president ordered a "complete and very profound re-
Asian mainland. Nor would their presence alone guar-
The
lost their lives.
States was further than ever from
deeply reluctant to deploy American troops on the
antee victory.
there were
in
Vietnam. Whether or not
reversed a
momentum
of involve-
nearly two decades in the making, he never got
the chance.
One week
later
John
F.
Kennedy was dead.
willingness to address the
and economic needs of South Vietnam's peasant
majority, something
it
had so
far refused to do.
Yet with-
out a credible threat of withdrawal, Washington had no leverage to enforce
Confident of
its
demands
his ability to
for reform.
maintain control of U.S.
involvement and unwilling to accept the costs of pulling out,
Kennedy opted
for a
middle course between retreat
and direct military intervention. Warding to introduce
combat
increased the
American
amount of U.S.
advisers.
off pressure
troops, the president substantially
Any
aid
and the number of
consideration of a larger U.S.
Following page. as a
on
A peasant plows his paddy m
French convoy
May
25, 1954,
that the
depended on evidence from Saigon
government intended
to put
its
house
in order.
came the
first
two weeks
who
the
Red River Delta
hecause of a Vietminh amhush ahead
Bien Phu. The picture was rapher Robert Capa,
military presence
stalls
after the
among
French sunender at Dien
the last taken by war photog-
within hours of taking this picture he-
American correspondent
killed covering fighting in
Indochina.
13
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— —
1
THE ROAD TO WAR
Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed power on November
22, 1963, in the
wake of the most
shocking national event since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. "Everything was in chaos," Johnson would later
come
to grips with
recall.
"We
were
all
spinning around and around, trying to
what had happened, but the more we
tried to
understand
the more
it,
confused we got." Uncertain of his legitimacy in the eyes of the American people, the
new
president clothed himself in Kennedy's mantle, vowing to carry forward the
martyred predecessor had
left
undone
—protecting the
civil rights of
work
his
black Americans,
ameliorating the hardships of the poor, and defending South Vietnam from the threat of
Communist
aggression.
Johnson's rhetoric reflected his shrewd appreciation of the national
math of John Kennedy's
death, but his
commitment
to
mood
in the after-
Vietnam had deeper and more
important roots. There were, to begin with, the lessons of Munich and the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. Like
many
of his generation,
Lyndon Johnson remembered
too vividly what appeasement of Hitler had purchased in 1940. Behind Hanoi's bel-
all
licosity
Johnson saw the aggressive hand of
a
Communist China
the entire Southeast Asian peninsula. Should the United States lenge,
it
If
Vietnam was
all his
a trial of U.S. credibility
made
politics, the
am
and
new
resolve,
affairs.
this chal-
was also a personal challenge. little
who doubted
experience in foreign
his capacity to
am
Southeast Asia go the way China went."
also led
hums, Special
Fitrces
It
handle
His sensitivity on this issue hardened John-
not going to lose Vietnam," he told Henry Cabot Lodge
forty-eight hours after Kennedy's death. "1
VC camp
it
president had
repeatedly by those in the press
the complex problems of international son's resolve. "I
a
on dominating meet
would not only cost the South Vietnamese their freedom but
mastery of domestic
policy, a point
As
to
have "profound consequences everywhere."
also
For
Johnson believed,
intent fail
not going to be the president
him
Captain Vernon Gillespie
to retain
raJiits
less
than
who saw
Kennedy's top foreign
nearby patrols, September 1964-
policy advisers
— men
like Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara their
own
Dean Rusk
American combat
— who had
American assumption
stake in South Vietnam's survival.
Compounding
matters was the sense of
oping Southeast Asia
at the
seriously undercut
envel-
crisis
end of 1963. In Indonesia,
forces
Any
American
Asia.
called for
an
inter-
significant
November. Johnson
was not only unwilling
happen, he saw no
to let this
Preoccupied with establishing his leader-
The same theme was trumpeted by French
ship and taking advantage of the
president
challenged American influence
program and jeop-
ardize Johnson's bid for election in
reason for
who
it.
civil rights
and antipoverty
bills
moment
to push major
through Congress, the
commitment with
in southern Asia with a proposal for the neutralization
president balanced
of South Vietnam.
off difficult decisions for as long as possible.
Meanwhile, the military junta that took power Saigon was able neither to
fill
the political
vacuum
in left
by Diem's death nor to cope with the upsurge of fighting
On
December
re-
escalation would en-
legislative
national conference to guarantee his nation's neutrality.
Charles de Gaulle
itself.
percussions of greater U.S. involvement in Southeast
danger the administration's
had renounced American aid and
war might
defend
will to
Even more important were the potential domestic
king to open war against the pro-Western government
Norodom Sihanouk
Moreover,
region.
South Vietnam's
the mercurial Sukarno had gone from flirtation with Pe-
of Malaysia. In Cambodia, Prince
the
in
ot responsibility for the
Thus,
for
all
caution, putting
upheavals of the
the
months, the spring of 1964 witnessed
change
in the course of
previous
little
six
apparent
U.S. policy. After a review of
21, Robert
the options available to him, Johnson authorized the
returned to Washington after a brief inspec-
deployment of additional U.S. military advisers and an
tion tour with a grim report of political turmoil, admin-
enlargement of the economic assistance package to Sai-
that wracked the countryside.
McNamara
and
istrative paralysis,
military reverses at every hand.
gon.
The
emphasis, however, remained squarely on the
Unless the situation was stabilized immediately, warned
South Vietnamese, with new plans
the secretary of defense, the fate of South Vietnam
the
would be "neutralization
at best
and more
likely a
Com-
Concerned
show
he could deal with the
Johnson responded
government's
intention
He
Southeast Asia.
American
political standing
and the
America around the world, determined
his critics
inherited,
own
for his
on
to
he had
crisis
by vigorously affirming his
of resisting
communism
in
expressed his resolve in terms of
responsibilities
strength imposes
us
of the
ARVN,
around
the
world.
"Our
an obligation to assure that
this
for
an increase
in
intensification of the pacification
program, and stepped-up military operations against the Vietcong. "The only thing
munist-controlled state."
credibility of
size
Senator William Fulbright
same and do
it
more
I
know
to do,"
March,
in
efficiently
and
"is
Johnson told
more of the
effectively."
Yet, hidden from public view were important changes that, like the
contained a
heightened rhetoric of U.S. commitment,
momentum
of their own. Concerned over
reports of increased infiltration of
ing south,
men and
supplies flow-
the administration approved a program of
clandestine operations into Laos and North Vietnam.
McNamara
concrete steps to counter the
type of aggression does not succeed," Johnson wrote in
Pressed by
February 1964- Neutralization was unworkable, with-
continuing military decline on the ground, the president authorized
drawal unthinkable. For
all
that,
new
the
straint during his
first
president proceeded with re-
year in office.
One
reason for the
measured pace was Johnson's reluctance to employ
American home.
military
No more
power on a
large scale so far
from
than Kennedy or Eisenhower did he
relish the prospect of
the Asian mainland.
U.S. troops engaged
Nor was Johnson
in battle
certain
how
on the
Soviets or Chinese would react to the appearance of
18
strikes
contingency
north of the
American
for
resolve,
continued support
planning
for
DMZ. Determined
retaliatory
air
to demonstrate
Johnson privately warned Hanoi that for the insurgency
"greatest devastation" to
could bring the
North Vietnam. Taken
whole, these measures revealed a fundamental perspective, a growing belief in
Washington that
action against North Vietnam could
what U.S. policy had
failed to
as a
shift in
direct
somehow achieve
accomplish in the South.
In an act that
shocked the world, Buddhist monk Quang Due immolates himself on
Ngo Dinh Diem's
a
Saigon street on June
11, 1963, to protest President
persecution of Buddhists.
For the time being the counterinsurgency war in the
but also making them more vulnerable to
South continued, with the United States more deeply
attack.
From 1960 through 1962, 32 U.S.
involved than ever. Over the next nine months the
sonnel
lost their lives in
number
that figure climbed to 77, and in
of
American
military advisers increased
16,000 to 23,000, among them naval
from
working
hostile action totaled 137.
with the fledgling Vietnamese navy and nearly 100 U.S.
the trend was disquieting.
Air Force
ARVN
pilots
combat-support missions for
flying
offensives as well as training
The army was
also
officers
Vietnamese
struggling to contain the
in the
late spring
shooting war. By the end of 1964 American Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense
had established
forty-four
Group (CIDG) teams
camps throughout South Viet-
nam. Many of them were located along the Laotian border, enabling the allies to
monitor
Green traffic
Berets and their
along the
montagnard
Ho Chi Minh
Trail
South Vietnam. During 1963
If
1964, deaths from
the numbers were
still
low,
But U.S. servicemen were not the only Americans
pilots.
becoming increasingly engaged
Communist military per-
Communist
Frank Scotton, a junior
guerrillas. In the
field
operator with
the United States Information Service, unveiled the
—six-man teams
People's Special Forces group
Vietnamese
civilians
first
of armed
trained to fight local insurgent
bands on their own terms. By August the program had
been taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which also provided arms and funding
for Viet-
19
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namese Counter-Terror Teams and sponsored Radio
Hue
Freedom, a 10,000-watt station based in
that sent
was an expanding
activities
program of U.S. -directed covert operations. Some were
Command,
run by the U.S. Military Assistance
nam (MACV),
Viet-
such as Project Leaping Lena, which
commandos on
sent eight-man squads of Vietnamese
long-range reconnaissance patrols into Laos, or Project Delta, in
new
up of American and Vietnamese Special Forces
soldiers
within
South
enemy-controlled
territory
Vietnam. The most dramatic covert
activities,
however,
in
Hanoi
strategy for the southern insurgency.
North
government.
Vietnam
amounts of war materiel to take to the field
and
to
its
to approve a
Hoping
the Saigon
funneled
increasing
southern
who began
allies,
armed with mortars, machine guns,
recoilless rifles.
A
wave of
American colony
terrorist attacks hit the
in Saigon, but the
main
new campaign was
thrust of the
to destroy Saigon's strategic reserves already
by spiraling desertion
rates.
weakened
Striking repeatedly at iso-
ARVN
were carried out by the innocuously named Studies and
lated posts, the Vietcong lured
Observation Group (SOG),
bases into carefully concealed ambushes. By late
a highly classified unit
trolled directly by the Pentagon.
SOG
Cambodia, Laos, and even North Vietnam
on enemy
intelligence
interrogation,
Vietnamese
and
PT
activities,
con-
teams entered to gather
snatch prisoners for
SOG
interdict infiltration.
also sent
and the nation's confidence
into small enclaves,
multiplied d'etat
on Saigon's
streets,
while an attempted
from within was aborted only when U.S.
warned
officials
Maxwell Taylor,
off the conspirators.
who succeeded Henry Cabot Lodge
as
American am-
bassador in midsummer, estimated that the
Khanh
crease of $125 million in aid were able to arrest the
ernment had no more than "a 50-50 chance of
steady decline of Saigon's military and political fortunes.
out the year."
The
junta that had deposed
two months
lent
Khanh
in
extending
its
its
1
new
predecessor
authority into the countryside.
on April
under
officers
Nguyen Khanh. Although
successful than
A
U.S.
estimated that the Vietcong
controlled between 40 and 60 percent of the rural population.
Even
in areas
Saigon could claim as
its
lack of trained officials, bureaucratic lethargy,
own
a
insuffi-
cient resources, pervasive corruption, and the sometimes brutal behavior of
new
government
pacification program
soldiers
undermined the
and prevented the implemen-
tation of ambitious development plans drafted by the
Americans.
main problem was the
itary situation.
22
Khanh a
cr^'
In
at rallying public sup-
steadily
December 1963,
as
to solve the problems that surrounded him,
upon
called
his
countrymen
The flamboyant young commander air force publicly
been training
Ky
gov-
lasting
to
"March North,"
echoed immediately by General Nguyen Cao Ky.
announced
of the Vietnamese
that his pilots
had already
"We
are ready,"
such a mission.
for just
told the press, resplendent in a black flight suit
lavender
scarf.
assure that
all
"We
could go this afternoon.
I
and
cannot
of North Vietnam would be destroyed,
but Hanoi would certainly be destroyed." Although Tay-
reprimanded both South Vietnamese lead-
lor privately
ficials
many Washington
provocative remarks,
ers for their
had by
this
time
come
to
much
of-
the same point of
view.
Indeed,
Although Khanh proved inept port, his
Unable
overthrown
vocal public support, the
government was no more
report issued
itself
by a group of younger
later
the leadership of General
Washington
Diem was
vir-
tually spent. Public demonstrations against the govern-
ment
the expansion of covert operations, nor an in-
summer
the territory held by Saigon fragmented
annihilated,
coup
Unfortunately, neither the dispatch of additional ad-
units from their
of South Vietnam's military reserves had been
named Operation
34-Alpha.
visers,
much
boats against North Vietnamese coastal
installations in a series of raids code
to dis-
down
courage the United States and bring
which ten-man "Hunter-Killer Teams" made
penetrated
over large sections of the South Viet-
at will
namese Communist party met
propaganda broadcasts to North Vietnam. Alongside these "public"
roamed
namese countryside, the central committee of the Viet-
against the
pressure
for
direct
North was coming
As
U.S. at
military
Johnson from
action all di-
early as January the Joint Chiefs of Staff
worsening mil-
rections.
Vietcong units
had urged the president
to "take bolder actions
which
may embody restrictions
greater risks." Deploring the self-imposed
under which the war was being fought, the
recommended the commitment
generals forces to
infiltration,
and the bombing of key
and President Johnson's
capability,
air
reluc-
tance to risk American ground combat units had fash-
combat
ioned a growing consensus within the administration for
to hinder
the application of air power against North Vietnam. By
of U.S.
South Vietnam, an invasion of Laos
unused
targets in
North
midsummer, planning
for a
program of "graduated overt
Vietnam. In March, the interagency Vietnam Working
pressure" against the North was well advanced, along
Group, chaired by the State Department's Robert John-
with drafts of a Congressional resolution supporting
JCS recommendations,
son, endorsed the
particular a blockade of
suggesting in
Haiphong Harbor and
air strikes
against military training camps, transportation arteries,
and petroleum storage
McNamara
Defense
facilities.
Although Secretary of time
rejected escalation for the
being, he persuaded the president to authorize planning for a
bombing campaign
against the North. By June, as
the situation in Vietnam worsened, both outgoing
bassador Lodge and the newly appointed
MACV,
General William C. Westmoreland, were
American
ing for vigorous
air strikes against
Those
in
of
their proposals
Washington who dissented from the new
Among them
was Roger Hilsman, assistant sec-
retary of state for Far Eastern affairs.
Kennedy
years
and
a
A
might deem necessary.
veteran of the
proponent of patient counterin-
effort.
role in
I
continued to hope that we could keep our
Vietnam
limited." Events in the Gulf of
istration the
momentum
ment was almost
toward
Among
during the spring were electronic surveillance missions
off the coast of
North Vietnam. The.se
on
months without incident when, on the
for several
night of August three
Me
2,
the U.S.S.
in the
Gulf of Tonkin. After
nam
Ticonderoga.
Assuming
that the
Charged by Johnson with
disloyalty
and
pressured to resign, Hilsman warned in a letter to Secretary of State
Rusk that
in
action against
Hon Me two
with the
aircraft carrier
U.S.S.
North Vietnamese had
34-A
raid
days earlier, Johnson declined to
retaliate. Lest his restraint
be misinterpreted by Hanoi,
with the addition of a second destroyer, the U.S.S.
is
Communists
as
an act of desperation, and
not be effective in persuading the North
Vietnamese to cease and
Operations against
desist."
North Vietnam, he concluded, "may
at a certain stage
be a useful supplement to an effective counterinsurgency
program, but cannot be an effective
insis-
tence on the priority of political over military solutions
Vietnamese problem and
tenacity.
However,
own house
his
judgment of Hanoi's
frustration over Saigon's inability to in order,
Turner ]oy, the provision of
air cover,
and
explicit au-
thorization to respond with force to any attack in inter-
national waters.
On
the night of August 4, as the two ships plowed
through heavy seas sixty miles from the North Vietna-
mese mainland, the Maddox radioed that the destroyers
substitute."
Subsequent events would vindicate Hilsman's
its
off the attackers
confused the Maddox with an unrelated against
Hon
our counterinsurgency program will be inter-
will, therefore,
put
island of
twenty-minute en-
however, the president ordered the patrols to continue
preted by the
to the
a
taken before we demonstrate suc-
North Vietnam that cess
"significant
had gone
Maddox was attacked by
from the
civic action" as
patrols
North Vietnamese PT boats near the
jet fighters
military effort.
military involve-
the covert operations approved by the president
help of four
and
full
irresistible.
gagement the Maddox drove
political
Tonkin
in August, however, suggested that within the admin-
"over-Americanization" of the war, arguing that Viet-
much
a reso-
lution was simply "part of the normal contingency plan-
ning
surgency, Hilsman had cautioned in early 1963 against
required "as
mind such
In Johnson's
code named DeSoto and conducted by U.S. destroyers
Laos or North Vietnam.
administration's emerging policy were few and far be-
tween.
Southeast Asia and providing authori-
in
call-
military action to bolster
South Vietnamese morale. Chief among were
Am-
commander
U.S. policy
zation to the president for whatever military action he
the existence of a major
were under attack by North Vietnamese gunboats. In fact,
on an "inky black night" one seaman described
as
"darker than the hubs of Hell," no one aboard either ship actually saw the
enemy
craft, firing their
guns
in-
stead at sonar and radar contacts of questionable relia-
23
After a brief engagement, the destroyers reported
bility.
they had repulsed the North Vietnamese without sustaining any casualties or damage. But several hours later
commander
the
Maddox
of the
reassessed the situation,
may have accounted
parent torpedo attacks and that there
enemy
had been "no actual
cluded that the entire action
for the ap-
contacts. Emphasizing
he con-
visual sightings,"
many doubts" and
"left
of
Oregon warned
his
colleagues they were circumventing the Constitution,
the Senate overrode their objections by a vote of 88-2.
The margin The
indicating that "freak weather effects" as well as an
"overeager" sonarman
Wayne Morse
war," and Senator
in the
House was 466-0.
events in the Tonkin Gulf proved to be a wa-
tershed of vast proportions. By seizing the opportunity
won
afforded him, Johnson
endorsement
a resounding Congressional
His firm but restrained
for his policies.
handling of the
crisis
earned him broad popular support,
suggested a complete evaluation before any further ac-
neutralized the hawkish Republican presidential nomi-
tion was taken.
nee. Senator Barry Goldwater, and paved the
By the time these second thoughts reached Washington, however,
Johnson had already decided on
retaliatory strike.
men on
ambush was bona
fide,"
McNamara recommended At
engagement and
on assurances by Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp,
commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet "the
(CINCPAC),
that
Secretary of Defense
that the air raids go ahead.
11:37 P.M. on the evening of August 4, some thir-
teen hours after the
first
Washington,
reports reached
Johnson went on television to inform the American people that U.S. jets were already in the
air.
The
carrier-
launched attacks, code named Pierce Arrow, struck patrol
boat bases and
Vinh, Phuoc Loi,
oil
Hon
sinking twenty-five
storage depots at
Gai, and the Lach
PT
Quang Khe,
Chao
Estuary,
boats and destroying an esti-
mated 10 percent of North Vietnam's
total
petroleum
way
November.
both he and the nation would pay
a
for
Yet,
heavy price
The Southeast Asia commitment,
U.S.
Resolution raised the level of
linked
American
firmly than ever with the fate of virtually
had shattered the
to the North,
that
more
South Vietnam, and
compelled Washington to respond to future
North Vietnamese provocations. The selves
prestige
much
making
them-
war
further escalation of the conflict
And
easier.
air attacks
barrier against taking the
if
the administration had pun-
ished the North Vietnamese, America had also paid a price.
Antiaircraft
two U.S.
aircraft
fire
during the raids brought
and damaged two more. One of the
pilots ditched his plane in the
ocean and died. The
other. Lieutenant Everett Alvarez of nia,
became the
down
first
American
pilot
San
Jose, Califor-
taken prisoner by
the North Vietnamese. Although Alvarez would languish in a Hanoi prison for the next eight years, he was
storage capacity.
The
in time,
electoral victory in
for his victory.
the scene in favor of North Vietnamese radio
intercepts that appeared to confirm an relying
a swift
Discounting the uncertainty of the
overwhelming
his
following day the president submitted to
gress a resolution authorizing
him
Con-
to take "all necessary
not alone.
The United
States, too,
had become
a hos-
tage of the war.
measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."
During the
Asserting that the peace and security of the region were
tions of various sorts enforced restraint.
"vital"
to
the national interest,
committed the U.S., take
all
to assist
the measure further
"as the president determines, to
necessary steps, including the use of armed force,
any member or protocol
state of the
Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance defense of
its
freedom."
On
August
7,
after less
in
than
fall
of 1964, however, political considera-
idential election fast approaching, his desire to limit
With
the pres-
Johnson emphasized
American involvement.
"We
seek no
wider war," he declared repeatedly, assuring campaign audiences that American boys would not be sent to do the fighting that Asian boys should be doing for themselves. In
South Vietnam, meanwhile, a clumsy attempt
Khanh
ten hours of debate, Congress delivered the mandate the
by
president wanted. Although Alaska's Ernest Gruening
antigovemment
attacked the resolution as a "predated declaration of
while warring Buddhist and Catholic mobs rampaged
24
to seize dictatorial riots that
power provoked violent
drove the general from Saigon
^Xa--^''N-
.-^^,-^4
^-'>-f'-»
-.i«fc,.
.»
'^'^^^ii
»-',>'*^.
!4^;fJ:-r^^v^v-^:*;^>..-^
>J^:*»# #r:;<**«-.«tT/*^
A photograph
taken from aboard the U.S.S.
destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin on August
through the
streets.
Khanh
Maddox shows one 2,
ot the three
returned to power a week
but the fragility of his government seemed to
later,
Washington
to preclude any military initiatives against
Nonetheless, the pressure on Johnson to expand the
air force
steadily. In
mid-September, with both the
and Marine Corps urging extended
air attacks
By the end of the month
icy review.
emerged on the need "carefully
Vietnam,
North Vietnam.
war mounted
North Vietnamese torpedo boats that attacked the American
1964-
orchestrated" a
left
With
a
consensus had
what Taylor described
air
as a
campaign against North
conviction hardened by the bombing of a
U.S. bachelor that
for
officers' billet in
Saigon on December 25
two Americans dead and
fifty-eight
bellicose statements issuing from
wounded.
Moscow and
Pe-
to the
king and Sukarno pulling Indonesia out of the United
president that sharp increases in hard-core Vietcong
Nations, the need for decisive U.S. action in the region
strength had reduced the area of government control in
seemed compelling.
against the North,
Ambassador Taylor reported
the South to no more than 30 percent of the country.
Two
weeks
later that figure
ing an uprising of
When
lands. at
Bien
montagnard
tribes in the central high-
the Vietcong attacked the U.S.
Hoa on November
damaging
shrank even further follow-
five aircraft,
1,
killing four
air
base
Americans and
Johnson ordered a wholesale pol-
More than anything
else,
however, what propelled
the United States toward war in the spring of 1965 was the continued disintegration oi the Saigon government
and the threatened defeat of the South Vietnamese army at the
that
hands of the Vietcong. Combined with reports
North Vietnamese
regular units
had entered the
25
A
IJQi
^^.
™-f-*
?- jr J^K
i^%.
^ r/-
>.
'?v '.'J'A-
r?^i.!iia^
-4» 77ie remains
bomber
of a U.S. Air Force Canfcena
litter
the tarmac ofBien
field following a
'November
H
*"^
'<;
rf*
4
'
>w.>- "^'^-
1,
Hoa
air-
Vietcong mortar attack on
1964.
ML:
country, the political instability that had once been the
now became
principal obstacle to escalation
persuasive argument for
the most
Without the psychological
it.
shot in the arm that a strike against the North would
no anti-Communist
provide, argued Johnson's advisers,
South Vietnamese government could
On
February
it
sought.
mantel and our
"We
have kept our guns over the
shells in the
cupboard
for a
long time
now," exclaimed an angry President Johnson. ask
American
instal-
handing the administration the op-
lations at Pleiku,
portunity
"I can't
soldiers out there to continue to fight
one hand behind
their backs."
One
day
with
after the Pleiku
U.S. planes struck North Vietnamese targets
attacks,
When
Operation Flaming Dart.
the
Communists
an American enlisted men's quarters
in
raids.
"They woke
and we woke them up
night,
said a grim-faced president.
did
it
us
up
in the
in
Qui Nhon on
in the
middle of the
middle of the night,"
"They did
it
again and
we
again." But the time for "tit-for-tat" reprisals had
On
ended.
"moving
13,
convinced that Hanoi was
in for the kill,"
Johnson approved a program
February
a staunch advocate of
Da Nang.
bombing. Maxwell Tay-
expressed grave reservations about the dispatch of
lor
ground
forces, questioning the suitability of
combat troops
for
an Asian
guerrilla
ahead. Preoccupied with the
paign against the North,
Westmoreland's request affair to
March
8,
meet the
as a
diffi-
had been
stages of the air
minor
detail, a
On
a specific situation." first
step
first
the administration
cam-
treated
"one-shot
the morning of
wave of the 9th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade splashed ashore near sitions
first
American
war and the
Washington went
Despite Taylor's warnings,
taken.
Da Nang and took up
on the edge of the sprawling
po-
air base.
For Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, however, the
struck
February 10, Johnson ordered an even heavier series of
bombing
Although
culty of "holding the line" once the
survive.
Vietcong units attacked U.S.
6,
talions to defend the vital U.S. air base at
deployment of the Marines was only the troop buildup of
much
to the conclusion by
first
stage in a
Having come
vaster proportions.
mid-March that the only way
for
the United States to avert disaster in South Vietnam
was "to put our
own
finger in the dike," the
commander recommended
Army
divisions.
the
Westmoreland
American troops not be
MACV
commitment of two U.S. proposed
also
that
limited to defensive coastal en-
of graduated, sustained air attacks against North Viet-
claves, as Taylor wanted, but engage in offensive oper-
nam code named
ations against
Rolling Thunder.
After a series of delays the operation finally got under
way on March struck an
2
when U.S. Air
ammunition depot
miles north of the sire for
DMZ.
at
Force fighter-bombers
Xom
Bang, thirty-five
In keeping with Johnson's de-
a "limited air action," the second Rolling
Thun-
der mission did not take place for nearly two weeks. But the meager results of these
first strikes,
plus pressure from
the Joint Chiefs for more substantial blows and ominous
South
reports of a worsening military situation within
Vietnam, induced the president
panded
effort against
munication April,
as far
to
authorize an ex-
North Vietnamese
north as the twentieth
parallel.
American and South Vietnamese
total of
3,600 sorties
in
lines of
com-
During
pilots flew a
what had become
a sustained
bombing campaign.
Although
enemy
units in the central highlands.
frustrated
by the limited results of the
bombing campaign and angry over
a
VC
attack
on the
U.S. Embassy in Saigon on March 29, Johnson was reluctant to war.
He was
become too deeply embroiled
in the
still
ground
concerned, however, that a lack of decisive
action might precipitate the long-feared South Vietna-
mese
collapse.
Johnson forged
a
compromise between
Taylor and the Joint Chiefs formalized in a national security action
memorandum
dated April
policy called for a continuation of the
6.
The new
bombing cam-
paign against the North, the deployment of two additional
Marine combat battalions
an increase of some 20,000 men forces.
to in
South Vietnam, and U.S. military support
Although the new troops would continue
to be
confined to enclaves around major U.S. bases, the pres-
TTie initiation of regular air operations against North
Vietnam produced
a
concomitant deployment of ground
forces to the South. Fearing Vietcong retaliation. eral
28
Westmoreland requested two Marine
Gen-
infantry bat-
Nguyen Cao Ky
(right),
South Vietnam's flamboyant
air vice
marshal, chats with fellow officers before leading his country's first
air strike
over North Vietnam, February 1965.
T^r
V
V ^
v'k
f,-^
:|^^^^
ident also approved a "change of mission" for battalions deployed to Vietnam,
operations within
weeks
later,
fifty
Marine
all
permitting oiYensive
miles of their base areas. Three
under continued prodding from Westmore-
land and the Joint Chiefs, Johnson approved the de-
ployment of nine more
battalions, bringing total
U.S.
troop strength in Vietnam to 82,000 men.
The
of
implications
full
which
decisions,
these
marked a major step toward large-scale involvement
in
the ground war, were carefully concealed from the pub-
During the deliberations that produced the new pol-
lic.
icy directives
Johnson told
reaching strategy that gated."
When
the Marines'
mentioned
tally
months
reporters, "1
in
a
know
new
no
far-
mission was acciden-
government
"credibility gap" that
two
release
press
later the administration issued a
opening a
of
being suggested or promul-
is
heated denial,
would torment Johnson
remainder of his presidency. The obvious expan-
for the
sion of the war, however, was protest, including a
enough
to
provoke vocal
march on Washington that
attracted
12,000 college students. Johnson attempted to disarm his critics
by sending spokesmen to university campuses
bombing pause
and authorizing
a five-day
The temporary
halt produced
in early
May.
no response from Hanoi
but did help the administration push through Congress a $700-million appropriation to support military opera-
tions in Vietnam.
To
the president's dismay, however, neither the
new
deployments nor the additional funding were enough to
At
reverse the deteriorating military situation.
of
May
the end
the Vietcong launched their spring-summer of-
fensive with regiment-size attacks in
ince that within a
week had
killed
Quang Ngai
Prov-
more than 1,000 of
the government's best troops. In mid-June the offensive
moved
into
War Zone C
tactical ineptitude
and
to the savage mauling of units. By the end of the five
ARVN
still
more South Vietnamese
month
MACV
estimated that
ineffective" as a result of the
The new American commitment
also
seemed
After a successful landing, Marines of the 9th Expeditionary
gade
30
rest
#l»-^i
regiments and nine separate battalions had
been rendered "combat fighting.
northwest of Saigon where
a lack of leadership contributed
on Da Nang's Red Beach Two on March
8,
Bri-
1965.
^
u
mm \
v^
> y
i
-?*v
p^
to
have
little
Vietnamese
effect
had been ousted ernment,
young
on
South
stabilizing the chaotic
political scene
from which General Khanh
in February in favor of a civilian gov-
overthrown on June 12 by a group of
itself
officers under the leadership of
and the staggering Vietnamese
Vietnam, in
led
air
war against North
and the adoption of
new
a
offensive
request in early June for an additional a
month
Washington, constituting the
U.S. policy on Vietnam
The
to
expansion of American ground forces
MACV's men precipitated
150,000 in
a drastic
the South,
strategy.
South
casualties sustained by the
Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs
propose an intensification of the
of intense discussion last
major review of
until the spring of 1967.
military was convinced that the size
of U.S. forces in
Vietnam were not
"You must take the war
ever
won
a battle sitting
entreaties were seconded by
on
Their
his ass."
Ambassador Taylor, whose
reluctance to use American ground forces in general
combat had been overcome by the strength of the offensive and by presidential assistant
urged a full-scale trial
air assault
infrastructure.
Johnson's
Undersecretary of State George
about the impact of
air
mitment of U.S. ground about Washington's
VC
Walt Rostow, who
on North Vietnam's
Among
With
these July decisions Johnson had fully commit-
Yet the president had not authorized a mobilization of
indus-
He had
the Reserves as sought by the Joint Chiefs.
not
declared a state of national emergency or asked Congress for
an increase in taxes
as
McNamara
He had
urged.
not informed the nation that he had privately authorized the incremental dispatch of an additional 100,000 men,
U.S. troop strength
raising
225,000.
And he had the
subdued
in
Vietnam
to
more than
known
not made his decisions
American people
to the
choosing
in a formal address,
forum
an
of
afternoon
press
conference.
Unwilling to face the consequences of withdrawal yet
getting the job done.
Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"No one
he
military appropriation to fund the increases.
instead
and posture
enemy," argued General
to the
Finally,
later.
ted the United States to the defense of South Vietnam.
Vietcong offensive
ferocity of the
50,000 men, with more to be sent
would seek from Congress an additional $1.7-billion
Nguyen Cao Ky
and another general, Nguyen Van Thieu.
The unexpected
and publicly announced the immediate deployment of
fearful that the
war would destroy the domestic reforms
of his "Great Society," the president determined to do
"what
will
be enough, but not too much."
States would fight in Vietnam, but a
minimum
in the
it
would do so with
of domestic disruption. Thus,
summer
The United
on
hot day
a
of 1965, without fanfare or declaration,
Lyndon Johnson
led the
American people
into
what
would become the nation's longest war.
only
advisers
Ball, already skeptical
power, opposed this
new com-
forces, expressing grave
ability to force
Hanoi
doubts
to the bar-
gaining table and profound concerns over the eventual costs of escalation. Secretary of Defense
McNamara
also
warned the president that the war would be protracted and as
costly, testing the
endurance of Americans
Vietnamese. Nonetheless,
early July,
after a visit to
McNamara recommended
as
much
Saigon
in
the deployment of
an additional 100,000 men.
By the end of the month Johnson had reached cision.
The
a de-
enclave strategy was scrapped in favor of
aggressive operations aimed at the gradual attrition of
the enemy.
The
president approved Westmoreland's re-
American quest for the use of B-52s in South Vietnam, agreed to a gradual intensification of the
32
bombing
in the
North,
in
Saigon
military police stand guard outside the U.S. Embassy in July 1965.
was built following a
The
harrier surrounding the
terrorist attack in
March.
compound
Whether they signed DD Form 4— ENLISTMENT CONTRACT: ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
Focus: Training
STATES
—
or received a letter headed "Greetings," the
beginnings were to a place like
Carolina, or one oFthe lively
A bus or a train took them
the same.
all
Marine boot camp
at Parris Island,
many army
young men growing strangely
South
training centers, the silent as they
neared
"There was no conversation now, no
their destination.
sound but the mechanical grate and whine of the bus
remembered one
itself,"
—raw
anticipation
Then
impossible."
Communist
July 28, 1965, as a
to split
South Vietnam
in two. President
Lyndon John-
son told the American people that their sons and daughters
were going to war.
"We
did not choose to be the
guardians at the gate, hut there the president.
"We
no one
is
else," declared
Ordering the immediate deployment of the
and
alry Division
a
doubling of draft
Congressional authorization tor in all
U.S. armed
forces.
a
calls,
1st
Johnson asked
340,000-man increase
His request initiated the largest
months
military buildup in U.S. peacetime history. Six after the president's
announcement the number of U.S.
military personnel in
South Vietnam had jumped from
81,000 to 250,000. Within two years that doubled. but
the
Some
of the increase
majority
Cav-
of those
figure
came from
sent
to
almost
volunteers,
Vietnam flowed
through some 4,000 draft boards that by December 1965
were already processing more than 40,000
To handle
the sudden
demand
for fighting
air force,
navy, and Marines
all
facilities.
But the president's
call to
est
men
a
month.
men, the
increased their training
arms had the great-
impact on the army. Ordered by the Pentagon to
create three
new 7,500-man
infantry brigades
and more
than 700 smaller units, the army expanded half a dozen bases and
opened new
By the end of the year
facilities all
six
around the country.
army basic-training centers
New
Fort Ord, California; Fort Dix,
Jersey; Fort Jack-
son, South Carolina; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Gordon,
Georgia;
and
Fort
Leonard
teaching nearly 13,000 recruits in the jungles of
34
Wood,
how
Southeast Asia.
Missouri
to fight
—were
and survive
The next
by brass bands. to be a
good deal
man
large
was
title
in a
—made thought new
world.
arrivals
were met
greeting they received was apt
less friendly.
usually
It
came from
whose
face
was scowling, and
when
carried unmistakable conviction
growled, "You're
all
few days varied from place to place but everywhere
blood
forms to
tests,
in-
fill
lec-
out, talks by chaplains
and Red Cross representatives, more orientation sions,
fingerprinting,
home, and
it
mine now!" The routine of the next
cluded orientation lectures, haircuts, shots, more tures,
a
wide-brimmed, forest-ranger hat whose
sergeant,
drill
a
new
reception centers the
whose voice
Vietnam."
will stand in
At some
offensive threatened
unknown
the bus stopped, the train coasted to
and the doors folded open on
a halt,
On
"Nervous
recruit years later.
fear of the
TB
form
tests,
a small reference booklet that
ses-
write
to
letters
covered every-
thing a soldier needed to know, including "Pay due a
serviceman recruits
at
time of death." Along the way the
were issued boots, uniforms,
and bedding. They learned how a
cotton ball tor their blood
field gear,
to salute,
how
and how
test,
to
new
rifles,
to
hold
make
a
bed to military specifications. In the
mid-1960s the army was undergoing
sance in the ranks led by army chief of
staff
a renais-
General
Harold K. Johnson. Convinced that modern warfare
re-
men
to
quired a modern soldier, Johnson wanted his
think for themselves. "You can't just stand there and up,' "
yell
'Hurry
tor.
"The American
it
he once admonished a
The Marines remained wedded
to
however. Like thousands of others, sight of a
Marine
he recounted
in
Memoir. "The DI
drill instruc-
soldier has to be led, not pushed."
drill
W.D.
Ehrhart's
first
instructor was unforgettable, as
Vietnam-Perkasie:
who
an older tradition,
got
A
Comhal Marine
on that bus was eight-and-
a-half-feet
And
tall.
hands tm
his
ho was
Standing there with
iiKly.
he looked
his hips,
hetween
like a cross
Paul Biinyan, Babe the Blue Ox, and Godzilla." The
came from
ear-shattering bellow that
mouth, recalled
his
the suddenly terrified recruit, sounded like the voice of "
Ood.
painted on the deck
have three seconds
on one of those
not
talk.
You
times.
fucks
do everything you're told
will
You
up.
it
Not
else.
I'll
kill
the
that the
much
army had
Do
it!
at all
instantly,
and
cocksucker that
first
scuzzy shitbirds are mine, ladies!
Now, MOVE! Do
don't like you.
into the
and plant your-
yellow footprints. You will
sets o(
keep your head and eyes front
will
do nothing
will
those steps over there,'
And
I
"
ersacks.
K.P.
,
it
struction given during to
in
weeks
World War
Vietnam underwent
a
minimum
II,
on
it
soldiers
heading
months of
of four
processing was completed, the
initial
the army provided of
new
lectured
Over the next
eight weeks
them with 352 hours of
instruction.
on
military courtesy
and sanitation. But the
trainees spent most of the time preparing their
and bodies
morning, they drill,
minds
of their
bunks
at 5:15 or 5:30 in the
the days with calisthenics, close-
filled
and marching, always marching, whether
they were Marines or army soldiers.
"Whenever
I
think
back to those days at Basic School," wrote former Marine Philip
mind
is
Caputo, "the recollection that
always the same: a double
file
A a
remorseless sun
is
first
comes
of green-clad
bent beneath their packs, are tramping
down
to
men,
a dirt road.
beating dt)wn. Raised by our Kxits,
cloud o{ red dust powders the trees alongside the road,
making them look
sickly
our uniforms, runs
in
and ashen. The dust clings
muddy
streaks
the weight of steel hel-
echoing up and down the long ct)lumn."
When
they dropped their packs the young recruits
were introduced to their
"A
rifles.
soldier's
their charges not only could shoot their
knew how
them
to take
weapon
who made
his best friend," intoned the instructors
but also
rifles
them back
apart and put
is
sure
to-
gether again. There were classes in grenade throwing
and hand-to-hand combat,
pugil-stick fights
net training. There were exercises in real bullets whizzing a
and bayo-
mock combat with
few inches over
a
man's head as
were taken out on bivouac to learn how to
down
to
our sweating
live in
the field and eat C-rations.
Through
it
the veterans with the stripes on their
all
sleeves tried to teach the in
new
how
recruits
to get
one piece from "the boonies." Never stand
Do
not give officers.
all.
or return salutes
—
When
a loud nt)ise, hit the deck,
you hear
can, under the ground
summarized
all
back
in groups,
Charlie likes to shoot the
or one incoming round could get you
if
possible.
And
do not
ground
as
try
you
the one rule that
the rules for survival in a war zone: "Keep
your ass down." Slowly, steadily, the regimen of training began to
change the former
civilians:
It
toughened them physi-
cally, disciplined their reactions,
reality of
and taught them the
interdependence and the necessity of team-
work. Those
for war.
Crawling out
order
re-
took place in classrooms where instructors
it
our hav-
up, keep your interval, close
to run for a bunker. Sleep as close to the
were divided into 250-man companies and shipped
off to basic-training centers.
Some
some
subjects unimaginable only a decade earlier.
Once cruits
ever.
of military in-
training divided into basic and advanced courses,
of
is
in
men
many ways tougher than
to the eight to twelve
up'
it
and bayonet scab-
bouncing
men welcomed
number
Despite such novelties as
was
their training
slings
rifle
Our heads ache from
mets, and the cry 'Close
automatic dishwashers and potato-peeling machines in
Compared
the rattle of
he crawled through the mud. Near the end of basic the
easy.
of
is
it!'
larger
it
There
bards, the clattering of mess kits
footprints
give the word, you filthy pigs
I
to get outta this bus
self
you
in front ot
'When
roared the DI.
You
columns of yellow
four
'There's
faces.
who
failed
any portion of the course "re-
cycled" that segment until they got
it
When
right.
everything worked, a group of .individuals became a ma-
chine that theoretically would respond
as a single unit
in the face of danger. Finally, after passing the army's
exhaustive Physical
Combat
Proficiency Test, recruits
graduated from basic training. After a well-deserved leave, army recruits went on to
Advanced
Individual
learned additional interests.
Some
Training
skills
(AIT).
There
they
based on their aptitudes and
received further training as clerks or
cooks, typists or truck drivers. Others underwent a nine-
week course
in
one
of a variety of
combat arms
special-
35
These
tics.
riinged from artillery to tanks to helicopters
hut also included the most basic specialty of
all
—
infan-
AIT was
designed
in basic training.
in part to refine skills
mastered
first
Already exposed to living in the open,
future infantrymen
now
how
learned
wounds, select food
prevent malaria or treat
it
if
to sterilize water,
bull's-eyes painted
Vietnam-bound
foot soldiers were
their uniforms,
taught "instant reaction" and "quick
They
learned to shoot at sound and
kill"
techniques.
movement without
consciously aiming, practicing on multiple targets that
popped up
random from behind bushes and
at
Meanwhile, the aggressive psychology necessary was fostered through everything from signs shouting
combat
The
"Bong the Cong"
for
war
painted
to hard-bitten instruc-
primary goal of AIT, however, was to give novexperience of Vietnam before they had
to face the real thing. replicas of
To do
the
so,
army constructed
VC hamlets— "staffed" with "enemy" soldiers
and complete
— then
in detail
set
down
to the last tunnel
combat "problems"
and punji
for the trainees to
At
into
more exotic
men
"slept four
methods used by the
hidden soldier carrying
a
VC
to conceal themselves,
machine gun jumped from
a
"Everything
men were fare in
system
taught the nuances of counterinsurgency war-
Vietnam. They discovered the need
—one
man
walking
down
a
glued to the ground in search of
buddy kept detect
how
a lookout for snipers.
enemy booby
to set
traps
how
36
while his
They learned how
to
listening posts outside
to
into predesignated "killing zones." recruits learned by
with his eyes
trip wires
jump from hovering
helicopters into "hot" LZs and flush
sas, all
buddy
and place claymore mines,
ambushes and establish
night defensive perimeters,
trail
for the
enemy
Much
making mistakes. At
guerrillas
of the time the
Fort Riley,
Kan-
vehicles and personnel in the training sector were
cht)se to
specialties.
and
— home,
five
in
extend their training
There was airborne, where
hours a night and then got up
letters,
concerns, friends
—
every-
jumps from 250-foot towers and the
rigors of practice
fear of their
they were.
schedule
pound cliffs,
first real
Then
made
jumps made them
forget
how
tired
there was Ranger training, where the
airborne look like a piece of cake: 3:30
wake-ups,
twelve-minute-mile
runs
down
field packs, perilous descents
100-
with
ice-covered
low-level night parachute jumps into impenetrable
cypress swamps.
There was
limit to
a
what even the most
realistic
"No
training
instruction could accomplish, of course.
could convey the reality of war or the reality of Viet-
one former platoon fresh
leader,
and newcom-
from "The World" were routinely
advised to forget everything they had already learned.
If
there was no substitute for war, however, the training
had hardly been wasted.
The
acclimated to the "enemy" environment, the
Hoa" found the
of tunnels.
thing faded under the weight of exhaustion" until the
hole only a few feet in front of the startled recruits.
Once
maze
a
and ran everywhere," remembered one parachutist.
insisted
a
they were
if
combat, and many soon found themselves
ified for
Vietnam
class in
would mean
the recruits were considered qual-
Vietnam. But some men
nam,"
one
AIT
the end of
ers to
officer lectured
it
Vietnam-
tacking the fortified village of "Vinh
enemy had escaped through
and ambush and counterambush techniques, along with
As an
what
trainers gave
captured, while at Fort Gordon, Georgia, trainees at-
deal with. Particular attention was devoted to patrolling
the intricacies of camouflage.
At
"aggressor" forces at any hour.
soldiers a taste of
A.M.
to kill!"
is
ice soldiers the
stick
luridly
trees.
reminding the young trainees, "The essence
tors grimly
of
Oklahoma, veteran
and
for jungle survival,
necessary. Since the Viet-
cong would not stand around with
on
ambush by
Fort Sill,
bound
try tactics.
self-treat
subject to
long weeks of preparation gave young
endurance they would need to searing, a
mind-numbing
map, how
someone shot
to at
fire
heat.
a
It
hump
men
the
mile after mile in
taught them
how
mortar, and what to do
to read
when
them. Their training nurtured pride
in
themselves and loyalty to their comrades. Equally important,
it
transformed the way they looked at the world
around them. Landscape was no longer scenery, terrain.
The
little
man
in
longer quaint, he was the enemy.
had come
a
long way.
"When
said a training officer at Fort Polk's
are ready to fight."
was
no
They might not be
finished with their military education, but the cruits
it
the black pajamas was
new
re-
they leave here,"
AIT
center, "they
"You're all mine
mnv!"
A
drill .scTi/cinr
,it
Fort Knox, Kentucky, welcomo-
.1
i;rt'up ol
aniiy
recruits.
37
Above. At thenrmy's training center the tnippings of civilian
lite.
Right, clockwise from top
left.
()/
in Fort Dix,
Boys become
New Jersey, an
soldiers:
inductee loses some
uniform measurement at Fort
Dix; being fitted for boots, Fort Knox; trying on a garrison hat; the receiving end of
an inoculation gun.
38
39
Recruits receive pu^il-sttck tniinin)^, which prcfxiro rhem
40
ti>r
hayoner h^htm^^
New
M'lJicr.-^
Ic.irncJ
lum
h> (/i/cu
i;R7),K/i',s
Irom lour
f\»itioih^: sr.inJin^,
kneeling, crouLliui^. .inj supine.
Hciv
i:;^:
.'
I\>IL
Louisiana}, ;nv,i/f their insrrticror's coium.inJ fd hurl their ^rcnuJcs.
41
m mmsm
"'newly trained soldiers make a call
home.
last /'/lo/ic
With
Witness: Morris Udall
the United States began a tortured
this vote,
and calamitous period
in
which the government and the
would be subjected
military
of competency and
to tests
would not and could not
integrity that they
On
pass.
that day in 1964, the Congress of the United States did
not see what horrors were about Less than a year later
I
voiced
come. Nor did
to
my
my
direction of the war in a newsletter to stituents, but
I.
misgivings over the
Arizona con-
was willing to give the president the
I still
benefit of the doubt.
"The United
fact
is,
" I
States, unlike the rulers
Union, has fo operate that
President
Lyndon Johnson once
kin Resolution that
could
yt)u
it
American men and amount to the
hard
of
war by mid- 1965 proved
it,"
and the number
U.S. dollars committed this
was no boast.
It
he explain
vance,
we make
When we demand
move, and preferably
his every
in ad-
his position increasingly difficult in re-
The president may not always be president,
In
is
and he deserves our
right
.
.
but he
.
and
loyalty
is
our
(uir support.
"
1967 1 would withdraw that support and be accused White House. More on that
of disloyalty by the
later.
minds of the U.S. senators and congressmen who
nearly unanimously approved the measure
1964. Yet
on August
7,
was not without trepidation that the Con-
it
gress voted
it
into law, as
Congressman Morris K. Udall
of Arizona, then in his second term, remembers.
The hows and whys
August
7,
films, televisicm series,
to
1964, in response to a plea by the presi-
dent and the leadership of both
parties,
the
House
of
Representatives passed House Joint Resolution 1145, ironically entitled
"A Resolution
to
Promote the Main-
tenance ot International Peace and Security east Asia. " It
is
in
better kninvn as the Gulf of
shed more
light
it
voted for H. First of all,
state
J.
it is
and
elections.
on the abstract
1
will
issues,
not attempt
but
I
can
tell
of mind of the Congress and why
Res. 1145.
important to remember that the
bers of the 88th Congress were
still
mem-
heavily influenced
by their own experiences of World War
II.
The signing
had taken place
South-
of the Japanese surrender
Tonkin
twenty years prior to the attack by North Vietnamese
less
than
patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf. Like me, most of the
Resolution.
The vote was
Tonkin resolution and the
of the
ensuing catastrophe have been the subjects of books,
something of the
On
of China and the Soviet
in a fishbowl.
lation to these other participants in the world struggle. of
whether such grandiose military plans were
to knt)w
in the
Gulf ot Ton-
was "like grandma's nightshirt
everything under
fit
said of the
"that the president of the
wrote,
a badly
needed mandate
for
Lyndon
members
of the Hiiuse
and Senate had served
in
the
They had grown
up,
Johnson, endorsing his decision to launch U.S. carrier
armed
planes to hit targets in North Vietnam following re-
fought fascism, and were elected during a period of total
ported attacks on American warships. Passage of the
and uncomplaining
resolution gave the president the authority to conduct
World War
foreign policy without the Congress. It was a historic
tremely popular and powerful Franklin Delano Roose-
and
velt.
tragic occasion. It was, in fact, wholly unnecessary,
the product of an Atnerica that "had never lost a war"
War
forces during that
II
war.
fealty
to
the president.
the Congress abdicated
its ri^le
to
During an ex-
That abdication continued through the Korean years
and the Cold War
era
of Truman and Eisen-
now
ques-
hower, the Berlin
ticmable thesis, "Support the president; he knows
more
the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia during the
and
a foreign policy that
than we do.
44
was built on the
Kennedy-Johnson
crisis,
the
years to
Cuban
missile crisis,
August of 1964-
and
'
On
August
?
:ind 4 the cliKikrooins ot the U.S.
House
and
ruimyr,
Representatives, m^rmally scenes
i)t
hterally huzzed with
i)f
gossip
news of the foolhardy attack hy
small i^unhoats ot
the North X'ietnamese navy on the
The debate continued, House
citing the
need
American
threat ro
with senior
members of the
to be unified in opposition to the
The
warships.
right-wingers, such
and John .Ashbrook
as H. R. Gross ot Iowa
ot ()/)/o,
bashed the United Nations and the secretary of
American destroyer MaJdox. The next day hemusement
lustily
turned to anger as other naval units ot the United States
state for, respectively, "token opposition to the halting
came under hostile
reportedly
fire in
the Gulfot Tonkin.
And in
This was, ot anirse, an election year. tion
an elec-
year events can often be magnified by political
My
and bombast.
rhetoric
on the Maddox. President Johnon
son, not anyone's idea ot a dove, ordered air strikes
the North Vietnamese mainland, but this did not calm
down a
the hawks.
show
To cover his political
LB] wanted
base,
of support from the entire Congress,
short of a formal declaration of war, to give
something
him
man-
a
The
floor debate in
marked by thunderous condemnation
"
has followed.
As
the debate continued, tew uor/.s of caution or
moderation were heard until shortly before the vote. clutch of liberals huddled listening to the righteous
A
of the resolution.
fiery rhetoric in
few ot us worried ahtud
1 recall
of the
it,
president to use
was
North Viet-
support fo
each
about setting an unhappy precedent allowing the
of/ier
lives
and
A
chamber
in the rear of the
necessary to protect American
all force
without our knowing anything other than what the
Pentagon and the White House were feeding
date for his unilateral military response. the House, as
Department
vacillating course of events which our State
Arizona colleague Barry
Goldwater, for example, was urging massive retaliation after the initial attack
of the Communist world conspiracy" and "the no-win
Finally,
Henry Reuss,
waukee, took to the
floor.
us.
a scholarly lawyer from Mil-
Allowing that he would sup-
the heartier the
port the resolution, Henry said he was "somewhat in the
cheers from Democrats and Republicans alike. Sitting
position of the proprietor of the saloon whose bartender
namese.
in the in
The
stronger the language,
back of the House,
I
could not imagine the House
calls
higher dudgeon at the news ot the sinking ot the
Maine
in
Havana Bay
'Is
on the
speech
made
tack: "Let
that this
a
a nation divided in this election year.
is
our
full
and
free
The majority
leader
Our
debate are America's
strength, not America's weakness.
"
had nothing
lican counterpart, Charles Halleck
to fear.
His Repub-
of Indiana, took to
White
called the Congressional leadership to a spe-
on the
crisis.
Though the
retaliatory attack
witlnKit Congressional advice
and
consent, Halleck said he agreed with this decision
and
had been ordered
he supported
'
That pretty much summed up the befallen
"this resolution as a
One
situation that
had
us.
of the
clear indication on
the part (4 the Congress of our determination to be a
united people in the face ot any threats to
" oi/r liberty.
last
speakers before the roll-call vote was
Congressman George Brown, spoken Asia,
the floor and advised his colleagues that the
cial briefing
is.
at Syracuse University after the initial at-
not friend needlessly fear nor toe vainly hope
free election,
House had
in
tor a drink!'
itl'
"
'He
resolution. Carl Albert, then
debate and quoted President Johnson
had
to ask:
'He has.
Democratic majority leader of the House, urged against partisan
Casey good
'Has he
or the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Leaders from the Democrats and Republicans joined to urge quick action
him on the intercom
lution.
critic ot
who
He
a Calitornian
and an out-
the administration's policy in Southeast
nonetheless was going to vote for the reso-
spoke for
many of us when he
said,
"I
am of
the very firm conviction that the peace and freedom
which
this CiHintry
Vietnam of
this
will
is
dedicated to achieve in South
not be attained bv the gradual escalation
unfortunate war.
"
In listening to George's speech,
accuracy of his warning: forces,
".4,s
1
was chilled by the
long as the
Communist
seeking to gain control of South Vietnam, can
ccmtinually replenish
and strengthen
from the mass ot unhappy peasants
their guerrilla units
in this
land and can
45
arm these
units with
American weapi)ns
seized tri)m the
frequently cooperative government forces
— there
no
is
"
House had no
In those days the
We
had the
roll called
quietly listening to the vote " "Burton. "
"Aye.
"Aye.
"
answered
I
sat
I
resc^hition. "Abbitt.
"Dingell.
"
"
"Aye.
On
went
it
was nof happy with the way
things were going in Southeast Asia,
had
I
my
trust in
The
South
casualties increased, the corruption ot the
Vietnamese government and military was further exposed,
and the
dissent from the nation rose.
I
increas-
doubted our policy and the mandate the Congress
ingly
had given President Johnson with the Tonkin
resolu-
October 1967,
In
it
was time to face
reality. I
hometown. The audience was made up establishment.
I
loyal
wonder:
It
re-
" / said,
"I
want
about war and
to talk
peace, about presidents, dominoes, commitments, mistakes.
.
and doubt grown
.
.
I
involvement
as the limited
I
support has
American troops scattered
fighting an
enemy who
is
in jungles
and ham-
everywhere and nowhere,
seeking to save a country which apparently to be saved, with casualties
not
d(.K's
mounting and no end
"Many
of the wise old heads in Congress say privately
that the best politics in this situation
is
to
remain
silent,
to fuzz your views, to await developments. I
simply as
have come here tonight I
can that
I
was wrong
.
.
to say as plainly .
and
I
President Johnson's advisers are wrong today.
went on
troops,
to outline a proposal to
to continue to fund the
after ensuring reforms
we were wrong creasing the
and
and
firmly believe "
withdraw American
Vietnamese but only
political stability. I said that
to continue
bombing the North and
American presence
in the
in-
South. Because
frustra-
of his presidency^
felt
he was right and that
ciirrect course. Later, I
phantom
contrasted LBJ's
end the war with Richard Nix-
"secret plan" fo
end the war
in
Vietnam.
and
resulted in
disaster for the
United States and South
Vietnam.
Nixon,
used the Tonkin resolution ro justify
cost tens of thousands of American lives
like LBJ,
and the
killing.
we who voted
We
American
Tonkin resoluticm were
for the
were desperately wrong. More than 52,000
lives
were
lost.
We
set in
destroyed a nation's trust in those military institutions.
motion forces that
who govern and
A decade
later
re-
we had
deserted hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese to
an uncertain
fate.
Our Vietnam
We
had
tragedy
lost the war.
had forever changed the way
the administration and the Congress conduct foreign policy. I
doubt that there ever again
of mindless obeisance to a president.
will
be that kind
The Congress and
the nation will rally around our president in times of
grave national be.
crisis,
but
it
will
That may be the only good
nof be
to
like
it
used to
have come from pas-
sage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
in sight.
"But
final year
Nixon's secret plan was an escalation of the war that
have thought with increasing dismay
into a very large Asian land war with a halt-
million
want
and
only more of us had questioned them
forthright efforts to
spect for our
"Tonight,
Democrat was questioning his policies.
marked the
he was on the
on's
the
to under-
have often thought about Lyndon Johnson's per-
Yes,
my
If
sonal tragedy. I really think he
wrong.
of the business
was not entirely receptive to
member of
would he have been spared the pain and
tion that
my
marks.
46
earlier,
chose
to speak to a large gathering in Tucson, Arizona,
I
now
in Presi-
remarks got more attention
given a rather juniiir
is
his escalation
f/on.
lets,
I
more
president and in our military leaders.
why a
stand
"
As my name was called,
my
House. LBJ, of course, was enraged, unable
but not without a sense
in the affirmative,
of foreboding. Though
electronic voting
name by name.
on the
without a single dissenting vote. I
brother Stew was secretary of the interior
dent Johnson's cabinet, than usually
victory possible.
device.
my
forced to take upon themselves the burden oi leadership
ARVN and Its Advisers
Focus:
when
faltering soldiers threatened to panic.
To
the Vietnamese they
these
tall,
bush
made
striking
a
their sweat-soaked uniforms
in
World War
baseball caps, carrying
hands and .45-caliber advisers were the
II
and faded green carbines in their
pistols strapped to their sides, the
combat pioneers of the American en-
men who
Vietnam, the handful of
terprise in
picture,
confident Americans. Striding through the
blazed the
path that thousands would soon follow.
Many
new
of the
advisers
part of the buildup of the in
who
arrived in-country as
American
1962 were assigned to the 7th
assistance
ARVN
whose
Mekong
Delta.
troops patrolled the watery world of the
After the departure of French troops in April 1956, the
United
Mihtary
States
(MAAG)
assumed
full
responsibility for rebuilding the
South Vietnamese army. Over the next four the U.S. provided equipment, streamlined
MAAG
of
armed insurgency and the
arrival
of a
new
idly
transformed this relatively low-key effort into a
able
administration in Washington, however, rap-
commitment. Alarmed by the deteriorating of the
pects
Diem government,
sharply increased
gon.
At
2,067.
ar-
advisory corps from 350 to nearly
its
The outbreak
700.
years, as
command
rangements, and conducted training programs, slowly increased
Group
Advisory
Assistance
all
Twelve months
MAAG
later
several thousand
advisers to every level of the
strength stood at
in
Vietnam.
American
Among
soldiers acting as
Vietnamese army. Working
with their Vietnamese counterparts,
the advisers re-
reports, helped plan operations, set
up communications, and arranged
— the
strange language, the alien culture, the ripe smell ot
nuoc nam
fish
sauce (which the Vietnamese seemed to
pour on everything they But the job at
itself
ate), the
mind-numbing
heat.
was even more demanding, especially
the lower levels where advisers accompanied the
ARVN
into the field to coordinate artillery and air sup-
pon and
assure medical assistance.
no command
authority, the
shimmering plain stretching south from Saigon
Ca Mau
Peninsula, the delta was 26,000 square
miles of rich, alluvial rice lands crisscrossed by irrigation
canals and the tributaries of the
Mekong
River.
The
region had been under the influence of the Vietminh since before
World War
II.
Their Vietcong successors
operated out of the hundreds of villages that clustered along the canal banks and from bases concealed in the
impenetrable swamps and thick forests that dotted the
Hunting them down, discovered one
coast.
was
adviser,
"like trying to identify tears in a bucket of water." After
three years of mounting violence, the contest in the
ARVN
was not
Like their adversaries, the vast majority of
ARVN
delta
between the Communists and the
being
won
soldiers
by the government troops.
grew up
in rural villages,
farmers. Like their opponents they
mal education, and
had
little if
like the guerrillas they
for the duration or until they fight.
the sons of peasant
any
for-
would serve
were no longer able to
Unlike the Vietcong, however, they were usually
assigned to a unit far from home. Although some wives
for supplies.
Getting used to Vietnam was tough enough
vast,
to the
were more than
there
11,000 U.S. military personnel
viewed intelligence
pros-
Kennedy
forms of military assistance to Sai-
the end of 1961
them were
President
siz-
A
program
Division,
Although they had
Americans were sometimes
followed their husbands and settled near
most enlisted men saw a year.
cation est
their families
ARVN
camps,
no more than once
Also unlike the Communists, their lack of edu-
meant they had
rungs of army
a salary of $11 a
life,
little
chance
of escaping the low-
surviving as well as they could
on
month.
Extended absences without leave and outright desertion were their
common. But
circumstances
for the
most part they accepted
philosophically.
Generally
ne-
47
glcctcd by rhcir t)thccrs, ^iven
were fighting a
the i)fdinary
ior,
idea ot
little
ARVN
what they
soldiers displayed
courage and endurance that won the respect of the
Americans.
When
asked what had been his most lasting
impression of Vietnam, one U.S. adviser replied: think
would be the almost
it
limitless ability ot the Viet-
namese
soldier to bear suffering
plaint.
I've
never heard a wounded Vietnamese
Americans
ot food,
cigarettes,
skill ot
favors.
when
ot
also
decent
the Americans were around than they
own commanders.
did from their
As
the ad-
They
understood that they had a better chance treatment
part,
an endless source
as
and other small
cry,
their
Ft)r
troops admired the bravery and
visers, prizing individual
a group, the
men
they
led.
The
well-educated
sons ot wealthy, urban Vietnamese families, most had
beneticiaries ot family or political connections, they
used their positions to line their pt)ckets with
money
siphoned from unit budgets or extorted from local farmers.
The
ultimate products of a traditional, class-hound
they
society,
looked down on
manded and on
the peasants they
the young Americans
whom
irritating tor
its
enemy open
advisers
much
ot the
ARVN
all
find that
many
the
all,
the Americans were dismayed to
men
officers
What
had no more enthusiasm
tor the dithcult task ot
subduing
characterized the government side ot the war
large the
and the
army kept
When
this discouraging situation
the vulnerable outposts they nicknamed Vietcong
PXs, and take the war to the enemy. They devised tacrefinements such as the tlare-and-strike technique
tical
to permit night operatitms
gle Flights,
and the highly
cong
units trying to escape.
equipment
successful Ea-
which helicopters loaded with
in
tor their units
ARVN
down on
They helped
get
Viet-
needed
and applied innovative ap-
proaches to counterguerrilla warfare.
Month
month American men and machines
by
changed the
face of
war
in the delta.
Caught
off guard,
the Vietcong suffered one stunning defeat after another.
As
the government extended
Communist
areas,
its
control into insurgent
defections grew while the rate of
recruitment dropped sharply. So grave were the
new new
problems facing their armed forces that the National Front
Liberation
even considered abandoning delta
Diem made
a considerable
By the end
ot the year
out of the delta entirely. initiative there ful
were
and population.
in
1962."
many Americans were enthu-
about the prospects
siastic
comeback
for driving the
Communists
With American hardware and
possibilities for "all sorts of delight-
operations," chortled Lieutenant Colonel Frank B.
all
at 7th Division headquarters.
It
Vietnamese needed was
a
the
seemed little
one
operations were
win
a
adviser, "but they're
war
if
though
leadership.
"These people may not be the world's greatest said
as
fighters,"
good people, and they can
someone shows them how."
to take place in areas ot little
activity or were so large
and noisy that the guer-
had ample opportunity
An Americnn
adviser
tlies
Farmgate mission
There
could
fly
interest in patrols
along
in
to get out ot the way.
were no nighttime operations, scant
48
met
counterparts to abandon their fortress mentality, close
down
turn rillas
advisers
with determination and ingenuity. They urged their
towns
to the safety of district
security of the roads.
mounted, they tended
enemy
hot.
The U.S.
Clay
the delta was a pervasive lack ot aggressiveness. By
and
escape routes
left
should an engagement
to the Vietcong, "In terms of territory
the Vietcong.
in
flee
keep the
Wilfred Burchett, an Australian journalist sympathetic
wondered whether the Vietnamese
ARVN
than the enlisted
artillery to
colonel archly, "but
are too
burden had been placed on them to "get
along." Most ot
on
and regularly
the Vietcong to
become too
wanted American advice and complained that too
really
relied
strongholds they had held tor thirty years. Concluded
"They
they can learn."
The
commanders
at arm's length
tor
to pursue Viet-
did blunder into government forces. In-
new
partial validity.
game," observed one
at the
com-
they some-
times treated with an obsequious condescension
more
who
stead, local
received their appointment as the result of patronage.
The
units
troops circled battle areas, ready to swoop
ARVN ofticer corps differed in almost
every respect from the
cong
and pain without com-
never heard a tired one complain."
ARVN
"I
and no attempt whatever
or ambushes,
in
combat missions the back seat.
a twin-seated
1962.
T-28 during an Opera-
Under Farmgate, U.S.
as long as a
pilots
Vietnamese trainee rode
^4»
disembark from
South Vietnamese
soldiers
a helicopter in the
Mekong River
August 1962 looks on.
50
as
Delta in
an American crewman
i,
J
^%^-
i
•viir
>
.!?
Mm
.ly,
II,
,,
,
On
52
a mission in the delta,
ARVN soldiers
move
past a hut they set ahre after discovering Vietci.>ng propaganda inside
it.
An ARVN
solJicr uses torcetul
means while
questionini;
,i
V
/eacn^' suspecr .nrested in a Je/fj
\///;i^e in
early
1963.
53
With lying
iit
hast a dozen of their comrades
dead
tack, a
in the
wake of an
await interrogation. ers
ARVN
group of Vietcong prisoners
look on from the
Two American
at-
(left)
advis-
rear.
55
)
::*«flr
k.'
r#*>'^^ rv-'^?^';!"'^ '^-^L*-- ^v'r, ^>*r«
'^"S^-'^a''"
-
^
v-->^ :^-*>-'>t-
^
«r.
-»
AMERICA TAKES OVER
When
"we marched
into the rice paddies
tenant PhiUp Caputo
later wrote,
conviction that the Viet
"we
on
Cong would be
enemy from
the
field,
damp March
afternoon," Marine Lieu-
and
American
military
the implicit
rifles,
quickly beaten." Certain that
legitimate, confident that the application of
the
that
carried, along with our packs
goals were
its
power would
swiftly drive
the United States went to war in 1965 with an almost casual
assumption of victory.
So pervasive was
this
optimism that
to the realities oi the situation in
little
attempt was made to tailor American strategy
Vietnam. As a
The
uncertainties and questionable assumptions.
Communist onslaught and compel serious attempt to determine just
result,
negotiations, but
what
U.S. policy was
dispatch of troops was
level of force
no one
in
filled
meant
with
to halt the
Washington made any
would be necessary
accomplish
to
those ends. Meanwhile, the introduction of large numbers of American units pushed the
indigenous military into the background, steadily diminishing
ARVN's
shoulder
ability to
the burden of their nation's defense. Further confusing matters was Johnson's sensitivity to adverse public reaction. Fearful of domestic unrest,
he sought a quick end to the war.
Yet, equally concerned that an overly aggressive pursuit of victory wcuild
or the Soviet Union, he imposed limitations
on
his military
commanders
draw that
in
China
made
their
missions more difficult to achieve.
For
Nor
its
part, the military
did U.S.
commanders
victories were always
never
fully
accommodated
itself
to
Washington's
adjust their vision to a revolutionary struggle in
more important than
military triumphs. Instead,
MACV
regular forces in a conventional war of attrition against an unconventional
unfamiliar setting.
more men were
When
that strategy failed to produce adequate results,
political
employed
enemy
in
an
when more and
sent to hold the line, the early optimism of 1965 degenerated \nto a bitter
frustration that threatened to tear the nation apart.
First
restrictions.
which
Cavalry Division soldiers heaJ into the hush on
;i
pafro/ in
Nmemher l%5.
Exemplifying
The
paign against North Vietnam.
were designed to meet the
Vietnamese
initial
cam-
bombing
raids
need
political
negotiated settlement of the war.
was confident that U.S.
air
confusion was the
this strategic
The
for a quick,
administration
power would force the North
air
to cease their support of the southern in-
surgency and that this could be achieved without
American
nificant loss of failed to
cow Hanoi, however,
The
shifted.
lives.
When
sig-
the initial attacks
the goal of the air assault
primary task became a military one
—
to halt
the flow of reinforcements and supplies to the South
where U.S. ground troops were engaged
Communist
Whether
forces.
air
with
in battle
power was
suitable for
either task would remain a subject of debate long after
The tempo
of air raids over the North increased stead-
during the
ily
summer
sure from the military,
After the fruitless five-day bombing pause in mid-
May, Rolling Thunder resumed
in earnest, long-range
under continuing pres-
later,
Johnson enlarged the
even further to include key
target
on the
railroad yards
list
out-
of Hanoi. By the end of 1966 the United States
skirts
had flown more than 105,000
The 165,000
tons of
over the North.
sorties
bombs delivered by American war-
planes since the beginning of 1965 had destroyed nearly
350 fixed structures and thousands of railroad tor vehicles,
and water
craft.
and military damage done
$200
cars,
mo-
Estimates of the economic
to
North Vietnam exceeded
million.
Yet the
air attacks cost the
$1.5 billion and the
the war was over.
to a peak of 12,000 sorties in
Two months
September.
bombing appreciably
Much
loss
United States more than
Nor had
of 489 aircraft.
the
affected the course of the war.
that had been destroyed was replaced by increased
China and the Soviet Union. What could not
U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers striking inland targets
aid from
while carrier-based navy aircraft operated along the
be replaced was rebuilt by armies of civilian workers. In
coast.
By September, American warplanes were
almost 4,000 sorties a ply depots,
and
month
infiltration routes in the
of North Vietnam.
At Johnson's
southern half
insistence major targets
within the Hanoi-Haiphong restricted zone
caped the
As
aerial onslaught.
demilitarized
zone
(DMZ)
flying
against military bases, sup-
initially es-
the ground war below the
intensified,
however,
the
Joint Chiefs argued that air power could not prevent the
flow of
men and
materiel south as long as these areas
remained
off-limits. In
approved
a full-scale assault against the
petroleum,
oil,
June 1966, the president
finally
North's vital
and lubricants (POL) storage
facilities
and transportation network.
While American
aircraft blasted
tank farms and
rail-
American
Hound,
pilots flew interdiction strikes along the
Trail in southern Laos.
connaissance
War
II,
and
leftover attack aircraft from
re-
World
propeller-driven observation airplanes and high-
flying B-52s.
Hound
jets
modem
During the
first five
months of 1966, Tiger
attacks destroyed thousands of structures and
trucks, dozens of bridges,
and hundreds of
analysis concluded that Rolling to cripple the
namese economy, weaken the North's
North Viet-
military estab-
lishment, or significantly impede the flow of supplies to the South.
The U.S. command
argued that the disap-
pointing figures were the direct result of Washington's
graduated
and
limited
power. Others,
like Secretary of
Namara, had begun ing
to believe that
would break the
Whatever the meant
causes,
will
of the
in
American
American
of
air
Defense Robert Mc-
no amount of bombNorth Vietnamese.
the failure of the air campaign
that U.S. troops would play far
role.
ground
application
more than
a stop-
By the beginning of 1967 the war on the
South Vietnam had long since become an fight.
Ho
Code named Tiger
this multiservice operation utilized
CIA
Thunder had been unable
gap
road yards on the northern outskirts of Hanoi, other
Chi Minh
January 1967, a
antiaircraft
When
the Marines landed at
there were slightly
Da Nang
in
more than 29,000 U.S.
March 1965, military per-
sonnel in Vietnam. During the next twenty-one months
U.S.
soldiers, sailors, air
crewmen, and Marines poured
into the country in ever increasing numbers.
Most came
courtesy of the Selective Service, which by the end of
1965 was processing up to ^0,000
men
a
month.
Pri-
positions along the major enemy infiltration route into
marily the sons of lower-middle-class or working-class
South Vietnam.
families unable to get the still-liberal college deferments.
58
show
Streaks of light
the path of a navy Skyraider that
night mission over North Vietnam in
men
these all
summer
moments
were funneled into expanded training bases
launched
air attacks
on the North from Yankee
Station,
100 miles off the coast of South Vietnam, southeast of
Cam Ranh
the heels of the 3d Marine Division, which set at
Da Nang
May
in
1st
Cam Ranh
arrival at
Bien
Bay on July
Hoa
of the 2d Battalion of the 1st Infan-
Within
try Division.
29. July also witnessed the
a
month advance elements
of the
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were building their
camp
at
An
1st Infantry
grow
soldiers
and Marines comprising twenty-two army and
thirteen Marine infantry and tank battalions. But the
pace of deployment scarcely slackened Division went to Division to
Chu
Cu Chi
Division deployed to
Phuoc Vinh and Ben
Ninh
more than 500
aircraft
air bases in
more men and machines
in
also
saw the
and 21,000
air
per-
South Vietnam, plus
Thailand. Offshore, the Sev-
Fleet's Cruiser-Destroyer
Group
patrolled the coast
gunfire support duty, while the navy's
Task Force 77
to
in
Marine
196th Infantry Brigade to Tay
in August; the 11th
Long Binh
1st
March; the 4th Infantry Division
in
to Pleiku in July; the
to
—the
Lai in January; the 25th Infantry
the remainder of the
sonnel at eight major
enth
nam
in Viet-
had grown to 250,000, including nearly 160,000
fall
Khe. During the
Cat northwest of Saigon. These months force
Bay.
By the beginning of 1966 U.S. troop strength
1965, came the army's 173d
Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, which landed
on
route to a
over the country, then rapidly shipped to Vietnam.
Airborne Brigade, assigned to Bien Hoa, and the
1st
Midway en
On
up shop
at
before took off from the deck of the U.S.S.
1965.
Armored Cavalry Regiment
September; the 9th Infantry Division,
slated for duty in the
Mekong
Delta, in December; the
199th Infantry Brigade to Long Binh, also in December.
At
year's
end U.S. ground combat strength had grown
to fifty-nine
army and twenty-four Marine infantry and
tank battalions.
59
i>
So rapid was the buildup
American troops
oi
MACV's
almost immediately outstripped
modern
their logistical needs. This huge,
that they
ability to
meet
military force
heat, a
ports, terminals, warehouses, or
Nor was
load.
highways to handle the
the army prepared to field combat support
units without the activation of the National
Army out.
Guard and
Reserve, something President Johnson had ruled
The
was temporary chaos marked by ammu-
result
nition shortages and delayed unit deployments.
To remedy
that took a man's breath
Almost
as
impenetrable as the heat was the peasant
population of the Vietnamese countryside.
Vietnam," recalled one infantryman, ignorance.
I
know
didn't
the language.
about the village community. aims of the people
—whether they were
difference
enemy, no way of
transport facilities. Meanwhile, the 1st Logistical
air
Com-
headquartered in Saigon became one of the largest in the world.
But there was more to
they wore until
surpluses.
Vietnam than
it
who was
was too
pected.
by
telling
for the
the
war or
in-
a farmer
friend
how
and who was
they acted or what
and who was a
guerrilla
late.
The people were
By the end of 1966
had turned shortages into
their joint efforts
knew nothing
and suspicion. Even worse, there was often
no way of distinguishing who was
expanded that nation's
of
against the war." Instead of grateful "natives" eager to
highway system, and
army organizations
I
time in
memory
knew nothing about
I
four major deep-water ports, rebuilt South Vietnam's
mand
"My
the
"is
be "liberated," U.S. troops frequently encountered
the situation army engineers constructed
greatly
into clouds of gritty
red dust.
required a continuous flow of supplies, equipment, and
manpower. But South Vietnam did not have enough
mind-numbing furnace
away and turned the winter mud
what the GIs ex-
different from
So was the war
itself.
Large units were broken
military
up and scattered across the country, major engagements
that the maintenance of morale was
with the enemy were rare and, when they did occur,
of prime importance, Westmoreland not only limited
usually lasted only a short time. For most "grunts," as
supplies.
each
Convinced
soldier's tour of
men
to provide his
Even the troops meals with For
all
ice
logistics in
duty to 365 days, he also attempted
with
"all
in
hot
by helicopter for dessert.
Vietnam remained an
alien place for
most of the young Americans who served there, tiful
home."
in the field could expect regular
cream flown
that,
the comforts of
a beau-
but strange land of shifting topography, climatic
extremes, and enigmatic people. In the south was the delta,
a watery world of
mangrove swamps, and
flat
rice fields,
isolated forests.
impenetrable
North of Saigon
the emerald green fields dwindled to a narrow strip along
the infantrymen called themselves, the war became an
to exploit specific intelligence of
mountain
forests of the central high-
lands. Still farther north the high plateau gave
way
to
designed
enemy concentrations,
but most had no specific goal. Contact was sporadic, often limited to sniper brief,
savage
and booby
In
many
enemy
the
traps
but occasionally erupting into
fire
firefights.
came not from
he
areas the gravest threat
himself, but from the mines
behind. Sweltering under sev-
left
enty pounds of equipment and ammunition, soldiers
"humped"
across
the
enduring days
countryside
boredom punctuated by
split
seconds of sheer
terror.
had
in
raw firepower, the Vietcong and North Vietna-
mese Army (NVA) proved
elusive
and deadly adversar-
the rugged peaks and plunging waterfalls of the Truong
ies.
Son Mountains,
a steep wilderness of dense rain forests
solidate only for carefully planned attacks, the
rising as high as
8,000
feet
above sea
Less varied than the land, the weather of
Dispersed into platoon-size units that would con-
avoided contact except
level.
Vietnam
was dominated by the annual cycle of monsoons. During
of
Despite the overwhelming advantage the Americans
the rocky coast, the area of cultivation limited by the sparsely populated
Some were
endless round of small-unit patrols.
elaborate preparations
at
their
own
made by U.S.
enemy
initiative.
The
units prior to an
operation and the effectiveness of the
Communist
in-
the summer, drenching torrents of rain created a perpetual humidity that rotted clothing, mired everything
on the ground the winter
62
in
mud, and made
months the
rain
flying treacherous. In
was replaced by scorching
The Seventh the
first
Fleet's
U.S.S.
time since World
dump hidden
Oklahoma City unleashes
War
II
on
a
its
guns for
Vietcong ammunition
along the South China Sea coast
in late 1965.
iH^^lk. I
B
made
telligence network
When enemy
troops were
cornered, they fought stubbornly, standing their ground
even under the most punishing Vietcong
hi populated areas
turn
fire
that rarely found
and
and
artillery
air strikes,
guerrillas frequently fired
on American troops from within
civilian property
prompting
villages,
re-
target but often destroyed
its
wounded innocent
killed or
vil-
In the uninhabited border regions well-trained,
lagers.
Westmoreland's willingness
surprise almost impossible for
the Americans to achieve.
send his green troops
to
against the Vietcong was also a reflection of the deteriorating position of the
summer
early
ARVN
South Vietnamese army
in the
o{ 1965. Anxious to strike back before
collapsed
MACV
the
entirely,
commander
urged Washington to abandon the defensive enclaves to
which U.S.
forces
On June
had been deployed.
moreland was given permission
to
26 West-
commit U.S. combat
trcwps at his discretion. Within twenty-four hours the
heavily armed regular troops of the North Vietnamese
173d Airborne Brigade began a search-and-destroy op-
Army
eration into
challenged the Americans in an escalating series
The
of ferocious encounters that by the end of 1965 were already claiming heavy casualties
on both
first
War Zone D
northeast of Saigon.
major American ground combat action of
the war proved anticlimactic, the paratroopers encoun-
sides.
tering only scattered resistance during their four days in
While the White House maintained
tight control over
the
But the die had been
field.
cast.
Eight weeks later,
Westmoreland was
when elements
of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions cor-
given considerable freedom to develop and execute the
nered an entire
VC
the bombing of North Vietnam,
ground war
in
South Vietnam. The
strategy he formu-
U.S. combat
lated
was divided into three
units
would search out and destroy enemy Main-Force
units
and base
areas.
Next,
parts.
First,
ARVN
the area of Vietcong guerrillas
troops would clear
the large-scale
left after
search-and-destroy operations had ended. Finally, local
South Vietnamese units ular Forces (PFs)
—
— the Regitmal (RFs) and Pop-
would secure the area by providing a
permanent defense against
Although
his plan
Lai,
the Americans dealt the
enemy
a stunning
blow.
A
multipronged land, caught the
Starlite,
air,
VC
and sea
their entrenched positions the furiously but could not
assault.
Operation
completely by surprise. From
Communists fought back
contend with the Americans'
mobility and firepower. Using helicopter-borne troops to block avenues of escape,
Marme
infantrymen sup-
ported by tanks and amphibious tractors trapped the
future attacks.
was designed
Chu
regiment fifteen kilometers south of
in part to protect the
enemy regiment
against the sea, where
it
was torn to
population of the countryside, Westmoreland's primary
pieces by Marine air and naval gunfire. In less than a
goal was the attrition of the enemy's Main-Force units.
week of
Once
that
was achieved, reasoned the general, the
Communists would have no choice but
to sue for peace.
have bled
their country to the point
Westmoreland's strategy of
attrition relied
increasing pool of U.S. manpower,
tit)n of
American technology
enemy, and on the ready
power
to destroy
ter gunships,
him
—
on
on the
As
availability oi
air bases in
rillas in
fire-
awesome
and Thailand. So
confident was he in the impact of such weapons that
even before he had at
64
significant
years,
were destroyed.
numbers of combat troops
hand the American commander took the
highlands around Kontum, and grappled with guer-
tral
naval gunfire, helicop-
Guam
many
the intensity of combat increased. American units pene-
a stead-
American
fixed-wing attack aircraft, and
B-52 bombers from
700 men. Their
the year wore on and U.S. troop strength grew,
applica-
to the task of locating the
artillery,
lost nearly
trated Vietcong base areas near Saigon, swept the cen-
of national disaster for generations."
ily
VC
extensive tunnel and cave complexes, laboriously carved
out over
"We'll just go on bleeding them until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that they
fighting the
offensive.
as
the villages along the central coast. But even
U.S. soldiers and Marines poured into South Viet-
nam, the Communists more than matched the American buildup. By November,
total
VC/NVA strength was
estimated at 140,000 men. Early that
month
troops of
1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) met North Viet-
namese
regulars in a bloody battle that demonstrated
the
both the advantages and limitations of the American
way
of
war
in
Vietnam.
A M:mnc
medic amies
during [he (opening
;j
>r,(t,'c'>
5()i(f/i
Vietn,iinc:^c int.inr rn s.iferv-
of Openirion Pir.inh.i
en Oipe
The chiU
ir.i.s
woundeJ hy U.S.
jets in
September 1965
/iirany.in.
65
The
Cavalry Division (Airmohile), or
1st
warfare: airmohility.
on
sistence
Air its
in
Cav had
new
in
new
Team"
"First
Within
few minutes
a
wildly into their icans
NVA
some of the
panies,
fell
own
back into
fire
had decimated two com-
terrorized green
a
coherent perimeter. Helicopter
gunships raked the enemy positions, followed by
machine. The
1st
force fighter-bombers discharging loads of
flexible military
helicopters before
it
became the
division
first lull
When Communist troops attacked the Forces camp at Plei Me on October 19, elements
with the aerial support, enemy
fire
Special
morning the
1st
Brigade helped
process they discovered that two
were roaming the frontier
W. O.
UH-1
1st
full
after the
NVA
Kinnard declared that the 2d Battalion had "won the
Air Cav's commander.
Kinnard. Eager to
out his
try
Kinnard the order
enemy
Me
Plei
and destroy" every
fix,
and the Cambodian
aerial
Drang Valley. After
la
during the
reconnais-
Kinnard's helicopter pilots began sighting
fire,
an increasing number of North Vietnamese
weeks
first
G. Moore's
1st
several small
of the operation.
engagements
Colonel Harry
7th Cavalry,
Battalion,
soldiers in
set
down
at
Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray on the morning of November 14, virtually
on top
of
two
NVA
full
by rocket and grenade
sides by
By
enemy
regiments. Pinned
attacked on several
fire,
Moore
infantry,
called in air
and
artillery
within 150 meters of the battalion's perimeter.
nightfall reinforcements from the 2d Battalion
had
but the morning of the fifteenth
arrived at the LZ,
brought renewed assaults that were only beaten off fierce
hand-to-hand
finally retreated the
fighting.
When
next day, they
the
left
NVA
artillery
and
air strikes,
Stratofortresses, the ers
were used
The 2d heading
for
first
behind 834 con-
KIA
including several by B-52
time in the war the giant bomb-
had been
killed
set
out from
the
LZ X-Ray, 150
and another 250 wounded.
After the battles at LZs X-Ray and Albany, the
month-long campaign the entire battalions by
air,
1st
NVA
Air Cavalry had moved
dropped
artillery batteries into
Battalion
moved out on
LZ Albany
7,500 tons of supplies to the
more important,
the
in
field.
foot
November
17
ten kilometers away. Discovered straight into
an ambush.
Even
some 50,000 individual
during the operation, only fifty-nine helicopters
flights
were
men
in the course of
by enemy
hit
aircraft lost.
fire,
tour shot
The concept
down, and but
of airmohility
a single
had been
fully
vindicated. It
was
a sobering defeat tor the
Communists, who
1,500 dead scattered on the battlefield and lost as
the
many
as
2,000 more to
Communists had
air
and
left
may have But
artillery fire.
also gained important information
from the battle of thela Drang Valley. They discovered that they could neutralize the worst ot
American
fire-
by fighting at close range, and they learned not
p(.)wer
to reveal their positions by firing at low-flying recon-
naissance helicopters. losses
Moreover, the extent
their
ot
convinced the North Vietnamese to adopt
a
more
cautious approach that kept the initiative in their hands
and made U.S.
casualties their primary objective.
the end of 1965 Hanoi had adopted
its
own
By
strategy of
attrition, confident that eventually the bill ot
for tactical support.
en route, the troopers marched
66
in
soldiers
firmed dead plus an estimated several hundred more
from
500 men who had
the middle of the jungle sixty-seven times, and ferried
sance by
strikes
original
withdrew across the border into Cambodia. During the
"find,
to
Employing the new technique of
down
Of
day." But the price of victory had been steep.
staged one more attack against an artillery firebase, then
to
border.
the
General
go
between
soldier
littering the battleground.
October 27 Westmoreland gave
Kinnard sought permission
On
enemy.
wounded. By next
Counting the more than
400 enemy bodies
regiments
Hueys over the trackless mountain jungle of the
western highlands,
fled.
the siege. In the
That knowledge only
area.
whetted the appetite of the
lift
had
Even
fire.
remained too intense
to land reinforcements or evacuate
NVA
air
napalm that
seared the jungle in orange sheets of jellied
sent to Vietnam.
General Harry
Amer-
in-
staged only two full-scale maneuvers with
of the division's
troops shooting
ranks. Slowly the surviving
1963 as part of President Kennedy's
more
a
Cav
roots stretching hack to the old
Its
horse cavalry o( the Civil War, the
was initiated
Air
1st
new concept
as the troopers preferred, represented a
war would
be greater than the Americans were willing to pay.
The
idea
that
the
Communists could
outlast
the
United States was one General Westmoreland was de-
termined to
resist.
Yet as the new year he^an
commander had
ican
some
faced
serious
rlie
Amer-
prohlems.
Despite the rapid deployment of U.S. troops, the pres-
up the Reserves created
ident's decision not to call
manpower needed field
crisis
a
that delayed the dispatch of critically
logistical units, sent infantry platoons into the
with as few as half their authorized complement of
men, and threatened
to neutralize the promise of air-
mohility because of an acute shortage of helicopter pilots.
Westmoreland
also
had to contend with the
experience of his young soldiers, to
maneuver
safely, react to
the firepower at their
The most
difficult
who had
to learn
in-
how
ambush, and make use of
command.
prt^blem for
MACV,
however, was
security for the nation's 12,000 hamlets.
The poncho-covered bodies of
1st
Although West-
Cavalry Division soldiers killed
tor
American troops
most of
sparsely inhabited border regions,
during the
first
against the
and
to seek
The
his attention
half of the year was devoted to operations
VC/NVA
in the
populated coastal lowlands
in the strategically vital region
surrounding Saigon.
task of guarding the capital
fell
in part to the
173d Airborne Brigade and the 25th Infantry Division. During the
first
three
months of the
ments repeatedly penetrated
VC
year, airborne ele-
strongholds north and
west of Saigon in operations such as Marauder, Crimp,
and Mallet, provoking sharp contact.
the inability of the South Vietnamese army to provide
gathered
moreland's strategy called
out and destroy the enemy's Main-Force units in the
tioned at
For the
men
firelights
but no sustained
now
sta-
they threatened a prime
VC
of the 25th Division,
Cu Chi where
supply route to Cambodia, simply clearing the area im-
mediately around their base
in the bitter battle
of the
la
camp proved an arduous
Drang Valley
in
November 1965
are
in a clearing for evacuation.
67
M.innc medial
Lorf\sm:in Josi.ih Liicicr
;s
ocurrc'J h\ rhrcc Vietnamese children, inehiJini: one h.hlly hunieJ
by napalm, as he conduces his rounds south of
68
Da Nang.
Withsrandinj^
priKcss.
Vietcong
stubborn
amounts their
defenders,
against
captured
they
large
working
of materiel hut only after deliberately
way through enemy bunker and tunnel complexes.
The American the
engagements
intense
unit most active in
half of the year
first
Ranging north,
was the
and west
east,
That month the
other
men
of the "Big
deep
mud
in
the region
then worked their way
Special
sweep
Red One"
Zone southeast
in
E.
struggled through hip-
division
DePuy pushed
II.
commander
men
enemy
Vietnam, the
1st
tactics out of the
lands of Binh
from the
at
Dong Ha,
ward
Cam
the Marines attacked north and west to-
Lo and "Helicopter Valley," where the 3d
human-
Battalion of the 4th Marines endured a massed
wave
assault by 1,000
NVA
Only
soldiers.
after
napalm
were the Marines
strikes within fifty feet of their position
For the next three weeks
more than 8,000 Marines and 3,000 South Vietnamese
After several sharp
soldiers fought a savage conventional battle against as
enemy
Cam-
into
South
political center of
Cavalry Division brought
airmobile
its
mountain jungles and onto the low-
Dinh Province 400 kilometers north. Be-
ginning with Operation Masher/White
Wing
January
in
and continuing through the remainder of the
year, the
Air Cav combed the Bong Son Plain and the moun-
1st
battal-
able to drive the attackers
Infantry Division struggled to keep the
at arm's length
ARVN
VC
his
bodia, forestalling a threatened offensive against Saigon. 1st
ernmost provinces. Six Marine and hve
into
encounters, the Americans drove the
While the
and headed toward Quang Tri City with the ap-
operation of the war to date. Establishing a forward base
during June, where they met the 9th
Division in Operation El Paso
Division crossed the
two battalions
of the capital. After a fruitless
Major General William
NVA
the 324B
ions struck back in Operation Hastings, the largest allied
swamps of the Rung Sat
May around Loc Ninh,
War Zone C
when
in
Operation Birmingham, while
the mangrove
Marines would
a lesson that the rest of the
learn in July
DMZ
division also sent
in
was
It
fight."
parent intention of annexing South Vietnam's north-
in February,
north to Tay Ninh
one survivor, "but they can
Ma-
supermen," observed
rines killed in actit)n. "They're not
Woods and
through the jungles of coastal Phuoc Tuy Province April.
strength
its
of Saigon, elements of
the division swept the Boi Loi
around Long Thanh
oi
lost a third
but inflicted more than 500 casualties, including 98
Corps during
III
Infantry Division.
1st
North Vietnamese regiment
many
off.
12,000 enemy troops.
as
By August
when
3,
Hastings came to an end, the North Vietnamese had
been sent reeling back across the
DMZ
with more than
800 dead.
When later,
the
NVA
resumed the attack several weeks
the Marines met
them again
employing helicopter
assaults,
gunfire, air support,
and tanks
saults against
enemy
in
massed
Operation
Prairie,
naval
artillery fire,
in a series of costly as-
strongpoints.
The
operation,
which
continued into January 1967, netted more than 1,000
Communist stronghold
since
own
heli-
air
force
arms, the fighting since July had claimed 365 Marine
fighter-bombers, and the guns of the Seventh Fleet, the
dead with another 1,662 wounded. Forced to counter
tain valleys to the west, a
World War
II.
Making
effective use of their
copters and the added firepower of B-52s,
Cav decimated merous
VC
three
1st
regiments, capturing nu-
Quang Ngai
Province, the
Marine Division pushed out from
their
men
Chu
o{
Lai
enclave into the Vietcong-dominated villages that sur-
rounded them. Between February and early April they battled the
enemy and
the
rate excursions into the
monsoon
An Hoa
tion Utah, a joint ciiort with South
the Marines encountered
NVA
rains in four sepa-
basin.
the defense of the northern border cost
the Marines as well. Despite lavish use of supporting
this
new
threat, the
Marine command
shifted 3d Divi-
sion headquarters plus two regiments and most of a
suspects and tons of war materiel.
Farther north, in the
enemy
enemy KIA. But
During Opera-
Vietnamese
forces,
regulars for the
time. In three days of fierce battle the heavily
first
armed
Ma-
rine helicopter group to
Quang
a severely stretched 1st
Marine Division with responsi-
bility for the three
The C(,)me.
Tri in October, leaving
southern provinces of
I
Corps.
fighting in the north was a sign of things to
So was Operation Attleboro,
a massive search-
and-destroy sweep through the heart of the enemy's
Zone C. The
initial
penetration was
made
in
War
September
by the newly arrived 196th Light Infantry Brigade. For several
weeks contact with the enemy was sporadic, but
69
by mid-October the 196th was beginning to uncover
When
considerable quantities of rice and documents. the brigade ing the
9th
VC
moved
first
closer to the
Cambodian border
days of November,
it
ran
severely shaken by their rough initiation to combat. But
June battles
its
MACV
of the 196th, plus re-
hurled the
1st
173d Airborne Battalion, and
the Michelin
troops,
backed by B-52
rounds of diers
force of
artillery,
and more than 10,000
drove the twice-beaten enemy
back into Cambodia. They
and tons of
left
ations against
in
Communist
would bring the enemy
base areas and supply routes
to battle
and destroy him.
Much
of 1967 would be spent testing that belief.
By the time Operation Attleboro came
February l%6.
(left)
to
an end the
military dimension of the Vietnamese conflict overshad-
owed
all
other aspects of U.S. involvement in that trou-
bled country. But alongside the cries of battle were the voices of other Americans
— men and women,
and
official,
civilian,
Vietnam
supplies.
turned) at the Honohiiu summit
sol-
behind 1,100 dead
Souch Vietnamese prime minister Nf^uyen Cao Ky
70
each
battle.
more than 22,000 American
strikes
American
that multidivisional search-and-destroy oper-
Infantry Di-
a brigade
from the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions into the
The concentrated
Attleboro's resounding success convinced the
command
their survival in the tangled jungle west of
vision, the
Amer-
disablement of the 196th, whose novice troops had been
inforcements from the 25th Infantry Division, fought for
rubber plantation,
1,000
KIA, and the temporary
dur-
1st Infantry Division.
While the outnumbered men
MACV were the nearly
smack into the
Division, returning to the site of
with the
Less pleasing to
ican casualties, including 155
private
and
—who attempted
and president Nguyen Van Thieu
(right)
in
military
Washington and
in the midst of
war to con-
meet with President Johnson (back
—
tinue the
nation-building that had hrst brought
jt)b of
the United States to Vietnam. view, the key to South
Vietnam's survival was the creation of
government
The
in Saigon.
and
a popular
first
requirement
of any South Vietnamese regime, however, was stability. In February
made eral
clear
months
Cao Ky
its
elite
after
to the former air force gen-
To South
women
this signal of
American
who
No
domination by the
sooner had the premier
re-
turned from Honolulu than the Buddhists took to the streets of
Hue
in a series of
anti-American demonstra-
tions that quickly escalated into
two months the
crisis
of negotiation
open
rebellion. After
and confrontation Ky ended
with a show of force that cowed the Buddhists
and gave South Vietnam
measure of
at last a
political
solidify Ky's position but also to
fight
crops,
of the
official
and Marines dug
soldiers
farms, distributed food cine,
and
trained
auspices of
own
MACV's U.S.
initiative,
wells, built bridges, stocked pig
and clothing, dispensed medi-
local
volunteers
rudimentary
in
health-care techniques.
sweating over their civic action projects were
part of a long-standing U.S. effort to plant "rice roots
win
democracy"
what Johnson
his support for a in
called "the other
social services
who
villages to build popular support
government. Unfortunately, Saigon's
interest in
the program turned out to be largely rhetorical. Poorly
RD
cadres accomplished
The fundamental problem, however, was
the lack
in a
country that had only the mt)st limited
experience with democratic government. But democracy
meant more than
military
propaganda and
trained and ill-supported, the
new
Some
clinics.
Civic Action Program and on their
velopment (RD) Program featuring teams of young Viet-
would go out into the
young men and
to the
most meaningful work was undertaken by American servicemen. Both under the
lages.
in
peasants,
operated schools, experimented with
war," the two nations devised an ambitious Rural De-
namese trained
rural
designed not only to
sweeping agenda of social and economic reforms
little.
to
The GIs
The Honolulu conference was
South Vietnam. To
la-
of the private International Voluntary Service,
and conducted family-planning
stability.
for the
comfort to the war-torn villages where they
democracy
Honolulu.
in
their continued
Catholic minority.
wht) provided food, clothing, and medicine as well as spiritual
bored; from agents with the United States Information
commitment
Ky meant
land reform, local government, and public health, to
workers with the Christian and Missionary Alliance,
Service (USIS), wht) showed films on sanitation and
Vietnamese Buddhists, however, support for
in
the coup that
summit conference
at a
for International
to power, the administration
1966, eight
brought Nguyen
United States Agency
of the
Development (USAID), who sponsored programs
From Washington's point of
effective
employees
tions.
also
It
self-sufficient, self-governing local vil-
meant the replacement of authoritarian
government with democratic
At
political institu-
the Honolulu conference the United States
and South Vietnam pledged themselves
Seven months
later,
to
both
goals.
amid threats of Vietcong violence,
81 percent of the nation's registered voters turned out to select draft a
members
new
of a constituent assembly that
would
constitution and formulate procedures for a
some observ-
of security in the villages. Preoccupied with defeating
presidential election the following year.
the enemy's Main-Force units and hampered by limited
ers
manpower
gested that democracy would hardly solve South Viet-
resources,
Westmoreland
left
pacification
the job of destroying Vietcong political and military organizations at the
ARVN,
local
which had even
level
—
in
the hands of the
If
questioned the sincerity of the government or sug-
nam's problems, country
still
very
it
was nonetheless a notable step
much
in a
at war.
less interest in rural security
than the Americans. Thus, even by the suspect methods
Unfortunately, by the end of 1966 the constantly grow-
used to measure progress, the number of "pacified"
ing
vil-
lages increased only 5 percent during the hrst year of
the
new program.
Far
more
conflict threatened to
overwhelm everything
the United States was trying to achieve for South Viet-
nam: deim)cracy, development, independence. At the
successful were the thousands of individual
Americans working
armed
in the
Vietnamese countryside: from
same time the war rained down destruction on North Vietnam, eroded the
prestige
of the
United States
71
around the world, and jeopardized Johnson's Great SoYet neither side was ready
ciety.
own
for
its
perspectives with which they viewed the events of the
previous eighteen months.
Hanoi's
terms.
North Vietnam, which refused til
peace except on
the
bombing stopped,
remove
its
to negotiate at
insisted that the
all
un-
United States
troops from South Vietnam, withdraw sup-
port from the existing Saigon regime, recognize the tional Liberation Front
(NLF)
Na-
as a legitimate partner in
a coalition government, and accept the eventual unifi-
cation of North and South as mandated by the
Geneva
agreements. But the Johnson administration would not stop the
bombing
until
Hanoi ceased
its
support of the
southern insurgency, and the U.S. refused to accept any
South Vietnamese government
in
which the Vietcong
played a role, implicitly denying the possibility oi uni-
to
crush
the
ARVN
had
thwarted and U.S. troop strength in Vietnam 385,000.
taled
ft)rces to
The
tt)
their
take the«~offensive in 1966 and
superior
Communist
a year of
now
mobility
make the
base areas.
and firepower,
troops had yet to suffer a significant defeat.
than
been to-
buildup had enabled American
serious forays into major
first
Thanks
American
With more
combat experience behind them, with
base areas and lines of communication secured, with logistical
problems well on the way
to resolution,
and
with most of the restrictions on the bombing campaign lifted,
both Washington and
MACV
looked forward to
1967 with confidence. Yet Washington's swift victory had been denied, and
fication.
The
attempt
failure of a late-1965
"peace offensive" that sent
the gains
made had not come
cheaply. During the year
U.S. representatives to foreign capitals around the world
U.S. forces had suffered more than 35,000
casualties,
with offers to negotiate had hardened Johnson's attitude
including 5,008 dead. By December, U.S.
KIA were
toward the North Vietnamese. But mounting interna-
averaging nearly 500 a month. At the same time, the
tional
criticism persuaded
and domestic
another
effort.
In
November 1966
him
make
to
the administration
reluctantly accepted a ten-point peace plan put forward
by the Polish the
new
diplomat Januscz Lewandowski. As
part of
code named Marigold, Washington
initiative,
offered to halt the air strikes over
return for Hanoi's promise that
within a reasonable time.
it
Once
North Vietnam
would stop
ratio of idly,
1965.
infiltration
enemy
to
American
infiltration
of time, place, type,
and duration."
ditional 45,000
men, Westmoreland was even now de-
veloping requests for a force level of 542,000 troops.
was rapidly becoming apparent the war had just begun.
And
tion persisted because
it
before the
Warsaw
5.
Then, three days
meeting, U.S. warplanes struck
rail-
road yards within eight kilometers of the center of Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese immediately broke
Staff,
Although the president had already approved an ad-
through the Poles and an opening round of scheduled in Warsaw for December
was dropping rap-
Moreover, reported the Joint Chiefs of
peace talks could begin. Contact was made with Hanoi talks actually
losses
was up 250 percent over
"three-fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice
in
the infiltration ceased,
VC/NVA
while
if
at the
the Johnson administra-
believed the United States
would win, the North Vietnamese believed they could not
end
It
of 1966 that
persisted because they
lose.
off the
contact and Marigold was aborted.
Whether Johnson his critics
deliberately scuttled the talks, as
have charged, or simply
fell
victim to poor
coordination within the government, as the administration claimed,
made
little
difference. Neither
Washing-
ton nor Hanoi was ready to concede defeat or compro-
mise
on the
central
political future of
issue
that
divided
South Vietnam. The
them
— the
futility of
the
Marigold initiative simply underscored the enormous "ulf that lav
72
between the two countries and the
different
A
niJiu operator from the 1st Cavalry Division watches for any-
suspicious moven-ient near a burning Vietnamese farmhouse in
Binh Dinh Province
m
1965.
'/ --C :^
T.t
I
"fc^-
^^
NVA
Regiment. Together they comprised the 3d
Focus: Masher/White Wing
known
vision, also
Sao Vang, or Yellow
as the
Di-
Star,
Division.
Kinnard divided the
target area into four sectors, then
devised a plan of attack that
made
Amer-
the most of the
ican advantages ih^firepower and mobility. Operating
out of Bong Son, a small airstrip and Special Forces
camp, the Air Cav would mount "hammer-and-anvil" operations troopers flushed the
would he supported by
When
Major General Harry W.O. Kinnard brought
1st Cavalry Division (Airnn)hile) to
An Khe
ber 1965, his mission was clear: to stop the
driving to the coast and cutting South
Within weeks
in
his
enemy from
Vietnam
in two.
men
of their arrival in-country Kinnard's
rose to that challenge in a series of violent battles along
the of
Cambodian
The bloody
border.
November 1965 blunted
the
la
Drang campaign
Communist
offensive in
the central highlands and validated the concept of
air-
mobility in land warfare. Heartened by the division's
Kinnard immediately shifted
success,
his attention to
another Communist stronghold, the northeastern corner of Binh
and
Designated by the Saigon
a "national priority area," the region
ARVN
Division,
was
which had more
could handle trying to keep Highway
1
dominated by the Communists
open and for
more
Geneva accords
artillery
commander Colonel Harold G.
Brigade
3d
Moore, a tough, hard-driving
officer
who had
"Hal" recently
received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions
during the
Drang campaign.
la
first
days ot the operation were bedeviled by bad
But when fighting resumed
renew family
ties,
and re-create the forces.
18th and 22d
to
in 1960,
carrying
forty-two cavalrymen crashed into a fog-shrouded tain killing everyone
launched days
its initial
rain
later,
and
When
on board.
assault into the
and low
Bong Son
Plain three
ceilings restricted helicopter
virtually
eliminated
These problems had
little effect
flights
moun-
the 3d Brigade
tactical
on the
support.
air
Battalion,
1st
resistance. For the
2d Battalion, however, D-day almost turned into aster
North Vietnam.
many
returned to
re-establish a political organization,
infrastructure necessary to sustain regu-
By 1966 these forces consisted of the
NVA
toward
With the
signing
Regiments plus the 2d Vietcong
and
aviation units. Directing the 5,700-man task force was
the province had
45,000 Vietminh
in 1954, nearly
Dinh "regrouped"
cadres from Binh
74
War
center of insurgent resistance.
and aug-
and 2d Battalions, 12th Cavalry, the
which encountered only mild enemy
During the French Indochina
armed
1st
Squadron, 9th Cavalry, plus assorted
1st
1st
now
2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, the brigade was
C-123
moun-
than two decades.
lar
Cav's 3d Brigade to
1st
forward staging areas on January 25, a
pacify villages
of the
general dubbed his conception Oper-
tree lines along the thickly populated coastal
protected by the 22d
a
to another.
spearhead the attack. Normally consisting of the
mented by the
artil-
helicopter
An Khe
government
been
and
moved forward by
weather and bad luck. Moving out from
t)f
tain valleys farther inland.
it
the ground
operations ranged from rice
area
plain to steep, bamboo-forested slopes and rugged
than
The men on
Masher and selected the
The
Dinh Province.
The intended fields
The American ation
friendly units
tactical air, gunships,
continuously
from one emplacement
Septem-
which some of the
enemy toward other
waiting in blocking positions.
lery batteries
a series of fast-moving in
when Company
C dropped right on
battalion at a village called
Enemy they
ever
fire
touched down,
Phung Du.
scattering
When
regroup,
NVA
cally cut
them down. Attempting
A
dis-
NVA
ripped through their helicopters before
across a kilometer of rice fields.
Company
top of an
the
the
machine guns and mortar to
come
Americans
men fire
tried to
methodi-
to the rescue,
ran into heavy resistance just south of the
only barely making
village,
it
into a nearby cemetery,
where the troopers found what shelter they could behind
mounds
waist-high
marked the grave
that
During
sites.
the results of a week's worth of fighting were
verses,
1
19
American
the afternoon helicopters repeatedly attempted to land
crash. U.S.
reinforcements but could not penetrate
of the
enemy
down, and cut
divided, pinneci
Under
the
intense
By the end of the day the 2d Battalion was
fire.
to
lift,
and
to consolidate their positions
A-1
allowing
berra bombers to
Skyraiders and
pummel enemy
B-57 Can-
positions with
napalm
and high explosives. In midmorning two companies 12th Cavalry, arrived on the
from the 2d Battalion,
Even
guidance to
move them
men and
concluded
11
supplies were
name
in the
— the addition of Colo-
2d Brigade, and a change
jr.'s,
from Masher to White
of the operation
Wing. The former
reflected the division's
for mt)re
own
his
Washington's desire to
reflected
latter
avoid overly aggressive connotations
in its
ongoing bat-
public opinion back home.
tle for
out of there." Moore provided
need
power before tackling the enemy on
The
had
got under way, however, there
been two notable developments
hitting
men. The biggest thing they needed was leadership and
I
nel William A. Lynch,
ground.
around and talked to the
Phase
as
By the time Phase
Old Man was not pleased," remembered Sergeant Major
"We moved
22d Regiment had been put out of action,
equipment, personnel, and prestige," said the
being readied for an immediate resumption of activity.
scene accompanied by a furious Colonel Moore. "The
Basil Plumley.
C-123
two battalions
division report, that "will be difficult to overcome."
oft.
tend their wounded. Shortly after daybreak the clouds
began
at a cost of
lives, including those killed in the
intelligence estimated that
NVA
a "loss of
the cover of darkness and a heavy rain, the
Americans managed
enemy dead
impressive: an estimated 1,358
Delayed
for
what turned out
to be three crucial days
both, ordering preparatory artillery strikes and tear-gas
by more bad weather, the assault into the rugged moun-
barrages, then directing an assault by the 2/12 against
tain valley
the
enemy
Once move
battalions were lifted
fortifications.
the village had been cleared. Masher began to
forward as planned. Over the next two days the
and 2/12 swept past Phung Du while the
2/7
ion
explored
the
intricate
1st Battal-
network of hamlets and
hedgerows farther north. The two groups acted giant vise, using their airmobility to trap
between them while constantly ies to
enemy
like a
units
shifting artillery batter-
maintain an umbrella of protection. The swiftly
moving
troopers provoked several sharp encounters
Tan Thanh, where entrenched
in
the 2/12 battled an
what Col. Moore
bunkers and spider holes," and 1/7 lost thirteen
men
in a contest fought at artillery
nor
air strikes
During the
first
North Vietnamese
killed
at
—
at
Luong Tho, where the
and thirty-three wounded
enemy
flights.
As
decreased, the cavalrymen re-
turned to their forward bases and the
Masher came
traps.
to a close.
first
phase oi Op-
Despite the early
re-
floor.
fierce resistance to their
Communist
pen-
base area, and U.S. troopers
But their tardy
had given the enemy time
arrival
to escape. After three days of fruitless searching, dis-
appointed division commanders closed out Phase
II
and
turned their attention to the southwest sector of the operational area.
The
third phase of
Masher/White Wing was directed
toward another mountain valley, called also
known
as the Eagle's
Claw because of
Kim Son its
shape. Reversing the tactics used in Phase
down on
American
four cavalry
did find an elaborate system of fortifications and booby
could be brought in for support.
weather that hampered U.S. reconnaissance
eration
etration of the
Moore put
units slipped through the
when
then swept down the mountain slopes to the valley
such close quarters that neither
few days of February the remaining
February 7
by helicopter onto high ground,
The Americans expected
enemy company
called "a rat's nest of
net and withdrew to the west, their escape aided by bad
contact with the
commenced on
the 3d Brigade and
its
but
distinctive II,
Colonel
supporting artillery
the bottom of the valley, then sent patrols into
subsidiary canyons to flush out the Vietcong. After sub-
duing a
VC
the valley pital, a
tant, in
company, the
floor.
The
2/7 Cavalry
began scouring
trotipers discovered a
Communist weapons
documents pinpointing
a
factory,
Vietcong hos-
and most impor-
VC Main-Force battalion
nearby Son Long Valley. Mtxirc immediately dispatched Captain Myron Di-
75
—
duryk's
Company
which
B,
just as quickly ran into
two
Mot. Diduryk hlasted the well-camouflaged defensive works with
his
own
Meanwhile, he prepared
raiders.
Kim
mortars, hattalion artillery from
Son, and cluster homhs delivered hy
classic infantry assault.
As soon
air force
A-1 Sky-
3d Platoon for a
his
as the last
homb had
fallen the GIs, bayonets fixed, leaped to their feet
raced forward screaming "like the sudden attack, terrified
murderous
crossfire
The
toon.
and
mad men." Unnerved
enemy
at
soldiers fled into a
from Diduryk's well-placed 2d Pla-
battle left fifty-seven
VC
and captured
Hon
entrenched enemy companies near the village of
dead and scores
wounded, including an enemy battalion commander.
thirty of the demoralized
March
The
6.
bility
and demonstrating anew the might
3d
through four Communist base
redoubt north of Saigon.
earned
rest,
1st
12th Cavalry
The ensuing and
B. Roberts's 1st
sent his 2d Brigade
—
against the
enemy
battle raged for four days.
air support,
labyrinth of their
Claw and
for a well-
and 2d Battalions, 5th Cavalry, and the 2d Bat-
talion,
lery
An Khe
Kinnard put Colonel Elvy
Brigade into the Eagle's the
to
VC
own. More
stronghold.
Backed by
artil-
the cavalrymen blasted through a
defenses killing 313 and losing 23 of
anyone had anticipated,
successful than
the two-week Phase
campaign claimed
III
in all
more
than 700 enemy KIA, plus a substantial quantity of
final
phase of Masher/White
foray into the
Son
Cay Giep Mountains
— began on
air force
March
1
Wing
—
a lightning
southeast of
in spectacular fashion.
bombers blasted holes
in the layered
CH-47 Chinook the
1
,
342 enemy
VC
"at least 50 percent better" than the 38-day in the la
Drang, claimed the
Cav had
1st
campaign
driven
of the enemy's nine battalions unfit for combat, and
The
VC
Vietnamese "from
domination."
violence the Americans visited upon the enemy,
however, also proved devastating to the people
Bong Son
district.
The
ing
lavish use of fire-
— more than 140,000 rounds the six-week operation— ravaged
power
who
of artillery alone dur-
the villages in
which the Communists entrenched themselves and drove more than 16,000 civilians from their homes.
Nor were
refugees the only problem.
Smashing the
enemy's military units was one thing, breaking up
Swarming down the thick for
18th
his
was quite another. Unless there was
political apparatus
continuity between the military and pacification efforts, unless the
the
Communist
villages
infrastructure
was rooted out o(
once the enemy's base areas had been
cleared, his military forces were sure to return. But the to carry
out the security and pacification programs necessary to take advantage of the 1st Cav's battlefield victories.
green can-
NVA
Com-
munist military forces from the coastal plain, rendered
a result,
cavalrymen braced themselves
heavy fighting with the 6th Battalion of the
sus-
judged the division's performance
Bong
helicopters to hack out land-
ing zones for the 2d Brigade.
jungle slopes
NVA
After
opy, engineer teams descended on rope ladders from
hovering
areas, killing
South Vietnamese authorities were not prepared
arms, ammunition, and materiel.
The
who
pects. Kinnard,
lived in the
Ordering the 3d Brigade back
American
capturing 633, and detaining 1,087
soldiers,
five
Communist
of
cavalrymen had slashed their way
the
Division,
freed 140,000
the "iron triangle" after the famous
operation had been an outstanding mil-
firepower. During 41 days of fighting against the
During interrogation he volunteered information that
named
troops.
proving again the effectiveness of airmo-
itary success,
revealed the location of a Vietcong regimental headquarters a few kilometers to the south in an area nick-
enemy
Masher/White Wing was formally closed down on
region
Wing,
enemy
less
than
soldiers
began
week
after the
a
prompting new
filtering
As
back into the
end of Masher/White
operations
with
names
like
Thayer and Irving and Crazy Horse and Davy Crockett. But the of the
results
war the
were always the same. Over the course
men
of the 1st Cavalry Division would
return to the area again and again as they struggled in
Regiment. For the second time during the operation,
vain to transfer control of Binh Dinh Province from the
however, the troopers discovered that the enemy they
Communists
expected to meet had gone. Fleeing south, the North
they would learn to their bitter dismay what American
Vietnamese collided with units of the vision.
76
The South Vietnamese
ARVN 22d DiNVA soldiers
killed fifty
to the
Saigon government. In the process
arms and ingenuity could accomplish
what they could not.
in
Vietnam, and
With intense enemy
tire
having stalled the American assault on Landing Zone
Masher/White Wing, Captain Joel Sugdinis (squatting
in
foreground) and his
Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, take shelter in a ditch and call in
4, an LZ used during the opening phase of Operation command group from Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th
artillery, late
January 1966.
77
I
.4,s
solJicrs of the
nlrv.
hxtk on.
napalm
o/i
,)
2d Bunnlion,
7th
Cav-
B-57 Canberra unloads
its
nearby North Vietnamese po-
sitions siirroundim: Landini;
Zone
4.
79
li
Under withering
tire
from North Viernnmese
near the landing zone, January 28.
80
units,
men
from the 2J fint.ihon. 7th C^nvulry. cnnvl torw.nd through
,i
flooded nee field
^•''^
Having reached che other
side at the held,
one
of the tntopers helps a
wounded
I.
soldier to higher grtnind.
81
"
f'
^^mr' ^^^
/
^^*^'€fo
Ss
/^i
M^^Bys-' -.
i.
•li
,-*^^
/ *»
fv
^PflB^'"
^ Caviilrymcn puss by the wreckage of an
army helicopter shot down by Vietcong ground fire as it attempted to resupply units fighting near
'ti^^m>s^
LZ
4 on January 28.
a
^ S()/t/;ers
84
at r/ie 1st Cavalry Division guard
VieKimg
soldiers aipnircd in the
first
two days of
battle,
January 28 and 29.
Despite his i)wn wounJy., I'nwne First Class
Thomas
Cole, a medic with the 1st Cavalry
Division, tends to Staff Sergeant Harrison Pell, another cavalryman injured at
LZ
4-
85
snipers,
Focus: Prairie
company
a
Vietnamese
of Marines was trapped by
North
dug into
a slope
soldiers concealed in caves
called Razorback Ridge.
two-day
The ambush
initiated a vicious
through the cave complex that killed 21
fight
Americans and up
to 170
NVA. The
repulse of a mul-
ticompany enemy attack against Marine
Cam
Lo
in the early
month
the bloody
morning hours of August 26 brought
Con Thien
was no longer enough
area of operations
region, but the 2/4 alone
to deal with the
decided to meet the
new
expanding num-
DMZ. The Marine
ber of Communist troops south of the
command
near
to a close.
At the beginning of September the shifted into the
artillery
threat with an
am-
phibious assault from the coast. Called Deck House IV,
During the
first
NVA
Di-
the maneuver was carried out by the
Quang
Tri
Marines, in
days of July 1966, the 324B
vision crossed the demiUtarized zone into
its
Battalion, 26th
1st
capacity as Seventh Fleet Special Land-
Province. Within three weeks 8,000 Marines drove the
ing Force. Initial sea
invaders back into North Vietnam after some of the
ber 15 met
toughest fighting of the war. Yet even then U.S. intel-
was heavily engaged. The Marines discovered that the
Hgence was reporting evidence of cursion.
To meet
this
launched Operation
tack was to go after the
the Marine
threat,
Prairie.
new Communist
a
The American
enemy and go
command plan of at-
after
him
hard.
Five-man Stingray reconnaissance teams would be serted near the border to explore suspected
nues of approach for signs of reinfiltration.
was made, the recon teams would
Cam
enemy
in-
ave-
Once contact
call in artillery
Lo or helicopter gunships and
Da Nang. Meanwhile, Marine
in-
strike aircraft
infantry units
and helicopter
enemy had constructed plexes in the
assaults
on Septem-
resistance, but within hours the 1/26
little
battalion attacked,
it
and bunker com-
large tunnel
Con Thien-Gio Linh
area.
ran into heavy
fire
Each time the from concealed
positions that were reduced only by a combination of assaults, air strikes, artillery, naval gunfire,
and
tanks. For ten days the battalion doggedly swept the
Cua
ground
NVA
Viet River Valley, killing 254
from
casualties of
from
across the border.
Even
would wait
its
while suffering 203
own, before driving the
enemy back
the North Vietnamese retreated from the
as
nearby to relieve, reinforce, or exploit offensive oppor-
coastal plain, they were trading savage blows with the
tunities.
4th Marines for control of key
Starting in early August, the 2d Battalion clashed
with North Vietnamese units over twenty square miles
On
of mountain jungle.
pointblank tank
fire
252 along Route
9.
An
18,
NVA
initial assault
on
the Marines used
enemy
The next day
elements of the 803d north.
August
to dislodge
troops from Hill
the battalion ran into
Regiment two miles a pair of
farther
enemy bunkers was
infiltration routes
had
most elaborate
built his
ticular
on two
dense jungle.
made by
hills rising
The
first
the 1/4 Marines,
fortifications,
who
battered
ments on the southern slope
for
men.
— including B-52s—
gan
man
86
against
NVA troop concentra-
Meanwhile, an enemy 12.7mm machine gun be-
firing
on
helicopters resupplying the critical eleven-
outpost on the Rockpile. Trying to silence the
When
it
became
from the south was J.
and
enemy entrench-
two-and-a-half days
efforts
but nine dead
clear that attacking the ridge
futile.
Lieutenant Colonel William
Masterpool's 3d Battalion was ordered to
assault
On
in par-
attempt to take the ridge was
which the Americans repeatedly
tions.
battle
400 and 480 meters out of the
with nothing to show for their
arms
The
the mountain valleys north of the Rockpile.
centered on the Nui Cay Tre ridge line where the enemy
followed by four days of heavy engagements, during called in supporting
through
from the east and turn the enemy's
mount an
flank.
the morning of September 22 helicopters carried
At 10:00
the battalion into the jungle three miles from the ridge
Each Marine
line.
carried his
rifle,
ammunition, two
canteens, a poncho, and two socks stuffed with C-ra-
Resupply would have to come through landing
tions.
At
zones hacked out of the undergrowth. talion it
first
the bat-
had more trouble with the dense vegetation than
NVA.
did with the
For three days the Marines strug-
gled in the tangled green darkness, sometimes halting
bombs
entirely until
What
the jungle.
napalm blasted
or
a path through
they saw as they approached Hill 400
this
enough huts piles
and
more enemy
harbor a regiment, and
in the ravines to
piles of
positions, including
ammunition."
the summit.
moving tance.
on August 26
uphill
"The
against determined resis-
piece of terrain, where
maneuver on the
it
was so narrow that we couldn't
and they'd dig
flanks,
us in the bottleneck." For
bounced down the
and wait
artillery barrages.
of the twenty-eighth, the
Without
terattacked.
in
warning,
dozens
of
tell
who was
fighting the
and
platoon
"The Char-
mines, and
ladders in the trees for
direct fire." After
enemy backed
A
firing,
—mortars,
— and they had
spotters to climb up
grenades
the battle:
They had everything
or us.
lie
Company K remembered
heavy weapons
coun-
the Marine lines ahead of
hill into
was so thick you couldn't
stuff
Then,
NVA
screaming North Vietnamese infantrymen. sergeant from
for
two days the Marines slowly
gained ground behind periodic
on the morning
the right
just
an hour of
By the end of the day
off.
the Marines controlled Hill 400 and prepared to advance
With Company
M
in
advance, the battalion spent
days covering the 3,000 meters separating the two
hills,
then launched an all-out assault on October 4 into
the teeth of the a hail of
NVA defenses.
automatic-weapons
the terrain
made
it
The
hre,
attack stalled under
and the steepness
of
impossible to call in artillery without
risking the Marines themselves.
North Vietnamese from
tried again,
NVA
won
The
Unable
to drive the
and
a
broke contact, leaving behind ten leading into the thick
trails
long battle was finally over, but the hard-
victory was not soon forgotten. Hereafter
Tre would be known
as
Mutter Ridge,
Nui Cay
after the radio
call sign of the 3d Battalion.
Although
Prairie
continued through January 1967,
the battle for Mutter Ridge was the turning point. After several
more skirmishes
monsoon
October the
in
By the end of the year
sides.
much an At
its
arrival oi the
greatly restricted activity Prairie
on both
was no longer so
operation as a far-flung area of operations.
gunships,
and Marine
killed nearly 1,400
enemy date,
tactical
aircraft.
NVA soldiers,
casualties in a single
and
Ma-
height, Operation Prairie involved eight
navy
rine infantry battalions supported by artillery units,
The
the largest
seriously degraded the
324B
fighting
number of
Marine operation Division.
to that
"At the
beginning of Prairie we were fighting well-trained and well-equipped
soldiers,"
4th
testified
com-
Marines
mander Colonel Cereghino. "At the end we were running into poorly equipped young soldiers and frustrated
commanders." Their heavy from establishing
a
demilitarized zone,
prevented the
losses
NVA
major operating base south of the forced
the
North Vietnamese
to
postpone their invasion of Quang Tri Province for another year, and convinced the
from Main-Force to
ily
enemy
to shift temporar-
guerrilla tactics.
Yet the operation had also cost the Marines
than 200 dead plus more than 1,200 wounded.
to their final objective, Hill 484.
five
M
fighting raged for another hour
bodies and a score of bloody jungle.
NVA was damn clever," recounted Captain
Roger Ryman. "Invariably they'd pick
The
half before the
northeast
Led by Companies L and K, the 3d Battalion began
Company
from tanks on prearranged
fire
concentration points. By noon the 2d Platoon gained
did not improve morale, either. Recalled one officer, there were "more and
the next morning
time using direct
the
enemy was badly
en back across the
—more And
if
hurt, he was far from beaten. Driv-
DMZ
for the
second time in
six
months by the overwhelming weight of American men and machines, the enemy had again retreated to havens over the border to repair for a fresh assault.
One
Marine commander
his kisses
safe
and prepare
thing for sure, concluded a senior
at year's end,
"they haven't quit."
their fortifications, the infantry
pulled back while Marine air and artillery pounded the
enemy
posititms.
87
/n che early stages
October 1966,
of Operation
U.S.
mark
./
their position ntoj-
smoke grenade
to
the Rockpile,
a strategic
DMZ.
Prairie in
Marines set off
peak near the
Their mission was to block
efforts
by invading North Vietnamese tmops to capture the
hill.
Marines cake
a break
destroy units from the
90
and share
324B
a
NVA
meal of C-rations during Operation
Prairie.
Division that had recently infiltrated into
Marine reconnaissance teams
Quang
Tri Province.
tried to track
down and
Two
soldiers
early
Oetoher resulted
from the hi Murine Division hre upon Norrh Viernnmese troops Jetendini: Hill 484- The Khnine in
one
of the fiercest
flights
of the operation, the kittle for
.issaiik i^n this hill in
Mutter Rid^e.
91
92
Ignorint;
his
reaches tor
,\
(ivvn
wcHinJs.
buddy injured
srruogle for Hill 484-
NVA
a
Murine
durint;
the
troops repelled
the initial attack on the hill on October 4,
so the Marines pulled back
in artillery
and
and
called
air strikes.
93
Marines carry one of their wounJeJ 5,
94
to an air evacuation
bringing to an end the struggle for Mutter Ridge.
tyite
near Hill 484- They captured the
hill
on October
An
abanJoneJ
Operation
hc-lmct
dnJ
ntic
.sf.i/iJ
tribute
ft)
the
200 Americans
killed
Junng
Prairie.
95
Mary
Witness:
Vietnam; he was with the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infan-
Reis Stout
and we were
try Division,
We
each other.
usually within
so that was kind of a bonus for both of I
guess the things that
miles of
six weeks,
us.
remember most
I
primarily shrapnel wounds
wounds,
fifty
saw each other about every
are massive
had
that
be
to
opened. Most people don't understand that the way you treat these
war wounds
out
damaged
all
the
to
is
open them even more, take
and
tissue,
them open so that
leave
they can be cleaned, so that they don't get infected.
Large chunks of people's bodies, particularly muscle,
were gone. There were a
lot
of amputations, multiple
amputations, because there was so
As
the war heated up in 1966 and 1967,
diers all across casualties,
American
sol-
South Vietnam took greater numbers of
and the
American
role of the thousands of
medical prt^fessionals in Vietnam became even more important. Reis, an at
One
of this group was
army nurse
An Khe
at the
vember 1967.
2d Surgical Hospital
(MASH) to
No-
1987, nearly twenty years after her
In
Mary Reis Stout was elected
pres-
Vietnam Veterans of America.
ident of the
lot
seemed
as
When I graduated from high schi)ol in Columbus, Ohio, my class had a prophecy. Their prophecy for me was ended up being
I
need
A
field hospitals there. I
called
my
corps.
volunteer. in the
He
army
for
medical people to go to the
lot of
my
friends volunteered,
parents and talked to them about what
My
was going on.
me not to my being
father specifically asked
wasn't particularly crazy about
to begin with.
The thing
that finally got
me
to
orders to go.
We
met
at
my
put
first
in the
my
is
paperwork
husband now,
duty assignment at
Fort Ord, California, where he was a field artilleryman
working with basic
army now, needed. for
And
"I'm in the
my
services are
war going on, and
if Carl's
our future that
going through.
96
trainees. I just decided,
there's a
"
We
I
going
to he there
it's
important
understand somewhat what he's
ended up pretty
close together in
comparison
it
just dis-
Our major job people
in
alive;
happened.
it
was to keep these
in field hospitals
we didn 't deal with the long-term psycho-
logical effect, like the medical people at the hospitals
back
We
in the States did.
were just part of the chain.
We
never knew what happened to anybody when they
left
our hospital.
this
person made
We
never got word back that "yeah, or "that person didn't
it"
That was something that bothered
me
make
it."
for a long time;
whatever happened to those people.^ Boy, too
I
got tough really
much about
it all,
and get through each I
came
The
fast.
just
day.
I
We
really
not think
all tried to
do what needed
to be
blocked out a
done
when
lot
Chu
back, but there were a couple of cases at
Lai that
named
I still
remember. Both of them happened
Steve, but
first
I
can't
remember
Steve had a gunshot wound
He seemed stabilize
was the fact that Carl Stout, who
had
war
volunteered to go to Vietnam. In basic training they
told us there was a
and
a nurse in the
much mining. There
though there were so many more of the
enemy when
with the
that I was going to be a nurse in the Peace Corps. I've often said I
of gunshot wounds, but
tance kind of injuries, where you weren't face to face
Lieutenant Mary
1st
and Chu Lai from November 1966
return from the war,
were a
to be
doing OK, and
you kind of
let
yi)u
your guard
yourself get close to them.
He
to
be
their last names. in the
abdomen.
know, once people
down about
just got very
letting
bad
(yne
night, with a lot of breathing problems. His doctor said, "Just
keep suctioning him out and don't
he gets worse.
call
me
unless
"
Well, he basically didn't get any worse, but he just all of a
bring
We
couldn't
back. That was unusual, because if
we were
sudden went into cardiac
him
right there with
arrest.
them normally we could get them back.
His death was very traumatic for me.
On
top of that,
the hospital commander,
when he went
had
of guilt about that
a lot
responsibility
took
me
to be there
me
told
it
and understand why
that happened, but
it
he begged them not
wound. Nor-
leg
When
to.
—
and got processed out
get right back to work. the hospital where
adrenaline going. But
you're getting married in a
"Please don't take
to
my
on him, but
it
concerns that
real
check on him very
he wasn't bleeding around
In fact,
nam.
and moving
my
opened
into surgery. leg. "
They did an-
other graft and that held for a couple of days.
Then one evening
and saw he was having some
nurses' station
When
blood.
wound
pulled the dressing off his
I
I
could
see his artery pumping. His pulse was getting thready
and he was perspiring and going put
my hand into
technique
when
it's
his leg
something
is
somebody's
So
I
just
artery. Sterile
ingrained in you,
that's
life
into shock.
and grabbed the
the most important thing
but is
to
and on the way
in
They took him back he was saying
into surgery,
"Take
to the doctors,
it off,
1
don't want
"
We
had him
talking
for a while after surgery,
and wondering what
without his
We
leg.
were
and he
started
his life was going to be like
all trying to
be positive, saying
you can ski and you can ride horses, you're not going fo
have any problem. But is
my
girlfriend
it
going to
something we had tients,
was tough.
feel
He
"How
to deal with very often in our pa-
because they usually
and confident about that later in
asked,
about thisT' That wasn't
left
so soon after surgery.
You don't have the answers. You can be
It's
would go back. But
I
it,
but
I
really positive
wonder how he dealt with
amazing
how
adrenaline keeps you going in
from month to month.
When
I
got back
home
camp it
was
after I
kept
went
to
new world
up. I spent time as a volunteer for the
all I
USO,
my daughters. Then
could think of was Vietnam.
had thought about
I
become very good
much
it
before, of course, but I
at deciding not to think about
or really deal with
it.
our marriage,
in
and a
lot
reason,
more
had too
for the first time
took over a lot of the responsibility
I
When
stress.
very
it's
it
But when Carl was sent to
Korea in 1981 and we were separated
common
whatever
stress increases for
that post-traumatic stress
and
memories of Vietnam have an impact along with the For some reason,
stress.
I
Maybe
thought,
if I
could talk to some other Vietnam veterans they'd help
me
understand why
this
involved.
is
happening. Soon after that
I
VVA
I
and got more
became national membership
director in
1983, then national secretary, then, in 1987, president. In
many
what I'm doing now encompasses the
ways,
best aspects of
what
I
—
cared about in nursing
especially
the holistic approach of caring for people. Recently
met
Lillian
chief of the told her
I
Dunlap, a retired brigadier general
army nurse corps when
I
I
who was
was in Vietnam.
I
haven 't done any nursing since Vietnam. She
said,
"You do
you. "
And
it
it
every day, dear.
struck
mc
nursing as working in a
life.
wife. I
in social welfare, a
joined the Columbus chapter of the
to die.
to work.
to nursing after Viet-
Germany, even Girl Scouts with
other
stop the bleeding.
went back
and got my degree
suddenly,
difficulty. I
pulled back the sheet and he was lying in a pool of
month, why don't you
go back
school programs, an outreach program for military wives in
looked over at him from the
I
keep that
to
over with Carl as a military
all
the thought that
He
my
really
need
nursing registration current until 1982, always with
college
begged them again, "Don't take
didn't
1
to
spent several years raising our three daughters
I
the graft. Within a few hours he started leaking around
and they took him back
never
I
So
off.
wanted
parents said no, you need to
some time
would not hold. So we had
the graft,
my
take
leg,
I
to volunteer in the
trained,
really felt the
1
they brought him in he
Instead, they did an arterial graft
sure that
roi)m.
hours from the
thought about going back to
I
had
I
thirty-six
my parents' kitchen.
intensive-care ward to
rest,
was such a large graft that they had
make
got off the plane at Seattle, went to Fort
difficult. 1
but
just kept pleading with them,
regularly to
very
Lewis,
emergency
a long time.
mally the doctors would have just amputated his
it
my
for years. I've taken that
The other Steve had an enormous
leg. "
was
should have done a tracheotomy on him.
fault because I I
who just happened
into cardiac arrest,
We're very proud of
that she was right. h(^spital,
You picture
but nursing
is
really
caring for people. That's what I'm about, and that's what
VVA
is
about.
So
I
guess I'm in the right place.
97
••••fi'^l^ljv^,,
^
STALEMATE
General Westmoreland's strategy large
enough
enemy
for defeating the
to protect the populated areas of
Communists required
South Vietnam and
a military force
to take the
war to the
remote jungles along the border. Despite the increasing tempo of fighting
in the
during 1966, the
first
eighteen months of active U.S. involvement had been devoted
primarily to building up that military machine.
By the beginning of 1967 Westmoreland had
namese
at his disposal substantial
South Viet-
including eleven army divisions, two independent regiments, a marine
assets,
brigade, ten armored cavalry groups, twenty Ranger battalions, six artillery battalions, plus a host of territorial
and police units scattered about the country. In addition, the
American commander could Korean marine brigade, and Westmoreland's plans
U.S.
soldiers
call
a
upon the
new
year,
task force.
however, depended chiefly on the 430,000
and Marines who now called South Vietnam
one armored cavalry regiment, and
battle
two Korean infantry divisions, a
combined Australian-New Zealand
for the
ganized into seven infantry divisions,
who would
services of
their temporary
two paratrooper brigades, two
home. Or-
light infantry brigades,
a reinforced Special Forces group,
it
was these
men
bear the primary responsibility for meeting the enemy's Main-Force units in
and defeating him.
Or, rather,
it
would be the 20 percent of these men who comprised American combat
units in Vietnam.
Although
television
news reports suggested that U.S. troops spent their
time leaping from helicopters into hot LZs or hacking their way up jungle hillsides in search of their elusive quarry, most Americans
who
support personnel. For every mud-coated soldier
humping through the rain there were a
half-dozen mail clerks, typists, maintenance men, air
served in
traffic
Vietnam were
staff
and
controllers, briefing officers,
military policemen, transport pilots, supply sergeants, nurses, chaplains, or truck drivers.
And
for all the
newspaper photos o( mortar-blasted
Marines herd Vietcong suspects aiptured
in the MekiHit;
fire
support bases carved out of the
River Delta o/iro n hehcopter.
most Americans who served
jungle,
in
Vietnam spent
their tours of duty at sprawling rear-echelon hases like
Bien Hoa, Bai,
Tan Son Nhut, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Phu
Da Nang,
or
Cam Ranh
VC terrorism,
life
in the rear
could he quite agreeable.
Living accommodations were comfortable, rious.
The menus
steaks
and
at
if
not luxu-
messes and snack bars featured
cream, while nearby
ice
was from these outlying hases and strongpoints that
Westmoreland tion
initiated Phase
— moving out from
officers'
men's clubs served liquor and cold beer prices. Off-duty soldiers could read a
at
and enlisted rock-bottom
book
in air-con-
oi his strategy of
II
attri-
the populated areas into the ene-
my's sanctuaries where the
Bay.
Aside from an occasional rocket attack and the threat of
It
Communist Main-Force
units
could be located and destroyed. With Operation Attle-
boro as
command launched
model, the American
its
Communist
series of multibattalion thrusts against
areas
and supply
These huge search-and-de-
corridors.
stroy operations utilized superior
and technology
American firepower
to reap a punishing harvest of
dead. But they also
left
a
base
behind
growing
a
toll
of
enemy Amer-
ditioned libraries, play volleyball, go water-skiing on the
ican casualties while steadily drawing more and more
Saigon River, or catch their favorite television shows
U.S. forces farther and farther from South Vietnam's
on the Armed
cities
at the larger
Forces Television Network. GIs stationed
U.S. installations could choose from two
or three different first-run films a
week
at base
movie
theaters or pick up anything from potato chips to port-
stateside food
ational facilities
and drink, the elaborate
recre-
and bountiful consumer goods were
deliberate effort by
villages.
During the second week of January, elements of the 1st,
25th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, the 196th Infantry
Brigade, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Ar-
— some —joined an equal number
mored Cavalry Regiment
able stereos at the local PX.
The
and
MACV to maintain morale.
a
Coupled
can soldiers in
of
Operation Cedar
stroy
Falls,
sweep directed against
from the surrounding Vietnamese community, however,
angle. Preceded by
the material abundance had a disorienting effect on
leaflets
who found
soldiers
it
difficult to reconcile their
relatively plush existence with the death
and destruction
troops
known
as the Iron Tri-
and 20,000 airdropped
strikes
warning inhabitants
Communist
long-time
a
stronghold northwest of Saigon
B-52
ARVN
an enormous search-and-de-
with tight restrictions that isolated most servicemen
many
16,000 Ameri-
in all,
to leave the area,
twenty
battalions crashed into the sixty-square-mile triangle
January 8 in search of the 9th
VC
Division. By the
on
end
day the Americans had cordoned off the
that surrounded them. Critics charged that the profusion
of the
of clubs, slot machines, steam baths, luxury purchases,
fortified village of
and other "nonessentials" overtaxed the U.S.
refugee camps, bulldozed the town's dwellings, and de-
logistical
system and created endless oppt)rtunities for corruption. It
also exacerbated the division
between rear-echelon
personnel and those assigned to combat units. For the
men who a
a huge, dusty
compound
at
An
good deal
less
comfortable.
like the 1st
It
"home" might be
Cav's headquarters
Khe, which lacked many of the amenities of Sai-
gon but
still
boasted
its
own
twenty-five-acre "enter-
tainment area" complete with bars and brothels. Or
might be the much smaller and starker confines of support base. There a soldier could
meal,
a
drink
—sometimes
change of clothes, but to protect
attacks.
100
him from
little
even
still
a
count on
cold one
a
hot
—and
enemy
it
a fire
more than sandbags and
either the weather or
Ben Sue, removed 6,000
villagers to
elaborate network of tunnels and supply
stroyed an
caches that honeycombed the ground beneath the surface.
actually fought the war,
was apt to be
first
a
dirt
sapper
Over the next eighteen days American and South Vietnamese
soldiers evacuated the region's four
villages as air strikes, artillery,
and
giant
Rome
main plows
demolished the surrounding jungle. Meanwhile, 6-10-
man teams
of "tunnel rats" crawled through
nearly
twelve miles of underground corridors unearthing tons of supplies
and thousands
of
enemy documents. By the
time the operation ended, the Vietcong had suffered the discovery and seizure of a key headquarters complex, the destruction of twenty years' worth of tunnels and fications,
and the
rate operation
loss
forti-
of nearly 800 men. But the elabo-
had not been able
to trap the
main body
American servicemen sunbathe on (he deck Vietnam,
iti
of the
swimmim; pool
at the U.S.
Armv'> cvKirnidus
iK'aJqtiarters at
Umg
Binh. South
September 1969.
101
In January 1967, U.S. forces attacked
the ''^
Vietcong stronghold northwest of Saigon called the Iron Triangle, focusing on the village
of Ben Sue. Here some of Ben
»,
Suc'S^t**,
3,800 inhabitants, headed for a refugee"^"
camp,
sit in
an evacuation helicopter with
their belongings; their village will soon be
razed so
it
can no longer be used by the
Communists.
«
'm^^'
'''^^
^^j"""^^:^'
%0^
A
of
enemy
who
soldiers,
filtered
through allied lines
to-
ward the Camhodian border. Four weeks
later
Americans
Westmoreland took up the
pursuit,
sending twenty-two American battalions northwest of
War Zone C
— $25 — some
pursuit of an elusive quarry at a cost
1,576 wounded
killed,
282
million,
that
thought
well out of proportion to the results.
Two
hundred miles north,
in the
western reaches of
Operation
the central highlands, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division
Junction City. Spearheaded by the 503d Airborne Bri-
fought a different kind of border campaign during 1967.
the Iron Triangle into
as part of
which on February 22 conducted the
gade,
combat parachute
assault since the
U.S.
first
Korean War, Junc-
maneuver
tion City was a classic "cordon and sweep"
designed to trap the Vietcong division with speed and
hammer
numbers, then
it
overwhelming
to pieces with
paratroopers formed the eastern side
tif
an enor-
mous horseshoe. To the west were the 196th Light
To
the north were eight battalions of the 1st
some 250
Infantry Division, carried into battle by icopters in
one of the
11th
as the
blocking forces were
terrain while
Rome
men had
Peers's
the job of guarding the
proved an arduous
It
NVA
and 10th
1st
an endless round
task,
of patrols through steep rain forests in temperatures that
Communists
of
concealment.
troops collided with
enemy
When
So
period.
umn had been
advancing
concentrations, the
icans called in prodigious quantities of artillery
Amerand
air
was
cut
down
in a hail of
So thick was
fire.
leaguered American units.
Between January and ments known
River in
the
his presence
the jungle that aircraft frequently could not locate be-
the thickly
to deprive the
was the enemy that
skilled
often never suspected until the lead elements of a col-
devoted
plows and heavy bulldozers
away great chunks of jungle
stripped
Divisions.
and the
units of the 25th Infantry Division
Armored Cavalry swept north through
wooded
hel-
largest air assaults in the history
As soon
of army aviation. in place,
In-
and the 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry
fantry Brigade
Division.
William R.
rugged frontier region against the
could fluctuate sixty degrees during a twenty-four-hour
firepower.
The
Operating out of its base camp near Pleiku City, General
its
as
in a series of
April,
Operation
Sam Houston,
attention to the area west of the
Kontum
countered only
Province.
At
first
Sathay
light resistance as they systematically
un-
fortifications.
mid-February the North Vietnamese began to
in
strike back.
and
the division
Nam
the infantrymen en-
covered and destroyed enemy tunnels and
But
engage-
trail
Shadowed by
watchers,
NVA
reconnaissance teams
harassed by daytime snipers and
power, including airdropped cluster bombs (CBUs) that
nighttime mortar attacks, the GIs endured a growing
ripped through the tangled foliage with devastating re-
number
sults.
bers
Such
collisions
were
rare.
When
they did take place
the Vietcong were handled severely. But the large
of vicious ambushes that sapped both their
and
their morale.
The North Vietnamese
to position themselves so close to the
num-
learned
Americans that
was impossible. Counterattacks
size
effective supporting
fire
of the operational zone, the ruggedness of the terrain,
typically resulted in
heavy casualties from carefully pre-
and the noise generated by
made
units
most of der.
it
large,
mechanized American
almost impossible to surprise the enemy,
whom
The high
scattered west across the
Cambodian
point of the allied effort in
during 1967, Junction City demonstrated ity
to
swiftly
penetrate
III
Corps
MACV's
heretofore- inviolable
bor-
abil-
enemy
sanctuaries in force, but the massive shock
power of the
multidivisional operation had largely spent
itself in futile
pared
enemy
firefights
could
enemy had
one
of [he
few combat jumps made
last
And
although such
well into the night, by daylight the
invariably disappeared, taking his dead
and
wounded with him.
With
the beginning of the
summer monsoon
April, the 4th Division shifted
its
in early
energies south into
western Pleiku Province. For this new operation, code
named
Francis
greater success In
flanking positions.
Marion,
the
on supporting
Americans firepower,
relied
with
including in-
digenous armored personnel carriers and the tanks of the in the war, paratroopers
of the 17 k] Airborne Brigade parachute into Tay Ninh Province
10th Cavalry in a series of violent encounters that raged
on March
across the rolling hills south of the Se
i,
1967, during Operation Junction City.
San River. For
105
months the
three
NVA
attempted without success to
drive the division away from
on
battles culminating
tierce
border sanctuaries, the
its
23
July
hghter-bombers annihilated an entire it
when
NVA
American
The
first
Khe Sanh had
battle of
all its difficulties
and dangers, however, the contest
against the
NVA
compare
scope or savagery to the continuing battles
in
in the
western highlands could not
waged by the U.S. Marines along the shattered
hills
rine Division
had established
a series of
strung out between Route 9 and the isolated strongpoints bristling
with
of
Ma-
the demilitarized zone. By the end of 1966 the 3d
combat bases
DMZ. From
these
and barbed
artillery
Itlxury of rear bases in
simply regrouped,
midsummer
NVA
the
anti-infiltration barrier.
chief proponent.
McNamara, sors,
this
Heavy
fighting broke out
on February 27 when
Cam
regiment near
relief force that left
one Marine battalion commander and dozens of
The same
dead.
scale in April at
pattern was repeated on a
Khe Sanh when
B, 9th Marines, ran into
NVA
Division.
a
in the hills
men
larger
Company
advance elements of the 325C
As reinforcements poured
that the
his
much
squad from
western outpost over the next three days,
came apparent
NVA
Lo, precipitating a series of am-
bushes against a hastily dispatched
enemy was
surrounding the base.
It
into the small it
quickly he-
casualties to drive the
back across the
guard towers, and physical obstacles was an attempt
May
North Vietnamese
to press their hard-
marked the
first
time
that U.S. forces had penetrated the demilitarized zone.
The complex scheme
of
terminus
maneuver
— the combat base
focal point of
NVA artillery,
Attempting
with the 90th
NVA
intense
enemy
combat
utilized the full range
base.
battalions fought a furious
Regiment
early July.
in
of
artillery,
air,
and naval lives
but
Throughout August and September
arms that drove
Con
Thien's defenders burrowing into
the ground for protection and
mese
NVA bunker complexes all
the
River, then wheeled soufh to sweep
left
the tortured landscape
with the bodies of thousands of North Vietna-
soldiers (see page 120).
Only under the devastating
impact of nearly 800 B-52 bombing runs did the enemy finally retreat in early
October.
Driven back along the northern
frontier, the
munists struck farther south, attacking an
assaults
sualties.
the
Com-
ARVN
out-
Phuoc Long Province on October 27 and the
Both
106
attacks.
growing pressure
the two sides engaged in a fearful contest of supporting
Cambodian border town
to
and ground
more than 1,300 enemy
gunfire that claimed
by a cascade of supporting arms the Americans smashed
way
initial
the Americans directed a
artillery fire,
thunderous bombardment
post in
fortified
its
— became the
Against waves of North Vietnamese infantry backed by
fighter-bombers, and amphibious landing craft. Backed
the Ben Hai
rocket,
on Con Thien, three Marine battle
Con Thien
to relieve the steadily
of Marine combat assets, including helicopter gunships,
through heavily
at
sieged
Hickory. Launched on
18, this multibattalion strike
dubious value and
vive the year. Nonetheless, the barrier and
littered
won advantage with Operation
Of
failed to do.
took twelve days of
DMZ.
The Marines immediately sought
after
Secretary of Defense Robert S.
did nothing to stop the steady encirclement of the be-
helicopter gunships, attack aircraft, and nearly
600 American
stage of a massive
first
Dubbed McNamara's Line
heavily entrenched
continuous battle, a relentless bombardment by Marine artillery,
in
Ma-
inordinate expense, the grandiose project did not sur-
Ma-
a
By
accomplish by other means what the bombing of
North Vietnam had
attrition.
rine reconnaissance patrol intercepted an entire
units
combination of mines, electronic sen-
during 1967, as heavily armed Communist regulars tested
bloody war of
enemy
to battle.
was threatening U.S. defenses
rines labored to construct the
to
own
and returned
the eastern part of the demilitarized zone where the
its
on
effect
Laos and North
attack, battered
refitted,
wire, the Marines fought a succession of costly battles
the Americans in their
at least as
many. But neither defeat had any appreciable
Vietnam secure from U.S. For
North Viet-
cost the
namese an estimated 1,000 KIA, Hickory
Hanoi. With the
company.
light-
ning assault.
force
air
regiment as
vainly attempted to overrun an isolated
up the remnants of enemy units scattered by the
of Loc
Then on November
NVA
Ninh two
days
later.
were thrown back with heavy enemy ca-
1st Division, after
3 a defector revealed that
months of elaborate prep-
While one Marine checks during tierce lighting near
aration,
a fallen hiiJJv, others charge
Khe Sanh
Coward North Vietnamese positions on the ravaged slopes ot Hill 881 North
in spring 1967.
was poised to attack the highlands town of Dak
To. Seizing the opportunity to engage the enemy force, the
American command deployed
talions of the 4th Infantry Division,
Airborne Brigade,
ARVN
a brigade
from the
all
in
sixteen bat-
the entire 173d 1st
Air Cavalry,
ously carved out of the steep hillsides, the
took a steady
toll
of
American
counters, including a Veterans
borne task
force.
Four days
battalions into the narrow valleys
and
mortar attack on the Dak
sur-
C-130
six
rounded the remote
As first
allied units
probed south from Dak
To
during the
two weeks of November they clashed repeatedly
with well-armed
NVA
regulars.
Day ambush
transports
later a
From the labyrinth of
tunnels and camouflaged fortifications they had labori-
that
left
To
20
air-
North Vietnamese
airfield
destroyed two
and blew up an ammunition dump
an explosion that sent an enormous
district capital.
during these en-
dead, 154 wounded, and 2 missing from a 200-man
onto the precipitous, jungle-canopied ridges that
and
lives
Communists
fireball
in
shooting
thousands of feet into the night sky.
The the
blazing airfield proved the high-water
Communist attempt
oi the
month
to take
the weight of
Dak To. By
mark of
the middle
men and machines
that
107
American Mass.
108
soldiers stationed at the rcniutv
(_
->
Anii) tdiup at
Dak To near
the
Cambodian
bi>rdcr fjAc tunc out to attend
Sunday
—
MACV
had hurled into
battle
began to
units southwest toward their
enemy
As they
tuaries.
retreated the
pushing
tell,
Cambodian
sanc-
North Vietnamese fought
tenacious rear-guard actions, forcing the Americans to
whole
literally obliterate
on the ground could claw
before units in
hilltops with supporting fire
hand-to-hand
vicious
their
engagements.
During
tensively
the
mounted
enemy
positions. Fi-
nally, after a savage five-day battle tor Hill
875 (see page
many
132) in which 158 Americans and at least twice as
NVA
were
killed.
North Vietnamese
resistance
came
to
A-6A
— and close
for
— the
Intruder
air
Vietnam's main
the battered 1st
yet subjected to
and Guam.
Stratofortresses based in Thailand
American warplanes were
far
outnumbered, however,
by the thousands of observation, reconnaissance, cargo,
command
tanker, transport, and
aircraft that daily filled
NVA
Division limped into
Cam-
every kind and description flying cargo, troop gunship,
transport,
dous
that had transported 16,000
allied troops into
sponsible
South Vietnam,
ments"
effort
some of the most
hostile territory in
maintained an astonishing level of logistical and
fire
sup-
— changes—
The bulk
of
in every
enemy
casualties at
Dak To,
as they
had
other major battle during the year, were
the result of air strikes.
The expansion
of
American
this
growing
on Lyndon Johnson
to
namese weakened the hand of those argued for caution ruary 1967
when
more than 60,000 personnel organized
one
into
air
com-
wing, nine tactical fighter wings, three strategic
bombardment wings, and one wing,
erations
air
commando/special op-
communications groups,
plus
tactical
control groups, and a welter of subsidiary units operating
out of sixteen major
air
carrier-based
U.S. Navy
Yankee Station some 100 miles of South
Vietnam and the
air
force
aircraft
off the
six air
flying
bombing pause
of the
1st
I
aircraft used to
wage the in-country war over light
bombers,
Washington who
rate. Just as
im-
number of U.S.
cain
The
result
was
a
hawks
led by
John C. Stennis whose August hearair
war sharply challenged
air
campaign.
continuing escalation of the bombing
throughout Indochina. American
pilots
on Tiger Hound
missions over the Laotian panhandle flew more than sorties during the
end the
air force
first
four
months
of 1967.
By
recorded 1,718 B-52 raids alone.
Ho Chi Minh
Trail paled
beside what was happening over North Vietnam, where total sorties increased
South Vietnam included B-57 Canberra
without
undermine public confidence
But the activity along the
Corps.
The
to
White House control over the
year's
aircraft
it
to resupply their forces in
an unprecedented
conduct of the
ings into the
— representing throughout
had begun
Mississippi senator
12,000
groups
scattered
from
at
in
to Johnson, however, were Congressional
northern coast
approximately 500 helicopter and fixed-wing
Marine Air Wing
were the
employ
the president's handling of the war. Most troublesome
bases in South Vietnam, Thai-
and Guam. Alongside the
70-100
sualties
single day.
they took advantage of a Feb-
portant, the steady increase in the
had
pattern
against the enemy's heartland. The North Viet-
more than matched by the increase of U.S.
air assets in
flight
re-
"move-
armada came mount-
aerial
South Vietnam
air force
traffic
and major
ground forces during the previous two years had been
Southeast Asia. By the end of 1967 the
air
South Vietnam alone every
in
ing pressure restraint
action.
53,000
missions
armada was
this aerial
landings,
takeoffs,
Along with
and driven one of the enemy's best divisions from
the field with losses estimated as high as 1,600 killed in
more than
for
medevac
and
rescue,
around the clock. By 1967
land,
North
defense system were the giant B-52
air
American command celebrated the tremen-
mand
all-weather at-
first
Corsair. Utilized ex-
support and interdiction over
bodia, the
been
A-7
later the
South Vietnam and Laos but not
ters of
port,
on
Laos the air force relied heavily
the skies over Southeast Asia, not to mention helicop-
an end.
As
Above
Skyraiders.
the F-105 Thunderchief, while navy pilots flew the F-8
Crusader, the tack aircraft
of artillery, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and strikes against
North Vietnam and
supersonic F-4
air support,
and prop-driven A-1
Phantoms,
way forward
course of the operation U.S. forces fired 151,000 rounds
257 B-52 bombing
F-1 00 Supersabres for close
in 1
1967, the
amount
from 79,000 oi
in
1966 to 108,000
bombs dropped climbing from
36,000 to 226,000 tons of high explosives.
109
the number and type of
targets authorized hy
Johnson met Hanoi's
ton.
expansion in both
figures lay a steady
Behind these
Washing-
increased infiltration ot Feb-
North Vietnamese
ruary with mine-laying operations in
south of the twentieth parallel and strikes against
rivers
manufacturing targets near Hanoi and Haiphong. In
March, American warplanes
thirty-five miles
and chemical plant
Thai Nguyen
hit the
steel
north of the capital.
During April they struck power plants, ammunition
dumps, cement
Haiphong
within the Hanoi-
airfields
The most important
restricted zone.
month was
that
plant in
and
factories,
target
32,000-kilowatt thermal power
the
downtown Hanoi, which U.S. Navy
pilots
knocked out with television-guided "Walleye" bombs. Eight weeks later Johnson approved attacks against pe-
troleum storage
sites
near Hanoi and Haiphong. In July
new
the president added forty
transportation and mili-
tary installations to the Rolling
cluding the crucial Paul
Thunder
Doumer
of Hanoi, which
air force
time on August
2.
Bridge
target
on the
list,
fighter-bombers hit for the
That same month
in-
outskirts first
were made
strikes
against previously prohibited regions within the city limits
of Hanoi and along the buffer zone near the Chinese
border, a series of raids culminating
U.S.
aircraft flew
more than 200
Vietnam, the greatest
on August 20 when sorties
over North
single day's effort since the
bomb-
ing began. During the remainder of the year American
on
virtually every military, indus-
pilots
were
trial,
and transportation
let
loose
target
recommended by the
Stennis committee.
By December 1967 the United States had delivered a total of
namese
864,000 tons of bombs on the North Viet-
— 70 percent more than had been dropped
entire Pacific theater during
ing
had
inflicted
World War
an estimated $300 million
on North Vietnam,
seriously disrupted
its
in the
The bomb-
II.
in
damage
agricultural
fragile industrial base.
Al-
production, and crippled
its
though
had generally been kept low,
some
civilian casualties
cities
were severely damaged; others were almost
entirely destroyed.
Soldiers in an
AC-47 gunship
guns into the twilight
named
sky,
fire its electrically
showing why the
"Puff the Magic Dragon.
driven Gatling
aircraft
was nick-
"
no
^M
Z^:^W^'
A
Nnrrh
\
icrnamese transport truck crosses a pontoon bridge that was built to replace the one dcstrtiycd earlier outside
U.S. bombers.
112
Nam
Dinh by
The
actual dollar cost ot the air war to the LInited
States,
—some $900 million
however, was
far greater
in
mention enormous operating
lost aircraft alone, not to
and munitions expenditures. Had the bombing been successful
such
deficit
spending might have been accepted
with equanimity. But the hard
fact
was that the
air
cam-
paign against North Vietnam had failed utterly to meet its
States constructed
its
military strategy in
Southeast Asia around the assumption that
air
power
dis-
army of
and keep
By
the world,
i>n
the United States pay a heavy
North Vietnamese survival and technical assistance they
aid
Communist
allies, especially
Union and China. Hanoi's
tage of Sino-Soviet rivalry, skillfully playing
were no closer to giving up than they had been
power against the other
one super-
in their quest for increased aid.
beginning of 1965. Despite the destruction, the econ-
The
omy
quantities of rice, small arms, ammunition,
there was
And
no evidence of
a significant loss of morale.
despite everything that
do to stop
American
the infiltration of
it,
The
it
air
that their allies supplied. This cumulative contribution,
reasons for these failures were many.
on Europe
their doctrine
for
triple-
terrain. After focusing
two decades, they had to
adapt aircraft designed primarily for strategic nuclear warfare to the
had
to
niques.
demands
retrain pilots
Beyond
this,
of a limited political conflict in
cc)nventional
To
American
power posed by Vietnam's monsoon climate,
made up
1968, more than
and
bombing tech-
the air war was saddled from the
Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara
in
much bombing we
proposed an uncon-
ditional ics
bombing
do,"
McNamara
halt in hopes of appeasing antiwar crit-
negotiations.
He
American ground
also
urged the president to revise
strategy
and place
a
hope
of victory.
its
economic
assets
away from urban
selection resulted in unwieldy chains of
command. Even
a ceiling
ican troop levels. Although he did not put
been
centers, while the administration's tight control of target
"no matter how
within the United States and prodding Hanoi toward
words, by the middle of 1967 the
Washington's gradualist approach gave Ha-
the figures
North Vietnamese would not give
and
noi time to disperse
inflicted
Convinced that the
called for a reassessment of strategy.
beginning with shortages of equipment, ammunition, pilots.
damage
for all the
by the bombing.
had underestimated the limitations on
canopy jungle, and mountainous
vehicles,
(SAMs), and tanks
estimated to be in excess of $2 billion between 1965 and
had been before the bombing began.
military planners
fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles
power could
southern battlefields during 1967 was nearly three times greater than
success of their efforts was measured in the vast
supplies to the
air
men and
the So-
leaders took full advan-
onslaught unparalleled in history the North Vietnamese
functioned. Despite the shortages and dislocations,
an
by creating one of
defense systems
however.
on the material
viet
at the
raising
air offensive.
its
the end,
In
rested
air
make
they were able to price for
And
roadways open.
vital
received from their
aerial
air raids.
they were able to effect repairs with remarkable speed
have no choice but to sue
an
that
armed with picks and shovels,
civilian workers
courage the people of North Vietnam that Hanoi would for peace. Yet, after
targets
could not be moved, they were able to minimize the
damage done by the American
would so devastate the North Vietnamese economy, so impede the flow of men and materiel south, and so
the coun-
facilities acrt)ss
and cleverly camouflaging those
tryside,
the most sophisticated
original objectives.
The United
petroleum and other storage
For their
it
on Amer-
in so
many
man who had once
major proponent of escalation no longer had any
if
air
power had not brought the Communists
knees,
neither
had
General
to
Westmoreland's
worse, from the pilots' point of view, were the plethora
strategy of attrition.
of prohibited zones and restrictive rules of engagement
million troops had saved South
that diminished both the effectiveness and the safety of
taken a heavy
many
fought well under adverse conditions, utilizing an enor-
missions.
Compounding
these problems were the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of the civilians
from the
North Vietnamese. By evacuating
cities,
dispersing industries, scattering
toll
mous advantage
of
The commitment enemy
casualties.
in mobility
oi nearly half a
Vietnam from defeat and U.S. soldiers had
and firepower to drive the
Vietcong from even their most secure strongholds. deed, whenever American
forces actually
engaged
In-
VC //J
NVA
or
they almost always prevailed. But the
units,
down
primary goal of grinding
the
enemy
until
he hol-
lered "uncle" was not happening. Despite official esti-
mates ot
many
as
as
220,000 enemy
soldiers killed since
Com-
the deployment o( U.S. citmhat forces, overall
munist strength
in
South Vietnam stood
at approxi-
mately 350,000 troops, compared to some 200,000
in
June 1%5.
titmed the accuracy of little
MACV's enemy
command
dinary peasants, of junior officers
"body count"
affairs
some
at least
battle, the
Vietcong
guerrillas
pressure,
and the ambitions
from
or-
manpower pool
far in excess
fact that
some
each year,
draft age
of the
number of enemy
KIA, even when estimated by the most
optimistic meth-
Moreover, the Communists had time and terrain
By
their side.
fighting only
when and where
they
chose, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese were largely able to control
how many
became too
When
casualties they suffered.
high, they simply scattered into the
jungle or crossed the border into sanctuaries
immune
In
Westmoreland's
short,
—when
number of
enemy
soldiers
the
through recruitment or
infiltration
Along with
On
toll
compared
replace
— was never reached.
rates steadily increased, av-
mtmth during
the
first
477 per month during 1966.
swelling draft calls, the mounting
American
further eroded domestic support for the war.
the other hand.
despite
to
"cross-over
would exceed the
Communists could
eraging 816 killed in action per half of 1967,
vaunted
casualty rates
Meanwhile, U.S. casualty
death
formidable
Communist morale remained losses
and
staggering
intact
hardships,
thanks to an effective system of internal discipline and a firm conviction that they
were defending their country
Neither the Americans nor their
had been able
114
to the
rural population
ineffectiveness and, otten,
arrogance and brutality.
to the
its
with
its
U.S. military command. The massive search-and-
much
destroy operations that occupied so
MACV's
of
time and resources diverted attention from the social
and
They
political roots of the insurgency.
havoc among the
wreaked
job ot the combat officer in Vietnam, wrote one
commander, was
a millionaire
to "spend firepower as
and husband
pauper," and so he did.
his
men's
upon
lives as
if
if
he
he
is
is
a
Armed with automatic weapons, and machine guns,
recoilless rifles, grenades, mortars,
able to call ships,
also
civilian population of the countryside.
naval gunfire, helicopter gun-
artillery,
and supersonic fighter-bombers carrying every-
thing from high explosives to cluster bombs, defoliants,
and napalm, American commanders
Since
it
common
was
on American
let
loose a storm ot
enemy whenever he appeared.
shot and shell against the
practice for the Vietcong to
fire
troops from within villages, the reliance
on firepower contributed
to inspire the
The widespread
to a soaring rate of
use of "free
and interdiction"
fire as
own
same
the people of St)uth Vietnam.
political leaders
a
damage and
fire
zones" and "harassment
means o( controlling enemy
movements only made matters
worse.
So did the
cal-
culated attempt to discourage villagers from aiding the
VC
by burning their homes and evacuating them to
crude refugee camps that eventually housed more than
20 percent of South Vietnam's population.
The
results,
observed one
official pacification report,
were highly counterproductive: easy for the sentful
VC
to replace losses
and disgruntled
and property and therefore
ernment of Vietnam] and
trict
behind 365
"It
becomes
relatively
from a population
re-
at the destruction of their lives
briefing that U.S. forces
against foreign invaders.
among
ARVN,
death among the civilian population of the countryside.
from U.S. attack.
point"
onus rested on the
ot the
Vietcong while alienating the
The
200,000 North Vietnamese reached
losses
pockets
which ceded de facto control of whole provinces
brigade
ever, Westmoreland's strategy ignored the
on
namese people. Some
the notoriously unreliable
Defense Department analysis. Far more important, how-
ods.
own
than improving the living standards of the South Viet-
30 percent according to one
all inflated
—by
ques-
casualty figures.
douht that the contusions of
difficulty of distinguishing
a
with the Saigon government, whose corrupt
agents were more intent upon lining their
But an important measure of responsibility also belonged
In trying to account for this state of
There was
for this lay
hostile to the
CVN
IGov-
Informed
at a press
had moved into one
rural dis-
its
allies."
tactical air strikes,
30 B-52
sorties,
spirit
of resistance
a barrage of more than a million artillery shells,
Much
of the blame
American correspondent had
and an
a similar reaction. "It ap-
American
metal detectors to examine a South Vietnamese farmer's harvest ot dried
soldiers use
rice plants tor
any hidden weapons or
ammunition, 1966.
pears you [have] leveled virtually every village and let,
killed or driven
more than 50,000 peasants
land with your firepower.
My
question
is,
ham-
off the
how do you
won.
It
largely
was not being won because
on the enemy's
assets to the pursuit of
enemy Main-Force
intend to go about winning the hearts and minds of
mote war zones and base
these people?" "I'm afraid you'll have to take that up
was losing
with Civic Affairs, a real
sir," replied
the briefing officer, "but,
areas, the
men and machines
it's
What
the United States had achieved in Vietnam after
nearly three years of war was stalemate, but stalemate
higher level of commitment.
In the air
and on the ground American
with no commensurate
increase in security for the bulk of the South Vietnamese
Communist
supplies
and tem-
units from the area,
once the
"successful" in capturing
much
units in re-
American command
population. Although most of the giant operations were
good question."
jeeze,
at a
was being fought
it
terms. By devoting U.S. military
porarily clearing
Americans
left in
enemy
search of
new
targets the
returned. After }0,000 U.S. and forces
were
scoring ever greater victories. But the war was not being
ARVN
Communists troops spent
three weeks blasting their way through the Iron Triangle in
Operation Cedar
Falls,
1st
Division
commander Ma-
115
jor
General William nePiiy called the destruction of the
Communist stronghold this area
may never
an American
later
"a blow trom
VC
which the
recover." Yet scarcely two weeks
by hel-
officer reconnoiterinf^ the area
icopter reported that "the iron Triangle was again
with what appeared to be Viet
erally crawling
on
riding bicycles or wandering around
The Ktrder
0)ng
want
to get out," explained
want
to give up."
Lyndon Johnson might
limit,
enabled the Communists to regain the military
expand the war any
yet reluctant to
some
McNamar^'s
of
and
initia-
units lured into large frontier
once more sought
middle ground.
a
he gave Westmoreland only
men
additional
open he placed no
he began to consider ways
casualties was
he was not prepared
one Giap was more than willing to pay
as
long as sufficient replacements were available and sub-
As one out, in
it
on
his adversary.
authority on North Vietnamese strategy pointed
was not by battles won or
homebound American
lost
coffins that
but "by the
traffic
Giap measures
his
In
that regard the
North Vietnamese general was
most
astute, for by the
end of 1967 the war had produced
sharp divisions
among
the American people. Believing
that the strategy of attrition was bearing
solution in
fruit,
that the
Vietnam was "more bombs, more
more napalm
.
.
.
till
shells,
the other side cracks and gives
tt)
not ready to retreat.
Having made
his decision to stay the course,
last
month
war to the enemy
in
to
Washington
to reassure the natitm with
an
"We are not going "We are not going to
optimistic speech before Congress. to yield," declared the president.
shimmy.
We
honor which spoke.
are going to all
wind up with
peace with
a
Americans seek." Yet, even
Communist
as
he
troops in unprecedented numbers
were marshaling their forces
all
across
South Vietnam.
they were about to deliver would
American determination.
many
to take the
Laos and Cambodia. At the same
time, the growing antiwar
movement
castigated the gov-
ernment
for
manding
that the administration end the bombing of
its
Johnson
teams" around the country and recalling General West-
take the true measure of
200,000 men, and permit Westmoreland
to
of the year, dispatching government "truth
The stunning blow
as
If
go further, Johnson surely was
mcuinted a frenzied public relations campaign during the
the president to remove remaining restrictions on the as
but
levels,
of transferring greater respon-
The American commitment
up," military leaders and Congressional hawks pushed
bombing, increase American troop strength by
his options
Vietnam would continue.
moreland
success."
To keep
but
list,
200,000
the ground war to the South Vietnamese.
sibility for
The heavy
stantial losses could also be inflicted
sharing
appease the
target
on American troop
ceiling
"isolated islands in
cost in
To
a quarter of the
the general sought.
Da
the coast such as
become
Vietnam
further,
hawks he enlarged the Rolling Thunder
Vo
Lai would
same
reservations aK)ut the likelihood
Nguyen Giap, strongholds along
the open sea of the people's war."
don't
I
well have said the very
thing. Discouraged by the lack of progress in
engagements, prophesied North Vietnam's General
Nang and Chu
one housewife, "but
of military victory yet unwilling to concede defeat, he
1967 exacerbated the security
battles of
With major U.S.
lit-
foot."
problem, stretched American forces to the
tive.
in
involvement
in
Southeast Asia,
North Vietnam and cease propping up the Saigon
de-
re-
gime.
Meanwhile, opinion
polls charted a steady decline in
public support for the war and an equally steady rise in
the
number of Americans who disapproved of the way
the president was handling the situation in Vietnam.
What
the polls revealed more than anything else was a
profound confusion and uncertainty about the war.
116
"1
One of the
1,500 Murines defending
Con Thien
near the
DMZ
hraces for an incoming mortar round during a four-day battle with
North Vietnamese troops
in late
September 1967.
4^
^K»
out so
Sam Davis
Witness:
many more
The reason was
than the average
rount/.s
that the unit
was used to working together as a crew. first
replacements to join
and
it,
artillery crew.
had trained together and
I
I
was one of the
learned
how
work
to
with them.
On
November 17 we were
the night df
Mekong
Base Cudgel, right on the
at Forward
River, south of
My
Tho. Just before dark the major came to the camp
and
his helicopter
"The probability
said,
getting mortared tonight
is
anything about a ground
assault.
very good."
of you guys
He
didn't say
So we prepared
our-
of the water table you
selves as well as possible. Because
could dig down only about fourteen inches, then
From
murky paddies oi the Mekong Delta
the
skies over
to the
Hanoi, Vietnam was the scene oi countless
acts of bravery. For their intrepidity in the face of battle
and valor
in
Vietnam "above and beyond the
call of
duty," 238 Americans received their country's highest
One
award, the Medal o( Honor. L. Davis, a
of
sandbags to put around
beehive rounds
first
class in
vember 1967, when
his 9th Infantry Division base
under attack
in the
Mekong
Looking back
I
No-
came
difficult
n believe that )
I
or anyone
was cited for individual heroism. The situation that
else I
it
faced (m the night of the acticm was difficult and dan-
gerous, to be sure, but difficult
and dangerous
that address all the experiences that
As honored
as
I
am
Medal of Honor, to
honor
all
it
to
made up Vietnam.
have been chosen
to receive the
seems that there should be some way
the rest of the
men
in
my
unit
the other units that served in Vietnam. indiscriminate in
are words
its
selecti(m of
whom
and
Vietnam was it
called
when, and once called there was no refusing mands. The overwhelming majority of test
and met the challenge
—not
in all
men
and
its
de-
passed the
medals
for politics or
or any high sense of righteousness, since those things
little
At
2:00 on the button we heard the
tar slide if
down
a mortar attack lasts
at 2:30 fast
So when
this
one
And sure
enough,
and run
They were coming en masse from im-
us.
mediately across the river and from
my
NVA
majority of the
were coming from
and started firing.
I
C Battery, hard-working fact,
our
2d
When
the one firing the piece. the third round, the
NVA
unit.
call sign
was a statement
118
We
terrific,
did our jobs very, very well. In
was 'Automatic Five-Niner,
in itself
"
which
because we were able to put
direction.
the tube beehive,
nade right at our muzzle
I
pulled the lanyard on
fired a rocket-propelled gre-
blast.
It
hit the shield that 1
was hiding behind and the shield kind of exploded. got thousands of
little bitty
and was knocked unconscious,
my
foxhole.
They thought
Our guys
I
The other guys
and woke me
and half
lying half in
just gathered
make
my
it
guys
1
right
up the
and left
fell
me.
was dead.
fired
and when they
my
pieces of steel in
back to the next piece. That's why
Battalion, 4th Artillery, was a
had
and the
was the assistant gunner of our crew,
out of
all in it together.
my
We jumped up from our fi)xhi)les, dropped on the 105 MM gun for direct fire, loaded up a
guys they thought were alive and would
were
We
right.
four guns, each covering a different direction,
side
a
starting to yell
big was coming.
NVA
it's
lasted half an hcnir,
can't be felt by people covered with mud. Things hap-
we
enemy mor-
more than 6ve minutes,
we could hear the
toward
first
the tube. They were very close. Usually
pened because men made them happen,
just because
arrows ahnit
very devastating; high-
rounds, filled with chieu hoi ni)tes for the enemy.
we knew something find
with tlechettes,
white phosphorus; and propaganda
explosive rounds;
really long one.
Delta.
fill
We also stocked our artillery:
it.
an inch and a quarter long,
them was Sammy
twenty-one-year-old private
filled
in
beehive to keep the
fired the
up.
1
NVA
round some of the
had
a
off
the gun,
darts hit
tremendous buzzing
in
me my
hend, :inJ
took a
it
ing it
and what
until
my
I
had
to do.
Then
quit.
it
foxhole until
I
to
So
tired up.
My
head was
and
what, but
in
didn't have anything
I
The only I
if
alter-
could get
but
tired quite a
I
tell
few
what round was
more beehives and some
The
were
hadn 't
tired that
when
the howitzer, so
hit the recoil
jumping back and back.
but
it
went
After
I
had
It
It
would just suck
I tired it,
ended up
to load the last
of the guys I
gun
I
across the river. I
bad and couldn't get mattress and made
it
to
him by
One
and the
was shot
my
back,
I
tirst.
took the guy
me
On
was hurting
I I
took an air
the other side,
another
in the
head,
guy who had been
and the two other guys each river.
don't think they thought
who was wounded
the river so they
had more problems when
One of the
carried us through the experience
that everyone needed everyone
me
today
that time the
I
other men, and
I
the other
riverbank because of what
my
This
turn. is
We
a trait
all
— the building
and ceremonies
of events
my
kidney
We're just
Most
came out that
what
of
of the sense
if
We
the war
you helped
would both
would never have made for the efforts
it
of the
men came away
from the
did there, then
it
simply
us as well.
coming out over the
last
The few
of the Wall in Washington, the pa-
NVA
was medevacked the next
the heat,
looked out for each other.
movies, with the more
—
I
one who
made by
we brought home with
that have been
signs
in various cities, realistic
the books, the
understanding and view
are largely the product of our efforts, because
we're the ones
beehive darts had penetrated
if
I
No
task.
else,
had not been
to that riverbank if it
of the guys
had
— which
terror,
"
would help you tomorrow.
help a third the next day.
rades
some
man
you're only forty. But I'm hang-
simply by applying himself to the
guys. I spent the rest of the time
I
been pretty well whipped. I
when
Because
to dioxin.
internal organs work at the
or the tremendous physical demaiids
years
just tending to business, taking care of
day.
my
it,
don't think that a person can be honest and say, "I
went across
who had been wounded. By
exposure to
Most
delta.
today, except for
ing in there.
was
the worst across
get him up on the bank. Then
and got the other two
me
served there could escape or endure the
Our guys saw me swimming across
helped
throughout the
all
back problem, can be attributed
really confusing
when they
that's
knew
there would be anybody on their side of the river. I
Orange that was sprayed
is
was (me of
I
was exposed to dioxin from the Agent
rate of a seventy- or seventy-tive-year-old
We all kind of leaned on
NVA ran right past us;
I
just kept
other and helped each other back toward the
Some
and
in its original studies,
to take
hallway
Agent Orange
it
in a little creek
them
in the
Jersey
only took care of myself in Vietnam.
third in the foot. I threw the
leaned on each shoulder.
New
used by the
Then one
I lived.
saw one of our guys
across that way.
shot in the head over
down
and
of the things that are wrong with
my
They gave up die.
had more health problems.
men
Commission
lay
a
my body
hiuirs
of
round underwater,
myself, so
in the back,
I
us up,
blood
They would give me
probably
reached the wounded guy and found two more with
him.
He
my
where
across the river for told
They hooked
determined that
my
blood anyway, and
out in the hallway to
swam
Years later
temperature for
the moisture back out.
all
body just
vv/io/c
to the point
blood out of his arm for me.
I
tinished with the
lost a lot of
me
to buttermilk.
me and put me
the point
my
and within twenty-four
transfusion,
beside me.
thai
a 106-degree
it
off.
wounded
lying
if
broke some vertebrae in
killed me. Every time
eight feet away. I
guess
mechanism on
back. If it hadn't been for the soft mud,
would have
I
the gun went crazy.
I tired it
me and
just rolled over onto
I
side of the
gun we would have been overrun from
The grenade had
that side.
my
on the other
still
about twenty-tive to thirty meters away.
river, I
NVA
had
had
I
had almost turned
white phosphorus rounds and even some propaganda rounds.
a week.
I
the fever dehydrated
on
couldn't
four
I tired at least
iritcctioii,
more than
machine gun
I did.
I
got a kidticy
my M16 and tired
M60
the
ringing,
still
rounds. It was dark,
I
picked up
Then
what
and
kind of deteriorated.
just kept coming.
that's
together.
what was happen-
native was to get hold of the 105 and see it
it
/,'c'f
realized
1
I tired
quit.
it
and they
else to tire
mc
rime tor
lon
After maybe a tew minutes
who understand what
t.iking care of
each
of/ior.
has to be done. It's
what we do
best.
119
Focus:
back again, the guns were frequently shifted
to
prevent U.S. spotters from hxing their locations for
air
rolled
Con Thien
Although the Americans
force bombers. artillery
and
hundreds
to stop the
Con
of
toll
The
air strikes
men from
ing, the
1967 than the struKKle over
oi
DMZ
and the
battle for Hill
875
Con Thien
near the
in the central high-
lands. Both were long and hard fought, with each side
taking heavy casualties.
And
who occupied
piece of hell, just two miles from the
The cramped
outpost, barely big
was
it
An-
a little
160 meters
dirt
enough
trenches and sandbag-covered bunkers.
to hold
To
the
east
stretched the Trace, the 600-meter-wide firebreak the
Marines had cleared
for the
McNamara
Line. Equally
important, the hilltop strongpoint overlooked one of the principal
enemy
routes into South
the vast U.S. logistics complex at
away.
If
the
rines,
Vietnam
as well as
Dong Ha
ten miles
enemy ever occupied Con
Colonel Richard
Thien, observed
Smith, commander ot the 9th Ma-
B.
"he would be looking down our throats."
The men
of the
1st
Battalion, 9th Marines,
risoned the outpost, suffered from blazing heat
Con Thien and Gio
Linh, while American air
rain ot artillery
northern not
Con Thien
from
hills ot
t)nly well
at
the
who
gar-
and chok-
NVA
a .special misery
batteries tucked
was the
away
DMZ. The Communist
in
the
guns were
camouflaged but also sheltered
and other protected
120
artillery
punished the North Vietnamese with more
bush
set oft a
week
ot violent
when American
July 6,
encounters climaxing on
units hacked by tanks, naval
The
carnage,
behind
battle left
with some 800 enemy bodies and tons of
denn)lished
equipment scattered over the smoking,
blasted landscape. By the time the across the
DMZ
had been
diers
in
in
caves
positions. Rolled out to hre, then
NVA
had retreated
midmonth, nearly 1,300 enemy and
killed
Vietnamese regiment
at least
one
first-line
virtually destroyed.
on the North Vietnamese.
enemy returned
when
little
August the
In late
the attack and by early September,
tt)
the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, took over from the
ground
1/9,
sol-
North
Yet their horrendous casualties seemed to have effect
at-
a scene of indescribable
had erupted south of the
assaults
September 10 the 3/26 Marines engaged an
base.
On
NVA
entire
regiment tour miles from Ci)n Thien, which
itself
was
hit three days later.
Meanwhile, the Marines were experiencing one the heaviest shellings ot the war.
ing dust, from snipers and threats of ground attack. But
what made duty
fight-
1,000 artillery and mortar
Communist ground
revetments, and crisscrc^sed with
artillery
nearly
U.S. company. During the
a single
and helicopter gunships
an understrength battalion, was ringed by barbed wire, studded with
On July
wounded
fought off a ferocious nighttime
DMZ, Con Thien
was a barren, bulldozed plateau of red high.
it,
killed or
Thien.
gunfire, artillery, attack aircraft,
to local missionaries as the Hill ot
but to the Marines
gels,
Con
than 100 tons of napalm and high explosives. The am-
tack.
was known
noose around
exercises in
futility. It
a
at least to
both seemed,
the American troops wht) Kiught them,
and
a steady
NVA fired more than
rounds at
end
draw
North Vietnamese ambush
275
each day took
Marine battalions clashed with enemy
as other
units trying to
Nothing' better symbolized the stalemate reached by the
ot shells that
ThieiT's defenders.
heaviest fighting took place outside the wire,
however,
2 a
retaliated with
of their tiwn, they were not able
rit)d
Con Thien
Over one
ot
six-day pe-
endured twenty-four separate bombard-
ments, during which a total of more than 3,000 rounds ot artillery, rockets,
guered garrison. 1,200 rounds
and mortars crashed into the belea-
On
fell
September 25 alone, more than
within the perimeter.
thunderous cascade of
shells the
out the sounds that could life
and death
mean
— the "whump"
Marines
Under
that
tried to pick
the difference between
of mortars that
gave
a
man
ten seconds to seek cover, the whine ot artillery
five to
shells that could he heard three seconds hetore impact,
and
the terrible
whisper of enemy rockets that gave no
more than
a second's warning. But the
combined
ume
from U.S. and enemy guns
left
of
fire
even when the shelling stopped
porarily deaf, so that
men
the
make themselves
had to shout to
Adding
m^mth
early in September, tkx)ding trench
bunkers, and washing out land lines ot
lines, collapsing
communication. The
muddy quagmire
rain turned the laterite soil into a
some
that absorbed
frt)m high-explosive artillery shells, but it
heard.
was the nt)rtheast monsoon
to their misery
that arrived a
of the shrapnel
which
also
made
run for cover and eventually concealed so
difficult to
many dud rounds
Con Thien became
that
of unexploded ordnance.
At
a minefield
night, fog shrouded the
creating an even greater sense of isolation and
base,
When
magnifying every sound into an enemy attack.
was not raining
it
was
agony and
sodden that skin
feet so
sloughed off in long
They
mere touch was
a
a pale
shade of green
strips.
shared with
—
dank,
in
on resupply choppers
ammo
for
and
placement troops, carrying wounded men through of mud, and
all
men
bunkers they
filthy
eating only one or two C-rations a day
rats,
to save space
living
re-
a sea
the while listening for the constant cry
of "Incoming!" In addition to the
deadly barrages that
Duncan
|vvho took
—came
to record
what was happening
made
random pattern way
superstition a
there were also recoilless-rifle
of
of
life,
and rocket-propelled-
fire
grenade (RPG) sniping to contend with,
full-scale at-
at
Con
at
Dien Bien Phu. Westmorel.ind scoffed
fight,
he sent four Marine battalions circling the combat
ba.se to
keep enemy units
NVA
at the
have the North Vietnamese stand and
to
with "one
of
at
arm's length and
firepower in the history of the Vietnam War."
was called Operation Neutralize,
It
campaign
porting arms
—
control pilots
who
artillery
—along with forward
special long-range reconnaissance patrols that
locate additional targets.
pummeled an
The
was a growing anger and confusion among the Marines
concentrated, seven-week
They were and
bitter
frustrated with having to
and take
about being asked to die for "a
place," as one oi to
sit
measure up
them put
it,
to that of the
shit
it
l'n)le
wh(xse value did not seem
men
being wounded and crippled and
beside killed.
ards of the journey, reporters and
them who were Despite the haz-
cameramen
— uiclud-
Manhattan with
nearly 20,000 rounds from land artillery and naval gun-
and more than 40,000 tons of bombs. Together,
force, navy,
and Marine
pilots flew
5,200
sorties
air
during
the siege, including 820 B-52 Arc Light missions. Like the torrent of firepower furrowed the
a terrible plow,
earth for mile upon mile, saturating
NVA
troop
sites,
demolishing more than 200 enemy gun positions, and leaving the land a desolate moonscape of water-filled craters devoid of
The
fearful
life.
onslaught
North Vietnamese
finally
offensive.
broke the back of the
Although willing
more than 2,000 dead and many times
NVA
October 4 siege of
to accept
that
number
units were never able to concentrate
an all-out attack. Toward the end of
MACV
Con Thien
to taper off,
and on
headquarters announced that the
was over. As North Vietnamese
troops staggered back across the
about their predicament.
infil-
bomb damage and
area the size of
September enemy shelling began
Thien; nor
air
pinpointed targets for aerial strikes
trated the demilitarized zone to assess
assault
sup-
bombers, offshore
strike aircraft, strategic
naval guns, and heavy
and
a ft)rty-nine-day
invt)lving the entire spectrum of U.S.
sufficient forces for
Con
hammered
the greatest concentrations of
breaking point. Shell shock, relatively unheard of elseat
warn-
at their
Happy
along the wire that stretched a man's nerves to the
Vietnam, was not unusual
isolated base, por-
ings.
wounded,
in
of them, too,
traying a grim siege they likened to the French disaster
tacks that sent the adrenaline surging, and small probes
where
Some
Thien.
wisdom of holding the
(.|uestioned the
fire
called themselves "the walking dead," the
Con Thien
it
moisture
drizzling, the perpetual
producing skin rashes so painful that
of
vol-
many tem-
ing the great war photogr.ipher David
the pictures on the following pages]
DMZ,
the 1/9 Marines
relieved the battered 3d BattalitMi. But the ctimbat base itself
remained, a grim, depressing place of danger and
misery.
Thien
From t)r
no escape
—not
at
Con
anywhere along South Vietnam's northern
frontier in the
where
that there was
thiri.1
year of a war
whose end was no-
in sight.
121
122
.4r nii^hr inside the c:ir:K\>mh-like
iinJcr Ca)ii
(center)
hunkers
Tlucn, Ciprjin Frank Breth
briefs
platoon lieutenants from
Mike Company of the 3d Marines, wiiose
men
Battalion,
9th
were amon^; the oc-
cup.mts of the Hill of Angels during; a twonicinr/)
/on.i,'
siege in
September and Oc-
r,'bcr h>67.
123
^a^-^H :j*A^~
A
moment of
relative relaxation at the
landing zone in the rear of the Marine base.
J^
126
P/i()f(>t,'r;ip/H'r
PiiviJ
Diincnn's
caption CO this picture, his
tirst
ori^irnil
published
in
book War Without Heroes; "One man
WHS black
and stant £,'n;ii
days,
—one
enemv lite
white; the endless nights
con-
the rain-flooded trench, shelling, cigarettes,
and the
thcv shared were the sanie.
"
127
Opposite and above. M;irines dive tor cover as enemy gunners "walk" their
on the landing zone
LZ
in the rear
of the base,
tiring
artillery in
each volley progressively closer to the
until they tinally score a direct hit.
129
/ V
Sunset
.)f
(on
Thien.
131
the several months since they had been built and pro-
Focus: Hill 875
tected from air and artillery
bombardment by up
twelve feet of overhead cover.
The
underground bunkers commanded excellent
of
fields
from one bunker
to the
out exposing them to danger. Six days
fire,
enemy
while the interconnecting tunnels enabled the to shift troops rapidly
to
gun ports of the
slit
next with-
men
earlier,
of
the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, had been badly mauled
NVA
trying to take out a pair of
nearby
As
hill.
morning
early
bunkers on another
the Gls checked their weapons in the
had few
mist, they
about what
illusions
lay ahead.
At By the time of the "horder
which Con Thien was the
1967, of
battles" in late
the war had
first,
become
a
bloody contest of regular armies and conventional arms.
Nowhere was
this
more evident than
at
beginning in early November 16,000
on the
1st
of western
engagements
battlefield.
1
NVA
Regiment.
units fought
until the incessant
pound-
North Vietnamese
73d Airborne Brigade, the their
On November
Cambo-
18 a Special
ran into the heavily
The next day
to take the hill.
was one oi the most savage
bamboo
battles of the
closely spaced trees,
thickets. Hill
brigade
What
field
comBat-
followed
Vietnam War.
at the top into a
the
hill
dense brush, and
875 rose gradually from the
rounding jungle toward two ridge broad "saddle."
sur-
lines that leveled off
The enemy had turned
into a fortress, lacing the slopes with bunkers
and trenches linked by tunnels and well-constructed trails
cut into the sides of the
fications spiraling
hill.
downward from
The
elaborate forti-
the summit were cam-
ouflaged with natural vegetation that had grown up in
132
of the
lead companies advanced slowly over the tangled trees
bunker only fell
five
Suddenly, the
The
rest of
As
logs.
came forward the enemy added
and grenades
Two men
the squad dropped their
packs and spread out behind fallen icans
hill.
the
Amer-
recoilless-rifle fire
to the withering barrage, then
launched from farther up the
NVA
concealed
a
meters from the point squad.
within seconds.
When
B40 rockets
the firing eased
momentarily, the paratroopers resumed their advance, tossing grenades into the bunker as they passed. But
sooner had
it
stopped than the shooting resumed
from above and from the bunker where those the grenades had been replaced by other
no
— both
killed by
NVA
soldiers
scrambling through hidden tunnels. Artillery
and
by pounding
But the
Covered with
began cutting
The men
ridge.
mander General Leo H. Schweiter ordered the 2d 503d Infantry,
A
by the bombing until they
entrenched enemy on Hill 875, ten miles from 173d
talion,
a landing zone out of the thick jungle.
left
Communist
company
headquarters at Ben Het.
Company
hill
air
up the northern
first
dian sanctuaries. Left behind to guard their retreat was
Forces mobile reaction
the base of the
and
artillery
started
neared the crest of the
Communists withdrew southwest toward
the 174th
D
jungle wilderness
Pursued by elements of the 4th In-
and the
fantry Division
At
preparatory
and
opened up with automatic weapons from
ing of U.S. air and artillery drove the
from the
C
and splintered bamboo
Province.
Feu two weeks American and a series of costly
after
Companies
took
allied troops
NVA Division in the steep, Kontum
Dak To, where
slope.
A.M.,
9:43
strikes.
tactical air tried to take the pressure off
enemy
men on
positions above the line of advance.
the ground were being hit by machine
guns, mortars, and sniper
fire.
Then
NVA
helmets camouflaged, faces painted black, in burlap, rushed the
"Jesus, they
were
all
attackers,
rifles
Americans from every
direction.
over the place," remembered one
Gl. "The noncoms kept shouting, 'Get up the
up the goddam
hill.'
wrapped
hill,
bogged down and casualties mounting, Company
commander Captain Harold
men
to pull back.
get
But we couldn't." With the assault
J.
C
Kaufman ordered the
The headlong withdrawal was
so pre-
Kaufman had
cipitous that
to
his pistol in the air to
tire
Their panic averted, the paratroopers
K)restall a rout.
estahhshed a perimeter within a few meters of where the battle
that
had begun, then dug
came
At
in furiously
with anything
the bottom of the
A
Company
hill,
meanwhile,
just collecting
firefight
soldiers tore
squad trt)m
a
some power saws and
when North
other equipment dropped by helicopter
Vietnamese
through the clearing.
drove the squad up the
toward
hill
A
brief
Company
A's main position, the GIs dropping fragmentation gre-
nades back
enemy
down
the
trail in a futile
As they reached
assault.
attempt to slow the
the rest of the company,
mortar shells erupted around the Americans followed by
waves of screaming
NVA
infantrymen. Defense lines
disintegrated under the impact of the mass attack that
bers of the
Company
A command
within
meters of U.S.
fifty
dropped
a
One
lines.
more
ing forty-five
and pieces o{ charred
limbs, bloody bandages,
uniforms hurtling through the night. "Heaps of dead after that
didn't
You
bomb,"
know where
D,
men
know where
slept with the corpses."
With most
company commanders
of the battalion's
dead or wounded,
junit)r t)tficers
NCOs
and
the mistaken bombing, U.S. artillery rounds started to
toward Companies
C and
the carnage by firing
on the
until cries of "Friendly! Friendly!" ena-
to
The
battalion was
300 North Vietnamese
men
until a platoon sergeant crawling frantically
now
soldiers,
and B40
rockets.
One
soldier
surrounded by up
who continued
had
to
his
was dragged to a
tree for cover by a
was shot through the head. shouted warnings, a lieutenant
still
sergeant
medic who himself
Despite
the
sergeant's
tried three times to
new wound with each
sergeant finally died,
M60 machine
hand. Nearby a wounded
gun blown out of
him, suffering a
his
As
the ninety-degree daytime temperature
the troopers cursed the
attempt.
tion from
down
six ot the
choppers. Just before dusk helicopter crews dcxlging snipers in trees dropped two pallets of
ammunition
American perimeter. The beleaguered
man and
toward
left in
fifty,
rucksacks
nature by burrowing into the earth
splintered
ammo
and worse.
weapons,
Said
boxes,
one survivor,
"Every time you tried to dig you put your shovel in
somebody."
AC-47
All during the hours of darkness
over the flares.
hill,
perimeter, exist,
gunships flew
illuminating the eerie scene with brilliant
But nothing could abate the terror of that night:
The
pleading with the officer not
that brought
clothing
fell
found their task complicated by discarded
GIs hollering
soldiers
fire
warm
wounded men begging
during the afternoon, but relief helicopters were driven
the
the
sporadic mortar and recoilless-rifle
Supplies of water and ammunition dwindled steadily
heavy enemy
finally raised
direction center and adjusted the errant guns.
reach
to try to rescue him.
off by
fire
scattered across the battlefield. Soldiers seeking protec-
attack the paratroopers with mortars, automatic weapons,
took charge
group. After fifteen
other
Together, the Americans temporarily halted the main assault.
to hide.
of the situation, which ct)ntinued to deteriorate. After
five
bled the survivors to gain the perimeter.
NVA
"You
recalled a stunned defender. to go, you didn't
from one shattered radio to another
retreating
men and wound-
concussion that sent
in a gigantic
geant Jack Siggers collected what remained of the com-
whose men compounded
The
target.
on the battalion command
fell
post and aid station, killing forty-two
human
fighter-bomber,
500-pound bomb short of the
high-explosive canister
hit the
hill
Skyraid-
300 miles an hour,
at
minutes of vicious hand-to-hand combat, platoon Ser-
pany and staggered up the
A-1
F-lOOs, pn)peller-driven
and helicopter gunships bombarded enemy positions
mem-
Captain Michael Kiley and
also killed
ers,
they had rested largely with air support.
fell
screaming toward the enemy
to hand.
was
What hopes As darkness
who
Meanwhile,
in
frustration
ripping across the
water that did not
and rage
at
enemy
taunted them with threats of destruction. at the
bottom of the
checked their weapons and
ammunition
fire
for
as
filled
hill,
reinforcements
their packs with extra
they prepared to relieve their tclKnv
paratroopers.
inside
paratr(.)opers
On
the morning ot
November 20 Lieutenant Colonel
reloaded their weapons, but few believed they would
James H. Johnson's 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, moved
make
up the
it
through the night.
hill
through a
litter
of smashed vegetation, aban-
133
doned
and
gear,
battalion spent
lifeless
Climbing cautiously, the
bodies.
day negotiating the 7,000 yards to
all
many
the 2d Battalion. Along the way they passed so
dead Americans they began
was
to
As
rimeter remained precarious.
the Associated Press's
Arnett reported from the
Peter
wounded cracked under " 'It's a
in his eyes early
He had been
on the
wound. All around him see
who had
other
lay scores of
lain there the longest.
they had ceased
Blood had clotted their bandages, their eyes
hours with a
tor fifty
hill
were glazed." Enemy snipers
firing
automatic weapons from treetops continued to drive relief helicopters. Just before
managed
to land
and carry out
men, but dozens more were
As
night.
wounded
tive critically
left to suffer
through another
the clatter ot helicopter blades faded in the
early evening darkness, the 4th Battalion's Bravo
pany
ott
dark one medevac chopper
finally
reached the
men
ot the 2d,
at the sight ot their rescuers.
who
Com-
cried openly
By 10:00 the remainder
ot
Early the next morning, the
newed with
re-
died together.
A
as the
day wore on.
dog handler and
Men who
his
were joking
with you and ottering cigarettes would be writhing on
wounded and pleading
There was no water
That
a ravine
rage crashed
and started
down on
uphill
when
a
mortar bar-
the head ot the column, killing
wounding dozens of men. While medics tended the
casualties, the battalion grimly
pushed forward. Crawl-
ing up the steep slope, the soldiers found themselves
under intense
fire
Not
managed
until they
from mutually supporting bunkers. to pull themselves within a few
meters of the concealed fortifications, however, could
enemy
they locate the bunkers by the muzzle smoke of rifles.
when
NVA
Their ranks had been steadily thinned by
machine-gun
fire
and grenades during the climb. Now,
enemy entrenchments,
they finally found the
weapons proved
Part of the problem was that
been trained
their
useless.
none of the men had
to use flame throwers.
More
to the point
was the care the North Vietnamese had devoted to their fortifications. dirt
Mortar
shells failed to penetrate the thick
covering that protected the bunkers, while rockets
narrow bunker
rec]uired a direct hit into
firing holes.
the results were not always satisfactory.
to
One
do
so,
group of
troopers fired a dozen rockets directly into a bunker
Cerman shepherd
later.
through
porthole, only to be met with grenades and machine-
after foxhole took hits.
the ground
with flame throwers, shoulder-hred antitank
and 81 MM mortars, the troopers had moved out
pounding the Americans
wrote that "the foxholes got deeper
Fc«hole
Armed rockets,
mortars throughout the day. Peter Arnett
their furious attack,
82mm
North Vietnamese
4th Battalion resumed the
of artillery, the
Even when marksmen occasionally managed
the 4th Battalion had arrived at the U.S. perimeter.
last-
assault.
or
that they haven't gotten us
afternoon Tuesday Ithe twenty-first].
lying
wounded. You could
moaning,
the
ot
gasped one paratroop sergeant with tears
t)ut ot here,'
painful groin
"Some
hill,
the strain.
goddam shame
minute wall
wonder whether anyone
alive to save. In fact, the situation at the pe-
left
high explosives. At 3:00 in the afternoon, behind a
for
them
for
or
water minutes
anyone
gun
fire
from enemy soldiers who had taken refuge
commanders
tried
day, however, the paratroopers cut a hillside
sending
individuals
with
satchel
charges or napalm and grenades against the bunkers, but the intensity of
fire
Making matters
else."
in a
connecting tunnel during the barrage. Some platoon
of their
own
that
made
it
difficult to get close
worse, the
NVA
began
enough.
tiring rockets
bounced down the slope and exploded
landing zone out of the bullet-scarred trees surrounding
among
their position. Helicopters were finally able to bring in
the paratroopers.
desperately needed food and water and evacuate the 2d
infantrymen using prepared avenues of entry and with-
Battalion's for
wounded. The dead would remain on the
another day. While these tasks were going on
way up the north
ter.
For seven hours
air strikes
and
II
half-
of dirt that sheltered to falter,
enemy
drawal from the battlefield attacked the battalion's flanks
and
rear, isolating small units
and wiping them out one
they had done to the 2d Battalion two days
by one
as
Corps could mus-
earlier.
By sheer determination the Americans captured
artillery battered
the
summit with more than 15,000 pounds of napalm and
134
mounds
As the advance began
was being
slope, the top of the hill
pounded with every supporting arm
hill
the fallen logs and
a pair of trench lines within
250
feet ot the
summit, but
the gains could not be consolidated and the assault
ground U)
Attcr dark the 'battered trtxipers gath-
a halt.
ered their casualties and pulled back to the original pe-
more than
rimeter,
half their
number
November
Since the beginning ot the battle on
Major General William R.
Peers,
commander
had promised reporters
Infantry Division,
wounded.
killed or
19,
ot the 4th
head-
at his
resistance in the area disappeared as the 1st
vision withdrew into
Cambodia. The
battle
NVA
had
ct)st
North Vietnamese an estimated 325 dead and ciently
damaged the 174th
NVA
Regiment
out of action during the next phase ot the
to
Di-
the
suffi-
keep
it
Communist
winter-spring offensive. General Westmoreland lauded
enemy the
quarters that Hill 875 would soon be in U.S. hands.
the paratroopers for their part in denying the
Now,
spectacular victory he sought, and the 173d received a
to
after
two attempts
to
do so had
end North Vietnamese resistance once and
November
All day and into the night of aircraft blasted Hill
and rockets
enemy
for
all.
American
22,
Presidential Unit Citation for
on
875 with tons of bombs, napalm, up the
a thunderous effort to soften
in
vowed
failed, Peers
by the airborne troopers.
before a final assault
Simultaneously, Peers placed the fresh
Battalion,
1st
12th Infantry, in a supporting position south of the
hill.
what
it
had accomplished
Hill 875.
men
of the 2d and 4th Battalions, 503d In-
had paid
a stiff price tor their heroism; 158 dead
But the fantry,
and 402 wounded strength.
"With
correspondent
—
nearly 15 percent of the brigade's
victories like this,"
watching
the
wondered
By 11:00 A.M. on November 23, Thanksgiving Day,
from helicopters, "who needs defeats?"
everything was ready.
was being asked more and more
Led by Bravo Company, the 4th Battalion scrambled back up the
behind
hill
though they encountered some sniper bered over the horrific landscape fighting, there later,
was
little
MM
a shield of 81
resistance.
mortars. Al-
fire as
left
by
they clam-
five
days of
Twenty-two minutes
shouting "Geronimo!" and "Airborne!" the troop-
was not a question
nalists
men
and
U.S.
as
It
that question
1967 came to a close,
for soldiers to answer.
While
jour-
politicians debated the course of the war, the
of the 173d held a service for the dead, laying out
the boots of their fallen comrades in simple tribute to those
whc^i
hill in
had perished
in a terrible battle
on
a
nameless
the middle of a jungle half a world from home.
ravaged summit. But their cries echoed
ers scaled the
hollowly in the smoke that
and clung
craters
it
a
wounded disembarking
NVA
during the previous night the
bomb
swirled around the
still
to the charred tree stumps.
Sometime
had slipped away,
taking most of their dead along with their weapons. All that remained of the a
enemy presence atop
NVA's
few blackened bodies and the
To
bunkers.
from
fire
ended. Said
After
nearby ridge-top, but their
1st
Lieutenant Alfred Lindseth oi
no
left
all
was
all
the blood there vvttuld be
simply sat
remained of the
down enemy
in
the
fortifi-
Later that afternoon helicopters carried in a
Thanksgiving dinner
The
soon
happy day when we found
The weary Gls
dust and surveyed what
sauce,
a
fire
Company
the hill."
the sweat and
final battle.
cations.
were
on the summit with mor-
a
B, 4th Battalion, "It
they had
hill
cover their retreat, the Communists ha-
rassed the paratroopers arriving tar
the
trench-works and
of
hot sliced turkey,
cranberry
and potatoes. battle of Hill
875 was the climax of the Dak
To
campaign. During the remainder of November enemy
135
lr#SS^
''^. Kfr%
w^
A
paratrooper rushes past his buddies
to-
ward a more secure position farther up Hill 875. Although stripped of
its
vegetation
by napalm and bombs dropped by U.S. craft,
air-
the hill was covered with triple-can-
opy jungle at the beginning of the
making
it
difficult for
•-^
battle,
the paratroopers to
detect North Vietnamese bunkers. \,>
*ifi^* 136
''« '
'
II
jixn
', ^^.
m ^
il!t
^ :
i^A rf^*
-'^ "^
Y^ 'T r
.'.m-
,
^
""y
-:
(
iiS^r.\
-^^Mm^:
Jkfr
"'* -^"d^-
JH
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.
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r.
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;^NP #1"^
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fi"..,,
^HMHHHjH
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^Jafc''*'^^
^HP
t».
^^
F
j^R.j2 J^^
/
-
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i
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i
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ife^
.,1
k
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Sfij^^'
•.
"
;
Ji
li^^^^^:ijffl
g|
J
A
trooper tags one of the fatalities tor
moval from the the contest's tire
hill
first
on November
2i.
re-
In
two days, intense enemy
prevented U.S. helicopters trom land-
ing to evacuate casualties.
Fcillowing page.
Thanksi:i\ing
Day l%7.
on Hill 875.
ry9
m "X..
-J^:.
•4.
f^.
y -.•*••
ir*%
fj^
/^
-NTOS -T'^*-
"t.
^a^ir
4r>'*'r
'.•^I
/TV,
4
THE TET OFFENSIVE
At
10:30 P.M. on January
in northwestern
someone
Quang
Khe Sanh Comhat Base
1968, the hark of a sentry dog at
2,
Tri Province alerted U.S. Marine lookouts to the presence of
just outside the defensive wire.
scopes, the Marines could see six
men,
all
Peering through their night-vision Starlight dressed in
walking along. Since no friendly patrols were reported
American uniforms, nonchalantly squad led hy Second
in the area, a
Lieutenant Nile B. Buffington was sent to investigate. As he approached the perimeter, Butfington called out to the
men
to identify themselves.
There was no
tenant repeated the challenge. At that point one of the strangers as
if
fell
reaching for a weapon or grenade.
The Marines opened
made
fire.
The
lieu-
movement,
Five of the intruders
dead, while the sixth escaped into the darkness carrying what was believed to he a
case of maps. Intelligence later identified three ot those killed as the ations officer,
When
and communications
news
officer of a
of the incident reached
moreland was not 1
reply.
a quick
surprised. In recent
Corps had increased dramatically,
outpost at
Khe Sanh. American
North Vietnamese sions
divisions
had been sighted
Convinced
that the
Vietminh had
commander, oper-
North Vietnamese regiment.
MACV
headquarters in Saigon, General West-
weeks the pace of
NVA
northern
infiltration into
Marine
particularly in the vicinity of the isolated
two
intelligence analysts believed that one, perhaps
had moved into the
area, while
full
elements of two other divi-
inside the demilitarized zone within striking distance o{ the base.
enemy intended
to "restage
Dien Bien Phu," where
decisively beaten the French fourteen years before,
ordered the Marines to reinforce Khe Sanh in mid-December.
evidence of the enemy's presence, the American
commmandcr
Ho Chi
Minh's
Westmoreland had
Now,
faced with fresh
decided to meet the
Com-
munist challenge head-on.
To
bolster allied
maneuver
A
manpower
battalions to
1
in the north,
C'orps,
Viercon^ rocket cxpLkIcs inrc Lh
Westmoreland
shifted
more than half of
beginning with the redeployment of the
N.i/it,'
Air Base
in rhc c.irlv im>rnini:
/icxyr.s
1st
ot l.ininiry
his
Cavalry
iC.
1968.
Division (Airmobile) on January
two more battalions a battalion of
MACV
time
of
He
9.
also dispatched
Marines to Khe Sanh, alon^ with
South Vietnamese Rangers. began laying plans
officials
concentrated application of tory of warfare.
mean-
In the
most
for the
aerial firepower in the his-
Called Niagara, a
name chosen
evoke the image of cascading bombs and
"to
shells," the
operation called for the use of some 3,000 strike aircraft to
pound suspected enemy
positions around the clock,
2,000 helicopters and cargo planes to keep the
as well as
Washington, President Johnson closely mon-
in
impending
the
itored
with
confrontation
growing
unease. Haunted by the specter of the massive French defeat fourteen years before,
the commander-in-chief
began making nightly
the
tion
Room, where
model
of the
request.
As
visits to
a large
Khe Sanh
White Ht^use
area had been installed at his
more
the prospect of a major attack grew
his ad-
about the wisdom of holding the base and
ulti-
when
a result,
North Vietna-
the
midnight on January
Hill 861 at half past
21, the Marines were waiting for them. After turning
NVA's
back the
initial
men
charge, the
of
Company down
3d Battalion, 26th Marines, counterattacked
and overrate the enemy
hill
No
combat.
savage hand-to-hand
in
artillery
and rocket
the main base, blasting holes in the
slammed
It
for cover,
never came. For reasons that
clear only later, the
not to exploit their advantage,
NVA
had decided
at least for the
moment.
Khe Sanh had begun.
siege of
While Westmoreland and the president focused on the showdown
attention
American
in
northern
military officials were
South Vietnam.
in
their
Corps, some
I
becoming equally con-
cerned about the pattern of Communist activity
where
into
destroying
The Marines scrambled
expecting a mass assault.
would become
fire
airstrip,
and detonating some 1,500 tons of
several helicopters,
The
K,
the
sooner had the fighting subsided than a
heavy barrage of
Situa-
photomural and sand table
imminent, the president repeatedly questioned visers
mese assaulted
stored ammunition.
base resupplied.
Back
As
the intelligence.
In Saigon,
II
Field Force
else-
com-
mander Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand was
mately took the unprecedented step of requiring a writ-
troubled by reports that several Main-Force Vietcong
ten endorsement of General Westmoreland's decision
units
from each member of the Joint Chiefs of
to the capital. Uncertain
The
Staff.
Khe
high-level debate over the investment of
Sanh was
still
going on when, on the afternoon of Jan-
uary 20, a North Vietnamese officer holding a white flag
suddenly materialized at the eastern end of the combat base.
Identifying himself as First Lieutenant Le
Tone, the
wanted
soldier
to defect.
Marine interrogators that he
told
He
Than
then proceeded to provide a wealth
had
and
ARVN
enemy
NVA
Division and the 304th
were preparing to overrun Khe Sanh, then sweep
east-
ward across Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces ward Hue. The campaign was
to-
to begin that very night
with attacks on the main base and two outlying
hills
Though Tone seemed
to
know more "than would be
officer in his position,"
Rathvon McC. Thompson decided ing to lose
144
and stood
of
it
but assum-
American
in
battalions back
meanwhile uncovered
forces
centers.
On
January
4, soldiers of the
vision captured Operation Order
on
ARVN
later.
Qui Nhon
in
of
4th Infantry Di1
calling for
On
an
January
Thuot, capital of Darlac Province.
South Vietnamese military
security agents
broke into a meeting of Vietcong cadres
and seized two prerecorded tapes declaring the
town and
tion" of the port lation to rise
series
Division discovered similar plans for
Me
an attack on Ban
A week
No.
the provincial capital of Pleiku.
23d
a
on other population
up against the
calling
on the
"libera-
local
popu-
GVN.
Aside from the redeployment recommended by Gen-
occupied by the Marines.
expected of an
make
orders calling for attacks
20, the
325C
to
closer
from border assignments to the outskirts of Saigon. U.S.
assault
Division, an elite home-guard unit from Hanoi,
what
camps and moved
Weyand convinced Westmoreland
early January to pull fifteen
firmed what the Americans already suspected. According to Tone, the
their jungle base
ing the worst,
of information about the enemy's intentions that con-
NVA
left
Marine General
that
"we had noth-
to gain a great deal," by acting
on
eral little
into
Weyand, however, heed its
to the
the
American command paid
accumulated evidence that had
hands. Believing the
ing serious attacks
on the
enemy incapable
cities,
fallen
of mount-
most U.S. intelligence
—
A
B-52 Stratofonress
the
Communist Tet
leaves
Guam
heading
for a mission in support of the beleaguered
lift
flagging
Communist
empty boasts
with a wave of simultaneous attacks on virtually every population center in South Vietnam. By taking the war
concluded that the documents represented an
ers
tempt
to divert attention
battlefield to the north.
As one high-ranking
exactly what was to take place, I
at-
and resources from the main
intelligence officer later conceded,
that
it
"Even
if
1
MACV
had known
was so preposterous
probably would have been unable to
sell
it
to
anybody."
The
plan that defied the credulity of the Americans in
Hanoi
in the spring of 1967, the product
of a major strategic reappraisal by the North Vietnamese leadership.
to the cities, the
Under
pressure from the southern
nists to accelerate the
Commu-
timetable for "liberation," yet
Communist
several purposes at once.
shatter any illusions of
At
refugees
At
who had
best, they
tied
to achieve
invulnerability as well
by hundreds of thousands of
from the war
would break the back
overthrow
hoped
leaders
the very least, they would
American
as the sense of security felt
a popular
was hatched
1968 during
in early
troop morale. Oth-
specialists dismissed the captured orders as
designed to
Marine outpost at Khe Sanh
offensive.
ot the
GVN,
in the countryside.
ot
ARVN,
instigate
and torce the Amer-
icans to accept a negotiated settlement.
Responsibility for planning the campaign was placed in the
hands of General
North Vietnamese defense
Now
Vo Nguyen
Giap.
minister, he
had orchestrated
the Vietminh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu.
unable to break the military stalemate brought on by the
Although Giap had personally opposed the
introduction of U.S. troops, the Politburo decided to
launching a general offensive, considering
inaugurate the third and final stage of the revolutionary struggle
— the
General Offensive, General Uprising
the
mature,
tt)o risky,
and potentially too
costly,
carried out the Politburo's will. During the
it
idea
ot
too pre-
he dutifully fall
of 1967,
145
an
in
etturt
Americans away from the
lure the
ti)
and screen the
Thien along the DMZ, Loc Ninh
lands, at
of major confron-
a series
South Vietnamese
tations alonfi the
Cambodian
and supplies
infiltration of fresh troops
from the North, he initiated
Dak To
at
sumed they would,
frontier
—
in the central high-
Khe Sanh.
Americans responded
as
Giap
munists a crushing blow. In the meantime the to lay the
pre-
diverting large numbers of troops to
groundwork
To undermine
activity in urban areas.
Com-
NLF
at-
for a general uprising of
the people of South Vietnam by stepping up
vincial capitals, five of six major cities, sixty-four district
towns, and
hamlets across the length and breadth
fifty
The
of South Vietnam.
be
Field Force, was the
I
on January
shortly after midnight
hit,
town of Nha Trang,
coastal
headquarters of the U.S.
on other towns within the
Corps area
II
first
its
political
the Thieu gov-
lowed
The next
in rapid succession.
to
30. Assaults
— Ban Me —
Thuot, Kontum, Hoi An, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku
the remote battle zones in the hope of dealing the
tempted
Con
at
Fishhook region along the
in the
border, and finally at
In each case the
cities
fol-
Com-
night the
munists expanded the scope of the offensive, penetrating in strength into I
Corps,
ital
Quang
Tri City,
Tam
Tuy Hoa and Phan Thiet
in
II
Hue
Ky, and
in
Corps, the Cap-
Military District of Saigon, and every provincial and
Mekong
district capital in the
Not
the
surprisingly,
Delta.
Communists
directed
their
ernment and sow discord between the Americans and
heaviest blow against Saigon and
South Vietnamese, Vietcong agents established clan-
environs, hurling thirty-five battalions into the battle
destine contacts with U.S. Embassy
mors of imminent peace ists
to
form
talks,
new "popular
a
officials,
spread ru-
and encouraged neutral-
front" in anticipation of a
In January 1968 Vietcong guerrillas began infiltrating
the cities disguised as civilians or
turning
home
also
predetermined
at
during the
last
manders learned
New
headquarters,
on January
mark the advent
and
memorably
if
the
ARVN
the
palace,
national
radio
most
and,
station
Embassy compound.
A
19-man sapper squad occupied
while a small contingent of Marine guards held the con-
29, the eve of Tet, it
came
ers relieved
them and
took
Some 4,000
to 5,000
Ho Chi
Year of the Monkey.
killed or captured the sappers.
Vietcong
local troops struck other
key targets simultaneously, including the airfield,
Tan Son Nhut
while small squads of armed political cadres city's residential districts
and ex-
outshines rise
up against "the dictatorial
the previous springs
Thieu-Ky regime." Outside the Main-Force units
victories throughout the land
come happy
on the
Joint General Staff
part of the embassy grounds for six hours that night
horted the Saigonese to
Oi
men and
Battalion spear-
not most successfully, the United States
fanned out into the far
the highly trained
C-10 Sapper
sulate building, until an assault force of U.S. paratroop-
of the
This Spring
effort,
com-
as unit
the form of a poetic exhortation written by to
in,
war
time what their missions
the order to attack. Brt)adcast by Radio Hanoi,
Minh
Year)
smuggled
of North Vietnamese General Tran
assault with a series of daring raids
presidential
Preparations inten-
week of the month
for the first
be. Finally,
sites.
headed the
densely populated
the task of paralyzing the "nerve cen-
of the Vietcong
soldiers re-
in false-bottom trucks or vegetable carts
then buried
would
upcoming Tet (Lunar
Weapons and munitions were
concealed
sified
for the
ARVN
command
ters" of the allied
women
negotiated settlement.
holiday.
under the
Van Do. Assigned
its
tried to pin
capital,
down
Khe, and
Cu
and
VC
allied reaction forces
by assaulting the U.S. military bases
tidings
NVA
at
Bien Hoa, Lai
Chi.
Forward!
much
the
Although caught by
sur-
Elsewhere the enemy's plan of attack was Total Victory will be ours.
same, and so were the
results.
During the next twenty-four hours more than 70,000 soldiers of the
People's
—backed by
cong
Army launched
146
Liberation
regular units of the
attacks
on
Army
— the
Viet-
North Vietnamese
thirty-six of fofy-four pro-
One of the
few survivors from the Communist sapper team that
penetrated the U.S. Embassy military poUce.
compound
in
Saigon
is
led
away by
is
jm-
* -.~v*
••fe
-
«^
r^^^^
South Vietnamese and American
prise,
forces reacted
using their superior mobility and firepower to
swiftly,
maximum
advantage and with devastating
Poor
effect.
timing and faulty execution also undermined the
Com-
munists' efforts, as did the unwillingness of most civilians to take up arms in support of their would-be "lib-
Only
erators."
district of
on
to hold
dozen places, such
in a
Cholon
more than
for
as the
populous
in Saigon, did the invaders a
manage
few days, and even then
only at staggeringly high cost. U.S. estimates of
Com-
munist casualties during the Tet campaign ranged high as ^0,000
as
whom came units. The NLF
killed, the vast majority of
from the ranks of Vietcong Main-Force
political infrastructure also suffered crippling losses, as
many
previously unidentified local cadres exposed them-
selves in
an attempt to foment a general uprising.
The exception
was the brutal battle of
to the pattern
Hue. After storming the
city
and
seizing the imperial
Citadel on the night of January 31, 7,500
NVA regulars
held out for more than three weeks in the face of an increasingly furious counterattack. raged, the
Communists
set
up their
While the
own
fighting
"revolutionary
government" and began rounding up alleged "collaborators,"
more than 2,000 of
whom
ecuted. By the time the ordeal
were summarily ex-
came
to an end,
much
of the once beautiful city had been reduced to ruins, streets
choked with rubble and
Years ficials
later, a
number
"its
rotting bodies."
of high-ranking
Communist
of-
candidly admitted their disappointment at the
outcome of the Tet wrote General Tran
mander
in the
offensive.
Van
South
"During Tet of 1968,"
Tra, a senior
at the time,
Communist com-
"we did not correctly
evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves
and the enemy" and
As
actual strength."
set goals "that
a result,
"we
were beyond our
suffered large losses in
materiel and men, especially at various echelons, which clearly
weakened
us."
General Tran
cinctly: "In all honesty,"
viewer in 1982, "we didn't achieve
which was
to spur uprisings
South Vietnamese
on January
soldiers drag
31, during the
Do
put
it
more
he told an American cnir
maui
suc-
inter-
iib|cctive,
throughout the Siuith."
away
a Vietcong guerrilla killed
enemy's surprise attack on government
buildings in Saition.
149
Yet
Communists
the
if
failed to
achieve their ultimate
objectives, they succeeded nonetheless in altering irrev-
ocably the course of the Vietnam War.
The unprece-
base must be held and that Westmoreland be given
whatever reinforcements he needed, Johnson told senior advisers to "review
his
options," including an ex-
all
dented magnitude and intensity of the offensive stunned
tension of enlistments, a call-up of the Reserves, a troop
the South Vietnamese and sent shock waves across the
increase in Vietnam, even a declaration of war.
United
Though
States.
initial
news reports tended
to
To
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
new mood
exaggerate the enemy's military successes, the sense of
Earle Wheeler,
pervasive confusion that they conveyed was not
far off
offered an opportunity to resolve fundamental issues that
recent
had been deferred too long. Since 1965 Wheeler and
making "steady progress,"
the other Joint Chiefs had urged Johnson to mobilize
Having been repeatedly assured
the mark.
months
that the allies were
in
that "the light at the end of the tunnel" had at last
come of
many Americans
into view,
venerable
"What
newsman Walter Cronkite.
television
the hell
exclaimed soon
is
shared the reaction
going on
here.''"
the president's
the Reserves, not only to meet the demands of the escalating
Vietnam War
mitments. But LBJ, remembering the public outcry that
1961 Berlin
had repeatedly vetoed the
crisis,
downplay the
in the
wake of Tet,
might
at last
General Westmoreland's attempts
to
over Khe Sanh, did
to lessen the widening credibility gap
between
of-
pronouncements and popular perceptions. Dra-
ficial
matic videotape footage of the bloody fighting in Saigon
and Hue, the
stark
photograph of the South Vietnamese
police chief, General Loan, executing a Vietcong pris-
oner
at
major
pointblank range, the offhand remark of an army
at
Ben Tre
the town to save
became necessary
that "it
it"
—
all
seemed
to destroy
to confirm the
growing
conviction, as the editors of the Cleveland Press put
it,
Wheeler decided
tough. 2
At
a
White House
press conference
he described the offensive
have known
as a
some time
for
on February
"complete failure." that
this
offensive
planned by the enemy," the president declared. ability to
prepared
and met." For
all
a
he sent Westmoreland
3,
strongly suggesting that the field
request for more troops.
I
Corps and
commander
"The United
States
is
put in a
not pre-
pared to accept a defeat in South Vietnam," Wheeler
summary,
if
you need more troops, ask
a further enticement,
White House was
for
Wheeler indicated that
actively considering
an expansion
of the ground war into eastern Laos, or perhaps even into
North Vietnamese
to relieve pressure
staging areas across the
on Khe Sanh.
When
DMZ,
Westmoreland
"We
replied that another division might be needed later in
was
the year "if operations in Laos are authorized," Wheeler
"The
do what they have done has been anticipated, for,
making
into
tinuing alarm over the threat in northern
the
sponse to the mounting chorus of criticism was to hang
to
for mobilization directly,
coax Westmoreland
back-channel cables conveying Johnson's con-
them." As
re-
mobilization, provided that
Beginning on February
a series of
given so far." initial
full
troop request that would force a decision on the Reserves.
be shrugged off with the kind of flimsy explanations
Johnson's
Now,
his cards right.
Rather than press the case
asserted. "In
President
it
idea.
suddenly seemed that the president
accede to a
Wheeler played
"that something enormous has gone wrong [that] cannot
Characteristically,
other global military com-
greeted President Kennedy's Reserve call-up during the
significance of the attacks, including his claim that they
little
its
thought we
were winning the war!"
fight
meet
tion continued to
but to insure that the na-
effort
Cronkite reportedly
after the fighting erupted, "I
were "diversionary" from the
of urgency
his apparent confidence,
prompted him again, explaining that been "interpreted"
mand"
as
something
less
his
message had
than a "firm de-
tor reinforcements.
however, Johnson was deeply troubled by the unex-
This time Westmoreland took the hint. The "signals
pected turn of events. Although Westmoreland contin-
from Washington" had become so strong, the general
ued to assure him that the situation was "well in hand,"
later recalled,
the president
still
itary setback at
152
feared the possibility of a major mil-
Khe Sanh.
Insisting that the
combat
that "it
seemed
to
me
that for political
reasons or otherwise, the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anxious to send
me
reinforcements." Ac-
In a shocking episode that later appeared on
Vietcong
officer
on a Saigon
street
American
on February
television,
em February 12 Westmoreland submitted
cordingly,
South Vietnam's General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executes a suspected
1.
a
to
make
a firm decision
formal request for additional troops, couched in lan-
dered an
guage that contrasted sharply with his previous
troops to
ments of the post-Tet situation setback
is
fully possible
desperately
"I
if
1
am
in
assess-
South Vietnam. "A
not reinforced," he wrote.
need reinforcements.
Time
is
of the
was then that Wheeler,
a skilled military bureau-
crat, tried to force the president's
Westmoreland's request the
hand. In forwarding
of
mo-
refusal to settle the
Re-
bilization to further study.
Undeterred by the president's serve issue,
Wheeler
flew to Saigon
on February 23
Westmoreland
later put
it,
the chairman of the
was about to authorize
change
to
Johnson, he emphasized that
istration
the deployment of additional
Pointing out that Secretary of Defense
troops to
service.
Vietnam Reservists
As
unless
were
in the past,
more than 100,000 army and concomitantly
recalled
to
however, the president declined
to
visit, as
JCS
"conned" him into believing that the Johnson admin-
JCS could not endorse
Marine
or-
"emergency" deployment of 10,500 more
Vietnam while consigning the question
confer with Westmoreland. During his two-day
essence." It
on the matter. Instead he
a
of strategy-
McNamara was
about to be replaced by the hawkish Clark Clifford,
Wheeler intimated
that the president at last
ready to relax long-standing constraints
t)n
seemed
ground op-
153
—
"
Cambodia. The two generals then
erations in Laos and
immediately ftirthcoming, Clifford demanded that the
how
discussed the forces that would he required to carry out
JCS
such operations
troops might be used and instructed officials at the De-
serve
major troop increase were approved. In the
a
it
as well as to replenish the strategic re-
end they
settled
Deployment
approval ot
would be sent
Vietnam by May
to
aggressive ground strategy; otherwise
they would be added to the strategic reserve.
When
fense,
Wheeler returned
to
Washington
the additional
and Treasury Departments
State,
to study the
implications ot the troop request and review possible alternatives.
was to be contingent upon
ot the rest
more
a
hgure of 206,000 men, approxi-
a
whom
mately half of 1.
on
provide precise information on
Seizing the opportunity to express views that had long
been ignored or suppressed, senior
civilians at the Pen-
tagon responded with a thoroughgoing indictment oi the
to lobby tor
prevailing policy.
"Our
has not
strategy of attrition
the gigantic troop increase, however, he said nothing
worked,"
about contingencies or new
challenging the argument that a large troop increase
strategies. Instead,
he por-
commander
trayed
Westmoreland
in dire
need of immediate reinforcement. Describing the
Tet offensive
means run
as a
as "a very
its
beleaguered
near thing
.
field
.
.
that has by
course," he told Johnson that
no
"MACV
be hard pressed" to meet the continuing threat in
will
northern
"We
1
must
Corps and be
to restore security in the cities.
prepared
Wheeler concluded,
some
accept
to
reverses,"
unless the troop increase was ap-
proved. Left unspoken, but nonetheless clear, was that
any
sizable
deployment would require
a mobilization of
the Reserves.
For
Wheeler's
Johnson,
somber report
posed an agonizing dilemma. Acceptance
ot the gener-
recommendations meant putting the nation on
al's
war footing
virtual
criticism ot his
a
an election year amid growing
in
management
of the conflict. Yet to deny
al-
to reach a decision without a full-scale review
"intensive triend
working group" headed by
and newly appointed secretary
his
ot defense,
Cliftord.
"Give me the
Clifford.
"Give me your recommendations."
Although Clifford
long-time
Clark
lesser of evils," the president told
initially
would somehow break Hanoi's
nam's "ruling its
war while
new
in
to raise for years.
fundamental questions that had been
"How
long would
it
take.'
Were 100,000
plan to win the war.'"
154
When
enough.'
Other De-
the U.S. will continue to fight
engages in back-room politics and per-
would
It
also "entail sub-
including higher American casualties,
even a wage-price
freeze, thus risking
"a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions."
As an
alternative to the search-and-destroy tactics
employed
in the past, the
that U.S. forces in South a
Pentagon
Vietnam
new "population opposed the
bitterly
civilians
pull
control strategy."
idea,
proposed
back to the
cities
The
mil-
however, contending
that such a strategy would lead to increased civilian casualties
and concede the
In the end,
president
tactical initiative to the
enemy.
the report that Clifford submitted to the
on March 4 contained elements of both views
but few specific recommendations. "Big questions re-
state tor Far Eastern attairs.
.
.
.
—
all
over the
assistant secretary of
"There were stop signs draft.
Anybody could
no president would decide on the
see
basis of these
recommendations.
take to succeed
Vietnam?" Clifford asked. "How many more troops it
it
taxes, possibly
that
would
elite that
mits widespread corruption."
caution signs
him
will to fight.
mained," recalled William Bundy,
believed his charge was to
own, there was no
sion of troops would reinforce the belief of South Viet-
met, the sheer magnitude of the proposed deployment led
its
fense Department officials contended that a fresh infu-
determine how, not whether, the troop request could be
avoided
ability to
reason to believe that 206,000 more American soldiers
itary
Unable
its
calation with an escalation of
and adopt
of the options, Johnson turned the matter over to an
Enthoven,
es-
tion of the war
to risk military defeat.
Alain
match each U.S.
ready demonstrated
the troop request was to invite an indefinite continua-
and perhaps even
analyst
could shorten the war. Since North Vietnam had
stantial costs,"
President
systems
reported
What was
the
clear answers were not
Children try to extinguish the
fire
that engulfed their father's
machine shop on February 6 when U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft
bombed
tour blocks of Saigon's
Cholon
District.
r
'^--W'-^
i1 p IMM
i'
-^
1
H'l 'a
V 1
0^a^
if
1
5-' -.Tsr."
^^^i
1
c^^^. *
.X^I^C^^
Though
the findings of the Chftord task force effec-
any chance
tively killed
of a
major troop increase, news
of the proposed escalation soon filtered back to the press,
March
eventually producing a front-page story in the edition of the
New
10
York Times. "Westmoreland Requests
206,000 More Men," the three-column headline blared, "Stirring Debate in Administration." For the
at a
worse time. In recent weeks public opinion had begun
hawks and
to shift decisively against the president, as
doves alike registered their dissatisfaction with prevailing
Vietnam
in late
policy.
A
series of
opinion surveys taken
February 1968, for example, revealed that only
26 percent ot the American people approved of the president's
handling oi the war and that a near majority
involvement
considered U.S. take." Perhaps fluential
drawn Wall
more
the conflict a "mis-
in
significant,
many
of the
more
in-
members of the national news media had with-
On
their support.
Street Journal ran
February 23, the prestigious
an editorial declaring that "the
American people should be
getting ready to accept,
if
they haven't already, the prospect that the whole Viet-
nam
may be doomed." Four
effort
days
chorman Walter Cronkite rendered
later,
CBS
an-
a similarly bleak
judgment, telling an estimated audience of 9 million
Americans that "the only
rational
tary of State
way out ...
is
to
up
lived
to their pledge to defend
democracy,
and did the best they could."
The expansion
sored a resolution calling for a
on Capitol ership
where the challenge
Hill,
to Johnson's lead-
had become increasingly open and
wake of the Tet count 10 doves
offensive.
in the
"A
year ago one couldn't
Senate," observed Senator Thur-
ston Morton, a Kentucky Republican
national notoriety late 1967.
By
late
direct in the
when he
who had
gained
turned against the war in
February 1968, however, Morton
es-
The most dramatic
1 1
and 12
came on March
12,
of Minnesota
came
New
Hampshire primary
election.
An
McCarthy had been given
date,
avowed peace candi-
little
ing a serious challenge to Johnson
chance of mount-
when he announced
Democratic nomination the pre-
his candidacy for the
ceding December. But after Tet the senator's quixotic
momentum,
crusade had steadily gained
in part
due to
the efforts of several thousand student volunteers. Since the president's
name
did not appear
on the
son supporters responded by organizing
campaign, implying
in
vote for
McCarthy was
a
ballot,
nam
are
ically,
watching the
in their advertisements that a a vote for the
New
enemy. Read one
tor
McCarthy,
so deep
disenchantment with Johnson's management
Kennedy of
New
A
late
New
Sen-
a platform of
oppo-
convert to the antiwar camp,
his hat in the ring.
the adminis-
critic of
tration in the weeks after Tet but
throw
16,
York announced that he,
would run against Johnson on
Kennedy had been an outspoken
the
was their
president barely had time to absorb the shock of
sition to the war.
to
Iron-
ot the war.
McCarthy's stunning showing when, on March
too,
in Viet-
Hampshire primary."
subsequent studies found that more self-described
hawks than doves voted
The
John-
vigorous write-
Johnson campaign slogan, "The Communists
had
resisted appeals
By hesitating
until after
Hampshire primary, he opened himself up
charges of opportunism. Nevertheless,
knew, with
his
name and
scholarly maverick
on March
later
within 300 votes of defeating Johnson in the
Senate and another 16 "leaning to the doves." Reflecin Congress,
week
indication of the president's grow-
when Senator Eugene McCarthy
Kennedy made
new mood
A
review of American
full
ing political vulnerability, however,
timated there were 25 outright antiwar senators in the
tive of the
grilled Secre-
eleven hours over
policy in Southeast Asia.
ator Robert
of antiwar sentiment was also evident
Committee
for a total of
139 members of the House of Representatives cospon-
negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people
who had
Dean Rusk
the possibility of another troop increase.
Johnson
come
administration, the leak could hardly have
the Senate Foreign Relations
a tar
Instinctively,
if
as
Johnson
his powerful party
to
well
connections
more formidable opponent than the
McCarthy. imprudently, Johnson decided to fight
back by taking his case to the country and demanding "a total national effort to win the war."
The Imperial Palace
at
Hue
lies in
ruins following the
long drive by allied troops to clear North Vietnamese invaders
from the city
in
February 1968.
"We
must meet
month-
our commitments in the world and in Vietnam," he told a business group in
Chicago on March
17.
"We
shall
157
and we are going
win the war!" The next day
to
his
tone became even more strident during an address to a
convention of farmers crisis of
Pearl
in
MinneapoUs. RecaUing every
the century from the sinking of the Lusitania to
Harbor and the BcrHn blockade, the president de-
"The time has come when we ought
clared,
and be counted, when we ought
our government, our men, and our is
stopped, wherever
When
it
to stand
up
to support our leaders,
aggression
allies until
to Johnson's
speeches
proved overwhelmingly negative, the president's advis-
became deeply worried. Pointing out
ers
and Kennedy are the candidates ident L.
is
of
that
Jr.,
peace and the pres-
strongly urged Johnson to "do something
exciting and dramatic to recapture the peace issue" be-
Wisconsin primary. "Hardly anyone
fore the April 2
today
is
interested in winning the war,"
in a blunt
Rowe
memorandum. "Everyone wants
and the only question
is
asserted
to get out,
how." The message sank
The next morning Johnson telephoned Defense tary Clifford: "I've got to get
On March
me
a
in.
Secre-
20 and again on March 22, Johnson con-
While most agreed
new peace
that the president should
propose to limit in some way the bombing of North
Vietnam, fundamental differences of opinion over the purpose of such a gesture undermined any firm consensus.
Convinced
that the
North Vietnamese would
reject
the offer, Secretary of State Rusk and national security adviser
Walt Rostow hoped
to placate public
opinion
long enough to allow for U.S. participation in the war to continue. In
Clark Clifford's view, however, the task
was not simply to
stabilize the
home
way out o( the "hopeless bog" States had partial
become mired. He
bombing
in a series of
halt should be
in
front but to find a
which the United
for the
tions persuaded
U.S. war
effort
moment
bombing
him
chief of
planned long
staff.
assume the position
to
Whether
move had been
the
advance, as the general himself
in
the president
made no
de-
halt proposal, the delibera-
that any further expansion of the
was no longer an option. At the March
later
claimed, or rather resulted from Westmoreland's failure
Tet offensive,
not clear.
is
seemed
It
nevertheless to signify that the Johnson administration
had decided upon
change of course.
a
Clifford, however,
son
was
still
not convinced that John-
appreciated the need to take bold and decisive
fully
action toward an acceptable peace. Concluding that the president required "some
home
medicine to bring
stiff
what was happening
to [him]
he pro-
in the country,"
posed that the president reconvene a group of elder statesmen
—the
Vietnam
his
ber
1967.
many
men
so-called wise
policy in April 1965
The
of the
group,
—who had endorsed
and again
Novem-
more prominent members of the post-
II
American
foreign policy establishment,
Dean Acheson,
including former Secretary of State
George
in
numbering fourteen, included
Ball,
McGeorge
Arthur
Bundy,
Goldberg,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and Generals Omar
Matthew Ridgway, and Maxwell
Bradley,
Taylor.
Before meeting with the president, the wise
sembled on the evening of March 25
men
ings from officials of the State Department, the
and the JCS. Many
what they
learned.
of those present
Asked how long
as-
for a series of brief-
it
CIA,
were shaken by
would take
to
win
the war at the current level of commitment. Deputy Assistant
"Maybe
Secretary
five years,
of
State
maybe
Philip
ten."
A
Habib
replied:
dramatic exchange
between United Nations ambassador Arthur Goldberg
After
a
also
West-
recall
and General William DePuy proved equally
as the first
22 meeting he formally rejected the Wheeler- West-
158
army
of
He
March.
in
therefore argued that a
negotiated settlement and total American withdrawal.
Though
moreland from South Vietnam
modest
a
augment the
implemented
concrete "de-escalatory steps" leading to
cision about the
to
informed his advisers that he had decided to
World War
peace proposal."
ferred with his senior advisers about a possible initiative.
emergency reinforcements dispatched
"McCarthy
the war candidate," campaign strategist James
Rowe,
deployment of 13,500 support troops
to anticipate the
has occurred."
the public response
moreland troop request, instead approving tmly
DePuy
asserted that the
enemy had
80,000 troops since the beginning inquired about
the
unsettling.
lost
of the year,
more than Goldberg
number of wounded. DePuy
re-
sponded that standard military estimates were based on a ratio of three to one.
many
effectives
field?"
DePuy
Then Goldberg
asked,
do you think they have operating cited
the
official
MACV
230,000. "Well, General," Goldberg
"How in the
estimate of
said, "I
am
not
a
who
man
great mathematician, but with 80,000 killed and with a
Johnson,
wounded
pressed his views, later complained bitterly about the
ratio of three to one, or 240,000, for a total
of 320,000,
The
who
McGeorge Bundy, set
outcome
fighting?"
out to do
begin to
move
"The majority
"is that
we can no we have
in the time
to disengage."
feeling,"
and others
a shift in
Five days
Although they disagreed
ground
strategy, all
curred with Cyrus Vance's view that "unless
thing quick, the country
A
may
bastards
his aides. In the end,
later,
on the evening of March
3
1
Lyndon
,
Johnson addressed the nation. Accepting Rusk's proposal,
he annt)unccd
in the televised
speech that the
bombing of North Vietnam would henceforth be
con-
we do some-
to the area just north of the demilitarized zone
limited
and held
out the possibility of a "complete bombing halt"
lead us to withdrawal."
weary President Johnson reworks the text of his March 31 speech
"The establishment
their collective judgment.
and we must
over the next step to take, with some favoring a bombing halt
of the meeting.
ex-
however, he knew that he had no choice but to accept
said
longer do the job left
impassively as each
have bailed out," he told one of
following day the group met with Johnson and
rendered their verdict.
we
we
the hell are
listened
in
it
the
which he stunned a nanonu/cie television audience hy announcing
that he would not seek re-election.
159
160
North Vietnamese responded favorably. Emphasizing^ CMfford's concerns, he characterized the unilateral
"the
as
what
first in
peace" and made
hope
I
clear that the
it
move
he a series of steps toward
will
United States was
prepared to hefjin talks at any rime and any place.
When
he reached the end
briefly
of his speech,
Johnson paused
before reading words that he had appended at the
moment.
have concluded that
"I
the presidency to
last
1
should not permit
become involved
in the partisan di-
visions that are developing,' this political year," he said.
"Accordingly,
I
not seek, and
shall
the nomination of
my
1
will
not accept,
party for another term as ye)ur
president."
Johnson's concluding statement electrified the nation
and the world. But perhaps end
The war
in
should not have. By the
Vietnam had taken
had cost him litical
it
March 1968, Lyndon Johnson was
of
his credibility,
a
and
heavy it
a
toll
weary man.
on him.
had eroded
authority to the point where he could no longer
govern
effectively. All that
what mattered most
to
remained to be salvaged was
him
— the
respect of his "fellow
Americans." By withdrawing from the presidential
Johnson hoped
that,
a nation divided by a
On
April
to
the
1
,
he sought to restore unity to
war he had chosen to hght.
1968, the day after President Johnson spoke
nation,
totaling
race,
to underscore the sincerity of his desire
More than
for peace.
Quang
It
his po-
a
combined U.S.-ARVN
some 30,000 troops
set
task
force
out along Route 9 in
Tri Province to relieve the Marine garrison at
Khe Sanh.
In a spectacular display of airmobility, sol-
diers of the
U.S.
1st
Air Cavalry Divisit)n spearheaded
the drive, leapfrogging ahead of a seemingly endless col-
umn
of tanks, trucks, and troops on foot. Meeting with
only token resistance along the way, the
cavalrymen
finally linked
the base on the morning of April after
A
it
first
ot
8.
Seventy-seven days
began, the siege of Khe Sanh was over.
SiHirb Vietn
civilinn Jiinni: ' e:irly
wave
up with the Marines outside
second u.irc
c/
Chmiminisr attacks
in
wounded Sanson in
Mny.
161
Witness:
on that
Ron Harper
I
night, Sergeant
went next door
Rudy
At about 2:30
Soto.
to the consulate
A.M.
compound, on the
other side of an eight-foot wall from the embassy.
I
talking to the two guards over there at about 2:45,
when
1
was
heard a big explosion. Sappers had blown out part of
the front wall of the embassy complex.
My first
thought was that
embassy, that Zach was
key to use
had the master key
I
to the
new and might not know which
to lock the door.
So
I left
the consulate, went
through the gate, and scooted to the back door of the
embassy lobby.
On
way I ran
the
right past a Vietnamese
guy just wandering around by the consulate
He
working there that night.
he was actually one morning hours of January
In the early
Vietcong attacked the U.S. Embassy
31, in
As
1968, the
As
Saigon.
I
chine-gun
waited in uncertainty, nineteen enemy sappers roamed
down
the courtyard of the embassy complex and tried, unsuc-
dirt,
embassy building. More than
any other incident of the Tet offensive, the attack sug-
American people, who awoke
gested to the ing
that
morn-
U.S. was
raid, that the
tar
from victory. The sole Amer-
ican defending the front lobby was twenty-year-old Ser-
W.
geant Ronald
Harper
ot the
Marine Security Guards.
war was sort ot
As
mand
said
too—
and no people.
and
it
—
in
—myself and Corporal
in addition to the
was going to
two army
start putting extra
seriously because we'd
oft.
And
MPs
162
so
went
and
pulled the big teak doors shut.
pushed the old man into an
I
the rear doors, too. on. All
I still
knew was
I
crap was flying
Zach
As
had
in the
these alerts before,
upstairs
lobby and
and talked
I
's
I
all
office
and ran
to lock
know what was going
didn't
that there was machine-gun
fire,
over the place, and there were flashes
was running to the armory, right near the
me on my
rear
end and blowing
eardrums out and hitting him with shrapnel.
exploded
in the wall right
over
my
It
head, ripping apart
the seal of the United States.
When
on
I
head
his
I
got up, there were dust and smoke
was the "roving
to the third
man
I
all
over
dragged him into the armory and bandaged
to stop the bleeding, but
kept making
noise. I said,
knew someone was
outside.
he was
in
shock and
"Zach, be quiet!" because
But
I
didn
't
know
if we
I
were
being attacked by one person or ten people. I
I
ran out
the place. Zach was moaning and groaning and couldn't
happen.
"
I
hear me.
one
don 't think anyone thought that anything big was going
guard,
So
No
they couldn't have been too serious be-
Zach was posted
and Zach was
calling for help.
men on
cause they put only one more person at the embassy.
to
ran into the lobby
I
wall near us, knocking
until Tet.
posts because something might he going on.
took
and they were apparently
could see was a cloud of dust, flying
to the front door, got the old Vietnamese guard,
always at the gate. But that night the comit
I
through the side windows at the front door and hit the
a very peaceful town.
the embassy building that night
who were
at those guys
desk where Zach was standing, an antitank rocket came
was
were two guards scheduled to work
George Zachuranic
looked over at the side
There
quiet,
usual, there
fire
I
on, considering the time. But the
It
much going
wasn't
didn't realize until later that
The Vietcong had shot heavy ma-
already. All
outside.
Saigon was quiet.
I
on the phone, apparently
screaming headlines announcing the embassy
tt)
shock.
of the Vietcong.
got to the back door
gate for the MPs.
American mihtary commanders and the news media
cessfully, to penetrate the
in
wasn't one of the local guards, because they weren't
grabbed a Beretta machine gun along with
pistol
and went back
to the
desk was right in the line of
armory fire.
I
my
.38
area,
because the
didn't
know where
MPs
the
were.
1
JiJn
thought
for help. I guess I
The phone Wendt, out
if
was going to
I
on duty
a civilian
him
told
in the elevator
on
The phone kept
crawl out to the desk and answer thing ringing because
me
believe
Of
the people
that the Vietcong weren
"My God,
Make
sure there's
down and check
When Vd
are you sure the
positive^
no one
I
a
him
There was enemy
The
He
fire
him back
left to
shoot
At
—
first
cameras on me, but they
moreland when he
all
of the enemy had been
there were a few television
General West-
all shifted to
it
was
get to bed tor another forty-eight hours.
No
arrived. After
about
six hours,
I didn't
one got city,
We
a lot of sleep.
There was
and we were under
still
fighting in the
martial law for several weeks.
were looking for another attack the following night,
We
called
getting rocket attacks into the city every morning, big
in the
six-
to run
't
to the ar-
a gun, be-
speak English,
the Vietcong
it it
waited with
inside
it
me
lived
on our
toes tor quite a while.
were
or eight-foot- long rockets a foot around. All of a
sudden we were before.
1
in a war,
and we hadn 't been
think the whole country
felt
in a
war
the same way.
couldn't see them.
But
still
little
I
I
moved
Harper was
later
awarded the Bronze
Star.
He
was hon-
orably discharged from the Marines in 1969.)
came
and outside the lobby
me when
(For his actions during the attack on the embassy, Sgt.
all night.
got heavy. The lobby was always
anyone outside could see
all
and
lit
so
around, but
could even hear them chattering
no one came
in.
things that night, stupid
little
happened that probably saved everyone. later that
't
bullets ricocheted off the granite walls
occasionally
was
was no one
killed by this time.
in the
't
had
I
others broke through the front gate in a jeep. But there
There was no one who wasn't vulnerable anymore.
He didn
throw
to
through the tront doors.
It
So
platoon from the 101st Air-
and we
that bottom floor.
smoke grenade—not
didn 't exactly trust him.
outside.
no
to,
staft
VC aren
else in there. "
a
ran back I found the old Vietnamese guard.
I
so I motioned to
night.
to
the rear doors.
mory and gave him
I
Check
forgotten all about him. I took
cause
had
I
talked
I
about 8:00
all over.
so I hated that
it,
Some major on Westmoreland's Are you
anyone
it
was tipping off someone
it
embassy.
building:'
he
upstairs. I
rang
it
and
said,
to find
hurt,
upstairs.
ringing. Every time
outside that I was there.
down
his floor so
ing. Finally at
borne came down into the lobby from the roof and some
him Zach was
and hrought him
to lock the elevator
one would
wniteJ
I
die.
upstairs, called I
broke into the lobby they couldn't get
damn
was.
started ringing almost immediately. Allan
we were OK. When
came down told
know where Rudy
't
Rudy was on
the root.
He
things that
I
tound out
fired
down and
probably killed one ot them and slowed them down. The
embassy was supposed
to be completely dark, but there
were a few lights
on
left
upstairs.
So
after
the Vietcong started shooting into those
Rudy
offices,
fired,
think-
ing more people were up there guarding the place than there actually were.
taken
us,
They could have walked
in
and
but they thought we were a lot more heavily
manned and armed. These
things slowed
them down
long enough for us to get help. I felt
I
better
when
it
got light at about 5:30 or 6:00.
could see outside, but there wasn't anything happen-
163
Focus: The Battle for
The 802d
residential sections of the Citadel.
Hue
ARVN
penetrated the
compound
initially
but was also driven
back by the Black Panthers. Elsewhere
though, defense was scattered,
in the city,
and waves of enemy troops continued
As
the streets.
daylight broke and the chilly fog lifted,
the gold-starred, red-and-blue
NLF
of the
flag
Hue was
the old emperor's palace.
The
to fan out into
in
flew over
Communist hands.
only significant pockets of resistance were
ARVN
and
MACV compounds,
cupants could only wait
NVA
watched the
and
where the besieged oc-
reinforcements as they
for
VC
the
dig in.
For General Westmoreland and the American and
South Vietnamese command, the Like most of the larger
cities of
South Vietnam, Hue
had been spared from extensive damage
in the
few
first
years of the war. Refugees fled there from the surround-
ing countryside of
Thua Thien
Province, and South
Vietnamese and American military authorities had
es-
tablished headquarters there, but there was relative calm
Although Hue
in the city.
in recent years
had been the
scene of protest by both Buddhists and students against
Nguyen
the Saigon government, the former seat of the
emperors was the South Vietnamese
social
and
Some
center and a virtual oasis from war.
religious
called the
shattered in the early morning
hours of January 31, 1968, the second day of Tet,
Communist 122MM fog
and exploded
a fortress
when
rockets screamed through the low
in the center of the ancient Citadel,
on the north hank of the Perfume River
rounded by
moat and
a
zigzag stone walls.
sur-
Almost
si-
multaneously soldiers of the 800th and 802d Battalions
NVA
Regiment stormed through the
lightly
defended western gates of the Citadel and made
for the
of the 6th
headquarters of the
corner of the II
ARVN
fortress.
1st
Division in the northeast
Attacks on Da
Nang and
cities in
Corps the night before had put some of them on
guard, and Brigadier General
ARVN
mander
of the
men on
alert that night.
ion arrived at the Citadel,
Panther
164
1st
Ngo Quang Truong, com-
Division in Hue, had placed
Thus, when the 800th Battal-
Tay Loc
airfield in
they were met by the
Company and
the middle of the
elite
disaster.
wrote
"would have
later,
"Taking
pact
on the Vietnamese
and
in the process the
the
it,"
Hue would
American general
a
profound psychological im-
in
both the North and South,
North Vietnamese might
seize
the two north provinces as bargaining points in any negotiations." For
all
its
strategic significance,
the initial efforts to retake
Marine command
at
Phu
Hue were
however,
unsuccessful.
ARVN
Black
forced to turn south into the
The
Bai, eight miles to the south,
believed that the attacking force was small and dis-
patched
a single
company
Company A,
unit,
1st
Hue. Along the way the
to
Battalion, 1st Marines,
met up
A NVA
with four American tanks and headed up Highway
beautiful city "a lotus in a sea of fire."
The calm had been
have meant
of
loss
sudden barrage of intense
fire
from one of the two
1.
battalions blocking the approaches to the city pinned
down
the Marines, and the call went out for reinforce-
A
ments.
American
second company arrived and the combined
MACV
force broke through to
headquarters,
but only after taking forty casualties, including ten dead.
The
fight for
Hue would demand more manpower: over
the next three days three more companies, three com-
mand in all
groups, and a tank platoon
—
—about 1,000 Marines
arrived to join in the fight. After a tailed
ican attempt to cross the river,
it
was decided that the
Marines would concentrate on the south river,
and
while
VC
ARVN
forces
worked
side of the
to dislodge the
NVA
from the Citadel.
The South Vietnamese had
a
General Truong had been able to to consolidate defense of the
enemy
Amer-
more pull
ARVN
difficult
back
task.
his troops
compound, but
control over the two square miles inside the Cit-
NVA
adel was strong.
troops and supplies continued to
rtow into the old fortress through the well'defended west gates; over the next
week ten
The
Hue.
now
twenty-foot-thick,
thirty-foot-high
walls,
defend the old emperors from ancient enemies,
provided the modern-day attackers a virtually im-
pregnable In the
On
week
American and South
of February,
Vietnamese troops locked themselves
cess of
rines attacked house by house,
in violent
street
gloomy and almost constant cold
in
at
many
seesaw
The
turns.
by
drizzle,
street,
in a
taking sniper
younger troops had fought only
the countryside and were unaccustomed to street
To some
fighting.
older Marines, the scene harked back
to a city battle in the previous war; "Seoul said
the
NVA
still
one commander, "but
this
—
well,
was tough,"
something
it's
buildings, supported by
fire
from tanks,
and machine guns. Howitzers
tired
huge
recoilless rifles,
shells at
pound bombs and navy
ships oft the coast hurled shells
several miles from five-, six-,
villas all
Americans,
and sprawling
crumbled under the rain of firepower
enemy
became
safety or
and eight-inch guns. Beau-
modest stucco houses,
pagodas,
French
enemy
and 750-
positions, while fighter-bombers dropped 500-
troops,
and
civilians
scurried
on.
it
The
NVA contested
grip-.
NLF
cadres quickly established a revolution-
ary government,
headed by
and the principal of
a local
each
of the
Perfume
damp weather
the
stench from the dead soldiers and civilians became un-
and the almost constant cloudiness
lent a fu-
By February 10 the area on the south bank of the declared secure, and most of
the fighting there abated, though there were sional mortar explosions patrols.
Hue
girls'
University professor
high school.
became the new mayor.
police chief
A
former
In the streets, sol-
and sympathizers hoisted banners denouncing the
diers
South Vietnamese and Americans and exhorting the people to join them.
methods
employed more heavy-handed
also
Using
to try to control the population.
ct)mpiled by local agents, small bands
who had been deemed
of those
actionary elements"
moved
ofticials,
marched, hands
lists
in .search
"cruel tyrants
—government
and anyone who was considered sympathetic gon government.
was
It
ple
and
re-
foreigners, to the Sai-
Hundreds of these detainees were
tied
behind their backs, to what their
shot on the spot
when
they resisted. Most
still
occa-
and sniper attacks on Marine
Exhausted and chilled, the Americans looked
later
estimated that approximately 3,000 peo-
were systematically executed by the Communists
during their occupation of Hue.
months
after the battle for
Hue
Many were found
in shallow,
mass graves;
others were never recovered and were presumed dead.
Later
American
would point
and
South
Vietnamese
authorities
to the massacre ot these civilians as evi-
dence of the ruthlessness of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and a ghastly hint ensue
nereal dankness to the city.
finally
a
Some were
was estimated that the Americans
while incurring 250 casualties. In the
Perfume River was
Communists tightened
In the heart ot the city, the their
were taken away and never heard from again.
had not yet taken half of the south bank
bearable,
The North Vietna-
post in the middle of
to
step the Marines took and often carried the day. By the
week
command
captors claimed were political reorientation sessions.
casualties.
enemy held
first
around their base, but
as
south bank of the Perfume, the well-entrenched and
end oi the
territory
this territory, in the Imperial Palace.
Despite the best efforts of the Americans to clear the
well-supplied
ARVN
The South Vietnamese had
allies.
their
The Communists
For several days Marines surrounded and stormed
1st
held 60 percent of the Citadel, including
mese established
else."
tiful
American
its
been able to regain .some
combat with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Ma-
fire
the north side of the Perfume, the
Division had not been able to match the apparent suc-
the southern sector of the fortress.
fortress. first
next objective: the
at their
Citadel.
more
battalions totaling
than a division would he committed to the battle for
built to
through the tog and smoke
it
they
won
ot the
massacre that would
the war.
While the Communists rounded up
their enemies,
the Americans on the .south bank ot the Perfume pre-
pared to
cro.ss
the river to the walls ot the Citadel.
the evening of February
1
armored vehicles of the
1,
the men, tanks, and
1st
Battalion,
On
Ontos
5th Marines,
165
crossed the Perfume. In their
first
and
forty
wounded; the
men
killed
fighting at the ramparts promised
even bloodier than the clashes on the south hank
to he
oi the Perfume.
The Saigon government
Americans that they
told the
Only the sacred Imperial Palace was
be spared. less
Once
again the barrage
the Americans
homes, only of a
firefight.
the
Confused
back
to their
Hundreds of homes were destroyed around
them, but the Communist soldiers continued to
fire
from
"A woman
littered the streets.
roof.
Many
child lay
knelt in death
Many
on
stairs
crushed by a fallen
of the bodies had turned black and begun
decompose, and
to
it
"A
rats
gnawed
at the
first
week
was estimated that the Marines took one casualty
The
every meter of ground gained.
for
wounded
scores of
were carried out on top of tanks or on the backs of fellow
who had been
began to show the
spared physical injury
strain, bursting into tears or
simply
staring blankly into the distance, victims of a form of
NVA
February 16, an
enemy commander had been had asked permission
denied by
NVA
enemy morale was
radio transmission from
killed
and that
to withdraw.
but
superiors,
dissipating.
it
The
his succes-
request was
was evidence that
The end was near
for the
Heartened by the new intelligence, the Americans
and South Vietnamese
soldiers fi)ught their
the 101st Airborne
namese supply
way
to
moved
its
units
in to close the
had
1st
the
Air Cav
northwest corner, and
lines in the west wall.
The two army
As
intensified their efforts.
Marines continued to work the Citadel, the
The
lost as
North Viet-
price
with the South
Rangers stormed
empty.
it
The enemy
battle for
Hue was
had emerged the
over, but
it
was unclear who
For their part, the Amer-
real victor.
commands pointed
ican and South Vietnamese
to the
Enemy
losses
were estimated
and 89 captured. American
at
ARVN
1,364 seriously wounded, and
KIA and
more than 5,000
losses totaled
216
figures
killed
killed
1,830 wounded.
But while the Americans and South Vietnamese gained the
city,
the jarring fact was that the
had been able
nists
in fact,
to seize
and hold
its
it
it
re-
Commu-
for three weeks;
North Vietnamese commanders claimed
the original plan had been to hold In
and
were 384
for just
later,
seven days.
length and severity the occupation contributed to
the devastating psychological impact of Tet upon the
Americans and South Vietnamese,
setting in
motion
Communists than
a military victory.
Whatever standards of
victory were applied, the cer-
The war
tain losers were the people of Hue. far
away had erupted
homes
in their
that
seemed
midst and destroyed half
in the city, leaving
116,000 homeless from
a total population of 140,000.
Another 5,800 people
the
killed in the crossfire or
munists. The war had
South Vietnam. But as the nation's ful,
fire"
in
Hue
city
seemed
What had been
had been engulfed
in a
Com-
to the cities all
over
there was a unique agony,
most beautiful
lingering death.
executed by the
come
finally
to die a pain-
"a lotus in a sea of
storm of death.
had been
many men
days as the Marines had in the past three weeks.
166
where they tore
fled in the night.
The
had been
occupiers.
high:
had
it
ARVN
The next day
flag.
the Imperial Palace, only to find
was intercepted, disclosing that the
inside the Citadel
sor
banner and replaced
events that ultimately proved more advantageous to the
shell shock.
On
Vietnamese
exposed flesh."
of the dead were Americans: In the
Marines. Those
NLF
favorable casualty figures as an indicator of their success.
by a wall in the corner of her garden," wrote one correspondent.
Division arrived at the
1st
flagpole at the Imperial Palace,
their entrenched positions.
Corpses
ARVN
Regiment, of the
main
to house.
for-
where they were scattered or destroyed. In the
down
streets, trying to get
Division
1st
morning hours of February 24 the 2d Battalion, 3d
early
shooed away by Marines in the thick
to be
ARVN
pushed the remaining enemy up against the south
to
moved from house
wandered the
resistance inside the Citadel crumbled,
and Vietnamese marines and the
commenced. Count-
buildings were pockmarked or reduced to rubble as
civilians
of the three-week battle proved to be anti-
NVA
climactic.
tress wall
could use whatever weapons were necessary to dislodge the occupiers.
The end
on the smith
assault
wall the next day, the battalion lost fifteen
in five
During the battle shelter against
for
Hue
incoming
in
February 1968, two Marines take
shells.
—
*«.. ^i*'-
:^*^^---—
.
v^i395f
,^^iii??:
•^in^-
-^.
L
3^
I-.'
»
Z
..:
..AiU.4l«
,-'^
•f"'"'5^1,-
r* 'f
1
1^
•
:
,
r
>
'I,''ll_ '^^r^-
."^ lyi^^^
1L
-
iSS ^>l^^ ""^^ 3^E
L-J^
.1
•J-'
-»
1
L ^^
^-
.^J
^
•'
^1
'^"^
3S
^: M^ ^S^^-l
Behind
168
^j
homhed-mit schoolhiHisc, Murines take
;i
moincnr out tnnn the
hiihtinii in
Hiu
Moments
after
throwing a grenade,
this
Marine was
killed
when another grenade exploded
in his
hand.
169
/\
170
\/;efC()n^'
suspect cowers before bis Ameriain capfors ;n
r/)t'
embnttled
city.
:jun /^
Wounded Marines
are rushed Co a held hospital.
171
s
'^
..^
H
c.
»sr**'
^#*^?5»i
^F':
> si^<-'*-f-
V
A
incJic c.irncs fo sutcrv
;i
Wrn.i/iR'.sv
chilj \\\HinJcJ in crosshrc.
173
^^^
.<
—^
i
I
-^f
^
^
*CS,
Above. Shell-shocked Marine, Hue, Fehnniry 1968.
Left.
Marines pull one ot Hue's CAHumunist defenders from
American
a tosliole.
\\(.niiu!ed
hv
tire.
175
So vulnerable was Khe Sanh,
Focus: The Siege of Khe Sanh
in fact, that the
Ma-
rines initially balked at the idea of defending the site.
Former JCS chairman General Maxwell Taylor,
Presi-
dent Jt)hnson's chief military adviser, believed that the base was simply too isolated to be adequately defended.
Noting the
parallels
between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien
Phu, pointing out further the problems of resupplying the base, and emphasizing that any defensive position
can be taken
if
the
enemy
is
willing to pay the price,
Taylor urged the president to consider ordering a withdrawal.
Such concerns, however,
did not deter General Wil-
liam Westmoreland from pressing ahead with plans to
defend Khe Sanh "at
enemy intended It
remains one of the most memorable engagements of
the Vietnam War, a contest of nerves as well as arms
Marines against an estimated
that pitted 6,000 U.S.
NVA
20,000-40,000
no one outside ers
is
certain
siege of
Giap at
a small circle of
what
Khe Sanh
it
meant.
a failed
Yet twenty years
later,
North Vietnamese
lead-
Was
the seventy-seven-day
attempt on the part of General
to re-enact his dramatic victory over the
Dien Bien Phu,
at the time?
rians
regulars.
as
Or was
many American it
officials
many
instead, as
have since concluded, part of
French
believed
military histo-
a clever "feint" that
succeeded in luring American forces away from the
on the eve of the cataclysmic 1968 Tet
northern
American
I
military officials
Corps
in
knew
that the
troops began
regiment strength,
Communists
were preparing to launch a major new offensive campaign.
They were
rine outpost at target. Situated
on
ulated northwest
combat base
also well
Khe Sanh
lay
aware that the remote Ma-
offered an especially inviting
pop-
a small plateau in the sparsely
comer of Quang
Tri Province,
within easy striking distance of
the
NVA
base areas across the Laotian border and inside the
DMZ.
Moreover,
it
was surrounded by dense
fog-shrouded valleys that made
it
difficult to
presence of even large numbers of troops.
be reinforced and resupplied only by cipal overland road into the base.
air,
forests
And
it
could
since the prin-
Route
9,
had been
cut off by the North Vietnamese in August 1967.
176
and
detect the
Quang
all-out drive to seize
Tri and
step in
first
Thua Thien
Provinces, he reinforced the outpost with three additional battalions of Marines
of
and deployed more than half
U.S. maneuver battalions to northern
all
To
I
Corps.
ease the fears of his jittery commander-in-chief,
Westmoreland dismissed
as groundless
any comparison
between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu. Though both outposts were isolated, he pointed out, Dien Bien
had been located a plateau.
in a valley
The French had
the U.S. Marines hills
while
Khe Sanh
support, while
commanded most
rested
Nor were
at
on
of the important
and only moderate
aircraft
American firepower
magnitude over that
Phu
held no high ground, while
surrounding their base. Most important of
French had had few
offensive?
when North Vietnamese
In late 1967, infiltrating into
cities
an
Convinced that the
costs."
all
to overrun the base as the
all,
the
artillery
"differed by orders of
Dien Bien Phu."
these the only considerations behind West-
moreland's resolve to hold the line at Khe Sanh. After years of chasing an elusive
mountains, and
enemy through
rice fields of
to fight a set-piece battle
the jungles,
South Vietnam, he longed
where the
full
weight of the
Americans' vastly superior firepower could be brought to bear. In a
war of attrition
in
which enemy "body counts"
represented the chief yardstick of battlefield success, a
major confrontation
in the barren reaches of
Corps afforded an opportunity
northern
I
to score a victory of un-
precedented proportions.
To meet
the threat of a massed
enemy
assault,
West-
moreland assembled an awesome armada of more than 2,000 strike
aircraft for
what he personally dubbed Op-
on January
eration Niagara. Beginning
22,
U.S.
aircraft
flew an average of
300
dropping
35,000 tons of bombs on suspected
enemy
a total of
sorties per
day over the base,
Giant B-52 Stratofortresses based
positions.
Guam, Thailand, and Okinawa emptied
in
support was provided by the behemoth
guns at the Rockpile and
tillery
Khe Sanh,
teen miles east of
105mm and 155mm
Camp
as well as
175mm
ar-
Carroll, seven-
some two dozen
howitzers inside the base.
NVA ground assault on one of the outlying hills
on the night of February
The next moment when
ruary 7, at
5,
Khe Sanh remained
ensure that the Marines remained adequately sup-
plied,
3,000 transport planes and helicopters were com-
Khe Sanh. Although hampered
by poor weather, exposed to heavy antiaircraft
fire
as
quiet
immediate aftermath of Tet.
in the
of crisis
came on the night
of Feb-
camp
the North Vietnamese attacked a
Lang Vei manned by U.S. Special Forces and
talion-size force of
locally
Group (CIDG)
recruited Civilian Irregular Defense diers seven miles southwest of
Khe Sanh.
three directions behind Soviet-made
To
mitted to the defense of
an assault on the Marine base. In any case, aside
from an
their payloads
every three hours, twenty-four hours a day. Additional fire
stalled
NVA sappers and
sol-
Striking from
PT76
tanks, a bat-
infantrymen, some
armed with flame throwers, smashed through the perimand quickly overran the
eter
CIDG
morning 200 of the 500
compound. By
fortified
troops at
Lang Vei were
they approached the base, and even more vulnerable to
dead or missing, along with 10 of the 24 Americans,
enemy
while the
450
guns and rockets
artillery
C-130 and
smaller
C-123 cargo
Khe Sanh during
flights into
wing
they landed,
made more than
fire.
When
"zero-zero"
took the place of the fixed-
set in, helicopters
In other instances, supplies and am-
transports.
Yet, for
all
the measures and countermeasures that
Westmoreland took
to protect
rines stationed there
knew
enemy
the brunt of a full-scale
had
to
Khe Sanh,
the 6,000
that they alone
Ma-
would bear
Every day they
assault.
The
random
terror that
one Marine com-
fall
deep-seated
of Lang Vei had a profound psychological
fear.
the
had
who was
Herr,
Now, observed
tanks.
present at the time,
a
few more sandbags to add to their bunkers.
And
every
day they stared into the opaque gray mists surrounding their base
and wondered, Are they coming tonight?
Tension ran especially high following the outbreak of the country-wide Tet offensive on the nights of January
30 and 31. Even though the
NVA
had
failed to exploit
the dire ammunition shortage caused by their opening rocket attack ten days before,
enemy would
Khe Sanh
seemed
likely that the
take advantage of the Tet attacks and hit
hard.
Convinced that
Giap's intention that a massive quarters
it
all
B-52
complex
along, raid
that had been General
Westmoreland
on
a
inside Laos
later
claimed
The ebb and
to believe
—
that
Michael
"how could you look
flow of anxiety and adrenaline took a
on the Marines, many of whom developed
toll
relieve the stress
often do:
known
and
They played
as the
that
"10,000-yard stare."
what
fatigue, they did
cards and exchanged
home, sang songs and
listened to music.
soldiers
news from
They accu-
mulated omens of good fortune and displayed them prominently
—
helmet
a lucky playing card stuck in a
band, a soldier's cross or even a peace symbol chained
around the neck.
On
Hill 881 South, the
200
men
of
I
Company, 3d
Battalion, 26th Marines, began each day with a cere-
monial
flag raising.
As
the
company
bugler belted out a
choppy version of "To the Colors," the sound day's
first
Knowing
North Vietnamese head-
fore the
on January 30 had
the
fore-
no one
area,
journalist
most
enemy
coming?"
To
their holes a little deeper, filling
stirring their
out of your perimeter at night without hearing the treads
someone
—digging
Khe Sanh,
—perhaps because no one wanted
NVA
blank look in the eyes
to pull the switch." Every day they reinforced
at
Despite recent reports that the
pared to "sitting in an electric chair and waiting for
their positions
had been reduced to bleak, smol-
was moving armored vehicles into the
endure the shocks of 50, or 200, or 500 incoming
rounds, a form of
itself
impact on the Marines
knew
munition were delivered by parachute.
camp
dering ruins.
the course of the siege.
Only 4 were destroyed by enemy weather
when
planes
incoming
shells
ot the
could be heard in the distance.
that they had exactly twenty-one seconds be-
rounds
hit,
the Marines stayed at attention until
last possible instant,
then dove
for
cover as
artillery
177
erupted
fire
all
Moments
around.
ascended their makeshift flagpole, called "Maggie's Drawers"
miss
on the
— the
camp
training
another banner
later,
a pair of red panties
traditional
symbol of
a
E.
Lownds, had other ways of keeping siege
of the
The
doned.
1st
trenches had long since been aban-
siege of 8,
Khe Sanh was
when
a relief
Why
the North Vietnamese decided to withdraw
from Khe Sanh remains one the many unsolved riddles of the war. In the view of
ence, a practice that some Marines openly questioned.
it
patrol, to
do what
don't know,
1
and they were promptly slaughtered," recalled medical corpsman
Richard
Heath.
But
Lownds's
superiors
thought otherwise. Resentful of their defensive posture,
which they considered contrary
to the heritage
of the Corps, they wanted the
maintain the rine
that the
at
and
spirit
Khe Sanh
For the record, in
initiative.
command
men
fact,
the
to
Ma-
repeatedly cited the patrols as evidence
combat base was not
By mid-February,
under
officially
the Tet offensive ran out of
as
steam, fighting in and around
Khe Sanh
also abated.
Although the NVA's long-range 130MM and 152MM tillery
guns continued to
no major ground
there were positions.
At
attacks
ar-
regularity,
on outlying U.S.
the end of the month, however, a Marine
patrol discovered a
more than
pound the base with
maze of enemy trench
a mile long, leading toward the
lines,
combat
General Westmoreland immediately dispatched
as they
contend that the abandonment
hold
Hue and
from the
at
which soon began dropping
cities.
some
of the trenches extended to within 100 yards of the
American
positions. Others
"Ts," signaling the sault
to
branch out into
of preparation before as-
ramps were put into place. With March
anniversary of the
approaching,
it
about to repeat
first
attacks
13,
the
on Dien Bien Phu,
fast
suddenly began to look as itself.
Once
Sanh prepared themselves again nothing happened.
ued, toward the end oi
history was
if
again the defenders of
for the big attack.
Not on March
o( the days that followed.
178
began
final stage
Though
March
Once
13.
Khe
And once
Not on any
the shelling contin-
patrols were finding that
directly
Quang
Sanh received on June as their
Thua
Tri and
to overrun the
combat base
allies'
attention
that had been accomplished, they
Two months after the
to maintain the siege.
siege
ended the Marines
at
17, they
blew up the bunkers that had served
homes and carted away what remained of
why
Khe
orders to dismantle their base. Beginning
When
supplies.
journalists
the "western anchor" of the
allies'
were told that the they had carved
NVA had changed
new
northern
"We
officer.
got to keep moving."
and that
Tri Province was
don't want any more
"To
they
their tactics, that
infiltration routes,
comer of Quang
their
began to
defense line had suddenly become expendable,
one Marine junior
nevertheless kept on digging, until
Khe Sanh was
others have concluded that the
no longer had any reason
inquire
just outside the perimeter.
NVA
Still
Communists never intended
necessary.
bombs
of
gain control of
Thien Provinces.
base.
had
materiel would
related to the collapse of North Vietnamese efforts to
He
The
men and
any additional expenditure o{
ammunition and
a seis-
NVA could not
be pointless. Others, including General Westmoreland,
base in the
their
military analysts, since
that the
overrun the base, General Giap probably concluded that
Dien Bien Phu and dynamite the Marines from below. also called in the B-52s,
some
March
clear by early
some
mographic team to determine whether the enemy was attempting to tunnel under Khe Sanh
became
but instead sought only to divert the
siege.
declared
Air Cavalry Division reached the Marine
side the perimeter to look for signs of the enemy's pres-
"They would go out on
officially
column made up of men
outpost.
men occupied.
his
he continued to send patrols out-
enemy
ended on April from the
firing range.
The base commander, Marine Corps Colonel David Throughout the
many
a fixed
no longer
Khe Sanhs,"
said
defeat an enemy, you've
Food and weapons drop by parachute
March
1968.
With an estimated 15,000
to
Marines at the besieged Khe Sanh base
NVA
regulars surrounding the base,
in
northwestern South
Khe Sanh amid be
resupplied
\'ieto.:ni.
onh
h\ an.
179
While some Marines relax during in
enemy shelling,
a
break
others go about the Sis-
yphean task of improving their bunker defenses by filling sandbags their
180
revetment
walls.
and adding
to
.s '*;'S?^#
™
\
-^-^Jl^r^v.
Inured Co the chaos outside, two soldiers bur^ker.
Meanwhile, others curl uf
incoming enemy shelling. In
of enemy
artillery.
one day alone
(Ictt)
in their
The Marines
at the
in late February,
c7i,if
inside their
hiri;e.
ivell-tortihed
trench (above) and await the impact ot
Khe Sanh
base faced around-the-ckKk
the base received
more than
I.
iOO rtninds
fire.
183
»* .
J%^^
i| As an enemy round
explodes in the back-
ground, a U.S. Marine crawls over crates
of ammunition to check for any burning debris that might ignite them.
The survnors
186
ot
,)
thirtv-nhin p.nrol
./;ii/ii/.s/ifj
hy Nurth Vietnamese soldiers dran their
wounded back
to the base.
An
American tank
leads the
way down Route 9 toward Khe Sank, part
reheve the Marines as part of Operation Pegasus
in early
of the joint U.S.
and South Vietnamese
task force sent to
April 1968.
187
-'.r£i
A
LLS.
Army
nitiitn to
wvstwiiiJ.
hclicnprcr delivers
l\\i::isiis ( );i
units
.4/v;7
7.
HI,
lia^htiiii: tl
the
1st
.'J Ixiit.tliiU}.
7th
u/i i\/(/i
the M.inne-'.
fllieii
eihl to the se\ei)i\ sevei,
(
{
\7s/<)/)',s
",
'M'
My private
Witness: Walter Cronkite
some
which
feelings,
I
believe I disguised with
success, probably reflected the opinion
jority.
of a ma-
approved of President Kennedy's dispatch of
I
military advisers to try to help preserve a corner of
Southeast Asia from the Communists.
when
became alarmed
I
the advisers began taking an active role in the
and
fighting
numbers grew.
their
along with those numbers and as through
my
My
alarm escalated
began to understand,
that they were in fact part of a
visits there,
"numbers game";
I
incredibly,
that,
being told the truth about
its
America was not
commitment
Vietnam;
in
that while the public was told that Congressionally ap-
proved
figures defined the limits
of our participation, the
military was filling the pipeline with the
much
teriel for a
In February 1968 Walter Cronkite of
CBS
one of America's most popular and respected traveled to
Vietnam
journalists,
for a firsthand look at the war.
Cronkite reported to the American people on February 27 that,
"It
now more
seems
certain than ever that the
bloody experience of Vietnam
The
is
to
end
On
News, then
in a stalemate."
only viable way out of the war, he concluded, "will
in
the
keeping with the
upon
editorialize is
too
much
to be true
on the
was viewed lic
as a
conflict by a
watershed
first
network anchor and
in the turn of
American pub-
opinion against the war. Twenty years
after the
fluential
Vietnam
visit
and
and
still feel,
what
to believe
it is
A
member of
more
may not have been much
surprised about our editorial conclusions
Tet offensive than
When
I
went
to
I was.
background knowledge of
sonal views must affect
When
how
commentary on
journalists work, could
of his reporting.
all
the North Vietnamese
their Tet offensive
and Vietcong launched
and within days had swept and through many
Vietnam soon
I
did not
know what
I
would
after the
dimensions
my mind find or
was wide
what
I
would
conclude from those findings. Throughout the long war I
had
I
had done what
I
and balanced
be.
uncertainty,
seemed
all
Were
Vietnam were
as accurate, fair,
claims
I
began to
With the offensive that had
and predictions of our military and
and confusion.
the feeling of a majority of
ance.
as first-person, risk-of-life, on-the-battle-
scene reports can
190
in
many
political leaders, I suffered a nauseous
good journalism
the reports of our extraordinarily talented and coura-
geous correspondents
tion to that philosophy.
could to be certain that
tried to report as impartially as
demanded.
into the
areas that
believe there perhaps should be an extraordinary excep-
upset so
of the offensive became obvious, open.
on the
it
know
the audience, lacking
our military had long claimed as pacified, President Lyndon Johnson
that I
or
possible to prepare,
at the next deliver an impassioned
very outskirts of Saigon
report.
felt,
conviction
comment
not be blamed for believing that the broadcaster's per-
Tet
offensive, Cronkite recalled the circumstances of his in-
maintain objectivity
— that a good journalist can at one point de-
the same event.
editorial stand
always
an audience
liver as objective a report as
who
did the best they could." Cronkite's report was the
I
it.
to ask
and
democracy and
I tried to
CBS credo and my own
that those delivering the news should not
be to negotiate, not as victors, but as honorable people lived up to their pledge to defend
larger involvement.
however,
air,
men and ma-
the
to be searching
What could we
I felt certain
my
some guid-
What was
the truth/
and nearing
end of the Vietnam nightmare/ Or did the Tet
tory, years that
wanted
we were
We
for
and hoping
believed
that this was
fellow Americans.
we, as our leaders claimed, winning
fensive indicate that
I
wave of doubt,
still
years
would be spent bridging
away from
ofvic-
rivers ofblood.^
to get the answers to those questions,
if I
could,
on the ground
in
Vietnam where the authoritn-
and where
tive sources were
I
eyes the statements versus the
The question
News
Would
strict impartiality
of our
in guiding at least a portion
maze of confusion I
if I
Richard Salant. Dick and
up to
now
listeners
on the Vietnam
issue,
future objectivity in the eyes
would
this fallout
itself!
was eternally
issue as large as
agreed that the answers,
my
studied
compromise
I
of our viewers, and
We
the entire
my
best to get
conclusions.
When I arrived, the battle for the once beautiful old of Hue was still raging, and I huddled with civilians
city
and American Marines seeking shelter from
artillery
us.
In Saigon I drove not far from the center of the city
beyond which the crunch
and the staccato pop of automatic stone and the tinkling of glass,
rifles,
of mortars
the crash of
testified to the incursion
and Seoul,
I
saw refugees from the
crowd toward the
brightly at the
To me
city's heart,
Paris
and
city's out-
pushing their
bi-
and
of the
enemy hot I
officers
villages
we needed
end
replacement
in
to secure the victory that
watched the helicopter
I
spots scarcely blocks away.
And at
heard angry, frustrated American
who had been
and who
we were winning
a
in
civil-
charge of pacification
few days before had claimed
the hearts
and minds
of the people
shone
light still
of the tunnel.
The reporting and the
tion.
We
not.
The
though
We
I
broadcasts themselves are,
had anticipated some public
would have been unique broadcasters reaction
if
we had
was generally favorable, and,
have no doubt that we
lost
some
I
reac-
al-
viewers, there
was no discernible drop in our audience.
What we had not later,
expected, and only learned
much
was that the president himself would react as he
did [that March
do not
31].
believe,
about anything.
No one has claimed, and I certainly
that our broadcast I
do believe
it
changed
may have been
his
mind
the back-
breaking piece of straw that was heaped on the heavy
he had been getting on alleged military success
reports in Viet-
nam, concern that the military was now asking other considerable increase
for an-
in troop strength to finish
and increasing public outcry
as
the nation
a presidential election.
Despite a considerable rewriting, or at least refine-
night, from the roof of the Caravelle Hotel, cor-
respondents' headquarters,
ians
all
gather, history.
the job,
gunships circling the city unload their hail of death on
now
that
trary.
headed into
the bar below
me
the
"
the evidence was overwhelmingly to the con-
belongings.
suspected
top officers told
had long eluded them. For them the
cycles laden with their impossible pyramids of precious
At
open.
in the
—doubt about the
Out of the pages of memory of Warsaw and
skirts
—out
one of
now have
"we
load he already was carrying
of the enemy.
Brussels
to recall that
few score more millions of dollars
equipment were
and
mortar shells as the ancient structures tumbled about
to the roadblocks
a
in
was
It
seem
I
only a few score thousand more young Americans and
decided in the end
to split the nation.
and broadcast my
and
to suggest that
At military headquarters
should go to Vietnam, do
I
half-full,
Their glass
grossly understated.
most important
any that had faced our nation —
one that threatened
fact,
wrong or
them even dared
that this was too parochial a consideration in regard to
an
minishing enemy strength of previous days had been
through the
be so severe as to jeopardize the stand-
CBS News
acknowledged that the optimistic reports of di-
enemy where we want him
would
the spokesmen
the "Five O'Clock Follies"),
it
either grossly
"CBS Evening News" and even
ing of the
reputation of
called
scarcely
CBS News president,
raised the
I
the daily press briefing (skeptical correspondents
be helpful
question with each other: By abandoning
my
who had
which we stumbled!
in
discussed the matter with our
neutrality
CBS my
broadcast
the opinion of one reporter
maintain
tried to
had welcomed the returning Vietcong.
At
asked myself was: Would we at
I
report with bitter cynicism that their villages apparently
tacts.
be performing a public service
findings!
my own
could check with
ment, of history
in the light of later
evidence and the
claim today, supported in some degree by statements of
North Vietnamese military
leaders, that
North Vietnam
actually suffered a battlefield defeat in the Tet offensive, I
have found no reason
to revise
the time that Tet proved
and
cast
doubt that
it
how
mv
far
belief expressed at
we were from
victory
ever was attainable.
191
THE HOME FRONT
"President Johnson's decision to sacrifice himself on the altar of peace and national unity is
an act of statesmanship which
and sympathy." So wrote the
many
in the
entitles
him
American
to the
people's deepest respect
immediate aftermath of Johnson's historic speech of March 31, 1968. Praise
of the president's actions was even more widespread after Hanoi that
it
fresh
view shared by
editors of the Los Angeles Times, voicing a
would accept the American
exhiliration temporarily gripped the
at last
be brought to an end, a
American people.
wishers cheered the president during a
3
begin preliminary peace talks. Infused with
offer to
hope that the Vietnam War might
announced on April
visit for
In
New
mood
ot
near
York throngs of well-
the investiture of Archbishop Terence
Cardinal Cooke, while on Wall Street the stock market recorded
its
greatest single-day
gain to that date.
For Lyndon Johnson there must have been more than a touch of irony in that transitory
moment
of renewed popularity. Barely three years had passed since he stood at the apex
of power and prestige, after scoring the mt)st lopsided electoral victory in the history of
With
the presidency.
the Demt)cratic party in firm control of both houses of Congress
and the economy booming, of John Kennedy's
Union
address
Johnson
laid
New
his
dream oi creating the Great Society on the foundations
Frontier had
on January
4,
seemed well within reach. During
1965, the House
out his agenda for the future:
aid to the elderly, to eradicate poverty
and insure equal
rights for
concluded, "tree, growing,
all.
tt)
and
is
"damn
cities,
and
to cut excise taxes
the State ot the Union," the president had
tull ot
Only one major problem confronted Johnson into reality: the war in that
as
extend federal aid to education and medical
and refurbish the
"This, then,
restless,
his State of the
chamber had thundered with applause
hope." as
he
little piss ant
set
out to transform his social vision
country," as he privately reterred to
Vietnam. Despite the commitment of more than 22,000 American military advisers, the The
tuncnil ot Private Robert
Ihmuin Wucrt:
ot M:is>ilh>n.
Ohio. killcJ
in \'wtnjin.
miqht of some 12,000 American bombing missions, and the influx of thousands of tons of American war mate-
the struggle against the
riel,
Communists
in
Southeast
Asia was going badly. Even more disquieting from Johnson's point of view,
it
was becoming
a political liability.
Public opinion polls taken at the end of 1964 revealed that fully 50 percent oi the public was dissatisfied with
the administration's handling of the war, though the
same surveys
aLso
indicated sharp disagreement over
what course the president should
follow.
During the
election campaign Johnson himself had seemed undecided, promising not to widen the war or "send
ican boys to do
what Asian boys ought
selves," while at the to
Communist By
to
do
Amer-
for
them-
same time vowing never "to
yield
aggression."
early 1965, however,
it
had become clear that the
time for such ambivalence had passed. With the threat
Communist
of a decisive
victory
in
South Vietnam
growing more imminent with each passing day, Johnson
would have
to
make "harder
McGeorge Bundy
choices," special assistant
advised him.
He would have
to
choose
between "escalation and withdrawal," between using "our military power to force a change in
Communist
policy" and applying "all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what
little
can be pre-
served." Fearful that he would be vilified by the Republican right nists
war
if
he "lost" South Vietnam to the
and confident that the nation wt)uld
as long as
son opted to
its
costs
raise the
remained
American
Commu-
tolerate the
relatively modest,
John-
stakes in Southeast Asia
by stepping up the bombing of North Vietnam and send-
combat troops
ing U.S. set in
motion
forces that
ter his plans for the
prive
him
From the eminent
to the South. In so doing,
Great Society, and ultimately de-
of the presidency itself.
outset there had been dissenting voices. journalist
conflict,
The
Walter Lippmann, who repeatedly
warned that there could be "no
Vietnam
he
would divide the nation, shat-
military solution" to the
was one. Senators
Wayne Morse
of
In an curly i}nnw,)r Jenwnstratum, 20,000 students from across
the country gather on the Mall in Washington, D.C., on April 17.
194
1965.
.;?r'A-
•ftS'
;
Oregon and Ernest Grucning of Alaska, rhe only memTonkin
hers of Congress to vote against the 1964 Gulf ot
With the
Resolution, were others. in the spring oi 1965,
escalation ot the war
however, public opposition to the
deepening American involvement
expanded and
Vietnam
in
rapidly
University students were
among
the hrst to register
March
at the University
of Michigan, activists at more than 100 colleges and
boycotted classes and staged
"teach-ins" to discuss the war and ers,
its
series
a
campuses
to participate in the
that took place in
New
York
ington, D.C., two days
t)n
later.
mass antiwar
April
1
and
5
the newly ftirmed Vietnam Day
to block troop trains
rallies
Wash-
tions
(SANE) and
A
the
ft)r
many
Viet-
liberal,
for
a
middle-class organiza-
Sane Nuclear Policy
American Friends Service Committee.
product of the earlier "ban the bomb" movement,
SANE year
mounted the
when
it
largest single antiwar protest of the
attracted 30,000 marchers to
Washington,
D.C., on November 27. Led by pediatrician Dr. Ben-
jamin Spock,
.socialist
Norman Thomas, and
Coretta
Scott King, the wife of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.,
the
demonstrators carried placards demanding an end to
U.S. bombing In
in
as
to question the
nam. In
a supervised cease-fire.
more and more ordinary American commitment
late January, a
servists to
House
Vietnam and
1966 the antiwar movement continued to gain
momentum,
End the War
Several days
in
them former Nobel
to
began
South Viet-
Vietnam picketed the White U.S.
after a thirty-seven-day
later,
citizens
group of 100 Veterans and Re-
to protest the resumption of
North Vietnam
5,000 American
air strikes
over
bombing pause.
.scientists,
17
196
of
Prize winners, petitioned the presi-
dent to review U.S. chemical and biological warfare Southeast Asia.
Under the dis-
to find answers
tt)
basic questions surrounding military
bombing
A
negotiations.
policy,
and peace
long-time friend and legislative ally of
Johnson, Fulbright had been instrumental through Congress the August
1964
in steering
Southeast
Asia
(Tonkin GulO Resolution, empowering the president "to take
all
necessary steps, including the use of armed
force," to defend the freedom of
many
of his ct)lleagues,
South Vietnam. Like
however, Fulbright had become
that authority to escalate the war without consulting the
heading into the Oakland
educators, and civil rights leaders, as
Committee
the
policy.
William Fulbright, the
J.
strategy, troop deployments,
branch.
legislative
in
Althtiugh
Secretary
of
Defense
McNamara and JCS chairman General Wheeler to testify before the
members of such
as
chairmanship of Senator
Vietnam
increasingly irritated by Johnson's highhanded use of
later at-
Swelling the ranks of the student protesters were
well as
tion" of the administration's
and
GIs.
many clergymen,
Com-
Services
Committee organized
army terminal, the point of departure
nam-bound
left
In Berkeley, California,
similar demonstrations during the spring
tempted
in
of
Oth-
implications.
seeking to express their dissent more directly,
their
Armed
mittee to initiate in early February 1966 an "investiga-
tinguished Arkan'^as Democrat, the committee set out
intensified.
their protest. Beginning in late
universities
Serious doubts about the war also began to surface in
Congress, prompting the Senate
with the inquiry, calling on
government
refused
committee, Fulbright pressed on
officials to
a
parade of high-ranking
defend the administration's po-
sition.
In the end, the
any concrete
month-long hearings
results,
failed to
produce
since few congressmen were pre-
pared to challenge the president directly or to cut off funds for the war. Nevertheless, by providing an open
forum
for a debate over
American
policy objectives in
Vietnam, the nationally televised proceedings made sent
more
of nearly
respectable, thus paving the
fifty
for a flurry
"peace candidates" in the November 1966
Congressional elections. Though
drew
way
dis-
were defeated some
all
significant support, including Robert Scheer, the
editor of the radical journal Ramparts,
who
received 45
percent of the Democratic primary vote in California's
Seventh
District.
Moreover,
New
kind observed in the
war could
find a
as journalist
Republic,
"measure of hope"
Andrew Kop-
opponents
of the
in the election of a
"miniblock" of dovish Republicans, including Senators
Mark
Hatfield of Oregon, Charles Percy of Illinois, and
Edward Brooke In the
war continued antiwar
of Massachusetts.
meantime,
rally
ma.ss
demonstrations against the
to proliferate, culminating in the largest in
LI.S.
history
—
a
march by 300,000
A
demonstrator
inserts
pink c:nn
rifle
barrels
of military policemen during the heated confrontation outside the Pentagon
on October 21, 1967.
Americans
months
in
later,
New
York City on April
on October
21, a
much
15,
1967. Six
smaller but equally
determined group
ot protesters gathered in front ot the
Lincoln Memorial
in
ers
condemn
Washington, D.C.,
to hear speak-
strators fell
back and held a nightlong candlelight
By the time the protest came
to
vigil.
an end the following
afternoon, 700 people had been arrested and twice that
number reported
as casualties.
the war amid signs demanding that Presi-
dent Johnson "Bring
Home
the GIs
Now!" As
the
last
speeches came to an end, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators linked arms,
crossed the Arlington Memorial
Bridge, and marched on the Pentagon. Met by
a line ot
military police as the protesters approached the
main
entrance to what they called "the center of the American war machine," several hundred of
them attempted
Although the motives of the
protesters varied, from the
ideological radicalism oi the student
"New
Left" to the
religious pacifism of the Quakers, the principal target of
much
early antiwar dissent
draft calls sht)t
was the same. As monthly
up to meet the demands
U.S. war effort— from 13,700 30,000
in
August 1967
—
in
oi the
expanding
April 1965 to nearly
protest against administration
troops re-
policy increasingly took the form of protest against the
dozens
Selective Service System (SSS). In addition ro coun-
of injuries as they drove the surging crowd back. After
seling potential inductees to resist conscription, antiwar
demon-
activists picketed IcKal draft boards, staged "sit-ins" at
to break
through and race up the
sponded with
a
tear gas
steps.
and truncheons,
second charge met with the same
The
inflicting
result,
the
197
and publicly burned their
military induction centers,
own
draft cards.
Congress
swiftly retaliated by stittening
the penalties for such acts and extending the range ot
punishable offenses. But even the vigort)us enforcement of the
new
laws could not curtail the steady growth ot
the antidraft movement.
For
who
all
the publicity they generated, however, those
actively resisted the draft remained a small,
vocal,
if
minority. Faced with the prospect of conscription, most draft-age males either accepted their lot or found other
Many
ways to avoid military service.
took advantage of
the long-standing system of exemptions and deferments instituted by the
SSS
to
"channel" the nation's youth
in "socially desirable" ways. Local draft boards
powered,
example,
for
grant
to
grounds of "family hardship" or skills"
and
were em-
exemptions on the occupational
"critical
to issue deferments to ministers, farmers,
and
college students "making satisfactory progress toward a
degree." Other young
men
drawing on the expertise of
took their cases to court, a
growing number of
draft-
law specialists to establish their credentials as conscientious objectors or to challenge the procedures
by their local boards.
Still
others contrived to
preinduction physical exams by
artificially
employed fail
their
elevating
their blood pressure, aggravating old sports injuries, or
simulating more serious di,sorders.
Though
the military did
tween legitimate and than one-quarter
its
of all prt)spective conscripts
from military service
qualified
best to discriminate be-
illegitimate cases, in the
for
end more were
dis-
medical reasons. Each
year another third obtained exemptions or deferments,
while 5 percent avoided serving in Vietnam by enlisting in the
National Guard or the Reserves. Since the
sification system by design allowed the better
and better
off
less
educated
not to serve, those actually inducted into
the military tended to
earning
clas-
come irom
working-class families
than $10,000 a year. Inductees typically
lived in cities or small towns rather than suburbs
and
had no education beyond high school. According
one
1968 study,
A
dropout from
a
low-income
draft-age youth from Hanford, California, appears before his
draft is
a high-school
to
board to learn that he
married.
198
will receive a
deferment because he
199
serving in Vietnam,
family faced a 70 percent chance
tif
whereas the corresponding odds
for a college graduate
were only 42 percent. Once draftees were tar roles
than those
more
who
in
likely to
Vietnam, moreover,
be assigned to combat
enlisted voluntarily,
and conse-
quently they suffered a significantly higher casualty
The
social imbalances of the Vietnam army
even more glaring following the introduction 100,000
in
rate.
became
ot Project
1966. Heralded as a Great Society program
designed to "rehabilitate the subterranean poor," especially
young
blacks, the project quickly evolved into a
vehicle for tunneling underprivileged and unemployed
youths from the streets of America to the battlefields of
minimum
Indochina. By lowering the
intellectual
and
physical standards tor induction, recruiters eventually
brought more than 350,000
men
Civil righcs leader Dr. Martin Lather California in January 1968, three
200
into the military under
A';n^', Jr.,
months heh>re
an oiitspc^ken
critic of
his assassination.
the program.
Of
that total, 41 percent were black,
40 percent served later
in the
infantry.
A
and
Pentagon study
determined that the "attrition-by-death" rate of
Project 100,000 soldiers was nearly twice as high as that
of Vietnam-era veterans as a whole.
The
racial inequities of the draft explain in part
why
antiwar sentiment consistently ran higher among black
Americans than among whites. Already engaged domestic struggle to end
legal
South and de facto segregation of the civil rights
in a
discrimination in the
in the
movement had
North, the leaders
retrained trom chal-
lenging U.S. foreign policy goals throughout the late
1950s and early 1960s. But as the Vietnam to take a
heavy
toll
on black youth,
War began
as well as
on the
antipoverty programs of Johnson's Great Society, blacks
came
many
to regard the ctmtlict as an obstacle to fur-
the war in Vietnam, addresses a caucus ot liberal Democrats in
The more
ther social progress.
radical
activists,
SNCC
"black power" advocate Stokely Carmichael ot (the Student Nttnvioient Coordinating
Huey Newton
ot the Black
Committee) and
Panther party, were
the
in
By early 1967 even the moderate leaders
movement had
comes when
silence
in relation to
4,
"A
time
betrayed," proclaimed the Rev-
erend Martin Luther King,
Church on April
ot the civil
turned against the war.
is
Jr., in a
sermon
1967. "That time has
Vietnam." Reminding
course of his
war
in
own
Vietnam.
eviscerated as
if it
home, he traced the
gone mad on war," King could never again raise
my
idle plaything of a society
"and
asserted,
1
knew
that
I
first
spoken
clearly to the greatest purveyor ot violence in the world
today
too
too
far,
— my own government."
— they
fought back by resisting desegregation of
and ctimmunities and by withdrawing their
support from liberal politicians whose social programs rarely addressed their
—by
own
More complicated were
needs.
the attitudes of working-class
American economy was
On
whites toward the war in Vietnam. blue-collar workers were
70,000 longshoremen,
among
May
1967.
effort, as
Fifth
the one hand,
more
the
evidenced by the
Avenue
in
and me-
New
Bless
Us
Patriots,"
York
"Down
Carrying banners reading
"God
and
visible
seamen,
carpenters,
who marched down
with the Reds,"
home and ct)mmu-
—crime,
neighbor-
their schools
hoods
the nation was "rich enough and strong enough" to hght
nism abroad
and disintegrating
taxes,
rising
City in
against poverty at
Forced to endure
the dislocations ot a rapidly changing society inflation,
of
system that
as victims of a
else's interests at heart.
out foundation. Despite President Johnson's belief that
—
remedy long-standing
so-called white backlash was espe-
themselves
to see
had someone
chanics
war
some
pronounced among blue-collar workers, many
promised the dream of the Great Society was not with-
a two-front
The
vocal supporters of the war
com-
King's claim that the rising costs oi the war had
the growth of
many white Americans
fast in its efforts to
social problems.
voice against the violence of
the oppressed in the ghettos without having
riots,
had become convinced that the government was moving
whom came
tor us
watched the program broken and
were some
the recurrent outbreak ot urban
come
his audience that
Troubled by
steadily since 1965.
black radicalism, and the perceived excesses of
cially
disillusionment with the undeclared "I
mounted
fact,
at Riverside
only a few years betore the Jt)hnson administration had declared a "war on poverty" at
had, in
federal antipoverty programs,
forefront of the opposition by early 1966.
rights
Opposition to the adnunistration's domestic policies
like
and "Support
the antiwar protesters and
Our Boys," they denounced called
upon the government
beginning to show signs ot strain. Faced with the threat
late."
On
the other hand, they were well aware that
of runaway inflation, which had been triggered by the
their
own
sons were bearing a disproportionate burden
sharp and unanticipated increase in military expendi-
of the fighting and dying in Southeast Asia.
early 1967 the
tures over the previous eighteen
mtmths, Johnst)n was
forced to choose between raising taxes and cutting do-
they deeply resented those they regarded
much
to "escalate,
who avoided
time went on and casualties multiplied
natives were, in August 1967 the president put betore
class parents
Congress a request charge.
for a
10 percent income-tax sur-
By that point, however,
with
dissatisfaction
war was
many working-
to share the dissenters'
a mistake.
Though
the draft and
antiwar protest as treasonous, as
mestic spending. Politically unpalatable as both alter-
came
not capitu-
view that the
Unlike the organized peace move-
ment, however, their tipposition was not so much
ide-
on the convictit^n
Johnson's social retorm agenda had become so wide-
ological or moral as pragmatic, based
spread that Congressional conservatives were in a posi-
that the price they were paying was simply too high.
tion to
demand
a quid pro quo.
a tax hike, they insisted,
deep cuts
It
the president wanted
he would
in social spending.
first
have
mately agreed, by then even the combination creased
federal
could not cool
make
to
Although Johnson
ulti-
oi
in-
revenues and decreased expenditures
down
the overheated U.S. economy.
one Long
Island construction wtirker put
it
after
As
watch-
ing the funeral procession of a local boy killed in Viet-
nam: "The whole damn country not
vvt)rth
the
lite
ot
the hell our politicians ot
oi
South Vietnam
is
one American boy, no matter what tell us.
watching these funerals
gi)
I'm
damn
sick
and
tired
by."
201
Si St'
^ 5?
lijg
^^x
A
r.. t'f^,] >^
^
t
-:'\F'.'''^
9HH
^H
|«p ^ M r ,
«»-
"
#^*.t k. itac^s^^rJd^ ^-
m
y
1^ 4i
The
pattern of gradual disillusionment with the war was
the late Peter Lisagor, then Washington bureau chief of
most Americans,
the Chicago Daily News. "There was a tendency to be-
also evident in the popular press. Like
the journalists
who covered
the war initially hacked the
U.S. commitment to Vietnam, helieving that
was
it
in
the nation's interest to "contain" the spread of com-
munism Sheehan in
in
when he
arrived in Saigon
first
1962 he was convinced that the U.S. was helping
the South Vietnamese "to huild a viahle and inde-
pendent nation-state and defeat a Communist
insur-
gency that would subject them to a dour tyranny."
According
to
the correspondents
American government was dermining
effort.
themselves,
the
In their zeal to put
the best face on
all political
U.S.
Washington and Saigon repeatedly pro-
officials in
an
to
have the
official's
and military developments,
however,
the flood of pessimistic dis-
patches from the war zone became too overwhelming to ignore.
Though few correspondents went
so far as to
challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. presence in Viet-
nam, by the summer of 1967 many had come
state.
still
far
from becoming a viable nation-
"Everyone thought
who
Charles Mohr,
was against the war," recalled
1
resigned his post as Time's Saigon
correspondent after his managing editor ordered him to rewrite a story claiming that the war was being
own
just
intelligence
gleaned from
other sources. Early on, for example, correspondents
were told that American forces were only "advising" the
South Vietnamese, even though the reporters saw them fighting
and dying.
Similarly, battles in
which
ARVN
forces were routed by the Vietcong were described as victories in official briefings. ficial in
"No
responsible U.S. of-
Saigon ever told a newsman
a really big false-
hood," recalled John Mecklin, chief of the U.S.
mation
Service.
"Instead
there
were
Infor-
endless
little
falsehoods."
As
of
it
thought as
it
wasn't working.
immoral
emerged between
campaign
get the message out" that
who was
"we
also chief of the
"I
are
1967 "to
winning." Under the
Walt W. Rostow,
White House Psychological
Strategy Committee, government officials inundated the
major news media with an endless stream of charts,
and previously
classified
showing "steady progress" on every front
Hubert H.
of the cor-
lost.
to think
in the fall of
direction of national security adviser
gap would widen over time. The skepticism
increasingly critical ac-
come
Johnson administration launched an
all-out public relations
against the Vietnamese
itself in
didn't
Troubled by the growing perception that the war was a "stalemate," the
the U.S. government and the Saigon press corps. That
respondents manifested
I
until the very end."
graphs, statistics,
a result, a "credibility gap" soon
to the
that the pacification program was failing, and that South
Vietnam was
vided information that was at odds with the reporters' observations or with
word
cosmic as war."
as
Eventually,
to accept
conclusion that the war was not being fought effectively,
largely responsible for un-
war
faith in the
and we were inclined
on something
Southeast Asia. As UPl correspondent Neil
later recalled,
them more because they were supposed
lieve facts,
documents
in the struggle
Communists. Vice President
Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, and
Secretary of State
Dean Rusk
offered
counts of the war effort that often directly contradicted
equally optimistic appraisals in televised appearances
on
what the Johnson administration was saying back
weekly news shows
fa-
Washington. In many instances, however, tive accounts
their nega-
were either buried on the back pages or
revised by editors
who
preferred to rely
on
tagon assessments, frequently expressed quantitative language of
enemy K)dy
official
in
counts,
weapons captured, and hamlets pacihed. largely at the
in
Pen-
the hard, kill ratios,
"We
were
mercy of the administration then,"
said
vored reporters.
as well as in private chats
The campaign reached
its
high point in
mid-November, when the president summoned General William Westmoreland, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,
and pacification chief Robert
W. Komer
from Saigon
confirm the administration's assessment.
whereas
ning, today he
certainly losing,"
is
am
City
nctivists .sm^v
in early
;i
Jemonsrr.ition on the streets o/
April 1967-
New
York
November
when
21.
"We
tii
abso-
1965 the enemy was win-
lutely certain that
in
"1
Westmoreland
serted in an address before the Natittnal Press
Prowar
with
as-
Club on
have reached an important point
the end begins to
come
into view."
203
As Johnson had hoped,
the administration's "success
Although President Jiihnson
initially resisted the press'
offensive" brought to a halt the steady erosion of popular
assessment, in the end he had
support for the war. Opinion polls conducted toward the
it.
end of the year showed
he always called them, he knew that he could no longer
a 7 percent increase in approval
of the president's handling of the war since the preced-
Even more
ing August.
public's perception ot U.S. "progress" in
who
to
Johnson could ncU even count on the continuing support
of people
plummeted, while those who thought that the rose from 34 percent
more than 50 percent.
Then came Tet
own
of his
showing
startling
the outbreak of the
Com-
Senator Eugene McCarthy's
political party.
New
in the
Hampshire primary and
Senator Robert Kennedy's subsequent entrance into the presidential race
on March 31
made
clear that
it
Johnson faced
a bit-
Democratic nomination. By announcing
ter fight for the
With
1968.
a majority of the public
Vietnam. Be-
thought the U.S. was "losing ground" or "standing
Americans were "making progress"
Not only had
effectively.
repudiated his Vietnam policies, but by mid-March 1968
shift
tween July and December 1967 the percentage
still"
govern
choice but to accept
nt)
the trust of his "fellow Americans," as
k)st
in the
was the
striking
Having
his intention to relinquish the presidency,
own
munists' cataclysmic, country-wide offensive in late Jan-
Johnson hoped
uary 1968, public confidence in the American war effort
personal authority and to restore a semblance of unity
and ultimately
suffered a grievous,
fatal,
Con-
blow.
coordinated, surprise attacks on a massive scale,
Americans found
it
tion's claims that the
could they place
many
the administra-
difficult to believe
U.S. was "winning" the war. Nor
much
General Westmoreland's
faith in
to salvage a
measure of his
to a nation increasingly divided against
mount
fronted with evidence of the enemy's capacity to
once
at
Yet such was not to be.
On
itself.
April 4, 1968, the day
North Vietnamese rekindled hopes
after the
for
peace
by accepting Johnson's offer to begin negotiations, Dr.
Martin Luther King, in
Jr.
,
was killed by an
Memphis, Tennessee. For
sanguine prediction that "the end" had "come into
matic leader of the black
view." By mid-February, two weeks after the offensive
of the
Nobel Peace
civil rights
Prize,
assassin's bullet
thirteen years the charis-
movement, winner
eloquent speaker and moral
began, popular disapproval of the president's Vietnam
teacher, King had long stood as a symbol of nonviolent
policy had reached an all-time high of 50 percent; by
social reform.
month
the end of the telling
the figure was 58 percent.
More
only one out of three Americans
still,
now
thought that the United States was "making progress" in
Vietnam, and nearly one
allies
the
in four believed that
The judgments rendered organizations polls.
reinforced
by the nation's leading news
the
verdict
reflected
by the
"After three years of gradual escalation. President
tragic
irony,
murder by
his
white ex-convict James Earl Ray became the occasion for the
most widespread
racial violence in the nation's
history.
Within minutes
after learning of King's death,
crowds of angry blacks began roaming the
many major
were "losing ground."
Now, with
and setting
breaking windt)ws, looting stores,
cities, fire
to
streets of
white-owned businesses. Black
col-
leges seethed with rage while urban high schools across
the country closed
down
in the face o{ violent racial
Johnson's strategy of gradual escalation has run into a
confrontations. In Baltimore, Detroit, and 4 southern
dead end," wrote the editors of Newsweek, expressing
cities,
view held by many Americans offensive.
Vietnam
Not
t)nly
in the
had the U.S. military buildup
failed to quell the
a
wake of the Tet
Communist
in
insurgency, but
overwhelmed
regular
army troops had
West Side ghetto went up
169
morass," riddled with corruption and unable to earn the
wake of the King
its
own
people.
What was
"the courage to face the truth" be
won by
whole
204
military
—
life
cities
to be called in after entire blocks in flames.
All told,
reported incidents of racial violence in the assassination, resulting in
some $130
was
that "the war cannot
means without
fabric of natit)nal
required
were forced to request
of the
the government of South Vietnam remained a "political
allegiance of
local officials
the assistance of the National Guard, while in Chicago
Residents in Washington, D.C., stand by as a local store goes up
tearing apart the
and international relations."
in flames
during one of the
riots that
the death ot Martin Luther King,
Jr.
enipted nationwide after
»
i Ll^^^^ •BnPl^5L^
million in property damage, nearly 24,000 arrests, and forty-three deaths, thirty-six of
them
blacks.
King's death was not the only reason for violence that
Three weeks
spring.
radical white in
New
on April
later,
and black students
York City seized
23, a coalition of
Columbia University
at
number of administration
a
new phase
buildings, signaling the advent of a
At
politics of student protest.
decision to construct a
issue
new gymnasium
in
Morningside
Harlem
Park, a city-owned plot of land in the adjacent
neighborhood, and
its
the
in
were the university's
with the Institute for
affiliation
Defense Analysis (ID.A), a multimillion-dollar consor-
tium founded strategy.
1955 to
in
weapons and military
test
Led by members of the
local chapter of the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and in loose alliance
with
Afro-American Society
Students'
the
(SAS), the protesters demanded that the administration
abandon its
its
officials failed
Low
occupied at
and end
allegedly racist "land-grab" policies
When
"complicity" in the Vietnam War. to comply,
the students
university
moved
and
in
Library, the main administration offices
Hamilton Hall, and
campus
several other
buildings.
After a week of inconclusive negotiations, punctuated
by a
series of violent clashes
Kirk called in the buildings.
New
cades, the police stormed fists
them downstairs
as
amounted
oppt)-
to clear the
a set of makeshift barri-
Low
to waiting
Library,
bludgeoned the
paddy wagons.
later
and
students to
and
and nightsticks, and then dragged
occupation several weeks results,
allies
York City police
Crashing through
students with
between
on April 29 President Grayson
nents of the occupiers,
A
second
produced even bloodier
engaged
police
hand-to-hand combat
what
in
the
throughcuit
campus.
By the time at
juries It
it
Columbia had
had
ended
(34 to police), also
in late
May
resulted in nearly
spawned
1968, the rebellion
900
arrests,
180
in-
and the suspension of 73 students. similar demonstrations at hundreds
of other campuses, including forty major confrontations,
and provoked
a torrent ot criticism against the
David Shapiro, one of the isrrative huildings at
behind the desk ot President Grayson
206
pol-
who occupied admin-
stiidenr radicals
Cohimhia University
new
in late
April 1968,
sits
Kirk.
V
*
— of "direct action." While President Johnson con-
itics
demned
the Columbia militants as "young totalitarians,"
the editors of Fortune warned
new
readers that the
its
gencnititm oi student activists sought to instigate a rev-
"not a protest
olution
tit)ns
.
doned
Johnson administration's polls 7;
The
policies.
were equally dramatic: victory
victory in Nebraska
on May
14-
nothing
less."
all" rules, the
June 4 California primary loomed
militant blacks and student radicals had aban-
crucial test of
who would
and
"Liberal
political revolution,
committed
still
its
phrey forces
working
to
With
May
28,
McCarthy by
six per-
Kennedy moved on
to Cali-
large bloc of delegates
Kennedy won.
told cheering
withdrawal from the presidential race had opened possibilities.
Suddenly
achieved through the
in the streets
our society,
New
come. Then,
Wis-
ence
performance
and
to steal the thunder
Although
from McCarthy's
his tardy
entrance into
and the
extended
far
as
among
oratory,
Kennedy had an appeal
disptissessed,
any
of
who had
among urban
that
t)ther national political
served under his brother,
He
enjoyed
blacks and also, remarkably,
working-class whites. in
as
he
left
the dais to hold a press confer-
another part of the building, Sirhan Bishara
in
port for Israel, suddenly raised a revolver and fired at
the senator's head.
The
following day Robert
Kennedy
was dead. His candidacy had for a time brought together
many
of the disparate elements of a perilously fragmented na-
An
tion.
gift for stirring
former members of the SDS.
end the war
between blacks and
national reconciliation shared by Kennedy's followers.
Eastern establishment as well
.
because of his
beyond that
strong support
.
be reckoned with. In part because of
His campaign entourage included members of the
figure.
to
a
because of his capacity to reach the disaf-
in part
fected
.
Sirhan, a Palestinian Arab angered over Kennedy's sup-
enemies within the party could deny that he was
in part
divisions
age groups or on the war in Vietnam" could be over-
the race had produced charges of opportunism, not even
name,
the
in
single-issue candidacy.
his
had
their success
Senator
But the other Democratic antiwar candidate, Robert
political force to
campaign workers that
whites, between the poor and the affluent, or between
consin primary.
Kennedy, was
Am-
York senator
might be
ballot, particularly after
his astonishing
New
proved that "the violence, the disenchantments with
a decisive victory in the April 2
McCarthy followed Hampshire with
new
seemed that what had
it
not been gained through protest
a
August.
in
In his victory statement at the
nam War
an end, President Johnson's unexpected
as the
challenge the Johnson-Hum-
bassador Hotel in Los Angeles, the
to
and "winner take
Democratic convention
at the
May
after losing
fornia.
agree.
within the system. For those seeking to bring the Viet-
his
Then,
the
at tin
"We
are not allowed
majority ot Americans were
F.
results
Indiana
anymore," he declared.
only
their taith in peaceful pt)litical change, the vast
range of
in
the Oregon primary to Senator
the leader of the Columbia
his
impassioned indictments of the
his
centage points on
.
if
hut an honest-to-God rev-
he delivered
as
SDS
arc out tor social
Yet
.
could
faction," .
.
name
solu-
Mark Rudd,
olution."
"action
.
he moved through ghetto neighborhoods, chanting
And
Vietnam, but
he promised not only
to heal the
wounds
that
the war had inflicted on the American nation.
Recognizing that he would have to "win through the
One
had destroyed the hope
assassin's bullet
for
them, speech writer Jack Newfield, fttrmerly a
oi
member
of
SDS, put
it
way:
this
"We had
already
glimpsed the most compassionate leaders our nation could produce, and they had
from
this
political leaders
Although
it is
been assassinated.
And
were part of memory now, not hope."
impossible to
pened had Kennedy deepened
divisions
all
time forward, things would get worse: Our best
lived,
know what might have hap-
it
is
certain that the natit)n's
after his death. Later that
summer,
the Democratic Convention in Chicago was to dramatize just
how
A
busboy cnniches beside presidential candidate Ritbert
divided America had already become.
people," Kennedy launched his campaign with an ex-
hausting whirlwind tour of sixteen states in twenty-one days.
one
Everywhere he went the people responded, wrote
reporter, with "an intensity
st)me and frightening"
208
and scope that was awe-
— clutching
at his
coat sleeves as
/lore/
Kennedy, who moments before had been
gunman
at
fatally
shot by a h>nc
Los Angeles' Ambassadin Hotel on June
4.
I%8.
my mind
Quay
Witness: Jim
before the selection was made, because the
only degree offered at West Point was a bachelor's in
and
science
I
want
didn't
had an inkling
that
other ways, but
I
to limit
My
options. I already
West Point might be confining
don't
in
remember having any moral ob-
As
jection to entering the military. to decide:
my
it
was, I never
me
congressman named
only
had
first alter'
nate.
What
turned a candidate to West Point
a conscientious objector
in
1963 into
My growing awareness
by 196V.
during those years of the enormous destruction being
upon the people of North and South Vietnam by
visited
the American military. I
knew
there was plenty of suf-
fering caused by "the other side, " but because of the
technological resources America
massive
Rather than answer the ican
men
call to arms,
refused to go to war.
Some
even went
to avoid the draft or
Selective Service laws.
fled
the country
to prison for violating
More than 170,000 won
sification of conscientious objector
their moral opposition to service.
James Quay
thousands of Amer-
(CO)
One
after
had
age far beyond anything available to
Ho Chi Minh
gressor or a popular Nationalist, I
was
Tet offensive, an American /
don 'r
my
when
recall exactly
full attention. I
remember
early years: a Buddhist
monk
namese government, seated
Ngo Dinh Diem
Kennedy was
in order to save
South Viet-
I felt
about the war.
all
and
assassination ot
on U.S.
August 1964. But
in
removed from my
far
eastern Pennsylvania. I was supposed to register at
when
local Selective Service board
September weeks.
It
istering,
thing.
26,
—but
1964
was no big deal.
and they didn
't
That wouldn't be
My family
I forgot. I
years later. In
my
to
210
That phrase
we were
Everything
my
violated
I
left to
killing
1960 election and
junior year in high school,
the necessary
tests.
I
applied
Academy I
crystallized
changed
what
Vietnamese and
name of freedom, who and
be free!
read and heard about the war continually
deepest patriotism,
my
pride in what this
country stood for in the world, until as an American
I
couldn't stand to be part of my country's war anymore.
that
my parents
1967
I
told
my parents
that
time,
I
noted
War a
II.
man
He
I
I
was plan-
remember
were concerned but not opposed;
they were mostly baffled. In a journal that in particular
my
could not help me.
I
I
He
think
kept at the
father's silence.
rejecting the course of action he I fa-
say about Barry Goldwater four
all
"
of the
to destroy the
In the spring of
true later.
a candidate to the U.S. Military
and took and passed
what would be
Vietnam. During the
ning to become a conscientious objector.
being late meant any-
in the
it.
It
in
artillery officer said
—
Didn't go for three
were middle-of-the-road Republicans.
found good things
become
my
to feel that the
my
turned eighteen
never considered not reg-
think
vored Nixon over Kennedy
to
I
in
life
came
became necessary
destroying Vietnam in the
three weeks before President
Gulf of Tonkin
of these events were
and
in the lotus position
assassinated; the alleged attack
destroyers in the
"It
town
burning like a torch; the overthrow President
of Ben Tre,
village
a few snapshots from the
protestinf^ the
in Viet-
destruction America was causing was incompatible with
any proper American objective
the war in Vietnam attracted
enemies
was a Communist ag-
or one or whether
showing
ot Pennsylvania.
its
dam-
nam. Regardless of whether Vietnam was two countries
the clas-
COs
of the
sessed, the U.S.
alone pos-
the capacity to inflict horrific
had taken
in
could show
I
was
World
me how
does what his government asks of him; he could
me how to oppose that government. But my father did me a very great kindness: He knew a member not show
of the local
draft
board from
belonged
From
that day in 1967 until the board
to.
a service organization
he
made
its
to
decision a year later,
a choice to
my
mention
decision
he gave
a result,
learning
made
father
who
I
me
and
a point rn)t
wi)uld rise up
I
was making
the war.
felt I
to face
its
a very great
was and what
it
Though
he would not have made, he
make my own
As
my
case to his friend.
had the
consequences. the gift of
gift:
valued on
I
right
my
ou'n
and
for myself.
My
very
May
In
1967, an official from the South
Vietnamese embassy came to speak at a hall at Lafayette College, where
stood I
in front
I
A
was a junior.
dozen people
knew
I
with signs that read "Stop the Bombing.
was not one of them. For
"
they were surrounded
this,
by hundreds of fraternity boys and subjected to hours of
The campus po-
water-and'ink bombs and verbal abuse.
were strangely absent.
lice
A
rally
my
port the right of free speech;
I
first
antiwar demon-
Amendment.
stration was really for the First
that
was organized to sup-
the country,
we should support the president.
I
my
my name opponent of my editorials for my
We
a democracy.
have
to support the president.
me and for all
Fortunately for
The
making objection
how fortunate
war
to
scientious objection
in
is
as
wrote
1
and took part
in
antiwar demonstra-
Looking back now, you see pictures of
tions.
of major
cities
was
and chanting and
it
and
members would go down
different. I
a
But
slogans.
in the
dozen other students
beginning, faculty
dem-
mighty throngs of people choking the
onstrations, streets
large
to the
town square
of Easton, Pennsylvania, population 30,000, and stand for
one hour
people
who
in silent witness, protesting the war.
reminding them of unpleasant events
many mistook our to
the country.
I
Methodist Church service. I
"foo/
()/
The
passed us were not always friendly; we were away,
far
I was. I
Vietnam secure
in the
it
handed out
leaflets at
the
Second
and then attended the worship
heard myself denounced from the pulpit as a
Moscow
the
beginning of
my
line" by the minister.
It
was the
education into the nature and power
You
see, in the beginning, I
thought
Americans were being misled by
we had what
to
their
it
would be
government. All
do was give them more information,
really
was going on
in
easy.
tell
them
Vietnam, and .Americans
You
knowledge that It
I
was uphold-
was not
who was
I
was Lyndon Johnson and his gov-
ernment.
My
claim to conscientious-objector status was not
example of an
my
agnostic.
In fact,
beliefs.
college's
I
Supreme Court had ruled
to
CO status
an orthodox
an
you could demon-
if
by reason of "religious training or belief the
in-
as
Until 1965, you could be re-
strate that your opposition to participation in
be denied
was
alumni magazine
leased from military service only
"
But
war was in
1965
that a person could not
simply because he did not belong
religious sect. It
was enough, the high
court ruled, if the belief that prompted your decision
occupied the same place
in
your
traditional deity occupied in the I
knew
I
that the belief in a
life
of a believer.
life
objected to the war in Vietnam.
What I had
to discover was the ultimate source of that objection and
describe
it
for myself
who comprised
draft
and for the
five
board no. 90
sylvania, in the space provided
The a
first
ordinary .Americans
Allentown, Penn-
in
on Special Form 150.
"Do you
question on that form was,
believe in
Supreme Being!" There were two boxes:
checked
of authority.
Con-
as cherry pie.
could oppose American policy
ing the finest American ideals.
and
opposition to the war as opposition
even older,
is
James Madison,
a constitutional right.
American
terviewed earlier by
college newspaper
in 1635.
of the architects of the U.S. Constitution, proposed
one
see
Quakers
first
on record at the United Nations government's war in Vietnam.
antiwar protesters, this
tradition of conscientious objection
arriving with the
based on traditional religious
an
"
country has a long tradition of resistance to authority.
mittee Against the Crime of Silence and put as
over
all
met with
the reply, "The president knows more than we do. This
Com-
joined the
citizens the issue
objections to the war were
betraying America,
wrote to congressmen and received polite replies
many
arguments repeated in homes
to authority. In
demonstration could not have been
first
that their governinent stop
to see that for
was not truth or falsehood but obedience or resistance
is
more American.
and demand
came
I
belief
YES.
which
Second is
)'f5.VO.
/
item: "Describe the nature of your
the basis of your claim
and
state
whether
or not your belief in a Supreme Being involves duties
which
man
fo yiHi are superior fo those arising
rclatitm. "
Here
is
part o/ what
I
from any hu-
\\Ti)re;
211
Because I believe that from man all awareness and order come, because I believe that each man is a divine beinf^
become more
striving to
and because
divine,
relationships, I believe that
human
and
me
justice
relationships
are the highest relationships. Therefore there arc
which to
I
did not want to avoid service.
no duties
human
are superior to those arising from
my
children asked what
War,
on
I
mnJc
a
who
of support not only from
point to get
letters
agreed with
my position
I
my
who
college,
who
hut from those
surely didn't appreciate the trouhle
was causing them hut who could confirm that
sincere. I
telling if
is
had done during the Vietnam
tell
now
son knows that hfS father
was
I
them that
I
had gotten out
fwenfy years
later,
and my
was lucky, of course. Lucky to have heard of
one of 170,000 who were
is
CO status during the
Vietnam War and one of
96,000 who completed the two years of alternative service.
The war
disagreed as well, including the dean and the president
of
I
did not want to
a technicality. It
granted I
remember
re-
lations.
people
I
believe that
I
divinity manifests itself only through the love
of human
and
people at the time that twenty years into the future,
Vietnam and the
in
that war forced
young men
me and
to ask themselves
and
willing to suffer
draft of
men who
fought
hundreds of thousands of other
what values they were
die for, at an age
when we were
conscientious objection, no doubt thanks to the influ-
just learning to think for ourselves about such questions.
ence of Quakers and small peace churches
One way
of Pennsylvania where
I
grew
nessed Martin Luther King, civil
in the section
Lucky
up.
disobedience to gain basic American
were able to go to college
and once
m
there, lucky to read authors like
on what
might mean
it
me
kids like
uiiprecedented numbers,
Thoreau and Albert Camus and reflect
wit-
Lucky
rights.
when lowcr-middle-class
to live at a time
have
to
lead black people in
Jr.,
Henry David
have the time
to
to
to he a conscientious
objector to war. conscientious-objector status (m the
I filed for
I
did not
know what
the draft board refused
my
not enter the
I felt I
military.
claim.
I
I
know
did
first
would do I
never had to find
On June
out.
me
that
I
if
would
was prepared to go to
prison rather than flee to Canada, but, fortunately,
board informed
14, Flag
had been
my
Day,
I
draft
l-O, a
classified
conscientious objector.
Three days
later I
began working for the
New
York
City Department of Social Services, where a conscientious objector I
and
service,
My
Harlem.
I
knew was performing
was given
draft
a case load
board informed
his alternative
of families
me
in central
that they did not
expect to receive a call for draftees until the
fall,
which
meant
I
could
stead,
I
volunteered for two years' alternative service.
When
I
was called for a physical examination
tember,
I
around
212
sit it
informed
which meant
I
be
out and possibly not be called. In-
my
draft
board
I
in
would not appear,
uou/J be passed automatically.
me young men
Sep-
All
were going to war or to prison.
it
who had
For many,
lucky ones; I
I
have no
regrets.
And
a
common ground too well that
we make matter.
I
am one
of the
though two decades
took a stand different from those
or consented to fight the war, we the
make
the consequences of their
choices have been harsh and lasting.
ago
to
we were willing to obey,
the authority of family, public opinion, country,
or conscience.
all
day of spring 1968.
or another, those of us
choice revealed what authority
who volunteered
now stand
together on
of grief as people who understand
life is
morally serious, that the choices
convention, culminating
Focus: Chicago
the nomination at "Piga-
in
more
sus," a live pig, as their party standard bearer. Far
serious were the intentions
and objectives of the Rev-
erend Ralph Abernathy, the
man who had succeeded
Dr. Martin Luther King,
as
Jr.,
head of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference.
mind the Democratic
Determined
to
re-
party of the broken promise of the
Great Society, Abernathy had decided
to bring a
group
of poverty-stricken Americans to the doors of the con-
vention hall ple's
launched Poor Peo-
as part of his recently
Campaign.
Fearing the worst.
Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago
prepared for the onslaught by placing the entire metropolitan police force of 12,000 on week-long, twelve-
nominated
In the words oi the presidential candidate
the 1968 Democratic Convention, "Chicago was tastrophe.
tered in a
My
wife
and beaten.
and
told her
I
shipwreck." While
its
would be
it
tor the
bat-
we had been
felt just like
1
knew
participants
the con-
vention would be a struggle, none could predict disastrous
a ca-
went home heartbroken,
I
at
just
how
Democratic party and,
hour
hour
nomination would go
but assured that the
Vice President Humphrey, hut
to
his accession to the party's leadership
would not be un-
opposed. In the weeks that followed the assassination,
Senator McCarthy's campaign gained fresh propelling
him
money.
A
a substantial influx of
York
pri-
much-needed
small boomlet of support also began to gather
around Senator George McGovern after family
him
momentum,
New
to victory in the June 18
mary and bringing
alert.
members and
their endorsement.
of
South Dakota,
aides of Robert
There was even
Kennedy gave talk in
some
deployed to the
The convention
fortified, its
while an additional
city,
site itself
was especially well
main entrance barricaded with barbed wire
and cham-link fence and
its
approaches guarded by some
2,000 police.
As all
also
National Guards-
Illinois
7,500 regular army troops were placed on twenty-four-
indeed, for the nation.
Robert Kennedy's death had
More than 5,000
shifts.
men were
it
turned out,
Daley's
well-publicized security
measures, together with his refusal to grant marching permits, dissuaded large strators
protesters
among
numbers of would-be demon-
from going to Chicago. The 10,000 youthful
who
however, were
did eventually arrive,
the more committed apostles of the antiwar
movement. Though most had no intention of provoking violence,
some
remain passive is
foolish
clearly expected a confrontation.
and degrading," one young
us," said another.
And
party circles of a possible convention draft for Senator
activist told a re-
"We're going to march and they're going
porter.
"How
to stop
can you avoid violence?"
violence there was.
On
Sunday, August 25, the
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Bobby's younger
eve of the convention, and again the next night,
brother.
police
Nor were
the politicians the only ones planning to
exert their influence tion.
Under the
Committee
to
leadership of the National Mobilization
End the War,
were hoping to in
on the proceedings of the conven-
rally as
many
a
number of antiwar groups
as half a million protesters
Chicago while the delegates met. Members
oi the
outlandish Youth International Party, or Yippics, also
planned
to be in
attendance and hold their
own mock
moved
in
demonstrators
to
to
riot
with nightsticks and tear gas to disperse
who had encamped
defiance oi an 11:00 P.M. curfew.
moved on
"To
in the face of escalating police brutality
in
Lincoln Park
The
in
protesters then
Grant Park, where they began laying plans
march on the amphitheater. As darkness
Wednesday evening, August more gathered
in the
28, a
park across from the
ton Hotel on Michigan Avenue, the
fell
on
crowd of 5,000 or
Conrad
Hil-
city's central thor-
oughfare. There they remained until some caught sight
213
— of Rev. Abernathy and his supporters from the Poor People's Campaign,
the
only
group
had been
that
taken place more than two hours before. Ordered to halt
and disperse the demonstrators who had
set
out from
had
granted a legal permit to march. Beckoned by shouts ot
Grant Park,
"Join us!" several thousand antiwar prt)testers surged for-
tercepted the marchers at the corner ot Michigan Ave-
ward, crossed a small bridge to Michigan Avenue, and
nue and Balbo shortly before 8:00.
behind Abernathy's motley
in
fell
refused to
train.
Inside the convention hall, meanwhile, a bitter battle
a
move, the police
then charged
arrests,
over the Vietnam plank of the Democratic party plat-
sticks flailing.
form was coming to a head. Although by that point
back,
many
Senator McCarthy had
hut conceded the nomination
world
is
a large bloc of antiwar delegates from
As
Humphrey,
to
all
phalanx of helmeted
intt)
first
riot police
When
made
in-
the protesters
a series of peaceful
the crowd with their night-
While some of the demonstrators fought
fell
limp and began screaming "The whole
watching!
The whole world
is
watching!"
scenes of the violence appeared on television sets
New
York, California, Wisconsin, and several other
throughout the convention
hall, the
nominating process
states
were determined to put their stamp on the
was soon overwhelmed by a
series ot
angry denunciations
Based on a minority report hammered out
official policy.
at
party's
the platform committee hearings the previous week,
the dissidents' position called for "an unconditional end to all
bombing of North Vietnam," the mutual with-
drawal ot
all
U.S. and North Vietnamese forces from
South Vietnam, and
"political
a
reconciliation" be-
tween the Saigon government and the Vietcong leading to a coalition
government. By contrast, the majority
of
Mayor Daley and
the Chicago police.
ot criticism reached
its
The crescendo
peak when Senator Abraham
Ribicoff of Connecticut rose to deplore the "Gestapo tactics in the streets of
Chicago,"
a choice of
words that
brought a stream of obscenities from the mayor himself.
"How
hard
staring it
it
down
is
at
to accept the truth," Ribicott replied,
Daley from the podium.
"How
hard
is."
plank recommended a gradual reduction of the U.S.
The
troop presence "as the South Vietnamese are able to
mactic, as
take over larger responsibilities" and a cessation of
lenger, Senator
bombing only "when the action would not endanger
For Humphrey, the nomination was a bitter prize in-
U.S.
lives."
As speaker
after speaker rose to
defend his
deed.
formal balloting that followed proved anticli-
Humphrey
outdistanced his only serious chal-
McCarthy, by more than 1,000
The tumultuous Chicago convention had
votes.
lett
the
respective position, the debate turned increasingly ac-
party he proposed to lead deeply, perhaps hopelessly di-
— 1,567
vided, with only eight weeks to go before the general
rimonious. Even before the
final tally
was read
in favor of the majority plank, 1,041 tor the minority
the
New York delegation
began singing
come," while spectators the
"We
in the gallery
Shall Over-
chanted "Stop
War! Stop the War!"
As
was nearly 11:00 P.M.,
when Mayor
as the
Demo-
Barely had Alioto begun
when CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite
re-
onstrators outside the convention hall. "There has been a display of
naked violence as
in the streets of
Chicago,"
he interrupted the convention
proceedings to show a tape of events that had actually
2M
point lead in the polls, he would have to use that time
Democrats back together.
In the process,
could restore unity to America by bringing peace to
in fact,
ceived news of a bloody clash between police and dem-
Cronkite declared,
formidable Republican chal-
he would also have to convince the electorate that he
vention to nominate Hubert Humphrey
to speak
his
Nixon, who held a tifteen-percentage-
Vietnam plank, the
Joseph Alioto ot San Francisco stood betore the con-
cratic presidential candidate.
deteat
until late in the eve-
a result of the tight over the
It
To
lenger, Richard
to bring the
nomination balloting was delayed ning.
election.
Vietnam.
Inside the convention hall, luemhen, of the
New
)'ork
JelemUion to the
1
968 Democratic National Convention demonstrate their
backing of the minority plank on the Vietnam War.
215
t_^^^
1
v-^&ji«^^^^^^^^^ ^^HAi^MH f^^Kgf^-'^l^EwK^^Bm^
^^h31r^ K. ^^^^^^^k^li^^Ktar /
1
3l»^
^
A y
After sevenil violent confrontations with police, demonstrati)rs feather at Cbicaf^o's
Ch:uit r.irk to
on August
28, I96S, to prepare
march on the Demoi mic Convention.
217
\M:
^
Jl ^BS^ii '^'^
N.
Above.
,4 p.iir of hippies kiss
Left. Police
m
Lincoln Purk.
grab an antiwar demonstrator from the Logan
monument
in
Grant Park August .
26.
219
V,(,/ence
m Gnmr P,nk on A.^'u.sf 28.
The
has ;.srrerneveJ. Je™>mrrar..r .reenter rear-gas
the am,srcr,nJrhro.'nn backer
fK)lice.
220
'.KiiL
U«l
Police he^n l\>ck the iutrivvar protesters
;jr
(/r.inr Park.
223
ALxnc. i\dnui)jl
Right.
224
On
LiLhtrJ^nicn line f/ic .^frccf
Michiffin
Avenue near
ournJc the L'onniJ Hikon Horcl
the amvention, protesters taunt police.
f
keep
Jenurs out.
^m^ v
&*
*
.m^^^tf'^
Chicago
whom
mayor
Richard
law enforcement
Daley
(left),
officials later ac-
cused of presiding over a "police riot" during the convention,
sits
by the DemiKratic
presidential candidate, Vice President bert
Humphrey,
vention
rally.
as
he addresses
The
what turned out
vice president faced
to he
an insurmountable
task after the disaster at Chicago.
226
Hu-
a postcon-
/
/
:s.
n
y
^3
-a
^/ \
si/
'PT
r -7 ,1^^^^
^y^
^ /
/—
^
I
ml
>-'^
v/.
r / /
f^-^ ''^
NIXON'S WAR
He began
his
1968 campaign
for the presidency with a
promise "to end the war and win
the peace," intimating that he had a "secret plan." Shedding the "loser" image that had
plagued him since he
won
the primaries and
the 1960 presidential race to John Kennedy, he stormed through
lost
the Republican nomination with ease.
1968, Richard Milhous
Nixon
at last
seemed poised
Now,
in the early fall of
had so
to capture the prize that
narrowly eluded him eight years before.
The tumultuous Chicago convention had liberals
had
all
left
the Dem.ocratic party in a shambles.
The
but abandoned Vice President Humphrey, and a sizable segment of the
white working class had defected to the camp of populist third-party candidate George Wallace, the once and future Alabama governor to a nation in turmoil.
As Humphrey
set
who vowed
out on the campaign
with catcalls of "Fascist," "Warmonger," and
"Dump
the
and order"
to restore "law trail,
hecklers greeted
Hump," while
party leaders, wrote veteran political journalist Theodore White, "fled
state
him
as
and if
him local
he were
the bearer of contagion."
Deprived of the funding and organizational support he needed to mount a successful
campaign, Humphrey soon concluded that he had no choice but to distance himself from the president's discredited Vietnam policy.
On
September 30 he unveiled
a
new
three-
point peace initiative calling for a U.S. bombing halt, a turnover ot the fighting to the
South Vietnamese, and the withdrawal of
UN
Though
supervision.
official position,
it
all
"foreign forces" from South
convinced many disaffected Democrats that the vice president was not
simply "Johnson's boy." In the days that followed, treasury, volunteers joined
bring the rank and polls
had
fallen
Lett. Rich:ird
file
from
Nixon
Vietnam under
the proposal differed only slightly from the administration's
up
in droves,
back to the
fold.
into the
and the labor unions redoubled their
campaign efforts to
By the middle of October Nixon's lead
fifteen points to twelve; a
thisbes his
money poured
rrndemark victory sign
week ;ir
r/ie
later
it
in the
was down to eight.
l%(^ Repuhlicnn N^uiomil Convcnrion.
— Although Humphrey's sudden resurgence gave Nixon cause for concern,
it
did not induce
him
As
to panic.
the past, the Rcpuhlican challenger refused to be
in
pinned down on
own
his
end the war,
secret plan to
wants to go," South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van
Thieu
flatly
refused to join in any negotiations that in-
cluded the Vietcong. As a
nounced the new peace
when Johnson
result,
initiative
an-
on the night of Oc-
preferring instead to address the issue only in vague,
tober 31, he could only say that the South Vietnamese
general terms. Having observed Johnson's futile escala-
were "free to participate"
tions,
he ruled out a military victory
Vietnam and
in
favored a "de-Americanization" of the war
But
effort.
expanded
in the
talks sched-
uled to follow.
Despite Thieu's intransigence, news of the bombing
he also opposed an unconditional U.S. bombing halt
halt provided an
and warned of the dangers of "precipitate withdrawal."
campaign. Opinion surveys taken
To
president's speech revealed that Nixon's lead
Nixon claimed
justify his evasiveness,
that he did
immediate boost
Humphrey
the
to
in the
wake oi the had dwin-
not want to undermine the Johnson administration's ne-
dled to an insignificant two percentage points with only
gotiations with Hanoi, even though his entire campaign
a
few days to go before the general election. Just when
it
seemed that Humphrey might overtake
strategy
was predicated on the assumption that there
would be no peace agreement
Unknown
prior to the election.
Nixon, however, by mid-October 1968
to
his
accusing the Johnson administration of "betrayal of an
the prospects of a breakthrough in Paris seemed brighter
ally"
than ever before. In
agreed to negotiate directly with Saigon.
moving, the American negotiating team led by
talks
W.
a last-ditch effort to get the stalled
hammered out
Averell Harriman had
a secret "un-
Republican
however. President Thieu intensified his protests,
rival,
and vowing
to boycott the Paris talks until
On
Hanoi
Tuesday,
November
5, as
faded,
million Americans went to the polls and
73
hopes of an imminent peace settlement
derstanding" with the North Vietnamese that called for
elected Richard
a series of concrete, de-escalatory steps by both sides.
the United States.
Under the terms
of the informal agreement, the U.S.
500,000 votes, or
bombing
hardly amounted to a mandate. Nevertheless, the
offered to stop a
its
Vietnamese
cities
and
a limitation of
DMZ. More
follow, based
on
exchange
for
and mortar attacks on St)uth
cessation of rocket
across the
unilaterally in
NVA
infiltration
substantive peace talks would
a subtle "our side, your side"
that would permit the
inclusion ot both
Vietnamese government and the
NLF
formula
the South
without requiring
Nixon the
thirty-seventh president of
The margin .7
of victory
—fewer than
percent of the total electorate
new
president-elect fully understood the task that lay before
To
avoid the fate of his predecessor, he would have
fulfill
the promise that launched his election cam-
him. to
He would have
paign.
"to
end the war and win the
peace," and he would have to do to a nation increasingly at
it
war with
in a
way acceptable
itself.
the formal recognition of either party.
Ever skeptical of Hanoi's intentions, President John-
son
initially
opposed Harriman's ingeniously devised
proposal. But after General a
bombing
halt
would not jeopardize U.S. troops
field,
he reluctantly gave
have
it
said of
Abrams convinced him
me
his assent.
man
that one
"I
that
in the
don't want to
died tomorrow
who
As many in fact
of his critics had suspected
had no "secret plan"
did have a
number of
No
sooner had the president reached that decision,
however, than the South Vietnamese balked. Declaring that his
government was not
to a locomotive
230
after taking office in
1953, "Eisenhower to
North Koreans that we would not
a chance. We'll try it."
a "car that
can be hitched
and taken anywhere the locomotive
first
and
Eisenhower's quick resolution of the Korean conflict.
word go out diplomatically
is
end the war, though he
to
informed his approach to the problem. Perhaps
his advisers. "1 don't think
happen, but there
Nixon
foremost, he had been deeply influenced by President
Soon
will
along,
strong ideas and impulses that
could have been saved by this plan," the president told it
all
war of
attrition,"
"and within
a
Nixon believed as a hard-line
let
the
the Chinese and the tolerate this continual
the former vice president recalled,
matter of months,
they negotiated."
that he could exploit his
anti-Communist
own
reputation
to similar advantage. "I
call
it
the
advisers.
Madman
Theory," he explained to one
"We'll just
let
of his
the wtird slip to |the North
Vietnamese] that, 'For God's sake, you know Nixon obsessed
when
about Communists.
he's angry
— and he has
We his
can't
restrain
is
him
hand on the nuclear
In addition to threatening
Nixon thought he could
Hanoi with annihilation,
cajt)le
the Soviet
perhaps even China into serving U.S. a concept
Union and
interests.
Relying
he called "linkage," he planned to use the
lure of arms control and expanded trade to win Soviet
cooperation
field
in
moving the North Vietnamese toward
a
of foreign
affairs,
he
still
as
an expert
in
needed someone ca-
pable of translating his grand geopolitical designs into reality.
The man he
Henry A. choice.
button.'
on
Even though Nixon regarded himself the
A
selected, national security adviser
Kissinger, was in
some
respects an unlikely
senior professor of government at Harvard
University, a frequent contributor to the Council of For-
eign Relations, and a former adviser to
New
York gov-
ernor Nelson Rt)ckefeller, the erudite Kissinger seemed to personify the Eastern liberal establishment that
had battled throughout differences
in
his political
background
and
Yet for
Nixon
all
their
temperament,
the
life.
peaceful settlement of the war. In the case of China, he
German-born academician and the Middle-American
speculated that the offer of a rapprochement with the
politician also
United States might induce
Mao
Tse-tung to put
in-
in
common. Both
the conduct of foreign policy ought
tt^
believed that
be centrally di-
rected and tightly controlled, bold in conception but
creased pressure on Hanoi.
PresiJenr Nixim's national securicy adviser, Henry Kissinger,
had much
h'/i
was ro play a major n>le in Viernam's
fiicure.
231
pragmatic
in
execution. Both shared a contempt for ca-
and bureaucrats
reer diplomats
And
secrecy and intrigue.
as well as a
penchant
for
both were fascinated by,
it
not wholly obsessed with, the uses of power.
no
Kissinger wasted
time. Shortly after
noon on
auguration day, January 20, 1969, he ordered his
American
to canvass
officials in
in-
staff
Washington and Saigon
for their appraisals of the situation in
To
Vietnam.
in-
sure against the usual bureaucratic collusion, Kissinger insisted that
each agency respond independently to
a
detailed questionnaire covering virtually every aspect of
The bundle
the war.
known
as
of confidential reports, collectively
National Security Study Memorandum-1,
vealed sharply divergent views. Senior military at
MACV, CINCPAC,
re-
officials
and the JCS, along with the
Saigon embassy, tended to be optimistic about current
and future prospects, while tagon, the
cidedly
civilian analysts at the Pen-
CIA, and the State Department were
more
"de-
skeptical," Kissinger informed the presi-
dent. Neither group foresaw a rapid conclusion to the
The
war, however.
"bulls" estimated that
at least eight years, the "bears"
for the
GVN
it
would take
more than thirteen
years,
to gain sufficient popular support to crush
the Vietcong insurgency. If
nothing
else,
the findings of
NSSM-1
Kissinger's conviction that the U.S.
gotiate
its
way out of the
war.
The
reaffirmed
would have
to ne-
only question was
how. Like Nixon, Kissinger believed that the war had to be
ended honorably
prestige. Like
Nixon,
for the sake of
too,
America's global
he was willing
to use force to
wrest concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table.
Where he
differed
from the president, however, was
his assessment of overall
in
U.S. objectives. While Nixon
envisioned a durable peace agreement that would preserve a
non-Communist regime
in
South Vietnam,
Kis-
singer was far less concerned about the ultimate fate of
America's
ally.
"However we
singer observed, "the
cans has settled the issue of involved
now
is
got into Vietnam," Kis-
commitment of 500,000 Ameri-
confidence
in
[its]
importance.
What
is
American promises." For
Their patrol of seven Americans and twenty-five South Vietna-
mese ambushed near Dak To, an as
an American
232
calls for help,
ARVN soldier dives
1969.
for cover
233
Kissinger, a settlement that gave
South Vietnam a "rea-
sonable" chance to survive would
suffice, as
United States was perceived to have
long as the
up to
lived
com-
its
Within
their initial negotiating position
failed,
was essentially
Em-
the same as that of the Johnson administration.
ploying a two-tiered approach,
they sought to reach
agreement with Hanoi on the mutual withdrawal of "external" forces, leaving to resolve their
own
it
to the
GVN
NLF
and the
"internal" political dispute.
all
As
in
no
fighting slackened con-
discernible change in the overall
military balance of power.
mitment. Though Nixon and Kissinger were confidenr that they could succeed where their predecessors had
week the pace of the
a
siderably, leaving
Although preparations fensive
took
spring of
had begun long before the Nixon administration
office,
the timing of the attacks, according to Kis-
"humiliated the
singer,
Communist
for the
new
president." Already frus-
trated by Hanoi's intransigence at the negotiating table,
an enraged Nixon decided "to do something
[the
Com-
munists] will understand." Against the advice of Kissinger,
who
worried about the long-range diplomatic con-
the past, however, the North Vietnamese resisted any
sequences of any impulsive action, but with the
attempt to separate military and political
endorsement of the JCS, on March 16 Nixon ordered
issues,
while
the South Vietnamese remained adamantly opposed to talks with the
NLF. Early
efforts to
apply Nixon's link-
full
the bombing of North Vietnamese base camps in neutral
Cambodia. He assumed,
correctly as
it
turned out, that
age strategy proved equally unsuccessful. After Kissinger
the North Vietnamese would not protest any such raids,
informed Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the
since their objection would indirectly confirm the long-
U.S. was eager first
needed to
made
to negotiate
what happened
gardless of
a variety of topics but
wanted improved
clear that they
it
on
settle the issue of the war, the
Russians
relations re-
Vietnam.
in
denied presence of
NVA
troops inside Cambodia. But
the president thought that disclosure of the
might have severe repercussions
at
a large extent, the stalemate in negotiations reflection
direct
strategy
while
"fighting
of
negotiating," to
if
Communist their
to underscore that point,
forces throughout
the
to a
North
make concessions
so long as they retained the capacity to
As
a
of the continuing stalemate on the
Vietnamese lacked any incentive
tively.
was
Having already committed themselves
battlefield.
wage war
effec-
on February 23
South Vietnam launched
1969 post-Tet offensive,
a coordinated series of
attacks directed primarily against allied logistical and
support installations. guerrilla
forces
As
in
1968, Vietcong local and
spearheaded the assaults while
Main-Force units held back
in reserve.
abroad.
Accordingly, elaborate precautions were taken to shroud the operation in near total secrecy.
To
bombing
home and
NVA
But otherwise
Not only were
withheld from most government
details
officials,
the
includ-
ing the secretary of the air force and the air force chief
of
but an intricate dual reporting system was intro-
staff,
duced strikes
air
from normal channels. Under the code name
Menu, the 18,
Pentagon to divert information on the
at the
began the following day, March
air strikes
unbeknown
American people. Though
to the
origi-
nally intended to be of short duration, the operation
continued
for the
next fourteen months. All told, 3,630
B-52 Arc Light missions were than 100,000 tons
of
fltiwn,
drt)pping
bombs on Cambodian
Nixon had good reason
to be
public's reaction to his policies.
more
territory.
concerned about the
Though opinion
polls
the country-wide offensive bore scant resemblance to
taken in the early spring of 1969 suggested that most
the previous year's cataclysmic wave of attacks. Aided
Americans had adopted
by an improved intelligence network and redeployed to
the
form a screen around the major population centers,
that criticism
lied forces intercepted
their base
groups.
As
many enemy
camps and forced them a result, only in a
to break into small
few places were the
munists able to mount large-scale ground
nowhere did they succeed
234
in
al-
units as they left
Com-
assaults,
penetrating the
and
cities.
new
a wait-and-see attitude
president's handling of the war,
would mount quickly
progress toward peace.
He
if
he
toward
Nixon knew
failed to
therefore decided to
public the proposals he had already
make make
communicated
vately to Hanoi. In a major address to the nation
May
14,
cease-fire,
he
set forth
an eight-point plan calling
a pullout of all
pri-
on
for a
American and North Viet-
namese troops over of prisoners of war.
a
one-year
At
and an exchange
perit)d,
the urging ot Secretary of Defense
2.
Hanoi did
American proposal
agree, however, to an
to h(jld secret peace talks outside the Paris
framework.
Melvin
Laird, a staunch advocate of "Vietnamization,"
On
that
turning the fighting over to the South Vietna-
encounters between Kissinger and North Vietnamese
is,
mese, Nixon also initiated planning
phased with-
tor a
August
the
4,
diplomat Xuan Thuy took place
drawal of U.S. combat forces. In June, after conferring
former French colonial
with President Thieu on Midway Island, he announced
diately
the immediate redeployment of the
would prove no more
increment of
first
25,000 U.S. troops.
tions
Neither the peace initiative of
May
in a long series of clandestine
tirst
official
became apparent
at the
apartment of a
outside Paris.
It
imme-
that these informal exchanges
than the formal negotia-
fruitful
taking place only a few miles away.
Kissinger
14 nor the pros-
merely reiterated the same proposals and ultimatum that
pect of GIs coming home, however, was enough to curb
Hanoi had already spurned, while Xuan Thuy parroted
growing opposition to Nixon's Vietnam policy. After
the standard North Vietnamese
the North Vietnamese publicly denounced the presi-
eral
dent's latest offer as a "farce," indicating they were pre-
and the establishment
became
included the Vietcong.
pared to
sit
in Paris "until the chairs rot,"
clear that there
it
would be no diplomatic breakthrough
near future. And, while most Americans favored
in the
a shift ot the burden of fighting to the South Vietna-
mese, the absence of any
set timetable
diminished the
withdrawal ot
all
to decide
war or
ization plan he
troop puUout by the end of 1970, while hawks rallied
urged Nixon to
"meaningful move" against North Vietnam. More omi-
nous
still,
from Nixon's point ot view, the organized peace
government that
whether
to carry out his threat
back entirely on the Vietnam-
fall
had inherited from the Johnson admin-
like
for a
of a coalition
to escalate the
istration. Kissinger,
demand
U.S. troops, the ouster ot Thieu,
who now had
mer, Congressional doves were calling for a total U.S.
Russell's
for the unilat-
Hanoi's continuing intransigence infuriated Nixon,
appeal of Nixon's phased withdrawal plan. By midsum-
behind Georgia senator Richard
demand
convinced that "a fourth-rate power
North Vietnam" had
North Vietnam. "At
a
to
have "a breaking point,"
"savage, punishing blow"
inflict a
minimum,"
recalled
a Kissinger aide at the time, "the attack plan
ris,
on
Roger Morwould
include the mining of the port of Haiphong and inland
movement, dormant since the previous fall, began stirring
waterways, a naval blockade, and intensive bombing
again with plans for large demonstrations in the
strikes at military targets
In response to the
July
Nixon
hastily
designed, as he put
other
—
mounting chorus of
adopted a new "go it,
for
fall.
criticism, in
broke" strategy
end the war one way or the
"to
and population centers." More
extreme options included the bombing
of the
Red River
dikes to flood North Vietnam's vital farmland and the closing ot
supply lines at the Chinese border.
rail
Defense Secretary Laird and Secretary ot State Wil-
either by negotiated agreement or by force."
sent a personal mes-
liam Rogers vehemently opposed Kissinger's recommen-
expressing his sincere desire for
dation, imploring the president not to take any action
a "just peace" but also threatening to resort "to measures
that would incite further domestic protest. Laird, in par-
of great consequence and force"
ticular,
Through French intermediaries he sage to
did not
Ho Chi Minh,
move
forward by
if
the Paris negotiations
November
versary of President Johnson's
1
— the
bombing
halt.
score the gravity ot the message, Kissinger
first
To
anni-
under-
met again
with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, warning him that "as far as
Vietnam
station
and
is
is
concerned, the train has
now heading down
Nixon's ultimatum drew ing
Ho Chi Minh, whose
a
just left the
rcbutt^'
from the
would "not be
satisfied
with
less"
than "the eventual
disengagement of American men from combat." His belief
that the South Vietnamese were approaching the
point where they could defend themselves found confir-
mation
in the
sanguine appraisal of Sir Robert
Thomp-
who
told the
son, the British counterinsurgency expert,
the track."
"cold
lic
had long been persuaded that the American pub-
ail-
written reply reached 'Wash-
ington only a few days before his death on September
president in October that, with continued .American aid, the
Saigon government might be strong enough to
ht)ld
own
its
within two years.
235
After the post-Tet 1969 offensive, a nun returns to her village
Vietnam Saigon.
home
in
Dong
Lach, a small
of Catholic refugees from North thirty
kilometers northeast of
The town's
cluster
of sheet-metal
shacks, occupied by the Communists, were virtually destroyed
explosive
by napalm and high-
bombs dropped by U.S. and
South Vietnamese
NVA
aircraft.
At
left is
body
of an
dry
out and reduce putrefaction.
it
soldier,
the
quick-limed to
ismimmm^^-
^^^^^.J
In rhc end,
Nixon
reluctantly shelved the Kissinger
plan, at least tor the time being. "I'm not sure we're
ready for this," he told his aides.
Whether he had
ac-
tually become convinced that Vietnamization would
military
move remains
any bold
public's reaction to
work or simply feared the
unclear.
At
the time of his de-
an
cision, Nixon's approval rating in the polls stood at
extraordinary 71 percent, largely as a result of his Sep-
tember announcement of a second troop withdrawal
as
well as a reduction in draft calls. Yet despite consider-
able public support, he had not been able to stop the
spread of antiwar sentiment
the more vocal and
among
elements of the population
influential
—
labor leaders,
educators, press commentators, clergy, and even cor-
porate executives.
The extent
to
which antiwar
had become
protest
re-
spectable was demonstrated dramatically on October 15,
when hundreds heeded the observe a
of thousands of middle-class Americans
call of the
movement
organized peace
to
national "Moratorium Day." Across the na-
tion church bells tolled in
remembrance of the Ameri-
can war dead, the names of those
killed
were read
at
candlelight services, and peaceful marchers sang the antiwar chant "Give Peace a Chance." Outside the United Stares,
don,
moratorium demonstrations were held
in
Lon-
Copenhagen, Tokyo, and Sydney, while
Paris,
Vietnam some American servicemen joined
in
in the ob-
servance by wearing black arm bands on patrol.
Though he
feigned indifference, the president was
deeply angered and alarmed by the mass protests.
Not
only did such demonstrations encourage North Viet-
namese
more important
intractability, but, perhaps
his view,
they also threatened to undermine
credibility.
As
a result,
when antiwar
leaders
plans to hold a second moratorium on
Nixon went on the counterattack. address to the nation
his
in
own
announced
November
15,
In a shrewdly crafted
on November
3,
he staunchly de-
fended the American commitment to Saigon, warning that an abrupt puUout would lead to a "bloodbath" in
Vietnam and ership.
He
Training the
a loss of faith
then proceeded to
ARVN.
soldiers as they take
238
abroad in American leadlay out his
Vietnamization
U.S. Marines supervise South Vietnamese
aim with their
M16
rifles.
r^
I
{.
plan in some detail, saying that
American
casualties
gardless of
promised to reduce
it
and bring the war
an end
to
what the North Vietnamese
did.
re-
Finally,
Nixon entered
Nevertheless, by early 1970, as
second year
in office,
looked
it
as
might actually work. Supplied with huge quantities of
American weaponry and expanded
against the advice of his entire cabinet, the president
the latest
attacked the antiwar protesters as "irresponsible" and
level of
accused them of sabotaging his quest for an honorable
become one
peace. Appealing to what he called "the great silent
world.
majority," he asked for "united" support and concluded
could fight aggressively and effectively
with a melodramatic admonition: "North Vietnam can-
and
not defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Amer-
formance
icans can do that."
Much
majority" speech was overwhelmingly positive,
once
again boosting his standing in the polls and bringing a
"We've got
bipartisan vote of confidence from Congress.
those liberal bastards on the run now," the president
"and we're going
to
keep them on the
run." Entrusted with the job of keeping up the pursuit.
Vice President Spiro
Agnew broadened and
the administration's attacks on
its
intensified
domestic "enemies."
Having already dismissed the antiwar effete corps of
protesters as "an
impudent snobs who characterize them-
selves as intellectuals," he
now
took on the "liberal es-
tablishment press," which he described as "a small and unelected elite" that "do not
—
repeat not
I
—represent
if
moment
to a force
had already
of the largest, best-equipped armies in the
Many
of
some
in
ARVN
million men,
1
units
its
had shown, moreover, that they
when
well led,
had even improved
cases they
after supporting
ment control over to bear fruit. In
their per-
U.S. forces were withdrawn.
the countryside were at
the president and his
men
in putting their critics
on the defensive, they
succeeded for the
soon learned that they could not silence them. The No-
vember 15 moratorium drew even more than the October demonstrations,
adopted by General Abrams
South Vietnamese
forces
a
in
1969,
had shifted
their
American and emphasis from
large-scale search-and-destroy missions to smaller "clear-
ing" operations designed to protect the rural population.
Under the new
pacification-oriented plan, elected vil-
lage councils were entrusted with responsibility for local security,
training
territorial
defense forces were given formal
Ml 6s,
and equipped with
and
a variety of "civic
action" programs were reintroduced to promote eco-
nomic development.
In conjunction with these self-help
measures, the CIA's controversial Phoenix Program suc-
ceeded
20,000
in inflicting severe
VC
damage
to the Vietcong.
figures,
in
Ac-
1969 alone nearly
cadres were "neutralized" through arrest or
assassination under the auspices of Phoenix, sharply re-
ducing the enemy's Yet for
participants
more than
as
beginning
last
accordance with the "one war" strategy
cording to U.S. Embassy
the view of America."
Yet
more than
Equally encouraging, allied efforts to extend govern-
to Nixon's delight, the response to his "silent
told his aides,
his
though Vietnamization
all
the
ability to tax
new
and
recruit.
gains that had been made,
of the same old problems persisted. Despite
and modern
ARVN
its
many
increased
quarter-million protesters converged on Washington,
size
D.C., alone. Carrying placards bearing the names of
age of competent officers and
U.S. war dead and describing themselves
as the "Silent
corruption at almost every level, and a seemingly un-
Majority for Peace," they served notice to the Nixon
shakable reliance on American advice and firepower.
administration that there would be no lasting peace in
Despite improved security and increased democracy in
America
until there
was peace
Thus,
as the year
drew
self
engaged
talks
in
Nixon found him-
in a stalemate at every turn.
remained deadlocked,
South Vietnam
virtually
the
The
military
Paris peace
balance
ing matters worse, the
242
in
unchanged, and the American
public polarized over the proper course to pursue.
running out of options.
suffered from a short-
still
NCOs, an abundance
of
the villages, signs of genuine enthusiasm for the Thieu
Vietnam.
to a close,
look,
American president was
Mak-
rapidly
government were
scarce.
still
And
despite the inroads
of Phoenix, the Vietcong infrastructure remained intact, its
relative inactivity in large part reflecting Hanoi's de-
cision to wait until the
In the opinion of
Americans
many
the South Vietnamese needed, time. General
Abrams,
left for
good.
senior U.S. officials, what
above
all,
was more
for one, strongly believed that
the American pullout was proceedinj^ too quickly, and
he therefore urged the president
to defer plans tor an-
other major troop withdrawal. But Nixon, under unre-
home,"
lenting domestic pressure to "bring the boys
overruled his commander. Hoping to "drop a bombshell
on the gathering spring storm of antiwar put
it,
in
late April
protest," as he
Nixon announced
that
150,000
more troops would be redeployed from Vietnam by the end
of
1970.
At the same
time, however, he acceded
to the military's long-standing request that allied
forces be allowed to attack aries inside
ground
North Vietnamese sanctu-
Cambodia.
ations.
To
such a
move would
ing Saigon
As
a variety of consider-
begin with, he accepted the judgment of
Abrams and other high-ranking
abandoned
that he could bludgeon the
North Vietnamese into
compromise settlement through
military
relieve pressure
and buy valuable time
on U.S. for
officials
that
forces guard-
Vietnami:ation.
An
force.
to take
conviction a
unexpected thrust into theoretically neutral that he was willing
more extreme measures than had President John-
son, compelling
take us
his
dramatic show o{
a
Cambodia would prove once again
on
all
Hanoi
to decide
"whether they want
to
over again." Finally, the recent overthrow
of Cambodia's neutralist leader. Prince
Norodom
nouk, by the pro-American Lon Nol prt)vidcd
Siha-
a previ-
ously lacking rationale for widening the war. By mid-
Cambodia was
in a state
of near anarchy. North
Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge
forces were pushing the
April
Nixon's decision to authorize a cross-border invasion
seems to have been motivated by
In addition, he h.id not yet
Cambodian army back
into the interior,
and Lon Nol,
with American encouragement, was openly calling outside help.
"We
need
a
bold
move ...
to
we stand with Lon Nol," Nixon informed April 26. Even though he might
fall
enemy
rear bases there in
for
that
Kissinger
on
anyway, "we must
men of May 1970.
the war progressed, nonstandard dress became standard tor the increasingh' ambivalent tightmg force. Here,
Division (Airmobile) pause in Cambodia's Fishhook region during the invasion of
show
the 1st Cavalry
243
Death
at
Kent
State.
Guardsmen on May
A
4,
young woman screams
in
anguish as she kneels over the body ot Jeffrey Glen Miller, felled in hre by National
1970.
do something symbolic"
for the
in the last twenty-five years
only
Cambodian
leader
"with the guts to take a pro-
Western and pro- American stand."
The
Nixon." Rather than
selling his action simply as a matter of as the military tify
the
"good
"incursion"
in
soft-
tactics,"
had recommended, he attempted
Cambodian
global terms.
on the evening
1970, in a televised speech that was, in
Kissinger's words, "vintage
to jus-
hyperbolic,
even
The North Vietnamese, he contended,
were preparing "to launch massive attacks on our forces
and those of the South Vietnamese" from tuaries in
Cambodia. Hanoi was
their sanc-
testing the "will
and
character" of the United States in an effort to expose
244
"pitiful, helpless
lenge" would only encourage "the forces of totalitari-
president revealed his decision
of April 30,
"the world's most powerful nation" as a
giant." Failure to respond to the enemy's "direct chal-
anism and anarchy
Ito]
threaten free nations and free
institutions throughout the world." ical
considerations,"
Nixon
Spuming
declared, he
"all polit-
had decided
to
follow his conscience rather than be "a two-term president at the cost of seeing defeat in
Even
its
as
sound
Nixon
America
.
.
.
accept the
first
190-years' history."
spoke. South Vietnamese forces were
already operating inside the Parrot's Beak, a narrow protrusion of
having later,
first
Cambodian
territory
crossed the border
on the morning of May
northwest of Saigon,
on April 1,
a
29.
Two
days
combined U.S.-
ARVN
men
force o( 15,000
region farther north. artillery fire
and
mored personnel Regiment
plunged into the Fishhook
Moving behind columns
air strikes,
and
of tanks
led the way, followed by troop-laden helicop-
Though
the invading troops expected to meet with heavy tance,
fled
of
in
advance, leaving behind vast store-
ammunition,
weapons,
The
materiel.
cover
COSVN
allied
command had
and also
war
other
hoped
to dis-
(Central Office for South Vietnam), the
alleged headquarters for
all
Communist
forces operating
found only "a scattering of
in the South. Instead they
empty huts" that bore
little
resemblance to the minia-
Pentagon they had imagined.
ture
resis-
soon became apparent that the North Vietna-
it
mese had houses
ar-
Armored Cavalry
carriers of the 11th
of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
ters
heavy
a shield of
The Americans
Mark
of South Dakota and
Hatfield of
U.S. pullout from Vietnam by the end of 1971.
Nixon immediately launched
Characteristically,
The time had come
counterattack.
around" with
his Congressional opponents,
sword, don't take
strict
out
it
Warning
the gut."
—
that
me. Congress
if
will
stick
it
in hard.
credi-bility
domestic ical
critics
and
verify suspected links
one of the most
project represented
it
tors
war and
campuses across the country erupted instances with tragic results.
in protest, in
On May
State students were shot, four of
university
them
4,
fatally,
were
still
because Nixon stole the opposition's
thunder by removing before June 30. Yet
all
U.S. troops from Cambodia
the president had survived the
if
with his authority intact, his options for
latest crisis
more
than ever. The
National Guardsmen sent in to maintain "law and or-
future action were
der." Several days later, two
bodian venture may have bought time
at
more students were
killed
Jackson State College in Mississippi during an angry
tion,
but
first
capacity to
week
and
gotiations.
May, hundreds of thousands
in
had gone on
strike
of students
to protest the shootings,
prompting more than 400 colleges and universities shut
down
to
had
Vietnamiza-
seriously diminished Hanoi's
make war nor broken It
for
Cam-
the deadlock in ne-
provoked the most violent out-
also
burst of antiwar protest since the war began, intensifying
pressure to speed up the pace of the
American with-
drawal and imposing clear limits on the future use of
entirely.
The expansion
restricted
had neither
it
confrontation with local police. By the end of the
faculty
won
unwilling to accept responsibility for the
in part
Kent
by Ohio
later
investigation during the 1973 Watergate
some
thirteen
and would
the approval of Congress, in part because most legisla-
commentators lashed out
the president,
The
serious abuses of
nor the more extreme McGovern-Hatfield proposal
exceeded his worst expectations. As prominent media at
between rad-
end neither the Cooper-Church amendment
In the
Cambodian invasion
also ordered
groups in the U.S. and foreign governments.
hearings.
the military benefits of the
undermining
the formation of a special covert team to monitor his
come under
short of Nixon's hopes, the domestic reaction to
for
and prolonging the war. He
immediate threat to the heavily populated Saigon-Bien
If
re-
have to assume the conse-
quences," he blamed his adversaries
U.S.
Hit 'em in
"Congress undertakes to
the destruction of the enemy's base camps relieved any
fell
he told his
"Don't worry about divisiveness. Having drawn the
staff.
presidential authority in U.S. history
corridor.
a
to stop "screwing
nevertheless pronounced the operation a success, since
Hoa
Oregon cospon-
sored an even more restrictive proposal requiring a total
of the war into
Cambodia
voked an angry response from Congress.
also pro-
In the
first
di-
U.S. combat troops.
Nixon assumed the
rect challenge to presidential authority since the begin-
pledged to end was
ning of the war, the Senate voted overwhelmingly in
promised to win was
A
year and a half after Richard
presidency,
still
the war that he had
going on, and the peace that ho
still
not
in sight.
June to rescind the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964Senators John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Frank
Church
of Idaho dratted a resolution setting a June 30
deadline for the termination of ations in
all
U.S. military oper-
Cambodia, while Senators George McGovern
245
Ar
Fire
Support Base
most U.S. busc
in
Fuller, the
northern-
South Vietnnm, Januiuy
1970.
'^-
'
f
^%
I,;
=v
afternoon the tanks collided with an entrenched North
Focus: The Cambodian Incursion
Vietnamese battalion. The ensuing the Fourth of July," recalled
Donn
adier General
with tactical
dead
By and
like
Brig-
minutes the Amer-
the ground with tank-
and pounded them from the sky
fire
When
air strikes.
the stubborn defenders
driven from their fortifications, fifty-two
finally
NVA
"looked
Cav commander
Starry. For sixty
enemy bunkers from
icans blasted
mounted cannon
were
1th
1
fight
lay sprawled across the
smoking
battlefield.
however, the Americans encountered
large,
only scattered resistance. Well aware of the armored
might being readied across the border, most enemy units
had chosen discretion over valor and withdrawn to the
From the
Vietnam War the Communists
outset of the
west ahead of the American advance.
enjoyed one enormous advantage over their American
network of secure bases and staging areas
adversaries: the just
beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam. American
intelligence eventually located fourteen major
bases inside Cambodia,
Saigon.
MACV
some only
enemy
thirty-five miles
from
repeatedly sought permission to launch
Most, but not
located supply depot force.
7 at speeds of
noon of the
tral" states, just as regularly refused.
Johnson's prohibi-
American troops who believed
tions frustrated
that
if
they were allowed to pursue the North Vietnamese across the frontier, they could hurt the
months
lived. Fifteen
Nixon gave them
On May
1
after
enemy where he
he came to
office,
1th
1
raced north along
fifth.
thousands of
Once
outskirts of
Snuol by the
using canisters
airstrip,
steel pellets to silence
carriers
Armored Cavalry Regiment churned
enemy
concentrated rocket and automatic-weapons
wave of CH-47 Chinook
helicopters carried troop-
Air Cavalry Division into landing zones
1st
by gigantic
bombs. "This Cambodian operation
one senior U.S. from a World
While
1st
Cav
and fanned out
II
pure blitzkrieg,"
something
Panzer division's book of tactics."
troopers consolidated their positions
in search of the
brushed through scattered
then rolled north across
248
is
15,000-pound
officer told a reporter, "like
War
enemy, the
RPG
flat,
fire.
For the rest of the day and through the night
town with napalm and high
air force
explosives. Periodically the
tanks returned to the task, firing volley after volley of
cannon
fire
into the crumbling, burning buildings, while
enemy
tance and mortars crashed into the rubble.
from the
positions.
ward the central marketplace where they were met by
land jutting into Binh Long Province. Overhead, wave
blasted out of the jungle
with
filled
the airstrip was secured, the tanks advanced to-
helicopter gunships rocketed pockets of
ers
after-
Immediately the tanks formed up and
across the border into the Fishhook, a narrow swath of
after
Highway throwing
fighter-bombers screamed through the sky plastering the
bombardment, tanks and armored personnel
(APCs) of the
occupied by a large enemy
sixty-five miles per hour,
stormed the town's
Richard
the chance.
1970, following a predawn air and artillery
,
up to
and reaching the
rivers
political repercussions of violating the territory of "neu-
4 the 11th Cavalry was
armored-vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs) across three
who wanted
ground war and feared the
still
The 100-tank column
operations against these sanctuaries; President Johnson, to contain the
On May
all.
ordered to proceed to the town of Snuol, a strategically
fire
open
1
1th Cavalry
along the frontier, terrain. Late in the
1
1th Cavalry entered the city on the morning of
there was nothing
during the night. civilians.
"We
one senior
didn't
officer,
troops coined a
meaning
left
The
but ruins.
for
NVA
the
May
had
6
fled
only bodies were those of four
want
to
blow
this
town away,"
said
"but we had no choice." American
new word
after the battle
—
to "snuol,"
to obliterate.
Yet the fighting of the
way
The
resis-
When
what turned out
operation.
Hoping
to bag
first
few days only cleared the
to be the real
enemy
work of the
troops the Americans
found
themselves
the
instead
treasure, for the fleeing
NVA
heir
had
left
the
to
ing quantity of equipment and supplies.
from the
around
1st
enemy's
behind a staggerInfantrymen
Cavalry Division organized the search
support bases established throughout the
fire
American commanders did not have was the same
dom
free-
enjoyed by their South Vietnamese counterparts.
Responding
storm of domestic protest, President
to a
Nixon announced no deeper than
that the incursion would penetrate
and conclude by
thirty-four kilometers
Fishhook. Working in tandem with teams of light ob-
June iO. Although U.S. gunships, fighter-bombers, and
servation helicopters and Cobra gunships, the troopers
B-52s continued
immediately began locating enormous hoards of enemy
and special land-clearing units slashed through the dense
arms and ammunition.
forest
One
"The City,"
of the most remarkable finds was
a
two-square-mile complex buried deep in the jungle south of Snuol complete with street signs, barracks, mess halls,
classrooms,
swimming age
recreation hall,
and pig farm. Inside the 400
pool,
and
sheds,
lumberyard,
range,
firing
bunkers
linked
by
huts, stor-
rice,
16,000 pounds of corn, 58,000 pounds
of plastic explosives, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition,
300
more than 200 crew-served weapons, and
trucks,
enough small arms later
and
for fifty-five battalions.
forty kilometers northeast,
another
discovered
NVA
dubbed Rock Island East in Illinois.
of
enemy
tained in
The
1st
Rock
Two
Cav the
installation
after the
The Cambodian
days
soldiers
troopers
Island Arsenal
some
329 tons of munitions.
spectacular booty uncovered in the Fishhook
ARVN
Parrot's Beak, the principal
to
task force scoured the
enemy
Rome
enemy
positions
American ground troops
plows,
to content themselves with the backbreaking
emptying the enemy sanctuaries. Engineers
much
to haul out as
work
built roads
and smaller caches were
as possible,
discovered faster than they could be destroyed. In saults
mid-May the Communists launched on American
scattered as-
what appeared
firebases in
to be the
prelude to a concerted counterattack. But the arrival of the
monsoon
sides to a halt.
On
June 28, two days before the
dent's deadline, the last
left
of the
presi-
American tanks rumbled back
across the border while U.S. air and artillery
what was
on both
rains in early June brought fighting
enemy
hammered
sanctuaries with a farewell
bombardment.
When
they
learned they would be going into
first
Cambodia, many GIs had reacted with helicopter pilot put
overshadowed what was happening 100 kilometers the south, where an elite
with giant
suspected
simply put to the torch. But supplies continued to be
version, the largest cache
materiel ever captured during the war, conall
of
three-foot-deep
trenches and miles of tunnels the troopers found 60,000
pounds of
had
pummel
to
it,
bat assaults near the
"We
had
In
staging area for the
we were
all
pleasure.
many men
As one in
com-
Cambodia border while the gooks
would go back into Cambodia, us, so
lost
and laugh
there,
sit
at
together for going in."
American terms they
what
got
largely
they
1968 Tet offensive. Driving into Cambodia two days
wanted. The incursion dealt the enemy a significant
before U.S. forces kicked off their part of the operation,
back, killing an estimated 4,776 men, destroying nearly
the South Vietnamese had to blast their way through
12,000 bunkers, capturing enough
enemy
Communist
ital
rear-guard units before seizing the provincial cap-
of Svay Rieng. But here, too, the bulk of North
Vietnamese troops had disappeared. Nonetheless,
rein-
unit in
enough ammunition
rice
South Vietnam for ten
to feed every
for four
months, and enough
activity sharply reduced
forcements poured across the border, eventually bringing
resulting decline in
ARVN
casualties during the remainder of the year.
strength in
Cambodia
to 18,000
men. Some de-
voted their attention to enemy base areas and supply caches.
Others launched wide-ranging mobile forays
deep inside Cambodian
territory.
By the second week oi the operation the U.S. had 30,000 troops of
its
own
in
Cambodia, including
ele-
ments of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions. What
months,
vidual weapons to equip seventy-four battalions.
enemy
indi-
The U.S.
That cnemv
Main-Ft)rce units had largely escaped intact, that <.)f
set-
much
the supplies would be replaced within a few months,
and that the boundaries
of the
widened were
South Vietnamese and Cambo-
facts the
war
h
been
irreversibly
dians wt)uld ultimately have to face. U.S. ground troops
had delivered
their last
major bknv of the war.
249
linear
Neak Luong dur-
Han incursion,
May
;se units initiated
vasion
on April 29 with an
Parrot's
1970.
the in-
assault into the
Beak section ofCatnhodia Jutting
into Soutli Vietnam.
f'
t^
*f^ •
•^-
While
252
his
hudJy keeps watch,
a soldier
from the
I
Jth
Armored Cavalry checks an enemy bunker
in the Parrot's
Beak,
May
2.
A
trooper troni the 1st Cav:ilry Division examines one of the hundreds o/ 5/CS
this
Communist hunker
bor.
American combat troops spent most of their two months
in
CamhoJia's Fishhook, another area reaching in
//iro its
ritles
/onnJ
in
eastern neif^h-
Cambodia removing; captured
suppUes and destroying abandimed enemy sanctuaries.
253
Men
of the 3d Battalion, 23d
Infantry.
25th Infantry Division, take up positions outside the village of Ph Tasuos just south
of the Fishhook,
Cambodia,
254
in early
five
kilometers
May.
inside
?fr
iBbtifmmmti^immammi
Above.
i^olJiers
tram the 25th
Irttantry Division drag
away
a
buddy
killed by sniper tire
coming
from Ph Tasuos.
Right. village.
256
As other men of the 25th
Infantry
move
to a safer position, a
Cobra gunship
strikes the
*
-^'^^
-
.
.
w
wred
CuvAlry, ruinhles rbraugh the Fish- 'H^
fheadini^ toward South Vietnam. 28,
Qn
4
'"^"^ '
the last American amiored ve-
hides made their way out of'^amhodia.
Jtlj^
'^'
^
'i^l^l'^* ,
'•**
..i'*^^**
>^^^9^':'li^'
H»
namese and
Al
Witness:
Santoli
North Vietnamese invasion
lived along the
route to the capital, independent of American forces.
headquarters was a small fortified village in the
Our
Kiem Hanh
near the city of Tay Ninh and a
District,
short hike from North Vietnamese Army sanctuaries in Cambodia. We were told that the area's tunnels housed Vietcong's
the
COSVN
elusive
Our small group was
from
headquarters,
where their leaders coordinated the war
in the
South.
of America: Mike
a cross section
Andrews, our leader, was a West Point graduate from
North Carolina; Steve Zontek was from California
or-
ange country; "Tree" Maples was a small-town philoso-
pher from Michigan; "Frenchy" was
and In the wake of the Tet offensive, American and South to regain
Vietnamese units struggled
had been contested or even
that
and control areas
lost in
the attack. Par-
I
own
then slipped
forces,
One
of the
members
Cam-
to the sanctuary of
of a
combined U.S. /ARVN
reconnaissance team in this area was Al Santoli, a
ser-
geant with the 25th Infantry Division from March 1968 to
March
and our own destiny,
American brella
of
from
MACV,
and we were very
were able to chart our lucky.
um-
infantry units operated under a tactical
artillery support.
removed from American on the
We
sources.
But our
tire
CRIP
platoon, far
support bases, had to rely
who
loyalty of the black-pajama-clad villagers,
were as fearful and suspicious of us as we were of them.
Although the twenty GIs
1969.
us
to
Vietnamese Province Command, the U.S. 25th Divi-
tween Saigon and the Cambodian border, where North Vietnamese and Vietcong units attacked U.S. and
bodia.
and assignments came
reports
sion,
ARVN
Cajun;
learning to think one step ahead of the VC. Intelligence
important was the populated countryside be-
ticularly
a Louisiana
was a street kid from Cleveland. All of us were
in
our platoon had only lim-
ited knowledge of the Vietnamese language and culture,
In
my
time in Vietnam,
I
came
to
understand that there
were actually two wars going on simultaneously, each important as the other. The
first
was the conventional
war against regular North Vietnamese
units; the
was for the support of the population, "hearts
as
and minds" of the people, who
second
winning the
for the
most part
simply wanted both sides of the war to stop disrupting their lives. It was in this
that
I
had my most
that gave
me
nature— my
As an Division,
second aspect of the conflict
valuable experience in Vietnam, one
a unique view
role in a
had fought along the Cambodian border west fierce
counteroffensive,
I
an area notorious
Our
to learn to coexist with villagers
for
Vietcong
objective was to monitor
out of Cambodia.
If
we could
activity.
NVA
locate
troop
them
movement
in the forests
of Tay Ninh and pinpoint
their bases for air strikes,
countless South Vietnamese
and American
be saved.
Communist
offensive was
to turn
strategy during
and
to "destroy villages in
order to save them" and to create unintentional civilian
Such destruction would cause
bitter feelings
toward American and South Vietnamese soldiers among a traditionally
xenophobic population and produce news
was wounded three different times.
national community.
1969
I
served
Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon
(CRIP) with twenty Americans and twenty South
Viet-
Tet
battletields.
photos and television images that horritied the
to February
would
after the
populated areas into
They wanted American tirepower
lives
encounters during the 1968 post-Tet
Then from October 1968
260
in
casualties.
CRIP platoon.
eighteen-year-old infantryman with the 25th I
of Saigon. In
in a
of the war and of human
we had no choice but
During Tet the Main-Force Vietcong been decimated, but surviving important roles as
spies,
VC
inter-
guerrillas
cadres
still
had
served
tax collectors, saboteurs,
and
We
guides for the North Vietnamese forces. In the villages
along the Cambodian border they dealt swift and brutal
who showed
"justice" to peasants
government or refused was hard tor
It
loyalty to the Saigon
to contribute support.
a regular infantry soldier to
the pressure the people lived under. Their silence lack of cooperation earned
sympathizer. " After a few
we came
them the
and
months of living among them,
to understand that thirty years of continuous
war and their precarious location near Communist base areas
had taught them
hope
that silence was their only
many of these
for survival. In discussions with
farmers
I
learned that they had no interest in politics, taxes, or armies.
They wished only
heritage
and work
continue their ancestral
to
their land in peace. 1 think they
to understand that
we were
risking our lives for
have the peace they desperately hoped
came
them
We
for.
to
awk-
wardly tried to understand their ways, ate their food,
and attended
An
local ceremonies.
veloped between
us.
We
became
And
con-
in a
COSVN we
campsite,
left a
We
us.
VC agents
learned that whenever
would come
through garbage and to plant booby to return.
We
began surprising them by leaving behind
an ambush team of three to the tables on later,
the saboteurs.
of our people who turned
six
But they kept
after us; years
COSVN security chief, now a map where the VC had sent
in Europe, a former
a refugee,
showed me on
out teams to hunt for
We
rarely
placent or
tired,
village.
on her
nights.
bicycle, giving us a
a little girl
warm
explosion rocked our camp.
a little
com-
grin.
We
would
ride by us
One morning
ran to the road
an
and
found a huge mine crater and a crumpled bicycle blown fifty
meters away. The
was gone. Her parents
little girl
were walking circles around the searching.
mained
We
tic
bag.
crater,
weeping and
tried to find the child, but all that re-
of her was a handful of pieces of flesh.
mother used chopsticks
NVA
And we
learned to look for signs like
base camps or supply caches.
One day we
received
North Vietnamese
from what seemed to be a
fire
We
outpost.
found what turned out Because of the small
probed the area and
to be a regimental headquarters.
of our patrol and teamwork we
size
were able to maneuver quickly as we drew
on our the
fire.
Luck was
Though we had underestimated the
side.
enemy camp,
size
of
they too were taken by surprise. Four
or five armored personnel carriers attached to our team
came
our rescue with .50-caliber machine guns pro-
to
viding a fierce base of
we were
much
a
fire,
which gave the
We
larger force.
illusion that
were able to withdraw
quickly with only one casualty.
By
living with the people
no matter how
realized that
tion's
in
and sharing
valiantly
their fears I
American
soldiers
combat, the key to winning the popula-
support was respect for their traditions. Through
our Vietnamese platoon members we had prolonged
who
cussions with villagers better
and
life
cong and North Vietnamese their rice
and
their sons.
and
soldiers
At the same
that there was a very effective
made them
dis-
expressed their hopes for a
their desire just to be left alone.
creetly, they confided their distrust
fear
Dis-
of the Viet-
who took both
time
it
was obvious
VC shadow presence
that
reluctant to cooperate with the South Viet-
to place
Through
particular location for
Once we got
though, and stayed almost a week near
Every morning
clearings.
We
or exposing ourselves
trails
namese government.
us.
camped near any
more than one or two
one
in to search
expecting us
traps,
open
on
risk traveling
performed
did not take kindly to our success and was
thick under-
footprints or broken foliage that would often lead to
unusual bond de-
friends.
tested area, friendship can have a heavy price.
always seeking to destroy
could not
"VC" or "VC
label
silently through
brush, using the cover of trees to our advantage.
in
understand
move
learned to
them tenderly
The bomb had been meant
The
my
relationship with these
learned that regardless of our a lot in
to
common. To me
many
of them,
many
proud people
differences,
they weren't just "gooks.
the soldiers in the
CRIP
I
we had
"And
were no
longer "long nose" barbarians, as Americans were often
With the passive support of the
disrespectfully called. villagers
we were able
namese on ability to
At
their
own
to beat the
turf,
VC and
North
Viet-
and we helped deny them the
launch surprise attacks on outposts or towns.
the same time
for the people
we gained
we were
respect
and understanding
protecting.
in a plas-
for us.
261
THE LONG GOOD-BYE
There was no longer any
The primary U.S. forces
and the
Cambodian
incursion.
Vietnam had become the rapid withdrawal of American
transfer of military responsibility to the
Nixon administration casualties,
talk of victory in the aftermath of the
objectives in
insisted that this
South Vietnamese. Because the
must be accomplished with
minimum
a
American combat operations would be permitted only
tor the
U.S.
ot
purposes of
defense or to "stimulate a negotiated settlement" with the Communists.
At in
the beginning of 1970 the United States had an estimated 450,000 troops stationed
South Vietnam. By the end
units assembled their
men
tor
One
184,000 remained.
ot 1971 only
by one American
stand-down ceremonies replete with speeches and
ritual tlag
lowerings, withdrew from outlying bases into coastal enclaves or populated areas,
prepared to return home. left
Vietnam
Division,
in the last
which
The 9th months
Infantry Division
ot 1969,
December the bulk of the 4th and 25th 1st
later the
of service, followed in
middle of 1971, the
and other
home
in
August by the
November by two
ARVN
1st
Infantry
1st
home. April 1971
Cavalry Division, and 1st
1
1th Ar-
Brigade of the 5th Infantry
173d Airborne Brigade quit Vietnam
after six
kmg
years
brigades of the 23d Infantry Division. By the
had taken over nearly two hundred and
titty
American bases
installations.
As more and more American
soldiers lett
Vietnam, those who remained tound their Since General Oeighton
role increasingly limited to protective security
and
Abrams succeeded William Westmoreland
MACV chief in June
steadily
by the
Infantry Divisions headed
Marine Division,
mored Cavalry Regiment, followed
One month
were soon followed
April 1970, and in October by the 199th Infantry Brigade. During
left in
witnessed the departure of the
Division.
and
and 3d Marine Division, which had
abandoned multibattalion
as
forays into
static detense.
ued to mount sweep operations and mobile reconnaissance During Operacion
Lam Son
719, a
UH-l
"slick"
1968, U.S. forces had
remote frontier regions.
lifts
a hclicoprer
efforts.
JmrneJ
/i)-
Some
units contin-
By the end Communist
ot
hrc.
1970,
though, most of the Americans' time was devoted to shielding the lowland population from attack through
constant patrolling and the destruction of supply caches, without which the tain offensive operations. lier
The
Communist
enemy could not
sus-
away from the
ear-
shift
search-and-destroy operations and General
large
Ahrams's insistence that the enemy he fought on
own
made
terms
his
the war more than ever a contest in
which platoons, even squads, became major
actors in
the military drama.
The change
placed enormous responsibility on the
NCOs,
shoulders of inexperienced junior officers and
whose jobs were made more power shortages that toons into the
If
or
men who
some commanders were
still
troops to effective, aggressive action, less
tical
interested in hunting the
enemy
objective than in seeing to
turned
home
little
of the
served before
able to inspire
many
others were
or capturing a tac-
men
that their
re-
safely.
In any case, the ficult to find.
it
pla-
Moreover,
less.
available exhibited
discipline or enthusiasm of the
them.
by serious man-
companies and
regularly sent
field at half-strength
who were
those troops
difficult
The
enemy was making himself
very dif-
staggering losses suffered by the
Com-
munists during the Tet offensive of 1968 and the year-
American
long
Hanoi and
to break
curtail
counterattack
up most of
followed
in favor of guerrilla ac-
Meanwhile, the Politburo
forces in preparation for the day
Americans
forced
local units
maintained military pressure without risking
large additional casualties. its
that
Main-Force and
conventional attacks
tivities that
built
its
left
when
re-
the
South Vietnam.
The Cambodian
incursion and the overthrow of the
Sihanouk government by pro-American General Lon
Nol
in the spring of
much more
difficult.
1970 made the Communist task
Not only
did these events set back
Hanoi's schedule, they also forced the redeployment of four divisions from to protect vital
In
November
1971,
chat will carry
Vietnam and the border sanctuaries
North Vietnamese
American
them back
airfield outside Saigon.
reduced from
264
its
By
soldiers
to the
lines of supply in the
board the "freedom bird"
United States from Bien Hoa
then, U.S. troop strength
1969 high of more than 500,000
had been
to 180,000.
^
IV*^
* *»-J?
,>
eastern halt
mained
Cambodia. Those enemy
t)f
South Vietnam continued
in
and rocket attacks and occa-
installations with mortar
mount ground
sionally marshaled sufficient forces to
U.S.
saults against
fire
as-
support bases. By and large, how-
Communists avoided
ever, the
units that re-
to harass allied
"Things were so
battle.
quiet during the final four
months of 1970,"
army intelligence
"we were almost tripping over
each other
The
an
in
relative
officer,
effort to find
units
— 10,000
troops,
and 600 helicopters
craft,
Canyon
II
composed of
task force
to clear
played
Route 9 and reopen Khe Sanh Com-
Lam Son
719.
ARVN
Once
penetration
the South Viet-
American
8,
Army
pi-
support and logistics role in the
a crucial air
subsequent fighting. Battling ferocious antiaircraft
U.S.
air-
— launched Operation Dewey
namese crossed the border on February lots
artil-
2,000 fixed-wing
bat Base in preparation for a major
of Laos, Operation
aviators flew
some 100,000 helicopter
critical installations.
with booby
fire,
sorties
could be a dangerous
It
traps. Indeed, these brutal devices
ing a far heavier
where
toll
enemy
of GIs than was
Communists avoided
while, the
sites
were tak-
fire.
Mean-
direct contact except
U.S.
lax security left strategically placed
instal-
lations vulnerable to attack.
Such was the
end of January
engineer, armored cavalry, infantry, and
lery, airborne,
aviation
at the
and
assignment, for the Vietcong laced their launching
something to do."
calm was shattered
when an American
1971
one
recalled
across the so-called rocket belts that encircled major cities
of
Mary Ann,
case at Fire Support Base
23d Infantry Division outpost
a
in the western highlands
Quang Tin Province manned by
a battalion of the
196th Infantry Brigade. In the early morning hours of
March 28
a
company
of
NVA
sappers cut through the
unguarded perimeter and swarmed over Mary hind a barrage of
82mm
Ann
be-
mortar rounds. In no more than
half an hour they were gone, having killed or
wounded
half of the firebase's 250 defenders, including most of
the officers, at a cost of only 10 of their
prompted
disaster
nated in disciplinary action against
them the
division
own
dead.
The
a full-scale investigation that culmi-
and
six officers,
assistant division
among
commanders,
during a seven-week operation that ultimately cost the
but did
Americans more than 1,400
deviled American forces as they waited to disengage
and missing, plus the
killed
casualties,
loss
including 253
of more than 100
air-
from
a
little
to arrest the steady deterioration that be-
war they no longer wanted
to fight.
craft.
During the remainder continued to pound the
of the year
American
Ho Chi Minh
Trail
aircraft
and provide
support to government forces in Laos and Cambodia,
while a renewed
air
campaign against North Vietnam
struck military targets in the demilitarized zone and the
Hanoi-Haiphong
area.
On
nam, however, there was Saigon
fought
the ground in South Viet-
little
occasional
enemy bunker complexes, and ical)
action. U.S. troops near
sharp
encounters
against
the 23d Infantry (Amer-
Division's 11th Infantry Brigade spent weeks in
futile pursuit of
Quang
Ngai.
the Vietcong province headquarters in
When
101st Airborne troopers completed
the construction of three firebases in coastal
Thua Thien
Province and wrapped up Operation Jefferson Glenn on
October
8,
they brought to an end the
last
major Amer-
troops remaining in
sharp decline in the number of encounters with the
enemy from mid- 1970 on meant number
was in some ways itary
a similar decline in the
of U.S. casualties. Yet, the period of withdrawal
forces
in
far
more damaging
Vietnam than the
to
American
years
mil-
of heaviest
combat.
The most
defensive posture mandated by Washington
soldiers with little sense of mission other
sonal survival. trolled
left
than per-
This situation might have been con-
had the army's
officer corps
maintained the high
standards of professionalism with which
it
entered the
war. Unfortunately, by 1970 the cumulative impact of college deferments, declining
ROTC
enrollments, ca-
reerism within the military, and the Johnson administration's decision not to call
up the Reserves had de-
graded the overall quality and competence of the junior
ican ground combat operation of the war.
Most of the American
The
Vietnam
officers sent to
Vietnam. Coupled with an uncertain
during 1971 spent their time guarding military bases,
schedule of unit withdrawals and the news of mounting
and highways or sweeping back and forth
antiwar protests back home, these conditions provoked
urban
266
areas,
Bodies of villagers gunned
March
16, 1968.
The
down by
so-called
soldiers
My Lai
of the U.S. 23d Infantry Division (Amencal) he across a road
within the disengagement army an epidemic of "shorttimer's fever" that corroded morale
ened discipline both on and
NCOs still
intent
on
and
seriously threat-
itself in
"lifers,"
fighting the
growing tension
the career officers and
war
in earnest.
It
could
he seen in the "search-and-evade" maneuvers that supplanted the aggressive tactics of earlier years. ble in the fake patrols that
when
the real thing
the village of
My Lai
4 on
some platoons
It
in the rear,
where
racial tensions suppressed during
bat added fuel to the
fires
com-
of resentment. Black soldiers
served as infantrymen and suffered battle casualties at
off the battlefield.
The contagion manifested between draftees and
in
massacre was the most publicized atrocity committed by either side during the war.
was
visi-
substituted for
they thought their assigned patrol
rates well out of proportion to their
nam. In the
rear,
numbers
whites to be assigned to low-skilled specialties.
The
dis-
was more the
crimination suggested by these figures sult of
in Viet-
black soldiers were tar more likely than
re-
socioeconomic factors than institutional racism,
but there was no denying the hostility that black soldiers frequently encountered from
men.
some white
Energized by the civil
sector was too hot for comfort, as well as in acts ot
listed
disobedience, insubordination, and outright mutiny un-
within the United States,
many
officers
rights
black soldiers
and en-
revolution
demanded
refusals,
changes, adopting a militant stance that increasingly
however, was the mounting incidence of attacks by en-
echoed black-power advocates back home. The military
der
fire.
listed
More
disturbing even than such
men on
number
unpopular
officers
combat
and noncoms. The
of these so-called fraggings more than doubled
between 1969 and 1970, spurred on by bounties as
$10,000 offered by disgruntled troops
for the
as
high
assassi-
nation of "overaggressive" commanders.
A
significant portion of fragging incidents took place
instituted a
number
ot
measures to reduce triction but
could not forestall ugly eruptions ot racial violence. Racial prejudice also contributed to a rising tide of
violence by U.S. troops against those
whom
come
and custom had
so far to help. Barriers oi language
they had
long obstructed relations between American soldiers and
267
268
rhc Vietnamese. During' the early years of the war mutual antipathies
had heen
largely held
m
check. Rut the
slow redeployment of U.S. troops provoked noisy anti-
American demonstrations and American criminal
dramatic increase in
a
Vietnamese
offenses against
These ranged from shooting water to
running
cyclists off the road,
civilians.
buffaloes for sport
from throwing C-ration
cans at Vietnamese children to using peasants tor target practice.
As
numbers of U.S. troops withdrew mto
large
heavily populated rear areas, public drunkenness, dis-
and
orderly conduct,
became more common.
theft
the countryside, a deadly combination of too
and too
tration
little
much
In
frus-
discipline led to a substantial in-
crease in formal allegations of war crimes,
including
manslaughter, rape, murder, and mutilation.
The mas-
sacre by
men
of the U.S. Americal Division ot more
than 450 Vietnamese villagers (but not discovered by the
than a year
later)
Lai in June 1968
was unprecedented
more
numbers But
were committed by American troops and
atrocities
numbers
as the
in
war went on.
While some U.S. servicemen reacted ties
until
in the
command breakdown.
involved and the extent of
greater
My
at
American public
to the difficul-
of the withdrawal years with aggressive behavior
one another or the Vietnamese, others simply
against
few through desertion, a great many
tried to escape, a
more through
drugs. Marijuana
was the most frequently
used substance, but heroin, opium, cocaine, and
phetamines were prices.
As was
readily available at
all
am-
rock-bottom
the case with racial unrest, drug use sky-
One
rocketed after 1968.
Defense Department survey in
1971 found that almost 50 percent of American troops in
Vietnam were
either occasional or habitual users o(
marijuana. Despite 20,000 arrests by the military during
1969 and 1970, the number users within the
armed
marijuana and heroin
of
forces ctmtinued to increase, as
did a host of drug-related crimes from petty theft to
murder.
And
areas, tales ot
though most drug use took place
in rear
combat troops smoking pot before going
out on patrol were too numerous to discount entirely.
.4 si)Llicr i>t
iihtrcJ
rhe U.S.
5ch Mcch.inizcd
personnel cirncr
,
It
L.im:
/Kixnon ,iU>n^ the DKIZ, April
\'ci.
4,
Di\isum
sl[s
arop his
iir-
the western most American
I'-Kl.
269
So
serious
was the
crisis
of discipline that afflicted the
disengagement army that some feared catastrophe. "By every conceivable indicator,"
Marine
officer
commented one
and military analyst
army that now remains
June 1971, "our
in
Vietnam
in
retired
in a state ap-
is
M16
armed with an
rifle.
M60 machine
12,000
The
guns,
ARVN
boasted
also
M79
^0,000
grenade
launchers, 2,000 heavy mortars and howitzers, plus an
armada of new
and
ships, airplanes, helicopters, tanks,
armored personnel
carriers.
Expanded
military schools
men welcomed
proaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or
bolstered the office? corps, while enlisted
having refused combat, murdering their
increased pay, enlarged benefits, and improved housing
noncommissioned
and
drug-ridden,
officers,
and
officers
dispirited
where not near mutinous." Although that sweeping dictment was overdrawn, there was no doubt
in-
in the
themselves and their families. Similar strides were
for
taken in other branches of the South Vietnamese armed forces:
the navy, which increased from a strength of
minds of most professional military men that the health
19,000 to 43,000
and effectiveness of the U.S. Army required that the
craft;
war be turned over
during these years; and the
to
the Vietnamese as swiftly as
sailors operating nearly
1,700 coastal
the Vietnamese air force, which more than tripled territorial
militias,
The new men and new weapons, however, In September
brought
down
1963,
at
the height of the
crisis
Ngo Dinh Diem,
the regime of
John Kennedy observed that there were
that
President
limits to
what
inspired troops,
staggering rates of desertion,
ment supplied by the U.S., enced junior
They
are the ones that
have
to
win
it
is
their
or lose it."
un-
as
lack of
trained personnel to maintain the sophisticated equip-
the Americans could do to help the South Vietnamese. "it
could not
themselves correct such fundamental problems
"In the final analysis," warned the president, war.
which
increased by 200,000.
possible.
among
officers,
severe shortages of experi-
corruption
and incompetence
the senior officer corps, heavy dependence
on
Almost forgotten by the Johnson administration during
the U.S. logistics system, and a continuing overreliance
the years of American military buildup, Kennedy's ad-
on American
monition reverberated through Washington of the 1968 Tet offensive. Unwilling to substantial
new
wake
commit the
the military wanted, Johnson
forces
upon the South Vietnamese army
called
in the
greater burden of the fighting.
One
to
assume a
year later,
after
initial
attempts at negotiation and mil-
itary pressure failed to
wring a settlement from Hanoi,
Richard Nixon's
the
new
president
made Vietnamization
the cornerstone
of his efforts to extricate the U.S. from Vietnam.
The
job
was entrusted to General Abrams,
had been
level of fighting the
MACV
missioning experienced
designed programs for com-
NCOs. To
firepower and mobility, the U.S. latest
hands.
American equipment
And
ations with
American
By 1971 these
South
Vietnamese
into
ARVN
to use the
new
on combined oper-
efforts
had resulted 1
in a
test
South Viet-
million soldiers, each one
with a pre-emptive strike
In conception, the Laotian incursion was similar to
the foray into
Cambodia nine months
to capture
still
in general create as
for support.
Lam Son was an
The
cut infiltration
and
Beyond these
pur-
719, was
much havoc
as possible while U.S. aviation
remained
tives.
earlier.
named Lam Son
NVA equipment and supplies,
and
for the
artillery assets
specific objec-
opportunity to demonstrate that
Vietnamization was working, to show the Communists that the South Vietnamese armed forces had age.
Although U.S.
ployed, no
aircraft
and
pilots
American ground troops or
accompany the
units.
namese army of more than
270
funneled the
knew how
to ensure they
hardware, Abrams sent the
provide the necessary
command
com-
the results were disastrous.
To improve
combat leadership
successful
remainder of 1970. But when Viet-
pose of the operation, code
who
These weaknesses
air support.
into the Laotian panhandle at the beginning of 1971,
enemy
their training programs.
and
namization was put to the
routes,
and expand
artillery
some extent obscured by the
bined operation into Cambodia and the relatively low
helped his South Vietnamese counterparts build up their forces
to
ARVN
of
would be emadvisers
would
beyond the border.
The 16,000-man South Vietnamese into Laos
come
on February 8
task force crossed
against minimal resistance.
Lam Son
719. Inside Ltos, woiinJcJ
Snurh Vietnamese
soldiers alxinJon chcir nrm^^rcd
personnel
c.irncr,
which
hit a mine.
271
f
.
1
SB W4« i
/"^'^'iju
^^^*^^~^
'
i_
1]
Jl
Li^
/^^.jM
/^
\
Wl^KtKr' ^ u<^^aBlH^^H^^H
..aiil
~j
«
..
« ^
^^ A.
H^Hpr''
Kj^r^^
"j
\
\
\\
VNS
\
V
u.
1^^t-
jHH^^ ><;
«*
"<
'« 1
i//^
'
V
TTie
main ammunition dump
became
at
TT
.^.
Khe Sank
.-
V-'.
- -sr
erupts after being blown up by
NVA
sappers on
a focus of activity as South Vietnamese soldiers driven from Laos at the
Americans stationed
ARVN
Airborne Division,
1st
Infantry Division, and a Ranger group established bases to the north
and south of Route
the
9,
1st
Armored
Brigade advanced along the highway hampered only by
and mud. At the end of the
third day the
main
South Vietnamese thrust was only twenty miles from
Tchepone,
a
main hub of the
Ho Chi Minh
Trail. Be-
ginning on February 12, however, the outlying firebases
The former Marine base
but almost immediately began a general withdrawal to-
ward the South Vietnamese border. Pursued by enemy forces
now
became
totaling 34,000
a disorganized retreat
ment and fought each other Despite
copters.
tirely annihilated.
through withering antiaircraft
fire in
support of
and
finally disintegrated
thousands
abandoned equip-
to reach evacuation heli-
of sorties
by
American
fighter-bombers and B-52s, some units were almost en-
soldiers
American gunships and supply helicop-
men, the withdrawal quickly
into a total rout as panicked soldiers
NVA
ters flew
23, 1971.
end of Lam Son 719 sought the protection of the
began to come under heavy attack from tank-supported infantry.
March
>—
there.
While troops from the
rain
i~"
who
Thousands more South Vietnamese
were saved only by American helicopter crews
braved intense
fire
to rescue them.
the entire
Although many South Vietnamese troops performed
northern flank was collapsing under the weight of three
well in individual battles during the course of the op-
enemy
eration. President Thieu's
the beleaguered defenders, but by
battle, the
NVA
rushed more and more troops into
armored column
ing for orders from higher
hind B-52
272
1
divisions.
While the
ble,
March
raids that
helicopter-borne
stalled along
command.
Route 9 wait-
On March
6, be-
reduced the Laotian town to rub-
ARVN
troops seized
Tchepone
announcement
that
Lam Son
719 was "the biggest victory ever" struck many
nam and
the United States as ludicrous.
had destroyed several enemy stockpiles and tent interrupted the
Communist
The to
in Viet-
ARVN
some ex-
logistical buildup.
But
the delay at best amounted to no more than a few
—
mmiths. Against
Vietnamese
had
this
soldiers
wounded, or captured
killed,
to the invasion.
every
command
level, the elite troops of the
taken a terrible beating.
ARVN
not for U.S.
it
had sup-
air
the outcome could well have been catastrophic.
port,
As
Were
at
the
American ground combat
last
new
units prepared to
Communists resumed
leave the country, and the
preparations for a
offensive,
it
their
appeared that Amer-
ican air power might be the only sure defense that South
Vietnam
still
possessed.
(SAM)
One
would again be called upon
weapon
year later that
to prevent disaster.
SA-7 SAMs
But they also discovered
An
Tri,
the
30, 1972,
two months
concentrations and cut
North Vietnamese troops backed by tanks and mobile armor units smashed across the provincial capital of
the
NVA
Quang
DMZ
Tri City.
had opened two more
heading
for the
Within two weeks
fronts in a stunning
Easter offensive that everywhere sent
ARVN
ing backward in disarray. By mid-April
all
American
resistance
and
a greatly
to battered
and naval support
to halt the
South Vietnamese defenders. By the end
diminished
remaining
before.
Compelled
to
draw down
their
numbers over the
previous twelve months, the air force had fewer than 90
combat
aircraft left in
Communist airplanes
on
South Vietnam navy only two
assault, the
at the
time of the
carriers
station in the Gulf of Tonkin.
with
1
70
Even with
the addition of air force B-52s and F-4 Phantoms diverted to the
Da Nang and Bien Hoa from Thailand,
American nor the
enough firepower lines.
Within
neither
St)uth Vietnamese air force
to stabilize the disintegrating
had
ARVN
six weeks, however, the call for reinforce-
ments brought U.S. strength
in
Southeast Asia up to
twenty American cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers,
70,000
1,000 U.S. warplanes.
air force
a
and self-propelled
tanks, trucks,
halt-dozen
personnel, and nearly
ar-
tillery pieces.
Long before
that
of the invasion
—
less
than sixty hours after the
—American
as soldiers
under
and refugees
a merciless
were hitting
aircraft
munist staging areas north of the 8,
DMZ. Then on May
from Quang Tri City
fled
Communist
start
Com-
artillery barrage, President
of full-scale
bombing
North Vietnam. The operatitm was code named
Linebacker.
It
would be
saults against the
of
North
new weapons,
different
from previous
air as-
key ways: the employ-
in three
the inclusion of
new
targets,
and
the absence of tight civilian oversight.
Because Washington
air
keep than ever
of
Communist
amid the smoking wreckage of thousands o(
against
enemy advance. The
difficult to
Amer-
that stood
U.S. ground troops, President Nixon instead pledged
promise of help was more
supply lines while
June the aerial onslaught had stalled the
ment of the
enemy
Nixon authorized the resumption
military presence.
Unwilling to delay the withdrawal
gunships blasted
units reel-
between the Communists and victory were pockets of
South Vietnamese
enemy
At
to air attack.
American B-52s,
ican transports delivered thousands of tons of equipment
major American ground contingent, ^^0,000
last
mechanized North
a heavily
AC-47
and
fighter-bombers,
offensive
after the departure of
and the small, shoulder-hred
Loc, and Kontum,
North Vietnamese
On March
sites,
that were particularly deadly to helicopters.
Vietnamese Army highly vulnerable
Quang
new (Commu-
ever, thanks to
including large-caliber guns, surface-
nist air defenses,
to-air missile
Plagued by faulty planning and poor leadership
found the skies over South Vietnam
pilots
more dangerous than
far
nearly 50 percent of the 20,000-man torce ultimately
committed
American
he placed the 9,000 South
ti)
felt
it
could
now
discount the
prospect of Chinese or Soviet intervention, target selection
tactical control in the
commanders, providing them with
field
flexibility
10,
and
they utilized to the
fullest.
Linebacker missions struck
fuel
Nixon
left
hands of
his
a long-awaited
Beginning on
May
dumps, warehouses,
railroad marshaling yards, rolling stock, trucks, petro-
leum pipelines, and power plants
—from SAM
all
across
DMZ
North Viet-
MiG
air bases
within ten miles of the center of Hanoi to
railri>ad
nam
sites
along the
bridges near the Chinese border.
The
to
president also gave
navy leaders something they had long sought sion to coast.
mine North Vietnam's harbors and blockade the Using airdropped magnetic-acoustic mines, the
navy seeded coastal approaches and major so effectively that left a
—permis-
no ship
North Vietnamese
of
any
river estuaries
size either
entered or
port for the rest of the war.
73
it/'
¥ '^
i i
The
new
air raids
were enormously successful, thanks to a
family of laser-guided and electro-optically guided
"smart" bombs that offered unprecedented accuracy and to such
improved electronic countermeasures equipment
as radar-detection
and jamming devices. These tech-
nological developments
made
targets with fewer sorties
and
it
possible to destroy
less
a lower rate of aircraft losses, than
bomb
more
tonnage, and at
fact,
the damage inflicted by American bombers from April
October 1972 exceeded
all
that had been
accom-
Communist
icans to leave. Eager to
Nixon was
willing to
Even before the viser
to remain in the
through Haiphong and other ports virtually eliminated,
of neutralists,
and the flow of war materiel
government
50 percent.
for
massive damage and staggering casualties endured
by Vietnamese on both sides during the summer of 1972
marked
new
a
level of violence in
would bring the Formal
talks
fighting to at least a temporary halt.
between the United States and North
Vietnam had begun ately
became
away toward an agreement that
in Paris in
deadlocked.
May 1968 and immedi-
When Lyndon
Johnson
turned over the presidency to his successor eight months later, all
that had been determined was the shape of the
after a cease-hre.
commitment
—
Vietcong, and members of the Saigon
In return,
the Nt)rth dropped
upon the departure of Thieu
as a
On
this
negotiations between Kissinger and
basis
North Vietnam's Le Due Tho moved October a provisional
early
agreement had
been reached. The tentative accord provided
of
American POWs, followed by
worked out through
a
tripartite
a political settlement
National Council of
Reconciliation and Concord. Infiltration of troops
into
the South would end,
and-a-half more years of public and secret meetings did
October 22 President Nixon suspended
tinued to founder on two key sistence that
NVA
issues:
Washington's
in-
troops withdraw from the South and
rebuild
north of the twentieth Kissinger
jeopardy. Thieu,
the negotiations,
of 1972,
however, Washington's de-
detente with China and the Soviet Union gave
both sides reason
for
compromise. Hanoi's
fears of dip-
lomatic isolation, the fearful pounding North Vietnam
had undergone from the
latest
round of U.S. bombing.
all
Four days
announced that "peace was
namese government involving Nguyen Van Thieu. By the summer
parallel.
to
help
infrastructure.
at
On
bombing
later
Henry
hand."
In fact, the painfully garnered accord was in grave
Hanoi's refusal to accept any provisional South Viet-
sire for
assistance
economic
its
NVA
new
and Washington
North Vietnam
talks con-
for the
simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. troops and the return
would extend postwar economic
The
By
into high gear.
cease-fire
people he had a "secret plan" to end the war, but three-
in Paris.
its
precondition
cease-fire so long as the National Liberation
conference table. Richard Nixon told the American
nothing to break the stalemate
to
— made up
that would supervise a political settlement
South Vietnam.
any
commission
electoral
Front was granted political status in the South.
what already had been
a costly war. But the bloodletting finally prodded negotiators 6,000 miles
for
South
Kissinger hedged Washington's
insistence
The
private assurances that
the United States was willing to permit North Vietna-
mese troops
Thieu by accepting an
as
to his
Vietnam
to put
resumed, national security ad-
Henry Kissinger gave Hanoi
portation system was crippled, the shipment of goods
much
and anxious
meet them halfway.
talks
Now
by as
Amer-
behind him before the upcoming presidential election,
plished between 1965 and 1968: North Vietnam's trans-
to southern battlefields cut
for the
remove the chief obstacle
larger foreign policy designs
in-
what they
leadership to take
could get at the negotiating table and wait
had been experienced
during the earlier Rolling Thunder campaign. In
to
and the prospect of complete American withdrawal clined the
who had
noi would never accept. early
November
not been consulted during
demanded wholesale changes
When
that
Ha-
the talks resumed in
the U.S., at Thieu's insistence, pro-
posed sixty-nine amendments to the agreement. The
North Vietnamese responded with dozens their
own.
After
weeks
of
changes, the twci sides broke
Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese diplomat Le Due Tin
Caught between
leave a heavily charged negotiating session in Neiiilly, France.
sary,
of
increasingly off talks
a truculent ally
demands heated
on December
of
ex13.
and a stubborn adver-
Richard Nixon determined to teach both a lesson.
275
To
the South Vietnamese the president extended weap-
ons, promises, and threats.
he authorized the im-
First,
mediate dehvery of more than $1 hiUion
in
equipment and suppMes, including enough
make South Vietnam's
military
aircraft to
the fourth largest in the
air force
Vietnamese
supported by hundreds of fighters,
skies
fighter-bombers, tankers, radar-jamming EA-6s, F-105
Wild Weasels crammed with
electronic countermeasures
equipment, F-4 Phantoms laying down corridors of chaff to confuse
enemy
and the newly deployed, super-
radar,
world. At the same time, Nixon gave Saigon "absolute
sonic F-llls the Worth Vietnamese called "whispering
should North Vietnam violate any
death." During twelve days of intensive bombing the
assurances"
that
peace agreement signed with the United States,
he
and severe
But
would order
"swift
retaliatory action."
the president also warned Thieu that
ernment did not accept the
the Saigon gov-
if
cease-fire terms ultimately
worked out between Washington and Hanoi, South
Vietnam would be on
its
ultimatum
Communists, demanding that Hanoi return
Thomas Moorer, him
of Staff, and told
any more of
war.
is
if
you don't,
concentrated
I'll
Nixon
told the admiral.
the night of
December
in the largest
II,
were
targets
18, 1972,
129 B-52 Strat-
heavily first
MiG
defended
War
airfields
wave approached the North
enemy
rushed
past. In all, the
at the
B-52s that night, forcing
surface-to-air missiles fly
their targets
among
II
aircraft
1
down
3
SAMs
back to base, of the giant
of the heavily loaded aircraft hit
and returned
Linebacker
more than 200
fired
more, and bringing rest
safely to
276
Day
after
campaign and the concentration
indiscriminate destruction and even geno-
The most
civilian deaths.
notable case was
the destruction of the Bach Mai Hospital outside a mil-
Hanoi. Accusations of terror bombing
itary airstrip in
on
or deliberate attacks
unfounded.
Indeed,
—approximately
falling
the
number
of civilian
own
count,
North Vietnamese
missiles
1,400 by Hanoi's
killed by
back to earth
however, were
civilian targets,
— was remarkably
low considering
the weight of bombs dropped and the experience of com-
bombing operations during World War
parable
On
December 26 Hanoi
willingness to talk once the later
icans
Linebacker
II
came
had exhausted
final
Linebacker
cut
its
an end. By then the Amerand the North Viet-
missiles.
American blow of II
II.
Washington
bombing stopped. Four days
their targets,
namese had run out of
The
to
signaled to
a long
North Vietnamese
and
terrible war.
rail lines at
more
than 500 points, demolished nearly 400 pieces of rolling stock, heavily air defenses,
damaged ten
and
left
airfields,
shattered Hanoi's
some 1,600 separate
military struc-
tures in ruins. In two short weeks 25 percent of
North
Guam.
continued day and night
for
almost two
weeks, interrupted only by a thirty-six-hour Christmas truce.
Ha-
"spillage" from the target areas did result in residential
II.
read by the light of the rocket engines as the missiles
bombers. But the
in the
the contrary, most of the bombing was con-
damage and
the American planes, said one pilot, that he could have
2
of the air
some of whom were
up the sky around them. So thickly did they
damaging
To
cide.
totally
Andersen Air Force Base on
Vietnamese capital salvos of SA-2 lit
Nixon with
deaths
heavy bomber operation mounted
around Hanoi. As the
power plants
corridor.
targets in heavily populated areas led critics to charge
The
by the United States Air Force since World
Their
on
was the most
hold you responsible."
air offensive of the war.
ofortresses took off from
Guam
don't want
about the fact that we couldn't
resulting operation, called Linebacker
On
"I
your chance to use military power to win this
And
noi-Haiphong
onboard radar systems and laser-guided bombs. Some
hit this target or that one,"
"This
farms, factories, airfields, and
and gas tank
ducted with extraordinary precision, thanks to advanced
to prepare a massive air attack
this crap
yards, warehouses, military barracks, oil
summoned Ad-
North Vietnamese heartland.
against the
and delivered
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
reply was forthcoming, the president
miral
to
When
the bargaining table within seventy-two hours.
no
rail
The scope
different kind of
flew nearly 2,000 sorties
35,000 tons of bombs against transportation terminals,
own.
Meanwhile, Nixon sent a to the
American planes
day the giant bombers took to the North
A
win^ of the Bach Mai Hospital
an errant II,
bomb dropped
the Christmas
lies in
ruins after being hit by
by a B-52 during Operation Linebacker
bombing
of Hanoi.
W^' .'^w.
'-V
y-i^
-
V
.
-
^»T ,-jrL
TSfk'^
^l«i#^
-\
\
n^ ^-
Vietnam's petroleum reserves and 80 percent of generating capacity
trical
its
elec-
The
had been destroyed.
United States had by no means escaped unscathed from battle,
losing twenty-six aircraft,
among them
fifteen
between government
had no
tr(K)ps
and the Pathet Lao
Cambodia, where the Vietnam
subsided. In
effect whatsoever,
finally
cease-fire
American bombers remained
the principal defense of the embattled
Phnom Penh
gov-
B-52s, along with ninety-three pilots and crew
mem-
ernment. In the
bers, including thirty-three taken prisoner by the
North
dropped more than 250,000 tons of explosives on Cam-
Vietnamese.
When
bodia, an
peace talks resumed
in
Paris
on January
The
1973, both sides sought a quick settlement.
8,
leaders
Japan
first
amount
half of 1973 the United States
American
off all funds for
had been dropped on
greater than
World War
in all ot
Not
II.
Congress cut
until
military operations in Indo-
of North Vietnam were not willing to endure more pun-
china, mandating an August 15 end to the air raids, did
ishment to no purpose. Richard Nixon was not prepared
the
to wait until after his inauguration to a
second term or
of military aid for South Vietnam threat-
risk the loss
ened by the new, dovish Congress. After
six days of
marathon negotiations an agreement was reached that scarcely differed from
The United
what had been drafted
October.
States would complete the withdrawal of
from South Vietnam, the
forces
in
POWs
home, the Thieu government would be
its
would come
left intact.
At
the same time. North Vietnamese troops would remain in
the South, and the
PRG
(Provisional Revolutionary
last
U.S. military forces leave Southeast Asia.
For most Americans, however, the war ended on the
Lam
gray tarmac of Hanoi's Gia ruary 12 the
Airport, where
on Feb-
116 U.S. prisoners of war crossed an
first
imaginary line to freedom.
Once
in
American hands,
the former captives were taken to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for medical examinations before flying
home
some had not seen
to families
for as long as eight-
and-a-half years. Minor problems and delays disturbed the repatriation process, but on last
prisoners were freed.
At
March
29,
1973, the
the same time, the final
Government, the government of the National Libera-
contingent of American combat troops withdrew from
tion Front) would be provided status as a legal organi-
South Vietnam. With
zation.
The
military cease-fire
would be administered by
in
an International Commission of Control and Supervision
(ICCS) composed of representatives from Poland,
Hungary, Canada, and Indonesia. The ultimate future of
— the central
South Vietnam^
the war had been fought
—was
issue
political
over which
to be resolved later by
the amorphous reconciliation council.
loss
of U.S. aid, he decided he could not allow
himself the luxury of resisting any further.
On
January
21 he grudgingly acceded to the treaty after receiving
assurances of continued American assistance. later
Henry Kissinger and Le Due Tho
"Paris in
Two
days
initialed the
Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace
Vietnam." With the formal signing of the document
at the
Hotel Majestic on January 27, 1973, America's
American war
their departure the
at last to
an end.
During more than a decade of
political
and military
involvement, the United States had spent almost $200 billion to fight the
war and improve the
lives of the
people of South Vietnam. Over that period more than 3
million
American men and women had served
Southeast Asia.
Thieu, for one, was not reconciled. But, threatened
with the
Vietnam came
Of
those,
wounded and 57,000
in
nearly 304,000 had been
killed in action.
More than 100
Americans died
in captivity during the course of the
war, with 1,284
still
the
last
costly
POWs
listed as
missing in action
returned home.
Whether
commitment had been worth
tion that
still
lay in the
this
long and
the price was a ques-
balance in the spring of 1973.
But the Americans would no longer have a hand answer.
The
future of
when
in the
Vietnam was now something the
Vietnamese alone would decide.
longest war was officially over.
TTie peace agreement did not bring an immmediate end to
American
strikes
278
military involvement in the region.
B-52
continued over Laos into April before fighting
Ac Bien Hoa
in 1971,
South Vietnamese who
an American has will
left
soon take over the
a greeting to the air base.
— Camp
west near
Focus: The Easter Offensive
Cam
the
enemy
Carroll,
tanks rumbled across
ARVN
Lo Bridge when the 56th
Regiment
surrendered en masse. Along with the firebase, which
occupied
key strategic position
a
mese defense the
NVA
in the
South Vietna-
Colonel Dinh also turned over to
lines,
the largest concentration of artillery in the
175MM
northern provinces, including four huge
guns,
the only weapons capable of responding to the enemy's
long-range
artillery.
As northern
through the gap
soldiers raced
South Vietnamese
lines,
ARVN
Camp Carroll staggered eastward Noon, March
30, 1972.
With
crashed into the Ai
The
Tri City.
long-range
Tu Combat
first
and
a sharp crack
130MM
a
thun-
howitzer shell
Base just north of Quang
round was followed by a barrage of
Communist
artillery shells that
blanketed the
to
NVA
advance and
Cua
of the
enemy breakthrough
ARVN
stabilized a defensive line south
Viet River. But unfounded rumors of an
Quang
by thousands of frightened refugees.
troops supported by
—some
30,000
more than 200 Soviet T54 tanks
poured across the border.
The
Easter offensive
along Highway vilians
who
ners
had begun. Before
it
North Vietnam would commit 200,000 men
was over.
in fourteen
irresistible target for
new
them
Chinese crossed the Yalu River into Korea twenty-one
bodies, broken vehicles, and
With American combat
ARVN
While
troops almost
smoking
try reeled
namese troops opened two more
ing the South Vietnamese army and forcing a negotiated
offensive.
regret that the
ARVN
terms.
would
They learned
to their
back and that Wash-
fight
ington was not yet prepared to abandon South Vietnam to defeat.
ever,
During the
first
Hanoi had reason
The green
weeks of the invasion, how-
to celebrate.
recruits of the
3d
Division, de-
debris.
under the shock of the invasion, North Viet-
On
April
5,
fronts in their far-flung
NVA/VC
the 5th
Division, sup-
ported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, rolled out of
Cambodia base
its
outpost at Loc Ninh. garrison a
ARVN
My Chanh
units in the northern part of the coun-
discarded a strategy of protracted war in hopes of crush-
own
fire.
finally estab-
twenty kilometers of smashed
lay
completely withdrawn from the South, the Communists
settlement on their
ci-
Communist gun-
defensive line south of the
River. Behind
earlier.
fled
together
column with 130MM
lashed the confused
divisions to the greatest military operation since the
years
Crammed
Those troops who survived the carnage lished a
and
Tri City, where they were joined
the mass of soldiers, trucks, and
1,
proved an
April 27,
their fortifications
below the demilitarized zone. Behind the three North Vietnamese divisions
On
precipitated a panic.
abandoned
troops
south through
fire
Us-
1.
weapons (LAWs)
good advantage, the 3d Division temporarily halted
the
thirty-kilometer-long South Vietnamese defensive line lethal rain of
in the
either side of
toward Highway
ing American-supplied light antitank
derous explosion, a high-velocity
on
units
area and attacked the
ARVN
The outgunned and outnumbered
— 2,000 men of the 9th ARVN Regiment and
South Vietnamese Ranger
American
advisers
battalion, plus a handful of
—held out
for
two days against
five
ployed along the northern frontier precisely because no
separate tank assaults. But by the morning of April 7
one expected an overt breach of the DMZ, buckled un-
those defenders not dead or captured had
der the pressure of the mechanized
raced for the protection of the
Cua
enemy columns and Viet River.
Ha, South Vietnamese marines held
At Dong
off the invaders
long enough for a pair of American army advisers to
blow up
280
a crucial bridge along
Highway
1.
But farther
ward
An
The
political
Province,
south to-
An
and commercial center of Binh Long
Loc stood
astride
Highway
kilometers from Saigon. Fearing
way
fled
Loc.
for a drive
on the
its loss
1
3
only ninety
would open the
nation's capital. President
Thieu
dispatched the 5th "held at
moved
all
ARVN
Division and ordered the city
Even
costs."
South Vietnamese troops
as
Ninh were
divisions
moving out
rounded
An
of
arrival.
joined hy two more
NVA
down Highway
Camhodia. Tt)gether they
Navy
sur-
Loc, blocking further overland reinforce-
U.S. Army Cobra
ARVN
artillery cap-
soldiers
enemy
and armored personnel
backed by
But
positions.
tanks,
artillery,
ground forward relent-
carriers
and
lessly, smashing into the city, seizing the airfield,
reducing the South Vietnamese perimeter to a square
On
kilometer.
April 20, the senior U.S. adviser on the
scene reported a desperate situation: "Supplies minimal, casualties
continue to mount, medical supplies low.
Wounded
a major problem, mass burials for military
and
low ebb." Most discouraging of
all,
civilian,
morale
at
"In spite of incurring heavy losses from U.S.
enemy continues
the
With An Loc
air strikes,
invested, three
more Communist
di-
town of Dak To on
April 12, opening the third phase of the North Vietoffensive. After capturing the high
enemy
the west,
of the 22d
ARVN
ground
to
units encircled the outlying military
camps of Tan Canh and Dak To
II
held by two regiments
Division, the only South Vietnamese
forces in the region.
On
The
April 24,
NVA
tanks blasted
AT-3
Russian
morning hours o( May
hanging over the
diers
limped
down Highway
twenty-five miles away and Inexplicably, the
NVA
14 toward
Kontum
now completely
sol-
—only
the province capital. "It was the dumbest possible thing
Pizzi,
"and I'm very
nobody
to stop
pistols."
moved
Given the
Army Colonel
Joseph
grateful they did because there
them except
a
reprieve,
few people hke the
absorbing
Then,
in the
forces lo-
enemy regiment>
when
out of the smoke
two U.S. helicopters carrying
TOW
By day's end the
missiles.
"tube-launched, optically tracked, ifire-guided" rockets
had destroyed ten enemy
namese attempted
When
tanks.
the North Viet-
they were blasted by
to withdraw,
fighter-bombers and B-52s. Their fuel running out, their
reaching
the
critical prop(.)rtions,
NVA
had no
option but to retreat.
Everywhere across the country the
American
air
lethal
impact of
power, the mistakes of Communist com-
manders, and the stubborn courage of South Vietnamese soldiers
more
were having the same
An
true than at
Lt)c,
effect.
Nowhere was
this
where government troops
held out for ninety-five days under constant shelling and
ground attacks. By the middle of June the enemy's
had been exhausted. Communist
bombardments continued
infantry units
to
make
Loc, but decimated
had already begun
sanctuary of their bases in
to
Now
it
artil-
life
difficult at
NVA
armor and
withdraw toward the
Cambodia and
North Vietnamese invasion had reached mark.
of-
its
Laos.
The
high-water
was Saigon's turn.
defenseless.
waited three weeks to attack
they could have done," said U.S.
city flew
experimental airborne
Kontum and An
ARVN
assault.
Communist
27,
fought their way into Kontum,
disin-
Scattered into small groups, the surviving
new
lines,
ing behind a spearhead of armor, three
an ambush and
that included
attempted without
ARVN
cated a gap in the South Vietnamese defenses. Advanc-
lery
fire
with each
horrific casualties
early
come
enemy
NVA
success to smash through the
to
radio-controlled Sagger antitank rockets.
swung
tank-supported assault made an ideal target for
fensive potential
tegrated under concentrated
finally
defenses.
through minimal resistance to overrun both outposts.
to the rescue drove straight into
Communists
14, they attacked right into the teeth of
An
armored column from Ben Het attempting
the
B-52 bombers, which pounded the enemy column with-
losses
to persist."
visions struck the central highlands
namese
ARVN
the
the enemy's inevitable
beft)re
when
16,
out mercy. For ten days the
invasion of Laos.
gunships and U.S. Air Force and
fighter-bombers pounded
North Vietnamese
fortifications
On May
forces
ments, and began shelling the city with tured during the 1971
and other
Communist
into position, however, the
that overran Loc
the city where they raced to construct trenches, dugouts,
me
was with
ARVN command
the 23d Division and several Ranger groups into
The
loss of
Quang
ARVN
of the 3d
Tri Province and the near collapse
Division had precipitated a change in
personnel and approach on the northern front. Taking
over ct)mmand of
1
Corps on May \ Lieutenant General
Ngo Quang Truong tation as
wasted no time
South Vietnam's
discipline,
Truong
in
proving his repu-
best general officer.
To
restore
issued orders for the execution of de-
281
and
setters
looters.
To
And
he sent
regain the initiative,
South Vietnamese marines on
NVA
hehind
raids
Truong
to recapture the territory lost in April,
new
gathered offensive.
and supplies
troops
By the
major counter-
tor a
week of June, he was
last
Hnes.
for
With
multaneous
Hue and north
ARVN
assaults, the
etly crossed the
of the
Communists preoccupied by
the
My Chanh
Viet
these
si-
Airborne Division qui-
on the night
of
June 27 and
upon unsuspecting North Vietnamese troops along
fell
The stunned enemy
the north side of the river. tried to
and marme battalions blocking
NVA
Within hours the unraveled
as
itive supply
soldiers
their
path.
defensive line had completely
Communist
accustomed to a prim-
officers
system and light arms struggled to protect
the vulnerable logistical network of their nized army. By the end of the
first
way back
July, the
rolled the
Quang
to the outskirts of
new mecha-
week of
South Vietnamese counterattack had the
Communists had
laced the city and
its
NVA it,
suburbs with a
formidable network of bunkers, strongpoints, trenches,
and observation
Any
posts.
would have to cross
assault
pretargeted fields of artillery, mortar, and machine-gun
Even when these
Truong's
men would
own
defenses,
On
September
for
and
finally
asked for
behind
9,
units, realigned his
full
American fighter-bombers and B-52s, marines began another
U.S.
tember
16, the bloodied victors raised the flag
survived
South Viet-
fortress.
By then, observed Major John Howard,
who had
of
noon on Sep-
assault. Finally, at
over the walled
from
five battalions
namese
adviser
air support.
a cascade of explosives
An
Army
U.S.
a
Loc and witnessed the
costly northern counterattack, the opposing armies were like
"two
fighters in the fourteenth or fifteenth round;
they could hardly do anything but hold on to each
With
other."
the recapture of Quang Tri City the Easter
came
offensive
to
an end, the existing battle
lines trans-
formed into de facto boundaries of occupation.
ARVN
offensive had killed }0,000
duced three province
Hanoi
narrow
a
strip of
for
land along the northern and
western borders of South Vietnam.
The new
helped safeguard Communist base areas
Cambodia,
soldiers, re-
and gained
capitals to rubble,
in
territory
Laos and
simplified the task of supplying troops in the
had been overcome,
South, and permitted political cadres to renew organi-
enemy
troops barricaded be-
zational
face
Tri's central citadel,
a miniature version of the fortress at
had held
new
battered Airborne Division with
obstacles
hind the thick stone walls of Quang
NVA
more
disaster stalled the counteroffensive for
than a month. During the interval Truong replaced the
The the
and wounding twenty.
survivors stumbled back through the gap in
the wall, their dead comrades in their arms.
Tri City.
During the two months since they occupied
fire.
The dazed
withdraw to new positions, only to discover four
ARVN
all
Cua
di-
dropped three 500-pound bombs
air strike
troopers, killing forty-five
The
South
Vietnamese operations, Truong's attack began with
River.
on the
ready.
Marked hy boldness and audacity unusual
versionary feints west of
Vietnamese
more than
a
Hue which
month during
the
the 1968
North Vietnamese
Tet
offensive. Moreover, since the
still
controlled two sides of the city, they were able to
work among the
The
rural farmers.
these modest gains was an estimated
Vietnamese dead. The staggering casualty due
in part to the failure of the
command
to concentrate
field officers in
price for
100,000 North figures
Communist
were
military
forces, the inexperience of
its
coordinating infantry and armor, and an
funnel supplies and reinforcements to defend their cap-
overreliance on shock assaults into heavily defended po-
tured prize.
sitions
Truong gave the job of regaining Quang Tri
The
Airborne Division.
paratroopers
house at a time, enduring
130mm
howitzer
until
fire
a
to the
advanced one
continuous barrage of
they clawed their way to
within 100 meters of the citadel. After U.S. aircraft carrying laser-guided east wall,
bombs
blasted a hole in the north-
three airborne companies
swarmed through
the breach. Then, with victory at hand, an errant South
282
to
—
good For
all
use in the future.
all
the
played hy the
nam
Communists would put
valuable lessons the
NVA ARVN,
in the spring
tating weight of
mistakes and
all
the tenacity dis-
what ultimately saved South Viet-
and summer
American
air
of
1972 was the devas-
power.
If
that could be
removed, concluded Hanoi, nothing would stand
way of
in the
victory but time. In the final analysis, that was
the most important lesson of
all.
North Vietnamese
soldiers
advance over
a bridge in
South Vietnam's northernmost province, Quang Tn,
as thev
move
to capture the
provincial capital during the early phases of their Easter 1972 otfensive.
283
Above. With their U.S.
adviser,
South Vietnamese Rangers
North Vietnamese onslaught. Minutes
284
later,
in
Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, plot enemy troops and had to draw a
they were mortared hy
their next
move
hasty retreat.
in
the face of the
Alonj^ Ronrc
I
north o/Z/uc,
ARVN
troops re^nnip utter
.1
skirmish with
NVA
forces,
two ot
whom
lie
Jod
.ir
their teet.
285
Just south of
by the
An
Loc, a key city encircled
Communists
as they
opened the
of-
second front just 100 kilometers north of Saigon, the ARVN ammunition
fensive's
dump
at Lai
Khe
N
goes up after being bit by
an enemy round.
^ -
Im
•
•
\
•«*«•
Above. After depositing
An
Lac
Left.
On
as
tresh reintorcciuents
South Vietnamese
their
way
to
troops,
some
of
on April
overrunning several of the key
North Vietnamese capture an
ARVN
29, a hclidiptcr t.ikcs ott
them wounded,
Si >iith
tirebase outside ot
try desperately to
from besieged
climb aboard.
Vietnamese central highlands
Pak
i
To.
2S9
b**.
Above.
In response to the
full-scale aerial
Communists' threc-pron^ed Easter
offensive, the U.S.
hiimhing of North Vietnam with Operation Linebacker, hef^un
resumed in
April
1972. Here, civil defense forces in IHon Gai, on the Tonkin Gulf east of tLaniti, prepare a litter to carry
Right. Pyrrhic victory.
A
ruins of the citadel in
Quang
city
end.
292
out the body of a
woman
killed in a
September bombini^
South Vietnamese marine with Tri City.
Although
it
was
a captured
raid.
AK47 stands
virtually destroyed
by
atop the
battle,
the
was retaken from the Communists in mid-September to mark the Easter offensive's
.^^
Focus:
POW
with widespread internatit)nal protest, Hanoi abandoned plans for war crimes
its
public of
trials,
but the Democratic Re-
Vietnam (DRV) continued
to
whip up internal
support for the war effort by constant condemnation of the
American POWs.
At
the same time, the North Vietnamese trumpeted
the compassionate care they provided the prisoners.
Staged photos released to the press showed apparently well-fed
men housed
in clean
sympathetic journalists
compounds, while such
as Australian
assured the world that the
POWs
Wilfred Burchett
were receiving decent
treatment. Hanoi invited American antiwar activists to
meet with the prisoners and
periodically released small
groups of prisoners to U.S. antiwar groups. These media events not only displayed North Vietnam in a favorable
During the course of the war some 700 U.S. mihtary
light,
and civihan personnel were taken prisoner hy the Com-
figures like
Among them
munists.
were soldiers and Marines, de-
velopment workers and missionaries captured
in
Vietnam. But the vast majority were
and navy
pilots shot
air force
down over North Vietnam and
taken to one of
a
downtown Hanoi, nicknamed
POWs
had names
tation,
the Zoo,
came
tor the
the Hanoi Hilton.
closer to conveying
in deadly earnest.
To
pawns
to be used without
t)f
that
ran them
war but valuable
compunction
for
whatever
advantage Hanoi could derive.
From the moment of
their capture the
targets
and domestic public opinion.
denounced the
POWs
as
of fingernails, being infected
arm almost
Americans
in a cynical propa-
were both international
On
the one hand, Hanoi
heinous criminals. Handcuffed
together, captured aviators were paraded through the
mane." Some
For
much
U.S. prisoners to the
in
American
activists criticized
fact,
he had
and
Vietnam remained generally unknown public.
Geneva convention
U.S. protests were met with threats that military personnel
tried tor unspecified "crimes against
would be
humanity." Faced
North Vietnam had
ratified the
regulating the treatment of
in 1957. But, since there
POWs
was no formal declaration of
war between the United States and the Democratic Re-
Americans were not
294
and antiwar
of the war the conditions of captivity for
threw rocks, and spat on the helpless
American
having an
told only part of a long tale of brutality, abuse,
insults,
as sixty
ceiling,
without medical care, and being
Frishman's grim portrayal as a serious misrepresentation
screamed
many
don't think
"I
of prison conditions in North Vietnam. In
public of Vietnam,
as
hung from the
lost
journalists
Hanoi before mobs of angry Vietnamese who
Official
unequivocally chal-
dragged along the ground with a broken leg are hu-
streets of
men.
POW
lenged Hanoi's claims of benevolence.
mistreatment.
found themselves on center stage
ganda campaign whose
held
Bethesda Naval Hos-
put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal
the North Vietnamese, the
were not untortunate victims
which the former
flier
at
bed
The
what went on behind the
POWs
in
his
forced statements, living in a cage for three years, being
— the Plan—names who
Frishman had another point of
view. Released in September 1969, the navy
pital
its
POWs.
F.
news conference from
for
in
other camps, too
the Rockpile, Alcatraz
prison wire. For both the camps and those
were
or
halt-dozen prison camps scattered
North Vietnam. The most famous was Hoa Lo
across
Lieutenant Robert
a
Wherever they were captured, most were sooner later
DRV
Rennie Davis, who lauded the
enlightened care of the
South
Laos.
they also gave considerable coverage to antiwar
Hant)i
maintained that captured
entitled to
POW status.
Nor would
the North Vietnamese or Vietcong allow representatives
from the International Red Cross to
The
handful of Americans
who
visit
the camps.
escaped or were released
North Vietnamese government. As
from Communist captivity were constrained from public
levels of the
description ot their treatment hy fears of retaliation
of the savage treatment they received,
against the remaining
POWs. What
glimpses Americans
did get of North Vietnamese prisons were carefully se-
Communists themselves and
lected hy the
veyed the
scarcely con-
a result
prisoners
signed statements or taped radio broadcasts condemning the war and asking for forgiveness. Stratton, paraded a
much
officer's
gaunt
made
before the press in the spring of 1967, publicized confession oi guilt.
reality of the prisoners' existence.
many
The navy
monotone voice
Those Americans captured hy the Vietcong were held
features, striped prison garb,
and
South Vietnam or Cambodia under
shocked Americans who saw
films of his appearance.
camps
in jungle
in
the most primitive conditions; the
POWs better.
of
life
North Vietnamese prisons was only
in
Most
sometimes with another prisoner,
cells that
provided
a bucket in the
little
way
watery soup and a
POWs
relatively
prisoners spent years confined by them-
selves, or
the
American
more than
narrow
in
a concrete
bed and
of amenities. Fed twice a day with
slice
of moldy bread or a bowl of rice,
only occasionally were allowed from their
cells for exercise or
the use of common showers. Medical
Others recognized
made
in the
dull,
had been coerced. For despite ness, the
Stratton
American
their apparent helpless-
prisoners found courageous and in-
genious ways of misleading their to their to
bow
exaggerated
before his captors a signal that his "confession"
own
sanity.
keep their
and ht)lding on
men
trivial
tried
responding to pressure with
stories simple,
information of only
jailers
During interrogation the
importance.
Some confused
the North Vietnamese with fanciful tales of farms on
and antiwar
named Clark Kent
or
care was minimal, mail privileges nonexistent. During
aircraft carriers
the Christmas season of 1966, 457 packages sent to the
Casey Jones. At the same time, the prisoners created an
POWs
elaborate system of clandestine ccmimunications using
sage:
by their families were returned bearing the mes-
"Refused by the Postal Authorities of Vietnam."
The months and
years of isolation were
difficult
tap codes,
hand
spitting noises
—
signals
fliers
—even coughing,
to break
down
hacking, and
their physical isolation
enough. But worse than that, worse than the inadequate
from one another. By such means they were able to
food and squalid living conditions, was the fear and pain
establish a secret organization they called the 4th Allied
of torture
—systematic and — which the majority
purposeful, physical
chological
to
subjected.
The
confinement rubber hoses.
and psy-
of the prisoners were
pattern of abuse ranged from solitary
to vicious beatings with leather straps
The POWs were denied
and
tormented
sleep,
with ropes that forced their bodies into excruciating poby
sitions, or lacerated
around their
wrists.
steel
One
manacles slowly tightened
prisoner was
hung from
a rafter
by his broken arm. Another collapsed into unconsciousness after a beating that
left his
nose broken, his teeth
cracked, and his buttocks a mass of bloody
Fred V. Cherry, the senior black
ninety-two days his country. tors stuffed
POW,
flesh.
was tortured
row when he refused
in a
Commander the navy
I
to
for
denounce
Richard Stratton's interroga-
flier's
mouth with urine-soaked
sand, then burned his body with cigarettes.
believe
Colonel
"You
better
talked," Stratton later admitted.
That was the
pt)int of
prisoners of war was sadistic guards.
It
it all.
The
torture of
American
more than the perverted pastime
was
a policy dictated
oi
from the highest
POW
Wing
that provided the structure and discipline
necessary to maintain morale and continue resistance.
As
the war went on, support from back
became more
Hoping
vigorous.
mese cooperation and
to gain
home
North Vietna-
endangering the
fearful of
also
pris-
oners further, the Johnson administration refrained from
POWs.
publicizing abusive treatment of the restraint
much
Since this
produced nothing. President Nixon adopted a
tougher policy. Beginning
made formal complaints publicly pressing
Hanoi
change prisoners
of war.
to the
in
1969 U.S.
officials
United Nations while
to cease
its
Meanwhile,
brutality
POW
and ex-
wives and
other family members mobilized for action, dispatching representatives to
demand
informatitin from the Camh-
munist delegation to the Paris peace
talks
and
establish-
ing the National League of Families of
American
oners and Missing in Southeast Asia.
The mounting
pressure
on Hanoi produced some improvement
m
Pris-
li\ing
conditions at the prisons, including the initiation of limited mail privileges.
295
change occurred
iRinically, the greatest
as the result
On
of a spectacularly unsuccessful rescue mission.
vember
20, 1970, a select group of air force
Son Tay
Forces volunteers hit the miles from
NVA
Within minutes the commandos
Hanoi.
The
juries.
one
The Americans
suffered only 2
minor
in-
daring raid had gone like clockwork, with
single exception:
moved out
and
into the cells,
leaving up to 200 dead
their helicopters,
in
behind.
and Special
Prison twenty-three
knocked out the guard towers, broke escaped
No-
The
months
four
prisoners at
Son Tay had been
While recriminations
flew thick
and
fast in
outlying camps and brought the
POWs
all
into Hanoi.
fifty
men
POWs
each, the
were able to meet,
effective
much
were
in isolation, they
command and
greater support.
now
and
"The
raid
would be two more
POWs
American once more
itary action.
On
President
on
failed in
wrote,
"but
its it
however, before the
again had cause for celebration.
Even
as cracks
sent 126
December
1972, in an
18,
B-52 bombers
against Hanoi.
appeared in the walls of their
dust swirled around them, the
POWs
rejoiced.
Jon A. Reynolds, a long-time prisoner,
noted the guards.
effect of the
raid
cells
and pulled the
immediately
on the prison
They simply headed
time, the United States
the guards
knew
it,
of North Vietnam
Within
a
nam's Le Due
and
knew
meant it
29, only twenty-four hours behind schedule,
of the 591 American
American
296
in
Hanoi.
As they were
released,
the former in the Phil-
for years.
ippines.
Greeted by cheering crowds and specially
business.
We
first
knew
it,
se-
lected escort officers, they were given medical exami-
nations, outfitted with
new
on personal family news
uniforms, brought up to date
world events,
as well as recent
down hamburgers and banana from schoolchildren each
man was
home and
est to his
and received
Once
certified
gifts
to
fit
reunited with his family. officially
regarded the status of
htmorable nor dishonorable but
neither
as
gobbled
flown to the military hospital clos-
Altht)ugh the military prisoner
splits
at the base.
salary, pro-
men
rather as an accident of war, the
comed home
the former
homecomings
all
POWs
across the
American people welas heroes.
In personal
men were
United States the
surrounded by joyous neighbors, feted with parades and
and showered with
special
ceremonies,
months
that followed, the former captives found
had changed during it
their impristmment,
wt)uld be easy to get used
to
"normal"
life
the
more
and
the
much
nt)t all
of
For some the transition
would be long and
American people, the last,
to.
In
gifts.
difficult.
return of the
POWs
But to the
marked
certainly than any other event, the
at
end of
Vietnam War.
seems clear that the leaders
Kissinger and
North Viet-
initialed a cease-fire
agreement.
provided for the repatriation of
POWs
left
were flown to Clark Air Force Base
Captain Charles Boyd, a captured U.S. Air Force pilot,
591
four increments over a period of
is
paraded
before Vietnamese villagers as part of an anti-American propa-
ganda campaign
The document
POWs
it."
month Henry
Tho had
acts of
for their shel-
over their heads. For the
lids
and
Colonel
"There was no joking, no laughing, no
defiance or reprisal. ters
bombing
March
last
The Pentagon had been planning Operation Home-
And
peace agreement with the United States,
a
Nixon
but on
motions, and decorations. In between, the
later
called
Minor prob-
across the line to freedom.
with
attempt to force the North Vietnamese to complete negotiations
name was
lems and delays affected each of the subsequent releases,
travel,
years,
the night oi
man walked
his
men
wt)uld be the result of dramatic U.S. mil-
it
each
As
military personnel.
and provided with information on accrued
boosted our morale sky-high!" It
boundary between the
more
may have
POW
Airport and marched up to
line serving as a
able to exert
provide the younger
primary objectives," one
American
POWs
talk,
Lam
On
South Vietnam.
in
group of prisoners was
first
U.S. and North Vietnam. Waiting to receive them were
The
organize as never before. Although senior officers re-
mained
brought to Hanoi's Gia
coming
Placed in large, open rooms housing twenty to
the
1973,
12,
an imaginary
their
consolidation had a prt)found impact on the prisoners' lives.
February
Washing-
North Vietnamese evacuated
ton, the startled
remaining U.S. combat forces
the
earlier.
their release tied to the withdrawal of the
sixty days,
the
POWs
in 1966.
North Vietnam frequently
to strengthen support for the
undermine the U.S. position abroad.
tried to use
war at home and
to
J^
>
A
view inside
after
298
f/ie
compound
ot Ihyj
North Vietnam released the
last
L>
Prison, hcrrcr
American
known
[irisoners
as the
Hanoi Hilton,
held there, March
18,
j ten
I97h
Jj}^
Apprentice Senmnn Douglas HegJahl at the
Hamu
(left) .uiJ
Licucenunt Comniant/t-r Richard Srrarron (nghc) sweep the prison yard
Hilton. Such chores provided the prisoners
some
rehet from the
boredom
ot captivity.
29^)
Navy and
300
LiL'incrhinr
bread.
i
.mi
{
i.ii,inri
s/r> in.siJc
,i
harrcn pri^an cell .inJ
.ni',i/f> /)/>
nc\r maimer
me.tl. usually norhin;^ innrc rh.in wiJtery
soup
Li^i^uii.iiii
^
.liiiiLinJcr
Stnnton Ixnvs nt
a press conference
Stratton's v.ionr expression .inJ submissive
North Viernnmese were
demeanor
m
m
this
Norr/i \'iern,iin in A/.ia/i
meennu
einployini; inennil .ukI pbysicnl pressure
m
l'->07.
led m.inv fo believe
riie
bie.ik iheir prisoners.
k'l
Above. Free
handmade
at
Right. Captain
Vietnam,
is
Returning prisoner Captain Galand Kramer of the U.S. Air Force holds up a
Air Base
in the
Philippmes, February 12, 197^.
James StcKkdale, the highest-ranking naval
officer
held as
a prisoner of
war
in
North
reunited with his wife, Sybil, and three of his sons at Miramar Naval Air Station near San
Diego, February
302
last.
sign after arriving at Clark
15,
1973.
A
Witness: Everett Alvarez
week
when they put me
later,
somewhere,
thought
/
United States was
think
I
mean, the
saw
I
a
road sign that
Prison.
and
thought, Well,
I
I
me
they were going to try
guess
for
week
a
They
will.
I
didn't
I
was going^to be there very long, until
I
passed,
me
But then
fast.
"Hanoi" and we went into Hoa Lo
said
told
war crimes. But there
was no state of war or declaration of war. Not only as far as I in
What
the hell do
/
and
August
5,
American
1964, during
on North Vietnam
A-4 Skyhawk Irom down over Hon Gai, Everett Alvarez,
Gull ol Tonkin incident,
alter the
an
and
as
pilot,
its
Lieutenant
ejected into the water.
Jr.,
(j.g.)
He was
the
North Vietnam. Alvarez
would spend more than eight years
one
in captivity,
do now
to
I
I
and
back.
I
interrogation, but nothing too
them anything.
tell
was showing a "good attitude.
know
"
but
off,
I
;7j;}c/e
pi^pcorn.
They
weeks.
They
ot
let
me
and
receive
write letters until the
tory.
back with equipment from planes that were shot that they wanted
I
mind.
do!
My
flouted in the water, nil sorts of things ran throui^h I
My poor
thiui^ht,
wife.
feel.' I
me, hanging
me
had
also
hy
my
even remembered that
and
about thirty niinutes, I
looked behind
I felt
rels.
They could have
were that I
skinriing
first
abuse me. hurting.
my
I
I
alive.
I
me
a fishing
if
as I
my
elbow.
boat with guns
drifting from the bar-
they wanted to
— they
I
bad
that
I
couple of days they didn't
a farmhouse.
try to harass
or
I
attitude, cut off
Then
I
my
debated what
is it.
my
We're
tactics
should be and what
expected to do. But after the bombing
From now on we don't help our
it
capfors or answer ques-
tions.
From then (m wolfed down, and years
I
I I
got very meager rations, lost quite a lot of weight.
which
was down by about 50 pounds to between 100
and 105 pounds. in,
we worked
to maintain
munications. Messages were dropped at certain places,
We
was
Words were scratched
used a tap code and hand code, especially for the
I
was
ture from the ejection that
after
a hairline frac-
had eventually
healed.
com-
such as where you would clean out your latrine can.
had
later,
I
For a few
I
found evidence of
was
I
was very clear:
I
back during ejection. Years
mail,
really in a war. Before
could hardly walk, and
stiff that I
do
found out they
was sleeping most of the time because
got so
d<.nvn
refused to
second American, Bob Shumaker. Then
thought. Well, this
As more men came
was captured.
released, the doctors
304
me
my mind
was taken to a nearby prison, then to
In the
hurt
close. I
hit
a
a
seat pan. Finally, after
and smoke
sticking over the side
had
had captured
something graze
me and saw
I
do! How's
to
of them capturing
night on the ship. All this went through
my
they said
in a very small cell.
was going to miss roast beef
was trying to swim, dragging
5()
bomb-
Then they came
to explain to them.
and stuck me
visions
feet, I
that,
me
What's she going to
poor mother. What's she going
she going to
the
ofi
quit after ahnit six
ing started again, in February 1965.
my
and
was telling them such things
the longest terms as a prisoner of war in American his-
As
They
things like the layout of a carrier
was in charge of the popcorn machine /lou- /
We
thought.
/
talked to them but didn't
a plane took
how
ship
I
went through some
wanted
how
and hadn't come
struck
They thought
the carrier Constellation was shot
pilot taken prisoner by
first
retaliatory raids
that,
there weren't any other prisoners.
came
difficult. I
On
knew
go
in a jeep fo
gomg home.
world power. They were going to
a
things up really
fix
was
I
who
at the
didn't have nxymmates.
bottom o/ bowls.
We
keep the lines open. That was very ior officers
always
managed
//Jiporfanr.
were able fo pass along orders to
also
men
all
The
to
sen-
the pns-
and we
oners,
I
kinds of information back and
sent: all
mostly just anecdotes and sea
forth,
When
it
was
best to keep
him
pumped you
up.
You had
went down you'd do your
a person's morale up,
and when you were down they
when we had roommates.
Especially
to develop a real sense
were living
in very close,
of consideration; you
cramped quarters. Twenty-four
hours a day, every day, you'd sleep together, exercise together, eat together,
my
or had diarrhea, I
and
if
Harris,
how
Son Tay camp. That showed they
hadn 't forgotten and were 1972 elections
terrible.
Smitty
his cell-mate,
to play the piano by using a "keyboard"
in the
Vietnamese
the
knew
it
guns anymore. Those people were
They would show
movement
in the
United
us
movies of the an-
States, like Berkeley
and
the march on Washington, and ask us if we would also
They got many of us
protest. Hell, no, we'd say.
to sign
who
"confessions" stating that we were war criminals
A
few weeks
We
later, in
and
all just sat
long overdue.
the
end
buses
and went
fear,
and not only
that,
you off the ground or
That was tough. There was
strip.
there was punishment.
They
were very brutal at times. There was no lying back.
mean, they actually
killed guys.
Others got sick from
the diet or the treatment. In late 1969, the
was really physically abused,
I
I
time
last
I
got sick with jaundice and
From 1970 in
to
1973 we began
to see a gradual im-
our diet and treatment. By the summer of
1972 they were bringing
and canned
fish,
in
wagonloads of canned meat
even bread,
to fatten us up.
get a lot more exercise and recreation. cards, packages,
to-date
was so
It
I
was emotionally
wasn't sure that this was
it,
12, Lincoln's birthday, the first group
field, still
to the airport.
wondering
if
it
We
would
sat
fall
"Just a
said,
just stepped over the line
the wheels were in the well that
through when, sure
its
way of taking
I'm very lucky to be alive.
We
A
colonel
came
and
"
into the hands
we had taken
I felt elated
off and
and
every-
crazy.
Life has
at a time.
at the
few more minutes, guys, hang on.
of the Americans. It wasn't until
one went
on the bus
We
had
its
turns and, you
We had
also learned the value
to face
We
to be positive.
know,
each day one
couldn't give up.
of having each other. You
gain individual strength through the chain; each link
hepatitis.
provement
I still
enough, an American C-141 landed.
Then we
beat you with a rubber
cheered.
We just went back and finished our bridge
But on February
They'd
your arms
Nobody
listened.
of forty prisoners, the ones there the longest, got on
we agreed only after days of
tie
We knew
tired.
of the war.
up and
lift
man
January 1973, they marched us
was sort of anticlimactic.
It
things like that, but
torture.
to
out into the yard and read us the peace agreement.
all
had attacked innocent civilians and
together at the shoulders and
We
for joy.
was close to the end.
drained by that time.
tiwar
that
bombing
the
where the Vietnamese wouldn't even bother their
games.
for propaganda.
When
we were cheering
tell
wouldn't stop. The bombing got to the point
it
written on contraband rice paper. Things like that kept
trying to use us
concerned. Then by the
were hurting.
us going.
The North Vietnamese were always
still
United States we could
started after the election,
your roommate was sick
God, the stench would be
remember Bob Shumaker taught
was because there had been a raid by Amer-
it
ican forces on the
stories.
think everyone always shared the sense that
their responsibility to contribute to keeping the others up.
found out
could
ered his
own
strength.
I
and through
was there with gath-
We had won. We had maintained
our strength.
got playing
and letters from home and got more up-
on what had happened
been shot down.
We
We
contributes to the strength of the chain,
group unity each individual that
We
in the years since
we had
were getting the royal treatment
/ guess in preparation for
—
eventual release.
During the whole time we never thought that our
government would
forget us or just drop
were put together at the Hanoi Hilton
us.
When we
in late 1970,
we
305
'
i»ii-iiiuiBT-"H'»nii
,
^^
4§
^
'S
*-
-^
f
8
THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM
To
many
the disappointment of
but to the surprise of no one, the Paris accords did not
bring peace to Vietnam. Even as the mutually proclaimed cease-fire went into effect at
ARVN
8:00 A.M. on January 28, 1973, fighting between to rage across the length
much
and Communist forces continued
and breadth of South Vietnam. Hoping
territory as possible before the International
Commission
to gain control of as
of Control
and Supervision
overseeing the cease-fire certified their claims, both sides took to the offensive in what
came
to be
known
Vietnamese
as "the
war of
days leading up to the cease-fire, South
flags." In the
forces hastily established forward outposts
and
resettled refugees in
Commu-
nist-dominated areas, while Communist cadres slipped into countless villages and hamlets
When
to proclaim their "liberation."
charged
that their "legitimate" claims
Efforts to affix
blame
counterattacks followed, Hanoi and Saigon both
had been "violated" by the enemy.
its
long-range goals and each seemed willing to observe the
accords only to the extent that suited
from the outset
as
if
proclaimed in 1969
its
oi territory,
no
Revolutionary Government
down on
all
Still
wedded
— no negotiating with the enemy, coalition
possibility of a political solution by
visional
For his part, President Thieu acted
interests.
the accords did not exist.
Vietnam, no surrender any
peace agreement proved pointless, since
for the failure of the
neither party had abandoned
set
to the "tour no's"
no Communist
government
he had
South
activity in
— he systematically undercut
denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the Pro-
up by the National Liberation Front, by cracking
domestic political opponents, and by refusing to cooperate with the
and Joint Military Commission. Nor did he make any
Even though the
GVN
first
ICCS
effort to curtail offensive operations.
controlled approximately 80 percent ot the land and 90 percent
of the people at the time of the cease-fire, Thieu immediately tirdered his military torces to attack
NVA
military bases
and PRG-held
and the environs of Saigon. As In April 1975 with Sc^urh
Viecnam
villages in the delta, the coastal lowlands,
a result, during the
falling ro the
NVA,
first
three nnniths of "peace"
residents of rlie delta
head
tor Saigon.
ARVN
lost
more than 6,000 men, among the highest quarterly
totals of the war.
Thieu drew en-
In adopting his belligerent stance,
couragement from the promises he had received of con-
Though Henry
tinuing U.S. support.
have sought nothing more than
tween the signing of the in
Kissinger seems to
"decent interval" be-
a
and
Paris pact
a final settlement
Vietnam, Richard Nixon remained
ever not to be the
first
as
determined
American president
as
to lose a war.
in addition to supplying the South Vietnamese with vast stores of fire,
war materiel
Nixon
would ct)ntinue aid"
in the
secretly assured
months preceding the ceaseThieu that the United States
economic and military
to provide "full
and would "respond with
force"
full
Vietnamese violated the agreements. meeting with Thieu
at
the Western
the North
it
1973
In an April
White House
Clemente, California, Nixon reiterated
in
his pledge.
can count on us," he told the Vietnamese
San
"You
leader.
For a variety of reasons, the Communists approached the "postwar war"
much mcue
South Vietnamese
adversaries. Still suffering the effects
cautiously than did their
of the bloody campaigns of 1972, forced to accept cut-
backs in Russian and Chinese the complete withdrawal of
all
Vietnamese leadership decided itary action
its
During the
first
military forces in the
U.S.
as
it
To
came
and
political
organiza-
Communist
South were ordered to assume a
PRG
concentrated
territories
under
its
the creation of this Third Vietnam,
to be called, as
headed south
any major mil-
year of the cease-fire
on consolidating the newly gained control.
North
on economic recon-
primarily defensive posture while the
assist in
to ensure
forces, the
to avoid
energies
military regrouping,
struction, tion.
and focus
and eager
aid,
many
as
5,000 political cadres
to establish local administrative offices, set
up new schools, and organize collective farms among the peasantry.
Although the United States formally protested the continued
infiltration of
North Vietnamese troops into
South Vietnam, President Nixon coukl do it.
Already reeling from the
An NVA
political
sitlJicr sr.ircs innv.s r/ic
o/i hiitu.uv 28,
ro stop
of the
un-
Tlmcl) H.in River scpnninni^
Norf/i V'R-rn.un troni Smith \'ictn.ini ;iic'.')r
lirrlc
shock
.tttcr
rhc caisc-tire
.i.tTec-
l'-)7h
)\^iP
foldinf^
Watergate scandal, Nixon tounJ
his ability to
take unilateral military action sharply limited by the assertive
93d Congress. As soon
POWs
and
were
home,
safely
moved
legislators alike
American troops
as all
liberal
and conservative
swiftly to halt
any further U.S.
ever possible and to initiate strategic raids that would
bleed
ARVN
Thieu regime. Rather than an
for the
the
new campaign would
military operations "in or over or from the shores of
and complex"
South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia." Several months
tween "anti-nibbling
November
in
later,
War
Powers Act, which required the president to
inform the legislative branch within forty-eight hours of the deployment of U.S. troops abroad and obligated to
withdraw them within
him
absence of
sixty days in the
explicit Congressional approval.
take the form of a "protracted
General Dung observed, be-
struggle.
President Thieu refused to scale back either his
For the Saigon government, the escalation of the ing could hardly have
come
1974 the South Vietnamese economy was teetering on
withdrawal and partly
ican
in
American
and
broke off in late
at political settlement formally
1973, South Vietnamese forces stepped up ground and base camps and launched a
series of land-grabbing operations in
along the eastern seaboard, in Tay of Saigon, and in the
Communists
the
areas from
Mekong
PRG
new
strongholds
Ninh Province north
"We
losses
The economic
impact on Saigon's
crisis
had an
especially profound
-million-man army, causing chronic
and promoting further corruption. The payment of
command
will harass us,"
Thieu
told officers
in early January 1974, as
surprise,
the
NVA
he pro-
and
PRG
heavy
suffered
bribes for air
and
artillery
support became commonplace,
and desertion reached epidemic proportions.
Com-
pounding the government's problems, the Buddhist opposition began agitating during the late
summer
for
however, the Communists went on the
Catholics, Thieu's principal base of support, launched a
units in the Iron Triangle, recapturing
of the territory they had
lost,
and
The fledged,
willingness of the
open warfare
Yielding to the hawks
Communists
reflected a
withm
major
GVN.
to
nationwide anticorruption campaign aimed
full-
shift in strategy.
Vo Nguyen Giap and
Van Tien Dung,
munist party central committee had passed
the a
Com-
compro-
As
the situation steadily deteriorated,
Defense
Attache's
failure of the
when-
the
Saigon
in military aid. Secretary of
United States
to
uphold
its
"moral obli-
gation" to the South Vietnamese would have "a corrosive effect
on our
interests
beyond Indochina." But Con-
mood
of a war-weary nation, refused
to be swayed.
Armed
in
State Kissinger echoed their entreaties, warning that the
of reconstruction in the North but also authorizing a
GVN
officials at
(DAO)
pleaded with Washington to find some way to provide
gress, reflecting the
return to "revolutionary violence" in the South.
Office
an additional $500 million
mise resolution in October 1973 reaffirming the priority
forces were henceforth to strike back at the
at the pres-
ident himself.
U.S.
resume
the Hanoi Politburo, no-
tably Defense Minister General
chief of staff General
much
seizing additional
lands previously under the control of the
310
1
inflation,
in corruption at every level of
peace and accommodation with the PRG, while the
ARVN
NVA
and a marked increase society.
had combined
unemployment, soaring
to produce massive
to enjoy stable security in their staging
will
counteroffensive and scored success after success, mauling
a sharp rise in worldwide oil prices
rice harvests,
during the early stages of the campaign. In the
spring,
late
poor
shortages of vital military necessities, sapping morale,
Delta.
claimed the advent of the "Third Indochina War."
Taken by
series of
not allow
which they
of the delta
oi President
result
military aid from $2.3 billion in 1973 to
aimed
NVA
a
as
Amer-
the United States annually spent in Vietnam, a cutback
about $1 billion in 1974, a
on
fight-
worse time. By mid-
at a
the brink of total collapse, partly as a result of the
political ambitions or his military offensives. After talks
air attacks
and the nibblers."
forces
Thieu's aggressive policies. Loss of the $400 million that
Despite these clear signals of flagging American support.
all-out offensive,
1973, Congress raised the "Indo-
china Prohibition" to the level of principle by passing the
NVA
allow further expansion of
units,
base areas and supply corridors, and undermine support
at
Faced with the threat of runaway inflation
home, angered by
South Vietnam, and
reports of tired of
rampant corruption
in
underwriting what one leg-
islatDr described
many
as
"self-perpetuating dictatorship,"
a
with Senator Edward Kennedy
visions
come
to terminate America's "endless
up positions
that the time had
Some even
support for an endless war."
believed that a
had been mobilired
new
piled,
by forcing President Thieu to negotiate
logistical
tlement of the conflict. As a
result, in
Congress voted to cut military aid fiscal
for
1975 to $700 million, half of which would be con-
sumed
A
September 1974
South Vietnam
to
ended
before, the
in President
DMZ.
the
just across
Watergate scandal had
finally
Nixon's forced resignation. That and
reserve di-
the North, several taking
Vast quantities of
all
and hospital
training
and the
facilities built,
network under construction since early 1973
but completed. "It was a picture to be proud of,"
North Vietnamese chief of staff General Van Tien LXmg "In that region of our Fatherland were
later recalled.
more than 20,000 kilometers of
in shipping costs alone.
month
in
weapons, ammunition, and supplies had been stock-
reduction in aid would enhance the prospects for peace a fX)litical set-
Another seven
Strela surface-to-air missiles.
legislators agreed
running
strategic roads
north and south, with campaign roads running east and west
—strong
inching
ropes
day
gradually,
by
demon, awaiting
the vote reducing aid together had a devastating impact
around the neck, arms, and
on the South Vietnamese,
the order to jerk tight and bring the creature's
intensifying Thieu's political
and economic problems and encouraging what one torian has called "a psychology of retreat that ably,
his-
sometimes approached despair." Unaccount-
made any
Joint General Staff
effort to adjust to their
Though
country's radically altered strategic situation.
ARVN
outposts continued to
fall
to the
enemy with
alarming regularity, no attempt was made to concentrate scattered lines.
South Vietnamese
forces along
Nor were any contingency
ticipation of a major
more defensible
plans drawn up in an-
North Vietnamese
"Our
offensive.
leaders continued to believe in U.S. air intervention
even it,"
after the
U.S. Congress had expressly forbidden
ARVN
one high-ranking
general later
wrote. "They
deluded themselves into thinking that perhaps ply
meant
this sim-
that U.S. intervention would take a longer
time to come because of the complex procedures
in-
While the their
leaders of the
GVN
waited and hoped,
North Vietnamese counterparts
carefully reassessed
the shifting military balance in the South.
meeting of the Politburo and
At
a joint
the central military
com-
to
Before that tirder could be given, however, the North
Vietnamese
first
had
Amer-
to consider the likelihood of
Though even Dung
ican intervention.
agreed that cau-
tion was in order, the consensus of the conference was
summed up
"Now
general.
Communist
by Le Duan,
in.
And no
party
matter
how
"it will
they
may
What
lapse."
1975,
a
finally
be hard to jump back
two-year plan
to
year of the campaign.
move
its
disastrous col-
emerged from the October
document known
through negotiations, but by first
secretary-
intervene, they cannot
rescue the Saigon administration from
erations was a
first
that the United States has pulled out of
the South," he declared,
as
"liberate" fc:)rce
delib-
the Resolution for
South mit
the
of arms. During the
Communist
would
forces
out oi their jungle base camps and systematically
eliminate exposed .A.RVN outposts, further extend supply corridors,
volved."
life
an end."
accommodation and
however, neither Thieu nor the members of his
legs of a
day,
and
force
ARVN
to retreat to
urban areas.
Large-scale attacks against the cities and major garrisons were to be launched
1976,
culminating
in
a
m
ARVN
the following year,
"General Offensive, General
Uprising" that would topple the Saigon regime
or,
at
mittee in early October 1974, the hawks once again
the very least, force acceptance of a coalition govern-
pressed their case for all-out war, arguing that the grow-
ment.
ing vulnerability of
ARVN
availed
only waiting to be grasped.
Vietnamese had already the South
troops
artillery
antiaircraft regiments
By that point the
North
infiltrated ten full divisions into
—some 200,000
and 450 long-range
"new opportunities"
— backed by 700 tanks
pieces as well as twenty
armed with sophisticated
SA-7
As outlined by General Dung, 1975 offensive would be
the centerpiece of the
a thrust into the vast,
defended region that the X'lctnaincsc yen,
known
In early
c.illed
lightly
Tan Ngu-
bv the .Amenc.uis as the central highlands.
December, however. Dung was forced
his plans after Lieutenant
to
modify
General Tran Van Tra, the
311
f«JW^
Wirh porr/ons of South Vietnam along the Cambodian border already having try to
312
hold positions west of Saigon on March
12.
fallen to the Ni>rth
—
-T-iry
'J
—r-
\
Vietnamese, South Vietnamese troops
ct)mmanJer
Communist
of
lands-Mekong Delta political officer of
low-
the
in
and Pham Hung, the chief
region,
COSVN,
forces
the Central Office for South
Vietnam, convinced the Politburo
cam-
to begin the
paign with a major assault on Phuoc Long Province northeast of Saigon.
Not only would
Phuoc Long make
mockery of Thieu's "no
a
concession" policy, the two
down ARVN's mobile
tie
way
men
the liberation of
argued,
reserves
territorial
would
it
also
and thus prepare the
for a bold strike against the capital in 1976.
As
shorten their defense lines and stitute a national
at the
same time recon-
mobile reserve capable of rapid de-
ployment. As in the
however, President Thieu
past,
refused even to consider a strategic withdrawal since
it
violated his policy of "no retreat." Instead he continued to cling to the
hope that somehow,
Americans would eventually come faith derived in part
some way, the
in
His
to his rescue.
from the secret assurances given by
the past president, in part from his calculation ui U.S.
and
geopolitical interests,
in part
from his ignorance of
turned out, the attack on Phuoc Long proved
the American political system. In South Vietnam Ngu-
even more successful than Tra had anticipated. Begin-
yen Van Thieu was the government; he seems never
ning on December
fully to
NVA
it
13,
the 7th and newly formed 3d
Divisions quickly captured a series of key outposts,
surrounded the garrison town of
Don
and the province
also cut off
brought under
siege.
As
ARVN
garrisons were
Phuoc Binh
capital of
Communists bombarded the
the
town with long-range 130MM
artillery shells,
two com-
panies of highly trained Rangers were dispatched to bolster
ARVN's
defenses. But
it
gunned and outnumbered
was hardly enough. Out-
nearly
four
one,
to
the
defenders of Phuoc Binh finally succumbed on January 6,
ease with
which Phuoc Long had
the Hanoi Politburo immediately di-
liberated,
rected the
NVA
Campaign
275, the previously planned drive into the
General Staff to revise
its
plans for
central highlands. Scrapping the conservative objectives initially
series
outlined by General Dung, which called tor a
of attacks on exposed outposts, new orders were
now drawn up
for a surprise attack
capital of Darlac Province
ARVN litical
on Ban
Me
Thuot,
and headquarters of the 23d
"Never have we had
we have now," Le Duan
told
Dung,
as
he
dis-
ot the
a
rising inflation
In Saigon, meanwhile, the South Vietnamese Joint
General Staff scrambled to cope with the unfolding milcrisis.
Uncertam where
the
enemy might
strike
next and lacking the manpower to defend every front,
ARVN
commanders began
fleshing out plans to
Phuoc Long reached Wash-
months. Al-
in office only five
CIA
and widespread unemployment
to
wiretapping scandal, further preoccupied by the
threat of renewed war between Egypt and Israel in the
Middle
he was hardly inclined to
East,
risk his political
capital by taking forceful military action in Southeast
Even
if
he had been willing to do
War
china Prohibition of 1973 and the
1974 sharply limited gress,
to the coast of
much
his options.
As
less
Vietnam without
unleash thundering
Con-
legislative approval,
fleets
He
there-
was to seek
a sup-
of B-52s.
plemental appropriation ot $300 million
in military aid
South Vietnam and an additional $222 million
Cambodia, where Khmer
on the
R(,)uge forces
Phnom
capital city of
were rapidlv clos-
Penh.
South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia for an on-the-spot apptcUsal
Though
but one ot the legislators
New
York
— returned
voring some addition. il
ot rhc
—Congresswoman to
dctcnoraring
skeptical at the outset, Bella
all
Ab:ug
Washington on March
2 fa-
tnilitarv
both countries. But their recttmmendations had effect.
for
Ford's urging, in late February a special Congres-
sional delegation traveled to
of
the Indo-
interpreted by
fore decided that the only alternative
for
so,
Powers Act of
Ford could not even send a U.S. naval task force
military situation.
highlands offensive.
the
from
At
patched the general south to take personal charge
of the fall ot
ready burdened by a host of domestic problems ranging
conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage so
military
news
ington in early January 1975, Richard Nixon's successor,
ing in
Division.
the United States,
nt)t.
Gerald Ford, had been
and po-
great as
itary
When
Asia.
1975.
Emboldened by the been
the president was
in
Luan, and severed
the main road leading through the province. During the
next two weeks the remaining
have comprehended that
little
Most members of Congress, and with them the
313
majority of Americans, rhoufjiht S'ving South Vietnam
more
would be throwing good money
aid
While the
As
after bad.
president's supplemental-aid request lan-
guished on Capitol Hill, the North Vietnamese
Army
Combat Engineer Group
with the 20th
leading the way.
the engineers repaired the road, built fords, and re-
placed bridges
—
process that,
a
Phu's estimation,
in
would take no more than two days
in total
—
infantry,
In
accordance with the Politbu-
armor, and medical units would follow. Crack South
ro's latest directive, early
on the morning of March 10
Vietnamese Ranger groups would act
resumed the offensive.
NVA Divisions surged out the ARVN garrison at Ban
the 320th, 316th, and 10th of the jungle and attacked
Me
Thuot. Employing a
movement
to screen the
General Dung called the
tactic
Even before the
first
"blossoming lotus," a single regiment of infantrymen
ous problems arose.
and sappers spearheaded the
for
Nha
was
in
the government
command
assault, striking quickly at
centers inside the
then turning outward, "like
a flower
town and
bud slowly opening
the petals." In the meantime, columns of tanks and
armored personnel
carriers closed in
from the north and
south behind a shield of long-range the
trapping
artillery,
ARVN defenders between the claws of an ever tight-
ening pincer. Although the South Vietnamese troops fought bravely,
at
times savagely, to hold their ground,
within two days only a few pockets of organized
resis-
The
ot
fall
Ban
In order to prevent the
President
to start trading land for time.
North Vietnamese from march-
ing to the sea and cutting the country in two, he decided to
withdraw
and Pleiku there to
his
remaining highland forces from
to the coastal
mount
Kontum
town of Tuy Hoa and from
a counterattack
on Ban
Me Thuot.
Since
the main road leading to the coast. Route 19, had
ready been cut by the
NVA,
al-
retreating forces were to
descend along interprovincial Route 7B, an old logging road that snaked
its
way from the
outskirts of Pleiku
through Phu Bon Province. Though the road had rarely
been used
in recent years
be heavily mined,
it
and
parts of
it
were
known
many
the past.
With
careful planning
and any
in
luck, the force
would be gone before the North Vietnamese
realized
soon
as
15
seri-
Phu himself departed as to
who
without alerting the Territorial
As
a
began moving out,
as the regular units
Regional- and Popular-Force troops gathered their
families
and joined the mass exodus. So did thousands
As
of other civilians.
the military convoys headed south
kicking up clouds of red dust, unbroken lines of refugees
on
foot paralleled the path of the
army on each
side of
the road.
As the South Vietnamese had hoped. General Dung his staff
retreat.
But
were
initially fooled
after receiving
ARVN's
by
strategic
both Western news reports
of civilians fleeing the highlands and radio intercepts of flights
from Pleiku to the coast, the North Vietnamese
general became convinced that the
move. Seizing the opportunity
enemy was on the major
to destroy a
command. Dung immediately ordered
ARVN
the 320th
NVA
Division to drive northeast, attack the flank o( the col-
umn, and
stall
the retreat long enough to allow the
968th Regiment to close
in
from the
rear.
Other
forces
along the coast were to cut 7B in advance of the with-
drawing South Vietnamese refuge at
when
as they
falling
on the evening of March 18
the lead elements of the
with the
headed toward their
Tuy Hoa.
Darkness was
to
had the advantage of passing
through territory that the enemy had largely ignored
On March
Forces of their assigned role in the withdrawal.
and
Me Thuot finally convinced
Thieu that he would have
of the column.
convoy departed, however,
Trang, leaving contradictory orders
command and
result,
tance remained. By March 15, the battle for the Darlac
Province capital was over.
as a rear guard,
while the Territorial Forces at Pleiku remained behind
II
Corps column
where engineers had been days to construct a
at
NVA
320th caught up
Cheo Reo (Hau Bon),
frantically
working
for
two
pontoon bridge
across the Ea Pa
ARVN
veteran leads a group
what was happening.
Once
the order was given,
II
Corps commander Major
General Pham Van Phu immediately began planning the
On March
21,
1975, a one-legged
of refugees from
Ban
evacuation. Thinking only of speed, he decided that the
12,
withdrawal would begin within two days, on March
125-kilometer march.
314
16,
Me
Thuot, taken by the
into the outskirts of the coastal town of
NVA
on March
Nha Trang
after a
«4
*
i
'"tr.:
f?**
River. Just as they CDmpleted their work, a shower of
heavy
artillery shells,
down on
mortar rounds, and rockets rained
the throngs of soldiers and refugees
converged on the riverbank, waiting to
same time, other Communist tail
end
ot the ct)lumn,
which
who had
cross.
At
the
units began hitting the still
stretched back to the
outskirts ot Pleiku.
Nevertheless, the next day the column pushed on, as helicopters darted in to evacuate the sick and
and
VNAF aircraft
bombed
The convoy continued March
21,
when
the advancing
wounded
NVA
troops.
Cheo Reo
to flow through
until
the North Vietnamese finally broke
On
through the Ranger rear guard and seized the town. orders from General Phu,
doned
their
the trapped Rangers aban-
heavy weapons and
fled
into the jungle.
Elsewhere along the column panic dissolved into chaos as roving
bands of leaderless soldiers fought with
ians over dwindling supplies of food priest later reported seeing people so
civil-
and water.
One
weak and exhausted
they could "barely climb onto helicopters" and children
dying of starvation.
By the time the lead elements of what had come
to
be called the Convoy of Tears fought through the
last
NVA
25,
roadblocks and reached
the losses were staggering.
who began
vilian refugees
were accounted tually
made
quarters
20,000
at
it
for.
Nha
logistics
estimated 180,000
Rangers, only 900 even-
newly established
Trang,
ci-
the journey, only one-third
Of 7,000
to the
Tuy Hoa on March
Of an
II
Corps head-
while about one-quarter ot
and support troops completed the with-
drawal. All told,
JGS chairman General Cao Van Vien
later reported, "Seventy-five percent of
II
Corps combat
strength, to include the 23d Infantry Division as well as
Ranger, armor
artillery,
been
expended."
tragically
The
engineer, and signal units, had
morale-shattering defeat in the central highlands
was soon followed by an equally disastrous collapse ot
ARVN
forces in the northern provinces. There, too, a
decision to pull back to move detcnsible positions pre-
— the column of
The Convoy of Tears
soldiers
and
civilians re-
creating ro the coast from the hard-pressed highland citv ot Pleiku
along disused R(^ute 7Bhv
%%
l^'-^^^
^
NVA
—/irfwc-
through smoke and debris
left
shellhre.
317
among
cipitated a mass panic
elite
ARVN
the civilian population
Thieu ordered the redeployment of the
after President
Airborne Division to Saigon and the with-
ground tual
downtown
in the
the main airport frenzied
complicating matters, Thieu repeatedly failed to
craft shuttling in
his
commands,
at
first
held "at
all
meantime, the
costs." In the
and 325C Divisions army, cut Route
from
isolated the city
it
be
324B
I
on March 24
flotilla
to
The
to
hastily
head
where
for the shore,
a
and third-country nation-
officials,
were among the
als
to leave, flying out in aircraft
first
provided by Air Vietnam, World Airways, Air America,
and the Vietnamese
air force.
But
as the
backlog of
passengers grew and the crowds at the airfield became increasingly unruly, the
airlift
had
to be
suspended and
an American
scrambled to locate their families and
NVA,
Behind them the
with their
to-
own
entering Hue, trained their artillery guns on
the principal embarkation point,
inflicting
heavy casualties and feeding panic among those waiting
When
to be evacuated.
the promised naval fleet at
appeared, a combination of low increasingly accurate
enemy
drowned
rough
tides,
shellftre
from reaching the shore. Dozens of refugees
seas,
last
and
prevented the ships soldiers
and
civilian
attempted to swim to the 100
as they
DAO
official,
it
was decided that a small
of tugs and barges assigned to
fleet
would instead be used
move
military supplies
to transport people. In the
mean-
time, several large cargo ships were dispatched from Sai-
gon
to assist in the evacuation.
As rumors
of the impending sealift spread through
the city, thousands of civilians and renegade soldiers
rushed the docks, overwhelmed a cordon of
and
curity guards,
Many
barges.
civilians
ARVN
drowned
or were trampled to
death in the crush. Others were shot by South Vietna-
mese
soldiers
determined to make room
for themselves.
others waded into the sea, hoping to be picked up
Still
by one of the boats already making their way out to
namese navy had brought from Da Nang.
"Vietnamese mothers saved
most of one regiment of the single boatload of cessfully
1st
ARVN
In the end,
Division and a
South Vietnamese marines were suc-
evacuated to Da Nang, along with 7,700 people Island.
Thousands of others were
left
on
the beach to await the arrival of the conquerors of Hue.
Although President Thieu holding the line at
Da Nang,
still it
entertained hopes of
soon became apparent
that any attempt to resist the advancing North Viet-
namese Army would be terrified refugees
futile.
As
poured into the
tens of thousands of
city during the last days
of March, doubling the population to
some
2 million,
any semblance of order or discipline evaporated. By
March 27 crowds
318
of Vietnamese occupied every inch of
se-
board the waiting boats and
tried to
or so junks, river craft, and barges that the South Viet-
on Vinh Loc
Cam
planned evacuation soon turned into a
the ten-mile stretch of road leading to the port town of
Tan My,
as possible to
some other means of escape found. At the suggestion of
coast.
now
ahead with
pressed
frantically
many people
Saigon. Nonessential U.S. consular per-
then dissolved into the civilian throngs streaming
troops
authorities
plans to evacuate as
Da Nang.
rout, as soldiers
ward the
the mounting anarchy South Vietnamese and
American
GVN
of South Vietnamese naval vessels was to carry
them south
air-
city.
Ranh Bay and
Corps commander General Truong ordered
rior force,
and out of the
sonnel, senior
he could not possibly hold out against the enemy's supe-
his troops
mobs converged on every
retreating
on the
overland access. Realizing that
all
no
soldiers,
and south of Hue, and
rapidly closed
to the north
1
NVA
Amid
Hue
indicating that the city of
should be abandoned and then demanding that
armed
streets
longer under any control, wandered aimlessly, while at
drawal ot other units to enclaves along the coast. Further clarify
area, bringing traffic to a vir-
Along the
standstill.
them
to British girls, Aussies
bies," recalled
sea.
their children by throwing
—everybody grabbing
ba-
one American.
The North Vietnamese 2d Army Corps Easter morning,
March
waited until
30, before entering
Da Nang.
By that point much of the madness that had gripped the city
had already burnt
itself out,
50,000 civilians and 16,000
no
resistance as the
had managed
to
who remained
of-
soldiers
escape. Resigned to their fate, those fered
even though only
Communists
over South Vietnam's second-largest years before the
first
raised their flag city,
where ten
contingent of American combat
troops had splashed ashore.
The
following day,
March
31, a flash telegram arrived
at
General Dung's
command
post near
Ban
Me
Thuot,
to serve as
supreme commander and
litical
decision." Abandoning the two-year plan outlined the
northerner, their deputies.
preceding
fall,
the North Vietnamese leadership had de-
cided to seize the "once-in-a-thousand-years opportunity" that lay before
them and
"liberate Saigon before
was to be launched no
mitted at once to the southern front, while
Dung himself Loc
later
a
offensive against Saigon
than the
last
week of
later wrote,
April.
"we were
racing against the clock." In the
tinued
Along
meantime, the North Vietnamese Army con-
its
seemingly
coastal
Route
inexorable
1
southward advance.
and the newly paved roads of the
COSVN
political
central highlands, long convoys of trucks, armored per-
to begin
sonnel to
nam War.
April.
Tho
Le Due
South
joined
them
to apprise
resolutions
and to monitor the
been designated the
Nha Trang
Dung and
offered
pth^r ft the
no
l:i-it
his
comrades
in the
in detail of the Politburo's latest final
phase of what had
Ho Chi Minh Campaign. Dung safe
haven
for
iircrifr (vit of
was
highland refugees; they arrived
Nha Trang
uses his
fists
to
carriers,
tanks,
and
artillery pieces ran
bumper, day and night, throughout the
preparations for the "final decisive battle" of the Viet-
rhi'
lung as chief po-
Pham Hung and General Tran Van Tra
Ninh. There he would be joined by chief
at
The
"From then on," General Tra
the rainy season." All available units were to be com-
was to proceed to the regional military base camp
officer,
1
with Generals Tra and Le Due Anh,
informing him that the Politburo had reached a "historic
As
the
NVA juggernaut
cipal population centers of sion.
On
April
1
II
first
bumper week
of
rolled forward, the prin-
Corps
fell in
the coastal city o(
rapid succes-
Nha
Trang, the
northernmost point on
ARVN's
without a
Corps commander General Phu
to find the
fight after
II
latest
defense line,
fell
people of the coastal town fleeing south to Saigon. Here,
keep more people
off
the already overloaded plane. April
I.
?/^
panicked and
fled to
installation at
Cam Ranh
as the lOth
NVA
In Saigon,
Two
Saigon.
Bay was
Division closed
news of the
days later the huge similarly
abandoned
in.
latest territorial losses raised
tensions to the brink of panic, sparking a run
on the
banks
Thieu's
widespread
as well as
resignation.
calls for President
In characteristic fashion, the
South Viet-
namese leader lashed back by censoring opposition newspapers, arresting alleged "plotters," and authorizing
and
local police to "shoot
on the spot" anyone who
kill
violated a 9:00 P.M. curfew. Yet aside from promising to
form a new "fighting cabinet," he made no
rally
the nation behind
him
effort to
or to provide any real lead-
ership to the government or armed forces. Plans to re-
organize and re-equip the troops that had straggled back
South were
to the
in disarray,
one American reporter noted,
bureaucracy,
GVN
while inside the
"officials
either stopped working altogether or kept mindlessly
suing instructions that could not he carried out." President had
all
is-
"The
the power in his hands and could easily
impose his policy," recalled Bui Diem, former South
Vietnamese ambassador there
the U.S.,
to
somehow
"but
was no sense of purpose or direction among
the high
enough
.
of the government," nor "strangely
officials .
.
any sense of urgency about the situation."
Convinced
an
that
South Vietnam might
independent,
if
"truncated,"
be salvaged from the wreck-
still
age of the current military campaign, U.S. ambassador
Graham Martin and
other American
officials
eventually
persuaded Thieu to organize a new defense line centered
around the garrison town of Xuan Loc,
thirty-five miles
northeast of the capital along strategically vital Route 1.
At
the same time, however, Martin authorized U.S.
defense attache General
Homer Smith
to
update con-
tingency plans for a full-scale U.S. evacuation in the
event
that
ARVN
promptly ordered
failed
his
to
staff
processing center adjacent to to
draw up
lists
to
hold set
the
line.
Smith
up an evacuation
Tan Son Nhut Air
of nonessential U.S.
Base,
personnel and
"high-risk" Vietnamese, and to identify and locate any
BoJiea at refugees rnunpleJ in (he rush tu escape
Trang dock on April
1,
us a
lie
on the Nba
crowded barge headed
for
Saigon
approaches.
321
other Americans
still
living in Saigon. Yet
Ambassador
Martin wanted to proceed slowly, since he feared that any
visible sign of a
U.S. pullout might precipitate the
same kind of mass panic
Nha
Trang. As a
lation of
result,
that had engulfed
out of a total American popu-
more than 6,000, only 1,285
during the
first
Da Nang and
left
the country
two weeks of April.
ital
down on
from three directions
area surrounding
1
.
Only
at
began
to arrive
North Vietnamese ad-
week. Yet once fresh
from the coast on April
clear that the defenders of
running
NVA
15,
it
forces
became
Xuan Loc could not hold out a twenty-mile race
with one
the South Vietnamese cap-
four-man relay," one Western military analyst lamented.
the northwest in the
did General Dung's army meet with
There the 18th
what would prove
ARVN
ARVN
Di-
to be a desperate last
Division's heroic last stand at
drop off supplies and pick up civilians on April 20.
322
for nearly a
contestant going the distance while the other runs a
—from
resistance.
In the midst of the 18th to
vance
"There's simply no way
As
Tay Ninh, from the south along Route
Xuan Loc
vision dug in for
after counterattack, stalling the
divi-
4 leading from the delta, and from the east along Route
more than token
heavily outnumbered and outgunned,
the South Vietnamese troops launched counterattack
for long. "It's like
By that point twelve Communist Main-Force sions were bearing
Though
stand.
ARVN
the North Vietnamese
can win."
Army
tightened
its
noose
around Saigon, Ambassador Martin came under increasing pressure to accelerate the pace of the U.S. with-
drawal.
Services
Xuan Loc
On
April 19, two days after the Senate
Committee formally
Armed
rejected President Ford's
seventy-five kilometers northeast of Saigon, helicopters land
Admiral Noel Gayler,
request,
aid
com-
U.S.
the
mander-in-chief, Pacific, was dispatched to inform Mar-
Washington wanted the American presence
tin that
no more than 1,100
duced to
GVN
as possible.
re-
debate to
To
of our soldiers.
"The United Thieu declared.
Gayler devised
scheme
a
rules,
that broadly
while Martin and
expanded the
def-
inition of "dependent." In the days that followed, the
of evacuees leaving the
Tan Son Nhut
airfield
on outbound C-130 and C-141 cargo planes grew
dra-
matically from an average of 200 to more than 3,000
DAO officials organized a
per day. In addition,
series of
ultrasecret "black flights" to insure that especially "sensitive"
Vietnamese, many of them former U.S.
intelli-
gence operatives, could get out of the country without
GVN.
the knowledge of the
The American tion
came
no
as
surprise to President Thieu.
Having
would be no eleventh-hour
finally realized that there
U.S. rescue, he knew that the end was drawing near.
The government he
ruled
no longer supported him,
his
once loyal generals were threatening to depose him, and his
army was collapsing on every
group of leading ures
political
to
On
front.
April 18, a
moderates and opposition
fig-
had informed him that they would publicly demand
his resignation in six days
days
later.
It
is
he did not step down.
if
Ambassador Martin
Two
.
.
North Vietnam renewed
if
.
.
its
over the bodies
.
States has not respected "It
is
irresponsible."
tirade did
inhumane.
Only
Thieu unveil
after
today," he announced.
It
its
promises,"
not trustworthy.
is
he had concluded his
his decision to yield his tattered
authority to Vice President Tran "I
am
Van Huong.
resigning, but
"I I
depart
am
not
deserting." In the
wake of Thieu's resignation
that the aged and enfeebled transfer
power
to a coalition
styled "neutralist" General
ing the
way
ever a time
decision to begin a full-scale evacua-
.
market bargaining
"fish
Vietnamese nationals, U.S.
immigration and emigration
number
force
full
aggression" and comparing the recent Congressional aid
authorities agreed to relax their respective
facilitate the departure of
and
soon
as
spond with
it
was widely hoped
Huong would immediately government headed by
Duong Van Minh,
for a negotiated settlement.
when such
a
there were
bargain might have been ac-
ceptable to the Communists, however, passed.
If
self-
thus pav-
By April 26, when Huong
had long since
it
finally
agreed to put
the question of Minh's accession before the National
Assembly, General Dung and his
staff
had already put
the finishing touches on their plan for the of the
Ho Chi Minh
for attack"
last
offensive
Campaign. The formal "resolution
had been approved and signed. At precisely
5:00 P.M. on April 27, the "final decisive battle" of the
Vietnam
War
— the
"liberation"
of
Saigon
—would
begin.
carried a similar message
Independence Palace. Emphasizing that he was speak-
and not
ing "only as an individual,"
as a representative
of the United States government, Martin told Thieu that "almost
all
of his generals" considered the military
and that most Vietnamese believed
situation hopeless his departure
with
the
thought
it
facilitate a
Communists.
Though
Martin
personally
GVN
ofes-
commodity
The next
negotiated settlement
might buy time, which was now the
would make
ficials "felt it
sential
would
for
little
many
difference,
South Vietnam."
day, April 21,
Thieu announced
his resig-
nation in a ninety-minute televised address to the National Assembly.
with
tears,
Often rambling and
at
times choked
the South Vietnamese leader devoted most
Following page. Their city sunounJeJ and under rocAer
.)ff;tci:
of his speech to a bitter attack on the United States,
by the Communists, residents of Saifion clear rubble and search
recounting President Nixon's "solemn pledge" to "re-
for survivors
of the
latest volley
of tire on April
27.
323
d
>ie"'"
MUlfmilt^^
%
Mm
"
y
--^/
4i**ii«.
«*•»*-.»
^^^
y^,mm ffy"^
gon and the Tan Son Nhut
Focus: The Fall of Saigon
seemed
airfield
no im-
in
minent danger, Martin was confident that he "could a
maximum number
get
of Vietnamese and Americans out
by the thirtieth" by means of the ongoing fixed-wing Deferring to their
airlift.
men
ident and his
7,500 evacuees
"man on
Saigon on outbound cargo planes
left
destined for the Philippines or daily
the scene," the pres-
agreed to delay. That day more than
exodus since the
airlift
Guam,
the largest single
began. Only 219 of those
departing, however, were Americans.
Among
the
new
leaders of the
South Vietnamese gov-
ernment, the accelerated pace of the U.S. withdrawal
During the predawn hours of April 27, 1975, four heavy rockets
slammed
South Vietnamese
into the
naling the onset of the Communists'
from the
fires
ital
on
blasts raged out of control,
went on the
soldiers
NVA
attack, pressing in toward the cap-
later wrote, his
ricane" and
made
NVA
own
chief of staff General
troops "attacked like a hur-
To
rapid progress.
in
on Bien Hoa
a wall of long-range artillery fire, while
Army Corps
cut off coastal Route 15 and sur-
rounded the port town of Vung Tau. To the south,
VC/NVA
combined delta
tactical force
a
pushed up from the
and permanently severed Route 4 nineteen miles
from the the 3d
evening of the twenty-seventh, the 125 members
Throughout the afternoon and
of the National Assembly engaged in a meaningless con-
city's edge.
Army Corps
from President Tran Van Huong to General Duong
Minh. Not
P.M. did the legislature finally
Minh
to the presidency to "carry out
agree to elevate
And
to the north
blocked Route
1
and northwest,
at several points
South Vietnam." Minh,
to
postponed his
in turn,
have time
to interview candidates for his
artillery
fire
as
Minh
rose
of the latest
Communist advances reached
Washington, President Gerald Ford and visers quickly
total
his senior ad-
determined that the time had come
U.S. puUout. While some administration
for a
officials
advocated the immediate implementation of Option IV, a worst-case
emergency plan
Americans by helicopter bassador
Graham Martin
to
to
remove
all
an offshore U.S.
assured the
remaining fleet,
White House
Amthat
the
an immediate
for
cease-fire
tions
and
on the
acceptable to
press,
a
all political
and form
all parties,
and
ing of a
As
called
resumption of formal
prisoners,
a coalition
if
all
restric-
lift
government
Minh concluded with an
appeal
"remain here to
those with good will to join in the build-
new South
for
our future generations."
Minh's eleventh-
to underscore the futility of
hour plea, no sooner had he finished
Communists launched
their
first
his address
and only
had defected
to the
of five captured
enemy
A-37
earlier in the
Dragonfly
Son Nhut Air Base and bombed
jets
month,
several aircraft were destroyed
Tan
Vietnamese
planes parked along the main runway.
Since no more than 1,000 Americans remained
who
a group
streaked over
a line of
than
air strike
of the war. Led by a former South Vietnamese pilot
air force
326
convinced that
Still
accordance with the 1973 Paris agreement. Fur-
talks in
ther pledging to free
the
distant
Communists would negotiate with him, he
such "extraordinary measures" were not yet required. in Sai-
cabinet.
deliver his acceptance
to
speech at 5:30 P.M. on April 28.
to those attempting to flee abroad to
Chi.
new
Loud thunderclaps mingled with the boom of
join us
Cu
in-
auguration until the following evening so that he might
ARVN
As news
Van
until 8:15
between Saigon and Tay Ninh and encircled the 25th Division at
power
stitutional debate over the prospective transfer of
the east, the 4th
North Vietnamese Army Corps closed Air Base behind
virtually unnoticed.
early
the mission of seeking ways and means to restore peace
the South Vietnamese forces defending the
city fought "stubbornly,"
the 2d
130,000
As
five fronts.
Though
Dung
capital, sig-
final offensive.
went
Though
and others badly dam-
aged, the runway
itself
did not
130mm base.
artillery
come under
when an
early the next morning,
shells crashed
Pandemonium broke
aircraft in a desperate
into the sprawling air
out
fuel tanks,
airlift
fired
them Vietnamese, had been
Marine
up their
awaiting evacuation from the U.S. Embassy.
abandoned
and other pieces of
trucks,
dis-
carded equipment littered the runways, while rampaging still
chased any
aircraft that
moved.
of
With
American and Vietnamese
now more than
the operation
visibility steadily
"damn
want
well didn't
called
for
remained
in the
compound. Unaware
tape of Bing Crosby's "White Christmas," a prearranged
traction plan called for
had begun.
all
remaining Americans and
Defense Attache's Office
(DAO) compound
Tan Son
helicopters
when
than 400 people were Several hours President
on
called
the
last vestiges
and awaited the
and kick them back." Unable
to bulldoze their way through the growing throngs, many
abandoned hope of reaching Tan Son Nhut and
a result,
U.S. Embassy com-
by the time the
copters arrived at the
airfield,
first
wave of
heli-
between 2,000 and 3,000
people slated for evacuation were
still
inside the city.
Despite rapidly deteriorating weather conditions, the
evacuation from the
DAO
compound proceeded
like
clockwork. Beginning at 3:00 in the afternoon, an average of thirty-six helicopters per hour landed at
Tan Son
Nhut, boarded up more than 50 passengers each, and whisked them away
to the
10:24 A.M. on April 30, 1975, national radio and
remain calm, to stop
fighting,
Throughout the environs of Saigon,
of resistance wilted and the
armada of ships anchored
arrival of their conquerors.
convoy of tanks and
a
off their passengers at the
contingent of helicopters
embassy compound, more
Army
of
the Republic of Vietnam began to disappear as thou-
Tu
pound. As
a figure
sands of soldiers discarded their weapons and uniforms
Beech of the Chicago Daily Nevus. "Every time we opened
dropped
him
"At
pleading to be taken inside," recalled journalist Keyes
to beat
that the admin-
on the
city.
every stop Vietnamese beat on the doors and windows
we had
still
behind.
left
his soldiers "to
however, the operation ran into unanticipated
the door
last
Duong Van Minh went on
to stay put."
designated assembly points throughout the
the
later, at
and
fleet.
delays, as large crowds of Saigonese converged
drivers
a result,
From the very
dispatched from the offshore U.S. outset,
at
CH-53
CH-53s
"Seven hundred twenty-six," he
finally arrived to clear the
certain select Vietnamese to be shuttled by bus to the
Nhut, where they would board huge
thirty
of helicopters required, Martin gave
As
said.
the worst-case ex-
need
istration intended to use his estimate to calculate the
number
officials,
"1
and asked the ambassador how many people
off the top of his head.
As conceived by U.S.
clear that he
need them now." Secretary of State Kissinger then
I
the American radio station in Saigon began playing a
signal that the final evacuation
it
spend another night here,"
to
10:51 A.M. Saigon time. President Ford gave the exe-
name
hours old and
five
But Ambassador Martin balked. Making
and
short time later, operators at
still
the president to suspend the operation until morning.
Ambassador Martin telephoned the White House. At
A
civilians
diminishing in the deepening twilight.
he cabled the White House that
the emergency puUout.
a
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger strongly urged
Realizing he had no choice but to go to Option IV,
cute order for Operation Frequent Wind, code
Only
undetermined
security force remained, plus an
number
was clear that the
it
safely extracted.
soldiers
could no longer continue. Jettisoned
Vietnamese troops
the coast. By 8:00 P.M. more than 6,000 people, 5,000 of
attempt to get out of the country.
By midmorning on April 29 fixed-wing
ARVN
as
VNAF pilots
swarmed onto the tarmac and
attack until
intense barrage of
Street and turned
trucks rumbled
At midday,
down Hong Thap
onto Thong Nhut Boulevard
left
to face the presidential palace.
Without slowing down,
the lead tank crashed through the high, steel front gate
and coughed
to a halt inside the spacious courtyard.
Other tanks followed, forming the main entrance. steps
and unfurled
As one a
a
of the
huge semicircle before
crewmen raced up
huge gold-starred liberation
the
flag,
the ranking North Vietnamese officer entered the palace
and confronted President Minh. "You have nothing fear," the officer declared.
are
no
victors
and no vanquished. Only the Americans
have been beaten.
moment
to
"Between Vietnamese, there
of joy.
If
you are
The war
for
patriots, consider this a
our country
is
over."
off
327
With the to let
fall
at Saigon
sanctuary, April 1975.
328
—sixteen NVA
imminent
— Vietnamese
divisions surround the capital
them into the U.S. Embassy while others
(right)
citizens plead with a
crowd toward the compound's outer
walls,
Marine guard (above)
hoping to enter the American
A
few hours after South Vietnam's uncon-
ditional
surrender,
flying the
NLF
flag
a
Communist tank
smashes through the
gates of the presidential palace in Saigon,
April
330
30.
A
South Vietndmese police coktnel
30.
Unable
to accept the defeat
lies
dead
at the k>ot ot S,ii^on\ w,ii nicinonul statue
of his country, he had walked up
to the statue, saluted,
on April
and shot
himself
Evacuees hoard an Air America helicopter
in
downtown Saigon on April
29.
In the nineteen
hours before the collapse of the capital, U.S. helicopters evacuated more than 7,000 U.S. per-
sonnel and selected South Vietnamese citizens to ships of the Seventh Fleet waiting offshore.
332
—
Focus: Coming
if
Home
they had slapped
Cav platoon
1st
me
leader.
in the face," recalled a
former
Others recoiled from movies and
television shows that depicted
Vietnam veterans
as psy-
chotic killers or freaked-out drug abusers. In fact, the vast majority of veterans readjusted well to civilian
Sbme became
life.
successful businessmen,
professional athletes, actors, and elected officials (in-
cluding within a decade of the war's end two governors
and three U.S.
senators).
Most simply
settled
down
like
others of their generation. "We're just ordinary guys," said
one veteran.
"We
and kids and ordinary hear about
us.
live ordinary lives;
jobs.
You only hear about
messed up." In a country unwilling
With
the
fall
of Saigon the people of the United States
began a headlong rush into the post-Vietnam
Americans had not even waited that before the
the U.S.
last
Marine helicopter
long.
lifted off
Some
era.
Five days the roof of
Embassy, President Gerald Ford announced
that the evacuation of Saigon "closes a chapter in the
American experience." By and
large his
seemed
hitter conflict
to agree.
palled at
its
Wearied of the
it is
sisted. It
and ap-
almost as though
became
easier for
Vietnam. Said one
in
go out
for jobs,
I
think you're a time
Those
fears,
bomb
to face
some men
New
don't put
the guys its
who
are
own
re-
the "taint" of Vietnam per-
and disdain by simply hiding the
countrymen
conclusion, the American people began a
period of national denial. "Today,
sponsibility for the past,
we have wives
We're OK. But you never
to avoid the insults
fact that they
had been
York City native,
down
that
I
was a
"When
vet.
or an addict."
however compounded by
guilt or igno-
rance, also reflected the very real problems of a minority
of
Vietnam
veterans. In most cases these afflictions tor-
mented only the
and
individual; occasionally, the pain
the war had never happened," wrote newspaper col-
anger turned outward in violence toward others.
umnist Joseph Harsch
either case, veterans initially found
somehow blocked Ironically,
government
out of their consciousness."
it
many
1975. "Americans have
in late
of those
who
served in
Vietnam
ac-
I
People
in
little
whose name they had
Nearly 100,000 Americans
left
In
help from the
served.
Vietnam with acute
— not out of shame
physical disabilities, ranging from amputated limbs to
hut out of bitter experience with the indifference and
shattered spines to blindness. Thousands more returned
quiesced in this conspiracy of silence
hostility
of their countrymen.
World War
II
Unlike servicemen
who came home with
in
their units to formal
United States addicted
to the
to drugs or alcohol.
A
1971 Harris survey indicated that 26 percent of Vietnam
re-
veterans took drugs, including at least 7 percent
who
turned by themselves to the emptiness of an airport wait-
were addicted to heroin or cocaine. Seven years
later
most Vietnam veterans
ceremonies of welcome,
ing lounge. Transported hack to the United States with
no time
for readjustment,
devices in a nation
they were
to their
left
increasingly uncomfortable
problem drinkers accounted
with
hospital population.
ical
veterans discovered that both ends of the polit-
spectrum had rejected them.
To
the war they were losers.
war they were either in
L.A. the
gave
334
me
first
a look of
for 31 percent of the
VA
Less well recognized was a collection of infirmities
their presence.
The
the Veterans Administration reported that alcoholics or
own
To
those
those
who
fools or criminals.
people
I
who backed
protested the
"When arrived my own age I
saw who were
such overwhelming contempt
I
felt as
chronic skin rashes, respiratory problems, impaired hearing
and
vision, violent headaches, loss of sex drive,
cancer
—
called
Agent Orange. Widely used
and
resulting from exposure to a chemical defoliant in
Vietnam
to
deny
cover to the enemy and to clear friendly perimeters, the herbicide not only produced a multitude of problems for
original victims hut also was suspected of causing
its
higher rates of
stillbirths
and hirth defects among
their
nam
children.
Even more
wounds
Seemingly rejected by the
insidious were the hidden, psychological
some veterans
unable to
larger society,
needed from the government, Viet-
find the help they
veterans broke through their self-imposed isolation
and banded together
own
in their
The
defense.
first self-
These disorders
help efforts began in the mid-1970s with discussion
took the form of extreme restlessness, depression, sleep
groups and vocational training programs in California
disturbance, and paranoia. Such problems were partic-
and
that
suffered.
whom
wres-
tled for years to suppress a nameless anger they
were
"No
able
ularly acute for
combat
barely able to contain. to
keep a
lid
on
it," said
veterans,
matter
many
of
how much was I
one former infantryman,
"I
was
always aware that just beneath the surface there was this rage, this
that
tremendous, almost uncontrollable volatility
somehow had
I
to absorb." Others
became victims
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), in which the
employment
a successful
Then,
1978,
in
a
referral service in Detroit.
named Robert
disabled ex-Marine
Muller founded the Vietnam Veterans of America, the
most
Vietnam veterans
visible of several national
ganizations.
campaign
Jimmy
VVA
The
in
initiated
Washington, finding an
who upgraded
Carter,
or-
vigorous lobbying
a
ally in
President
veterans' services across
the board and appointed a former Vietnam combat of-
Max
ficer.
Cleland, as director of the Veterans
VVA went on
The
Admin-
up the cause of the
individual actually re-experienced traumatic incidents
istration.
often as recurring nightmares, sometimes in the form of
MIAs,
psychotic hallucinations.
victims of Agent Orange, help form the Vietnam Vet-
The
terror,
guilt,
and rage that frequently accom-
to take
fight for official recognition of
PTSD,
erans in Congress caucus, and shepherd two job-training
VVA's
panied such episodes contributed to a suicide rate among
acts
veterans substantially higher than that for nonveterans
accomplishment was Operation Outreach,
of their generation.
Psychological disorders and sub-
stance abuse also played a large role in the disturbing
number
of violent crimes
committed by men who had
through Capitol
Vietnam
veterans. By 1983
more than 200,000
The
But
members and
tional recognition for the
Vietnam and
Once
men and women who
selves for the answer. In 1979, the
clinics
the
hospitals
and
were overcrowded, unsanitary, and understaffed,
VA blamed Congress for insufficient funds.
officials
But
VA
could not escape responsibility for a lack of com-
Muller began the
named Jan
nam
VVA,
all
a
served
who had not
for the sacrifices of those
again, the veterans
with the manifold problems encountered by Vietnam its
were
lacking was any larger na-
still
returned.
In response to complaints that
for
137 centers had assisted
its
ther the facilities, resources, nor understanding to cope
vets.
greatest
Congres-
veterans.
vitally necessary.
in
a
legislation, the rehabilitation programs,
of unprovoked violence that claimed the lives of family
Unfortunately, the Veterans Administration had nei-
Perhaps the
Hill.
independent counseling program
sionally funded,
experienced heavy combat and in occasional outbursts
total strangers.
support
had to look
to
them-
same year that Robert
former army infantryman
Scruggs started raising
money
to build a Viet-
veterans memorial in Washington, D.C.
Over the
next three years Scruggs and many others labored to
munication with the veteran population and an unwill-
make
ingness to confront the unconventional ailments of a
passions that had once divided the nation. But this time
new
the storm acted as a catharsis:
generation of servicemen. Despite additional funds,
new programs, and of
Vietnam veterans employed by the agency,
vets
complained that the bureaucracy remained
number
many
a concerted effort to increase the
VA
unresponsive and insensitive.
The
PTSD
treatment until 1981 and
as a diagnosis meriting
continued to
insist
refused to accept
there was no proof that exposure to
Agent Orange could cause
his
dream
a reality. In the process, they ignited
On
the dedication ot the memorial
national reconciliation. here,
man,"
said
"We
one former
Veterans Day 1982,
became
a
celebratum
ot
waited fifteen years to get soldier, still
wearing the
patch of the 101st Airborne Division on his faded green fatigues.
We
"But
made
it.
it's
It's
not too like
late.
I'm just proud to be here.
coming home."
serious illness or death.
335
and
built,
Witness: Jan Scruggs
if indeed
had given
their lives,
and the
erans
had the names on
it
came back
it
country.
it
of those who
would be unifying
for both vet-
would give the veterans who
It
of welcome, because
a kind
and supported by everyone
regardless
it
would be
Amer-
the war. In terms of the collective psychology of ica,
would give the country
it
everyone could
and absolve
one way or another,
in
amount of guilt
war
terness about the
a shrine, a place that
good about,
feel
a certain
in
built
how they felt about
and
feelings
bit-
both participants and nonpar-
tic ipants.
kept
I
my head
this idea in
March 1979
people in the movie were very Jan C. Scruggs served with the 199th Light Infantry
you ended up with
Brigade near Saigon in 1969 and 1970. Years after his
who go
became obsessed with the
nated his
life
for several years: a national
Vietnam me-
morial.
a
I first
got home,
Vietnam veteran.
to he a
should have bought really
thought
amazed
letter
went
me
a
new
didn't think
chology.
somebody
one had
for being a
my
I
I
was
and the kind
Vietnam veteran.
to college, then enrolled at to get
but
suit or anything,
deserved some appreciation.
1
Washington
versity in
American Uni-
master's degree in psy-
did research on Vietnam veterans' readjust-
I
ment and even
testified
Senate subcommittee things.
I really
at the fervent antiwar sentiment
of scarlet I
wasn 't such a neat thing
just
it
One
of
about
in 1977. 1
my
Then, in
years.
war
the type of guys that
real,
The Deer Hunter,
After seeing
first.
The more
was that
it
I
thought about
be built not by the government but by the
people of the country giving a few bucks apiece. That
would I
really
make
a
it
symbol of reconciliation.
announced the fund
Washington, but at
From May 28
first
we
1979,
to July 4,
Then the campaign
drive at a press conference in
the donations just trickled
started gaining
joined the campaign, people
momentum
like Jack
as
people
Wheeler and Dick
Radez, both West Point graduates with Harvard
who had
assembling a team of good minds and organizers and
found out some amazing
putting together a plan to accomplish the objective of
them was that the divorce
rate of the
building a national memorial by Veterans
There were a
lot
Day
of obstacles ahead. In order
1982. to build
a national memorial you
era veteran. Also,
combat veterans were
by the House and the Senate and signed by the
memorial.
I
significantly
of people and authority. that research
read
all
came the
dent. idea for a
Vietnam
kinds of books on psychiatry and
the psychology of trauma, from Carl Jung, the Austrian psychiatrist
Jay Lifton,
and one of Freud's
early students, to
the contemporary
Robert
Yale psychiatrist
wrote about veterans. From them
I
who
got the idea of col-
lective states of mind: collective guilt, collective shame,
collective pride.
336
I
thought that
MBAs
served in Vietnam. That was a turning point:
noncombat veteran or the Vietnam-
all
in.
raised only $144.50.
that of the Vietnam
From
fur-
more important
the
it,
data before a U.S.
Vietnam combat veteran was three times higher than
less trustful
/
idea of the memorial. I took
few weeks off from work and developed the idea
ther. it
When
two
Vietnam, the sons of steelworkers,
in
return to the United States he had a vision that domi-
to
for
saw the movie The Deer Hunter. The
I
if a
memorial could be
So we went
need
to see
to
have
legislation passed
presi-
Senator Charles Mathias of
Maryland. Once we explained the idea he agreed to sponsor the legislation.
Mac
Mathias and Senator John
Warner of Virginia were the two people who with us through thick tional
commitment
100 sponsors bers. It
and
thin.
They both had an emo-
to the project.
for the bill in the
really stuck
We
Senate
eventually got
—
all
the
mem-
passed in both the Senate and the House, and
President Reagan signed
it
on July
1,
1980.
Meanwhile, more unJ more people were joining
us.
General Westmoreland was intensely mvolved from day one.
Others,
James
like
Kilpatrick,
J.
the columnist,
George McGovem, and people from both the
left
and
the right helped us as well. By the time the fund drive
ended
we had
in 1982,
The next
big hurdle was the design of the memorial.
In the spring ot 1981
we staged the
com-
largest design
and the winner
was Maya Ying Lin's design of a wall bearing the names
Over the next
ot the dead.
it,
saying
nam
several
against
was a black gash of shame, asking why Viet-
it
The
veterans should be honored with a black ditch.
opposition tried to turn the whole thing into an ideo-
Their point was that
logical issue.
war was something nally,
at a
hidden and ashamed of
Fi-
meeting with the opposition. General Mi-
USA
chael Davison,
came up with flag,
to be
this design said the
(Ret.), a supporter ot the design,
the idea of adding a statue, along with a
to the memorial, at a location to be decided. Every-
body agreed
to the
On March
compromise.
11, 1982,
we got
from the Interior Department. But there was no time to sit
back and congratulate ourselves. As soon as was pos-
sible
we had a fence put
and construction equipment
up,
started tearing up the ground.
We
were
't
seen each other for years
the people there had never met.
still
atraid
it
of emo-
— though most of
At
the reunions an
awful lot of people ran into guys thev were
then with
and the
all
in the service
who had been
And
killed.
the emotion in the parade, the dedication,
sea of people touching the Wall,
weekend had
a quality to
it
the entire
that was extraordinary
and
spontaneous, like a Woodstock for veterans.
home
think this really began a process of welcoming
I
the Vietnam veterans recognition
and
and giving them
their just
due
—
respect for the sacrifices they made.
Since then, there has been the dedication of the statue at the
memorial
in cities like
in
New
1984 and other parades York and Chicago.
I
for veterans
think because
the Vietnam veteran had been kind of freeze-dried for so
many
years
it ti)ok
a lot longer to
I've always detected
veterans,
and
some
I still do,
but
welcome him home.
bitterness I
among Vietnam
think the real cold edge
has been taken off by the memorial and other positive things.
the construction permit
lot
hugging each other as though they were old friends
who hadn
months there were
and emotional arguments
extraordinarily heated
tion,
with and the parents of guys
raised $8.4 million.
petition ever held in the United States,
acted spontaneously, with guys showing a
By and
large,
young people today who know
anything about Vietnam, as well
own it's
as older
people and our
generation, are very respectful of what
good
to be a
Vietnam
Vietnam veterans are going
veteran. to
do a
And lot of
we I
did.
Now
think that
good
for this
country in the years ahead.
would be held up somehow. For the same reason we needed to kick up some earth,
we
also
some
needed
to
put a panel of names
we
progress. In July
the site
and
in place to
show
called a press conference at
we had
called in the relatives of people
identified from the panels. After the little
ceremony we
noticed the way people reacted to the memorial: They
wanted there,
to touch the
and
names, leave flowers and things
see their reflection in
came obvious the back of
it.
That's
when
I
had been thinking
that
maybe
now we
that the memorial would be a success.
The 1982 Veterans Day weekend seemed a life
be-
that the memorial was going to work. In
my mind
the opponents of the design were right. But
knew
it
of its own.
It
fo take
on
was a big word-of-mouth event, and
once some publicity started, word came
in
from veterans
all around the country that they were coming. People
337
From atop Wright
III
his
father's
shoulders,
Gary
from northern Virginia peers at
the inscription on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial of his grandfather's name, Gary Wright, Sr., a colonel in Vietnam listed as missing
338
m
action.
aiOjs:-fc*-« jr.:--'-
^l
-'•'
,_,.,
a*»
>^
^^
'miSS^'
Above.
Left.
.4
Two
couple mourns tor
visitors
ex.uninc
.1
,(
lovcJ one
n.iinc
lo>r in \ lern.im.
on rhc
incnH>n
Frederick Hurt statue /n Noveinher I^S4- Hurt's tmJinonjI
tii:ure
was placed near the wall to accommodate those veterans who was an inappropriate commemoration for those who fought
(>/
three Americjii si'lJiers
lelt
the
iir/i,'/n,i/
menu'rial
in liKh'china.
341
vv
^-iOs.
yA\
W-'
'
jvj.
^TlilwLr .y-v-.-
.
,
'-
.-^^
Three Vietnam veterans share r/iefr^Hiof/'ons
before the memor/ij/.
people
file
past
its
each day, making quently visited ton.
D.C.
Thousams
ptilished f^r^tr^ it
one
monum -aJ
ot
ctf
\i'ills
—-
'-
•
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©
1966 Time Inc.
of Involvement
—
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Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 19, AP/Wide World, pp. 20-21, Larry Burrows— LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 25, AP/Wide World, pp. 26-27, Jerry Rose— LIFE Magazine, © 1964 Time Inc. p. 29, James Pickerell Black Star. pp. 30-31, © Larry Burrows Collection, p. 33, Bill Eppridge LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc.
—
Training p.
Summers, Harry G.,
to
16, Larry
—
Presidio Press, 1985. .
The Road p.
1976.
Vietnam War Almanac. Facts on
37,
Mark Kauffman
38, 39 top
©
left,
bottom
1965 Time Inc.
p.
— LIFE Magazine, left
& right,
39 top
right,
© 1965 Time Inc. pp. Boh Gomel LIFE Magazine, Mark Kauffman LIFE Maga-
—
—
©
zine, p.
1965 Time Inc.
Army.
41, U.S.
ARVN
and
pp. 49-51,
Its
©
p.
pp. 42-43,
40, Richard Stack— Black Star, David Lomax Camera Press Ltd.
—
— LIFE Magazine,
America Takes Over
215, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 216-217, Fred W. McDarrah. p. 218, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 219, Roger Malloch Magnum, pp. 220-223, Jeffrey Blankfort Jeroboam, Archive, p. 225, Perry C. Riddle, pp. p. 224, Mark Godfrey 226-227, Hiroji Kubota Magnum.
p.
—
Advisers
Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 52-55, Larry Bur-
rows
Chicago
©
1963 Time Inc.
—
War
Nixon's
—
— —
Rentmeester LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. pp. 60-61, LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 63, Bill Larry Burrows Ray LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 65, Paul Schutzer LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 67, AP/Wide World, p. LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 70, 68, Paul Schutzer Y.R. Okamoto, Courtesy LBJ Library, p. 73, Bunyo Ishikawa.
240-241, Charles Phillips— LIFE Magazine, © 1969 Time Inc. p. 243, Mark Jury. p. 245, John Filo, Courtesy Valley News Dispatch, pp. 246-247, Mark Jury.
MasherAVhite Wing
The Cambodian
p. p.
Co
56,
Ray— LIFE
59, Bill
—
—
—
77, Henri Huet— AP/Wide World, pp. 78-79, Henri Huet— Hal Moore Collection, pp. 8CU85, Henri Huet— AP/Wide World. p.
Alfred Eisenstaedt Larry Burrows
Tim
— LIFE Magazine, © Time — LIFE Magazine, © Time
Vernon Merritt
228,
p.
Page.
Inc. p. 231,
Inc. pp.
— LIFE
232-233,
Magazine, © Time Inc. pp. 236-237, © 238-239, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp.
pp.
Incursion 250-251, Bunyo Ishikawa. pp. 252-257, © Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 258-259, Philip Jones Griffiths Magnum. pp.
—
The Long Good-bye Prairie
—
Rentmeester LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. pp. 90-91, © Larry Burrows Collection, pp. 92-94, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 95, © Larry Burrows
Co
pp. 88-89,
—
nett
—
©
LIFE Magazine, © 1969 Time Inc. pp. 268-269, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 271, Akihiko Okamura. p. 272, Mark Godfrey Archive, p. 274, Henri Bureau SYGMA, p. 277, Roger Pic/Gamma-Liaison, p. 279, Christine Spengler/Gamma-Liaison.
—
Collection.
Stalemate
—
LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Time Inc. p. 101, 102-103, Richard Swanson LIFE Magazine, © LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Inc. p. 104, Co Rentmeester Inc. p. 107, Catherine Leroy/Gamma-Liaison. p. 108, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1967 Time Inc. pp. 110-111, Larry Burrows LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. p. 112, Lee Lock-
p. 98,
262, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 264-265, David BurLIFE Magazine, 1971 Time Inc. p. 267, Ron Haeberle
p.
Larry Burrows
Mark Time Time
Jury. pp.
wood,
p. 115,
—
—
— —
Bunyo Ishikawa.
p.
117,
Dana Stone
—UPI/Bett-
The
Easter Offensive
Agence France
283,
p.
1983—Contact, Ngo Vinh Long pp. 290-291, Billhardt,
Presse. pp.
Collection,
©
GDR.
p.
©
David Burnett p.
288,
289, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.
p.
David Burnett
Berlin,
284-285,
Mark Godfrey— Archive,
pp. 286-287,
1987—Contact,
293,
p.
292,
Thomas
Claude La Fontan/Gamma-
Liaison.
mann Newsphotos.
POW Con Thien pp. 122-131,
Hill
297, Thomas AP/Wide World, p.
David Douglas Duncan.
875
136-137, Gilles Caron/Gamma-Liaison. pp. 138-139, U.S. Army. pp. 140-141, Bunyo Ishikawa.
The Tet
Offensive
142, U.S.
©
Time
Inc.
Army pp.
p.
Co
145,
147-149,
— LIFE
Rentmeester
Magazine,
UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.
pp.
150-151, U.S. Air Force, p. 153, Eddie Adams— AP/Wide World, p. 155, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p. 156, Ghislain Bellorget. p. 159, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 160-161, Philip Jones Griffiths
— Magnum.
Hue pp. 167-175,
Don McCullin
— Magnum.
GDR.
Thomas
p.
298, Horst
Billhardt, Berlin,
Faas—
GDR.
The End and Aftermath A. Pavlovsky— SYGMA, pp. 308-309, Bunyo Ishikawa. 315, AP/Wide World, pp. 316-317, Jean-Claude Francolon/Gamma-Liaison. p. 319, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. pp. 320-321, Jean-Claude Francolon/Gamma-Liaison. pp. 322, 324-325, Hiroji Kubota Magnum. p.
306,
J.
312,
pp.
p.
Berlin,
pp. 299-300,
301, Lee Lockwood. pp. 302-303, APA)C'ide World.
p.
pp.
Billhardt,
—
The
Fall of
Saigon
©
Nik Wheeler, p. 329, Nik Wheeler— Black Star. pp. 330-331, Fran^oise Demulder/Gamma-Liaison. p. 332, J. A. Pavlovsky— SYGMA, p. 333, UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos. p.
328,
Coming Home pp.
Khe Sanh
338-339, Seny Norasingh. p. 340, © 1984 Patricia FisherJohn Ficara— Woodhn Camp. pp. 342-343, Peter
Folio, p. 341,
Robert Ellison— Black Star. pp. 180-181, Richard Swanson Black Star. p. 182, Richard Swanson LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. pp. 183-186, Robert Ellison— Black Star, pp. 187-189, Larry Burrows— LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. p. 179,
—
—
Marlow
— Magnum.
The Home Front 192, Bill Ray— LIFE Magazine, © 1966 Time Inc. pp. 194-195, Charles Harbutt— Archive, p. 197, Bernard Boston, pp. 198-199, Co Rentmeester— LIFE Magazine, © 1965 Time Inc. p. 200, William James Warren, pp. 202, 205, Burt Glinn— Magnum, pp. 206-207, Gerry Uphan LIFE Magazine, © Time Inc. p. 209. Bill Eppridge— LIFE Magazine, © 1968 Time Inc. p.
—
347
1
1
,
INDEX
Chicago Democratic Convention and, 213-14, 215-27, 229; Moratorium Day and, 238-42; Kent State University
Abemathy, Ralph, 213, 214, 263, 264 Abrams, General Creighton, 230, 242, 270 Abzug, Bella, 313 Acheson, Dean, 158
Advanced Individual Training (AIT), 35-36 Agent Orange, 119, 334, 335 Agnew, Spiro, 242 Aid from U. S., Diem and, 12, 13, 47; Johnson and, 30, 32; American advisers and, 47-48, 49-55; Paris talks and, 275, 278; withdrawal and, 310-11,
313-14, 323 Air Force (U.S.), 58, 150-51 Air power. 29, 109-14, 281, 282;
American
advisers to
ARVN
and, 244, 245;
Armed
reactions to
reconnaissance and, 66, 75; aircraft used in, 109; military strategy in,
113-14; Khe Sanh and, 177, 178, 179; end of war and, 264-65; fall of Saigon and, 318, 326-27, 332
Vietnam and, 1
Alvarez, Lieutenant Everett,
Jr.,
24,
304-5 American Friends Service Committee, 196
Andrews, Mike, 260 An Hoa, 69 An Khe, 59, 74, 76, 96, 100 An Loc, 273, 280-81, 286-87, 289, 290-91, 293 Antiwar movement, 116, 194-95; Columbia University and, 206-8; conscientious objectors and, 210-12;
348
14;
71; nurses and,
64; villages and, 67, 71,
Operation Cedar
115; battle for
Hue
Falls
and, 100,
and, 164-66;
training of, 238-39; Laos and, 266,
270-73; fall of Saigon and, 318-19, 321-23, 326, 327 Ashbrook, John, 45
B Bach Mai Hospital, 276, 277 Ball,
George, 32, 158
BanMeThuot,
Albert, Carl, 45
of,
of, 62; civic
96-97; rear-echelon bases and, 99-100, 101; discipline of, 266-70; fragging incidents and, 267 Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (ARVN): U.S. assistance to, 12, 30, 32; Johnson and, 18, 22; American advisers to, 47-48, 49-55, 203; air campaign against North
and, 48,
66, 69, 74;
logistics and, 62;
Vietnam
action projects
campaign against North Vietnam and, 58, 64-66, 109, in,
and, 294, 305
forces (U.S.): training of, 34-36,
37-43, 58-59, 96;
49, 50-51, 203;
276; airmobile tactics
POWs
144. 146, 313, 314, 315,
319
273, 276, 278, 281, 282, 313 Bien Hoa, 11, 25, 26-27, 59, 100, 146,
264-65, 273, 279, 326 Binh Dinh Province, 69, 73, 74, 76 Binh Long Province, 248, 280 Black Panther party, 201 Blacks: draft and, 200-1; King's death
and, 204-6; held conditions and,
267-69 Boi Loi Woods, 69
Bong Son, 74, 76 Bong Son Plain, 69, 74 Boston, Captain Howard, 1 Boyd, Captain Charles, 297 Bradley, General Omar, 158 Breth, Captain Frank, 122-23
Brooke, Edward. 196
Brown. George, 45 Buddhists, 13, 19, 25. 71. 164, 210. 310 Buffington.
Major Dale, 1 Bundy, McGeorge, 158, 159, 194 Bundy. William. 154 Bunker defenses. 180-81. 182, 252, 253 Bunker, Ellsworth, 203 Burchett. Wilfred. 48. 294 Buis,
C
Bayonet fighting, 40 Beech, Keyes, 327 Ben Cat, 59 Ben Hai River, 106
Cambodia,
13, 44,
12, 18, 22;
Vietcong
in,
66,
67, 69, 70, 105, 109, 264-66; U.S.
Ben Het, 281 Ben Sue, 100 Ben Tre, 152 crisis,
B.
Bui Diem, 321
Basic-training centers, 34-35, 59
Berlin
Second Lieutenant Nile
143
152
B-52 bombers, 32, 58, 64, 69, 70, 86, 100, 109, 121, 145, 111, 178, 234,
incursion into, 234, 243-49. 250-59, 260-61, 263, 264, 270. 278; ARVN in. 281. 282 Cam Lo. 69, 86, 106, 280 Camp Carroll, 177, 280 Campaign 275, 313 Cam Ranh Bay, 59, 60-61, 100. 318,
321
Ca Mau
Peninsula, 47 Canberra bombers, 26-21, 75, 78-19,
109
Davis, Private First Class
(COSVN), 245, 260, Cheo Reo, 314, 317
IV, 86 Defense Attache's Office (DAO), 310, 318, 323, 327 Defense Department, 154, 269 de Gaulle, Charles, 18
Demilitarized zone 106, 273, 19,
261, 313
Cherry, Colonel Fred V., 295
Chicago demonstrations, 208, 213-14, 215-21, 119 Children, South Vietnamese, 65, 68, 155, 112-13, 261, 317, 318 China: Vietnam War and, 17, 57; aid from, 58, 113, 309;
18, 25,
Nixon and,
231, 235, 273, 275
116
Civic Action Program, 71 Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
(CIDGs),
19,
Civil rights
177
movement, 200-1, 267
Clay, Lieutenant Colonel Frank B.
48
,
Cleland, Max, 335
bombs (CBUs), 105 Cold War, 11, 17, 44 Cole, Private First Class Thomas, 85 Columbia University, 206-8 Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), 196 Cluster
Congress: Johnson and, 23, 30, 32, 34, 109, 193, 201;
86, 88-89,
238-42 DePuy, Major General William
Gulf of Tonkin
178 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 234, 235 Dong Ha, 69, 120, 280, 284 Dong Lach, 236-31 Don Luan, 313 Draft, 34, 58-59, 197-200, 210 Drill sergeants, 34-35, 31 Drug use among troops, 269, 334
Dunlap,
Lillian,
and, 245;
and, 310,
Eisenhower, President Dwight,
49,
,
Averell, 230
American
332 Highway Highway Highway
13,
280 280
14,
281
1,
74,
86 400, 87
Hill 484, 91, Hill 861, 144
258-59
Ford, President Gerald, 313, 322, 326 Jersey, 34, 38,
Gordon, Georgia,
39
34, 36
Knox, Kentucky, 31 Missouri, 34
Fort Lewis, Washington, 97 Fort Ord, California, 34, 96 Fort Polk, Louisiana, 34, 36, 41 Fort Riley, Kansas, 36
Oklahoma, 36
Darlac Province, 144, 313, 314
Fort Sill,
Davis, Rennie, 294
Fragging incidents, 267
advisers and, 48,
50-51; evacuation and, 322, 327,
246-41; Mary Ann, 266 Fishhook region, 146, 243, 245, 248,
Da Nang,
100, 116, 142, 164, 273, 318, 322
289, 317;
Hill
Wood,
296
W. 162-63
Mark, 196, 245 Heath, Richard, 178 Hegdahl, Apprentice Seaman, 299 Helicopter Valley, 69 Helicopters, 4-5. 64, 76, 82-83, 133, 140-41, 188-89, 250-51, 262, 266,
Fire support bases, 266, 280, 288; Fuller,
New
110, 235, 266, 275
Hatfield,
Field hospitals, 96-97, 111
Daley, Richard, 213, 214, 226 28, 30-31, 58, 59, 68, 86,
W.
Hill 252,
Fort Dix,
58,
11, 58, 110, 266, 278, 294,
F
Fort Leonard
288
13,
230 Enthoven, Alain, 154
Fort
146, 232-33, 281,
12,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 34
D Dak To, 107-9,
283-93
18, 44,
Fort
Chi, 59, 67, 146, 326
Great Society programs, 32, 72, 193, 194, 200, 201, 213 Green Berets (See Special Forces [U.S.]) Gross, H.R., 45 Gruening, Ernest, 24, 196 Guam, 64, 109, 177, 326 Gulf of Tonkin incident, 23-24, 25, 45, 210 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 24, 44-46, 196, 245
Harris, Smitty, 305
W.D., 34
249, 253, 256, 251,
280, 282
213, 214, 216-11, 218, 220-21,
222-23
Harriman,
Claw, 75 Ea Pa River, 314-17 Ehrhart.
Cronkite, Walter, 157, 190-91, 214
Gia Lam Airport, 278, 296 Gillespie, Captain Vernon, 16 GioLinh, 86, 120 Goldberg, Arthur, 158-59 Goldwater, Barry, 24, 45, 210 Grant Park, Chicago, demonstration,
Harper, Sergeant Ronald
E
Easter offensive, 273, 280-82,
Cua Viet River Valley, 86, Cuban missile crisis, 13, 44
accords: of 1954, 12, 72, 74; of
1957. 294
Hanoi,
327
incursion
platoon, 260-61
Geneva
Hart, Frederick, 341
235, 242, 278;
122-31, 132, 146 of Tears, 314 Cooper, John Sherman, 245 Counterinsurgency, 19-22, 23
Gayler, Admiral Noel, 323
Halleck, Charles, 45
323, 326,
Tet offensive and, 157; Nixon and,
Convoy
G Galanti, Lieutenant Paul, 300
Haiphong, 23,
97
Duong Van Minh, General,
Eagle's
and, 335 Conscientious objectors (COs), 210-12 ConThien, 86, 106, 111, 120-21,
294
Habih, Philip, 158
Eagle Flights, 48
313; withdrawal and, 310-11; veterans
,
H
Duncan, David, 121, 126-21
Resolution and, 24, 44-46, 196, 245; bombing of North Vietnam and, 116;
Cambodian War Powers Act
E., 69,
116, 158
Diduryk, Captain Myron, 75-76 Dien Bien Phu, 12, 121, 143, 145, 176,
Church, Frank, 245 Lai, 59, 64, 69, 96,
(DMZ),
280
Democratic National Convention, 208, 213-14, 215-21, 229 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (See North Vietnam) Demonstrations: Buddhist, 19, 25, 71, 164, 210, 310; South Vietnamese, 22; students and, 30, 206-8, 244, 245; antiwar movement and, 116, 194-97; prowar, 202; King's death and, 205; Democratic Convention and, 213-14, 215-21, 229; Moratorium Day and,
Christian and Missionary Alliance, 71
Cu
Frishman, Lieutenant Robert F. Fulbright, J. William, 18, 196
Deck House
Capa, Robert, 14-15 Cape Batangan, 65 Caputo, Lieutenant Philip, 35, 57 Carmichael, Stokely, 201 Carter, President Jimmy, 335 Cay Giep Mountains, 76 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 58, 158, 242 Central Office for South Vietnam
CRIP
France, 10, 12, /'^15, 18, 47, 74, 76
L.
Davison, General Michael, 337
Cao Van Vien, General, 317
Chu
Sammy
118-19
92-91 94
875 (Hill of Angels), 109, 120, 122-23, 132-35, 136-41
Hill
Hill 881 North,
101
Hill 881 South, 177
Hilsman, Roger, 23 Prison ("Hanoi Hilton"), 294,
Hoa Lo
298. 299, 304-5
Ho Chi Minh, 11, 12, 143, 146, 235 Ho Chi Minh Campaign. 319, 323 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 13. 19. 58. 109. 266. 272 Hoi An. 146
Hon Gai. Hon Me,
24,
292
23
349
,
Honolulu conference, 70, 71 Hue, 22, 71, 146, 149, 156, 164-66, 167-75, 191, 282, 318 Humphrey, Hubert H., 203, 213, 214, 226-27, 229, 230 I
la
Drang Valley, 66, 67,
74, 76
Indochina Prohibition of 1973, 310, 313 Indochina War, 10, 12, 14-15, 47, 74 Indonesia, 18, 25 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), 278, 307 International
Red
Cross, 294
International Voluntary Service, 71 Iron Triangle, 100, 105, 115-16, 310 J
Jackson State College, 245 Johnson, General Harold K., 34 Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel James H., 133
Johnson, President Lyndon Baines, 203, 204, 208, 229, 230, 248, 295; road to war and, 17-18, 22-32; air strikes against 32, 58,
North Vietnam and, 24, 28, 109, 159-61; Gulf of Tonkm
Kirk, Grayson, 206 Kissinger,
Henry A., 231-34, 235, 238,
Mecklin, John, 203 Medical personnel, 65, 68, 96-97,
172-73
243, 274, 275, 278, 296, 309, 327
Komer, Robert W., 203
Kontum
Mekong
Province, 64, 105, 146, 273,
Mekong River, 47 Midway (USNS), 59
281, 314 Kopkind, Andrew, 196 Korean War, 13, 44, 230 Kramer, Captain Galand, 302
Military Assistance Advisory
(MAAG), (MACV),
Lach Chao Estuary, 24 Lai Khe, 146, 256-57 Laird, Melvin, 235 Landing zone (LZ), 99, 124-25, 128, 129; Albany, 66; Four, 77, 78-79, 80, 82-83; X-Ray, 66 Lang Vei, 177, 268-69 Laos, 12, 18, 22, 23, 177; air strikes 58, 109, 152, 278;
ARVN
in,
266,
in,
270-73, 281, 282 Le Duan, 311, 313 Le Due Anh, General, 319 Le Due Tho, 274, 275, 278, 296, 319 Lewandowski, Januscz, 72 Lincoln Park, Chicago, demonstration,
145, 158, 232, 248, 270 Miller, Jeffrey Glen,
244 Mohr, Charles, 203 Montagnard troops, 20-21 Moore, Colonel Harry G.("HaI"), Moratorium Day, 238-42 Morse, Wayne, 24, 194 Morton, Thurston, 157 Muller, Robert, 335
Mutter Ridge, 87, 91, 94 My Chanh River, 280, 282 My Lai massacre, 267, 269 My Tho, 118
N
deployment and, 62, 67, 116, 152; Honolulu conference and, 70, 71; Tet
Loc Ninh, 69, 106, 146, 280, 281, 319 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 17, 22, 23, 158
Nam Nam
offensive and, 144, 152, 153, 154, 157,
Long Binh, 59, 101 Long Than, 69 Lon Nol, 243, 264
campaign and,
58, 72;
Tet offensive
and, 144, 152, 153, 159; Nixon and, 232, 234
K Kaufman, Captain Harold J., 132-33 Kennedy, Edward, 213, 311 Kennedy, President John, 13, 17, 18, 44, 47, 66, 90, 193, 210, 229, 270 Kennedy, Robert, 157, 204, 208, 209, 213
Kent State University, 244, 245 Khe Sanh, 106, 107, 143, 144, 146, 152, 161, 176-78, 179-89, 266, 272
Khmer Rouge, 243, 313 Kiem Hanh District, 260 Captain Michael, 133 Killed in action (KIA): U.S., 19, 67, 69, 70, 72, 87, 95, 96-97, 107, 114, 135, 138-39, 165-66, 256, 266, 278; NVA, 72, 87, 106, 114, 148-49, 236, 242, 282; civilian, 276; ARVN, 309, 332 Kilpatrick, James J., 337 Kim Son, 75, 76 King, Coretta Scott, 196 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 200, 201, 204-6, 212 Kinnard, Major General Harry W.O. 66, 74, 76 Kiley,
350
Lucier, Josiah,
E.
,
178
66,
74, 75
Lisagor, Peter, 203
Lownds, Colonel David
Command, Vietnam
22, 30, 32, 57, 62, 64, 67,
70, 72, 100, 105, 114, 121, 143, 144,
213, 219 Lippmann, Walter, 194
159, 161, 193-94, 204, 208 Johnson, Robert, 23 Joint Chiefs of Staff: Johnson and, 22-23, 28, 30, 32; North Vietnam
Group
12
Military Assistance
L
Resolution and, 24, 44-46; Great Society programs of, 32, 72, 193, 201; public opinion and, 57, 157; troop
190; election withdrawal by, 157-58,
Delta, 4-5, 47, 50-51, 52, 59,
98, 118-19, 146, 306, 310, 313
Dinh, 10 Sathay River, 105
Napalm
strikes, 69, 75, 78-79, 114, 134, 136-37, 236-37 National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, 275 National Liberation Front (NLF), 13, 48,
72, 146, 149, 164, 165, 234, 275, 278,
68
330-31
Luong Tho, 75 Lynch, Colonel William A.,
Jr.,
75
National Mobilization Committee to End the War, 213
M
National security action memorandum,
McCarthy, Eugene, 157, 158, 204, 208, 213, 214 McGovem, George, 213, 245, 337
28 National Security Study Memorandum-1, 232
McNamara, Robert,
Navy
18, 23, 24, 32, 58,
106, 113, 116, 196, 203
McNamara's
MACV
(U.S.): training
of, 34; aircraft of,
59, 75, 76, 109
Neak Luong, 250-51
Line, 107, 120
Newfield, Jack, 208
(See Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam [MACV]) Maddox (USNS), 23-24, 25, 45 Malaysia, 18
Newton, Huey, 201 York City demonstrations, 196-97, 201, 202
Mao
Nha
New
Tse-tung, 231
Marine Corps, 64, 69, 106, 263; Johnson and, 28-30, 30-31; training of, 34-35;
Da Nang
and, 58, 59; medics
in, 65,
68; Operation Prairie and, 86-87,
88-95; Con Thien and, 120-21, 122-31; Tet offensive and, 143, 144; battle for Hue and, 164-66, 167-75; Khe Sanh and, 176-78, 179-89;
Cambodia and, 250-51 Marines (South Vietnam), 4-5
Martm, Graham, 321, 322, 323,
326,
327 Masterpool, Lieutenant Colonel William J.,
86
Mathias, Charles, 336
Trang, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320-21,
322
Ngo Dinh Diem,